s ^5A\fUNIVEf?% ^lOSANCElfj^. ^OFCAUfO/?^ ^-OFCAIIFO^ <£ I $ ^<9AavnaiH^ *^OAav«aiii'^ .^ ^>MUBRARYac. ^,^M•UBRARYa^ ^AOJIIVDdO'^ ^&AMvaain^ aweunivek. so ^/SJBAWIHWV'^ -^MIBRARY6k ^«»0JI]V3JO'^ '^^OJI1V3JO'^ ,^WEUIJIVER% AvlOSANCElfXx o ^.OFCAllFOff^ ^.OFCAIIFO% ^ 3<3 > ^illBRARY<9/^ .^tUBRARYO^^ 3 i I f^ ^ ^^OJITVDJO^ ^.aOJITVOJO^ .^WEUNIVERSyA <: CO . L' " ' o :^ ^OAaV88IHV^ ^OF-CALIFOi?^ ^^MElNIVERi/^ ^lOSANCElfj-^ "^^^Aavaaii^^ ^JUAiNniwv* ^^iiJONvsoi^ ' "^/jajAwnaWLv' ^OriAllhU«^ ^OfCAllfO% M-LIBRARYOc ^llIBRARY f^lUBRARYQ^ § 1 I r-^ ^^ ^nM-IIBRARYQ^ u? 1 \r^ ^ ^^OdllVDJO'^ '^^OJIIVJJO^ >■ < awei \WFUNIVER5y/, ^OFCAIIFO% ^OFCAllFOff^ vvlOSANCElfjVj. ^x?i3!)Nvsoi^ "^/wuwnMv >&Aavaaii^^ ^- < .\WEI jM-LIBRARYQ^ ^^nM-UBRARYQ^ ^ rp. 10, CH. 1. estate, still the rent continues as long as the estate would have lasted if not surrendered (It). So, if a lessee makes an underlease reserving rent, and afterwards surrenders tlie original lease, the underlease shall continue in force ; but by the old law, prior to the stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, s. 12, and 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 9, the reversion was merged, and the remedies incident to it were extinguished (/), unless the surrender were for the purpose of renewal (IS). A feme covert may be restrained from alienation with- Hesiniiut on "^ alienatiou. out any clause of cesser, but a person not under coverture cannot (/). It may be stated in this place, that subject to excep- Aiien.ation tions where tenants in tail are restrained by statute from estates. defeating their estates tail, or where the reversion is in the Crown (s. 42), it is enacted by the stat. 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, ss. 11, 14, &c., that the Court of Chancery may authorise the sale of settled estates, that is, of estates limited by any instrument to or in trust for any persons in succession, or of timber growing on them, or may direct any part of settled estates to be laid out for streets, roads, paths, squares, gardens, or other open spaces, sewers, drains, or watercourses, either to be dedicated to the public or not. And the stat. 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, is amended and extended by the stat. 21 & 22 Vict. c. 77. By s. 1 of this amending Act, " all estates or interests in remainder or reversion not disposed of by the settlement and reverting to the settlor, or descending to the heir of a testator, shall be deemed to be estates coming to such settlor or heir under or by virtue of the settlement." And by the stat. 27 & 28 Vict. c. 45, {h) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 286 ; Co. (Jc) Piatt on Leas. 787—8. Litt. 185 a, 338 b. (1) 11 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, (/) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 285 ; Watk. 473 ; Benaud v. Touranrjeau, L. E. Conv. 3rd ed. by Prest. 24 ; see 2 Ap. Ser. (P.O.) 4 ; see supra, pp. Part III. Tit. 12, c. 2, s. 5, infra, on 08—101. Leases. b2 598 OF ALIE^'ATIOX. Part III, s. 3, " tlie saicl Court in determining what are settled ''"^"''" -' estates within the said Act (19 & 20 Vict. c. 120) shall he governed by the state of facts and by the trusts or limi- tations of the settlement at the time of the said settlemen talvins:'- effect." 5 'JO CHAPTEK II. OF A vendor's title («). Sectiox I. Of the Requisite Lcnytli of Title. Befoue tlic stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4 c. 27, a purchaser had a pt.iii.t.io, . . ^<^"- 2,3.1. rJOfht to require a title commeucino- at least sixty years , . . Sixty years' previously to the time of his i)urcliase ; because the old ^'t'e. ^ i- ^' -L ' required. Statute of Limitatious could not in a shorter period confer a title (b). And the new statute does not in effect intro- duce any new rule on the subject : for, although the new Statute of Limitations confers a title in forty years in ordi- nary cases instead of sixty years, yet in many instances a forty years' title would be quite insufiicient ; for adverse possession against a tenant for life during his whole life would not affect a remainderman or reversioner (c). Indeed, a title for a shorter period than sixty years is not market- able (fZ). And in the case of an advowson, a hundred years' title at the least is necessary (e). And in other cases, sixty years- . . . . , . ,, . title not even sixty years is sometimes insufficient. For instance, always ■^ "^ sufficient. if it may reasonably be presumed from the contents of the («) On this subject, the reader is {b) Sugd. Concise View, '2G5. referred generally to Lord St. Leo- (c) See Sugd. Concise View, 265 ; nards' " Law of Vendors and Pur- ] Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 59^-Gl ; chasers " (an invaluable mass of law 9 Id. 28. and practice). The present chapter (fJ) 1 Jarui & Bytli. by S\vec(, GO, chiefly consists of short extracts ot n. {l). a few leading points from that (c) Sugd. Concise View, 267. work. 600 OF A vendor's title. ■^ch "■ ^'i"' ^^s^^'^"^*^^ ^^^^^ estates tail are subsisting, the purchaser may demand the production of the prior title (/). Bight to III every case where the statement in the abstract, or its productiou "^ tiiil.^°^ silence, leads to a fair inference that the prior title may disclose an existing defect, the purchaser may require it to be produced ; although, where it is not in the seller's power, he cannot object to the title upon mere suspicion (r/). If nothing appears on the face of the deeds comprised within the period tlirough which a purchaser is entitled to inves- tigate the title, which throws a reasonable doubt or sus- picion on the anterior title, the want of the prior instru- ments, though referred to or recited in the abstracted deeds, is not material (A). But where an assurance depends for its validity upon something which had been previously done, the whole transaction should be stated upon the abstract, although the abstract may thereby be carried beyond sixty years. Thus, an appointment should not be abstracted without previously showing the creation of the power, and the ceremonies requisite to the valid exercise of it ; nor a post-nuptial settlement executed in pursuance of articles antecedent to the marriage, without first abstract- ing the articles at length, that it may be seen Avhether or not the settlement is in conformity with them (i). Section II. Of the Kind of Title which is requisite. "^ch"; s.' 2*?' -^^^ contracts for the sale of real estate, an agreement to jmpiig^ make a title is always implied, unless the liability is ex- (/ ) Sugd. Concise View, 265 ; 1 62, Jarm. & Bytli. by Sweet, 60, n. {i). (i) 1 Jarm. & Bytli. by Sweet, iff) Sugd. Concise View, 2G6. 67. (h) 1 Jarm. & Bytli. by Sweet, OF THE KL\D OF TITLE WHICH LS UEi^UISITE. 601 l^resslv excluded. And an airreenient n-enorally to sell, not rT.iii.T.io, ^ - ® '^ -^ ' Ch. 2, s. 2. expressinrr tlie interest in tlie subject, includes all the — ° agreement vendor's interest (k). to make a ^ ' title to all Where a contract is entered into for the purchase of " a •nferest"'^^ freehold," the purchaser is entitled to have a clear freehold Freehold. title, and not a title encumbered with any covenant or con- dition (/). A purchaser cannot be compelled to take a doubtful Doubtful title (?n) ; but still he will not be permitted to object to a title on account of a bare r)0ssibility or susiiicion 00- A Title with ^ ^ i \ ./ ludemnity. purchaser is not bound to accept, nor a vendor to give, a title with an indemnity (o). Xor will a purchaser be fit'i"^'^^^^ obliged to take an ecj[uitable title, unless the Court sees that the legal estate can be got in (p). But he will be Destructiou o o \^ / of con- compelled to take a title depending upon the destruction remainders. of contingent remainders, or upon the Statute of Limita- statuteof o ' ^ Limitations tions {q). It is no objection, that, at the time of the agreement, Titia _ _ incomplete. matters remained to be done to complete the title, which in their nature were capaljle of being effected before the completion of the purchase (v). Some objections properly constitute subjects of compen- compensa- sation, while others do not. Thus, small rents may be subjects of compensation, although larger ones cannot (.s). But there are some rights (such as a right of sporting) which, although in themselves of small value, are incapable of compensation, and therefore, if undisclosed, vitiate the contract (/). {k) Sugd. Concise View, 13. (p) Sugd. Concise View, 280; {I) Phillips V. Calddcugh, L. R. Frecland v. Pearson, L. E. 7 Eq. 4 Q. B. 159. 216, 219. {m) Rogers v. Wederhousc, i (q) Sugd. Concise Vie-sv, 283. Drewry, 329. (,.) gugd. Concise View, 181, (n) Sugd. Concise View, 280, 283 is6. — •i- («) Sugd. Concise View, 276. (o) Sugd. Concise View, 219, 277. (t) Sugd. Concise View, 218. 602 OF THE KIND OF TITLE WHICH IS REQUISITE. Pt.IIL T.IO, Cn. 2, s. 2. Lessor's title. Title to lands allotted. Title to lands taken in exchange. Title to enfranchised laud. Title to property derived under a Unless there is a stipulation to the contrary, there is, in every contract for the sale of a lease, an implied under- taking, at law and in equity, to make out the lessor's title to demise, as well as that of the vendor to the lease itself, even though there is a very short residue of the term, and the value of the property is very small, and no premium is taken for the lease («). But a purchaser of a lease held under a bishop cannot call for the lessor's title («). Lands allotted under Inclosure Acts become lialile to the uses of the estates in respect of which they were allotted ; and, therefore, upon the sale of such lands, it is necessary to investigate the title to the original estates (y). Under Inclosure Acts, the allotments taken in exchange are usually impressed with the title of the property given in lieu of them, and discharged from their original uses (z) But if the property has been derived under a common law exchange or an exchange by mutual conveyances with eviction clauses, the title to the estate given in exchange, as well as of the estate taken in exchange, must be shown from the usual period down to the date of the exchange ; unless, in the case of a common law exchange, it can be proved that the lands given in exchange have been aliened by the other party (a). If the estate was copyhold, and has been enfranchised, the lord's title to the freehold will be required, as well as the copyholder's title before its extinguishment (h). Eeversions and remainders in the Crown were not destructible by recovery, nor can they now be barred by (m) Sugd. Concise View. 268 ; 1 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 70, 551 ; Solder v. DraJce, 5 B. & Ad. 992. (x) Sugd. Concise View, 268 ; 1 Jai-m. & Bytli. by Sweet, 70. (y) Sugd. Concise View, 271. (z) 4 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 6, 7 ; see also Sugd. Concise View, 271. («) 1 Jarm & Byth. by Sweet, 75 ; Sugd. Concise View, 271 ; 4 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 3, 5; Watk. Conv. 3rd ed. by Brest. 181. (l) Sugd. Concise View, 270 ; 1 Jarm. & Bytli. by Sweet, S3. OF THE DEFECTS IN THE TITLE. G03 an enrolled assurance; and it is therefore necessary, in Pr.iir. t.io, C/IT. ^} S. u„ deducino; a title under a OTant from the Crown, to set forth <^ ° giant from the original grant, in order that it may be seen whether t^^^ ^rown. any interest remains in the Crown or not, or whether any rent, condition, or service has been reserved (c). The foundation of a title to tithes as an existiDg lay pro- Tiiie to perty, must be a grant from the Crown after the dissolution of the monasteries. But it is not necessary to deduce the title from that period. The title following the grant may commence at the same period as the title to the estate out of which they issue would have done {(J). tithes. Section III. Of Defects in the Title (c). If the purchaser accepts an abstract as showiuf^ a satis- pt.iii.t.io, . "• ° Oil. 2, s. 3. factory title, yet he is not precluded from showinc; by other evidence that the title is a bad one ( /). may show ^•^ ^ title to be Unless a vendor or his agent suppresses an incumbrance no'^e/ect"'' or a defect in the title, a purchaser cannot obtain relief atlstmc™ against a vendor for any incumbrance or defect in the title ^Jj"i';uef'' which is altogether overlooked, and to which his covenants direct o? do not extend [g). And although tlie vendor has fraudu- "^™'" ^^^'^'^' lently concealed an incumbrance, yet the purchaser has no lien on the purchase money after it is appropriated by the vendor [h). A decision of the House of Lords when once pronounced Decision by the House in a particular case is conclusive in that case, and cannot o^' I'O'^''^- (c) 1 Jann. & Byth. by Sweet. eealment or falsifying a pedigree by 68. a vendor or mortgagor. (cZ) Sugd. Concise View, 267. (/) Siigd. Concise View, 315. (e) See 22 & 23 Vict. c. 85, s. 24, {y) Sugd. Concise View, 6, 406 and 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38, s. 8, as to —411. the punisliment for fraudulent con- (A) Sugd. Concise View, 411. 604 OF THE DEFECTS IN THE TITLE. Pt.III. T.IO, Ch. 2, s. 3. Waiving objecuou3. Pi'oteclioii by means of an assign- ment of a statute, recognisance, or judgment. be reversed except by Act of Parliainent. But it would seem that if the House shoidd afterwards ]je of opinion that an erroneous principle had been adopted in the first case, the House would not be bound in any other to adhere to such principle (i). And a decision by the House of Lords, in favour of the validity of a title, if in a suit between a vendor and purchaser only, would be no more than a precedent for a decision in favour of the title, if it should be attacked by a third party (Jc). A purchaser, by entering into possession, is generally held hj that act to have waived those objections to the title of which he had distinct information. But if posses- sion is autliorised by the contract to be taken before a title is made, the fact of taking possession cannot by itself amount to a waiver of objections. Nor will acts of owner- ship after an authorised possession, or the preparation of a conveyance (I). And, with the vendor's concurrence, a purchaser, without waiving objections thereby, may safely take possession of the estate at the time the contract is en- tered into ; as he cannot be held to have waived objections of which he was not aware (v//). A purchaser witliout notice of any incumbrances may protect himself from them, by means of an assignment of a statute, recognisance, or judgment (n). (?) Wilson V. Wilson, 5 II. L. Cas. 40, 63, 71. {I) Sugd. Concise View, 2S1. (l) Sugd. Concise View, 244 — 6. (hi) Sugd. Concise View, 7. («) 2 Cruise T. 14, § 107. 605 CHAPTER III. OF CONDITIONS OF SALE. It is now a very cjeneral iiractice for vendors to take the fARim. •^ ^ J- T. 10, ( H. 3. precaution of liavino- their title investicjated before they ^ ° to J Investiga- atteinpt to sell, in order that they may know upon what tiouoftuio ■1- ' ^ J X by vendor conditions to offer the property for sale («). m/wiiT""'^ A prudent vendor invariably resorts to special condi- seii"''°'^ tions, wherever the circumstances of his title render it ^^^^^'j^, probable that ho may be unable to enforce a contract arercqui'site entered into without such protection, or may be put to great expense by unreasonable or unnecessary requisitions on the part of the purchaser (Jj). Hence, special conditions are frequently resorted to in order to guard against the liability to produce titles upon exchanges, inclosures, re- newable leaseholds, or the like, and to provide for appor- tionment of rents, so as to be binding on purchasers, or to make the purchaser take subject to unusual liabilities ; such as a liability to an original rent and the covenants in the original lease, where only part of the property is sold (c). But unusual conditions should be avoided, even where where tbey should be property is sold by one who is absolutely entitled to it, avoided. Unless such conditions are necessary ; because they tend to alarm and disgust purchasers and their solicitors (d). And where property is sold by trustees, mortgagees, or assignees, this caution is particularly needful ; for if they unneces^ (a) 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, (c) Sugd. Concise View, 28. 48 ; 1 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 505, (rf) Sugdi Concise View, 28; (h) 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 48i 606 OF CONDITIOiNfS OF SALE. r.vRT TIL sarily impose any unusual conditions wliicli may cause the property to fetch a less price than it otherwise would, they may render themselves liable for a breach of trust (c). Yet at the same time there may be cases where they may render themselves ef{ually liable, if they omit the protec- tion of special conditions, where they are clearly neces- sary (/). It is the duty of persons who put up property for sale by auction, to describe it with perfect accuracy, and not merely in such a way that a person, by drawing proper inferences from everything that is stated, may be able to ascertain what is sold {g). How iiiey Special conditions should be very clearly and precisely expressed, exprcsscd ; for, if a vendor sells property under stipulations Avhicli are against common right, whether contained in the contract itself or in conditions of sale, but uses ambiguous words, the purchaser may generally construe them in the manner most advantageous to himself (Ji). Hence a life annuity to which an estate is subject, granted for several lives and the life of the survivor, should be so described, and not simply as " a life annuity," which might be for one life only (i). Condition A coudition that the vendor shall be at liberty to rescind as to '' thfcontract ^^^® contract, " if the purchaser shall show any objection, whether of title, convej-^ance, or otlierwise, and shall insist thei'eon," or " if the purchaser shall insist on any objec- tions or requisitions whicli the vendor may be unable or unwilling to remove or comply with," does not authorise the vendor to rescind the contract, without attempting to (e) See Siigd. Concise View, 45 j 9 Symons v. James, 1 Y. & C. N. 11. Jarm. & Byth. by S\YCct, 4S. 487—490 ; Seaton v. Mapjh 2 Coll. (/) See 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 562 ; Modes v. Ihhetson, 4 D. M. & 48. G. 787, 790—3 ; Greaves v. }Yilson, {(j) Swai'shmd v. Dcarsley, 29 25 Beay. 290. Eeav. 430, (/) Drysdale \. Mace, 5 D. M. & (/(.) Sugd. Concise View, 242 ; G. 103. OF CONDITIONS OF SALE. GO? answer tlie recraisitions, altliouoli some of them are imten- part in \ . !'■ 10, On. 3. able ; l3ut the vendor is bound to answer them, and give the purchaser an opportunity of either waiving or insisting upon them. And the vendor has duties which he cannot get rid of l)y such conditions. So that there are some things which the jnirchaser has not only a right to make the subject of requisition, but even to insist on them, notwithstanding any such condition : as for instance, that a mortgagee shall be paid off and concur in the convey- ance (/.'). A condition that all objections to the title must be conditions ,-,. ,.,. . . .-., - -, .- as to time delivered within a given time, or shall be deemed waived, for taking _ objectious, is binding (/). But a condition stipulating that the time appointed, after the delivery of an abstract, for the taking of objections, shall be of the essence of the contract, means after the delivery of a perfect abstract (m). And the purchaser is not precluded from taking objections which arise out of evidence called for before the time limited (/(). A inirchaser is frequently precluded by a condition from condition as *■ J- .^ X ./ to range oi calling for a title antecedent to a certain period, and some- *^"®- times a very recent period ; as the vendor's conveyance or a late inclosure Act, &c. (o). But this does not preclude the purchaser from showing that such anterior title is defec- tive Q?). Where, therefore, such anterior title is defective, the vendor should further stipulate that he shall not be considered as answerable for any defects of title which may be discovered (q). A special condition of sale, limiting the extent of title, is no excuse for a purchaser not insisting on the production (k) Greaves v. Wilson, 25 Bear. (o) 1 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 290 ; Tuiyin v. Chamhcrs, 29 Bear. 505. 101. {p) 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 3. (?) Sugd. Concise View, 15. See also Sugcl. Concise View, 14. (m) Sugcl. Concise View, 194. iq) 9 Jarm & Byth. by Sweet, 3. (n) Siigd. Concise View, 15, 16. 608 OF CONDITIONS OF SALE. PARTiir. of a deed beyond those limits, of wliicli he had actual or T. 10, Cu, . '' constructive notice (r). "Where a vendor knows of a deed affecting the title, lie does not protect himself from disclosing it by a condition of sale providing that no requisition should be made in respect of a specified deed, "or any other prior to" a cer- tain date : for it would be most mischievous to allow a vendor to suppress facts known to him affecting the title, and yet compel a purchaser to accept it (s). Conditions It is a commou practice to restrain a purchaser from as to -■■ -^ evidence. calling for evidence of extrinsic facts (as heirship, intestacy, death, &c.) which are recited or taken notice of in deeds of a certain antiquity, as, for instance, in deeds thirty years old, unless the circumstances of the title require that a more recent period should be fixed upon (t). If a condition of sale, as a ground for excluding the pur- chaser from evidence of title to Avhich he would otherwise be entitled of common right, makes an assertion of a fact, such assertion must be proved. Thus, if a condition states, that, as certain lands were allotted in respect of a manor, and the manoi', with the allotments, was purchased by the vendors' testator, the title of the vendors to the manor shall be conclusive evidence of their title to the lands ; the purchaser is entitled to proof of the two assertions on which this condition is grounded (u). Where it is a con- dition of sale that no further evidence of the identity of the parcels shall be required than what is afforded by the abstract, or by the deeds, instruments, or other documents therein abstracted, and the descriptions in the different documents differ among themselves and from the descrip- tion in the particulars of sale, the purchaser is entitled to {r) Peto r. Hammond, 80 Bcav. {t) 1 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 495. 120, 121,505. (s) Edwards v. Wklcwar, L. 11. {it) Siimons v. James, 1 Y. & C. 1 Eq. 68. N. E. 487. OF CONDITIONS OF SALE. ' 609 ]iave some proof of the identity aliunde. For, in the case partiii. ^ '^ ' T. 10, Cn. 3. snpi)osed, the deeds themselves do not afford evidence of ■ the identity, but constitute the subject of the doubt as to the identity (x). AVliere it is stipulated that the vendor shall deduce a good title, and that he shall deliver up to the purchaser of the greater part in value of the estate all the title deeds and documents in his custody, but shall not be bound or required to produce any original deed or other documents than those in his possession and set forth in the abstract, the word "produce" means "deliver up." The stipulation does not exempt the A^endor from producing the deeds themselves for the purpose of verifying the abstract. For otherwise the vendor might have furnished an abstract of a good title, and yet he might not have one deed, or only some immaterial deeds, corresponding with the abstract, so that the al)stract might be wholly unverified, and the pur- chaser might have no title at all (//). A condition that misdescriptions and errors shall not Condition as til flTOl'S annul the sale, but that a compensation shall l)e oiven for a"fi "lis- ° descriptions. tlie difference in value, does not extend to fraudulent errors or substantial misdescriptions (z). Where a defect is a latent one, and the purchaser cannot Latmt (lelLCt where by the greatest attention discover it, if the vendor is aware f^'-'^te is •^ ° ' bought with of it and does not acquaint the ]nirchaser with the fact, the ^'^ *^^""^" contract is not binding at law or in equity, although he bought the estate wdth all faults (a). There must be express conditions where the seller intends conriition as to expeiifes. to throw upon the purchaser the expense of searches, or the expense of travelling to a distant place to examine the abstract with the deeds, or the like (h). Where the title (.r) Floivcr V. Hartopp, 6 Bcav. PliiUqys v. C'aldeIeugJi,'L.'R. 4 Q.'B. 470. 159. {>/) Southhy V. Jlutt, 2 My. & C'r. (a) Sugd. Concise Vie^r, 238. 207. (h) Sugd. Concise View, 24. (:■) Sugd. Concise View, 20—1 ; 610 OF CONDITIONS OF SALE. Tabt III. T. 10, Cii. 3. Condition as to possessioD. Condition as to interest. Condition as to timber. Condition as to fixturea. Condition as to deeds. deeds cannot be delivered up, it should be provided that the expense of attested copies thereof, and of covenants to produce thera, shall be borne by the purchaser, as other- wise the expense will fall on the vendor ; and if the pro- perty is sold in several lots, and the deeds are numerous, a large proportion of the j)urchase money may be thereby absorbed (c). As a general rule, where a contract for purchase provides that "possession" shall be given by a certain day, the word "possession" must be understood to mean possession with a good title shown (d). A condition for payment of interest, if, by reason of any " unavoidable obstacle," the contract cannot be completed by a day named, does not apply to a delay occasioned by the state of the title (e). A condition to pay interest, if, " from any cause what- ever," the purchase is not completed by the time fixed, does not apply to a case of delay occasioned by the mis- conduct of the vendor (/). If it is simply stipulated that the purchaser shall pay for timber, he must even pay for trees which are not stiictly timber, but yet are considered such according to the custom of the country ( o > > L J ^ ^ ^ Alienation natural persons might grant or give anything which lay in ^'^"j""' livery without deed («). But, in consequence of the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, statute of Frauds. c. 3, there must be a writnig, duly signed, if any estate beyond three years, or even an estate for less than three years at a less rent than two third parts of tlie value, be designed to pass (h). By s. 1, it is enacted, " that all leases, estates, interests of freehold, or terms for years, or any un- certain interest of, in, to, or out of any messuages, manors, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, made or created by livery and seisin oidy or by parol, and not put in -WTiting and signed by the parties so making or creating the same, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorised by writing, shall have the force and effect of leases and estates at will only, and shall not, either in law or in equity, be deemed or taken to have any other or greater force or effect." By the 2nd section, leases for three years, whereupon the rent reserved amounts to two thirds of the full improved value, (a) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 229 ; Co. (h) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 228. Litt. 169 a. 622 ALIENATION AT LAW BY WPJTTEN AGREEMENT. Part iif. ai'G exccptecl. And by the 3rd section it is enacted, " tliat T. 11, ch. 1. •■■ / _ ' no leases, estates, or interests, either of freeliohl or terms for years or any nncertain interest not being copyhokl or customary interest, of, in, to, or out of any messuages, &c., shall be assigned, granted, or surrendered, unless it be by deed or note in writing, signed by the party so assigning', granting, or surrendering the same, or their agents there- ■= unto lawfully authorised by writing, or by act or operation of law." And by the 4th section it is enacted, " That no action shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon any agreement made upon consideration of marriage, or u])on any contract or sale of lands, tenements, or here- ditaments, or any interest in or concerning them, or upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from tlie making thereof, unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memo- randum or note thereof, shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorised." The 1st section appears to relate to cases whei-e an estate or interest is created de novo, and actually passes to the grantee or lessee ; the 3rd section, to cases where an estate or interest previously existing is transferred ; and the 4tli to cases where a right of action only is created by an agree- ment, or where an agreement is made respecting the future creation or transfer of an estate or interest. In cases within the 1st and 3rd sections the statute requires the agent to l)e authorised in writing, but not in cases within the 4th section (c). By a recent statute, as we have seen, a deed is now required in certain cases where a deed was not necessary, or where it was doubtful whether a deed was necessary at the common law {d). (r) See Sugd. CoucisG View, 72, (cZ) See supra, p. 595. 73, 94. C23 CHAPTEE II. OF ALIENATION IN EQUITY BY MERE WRITTEN AGREEMENT. At law, contracts and covenants to sell, convey, or transfer part hi. . T. 11, Ch. 2. land or other property, are considered simply as personal At law. con- and executory contracts and covenants, and not as attach- tracts aud '' covenants ing to the property in any manner as a present or future suieicd' charge or otherwise (a). But it is a maxim of equity that "ersonailnd tilings agreed to be done shall be regarded as if actually ^^^^™ °^ ' performed, in respect to the consequences. And therefore, performed in equity, from the time of a contract for the sale of land, to conse- the vendor and his heirs, even though he did not covenant for tliem, and any person or persons claiming under him as a subsequent purchaser or as assignees in bankruptcy or insolvency, become, as to the land, trustees for the purchaser and his heirs, devisees, or vendees ; and the purchaser and his representatives or assignees in bank- ruptcy or insolvency become, as to the money, trustees for the vendor and his personal representatives. In cases not within the stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 113, and 30 & 31 Vict. c. 69, the personal representatives so become trustees as to the money. But in cases within those statutes, the persons on whom the purchased land devolves become such trustees (&). And hence the purchaser is entitled to the profits J^So^ of the estate from the time fixed upon for completing the jfurchaser^s'^ contract, whether he does or does not take possession of the profl's? ^^'^ estate ; and the vendor, to interest for the purchase money, if it is not paid at the day ; unless there is a material ob- ^ (a) See Story's Eq. Jur. § 714, cise View, 121-123, H3. And see ^^^' supra, pp. 518, 519. {b) Id. § 788-790 ; Sugd. Con- 624 ALIENATION IN EQUITY BY WRITTEN AGREEMENT. rARTiTi. iection to the title, and it remains to be cleared np ; or T. 11 Cn. 2. — ^ — — unless the delay is occasioned by the vendor, and he has notice from the purchaser or knows aliunde that the pur- chase money is lying idle ; or unless the interest is greater in amount than the rents and profits ; in which case the vendor will not be entitled to interest, but will have the interim rents and profits. This right to interest exists even in the case of a sale of a reversion ; because the wearing out of the lives is equivalent to taking the profits. If no time is limited for the performance of the agreement, the x^urchaser must pay interest on the purchase money from the time of taking possession (c). Wliere a good title is not shown until a given period, the purchaser will pay interest only from that period, and he will of course take the rents from the same time {d). And interest on the purchase money of timber to be taken at a valuation will only commence from the valuation ; because the in- crease in the value of the timber by growth is an equiva- lent for the interest (e). The vendor may stipulate that the purchaser shall pay interest at a given rate up to a given time, and then at a higher rate up to a subsequent time, and then at a still higher rate up to a still later time (/). Where the If a vcudor cauuot make a good title, and the pur- vendor must _ pay interest cliascr's moucy has been lying ready without interest being made by it, the vendor must pay interest to the purchaser (a). Risk. The purchaser being considered as the owner of the pro- perty from the time of entering into the contract, he from that time bears the risk of accidents (h). (c) Sugd. Concise View, 488—491, H. Co., L, E. 2 Eq. 221. 494. (g) Sugd. Concise View, 499. (d) Sugd. Concise View, 494. {/<) 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, (f) Sugd. Concise View, 491, 492. 13. (/) Hcrhert v. Salishunj cC- Yeovil ALIENATION IN EQUITY BY AVIUTTEN AGREEMENT. 625 In accordance with the maxim of equity alDOve men- pamiii. ^ '' T. 11, Ch. 2. tioned, if trustees under a power of sale make a legal con- tract for sale of the estate, the contract binds the estate ; contract by and though by the deaths of parties the power should be extinguished, yet the contract must be executed by those who have got an interest by the extinguishment of the power (i). It follows from the same maxim, that a purchaser, or, if Devise, sale, 01' charge he dies before the conveyance is executed, his heir, may before con- ■' ' ' ^ veyance. devise, sell, or charge the estate before the conveyance is executed (A"). As a further consequence of the same maxim of equity, night of heir to have where the purchaser died intestate before the conveyance, estate pui- ■"- "^ chased out or where an estate contracted for after the will did not toi.'g'';^"^'^*' pass by it, the heir at law was entitled to have the estate ^°"^^ ®*'''^'®' purchased for his own benefit out of the personal estate of his ancestor (/). But by the stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 113, and the stat. 30 & 31 Vict. c. C9, this seems to be now altered (/»). On the same principle, if a person contracts with a builder to erect a house on a piece of ground belonging to him, and dies intestate before the house is finished, the heir at law is entitled to have the house finished at the expense of the personal estate of the intestate ((a). Upon the same principle, if the consideration is an saieforau ■•• ^ ^ annuity annuity for the life of the vendor, though the vendor dies ^\!f|y,Vt^g''*^^ before the conveyance is executed, by which event the conveyauce. annuity ceases, yet the purchaser will be entitled to a specific performance of his contract (o). On the same ground, the consideration must be paid, cesser of tho (/) Sugd. Concise View, 148, 149. O") See supra, pp. 518, 519. (/.•) Sugd. Concise View, 125,] 33. («) Cooler v. Jarman, L. E. (/) Sugd. Concise View, 133; Eq. 98. Grcemi'ood v. Penny, 12 Beav. (o) Sugd. Concise View, 209. 406. 626 ALIENATION IN EQUITY BY AVEITTEN AGREEMENT. Part III. T. 11, Ch. 2. estate or thing before conveyance. Verbal agreements or variations of agree- ments. altlioiigli the estate or thing itself be destroyed or cease (as in the case of the purchase of an annuity when the annuitant dies) between the agreement and the convey- ance. And, on the other hand, the purchaser will be en- titled to any benefit which may accrue to the estate in the interim {p). In some cases effect is given by the Court of Chancery to verbal agreements or variations of agreements ; but this belongs more properly to the subject of equity jurispru- dence, and is fully discussed by the writers on that sub- ject {(f). 209, {■p) Sugd. Concise Vieiv, 205— G, ct seq. ; and see Sugd. Concise View, {q) See Story's Eq. Jur. § 754 Chap. 3. G27 TITLE XII. OF ALIENATION BY DEED. CHAPTER I. OF DEEDS CtENEEALLY AND THEIR PARTS.. Section I. Of Deeds generally. A DEED is a written or printed document on parchment, i'T.in.T.12, vellum, or paper, sealed and delivered, to prove and testify ■■- ■'^ ' ' ^ -^ Definition of the agreement of the parties whose deed it is, to the things ^ '^'''^• tlierein contained (ft). A deed must be written or printed on parchment, vellum, or paper, because there is nothing else which is at once so durable and so little liable to alteration (&). Deeds, when considered with reference to the parties to Dee,is are eitlier iu- them, are of two kinds : Indentures or deeds inter partes. <|enuires 01 •c^ ' deeus poll. and Deeds Poll. An indenture or deed inter partes is a deed containing Definition of "an iudeu- mutual stipulations by two or more persons (c). Formerly, *"^®- . Origin of tlio when deeds were more concise than thev are at present, if term inden- ture. Au- they were made between two or more parties, it was usual cieut mode '' ^ ' of indenting to write both parts of which they were composed on the same skin of parchment, with some words or letters of the (a) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 1, § 16 ; 2 T. 54 ; Co. Litt. 35 b, 229 a. Bl. Com. 295 ; 1 Pres. Shep. T. 50, (c) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 1, § 20 ; 2 51, 54; Co. Litt. 35 b, 171 b. Bl. Com. 296 ; Burton, § 140: C-^. ('j) 2 El. Com. 297 J 1 Pres. Shep. Litt. 229 a. VOL. II. 1, 628 or DEEDS flENEKALLY. Pt.III.T. 12, Ch. 1, s. 1. Srodern way of iudeuting. Reason for iodeuting. Indenting not now necessary. Originals and couuter parts. Definition of a di'ed poll. alphabet written between them, tbroiigli wliicli tlie parcli- ment was cut in acute angles, instar tlentium (from which they acquired the name of indentures or deeds indented), in such a manner as to leave half the words or letters on one part and half on the other (<:/). Afterwards, indenting in an undulating line came into use, without cutting through any words or letters at all (=> i- J -J' _ ^ accoidingto deeds, they operate according to the priority of times of Ij^^.^^'^^lgg^^^j. delivery, it being a maxim of common law, Qui prior est "ieiivery. tempore, potior est in jure (/). Bad English will not vitiate a deed, when it does not Bad Lnciisii. render the deed unintelligible {m). Section II. The several Parts of Deeds enumereded. It is not necessary to the validity of a deed that it l)e pt.iii.t.i2, Cii 1 3 2 framed in any particular mode whatever. The only thing — -- ' ' ■ absolutely essential is, that words be used which are suffi- cient to specify the agreement and bind the parties. But there are certain formal and technical parts in all deeds 'prepared by professional draftsmen, because these have been v.^ell considered and settled by the wisdom of suc- cessive ages, as the forms best calculated to express the meaning and accomplish the objects of the parties («). These are : 1. The Date. 2. The Parties. 3. The Ee- citals. 4. The Operative Part. 5. The Parcels. 6. The Habendum. 7. The Declaration of Uses. 8. The Decla- ration of Trusts. 9. The Pteddendum. 10. The Conditions. 11. The Provisoes, Declarations, or Special Stipulations (0 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 1, § 19 ; Co. {m) The Queen v. The Inhabitants Litt. 229 a. of Wooldale, 6 Ad. & E. 549. (1-) 2 Sugd. Pow. 363. («) 2 BL Com. 398 ; Co. Litt. 7 a. il) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 20, § 5. 630 THE SEVEEAL PAETS OE DEEDS ENUMERATED. tt. HIT. 12, appropriate to tlie particular transaction. 12. The Cove- nants. 13. The Testimonium or Conclusion (o). 14. The Seals and Signatures. 15. The Attestation. IG. The Ee- ceipt for the Consideration indorsed, if there is any pecu- niary consideration. The last two are only parts of the deed in a qualified sense, as regularly occurring in the case of formal agreements under seal, but a deed is complete in itself without them. And even when they occur, they are not regarded as themselves under seal [p). Some of the parts above mentioned always occur in all formal deeds. Such are, 1. The Date. 2. The Parties. 3. The Operative Part. 4. The Testimonium. 5. The Seals and Signatures, ■ 6. The Attestation. Eecitals are also usually required and inserted in inden- tures. The other parts are peculiar to certain deeds. The date, the parties, the recitals, the operative part, and the parcels are all included in the term " the premises," as used in speaking of a deed {q). But this word, when used in a deed, sometimes refers to the parcels or property comprised in the deed, and at other times it is used in reference to facts and transactions which occur in a former part of the deed, as things praemissa or preceding (r). Section III. Of the Date. In expressing the date of a deed, that is, the time of the making thereof, it Avas the usual practice to mention (o) 2 Bl. Com. 298—304. See (q) 2 Bl. Com. 298 ; Co. Litt. 6 Burton, § 513. a ; Burton. § 516 ; 1 Pres. Shep. T. (p) See Sugd. Concise View, 537; 52, 74. 1 Jarra. & Byth. by Sweet, 90 ; 1 (r) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 74. Pres. Shep. T. 55. OF THE DATE. G31 the year of the reim of the Sovereim as well as the year ^t "/t-is, of our Lord, but the modern practice is only to mention the year of om* Lord. The date may be placed either at the beginning or at the end. In deeds indented, it is now usually placed at the beginning, and in deeds poll at the end (s). A deed is good, though it mention no date, or thouo'h it '^^ '^'■'*^' f^" o ^ o ' o wrong date. have a false date, i.e., a date which is not the date of its delivery, or an impossible date, as the 30th of February ; provided the real day of its being dated or delivered can be proved {{). In such a case, it will take effect from the time of its delivery i^i). The date mentioned in the deed is not conclusive, even Date not conclusive. against the parties, unless perhaps it be made so by inrol- ment (x). But a deed is presumed to have been exe- cuted at the date expressed in it, unless the contrary be shown (y). Section IV. Of the Parties. or passive. With respect to the parties to a deed, they are either pt.iii.t.is active or passive. Those who do the act which is to ac- Parties are complish the obiect of the deed are the active parties: either active i- o i nr iiasaivfi. those in whose favour the act is done are the passive parties. The former are distinguished by the termination or in their designations, the latter by the termination ec. Thus, parties who grant, lease, or release, are the active parties, and are called the grantors, lessors, and releasors ; is) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 20, § 2. Co. Litt. 46 b. {t) 2 Bl. Com. 304. {x) Burton, § 525. (») 2 Bl. Com. 304; 4 Cruise T. (y) Burton. § 449. 32, c. 20, § 4 ; 1 Pres. Shop. T. 55 ; the premises. 632 OF THE PARTIES. pr.iii.T.i2 and tliose to whom lands are granted, leased, or released, Cn. 1,8.4. & > > arc tlie passive parties, and are called the grantees, lessees, or releasees («). Who must iw ^11 those M'ho have any estate, ridit, title, or interest parties. -^ ' o ' ' whatever, either at law or in equity, in that which is the subject matter of a deed, must necessarily be parties to it, if they are to be bound by it («). plrscu need Evcu uudcr tlic old law, a person may take an estate in as a pnrtyYn remainder by a deed to Avliich he is not a party, and Avhen the person to whom the remainder is limited enters on the land, he then becomes bound to perform the conditions contained in the deed (h). A power of attorney may also be given by indenture to a person who is not named as a party (c). And, even under the old law, if no person is named in the premises, one who is named for the first time in the habendum may take an immediate estate ; but if any other person was named in the premises as go^antee, no new grantee could be added in the habendum in an inden- ture, unless in correction of an evident clerical mistake, or except by way of remainder or by way of use {d). But by the stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, s. 11, it w^as enacted, " that any person, not being a party to any deed, may take an immediate benefit under it in the same manner as he might under a deed poll." And although that statute was repealed by the stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, yet by s. 5 of the latter Act, it is enacted that " under an indenture, exe- cuted after the first day of October, 1845, an immediate estate or interest, in any tenements or hereditaments, and the benefit of a condition or covenant respecting any tene- ments or liereditaments, may be taken, although the taker thereof be not named a party to the same indenture." (z) See 4 Cruise T, 32, c. 20, § 7. {d) 9 Jarm. & Bytli. by Sweet, 87; (rt) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 2, § 3. 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 2, § 3 j and c. 20, (6) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 2, § 3 ; Co, § 67, 69, 71 ; Burton, § 442 ; 1 Pros. Litt. 231 a'; Burton, § 442. Shep. T, 76. (c) Burton, § 442, n. OF THE PARTIES. Goo With respect to tlie arraiigenient of the parties, the pt. 111.T.12, active parties should be named before the passive parties ; J. J. / Arraiigcnicut the legal owner before the equitable owner ; the freeholder °^^^l^^^ before the termor ; those who have estates before those who have mere rights ; the vendor after all the other active parties ; the purchaser before the parties on his behalf. For the sake of perspicuity, if the same persons are made parties in different characters (e.fj. both as beneficial owners and as trustees), they should be named as parties of as many different parts as they sustain different characters ; and the same rule is to be observed if any of the parties are to take estates or to receive benefits under different characters or in different modes (e). But the rule of law does not require this or any other arrangement of the parties (/). The parties to a deed ought to be described by their Desoiptiou ■■ _ of tlje proper Christian and surnames, their rank, profession, and parties, place of residence. But if the description, however imper- fect, is sufficient to distinguish the person described from all others, it will be good. Nihil facit error nominis cum de corpore constat (g). And Avhere a party to a deed is named by different Christian names in different parts of the deed, parol evidence is admissible to show by whom the deed w'as executed (Ii). If several join in a deed, and some are able to make where some " are cajiable such a deed, and some are not able, the deed is deemed ^"1'/'"'°''^ to be the deed of the former alone (?'). It there are two grantees, and one of them only is capable, the person who is capable will take the wliole exclusively, if they were to be joint tenants, because joint tenants take per mie et per tout ; but only an aliquot part, if they were to be tenants (f) Martia's Conveyancer's Ee- Burton, § 529. cital Book, 25; 9 Jarni. & Byth. by (h) The Queen v. The Inhabitants Sweet, 204. 0/ Wooldak, 6 Ad. & E. 549. (/) 2 Pres. ConTeyanciug, 419. (?) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 81—2; 4 (y) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 20, § 10 ; Cruise T. 32, c. 20, § S. 634 OF THE PARTIES. pt. iii.t. 12, ill common, because tenants in common take per mie only. C'li. 1, s. 4. ' . But in a gift to persons, as a class, as tenants in common, those wlio are capable will take the entirety {h). ■\viiomaybe ^j} persons that may be grantors may be grantees. And grantors or -•- Jo J n grantees, gome wlio cannot grant or give, may yet take or receive (/). A person born deaf and dumb is not thereby incapaci- tated to execute a deed or will, if he has sufficient under- standing to give evidence of his assent, either by his own signs, or by signs with the assistance of an interpreter. And he might have acknowledged a fine or suffered a recovery {m). But persons who are born blind as well as deaf and dumlj, as they liave always wanted the common inlets of understanding, are incapable of contracting or making a gift, lease, grant, or will {n). If a gift or grant of goods is made to the churchwardens or to the parishioners of Dale, by those words, it seems this gift is good, and the churchwardens will take to the use of the parish (o). But in general if a grant of land is made to the churchwardens or to the parishioners or to the inhabitants of Dale, or if a grant is made to tlie commoners of such a waste, or to the lord and his tenants, these are not good grants : for, although these persons are capable, yet they are not capable by these names {p). Actins by When a person has autliority as attorney to do any act, attorney. . , . . , as to enter into an agreement, he must do it in the name of the person who gives the authority, and not in his own name, or as his own act (cj). And if an attorney covenants in his own name, for himself, his heirs, &c., it will be his personal covenant, although he be desciibed in the instru- ment as covenanting for and on the part of his principal (r). (Z:) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 71, 81— 2, 237. {p) 1 Pres. Shop. T. 237; see (0 2 Prca. Shep. T. 235. infra, Part IV. T. 1, c. 8. {m) 3 Jarm. & Eytli. by Sweet, 22. {q) 1 Jariu. & Byth. by Sweet, (h) 3 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 428. 23 ; Co. Litt. 8 a. (r) 1 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, (o) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 237. 428 ; 4 Id. 256—7. OF THE RECITALS. bdb Section V. Of the Recitals. Eecitals are statements made in a deed, with the view of Pr.i[i.T.i2, Ch. 1, s. 5. sliowinff what are the interests of the parties, the characters . Nature and in whicli they are made ijarties, and the objects to be "sesof •' ^ '' recitals. effected. In the case of title deeds, recitals are also in- serted for the purpose of rendering the deed a constituent part of the evidences of ownership, by stating the facts on which its own validity depends, and referring to preceding deeds which afibrd information respecting the title, and narrating all such circumstances as have taken place since the execution of the last instrument, so as to furnish, on the documents themselves, a continuous history and ex- planation of the title (s). The recitals of a deed are a key to its true construction, Effect of a recital on the where it is expressed in language that admits of doubt (t). construction. And hence, where there is a particular recital in a deed, and general words of release or conveyance are afterwards inserted, the generality of the words will be qualified by the recital («). Eecitals are never evidence as against persons who are Not evidence against not parties to the deed (x). strangers. Where a circumstance is recited as a fact which proves False recital, to be false, though the intention of the parties may be founded on the mistake, the conveyance stands good at law {ij). But in some cases the mistake may be rectified (s) See llartin's Conveyancer's 209. Recital Book, Introduction, and (u) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 19, § 15 ; Appendix ; 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Burton, § 530 ; 9 Jarm. & Bytli. by- Sweet, 215 ; i Cruise T. 32, c. 20, § Sweet, 817 ; Boijes v. JBluck, 13 Com, 22. Bench, R. 652 ; Rooke v. Lord Ken- it) Bailey v. Lloyd, 5 Buss. 330 ; sington, 2 K. & J. 753, 768—771 ; Mather t. Fraser, 2 K. & J. 536 ; Jenner v Jenner, L. B. 1 Eq. 361. CIdlders v. Eardley, 28 Beav. 648 ; {x) 1 Jarm. fcBytli. by Sweet, 121. Gicyn V. Neath Canal Co., L. E.. 3 Ex. (y) Burton, § 538. 036 OF THE RECITALS AXD THE OPERATIVE PART. PT.iir.T.ia, iu equity (s). A mis-recital of a former grant will not in- — ' ' ' validate a deed ; neither will a mis-recital of the estate of the grantor in the land, or of the date of the deed by which he acquired the land, render the deed invalid («). An ex- ception or qualification occurs, however, in the case of an assignment of the parcels comprised in a recited lease, where the lease is recited as bearing date " on " a certain day (and not " on or about " a certain day), and the date is mis-recited; for in such a case, although in equity the mistake might be corrected, in certain cases at least, yet at law there would be no valid assignment, because, there being no such lease in existence, it would be an assign- ment of that which did not exist (b). A person cannot be required to execute a deed con- taining incorrect recitals (c). omissiou of A mortgagee cannot refuse to execute a deed of recon- recitals. . . , . veyance, on the ground that it contains no recitals, if all persons interested in the property concur in it (r?). Section VI. Of the Operative Part. ^CH^V/f'e^' After the recitals, if any, or after the commencement, if there are no recitals, comes the witnessing or operative part. It is called the witnessing part, because it begins, in case there are no recitals, with the word " witnesseth," or, if there are recitals, with the words, " Now this inden- ture witnesseth," or, in the case of a deed poll, witli the words, " Now know ye, and these presents witness," or (z) Brooke y. Ilaymcs, L. R. GEq. (c) Hartley v. Burton, L. 1?. 3 CIi. 25. Ap. 365. (ff) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 20, § 23. {d) Hartley V. Burton, L. R. 3 Ch. {b) See 2 Jarm. & Bytli. by Ap. 3G5. Sweet, 288—9. OF THE PARCELS OR SUBJECT. 637 "ISTow tliese presents witness." It is also called tlie Priii.T.12, ■■- _ Cn. 1, 3. 6. Operative part, because it states what is clone or intended to be done by the deed, and for what consideration, by whom, and to or in favour of whom ; and, if the conside- ration is a pecuniary one, the payment of it is mentioned in this part. Until of late years it was the practice to use operative words of the past tense, as well as of the present : as " Hath granted, and Doth grant." But the past tense is now usually omitted. The practice of using it originated with charters of feoffment, which, before the Statute of Frauds, were a mere record of the livery by which the estate had passed. Its adoption in other cases w^as generally inaccu- rate as well as useless (e). Section VII. Of the Parcels or Suhj'ect. I. The Parcels or Suhject gemrally. The civil division of the kingdom was originally into ri.iii.T.ia, counties, liundreds, and vills, tithings, or townships ; for -^^ .. . ,..-, Territorial parishes were divisions only in reference to ecclesiastical divisions, affairs, of which the common law took no notice. But in process of time parishes became divisions in reference to civil matters (/), and it is now the constant practice to describe property as situate in a certain parish and county. Old general or vague descriptions, particularly those of 01a general copyholds, will, in most cases, pass the lands which have dwcripuons. regularly been held under them {g). (c) Sec •iJarra.& Byth. by Sweet, {g) Sugd. Concise View, 231; 38 ; 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 638; Waterpark v. Fennell, 7 H. L. Cas. Watk. Conv. 3rd ed. by Prest. 169. 650, 680, 684. (/) 4 CruiBe T. 32, c. 20, § 32. 638 OF THE PAECELS OR SUBJECT. Pt.IIT.T.12, Cn. 1, s. 7. Statiiic; the quautity. Property not included where it would work a forfeiture. General ivorils and other clauses applicable to the subject matter of the deed. Means to attain or use the thing granted, and fruits, inci- dents, and accessories. Where land has been described in preceding deeds as of a certain estimated qnantity, that estimated fjuantity should be stated for the purpose of identifying the land -with tlie land which is the subject of those deeds : but wiien the estimated quantity and the actual quantity differ, the latter should also be stated (Ji). Where a deed would work a forfeiture of property, if it were held to include that property under its general terms, there the Court will not impute to the parties an intention to pass such property (i). In conveyances, after describing the thing conveyed, it is usual to add the general words, as they are termed, that is, an enumeration of the incidents, accessories, and appurte- nances thereto. Formerly, at least, it was also the general practice to add, " all the reversion and reversions, remain- der and remainders," &c. But this clause is unnecessary, and where there is no particular estate it is obviously in- applicable ; and therefore by many practitioners it is always omitted (Jc). After this clause, where inserted, or after the general words, where the reversion clause is omitted, follow the words " all the estate, right, title," &c., and sometimes " all deeds, papers, and writings" (/). When anything is granted, all the means to attain it, and all its fruits and effects, incidents, and accessories are also granted, and will pass inclusively, by force of the grant of the thing itself, without the word appurtenances or any similar words. Cuicunque aliquid conceditur, conceditur etiam et id sine quo res ipsa non esse potuit (w;). Thus, by a demise of land, a right of way appurtenant to it will pass to the lessee, without being mentioned (it); and by the (A) 6 Jarm. &; Bytli. by Sn'cet. {1} As to Avhich, see 9 Jarm. & 19. Byth. by Sweet, 88. (i) Re Waky's Trusts, 3 Drewry, (m) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 89 ; 4 Cruise 165. T. 32, c. 20, § 30. (k) 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 73, (") Skull v. Glenista; 16 C. B. N. S 435. 81, 91. OF THE PARCELS OR SUBJECT. 639 grant of a piece of ground, is granted a way to it, i.e., all ^^:/yj-i'' usual ways ; and if there is no usual way, then a way of necessity will pass. By the grant of trees, is granted the power to cut them down, and take them away, unless the right of cutting is restrained, so as to preserve them for ornament or for other purposes. By the grant of mines, is granted the power to dig them ; and by the grant of fish in a pond, is granted power to come upon the banks and fish for them (o). By the grant of arablg land, the common appendant thereunto will pass. And so by the grant of a house, the estovers appendant thereto will pass (^9). And it has been held, that a garden usually occupied with a house will pass by a conveyance of the house " with the appurtenances thereunto belonging," though in the condi- tions of sale it was expressly excepted {q). That which is parcel or of the essence of a thing, and is still belonging to tlie same, passes by the grant of the thing itself, although at the time of the grant it be actually severed from it (r). Those things that are inseparably incident to others are not grantable without the things to which they are so incident. And therefore common appendant to land is not grantable ^vit]lout the land itself ; and common of estovers appendant to a house is not grantable without the house itself; nor is common appurtenant which is measured by levancy and couchancy or any other terms applicable to the farm. But common appurtenant for a certain number of sheep, &c., is severable (s). A grant is void for uncertainty, if the subject matter of certainty in it is neither certain in the first instance, nor can be ren- J^attcr. (0) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 89. purtenances" only include incor- {p) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 89. poreal hereditaments, such as rights {q) Doe d. Norton v. Webster, 12 of way, &c., and not additional Ad. & E, 442. But see Lister v. land. Plcl-ford, 34 Beav. 5/6, where it (r) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 90. was held that land cannot be ap- (s) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 240. purtenant to land; and that "ap- C40 OF TIIP] TAECELS OE SUBJECT. rT.iii.T. 1?, cTcred certain. Certainty in the first instance is not ncces- Ch. 1, s. 7. '' sary ; for the maxim is " Id ceiinm est, quod certum reddi potest." Hence a grant of so many trees as may be rea- sonably spared is void. But a grant of so many trees as A. shall think fit is good ; for it may be rendered certain by his determination {t). So if a grant is made of several different things in the disjunctive, this grant may ho, made certain and complete by the election of the grantee, or by the act of the grantor in performing the grant {u). So if a person having the reversion of four acres of land grant the reversion of two acres, this is a good grant, to be rendered certain and complete by election. But election must be made in the lifetime of the grantor and of the grantee (a;). Erroneous Where the words of original designation, or the first and description. . . principal words of description, are erroneous, the thing wrongly designated will not pass {y). But where land is generally but erroneously reputed to be in a particular parish, and forms a part of a farm which is in that parish, it will pass under a devise of all the testator's lands in that parish {z). With respect to v.^ords of description super- added to Avords of original designation, they may either be words of qualification or words of demonstration (a). And where the superadded words are completely incorporated with the preceding words of original designation, so as naturally and almost necessarily to form a restriction, they are words of qualification, and, if erroneous, vitiate the description and the grant itself But if there are any parcels to satisfy the terms of restriction, they wiiriiave effect in restraining the operation of the grant within the extent of the terms of restriction. If the superadded words (t) 2 Pres. Sliep. T. 250. {z) Aiistec v. Nelms, 1 Ilurlst. & {u) 2 Pres. Sliep. T. 251. Norm. 235. (a;) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 250. (a) Marti/r Laurence, 2 D. J. (y) Burton, § 562 ; 4 Cruise T. & S. 2G1. 32, c. 20, § 59. OF THE PARCELS OR SUBJECT. 641 are nut so incorporated with the preceding words, but pt.iii.t.i2, ^ ■"■ " , Cii. 1, s. T. appear to constitute an additional, independent, particnhir description of that which is witli sufficient certainty de- scribed by the preceding words, they are words of demon- stration, and, if erroneous, will be rejected (&). Thus, if a person grants " all his lands which he had by the grant of J. S. in D.," the grant will not pass any other lands in D. than those which he had of the grant of J. S. But if a person grants all his lands in D., which lands he had by the grant of J. S., all his lands in D, will pass, though he had them not by the grant of J. S. And so if he grants all his lands in D. called N"., Avliich was the estate of J. S., there the lands called K pass, though they never were the estate of J. S. So if the grant is of " all that my house in the occupation of J. S., in St. Andrew's parish," whereas in truth it is in the parish of K., but in the occupation of J. S., it seems this grant is good to pass the house. But if it is of " all that my house in St. Andrew's parish in Holborn, in the occupation of J. S.," and in truth it is in another parish, but in his occupation, this grant is not good to pass the house ; because the first term of the description is false (c). The words which come after a " videlicet " or " that is to say," can neither enlarge nor restrain the preceding description, though they will explain it, if ambiguous (d). AVhere general Vv^ords are preceded by a specification or Effect of ^ -L ./ i adding words enumeration of particulars, the general words will not, of a general i ' o > character. without the help of other words, be construed to signify anything of a higher order or more importance than what is before expressed (e), but will be held to denote only things ejusdem generis, upon the principal of the maxim, (6) See 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 20, § Dodds, L. E. 2 Eq. 819. 56, CO— G2 ; Burton, § 560, 563, (c) 2 Pros. Sliep. T. 247—8. 564 ; 2 Pres. Sliep. T. 247 ; Evans v. {d) Eurton, § 565. Angdl, 26 Bear. 202 ; Pedley v. (e) Burton, § 557—8. 642 OF THE PARCELS OR SUBJECT. pt.iii.t.12, noscitur a sociis. But where somethinoj is excepted which cu. 1, B. r. o i is not ejusclcm generis, it shows that the general words are not to be understood in this restricted sense (/). II. Particular Sicbjects of Pro])eriy, and the Viords by vjMcJi they pass in a Deed. Land. Land, in the legal signification of the term, compre- hends the surface and substance of the earth under all cir- cumstances, and everything permanently fixed or incident to it, so as to include every kind of ground, soil, or earth whatever; as meadows, pastures, woods, moors, waters, marshes, furzes, heaths, and all castles, houses, and other buildings thereon, and mines and fossils under it, and articles fixed to the soil by the owner thereof (g). And it comprises land in reversion or remainder, as well as land Ail lands or in posscssiou (Ji). A grant of all a person's lands or goods passes not only what he is sole seised or possessed of, but also what he is jointly seised or possessed of, as far as respects his share : for verba generaliter dicta generahter interpretanda : qui omne dicit, nihil excipit. And so e converso, if two persons join in a grant of all their lands or all their goods, this wdll pass their several as well as their joint property (i). Farm. jjy the conveyance of a farm, a messuage or principal dwelling house will pass, and all arable land, meadow, pasture, wood, &c., thereto belonging or therewith occu- pied (/>;). Messuage or Tlic word mcssuagc is synonymous with dwellinf]: house ; house, with a J J ^ & j nauces™"^' ^^^^ ^ gTaut of a mcssuagc or house with the appurtenances (/) Ivison V. Gassiot, 3 D. M. & K. & J. 536 ; and see supra, p. 2, G. 958; Roohe v. Lord Kensington, n. (a). 2 K. & J. 753, 771—3 ; see infra, {h) Burton, § 551. Pt. III. T. 15, c. 3, s. 2. (i) 1 Pres. Sliep. T. 90. {(/) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 20, § 42 ; {k) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 20, § 41 ; Burton, § 42; Mather v. Frascr, 2 Burton, § 545 ; 1 Pros. Slicp. T. 93. OF THE PARCELS OR SUBJECT. G-iS will not only pass a house, l3ut all Luildiiiffs attaclied or Pr.iii.T.12 ... ch. 1, s r. adjoining to it ; as also its curtilage, garden, and orchard, together with the close in wdiicli the house is built, or pleasure grounds adjoining and belonging to it. But if a greater q^uantity of land has been usually occupied with the house, it will not pass (/). By the grant of a cottage, a small house with its cur- Cottage. tilage passes. And the term may also comprise a gar- den (m). If a person grants his manor, and does not say in what Manor, parishes it lies, this is a good grant of all the manor. But if it lies in different parishes, and some are mentioned, but others are omitted, no part of the manor lying in the ])arislies not mentioned M'ill pass (??). — The word manor has a very extensive signification ; for even without the word appurtenances, it will pass, 1. All the demesnes, that is, all the lands wdiereof the lord is seised wdthin the manor ; and also the freehold of all the lands held by copy- holders or other customary tenants, together with all the wastes. But demesnes previously granted in fee do not become a part of the manor again, on a repurchase of them by the lord (as they would if they escheated to him) ; and therefore they do pass by a devise of the manor prior to such repurchase (0). 2. All the services ; such as fealty, suit of court, rents, &c. 3. All courts baron, courts leet, with the fines and perquisites annexed thereto ; and all other franchises that are parcel of, or appendant to, the manor at the time of the conveyance. 4. Advowsons appendant Qj). — Lands held in fee simple of a manor are not considered as parcel of the manor, although the rents (l) 4 Cruise, T. 32, c. 20, § 40 ; Sliep. T. 99. Burton, § 546 ; 1 Pres. Shep. T. 94; (o) Delacherols v. Delacherois, 11 Co. Litt. 56, b. ; lie Midland R>j. H. L. Cas. 62. Co., 34 Beav. 525. {p) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 20, § 34, 37 ; (m) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 94. 1 Pres. Shep. T. 92. (n) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 248 ; 1 Pres. VOL. IT., E 644 OF THE PARCELS OR SUBJECT. pt.iii.t.12, and services issuing? out of such lands are parcel of the Cn. 1, s. 7. manor (q). — Although many manors have been destroyed yet they still continue to be called manors, though in fact they are only reputed manors ; and a reputed manor will pass in a deed hj the word manor (r), Kectory. By tlic grant of a rectory, will pass the house, the glebe, the tithes and offerings belonging to it. And by the grant Vicarage. of a vicarago, will pass as much as l)elongs to it ; as the vicarage house, &c (s). Toft. A toft is the site of a house which has been pulled down (t). Profits. A grant of the profits of land carries the land itself (j^). Trees, grass, Trccs, grass, and corn, growing upon the ground, fruit corn, fruit, wool. upon the trees, and wool upon the sheep's back, may be granted as distinct interests from the things on which they grow (.!'). But a lessor for life oi' years cannot, as against his lessee for life or years, give or grant the trees growing on the ground comprised in the lease, without the licence of his lessee, unless they are first cut down by the lessee or some other person, or unless they are excepted out of the lease (jf). Mines. Miucs, if actually opened, are corporeal hereditaments, and may be made the subjects of conveyance by livery. And an interest in mines unopened may exist indepen- dently of any estate in tlie surfoce of the land (z). But the land itself will pass by the name of a " mine," in a conveyance adequate for that purpose (a). By a grant of water, the land Avhich is covered by the water will not pass, but only the right of fishing in that water. A piece of water should be granted by tlie name Cq) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 20, § 35. Shep. T. 241 ; Burton, § 11G2. (r) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 20, § 38. (y) 2 Pres. Shop. T. 244. (s) 1 Pres. Sliep. T. 94. (z) Burton, § 11G4 ; 1 Pres. Shep. (t) Burton, § 54G. T, 90, 9(5. («) Burton, § 547 ; Co. Litt. 4 b. («) Burton, § 548. (*•) 1 Pros. Shep. T. 95j 2 Pres. Water. OF THE PARCELS OK SUBJECT. C45 of SO many acres of land covered with water. But tlie word pt.iii.t.is, •^ Cn. 1, s. 7. staguum or pool will pass both the water and the land (h). A reversion may be granted by the name of a remainder ; Remainders . andrever- or a remamder by the name of a reversion (c). By the sions. grant of an acre of land, or of any other thing by the name whereby it is called, the reversion thereof will pass, if the grantor have no more than a reversion (d). The word share, even in a deed, may embrace accruing share. as v/ell as original shares (c). A grant of common for all beasts is not a grant of Commons. common for goats, pigs, and such other beasts and cattle as are not commonable. But it is otherwise if the grant is of common for all manner of beasts (/). The word " warren," does not pass an estate to the soil, warren, unless the context of the instrument shows that to be the intention (r/). A conveyance of the estate itself in respect of which an Allotments, allotment is subsequently awarded includes the right to the allotment (h). Under a mortgage or sale of a factory or mill, with " the JMachmery. steam engines, &c., and all other the machinery, fixtures, and effects, fixed up in, or attached, or belonging " thereto, it has been held that the mortgagee or purchaser only took such machinery as essentially belonged to it, and necessarily formed a part of it, Mdiatever might be the purpose to which the mill might be applied, and not machinery merely fitted up in it, such as looms, the legs (h) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 20, § 49 ; 2 4 Ch. Ap. 5S2. VA. Com. 18, 19 ; Burton, § 550 ; (h) 1 Jarra. & Bytli. by Sweet, Co. Litt. 4. b. 79, SO. (c) 2 Pres. Sliep. T. 249. As to the force and meaning of (d) 2 Pres. Sliep. T. 245. many other terms besides those (e) JDoe d. Clift v. JBirUiead, 4 noticed in this work, which are Exch. 110. used to describe parcels, especially {/) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 96. in old deeds, sec Co. Litt. 4 b— G a ; (f/) Earl JBeauchamp v. Winn, L. E. 1 Pres. Shop. T. 93—97. £2L 646 OF THE ?ARCP]LS OR SUBJECT. pt.iii,t.i2, of wliicli were let into loom foots sunk into tlie pavement Cii. 1, s. 7. ^yitllout fastening (i). III. Exceptions. Of course an exception cannot be of the whole thing granted, nor of a part of a thing ^^']lich is not granted. And if it is of part of a thing granted, or of a thing connected with a thing granted, it must be of such a part or thing as is severable from the thing granted, and not an inseparable interest or incident. It must also be of a thing of that nature that it may be held by itself, and that he who excepts may retain it {j). Hence, if a manor is granted excepting the court baron, or if land is granted excepting the common appendant thereto, these exceptions are void : for no lord except the lord of the manor can hold the court ; and no one except the owner of the land can have right to this sjiecies of common (Z:). An exception must not be such as is repugnant to the grant. Hence, it must not be such as would utterly subvert the grant, by taking away all the benefits of it : as if a manor or land were granted, excepting the profits thereof. Nor, upon the same principle, may it be such as would be an exception of that which is in terms specifically granted. But, subject to these qualifications, it may be of one thing out of anotlier thing granted, or of a particular thing out of a class of things or aggregate granted (/). Thus, if a person grants all his horses except his white horse, this is good exception of tlie white horse, if he has three horses and one of them is white ; but if he has only two horses, this exception is repugnant to the terms of the grant, and void. So, if a person grants his house, chambers, and shops, (/) IlutcJdnsoii V. K(i>/, 23 Beav. (I) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 70 ; 4 Cruitie 413. T. 32, c. 20, § 36. (i) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 20, § 06 ; 1 (?) See 1 Pres. Shep. T. 78, 79. Pros. Shep. T. 78, 79. OF THE rARCELS OK RUBJECT. 647 excepting liis shops, tliis is a void exception. So if twenty ^^^"/- ^-l^' houses or twenty manors are gTanted, excepting one of them, this exception is repugnant to the grant, since the exception negatives the right to one of those things wliich are specifically comprehended in the grant (;/;). An exception may he made out of an exception, or a saving out of a saving {n). Section VIIL 0/ the Habendum. The office of the habendum is to point out what estate Pt- 111.T.12, ^ Ch. 1, s. 8. or interest is granted. But this is frequently and now ■ ^ 1 J Use of the usually done in the premises as well as in the liaben- iiabeadum. dum ((?). And where the estate or interest is pointed out in the premises, the habendum is not essential, and in the majority of deeds is useless (j>) ; and in a surrender or a release of right, it is inappropriate {q). As it is a rule that where two parts of a deed are where the habendum is al3Solutelv repugnant and irreconcilable, the latter shall be i'epug"ant ■■- " ' aud void. rejected ; so where the habendum is repugnant to and irreconcilable with the premises, and the estate limited in the premises is capable of taking effect, the habendum is void, and the grantee will take the estate given in the premises ; unless the estate limited by the habendum is larger than the estate given in tlie premises, in which case the habendum wdll prevail ; because, according to (m) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 78, 79. {p) 9 Jarm. & Bytli. by Sweet {n) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 78, n. (68). 460 ; Burton, § 515. (o) 2 Bl. Com, 298 ; 1 Pres. Shep. (q) 2 Janii. & Byth. by Sweet, T. 74. 170. 64§ OF THE HABENDUxAL PT.iir.T.i2, another rule of law, a deed is to l)e construed most Ch. 1, 3. 8. _ ' strongly against tlio grantor (?■). iHbendum Where the habendum is not irreconcilable with the explains the • ii- iij?i- ii i^ premises. prcmiscs, Dut IS Capable oi benig regarded as explanatory of the premises, it will be so construed (s). Illustrations. Xo illustrate these rules, if land is given in the premises to A. and his heirs, habendum to A. for life or years, the habendum is utterly repugnant and void. But if land is given in the premises to A. for life, habendum to him and his heirs, he will take the greater estate given by the habendum, i.e., an estate in fee (t). Again, if lands are given in the premises to A. and his heirs, habendum to him and the heirs of his body, he will only take an estate tail ; because the habendum is considered to explain the kind of heirs meant in the premises (it). And so where a tenant in fee conveyed lands to H. her heirs and assigns, to hold to H, and her assigns for the life of G-., the habendum, so far as regarded the words " for the life of G.," explained the premises, so as to make the persons designated by the word '' heirs " take as special occupants, and not as heirs by descent ; but so far as regarded the words " to 11. and her assigns," the habendum was rejected : because those words were contrary to the premises, as they would make the estate on the death of H. in G.'s lifetime personal assets by virtue of the statutes 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 12, and 1-i Geo. 2, c. 20, s. 9 (,>■). The habendum will bo regarded as explanatory of the premises, instead of inconsistent therewith, where the pre- (r) See 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 20, § 9 Jarm. & Bytli. by Sweet, 84. 75—77, 84} 9 Jarm. & Bytli. by {>,) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 20, § 81 ; 4 Sweet, 86 ; 1 Pres. Shep. T. 113 ; Cruise T. 32, c, 21, § 16 ; 9 Jarm. & Co. Litt. 299 a. Bylh. by Sweet, 84 ; 1 Trcs. Shep. (.s) See 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 20, § T. 113; Co. Litt. 21 a., n. (2). 79— 84 ; 9 Jarm. & By tb. by Sweet, (x) See 1 Pres. Shep. T. 113; 86. Doe d. Timmis v. Steele, 4 Ad. & E. {t) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 20, § 76, 84; (N. S.) 663 j and supra, 536-7. 0T7 THE nAr>ENDu.\r. C40 mises do not at all express tliu qiiaiitity or kind of interest, Pt.iii.t.iz, Itut tlie liabenduni expresses tlie quantity or kind of in- terest, and denotes a different quantity or kind of interest from tliat which by construction of hiw, in the absence of any controlling clause, the grant in the premises would give. Thus, where a grant is made to a person in the pre- mises, Avithout any words indicative of tlie quantity of interest he is to take, but an express estate for years is limited in tlie habendum, the habendum will be held to explain the premises, so that he will take an estate for years, instead of an estate for life, which would have parssed by construction of law, l)ut for the habendum (y). And where a lease is made to t^'o, habendum to the one for life, remainder to the other for life, they take accord- ing to the habendum (z). And so where a lease is made to two persons, habendum the one moiety to the one, and the other moiety to tlie other, the habendum makes them tenants in common ; whereas by construction of law they would otherwise have taken as joint tenants by the pre- mises (rt). Where the premises and the habendum limit estates of wiieie premises .and different kinds, and they are capable of distinct and several habendum " ^ liave a operation, and appear to have been intended so to operate, opgi-auou as they will be construed accordingly. Thus, if lands are ilmita'tion'of given in the premises to a person and the heirs of his ^^^^^' body, habendum to him and his heirs, if there are circum- stances showing such an intention, he will take an estate tail, with a remainder in fee (b). Although the habendum will fail to qualify the pre- where the . . . use declared mises, where it cannot be regarded as explaininof them, yet isuotcom- *-' J. o ' J mcnsurato the estate limited in the premises may be cut down by the estM^c'ln the premises. (y) Co. Litt. 183 a. ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 20, § 83. 82, c. 20, § 80. {h) Co. Litt. 21 a ; 4 Cruise T. 32j (2) Co. Litt. 183 b. c. 20, § 85—87. (a) Co. Litt. 183 b, ; 4 Cruise Ti 6B0 OF THE HABENDURl. Pt.III.T.1?. Ch. 1, 8.8. New subject or exception in the habendum. Two or more grants and one haben- dum, or one grant and two or more habenduins. fact that tlie use declared is not co-extensive with the estate given in the premises, but is only commensurate with the estate limited in the habendum. Thus, if land were given to A. and his heirs, habendum to A, for life, to the use of A. for life, A. would take no larger estate than an estate for life, and the ulterior use would result to the grantor (r). A new subject matter cannot be added in the habendum. But an exception may be contained in the habendum (d). Sometimes there are two or more grants and only one habendum. This form, though sufticient in point of law, is an incorrect mode of preparing a deed. In other instances there is one clause of grant with several habendums. This form is perfectly correct and even requisite, when it is necessary or convenient to introduce real and personal property, or property held for different estates, in one and the same clause of grant ; as in the case of property in the West India Islands, or of freehold and leasehold lands intermixed (c). Pt. III.T.12, Ch. 1, s. 9. Sectfon IX. Of the Reservation (/). A reservation is a clause in a deed, whereby the grantor or lessor, in respect of the grant or lease, reserves to hini- Definition of -"- ^ ' a reservation, self, or in souie cascs to the lord of the fee, and not to a stranger, some money, chattel, or service, and not any part of the thing granted or leased or of the estate created, nor a privilege annexed to the property (^). (r) 9 Jam. & Byth. by Sweet, 85. (d) 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 87; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 20, § 73. (c) 1 Prcs. Shcp. T. 74. See 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 130. (/) See Part I. Tit. 2, c. 2, s. 2, on lients. ((/) See Co. liitti 47 a ; 1 Pres. OF THE RESEllVATIOl?. 651 If a person conveys to another, on condition that he shall ^qJ^^-'^'I^' render to a strano-er a yearly rent ; and if he fail of pay- t~; o J ^ ' -■■ -^ Aa to reserv- ment thereof, that then it shall be lawful for the grantor to s'traugw.*" * enter, this is a good condition for payment of an anmial sum in gross, hut it is void as a reservation of a rent (Ji). That wliich is reserved as rent must be certain, or at Subjectof ' reservation. least reducible to a certainty by either party (?'). If a person grants land, yielding for rent, money, corn, a horse, spurs, or a rose, this is a good reservation ; but if the reservation were of the grass or of the vesture of the land, or of a common, or of other profit or benefit to be taken or enjoyed from or upon the land, such a reseiTation, considered as a rent, would be void (k). Eent, lieriot, suit of court, and suit of mill, if purported to be reserved, are strictly reservations ; but the liberty of hawking, hunting, fishing, and fowding, is not legally a reservation or excep- tion, but a privilege granted to the lessor, though words of reservation and exception are used. Trees, mines, and quarries, purported to be excepted and reseiTed, are excep- tions, not reservations ; for an exception is of a part of the thing granted (/). A man cannot grant an estate, and reserve a part of the estate ; or make a feoffment in fee, and reserve a lease for life {/n). A reservation is commonly said to be a reserving of a new thing issuing out of the property (it) ; but tlie aliove examples show that it need not strictly be either a new thing or a thing issuing out of the property. These expressions only mean that it must not be a part of the property, like an exception, nor a privilege annexed to the property, like a right of sporting. Shop. T. 80 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 24, (k) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 80 ; 3 Cruise § 1; 2 Bl. Com. 299 ; Gilbertson v. T. 28, c. 1, § 3 ; Co. Litt. 142 a. Richards, 4 Hurl. & Norm. 277 ; 5 (t) Doe d. Dour/las v. Loci; 2 Ad. Hurl. & Norm. 453. &E. 705. (70 Litt. s. 345-6 ; Co. Litt. (m) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 79. 313 a. (j() 1 Pros. Shep. T. 80 ; 4 Cruise (/) 3 Cruise T. 2S, c. 1, § 3. T. 32, c. 24, § 1 ; 2 Bl. Com. 299. 652 OF TIIK llESEliVATlON. tt. iii.t.12, a person may reserve one rent for one year, and another rent for anotlier year : as lOs. for one year, and 2O5. for Modes (if "^ . rcn7^'"° another year ; or a rent to be paid at the end of every second or third year, and no rent for the other years ; or one kind of rent for one year, and another kind of rent for anotlier year (0). And there may be several reservations of several rents in the same conveyance. But where there is one reservation of rent in gross at first, though it be afterwards divided and severed into different parts, yet it will be one entire rent (2?). Thus, if a person grants the manors of A., B., and C, rendering £3, viz. for A. 20.9., for B. 20.5., and for C. 20s., this is a good reservation ; but in this case the rent is entire, for the word " videlicet " cannot divide one rent into several {q). If a conveyance or lease is made rendering rent to the heirs of the grantor or lessor, tliis reservation is A^oid, be- cause the rent is not reserved to himself first; for this mode of reservation would make the heirs purchasers, and the right to the rent would be distinct from the rever- sion {)'). Except in the case of leases imder statutes, it is generally most advisable, especially when leases are made by virtue of powers, not to specify to whom the reservation is made; for then the rent will be annexed to the reversion, and belong to the person for the time being entitled to the reversion (s), even where there is no mention of the term for which the rent is to be paid {t). A reservation is always taken most in favour of the grantee or lessee, and against the grantor or lessor. And therefore, if the reservation is only to the grantor or lessor, or to him (0) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 81 ; 8 Cruise 213 b. T. 28, c. 1, § 3. (s) 1 Pres. Bliep. T. 80, 115 ; ip) 3 Cruise T, 27, c. 1, § 28, 30. Watk. Conv. 3rd. ed. by Preston, ((7) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 81. 156-7, 177 ; Co. Litt. 47 a. (>•) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 80 ; Co. Litt. (<) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 115. OF THE EESEllVATION. 653 and his assigns, without naming his heirs, executors, or rT.Tii.T.12, " ^ Ch. 1, s. 9. administrators, this reservation will continue only for his lifetime (;/). It is said that if a lease is made of a term of years, reserving rent to the lessor and liis heirs, it will determine by the death of the lessor ; for the heir cannot have it, as he cannot succeed to the estate, it being only a chattel ; and the executor cannot have it, there being no words to carry it to him (.r). On the other hand, it is said that if a grantor or lessor seised in fee reserves rent to himself, his executors or assigns, the rent shall continue only for his life ; because it cannot be taken by the execu- tors, though named, as they are not privies in estate ; and it cannot be claimed by the heir, inasmuch as he is not named, while the grantor or lessor himself and his executors are named (ij). But where a rent was reserved to the lessor, his executors, administrators, and assigns, yearly, during the term, it was resolved that it should go to the heir of the lessor {z). Where, however, no reversion is left in the lessor, and the rent is reserved to his executors, administrators, and assigns, it will go to them and not to the heir {a). Section X. Of the Covenants, (h). A covenant is a clause in a deed whereby a person pt.iii.t.i2, Ch. 1, 8. 10. engages, in terms or in effect, that a certain thing is Definition. (it) Co. Litt. 47 a ; 1 Trcs. Sliep. (5) See infra, Part III. T. ]-2, T. 144 ; 3 Cruise T. 28, c. 1, § 38. c. 5, s. 1, as to covenants in pur- (x) 3 Cruise T. 28, c. 1, § 38. cliase deeds. And as to relief for ((/) Co. Litt. 47 a ; 1 Pros. Sliep. breacli of covenants or conditions T. 81, 115 ; 3 Cruise T. 28, c. 1, to insure, and as to benefit of in- § 38. formal insurances, sec stat. 22 & 23 (2) 3 Cruise T. 28, c. 1, § 39. Vict. c. 35, s. 4-9. («) 3 Cruise T. 28, c. 1, § 40. C54 OF THE COVENANTS. pt. III.T.12, true, or lias or lias not Ijeeii done, or shall or shall not C'H. 1, s. 10. ' ' be done («). I. Covenants generally. A covenant X coveiiaiit caii oiilv Ije created Ijy deed, Lut it may be can only he j j ' j de^r**''^ either l)y deed poll or by indenture (r/). Covenants by Ijy the old law, a pei'soii not named as a party could not strangers. ]jq ,^ covenaiitec uiidei' ail indenture. But he might covenant with a party to the indenture. And he might be a covenantee in a deed poll (c). And now by the stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 5, " under an indenture executed after the 1st Oct. 1845, the l)eiiefitof a covenant respecting any tenements or hereditaments, may be taken, although the taker thereof be not named as a party to the same indenture." wvenants. Generally, where a condition, as regards the matter of it, is good or bad, a covenant comprehending the same matter is good or bad also (/). A covenant not to carry on a particular trade within the cities of London and Westminster, or within 600 miles from the same, is good, so far as it relates to London and Westminster, Init xoif\ as to the rest, as unreasonably restrictive (g). Performance. Wlieii 110 time is limited for the performance of u cove- nant, it must 1)0 done within a reasonable time {h). Where a Where lands are conveyed by indenture to two persons, becomes j^j-^j ouc of tlieiii docs iiot scal tlic deed, yet if he enters liable to ' -^ withoutbeing ^-^pou the hiud aiul accepts the deed in other respects, he wuhouV will be liouiid by the covenants contained in it. And where an estate is limited to a person for life, with a remainder to anotlier who is not a party to the deed, if the (c) See 2 Bl. Com. 304 ; 1 Pres. eel. 596; Chesterfield d:c. Colliery Co. Shep. T. 160, 162, and remcarks \. Ilau-kins, 3 Hurl. & Colt, 677. infra. (/) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 163, 164. (d) i Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 3 ; (g) Green v. Price, 13 M. & W. Burton, § 1089. 695. Sec supra, p. 97. (c) Shelford's Ileal Prop. Acts, 6tli (h) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 12. executiug. OF THE COVENANTS. 655 remainderman enters, he Avill bo bound by the covenants ^^J^^-^-^^^^ contained in the deed (i). II. Express and Implied Covenants. Covenants are either express or implied. No particular words are necessary to constitute an what words create an ex- express covenant. A recital may amount to a covenant, press cove- And cases have arisen where the words " upon condition," " shall," " it is agreed," &c., have been held to import a covenant (/.■). Where words occurring at the beginning of a sentence are conditional, and have the effect of a con- dition, they will not be construed to make a covenant. And yet if words of condition and words of covenant are coupled together in the same sentence (as " provided always, and it is covenanted," or the like), in such cases the words may be construed to make both a covenant and a condition (/). With respect to implied covenants, there are some words what words •^ ^ create an im- which, when used in V)articular contracts, will create a piiedcove- covenant. Thus, by the old law, the word grant or demise, in a lease for years, creates a covenant in law for quiet enjoyment of the lands demised during the term (m). But by the stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 7G, s. G, it was enacted, that the word " grant " should not create any warranty or right of re-entry or covenant by implication, except by Act of Parhament. And though this Act was repealed by the stat. 8 & 9 A^ict. c. lOG, yet by section 4 of that statute, the word " give " or the word " grant " in a deed (i) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 4 ; Co. J. 572 ; Lay v. Mottram, 19 0. B. Litt. 231 a. (N. S.) 479. (A:) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 5-9 ; (?) 1 Pres. Sliep. T. 163 ; 4 Cruise Wood V. Copi-)er Miners' Co., 7 Com. T. 32, c. 24, § 6. B. 906 ; 14 Com. B. 428 ; Farrall (m) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, 13 ; T. Hilditch, 5 C. B. (N. S.), 840 ; Burton, § 846, 891. Money^penny v. Moneypenny, 3 D. & G5G OF THE COVENANT!^. Pt. Ch .III.T.12, executed after tlie 1st October, 1845, shall not imply any a. 1, s. 10. i J J covenant in law, in respect of any tenements or here- ditaments, except so far as the word " give " or " grant " may, by force of any Act of Parliament, imply a covenant. By the stat. 6 Anne, c. 35, ss. 30 and 34, and the stat. 8 Geo. 2, c. 6, s. 35, the words "grant, bargain, and sell," in bargains and sales of hereditaments in the East and North Pddings of Yorkshire, inroUed according to those Acts, have the effect of the usual covenants for title in favour of a purchaser («). And if a lease for years is made, reserving or yielding and paying a certain rent, these words will create a covenant for payment of the rent (o). A person who agrees to let agrees to grant a valid lease ; and therefore imj^liedly promises that he has a good title to let (jj). An express covenant will qualify the generality of an implied covenant, so that it shall not extend further than the express covenant (q). Implied covenants qualified by express cuveuiiiits. III. General and Specific Covenants. Covenants are again divided into general and specific. A covenant to settle lands of a certain value is a general covenant, which does not bind any particular lands of the covenantor, and the covenantee will be deemed a specialty creditor only. But a covenant to settle particular lands is a specific covenant and a lien on those lands (?•). in) Burton, § 593 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 63. (o) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 13. (p) Stranls t. St. Juhn, L. E., 2 C. P. 37G. (q) 4 Cruise T. 32, c, 25, § 15. (r) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 42 ; Story's Eq. Jur. § 1249 ; Sugd. Con- cise View, 5G3. See supra, 371. OF THE COVENANTS. 657 IV. Inherent and Collateral Covenants. Ao'ain, covenants are divided into inherent, ^vllicll fire pt.iii.t.i2, '^ ' Ch. 1, s. 10. those that immediately relate to the property: and col- lateral, which are those that immediately relate to some collateral thing (s). V. Joint and Severed Covenants. Again, covenants may be joint or several, or both joint and several. For, where several persons enter into a cove- nant, they may bind themselves jointly, or they may bind each of themselves severally, or they may bind themselves jointly and severally (t). If two lessees covenant jointly and severally at the beginning of the covenants, these words will extend to all their subsequent covenants, notwithstanding the interven- tion of covenants on the part of the lessor (u). By express words clearly indicative of the intention, a covenant may be joint, or joint and several, hj or with the covenantors or covenantees, notwithstanding that the inte- rests are several. So they may be several, although the interests are joint. But the implication of law, when the words are ambiguous or are left to the interpretation of law, is, that the words have an import corresponding to the interest of the parties, so as to be joint when the interest is joint, and several when the interest is several, notwithstanding language which under different circum- stances would give to the covenant a different effect (a). Thus, where a j)erson covenants with two or more and with each of them, if each of the covenantees takes a several (s) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 161. (x) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 166 ; Sorslie (t) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 17. v. Park, 12 M. & W. 146 ; Piu/h v. (t() 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 19. Strinr/fidd, 3 Com. B. 2. G58 OF THE COVENANTS. Pr.Tii. T.12, interest, the covenant is several ; Init if tlie covenantees Ch. 1, s. 10. take a joint interest in the snbject matter of the covenant, it is a joint covenant {y). And it has been held, that where A. covenants with one person, " and also, as a dis- tinct covenant," with another, this is a joint covenant on which both must sue jointly, if it appears on the face of the deed that they have a joint interest in the subject matter of the covenant {£) ; and that a covenant with tenants in common, and each and every of them, their and each and every of their heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, to repair, is a joint and not a several cove- nant ; so that an action must be brought by all the tenants in common, or the survivors or survivor of tliem (a). VI. Real and Personal Covenants. Definition of covenants real. Easential difference between covenants real and pei'dunal. Covenant running with tlie laud. Liability of the cove- nantor, his heirs, execu- Covenants are further divided into real and personal. Covenants real are those which have for their object some- thing annexed to, or inherent in, or directly and per- manently connected with, real property (&). Thus the usual covenants for title are real covenants (r). The essential difference betAveen a real and a personal covenant is, that a real covenant runs with the land {d). And a covenant which runs with the land is one of which the obligation on the one hand, and the benefit, to be enforced by action, on the other hand, will attach upon the successive owners of the property (c). Whether the covenants are real or personal, the cove- nantor is liable to an action for damages for breach of ((/) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 18. (2) Hophinson v. Lee, 6 Ad. & E. N. S. 964. {ft) Bradhurne v. Boffidd, 14 M. & W. 559. (/;) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 21. Seo Thomas v. Ilayuxird, L. R. 4 Kx. 311, infra, p. 663. (c) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § G4 ; Sugcl. Concise View, 435. {d) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 25, 28. See Wilson v. Hart, 2 Hem. & M. 551 ; Hooper v. Clarice, L. Iv., 2 Q. B., 200. (e) Burloii, § 475. OF THE COVENANTS. 659 covenant or, if lie is dead, liis executors or administrators ^f- i"-ti2, ' ' ' Ch. 1, s. 10. are liable to tlie extent of liis personal propertv in their ;■ - --~ ^ ^ i- -J fora, and ad- liands ; and if the covenant is (as it constantly is) for liini ""'-istrator. and his " heirs," then his heir is also liable, so far as the value of any real property which has descended to him in fee simple may extend (/). The heirs are not bound unless named ; and the heirs cannot be Ijound unless the obligation commences in or with the ancestor ; and there- fore a covenant by a man, for himself, his executors and administrators, or for his heirs, without naming himself, even though the act is to be done after his death, will not bind the heirs. The executors and administrators are bound without being named, unless the act is one which is to be performed personally by the covenantor, and there lias been no breach before his death (rj). By the stat. 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 27, "Where an exe- Astoiiau- cutor or administrator, liable as such to the rents, cove- ^uTstrafot* , I j_ • T • ^ i in respect of nants, or agreements contanied m any lease or agreement rents, cove- for a lease granted or assigned to the testator or intestate agTeements. whose estate is being administered, shall ha\'e satisfied all such liabilities under the said lease or agreement for a lease as may have accrued due and been claimed up to the time of the assignment hereafter mentioned, and shall have set apart a sufficient fund to answer an}^ future claim that may be made in respect of any fixed and ascertained sum covenanted or agreed by the lessee to be laid out on the property demised or agreed to ])e demised, although the period for laying out the same may not have arrived, and shall have assigned the lease or agreement for a lease to a purchaser thereof, he shall be at liberty to distribute the residuary personal estate of the deceased to and amongst the parties entitled thereto respectively, (/) Burton, § 579; Sugd. Concise 1 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 434 ; 3 View, 452. If]. 484—5. (g) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 80, 177—8 ; yoL. ir, r 660 OF THK COYEXANTS. PT.iir.T.i2, without appropriating any part, or any further part, (as the case may be,) of the personal estate of the deceased to meet any future liability under the said lease or agree- ment for a lease ; and the executor or administrator so distributing the residuary estate shall not, after having assigned the said lease or agreement for a lease, and having, ^\diere necessary, set apart such sutficient fund as aforesaid, be personally liable in respect of any subse- quent claim under the said lease or agreement for a lease ; but nothing herein contained shall prejudice the right of the lessor or those claiming under him to follow the assets of the deceased into the hands of the person or persons to or amongst ^\'hom the said assets may have been distributed." Astoiiabi- And by s. 28, "In like manner, where an executor or cutor, &c., administrator, liable as such to the rent, covenants, or lu respect oi ' ' ' ircm'ivty- agreements contained in any conveyance on chief rent or chief rent or rent charge (whether any such rent be hj limitation of use, reut-cUarge. ,• \ j. r i grant, or reservation), or agreement tor such conveyance, granted or assigned to or made and entered into with the testator or intestate whose estate is being administered, shall have satisfied all such liabilities under the said con- veyance, or agreement for a conveyance, as may have accrued due and been claimed up to the time of the con- veyance hereafter mentioned, and shall have set apart a sufficient fund to answer any future claim that may be made in respect of any fixed and ascertained sum cove- nanted or agreed by the grantee to be laid out on the property conveyed, or agreed to be conveyed, although the period for laying out the same may not have arrived, and shall have conveyed such property, or assigned the said agreement for such conveyance as aforesaid, to a purchaser thereof, he shall be at liberty to distribute the residuary personal estate of the deceased to and amongst the parties entitled thereto respectively, without appro- OF THE COYENAXTS. 661 piiating any part or any further part (as tlie case may be) ^^^V''^-^"' of the personal estate of the deceased to meet any future — liability under the said conveyance or agreement for a conveyance ; and the executor or administrator so distri - buting the residuary estate shall not, after having made or executed such conveyance or assignment, and having, where necessary, set apart such sufficient fund as aforesaid, be personally liable in respect of any subsequent claim under the said conveyance, or agreement for conveyance ; but nothing herein contained shall prejudice the right of the grantor, or those claiming under him, to follow the assets of the deceased into the hands of the person or persons to or among whom the said assets may have been distributed," Those persons only will l)e bound l)v a real covenant. Appointee of -^ "^ • covenantor who take the estate of the covenantor. And therefore an ""' •^°""''' a,ppointee of the covenantor will not be bound ; because the appointee is in under the deed creating the power : his estate is derived out of the seisin, not of the appointor, Ijut of the person out of whose seisin the appointor's estate was derived (Ji). In the case of inherent, l)ut not of collateral covenants, Liability of assignee. even though assigns he not mentioned, and whether the assignment is from the lessee himself, or from his repre- sentatives, or from any other assignee, an assignee is bound by an express real covenant from the date of his assign- ment, whether he enter or not, Init only ^^'■hile he continues assiii'nee ; and he mav at anv time discharge himself from his obligation to the reversioner, but not from his covenants for indemnity, by an assignment, even to a beggar (i). But the lessee himself, the original covcjiantor, is n()t (/i)9Javni. & Bytli. by Sweet, (/) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 177, ISO ; 345, 346; Sugd. Concise View 437, Burton, §1086 ; 9 Jam. & Byth. by 439, 441 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, Sweet, 333—9. § 67. ?2 662 OF TTIE COVENANTS. Ptiii. T.12, discharged from lialiility on an express covenant by assign- ing over the term ; nor are his heirs, when named, nor his Liability of o ' ' > lesseu after exccutors Or administrators ; for the lessor or i^rantoe of the reversion may either charge the lessee, his heirs, executors, or administrators, or the assignee {h). But the original lessee is discharged from all im-plied covenants by his assignment, if assented to by the reversioner (/). '^rtw'^^^^^ A person who is not assignee of the whole term or un- uu;i'e'r'lfim cxpircd rcsiduB of a term, but is a mere underlessee, or an not buuud. . p I . . , , , . , assignee ot, or person clanning under, an underlessee, is not liable to an action for the breach of any of the covenants contained in the original lease {m). But he may under certain circumstances be liable to an injunction (n). To wiiom the The benefit of real covenants passes to the heirs of the beiieti: nf •"■ ruHi cove- covenantee, althouoh entered into with him and his execu- uants passes. ' o tors and administrators only, if they relate to land of which the covenantee is seised, either previously to or by the deed containing such covenants, or by a deed forming, with such deed, a part of one transaction. And the benefit of real covenants, entered into with the covenantee, his heirs and assigns, or even with the covenantee and his heirs only, also passes to all persons who take the estate of the covenantee, or any estate derived out of that estate, but not to persons whose estate is derived out of the seisin of some other per- son. Hence, where covenants are entered into with the releasee to uses and his heirs and assigns, or with him and his heirs only, they run with the land for the benefit of all the cestuis que use whose estates are derived out of the momentary seisin of such releasee, whether such cestuis que use are or are not parties to the conveyance, and whether (Z-) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 180 ; 4 Burton, § 855, n. Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 37 ; Eurton, § (n) Parlcer v. Whyte, 1 Hem. & lOSG. Mil. 167; ClemenlKy. ]VcUcs,U\{., (I) Burton, § 1087. 1 Eq, 200, (//!) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 33; OF THE COVENANTS. 663 they claim immediately under it, or by virtue of an appoint- pt.iii. T.12, ment made under a power contained in that conveyance. And so, -where the covenants are made, not with tlic re- leasee to vises, but with the cestui que use and his heirs and assigns, or with him and his heirs only, they run with the land for the lienefit of any person who claims as suc- cessor or alienee of his estate. But Avhen made with the cestui que use and his heirs and assigns, they do not run with the land for the benefit of an appointee of the cestui que use ; because such appointee, though the alienee of the cestui que use, is not the alienee of his estate ; for the cestui que use, liy the appointment, defeats and annihilates his own estate, and substitutes a new estate in favour of his appointee, which takes effect, not out of the seisin of the cestui que use, but out of the original seisin of the releasor to uses. In consequence of this, where the releasee to uses and the purchaser are different persons, covenants which are intended to run with the land should be made with the releasee to uses, and not with the cestui que use (0). As the covenants will only run with the estate of the covenantee, if he takes but a particular estate, and an estate in remainder is limited to another person, the covenants will not run with the latter estate, unless the remainder- man is expressly named in the covenant, and, in cases under the old law, is also a party to the deed (p). If a covenant does not concern the land itself, but only a particular mode of occupying or using the same, it does not run with the land. Thus, if a lessee covenants to use the premises as a public-house, and the lessor covenants not to Iniild or keep any house for the sale of beer or spirits within a certain chstance of the demised premises, (0)4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 28, She]}. T. 17Q ; Western v. Macdcrmoti 64 ; Sugd. Concise View, 435—441 ; L. R., 1 Eq. 499. 9 Jarm, & By th. by Sweet, 355, 362, Cp) 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet 364 ; Burton, § 581, 585 j 1 Pres. 363. See supra, p. 654. 664 OF THE COVENANTS. pr.iir. T.12, the lessor's covenant does not run M'itli the land, so as to Ch. 1, s. 10. 1 • / X enable tlie assignee of the lease to sue lum [q). Where the whole of a term is assigned, and no reversion is left in the assignor, though the rent be reserved to the original lessee and not to the lessor, the assignee will be entitled to the benefit of the covenants contained in the original lease (r). Coveuaijtor'3 widow claims under liim. Covenant to ktep policy ou lout. Meaning of expression " clear of taxes." Covenant as to purpose for which a house is to be used. YII. Constrndion of certain Covenants. The widow of the covenantor claiming dower is a person claiming under him, within the meaning of the covenants for title (.s). Although covenants are to be construed according to the intent of the parties, yet where a person covenants to do and perform all such acts, matters, and things as may be requisite for continuing and keeping on foot a policy of insurance on his life, it was held that this covenant could not be read negatively, as if he had covenanted to do no act whereby it would become void ; and that therefore the covenant is not broken by his suicide, whereby the policy becomes forfeited (t). It has been held that a charge for repair of a bridge is not a parliamentary tax, Avithin the meaning of a covenant to pay rent clear of " all taxes and deductions whatsoever, parliamentary or parochial," where it arises from a liability by reason of tenure, and does not originate in an Act of Parliament, though an Act of Parliament supplies a more convenient mode of raising the necessary funds to meet it (u). Where a house is sold subject to a covenant not to cany on any trade, business, or calling whatever, in or upon it, (q) Thomns v. Iliujicard, L. R. 4 {t) Dormay v. Borrodaile, 10 Ex. 311. Beav. 335 ; 5 Com. B. 380. (r) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 5. (u) Baher v. GreenhiU, 3 Ad. & E. (s) See 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 78. N. S. 148. OF THE COTEXANTS. 665 or otherwise use, or suffer the same to be used, to the rr.nr.Ti?, ' Cn. 1, s. 10. annoA'auce, nuisance, or injuiy of any of the houses on the — — — estate, the carryinsz on a school for voung ladies is a breach of the covenant (r). The sale of beer by retail under a license '•' not to be drunk on the premises," is no breach of a covenant not to use the premises as " a public house " (,>;). VIII. Cesser, Discharge, or Satisfaction of Covenants, and Relief against them. Where a person has expressly and absolutely contracted xoreriefin or covenanted to do a particular thing, it is no ground for f^^gj'jf^fj^" the interference of a court of equity that he has been pre- "S'-eenieiit vented by accident or unforeseen circumstances from fulfil- ling his engagement, or from deriving the full benefit of the contract on his side. For he might have prevented any injury to himself from accident, by making proper excep- tions ; but since he omitted doing so, the law will presume an intentional general liability {]/). So that if a lessee to repair, covenants to keep the demised premises in repair, he will be bound to do so, notwithstanding any unavoidable acci- dent by Avhich tliey are destroyed or injured (z). And °g^°.P*y where there is a covenant to pay rent during tlie term, without any proper exceptions, it must be paid, notwith- standing the premises are accidentally burnt down during ■ the term CfO- And where a person covenants to raise and toraieeand N ' i- pay tor a v/ork a certain number of tons of coal in the year, and pay quantity of for the same a certain rate per ton, or pay a fixed rent, whether the coals should he wrought or not ; the whole amount of rent may be claimed, although the mine is so (!') Keiii}^ V. Sober, 1 Sim. N. S. (//) Sec Story's E({. Jiir. § 101 — ■ 517. 104. (x) PcKSc V. Coats, L. R. 2 Eq. (t) .Story's Eq. Jur. § 101. 688. [a) Story's Eq. Jur. § 102. 666 OF THE COVENANT^. Pt.III.T.12, Ch. 1, s. 10. Oppres^iive coviiiaut not eiiliirced iu equity. Covenants detcrniineJ with the deed or estate itself. Where the leavj:jg a flistrihutive share by au intestate is a performance or satisfac- tion of v.n obligation by covenant. exliaustud thai the lessee eould not raise the number of tons in the year. In such a case it is considered that the Court cannot import into the covenant a condition that there should be coals to that extent : if such was the inten- tion of the parties, they should have so expressed it (h). But where performance of a covenant is become impossible, by the act of God (as where a person who covenants to serve another for seven years, dies before the seven years are expired), the covenant is discharged (c). If a covenant is very injurious and oppressive, a court of equity will not enforce it, nor grant an injunction to pre- A'ent a breach of it (d). Where the deed itself, wherein the covenants are con- tained, or the estate on which the covenants depend, is at an end, there, regularly, the covenants are also determined, except in cases provided against by the stat. 7 & 8 Vict, c. 76, s. 12, and 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 9 (e). And, there- fore, under the old laAv, if a lease for life or years was sur- rendered, except for the purpose of renewal, or if a deed was void by erasure or the like, and there were covenants contained in the deed, the covenants were also extingnished thereby. But a surrender did not discharge a breach of covenant antecedent to such surrender (/). AVhere, on a purchase by the lessee, a conveyance of the inheritance is made by the lessor to the lessee, that puts an end to the covenants in the lease {(/). In the case of a covenant that a wife or relative shall receive a gross sum on the death of the covenantor, his or her distributive share, in the case of an intestacy, if equal to or greater than the sum covenanted to be paid, is to be {h) Marquis of Bute v. Thonipson, 13 M. & W. 487. (c) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 180. (d) Talbot V. Ford, 13 Sim. 173. (c) See Part Til. T. 12, c. 2, end of s. 5, on Leases. (/) 1 Pros. Shep. T. ISO ; 1 Piatt on Leases, 787 — 8. [(j) Sugd. Concise View, 124. OF THE COVEXANlS. 667 considered as a performance ; if less, as a part perform- PT.iir.T.12, ance. But where the covenant is that an annuity shall be paid or secured on the death of the covenantor, the distri- buti^^e share is not a performance or part performance (/'). And, where the covenant debt arises in the lifetime of the , covenantor (as Avhere he covenants within two years after marriage to pa}' a certain simr, and he outlives the two )'ears), a distributive share Avill not be a performance or a satisfaction of the covenant. iN'or is an orphanage part ; for it is not in the father's power {i). AVhere a father, on the marriage of his daughter, cove- ^^•ller^aa '-' ^ obligation by nants that he will, bv deed or will, give, leave, and be- coveuam u queath unto her an equal share with his other children, of {'he'llerson^in all the real and personal estate of which he may die uwas seised or possessed, and the daughter dies in her father's lifetime, and he devises and becpieaths his property to his surviving children, it has been held that this is no breach of the covenant (k). Section XI. Of the Indorsed Reccijjf. It is the usual practice to acknowledge payment of the pt.iii.t.i2, consideration money in the operative part. And sometimes there is a distinct recital of the payment of the same. In addition to either or both of these, it is usual, in the case of a purchase or mortgage, where the consideration money is paid or advanced at the time of the execution, to indorse upon the deed a receipt for it, signed by the party who receives the money. But when the payment of the money is recited as an antecedent transaction, it is not usual to {h) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 609. {k) Jones v. IIoiv, 7 Have, 267. («■) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 609. 668 OF THE KECEIPT. tt. TILT. 12, place a receipt on the back of the deed. At la^v, either tlie Ch. 1, 8. 11. ^ recital or the acknowledgment, if sufficiently precise, Mill hind the parties hy estoppel. But the indorsed receipt is not conclusive, because not under seal. And in equity, none of these are of any avail if non-payment is proved, as it may be (/). In equity, payment -will be presumed, after a great length of time (;»). The indorsed receipt, or, it seems, a distinct circumstantial recital of jjayment in the body of the deed, is, under ordinary circumstances, suffi- cient to excuse persons subsequently dealing with the purchaser, from inquiring whether the money has been actually paid (??). And, on the other hand, the absence of any receipt for the consideration is notice to a purchaser that it has not been paid (o). {1} Sugd. Concise View, 537 ; (in) Sugd. Concise View, f^S?. Burton, § ,o35 ; 1 Jarm. & Bytli. by (n) 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 78. Sweet, 90 ; 5 Id. 552 ; 9 Id. 78 ; i (o) 1 Jarm. & BUb. by Sweet, 93. Cruise T. 32, c. 20, § 27. 669 CHAPTER IT. OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF DEEDS : AND FIRST, OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF COMM<;»N LAAV CONVEYANCES. Those deeds wliicli are termed conveyances, in the wide ,/^^'^^l\ sense of the word, and which serve to create, divide, trans- ^^^j~^ fer, discharge, strengthen, defeat, or renounce estates or conveyances. interests, may be arranged into two great classes : — I. Conveyances at tlie Common LaAV. II. Statutory Conveyances, that is, deeds which derive their efficacy from the operation of an Act of Parliament. I. Of Common Law Conveyances there are about thirteen Common law '' conveyances. kinds : — 1. Feoffments. 2. Gifts. 3. Grants. 4. Bargains and Sales. 5. Leases. 6. Exchanges. 7. Partitions. 8. Eeleases. 9. Confirmations. 10. Surrenders. 11. As- signments. 12. Defeasances. 13. Disclaimers. Defeasances and disclaimers operate in effect as convey- ances, by causing property to return. Feoffments, leases, and partitions exclusively relate to real estate. Gifts, grants, bargains and sales, exchanges, releases, confirma- tions, surrenders, assignments, defeasances, and disclaimers may relate either to real or to personal estate. II. Not reckoninjT those deeds which existed at common statutory ^ conveyances. law, and when made to uses operate under the Statute of Uses, such as feoffments and bargains and sales to uses, there are about ten kinds of statutory deeds i — 1. Covenants to stand seised. 2. Deeds of Lease and Release. 3. Sta- tutory Releases. 4. Statutory Grants, that is. Grants to uses imder the Statute of Uses and the stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 2. 5. Deeds to lead and declare the uses of other assurances. G. Deeds of revocation of uses. 7. Deeds of 670 DIFFERENT KINDS OF CONVEYANCES. Tart HI. T. 12, Ch. 2. Deeds op'-ratins by I raasmuta- ti.Jii of possession, or wUliuut transmuta- tion of possession. Deeds otlier than convey- ances. Deeds wlien considered with relcr- euce to the piu'iiose to be effei^ted by tliem. appointment under powers. 8. Leases under powers. 0. Bargains and sales under the Act for the abolition of Fines and Eecoveries. 10. Concise conveyances and leases under the statutes 8 & 9 Yict. c. 1 19 and c. 124, and 25 & 20 Vict. c. 53. Deeds under tlie Statute of Uses are said to operate eitlier without transmutation of possession, as in the case of a bargain and sale, or a covenant to stand seised ; or by transmutation of possession, as in the case of deeds to lead or declare the uses of feoffments, fines, or recoveries : for, in the former case, the alteration of the legal seisin is effected by the mere operation of the statute, the use alone being transferred by the conveyance itself; while in the latter case, the legal seisin is first transferred by a common law assurance before the statute operates (a). III. There are some other deeds wdiich affect or concern real or personal estate, Ijut are not properly termed con- veyances. Such are, 1. Deeds of covenant or agreement respecting real estate. 2. Bonds. 3. Declarations of trust of real estate. 4. Deeds of appointment of trustees, re- ceivers, stewards, guardians, attornies, and others standing in a confidential relation. IV. Some of these various deeds ser^■e as purchase deeds, others as mortgage deeds, others as marriage settlements, others as deeds of arrangement, others as deeds of indemnity, others as composition or creditors' deeds, others as appor- tionments of rents, others as partnership deeds, and others are used for certain other purposes which will appear from the definitions given of them in the foUoAving pages. («) 1 Cruise T. 11, c. 4, § 1-2—11 ; 2 Pres, Shep, T. 510. OF A FEOFFMENT, 671 Section I. Of a Feoffment. A feoftinent properly sio'iiifies a conveyance of corporeal pt. 111.T.12. T r. 1 ch. 2, S.l. hereditaments for an estate m fee simple, or lor a deter- ., , ,. „ . . Definition, minable fee other than an estate tail, by livery ot seism evidenced by a deed in writing. Sometimes, however, a feoffment signifies a conveyance of corporeal hereditaments by livery, evidenced by deed, though only in tail or for life. But a feoffment in tail is more ]n'operly termed a gift, and a feoffment for life, a lease (//). A feoffment consists of two distinct acts : first, livery of Jfe^Cent^f seisin, or delivery of possession, which was all that the Livery of ' 1/ i. seisin, common la^^' required. And, secondly, a written explana- and a written tioii signed by the feoffor, Avliich is required by the Statute e.\pianation, of Frauds {c). By the stat 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, this must be ,^^^;^|;g"j;j,'* by deed : for it is enacted, by s. 3 of that Act, " that a '^''^'• feoffment made after the 1st of October, 18-45, other than a feoffment made under a custom by an infant, shall l)e void at law unless evidenced by deed." Livery of seisin is of two kinds : livery in deed, and Livery is either in liverv in law. The first is an actual delivery of some ci.^odorin •' law. symbol of possession on the land, \\W.\\ apt words. The second is a verbal delivery within sight of it {d). Livery in law does not transfer the freehold till an Howiivery actual entry is made by the feoffee. Therefore, if either reqnirestobe ^ perlected, the feoffor or feoffee dies before an entry is made under the livery thus given, it becomes void (f). If the feoffee dared not enter through fear of his life or bodily harm, then liis continual claim made yearly in due form of law as [h) 1 Tres. Shep. T. 203, 204 ; Co. (;). A common law bargain and sale may, however, be made of chattels personal (?/). A bargain and sale, if enrolled within the i^roper time, Dispositions ° ' ^ -"^ ' by, or r!eed3 binds the land in point of title from the execution thereof ; »' bai-gaiuor J- 01' liargaiiiee so that, if the bargainor attempted to dispose of or charge em°l®ent. the estate between the delivery of the deed and the enrol- ment thereof, such an intervening disposition or charge would be void {z). And the death of the bargainor or of the bargainee before enrolment, is not material. Where the bargainee dies before enrolment of the deed, if it is afterwards duly enrolled, his heir will be in by descent (ci). And an assurance made by the bargainee before enrol- {q) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 223 : 4 Cruise Pres. Shep. T. 222. T. 32, c. 9, § 20, 22. (.r) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 9, g 18. (r) 3 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, (;/) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 224. 239. (z) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 226— 7 j 2 (») 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 9, § 4, 11, Pres. Shep. T. 511 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, 15, 18 ; Watk. Conv. 3rd ed. by c. 9, § 34 ; 3 Jarm. & Byth. by Prest. 203. Sweet, 238 ; Burton, § 142. («) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 9, § 16. («) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 9, § 35, (w) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 9, s. 17 ; 1 682 OF A TiAllGAIK AN'D SALE. pt.iii.t.12, inent is valid, if tlic Ijavii-ain and sale is afterwards duly Cu. 2, 8. 4. '^ "^ enrolled (h). Disuse of Bargains and sales of real estate under the Statute of baig.-uiis nnd ^ estatt°s^ '''''' Uses are now little used as assurances from vendor to vendee, because they do not admit of the limitations usual in purchase deeds, namely, the limitations to prevent dower, including the power of appointment (r). And these assurances do not admit of general powers (d). Bargain and By the statutc 25 Gco. 3, c. 35, the lands of debtors Bale of iamls '^ tbe crowii*° ^^ ^^^^ Crown which have been extended, may, by order of the Court of Exchequer, be sold and conveyed by bargain and sale enrolled (c). Enrolment of A bargain and sale under a common law authority does bargains and ° ^ro^'^ert "^ for ^^'^^ rcqulrc enrolment (/'). But to the validity of a bar- freehoii °* g^iii ^^i^tl^ sale of real property for an estate of freehold, uuder the Statute of Uses, enrolment was rendered ne- cessary by the Statute of Enrolments. By the common law, the transfer of property in land was made a matter of publicity by a formal giving and taking possession ; and the secret nature of uses is mentioned in the preamble to the Statute of Uses as one of the principal inducements to their abolition. Yet, as the effect of the construction put upon that statute Avas, that such property might be trans- ferred by a secret transaction ; in order to remedy this, the stat. 27 Hen. 8, c. 16, was passed (g), whereby it was enacted, that no " manors, lands, tenements, or other here- ditaments shall pass, alter, or change from one to another, Avhereby any estate of inheritance or freehold shall be made (b) 3 Jarm. & Byth. by S^veet, (e) 2 Cruise T. 14, § 106. 238. (/) 3 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, (c) 9 Jarni. & Byth. by Sweet, 238; 9 Jarm, & Byth. by Sweet, 281, 425-6. See supra, pp. 256, 425—6. 262. {fj) Burton, § 139 ; 2 Bl. Com. (d) Walk. Conv. 3rd ccl by Brest. 338 ; Co. Litt. 48 a, n. (3) ; Watk. 204. Conv. 3r(l ed. by Brest. 202. OF A BAROAIN AND SALE. 65^) or take effect in any person or persons, or any use thereof p^. 111.T.12 to be made, by reason only of any bargain and sale thereof, except the same bargain and sale be made by writing in- dented, sealed and enrolled in one of the King's Courts of Eecord at Westminster, or else within the same county or counties where the same manors, lands, or tenements, so bargained and sold, lie or be, before the custos rotulorum and two justices of the peace, and the clerk of the peace of the same county or counties, or two of them at the least, whereof the clerk of the peace to be one ; and the same enrolment to be had and made within six months next after the date of the same writings indented." But liy s. 2, it is i)rovided, that this enactment shall not raiticuiar exemptions "extend to any manor, lands, tenements, or heredita- from emoi- ments, lyuig or being within any city, borough, or town corporate within this realm, wherein tlie mayors, recor- ders, chamberlains, bailiffs, or other ofticer or ofiicers have authority or have lawfully used to enrol any evidences, deeds, or other writings within their precinct or limits ; anything in this Act contained to the contrary notwith- standing." In consequence of this exemption, lands antl tenements in cities and boroughs having the privilege of enrolment are not within the Act; and though the intention of the statute was only to exempt them from enrolment in the Courts at Westminster, yet it is worded in such a manner that they are discharged from any enrolment whatever (//). The deed must be an indenture, and the enrolment Kind of deed and mode of must be on parchment {i). enrolment. The computation of the time for enrolment is by lunar computation ^ •'of the six months, except in the case of a disentailing assurance, and ™<'°*ii»- from and exclusive of the day of the date of the deed, or, [h) i Cruise T. 32, c. 9, § 32. {i) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 221, 223. ricaciiiig or giviug in evidence. 684 OF A r.Ai;(_;AL\ and salk. r?;.iH.T.i2, ji" it hears no date or an impossible one, from and cxclu- Ch. 2, s. 4. ■•- ' sive of the day of delivery {j). atter'dlath. '^'l'^' enrolment may he made after the death of either part)- Cy). Tlie hargaid and sale, as such, cannot, after the end of six months, or even during the six months, he given in evidence or pleaded, unless it has Ijeen enrolled within the six months (IS). Enrolment in p,y t|:ie statutc 5 Eliz. c. 26, bargains and sales of lands DudlaiT'and b'^^S ^^^ ^^^^ couuties pa,latine of Lancaster and Chester, and the bishopric of Durham, are required to be enrolled in the respective Courts of those counties. And l:)y the statute 5 Ann. c. 18, 6 Ann. c. 35, and 8 Geo. 2, c. 6, bar- gains and sales of lands lying within the west, east, and north ridings of the county of York, may be enrolled before the registrars of those ridings (/). Ejempticn By the statute 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, s. 2, it was enacted, from enrol- •^ stlt'r'&T " ^^^'^^ every person may convey by any deed, without vict. c. re, liy^^iy of seisin, or enrolment, or a prior lease, all such freehold land as he might before the passing of the Act have conveyed by lease and release." But this enactment was repealed by the stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 1, as from the 1st day of October, 1845. fatefor''^"'^ T(j a bargain and sale of personal chattels at the coin- chX\f \'L\o\\ law, or of real property for a term of years, under the iTOiierty'for Statute of Uses, by a person having an estate of freehold, a term of . ••iio p-r). Copyholds Tlio statute 32 Plen. 8, c. 28, does not extend to copy- the Stat. hold estates (c). 32 Hen. 8, ^ ^ c- 28- All leases by tenants in tail, not warranted by the sta- tenant in tute 32 Hcu. 8, wcrc o'ood against the tenant in tail himself, tail not ' O o warranted by \)iit ^;yQYQ yoidablc by tlic issuc iu tail, unless l)arred. But that statute. "^ ' if the issue in tail accepted of rent or fealty after the death of his ancestor, or brought an action for the rent, these acts would operate as a confirmation of the lease (d). And each issue in succession might, while the lease continued, affirm the lease for his time. But a lease avoided by the issue in any line of the succession, was avoided for ever (e). Leases made by tenants in tail were absolutely void as against the persons in remainder and reversion, and ipso facto determined on the death of the tenant in tail and failure of the issue in tail, according to the maxim, Ces- sante statu primitivo, cessat et derivativus : so that no acceptance of rent by them woidd operate as a confirma- tion (/). Leases by tenant in tail might, however, become indefeasible, as against the issue, by means of a fine with proclamations or a recovery duly suffered, and might become absolute and binding on the entire fee simple, (l) 2 EL Com. 319, 320 ; Co. Pres. Sliep. T. 268, 275, 284, 289 ; Litt. 44 a, b; Pres. Shep. T. 278 Burton, g 714. —9. (e) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 289. (c) 1 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, (/) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. r>, § 71 ; ' 2 433, n. (a). Pros. Shep. T. 2GS. ((?) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 5, s. 70 ; 2 OF LEASES AND UNDERLEASES. 0S9 wlien tlie estate tail was hy a common recovery enlar^'ed pt. nr.T.12, '' ./ o c,,^ 2, s. 5. into a fee simple {g). Leases made by Imsband and M'ife of tlie wife's land, pases by 'J Lusbaud and. though not conformable to the statnte 32 Hen. 8, were ^Im-anLiby only voidable, and not void ; and therefore acceptance sfnea/s. of rent by the wife after her husband's death, would ope- rate as a confirmation (A). An agreement for a lease by a husband and wife seised in right of the wife, would not be binding on the wife or her heirs, or her issue in tail, because the statute 32 Hen. 8, c. 28, only authorises " leases " (i). This Act is repealed by the stat. 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, Repeal tliereol'. s. 35, except so far as relates to leases by persons having an estate in right of their churches. By the stat. 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, power is given to the Leases ani "^ X o agreementa Court of Chancery (even in the case of infants, lunatics, ^^^^^^4^^^, bankrupts, insolvents, and married women, ss. 36 — 8), to yfct. ^ i'2o!' authorize leases, and preliminary contracts to grant leases, of settled estates, that is, of estates limited by any instru- ment or instruments (whether before or after the passing of the Act, s. 44), to or in trust for any persons by Avay of succession, or of any rights and privileges over or affecting any settled estates, subject to certain conditions (ss. 1, 2, 3, 6), unless an application for that purpose lias been rejected by Parliament (s. 21) ; or unless it would be contrary to the intention of the settlor (s. 26) ; or beyond his power (s. 27) ; or unless in the case of leases of copyholds with- out the consent of the lord (s. 43). But no lease shall be granted for more than 21 years, of any settled estate whereof the tenants in tail are debarred from defeating their estates tail, or where the reversion is in the Crown (s. 42). (g) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 284. 252. {h) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 5, § 72 ; (/) 1 Jp.rm. & Bjtb. by Sweet, Watk. Cony. 3rd. ed. by Prcst. 427. GOO OF LEASES AND UNDERLEASES. pt. iii.t.12, By ss. 32, 33, 3G — 8, of tlie same statute (even in the Oh 2 s. 6 -"—--" case of infants, lunatics, bankrupts, insolvents, and married women), tenants for life, or for years determinable on lives, or for any greater estate, of property settled since the passing of the Act, and tenants by the curtesy, or in dower, or in right of their wives, of unsettled property, may, without application to the Court, make binding leases (except of the principal mansion and the land usually oc- cupied therewith) for 21 years, in possession, subject to certain conditions, except in the case of copyholds without the consent of the lord. By ss. 7, 10, of the same statute, the Court of Chancery may vest powers of leasing settled estates in the trustees of the settlement or in any other persons. The Act is amended and extended by the stat. 21 & 22 Vict. c. 77 (k), and by the stat. 27 & 28 Vict. c. 45, so far as regards the 1st and 10th sections, lease by If tenant in fee simple takes a wife, and then makes a tenant in '■ foe wLose Iqq^sb for vcars, and dies, and the wdfe is endowed, the lease wife IS J > ' ' endowed. ^^ ^.^-j ^^ agaiust her, but will be good as against tlie heirs, &c., of the husband (/). leases by Joint tcuauts, teuauts in common, and coparceners may joint teuauts, tenants in makc Icascs for life or years of their own shares, and these common, ai.d '' coi.arceners. jg^ggg -^viU bind their companions ; and one joint tenant, coparcener, or tenant in common may make a lease of his or her part to the other {iri). If joint tenants join in a lease, there will be but one lease ; for they have but one freehold. But if tenants in common join in a lease, there will be se^^eral leases of their several interests (?i). Operative The words " grant," " demise," and "to farm let," are the words. . 1 • 1 p most proper operative words m a lease for years ; but any words which show the intent of the parties that the one (Z-) See supra, pp. 597—8. p. 235. (/) 2 Pres. Shop. T. 275. (n) 2 Pros. Shep. T. 208, n. (8). (w) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 2C8 ; supra, OF LEASES AND UNDERLEASES. 691 sliould divest liimself of tlie possession, and tlie other come rr- Tri.T.12, . ^ . Cii. 2, s. 5. into it for a determinate time, are in general snfficient for — — — the pnrpose (0). There are some kinds of incorporeal hereditaments which Leases of incorporeal may be leased. Thus, an advowson appendant may be i^ere'Uta- leased with the manor to which it is annexed, or separate from it ; and an advowson in gross may also be leased Q;). And tithes, whether in the hands of ecclesiastics or lay im- ] )ropriators, might be leased (q). If a man is possessed of a term of years, althongh it be Grant of residue of one hundred years or upwards, and OTants to another, as a term alter ■ ^ ' o ' death ot legal interest, all the residue of the term of years that shall *"'mor. be to come at the time of his death, this grant is void ; because terms for years being anciently A'ery short, the common laAV will not presume that any part of the term wiU exist at the death of the grantor (?-). A lease for life of anything whatsoever, whether it lie in Lease for livery or grant, it it is 111 esse beiore, cannot begin at a day future, to come, unless it lies in livery, and livery is not made till that day (s) ; or unless it is by w^ay of remainder, or by way of grant of the reversion, or of a part of the reversion immediately expectant upon some other estate of freehold ; or unless it is a lease under the Statute of Uses, and not at the common law. In the case of leases for lives, the timber is included. Timber, unless excepted, so that the lessor must not fell them, because the lessee has by his lease a particular interest in the trees, such as the mast and fruit of them, and shade and shelter for his cattle, and may lop them, if they be not thereby injured (/"). ^Yllere the trees are excepted in the (0) Burton, § 838 ; 2 Bl. Com. (r) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 251 ; see 317 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 5, § 2 ; Co. also supra, p. 321. Litt. 45 b ; Watk. Conv. 3rd ed. by (s) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 272; Watk. Prest. 18, 19, 178. Conv. 3rd ed. by Prest. 170, 175. (p) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 5, § 22. (t) I Oruiso T, 3, c. 2, § 3. (7) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 5, § 23, YOL. u, ^1 692 OF LEASES AND UNDERLEASES. pr. III.T.12, lease, as tlioy usually are, the lessee has no interest what- Ch. 2j 3. 5. ever in them. The lessor also has power, as incident to the exception, to enter upon the land, in order to fell and take away the trees ; though this power, for greater caution, is often expressly reserved (u). Lessee not A Icsscc is uot estoppcd ]w the descriijtion of the lands estopped by i- 1. j ticscriptioii. contained in his lease ; for this is not the essence of the deed. And he may therefore show that what is there called meadow has been sometimes ploughed (a;). Rent (j/). Whether any rent is reserved upon a lease for life or years or at will, or not, is not material, except in the case of leases made by virtue of any statute whereby rent is required to be reserved ; or by ecclesiastical persons ; or by persons leasing under powers requiring a reservation of rent (z). If a lease is made reserving rent, payable quarterly, this shall be intended quarterly from the date of the lease, and not at the usual feasts (a). Tithe and In tlic abseucc of any stipulation on the subject, the land tax. . J r ^ > tithe rent charge is payable l)y the landlord (b). Where a lease was made at a yearly rent, " payal^le quarterly, free of all outgoings," the Vice-Chancellor Stuart held that these words were not sufiicient to relieve the lessor from the payment of the land tax and tithe rent charge ; but Lord Campbell, C, held that the tenant must pay them (c). Disagreeing Any pcrsou may disagree to a term for years (rZ). Where entry ^^ Icascs for ycars at the common law, an actual entry IS necessary. ^^ necessaiy to vest the estate in the lessee ; for the bare lease does not give him an estate, l3ut only a right to enter, {u) 1 Cruise T. 3, c. 2, § 4. (6) Parler v. Tcmoell, 2 D. & J. [x) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 19, § 61. 559. {ij) See supra, pp. 17 et seq. ; 650 (c) Parish v. Sleeman, Gif. 238 ; —3. 1 D. F. & J. 326. (z) 2 Pres. Sliep. T. 268. {d) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 26, § 9. (a) 3 Cruise T. 28, c. I,go0. OF LEASES AND UNDEllLEASES. 093 which is called his interest in the term, or interesse ter- ^Tj^^'^-J-^^' mini (c). And as the lessee has no estate till entry, so until entry the lessor's estate is not converted into a rever- sion (/). But where a term for years is created by way of use, tlie interest is made an estate l>y the statute without entry (g). A termor for years may assign or underlet, unless there Assignment or uiider- be an express condition or provision in the lease to restrict letting, the power of alienation which the law gives ; and even in that case, the lessee may assign or underlet, but the assign- ment will give to the reversioner the right of re-entry, if he think proper to avail himself of the condition. But he may dispense with the forfeiture, as by accepting rent, confirming, &c., and in that case the title of the assignee will be indefeasible (/^). A tenant wlio has not stipulated that he will deliver up possession at the end of the term, is nevertheless bound to deliver up complete possession And therefore, if, against his wiU, his under-tenant holds over, the landlord can recover against the tenant damages equal to the rent which he has lost, and the costs of bringing an ejectment, (i). Where the owner of a term agrees to let for three years, and also, when called upon, to grant a lease for three years or seven years or the whole term, and the tenant continues in occupation beyond the first three years, and becomes bankrupt, and the assignee sells the bankrupt's estate and interest, the option of the tenant to take a lease is not to be regarded as having ceased at the end of the first three years, but it passes to the assignee, and from him to tlie purchaser (j). (e) 2 Bl. Com. 314 ; Burton, § 61 ; (h) Watkias's Conveyanciug, 3rd Co. Litt. 46 b ; Watk. Couv. 3rd ed. by Preston, 21, 177. ed. by Prest. 175. {!} Henderson v. Squire, L. R. 4 (/) Burton, § 61 ; Co. Litt. Q. B. 170. 46 b. {j) Bucldand v. Popillon, L. R. 2 {g) Barton, § 131. Ch. Ap. 67. 52 694 OF LEASES AND UNDERLEASES. pt. tii.t.12, If a lease for years is made on condition that tlie lessee Ch. 2, s. 5. -^ • — shall not assign or alien the term or the land dnrinf? his Oondilioiis _ ° ^^ against as- lifg -^vitliout the licence of the lessor, and the lessee gives it by his will without licence, this is a breach of the con- dition, and a forfeiture of the estate. But if a lease is made on condition that the lessee shall not alien without the licence of the lessor, so as to be personal to him, and afterwards the lessor dies, and the lessee assigns ; or the lessee dies, and his executors or administrators assign; there is no breach of the condition in either of these cases (/j. And Avhere there is a condition that the lessee shall not assign it over without permission, an underlease is not within the condition (vi). Covenant not Where a lessee covenanted not to alien or transfer his to aheu. lease, and afterwards acknowledged a judgment, on which the lease was taken in execution and sold, it was held that this sale was not a forfeiture of tlie lease (n). But where a warrant of attorney to confess a judgment is given by collusion for the purpose of enabling a creditor to take a lease in execution, it will be a breach of such a covenant (o). A covenant by lessees, for themselves, tlieir heirs, execu- tors, administrators, and assigns, that they, their executors, administrators, and assigns, would not assign without the lessor's consent, is a covenant which touches and conceras the land, and, therefore, runs with the land, and the lessor can sue an assignee of the lessee for the breach of it (^9). Similar covenants relating to things fixed to the land also run with the land (q). Covenant to A covcuant in a sublease to perform all the covenants perform ^ (h) As to the apportionment of (n) 2 Cruise T. 13, c. 1, § 4G. such conditions, see supra, pp. 72, (o) 2 Cruise T. 13, c. 1, § 48. 73. (p) Williams v. Earle, L. R. 3 Q. (Z) 1 Pres. Shep. T. lU, 145. B. 739. (m) 2 Cruise T. 13, c. 1, § 42 ; (q) WiUiams v. Earle, L. R. 3 Q. "VN'atk. Conv. 3rcl ed.by Pi-est. 21. B, 739. OF leasp:.s and underleases. 6f)5 in the original lease, is a covenant to perform those cove- Pt.ii[.t.i2, *^ ' ■- Ch. 2, s. 5. nants whilst the oririnal term is unexpired and unsiir- - — o *- covenants m rendered : it is not a covenant to do or abstain from doing f^^^^^^ the acts mentioned in those covenants, so as to apply, even after a new lease is taken, in which those covenants are omitted (?-). If an agreement for a lease contains no stiindation as to Usuai covenants. covenants, the party agreeing to take the lease has a riglit to a lease containing only usual covenants. A covenant in restraint of trade in a trade locality is not a usual cove- nant (s). Nor is a covenant not to assign or underlet (i). Under a contract for a lease to contain all usual cove- nants, particularly a covenant to keep the premises in good repair, the lessee is not entitled to have introduced the ^vords " damages by fire or tempest only excepted " (u). The assignee of a lease cannot, by assignine' over, mt rid Obligation of '^ ' -J o a > b lessee's of his liabilities for breaches of covenant committed during covcuants. the period of his own occupation. And hence, if the assignee of a lease devises the leaseliold, although the devisee may take it subject to the liability to do repairs wliich Avere wanted at the death of such assignee, yet the executors of the assignee are still liable, as between themselves and the lessor ; and they are entitled to have an indemnity in indemnity (o executors of respect of such liability before the devisee is let into pos- assignee, session (./;). And, except so far as the stat. 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 27, may protect them, executors of an assignee are entitled to have a fund set apart out of the assets for their indemnity, on their assigning to a purchaser, though he covenant to perform the covenants and to indemnify (//). But, as we have seen, the obligation of the lessee's covenants, thougli (r) Piggott v. Btratton, 1 Johns. («) Bhurp v. .Uilllgai), 23 Beav. 341. 419. (s) Propert v. Parker, 1 My. & K. (,r) HicUing v. Boyer, 3 Mac. & 280 ; Wilhraham v. Lkesey, 18 G. 635. Beav. 206. {,j) Brewer v. Pocock, 23 Bear. {t) Watk. Oouv. 3rcl ed. 177. 310 ; see supra, 659. 696 OF LEASES AND UNDERLEASES. pt. III.T.12, it will pass to an assignee of the whole term, is not com- Cu. 2, s. 6. J- ° ' mnnicatcd to an nndeiiessee (z). Renewal (a). By the stat. 4 Cleo. 2, c. 2'8, s. G, reciting that leases for lives or years could not be renewed without a surrender of all the underleases derived out of the same, it is enacted that all future renewals of leases for lives or years shall be valid without the surrender of any derivative leases (h). By the stat. 1 Will. 4, c. 65, s. 18, if persons bound to renew are out of the jurisdiction of the Court, renewals are directed to be made by a person appointed by the Court of Chancery in the name of the person who ought to have renewed. When a renewable leasehold estate is devised to trustees in trust for one person for life, remainder in trust for another for life, remainder in trust for a third person, with a direction to renew, and pay the fine out of the rents and profits, it seems to be the duty of the trustees to provide an accumulating fund out of the rents and profits during the enjoyment of the first tenant for life, to answer the renewals to be made in his time, and to pursue the same conduct during the life of the second tenant for life (c). Where a testator gives his leaseholds to trustees for legatees in succession, and upon trust that, " if the trus- tees shall think it proper or advantageous, as to those vdiicli are customarily or may be renewed, they shall or lawfully may endeavour to effect renewals upon such terms as they shall think proper ; " this does not make it compulsory on the trustees to renew, if they can by possi- bility obtain a renewal ; for then they would be compelled to pay any sum, however unreasonable, which might be demanded by the lessor. Yet, on the other hand, it does not give them a discretion to refrain from exercising the (z) See supra, p. 661—2. (h) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 5, § 59. (a) See stat. 23 & 24 Vict. c. ] 45, (r) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 819. BS. 8, 9 ; iufra, Part IV. Tit. 1, c. 2. OF LEASES AND UNDERLEASES. 697 power of renewal at their arbitrary will and pleasure. ^q^^I^-Y- But it imposes on tlieni the duty of endeavouring to effect a renewal, if they can do so on reasonable terms {(^). The right of renewal may be forfeited by the laclics of the tenant in not applying for a renewal within the time mentioned in the lease ((). U) 2 Pres. Shop. T. SOL (/.■) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 302. (/) Doe d. Earl of Egremont y. Courtencuj, 11 Ad. & E. (N. S.) 702. (m) Doe d. Earl of Egremont v. Courtenay, 11 Ad. & E. (N. S.) 702. (n) Att.-Gen, v. Foord, 6 Beav, 288 ; Att.-Gen. v. Iloiham, 3 Euss. 415. OP LEASES AND UNDEl{LEASES. Gt)9 And a building lease of cliarity property for more than pt.iii.t.i2, ninety-nine years cannot stand, unless there is some special ground on wliicli it can be protected (o). A lessee is bound to incpire into, and is bound by all ^°°j'e'"f*'^® covenants into whicli Ins lessor lias entered {p) And a per- ^"^''"'''^"'^• son contracting for an underlease lias notice of all the cove- nants contained in the original lease, or at least of those which are usual in leases of property of that description, and he will be bound to take an underlease subject to those covenants {q). A ri'2,lit of entry in a lease cannot be reserved to a Right of . . entry. stranger ; and tlierefore if it ajipears upon the face of the lease that the legal estate is in a mortgagee or a trustee for him, and the right of entry is reserved to the mortgagor, it will be void (r). By the general custom of all manors, every copyholder leases of copyholds. may make a lease for any term ol years, if he can obtain a licence from the lord ; and even without such licence, he may demise his tenement for one year ; and the interest thus created is not of a customary nature, but a com- mon law term (s). The lord of a manor cannot authorise an e(piitable tenant of a copyhold to demise ; because there is no privity of estate between them (/). The lord can only grant a licence to lease during the continuation of his own estate in the manor. Therefore a lease for years made by licence of a lord who is only tenant for life, will cease at his death (u). In the case of a lease by licence of the lord, the lessee may assign it, or make an underlease for years without any new licence ; for the lord's interest (o) Lord Langdalc in Att.-Gen, (r) Coote Mortg. 3rd ed. 338. V. Foord, 6 Beav. 290. (s) Burton, § 1313 ; 1 Cruise T. (p) Fielder V. Slater, L. E. 7 Eq. 10, c. 3, § 18. Cas. 523. {t) 1 Jarm & Bytli. by Sweet, (q) See Cosscr v. Collinge, 3 My. 433, n. (a). & K. 283 ; Wilhraham t. Livesejj, (m) 1 Cruise T. 10, c> 3, § 20, 18 Beav. 206. 700 OF LEASES AXD UNDERLEASES. Leases must be by deed. pt.iii.t.12, is discliargcd for so many years. And if the copyholder shoukl die witliont heirs, still the lease would stand against the lord, by reason of his licence, which amounts to a confirmation («), A lease made contrary to the custom of a manor is good against all but the lord ; and even as against him it is not void, but only a ground of forfeiture, which he may waive (y). By the stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, s. 4, it is enacted, " that no lease in writing of any freehold, copyhold, or leasehold land shall be valid as a lease unless the same shall be made by deed ; but any agreement in writing to let any such land shall be valid and take effect as an agreement to execute a lease ; and the person who shall be in the possession of the land in pursuance of any agreement to let may, from payment of rent or other circumstances, be construed to be a tenant from year to year." This was repealed as from the 1st of October, 1845, by the stat. 8 & 9 A^ict. c. 106. But by s. 3 of that Act, it is enacted, that " a lease required by law to be in writing {z), of any tenements or hereditaments, made after the 1st of October, 1845, shall be void at law, unless made by deed," Although an instrument may be void as a lease at law in conse- quence of this enactment, yet it may be used as an agree- ment in equity {a), or to prove the terms on which the tenant holds as constructive tenant from year to year ; so that his tenancy, which may be determined during the term by a half year's notice at the proper time, will, at the end of the term, expire without notice {h). By the stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, s. 12, it is enacted, " that Where remedies for {x) 1 Cruise T. 10, c. 3, § li>. {y) Doe d. Rohinson v. Bousfidd, 6 Ad. &E. (N. S.) 492. (z) See supra, p. 621. (a) Parlcr v. Taswell, 2 D. & J. 559. {h) Tress v. Sarm/e, i El. & Bl. 36 ; see also Doe d. Bavenish v. Moffatt, 15 Q. B. 257, in which there was a similar decision, under the stat. 7 & S Vict. c. 76, s. 4, And see Tidcij v. Mollett, 16 C. B. (N.S.) 298 ; Hayne v. Cummiiujs, Id. 421. OP LEASES AND UNDERLEASES. 701 3rsion of any land, expectant on a lease, shall be memed in any remainder or other reversion or estate. where the reversion of any land, expectant on a lease, shall rT.iiLT.i2, rent, cove- the person entitled to the estate into which such reversion u^ts aud shall have merged, his heirs, executors, administrators, n"t\o'bff successors, and assigns, shall have and enjoy the like ad- by'^thr'*'"''^ vantage, remedy, and benefit against the lessee, his heirs, immediate . . 1 • p reversion, successors, executors, administrators, and assigns, for non- payment of the rent, or for doing of waste or other for- feiture, or for not performing conditions, covenants, or agreements contained and expressed in his lease, demise, or grant, against the lessee, farmer, or grantee, his heirs, successors, executors, administrators, and assigns, as the person who would for the time being have been entitled to the mesne reversion which shall have merged would or might have had and enjoyed if such reversion had not been merged." This was repealed as from the 1st of October, 1845, by the stat. 8 & 9 Vict, c, 106. But by s. 9 of that when the reversion on Act, it is enacted, " that when the reversion expectant on =* ''^^^e is ' ' ^ gone, Ibe a lease made either before or after the passing of this Act, be'deciMd'" of any tenements or hereditaments, of any tenure, shall, sioV.'^^^^" after the said first day of October, 1845, be surrendered or merge, the estate which shall for the time being confer as against the tenant under the same lease the next vested right to the same tenements or hereditaments, shall, to the extent and for the purpose of preserving such incidents to, and obligations on, the same reversion, as, but for the surrender or merger thereof, would have subsisted, be deemed the reversion expectant on the same lease." Definition. 702 , OF AX EXCHAKGi;. Section VI. Of an Exchaiujc (c). Pr. III.T.12, An exchanu'e is an arrano-enient between two persons, or Ch. 2, s. G ^ ^ ^ between two classes of persons by eacli of wliicli property is held in commimity, that each person or class shall divest himself, herself, or themselves of his, her, or their o^vn property in favour of the other, and in lieu thereof shall take the property of the other, ucqnisitesto To tlic Validity of exchano'es at common law, five thinas an exchange ./ o o faJ^"'""""" are requisite : 1. That the the two subjects l)e of the same general nature. Thus, real estate cannot be exchanged for personal estate : but real estate of one kind may be ex- changed for real estate of another kind ; so that corporeal hereditaments may be exchanged for incorporeal heredita- ments {d). 2. That the parties take estates of the same general denomination, as regards the quantity of interest. Thus, an estate in fee simple cannot be exchanged for an estate tail, or either of them for an estate for life. But an estate in fee simple maybe exchanged for a base fee. And if a tenant in tail grants lands in fee, so as to give a base fee in exchange with a tenant in fee, this is a good ex- change until avoided by the issue. And an estate tail after possibility of issue extinct may be exchanged for an ordinary estate for life, as both are of the same duration (c). (c) Powers of exchange are con- Tit. 1, c. 2. ferred by various statutes, as to {d) 4 Jann. & Bytb. by Sweet, 1 whicli see Stamp's Index to the CoLitt. .50b; 4 (Jruise T. S"2, c. 6, Statute Law, tit. "Exchange ; " § 4 ; 2 Pres. Shep. T. 293—4. Burton, § 240; and see Minct v. {c) 4 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 1, Leman, 20 Beav. 269; 7 D. M. & 2; 2 Pres. Shep. T. 295; 4 Cruise G. 340. As to exchanges, reserving T. 32, c. 6, § 3, 4 ; 1 Cruise T. 4, or excepting minerals, see stat. 25 § 9 ; Burton, § 63 ; 2 Bl. Com. 126, & 26 Vict. c. 108, infra, Part IV. 323 ; Co. Litt. 28 a, 51 a. OF AX EXCHANGE. 703 3. The word "excliange" must be used (/). 4. Entry PT.ni.T.i2. (but not livery of seisin) is also requisite to give effect to an exchange ; and therefore if either party die before entry, his heir may avoid the exchange {(1). 5. An exchange, since the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3), must be in writing, and even before the statute 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, if the hereditaments whereof the exchange was made con- sisted of reversions, rents, or other incorporeal heredita- ments, or if they lay in several counties, it must have been by deed Qi). And by the stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, s. 3, it was enacted, " that no exchange of any freehold or lease- hold land shall be valid at law, unless the same shall be made by deed." And although this enactment was re- pealed l)y the stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, yet by s. 3 of that statute, it is enacted, " that an exchange of any tenements or hereditaments, not being copyhold, made after the first day of October, 1845, shall be void at law, unless made by deed." It is not necessary that both estates be in possession ; for an estate in possession may be exchanged for an estate in reversion. Neither is it necessary that there be an equality in the value or quantity of the lands. For if the land ot one party be worth 100/., and the land of the other but 10/., or if the land of one of the parties be 100 acres and the land of the other but ten acres, the exchange is good; Neither is equality in the quality or manner of the estate requisite. For an estate in joint tenancy may be exchanged for an estate in severalty or in connnon. And if A., tenant for life, and B., the owner of the remainder or reversion in fee, exchange with tenant in fee, and grant to (/) Co. Litt. 51 b ; 4 Jarm. & § 6 ; Burton, § 63 ; 2 Bl. Com. 323; Bytli. by Sweet, 2 ; Burton, § 63 ; Watk. Conv. 3rd eel. by Prest. 179, Watk. Conv. 3rd ed. by Prest. 181. 180. {g) Co. Litt. 50 b, 51 b ; 2 (h) i Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 1, Pres. Shep. T. 297 ; 4 Jarm. & Byth. 2 ; Co. Litt. 50 a, 51 b ; Watk. by Sweet, 2 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 6, Conv. 3rd ed. by Prest. 180. 704 OF AN EXCHANGE. Pr. II1.T.12, hiiii ill fee, while lie j jo to be made to the respective parties, and to execute the requisite conveyance or conveyances (?;). Compulsory If any of the joint owners, whether joint tenants, tenants in common, coparceners, or heirs in gavelkind, are unwil- ling to concur with the rest in making partition, or by reason of minority or mental imbecility are incapable of concurring, or for any other cause cannot come to any amicable arrangement for dividing the estate, any one or (?•) 2 Pres. Sliep. T. 299. cepting minerals, see stat. 25 & (s) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 299. 26 Vict. c. lOS, infra, Part IV. Tit. (t) Powers of partition are con- 1, c. 2. ferred by various statutes. See ()() 6 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, Stoimp's Index to the Statute Law. 586. As to partitions, reserving or ex- partition. OF A PAI^TITIOX. 707 more of tliem may, by proceedings in Chancery, procure a rj^"f t.i^?, partition to be made (cc), And this power of the Court is expressly extended to lands of copyhold or customary tenure by the statute 4 & 5 Vict. c. 35, s. 85. The mode in Avhich relief is administered in equity is, by first ascertaining the rights of the several parties in- terested ; and then issuing a commission to make the par- tition ; and, on the return of the commission and confirma- tion of the return by the Court the partition is finally com- pleted by mutual conveyances of the lots made to the several parties (?/). And the same conveyances are neces- sary as if the parties had agreed to a private partition (z). Formerly, if the conveyances could not be executed on account of infancy, or on account of an executory interest, the decree could only put the parties in possession, and secure them in the enjoyment of the parts allotted to them until effectual conveyances could be made («). The Court would decree a partition even in a suit by or against per- sons who were only tenants for life or years ; and the decree would be binding on all whom they virtually repre- sented, but not on otlier persons. Thus, a decree in a suit by or against a tenant for life would be binding on the re- mainderman who was not in esse at the time, on the ground of virtual representation, if the Court was of opinion that it would be for the benefit of such remainderman that the agreement should be carried into effect, either as it stood, or with such variations as tlie Court might think proper (h). But a tenant for years or for life could not insist, as against the owners of the other shares, upon a partition to endure beyond his own estate (c). {x) G Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, (a) Story's Eq. Jur. § 652 ; G 587, 600, 603. Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 609. (y) Story's Eq. Jur. § 650 ; G (b) Story's Eq. Jur. § 656, 656, a. Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 600. (c) 6 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, (s) 6 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 603. 609. 708 OF A PAETITION. PT.Iir.T.12, C'H. 2, s. 7. Court to declare what jiartiis are trustees of lands com- prised ill /) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 6, § 28 ; Co. Co. Litt. 273 a. Litt-. 270 a, u. (3) j 273 aj Watk. {!>) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 326. 714 RELEASES AND THEIR OrEllATION. pt. III.T.12, must have entered on the lands before the execution of On. 2,8.8. the release ; for, till entry, he has only an mteresse ter- mini, which is not capable of being enlarged (c). A release to a person having an estate by statute mer- chant, statute staple, or elegit, or to a tenant at will, or to a tenant in dower or by the curtesy, operates to enlarge his or her estate {d). It seems to be a general rule, that, whenever an estate may merge in the remainder or reversion, that estate may be enlarged by the release of the remainderman or rever- sioner (c), A release to operate by way of enlargement may be made to a vested remainderman for life even before entry because he has an estate of freehold in law (/). But if a man is disseised and has only a right, or if he has a posses- sion only and no estate, of if he has neither estate nor possession, a release made to such a one will not avail to enlarge his estate {g). If a tenant for life leases for years, and the reversioner and the tenant for life join in a release to the lessee for years, this is a good release to enlarge the estate ; operating first as the release of the estate for life, and secondly as an enlargement of the estate for life into a fee simple (li). The particular tenant cannot release to the reversioner, . but his estate must be extinguished by surrender or merger. On the other hand, the estate of the reversioner cannot be merged in the particular estate or be surrendered to the tenant of that estate ; but it may be released to him by way of enlargement, so as to produce a merger of the par- ticular estate (^). (c) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 6, § 29 ; Co. (e) 2 Pros. Shcp. T. 324- Litt. 270 a, n. (2) ; Watk. Conv. (/) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 325. 3rd ed. by Prest. 20. (,v) 2 Pres. Shcp. T. 325. (cZ) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 6, § 31 ; {h) 2 Pres. Sliep. T. 326. Co. Litt. 270 b, 1 ; 272 b. 1 ; AYatk. (/) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 324. Coav. 3rd cd. by Prest. 5. RELEASES AND THEIR OPERATION. 715 The operative words in a release enuring by way of ^j^;/yj-g^' transferiino- a rio'lit or of extiuouislimeut, are " remise, : ■ f^ o o ' Operative release, and for ever quit claim and discharge." The ^°''^'^- operative words of a release in enlargement, by trustees, are " bargain, sell, and release :" those in a similar release by owners, are, '' grant, bargain, sell, release, and confirm." But any expression of an intention to release will suf- fice (.;•). Besides exiiress releases, which are sometimes called re- ReUase lu *- law. leases in deed, there are also releases in law (k). A covenant never to sue amounts in construction of law to an absolute release of the covenantee. But a covenant not to sue for a definite period or during a given state of circumstances, is no release (/). The general words of a release may be restrained by the General ^ ./ .; words recitals (»?). And therefore, in preparing releases which redt'd "'^'^ ''^ are intended to be general, care should be taken to avoid any recitals which by possibility might have the effect of narrowing the operation of the instrument (n). A release, whether in deed or by operation of law, to one Release to one iif of several co-debtors, discharges all of them, as well in several co- "■^ debtors or equity as at law, though they are severally as well as ■|.o|e^.^,^tol■s jointly bound ; and a proviso that the co-debtor shall not take advantage of tlie release would be repugnant and void (o). So in equity, whatever act is a discharge of the prin- cipal will be a discharge of the surety, though the surety be not released at law (^;). (j ) Watk. Conv. 3rd ed. by Prest. 817. 186 ; Co. Litt. 264 b ; 2 Bl. Com. {n) 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 324 ; 2 Prcs. Shop. T. 320, 327 ; 4 884 (6). Cruise T. 32, c. 6, § 20. (o) 9 Jarm. & Bytb. by Sweet, {k) Co. Litt. 264 b. 811 ; 1 Pres. Sbep. T. 71 ; 2 Id. (l) 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 337. 797 ; Rnj V. Jones, 19 C. D. (N. S.) (jj) 1 Pres. Sliep. T. 71 ; Wchb v* 416. Ileimtt, 3 K; & J. 438. {m) 9 Jarm. & Bytb. by Sweet. 716 llELRASES AND THEIR OPERATlOX. Tt. III.T.12, Ch. 2, s. 8. Joint release to tbose against ■wlaom tliere are several causes o£ action. Bel ease to one trustee. nelease of right to (lio owner of a particular estate, or to a remainder- man or reversioner. Release by tenant in tail. What releases may he for a time uuly. And the like rule applies to joint and several cove- nants ((/). But tliis rule is confined to a release properly and technically so called ; for a perpetual covenant not to sue, which operates as an absolute release of the cove- nantee, will not discharge a co-debtor, though the debt of the covenantee and the third person is joint only, and not joint and several (;•). If one has several causes of action against two, and makes a joint release to them, this shall be taken to be a release of all joint and several causes of action (s). A release of breaches of trust to one trustee, will gene- rally enure to the benefit of his co -trustee (/). A release of the right to land, if made to a tenant in tail or for life, will avail and enure to a person who has a re- version or remainder. And so, e converso, a release of right made to a person who has a remainder or reversion will avail and enure to the benefit of a person who has a prior estate in tail, or for life, or for years (u). Indeed, such a release will operate for the benefit of all persons who are entitled to the property by the same means (.''). If a tenant in tail makes a lease for years, and after- wards releases all his right to the lessee for years in pos- session, to hold to him and his heirs for ever, this will pass a determinable fee, subject to be avoided by the issue, until they are barred (?/). A right of action cannot be released for a time oiily^ but if once released, it will be so for ever. And therefore, if a release of right is made to any one who has an estate of inheritance by wrong, or a particular estate of freehold, thouoh but for one hour, this is a good release for ever. (2) 2 Prcs. Shcp. T. 337. (r) 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 811, 812 ; 2 Pres. Shep. T. 253. (s) 2 Pres. Shep. T. BU. (0 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 812. (h) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 335 ; Co. Litt. 2G7 b ; Watk. Ccnv. Srd ed. by Prest. 42, 114. (x) Burton, § 49 ; Watk; CoiiT. 3rd cd. by Prest. 42. ii/) 2 Pres, Bhepi T. 347; RELEASES AND TIIEIE OPERATION'. 717 But it is otherwise Avitli a release operating by way of en- t't. 111.T.12, lara'ement. Tims, if a lessor releases to his lessee for years _ ^ But a release all his ritiht Mliich he has in the land, without usinGj any bycuiai-ge- "3 ' o ./ inent may bo other Avords in the deed, or releases to him for his life, he ^°'^^^^^- has an estate for his life only by way of enlargement of estate {z\ We have seen that inior to the stat. 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, Release of part of land s. 10, a release of any part of the lands operated as a release ^||,'^^!|.t *to g, of a rent-charge issuing out of the whole (a). reut-ciiarge. In general, a release made between certain parties can- Tinni person not be set up a2;ainst the claims of the releasor by a third to benefit of ■^ ° . "^ release. person Avho is no party, thougli it professes to discharge him from those claims (&). 11. What may he ■released (c). A covenant to do an act may be released before it is covenasito broken, by a release of the covenant eo nomine, or by words to that effect (cI). Debts, legacies, and other duties may be released and Debts, discharged before or after they should be paid or per- other duties. formed (c). If a lease for years is made to two, to beoin at a day to interesso •^ ^ . termini. come, a release by one of them to the other is good. And a person who has an interesse termini may release it to the lessor (/). If a person grants an estate on condition, he may, before condition. condition broken, release all his right in the land, or release (z) 2 Pres. Sliep. T. 345—6; (>;) As to the release of a right of Walk. Conv. 3rd ed. by Pres. 42, execution under a judgment or sta- lls, tute, see supra, pp. 454 — 6. (a) See supra, p^ 25—6. (d) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 322. (b) 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, {<:■) 2 Pros. Shep. T. 323, 333. 809. (/) 2 Pres. Sliep. T. 327. 718 WHAT M.VY DE RELEASED. Pt. III.T.12, Ch. 2, B. 8. Tenures, services, rents, commons, and other profits. Hope of succession, possibility, or executory iuterest. Power. Hights and triies of cntiy or action. the condition to tlie grantee ; and tliis will make the estate absolute {y). Tenures^ services, rents, commons, and other profits arising out of or annexed to lands may he extinguished by release to the owner of the land (li). Except so far as the stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 7G. s. 5, and 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. G (^), may apply, the mere hope of an heir apparent, or a mere possibility, or an executory interest, where the person is unascertained, cannot be released {j). And though executory interests in real estate in a person who is ascertained may be released, yet they are only re- leaseable to the terre-tenant or owner of the land, and not to a stranger (/v). A mere authority or a power without any interest can- not be released. And therefore, if a person devises that his executors shall sell his land, and the executors release all their right and title in the land to the heir, this is void. But a power coupled with an interest may be re- leased (T). Although rights and titles of entry could not be granted by act of the party {m), nor could any action be granted by act of law or of the party, yet these may, and always might, be released to the terre-tenant, and his heirs, in respect of realty, or his executors and administrators, in respect of chattel interests {n). They may be released to any person who has a vested estate in the tenement, whether in pos- session, reversion, or remainder, with this qualification only, that the right to an estate of freehold can only be {[/) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 332. {h) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 322, 332 ; i Cruise T. 32, c. C, § 38; Watk. Conv. 3rd ed. by Prest. 158. {i) See infra, c. 6, s. 4, No. V. 0") 2 Pres. Shep. T. 322, 328 ; Burton, § 47, 48; Co. Litt. 265. a. b> ilc) 2 Pres. Abstracts, 284 ; seo infra, T. 12, Ch. 6, s. 4, No. V. {I) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 328, 332 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. G, § 39 ; Co. Litt. 265 b. ; Smith v. HoiMon, 26 Beav. 482. {m) See infra, e. 6, s. 4, No. V. (h) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 321 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 6, § 38, 39 ; Co. Litt. 265 a. n. (1). WHAT MAY BE RELEASED. 719 released to a person whose estate is of that degree either by ^^■J-^^-'^-'f' right or by wrong (o). A man may release a sum of money owing to his wife, Money owing •^ JO ' to a wife or while sole ; and one of several partners in trade may re- partuir. lease a debt owing to the firm ; the power of release being incidental to the power to receive, which is possessed by the husband and partner (p). If two have the errant of the next advowson or avoid- Next presen- ^ tatioii, ance of a church, one of them may release to the other, before it is void, but not afterwards (q). One of several joint obligees may release the obligation, obligation or *" _ cause of So, generally, one of several co-plaintiffs may release the action, cause of action, though the plaintiffs be trustees ; but if this power is exercised fraudulently, the Court will set aside the release (r). III. Construction of Releases. By a release of rent, the rent is extinct and discharged, Eeiease of J ' o ' rent. whether the day of payment be come or not (s). And a release of rent to a reversioner or remainderman, will en- title the owner of a particular estate to the benefit of the release, and e converse. But a grant to the tenant, rever- sioner, or remainderman, cannot be taken advantage of by any other person than the grantee (t). ]jy a release of all covenants, all covenants then in beino', Release of •^ ° coveuants. which are then broken, or may afterwards be broken, are discharged (w). By a release of all promises or assumpsits, a man may Keiease of promises or bar himself of the fruit or effect of the promises, or damages assumpsits. (o) Burton, § 46 ; Co. Litt. 265 (r) 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, a 1, 265 b, 266 a; Litt. s. 449 803. —451. (s) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 343. if) 9 Jarm & Bytli. by Sweet, {t) Watk. Conr. Srd edit, by 802. Prest. 158. (5) 2 Pros. Shep. T. 332. («) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 342. 720 CONSTRUCTIOX OF RELEASES. Release of debts. Release of actions. rT.iii.T.i2, for tliG brcacli of tliem, when tliey could not be released by Ch. 2, s. 8. > J J other words (,'). By a release of all debts, are discliarged all debts then owing from the releasee to the releasor (y). Release of By a release of all qnarrels, or all controversies, or all contioversies debates, all actions real and personal and all canses of such or debate?. actions are discharged, except causes of suit that were not existing at the time of the release, as the future breach of a covenant, whether existing at the time of the release or afterwards entered into (z). A release of all actions will not discharge executions, or bar a man of taking out execution, except it be where it must be done by scire facias ; neither will it discharge or bar a man of suits by audita cpierela, unless depending, or by writ of error to reverse an erroneous judgment ; neither will it discharge covenants before they are broken ; nor will it discharge anything for which the releasor had not cause of action at the time of the release made («). A release to A. & B. of all actions ^vhich the releasor has against them, extends to actions against the releasees seve- rally as well as jointly ; for it shall be taken most benefi- cially for him to wlioni the release is made, and most strongly against him who makes it (jj). The word " suits " is of a somewhat more large extent than " actions ;" for, by a release of all suits, are dis- charged, not only all actions, but also all executions, in the case of a subject (c). By a release of all a man's right in any lands or tene- ments, all manner of rights of action and entry of the re- leasor in or against the land, are discharged. But this release of right will not bar a man of a possibility of a Release of suits. Release of right. {x) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 343. (?/) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 341. (z) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 342. (a) 2 Pres. Shep, T. 338, {h) 9 Jarra. & Byth. by Sweet, SIO, 811. (f) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 342. COXSTKUCTION OF RELEASES. 721 rio'lit tliat lie lias at the time of the release, or of a ridit pt.iii. T.12, ° * Cu. 2, s. 8. that shall descend to him afterwards. And therefore, if the coimsee of a statute before execution releases all his right in the land to the terre-tenant, or the heir of a disseisee in the lifetime of his father releases to the disseisor all his right, these releases do not bar them (d). A release of title has the same operation as a release of Keiense of ■■- title, all right (e). A release of all demands is the best release of all. By Release of demands or a release of all demands, are released all right and titles to daims. land, warranties and conditions annexed to estates, whether broken or not, all statutes, obligations, contracts, recogni- sances, covenants, rents, commons, and the like ; and all manner of actions, real and personal, appeals, debts, and duties ; and all manner of judgments and executions ; and all annuities and arrears of annuities and rents. And if a man has a rent service, rent charge, estovers, or other profit to be taken out of the land, by such a release to the tenant of the land it is discharged and extinct. And a release of all claims is much of the same nature (/). But a release of all demands or all claims has not the effect of releasing anything which cannot be specifically released ; as a mere possibility not coupled with any present interest, or the like (//). And a release of all demands is in general con- fined to demands existing at the time of the release ; and therefore does not extend to a covenant not then in being or then unbroken ; nor to a legacy payable at a future day (Ji). A receipt in full discharge of all claims, means of all claims which were known to the person giving the receipt (i). (f?) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 339 ; Litt. (k) 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, s. 446 ; Co. Litt. 265 b. 815, 816. (f) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 340. (/) Eaves v. Hidson, 30 Beav. (/) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 348—4. 142. iff) 2 Prc3. Shep. T. 344. V22 CONSTUUCTION OF IlELEASES. tt. III.T.12, In a release of tlic piincipa], the accessoiy is iDclucled. Oh. 2. s. 8. 11' J And therefore a release of all debts or duties will operate Release of the principal, r^g r^ discliargc of all actions, judgments, executions, and RbIgiIso of debts or oljliQ-ations. By releasing a debt, the security for the debt duties. ^ Release of is released. And a release of judgments will extend to an judgments. , . , ,^ execution [j ). IV. Releases generally. Seal. Release upon condition or oil a future time or event. Partial releasus. Release of a debt. A release must be under seal QS). A release by way of mitter Testate may be made upon condition, either precedent or subsequent. And a release by way of mitter le droit or extinguishment may be made upon a condition precedent ; but it cannot be made subject to a condition subsequent. If such a thing is attempted, the release is good, and the condition subsequent is void ; because a right released for an instant is released for ever {I). A release of all actions may be made upon a time past, as until the 1st of May last, or until the day of the date of the release. But a release cannot be made of a right or action for a part of an estate, nor, as we have seen, for a time only to come ; as for one year, or until a future time. And yet a man may release his right in a part of the land (m). If a man is under covenant to perform two things, the covenantee may discharge one of them ; but an entire thing cannot be released in part {n). A debt may be released even before the day of payment, by apt words (o). U) 9 Jarm. & Bytli. by Sweet, (m) 2 Pres. Shop. T. 323. 814. (i?) 9 Jarm. & Bjth. by Sweet, (/.•) 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 814. 801. (o) See 2 Bres. Shcp. T. 334. (0 2 Pres. Shep. T. 307, 323. RELEASES GENERxVLLY. 72c A release is an act favoured and strenuously supported PT.iir.T.12, by the law, as it induces peace and promotes good - order Qj). favoured. But releases will be set aside by tlie Court of Chancery, belief agaiust where they have been extorted by fraud, or extended to releases. matters not contemplated by the releasor, or have been obtained from persons who at the time were not conusant of their rights (r/). And although a release is general in its terms, the Court will limit its operation to matters contemplated by the parties at the time of its execu- tion (r). And the Court will not permit a release to stand which has been obtained without a full and honest disclo- sure to the releasor of all the circumstances in the releasee's knowledge affecting his (the releasor's) actual situation. But, unless such a disclosure has been withheld, the Court will not disturb an arrangement intended as a compromise of doubtful rights, especially between the members of a family, because the parties entertained mistaken notions of those rights (s). Section IX. Of a Confirmation. Definition. A confirmation is a deed whereby a conditional or void- PT.iri.T.12, Ch 2 s 9 able estate is made absolute and unavoidal)le by the con- firmor, so far as he is able, or wherel )y a particular estate is increased {t). {p) 2 Pros. Shep. T. 244. (s) 9 Jarra. & Bjth. by Sweet, (2) 9 Jarm. & Bytli. by Sweet, 806. 805; Story's Eq. Jur. §145; Eyre (t) Co. Litt. 295 b; 2 Bl. Com. V. Burmestcr, 10 H. L. Cas. 90. 325 ; Walk. Conv. 3rcl eel, by Brest. (?■) Lyall V. Edwxrds, G Hurl. & 18G--7. Norm. 337. 724 OF A CONFIKMATION. The usual operative -svorcls of a confirmation are '' give, grant, ratify, approve, and confirm " (u). But a confirmation may be made by otlier words. Tliere must be a precedent riglitful or wrongful estate in the person to whom the confirmation is made, in his own or in another's right, or, at least, he must have the possession of the thing whereof the confirmation is made, as a foundation for the confirmation to work upon (a;). A person who has only an interesse termini cannot receive a confirmation until he has entered (y). other To givo Validity to a confirmation of a voidable estate, requisites to cuuflrmatiou f}^Q partv coufirminiT; must not be ignorant of his riolits, and estates. must bc informed of the consequences in point of law, and must be a free agent (z). wiiere words To enlarge a particular estate by confirmation, there of limitation are ueces- must bc words of limitation (a). sary. ^ ' Operation of A Confirmation sometunes serves to make sure a void- a confirma- i t t i . i tion. able contract, conveyance, or estate, by addmg the right to the possession or defeasible seisin ; and sometimes to make a conditional estate alDsolute, hj discharging the condition; and sometimes to enlarge an estate. But it will not make a contract, conveyance, or estate good, which is absolutely void ; for quod ab initio non valet, in tractu temp oris non convalescit. Nor will it add to an estate a descendible quality, nor make a man capable who is incapable of himself (h). Confirmation A Confirmation of the estate of one joint tenant enures ill tlie case of mid'tenaiu:*^^ to tlic othcr joiut tcuaut or tenants ; because they have in common. ((() Co. Litt. 295 b, 301 b ; 2 (z) Sugd. Concise View, 181 ; Bl. Com. 325 ; 3 Jarm. & Byth. by Sarcri/ v. King, 5 H. L. Cas. 627, Sweet, 591 ; 2 Tres. Shep. T. 314 ; GG4. Watk. Conv., 3rcl edit, by Brest. («) 2 Bres. Shop. T. 315. 188. {b) 2 Bres. Shep. T. 311, 315; (x) 2 Bres. Slicp. T. 312. Story's Eq. Jur. § 306 ; 4 Cruise T. (y) Watk. Conv. 3rd edit, by 32, o. 6, § 47 ; Co. Litt. 295 b, and Brest. 20. n. (1). OF A CONFIRMATIOK 725 one joint seisin. But it is otherwise in tlie case of tenants p;;-^"-''"-;!,-. " (Jil. 2, s. 9. in common ; because they have several freeholds and several seisins. But if the confirmation is of the laud, to have and to hold the land to one joint tenant, it may enure to him alone (c). A confirmation Ly a disseisee of a particular estate will confli-mation '' -^ of oae estate not enure to the remainder or reversion. But a confirma- *"^>'- tion by him of a remainder or reversion will operate as a confirmation of the particular estate (d). In the case of a lease for years, a confirmation may be Part of ca •^ term may be made for part of the time. But the proper mode of contu-med; accomplishing tliis is. by a confirmation of the land, to liold for part of the term, and not of the term or estate (c). A confirmation cannot be made of i)art of an estate of but not part of an estate freeliold; because an estate of freehold is entire and indi- of freehold, visible (/). A confirmation may be made of part of the land or other confirmation •J -i- of part of tlie subject (r/). Sect.'*''' If there is nothing more than a confirmation of title, uses or there cannot be any uses or trusts, because no seisin passes (//.). (c) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 319 ; Co. Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 591 ; Co. Litt. 297 b. Litt. 296 b, 297 a, n. (1) ; Watk. (d) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 313, 319 ; Coiiv. 3rd ed. by Prest. 188. Co. Litt. 297 a, 298 a; Watk. (ff) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 317; Co. Conv. 3rd ed. by Pret^t. 188. Litt. 297 a ; 3 Jarm. & Byth. by (f) See 2 Pres. Shep. T. 317;3 Sweet, 521—2; Watk. Conv. 3rd Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 592 ; Co. ed. by Prest. 188. Litt. 297 a, and n.(l) ; Watk. Conv. (/() 3 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 3rd ed. by Prest. 188. 592. (/) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 317; 3 k2 Dtfiuitioii. 726 OF A SURKENDER. Section X. Of a Surrender. rT.iii.T.12, A surrender, sursum redditio, or renderincf up, is of a Cn. 2, s. 10. ' ' o i > nature directly opposed to a release operating by way of enlargement. It is a yielding up of an estate for life or years to him who has a higher or equal estate in immediate reversion or remainder, wherein the particular estate may merge or drown (J). siiiTcmiers ^ Surrender is of two kinds : — 1. Express, or in deed, are either -i- ^ ' fmpiT^.°' that is, by the express agreement of the parties that a surrender should be made. 2. Implied, or in law, that is, by operation of law (/). operativo The usual operative words are — " surrender, and yield words. -'• -^ up." But any other words that denote that the remain- derman or reversioner is to have the particular estate will suffice (k). What estates Subjcct to the followiug qualifications, a surrender may surrendered. \)q made of any kind of estate for life ; (as by dower, by curtesy, or by tenancy in tail after possibility of issue extinct ;) or of any estate for years, or for years determi- nable upon lives, in any kind of property that is grant- able (l). Eequisites to In ordcr that a surrender in deed may be good — a surrender "^ ^ indeed. \ ^he Surrenderor must have a vested estate. And 1. Vested t^ • -, -i • ^ estate. therefore rights and titles only cannot be surrendered {m). Thus, if a lessee for life is ousted by a stranger, and after- (/) Co. Litt. 337 b, and n. (1) ; T. 306 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 7, § 4 ; 2 Bl. Com. 326 ; 2 Pres. Sliep. T. Watk. Conv. 3rd ed. by Prest. 23, 300 ; Watk. Conv. 3rd. ed. by Prest. 192. 189, 191. (Z) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 303, 306. (i) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 300; Co. (m) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 306; Co. Litt. 338 a; Phcnc v. Poppkivdl, Litt. 338 a ; Watk. Conv. 3rd ed. 12 C. B. N. S. 334. by Prest. 114. {k) 2 Bl. Com. 326 ; 2 Pres. Shep. 01-' A SURRENDER. - 727 wards surrenders to his lessor, the surrender is void : pt. 111.T.12, Cn. 2, s. 10. because he liad but a right at the time of tlie surrender. So if a woman has a title to dower, and surrenders to the person against whom she ought to have dower, it is void for the same reason. And a lease for years, to commence at a future day, cannot be surrendered ; nor can a lease for years at common law, before entry ; because the lessee has no vested interest, but only an interesse termini before the commencement of the lease in the one case, or entry in the other, and the lessor has no reversion before that time (n). 2. The estate of the surrenderor must be one that may 2, capacity of merger. meru'e in the estate of the surrenderee. And therefore an estate tail cannot be surrendered, even to a person who has the reversion in fee (0). And for the same reason, 3. The estate of the surrenderor must be of a lower 3. Not of higher denomination than the estate of the surrenderee, or of the denomina- ' tion. same, and not of a higher denomination. And therefore an estate in fee simple cannot be surrendered ; nor can an estate for life be surrendered to a person who has only an estate for years. But a tenant for his ovvn life may sur- render to another person who has only an estate for his own life. And a term for years may be surrendered even to a person who has a term for a fewer numljer of years than the surrenderor (j;). For the same reason, 4. The estate of the surrenderee must be the next estate 4. Next estate in in remainder or reversion, so that there be no intervening jg^g'J^'-onl^ °^' estate to prevent a merger ((/). Thus, if a lease is made for years, remainder for life, remainder in fee, tire lessee for years may surrender to the lessee for life ; and so may (h) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 7, § 10 ; T. 303, 306 ; Watk. Conv. 3rd ed. Walk. Conv. 3rd ed. by Prest. 20. by Prest. 25, 36, 190. (0) 2 Pre.s. Shep. T. 306 ; Burton, (9) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 303 ; Co. § 751. Litt. 337 b, n. (1). p) 2 BL Com. 326 ; 2 Pres. Shep* 728 , OF A SURRENDEl?. pt.iji.t.12, the tenant for life to the r^erson in remainder or reversion Cu. 2, s. 10. ^ in fee. But if a lease is made for life, remainder for life, remainder in fee, tlie first tenant for life cannot surrender to the person in remainder in fee, on account of the inter- mediate estate (r). 5. Privity. g_ There must be a privity of estate between the surren- deror and the surrenderee. Hence, if lessee for twenty years makes a lease for five years, and the lessee for five years enters, and afterwards the lessee for twenty years surrenders to the person in reversion or remainder, this is a good surrender. So also if the two lessees join in the surrender, it is good ; for, by construction of law, there is first, a surrender by the tenant for twenty years to the reversioner, and secondly, a surrender by the termor for five years to the same x^erson. So also if the first lessee surrenders first, and the lessee for five years surrenders afterwards, the surrender is good. But if the lessee for five years attempts to surrender to the person in reversion or remainder before the lessee for twenty years surrenders, this act cannot take effect as a surrender, for two reasons ; first, because there is a remnant of the term as an inter- venient estate to hinder the drowning of the term ; and, secondly, because, while the interposed reversion continues, there wants a privity between the lessee for five years and the remainderman or reversioner (s). 6. Not of (3 The sruTender must not be of part of an estate. Thus, part of au J- ' estate. ^£ ^ pcrsou lias a lease for ten years, he cannot surrender the last seven years, and keep to himself the first three years (t). 7. Dccdcr 7. By the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 3, no sur- note in -^ > > j ? render is valid unless it is by deed or note in writing duly signed, or by act or operation of law (u). So that a term (r) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 304. (t) 2 Pres. Slicp. T. 30G. (s) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 303, 305 ; («) See supra, p. G22 ; 4 Cruise 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 7, § 11. T. 82, c. 7, § 6 5 Burton, § 751 writ in a OF A SUKREXDEn. V29 for years or for life cannot be extin<2;uislied l»y cancelliiiL!- '"''■ ni.T.12, the instrument of demise, or otherwise than by writing, or accepting another lease incompatible with the former lease (.v). And such things as commons, rents, advowsons, reversions, remainders, and other incorporeal hereditaments that cannot be granted without deed, could not be surren- dered without deed (?/). But an estate of freehold of lands in possession might be surrendered to the immediate rever- sioner or remainderman, l)y deed or note in writing, with- out livery of seisin or anything tantamount to it (,;). It was enacted, however, by the stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, s. 4, " that no surrender in writing of any freehold or leasehold land shall be ^"alid as a surrender, unless the same should be made by deed ; but any agreement in writing to surren- der any such land shall be valid and take effect as an agreement to execute a surrender." This was repealed by the stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106 ; Init hj s. 3 of that statute, " a surrender in writing of an interest in any tenements- or hereditaments, not being a copyhold interest, and not being an interest which might by law have been created without ^^^■iting, made after tlie 1st October, 1845, shall be \'oid at law, unless made by deed." A surrender may be made ui^on a condition precedent or smrenda- m couditiou. subsequent («). An interesse termini cannot be surrendered in deed ; but suneudcv of an inleresse it will be surrendered in law by accepting a lease for an termini, estate which is incompatil^le with it (h). A surrender to one of two or more joint tenants will be surrender to one of two or construed to enure to both or all. But if tenant for life f»oiejo'iit tenants. or years grants his estate to one joint tenant in reversion, Watk. Conv. 3rd eel. by Prest. {z) 3 Jann. & Byth. by Sweet, 192. 259 ; Co. Litt. 337 b, n. (1), 338 a ; (cc) 2 Pros. Sbep. T. 306 ; Co. Litt. Burton, § 751. 338 a, n. (1). 00 2 Prcs. Shep. T. 307. {y) '2 Pres. Sbep. T. 307 : Co. Litt. {h) Watk. Ccnv. 3rd ed. by Prest, 338 a. 20. 73 OF A SURRENDER. r:,T-in-T.i2, tliis will not enure as a surrender to the otlier or otliers, Cn. 2, s. 10. ' but as a grant to liini alone (e). impiied^or in ^^ ''' lessec for life accepts another valid lease in writing from the lessor, though it be only for years, it will be a surrender in law of the lease for life (d). Where an estate incompatible witli an existing prior estate is accepted, or where the particular estate is actually transferred to the person having the immediate reversion or remainder, with a view that it should abide in him, the law construes it to be a surrender (e). The term "surrender in law" applies to cases where the owner of a particular estate has been a party to some act, the validity of which he is by law after- wards estopped from disputing, and which would not be valid if his particular estate continued to exist. Such a surrender is the act of the law, and will take place inde- pendently of, and even contrary to the intention of the parties (/). Definition. Section XI. Of cm Assi(jiimcnt. i;T.irr.T.i2, An assignment is that kind of total alienation by deed or Cn. 2, s. 11. _ -^ writing, other than testamentary, of a chattel interest in real property, which is not essentially destructive of such interest, or an alienation by deed or writing, other than testamentary, of chattels personal or of an equitable inte- rest in real estate. Gifts au'i Some assignments are called gifts; others, bills of biUs of sale. o J ' sale {g). A gratuitous transfer of personal chattels is spe- (c) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 308 ; Co. Litt. Conv. 8rd cd. by Prcst. 189. 183 a, n. (2), ]92 a. (/) Lyon v. Real, 13 M. & W. {d) 3 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 285. 259, n. {a). (^) Burton, § 889. (f) 2 Pres. Shcp. T. 300 ; Watk. Of AN ASSIGNMENT. 731 cifically called a gift. And a transfer of personal chattels ft. 111.T.12, for valuable consideration is termed a bill of sale, whether the transaction be a purchase or a mortgage (h). The technical operative words of an assignment are, operative *" word J. " assign, transfer, and set over." But the words " give, grant, bargain, and sell," or any other words which show the intent of the parties to make a complete transfer, will amount to an assignment (i). An assignment of a term differs from a lease or under- Assignments ■^ of terms lease in this circumstance, that, by a lease or underlease, J|!p^j"i^'"se'^'^'^ the lessor conveys an interest less than his own, reserving feaLr'^^"^' to himself a reversion ; whereas, in an assignment, the as- signor parts with liis whole interest in tlie thing assigned, and puts the assignee in his place (/). Cliattels personal may in general be oiven or OTanted wiiatmay ^ . . be assigned. without deed (IS). But a registered ship or shares therein Mode of can only be transferred by bill of sale, in a prescribed form, under seal, executed in the presence of and attested by at least one witness, and registered. The name of the transferee, as owner, must be registered, and the date and hour of the entry must be indorsed on the bill of sale (/). And it is enacted by the 3rd section of the Statute of Requisites "^ to an assign- Frauds, that all assignments of leases or terms for years shall be by deed or note in writing, signed by the party assigning or his agent thereunto lawfully authorised by ^\'riting. And by the 9tli section of the Statute of Frauds, it is enacted, " that all grants and assignments of any trust shall be in writing, signed by the party granting or assign- ing the same, or else shall lie utterly void and of none (^) 2 Bl. Com. UO ; 2 Steph. Com. by Prest. 22, 192, 194. 43, 45. {k) 2 Pres. Sliep. T. 231 ; 2 Bl. (0 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 7, § 17 ; Com. 441 ; Bux-ton, § 889. Watk. Coiiv. 3rd ed. by Prcst. 22, {1} Sm. Merc. Law, 6tli cd. 193 195. —6 ; Mail. & Poll. 20—2 ; Ad. Cont. 0') 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 7, § 14 ; 2 5th ed. 141 ; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, Bl. Com. 326 ; Watk. Conv. 3rd cd. ss. 55, 57. nient of real estate and cliattels real. 732 OF AN ASSIGNMENT. rT.iii.T 12, Ch. 2, s. 11. What • aiiioviiits to an assign- ment of cliatlclsi liei'soual. effect " (m). And it was enacted by the statute 7 & 8 Vict, c. 76, s. 3, tliat no assignment of any freeliold or leasehold land should be valid at law unless the same should be made by deed. Tliis was repealed by the statute 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106 ; but by section 3 of that statute, " an assignment of a chattel interest, not being copyhold, in any lands or tenements, made after the 1st October, 1845, shall be void at law, unless made l)y deed." Anything written, said, or done, in pursuance of an agreement, and for a valuable consideration, or in con- sideration of an antecedent debt, to place a chose in action or fund out of the control of the owner, and appropriate it in favour of another person, amounts to an equitable as- signment. So that an agreement between a debtor and a creditor that the debt shall be paid out of a specified fund coming to the debtor, will operate as an equitable assign- ment. And so an order given by a debtor to his creditor upon a person owing money to such debtor or holding funds belonging to him, directing such person to pay the creditor out of such money or funds, will amount to an iri'cvocable equitable assignment of such money or funds or a sufficient part thereof, if made in consequence of a direct engagement (n). And if the person so ordered to pay the assignee, nevertheless pays the assignor, he will be made to pay over again to the assignee, even though the assignor commenced an action against him (o). But where personal property is assigned, delivery is necessary (m) 1 Cruise T. 12, c. 2, § 6. (m) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 85G, 8G0 — 1, 907; Coote's Mortg. 3rd ed. 234 J 2 Tudor's Leading Cases, 574 ; lioiu V. Dawson, 1 Ves. 330 ; Ex ^lartc South, 2 Swans. 392 ; Lett v. Morris, 4 Simons, 607 ; Burn v. CaJvaUw, 4 My. & Cr. 690 ; L'Estrmvje v. VEstranrje, 13 Beav. 281 j Ex 2iarte Steward, 3 M. D. & Do G. 265; liodicJc V. Gandcll, 1 D. M. & G. 777 ; Diploch v. Hammond, 2 Sm. & Gif. 141 ; 5 D. M. & G. 320 ; Watson V. Duhe of WelUngton, 1 R. & M. 602 ; Malcolm v. Scott, 3 Hare, 39 ; Clwivne v. BajjUs, 31 Beav. 351, (o) Jones V. FarrcU, 1 D. & J. 208. OF AX ASSIGNMENT. 733 to complete the transaction, or at least that which is tan- PT.ni.T.12, ^ ' Cn. 2, s. 11. tamount to or is the nearest approximation to delivery of wliich the property is susceptible. "Where the assignment is for valuable consideration, it is not indeed necessary, at least in equity, as between the vendor and vendee, or mort- gagor and mortgagee, except to prevent the vendee or mortgagee Irom losing the property by a subsequent secret disposition by the vendor or mortgagor ; but it is required for the protection of third persons, who might otherwise be deceived by apparent possession and ownership remaining in a person who in fact is not the owner ( j;). Where the assignment is voluntary, it is necessary even between the parties themselves ; because equity will not enforce an imperfect voluntary assignment. Hence, in the case of chattels in possession, delivciy of possession is necessary ; and in the case of an assignment by way of mortgage of chattels to be brought upon certain premises, some act tantamount to taking of possession is necessary on the part of the mortgagee, to perfect his title ; and if he neglects to do some such act, the title of an execution creditor who takes possession will be preferred (q). In the case of a bond debt, delivery of the bond and notice to the deljtoi' are requisite. And in the case of a trust fund, the trustee being the legal depositary, formal notice ouglit to be given to him by the assignee, and not by a stranger, to make him a trustee for the assignee. So that if a prior assignee neglects to give- notice to the trustee, and a subsequent as- signee, after inquiry of the trustee and at the time of his as- signment, is unaware of the prior assignment, and gives notice to the trustee of his own assignment, he thereby gains priority over the first assignee (r). And assignees in bank- (p) See remarks of L. J. Turner (q) Ilolroyd v. MarslmU, 2 D. F. iu Ex parte Bolton, 1 D. & J. 178— & J. 59(5 ; 10 H. L. Cas. 191. 9 ; Stmisfield v. Culltt, 2 Gift. 382 ; (r) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1017 ; 2 2 D. & J. 222. Spcnce's Eq. Jur. 764, 855 -857 ; 2 V34 OF AX ASSIGNMENT. cn^Vii^' ™P^cy who neglect to give notice M'ill lose their priority efjually with particular assignees («). It is immaterial, however, whether tlie notice was given before or after the assignment, provided it was given previously to notice by any other claimant (f). In the case of an assignment of an interest in a fund in Court, the assignee should obtain a stop order (^^), unless the fund constitutes part of a tes- tator's estate ; in which case notice to the executor M'ill be sufficient, without a stop order (.).;). In the case of an assignment of costs of suit not yet ordered to be paid, notice should be given to the parties by whom they would be payable (,y). In tlie case of an erpiitable assignment of shares in a company, notice must be given to the com- pany (;:'). In the case of an assignment of freight, the assignee should give notice of the assignment to the char- terers (r/). If the assignor is a legatee of the original cestui que trust, notice must also l)e given to the executor, if the latter has not assented to the bequest. A second incumbrancer on stoclc gains priority by lodging a distringas on the bank, if neither paiiy has given notice to the trustees of the fund. If a policy of life assurance is assigned, notice of such assignment must be given to the offtce in which the assurance is effected, to take it out of the reach of the bankrupt laws (h). In order to maintain liis priority, it is Bl. Com. 441—2; Cootc, 3rd cd. («) Bartlett \ . Bartlctt, 1 D. & J. 231, 232; Dearie v. Hall, Love- 127. ridge v. Cooper, 3 Kuss. 1 ; Mceh v. {jc) Tlwmpson v. Tomhins, 2 .Dr. Kettlewell, 1 Hare, 464 ; 1 Phil. 342 ; & Sm. 8. Bridge y. Beadon, L. E. 3 Eq. Cas. (y) Bay v. Bay, 1 D. & J. 144. 664 ; Lloyd v. Banks, L. E. 4 Eq. (z) Ex parte Boulton, 1 D. & J. Cas. 222 ; In re Brown's Trusts, L.K. 163. 5 Eq. Cas. 88 ; and sec infra, c. 6, (a) Bromi v. Tanner, L. E. 2 Eq. on Void and Voidable Deeds. 806. (s) Re Barr's Trust, 4 K. & J. (b) Coote Movi.g. 3rd ed. 231 ; 219. Thompson v. Tomlins, 2 Dr. & Sm. 8. (it) Sugd. Concise View, 275. OF AN ASSIGNMENT. 735 sufficient if a prior assignee of tlie proceeds to arise from Pf . iii-J-^'^^ the sale of au oflicer's commission gives notice to the army agent of the regiment before tlie money readied the agent's hands, though a subsequent assignee gave notice first (c). In general, notice to one of several trustees is notice to the otlicrs. Where one of the trustees is assignee, the assio-nment itself is notice to all the others. AVhere one of the trustees is assignor, the assignment itself is not notice to the others, but formal notice to the trustee who is assignor is notice to the others {d). " Neither a voluntary assignment by deed of a mortgage debt, accompanied by a grant, not specifying the particular estate, but of all estates held in mortgage, and by a covenant for further assurance, without delivery of the mortgage deed or notice to the mortgagor, nor the voluntary assign- ment of a policy of assurance retained in the hands of the assignor, and without notice given to the grantor, though accompanied by a covenant for further assurance, can be considered as a complete and effectual assignment, to be acted upon and enforced by the assignee, without any further or other act to be done by the assignor " (e). And where a person becomes a trustee of money for several creditors, and at the date of the trust deed the trustee had a charge on the share of one of them, but it is not mentioned in the deed, he will be postponed to another person who has a subsequent charge on that share, and had no notice of the trustee's charge, but gives immediate notice of his own(/). An assignment of a term, or of the residue of a term, to Assigameut (c) B idler v. Pliinlelt, 1 Johns. & Willes v. Greenhill (Nos. 1 & 2), 29 Hem. 441. On this subject, see also Beav. 376, 387 ; 4 D. F. & J. 147. Welster v. Webster, 31 Beav. 393; (e) Ward v. Andland, 8 Beav. Somerset v. Cox, 33 Beav. 634. 212. (d) Coote Mortg. 3rcl ed. 231; (f) Commissioners of PnUicWorls Browne v. Savaje, 4 Drew. 635 ; v. Ilarhij, 23 Beav. 508. 736 OF AN ASSIGNMENT. pt.iii.t.12, liold from tlie deatli of tlie assio-nor, is void (ri) ; for, terms Cii. 2, s. 11. o ' \JJ i > — for years beinc: anciently very short, the law regarded the of a term or "^ * J J ' a «f '.''" , continuance of a term after the death of the termor as a residue of a a'^f™ure'"^ more possibility, which could not be assigned. And, upon *"^^' the same principle, it would seem that an assignment of a term or of a residue of a term, from the death of any other person, would be void. Indeed, it would seem that an assignment cannot be made of a term from any future time ; because an assignment of a term is an alienation of the whole term. But there would appear to be no reason why the residue of a term from a future time, otherwise than the death of any person, should not be assigned (Ji). And if a termor, instead of assigning, carves out of his term a new term of years which must end before the expiration of the original term, such a demise or underlease, which leaves a reversion in the original termor, may, like any other lease for years, be made to take effect at a future time (i), except such future time be the death of the original termor or any other person ; for then there is the same reason why such an under- lease should be void, as for the invalidity of an assign- ment of the residue of a term after the death of the assignor (j). Assignment A deed of assignment by a person of all his personal of person- alty passing estate and effects whatever, to trustees, for the benefit of a ■). By tlie same section it is enacted, as regards wills made on or after the 1st of January, 18.38, o'^^^'- O .; ' ' required that " every will executed in manner hereinbefore re- neeTuiufe quired shall, so far as respects the execution and attestation " ^"^"^^^ ' thereof, be a valid execution of a power of appointment by will, notwithstanding it shall have been expressly required that a will made in exercise of such power should be executed with some additional or other form of execution or solemnity." But in ^¥c^t v. Kay (.s), it was held, con- Entnot trary to Buchidl v. BlenJcom (i), that, where a power of ^^^f;"'".. i^ appointment is to be exercised by " any deed or writing " ^'^^viu-ed. under the hand and seal of the donee, it cannot be exer- cised by a will executed with only the formalities required by 1 Vict. c. 26, notwithstanding the 10th section of that Act ; the power not being in terms a power to appoint by will, but only liy any deed or writing. (i)) 2 Sugd. Pow. 125— G ; 1 (.v) 1 Kay, 3S5 ; see C'oUard y. Story's Eq. ,Tur. | 97, 173—4 ; 4 Sampson, 4 D. M. & G. 224 ; Orange Cruise T. 32, c. 17, § 7. v. Plcl-fonl, 4 Drewry, 363 ; Taylor Cq) 2 Sugd. Pow. 125—6; 1 Story's v. Meads, 13 W. R. 394 (L. C.) Eq. Jur. §174. " (^ 5 Hare, 131. (r) 2 Sugd. Pow. 125—6, yoL. II. 51 756 OF A DEED OF ArrOINTMENT rT.iii.T.i2, By the stat. 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 12 (13tli Aug. 1859), " a deed hereafter executed in the iDresence of and attested Appoiut- ^ deed or'^ ^^ ^^^^^ ^^ uiore witucsses in the manner in which deeds Testameutary ^^'G Ordinarily executed and attested shall, so far as 'isthofAu- respects the execution and attestation thereof, be a valid execution of a power of appointment by deed or by any instrument in writing not testamentary, notwithstanding it shall have been expressly required that a deed or instru- ment in writing made in exercise of such power should be executed or attested with some additional or other form of execution or attestation of solemnity : Provided always, that this provision shall not operate to defeat any direction in the instrument creating the power that the consent of any particular person shall be necessary to a valid execu- tion, or that any act shall be performed in order to give validity to any appointment, having no relation to the mode of executing and attesting the instrument, and nothing herein contained shall prevent the donee of a power from executing it conformably to the power by writing or otherwise than by an instrument executed and attested as an ordinary deed, and to any such execution of a power this provision shall not extend." vtimh there belief Is granted even where there is only an inten- int"enU(.r tiou to exccutc the power, if it is clearly manifested in to execute. • , • / \ writing {Uj. Where de- Equity cannot dispense with the regulations prescribed, execution is whcrc the powcr is created by statute (at least where they not relieved ••- ,/ \ ./ against. constitute the apparent policy and object of the statute), or with the consent of persons whose consent is required. Nor will the regulations prescribed be dispensed with, where such dispensation would wholly or partially defeat the object of the donor of the power ; as where, in the case of a lease under a power, the best rent is required to (u) 2 Sugd. Pow. 115—6 ; Oarih v. Toumcnd, L. K. 7 Eq. 220. UNDER A rOWER. 757 be reserved, and it is not reserved. 'Nov will an execution pt.iii.t.12, Ch. 3, s. 6, by an absolute deed, or by a surrender of copyholds, instead of by will, be supported ; as that would be repugnant to the power, since it would not be revocable like a will (./•). Nor will a defective execution be supported, wdiere the donee of the power afterwards executes it in due form in favour of a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee without notice of such defective execution ; it being a maxim, that where the equities are equal, the law^ shall prevail Qj). Putting aside cases of fraud and election, and cases of NoreUef '^ in cases of an intention to execute manifested in writing, equity will t^^'®^^'''^' not interpose in the case of the non-execution of a mere power ; for that would be depriving the donee of the right of discretion in regard to the exercise of the power. But where a power is coupled with a trust, that is, where a man is invested with a trust to be effectuated by the execution of a power, it is his duty to exercise the power ; and if he does not execute it, equity will carry the trust into execution, even though the person in whose favour it is to be executed is a mere volunteer. An instance of this kind occurs wdiere trustees are empowered to sell an estate, and apply the proceeds upon certain trusts {z). III. Excessive ExeciUioii of Poimrs, Where there is a complete but excessive execution, the complete b>it excessive excess alone is void, if it is of such a nature as to be execution. capable of being exactly distinguished and severed from that which would constitute a complete and proper ap- pointment : as where a man, having a power to lease for twenty-one years, leases for forty ; or where a person {x) 1 Story's Eq. Jur. § 96—7, (z) 2 Sugd. Pow. 157—160 ; 1 173 ; 2 Sugd. Pow. 128, 138 ; Watk. Story's Eq. Jur. § 98, 169, 170 ; 4 Conv. 3rd ed. by Prest. 140. CniLse T. 32. c. 17, § 1, 25. ijj) 2 Sugd. Pow. 103—4,. M 2 758 OF A DEED OF APPOINTMENT Pt. III.T.12, Cli. 3, s. 0. Effect of engrafting void trusts on an ap- pointment, or illegally modifying tlie interest appointc'-l. liaving poM'jjr to cliarge a particular sum charges a larger sum (ft) ; or, in most cases, where an ap})ointnient is made to persons, some of whom are not ohjects of the power (Ii) ; or where a distinct unauthorised limitation, trust, or con- dition is superadded (r). Where a testator, after appointing personal property in terms which, per se, w^ould give the appointee the absolute interest, proceeds to direct, that, after the death of the appointee, the property shall he held upon trust for other persons, who are incapahle of taking, the first appointee takes the absolute interest, unaffected by the subsequent trusts (d). And where there is an absolute appointment liy will in favour of a proper oljject of the power, and that appointment is followed by attempts to modify the interest so appointed, in a manner which the law will not allow, or to subject it to a condition, or to a trust in favour of persons not objects of the power, the Court reads the will as if the passages in which such attempts are made were swept out of it, for all intents and purposes, i. e., not only so far as they attempt to regulate the quantum of interest to be enjoyed by the appointee in the settled property, but also so far as they might otherwise be relied upon as raising a case of election {c). But under a power to appoint to his children, a father may appoint a share to- a daughter for life for her separate use, with remainder as she should by will appoint (/ ). And where, under a power of appointing to children, an appointment is made to trustees for a daughter, her intended husband, and the children of the marriage, it {(() See 2 Sugcl. Pow. 75—8. {I) 2 Sugd. Pow. 62, 66—7. {(-) 2 Sugd. Pow. 73, 76, 84 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 16, § 49 ; Watt v. Creyl-e, 3 Sm. & Gif. 362 ; CWu- v. Foster, 1 Johns, k Hem. 30 ; In re Brown's Trust, L. E. 1 Eq. 74 ; In re Jeaffreson's Trust, L. E. 2 Eq. 276. (rf) Harrey v. Stracey, 1 Drewry, 137—40; Re Lord Sondes' Will, 2 S. & Gif. 416. (e) Woolridge v. WooJridge, 1 Johns. 63 ; Roolce v. lioolce, 2 Dr. & Sm. 38; Cliurcldll v. Churchill, L. E. 5 Eq. 44. {f)Morse v. Martin, 34 Beav. 500. UXDEK A P0"\VE1I. 759 will be supported as an appointment to the daughter, and Pr.iii.T.12, l-'II. Of S. O. a settlement of the sum appointed (ied. perty, to the person to whom he affects or attempts to give it in that character : otherwise it is considered as a fraud upon the power (/). Hence, \\'here a person has a power of appointing to all or any of his children, and he exercises it in favour of one child, merely in order to remove an objec- tion to the title of an estate, the appointment is void {j). And if a jjerson, having a particular power to be exercised Appointment '" ■whereby a for the benefit of others, make an appointment in payment benefit is ^ ^ J. ./ secured to of a debt due to the appointee by the appointor, or upon orl^itran"cr*er! the terms or for the purpose (whether made known to the appointee at the time, or not), of securing some benefit to himself or some other persons who are not objects of the power, such an appointment is fraudulent, and will be set aside in equity (/,■) : as where the donee of a power appoints a fund to one of the objects of the po^\'er, under an under- standing that the latter is to lend the fund to the former, {(j) Flkrojj V. Dulce of Rkhmnd Eep. (N. S.) 295. (No. 2), 27 Beav. 190 ; Daniel v. (^0 Sec 2 Sugd. Pow. 181, 184, ^r^■iM•(^//^<, 2 Hem. & Mil. 95. 191 — 4; Arnold t. Hardwick, 7 {h) Dickinson v. Mart, 8 Have, Sim. 343 ; Askham v. Barker, 12 178. Beav. 499 ; 17 Bear. 37; Eariison (0 Portland {Duke of) v. Topham,, v. Randall, 9 Hare, 397 ; Agassiz v. 11 H. L. Cas. 32 ; Pryor y. Pnjor, Squire, 18 Beav. 431 ; Pcid v. Eeid^ 2 D. J. & S. 205. 25 Beav. 409. (i) Weir V. Charnhj, 1 Ir. Eq. "60 OF A DEED OF APPOINTMENT Appointment to an iiifaut. Eights of creditors against a general appointee. Illusory ap- pointments. tliougli on good security (/) ; or that the appointee should hold the fund in trust for or make over a part to persons some of whom are not objects of the power (m). Upon the same principle, if a parent appoints an im- mediate portion to an infant who is not in want of it, or appoints to a child, whether infant or adult, who is seriously ill, with a view to becoming entitled to that which is so appointed himself, as the personal representative of such appointee in the event of his death, the appointment is void as a fraud upon the power (w). Wliere a person exercises a general power of appoint- ment in favour of a stranger, his creditors will in equity l)ecome entitled to the property appointed, if there is a deficiency of assets (o). Where a person had a power of appointing an estate or a sum of money unto and among his children or any other class of persons, in such shares and proportions as he should think proper, there, prior to the 16tli of July, 1830, each of the class must in equity have had such a fair and reasonable share as was not illusory : otherwise an ap- pointment to them prior to that date was void in equity (j)). But by the stat. 1 AVill. 4, c. 46, s. 1, illusory appointments made after the 16tli of July, 1830, are valid in equity as well as at law. The Act is in these words : " Whereas, by deeds, wills, and other instruments, powers are frequently given to appoint real and personal property amongst several objects, in such manner that none of the objects can be excluded by the donee of the power from a share of such property : and whereas appointments in exercise of such powers whereby an unsubstantial, illusory, or nominal (l) Arnold v. HanhcicTc, 7 Sim. 313. {m) Birley v. Birley, 25 Beav. 299 ; Re Marsdcn's Trust, 4 Drew. 594. (.rt) 2 Siigd.Pow.194; WeUesIc>/v. Earl of Morninrjton, 2 K. & J. 143 ; Beere v. Iloffmister, 23 Beav. 101. (o) 2 Sugd. Pow. 102, 158—9 ; 1 Story's Eq. Jur. § 169; 1 Lead. Cas. in Eq. 3rd ed. 210 ; 2 Id. 121—2. ixi) 4 Cruise T. 32. c. 16, § 58. UNDER A rOWEE. 761 sliare of tlic property affected thereby is appointed to or ^ch^sJ'o^' left imappointed to devolve upon any one or more of the objects thereof, are invalid in equity, although the like appointments are good and binding in law :" and Mdiereas considerable inconvenience hath arisen from the rule of equity relative to such appointments, and it is expedient that such appointments should be as valid in equity as at law ; be it therefore enacted, that no appointment which, from and after the passing of this Act shall be made in exercise of any power or authority to appoint any pro- perty, real or personal, amongst several objects, shall be invalid, or impeached in equity, on the ground that an un- substantial, illusory, or nominal share only shall be thereby appointed to or left unappointed to devolve upon any one or more of the objects of such power ; but that every such appointment shall be valid and effectual in equity as well as at law, notwithstanding that any one or more of the objects shall not thereunder, or in default of such appoint- ment, take more than an unsubstantial, illusory, or nominal share of the property subjected to such power " (s. 1). " Provided always, and be it further enacted, that nothing in this Act contained shall prejudice or affect any provision in any deed, will, or other instrument creating any such power as aforesaid, which shall declare the amount of the share or shares from which no object of the power shall be excluded " (s. 2). " Provided also, and be it further enacted and declared, that nothing in this Act contained shall be construed, deemed, or taken, at law or in equity, to give any other validity, force, or effect, to any appoint- ment, than such appointment would have had if a sub- stantial share of the property affected by the power had been thereby appointed to or left unappointed to devolve upon any object of such power" (s. 3). 762 OF A DEKl) OF ArPOINTME^'T V. The Question v.hdhcr an Indmmcnt is intended to operate as an A-ppointment. ft. III.T.12, A power may Lc executed without being in any manner Cii. 3, 3. 6. — referred to, provided, in cases not within the Wills Act, tlie intention to execute it or to pass the property sufficiently appears {q). Where, however, a man has both a power and an interest, relating to the same property, or to different properties or portions of property, and he devises, be- queatlis, or conveys generally, without in any manner indicating an intention to exercise his power, the act done will only operate, if it can, by virtue of his ownership or interest, and not in exercise of his power (;•). But where a person has both a power and an interest (as Avliere he has a general power of appointment, with a limitation to himself in fee), and he makes a disposition which is not adapted to pass his interest and would be absolutely void if it did not enure as an execution of the power, it will take effect as an appointment, if it is of the nature and executed in thg manner prescribed by the power, however general it may l)e (.s). And where a man has both a power and an interest, and he creates an estate which would not or might not endure for the period assigned to it by the terms of its creation, if it were fed out of his interest, it shall take effect by force of the power {t). Even prior to the Wills Act, where a man had a poA\er of appointment over certain property, but no estate in it, if he executed an instrument purporting to convey, devise, or bequeatli that specific property, and the forms requisite (2) 1 Sugcl Povv. 356; 4 Cruise (;•) 1 Siigd. Pow. 41-2; 4 CnilsG T. 32, c. 16, § 27, 31 ; Co. Litt. 271 T. 32, c. 16, § 70 ; Burton, § 610 ; b, n (1), vii. 2. And sec Li Re Noel v. Aocl, i DrcAV. 624. David's Trusts, 1 Johns. 495 ; (s) 1 Sugd. Pow. 417 ; Co. Litt. r^i-y«H V. Yi/ryati, 30 Eeav. 65; 271 b, n. (1), vii. 2. and infra, p. 763. (t) 1 Sugd. Pow. 41S. UNDEK A POWER. 763 to an execution of the power "were observed, the convey- ^qJ^^''^'\^' a nee, devise, or liequest enured as an appointment, because otherwise it would have been necessarily void, ab initio (u). And where an act can operate only as an exercise of a power of revocation, and all the circumstances requisite to an execution of the power are observed, the act shall be deemed an execution of the power, although no reference whatever is made to it, or to an intent to revoke (.r). In cases under the old Vaw, where there is no general reference to powers, and no reference to the particular [)Ower, the property comprised in it must be mentioned, or in some other way there must be an intention apparent on the face of the will to operate upon it (i/). But in the case of wills made on or after the 1st of January, 1838, a general gift includes real and personal property over Avliich the testator has a general power of testamentary appoint- ment, unless a contrary intention appears by the will (z). For, by the stat. 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 27, it is enacted "that a general devise of the real estate of the testator, or of the real estate of the testator in any place or in the occupation of any person mentioned in his will, or otherwise described in a general manner, shall be construed to include any real estate, or any real estate to which such description shall extend (as the case may be), which he may have power to appoint in any manner he may think proper, and shall operate as an execution of such power, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will; and in like manner a berpiest of the pers(7nal estate of the testator, or any (u) 1 Sugd. Pow. 357, 377, 380 ; K. & J. 255, 3 D. & J. 142 ; Ecldx. 1 Javrn. "Wills, 2nd ed. 582—4 ; see Held, 25 Bcav. 469 ; Roolv v. Boole, ."^he/ford T. Acland, 23 Bear. 1014; 2 Dr. & Sm. 38. See Att.-Gen. v. Ccu-Vcr V. FikJumh, 27 Beav. 488. Wdkinson, L. E. 2 Eq. 816. (..) 1 Sugd. Pow. 357—8. (.-) Moss v. Harfer, 2 Sm. & Gif. (//) 1 Sugd. Pow. 367—9 ; 4 458 ; ScHreii v. Scindom, 2 Johns. & Cruise T. 32, c. 16, § 34 ; Evans v. H. 743 ; Bush v. CoiOaii, 32 Beav. Evans, 23 Beav. 1 ; V.-C. Wood's 228. remarks in Hidchiugs v. Osborne, 4 76-4 OF A DEED OF AITOIXTMENT rT.iii.T.i2, bequest of personal property described in a general C'H. Oj S. 0. manner («), shall be construed to include any personal estate, or any personal estate to wliicli such description shall extend (as the case may be), which he may have power to appoint in any manner he may think proper, and shall operate as an execution of such power, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will." Notwithstanding the 8th section (h) the 27th section ap- plies to testamentary appointments by married women (c). Where a gift is prima facie specific, evidence may be received as to the state of the property at the date of the will, or at the time of the testator's death, for the purpose of identifying the subject matter of the gift, so as to ascer- tain whether the testator meant to refer to his own pro- perty or to property over which he had only a power of appointment (d). But the Court will not infer an inten- tion to execute a power from the mere fact of the instru- ment being executed in the manner required by the power, nor from any other slight circumstances of conformity, nor from the fact that otherwise there would not be sufficient to answer the purposes of the will (c). Who may exercise a power Time for execution. VI. Appointments generally. Every person who is capable of disposing of property of wliich he is the owner, may exercise a power (/). In the absence of any indication of a contrary intent, a donee of a power may execute it at any time during his life {g). (a) See Hawtliorn v. Shedden, 3 Ap. 587. Sm. & G. 293 ; Wilday v. Barnett, L. R. 6 Eq. Cas. 193. (6) See infra, Part IV. T. 1, c. 3, s. 1. (c) Bernard v. MinshuU, 1 Johns. 276 ; Thomas v. Jones, 1 D. J. & S. 63. In re Wilkinson, L. E. 4 Ch. (d) Lines V. Sayer, 3 Mac. & G-. 606. (e) 1 Siigcl. Pow. 370—1, 387; Davies v. Thorns, 3 Dc G. & Sm. 347. (/) 1 Sugd. Pow. 181. {rj) 1 Sugd. Pow. 330—1. UNDER A rOWER. 765 It is the duty of a trustee who executes a power, to tt. 111.T.12, '' _ _ ^ Cn. 3, s. 6. show that he has complied with the exijTencies required ■^ ij J. Duty of a by it (h). ^""^'ee •/ ^ '' exercising a As a power limited by way of use is a mere riofht to ^°^^''- ^ ^ J o Who should appoint a use, the immediate appointee takes the first use, I'^/^f/^ig^jg which the statute executes, and any use engrafted on that ^^pp^intee. Where the appointment is a second use, which the statute does not legai estate ■tt vests 111 him, execute, and which is consequently a mere trust. It is therefore necessary to appoint immediately to the person intended to take, and not to some other person to his use, unless it is desired that he should not have the legal estate (/). But in the case of a mere common-law autho- rity, as in the case of a power given liy will without the intervention of uses, an appointment, by virtue of such a power, to a person to certain uses, would not of itself vest the legal estate in him, but the legal estate would vest either in the immediate appointee or in the person to whose use the appointment was made, as would best effectuate the intention of the parties (/). Where a deed of appointment is required by a court of where an ■^ 'J irrevocable equity, or, as it would seem, by the instrument creating the ^Pj^f ^e"''''^'' power, to be executed within a limited time, an irrevocable ™^*^®' appointment must be made within that time : an appoint- ment with power of revocation is not a proper compliance with the requisition (k). An appointment in pursuance of a power under the How an appointment Statute of Uses operates under that statute, not as a con- operates. veyance of the land, but as a substitution of a new use in the place of a former one (/). Although estates arising Estates ^ . ^ ^ * ° appointed from the execution of powers owe their commencement to 'ate effect as (A) Sir /. Romilly, M; R., in Mor- 242. fls V. Wriglit, 14 Beav. 303. {k) Piper v. Piper, 3 My. & K. (/) 1 Sugd. PoT\% 229, 238—9, 159. 242; Co. Litt.271 b, u. (1), vii. 1. kJ) i Oruise T. 32, c, 16, § 78; (i) See 1 Sugd. Pow. 238-9, Co. Litt. 271 b, n. (1), vii. 1. 66 OF A DEED OF APrOINT.MENT UNDER A POWEIJ. if iiisorted in the instru- nieut creat- ing tlic power. ^.T- "i-'^'l.^' the deed of aiipointmeiit, A'ct the appointee under the Cn. 3, 8. 6. ^ ^ " ^ ^ power does not deii\e his title from the appointor, or out of tlie estate whereof the appointor is seised, hut comes in directly under the conveyance by -wliich the power was created ; and the uses created hy the a})pointment precede the uses limited by the original conveyance, just as if the estate created l^y the appointment had been actually limited in such original conveyance (ni). But the rule does not apply so as to make the interest appointed vest by relation from the time of the limitation of the power (n). Nor does the rule apply so as to render an interest void, like a remainder, because the particular estate determined before the power arose (o). Where portions of a fund are appointed, and then " all the rest " or " remainder," it should be expressed whether this is to include shares of appointees which may lapse, or only the balance of the fund (ji). "All the rest," or "icmainder" ot a fund. Section VII. 0/ Leases under Powers. pt. III.T.12, As all leases (excel )t under the Leases and Sales of Ch. 3, s. 7. , Settled Estates Act) created by tenants for life out of their giving own interest determine liy their death, powers are usually powers of "^ ^ "^ leasiDg to inserted in modern settlements enabling the tenants for life tenants tor " ^^®' to grant leases, to be valid against the persons in remainder and reversion. {m) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 16, § 76 ; 2 Sugd. Pow; 22; Co. Lilt. 271 b, n. (1), Tii. 2 ; Watk. Conv. 3rd cd. byPrest. 151. (n) 2 Sugd. Pow. 23 5 Co. Litt. 271 b, n. (1), xiu 2. {o) 2 Sugd. Pow. 26. (j)) Sec //( re Jfarricb-'s Trad, 1 Johns. 199. OF LExVSES UNDER rOWEKS. 767 beuaiits for life slioukl exert these powers to the prejudice of the persons in remainder or reversion, But, lest the tenants for life should exert these powers pt.iii.t.12, ^ Cn. 3, s. 7. Restrictions they are in general restrained by the words of the power constnied from making leases, except on certain conditions, hy A\liich tluauubr they are obliged to secure the same advantages to those ^'*'^* who may succeed to the estate as to themselves. It has therefore been long settled, that the restrictive parts of these powers shall be construed strictly against the tenant for life, and in fa^'our of the remainderman and reversioner ; because the conditions on which powers of this kind are given are inserted with a view to their interest (q). The instruments by which leasing powers are executed are con- strued more strictly than other deeds of appointment. For, it being expressly required that tenants for life should execute their powers of leasing in a particular manner, that becomes a condition precedent ; and if all the circumstances required by the power are not strictly followed, the power is held to be totally unexecuted. So that, if a usual cove- nant is omitted, or if an unusual or improper covenant is inserted in a lease under a power, the lease is thereby void in its creation, and not the covenant only ; and, prior to the stat. 12 & 13 Vict. c. 26, s. 3, and 13 Vict. c. 17, s. 2 (?■), no acceptance of rent or other act by the person in remain- der or reversion would operate as a confirmation of it (s). A power in a bargain and sale, to lease to any man in- powers to definitely (although for a valuable consideration), and not bargain and sale, or to a person from whom a valuable consideration moved at covenant to ■^ stand seised the time of the execution of the deed, is void. And so, a power in a covenant to stand seised, to lease to any one indefinitely, and not to a person named in the deed and also within the consideration of blood or marriage, is void (t). A power of leasing may be exercised toties cpoties («). Power may be exercised toties (g) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 15, § 1, 2. (i) 1 Sugd. Pow. 158—9 ; 3 Jarm. 'i"""^^- (r) See infra, p. 772—4. & Byth. by Sweet, 676. (s) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 15, § 3, 61, 65. (») 2 Sugd. Pow. 312, 708 OF LEASES UNDER POWEKS. PT.iir.T.i2, Ch. 3, s. 7. lustrument usually required. Leasing by letter of attorney. Laudg "usually demised." T. Usual Restrictions. The restrictions wliicli fire usually annexed to leasiiij powers relate to, 1. The instrument by which the jiower i to be executed. 2. The lands to be let. 8. Tlie time whei the lease is to commence. 4. Its duration. 5. The rescr vation. 6. The clauses and covenants rc(iuired to be in serted in such leases {x). 1. Instrument hy irJiich the Power is to he executed. A leasing power is generally required to be executed 1)} deed, sealed and delivered in the presence of and attestei by two or more witnesses. It is also usually requirci that the tenant should execute a counterpart of sucl indenture (y). A power to make leases for life or years cannot b( exercised by letter of attorney ; for delegatus non pott's delegare (z). 2. Lands to he Let. In many cases, powers of leasing are restrained to lands which have been usually demised to farmers, in order t( prevent the tenant for life from leasing the mansion house gardens, pleasure grounds, park, or other parts of the lane usually occupied by the proprietors of tlie estate, anc deemed necessary to the dignity of the family (a). Wher( a power extends to lands that have been usually let, land? which have been twice or thrice let are within tlie power and so are lands which have been in lease for a very long term, say ninety-nine years, though it has recently ex- pired (&). With this exception, lands which have beer (a-) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 15, §4. {y) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 15, § 5. {z) 1 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 429 ; 1 Sugd. Pow. 213.. (a) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 15, § 7. {V) See 2 Sugd. Pow. 317—319; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 15, § S, P. OF LEASES UXDEr> rowEiis. 760 only once let do not fall within the description of lands pt^hi. T.12, usually let : for usus fit ex iteratis actibus. And lands not demised for the space of twenty-one years previous to the making of a lease under a power, are not considered as lands usually let (c). Where there is a power of leasing any part of premises leasing usually so leased, reserving the ancient and accustomed \^^^^^^^ rents, two tenements which had previously been leased separately may be leased together under a single demise, if the rents reserved are in proper proportion (d). Lands comprised in a power may be, and frequently are, demised in the same lease with lands not comprised in the power. But in such a case there should be several demises with distinct reservations (c). Joining, at an entire rent, even though it be a proportionately larger rent, premises within a power of leasing at the accustomed rent, with other premises not within the power, is fatal to the lease (/ ). 3. Commencement of the Lease. Where a power is to grant leases in possession, a lease in futuro is void at law and in equity, even though it commences only a day after the date of the deed creating it(^). In one sense, as opposed to a lease in possession, that is lease i said to be a lease in reversion which commences at a future day. But in powers, the usual construction of the term lease in reversion as opposed to a lease in possession, is a lease to commence after the end of the present interest in being (h). Even though a power to lease be general, with- out expressing that the leases shall be in possession, leases (c) 4 Ci-uise T. 32, e. 15, § 8, 9. Stephens, 6 Ad. & E. (N. S.) 208. {d) Doe d. Earl of Egremont V. {rj) 2 Sugd. Pow. 361, 363. Williams, 11 Ad. & E. (N. S.) 688. Qi) 2 Sugd. Pow. 343—4; 4 Cruise (e) 2 Sugd. Pow. 417. T. 32, c. 15, § 21, 40. (/) Doe d. Earl of Egremont v. reversion. YV OF LEASES UNDER POWERS. Pt >T. ni.T.i2, in possession only are authorised (/). Under a power to '- make leases in reversion as well as in possession, the donee cannot make a lease in possession and another lease in reversion of the same land (/). And in tlie case of a lease of the reversion, there should not he an interval between the former lease and the lease of the reversion (JS). 4. Duration of the Lease. Leases for terms of years. Leases for lives. The usual practice is to restrain tenants for life from making leases for a longer term than twenty-one years, except in those counties Avhere lands are usually let for live s (/). Under a power to lease for a term not exceeding twenty- one years, a lease may be made for that period, determinable, at the option of the lessee, at the end of the first seven or fourteen years (in). The usual power of leasing for lives authorises a lease for lives in esse, and for concurrent lives only (ii). A power to make leases for two or more lives authorises a lease for a less number of lives, or for the same number of lives and the life of the survivor (o). Meaning of word rent. How ancient rent is reserveil. 5. The Beservation. The word " rent," in powers of leasing, may mean any return or equivalent adapted to the nature of the subject demised. So that, upon a lease of mines, a due proportion of the produce may be reserved as a rent {li). Wliere the usual or ancient rent is to be reserved, generally the usual way of reserving it must be followed. But where merely the best yearly rent is required to be reserved, it may be made payalile quarterly or half-yearly. (0 2 Sugd. Pow. 345 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 15, §24. {)) 2 Sugd. Pow. 358. {h) 2 Sugd. Pow. 359. (0 4 Cruise T, 32, c. 15, § 43. {m) Eihoards v. Milhanl; 4 Di-ew. 606. (») 2 Sugd. Pow. 329, 340. (o) 2 Sugd. Pow. 339, 341. (2^ 2 Sugd. Pow. 402. OF LEASES UNDER POWERS. 771 Tlie word yearly in such powers denotes, not that the ^J-^o^J'^/- payment is to be made only once a year, but that it is to bo made in each successive year {q). If " the best imiiroved rents " or " the ancient accus- uncertainty iu the reser- tomed rents " are reserved, the lease is void on account of vatiou. the uncertainty as to the amount of the rent {r), 6. Conditions and Covenants. Bv the stat. 32 Plen. 8, c. 34, grantees and assi o o assignees of reversions, their heirs, successors, executors, administrators, entmedTo and assigns may have the same benefit of conditions and conduioiis covenants agaiiist the lessees, their executors, adminis- nauts. trators and assigns, as the lessors or grantors themselves or their heirs or successors mio'lit liave had. And the co/enants " entered into covenants entered into by a lessee with a tenant for life, J^'^^^ for the donee of tlie power, his heirs and assigns, will enure the rfcma*in-" to the remainderman, who is considered to be an assignee within the meaning of that statute, as being an assignee of the estate out of wiiicli tlie lease was created (.s) . Where a power of leasinsj provides that the lease shall "Usuai ■■- or covenants, contain all " usual and reasonable covenants," the general rule is to determine the question " what are usual cove- nants " by reference to the lease in existence at the date of the power (/"). Where a power of leasing requires that the usual cove- nants shall be inserted in the lease, with a condition of re-entry 'for non-performance of the covenants therein to be contained,' and the lease contains a general covenant to repair and keep in repair, but, by the clause of I'e-entry, the right to re-enter is not, in general terms, in case the lessee shall not repair, but in case the lessee shall not {q) 2 Sugd. Pow. 403—406. (0 Doe d. Lord Egremont v. 00 2 Sugd. Pow. 414, 415. I^tephens, G Ad. & E. 208. (.<() 2 Sugd. Pow. 451—2. 772 OF LEASES UNDER TO WE US. Pr.iii.T.i2, repair "within six calendar months next after notice;" Cu. 3, s. 7. -'- ••11 ■ in such case the lease is not in compliance with the power («). II. Relief agedmt the defeetke Execution of Fovxrs (f Leasing. EquitaUo In somc cases, where the forms prescribed Ijy the power relief. ' . . . „ have not been observed, equity will relieve in favour of a lessee, if he is in the nature of a purchaser (x). statutory Bv the stat. 12 & 13 Vict. c. 2G (?/), s. 2, " where, in the relief. "^ \J/> '^ iea?ea intended exercise of any such power of leasing as aforesaid, to deviatiou" whether derived under an Act of Parliament or under any from terms of tije power instrument lawfully creatino; such power, a lease has been to be deemed -^ o x ' equuyfo*-'" °^' ^"^^dW hereafter be granted, Avhich is, by reason of the asmight^^ non-observance or omission of some condition or restric- grluted''" tion, or by reason of any other deviation from the terms of power. such powcr, invalid as against the person entitled, after the determination of the interest of the person granting such lease, to the reversion, or against other the person who, subject to any lease lawfully granted under such power, would have been entitled to the hereditaments comprised in such lease, such lease, in case the same liave been made bona fide, and the lessee named therein, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, (as the case may re- quire,) have entered thereunder, shall be considered in equity as a contract for a grant, at the request of a lessee, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, (as the case may require,) of a valid lease under such power, to the like purport and effect as such invalid lease as aforesaid, save so far as any variation may be necessary in order to comply (m) Doe d. Lord Egrcmont v. Bur- elude corporations aggregate and rourjh, 6 Ad. & E. 229. s^ole, unless there bo something in (:r) 2 Sugd. Pow. 138. the context contrary to such con- (y) ^y s. 1, "person" shall in- structiou. OF LEASES UNDER TOWERS. 7 16 ■svitli th(3 terms of sucli power ; and all persons wlio would r^- in.T.12, ■*• ^ Cii. 3, s. 7. liave l)een bound l)y a lease lawfully granted under such power sliall Le bound in enuitvltv sucli contract : l*]'o\ided rroviso -I i .. . where the always, that no lessee under any such iuA'alid lease as fev"r«ronor aforesaid, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, conflrmf " sliall be entitled l)y virtue of any such equitable contract as aforesaid to obtain any variation of such lease, "where the persons wlio would haxe l)een bound by such contract are willing to confirm such lease without variation." By s. 3, " the acceijtance of rent under any such in\alid Acceptance •^ ' i- '' of reut to ba lease as aforesaid shall, as against the person so accepting coum-mauou. the same, be deemed a coniirmation of such lease." By s. 4, " where a lease granted in the intended exercise Lea'-es invalid ut of any such power of leasing as aforesaid is invalid by thegiauting -' i- ^ J thereof may reason that at the time of the granting thereof tlie person |f f^^"^ ^■'^''^ granting the same could not lawfully grant such lease, but ti'u"e'^[,th"" the estate of such person in the hereditaments comprised ujtiftle^^ 11 1111 -IP ^ • 1 time when in such lease shall lla^'e continued alter the time when he migiit lawfully such or the like lease might ha^'e been ^ranted by him in ew"*^ such a o n J kase. the lawful exercise of such power, then and in every such case such lease shall take effect and be as valid as if the same had been granted at such last-mentioned time, and all the provisions herein contained shall apply to every such lease." By s. 5, " when a valid power of leasing is vested in or what shaii , be deemed may be exercised by a person granting a lease, and such ■'^'^ iuteiu'wi •^ ./ i o o J exercise ot a lease (by reason of the determination of the estate or inte- i"""'*^''- rest of such ])erson or otherwise) cannot have effect and continuance according to the terms thereof, independently of such power, such lease shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be granted in the intended exercise of such power, although such power be not referred to in such lease." By g. 6, " nothing in this Act contained sliall extend or Saving of "^ *= the rights of 1)0 construed to prejudice or take away any right of action the lessees V74 OF LEASES UNDER POWEHS. Pt. III.T.12, ch. 3, 3. r. under cove- nants for title aud for quiet enjoy- ment, aud tlie lessor's riglit of re-entry for breach of covenant, ifcc, Act not to extend to certain "Where there is a note iu writing sliowiiig intent to confirni, acceptance of rent to be deemed a confirmation. or other right or remedy to wliich, hut for the passing of this Act, the lessee named in any sucli lease as aforesaid, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, would or might have been entitled, under or by virtue of any cove- nant for title or quiet enjoyment contained in such lease on the part of the person granting tlie same, or to prejudice or take away any right of re-entry or other right or remedy to which, but[for the passing of this Act, the person granting such lease, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, or other the person for the time being entitled to the rever- sion expectant on the determination of such lease, would or might have been entitled, for or by reason of any breach of the covenants, conditions, or provisoes contained in such lease, and on the part of the lessee, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, to be observed and performed," By s. 7, " this Act shall not extend to any lease by an ecclesiastical corporation or spiritual person, or to any lease of the possessions of any college, hospital, or chari- table foundation, or to any lease where, before the passing of this Act, the hereditaments comprised in such lease have been surrendered or relinfjuished, or recovered adversely, by reason of the invalidity thereof, or there has been any judgment or decree in any action or suit concerning the validity of such lease," &c. By the stat. 12 & 13 Vict. c. 110, the operation of this Act w^as suspended till the 1st of June, 1850. And by the stat. 13 A^ict. c. 17, the 3rd section of the 12 & 13 Vict, c. 26, was repealed. And by s. 2, " where, upon or before the acceptance of rent under any such invalid lease, as iu the said first-recited Act mentioned, any receipt, memo- randum, or note in writing, confirming such lease, is signed by the person accepting such rent, or some other person by him thereunto lawfully authorised, such acceptance shall, as against the person so accepting such rent, be deemed a confirmation of such lease." OF LEASES UNDER POWERS. Hi) By s. 3, "where during the continuance of the possession ^^■^"- J-\^' taken under such invalid lease, as in the said first-recited ,— ' \\ here Act mentioned, the person for the time being entitled (sub- IsZao^^m ject to such possession as aforesaid) to the hereditaments conHnn!" • T • Igsscg to comprised in such lease, or to the possession or the receipt accept . confirmation. of the rents and profits thereof, is able to confirm such lease without variation, the lessee, his heirs, executors, or administrators (as the case may require), or any person A\'lio would Iiave been bound by the lease if the same had been valid, shall, upon the request of the person so able to confirm the same, be bound to accept a confirmation accordingly ; and such confirmation may be by memo- randum or note in writing, signed l)y the person con- firming and accepting respectively, or by some other persons by them respectively thereunto lawfully autho- rised ; and, after confirmation and acceptance of confirma- tion, such lease shall be valid, and shall be deemed to have had from the granting thereof the same effect as if the same had been originally valid." Section VIII. Of Assitranccs luidcr the Act for the Abolition of Fines and Recoveries (z), I. Assurances hy Persons liable after the 31st Deceriiber, 1833, to levy a Fine or suffer a Recovery. By the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 3, persons liable after pt.iu.t.iz, the 31st December, 1833, to levy fines or suffer recoveries, ' ^' ' . or to procure the same to be levied or suffered, shall effect (z) This Act being so lengthy, given verbatim in this edition, but and being in the possession of every in the way of an abridgment, practitioner in some form, it is not 770 ASSURANCES UNDER THE ACT FOR I'T.iir.T.is, sucli of the intended |)urpose3 as can Le so effected, by a disposition nnder the Act, and such of them as cannot he so effected, by a deed ^vhich shall purport to be intended to liave, and Mhieli shall accordin^^ly have, the same operation as a fine or recovery. II, Dispositiun of Freehold Lands hy Tenants in Tall, Issue in Tail, and Persons entitled to Base Fees in gene red. Enabling Cy thc Stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 15, '' after the clause, giviug power P, 1st day of December, 1833, every actual tenant in tail, OF dif'posing " ' ' ./ ilnd''^^^"^ whether in possession, remainder, contingency, or other- wise, may dispose of for an estate in fee simple absolute, or for any less estate, the lands entailed, as against all persons claiming tlie lands entailed by force of any estate tail which shall be vested in or might be claimed by, or Avhich but for some previous Act would have been vested in or might have been claimed by, the person mahing the disposition, at the time of his making the same, and also as against all pei'sons Avhose estates are to take effect iifter the determination or in defeasance of any such estate tail." Exception iu But, 1. By s. 16, this power of disposition as to lands of the case of a i-i . . .,.,., iiTThr tenaut iu tail whicli a wouiau IS tenant m tail within the stat. 1 1 Hen. 7, ex provisione vi"- c. 20, under a settlement prior to the stat. 8 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, cannot be exercised hj her, except with such assent as, if this Act had not Ijeen passed, would, under the pro- visions of the Act of Hen, 7, have rendered valid a fine or common recovery levied or suffered by her of such Exccptiouin laiids. 2. By. s. 18, the power of disposition does not the case of enautsiii cxtcud to tcnaiits of cstatcs tail who l)y any Act are tail re- barHug^heu' I'^st'-'f^incd fVom barring their estates tail, or to tenants in and\^en!ant» f^iil after possibility of issue extinct. 3. By s. 20, a person possibiiiiy of cauiiot disposc of aiw lands entailed in respect of any issue extiuct. THE ABOLITION OF FINES AND KECOVEEIES. 777 expectant interest wliicli lie may have as issue inheritable JPt. nr.T.12, ^ ^ Cn. 3, s. 8. to any estate tail therein. - — : — 7- •^ Expectancies By s. 19, after the :31st day of December, 1833, where I'/^i^"'^"' an estate tail in any lands is barred and converted into a Kuabiing ■^ clause base fee, the person who would otherwise have been actual fo^i^fa^"" tenant in tail of the same lands, shall have full power to ^"^^ ^^''^^' dispose of such lands, as against all persons whose estates are to take effect after the determination or in defeasance of the base fee, so as to enlarge the base fee into a fee simple absolute. By s. 21, if a tenant in tail of lands makes a disposition Di^sposiUon T 1 • A 1 r '^y ^ tenant of the same under this Act, by way of mortu-ao'e, or for any intaiifm-a , , , O O ' J limited other limited purpose, such disposition is to the extent rui'poss. of the estate thereby created, an absolute bar to all persons as against whom such disposition is by this Act authorised to be made. By s. 22, if at the time when there is a tenant in tail Protector "^ where none of lands under a settlement, there is subsisting, in the is appointed. General rule. same lands under the same settlement, any estate for years determinable on the dropping of a life or lives, or any greater estate (not being an estate for years), prior to the estate tail, the owner of such prior estate, or the first of such prior estates if more than one, then subsisting under the same settlement, or who would have been so if no absolute disposition thereof had been made, shall be the protector of the settlement, although the same may have been charged or incumbered or absolutely disposed of ; and an estate by the curtesy, in respect of tlie estate tail, or of any prior estate created by the same settlement, is deemed a prior estate under the same settlement within the mean- ing ; and an estate by way of resulting use or trust to or for the settlor is deemed an estate under the same settlement. By s. 23, where two or more persons are owners of a Protector ia "^ -^ the case of prior estate, each is the sole protector to the extent of his p^"^' owners. undivided share. 778 ASSURANCES UNDER THE ACT FOR Vr. 7II.T.I2, Ch. 3, s. 8. Protector in the case of a roari'ied woman. rcrsoiiR who are not to be protectors. Protector in the case of an estate disposed of or created out of a remainder or reversion before December 31st, 1833. Power to appoint protector. J5y s. 24, where a married woman woiiltl, if single, Le the protector of a settlement, she and her husband together are the protector of snch settlement ; Init if such prifH' estate has by such settlement been settled, or agreed or directed to be settled, to her separate use, she alone is protector of such settlement. By ss. 27, ol, no woman, in respect of her dower, and (except in the case of a bare trustee under a settlement made on or before the 31st day of December, 1833, ^ho would haA'e been the proper person to make a tenant to the writ for suffering a common recovery to bar an estate tail), no bare trustee, heir, executor, administrator, or assign, is the protector. And by s. 28, where under any settlement there is more than one estate prior to an estate tail, and the owner of any prior estate is excluded from being the protector, the person (if any) who, if such estate did not exist, would be the protector, shall be such protector. By s. 29, where on or before the 31st day of December, 1833, an estate under a settlement has been disposed of, the person who in respect of such estate would have been the proper person to have made the tenant to the writ of entry or other writ for suffering a common recovery of the lauds entailed by such settlement, is the protector. And by s. 30, where any person who, on or before the 31st day of December, 1833, disposed of a remainder or reversion in fee in any lands, or created any estate out of such remainder or reversion, would otherwise have been the protector, and thereby be enabled to concur in the barring of such remainder or reversion, the person Avho would have been the proper person to have made the tenant to the writ of entry or other writ for suffering a common recovery of such land, is the protector. •Section 32 gives power to any settlor to appoint anyperson or persons the protector, and to perpetuate the protectorship. THE ABOLITION OF FIXES ANT) RECOVERIES. 779 The miniljer of persons to compose the protector is not to pt. iiI'T-12, exceed three. Every deed whcrehy a protector is appointed or relin<|uislies his office, is to he void, unless inrolled in Cliancery witliin six months. By s. 33, if any person, protector of a settlement, is wiioretLe J ' - L J L Lord Chan- lunatic, idiot, or of unsound mind, whether found such cciiororthe ' ' ' Court of hy inipiisition or not, the Lord Chancellor or other the ['o'b"*fhJ'* person or persons for the time being intrusted by the p'"°'*^'^'°''- King's sign manual with the care and commitment of the custody of the persons and estates of persons found lunatic, idiot, and of unsound mind, is or are the protector in lieu of the person who is such lunatic or idiot, or of unsoiuid mind ; or if an}' person, protector of a settlement, is con- victed of treason or felony, or if any person, not being the owner of a prior estate under a settlement, is protector and is an infant, or if it is uncertain whether such last-men- tioned person is living or dead, then the Court of Chancery is the protector in lieu of such person ; or if any settlor declares that the person who would otherwise be entitled to be protector shall not be such protector, and does not appoint any person to be protector in his stead, then the Court of Chancery is the protector ; or if in any other case where there is subsisting a prior estate sufficient to qualify the owner thereof to be protector, and there happens at any time to be no protector, the Court of Chancery, while there is no such protector, and the prior estate is subsisting, is the protector. By ss. 34 and 35, where there is a protector, his consent How far pi'otectoi- s is to be requisite to enable an actual tenant in tail to consent is create a larger estate than a base fee, or to enable a person to exercise the statutory power of disposition in the case of a base fee. By s. 36, the protector is to be subject to no control or protector to liability in the exercise of his power of consenting. discretiou. By s. 38, a voidable estate by a tenant in tail in favour coufirmation ■80 ASSUPvAXCES UNJ)l':it THE ACT FOil I'T. iri.T.i2, Ch. 3, E. 8. of a voidable estate ))y a subsequent disposition. Enlargement of a base fee by union with the remainder or reversion. Mode of assurance by a tenant in tail. lurolment tliereof. Commence- ment of operation of an inrolled deed. Protector's consent, Low given. Consent by a distinct deed, liow con- strued. Inrolmeut of consent by a distinct deed. Consent not revocable. Consent of a married woman as protector. Exclusion of tlie aid of a court of equity. of a purchaser is confirnied by a subsequent disposition of sucli tenant in tail under tlie Act, but not against a pur- chaser witliout notice. By s. 39, base fees, wlien united with the immediate reversions, are enlarged, instead of being merged. l)y s. 40, a disposition l)y a tenant in tail is to be effected by any description of deed used to pass the legal fee, but not by a -svill or by a contract. If the tenant iii tail is a married woman, the disposition must be with the concurrence of her husband, and must be acknowledged l)y her. By s. 41, no assurance by a tenant in tail, except a lease for not more than twenty-one years at not less tliaii five-sixths of a rack rent, shall have any operation under the Act, unless inrolled in Chancery within six calendar months. By s. 74, every deed required to be inrolled shall, when inrolled, take effect in the same manner as it would liave done if the inrolment thereof had not lieen required, except that every such deed shall be void against any per- son claiming the lands or money thereby disposed of for valuable consideration, under any subsequent deed. By s. 42, the consent of the protector must be given Ijy the same assurance, or by a prior or contemporaneous deed. And by s. 43, if l)y a distinct deed, it is to be considered an unqualified consent, unless he confines it to a particular disposition. And, in that case, hj s. 46, it must be enrolled in Chancery, with or 1 jefore such assurance. By s, 44, the consent of a protector cannot l)e revoked. By s. 45, any married woman, being protector, may, under this Act, in the same manner as if she were a feme sole, give her consent to the disposition of a tenant in tail By s. 47, coiu'ts of equity are excluded from giving any effect to dispositions by tenants in tail or consents of pro- THE ABOLITION OF FIXES AND RECOVEKIES. 781 lectors of settlements Y\-]iich in courts of Lnv ^voulcl not l)e ^'/- ^^J'^l-' Cii. 3, s. 8. effectual. V>y ss. 48, 49, tlie Lord Chancellor or the Court of Chan- ^{^^'^^'^f ceiy, v»-liile protector of a settlement, has the same power court of ""^^ °^ to consent, and to make such orders as shall he thought ''''"^°'"y- necessary, which are evidence of such consent ; and if any other person is joint protector, the disposition is not valid without his consent. III. Dispositions h// Tenants in Tail and Oicncrs of Base Fees in Copylwlds. By s. 50, all the previous clauses in this Act, so far as Previous clauses to circumstances and the different tenures adndt, apply to apply to -'-'->' copyhold 3, lands held by copy of court roll, except that a disposition ^^"^^p*' '^'^• hy a tenant in tail whose estate is an estate at law, must l)e made by surrender, and except that a disposition l)y a tenant in tail whose estate is merely an estate in equity, may l)e made either T)y surrender or Ijy a deed, and except so far as such clauses are otherwise altered or ^^aried 1 ly the clauses which follow. ]]ut hy s. 51 it is provided, that, if the consent of the Protector's "^ ^ consent liy protector to the disposition of lands held hj copy of court <^'^^'^- I'oll is given by deed, such deed, either at or before the lime of the surrender, shall be executed by the protector and produced to the lord of the manor, or to his steward, or to the deputy steward ; and, on the production of the deed, the lord, or steward, or deputy steward, must, by v^'riting under his hand indorsed on the deed, acknowledge that the same was produced within the time limited, and must cause such deed, with the indorsement thereon, to be entered on the court rolls of the manor ; and after such deed shall have been so entered, the lord of the manor, or his steward, or the deputy steward, must indorse thereon a 782 ASSlTiAXCKS UNDEIl THE ACT FOll pt. iir.T.i2, memorandum sio-ncd liy him, testifviiic[ the entry of the Ch. 3, s. 8. a J > ^ a J — same on the court rciUs. Protectoi-'a Bv s. 52, if the consent of the in-otector to the disposition consent when not by deed, ^f hinds liehl l)y copy of court roll is not given Ijy deed, the consent must he given by the protector to the person taking the surrender by Avliich the disposition is effected ; and if the surrender is made out of court, it must be expressly stated in the memorandum of such surrender that such consent has been given, and such memorandum must be signed l)y the protector ; and the lord of the manor of which the lands are parcel, or his steward, or the deputy steward, must cause the memorandum, with such statement therein as to the consent, to be entered on the court rolls of the manor ; but if the surrender is made in court, the lord of the manor, or his steward, or the deputy steward, must cause an entry of such surrender, containing a statement that such consent had been given, to be made on the court rolls. Equitable By s. 53, a tenant in tail of lands held by copy of court estates tail J ' ^ j lj in copyholds, poll, wliosc estate is merely an estate in equity, may by deed dispose of such lands in the same manner as he could have done if they had been of freehold tenure ; and all the previous clauses in this Act, so far as circumstances admit, apply to the lands in respect of which he avails himself of this power of disposition ; and the deed by which it is effected must Ije entered on the court rolls of the manor ; and if there is a protector to consent to the disposition, and such protector gives his consent l)y a distinct deed, the consent is void unless the deed of consent is executed by the protector either on or at any time before the day on which the deed of disposition is executed by the equitable tenant in tail ; and such deed of consent must be entered on the court rolls ; and it is imperative on the lord of the manor, or his steward, or the deputy steward, when required so to do, to enter such deed or deeds on the court rolls, and THE ABOLITION OF FINKS AND llECOVErJES. 783 lie must indorse on each deed so entered a memorandum, pt. ni.T.12, ' ch. 3, 8. 8, signed by him, testifying the entry of tlie same on the court rolls : a deed by which lands held by copy of court roll shall be disposed of under this clause, by an equitable tenant in tail, is void against any person claiming such lands for valuable consideration under any subsequent assurance duly entered on the court rolls, unless the deed of disposition by the equitable tenant in tail be entered on the court rolls of such manor before the subsequent assur- ance is entered. By s. 54, the surrender or the memorandum, or a coiiy im-oimeut, '' •*• '' except ott thereof, or the deed of disposition, or the deed of consent ^^^t neces-' to tlie disposition, need not be inroUed otherwise than by ^^''^' entry on the court rolls. A disentailing deed of copyholds nmst be entered on the court rolls within six months after the execution thereof: otherwise it will have no operation under this Act (a). IV. Disposition of Lands of irhich Bankrupts arc Tenants in Tail, or in vjhich they have Base Fees. By s. 56, the commissioner, in the case of an actual Power of commissioner tenant in tail becoming bankrupt after the 31st of Decern- to dispose of ber, 1833, may by deed dispose of the lands of the bank- ^'^^'^''■ rupt to a purchaser, and without the protector's consent, for as large an estate as the actual tenant in tail, if not a bankrupt, could have created without such consent. By s. 57, the commissioner, in the case of a tenant in Power of .,.-,•, , PI -11 1 1 commissioner tail entitled to a base fee becoming bankrui^t, and of there to dispose of '^ laud wherein beiuo- no protector, may by deed dispose of the lands of the "'^ bankrupt o i. ' ^ ./ i ]jag a base tenant in tail to a purchaser for as large an estate as such *'^®- tenant in tail could have created, if not a bankrupt. (rt) Honeywood v. Foster (No. 1), 30 Bcav. 1. 1U AySUF.ANCKS UXDHK THE ACT I'Oll Pt. III.T.12, Cn. 3, s. 8. Protector's couseiit. Inrolment cf deed of disposition aiui consent. Enlargement of base fees on the event of there being no protector. Confirmation of voidable estates by a subsequent disposition. Acts of a bankrupt in regard to his estate tail void against a disposition by the com- mi«sioLer. By s. 58, the commissioner stands in the phace of the actual tenant in tail or tenant in tail entitled to a l)ase fee, so far as regards the consent of sucli protector. By s. 59, a deed of disposition of freeholds l)y a com- missioner must he inrolled in Chancery witliin six months ; and a deed of disposition of copyholds hy him must ho entered on the court rolls, and the consent to a disposition of such copyholds, if Ly a distinct deed, must he executed on or before the deed of disposition, and must he entered on the court rolls, and a memorandum hy the steward or deputy steward testifying the entry of such deeds on tlie court rolls must he indorsed tliereon. By s. 60, where the disposition of a commissioner only creates a base fee, in consequence of the protector not giving his consent, then such liase fee will he enlarged as soon as there ceases to he a protector, and, Ijy s. Gl, even suhsequent to the sale or conveyance of the lands under the bankrupt laws. By s. 02, a voidable estate created in favour of a pur- chaser hy an actual tenant in tail becoming a bankrupt, or l)y a tenant in tail entitled to a base fee becoming a bank- rupt, is confirmed to the full extent as against all persons, except those whose rights are saved by the Act, by the disposition of the commissioner, if there is no protector, or if the protector consents, or if there ceases to be a protec- tor, or confirmed so far as such actual tenant in tail, if not a bankrupt, could have confirmed the voidable estate with- out such consent, if the protector does not consent ; 1 )ut not, in any of these cases, against a purchaser without express notice of the voidable esttite. All acts and deeds by a bankrupt tenant in tail of lands, which affect such lands, and which, if he had been seised of or entitled to such lands in fee simple absolute, would have been void against his assignees, and all persons claiming under them, are void against any disposition THE ABOLITION OF FIXES AND KECOVEFaES. 785 which mny be made of such lands under this Act hv the rT.iii.T.i?, "^ •■ Cll. 3, s. 8. commissioner (s. Go). Subject to the i^owers ^iven to the commissioner and Power ^ "^ reserved to to the estate in the assignees, a bankruy)t tenant in tail t'^e bankrupt c ' ^ himself by retains his powers of disposition (s. 6-i). *''® statute. The disposition l^v the commissioner of the lands of a Disposition ■•• "^ alter the bankrupt tenant in tail or a tenant in tail entitled to a decease'*^'* base fee, will, if the Ijankrupt be dead, have the same ope- ration as if he were alive, in case at the time of the bank- rupt's decease there is no protector of the settlement, or in case the bankrupt was an actual tenant in tail, and there was, at the time of the disposition, any issue in- heritable to the estate tail, or in case the bankrupt was a tenant in tail entitled to a base fee, and there was, at the time of the disposition, any issue who, if the base fee had not lieen created, would have been actual tenant in tail, and either no protector, or a protector who consented to the disposition (s. 65). By s. GG, every disposition of copyholds by a commis- Disposition of copyholds sioner of bankrui)ts, where the estate shall not lie e(|uit- to operate as -"■a surrender. able, will have the same operation as a surrender. By s. 67, the mesne rents and profits of the lands of a Rents, cove- nauts, and Ijankrupt, of which a commissioner has power to make conditions, disposition, sliall be received and recoverable by the assig- nees ; and they may enforce covenants, conditions, and aQTeements. V. Dispositions in the case of Money suhjeet to he invested in Land wJiieh is to he entailed. By s. 71, the previous clauses apply to lands to be sold, where the purchase money is subject to be invested in the purchase of lands to be entailed, and to money subjoct-to be invested in like manner. 78(1 ASSUIiANOKS UNDER TIIK ACT FOlt VI. Dinposifions hy Married Women, Pt. III.T.12. Ch. 3, s. 8. Power of disposition conferred by the Act. Aclcnowledg- nieut of disposition. Forms to be observed. Vij s. 77,- a married woman, not being tenant in tail, may, with her husband's concurrence, by deed acknow- ledged, dispose of lands, and money subject to be invested in the purchase of lands, and of any estate therein, and may release and extinguish powers, as a feme sole, except in the case of copyholds, where any of the ol)jects to be effected could have been effected by her by surrender (h). By s. 79, every deed to be executed by a married woman for any of the purposes of this Act, except such as may be executed by her in the character of protector, must, upon her executing the same, or afterwards, be produced and acknowledged by her as her act and deed before a Judge of one of the superior Courts at Westminster, or a IMaster in Chancery, or before two of the perpetual commissioners, or two special commissioners. By s. 80, the feme covert is required to be separately examined as to her consent. By s. 81, provisions are made as to the appointment and lists of perpetual commissioners. By s. 82, it is provided that their power is not to be con- fined to any particular place. By s. 83, provision is luade for tlie appointment of special commissioners in certain cases. By s. 84, a memorandum and certificate of acknow- ledgment are required. -By s. 85, the certificate, with an affidavit verifying the same, is required to he filed. And by ss. 87 and 88, provisions are made as to an index and copies of certificates, and by s. 89, as to the power of the Court of Common Pleas to make orders, &c. And by the stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 75, s. 1, deeds acknowledged shall not be impeached by reason only of the party taking the acknowledgment being interested. But by s. 3, the Court (b) See Crofts v. Middktov, 8 D. M.& G. 192. THE ABOLITION OF FINES AND RECOVERIES. 787 of Common Pleas mav make rules to prevent interested pt. T11.T.12, ■■■ Cu. 3, s. 8. persons from takino- acknowleclmnents. — •I 00 Relation of By the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 86, when the certifi- '^'''^^ cato of the acknowledgment of a deed by a married woman is so filed of record, the deed so acknowledged will, so far as regards the disposition, release, surrender, or extinguish- ment thereb}^ matle by any married woman whose acknow- ledgment is so certified, take effect from the time of its being acknowledged, and the subsequent filing of such cer- tificate will have relation to such acknowledgment. By s. 90, a married woman must be separately examined Equitable ■^ L ./ interests in on the surrender of her equitable estate in copyholds, as if copyholds. such estate were legal ; and every such surrender, whether made before or after the passing of the Act, is valid. By s. 91, if a husband, in consequence of being a lunatic. Dispensation Tvitli the idiot, or of unsound mind, or from any other cause, is in- husband's concurrence capable of executing a deed, or of making a surrender of j.ase"''^^'^ lands held by copy of court roll, or if his residence is not known, or he is in prison, or he is living apart from his wife, the Court of Common Pleas may dispense with the concurrence of the husband, unless the Lord Chancellor, or other the person or persons intrusted with the care and commitment of the custody of the persons and estates of persons found lunatic, idiot, and of unsound mind, or tlie Court of Chancery, is the protector of a settlement, in lieu of her husband. Section IX. Of Concise Conveyances and Leases under the Staf. 8 and 9 Vict. cc. 119, 124, and the Stat. 25 c(- 26 Vict. c. 53. In the Stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 119, intituled " An Act to pt.iii.t.i2, ' Ch. 3, s. 9. facilitate the Conveyance of Eeal Property," and com- - — ^ ■ 788 CONCISE CONVEYANCES AND LEASES. pt.iii.t.12. mencino; on the 1st October, 1845, a form of the com- Ch. 3, s. 9. ° ' ' iiiencement and the operative part and conclusion of a Vict. c. 119, . ^ ^ as to concise JqqcI IS given ill the first schedule. And in the second conveyances. o scliedule there are two columns, the first of which consists of some very short forms of words, expressive of the sub- stance of certain longer forms contained in the second column, which are of the length and cliaracter usually employed in deeds. And by s. 1, it is enacted, that, where the w^ords of any form in the first column are employed, the deed is to have the same effect as if the corresponding form of words in the second column had been used. The second schedule also contains directions for varying the forms in the first column ; and provides, that, where they shall be so varied, similar variations shall be deemed to be made in the corresponding forms in the second column. By s, 2, unless specially excepted, the deed shall be con- strued to include those clauses which generally begin -with the words " and all houses," &c., " and the reversion," &c., " and all the estate," &c. By s. 3, provision is made as to the stamp duty. By s. 4, the remuneration for such a deed is to be according to the skill and labour and responsibility. And by s. 5, any deed or part of a deed failiug to take effect by virtue of the Act, is to be as valid as if the Act had not been made. Stat. 8 & 9 By the stat. 8 & 9 Vict c. 124, intituled " An Act to Vict. c. 124, , ^ . n . T astoconciac facilitate the Granting of certain Leases, provisions are leases. ° ^ made for facilitating the granting of leases of houses, similar to the provisions of the stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 119, for facilitating the conveyance of property. Gtat. 2.5 & 26 Bv the stat. 25 & 26 Vict. c. 53 (the Transfer of Land Vict. c. .53. Act), land registered under that Act, may (as we have seen (e) ) be dealt with or affected, 1st, by a statutory disposition in a scheduled form ; 2ndly, by an indorsement on an instrument called the land certificate. {(■) Supra, pp. 561—2, 789 CHAPTER IV. OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF DEEDS OTHER THAN CONYEYANCES. There are, as alreadv observed, some other deeds wliicli ^JP-^-^'^i"-, > « > T. 12, Ch. 4. are not properly termed conveyances. Such are, 1. Deeds of covenant or agreement. 2. Bonds. 3. Declarations of trust. 4. Deeds of appointment of trustees, receivers, stewards, guardians, attoruies, and others standing in a confidential relation. The points connected with deeds of covenant or agree- ment and deeds of appointment of trustees, &c., so far as they fall within the scope of this work, Avill be found under other heads. But some observations may be made in this place on bonds and declarations of trust. Section I. Of Bonds. Bonds gcncralhj. A bond or obligation is a deed poll, whereby the obligor pt.iii.t.i2, binds or obliges himself alone, or himself and his heirs, or Definition, himself, his heirs, executors, and administrators, to pay a sum of money or to do some other thing at a particular time («). Bonds are of two kinds : simple or single, that is, with.- ^^"^^ ^P ^ o ' ' either sim- out any defeasance or condition in or annexed to them ; ^^® ^'^ ""^'^' (a) See 2 Pres. Shep. T. 367, 3G9, Bl. Com. 340, 370 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 8, § 1 ; 2 q2 790 OF BONDS. Pt Ch, cir double or condi- tional. Requisites to a bond. r.iiT.T.i2, and double or conditional, that is, accompanied with a 'H. 4, S. 1. } ' i. condition (b), that, if the obligor does some act, the obliga- tion shall be void, or else shall remain in full force ; as pay- ment of rent, performance of covenants in a certain deed, or repayment of a principal sum of money borrowed of the obligee with interest. AVhere the obligation is intended to secure the repayment of a sum of money mentioned in the condition, the penal sum mentioned in the obligation is usually double the sum mentioned in the condition, the payment of which is so secured (c). There are only three things essentially necessary to a bond, namely, writing, sealing, and delivery. For, as to signing, that was clearly not necessary in former times, and the Statute of Frauds does not extend to bonds ; for no estate or interest in lands is immediately created by them {(I). And no particular form of words is required to constitute a bond {c). Executors and administrators will be bound by an obli- gation, although they be not named ; but the heir of the obligor will not be bound by tlie obligation, unless he is named (/). An exception to this, howevei-, is created by the 27th section of the stat. 33 Hen. 8, c. 39, by whicli it is enacted, that the King shall not be excluded from demanding his just debts against any of his subjects, as heir or heirs to any person or persons indebted to the King or to any other persons to his use, albeit the word heir be not comprised in such recognisance, obligation, or specialty {g). If an obligation is made to one and his heirs, the executors and administrators, and not the heir, shall take advantage of it ; for the heirs do not represent the obligee as to such a matter (A). Who are bound. Who may take advan- tage of a bond. (6) 2 Pres. Sliep. T. 367. {c) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 8, § 1. {d) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 8, § 2. (f) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 8, § 3 ; 2 Pres. Shep. T. 367. (f) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 376, 369. {g) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 8, § 17. (h) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 37C, Of bo}sDs. 791 Where there are two or more obligors, a bond mav be PT.ni.T.12, ° ^ " C'H. 4, s. 1. either joint only or joint and several. If two or more bind '' -^ ^ . ^ Joint and themselves simiiliciter, without any words expressive of several, or ^ ' "^ ^ jomt only. severalty or individuality, the obligation is joint only, and not several. But even if the obligation is several, the obligee may sue all the obligors together, or all of them apart, at his pleasure ; and yet it seems that unless the obligation is special for this purpose, he may not sue some of them, and spare the rest, but he nuist sue them all. Although he may have several judgments and several exe- cutions against the obligors, yet he shall have satisfaction but once, or from one of them only ; for, after he has been satisfied by one, the rest shall be discharged. But where the obligation is joint and not several, the obligee must sue all the obligors together, except in some special cases ; as where one of the obligors alone seals the deed, or where all of them seal, but one of them is an infant, a married woman, a monk, or the like, or Avhere one of them is dead (i). A sinole obligation is alwavs taken most in advantage constructiou 00 " ° of bonds and of the obligee and against the obligor. But the condition ^nnt'xecr^ of an obligation is always taken most in advantage of the *'^®^'^'°' obligor and against the obligee, because it is introduced for his benefit (/). II. TJic Conditioii of a Bond. If these words are omitted in the close of the condition, omission of coij eluding " that then the obligation shall be void," the condition is w..ids. void (A;). The condition of an obligation may be either in the same How the ° "^ condition or in another deed ; and, if in the same deed, it may be "^^^^ *'^" be indorsed on the back of the obligation, subscribed under it, or contained within it (/). (0 2 Pres. Shep. T. 375. {I) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 371. 0') 2 Pres. Shep. T. 375. (0 2 Pres. Shep. T. 370. 792 OF JJOXDS. Pt. ITI.T.12, Ch. 4, 3. 1. What may he the con- dition. Condition malum iu 30. Condition against the municipal law, or re- pugnant. Condition iusemnble and uncer- tain. fmposaible condition. The condition of an obligation may be to do any lawful and possible thing (m). Wlien the oljject sought to Ijc accomplished by the con- dition is malum in se, that is, contrary to the moral law, there, not only the condition, but the whole obligation also is void, ab initio (/«-). But when the object is only against some maxim of law, or is but malum prohibitum only, or is repugnant to the estate, the condition only is void, and the obligation re- mains single and without a condition (o). When the condition of an obligation is insensible and uncertain, so that the meaning cannot be known, or is repugnant to the obligation, the condition only is void, and the obligation good ( j;). When the thing wdiich is required to be done by the condition is in its nature impossible to be done at the time of the making of the obligation, there the obligation is good, and the condition only is void. But when it is a thing possible at the time of making the obligation, and afterwards, by matter ex post facto, by the act of God, the act of the law, or the act of the obligee, it becomes im- possible, the obligation and the condition both become void (q). AVhen the condition of an obligation is to do one of two things by a given day, and at the time of mak- ing the obligation both of them are possible, but afterwards one of the things becomes impossible by the act of God, or by the sole act or laches of the obligee himself, the obligor is discharged of the whole obligation. But if one of the things becomes impossible afterwards by the act of the obligor or a stranger, the obligor must do the other thing. And if, at the time of the making of the obligation, one of (m) 2 Pres. Sliep. T. 371. (n) 2 Pres. Shep, T. 371 ; 2 Bl. Com. 340 ; Co. Litt. 205 b. (o) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 372 ; 2 Bl. Com. 340 ; Co. Litt. 206 b. Cp) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 373 ; 2 Bl, Com. 340. (g) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 372, 382, 393; 2 Bl. Com. 340; Co. Litt. 206 a. OF BOXD.S. 703 the things is, and the other of the thmgs is not, possible tu ^^^^/'g^'-J-'- be done, he must perform that ^\'hich is possiljle (r). On breach of the condition uf a bond, the penalty then Conse-^ ^^ becomes the legal debt. And no relief ^\•as given against ^'£0! it by the common law. But in equity, where the bond is for the payment of money, the obligee can only recover his principal, interest, and costs. And, by the stat. 4 Anne, c. 1(), s. 12, payment of the principal, interest, and costs, is good at law. And where the bond is for the performance of any other act, for the non-performance of which com- pensation may be made in damages, the obligee is in equity only allowed those damages (s). AYhen the condi- tion of a bond is not pei'formed, and it thereby becomes absolute, it is a charge on the personal estate, including the chattels real of the obligor. And on the death of the obligor, it charges his heir, if named, who, if there is a de- ficiency of personal assets, is bound to discharge it, so far as he has assets by descent (t). But the bond itself, with- out a judgment, is not an immediate or a direct charge upon the real estate of the obligor ; and therefore any set- tlement or disposition which he makes in his lifetime of his freehold estates, whether voluntary or not, will be good against bond creditors, except so far as they may be pro- tected by the stat. 13 Eliz. c. 5 (u). Section II. Of Declarations of Trust. It is not necessary that uses or trusts should be created rT.iii.x.ia •^ ^ ch. i, 3. 2 by writing, but it is necessary that uses or trusts of free- How trust ()•) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 382, 393. («) 2 Bl. Com. 340; i Cruise T. 32, (s) i Cruise T. 32, c. 8, § 13 ; 2 c, 8, § 8. Bl. CorQ. 341 ; Story's Eq. Jur. § ((() 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 8, § 8, 10. 1314. Sec infra, T. 12, c. 6, s. 3, No. Y. 794 OF DECLARATIONS OF TEUST. pt. III.T.12, hold, copyliold, or leasehold hereditaments be evidenced '- by writing. By tlie Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3), created and g. 7, It is enactcd, " That all declarations or creations of evidenced. ' trusts or confidences of any lands, tenements, or heredita- ments, shall be manifested and proved by some writing signed by the party who is by law enabled to declare such trust, or by his last will in writing, or else they shall be utterly void and of none effect." But by s. 8 it is pro- vided, " That where any conveyance shall be made of any lands or tenements by which a trust or confidence shall or may arise or result by the implication or construction of law, or be transferred or extinguished by an act or opera- tion of law, then and in every such case such trust or con- fidence shall be of the like force and effect as the same would have been if this statute had not been made." The beneficial owner of real estate purchased in the name of a trustee, may declare the trust thereof, as " the person who is by law enabled to declare such trust," within the meaning of the 7th section of the Statute of Frauds (.1;). Declarations of trust of money, even though secured on real estate, or of chattels personal, need not be created nor evidenced by writing {y). If a person declares himself to be a trustee for another of money or personal property to be recovered, wdiether in writing or by acts or declarations of a decisive and definitive nature sufficiently proved, the transaction will be binding against him and his represen- tatives {z) ; and if a person, by writing or by word, directs his debtor to hold the money due in trust for a third person, and such direction is communicated to the debtor {x) Tierncij v. Wood, 19 Beav. 31 Beav. 250. 330. {z) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 897 ; (y) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 12, § 2, 3 ; Dipplc v. Corles, 11 Hare, 183 ; Story's Eq. Jur. § 972 ; 1 Spence's Peckhain v. Taylor, 31 Beav. 250 ; Eq. Jur. 497—8; 2 Spence's Eq. Grant v. Grant, 34 Bear. 623. Jur. 19, 20, 97 ; Pcclcham v. Taylor, OF DECLAEATIOXS OF TKUST. 795 and the donee, an effectual trust is created in fa^'oul• of the i";;- i^it-is, ' Ch. i, s. 2. donee (((). But a mere promise to give, "without A'ahiable consideration, or a defective conveyance, gift, or assign- ment, without vahiaLle consideration, where the party means actually to vest the h'(/al ownership in the donee, or in any other person as trustee for him, will not be con- sidered as a declaration of trust (&). And it has been held that a memorandum expressive of an " intention to leave " and a " determination to appropriate " a fund to a person, and a declaration during a last illness of a wish that it should be given to such person, does not amount to a de- claration of trust, but is a mere inoperative indication of a testamentary intent not carried into effect (r). "Where a person holds property in trust, a declaration of trust, if bona fide, is valid, though at a distance of time, and even after the trustee has committed an act of bank- ruptcy (d). And if the signed document refers to any other document which shows wdiat was meant by the parties, that will be sufficient (f). And if the terms of the trust do not sufficiently appear upon the face of the instrument, evidence may be received to show the position of the party signing, and the circumstances by which he knew himself to be surrounded, and the credibility of the instrument (/). Declarations of trust executed are construed in the same How deck- rations of manner as common law conveyances (rn. But, as we have trust are ^" construed. seen, executory trusts are construed more liberally {Ji), (a) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 531, 898 ; 186. Paterson v. Murphij, 11 Hare, 88 ; (c/) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 21. Vandcrherg v. Palmer, i K. & J. (f) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 22. 204. (/) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 22. {h) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 57, 886 ; {rj) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 19, § 66, Dlpple V. Codes, 11 Hare, 183. {h) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 19, § Q7. (c) Re Glover, 2 Johns. & Hem. See supra, pp. 269, 270. 796 CHArTER V. OF THE DIFFEEENT KINDS OF DEEDS, "WHEN COXSIDEliKD ■WITH EEFEEENCE TO THE FUEPOSE TO BE EFFECTED BY THEM. vt. III. Some of the various kinds of deeds serve as purchase deeds, T. 12, Ch. 5. _ ^ others as mortgage deeds, others as marriage settlements, others as deeds of family arrangement, others as deeds of indemnity, others as composition or creditors deeds, others as apportionments of rents, others as partnership deeds, and others are used for certain other purposes, which will appear from the definitions given of them in the preceding pages. The attention of the reader will only lie directed in this place to purchase deeds, so far as the covenants iu them are concerned ; the other points connected with them forming the subjects of many other parts of this work. The law connected with marriage settlements will also be found in other parts of this work, with the exception of a few points which will be mentioned in the second section of this chapter. Mortgages and mortgage deeds have been already noticed. And, with the exception of some obser- vations on deeds of compromise and family arrangement and creditors deeds, which are made in the third and fourth sections, the reader is referred to other parts of this book, and to other w^orks, for the points which ought to be borne in mind respecting the other kinds of deeds, when considered with reference to the purpose to be effected by them. OF COVENANTS IN PUECIIASE DEEDS. 797 Section I. Of Purchase Deeds («). I. Who covenant for the Title. All persons (except the Sovereign and married women) rT.iii.T.12, -•■ ^ ^ ^ Cn. 6, s. 1. who convey lands in their t)wn rioht and for a valuable ^ "-^ Persons con- consideration are bound to enter into the usual covenants J^l^l^^ for the title {h). "^ Where the wife's estate is sold l)y her and her husband, Husbands, as she cannot bind herself by covenant, he enters into the ordinary covenants for title (c). Tenants for life are bound to co\'enant for title, where Tenautafor life. the estate is sold with their assent under a power, or Avhere a power of sale has been obtained by them to be vested in trustees by an Act of Parliament. But covenants could not be required where the sale is compulsory under Eail- way Acts and the like {(T). A person whose estate is sold under an order of a court Persons whose es- of equity, or by a trustee to Avhom he has conveyed it upon ''"^j^'A'"^,^ trust to sell, is bound to covenant for the title, in the same chTucery, or manner as he must have done if he himself had sold the y*^"^"^"^"^**- estate (f). Where lands are devised to trustees upon trust to sell, c'estuis que ^ trust of the and the proceeds are absolutely given to two or more per- ^^j"'^^®^^ °^ sons, all the persons whose shares in the purchase money are in anywise considerable, are bound to enter into the usual covenants for the title, to the extent of their respec- tive shares (/). And the same course is adopted in prac- (a) Most of the points necessary {<:) Sugd. Concise View, 433 ; 9 to be borne in mind in connection Jann. & Bytli. by Sweet, 455. with purchase deeds will be found (c?) Sugd. Concise View, 433. under other heads, to which they (e) Sugd. Concise View, 432. properly belong. (/) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 82, {h) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 82 : 84 ; Sugd. Concise View, 433. Sugd. Concise View, 433. '08 OF COVENANTS IN PUECHASE DEEDS. Pt. Ill.T.12, Cn. 5, s. 1. Trustees or assignees. Bankrupts. tice, even where an estate is sold by trustees under a will, and the money is to be applied in payment of debts, &c., and the residue is given over, or where an estate is sold for similar purposes under an order of the Court of Chan- cery, although the purchaser cannot insist on any cove- nants for the title in such cases. Where an estate is conveyed by persons wlio have no beneficial interest, such as trustees or assignees of a bankrupt, or with their concurrence, each is only bound to covenant that he has done no act to incumber the estate {y). A purchaser cannot insist on the bankrupt's covenanting for title (A). But the usual practice is for the bankrupt to enter into the ordinary covenants for title {i). Usual cove- uauts. Coveuant where the vendor has only a power to appoint. Covenant II. Covenants for Title in the case of Estates in Fee. The covenants usually entered into by a vendor seised of the inheritance, are, 1st, that he is seised in fee. 2ndl}', that he has power to convey. 3rdly, for quiet enjoyment by the purchaser, his heirs, and assigns. 4tlily, that the land shall be held free from incumbrances. And 5thly, for further assurance {j). A man having merely a power to appoint an estate cannot be said to be seised in fee of the estate, although he has a right to convey ; and therefore, in such a case, it is usual to omit the first covenant, and to insert a covenant that the power was well created, and is not suspended or extinguished (IS). Where lands are conveyed to particular uses, instead of {g) i Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 75 ; Sugd. Concise View, 433 — 4 ; Bur- ton, § 577. (A) 9 Jarm. & Byth. by S^ycet, 266. n. (o). (/) Sugd. Concise View, 433. {j) Sugd. Concise View, 459 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 45, 46, 49, 57, 59. {k) Sugd. Concise View, 459. OF COVENANTS IX PURCHASE DEEDS. 799 a covenant for quiet enjoyment, the words usually inserted pt. 111.T.12, are, that the estates conveyed shall he and remain to the where the uses thereby declared, Avithout any eviction, &c. (/). cf.uveyance ■^ "^ ' \ / \%io particu- Witli respect to the covena,nt as to incumbrances, which ^*'' "^^^• Covenant as is alwavs connected with the covenant for quiet enioyment, toincum- the common form is not, that the estate is free from in- cumbrances, which would amount to a covenant that would be broken as soon as made if there were any incumbrance, but it is only that the purchaser shall enjoy free from incumbrances ; and so long as he does so enjoy the estate, the co^'enant is not broken, although there may be incum- brances (?/?). A covenant to do all reasonable acts, means such neces- Covenant for further sary acts as the law requires (?«). assurance. Where any defects in the title, which may be supplied by the vendor, are discovered after the execution of the conveyance, the vendor may be compelled in equity to do whatever is necessary to supply such defects, by a bill for a specific performance of the covenant for further assurance, if tlie transaction is free from all objection (0). Under such a covenant, a purchaser may require the removal of a judgment or other incumbrance Q;). But it is laid down b}' Lord Coivper that a covenant for further assurance will not help the case, where the original conveyance itself is void {q). Where the agreement is to convey an estate upon a sale, the purchaser would have a right to a conveyance with usual covenants, although nothing was expressed about covenants in the agreement (?'). But where the conveyance is a further assurance, the purchaser must be supposed to have already obtained all such covenants and evidence as (/) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 56. Sugd. Concise View, 473. {ni) Sugd. Concise View, 471. (p) Sugd. Concise View, 474. («) Sugd. Concise View, 474. (5) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 94. (0) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 93 ; (r) Sugd. Concise View, 475. 800 OF COVENANTS IN PURCHASE DEEDS. Pt. III.T.12. Ch. 5. 8. 1. Duty of a solicitor aa to unusual covenants. Eviction lie was entitled to ; and therefore he cannot insist upon any covenants which he ought to have obtained before (such, for instance, as a covenant for production of deeds), under the covenant for further assurance (.s). And it has been held that the covenant for further assurance does not entitle a purchaser who has neglected to obtain evidence of facts material to his title at the time of his purchase, after- wards to call for the production of such evidence, or to have the future preservation and production of the docu- ments containing the evidence secured to him (;!). If the seller's solicitor permits his client to enter into an unusual covenant for title, without explaining to him, not only its effect, but also that it is an unusual covenant, and cannot be insisted on, the solicitor will be liable to the client for any consequent loss (u). A purchaser of land sold for building ground, who has been evicted, is entitled to recover upon liis covenants, not only the value of the land, but also that of tlie houses erected thereon («). III. Covenants on Sale of ZcaseJwlds. Usual cove- nants. The usual covenants in assignments of leasehold estates, are, 1st. That the lease is valid in law, not forfeited, sur- rendered, or determined, or become void or voidable. 2ndly. That the assignor has good right to assign. 3rdly. That the rent has been paid, and the covenants performed, up to the time of the assignment. 4thly. For quiet enjoy- ment during the term, free from incumbrances, without an}' restriction. And 5thly. For further assurance (y). (s) Sugd. Concise View, 475 — 6; 1 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 102. (t) 1 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 102. (m) Sugd. Concise View, 430 ; 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 373. (x) Bunny v. Hoplcinson, 27 Beav. 565. 0/) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 95. OF COVENANTS IX PURCHASE DEEDS. 801 Where a leasehold estate is sold by the lessee, the pur- PT.iir.T.12, chaser, vrithout any express stipulation, is bound to enter ■ -^ ^ '- _ Coyenants into a covenant with the vendor to indemnify him against °[/°'^^™' the rent and covenants of the lease ; because the original lessee continues liable, even for breaches of covenant com- mitted after he has assigned. But where a leasehold estate is sold by an assignee of the lessee or of any other assignee, the vendor, by the assignment itself, is discharged from liability for any breaches of covenant not committed during the period of his ownership, unless he has entered into a covenant with the person from whom he purchased, whether lessee or assignee, to pay the rent and perform the cove- nants ; and in that case he is entitled to an indemnity from the purchaser against this covenant, from which he is not released by Ms assignment (z). Except so far as the stat. 22 & 23 Vict. c. 38, s. 27, may protect him, the executor of a lessee assigning leaseholds to a legatee, whether specific or residuary, is entitled to an indemnity against the rent and covenants of the lease, to which, notwithstanding the assignment, he continues liable to the extent of the assets that have reached his hands (a). "Where a leasehold estate. is sold by tlie assignees of a bankrupt, inasmuch as such assignees are not liable to the covenants of the lease after assignment, nor to any covenant of indemnity the bank- rupt may have entered into, they cannot require the pur- chaser to enter, into a covenant for their indemnity or for the indemnity of the bankrupt — a circumstance which gives purchasers of leaseholds from assignees of bankrupts an important advantage (h). (z) 9 Jarm. & Bytli. by Sweet, (a) 9 Jarm & Byth. by Sweet, 172 ; Sugd. Concise View, 25 ; 4 839. See supra, 659. Cruise T. 33, c. 25, § 37, 96 ; 2 (h) Sugd. Concise View, 25 ; 9 Piatt on Leases, 417 ; HicUing v. Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 172, 272, Boyer, 3 Mac. & G. 645. 273. 802 OF COVENANTS IN rURCHASE DEEDS. IV. Against irhosc Ads a Vendor should Covenant. pt.iii.t.12. Covenants for tlie title are usually restrained and quali- Ch 5 s 1 , ' ' ' " fled accoixling to the nature of tlie vendor's title. And altliougli where covenants are several and of distinct na- tures, restrictive words annexed to one of them will not he applied to the others, yet where all the covenants have the same object, and restrictive words are annexed to the first of them, those words will be considered as extending to all the others (c). Where the vendor has himself purchased the estate, and has obtained proper covenants for the title, he is only bound (giving up the title deeds) to covenant against his own acts (r/). But where the title deeds are not delivered up to the vendee, it is desirable that the cove- nants should extend to the acts of the person from whom the vendor purchased the estate ; for the covenant to pro- duce his purchase deeds cannot insure the production of them, which may be prevented by accidents, for which the vendor, in whose custody the deeds are, ought to be the sufferer, rather than the vendee (c). The Court of Chancery appears to hold that a vendor not claiming by purchase, is only bound to covenant against his own acts and those of the owner who imme- diately preceded him (/). But, upon principle and accord- ing to the settled practice of conveyancers, where a vendor derives title by descent, devise, or voluntary deed, without proper covenants for the title, lie ought to covenant, not only against his own acts, but also against the acts of all the intermediate owners, up to the last purchaser for valu- able consideration or other person who obtained proper (0 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 68 ; (c) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 7?, ; Sugd. Concise View, 465. Fearne's Posth. Works, 110. But (d) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 72, 74 ; see Sugd. Concise View, 432. Sugd. Concise View, 432 ; 9 Jarm. (/) .Sugd. Concise View, 432; & P.ytli. by Sweet, 373. 9 Jarra. & Bytli. by Sweet, 373. OF COVEXANTS IN PUECIIASE DEEDS, 803 covenants for tlie title, so that tlie purchaser from such pt. 111.T.12, ^ Cn. 5, s. 1. vendor may be protected by covenants extending to the acts of all the successive owners of the property (//). Where there is a defect in the title, a purchaser has a right to covenants against all persons chaiming a lawful title to the estate, whicli, unless the defect appears on the face of the conveyance, should be by a separate deed. And where a purchaser consents to take a defective title, relying for security on the vendor's covenant, this should be particularly mentioned to be the agreement of the parties ; for otherwise, as the defect was known, it might be contended that the covenants for the title should not extend to warrant it against such particular defect (h). V. To what Ivind of Acts Covcnnnts will extend. The law will never adjudge a person to covenant against As a general rule, cove- the wrongful acts of strangers, unless his covenant is nantsrionot ° ° ' extend to express to that purpose ; for the law itself defends every *'^'si°"yj'e^j.g^ one against wrong. And therefore, though a person may covenant in the most general terms for the title to lands, yet such covenant will not be held to extend to tortious acts. If general covenants extended to tortious evictions, a way might be opened for secret practices and combina- tions between a purchaser and strangers, that the purchasers might recover damages from the covenantors {i). But where the covenant is to save the purchaser hami- Exceptions, less from all acts of a particular person, there the vendor is bound to defend the purchaser against the entry of that person, whether by title or not {j ). So where the covenant ig) Fearne's Posth. Works, 110 ; (/) Sugcl. Concise View, 459 ; Bur- Sugd. Concise View, 432 ; 4 Cruise ton, § 578 ; 4 Cruise T. -32, c. 25, T. 32, c. 25, § 74—5 ; 9 Jarm. & § 50. Byth. by Sweet, 373. " 0') 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, §52; {h) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 75 ; Hugd. Concise View, 459. Sugd. Concise Viow,-431v 804 OF COVENANTS IN rUKCHASE DEEDS. pt.tii.t.12, is against all claims to a imrticular right, it will extend to Ch. 5, s. 1, * •>• '=> ' tortious as well as to legal claims {Jc). Covenants Notwithstanding the engagement be expressly against tortious acts lawlui acts, yet any act of the covenantor hmiseli which amounts to an assertion of title, however groundless, will he a breach of covenant (/), although the act done by him was tortious and might ]3e the suliject of an action of trespass ; and if the covenant extends to his heirs or executors, the rule equally applies to them (//'). of cove uaiitor. Pt. III.T. 12, Ch. 5, s. 2. Covenant to settle 01' leave pro- perty, or as- signment. Section II. Of Marriage Settlements (»)• Where a covenant is entered into to settle after-acquired property of the wife, it should be expressed whether it is intended to comprise property given to her separate use (o). An assignment by an intended wife of her future property, followed by a covenant by the intended husband to settle the after-acquired property of the wdfe, will not extend to property given to the wife in terms which are inconsistent with the trusts of the settlement ( i)). A covenant to settle after-acquired property does not comprise a life interest of the husband under a subsequent will; nor does a settlement of property "then in his pos- (k) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 54 ; Sugd. Concise View, 460. {I) Burton, § 578. {m) Sugd. Concise View, 460. (n) Most of the points necessary to be borne in mind in connection with marriage settlements, will be found under other heads, to which they properly belong. (o) See BrooTcs \. Keith, 1 Dr. & Sm. 462 ; Wdloughhy v. Middleton, 2 Johns. & Hem. 344 ; CamjoheU v. Balnhridge, L. R. 6 Eq. Cas. 649. {p) In re Mainwaring''s Settle- ment, L. E. 2 Eq. 487. OF MAEKIAGE SETTLEMENTS. 805 session or to whicli he mmlit claim to be possessed of or ^;^-i"-^J2. ~ ^ Ch. 5, s. 2. interested in in any manner liowsoever," comprise his life ~ interest nnder a prior will (jj). Where, in a marriage settlement, the intended wife has assigned all the property to which she then was, or to ^^'hich she or her intended Imsband in her right should during the coverture become entitled, to trustees, upon the trusts thereby declared, this does not amount to a covenant to exercise a general power of appointment in favour of the objects and upon the trusts of the settlement. And if she appoints an annuity to herself, this will not be affected by tlie settlement, unless it was intended by the settlement that any after- acquired property should be converted or taken otherwise than in the state in which it should be so acquired. But if she appoints a gross sum to herself for her separate use, it will be bound by the trusts of the settlement, even though the appointment contained a ])ower ofrevo- cation (r). A covenant in a marriage settlement, to settle property to which the wife was " then entitled," applies to property to wliich she was entitled on the death of another (s-). A covenant to settle all the real and personal estate of or to which the intended wife should at any time during tlie coverture become seised, possessed, or entitled, does not comprise a vested estate in a moiety of a leasehold which she had at the time of the marriage ; though it does comprise the other moiety which she did not acquire till after the marriage : nor does it comprise a vested interest in certain property, though at the time of the marriage it was not ascertained whether it would turn out to be of any value or not (/). {q) St. Aahyn v. Ilumplireijs, 22 (?•) Ewart v. Ewart, 11 Hare, 27G. BeaT. 175 ; Wliitc v. Briggs, decided {s) In re Mackenzie's Settlement, by Lord CottenJiam, C, and repoited L. E., 2 Ch. Ap. 345. 22 Beav, 176, note. [t) Viilton v. Colvin, 3 Drewry, p2 806 OF MAEEIAGE SETTLEMENTS. PT.ni.T.i2, And if a person covenants to settle any real or per- sonal estate, which should descend, devolve to, or vest in his ^\ife, or to or in him in her right, the covenant will not include property "svliicli l)elouged to the ^^'ife at the time (u). The words, " become entitled," import a change of con- dition, and hence they include a contingent interest which becomes vested during the coverture, but they do not include stock vested in possession at the date of the settle- ment (a;). Where a flither, on a treaty for the marriage of his daughter, promises the intended husband that at the father's decease she shall have her share of whatever property he shall die possessed of, the daughter will be entitled to the share of personalty which she would take under the Statute of Distributions in case of an intestacy, but not any real estate (y). Where arii- Where there are articles and a settlement before mar- cles and set- tlement riage, there, as a general rule, the settlement alone can l)e vary. o ^ ^ o ' looked to : if it is different from the articles, it must be taken as a new agreement. But if it purports to be executed in pursuance of the articles, or if there is clear and satisfactory evidence showing that the discrepancy had arisen from a mistake, the Court will reform the settle- ment, and make it conformable to the real intention of the parties (z). If the articles are Ijefore marriage and the settlement after marriage, the articles are in effect the binding settlement ; and if the settlement gives estates or interests different from those which the Court would give on the construction of the articles, the settlement will be 017. Ill re Browne's Will, L. E. 7 (x) Archer v. Kelly., 1 Dr. & Sm. Eq. 231. See re Hurjlies's Trusts, 300. 4 Gif. 432. Oj) Lavcr v. Fiehler, 32 Beav. 1. (u) Churchill v. Shepjpenl, 33 Bear. (s) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 1 40 ; Bold 107. In re Wynhanis Trusts, L. R., v. Hutchinson, 5 D. M. & G. r)58, 1 Eq. 290. 568, OF MARRIAGE SETTLEi^IENTS. 80? reformed, as l)etweeii the i )arties and tlieir representatives Pt-hi. t.i2, ^ -■- Ch. 5, s. i. and mere volnnteers, but not as against a purchaser for valuable consideration without notice (rr). In a maniage settlement there is sometimes a clause clause of accruer. providing that " in case any of the younger sons shall become an eldest or only son," his portion shall accrue to the other children. And by force of this clause a younger son may lose his portion on liecoming an eldest or only son, although he may not have succeeded to the property of his elder brother (/>). This is, of course, contrary to the intention of the settlor, who must be presumed to have intended that all the children of the marriage should be provided for. It is evident, therefore, that the condition on which the accruer is to take place ought to be more fully and accurately expressed. A clause in a marriage settlement, requiring the trus- clause autho- tees, at the request in writing of the wife, to advance part totirehus- ^ . ° . -^ band. of the trust monies to the husband, ou the security of his bond, with a proviso that they should not be obliged to call in the monies so lent unless required by the wife, ceases to be applicable to the husband after he has taken the benefit of any Act for the relief of insolvent debtors (c). Wliere a person makes a settlement on his first marriage Piefcrence ... . T . , . , ofchildreu on Ins sons m tail, remamder to persons not within the claiming under a consideration of the marriage, and subsequently, on a settlement ^ ' ■>■ -J ' ou a second second marriage, covenants that he will settle the reversion OTe^vdun- expectant upon the decease of his sons without issue, to in^uiurera the use of the children of that marriage, it has been held on a first marriage. by tSir K Sur/dcn, when Lord Chancellor of Ireland, that they will take in preference to the persons claiming under the voluntary limitations in the first settlement (r?). (a) 2 Spence's Eq. .Tur. 140—1. (c) Boss v. GodseU, 1 Y. & C. C. 0. Peachy on Settl. 132. See Mignan 617. V. Parry, 31 Bcav. 211. {d) Siaclpoole v. Stachpoolc, i (h) See Peacocl v. Pares, 2 Keen, Dm. & W. 320. 689. 808 OF MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS. pt. iii.t.12. Where a testator directs a settlement to be made, lie is Ch. 5, s. 2. _ ' deemed to have iutejided that all usual powers should be Direction to ^ tiemeiiV^'' ii^'^^erted ; such as powers of leasing, sale and exchange, with a receipt clause, in the case of real estate, and provi- sions for maintenance, education, and advancement, and appointment of new trustees (e). Where a fund is directed to be settled on a daughter and her issue, so that the same may not be subject to her husband's control or engagements, the proper mode is to settle the property on her for life, for her separate vise, without power of anticipation ; after her death, to her issue, as she shall appoint by deed or will ; and in default of ap- pointment to the issue living at her death, efjually, per stirpes ; and in default of such issue, then as she shall appoint by will ; and in default of appointment, to her executors, administrators, and assigns (/). Setting aside, j^^ antenui)tial settlement cannot be set aside, reformed, reformiug, J- ' ' settlement.* or vaiicd, Oil the grouiid that it was intended that there should be a pecuniary consideration on both sides, whereas the pecuniary consideration on one side has failed ; and this is the case, whetlier as between the persons who are within the marriage consideration, or as between the husband and appointees of the wife who are strangers ; for, such appointees, though volunteers as between the wife and themselves, are not volunteers as between themselves and the husband, but claim under and therefore stand in the situation of a purchaser (rf). Where a settlement is made by a person in illness and under the apprehension of speedy dissolution, it should contain a power of revocation, so as to give him the oppor- tunity of revoking it in case of his recovery and formuig (e) learner v. Sargent, 17 Boav. 450. 515. (ff) CahipbeU v. hiy'dbij, 21 BcaV. (/) Slanlcij V. Jachnan, 23 Beav. 567 ; 1 D. & J. 393. OF MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS. 809 a cool judgment ; and if sucli a power is not inserted, tlic Pt. tTi.T.12, deed will be set aside (h). '- If, in a marriage settlement, a person enters into a cove- Mutual cove- nant to settle property on the objects of the settlement, in property. case anotlier person who covenants so to do should also settle property upon them, and it is intended that the covenant of the one should not be performed unless the other should make such settlement on his part, care should be taken unequivocally to express that intention. For, though the making of such settlement by the other may appear to be a condition precedent, looking to the terms of the covenant alone ; yet, if from any other part of the instrument it appears to be doubtful whether it was in- tended to be a condition precedent, it will not be construed as such, because, as a general rule, in marriage contracts there can be no resistance on the part of one, merely be- cause another contracting party has failed to perform his part of the agreement ; inasmuch as the parties to the con- tract are not the only persons having an interest in the subject, but tlie contract is made by them on behalf of the issue of the marriage (z). Marriage articles will be specifically executed on the Execution of marriage application of any person withm the scope of the con- artides, sideration of the marriage, or of those claiming under any such person. But they will not be specifically executed on the application of persons who are volunteers, even of a wife or child by a subsequent marriage ; although where the bill is brought by persons who are within the scope of the consideration, or by those claiming under tliem, courts of equity will decree a specific execution throughout, as well in favour of the mere volunteers, as of the plaintiff ; as they either execute them in toto, or not at all {J). {h) Forslum v. Wehhy, 30 Bear. 192. 213. (j) Story's Eq. Jur. § 9S6, 987 J (t) Lloyd V. Lloyd, 2 My. & Cr 2 Spencc's Eq. Jur. 237. 810 OF MAlUilAClE SETTLEMENTS. rr.III. T.12, Ch. 5, s. 2. Sotlliament on a ward of Court. Appoint- ment to thy executoi s and adminis- trators of a settlor. Frauds ou marital rights or ex- pectations. Ill a settleineut on the iiiarriage of a female ^va^d of Court, provision must be made, out of her fortune, for the children of a future marriage (/.:). Where a settlement is executed a few days after the lady, who was a ward of Court, has attained her majority, and is pursuant to proposals made a very short time before she attained her majority, and is such that the Court would not approve thereof, it will be rectified, if at least it was the work of her friends, and she was not made to un- derstand its effect and called upon to exercise her judg- ment upon it {I). The effect of a limitation or appointment of personalty to the executors and administrators of a settlor, is, simply to add it to his general personal estate, so as to subject it to any disposition which he may make of it in his lifetime or by his will, or to any lialjility incident to his general personal estate (as to the claims of assignees in bankruptcy or insolvency), or to the Statutes of Distribution, as the case may be. And this rule applies even to money pay- able at the settlor's death under a policy of life assurance, because the settlor or his assignees may sell the policies at once (?m). Eelief will be granted against acts secretly done by a woman in contravention of the marital rights, or in disap- pointment of the just expectations of her intended hus- band ; as where a woman, in contemplation of marriage and without the privity of her intended husband, makes a settlement to her separate use, or a conveyance in favour of persons for whom she is under no moral obligation to provide. But a reasonable provision for her children by a former marriage, under circumstances of good faith, is free from objection («.). {k) Radge v. Winnell, 10 Beav. 98. & G. 559, (?) Money v. Moneij, 3 Drewiy, {n) Story's Eq. Jur, g 273 ; 2 256. Spence's Eq. Jur. 505. (m) Machenzie v. Muclccnzk, Mac. OF MAKEIAGE SETTLEMENTS. 811 If a person marries his deceased wile's sister, she can- pt. ni.T.12, ^ _ Ch. 5, s. 2. nut make a valid settlement on liim (0). ^ -^ Settlement AVliere a marriage settlement contains a i^ower of re- by deceased o 1 wife s sister. yoking the uses, trusts, &c., and of appointinc!' new uses, Power of revocation. trusts, &c., in lieu of those revoked, this power only authorises a revocation for the purpose of resettling the estate for the benefit of the cestui (|ue trusts, and does not authorise a mortgage for a sum to be paid to the husband (j>). Section III. Of Deeds of Compromise and Family Arrangement. In the case of a comiiromise of doubtful rights, if all the PT.11r.Ti2, „ . Ch. 5, s. 3. parties are 111 a state of mutual ignorance, or they are all acquainted with the doubts which exist in their favour, the compromise is binding. But where one or more of them is or are not aware of the doubts existing in his or their favour, while the fact that such doubts exist is known to tlie other or others of them, the compromise is not bind- ing {q) ; because, in that case, there is room for the pre- sumption of surprise or confidence abused, and the very nature of the transaction made it requisite that all the parties should be on an equality" as regards knowledge or ignorance of the doubts existing in their favour. To render a family compromise binding, there must be an honest dis- closure, by each party to the other, of all such material facts known to them, relative to their rights and title, as are calculated to influence the judgment in the adoption of the compromise ; and any advantage taken by either of the (0) Coidson V. Alison, 2 D. F. & (^j) Elmid v. Baler, 29 Beav.lZT, J. 521. r ^q) See Story's Eq. Jur. § 130—1. 812 OF DEEDS OF COMPROMISE AND ARRANGEME^'T. pt. 1II.T.12, parties of the known io-norancc of the other of such facts, Ch. 5, s. S. ^ O renders such compromise void in equity (r). Deeds of the nature of family arrangements are exempted from the rules as to the adequacy of the consideration applicable to other deeds ; the consideration in such cases being compounded partly of value and partly of natural love and affection. And it is not necessary that there should be any rights in dispute, in order to uphold them (s). To render the compromise of litigation valid, it is not necessary that the question in dispute should be really doubtful, if the parties bona fide considered it to be so (t). Pt. III.T.12, Ch. 5, s. 4. Conveyance or assign- nient tor a particular creditor may be valid, and for all the creditors invalid. Rcvocaijlc- Section IV. Of Creditors Deeds. I, Creditors Deeds gencredly.' It will appear Ironi a preceding and a subsec^uent chapter that a conveyance or assignment may be valid, under certain circumstances, even though made by an insolvent debtor in favour of a particular creditor; and that, on the other hand, a conveyance or assignment by such a person may be invalid, under certain circumstances, even though made for the benefit of all his creditors (u). Conveyances in trust to sell and pay creditors are in the (}•) Smith \. Pincomhe, 3 Mac. & G. 659 ; Greeimood v. Greenwood, 2 D. J. & S. 28 ; Broole V. Lord Moshjn, 2 D. J. & S. 373. (s) Persse v. Persse, 7 CI. & F. 279 ; Williams v. Williams, 2 Dr. & Sm. 378 ; L. E. 2 Ch. Ap. 294. As to deeds of this nature, see also Dinisdalev. Dimsdale, 3 Drewry, 556, 569—571. (t) Lucy's Cose, 4 D. INT. & G. 856. (w) See supra, p. 581 — 2 ; infra, p. 838— 843> OF Creditors' deeds. 813 nature of an instrument of aQ'ency, and revocable at the Pt- in.T.12, . . . Cn. 5, s. i. will of the debtor, unless the creditors are executing parties, — or the deed has been acted upon, or notice <];iven to the jeYances in ^ ' o trust for ere- creditors {.v). ^''°'■'• A conveyance by a debtor of his Q'oods to two creditors, Passing of '^ "^ ° _ tlie i)roi)ertj-. for the benefit of themselves and the other creditors, passes tJie property at once on the execution of the deed by the debtor, without any assent on the part of the trustees (.y). Where a deed of assi2;nment puri^orts to be made by all i^eed of the partners in a firm, and to convey all their personal one'^oni'y ^/ estate and effects whatsoever in trust for the benefit of signors. creditors, and it is executed by only one of the partners, it operates to convey all his separate effects, and all his share in the joint effects (z). In order to entitle the creditors named in a c^eneral where ere- *-' ditors take, assignment for the benefit of creditors to take under it, parfe.'&c. it is not necessary that they should be technical parties thereto, unless they are named in the assignment as parties, and are expressly required to execute before they can take under its provisions. It is sufficient if they have notice of the trust in their favour, and assent to it ; and if there is no stipulation for a release, or any other con- dition in it which may not be for their benefit, their assent will be presumed, till the contrary appears {a). Under special circumstances, creditors who have not acceded to a composition deed within the time limited by it, may participate in the benefits thereof (h). And where creditors have acted under a deed of composi- (.v) Coote Mortg. -3rcl. ed. 164 ; W. 128. Story's Eq. Jur. § 1036 b ; Steele r. (a) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1036 a ; Murphu, 3 Moore's P. C. C. 445. see Biron v. Mount, 24 Beav. 642. (//) Hobson V. ThcUiison, L. 1\. 2 (b) Whitmore t. Turquand, 1 Q. B. 642. Johns. & Hem. 444. (a;) JBowJccr v. Bardtlviij 11 M; & 814 OF CKKDITORS DEEDS. Pr. iir.T.i2, tioii and treated it as valid, the Court of .Cliancerv M'ill On. 5, s. 4. " also act under it and treat it as valid as against the assignor, though the creditors have not executed it within the time prescrilicd (r). A deed of trust for the l)cnefit of creditors is not avoided, though the creditors named as parties to it of the second part are described as the several persons whose names and the amount of whose debts are set out in a schedule thereunto annexed, and yet there is no schedule annexed at the time of execution, and erasures are made in the names of some of the creditors written in the schedule afterwards added, and against the names of others no sums are set (d). If any creditor who is a party to a composition deed, has, unknown to the other creditors, obtained any benetit or security, either from the debtor or a third person, beyond what the others have received, or enters into a contract with the debtor which prevents him from being put into that situation of freedom from resisting demands which may be considered as one of the chief inducements to the others to sign the deed, it is a fraud on the policy of the law ; and such secret arrangements are entirely void, even as against the assenting debtor, or his sureties, or his friends ; and money paid under them may be recovered back ((•). Frauds on creditors. II. Deeds of Arrangement, under the Bctnkr^iptcy Act of 1861, where there have heen jnveeedinrfs in Bcdiknqytci/ (/). Court to°' ^y ^- ^^'^> " ^^ ^^^® proceedings in bankruptcy be stayed ciaratioifof as herein provided, the bankrupt, or any creditor nomi- (c) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 354. id) West V. Steward, 14 M. & W. 47. (e) Sec Story's Eq. Jur. § 378—9 ; 2 Speuce's Eq. Jur. 357 — 3G0 ; Pjlerjer v. Broivne, 28 Beav. 391. (/) See enactments in the amende ding Act 31 & 32 V. c. 104, some of ■vvliicli are stated infra, pp. 819, 820. OF Creditors' deeds. 815 iiated ill tliat belialf by the meeting aforesaid, may, at any ^^-J^ll-]^' time within the period during which the proceedings are '~^^ so stayed, produce to the Court a deed of arrangement, ^^'^''^^ signed by or on behalf of three fourths in number and vahie meut'!%id of all the creditors of the bankrupt ; and the Court may to be regis- tered ; and consider the same, and may examine on oath the bankrupt to amuii ' -^ _ baukruptcy. and any of the creditors who may desire to be heard in support of or in opposition to the deed, and may make such other incpiiry as it may think necessary ; and if the Court sliall be satisfied that the deed has been duly entered into and executed, and that its terms are reasonable and calcu- lated to benefit the general body of the creditors under the estate, it shall by order make a declaration of the complete execution of the deed, and shall direct the same to be registered with the chief registrar, and sliall also, if he thinks fit, annul the bankruptcy ; and such deed shall there- Beed.if so ■'-■'' registered, after be as Ijinding in all respects on any creditor who has ^^j"^,]"!!,''^: not executed the deed as if he had executed it, provided cilaulug. such deed be registered with the chief registrar in manner directed by the order." By s. 194 of the same statute, " Every deed, instrument, f/^fj^^J^'^i^ or agreement Avhatsoever, by which a debtor, not being a il'aukruptcy! bankrupt, conveys or covenants or agrees to convey his Suit'"ot''to 1)6 rGccivBtl estate and effects, or the principal part thereof, for the iu evidence. benefit of his creditors, or makes any arrangement or agree- ment with his creditors, or any person on their behalf, for the distribution, inspection, conduct, management, or wind- ing up of his affairs or estate, or the release or discharge of such debtor from his debts or liabilities, shall, within twenty-eight days from and after the execution thereof by such debtor, or within such further time as the Court in Lon- don shall allow, 1)0 registered in the Court of Bankruptcy ; and in default thereof shall not be received in evidence Qj)." {g) This section does not apply to and Holmes on Bankruptcy, pp. deeds under s. 192. See 2 Griffiths 1029, 10-30. 816 OF creditors' deeds. III. Deeds of Composition, under tlic Banhruptcy Act of 1861, suhject to the Jurisdiction of the Court of Bcmk- ruptcy, where no lanlxrvpAcy 2^''oceedinr/s have hccv tcdcen (/;). PT.iir.T.i2. By the stat. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 134, s. 192, " Every deed or Ch. 5,3.4. "^ . instrument made or entered into between a debtor and liis What deeds to be valid; creditors, or any of them, or a trustee on their behalf, and iijion ' ./ ' tiou3 *^°"'''' rehxting to the debts or liabilities of the debtor, and his release therefrom, or the distribution, inspection, manage- ment, and winding up of his estate, or any of such matters, shall be as valid and effectual and binding on all the cre- ditors of such debtor as if they were parties to and had duly executed the same, provided the following conditions be observed ; that is to say, 1. A majority in number repre- senting three fourths in value of the creditors of sucli debtor whose debts shall respectively amount to ten pounds and upwards shall, before or after the execution thereof by the debtor, in writing assent to or approve of such deed or instrument : 2. If a trustee or trustees be appointed by such deed or instrument, such trustee or trustees shall execute the same : 3. The execution of such deed or instru- ment by the debtor shall be attested by an attorney or solicitor : 4. Within twenty-eight days from the day of the execution of such deed or instrument by the debtor, the same shall be produced and left (having been first duly stamped) at the office of the chief registrar, for the purpose of being registered : 5. Together with such deed or instru- ment there shall be delivered to the chief registrar an affi- davit by the debtor or some person able to depose thereto, or a certificate by the trustee or trustees, that a majority (/(.) See enactments in the amend- ofwliichare stated infra, pp. 819, ing Act 31 & 32 Vict. c. 104, some 820. OF CKEDITOES' DEEDS. 817 in number representiiio; three fourtlis in value, of the ore- Pi.iii.T.12, ^ Cn. 6, s. 4. ditors of the debtor whose debts amount to ten pounds or upwards liave in writing assented to or approved of such deed or instrument, and also stating the amount in value of the property and credits of the debtor comprised in such deed : 6. Such deed or instrument shall, before registration, bear such ordinary and ad valorem stamp duties as are hereinafter provided : 7. Immediately on the execution thereof by the debtor, possession of all the property com- prised therein, of which the debtor can give or order pos- session, shall be given to the trustees." P)V s. 196, "Everv such deed, on being so resfistered as Memoran- aforesaid, shall have a memorandum thereof written on the gistrat'on. face of such deed, stating the day and the hour of the day at which the same Avas brought into the office of the chief reo'istrar for resjistration." By s. 197, "From and after the registration of every such Jurisdictiou J '' O '^ of the Court, deed or instrument in manner aforesaid, the debtor and ay^Ji!°i-|?. creditors, and trustees, parties to such deed, or who have |,artrM|^after assented thereto or are bound thereby, shall in all matters of deed, relating to the estates and effects of such debtor be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Bankruptcy, and shall respectively have the benefit of and be liable to all the provisions of this Act, in the same or like manner as if the debtor had been adjudged a bankrupt, and the creditors had proved, and the trustees had lieen appointed creditors assignees under such bankruptcy ; and the existing or future trustees of any such deed or instrument, and the creditors under the same, shall as between themselves respectively, and as between themselves and the debtor and against third persons, have the same powers, rights, and remedies, with respect to the debtor and his estate and effects, and the collection and recovery of the same, as are possessed or may be used or exercised by assignees or cre- ditors with respect to the bankrupt, or his acts, estate and 818 OF CllEDITOKS DEEDS. Provision in case debtor can- not obtain assent of requisite majority of creditors. "pt. iii.t.12, effects in bankruptcy ; and, except where the deed shall expressly provide otherwise, the Court shall determine all questions arising under the deed according to the law and practice in bankruptcy, so far as they may be applicable, and shall have power to make and enforce all such orders as it would be authorised to do if the debtor in such deed had been adjudged bankrupt and his estate were adminis- tered in bankruptcy." By s. 200, " If a debtor cannot obtain the assent of a majority in number representing three fourths in value of his creditors, by reason of his being unable to ascertain by whom bills of exchange, promissory notes, or other negoti- able securities accepted, drawn, made, or endorsed by him are holden, or by reason of the absence of creditors in a foreign country, or otlier similar circumstances, it shall bo sufficient if he obtain the consent of a majority in number representing three fourths in value of all his other creditors to such deed or instrument as aforesaid ; provided that notice shall have been inserted by or on behalf of the debtor in one or more newspapers published in the county or place at which he shall have carried on business imme- diately prior to the date of such deed or instrument, recpiiring his creditors to signify their assent to or dissent from such deed or instrument by notice in writing addressed to the trustee or trustees thereof within fourteen days from the insertion of such notice, and that the affidavit or certifi- cate of the trustee or trustees shall state the circumstances of the case, and the same shall be allowed by the Court, and provided the deed or instrument be in such form as is expressed in Schedule (D) to this Act annexed, which shall vest all the estate and effects of the debtor in the trustees of such deed, and provided that all such other conditions as are hereinbefore required be duly complied with." OF CEEDITOES' DEEDS. 819 Tt I11.T.12. Ch. 5, 8. 4. TV. Some Enactments in the "Act to amend the Bankruptcij Act, 1861." By the stat. 31 & 32 Vict. c. 104, s. 1, it is enacted that supcraddea '' amditions. " no deed or instrument made or entered into between a debtor and his creditors, or any of them, or a trustee on their behalf, relating to the debts or liabilities of the debtor and his release therefrom, or the distribution, inspection, management, and winding-up of his estate, or any of such matters, shall be as valid, effectual, and binding on all the creditors of such debtor as if they were parties to and had duly executed the same, unless, in addition to the con- ditions to be observed in accordance with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, the following conditions shall be observed ; that is to say, 1. Together wdth such deed or instrument there shall be delivered to the chief registrar a list showing, to the best of the knowledge, information, and belief of the debtor or other person by whom the list is made, the debts and liabilities of every kind of the debtor, and the times when such debts and liabilities were contracted or incurred, and the considerations for the same, the names, residences, and occupations of his creditors, and the respective amounts due to them, and the securities held by them, and the estimated value of such securities : 2. A statement showing, to the best of the knowledge, information, and belief of the debtor or other person by whom the statement is made, the debtor's property and credits, and the estimated ■'ralue thereof. By s. 3 it is enacted that "no creditor shall be reckoned "sviioshaUbe reckoned in the computation of the requisite majority in number creditors ■*• i. J J Kegistratiou. representing three fourths in value of the creditors of the debtor executing such deed or instrument unless he proves his debt by affidavit or declaration in the manner and sub- VOL. II. Q 820 OF CKEDITOKS' DEEDS. pt. iii.t.12, ject and according to the provisions to be prescribed by Cn. 5. s. 4. general orders ; and in tlie computation of the requisite value of such creditors, and for all other purposes of the deed, the amount due to each creditor, after deducting the value of the securities held by him on the debtor's property, shall alone be reckoned ; and notwithstanding anything in the Bank- ruptcy Act, 1861, the time for the production and leaving of any such deed or instrument at the office of the chief registrar as therein provided shall be twenty-eight days from the day of the execution thereof by the debtor, or such further time as the Court may allow. By s. 7 it is enacted that " in case of a deed of arrange- ment under section 187 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, no creditor shall be reckoned in the computation of the re- quisite majority in number and value of the creditors of the bankrupt unless he proves his debt by affidavit or declara- tion in the manner and subject and according to the pro- visions to be prescribed by general orders ; and in the com- putation of the requisite value of such creditors, and for all other purposes of the deed, the amount due to each creditor, after deducting the value of the securities held by him on the bankrupt's property, shall alone be reckoned. Commence- By s. 15, " this Act shall commence and take effect on ment of Acf , "^ '^<=- the 11th day of October, 1868, and shall be construed together with so much of the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, the Bankruptcy Act, 1854, and the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, as is in force, as one Act, and may be cited for all purposes as The Bankruptcy Amendment Act, 1868." 821 CHAPTEE VI. OF VOID AND VOIDABLE DEEDS AND CONTRACTS (a). Section I. Of Deeds which are Invalid hy reason of the Absence of any Cotisideration, or the Inadequacy or Unlaiofidncss of the Consideration. I, Absence or Failure of Consideration. Lawful considerations are of two kinds — valuable and pt. iii.t.i?. Ch. 6, s. 1. good. A valuable consideration is money, or any other . Considera- tnmg tnat bears a known value, or marriage, or some other tions are _ _ either valu- • benefit to the person making a promise, however slight, or a^^'e or good. to a third person by the act of the promisee, or any loss, trouble, detriment, or inconvenience to, or charge or lia- bility upon, the promisee, however slight, for the sake or at the instance of the promisor, though without any benefit to the promisor, or the suspension or forbearance of legal proceedings, the prevention of litigation, or the settlement of disputes. A good consideration is affection for a child or relation, or the payment of debts by the debtor (&). In the case of deeds operating by transmutation of the in what cases a con- possession, no consideration is necessary, as between the siderationis necessary. parties, nor as to strangers, except in cases of actual or (a) Of course tliis chapter only grounds of invalidity, points out some of the grounds, not {h) See 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 2, § 50, noticed under other heads, on which 51 ; Smith's Common Law Manual, deeds are void or voidable. The 3rd ed. 45, 46 ; Keenan v. Handky, perusal of other parts of the work 2 D. J. & S. 283. will at once direct the reader to other q2 822 OF DEEDS VOID OR VOIDABLE pt.iii. T.12, constructive fraud (c). But in the case of deeds operatincf Ch. 6, s. 1. ^ ■' . . without transmutation of the possession, that is, bargains and sales, and covenants to stand seised, a consideration is absolutely necessary (d). Revocable- Where a person executes and delivers a deed of convey- ness of a ■*• '' voimitary q^^^^q ^f equitable property to a volunteer, or where the legal estate is transferred and a trust of it is declared in favour of a volunteer, and there is nothing upon the face of the transaction or from contemporaneous evidence to show that it was intended to be revocable, it cannot be re- voked or avoided in any way. And even if the donor procures a re-transfer of stock by the trustees, and, where it is in writing, cancels the instrument, and by will makes a provision for the same cestuis que trust, still the settle- ment is binding ; and unless the subsequent provision is expressed to be substitutionary, the cestuis que trust, if the gift is not by way of portion, will take both. They will have their election, if it is expressed to be in substitution ; and stock not being within the stat. of 27 Eliz., a purchaser from the donor cannot avoid the voluntary settlement or gift (c). The keeping a deed, so executed as to pass an estate or interest, in the donor's possession, is not of itself suffi- cient to enable the donor to revoke it by cancellation or by will ; though no notice of it may have been given to anyone ; and though it may have been foolishly or incon- siderately executed (/). Hence, a person unmarried can- not recall a voluntary deed which he has executed for the benefit of future children. Nor can he relieve himself from a provision by which he has chosen, for the benefit of those children, to submit to the discretion of a third person (c) See infra, sect. III., on volun- Pres. Sliep. T. 510 ; Burton, § 536. tary deeds void as against purchasers (e) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 882 — 3. and creditors. (/) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 885 ; Re (d) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 2, § 46 ; 2 Wai/s Trusts, 2 D. J. & S. 365. FOR WANT OF A CONSIDEKATION. 823 the extent of the enjoyment of the income of his pro- Pr.iii.T.12, perty {g). And where a feme sole makes a settlement of personal property upon certain trusts for herself, and any husband with whom she may intermarry, and any child- ren she may have, and her appointees and next of kin, it has been held to be irrevocable years afterwards, although she never marries, and it does not appear that it was made in contemplation of an immediate marriage, or of a marriage with any particular individual at any sub- sequent time ; and although it is alleged in the bill, and the probability is, that it was executed solely in order to protect herself against the importunities of relations, and is purely voluntary, and although, in consequence of the locking up of the capital, she becomes greatly embar- rassed {h) ! Courts of eciuity will enforce an obligation imposed by Enforcing ^ -^ o r J voluntary wlQ, without any consideration (i). But they will not deeds, enforce, either against the party himself or any volunteers, claiming under him, any contract or any imperfect gifts inter vivos (not being donations mortis causa) or imperfect assignments of debts or other property, or executory trusts raised by a covenant or agreement, or defective or imperfect settlements or conveyances, which are not founded in a valuable consideration, even though the transaction be founded on a meritorious consideration, as in the case of a provision for a wife or child ; that is, equity will not enforce them so far as something is sought beyond what, if anything, may be recovered under them at law, although it will, if necessary, give effect to any legal obligation created by them. But if a transfer, assignment, trust, settlement, or conveyance is complete, so that no act remains to be done to give full effect to the title, equity will enforce it {g) Petre v. Espinesse, 2 My. & K. Bill v. Cureton, 2 My. & K. 503. 496. («') 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 255. (/*) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 129, 255 ; 824 OF DEEDS VOID OR VOIDABLE pt. JII.T.12, tlirougliout against the party making or creating it, and his representatives, although it be merely voluntary (j). And simply to sign a declaration of trust in favour of the donee is an effectual mode of effecting a voluntary transfer. And if a person directs by letter, though not for valuable consideration, an executor to pay over to another the share to which such person is entitled, and the letter is acted upon by the executor, it will operate as an assign- ment (k). A third person, particularly if a relation, may enforce in equity a stipulation made by another in his favour, and for which the party who obtained it has given a valuable con- sideration plainly with a view of benefiting such third person, though such third person, as regards each of the contracting parties, may be a volunteer (/) : as where a person who has contributed a valuable consideration to a settlement, has exacted, as part of the contract, that certain property shall be so settled as that the property, whether belonging to one of the parties or the other, shall go to some near relative, in the event of the intended limitation to the issue of the marriage failing to take effect (m). But it would appear, that, if the party exacting the stipula- tion releases the other, the stranger cannot enforce it, ij) Story's Eq. Jur. § 433, 787, Woodford v. ClmrnUy, 28 Beav. 96 ; 793 a, b, 973 ; 1 Spence's Eq. Jur. Dilrow v. Bone, 3 Giff. 538 ; Airey 507 ; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 52, 57, n. v. Hall, 3 Sm. & G. 315 ; Parndl 129, 254, 255, 285, 889—893, 898, v. Hingston, 3 Sm. & G. 337 ; Mil- 899, 907, 909—915 ; Fletcher v. roy v. Lord, 4 D. F. & J. 234. Fletcher, 4 Hare, 67 ; Voijle r. (k) Kelcewich v. Manning, 1 D. Hughes, 2 S. & G. 18; Bridge v. M. & G, 176 ; Grants. Grant, 34 Bridge, 16 Beav, 315; Weal v. Beav. 34 ; (?«76er«v. Owrtore, 2 Hem. '■ Ollive, l7Bea,v. 252 iScalesv.Maicdc, & Mil. 110; Jones v. Zocl, L. 6 D. M. & G. 43 ; Dening v. Ware, E. 1 Ch. Ap. 25 ; Richardson v. 22 Beav. 184; Tatham v. Vernon, Richardson, L. R. 3 Eq. 686; Lambe 29 Beav. 604 ; Beech v. Keep, 18 v, Orton, 1 Drew. & Sm. 129. Beav. 285 ; Donaldson v, Donald- (l) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 286. son, 1 Kay, 711 ; Pearson v. Ami- (m) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 281. cable Assurance Office, 27 Beav. 229 ; FOR WANT OF A CONSIDERATION. 825 unless his condition in life has been altered by the stipula- i';;- ^"•''^•i^. •^ ^ Cu. 6, s. 1. tion (n). A grant or obligation which is voluntary, as regards the grantee or obligee, ceases to be voluntary, where, with the privity of the grantor or obligor, it forms the consideration on the faith of which a marriage is contracted and a settle- ment executed (o). When the cause of a grant fails, and the thing granted failure of " ' '^ '^ the cause oi is executory, the grant becomes void. Thus, if a person aslant, grants an annuity for an acre of land, or for counsel, the word " for" is conditional ; and, therefore, if the land is evicted by an elder title, or if the annuitant refuses to give counsel, the annuity is determined (p). In every transaction in which a person obtains, by Requisites "^ _ ^ -^ to a volun- voluntary donation, a benefit from another, it is necessary, t^ry gift. if the transaction be called in question, that he should be able to establish that the person giving him the benefit, did so voluntarily and deliberately, and with full knowledge of what he was doing. If this is not established, the transac- tion will be set aside (q). II. Inadequacy of the Consideration. Mere inadequacy of price, or any other inequality in the mere mere baro;ain, does not constitute by itself a ground to avoid of price a o ' JO ground of it (?•). Still, however, there may be such an unconscion- relief, ableness or inadequacy in the bargain as to shock the conscience, and amount to conclusive evidence of imposi- tion or undue influence ; and, in such a case, courts of (n) See 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 280, 241 ; Anderson v. Ehworili, 3 Gif. 281. 154 ; Sliarp v. Leach, 31 Beay. 491 ; (o) Payne v. Mortimer, 1 Gif. Toker v. Toher, 31 Beav. 629. 118. (r) Story's Eq. Jur. § 244 ; Allot {p) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 285. v. Stvorder, 4 D. G. & Sm. 448 ; liar- (g) Cooke v. Lamotte, 15 Beav. rimn v. Guest, 6 D. M, & G. 424. 826 OF DEEDS VOID OE VOIDABLE Pt. III.T.12, Ch. 6. s. 1. Gross in- adequacy, coupled ■with other grounds of relief. Inadequate consideration in case of persona pecu- liarly liable to be im- posed on. Bargains with expect- ant heirs, remainder- men, and re- versioners. equity ought to interfere on the ground of fraud. And where there are other ingi^edients of a suspicious nature, gross inadequacy in the consideration must furnish the most vehement presumption of fraud (s). Such is the case if proper time for deliberation is not allowed the party injured ; if he is importunately pressed ; if those in whom he placed confidence make use of strong persuasion ; if he is suddenly drawn into an act, without being fully aware of the consequences ; if he is not permitted to con- sult disinterested friends or counsel, before he is called upon to act, in circumstances of sudden emergency or un- expected right and acquisition ; or if he is an illiterate person, and advantage has been taken of his necessities ; or if he is a person of weak understanding (t). But equity will not relieve where the parties cannot be placed in statu quo. Such relief, for instance, will not be given in the case of marriage settlements ; inasmuch as the Court cannot un- marry the parties {u). Relief will be granted, on account of the smallness of the consideration, in favour of those classes of per- sons, of whom, from their peculiar circumstances, irre- spective of any mental incapacity, undue advantage may readily be taken, although the transaction could not be im- peached if entered into by parties otherwise situated. Thus, Bargains with expectant heirs will be set aside, unless the party can show that a full consideration was paid, or that the bargain was fully made known to and approved by the person to whose estate the expectant heir hoped to succeed (v). But although a person seeking the benefit (s) story's Eq. .Tur. § 24G, 251. See remarks of Lord Cranworth, C, in Harrison v. Quest, 6 D. M. & G. 424. {t) Story's Eq. Jur. § 251 ; Cochell V. Taylor, 15 Beav. 103, 115; Long- mate V Ledger, 2 Gif. 157 ; Clarh v. MaljMS, 31 Beav. 80 ; Bal:er v. Monk, 33 Beav. 419. (u) Story's Eq. Jur. § 250. (v) See Story's Eq. Jur. § 334— 340, 343; Bromley v. SmitJi, 26 Beav. 644. FOR INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION. 827 of a dealing with an expectant lieir for liis expectancy ^ch^^'s'i!' must show that he gave him a fair market price at the time of the dealing, yet he is not bound to show that he gave the full value according to the calculations of actua- ries on the tables ; as those calculations were made on the result of a great mass of cases, and therefore may not be a true criterion of the value of the particular case, as, for instance, where the life in question is not of average value. Besides, if the utmost value were required to be given, it might altogether prevent expectants from dealing with their expectancies (iv). If, however, the heir, after being relieved from his neces- sities, absolutely, and deliberately, and on full information as to his right of setting aside the bargain, confirms the transaction, or does any act by which the rights or property of the other party are injuriously affected, he will not be allowed to repudiate the bargain (x). The same relief was afforded to remaindermen and rever- sioners, unless the party who dealt with them could show that a full consideration was paid, or that the bargain was fully made known to and approved by their parents or other persons standing in loco parentis, who had the means of obviating the necessity for such an alienation of their future interests. And tliis doctrine applied to a charge as well as to a sale, and notwitlistanding the expectant was of mature age, and fully understood the transaction. And it was not necessary to show that he was in pecuniary difficulty, for that would be assumed (?/). (ic) Earl of Aldhorough v. Trye, 11; Talbot y. Stan forth, 1 Johns. & 7 CI. & F. i36. H. 484 ; Foster v. Roberts, 29 Beav, {x) Story's Eq. Jur. § 345, 346. 467 ; Jones V. Rkletts, 31 Beav, {y) See Story's Eq. Jur. § 334— 131 ; Sharp v. Leach, 31 Beav. 491 340; Salter V. Bradshaio, 26 Beav. Perfect \. Lane, 3 D. F. & J. 369 161; Bromley v. Smith, 26 Beav. Tyntex. Hodge, 2B.Qm..kMi\.2i7 644 ; St. Albyny. Harding, 27 Beav. Nesbitt v. Berridge, 32 Beav. 282; 828 OF DEEDS VOID OR VOIDABLE pt. iii.t.12, By the stat. 31 Vict. c. 4, it is enacted tliat "no purchase, Ch. 6, s. 1. "^ ' ^ made bona fide and without fraud or unfair dealing, of any reversionary interest in real or personal estate shall here- after be opened or set aside merely on the ground of under- value (s. 1) ; and that the word ' purchase ' in this Act shall include every kind of contract, conveyance, or assign- ment under or by which any beneficial interest in any kind of property may be acquired (s. 2) ; and that this Act shall come into operation on the 1st day of January, 1868, and shall not apply to any purchase concerning which any suit shall be then depending" (s. 3). Post-obit On the principles above mentioned, post-obit bonds and bonds, &c., X r ' Jr ^y^^^pect- other securities of the like nature are set aside, when made by heirs and other expectants. A post-obit bond is an agreement, on the receipt of money by the obligor, to pay a sum exceeding the sum so received and the ordinary interest thereof, on the death of the person upon whose decease he expects to become entitled to some property {£). Even the sale of a post-obit bond at a public auction will not give it validity, unless the sale was free, fair, and with the ordinary precautions and advertise- ments («). If, however, these contracts are perfectly fair in other respects, relief will not be granted, except upon the terms of paying that to which the lender is equitably entitled (6). The repeal of the usury laws has not altered the course of the Court of Chancery as to dealings with expec- tants (c). Bargains Commou sailors, being so extremely generous, credulous, with cum- " raou sailors. Q^^^f[ inlprovidcnt a class of men, that they require guardian- ship all their lives. Equity treats them in the same light as Dally y. Wonhem, S3 Beav. 154, {h) Story's Eq. Jur. § 344. 162. (c) Croft V. Graham, 2 D. J. & (z) Story's Eq. Jur. § 342. Sm. 155. (a) Story's Eq. Jur. § 347. FOR INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION. 829 young expectant heirs ; and relief is generally afforded r'l. iii. t.i2, against contracts respecting their prize-money or wages, wherever any inequality appears in the bargain, or any undue advantage has been taken (d). Wliere a person, shortly after obtaining his majority. Bargains makes a gift, sale, or lease, in favour of a relative, it will Pfi[g°^°f^g be set aside, unless the grantor or lessor makes it inten- comrof age tionally and deliberately, after having had the fullest in- solicitors! formation on the subject, and separate, independent, and disinterested advice, even though the terms, in the case of a sale or lease, were fair, but yet not so advantageous as might have been obtained (e). III. Uoilawfidness of the Consideration. Considerations which are against the principles of justice, the doctrines of morality, or the rules, provisions, or policy of the law, are utterly void ; it being a rule of both law and equity that ex turpi contractu actio non oritur (/). Hence, a deed executed in consideration of a future coha- bitation between persons who are incapable of contracting legal marriage, is invalid (g). And a bond given to a woman as the price of prostitution is void in law (A). But where a bond is given for securing an annuity or a sum of money for the support and maintenance of the person seduced, and not with any view to future cohabitation, a court of equity will not set it aside, even though she was a common prostitute (i). {d) Story's Eq. Jur. § 332. (*/) Ford v. De Pontls, 30 Beav. (e) Grosvenor v. Sherratt, 28 Beav. 572. 659. (h) 4 Cruise T. 32 c. 26, § 49. (/) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 2, § 51 ; (i) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 26, § 51, 65. Story's Eq. Jur. § 294—297. 830 DEEDS INVALID ON ACCOUNT OF Section II. Of Deeds and Contracts vjMcIi are Invalid on the ground of Constructive Fraud ^iractised hi/ Persons sta^iding in a Confidential Relatioii to the Parties sotight to he hound hy such Deeds or Contracts. rT.iii.T.i2, Where a reasonable confidence is reposed in another CfH, \}f S. A» ; — 7- person, or a peculiar influence is possessed by him, in con- frauda by— gequcnce of standing in a confidential relation, or where a person, by being employed or concerned in the affairs of another, has acquired a knowledge of his property, and he makes use of that confidence or that influence or that knowledge to obtain an advantage to himself at the expense of the party confiding in him or under his in- fluence or in whose affairs he is concerned, he will not be permitted to retain any such advantage, however unim- peachable the transaction would otherwise have been (/). Thus, 1. Parents, 1. Coutracts and conveyances whereby benefits are and others in t^m^or^' secured by children to their parents, or to persons who relations. stand in loco parentum, or by young persons to their relations who had an influence over them, if not entered into with scrupulous good faith, and reasonable under the circumstances, will be set aside, unless third persons have acquired an interest under them (k). And when a child, recently after attaining majority, makes over property to {j) Sharp V. Leach, 31 Beav. 491 ; Wright t. Vanderplank, 2 K. & J. Brown v. Kennedy, 33 Beav. 133. 1 ; 8 D. M. & G. 133; Dimsdale See also Modes v. Bate, 4 Gif. v. Dimsdale, 3 Drewry, 556, 575, 670 ; L. E. 1 Ch. Ap. 252 ; Tate v. 577 ; Baker v. Bradley, 7 D. M. & Williamson, L. E. 1 Eq. 528 ; 2 G. 597, 620 ; Potts v. Surr, 34 Beav. Ch. Ap. 55. 542 ; Berdoe v. Daivson, 34 Beav. (/L-) Story's Eq. Juv. § 309; Hogh- 603; Sercombe v. Sanders, 34 Beav. ion V. Hoghton, 15 Beav. 278; 382; ChamhersY. Crabhe, Zi'QQd.w. Espley V. Lake, 10 Hare, 260; 457. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 831 the father, without consideration, or for an inadequate ^'"/tiz, consideration. Equity will require the father to be able to show that the child was really a free agent, and had ade- quate and independent advice (/). And if an estate held in trust for a father for life, the remainder to his son in fee, is sold by the father and son immediately on the son coming of age, and the whole purchase money is paid to the father, there, if the assistance of the Court is required by the pm-chaser to complete the transaction, its straight- forwardness must be proved (m). 2. During the existence of guardianship, the relative 2. Guard- situation of the parties accasions a general inability to deal with each other. And courts of equity will not permit transactions between guardians and wards to stand, even when they have occurred after the minority has ceased, if the intermediate period is short ; especially if all the duties attached to the office have not ceased, or if the estate still remains in some sort under the control of the guardian ; unless the circumstances demonstrate the fullest deliberation on the part of the ward, and the most absolute good faith on the part of the guardian (n). But when the guardianship has entirely ceased, and a full and fair settle- ment of all transactions growing out of it has been made, and a sufficient time has intervened to allow the ward to feel completely independent of the guardian ; there is then no objection even to a bounty being conferred upon the latter (0). 3. The same principles are applied to persons standing 3. Quasi- . . . , , . guardians or m the relation of quasi-guardians or confidential advisers advisers. or ministers of religion, and to every case where influence (Z) Savery v. King, 5 H. L. Cas. 19. 627, 655 ; Bury v. Oppenheim, 26 (n) Story's Eq. Jur. § 317—320; Beav. 594 ; Davies \. Bavies, 4 Gif. Wright v. Vanderplanh, 2 K. & J. 1. 417. (0) Story's Eq. Jur. § 320 ; Brown («i) Hannah v. Hodgson, 30 Beav. v. Kennedy, 33 Beav. 133. 832 DEEDS INVALID ON ACCOUNT OF pt. in.T.i2, is acquired and abused, where confidence is reposed and Ch. 6, 8. 2. -■■ ^ betrayed (p). i. soUcitors. 4. A solicitor is not incapable of contracting with his client; but, as the relation must give rise to great con- fidence in the solicitor, or to very strong influence over the client, the relation must be dissolved before the con- tract, or the whole onus of proving the fairness and pro- priety of the transaction will be thrown on the solicitor, or he must show that the client had sufficient advice and assistance to relieve him from the pressure arising from the relation of solicitor and client, and that he has taken no advantage of his professional position, but that he has done as much to protect the client's interest as he would have done in the case of the client dealing with a stranger (q). And a solicitor who is an agent for a sale cannot become the purchaser w^ithout full explanation to the parties in- terested of all the circumstances of the sale and of the value of the property ; because his duty and his interest are in conflict (r). And if a solicitor can show that he is entitled to purchase, yet if, instead of openly purchasing, he purchases in the name of a trustee or agent, without disclosing the fact, no such purchase can stand (s). And in the case of a solicitor taking a security or a purchase from his client, it is incumbent on the solicitor to prove the advance of the money to the client by some other evidence than the deed of security or purchase (t). (p) Id. § 319 ; Nottidgey. Prince, Ccnvdri/ v. 2)a)/, 1 Gif. 316; Gresley 2 Gif. 246 ; Smith v. Kay, 7 H. L. v. Mousley, 1 Gif. 450 ; 4 D. & J. Cas. 751, 771, 778 — 9; Brown v. 78; Pearson v. Benson, 28 Beav. Kennedy, 33 Beav. 33 ; Graham v. 598 ; Oihhs v. Daniel, 4 Gif. 1. Johnson, L. K. 8 Eq. 36. (r) In re Bloyes' Trust, 1 Mac. & (q) See Sugd. Concise View, 548; G. 494, 497. Story's Eq. Jur. § 310—313; IIol- (s) Lewis y. Hillman, 3 H. L. Cas. man v. Loynes, 4 J). M. & G. 270 ; 630. See remarks at p. 834, on Tomson v. Judge, 3 Drewry, 306 ; Agents. Savery v. King, 5 H. L. Cas. 627, (t) Gresley v. Mousky, 3 D. F. 655—6 ; Waters v. Tliorn, 22 Beav. & J. 433, 444. 547 ; Spencer v. Topham, lb. 673 ; THE RELATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 833 As a general rule, a solicitor shall not accept a dft, or, pt. in.T.i2, ° -^ ° Ch. 6, s. 2. in any way whatever, in respect of the subject of any transaction between him and his client, make a gain to himself at the expense of his client, beyond the amount of the just and fair professional remuneration to which he is entitled (u). On the above principle, an agreement on the part of a client to allow a solicitor a commission of so much per cent, on a fund in Court, as a remuneration for recovering the fund or employing another solicitor to recover it, is void, as contrary to the policy of the law (x). And an agreement by a client to allow his solicitor in- terest on his bill of costs, cannot be maintained — at all events, not unless the solicitor informed the client that the law allowed no such charge, or the client acquiesced, after the termination of the relation, and after proper advice upon the subject (3/). But a deed executed by a client in favour of his solicitor, if voidable, may be confirmed by the will of the client (z). An agreement between a solicitor and client, that a gross sum shall be paid for costs for business already done, is valid. But an agreement to pay a gross sum for business hereafter to be done is void. And if a solicitor takes a gross sum for his services, without an account, he should preserve evidence of the fairness of the agreement, and that the client had good advice, or had full opportunity and capacity to judge for himself {a). (m) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 26, § 35 ; O'Brien v. Lewis, 4 Gif. 221. Story's Eq. Jur. § 312; Moss v. (a;) Stranrje y. Brennon, 15 Sim. Bainhrifjfje, 18 Beav. 478 ; 6 D. M. 346. & G. 292 ; Tomson v. Judge, 3 {y) Lyddon v. Moss, 4 D. & J. Drewry, 306 ; Re IIolmes''s Estate, 3 104. Gif. 337 ; Nanney v. Williams, 22 (2) Stump v. Gaby, 2 D. M. & G. Beav. 452 ; Walker v. Smith, 29 631. But see Waters v. Thorn, 22 Beav. 394 ; Bank of London y. Tyr- Beav. 547, 559. veil, 2mA Tyrrell y. Bank of London, (a) Re Netvman, 30 Beav. 196; 27 Beav. 273 ; 10 H. L. Cas. 26 ; Morgan v. Eirjgins, 1 Gif. 277. 834 DEEDS INVALID ON ACCOUNT OF Pt.III.T.12, Ch. 6, 8. 2. 5. Doctors. 6. Agents. 7. Trustees or other persons who from their office or employ meut have ac- quired a kuowledge of the property. 5. Similar rules apply to the case of a medical adviser and liis patient (h). 6. An agent will not be permitted to reap any advan- tage by becoming secret vendor or purchaser of ]Droperty which he is authorised to buy or sell for his principal (c). So that if an agent sells his own property to his principal as the property of another, without disclosing the fact, or if an agent purchases the goods of his principal in another name, however fair the transaction may be, the principal may either repudiate it, or may claim any profit made by the agent ; because an agent will not be allowed to place himself in a situation which under ordinary circumstances would tempt a man to do that which is not the best for his principal (d). And if an agent employed to purchase for another purchases for himself, he will be considered as the trustee of his employer, at the option of the latter (e). And in all transactions directly and openly entered into between principal and agent, the utmost good faith is required ; so that the agent must not conceal any facts within his knowledge which might influence the judgment of his principal as to price or value (/), 7. A trustee is not allowed to partake of the bounty of the party for wdiom he acts, except under circumstances which would make the same valid if it were a case of guardianship (g). Trustees, mortgagees, and executors, with powers of sale, cannot buy the trust estate from themselves, or in other words they cannot sell it to themselves ; for although they may vest the estate by conveyance in themselves as piu'- chasers, or in a nominal purchaser as a trustee for them, (b) Story's Eq. Jur. § 314. (c) Story's Eq. Jur. § 315. (d) Bentleij v. Craven, 18 Beav. 76. See also Bank of London v. Tyrrell, 27 Beav. 273 ; Tyrrell v. Bank of London, 10 H. L. Cas. 26. (e) Story's Eq. Jur. § 316, 1211 a ; Sugd. Concise View, 545. (/) Story's Eq. Jur. § 315, 316 a ; Dcdly V. Wonham, 33 Beav. 154. ig) Story's Eq. Jur. § 321—2. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE PAETIES. 835 yet Equity would not allow sucli a purchase to stand, unless ^^ Jii. T.12, it should prove Ijeneficial to the cestuis que trust {h). And if a purchase is made of a trust estate, from the cestui que trust, by a trustee (not being only a formal or nominal trustee, such as a trustee to support contingent remainders), although the purchase be at a public auction, unless there has been no fraud, concealment, or advantage on the part of the trustee, and no want of protection and security on the part of the cestui que trust, the cestui que trust may require a reconveyance or a resale ; and, if the resale pro- duces more than the trustee gave, the cestui que trust may repudiate the first sale, and adopt the resale ; if less, he may affirm the first sale (i'). And a trustee for a person not sui juris can only buy the estate under the authority of the Court (j). On similar principles, agents, commissioners of bank- rupts, assignees, and solicitors of bankrupts' and insolvents' estates, or their partners in business, auctioneers, creditors who have been consulted as to the mode of sale, counsel, or any persons who by being employed or concerned in the affairs of another have acquired a knowledge of his property, even though the bargain be perfectly fair, are incapable of purchasing such property, except under similar restric- tions (Ji). And where a trustee or agent agrees to accept a benefit from an intended purchaser, the purchase cannot be maintained (I). "Where a person cannot purchase the estate himself, lie cannot buy it as agent for another. So, if a person is dis- (h) Sugd. Concise View, 48, 547 ; Lord, 34 Beav. 220. and dictum of M. R. in Benton v. (j) Sugd. Concise View, 548. Bonner, 23 Beav. 290. (k) See Story's Eq. Jur. § 322 ; 2 (0 Sugd. V. & P. 14th ed. 69, Spence's Eq. Jur. 943—4 ; Sugd. 691 — 4 ; Lewin on Trusts, 4th ed. Concise View, 543 — 4 ; Pooley v. 335—342. St. § 322 ; 2 Sp. 943— Quilter, 2 D. & J. 327. 4; Smedley v. Varley, 23 Beav. 358 ; (I) Sugd. Concise View, 545. Denton v. Bonner, Id. 285 ; Luff v. VOL. II. s, 836 DEEDS INVALID ON ACCOUNT OF ^ci/^6'"s'2^' '"'■^Icd from purchasing, Lis solicitor or agent in tlic trans- action is equally disabled, although for his own benefit (m). The circumstance, however, that two parties stand to each other in the relation of trustee and cestui que trust, does not affect any dealing between them unconnected with the subject of the trust (n). Purchases by A Sale bv a mortgagor to a mortgagee does not stand mortgagees and upon the principle of a sale by a cestui que trust to his trustee, but on the same principle as a sale between parties having no connection with each other; for otherwise it might be impossil^le for the mortgagor ever to get rid of his debt by releasing the equity of redemption (o). But if a mortgagee takes a conveyance with a power of sale, he is a trustee for sale, and as such disabled from pur- cliasing (j9). creditors. A creditor who has taken out execution, may buy the estate sold under the execution (q). Purciiasesor It may licrc be remarked, that where a power is given exchanges by tenant tor ] ,y a, settlement to trustees to sell or exchange the estate life. -^ " with the consent of the tenant for life, or to the tenant for life to sell or exchange with the consent of the trustees, the estate may be safely purchased by the tenant for life him- self, or taken in exchange for land of his own (r). (wi) Sugd. Concise View, 546. 545. (n) Knight \. Major ibanlcs, 2 Mac. (|)) Siigd. Concise View, 545—6. & G. 10. (g) Sugd. Concise View, 545. (o) KnUjlit V. MujoTibanl-s, 2 (r) 2 Sugd. Pow. 492; Sugd. Mac. & G. 10 ; Sugd. Concise View, Concise View, 546, 49. FEAUD ON THIED PERSONS. 837 Section III. Of Deeds which arc Invalid on account of Actual or Constructive Fraud on Third Persons. All instrument may be entirely set aside on the otoihicI pt. 111.T.12, •^ '^ , '=' Ch. 6, s. 3. of fraud {s), wliether actual or constructive ; so that con- tracts which operate as a virtual fraud upon third persons are invalid. Thus, I. If clandestine marriage contracts are designed to i- ciandes- " ° tiue marriage impose on parents or persons standing in loco parentis or contracts. in some other peculiar relation to the parties, so as to dis- appoint their bounty, or to defeat their intentions in the disposition of their property, such contracts ^Yill be set aside, or the equities will be held to be the same as if they had not been entered into {t). II. So, relief will be granted to the injured parties, 11. Frauds where persons, after doing acts required to lie done on a treaty of marriage, render those acts virtually unavailing by entering into other secret agreements, or derogate from those acts, or otherwise commit a fraud upon a marriage {u). As where a parent declines to consent to a marriage on account of the intended husband being in debt, and the brother of the latter gives a bond for the debts to procure such consent, and the intended husband then gives a secret counter-bond to his brother to indemnify him against the first (;/;). So where a brother, on the marriage of his sister, let her have a sum of money privately, that her fortune might appear to be as much as was insisted on, and the sister gave a bond to the brother to secure the repayment thereof, the bond was set aside (y). So where, upon a ou raamascs (s) See Story's Eq. Jur. § 161. {x) Story's Eq. Jur. § 269. (0 Sec Story's Eq. Jur. § 275. (.y) Story's Eq. Jur. § 270. in) Story's Eq. Jur. § 268—272. 838 DEEDS INVALID ON ACCOUNT OF Pf-n^ T.12, treaty of marriage, a creditor of the intended Imsband con- cealed his own debt, and misrepresented to the wife's father the amount of the husband's debts, the transaction was treated as a fraud upon the marriage, and the creditor was prevented from enforcing his debt (z). And where a father, on the marriage of his daughter, enters into a covenant, that, on his death, he will leave her a full and equal share of all his personal estate, he cannot afterwards transfer a portion of his personal property to another child, retaining the annual income thereof for his life («). III. Belief will also be granted against acts secretly done by a woman in contravention of the marital rights, or in disappointment of the just expectations of her in- tended husband. As where a woman, in contemplation of marriage, and without the privity of her intended husband, makes a settlement to her separate use, or a conveyance in favour of persons for whom she is under no moral obligation to provide. But a reasonable provision for her children by a former marriage, under circumstances of good faith, is free from objection (&). IV Deeds of IV. By the Stat. 3 Hen. 7, c. 4, all deeds of gifts of gift of goods -^ ' " i^e™g Jr goods made in trust to the use of the donor, shall be the donor. ^^^^^ . i^gj^r^^^^gg otherwise persons might be tempted to commit treason or felony without danger of forfeiture, and the creditors might also be defrauded of their rights (c). V. voiuu- V. By the stat. 13 Eliz. c. 5, s. 1 (made perpetual by tary deeds '^ > \ L L J stet Ts'mz ^^^^ ^^^^- ^^ ■^^^^- ^- ^)' "^^^^ ^^^^ avoiding of feigned, ^•^- covinous, and fraudulent feoffments," &c., "contrived of malice, fraud, covin, collusion, or guile," to " delay, hinder. {z) story's Eq. Jiir. § 271. 2nd cd. 32.5, ct seq. ; Pridcaux v. (a) Story's Eq. Jur. § 382. Lonsdale, 4 Gif. 159 ; 1 D. 'J. & (6) Story's Eq. Jur, § 273 ; 2 Sm. 433 ; Bournes \. Jennings, 32 Spence's Eq. Jur. 505; Countess of Bcav. 290. Strcdhmorev. Boives,! Lead.Cas. Eq. (c) 2 Bl. Com. 441. FRAUD OX THIRD PERSOXS. 839 or defraud creditors or others," it is enacted, that " all ^ck^g^'g'g^' and every feoffment, gift, grant, alienation, bargain and conveyance of lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods and cliattels, or of any of them, or of any lease, rent, common, or other profit or charge out of the same lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods and chattels, or any of them, by ■writing or otherwise, and all and every bond, suit, judg- ment, . and execution, at any time had or made sithence the beginning of the Queen's Majesty's reign that now is, or at any time hereafter to be had or made, to or for any intent or purpose before declared and expressed, shall be from hencefortli deemed and taken (only as against that person or persons, his or their heirs, successors, executors, athninistrators and assigns, and every of them, whose actions, suits, debts, accounts, damages, penalties, for- feitures, heriots, mortuaries and reliefs, by such guileful, covinous, or fraudulent devices and practices, as is afore- said, are, shall, or might be in any ways disturbed, hin- dered, delayed, or defrauded), to be clearly and utterly void, frustrate, and of none effect ; any pretence, colour, feigned consideration, expressing of use, or any other matter or thing to the contrary notwithstanding." But, by s. 5, it is provided " that this Act, or anything therein contained, shall not extend to any estate or interest in lands, tenements, hereditaments, leases, rents, commons, profits, goods or chattels, had, made, conveyed or assured, or hereafter to be had, made, conveyed or assured, which estate or interest is or shall be upon good consideration and bona fide lawfully conveyed or assured to any person or persons, or bodies politic or corporate, not having at the time of such conveyance or assurance to them made, any manner of notice or knowledge of such covin, fraud, or collusion as is aforesaid." In consequence of this statute, deeds, though good as between the parties and in other respects, are void as 840 DEEDS INVALID ON ACCOUNT OF Ft. iir.T.12, against creditors, when made with an actual intent to Cn. 6, s. 3. * ' defrand them {(T), even though such deeds be for valual)le consideration (c), except as regards a bona fide purchaser from tlie debtor or from an assignee of the debtor without notice of the circumstances amounting to such actual fraud. And if a person makes a conveyance or assign- ment of any real or personal property which is liable to his debts (unless it is to a purchaser for valuable consideration who lias no notice of a fraudulent intent), and at the time, or immediately afterwards, he is indebted to such an amount that he has not ample means besides that property available to pay the debts, such conveyance or assignment is void as against those who were creditors at the time of and subsequent to the deed, to the extent to which it may be necessary to deal with the property for their satisfac- tion (/). A deed, however, which is apparently voluntary, may be shown by extrinsic evidence to have been made for valuable consideration, and may be supported as such against creditors {g). And a deed is not necessarily void under this Act, merely because designed to prefer or defeat a particular creditor (/t). (rf) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 27, § 4; 3 thmjsen, 11 Hare, 126 ; Dcning v. Drewry, 717; Bessoj v. Windham, Ware, 22 Beav. 184; Holmes v. 6 Ad. & El. (N.S.) 166. Penney, 3 K. & J. 90; Turnley v. (e) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 27, § 4 ; Hooper, 3 Sm. & G. 349 ; Dariille Stronrj T. Strong, 18 Beav. 408 ; v. Terry, 6 Hurl. & Norm. 807 ; BottY. Smith, 21 Beav. 511 ; Wells v. Thompson v. WeUter, 4 Drew. 628 ; Gardner, L. B. 7 Eq. 317. 4 D. & J. 600 ; Acraman v. Corlett, (/) See Story's Eq. Jur. § 352— 1 Johns. & Hem, 410 ; Barling v, 374, 381; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 887; Bishopp, 29 Beav. 417 ; Stohoe v. 4 Cruise T. 32, e. 27, § 15—17 ; Coivan, 29 Beav. 637 ; Spirett v. , Coote Mortg. 3rd ed. 238 ; 2 Bl. Willows, 3 D. J. & S. 293 ; Smithy. Com. 441; 1 Pres. Shep. T. 66; CherriU, L. E. 4 Eq. Cas. 390; Add. Cont. 6th ed. 149 — 156; liees River Silver Mining Com- Twyne's case, 3 Co. 80 ; Chit. Con. pany v. Atwell, L. K. 7 Eq. 347. 8th cd. 380 et scq. ; Skarfv. Soulby, (g) Pott v. Todhmiter, 2 Coll. 76. 1 Mac. & G. 364 ; Be Magemley's (h) Ad. Cont. 0th ed. 151 ; Chit. Trmt, 5 Do G. & S. 1 ; Botty. Smith, Cont. 8th ed. 383 ; Alton v. Harri- 21 Beav. 511 ; Barton v. Vanhey- son, L. R. 4 Ch. Ap. 622. FEAUl) ON THIRD TERSONS. 841 As regards the ridits of creditors with resi)ect to con- pt. 111.T.12, 00 L Ch. 6,8.3. veyauces and assignments to their prejudice, there may be three distinct questions : (1). AVhether they are acts of bankruptcy ? (2). Whether they are fraudulent preferences, which, when not prohibited by statute, were held to be void as against the assignees in bankruptcy, as contrary to the policy of the bankrupt law ? (3). Whether they are void under the statute of 13 Eliz. c. 5, and the construc- tion put on it by the courts of law and equity? Now, with reference to the third of these questions, Judge Story, in his " Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudeuce," § 352, remarks, that this Act " has always received a favour- able and liberal construction in all the courts, both of law and equity." And the only true principle w^ould seem to be, that where a conveyance or assignment is made for no considera- tion, or for none luit an antecedent debt or a meritorious consideration, or even for a valuable consideration, but with a knowledge on the part of the purchaser of an intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors, and it withdraws from tlie debtor the means of paying the general body of his creditors, it is fraudulent and void, as against them, by virtue of the stat. 13 Eliz. c. 5, whether made under pressure or not, and whether made in contemplation of bankruptcy or not. To hold otlier\tise, would open a door to innumer- able frauds on creditors, especially in the case of assignments of all a debtor's property, and more particularly when made to a relative or friend. A debtor might incur a number of debts, to any amount, and yet defeat all but a particular creditor, perhaps a relative or friend, with wdiom he miglit have an understanding that he slioidd receive part back, or that the property should be held in trust for him. Where a debtor gives a bill of sale or makes some other disposition of all his property, it is very different from the case where a creditor gets a judgment in an adverse 842 DEEDS INVALID ON ACCOUNT OF PT.iii.T.12, suit, liavinf;- tlio same effect of takintf all tlie debtor's Ch. g, s. 8. "^ '=' property. In the former case, tlie bill of sale, or other disposition, if not the voluntary act of the debtor, is an act in which the debtor concurs, though it may be under pressure : it is his own act. But in the latter case, the act is the act of the creditor, Avhich the debtor cannot avoid. To take a case out of the statute, it must be both " on good consideration" and "boni, fide." It has indeed been held that an antecedent debt or a meritorious consideration may be a " good consideration." And a preference of a par- ticular creditor may, under some circumstances, be only right ; while, on the other hand, the defeating a particular creditor may be for the benefit of the general body or the majority of the creditors. But it cannot be justly regarded as a bona fide transaction, where a debtor makes over all his property to a particular creditor, and thereby disables himself from paying any of the others. Suppose a man having £100,000, and owing that amount to one creditor, and £900,000 to others : could it be anything else but the grossest dishonesty and fraud upon them, if he were to make over the whole £100,000 to the creditor to whom he owed that amount ? and this would be especially bad, if the property consisted of chattels, and if, though he assigned them to the first creditor, he remained in possession of the chattels, and thereby may have led the subsequent creditors to suppose that he was the owner of them, in consequence of which they may have been induced to trust him. True it is, that they might have searched the register. But the fact of registration does not validate a transaction which, of itself, is invalid, or fraudulent, whether actually or con- structively. It may be said of registration, that the deed would not be valid as against creditors without it ; but the deed may not be valid even with it. In order to be obnoxious to the statute, it is not neces- sary that there should be a wilful, otherwise called an Fr^AUD ON THIRD PERSONS. 843 actual, fraud. It is sufficient if there is a virtual or coii- fr. 111.T.12, Ch. 6, s. 8. structivc fraud. The question is this — Is it within the mischief intended to l)e guarded against by tlie Act ? Does it necessarily operate to delay, hinder, or defeat creditors, in a manner which the law deems to he contrary to good faith ? It is for the plaintiff to make out his case; and, in inter- pleader cases, the claimant, under a hill of sale or other disposition, is in the situation of a plaintiff. He seeks to deprive the judgment creditor of the possession which he has acquired under the judgment. On the claimant, there- fore, is the onus of proving his title, as claimant and virtual plaintiff, to property not in his possession, but in the possession of the officer of the Court, as the agent of the judgment creditor. It is for the claimant to prove that the bill of sale or other disposition is both on valuable or good consideration, and bona fide, so far as the debtor is con- cerned, or both on valuable consideration (i. c, for money or money's worth, advanced at the time), and bona fide without notice of circumstances amounting to actual or constructive fraud, so far as the claimant is concerned. It has been held that a creditor under a voluntary post obit bond is as much entitled to the benefit of the statute as any other creditor (i). If there is a positive agreement, that after a settlement, a sale, or a mortgage of chattels, the settlor, vendor, or mortgagor shall retain the apparent ownership of them ; this is a fraud on creditors, because it enables him to gain a false credit. But this doctrine does not apply where the retaining the possession is consistent with the nature of the transaction, and does not appear to have been fraudulent, or where the transfer is so notorious that the continuance of possession does not create any false credit, (0 Adamcs v. Halktt, L. E. 6 Eq. Cas. 408. 844 DEEDS INVALID ON ACCOUNT OF Tr.iu. T.12, or where the settlor, vendor, or mortu'«fi;or is not indebted Cn. 6, 3. 3. _ _ ' ' ° ^^ at the time (j). If a trader in insolvent circumstances agrees to sell his business and stock in trade to a person who has no know- ledge of the state of the trader's affairs, in consideration of (inter alia) an annuity to his wife, although the sale is valid, yet the transaction, so far as it is a settlement of the anmiity on the wife, is within the stat. 13 Eliz. c. 5, and may be set aside by a creditor, as regards the annuity, without impeaching it in any other respect (JS). If a father assigns to his son his dwelling house and personal estate, in consideration of natural love and affec- tion, and by a bond, bearing even date with the assign- ment, but not noticed therein, the son binds himself to maintain his father's wife and children, the assignment is not void against creditors under the stat. 18 Eliz. c. 5 (l). As a general rule, a post-nuptial settlement by a hus- band deeply indebted at the time, is void as against cre- ditors, even though made in pursuance of a pre-iiuptial parol contract ; for such a contract is inoperative in con- sequence of the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 4 (tn). But if a person agrees to pay all the debts of another, on condition that the latter shall make a post-nuptial settle- ment of his property, so as to be applied for the mainte- nance of the settlor, his wife, and children, "or any of them," at the absolute discretion of the trustees ; and such a settlement is accordingly executed ; it is good against subsequent creditors, and even against a person who was a creditor at the time it was executed, if the person who agrees to pay the settlor's debts was not aware of tlie exist- (j) Coote Mortg. 3rcl ed. 239; (0 Gale v. Williamson, 8 M. & Add. Cont. 5tli ed. 153— 7 j Gale v. W. 405. Burnell, 7 Ad. & El. (N.S.) 850. (m) Warden v. Jones, 23 Beav. {h) French v. French, 6 D. M. & 487 ; 2 D. & J. 76 ; Buhner v. G. 95. See Wakefield v. Gibbon, 1 Hunter, L. E. 8 Eq. 46 ; and .sec G' . 401. supra, p. 622. FEAUD ON THIRD PERSONS. 845 ence of the debt duo to that creditor, hut was assured that pt.iii.t.i2, ' On. 6, s. 3. the debts paid by him constituted the only debts of the settlor. And in such case, the discretion of the trustees being absolute, the Court cannot apportion the income of the settlor between his wdfe and children, so as to make the settlor's part of it available for his creditors (oi). If a voluntary settlement contains a general power to the settlor to dispose of or mortgage the estate, it will be deemed fraudulent as against creditors by statute and judgment ; but a power to revoke for a particular purpose may not make such a deed void (o). Unless the marriage itself was a mere fraudulent con- trivance for defeating creditors, a settlement of the hus- band's property made previously to and in contemplation of the marriage, will be supported, even though the wife contracted the marriage and obtained the settlement with a full knowledge that the husband was in embarrassed cir- cumstances (j)). VI. By the stat. 27 Eliz. c. 4, s. 1 (made perpetual by vi. voiun- the stat. 30 Eliz. c. 18), it is enacted, "That all and every voidui.der ^ ' -^ the stat. 27 conveyance, grant, charge, lease, estate, incumbrance and ^iiz^ c 4, limitation of use or uses, of, in, or out of any lands, tene- ments, or other hereditaments whatsoever, had or made any time heretofore sithence the beginning of the Queen's ^lajesty's reign that now ±^, or at any time hereafter to be had or made, for the intent and of x^in^pose to defraud and deceive such person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, as have purchased or shall afterwards purchase in fee simple, fee tail, for life, lives, or years, the same lands, tenements, and hereditaments, or any part or parcel thereof so formerly conveyed, granted, leased, charged, incumbered, or limited in use, or to defraud and deceive («) Holmes v. Penney, 3 K. & J. (j)) Colomline v. Penhall, 1 Sm. 90. & G. 228 ; Fraser t. Thompson, 1 (<0 2 Sugd. Pow. 234. Gif. 49, G2. 846 DEEDS INVALID ON ACCOUNT OF pt. iii.t.12, such as have or shall purchase any rent, profit or commo- dity in or out of the same or any part thereof, shall he deemed and taken (only as against that person and per- sons, bodies politic and corporate, his and their heirs, suc- cesssors, executors, administrators, and assigns, and against all and every other person and persons lawfully having or claiming by, from or under them or any of them, which have purchased or shall hereafter so purchase for money or other good consideration, the same lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any part or parcel thereof, or any rent, profit, or commodity in or out of the same), to be utterly void, frustrate, and of none effect ; any pretence, colour, feigned consideration, or expressing of any use or uses to the contrary notwithstanding." But by s. 4, it is jDrovided, "That this Act or anything therein contained shall not extend or be construed to impeach, defeat, make void, or frustrate, any conveyance, assignment of lease, assurance, grant, charge, lease, estate, interest, or limitation of use or uses, of, in, to, or out of any lands, tenements, or heredita- ments heretofore at any time had or made, or hereafter to be had or made, upon or for good consideration and bona fide, to any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate ; anything before mentioned to the contrary hereof notwith- standing." The object of this statute being to give full protection to subsequent purchasers against prior voluntary convey- ances, it has been decided, that in consequence of this statute, a prior conveyance is void as against a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, from or of the voluntary grantor, whether with or without notice, (but not from or of his heir or devisee,) and even after a bill filed to enforce such prior conveyance, if not actually on valuable consideration, although it may be bona fide and on good consideration, or although it may be expressed to be made for divers valuable considerations (not naming them), or although FRAUD OX THIRD PERSONS, 847 iiiailo 1)V direction of the Court of Chancery ; on the ^l,-'^^^-^\-' '' ' Ch. (3, s. 3. ground that the statute in every such ■case infers fraud, ~ and will not suffer the presumption to be rebutted. As between the parties themselves, however, such convey- ances are binding ; and as between two voluntary convey- ances, if the first is fraudulent, the second will prevail ; l)ut where each is bona fide, Equity will not interfere (q). A conveyance in the form of a purchase deed for valuable consideration, but, in fact, voluntary, will not be supported against a prior voluntary conveyance by the same party, even though the prior voluntary conveyance did not appear to have been parted with or communicated to the volun- tary grantee (r). And Avliere the price is inadequate in a considerable degree, or where an apparent inadequacy of price is coupled ^^dth other circumstances indicating a fraudulent collusion between the purchaser and the vendor to avoid a preceding conveyance, a purchaser under such circumstances will not be entitled to the protection of the statute (s). ISTor will Equity interfere in favour of a sub- sec[uent purchaser, Avliere the voluntary grantee has con- veyed to a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration, or a person has intermarried with the voluntary grantee on the faith of the voluntary deed, before the bona fide pur- chaser from the voluntary grantor acquired his title (/). (q) Story's Eq. Jur. § 425, 426, equity against the purchase money 433 ; 2 Silence's Eq. Jur. 288, 638 ; payable to the vohmtary settlor. 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 27, § 9, 12, 21, 23, The propriety of this decision seems 26, 29, 44, 47, 49 ; Sugd. Concise questionable. View, 565—6 ; Burton, § 224—5 ; (?•) Boberts v. Williams, 4 Hare, Kelson y. Kelson, 10 Hare, 385 ; Doe 130. d. Newman v. RusTiam, 17 Ad. & E. (s) 4 Cruise T. 32, e. 27, § 42 ; 2 724; Barton v. Vanhei/thuysen, 11 Sugd. Pow. 228. Hare, 126 ; Lewis v. Rees, 3 K. & {t) For examples of the mode of J. 132, 150 — 1 ; Lloyd v. Attwood, relief in cases of fraud, see Story's 3 D. & J. 614 ; Dahinrj v. }Miimper, Eq. Jur. § 437—439 ; Id. § 434 ; 26 Beav. 568. In this case it was Sugd. Concise View, 569 ; 1 Pres. held that the volunteers had no Shep. T. 65. 848 DEEDS INVALID ON ACCOUNT OF Gifts to cha- rity. pt. iii.t.12, And Equity will not give its aid to a voluntary settlor to enable liim to complete a contract for sale against a pur- chaser; tliougii the Court will enforce it at the suit of the purchaser, even with notice at the time of his pur- chase («'). There is this exception to the general rule, in the case of a charity, that if a purchaser has notice of a gift to a charitable use, or purchases without notice from a pur- chaser with notice of such a gift, he takes subject to it ; though, if he has no notice, and he has not purchased from a purchaser with notice, he will have the same pro- tection as he would have against an ordinary voluntary conveyance (»). A fair voluntary settlement in favour of a wife and children is also an exception to the rule to this extent, that almost any bon^ fide consideration, in addition to the meritorious consideration of the provision itself, will be sufficient for the purpose of supporting the settlement. Therefore, if a person whose concurrence the parties deem es.'^ential joins in a settlement, his concurrence will be deemed a valuable consideration, although he did not substantially part with anything (jj). And as to pre- nuptial settlements, and post-nuptial settlements in pur- suance of pre-nuptial articles or on receipt of an additional portion, they are settlements for valuable consideration, and of course good against subsequent purchasers {z), or against prior voluntary grantees, as the case may be [a). In general, the marriage consideration will not extend to remainders to collateral relations, so as to support them Where per- sons claim- ing under a settlement stand in the position of purchasers. {u) Sugd. Concise View, 570 ; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 289 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 27, § 29 ; 1 Prcs. Shop. T. 05. {x) 2 Sp. 289 ; Tudor's Char. Trusts, 2nd ed. 329—332. (y) See 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 288, 290 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 27, § 23, 73 ; Sugd. Concise View, 568 — 9 ; Butter- field V. Heath, 15 Beav. 408 ; Atkin- son V. Smith, 3 D. & J. 186. (z) 2 Sugd. Pow. 229 ; Sugd. Con- cise View, 568 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 27, § 55. (a) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 27, § 43, 57. FRAUD ON TIIIED PEESONS. 849 aavaiiist creditors, or a subsequent sale to a bona fide pur- i'^-ni.T.i2, CI ' ■>- ^ Ch. 0, s. 3. chaser (h). But if tlie remainders are, or may fairly be assumed to have been, specifically contracted for and brought witiiin the consideration, they will be good against subsequent purchasers. And the same is the case where they are interposed between two limitations to the different classes of the issue of the marriage (c). And where a settlement is made by a father or other lineal ancestor, in consideration of the marriage of one of his sons or descend- ants, and it contains remainders to the other sons or descendants, such remainders will be good against creditors and subsequent purchasers (f/). A lessee, or a mortgag'ee, or any other person who for a other per- ^ sous who valuable consideration has any charge out of or upon the are pur- '^ <-> -L chasers for land, is a purchaser within the statute (c). But notwith- ™!,swira- standing the stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 13 (/), a judg- ^^^S^. ment creditor is not a purchaser within the stat. 27 Eliz., so as to be able to set aside a prior voluntary settlement {{/). A conveyance for payment of debts generally, to which no creditor is a party, and in which no particular debt is expressed, is a fraudulent conveyance within the sta- tute (h). It is seldom advisable to buy from one who has made objeotioato title from a a prior conveyance ; because, in the first place, such prior person who conveyance may in reality have been for a valuable con- p^^c^' sideration, though none appear ; and parol evidence of the valuable consideration would be admissible in order to support the deed (?") ; and, secondly, because the prior (6) Sugd. Concise View, 567 ; 2 (c) 2 Sugd. Pow. 228. Spence's Eq. Jur. 291—293 ; Smith (/) Supra, p. 423. V. Cherrill, L. E. 4 Eq. 390. C^) Beavan v. Earl of Oxford, 6 (c) Sugd. Concise Vie^y, 567 ; D. M. & G. 507. Clarice v. Wright, 5 Hurl. & Norm. (h) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 351. Sec 401 ; 6 Id. 849. also Burton, § 228. (d) See 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 27, § 67 (i) Sugd. Concise View, 570 ; 2 —71. Pres. Shep. T. 511. 850 DEEDS INVALID ON ACCOUNT OF rT.III. T.12, Ch. 6, s. 3. CopyLoIds are witluii the Stat. 27 Eliz. c. 4. VII. Deeds void under Stat. 27 Eliz. c. 4, s. 5, as subject to a power of revocation. grantee, if voluntary, may have made a conveyance for valuable consideration before the purchaser from the volun- tary grantor (/). But yet it has been held, that a pur-, chaser will be compelled to accept a title depending upon the invalidity of a voluntary deed (k). Coi)yholds are within the stat. 27 Eliz. c. 4 (/). VII. The statute 27 Eliz. c. 4, s. 5 (made perpetual by stat. 30 Eliz. c. 18, s. 3) makes void, as against subsequent purchasers for money or other good consideration, all con- veyances with any clause, provision, article, or condition of revocation, determination, or alteration at the grantor's will or pleasure, whether such clause, &c., extend to the whole interest conveyed, or only partially affect it (m). The words are these : " If any person or persons have heretofore since the beginning of the Queen's Majesty's reign that now is, made, or hereafter shall make any con- veyance, gift, grant, demise, charge, limitation of use or uses, or assurance of, in, or out of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, with any clause, provision, article, or condition of revocation, determination, or alteration, at his or their will or pleasure, of such conveyance, assurance, grants, limitations of uses or estates of, in, or out of the said lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or of, in, or out of any part or parcel of them, contained or mentioned in any writing, deed, or indenture of such assurance, convey- ance, grant, or gift ; and after such conveyance, grant, gift, demise, charge, limitation of uses, or assurance so made or had, shall or do bargain, sell, demise, grant, convey, or charge the same lands, tenements or heredita- ments, or any part or parcel thereof, to any person or persons, bodies politic and corporate, for money or other (j) Sugd. Concise View, 570 ; Burton, § 226-7. (k) Carrie v. ^^!lld, 1 My. & Cr. 1 7 ; Buttcrfidd v. Ihath, 15 Boav. 408. (A Doe d. Tunstill v. BottricJ, 5 B. & Ad. 131 ; Carrie v. Nind, 1 My. & Cr. 25. {m) Burton, § 221 FRAUD ON THIRD RERSONS. ^^1 good consideration paid or given (tlie said first conveyance, ^^-^^^I'lll' assurance, gift, grant, demise, charge or limitation, not by him or them revoked, made void or altered, according to the power and authority reserved or expressed unto him or them in and by the said secret conveyance, assurance, gift or grant) that then the said former conveyance, assur- ance, gift, demise, and grant, as touching the said lands, tenements, and hereditaments, so after bargained, sold, conveyed, demised or charged against the said bargainees, vendees, lessees, grantees, and every of them, their heirs, successors, executors, administrators and assigns, and agauist all and every person and persons which have, shall, or may lawfully claim anything, by, from, or under them or any of them, shall be deemed, taken, and adjudged to be void, frustrate, and of none effect, by virtue and force of this present Act." But by s. 6, it is provided, " that no Lawful mortgage made or to be made bona fide, and without fraud or covin, upon good consideration, shall be impeached or impaired by force of this Act, but shall stand in the like force and effect as the same should have done if this Act had never been had nor made ; anything in this Act to the contrary in any^vise notwithstanding." In consequence of this statute, where a deed contains a power of revocation at the will of the settlor, or a power tantamount to it, and the deed is not revoked, it is void agauist subsequent purchasers, even though the settlement be for a valuable consideration, unless the power of revo- cation can only be exercised with the consent of persons who are not under the control of the settlor (n). A power to mortgage to an indefinite extent (o), and to lease all or part of the lands for any number of years, with or without rent (^j), are in effect powers of revocation, and have (ft) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 27, § 30, 35, (o) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 27, § 33. 37 ; 2 Sugd. Pow. 223—4. (p) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 27, § 34. 852 DEEDS INVALID ON ACCOUNT OF Pt. III.T.12, Ch. 6, 8. 3. VIII. Mort- gage or con- vcyauce with notice of another's title. Doctrine of notice a])- plie3 lo pro- perty in a register county. tlicrefore been held to render tlie deed in which they are contained void as against a subsequent purchaser {q). But a power to charge a sum of money on an estate is not in effect a power of revocation, unless the sum bears so large a proportion to the value of the estate, that the exercise thereof would virtually amount to a revoca- tion ()•). And a settlement with a power to the settlor to revoke, that the money might be paid to trustees to be invested in the j)u.rchase of other estates, would be valid (s). VIII. AVhere a person takes a mortgage or a conveyance with full notice of the legal or equitable title of other persons to the same property, his own title wiU be post- poned and made subservient to their title, or to that of a transferee from them (t), except in cases within the stat, 27 Eliz. c. 4 {u). Thus, if a person takes a mortgage of property, knowing that it was subject to an equitable mortgage made by deposit of the title-deeds, the notice of the equitable mortgage will raise a trust in him to the amount of the equitable mortgage (a;). This is the case even where the property lies in a register county. The object of the Eegistry Acts was, to afford to persons proposing to become mortgagees or purchasers, the means of discovering any prior incum- brances, if registered, or of protecting them against any unregistered and secret prior incumbrances or conveyances. AVhere, therefore, a person proposing to become a mort- gagee or purchaser has actual notice of a prior unregistered incumbrance or conveyance, the principle of the Eegistry Acts becomes inapplicable ; because it is his own foUy if (q) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 27, § 39—41. {r) See 2 Sugd. Pow. 223. (s) Sugd. Concise View, 571. (0 Story's Eq. Jur. § 395- 6 ; Sugd. Concise View, 595, 597 ; At- terhury v. Wallis, 8 D. M. & G. 454; Pease v. Jackson, L. R. 3 Cli. Ap. 576. (v) See supra, p. 850. (:r) Story's Eq. Jur. § 395. FRAUD ON THIRD PERSONS. 853 he is a loser by advancing any money by way of purcliase ^^.-^^I'l^l' or loan ; and therefore, if a subsequent purchaser or mort- gagee has notice, at the time of his purchase or mortgage, of any prior unregistered conveyance or mortgage, he will not be permitted, in equity, to avail himself of his title against the prior conveyance or mortgage, any more than he would if the same were registered (y). Notice may be either actual, or constructive, i c, imputed by construction of law (z). Actual notice, to constitute a binding notice, at least Actual no- ' o ' tice. where it depends on oral communication only, must be given by a person interested in the property, and in the course of tlie treaty (a). As to constructive notice, whatever is sufficient to put constructive ■^ notice. any person of ordinary prudence on inquiry, is construc- tive notice of everything to which that inquiry might have led {&). And hence a purchaser is presumed to have knowledge of the instrument under which the person with whom he contracts, as executor, or trustee, or appointee, derives his power (c); And if a purchaser has notice of a deed, he has constructive notice of all its contents {d), and of the facts which would have neces- sarily become known, if its production had been insisted on (e). But if instead of referring the purchaser to a deed to ascertain its contents, the vendor himself states what the contents of the deed are, the purchaser is not bound to examine the deed itself, but may trust to such (y) Story's Eq. Jur. § 397 ; 2 Siigd. Concise View, 606 ; Coote Spence's Eq. Jur. 763 ; Coote Mortg. Mortg. 3rd ed. 372 ; Orjilvie v. Jeaf- 3rd ed. 381 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 28, freson, 2 Gif. 353, 378 ; Ze/r/A v. § 20 ; Sugd. Concise View, 578—9 ; Zloyd, 2 D. J. & S. 3 JO ; Broadhent 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 691. v. Barlow, 3 D.-F. & J, 570. (2) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 754. (c) Story's Eq. Jur. § 400. («) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 753; Sugd. [d] Sugd. Concise View, 671, 611. Concise View, 601. (c) Pcto v. Hammond, 30 Beav. (6) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 755-760 ; 495. s2 ^^"^ DEEDS INVALID ON ACCOUNT OF ^^n!"''^* s!' statement (/). It is sufficient if notice, actual or con- sti'uctive, is brought home to the agent, attorney, or counsel in the transaction, or in one immediately preced- ing it {(j) ; unless there is a moral certainty that he would not have communicated the fact to the principal or client (Ji), or he, colluding with the person who was bound to give the notice, concealed the fact (^'). The circumstance of only one solicitor acting in a transaction does not con- stitute him the solicitor of both parties, so as to affect both parties with notice of the facts {j ). Though it is only prudent to do so, yet it is not the duty of a purchaser to search for incumbrances ; for if it were, the registry would of itself be notice to all the world {k). But registration is not of itself notice {l). And hence a person having the legal estate as a mortgagee, and advancing more money without notice aliunde of a second mortgage, or of a purchase of the equity of redemption, though duly registered, shall hold against the second mort- gagee or purchaser of the equity of redemption, until all tlie money is paid {^in). And, for the same reason, a pur- chaser obtaining the legal estate will not be prejudiced by a prior equitable incumbrance, of which, though duly registered previously to his purchase, he had no notice aliunde {n). And a purchaser of an equity of redemption for valuable consideration without notice of a prior regis- tered judgment, will not be postponed to it, on a bill filed (/) Coajv. Co?'e«to?i, 31 Beav. 378. (X) Lane v. Jackson, 20 Beav. {g) Story's Eq. Jur. 408 ; 2 535, 538. Spence's Eq. Jur. 760—1 ; Sugd. (?) Sugd. Concise View, 578 ; 9 Concise View, 602—3 ; Atterhurij Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 692 ; Lane v.WalUs, 8 D. M. & G. 454 ; Spakjht v. Jackson, 20 Beav. 535. V, Cowne, 1 Hem. & M. 359. {m) Coote Mortg. 3rd ed. 378 ; {h) Thompson v. C'artwright, 33 Story'sEq. Jur. § 401— 2; 2 Spence's Beav. 178, 185. Eq. Jur. 763 ; Sugd, Concise View, (i) Sharp V. Foy, L. R. 4 Ch. Ap. 136, 578 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 28, § 16. 35. {n) Sugd. Concise View, 578 ; 9 0') Perry v. Holl, 2 D. F. & J. 38. Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 692. FEAUD ON THIRD PERSONS. 855 by the iiidmient creditor (^ A But if a man searches the pt.iu.t.i2, J >> o ^ ^ Ca. 6, 8. 3. register, he will he deemed to have notice ; though, if a search is made for a particular period, the purchaser ^Yill not by the search be deemed to have notice of any instru- ment not registered within that period (7;). And where a mortgagor has at different times employed the same solicitor in effecting different incumbrances upon the same estate, and the incumbrancers have employed the mort- gagor's solicitor in the several transactions, each of the puisne incumbrancers has been held to be affected with notice of the prior incumbrances (q). The court rolls of a manor do not give constructive notice (r). Notice before actual payment of all the money, although Time of ^ -^ Jj o notice. it be secured and the conveyance actually executed, or before tlie execution of the conveyance, notwithstanding that the money be paid, is equivalent to notice before the contract. But notice at the time of getting in a precedent incumbrance as a protection against mesne charges, is not material, provided there was no notice at the time of the purchase (s). A purchaser of a legal estate, with notice of an equit- Protection of -*- ^ , n purchaser able claim, will be protected, if he purchases from a prior ^g|jjj«'^^ bona fide purchaser without notice ; for otherwise the latter ^^^^^ ''^ ^^^ would not enjoy the full benefit of his own unexceptionable title. And if a person who has notice sells to another who has no notice and is a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration, the title will not be affected with notice in the hands of the latter ; for otherwise no man would be safe in any purchase {t). (0) Lane v. Jackson, 20 Beav. 525. (s) Sugd. Concise View, 599. 0), Sugd. Concise View, 605. (t) See Story's Eq. Jur. § 409, ((j) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 7(31. But 410; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 764; query whether this is not contrary Sugd. V. & P. 14th ed. 153 ; 2 to Perry v. Holt, cited p. 854. Lead. Cas. Eq. 2nd ed. 36, 37. {)•) Coote Mortg. 3rd ed. 382. 85G DEEDS INVALID ON ACCOUNT OF FRAUD ON TIIIUD PEESONS. rT.iii.T. 12, Ch. 6, 3. 3. IX. Secret deed calcu- lated to de- fraud pur- cliasers or incumbrau- cers. IX. If, on his marriage, a person demises, upon certain trusts for the benefit of his intended wife, lands of which he is tenant for life, and, by a distinct deed, covenants not to seU or incumber the lands comprised in the term, and it is declared, that, if he shall at any time sell or incumber them or attempt so to do, the trustees of the term shall recover the rents and profits, and api^ly them as they may think fit, for the maintenance and support of him or his wife or children or issue, the covenant and proviso are fraudulent and void as against a subsequent incumbrancer of his life estate {u). Pt.III.T.12, Ch. 6, s. 4. I. Where per>ons are not free agents ; but under duress, or in fear. or un;ler ex- treme neces- sity. II. Assign- ments by persons Section IV. Of Contracts, Agreements, or Covenants which arc against Piihlic Policy. These will not be enforced. And hence, I. Where a party is not a free agent, and is not able to protect himself, a court of equity will protect him. Hence, Equity will relieve against acts, done under duress, or under the influence of extreme terror or of threats. And it watches with great jealousy all contracts made by a person while imder imprisonment ; and if there is the slightest ground to suspect oppression or imposition, it will set the contract aside. And in like manner, circumstances of extreme necessity and distress may so entirely over- power free agency, as to justify the Court in setting aside a contract on account of some oppression or fraudulent ad- vantage attendant on it {v). II. An officer in the army or navy or other officer of the Government cannot assign his future accruing pay or other (»() Phipps V. Lord Ennismorc, i Euss. 131. (r) Story's Eq. Jur. § 239. DEEDS, ETC., AGAINST TUBLIC POLICY. 857 remuneration connected with the right to future services pt.iii.t.i2, ° _ _ Cn. (J, s. 4. from him ; because it is contrary to the honour, dignity, rrrr^ and interest of the State, that its servants should be in ^'^^'l^.f;;,'^^^,'; danger of bemg reduced to poverty, by anticipating those "ate'&rst*''^ resources which were intended to_ place them in a suitable pauy) condition of respectabihty, comfort and efficiency (;«). An assignment of the pension of an officer in the royal army is void. But an assignment of a pension granted by the hxte East India Company is valid (y). And so it has been held that a pension payable to a former officer of the East India Company out of the revenues of India since the Transfer Act (21 & 22 Vict. c. 106) may be assigned (s). And in cases wliich are not within any statutory pro- hibition, a man may assign a pension given him entirely for past services, unconnected with any right to future services ; and prize money may be assigned (a). And an "gug^* ^ ^ assignment of the income of a fellowship of a college is ''"^''s®- valid in equity (b). An agreement tliat a person appointed to a public office Agreement o 111 r betvvten ap- shall pay to the person appointing liim the surplus of his IiJppointe^e'"^ fees beyond a certain annual amount, is contrary to public as to fees!^ policy, and void ; because he is considered to require his fees to support him in performing the duties of his office. And this applies to a person appointed by a corporation, where he is not their officer, though the individual mem- bers may not appropriate any part to themselves (c). III. Equity will not uphold assignments which involve m. Assign- , . . mentsin- champerty, or maintenance, or buying of pretended titles ((t?). voiving {x) See story's Eq. Jur. § 769, (a) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 867. 1040 C--1040 f, and notes; Coote (h) Fcistcl v. King's College, 10 Mortg. 3rd ed. 101, 102 ; 2 Spence's Beav. 491. Eq. Jur. 867; 47 Geo. 3, sess. 2, (c"> Corp. of Liverpool t. Wright, c. 25, 8. 4 ; Lloyd v. Cheetham, 3 1 Johns. 359. Gif. 171. (rf) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1049 ; i?e//- (y) ITcald V. ffay, 3 Gif. 467. nell v. Sj^rye, 1 D. M. & G. 660 ; (z) Careiv v. Cooper, 4 Gif. 619. Grell v. Levy, 16 C. B. (N. S.) 73. 858 DEEDS, ETC., AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY, ■^Ch"^"T'4^' Champerty (canipi partitio) is properly a bargain between champerty, niaiiitennnco, or buyiug of pretended titles IV. AssigU" ments of mere uaked a plaintiff or defendant in a canse, and another person who has no interest in the subject in dispute, to divide the land (campum partire) or other property sued for between them, if they prevail at law, in consideration of the other person carrying on the suit at his own expense. Maintenance, of which champerty is a species, is properly an officious inter- meddling in a suit which in no way belongs to one, by main- taining or assisting either party with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it. And an agreement whereby a person engages to supply information and evidence for the recovery of property, on condition of receiving a part of it, is maintenance of the worst kind, as it leads to perjury and perversion of justice (c). Champerty and maintenance are punishable, both at the common law and by statute, as tending to keep alive strife and contention, and to pervert the remedial process of the law into an engine of oppres- sion. Exceptions are made, however, to the general rule against champerty and maintenance, in the case of father and son, or of an heir apparent, or of the husband of an heiress, or of a master and servant, and the like (/). And a deed, whereby, in consideration of a son prosecuting a commission of lunacy in the father's name against a person to whom the father is heir at law, the father covenants to convey the estates that should descend to Jiim on the lunatic's decease, to the use of himself for life, with re- mainder to the use of the son and his children, is not illegal, as savouring of champerty or maintenance, or as against public policy {g). IV. Upon the same principle of not giving any en- couragement to litigation, especially wdien undertaken as (e) Sprye v. Porter, 7 EU. & BL 58, 81 ; Hilton v. Woods, L. E. 4 Eq. 432. (/) Story's Eq. Jar. § 1041* ; 2 Silence's Eq. Jiir. 870 — 1, (^) Persse v. Pcrsse, 7 CL & F. 279. DEEDS, ETC., AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. 859 a speculation, equity will not enforce tlie assignment of a ^l,J^^-1-\^' mere naked ridit to litioate, that is, a right which, from its -—— o o ' ' o rights to very nature, is incapable of conferring any benefit except li'igate. through the medium of a suit ; such as a mere naked right to set aside a conveyance for fraud (h). But a person who is interested in a fund in Court, may mortgage it pen- dente lite, to enable him to prosecute his claim (i). And a person may take an assignment of the whole interest of another in a contract, or security, or property which is in litigation, at least if he does not undertake to pay the costs which the seller had incurred, or make any advances beyond the mere support of the interest which he has so acquu-ed. Thus, notwithstanding the stat. 32 Hen. 8, c. 9, referred to below, an equitable interest under a disputed contract for the purchase of real estate may be the subject of sale. If such an interest is sold by the purchaser under such original contract, he becomes in equity a trustee for his sub-purchaser, and must permit the sub-purchaser to use his name in legal proceedings for obtaining the benefit of the contract. And without entering into any covenants for the purpose, such sub-purchaser is obliged to indemnify the original purchaser from all the acts which he must do for the sub-purchaser's benefit. And so, a legatee may assign his legacy, and a creditor may assign his interest in a debt, although he may have commenced a suit to recover it (y). In these cases there is an actual interest in the assignor, independently of litigation ; and although it may require continued litigation to enforce it, yet the parties may possibly adjust the matter without further proceed- ed) story's Eq. Jur. § 1040 g, and 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 863, 868—871 ; note; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 868 — 9, Sugt].CoiicheYiew,2i,9; Harrington 8''2- V. Long, 2 My. & K. 590; Myers \. (i) CocMl V. Taylor, 15 Beav. United Guarantee Com., 7 D. M. & 103, 116-7. See HiU v. Boyle, G. 112 ; Tyson v. Jachon, S(\ Beav. L. E. 4 Eq. 260. 384. ij) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1050—1054; 8G0 DEEDS, ETC., AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. Pt.III.T.12, Ch. 6, s. 4. V. Aasiga- ineuts of things in action, rights of entry, possi- bilities, and executory interests. ings ; whereas, in the case first mentioned, there is no in- terest in the assignor, or none but what may result from oversetting an interest in the other party (k). But no at- torney can be permitted to purchase anything in litigation, of which he has the management (J). If, however, a person who has recovered property conveys it to his solicitor by way of security for costs incurred l)efore the date of the conveyance, that is not unlawful (m). V. Things in action, rights of entry, and contingent remainders and other executory interests in favour of persons ascertained, might always be released by deed to any one having a sufficient estate or interest by right or by wrong (n). But the stat. 32 Hen. 8, c. 9, prohibits the sale of any right or title to hereditaments, unless the seller, or his ancestor, or those by whom he claims, have been in possession of the same, or of the remainder or reversion thereof, or of the rents and profits thereof, for one year next before the sale (o) ; or unless the purchaser is in lawful possession, in which case he may buy in any pretended right, and he will not in any case be affected, unless he bought with notice (^). Indeed, it is a rule of the common law, that no possibility, right, title, or thing in action, entry, or re-entry, can be granted to third persons, except in the case of the Crown, to whom and by whom an assignment could always be made ; for it was thought that a different rule would be the means of multiplying contests and suits. So that a stranger could not take advantage of the breach of a condition for the (A:) See Prosser v. Edmonds, 1 Y. & C. Eq. Exch. 48L (?) Simpson v. Lamh, 7 El. & Bl. 84, 93. (m) Anderson v. Radcllffe, 1 El. Bl. & El. 806, 819. {u) 2 Bl. Com. 290 ; 2 Pres. Shep. T. 231, 238, 322 ; 4 Jarm. & Bjth. by Sweet, 122, 123 ; Walk. Conv. 3rcl ed. by Brest. 114; supra, p. 718. (o) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1048, and note, and 1048 a ; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 869. (j^) Sugd. Concise View, 258. DEEDS, ETC., AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. 861 avoidance of an estate of freeliold, as tliat is only voidable p? i' J-I'- p. ' "^ Ch. 6, s. 4. by entry ; or even of an estate for years, where it was only voidable by entry. But a stranger might take advantage of a condition, the breach of which rendered an estate for years ipso facto void witliout entry ; for a stranger might take the benefit of a void thing, but not of a voidable estate, by entry (q). Nor could contingent remainders or other executory interests in real or personal estate be granted over. And, at law, this still continues to be the rule, except in the case of negotiable instruments, and some few other securities ; and except in the case of an assignment of a debt, where the debtor assents to the transfer, so as to enable the assignee to maintain a direct action against him on the implied promise which results from such assent (r) ; and except in cases within the stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 6. By the stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, s. 5, it was enacted as stat. 7 & 8 . Vict c. 76, follows : — " That any person may convey, assign, or charge s. 5. by any deed any such contingent or executory interest, right of entry for condition broken, or other future estate or interest as he shall be entitled to, or presumptively entitled to, in any freehold or copyhold or leasehold land, or personal property, or any part of such interest, right, or estate respectively ; and every person to whom any such interest, right, or estate shall be conveyed or assigned, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, according to the nature of the interest, right, or estate, shall be entitled to stand in the place of the person by whom the same shall be conveyed or assigned, his heirs, executors, adminis- trators, or assigns, and to have the same interest, right, or (q) Co. Litt. 214 a, b ; 215 a ; 32, c. 7,§ 21 ; 4 Jarm. and Byth. by 218 a. Sweet, 122 ; Fearne, 366 ; Burton, (?•) Story's Eq. Jur. 1039; 2 § 857, 946— 7 ; Watk. Conv. 3rd ed. Spence's Eq. Jur. 850,851,855; 2 by Prest. 97. 114, 116; Co. Litt. BL Com. 290, 442 ; 2 Pres. Sbep. T. 214 a, b ; 215 a ; 232 b ; 266 a. 231, 238—240, 322 ; 4 Cruise T. 862 DEEDS, ETC., AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. pr.iii.T.is, estate, or sucli part tliereof, as shall be convoyed or assigned to him, and tlie same actions, suits, and remedies for the same, as the person originally entitled thereto, his heirs^ executors, or administrators would have been entitled to if no conveyance, assignment, or other disposition thereof had been made ; provided that no person shall be empowered by this Act to dispose of any expectancy which he may have as heir, or heir of the body inheritable, or as next of kin, under the statutes for the distribvition of the estates of intestates, of a living person, nor any estate, right, or interest to which he may become entitled under any deed thereafter to be executed, or under the will of any living person, and no deed shall by force of this Act bar or enlarge any estate tail : provided also, that no chose in action shall by this Act be made assignable at law." Stat. 8&9 This was repealed by the stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106 : but Vict. c. 106, ^ •' «-6- by s. 6 of that Act it was enacted, that "after the 1st day of October, 1845, a contingent, an executory, and a future interest, and a possibility coupled with an interest, in any tenements or hereditaments of any tenure, w^hether the object of the gift or limitation of such interest or possi- bility be or be not ascertained, also a right of entry, whether immediate or future, and whether vested or con- tingent, into or upon any tenements or hereditaments in England, of any tenure, may be disposed of by deed ; but that no such disposition shall, by force only of this Act, defeat or enlarge an estate tail; and that every such disposition by a married woman shall be made conform- ably to the provisions relative to dispositions by mamed women," contained in the English (s) and Irish Acts for the abohtion of fines and recoveries, and for the substitu- tion of more simple modes of assurance. (s) Stat. 3 & -i Will. 4, c. 76, see isupra, p. 780— 7. DEEDS, ETC., AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. 803 It has been held that this section does not relate to a ^J!,- ^^I-"^'- ^2, Ch. 6, s. 4. right of entry for a condition broken (t). Even in cases not within the stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, Executory interests s. 5, and 8 & 9 Vict, c. 106, s. 6, contingent remainders estZpe'i!!' and other execntory interests in real or personal estate might be bound by estoppel, on a fine or recovery, or, it seems, even on an indenture f?0. They are also assign- Executory ^ ^ "^ . ^ interests, able in equity for valuable consideration. And it would possibilities, ^ -J or expsct- seem that they are assignable in equity even for good chosesin'"^ consideration, except as against bona fide purchasers. A gfgn°abi?i,i voluntary assignment of a mere expectancy is invalid both ^'^"' ^' at law and in equity. But courts of equity give effect to assignments, for valuable consideration, of possibilities and even of mere expectancies of heirs at law, and choses in action. Such assignments of a chose in action are considered in equity as amounting to an agreement to permit the assignee to make use of the name of the assignor at law, in order to recover the debt, or to reduce the property into possession ; or as a contract entitling the assignee to sue in equity in his own name, and enforce payment of the debt directly against the debtor, wdiethev he has assented or not, making him, as well as the assignor, if necessary, a party to the suit (.«). And such assignments of possibilities and expectancies are regarded in equity as amounting to a contract to assign when the interest becomes vested ; and when the interest does so become (t) Shelf. Eeal Prop. Acts, 6th Eq. Jur. 852, 865, 866, 896 ; 2 Pres. ed. 597. Shep. T. 231, 2-38, 240, 322 ; 2 (u) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 238, 322 ; 4 Bl. Com. 442 ; Coote Mortg. 3rd Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 122—128 ; ed. 235 ; 4 Jarm. & Byth. by Watk. Conv. 3rd ed. by Prest. Sweet. 122 ; Co. Litt. 232 b, n. (1) ; 97, 116 ; Smith's Executory Inter- Watk. Conv. 3rd ed. by Prest. 87, ests annexed to Fearne, § 754 — 116 ; Smith's Executory Tnter- 756. ests annexed to Fearne, § 749, (x) See Story's Eq. Jur. § 1040, 750. 1040 c, 1044, 1055, 1057 ; 2 Spence's 864 DEEDS, ETC., AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. PT.in.T.i2, vested, the claim of the assignee is enforced, not indeed as Cn. 6, s. 4. ' ° a trust, but as a riglit under a contract (ij). ment^oT'^"' ^^- ^^^ ^^^^^> ^^^ assignment of goods which do not belong bei'ongi°g\o to the assignor at the time does not pass the property in artbe ume.'^ them. And accordingly at la^Y, a bill of sale of the effects in a given place will only pass such things as are in that place at the time of the grant, though effects to be subse- quently brought on the premises are expressly included. But if a person sells or mortgages after-acquired chattels, the contract may operate as an actual assignment in equity, having the effect of transferring the property immediately it is acquired by the vendor or mortgagor, if it purports to confer an interest immediately by its own force, as dis- tinguished from a mere power of entry. And the instru- ment may be so framed as to give the m(.>rtgagee, even at law, a power of seizing such future chatties of the grantor as they should be acquired and brought upon the pre- mises (z). And the future fruits or proceeds of property which the grantor has at the time of the assignment will pass. Thus, the next year's wool of sheep belonging to the grantor is capable of being assigned («). And so a tenant's interest in crops grown in future years will pass by an assignment to the landlord of all the tenant's " tenant- right and interest yet to come and unexpired in and to the farm " (h). An assignment of freight not actually earned, but to be earned, is good in equity (c). And the right to freight is incidental to the ownership of the vessel which {y) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1040 b. (a) Coote Mortg. Srd ed. 235. (z) Lunn v. Thornton, 1 M. G-r. & {h) Fetch v. Tutin, 15 M. & W. Sc. 379 ; Gale v. Burncll, 7 Ad. & 110. E. (N.S.) 850 ; Coote Mortg. 3rd ed. (p) Douglas v. Russell, 4 Sim. 235 ; Bope v. Ilailey, 5 EH. & Bl. 524 ; affinned 1 My. & K. 488 ; 830 ; Holroyd v. Marshall, 2 Gif. Lindsay v. Gihhs, 22 Bcav. 522 ; 382 ; 2 D. r. & J. 596 ; 10 H. Brown v. Tanner, L. E. 2 Eq. Cas. L. Cas. 191 ; Beldinr) v. Read, 3 806 ; 3 Ch. Ap. 597. HurL & Colt. 955. DEEDS, ETC., AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. 865 earns it ; and therefore a mortgaoe of a ship carries with ^^Jfl- 1^' it the freight, and a transfer of a share in a ship passes the corresponding share in the fi-eight, under an existing charter party, without the mention of the word "freight" (^). An assignment for vakiable consideration of a cargo to be obtained is valid in equity (c). And a debtor may assign future accruing payments to be made to him under an en- gagement with a third person (/). And if a policy of assurance is assigned, with the sum assured, future bonuses will pass with it (g). VII. Marriage brokage contracts, which are agreements vri. Mar- V '-' riage brokage whereby a party engages to give another a remuneration if contracts. he will negotiate a marriage for him, are void, as tending to introduce matches wdiich are iU-advised and not based on mutual affection, and therefore against public policy. And they are so utterly void, that they are deemed in- capable of confirmation ; and money paid under them may be recovered back again in a court of equity, whether the marriage is an equal or an unequal one (7i). VIII. The same rules are applied to bonds and other viii. A-r^e- meiits til iii- aiiTeements entered into as a reward for using influence fluencetc.- C' " tators. over another, to induce him to make a will for the benefit of the obligor (^) ; for such contracts encourage a spirit of artifice and scheming, most prejudicial to the moral tone of those in whom it exists ; and they tend to deceive and injure others. IX. On a similar ground, secret contracts made with ix. con- tracts to parents, or guardians, or other persons standing in a pecu- facilitate liar relation to another, whereby on a treaty of marriage, they are to receive a remuneration for promoting the marriage or giving their consent to it, are held void (j). (d) Lindsay v. Gibhs, 22 Beav. 522 ; {[/) Coote Mortg. 3rd ed. 235. Eusden v. Pope, L. R. 3 Ex. 269. (h) Story's Eq. Jur. § 260—263. (c) Lcmgton v. Horton, 1 Hare, 549. ( i ) Story's Eq. Jur. § 265. (/) Coote Mortg. 3rd ed. 236. {j) Story's Eq. Jur. §266, 267. 8G6 DEEDS, ETC., AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. Pt. III.T.12, On. 6, 8. 4. X. Contvacts in restraint of marriage. XI. Con- tracts in restraint of trade. X. On the otlier hand, a contract is void, if it is ex- pressly in restraint of marriage generally, or if it is so restricted that it is probable that it may virtually operate in restraint of marriage generally (Jc) ; as, that a woman shall not a marry a man who has not an estate of 500^. a year (/), or shall not marry till fifty years of age, or shall not marry any person residing in the same town, or any person wlio is a clergyman, a physician, or a lawyer, or any person except of a particular trade or occupa- tion (m). XI. So, contracts in general restraint of trade are void, as tending to discourage industry, enterprise, and just competition. But a person may be restrained from carry- ing on trade in or within a certain distance from a par- ticular place, or witli particular persons, or for a reason- able limited time (n). Some contracts for the partial restraint of trade are upheld, because they are advantageous not only to the in- dividual in favour of whom the restraint is inserted, but to the public also, who, instead of being thereby injured, derive advantage in the unrestrained choice of able assist- ants which such a stipulation gives to the employer, and in the security it affords that the master will not withhold from his assistants instruction in the secrets of his trade and the communication of his own skill and experience, from any fear of afterwards having a rival in the same business. And hence a stipulation on the part of an assistant to a London dentist not to practise in London, will be enforced. But whatever restraint is larger than the necessary protection of the person with whom the contract is made, is unreasonable and void, as behig in- jurious to the interest of the public, on the ground of {k) See Story's Eq. Jur. § 274, 276—283. ( I ) Story's Eq. Jur. § 280. (m) Story's Eq. Jur. § 283. («) Story's Eq. Jur. § 292 ; Ben- well V. Inns, 24 Beav. 307. DEEDS, ETC., AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. 867 public policy. And therefore a contract by an assistant ^J^'^g^-J;^"' to a London dentist not to practise in any of tlie places in England or Scotland where the employer might have been practising before the expiration of the service, is void (o). But a covenant, on the sale of the business of a horse-hair manufacturer at a given place, not to carry on the same business within 200 miles of that place, is good (p). XII. Agreements for the suppression of criminal prose- -^j^^jf^' '^j cutions are void (q), as tending to weaken the beneficial p^™eedings. preventive influence of the law, by duninishing the cer- tainty of punishment. And an agreement by a petitioner in a suit for divorce, to withdraw from the suit, in con- sideration of money to be paid to the petitioner, is void as a fraud on the Divorce Act, which enables the Court to apply damages for the benefit of the wife or of the children (?■). XIII. Simoniacal contracts are void, as contrary to xiii. simo- iiiacal cou- public policy. Simony is the corrupt presentation of t^i'^cts. any one to an ecclesiastical benefice, for money, gift, or reward (s). By the statute 31 Eliz. c, 6, s. 5, it is enacted, " that if any person or persons, bodies politic and cor- porate, shall or do at any time after the end of forty days next after the end of this session of Parliament, for any sum of money, reward, gift, profit or benefit, directly or in- directly, or for or by reason of any promise, agreement, grant, bond, covenant, or other assurances, of or for any sum of money, reward, gift, profit or benefit whoisoever, directly or indirectly, present or collate any person to any benefice with cure of souls, dignity, prebend or living- ecclesiastical, or give or bestow the same, for or in respect (o) Mallan v. May, 11 M. & W. ' (q) Story's Eq. Jur. § 294. 653. See supra, p. 654. (?•) Gipps v. Hume, 2 Johns. & {p) Harms v. Parsons, 32 Beav. Hem. 517. 328. (s) 2 Bl. Com. 278. 8G8 DEEDS, ETC., AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. pt.iii.t.12, of any such corrupt cause or consideration ; that then Ch. 6, S. 4. "^ ^ ' _ every such presentation, collation, gift and bestowing, and every admission, institution, investiture and induction thereupon, shall be utterly void, frustrate, and of none effect in law ; and that it shall and may be lawful to and for the Queen's Majesty, her heirs and successors, to present, collate unto, or give or bestow every such bene- fice, dignity, prebend and living ecclesiastical for that one time or turn only ; and that all and every person or per- sons, bodies politic and corporate, that from thenceforth shall give or take any such sum of money, reward, gift, or benefit, directly or indirectly, or that shall take or make any such promise, grant, bond, covenant or other assur- ance, shall forfeit and lose the double value of one year's profit of every such benefice, dignity, prebend and living ecclesiastical ; and the person so corruptly taking, pro- curing, seeking, or accepting any such benefice, dignity, prebend or living, shall thereupon and from thenceforth be adjudged a disabled person in law to have or enjoy the same benefice, dignity, prebend or living ecclesiastical." And by the stat. 12 Anne, st. 2, c. 12, s. 2, it is enacted, that " if any person shall or do, for any sum of money, rew^ard, gift, profit, or advantage, directly or indirectly, or for or by reason of any promise, agreement, grant, bond, covenant, or other assurance, of or for any sum of money, reward, gift, profit, or benefit whatsoever, directly or in- directly, in his own name, or in the name of any other person or persons, take, procure, or accept the next avoid- ance of or presentation to any benefice with cure of souls, dignity, prebend or living ecclesiastical, and shall be pre- sented or collated thereupon, that then every such pre- sentation or collation, and every admission, mstitution, investiture, and induction upon the same shall be utterly void, frustrate, and of no effect in law, and such agreement shall be deemed and taken to be a simoniacal contract ; DEEDS, ETC., AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. 860 aiul tliat it shall and may be lawful to and for the Queen's ^^jj"^-^]^^' ]\Iajesty, her heirs and successors, to present or collate unto, or give or bestow every such benefice, dignity, prebend, and living ecclesiastical, for that one time or turn only ; and the person so corruptly taking, pro- curing, or accepting any such benefice, dignity, prebend, or living, shall thereupon, and from thenceforth, be adjudged a disabled person in law to have and enjoy the same" (t). Although he who is presented be not aware of the simony, yet the presentation, admission, and induction are void. But if the presentee be not cognisant of the corrup- tion, then he shall not be within the clause of disability in the statute («). As to what constitutes simony, the following rules may be laid : 1. A purchase of a next presentation made after the church has actually fallen vacant, is void ; and a pur- chase of an advowson at such a time is void, quoad the fallen vacancy, but not otherwise (x). 2. For a clerk to bargain for the next presentation, the incumbent being sick and about to die, w^as simony, even before the statute of Queen Anne : and now, by that statute, to purchase either in his own name or in another's the next presentation, and be thereupon presented at any future time to the living, is simony (j/). But, 3, where a person purchases the next presentation to a benefice, the church being then full, and the incumbent not ill, even though the purchaser intends to present a particular person other than himself, and he afterwards does present that person, such a purchase is not deemed simony (z). 4. A purchase of the next presenta- ( O See 2 BL Com. 279. Shep. T. 240. (m) 3 Cruise T. 21, c. 2, § 59 ; 2 (y) 2 Bl. Com. 479. Bl. Com. 280. (2) .3 Cruise T. 21, c. 2, § 67 ; 3 {t} 3 Cruise T. 21, c. 2, § 64 ; 3 Steph. Com. 72. Steph. Com. 70, 71, 72 ; 2 Pres. T 2 870 DEEDS, ETC., AGAINST rUlUJC POLICY. pt. iit.t.12, tion to a cluircli, even when tlie incumbent is in a dyinj? Ch. 6, s. 4. ^ o state, is not simony, if without the privity and without any view to the nomination of the particular person presented (a). And a purchase made of an advowson in fee simple under similar circumstances, is not si- mony (&). Engage- The stat. 9 Geo. 4, c. 94, s. 1, declares valid every en- meuts to J } ) J flcgSQbene- gagemcut by promise, grant, agreement, or covenant for the resignation of benefices which are private property, after the 28th of July, 1 828, to the expressed intent of ap- pointing any one person therein named, or one of two persons therein named, each of whom is related by blood or marriage, as uncle, son, grandson, brother, nephew, or grand nephew of the person, or the wife of the person, in whom the patronage is beneficially vested. But such engagement must be entered into before the appointment of the person entering into it, and one part of the instrument must be deposited within two months with the registrar of the diocese or peculiar jurisdiction. XIV. Agree- XIV. There is nothinfj contrary to the policy of the law mcnt to o ^ X ./ perty^if"^"' ^^ tending to murder, or to undue influence over a testator, devised. ^^, contrary to the stat. 32 Hen. 8, c. 9, relating to pre- tended titles, in an agreement by a person who expects to become devisee of land, that, if he should be such, he will convey it to another person for a certain sum ; but if he should not become devisee, he will return the money (c). XV. UKuri- XV. In consequence of the stat. 12 Anne, st. 2, c. 16, oils con- tracts, a contract for the payment of more than 51. per cent, in- terest was usurious, except in certain cases (d). Bat by (a) 3 Steph. Com. 72 ; Siigd. Con- Com. 71. cise View, 259. (p) Cook v. Fcild, 15 Ad. & E. (6)3 Cruise T. 21, c. 2, §68; 4G0. Sugd. Concise View, 259 ; 3 Steph. (d ) See 2 Steph. Com. 86—94 ; DEEDS, ETC., AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. 871 the Stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 90, the statutes relating to usury, ?■■• m.T.is, except those relating to pawnbrokers, are repealed, as ■■ — regards transactions subsequent to the 10th of August, 1854, the time of the passing of the Act. A transaction is sometimes void as indirectly opera- ting in violation of the law against usury (c). Thus, a purchase of a rent-charge or an annuity for a deter- minate number of years was set aside as usurious in equity, if the total amount of the annual payments was more than sufhcient to pay the principal sum and legal interest (/). So, a lease to be granted in consideration of a loan of money, could not be supported. But where the creditor was to be re-paid his principal and legal interest by way of a rent to be received or retained by him, tlie aoTcement was in the nature of a mortoaoe security, and was supported in equity. Where an in- strument which was in appearance a lease, was in fact a contrivance to secure to the vendor the purchase money by instalments carrying illegal interest, it was usurious and void. And where a builder assigned his lease or contract for lease in consideration of a sum of money advanced to him, and, as part of the same transaction, took or agreed to take an underlease at a rent greatly exceeding the rate of interest on the sums advanced, after deducting the ground rent (so that the total amount of the payments during the lease would exceed the principal monies and interest), and with the same covenants and obligations in the underlease as were contained in the original lease, the courts both of equity and common law have treated such contracts as usurious, notwithstanding the liability of the lender to Stamp's Index to the Statute Law, (e) Earl of Mansfield v. Oijlc, 7 tit. "Usury;" Bond v. Bell, 4 D. M. & G. 181. Drew. 157, (/) Coote Mortg. 3rd ed. 423. 872 "" DEEI)S, ETC., AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. ■^ch^"'!"]^' ^^^^ superior landlord, and risk of forfeiture, and although he might have no power of calling in his money, whilst the other might have an unlimited power of re- purchasing (//). ^^1; ^^ ^- XVI. Where contracts are intended to carry into effect ®nTm"!'rai ^^ immoral purpose (as in the case of a house let for a purpose. l)rothel), even though that purpose do not appear on th(^ face of the instrument, the Courts will not enforce any of the stipulations therein comprised (h). Section V. Of Deeds void fur Uncei^tainty. pt.iii.t.12, An agreement will not he enforced, if the terms of it Cb. 6, 3. 5. ° . , are uncertain (^'). A deed is void for uncertainty, if it is totally uncertain on the face of it who is or are the intended grantee or grantees. Thus, if a grant is made to one of the children of J. S., who has more than one child, and the grantor does not describe which he intends, this grant is void for uncertainty, and cannot be rendered good by any evi- dence ; for the ambiguity is patent, and parol evidence is inadmissible {j). An instrument which is left blank in any material part, is incapable of operation until such blank is filled up, although executed by the parties, and does not become effectual by the subsequent filling up of the blank by a ig) Coote Mortg. 3rd eel. 424. (i) Taylor v. Portincjton, 7 D. M. {h) Smith V. White, L. R. 1 Eq. & G. 328. 626. {j) 2 Pres. Shop. T. 251. DEEDS VOID FOR UNCERTAINTY. 873 stranger, in the absence of the parties unless he is autho- pt. iii.t.12, Cn. 6, s. 5. rised to do so by deed (A;). Section VI. Of the Avoidance of a Deed hy Disagreement (I). No person can be made to take an estate without his pt.iii.t.i2, ^ Ch. 6, s. 6. consent, express or implied ; and therefore the purchases of idiots, lunatics, infants, and femes covert, if disadvanta- geous, may be set aside (7/1). And it is common for trustees, when nominated without their consent, to renounce the estate conveyed to them, which is done by deed of dis- claimer {n). The law presumes that every conveyance is for the benefit of the grantee : and therefore, till the contrary is shown, supposes an agreement to the conveyance. But from the moment there is evidence of disagreement, the conveyance, in construction of law, is void ab initio, as if none had been made ; and in intendment of law, the free- hold never passed from the grantor (0). If, however, a feoffment is made to two as joint tenants, and one only disagrees, the entirety vests in the other. But if a feoffment is made to two tenants in common, and one disagrees, this only avoids the grant as to his share (7^). Wlien the party, being free from insanity, coverture, or (i) 3 Jarm. & Byth, by Sweet, (0) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 285 ; Watk. 19. Conv. 3rd ed. by Prest. 23. {I) See supra, p. 739. {p) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 285 ; see Cm) Burton, §212. supra, p. 739. {n) Burton, §213. 874 AVOIDANCE OF A DEED BY DISAGREEMENT. ^ch^6^"s.'6?' i^fe-ncy, has once by his agreement made the deed good, he cannot afterwards by his disagreement make it void. And when once by refusal and disagreement he has made the deed void, he cannot by agreement or acceptance after- wards make it good (q). '(q) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 70. 'Vt» CHAPTEE VII. OF DIVERS MATTERS "PERTAINING TO DEEDS IN GENERAL. Section I. Of Stamjnng Deeds (a). It is generally necessary that a deed should be stamped, ^ch^t^Ji^' as required by the Stamp Acts, in order to render it available in Court : but the want of a proper stamp does not prevent its legal effect and operation in other re- spects (6). The deed ought regularly to be, and usually is, properly stamped before execution. But by stat. 37 Geo. 3, c. 136, s. 2, and 13 & 14 Vict. c. 97, s. 12, the stamp may be af&xed afterwards, on payment, in addition to the duty, of a certain penalty. And by stat. 44 Geo. 3, c. 98, s. 24 (c), and 13 & 14 Vict. c. 97, s. 12, this penalty, which by the latter Act is fixed at 10/., may be remitted, if the application be made within twelve mouths after the execution, and the commissioners be satisfied that no fraud upon the revenue was intended. The principal ' statutes by which the existing duties for Great Britain have been imposed are the 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, and the Stamp Duties Act of 1850, 13 & 14 Vict. c. 97, and the stat. 23 & 24 Vict. cc. 15 and 111. (a) As to the amount of the stamp Laws ; and see Vacher'a ' Pocket required, and the exemptions, see Digest of the Stamp Duties. Mr. George Sweet's Supplement to (b) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 2, § 57 ; Jann. & Byth. Conveyancing, which Burton, § 451. contains a summary of tlie Stamp (c) Burton, § 451. 870 OF THE EXECUTION OF DEEDS. Section II. Of tlie Execution of Deeds. ^c'n.^T'J. 2^' I- So far as regards any person requiring a deed to be I. Beadiug. read, it is necessary to its validity, either that he be per- mitted to read it himself, or, if he cannot read, that it be read to him. If it be read to him falsely, it will be void, at least for so much as was misread ; unless it be agreed by collusion that the deed should be read falsely, on purpose to make it void ; in which case it will bind the fraudulent party (cZ). II. siguing. II. Signing is often necessary to flie valid execution of powers. And in cases within the Statute of Frauds, the better opinion would seem to be, that it is rendered neces- sary by that statute (e). In practice it is an invariable part of the execution of all deeds, as the present practice of sealing cannot serve any purpose of identification or verification, but has degenerated into a mere useless form. But where a person is incapacitated from signing, by infirmity or want of instruction, he may either make a mark by way of signature' to a deed, or it may be signed for him by a stranger at his request and in his presence (/). III. seuiiDg. III. A seal is essential to a deed, since no writing with- out a seal can be a deed. But if the deed is sealed with any setil whatever, or even if an impression is made with a stick or anything else, it is sufficient {g). It is sufficient that there is a seal to the deed at the time of its actual or [d) 2 Bl. Com. 304 ; 4 Cruise T. 1 Sugd. Pow. 286, contra. 32, c. 2, § 61 ; 3 Jarm. & Byth. by (/) 3 Jarra. & Byth. by Sweet, Sweet, 24 ; 1 Pres. Sliep. T. 56. 24, 25, (e) 2 Bl. Com. 305, 306 ; 4 Cruise [g) 2 Bl. Com. 305 ; 4 Cruise T. T. 32, c. 2, § m, 69 ; Mr. Hilliard's 32, c. 2, § 63 ; 1 Pres. Shep. T. 54, note to 1 Pres. Shep. T. 56. But 56, 57. see Mr. Preston's remarks. lb., and OF THE EXECUTION OF DEEDS. ^77 constructive delivery ; and that the party, in terms or by ^l-J^fl-\^' conduct, adopts the sealing. And if another person seals the deed, yet if the party delivers it himself, he thereby adopts the sealing (/?). The common practice is for the copying clerk to af&x ^^^^^^ any kind of seal when he has finished copying it, and for tlie party to adopt the sealing at the time of execution, by placing his finger on the seal, and saying, " I deliver this as my act and deed." If there are several grantors, obligors, &c., named in a sealing by one of tbe deed, and one of them only seals the deed, this is a cjood sj-antors, ./ ' o obligors, &c., deed as against him, and void as to all the rest (i). ""'y- A person may appoint another to be his attorney to seal sealing and i- > ' a tratiou of draining of Bedford Level, it is enacted, that all convey- ^l^^^^^ ^^ ances by indenture of the 95,000 acres contained within wuhfnuie the said Level, or any part thereof, entered with the Levti^ Eegistrar of the corporation, in a book to be kept for that j)urpose, shall be of equal force to convey the freehold and inheritance thereof, as if the same conveyances by inden- ture were for valuable considerations of money enrolled within six months in one of the King's Courts of Eecord at Westminster ; and no lease, grant, or conveyance of or charge u})on the same, except leases for seven years or under in possession, shaU be of force but from the time it shall be entered with the Eegistrar {l). III. By the stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36, s. 1, "every bill ^li^J^lf- of sale of personal chattels {m) made after the passing of ^^'^^ "^ ^''^' this Act, either absolutely or conditionally, or suljject or not subject to any trusts, and whereby the grantee or holder shall have power, either with or without notice, and either immediately after the making of such bUl of sale or at any future time, to seize or take possession of any pro- ( i ) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 28, § 6. ( Z ) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 28, § 33. (j) See 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 28, § 2, {m) See interpretation clause, 10 ; Sugd. Concise View, 577. infra, p. 883 ; and see Johnson v. {k) See supra, p. 852. Osenton, L. E. 4 Ex. 102. 882 OF THE KEGISTRATION OF DEEDS. pt. 1II.T.12, perty and effects comprised in or made subject to such Ijill of sale, and every schedule or inventoiy which shall bo thereto annexed or therein referred to, or a true copy thereof, and of every attestation of the execution thereof, shall, together with an affidavit of the time of such bill of sale being made or given, and a descrij)tion of the resi- dence and occupation of the person making or giving the same, or, in case the same shall be made or given by any person under or in the execution of any process, then a description of the residence and occupation of the person against Avhom such process shall have issued, and of every attesting witness to such bill of sale, be filed with the officer acting as clerk of the docquets and judgments in the Court of Queen's Bench, within twenty-one days after the making or giving of such bill of sale (in like manner as a warrant of attorney in any personal action given by a trader is now by law required to be filed), otherwise such bill of sale shall, as against all assignees of the estate and effects of the person whose goods or any of them are com- prised in such bill of sale under the laws relating to bank- ruptcy or insolvency, or under any assignment for the benefit of the creditors of such person, and as against all sheriffs' officers and other persons seizing any property or effects comprised in such bill of sale in the execution of any process of any court of law or equity authorising the seizure of the goods of the person by whom or of whose goods such bill of sale shall have been made, and against every person on whose behalf such process shall have been issued, be null and void to all intents and purposes what- soever, so far as regards the property in or right to the possession of any jDersonal chattels comprised in such bill of sale, which at or after the time of such bankruptcy, or of filing the insolvent's petition in such insolvency, or of the execution by the debtor of such assignment for the benefit of his creditors, or of executing such process (as the OF THE REGISTRATION OF DEEDS. 88:^) case may be), and after the expiration of the said period of ^^j,"J-^-^^> twenty-one days, shall be in the possession or apparent possession of the person making snch bill of sale, or of any person against whom the process shall have issued under or in the execution of which such bill of sale shall have been made or given, as the case may be." By s. 2, " if such bill of sale shall be made or given ^Scef^'am- subject to any defeasance or condition or declaration of deciaratkins trust not contained in the body thereof, such defeasance or %iih mus condition or declaration of trust shall, for the purposes of subject this Act, be taken as part of such bill of sale, and shall be written on the same paper or parchment on which such bill of sale shall be written, before the time when the same or a copy thereof respectively shall be filed, otherwise such bill of sale shall be null and void to all intents and pur- poses, as against the same persons and as regaids the same property and effects, as if such bill of sale or a copy thereof had not been filed according to the provisions of this Act." By s. 6, " it shall be lawful for any Judge of the said Jiemo.-r,n- J ' JO dum of sa- Court of Queen's Bench to order a memorandum of satis- *'«*="="""• faction to be written upon any bill of sale or copy thereof respectively as aforesaid, if it shall appear to him that the debt (if any) for which such bill of sale is given as security shall have been satisfied or discharged." By s. 7, " in construing this Act the following words and interpreta- •^ " " tion clause. expressions shall have the meanings hereby assigned to them, unless there be something in the subject or context repugnant to such constructions : (that is to say), The ex- pression ' bill of sale,' shall include bills of sales, assign- " Bm of sale." ments, transfers, declarations of trust without transfer, and other assurances of personal chattels, and also powers of attorney, authorities, or licences to take possession of per- sonal chattels, as security for any debt, but shall not in- clude the following documents ; that is to say, assignments 884 OF THE REGISTRATION OF DEEDS. Pr Ch " Personal chattels." W'si/' ^°^" ^^^® benefit of the creditors of the person making or giving the same ; marriage settlements ; transfers or as- signments of any ship or vessel or any share thereof ; transfers of goods in the ordinary course of business of any trade or calling ; bills of sale of goods in foreign parts or at sea ; bills of lading ; India warrants ; warehouse keeper's certificates ; warrants or orders for the deliveiy of goods, or any other documents used in the ordinary course of business as proof of the possession or control of goods, or authorising or purporting to authorise, either by endorse- ment or by delivery, the possessor of such document to transfer or receive goods thereby represented : The expres- sion ' personal chattels ' shall mean goods, furniture, fix- tures, and other articles capable of complete transfer by delivery, and shall not include chattel interests in real estate, nor shares or interests in the stock, funds, or secu- rities of any government, or in the capital or property of any incorporated or joint stock company, nor choses in action, nor any stock or produce upon any farm or lands which, by virtue of any covenant or agreement or of the custom of the country, ought not to be removed from any farm where the same shall be at the time of the making or ffivinff of such bill of sale : Personal chattels shall be deemed to be ui the ' apparent possession ' of the person making or giving the bill of sale, so long as they shall remain or be in or upon any house, mill, warehouse, building, works, yard, land, or other premises occupied by him, or as they shall be used and enjoyed by him in any place whatsoever, notwithstanding that formal posses- sion thereof may have been taken by or given to any other person." By s. 8, " this Act is not to extend to Scotland or Ire- land." By the stat. 29 & 30 Vict. c. 96, it is enacted as follows : — " The Principal Act (17 & 18 V. c. 36) and this Act shall, " Apparent possession." Construction of Act. OF THE REGISTRATION OF DEEDS. 850 as far as. is consistent with the tenor of such Acts, he pt. 111.T.12, ' Ch. 7, s. 3. construed together " (s. 1). " The Principal Act may he cited as ' The Bills of Sale ^boit titles. Act, 1854,' and this Act may he cited as ' The Bills of Sale Act, 1866' " (s. 2). "The filincj of a hill of sale, or a copy thereof, with Definitiouof o ' I- -J ' registratiou the affidavit required hy the Principal Act, is herein- gaie.^'^*^"^ after referred to as the registration of a hill of sale " (S.3). " The registration of a hill of sale under the Principal Renewal of ^ ^ registration Act shall, during the suhsistence of such security, he re- g^g'^^®"^ newed in manner hereinafter mentioned once in every period of five years, commencing from the day of the registration, and, if not so renewed, such registration shall cease to he of any effect at the expiration of any period of five years during which a renewal has not heen made as herehy required, subject to this provision, that where a period of five years from the original registration of any l)ill of sale under the Principal Act has expired hefore the 1st day of January, 1867, such bill of sale shall he as valid to all intents and purposes as it would have heen if this Act had not heen passed, if such registration he renewed in manner aforesaid hefore the 1st day of January, 1867 " (s. 4). " The registration of a hill of sale shall he renewed by Mode of re- nevviug bill some person filing in the office of the Masters of the Court of^saie^ ^ ^ of Queen's Bench (being the officers acting as clerk of the ^'^x^'i^' docquets and judgments in the said court) an affidavit stat- ing the date of such bill of sale, and the names, residences, and occupations of the respective parties thereto as stated therein, and also the date of the registration of such bill of sale, and that such bill of sale is still a subsisting security, and such Masters shall thereupon number such affidavit and re-number the original bill of sale or copy filed in the said office with a similar number " (s. 5.) u2 886 REGISTKATION AND ENKOLMENT OF DEEDS. pt. iii.t.12, Where a conveyance is made of real estate, and that conveyance carries the fixtures on the property conveyed, this Act lias no application to such a case (vi). Section IV. Of tlm, Enrolment of Deeds. Pt. iii.t.12, Dccds are sometimes enrolled for safe custody, that is, Ch. 7, s. 4. J ' ' they are transcribed upon the records of one of the Queen's Enrolment "^ ^ of de^dsfor Courts at "Westminster or at a court of quarter sessions io). safe cubtody. -L \ ' The enrolment of a deed does not make it a record, hut it thereby becomes a deed recorded (^j). Euroimentof Dccds coiiveyim? or affectinc; lands or tenements in deeds re- JO ^ o iitiuc; to he- Loudoii, or auv interest therein, may be enrolled either in reditaiiients ' j ' ^ m London. ^|jg Hustiugs of Plcas of Land or Common Pleas, the exe- cution thereof being first acknowledged before the Mayor or the Eecorder and one Alderman, and proclamation thereof being made at one of these Courts {cf). Section V. Of the Possession and Transfer of Title Deeds. Pt. III.T.12, The immediate freeholder has, both at law and in equity, a prima facie title to the possession of the deeds (i"). («) Mather v. Fraser, 2 K. & J. 263. As to tlie enrolment of annuity 536, 558. deeds and deeds of bargain and sale, As to registration under the Trans- see supra, pp. 15, 16, 682. fer of Land Act, see supra, 561. (r) 9 J arm. & Byth. by Sweet, 90 ; (o) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 28, § 34. Alhjood v. Ileywood, 1 Hurl. & Colt. (j,) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 28, § 35. 745. {q) 1 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, POSSESSION AND TRANSFER OF TITLE DEEDS. 887 A joiutress or dowress will not be compelled to deliver ^J'^l^JP' up title deeds, unless the person applying for tliem not ^ ' ^ J- J. ^ O p083( ssiou only offers to confirm, but does absolutely confirm, the ot'iieeds. Delivery up iomture or dower (s). ot tiiie deeds ^ ^ by a joiutress The right to title deeds, like that to other personal pro- "'" do^i-ess. TruDsfcr perty when in actual possession, may be transferred either a.id trans- by deed or by delivery made with that intention ; but if ^eeds. not transferred, it descends with the land (t), and passes with it by conveyance, without being named (u). It is advisable, however, to add a grant of the deeds, where the purchaser is entitled to the custody of them (x). Section VI. Of Attested Copies and Covenants for Production of Documents of Title. Where property is sold in lots or parcels, either at one pt.iii. t.i2, time or at several times, or where only a part of the pro- , , General rule. perty is sold, and there are documents of title which relate to tlie whole, it is usual for the person who keejjs the deeds to enter into a covenant with the owner or owners of the other part or parts, for the production, at the expense of the covenantee or covenantees, of the documents of title so kept, whenever it shall be necessary for the manifestation or support of the title of the covenantee or covenantees. Sometimes the vendor retains the documents, and enters into this covenant with a purchaser or purchasers, espe- cially where he retains the most valuable part of the estate. At other times, a purchaser, especially of the part of the greatest value, retains the documents, and enters into such (s) 1 Cruise T. 7, c. 2, § 12, 14. («) Sugd. Concise View, 322. ( t ) Burton, § 476. (a;) fSugd. Concise View, 416. ATTESTED COPIES AND COVENANTS TO niODUCE. Pt. III.T.12, Ch. r, s. 6. Of what documents a purchaser is entitled to atteate I copies yiui a coven auc lor pr.jiiuc- tion. This cove- nant runs with the land. Assignees in bankruptcy bound. irse of at- tested copies. a covenant with tlie vendor, or with the other purchaser or purchasers (ij). A covenant for production of deeds should in most cases be by a separate deed (z). In the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, the pur- chaser is entitled to attested copies and a covenant for the production of every document which the vendor is obliged to state in his abstract, and which is not delivered up to him, except documents on record, copies of court rolls (unless in the possession or power of the vendor), wills proved in the Ecclesiastical or Probate Courts, bargains and sales enrolled under the stat. 10 Ann. c. 18, and gene- rally documents j)reserved in some general or quasi public repository, from whence copies may be obtained that will be admissible as primary evidence («). And this covenant, being real, will run with the land conveyed for the benefit of all future purchasers of it, without a fresh covenant on a re-sale. But if the deed containing such covenant be not delivered to a future purchaser, he will then be entitled to a new covenant from the vendor for the production of the title deeds (h). Even assignees in bankruptcy are bound, at the expense of the estate, to furnish the purchaser with attested copies of the deeds which they retain, and to covenant for the production of the originals so long as they remain in of&ce (c). Attested copies are useless as against strangers, and can- not be used on an ejectment, unless perhaps as between the parties themselves {d). (ij) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 97 ; Burton, § 475, 582 ; 9 Jarm. & Bytli. by Sweet, 4, 5. (z) Sugcl. Concise View, 334. 69 ; Sugd. Concise View, 331—333. (6) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 97. (c) 9 Jarm. & Bytli. by Sweet, 70 ; Sugd. Concise View, 334. (a) 9 Jarm. & Bytb. by Sweet, (d) Sugd. Concise View, 334. OF MISTAKES IN DEEDS. 889 Section VII. Of Mistahes in Deeds (e). Evident omissions and mistakes may be supplied and ^CH!V's.'r!' rectified (/). correction Wliere it is evident from the nature of tlie case or *^'^'"®°^- Name of one from the rest of the deed, that the name of one of the Pf.ty"'sert- ctl 111 3, SCI" parties was inserted by mistake for the name of the other, InsteaTof such a mistake will be corrected : as where by articles of ofher.'' separation it was stipulated that the trustees should in- demnify the husband against his own debts, instead of his wife's debts ((f). If a man clearly purchases an estate by a particular of couveyauce sale, and in the conveyance part of the land is left out, J^fg g^ij' equity will relieve Mm. And, on the other hand, it will relieve a vendor, where more land has passed than was contracted for (Ji). Where by mistake an instrument inter vivos is not what inistrument "^ not what the parties intended, or there is a mistake in it other than "^^ '"*',"''" i ' ed, or there a mistake in law, or any acts necessary to give validity to OTnecesKuy the instrument have been omitted, and the mistake is omit'tel clearly made out by admissible and satisfactory evidence, or is admitted by an answer to a bill, equity will rectify the same (i), except as against a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice (J), or other person (e) For some otlier points con- View, 117 ; Meadows v. Meadows, nected witli tlie subject of Mistalce, 16 Beav. 401 ; Murray v. Parker, the reader is referred to the Index, 19 Beav. 305 ; Torre v. Torre, 1 S. tit. "Mistake." & G. 518 ; Re Morse's Settlement, 21 (/) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 19, § 29, 31. Bear. 174 ; Wright v. Goff, 22 Beav. {g) Wilson v. Wilson, 5 H. L. 207 ; Woltcrheek v. Barroio, 23 Beav. Cas. 40, 52—7, 59, 63—71. 423. (A) Sugd. Concise View, 231. {j) Story's Eq. Jur. §165; 2 (i) Story's Eq. Jur. § 152, 157 Spence's Eq. Jur. 195. 159, 166, 168, and see Sugd. Concise 890 OF MISTAKES IN DEEDS, Pt. ITI.T.12, C'H, 7, s. 7. Instruineut not calcu- lated to ef- f(^ct intend- ed purpose. AVbere mis- taki' not rL-meilied in lavinir (fa stranger. Variances between filial instru- ment and pi-eliminary contract. Evidence of mistake. having an equity e(|Tiiil to tliat of the phaintiff (/.;), such as the issue in tail, or a remainderman in tail, where there is no equity to affect the conscience of such issue or remain- derman (/). But in order to enable the Court to rectify an ante-nuptial settlement Ly striking out a part, it must be proved that it contains something which has been in- serted by mistake, contrary to the intention of all the parties {m). Where an instrument is substantially what the parties intended, although so framed under a mistaken view of the law, the Court will not rectify the mistake {%). A bond to leave or convey property has, however, been sometimes upheld in equity as an agreement defectively executed (o). The Court of Chancery will not remedy a defect or supply an omission in a deed in favour of a stranger, where there is no consideration, even in the plainest case, and even when it has arisen from mere mistake, and though the correction would not be inconsistent with the deed {p). Where the final instrument of conveyance or settlement differs from the preliminary contract, that very circum- stance affords of itself some grounds for presuming an in- tentional change of purpose, unless, from some recital in it, or from some attendant circumstances, it appears to have been intended to be merely in pursuance of the original contract {q). As regards the admissibility of the evidence, it is a rule of the common law, independently of the Statute of Frauds, that parol evidence is not admissible to disannul, {k) Story's Eq. Jur. § 176. {I) Story's Eq. Jur. §178. (m) Rooke v. Lord Kensin'jton, 2 K. & J. 753, 764. (n) Story's Eq. Jur. § 113—115. (o) Story's Eq. Jur, § 136 Spence's Eq. Jur. 886. (i>) 2 Spcuce's Eq. Jur. 886. (q) Story's Eq. Jur. § 160. OF MISTAKES IN DEEDS. 81)1 substantially add to, subtract from, qualify, or vary a tt. rii.T.12. Ch. 7, s. 7. Mvitteii instrument (/■). But cases of accident, mistake, fraud, menace, and duress, are exceptions to this rule (s). Section VIII. Of Alterations in Deeds. A deed should not be in any way altered after delivery, pi-hi.t.is, •^ "^ _ _ "^ ' Ch. 7, s. 8. but any alteration that may be requisite should be made : "^ ^ X Alteratii '113 before the execution of the deed. Any alteration made ^ade'bl-fore before the delivery of the deed, by whomsoever made, will ^^<^'='^'^^'^"- not invalidate the deed ; for in that case the addition constitutes part of the deed as it originally began to operate (f). An interlineation, if nothing appears to the contrary, wheninter- . Til 1 1 • 11 lineations Will be presumed to have been made at the time when the are presum- ed to have deed was executed, and not afterwards ; because a deed ^^^^ ^'^^''• cannot be altered after it is executed without fraud or wrong, which will not be presumed. But an erasure or alteration in a suspicious place must be explained by the party seeking to enforce the instrument (u). The modern practice is, when any alteration, interlinea- Modem practice. tion, or erasure is made in a deed before it is executed, to take notice of it in the attestation (sc). It would seem, however, that at the present day no deed immaterial alterations. (;•) See Story's Eq. Jiir. § 153, {t ) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 69. 158 ; and see also Sugd. Concise (m) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 26, § 14 ; View, ch. 3, sects. 8, 9 ; Best on Burton, § 443 ; Best on Evid. 3rd Evid. 3rd ed. 302. ed. 309 ; Doed. Tatumx. Catomorc, (s) Story's Eq. Jur, § 155, 156, 16 Ad. &E. (N. S.) 746. 161, notes ; Best on Evid. 3rd cd. {x) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 26, § 15. 306. 892 OF ALTERATIONS IN DEEDS. Pt. 111. T. 12, Ch. 1, 8. 8. Material alterations. would be lield void on account of any immaterial altera- tion, after execution, Ijy whomsoever made (?/). An alteration, even in a material part, by a stranger or a mere spoliator, without the consent of the party bene- fited, would not invalidate a deed (z). But an erasure or alteration made in a material part by the party benefited, at least if the alteration is in his own favour, will malce a deed void as against the ojoposite party (a). Any alteration made after the execution of a deed by any one of the parties, leaves the deed valid as to him, provided the alteration has not affected the situation in which he stood (h). Section IX. Pt. 1II.T.12, Ch. 7, s. 9. I. Intentiou to be effec- tuated. II. Inten- ti m to be collected from the words, and Of the Construction of Deeds. I. General Rules of Gonstrtiction of Deeds (c). I. All deeds shall be construed favourably, so as to support them and effectuate the apparent intention of the parties, as far as possible, consistently with the ndes of law. Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire {d). II. The intention must not be imputed by mere con- jecture, but must be collected from the deed itself {e). And, in general, when there is no ambiguity in the words, no {y) 3 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 18 ; Eest on Evid. 309. But see 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 26, § 13. (z) See 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 26, § 12 ; 1 Pres. Shep. T. 69 ; Burton, §443. {a) See Burton, § 443 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 26, § 12, 13 ; 2 Bl. Com. 308. But see 3 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 18, 19. (&) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 26, § 12, n. (c) For other rules of construc- tion of deeds and other instruments inter vivos, the reader is referred to the specific heads to which they belong. - (d) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 19, § 2 ; 2 Bl. Com. 379, 380 ; Burton, § 503. 1 Pres. Shep. T. 86, 253, n. ( e) See Burton, §504, 510. OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF DEEDS. 893 construction is to be made contrary to the words (/). ^ch^tJo^' Exceptions occur to this rule in cases where a construction ^^^^^^^^^^ is adopted in furtherance of the general or paramount •"J'toThe''^" intention, contrary to words merely expressive of a par- ^°' ^' ticular or subordinate intention {g), and also in cases where an instrument is allowed to operate in a different way from that which was intended (Ji). III. As a Efeneral rule, words are to be construed in m. when o ' words are to their strict and proper sense. Thus, where a person agrees Ihelr'^tric" not to carry on a business or profession in London, the ^^"^^" word London is taken in its primary and strictly correct sense of the city af London, and not in its popular and colloquial sense, although the party in whose favour such agreement is entered into is not carrying on that profession or trade in the city of London, but in another part of the metropolis ; at least, this is the case where that party, by describing the locality of his place of business as situate in the coimty of Middlesex, has shown that he knew that it was not in the city of London {i). But words are not to be construed according to their strict and proper acceptation, where, from the context of the instrument, they appear to be used in a different sense ; or where they are incapable of being carried into effect in their strict sense (/) ; for in such a case, qui hteret in litera liseret in cortice (Jc). And hence, in a deed, as well as in a will, " or " may be con- strued to mean " and," and " and " may be construed to mean "or," if such a construction is necessary to give effect to the intention (/). The meaning of a particular (/) 2 Bl. Com. 379 ; 4 Cruise T. W. 517, 518 ; Key v. Key, 4 D. M. 32, c. 19, § 4. & G. 84, 85. (r/) See supra, p. 161, et seq. {h) 2 Bl. Com. 379 ; 4 Cruise T. (h) See infra, p. 897. 32, c. 19, § 4 ; 1 Pres. Shep. T. 87. (i) MaUan v. May, 13 M. & W. (l) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 19, § 19 ; 511. Burton, § 510 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd {j ) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 87 ; Pollock, ed. 422, 433 ; White v. Siqjple, 2 C. B., in Mallan v. May, 13 M. & Dru. & War. 471 ; Pitt v. Pitt, 22 804 GENERAL RULES OF Pt. Ill T12 Ch. 7, s. 9. IV. Sense agresable to law pre- ferred. V. Construc- tion of gene- ral expres- sions. VI. When general words are to be fol- lowed, and when spe- cial. VII. Uncer- tainty. ^v'o^d may also be shown by parol uvidcnce to be different in some particular place, trade, or business, from its proper and ordinary acceptation (m). And wliere it is necessary to efi'ectuate the intention, words and clauses may be transposed ; the strict grammatical sense may be dis- regarded ; the word " same," though properly referring always to the last antecedent, may, to avoid contradiction, be differently applied {%). IV. If words will bear two senses, one agreeable and another contrary to law, that sense is to be preferred which is most agreeable to law. For example, if a tenant for life makes a lease for life generally, it shall be construed for his own life only, and not for the life of the lessee, which is beyond his power to grant (o). And so, vinder a general conveyance of lands and tenements, copyholds are held not to he included ( p). V. Generale dictum generaliter est intelligendum, or, verba generaliter dicta generaliter accipienda {q). VI. Wlien, however, there are general words, and these are followed by special words which are consistent with them, the deed shall be construed according to the special words. But when a deed first contains special words, and then concludes in general words, both the general words and the special shall stand (?-). For, in the first case, the general words may be considered as merely intro- ductory ; whereas, in the latter case, they could only have been inserted with the view of enlarging the operation of the deed. VII. Where the words of a deed are so uncertain that Beav. 294 ; Blaynard v. Wriglit, 26 (o) 2 Bl. Com. 380 ; i Cruise T. Beav. 285. (m) PollocJc, C. B. in Median v. May, 13 M. & W. 517, 518. (n) 4 Cruise T. 32, e. 19, § 10— 12 ; Burton, § 509 ; 1 Pres. Shep. T. 87 ; 2 Pres. Shep. T. 253, n. 32, c. 19, § 18 ; Burton, § 1332 ; Co. Litt. 42 a, 183 a. (p) Burton, § 1332. (q) Co. Litt. 36 a. (r) See 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 19, § 9. CONSTRUCTION OF DEEDS. 895 tlie intention of the parties cannot be discovered, the deed ^i;. 111.T.12, ■'■ ' Ch. 7, s. 9. will be void (s). VIII. The construction should be made, not merely viii. cou- •^ structiou to upon particular parts of a deed, but upon the entire deed, ^^ijoi^^^egj® so as to give effect, if possible, to every part and every word (t). IX. If one part of a deed is so ambiguously worded, that ^^;^^^^ it is equally capable of two different constructions, one of oJ^'i^o^rds which is in accordance with, and the other conflicts with another part of the deed, about the meaning of which there is uo doubt, the former construction must be adopted («). If there are two clauses m a deed so totally repugnant to each other, that they cannot be reconciled, there, unless contrary to the apparent general intention, the first shall be received, and the latter rejected (x). But if in any part of an instrument there is or are any clause or words evidently repugnant to the other parts of it, and to the general intention apparent upon the whole instru- ment, such clause or words will be rejected (y). X. So far as the api^arent intention and the rules of law x. construc- tion to be will admit, the construction ought to be reasonable and reasonable. agreeable to the common imderstandiug of mankind (z). And therefore a grant of common in a manor will extend to commonable places only, and not to gardens, orchards, &c. And so a grant of a right to dig for metals, will not confer a right to dig under the grantor's house, so as to endanger it (a). XI. The words of an indenture are the words of either xi. nuie as to the words party. And although they are spoken as the words of the f »» iaden- (s) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 19, § 24. 32, 0. 19, § 8 ; Burton, § 512. it) 2 Bl. Com. 380 ; 4 Cruise T. (y) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 19, § 25 ; 9 32, c. 19, § 6; Burton, § 504, 510 ; Jarm. & Bytli. by Sweet, 85. 1 Pres. Shep. T. 87. (2) 2 BI. Com. 379 ; 2 Pres. Shep. (m) Herrick v. Sixhj, L. K 2 Ap. T. 253, n. Ser. (P. C), 436, 450. (a) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 87. {x) 2 Bl. Com. 381 ; 4 Cruise T. 896 GENERAL RULES OF Pt.IU. T.12, Ch. 7, s. 9. XII. Words construed most strongly afcainst the active party. XIII. Inad- missibility of averments founded ou parol evi- dence. one party only, yet they are not his words alone, but may be applied to the other party, if they more proj)erly belong- to him (h). XII. Subject to all other rules of exposition, it is a rule that a deed is to be construed most strongly against the grantor, covenantor, or active party, and most favourably to the grantee, covenantee, or person intended to be bene- fited. Verba cartarum fortius accipiuntur contra proferen- tem. For, the principle of self-interest will make men sufficiently careful not to prejudice themselves by using words of too extensive a meaning. And those who bind themselves by deed would always adopt ambiguous ex- pressions, if they were afterwards at liberty to put their own construction on them (c). And although this applies with more force to a deed poll than to an indenture, in which the words are deemed the words of both, yet the rule applies even in the case of an indenture (d). XIII. No averment founded on parol evidence, which tends to contradict, or vary, or, in general, even to explain a written agreement concerning lands, shall be admitted, except in certain cases of fraud, accident, or mistake (e). But averments founded on parol evidence of collateral facts tending to support or explain a deed have in some cases been admitted ; as in the case of an averment of a consi- deration for a bargain and sale (/). In the case of an ambiguitas patens, i.e., where the words themselves prima facie import an ambiguity, no parol evidence is admissible to explain it. But in the case of an ambiguitas latens, i.e., where there is no ambiguity on the face of the instrument, (b) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 53. (c) 2 Bl. Com. 380 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 19, § 13 ; 1 Pres. Shep. T. 88, and n. (81) ; Warde v. Warde, 16 Beav. 103. {d) See Burton, § 511 ; Co. Litt. 30 a ; Warde v. Warde, 16 Beav. 103. But see 2 BL Com. 380 ; 4 Cruise T. 32 ; c. 19, § 17; 1 Pres. Sliep. T. 53. (e) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 19, § 45, 48, 56 ; Burton, § 508. (/) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 19, § 49. CONSTKUCTION OF DEEDS. 897 l)ut an ambiguity can be made to appear from parol evi- ^i;. in.T.12, dence, there parol evidence is admissible to explain as well as to raise it. Thus, if it appears by parol evidence that there are two persons or things of the same name, it is allowaljle to adduce parol evidence in order to remove the ambiguity, by showing which was intended (jj). And parol evidence is admissible, whether in the case of a deed or of a will, to explain the situation of the parties or the state of the facts at the time, on wliich the extent of the operation of the deed or will must frequently depend Qi). XIV. Where a deed cannot operate in the way intended ^JJo /'p®''^" by the parties, it will be construed in such a manner as to dfff^rent' operate, in some other way, if it is possible, consistently what w^ with the rules of law and tlie general intention of the parties. Quando quod ago non valet ut ago, valeat quan- tum valere potest {i). Thus, a deed, which was intended to operate as a bargain and sale, but was void for want of a pecuniary consideration, has been held to operate as a confirmation (7). And so, if a person having a power of appointment, but no estate, uses the language of convey- ance appropriate to the transfer of estates, and not the language appropriate to the exercise of his power, it will be deemed an exercise of his power (JS). And, on the other hand, the words " limit and appoint " may operate by way of grant {t). So the word " grant " will operate as a con- firmation ; and the word " confirm " may in some cases operate by way of grant or release {ni). So a conveyance {rj) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 19, § 53— T. 30S, 514 ; Burton, § 505 ; 4 Jarm. 55 ; Burton, § 507 ; Sugd. Concise & Byth. by Sweet, 106. But see View, 115 ; Best on Evid. 3rd cd. Co. Litt. 301 b ; Johnson \. Osen- 302—5. ton, L. E. 4 Ex. 107. (It) 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, (j) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 19, § 34 ; 3 821 ; Sugd. Concise View, 115, 116 ; Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 591. WaterparJc v. Fennell, 7 H. L. Cas. (k) Burton, § 505. 650, 678, 684. (l) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 514. ({) 4 Cruise, T. 32, c. 19, § 33 ; 1 (m) 3 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, Pres. Shep. T. 82, 87 ; 2 Pres. Shep. 591. 898 GENEKAL HULES OF Pt Ch • "IT.12, in tlie form of and void as a ^rant, feoffment, release, bar- H. 7, s. 9. o ' ' ' gain and salq, or surrender, may sometimes take effect as a covenant to stand seised (n). So a feoffment may be con- strued to enure as a surrender (o). And where heredita- ments may not pass by way of surrender, on account of the existence of an intervening estate, if there are sufficient words in the deed, it may enure and pass the property by way of grant, release, &c. (p)- -^^^^ where one thing is in- tended to be granted for another so as to operate in the nature of an exchange, but the things cannot pass by way of exchange, they may pass by way of grant (q). Again, a deed purporting to be an assignment of an old term, may, if that term has by any accident ceased, even operate as the creation of a new one (r). And where a conveyance would have some effect, but not all the effect intended, there, to the end that the main design of the parties may be accomplished, the estate shall pass in another way than that which was intended (s). XV. Where a deed may enure in different ways, the person to whom it is made shall have his election in which way to take it (t). Wliere a conveyance by the common law and one by the Statute of Uses concur, that by the common law shall be preferred ; and therefore, wliere the lands are conveyed by bargain and sale, and also by feoff- ment to the bargainee before enrolment, he shall take by the feoffment, unless the bargainor incumbers the estate between the execution of the bargain and sale and the feoffment ; for in that case the bargainee shall be in by the XV. Where a ileed may enure in dif- ferent ways. (n) 3 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, Conv. 3rd ed. by Prest. 192. 670—1; 2 Pres. Shep. T. 514; Watk. Couv. 3rd ed. by Prest. 192, 199,200. (o) Watk. Conv. 3rd ed. by Prest. 1G7. {p) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 308 ; Watk. ((?) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 297. (r) Sugd. Concise View, 481. (s) 1 Sugd. Pow.414. (/) 4 Cniise T. 32, c. 19, § 42 ; 1 Pres. Shep. T. 205. COXSTIIUCTIOX OF DEEDS. 899 bargain and sale, and the enrolment shall relate back in PT.ni.T.12, ° Ch. t, s. 9. favour of the bargainee (n). An alienation is the lease or grant of the person from whom the right of possession passes, and the confirmation of the other parties till their interest comes into possession ; and from that time it is their lease or grant, and the con- firmation of the other person. If tenant in tail and the reversioner grant a rent charge in fee, it shall be taken to be the grant of the tenant in tail, and the confirmation of the reversioner ; but when the tenant in tail dies without issue, it shall be taken to be the sole grant of the re- versioner (.v). XVI. When no time is fixed for the be«;inning of an xvi. com- '-' '--^ meucement estate, it shall begin immediately (y). of an estate. XVII. An instrument, of whatever kind it may be, must xvii. same "^ construction receive the same construction in every Court, Wliatever j^^^^J^^""^ is its true meaning, must be its meaning everywhere (.:). IT. The Construction of particular Expressions in Deeds {a). The word " begotten," extends to issue born after the "Begotten." o ' and to be execution of the deed or will, and the words " to be be- begotten." gotten " extend to issue born before {h) ; unless both these expressions are used, in which case each has its proper signification and efiicacy (c). Wliere an act is to be done within a certain number of "From "a certain day. days " from " a particular day, the day named is excluded (it) See 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 9, § 39. other expressions is noticed, (x) 1 Pres. Sliep. T. 84. {h) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 10, § 48 ; 2 (?/) 1 Pres. Sliep. T. 108. Rop. Leg. by White, 15, 13 ; 2 (3) 2 Sugd. Pow. 182—3. Jarm. WUls. 2nd ed. 150, 152, 153 ; (rt) See Construction of ^Vill^=, Almaclc\. Horn.lT^&m. kll. Q2,0. infra, and the Index, tit. "Words," (c) Ckihh \ . Preyulergast , 1 'K. k. 3 . &c., as to certain specific heads, 439. under which tlie construction of 900 CONSTRUCTION OF PARTICULAE, EXniESSIOXS. tt. iir.T.i2, from the computation, imless there are special grounds for a different construction {d). " Heir fc- The cxpressiou " heir female " in a deed is deemed to m;ile. ■•■ designate such person as would be heir if females only were capable of being heirs : so that a daughter may take by that designation, though in consequence of the exist- ence of a son, she is not very heir — at least if there are words showing that the word " heir " is not used in the strict technical sense, as where the words " now living " are added (c). " insoi- The ordinary meaning of the word " insolvency " is an incapacity of paying one's just debts : unless restricted by the context, it is not limited to the condition of one who has taken the benefit of an Act for the relief of Insolvent "London." Debtors(/). It has been held that the word " London," when used in articles of agreement, and unexplained by express words in the context, is to be understood in its strict and primary sense of " the City of London ;" although, in its popular or colloquial sense, it denotes the cities of London and West- minster, and the borough of Southwark, and the adjacent streets and places ; and although, judging from the general scope and design of the instrument, it was intended to be understood in its popular or colloquial sense. This was decided in a case where an assistant to two surgeon- dentists, who practised in Great Eussell-street, Blooms- bury, but had never practised in the City, agreed not to practise in London, or m any of the towns where they had been practising, without their permission. He afterwards practised in Great Eussell-street, and yet it was held to be no breach of his agreement {g) \ ((?) 9 Jarm & Byth. by Sweet, 817. R. 617 ; 1 Tyr. & Gr. 105 ; Re Mug. (c) Chambers v. Taylor, 2 My. & gcridges Trusts, 1 Johns. 627. Cr. 37G. (g) Median v. 3fag, 13 M. & V\". (/) ParJcer y. Gossage, 2 Cr. 31. & 511. See supra, p. 893. CONSTRUCTION OF PARTICULAR EXPRESSIONS. 1)01 The distinction between a mine and a ciuarry is, tliat in pt. 111.T.12, ^ J ' Ch. 7, s. . mining you only begin on tlic surface, and by means of a ,7— — 17-^ shaft or lateral drift, you work so that you leave a roof !! ^'uaaiel'''' overhead. Whereas in quarrying, you remove the surface. A mine, in its general sense, is that out of which some metal substance is dug by means of sinking shafts or making drifts, but in its strict sense it may include a place out of which any other substance is so dug. And minerals, in the strict sense, may mean any earthly sub- stance worked by means of a mine or a quarry, or it may mean some metal substance so worked, or it may mean substances dug by means of a mine as distinguished from a quarry (li). Ordinarily and prima facie, a month, in a contract at "Month." law, means a lunar month, except it be a mercantile con- tract, when it means a calendar month {i). Where a father covenants, that, in case he should give "Portion, one daughter, on her marriage or otherwise, a greater por- tion than a specified sum in money or value, his executors would pay such further sum as would make the fortune of another daughter equal to the fortune given to the first ; a gift of a life interest in freehold and leasehold estate made to the first is an additional portion of fortune within the covenant. But the gift of furniture is not (j). The word "thiixls " is not confined to real estate, but is "Thirds." a general expression which may signify the interest of a widow in any property, whether real or personal, of her deceased husband {h). (/i) EarlofRosse v. Wainman, 14 Chit. Cont. 8th ed. 658 ; Byles on M. & W. 859 ; 2 Exch. 800 ; Darvlll Bills, 8th ed. 188. V. i?ope?-, 3 Drewry, 296,299—301; (j) Eardleij v. Oivcn, 10 Beav. Bdl V. Wilson, L. E. 1 Ch. Ap. 572. 303. (/,-) TJiompson v. Watts, 2 Johns. (/) Sugd. V. & P. 14th ed. 257 ; & Hem. 291. X 2 902 OF ESTOrPEL. Section X. Pt. III.T.12, Ch. 7, s. 10. Definition. Different kinds. How estop- pels are regarded. Eeciprocity necessary. Affirmation precise and certain. A general recital does not, but a particular recital does, work an estoppel. Where es- toppel by Of Edoi^iid. Estoppel or conclusion is the being stopped or debavred by a statement or an act from alleging anything contrary to that wliich such statement expresses or such act im- ports. Estoppels are of three kinds : by matter of record, such as a fine or recovery ; by deed ; or by some act, such as entry, payment or acceptance of rent, &c. (/). Estoppels are favoured where they operate in support of truth, but they are deemed odious, where they operate as legal traps {^iii). An estoppel must in general be reciprocal, that is, it ought to bind both parties {}i). Hence, to create an estoppel, there must be an affirma- tion, precise and certain to every intent, and not taken by way of argument or inference (o). A general recital does not work an estoppel. But if an indenture contains a recital of a particular circumstance as a fact, it works an estoppel or conclusion, that is, it stops and concludes the party or parties whose averment it is from averring anything contrary to such recital in any legal proceedings founded on that deed {ji). But in some cases of mistake, relief is given in equity (g-). Where a recital is intended to be a statement which all (/) Co. Litt. 852 a ; Diikc V. Aslihy, 7 Hurl. & Korm. 600. (m) Co. Litt. 365 b ; Best on Evid. 3rd ed. 654—5. (h) Co. Litt. 352 a; 2Prcs. Sliep. T. 276, n. (o) Co. Litt. 352 b. (i^) 1 Prcs. Sliep. T. 53 ; 4 Cniise T. 32, c. 20, § 24 ; Burton, § 331 ; Co. Litt. 352 b ; Carpenter t. Bul- hr, 8 JL & "W. 209 ; Carter v. Carter, 3 K. & J. G17, 644—6 ; Gu-yn v. Neath Canal Co., L. E. 3 Ex. 209. {q) Manual of Eq. 9th cd. tit. 1, OF ESTOPPEL. 003 the parties to the deed ]iave mutually ap;reed to admit as ^t. 111.T.12, i -^ ° _ Cu. 7, s. 10. true, it is an estoppel upon all. But when it is intended . .... to he the statement of one party only, the estoppel is con- p^°° ""o^iy fined to that party. And the intention is to be gathered by construing the instrument. Thus, where in an inden- ture of transfer of securities from one lender to another, there was a recital that money advanced by the transferror was owing, and a covenant to the same effect, this was held to be the statement of the transferror alone ; so that the transferree was not precluded by it from suing on the covenant, on the ground that no money Avas owing to the transferror (;•). Where a distinct statement of a particular fact is made Estoppel . . confined to in a recital, a i')arty to the instrument is not estopped pioceedings > i- -^ i-L on the deed. from disputing that fact in an action by another party to the same instrument, not founded on that instrument, and wholly collateral to it ; for such recital, thougli evidence of the fact, is not conclusive evidence ; so that evidence of the circumstances under which such statement was made, is receivable, to show that the admission was incon- siderately made, and is not entitled to weight as a proof of the fact which it is used to establish (s). Privies in blood, as the heir, except an lieir in tail ; who are ^ r n 1 o bound by, privies in estate, as the feoffee, lessee, &c. ; privies m lav,', anJ may as the lord by escheat, tenant by the curtesy, tenant in *^"^ "'" ^^' dower, and others who come in by act of law or in the post, shall be bound and take advantage of estoppels by deed (f). But regularly, a stranger, or a feme covert, or an infant, shall not take advantage of an estoppel, for want of mutuality (u). And where a person sues, not in (r) StroughillY. Bud, li Ad. &E. T. 32, c. 19, § 60 ; 1 Pres. Shep. T. (N. S.) 781. 53. (s) Carpenter v. Bailer, 8 M. & (») Co. Litt. 352 a ; 9 Jarm. & W. 209 ; Carter v. Carter, 3 K. & J. Byth. by Sweet, 81 ; 2 Pres. Shep. 617, 644—6. T. 276, ii. ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 19, {t) Co. Litt. 352 a; 4 Cruise §60. take advan- tage of e tcppels. 904 OF ESTOPPEL, Interest created by estoppel under an jndentm-e. pt- "I-T-12, his own ridit, but in riolit of another, he must be deemed Ch. 7, s. 10. o ' o ' a stranger, so as not to be bound by estoppel by a deed executed by him in his own right («). Strangers, how- ever, shall both take tlic benefit of and be concluded by a record relating to the disability or legitimation of a person (if). Where by deed indented a man directly and unequivo- cally recites that he is owner of an estate, and affects to convey it for valuable consideration, when in reality he has only an interest under a limitation in favour of a person not yet ascertained, or a mere hope or chance of succession as heir apparent, or no interest whatever, there, if by any means he afterwards acquires an interest in the estate, he is estopped, in any legal proceedings founded on that deed, from saying, as against the other party to the indenture, contrary to his averment in that recital, that he had not such interest at the time of its execution (z). And if a lease is made by indenture by a person who at the time liad no interest in the property, but that fact does not appear on the face of the deed, it is a good demise by way of estoppel, and a reversion in the lessor by estoppel is thereby created, which may be conveyed to another person ; and if a lease for a longer term is afterwards made to the lessor by the real owner, the first lease thereupon becomes a lease in interest, the estoppel created by the first lease being fed by the interest created by the second lease of the real ow^ner («). But if a deed operates to any extent actually to pass an interest from the lessor, it shall not (x) Metiers v. Brown, 1 Hurl. & Colt. 686. {y) Best on Evid. 3rd cd. 655. {z) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 328 ; 4 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 125—128 ; 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 81, 82 ; Bcnsley v. Biirdon, 2 S. & S. 519, affirmed on appeal, 8 L. J. 85. But see Stacl-poole v. Btaclcpoole, 4 Dru. & War. 347 ; and Lhyd v. Lloyd, 4 Dru. & War. 354. (a) Sturgeon v. Winr/jield, 15 M. & W. 224 ; Co. Litt, 47 b ; 2 Pres. Sliep. T. 53, 320, 321 ; 4 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 122, 123, 126 ; Bur- ton, § 850. OF ESTOPPEL. 905 afterwards operate by estoppel, tliougli the interest pur- ^''•^l^-^^-''^' ported to be granted be really greater than the lessor at that time had power to grant : as if A., lessee for the life of B.j makes a lease for years by indenture, and afterwards purchases the reversion in fee, and then B. dies. A, shall avoid his own lease, though the years expressed in the lease be not ex^^ired (h). A deed poll cannot create an estoppel in point of estate. Estoppel by But if a deed poll of A. recites that A. by bond did, &c., A. cannot say that there is not any such bond (c). The doctrine of estoppel does not prevent a deed from Fraud or being impeachable for fraud or illegality (d). Section XI. Of Cancelling Deeds. To cancel a deed, it may either be delivered im for that pt- in.T.12, -^ ^ Ch. 1, s. 11. purpose to the party who is bound by it, and cancelled by ■ Mode of caE- him accordingly, by tearing off the seals or otherwise <=«"i"g- defacing it, or the person who has the deed may cancel it by agreement with the other party (e). If the seal, &c., were broken or destroyed by accident, or by a stranger, or by the obligor, the deed would remain in force, on proof that it was sealed and delivered, and accidentally or wrongfully cancelled. To destroy the deed, there must be a cancellation eo animo (/). So far as regards the operation of an assurance in vesting Eflfect of ■^ o cancelling, {h) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 19, § 58 ; (e) 2 Bl. Com. 308 ; 4 Cruise T. Co. Litt. 45 a ; Burton, § 850 ; 1 32, c. 26, § 18. Pros. Shep. T. 53. (/) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 69 ; Burton, (c) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 53. § 443. {d) Broom's Com. 2nd ed. 283. 906 01<" CANCELLING DEEDS, 'c'^V'^'n' ^^^ estate or interest in real or personal property, as clis- tinguislicd from those operations of the assurance which are merely accessory or incidental, it is immaterial, except as to the evidence of original validity, whether the deeds continue in force or not ; for, their whole effect as regards this purpose is instantaneous, and tlie estate which has once passed cannot he recalled ([/). And hence an estate or interest in real or personal property which has once vested by a deed, cannot he devested by cancelling the deed ; because, once vested, it exists, independently of the deed, in the person in whose favour it was created or to Avliom it was transferred (h). So that any freehold estate or a money fund once absolutely vested by a settlement cannot be devested by merely cancelling the deed creating or transferring it ; nor can a lease for years be surrendered by cancelling the indenture of lease ; nor can a lease for years assigned be revested in the assignor by cancelling the assignment. To accomplish the purposes intended, the freehold estate must be conveyed, the benefit of the settlement must be released, the lease for years must be surrendered, and the leasehold estate must be assigned. But a mere contract or obligation, of which the deed is the essence, may be extinguished by destroying the deed with that intent(2). (ij) Burton, § 444 ; 2 Jarm. & 20 ; Lord Ward x. Lumlcy, 5 HurL Byth. by Sweet, 285; Co. Litt. 225 b, & Norm. 87. But see Co. Litt. 308 b, n. (1). as to incorporeal hereditaments. {h) 2 Jarm. & Bytli. by Sweet, {I) 2 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 285; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 26, § 18— 285. 907 TITLE XIII. OF ALIENATION BY MATTEK OF KECORD (((). Assurances hy matter of record arc sucli as do not rx.iii.T.is. entirely depend on the act or consent of the parties themselves, but the sanction of a Court of record is called in to substantiate, preserve, and be a perpetual testimony of the transfer of property, or of its establishment, when already transferred. Of this nature are, I. Private Acts of Parliament, II. Royal Grants. III. Fines. IV. Common Recoveries. CHAPTER T. OF PRIVATE ACTS, AND ROYAL GRANTS. I. Of Private Ads. Private Acts are frequently resorted to as a mode of pt.iii.t.is, assurance, in cases where the object of parties can be Where they effected in no other way : as to unfetter an estate, to give are used, its tenant reasonable powers, or to assure it to a purchaser against the remote or latent claims of persons under legal disability («). Acts of this kind are not ijassed without great care to care takea to avoid iu- (u) See 2 Bl. Com. 344 — 5. But and leases of settled estates, see supra, pp. 597, 689, as to sales 908 OF A PEIVATE ACT. TT.ui.T.n, avoid aii}' injustice. No thing is done without the consent, . — : — expressly given, of all parties in being and capable of con- justice 3.nn mode of as-** scnt, who havc the remotest interest in the matter ; unless Burauce. ^^^q]^ couscnt appears to be perversely and without any reason withheld. And an equivalent in money or other property is usually settled upon infants, or persons not in esse, or not of capacity to act for themselves, who are to bo concluded by the Act. And a general saving is constantly added, at the close of the Act, of the right and interest of all persons wdiatsoever, except those whose consent is so given or purchased, and who are therein particularlynamed ; though even if such saving is omitted, the Act will bind none but the parties {h). Light in A law thus made, though it binds all parties to the Act, wbicli pn- •> o L regaidcd- '^'° ^'^ ^^^ lookcd upou ratlicr as a private conveyance, than as coustructiou the solemn act of the legislature (c). Hence private Acts of private ^ ^ ■' '- ^^^^- are construed in the same manner as conveyances that derive their effect from the common law (d). ^iL'ai'i^t^Js "^^^^ ^^^•'■®' i^fii'giiial notes, and punctuation of an Act of «oB.^""*''"'^* Parliament form no part of it, and ought not to be taken into consideration in the construction of it (e). Repugnancy. If two scctious of an Act are absolutely repugnant, the last shall prevail (/). Time of com- Bcforc the stat. 33 Geo, 3, c. 13, an Act took effect from meucemeLt. ' ' the first day of the session in which it was passed ((f). But, by that statute, private as well as public Acts commence their operation (unless it be otherwise provided) from the time of the Eoyal Assent being given {li). ^peratwu."^^ Au Act has uo rotrospective operation, unless an inten- (6) 2 Bl. Com. 3i5 ; 5 Cruise T. Mac. & G. 651; Willes, J.,in Claydon 33, § 29 ; Burton, § 482—3. v. Green, L. R. 3 C. P. 522. (c-) 2 Bl. Com. 3 IS. (/) Keating, J., in Wood v. Eiley, (d) 5 Cruise T. 33, § 39. L. E. 3 C. P. 27. (c) Att.-Gcn. V. Lord Weymouth, {g) 1 Jarm. & Bytli. by Sweet, 91. Ambl. 22 ; Hunter v. NocMds, 1 (/;) Burton, § 485. OF A PKIVATE ACT. 909 tioii that it should so operate is clear from the language ^^-y"'!^-^^' used ( ^ ). Acts of Parliament of a local or private nature, if con- when void, trary to reason, or grounded on a false statement or recital in the preamble, or obtained by fraudulent suggestions, have been held to be void (J). II. Of Royal Grants. These are contained in charters or letters patent (litera3 patentes), that is, open letters (IS). 1. A grant made by the Sovereign, at the suit of the grantee, is taken most beneficially for the Crown, and against the party : whereas the grant of a subject is construed most strongly against the grantor. Wherefore, it is usual to insert in the royal grants, that they are made, not at the suit of the grantee, but " ex speciali gratia, certa scientia, et mero motu reginfe ; " and then they have a more liberal construction. 2. A subject's grant shaU be construed to include many things besides what are expressed, if necessary for the operation of the grant. But a royal grant shall only enure to that which is precisely expressed in the grant. 3. When it appears, from the face of the grant, that the Sovereign is mistaken, or deceived, either in matter of fact or matter of law, as in case of false suggestion, misinformation, or misrecital of former grants ; or if his own title to the thing granted is different from what he supposes ; or if the grant is (/) Ellis V. McCormid; L. R. 4 of a grant by letters patent, see 1 Q. B. 274. Steph. Com. 596. And as to the {j) Burton, § 482 ; 2 Bl. Com. subject-matter of royal grants, see 1 346. Steph. Com. 59S— 9, and Stamp's (F) 2 Bl. Com. 346 ; Burton, § Index to the Statute Law, tit. 486. As to the course of proceed- " Crown Lands," &c. ing with respect to the making out 010 OF A ROYAL fIRANT. ri.iir.T. 13, informal ; or if he grants an estate contrary to the rules of law ; in any of these cases the grant is absolutely void (/). And to prevent the Sovereign from being deceived with regard to the value of the estate granted, it is particularly provided by the stat. 1 Hen. 4, c. 6, that no grant of his shall be good, unless, in the grantee's petition for them, express mention be made of the real value of the lands (m). (l) 2 BI. Com. 347 ; sec Att.- 386—7. Gen, V. Eivclme Hospital, 17 Beav. (m) 2 Bl. Com. 348 911 CHAPTEE II. OF FINES. Section I. Of Fines generally. A FINE (finis) was an amicable composition or agreement Pr.iii.T.is, and termination of a suit, either actual or fictitious, Definition of whereby the lands which formed the subject of such suit afl"«- were acknowledged to be, and thereby became, the pro- perty of one of the parties, to whom the fine was levied. In its origin it was founded on an actual suit, commenced at law for recovery of the possession of land or other hereditaments ; and the possession thus gained by such composition was found to be so sure and effectual, that fictitious actions were commenced, for the sake of obtaining the same security («). The mode of levying a fine was this : — 1. The party to Mode of whom the land was to be conveyed or assured commenced fine. an action against the other, generally an action of cove- nant, by suing out a writ of pra3cipe, called a writ of covenant, the foundation of which was a supposed agree- ment or covenant that the one should convey the lands to the other, on tlie breach of which agreement the action was brought. 2. A licentia concordandi, or leave to com- promise the suit, was then obtained from the Court. 3. Next came the concord or agreement itself, which was usually an acknowledgment from the deforciants, or those who kept the other out of possession, that the lands in (a) 2 Bl. Com. 349. 912 OF FINES. I'T-^iy-T- 13, question were tlie rifflit of the complainant. And from this acknowledgment or recognition of I'ight, the party levying the fine was called the cognisor, and he to whom it was levied the cognisee (h). 4. The next part was the note of the fine, which was only an abstract of the writ of covenant and the concord, naming the parties, the parcels of land, and the agreement. This was to be enrolled of record in the proper of&ce, by direction of the stat. 5 Hen. 4, c. 14. 5. The fifth part was the foot of the fine or conclusion of it, which includes the whole matter, reciting the parties, day, year, and place, and before whom it was acknowledged or levied. Of this there were indentures made or engrossed at the chirographer's oftice, and delivered to the cognisor and cognisee (c). By the above proceedings a fine was complete at the common law. But, by several statutes, still more forms were superadded. It is only necessary to mention that, by 5 Hen. 4, c. 14, and 23 Eliz. c. 3, all the proceedings on fines were to be enrolled of record in the Com-t of Common Pleas. And by 1 Eich. 3, c. 7, 4 Hen. 7, c. 24, and 31 Eliz. c. 2, fines were to be openly read and proclaimed in court, once in the term in which they were made, and once in each of the three succeeding terms ; and these proclama- tions were to be indorsed on the record (cT). Fines are of four kinds : 1. A fine sur cognizance de droit come ceo que il ad de son done, or a fine upon ac- knowledgment of the right of the cognisee, as that which he hath of the gift of the cognisor. This is the best and most usual kind of fine. It acknowledged a former gift or feoffment in possession to have been made by him to the plaintiff, and thereby it virtually conveyed an estate, either of inheritance or at least of an absolute freehold, and gave Additional forms re- quired by statute. Knes are of f jur kinds. (h) 2 Bl. Com. 350. (c) 2 El. Com. 350—1, (d) 2 Bl. Com, 352. OF FINES. 913 tlie co!i:nisee a seisin in law "svitliout any actual livery, and rT.iii.T.is, ° J J ' Cu. 2, s. 1. is tlierefore called a fine executed, whereas the others are but executory. 2. A fine sur cognizance de droit tantum, or upon acknowledgment of the right merely, not with the circumstance of a preceding gift. This was commonly used to pass a reversionary interest which was in the cognisor. For of such reversions there could be no feoffment or dona- tion with livery supposed, as the possession, during the particular estate, belonged to a third person. 3. A fine sur concessit is where the cognisor granted to the cognisee an estate de novo, usually for life or years, by way of sup- posed composition. And in this case there might be a reservation of a rent or the like ; for it operated as a new grant. 4. A fine sur done grant et render is a double fine, comprehending the fine sur cognizance de droit come ceo, &c., and the fine sur concessit ; the cognisee, after the right is acknowledged to be in him, granting it back again, or rendering to the cognisor or to a stranger some other estate in the premises (c). By the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 2, fines are abolished. Aboiuiou of By s. 5 of the same statute, the fines or common reco- Fine or re- ct'VGi'v in veries which at any time before the passino- of this Act uuautho- f ^ . . "«ed Couit. may have been levied or suffered in certain unlawful or unauthorised courts shall not be invalid in consequence of their having been levied or suffered therein. By s. 7 of the same statute, errors in fines are rectified in Rectification "^ of errors. certain cases without amendment. By the stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 70, s. 1, after reciting^ that lividencecf ° proclama- notwithstanding all fines levied in the Court of Common *'<*"*• Pleas at Westminster were levied with proclamations, yet unnecessary trouble and expense were occasionally incurred by parties being required to procure evidence of such pro- clamations having been in fact made, it is enacted that " all (e) 2 Bl. Com. 352—3. 914 OF FIXES. ri. III.T.13, fines lieretoforc levied in the said Court of Common Pleas, Ch. 2, 3. 1. ' shall he conclusively deemed to have heen levied with pro- clamations." But by s. 3, it is provided, that " this Act shall not extend to any fine heretofore levied of or concern- ing any lands, tenements, or hereditaments which at the time of the passing of this Act shall he actually possessed or enjoyed by any person or persons under a title adverse to or inconsistent with the operation of such fine if le%aed with proclamations, but in all such cases it shall be neces- sary for all parties alleging that such fine was levied with proclamations to prove such allegation in the same manner as if this Act had not been made." By the stat. 5 Vict. sess. 2, c. 32, intituled " An Act for better recording Fines and Eecoveries in Wales and Cheshire," fines in the abolished Courts of those districts are made good, notwithstanding certain neglects or omis- sions in re2;ard to them. Neglects and omis- sioos as to fiaesin Wales auj Cheshire. Pt. III.T. 13, Ch. 2, s. 2. Importance of the sub- ject. Section II. Of the Oprro.tion of Fines. It is scarcely necessary to obsei'\'e to the legal reader, or, at least, to the practitioner, that, although fines and reco- veries have been abolished some years past, an accurate knowledge of the operation of those assurances will still be of the greatest practical importance, since the Act for their abolition does not set aside the force and effect of those le\-ied or suffered before the year 1834, tliousands of which will therefore continue most materially to affect the title to real property in this country. Such being the case, an attempt will here be made to give a succinct, yet accurate, well-defined, and perspicuous view of that subject, which, ox THE OPEEATIOX OF FIXES. 915 in our standard text-books, occupies a considerable space, pt-hi. t.is, and is involved in much intricacy, obscurity, and real or apparent discrepancy. A fine was completed when the concord was duly ac- when a fine J- '' was com- knowledged (/), and it began to operate from the return- ^^/g^flJ f^'^' day of the writ of covenant on which it was levied, which «P«'''^'e- was usually the first day of the term in which it was re- corded {g). A fine sur cognizance de droit come ceo, &c., without wiiat estate o It passed. any qualification in the concord or elsewhere, passed a fee simple, without the word " heirs " (/;). But it miglit be so qualified by express words in the concord, or even in some other deed connected with it, as to pass an estate in tail or for life {i). Fines of this sort vary in their efficacy, accordino- to the I's efficacy •^ •■' ' ^ vanes with ceremonies observed in completing them, the legal character gi'^"™"_ of the parties, and the conduct of the other persons whose rights were affected by them. And it would seem that they might operate in the following ways : — I. By way of conclusion or estoppel. Modes of 'J 'J -Li operation. II. As an ordinary conveyance, by way of grant, release, surrender, or confirmation. III. As an extinguishment of a right of entry or action. IV. As an extinguishment of a power appendant or in gross. V. As a revocation of a devise. VI. As a conveyance of the estate of a married woman, or as an extinguishment of her dower. VII. As a bar to the heirs in tail of the cognizor. VIII. As an instantaneous bar of contingent remainders. IX. As a simple devestment, without causing any bar in case of non-claim. (/ ) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 2, § 71. (A) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 3, § 13 ; {g) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 2, § 1 Prest. Conv. 202. 73—77. (0 la. s. 14 ; infra, p. 918. 916 ON THE OPERATION OF FINES. PT.ni.T.13, X. As a forfeiture. Ch. 2, s. 2, XI. Both as a clevestment, and as a bar in case of non- claim. XII. As a discontinuance, without causing any bar in case of non-claim. XIII. Both as a discontinuance, and as a bar in case of non-claim. XIV. As a bar in case of non-claim, without causing a devestment or discontinuance. A fine estops the parties. and their privies in blood aud estate. and their vendees, or devisees, &c. Illustration of privity iu hlood aud estate. I. Conclusion or Estoppel. Unless levied by a married woman alone, as such, a fine, whether it were levied Avith proclamations according to the statute or not, operates by estoppel, that is, it estops or prevents the parties, whether cognizors or cognizees, aud their privies in blood and estate, so far as they claim the same interest by the same title, from averring or proving anything contrary to the fine. And privies in blood and estate include those persons who, in order to make title to the estate, must claim immediately through or under the parties themselves, as heirs general to them, and also those who claim derivatively through or under such persons as heirs general to them. A fine likewise operates by estoppel as against vendees or devisees of the parties to it, or of their privies in blood and estate, claim- ing nnder instruments taking effect subsequently to the fine, and those claiming through or under such vendees or devisees, in privity of blood and estate, or as derivative vendees or devisees {j). To illustrate what is meant by privity of blood and estate, in reference to the doctrine of estoppel, we may observe, that, if the father disseised the grandfather of (,0 See 5 Cm. Dig. c. 12, 5 G ; 21, 30; Prcst. Conv. 2G0 ; Burt. 2 131. Com. 355 ; Pi-cst. Sliep. T. 3, Comp. § 79, n. SO, 83. ON THE OPERATION OF FINES. 917 land, of wliicli the latter was seised in fee simple, and pt.iii.t.i3, ' ^ Ch. 2, B. 2. then levied a fine of the land, and then the grandfather died, and afterwards the father died, the grandson was barred by the fine ; but, if the father had not survived the grandfather, the grandson would not have been bound (Z;), because the grandson would then have claimed as heir to the grandfather, and not as heir to the father. A fine had the operation above mentioned even when rineby parties none of the parties had any interest in the lands at the Jiaviug no ^ '' interest. time of levying the fine, and where it was consequently void as to strangers (I). Even if a feme covert levied a fine of her estate, but as Rne by a married a feme sole, the fine, unless avoided by the husband, bound woman, her and her heirs, because she and they were estopped from claiming anything in the lands, and could not be admitted to aver that she was a married woman, that beins; contrary to the record. But her husband might enter and defeat such fine, either during the coverture to restore himself to the freehold, which he held in right of his wife, or after her death to restore himself to his tenancy by the curtsey (w). But if she levied the fine alone, as a married woman, it was void, or at least might be avoided, even by the wife or her heirs (n). The issue in tail cannot be bound by estoppel, so as to Estoppel as ■^ ^^ ' agaliisttbe prevent them from asserting their right to the estate, issue in tail, because they do not claim from their immediate ancestor, but per formam doni (o). It has been decided, however, that, where the issue in tail levied a fine, without procla- mations, in his ancestor's lifetime, the fine so far operated by estoppel, as against himself, and those claiming through him as heirs in tail, as that, by force of the statute 27 (k) Prest. Shep. T. 21. Sliep. T. 7. (0 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 5, § 36, [n) Id. c. 5, s. 13 ; 1 Prest. Conv. and c. 12, § 6, 7 ; Prest. Shep. T. 255. G, 14 ; Burt. Comp. § 80, S3. (o) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 3G, c. 2, § 57 ; {m) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 5, § 11 ; Pros. Shep. T. 14. y2 918 ON THE OPERATION OF FINES. ^cb^'1'1^' ■'^^^^'" "'"' ^' ^ ^^^ fiiiibus levatis), it prevented them from averring quod partes finis niliil habnerunt; and that as soon as the issue in tail succeeded to tlie estate, the in- terest which then existed fed the estoppel Qj). Oper.itiouof The Operation of a fine, whether it enm'es by way of a tine may be qualified. estoppcl Only or not, may be qualified by another assur- ance so connected with it that both form parts of one and the same transaction ; so that the fine, though of itself ac- knowledging the existence of an absolute fee simple in the cognizee, may be rendered sul^ervient to the particular uses of such assurance, and to the intention of the parties (q). Hence, if A. enfeoffed B. of certain land in fee, rendering rent, with a condition of re-entry for non-payment, and, by indenture covenanted to levy a fine of the same land to the uses and conditions in the deed of feoffinent, the rent and condition were not extinguished by the fine, but remained (?■). II. An ordinary Conveyance. A fine, whether with or without proclamations, might be employed to effect the same purposes as those which are accomplished under the same or other circumstances by an ordinary conveyance, by way of grant, release, surrender, or confirmation. j^)hit tenlntT Thus, a fiuc Icvicd by one joint tenant to his companion aSas'e^''* Operated as a release; for, each joint tenant being seised per my et per tout before the fine, and the cognizor being estopped by the fine from claiming any estate in the land, the seism per tout, which the other had before the fine, became freed from the participation therein of the cog- nizor, so that the other became thenceforth seised per tout {li) Doc (I. Thomas v. Jones, 1 VI.; and see Tyrrell v. Marsh, 3 Twynv. 506 ; see infra, XII. Eing. 31 ; S. C, 10 Moore, 305. (5) See Co. Litt. 342 b.,. u. (1), (r) Shep. T. 35. ON THE OT'KKATIOX OF FINES. 919 simply, iust as ho would have been had the comizor died pt.ih.t.is, ^ -^ ' •> '=' Qu, 2, H. 2. before him. And if one coparcener in tail levied a fine Fine between to another coparcener, it operated as a grant. And if a ^°^,^^^tf°"^g tenant in tail made a bargain and sale in fee, and then -^sraut. ^ Fine by a levied a fine to the bargainee, the fine operated as a con- tenant in taii, '^ ^ operating as lirmation of the estate which passed by the bargain and ^^0^°''™*" sale. So, if a tenant in tail made a lease not warranted by the statute, confessed a judgment, made a mortgage, or incumbered his estate in any other manner, and after- wards levied a fine with proclamations, it operated as a confirmation of all his prior charges and incumbrances (s), because, by barring the estate tail, it deprived the issue in tail of that right to avoid the estate passed by the bargain and sale, or the charges and incumbrances, which the issue would otherwise have had. A fine whicli could only operate by estopel at first. Fine operat- ing first by miu;ht, in some cases, at length take effect as a convey- tstopi)ei ana o ' ' J of uses!' '^^'"" ration of uses ; because the use resulted to the husband, and a new right to dower accrued (h). VII. A Bar to the Heirs in tail of the Cognizor. A fine was a By forcc of tlic stat. 4 Hen. 7, c. 24, explained by the bar to lineal "^ ' ^ s: J ijeirs^n tail, g|;r^t_ 32 Heu. 8, c. ?yQ), a fiuc, if levied vntli proclamations, Miiuwi^^ &c. ^'^^^ ^-^y ^ legal tenant in tail in possession, remainder, or re- version, operated as an instantaneous bar to all the lineal heirs in tail of the cognizor, and to all his collateral rela- tions who were privy to him in blood and estate, that is, to all his collateral kindred, who, in order to take under the entail, must have claimed as collateral heirs to him (the cognizor) or his issue ; and the fine is also a bar to all who Examples. claim Under him or them in other ways. So that, if a tenant in tail had two sons, and the eldest levied a fine in the lifetime of the father, and the estate tail descended to him or his issue, the fine barred the younger brother and his issue, as well as his own issue. But if the eldest son died in the lifetime of the father without issue, his fine did not bar his younger brother ; because, the estate tail having never become vested in the eldest son or his issue, the second son did not claim as collateral heir to the eldest (a) See 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 10, p. 201. § 5-22 ; Co. Litt. 121 a., n. (1) ; (6) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 10, § Burt. Comp. § 1369. See supra, IG— 19. ON THE OPERATION OF FIXES, 923 son or liis issue, but as liucal heir of the father (c). And pt. iit.t.is, ^ ^ Cu. 2, s. 2. if a tenant in tail had three sons, and the second levied a tine with proclamatious, the fine never could bar the eldest son or his issue ; and it couhl not bar the youngest son and his issue, unless the estate tail descended to the second son or his issue ; so that, if the second son died without issue in the lifetime of the eldest son or his issue, who survived the father, the third son was not liarred by the tine, because he claimed as collateral heir to his eldest brother or his issue (d). It may be expedient to observe to the student, that, if limitations are made in favour of the first and other sons successively in tail, a line levied by an elder son or his issue would not bar the younger sons or their issue, except in case of non-claim ; because, in this case, each son has a distinct entail. A fine had the effect above described, even though levied Fine by the issue in tail, by the issue in tail in the lifetime of the tenant in tail, or or by a ■^ tenaut in tail by a tenant in tail during a disseisin of his estate, or by l^y ouf^Jho'" one who had but a contingent interest in tail (e), and even conti'ngert though it might be defeated by a stranger (/). But a fine, tairorby .. "^ the ancestor With proclamations, levied by the ancestor subsequently to <-<.««'■ one by a fine or other assurance of his issue in tail, was an instan- taneous bar to the persons claiming under such fine or assurance of the issue in tail, as much as to the issue them- selves ([/). It is to be observed, that the lineal descendants of the Lineal cognizor, the tenant in tail, are barred in all cases : the col- ban-edinaii cases. lateral kindred in i;)articular cases only. If the coouizor is couaterai -■- i/ o kmared, in tenant in tail in possession, the fine is an instantaneous ^o™'^*^^^^^^ (c) See 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 9, Pros. Shep. T. 3, 6, 13, 14, 21, 24, § 30—33 ; Pros. Shep. T. 26 ; 1 26 ; 1 Prest. Conv. 218, 306. Prest. Conv. 21S. (/) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. .?5, c. 9, § 45 ; (d) Pres. Shep. T. 27 ; 1 Prest. 1 Prest. Conv. 297, 298. Conv. 309. (rj) See 5 Cm. Dig. tit. 35, e. 9, § (e) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 9, § 24 ; 23 ; Shep. T. 26. 924 ON THE OPERATION OF FINES. Pt. Tir.T.i3, l)ar to tlie whole estate tail in possession of which he is Cii. 2, s. 2. ^ seised : it is a bar to all his collateral kindred, so far as they are inlieritable in respect of that estate tail, as con- tradistinguished from any estate tail in remainder or rever- sion, as well as to his lineal descendants, so far as they are inheritable in respect thereof. But, if the cognizor is not tenant in tail in possession, the fine is not necessarily a bar t6 the whole estate tail. It is a bar, indeed, to all his lineal descendants, so far as they are inheritable in respect of the estate tail of which he is seised in remainder or rever- sion, or to which he is the expectant heir, as contradistin- guished from any other estate tail in the same property to which they may be inheritable ; but it is no bar to those of his collateral kindred (if any), who, in case he himself is not the donee of the entail, are inheritable before him, such as an elder brother ; and it is a bar to his collateral kindred inheritable after him in respect of the same estate tail, only in case such estate tail descends, or, but for the fine, would have descended, to him or one of his lineal de- scendants ; or, in other words, only in case of his or one of them becoming heir cle facto to the entail (A). The Court of Chancery gives the same effect to fines levied of equitable estates tail as that Avhich belongs to fines of legal estates tail (?'). To the rule above laid down respecting the operation of fines levied by tenants in tail, there are two exceptions. First, a tenant in tail by the gift or provision of the Crown for services is disabled by the stat. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 10, from barring the entail, while a remainder or reversion continues in the Crown (j). And, secondly, a fine by a woman, tenant in tail of lands of the gift of her hus- Equitable estates tail. Exceptions wliere an estate tail is not barred. (A) See authorities cited in the preceding paragraphs, and 1 Prest. Conv. 219, 307, 308. (/) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. .35, c. 10, § 36 ; Biirt. Comp. § 1369, n. (/) Co. Litt. 373 a. ; Pres. Shep. T. 15; 1 Prest. Conv. 221; Burt. Comp. § 707. ON THE OrEEATION OF FINES. 925 band or any of liis ancestors, may, in certain cases, bo pt.hi.t.is, Ch. 2j S, J* avoided. If a tenant in tail accepted a fine from a stranger, it had ftrangeAo a no operation ; but if lie made a grant and render of some- taS?"^' ^ thing that was entailed, it would bar the issue when exe- cuted in possession (h). A fine ivithout proclamations was no bar either to the Pine without J- proclama- issue in tail or to strangers (l). *'^'"^- In the case of an entailed rent, a fine levied of the land ^^''i;^"'.^'^ ' eutail of a out of which it issued would bar the entail of the rent ; '''^"'" but, properly, the fine ought to have been of the rent, and not of the land («?.). VIII. An instantaneous Bar of CoiUingent Remainders. Where a fine sur cognizance de droit come ceo, &c., was levied by the owner of an estate for life or in tail in pos- session, and the legal fee simple was not vested in trustees, it occasioned the destruction, or, in other words, it operated as an instantaneous bar of contingent remainders which were expectant on such estate for life or in tail, and were unsupported by any other estate of freehold, unless the operation of the fine were so qualified by the express words of the concord, or by some deed connected with it, such as a deed to lead or declare the uses thereof, as to pass no more than might rightfully pass (ii). There is no necessity for the continuance of a preced- ing particular estate of freehold to preserve contingent re- mainders, where the legal estate in fee is vested in trustees ; for that legal estate will be sufficient to preserve them (o). (/.■) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 9, § 41, terests, § 766, 767, 770 ; 5 Cru. Dig. 42. Tit. 35, c. 3, § 14 ; Davics \. Bush, {I) Pres. Shep. T. 20. M'CIel. & You. 88. (m) Pres. Sliep. T. 25. (o) Smitli's Executory Interests, (w) See Smith's Executory In- §783. 926 ON THE orEllATION OF FINES. Pt. III.T.13, Ch. 2, s. 2. Fine without proclama- tions by a tenant lor life in possession. Changes in the law relative to the bar by non-claim. Fine at couinion law IX. A svmph Dcvestment, tvithout a Bar in case of Non-claim. If the owner of an iniinediatc legal estate for life in actual possession levied a fine of the first kind, vjithoitt proclamations, and the operation of it was not restricted to such an interest as might rightfully pass, it caused a simple devestment, that is, a turning of the estates in re- mainder or reversion into rights of entry, without causing any bar by or in case of non-claim specifically so called, that is, a non-claim within the stat, 4 Hen. 7, c. 24, as distinguished from a non-claim within the Statute of Limitations. Originally, indeed, a fine, like a judgment in a real action, was a bar from the moment it was completed. And although this was altered some time at the latter end of the reign of Hen. 3, or the beginning of the reign of Edw. 1, and the fine was no longer an instantaneous bar, yet it was allowed to form a perfect bar, unless claim were made against it within a year and a day ; and this was affirmed by the statute 18 Edw. 1, st. 4, usually called the statute De Modo levandi Fines. But by the statute 34 Edw. 1, c. 16, the bar by non-claim on a fine was entirely removed ; and though the statute 4 Hen. 7, c. 24, afterwards enacted that non-claim within the period therein specified should be a bar, yet that was only in the case of fines proclaimed in the manner required by that statute ; and that statute did not repeal the statute 34 Edw. 1, c. 16, nor prohilnt, but expressly permitted, the levying of fines as they were theretofore levied. If, therefore, a fine was not proclaimed in the manner directed by the statute 4 Hen. 7, or afterwards, in the manner dkected by the statute 31 Eliz. c. 2, by which the statute 4 Hen. 7, was amended, it was subject to the ON THE OPERATION OF FINES. 927 statute 34 Edw. 1, c. 16, and consequently, was no bar in ^(^;,"J-'^-\^' case of non-claim, specifically so called {p). Still, when levied by the owner of an immediate legal estate for life in actual possession, without being restricted to such an estate as he might lawfully pass, and without the concurrence of the person or persons in remainder or reversion as joint cognizor or cognizors with the tenant for life, it devested the estates in remainder or rever- sion {q), so as to turn them into rights of entry, and sub- ject them to the consequences attached to non-claim by the Statute of Limitations in case the persons in remainder or reversion failed to enter, and so as to render them in- capable of being transferred or devised (r). When there was an estate to A. for years, remainder to B. for life, remainder to C. in tail, &c., a fine levied by B. while A. was in possession would not devest the remain- ders, because the possession of A. was a continuance of the seisin to C, {s). X, A Forfeiture. Such an act, however, of a tenant for life, or his accept- F">c by or ' ^ -•- to a tenant ance of a fine come ceo, &c., from a stranger, was an act of f°^l'i^®,:':?„ ' ^ O ' ])OSSe3310D, forfeiture of the estate for life, even thoucfh he mio-ht have a remote estate of inheritance ; so that the person in im- mediate remainder or reversion might, if he chose, enter immediately, and thereby exclude the cognizor and cog- nizee, and restore all the estates devested by the fine {t). A fine come ceo, &c., levied by a tenant for life of thino's if^ied of ' ' 'J o things lu grant. {p) See 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, cc. 8, 226 ; Burt. Comp. § 741, 744. 9, and c. 2, § 79, SO ; Burt. Comp. (s) 1 Pres. Conv. 220. § 77—104. {t) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 12, § (g) Pres. Shep. T. G, 28, 32. 27, 30, 31 ; Co. Litt. 233 b., n. (1) ; (»•) See 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 12, Pres. Shep. T. 14, 32 ; 1 Pres. Conv. § 11, and tit. 13, c. 1, § 15 ; G Cru. 201 ; Burt. Comp. § 741, 744. See Dig. tit. 38. c. 3, § 30 ; Pres. Sliep. supra, p. 5G7. T. 14, 32 ; 1 Prest. Conv. 20G, 207, 928 ON THE OPEKATION OF FINES. Pt.III.T.13, Cn. 2, s. 2. Fiue cnme ceo, &c., by a touaut for yeara. Fine sur concessit. Fine by a cestui que trust for life. Fine by a copyliolder. Fine levied of a maiital estate. ill grant, such as a rent or an advowson, worked a forfei- ture, altliougli a line of tilings in grant passed no more than what might lawfully pass («). So, although a fine come ceo, &c., by a tenant for years did not create any bar, yet it worked a forfeiture. But a fine sur concessit would not work a forfeiture, because not only would not that assurance actually pass more than what lawfully might pass, but being as appropriately used for conveying an estate for life or years as for conveying a fee, it did not of itself import an attempt to do an unlawful act (x). 'No fine levied by a cestui que trust for life would be allowed in Chancery to operate as a forfeiture, because it could not afiect a remainder (t/). If a copyholder levied a fine of his copyhold, it worked a forfeiture (z). The law respecting a fine levied by a woman of an estate which moved from her husband or any of his ancestors, or by a husband alone v/ho was seised in right of his wife, will be found in a subsequent page. Fine with proclama- tions by a tenant for life in posses- sion. XI, A Devestment, and a Bar in case of Non-claim. If the owner of an immediate legal estate for life in actual possession levied a fine with proclamations, and the operation of it was not restricted to such an interest as might rightfully pass, it operated both as a devestment, and as a bar in case of non-claim, by barring all strangers, that is, all who were neither parties nor privies (with the excep- tions noticed infra, XIV.), in case they failed to enter within the period allowed by the Statute of Non-claim, 4 Hen. 7, c. 2i («). (m) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 12, § 32 ; Pet, 11 Ad. & Ell. 842. Burt. Comp. § 745. See supra, {y) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 12, § p. 5G7. 35. Gr) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 12, § 33, (r.) Id. c. 12, § 3G. 34 ; and c. 3, g 21 ; Doe d. Blight v. (a) See 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 10 ; ON THE OPERATION OF FINES. 929 Three different periods arc fixed by tlio statute in dif- pt.iii.t.is, ■•• ' C'n. 2, s. 2. ferent cases : — — Periods for 1. By the terms or effect of the first saving, strangers claiming, wlio had a present riglit of entry or action at tlie time of the first saving in tlie ingrossinoj of tlie fine, and were under no disability, favour of ■^ *- , "^ persons who and those claiming under them, were allowed five years Jjfjl,^'' i"'^^"'* from the last proclamation. So that if a tenant in tail was disseissed, and the dis- seissor levied a fine with proclamations, the tenant in tail might defeat the fine at any time within five years from the last proclamation, or, if ho died Avithiu the five years, his issue might avoid it within those five years, but not afterwards (h). 2. By the terms or effect of the second saving, strangers Period under •^ O' o tlie second who were under no disability, and to whom a present f^vou^o't riglit of entry or action, after the levying of the fine, from whom'aiMgiit , , • , n n n 1 ^ ^ accrued alter any cause or matter prior to the fine, first accrued, and the fine, those claiming under them, were allowed five years from the time when such right so accrued. So that if a tenant in tail made a conveyance, and the grantee levied a fine, the issue in tail had five years from the death of his father to avoid the fine : because such issue was the first to whom the right accrued after the fine was levied ; for his father could not enter against his own conveyance. And where there was a term for years existing at the intervening •^ ® term for time when an estate for life or in tail determined, the re- y^'^'-'^- mainderman or reversioner was allowed five years from the determination of such term. If the ow^nership of a term was vacant for want of letters Term the , . . ownership of of administration of the effects of the last owner at the ^i^'ch was vacant. time when the last proclamation was made, or when the Pres. Shop. T. 3, 6 ; Slicp. T. 14, (b) See 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 11, 2:3, 28, 32 ; 1 Presfc. Conv. 225, 300 ; § 1—5 ; Prest. Conv. 23G— 239 ; Hurt. Comp. § 90. Shop. T. 22, 23, 30. 930 ON THE OPERATION OF FINES. ■^ch^^'s' 2^' ^'%^^^ would have accrued to the owner, if tliere had been one in existence, non-claim did not begin to run till the grant of letters of administration. remafnders. "^^^ owucr of cacli successive remainder was allowed five years from the determination of all the particular estates anterior to his remainder. But if he, or any other stranger to whom a title first accrued after the fine, not being under disability at the time of the accruer of his right, did not pursue it within the five years, those claiming under him were barred, as well as himself. Pine by a If a man levied a fine of land whereof his wife was dow- husband. able, she was thereby barred of her dower, unless she claimed within five years from her husband's death. Distinct ^ strano-er, Avho had distinct rights accruing at different rights. o > o o times, was allowed five years after the accruing of each title (c). Period under 3. Bv tlic temis or cffcct of tlic third saving, strangers the third "^ O' o faTOuf l" ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^ present right of entry or action at the time of undeT* the last proclamation, but were then under coverture, under ^^ ' ' ^' age, in prison, out of the realm, or not of whole mind, and strangers to whom a present right of entry or action accrued after the levying of the fine, from any cause or matter prior to the fine, and who were then under any of the above- mentioned disabilities, and those claiming under them, were allowed five years from the removal of such disabilities. If they died under disability, those claiming under them were allowed five years from their death, or, in case the latter were themselves under disability or disabilities, five years from the removal of such disability or disabilities. But when once the five years allowed for avoiding a fine began to run, the time continued to run against the person having the right, and his heirs general, or heirs of the body, or (c) As to these paragraphs relat- Pres. Shep. T. 20, 22, 23, 30, 32, 33, ing to the second saving, see 5 Cru. 34 ; 1 Prest. Conv. 238, 240. Dig. tit. 35, c. 11, §7-15, 18—31 ; ON THE OPERATION OF FIXES. 931 personal representatives, according to the nature of tlie ^^•JY's'f' estate, notwithstanding any subsequent disability, whether voluntary or not. So that if a person who had a present right of entry or action in respect of an estate of freehold was under no disability at the time of the last proclama- tion, or if a person to whom a right first accrued after the fine in respect of an estate of freehold was under no dis- ability at the time when his right so accrued, the claim must have been made by him or his heir within live years from that time, even though he died or fell under disability Ijcfore the expiration of that period, or although his heir was under age, or under any other disability, at the time of his (the ancestor's) decease (d^. XII. A Discoiitmuance, loitliout a Bar in case of Non-claim. If a tenant in tail in possession (though subject to a Finewith- term) levied a hue of corporeal hereditaments without pro- ™^g|°^''^^t'|^ clamations, as an original assurance, or as part of an *egg|^n^'°^' original assurance, — as, where he levied a fine in the first instance, or conveyed by lease and release, and then levied a fine in pursuance of a covenant contained in the release, — in such case the fine operated as a discon- Definition ■^ of a discon- tinuance, which, as it existed in more modern times, may timiauco. be defined to be, a devestment of an estate tail in things lying in livery, and of the estates in remainder or reversion, and a turning of them into mere rights of action, by a feoff- ment, fine, or recovery, of a tenant in tail in possession. But, even an ordinary conveyance, if accompanied with warranty, of a tenant in tail in possession, opera,ted as a discontinuance so far as regarded the issue in tail, though not as regarded the estates in remainder or reversion {c). {d) See 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 11, (c) Sec 5 Cm. Dig. tit. 35, c. 8, § § 33—57 ; Pres. Shep. T. 20, 22, 23, 21, and c. 12, § KJ, 17, 20—24 ; Co. 311, 31 ; 1 rrest.Couv. 211, 242. Lilt. 325 a, n. (I) ; 326 b, n. (1) ; 1)32 ON THE OPERATION OF FINES. Pt. I1I.T.13, Cii. 2, s. 2. Fines with- out procla- mations by tlie issue iu tail. Illustration ottho meau- ing of an oritjinal assurance. If the issue in tail, as wc have abeady observed, levied a fine, without proclamations, in his ancestor's lifetime, the fine so far operated by estoppel as against liim, and those claiming through liim as heirs in tail, as that, by force of the statute 27 Edw. 1, c. 1, De finibus levatis, it prevented them from averring quod partes finis niliil habuerunt ; and, as soon as the issue in tail succeeded to the entail, the estate which then existed fed the estoppel. And the fine having created an estate in this way, by its operating fkst as an estoppel in the ancestor's lifetime, and after- wards as a conveyance after his decease, if the fine was levied with warranty, it had, by reason of the warranty which was annexed to the estate so created, the effect of a discontinuance, so far as the issue in tail were concerned, so tliat in such case their right of entry was taken away (/). In illustration of what is meant by the above expression, " an original assurance," it may be observed, that, if lands were given to A. and the heirs male of his body, the re- mainder to B. and the heirs male of his body, the re- mainder to the right heirs of A., and A. bargained and sold the land by deed indented and inroUed to J. S. and his heirs, and afterwards levied a fine of it sur cognizance de droit come ceo, &c., as a distinct assurance, to him and his heirs, by this the remainder to B. was not discontinued, but the estate of the bargainee lasted so long as there was issue inheritable under the entail, and then determined without entry. But if the fine had been before the bargahi and sale, or as part of that assurance, it would have been a discontinuance of the remainder, and a bar to the re- 327 a, n. (2) I. ; 330 a, ii. (1) ; 332 a, n. (1) ; 333 a, u. (1) ; 335 a ; 372 b, n. (1); Litt. ss. 598, GOl, 637; Co. Litt. 339 a; Pres. Sliep. T. 3, 35 ; 1 Prest. Conv. 203— 20G, 213, 299 ; Burt. Comp. § 098; Lord Lyudhursifs remarks in Doe d. Thomas V. Jones, 1 Tyrw. 50G ; Doe d. CooiKr v. Finch, 4 B. & Ad. 233. (y) Doe d. Thomas v. Jones, 1 Tyrw. 50G. ON THE OPERATION OF FINES. 933 maiiidermaii in case lie failed to claim within five years ^^-i^-^-i^' '' Ch. 2, s. 2. after the remainder came in possession (^). The effect of a discontinuance was, that the estates so Conse- ' quences of discontinued were subjected to the Statute of Limitations, ti^^^nTel 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, whereby a formedon (an action abolished by the stat. 3 & 4 "Will. 4, c. 27, s. 36) must have been l)rought within twenty years after the right of action accrued, unless the party laboured under any of the dis- abilities there specified (Ji). But the fine in such case was no bar in the event of non-claim, under the stat. 4 Hen. 7, because it was not proclaimed. Another consequence of a discontinuance was, that, as the estates of the persons in remainder and reversion were converted into mere rights of action, their interest could not be granted over or devised {%). To the operation of a fine as a discontinuance, an ex- Exception in ■^ the case of a ception occurred w^here the remaiiider or reversion was remainder or •L reversion in in the Crown. By the common law, such a remainder or *^® ^^'°^"" reversion could never be devested ; and the stat. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 20, prohibited a tenant in tail, by the gift of the Crown, as a reward for services, from barring even his own issue (/). XIII. A Discontinuance; and a Bar in case of Non- claim. If proclamations were made, and the remainder or rever- Fine with •"- proclama- sion was not in the Crown, the fine so levied by a tenant teuanun tail in tail in possession as an original assm^ance, or as part of '" po^sessiou. an original assurance, was an immediate bar to the entail, {g) Pres. Shep. T. 27 ; see also Id. tit. 38, c. 3, § 30. 29,33,35; 1 Prest. Conv. 205. (j) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 9, § {It) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c, 8, § 21 ; 55, c. 13, § 27 ; and tit. 36, c. 10, Pres. Shep. T. 32, n. (39). § 41, 42 ; Co. Litt. 335 a ; 372 b, 0') See 1 Prest. Conv. 206 ; 2 Cru. u. (3) ; Burt. Comp. § 707. Dig. tit. 13, c. 1, § 15; 6 Cru. Dig. 934 ON THE OPEEATIOX OF FINES. pt. iii.t.13, and both a discontinuance, and a bar in case of non-claim, Ch. 2, s. 2. ' as against all strangers, with the excerptions noticed infra, XIV (/.•). Fine by a And the Same was the case if a tenant in tail made a tcnaut iu tail alter creating i^asc foi life, and then levied a fine with proclamations (I); a derivative ' ^ ^ ' possesskL''^ because there was no just reason why he should lose his power over the estates in remainder and reversion merely because ho had created a derivative estate for life out of his estate tail : for although, as regards such derivative estate, he had only a reversion, yet the relation of his estate tail to the estates expectant on it remained the same as at first. As regarded the estates limited by the instrument under which he claimed, he was still seised of the prior estate ; and that Ijeing an estate tail, he not only originally possessed, but also continued to retain, the power of discontinuing the estates in remainder and reversion, so as to subject them to the bar in case of non- claim. XIV. A Bar in case of Non-claim, tvitJiout a Dcvcstmcnt or Discontinuance. Bar of right In cacli of tlic cascs abovc noticed, in which the cognizor of entry or _ action. ^yf^g gg situatcd that the line was both a devestment or discontinuance and a bar in case of non-claim, it might operate in the latter way only, that is, as a bar in case of non-claim, in regard to estates which had been previously converted into rights of entry or action. Fine by a So, a fiuc by a person seised in fee simple in possession, person seised ./ j. x j. ' in !!f=,l!.°=?^''' whether by right or by wrong, barred the rights or interests ID possession, «/ o j o^ o of strangers in case of non-claim, though, from the nature of the case, there could be no actual estate in the land for the fine to devest or discontinue. And it is conceived that a fine by a person seised in fee simple in remainder (/.) See 4 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 8, § d. Gilbert v. Ross, 7 Mees. & W. 102. 21, and c. 9 ; Trcs. Shop. T. 3 ; Doc (I) Salrin v. Clerl; Cro. Cm: ICG. remainder, or reversion. ON THE OPEK.VTION OF FINES. 935 or reversion had the same effect of baiTm<:>' the ridits or tt.iii.t.is, ^ ^ Ch, 2, 3. 2. interests of strangers who had no actual estate in the lands (m), though, of course, it did not affect a preced- ing estate of freehold (^n) ; because that would have been obviously a mere injustice, for which there could be no pretext whatever : and, the estate of the cognizor being a fee simple, of course there could be no remainder or reversion to discontinue or devest. And where a fine sur cognizance de droit come ceo, &c., ^"leby a o ' ' remainder- was used for the conveyance of a remainder for life or in ™™ ^°["i/''^° tail, expectant upon a particular estate of freehold, it would seem that it might operate as a bar in case of non-claim, in regard to persons wlio had a mere right, when it would not discontinue, devest, or bar those who had actual estates in the lands. It is certain that, if a fine of this kind was levied by a tenant for life or in tail in remainder, even though the tenant for life in possession joined in the fine, it would not clistin^b the preceding freehold, or the ulterior estate, if any, in remainder or reversion, but had the same effect in that respect as a fine of the second or third kind, which would only operate as a grant of the conusor's estate, without invading or affecting the estate of any other person (o). And where a tenant in tail, after having Fine by a assigned dower, levied a fine, it did not affect the estate tail' after ... . . assigning limited in remainder after his estate tail as to the part ^ower. assigned as dower ; because, as to that part, the tenant in tail had no immediate estate of freehold (i)). Yet we have Fine by a tenant for seen that a fine by one who was only a tenant for life, if life in ■^ '^ possession. he was in possession, would devest the estates expectant on his freehold. The reason of the difference would seem Reason of tiie to be this : the tenant for life in possession frequently tiie effect of (hi) See 1 Prest. Conv. 258, 259. Bmdons Case, 1 Eep. 76. (n) Burt. Comp. § 76, 98. {p) See 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 14, (o) Pres. Shep. T. 27, 29 ; 1 Prest. § 63. Conv. 226 ; Burt. Comp. § 76, 98; 936 ON THE OPERATION OF FINES. Pt. TILT. 13, Cu. 2, s. 2. his fine and that of a re- mainderman ia regard to devesting and barring ulterior estates. Construction of tlie Stat, of Non- claim. appears, prima facie, to be the owner of the iiilieritance, and lie mialit sometimes be mistaken for the owner thereof by a pnrchaser in very early times, when land was often transferred by livery of seisin without deed ; and there- fore the law, which always discouraged laches, would not suffer the possession under the fine to be disturbed, unless the party entitled to the remainder or reversion entered within a limited time. But a remainderman is not the ostensible owner of the property, and therefore there is not the same reason why his fine should have l^een allowed to devest any ulterior estate ; on the contrary, it would have been an encouragement to fraud to have permitted the fine, in such a case, to affect the estates of other persons. Now, as the preceding and the ulterior estates could not be devested by the fine of an intervening remainderman, so neither could they be barred by non-claim on his fine ; for non-claim on a fine would not bar any estate or interest which was not devested out of the owner, or in a state of adverse claim ; because, if the estate was not devested or in a state of adverse claim, there could be no necessity or reason for a claim [q)] and therefore, when the Statute of Non-claim (4 Hen. 7) enacts that strangers shall be l)arred, unless they "take their actions and entry" within the time prescribed, it pre-supposes that the interests of such strangers shall have been converted into, or were in their nature, mere rights ; and consequently it does not bar those whose estates w^ere not devested; and hence a fine by a remainderman ^vould not bar any ulterior vested remainder or reversion. But it would seem that a fine by the owner of any subsequent interest of freehold would bar a right of entry or action, in case of non-claim, by force of the express words of the statute, though it would not bar a preceding or a subsequent estate {r). (q) 5 Cm. Dig. c. 13 ; Pres. Sliep, (r) See 1 Prest. Con v. 259, 300. T. 23 ; Co. Litt. 332 b, n. (1). ox THE OPEEATION OF FINES. 937 There were several cases iii wliicli non-claim on a fine, pt. iii.t.is, Cn. 2, s. 2. altliouo'li duly proclaimed, was no bar : 7~ -y- o J I- ' Where a fiou, 1. A fine was absolutely void, as far as strangers were *]j°"i|'jj^^'^'^ concerned, if none of the parties, at the time of levying '■''^^^°^'^^'- 1. Where the fine, had an estate of freehold. But, if either the "O''^. ^-f the ' ' parties had cognizor or the cognizee had a freehold estate, the fine a"y ^'eeii^id. was not void, even as to strangers (s) ; for the words of the statute are, " saving to every person or persons not party nor privy to the said fine, their exception to avoid the same fine, by that, — that those who were parties to the fine, nor any of them, nor no person or persons to their use, nor to tlie use of any of them, had nothing in the lands and tenements comprised in the said fine at the time of the said fine levied " (t). The author of " The Touchstone " and Mr. Preston have whether a flue by or to laid it down, that a fine by or to a remainderman or rever- ^ rcmainder- •^ man or sioner cannot be avoided by the plea quod partes finis nihil co^i^ff""^''" habuerunt (u). And this opinion, which was also the thepfeliof opinion of Mr. Burton (x), clearly seems to be in accord- toiLnihir^ ance with the words of the statute above quoted, and to be the correct view. Mr. Cruise, however, states that this opinion is erroneous, and then proceeds to give some cases, by which, as he supposed, the contrary doctrine was esta- blished (?/). But, to the writer of these pages these cases appear only to show what we liave already seen to be the case, namely, that a fine by a remainderman or reversioner w^ould not affect the owner of the preceding freehold or the ulterior remainderman or reversioner, though, as to other strangers, it would operate as a bar in case of non-claim. And it would have this effect as well in favour of the pre- ceding freeholder and the ulterior remainderman or rever- (s) Burt. Comp. § 96, 101 ; 1 Cony. 258. Prest. Conr. 223, 258. (•«) Burt. Comp. § 96. (t) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 5, § 21 ; {>/) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 14, § Burt. Comp. § 95. Gl— 63. (u) Pros. Sliep. T.,13, 29 ; 1 Prest. 938 ON THE OPERATIOX OF FIXES. I'T. Iir.T.13, C'li. a . s. 2. A frccliokl by wronu was suflioiunt. What will give a seisin by wrung. Keccijit of rent, by a person claiming as Leir. AVror.tjfiil coiitinnance of an origin- ally rigblful permissive liossescion. sioiiei', a,s of the cognizor, because it is a general rule, tliat all acts by the OAvner of a particular estate and tlie owner of a remainder or reversion enure to the benefit of each other, if made on the foundation of their common seisin or privity, and not adversely (z). A fine was valid as to strangers as well as parties and privies, even though the estate of freehold in the cognizor or cognizee was only an estate by wrong, whether gained by a feoffment or otherwise (a). So that a fine, wdth pro- clamations, hy a disseisor, barred an ejectment, unless there was an actual entry wdthin five years from the levy- ing the fine (b). "With regard to wliat is sufficient to give a seisin by wrong, Lord Hardwicke considered that the same acts that are sufficient to gain a seisin, when done by a person wdio has right, are not sufficient in the case of a w^'ong-doer, but he ought to have a continuance of possession, wdthout interruption, to gain a seisin (c). And if one of two persons who claim an estate as heir to anotlier levies a fine before receipt of any rent, and afterwards obtains a A^erdict, and rent is paid to him for a period antecedent to the fine, but the other party subsequently succeeds in establishing his claim, the reception of rent l)y the former wdll not be taken to be evidence of a seisin by relation : for fictions and relations in law are only good to support right, and consequently the fine will not operate as a bar to the eject- ment of the other party {d). And Avhere a younger son, who managed his father's property, continued in possession for several years after his father's decease, claiming as heir to his fi^ther, on the ground of the illegitimacy of an elder (z) Pres. Sliep. T. 29 ; 1 Trcst. Conv. 258, 259. (a) 1 Prest. Conv. 22-1, 225, 258, 262, 301 ; Davics v. Lowndes, in error, G JMan. & Gr. 521. (h) Doc d. Anderson and Wife v. Thomas, 1 C. & P. 91. (c) 3 Atk. 336, quoted 5 Cru. Dig. c. 5, § 34. (d) Doe d. Lcdyhlrd v. Lawson, 8 B. & C. 606. ON THE OPERATION OF FINES. 039 soil, and levied a fine, such fine would not oi^icratc ; because, tt. iii.t.is, ' -^ ' ' Cn. 2, a. 2. by the mere wrongful continuance of an originally right- fnl permissive possession, no freehold is acquired, evTU by wrong ; such a continuance of the possession not amount- ing to a disseisin, abatement, or intrusion {c). But, ordi- felrl alnst narily, if the heir entered, notwithstanding a devise in '^°^'^'-'°- lavour of another person, and levied a fine, it barred the devisee after five years' non-claim ( /). And if a person Euiiybya J \o / L devisee entered under a void devise, he thereby acquired a free- devj^^e^™''' hold by abatement ; so that if he levied a fine it was a bar in case of non-claim {g). 2. Where the possession of the coG;nizor was the posses- 2. Whoro the ^ o J. cognizoi's sion of a third person, such person was not barred by the ^°f^^e°" fine and non-claim; because it was necessary that the aThw'"""*^ party levying the fine should have a possession adverse to ^"^°"" that of the person to l^e barred, for otherwise there would be no occasion for a claim (Ji). Thus, in case of non-claim a fine was a bar to a term of Terms for years. years in those cases only where the possession of the cog- nizor was not the possession of the termor. And hence, where a purchaser at the time of his contract was not aware of a term, and its existence would have endangered or affected his title, a fine levied with five years' non-claim would have operated as a bar to the trustee of the term {i). But an attendant term is not barred by a fine levied by the owner of the fee, if it was not his intention that the term should be barred {j). So, where a lessor continued in possession, and levied a (c) Doc d. Davis v. Davis, 12 {h) 5 Cm. Dig. tit. 35, c. 13, §12. Trice, Tofi. Eut see c. 11, § 33—35, and c. 13, (/) 5 Cm. Dig. tit. 35, c. 5, § 28 ; § 11. Co. Litt. 240 b, n. (2) ; 1 Prcst. (/) 3 Sugd. V. & P. 2, pi. 2 ; 5 Conv. 224 ; Doe d. Cadioaladcr v. Cm. Dig. tit. 35, c. 10, § 41, 42. Price, 16 Mces. & W. 603. (j) 3 Sugd. V. & P. 30, pi. 16 ; dj) 5 Cm. Dig. tit. 35, c. 5, § 27 ; 5 Cm. Dig. tit. 35, c. 10, § 41, 42. 1 Prest. Conv, 224. 940 ON THE OPERATION OF FINES, Ft. II[.T.13, Ch. 2, s. 2, Joint tenancy. 3. Where there was no ■devestmeut or state of adverse claim. i. In the case of the Crown. 5. In tho case of an ecclesiastical corporation line, it was no bar to liis lessee ; because a lessor is con^ sidered as tenant at will to his lessee (/.•). And so, if one of two joint tenants in fee levied a fine of the whole, this did not amount to an ouster of his com- panion ; but it was a severance of the jointure, though they continued to be in of the old use (/). 3. No estate or interest was barred by fine and non- claim which was not devested and turned to a right of entry or action, or in a state of adverse claim (m). And hence non-claim on a fine would not bar a term to commence at a future time, or a condition subsequent, before it was broken ; for while it conferred no right of im- mediate entry there was no ground for a claim. But, as soon as it conferred a right of immediate entry, non-claim by the person interested in the term, or by the person who was to take advantage of the breach of the condition, began to be a bar to him, though the fine were levied before the right of immediate possession existed. The same is the case with an authority to executors to sell (n). 4. A fine and non-claim were no bar to the Crown ; for nullum tempus occurrit regi (o). 5. Ecclesiastical corporations, as such, Avhether aggregate or sole, could not be barred by non-claim on a fine within the period specified in the Statute of ISTon-claim. But a sole ecclesiastical corporation, as a bishop, parson, or vicar, might be personally barred if he failed to claim within five years after his title accrued ; and each of his successors might be personally barred in a similar event ; and each successive head of a corporation aggregate might be per- sonally barred in the same manner (^j). (A) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 10, §44. (l) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 5, § 18, and c. 13, § 13. (m) See 1 Prest. Conv. 223, 227. (») See 1 Prest. Conv. 231, 232, (o) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 9, s. 55, ami c. 13, § 2 ; 1 Prest. Conv. 235, (2)) 1 Prest. Conv. 235 ; 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 13, § i. ON THE OPERATIOX OF FINES. 941 6. If a tenant in tail of an incorporeal liereditament, rT.iii.T.is, . , . Cn. 2, S.2. Avlietlier in possession or remainder, levied a line, it barred the entail, and cliano-ed the estate tail into a qnalified or 9^^^°^ , ' o J- incorporeal hase fee, determinable on the death of the cognizor and the menu^" failure of issue inheritable according to the entail, but it had ]io effect on the ulterior estates in remainder or rever- sion i^i). And an incorporeal hereditament in a third person, or a right to sue execution on a judgment, was not barred by a fine levied of the laud (r) ; because it was col- lateral to the seisin or ownership of the land, and therefore not affected by any transfer of the land. 7. The same was the case with powers simply collateral, 7. in the CtlS6 Ot for the same reason, and because the donee of such a power powers ■■-. simply could not have made an entry (s). collateral. 8. There were others who, thoudi Ixarred at law, mioht ^- ^" ^^'^ ' o ' o case of cer- be relieved in equity ; as in the case of cestuis que trust *vho are Te"* under an express or implied trust, where the fine was levied equity.'" by a trustee to a person who had notice of the express trust, or by a devisee to a person who had notice of a charge amounting to an implied trust, or by a person coming in by conveyance from a trustee, without any valuable con- sideration, or with fraud, or notice of trust or fraud ; and in other cases of fraud {t) ; and in cases where courts of equity limit the operation of fines to the purposes for which they were intended, so as to prevent them from barring a jointure, or from operating farther than was intended by the decree in pursuance of which they were levied, or from operating to other uses than those intended by marriage articles {a). And a Court of equity will not suffer an infant (2) Bart. Comp. § 700. —775 ; 3 Sugd. V. & P. 446 ; 5 (?•) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 13, § Cm. Dig. tit. 35, c. 10, § 31—34, 22 ; Shop. T. 23 ; 1 Ti-est. Conv. and c. 14, § 71—81, 86. 231. (it) Story's Eq. Plead, s. 77G ; 5 (s) 5 Cni. Dig. tit. 35, c. 10, § 59 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 10, § 23—25, —62. and c. 14, § 87, 88. {t) See Story's Eq. Plead, s. 773 942 ON THE Ol'KKATION OF FINES, i'T. III-T.13, to be barred by the laches of liis trustee (x) ; nor an equity of" redemption to bo barred Ity a mortgagee; nor a mort- gagee to be barred Ijy a mortgagor (//). iluw a fiiio cuulil 1)0 a,voi(io(i liy a person )i:iviii}i; a rij;ht of cutry. F.ffoct of an entry by a particular tenant, copyholder, or part owner. How a fine could be avoided by a person having a right of action. It may here be observed, tliat a person wlio had a right of entry, in order to have avoided a fine, where it was levied with proclamations, must not only have entered on the land, or, if prevented from entering, have made his claim as near the land as might be, but nmst have also brought an action of ejectment within one year afterwards, and prosecuted the same (z). The entry of the particular tenant restored the estates in remainder or reversion, as M'ell as the particular estate (a). And so the entry of a copyholder restored the estate of the lord (&). And the entry of one joint tenant, copar- cener, or tenant in common, avoided the fine as to the others {c). In order to have avoided a fine, a person who had a right of action only must have brought a real action : an action of ejectment was not sufficient (r/). The filing of a l)ill in Chancery would not have prevented the bar by non- claim, except in the case of a cestui que trust (c). A fine sur done, grant, et render, being a double fine, gave a new estate to the cognizor, so that, if before the fine he was seised in fee ex parte materna, and he took back an (x) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c 14, §83. i/j) Id. § 85 ; 1 Prest. Conv. 233. (j) 5 Cm. Dig. tit. 35, c. 14, § 43, 45—49, 55 ; Co. Litt. 252, n. (1) ; 1 Prest. Conv. 247. {a) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 14, §52; Pres. Shep. T. 35 ; 1 Prest. Conv. 227, 247. (h) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 14, § 52 ; Pres. Sliep. T. 35. (c) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 14, §53. (d) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 14, § 41, 43. (f) Id. § 42. ON THE OPERATION OF FINES. 943 estate in fee simple, the descent was thereby altered to a PT.iir.T.13, -'- "^ Cil. 2, s. 2. descent ex parte paterna, although the seisin of the cog- nizee, from whom such new estate proceeded, being but for ^^°^^^^„ ^ an instant, did not entitle his widow to dower. The other '""'^ ^*"''*^- fines being single fines, when levied by a tenant in fee simple, did not give a new estate : so that, if a person seised in fee ex parte materna levied a fine sur cognizance de droit come ceo, &c., and either made no declaration of the uses of it, or declared it to be to the use of himself and his heirs, the lands descended ex parte materna, because the old use resulted to him (/). Such a fine, however, by the owner of a particular estate in possession, unless restricted in its operation to such an estate as he might lawfully pass, created a new and tortious estate in fee. Various statutes, the latest of which was 43 Eliz. c. 15, Fines levied ill local communicated the properties of a fine levied in the Court ^-'^'''s. of Common Pleas according to the stat. 4 Hen. 7, to fines levied in the counties palatine of Durham, Lancaster, and Chester, and in Wales and the Isle of Ely (f/). (/) 5 Cm. Dig. tit. 35, c. 12, § 37, Conv. 211. 40 ; Pres. Shep. T. 4 ; 1 Trest. {g) Burt. Comp. § 78. 9-i4 CHAPTEE III. OF COMMON RECOVERIES. Definition of a reco- very. Jlode of suf- feriug a re- covery. Section I. Of Common Recoveries generally. pt. iii.t. 13, A COMMON RECOVERY is an action, eitlier actual or fictitious, Oh. 3, s. 1. _ ' not compromised, but carried on tln^ongli every regular stage of proceeding, by means of wliich lands Avhicli were the subject of tlie action were recovered against the tenant of the freehold, and all persons were bound, as by an actual adjudication of the right, and an absolute fee simple was thereby vested in the recoveror {a). The mode of suffering a recovery with single voucher was this : the person to whom the land was intended to be conveyed, the demandant or recoveror, brought an action against the person who was to suffer the recovery (the tenant or recoveree), by suing out a writ, called a praecipe quod reddat, against him. Tiie latter then vouched or called another person to defend the title, upon the alleged ground of such other person's having conveyed, the land to him with a warranty. The person so vouched, who was generally the crier of the court, and was called the common vouchee, made default, and thereupon judgment was given for the demandant to recover the lands against the tenant, and the tenant had judgment to recover of the vouchee lands of equal value in recompense for the lands so war- ranted by him ; Imt of course lie recovered nothing, as the common vouchee had no lands of his own. It was more {a) 2 Bl. Com. 857. OF COMMON EECOVEIUES. 945 usual, however, to have a recovery with double voucher pt.ih.t.is, ' -^ Ch. 3, s. 1. at the least. And, in the case of a double voucher, an estate of freehold was first conveyed to some other person against whom the pra:^cipe was brought, and then he vouched the tenant in tail, who vouched over the connnon vouchee (h). By the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 2, no recovery was to Abolition of '' ' J J J recoveries, be suffered after the 31st of December, 1833, unless upon a writ sued out on or before that day. By s. 5 of the same statute, recoveries are not invalid in certain mistalies consequence of having been suffered in unlawful or unau- 3^^,^^^'"' ^^' thorised Courts. By s. 8 of the same statute, certain misnomers, mis- descriptions, or omissions in a recovery, the non-enrol- ment of the deed making the tenant to the writ, and the omission to make the tenant to the writ, are cured in certain cases. By s. 3 of the stat. 5 Vict. sess. 2, c. 32, certain re- coveries in Wales and Cheshire are validated. Section II. Of the Operation of Recoveries. Eecoveries vary in their eflicacy according to the mode pt. iii.t.is, Ch. 3, s. 2. m which they were suffered, and the legal character of the EfBcacy parties ; and they may operate in the following ways : — ■varies with X ; J J X. o J cireum- I. By way of conclusion or estoppel. stances. Modes of II. As an ordmary conveyance. operatiou. III. As an extinguishment of a right of entry or action, IV. As an extinguishment of a power appendant or in gross. {h) 2 BI. Com. 35S— 9. 946 OF THE OrElLVTIOX OF KECOVERIES. Pt. III,T.13, C'H. 3, s. 2. V. As a revocation of a devise. ^''I. As a conveyance of the estate of a married woman, or as an extinguishment of her dower. VII. As a forfeiture. VIII. As a discontinuance. IX. As an instantaneous bar of contingent remainders. X. As an instantaneous bar of an estate tail, and of the remainders and reversion expectant tliereon, &c., and a creation of a fee out of the estate tail. I. Condusmi or Estoppel. A recovery, unless suffered by a feme covert, as such, would operate as an estoppel as against the parties and their heirs general, in the same manner as a fine, even though suffered by a tenant in fee, or without a voucher, or without a proper tenant to the prrecipe (r), that is, a person against whom the writ of entry was brought, and who, at the time of the writ being so brought against him, or before judgment given, had the immediate estate of freehold either by right or by wrong {d). But a recovery by a tenant in tail does not operate by estoppel against the issue in tail, or persons in reversion or remainder, or other strangers (c). Eecovery by a tenant in tail without u proper tenant to the prsecipo, or without a voucher. II. Ail ordinary Conveyance. Even where a recovery is void or voidable, as against heirs in tail and the remaindermen and reversioners, it may be good as an ordinary conveyance, as between the parties themselves and tlieir heirs general, and all others, except heirs in tail, who must make title by the pei'sons (c) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 2, § 57 ; c. 8, § 2 ; c. 9, § 1 ; Pres. Shop. T. 42, n. (80), 48, 49 ; 1 Pres. Conv. 4, 120; Burt. Comp. § 107. {d) 1 Prcst. Conv. 48 ; Pres. Shep. T. 42. (e) 1 Prest. Conv. 5, (5, 88, 92, 95, 97, 98, 142. OF THE OPERATION OF RECOVERIES. 947 suffering the recoveiy (/). This is the case with a recovery pt^iii.t.is. suftered by a tenant in tail without a proper tenant to the praecipe, or without a voucher. Such a recovery was good as a conveyance in fee, as betw^een the tenant in tail himself and the other parties to it ; and it w^as only void- able by, and not void as against, the issue in tail, remain- dermen, and reversioners, and other strangers : it was good against them until avoided by them {g). A recovery duly suffered by a tenant in tail, after a |f'=';"[g«_^^^ mortgage, charge, lease, conveyance or settlement made i.a,-'"g^a' by him, wovdd operate as a confirmation of such convey- tio°u™^" ance or settlement, by barring the estate tail and the remainders and reversion, so as to preclude the issue in tail and those in remainder or reversion from avoiding the conveyance or settlement (]i). Eecoveries by spiritual persons, such as bishops, deans. Recoveries ■^ -^ ^ . ^y spiiitual and parsons, of their ecclesiastical lands, were good against persons. themselves, but would not bind their successors {i). A recovery, even without a proper tenant t-o the praecipe. Recovery by or without a voucher, might operate as a conveyance by o/qMiified any person w^ho had an estate of inheritance, not being an estate tail (/). A recovery, which could only operate by estoppel at Recovery •^ ./ X J L i. operating by first, might in some cases, as in the case of an executory g^^jP^''"' ^' interest or an expectancy, at length take effect as a con- veyance, in the same manner as a fine under similar cir- cumstances (Jx). III. An Extinguishment of a right of Entry or Action. It would seem that a recovery would operate as an extinguishment of a right of entry or action in those cases (/) See Pres. Shep. T. 48, 49. (i) Shep. T. 44. {g) 1 Prest. Conv. 86—100, 120. {j ) 1 Prest. Conv. 5, 6, 86—100, (A) 1 Prest. Conv. 22; 2 Pres. 120. Shep. T. 287. (^•) See Fearne, 366. 948 OF THE OPERATION OF RECOVERIES. tt. III.T.13, in whicli a fine would have that effect ; as in the before- Cn. 3, s. 2. _ ... mentioned case of a disseisee (I). IV. Extinguishment of a Poiuer a'p'pendant or in gross. If the operation of a recoveiy by a donee of a power ap- pendant or in gross was not qualified by some other instru- ment connected with it, and it created an interest totally inconsistent with the exercise of the power, it extinguished the power, on the general principle that a person is not permitted to defeat his own gTant {m). So that, if a tenant for life, with a power of appointment in favour of his children, with remainder in default of appointment to his eldest son in tail, joined Avith such son in suffering a re- covery, it extinguished the power {n). V. A Revocation of a Devise. If a person suffered a recovery of lands which he had devised previously to the recovery, and also previously to any other assurance connected with the recovery and form- ing part of the same transaction, such as a deed to make a tenant to the praecipe, the recovery operated as a revocation of the devise ; even though he took back the same estate, as when he was seised in fee, and made no declaration of the uses of the recovery (o). VI. A Conveyance of a Married Woman's Estate, or an Extinguishment of Dower. If a married woman joined in a recovery, it would operate as a conveyance of her estate, or as an extinguishment of (l) Supra, p. 920. (n) Smith v. Death, Madd. 371. (m) See Co. Litt. 342 b, n. (1), {o) See 6 Cru. Dig. tifc. 38, c. 6, IV.— VI. 3 ; and Smith v. Death, 5 § 72—78 ; 1 Prest. Conv. 196, 197. Madd. 371. OF THE OPERATION OF RECOVERIES. 949 her dower ; because a married woman could always be Pt- nr.r.is, . . . . Ch. 3, s. 2. bound l)y a judgment in an adverse suit, of which a re- covery was an imitation, and because she was privately examined as to lier consent [p). VII. A Forfeiture. By the statute 14 Eliz. c. 8, it is enacted, that a recovery Recovery . . . -IP • ^• n • against or . prosecuted agamst tenant m tail after possibinty of issue voucher of a teuaut in extinct, tenant by the curtesy, or any other tenant for life, ^^}^l^^l^ or any other person with voucher over of such particular possibility of issue extinct. tenant, without the concurrence of the person in remainder, thrcu.t'e^sy. shall be utterly void and of none effect, as against all tenant for persons m remainder or reversion [q). And a recovery by a tenant for life, "svithout the concurrence of the remainder- man or reversioner, operated as a forfeiture, unless he him- self had a remote remainder in tail (r). And in consequence of the statute 11 Hen. 7, c. 20, a Fine or recovery by fine or recovery levied or suffered by a woman, of an estate ^ "'°°'.?", °^ ^ J > a marital in dower, or for life, or in tail, which was limited to or for ®*'^'^' her, either solely or jointly with her husband, and which moved from her husband or his ancestors, was utterly void and of no effect, if levied or suffered after his decease, unless had with the consent of the heirs next inheritable to her, or of the person next in remainder (such consent ap- pearing on record) ; or unless the lands were limited to the wife in tail general, without any limitation in favour of the husband or his issue or relations from whom the estate moved. And, in the case of such a void recovery, the person in remainder or reversion was enabled to enter im- mediately (s). But an alienation merely for the term of {p) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 8, § 3; (r) Id. c. 9, § 8—11 ; Pres. Shep. Shep. T. 39 ; 1 Prest. Conv. 4. See T. 40, 49, n. (3) ; 1 Prest. Conv. supra, p. 201. 202; Burt. Comp. § 746. {q) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 5, (s) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 10, § § 23. 7—31 ; see also Shep. T. 5, 28, 43 ; A A 2 950 OF THE OPERATION OF RECOVERIES. ^qJ^^-'^-^^' the widow's life is excepted in the statute (i). And it does not extend to copyholds (u). Fine or It mav bc mentioned, in this i^lace, that, by the statute recovery by ahusbaiid 32 Hen. 8, c. 28, a fine or recovery l)v a husband alone, alone of his j j ' wife'a es- ^j^q ^^g soiscd in right of his wife, shall not be prejudicial to her or her heirs, or the person in remainder or re- version (x). VIII. A Discontinuance. A voidable recovery by a tenant in tail in possession operated as a discontinuance {y). IX. An instantaneous Bar of Contingent Remainders. Where a recovery was suffered by the owner of an estate for life in possession, and the legal estate was not vested in trustees, it occasioned the destruction, or, in other words, it operated as an instantaneous bar of contingent remainders which were expectant on such estate for life, and unsup- ported by any other particular estate of freehold {z). For although by the statute 14 Eliz. c. 8, it is enacted, that re- coveries by tenants for life shall, as against " persons to whom any reversion or remainder may appertain, and against their heirs and successors, be clearly and utterly void and of none effect," yet that refers to vested remainders only («). 1 Prest. Conv. 147; Burt. Comp. effect of a discontinuance, see supra, § 708. p. 931. {t) Burt. Comp. § 708. {z) 5 Cru. Dig. til. 36, c, 8, § 31 (m) 1 Prest. Conv. 148. — 34 ; Smitli's Executory Interests, {x) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36. c. 10, § § 766, 767, 770, 783. 33 ; see also Shep. T. 15. (a) Doe d. Davies v. Oatacre, 5 (y) See Co. Litt. 330 a, n. (1) ; Bing., N. S. 609. 335 a, n. (2) As to the nature and OF THE OPERATION OF IIECOVEIIIES. 051 X. An i7istantaneous Bar of an Estate Tail, and of the Re- mainders and Reversion expectant thereon, &c., and a creation of a Fee out of the Estate Tail (b). Where the writ was brouo'ht against a tenant in tail pt. hi.t.is, => ° Ch. 3, s. 2. himself, when in possession, and he vouched over another 7 — ' ■•■ ' Effect where person, it was an instantaneous bar of the estate tail of which ^I'^^^J^l ^''^^ he was so seised in possession, unless the estate tail was t^uanUn granted by the Crown as a reward for services, and the re- -R'hen'ir^ ' niainder or reversion was in the Crown at the time of tlie recovery. But a recovery so suffered was no bar to any other estate in him, or in another person, such as a re- mainder in tail, or an estate tail after a disseisin or discon- tinuance or alienation in fee of or by a tenant in tail (c). Wliere a tenant in tail in possession conveyed an estate Effect where a tenaat iu of freehold to another person to mal^e him tenant to *^'i*° . -•- possession or the praecipe, and he himself came in as voucliee, tlie re- Jemaind-.u- covery barred not only the estate of which he was seised vouchee.''''' in possession, but also every otlier estate that had ever been in him. And where the writ was brought against a tenant for life in possession, and a person having a vested estate tail in remainder came in as vouchee, it would bar his estate tail in remainder, and also any latent right that was in him {d). But a recovery by a donee under a con- necovory by . . .■! person tmo'eut interest m tail, or by an expectant heir m tail, h.iving a oon- *=> ' J i- ' tiiigo.itor would not bar the issue or those in remainder or reversion. ?xi.eciant luterest m And a recovery would not bar a remainder in tail, if *■'"'• Kecovtry the writ were brought against the tenant in tail in re- i" "iiitii ti (b) See Parlcr v. Tooted, 11 H. Prest. Conv. 123. L. Cas. 113. (d) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 7, § 54; (c) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 10, § 2 Bl. Com. 359; Shep. T. 42, 45 ; 1 40—49 ; c. 7, § 45—53 ; 2 Bl. Com. Prest. Coiiv. 126, 138; F.urt. Comp. 359 ; Go. Litt. 372 b ; Pros. Shep. § 68G, &c. T. 37, 1). (57), 39, 43, 45, 46 ; 1 952 OF THE OPERATION OF RECOVERIES. conditions, limitations, executory interests, derivative estates, cliarges, and incum- brances. and colla- teral inte- rests. Creation of a fee giniple out of tlie estate tail. mainder, as well as against tlie tenant for life, and the former vouched over, but was not vouched himself (e). And in each of these cases, where the tenant in tail came in as vouchee, and the estate tail was so barred, the re- covery was also an instantaneous bar to the remainders and reversion dependent on such estate tail and not vested in the Crown (/), and to all conditions subsequent or mixed [g), not being conditions for payment of rent to the donor ; and to all special or collateral limitations, and con- ditional limitations annexed to such estates tail, and all executory interests subsequent to such estates tail ; and to all estates, charges, and incumbrances derived out of such remainders and reversion {h), including any estate in fee into which a remainder or reversion depending on such estates tail might have l)een converted by a prior recovery suffered by a person entitled to such remainder or reversion {i) ; and to collateral interests, such as rents, liens, judgments, and powers appendant or in gross, where the recovery was not qualified, and prevented from having this effect by some other assurance connected with the recovery, and showing that the recovery was not intended to extinguish such in- terests (y). A recovery, by barring an entail and destroying the estates expectant thereon, &c., created a fee simple out of the estate tail, or, at least, a fee commensurate with the estate, which, at the time of granting the entail, was vested (e) Pres. Sliep. T. 44—46 ; 1 Prest. Conv. 142. (/) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 10, § 45, 53—56 ; Pres. Shep. T. 40, 43, 45 ; Earl of Scarborough v. Doe d. SaviU, 3 Ad. & Ell. 897. ig) Smith's Executory Interests § 11 — 22 ; Earl of Scarhoroucjk v. Doe d.Savile, 3 Ad. & Ell. 897. (h) See 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 7, § 30—36 ; c. 8, § 25—29 ; Co. Litt. 327 a, n. (2), II. 1 ; 2 Bl. Com. 361 ; Fearne, 424, 425 ; Smith's Executory Interests, § 34—36, 148, 149; Shep. T. 40; Pres. Shep. T. 40, and n. (72) ; 1 Prest. Conv. 3, 21. (i) Pres. Shep. T. 41 ; 1 Prest. Conv. 17, 141. (j) 1 Prest. Conv. 5 ; Co. Litt. 342 b, n. (1), VI. 3 ; Smith v. Death, 5 Madd. 371. OF THE OPERATION OF RECOVEEIES. 953 in the donor (Z;), even thouQ;h the tenant in tail declared pt.iii. t.is, ^ '" ^ Ch. 3, 8. 2. no nses, or the uses declared were void (/). But, 1, when a tenant in tail became a tenant in tail "^'''f* ""^i;® ' ' Dot banea. after possibility of issue extinct, he lost the power which exp^cunT he before had of barring the estates and interests of ummm^^ , , . possibility others (mX of issue extiuct. 2. A recovery was no bar to powers simply collateral (n). 2. Powers 3. Nor to any inherent condition annexed to estates tail collateral. for payment of rent to the donor (0). cou'dufoDs. 4. K"or to any estates or charges which were created by aud^chare^es the tenant in tail himself (p). On the contrary, since it tiie^reco^^ would be contrary to justice that a person should defeat his own contract, a recovery suffered by a tenant in tail, for whatsoever purpose suffered, by barring the entail, let in and confirmed all the estates, charges, and incum- brances which he had created, and which were before defeasable by the issue, so that they took jDlace before any charge which was made on the lands by or after the recovery (q). 5. Nor was a recovery a bar to any estates, charges, s- Estates, limitations, or conditions to which the estate of the donor Y'^^'^V^® ' cloEior s of the entail was subject (r). So that, if the person who subject!"*^ created an estate tail had only a limited or determinable interest, the recoveror had such estate only as was in the donor, and not a fee simple (s). 6. Nor was a recovery a bar to any estates or interests 6. Estates which were not subsequent, in point of limitation, to the tbarot't^he estate of which the recovery was suffered (t). recoveree. (k) See 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 9, (^3) See Id. c. 9, § 7 ; Pres. § 7 ; 2 Bl. Com. 361 ; 1 Prest. Shep. T. 41, 47 ; 1 Prest. Conv. 16. Conv. 1. (q) Id. § 2—7. (l) Tanner v. Radford, 6 Sim. 21. (r) Id. c. 8, § 26 ; Pres. Shep. T. (m) 1 Pre.st. Conv. 144. 40, 47 ; 1 Prest. Conv. 17. (.w) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 8, (s) Pres. Shep. T. 38 ; 1 Prest. § 24. Conv. 2, 140. {o) Id. § 26, 27, 30. («) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 10, § 3 ; 954 OF THE OPERATION OF llECOVERIES. Pt. TII.T.13, Ch. 3, s. 2. Instances of an inter- vening remainder. Instance of a term before an estate taU to raise money on failiiie of issue. Dower. Distinction between joint ten- ants. and tenants by entireties, in regard to the power of barring. Thus, if a remote remainderman in tail, with the as- sistance of the owner of the immediate freehold, or if a tenant for life in possession, wdtli a remote remainder in tail in himself, suffered a recovery, it barred his estate tail and the remainders and reversion expectant thereon, but was no bar to the remainders intervening between the immediate freehold and his estate tail (^u). And so, if a term for years was limited to arise before an estate tail, even though for the purpose of raising a sum of money in case of a failure of issue of the parent to whose issue the estate tail was given, it was not barred by a recovery suffered of the estate tail {x). And so a recovery by a husband, in which his wife did not join, was no bar to her dower. There is an Act of Parliament, Stat. Westminster 2, c. 4, to this effect (?/) ; but it is conceived, that, in accordance with the general principle, the same would have been the case independently of that statute. Where two persons were seised as joint tenants for life, with a remainder in tail to one of them, and the person who had the remainder in tail suffered a recovery, it severed the jointure, and barred the estate tail and the remainder over, as to a moiety, but no more (z), because joint tenants are each seised of an undivided moiety of the whole. And where land was limited, before marriage, to a man and his intended wife and the heirs of their bodies, and the husband suffered a recovery, in which he was vouched, the recovery was a good bar to the estate tail as to the husband's moiety («). But if lands were given, after marriage, to husband and wife and the heirs of their two bodies, remainder over, so Co. Litt. 203 b, n. (1) ; 1 Prest. Conv. 16, 141. (m) 1 Prest. Conv. 16, 17; Pres. Shep. T. 41 ; 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 10, § 6. (ic) Bales v. Conn, 4 Sim. 65. {l/}-5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 8, § 5, 6. (z) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 7, § 25, 26; 1 Prest. Conv. 125. (a) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 7, § 25, 26 ; 1 Prest. Conv. 125, 143. OF THE OPEKATION OF RECOVEKIES. 955 tliat they were seised in tail as tenants by entireties, a pt.iii.t.is, recovery Ijy tlie husband alone was no bar to the estate tail, remainder, or reversion, for any part of the land; because, in this case, the husband had no distinct in- terest (b). And if land was limited, after marriage, to husband and wife for life, and to the heirs of the body of the husband, and the husband alone suffered a recovery, with single voucher, it was no bar, even as to a moiety ; because the limitation to the heirs of the body of the husband was not executed in possession absolutely; and the husband and wife took by entireties under the first limitation, so that the husband took no distinct interest in possession ; and a recovery with single voucher could have no effect except on an estate in possession. But the recovery, in such a case, was a bar to the remainder, if the husband came in as vouchee, though it did not bar the estate of the wife for her life, after the husband's death (c). 7. A woman could not bar a marital estate tail within 7. Marital the stat. 11 Hen. 7, c. 20, already noticed: a recovery suffered by her of such an estate was void (d). 8. In consequence of the stat. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 20, s. Estates 1 1 /-M 1 *'^'' sranted where an estate tail was granted by the Crown as a reward by the ° Crown as a for services, and the remainder or reversion was in the reward for ' services, and Crown at the time of a recovery suffered by the tenant in auTre4*i^^ tail, such recovery could not bar either the entail or the crown!^ remainder or reversion in the Crown, or particular estates derived out of it, or any other estate in the land (c). And in other cases where the reversion was vested in the Crown, except by a subject in fraud of alienation, it (h) See Pres. Shep. T. 46 ; 1 (d) See § VII., supra, and 1 Prest. Conv. 124. Prest. Coav. 20. (c) See 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 7, (e) .5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 10, § § 27—29, 56, 57 ; Pres. Shep. T. 40, 49 ; Co. Litt. 372 b ; 1 Prest. 46 ; 1 Prest. Conv. 55—57, 124, Conv. 18, 145. 125, Fearne, 36, 37. 95G OF THE OPERATION OF RECOVERIES. •^^•^¥•'^4^' is doubtful, at least, whether such reversion could be Ch. 3, 8. 2. barred (/). 9. By the stat, 21 Hen. 8, c. 15, s. 14, no manner of statute staple, statute merchant, nor execution by elegit shall be avoided, or in any manner made frustrate, by a feigned recovery {g). 10. The Court of Chancery will interfere in the case of recoveries obtained by fraud (A). And it will also confine the operation of a recovery to those purposes for which the recovery was intended {i). 9. Statutes or elegits. 10. Persons not barred in equity iu certain cases. Tenant to the praecipe. Kule as to him. Enactraents upon the point. As the effect of a recovery so materially depended on there being a proper tenant to the praecipe, it may be desirable to add a few observations upon that point. We have seen that the rule was, that a person, in order to be a proper tenant to the praecipe, must, at the time of the writ being brought against him, or before judgment given, have had the immediate estate of freehold, either by right or by wi'oug {j). But by the stat. 14 Geo. 2, c. 20, s. 6, a recovery was valid to all intents and purposes, if the deed making the tenant to the praecipe were executed before the end of the term, great session, session, or assize in which such re- covery was suffered (/.:). By section 5 of the same statute, after a lapse of twenty years from the suffering a recovery, it is to be deemed valid, if it appear on the face of it that there was a tenant to the writ, and if the persons joining iu such recovery had a sufficient estate and power to suffer the same, not- (/) See 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 10, § 44. § 45, 53—56 ; 1 Prest. Conv. 19, {i) Id. § 46. 146. (i) Pres. Shep. T. 42; 1 Prest. (r/) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 10, Conv. 48. § 57. (h) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 2, § 24, (li) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 10, 25. OF THE OPEEATION OF RECOVEKIES. 957 withstandinc: the deed for making the tenant to snch writ pt. iiit.is, ® " Cn. 3, s. 2. be lost or not appear (/). ' And, in consequence of tlie same statute, a tenant in tail in remainder could suffer a recovery without the con- currence of the tenant of the first estate of freehold, if the latter were a mere lessee for life under a rent, provided the owner of the estate of freehold next expectant on such life estate conveyed an estate of freehold to the tenant to the A\'rit (/??). A recovery suffered by a cestui que trust in tail who ^fj^jj^^t''^ was in possession under the trustees, or by a cestui que lo^the^"'*'^* trust in tail in remainder in conjunction with a cestui que p"*'''p®" trust for life in possession, would effectually bar such estate tail and all equitable remainders and equitable reversions, although there was only an equitable tenant to the praecipe. And a recovery suffered by an equitable tenant in tail who had previously mortgaged in fee is valid without the concurrence of the mortgagee, because the whole beneficial ownership, subject to the payment of the money, remains in the mortgagor (71). But a re- covery without a legal tenant to the praecipe was no bar to any legal estate (0). It is enacted, however, by the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 11, that no recovery " shall be invalid in consequence of any person, in whom an estate at law was outstanding, having omitted to make the tenant to the writ of entry or other writ for suffering such recovery, provided the person who was the owner of or had power to dispose of an estate in possession, not being less than an estate for life or lives in the whole of the rents and profits of the lands in which such estate at law was outstanding, (1) 5 Cm. Dig. tit. 36, c. 2, § 56. Turn. & Russ. 26. (m) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 2, § 28; (0) See 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 8, Shep. T. 42, n. (82) ; Burt. Comp. § 9—20 ; 1 Prest. Conv. 22—24 ; § 691. Ireson v. Pearman, 3 Bar. & Cress. (n) Nouaille v. Grccmoood, ] 799. 958 OF THE OPERATION OF RECOVEKIES. I'T.III.T.IS, Ch. 3, s. 2. Freehold ill the teiiaut to thi- pisecipe, where some only of several remainder- men in tail were vouched. Surreiider of a life estate to the remainder- man, or reversioner. or convey- ance thereof to a third person. or the ultimate surplus of sucli rents and profits after pay- ment of any charges thereout, and whether any surplus after payment of such charges shall actually remain or not, shall within the time limited for making the tenant to the writ for suffering such recovery, have conveyed or disposed of such estate in possession to the tenant to such writ; and an estate shall be deemed to be an estate in possession not- withstanding there shall be subsisting prior thereto any lease for lives or years, absolute or determinable, upon which a rent is reserved, or any term of years upon which no rent is reserved." Where a remainder in tail was vested in several persons, who joined with the tenant for life in making a tenant to the praBcipe, and a recovery was suffered, in which some only of them were vouched, an estate of freehold co-ex- tensive with the interests of the others or other of them, who was or were not vouched, remained in the tenant to the precipe, and was sufficient to give validity to a subse- quent recovery, in which such others or other of them was or were vouched (p). If a person, having a remainder or reversion expectant on an estate for life in possession, was made tenant to the praecipe, such life estate, except it were a lease for life within the stat. 14 Geo. 2, c. 20 (p. 957), ought to have been surrendered to the remainderman or reversioner, before he became tenant to the prsecipe. The Courts will presume a surrender of the life estate, where there are sufficient grounds for so doing ; as where the possession has accom- panied the recovery a long time, as for forty years ; or w^here there are entries in an attorney's book of a surrender having been prepared and paid for. The most usual course, however, was for the prior estate for life to be conveyed to some third person, to make him tenant to the precipe (q). (p) Collyer v. Mason, 2 B. & B. 685. Cq) Prcs. Shcp. T. 42, n. (82) ; 1 Prcsfc. Conv. 77 — 85. OPERATION OF FINES AND KECOVERIES CONTRASTED. 959 Section III. The opeirttion of Fines and the operation of Recoveries con- trasted. Most of tlie points of resemblance and of difference pt. ni.T.13, C'H. Of S. 3. between Fines and Eecoveries, as regards tlieir operation, may readily be collected from tlie preceding view of the modes in which they respectively operate. One or two of these differences, however, it would seem expedient par- ticularly to notice. At the same time as a recovery barred an entail, we a recovery iustantly have seen that it instantly destroyed the estates expectant destroyed •J -J i the estates thereon, and created a fee simple out of the estate tail, or and'r'^ver^^'^ at least a fee commensurate with the estate which at the a fine did time of granting the entail was vested in the donor (r), even though the tenant in tail declared no uses, or the uses declared were void (s). The effect of a fine was very different. While, if levied with proclamations, it instan- taneously barred all the lineal heirs in tail of the cognizor, and all his collateral relations who were privy to him in blood and estate, it had no immediate effect on the subse- quent estates, but, until the expiration of the five years within which the owners of such estates were allowed to claim, only converted the estate tail into a base fee, although after that time, indeed, in the event of non- claim, the estate tail became an estate in fee simple {t). From this diversity of operation, there sometimes re- sulted some most important practical differences in the effect of the two assurances. Thus — (r) See 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 9, 21. § 7 ; 2 Bl. Com. 361 ; 1 Prest. {t) See 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 9 ; Cony. 1. 1 Prest. Conv. 8 ; Doe d. Gilbert v. (s) Tanner v. Radford, 6 Sim. Ross, 7 Mees. & W. 125. 960 THE OPERATION OF FINES pt. III.T.13, 1. If the immediate reversion or remainder in fee simple Cn. 3, s. 3. _ _ ^ happened to be vested in the tenant in tail himself, and 1. Aiecovery would some- had descended from and was subject to an incumbrance of times •' ^^cuuXance ^^^ °^ ^^^^ auccstors, a recovery suffered by the tenant in woii'id''^"^ tail cut off the incumbrance, by cutting off the reversion or remainder subject thereto. But if a fine was levied by him, it served to accelerate the incumbrance : for the base fee into which the estate tail was converted merged in the reversion or remainder in fee, so that such remainder or reversion became an estate in possession ; and the incum- brance which was unavailing as against those who claimed under the entail before the fine, became, by the operation of the fine, accelerated together with the reversion or re- mainder, and established as an immediate charge upon those persons against whom it was before of no avail, that is against the tenant in tail and the heirs in tail, under their new characters of tenant in fee simple and heirs general, which they acquired by the fine (u). 2. The indi- 2. If a pcrsou scised in fee ex parte materna suffered a rectoperation J- ^ sometimes rccovcry, it did not alter the mode of descent (x). In the from that of case of a tenant in tail by purchase under a marriage as regards' Settlement made by his maternal ancestor, with the re- the descent of au estate, version in fee by descent ex parte materna, if the tenant in tail suffered a recovery to the use of himself in fee, the estate would descend to his heirs ex parte paterna ; because the estate tail acquired by purchase, though from his maternal ancestor, would so descend ; and the fee created by the recovery out of the estate tail descended in the same manner as the estate tail (y). Whereas, if a tenant in tail similarly situated had levied a fine, it is conceived that the property would have descended to his (m) See 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 35, c. 12, {x) 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 9, § § 9, 10; tit. 36, c. 9, § 7; 1 Prest. 12, 13. Conv. 9, 10, 13, 14; 2 Pres. Shep. {y) See 5 Cru. Dig. tit. 36, c. 9, T. 286 ; Watk. Conv. 3rd ed. by § 14, 15 ; 1 Prest. Conv. 197. Prcst. 64—5. AND RECOVEEIES CONTRASTED. 961 heirs ex parte materna ; because tlie estate tail, which was pt. iii.t.is, Ch. 3, s. 3. alone originally descendible to his paternal heirs, would have been converted into a base fee, and that base fee would have merged in the reversion in fee simple de- scendible to his maternal heirs. 962 TITLE XIV. Part. III. Title XIV. Alienation by the lord or a tenant. Ordinaiy mode of alienating copyholds- ■when held in fee sim- ple. Surrender and admit- tance. OF ALIENATION OF COPYHOLDS BY VOLUNTAKY GRANT AND ADMITTANCE, BY SURRENDER AND ADMITTANCE, BY BARGAIN AND SALE AND ADMITTANCE, OR BY RECOVERY. Alienation of copyholds may be either by the lord of the manor, or by one tenant of the manor to another. We have already made some few observations upon alienation by the lord by way of voluntary grant {a). With regard to alienation by one tenant to another, no ordinary assurance applicable to property of freehold tenure has any operation upon the legal estate in copy- holds (h). The ordinary mode of alienation of a copyhold by a tenant having an estate in fee simple is by surrender and admittance, that is, a surrender or yielding up of his estate by the tenant to the lord or his steward, to the use of the alienee, or for such purposes as in the surrender are expressed; and an admittance of the alienee or person intended to take, to hold to him and his heirs at the will of the lord, according to the custom of the manor. The surrender and admittance are entered on the court roll, and the new tenant receives a copy of this entry (c). Before admittance, it was necessary, until a recent enact- ment, that the surrender should be presented by the homage or jury, by way of giving the lord notice of the surrender, unless he chose to proceed without it. But by the stat. 4 & 5 Vict. c. 35, s. 90, 23resentment is no longer necessary. (a) Supra, p. 123— 4. (b) 2 Bl. Com. 367 ; 1 Cruise T. 10, c. 3, § 17. (c) Burton, § 1263 ; 2 Bl. Com. 365 ; 1 Cruise T. 10, c. 3, § 17. OF ALIENATION OF COPYHOLDS. 963 We have seen (p. 121) that iu the case of free copyholds, part.iil a deed of barofain and sale is sometimes employed, instead ° i J ' BargaiQ of a surrender. And sometimes, to avoid the necessity for ^ud sale. Pow( sale. admittance of trustees for sale of copyholds under a will, a ^°^'^'" °^ mere power of sale is given them without any estate, and they then execute a deed of bargain and sale in favour of the purchaser, which gives him the right of claiming ad- mittance from the lord (cl). Where a man has only a right to a copyhold, he may Release, release it by deed or by copy to one who is admitted (e). Estates tail in copyholds are not capable of being Modes of ^ ^ '■ " barnug discontinued ; nor could auy assurance be made of them entails. similar to a fine : but iu all cases previous to the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74 (which, as we have seen, abolished recoveries and substituted other modes of disposition by tenants in tail and owners of base fees in copyholds) (/), such estates might be enlarged into fees simple, either by some appropriate proceeding in the lord's court (which was most commonly analogous to a common recovery, and called by that name), or, in the absence of a custom for that purpose, by a mere surrender (g). By the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 4, no fine or re- F>Qeor recovery of covery levied or suffered in a superior Court of lands of '^"'?* '" the tenure of ancient demesne may be reversed as to any '^emesue. person except the lord of the manor ; and every such fine or recovery which may be reversed as to him will still remain valid against and as binding upon the conusors or vouchees, and all persons claiming under them, as if not reversed. By s. 5 of the same Act, if a fine or recovery has been levied or suffered in a superior Court of lands of the (d) See 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, (o) Burton, § 1285 ; 5 Cruise T. 424. 37, c. 2, § 7, 19 ; Co. Litt. 60 a, b, (e) Co. Litt. 59 a. & n. 3, 1. (/) See supra, p. 781. VOL. II. B B 964 OF ALIENATION OF COFYIIOLDS. Part. til. Title XIV. Mode of suneuder. Where grants and admittances may be made. tenure of ancient demesne, and subsequently a fine or recovery lias been levied or suffered of the same lands in tlie court of the lord of the manor, the fine or recovery in the lord's court will be as valid as if the tenure had not been altered. By s. 6 of the same statute, tenure of ancient demesne, where suspended or destroyed Ijy levying or suffering a fine or recovery in a superior Court, will be restored wdiere the lord is not barred of his right to reverse such fine or re- covery, provided his rights shall have been recognised within twenty years from the 1st January, 1834. By the general custom, every copyholder may surrender in Court, or he may surrender out of Court to the lord himself or his steward. But he cannot surrender out of Court to the lord by tlie hands of any other person, except by particular custom (A). By the old law, grants and admittances must generally have been made at a court held within the manor. But by particid.ar custom, the court might be held out of the manor, and grants and admittances made there {i). And by the stat. 4 & 5 Vict. c. 35, s. 87, it is enacted " that, after the 31st day of December, 1841, it shall be lawful for the lord of any manor, or his stew^ard, or the deputy of such steward, to grant at any time and at any place, either within or out of such manor, and without holding a court for such manor, any lands, parcel of such manor, to be held by copy of court roll, or according to the custom of the said manor, which sucli lord shall for the time being be authorised or empowered to grant out to be held by copy of court roll, or according to such custom, so never- theless that such lands be granted for such estate only, and to such person only, as such lord, steward, or deputy shall for the time being be authorised or empowered to (h) Co. Litt. 59 a, & n. 6. (/) 1 Cruise T. 10, c. 1, § 22. OF ALIENATION OF COPYHOLDS. 965 grant the same." And by s. 88, it is enacted, " that, alter J'^»f I'l- ° J ' TlTLK XIV. the 31st day of December, 1841, it shall be lawful for the lord of any manor, or his steward, or the deputy of such steward, to admit, at any time, and at any place, either within or out of such manor, and without holding a court for such manor, any person as tenant to any lands, parcel of such manor, to be held by copy of court roll, or ac- cording to the custom of such manor, to and for which such person' shall for the time being be entitled to be admitted." But by s. 91, it is provided, " that where by the custom of any njianor the lord of such manor is authorised, with the consent of the homage of such manor, to grant any common or waste lands of such manor to be holden of the lord by copy of court roll, nothing in this Act contained shall operate to authorise or empower the lord to grant any such common or waste lands without the consent of the homage assembled at a customary court holden for such manor, &c." Prior to this Act, an admittance by the steward, as such, out of the manor, whether at a court or otherwise, was in- operative, unless by virtue of a special authority from the lord, or unless subsequently ratified by him and notified to the homage {j). By the stat. 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 65, s. 3 — 5, in- Admittance of persons fants, femes covert, and lunatics may be admitted to copy- ^!"|er, hold estates by their guardian, committee, or attorney. By s. 6, if the fines are not paid, the lord may enter and receive the profits of the copyhold till he is satisfied. By s. 8, guardians, or husband, or committees paying fines, may re- imburse themselves out of the rents of the copyhold. And by s. 9, no forfeiture is to be incurred by an infant for not appearing or for refusing to pay fines. But the stat. 16 & 17 Vict. c. 70, repeals this Act, as regards lunatics, and makes certain enactments on the subject (/c). {j) Doe d. Gutteridrje v. Sowerbi/, (k) See Pt. IV. T. 1, c. 6. 7 Com. B. (N.S.) 599. B B 2 disability. 966 OF ALIENATION OF COPYHOLDS. Part [TI. Title XIV. Words of limitation in a surrender, and construc- tion tliereof. Circum- stances under wliich admittatccs may take place. Husband not admitted. Rights of surrenderee before admittance. Rights of heir or devisee before admittance. The words of liinitation in the surrender must be the same as tliose which would he required in the conveyance of freehold lands, unless the peculiar custom authorises a variation. And the surrender is generally to be construed in the same manner as a conveyance at common law (/). Admittance may take place, first, upon a voluntary grant from the lord. Secondly, upon a surrender or devise by the former tenant. And, thirdly, upon a descent (m). If a person marries a woman who has a term of years or other greater estate in a copyhold, though he thereby be- comes seised or possessed of the copyhold, yet as it is jure alieno, he is not obliged to be admitted, and therefore not liable to a fine (;)i). After surrender, and before admittance of the surrenderee, the surrenderor remains tenant to the lord ; and if the sur- renderee surrenders to another, the surrender is void, and cannot be confirmed. But the surrenderee is so far re- garded as owner, that the surrenderor cannot revoke the surrender, or convey away, or incumber ; and the surren- deree may make an equitable, though not a legal, transfer by act inter vivos ; and if the surrenderee, in the case of a free copyhold, dies before admittance, his widow is entitled to dower (o). Before the stat. 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 3, a sur- renderee before admittance could not devise ( j)). The heir has as complete a title without admittance, as with it, against all the world (q), except the lord. Indeed, upon satisfying the lord for his fine clue upon the descent, he may surrender into the hands of the lord to whatever use he pleases (r). And even before the stat. 1 Vict. c. 26," s. 3, an heir at law might devise a copyhold estate de- (/) Burton, § 1278 ; 5 Crui.se T. 37, c. 1, § 76, 84, 85. (m) 2 Bl. Com. 370. (m) 1 Cruise T. 10, c. 4, § 19. (o) See 5 Cruise T. 37, c. 1, § 53 —59 ; 2 BL Com. 368 ; Coote Mortg. 3rcled. 114. (p) 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 48. (q) 2 Bl. Com. 371, Christian's note. (r) 2 Bl. Com. 371 ; Burton, § 1295. OF ALIENATION OF COPYHOLDS. 967 scended to liiiii, witliout liaving been admitted, and without pakt in. ' ^ ' _ Title XIV. previous payiiieiit of the lord's fine (s). But, until admit- — tance, a devisee cannot surrender the tenement, nor, before the stat. 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 3, could he devise it (t). The uses expressed in the surrender entirely ffovern the Admittance ■*- t/ T> governed by operation of the subsequent admittance. If any other ^*j.*JJffiei. person than he to whose use the surrender was made is ad- mitted by the lord, he acquires no title ; and if, on the admittance of the surrenderee, other words of limitation are used than those in the surrender, they are of no avail, and the estate expressed in the surrender takes effect (i(). By the sreneral custom, admittance of a tenant for life is A a devise by a former tenant, or upon a voluntary grant (c). On tlie admittance of joint-tenants, the fine is not a single fine, but is increased by the numl)er of the co-tenants {(I). And if a person entitled to copyholds in fee dies without having been admitted, two fines are payable on the admis- sion of his devisee (e). Where a man acquires a copyhold by the custom of curtesy, or a woman acquires a copyhold by the custom of free bench, a fine is payable in some manors on the admittance of these tenants, and in others not (/). As by the general custom of copyholds, the ad- mittance of a tenant for life is an admittance of the persons in remainder, so the fine is not assessed for the particular estate alone, but for the wliole inheritance. In some manors, however, by particular custom, persons in re- mainder must be admitted, and pay a fine on their admit- tance (f/). And where this custom exists, the same rule ought to be applied to an executory devisee who becomes entitled on the defeasance of an estate in fee (h). A fine being only due as a consideration for the admittance of a new tenant, if a copyholder surrenders for life, reserving the reversion to himself, and the tenant for life dies, the surrenderor may enter without paying a fine, because the reversion was never out of him. So if a copyholder grants his estate to a stranger upon condition, and afterwards enters for the condition broken, he is not liable to the pay- ment of a fine ; because he comes in of his old estate (i). And where a testator directs certain persons to sell his copyholds, they need not be admitted, and consequently they are not liable to the payment of a fine (/ ). (c) 1 Cruise T. 10, c. 4,§ 1, 2, 3. 1 Scriven ou Copyh. 4tli ed. by (d) Bcnce v. Gilpin,'i^.TX. 3 Ex. 76. Stalman, 294—5, 342—3. (e) Lord Londesborouf/li v. Foster. (h) Randfidd v. Eandfidd, 3 De 3 Best & Sm. 805. G. F. & J. 766. (/) 1 Cruise T. 10, c. 4, J; 4. (/) 1 Cruise T. 10, c. 4, § 15. ( Subject to thereon/' and of leasehold estates " subject to the per- ance'of th™' formance of the covenants," that the words " subject," &c., •=°^«'^^"*^-" when used in reference to mortgages, are not mere useless surplusage, even when they are not construed to import til at the party is to take cum onere ; for they may be intended to prevent disappointment, and perhaps disputes or doubts, by showing at once that the estate is in mort- gage, which might not otherwise be known to be so. But tlie words " subject," &c., when used with reference to property which has already been described as a leasehold, are mere useless surplusage, unless they are used to signify that the bequest is to be subject to the performance of the covenants to repair, in respect of dilapidations existing at the time of the testator's death ; and the Court ought not, without some special reason, to construe words as mere surplusage which may fairly be employed for some useful purpose. It is only natural, and in accordance with the presumable intentions of a testator who makes a specific bequest of leaseholds, that the legatee should take them subject to the burden of putting them in repair, Avhere they are in a state of dilapidation at the time of the testator's decease ; altliough the general personal estate is tlie natural fund for the papuent of debts, and otlier kinds of property are commoid.y ex- onerated by that (d). Wliere a testator provides that an estate shall go over "Devolve." from a person taking the same under the will, in case a certain other estate shall " devolve " upon liim, he will be held to mean tliat the shifting clause shall take effect in case such person shall have the fidl beneficial enjoyment of tlie latter estate : so that such estate will not be deemed to have " devolved " upon him, if he takes it subject to a id) Hickling v. Boyer, 3 Mac. & G. 643. 1002 OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES. pt. iii.t.15, charge (e). And the expression " devolve upon her cliil- dren, if she has any," denotes transmission to children living at the time when the devolution is to take place ; so that the representative of a child then dead will take nothing (/) The word " legacies " will often include annuities (g). In a will, the word " London " will include the cities oi' London and Westminster, and the borough of Southwark, and the adjacent streets and buildings, where such would seem to have been the intention (7t). "Legacies" iucludins; "aunuities.' " Loudon." Section VI. Pt. IILT.15, Ch . 1, 8. 6. Devise or bequest to per.-ons sus'aining a particular character. Of Devisees and Legatees. Where a devise or bequest is made to a person or persons by any description denoting a person sustaining a particular character (such as heir, next of kin, nearest of blood, youngest or only surviving son), and the person or persons who sustain it at one time may be different from the person or persons who sustain it at another time, it is very expedient to express the time at which that character is to be sustained (^). General rule. I. Error or Defect in a Name or Description. Any words that are sufficient to denote the persons (e) Fazakerley v. Ford, 1 Ad. & E. 897 ; 4 Sim. 390. (/) Parr v. Parr, 1 Mj. & K. 467. {fj) 2 Jann Wills, 2nd ed. 516 ; Cornfield v. Wyndham, 2 Coll. 184 ; Heath V. Weston, 3 D. M. & G. 601 ; Ward V. Grey, 26 Beav. 485 ; Mul- ling V. Smith, 1 Dr. & Sm. 204; GasUn v. Rogers, L. K. 2 Eq. 284. {h) Wallace v. Att.-Gen., 33 Beav. 384. {/) See Supra, p. 337 : and 2 J arm. Wills, 2nd cd. 167—180. OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES. 1003 meant by the testator, and to distinu-uisli them from all pt. iii.t. is, •^ . . ^ Cn. 1, s. 6. others, operate as a good description (/). Wlien there is a mistake in the Christian or snrname, Mistake in name. or in both names, it will be corrected, if the intention clearly appears in any other part of the will or by parol evidence (/•). Bnt where there is a relative having the names mentioned, but described as standing in a different degree of relationship from that mentioned, and there are other relatives having some only of the names and stand- ing in the relationship mentioned, the gift will be void for uncertainty if there be no other evidence than that of the solicitor who prepared the will (/). Parol evidence will be admitted to supply a blank for Blank for a Christian name, but not a blank for an entire name (m). If, however, a legatee is described by the initials of his initials, name only, parol evidence may be given to prove his iden- tity (w). But if a testator devises to certain persons by no Arbitrary other names or descriptions than by certain letters of the alphabet arbitrarily chosen for the purpose, and refers to another paper signed by him, but not attested as explain- ing who were intended by those letters, such a devise is void (o). There is no presumption in favour of the name more Error lu description of than of the description (p). But where the description of ^ legatee. a legatee is erroneous, and there is no doubt as to the person intended to be described, the mistake will be (j) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 10, § 23 ; 1 (I) Drake v. Brake, 25 Beav. Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 310, 311. 642 ; 8 fl. L. Cas. 172. (k) 1 Eop. Leg. by White, 164, (m) 1 Eop. Leg. by White, 186 ; 166; Burton's Compendium, § 605 ; Re Gregson's Trusts, 2 Hem. & M. 1 .Tarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 312, 368 ; 504. Mostyny. Mostyn, 5 H. L. Cas. 155; (w) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 187. Wigram on Wills, 51 ; Blundell v. (o) Cl/iyton v. Lord Nugent, 13 Gladstone, 2 Phill. 279 ; Bernasco- M. & W, 200. nini v. Atkinson, 17 Jur. 128 ; Re (p) Brake v. Brake, 8 H. L. Cas. Blackman, 16 Beav. 377 ; Hodgson 172, 179. V. Clarke, 1 D. F. & J. 394. 1004 OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES. pt. iii.T. 15, rectified, unless tlie description imputes to the legatee a Ch. 1, s. 6. character which is the essence of the bequest, and it may reasonably be presumed that the testator would not have made such a bequest, if he had not been so mistaken (g). Questions arising on such be- quests. Where issue are only substituted in the event of the parent predeceasing tho testator. II. Devises and Bequests to Parents and Children, In the case of devises and bequests in favour of a person and his or her children, at least in wills drawn by unpro- fessional persons, questions frequently arise as to the mode in which they are to take — wdiether the parent is to take for life, with remainder to the children ; or whether the parent is to take an estate tail or the absolute interest ; or whether parent and children are to take simultaneously, and, if so, whether as tenants in common or as joint- tenants. All such questions should be excluded (r). Whenever the word "entitled" is used, it is highly expedient to specify whether it is meant " entitled in in- terest " or " entitled in possession " {s). Where a testator bequeaths personal estate to one for life, and after his death to others equally, and in case any of them should liappen to die before they become " enti- tled " to their shares, to the children of him, her, or them so dying, the word " entitled " does not mean " entitled in possession ;" but the gift to the children is merely a sub- stitution in the event of the parent dying in the testator's (g) 1 Eop. Leg. by White, 169, 172 ; Stoi-y's Eq. Jur. § 182, 183 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 312 ; Re Ricket's Trust, 11 Hare, 299 ; Strin- ger V. Gardiner, 4 D. & J. 468 ; see In re Petts, 27 Beav. 576 ; Gamer V. Garner, 29 Beav. 114. (r) For instances, see Lendcn v. Blachnore, 10 Sim. 626 ; Vawjlum V. Hcadford, Id. 639 ; Mason v. Clarke, 17 Beav. 126 ; Conrjreve v. Palmer, 16 Beav. 435 ; Ive v. King, Id. 46 ; Harty. Tribe, 18 Beav. 215 .. Welh V. Byng, 2 K. & J. 669 ; 8 D. M. & G. 633 ; S. C. nom. Byng v. Byng, 10 H. L. Gas. 171 ; In re Graham's Will, 33 Beav. 479 ; Greeve V. Greeve, L. R. 4 Eq. Gas. 180; Davis V. Bennett, 4 D. F. & J. 327. (s) See Charley v. Lovehand, 33 Beav. 189 ; Turner v. Gosset, 3.4 Beav. 593. OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES. 1005 lifetime : so that if one of the parents survives the testator, ^ r. m.T.is, ^ ' Ch. 1, s. 6. and dies before the tenant for life, the property vests in his representative, and does not go over to his children (t). And, under a bequest to A. or his children, he is absolutely ^ entitled if he survives the testator : the children can only take by substitution in case of the death of their parent in the testator's lifetime (^f). III. Devises and Bequests to Children. In construino; a will, an infant in ventre matris is con- infant in " ventre sidered as a child " living," and even as a child " born," mat^s. that word being read as synonymous with procreated (x). In the absence of indications to the contrary, where a who take where no legacy is given to a class of individuals, as to children, in pe™^ for general terms, and no period is appointed for the distribu- ^^ appointed, tion of it, the death of the testator is the period of distri- bution, and none of the class but those who are born or in ventre matris at that period are entitled to participate in the bequest. And so, as a general rule, where a period is who take where a appointed for distribution, as the attainment of maionty perindfor ^^ J ^ distribution or the death of a parent, the fund is distributable among '» appointed. as many as come into existence before that time, and no child born afterwards can be admitted to a share (y). If there is a bequest to children " begotten" or "to be Bequest to ^ '^ children begotten," or "who may be born," these words refer only '' begotten or " ./ ' -^ to be begot- to children who may be born after the date of the will and *fJJ'i]'o°^ay before the death of the testator, and not to children born ^® ''°™"" after his decease, where a different construction would (() Henderson v. Kennicot, 2 De 53 ; 2 Spence'sEq.Jur. 418 ; .Smith's G. & S. 492. Executory Interests annexed to (m) Penley v. Penley, 12 Beav. Fearne, § 227 — 234 ; 2 Jarm. Wills, 547. 2nd ed. 126—130 ; Mann v. Thomp- {x) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 2, § 16 ; son, 1 Kay, 638 ; Hagger v. Payne, Watk. Conv. 3rd ed. by Prest, 243 ; 23 Beav. 474, 47S ; Bateman v. Gray, 2 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 153—4. 29 Beav. 447. {y) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 38, 46, 1006 OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES. Whether cliDdren of a subse- quent mar- riage are in- cluded. Whether grandchild- ren or issue generally are in- cluded. Where it is sufficient to answer the desciip- tion in sub- stance, though not literally. Where a younger has been considered as an eldest chUd. impute to the testator the inconvenient and improbable intention that his residuary personal estate should not be distributed until after the deaths of the parents of the legatees (z). The word " children " will include children by a second or other subsequent marriage, unless it clearly appears that the testator only meant children of the first mar- riage (ft). The word " children " does not orrlinarily comprehend grandchildren or issue generally ; but it will be construed in this more extensive sense where the will would other- wise be inoperative, or where the testator has clearly shown by other words that he used the word in the more extensive sense (h). In general, even in the case of a will, the persons who claim must answer the description and character given of them in the will (c). But sometimes they may not answer the description and character literally, and yet they may answ^er what was really intended by such description and character. Thus in the case of provisions made for younger children, by will or by way of executory trust, by the parent or a person who stood in loco parentis, as being under a moral obligation to provide for the children or as intending to take upon himself or herself those duties and obligations which ordinarily and properly attach to a father or mother, a younger child becoming entitled to the family estate has been considered an eldest child, so as to exclude him from the benefit of the pro- vision for the younger children, where such appeared to be (z) 2 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 148— 9 ; Storrs v. Benhow, 2 My. & K. 46 ; 3 D. M. & G. 390 ; Butler v. Lotve, 10 Sim. 317 ; Townsend v. Early, 28 Beav. 429. («) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 48 ; 2 Jarm. Wills. 2nd cd. 123—4. (6) 1 Eop. Leg. by White, 68 ; 2 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 124-5 ; Pnde V. Fools, 3 D. & J. 252, 266 ; Jte CrawhalVs Trust, 8 D. M. & G. 480. (c) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 6^. OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES. 1007 the testator's intention. And, on the other hand, an pt.iii.t.is, Ch. 1, s. 6. eldest dauo'hter destitute of a provision has been con- ^ -■- Where an sidered a younger child ; and an eldest son is entitled (/a,f,;i*ter to claim a portion as a younger child, when the family considered estate is given from him, or he is otherwise unprovided yomiger, o / T^ °'' ^^ eldest tor (a). son as a younger. "Begotten" will extend to the issue begotten afterwards, "Begotten" and the words "to be begotten" to the issue begotten begotten."* before (e). Where several sons, daughters, or children are spoken "Next surviving of, and the words "next surviving are used, it should be son, ' _ . daughter, specified whether next younger or next elder is meant (/). °^ '^^^^^■" Where a testator directed that his daughters' shares Direction that should be " settled upon themselves strictly," it was held daughters' shares should that the income of the share of each should, during the 'Jesettted ' o upon them- joint lives of herself and her husband, be paid to her for stncUy. life, without power of anticipation ; that if she should die in the lifetime of her husband, then her share should go as she should by will appoint ; and, in default of appoint- ment, to her next of kin, exclusively of her husband ; and that if she should survive her husband, then the share should belong to her absolutely (g). TV. Devises or Bequests to Issue or Offspring, The word issue is used sometimes to denote all descen- dants, and at other times immediate descendants or some particular class of descendants living at a given time. (d) 1 Kop. Leg. by White, 59, 62, L. R. 4 Eq. 48, 55 ; ColUtujwood v. 65 ; 2 Spcnce's Eq. Jur. 412—3 ; 2 CoUingwood, L. R. 4 H. L. 43. Jarm. Wills, 2ad ed. 167—169 ; (e) 2 Rop. Leg. by White, 1513 ; Lijddon V. Ellison, 19 Beav. 565; 2 Jarm. Wills, 2ad ed. 150, 152, Macoubrey v. Jones, 21 Beav. 684 ; 153. Sandeman v. Mackenzie, 1 Johns. & (/) See Eastwood v. Lockwood, Hem. 613 ; Ellerde v. Thomas, 1 D. L, E. 3 Eq. Cas. 487. J. & S. 18 ; Davies v. Huguenin, 1 {g) Loch v. Bagley, L. R. 4 Eq. Hem. & Mill. 730 ; Wood v. Wood, 122. 1008 OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES. pt.iii.t. 15, And, in a will, issue is either a word of purchase or of Ch. 1, s. 6. _ ' _ ' _ _ -^ limitation, as will best answer the intention of the devisor, though, in the case of a deed, it is universally a word of purchase (Ji). When used as a word of purchase, and unconfined by any indication of intention, it will comprise all persons who can claim as descendants from or through the person to whose issue a devise or bequest is made (?'). It may be used in different senses in the same will. But if in the first part of a will it is used equivocally, and there is nothing in the immediate context to aid in con- struing its meaning, but in another part of the same will the ambiguity is corrected and the word is used in a particular sense, the presumption is that the testator has always used it in that sense in which he himself has cor- rected the ambiguity {j). " Issue male" means issue claiming through males, even in a bequest of personalty to issue male (Jc). The word " offspring " is a word of similar effect to the word "issue" (/). V. Devises to Heirs or Descendants. "Heirs" meaning cbildren, or descen- dants, or statutory next of kin. It is not unusual for testators, whose w^ills are not made by lawyers, to use the word " heirs " as synonymous with " children," or next of kin, who are descendants or sta- (li) 2 Jarm. Wills, 2iid ed. 80— 4 ; L. C. J. Wilmot, in Roe v. Grew, 2 Wils. 322 ; and Lord Kenyan^ C. J., in Doe d. Cooper v. Collis, 4 D. & E. 294. {i) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 94 Leigh v. Norhury, 13 Ves. 344 MaddocTc v. Legg, 25 Beav. 531 remarks of M. R. in Rhodes v. Rhodes, 27 Beav. 416 ; M'Oregor v. M'Gregor, 1 D. F. & J. 63. {j) Edwards t. Edwards, 12 Beav. 100 ; Re Corrie's Will, 32 Beav. 426. (k) Lywood v. Kimher, 29 Beav. 38. {I) Young v. Davies, 2 Dr. & Sm. 167. OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES. 100!) tutory next of kin : and where this appears to be the case, pt.iit.t.is, that meanino' will be oiven to the word (m). ^ _ *=■ _ \ ^ Riiiht heirs A devise in remainder to the rig-ht heirs of the testator ^^^'»<^ ''^'*- o tatoi-, ex- for ever, his son excepted, is void (n). *^^p* ^"^ ^°°- A devise to the right heirs of husband and wife is a Right heirs , . 1 .■,-...„,. of husband devise to the person answering the description oi heir to and wite. both, namely, a child of both, inasmuch as husband and wife are considered in law as but one person (o). AVliere a testator de\'ises real estate to a person and his ?¥ ^^^*' -"■ heir. Avife for their lives, and after their decease to their son, his heirs and assigns, for ever, but in case he should not sur- vive liis parents, and should die without an heir lawfully begotten, then to "the next heir" of the first takers, " their heirs and assigns for ever," " the next heir " means the person who should be the heir of the first takers in the technical sense of the word heir : so that, under the limitation over to the next heir, the estate will not vest in a second son of the first takers dying in the lifetime of one of such first takers, but will vest in his son, as he became the next heir in the technical sense of tlie word (^j). A devise to "the heirs male" of the devisor onlv extends Heirs male "^ _ ofthede- to the heirs male of his body, and not to a collateral heir : ^'^or. so that if the devisor has not an heir male of his body, the debase is void {q). The exiiression, " the first male heir of the branch of First male heir of the A.'s family," is not a definite and safe designation, but is ^.'■'^^^^ °f "^ o ' A. s family. one which may lead to perplexing questions, if not to the total failure of the estate intended to be limited, on the ground of uncertainty. For, under some circumstances, it may be a matter of the most perplexing doubt whether the (m) Roberts v. Edtmrds, 33 Beav. (o) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 10, § 39. 259 ; In re Jeaffreson's Trusts, L. R. {p) Doe cl. Knight v. Chaffey, 16 2 Eq. 276 ; In re Philps' Will, L. R. M. & W. 656. 7 Eq. Cas. 151. (q) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 10, § 37. (re) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 10, § 40. 1010 OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES. Pt Ch III. T 15, person intended must be an heir in tlie strict teclmical 3. 1, s. 6. -"^ sense, by being the child of a deceased parent and heir general, or whether it is sufficient if he is the child of a deceased person though not heir general, or whether " male heir " does not mean male heir apparent " or " male descendant," and whether the word " first " refers to the seniority of the heir, or whether it refers to seniority and priority of the stock from which he springs, or whether the devise is not void for uncertainty. Thus, where A. has no son, but several daughters, who have issue, it may be doubted whether the son or grandson of the eldest daughter is to take, because the eldest daughter has for some purposes priority over the others ; or whether the son of a younger or even of the youngest daughter should take, on the ground that he was born before the children of the other daughters ; or whether a son of a younger or even of the youngest daughter is to take, because his mother is dead at the time of the determination of the particular estate, while the other daughters are living, so that he is technically heir to her, while the children of the other daughters are not technically heirs to them ; or whether the devise is not void for uncertainty (r). Such cases are only mentioned to illustrate the care that is neces- sary in the use of the word " heir." In limitations in tail, " the eldest male lineal descendant of A." means eldest in line, not eldest in years, so as to desig- nate a grandson of A.'s eldest son as the eldest in line, rather than a son of A.'s youngest son, as the eldest in years (s). In giving property to " male descendants," or to " issue male," it is expedient to express whether or not the testator means persons claiming through males only {t). Eldest male lineal de- Bcendaut. Male de- scendants, (r) Winter v. Perratt, 9 CI. & F. 606. (s) TheUusson v. Rendlesham, 7 H. L. Cas. 429. ( t ) See Bernal v. Bcrnal, 3 My. «& Cr. 559 ; Lambert v. Peyton, 8 H. L. Cas. 1. OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES. 1011 A sister of the testator may be entitled under the pt. iii.x.is, . . . , Ch. 1, s. 6. description of his " nearest of kin in the male line/' in NCLU'Ci-t iireference to a son of the testator's paternal uncle (u). ofkiniu -I 1 \ / the male Under a limitation of lands of cjavelkind or borouQh- ''"''•" ^ ° Limitation Enolish tenure to the heir or heirs as a purchaser or pur- otgaveiitind '^ ^ ^ OT l)ori'Ugu- chasers, the common law heir takes, and not the heir by onieSonaify the custom. And the same rule applies in the case of *°**^^^^^'^- chattels real or other personal estate, where the word heir is used in its technical sense («). If it appear from the context that the words "in tlie "in the character of character of the then heir male of the body " of tlie tenant the tiien h ir "^ m.iie of the for life, have been used to denote a person taking 1/y ^°'^y" purchase as first tenant in tail after the determination of the estate for life, the words will receive that construction. But that is not the technical or proper meaning of those words (y). VI. Bequests to a Person and his Heirs, or to the Heirs of ct Person. A legacy to a person and his heirs, or to a person " or his heirs or assigns," is a bequest of the entire interest to him absolutely. But when money is bequeathed to the heirs of a person to whom no interest in it is given, or when money is bequeathed to a person with a limitation to his heirs by way of substitution or remainder, in some cases it is held that by the word "heh-s," the testator means the persons who under the Statute of Distributions would be entitled, in case the individual whose heirs are spoken of had died intestate ; in which case it would include even his widow, and not merely his nearest of (u) Boijs X. Bradleii, 10 Hare, Slnden,2 Johns. kYiem.ZQ'd ; Polky 389 ; 4 D. M. & G. 58 ; S. C. nom. v. PoUey (No. 2), 31 Beav. 363. Sayer v. Bradley, 5 H. L. Cas. 874. (y) Mirl:lethv:ait v. Micklethxvait, {x) Co. Litt. 10 a, n. (4) ; Thorp 4 Com. B. 790. V. Owen, 2 S. & G. 90 ; Sladen v. VOL. II. . E E 1012 OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES. pt. III.T.15, blood. In other cases it is held to mean "his children;" Ch. 1, s. 6. and in others the strict literal meaning is given to it. (z). Gifts to cousins. Nephews aud niece.'' Relations i a fnu.ily. VII. Devises or Bequests to Ne^pheivs and Nieces, Cousins, or Relations, or a Family, or Next of Kin, or Persons claiming under the Statute of Distributions, or Trustees, Executors, or Personal or Legal Bcprescntatives. Where a bequest is made to "cousins "-simpliciter, first cousins only will be entitled, unless there is anything in the wiU to indicate a different intention (ft). Under a bequest to the testator's first and second -cousins, first cousins twice removed were held to be entitled, as being within the degree of relationship men- tioned in the will (b). But, under a bequest to " first cousins or cousins german," children or descendants of first cousins will not take ; the designation " cousin german" being considered as synonymous with and used in explanation of "first cousin" (c). NejDhews and nieces of the wife of a testator will take under a bequest to his nephews and nieces, where he has none of his own (d). Where a devise or bequest is made to " relations " or " near relations," and there is nothing to show that more remote relations or tliat some only of the relations were intended, all of those and none but those are entitled, per (s) See 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 88, 89, 90, 93 ; 2 Jarm. "Wills, 2nd ed. 65—9 ; In re Walton's Estate, 8 D. M. & G. 173; Doody v. Higgins, 9 Hare, App. p. xxxv. ; 2 K. & J. 729 ; De Beauvoir \. De Beauvoir, 3 H. L. Cas. 524, 557 ; Re Roots, 1 Dr. & Sm. 228 ; Hasleioood v. Green, 28 Beav. 1 ; Hamilton v. Mills, 29 Beav. 19.3 ; Tn Re Newton's Trusts, h. R. 4 Eq. 171. («) Stoddard v. Nelson, 6 D. M. & G. 68; Stevenson v. Abingdon, 31 Beav. 305. (b) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 145 ; 2 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 125. (c) Sanderson v. BayJeij, 4 My. & Cr. 56. {d) Hoggy. Cook, 32 Beav. 641. OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES. 1013 capita, wlio, in case of intestacv, could claim as next of pt. iti.t.is, r > ' o > Ch. 1, E. 6. kin by the Statute of Distributions. This construction is adopted as the best mode of setting bounds to the generality of the word " relations." If tlie Ijeqiiest is confined to the testator's " poor " or '' necessitous " or " poorest " or " most necessitous " relations, those only will take who could claim by the Statute of Distributions, and are also in want of assistance. But when it appears from the will that a testator intended to appropriate a sum of money, not only for his then existing poor relations, but for those to succeed without limitation as to time, a court of equity will sup- port the bequest as a charity, and admit all his poor relations without regard to the Statute of Distributions (e). When a testator has delegated a power to distribute the fund among his relations according to the discretion of the donee of the power, he may distribute the property among the testator's kindred, although they be not within the Statute of Distributions. And if such a j)0wer is not executed, the property will go to the next of kin at tlie death of the donee of the power (/). And where a person is empowered to fix the amount of the shares to be taken by relations, but not to select the objects, those will be entitled who are the next of kin according to the Statute of Distributions, at the death of the donee of the power {g). And bequests to a person's " family " are to be construed by the same rules as bequests to " relations " {li). Where a testator uses in an ultimate limitation the Next of Wn and piTisous words " next of km of my own family," they mean the entitled nearest or next of kin of those persons who accordino: to ?J*^".'« °^ ^ O Distill .11- tions. (e) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 101, {g) Finch v. Hollingsicorth, 21 104, 105, 107, 112, 113; 2 Jarm. Beav. 112; and Pope v. Whitcombe, Wills, 2nd ed. 97, 98, 100, 101 ; as there corrected, and not as re- Tiffin V. Longman, 15 Beav. 275 ; 2 ported 3 Meriv. 689 ; Salusbury v. Sugd. Pow. 237. Denton, 3 K. & J. 529, 536. if) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 107, (h) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 141 ; 108, 110. see supra, n. {g). 1014 OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES. Pt Ch "/"s's^' oi'^^iii^iy Iflngnage are his family ; as, for instance, the next ~ of kin of his daugliter, where he had an only daughter (i). The expression next of kin, uncontrolled by any other expression, does not mean " those persons who in case of intestacy would be entitled under the Statute of Distribu- tions," but it means those persons (without any distinction between the whole and the half blood) who are nearest in degree of personal propinquity. And therefore, on the one hand, it excludes the children of the deceased brother or sister, where there is a brother or sister living ; and on the other hand, it includes the parents as well as the children of the person named, as being all related to him in the first degree, or the brothers as well as the grand- children of such person, as being all related in the second degree (/). A widow, as such, cannot take under a limitation to the next of kin of her husband according to the Statute of Distributions (k). And the husband is not a person en- titled under that statute to the personal estate of his deceased wife ; for his right is independent of any statute : and therefore under a bequest " in trust for the person or persons who would at the time of the decease of a daughter or daughters, or of the decease or failure of her or their children respectively (whichever event should last happen), be entitled, as next of kin or otherwise, to the personal estate of such daughter or daughters respectively under the statutes made for the distribution of intestates' effects," the husbands of the daughters are not entitled (/). (i) Clapton v. Buhner, 10 Sim. (k) 2 Jarui. Wills, 2nd ed. 86 ; 426 ; 5 My. & Cr. 108. Cholmondeley v. Lord Ashburton, 6 (j) Withey V. Mangles, 4 Beav. Bear. 86. 358 ; 10 CI. & F. 215 ; 2 Jarm. {I) 2 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 86, Wills, 2nd ed. 84—6, 100 ; Cooper v. 100 ; Milne v. Gilbart, 2 D. M. & G. Denison, 13 Sim. 290 ; Elmsley v. 715 ; 5 D. M. & G. 510. See supra, Youfig, 2 My. & K. 82, 780 ; Avison p. 527—530. V, Simpson, 1 Johns. 43. OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES. 1015 Where a bequest is made to such of the testator's next pt.iii.t.is, ^ _ _ Ch. 1, s. G. of kin as would by virtue of the Statute of Distributions have been entitled in case of his intestacy, or to such persons as sliould be his next of kin " under or according to the statute/' the reference to the statute points out not only the class but also the manner in which they are to take ; so that the class take as tenants in common and not as joint tenants (?n). A legacy to a person Avho is an executor, though given Executors, to him by name, is (in the absence of any indication of bounty towards him, irrespective of that office), prima facie given to him as executor, and as a remuneration or acknowledgment for his trouble ; and if he does not prove tlie will, he will not be entitled to his legacy (n), even though he may have been physically incapable of so doing (o). And when bequests are made to individuals in Trustees. the character of trustees, and not as marks of personal regard only, the legacies are held to be given upon an implied condition that such persons clothe themselves with that character (jj). The ordinary lecjal meanincy of each of the terms Representa- . ^ ^ tives. " representatives," " legal representatives," and " personal representatives," as well as the term " legal personal representatives," when used with respect to personalty, is not children or next of kin, but executors and administra- tors. And that is the sense in which the testator must be considered to have used these terms, unless the will affords evidence sufficient to satisfy the Court that he intended to use them in a different sense (q), as where they are (m) Downes v. Bullock, 25 Beav. (o) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 777, 54 ; Bullock v. Doivnes, 9 H. L. C. 780 ; Banbury v. Spooner, 5 Beav, 1 ; In re Ranking's Settlement Trusts, 630 ; Re Haiokin's Trusts, 33 Beav. L. R. 6 Eq. 601. 570 ; Slaney v. Watne^J, L. R. 2 Eq. (w) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 780 ; 418. Calvert v. Sebhon, 4 Beav. 222 ; Re (p) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 777. Deiiby, 3 D. F. & J. 350. (q) 2 Jarm. Wills, 2ml ed. 91 ; 1016 OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES. pt. iii.t.15, connected with the Statute of Distributions (r), or where Ch. 1, s. 6. . , ^ ^ the words " per stii^pes and not per capita," are added (s), or where the word " next " is prefixed to the words " legal representatives " (t) or " personal representatives " (u) ; or where the words " sliare and share alike " are added to those words (x) ; or where the testator frequently uses the very words " executors and administrators " in other pas- sages, Avhere he intended to designate them (y) ; or where the legacy or gift is immediate, as to A. or his representa- tives (z) ; and not after a previous life estate (a). Under an ultimate limitation to the " next legal representatives " of a person, the property does not pass to his executors or administrators, either beneficially or otherwise, but to the person or persons who, in case of intestacy, would, under the Statute of Distributions, in right of consanguinity, take his personal estate beneficially, whether such person or persons be next by personal proximity of relationship or next by representation (b). The words " to or amongst such person or persons as would be the personal represen- Eilner V. Leach, lOBeav. 362; (t) Booth y. Vicars,! Co\\. 6. Smith V. Barneby, 2 Coll. 728 ; (w) Stockdale v. Sichohon, L. R. Minter v. Wraith, 13 Sim. 52 ; 1 4 Eq. Cas. 359. Rop. Leg. by White, 124, 128 ; In {x) Smith v. Palmer, 7 Hare, 225 ; re Crawford's Trusts, 2 Drew. 237, Kinc/ v. Cleaveland, 26 Beav. 26 ; 4 239 ; Saberton v. Skcels, Taml. 383 ; D. & J. 477. But see Chapman v. 1 R. & M. 587 ; Atherton v. Crmv- Chapman, 33 Beav. 556. «Aer, 19 Beav. 448 ; Re Henderson, (y) Walker y. Marquis of Camden, 28 Beav. 656 ; Chapman v. CJmp- 16 Sim. 329 ; King v. Cleaveland, man, 33 Beav. 556 ; He Turner, 2 26 Beav. 26 ; 4 D. & J. 477, 488. Dr. & Sm. 501 ; Jle Wyndham's But see Hinchliffe v. Westwood, 2 Trusts, L. R. 1 Eq. Cas. 290 ; Alger De G. & S. 216. T. Parrott, 3 Eq. 328. In Dixon v. (2) Bridge v. Ahhott, 2 Bro. C. C. Dixon, 24 Beav. 129, the same con- 224 ; Cotton v. Cotton, 2 Beav. 67. struction was adopted in the case of (a) Judgment of V.-C. Kinders- a residue of real and personal estate. ley. In re Crawford's Trusts, 2 (r) IIoUowayY. RadcUffe, 23 Beav. Drew. 240—3. 163. (h) Booth V. Vicars, 1 Coll. 6. is) Atherton v. Croivther, 19 Beav. See also Smith v. Palmer, 7 Hare, 448. 225. OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES. 1017 tatives," are inapplicable to executors or administrators, pt. iii.t.is, ' ^^ ' On. 1, s. 6. and denote next of kin (c). The full expression commonly employed, and the most unequivocal expression to desig- nate executors or administrators, is "legal personal repre- sentatives." But the words "legal" and " personal" are not essential to the designation when applied to personal property. The word " legal," when added to representa- tives, only means the representatives recognised by law ; and the word "personal," when added to representatives, only denotes the representatives in respect of personal pro- perty (rZ). VIII. Testamentary Gifts to other Ohjeets. The circumstance of a solicitor preparing for a client a Gifts to the . . solicitor of will containing dispositions in favour of the solicitor, does tiie testator. not of itself take away the right of the solicitor to be a de- visee or legatee for his own benefit (c). A bequest to a parish church is a gift to the church- oirts to the , ,.,.,. , parish or wardens ol the parish named, to be applied in adorning and pa.ish ^ ' ri o church. repairing the church, and not to the parson. A bequest to " the parish," without saying to what use, has been con- strued a bequest to the poor of the parish (/). An undischarged bankrupt may be a legatee, but the Gift to a . . . banlirupt. beneficial interest will belong to Ins assignees in trust for his creditors (g). A bequest of a year's wages to each of the testator's Gifts to servants. servants, over and above what may be due to them at the time of his decease, applies to such family servants only as (c) Baines v. Ottey, 1 My. & K. M. & G. 301 ; Walker v. Smith, 29 465 ; In re GrylW Trusts, L. R. 6 Beav. 394. Eq. 589. (/) 2 Eop. Leg. by Wliite, 1495. {d) In re Crawford's Trusts, 2 As to charitable bequests, see supra, Drew. 235. pp. 285, ct seq. (c) Hindson v. Wcatherill, 5 D. (g) 1 Rop. Leg. by Wliite, 20. 1018 OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES. ■^ch^Y'J'6*' ^^'^ usually hired by the year, and not to an under-gar- dener, who, though he had worked for the testator for some years, had received weekly wages, and had not resided in the house (h). And where a testator gives to each person, as a servant in his domestic establishment at the time of his decease, a year's wages, beyond what may be due for wages, a head-gardener who lives in one of the testator's cottages, and was not boarded by the testator, is not en- titled to a year's wages. The expression " servant in my domestic establishment," in such a case, denotes an indoor servant (i). I Section VII. Of Implied Devises and Bequests. ^ch^"T'7^' -^^ many cases a devise or bequest may be made by plain implication as well as by express words {j). And by plain implication is meant, not merely a possible or pro- bable intention, but so strong a probability of intention that an mtention contrary to that which is imputed to the testator cannot be supposed (h). For example, in cases where a fund has been given upon trust for a person until the age of twenty-one or marriage, without any further be- quest, or wdiere a fund or a provision or partial interest out of a fund has been given to a person until he attain twenty- one or marry, with a limitation over if that event should not happen, but with no further bequest in case the event should happen, a bequest on that event has been implied. {h) 11 Jarm. & Byth by Sweet, 359. 505 ; Booth v. Dean, 1 My. & K. ( j) In re Blake's Trust, L. R. 3 560 ; Blackwell v. Pennant, 9 Hare, Eq. 799. 551. {k) 6 Cruise T. 3S, c. 10, § 18 ; 1 -(I) Ogle V. Morgan, 1 D. M. & G. Hop. Leg. by White, 1439. OF IMPLIED DEVISES AND BEQUESTS. 1019 And so, where a fund is directed to be paid to an indi- -Pt. hi.t. is, '- Cn. 1, s. 7. vidual, for the purpose of making a partial application for the benefit of a tliird person, and there is no express gift of the surphis, the legatee takes the fund absolutely, subject to the trust for the partial purpose specified (/). But the application of the doctrine of implied gifts is often very difficult ; for there are cases in which the Courts have re- fused to hold that a gift was implied, where there appeared to be strong grounds for such a construction. Thus it has been held that wdiere a bequest, even though it be a resi- duary bequest, is made to a person, but if he should die in the lifetime of the testator without leaving children, then to another person, such children take nothing by implica- tion (»t). And where an estate is devised to a person (who is not the heir at law of the devisor) after the death of the devisor's wife, the wife does not take an estate for life by implication, because the testator may have intended that the estate should descend to his heir at law until the death of his wife (n). But where a man devised his goods to his wife, and that after her decease his son and heir should have a certain house, it was determined that this was a good devise of the house to the wife for life by implication ; for by the express words of the will the heir was not to take it till after the death of the wife ; so that if she did not take it, no one else could (o). (I) See 2 Rop. Leg. by White, also Neighbour v. Thurlow, 28 Beav. 1439—1450. 33. {m) Addison v. Bnsl; 14 Beav. {n) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 10, § 20. 459 ; 2 D. M. & G. 810. See also (o) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 10, § 19. Sparks v. liestall, 24 Beav. 218 ; see 1020 KEVOCATION UNDEll THE OLD LAW. Pt. III.T.15, Ch. 1, s. 8. Will cannot be made irrevocable. Enactments of the Statute of Fiauds as to revocation. Section VIII. Of the Revocation of Devises and Bequests. I. Bevocatmi imder tlic Old Law. Although a person shouhl declare his will to be irrevo- cable in the strongest terms, yet he may revoke it, because his own acts or words cannot alter the disposition of the law, so as to make that irrevocable which in its own nature is revocable {;p). By s. 6 of the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, it is enacted, " that no devise in writing of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, nor any clause thereof, shall be revocable otherwise than by some other will or codicil in writing, or other writing declaring the same, or by burning, cancelling, tearing, or obliterating the same by the testator himself, or in his presence and by his directions and consent ; but all devises and bequests of lands and tenements shall remain and continue in force until the same be burnt, cancelled, torn, or obliterated by the testator or his directions, in the manner aforesaid, or unless the same be altered by some other will or codicil in writing or other writing of the devisor signed in the presence of three or four witnesses, declaring the same ; any former law or usage to the con- trary notwithstanding " {cj). By s. 22 of the same statute, it is provided that no will in writing concerning any goods or chattels or personal estate, shall be repealed, nor shall any clause, devise, or bequest therein be alteied or changed by any words, or will by word of mouth only, except the same be in the life of the testator committed to \vriting, and after the writing thereof read unto the testator, and allowed by (/>) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6. § 1. (q) Burton, § 261. REVOCATION UNDER THE OLD LAW. 1021 him, and proved to be so done by three witnesses at the pt. iii.t.is, ^ ' Cu. 1, 8. 8. least (r). I. Under this statute there are four exi)ress modes of re- i- Express *- revou'itiona voking a will of real estate. 1. The first mode is by a stl^'',','te'j,f subsequent will duly attested accordinfr to the statute (s). ^''''•"''^• J- ^ ® ^ ^ Revocation A subsequent will operates as a revocation of a former one ''^j^J';^'^^if" in all cases where it contains an express clause revolting all former wills, or where it makes a different and incompatible disposition. The intention of a testator to revoke his will is the circumstance which constitutes the revocation ; and when that has appeared in a subsequent will, it is sufficient, though such subsequent will should not take effect from any disability of the devisee, or from being lost. Wliere a second will lias not a clause of revocation of all former wills, and does not make any disposition inconsistent with a former will, it does not operate as a revocation of such former will, but both remain in force (t). If a subsequent testamentary paper is only partly inconsistent with one of an earlier date, the earlier instrument is only revoked as to those parts where it is inconsistent, and both of the papers are entitled to probate (?^). Where a testator has made a second will different from the first, but it is not known in what that dift'erence consisted, such second Mill does not revoke the former one (x). Where there is a duplicate of a will, and the testator cancels or makes an obliteration in the manuscript which is in his own possession, this gene- rally operates as a revocation of or obliteration in the other ; for it may not be in the testator's power to get pos- session of the other manuscript (;j/). (»■) 1 Jarm. Wills, 2iid ed. 35, (m) Lemaje v. Goodhan, L. R. 1 140. Prob. 57. (s) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 3. (x) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 13 ; 1 {t) G Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 4, 5, 9 ; Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 143. 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 143, 145; {y) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 39 ; 1 Johnson v. Lyford, L. E. 1 Prob. Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 115,116. 546. 1022 KE VOCATION UNDER THE OLD LAAV. I'T. III.T.15, 2. The second mode of revocation ia by a codicil duly r \ — executed according to the Statute of Frauds, and contain- Kevoc-atiou " by a codicil, jj^g express words of revocation, or making a different disposition from that contained in the will (z). The dis- positions contained in a will are not affected farther than is absolutely necessary in order to give effect to those which are contained in a codicil. If a disposition in a will is clear, it is incumbent on those who contend it is not to take effect by reason of a revocation in a codicil, to show that the intention to revoke is equally clear and free from doubt as the original intention to make such a dis- position (a). Therefore a devise by will to the children of A. was held not to be revoked by parenthetical expres- sions in a codicil, that they were not intended to take any beneficial interest under the will or codicil, as it might refer only to the testator's view of the effect of his will, or to an intention of future revocation (&). And where A. devised the remainder in fee in her lands to her grand- daughter, and by a codicil, Avhich she directed to be annexed to and taken as part of her will, reciting her subsequent acquisition of other lands, and that she in- tended to dispose of all her estates for the benefit of her grand-dauc^hter " for her life, with such limitation and in such manner " as thereafter expressed, " instead of the devise contained in her will," she thereby devised her estates in trust for her grand-daughter for life, and then for her children who should sur\T.ve her in fee, or if no children, for her brotliers and sisters who should survive her in fee, but without limiting the estates over in case of the limitations to the children and the brothers and (2) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 18 ; Beav. 303 ; Ar/ncw v. P021C, 1 D. & Tupper V. Tupper, 1 K. & J. 665. J. 49 ; Robertson v. Poxoell, 2 Hurl. (a) 1 Jarm, Wills, 2nd ed. 146, & Colt. 762. Supra, 992. 151; Cleohury v. Beckett, 14 Beav. (b) Cleobury v. Beckett, 14 Beav. 586, 587 ; Butler v. Oreemvood, 22 583, 588. REVOCATION UNDER THE OLD LAW. 1023 sisters (whicli event happened) never taking effect ; there, ^^■J^l''^-\^' as it was tlie manifest intention, both in the will and codicil to make the grand-daughter the principal object of the testatrix's bounty, it was held that the words, " instead of/' &c., did not amount to a revocation, but meant " in- stead of so much only of the devise " in the will as was incompatible with the disposition contained in the codicil ; so that the gift of the remainder in fee was unaltered by the codicil (c), 3. The third mode of revoking a will which is men- Hevocation ° ny a writing tioned by the Statute of Frauds is, by a writino- declaring ^■s"^'^^' *° ^„^® •^ ' J o o presence of an intention of revoking such will, signed in the presence ne'ssL*''" of three witnesses. And it is observable, that the Statute of Frauds requires that in devises of lands, though not in mere revocations, the three witnesses should subscribe the will in the presence of the testator. While, on the other hand, the clause relating to revocations requires that the testator should sign in the presence of three witnesses, which was not required in devises (rf). And it has been held, that, although a will may be revoked by a written declaration without being attested by three witnesses subscribing the will in the testator's presence, yet that a second will, thovigh containing a clause revoking all former wills, shall not operate as a revocation of the first will, unless it is executed in such a manner as to operate as a devise (c). 4. The fourth mode of revoking a will which is men- Revocation by burning, tioned by the Statute of Frauds is, by burning, cancelling, canceiiiug, ■^ ' J to' G' tearing, or tearing, or obliterating the will, with the intent to revoke obliterating, it (/). An obliteration or alteration of a part of a will does not operate as a revocation of the whole will, but (c) Doe cl. March v. Marchant, 6 (e) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 19. M. & Gr. 813. (/) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 3, 25 {d) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 19 ; 1 —27; 1 Jarm. Wills, 109, et seq. Jami. Wills, 2nd. ed. 140—1. 1024 REVOCATION UNDER THE OLD LAW. Pt. III.T.15, Ch. 1, s. 8. II. Implied revocations. Revocation by marriage aiul birlli of chUd. Revrication by uu aiii na- tion or diajjosition oi' merger of the estate. only of the part obliterated, and the rest will remain good {g). II. Besides the different modes of revoking a will allowed by the Statute of Frauds, there are certain alterations in the situation of the testator or in the estate devised which have been held to operate as implied revo- cations of a devise (A). Where a man made his will, and afterwards married and had a child, these events generally operated as a revocation of his will ; because they produced a complete change in the situation and in the duties of the testator. But neither of those circumstances singly (as a subsequent marriage, or the subsequent birth of a child) had that effect {i). But the will of a female was always revoked by her marriage, on the ground that it would otherwise by her own act become irrevocable, which is contrary to the nature of the instrument, though it may become so by the act of Grod, as by insanity supervening and continuing till death {j). An actual alienation or disposition of an estate, whether legal or equitable, after a devise, generally operated as a revocation; for in such cases the alienation was deemed undoubted evidence of an alteration of intention, and in some of these cases the devisor did not die seised {h). Even an agreement or covenant to convey lands which have been previously devised by will, whether in execution of a power or not, operates in equity, though not at law. ig) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 34 ; 1 Jarm. Wills. 2nd ed. 112. (/i) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 40 ; Burton, § 267. (?•) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 41, 44 — 50 ; Burton, § 269 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 102 — 108 ; Marston v. Roe d. Fox, 8 Ad. & E. 14 ; 2 N. & P. .504 ; Israeli v. Rodon, 2 Moore's P. C. C. 51 ; In the goods of Thos. CadywoU, 1 Swa. & T. 34. (j) Burton, § 270 ; 6 Cruise T. 38, c. C, § 53 ; 2 Bl. Com. 498 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 102. (/.■) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 55 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 122, 124 ; Grant V. Bridgcr, 3 Eq. Cas. 347. KEVOCATION UNDEK THE OLD LAW. 1025 as a revocation or ademptioii of sucli devise, as well in ^'^J^JJ-g^* cases before the stat. 1 Vict. c. 26, as in cases within it (/) ; and thedevisee is not entitled to the purchase money ()n), even though the contract were entered into under the compulsory powers of a railway company (n) ; or though the conversion be at the option of the person with whom the agreement \vas ejitered into, and it be not exercised till after the death of the testator (o). In cases where the will is revoked in equity, but not at law, the legal estate passes by the will to the devisee, but the Court of Chancery will compel him to convey it to the person entitled under the equitable agreement. Even an intended alienation of an estate previously devised, which failed of taking effect for want of some formality, has been held to operate as a revocation of the devise. Thus a feoffment without livery and a bargain and sale not enrolled have been held to be revocations of prior devises ; because such intended alienations were considered as proofs of an alteration of intention ( jj). An alienation to a trustee, or conveyance to a cestui que use, without any intention of parting with the estate, and though the alienor took back the old use, has been held to operate as a revocation of a prior devise (q). Where a person who had devised his lands, afterwards levied a fine or suffered a recovery of them, these acts operated as a revocation of the devise (r). Parol evidence is not admissible to prove that the (l) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 58 ; 2 (o) Weeding v. WeecUnrj, 1 Johns. Sugcl. Pow. 10 ; Sugd. Concise View, & Hem. 424. L31, 132 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. (j4 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 62, 63 ; 135 ; Andrew v. Andrew, 3 Sm. & 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 137—139. G. 130. iq) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 65 ; (m) 11 Jarm. & Bytli. by Sweet, Burton, § 267 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd 794. ed. 124. (m) Re Manchester and SouthpoH (r) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 72 ; Railway Comp., 19 Beav. 365 ; Gale 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 125. V. Gale, 21 Beav. 349. 1026 REVOCATION UNDER THE OLD LAW. pt. III.T.15, testator meant that his will should remain in force and C'n. 1, s. 8. unrevoked by the subsequent conveyance (s). A conveyance of property contracted to be purchased, if made to the usual uses to bar dower, revoked a devise of the property by the purchaser, if there was no special contract that the property should be conveyed to the usual uses to bar dower, and if the devise referred exclusively to the estate which the testator then had, and did not also refer to an estate or interest which he might have at a future time ; because, at the date of his will, he was equitable owner in fee under the contract, and by the conveyance he acquired a legal estate of a different character to his former equitable estate, which was the subject of the devise (t). And in such case the testator's heir, if entitled to benefits under his will, is not bound to elect between those benefits and the property so conveyed (v). Where a man has an equitable interest in fee in an estate, and afterwards takes a conveyance of the legal estate to the same uses, this is no revocation (x). And so, where a person devises a copyhold estate, and is after- wards admitted to it, this does not operate as a revocation of the devise (?/). And the mere change of a trustee does not operate as a revocation of a preceding devise (z). Nor does a partition of an estate between tenants in common operate as a revocation of a prior devise made by one of the tenants of his share, even though such a partition be corroborated by a fine (a). (s) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 83. Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 129 ; BulUn v. (<) 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 130 ; Fletcher, 2 My. & Cr. 432. Phwden v. Hyde, 2 Sim. (N.S.), 171 ; (y) Q Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 92. 2 D. M. & G. 684 ; Bvllin v. Flet- {z) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 94 ; 1 cher, 2 My. & Cr. 432. Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 129. {u) Plowden v. Hyde, 2 Sim. (a) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 97 ; 6 (N.S.), 171. Jarm. & Hyth. by Sweet, 596 ; 1 {x) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. fi, g 90 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 125. REVOCATION UNDER THE OLD LAW. 1027 "Where a person has an estate pur autre vie at the time ^^•'^j^-^-g^- of making his will, and afterwards purchases the in- heritance, it is a revocation of any devise of the estate pur autre vie {h). Although a mere mortgage in fee made after the lands mortgaged were devised is a revocation of such devise at law, }'et in equity it only has the effect of making the devisee take subject to the mortgage as against the mort- gagee, and in cases within the stat. 17 Vict. c. 113, as against the testator's representatives (c). But if lands are devised to a person in fee, and the testator afterwards mortgages them to the devisee, it will be a revocation in toto, being inconsistent with the devise (d). Where the owner of an estate limited to the usual uses to bar dower mortgaged it in fee, and then devised the estate, and subsequently took a reconveyance from the mortgagee to the same uses to which it stood limited before the mortgage, and died before the Wills'Act came into operation, the will was not revoked by the recon- veyance, though, by the proviso for redemption, the estate was to be reconveyed to the mortgagor, his heirs, ap- pointees, or assigns, or to such other person or persons, to such uses, and in • such manner as he or they should direct; the Lords Justices, Sir J. L. Knight Bruce, and Lord Cranworth (contrary to the decision of the Court below) (c), considering that, notwithstanding the form of the proviso for redemption, the mortgage deed, being executed simply for the purpose of creating a charge, did not affect the estate of the mortgagor any further than by rendering that an equitable estate which was before a legal estate ; and it being clear that the mere bringing back the legal estate to the equitable estate by the recon- (6) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 113. Jarm. Wills, 2iid ed. 125-7. (c) See supra, p. 518. (e) 2 Sim. (N. S.) 171. (d) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 106 ; 1 1028 REVOCATION UNDER THE OLD LAW. ''ch^"'!''^^' "^^yance could not operate as a revocation, if the equitable estate existing after tlie mortgage was of a similar kind to the legal estate which existed before the mortgage and was brought back by the reconveyance (/). A conveyance, to have the effect of a total revocation of a prior devise, must be co-extensive with the disposition made by the will. For if it is only of a part of the pro- perty, it affects the will no farther than concerns that part. And if it is of a particular estate or interest only, it only operates as a revocation pro tanto. Hence a lease made of lands already devised only operates as a partial revocation or a revocation pro tanto in such a way that the devisee takes the inheritance subject to the term, with the rent, if any, reserved by the lease {g). A conveyance in fee to trustees merely for raising money to pay debts, will only operate as a revocation pro tanto of a prior devise, so far as relates to the payment of the debts, but no further (Ji). But where a person, after having made his will, executed a conveyance in trust for payment of debts in a schedule, and instead of declaring the uses to himself in fee after payment of the debts, he declared that the trustees should convey to such uses and purposes as he by deed or will should appoint, and for default of appointment to himself in fee, this was held to be a revocation (*). A surrender of a lease for lives and the taking a new lease was held to operate as a revocation of a prior devise ofit(y). And where a testator bequeathed a term for years, and afterwards surrendered it and took a new term, it was held that this operated as a revocation or ademption of the (/) Plowden V. Hyde, 2 D. & M. {h) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 107 ; 1 G. 684. Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 126. {g) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 104 ; 1 (0 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 109. Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 122. U) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 111. REVOCATION UNDER THE OLD LAW. 1029 bequest. If however the words of the will show the testa- ''^•J^P^-^g^- tor's intention to dispose of all terms for years whereof he might die possessed, a renewed term would pass ; for a term of years being only a chattel, there was no necessity for a possession at the date of the will, or of a conthniance of such possession till the testator's death (k). A devise is revoked by a bankruptcy, so far only as may Revocation be necessary for the purpose of paying the creditors (/). '^'^P^'^y- The republication of a former will revoked one of later Revocation i by republi- cation of a former «ill. date, and established the first again (m). ^''*^°" °^^ II. The Law as to Bevocation hy the Stat. 1 Vict. c. 26. Bv s. 18, " every will made bv a man or woman shall be wiiitobe -^ ' '^ ^ J ^ ^ revoked by revoked by his or her marriage (except a Avill made in mainage. exercise of a power of appointment, when the real or per- sonal estate thereby appointed would not, in default of such appointment, pass to his or her heir, customary heir, executor, or administrator, or the person entitled as his or her next of kin, under the Statute of Distributions) " {;)i). Bv s. 19, "no will shall be revoked by any presumption No win to J ' . . be revoked of an intention on the ground of an alteration in circum- J'j^J"''^*"'^''' stances." By s. 20, " no will or codicil, or any part thereof, shall ,^3°^.^"^^°} be revoked otherwise than as aforesaid, or by another wiU a^'^t'^er wui or codicil executed in manner hereinbefore required, or by or by a" ' some writing declaring an intention to revoke the same, execut'ed like a will, and executed in the manner in which a will is hereinbefore "iby destruction. required to be executed, or by the burning, tearing, or otherwise destroying the same by the testator, or by some person in his presence and by liis direction, with the inten- tion of revoking the same." % 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 114, 116. (wi) 2 Bl. Com. 502. {I) See 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 6, § 110 ; (w) In the goods of Fenwick, L. R. 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 127. 1 Prob. 319. F F 2 1030 REVOCATION UNDER THE STAT. 1 VICT, C, 26. pt iii.t. n Cii. I, s. 8. A devise not to be rendered iiiO])(irative 1-iy ;iiiy subsequent conveyance or act, except, (fee. By s. 23, "no conveyance or other act made or done subsequently to the execution of a will of or relating to any real or personal estate therein comprised, except an act l)y which such will shall he revoked as aforesaid, shall prevent the operation of the will with respect to such estate or interest in such real or personal estate as the testator shall have power to dispose of by will at the time of his death." This section does not apply to conveyances or contracts whereby the testator has entirely and effectually parted with the property, at law or in equity (o). I PT.in.T.15, Ch. 1, s. 9. General rule. Section IX. Of the Lapse of Devises and Bccfmsts. With the exceptions noticed below, a devise or bequest lapses, that is, fails, by the death of the devisee or legatee in the lifetime of the testator ( jj). And though the devise be to a person and his hehs, yet if he die before the tes- tator, his heirs will not take the land ; because the mention of the heirs only denotes what estate he himself should take, viz., a fee simple, if he were living at the time when the will must take effect (q). And so, although a legacy be given to a person, his executors or administra- tors or personal representatives, it will lapse by his death before the testator ; because the additional words may have been intended merely to denote the gift of the absolute interest, or to express to the legatee, that if he (o) See supra, p. 1024 ; Ford v. De Pontes, 30 Beav. 572. ip) 1 Eop. Leg. by White, 463 ; Burtou, § 275 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2ad ed. 277. (q) Burton, § 275 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2ud ed. 277. OF THE LAPSE OF DEVISES AND BEQUESTS. 1031 should survive the testator and afterwards die before the ^;^-^\^'^-i^' Ca. 1, s. 9. legacy would be payable, his personal representatives should receive it (?•). Where the testator releases and forgives a certain sum fo'J'g-^e'Jf.^""' owing on a bond, and directs the bond to be delivered up to be cancelled, the will does not import a general release, but the benefit of the release lapses by the death of the legatee before the testator (s). If a devise or bequest is made to two or more persons Distinctions iu the case as joint tenants, the share or shares of any one or more of of joiut " ' ^ tenants aud them who may happen to die before the testator, or whose common!" interest may happen to be revoked by the testator, or may be avoided by becoming an attesting witness or witnesses, will not lapse, but will go to the other joint tenant or tenants ; because each joint tenant takes per mie et per tout (/). But in the case of the death of a tenant in common before the testator, or of his interest being revoked, his share will not pass to the survivor or survivors (;ii), unless the devise or bequest is made to the tenants in common as a class of indefinite number, and not nominatim or in words denoting the precise number of the individuals intended to take. Thus, if a devise or bequest is made to " the children of A.," i.e., to B. C. D., and E., as tenants in common, or " to the four children of A.," as tenants in common, and one of them dies in the lifetime of the testator, his share will not go to the survivors. But if a devise or bequest is made "to the children of A.," as tenants in common, and one of them dies, or the interest of one of them is revoked, his share belongs to the other (r) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 467 — 8 ; 216 ; Young v. Davies, 2 Dr. & Sru. IJarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 277— 8. 167; Drakeford v. Dralcford, 33 (s) 11 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, Beav. 43. 464. («) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 71 ; Burton, (t) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 71 ; 1 Rop. § 277 ; 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 485 ; Leg. by White, 482 ; Burton, § 276 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 279 ; 2 Id. 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 274 ; 2 Id. 216. 1032 OF THE LAPSE OF DEVISES AND BEQUESTS. Pt.III.T. 16, Ch.1, 8. 9. Where there is no lapse of a beneficial interest or charge, or of a Slim due to creditors. To whom a lapsed estate or i nterest will go. or others ; because the devise or bequest is made to them as a class and not as individuals (x). Wliere a legacy is given to a trustee for another person, and the trustee dies before the testator, the trustee's death does not prejudice the cestui que trust. And so if real or personal estate is devised or bequeathed to a person, charged with a legacy to another, the death of the devisee or legatee before the testator will not be allowed in equity to prejudice the charge. And where a testator bequeaths a sum to creditors in discharge of debts actually due, although the legal remedy for their recovery may be gone, if one of the creditors dies in the testator's lifetime, yet his personal representatives will be entitled (y). By the old law, where a devise of lands in fee simple became lapsed by the death of the devisee in the lifetime of the testator, the estate devised would not go to the residuary devisee of the real estate, but descended to the heir at law of the testator (z). But this is now altered (a). If an estate is devised, charged with legacies which fail, the devisee shall have the benefit of them. And where an estate is devised to a mere trustee, in trust to sell and pay particular sums of money which lapse, and no disposition is made of the extra produce, those lapsed legacies will sink into the land for the benefit of the heir (&). When a bequest which is not residuary lapses, it falls (x) See 1 Kop. Leg. by White, 485—489 ; 11 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 527 (a) ; Burton, § 278 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 279 ; 2 Id. 216 ; Leigh v. Leigh, 17 Beav. 605 ; Cruse V. Nowell, 4 Drew. 21 5 ; Fitz Roy V. Duke of Richmond (No. 1), 27 Beav. 186 ; iSe Stanhope's 7'rusls, 27 Beav. 201. But see Sanders v. Ash ford, 28 Beav. 913. {y) 1 Eop. Leg. by White, 474— 5 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 282. (2) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 8, § 35, 37 ; Burton, § 279 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 548. ((() See infra, 1037. (6) 1 Kop. Leg. by White, 499. OF THE LAPSE OF DEVISES AND BEQUESTS. 1033 into the general residue, and consequently belonsTS to the pt.iii.t.is, residuary legatee (c). But if a residuary bequest or a share of a residuary bequest lapses, it belongs to the testator's next of kin (d). By the stat. 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 82, "where any person to Devises of •^ ' J L estates tail whom any real estate shall be devised for an estate tail or ?'>^'^ i"' ^ lapse. an estate in quasi entail shall die in the lifetime of the testator, leaving issue who would be inheritable under such entail, and any such issue shall be living at the time of the death of the testator, such devise shall not lapse, but shall take effect as if the death of such person had happened immediately after the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will." And by s. 33, "where any person, beino- a child or other Gifts to J ' J C > Q children issue of the testator, to whom any real or personal estate P"" ^^^^l ' k,V^*"® not determinable at or before the death of such person, testatVs shall die in the lifetime of the testator leaving issue, and not lapse'. any such issue of such person shall be living at the time of the death of the testator, such devise or bequest shall not lapse, but shall take effect as if the death of such person had happened immediately after the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will." This section does not substitute, for the predeceased devisee or legatee, the issue whose existence is the event or condition which excludes the lapse, but renders the subject of the gift the absolute property of the predeceased devisee or legatee, and therefore disposable by his will, or transmissible to his personal representatives in case of intestacy, notwithstanding his death before the death of the testator (.&,JAdO. 157; Eccles v. Cheijne, 2 K. & J. {d) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 498 ; 676 ; In the yoods of Jane Parker, Lloyd V. Lloyd, 4 Beav. 231. 1 Swa. & Trist. 523. 1034 OF THE LAPSE OF DEVISES AND BEQUESTS. pt. iii.t.15, made in exercise of a general power, as well as to an ordinary bequest (/). But as this section is expressly addressed to cases where, but for its provisions, lapse would ensue, it does not apply to devises or bequests to the testator's children as a class {g). Section X. Of the Rcpiiblication of Wills. Pt. iii.T. 15, By the old law, a republication of a will has a twofold Ch 1 "^ 10 '"" — '- effect : first, in general, to give it the effect of a will made repiibiica- at the time of its republication ; and, secondly, to set up tiuu and re-establish a will that has been revoked {Ji). Kerubiica- The first mode of republishing a will is by re-execu- tiun by re execution. tlOn \l). Repubiica- Anotlicr mode is by a codicil duly executed. This co°diciL operates as a republication of the will, so as to make it take effect from the time of the execution of the codicil. And hence where a will, if read as speaking at the date of the execution of a codicil, contains language which would operate as an incorporation of an unattested docu- ment to which it refers, such document, although not in existence until after tlie execution of the will, is entitled to probate, by force of the codicil (/). And hence, also even by the old law, in the absence of indication to the contrary, realty acquired after the execution of the will, and before the execution of a codicil, passed by the will, if it was specified, or if the description in the will was (/) Eccles V. Cheyne, 2 K. & J. 38, c. 7, § 1. 676. (i) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 7, § 2 ; 1 (g) Browne y . Ham'niond, 1 Johns. Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 159. 210 ; Olney v. Bates, 3 Drewry, 319. {j) In the goods of Lady Truro, (h) Burton, § 271 ; G C'ruisc T. L. K. 1 Prob. 203. OF THE REPUBLICATION OF WILLS. 1035 sufficiently general to include it (Jc). And a codicil will ^cu^l^'^il' have this effect, even though it relates to the testator's per- soual estate only (/) ; or only appoints a new executor (?;?). And where a testator, after having made a will before the stat. 1 Vict. c. 26, has, since that Act came into operation, executed a codicil, ratifying and confirming the will, though it was apparently made only for the purpose of appointing an additional trustee ; this amounts to a republication of the will, so as to have the effect, by virtue of the stat. 1 Vict. c. 26, ss. 24, 34 (7t), of passing real estate purchased by the testator after the date of the will, and even after the date of the codicil (o). But where a codicil is expressly confined to the lands devised by the will, it does not ope- rate as a republication of such will, so as to make it pass after-purchased lands (p). And although a codicil con- firming a will makes the will for many purposes to bear the date of the codicil, yet this is not the case where such a construction would defeat the intention of the testator. So that where a will contains a power of leasing at the ancient accustomed rent, and a codicil is made for some special purpose wholly unconnected with the power, a lease made after the date of the will, but prior to the codicil, will not be taken into account in deciding the question what is the ancient accustomed rent {q). Where a person made his will, and afterwards revoked Cancelling second will. (h) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 7, § 3 ; (n) Supra, 978, 995. Sugd. Concise View, 127 ; Burton, (o) Doe d. York v. Walker, 12 § 271 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 159, M. & W. 591 ; Lady Langdale v. 161, 164—5 ; Hughes v. Basking, Briggs, 3 Sm. & G. 246. 11 Moo. P. C. C. 1. (p) 6 Cruise T. 38, e. 7, § 12 ; {I) Burton, § 274 ; Rugd. Concise Moneypenny v. Bristow, 2 Russ. & View, 127 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. M. 117 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 161, 159 ; Bickinsonv. Stedolph, 11 Com. 165. B. (N.S.)341. (q) Doe d. Biddidph v. Hole, 15 (m) In re EarVs Trust, 4 K. & J. Q. B. 848; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 673. 161, 165. 1036 OF THE llEPUBLICATION OF WILLS. 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 22, as to revival of will. >T.in.T.i5, it by makincr another will, but did not actually cancel the Ch. 1,8. 10. JO I . 1 first will, the cancelling of the second will operated as a republication of the first (r). By the stat. 1 Vict. c. 26, s, 22, " no will or codicil, or any part thereof, which shall be in any manner reyoked, shall be revived otherwise than by the re-execution thereof, or by a codicil executed in manner hereinbefore required, and showing an intention to revive the same ; and when any will or codicil which shall be partly revoked, and afterwards wholly revoked, shall be revived, such revival shall not extend to so much thereof as shall have been revoked before the revocation of the whole thereof, unless an intention to the contrary shall be shown." It was held that under this section, where a subsequent will contains a clause of revocation of a prior will, such prior will is not revived merely by the destruction of the subsequent will And parol evidence is admissible as to the contents of the second will (s). A will cannot now be revived by mere implication (t). Destruc- tion of a subsequent will which revokes a prior oue. (r) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 7, § 15. (s) In the goods of Wm. Brown, 1 Swa. & Tr. 32. (t) In the goods of Steele, L. R. 1 Prob. 575. 1037 CHAPTER II. OF DEVISES SEPARATELY CONSIDERED. Section I. Of Devises generally. The proper and teclmical words of devise are " ftive and ^l- i"-t. is, ^ ^ o Ch. 2, s. 1. de^^se," but any other words which sufficiently show the ~ : — •^ -^ Operative intention of the testator to dispose of all or any part of his de°vise.°^ real estate will be sufficient for that purpose («). AVith respect to the words that are necessary to denote words ^ expressive the nature of the estate or interest intended to be siven of the nature o of the by the testator to the devisee, the Courts will carry the "''"^s*- intention of the testator into effect, if sufficiently declared, however defective the language may be (b). Where a testator, after limiting the fee in contingency, a residuary o ^ devise makes a residuary devise of " all the residue and remain- passing the '' tee, where der of his estate and effects whatsoever and wheresoever, {J^ftg^iu not thereinbefore disposed of," the fee passes under the ^^J^J^seucy residuary devise, and vests in the residuary devisee, until the happening of the event on which the contingent limitation in fee is to take effect (c). By the stat. 1 Vict, c. 26, s. 25, it is enacted, "that, a residuary devise to unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will, such real include estate or interest therein as shall be comprised or intended j^aS^aifd"* to be comprised in any devise in such wiU contained, which "^^^ devises, shall fail or be void by reason of the death of the devisee (a) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 10, § 2. (c) Eycrton v. Masscy, 3_Com. B. (6) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 11, § 1. 338. 1038 OF DEVISES GENERALLY. Pt Ch r.iir.T.15, iu tlie lifetime of the testator, or by reason of siicli devise :b. 2, s. 1. . . being contrary to law or otherwise incapable of taking effect, shall be included in the residuary devise (if any) contained in such will." A devisee takes all the income accruing from the subject of gift subsequently to the testator's decease (d). The freehold or interest in law is in a devisee before entry (c). But he may disagree to and disclaim the devise by deed ; in which case the devise becomes void, and the lands descend to the heir at law (/). Perpetuity. A devise wliicli tends to a perpetuity is void ([/). Income. Disclaimer. Pt.III.T.15, Ch. 2, s. 2. Devise of "the reuts." Effect of superadded words. Where the word "estate" passes all the interest of the testator. Section II. Of the Bescri'ption of the Parcels or Suhjcct. A devise of the rents passes the land itself, both at law and in equity (/;). Where there is a correct and specific description of the property devised, a mistake in any additional words will have no effect ; but where the first description is merely general, there additional words will be considered either as explanatory or restrictive, according to the intent of the testator (■/). " It is established by a long course of decisions " (observed a learned Judge), " that the word estate or estates, used in the operative part of the will, passes not only the corpus (d) 11 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 774. (e) Co. Litt. Ill a. (/) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 8, § 41. (g) See supra, p. 338 ; Attorney- General V. GreenhiU, 33 Beav. 193. (h) 1 Jarm. Wills, ■2nd ed. 681 ; 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 10, § 66. (0 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 10, § 80. See also 1 Jarm. Wills, 2ad cd. 671 — 6 ; Harrison v. Hyde, 4 Hurl. & Norm. 805 ; Stanley v. Stanley, 2 Jobns. & Hem. 491. OF THE DESCRirTION OF THE PARCELS OR SUBJECT. 1039 of the property, but all the interest of the testator in it, ^t. hi t. 15, unless controlled by the context; and that superadded words of local description more applicable to the corpus of the property, indicating its situation or the nature of its occupation, do not prevent it from passing the whole interest. Nor do words apparently explanatory of the meaning of the term, inserted in the devise itself ; as where the testator leaves his real estate, that is, his land and buildings situate at A. (j), or his freehold estate, consisting of thirty acres of land (k) . . . But where the word ' estate ' is not used in the operative clause of the devise itself, but is introduced into another part of the will referring to it, we find no decision or dictum authorising us to construe it as having the effect of extending the meaning of the operative clause, wdiether prior or subse- quent, and to read the will as if the testator had said, by the devise of lands in another clause I mean to give my estate in these lands " (/). Sometimes the word " estate " or " property," thouo'h where the -^ ^ '^ '^ word estate apparently applicable to personalty alone, has been held ^f'^jl''-'^ *** also to apply to real property : as where the word devise is not used, and there are no words of limitation to the heirs (m). Indeed, the word " estate," by its own proper force, without any proof aliunde of an intent to aid the construction, carries the realty as well as personalty, and is not to be restrained to personalty only, unless there is a (j) Denn d. Richardson v. Hood, 633 ; D'Almainev. MoscIe>/, 1 Drew. 7 Tauul. 35. 629 ; Fattersonv. Huddart, 17 Beav. (k) Gardner v. Harding, 3 J. B. 210 ; Re Greenwich Hospital Ini- Moore, 565 ; 1 B. & B. 72. provemcnt Act, 20 Beav. 458. See ( I ) Pollock, L. C. B., in Doe d. also Sanderson v. Dobson, 1 Exch. Burton v. White, 1 Exch. 534. Tlie 141 ; S. C. 7 Com. B. 81 ; Streat- decision in thif? case was affirmed feildv. Coopcr,27'Bea,v.S38; 3Iorris by tlie Exchequer Chamber, 2 Exch. v. Lloi/d, 3 Hurl & Colt. 141 ; Ha- 797. See also 6 CruLse T. 38, c. 10, milton v. Buckmaster, L. E,. 3 Eq. § 62, and supra, p. 149, 150. 323 ; Dobson v. Bowness, L. R. 5 Eq. (m) 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 613— 404. 1040 OF THE DESCRIPTION OF Pt. III.T.15, Ch. 2, B. 2. A^Tiere "real estate " iiicludf^s leaseholds. Where general words apply to leaseholds. A general devLse of the testator's lands now includes copyhold and leasehold, as well as freehold lands. Where mortgage or trust estate clear intent so to restrain it, to be gathered either from the whole will, or from the way in which the word is used in that particular part of the will where the contested use of it arises (/i). Leaseholds will not pass under a general devise of " real estate " before the stat. 1 Vict, c. 26, s. 26, unless aided by other words (o). In the case of a will made before the year 1838, when a testator uses general words equally applicable to free- hold and leasehold property (such as "lands and tene- ments"), they are construed to apply to the freeholds only, if the testator had, at the date of his will, both free- hold and leasehold property, unless a contrary intention appears ; but if the testator had leasehold but no freehold property to satisfy them, they are held to apply to the leasehold {p). But by the stat. 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 26, " a devise of the land of the testator, or of the land of the testator in any place or in the occupation of any person mentioned in his will, or otherwise described in a general manner, and any other general devise which would describe a customary, copyhold, or leasehold estate if the testator liad no free- hold estate which could be described by it, shall be con- strued to include the customary, copyhold, and leasehold estates of the testator, or his customary, copyhold, and leasehold estates, or any of them, to which such descrip- tion shall extend, as the case may be, as well as freehold estates, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will." If in a will there is a general devise in fee sufficiently comprehensive to pass the legal interest to the devisee. («) Mayor of Hamilton v. Hods- don, 6 Moo. P. C. C. 76, 82. (o) Swift V. Swift, 1 D. F. & J. 160. {p) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 10, § 90 ; 2 Rop. Leg. by White, 1489 ; 1 Jarm, Wills, 2nd ed. 573, 579 ; Hohson v. Blackburn, 1 My. & K. 679. THE PARCELS OR SUBJECT. 1041 . siii juris, and competent to convey, and the will does not charge the devised estate with debts, who is a person siii juris, and competent to convey, and ^^-^^-'^l^ passes by tho leoacies, or annuities, or tho charo-e may be reteiTed to wi^i^f'e " ' ' o J mortgagee or other property, in which the testator had the absolute '™^'''*^- beneficial interest, and there is not in the whole will any other declared intention inconsistent with a devise of trust or mortgaged estates, then, although there is not in the will any declared intention of the testator to devise the trust or mortgaged estates, they will pass to the devisee, and in such a case the concurrence of the heir at law may be dispensed with. And the words "for the absolute use and benefit " of the devisee, will not prevent the devise from including the legal estate in property mortgaged to the testator (q). The legal estate in property of which the testator is mortgagee in fee will pass under a gift of " mortgages " or "securities for money" (r). And it has been held, that where a testator willed his wife "to receive all monies upon mortgage," these words passed the legal estate upon which the money was secured (.s). Lands which are in mortgage, and whereof the devisor where lauds in mortgas^e has only the equity of redemption, will pass by the same v'^ss by the words as lands not mortgaged ; because a mortgage is ""ortgagor. only considered as a pledge for securing the repayment of a debt, and the lands remain in the mortgagor for every other purpose (t). Eeversions in fee wiU pass under a general devise of where a reversion passes. (g) Coote Mortg. 3rd ed. 549 ; L. R. 6 Eq. 596. Burton, § 611 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd (r) 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 600 ; ed. 591, 596 ; Eackham v. Siddall, In re Kinr/'s Mortgage, 5 De G. & S. 16 Sim. 297 ; Boc d. Roylance v. 644 ; Knight v. Robinson, 2 K. & J. Lightford, 8 M. & W. 553 ; Silvester 503 ; Rippen v. Priest and others, V. Jarman, 10 Price, 78 ; Bope v. 13 Scott, 308. Liddell, 21 Beav. 183 ; Re Finney's (s) Doe d. OueM v. Bennett, 6 E^itate, 3 Gif. 465 ; Re Field's Mort- Exch. 892. gage, 9 Hare, 414; Lewis v. Mattheics, {t) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 10, § 128. L. R. 2 Eq. 177 ; In re Stevens' Will, 1042 OF THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PARCELS OR SUBJECT. pt.iii.t. 15, " lands or hereditaments," or even under a devise of " lands Ch. 2, s. 2. ' not settled or disposed of" (?(). Money Monev devised or contracted to be laid out in the pur- devised or '^ -L bTiaiamft ia cliasc of lauds passes by the words " lands, tenements, and the purchase i t, j. >> / \ of lauds. hereditaments [x). "Myun- The expression "my unsettled real estate" means, in settled real ^ "^ estate." commou parlance, that part of my real estate which is not in settlement. But in its technical sense the word " estate " refers to the interest which the testator has in his hereditaments as well as to the hereditaments themselves ; and hence in the legal sense the expression " my unsettled real estate" comprises such interest in hereditaments which have been put in settlement as is not tied up by the settlement, but is at the disposal of the testator, as well as hereditaments which have never been put in settlement {ij). Jjl^^^^j'.'P"' Under a devise of lands "purchased," lands which have been taken in exchange will pass (&). " ^'^''"g" The word " living " is ambiguous : it may mean either the advowson or the next presentation, according to the context («). Section III. Of Devises of Cojjyholds. ^ch^^'1'3^' "^^^^ ^^^ statutes of wills have no connection with copy- holds. And though that part of the Statute of Frauds Copyholds (u) 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 558 ; (y) Incorporated Society v. Rich- 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 10, § 104. ards, 1 D. & W. 258. (x) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 10, § 55 ; 2 (z) Doe d. Meyrick t. Meyncl; 1 Speuce's Eq. Jur. 264 ; 1 Jarm. C. & M. 820. Wills, 2iid ed. 494, (a) Webb v. Byng, 2 K. & J. 6C9. OV DEVISES OF COPYHOLDS. 10-13 wliicli relates to the sicjnaturc of wills (h) mentions lands ^t. iii.t is, o ^ ' Ch. 2, s. 3. "devisable Lv any particular custom," still it does not in- ~~~r. — ^ 'f L not withiu elude copyhold estates ; so that by the old law copyholds gfa,^!'^ ^j. were devisable by any instrument which was adequate to "''"^" the testamentary disposition of personal estate (c). By the general custom of all manors every copyholder By general '^ o v- i ./ custom they has a right to surrender his estate to the use of his will (d). ^^J^^^^^ But there are some ciistomary estates in the north which were not devisable either directly or indirectly ((;). Formerly, copyholds could not be devised unless the tes- snrrenrter to '^ ' ^ -^ the use of tator had previously surrendered them to the use of his "'*'^- will, and they were considered to pass rather by that sur- render than by the will itself. The will operated as a declaration of the uses of the surrender (/). A surrender to the use of a will could not be made before the admit- tance of the devisor: for until then he had no estate or in- terest in the copyhold. Where a copyholder surrendered to the use of his will, the estate remained in him or his heirs until the admittance of the devisee, and did not vest in the lord during the copyholder's lifetime, nor in the devisee after the copyholder's decease until he was ad- mitted. But if a devise were made to two persons, and one of them was admitted according to the purport of the will, this enured to both ((/). Where the legal estate in a copy- hold was outstanding, the person entitled to the equitable interest might always devise it without a surrender : for otherwise it could not be disposed of by will ; as a person who has not the legal estate in a copyhold could not make a surrender (h). And hence where a copyholder mortgaged (6) Stat. 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 5. (/) Burton, § 1288 ; 6 Cruise T. (c) Burton, § 1287 ; 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 4, § 1 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 38, c. 4, § 1 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 45. 83. (g) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 4, § 3, 4, 5, (d) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 4, § 2 ; 1 11 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 45. Cruise T. 10, c. 3, g 17. {h) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 4, § 21. (e) 1 Cruise T. 10, e. 3, § 17. VOL. II. G a 1044 OF DEVISES OF COPYHOLDS. f^iyT-15, his copyhold, and the mortgagee was admitted, the mort- gfigor, not having the legal estate of the copyhold in him, had no estate that he conld surrender, and therefore might devise the copyhold premises without any surrender (*'). But as the mortgagor had the legal estate till tlie mort- gagee was admitted, so until that time the mortgagor could not devise the copyhold without a surrender to the use of his will (y). Surrender to By stat. 55 Geo. 3, c. 192, every disposition of copyhold tUG IISG 01 3. will rendered tenements made by the last will of a person who should uimecessciry. ^ ^ die after the 12th day of July, 1815, was to be as valid, though no surrender should have been made to the use of his will, as if such surrender had been made Qi). This Act does not dispense with a particular mode of surrender re- quired by tire custom to give validity to a devise by a married woman (/). It is repealed by the stat. 1 Vict, c. 26, s. 2, but the necessity of a surrender is dispensed with by the enabling clause of the latter Act (m). As to the By s. 4 of the same Act, however, it is iDrovided, " that fees and fines '' devheels of whcre any real estate of the nature of customary freehold and copy-^ or tenant right, or customary or copyhold, might, by the custom of the manor of which the same is holden, have been surrendered to the use of a will, and the testator shall not have surrendered the same to the use of his will, no person entitled or claiming to be entitled thereto by virtue of such will shall be entitled to be admitted, except upon payment of all such stamp duties, fees, and sums of money as would have been lawfuUy due and payable in respect of the surrendering of such real estate to the use of the will, or in respect of presenting, registering, or enrolling such surrender, if the same real estate had been surrendered to the use of the will of such testator : Provided also, that (i) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 4, § 2.5. {h) Burton, § 1288. (i) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 4, § 8 ; 1 (Z) 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 46. Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 45. (m) See supra, p. 987. hold estates. OF DEVISES OF COPYHOLDS. 1045 where the testator was entitled to have been admitted to pt.hi.t.is, Ch. 2, s. 3. such real- estate, and might, if he had been admitted thereto, have surrendered the same to the use of his will, and shall not have been admitted thereto, no person entitled or claiming to be entitled to such real estate in consequence of such will shall be entitled to be admitted to the same real estate by virtue thereof, except on payment of all such stamp duties, fees, fine, and sums of money as would have been lawfully due and payable in respect of the admit- tance of such testator to such real estate, and also of all such stamp duties, fees, and sums of money as would have been lawfully due and payable in respect of surrendering such real estate to the use of the will, or of presenting, registering, or enrolling such surrender, had the testator been duly admitted to such real estate, and afterwards sur- rendered the same to the use of his will ; all which stamp duties, fees, fine, or sums of money due as aforesaid shall be paid in addition to the stamp duties, fees, fine, or sums of money due or payable on the admittance of such person so entitled or claiming to be entitled to the same real estate as aforesaid." Where a person having an estate tail in a copyhold sur- Devise by a -■- ° -^ -^ tenant in renders it to the use of his will, if entails by the custom of **''• the manor are not barrable by recovery or fine, but by sur- render, in such case the surrender to the use of his will not only effectuates the will, but operates as a bar to the entail (n). By the old law, before the stat. 55 Geo. 3, c. 192 (o), J-;^^^,^!^ legal copyholds not surrendered to the use of a will, though lenlraT'^"^ in some cases they would pass in equity, did not pass at law, by a specific description, much less by general words. And without souie indication of intention beyond mere general words of devise, an equitable interest in copyholds in) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 4, § 19. (o) See supra, p. 1044. o a 2 1046 OF DEVISES OF COPYHOLDS, Pt. III.T.15, Ch. 2, s. 3. Devise by a purchaser before admittaace. Escheated copyholds pass with the manor. Kcvocation by surrender of copyholds. would not pass. But, as we have already seen, by the stat. 1 Vict. c. 26, a general devise will now include unsur- rendered copyholds, unless a contrary intention appears by the will. And so it would, as the law stood after the stat. 55 Geo. 3, c. 192, and before the stat. 1 Vict. c. 26 (2^). And even by the old law, where copyhold lands were sur- rendered to the use of a will, they passed by a general devise of all the testator's lands and tenements, notwith- standing there were freeholds to answer such devise {q). Even by the old law, if a man made a disposition by will of all his copyhold estates generally, and afterwards purchased other copyhold estates, and surrendered them to the uses declared by his will, or even to the uses declared by his will of and concerning the same, the after- purchased estates would pass under the general devise, although the will was not republished (r). By the new law, such after-purchased estates would pass without any surrender (s). Even under the law prior to the stat. 1 Vict. c. 26, and subsequent to the stat. 55 Geo. 3, c. 192, a purchaser, before admittance, has an equitable and devisable interest, and the devise is not revoked by his subsequent admittance, and is good without any surrender to the uses of the will, and though the words be mere general words, such as " real estate " (t). Even under the old law, where a person devised his manor, and, subsequent to the execution of his will, but before his decease, a copyhold escheated, it passed to the devisee (w). A surrender of copyholds made after the will and {p) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 10, §129; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 569—571 ; Torre v. Browne, 5 H. L. Cas. 555. See supra, p. 1040. (?) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 10, § 129. (r) Sugd. Concise View, 128; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 46. (s) See supra, p. 987 — 8. {t) Seaman v. Woods, 24 Beav. 372. («) 6 Cruise T. :J8, c. 3, § 40. OF DEVISES OF COPYHOLDS. 1047 amountinsf to a partial alienation of the estate, does not f^. iii.t.is, o ^ ' Ch. 2, s. 3 operate as a complete revocation of the will, which may still have its effect upon the reversion or other continuing interest of the testator {x). By s. 5 of the atat. 1 Vict. c. 26, " when any real estate wnisor "^ . extracts of of the nature of customary freehold or tenant rioht or wuisnf •^ o customary customary or copyhold shall be disposed of by will, the c'o1!vhoias''to^ lord of the manor or reputed manor of which such real onuw'court estate is holden, or his steward, or the deputy of such steward, shall cause the will by which such disposition shall be made, or so much thereof as shall contain the disposition of such real estate, to be entered on the court rolls of such manor or reputed manor ; and when any trusts are declared by the will of such real estate, it shall not be necessary to enter the declaration of such trusts, but it shall be sufficient to state in the entry on the court rolls that such real estate is subject to the trusts declared by such w^ill ; and when any such real estate could not have aud the lord ^ to be entitled been disposed of by will if this Act had not been made, the fl^g'^^g^™^ same fine, heriot, dues, duties, and services shall be paid ^suaL^are and rendered by the devisee as would have been due from "isaWe^asite the customary heir in case of the descent of the same real been from the heir iu case estate, and the lord shall, as against the devisee of such of descent, estate, have the same remedy for recovering and enforcing such fine, heriot, dues, duties, and services as he is now entitled to for recovering and enforcing the same from or against the customary heir in case of a descent." (x) Burton, § 1292. 1048 Pt. IIl.T. 15, Ch. 3, 8. 1. Devisiou of legacies. Definition of a genei-al legacy. Definition of a specific legacy. Definition of a demonstra- tive legacy. CHAPTER III. OF BEQUESTS SEPARATELY CONSIDEEED. Section I. Of Gemeral, Si^ecijic, and Demonstfative Legacies. Bequests or legacies may be classed tinder three heads — General, Specific, and Demonstrative {a). A general bequest is a legacy of personal estate by a general denomination which does not necessarily designate any particular thing forming part of the testator's estate either at the date of the will or at the death of the testator, any more than something of the same kind not forming part of his estate : as where a bequest is made of goods and chattels, or of money or stock generally (b). A specific bequest is a legacy of a particular thing forming part of the testator's estate either at the date of his will or at the time of his decease, and distinguished by him from all other things of the same kind : as in the case of a bequest of stock which a testator may have at the time of his decease, or of money in a bag, or of a certain piece of plate, or of a term of years (c). A demonstrative bequest is a legacy of a sum of money, with reference to a particular fund for its payment {d). (a) See 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 1, 191 — 2, 198. (b) See 1 Eop. Leg. by White, 1, 191, 203 ; Fielding v. Preston, 1 D. & J. 438. (c) See 1 Hop. Leg. by White, 1, 191, 203 ; Steiihenson v. Doivson, 3 Beav. 342 ; Mills v. Brown, 21 Beav. 1 ; Chester v. Urivick, 23 Beav. 402 ; Fieldhuj V. Preston, 1 D. & J. 438 ; Moore v. Moore, 29 Beav. 496 ; Mea- sure V. Carleton, 30 Beav. 538 ; Jones V. Southall (No. 2), 32 Beav. 31 ; Paget v. JIuish, 1 Hem. & M. 663 ; In re Jeffcrifs Trust, L. E. 2 Eq. 68. Cf^) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 192, 198, 199; Robinson v. Cxddard, 3 OF GENERAL AND OTIIEIl LEGACIES. 1049 The terms " pecuniary legacies" and " general legacies " ^^-^-''^-JS' are sometimes used as synonymous ; but every general ^ J ' v' o Pecuniary legacy is not pecuniary, i.e., relating to money ; and one legacies. species of specific legacy is of a pecuniary nature : so that, in fact, there may be either a general pecuniary legacy or a specific pecuniary legacy (c). The fact of a testator oivinGr an amount of property of a certain ca^^es o o J. 1 ^ of general particular kind, and of his liaving at the date of the will fe"lcies"^*' some property of that kind of the same amount, is not a gSed. ground upon which the Court can conclude that the legacies are specific, where such property can be bought, and where he has not in any way designated the property bequeathed as the identical property he had at the date of his will or should have at the time of his death. So that where he has a certain number of canal shares at the date of his will, which by Act of Parliament were to be deemed personalty, and he bequeaths that precise number of canal shares generally, his legacy is general, and amounts in effect to a gift of such an indefinite sum of money as will suffice to purchase so many shares as he has given : and hence if at the testator's decease he has no shares, the legatee will be entitled to the value of them out of the general personal estate. But the word " my " preceding the words " stock," "■ annuities," or " shares," renders a legacy of stock, annuities, or shares specific (/). And where a certain amount of stock is bequeathed, with a du'ection, that, if the testator should not have sufficient stock to answer the legacy, his executors should, out of his residuary estate, purchase enough to make up the deficiency^ such a bequest creates a specific legacy (^). Mac. & G. 735 ; Hodges v. Grant, 2 Beav. 515 ; Miller v. Little, 2 L. E. 4 Eq. 140. Beav. 259. (e) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 191, n. {). Section II. Of the Description of the Things Bequeathed. However general the words of bequest of a term may pt. ui.t.is, be, if they are satisfied by the interest which the testator — y J J « xerm." had at the date of his will, the bequest will not pass a new estate acquired by the testator after the devise by renewal or otherwise ; at least where the legal estate in the term was vested in the testator himself, and not in some other person in trust for him {rj). The word " money " will include notes payable to bearer, "Mouey." («i) 1 Rop. Leg. by AVhite, 237. {p) V.-C. KindersUy in Mullins {n) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 3. v. HmUh, 1 Dr. & Sm. 210. (o) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 334 ; {q) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 350, Sideiothavi v. Watson, 11 Hare, 170. 352; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 263. 1052 OF THE DESCRIPTION OF Ft. tilt. 15, excliequer bills, and bills of exchange endorsed in blank ; \jB., Of S. Z. because tliey are not to be considered as choses in action (r). Generally, cboscs in action, sncli as Government securities and promissory notes not payable to bearer, do not pass under the name of money or cash (s). The word " money" will not pass stock in the funds, unless its meaning is enlarged by the context ; or unless the testator at the date of his will and his death had no other property on which the bequest could operate (t). And the circumstance, that the amount of cash which the testator had at the time of his death was very small, and yet the money was given to one for life, with a limitation over, is not of itself sufficient to extend the signification of the word money ; especially if there are other parts of the personal estate which neither that expression nor any others used by the testator would pass ; so that there is nothing on the face of the will to show that he intended to make a disposition of the whole personal estate (u). But in the absence of any other bequest of the residue, or other indication to the contrary, a bequest of any money which may remain after payment of debts includes the general residue not specifically bequeathed, and which by law is liable to the payment of the testator's debts (*). And so a bequest of any money which may remain after payment of legacies may include the general residue, if the testator has manifested an inten- tion of disposing of everything, which would otherwise be frustrated (v/). (r) 1 Eop. Leg. by White, 282 ; 1 terill, 1 My. & K. 56 ; Lamer v. Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 657, n. (/). Larmr, 3 Drew. 704 ; Newman v. (s) Marquis of Hertford v. Lord Neioman, 26 Beav. 218 ; Voiding v. Lowther, 7 Beav. 1 ; 1 Eop. Leg. by Cowling, 26 Beav. 449. Wliite, 282. (x) Stoch v. Barre, 1 Johns. 54 ; (t) Chapman v. Reynolds, 28 Beav. Neviiison v. Lady Lennard, 34 221. Beav. 487. (u) Loioe V. Thomas, 1 Kay, 369 ; (y) Montague v. Earl of Sand- 5 D. M. & G. 315 ; Dosdcn v. Dot- wich, 33 Beav. 324. THE THINGS BEQUEATHED. 1053 And as stock in the funds is not money, so lesjacies of tt- hi.t.is, "^ * Ch. 3, s. 2. stock are not properly " pecuniary legacies " {z). ■_ — Freight, under a charter-party, executed after the date of i«s.icies." a will, and in respect of a voyage not completed till after due.""^^ the testator's death, will not pass as " money which at the time of his decease should be due to him " («). But money receivable by executors under a policy of assurance on the testator's life, will pass under a bequest of " any money he may die possessed of, or which may be due and owing to him at the time of his decease " {])). A bequest of the testator's "ready money " comprehends "Keady ■*- ^ ./ i money. money of the testator in the hands of his banker, or in a savings bank where he had given notice for payment, but not promissory notes or notes of hand, or debts due to him, however safe, or Avith whatsoever facility obtainable (c). And it was held, that money of a testator which at the time of his death was in the hands of a salemaster in Smithfield was not ready money within the meaning of a clause directing the payment of debts, by the application in the first instance, of all his ready money and securities for money {d). While the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 85, for the regulation Government or parlia- of the East India Company's Charter was in force, the meutary stocii or capital stock of the Company was not " a Government or ^"^^• Parliamentary stock or fund," nor was it a foreign stock or Foreign stock or fund (c). funtl- Eailway preference and other stock will pass under the Railway , ^ stock or term " railway shares," where the testator never had any si^ares. shares, but had railway stock at the date of the will (/). (z) 11 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, C. C. C. 290 ; 1 Phil. 356 ; In re 457. PoweWs Trust, 1 Johns. 49. (a) Stephenson v. Doivson, 3 Beav. {s v. Eastivood,lAojd& 541. Gould, temp. Sugden, 270. (m) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 296 ; 0:>) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 284. Roberts v. Edwards, 33 Beav. 259, fo) H Jarm. & Byth. by vSweet, {n) Loch V. Venahles, 27 Beav. 452 ; Iluddledon v. Gouldsburi^, 10 568. Beav. 547. 1056 OF THE DESCRIPTION OF pt.iii.t. 15, alone, will embrace all the personal estate of a testator: as Ch. 3, s. 2. ^ — bonds, notes, money, plate, furniture, &c. (r). But when a property, ettvcts testator only bequeaths floods and chattels or effects in a personal -j x o thiiit's'" particular situation, as " all his goods in his house at A.," those alone pass which may be regarded as then connected with that locality, rather than as independent of locality ; so that furniture not attached to the freehold, linen, plate, money, and bank notes, will pass ; but not things in action, as bonds, mortgages, receipts, &c. (s). So, a specific legacy of all a testator's "property," " personal estate," or "things," in a particular place, will not pass choses in action there (t). And when the word " goods," or " chattels," or " effects," or " personalty," is preceded and connected with a number of substantives of narrower import, it will be confined to property ejusdem generis with those previously described by those words ; unless something is excepted out of the things enumerated, by words of narrower import, which is not ejusdem generis with those things ; or unless the be- quest is expressly or apparently residuary (u). But where a testator disposes of all the residue of his estate and effects, or disposes of his " personal estate," adding, without any intervening words, an enumeration of certain specific articles, the general words are not limited to things ejus- dem generis with the specific articles, but the words enu- merating the specific articles are regarded as a defective enumeration (x). If a bequest is made " of all the testa- (r) 1 Eop. Leg. by White, 250, (m) 1 Eop. Leg. by White, 261, 280 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 644 ; 267, 280 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. Kendall v. Kendall, 4 Russ. 360. 644, 648, 653 ; Ee WrighVs Trusts, (s) 1 Eop. Leg. by White, 250 ; 15 Beav. 367 ; Avisonv. Simpson, 1 11 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 442 ; Johns. 43 ; Borton^r. Dunbar, 2 Gif. Marquis of Hertford \. Lord Low- 221; Swinfen \. Swinfen (No. 4), ther, 7 Beav. 1 ; Svnnfen v. Sioinfen 29 Beav. 207 ; Nugee v. Chapman, (No. 4), 29 Beav. 207. 27 Beav. 290. (t) 1 Eop. Leg. by White, 259, (x) Fisher v. Hephurn, 14 Beav, 260 ; 11 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 626 ; Dean v. Gihson, L. E. 3 Eq. 442. 713. THE THINGS BEQUEATHED. 1057 tor's ffoods, &c., in a particular house or place," without pt.iii.t.is, any words indicating that he refers to such only as are there at a particular time (as at the date of his will), what- ever personal chattels are found there at his death will be the property of the legatee (?/). And none but those wliich are in that place at the death of the testator will pass, except where the locality of them was referred to merely for the purpose of describing the articles {s). A bequest of "household furniture, plate, house linen, "au other and all other chattel property," does not include the gene- property." ral personal estate ; for the words " all other chattel pro- perty " must be construed by the other words with which they are associated, and mean all other chattel property ejusdem generis, at least where there is a distinct residuary clause (a). In like manner the words " et cetera," following an enu- "Et cetera." meration of specific articles, refer to things ejusdem generis, and do not include the general residue (6). Pictures placed as ornamental furniture of a house, and ''P^"™i- plate and linen, pass under the description of " all furniture belonging to a house." But, in general, books will not pass under that description (c). Where "fixtures and fixed furniture " are bequeathed to "Fixed ^ furniture." a person for life, and the household goods, furniture, and other property " not comprehended under the term fixtures and fixed furniture " are bequeathed to him absolutely, the term " fixed furniture " includes looking-glasses standing on chimney-pieces and nailed to the wall, and bookcases standing on, but not fastened to, brackets, and screwed to the waU {d). (y) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 248. 220. (z) lEop. Leg. by White, 343 — 4. (c) Cremorne y. Antrobus, 5 'Russ. (a) Lampier v. Despard, 2 D. & 312. W. 59. {d) Birch v. Daioson, 2 Ad. & E. (&) Newman v. Neioman, 26 Beav. 37 ; 6 C. & P. 658 ; 4 F. & M. 22. 1058 OF THE DESCRIPTION OF THE THINGS BEQUEATHED. Pt. III.T.15, Ch. 3, s. 2. "nouseLold furniture." " Household scoorts." " Household effects." *' Plant and goodwill." 'Linen." 'Plate." Under a bequest of household furniture, fixtures belong- ing to the testator in a leasehold house occupied by him will pass (c). But books do not pass under the words " household furniture " (/). Nor do goods in a house of business which belong merely to the business {g). The term " household goods " includes all articles of household which are neither fixtures nor things of such a nature that they are consumed in being enjoyed {h), but not articles used in the testator's trade, though contained in his house ( i ). The term " household effects " is more extensive than household goods or furniture (/ ). Occurring after " house- hold furniture," it comprises such things as wines (Tc). The term " plant " includes all the things which form part of the permanent establishment used for the purposes of a trade, but not the fluctuating stock in trade, or the household furniture. A gift of the plant and goodwill to- gether may pass the leasehold interest in the house, where that would be valueless without the goodwill (/). The term " linen," without qualification, will comprise body linen, table and bed linen, and every article to which that general word can be applied (m). " Plate," of itself, will not include plated articles {n). ie) Paton v. Shepherd, 10 Sim. 186. As to the words " household furniture, goods, or effects," see 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 650, n. (6). (/) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 269. {g) Manning v. Piircdl, 7 D. M. & G. 55, 64, 68. (/() See 1 Eop. Leg. by White, 253, 256. (/) 1 Eop. Leg. by White, 253. {j) 11 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 441. m Cole V. Fitzgerald, 1 S. & S. 189 ; 3 Russ. SOL (?) BlaU V. Shav\ 1 Johns. 732. (m) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 289. (w) Holden v. Ramshottom, 4 Gif. 205. OF THE PROPORTION IN WHICH LEGATEES TAKE. 1059 Section III. Of the Shares or Pro]3ortions in ivhich two or more Legatees take. Under a bequest to tlie persons who would have been pt.iii.t.is, ^ ^ Ch. 3, s. 3. entitled under the Statute of Distributions, it should be expressed whether they are to take in equal shares, or in the proportions fixed by the statute (o). Where a testator bequeaths personal estate to several persons, as tenants in common, with a declaration, that, upon all or any of their deaths before a particular time, their respective shares shall be equally divided among their respective issue or descendants, and they die before the arrival of the period, some leaving children, and others more remote descendants, the issue of such deceased persons w^ill take their shares, per stirpes, and the issue of any one of them so dymg, whether they be his children or more remote issue, will divide his share among themselves equally per capita {])). Under a bequest to a husband and wife and another person, or other persons, though in equal shares, the husband and wife will generally take only one share between them, as being but one person in law {q). Under a bequest to be equally divided amongst the tes- tator's next of kin, both paternal and maternal, the fund is divisible between the two classes per capita, and not per stirpes (?•). And under a bequest to A. and B. and their (o) See Martin v. Glover, 1 Coll. 724 ; Gordon v. Whieldon, 11 Beav. 269 ; Richardso7i v. Richardson, 14 170. But see Paine v. Wagner, 12 Sim. 526. Sim. 184 ; Warrington v. War- (jj) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 163. rington, 2 Hare, 54 ; Marchant v. See Timins v. Stackhouse, 27 Beav. Cragg, 31 Beav. 398. 434. {r) Dugdaley. Ditgdcde, 11 Beav. (q) In re Wylde, 2 De G. M. & G. 402. VOL. II. H H 1060 OF THE PROPOKTION IN WHICH LEGATEES TAKE. PT.iir.T.15, several children, to be divided between them, in equal Ch. 3, s. 3. ' ^ shares and proportions, the parents and their children (such children being in esse at the date of the will) take per capita and not per stirpes (.s). Onus probandi on party seeking priority. No priority from differ- ence la times of payment ; uor from Section IV. Of the Priority mid Abatement of Legacies. If the assets, after payment of debts, are insufficient for the payment of all the legacies and annuities, all the general voluntary legacies and annuities abate rateably : for, since they cannot all be paid in full, they shall all abate rateal)ly, on the principle of the maxim " equality is equity," " equity delighteth in equality." This rule is indeed subject to exceptions ; for there are cases in which some annuities or legacies are to be paid in priority to others. But the onus lies on the party seeking priority, to make out that such priority was intended by the testator ; and the proof of this must be clear and conclusive. The reason is, that a testator, in the absence of clear and conclusive proof to the contrary, must be deemed to have considered that his estate would be sufficient ; and conse- quently not to have thought it necessary to provide against a deficiency, by giving a priority in case of a deficiency to some of the objects of his bounty {t). Hence, a difference in times of payment will not impart to any of the legatees such a preference as to exempt them from abating upon a deficiency of assets. Nor will abate- (s) CiLnninglmm v. Murray, 1 De G. & S. 366. (<) 1 Eop. Leg. by White, 421, 425 ; Story's Eq. Jur. § 544-7 ; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 314 ; Miller v. HmhUeston, 3 Mac. & G. 523 ; Thwaites v. Foreman, 1 Coll. 409. payment ; nor from the character of OF THE PRIORITY AND ABATEMENT OF LEGACIES. 1061 ment be prevented by words which may be merely ex- ^ch^s's"!*' pressive of the order in which the bequests are made in — - 7 •■^ ■■- words merely succession (?<). Thus, the words " after payment " may i,'",|'^""f °'^'' merely refer to the order of payment to be made, on the supposition that there was a sufficiency of assets to pay all the legacies, and do not necessarily or clearly import a preference in the event of a deficiency of assets. They are merely introductory to what follows ; importing no more than would have been implied without them (,«). And so where a testator, with reference to the different payments to be made by his executors, uses the words " in the first place," " and then," and " in the next place," these words, unsupported by others, will be construed to be mere introductory words of enumeration, and not words denoting priority of payment {y). And when there are no expressions manifesting an intent to give a priority to a general voluntary legacy, the or^th?'*'^^' character of the legatee or the purposes to which the the legacy, legacy is to be applied will not exempt it from abate- ment (z). Hence legacies to the children of the testator will be subject to abatement as well as legacies to strangers. If the testator has thought fit to provide for other persons besides his children and his wife, so that he has not made them the exclusive objects of his bounty in the case of the property being sufficient, he might never have intended them to be the exclusive objects of his bounty even in the event of a deficiency. He may have intended that the others should share with them in the latter case as well as in the former, and in the same proportion (a). (m) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 425, {y) Thwaites v. Foreman, 1 ColL 427. 409. (aj) Miller v. Suddleston, 3 Mac. (2:) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 418. & G. 525 ; Haslewood v. Green, 28 («) Miller v. Huddlcston, 3 Mac. Beav. 1. &G. 529. H H 2 1062 OF THE PRIORITY AND ABATEMENT OF LEGACIES. Pt. in.T.15, Ch. 3, s. 4. Legacies for a valuable consideratiou Lave priority. Abatement as between general and specific legatees ; and as between pecuniary and residu- ary legatees. Upon the same principle, beqnests to charities are not privileged from abatement. Nor are legacies to executors for tlieir trouble (h). Nor are legacies bequeathed to cre- ditors whose debts had been previously compounded (c). When a general legacy is given for a valuable con- sideration, as in consideration of a debt owing to the legatee, or of his relinquishing any right or interest, it will have priority over merely voluntary legacies. Hence legacies in lieu of dower do not abate (d). As between specific legatees and general legatees, in case of a deficiency of assets, the loss falls entirely on the latter ; so that the specific legacies are paid in preference to the general legacies (e). If a fund is not sufficient for both pecuniary and residuary legatees, and it was not of an ascertained amount or expressly assumed by the testator to be of a certain amount, but the amount of it was unknown to him, the loss will fall wholly on the residuary legatees (/). Pt.III. T.15, Ch. 3, s.S. Double legacies. Section V. Of Douhlc Legacies cmd Residuary Legacies. AVhere, in form, two legacies are given to the same person by the same will or the same codicil, if they are of the same amount, they are construed as only one bequest twice mentioned ; but if they are of different amounts, they are held to be distinct legacies {g). (b) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 417. (c) 1 Eop. Leg. by White, 418. (d) 1 Eop. Leg. by White, 431 — 2 ; 3 & 4 Win. 4, c. 105, s. 12 ; Stahlschmidt v. Lett, 1 Sm. & Gif. 421. (e) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 343 ; 1 Eop. Leg. by White, 356. (/) Petre v. Pctrc, 14Beav. 197 ; ElvKs V. Causton, 30 Beav. 554. ig) 2 Rop. Leg. by White, 996, 998. OF DOUBLE LEGACIES AND EESIDUAKY LEGACIES. 1063 Where, in form, two legacies, even though of the same pt^iii.t.is, amount, are bequeatlied to the same person by different testamentary instruments, namely, by two wills both admitted to probate, or by a will and a codicil, or by different codicils, two distinct legacies are thereby given, unless the double coincidence occurs of the same motive expressed and the same sum in both instruments ; or unless the instrument giving the second legacy furnishes intrinsic evidence that the second legacy was merely given in lieu of the former (h). Where a residuary legatee is general legatee, he is To what a residuary entitled to whatever may not be disposed of in terms or m logatte la '' '■ entitled. event (z). A residuary legatee of a partial residue will be entitled to interests -which were a charge upon the partial residue, but lapse (J ). Section VI. Of the Payment of Legacies. Legacies are to be paid in the currency of the country '^^- "I-T-is, in which the testator is domiciled and the will is made (l^. ~ ^ ' In what The executor is not obliged to pay, nor can he in many currency. f 1 J 1 T • 1 Legacies to cases saiely pay, the legacies sooner than a year after be paid ■^ ^ '' ° '' within a the testator's decease, although the testator may have y*'^''- directed them to be discharged within six months after his death (/). (k) 2 Rop. Leg. by White, 999, 1 Jarra. Wills, Snd ed. 654. 1008, 1012 ; Russell v. Dickson, i (j) 2 Eop. Leg. by White, 1683, H. L. Cas. 293 ; Townsend v. Mos- 1684. ti/n, 26 Beav. 72 ; Tackey v. Ren- (1-) 1 Eop. Leg. by White, 856. dcrson, 33 Beav. 174 ; Creswell v. (1) 1 Rop. Leg, by Wliite, 863 ; CresweU, L. R. 6 Eq. 69. 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 834 ; (i) 2 Rop. Log. by White, 1673 ; 11 Jarm. & Byth. hy Sweet, 773. 1064 OF THE PAYMENT OF LEGACIES, Pt. III.T.15, Ch. 3, s. ,6. Eight to indemnity on yaymeut. Right to paynieut, notwith- standing direction to accumulate or to post- pone pay- ment. Death of legatee before time for [jayment. When there are contingent liabilities that may create demands upon the assets of the testator, a Court of equity will not oblige the executor to part with the fund without a sufficient security for his indemnity against legal con- sequences {ni). But executors bringing facts plainly before the Court and distributing the assets under its direction are absolutely protected against any future claims ; and the only remedy of a creditor, on covenant or otherwise, is against the legatees (/i). "Where a legacy is directed to accumulate for a certain period, or where the payment is postponed, the legatee, if he has an absolute indefeasible interest in the legacy, is not bound to wait until the expiration of that period, but may require payment the moment he is competent to give a valid discharge (o). If a legacy is given to A., to be paid at twenty-one, and A. dies before that period, his representative must wait for the money until A,, if living, would have attained twenty- one, if intermediate interest is not given, but not if inter- mediate interest is given ( p). Pt.III.T. 15, Ch. 3, s. 7. Interest on Section VII. Of the Interest or Income of Property hequeathed. Specific legacies are considered as severed, for the benefit of tlie legatee, from the bulk of the testator's property, (m) 1 Kop. Leg. by White, 865. On this subject see supra, pp. 659, 660. (m) Bennett v. Lytton, 2 Johns. & Hem. 155. (o) Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 116 ; Cr. & Ph. 240 ; Eocke v. BocJce, 9 Beav. 66 ; ^e Toung^s Settlement, 18 Beav. 199 ; Gosling v. Gosling, 1 Johns. 265. (p) 1 Hop. Leg. by Wldte, 868, 871. OF INCOME OF PKOPEKTY BEQUEATHED. 1065 from his death ; and. hence interest is computed on them pt. iilt.is, . . Ch. 3, B. 7. from that time, even where the enjoyment of the principal — ■_ is postponed (q). legacies. General legacies out of personalty usually carry interest General rule only from the period when they become payable (?•). °e"aaef ^^ Where no time of payment of a general legacy is named wiiere no by the testator, there, in the absence of any contrary inten- ^^^'^"' ^^ tion to be collected from the will itself, they shall be paid at the expiration of one year next after his death ; and if the executor then omits to pay them, the legatees will be entitled to interest from that period, though actual payment at that time may be impracticable (s). This rule applies to legacies under an appointment by a feme covert (t), and even to legacies given for the purchase of mourning rings («'). And a direction to pay " as soon as possible " does not exclude the application of the general rule (x). And a general legatee of Long Annuities is not entitled to dividends accruing before the expiration of a year from the testator's decease (y). "VVliere a time of payment of general where a legacies is named by the testator, and such legacies are not l^^^^^^ '^ of a residue, there, with some exceptions, the legacies will not carry interest before the arrival of the appointed time of payment, even though they be vested ; but when that period arrives, the legatees will be entitled, although the legacy be charged upon a dry reversion (z). The rule which postpones a legatee's title to interest Kxcepuonsto general rule. until the end of a year, or any other prescribed period of payment, admits of exceptions, where there is an indication (q) 2 Eop. Leg. by White, 1245 ; 504. 11 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 774. (x) 11 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, (r) 11 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 773. 773. (y) Collyerv. Ashburner.2 De G. (s) 2 Eop. Leg. by White, 1245. & S. 404. {t) Tatham v. Drummond, 2 Hem. {z) 2 Rop. Leg. by White, 1253, & Mil. 262. 1316. (u) 11 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 1U66 OF INCOME OF PROPERTY BEQUEATHED. pt.iii.t.15, of a contrary inteutioii in the will, or wliere legacies are '- bequeathed in satisfaction of debts, or where a legacy is given by a parent to his child, or by a person in loco parentis, and no provision is made by him for the child's maintenance {a), or by a person who, though not in loco parentis, has empowered his executors to apply it, or the income of it, for the maintenance or benefit of the legatee (&). Legacies charged primarily on real estate bear interest from the testator's death (c). Where there is no direction for accumulation, the tenant for life of a residue is entitled from the death of the testator to the income of all such parts of the residue as are in a state of investment in accordance with the directions of the will (d). And where a residue is directed to be laid out in land, to be settled on one for life, with remainder over, and the testator directs the interest to accumulate in the meantime, the accumulation will cease at the end of the year from the testator's death, and from that period the tenant for life will . be entitled to the interest (c). Legacies charged on real estate. Income of a settled residue. Section VIII. 0/ Bequests generally (/). ^^•^Tii.TJs, A bequest for the promotion of an object which would Beq^ not be consistent with our amicable relations with a foreign (a) 11 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 773 ; 2 Eop. Leg. by White, 1290 ; Donovan -v. Needham, 9 Beay. 164. (b) In re Richards, L. E. 8 Eq. 119. (c) 11 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 773 ; 2 Bl. Com. 513. {d) 2 Eop. Leg. by White, 1321 2. (e) 2 Eop. Leg. by White, 1336. (/) As to gifts to superstitious uses, see Boyle on Charities, 242, et OF BE.QUESTS GENERALLY. 1067 state is void : as in the case of a bequest towards the ^ch^s.'I/s?' political restoration of the Jews to Jerusalem {g). contrary to So also is a bequest tending to protect persons from the ^^^^^ consequences of crimes which they have committed, or otherwise to encourage offences against the law iji). So also is a bequest for a purpose which is to endure for ever, other than a charitable bequest. On this principle it has been held that a bequest of money in trust to keep up the tomb of the testator and his family is void, as being a perpetuity {%) ; but that a bequest in trust to keep in repair a monument in the church and a memorial window is a good charitable bequest {j). Where a legacy is given, and the application of it is ^''?^^^]^'>j|^ prescribed by the testator himself, or left by him to the purpose, discretion of some other person, if that discretion is not exercised, or circumstances prevent the employment of it in the way which is contemplated, the gift prevails. The mode of application may fail, but that will not interfere with the substance of the gift (A"). And if a bequest is made to or in trust for a legatee, for a particular purpose (as, to put him out apprentice or to advance him in a business or profession), it is an absolute bequest to him, seq. ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 170 — a purely metaphysical principle, at 173; Heath v. Chapman, 2 Drew. the expense of justice, reason, and 417 ; and supra, 283. common sense, and ought to be {g) Habershon v. Vardon, 4 De swept away with a strong hand. G. & S. 467. " Apices juris non sunt jura." (A) Thrupp V. Colkit, 26 Beav. (j) Hoare y. Osborne, L. R 1 Eq. 125. 585. (!) Rid-ard \. Rohson, 81 Beav. {k) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 646 ; 1 244 ; Fowler \. Fowler, 33 Beav. Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 326 ; Lord 616 ; Hoare t. Osborne, L. R. 1 Eq. Cottenham, C, in affirmance of the 585; Fish v. Att.-Gen., L. E. 4 decision of .S'Aadtw??, V.C. E., Gow^r/t Eq. 521. Such a deci-ion may be t. Bidk^lQ Sim. 54 ; Earl of Lons- thought to be only in keeping with dale v. Countess of Berchfoldt, 3 K. a large number of others, which con- & J. 185; Re Skinner's Trusts, 1 sist (in the author's opinion) in Johns. & Hem. 102. carrying out an abstract and often 1068 OF BEQUESTS GENERALLY. Pt.IILT.15, Ch. 3, s. 8. Operation of a divesting clause restricted to a period prior to tbe time appointed for payment. SO that he will be entitled to the payment of it before it is required for the purpose mentioned, and, if he dies before it has been so paid or applied, it will form part of his per- sonal estate (/). But where a discretion is reposed in trus- tees, both as to the propriety of raising the money, and as to the amount, there, if the legatee dies before the discretion is exercised, the legacy fails {m). When a certain and determinate period is appointed for the payment of a legacy, and it is given over upon the happening of a contingent event, the divesting clause is to be confined within the time when the legacy is payable ; for otherwise it could not operate until the money might have been received and spent (ii). (I) 2 Eop. Leg. by White, 1496 ; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 462. (m) Cowper v. Mantell, 22 Beay. 231. (n) 1 Kop. Leg. by White, 797, 822—3. PAET IV. (Df axinux |lcrsons aiib mbtcllaiteaus |5^abs of f ah) coumctttr toitlj Conbcyiinnng. TITLE I. OF CEETAIN PEESONS CONNECTED WITH CONVEYANCING. CHAPTEE I. OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTEATORS («). An executor is the person to wliom a testator commits paet iv. the execution of his will. ' — 1-1 All who are capable of making wills are capable of being exerator!"^ appointed executors, and many others besides, as femes ^ecuu.r^''^ covert and infants, and even infants unborn or in ventre sa mere. But by the stat. 38 Geo. 3, c. 87, s. 6, no person who is sole executor can act as such till the age of twenty- one years (h). The appointment of an executor may be made either by now an executor express words, or by plain implication. maybe -^ ./ J- J. appointed. If the testator makes his will without naming any exe- Admiaistra- cutor, or if he names incapable persons, or if tJie executors testameuto anueio. named refused to act, administration cum testamento annexe must be granted to some other person (c). (a) On this subject the reader is (b) 2 Bl. Com. 503 ; 1 Wms. on referred to The Right Hou. Sir Exors. 4th ed. 189 ; Watk. Conv, Edward Vaughan Williams's valu- 3rd ed. by Prest. 248. able work. (c) 2 Bl. Com. 503. 1070 OF EXECUTOKS AND ADMINISTRATORS. Part IV. T. 1, Ch. 1. Administra- tiou durante miiiore rotate, durante absentia, or pendente lit.e. General administra- tion. To whom it is granted. When a sole executor is under age, or is out of the reahn, or when the validity of the will is contested in the Court of l*robate, an administrator is appointed durante minore tetate, or durante absentia, or pendente lite (d). There are some peculiar cases of property of a very small amount which, by certain statutes, is payable to the next of kin, Avithout taking out any letters of administration (c). But with these exceptions, if the deceased died totally intestate, general letters of administration must ordinarily be granted to such administrator as the statutes 31 Edw. 3, c. 11, and 21 Hen. 8, c. 5, direct. And, 1. Administration of the goods and chattels of the wife must be granted to the husband or his representatives ; and administration of the husband's effects to the widow or next of kin, or to both. 2. Among the kindred, those or some of those are to be preferred who are the nearest in degree to the intestate according to the Civil Law mode of computation (/), whether those of the paternal or maternal line, without distinction. Of persons in equal degree, there are some who are to be preferred ; but subject to this, administration may be granted to any of them. Thus, in the first place, the children, or their lineal descendants, are entitled, or, if there are no issue, the father, or, if no father, the mother of the deceased, is entitled. Then follow brothers or sisters, next grandfathers or grandmothers, then uncles or aunts or nephews or nieces, and, lastly, cousins. But the next of kin, in order to be entitled to administration, must have an interest in the property. 3. The half blood is admitted to the administration as well as the whole ; for they are of the kindred of the intestate, and were only excluded from inheritances of land upon feudal reasons. Therefore, the brother of the half blood shall exclude the uncle of the {d) 2 Bl. Com. 503; Wms. on Exors. 4th ed. 189. (e) See Stamp's Index to the Statute Law tit. "Administration." (/) See supra, p. 4G6. OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATOKS. 1071 ^vllole blood, and administration may be granted to the ^^^'^^^J-j^ sister of the half or the brother of the whole blood. 4. If none of the kindred will take out administration, a creditor may by custom do it (g). If the executor refuses or dies intestate, the adminis- tration may be granted to the residuary legatee, in exclusion of the next of kin (rj). For default of these persons, the Court may commit administration (as it might have been done before the statute of Edw. 3) to such discreet person as it approves of, or may grant him letters ad colligendum bona defunct i, Letters ad which neither make him executor nor administrator ; his ^"f^^gti^ only business being to keep the goods in his safe custody, and to do other acts for the benefit of such as are entitled to the property (h). Although the above are the general rules, yet by the Power to «= ° ' J ■; grant to 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77, s. 73, the Court of Probate is °'^''' ' ' persuus. empowered to grant administration to any person it may deem fit. If a bastard, who has no kindred, being nullius filius, Administra- ° tioL where or any one else that has no kindred, dies intestate and ti»e deceased •^ ' has uo without wife or child, the usual course now is for some ^"'^^'^• one to procure letters patent or other authority from the Cro^\m, and then the Court grants administration to him (i). By the old law, if all the goods lay within the same Diocesan _ >_ ^ pri)bate or jurisdiction, a probate before the ordinary or an adminis- ^|,^"'^^*'"^" tration granted by him was the only proper authority. rrerogatiTo But if the deceased had bona notabilia or chattels to the administra- tion. value of a hundred shillings in two distinct dioceses or jurisdictions, then the will must have been proved or administration taken out, to save trouble and also uncer- tainty to creditors and legatees, before the metropolitan of {g) 2 Bl. Com. 504, 505 ; 1 Wms. {h) 2 Bl. Com. 505. Exors. 4th ed. 336—7. (i) 2 Bl. Com. 505. 1072 OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. Part IV the provincG by way of special prerogative : whence the Courts where the vahdity of such wills was tried, and the offices where they were registered, were called the Prerogative Courts, and the Prerogative Offices, of Cauter- New Court ot bnry and York (/). But by the stat. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77, the jurisdiction as to probate and letters of administration is vested in one new court, called the Court of Probate. ofThe^coun't ^y ^- ^^> lio^cver, wliere the personalty is under £200, and ^°"'''^- t]ie real estate under £300, the County Court has the contentious jurisdiction. This section was repealed by s. 11 of the stat. 21 & 22 Vict. c. 95, but the above pro- vision was re-enacted by s. 10. Enactments By 20 & 21 Vict, c. 77, s. 86, probatcs and adminis- as to pro- "^ bates and tratious granted by Courts which had not jurisdiction admimstra- o J o ^hTxclT^ are made valid, unless set aside by any Court. And by s. 87, probates and administrations before the Act are to have the same force and effect as if granted mider the Act {k). Several A. tcstator mav aiDpoint several executors for different executors for ./ x j- puroMesor purposes, and in respect of different parts of his property, properties. ^^^ ^^^ Yi^q manner, an administrator may have only Adrainistra- . tJTa '^"ticu- ^ limited or special administration committed to his care (/). lar thing. rjij^^ exccutor of a sole executor or sole surviving exe- Transmission of^represen- cutor who has provcd, is the executor and personal repre- sentative of the first testator ; unless he refuses that office, which he may do, while he accepts that relating to the property of his own immediate testator, though not vice versa. And so long as the chain of representation is unbroken by any intestacy, the ultimate executor is the representative of every preceding testator, because the power of an executor is founded upon the special confi- dence and actual appointment of the deceased, and such executor is therefore allowed to transmit that power to {j) 2 Bl. Com. 509, 510. {I) Burton, § 977—8 ; 2 Bl. Com. (k) See Jebb's Probate Act, p. 15. 506. OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. 1073 another in whom he has equal confidence. But the /j^^n^i administrator of an executor is not the representative of the testator; because he was merely the officer of the ordinary or metropolitan, in whom the deceased executor had reposed no trust at all. Nor does the executor of a deceased executor at all represent the original testator, where such deceased executor has left a co-executor him surviving. For, in such case, the representation devolves on the surviving co-executor, if he proved in the life- time of the deceased executor. And if he has not proved ^o^^'bom's in the lifetime of the deceased executor, and does not °™' choose to prove after he becomes the survivor, (as he might formerly do, even though he had renounced,) or if a sole executor or sole surviving executor dies after probate, intestate, or if a sole or sole surviving administrator dies, whether testate or intestate, an administration de bonis non is granted, that is, an administration of the goods of the original testator or intestate left unadministered (vi). An executor may contract and do many acts before Acts before •^ '^ probate or he proves the will, but an administrator may do nothing ^q™"''^*'^^' till letters of administration are issued ; for the former derives his power from the will, and not from the probate ; while the latter derives his title entirely from his appoint- ment as administrator, though his title relates back to the time of the intestate's decease (n). An executor, before probate of the will, may release a debt or duty due to the testator. But the release cannot be given in evidence until the will has been rendered authentic by probate or letters of administration (o). The whole personal property vests in the executor (p), Personauy {711) Wms. on Exors. 4th ed. 207 2nd ed. 593. —209, 387—390 ; 2 Bl. Com. 506 ; (0) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 334 ; Co. Burton, § 962—970 ; 3 Jarm. & Litt. 292 b. Byth. by Sweet, 709 ; see infra, ( p) 1 Wms. on Exors. 4th ed. 1082. 546. (w) 2 Bl. Com. 507; Broom's Com. 1074 OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. Part IV. T. 1, Ch. 1. vests in the executors, who tliercby become liable to c red i tors and lei'atet-s. Emblements. Where executors take au estate, and where ouly a power. Executors take a joint and several interest, but administra- tors do not. SO that the demands of creditors and legatees are personal upon the executor ; and tliough tliey exist in respect of the property, and are limited by the extent of it, yet they are no lien upon it, wliether in his hands or in the hands of his assignees {q), where they are not affected with fraud. If an executor has, without the direction of the Court, paid away tlie residue in ignorance of the existence of any debt, he is still liable for it. But an executor fairly stating the facts, and paying over the assets under the direction of the Court, in an administration suit, is fully indemnified against all existing or contingent demands on the estate (?■). Executors of a tenant in fee simple are entitled to the corn growing at his death, as against his heir, but not as against his devisee (.s). A devise of land to executors to sell passes the estate in it ; but a devise that executors shall sell it, or that it sliall be sold by the executors, gives them a power only (/). A\liere executors take the residue in the character of executors, they take the same as joint tenants. And hence if one of them dies before the testator, the sur- vivors are entitled to the whole property («). But where there are several executors who all prove the will, they have not only a joint but also a several interest in aU the goods and chattels of the testator. Hence, a sale or release by one of them is good. But it is otherwise in the case of administrators (a). It is the usual practice, how- {q) See Co. Litt. 290 b, n. (1), xiv. 1. (r) 2 Sp. Eq. Jur. 921 ; Waller V. Barrett, 24 Beav. 413 ; Williams V. Headland, 4 Gif. 495; but see supra, 659, 660. (s) Co. Litt. 55 b, n. (2) ; 2 Pres. Shep. T. 472 ; Cooper v. Woolfit, 2 Hurl. & Norm. 122. {t) 1 Sugd. Pow. 131—134 ; Doe d. Hampton t. Shatter, 8 Ad. & E. 905. [u) 1 Pop. Leg. by White, 484 ; 1 Wms. on Exors. 4th ed. 208. (or.) 1 Cruise T. 8, c. 1, § 27 ; 2 Pres. Shep. T. 303, 335 ; 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 802 ; 2 Bl. Com. 510. OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. 1075 ever, to require the concurrence of all the executors, in part i v. ' ^ T. 1, Ch. 1. order to guard against the possible event of a sale having been made by any other executor, and, in the case of an assignment of a term, in order that the purchaser may have the benefit of a covenant from all the executors that they have not incumbered (y). Executors and administrators represent the testator, and Rights ot ^ executors or are entitled to all damages which accrued to the testator in f^^^'/J,'*'"'''*" his lifetime, and to the benefit of all covenants with and coYenluts, oi- duties to the testator, except those duties which concern acts to be done to tlie testator personally in respect of his person, and which become impossible of performance by his death, or which are to be done for creating a title to be communicated to the heir (z). An executor or administrator has a right to retain out Right of retainer, or of legal assets the amount of a debt due to him, either bene- paymeut of o debts, thoiu h ficially or as trustee, as against creditors of equal degree («). barred. An executor may pay a debt justly due to another person, although barred by the Statute of Limitations in the testator's lifetime. And he may retain a debt due to himself, although so barred (b). One of two or more executors may settle an account Power or one executor to with a person who is accountable to the estate, so as to ^^"i'^ *"* i ' account. bind the others and the estate ; subject to any question of his liability to the parties beneficially interested for any impropriety of conduct ; and subject to this also, that if there is any fraud or gross error in the settlement of account, it may be a ground for re-opening it (c). As the law vests all the chattels real and personal of a Necessity for asspnt to testator in the executor, to be applied by him, in the first a legacy, or (ij) 9 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 1635 ; Stahlschmidt v. Lett, 1 Sm. & 138. G. 41.5 ; Hill v. Walker, 4 K. & J. (2) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 175. 176. («) 2 Wms. on Exors. 4th ed. 894 (c) Smith v. Everett, 27 Beav. 446, —904 ; Boyd v. Broolcs, 34 Beav. 7. 454. (h) 2 Wms. on Exors. 5th ed- 1076 OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. Part IV. T. 1, Cn. 1. to a devise of a term of years. Assent of executors, how sisruified. As.^ent by one executor. Assent by husbaiid of executrix. Assent in cases of legacy limited by way ot quasi remainder. When assent should be given. Effect of assent. Effect of appointing creditor or debtor, or obUgee or place, in payment of debts ; so every legatee must obtain the executor's assent to his legacy before his title as legatee can be complete (d). So that, whenever a term for years is devised, the consent of the executor is necessary to com- plete the title of the devisee, as in the case of any other legacy (c). Any expression or act done by the executor which shows his concurrence in a bequest will amount to an assent (/). One executor is competent to assent to a legacy ((/). If an executrix is a married woman, the assent of her husband to a legacy will be sufficient ; as the law autho- rises him to administer in right of his wife (A). Where a legacy is limited to several persons in succes- sion, the executor's assent to the first taker will be con- sidered an assent to the quasi remainder or remainders. And, on the other hand, his assent to a quasi remainder will enure to the benefit of any person taking a prior in- terest in the property bequeathed (i). It is the duty of executors to assent as soon as all the debts and expenses attending the administration have been satisfied, and there is a sufficient residue to pay all the legacies (/). By assent the legal interest which the executor had in the fund ceases, and the entire property legal and equit- able becomes vested in the legatee (k). If an obligee or creditor makes a sole or joint obligor or debtor his executor or one of his executors, the obligation or debt is released at law, except as against creditors. But (d) 2 Wms. on Exors. 4th ed. 1175,1176. (e) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 3, § 6. (/) 1 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 185 ; 2 "Wms. on Exors. 4th eel. 1178 ; 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 846. ( I b > o and exceptino- persons attainted, but not excepting femes Who may be . i- o trustees. covert and infants, may be trustees (h). Equity never It is a rule in CQuity, wliicli admits of no exception, wants a ± ^ ^ trustee. that, wlicre a trust exists, a Court of equity never wants a trustee. For, wherever a perfect trust, as opposed to a trust resting in contract or in fieri, or even an imperfect trust, if supported by a valuable consideration, has once attached, whether it is an express, an implied, or a con- structive trust, and it is not extinguished by the counter- vailing equity of a bon^ fide purchaser for valuable consideration, without notice, or other person having a conflicting equity, nor has otherwise ceased to subsist, equity will follow the legal estate, and decree the person in whom it is vested to execute the trust (c). And the lapse of the legal estate never has the least influence on the trusts to which it is subject : if the individuals named happen to fail, by death, incapacity, or refusal, the Court wiU provide a trustee : if no trustees are appointed at all, the Court assumes the office in the first instance (d). Devolution or If a man appoints a trustee of real or personal estate, delegation of . a trust. without naming his heir or personal representative, the heir or personal representative does not become a trustee, (a) On this subject the reader is 1159, 1162; 1 Spence's Eq. Jur. referred to the very valuable works 501; 2 Id. 51, 52, 369, 875, 876; of Mr. Lewin and Mr. Hill. Co. Litt. 113 a, n. 2, 290 b, n. 1. (6) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 32. VI. ; 1 Cruise T. 12, c. 4, § 60. (c) See Story's Eq. Jur. § 976, (d) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 876. OF TKUSTEES. 1085 on the decease of the person so appointed, althongh. the part i v. property may vest in the heir or representative. And where two or more persons, and the survivor, and tlie heu's, executors, or administrators of the survivor, are appointed trustees, and the word " assigns " is not intro- duced, the sole or surviving trustee cannot delegate the trust either by act inter vivos, or by devise ; for although he may thereby pass the legal estate, yet the person in whom it is thereby vested will not be clothed with the character of trustee (c). Hence, where a testator gives leaseholds to two trustees, their executors and adminis- trators, and the surviving trustee devises and bequeaths all trust estates to trustees, and appoints them and another person his executors, neither the trustees nor the executors of such surviving trustee can execute the trusts, but new trustees must be appointed; because by the devise and bequest made by such surviving trustee, he has taken away the legal estate from his executors, who ought otlier- wise to have been the trustees (/). And where a testator devised estates to trustees, their heirs and assigns, upon trust to sell, and provided that " the receipts of his trustees or the survivors should be sufficient," and the surviving trustee devised the estates upon the same trusts, the cestuis que trust were entitled to have new trustees appointed of the original will {g). A trustee cannot, without the consent of his cestui que trust or of the Court, denude himself of the character of trustee, until he has performed the trusts. If, without such consent, he assigns the trust, or delegates the per- formance of its duties to a stranger, he will be answerable for the breaches of trusts committed by the assignee or stranger {h). But where a testator devises and bequeaths (e) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 38 ; Cooke {g) Oclieston v. Heap, 1 De G. & V. Crmvfurd, 13 Sm. 91. S. 640. (/) In re Burtt, 1 Drew. 319. (li) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 920. 108G OF TEUSTEES. Fabt IV. T- 1, Ch. 2. Inyest- meut — under the Stat. 23 <& U Vict. c. 38, and order of Feb. 1, 1861 ; under stat. 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35; as extended by the stat. 23 & 24 Vict. 0. 38, and by the stat. 30 & 31 Vict. c. 182 ; real and personal estate, on cei-tam trusts, to be performed hy the trustees named, and tlie sui-vivors and survivor, and by the heirs and assigns, or the executors or administrators of the survivor, whether the will contains a power to the survivor to appoint new trustees, or not, and the surviving trustee devises and bequeatlis the trust estates and moneys to certain persons, upon the trusts of the first will, this is a valid devise and bequest to them upon those trusts ; because " assigns," may fairly be deemed to mean persons who may be made assignees by devise and bequest («'). It was the duty of trustees, executors, or administrators, to whom no discretion as to investments was given, to invest in consols or reduced or new £3 per cents. Tiiistees, executors, or administmtors, having power to invest upon government securities or upon parliamentary stocks, funds, or securities, may now invest in Bank stock,. East India stock, Exchequer bills, and £2 10s. per Cent. Annuities, and upon mortgage of freehold and copyhold estates in England and Wales (/). And by the stat. 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 32, "when a trustee, executor, or administrator shall not, by some instrument, creating his trust, be expressly forbidden to invest any trust fund on real securities, in any part of the United Kingdom, or on the stock of tlie Bank of England or Ireland, or on East India stock, it shall be lawful for such trustee, executor, or administrator to invest such trust fund on such securities or stock ; and he shall not be liable on that account as for a breach of trust, provided that such investment shall in other respects be reasonable and proper." This is only prospective (Jc). But by the stat. 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38, s. 12, this 32nd section "shaH operate retrospectively." And by the stat. 30 & 31 Vict. c. 132, (i) Titleyy. WoIstenholme,7 Hcav, 436 ; Ball v. Mai/, 3 K. & J. 585. (j) 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38, ss. 10, 11, and Gen. Ord. of Feb. 1, 1861. (k) Re Miles Will, 27 Beav. 579. OF TRUSTEES. 1087 s. 1, it is enacted that "the words 'East India stock' in Partiv. T. 1, Oh. 2. tlie said Act passed in the session holden in the 22 & 23 — Vict. c. 35, sliall inchide and express as well the East India stock which existed previously to the 13th day of August, 1859, when the said Act received the assent of her Majesty, as East India stock charged on the revenues of India, and created under and by virtue of any Act or Acts of Parliament wliich received her Majesty's assent on or after the 13th day of August, 1859 ; and it shall be lawful for every trustee, executor, or administrator to invest any trust fund in his possession or under his control in the stock created by the last-mentioned Act or Acts to the same extent, and for the same purposes and objects, as he can now invest such trust fund in the East India stock which existed previously to the 13th day of August, 1859." And by s. 2, "it shall be lawful for every trustee, executor, or administrator to invest any trust fund in his possession or mider his control in any securities the inte- rest of which is or shall be guaranteed by Parliament to the same extent and in the same manner as he may invest such trust fimd in such securities as aforesaid." And by the stat. 23 & 24 Vict. c. 145, s. 25 (/), " trustees ^°d™de': having trust money in their hands which it is their duty to J^gs "' ^^^' invest at interest shall be at liberty, at their discretion, to invest the same in any of the parliamentary stocks or public funds, or in government securities, and such trustees shall also be at liberty, at their discretion, to call in any trust funds invested in any other securities than as aforesaid, and to invest the same on any such securities as aforesaid, and also fix3m time to time, at their discretion, to vary any such investments as aforesaid for others of the same nature : provided always, that no such original investment as afore- (l) See infra, p. 1095, as to object infra, pp. 1100 — 1. of this Act ; and see ss, 32, 33, 34, 1088 OF TRUSTEES. Part IV. T. 1, Oh. 2. Improper investments. said (except in the £3 per Cent. Consolidated Bank Annui- ties), and no sncli change of investment as aforesaid, shall be made where there is a person under no disability entitled in possession to receive the income of the trust fund for his life, or for a term of years determinable with his life, or for any greater estate, without the consent in writing of such person." According to the general understanding of the profession, and the general practice of the Courts, where trustees are authorised to invest on mortgage of real estate, they are not justified in advancing more than two-thirds of the value of agricultural freeholds, or one half of the value of freehold houses ; and if the value depends upon fortuitous circum- stances — for instance, if the property consist of a mill or factory, or other buildings used for purposes of trade, or houses situate in a watering-place, or the like — the trus- tees run the risk of having the mortgage thrown upon themselves, and of being made answerable for the money advanced. In such cases, the burden of proof as to suffi- cient value lies upon the trustees {on). A power to invest trust funds " upon the security of the funds of any com- pany " does not warrant their investment in preference railway shares ; for such an investment is not an invest- ment on the security of the funds of a company, but a purchase of shares in the undertaking, or an investment secured on the profits of the concern (n). And an authority to invest trust moneys on real securities does not authorise an investment on London Dock stock, Eoad bonds, or Sewer bonds (o). Nor does a power to invest on the secu- rity by way of mortgage of any freehold, copyhold, or lease- (m) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 925 ; Coote Mortg. 3rd ed. 162 ; remarks of Sir/. Romilly, M. R., in Madcod V. Annesley, 16 Beav. 605 ; Stickney V. SeweU, 1 My. & Cr. 15 ; Stretton V. Ashmall, 3 Drew. 9. (n) Harris v. Harris (No. 1), 29 Beav. 107. (o) Rohinson v. Robinson, 11 Beav. 371. OF TKUSTEES. 1089 hold liereclitaments, authorise an hivestment in railway partiv. _ "^ T. 1, Cn. 2. mortgages and railway debenture stock ( j:>). And if trus- tees are empowered to lend money, even on personal secu- rity, and one lends a sum of money to the other, upon a mortgage of his real estate, and the latter becomes bank- rupt, and the estate when sold is insufhcient, the trustee lending the money is liable for any loss occasioned by such an investment ; because trustees ought not to lend to one another {q). Where a discretion is given to executors and others to invest money on securities generally, unless personal secu- rity is expressly or clearly implied, they ought not to invest the funds on personal security. And even where trustees are authorised to lend on such personal security as they shall think sufficient, they are not enabled to lend trust money to a trader or trading concern (r). And an indemnity clause, declaring that they shall not be liable for the insufficiency of any security, will not exonerate them from liability, if they lend on palpably inadequate security (s). It is a breach of trust to sell out stock, and invest the proceeds on a mortgage for securing the re-transfer of such stock, and the payment of interest equal to the amount of the dividends (/). An executor will not be liable for money allowed to remain with bankers who fail, where it is not an unreason- able sum for executors to keep in the bank (ti), or where it was right and reasonable for the money to be deposited there under the circumstances {x). But he will be {p) Mortimore v. Mortimore, 4 D. 221. & J. 472. {t) Whitney v. Smith, L. E. 4 Ch. Cg) Stichney v. Sewell, 1 My. & Ap. 513. Cr. 8. (m) Swinfen v. Swinfen (No. 5), (r) 2 Eop. Leg. by White, 1500, 29 Beav. 211. 1501 ; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 296, 926. (x) Fenwick v. Clarke, 4 D. F. & J. (s) Drosier v. Brereton, 15 Beav. 248. 1090 OF TRUSTEES. Part IV. T. 1, Ch. 2. Power to lend money oil real securities in Ireland. liable if he places money iu the hands of a banker by way of investment, notwithstanding an indemnity clause against losses by a banker of money deposited for safe custody (?/). By the stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 29, s. 1, it is enacted, that, from and after the passing of the Act, " it shall be lawful for any person or persons who, under or by virtue of any direction, trust, or power already given, created, or reserved, or hereafter to be given, created, or reserved as aforesaid, is or are or shall be authorised or directed to lend money at interest on real securities in England, Wales, or Great Britain, to lend the same or any part thereof at interest on real securities in Ireland, in the same manner in all respects as if such investment had been expressly authorised in or by such direction, trust, or power as aforesaid," &c. But by s. 2, it is provided, " that all loans of money on real securities in Ireland under this Act, in which any minor or unborn child or person of unsound mind is or may be in- terested, shall be made by the direction and under the authority of the Court of Chancery or Exchequer in Eng- land, such direction or authority being obtained in any cause upon petition in a summary way." And by s. 5, it is further provided, " that the provisions of this Act shall not apply to any case in which such direction, trust, or power as aforesaid doth or shall or may contain any express restriction against the investment of such money as afore- said on securities in Ireland." And by s. 6, " that nothing contained in this Act shall relieve or be construed to relieve any person or persons intrusted or clothed with such dhec- tion, trust, or power as aforesaid from any responsibility as to title, security, or otherwise, either at law or in equity, save that [of] having lent and advanced such money as aforesaid on real securities in Ireland, instead of having {y) Reyden v. Wesley, 29 Beav. 213. OF TRUSTEES. 1091 invested siicli money on real securities in England, Wales, part.iv. "^ ° T. 1, t'li. 2. or Great Britain." And hence, where upon a petition under this Act, the Court sanctioned an investment, which was made without proper evidence of value, and without the consent of the necessary parties, and there was a loss, the trustees were held liable for the breach of trust (z). Trustees cannot act separately, but must all join both in Trustees ^ "^ "^ must join iu conveyances and receipts. andTeceiTts A trustee is responsible for his own acts and defaults, Resp.nisi- bility lor and for those wrongful acts and defaults of his cotrustees each other's ~ afts and to which he is priv}% and in which, though without any default, corrupt motive, he expressly, tacitly, or virtually acquiesces, or which would not have happened but for his own act or default (a). The trustee indemnity clause does not exonerate a trustee Trustee •^ indemnity from this liability for a breach of trust committed by c'^"*"- his cotrustee (h). The insertion of it leads many, in igno- rance of this, to accept a trust, and many others to be so remiss as to give their cotrustees the opportunity of com- mitting breaches of trust, through which they themselves are involved in a Chancery suit, though that often neces- sarily proves unavailing to remedy the loss occasioned to the cestuis que trust. By the stat. 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 31, "every deed, will, Every trust instrument or other instrument creating a trust either expressly or by *" '^e deemed ° -'- -^ "^ to coutaiu implication shall, without prejudice to the clauses actually ti^"f,^^c°'^ contained therein, be deemed to contain a clause in the "eimbn'rle- words or to the effect following ; that is to say, ' that the trustees, trustees or trustee for the time being of the said deed, will, or other instrument shall be respectively chargeable only for such moneys, stocks, funds, and securities as they shall respectively actually receive, notwithstanding their respec- (z) Sheltbrd's Eeal Prop. Acts, ed. 206. 527. (6) Brvmridf/e v. Brumridge, 27 (a) See Smith's Manual of Eq. 9t]i Beav. 5. 1092 OF TRUSTEES. Pakt IV. T. 1, Ch. 2. Remunera- tion. tively signing any receipt for the sake of conformity, and shall be answerable and accoiintal)le only for their own acts, receipts, neglects, or defaults, and not for those of each other, nor for any banker, broker, or other person with whom any trust moneys or securities may be deposited, nor for the insufficiency or deficiency of any stocks, funds, or securities, nor for any other loss, unless the same shall happen through their own wilful default respectively ; and also that it shall be lawful for the trustees or trustee for the time being of the said deed, will, or other instrument to reimburse themselves or himself, or pay or discharge out of the trust premises all expenses incurred in or about the execution of the trust or powers of the said deed, will, or other instrument.' " Trustees, executors, directors of private companies, and other persons standing in a similar situation, are not allowed, even with the consent of their cotrustees, co- executors, or coadjutors, and however extraordinary the services they may have rendered, to take any remuneration by way of commission, or brokerage, or salary, without some express or implied provision for that purpose in the instrument under which they claim (c). And a solicitor, who is a trustee, is not entitled to charge for business done by him in relation to the trust, as distinguished from costs out of pocket, although employed to do it by his cotrustee, unless there is a provision, in the deed or will creating the trust, enabling him to receive remuneration for the trans- action of such business (d). And even where there is a provision that a solicitor is to be at liberty to charge for his professional services, he is only entitled to charge for services strictly professional, and not entitled to charge for matters which an executor or trustee ousfht to have (r) story's Eq. Jur. § 460 a, 1268; 2 Si)ence's Eq. Jur. 945, 946; Barrett V. Hartloj, L. R. 2 Eq. 789. (d) Broughton v. Broughton, 2 De G. & S. 422 ; 5 D. M. & G. 160. OF TRUSTEES. 1003 done without the intervention of a solicitor; such as for at- part iv. ' T. 1, Oh. 2. tendances to pay premiums on policies or to make transfers at the bank, attendances on proctors, auctioneers, legatees, and creditors (c). But trustees are entitled, without any Expenses, express provision, to defray out of the trust funds expenses legitimately and properly incurred (/). The Court of Chancery will not in any case permit a ^ fiducfal" trustee or other person standing in a iiduciary relation to allowed tt derive any benefit from the property with which he is bene&t. entrusted or from the of&ce itself If a trustee or other person standing in a fiduciary relation acquires property or makes a profit by means of transactions within the scope of his agency or authority, or if a person employs another's property in any trade or speculation, there will be a constructive trust as to the property so acquired or the profits thereby made, for the benefit of the cestui que trust, principal, owner, or otlier person standing in the opposite relation (//). Therefore, if a trustee compounds a debt for less than is due, he shall not derive any advantage to himself from the transaction (A). And if a trustee purchases a lien or mortgage on a trust estate at a dis- count, he will not be allowed the benefit of the difference, but the purchase will be a trust for the cestui que trust. So, if a trustee or a partner renews a lease of the trust or partnership estate, he will be a trustee of such renewed interest for his cestui que trust or copartner, even though the lessor may have refused to grant a renewal to the cestui que trust or copartner (/). (e) Hurhin v. Darhy (No. 1), 28 192. Beav. 325. {h) 1 Cruise T. ] 2, c. 4, § 38. (/) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 938. (i) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1211 ; 1 ig) 1 Craise T. 12, c. 4, § 38. Spence's Eq. Jur. 512 ; 2 Spence's See Story's Eq. Jur. § 1211, 1211 a, Eq. Jur. 208, 299, 300; 1 Cruise T. 1261 ; 1 Spence's Eq. Jur. 512 ; 2 12, c. 1, § 61. As to purchases by Spence's Eq. Jur. 208, 299, 800 ; trustees, see supra, p. 834—5. Sugden v. Crossland, 3 Sm. & Gif. K K 2 1094 OF TRUSTEES. Part IV In general, whenever property of one kind has been wrongfully converted into property of another kind, by a trusT' ro-"^ °^ trustee or agent, if the property which has been so substi- perty. tutcd cau be ascertained to be such, it will be liable to the rights of tlie cestui que trust or principal, to which the property converted was subject (7). Conveyance, ^ trust uiav be extinguished by a transfer of the funds ;tssigntuent, -^ o .^ a^rustle iif ^u the trusts of au ante-nuptial settlement, where either lus^trust.^^ the husband or wife was not aware that the party trans- ferring them had no power to do so (k). And if a trustee conveys the trust property to a l)ona fide purchaser for valuable consideration, who has paid his purchase money, and had no notice of the trust at the time of paying the same, the trust is extinguished. But if the trustee should afterwards repurchase or otherwise become entitled to the same property, the trust would be revived by construction of equity (/). And if a trustee conveys or assigns the trust property for valuable consideration, in violation of the trust, to a person who is aware of that circumstance, or conveys or assigns it without valuable consideration, even to a person who has no notice, such person will be treated as a trustee for the cestui que trust. And an executor is deemed a trustee of the assets of his tes- tator (vi). If a cestui que trust is in possession, that is con- structive notice of the trust to a purchaser from the trustee (w). A trustee may bind the estate by a bona fide mortgage or other specific lien, without notice of the trust. But the (?) See Story's Eq. Jur. 1158, 12,1.3. 1560 ; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 203. (k) Cooper v. Wormnld, 27 Beav. 266. [1) See Story's Eq. Jur. § 1264, and note ; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 40, 19.5, 196 ; 1 Cruise T. 12, c. 4, § 10, (wi) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1257; 1 Spence's Eq. Jur. 512; 2 Td. 40, 195, 298 ; 1 Cruise T. 12, c. 4, § 13. in) 2 Pres. Sliep. T. 507, n. (8). OF TKUSTKES. IWo trust property will not be bound by any judgment or other i'art iv.^ claim of creditors against the trustees (o). By the stat. 23 & 24 Vict. c. 145, after reciting that " it P-'^frs gWeu •/ ' o by tlie Slat. is expedient that certain powers and provisions which it is c^i^s^'*^''^'' now usual to insert in settlements, mortgages, wills, and other instruments should be made incident to the estates of the persons interested, so as to dispense with the necessity of inserting the same in terms in every such instrument : " it is enacted that " in all cases where Trustees eiiipowerea by any will, deed, or other instrument of settlement tofs'i''''^^ J J > > sell in lots, it is expressly declared that trustees or other persons auctfou or ''^ therein named or indicated shall have a power of sale, contract. either generally, or in any particular event, over any hereditaments named or referred to in or from time to time subject to the uses or trusts of such will, deed, or other instrument, it shall be lawful fur such trustees or other persons, whether such hereditaments be vested in them or not, to exercise such power of sale by selling such hereditaments, either together or in lots, and either by auction or private contract, and either at one time or at several times, and (in case the power shall expressly authorise an exchange) to exchange any hereditaments fowerto " ^ o ^ exchauge. which for the time being shall be subject to the uses or trusts aforesaid for any other hereditaments in England or M^ales or in Ireland (as the case may be), and upon such exchange to give or receive any money for equality of exchange " (s. 1). And " it shall be lawful for the persons making any saie may be made under such sale or exchange to insert any such special or other ^i.'f."^' <=''°- " ./ X ditioiis, and stipidations, either as to title or evidence of title, or other- b^vl^^ '^^^ wise, in any conditions of sale, or contract for sale or vri^'ion-"'^ exchange, as they shall think fit, and also to buy in the re-seiiV hereditaments or any part thereof at any sale by auction, (,o) Stoi-y's Eq. Jur. §. 977. 109() OF TRUSTEES. Part IV. and to rescind or vary any contract for sale or exchange, T. 1, Ch. 2. J J O ' and to re-sell the hereditaments which shall be so bought in, or as to which the contract shall be so rescinded, without being responsible for any loss which may be occasioned thereby, and no purcliaser under any such sale purchaser/" shall be bound to inquire whether the persons making the same may or may not have in contemplation any particular re-investment of the purchase money in the purchase of any other hereditaments or otherwise " (s. 2). exereWncr " For the purposc of completing any such sale or ex- saier&cf change as aforesaid, the persons empowered to sell or to convey. cxchauge as aforesaid shall have full power to convey or otherwise dispose of the hereditaments in question, either by way of revocation and appointment of the use or other- wise, as may be necessary" (s. 3). Moneys <' Xhe moncv so received upon any such sale or for an -lug from •• i. j be'iaicfoiiun equality of exchange as aforesaid shall be laid out in the er an s; jj-j^j^^gp indicated in that behalf in the will, deed, or instrument containing the power of sale or exchange, or if no such indication be therein contained as to all or any part of sucli money, then the same shall with all con- venient speed be laid out in the purchase of other here- ditaments in fee simple in possession to be situate in England or Wales or in Ireland (as the case may be), or of lands of a leasehold or copyhold or customary tenure, which, in the opinion of the persons making the purchase, are convenient to be held therewith or with any other hereditaments for the time being, subject to the subsisting uses or trusts of the same will, deed or other instrument of settlement in which the power of sale or exchange was contained ; and all such hereditaments so to be purchased or taken in exchange as aforesaid as shall be freeholds of inheritance shall be settled and assured to the uses, upon and for the trusts, intents, and purposes, and with, under, and subject to the ]")Owers, provisoes, and declarations, to OF TRUSTEES. 1097 which the hereditaments sokl or oiveu iu exchaucfe were part iv. ° ° T. 1, Ch. 2. or would have been subject, or as near thereto as the deaths of parties and other intervening accidents will admit of, but not so as to increase or multiply charges ; and all such hereditaments so to be purchased or taken in exchange as aforesaid as shall be of leasehold or copyhold or customary tenure shall be settled and assured upon and for such trusts, intents, and purposes, and with, under, and subject to such powers, provisoes, and declarations, as shall, as nearly as may be, correspond with and be similar to the aforesaid uses, trusts, intents, and purposes, powers, provisoes, and declarations, but not so as to increase or multiply charges, and so that if any of the hereditaments so to be purchased shall be held by lease for years the same shall not vest absolutely in any tenant in tail by purchase who shall not attain the age of twenty-one years; and any such purchase as aforesaid may be made subject to any special conditions as to title or otherwise : Pro- vided that no leasehold tenement shall be purchased under the powers hereinbefore contained wdiich is held for a less period than sixty years " (s. 4). " Provided nevertheless. That it shall be lawful for the or in pay- ment o. in- persons exercising any such power as aforesaid, if they cumUMuces. shall think fit, to apply any money to be received upon any sale or for equality of exchange as aforesaid, or any part thereof, in lieu of purchasing land therewith, in or towards paying off or discharging any mortgage or other charge or incumbrance which shall or may affect all or any of the hereditaments which shall then be subject to the same uses or trusts as those to which the heredita- ments sold or given in exchange w^ere or was subject " (s. 5). " ;N"o monev arisino; from any such sale or exchange of Money ■JO J ^ o ^ arising from lands or hereditaments in England or Wales shall be laid sai^, ac o not to W laid out in the purchase of lands or hereditaments situate "ands^ex- 1UU8 OF TllUSTEES. I'ABT IV. T. 1, Ch. 2. chaiiaerl, elsewhere than in the country lu wliich laud sold or exchanged is situated. Until pur- chase of lands, &c., money to be invested at interest. Tnistees of renewable leaseholds may renew. elsewhere tliau in England or Wales, and no lands situate in England or Wales, shall, under any such power as aforesaid, be exchanged for any lands or hereditaments situate elsewhere than in England or Wales ; and no money arising from any such sale or exchange of lands in Ireland shall he laid out in the purchase of lands or hereditaments situate elsewhere than in Ireland, and no lands or hereditaments situate in Ireland shall, under any such power as aforesaid, be exchanged for any lands or hereditaments situate elsewhere than in Ireland" (S.6). " Until the money to be received upon any sale or for equality of exchange as aforesaid shall be disposed of in the manner herein mentioned, the same shall be invested at interest for the benefit of the same parties who would be entitled to the hereditaments to be purchased there- with as aforesaid, and the rents and profits thereof, in case such pm-chase and settlement as aforesaid were then actually made " (s. 7). " It shall be lawful for any trustees of any leaseholds for lives or years which are renewable from time to time, either under any covenant or contract or by custom or usual practice, if they shall in their discretion think fit, and it shall be the duty of such trustees, if thereunto required by any person having any beneficial interest, present or future or contingent, in such leaseholds, to use their best endeavours to obtain from time to time a renewed lease of the same hereditaments on the accus- tomed and reasonable terms, and for that purpose it shall be lawful for any such trustees from time to time to make or concur in making such surrender of the lease for the time being subsisting, and to do all such other acts as shall be requisite in that behalf ; but this section is not to apply to any case where by the terms of the settlement or will the person in possession for his life or other limited OF TKUSTEES. 1099 interest is entitled to enjoy the same without any ohli- partiv. gation to renew the lease or to contribute to the expense of renewing the same " (s. 8). " In case any money shall he required for the purpose ^loney for equality of of payino- for equality of exchano-e as aforesaid, or for exciiango an.i i- '' o i- J o for renewal of renewal of any lease as aforesaid, it shall he lawful for the p^wWed""^ persons effecting such exchange or renewal to pay the same out of any money which may then be in their hands in trust for the persons beneficially interested in the lands to be taken in exchange, or comprised in the renewed lease, whether arising by any of the ways and means hereinbefore mentioned or otherwise, and notwithstanding the provisions for the application of money arising from sales or exchanges hereinbefore contained ; and if they shall not have in their hands as aforesaid sufficient money for the purposes aforesaid, it shall be lawful for such persons to raise the money required by mortgage of the hereditaments to be received in exchange or contained in the renewed lease (as the case may be), or of any other hereditaments for the time being subject to the subsisting uses or trusts to which the hereditaments taken in ex- change or comprised in the renewed lease (as the case may be) shall be subject ; and for the purpose of effecting such mortgage such persons shall have the same powers of conveying or otherwise assuring as are herein contained with reference to a conveyance on sale ; and no mortgagee advancing money upon such mortgage purporting to be made under this power shall be bound to see that such money is wanted, or that no more is raised than is wanted for the purposes aforesaid " (s. 9). " No such sale or exchange as aforesaid, and no purchase cousent to f, 1 , . . sale, ex- ot hereditaments out of money received on any such sale change, or •^ "^ purchase. or exchange as aforesaid, shall be made without the consent of the person appointed to consent by the will, deed, or other instrument, or if no such person be ap- 1100 OF TRUSTEES. Part IV. poiutecl, tliGii of the person entitled in possession to the T. 1, Ch. 2. ^ ' ^ ^ receipt of the rents and profits of such hereditaments, if there be such a person under no disability ; but this clause shall not be taken to require the consent of any person where it appears from the will, deed, or other instru- ment to have been intended that such sale, exchange, or purchase should be made by the person or persons making the same without the consent of any other person" (s. 10)- to be entXd " ^^r the purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed or lucome.""^ to be entitled to the possession or to the receipt of the rents and income of laud or personal property, although his estate may be charged or incumbered, either by him- self or by any former owner, or otherwise howsoever to any extent ; but the estates or interests of the parties en- titled to any such charge or incumbrance shall not be affected by the acts of the person entitled to the possession or to the receipt of the rents and income as aforesaid, unless they shall concur therein " (s. 31). Puwers, &-!., " ]^one of the powers or incidents hereby conferred or hen by given niaybc^ auucxed to particular offices, estates, or circumstances negatived by ^ decLaration ^^^^^^ take effcct or be exercisable if it is declared in the suiijMUo*''^ deed, will, or other instrument creating such ofhces, estates, provisions, or circumstauccs that they shall not take effect ; and where there is no such declaration, then if any variations or limit- ations of any of the powers or incidents hereby conferred or annexed are contained in such deed, will, or other instrument, such powers or incidents shall be exercisable or shall take effect only subject to such variations or limitations " (s. 32). Provisions " Notliiug in tliis Act coutaiucd shall be deemed to ill tlie Act T 1 • 1 to operate as empowcr any trustecs or other persons to deal Avitli or if inserted in me^nt"**^'"' ^^sct the cstatcs or rights of any persons soever, except to the extent to which they might have dealt with or affected the estates or rights of such persons if the deed, will, or other instrument under which such trustees or other persons are empowered to act had contained express OF TRUSTEES. 1101 powers for sncli trustees or other persons so as to deal with part i v. or affect such estates or rights " (s. 33). " The provisions contained in this Act shall, except as coinmepce- -■■ ^ ineut of Act. herein! )efore otherwise provided, extend only to persons entitled or acting under a deed, will, codicil, or other in- strument executed after the passing of this Act, or under a will or codicil confirmed or revived by a codicil executed after that date," i.e., 28 August, 18G0 (s. 34). By the stat. 7 & 8 Yict. c. 76, s. 10, it was enacted ^An,sTeef ' " that the bona fide payment to and the receipt of any tuai dfa-*^*^" person to whom any money shall be payable upon any express or implied trust or for any limited purpose, or of the survivors or survivor of two or more mortgagees or holders, or the executors or administrators of such sur- vivor, or their or his assigns, shall effectually discharge the person paying the same from seeing to the application or being answerable for the misapplication thereof, unless the contrary shall be expressly declared by the instrument creating the trust or security." This enactment, which only took effect on the 1st day of January, 1845, was repealed by the stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 1, as from the first day of October in the same year ( jj»). But by the stat. 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 23, " the bona fide payment to and the receipt of any person to Avhom any purchase or mortgage money shall be payable upon any express or implied trust shall effectually discharge the person paying the same from seeing to the application or being answer- .able for the misapplication thereof, unless the contrary shall be expressly declared by the instrument creating the trust or security." And by the stat. 23 & 24 Vict. c. 145, s. 29 (g'), " the receipts in writing of any trustees or trustee for any money payable to them or him by reason or in the exercise of any trusts or powers reposed or vested in {2>) See supra, p. 615. (7) But sec ss. 32—4, supra, 1100 — 1. 1102 OF TRUSTEES. T, pabt IV. them or liim shall be sufficient discharges for tlie inoiiey r. 1, Ch. 2. o ^ therein expressed to be received, and shall effectually ex- onerate the persons paying such money from seeing to the application thereof, or from being answerable for any loss or misapplication thereof" Conveyance When all the duties of a trustee are at an end, and this of legal estate to jy clcarlv sliown to him, and he has no notice of any dis- costui que J ' 'J trust. position or incumbrance made by the cestui que trust, he must, on demand, convey the legal estate to his cestui que trust, at the peril of paying the costs of any suit occasioned by his refusal. In cases of real doubt or difficulty, a trustee, before he parts with his estate, is fully justified in requir- ing an indemnity from his cestui que trust, or in seeking the direction and indemnity of the Court (r). Where the beneficial occupation of a trust estate by the person entitled to it has given reason to suppose that there was a conveyance of the legal estate to the person who was equit- ably entitled to it, a jury may be directed to presume such a conveyance (s). of u'usf^*^"" ^Vhere there is a devise, bequest, conveyance, or assign- ment to two trustees, whether nominatim or not, and one assents and the other disclaims, the property passes to the assenting trustee. And if power is given to them, whether nominatim or not, to give receipts, the receipt of the assent- ing trustee alone will be sufficient {t). A disclaiming trustee should not convey the estate to his cotrustee ; for, according to Creiv v. Dichen (u), if a trustee refusing to act, reconveys his interest to his co- trustee, he thereby accepts the trust, though he conveys away the estate (a;). But according to Nielson v. Words- (r) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 48. ed. 547 ; Adams y. Taunton, 5 Mad. (s) 1 Cruise T. 12, c. 2, § 39. 435. (t) 2 Spence's Eq. Jiir.351;Lewin (n) 4 Ves. 97. on Trusts, 3rd ed. 532 — 3 ; Hill on (.«) 3 J arm. & Byt.h. hy Sweet, Trustees, 484 ; Sugd. V. & P. IStli 698 ; 1 Cruise T. 12, c. 4, §59. OF TRUSTEES. 1103 uwih (y), a release, with intent to operate as a disclaimer, /'^^''J,^^, will be held to amount to a disclaimer in equity {z). By the stat. 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, s. 1, the stat. 11 G. 4 & l^i;]""" ^'^' 1 Will. 4, c. GO, as to trustees and mortgagees, the stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 23, as to escheat and forfeiture of trust pro- perty, and the stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 69, as to heirs and devisees of mortgagees, are repealed, but without reviving the acts repealed thereby. By the same statute (13 & 14 Vict. c. 60), an order may be made, vesting in any other persons, estates vested in trustees or mortgagees who are of unsound mind (s. 3), or are infants (s. 7), or in trustees who are out of the juris- diction or cannot be found (ss. 9, 10). An order may also be made releasing or disposing of to any other persons, contingent rights in hereditaments to which such trustees or mortgagees are entitled (ss. 4, 8, 11, 12). A similar vesting order may be made as to estates in trustees, where it is uncertain which was the survivor (s. 13) ; or where it is uncertain whether the last trustee is living or dead (s. 14) ; or where a trustee dies intestate without an heir, or it is not known who is his heir or devisee (s. 15). A similar vesting order may be made in the case of con- tingent rights of unborn trustees (s. 16). An order may also be made vesting in any other persons the right to transfer any stock, or receive the income thereof, or to sue for a chose in action on any interest in respect thereof, in the case of trustees or mortgagees or personal representatives of unsound mind (ss. 5, 6, 20), or trustees or personal representatives out of the jurisdiction or not to be found, or concerning whom it is not known {y) 2 Swanst. 365. 700—702. {z) See 3 Jarm. & Bytli. by Sweet, 1104 OF TRUSTEES. Part IV. whether they are living or dead (ss. 22, 25, 20), or in the case of trustees or personal representatives who neglect or refuse to transfer or receive the income, or trustees who neglect or refuse to sue for any chose in action (see ss. 28, 24, 25, as amended by s. 4 & 5 of the stat. 15 & 16 Vict. c. 55). Sections 21, 26, define the effect of such an order as last mentioned. Power is given to appoint a person to convey, assign, release, or dispose of, instead of making a vesting or re- leasing order (s. 20). The same powers are given to the Courts in Lancaster and Durham, as regards lands within their jurisdic- tion (s. 21). Section 28 defines the effect of an order vesting copy- hold or customary lands, or appointing a person to convey them. Section 29 relates to the case of lands ordered to be sold for payment of debts ; and section 30 enables the Court to declare certain persons to be trustees. Sections 82 — 85 confer a general power on the Court of Chancery to appoint new trustees, and vest in them here- ditaments, or the right to call for a transfer, or to receive dividends, or to sue. Act to extend Bv the stat. 15 & 16 Vict. c. 55, intituled "An Act to Trustee Act, '' 1850. extend the provisions of the Trustee Act, 1850," the pro- visions of the 29th section of that Act are applied to de- crees for sales generally, and are otherwise extended. By S..2 (which repeals the 17th and 18th sections of the Trustee Act, 1850), power is given to make an order, vest- ing in another person an estate, or releasing a contingent right, on refusal or neglect of a trustee to convey or release. By s. 3, power is given to make an order vesting in another person, the right to transfer or receive the income of stock in the name of an infant trustee. OF TRUSTEES. 1105 By s. 8, power is given to appoint new trustees in the pa»t iv. place of persons convicted of felony. By s. 9, " in all cases where it shall be expedient to ap- . point a new trustee, and it shall be found inexpedient, difficult, or impracticable so to do without the assistance of the Court of Chancery, it shall be lawful for the said Court to make an order appointing a new trustee or new trustees, whether there be any existing trustee or not at the time of making such order." The Trustee Act, 1850, contains an interpretation clause (s. 2) ; and by s. 12, of the subsequent Act, that Act is to be construed as part of the former Act. By s. 13, vesting orders under these Acts are to be chargeable with the same duty as deeds. Wliere the Court of Chancery appoints new trustees, it ?'°,y?!' '° „ *j i L 3,pp01Ilt new does not give them a power to appoint otlier new trustees, ^'ivelf by'the even though the testator empowered the original trustees chaucery. to appoint new trustees («). In selecting a person for the office of trustee, the Court Principles of t3 r ' tlie Court will have regard to the wishes of the author of the trust, jfew^trSs. expressed in, or clearly to be collected from the instrument creating it. Again, the Court will not appoint a person to be a trustee, with a view to the interest of some of the persons interested under the trust, in opposition to the in- terests of others. For it is the essence of the duty of every trustee to hold an even hand between the parties interested under the trust. And thirdly, the Court will have regard to the question, whether the appointment will promote or impede the execution of the trust (b). But by the stat. 23 & 24 Vict. c. 145, which recites that l^^y^^^^^ it was made to dispense with the necessity of inserting u^,deru'f®^ certain usual provisions, it is enacted by s. 27, that "when- v?ct."'n. 145, s. 2T (c). (a) Holder v. Burhin, 11 Beav. Ap. 485. 594. (c) But see ss. 32—4, supra, p. (b) In re Tempest, L. R. 1 Ch. 1100—1. 1106 OF TRUSTEES. Part IV. ever any trustee, either original or substituted, and whether T. 1, Ch. 2. "^ ' ° appointed by the Court of Chancery (d), or otherwise, shall die, or desire to be discharged from or refuse or become unfit or incapable to act in the trusts or powers in him re- posed, before the same shall have been fully discharged and performed, it shall be lawful for the person or persons nominated for that purpose by the deed, will, or other in- strument creating the trust (if any), or if there be no such person, or no such person able and willing to act, then for the surviving or continuing trustees or trustee for the time being, or the acting executors or executor or administrators or administrator of the last surviving and continuing trustee, or for the last retiring trustee, by writing, to ap- point any other person or persons to be a trustee or trustees in the place of the trustee or trustees so dying, or desiring to be discharged, or refusing or becoming unfit or incapable to act as aforesaid ; and so often as any new trustee or trustees shall be so appointed as aforesaid all the trust property (if any) which for the time being shall be vested in the surviving or continuing trustees or trustee, or in the heirs, executors, or administrators of any trustee, shall with all convenient speed be conveyed, assigned, and transferred so that the same may be legally and effectually vested in such new trustee or trustees, either solely, or jointly with the surviving or continuing trustees or trustee, as the case may require ; and every new trustee or trustees to be ap- pointed as aforesaid, as well before as after such convey- ance or assignment as aforesaid, and also every trustee apj)ointed by the Court of Chancery either before or after the passing of this Act, shall have the same powers, autho- rities, and discretions, and shall in all respects act, as if he (d) By 28 & 29 Vict. c. 40, " tlie include the Court of Chancery of the Court of Chancery," in this section County Palatine of Lancaster.'' " shall be deemed to extend to and OF TRUSTEE.^. 1107 had been oricfinally nominated a trustee by the deed, will, P^^y.^^i ^ J J T. 1, Cu. 2. or other instrument creating the trust." A power of appointing new trustees of a will authorises Jjj,';,'|''f,f„ the filling up of a vacancy occurring in the testator's life- d'!|Xot The . , tcritator. tnne [c). A power to appoint any person or persons to be a t^f°„^,ie"._ trustee or trustees, in the place or stead of a trustee or trustees dying or desiring to be discharged, does not autho- rise the appointment of a greater number of trustees than the original number, in case of the decease or resignation of all the original trustees (/). The appointment of a person as new trustee of a will onfmi^eT* who]n the testator has excluded from the trust by a codicil, testator has exduded. after having appointed him by will, is improper, and the Court will cancel the appointment, and declare the con- veyance to such person void {g). By the stat. 10 & 11 Vict. c. 96, s. 1, intituled " An Act ^S^'into for better securing trust funds and for the relief of trustees," cuanc'Ty."' "all trustees, executors, administrators, or other persons, having in their hands any moneys belonging to any trust whatsoever, or the major part of them, shall be at liberty, on filing an affidavit, shortly describing the instrument creating the trust, according to the best of their knowledge and belief, to pay the same, with the privity of the Ac- countant-General of the High Court of Chancery, into the Bank of England, to the account of such Accountant- General in the matter of the particular trust (describing the same by the names of the parties, as accurately as may be, for the purpose of distinguishing it), in trust to attend the oi'ders of the said Court ; and all trustees or other persons having any annuities or stocks standing in their name in the books of the Governor and Company of the (e) Lewin, 4th ed. 42fi. {g) Suyden v. C'rosdand, 3 Sai. & (y) Ex parte Davis, 2 Y. & C. C. G. 192. C. 468. VOL. II. I' li 1108 OF TRUSTEES. Part IV. Bank of England or of the East India Company or South 1. 1, Ch. 2. ^ . . — Sea Company, or any government or parliamentary securi- ties standing in their names or in the names of any de- ceased persons of whom they shall be personal represen- tatives, upon any trusts whatsoever, or the major part of them, shall be at liberty to transfer or deposit such stocks or securities into or in the name of the said Accountant- General, with his privity, in tlie matter of the particular trust (describing the same as aforesaid), in trust to attend the orders of the said Court;" &c. And by the stat. 12 & 13 Vict. c. 74, it is enacted "that if upon any petition pre- sented to the Lord Chancellor or Master of the Eolls in the matter of the said Act (10 & 11 Vict. c. 96), it shall appear to the Judge of the Court of Chancery before whom such petition shall be heard, that any monies, annuities, stocks or securities are vested in any persons as trustees, execu- tors, or administrators, or otherwise upon trusts within the meaning of the said recited Act, and that the major part of such persons are desirous of transferring, paying, or de- livering the same to the Accountant-General of the High Court of Chancery under tlie provisions of the said recited Act, but that for any reason the concurrence of the other or others of them cannot be had, it shall be lawful for such Judge as aforesaid to order and direct such transfer, pay- ment, or delivery to be made by the major part of such persons without the concurrence of the other or others of them ; and where any such moneys or government or par- liamentary securities shall be deposited with any banker, broker, or other depositary, it shall be lawful for such Judge as aforesaid to make such order for the payment or delivery of such moneys, government or parliamentary secu- rities, to the major part of such trustees, executors, ad- ministrators, or other persons as aforesaid, for the purpose of being paid or delivered to the said Accountant-General as to the said Judge shall seem meet." OF TRUSTEES. 1109 By the stat. 25 & 26 Vict. c. 108, " no sale, excliange, /^"^^^j partition, or enfranchisement at any time heretofore of land g^^^ 25 & 26 by any trustee or other person, expressed or intended to be J^f^ ^■^^^'^' made in exercise of any trust or power authorising the sale, chang??^ exchange, partition, or enfranchisement of land, and not aii.ieufian- . 1 1 • 1 1 cliisuiueiits of forbidding the reservation of minerals, and which sale, land hereto- " f. 're mado, exchangee, partition, or enfranchisement shall have been le^erving or o > L > excepting made with an exception or reservation of minerals, and "^'"efais; with or without rights or powers for or incidental to the working, getting, and carrying away of such minerals, or otherwise relating thereto, shall be invalid on the ground only that the trust or power did not expressly authorise such exception or reservation, but such sale, exchange, partition or enfranchisement shall be deemed to have taken effect in the same manner as if the exception or reservation had been authorised by the trust or power ; and a?, to "^ ^ past sales, and no sale, exchange, or partition heretofore made as exchaiges, ' o ' 1 and pai ti- aforesaid of any minerals separately from the residue of mi'ne,°L the land subject to the trust or power intended to have The'iaadT been exercised, and either with or without such rights or powers as aforesaid shall be invalid on the ground only that the trust or power did not expressly authorise such sale, exchange, or partition, but such sale, exchange, or partition shall be deemed to have taken effect in the same manner as if such minerals, rights, and powers (if any) had been expressly authorised to be so dealt wdth separately from the residue of such land ; but this enactment shall not be deemed to confirm any sale, exchange, partition, or enfranchisement already declared by a Court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, nor to confirm or affect any sale, exchange, partition, or enfranchisement as to the validity of which any suit or other proceeding is now pending" (s. 1). "■ Every trustee and other person now or hereafter to be- f^^ '^^ *" •^ ^ future trans- come authorised to dispose of land by way of sale, exchange, same"kind*''* L L 2 1110 OF TRUSTEES. /i^ch^s Pf^i'tition, or enfrancliisement may, unless forbidden by the instrument creating the trust or power, so dispose of such land with an exception or reservation of any minerals, and with or without rights and powers of or incidental to the working, getting, or carrying away of such minerals, or may (unless forbidden as aforesaid) dispose of by way of sale, exchange, or partition the minerals with or without such rights or powers separately from the residue of the land, and in either case without prejudice to any future exercise of the authority with resj)ect to the excepted minerals, or (as the case may be) the undisposed-of land ; but this en- actment shall not enable any such disposition as aforesaid without the previous sanction of the Court of Chancery, to be obtained on petition in a summary way of the trustee or other person authorised as aforesaid, which sanction once obtained shall extend to the enabling from time to time of any disposition within this enactment of any pait or parts of the land comprised in the order to be made on such petition, without the necessity of any further or other application to the Court" (s. 2). \ 1111 CHArTER III. OF MARRIED WOMEN (ft). At the common law, the bemo; or le^^al existence of the „,^^^T,^"^; ' o o 1\ 1^ Ch. 3. wife, for almost all purposes, is considered as mercjed in ~~ ; : ' L L > o How husband that of the husband (h). But courts of equity, in many reganlldat^ respects, treat husband and wife as distinct persons (c). equity. In treating of tliis subject, let us consider, I. The legal disability of married women. II. The power which husband and wife have, in equity, of contracting wdth, and giving, and granting to, each other. III. The interest of the husband in the wife's pro- perty.' IV. The wife's pin-money and paraphernalia. V. The wife's separate estate. VI. The equity of the wife to a settlement or main- tenance out of her own property. VII. Some points respecting deeds of separation. VIII. Some miscellaneous points. Ft. IV. T. 1, Cn. 3, 8. 1. Section I. The Legal Disability of Married Women. It is a rule that in no other way than with the protection of a private examination to ascertain whether or not the ^ „ , wife deliberately assents to the arrangement, can her real e^ate^'*''^ {(() The reader is referred to the on this subject, works of Mr. Ih'ight, Mr. Maequeeii, {h) See Story's Eq. Jar. § 1367. and Mr. Bell, for further iuformation (c) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1368. 1112 THE LEGAL DISABILITY OF MARRIED WOMEN. Pt. IV. T. 1, Ch. 3, s. 1. Fines, r^'coveries, deeds, and perfdrinance of conditions by married women. estate Le touched or affected ; and every act done in her name or on her behalf by her husband, without this protec- tion, is her husband's act, and an act with wdiich, in the eye of the law, she has no concern whatever {d). But a married woman might, with her husband, make an effectual assurance by fine or recovery, and, in order to this, she might join with him in the declaration of uses of such fine or recovery [c). And as we have seen, married women are now enabled to dispose of their real property, and of money subject to be invested in the purchase of real property, and of the proceeds to arise from the sale of land, or may release or extinguish powers relating thereto, by an assurance, under tlie stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74 (/). A married woman may also execute a power or authority, in the absence of words to the contrary, whether such power is given to her before or after marriage, or upon her marriage, and even without the concurrence of her husband {(j). Again, if an estate is made to a married woman upon condition to convey, she will be bound to perform it ; because this does not charge her person, but the land (/;). And by the custom of London and of several other cities, a married woman may bind herself by a deed enrolled, after being privately examined : and this custom was confirmed in the reign of Hen. 8, by a positive statute { i). But with the exceptions presently noticed, all other deeds executed by married women, except a queen consort, by which they might be deprived of any right or charged with any duty, are absolutely void at law, and not merely void- able {j). They are also void in erpiity, except in certain (d) Nicholl V. Jones, L. 11. 3 Eq. 708. (e) Burton, § 206 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 12, § 30, 35. (/) See supra, p. 786 ; Fran /is V. Bollens, L. R. 3 Ch. Ap. 717. iff) 1 Sugd. Pow. 181-2; Co. LUt. 112 a. {h) 2 Cruise T. 13, e. 2, § 17 ; Co. Litt. 112 a. (0 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 2, § 33. (j) 2 Bl. Com. 292—3 ; 4 Cruise THE LEGAL DISABILITY OF MAKRIED WOMEN, 1113 cases where they relate to or affect her separate estate ; and ^t. iv. t. i, ■^ ^ ' Ch. 3, 8. 1. no act of the wife after the death of her husband, except ' ~ in the case of a lease, will in general operate as a confirma- tion of them (/.'). But if a woman, after the death of her husband, acknowledges a deed executed by her during her marriage, that may in some cases amount to a re-delivery of it, and so render it valid (/). Bv the stat. 1 Will. 4, c. 65, s. 12, where a feme covert Leasesto is entitled to any lease, she, or any person appointed by ^o'"'^'*- the order of a court of equity in her place, may by such an order be enabled to surrender such lease, and take a new one. By s. 14, expenses attending renewals are to be charged on the estate. And by s. 15, the new leases are to be to the same uses. By ss. 16, 20, where a feme covert might in pursuance Leases b^ ^ -^ married of any coveuant or agreement, if not under disability, be ^o™en. compelled to renew any lease, such feme covert, by the direction of the Court of Chancery, may accept a surrender of such lease, and execute a new one. And we have seen that by the stat. 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, additional leasing powers are given in the case of married women (»i). By the stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 7, it is enacted, "that, capacity of m.inied after the 1st day of October, 1845, an estate or interest in women to "^ ' declaim any tenements or hereditaments in England, of any tenure, fi^lerests'by may be disclaimed by a married woman by deed ; and that ^^^^' every such disclaimer shall be made conformably to the provisions of the Act for the abolition of fines and recoveries, and for the substitution of more simple modes of assurance." A married woman is incapable of making a testament Power to of chattels, without the licence of her husband ; except of wm, T. 32, c. 2, § 29 ; Burton, § 206 ; {k) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 2, § 29. Watk. CoQV. Brd. ed. by Prest. 250, (I) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 2, §31. 251. (m) See supra, p. 689. lU-i THE LEGAL DISABILITY OF MARRIED WOMEN. Tr. IV. T. 1, property to wliicli she is entitled in autre droit, as exe- cutrix, or of property settled to lier separate use (n), or property over wliich she has a power of appointment by will. And the husband's licence or assent must be given to the particular will, and can only give validity even to that, in the event of his being the survivor. And he may revoke such assent at any time during his wife's life, or after her death before probate. After her husband's death, however, she may recognise her will made during coverture, and thereby cause it to operate as a new will (o). The wife of a convicted felon, however, is a feme sole, as regards the power of disposing by will, at least of personal property accpiu-ed after her husband's conviction (j^)- Married women were expressly disabled by the old statute of wills from devising their lands. And by s. 8 of the stat. 1 Vict. c. 26, it is enacted, that " no will made by a married woman shall be valid, except such a ^vill as might have been made by a married woman before the passing of this Act." But married women are frequently enabled to dispose of lands by wills "operating as appoint- ments under powers contained in conveyances to uses (q). And the meaning of the 8th section is simply this, that the legal testamentary status of a married woman as such shall remain the same, so that it does not exclude her will from the 24th or the 27th section (r). Surrender of A surrcudcr iiiav be made by husband and wife of the copyhold. -^ '' wife's copyhold land, without any special custom ; she being first examined as to her consent by the steward: but a custom for the wife to surrender alone cannot be supported (s). (n) See infra, p. 1132. (p) In the goods of Coioard, 4 (o) Wms. Exors, 4th ed. 4.5—52 ; Swa. & Tiis. 46. 2 ni. Com. 498 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd (q) 6 Cruise T. 38, c. 2, § 7. ed. 130: Ex parte Fane, IC Sim. (;•) TOowrtsv. /o»jcs,l D. J. & S.do. 406. {s) Burton, g 1275. THE LEGAL DISABILITY OF MAREIED WOMEN. 1115 A power to a married woman to appoint by deed or ^pH^ss^i^' will, notwitlistandinsj;' her coverture, and as if she were ' " Puwer not sole, does not restrict her to an execution during cover- ^""gj"^*!;^'' ture (f). Married women are capable of purchasing, but their Purchases by ^ X -^iv. r.i, description which she may acquire or which may come to or devolve upon her ; and such property may be disposed of by her in all respects as a feme sole, and on her decease the same shall, in case she shall die intestate, go as the same would have gone if her husband had been then dead ; provided, that if any such wife should again cohabit with her husband, all such property as she may be en- titled to when such cohabitation shall take place shall be held to her separate use, subject, however, to any agree- ment in writing made between herself and her husband whilst separate " (s. 25) (/). 3. " In every case of a andjs^ judicial separation, the wife shall, whilst so separated, be ^°"ongs*^^mi considered as a feme sole for the purposes of contract, and ^^^^' wrongs and injuries, and suing and being sued in any civil proceeding ; and her husband shall not be liable in respect of any engagement or contract she may have entered into, or for any wT?ongful act or omission by her, or for any costs she may incur as plaintiff or defendant; provided, that where upon any such judicial separation alimony has been decreed or ordered to be paid to the wife, and the same sliall not be did.y paid by the husband, he shall be liable for necessaries supplied for her use ; provided also, that nothing shall prevent the wife from joining, at any time during such separation, in the exercise of any joint power given to herself and her husband " (s. 26). In consequence of these enactments, a wife who has obtained an order for protection is entitled to payment of a fund in Court representing a legacy bequeathed to her (m). By the stat. 21 & 22 Vict. c. 108, s. 7, the provisions ft^'l^^^^^f of the stat 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, " respecting the property t^miedTo (I) See In re Insole, L. E. 1 Eq. (m) In re Kinrjsley's Trust, 26 470; Johnson v. Lander, L. R. 7 Beav. 8-i; Cooke v. Fuller, 26 Beav. Eq. 228. 99. 1120 THE LEGAL DISABILITY OF MARMED WOMEN. Ft. IV. T. 1, Cn. 3, s. 1. property to which the wife is tntitled as exi'cutrix, admiuislra- trix, or trustee. Eflf^'Ct of order fnr protection or decne tor se|)aiatioD, atleiTvards di-charged, varied, or reveraed. Property ia remaiu.ler or reversion . Order to state time of desertion. of a wife who has obtained a decree for judicial separation or an order for protection, shall be deemed to extend to property to wliich such wife has become or shall become entitled as executrix, administratrix, or trustee since the sentence of separation or the commencement of the deser- tion (as the case may be) ; and the death of the testator or intestate shall be deemed to be the time when such wife became entitled as executrix or administratrix." By s. 8, "in every case in which a wife shall under this Act or under the said Act of the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, have obtained an order to protect her earnings or property, or a decree for judicial separation, such order or decree shall, until reversed or discharged, so far as necessary for the protection of any person or corporation who shall deal with the wife, be deemed valid and effectual ; and no discharge, variation, or reversal of such order or decree shall prejudice or affect any rights or remedies which any person would have had in case the same had not been so reversed, varied, or discharged in respect of any debts, contracts, or acts of the wife incurred, entered into, or done between the times of the making such order or decree and of the discharge, variation, or reversal thereof And property of or to which the wife is possessed or entitled for an estate in remainder or reversion at the date of the desertion or decree (as the case may be), shall be deemed to be included in the protection given by the order or decree " (;)i). By s. 9, " every order which shall be obtained by a wife under the said Act of the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, or under this Act, for the protection of her earnings or property, shall state the time at which the desertion in consequence whereof the order is made commenced ; and the order (tt) See In re Shackle s Trusts, 7 W. R. 280 ; In re Raindon's Trust, 7 W. R. 184 ; 4 Drew. 446. THE LEGAL DISABILITY OF MARRIED WOMEN. 1121 shall, as regards all persons dealing with such wife in ^^^-JJ-^-j^' reliance thereon, be conclusive as to tlie time when such desertion commenced." By s. 10, " all persons and corporations who shall, in J,';;J^f,;"^;*| *" reliance on any such order or decree as aforesaid, make any afce'mr''' payment to, or permit any transfer or act to be made or d'/erees, . inj_ whereafter- done by, the wife who has obtained the same, shall, not- wani^s dis- ctiaiged, withstandino- such order or decree may then have been dis- vaiied, or o "^ reversed, or charged, reversed, or varied, or the separation of the wife "|J • ^f, jf^^g*" from her husband may have ceased, or at some time since tinued.'"'"'"" the making of the order or decree been discontinued, be protected and indemnified in the same way in all respects as if, at the time of such payment, transfer, or other act, such order or decree were valid and still subsisting without variation in full force and effect, and the separation of the wife from her husband had not ceased or been discon- tinued, unless, at the time of such payment, transfer, or other act, such persons or corporations had notice of the discharge, reversal, or variation of such order or decree, or of the cessation or discontinuance of such separation." Section II. The Powers which Husband and Wife have of Contracting tvith, and Giving and Granting to, each other. I, At law, contracts made between husband and wife p?. ly. t i, ' Ch. 3, s. 2. before marriage, are extinguished by the marriage, if they r^ are for debts or things due in pricsenti, or at or on a future Jj|![^j?,„g time or event which may occur during, and not after the determination of, the coverture. But Courts of equity, although they generally follow the same doctrine, will enforce such contracts, where it would be in furtherance 1122 THE POWEIW WHICH HUSBAND AND WIFE HAVE Ft IV. T. 1, Ch. 3, s. 2. II. Contracts after man-iage. III. Gifts and grants after marriage. of the manifest intention and object of the parties to do so ; as in the case of an agreement on the marriage, by liiisband and wife, for the mutual settlement of their estate, or of the estate of either of them, on the other, even with- out the intervention of trustees (o). II. Contracts made between husband and wife after marriage, are a mere nullity at law ; but, under particular circumstances, they will be enforced in equity, where they are of a reasonable nature. Thus, if the liusband shovdd contract with his wife, for good reasons, that she should separately possess and enjoy property bequeathed to her, the contract would be upheld in equity (^;). So the wife may even become a creditor of her husl^and ; and her rights, as such, will be enforced against him and his repre- sentatives. Thus, if a wife raises money out of her estate to answer his necessities^ whatever be the mode adopted to carry that purpose into effect, she is, in equity, entitled to reimbursement out of his estate {q). But a contract by a , husband to transfer to his wife his rights and duties in reference to his children, is contrary to public policy, and will not be enforced (r), unless his conduct has been such, that the Court of Chancery would remove the children from his custody (s). III. At the common law a wife cannot grant to her husband, because they make but one person at law. And for the same reason, a wife cannot by the common law be the immediate grantee of her husband, but she may take an estate from him through the medium of a third person under the Statute of Uses {t). And as an appointee takes (o) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1370, 1371; 2 Pres. Shep. T. 335, 395. {p) See Story's Eq. Jur. § 1372 ; Hexdson v. Neyus, 16 Beav. 594 ; Anderson v, Abbott, 23 Beav. 457. (q) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1373. (}•) Vansittart v. Vanslttart, 4 K. & J. 62 ; 2 D. & J. 249 ; Walrond V. Walrond, 1 Johns. 18. (s) Sioift V. Sivift, 34 Beav. 266. (t) Co. Litt. 3 a, and n. (1) ; 112 a; 187 b ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 2, OF CONTRACTING "WITH EACH OTHER. 1123 under the original deed, so, althoudi a husband cannot at p?. ly. t i, ~ " Ch. 3, s. 2. common law convey directly to his wife, yet he may make an immediate appointment to her ; because her estate arises out of the original seisin. And for the same reason, a wife may appoint immediately to her husband. In like manner, a surrender of copyholds by the husband to the wife, or by the wife to her husband, is good (u). And gifts and grants by a husband to his wife, though directly and immediately, wall be enforced in equity, if they are of a reasonable nature, and there is no ground to suspect fraud. Thus, gifts made by the husband to the wife to purchase clothes or personal ornaments, or for her separate expendi- ture, and personal savings and profits made by her in her domestic management, which the husband allows her to apply to her own separate use, will be held to vest in her, as against her husband, but not as against his creditors, an unimpeachable right of property therein, so that they may be treated as her separate estate, if such gifts are established by clear and incontrovertible evidence («). If a husband makes presents of chattels to his wife, even verbally, and without any words of separate use, her right to them will be enforced against his residuary legatee, if the gift is proved by the testimony of any one wdio heard him use words of gift, or to whom he afterwards stated that he had given the chattels, or that they were hers. But the Court will not act upon the unsupported oath of the wife (y). § 40 ; 1 Cruise T. 11, c. 3, § 25; 3rd ed. by Prest. 249, 250. Burton, § 211 ; Watk. Conv. 3rd {x) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1374, 1375. ed. by Prest. 249, 250. {y) Grant v. Grant, 34 Beav. (w) 2 Sugd. Pow, 24; Watk, 623. 1124 THE INTEREST OF THE HUSBAND Pc. IV. T. 1, Ch. 3, s. 3. llusbaiid's interest in the wife's real estate. Huaband's interest in wife's chattels real. Section III. The Interest of the Husband in the Wife's Prope7'ty lohich is not settled to her s¶te use. A husband takes a freeliold interest during tlie joint lives of himself and his wife in land belonging to her in fee simple, in tail, or for life ; and such interest will pass by a conveyance executed by the husband alone {z). But in strict legal language, where the wife has an estate, it is said that the husband and wife (and not the husband only) are seised in right of the wife {a). Anciently, the husband had power over his wife's land by feoffment or fine, to make sucli an alienation of it that she could not enter upon it after his death, but must pursue her right by action. This power is taken away by stat. 32 Hen. 8, c. 28, s. 6 (b). And a contract by the husband as to the wife's real estate will not bind her at law or in equity (c). A chattel real which the wife has in her own and not in another's right, and which is not settled to her separate use, vests in the husband, not absolutely, but sub mode. Thus, the husband is possessed of the wife's term for years in her right, and hence he is entitled to receive all the rents and profits of it. He may also sell, surrender in deed or in law, or dispose of it during the coverture, so that even if the wife survive, she will have no right to it, unless it is reversionary and could by no possibility be reduced into possession during the coverture. If lie mortgages it, and the estate of the mortgagee becomes absolute, the wife's legal right by survivorship will be barred, but she will in general be entitled to the equity of redemption, if she sur- (z) Co. Litt. 351 a ; 2 Stepli. Com. 4th. ed. 260 ; Robertson v. Non-is, 11 Ad. & E. (K S.) 916. (a) Burton, § 757. (6) Burtou, § 220. (c) Sugd. Concise View, 147. IN THE wife's property. 1125 vives. If the liusbaud is outlawed, attainted, or convicted ^- iv. t. i, ' ' Ch. 3, 3. 3. of felony, or found felo de se, it is forfeited to the Crown. It is liable to execution for his debts ; and, if he survives his wife, it is to all intents and purposes his own. Yet if he has made no disposition thereof in his lifetime, and dies before his wife, he cannot dispose of it by will, inasmuch as it has not been transferred from the wife (d). As to chattels personal in possession which the wife has Ptg^e^"'-'* in her own right, as ready money, jewels, household goods, ^ijaueis and the like, the husband has an immediate and absolute p^'^^'*"^* property therein by the marriage, which never can again revest in the wife or her representatives, subject to an ex- ception created by ss. 21 & 25 of the stat. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85 (c). But chattels personal, en autre droit, as exe- cutrix or administratrix, &c., do not belong to the husband, though he survive, but go to the administrator de bonis non of the wife (/). As to the wife's chattels personal or clioses in action, which comprise debts, legacies, residuary personal estate, money in the funds, money received by a person to be appropriated to her use, &c., these the husband may have, if he reduces them into possession. They then become absolutely and entirely his own, and go to his executors and administrators, or as he bequeaths them by will, and shaU not revest in the wife. But if he dies before her, and before he has released them or reduced them into posses- sion, so that at his death they still continue choses in action, they survive to the wife, whether against the per- sonal representatives of the husband, or against his assig- nees in bankruptcy or insolvency, or his assignees for {d) 2 Bl. Com. 434 ; Co. Litt. 46 16 Beav. 33 ; 5 H. L. Cas. 388. b, 351 a, and n. 1; 1 Bright's (e) See supra, p. 1118, 1119. Husband and Wife, 94, 95, 98, 99, (/) 2 Bl. Com. 435 ; Co. Litt. 100, 105—6, 110 ; Bonne v. Hart, 351 b. ; 1 Bright's Husb. & Wife 2 Russ. & M. 361 ; Duherley v. Day, 34, 39. M M 2 1126 THE INTEREST OF THE HUSBAND pt. IV. T. 1, valuable consideration. If he survives her, he will not Cii. 3, 9. 3. — - have them by survivorship, as lie would have a chattel real, except in the case of arrears of rent due to the wife before her coverture, which in case of her death are given to the husband by the stat. 32 Hen. 8, c. 37 ; but he will still be entitled to the chose in action as her administrator, and may in that capacity recover such things in action as became due to her before or during the coverture (g). On taking out administration to her estate, he will become entitled, as her administrator, to all her personal estate which was outstanding and unrecovered at her death. And if he does not take out administration to her estate, but some other person does, the husband will be entitled to any surplus which may remain after paying the- wife's debts. If the husband dies before he or some other person has administered to her estate, his personal repre- sentatives may take out letters of administration to her estate, and recover all her property in action and unre- covered at her death, even though such property was reversionary at her death, and in fact did not cease to be so until after the death of the husband, as where he died in the lifetime of a prior taker of the property ; or, if the personal representatives of the husband do not take out administration to her estate, any other personal repre- sentatives of the wife may recover such property. But such personal representatives are trustees for the persons beneficially entitled to his general personal estate, under his will, or under the statutes of distribution, or under his bankruptcy or insolvency, or otherwise, as the case may be, as to any surplus which may remain after paying the wife's debts (A). (g) 2 Bl. Com. 434—5 ; Co. Litfc. 36, 41, 42, 72, — 8 ; 1 Wms. on 351 b. Exors. Gth ed. 815 ; Drew v. Long, {h) See 1 Bright's Husb. & Wife, 22 L. J. 717 (V. C. K); Att.-Gen iNTiiE wife's property. 1127 Where the wife is the proprietor of land-tax redeemed, pt. iv. t. i, ^ ^ Cn. 3, 8. 3. and the husband obtains a certificate of his title by virtue of his marriage, he may dispose of the whole. But if he only makes a mortgage of it, though he reserves the equity of re- demption to himself alone, it is only a disposition pro tanto, and if the wife survives, the equity of redemption will belong to her {i). As to the disposition of the reversionary interest of Disposition _ _ of tbe rever- married women in chattels personal (in cases not within siouary ■*- ^ interests of the Stat. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 57), the general result of the X™,^;^ cases may be briefly stated in these general terms {j ) : — personal, in 1. An assignment by a married woman of a vested re- wi'thin2o& ^ "^ 21 Vict. versionary interest in chattels personal, if bequeathed or c. sr. settled to her separate use, will be binding upon her even after the determination of the coverture. 2. A married woman cannot directly deprive herself or be deprived of a vested reversionary interest, as such, in personalty not given for her separate use, so effectually that she will be precluded from asserting a claim to it, if her husband dies before her without having reduced it into possession. 3. According to the decisions in Lachton v. Adams (k), Creed V. Perri/ (J), and Wilson v. Oldham, cited by Mr. Lewin in his work on Trusts, 2nd ed. 296, and according to the opinion of that eminent lawyer, the late Mr. Jacob, as stated by Mr. Lewin, a married woman may deprive herself or be deprived of chattels personal in which she has a vested reversionary interest, by means of the con- version of that reversionary interest into an interest in possession in herself, through the operation of merger consequent upon a surrender or assignment made to her V. Partington, 1 Hurl. & Colt. 193 ; (j) See an article on this subject, Fleet V. Perrins, L. R. 3 Q. B. 536; by the writer of these pages, 10 4 Q. B. 500 (Ex. Ch). Jurist, 231, 24S. (i) Pigott V. PIgott, L R. 4 Rq. (k) 5 L. J. (N. S.) Chanc. 382. 549. (I) 2 Eq. Rep. 42. 1128 THE INTEREST OF THE HUSBAND pt IV. T. 1, of the prior life interest, where at least the person to Ch. 3, s. 3. ^ ^ whom that prior life interest is limited is some other person than her own husband, and by means of a sub- sequent reduction of the property into tlie possession of the husband. But according to the decision of Lord Langdale and Lord Cottenliam (m), a married woman cannot so deprive herseK or be deprived by means of such a merger and acceleration of chattels personal in which she has a vested reversionary interest. The writer of these pages conceives that the opinion of Mr. Jacob was right, for the reasons given by the writer in the article already refeiTed to {n), and that the decision in Wliittle v. He7ining was wrong ; but in the absence of any decision of the question by the House of Lords, the doctrine of Lord Cottenham in Whittle v. Henning must be deemed to be the law of the land (o). 4. If the reversionary interest of a married woman in personalty is contingent, and bequeathed or settled to her separate use, and, a fortiori, if it is con- tingent and not settled to her separate use, she cannot deprive herself or be deprived of it, so as to be bound after the determination of the coverture. Stat. io&2i By the stat. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 57, it is enacted as fol- Vict. c. 57. "^ Disposal of lows : — " 1. After the 31st day of December, 1857, it shall reversionary n p i p • i interests of be lawful for cvcry married woman by deed to dispose of married . . women, and evciT futurc or reversioiiary interest, whether vested or release or •' j ' or^'theu-Tia'bt Contingent, of such married woman, or her husband in ment'.*^ '^^ her right, in any personal estate whatsoever to which she shall be entitled under any instrument made after the said 31st day of December, 1857 (except such a settlement as after mentioned), and also to release or extinguish any power which may be vested in or limited or resei'ved to her in regard to any such personal estate, as fully and (m) WJiittle V. Ilennijig, 11 BesLV. (o) 2 Tudor's Lead. Cas. in Equity, 222, and 2 Phil. 731. 580. (n) Supra, p. 1127, n.{j). IN THE wife's property. 1129 effectually as she could do if she were a feme sole, and i't- iv. t. i, also to release and extinguish her right or equity to a settlement out of any personal estate to which she or her husband in her right, may be entitled in possession under any such instrument as aforesaid ; save and except that no such disposition, release, or extinguishment shall be valid unless the husband concur in the deed by which the same shall be effected, nor unless the deed be acknowledged by her as hereinafter directed : Provided ahvays, that nothing herein contained shall extend to any reversionary interest to which she shall become entitled by virtue of any deed, will, or instrument by which she shall be restrained from alienating or affecting the same (s. 1). 2. Every deed to needs by be executed in England or Wales by a married woman for ^^^''°^' any of the purposes of this Act shall be acknowledged by her, and be otherwise perfected, in the manner in and by the Act passed in the third and fourth years of the reign of his late Majesty King "William the Fourth, intituled An Act for the abolition of fines and recoveries, and for the substitution of more simple modes of assurance, prescribed for the acknowledgment and perfecting of deeds disposing of interests of married women in land ; and every deed to be executed in Ireland by a married woman for any of the purposes of tliis Act shall be acknowledged by her and be otherwise perfected in the manner in and by the Act passed in the fourth and fifth years of the reign of his late Majesty King William the Fourth, intituled An Act for the abolition of fines and recoveries, and the substitution of more simple modes of assurance, in Ireland, prescribed for the acknowledgment and perfecting of deeds disposing of interests of married women in land ; and all and singular the clauses and provisions in the said Acts concerning the disposition of lands by married women, including the j^ro- visions for dis]3ensing with the concurrence of the husbands of married women, in the cases in the said Act mentioned. ll:]0 INTEREST OF THE HUSBAND IN THE WIFE'S PROPERTY. Pt. IV. T. I Ch. 3, s. 3. The power uuiler this Act not to iuterfere with other powers. Interepts of Women uiuier their man iago 8t-i,tlonieiit3 not to be affected. Arrears of inoorae of wile's choses in actiou. Release by husbaml. Hliall extend and be applicable to such interests in personal estate and to such powers as may be disposed of, released, or extinguished by virtue of this Act, as fully and effec- tually as if such interests or powers were interests in or powers over land (s. 2). 3. Provided always, that the powers of disposition given to a married woman by this Act shall not interfere with any power which inde- pendently of this Act may be vested in or limited or re- served to her, so as to prevent her from exercising such power in any case, except so far as by any disposition made by her under this Act she may be prevented from so doing, in consequence of such power having been suspended or extinguished by such disposition (s. 3). 4. Provided always, that the powers of disposition hereby given to a married woman shall not enable her to dispose of any interest in personal estate settled upon her by any settlement or agreement for a settlement made on the occasion of her marriage " (s. 4). Arrears of income of the wife's jDroperty consisting of choses in action not reduced into possession by the hus- band, belong to the wife by survivorship, and not to the representatives of the husband or his assignees (p). Wliere the wife has any right or duty which by possibility may arise during the coverture, the husband may by release discharge it (q). A husband may release a personal an- nuity secured by bond to which his wife is entitled, so as to bind his wife, even if she survives him (v-). And at law a man may even release a cause of action which his wife has as executrix or administratrix (s). But where the wife has a right or duty which cannot by any possibility accrue to her during the coverture, the husband cannot release it (t). (p) Wilkinson v. CharUsivorth, 10 Beav. 334. ('/) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 322. ((•) Ilorcv. Bccher, 12 Sim. 165. (s) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 333. (0 2 Pres. Shep. T. 322 ; Bri^hfs Hiisb. & Wife, 73. PIN-MONEY AND PARAPHERNALIA. 1131 Section IV. Pin-Money and Para;pJiernalia. I. Pin-money is not deemed to be an absolute gift. It ^^Jl''^-^' is not considered like money set apart for the sole and sepa- T~Z~_ rate use of the wife during coverture ; but it is a sum pay- ^^"^^7- able by the husband to the wife, in \drtue of a particular arrangement, and to be applied by tlie wife in attiring her person in a manner suitable to the rank of her husband, and in defraying other personal expenses — a sum allowed to save the trouble of a constant recourse by the wife to the husband, in order to meet her ordinary personal ex- penses («). Such being the peculiar nature of this provision, the wife ^"^^^j? cannot make such a disposition of it as she can of her sepa- rate estate. And courts of equity refuse to call upon the husband to pay beyond the arrears of a year, although sti- pulated for by a marriage settlement. For, setting aside the presumed satisfaction by acquiescence, the money is meant to dress tlie wife during the year, so as to keep up the dignity of the Imsband, and not for the purpose of accumulation. And, on the same principle, the personal representatives of the wife are not allowed to make any claim even for arrears of a year (x). II. The wife's paraphernalia are personal apparel and n- Para- . . phernaJia. ornaments of the wife, suitable to her rank and condition in life {]/). Old family jewels, although worn by the wife, do not constitute a part of her paraphernalia, unless she has acquired them by gift or bequest {z). ((() See story's Eq. Jur. § 1375 {y) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1376 ; 11 a, and note; 2 Spcnce's Eq. Jur. Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 442 ; 2 Bl. 500, :.01. Com. 436. {x) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1375 a, and (2) Jervoise v. Jervoise, 17 Beav. note; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 501. ;)Q6. 1132 PIN-MONEY AND PARAPHERNALIA. Pt. IV. T. 1, Cii. 3, s. 4. Rule of law respectiug them. Rule of equity, where they were given by the husband ; or where given by any one else. At law, the husband may, in his lifetime, but not by his will, dispose of the wife's paraphernalia, with the exception of necessary apparel. And tliey are lialjle to the claims of creditors, with the like exception. And if the articles were given by the husband, either before or after marriage, courts of equity fully recognise this right of the husband and his creditors, instead of treating the articles as absolute gifts to the wife, as her own separate property ; although in the case of creditors claiming against the assets of the husband, the personal assets of tlie husband will be mar- shalled against his representatives, in favour of the widow. But if the articles were bestowed on the wife by any one else, they will be deemed absolute gifts to her separate use ; and then, if received with the consent of the husband, neither he nor his creditors can dispose of them (a). Section V, The Wife's se^xtrate Estate. I. With regard to the means of acquiring a separate e — 1. Wlienever real or personal estate is given, granted, or Pt. IV. T. 1, Ch. 3, B. 5. ,— — estate — I. Means of acquiring it. 1. By gift, grant, devise, dcviscd to, or Settled Oil, a woman, either with or without or settle' ment. the intervention of trustees, whether after marriage, or as a provision on marriage, or not in contemplation of immediate marriage, and whether by her husband or by a mere stran- ger, it will be deemed separate estate, if it clearly appears from the will itself that the property was intended for her separate use Q>). Thus, not to mention other instances (a) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1376, 1377 ; 11 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 442 ; 2 Bl. Com. 43fi. yb) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1380, 1381, THE wife's separate ESTATE. 1133 where the intention is more obvious, a legacy to a married f^- ly- t. i, woman, with a declaration " that her receipt alone shall be a siitficient discharge to the executors," amounts to a be- quest for her separate use. So a bequest to a married woman " for her own use, and at her own disposal," has been held to be a bequest to her separate use (c). But where the expressions do not clearly show that the husband is to be excluded from his marital rights, the wife will not take for her separate use. Thus, in the case of a direction to pay money into her own proper hands " for her own use and benefit," it has been held, that, although the money is to be for her own use, yet there is nothing in that inconsistent with its being subject to the husband's marital rights (d). And a direct devise or bequest " for her sole use and benefit," to a woman who is either single or will become discovert on the death of the testator, does not amount to a gift to her separate use (e) ; unless, aided by other expressions in the will, or other circumstances, such as the fact that tlie instrument shows that the mar- riage of the person spoken of was contemplated by the author of it (/ ). But a gift, by way of trust, " for her sole benefit," to a married woman, does create a separate estate {g). Wliere personal chattels are given for the separate use of a married woman, a trustee should always be interposed, in order to exclude the legal title of the husband, who might 1384; 2 Spence'sEq.Jur. 502, 507, Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 19, 20. See 511 ; 2 Rop. Leg. by Wliite, 1414; also Sjurett v. Willoivs, 3 D. J. & S, 2 Jarm. WiUs, 2nd ed. 19, 20 ; 293. Gouhler v. Camm. 1 D. F. & J. (c) Gilbert v. Lewis, 1 D. J. & S. 14G. 38. See also Leivis v. Mathews, (c) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1382; L R 2 Eq. 177. 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 507; 2 Eop. Leg. (/) In re Tassei/s Trust, L. R. 1 by White, 1414 ; 2 Jarm. Wills, Eq. 561. 2nd ed. 19. {(f) Green v. Britten, 1 D. J. & {(I) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1383 ; 2 Sm. 649. Spence's Eq. Jur. 508—511 ; 2 1134 Pt. IV. T. 1, Ch. 3, 8. 6. 2. By carry- ing un a sepaiate trade iu Loiidou, or eveu else- where, by agieement before marriage ; or by agree- meut a!ter marriage ; THE WIFE S SEPARATE ESTATE. otherwise defeat the trust by dehvering the property to a purchaser, &c., without notice (h). 2. By the custom of London, a married woman may carry on trade witliin the City, as a sole trader, and be liable as such. But, independently of any such custom, if it was agreed between the husband and wife, before marriage, that the wife shall be allowed to carry on a separate trade, such an agreement will be maintained at law against the husband ; and being an agreement for valuable consideration, namely, that of the intended marriage, it will also be maintained at law against his creditors. And if such an agreement is made after mar- riage, and trustees are interposed, it will be maintained at law against the husband ; and, if it is for valuable consideration, against his creditors also ; for in such case, the wife's trustees will, at law, be entitled to the property assigned, and to the increase and profits thereof, and she will be considered, at law, as their agent, and her possession as their possession. The trustees, however, will be regarded, in equity, as holding such property, and receiving the increase and profits thereof, for the sole and separate use of the wife. And thus, in such cases, where trustees are interposed, the beneficial interest in the property, and the increase and profits thereof, are secured to the wife by the joint operation of law and equity. By the operation of law, the legal estate is vested in the trustees, and taken out of the power of the husband. By the operation of equity, the beneficial interest is vested in, and secured to, the wife, against her husband, and, if the agreement is for valuable considera- tion, against his creditors also. But even where there are no trustees interposed, such an agreement has the force, in equity, of creating a separate estate for the wife, and 4 '{fi, 11 Janu. & Byth. by Sweet, -146. THE wife's separate ESTATE. 1135 seciirinej it aGjainst the husband, and, if the aGfreement is pt. iv. t. i, . . . . ^-H- 3, s. 5. for valuable consideration, against liis creditors also. And — this is the case even though it be a mere implied agree- even though the agree- ment. So that if the husband should permit his wife, nientbe merely after the marriage, to carry on business on her sole and ^^v^'^^ii- separate account, all her earnings in the trade will be her separate property. And if a husband should desert his wife, and she should be enabled, by the aid of her friends, to carry on a separate trade, her earnings in such trade will be enforced in equity against her husband (i), indepen- dently of the statute 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, ss. 21, 25. Where the property is vested in trustees, care must be taken that the negotiations are not carried on in the name of the wife, as by taking notes or other securities in her name ; for then they will, at law, be held to belong to the husband, although it will be otherwise in equity (J). 3. By the stat. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 21, and 21 & 22 3- RyB^at. "^ ^ ' ' 20 & 21 Vict. Vict. c. 108, s. 8, if a wife is deserted by her husband, she gi^l' 22"vict may obtain an order of protection of her property against ^' ^'^^' her husband and his creditors ; and by s. 25 of the former Act, if she is judicially separated, she is to be considered as a feme sole as regards her property ; and in case of subsequent cohabitation, it shall be held to her separate use, subject to any agreement (k). II. As to the wife's power of disposing of her separate ii. wife's estate, all pre-nuptial agreements for securing to the wife dispo>ing of separate separate personal property, will confer on her, in equity, e="ate, unless the contrary be expressly stipulated or implied, the Trlseu from a „ , . . „ , pre-nuptial same power of disposing of such separate property, by will agreement ; or otherwise, as an unmarried woman would have (I). With respect to her power of disposing of her separate where it has arisen from (/) See Story's Eq. Jur. § 1385— {k) See supra, 1117—1121. 1387 ; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 503. (l) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1390 ; 2 (i) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1386. Spence's Eq. Jur.' 506, 507. 1136 THE WIFE S SEPARATE ESTATE. Pt. IV. T. 1, Ch. 3, s. 6. a post- nuptial agreement of the husband ; where it is given by a third person before or dwiug the coverture. property, where no trustee is interposed, and it rests merely on a post-nuptial agreement of the husband, if the property consists of personalty or an estate for life in real property, her disposal thereof can affect her husband's rights alone ; and therefore his assent is conclusive upon him. And if real jjroperty is settled upon her in fee in trust for her separate use, without any special power of appointment, she may dispose of or charge the rents and profits accruing during lier life. But it was formerly held that she can only dispose of the inheritance by the ordinary means by which married women dispose of their real property ; because, in regard to real estate, her own heirs are or may be affected in their interest by descent (m). And where an estate of inheritance was given her by a third person, during the coverture, or, as it seems, before coverture, for her separate use, it was formerly held that she could not dispose of it, except by those means (that is, by a deed duly acknowledged under the Fines and Eecoveries Act) or under a power: but if such a power was expressly given her, she might dispose of the estate, even though there were no trustees interposed to protect the execution of tlie power (n). It has been subsequently held, however, that she, like a feme sole, by virtue of her ownership, may, by deed or will, dispose of an estate of inheritance settled to her separate use, even though a special power of appointment be given her (o). Where personal property, whether in possession or reversion, or a life interest in real property, is given by a third person, for the separate use of a married woman, she I (m) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1391 ; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 501, 513 ; and see remarks of V.-C. Kindersley, in Moore v. Morris, 4 Drewry, 37 — 8. {n) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1388, 1392 ; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 504, 507 ; Har- ris V. Mott, 14 Beav. 169 ; Lechmere V. Brotheridge, 32 Beav. 853. (o) Taylor v. Meads, 13 W. K. 294 (L. C). alienation or auticipatioa. THE wife's separate ESTATE. 1137 lias, in effect, a full power to dispose of it, unless, from the '^^■J-J- J-^' words of the gift, it appears, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have been the intention of the giver that this absolute power should not exist ( p). But where trustees hold personal property in trust for a ^^'J.rled* married woman absolutely, and to apply the income for 11^^^ *^** 1 , I' ^•^ 1 ^ t/>'x ^ ^ interest for her separate use tor iiie, she has a iiie interest and a rever- her separate n T .. /.I !■/>• use, With a sion, and slie has the power oi disposition of her lite interest revmsion. during coverture, but no power of disposing of the rever- sion until she is discovert (q). III. Eeal property, whether in fee or for life, and per- ^^- E^eatric- 1. sr •/ ' ' L tious against sonal property may be given or settled to the separate use of a woman, though unmarried at the time when the gift or settlement takes effect, and the gift may be accom- panied by a prohibition of alienation or anticipation. But a separate estate and a mere prohibition of alienation or anticipation are both suspended whilst and as often as a woman is discovert : for, the separate estate of course only exists during coverture, and the prohibition of alienation or anticipation is exclusively annexed to the separate estate ; because such prohibition, without a clause of cesser, is inoperative as against an unmarried woman, and even as against a married woman if the gift is not for her separate use, just as it is void as against a man (r). So that a clause against anticipation, unaccompanied by a gift over on such anticipation, annexed to a gift to the separate use of a female for life, does not prevent her from (p) See Story'8 Eq. Jur. § 1393, 11 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 473; 2 1394 ; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 513 ; Jami. Wills, 2nd ed. 30 ; Barton v. Lechmere v. Brotheridrje, 32 Beav. Briscoe, Jac. 603 ; Tullett v. Arm- 353. strong, 1 Beav. 1 ; 4 My. & Cr. 377; {q) Hanchett v. Briscoe, 22 Beav. Baggett v. Meux, 1 Coll. 138, 1 496. Phil. 627 ; Re Young's Settlement, {r) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 511, 520 18 Beav. 199; Wright v. Wright, 2 —522 ; Story's Eq. Jur. § 1382 a, Johns. & Hem. 647. 1884 ; 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 794 ; 1138 THE wife's separate estate. pt. IV. T. 1, alieuatinff her whole interest, or converting all the pro- Ch. 3, a. 5. ^ O 1 perty to her own absokite use, before she is married, or after she becomes discovert (s). And if the property con- sists of a sum of money to be invested in the purchase of an annuity, she is entitled before her marriage to have the money paid to her at once, without having it laid out {t). The words " independent of her husband " mean no more than that Equity will not permit the marital power of the husband to be used in contravention of the enjoy- ment of the property according to the terms of the gift. If there is no restraint on alienation of the separate estate, she has an alienable estate ; and though it is legally en- joyable independent of her husband in the sense above mentioned, yet it is virtually liable to be destroyed by the influence and control of the husband, in inducing the wife to exercise the power of alienation thus incident to her separate estate. But if the limitation of a separate estate is accompanied with a prohibition of alienation or anticipa- tion, she has an unalienable estate during the coverture existing at the time when the 'gift was made, or, if she was then discovert, during the coverture following the gift ; and if the words are general and unrestricted to any particular coverture, during every subsequent coverture (w). Where a sum of money was vested in trustees, upon trust to pay the income to such persons as a married woman should appoint, but not so as to dispose of the same in the way of anticipation, and in default of such appointment into her own hands, for her own separate (s) Brown v. Pococh, 2 Euss. & (?<) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 524 ; Tul- My. 210, overruling the decision of lett v. Armstrong, 1 Beav. 1 ; 4 My. Sir /. Leach, 2 My. & K. 189 ; & Cr. 377 ; Baggett v. 3feux, 1 Coll. Wright v. Wright, 2 Johns. & Hem. 138 ; 1 Phil. 627 ; Clark y. Jacques, 647. 1 Beav. 36 ; Dixon v. Dixon, lb. {t) Woodmeston v. Walker, 2 Russ. 40 ; Jones v. Salter, 2 Euss. & My. & My. 197. 208. THE wife's separate ESTATE. 11B9 use, notwitlistandinQ- her coverture, independent of her Pr. iv. t. i, , Ch. 3, s. 5. husband (naming him), &c., the allusion to her present husband did not restrict the generality of the first part of the provision, so as to confine the restraint on anticipation to the existing coverture (x). But in the case of a devise or bequest to a married woman, independent of her husband (naming him), for her separate use, or for her separate use independent of him, the limitation to her separate use is restricted to her present coverture (,y). Eestrictions against alienation or anticipation will not be inferred fi'om any ambiguous expressions. They must either be contained in express words, or be deducible by plain implication (z). Hence tlie mere circumstance of the interest being directed to be paid from time to time will not prevent the wife from making a sweeping appoint- ment at once (a). And a woman is not restrained from the power of alienating her life interest, because it is given to her sole and separate use, and is to be paid into her own proper hands and upon her receipt alone ; such expressions being intended only to exclude the marital claims of any present or after-taken husband, and not to control that right of disposition which is incident to property (6). But it has been held on appeal, that where a testator gives property upon trust to pay the rents, &c., unto such person or persons, for such intents and purposes, and in such manner as a married woman by any writing or writings under her hand, when and as the same shall become due, but not hj way of assignment, charge, or other anticipation thereof, shall, notwithstanding her present or an}- future coverture, direct or appoint, and in default of any such (x) In re Gaffees Settlement, 1 (a) 1 Sugd. Pow. 207 ; 2 Jarm. Mac. & Gord. 541. Wills, 2nd ed. 21 ; and remarks of iy) Moore v. Morris, 4 Drewry, V.-C. KlndersUy in Moore v. Morris, 33. 4 Drewry, 37. {z) See 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 512, (6) 1 Sugd. Pow. 210; 2 Jarm. 522; 2 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 21. Wills, 2nd ed. 21. 1140 THE wife's separate estate. ^ch^I's^'s'' tlirection or appointment, or, so far as the same, if incom- ■ plete, shall not extend, into her proper hands, for her sole and separate use, &c., for which purpose her receipts in writing shall, notwithstanding any such coverture, be good discharges ; there the restrictive clause " but not by way of assignment, charge, or other anticipation thereof," extends to the whole gift, and applies as well to any disposition made as incidental to the separate estate which she is to take in default of appointment, as to any appointment made in execution of the power. For she is not allowed to direct the payment or application of the rents, &c., by way of assignment, charge, or other anticipation ; and therefore she could not make any disposition, as incidental to her separate estate, to take effect as an assignment, charge, or other anticipation, because that would operate as a direc- tion (c). And where trustees are directed to receive the income of settled property, when and as often as the same shall become due, and to pay the same to her, or to such persons as she shall appoint, or to permit her to receive it for her separate use, so and in such manner that her receipts alone, or the receipts of any person to whom she may appoint the income after it shall become due, shall be a valid discharge, tlie feme is restrained from antici- pating the income {d). The Court of Chancery has no power to release a sepa- rate estate from a restraint on anticipation or alienation, even where it would manifestly be for the benefit of the married woman : as where a legacy of considerable amount is given to her on condition that she convey away a sepa- rate estate of inconsiderable value (c). (c) Brown v. Bamford, 1 Phil. 597, overruling tlie decision of the 629, reversing decision of V.-C. E., Court below ; 2 Sm. & Gif. 555 — 6, 11 Sim. 127. 560—3. (d) Field V. Evans, 15 Sim. 375 ; (e) Rohinson v. mteelwrigU, 21 Bakei' V. Bradley, 7 D. M. & G. Beav. 214 ; 6 D. M. & G. 535. THE wife's separate ESTATE. 1141 IV. Wliere the wife bestows lier separate property upon pt. iv.t. i, Oh. o, 3> 5. her liusband, Courts of equity examine the transaction with > i- "^ IV. Gifts fo an anxious dread of undue marital influence ; and if they ^'J.^jj^" wue'^ are requii-ed to give sanction or effect to it, they will ex- amine the wife in Court, and adopt other precautions to ascertain her unbiassed wishes (/). Where, however, the husband, with the consent of the Husband's receipt of wife, is m the habit of receiving the income of her separate "^^ income, estate, it is regarded as showing her voluntary choice thus to dispose of it for the benefit of the family ((/). Separate money of the wife, paid to the husband or placed to his account by her authority or with her con- currence, cannot be recalled, whether it exists unapplied and capable of being ear-marked, or not (h). And the in- come of separate estate, where the wife is of unsound mind, is payable to the husband for her support, if he is unable to maintain her (i). But, upon principle, it clearly ought to be held to be payable to him, even if he is able to maintain her. V. "Where a married woman is possessed of money aris- 7- i^'g^'t °^ ^ "^ hiisbaiid to ing from personal property settled to her separate use, she rate'%^olert may dispose of it either by deed or by wHl ; but if she ""depeif-*^^'''' makes no disposition of it, it will, on her decease, belong gff? "^ °^ ^°^ to her liusband in his marital rioht, without taking out ad- ministration (J). And where it is stipulated in marriage articles, that the intended wife's property shall be for her separate use to all intents and purposes as if she were sole and unmarried ; in such case, on her death without issue, and without having made any appointment of the property, (/) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1395; 2 Gif. 126. Speuce's Eq. Jiir. 514. {{) 2 S]Dence's Eq. Jur. 525, (g) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1396 ; see (/) Molony v. Kennedy, 10 Sim. 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 514; 1 Lead. 254; see also Tagnian v. Hopkins, Cas. Eq. 2nded. 411. 4 M. & Gr. 389; 5 Scott, N. R. (A) Caton \. Rklout, 1 Mac. & 464. Gord, 603 ; Gardner v. Gardner, 1 N K 2 1142 THE wife's SEP abate ESTATE. Pp. IV. T. 1, the husband is entitled to it as her administrator, and not Ch. 3, s. 5. , her next of kin (/<;). VI. Liability VI. Except undei' the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 26 (I), a of separate estate. woinaii caimot render herself or her property liable at law, for any contract, debt, or charge created by her durmg the coverture, not even for necessaries. But a married woman having separate estate (except so far as she is restrained from anticipation), being considered in equity as a feme sole, as regards the separate estate, with respect to the ca- pacity of enjoying it, she is likewise considered as a feme sole with respect to the capacity of charging the estate with debts or engagements. No personal decree, however, can be made against her : the Court can only affect her separate estate in the hands of her trustees : she cannot bind her person at all, or her property generally, but only her separate property (m). This will be held liable for all the debts, charges, and incumbrances which she expressly charges, or which, judging from the nature thereof, it may be fairly inferred that she intended to charge on her sepa- rate estate, and for her breaches of trust, except so far as she is prevented by being restrained from anticipation (n). And hence, if she gives a promissory note, or an acceptance, or a bond to pay her own debt, or if she joins in a bond with her husband to pay his debts, without reference to her separate estate, it will be intended as an application pro tanto of her separate estate ; because the security must have been executed with the intention that it should operate in some way, and it can have no operation except as against her separate estate. And if she employs a lawyer upon (k) Proudley t. Fielder, 2 My. & Vaughan v. Vanderstegen, 2 Drewry, K 57. 179—184 ; BJatchford v. Woolley, 2 {I) See supra, p. 1119. Dr. & Sm. 204. (m) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1397, and (n) Clire v. Carew, 1 Johns. & note, and 1400, note ; 2 Spence's Hem. 199. And see Johnson v. Eq. Jur. 324, 325, 504, 515—518 ; Gallagher, 3 D. F. & J. 494 ; in re see remarks of Kindersley, V.-C, in Leeds Banking Co. h. E,. 3 Eq. 781. I THE avife's separate estate. 1143 her own responsibility, lier separate estate will T)e liable, pt.iv. t. i iroiii the nature of the engagement. But it would seem that her separate estate would not be liable for debts of an ordinary character, for which she gives no security, unless, at least, she is divorced or judicially separated. For she may, and in general must, be presumed to have intended that these should be paid by her husband. And in no case will the Court charge the corpus of the separate estate in respect of her general obligations (o). Unless contrary to the deed of settlement of the company, a married woman may be a shareholder in a joint-stock company in her own right, so as to bind her sejDarate estate (p). It has been held that where she has a life interest to her separate use, with a general power of appointment by will over the remainder, she does not, by exercising the power, make the remainder applicable to the discharge of such en- gagements as would bind her separate property, unless she has been guilty of fraud (q). VII. A covenant by an intended husband alone, to settle vri. a cove- nant to any property to which his intended wife or he in her right settle pro- might become entitled during the coverture, will not affect ^ttj^^l^jt property subsequently given to her separate use (?'). And orafter-^*^'' although an ante-nuptial settlement purports to give the separate husband a life interest in aU property which the wife might acquire during the coverture, yet the husband will take no interest in property afterwards given for her separate use (s). (o) See Story's Eq. Jur. g 1398— No. 2), 28 Beav. 354 ; Blatchford v. 1401, and notes ; 2 Spence's Eq. Woollci/, 2 Dr. & Sm. 204, Shattock SIS, 516, and notes. v. ShaUod; L. R. 2 Eq. 182. {p) In re Leeds Banhiny Co. L. R. (?•) Travcrs v. Travera, 2 Beav. 3 Eq. 781. 179 ; Grey v. Stmrt, 2 Gif. 398. {q) Vaughan v. Vanderstegen, 2 (s) Duncan v. Caiman, 21 Beav. Drewry, 165, 363 ; Hobday v. Peters, 307. estate. 1144 THE wife's equity to a settlement. Section VI. The Wife's Equity to a Settlement or Maintenance out of her oiun Property (t). pt. IV. T. 1, I. Trustees of a married wonian's personalty, not settled Ch. 3, s. 6. J. J ' to her separate use, may pay it over to her husband before I. Powei" of trustees of Chancery ]3roceedings are taken in respect of it. But, on nor^euied to ^^^® othcr hand, they may refuse to pay it over to him, even Sse.^*^^^'*'^ at his wife's request, unless he make a settlement, where the Court would require him to make one (u). Equity of the Witli regrard to cases where the Court requires a settle- witf, wliea deiendant, meut, if the wife has real property, or the absolute interest against her husband, in personal property (with the exception, perhaps, of a term for years), which cannot be reduced into the pos- session of tlie husband without a suit in equity (as where the legal property is vested in trustees), and the husband applies to a Court of equity for the purpose of reducing the property into his possession ; the Court, acting upon the maxim that he who seeks equity must do equity, will not give it up to him, without requiring him to make a suitable settlement of a part of the property, or of some other property, for the due maintenance of his wife in case of her surviving him (»'), witli a provision for the issue of mamage (y), even though the property is under £200 (z), unless the wife and children are already amply provided for under a prior settlement (a), or the right to a settle- (t) See Gleaves v. Paine, 1 D. J. v. Siddall, 3 D. F. & J. 271. & S. 87. (y) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1406 ; 2 (m) Hill on Trustees, 409, 410, Spence's Eq. Jur. 488. 415; Jie Swan, 2 Hem. & Mil. 34. (2) In re Cutler, 14 Beav. 220; (a;) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1404, 1405, Re Kincaid's Trust, 1 Drewry, 326. 1410, 1418; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. (a) Story's Eq. Jur. §1416; Spi- 482, 484. See Life Assoc, of Scoil. cer v. Spicer, 24 Beav. 365. THE wife's equity TO A SETTLEMENT. 1145 ment is waived or lost (h). In the absence of a contract to pt- iv- t- i. ^ ' Cn. 3, 8. 6. that effect, an inadequate settlement, even before marriage, of a part of the wife's property does not deprive her of her right to a settlement out of the residue of her property, though vested in her at the time of the marriage (c). This equity of the wife exists in the case of a charge on land for her benefit, even though there be a power of entry and receipt of the rents and profits (d). If the husband does not choose to make a settlement or Refusal of the husband provision for the wife, the Court will not ordinarily take *« m-ike a •t "^ settleuient. from him the income and interest of his wife's fortune, so long as he is willing to live with and maintain her, and there is no reason for their living apart. Under such cir- cumstances, the Com-t secures the fund, so as to give her the chance of taking it by survivorship, allowing the hus- band, under its order, to receive the income and interest, or a part of it at least (c). Where a woman is indebted at the time of her marriage, inrtebtedaesa of wife ou she has no equity to a settlement until her debts are pro- n^amage. videcl for (/). II. The assio-nees in bankruptcy or insolvency of a ir. Equity o '- '' ''of the wile, husband, and also his assignees for payment of debts due ^^en deiea- to his creditors generally, are bound to make a settlement ^7,Xaucrr ou the wife out of her immediate clioses in action, and immediate, absolute, equitable interests in chattels per- sonal assigned to them, in the same way, and under the same circumstances, as he would be bound to make one ; for it is a general principle that such assignees take the property subject to all the equities which affect the bank- rupt or insolvent or general assignor. Such assignees also (6) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1418, 1419 ; Beav. 472 ; 2 D. F. & J. 509. infra, 1106—7. (c) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1415 ; see (c) Barrow v. Barrow, 18 Beav. 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 490, 491. 529. (/) Barnard v. Ford, L. K. 4 Ch. {d) Duncomhe v. Greenacrc, 28 Ap. 247. assiETQees. 1146 THE wife's equity to a settlement. ■'cn^r Je^' ^^-^^ ^•'^^ propei-ty subject to the wife's riglit of survivor- ship, in case the husband dies before the assignees have reduced her cliosos in action and equitable interests into possession ((/). And even a specific assignee or purchaser from the husband, for valuable consideration, of her ehoses in action and equitable interests, is bound to make such a settlement. And no assignment of them will convey any right to the assignee or purchaser against the wife, if she survives her husband, and they are not reduced into posses- sion in his lifetime (Ji). When an There is this distinction, however, between the case of imnudiite muiied" '^ ^^^® husband himself and his specific assignees for valuable consideration on the one hand, and the case of his as- signees in bankruptcy or insolvency, or assignees, for payment of debts generally, on the other hand, that in the case of the former, it is only necessary that the pro- vision for the wife should commence from the death of her husband ; whereas in the case of the latter, it is necessary that the provision should commence immediately, because the general assignment of his property renders him in- capable for a time, and perhaps for ever, of affording her a suitable support (i). Epfns.iiof If the assignees in bankruptcy, or other general assignees to make a claiming title under the husband, refuse to make a settle- ment on the wife, the like doctrine applies to them, as to the husband himself, when he refused to make a settlement (/). The husband can sell the life interest of his wife in personalty, and she has no equity to a settlement as against the purchaser {k). (y) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1411, 1421; 220. 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 476. (0 Story's Eq. Jur. § 1421. (A) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1412 ; 2 (/) Story's Eq. Jur. §1415 ; supra, Spence's Eq. Jur. 476 ; Scvtt v. p. 1103. Spaskett, 3 Mac. & Gord. 604 ; (k) Re Duffy's Trust, 28 Beav. Prole V. Soadi/, L. 11. 3 Ch. Ap. 386. THE wife's equity to a settlement. 1147 III. AVhenever the wife, as defendant, would be entitled pt- iv. t. i, Ch. 3. 8. 6. to an equity for a settlement, out of her eqidtable interest, III. E(|uity against her husband or against his assignees, she may assert "*/•>'* ^'!e. O " O > J whe.i plaiu- it, as plaintiff or petitioner (/). ^L^'rftol TV. The Court has a full discretion as to the amount to her hus^-"' "" be settled, according to the circumstances of each case (m). bankiuptcy, ' . or iiisulvency. In the absence of special circumstances, however, the iv. Amount general rule or the common course has been to settle about one-half on the wife and her children (n), with remainder, in default of issue, to the husband or his assignees (o). But where particular reasons have occurred, the Court has fi'equently settled the whole : as in Marshall v. Fotder {p), where the husband had taken the benefit of the Insolvent Debtors' Act, and was moreover almost entirely dependent on charity ; In re Kincaid's Trust (q), and Ward v. Yates (r), where the husband was a bankrupt, and the fund was under £200 — so small a sum that it would not have been worth while to have made any settlement at all, unless the whole had been settled ; In re Cutler (s), and in Watson v. Marshall (f), and in Francis v. Brook- ing {u), Koeher v. Sturgis (x), Squires v. Ashford {y), Duncomhe v. Greenacre (z), where the husband was an in- solvent debtor ; in Scott v. Spashctt {a), where, besides other special circumstances, the husband had received about (0 story's Eq. Jur. § 1414 ; 2 (o) Spirctt v. Wilhivs, L. R. 1 Ch. Spence's Eq. Jur. 482, 484, 485 ; Ap. 520 ; 4 Ch. Ap. 407 ; In re Walker v. Druri/, 17 Beav. 482; Suggitt'sTriists,li.R. '^Ch. K^.2l^. Gleaves t. Pain, 1 D. J. & S. 87 ; {p) 16 Beav. 249. Re. Ford, 32 Beav. 621. {q) 1 Drew. 326. {m) Waller v. Di-ury, 17 Beav. (»•) 1 Drew. «fe Sm. 80. 482 ; Smith v. Smith, 3 Gif. 121. (s) 14 Beav. 220. i^n) Napier v. Napier, 1 Dru. & (<) 1 W. R. 523. W. 410 ; Bagshaw v. Winter, 5 De («) 19 Beav. 347. G. & Sm. 466 ; M'Cormich v. Gar- (x) 22 Beav. 588. nett, 2 Sm. & G. 37 ; 5 D. M. & G. {y) 23 Beav. 132. 278 ; Re Grove's Trusts, 3 Gif. 583 ; (z) 28 Beav. 472 ; 29 Beav. 578 ; 2 Speiiee'.s Eq. Jur. 485 ; 1 Bright, Newman v. Wilson, 31 Beav. 34. Husb. aud Wife, 241 {a) 3 Mae. & Cord. 599. 1148 THE WIFE S EQUITY TO A SETTLEMENT. Pt. IV. T. 1, Ch. 3, s. 6. V. Limita- tions ol the settlement. VI. Substi- tute for a settlemeut where fund is &uiall. VII. Wife's equity waived : double the amount of the wife's property under a pre- vious order, and no settlement had ever been made ; in Dunhley v. Dunkhji (b), Vcmglian v. Buclc (c), and Gent V. Harris (d), where the husband had become bankrupt, and had deserted his wife ; and In re Wclchman (e), where the husband was a bankrupt, and had no means of main- taining his v/ife and child. V. Wliere a settlement is made to give effect to a wife's equity to a settlement, in the absence of special circum- stances, the limitations, in the event of her predeceasing the husband and of there being no issue of the marriage who should attain a vested interest, ought not to be upon such trusts as the wife shoidd appoint, and, for want of appointment, for her next of kin ; for the husband's right is only subject to the equity of the wife herself and her issue (/). VI. To avoid the expense of a settlement, where the fund allowed to the wife is small, it will sometimes be ordered to be brought into Court, or, if already in Court, it will be retained there, and the dividends directed to be paid to the wife for her life (g). VII. The Court will not insist on a settlement on the wife, if, at any time before a settlement under the decree is completed, or at least before proposals are made under the decree, the wife, by her consent given in open Court or under a commission, agrees that the absolute fund shall be wholly and absolutely paid over to her husband, except in tlie case of a female ward" of the Court of Cliancery who has married without its authority (//). But until the (6) 4 De G. & S. 570 ; 2 D. M. & (ff) Bagshaw v. Winter, 5 De G. G. 390. (c) 1 Sim. (N. S.) 284. (rf) 10 Hare, 383. (e) 1 Gif. 31. (/) Carter v. Tarjrjart, 1 ]). & M. &286. Watson V. Marshall, 17 Walker v. Drury, 17 & Sin. 466 ; Beav, 363 Beav. 482. (A) Story's Eq. Jiir. § 1418 ; 2 Spcnce's Eq. Jur. 48(), 488. THE wife's equity to a settlement. 1149 transfer to the husband has actually been made, the wife pt. iv. t. i, *' Ch. 3, B. 6. can revoke her consent (i). The equity of the wife to a settlement may be lost or or lost or i- '^ " suspeudeci. suspended by her own misconduct. Thus, if the wife (not being a ward of Court married without its consent) should be living in adultery, apart from the husband, a Court of equity will not direct a settlement, on her own application, as it otherwise would ; because, by such misconduct, she has rendered herself unworthy of the protection and favom* of the Court. On the other hand, in such a case, a Court of equity will not decree such equitable property to be paid over to the husband, on his application ; for when the wife is living apart from him, he is at no charge for her mainte- nance ; and it is only in respect to his duty to maintain her, that the law gives him her fortune. And in the case of a female ward of Court married without its consent, the Court will insist on a settlement, as a punishment to the husband for contempt of its authority (J). We must, however, be careful to distinguish an applica- tion which is grounded merely on general principles of equity, and an application grounded on positive vested rights under a settlement or under a valid contract for a settlement made before marriage. In the latter case, Courts of equity cannot refuse to protect or support those vested rights, on account of any misconduct in the wife (k). A woman may, by her fraud, even though perpetrated imder her husband's compulsion, preclude herself from asserting against a purchaser that equity to a settlement which she would otherwise possess (/). We have seen that the Court, in making a settlement waiver of provisiou on the wife, properly attends to the mterests of the chil- »or the cMldien. ((■) Penfold X. Mould, L. R. 4 Eq. Jur. 4S6. 562. {k) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1420. (j) Story's Eq. Jur. §1419, and (l) hire Lush's Trusts, L. R. 4 note, and 1419 a; 2 Spence's Eq. Ch. Ap. 591. 1150 THE wife's equity to a settlement. pt. IV. T. 1, (Iren. But it must be observed, that the Court attends to Cu. 3, 8. 6. ' their interest only upon the supposition, that, in so doing, it is carrying into effect her own desire to provide for her offspring. They have no independent equity of their own ; for although the husband is under a moral obliga- tion to provide for them, yet he is not bound to provide for them in any particular way or out of any particular fund. They have only a claim to the consideration of the Court constituting part of the equity of their mother, and capable of being either expressly given up by her before the amount is ascertained, or tacitly waived by her dying without having asserted it {m). And it has been held that if she dies before decree, even without waiving the right to a settlement, the children cannot enforce their claim {n). a seurenfent "^^ ^^^^ ^^^^' °^ Scotlaud, a married woman has no equity Tre'^domidied to a Settlement ; and if husband and wife are domiciled in CO ail . ggQ^2r^ji(;i^ g]^Q l^rj^g HQ equity to a settlement (o), even out of the produce of real estate in England du'ected to be sold {])). But still, if she is a ward of Court, the Court, before parting with her funds to her husband, will take care that a proper provision is made for her, imless the property is small, and it does not seem expedient that a settlement should be made {q). oVtbewlSo "^m- Although Courts of equity do not claim any na"c",'i^"case general jurisdiction to decree a suitable maintenance for husband's the wife, out of her husband's property, when he has misconduct, i -n or bank- dcsertcd or ill-treated her, yet, whenever the wife has an ruptry, or "^ insolvency. e(j[uitable property, even though it be only for her life, within the reach of the jurisdiction of Courts of equity, and the husband has deserted, or ill-treated, or refused to (m) See Story's Eq. Jur. § 1417 ; M. & G. 278. 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 488—492. {p) Hltchcoch v. Clundmcn, 12 (m) Wallace v. Auldjo, 2 Dr. & Beav. 534. Sm. 216 ; 1 D. T. S. 643. {q) In re Tweedale's Settlement, 1 (^o) M'Curmkk v. Gurndt, 5 D. Johns. 109. THE wife's equity to a settlement. 1151 maintain her, they will decree a suitable and immediate pt. iv. t. i, •^ On. 8, B. 6. maintenance out of such equitable property, or, if it has passed into the possession, of a bona fide purchaser with- out notice, out of other property of the husband ; because the obligation of maintaining the wife is the ground on which the law gives her property to the husband (r). And where the wife has an equitable interest, for life only, and the husband is a bankrupt or insolvent, and therefore, as a general rule, is deprived, for a time at least, of the means of duly maintaining her, she is entitled to an allow- ance for maintenance out of such life interest, as against the assignees (s). But a married woman, even though her husband does not maintain her, is not entitled, as against a particular assignee for a valuable consideration of the husband, to an allowance for maintenance out of the income of real or personal estate to which she is entitled in equity for her life only ; because, if she were, purchasers would be involved in inquiries respecting the relations between hus- band and wife, and their other property and sources of maintenance ; and the life interests of married women would become incapable of being dealt with, whatever might be th^ exigencies of the case (t). Section VII. So7ne Points respecting Deeds of Separation. Wliere, in a separation deed, the wife covenants to save pt. iv. t. i, and keep indemnified the husband against the debts which she had contracted at the time of making the indenture, or which she shoidd thereafter during the separation con- (r) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1408, 1422, note. 1424, 1426, 1408, note. {t) Tlddv. Lister, 10 Hare, 151, (5) Story's Eq. Jur, §. 1 412, 1408, 153 ; 3 D. M. & G. 857. 1152 DEEDS OF SEPARATION. pt. IV. T. 1, tract, this covenant includes debts previously contracted by Ch. 3, s. r. i J J tlie wife for necessaries wliile living witli the husband (it). A deed of separation containing no covenant on the part of a trustee to indemnify the husband against the wife's debts, is not void on that account [sc). And if a deed of separation contains a covenant by the husband to pay an annuity to a trustee for the wife, but no covenant to in- demnify the husband against the wife's debts, the husband's covenant may be enforced against him or his executors, but, being voluntary, not against his creditors {y). And an agreement by the husljand to pay an annuity for his wife is voluntary, notwithstanding an agreement by her to in- demnify her husband in respect of debts on account of her- self or her child, although she have separate estate, if she is restrained from anticipation {£). Wlien a deed of arrangement is entered into between husband and wife, by which, in consideration of the dis- continuance of a suit against the husband for a divorce, and of certain proceedings for obtaining a provision for the wife and her children, it is agreed that the wife is to have an income independent of her husband, for maintaining an establishment for herself and her children, of which the husband is enabled to partake, and for educating and cloth- ing her children ; such a deed is not contrary to the policy of law, or otherwise void, but is one which a Court of equity will enforce («). As a deed of separation cannot dissolve the marriage, it does not relieve the wife from any of the ordinary dis- abilities of coverture (h). A deed of separation entered into between the husband («) Summers v. Ball, 8 M. & W. 174. 596. (s) Walrond v. Walrond, 1 Johns. (aj) Frampton v. Frampton, 4 18. I Beay. 287, (a) Jodrell v. Jodrell, 9 Beav. 45. ■ (y) Clough V. Lambert, 10 Sim. {h) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1428. DEEDS OF SEPARATION. 1153 and wife alone, without the intervention of a trustee, is pt. iv. t i, ' Ch. 3, 8. 1. utterly void (c). A covenant for separation, whether immediate or future, is void. But the Court of Chancery may compel parties, in pursuance of articles of separation entered into between them, to execute a formal deed of separation, quantum valeat, unless in the meantime they agree to live together. And it would seem that if a deed for immediate, and not for future, separation contains a covenant by the husband to maintain his wife, and a covenant by the trustees to exonerate him from any debts contracted for her main- tenance, such covenant will be enforced so long as the separation lasts ; but it will not be enforced for a longer period, even as to past separation [d). A contract in a separation deed cannot affect the pro- perty of the wife, if not settled to her separate use, or reduced into possession during the coverture (c). The Court will interfere to prevent the doing of any per- sonal acts which, if done, would be in violation of an agree- ment respecting property entered into on the separation (/). And where by articles of separation it is agreed that the husband shall permit his wife to live separate, and as if unmarried, without any molestation, interference, or annoy- ance whatever, and that a proper deed shall be executed for effectuating the object of the articles, and containing all such covenants, &c., as should be deemed expedient for that purpose ; this justifies the insertion, in the deed, of a covenant that the husband will not compel or endeavour to compel the wife, by judicial proceedings or otherwise, to cohabit or live with him. And such a covenant is enforce- able by action or injunction [g). (c) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1428. (e) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 532. (d) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1428 ; 2 (/) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 532 ; Spence's Eq. Jur. 528 ; Wilson v. Wilson v. Wihon, 1 H. L. Cas. 528 ; Wilson, 1 H. L. Cas. 538 ; 5 Id. 51, Saunders v. Rodway, 16 Beav. 702. 61, 62. {g) Wihon v. Wilson, 5 H. L. 1154 DEEDS OF SEPAEATION. pt. IV. T. 1, Eeconciliation puts an end to a deed of separation, as it Ch. 3, s. r. must not be permitted to parties to make agreements for themselves to hold good whenever they choose to live separate (Ji). If a wife induces her husband to execute a deed of sepa- ration in contemplation by her of her renewal of an illicit intercourse, the deed is void (^). Section VIII. Some Miscellaneous Points. Pt. IV. T. 1, A power of advancement will not iustify trustees in Ch. 3, s. 8. ^ ■) J advancing the share of a married daughter for the purpose Advance- . ° ° ^ ^ ment. of paying her husband's debts (/). Revocation Whcrc a lady's fortune, by the advice of her friends, has of a settle- j ' J ment. bccu Settled upon trust for her, "her executors, adminis- trators, and assigns," until the marriage, and afterwards for her, her husband and children, the intended husband and wife cannot revoke the settlement without consulting her friends, so as to entitle him after the marriage to the fund so settled (k). Barring the A woiuau may be barred, by the express words of her wile 8 share "^ ' •/ l ot personalty, settlement, of her share of the personal estate of her hus- band under the Statute of Distributions in the event of his intestacy. And where a certain sum was settled in trust for an intended wife, "as and for her jointure, in full lieu, Cas. 40, 51, 52, 60—3, 71, 72. And (/) Era-ns \. Cnirhujton, 2 D. P. see remarks of V.-G. Wood, ia & J. 481. Stocker v. Wedderhurn, R K. & J. {j) Talbot v. Marslifidd, L. E. 3 403 ; Hunt v. Hunt, 31 Beav. 89 ; Ch. Ap. 622. 4 D. F. & J. 221. (^0 Page v. Home, 11 Beav. 227. Qi) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 532. OF MARRIED WOMEN, 1155 bar, and satisfaction of any dower or thirds which she pt- iv. t. i, ' -^ Ch. 3, 8. 8. could or might claim at common law out of all or any of the estates, real, personal, or freehold," of her intended husband, and he died intestate and without issue, it was held that this barred her claim to a moiety of his personal estate under the Statute of Distributions ; the words "common law" meaning the general law, and not the common law as opposed to the statute law (l). By the dissolution of marriage, the husband loses all iff of •J o rights on those rights which he would otherwise acquire jure mariti mardaie*!" "^ after that time. And hence, if the divorced wife dies be- fore she has reduced a chose of action into possession, the divorced husband will have no right, either as her adminis- trator or otherwise (7n). By the stat. 22 & 23 Vict. c. 61, s. 5, " the Court, after a ^owerot ■^ Divorce final decree of nullity of marriage or dissolution of mar- ^™j'^ ^°((.jg^ riage, may inquire into the existence of ante-nuptial or p^p'^^'^^- post-nuptial settlements made on the parties whose mar- riage is the subject of the decree, and may make such orders with reference to the application of the whole or a portion of the property settled either for the benefit of the children of the marriage or of their respective parents, as to the Court shall seem fit." (l) Gurly T. Gurly, 8 CI. & Fin. Jurisprudence," 9th ed. 743. Much offhis Chapter is taken (m) Wilkinson \. Gibson, L. R. 4 from the writer's " Manual of Equity Eq. 162. 1156 CHAPTEE IV. OF INFANTS. paet V. By the stat. 12 Car. 2, c. 24, s. 8, a father of an immarried T. 1, Ch. Appiiiiitment ol guai'dian. legitimate child may by deed or will appoint any person, in possession or remainder, except a Popish recusant, to be a guardian, until such child shall attain the age of twenty- one years, or for any less time. And by the same section, a father might by will, as he may still by deed, make such an appointment, though not himself of full age ; but by the stat. 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 7, no will made by any person under the age of twenty-one years shall be valid. By s. 9 of the stat. 12 Car. 2, the authority of the guardian so appointed is to extend to the custody of the profits of the real estate, and the custody, tuition, and management of the personal estate of the ward. A mother cannot appoint a guardian. Nor can a father make a valid appointment of a guardian to his natural child. If, however, he does nominate a person to be guar- dian, the Court of Chancery will appoint such person to that office (a). Section I. Of the Acts which an Infant may or may not do. I"'- ij- T. 1, If a conveyance, &c., is made to an infant, the deed becomes void, in case he, when adult, disagrees to it, or in Convpyance ' o ' to an iniaut. ^g^gg j^^g ]jg^j^. disagrees after his death, where he died during (a) 11 Jarm. & Bytli. by Sweet, 2.5, 34 ; Maepherson on Infants, 83, 431, 432 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 460. ACTS AN INFANT MAY OR MAY NOT DO. 1157 his minority, or died after he came of age without having ^ch^I's.i?' agreed to it (h). Infants may, even at law, bind themselves, under certain contracts. circumstances, by contracts for necessaries suitable to their degree and quality, and may bind themselves by acts which the law requires them to do (c). But, in general, where a contract may be either for the benefit or to the prejudice of an infant, he may avoid it, as well at law as in etiuity. Wliere it can never be for his benefit, it is utterly void (d). An infant may purchase real property, because it may Purchases. be for his benefit ; yet upon his attaining his full age, he may either agree or disagree to it without showing any cause ; and so may his heir if he dies under age or without ha\dng agreed to it (e). And if an infant enters into a contract for the purchase of an estate, he cannot enforce it in equity, because the remedy is not mutual (/). An infant cannot, at common law, alien his estate, unless AHenation by force of a custom, not even if a special power is given him (g). But the owner of gavelkind land may alien by feoffment at the age of fifteen years (7t). By the stat. 17 Geo. 3, c. 26, s. 6, and 53 Geo. 3, c. 141, coutracts for "^ ' ' annuities s. 8, it is enacted, that all contracts for the purchase of any annuity with an infant shall be utterly void. An infant, like a feme covert, may at common law do Esecutioh of powers, &c. any act where he is a mere instrument, and his interest is not concerned (i). Thus an infant is capable of executing a bare authority (j). But an infant cannot sell an estate {b) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 70 ; Watk. cise View, 541 ; 2 Bl. Com. 292 ; Couv. Srd ed. by Prest. 243. Co. Lit. 2 b. (c) Story's Eq. Jur. § 240 ; Co. (/) Sugd. Concise View, 149. Litt. 172 a; Burton, § 199. And see (j/) 1 Sugd. Pow. 211 ; Co. Litt. Smith's Common Law Manual, Srd 171 b, n. (5). ed. 57—8, (h) 2 Bl. Com. 84 ; Co. Litt. 171 (d) Story's Eq. Jur. § 241 ; Bur- b, n. (5). ton, § 199. (i) 1 Sugd. Pow. 211. (c) 4 Cruise, T. 32, c, 26, § 6 ; 2 (./) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 13, § 28 ; Pres. Shep. T. 235, 285 ; Sugd. Con- 2 Sugd. Pow. 7th ed. 537—541 ; 1 1158 ACTS AN INFANT MAY OR MAY NOT DO. Pt. IV. T. 1, Ch. 4, s. 1. Presenting to a benefice. Fine or recovery. Feoflfment. Dt-ed taking eSe:t by delivery. Admittance to copyl)old3. Surrendering leases and taking new ones. Accepting surrenilers of le^'ses aud granting new ones. Granting lea>es of estates of infants. devised or conveyed to liini in trust to sell ; for a testator or grantor cannot confer upon an infant a capacity of discretion in the way of contract which the law does not give him (/■). An infant of the most tender age may present to a benefice ! (/). If a fine or recovery by an infant was once admitted (except in the case of a recovery suffered by attorney), it could not be reversed withtnit a personal examination of the party by the Court during the continuance of his minority (7n). If an infant makes a feoffment and gives livery of seisin in person, it is not void, but only voidable (;)i). And even a deed which takes effect by delivery, without an additional ceremony, if executed by an infant, is voidable only, and not void, at least if it is for his benefit (o). By the stat. 1 Will. 4, c. 65, ss. 3 — 8, infants may be admitted to copyhold estates, by their guardians or at- torneys (j:>). By ss. 12 and 15 of the same Act, infants or their guardians may, by order of the Court of Chancery, sur- render leases, and take new leases, to the same uses, and liable to the same trusts, charges, incumbrances, disposi- tions, and conditions as the leases surrendered. By ss. 16, 18, 20, and 21, infants, or if they are out of the jurisdiction, some other person, by order of the Court of Chancery, may accept surrenders of leases and execute new leases. By s. 17, by direction of the Court of Chancery, an infant, or his guardian in his name, may grant leases Jarm. Wills, 2iid ed. 80; Walk. Conv. 3rd ed. by Prest. 246. (k) King v. Bdlord, 1 Hem. & Mil. 343. (/) 3 Cruise T. 21, c. 2, § 24; Burton, § 200 ; Co. Litt. 89 a, n. (1), aud 172 a. («() burton, § 19S. (h) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 4, § 23 ; Burton, § 199. {o) Allen V. AUen, 2 D. & W. 307. (p) See supra, p. 965. ACTS AN INFANT MAY OR MAY NOT DO. 1159 of any land belonging to him, when it is for his benefit ; P'^iy. x.^i. but no fine or premium is to be taken ; and the best rent that can be obtained is to be reserved ; and the leases are to be settled and approved of by a Master, and a counterpart executed by tlie lessee, and deposited in the Master's office, until the infant attains his majority. But no lease is to be made of the capital mansion-house and the park and grounds held therewith for any period ex- ceeding the infant's minority. And the Court of Chancery has no jurisdiction under this statute to lease an infant's estates, unless the infant is indefeasibly seised either in fee or in tail in possession (q). We have seen, however, that by the stat. 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, additional leasing powers are given in the case of infants (r). Independently of these enactments, it was a rule that an infant could not make a lease of his lands, unless it was evidently beneficial to him (s). Hence, if an infant is seised of land in fee simple, and he makes a lease for years of it, rendering no rent, this lease is void, unless the lease is for the purpose only of trying the title by ejectment. But if there is a rent reserved upon the lease, then the lease is but voidable, and may, by the acceptance of the rent after his full age, be made good (f). By the 1 Will 4, c. 65, s. 26, a guardian, with the appro- Agreements . on behalf of bation of the Court of Chancery, may enter into agreements infants. for or on behalf of the infant. Bv the stat. 18 & 19 Vict. c. 4:?>, s. 1, it is enacted, that. Marriage " settlements. " from and after the passing of this Act, it shall be lawful for every infant upon or in contemplation of his or her marriage, with the sanction of the Court of Chancer}^, to make a valid and binding settlement or contract for a ^^1 Ex parte Leyh, 15 Sim. 445. Burton, § 199. ()•) See supra, p. 689, 690. (t) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 268. (s) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 5, § 66 ; 1160 ACTS AN INFANT MAY OE MAY NOT DO. pt. IV. T 1, settlement of all or any part of liis or lier property, or property over which he or she has any power of appoint- ment, whether real or personal, and whether in possession, reversion, remainder, or expectancy; and every conveyance, appointment, and assignment of such real or personal estate, or contract to make a conveyance, appointment, or assignment tliereof, executed by such infant, with the approbation of the said Court, for the purpose of giving effect to such settlement, shall be as valid and effectual as if the person executing the same were of the full age of twenty-one years : Provided always, that this enactment shall not extend to powers of which it is expressly declared that they shall not be exercised by an infant." But by s. 2, it is provided, " that, in case any appointment under a power of appointment or any disentailing assurance shall have been executed by any infant tenant in tail under the provisions of this Act, and such infant shall afterwards die under age, such appointment or disentailing assurance shall thereupon become absolutely void." And by s. 4, it is further provided, "that nothing in this Act contained shall apply to any male infant under the age of twenty years, or to any female infant under the age of seventeen years." By s. 3, the sanction of the Court may be given upon a petition. Before this enactment a male infant could not bind him- self by a settlement of his real or personal estate ; nor could the property of a female infant be bound, except so far as regards a settlement of personal estate not given for her separate use («). An infant canuot in general execute a letter of at- torney (.«). An exchange of corporeal hereditaments made between Letter of attorney. Exchange. (m) Macphersonon Infants, .5] 9— (x) 1 Pres. Sliep. T. 217 ; Burton, 527 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 2, § 21 ; 1 § 201. But see Watk. Conv. 3rcl Cru. T. 7, c. 1, § 31. ed. by Prest. 242—3. ACTS AN INFANT MAY OR MAY NOT DO. 1161 an infant and another, is not void, but voidable only ; for pt. iv. t. i, the infant, at his full a^'e, or if he dies under aoe or with- out having agreed to it, his heir, may either affirm or avoid it as he may choose (?/). Under the old law, males of the age of fourteen years wiiia. and females of the age of twelve might make a will of personal property (z). But real estate could not be devised by an infant, unless by special custom (a). And by the stat. 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 7, it is enacted " that no will made by any person under the age of twenty-one years shall be valid." If an estate is made to an infant upon an express condi- Performance ^ •*• of condition. tion, the infant will be bound to perform it (&). Section II. Of Portions and Legacies to Infants. A portion is a pecuniary provision made for a child by pt. iv. t. i, a parent or person standing in loco parentis. -^ ^ ox What is a A legacy by a parent to a child is presumed to be a portion. portion, although it be not so expressed ; because providing for a child is a duty w^hich the relative situation of the parties imposes upon the parent. The duty which is im- posed upon the parent may be assumed by any other person, who for any reason thinks proper to place himself in that respect in the place of the parent ; and when that is so, the same presumptions will arise as in the case of a legacy or gift by a parent. There are some doctrines applicable to portions which would not be applied to a gift as between strangers (c). (y) 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 6, § 9 ; 2 {a) 6 Cruif3e T. 38, c. 2, § 5. Pres. Shep. T. 291, 299. (6) 2 Cruise T. 1-3, c. 2, § 17 ; Co, (2) 2 Bl. Com. 497 ; Co. Litt. 89 Litt. 2i6 b, 380 b. b, n. (6). (^c) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 394. 1162 Pi . IV. T. 1, Ch. 4, s. 2. Time for raising portions. Wliere portions or legacies are not t') be raisiid. Payment of legacy to an infant. OF PORTIONS AND LEGACIES TO INFANTS. If there is a limitation to the parent for life, with a term to raise portions at twenty-one or marriage, and the in- terests are vested, the portions must be raised at that age or on marriage, by sale or mortgage of the reversionary term, unless there is something to indicate an intention that the portions should not be raised until the term falls into possession (d). If the portions are not raiseable till the parent's death, they will not carry interest, except from that time, though they may have become vested previously, unless there is some clear indication of intent that they should carry interest in the meantime (c). If portions or legacies charged on land are made payable on an event personal to the party to be benefited, and such party dies before that event happens, the portion or legacy is not to be raised out of the land. But it is otherwise if the payment is postponed until the hap- pening of an event not referrible to the person of the party to be benefited, but to the circumstances of the estate out of which the portion or legacy is to be paid (/). Where a portion is charged on land, and no particular time is fixed for the vesting, if the child dies before the time when the portion is needed, the portion shall not be raised ; for it is reasonable that the land should be eased of the charge when the only motive for making the same is at an end (g). An executor cannot, without personal risk, pay the whole or any part of a legacy directly bequeathed to an infant, either to the child or to any person for his use (A). But by 36 Geo. 3, c. 52, s. 31, an 'executor may pay the legacy I (d) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 405 ; Coote Mortg. 3rd ed. § 131. {e) Massy v. Lloyd, 1 H. L. Cas. 248. (/) 2 Speuce's Eq. Jur. 39(>; Parker v. Hodgson, 1 Dr. & Sm. (g) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 398. (/() 1 Rop. T.eg. by White, 883. OF PORTIONS AND LEGACIES TO INFANTS. 1163 of an infant into the Court of Chancery, after deducting the '^^-J'^-^.l' duty, without suit, and when the legatee attains twenty- one he may petition for it (/). Section III. Of Maintenance. Let us first consider the law as it stood prior to the stat. pt. iv. t. i, ^ Ch. 4, s. 3. 23 & 24 Vict. c. 145, s. 26. • Law prior to "^Vhere a legatee is under age, and is a child of the tes- ^tat. 23 & 24 ° ° Vict. c. 145, tator, or one towards whom he has placed himself in loco ^ ^^• Where the parentis, and no maintenance or interest is given, there, legat.eisa ^ o ' ' child of the even though the legacy is contingent, interest will be al- tieLte°d'ar lowed to such legatee from the time of the death of the ^^^^' testator (_;'), or from the bu'th of the legatee, if the legatee was in ventre sa mere at the time of the father's decease {k). Where the legatee is a child of the testator, and mainte- nance or interest is given by the will, and the amount or rate is specified, the legatee will not in general be entitled to claim more than the maintenance or interest specified (/). AMiere, however, the amount specified is msufficient, and the legacy is vested, the Court will allow a reasonable maintenance, even though the surplus interest be directed to accumulate {m). Where legacies are sfiven to grandchildren of the tes- where the " 00 legatee is a tator, or to any class of infants who are strangers to the ^™°rau!r^r testator, upon a future or contingent event, and the will is silent as to interest or maintenance, aud there is a limita- tion over to others, the Court will allow interest in the shape of maintenance, if those other persons consent (m). (/) 1 Rop. Lej;. by White, 882. (X') 2 Rop. Leg. by White, 1260. (/) 2 Rop. Leg. by White, 1257, (I) 2 Rop. Leg. b} White, 1261. 1270, 1348 ; Mnrtin v. Martin, L. R. (m) 2 Rop. Leg. by White, 1262. 1 Eq. 369. (») 2 Rop. Leg. by Wliite, 1279. 1164 OF MAINTENANCE. Pt. IV. T. 1, Ch. 4, s. 3. Wliere acfuinulatiou is directed. Apportion- meut. Maintenaiice doppuds (in circum- stances and state of family. ■Rule where the father is able to iiiaiiitain his chUdreu. And wliere there is no limitation over, and all or some of the class of legatees must absolutely take the fund, there, all having an equal chance of taking, the Court will allow interest in the shape of maintenance, if the father of the legatees is not of ability to maintain them (o). Where a legacy is vested, but no maintenance is directed, the Court will order it, though the interest is directed to be accumulated (|)). Though a sum be directed to be paid periodically for maintenance, until the time for the payment of the portion, the child will be entitled to a proportionate part during the interval between the last periodical payment and that time (q). The Court is governed by a regard to the circumstances and state of the family to which the infant belongs, in respect to the allowance of any maintenance at all, and to the amount of such allowance. So that although there may be a trust for maintenance under which the whole income may be applied, yet the Court will not apply more of it than necessary, where the infants have other sources of income (7^). And if the father is able, out of his own property, to maintain the infant, the Court will ordinarily withhold all allowance from the property or income of the infant for his maintenance, even though there may be a power (as distinguished from a trust), in the settlement or will, at the discretion of the trustees, to appoint part of the income for the purpose of his maintenance and educa- tion (s). But if there is a contract on marriage, amounting to a trust, that property shall be applied for the mainte- nance and education of the children, the property must be applied, without reference to the ability of the father to (0) 2 Rop. Leg. by White, 1283. {p) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 462. (q) Story's Eq. Jar. § 470 ; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 462. (r) White v. Grane, 18 Beav. 571. (s) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1354 a, and note ; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 462, 466 ; 2 Hop. Leg. by White, 1292. OF MAIXTENANCE. 1165 maintain and educate tliem ; because the father has thereby ^J^^y^s^' contracted for such a benefit or relief to himself (t). And an allowance will not be withheld, though the father be of ability to mamtain the cliildren, if it would be a hardship upon him and injurious to others of his children who take no benefit under the will and are dependent on the father, by diminishing his means of maintaining them (u). And where the interest of children's legacies is given to a parent, to be applied for or towards their maintenance and education, there, in the absence of a contrary intention, the parent takes the interest subject to no account, pro- vided only that he or she discharges the duty of maintain- ing and educating the children in a competent manner. And the reference to " the accumulations, if any," will not afford an indication of a contrary intention, if it is capable of being referred to the case of the trustees themselves ap- plying the income for the maintenance and education of the children, instead of paying it over to the parent for that purpose (.»). But if the fund is given to the parent in trust for the maintenance of his children, though he is en- titled to apply it for that purpose, whatever may be his ability, he must account for the application, like any otlier trustee (y). If the infant is an eldest son, and the younger children liave no provision made for them, an ample allowance will be decreed to the infant, so that the younger children may be maintained ; and the Court will act in a similar way where the father or mother of the infant is in distress or narrow circumstances (z). (t) 2 Kop. Leg. by Wliite, 1297 ; 92 ; 11 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 11 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 662 ; 662 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 329. 2 Spcnce's Eq. Jur. 466—468 ; (y) H Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, Jtansome v. Burfjess, L. R. 3 Eq. 662. 773. (s) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1355 ; 2 (») 2 Eop. Leg. by White, 1293. Spcnce's Eq. Jur. 461, 462 ; 2 Rop. {x) Browne v. Paull, 1 Sim. (N.S.) Leg. by White, 1296. 1166 OF MAINTENANCE. pt. IV. T. 1, In the case of devises and bequests to a woman, in Ch. 4, 8. 3. ^ terms or in effect, for the support or benefit of her cliildren, Dovises and bequests to a qj. gf hersclf and her cliildren, there is often a question wdiiian lor •■■ or'for'h'irsdf whether she is to take a part of the beneficial interest ; aud ciiikhen. ^^^^ ^^ ^^^^ other hand, whether she is to take the beneficial interest, subject to a trust for her children, and what is tlie duration of such trust ; or whether she is to take the whole without any trust. All such questions should be excluded {a). In general, when the income of property is given to the mother of a family, for the maintenance of herself and her children, what is intended, is, that she shall receive the whole of the income, and shall maintain the children out of it, so long as they form part of her family. But in such a case, when a daughter marries, she loses the right to maintenance {h). A direction by will that the testator's widow shall receive all the income of his real and personal estate, and pay and apjjly the same to and for the use of herself and the children of their marriage, agreeable and according to her own discretion, during her life, confers upon the wife a discretionary power, which the Court will not disturb, so long as it is reasonably and honestly exercised (c). Effect of In the absence of indication to the contrary, the words SainienaDce, " maintenance, education, and bringing up," standing to- ediication, and bringing getlicr, liavc reference to minority only. But where a provision is made for " the maintenance and education " or " the maintenance, education, and bringing up " of a per- son during the life of another, such person is entitled to the benefit of the provision during the whole of that period (d) ; (a) For instances, see Gilbert v. cases referred to in n. (a). Bennett, 10 6\in. 371 ; Jiibber v. (c) Costabadie v. Costabadie, 6 Jubber, 9 Sim. 503 ; Thorp v. Owen, Hare, 410. 2 Hare, 607 ; In re Harris, 7 Excli. (cZ) Badham v. Mee, 1 Russ. & 344. My. 631 ; Bcnjnc v. Crowlher, 20 (,6) Bowden wLainy, 14 Sim. 113; I'eav. 400. 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 4()1, and sec OF MAINTENANCE. 1167 and it has been held that if such person dies before that pt. iv. t. i, _ ^ Ch. 4, 8. 3. period expires, liis representatives are entitled to the amount of the income accruing between his death and that of the person for whose life the provision was to last (('). And where the income of real or personal property- is directed to be applied for the " maintenance " or " the support " or " the maintenance and education " of a person, though at the time an infant, he is, generally speaking, entitled to the income during his life (/). " Education " includes maintenance. But a legacy given to a mother for " maintenance " of her children is not, by the terms of the bequest, applicable to their education. Where main- tenance is given during minority, as a general rule it does not cease on the marriage of the child (g). A direction that the testator's daughter shall reside with and be maintained by his son so long as she shall remain single, oidy entitles her to maintenance so long as he lives, and so long as she chooses to reside with him (/;). Where a testator bequeaths personal estate to trustees, amongst other things to pay and apply a certain sum in and upon the education of a child, this is an absolute legacy to the child, and he is entitled to have the whole at once severed from the testator's estate, with interest from the end of the first year after the death of the testator, and inA'ested for his benefit (i). And where a testator devised estates to trustees, in trust to pay, out of the rents, £300 a year for the maintenance, clothing, and education of his sou's children, during his son's life, and the son had three children, all of whom attained twenty-one, and then one died, it was held that the whole of the fund was not to be applied for the maintenance, (e) Webb v. KcUt/, 9 Sim. 469 ; 33 Beav. 474. Bayne v. Crowther, 20 Beav. 400. (r relatives. by something else in the deed or wiU itself, or unless the words cannot be satisfied by any other construction. And an illegitimate son will not take under the description of first-born son of his mother, though the testator weU knew that her son was illegitimate. Evidence cannot be received to prove that they were intended by the testator to be in- cluded in that description, otherwise than by showing that there were illegitimate children who had acquired the name and character of children by reputation, and showing the existence of other material circumstances, at the date of the will, conclusively proving that illegitimate children must necessarily have been intended (l). (Jc) 1 Eop. Leg. by White, 80 ; 2 Hammond, 26 Bea\^. 36 ; Medtvorth Pres. Shep. T. 235 ; 2 Jarm. Wills, v. Pope, 27 Beav. 71 ; Me Herbert's 2nd ed. 199, 204 ; Fratt v. Matthew, Trusts, 1 Johns. & Hem. 121 ; Re 22 Beav. 328. Standleys Estate, L. E. 5 Eq. 303 {I) 2 Pres. Shep. T. 237 ; 1 Eop. Clifton \. Goodhun, L. E. 6 Eq. 278 Le-. by White, 80 ; 2 Jarm. Wills, In re Wells' Estate, L. E. 6 Eq. 599 2nd cd. 181—197 ; Durrant v. Holt v. Tindrey, L. E. 7 Eq. 170. Friend, 5 De G. & S. 343 ; Gahb v. As to children of an illegitimate Prendergast, 1 K. & J. 439 ; Pvc child, see Allen v. Webster, 2 Gif. OverhiU's Ti-ust, 1 Sm. & Gif. 362 ; 177 ; Edmunds v. Fessey, 29 Beav. Leigh v. Byron, 1 Sm. & Gif. 486 ; 223 ; Barnet v. Tugwell, 31 Beav. Worts V. CubUt, 19 Beav. 421 ; Tug- 232. weU V. Scott, 24 Beav. 141 ; Kelly v. 1172 CHAPTEE VT. OF PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND. Paet IV. T. 1, Ch. 6. Contracts, or other acts of persons of unsound mind. CouTeyance by an insane person. Purchases by such a person. In the case of conti-acts or other acts, however solemn, of persons who are idiots, lunatics, or otherwise of unsound mind or of weak understanding, wherever, from the nature of the transaction, tliere is not evidence of entire good faith, or it is not seen to be just in itself or for the benefit of tliose persons, courts of equity will set it aside, or make it subservient to their just rights and interests. But where there is entire good faith, and the contract or other act is for the benefit of such persons, as to provide them witli necessaries, there courts of equity will uphokl it, as well as courts of law (a). Where a lunatic tenant in tail of copyholds executes a power of attorney authorising her attorney to procure her admission as tenant in tail, and then to surrender them and take a re-admission in fee, for the purpose of barring her entail, the estate tail is not barred (b). A person is not allowed to allege his own insanity to avoid a conveyance made by him when insane. But after his death, his heir or other person interested may take advantage of his incapacity and avoid the grant. And so, if a person purchases when insane, he cannot avoid the purchase himself; but if he dies insane, or does not after- wards, upon recovering his reason, agree to the purchase^ his heir may either waive or accept the estate at his option (c). And after a person is found a lunatic by inqui- (a) Story's Eq. Jur. § 227—229, 234 — 238 ; Longmate v. Ledger, 2 Gif. 157. (6) EUiot V. Ince, 7 D. M. & G. 475. (c) 2 Bl. Com. 291-2 ; Sugd. Concise View, 542 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 25, § 8 ; Co. Litt. 2 b, 247 b ; Litt. s. 406. OF PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND. 1173 sition, his committee may vacate the purchase. And as /*«^^,,^^'g the Sovereign has the custody of idiots upon office found, — he may annul a purchase by an idiot (d). AVhen, how- ever, a person apparently of sound mind and not known to be otherwise by the vendor, enters into a contract for the purchase of property, which is fair and bona fide, and which is executed and completed, and the property, the subject-matter of the contract, has been paid for and fully enjoyed, such contract cannot be afterwards set aside either by the alleged lunatic or those Avho represent him : espe- cially where the property cannot be restored so as to put the parties in their original position (e). It may here be remarked, that, before a person is found Presumption '' ' ' 1- of g^uity or a lunatic by inquisition, the presumption of law is in insanity. favour of his sanity ; but after that, the presumption is against his sanity. The finding of insanity by the jury therefore shifts the burden of proof, but it is not conclusi^^e on third persons (/). Madmen and lunatics, except during a lucid interval, wiiis of persons of idiots, or natural fools, and persons grown childish by unsouna reason of old age or disease, are incapable of making a will (g). And the onus probandi lies on the party setting up a will made during the subsistence of a commission of lunacy, to establish the fact of a complete or partial recovery of the testator, at. the time of gi\dng instructions for and executing the will (h). But if a person of sound mind makes his will, it is not revoked or aliected by his subsequent insanity (t). (d) Sugd. Concise View, 542. Prinsep and E. I. Company v. Dyce (c) Molton V. ^amroux, 2 Exch- Sombre, 10 Moore P. C. 232, 239, 487, 503, affirmed 4 Excli. 17 ; Sugd. 245—7. Concise View, 542 ; Phil. Lun., 17; {g) 2 Bl. Com. 497; 1 Jarm. Broom Com. 2nd ed. 538 ; Kosc. AVills, 2nd ed. 26. on Evid. 10th ed. 452; Chit. Con. (/i) Prinsep andE. I. Company v. 7th ed. 131—4 ; Ad. Con. 5th ed. Dyce Sombre, 10 Moore P. C. 232, 944—5 ; Sm. Con. 3rd ed. 294—7. 239, 245—7. {/) Snook V. Watts, 11 Beav. 105; (/) 1 Wms. Exors.4th ed.l8,n.'(i)). p P 2 1174 OF PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND. Pakt IV. T. 1, Ch. 6. Lunatics cauuot present. Powers conferred by the Lunacy Regulatiou Act, 1853, and by the statutes 18 Vict. c. 13, and 25 & 26 Vict. c. 86. Neither a limatio nor his committee can present to a church. But the Lord Chancellor, by virtue of the general authority delegated to him by the Crown, presents to all livings whereof lunatics are patrons (,/). By the statute 16 & 17 Vict. c. 70 (by which so much of the statute 1 Will. 4, c. 65, as relates to persons of un- sound mind, and parts of certain other Acts mentioned in the schedule, are repealed), certain enactments are made for the admittance of lunatics to copyhold property, by their committees, or by attornies appointed by the lord, and for the payment of the fines due thereon (ss. 108 — 112). The committees may surrender leases and accept renewals (s. 113) ; and the expenses of renewal may be charged on the leasehold property (s. 114) ; and every lease renewed shall " operate and be to the same uses, and be liable to the same trusts, charges, incumbrances, dis- positions, devices, and conditions, as the lease surrendered was subject to, or would have been subject to if the sur- render had not been made" (s. 115). The property of lunatics may also, by order of the Lord Chancellor, be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise disposed of, for payment of debts, or for future inaintenance, or for other expenses therein mentioned (ss. 116, 117). The expenses of improvements maybe charged on the lunatic's estate. (s. 118); and the surplus of monies to be raised under the previous sections will be of the same nature and character as the estate sold, mortgaged, charged, or disposed of (s. 119). Committees may, by order of the Lord Chancellor, sell, mortgage, let, divide, exchange, or otherwise dispose of land, in per- formance of contracts entered into prior to the lunacy (s. 122) ; and may, on a dissolution, by order of the Lord Chancellor, convey partnership property (s. 123) ; and committees, by the order of the Lord Chancellor, may also (i) 3 Cruise T. 21, c. 2, § 44. OF PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND. 1175 sell undmded shares of land, or make partition or ex- part i v. ^ T. 1, Cii. 6. changes (s. 124) ; may sell lauds for building purposes (s. 125) ; may dispose of business premises (s. 126) ; may dispose of undesirable leases or underleases (s. 127) ; may enter into certain agreements on behalf of lunatics (s. 128) ; may make leases and underleases (ss. 129 — 135); and may exercise powers vested in lunatics (ss. 136 — 138). Sections 129, 130, 131, of this Act are explained and amended by the stat. 18 Vict. c. 13, whereby the com- mittee of a lunatic tenant in tail is enabled, by order of the Lord Chancellor, to make leases so as to bind the lunatic and his heirs, and all persons claiming under the entail, or after the determination of, or in remainder or reversion expectant on the estate tail (k). By the stat. 25 & 26 Vict. c. 86, ss. 1—15, in the case of insane persons not found lunatic by inquisition, whose property does not exceed £1000 in value or £50 per annum, the Lord Chancellor may apply such property for such person's benefit in a summary manner. And by s. 16 the powers over the property of lunatics given by s. 116 of the preceding Act, are extended. (k) As to leases and sales of settled estates in which lunatics are inte- rested, see supra, pp. 689, 690. 1176 CHAPTER VII. OF ALIENS. Past IV. T. 1, Ch. r. Who are alleus. What aliens may acquire, and what they may hold. "With certain exceptions (a), a person born out of the Queen's dominions is an alien, until naturalised or made a denizen, unless such person's father is not attainted of treason, nor liable to its penalties if he should return home, nor in the actual service of any hostile prince or state, and is either a natural-born subject (&), or is the son of a natural- born subject, having the three other above-named qualifi- cations (c), or unless such person is the wife of a natural- born subject or naturalised person (d). By the common law, an alien may purchase, but he cannot hold any real estate or chattel real ; for if he pur- chase any real estate or chattel real, it will be forfeited to the Crown, on office found, or on the death of the alien, whichever shall first happen. A lease for years of a house for convenience of merchandize is an exception to this ; and though the stat. 32 Hen. 8, c. 16, s. 23, makes void all leases of houses or shops to an alien artificer or handicrafts- man, yet in favour of aliens this enactment has been con- (a) See Stamp's Index to the Sta- tute Law, tit. "Alien." (h) Stat. 7 Anne, c. 5, s. 5 ; 4 Geo. 2, c. 21. (c) Stat. 13 Geo. 3, c. 21 ; Burton, § 193 ; 3 Cruise T. 29, c. 2, § 13, 14. The words in the stat. 13 Geo. 3, c. 21, 8. 3, are to be read " aliens' duties, customs, and impositions," as in Raithby's ed., and not " aliens, duties, customs, and impositions," as in the quarto ed. of 1774 ; and therefore the grandchild of a natural- born subject, born out of the Queen's allegiance, is entitled to the benefit of the statute, in regard to holding lands as a natural -born subject, al- though he has not complied -with the foi'malities specified in the 3rd section, which only refers to fiscal charges on subjects and on aliens. Barrow v. Wadkin, 24 Beav. 327. (d) 7 & 8 Vict. c. 66, s. 16. OF ALIENS. 1177 strued very strictly (e). And further exceptions are created , ''art iv. by the stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c.66. By s. 3 of that Act, " every per- son now born, or hereafter to be born, out of her Majesty's dominions, of a mother being a natural-born subject of the United Kingdom, shall be capable of taking to him, his heirs, executors, or administrators, any estate, real or per- sonal, by devise, or purchase, or inheritance, or succession," And after enacting, by the 4th section, that " every alien, being the subject of a friendly state, shall and may take and hold by purchase, gift, bequest, representation, or otherwise, every species of personal property except chattels real," it is by s. 5 enacted, " that every alien now residing in, or who shall hereafter come to reside in, any part of the United Kingdom, and being the subject of a friendly state, may, by grant, lease, demise, assignment, bequest, representation, or otherwise, take and hold any lands, houses, or other tenements, for the purpose of residence or of occupation by him or her, or his or her servants, or for tlie purpose of any business, trade, or manufacture, for any term of years not exceeding twenty- one years, as fully and effectually to all intents and pur- poses, and with the same rights, remedies, exemptions, and privileges, except the right to vote at elections for members of parliament, as if he were a natural-born subject of the United Kingdom. Aliens may take under a will the produce of real estate Produce of real estate. thereby devised to trustees to be sold (/). Aliens cannot be seised to a use ; and therefore, if a con- Aliens not seised to veyance is made to an alien and a natural -born subject to uses. uses, the moiety of the alien, upon office found, becomes vested in the Crown (rick-earth, stone, or the like, where there are no pits open, unless for the reparation of buildings or the benefit of the estate. Where a lease is made of land, and mines are not mentioned in the lease, the tenant for life or years may work open mines, but may not dig for any new mine. And if there are open mines, a lease of the land, with the mines, will only give the right to work the open mines. But if there is no open mine, and the lease is of the laud with all mines, the lessee may open mines (h). A power to grant leases, without mentioning mines, does not authorize a lease of unopened mines (c). Where a power is given of leasing hereditaments, and the coal and minerals under them, together with or sepa- rately therefrom, in terms showing an intention that the lease shoidd extend to unopened mines, a clause that the lessees shall be punishable for waste, is repugnant and of no effect (d). 4. The conversion of one kind of land into another, as 4. changing t'he com.se uf the changing of meadow into arable, is also waste, because tusbandiy. it not only changes the course of husbandry, but also affects the evidence of the estate (e). (a) 1 Cruise T. 3, c. 2, § 80, 81. (c) Clegg v. Rowland, L. R. 2 Eq. (b) 1 Cruise T. 3, c, 2, § 14, 16 ; 160. 2 Bl. C!om. 282 ; Co. Litt. 53 b, {d) Daly v. BecMt, 24 Beav. 114. 54 b ; Yool on Waste, &c., 52—55 ; (c) 1 Cruise T. 3, c. 2, § IS ; 2 BL Barjotv. Bcujot, 32 Beav. 509 ; Clcyy Com. 182 ; Co. Litt. 53 b. V. Roivland, L. R. 2 Eq. 165. Q Q 2 1100 OF WASTE. Part IV. T. 2, Ch. 1. 6. Destruc- tion of heir-looms. 6. Waste as regards living creatures. 5. The destruction of heir-looms is waste (/). 6. Waste may also be committed in ponds, dove-houses, warrens, parks, and the like, by so reducing the number of creatures therein that there will not be sufficient for the reversioner {g). Waste, by tenants iu fee or in tail. Waste by tenants for ife. Waste by ecclesiasti- cal persons. II. Who may and 'ivho may not commit Waste. Tenant in fee or in tail has a right to commit every kind of waste ; so that even a bond to restrain him from com- mitting waste is void (//). A devisee in fee, subject to an executory devise over is dispunishable for ♦ legal waste, unless restrained from committing it. But he is liable for equitable waste ; and he may be restrained from committing legal waste by a ■clause of forfeiture {i). Tenants for life, whether their estates are created by deed or devise or by operation of law, are punishable or liable to be impeached for voluntary waste, unless their estates are made without impeachment for waste {j), or unless they are granted with partial powers to do waste (Tc). The Court of Chancery will not permit tenant for life, without impeachment of waste, to commit waste upon an estate which is decreed to be sold, in order that the money should be invested in the purchase of another estate to the same uses ; because in that case he would have the benefit of double waste {I). Bishops, parsons, vicars, and other ecclesiastical persons, being considered in most respects as tenants for life of the (/) 1 Cruise T. 3, c. 2, § 20. (r/) 2 Bl. Com. 281 ; Co. Litt. 53 a. (A) 1 Cruise T. 2, c. 1, § 32, 35 ; 2 Bl. Com. 115. (?■) Turner v. Wrtrjht, 2 D. F. & J. 234 ; Blake v. Peters, 1 De G. J. & S. U5. (i) 2 Bl. Com. 283, 122 ; Sea- gram V. Knight, L. R. 2 Ch. A p. 628. (k) 1 Cruise T. 3, c. 2, § 68. {I) 1 Cruise T. 3, c. 2, § 65, 66. OF WASTE. 1191 lands M'liich tliey hold jure ecclesiaj, are disabled from com- J'**' ^"v- J i ' T. 2, Ch. 1. iiiittiiig any kind of waste (m). By the stat. 35 Edw. 1, it is declared that parsons shall not presnme to fell trees growing in the churchyard, but when the chancel or the body of the church requires reparations {n). Tenant for years may not commit any kind of waste, waste by unless liis lease is made without impeachment for waste (o). years. Tenants at will may not commit any kind of voluntary waste by "^ tenants at Avaste. But they are not punishable for permissive waste ; "iu for they are not bound to repair {p). One tenant in common has no right to commit any waste by teuauts in waste of the nature of destructive waste {(]). common. Every copyholder may, of common right, as incident to waste by lord or the grant, take housebote, hedgebote, and ploughbote upon tenants of " ° . * manor. his copyhold. But this right may be restrained by custom, namely, that the copyholder shall not take it, unless by assignment of the lord or his bailiff. In consequence of the right of the copyholder, the lord cannot cut down all the timber trees on a copyhold estate, but inu^t led.ve sufficient for the reparation of the houses and fot' plotigh- bote, &c. (r). But by the general custom of most manors, timber and mines are the property of the lord, and' a copyholder or a customary freeholder cannot commit any kind of waste, unless there is a particular custom to war- rant it (s) ; and a copyholder for life is punishable for per- missive waste {t). {m) 1 Cruise T. 3, c. 2, § 71. (»•) 1 Cruise T. 10, c. 3, § 3, 7. {n) 1 Cruise T. 3, c. 2, § 72. (s) 1 Cruise T. 10, c. 3, § 7 ; Buhe (o) 1 Cruise T. 8, c, 2, §2, 12. of Portland v. Hill, L. R, 2 Eq. ip) 1 Cruise T. 9, c. 1, § 10. 765. (e View, 478. Litt. 338 b ; 1 Cruise T. 8, c. 2, § OF MERGER. 119^ purchase after the marriage, by active and immediate p^k'.iv. acquisition. If a husband is possessed of a term of years, and the owner of the reversion in fee devises it to the wife, who has issue, the husband, who, in the lifetime of the wife, is tenant by the curtesy initiate, hokls the two estates in different rights, and there is no merger (r). If a man has a term in right of his wife, and purchases the freehokl, the term is not merged, because the wife would thereby be prejudiced (s). If a lessee makes his lessor executor, the term is not merged ; for that would be an injury to the lessee's estate, and might injure the lessor also (t). If a person having a term of years as executor, purchases the inheritance, the term is not merged, because that would prejudice creditors and others who are in- terested in the testator's estate, or, if merged, it is only so far as the executor's own interest is concerned (u). And in consequence of the 3rd section of the Statute of Uses, no term for years or other interest, whereof a person to whom lands are conveyed to uses is possessed in his own right, will be merged or destroyed by such conveyance (x). If a person is joint tenant of the first estate, and sole Estates in joint tenant of the second, his share only will be merged. Nor tenancy. wiU even this partial merger take place, unless the two estates are vested in him by several conveyances (3/). On the other hand, if a person is sole owner of the first estate, and joint tenant of the second, his estate wiU be merged either for the whole or a part only of the tene- ment, according to the apj)arent intention with which the two estates were brought together. Thus, if A. and B., (r) Burton, § 902 ; Sugd. Concise 1 Cruise T. 8, c. 2, § 34—36 ; View, 6, 7 ; Jones v. Daries, 5 Hurl. Burton, § 903. & Norm. 766 ; 7 Id. 507. (x) 1 Cniise T. 11, c. 3, § 37 ; 1 {s) 1 Cruise T. 8, c. 2, § 37, 38. Cruise T. 8, c. 2, § 40; Burton, § 758; (t) 1 Cruise T. 8, c. 2, § 39 ; Sugd. Concise View, 480. Sugd. Concise View, 480. {y) Burton, § 748,749 ; Co. Litt. (u) See Sugd. Concise View, 481 ; 182 b. 1196 OF MERGEK. Part IV. T. 2; Ch. 2, Eflfecf-, on third persons. Merger of a charge. being joint tenants in fee, make a lease for life to C, and C. afterwards surrenders the tenement to A., this will cause the estate for life to be entirely merged (z). But if C. were to convey his estate to A. by the same means as he might to a stranger, there, the intention being apparently not to destroy the estate, the merger would take place so far only as it must of necessity, that is, for one moiety : in consequence of which, A. would be seised of that moiety of the tenement in fee simple, and of the other moiety for the life of C, with reversion in fee to B. («). If the estate which is merged were, in any case, either previously to the transaction which caused the merger or by that transaction, charged with a rent or other incum- brance, or if an estate were created out of it, this charge or derivative estate woidd still subsist as long as the merged estate might have continued if it had not been merged ; for it is a maxim that actus legis nemini facit injuriam (h). Where the same person takes under a will a rever- sionary life estate in certain property, and a life annuity charged on the same property, the annuity will not merge, by operation of law, in the life estate, when it falls into possession, where such merger would be injurious to the person entitled thereto (c). And where a tenant for life, or a remainderman in tail, whose estate may be altogether defeated, or a tenant in tail whose estate is subject to an executory devise over, pays off a charge, it will be presumed that he meant to keep it alive, unless there is evidence to the contrary (d). Where a tenant in fee or a tenant in tail in possession, whose estate is not subject to an executory limitation over, and who can acquii'e the fee, becomes entitled to a (2) Burton, § 750. (a) Burton, § 752. (b) Burton, § 765 ; 4 Cruise T. 32, c. 7, § 3. (e) Byam v. Sutton, 19 Beav. 556. (d) Story's Eq. Jur. § 486 ; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 344, 345 ; Horton V. Smith, 4 K. & J. 624. Supra, 509. OF MERGER. 1197 charge upon tlie same estate, the general rule is, that the pabt iv. charge merges, unless it is the intention of the owner to keep it alive. This intention need not be expressed. It may be collected from words or acts. And it will be pre- sumed where it would be injurious to him to merge the charge. So that where the merger of the charge w^ould have let in other charges in priority, the Court will presume an intention to keep the charge on foot {c). ^Vhere the purchaser or owner of an estate or interest in real or personal property pays off a first incumbrance, or a first incumbrancer takes a conveyance of the equity of redemption, he should take proper steps to keep the first incumbrance on foot for his own benefit ; because in some cases it has been held that if he does not, it merges, so that the next succeeding incumbrance becomes the first charge on the estate or interest (/). Where a tenant in tail entitled to a charge on the estate is an infant, the charge is not merged, if he dies under twenty-one, as well upon other grounds, as upon the prin- ciple that until that age he cannot gain the absolute pro- perty in the land (g). A vested remainder for years interposed between the what win "^ prevent freehold and the inheritance, does not prevent their con- merger, solidation (Ji) ; because it is not an intervening ]3ortion of the seisin or ownership, but only confers a possessory right (i). And a fortiori, a mere interesse termini cannot hinder the merger of any estate (J). And yet, if a person (e) Coote Mortg. 3rd eel. 395 ; 1 Hem. & Mil. 68. Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 591 ; 1 Story's (/) Fisher on Mortg. 443—7 ; Eq. Jur. § 486 ; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. Coote on Mortg. 3rd ed. 394 ; 5 308, 345 ; Hatch v. Skelton, 20 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 454. Beav. 453 ; Ch-ice v. Sliav), 10 Plare, (g) Coote Mortg. 3rd ed. 397. 76; Davis X. Barrett, liBesLV. 54:2 ; (A) Burton, § 762. Swinfen v. Su'infen (No. 3), 29 (/) See supra, pp. 143 — 6. Beav. 199; Tyrivhitt v. Tyrivhitt, (j) Burton, § 907. 32 Beav. 244 ; Sing v. Leslie, 2 1198 OF MERGER, pakt IV. has a term for years, and a freehold estate, but there is T. 2, Ca. 2. . . a second term interposed between them, no merger will take place (/;). If any freehold interest by way of con- tingent remainder is interposed between two estates, which in their creation are given to one person, the absolute coalition of them by merger in his hands is prevented ; because otherwise the first estate would be created and destroyed in the same instant, which would be absurd (/). And for the same reason if a person is made tenant for life by will, wdth a contingent remainder to another, and the reversion in fee descends from the testator to his devisee for life, no merger will take place (m). In all cases, liowever, where a contingent remainder is the only obstacle to merger, there is such a coalition between the estates, that, if the second is of inheritance, and the first is in possession, the right of dower and most other incidents of a fee in possession will attach (re). And if two estates, capable of coalition by merger, become, by any act or event subsequent to their creation, vested for the first time in one person, a merger will take place, and by the old law, prior to the stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 8, an intervening contin- gent remainder was destroyed (o). ] '' *' Merger not Merger was never favoured in courts of law, and still favoured. " less in courts of equity (p). (k) Burton, § 898. Executory Interests annexed to (0 Burton, § 759. Fearne, § 777 — 780 a ; Egerton v. (wi) Burton, § 760. Massey, 3 Com. B. 338 ; and supra, (n) Burton, § 761. p. 329. . (o) Burton, § 760. See Smith's {p) Co. Litt. 338 b, n. (4). 1199 CHAPTEE III. OF CONVERSION. Where property which wears out by effluxion of time partiv. (such as leasehoklsl or property invested on securities, — '- Where pro- which, though yieldino- a hioh rate of interest, the Court of per'y ^.i^icii Chancery does not adopt, (such as bonds, shares in a °e,\ioua^;y company, or Dutch bonds,) is given to be enjoyed by two pn.'perty'in- or more persons in succession, it is a rule, that in order to certain . securities, accomplish the object oi the testator, it must be converted sijouuibe converted. into authorized securities, and the dividends paid to each person in succession, unless the person contesting the application of this rule can show that the will contains some sufficient indication of intention that the property is to be enjoyed in specie. This rule is for the benefit of the persons in remainder. And if reversionary property is made the subject of successive interests, the same rule applies, for the benefit of the first taker {a). As it is often made a point of dispute, whether an intention of enjoyment in specie is sufficiently indicated, it is desirable to exclude all doubt by express words (h). (a) Lewin on Trusts, 283, 2nd D. M. & G. 338 ; Boys v. Boys, 28 ed. ; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 42, 552 — Beav. 436 ; Eowe v. Bowe, 29 Beav. 557 ; 2 Rop. Leg. by White, 1343 ; 276. 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 516 — 519 ; (6) For instances, see Lichfield v. Morgan v. Morr/an, 14 Beav. 82, 83 ; Baker, 2 Beav. 481 ; Goodenow/h v. Sutherland v. Coole, 1 Coll. 498 ; Tremamondo, 2 Beav. 512 ; Picker- Johnson V. Johnson, 2 Coll. 441 ; ing v. Pickerinrj, 2 Beav. 31 ; Pickup Chambers v. Chambers, 15 Sim. 183 ; v. Atkinson, 4 Hare, 624 ; Blann v. Pickup V. Atkinson, 4 Hare, 624 ; Bell, 5 De G. & S. 658 ; 2 D. M. & Thornton v. Ellis, 15 Beav. 193; G. 775 ; Crowe v. Cm/onZ, 17 Beav. Blann v. Bell, 5 De G. & S. 658 ; 2 507 ; Hood v. Clapham, 19 Beav. D. M. & G. 775 ; Bate v. Hooper, 5 90 ; Jehb v. Tacjivell, 20 Beav. 84 ; 1200 OF CONVERSION. Part IV. T. 2, Ch. 3. Land directed, articled, contracted, conveyed, or devised to he sold, and turned into money, is reputed as money ; and, as sucli, will not pass under a devise of land, but will pass under a residuary bequest, and, in case of intestacy, Avill go to the personal representatives. And money directed, articled, covenanted, assigned, or bequeathed to be invested in land, has in equity many of the qualities of real estate, and in particular is descendible and devisable as such (c). But a mere direction that real estate is to be considered as personal or vice versa, is insufficient to work a conversion [d). Where the specific execution of a contract respecting land would have been decreed between the parties, it will be decreed between all persons claiming under them in privity of estate, representation, or title, unless other con- trolling equities have intervened (c). And where the heir of the purchaser came into equity for a specific per- formance, he might in general require the purchase-money to be paid out of the personal estate of the purchaser in the hands of his personal representatives (/). But by the stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 113, and the stat. 30 & 31 Vict. c. 69, this seems to be now altered. If upon the death of the vendor a title cannot be made, or there was not a perfect contract, or the Court thinks that the contract ought not to be executed, there is no conversion of real estate into personal ; and therefore the estate will go to tlie heir-at-law of the vendor. And Wearing v. Wearivff, 23 Beav. 99 Skirving v. Williams, 24 Beav. 275 Holgate v. Jennings, 24 Beav. 623 Llewellyn''s Trixst, 29 Beav. 171 VacMl V. Roherts, 32 Beav. 140 Green v. Britten, 1 D. J. & S. 649 Broion v. GcUatley, L. K. 2 Cli. Ap. 751. (c) Story's Eq. Jur. 788-790, 1211 a ; 2 Spcncc's Eq. Jur. 256 — 258, 264 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 493—4 ; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 666, 672 ; Barham v. Earl of Clarendon, 10 Hare, 126 ; Dixie v. Wright, 32 Beav. 662. {d) 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 495. (e) Story's Eq. Jur. § 788 ; see 2 SpcDce's Eq. Jur. 268—9. (/) Story's Eq. Jur. § 790. OF CONVERSION. 1201 SO if upon the death of the purchaser a title cannot be made, /**^^^j or there was not a perfect contract, his heir or devisee will not be entitled to the money agreed to be paid for the lands, or to have any other estate bought for him (g). And where the conversion has not taken place, and the Election to take pro- interest has vested absolutely, wliether in land or money, P^'^'y '" '^" •' ' -J ' unconverted in one person, he may elect to take the property in its ^'^^'"^ unconverted state, and any act or declaration of his un- equivocally indicating an option in which character he takes the property, will determine the succession as between his real and personal representatives (h). But where it has vested in two or more persons, one cannot elect without the others or other (i). A strano'er (such as the Crown or the lord claimino- in a stranger . . . . . cannot default of heirs) is not entitled to call for a conversion (/). enforce ' \J / conversion. In general, courts of equitv do not incline to chano-e the ciearinten- . 1 ^ o tion of oou- quality of the property as the testator or intestate has left version •^ '^ i J. ^ neceasaiy. it, unless there is some clear act or intention by which he has unequivocally fixed upon it throughout a definite and different character (A'). Where the intention in marriage articles is plain, that consent to '■or approval a conversion should be made, but consents of the parties o.^coi'ver- ' i sion. interested to the actual purchase cannot be obtained, as required by the instrument, by reason of their deaths or for some other cause, there, if any convenient purchase could have been obtained, the Court will take upon itself to judge wliether such consents ought to have been given, and the conversion being the paramount object, it will be considered as made ; else the parties to consent would have the option of determining whether the property should {g) Sugd. Concise View, 134 ; Be 1 Jam. Wills, 2nd ed. 507. Battersea Pi(7-k Acts, Re Arnold, 52 (i) Hollowaij v. RadcUffe, 23 Beav. 591. Beav. 163. (A) Cookson v. Cookson,12 C\. k (j) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 266, Fin. 121 ; Story's Eq. Jur. § 793, (k) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1214. 1213 ; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 270, 271 ; 1202 OF CONVEKSIOX. Part IV. T. 2, Ch.3. I'ime allowod for conversion. Liability to legacy duty coQ- sequent du direolion for conversiou. Failure of objects for conversion under a will. be real or personal, which, unless it be clearly given to them, will not be permitted. An equitable conversion of land into money or of money into land takes place by force of the direction, notwithstanding the conversion or investment is directed to be made with the approbation of certain parties ; and legatees of legacies out of a property •directed to be converted with the consent in writing of the tenant for life are entitled to their legacies, whether the property be converted or not ; and the residuary legatees of the proceeds are entitled, subject to the legacies, to the estate itself, if not converted (I). Where personalty is directed to be converted as soon as conveniently may be, there, as between the executors and the persons interested in the estate, the personalty is to be considered as converted within a year ; that being con- sidered as the time within which, in the generality of cases, it may be converted with ordinary diligence (m). And where a sale of real estate is directed to be made with all convenient speed, twelve months is to be considered as the time within which a sale might reasonably be made, as regards the rights of a person who is to take a beneficial interest on the conversion of the property (?i). If not accompanied by a direction to re-invest in land, an absolute direction to sell real estate in any event, by converting it into personalty, renders it liable to the legacy duty, even though the beneficial donees should elect to take it in an unconverted state. But a mere trust for sale for payment of debts, or a discretionary power to sell, does not render the estate liable, at least if it is not sold (o). Where, in the events that happen, the contemplated object for which a conversion of land into money or money (?) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 260,^61. (m) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 42, 565, n. (r) ; 1 Jarni. Wills, 2nd ed. 514. ()() Vickcrs v. Scott, 3 My. & K. 500, (o) 11 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 612 (h) ; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 267 j 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 505. OF rONVi;j;sT()\. 1203 into land is directed b}- ^\•ill to bo made, doe.s not exist at /^"h^'s. all, the Court will not vary the property from that state in \vhieh it was found at the death of the testator : for where the purpose fails, the intention fails Qj). But if any event has happened on which the conversion ought to have taken ]»lace, though the object for the conversion afterwards ma}^ have ceased to exist, or partially fails, the property will be treated as if converted (q). Wliere real estate is directed by will to be sold for undisposed- of produce certain purposes, so much of the real estate or the produce ^^J^^^ «s^=^|° thereof as is not effectually disposed of by the will at the testator's death, from silence, or from the invalidity of the testamentary disposition, or from the contingency not happening on which it was to take effect, or from suli- sequent lapse, ^^■ill not go to the next of kin or to a residuary legatee, but will result to the heir, unless the testator has sufficiently declared his intention that the produce of the real estate should be deemed personalty, whether such purpose is to be effected or not: and the interest thus undisposed of results as part of the old use, and descends as realty to the heir, in his character of heir, if the sale was unnecessary, but results to him as personalty, if the sale was necessary (/•). If the testator directs expressly or by necessary implication that the pro- ceeds of the real estate shall be considered as having been converted into personalty before his death ; and a fortiori if he directs that it shall be treated as personal estate for every purpose, whether disposed of by his will or not, and ip) 2 Spence'sEq. Jur. 234, 261 ; roydx. Smithson, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. Buchanan v. Harrison, 1 Johns. & 2nd ed. 690 et seq. ; Taylor v. Hem. 662, 673. Taylor, 3 D. M. & G. 190 ; Robinson (q) See 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 262 ; v. The Governors of the London Bayster v. Fackcrell, 26 Beav. 471 ; Hosxntal, 10 Hare, 19 ; Buchanan Wall V. Coleshead, 2 D. & J. 683 ; v. Harrison, 1 Johns. & Hem. 662, Wilson V. Coles, 28 Beav. 215. 673; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 526— (r) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 233 ; 1 9 ; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 704—5. Rop. Leg. by White, 517, 533 ; Adc- 1204 OF CONVEllSION. tX^c^b^'s. ^vliether as regards legatees or next of kin, such a direction operates to give tlio next of kin, as against the heir, any portion of the proceeds tliat may lapse or not be effectually disposed of (s). But A\']iere it is possible to construe words of exclusion of the heir, or words expressive of an intention that the property should be considered as personal estate, as merely expressive of an intention that there should be a conversion for the purposes of the ^^■ill, or that the ex- clusion of the heir was only intended for the accomplish- ment of the purposes of the will, and there is any purpose, however limited, as payment of costs, for which the con- version may have been directed, the heir will take, and not the next of kin. And no words, however strong, expressive of an intention to exclude the heir, Avill be sufficient for that purpose, unless there is a gift to the next of kin, either l\y express words or by plain implication. Hence a mere direction that the proceeds shall be deemed part of the personal estate, or a reference to a mixed fund by the name of personal estate, or even a direction that the ]oro- ceeds shall be " considered to all intents and purposes pari, of the personal estate," will not be sufficient to give the surplus of the real estate to the next of Icin. And it was even held that the heir took, notwithstanding a declaration that the trustees should stand possessed of the proceeds as " a fund of personal and not of real estate," followed by the words " for which purpose I declare th-at such proceeds or any part thereof shall not in any cNcnt lapse or result for the benefit of my heir at law " {t). If, however, there appears to have been no particular motive for changing the nfi,ture of the real fund, and the testator has declared (s) 2 Spcucc's Eq. Jur. 237 ; 1 Warren, IG Sim. 124 ; Taylor v. Eop. Leg. by White, 517. Tcnjlor, 3 D. M. & G. 190 ; RoUnson {t) Sec 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 237 — \. Governors of London Hospital, 10 8 ; 1 Jarrn. Wills, 2nd cd. 530—1 ; Hare, 10 ; Fitch v. Webber, 6 Hare, ] Lead. Cas. Eq. 706—7 ; Johnson 14,'(. V. Woods, 2 Bcav. 409 ; Flint v. OF CONVERSION, 1205 or shown an intent that he meant to dispose of his real as „T^^''J'^^- '- T. 2, Ch. 3. ])ersonal estate, then the land will pass under a residuary personal bequest as personal estate (u). If a testator converts his real estate for all the purposes of his will, so as to affect the character of the property as between the real and personal representatives of persons taking under the Avil], that will not prevent the heir from taking by way of resulting trust any part which is undisposed of, or not effectually disposed of; as where it is the subject of limita- tions which are too remote («). But what he so takes will vest in him as personal estate (?/), unless the other j^arts are devoted to the payment of charges, and he chooses to [):iy them off, and thereby ])revent a sale, and take the estate (z). 1'lie question whether the surplus proceeds of tlie trust ])ro]:)erty jjelong to the real or personal repre- sentative, is not affected by the state, whether of realty or })ersonalty, in which such surplus is found, although the state of the jn'operty might affect the character in which such surplus would go to one or the other of such represen- tatives («). Where real estate is directed to be corn-erted by deed, uudisposed- of produce even though not till after the death of the owner, there is of real estate ° ' under a a constructive conversion from the delivery of the deed, ^'^^'^■ not only for the imrposes of the deed, Ijut " out and out," so as to cause any surplus that may not be effectually disposed of by the deed to result to the grantor, settlor, or mortgagor, as personalty, and thereby preclude in equity the title of his heir from ever arising ; unless, indeed, the whole of the purposes of conversion fail from the moment of the execution of the deed ; in which case the entire (;/) 1 Eop. Leg. by White, 523, Bitrlcjj v. Evcl>/n, IQ Sim. 290. 537. (z) 2 Spencc's Eq. Jur. 234. (x) 2 Spencc's Eq. Jur. 234 ; (a) Griffiths v. Rickctts, 7 Hare, Bvrlcy v. Evelyn, 16 Sim. 290. 290. [y) 2 Spcnce's Eq. Jur. 2-12 ; K R 2 1206 OF (■!)>; vi;i;,siox. Part IV. T. 2, Ch. I Undisposed- of produce lit ifjil estate uucler an order of the f'ourt of Chancery. Undisposcd- of part of mixed fuud. ])i'operty results to liiin as realty, as if no conversion had ever been directed (h). The same rule, for the same reason, would seem to apply to a sale of real estate under an order of the Court of Chancery, on the application and in the lifetime of the owner : for there a constructive conversion Avould take place from the date of the order. But where the order is oidy for a sale of a part, or of so much as may be necessary, or the application for a sale is not made by the owner of the realty, but is made against his will, or he merely acquiesces in it, there, although the estate be all converted, any surplus will belong to the heir at law ; for the conversion Avill only be regarded as constructively co- extensive with the purposes of the suit or proceeding (c). Where real estate is not made a subsidiary fund, but a testator creates from real and personal estate a mixed or general fund, and directs the whole of that fund to be applied for certain purposes, as for the payment of debts and legacies, he does in effect direct that the real and personal estates which have been converted into that fund, shall answer the stated purposes pro rata, according to their lespectiA'e values. If any of those purposes fail, then the part of the fund which upon this principle would other- M'ise have been applicable to those purposes, is undisposed of. So far as this part of the fund has been composed of real estate, the heir is to have the benefit of it, as so much real estate undisposefl of, whether the estate be even- tually sold or not ; and so far as this part of the fund has been com])osed of personal estate, it is personal estate un- disposed of, for the benefit of the next of kin ((/). (6) Biggs v. Andrews, 5 Sim. 424 ; Griffiths V. Ricketts, 7 Hare, 299 ; Clark V. Franklin, 4 K. & J. 260 ; Lord Eldon's remarks in Riplfj v. Exors. 5th cd. 586, n. (c). ((•) Corhe v. Dcaley, 22 Beav. 196 ; Jcnivjv. Preston, 13 Sim. 356. (d) 2 Spcncc's Eq. Jur. 235 ; Watcriuorth , 7 Vcs. ido ; 1 Wms. on Johnson r. Woods, 2 Bear. 409 ; OF CONVERSION. 1207 queathed to be laid out in land, the same principle applies as where land is directed to be con- Where money is bequeathed to be laid out in land, the part iv. Undisposed verted into money : the conversion will operate only so far of part of money directed to as the will disposes of the land into wliich it is to be con- ^e^con- verted ; so that if the land is devised for a limited estate ti,rpn'ciuce^ only, the produce of the fund, or the fund itself, if uncon- verted, beyond the interest so given, will result to the testator's next of kin as personalty, unless it be given aw^ay to some other person (e). Where a testator directs his personal estate to be converted into real estate for certain purposes, some of which fail, there, after the purposes which can take efiect are satisfied, the heir is not entitled to the unconverted personalty as impressed wdtli the cha- racter of realty (/). But if there is a residuary legatee, he is entitled to it. And if it has not been converted, he may elect to take it either as realty or personalty. But if lie dies without indicating his election, it will go to the person or persons entitled to his personal estate {g). Whenever a trade partnership purchase real estate for Real estate ■*■ _ of a partner- the partnership purposes, and with the partnership funds, »h»p- it is, as between the real and personal representatives of the partners, personal estate. But wdiere the land, and not the trade, is the principal object, and the trade is merely ancillary to the beneficial enjoyment of the land, or a part of it, the doctrine will not apply ; so that, if one of the co- owners dies intestate, his share in the land will pass to his heir, and not to his legal personal representative (/^). Ackroyd v. Smitlisov, 1 B, C. C. 481. .503. (.7) Hereford v. RavenUU, 5 Bear. (e) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 235 ; 1 51. Jarm. Wills, 2nd eel. 527 ; Reynolds (h) Darhy v. Darhy, 3 Drewiy, V. Godlee, 1 Johns. 536, 582. 495, 50C ; Steioard t. Blcikeimy, T^. (/) Hereford x. RarenhRl \ Beav. E. Eq. 479 ; 4 Gli. Ap. 603. 1208 CHAPTER IV. OF ELECTION. Taet IV. T. 2, Cii. 4. Definition. Principle election. Where elec- tion arises iu equity. Election is tlic choosing- between two riglits, ]:ty a person wlio derives one of tlieni under on instniinent in which a clear intention appears that he slionkl not enjoy botli. The principle of election is, that no one shall claim under and in opposition to the same instrument. There is a tacit condition annexed to all provisions of this nature, that the person taking do not disturl) the disposition which his benefactor has made {a). Election arises in equity in cases where a grantor, or more commonly, a testator, gives away, either knowingly or by mistake, that in which he has no interest, or the whole of that in which another person besides himself has an interest, and iu the same instrument makes a gift to the ov.'ner of the property so given away, or to the person entitled to such interest. In such cases the owner of such property, or the person entitled to such interest, cannot l)oth take the gift and retain his own property or interest ; but if he takes the gift, he must resign his own property or interest. On the other hand, if he should elect to hold his own property or interest, or, as the phrase is, if he should elect against the instrument, he cannot have the gift ; or at least lie cannot have the entire gift without compensating the person whom he has disappointed by electing to take his own property. In such cases, equity, in not suffering the disposition by which the gift is made to enure to the benefit of the person so electing against («) 2 Sugd. Poff. 1-14— 5, OF ELECTIOX. 1209 iho iii.stnniicnt, will not iviidcM' that disposition inoperative, J^^^Jj^^V but will make it tlie means oi" effectuating tliat intention of the author of the instrument which such person has frustrated by so electing to retain his own propert}'" or interest : for, equity will treat the gift, or at least a part of it, as a trust in the donee or devisee, the person so electing, for the benefit of the party disappointed by such person's refusing to give up his own property or interest (b). Indeed, the doctrine of election can never be applied where an election is made contrary to the instrument, unless the interest that would pass by it is of that freely disposable nature, that it can be laid hold of to compensate the party who suffers by the exercise of such election against the instrument. Thus, where there is a fund subject to the Election by '' an appom- appointment of a father amongst his children, and the *'^®- father appoints a part to some of his children, and the other part to persons not objects of the power, any child who is an appointee may both take his appointed share, and also claim his share of the improperly aj^pointed por- tion, as in default of appointment. But if there is a powei' to appoint to two, and the donee of the power appoints to one only, and gives a legacy to the other, he cannot claim the legacy and also dispute the validity of the appoint- ment (c). So where a man, having a power to appoint to A. a fund ^^'hich in default of appointment is to be given to B., exercises the power in favour of C, and gives other lienefits (i) See Story's Eq. Jur. § 1077, t. FUzsimons, 28 Beav. 417 ; Hony- note, 1081—1084, 1086, 1088, 1089, wood v. Foster (No. 2), 30 Bear. 14 ; 1093 ; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 586, 587, Iloiodls v. Jenkins, 2 Johns. & Hem. 588,601—004 ; 2 Sugd. Pow. 155 ; 706 ; Whitley v. Whitley, 31 Beav. 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 371—3 ; 173 ; 1 D. J. & S. 617; Miller v. Sioan V. Holmes, 19 Beav. 471; Thurgood, o3 Hcav. 496 ; Grissellx. Wintour v. Clifton, 21 Beav. 447 ; Swinhoe, L. K. 7 Eq. 291. 8 D, M. & G. 641 ; Stephens v. (c) 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 590 ; 2 Stephens, 3 Drewry, 697 ; Asticke v. Sugd. Pow. 148 — 9 ; lie Fowlers Peters, 4 K. & J. 437 ; Grosvcnor Trusts, 27 Beav. 362. V. I>urston,25 Beav. 97 ; Fitzsimons 1210 OF ELECTION. Part IV. T. 2, Ch. 4. Words uot creating a case of election. No election to B., although the execution is merely void, yet if B. will accept the gifts to him, he must convey the estate to C. according to the appointment. Again, where a father authorised his wife to execute a power vested in himself, and gave the objects of the power other benefits, although the father could not delegate the power, yet it w^as held, that any person who should defeat what the mother had done by what was in truth no power, should have no benefit under the father's Avill (r/). But words of mere desire, expectation, or wish, do not create a case of election (c). And hence, where a testator bequeaths his oami property to persons who are objects of a power, and also appoints to them the fund over which he has the power of appoint- ment, in terms which per se would give the absolute interest, but then adds a request that they would leave the appointed fund to their children, who are not objects of the power, the precatory words do not create a case of election either to accept a limited appointment, leaving the re- mainder for their children, or else to relinquish the legacies, Ijut the words relating to the appointed fund amount to an absolute appointment to the objects of the power, with a condition inconsistent with the power, which is simply void ; [ind therefore they are entitled to both funds (/). Prima facie, it is not to be supposed, nor must it be proved by extrinsic evidence, that a testator disposes of that which is not his own, so as to raise a case of election. It must appear on the will itself, by plain demonstration or by necessary implication {g). ^Vliere persons are named as residuary appointees, and {d) 2 Sugd. Pow. 148—9. (e) Lanrjslov) v. Langsloic, 21 Beav. 552. (/) Blacket V. Lamh, 14 Beav, 482. See supra, p. 758. {(j) 2 Sp. 592, 593, 595 ; Wintotir V. Clifton, 21 Beav. 447 ; 8 D. M. & G. 641 ; 3fiUer v. Thm-rjnod, 33 Beav. 49(5. between gifts under same will. OF ELECTTOX. 1211 also as legatees, in the same will, they are not obliged to Ji^V^-, elect between the residuary appointment and their legacies, so as to give up their residuary appointment or their legacies, in order to give effect to, or compensate the persons claim- ing under, a particular appointment void for remoteness ; for they claim each gift under the will itself, and neither of them is dehors the will or adverse to it (h). The doctrine of election applies even where, in a will ^f^t^g'^**'"" not within the Wills Act (1 Vict. c. 26), a devise of an t'h^^l^^ estate is made to the testator's heir, and the heir, accord- ing to the old rule, takes such estate by descent, and not by purchase, and, by the same will, the testator devises to another person an estate belonging to the heir, over which the testator has no disposing power (z). The same doctrine of election also applies in cases where it was apparently a testator's intention to dispose of all the property he might have at the time of his death, and the heir, who is a devisee under the will, claims property which was purchased subsequently to the will, and which, consequently, under the old law, did not pass by the will, but w^as intended to pass to another person under the general words of the will (j). But wdiere a w^ill, made before the year 1838, is void as a devise of land, either from the incapacity of the devisor or from its not being duly executed, and is good as to personal estate, the heir may take a legacy under it, without relinquishing his right by descent ; because, as to the land, there is in fact no disposition of it, and consequently no election (Jc). But although the will were not duly executed according to the {h) WoUaston v. Klnr/, L. li. S (j) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1094; G Eq. 165. Cruise T. 38, c. 2, § 28 j Sugd. Con- (i) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1094 ; 2 cise View, 127 ; Schroder v. Schro- Spence's Eq. Jur. 589 ; 2 Kop. Leg. der, 1 Kay, 578. by White, 1595 ; Schroder v. Schro- {I) 6 Cruise T. 38, e. 2, § 26 ; 2 der, 1 Kay, 578 ; Ilaacc v. TrcKhlt, Eop. Leg. by'^liite, 1595 ; 1 Jarm. 2 Johns. & Hem. 210. Wills, 2nd cd. 374. 1212 OF KI.Ef'TION. Part IV. T. 2, Ch. 4. It applies to every kind of interest. It is not raised by subsequent events. To what estput a person electing against a will forfeits the devise or bequest. Where pro- perty ot the person elect- ing is mort- gaged. Election as to one benefit. statuto, still if it contained an express t;ondition that any legatee who might not comply with its terms should forfeit all benefit under it, there the heir would, by force of the condition, be obliged to make his election (/). The doctrine is equally applied to all interests, whether immediate or remote, vested or contingent, of value or of no value, and whether in real or personal estate (m). It has been held that the doctrine of election does not apply to an instrument which was valid at the time of execution as to all the property comprised in it, but was considered inoperative as to some of the property by sub- sequent events («). According to the preponderance of authority and prin- ciple, a person electing against a will does not forfeit the whole of the benefit intended for him, where the value of the gift exceeds that of his own property or interest ; but he is only obliged to compensate in value the claimant whom he has disappointed by his refusing to give up his own property or interest (o). For, a Court of equity interfering to control his legal rights, for the purpose of executing the intention of the testator, is justified in its interference so far only as that purpose requires Q9). If the party has mortgaged the interest he takes in his own right, and then is suffered to elect to take under the will, the mortgage must be satisfied out of the interest provided for him by the will (q). A person may decline one benefit given him by a will, such as a legacy charged with a portion, without being precluded from taking another benefit by the same will ; {I) 2 Eop. Leg. by White, 1595 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 375. (m) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1096 ; 2 Spencc's Eq. Jur. 588 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 372. (n) BlaillocJc Y. Gr indie, L. R. 7 Eq, 215. (o) Story's Eq. Jur. § 3085 ; 2 Spence'a Eq. Jur. COl— G04 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 372—3. (j)) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1085, note. {q) 2 Sugd. Pow. 151. OF KLECTIOX. " 12 in unless it is fairly inforal)lo, from the nature of the dif- „partiv. T. 2, Cn. 4. ferent benefits, that he should either take all or reject all (r). Election may also arise where a j^erson claims both SrcaHoofa under and in opposition to a settlement (s). settlement. The ixirty is not bound to make an election till all Election nee;l uot be the circumstances are known. And if he should make a jvj'JJl^^ilpe choice in ignorance of the real state of the funds, or under stauces!"'' a misconception of the extent of the claims on the fund elected by him, it will not be conclusive on him. xA.nd he is entitled, in order to make an election, to maintain a bill in equity for a discovery, and to have all the accounts taken, to ascertain the real state of the fund (/). An election inay be presumed from a lonn; acquiescence, Election •■' ^ o J. presumed. or from other circumstances {u). Eemaining in possession of two estates held under titles not consistent with each other, affords no conclusive proof of the kind {x). The doctrine of election is not of the nature of a positive rule of law which a person is bound to knoM^ And there- fore, in order to infer an election, it is necessary to show that the person who ought to elect was aware of the doctrine (y). The doctrine of election is not arjiilied in the case of No election in the case creditors. They may take the benefit of a devise for pay- of creditors, ment of debts, and also enforce their legal claim against other funds disposed of by the will ; for a creditor claims not as a mere volunteer, but for a valuable consideration, and ex debito justitins (z). {)•) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1081 ; see Beav. 447. 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 591. («) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1097 ; 2 is) Anderson \. AlhoU, 23 Bcav. Spence's Eq. Jur. 598— GOO ; 2 457; Moslaj v. Ward, 29 Beav. Sugd. Pow. 154; Worthinr/tou v. 407 ; Broiai \. Brovni, L. R. 2 Eq. Wigginton, 20 Beav. 67. 485. {x) Spread v. Morgan, 11 H. L. (0 Story's Eq. Jur. § 1098 ; 2 Cas. 588. Spence's Eq. Jur. 598; 2 Sugd. {y) Spread y. Morgan, 11 H. L. Pow. 154 ; 2 Kop. Leg. by White, Cas. 588. 1591—2 ; Wintour v. CUfton, 21 (.-) Story's Eq. Jur. g 1092 ; 2 1214 OF ELF.CTIOX. Part IV. T. 2, Ch. 4. Mistake as to amount of another' .s interest. Disability. Persons Laving separate rights of election as next of kin of persons who died without eleetiug. AVhcre a testator gives one child a much larger property, under the mistaken impression that such child did not take under the testator's marriage settlement, he is not bound to elect between his interest under the settlement and the gift by will («). Where the person bound to elect labours under any dis- ability, as infancy or coverture, the Court will consider whether it will be most beneficial for him to take under or against the will or deed, and Avill decree accordingly (h). Where a person who had a right of election, dies intestate, without having exercised it, each of his or her next of kin has a separate right of election ; so that neither the election of the majority nor of the heir and adminis- trator will bind the others (c). Spence's Eq. Jur. 592 ; 1 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 377. (a) Box V, Barrett, L. K. 3 Eq. 244. to election between dower or free bencli, and benefits given by will, see supra, pp. 206 — 7. ((■) Fytche v. Fijtche, L. R. 7 Eq. {h) 2 Spence'8 Eq. Jur. 587. As 494. Definition. 1215 CHAPTEi; V. OF SATISFACTIOX (^0- Satisfaction may be defined to be, tlie makiiic; of a taetiv. 'J'. 2 Ch. 5 donation witli the express or implied intention that it shall be taken as an extinguishment of some claim which the donee has upon the donor (J)). Satisfaction imyjlies that something has been done in piffercncc ■^ " between lieu of tliat which was contracted or intended to be done. and^p^Ji""" But performance implies that the identical act which the ^°'"'°^"'=''- party contracted to do, has been done (c). Equitalile questions of satisfaction usually arise in three ^vhel■c satisfaction classes of cases : — •'^''''^f^s. I. In cases of portions secured by a marriage settle- ment. II. In cases of portions given by a will, and an ad- vancement of a donee afterwards in the testator's life- time. III. In cases of legacies to creditors or debtors (cl). It is advisable to observe in this place, with reference to satisfaction resting on all these classes of cases, that where the satisfaction is a presump- ' tion may be matter of presumption, that presumption may be rebutted '■ei»i"ed. either by intrinsic evidence derived from the will itself, or by extrinsic evidence, as by declarations of the testator or written papers (c). I. "Where a portion or provision is secured to a child i. as to ■*- portions (a) This chapter is almost entirely Ward, 22 Beav. 347. taken from the writer's Manual of (c) 2 Rop. Leg. by White, 1109. Equity Jurisprudence, 9th ed. ; but (d) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1109. with the addition of references to (e) Story's Eq. Jur. § 1102; 2 Roper's Legacies. Spence's Eq. Jur. 441 — 445 ; 1 Rop. (b) See Story's Eq. Jur. § 1099— Leg. by "White, 391 ; 1 Jami. 'VVills, 1101, 1106, and infra; Samuel v. 2nd cd, 343. 1216 OF SATISFACTIOX. Tart IV. ]jy a maiiiage settlement or otherwise, and the parent or person standing? in loco iDarentis — that is, a person mean- secured by ox X settlement, i^o- to stand in the place of a parent as regards pro^'iding for a relation's child — afterwards by will gives the same child a legacy, whether particular or residuary, without expressly declaring it to be in satisfaction of such portion or proA'ision, in such case, if the legacy is suljstantially the same in its value, in its nature, in time of payment, in certainty, and in benefit, with the portion or provision, and if it is not given for a different purpose, it will, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, lie deemed a full satis- faction, as the presumption is against double portions. If the legacy is less in amount than the portion or provision, or if is payable at a different period, then (looking to the ■weight of authority) it may lie deemed a satisfaction pro tanto, or in full, according to the circumstances (/). A testamentary provision has been considered an advance- ment in the lifetime of the parent, in full or part satisfaction of the portion provided by a settlement which contains a declaration that advancement by the parent in his life- time shall be considered in full or part satisfaction, unless the contrary is expressly declared in writing ([/). AVliere, on a covenant to take eflect on the death of the settlor, a ])ortion is settled on the husband for life, and then on his wife and children, and an absolute gift of other property is afterwards made by the settlor by A\'ill in favour of the husband, it may be a satisfaction of the (/) Story'sEq.Jur.§ 1109, 1110, 2 Hem. & Mil. 149; D. J. & S. 1103,1104; 2 Spcnce'sEq. Jur. 427 -336; S. C. nom. Chichester v. Co- —430, 432, 433, 438—440; Lady ventnj, L. R. 2 Ap. Ser. (H. L.) 72 ; E. Tlnjnne v. Earl of Glenr/all, 2 H. Glover v. Hartcup, 34 Beav. 74 ; L. Cas. 153 ; 2 Rop. Leg. by White, Camplell v. Camphell, L. R. 1 Eq. 1071; Sir /. Romilbj, M. E, 1.5 383; Parjct v. Orenfell, L. R. 6 Ecav. 572 ; Pinchin v. Simmn, 30 Eq. 7. Bcav. 119; Charlton v. West, SO [g) 2 Kop. Leg. by White, 1098. Bear. 124 ; Coventry] v. Chichester, OF SATISFACTIOX. 1217 husband's life interest under the settlement, but not of the J^rt iv. T. 2, Ch. S. interest of the wife and children (/?). 11. AVheve ;i ])arent or other i)ersou standiuL,^ in loco ii. As to , , "" , portions left parentis bequeaths to his own oi" to his relation's child a bywui. legacy, whether particular or residuary, and afterwards, by an act inter vivos, makes a provision for the same child, of ccjual or greater amount, of equal certainty, aud substan- tially the same in kind and in degree of benefit, without expressing it to be in lieu of the legacy, or for otiier oluects than those for Avhich the legacy A\'as given, — in such case, in the aljsence of evidence to the contrary, it wiU be deemed a satisfaction or ademption of the legacy. And if the provision inter vi^'os is less than the legacy, it M'iU be deemed an ademption pro tanto (i). And the con- iirmation of a will by a codicil does not revi\T a legacy adeemed by an act inter vivos in the interval between the will and the codicil (J). In the case of a provision by will, foUo^-ed by a provision by deed, the first lieing revocalile, there is no difficulty in the way of the second provision taking effect in lieu of tlie first; and no election on the part of the ])erson to be iKuiefited is rccpiired. And if the second ])rovision is c'cc Ceeditors' Deeds. COMPEOMISE, 811 CONCEALMENT. Sec Fraud. CONDITIONS. See Limitations. defined, 58 express, 58 implied, 58 on exchange, 704 — 5 on partition, 710 in law% 59, 65 in deed, 59 subsequent or destructive, 59 precedent or creative, 59 Avhat words create conditions, subse- quent or precedent, 59-^60 mixed, i. e., destructive and creative, or destructive and accelerative, 59 — 60 performance of, by a married woman, 1112 by an infant, 1161 where a time is fixed, 67 where no time is fixed, 67 where a place is appointed, 67 where none is appointed, 67 how conditions precedent must be performed, 08 conditions to pay money, 68 conditions to execute a re- lease, 68 conditions subsequent or mixed must be performed, 68 CONDITIONS (contin ned). subsequent and mixed conditions arc odious and construed strictly, 68 of consent to a marriage, 69 how consent must be given, 70 Avhen in terrorem, 70 refusal of consent, 71 of surviving parents, 338 effect of non-fulfilment of a condition, 71, 569 dispensed with, 71 — 73 relief in equity against, 74 who may take advantage of, 75, 771, 860—861 when a re-entry is necessary, 76 when notice of a condition must be given, 77 effect of entry for a breach of con- dition, 77 — 78 whether valid or not, contrary to public policy, 79 requiring the acquisition of a peerage, 79 in restraint of marriage, 79 — 96 in restraint of cohabitation, 96 in restraint of trade, 97 as to a separation, 96 repugnant, 97 for cesser on alienation, bank- ruptcy, or insolvency, 93 contrariant, 102 uncertain or ambiguous, 102 impossible, 102 involving too remote a possibilitv, 103 not to dispute a will, 1C3 as to invalidity of previousgift, 106 effect of the invalidity of, 107, 276 to whom reserved, 115 cannot be granted over, 115 when created, 115 taking possession binds to performance of, 115 period to which the event of death is to be referred, 108 condition, as well as a covenant, for the resumption of land, 115 partial operation of, 116 as to repairs, 116 release of, 116, 717 apportionment of, 72 may be a hereditament, 3 of a bonrl, 791. See Bond. defeasance of, 738 subsequent, not barred by a fine until broken, 940 subsequent and mixed, barred by a re- covery, 952 for payment of rent to donor not barred by recovery, 953 INDEX. 1229 CONDITIONS OF SALE, 695 _ ■\vhcn special conditious required, 605 how expressed, 606 as to time for taking objections, 607 rescinding a contract, 606 range of title, 607 evidence, 60S errors, 609 faults, 609 expenses, 609 possession, 610 interest, 610 time, 610 fixtures, 010 deeds, 610 lessor's title, 611 surrendered leases, 611 penalty for breach of agreement, 611 CONDITIONAL LIMITATION defined, 65 — 66 construed strictly, 68 in restraint of marriage, 80 CONFIRMATION defined, 723 operative words, 724 requisites to, 72-1 operation, 72-1 in the case of joint tenancy or tenancy in common, 724 of one estate only, 725_^ of part of an estate, 725 of part of the land, &c., 725 grant operating as a, 897 operating as a grant or release, 897 by a disseisee, 725 of an interessee termini, 724 bargain and sale operating as a, 897 uses or trusts of, 725 when a deed operates as a grant or lease, and when as a confirmation, 897 CONSANGUINITY defined, 464 lineal and collateral, 46 1 degrees of lineal consanguinity, 465 of collateral consanguinity, 465 CONSENT to a deed, 873 to a marriage, 69 CONSIDERATION. >S'cc Bakgain and Sale. good or valuable, 821 when necessary, 821 absence or failure of, 821 inadequate, 825 unlawful, 829 CONSIDERATION (ooui;/n ?(«?). a good consideration within the stat 13 Eliz. c. 5, and 27 Eliz. c. 4, 838—850 CONSTRUCTION. Sec Words. of powers and deeds of appointment, 750—1 general rules of construction of deeds, 892 intention to be cftcctuated, 892 intention to be collected from the words, and construction to be according to the words, 892 — 3 wlicn words are to be taken in their strict sense, 893 sense agreeable to law preferred, 894 construction of general expres- sions, 894 when general words are to be fol- lowed, and when special, 894 uncertainty, 894 construction to be upon tlie Avholo deed, 895 repugnant clauses, 895 construction to be reasonable, 895 rule as to the words of an inden- ture, 895 words construed most strongly against the active party, 896 inadmissibility of averments found- ed on parol evidence, 896 operation of a deed in a difTerent way from what was intended, 897 where a deed may enure in diffe- rent ways, 898 commencement of an estate, 899 same construction in every court, 899 of )5articular expressions in deeds, 899. See Words, general rules of construction of wills, 989 intention to bo efi'ectuated, 989, 992—3 intention must "be collected from the words, 990 express disposition not controlled by inference, 991 intention must be collected from the whole will, 991 eficet of a codicil, 992 when words are to be taken in their proper sense, and when in some other, 992 the more probable construction to be preferred, 992 words importing the futm-e, 993 1230 INDEX. CONSTRUCTION (conitnwefn. general rules of construction of Avills, relative construction of ambiguous expressions, 993 same words, having a difl'crent construction, 993 words rejected, sujiplicd, or changed, 993 transposition, 994 particular intent sacrificed to ge- neral intent, 994 testator presumed to know the law, 994 mistakes not presumed, 994 inconsistent clauses, 994 devesting words must be as clear as vesting words, 994 uncertainty, 995 prevention of intestacy, 995 at what lime a will speaks, 995 lex loci, 996 civil law followed as to purely per- sonal legacies ; common law as to others, 996 substituted or additional legacies governed by the original lega- cies, 996 of particular expressions in wills, 99S. See Words. of private acts, 90S of surrenders of copyholds, 966 recital, a key to, 635 CONSUMABLE ARTICLES, 325 CONTINGENT INTEREST. See Con- dition — ExECUTOKT Interests — Vested Interests. when releasable, 718, 860 grant or assignment of, 737, 860 — 864 devise or bequest of, 985, 988 contingencies with a double aspect, 334 order releasing or discharging a con- tingent right, 1103 CONTINGENT REMAINDERS defined, 325 four kinds of, 326 time for vesting of, 328 support of, 328 destruction of, 328, 1198 baiTcd by fine, 925, or recovery, 953 — 4 title depending on destruction of, 601 when they prevent merger, 1197 — 8 CONTRACTS. See Void and Voidable Deeds and Contracts. differently regarded at law and in equity, C23 CONTROVERSIES, release of, 720 CONVEESION of property which is wearing out, or reversionary property, or property invested on certain securities, 1199 of land, articled, devised, &c. to be sold, and money articled, bequeathed, &c., to be invested in land, 1200 election to take property in an uncon- verted state, 1201 a stranger cannot enforce, 1201 clear intention of, necessary, 1201 consent to, or approval of, 1201 time allowed for, 1202 liability to legacy duty consequent on, 1202 failure of the object for a, 1202 undisposed-of produce of real estate, 1203 imdispose.d-of part of mixed fund, 1206 undisposed-of part of money directed to be converted, or the produce there- of, 1207 of one kind of land into another, 1189 CONVEYANCES. Sec Deeds, &c. how made, 595 COPARCENARY defined, 241 parceners claim an inheritance by descent, 241 parceners have a unity, but not en- tirety of interest, 241 parceners make but one heir, 241 parceners by common law and by cus- tom, 241 advowson in, 34 tithes in, 39—40 curtesy and dower, 242 conveyance by one parcener to another, 242 destruction of, 242 modes of partition of, 242 liability of estate in coparcenaiy to extent, 431 possession of one parcener was the pos- session of the other, 549 — 550 descent to coparceners, 476, 482 — 3 descent to issue of coparceners, 476, 480 in the case of estates tail, 487 leases by coparceners, 690 releases by coparceners, 712 COPYHOLDS. See Manor. definition of, 119 ordinary copyholds, 120 free copyholds, or customarj- freeholds, 120 condition of, as regards the will of the lord, 120 INDEX, 1231 COPYHOLDS [roniin ued). customs^ 120 froehold is in the lord, 51, 121 aclmittaucc of trustees of, 121 lord may become entitled to, 123 voluntary grants, what may be granted by copy, 122 of waste, 122 granting for lives, 123 regranting, 123 — 4 derive their eflect from the cus- tom, 124 effect where lord retains, 123 application of statutes to, 124 not within the Statute of Uses, 266 32 Hen. 8, c. 2S, as to leases, (588 27 Eliz. c. 4, p. 850 extinction of, 125 effect of a release or surrender to the lord, or of a conveyance by him, 125 effect of an extent or assignment for dower, 12(3 must have been demised or demisable immemorially by cop3% 119 enfranchisement of, 128 — 142. .S'peEN- PRAXCHISEIIEXT. rent- charge in the case of, 18 fees conditional in, 154 not entadable, except by custom, 171 curtesy, 187 freebcnch, 210 terms for years in, 224 occupancy of, 53G — 7 descent of, 479 liability of, for debts, 503 forfeiture, for treason or felonj', 563 — 5 for breach of copyhold customs, 569 for alienation contrary to custom, 569 for waste in, 570 for disclaimer or refusal to perform services, or to pay a fine or rent, 570, 905 for refusal to be admitted, 571 by married women, 1117 by infants, 9(35 of bankrupts, 574 gift or grant to loi\l or tenants, 634 not included in a conveyance, 894 order of Court of Chancery vesting or appointing a person to convev, 1103—4 right of copyholder to housebote, hedge- bote, and ploughbote, 1191 waste in, 1191 mortgage of, 400. See Mortgage. COPYHOLDS {mntlmied). leases of, 570, 688, 699 alienation of, by tiie copyholders, contrary to the custom, 569 by surrender and admittance, 962 by bargain and sale and admit- tance, 121, 963 by recovery, 963 imder the Fines and Recoveries Act by tenants in tail and per- sons entitled to base fees, 781 by devise, 973, 988, 1040, 1043. See Devise. by tenant in fee, 962 by tenant in tail, 963 by husband and wife, 1114 before admittance, 966 — 7, 1046 presentment, 962 where grants and admittances may be made, 964 — 5 admittance of persons under dis- ability, 965 words of Ihnitations in a sur- render, 966 construction of a surrender, 966 circumstances under which ad- mittances may take place, 966 husband not admitted, 966 rights of surrenderee before ad- mittance, 966 rights of heir or devisee before admittance, 966 admittance governed by uses of surrender, 967 admittance of remaindermen, 967 admittance of one joint-tenant, 967 admittance relates back, 967 lord and steward are mere instru- ments on admittances on sur- render or descent, 967 fine, 967 heriots, 969 services, 969 right of heir or devisee before admit- tance, 966 order as to, under Trustee Act, 1103 — 4 CORN, grant of, 644 CORPORATION, aggregate and sole, 1183 necessity for the word successors to pass a fee, 1183 misnomer of, 1183 holding lands, 1183 mode of conveyance by a, 1184 common seal, 1184 delivery of deed of, 1184 1232 INDEX. rOra'ORATION (costumed). corporation cannot hold in joint te- nancy, 231 may take by ivay of use, but cannot bo seised to a use, 256 succession to property, 491 grant by deed, 621 ecclesiastical not barred by fine, 940, or recovery, 947 CORPOREAL THINGS, 4 how conveyed al common law, 5, 078 were said to lie in liverj', 5, 678 CORRUPTION OF BLOOD, 467, 489 COSTS, lieu for, 370 mortgage for, 403 COTTAGE, what passes by the term, 643 COUNSEL, purchases by, 835 COUSINS, bequests to, 1012 COVENANTS defined, 653 by what instrument created, 654 by what words created, 655 by or with strangers, 654 void, 654 performance, 654 express and implied, 655 general and specific, 656 inherent and collateral, 657 joint and several, 657 real and personal, 658 to keep policy on foot, 664 as to purpose for which, house is to be used, 664 to purchase land, 278 to convey, transfer, or pay, 278 to leave a share to a child, 838 to charge or settle, 371, 656, 804, 1220 wife's propei-ty, 804, 1143 to repair, 665 to pay rent, 665 not to transfer a lease, 694 not to sue, 715 to produce title deeds, &c. 887—8 a.s to resumption of land, 115 covenantor's widow is a person claiming under him, 664 cesser, discharge, or satisfaction of, 665, 1220 waiver of, 71 relief against, 665 damages for breach of, 494 COVENANTS (contvnicd). tlifl'ei'ently regarded at law and in equity, 623 running with the land, 658—664, 8SS liability under, 655, 658—662 benefit of, 662, 771 with whom they should be made, 063 usual covenants in a lease, 695, 771 in leases under powers, 771 obligation of lessee's covenants, 695 release of, 717, 719 who covenant for the title in purchase deeds, 797 for the title in the case of estates in fee, 798 duty of solicitor, as to unusual cove- nants, 800 on the sale of leaseholds, 800 against whose acts a vendor should covenant, 802 to what kinds of acts covenants will extend, 803 COVENANT TO STAND SEISED defined, 740 operative words, 741 who may convey, and what ma}' be conveyed by it, 741 uses on a, 256, 262 consideration, 741 distinction between this and a bargain and sale, 742 when and to whom a use will not arise, 742 to the use of a wife not entered into with herself, 742 to a use after covenantor's death, 742 creation of a rent, 742 disuse of, 743 in execution of a power, 750 power to lease in, 767 other assurances operating as a, 897 — 8 C RE D I T R. See Creditors' Deeds— Debt.s. deeds of arrangement, subject to the approval and control of the Court of Eankruptcy, 788 deeds of composition, subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Bank- ruptcy, where no bankruptcy pro- ceedings have been taken, 816 creditors faA'oured, 364 appointed executor, 1076 marriage with, 495 right of against general appointee, 760 purchases bv, 835- — 6 frauds on, 814, 838—845 a witness to a will, 975, 982 concealment of a debt bj-, 837 — 8 no election in the case of, 1213 INDEX. 123J CREDITORS' DEEDS, for benefit ol'all the creditors, 812 preforcnee of a parficuki" creditor, 812 rcvoeableuess of, 812 — 13 passing of the property, 813 executed by one of two or more joint debtox's, 813 where creditors take though not par- ties, 813 where the creditors have not executed within the time, 813 Avherc no schedule at first and erasures are made in the schedule afterwards added, 814 frauds on creditors, 814 CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, suppression of, 867 CROPS, i^'ce Emblements. right to, on death, 989 assignment of, SG4 CROSS REMAINDERS, 323 CROWN debts, 49a obligation of Crown debtors, 421, 490 lauds of Crown debtors couveyed by bargain aud sale, 682 liability to, 496, 790 jn-otection against, by a term, 221 discharge from, 500 accountants to the, 496 person who has executed a bond to Crown as receirer, 496 — 7 surety for a Crown debtor, 497 parish collector of taxes, 498 registration, 497 title to property derived from, C02 CURTESY, definition of, 184 requisites, 184 out of what, estate limited to wife's separate use. See Addenda to p. 185 remainders or reversions, 185 iacorporeal hereditaments, 185 money to be laid out in land, 185 not incident to estate pur autre vie, 186 copyholds, 187 gavelkind lands, 187 a rent, 22 an advowson, 35 tithes, 39 estate diA'csted, 77 — 8 incident to coparcenary, 242 incident to estate in common, 247 not incident to joint tenancy, 184, 192, 235 CURTESY {rontumed). commencement of estate by, 186 no entry necessary, 187 an inseparable incident, 187 when it ceases, 128, 135, 188 alienation by a tenant by the, 186, 567 estate by, may be surrendered, 726 in tiie case of an alien, 1179 CUSTOM, 540 CY PRES DOCTRINE, 165, 167, 169 DAMAGES, recovery of, in respect of arrears of rent, interest, &c., 30 for breach of covenant, 494 DATE, mode of dating, 630 no date or v.Tong date, 631 not conclusive, 631 DEAF AND DUMB, 634 DEATH, to what period it refers, 108 DEBATES, release of, 720 DEBTS AND INCUMBRANCES. Sec Assets. power to seU for payment of, 354 devise in trust to pay, 364 devise charged with or subject to, 364 indirect charge of, 364 to be paid out of rents, 353 creditors have no charge by statute, 505 effect of a charge of, 365 mode of enforcing charges of, 367 — 9 of record, 492 specialty, 492 simple contract, 493 mortgage, 493. See Mortgage. deeds of arrangement and composition for payment of debts, 812—818 infants or persons having a limited in- terest, or executory devisees, may convey mider decree for sale or mortgage for payment of debts, 506 —8 damages for breach of covenant, 494 trust to pay bond debts, 494 operation of the Statute of Limitations as regards debts, 493 buying up a charge, 495 crown debts, 496 terms for years liable for, 503 liability of real estates for debts, 503 to what debts issue in tail are liable, 508 1234 INDEX. DEBTS AND INCUMBRANCES (con- tinued). proportionate liability of joiutrcss and issue in tail to, 509 voluntary discharge of, 509, 1196 compulsory discharge of, 510 keeping down interest on, 510 payment or retainer of debts, though barred, 1075 concealment of, 385, 603,n. (r\ 837—8 abatement of, 513 assignment of, 732 duration of an interest by devise for payment of, 227 release of, 717, 719, 722, 1219 jiower to pay, compound, compromise or refer, 1082 DEBTOR. See Creditors — Creditors' Deeds. arrangements between debtors and creditors, 812—818 appointed executor, 1076 — 7 marriage with, 495 bequest of sum due from, 496 legacy to, 1219 DECLARATION OF TITLE ACT, SCI DECLARATION OF TRUST, for what purpose used, 793 how trusts may be created and evi- denced, 793 — 4 liow construed, 795 DECREES to have eflect of judgments, 436 registration of, 437 DEEDS. See Void and Voidable Deeds AND Contracts. defined, 627 indentures, 627 deeds poll, 628 from what time a deed takes effect, 629 operate according to the oi'der of tlieir times of delivery, 629 bad English in, 629 the several parts enumerated, 629 date, 630 parties, 631 recitals, 635 operative part, 636 parcels, 637 habendum, 647 reservation, 650 covenants, 653 indorsed receipt, 667 different kinds of, 669 operating by transmutation of posses- sion ov not, 67<) passing bv assignment of personal! v, 736 DEEDS {continued). other than conveyances, 789 different kinds of, when considered with reference to their olyects, 706 stamp, 875 execution, 876 reading, 876 signing, 876 sealing, 876 delivery, 877 attestation, 878 avoidance of, by disagreement, 873 enrolment and registration of, 682, 879, 886 -, possession and transfer of, 886 attested copies of, 887 covenants to produce, 887 — 3 coiaccalmcnt of, 603, n. (V) mistakes in, 889 alterations in, 891 general rules of construction of, 892 construction of particular expressions, 899 estoppel, 902 cancelling, 905 operating in a different way to what was intended, 897 enuring in different ways, 898 deed operating as a will, 977 DEFEASANCE, nature of, 738 when made, 738 DEFEASIBLE INTERESTS defined, 372 their several kinds, 372 DEFORCEMENT defined, 551 effect of, 549—50 DELIVERY of a deed, 877 of property, where necessary, 732 — 3 DEMANDS, release of, 719 DEMESNES, meaning of, 643 part of copyhold estate, 121 DEMISE. See Lease. creating an implied covenant, 655 DENIZATION, 1178 DEPOSIT of deeds bv way of equitable secnrilv, 414 DERELICTION, 539 DESCENT. See Consanguixitv — Heir. definition of, 464 lineal and collateral, 464 INDEX. 1235 DESCENT (coidiii tied). what clescenLls, 469 table of, oppot-ite to p. iUO rules of descent of an estulc iu fee simple, by the common law, 470 as altered by the statute, 479 of an estate iu fee simple, from whom traced, by the common law, 470 by the statute law, 479 whether to heir ex parte materna, 471, 478 of an advowson, 471 of a remainder or reversion, 472 title by purchase acquired by one who originally took by descent, 471 to descendants of the propositus, 473, 481 to issue of coparceners, 482 — 3 to the person who is heir on the ancestor's death, 473 afterborn brother displacing a sis- ter, 474 afterborn son displacing uncle, 474 lineal ancestors excluded by the old law, but taking by the new law, 474, 482 to descendants of lineal cognomi- nal male ancestors, 474, 482 from one brother or sister to an- other, 474, 482 kindred by the half-blood, 474 excluded by the common law, 474 taking by the statute law, 482 to descendants of ancestors of a wife of a lineal cognominal male ancestor, 475, 482, 484 preference of male sex and of eldest male, 475, 482 coparcenary among females, 475, 482 right of propinquity among de- scendants, 476, 483 light of representation among de- scendants, 476, 483 preference of descendants of a less remote lineal cognominal male ancestor, 477, 483 preference of descendants of the ancestors of the wife of a more remote lineal cognominal male ancestor, 477, 484 to collateral kindred of the wife of a lineal cognominal male an- cestor, 477, 484 DESCEMT [continued). of an estate in fee simple, from a person whose title was by descent, 477 inheritances descendible ex parte materna, cannot be created, 478 to lineal cognominal male ances- tor's wives or their descendants, ancestors, or collateral kindred, 482 preference (by the statute law) of lineal cognominal male ances- tor to his descendants, 483 preference (by the statute law) of the less remote lineal cognomi- nal male ancestor, 483 preference (by the statute law) of the wives to their issue related by the half-blood, 484 preference (by the statute law) of the wife of a more remote an- cestor, and her descendants, ancestors, and collateral kin- dred, 484 of the ancestors and collateral kindred of the wife of a male ancestor — who shall inherit by the statute law I 484 preference of paternal line to nia- ternal, 484 preference of male paternal line to female, 484 pi-eference of male maternal line to female, 485 what property affected by the Sta- tute of Inheritance, 479 meaning of worils in the Statute of Inheritance, " land," 479 " purchaser," 479 "descent," and "descend- ants," 479 "person last entitled," 480 "assurance," 480 summary of alterations made by sta- tute, 485 order of succession stated genera'ly, 486 of estates tail, 487 bv special custom, 488 gavelkind, 488 borongh-EnglLsh, 489 copyholds, 490 custom of, to cease on commutation of manorial rights, 128 or on enfranchisement, 135 in the case of illegitimate children, 1169 from or through an alien, 1179, 1180 cast, 550. 55!"» 1236 INDEX. DESCRIPTION. Sec rABCELS— Woiics. DEVESTMENT, nature of, •when caused by adverse pos- session, 549 — 551 devesting words must be clear, 68, 992, 994 eflfect of, 77 not caused bv cancelling, 906 by fine, 926, '928 not to take place after payment, 1068 DEVISE. Sec Will. operative words, 1037 ■words expressive of the nature of in- terest, 1037 residuary devise includes lapsed and void devises, 1037 interim income, 1038 disclaimer of, 1038 tending to a perpetuity, 1038 by a joint tenant, 237, 987 the parcels or subject, 1038 rents, 1038 where the word "estate" passes all a testator's interest, 1038 where the word " estate " applies to realty, 1039 where a general devise passes leaseholds, 1040 , Avhere a general devise passes mortgaged or trust estates, 409, 1040—1 where a reversion passes, 1041 money devised or contracted to be invested in the purchase of lands, 1042 copyholds, not within the old Statute of Wills, ] 042—3 ; or Statute of Frauds, 973 devisable by general custom, 1043 surrender to the use of will, 1043 fees and fines, 1044, 1047 devise by tenant in tail, 1045 passing under general words, 1040, 1045 escheated copyholds passing with manor, 1046 revocation by surrender of, 1046 entry of wills on the court rolls, 1047 made void as against covenantees or obligees, &c. of the devisor, 604 DEVISEE. Sec Devise. right of, before admittance, 967 freehold in, before entry, 1038 DIGNITIES, 56, n. {x) DIRECTORS, remuneration to, 1092 DISAGREEMENT to a deed, 873 DISCLAIMER of tenure, 566 of interest, 739, 879 in the case of joint tenants, 739 by married women, 1113 by trustees, 873, 1102 DISCONTINUANCE, defined, 172—3, 547 how caused, 547, 676, 745, 931—934, 950 abolished, 547 effect of, 544 not to defeat right of entry or action, 559 DISJUNCTIVE, grant of several things in the, 640 DISSEISEE, confirmation by, 725 DISSEISIN, defined, 546 partial, 548 effect of, 549 DISSEISOR, assignee of tenant at will is a, 226 release to a disseisor or his heir or feoffee, 712, 721 DISTRESS, contracts by persons in, 856 DISTRESS, POWER OF, incident to rent-service, 17 — 18 in the case of a rent-charge, 18 given by statute, 18 DISTRIBUTION of the personal estate of an intestate, by the general law, 527 by the customs of London and York, 530 DIVIDENDS, right to, on sale of life interest in stock, 620 DOCTOR, transactions between him and his pa- tients, 834 DOMICILE, 983 DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA, 970 DOWER, defined, 189 requisites to, 190 — 191 gavelkind lands, 189 INDEX. 1237 DOWER (cohtinucd). customs as to dower to cease on com- mutation of manorial rights, or en- franchisement, 128, 135 !ul ostium ecclesise and ex assensu pa- tris abohshed, 190 out of what entailed estate, 191 equitable estate, 190, 271 incorporeal hereditaments, 191 mines, 192 estate already assigned for dower, 192 a rent, 22 an advowson, 35 tithes, 39 estates divested, 77, 78 estate in joint tenancy, 192, 235 estate in coparcenary, 212 estate in common, 217 remainder or reTcrsion, 192 — 3 estate subject to a chattel interest, 193 land of which the husband is mortgagee, 193 wrongful estate, 193 Jewess not entitled to, 193 when it attaches, 193 convej'ance iu fraud of, 193 widow has no estate till assignment, 191 assignment of dower operates by re- lation, 191 how assignment of dower must be made, 191 what may be assigned for, 194 effect of assignment of dower on land fomierly granted by copy, 126 — 7 arrears of, 194 not affected by alienation or charge prior to Dower Act, 193 ways of preventing (at law and equity) a title to dower from arising, inde- pendently of the Dower Act, 195 uses to prevent dower, 195 legal jointures, 197 terms for years, 201—2, 221 other modes of barring, losing, or pre- venting a title to dower. bar or loss of dower, at law and in equity, after the title has arisen, bv fine or recoveiy, 201, 203, "921—2, 948—9, 954 by exercise of a power of ap- pointment, 203 by statutory modes, 203 by bargain and sale of lands in Loudon, &c., 204 by divorce or adultery, trea- son or felon v. 204 DOWEE (rontuiued). other modes of barring, losing, or pre- venting a title to dower prevention or bar of dower in equity, 205 by gift of a trust estate, 205 by ante-nuptial agreement to settle lands, 205 by bond, 205 by election, 206 in-cvention or bar of dower under , the Dower Act, 207 by alienation, 208 by declai'ation, 208 by a devise, 208 partially affecting dower under the Dower Act, 208— 9 priorit}' over simple contract creditors, 209 agreement not to bar dower, 209 when it ceases, 188 alienation by tenant in, 567 surrender by a woman entitled to, 727 in the case of an alien, 1179 in the case of an exchange, 193 DOAYRESS, delivery up of title deeds by, 887 DRUNKENNESS of testator, 972 DURESS, relief against acts done under duress, 856 "DURING," denoting a special limitation, 64 DUTIES, release of, 722 EASEMENTS, 5 claim to, by prescription, 542 ECCLESIASTICAL PERSONS. See Clergy — Corpobatiox, &c. are quasi tenants for life, 180 waste by, 1190 ECCLESIASTICAL COMMISSIONERS gifts to, 303 EDUCATION, bequest for promotion of, 282 EJECTMENT, by a mortgagee, 376, 399 ELECTION defined, 1208 principle of, 1208 1238 lADEX. ELECTION {continued). where it arises in equity, 1208 by an appointee, 1209 by the heir, 1026, 1211 to what extent a person electing against a will forfeits the devise or bequest, 1212 where property of the person electing is mortgaged, 1212 as to one benefit, 1212 in the case of a settlement, 1213 need not be made in ignorance of cir- cumstances, 1213 presumed, 1213 none in the case of creditors, 1213 disability of part}', 1214 by jointress, 201 by a married woman, 1117 by widow, 206 grant rendered certain by, 638 to take property in an unconverted state, ] 201 ELEGIT, nature of, 421 execution rxndcr, 421 estate by, is a chattel, 228 extension of remedy by stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, p. 422 extinction of, 454 merger, 1193 EMBLEMENTS. .See Ckop.s. right of tenant for life or his under- tenant to, 176 right of tenant for years to, 219 statutory extension of occupation in lieu of. 176 right of dowress to, 194 riglit of widow to, in case of freebcncli, 212 right of jointress to, 200 in the case of an estate at will, 225 in the case of estate in fee, 1074 ENCROACHMENTS, 548 ENFRANCHLSEMENT of copyholds, 128—142 of customary freeholds, 135 at common law, 125 by statute, 128 voluntary, 125, 128 compulsory, 131 deed of, 12.5, 134 consideration for, 128, 131, 132, 138, 139 effect of, 53, 128, 134—7 charge of expenses of, 128, 135, 138 — 9 ENLARGEMENT of an estate upon a condition, 331 ENROLMENT. S'ee Words. agreed or directed to be laid out ia land, regarded as converted, 1200 curtesy of, 185 disposition of, 785 passes by term " lands," &c., 1042 delivery of, 274 acknowledgment of payment of pur- chase or mortgage money, 667 — 8 MONTH, meaning calendar month, 67 MONUMENT, bequest to keep up a, 1067 MORTGAGE. See Debts. defined, 373 in the form of an absolute conveyance or assignment, 373 INDEX. 1253 MORTGAGE (continued). by way of trust for sale, 398 Welsh mortgage, 373 purchases with right of repurchase, 374 wife of mortgagee not dowable, 193 where money is advanced by two per- sons in unequal shares, 232 severing a joint-tenancy, 236 money within the JMortmain Act, 292 power appendant, not destroyed by, 359 debt, out of what payable, 517 under decree for payment of debts, 507 forfeiture of mortgaged estates, 566 purchases by mortgagees, 834 — 6 with notice of another's title, 852 estates passing under a general devise, 1040—1 power to executors to convey mortgage estate, 411 of property of person electing, 1212 mortgagor barred by Statute of Limi- tations, 558 estates, &c., of mortgagees of unsound mind, 1103 judgments, &c., against mortgagees who have been paid oft', 412 I. Legal Mortgages of Real Property. what may be mortgaged, 375 mortgagee's estate, 376 mortgagee's rights as to possession, timber, and leases, 376 moi'tgagee's liability to account, 376 attornment, 377 interest, 378 conversion into principal, 378 increase of, on default in regular payment, 378 is apportionable, 378 arrears of, 378 leases to the mortgagee, 379 limit to mortgagee's advantage, 378 what the mortgagee may add to his debt, 380 charge for management, 380 allowance for receiver, 380 rights ot a mortgagee of a West Indian estate, 380 mortgage of au advowson, 32, 381 pre-emption, 381 production of deeds by mortgagee, 381 mortgagee ejecting or refusing a tenant, 381 priority of charges and securities, 381 tacking, 381 postponement of a pi-ior mortgagee, independently of tacking, 384, 852 MORTGAGE {continued). concealment of, by mortgagor, or ftilsi- fying pedigree, 385, 603, n. {e) foreclosure, 386 sale, 387—91 power to mortgage under the stat. 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, ss. 14—18, pp. 367—9 powers to sell, insure, and appoint receiver, under the stat. 23 & 24 Vict. c. 145, pp. 389—93 concurrent remedies of mortgagee, 388 mortgagor's estate, 394 equity of redemption, nature of, 394 where the mortgage is by way of trust for sale, 398 cannot be controlled, 394 — 5 incidents, 395 redemption of part, 396 redemption of one estate, 397 who may redeem, 397 extinguishment or loss of, 398 mortgage of, 402 subject to old uses or trusts, 406 right of purchaser of, 409 does not escheat, 41-3, 533 annual rests, 398 right of mortgagor as regards posses- sion, rents, and timber, 399 expenditure hy mortgagee, 400 of copyhold, 400 how made, 400 how vacated, 400 mortgagee frequently not ad- mitted, 400 what acts a mortgagee can do be- fore admittance, 401 consequences of the admittance of the mortgagee, 401 second surrender, 402 of freeholds and copyholds together, 402 of leaseholds, 402, 403 rent instead of interest, 403 for costs, 403 conveyance in trust to sell, 403 by a tenant in tail, 404 defective mortgage, 404 payment of debt, 405 of wife's estate, 406, 1127 first mortgagee answerable to second, 407 registration of a mortgage not notice, 407 protection of a mortgagee by registra- tion, 408 assignment of mortgage, 408 what a purchaser of a mortgage has a right to, 409 TJU2 1254 INDEX. MOETGAGE (continued). gift of a mortgage security, 409 devise by a mortgagee, 381, 409, 986, 1040—1 by a mortgagor, 986, 1041 right of second equitable mortgagee, 410 extinguishment of mortgage debt, 410 reconreyance, 410 judgments against mortgagees who have been paid off, 412 death of mortgagor intestate, and without heirs, 413, 533 right of executors of mortgagee, 413 only a partial execution of a poAver of appointment, 751 II. Equitable Mortgages of Real ProjKrtij, how created, 414 further advances, 415 priority, 415, 852 III. Mortgages of Personal Property, 416. See Assignment. distinguished from pledges, 416 stock, 416 a fund in Court, 859 non-delivery of possession, 416 priority, 417 tacking, 417 redemption, 417 sale, 417 indemnity, 418 of a sliip, 418 MORTMAIN, alienation in, 566 MOETMAIN ACT, title of, 285 preamble, 285 enactments by s. 1, p. 285 extension of these by s. 3, i). 290 enactments by s. 2, p. 287 enactments of 9 Geo. 4, c. §5, in expla- nation of s. 2, of the Mortmain Act, p. 288 provisions by recent statutes on the same subject, 305 objects of, 291 leaning of the authorities, 292 cases witliin the Act, 292 terms, 292 charges on realty, 292 estates in mortgage, 292 money to exonerate lands in mort- main, 292 money ou tolls, rates, and rail- ways, 292, and Addenda to that page profits from mooring chains, 293 navigation shares, 293 judgment debts, 298 MOETMAIN ACT {continued). cases Af ithin the Act, money to be expended in the erection or repair of buildings, 293 lien for purchase money, 293 proceeds of sale of land, 294 bequest to restore tithes, 294 secret reservation of life interest to grantor, 294 cases not within the Act, 295 trusts for the Universities, or for colleges therein, or for Eton, Winchester, or Westminster, 295 Scotch property, 295 Irish property, 295 Colonial property, 296 discretionary investment, 296 devise by a freeman of London, 296 melioration of lands in mortmain, 296, 297, and Addenda to p. 297 endowment of churches, 297 gifts to Incorporated Church Building Society, 297 establishment of a school or hos- pital, 297 policies, 298 arrears of rent, 298 devise for certain poor families, 298 railway debentures, 298 shares in a company, 298, but see 293 covenant to invest money on charitable trusts, 300 bequest as an inducement to bring lands into mortmain, 300 devise or bequest which on the face of it is absolute, 301 exemptions by other statutes, 303 licence to hold in mortmain, without enabling . corporate bodies to take otherwise than under the Mortmain Act, 305 MURDEE, forfeiture for, 564 — 5 NAME, of party to a deed, 633 of devisee or legatee. mistake in, 1003 blank for, 1003 initials, 1003 arbitrary signs for, 1003 misnomer of a corporation, 1183 INDEX. 1255 NEW EIVER shares are real property, 2 NATURALIZATION, 11 7S NEXT OF KIN, limitatious to, 337 exclusion of, 277, 1078—80 right of, under the Statute of Distribu- tions, 527 — 9, or the customs of London and York, 530 their title to undisposed-of produce of real estate, or money directed to be converted, or of the produce thereof, 1203 NOMINATION to a benefice, 32 NON COMPOS MENTIS. See Lunatic. NOTICE, of judgments, 450 not necessary to priority of equitable mortgage, 385 necessity of, on assignment, 733 — 4 mortgage or conveyance with notice of another's title, 852 doctrine of notice applies to property in a register county, 852 registration is not notice, 854 actual, 853 constructive, 853 time of, 855 protection of a purchaser against claims of Avhich he has notice, 855 OBLIGATION, release of, 719 OBLITERATION in a \nll, 982—3 OCCUPANCY, 535 estate pour autre vie, common occupancy of, 535 special occupancy of, 536 — 7 OFFICES, 56, u. {x) assignments of income, 856 — 7 persons holding civil offices are quasi tenants for life, 1 80 entail of, 170 OFFICEE, assignment of pay, &c., by, 856—7 OPERATIVE PART, 636 ORDERS. See Vesting Order. to have effect of judgments, 436 registration of, 437 releasing or discharging a contingent right, 1206—7 OWNERSHIP defuied, 1 three kinds of, 143 division of, into portions, 143 — 6 PARAPHERNALIA, 1131 PARCELS, in a deed, 637 in a will, 1038 I. Parcels generally, 637 territorial divisions, 637 old, general, or vague descriptions, 637 stating quantity, 638 property not included where it would work a forfeiture, 638 general words, 638 reversion clause, 638 "all the estate," &c., 638 means to attain or use the thing granted, 638 fruits, incidents, and accessories, 638 certainty in the subject-matter, 639 erroneous description, 640 mistake in quantity, 889 effect of adding words of a general character, 641 II. Particular Subjects of Property , 642 all lands or goods, 642 allotments, 645 commons, 639, 645 corn, 644 cottage, 643 farm, 642 fruit, 644 grass, 644 house, 639, 642 land, 638, 642 machinery, 645 manor, 643 messuage, 642 mines, 639, 644 pool, 645 profits, 644 rectory, 644 remainders and reversions, 645 share, 645 trees, 639, 644 toft, 644 vicarage, 644 watei', 644 wool, 644 III. Exceiitions, 646 PARENTS, frauds by, 830 frauds on, 837 bequest to, 1004. 1256 INDEX. PAEISHIONERS, gift or grant to, 634 purchases by, 1184 PARISH OR PARISH CHURCH, gifts to, 1017 PARK, 53 PAROL conveyances, 595 PARTICULAR ESTATE, what is, 322 PARTIES, either active or passive, G31 who must be, 632 how designated, 631 when a person need not be named as a party in the premises, 632 arrangement of, 633 description of, 633 where some are capable and others not, 633 who may be grantors or grantees, 634 acting by attorney, 634 PARTITION defined, 706 voluntary by persons competent to bind their interests, 706 by infants, tenants in tail, and husbands and wives, 709 compulsory, 706 modes of effecting, 707 mode of division, 709 implied condition, 710 deed required, 710 by joint tenants, 238 by coparceners, 241 by tenants in common, 247 rent for owelty or equality, 243 eviction of share, 710 PARTI^ERSHIP, property purchased by a, 3, 233, 1207 release of money, 719 PEDIGREE, falsifying, 603, n. (e) PEERAGE, condition requiring acquisition of, 79 PENALTY, ofa bond, 790, 793 PENDENTE LITE, assignment, 857—861 PENSION, assignment of, 857 PER coming in, in the, 533 PER CAPITA, where legatees take, 1059 — 60 PER STIRPES, where legatees take, 1059 — 60 PERPETUITIES, rule against, 338 in the case of powers, 341, 354 charities, 284 other objects, 1067 PERSONAL PROPERTY. See Chattels. when treated as realty, 3 when rent is, 21 in joint tenancy or common, not in co- parcenary, 229 uses of, arc trusts, 265 the primary fund for payment of debts and legacies, 514 PEWS, 56, n. («) PIN MONEY, 1131 PITS, waste in, 1189 PLEDGE, mortgage distinguished from a, 416 PLOUGHBOTE, 49 POLICIES, not within the Mortmain Act, 298 covenant to keep on foot, 664 assignment of, 865 PORTIONS defined, 1161 out of what payable, 516 raising, 1162 interest, 1162 satisfaction of, 1217 POSSESSION, distinguished from ownership of land, 143—6 different kinds of, 248 of tenant for years, 213 — 14 adverse, 343, 546 postponement of, after vesting, 340 of one coparcener, joint tenant, or tenant in common was the posses- sion of the other, but it is not now, 548, 556 entry not to be deemed, 555 of younger brother or other relative, 549, 556 when delivery of necessary, 732—3 INDEX. 1257 POSSIBILITY. See Contingent Inte- HESTs— Executory Interests. meaning- of a, 343 bare or mere, 343 on a possibility, 103 of reverter, 322, 332, 343 not releasable, 718 assignments of possibilities, 860 — 4 POST, coming in, in the, 533 POSTHUMOUS CHILD, rights of, 328, 473 POST-OBIT BONDS, &c., 828 POUR AT] TEE VIE, ESTATES, not strictl.y entailable, 171 devise of, 988 occnpancy of, 535 — 7 POWERS. Sec Appointment — Leases UNDER Powers. defined, 345 different kinds of powers, 345 common law powers, 345 statutory powers, 345 powers hj way of use, 345 powers of attorney, 345. Sec At- torney. powers of appointment, 346 powers of revocation, 346 connected or unconnected with an interest, 346 relating to the land and collateral, 347 powers appendant, appurtenant, and collateral, or in gross, 347 naked powers, 347 general and particular powers, 347 in the nature of a trust, or containing a gift by implication, 348 how an estate passes in the case of an appointment, 345 to whom powers may be given or re- served, 346 power of disposition by will not con- stituting a power of appointment, 348 creation of powers, 349 indication of intention sufficient, 349 forms required, 349 Avhere a consideration is neces- sary, 349 a commensurate seisin required, 350 the land should be conveyed to the releasee, &c., and not to his use, 350 POWERS {continued). creation of powers, bargains and sales do not admit of general powers, 682 to jointure, 198 to appoint to children, 350 to younger children, 350 to children subject to a condi- tional limitation, 350 power to charge portions for younger children, 351 implied gift to surviving children, subject to a power, 351 what interests are authorised, 350 power to raise portions not avail- able until they are wanted, 351 whether an exclusive appointment is authorised, 351 rule against pei-petuities, 338 to appoint to issue, 361 to appoint to relations, 352 shares in default of appointment, implied gift in defaidt of appoint- ment, 352 appointees entitled to share in the gift in default of appointment, 353 shares in default of appointment vest, 353 to sell, mortgage, or charge, for payment of debts, legacies, &c., 353, 367—9 direction or power to raise money out of rents, 353 unlimited power to charge, 354 effect of a power to grant, 354 power to " raise a sum," 354 power to mortgage does not autho- rise sale, 354 whether a power to mortgage or sell authorises a mortgage with power of sale, 354 where a power to sell authorises a mortgage, 354 where there is a power to charge with interest, 354 implied power of sale or mortgage, 367 as to perpetuities, 354 where power of sale negatives power to buy, 355 not exercisable by trustees ap- pointed by the Court, 355 Bale after many years, 356 under the stat. 23 & 24 Vict. c. 145, p. 389—391, 393, 1095 —1101 to insure or appoint a receiver under the Stat. 23 & 24 Vict. c. 145, p. 389 —393 1258 INDEX. POWERS {conUnuecl). to exchange under same statute, 393, 1095—1101 of revocation, 356 either totally or partially, 356 by a new appointment, 356 implied in power to appoint, 356 implied in power of sale, 356 implies a power to appoint, 356 resei'ved on an appointment, 357 at different times, 357 necessity for reserving, 357, 808 — 9 effect of the exercise of, 357 for what purposes intended, 811 vested in a bankrupt, 577 exchanges under, 705 release of, 718 execution of by married women, 1112, 1115 extinction of, by execution, 357 by death of the person whose con- sent is required, 358 of collateral powers, 358 of powers appendant by total alienation of the estate or inte- rest, 358 of powers in gross, by conveyance, 359 by release, 360 by failure of object, 360 suspended, curtailed, or qualified by partial alienation, 358 prevention of exercise of, by contract, 360 merger of, 360 limitation for life, with power of ap- pointment, 361 delegation of, 362 perpetuities, 361 PEACTICE, condition or agreement not to prac- tise, 866 PRil^CIPE, 946 recovery without a proper tenant to the, 947 observations as to the tenant to the, 956—8 PREMISES, signification of the word, 630 PRESCRIPTION, defined, 540 distinguished from custom, 540 must be certain and reasonable, 540 what may be claimed by, 540 in whom a prescription in a que estate must be laid, 541 PEESCRIPTION {continued). rights of common, 542 rights of way, 542 use of light, 543 lost, 545 PRESENTATION, next presentation is a chattel, 35 distinguished from a right of nomina- tion, 32 how made, 34 revoked or varied, 34 grant of next or any number, 35 reservation of the presentation for life, 36 devolution of the right of, 36 by joint tenants, 37 by coparceners, 37 by tenants in common, 37 by trustees and mortgagees, 32 lapse of right of, 568 release of, 719 devise of, 989 PRESENTMENT, of surrender, 962 PRETENDED TITLES, sale of, 858—9 PRINCIPAL, release of, 722 PRISONER, contracts by a, 856 PRIVIES, in blood and estate, 916 in right and representation, 75 and assignees in law, 76 PRIZE MONEY, assignment of, 857 PROBATE of will, 977, 1071 PROFITS, a prendre, 5 claim to, 5, 541 grant of, 644 release of, 718 PROMISES, release of, 719 PROPERTY, subjects of, 1 definition of, 1 PROPERTY TAX, annuity subject to, 998 PROSTITUTION, bond given as the price of prostitution or to a prostitute, 829 liTDEX. 1259 PEOTECTION. order of protection of property of a wife deserted, 1117—18, 1119—20 PKOTECTOR OF A SETTLEMENT, general rule where none is appointed, 777 in the case of part owners, married womeu, or an estate coniirmed, or restored, or disposed of, or created out of a remainder or reversion be- fore Dec. 31st, 1833, pp. 777—8 persons not to be protectors, 778 wlierc a bare trustee is to be, 778 power to appoint, 779 — 80 wlicre the Lord Chancellor or the Court of Chancery is to be, 779 consent, how far requu-ed, 779 subject to no control, 779 how given, 780 how construed, 780 enrolment of, 780 not revocable, 780 of a married woman, 780 of the Lord Chancellor or Court of Chancery, 781 in the case of copyholds, 781 in the case of bankrupts' estates, 783—5 "PROVIDED," importing a condition precedent, 320 importing a condition subsequent, 59, 320 importing a special or collateral limi- tation, 320 PUBLICATION of wills, 974, 982 PURCHASE. Bee Vendor and Pur- chaser. in another's name, 274 covenant or trust to purchase land, 278 of a charge, 495 title by, 462 PURCHASE MONEY, application of, 612 PURCHASER. See Vendor and Pur- chaser. different senses of the word, 462 — 3 who is the, in case of descent of an estate in fee simple, 478, or fee tail, 480—1, 487 QUALIFICATION, gift to persons possessing a certain qualification, or sustaining a certain character, 65 QUAREELS, release of, 720 QUASI REMAINDERS, 324 QUEEN ANNE'S BOUNTY, devises in favour of, exempted from tlie Mortmain Act, 303 QUIETUS, 500 RATES, money secured on, witliin the Mort- main Act, 292 BEADING a deed, 876 REAL PROPERTY, defined, 1 peculiar kinds of, 2 realty at law, but personalty in equity, and vice versa, 3 of a partnership deemed personalty, 3 when rent is, 21 descends to the heir, 469 RECEIPT, power to give receipts, 615, 1101 how acknowledged, 667 effect of different modes of acknow- ledgment, 668 indorsed, 667 RECEIVER, 380, 389, 391—3 RECITALS, nature and uses of, 635 effects of a recital on the construction, 635 not evidence against strangers, 635 false, 635 omission of, 636 general words of release restrained by, 635, 715 when working an estoppel, 668, 902 — 3 of payment of purchase moneys, 667 — S RECOGNISANCE. See Registration. defined, 420 disused, 420 defeasance of, 738 registration of, 497 merger, 1193 RECORD, alienation by matter of, 907 RECOVERY. Sec Fines and Recove-^ EiES Act, defined, 944 mode of suffering, 944 abolition of, 945 in unauthorised courts, 945 1260 INDEX. EECOVERY {continued). misnomer, misdescription, or omission in a recovery, 945 non-enrolment of tlie deed making tlie tenant to tlie writ, 945 omission to make the tenant to the writ, 945 in Wales and Cliesliirc, 945 right to suffer was incident to an es- tate tail, 99 for conveyance of eqiiitable estate, 271 what were not barred by a, 953 equitable, 957 efficacy varies with circumstances, 945 modes of operation, 945 I. By way of conclusion or estop- pel, 946 II. As an ordinary conveyance, 946 III. As an extinguishment of a right of entry or action, 947 IV. As an extinguishment of a power appendant or in gross, 360, 948 V. As a revocation of a devise, 948 VI. As a conveyance of the estate of a married woman, or an extinguishment of her dower, 948 VII. As a forfeiture, 567, 949 VIII. As a discontinuance, 950 IX. As an instantaneous bar of contingent remainders, 950 X. As an instantaneous bar of an estate tail, and of the remain- ders and reversion expectant thereon, &c., and a creation of a fee out of the estate tail, 951 by a tenant in fee, 946, 948 by a tenant in tail. See Tenant in Tail. by a tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct, 567, 949, 953 by an expectant heir in tail, 951 by a tenant by the curtesy, 567 by a tenant for life, 360, 567, 949 by a third person, with voucher over of the particular tenant, 949 by a tenant for life and an ulterior re- mainderman in tail, 359, 953 — 4 by a spiritual person, 947 by a tenant by the curtesy, 949 by a husband, 950, 954—5 by a married woman, 201, 203, 946, 948 by a woman of a marital estate, 949 by a devisor, 948 by a joint tenant for life, with a re- mainder in tail, 954 EECOVERY {continued). by a person having a right of entry or action, 947 by a donee of a power appendant or in gross, 948 by a mortgagor, 404 distinction between joint tenants and tenants by entireties as regards power of barring by recovery, 954 by married women, 1112 by an infant, 1158 deeds to lead or declare uses of, 747 EECTOEY, of what consisting, 5 lay in livery, 5 distinguished from advowson of, 5 may be mortgaged, 375 what passes by the term, 644 EEGISTEATION of judgments, statutes, recognisances, decrees, rules, orders, crown debts, lites pendcntes, life annuities, and rcntcharges, 437—452, 497 of removed judgments, &c., 448 of orders of the Court of Bankruptcy, 448 of certificates of assignees in bank- ruptcy, 583 object of the Eegister Acts, 852 — 3 is not notice, 407, 854 in Yorkshire and Middlesex, 449, 879 in the Bedford Level, 881 of bills of sale, 881 of wills, 977 RELATIONS, bequests to, 1013 EELEASE, defined, 711 different kinds of releases in deed at common law, 711 by way of mitter Testate, 712 by way of mitter Ic droit, 712 by way of extingviishment, 712 by way of enlargement, 712 statutory, 745 in law, 715 to a tenant by sufferance, 226 to one of two or more joint-tenants, 713 to a person having an estate by sta- tute merchant, statute staple, or elegit, 714 to a lessee, 713—717 to an under lessee, 713 — 714 to an assignee of a lessee, 713 to a tenant at will, 714 INDEX. 12G1 EELEASE {continued). to or by a person entitled to an intcr- esse termini, 638, 713, 714, 717 to one of several co-debtors or joint covenantors, 715 joint release to those against whom there are several causes of action, 716 to a disseisor, 721 to a disseisee, 714 to one trustee, 716 to the owner of a particular estate or to a remainderman or reversioner, 714—716 by one obligee or plaintiif, 719 by a husband, 1130 by tenant in tail, 716 by one joint tenant to another, 235, 712 by one coparcener to another, 712 by a conusee of a statute, 721 by an heir of a disseisee, 721 of right of action cannot be for a time, 712, 716 of breach of trust, 716 by enlargement, may be for life, 717 third person not entitled to benefit of, 717 things released, 716—717 part of land which is subject to a rent charge, 717, or judgment, 456 copyhold, 125, 963 covenant to do an act, 717 debts, legacies, and other duties, 717 interesse termini, 717 conditions, 116, 717 tenures, seigniories, services, rents, commons, and other profits, 52, 125, 712,718 contingent and other executory interests, possibilities, and ex- pectancies, 718, 860, 863 powers, 718 rights and titles of entry and ac- tion, 718, 858—861 money owing to a wife or partner, 719 next presentation, 719 obligation or cause of action, 719 when severiug a joint tenancy, 237 no uses on a release of right, 256 habendum in a release of right, 647 construction of releases of, 719 rent, 719 covenants, 719 promises and assumpsits, 719 debts or duties, 720, 722 EELEASE {continued). construction of releases of, quarrels, controversies, or debates, 720 actions, 720 suits, 720 right, 720 title, 721 demands, 721 claims, 721 the principal, 722 judgments, 722 general words restrained by recital, 715 operative words, 715 seal, 722 favoured, 723 upon condition or on a future time or event, 722 partial, 722 of a debt, 722 relief against, 723 operating as a covenant to stand seised, 897—8 RELIEF, 118 EEMAINDEES AND QUASI EE- MAINDEES, lax sense of the term remainder, 321 properly so called, 321 remainder not limited alter a fee, 322 freehold after a teim, 322 cross remainders, 323 quasi remainders in personal property, 324 cannot be limited as a legal in- terest by deed, 324 limitation over of consumable articles, 325 vested, 325 contingent, 325 four kinds of, 326 instances where limitations to the heirs or heirs of the body do not create, 327 time for vesting of, 327 sui^port of, 328 destruction of, 328 statutes 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, aiid 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, as to remain- ders, 328—9 after an estate tail, 326 usual limitation to trustees to preserve, 327 a limitation construed as a remainder rather than as an executory limita- tion not by way of remainder, 336 reversion will pass by the term, 645 creation or transfer of, or of any estate out of them, 678 1262 INDEX. EEMAINDERS AND QUASI EEMAIN- DEES {continued). remainders conveyed by lease and re- lease, 744 ; not by feoffment, 675 remainders lie in grant, 5 curtesy or dower of, 185, 192 where barred by a fine or not, 925, 927, 933, 940—1 "wliere barred by a recovery or not, 946, 951—2, 953—4, 955 REMAmDERMEN, bargains ivitli, 826 when remaindermen will not have the benefit of covenants, 663 REMOTENESS. See Pekpetuity. RENEWAL of copyholds, 123 charges of, 219 of lease by a mortgagee or person hav- ing a limited interest, 279 underleases need not be surrendered before, 696 where persons are out of jurisdiction, 696 fund for renewal, 697 discretion as to, 696 forfeited, 697 covenant for, 697 RENTS. See Rentcharge— Reservation. defined, 17 rent-service, 17 rcntcharge, 18 rent-seek, 18 remedy by distress for, IS rents of assize, 19 chief rents, 19 quit rents, 19 rack rent, 19 fee farm rent, 19 to whom reserved, 19 out of what reserved, 21 seisin of, 21 disseisin of, 546 when real and when personal property, 21 when rent will go to the heir, and when to the executor, and when to neither, 653 estates in, 22 to commence in futuro, 23 cesser of, for a time, 23 cesser of rent-service, 25 apportionment of, 25 — 30 arrears of, 30 grant of, by tenants in common or persons seised in severalty, 24 when liable to duty or tax, 24 RENTS {continued). when necessary on a lease, 692 obligation to pay rent, notwithstanding fire, 665 release of, 718, 719 defeasance of, 738 may be created by a covenant to stand seised, 742 — 3 in the case of leases under powers, 770—1 how reserved, 652 a service incident to freehold tenure, 118 duration of an interest for raising arrears of, 227 devise of, 1038 trust to pay rents to a person until another comes of age, 218 RENTCHARGE defined, 17 how secured, 18 against common right, 19 how created, 20 gi'anted by tenant for life or years, 596—7 may be conveyed to uses, 20 for jointure, 199 apportionment of, 25 — 30 cesser of, 25, 30, 596—7 priority of, 31 release, 26, 719 usurious purchase of, 871 registration of, 15 — 17 REPAIRS, neglect to repair, not " an act done or caused to be done," 116 notwithstanding accident, 665 obligation of devisee and executors of assignee to do, 695 REPUGNANCY in a deed, 895 in a will, 994 RESERVATION. See Rent. defined, 650 to a stranger, 651 subject of, 651 wdiat are exceptions, and what arc reservations, 651 modes of reserving, 652 RESIGNATION OF BENEFICE, engagements as to, 870 REVERSION, defined, 330 vested, 330 an incorporeal hereditament, 4, 678 INDEX. 1263 REVERSION (continued). no reversion on a qualified fee, 332 forming part of a particular estate, 332 on an estate for years, 332 rent incident to, 332 when lying in liyerj', 5 curtesy or dower of, 185, 192 reversion clause, 638 a remainder will pass by the term, 645 passes by the grant of the land, 645 conveyed by grant, 678 conveyed by lease and release, 744 passing by general words, 1041 — 2 will not merge, 714 where barred by a fine or not, 927, 933 where barred by recovery or not, 946, 951—2, 953—4, 955 EEVERSIONARY PROPEETY. See Reversion. of married Avomen, 1124 necessity for conversion of, 1199 REVERSIONERS, bargains with, 826 REVOCATION of authority to sell or purchase, 61 S of conveyances in trust for creditors, 812—813 power of revocation vitiating a deed, 850 of devises and bequests under the old law, 1020 1. Express, 1021 by a subsequent will, 1021 by a codicil, 1022 by a writing, 1023 hj burning, cancelling, tearing, or obliterating, 1023 2. Implied, 1024 by marriage and birth of a child, 1024 by alienation or disposition of the estate, 921, 948, 1024, 1046 by bankruptcy, 1029 by republication of a former will, 1029 of devises and bequests under the stat. 1 Vict. c. 26, p. 1029 RIGHT "put to a right," 551 release of, 720 conveyance by lease and release used by persons having only a, 744 of action not released for a time, 716 ROMAN CATHOLICS, bequest for Roman Catholic schools, 282 disabilities of, 1181 ROYAL GRANTS, 909 RULES OF COURT to have effect of judgments, 436 registration of, 437 SAILORS, bargains with, 828 SAINT GEORGE'S HOSPITAL, gifts to, 303 SALE. See Powers — Vendor and Pur- chaser. mortgage by way of trust for, 373, 403—4 of mortgaged estate, 387 under decree for payment of debts, 506 of settled estates, 597 SATISFACTION defined, 1215 distmguished from performance, 1215 where it arises, portions secured by settlement, 1215 portions left by will, 1215 legacies to creditors, 1218 legacies to debtors, 1219 annuities, 1220 covenant to settle lands, 1220 covenant that a wife or relative shall receive a gross sum on death of covenantor, 666 maybe rebutted, 1219 SCINTILLA JURIS, 255 SEALING a deed, 877 SEALS, destroying, 905 SECURITIES in another's name, 274 SEDUCTION, bond given by a seducer, 829 SEISIN. See Livery. meaning of, 146 constructive or in law, 146, 185 required to give a title to an estate by curtesy, 184 — 5 lessee for years has no, 213 liow joint tenants are seised, 234 how tenants by entireties are seised, 239 how tenants in common are seised, 246 how coparceners are seised, 241 1264 INDEX. SEISIN {continued). where necessary to constitute a root whence a descent is to bo traced, 470—2, 480, 485-6 actual seisin, how acquired, 471 of a remainder, 472 of a rent, 21 necessary under the old law of devise, 985 not necessary under the new law, 987 —9 heir not seised of the part assigned to the widow for dower, 475 SEPARATE USE. See Mabried Women. appointment for, 758 — 9 SEPAEATION, conditions as to, 96 deeds of, 1151 SERJEANTY, grand, 118 lietit, 118 SERVANTS, gifts to, 1017 SERVICES, 969 incident to freehold tenure, 118 incident to copyhold tenure, 969 release of, 718 SETTLED ESTATES, sale and alienation of, 597 leases of, 689 SETTLEMENT. See Marriage Settle- ment. wife's equity to a, 1144 voluntary, 822—5, 838—850 SHARES. See Mortmain. construction of the word, 645, 998 necessity for conversion of, 1199 SHELLEY'S CASE, RULE IN, 160 how inheritance is executed in the ancestor, 161 reasons of, 161 in legal estates and trusts executed, 162 in trusts executory, 163 SHIP, mortgage of a, 418 transfer of a, 731 SIGNING deeds, 876 wills, 971, 978—981 SIMONY, 867 SOCAGE tenure, 117 SOLICITOR lien of, 370 concealment of deeds, &c., or falsifying pedigree, 603, n. (c) duty of, as to unusual covenants for title, 800 transactions between solicitor and client, 832, 1017 unable to purchase when their clients are, 835 — 6 chai'ges by, when trustee, 1092 SON, where a word of limitation, 158 — 9 SPRINGING USE OR INTEREST, 333 STAMPS, 875 STATUTES. See Act, private, title, 908 commencement of operation, 908 application of, to copyholds, 124 STATUTES, LIST OF (a) :— 20 Hen. 3, c. 2 (emblements), 194 — 0. 4, Stat, of Merton (inclosure), 51 6 Edw. 1, c. 7 (alienation by tenant in dower), 567 13 Edw. 1, c. 1, Stat, of Westminster 2nd ( De donis conditionalibus. Entails), 156, 420, n. (a) — c. 34, Stat, of Westminster 2nd (loss of dower by adultery), 204 — c. 18 (elegit), 421 35 Edw. 1 (waste in churchyard), 1191 31 Edw. 3, c. 11 (administrators), 1070 1 Hen. 4, c. 6 (royal grants), 910 5 Hen. 4, c. 14 (inrolment of proceedings, on fines), 912 8 Hen. 5 (alien women), 1179 I Rich. 3, c. 7 (proclamation of fines), 912 3 Hen. 7, c. 4 (deeds of gift of goods, in trust for the use of the donor), 838 4 Hen. 7, c. 24 (proclamation of fines), 912, 922 II Hen. 7, c. 20 (alienation of lands of de- ceased husband), 567 (a) Most of the references under this title, to the Later Acts, are confined to cases in wliich the enact- ments are given verbatim. As to many of the pas- sages in which enactments are merely adverted to, or in whicii the effect of them is given, the reader is referred to tlie titles in this Index which express the subjects of those enactments. INDEX. 12G5 STATUTES, LIST OF (continued). 21 Hen. 8, c. 4 (power of sale by executors), 1078 — c. 5 (administrators), 1070 23 Hen. 8, c. (5 (recoacnisances), 420 26 Hen. 8, c. 13 (forfeiture), 563 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (uses), 251 s. 6 (jointure in bar of dower), 197 s. 7 (eviction of jointress), 200 — c. 16 ( Stat, of lurolment), 682 32 Hen. 8, c. 9 (pretended titles), S60 — c. 16, s. 23 (leases to aliens), 1176 — c. 23 (leases by husband and wife and tenant in tail), 687 s. 6 (power of husband over wife's land), 1124 — c. 34 (breach of conditions and covenants), 75, 771 — c. 37 (aiTears of rent due to wife before coverture), 112G 33 Hen. 8, c. 20 (forfeiture), 563 — c. 39 (Crown debts), 496, 497, 509, 790 34 Hen. 8, c. 22 (customary conveyances), 204 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 11 (loss of dower by trea- son or felony), 205 5 Eliz. c. 26 (lurolment in Lancaster, Chester and Durham), 684 13 Eliz. c. 4 (Crown debts), 496, 497 — 0. 5, s. 1, 5 (voluntary deeds void as against creditors), 838, 839 — c. 20 (charges on benefices), 458 23 Eliz. c. 3 (inrolment of proceedings on fines), 912 27 Eliz. c. 4, s. 1, 4 (voluntary deeds void as against purchasers), 845, 846 s. 5, 6 (deeds void as subject to a power of revocation), 850, 851 s. 7, 8 (registration of statutes and recognisances), 421 29 Eliz. c. 5 (voluntary deeds void as against creditors), 838 30 Eliz.c. IS (voluntary deeds void as against purchasers), 845 s. 3 (deeds void as subject to a power of revocation), 850 31 Eliz. c. 2 (proclamation of fines), 912, 926 — c. 6, s. 5 (simony), 867 43 Eliz. c. 4 (charitable uses), 281 21 Jac. 1, c. 16 (Statute of Limitations), 493, 933 3 Car. 1, c. 4, s. 2 (charges on benefices), 458 12 Car. 2, c. 24, s. 8, 9 (appointment of guardian), 1156 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 4 (charges ou benefices), 458 STATUTES, LIST OF {continued). 15 Car. 2, c. 17, s. 8 (registration of deeds in the Bedford Level), 881 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 10 (distribution of intes- tates' effects), 527 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (Statute of Frauds), 243, 247 s, 1 (a writing necessary in the crea- tion of interests de novo), 621 s. 2 (exceptions), 621 s. 3 (a writing necessary to the transfer of an interest), 622 s. 4 (agreements to be in writing), 622 s. 5 (devises), 973 s. 6 (revocation of wills), 1020 s. 7, 8 (declaration or creation of trust), 794 s. 9 (grants and assignments of trusts), 731—2 s. 10 (judgments), 432 s. 12 (estates pur autre vie), 536 s. 18 (recognisances), 421 s. 22 (revocation), 1020 — c. 31, s. 25 (distribution of intes- tates' effects), 527 1 Jac. 2, c. 17 (distribution of intestates' effects), 529, 530 4& 5 Will. 3, c. 16 (concealment of incum- brances), 398 — c. 20, s. 3 (registration of judg- ments), 437 6 & 7 Will. 3, c. 14 (registration), 437 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 36 (same), 437 — c. 37 (mortmain), 567 10 & 11 Will. 3, c. 16 (posthumous chil- dren), 328 11 & 12 Will. 3, c. 4 (Eoman Catholics), 1181 — c. 6 (descent through an alien), 1180 2 & 3 Anne, c. 4 (registration of deeds and wills in Yorkshire), 879, 977 4 Aniie, c. 16, s. 12 (payment of principal, interest, and costs), 793 s. 15 (deeds to declare uses), 748 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16, s. 9, 10 (attornment), 596 s. 19 (limitations), 493 5 Anne, e. 18 (registration in Yorkshire), 449, 684, 879 6 Anne, c. 18 (protection of cestuis que vie), 181 — c. 31, s. 7 (accidental fire), 1189 — c. 35 (registration in Yorkshire), 449, 684, 879, 977 s. 30, 34 (words " grant, bargain, and sell "), 656 7 Anne, c, 18, s. 2 (presentation by joint tenants, &c.), 37 1266 INDEX. STATUTES, LIST OF {continued). 7 Anne, c. 20 (registration in Middlesex), 449, 879, 977 — c. '21, s. 10 (corruption of blood), 468 12 Anne, st. 2, c. 12, s. 2 (simony), 868 — st. 2, c. 14, s. 1 (Roman Catholics), 1182 — c. 16 (usury), 870 3 Geo. 1, c. 18 (Roman Catholics), 1181 4 Geo. 2, c. 28, s. 1 (holding over after re- ceiving notice to quit), 218 s. 6 (renewal of leases), 696 8 Geo. 2, c. 6 (registration in Yorkshire), 449, 684, 879, 977 s. 35 (words " grant, bargain, and sell "), 656 9 Geo. 2, c. 36 (title and preamble of Mortmain Act), 285 s. 1 — 3 (mortmain), 285 — 7 s. 4, 6 (exemptions), 295 11 Geo. 2, c. 17, s. 5 (Roman Catholics), 37, 1181 — c. 19, s. 15 (apportionment), 27 s. 18 (holding over after giving no- tice to quit), 218 14 Geo. 2, c. 20, s. 6 (recovery), 958 s. 9 (estates pvir autre vie), 536 25 Geo. 2, c. 6, s. 1, 2 (witnesses to a will), 975 — c. 39 (descent through an alien), 1180 29 Geo. 2, e. 36 (inclosure for planting), 51 31 Geo. 2, c. 41 (inclosure for planting), 51 5 Geo. 3,c. 17 (rent out of incorporeal he- reditaments), 21 17 Geo. 3, c. 26, s. 6 (contracts for annui- ties), 1157 18 Geo. 3, c. 60 (Roman Catholics), 1181 25 Geo. 3, c. 35 (Crown debtors), 682 31 Geo. 3, c. 32 (Roman Catholics), 1181 33 Geo. 3, c. 13 (commencement of the ope- ration of statutes), 908 36 Geo. 3, c. 52, s. 31 (payment of legacy to an infant), 1162 37 Geo. 3, c. 136, s. 2 (stamps), 875 38 Geo. 3, c. 87, s. 6 (age of executor), 1069 39 Geo. 3, c. 93 (corruption of blood), 468 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 88, s. 12 (escheat), 534, n-(/). — c. 98, s. 1 (accumulation), 272 41 Geo. 3, c. 109 (Inclosure Consolidation Act), 51 42 Geo. 3, c. 116, s. 52, 154 (land-tax), 19, 173 43 Geo. 3, c. 30 (Roman Catholics), 1181 — c. 84, s. 10 (charges on benefices"), 458 STATUTES, LIST OP {continued). 43 Geo. 3, c. 107 (exemptions from Mort- main Act), 303 44 Geo. 3, c. 98, s. 24 (stamping after exe- cution), 875 47 Geo. 3, sess. 2, c, 24 (escheat), 534, n. (/). 53 Geo. 3, c. 141, s. 2, 8, 10 (annuities), 15, 16,1157 54 Geo. 3, c. 145 (corruption of blood), 468 (forfeiture), 564 — c. 168 (attestation of appoint- ments), 753 55 Geo. 3, c. 184 (stamps), 875 — c. 192 (sun-ender to the use of a will), 1044—6 57 Geo. 3, c. 99, s. 1 (charges on benefices), 458 59 Geo. 3, c. 94 (escheat), 534, n. (/) 3 Geo. 4, c. 92 (inrolment of annuities), 16 5 Geo. 4, c. 84, s. 26 (property of felons), 565 6 Geo. 4, c. 17 (escheat), 534, n. (/) 7 Geo. 4, c. 75 (inrolment of annuities), 16 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 2 (petit treason), 205 — c. 83, s. 24 (New South Wales), 296 — c. 85 (Mortmain), 288, 289, 305 — c. 94, s. 1 (resignation of bene- fices), 870 10 Geo. 4, c. 7, s. 23 (Roman Catholics), 1181 — c. 25, s. 37 (Greenwich Hospital), 303 11 Geo. 4 & 1 AVill. 4, c. 47 (debts), 504 s. 1 — 6, 8 (devises made void as against covenantees or obligees, &c., of the devisor), 504 s. 11 (conveyance by infant under decree for sale for payment of debts), 506 s. 12 (conveyance by persons having a limited interest, &c., under a decree for sale for payment of debts), 507 — c. 65, s. 3 — 5, 6, 8, 9 (admittance of persons under disability), 965 s. 11 (common recovery of copyholds of married women), 1116 1 Will. 4, c. 40, .s. 1, 2 (right of executors to undisposed-of residue), 1078 -9 — c. 46, s. 1 — 3 (illusory appoint- ments), 760—1 — c. 65, s. 3 — 8 (admittance to copy- holds), 1158 s. 12, 14, 15, 16, 20 (leases to mar- ried women), 1113 IXDEX. 12G7 STA'J'UTES, LIST OF (nnithiuaJ). 1 Will. 4, c. 65, s. 12 and 15 (infants smrcu- dcring- leases and hiking new ones), 1158 s. 17 (granting leases of estates of infants), 11 58 s. 18 (renewal of leases), 696 s. 16, 20 (leases by married women), 1113 s. 16, 18, 20, 21 (infant accepting surrenders of leases and grant- ing new ones), 1158 s. 26 (agreements on behalf of in- fixnts), 1159 2 & 3 Will, i, c. 71 (shortening time for prescription), 542 s. 1, 4 (rights of common and other profits ;i prendre), 542, 543 s. 2, 4 (rights of way and other ease- ments), 542—3 s. 3, 4 (light), 543 — c. 115 (Roman Catholic charities), 282 3 & 4 Will. 4, e. 27 (Statute of Limita- tions), 552 s. 1 (interpretation clause), 552 s. 2 (general rule as to recovery of land or rent), 552 s. 3 (when right shall be deemed to have accrued), 553 s. 4, 5 (when a remainderman or reversioner shall have a new right), 554 s. 6 (accruer of riglit to an adminis- trator), 554 s. 7 (accruer of right in case of a tenancy at will), 555 s. 8 (accruer of right in case of a tenancy from year to year, or for some other period without a lease), 555 s. 9 (accruer of right in case of rent wrongfully received), 555 s. 10 (mere entry not to be deemed possession), 555 s. 11 (continual claim), 556 s. 12 (possession of one coparcener, joint tenant, or tenant in com- mon), 556 s. 13 (possession of a younger bro- ther or other relative), 556 s. 14 (aclcnowledgement in writing to the person entitled or his agent), 556 s. 15 (case of possession not being adverse at the time of tlie Act), 556 s. 16 — 19 (disabilities), 556 s. 20 (when the right to an estate iu l)ossession is barred, the other STATUTES, LIST OF {f<>„t!,iiic(l). rights of the same person shall be barred), 556 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 21 (bar to a feiiar.t in tail, a bar to those whom he might have barred), 55 7 6. 22 (possession adverse to tenant in tail, adverse to persons he might have barred), 557 s. 23 (other eases where estates to take effect after or in defeasance of estate tail shall be barred), 557 s. 24 (suits in equity), 557 g. 25 (accruer of riglit in eds:s of express trust), 557 s. 26 (accruer of right in cases of fraud), 558 s. 27 (jurisdiction of equity to refuse relief), 558 s. 28 (barring mortgagor), 558 s. 29 (bar to ecclesiastical or eleemo- synary corporation sole iu re- gard to land or rent), 558 s. 30, 31, 33 (bar to right of presen- tation or advowson), 558 s. 34 (extinction of the right as well as the remedy), 558 s. 35 (receipt of rent to be deemed a receipt of profits), 558 s. 36 (abolition of real and mixed actions), 559 s. 39 (no descent cast, discontinu- ance, or warranty, to defeat a right of entry or action), 559 s. 40 (bar to money charged upon or payable out of land, and to legacies), 559 s. 41 (arrears of dower), 194 s. 42 (arrears of rent and interest), 30, 378 — c. 42, s. 3 (time for bringing action or suit), 379, 494 — c. 74 (Fines and Recoveries Act), s. 2 (abolition of fines and re- coveries"), 913, 945 s. 3 (assurances bj' persons liable after the 31st Dec. 1833, to levy a fine or sutler a recovery), 775 s. 4 — 6 (fine or recovery of lands in ancient demesne), 963 — 4 s. 5 (fine or recoveries in unautho- rised court), 913, 945 s. 7 (errors in fines rectified), 913 s. 8 (misnomer, misdescription, or omission in recoveries), 945 s. 10 (uon-enrohnent of the deed making the tenant to the writ for suffering a recovery), 945 1268 INDEX. STATUTES, LIST OF {coiillnned). 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 11 (omission to make the tenant to the writ), 945 s. 14 (-.varranty), 172 s. 15 (power of disposition of en- tailed land), 776 s. 16 (exception in the case of a tenant in tail ex provisione viri), 776 s. 18 (exception in the case of ten- ants in tail restrained from barring their estates tail and tenants in tail after possibility of issue extinct), 776 s. 19 (power to enlarge base fees), 777 s. 20 (expectancies of issue in tail), 776 s. 21 (disposition by a tenant in tail for a limited purpose), 777 s. 22 (protector ■\vlicre none ap- pointed), 777 s. 23 (protector in case of part- owners), 777 s. 24 (protector in the case of a married woman), 778 s. 26, 27, 28 (persons who are not to be protectors), 778, and Ad- denda s. 29, 30 (protector in the case of an estate disposed of, or created out of a remainder or a rever- sion before Dec. 31, 1833), 778 s. 32 (power to appoint protector), 778 8. 33 (where the Lord Chancellor or the Court of Chancery is to be the protector), 779 s. 34, 35 (how far protector's con- sent is required), 779 s. 36, 37 (protector to have absolute discretion), 779 s. 38 (confirmation of a voidable estate by a subsequent disposi- tion), 779 s. 39 (enlargement of a base fee by union with the remainder or re- version), 780 s. 40 (mode of assurance by a tenant in tail), 780 s. 41 (enrolment thereof), 780 s. 42 (protector's consent, how given), 780 s. 43 (consent by a distinct deed, how construed), 780 s. 44 (consent not revocable), 780 s. 45 (consent of a married Avoman as protector), 780 s. 46 (enrolment of consent by a distinct deed), 780 STATUTES, LIST OF {continued). 3 & 4 Will 4, c. 74, s. 47 (exclusion of the aid of a Court of Equity), 780 s. 48, 49 (consent of the Lord Chan- cellor or Court of Chancery), 781 s. 50 (application of previous clauses to copyholds, with exceptions), 781 s. 51 (protector's consent by deed), 781 s. 52 (protector's consent when not by deed), 782 e. 53 (equitable estates tail in copy- holds), 782 s. 54 (enrolment except on court rolls, not necessary), 783 s. .56 (power of commissioners to dispose of entailed lands), 783 s. 57 (power of commissioners to dis- pose of land wherein the bank- rupt has a base fee), 783 s. 58 (protector's consent), 784 s. 59 (enrolment of deed of disposi- tion and consent), 784 s. 60, 61 (enlargement of base fees in the event of there being no pro- tector), 784 s. 62 (confirmation of voidable es- tates by a subsequent disposi- tion), 784 s. 63 (acts of a bankrupt in regard to his estate tail void against a disposition by the commis- sioner), 784 s. G4 (power reserved to the bank- rupt himself by the statute), 785 s. 65 (disposition after the bank- rupt's decease), 785 s. 66 (disposition of copyholds to operate as a suiTcnder), 785 s. 67 (rents, covenants, and condi- tions), 785 s. 71 (disposition in the case of mo- ney subject to be invested in land which is to be entailed), 785 s. 74 (commencement .of operation of an inrolled deed), 780 s. 77, 78 (power of disposition con- ferred on married women by th.e Act), 786 s. 79 (acknowledgment of disposi tion), 786 s. 80—85, 87—89 (forms to be ob- served on acknowledgments), 786 s. 86 (relation of deed), 787 s. 90 (equitable interests in copy- holds), 787 INDEX. 1269 STATUTES, LIST OF {continued). 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 91 (dispensation Avith the husband's concurrence in certain cases), 787 — c. 87 (defects in awards), 51 — c. 104 (real estate to be assets for payment of debts), 504, 524 — c. 105 (DoAvcr Act), 207 s. 1 (interpretation clause), 208, n. (s) s. 2 (dower of equitable estates), 190 s. 3 (right of entry or action), 191 s. 4 (dower barred by alienation), 208 s. 5 (dower affected by charges, &c.), 209 s. fi, 7 (dower barred by declara- tion), 208 s. 8 (dower subject to conditions, &c.), 209 s. 9, 10 (testamentary disposition in bar of dower), 208 s. 11 (agreement not to bar dower), 209 s. 13 (dower ad ostium ecclesiae and ex assensu patris), 190 s. 14 (saving clause), 209 — c. 106 (Inheritance Act). s. 1 (interpretation clause), 479 s. 2 (from whom descent is to be traced), 480 s. 3 (devise to heir of testator. Li- mitation to the grantor or his heirs), 473, n. {d\ 481 s. 4 (limitation to the heir or heirs of the body of a person's an- cestor), 481 s. 7 (what line is to be preferred), 484 s. 8 (preference of mother of more remote male ancestor and her descendants), 485 s. 9 (half blood), 485 s. 10 (corruption of blood), 468 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 22, s. 1, 2, 3 (apportion- ment), 27—9 — c. 23, s. 2 (exemption from es- cheat), 533 — c. 29, s. 1, 2, 5, G (power to lend money on real securities in Ire- land), 1090 G & 7 Will. 4, c. 71 (commutation of tithes), 30, 40, 44, 46 s. 71 (merger of tithes or tithe rent- charges), 40, 44 s. 86 (apportionment of rent-charges under Tithe Act), 30 — c. 115 (inclosurc), 51 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 28 (recovery of land mortgaged), 554 STATUTES, LIST OF (continncd). 7 Will 4 & 1 Vict. c. 69 (commutation of tithes), 40 1 Vict. c. 26 (Wills Act), 978—9 s. 1 (interpretation clause). Sec Ad- denda. s. 2 (repeal of certain Acts), 1044 s. 3 (general power of disposition), 966—7, 937 s. 4, 5 (devises of copyholds and cus- tomary estates), 1044, 1047 .0. 3, 6, 34 (estates pur autre vie), 537 s. 7 (age of testators), 1156, 1161 s. 8 (wills of married women), 1114 s. 9 (signature and attestation to wills), 978, 981 s. 10 (appointments), 349, 749, 752 s. 11, 12 (soldiers' and sailors' wills), 979 s. 13 (pul)lication), 982 .s. 14 (incompetency of attesting wit- ness), 982 s. 15 (gifts to attesting witness), 982 s. 16 (creditor attesting to be ad- mitted a witness), 982 s. 17 (executor to be admitted a witness), 982 s. 18, 19, 20, 23 (revocation of wills), 1029—30 s. 21 (alterations in wills), 982 s. 22 (revival of will), 1036 s. 24 (at what time a will speaks), 995 s. 25 (residuary devise), 1037 s. 26 (general devise to include copyholds and leaseholds), 1040 s. 27 (general gift to include pro- perty subject to the general power), 763 p. 28 (devise without words of limi- tation), 22, 151—2 s. 29 (want or failure of issue), 169 s. 30, 31 (devise to trustees or exe- cutors), 152 s. 32, 33 (lapse), 1033—4 s. 34 (cases to which Act is not to extend), 978, n. (?•) 1 & 2 Vict. c. 64, s. 1 — 4 (merger of tithes), 41, 42, 44 — e. 106 (mortgage of benefice), 375 — c. 110, s. 11 (extension of creditor's remedy), 422, 453 s. 13 (judgment to be a charge), 425, 433, 505, 509 s. 14 (charging orders), 433 s. 17 (interest on judgment debts), 435 s. 18 (decrees, &e. of Courts of ecpiity, &c. to have cflcct of judgments), 436 X X 2 1270 INDEX. STATUTES, LIST OF {continued). 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 19 (registration of judgments, &c.), 437, 438 s. 21 judgments of palatinate couvts), 448 s. 22 (removal of judgments into superior Courts), 448 2 Vict. c. 11, s. 1 — 5 (registration of judg- ments, &c.), 438, 440, 441 s. 7 (registration of lis ixnclens), 446 s. 9, 10, 11 (Crown debts), 497, 500, 501 2 & 3 Vict. c. 60, s. 1, 2 (sale or mortgage for payment of debts\ 507 — c. 62 (commutation of tithes), 40 s. 1 (preservation of charges on tithes merged), 44 s. 2, 4 (apportionment of charges on tithes merged and not merged), 44, 45 s. 6 (merger of tithes of glebe), 46 s. 19 (commutation of tithes), 40 3 & 4 Vict. c. 15 (commutation of tithes), 40 — c. 31 (inclosure), 51 — c. 82, s. I (judgment debtors), 434 s. 2 (registration of judgments, &c.), 450 4 Vict. c. 21, s. 2 (lease for a year), 743—4 4 & 5 Vict. c. 35, s. 13, &c. (eommutation of manorial rights), 128, 137 s. 50 (apportionment of rent-charges under C!opyliold Act), 30 s. 56, 57 (voluntary enfranchise- ment), 128 s. 64 (title to lands voluntarily en- franchised), 128 s. 68, 69 (charge of expenses of vo- luntary enfranchisement"), 128 s. 70 — 72 (charge of consideration for voluntary enfranchisement), 128 s. 79, 80 (cesser of customs as to de- scent, dower, freebench, and curtesy), 128, 129 s. 81 (effects of voluntary enfran- chisement), 129 s. 82 (rights not affected by volun- tary enfranchisement), 130 s. 85 (partition of copyholds), 707 s. 87, 88, 91 (grants and admit- tances), 964 — 5 s. 90 (presentment), 962 5 Vict. sess. 2, c. 32, (neglect and omis- sions as to fines in Wales and Cheshire), 914 s. 3 (certain recoveries in Wales and Cheshire made valid), 945 5 & 6 Vict. c. 54 (commutation of tithes), 40 6 & 7 Vict. c. 23, s. 1 — 3 (consideration for STATUTES, LIST OF (continitcd). voluntary commutation or en- franchisement), 130 6 & 7 Vict. c. 37, s. 22 (gifts to Ecclesiastical Commissioners), 303 7 & 8 Vict. c. 55, s. 5 (consideration for voluntary commutation or en- franchisement), 131 — c. 66, s. 3—5 (aliens), 1177 — c. 76 (Act to simplify transfer of property), 628 s. 2 (livery), 5, 672 (enrolment), 684, 746 (lease for a year), 746 s. 3 (exchange, partition, and assign- ment to be by deed), 595, 703, 710, 732 s. 4 (leases and surrenders to be by deed), 595, 700, 729 s. 5 (assignments of future interests and rights of entry), 861 s. 6 (word "grant"), 655 s. 6 (Avord "exchange"), 705 s. 7 (operation of feoffment), 675, 676 s. 8 (contingent remainders), 328 s. 9 (reconveyance of mortgaged es- tate), 411 s. 10 (power to give receipts), 1101 s. 11 (indenting), 628 (parties to deeds), 632 s. 12 (remedies for rents and cove- nants where reversion is mer- ged), 597, 700--1 8 & 9 Vict. c. 59, s. 2 (Jewish charities), 282, n. (n) — c. 106 (Act to amend law of real property), 411 s. 1 (repeal of 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, s. 8), 684, 1101 s. 2 (hereditaments to lie in livery), 5, 672, 746 s. 3 (leases to be by deed), 595, 700 (sun-ender to be by deed), 595, 675, 700, 729 s. 3 (partition to be by deed), 711 s. 3 (assignments to be by deed), 732 (exchange to be by deed), 703 (feoffment to be by deed), 671 .s. 4 (operation of a feoffment), 655 (condition in law on a partition), 710 (condition in law on exchange), 705 (Avord "give " or "grant"), 655 s. 5 (indenting), 115, 628 (parties to deeds), 654 INDEX. 1271 STATUTES, LIST OF (conlnntcd). S & 9 Viet. c. 106, s. (3 (assignments of fu- ture interests, possibilities, and riglits of entry), 8G1 s. 7 (disclaimer by married women), 1113 s. S (contingent remainders), 329 s. 9 (merger of reversion), 597, 701 — c. 112, s. 1, 2, 3 (satisfied terms), 222—3 — e. 118 (inclosure, exchange, parti- tion), 51 — c. 119 (concise conveyances), 670, 787 — c. 124 (concise leases), 670, 788 9 & 10 Vict. c. 70 (inclosure), 51 — c. 73 (commutation of tithes), 40 s. 1 — 11 (redemption of tithe rent- charges), 46 s. 18, 19, 20 (merger of tithes), 42—44 10 & 11 Vict. c. 96, s. 1 (payment or trans- fer into Court of Chancery), 1107 — c. 104 (commutation of tithes), 40 — c. 119 (inclosure), 51 11 & 12 Vict. c. 70 (proclamations on fines), 913 — c. 87 (conveyance under decree for sale for payment of debts), 508 — c. 99 (inclosure), 51 12 & 13 Vict, c, 26 (defective leases), 772 —4 — c. 7 4 (payment or transfer into Court of Chancery), 1108 — c. 83 (inclosure), 51 — c. 89 (certificate of Lords of the Treasury), 501 — c. 1 06 (Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act), 573 s. 48 (orders in Chancery and bank- ruptcy), 436 s. 125 (goods in possession, &c. of bankrupt), 577 s. 126 (alienations by traders in in- solvent circumstances), 579 s. 133, 134 (transactions not affected by bankruptcy), 580, 581 s. 141 (personal estate to vest in assignees), 576 s. 142 (real estate to vest in as- signees), 573 s. 143 (registration), 583 s. 145 (assignees accepting or declin- ing, or not electing either to ac- cept or decline, any land subject to a perpetual yearly rent or any lease), 575 s. 1 46 (assignees not electing to cither abide by or abandon anv agrec- STATUTES, LIST OP {continued). ment for purchase of real es- tate), 576 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, s. 147 (powers for bankrupt's benefit may be exe- cuted by assignees), 577 s. 148 (ordering bankrupt to join in conveyances), 583 s. 149 (estates granted by a bankrupt subject to a condition or proviso for redemption), 576 — c. 110 (defective leases), 774 13 Vict. c. 17 (defective leases), 774 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60 (Trustee Act, 1850), 708, 1103. Bee Trustees. — c. 97 (stamps), 875 s. 6 (duty payable in respect of a lease for a year), 747 s. 12 (penalty for stamping after exe- cution of instrument), 875 14 & 15 Vict. c. 25, s. 1 (extension of occu- pancy in lieu of emblements), 176, 219 — c. 53 (commutation of tithes), 40 — c. 83, s. 7 (jurisdiction in bank- ruptcy), 436 — c. 97, s. 8, 24 (gifts to Ecclesiastical Commissioners), 303 15 Vict. c. 24 (signatures to will), 978, 979 15 & 16 Vict. c. 51, s. 1 (compulsory en- franchisement), 131 s. 7, 9 (compensation for compulsory enfranchisement), 132 — 3 s. 10 (priority of charge of compensa- tion for compulsory enfranchise- ment), 133 s. 11 (deed of enfranchisement), 134 s. 12 (certificate of charge), 134 s. 13 (transfer of charge), 134 s. 25, 26 (enfranchisement avoided by offer to purchase), 134 s. 27 (compulsory enfranchisement of customary freeholds), 135 s. 31, 32 (charge of expenses), 135 s. 34 (cesser of customs as to descent, dower, freebencli, and curtesy), 135 s. 36 (power to sell rent-charge), 136 s. 37, 38 (redemption of rent-charge), 136 s. 45 (saving of commonable rights), 53, 136 s. 48 (what rights not affected by compulsory enfranchisement), 137 s. 53 (Act to be deemed part of pre- vious Copyhold Acts), 137 ■ — c. 55 (extension of Trustee Act, 1850), 1104 1272 INDEX. STATUTES, LIST OF (continued). 15 & IG Vict. c. 76, s. 219, 220 (redemption of mortgage at law), 37G — c. 79 (inclosure), 51 — c. 80, s. 48 (sale of mortgaged estate), 386 10 & 17 Vict. c. 51 (succession duty), 492, n. («). c. 57 (enfranchisement of copy- holds), 138 — c. 70 (Lunacy Regulation Act, 1853), 965, '1174 — c. 107, s. 196, 197 (obligations to the Crown), 501—2 — c. 124 (commutation of tithes), 40 — c. 137 (charitable trusts), 279, n. (y) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36 (registration of bills of sale), 684, 881 — c. 75 (acknowledgments of married women taken by persons inte- rested), 786 — c. 90 (inrolment of annuities — usuiy), 16, 871 — c. 97 (inclosure), 51 — c. 113 (payment of mortgage debts), 518, 521, 522, 1027 IS Vict. c. 13 (amendment of Lvmacy Regu- lation Act, 1852), 1175 — c. 15 (protection of purchasers, mortgagees, and creditors, 15, 412 18 & 19 Vict. c. 43 (marriage settlements), 1159 — e. 124 (charities), 279 19 & 20 Vict. 0. 94 (customary distribu- tion), 532 ~ c. 97, s. 9, 10, 12 (limitations), 493—4 — c. 120 (leases and sales of settled estates), 597, 598, 1159 20 & 21 Vict. c. 31 (inclosure), 51 — c. 57 (reversionary interests and powers of married women), 1128 — c. 77 (probate), 1071—2, 1082 — c. 85, s. 21, 25, 26 (married women deserted or separated), 1117 — 1119, 1120 21 & 22 Vict. c. 77 (leases and sales of settled estates), 597, 690 — c. 94 (the Copyhold Act, 1858), s. 6, 131 s. 21, 25 (charge of consideration money), 138 s. 22 (charge of value of land given as enfranchisement considera- tion), 138 s. 23 (power to lord to charge land purchased), 138 s. 24—27 (charge of expenses), 138 —9 STATUTES, LIST OF (ronthmed). 21 & 22 Vict. c. 94, s. 28, 29, 30 (certifi- cates of charge), 139, 140 s. 31 (lord's charge to be appurte- nant to the manor), 140 s. 33 (priority of charge), 141 s. 34 (charge not to merge), 141 g. 35 (recovery of sums charged), 141 8. 35 (land charged with enfranchise- ment consideration as the mort- gage in fee), 141 s. 52 (construction of Act), 142 — c. 95, s. 16 (probate), 1083 — c. 108 (order of pi-otcctiou and decree for separation), 1119 — 21 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35 (Law of Property and Trustees' Relief), s. 1, 2 (licence to assign, &c.), 72 — 3 s. 3 (benefit of conditions or powers of re-entry), 76 s. 4 — 9 (insurance), 653, n.{h). s. 10 (release from a rent-charge), 26 s. 11 (release from a judgment), 456 s. 12 (appointments), 756 s. 13 (payment' by mistake), 612, n.ih) s. 14 — 18 (raising money by sale or mortgage), 367 — 9 s. 19, 20 (descent), 480-1 s. 21 (assignment), 737 s. 22 (judgments), 498 s. 23 (po-nerto give receipts), 615 s. 24 (fraud of vendor or mortgagor), 603, n. (e) s. 25 (interpretation clause). Ad- denda s. 26 payments or acts under a power of attorney), 362 s. 27, 28 (liability of executors), 659 —60 s. 31 (trustees' indemnity and re- imbiu-sement), 1091 s. 32 (investment), 1086 — c. 43 (inclosure), 51 — e. 61, s. 5 (married women di- vorced), 1155 23 & 24 Vict. c. 15 (stamps), 875 — c. 38, s. 1 — 5 (judgments, &c.), 438, 439, 443—4, 448 s. 6 (waiver of covenant or condition), 73 s. 7 (scintilla juris), 255 s. 8 (fraud), 603, u. (c) s. 12 (investment), 1086 s. 13 (property of intestates), 560 — c. 93 (tithes), 40, 46 — c. Ill (stamps), 875 — c. 115, s. 1 (bonds to the Crown), 502 8. 2 (judgments), 456 INDEX. 1273 STATUTES, LIST OF (continued). 23 & 2i Vict. c. 134, 136 (charities), 279, n. iy) — c. 145, s. 1—10, 31—34 (powers of sale, exchange, and renewal of leases), 1095—1101 s. 11—24 (powers to sell, insure, and appoint receivers), 389, 393 s. 25 (investment), 1087 s. 26 (maintenance), 1168 s. 27 (new trustees), 1105 s, 29 (power to give receipts), 615, 1101 s. 30 (powers of executors), 1082 24 Vict. c. 9 (charities), 305 24 & 25 Vict. c. 114 (domicile), 983 -^ c. 134, s. 114, 115 (bankrupts^, 574 s. 185-7, 192, 194, 196, 197, 200 (deeds of arrangement and com- position), 814—818 25 & 26 Vict. c. 17 (charities), 309 — c. 53 (transfer of land), 561, 788 — c. 63, s. 3 (ships), 418 — c. 67 (declaration of title), 561 — c. 86, s. 1 — 15 (insane persons"), 1175 — c. 108 (minerals), 702, n. (c), 706, n. (t), 1109 26 & 27 Vict. c. 106 (charities), 311 27 Vict. c. 13 (charities), 311 27 & 28 Vict. c. 45 (settled estates), 597, 690 — c. 112 (judgments), 429, 444, 453 —4 28 & 29 Vict. c. 72 (wills of seamen), 979 29 & 30 Vict. c. 57 (charities), 312 — c. 96, s. 1—5, (registration), 884 —5 30 & 31 Vict. c. 47 (registration), 447 — c. 69 (debts), 519 — c. 132 (investment of trust funds), 1086—7 31 Vict. c. 4, s. 1—3 (reversionary interest), 828 31 & 32 Vict. c. 40 (partition), 708 — c. 44, s. 1, 2 (charities), 304—5 s. 3 (enrolment), 314 — c. 54 (judgments and decreets), 457 32 & 33 Vict. c. 71 (Banla-uptcy Act, 1869), 585 STATUTE MEECHANT OR STAPLE. See Eegistration. estate by, is a chattel, 228 defeasance of, 738 merger of estate by, 1193 STATUTE MEECHANT, defined, 420 STATUTE MERCHANT {(•mitlnucd). disused, 421 extinction of, 454 STATUTE STAPLE, defined, 420 disused, 421 extinction of, 454 STOCK, purchase or transfer of, in another's name, 274 the subject or security for a loan, 416 contract for transfer of, 416 SUBPUECHASE, where the original contract is disputed, 859 SUCCESSION of corporate property, 491 SUCCESSION DUTY, 491 SUFFERANCE, interest by, 226 SUICIDE, forfeiture for, 565 SUITS, release of, 720 SUPERSTITIOUS USES, bequest for, 283, n. SUEEENDEE defined, 726 express or in deed, or implied or in law, 726 presumed, 223 operative words, 726 what may be surrendered, 726 requisites, 726 on condition, 729 of an interesse termini, 729 to one joint tenant, 235, 729 no uses on a surrender, 256 severing a joint tenancy, 237 where it does not aflect interests cre- ated by the sun-enderor, 596—7 in law of a lease, 729 — 30 operating as a grant, release, &c., 898 feoffment operating as a, 898 habendum in, 648 SUEEENDEE OF COPYHOLDS, defined, 962 alienation by, 962 mode of surrender, 964 w'ords of limitation in a surrender, 966 construction of, 966 to the use of a wiU, 1043—4 of married women, 1114 1274 INDEX. SURVIVOR. See Survivorship. where he takes a contingent remaindcv, 2.30—1 SURVIVORSHIP. See Joint Tenaxcy. 230, 246—7, 999 necessity ibv surviving i)arent.-=, 3-38 TACKING, 381, 417 TAXES, clear of taxes, 664, 998 parish collector of, 499 TENANCY IN COMMON. See Tenant IN Common. defined, 245 liow ci-eated, 245 ■\vliat iniity necessary, 246 no entirety of interest, 246 cnrtcsy and dower, 247 of advowson, 35 of tithes, .39—40 dissohition of, 247 partition, 247 TENANT, meaning of, 117 TENANT EOR LIFE. See Life. TENANTS IN COMMON. Sec Tenancy IN COIIMON. liability to extent, 431 possession of one was the possession of the other, 548 where one is incapable of taking, G33 leases by, 690 gi-ant of rent by, 23 presentation by, 37 lapse of shares of, 1031 livery of or to, C73 confirmation of estate of one, 724 — 5 disagreement by one, 873 TENANT IN TAIL. See Fee-Tail. Fiiic by a tenant in tail in possession, with proclamations, 922, 933 witliout proclamations, 92.'», 920, 931 by a tenant in tail in remainder or re- ' version, 924—5, 935 by a tenant in tail disseised, 923 by a tenant in tail after creating a derivative life estate in possession, 934 by a tenant in tail after assigning dower, 935 by a tenant in tail wlio had made a lease not warranted by the statute, or confessed a judgment, or incum- l)cred his estate. 919 TENANT IN TAIL (contnnieil). by a tenant in tail after a fine by his issue, 923 by an equitable tenant in tail, 924 by a tenant in tail by the gift of the Crown for services, 924, 933 by a woman tenant in tail of land given by lier liusband or his ances- tors, 949 by the tenant in tail of an incorporeal hereditament, 927—8, 941 by a mortgagor or a mortgagee, 941 — 2 by the tenant in tail of a rent, 925, 928 by one who had but a contingent interest in tail, 923 by a grantee of a tenant in tail, 929 by a stranger to a tenant in tail, 925 Recovery by a tenant in tail operating by estoppel, 946 by a tenant in tail without a proper tenant to the prrecipe, or without a voucher, 946 by a tenant in tail in possession, 951 ])y a tenant in tail in remainder, 952 bv a donee of a contingent interest in 'tail, 951 by a tenant in tail after a voidable conveyance or settlement, 947 by a tenant for life, and an ulterior remainderman in tail, 952 by a tenant for life, with a remote re- mainder in tail, 949 by a joint tenant for life, with a re- mainder in tad, 954 b}' a tenant in tail where the reversion was in the Crown, 955 by an equitable tenant in tail, 957 TENANT IN TAIL AFTER POSSI- BILITY OF ISSUE EXTINCT, alienation by, 567, 726 TENANT-RIGHT ESTATES, 123 TENEMENT, meaning of word, 2, 117 TENURE explained, 117 release of, 718 TERM FOR YEARS. See Years, Es- T.VTE FOR. meaning of word "term," 215 is a chattel, 2 for what used in former day.s, 2 distinguished from a freehold interest, 145 INDEX. 127i TKRM FOR YEAKS {conUnued). use made thereof for protection against estates, charges, and incumbrances, 220 dower prevented by, 201 set aside, 200, 222 attendant, 220—4 in gross, 220 — 2 satisfied, 220—4 Stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 112, as to satisfied tenns, 222 presumed surrender, 223 in copyholds, 224 uses of, are not executed, 265 uses of land for a term are executed, 265 limitation over, after a, 322 grant of term for life, i-emainder over, 324 grant of residue of, after death of ter- mor, 691 confirmation of part of, 725 assignment from a future time, 735 — 6 defeasance of, 738 revocation of a bequest of term by its becoming attendant, 989 merger of, 1193 charges of renewal of, 219 liable for debts, 503 within the Mortmain Act, 292 effect of judgment on, 425, 426, 427 covenants on sale of, 801 effect of fine or recovery on, 939 — 940, 954. Sec Fine and Recovery. TESTAMENT, 970. See Will. TESTATORS. See Will. agi'cement to influence, 865 THELLUSSON ACT, 272 THINGS, division of, 1 real, 1 personal, 2 lying in livery and in grant, 5 TIMBER. See Waste. defined, 1185 on land leased, 691 — 2 M'aste in regard to, 1185, 1191, and Addenda to that page where the Court of Chancery will per- mit timber to be felled, 1187 TITHES defined, 38 their several kinds, 38 to whom due, 38 portions of, 38 lay impropriations, 39 origin thereof, 39 estates in tithe? in lay lands, 39 TITHES (continued). la}' impropriations, alienation of tithes in lay hands, 39 other incidents to them, 39 title to them, 39 lying in livery, 5 cannot be granted by owner of advow- son, 36 commutation, 40 merger of tithes or tithe rent-charges, 40 preservation of charges on tithes merged, 41 apportionment of charges on tithes merged or not merged, 44 redemption of tithe rent-charges, 46 jurisdiction of the tithe commutation eommissiouers, 46 may be mortgaged, 375 title to, 603 by whom payable, 692 TITLE. See Vendor and Purchaser. modes of obtaining unimpeachable title under new statutes, 561 defined, 462 by descent and by purchase, 462 specific kinds of titles, 463 release of, 721 TOLLS, right to receive, 54 of a lighthouse are real property, 2 money secured on, witiiin the Mort- main Act, 292 TOMBS, bequest for keeping up, 1067 TRADE, restraint of, 97, 654, 866, and Ad- denda to p. 654 condition against carrying on certain trades, 97 sale of trade secret, 97 use of a trade mark, 619 TRANSFER OF LAND ACT, 501 TREASON, forfeiture for, 563 — 5 TREASURE-TROVE, 54 TREES, sold by a tenant in tail, 1 73 gi-ant of, 639, 644 waste in regard to, 1185 TRUSTS. See Uses. definition of an equitable estate, and of an equitable interest, 200 meaning of the term " trust " and " trust estate," 200 different kinds, 261 1276 INDEX. TEUSTS iconllmted). express priyatc, 2G1 definition of an express Irust, 2G1 executed and executory, 201, 209 constriictive, defined, 278 under a covenant or agreement to convey, transfer, or pay money or other property, 278 on a fi-audulent conveyance, 279 of a lease renewed, 279 express uses unexecuted by tlie sta- tute are trusts, 262 wliat uses are not executed, 262 — 266 uses on uses are trusts, 262 uses •\vliich could not be executed consistently with the intention, are trusts, 264 uses of chattels are trusts, 265 uses of copyholds, 266 what words will create, 266 governed by the same rules as legal estates, 269 exceptions, 269 conveyance of equitable estates, 271 declaration of, 271, 793 for accumulation, 272 implied or resulting, 273 conveyance, assignment, transfer, or security in another's name, 273 — 5 where trusts fail or the property is unexhausted hx the trust, 270 where there is no consideration, use, or trust, 277 where a particular interest only is limited, 277 iise of a rent upon a use, 20 trust estates passing under a general devise, 1040—1 forfeiture of trust estates, 566 enforced in favour of volunteers, 757, 823 void trusts engrafted on an appoint- ment , 758 TRUSTEES, Avho may be, 1084 etiuity never wants a trustee, 1084 devolution or delegation of a trust, 1084 investment bj', 1086—90 must join in conveyances and receipts, 1091 notice to, 733, 735 responsibility, 1091 protected in acting under powers of attorney, 362 every trust instrument to be deemed to contain indemnity and reimburse- ment clauses, 1091 remuneration, 1092 TRUSTEES (continued). expenses, 1093 liencfit to, 834—5, 1092 legacy to, 1015 wrongful conversion, cliarge, or aliena- tion by, 1094 as to receipts of trustees being effec- tual discharges, 1101 convej-ance of legal estate to cestui que trust, 1102 renunciation of trust, 873, 1102 provisions of stat. 13 & 14 Viet. c. 60, 15 & 16 Viet. c. 55, and 23 & 24 Vict. c. 145, as to trustees of unsound mind, 1103 who arc infants, 1103 out of jurisdiction, 1103 who cannot be found, 1103 where it is uncertain wlio was the survivor, 1103 where it is uncertain whether living or dead, 1103 — 4 where a trustee dies without an heir, or it is not known who ia his heir or devisee, 1103 unborn, 1103 who neglect or refuse to transfer or receive income or sue, 1104 who refuse or neglect to convey or release, 1104 convicted of felony, 1105 power to appoint a person to convey, assign, release, dispose of, or transfer, 1104 cfl'ect of a vesting order as to stock or choses in action, 1104 effect of an order as to copyholds or customary lands, 1104 certain persons deemed trustees, 1104 general power to appoint and vest, 1104—5 vesting order in the case of lands directed to be sold, 1104 vesting orders to be stamped, 1105 principles of the Court in selecting ncv,- trustees, 1105 vacancy before testator's death, 1107 increase in number, 1107 appointment of trustees whom the tes- tator has excluded, 1107 payment or trfinsfer of trust funds into the Court of Chancery, 1107 when they take a fee, 150 when they take the legal estate, 264 usual limitation to preserve contingent remainders, 327 lien of, 371 sale by, 618, 625 purchases by, 834 — 5 INDEX. 1277 TPtUSTEES {continued). duty of, in exercising a power, 705 covenant by, 798 statutory power to sell or morlcjage, 367 UNCEETAINTY in a deed, 872, 894 in a \yill, 995— G UNDERLEASE by a person entitled to iuteresse ter- mini, 216 distinguished from a lease, 685 obligation of covenants on uuderlessee and persons claiming under him, 662, 699 from a future time, 735 — 6 amounting to an usurious contract, 870 UNDERWOOD granted by copy, 122 UNSOUND MIND. See Lunatics. " UNTIL" denoting a special limitation, 64 " UPON," whether expressive of contingency, 318 USES. See Trost-s. meaning of, 249 origin of, 249 evils incident to, 250 Statute of Uses and its operation, 251 —253 in the case of rents, 20 where word "use" or "trust" not necessar}', 252 seisin to serve, 255 no use on a release of right or surren- der, 256 on a bargain and sale, or covenant to stand seised, or appointment, 256, 262, 76,5—6 who may be seised to, 256 who may be cestui que use, 256 when a person takes by the common law, and when by the Statute of Uses, 257 of what an use maybe limited, 257 limited by will, 257 resulting, 258 deeds to lead and declare uses, nature of, 747 of fines or recoveries, 748 variance between fine or recovery and, 748 USES (rontinitecl). deeds to lead and declare uses. measure of right of declaring uses, 749 deeds of revocation, 749 USURY, 8 70- -2 VENDOR AND PURCHASER. See Conditions of Sale — Feaud. vendor's title, 599 length of, 599 kind of title required, 600 implied agreement to make a title to all the vendor's in- terest, 600 doubtful title, 601 title under indemnity, 601 equitable title, 601 " freehold," 601 title depending on destruc- tion of contingent remain- ders, or on the Statute of Limitations, 601 incomplete title, 601 compensation, 601 lessor's title, 602 title to lands allotted, 602 title to lands taken in ex- change, 602 title to enfranchised land, 602 title to property derived from the Crown, 602 title to tithes, 603 under a power, 600 under a post-nuptial settlement, 600 defects in, 60-3, 609 investigation of title by vendor to determine on what conditions to sell, 605 waiving objections, 604 description of the property, 606 application of purchase-money, 612 power to give receipts, 615 mistaken paj'ment to a tenant for life or other party, 612, n. {h}. vendor's lien, 519, 615 proviso as to penalty for breach of agreement, 611 sale of an estate for an annuity, 618, 625 sale by trustees and others, not being owners, 618 purchase by a tenant for life, 836 indemnity to a vendor, 618 conveyance to one purchaser, 618 resale of estate sold by the Court of Chancery, 618 1278 INDEX. VENDOR AND PURCHASER {con- tinued). revocation of authority to sell or pui'- chase, 618 sale of good-will, 619 sale of interest under a disputed con- tract, 859 right to dividends on a sale of life in- terest in stock, 620 purchase contract regarded as per- formed in regard to consequences. 623 vendor's right to interest and pur- chaser's right to the profits, 623 where vendor must pay interest, 62i risk, 62-1 searching for incumbrances, 854 devise, sale, or charge before convey- ance, 625 right of heir to have estate purchased out of ancestor's personal estate, 625 cesser of the estate or thing before conveyance, 625 — 6 purchase by two persons, 232 purchase in another's name, 274, 620, 834 eviction, 800 purchase, with right of repurchase, 374 agreement for purchase by mortgagee, 390 sales and purchases by married women, 1115 by infants, 1157 by lunatics, 1172 by solicitors, 832 by agents, 834 — 6 by aliens, 1176 by Roman Catholics, 1181 by persons who have acquired knowledge of the property from their employment as trustees, mortgagees, executors, agents, commissioners of bankrupts, as- signees, &c., 834 — 6 abandoning agreement for purchase by bankrupt, 576 VESTED INTERESTS, 317, et seq. See Executory Interests. present, 317 future, 317 vested in possession, 318 vested in right or interest, 318 vested rather than contingent, 337 postponement of the enjoyment till after the period of vesting, 340 VESTING ORDER. See Bankruptcy- Insolvency. under stat. 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, and 15 & 16 Vict. c. 55, p. 1103—5 VICARAGE, what passes by the term, 644 VOID AND VOIDxVBLE DEEDS AND CONTRACTS, absence or failure of the consideration, 821 inadequacy of the consideration, 825 unlawfulness of the consideration, 829 deeds and contracts invalid on account of constructive fraud practised by persons standing in a confi- dential relation to the parties sought to be bound by such deeds or contracts, 830, as by parents, 830 guardians, 831 quasi guardians, advisers, minis- ters, &c, 831 solicitors, 832 doctors, 834 agents, 834 trustees or other persons who have acquired a knowledge of the property, 834 deeds invalid on account of fraud on third pei'sons, 837 clandestine marriage contracts, 837 fraud on marriages, 837 deeds of gift of goods in trust for the use of the donor, 838 deeds void under the stat. 13 Eliz. c. 5, p. 416,838 deeds void by reason of the pos- session under them being re- tained, 842 voluntary deeds void under the stat. 27 Eliz. c. 4, s. 1, 4, p. 416, 845—852 deeds void under the stat. 27 Eliz. c. 4, s. 5, as subject to a power of revocation, 850 mortgage or conveyance, with no- tice of another's title, 852 secret deed calculated to defraud purchasers or incumbrancers, 856 contracts, agreements, or covenants, which are against public policy, 856 where persons are not free agents, 856 assignments by persons liolding offices under Government, or by fellows of colleges, 856 — 7 agreements between appointor and appointee of an office as to fees, 857 INDEX. 1270 VOID AND VOIDABLE DEEDS AND CONTEACTS {continued). contracts, agreements, or covenants, which are against public policy {continued). assignments involving champerty, maintenance, or buying of pre- tended titles, 857 — 8 assignments of mere naked rights to litigate, 858—9 assignments of things in action, rights of entry, possibilities, and executory interests, 860 assignments of things not belong- ing to the assignor at the time, 86i marriage brocage contracts, 865 agreements to influence testators, 865 contracts to facilitate marriages, 865 contracts in restraint of marriage or trade, 866 suppression of criminal proceed- ings, 867 withdrawal from a suit for divorce, 867 simoniacal contracts, 867 assignments in fraud of creditors, 838—8-15 agreements to convey property, if devised, 870 usurious contracts, 870 contract to effectuate an immoral purpose, 872 contracts by husband to transfer to the wife his riglits and duties as regards his children, 1122 deeds void for uncertainty, 872 VOLUNTARY DEED>S, revocableness of, 821 enforcing, 823 void as against creditors under the Stat. 13 Eliz. c. 5, p. 838 void as against purchasers under the Stat. 27 Eliz. c. 4, s. 1, 4, p. 845— 852 VOLUNTEERS, 807, 821—5. See Volun- tary Deeds. WAIFS, 54 AVAIVER of benefit of a covenant or condition, 73 "WARD. See Infant. settlement on a ward of Court, 810 transactions between guardians and wards, 831—2 WARRANT or ATTORNEY to confess judgment, 422 AVARRANTY barring estate tail, 172 abolished, 172 WAUREN, 53—4 WASTE defined, 11S5 different kinds of voluntary waste, 1185 in trees and hedges, 1185 in houses, 1188 as regards mines and pits, 1189 changing the course of husbandry, 1189 destruction of heir-looms, 1190 destruction of game, &c., 1190 who may and who may not commit, 1190 tenants in tail, 1190 tenants for life, 1190 ecclesiastical persons, 1190 tenants for years, 1187—8, 1191 tenants at will, 1191 lord or tenants of a manor, 1191 mortgagee, 376 mortgagor, 399 exemption from impeachment for, 1186 —1191 WASTE LAND, ownership of, 122 granting portions of, 122 WATER, right to running water, 56, n. {x) grant of a piece of, 644 — 5 claim by prescription, 542 — 5 WATER-COURSE, claim to, by prescription, 542 — 4 WAYS defined, 55 different kinds of, 55 how they arise, 55 not created by bargain and sale, 56 extinction of, 56 devestment of, 56 claim to, by prescription, 542 — 5 passing by a grant of land, 638—9 WIDOW. Sec Dower — Jointure. right of, under the Stat, of Distribu- tion, or the customs of London and York, 527, 530, 1154 WIFE. Bee Married Women. devise to a wife to maintain children, 228 1280 INDEX. WILL, ESTATE AT, defined, 22i creation of, 22 i dctcrmiiiiition of, 224 rent and emblements, 225 not assignable, 226 seldom arises, 226 is at will of both parties, 224 waste by tenant at will, 1191 WILL. See Bequest— Devise. defined, 970 who may make, 972 of drunkards, 972 persons under duress, 972 soldiers and sailors, 979 of testators domiciled abroad, 983 married women, 1113 infants, 1161 insane persons, 1173 requisite forms requisite forms before 1 Vict. c. 26, p. 973 altei'ations as to the forms by 1 Vict. c. 26, and the provisions of 15 Vict. e. 24, and 24 & 25 Vict. c. 114, p. 755, 978 signing, 973, 978—981 publication, 974, 982 attestation, 755, 973—976, 978-982 appointment by, 755, 971 written or verbal, 973 in the form of a deed, 977 registration of, 977 enrolment of, 977 probate of, 977 mistakes in, 972 essential that testator should know contents, 972 no relief against defective execution of, 978 alteration in, 982—3 what may be devised or bequeathed, hope of succession, 985 contingent and other future inte- rests, 985, 988 rights of entry, 985, 988 property of which the testator was not seised, 986, 988 title by mere possession, 986 interest of grantor under a void- able conveyance, 986 estate of mortgagee, 986 equity of redemption, 986 after-acquired property, 986, 988 customary freeholds and copy- holds, 966, 987—8 estates pur autre vie, 988 terms, 976, 987, 989 crops, 989 AVILL (mi dinned). wliat may be devised or bequeathed, general disposing power under 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 3, p. 988 advowsons and presentations, 989 devisees and legatees, 1002 sustaining a certain character, 1002 error or defect in a name or de- scription, 1002 devises and bequests to parent and children, 1004 children, 1005 issue or offspring, 1007, 1008 direction that shares of daugh- ters be settled upon them- selves strictly, 1007 heirs or descendants, 1008 a person and his heirs, or the heirs of a person, 1011 cousins, 1012 nephews and nieces, 1012 relations or a family, 1012 next of kin, 1013 persons claiming under the Statute of Distributions, 1013 executors, 1015 trustees, 1015 representatives, 1015 the parish or parish church, 1017 the Chancellor of the Exche- quer, 282 lloman Catholic priests, chapels, and schools, 283 a bankrupt, 1017 servants, 1017 implied devises and bequests, 1018 revocation of devises and bequests, 1020. See Kevocation. under the old law, 1020 under the stat. 1 Vict. c. 26, p. 1029 lapse of devises and bequests, 1030 republication of, 1034 revival of revoked will, 1036 condition not to dispute, 103 general rules of construction of, 989. See Construction. at what time a will speaks, 905 WITNESSES to deeds, 978 to wills, 975, 979-982 WOOL, assignment of, (JH, 864 INDEX. 1281 WORDS. Sec Construction, &c. general and special, 894 rejected or supplied, 895, 993 transposition of, 894, 994 construction of certain expressions {not alphabet icalli/ arranged) : "my unsettled real estate," 1042 " persons entitled under the Sta- tute of Distributions," 1014 'Mvho have issue," 1000 "may be born," 1005 " next surviving son, daughtei", or child," 1007 " all lands or goods," 642 lands "purchased," 1042 " on condition," 59 " subject to the performance of the covenants," 1001 "subject to the mortgage," 517 "claiming under," 664 dying "unmarried" or "without being married," 999 " subject to the incumbrances," 1001 " upon the security of the funds of any company," 1088 "clear of taxes,"' &c,, 24, 664 "first male heir of the branch of his family," 1009 " in (he character of the then male heir of the bod}-," 1011 " all other chattel property," 1057 construction of certain words {alpha- hetically arraru/ed) : "and" construed "or," 893 "as soon as," 318, 321 "at," 318 "attaining his twenty-fifth year," 999 " begotten," and "to be begotten," 158, 899, 1005 "cliattels," 1055—6 "child," 158—9, 1170—1 "children," 1006, 1170-1 " clear," 24—5, 664, 998 "common," 645 "controversies," 720 " cottage," 643 " cousins," 1012 "daughter," 1170—1 " debentures," 1055 " deductions," 998 "descendants," 464, n. (l) "devolve," 1001 " die without leaving children," 1000 " during," 64 — 5 "educated abroad," 69 " education," 1167 "cficcts," 1055— G WORDS {continued). construction of certain words : " eldest male lineal descendant," 1010 "eldest child, son, or daughter," 1006—7 " entitled," 1004 "estate," 149, 1038 "at cffitera," 1057 "family," 268, 1013 "farm," 642 " first cousin, or cousin german," 1012 " for," 825 " foreign stock or fund," 1053 " from and after," 318, 321 " from a certain day," 899 " furniture," 1057 "fixed furniture," 1057 " household furniture," 1058 "goods," 1058 "government stock or fund," 1053 " heirs." See Heir or Heirs. "heirs male," 1008 " heirs male " or " female " in a deed, 157- -8, 900 ; or in a will, 159, 1009, 1011 " right heirs," 1009 "then male heir," 1011 "next heir," 1009 "house," 639, 642—3 " household efiects," 1058 " Iiousehold goods," 1058 "if," 64, 320, 321 " in case," 320, 321 " insolvency," 900 " interest," 998 "issue," 165, 1007—8, 1171 "is^ue in tail male," 159 " issue male," 1008 " legacies," 1002 " life annuity," 606 " linen," 1058 " living," 1042 " London," 893, 900, 1002 "maintenance," nrj6 — 7 " maintenance, education, and bringing up," 1166 — 7 " male descendants," 1010 " manor," 643 " messuage," 642 " minerals," 901 "mines," 901 " moiety," 149 "money," 1051, 1055, and Ad- denda to that page " due," 1053 "ready," 1053 "in the funds," 1054 1282 INDEX. WORDS {continued). , construction of certain words : "month," 67, 901 "ray," 1049 " nearest of kin in the male line," 1011 "nephews and nieces," 1012 "next of kin," 337 " next of kin of my own family," 1013 " next legal representatives," 1015 " oflTspring," 1008 " or," construed " and," 893 "parliamentary stock or fund," 1053 "part," 149, 998 " pecuniary legacies," 1049, 1053 " personal estate," 1055 — G " plant and goodwill," 1058 " pool," 645 " portion," 901, 998 " produce," 608—9 "profits," 644 "promises," 719 "property," 149, 1055—6 " provided," 59, 320 " public-house," 665 "quarries," 901 " railway stock or shares," 1053 " real estate," 1040 " rectory," 644 "relations," 1012 " remainder," 149, 645 " representatives," " legal repre- sentatives," " next legal repre- sentatives," " legal personal re- presentatives," 1015 " reversion," 149, 645 "securities for money," 1041, 1055, and Addenda to that page "servant in my domestic estab- lishment," 1018 " same," 894 "shares," 149, 645, 998 " so long as," 64 — 5 " so that," 59 "son," 158, 1170—1 "support," 1167 "survivors," or "survivor," 999 " taxes," 998 " term," 1051 WOlfDS {conCuiucJ). construction of certain woid,- : "then," 321 "things," 1056 " thirds," 901 "till," 64—5 "toft," 644 "undivided quarter," 149 "until," 64—5 " upon," 318 "usual covenants," 771 " usually demised," 768 "vested in securities," 1055 "warren," 645 " water," 644 "when," 318, 321 " whilst," 65 "younger children," 350, 1006 WRECKS, 54 YEAR, DAY, AND WASTE, 564 YEAR TO YEAR. tenancy from, 216, 226 YEARS, ESTATE FOR. See Term. nature of, 213 at the common law, 213 under the Statute of Uses, 214 beginning and end of, 214 tenancy from year to year, 216, 226 devolves to the executor, 218 trust to pav rents till another comes of age, 218 holding over, 218 charges of renewal of leaseholds, 219 estovers, 219 emblements, 219 long terms for special purposes, 219 attendant terras, 220 use made of long satisfied terms, 220 determinable on the dropping of a life, 175 mortgage of, 402 tortious alienation by a tenant for years, 568 surrender of, 726 repair of leasehold bequeathed, 1001 passing under a general devise, 1040 waste by tenant for years, 1188, 1191 LONDON' STEVEKS AND RICHArDSON, TRINTER?, 5, GREAT QUEEN STREET, LINCOLN'S INN FIELI'.S, W.C. ^ l/' ^ 0^^ %oi\mi^'^ ^\WEllNIVERS'/4 ^lOSANCHfj; ^^iunNvyii^"^ ^y/mm ki. < so i-i\im^BS//i O ^lUtiK/ •'JlJJHV ^/sii3AiNft3WV^ \om3i^'^ \oi\mi^ ^10SANCEI% ^ . -< V/rMjAiun.iUV^ A.OFCAIIFO% A-OfCAllFOftj •< 55 -j^StUBRAfiYa^, -^^^lllBRARYQr^ \\\£UNIVER% ^lOSANCflfj "^i^liONVSOl^ ^OfCAllFOi?^ ^OFCAllFOff^ ^^V\E•UNIVER% ^lOSANCfl^ ^XiTJDNVSOl^ ■^/sa3AiNn3\< .^\^E^)NlVERy/A ^lOSANCflf% ^Quawsov^^ '^/sajAiNflmv' AWEUUIVEBS'/a ^lOSA^CElfj"^ o %iinNV<;n\'^ %«iAiMniv\v A^iUBRARY(9/- ^-OFCAllFOff^ ^>MIIBRARY6 ^^OFCAIIFOR ^(«/ojnvDjo>^ ^«!/ojnv3jo^ o ?^ %«uiNrtiuv^ ^OFfAllFO/?^^ ^OFCAllFOff^ >&AHVHaiH^ ^ %«■■■■■■ ^lUBRARYY?/^ %JllV3iO^ -v^lllBRARYG<- ^itfOJIWDJO'^ \WtUNIV[KS/A "^JliflWNVSOl^ vvlOSANCFlfj>. o %a3AiNn-3UV *V:OFCAllFOff^ ^^,OFCAIIFO% AWEUNIVER^//, ^lOSANCElfj^ Or ■■' ^^ O >t?AavH3ni^ ■^/iajAINIlJViV ^iUBRARY^/:^ ^>MllBRARYac. ^«!/ojiiv}jo^ ^-tfojnvjjo^^ ^^WElj^JlVER5/4 'jn.3UV^ ^•OFCAllFO/?^ ^OFCAIIFO% awei >-