LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DAVIS REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL LIFE OP GENERAL WILLIAM HULL; PREPARED FROM HIS MANUSCRIPTS, BY HIS DAUGHTER, MRS. MARIA CAMPBELL: TOGETHER WITH THE HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT, BY HIS GRANDSON, JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE. NEW-YORK: D. APPLETON & CO., 200 BROADWAY. PHILADELPHIA I GEO. S. APPLETON, 148 CHESNUT-STREET. M DCCC XLVIH. LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DAVIS . v - ^ Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year of our Lord 1847, BY E. F. CAMPBELL, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern District of New- York. TO THE READER. IN arranging and collating this manuscript, my desire is not to take more credit to myself, than com mon industry can claim ; neither would I render my father responsible for my failures, when I have been obliged to speak in other language than his own. General Hull left behind him Memoirs of his Rev olutionary Services, in MS., which he had written for the gratification of his children and grandchildren. These memoirs are the basis of the present work. His spirit pervades the whole, and my endeavour has been, that it should not be obscured. The facts are in substance precisely as he has related them. But as his MS. was not prepared for the press, it was necessary, to a certain extent, that the arrangement of the work, and sometimes the style, should be changed. When General Hull is spoken of, it will be noticed throughout the book, that the first and third persons are indiscriminately used. In the chapter concerning Captain Hale, 1 have more fully unfolded sentiments expressed by my fa ther in his last interview with that noble young man. In the work generally, I have introduced remarks not found in the MS., but which were familiar to my re- IV TO THE READER. collection from our frequent interchange of thought, as he always conversed with his children, as though they were his equals. He rarely spoke of himself, of his sufferings, or of his services rendered to his country. It was at the earnest entreaties of his children, that he took up the pen. The feelings of the soldier gave alacrity to the work, and it was completed. He wrote without view to publication, and directed his family to look for the connecting links of the narra tive, in the histories of the Revolution. The death of General Hull took place before the " Writings of Washington," by JARED SPARKS, were published ; but the faithfulness of his memory is ex hibited in comparing his MS. with the authentic documents of that most valuable work. EDITOR. Augusta, Georgia, 1845. Copy of a Letter from 3 are A Sparks, Esq., to the Rev. James F. Clarke. SALEM, July 31st, 1847. DEAR Sm, I have perused the manuscript which you sent to me, relating to the Revolutionary Services and Civil Life of General Hull* The whole appears to me to be written with close attention to the facts of history ; and it derives great value from the circumstance of its containing a record of the observations of General Hull himself on numerous public events in which he took a part, or with which he was personally acquainted. Having been an offi cer in the army during the whole war of the Revolu tion, engaged in many actions, and highly estimated for his military talents and character, he was necessa rily connected with stirring incidents, which are well described in this work. I have also read, with a lively interest, the chap ters on the Campaign of 1812. The narrative is clear and full, and whatever judgment maybe formed of the result, the particulars here set forth, give evi dence of having been drawn from the highest sources ; and they are exhibited in such a manner, as to present the controverted points in a just light. yi LETTER FROM JARED SPARKS, ESQ. These are my impressions, upon a hasly perusal of the manuscripts, and I doubt not they would be sus tained by a more careful study. I am, dear sir, Respectfully and truly yours, JARED SPARKS. PREFACE. IF principle be of any value, its power wil be felt and exhibited in the hour of adversity. Weak is the man, who, after having laid down to himself a rule of virtuous action, is diverted from it, by the frustra tion of his plans and the disappointment of his hopes. But when amidst the painful vicissitudes of life, he keeps his onward course, exhibiting the same can dour, dignity, and strength, which marked him in more prosperous days, we learn the useful lesson, that there is a sustaining power in our nature which, co operating with that from above, gives peace to the soul amidst its severest trials. Many an individual more highly distinguished than General Hull, has descended to the grave with out a record of his public services or private worth. But the manoeuvering of the Politician will some- 4 times fix, with more distinctness and permanency, the laurel on the brow which his hand was raised to de stroy. Had it not been for a persecution as severe as it was unmerited, the zeal, the ability, the faithful ness and the patriotism of General Hull in his country's service, might never have been made public, to sustain him in the hearts of the American people, v iji PREFACE. And so trusting, so satisfied is conscious innocence, in the approbation of a higher Power ; so modest in its claims to notice, that perhaps not even this would have been done, had not children, in the warmth and respect of filial love, urged and claimed the boon. Political necessity is the plea ever offered for transferring the errors of an administration to an in dividual, however innocent : and the sacred rights of character are thus sacrificed on the altar of popular feeling. If such be the practice of an enlightened, Christian government, who can expect, in the hour of adversity, the justice to which services and virtues are entitled ? Even Washington, with all the high perfection of his character, did not escape, when faction and interest judged his conduct. The heart sickens, while contemplating suffering, produced, not by the depravity of one man, who would blush to do the deed alone, but from the in sensibility of the many, when acting together. The laws of morality cease then to operate ; and hence, as has ever been the case, individuals have been sac rificed, to shield depraved or imbecile governments. How different would have been the fate of Ad miral Byng, whose sad history " is the deepest stain on the memory of Chatham, and the deepest dis grace of George II. and his Ministers," had the administration, generously and with moral courage, shielded him from calumny and outrage, under the first burst of a nation's disappointment ! When General Hull left Washington, in 1812, to take the command of the Northwestern Army, he PREFACE. j x was assured by the Government, that a naval force would be placed on Lake Erie, to keep open his com munication with his country, and that his army \vould be reinforced, before war was declared. Having ar rived at Urbana, in the State of Ohio, where his army had assembled, he cut a road from that place through the wilderness, for nearly two hun dred miles, and reached the river Miami, seventy-two miles below Detroit. Here he availed himself of the water communication to send on the sick, with his military stores and baggage. By mistake, a trunk containing the papers of General Hull was put on board the same vessel. After she had sailed, Gene ral Hull received a letter, announcing that on the 18th of June war had been declared. Thus fourteen days had passed before he was apprised of a fact so important to the safety of his army, while the British at Fort Maiden had four or five days previously, been possessed of the information. The vessel was cap tured, and the consequent possession of this portion of the papers of General Hull was made the ground on which the charge of treason was predicated. After the surrender of the fortress of Detroit,, when General Hull was taken a prisoner to Montreal, he judged it best to commit his remaining papers, with other valuable articles, to the care of his daugh ter, Mrs. Hickman, who, with her family, was short ly to take her departure for her paternal residence, in Newton, Massachusetts. The brig Adams, in which they sailed, was an American vessel, but had been captured by the British. The brig arrived in the x PREFACE. evening near Buffalo, and Mrs. Hickman was put on shore, assured by the captain that her baggage would be sent to her in the morning. In the course of the night, the brig was attacked by our sailors, under the command of Captain Elliott, and in the contest was burnt. By this event, the remaining papers of Gene ral Hull were destroyed. In the public offices at Washington, there were duplicates of letters and other papers, sent by Gene ral Hull to the different Departments, w 7 hile Governor of the Michigan Territory. To possess copies of these documents, was necessary to his justification. Previously to his trial, he made application for them- They pointed to the necessity of a naval force on Lake Erie ; and for troops, required for the garrison of Detroit, Michilimackinac, and Chicago, to enable the army to maintain a defensive position, or success fully to carry on an offensive war against the British and Indians. But the exertions of friends, joined to his own efforts to obtain copies of these papers, were unavailing. When the trial of General Hull closed in 1814, he yet hoped to give to his fellow-citizens a detailed history of the Northwestern Campaign. Anterior to that period, he had published nothing in his defence, persevering in a dignified silence, while constantly assailed in the public prints, with contumely and the grossest falsehoods. So exaggerated was the abuse, that to every reflecting mind, it carried with it the materials for its own refutation. Again and again were his hopes crushed by a failure in procuring PREFACE. x { copies of these important documents. Finally, he yielded, without temper and without recrimination, to these last acts of injustice, which the rulers of the nation, at this critical period of their power, consid ered expedient, if not necessary to their safety. At the expiration of nearly twelve years, the Honourable John C. Calhoun was appointed Secre tary of War. General Hull made one more effort, and on his application to that officer, most of the pa pers, previously applied for, were immediately for warded to him. As soon as he became possessed of these docu ments, he gave to the public a Memoir of the Cam paign of the Northwestern Army and in the confi dence of innocence and truth, appealed to his coun trymen for a reversal of a sentence which could be viewed as no less cruel than unjust.* These Memoirs have been before the public for more than eighteen years, and those of his fellow- citizens who have read them, have risen from their perusal satisfied that the cause of failure in the un successful invasion of Canada, was not to be imputed to the commanding officer, but to an administration that had rushed into war without foresight or prepar ation. Almost every engagement pledged by the Government for the support of their army was violated. General Hull was sent forth with a band of brave, but undisciplined yeomanry, most of whom had seen * General Hull was sentenced to dent, under the recommendation of be shot, under the charge of cow- the Court Martial, on account of his ardice, but pardoned by the Presi- Revolutionary services. X JI PREFACE. no service, to contend with the numerous and well- trained army of Britain, aided by her savage allies? not only unsupported, but deserted by his Govern ment. But under all these untoward circumstances? General Hull could have sustained his post at Detroit? had not an armistice, now a portion of history, been entered into with the enemy by General Dearborn? to the exclusion of General Hull's army, and without his knowledge. It was this, together with previous neglect on the part of General Dearborn to concen trate troops at Niagara, which enabled General Brock ? with an overwhelming force, suddenly to come against and overpower him. General Dearborn was Commander-in-chief of the American forces. He was stationed on the Ni agara river, two hundred and fifty miles below De troit. His orders were to keep the enemy in cheeky or to act offensively, as occasion might offer, and to co-operate with the army of General Hull. Instead of obeying these orders, he agreed to a suspension of hostilities with Sir George Prevost, the Commanding General of the King's forces, and stipu lates that it is to the exclusion of General HulVs army ; the very point to be gained by his wily adversary. The period of five days allowed ample time for the British to ascend the Lake and capture the American forces at Detroit. A ruse de guerre, cred itable to the acuteness of the enemy, but a sad re flection on the military genius of the Commander-io- chief of the American army* PREFACE. xiii General Hull received no official information of this arrangement between the two hostile armies, until twelve days after it had taken place, and four days after his army had surrendered to General Brock ; from whom he first learned the astounding fact. Among other papers for which application was made at the seat of Government, General Hull asked for a copy of this fatal armistice ; none was ever furnished, but the fact is recorded, and its disas trous effects on the issue of the campaign can no longer be gainsay ed by the most prejudiced mind. At the period of the late war, Mr. Jefferson had retired from office, but his pen was still exerted to support the measures of his party, and the Adminis tration of 1812. He was familiar with the character of General Hull, in the military, civil, and social re lations of life ; and he generously testifies to his merit in a letter to Colonel Duane, at the first intelligence of the surrender of the Northwestern Army. He writes : " The character of General Hull, as an officer of skill and bravery, was established on the trials of the last war, and no previous act of his life had led to doubt his fidelity."* Yet it is not long before we perceive, in another letter, that political necessity obliges this distinguished individual to speak a different language- In a letter to General Dearborn, the negotiator of the armistice, he writes : * Jefferson's Memoirs, Vol. IV., page 181. x j v PREFACE. " After the disasters produced by the treason, or the cowardice, or both, of Hull, and the follies of some others,"* &c., &c. But his first communication, uninfluenced by the bias of political necessity, and while yielding to the sober dictates of truth, with a full recollection of faithful services, was but a just tribute to a man, on whose public and private life, a steady and unclouded light had rested for forty years, eight years of which period he had served to gain our Independence. Finally, at the age of sixty-one, General Hull was summoned before a court martial to answer to crimes, of which the thought had never entered his mind. His appointed judges were men high in mili tary rank and titles, but many of whom had obtained that elevation and distinction without having ren dered any service to their country. In the defence before the court martial, while an imadverting upon the testimony of some of the wit nesses introduced on the part of the prosecution, General Hull says : " It seems extraordinary that there has not been a witness examined on the part of the prosecution, who has not been promoted since he was under my command. A great majority of the young gentlemen, who have been called by the Judge Advocate, have appeared, decorated with their epaulets ; these have been bestowed, and sometimes with the augmentation of a star, upon gentlemen who began their military career with my unfortunate campaign. By what services many of these gentle- * Jefferson's Memoirs, VoL IV., page 258* PREFACE. xv men have merited such rapid promotion, I have not learned. But if it all arises out of their achievements while under my command, I must say, that it appears to me, my expedition was more prolific of promotion, than any other unsuccessful military enterprise I ever heard of."* Without counsel to speak in his defence, he stood before the court unaided, except by his own vigorous mind and a clear and calm conscience. In the following narrative of the Revolutionary services of General Hull, there will rarely be found allusion to that act of his life, which was at once his glory and his shame ; the surrender of the fortress of Detroit to the British arms. It was his glory *, be cause he had " dared to do his duty."f It was his shame, because the epithets of traitor and coward were attached to a name, that had remained untar nished for more than half a century. It had stood the test of temptation, in the dangerous hours of prosperity in the possession of wealth, and in the acquisition of much honourable distinction, in public and private life. Prosperity did not elate, nor did adversity depress ; the same virtues shone, equally bright, in both estates. The thirteen years that succeeded his changed fortunes, were spent in the peaceful pursuits of ag riculture ; in the calm of a quiet conscience, in the possession of the affection and respect of virtuous friends ; blessed by the happiest relations of the do- * General Hull's Trial, page 64. his wife, respecting the surrender f Extract from the first letter to while a prisoner at Montreal. xv j PREFACE. mestic fireside, and surrounded by a numerous pro geny of affectionate children and grandchildren, each striving to cheer his declining years, and all cherishing, with filial reverence, the virtues of their patriot sire. To the latest moment of his life, when aware he was on the verge of eternity, in the full possession of his mental powers, General Hull still breathed his thanks to his Heavenly Father, that he had been the instrument of saving from the cruelties of a savage foe, a people who expected and demanded protection at his hands.* One generation since that trying hour has grown into manhood and imbibed the poison of falsehood from our school-books, while studying the history of the Northwestern Campaign. Another promising band is now receiving the same distorted views, over which it is hoped truth will sooner or later triumph. Such are the returns rendered to a soldier of the Revolution, who, through long and trying years of se vere service, aided to secure the sweets of liberty and all its associated advantages of moral and religious education. To my interesting and beloved young country men, the present work is dedicated ; and when the youthful student learns what the soldier of 1776 per formed, he will more readily be convinced by truth and facts, that he was altogether innocent of the charges of which he was accused in 1812. * General Hull was the Governor well as Commander of the army at of the Territory of Michigan as this time. CONTENTS. To THE READER iii LETTER FROM JARED SPARKS, ESQ v PREFACE vii CHAPTER I. EARLY LIFE OF WILLIAM HULL. HE JOINS THE ARMY OF WASHINGTON AT CAMBRIDGE, IN JULY, 1775 17 CHAPTER II. SIEGE OF BOSTON. WASHINGTON TAKES POSSESSION OF DORCHESTER HEIGHTS. EVACUATION OF BOSTON BY SIR WILLIAM HOWE . . . .25 CHAPTER III. EXECUTION OF CAPTAIN HALE AND MAJOR ANDRE. PARALLEL DRAWN BETWEEN THESE TWO OFFICERS 31 CHAPTER IV. BATTLE OF CHATTERTON HILL, AT THE WHITE PLAINS . . . .52 CHAPTER V. BATTLE OF TRENTON. CAPTAIN HULL ACTS AS FIELD OFFICER IN THE ABSENCE OF MAJOR BROOKS 58 CHAPTER VI. CRITICAL STATE OF THE COUNTRY. WASHINGTON'S EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE TROOPS FROM RETURNING TO THEIR HOMES. PROMOTION OF CAPTAIN HULL. BATTLE OF PRINCETON 63 CHAPTER VH. RETREAT OF GENERAL ST. CLAIR FROM TICONDEROGA . . . .72 xv iii CONTENTS. CHAPTER VHI. GENERAL ARNOLD MARCHES TO THE RELIEF OF FORT STANWIX. TRIAL OF BUTLER. RETREAT OF GEN. ST. LEGER. : . 80 CHAPTER IX. GENERAL SCHTJYLER SUPERSEDED IN COMMAND OF THE NORTHERN ARMY BY GENERAL GATES 87 CHAPTER X. BURGOYNE'S CAMPAIGN. BATTLE OF THE NINETEENTH OF SEPTEMBER . 92 CHAPTER XL BATTLE OF THE SEVENTH OF OCTOBER. SURRENDER OF THE BRITISH ARMY UNDER BURGOYNE 99 CHAPTER XII. VALLEY-FORGE. SUFFERINGS OF THE AMERICAN ARMY . . .112 CHAPTER XIII. BARON STEUBEN APPOINTED A MAJOR-GENERAL IN THE ARMY. LAFAYETTE SENT WITH A DETACHMENT TO WATCH THE ENEMY. HlS ESCAPE FROM THE BRITISH ARMY. MAJOR HULL IN THE DETACHMENT SENT TO REIN FORCE HIM. MEETING OF LAFAYETTE AND GENERAL HULL IN 1824 . 126 CHAPTER XIV. THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH 133 CHAPTER XV. MAJOR HULL'S COMMAND ON THE LINES 142 CHAPTER XVI. CAPTURE OF STONY POINT 155 CHAPTER XVII. PROMOTION OF MAJOR HULL TO THE RANK OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL. HE IS TRANSFERRED FROM THE ElGHTH TO THE THIRD MASSACHUSETTS REGIMENT. APPOINTED A COMMISSIONER TO PRESENT a PETITION TO THE LEGISLATURE OF MASSACHUSETTS, FOR THE RELIEF OF THE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS. APPOINTED INSPECTOR IN THE ARMY, UNDER BARON STEUBEN .171 CONTENTS. CHAPTER XVIII. STATE OF THE CURRENCY. MUTINIES IN THE PENNSYLVANIA AND JERSEY LINES. EXPEDITION OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL HULL AGAINST MORRIS- SANIA. MARRIAGE OF COLONEL HULL 178 CHAPTER XIX. COLONEL HULL DESPATCHED BY GENERAL WASHINGTON TO COUNT DE Ro- CHAMBEAU. PLAN OF ATTACK ON NEW-YORK AND OTHER POINTS. CHANGE OF THE SCENE OF OPERATIONS FROM NEW- YORK TO YORK- TOWN. CAPTURE OF THE ARMY OF CORNWALLIS. WASHINGTON TAKES LEAVE OF THE ARMY 199 CHAPTER XX. DISBANDING OF THE ARMY. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SOCIETY OF CINCIN NATI. MISSION TO QUEBEC 211 CHAPTER XXI. SHAYS' REBELLION 218 CHAPTER XXII. THE SPIRIT OF DISAFFECTION CONTINUES. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE REPRE SENTATIVE OF THE TOWN OF NEWTON, MASSACHUSETTS, PREPARED BY COLONEL HULL , 228 CHAPTER XXIII. PETITION TO CONGRESS FOR PAY OF OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY 240 CHAPTER XXIV. INDIAN WAR. COLONEL HULL APPOINTED A COMMISSIONER TO UPPER CANADA, TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A TREATY WITH THE INDIANS. INTERVIEW WITH GOVERNOR SIMCOE 251 CHAPTER XXV. COLONEL HULL VISITS EUROPE. ADDRESS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, JOHN ADAMS, AND HIS ANSWER, IN RELATION TO THE MILITIA OF THE COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX 261 XX CONTENTS. APPENDIX. I. COLONEL HULL'S CONVERSATION WITH GOVERNOR SIMCOE (IN 1793) RE SPECTING WASHINGTON'S ESCAPE FROM CORNWALLIS AT TRENTON, NEW JERSEY 267 II. THREE LETTERS FROM THE HONOURABLE HORACE BINNEY, OF PHILADELPHIA, TO A DAUGHTER OF GENERAL WlLLIAM HULL. EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM AN OFFICER OF DISTINCTION (MAJOR HULL) IN THE NORTHERN ARMY, DATED JULY 17, 1777, TAKEN FROM THE " CONNECTICUT Cou- RANT," HARTFORD, JULY 28, 1777 269 III. LETTERS TO MAJOR HULL, COMMANDING ON THE LINES IN 1779 . . 277 IV. EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM MRS. HULL TO ONE OF HER DAUGHTERS, DATED APRIL 12, 1822 284 V. EXTRACTS FROM A JOURNAL OF COLONEL HULL, WHILE COMMISSIONER TO TREAT WITH THE BRITISH AND HOLD TREATIES WITH THE INDIANS IN 1794 . 286 Page vii. 18, 28, 45, 54, 74, 76, 80, 306, 317, 319, 389, 410, ERRATA, . 1, for wtl read will. 25, for Housatonnuc read Housatonic. 21, and p. 76, 1. 20, for Thatcher read Thacher. . 5, for close read Clove. 5, for Brunx read Bronx. . 3, for withia read within. 1, for thai read that. 19, for Oanesvoort read Gansevoort. 24, for 17*A read 14A. 24, for regular times read regulations. 24, after could read not. bottom line, for Note 2d read Note 3d. close, for has at last illuminated read will at last illuminate. REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. CHAPTER I. EARLY LIFE OF WILLIAM HULL. HE JOINS THE ARMY OF WASHINGTON AT CAMBRIDGE, IN JULY, 1775, 1775. WILLIAM HULL was born at Derby, Connecticut, 24th June, 1753. His great-grandfather, Joseph Hull, emigrated from Derbyshire, England, and set tled in Derby, Connecticut. His grandfather, Joseph Hull, survived his father but a few years. Joseph Hull, the father of the subject of these Memoirs, while following the agricultural pursuits of his ancestors, was likewise engaged in the councils of his country. He was elected a member of the State Legisla ture for many successive years. His immediate de scendants, consisted of six sons and two daughters. Joseph was the eldest. In early life, he engaged in 2 18 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL the West India trade. At the commencement of the war of the Revolution, he received the appointment of Lieutenant of Artillery, and was made prisoner at the capture of Fort Washington, on York Island, in 1776. In defence of this Fortress, he is reputed to have behaved with great gallantry. He remained in cap tivity two years. At length he was exchanged, and his unbroken spirit was once more given to the ser vice of his country. Shortly after, he was appointed to the command of some boats on Long Island Sound, formerly used in the whale fishery, but now fitted out to annoy the enemy, as opportunity might offer. In this limited but dangerous sphere of action, he gave earnest of a mind and spirit, which under other circumstances would probably have developed more important results. On one occasion, a British armed schooner was lying in the Sound. She was engaged in transport ing provisions from the country to New- York, where the British army was then stationed. Lieutenant Hull proposed to some of his companions of the town of Derby to go out and capture the schooner. Derby stands on the Housatonnuc river, about twelve miles from its entrance into the Sound. On the evening appointed, twenty men, placing them selves under the command of Lieutenant Hull, em barked in a large boat, similar to those used in carry ing wood to the city of New-York. The men lay concealed in the bottom of the boat ; and the dusk LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. ]0 of the evening favouring the deception, it had the appearance of being loaded with wood. As they ap proached the vessel, the sentinel on deck hailed them. Lieutenant Hull, who was steering, answered the call, but continuing his course, came quite near the vessel, without exciting suspicion, when, by a sudden movement, he drew close along side of her. His men, well armed, sprang to her deck. The com mander of the schooner was sleeping below, arid aroused by the firing of the sentinel, he made an at tempt to gain the deck, but was instantly shot dead. The Americans immediately fastened down the hatches, took possession of the vessel, and carried her in triumph up to the town. This gallant soldier was the father of Commo dore Hull, who, by his coolness and intrepidity, was the first to give to America the knowledge of her naval superiority, as exhibited in his celebrated escape from a British squadron and afterwards by his victory over the " Guerrier." Samuel Hull served as a Lieutenant a part of the war, and was reputed a brave man. Isaac passed his life in agricultural pursuits. Levi died young. Elizabeth married a respectable farmer, and settled in Vermont. Sarah married in Derby, and soon after died. David was too young at the period of the war, to be enrolled with his brothers, in the service of his country. He graduated at Yale College, and be came a distinguished physician, in Fairfield, Connec ticut, where he settled and died. He married the 20 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL daughter of Andrew Elliott, D. D., of Boston. Doc tor Hull passed his life in extensive professional use fulness, respected and beloved by a large circle of his fellow-citizens. He died, a faithful disciple of his Saviour, in the spring of 1834. William, the fourth son, and the subject of this Memoir, was sent at an early period to reside with his grandfather Hull. He attended a New England school, and w r as instructed in the common branches of English education. Residing on a farm, he work ed daily in the fields, and here he acquired that taste for agricultural pursuits, which was his solace, when the dark and heavy clouds of adversity gathered thick ly around the gray hairs of declining years. In this employment he strengthened a naturally good con stitution, which secured the enjoyment of uninterrupt ed health. It may here be remarked, that a vigor ous body and sound mind are often united through a long life, when the early years of childhood are given to active and healthful employments, and the mind is not hurried into premature cultivation. It being decided that William should receive a liberal education, his father sent for him to return home. His grandfather remonstrated, for he could not sympathize with the more enlarged views of an other generation. He loved the affectionate and industrious boy, and his old heart grieved to part with him. " Billy," he said, " is a pure boy to work : it is a shame to take him to College." But the young plough-boy soon proved that he had mental as well as physical strength. He studied LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 21 with the Rev. Mr. Leavensworth, a highly respected divine, and entered Yale College at the age of fifteen years. At the expiration of four years, he graduated with honour. The English oration was assigned him at Commencement, and his College life, as well as his performance on this occasion, gave satisfaction to his friends and all who were interested in his youthful career, now opening with such fair promise. His first occupation after leaving College was the charge of a school. He has often been heard to say, that " this was among the happiest years of his life." But his parents anxiously desired that he should be come a clergyman. Without the fixed bias for this profession, which he deemed essential, he commenced the study of Divinity, rather from motives of filial affection, than from a conviction of religious duty. He studied for a year with Dr. Wates, subsequently Professor of Theology in Yale College. But he was too deeply impressed with the sacred trust devolving on a minister of the gospel, to assume its responsi bilities without a single eye to the glory of God, and a distinct call from the Holy Spirit. He therefore withdrew from these studies, though with reluctance, inasmuch as he disappointed the hopes his parents had cherished in reference to the clerical profession. After this decision, he attached himself to the cele brated Law School in Litchfield, Connecticut, and was admitted to the bar in 1775. The war with Great Britain was now the subject of universal interest, and with others of his country men did the young barrister sympathize in views 22 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL and feelings, which soon gave a new direction to his mind. But he maintained a reserve in regard to his inclinations, which he foresaw would soon ripen into action. His father returned one evening from a meeting of the citizens of Derby. He said to his son, " Who do you suppose has been elected Captain of the company raised in this town ?" He named several. His father replied, " It is yourself." He hesitated not in accepting the appointment, so unexpectedly of fered by his townsmen ; and prepared himself to join the regiment of Colonel Webb, then being raised by the State. At this interesting moment, his father was seized with a severe illness, which soon termi nated his useful life. By his will, the property, respectable for the times, was bequeathed to his widow and children. William refused to receive any part of it. He said, " I want only my sword and my uniform." With a full, but resolute heart, he left his peaceful home, and his afflicted family, to give his services to his country, then contending for rights which neither remonstrance nor patience, but force only could obtain. His com pany immediately joined the regiment which marched to Cambridge, the head-quarters of General Wash ington. The first incident recorded by Captain Hull, on his arrival in camp, is a striking illustration of the deficiency of military order, discipline and etiquette, with which Washington had to contend throughout the war. A body of the enemy landed at Lechmere's LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 3 Point, on the main land. It was expected an attack would be made on the American lines. The alarm was given, and the troops ordered to their respective stations. When the regiment of Col. Webb was formed for action, the captains and subalterns ap peared, dressed in long cloth frocks, with kerchiefs tied about their heads. Captain Hull was the only man in uniform. The officers inquired " why he came out in full dress ; that the regiment was going into action, and that he would be a mark for the ene my's fire." He replied, " that he thought the uni form of an officer was designed to aid his influence and increase his authority over his men and if ever important in these points, it was more particularly so in the hour of battle." They referred to their expe rience, remarking that " in the French war it was not customary, and they had never worn it." Captain Hull yielded to age and experience, sent his servant for a frock and kerchief, and dressed himself after the fashion of his companions. His company was in advance of the British lines. While at this station, General Washington and suite, in the course of re viewing the troops, stopped at the redoubt and asked "what officer commanded there." " With feelings of inexpressible mortification," says General Hull, " I came forward in my savage costume, and reported that Captain Hull had the honour of commanding the redoubt." As soon as General Washington passed on, Captain Hull availed himself of the first moment to despatch his servant with all possible speed to bring him his uniform. As he put it on, he quiet- 24 . REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL Jy resolved, never more to subscribe to the opinions of men, however loyal and brave in their country's service, whose views were so little in unison with his own. After the troops had waited four or five hours in expectation of an attack, the enemy returned to his encampment, having no other object in making the descent than to procure provisions. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 25 CHAPTER II. SIEGE OF BOSTON. WASHINGTON TAKES POSSESSION OF DORCHESTER HEIGHTS. EVACUATION OF BOSTON BY SIR WILLIAM HOWE. 1776. IN October, General Gage was recalled and Gen eral Howe appointed in his place, to take command of the troops in Boston. On the land side, the town was blockaded by the Americans. The eyes of the whole country were upon Washington and expecta tion at its highest pitch. It was believed that he had an army adequate to every emergency, and that the British General would soon yield to the force of his arms. But faint were the hopes of the American General of such an issue. Yet, trusting in an over ruling Providence, his strength rose in proportion to his difficulties. In a letter to a friend, he says : " I know the unhappy predicament in which I stand; I know that much is expected of me ; I know that without men, without arms, without ammunition, without any thing fit for the accommodation of a soldier, little is to be done ; and what is mortifying, I know that I cannot stand justified to the world, with out exposing my own weakness, and injuring the cause, by declaring my wants, which I am deter- 2(3 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL mined not to do, farther than unavoidable necessity brings every man acquainted with them. My situa tion is so irksome to me at times, that if I did not consult the public good more than my own tranquillity, I should long ere this have put every thing on the cast of a die. So far from my having an army of twenty thousand men, well armed, I have been here with less than half that number, including sick, fur- loughed, and on command ; and those neither armed nor clothed as they should be. In short, my situa tion has been such, that I have been obliged to use art to conceal it from my own officers."* A resolution had been passed in Congress which Washington viewed as an expression of their wishes, that he should make an attack on Boston. To this he was fully inclined, and he begged Congress to do him the justice to consider that circumstances, not inclination, occasioned the delay. He says, " It is not in the pages of History to furnish a case like ours. To maintain a post within musket shot of the enemy, for six months together, without ammunition, and at the same time to disband one army and recruit an other, within that distance of twenty odd British regiments, is more than probably ever was attempted. But if we succeed as well in the latter as we have hitherto done in the former, I shall think it the most fortunate event of my whole life."f Such were the difficulties which embarrassed the * Sparks' Life and Writings of f Marshall's Washington, Vol. II., Washington, Vol. L, page 170. page 340. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 27 movements of the Commander-in-chief. The short enlistment of the troops furnished no opportunity for their improvement in discipline. The officers were unable to establish their authority, and insubordina tion and misrule prevailed. General Washington says in one of his letters to Congress : " To make men well acquainted with the duties of a soldier, re quires time. To bring them under proper discipline and subordination, not only requires time, b'ut is a work of great difficulty ; and in this army, where there is so little distinction between officers and sol diers, requires an uncommon degree of attention. To expect, then, the same service from raw and un disciplined recruits, as from veteran soldiers, is to expect what never did, and perhaps never will hap pen." * To dislodge the enemy from Boston, before they received reinforcements, was an object of the highest importance. To effect this, four or five thousand troops were enlisted in Massachusetts, but a council of war decided almost unanimously against the attack, principally on the ground of the w r ant of ammuni tion, and to General Washington's great regret the measure was abandoned. It has been a question why General Howe, with a force of ten thousand men, did not attack the be sieging army ; and it is supposed to have resulted, either from ignorance of its weakness, or from the express orders of his government, to put nothing to * Marshall's Washington, Vol. II., page 345. 28 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL hazard. As the attack on Boston was abandoned, Washington decided to take possession of Dorchester Heights, which lie east of the town and entirely com mand it. This step, if successful, would force the British to evacuate. To deceive the enemy and fa cilitate the execution of the plan, a heavy bombard ment and fire was kept up from Lechmere's Point, Cobble Hill and Roxbury, together with other posi tions in* the neighbourhood of the enemy. This took place on the second of March. On the night of the fourth, immediately after our firing began, a body of American troops, under the command of General Thomas, in which was Captain Hull's company, marched from Roxbury to the Heights, and having prepared fascines, for the construction of the works by hand-labour, at morning light a barrier had been raised to screen them from the enemy. A severe but ineffectual fire was directed by the British against our works, and General Howe deemed it ne cessary to dislodge our troops from their position, or he could no longer hold the town. Dr. Thatcher, in his Military Journal, who was a witness of what he narrates, gives a lively description of these events. Here Washington showed the genius and resolu tion of the soldier. In one night he made himself master of ground that left no alternative to his adver sary, but to fight or evacuate the town. The plan was bold, and in the execution of it he was nobly sustained by the brave and virtuous yeomanry of New England. His ranks were filled ; the munitions of war were brought to his aid, and the spirit of so many LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 29 heroes supplied, for the time, the deficiency of disci pline ; while his single word moved the congregated multitude to act with one voice and one heart. Napoleon, when addressing his army, just before the battle of Moscow, as the sun arose, said, with the tact of one who well knew the human heart ' This is the Sun of AusterlitzS Washington, at the moment when he expected to be engaged in a severe conflict with the enemy, exhorted his troops " to bear in mind the fifth of March" when the first blood of their countrymen was shed in the sacred cause of liberty. He has been called the American Fabius, it being said, " that the art of avoiding battle, of baffling the enemy, and of temporizing, was his talent as well as his taste." But we have seen at this period, his fixed purpose, to make an attack on Boston, in the hope, that it would result in the destruction of the British army. In this he was disappointed ; for after the decision of three successive councils of war, he was obliged to abandon a plan, in the prosecution of which he was sanguine of success. Washington combined the two indispensable ingredients which form the character of the soldier, and when we arrive at the stirring scenes of Trenton and of Princeton, when he took an offensive position and won two battles in less than twenty-four hours, we shall find it difficult to admit the assertion that ; avoiding battles, baffling the enemy, and temporizing, was his talent as well as his taste !' Again, in his new position on the Heights, he challenges his adversary to battle, and carries out his 30 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL plans of offensive operations. In the full expectation of an assault on Dorchester Heights, his intention was, either during or after the battle, should a favour able moment offer,* " to embark from Cambridge four thousand chosen men, who, rapidly crossing the arm of the sea, should take advantage of the tumult and confusion, to attempt the assault of the town." Upon General Washington's taking possession of Dorchester Heights, General Howe was compelled either to attack him immediately in this new and strong position or to evacuate the town. For many reasons he judged the latter course preferable, and ac cordingly abandoned Boston to the Americans. The details of these transactions may be found in Botta, and in other histories of the Revolution. * Otis's Translation of Botta's History, Vol. II. 5 page 39. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. CHAPTER III. EXECUTION OF CAPTAIN HALE AND MAJOR ANDRE. PARALLEL DRAWN BE TWEEN THESE TWO OFFICERS. 1776. THE successful termination of the siege of Boston rendered the presence of the American army no long er necessary ; and New-York being now the object of the enemy, General Washington removed the troops to the defence of that city. To obtain this position, was highly important to the British, as it would, by means of the Hudson, open their communi cation with Canada, and enable them to co-operate with the troops in that quarter. General Howe sailed from Boston to Halifax, where he received reinforcements from England. He then bent his course southwardly, and took pos session of Staten Island, near New- York. The Americans had been engaged under General Greene in fortifying the Heights of Brooklyn. This officer was obliged from illness to retire from command, and General Sullivan succeeded him. General Put nam was finally sent over, and on him the command devolved, four days before the battle commenced. The British army, soon after, passed over to Long Island, between the Narrows and Sandy Hook. A 32 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL severe action took place. The force of the Ameri cans was about five thousand that of the British, fifteen thousand men. Lord Stirling's division con sisted of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Delaware troops. They fought with great bravery. General Sullivan's corps was attacked on both sides, and after an obsti nate resistance for three hours, he was compelled to surrender. The courage and good conduct of all the troops were universally acknowledged. Their loss was between eleven and twelve hundred, more than a thousand of whom were captured. General Sullivan and Lord Stirling were among the prisoners. In the midst of this sanguinary battle, General Washington crossed over to Long Island with a part of his army and took possession of Brook lyn Heights. The regiment of Colonel Webb, to which Captain Hull was attached, was in this division. We saw the carnage of our brave countrymen. The soul of Washington seemed bursting with anguish at an event so unexpected and distressing. To hasten to the succour of his gallant troops, was his first wish; but prudence denied this relief, which he had too much reason to apprehend could only be secured by the sacrifice of his remaining brave soldiers. Besides those with him, he had at command the troops in New-York, which he might have ordered into the bat tle. But sensible of his inability to contend with the powerful army of the British, in the spirit of his usual wisdom and self-command he restrained the desire, and turned his attention to the best mode of making a retreat. " A council of war was called. No time LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 33 was lost in deliberation. It was resolved to with draw the troops from Long Island. Boats were col lected and other preparations were made without delay. On the morning of the thirtieth, the whole army, amounting to nine thousand men, the military stores, nearly all the provisions, and the artillery ex cept a few heavy cannon, were safely landed in New- York. " With such secrecy, silence and order was every thing conducted, that the last boat was crossing the river, before the retreat was discovered by the enemy, although parties were stationed within six hundred yards of the lines. " This retreat, in its plan, execution, and success, has been regarded as one of the most remarkable military events in history, and as reflecting the high est credit on the talents and skill of the Commander. So intense was the anxiety of Washington, so un ceasing his exertions, that for forty-eight hours he did not close his eyes, and rarely dismounted from his horse."* It was evident, that the superior force of the British, would soon give them possession of New- York. The Commmander-in-chief, therefore, took a position at Fort Washington, at the other end of the Island. To ascertain the further object of the enemy, was now a subject of anxious inquiry with General Washington. He communicated his wishes to Colonel Knowlton, who made it known to Captain * "Writings of Washington," by Sparks. Vol. I., page 192. 3 34 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL Hale and other officers of his regiment. Captain Hale had recently been transferred from the regiment of Colonel Webb to that of Colonel Knowlton. There existed a warm friendship between himself and Captain Hull. They were of the same age, and had been classmates at Yale College. Two years after they graduated, the war commenced. They heard of the battles of Lexington and Bunker Hill. Their names were soon enrolled under the standard of their country, and they marched in the same regi ment, to join the army of Washington at Cambridge, shortly after his arrival in camp. Captain Hull had every opportunity to learn the true character of his much loved associate, nor can it be supposed, that there was a want of discrimination in the warm expression of his sentiments. He says in his MSS. Memoirs : " There was no young man who gave fairer promise of an enlightened and devoted service to his country, than this my friend and companion in arms. His naturally fine intellect had been carefully cultivated, and his heart was filled with generous emotions ; but, like the soaring eagle, the patriotic ardour of his soul < winged the dart which caused his destruction.' " After his interview with Colonel Knowlton, he repaired to my quarters, and informed me of what had passed. He remarked, < That he thought he owed to his country the accomplishment of an object so important, and so much desired by the Commander of her armies, and he knew of no other mode of ob taining the information, than by assuming a disguise LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 35 and passing into the enemy's camp.' He asked my candid opinion, I replied, that it was an action which involved serious consequences, and the propriety of it was doubtful ; and though he viewed the busi ness of a spy as a duty, yet, he could not official ly be required to perform it. That such a service was not claimed of the meanest soldier, though many might be willing, for a pecuniary compensation, to engage in it ; and as for himself, the employment was not in keeping with his character. His nature was too frank and open for deceit and disguise, and he was incapable of acting a part equally foreign to his feelings and habits. Admitting that he was successful, who would wish success at such a price ? Did his country demand the moral degradation of her sons, to advance her interests ? Stratagems are resorted to in war ; they are feints and evasions, performed under no disguise ; are familiar to com manders ; form a part of their plans, and, considered in a military view, lawful and advantageous. The tact with which they are executed, exacts admiration from the enemy. But who respects the character of a spy, assuming the garb of friendship but to be tray ? The very death assigned him is expressive of the estimation in which he is held. As soldiers, let us do our duty in the field ; contend for our legitimate rights, and not stain our honour by the sacrifice of integrity. And when present events, with all their deep and exciting interests, shall have passed away, may the blush of shame never arise, by the remem brance of an unworthy, though successful act, in the 36 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL performance of which we were deceived by the be lief that it was sanctified by its object. I ended by saying, that should he undertake the enterprise, his short, bright career, would close with an ignominious death. " He replied, ' I am fully sensible of the conse quences of discovery and capture in such a situation. But for a year I have been attached to the army, and have not rendered any material service, while re ceiving a compensation, for which I make no return. Yet,' he continued, ' I arn not influenced by the ex pectation of promotion or pecuniary reward ; I wish to be useful, and every kind of service, necessary to the public good, becomes honourable by being ne cessary. If the exigencies of my country demand a peculiar service, its claims to perform that service are imperious.' "He spoke with warmth and decision. I replied, c That such are your wishes, cannot be doubted. But is this the most effectual mode of carrying them into execution ? In the progress of the war, there will be ample opportunity to give your talents and your life, should it be so ordered, to the sacred cause to which we are pledged. You can bestow upon your country the richest benefits, and win for your self the highest honours. Your exertions for her in terests will be daily felt, while, by one fatal act, you crush for ever the power and the opportunity Heaven offers, for her glory and your happiness.' " I urged him, for the love of country, for the love of kindred, to abandon an enterprise which would LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 37 only end in the sacrifice of the dearest interests of both. " He paused then affectionately taking my hand, he said, I will reflect, and do nothing but what duty demands.' He was absent from the army, and I feared he had gone to the British lines, to execute his fatal purpose. In a few days an officer came to our camp, under a flag of truce, and informed Hamil ton, then a captain of artillery, but afterwards the aid of General Washington, that Captain Hale had been arrested within the British lines, condemned as a spy, and executed that morning. " I learned the melancholy particulars from this of ficer, who w r as present at his execution, and seemed touched by the circumstances attending it. " He said that Captain Hale had passed through their army, both of Long Island and York Island. That he had procured sketches of the fortifications, and made memoranda of their number and different positions. When apprehended, he was taken before Sir William Howe, and these papers, found concealed about his person, betrayed his intentions. He at once declared his name, his rank in the American army, and his object in coming within the British lines. " Sir William Howe, without the form of a trial, gave orders for his execution the following morning. He was placed in the custody of the Provost Marshal, who was a Refugee, and hardened to human suffering and every softening sentiment of the heart. Captain Hale, alone, without sympathy or support, save that from above, on the near approach of death asked for 38 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL a clergyman to attend him. It was refused. He then requested a Bible ; that too was refused by his inhuman jailer. " ' On the morning of his execution,' continued the officer, ' my station was near the fatal spot, and I requested the Provost Marshal to permit the pris oner to sit in my marquee, while he was making the necessary preparations. Captain Hale entered : he was calm, and bore himself with gentle dignity, in the consciousness of rectitude and high intentions. He asked for writing materials, which I furnished him : he wrote two letters, one to his mother and one to a brother officer. 5 He was shortly after summoned to the gallows. But a few persons were around him, yet his characteristic dying words were remem bered. He said, ' I only regret, that I have but one life to lose for my country.' ' Thus terminated the earthly existence of a man ? whose country mourned the loss of one of her fairest sons, and whose friends wept, in the bitter recollec tion of his untimely fate. The Provost Marshal, in the diabolical spirit of cruelty, destroyed the letters of his prisoner, and as signed as a reason, " that the rebels should not know that they had a man in their army who could die with so much firmness." The sentence was just, according to the laws of war^ but the manner of its execution must ever be deplored. There is a similarity in the fate of Major Andre and that of Captain Hale ; the former of whom ex cited so lively an interest in both armies, while the LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 39 latter has been rarely alluded to by the historians of the Revolution. Major Andre was the Adjutant General of the British army. He possessed a cultivated mind, genius in the fine arts, and was the charm of society wherever he was known. Sir Henry Clinton, who in Sept. 1780 was com manding in New-York, placed the highest confidence in his abilities and patriotism. For eighteen months, an anonymous correspondence had been held be tween the British Commander and General Arnold, when finally Arnold made himself known, and offered to deliver to the enemy of his country West Point and the neighbouring fortresses in the Highlands, then under his immediate command. Sir Henry Clinton proposed to Major Andre to ascend the Hudson in the Vulture sloop of war, and have an interview with General Arnold, that they might settle upon a plan, which, if successful, they hoped would strike a fatal blow to the liberties of America, and thus put an end to the war. Andre, it was believed, possessed the talent and the tact to negotiate this delicate business. He was promised promotion and pecuniary reward. In a fatal hour he consented to go ; to meet a traitor ; a man low in every thing but military genius : and by thus descending, brought ruin on himself, and injured the cause, for which he was making such immense sacrifices. They met. Their plan was settled ; was committed to paper, together with the drawings of the fortifications ; all of which were given to Ma jor Andre. 40 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL The Vulture sloop of war having been fired upon by the Americans, had dropped down the river, but soon after returned to her station. Joshua Smith, the only person that could be em ployed by Arnold to take Andre back to the vessel, became alarmed, it is supposed, on account of the firing, and refused to go. This man was perfectly ignorant of the nature of the transaction. He believ ed he was acting for his country's interests, and, as appeared on his trial, was completely duped by Arnold. The only alternative for Andre \vas, to return by land. This was full of danger, but the danger must be met. Major Andre received the pass of General Arnold, took off his uniform, assumed the name of John Anderson, and crossing the Hudson at Stony Point, commenced his perilous journey. He felt his situa tion extremely critical when within the American lines, and stopped at their outposts : but the pass of Arnold still carried him on with safety. At length a guide was no longer necessary, and Smith left him and returned home. Andre went on, until he arrived within half a mile of Tarrytown. Here he was stopped by three men. Their names were John Paulding, David Williams, and Isaac Van Wart.* One of them said, " There comes a gentle manlike looking man, who appears to be well dressed, * For a most interesting account ferred to Sparks' Life of Benedict of the circumstances attending the Arnold, from which some of the capture of Andre, the reader is re- above particulars are taken. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 4J and has boots on, and whom you had better step out and stop, if you don't know him."* ." On that I got up and presented my firelock at the breast of the person, and told him to stand ; and then I asked him which way he was going. ' Gen tlemen,' said he, c I hope you belong to our party.' I asked him what party. He said, c The lower par ty.' Upon that I told him I did. Then he said, ' I am a British officer, out of the country, on particu lar business, and 1 hope you will not detain me a minute ;' and to show that he was a British officer, he pulled out his watch. Upon which, I told him to dismount. He then said, ' Well, I must do any thing to get along,' and seemed to make a kind of laugh of it, and pulled out General Arnold's pass, which was to John Anderson, to pass all guards to White Plains, and below. Upon that, he dismount ed. Said he, ' Gentlemen, you had best let me go, or you will bring yourselves into trouble ; for your stopping me will detain the General's business ;' and said, he was going to Dobb's ferry to meet a person there and to get intelligence for General Arnold. Upon that, I told him, that I hoped he would not be offended ; that we did not mean to take any thing from him ; and 1 told him, there were bad people who were going along the road, and I did not know but perhaps he might be one. " We took him into the bushes," said Williams, * This was a part of the testimo- er's Journal, page 261, for Resolu- ny given by his captors, eleven days tion of Congress, in a Note, after Andre was taken. See Thatch- 42 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL " and ordered him to pull off his clothes, which he did ; but on searching him narrowly, we could not find any sort of writings. We told him to pull off his boots, which he seemed to be indifferent about ; but we got one boot off, and searched in that boot and could find nothing. But we found there were some papers in the bottom of his stocking, next to his foot, on which, we made him pull his stocking off, and found three papers wrapped up. Mr. Paulding looked at the contents, and said he was a spy. We then made him pull off his other boot, and there we found three more papers, at the bot tom of his foot, within his stocking. Upon this, we made him dress himself, and I asked him, what he would give us to let him go. He said, he would give us any sum of money. I asked him whether he would give us his horse, saddle and bridle, watch, and one hundred guineas. He said yes, and told us, he would direct them to any place, even if it was that very spot, so that we could get them. I asked him if he would not give us more. He said he would give us any quantity of dry goods, or any sum of money, and bring it to any place that we might pitch upon, so that we might get it. Mr. Paulding answered, c No, if you should give us ten thousand guineas, you should not stir one step.' " I then asked the person, who had called him self John Anderson, if he would not get away if it lay in his power. He answered, * Yes, I would.' I told him, 1 did not intend he should. While tak ing him along, we asked him a few questions, and LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 43 we stopped under a shade. He begged us not to ask him questions, and said, when he came to any Commander, he would reveal all. " In a few hours, we delivered him up to Lieu tenant-Colonel Jameson, who commanded at North Castle, with all the papers that had been taken from his boots. "* The papers were of great importance, and had the plot succeeded, would have given to the enemy an advantage, productive of the most serious conse quences. Major Andre, aware that his papers had been sent to General Washington, and not to General Arnold, as he had hoped, wrote to the Commander- in-chief, a full confession of his name, rank in the British army, and his object in coming within the American lines. After he had written this letter, it was remarked by Major Tallmage, who now had charge of the prisoner, that he seemed more cheerful, entered into conversation, in his own delightful and peculiar way, and greatly interested all around him, by the vivacity and beauty of a well-stored intellect. In a communication to Mr. Sparks, Major Tall- mage writes : " When we left West Point for Tappan, early in the morning, as we passed down the Hudson river to King's Ferry, I placed Andre by my side, on the after seat of the barge. I soon began to make inquiries about the expected capture of our fortress, then in full view, and begged him to inform me, whether he was to have taken a part in the military * See Sparks' Life and Treason of Benedict Arnold, page 226. 44 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL attack, if Arnold's plan had succeeded. He instantly replied in the affirmative, and pointed me to a table of land on the west shore, which he said was the spot where he should have landed, at the head of a select corps. He then traversed, in idea, the course up the mountains, into the rear of Fort Put nam, which overlooks the whole parade of West Point. This he did with much greater exactness than I could have done ; and as Arnold had so dis posed of the garrison, that little or no opposition could be made by our troops, Major Andre supposed he should reach that commanding eminence without difficulty. " In such case, that important key of our coun try would have fallen into the hands of the enemy, and the glory of so splendid an achievement would have been his. The animation with which he gave the account, I recollect, perfectly delighted me, for he seemed as if he were entering the fort, sword in hand. " To complete the climax, I inquired what would have been his reward, if he had succeeded. He replied, that military glory was all he sought : and that the thanks of his General and the appro bation of his King were a rich reward for such an undertaking. I think he further remarked, that if he had succeeded (and with the aid of the opposing General who could doubt of success ?) he was to have been promoted to the rank of a Brigadier-Gen eral. " After we disembarked at King's Ferry, near Ha- LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 45 verstraw, we took up our line of march, with a fine body of horse, for Tappan. Before we reached the close, Major Andre became very inquisitive to know my opinion, as to the result of his capture. In other words, he wished me to give him candidly my opinion, as to the light in which he would be viewed by General Washington and a Military Tribunal, if one should be ordered. "This was the most unpleasant question that had been propounded to me, and I endeavoured to evade it, unwilling to give him a true answer. " When I could no longer evade his importunity, I remarked to him as follows : ' I had a much loved classmate in Yale College, by the name of Nathan Hale, who entered the army in the year 1775. Im mediately after the battle of Long Island, General Washington wanted information respecting the strength, position, and probable movements of the enemy. Captain Hale tendered his services, went over to Brooklyn, and was taken prisoner, just as he was passing the outposts of the enemy on his return.' " Said I with emphasis, ' Do you remember the sequel of this story ?' < Yes,' said Andre, ' he was hanged as a spy. But you surely do not consider his case and mine alike ?' I replied, ' Yes, precisely similar, and similar will be your fate.' " He endeavoured to answer my remarks, but it was manifest he was more troubled in spirit than I had ever before seen him. " The day after his arrival at Tappan, a Board of Officers, of six Major- Generals and eight Brigadier- 46 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL Generals, were appointed to examine his case. Gen eral Greene was the President. The names of the officers constituting the Board were read to him. " General Greene told the prisoner that he might be at liberty to answer or not the questions put to him, and to take his ow r n time for recollecting and weighing what he said. " He was asked, if when he came on shore, he considered himself under a flag. He answered, it was impossible for him to suppose he came on shore, under the sanction of a flag, and added, that if he came on shore, under that sanction, he certainly might have returned under it. " During his examination, he was dignified and manly, and answered with frankness and truth every thing that related to himself, and used no words to explain or defend any part of his conduct. So deli cate was he in regard to other persons, that he scrupulously avoided mentioning names, or alluding to any particulars, except such as concerned himself. " After the most careful examination of his case, to which he offered no defence, he was, by the laws of war, sentenced to die as a spy. " His fate created great interest and sympathy, not only in the British, but in the American army. On both sides, the desire was to save him. But trying as it was to the feelings of General Washing ton, yet justice demanded the sacrifice. " Efforts were made to save him. Captain Ogden, an American officer, was sent to the British lines, under a flag of truce, with a packet of letters from LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 47 General Washington. He was directed to obtain further orders from General La Fajette. The Ge neral told him to arrange his visit in such a way, as to make it so late at night that he would be invited to remain. That in the course of conversation, it might probably be asked, by the officers, if there was any way in which Andre could be saved. That he should reply, yes, that there was a way ; which was, if Sir Henry Clinton would deliver up Arnold and take Andre in exchange, the prisoner would be set at liberty. Captain Ogden was asked if he had authority for such a declaration. He replied, * I have no such assurance from General Washington, but I am prepared to say, that if such a proposition were made, I believe it would be accepted, and Major Andre set at liberty.' " The commanding officer immediately went to Sir Henry Clinton. On his return, he told Captain Ogden that such a thing could not be done ; that to give up a man, who had deserted from the enemy and openly espoused the King's cause, was such a viola tion of honour and every military principle, that Sir Henry Clinton would not listen to the idea for a mo ment." Major Andre asked of General Washington the privilege of being shot, but this request could not be granted, according to the strict laws of war. Ge neral Washington made no reply to his application. Dr. Thatcher, in his Military Journal,* says : " At * Journal, page 273. 48 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL the moment, therefore, when suddenly he came in view of the gallows, he involuntarily started back ward and made a pause. * Why this emotion, sir ?' said an officer by his side. Instantly recovering his composure, he said, * I am reconciled to my death, but I detest the mode.' While waiting and stand ing near the gallows, I observed some degree of trepidation ; placing his foot on a stone, and rolling it over, and choking in his throat, as if attempting to swallow. So soon, however, as he perceived things were in readiness, he stepped quickly into the wag on, and at this moment he appeared to shrink ; but instantly elevating his head, with firmness he said, ' It will be but a momentary pang ;' and taking from his pocket two white handkerchiefs, the Provost Marshal with one loosely pinioned his arms, and with the other the victim, after taking off his hat and stock, bandaged his own eyes, with perfect firmness, which melted the hearts and moistened the cheeks, not only of his servant, but of the throng of spectators. The rope being appended to the gallows, he slipped the noose over his head, and adjusted it to his neck, with out the assistance of the awkward executioner. Colo nel Scammel now informed him that he had an oppor tunity to speak, if he desired it ; he raised the hand kerchief from his eyes and said, I pray you to bear me witness, that I meet my fate like a braVe man.' The next moment life was extinguished." Major Andre is described as being possessed of personal attraction, and was highly accomplished. A likeness of him is preserved, taken by himself with LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 49 a pen, on the morning of his execution, while seated at a table in the guard-room.* A parallel has been drawn by historians between Andre and Hale ; and it may be admitted, without a bias in favour of our countryman, that Hale was in fluenced by nobler and purer motives than Andre : for his death marked the Patriot and the Christian. But if we consider how different were their early condition in life, as well as their official stations, we would find abundant cause for this difference. Unhappily, men are more governed in their conduct by the circumstances in which they are placed, than by principle. The influence which surrounds them involuntarily becomes an element in action, and their motives are often worldly and selfish in their charac ter. Andre and Hale both possessed a high sense of moral rectitude, elevated tastes, and pure habits. Had their positions in life been changed, we are not sure but that Andre might have exhibited the qual ities of Hale, and Hale those of Andre. The coun try of Hale was poor and feeble, contending for its rights, under circumstances of great disadvantage, and deep depression. Its defenders were disciplined by suffering, and rather felt for her than themselves. Andre belonged to the most powerful nation of the earth : a nation whose armies were victorious in every quarter of the globe. To contend for her, was to contend for the enlargement of her borders * The original drawing is now in the Trumbull Gallery of Yale College. 4 50 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL and the increase of her pride. To combat for suf fering America, was to combat for liberty, for home, for virtue. Where is the man whose feelings and opinions would not be affected by such a discipline, and would not in the hour of death feel more for his country's interests than his own personal reputation ? Andre said, " I pray you to bear me witness, that I meet my fate like a brave man." The words of Hale were, " I only lament, that I have but one life to lose for my country." The one, in the event of success ex pected promotion and pecuniary rewards ; the other, looked only for the unspeakable happiness of having done what he deemed his duty. Andre engaged in the enterprise without the thought or view of danger. Protected by the power and influence of Arnold, and his retreat from our shores secured by a British armed vessel in the river, he had nothing to apprehend ; while animated by the prospect of almost certain success in viewing the advantage presented by the defection of Arnold. On the contrary, Hale went to the enemy's lines in the very spirit of self-devotion, resolved to achieve his work, or meet death, which he knew was the certain alternative. In the solemn hours preceding the approach of eternity, Andre sought relief in intellectual enjoy ments, in the works of genius, and left to the world a drawing of his own person, taken in his guard room, from which he was soon to pass to the scaf fold. He asked that he might die the death of a LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 5J soldier, and not by the hands of the common hang man. Hale thought not of the mode of his death. He felt like the virtuous Raleigh ; when inquired of by the executioner which way he should lay his head, replied, "No matter, so that the heart is right." In the near view of death, Hale sought the con solations of religion. He asked for a Bible and a clergyman, to assist him in his preparation for the eternal world. Though denied them both, yet we may be permitted to believe that the wish of his heart was blessed, and that the Spirit of God became his Teacher. The memory of Andre is enshrined in monu ments of art, that of Hale in the hearts of his coun trymen. 52 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL CHAPTER IV. BATTLE OF CHATTERTOX HILL, AT THE WHITE PLAINS. 1776. THE British army being in possession of New- York, General Washington took a strong position on the heights about Kingsbridge, at the eastern end of the island. The main body of the enemy ad vanced to a narrow part of the island, near his posi tion, their right extending to the East River, and their left to the Hudson, near Bloomingdale. Be tween these lines partial engagements took place, which were honourable to the American arms. The gallant manner in which the troops of Washington fought, together with the strength of his position, were undoubtedly among the reasons which prevent ed the British Commander from hazarding a general action. Even if Washington had been beaten on this ground, he had two lines of defence across the Island, and a very strong position at Kingsbridge, which would have enabled him to have retreated with safety, and preserved his communication with his country. Under these circumstances, General Howe made a movement, the object of which was to compel General Washington to abandon his position on LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 53 York Island and at Kingsbridge, or suffer his commu nication to be entirely obstructed. For this purpose he embarked his army on the East River, in flat-bot tomed boats, passed Hellgate, and landed on Frog or Throg's Neck, a suitable point from which to march his army across the country, attain the rear of the Americans, and communicate with a part of the British fleet in the" Hudson, which had passed forts Washington and Lee, notwithstanding their fire and the obstructions placed in the river to oppose their passage. The American Commander perceiving the object of this movement, determined, though with reluc tance, to abandon his position on York Island, and march the left of his army to the White Plains ; the right extending in the first instance to Kingsbridge. It was soon apparent that General Howe was concentrating his whole army at Frog's Neck and its vicinity, excepting a small body left in New- York for its defence. Washington therefore moved his right division from Kingsbridge to the White Plains. So anxious was he, however, to retain a footing on York Island, especially for the purpose of obstruct ing the navigation of the Hudson, that he left a gar rison of between two and three thousand men at Fort Washington, under the command of Colonel McGaw, of Pennsylvania. While the American General was marching the right wing of his army from Kingsbridge to the White Plains, General Howe commenced his march from Frog's Neck towards the same point. On the 54 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL march, the left wing of the British and the right wing of the American army were very near each other. When the left wing, under the command of Major-General Charles Lee, arrived at the White Plains, General McDougal's brigade was directed to take possession of Chatterton's Hill, about a mile in advance of the White Plains, on the right of the American army. The river Brunx ran in the low grounds, at the foot of the hill, and about one hun dred yards in front of McDougal's brigade. Colonel Webb's regiment, in which was Captain Hull's company, belonged to this brigade, which con sisted of about fifteen hundred men. " Early in the morning," says General Hull in his MSS., " having taken our position, we discovered at a distance the approach of the British army. Its appearance was truly magnificent. A bright autum nal sun shed its full lustre on their polished arms ; and the rich array of dress and military equipage, gave an imposing grandeur to the scene, as they ad vanced, in all the pomp and circumstance of war, to give us battle. " Wlien the columns arrived within a small dis tance of our line, on the opposite side of the Brunx, they halted ; their field artillery was advanced, with which they commenced a heavy fire. We had but three or four pieces of artillery. " They returned the fire, until the whole of them were dismounted. The enemy then made a nearer approach, and with chain and grape shot, continued the cannonade for more than an hour. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 55 " General Howe, finding that he could not dis lodge us from the hill with his artillery, formed three columns of infantry, which passed the Brunx, one against our centre, and the other two against each flank. " At this moment Colonel Webb received orders from General McDougal to move and take a posi tion further to the left, to prevent the enemy from turning his left flank. This was promptly done, and with much order and regularity. After a sharp con flict, the object was completely attained. Our whole line sustained the attack with persevering bravery, for a considerable time, but at length, overpowered by numbers, the right and the centre first retreated in some disorder. Colonel Webb's regiment main tained the conflict for a time, after the other part of the brigade had abandoned the field, and it had the honour to receive the particular thanks of Washing ton for its bravery and orderly retreat."* The loss of the Americans in killed, wounded, * Extract from a letter of General Plains, General Hull acted under my Brooks, to the President of the Court immediate orders, and was detached Martial, held at Albany, for the trial from the line, to oppose a body of of General Hull, dated February 4th, Light Infantry and Yagers, advanc- 1814, touching the battle at the ing upon the left flank of the Amer- White Plains. It will be perceived, ican army. .His orders were exe- that General Hull does not mention cuted with promptitude, gallantry, the fact, that he was the officer de- and effect. Though more than tached from the line by his Com- double his number, the enemy was mander, to oppose the enemy on compelled to retreat, and the left of the left. the American line thus enabled, by General Brooks says, " In the a flank movement, to pass the month of September, 1776, at White Brunx." 56 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL and prisoners, was about two hundred and fifty. The British loss nearly the same. General Howe did not pursue the advantage he had gained. A general action was expected the next morning, but a violent storm of rain was probably the cause which prevented it. When the storm ceased, General Howe changed his mode of opera tions, and made a retrograde movement to Kings- bridge, for the purpose of reducing the garrison at Fort Washington, on Long Island. The historians of the Revolution give an account of the reduction of this fortress, and the retreat of General Washington in November and December, through New Jersey, and over the Delaware. Cap tain Hull was not a witness of these events. The MSS. continues : " Our regiment formed a part of the division un der Charles Lee, and was stationed in the Highlands, on the Hudson. " General Lee was ordered to march through the o upper parts of New Jersey, and join, as speedily as possible, the army of Washington. During the march, at a halt in Morris county, he went one night to lodge at a farm-house, three miles distant from the camp. The British, by some means, obtained infor mation of this step, and Colonel Harcourt, with a body of cavalry, made a forced march in the night, and early in the morning surrounded the house. The troops fired into the windows, and General Lee was made prisoner, before he suspected that an enemy was near. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 57 " They mounted him on a horse in great haste, without cloak or hat, and carried him in triumph to New- York. It is impossible to describe the excite ment produced by this event. " General Lee was second to Washington in command. He had held a high rank in the British army, and had seen much military service. The country deplored his loss. Washington felt it to be a severe misfortune, and the army considered that, next to Washington, Lee was the sinew and soul of their strength. " General Sullivan, of New Hampshire, was the next officer of rank in the division. He marched it with great rapidity to the Delaware, and about the 20th of December joined the main army in Pennsyl vania. Here we remained inactive but a few days. General Washington deemed it necessary to make some bold effort to rouse the desponding spirit of the country, which at this period had sunk into the deep est gloom." Although the enemy had abandoned for the pre sent, the idea of proceeding to Philadelphia, on account of the severity of the season, and the diffi culty of passing the Delaware, yet Rhode Island and New- York were in their possession ; a great part of New Jersey was conquered, and a spirit of disaf fection prevailed in Pennsylvania. The patriotic feelings that pervaded every part of the country at the commencement of the contest, appeared now to be nearly extinguished. 58 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL CHAPTER V. BATTLE OF TRENTON. CAPTAIN HULL ACTS AS FIELD OFFICER IN THE AB SENCE OF MAJOR BROOKS. 1776. GENERAL WASHINGTON having been reinforced by the division under General Sullivan, and by a part of the northern army which had served under General Gates, formed the bold design of passing the Dela ware, and attacking the different posts of the enemy on its eastern shore. At Trenton there were sta tioned three regiments of Hessians, consisting of fif teen hundred men, besides a troop of light-horse. Other detachments were at Burlington, Borderi- town, Mount Holly, and Black Horse. General Cad- wallader was appointed to attack these posts, and directed to cross the river at Bristol, while Washing ton would cross above Trenton, and General Ewing below, and unite in the attack on the Hessians in that place. Early in the evening of the twenty-fifth of De cember, the troops were put in motion, and com menced crossing the river. The army consisted of two thousand four hundred men, and twenty pieces of artillery. It crossed the Delaware about ten miles above LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. f Trenton. The evening set in with a violent storm of hail and snow, which continued during the night. The weather was intensely cold, and the ice floated down the river in such quantities, that the passage of the troops was not completed until three o'clock in the morning. They were then formed into two columns. The right marched on a road near the river, under General Sullivan ; and the left on a road a little distant from it, towards the east. Both of these roads entered the town of Trenton, and the distance to be marched was about the same. Gen eral Greene led on the other column, but Washing ton commanded in person. Colonel Webb's regi ment formed a part of it. At daylight the columns halted, but the men were not permitted to leave their ranks. During the halt, Captain Hull was sent for by his Commander, who informed him, that his Lieu tenant-Colonel was absent, and that Major Brooks, overcome with fatigue, had returned to the encamp ment ; that he had no field officer with him, and desired Captain Hull to give the command of his company to his Lieutenant, and assist him as a field officer in the general command of the regiment. This order was promptly obeyed. When the columns were ordered to resume the march, the fatigue of the troops was so great that nearly one half of the men were asleep, and those awake passed by, leaving them standing on their posts. It was with difficulty they could be roused and the order of march resumed. According to the plan, both columns arrived at the point of attack with- 60 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL in a few minutes of each other. Notwithstanding the severity of the weather, the elements raging around us, the moment the firing commenced by the outguards of our columns, and the outguards of the enemy, the whole corps was animated with new spirit, and advanced with a firmness and impetuosity, which bore a striking contrast to the drowsy attitudes they exhibited a few mo ments before. The firing of the advanced parties having given the alarm to the enemy, the command ing officer, Colonel Rhal, immediately prepared for battle. He formed his line on ground, then an orchard, on the right of the road leading to Phila delphia, and facing to the northwest. The column led on by General Washington pressed with such irresistible force on the right arid centre of the enemy, while the column on the left acted with equal spirit, that the British force, after a short struggle, was compelled to surrender. Some of the British attempted to retreat on the Princeton road, but were prevented by a detachment from our left column. In a short time, nearly the whole body were either killed, wounded, or taken prisoners ; and all their artillery, magazines, and military stores, were in our possession. A small part of the enemy retreated to Borden- town and Burlington, which they could not have done had it been possible for the detachment under Ewing and Cadwallader to have crossed the Dela ware, below Trenton, and at Burlington above, as was the intention. Among the killed was the com- LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. Q\ manding officer, Colonel Rhal, a truly brave man, and nearly one thousand officers and. soldiers were made prisoners. General Washington, with all possible speed, com menced his march back to the same ferry where he had crossed the Delaware, taking his prisoners, can non, arms, and military stores. It occupied a part of the second night to recross the river, so great were the difficulties, increased by the accumulation of ice. The operation was not completed until three o'clock in the morning. " Six brass field-pieces and a thousand stand of arms, were the trophies of victory. Colonel Rhal, the Hessian commander and a gallant officer, was mortally wounded. Six other officers and between twenty and thirty men were killed. The American loss was two privates killed and two others frozen to death. Captain William Washington, distinguished as an officer of cavalry at a later period of the war, and Lieutenant Monroe, afterwards President of the United States, were wounded in a brave and success ful assault upon the enemy's artillery. The fact that two men died by suffering from cold, is a proof of the intense severity of the weather. It snowed and hailed during the whole march. The ice had formed so fast in the river, below Trenton, that it was im practicable for the troops under Cadwallader and Ewing to pass over at the times agreed upon. Cad wallader succeeded in landing a battalion of infant ry, but the ice on the margin of the stream was in such a condition, as to render it impossible to land Q<% REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL the artillery, and they all returned. If Ewing had crossed, as was proposed, and taken possession of the bridge on the south side of the town, the party that fled would have been intercepted and captured. And there was the fairest prospect that Cadwallader would have been equally fortunate against the detachment below, or have driven them towards Trenton, where they would have met a victorious army."* Captain Hull writes : " To give you some idea of the excessive fatigue of the troops engaged in this enterprise, I relate the following anecdote respecting myself. It was between two and three o'clock in the morning of the second night, when my company recrossed the Delaware. I marched them to the house of a farmer, and halted to obtain refreshments and rest. After my men were accommodated, I went into a room where a number of officers were sitting around a table, with a large dish of hasty pudding 3 in its centre. 1 sat down, procured a spoon, and be gan to eat. While eating, I fell from my chair to the floor, overcome with sleep, and in the morning, when I awoke, the spoon was fast clenched in my hand." * Sparks' Life and Writings of Washington, Vol. I., page 228. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. CHAPTER VI. CRITICAL STATE OF THE COUNTRY. WASHINGTON'S EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE TROOPS FROM RETURNING TO THEIR HOMES. PROMOTION OF CAPTAIN HULL. BATTLE OF PRINCETON. 1777. NOTWITHSTANDING the success which attended our arms at Trenton, the situation of the army and country was extremely critical. The time for which the best troops from the north ward had engaged, would expire in a few days. The recruiting service in every part of the country was attended with little success. It was with great dif ficulty that the militia could be called into active ser vice, and a spirit of despondency every where prevail ed. There was no period of the war more gloomy and discouraging than the close of the year 1776. Had General Washington now retreated into winter quar ters, the whole of New Jersey would have remained in possession of the enemy ; and as soon as the ice had formed on the Delaware, the British would have marched to Philadelphia without opposition. The state of the army and the circumstances of the coun try required bold and decisive measures. Of this Washington was sensible. After recruit ing his army for two or three days, he recrossed the 4 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL river to Trenton. The British garrison below, at Bordentown and Burlington, after our victory at Trenton, had retreated to Princeton and Brunswick, and Generals Ewing and Cadwallader had recrossed the Delaware with the militia under their command, and taken possession of the posts vacated by the enemy. The year was drawing to a close, and the most effective part of the army, in a few days, would be entitled to a discharge. At this critical moment Washington received information that a part of the British army, under Lord Cornwallis, was advancing from New-York to retrieve the misfortunes which had attended their arms at Trenton. General Wash ington immediately ordered the troops from the High lands into New Jersey, with all the militia that could be collected, to press upon the rear and right of Lord Cornwallis's division, to retard their movements as much as possible. He likewise ordered the militia from Burlington and Bordentown to join him at Trenton. Washington made a solemn appeal to that part of his army whose term of service was now expiring. He spoke of the fidelity with which they had served, and acknowledged their just right to a discharge. He begged them, however, to consider what would be the situation of the country, if they availed themselves of that right. He reminded them of their gallant con duct a few days before, on the very ground on which they were then standing ; how honourable it had been to them, how advantageous to their country, and how LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. (35 mortifying to the enemy. That if they now returned to their homes, all the advantages gained by us would be lost, and there would be no army to oppose the progress of the enemy, wherever he was inclined to march ; and asked them to consider what would be his situation under circumstances like these. He then urged them to engage for six weeks, and as an inducement, offered a bounty of ten dollars. Captain Hull communicated the proposition of the Commander-in-chief to his company, and used every argument in his power, in addition to what his General had urged, to induce them to comply. He was happy to return every man of them for the next six weeks. A large proportion of the army complied with the wishes of their Commander. The state of the country had now become so dis tressing, and the dangers impending so alarming, that Congress confided to General Washington extraordi nary powers, in relation to appointments in the army, requisitions on the State for militia, and resources for their support, but limiting these powers to the period of six months. The day before the army marched from Trenton to Princeton, Captain Hull was informed that the Commander-in-chief wished to see him at head-quar ters. He was introduced to General Washington, who observed to him that he understood that he was a Captain in the Connecticut line ; that there was no vacancy in that line, but there was a vacancy in the Massachusetts line ; that if Captain Hull was willing 5 66 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL to be transferred to another regiment, he was autho rized arid disposed to give him promotion. Captain Hull expressed his grateful feelings, and replied, " I am a soldier for my country, and it is immaterial in what particular line of the army I serve." Shortly after he received a commis sion as a Major in the eighth Massachusetts regi ment. About the first of January, Lord Cornwallis ad vanced from Princeton. General Washington directed a small body of troops to observe his motions, and by skirmishing with his advanced parties, to impede his progress. On this service Captain (now Major) Hull was ordered. The Americans met the guard of the British about three miles from Trenton, and skir mished with light parties of them, retreating at the same time towards the town. This continued during the afternoon, until the main body of the enemy reached Trenton, a little before sunset. Unimportant as this skirmishing may appear to one who knew not the secret design of Washington, yet it had a strong bearing on the future success of the American arms. His plan was well matured, and to retard the approach of the British until night was necessary to its execution. It was this delay which led to his escape from Lord Cornwallis at Trenton, and his subsequent victory at Princeton. On the approach of the enemy General Wash ington retired over the Assanpink, a creek which LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 7 runs through the southern part of Trenton, and emp ties into the Delaware. Here he formed, with the creek in his front, his left extending to the Delaware, and his right as far on the creek as his numbers would admit. Lord Cornwallis was on the other side of the creek, his right extending to the Delaware and his left towards Maidenhead. The American force, including militia, did not exceed five thousand men. The British were double the number. They commenced a cannonade, which was briskly returned, until darkness put an end to the contest. Both armies were without tents, and kindled fires for the night. The sentinels were sta tioned on the borders of the creek, and could hear each other's heavy tread, as they moved up and down its banks. The Delaware was so full of ice that a retreat seemed impossible. Lord Cornwallis expected, by a general action the following morning, to destroy this remnant of the American army. Here, amidst a choice of difficulties, Washington, with consummate foresight, adopted an expedient which not only saved his army, but added fresh lau rels to it. New Jersey was relieved from the pre sence of the enemy, and Philadelphia freed from the danger with which it was threatened. In the middle of the night Washington ordered his fires to be re-kindled ; " fires which were a light to the Americans, but darkness to the British ;" the outguards to remain on their posts, and men to dig so near the enemy's line, that the turning up of the 68 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL earth could be distinctly heard by their sentinels. He then silently drew off his army to the right, and made a circuitous march to Princeton. On approaching the town between daylight and sunrise, we met two British regiments, which had commenced their march, to join CornwaJlis at Trenton. An action imme diately commenced with these regiments, by the van guard of our column, in which the enemy at first had the advantage ; but, on the arrival of General Wash ington, with a superior force, they were dispersed, one part towards Trenton, the other towards Bruns wick. A third regiment, near the Colleges, had formed ; it was immediately attacked, and the rem nant of it, after much loss, retreated to Brunswick. About one hundred of the enemy were killed, and three hundred made prisoners. Lord Cornwallis had no knowledge of this move ment, until it was announced to him by the firing at Princeton. It was doubtful what course he would pursue. The possession of Philadelphia, the capital of America, had seemed a favorite object. Now that the road was open, he was not disposed to avail himself of the occasion to gain that point, but immediately commenced a rapid march, to attack us at Princeton. As soon as General Washington had collected the o prisoners, he advanced about three miles on the road leading to Brunswick, and after passing Millstone Creek, filed off to the left, and directed his march to Morristown, where he established his winter quar ters. Lord Cornwallis, supposing that Washington had LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 9 gone in the direction of Brunswick, and anxious for the fate of the garrison, as well as for the protection of a large sum of money deposited there, pushed di rectly to that place. During these operations, in the midst of winter, our army was destitute of the necessary articles of clothing. This circumstance, and the extreme fa tigue it had endured, prevented General Washington from proceeding to Brunswick, where in all probabi lity he would have gained another complete victory.* It was the fortune of Major Hull to be in the se verest parts of the memorable battles of Trenton and Princeton. The classical and eloquent Italian historian of the war, Charles Botta, after describing these transactions, adds : " Achievements so aston ishing, acquired an immense glory for the Captain General of the United States. All nations shared in the surprise of the Americans ; all equally admired and applauded the prudence, the constancy, and the noble intrepidity of General Washington. An unanimous voice pronounced him the saviour of his country : all extolled him as equal to the most cele brated commanders of antiquity ; all proclaimed him the Fabius of America. His name was in the mouth of all ; he was celebrated by the pens of the most distinguished writers. The most illustrious person ages of Europe lavished upon him their praises and their congratulations. The American General there- o fore, wanted neither a cause to defend, nor occasion * See Appendix No. I. Colonel Simcoe, respecting Washington's Hull's conversation with Governor escape from Cornwallis at Trenton. 7Q REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL for the acquisition of glory, nor genius to avail him self of it, nor the renown due to his triumphs, nor an entire generation of men perfectly well disposed to render him homage."* In a former chapter, the reader was informed that the regiment of Colonel Webb left the Highlands, under the command of General Lee, to reinforce the army of Washington in Pennsylvania. The march commenced about the beginning of December. Ma jor Hull writes : " In recounting the hardships and fatigue which my company encountered, and the patience and for titude with which they endured them, you will have a representation of the situation and conduct of the whole American army at that time. I relate nothing but what I was in the best possible situation to know, and what I personally witnessed. " When we left the Highlands, my company con sisted of about fifty, rank and file. On examining the state of the clothing, I found there was not more than one poor blanket to two men : many of them had neither shoes nor stockings ; and those who had, found them nearly worn out. All the clothing was of the same wretched description. " These troops had been almost a year in service, and their pay which was due, remained unpaid. Yet their privations and trials were only equalled by their patience. They knew the resources of their country did not admit of their being more comfortable ; yet ? * Otis's Botta, Vol. II., page 227. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 7| in a noble spirit of patriotism, they served her in her greatest need without compensation, and almost without the hope of more prosperous days. " In this condition, during the inclement month of December, we marched through New Jersey, slept on the cold ground, until we joined the army of General Washington in Pennsylvania. Here we remained a few days, but found no relief from our sufferings, unless it was relief to join companions in similar distress. " In the attacks at Trenton and Princeton we were in this destitute situation, and continued to sleep on the frozen ground, without covering, until the seventh of January, when we arrived at Morristown, New Jersey, where General Washington established his winter quarters. The patient endurance of the army at this period, is perhaps unexampled in this or any other country." 72 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL CHAPTER VII. RETREAT OF GENERAL ST. CLAIR FROM TICONDEROGA. 1777. WHEN the army was established in winter quar ters in New Jersey, Major Hull was ordered to re pair to Boston and assist in recruiting the eighth Massachusetts regiment. Michael Jackson, Esquire, was the Colonel of the regiment, and John Brooks, Esquire, afterwards Governor of Massachusetts, was the Lieutenant-Colonel. Colonel Jackson had not recovered from his wounds, received at Montressor's Island, near New- York, in the second year of the war, and was unable to perform duty. Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks had been active in recruiting the regiment, and several companies had been sent to rendezvous at Springfield, on Connecticut River. Major Hull was ordered to that place, to take the command of them, and attend to their discipline. Here he remained until the month of April, when about three hundred men had been recruited, and he was directed to march them to Ticonderoga, to reinforce the army at that station, under the command of Major-General St. Clair. Major Hull arrived early in May at Ticonderoga. His troops were posted at the old French lines, and LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 73 were employed in strengthening tjie works, until the latter part of June, when General Burgoyne ap proached with his army from Canada, and commenc ed an investment of the place. Ticonderoga is a neck of land, situated on the west side of Lake Champlain, and surrounded on all sides by water, excepting where the French lines were established. Mount Independence is on the eastern side of the lake, opposite to Ticonderoga. The two posts were connected by a bridge. Mount Independence was fortified, and a part of St. Glair's army stationed there for its defence. The Americans had no naval force on the lake. The British army came up in boats, and several armed vessels. It had been joined by a great number of savages. General Burgoyne commenced operations by landing his forces on both sides of the lake, about three miles above Ticonderoga. His right wing took possession of Mount Hope. This was an eminence in front of the French lines, and extended to the outlet of Lake George. His taking this position, entirely cut off our com munication with Lake George, and completely in vested Ticonderoga on the west side. The Germans, under the command of General Reidesel, landed on the east side of the lake, about three miles from Mount Independence ; they com menced cutting a road and advancing to a position, so as to form an investment of that place. The armed vessels took a station across the lake, a small distance from Ticonderoga. On the south 74 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL of the fort is a hill, called Sugar-loaf Hill, which over looks both Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, and withia point blank shot of both of these places. Between this hill andTiconderoga, is a narrow bay, into which is the outlet, running from Lake George. General St. Clair frequently spoke of the import ance of fortifying this hill ; but remarked, that it would be improper to do so, until the garrison was reinforced ; for he had not at that moment a sufficient number of men to defend the works already estab lished, and that by extending them he should weaken his post. General Burgoyne, perceiving the advantage of this position, with great labour surmounted the diffi culties of its almost perpendicular ascent, and com menced preparing a battery on its summit. General St. Clair was now convinced that the loss of his army would be inevitable, if he persevered in defending the fort. On the sixth of July, he summoned a council of war, and the unanimous opinion was to retreat, be fore the investment was completed, which would have taken place the following day. That evening the baggage and stores were put on board the boats, and at an early hour in the night the troops silently retired from Ticonderoga, over the bridge, to Mount Independence. The intention was to move quietly, that the enemy would have no in formation of the retreat until the next morning. Un fortunately, the barracks of General Fournay took fire, and the whole of Mount Independence was illu- LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 75 minated. By this disaster, the enemy were apprised of the projected retreat, before our march was com menced ; and they immediately prepared for pursuit. A brigade of troops under the command of Co lonel Long, proceeded with the baggage by water, to Skeensborough. The main body of the army, under the command of General St. Clair, marched through a wilderness to Castletown, in Vermont, about thirty miles from Ticonderoga. A large body of the enemy, under the command of Generals Frazer and Reidesel, pursued, and the morning after the retreat attacked the rear-guard, consisting of about thirteen hundred men, commanded by Colonel Warner. The guard had been much increased by a large number of troops falling out from the main body through fatigue and other causes. It was impossible to avoid this irregu larity, as the march was through a thick wilderness, in a path but just wide enough for two men to walk abreast. Colonels Warner and Francis were the principal officers who commanded in this trying and perilous situation. They made great exertions, and for some time successfully resisted. But when the main body of the enemy was brought into action, our gallant troops were compelled to retreat. At this time Co lonel Francis was killed ; and the loss of killed, wounded, and prisoners, was probably five or six hundred. It was the intention of General St. Clair to have marched to Skeensborough ; but at the same time that the rear of his army was defeated, he received 76 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL information thai Colonel Long had retreated from that place. As his object in quitting Ticonderoga was to save his army for future operations, he changed his line of march, and proceeded by the way of Rut land and Manchester in Vermont, to Fort Edward on the Hudson, and there joined the forces commanded by General Schuyler. The clamour against General St. Clair was exces sive. Even the army which he had saved from destruc tion joined in the popular cry against him. It was as serted that he had sold the key of the country ; and many of his own troops were made to believe that they were guarding him and his treasure to a place of safety. A public inquiry was made into his conduct, and he was honourably acquitted. Had he remained a few days longer at Ticonderoga, there is not a doubt but that his whole force would have been captured, and the result of the campaign of a very different char acter. Dr. Thatcher, who was with the army of General St. Clair, remarks in his military journal : " It is predicted by some of our well-informed and respectable characters, that this event, apparently so calamitous, will ultimately prove advantageous, by drawing the British army into the heart of the coun try, and thereby place them more immediately in our power." The wisdom that deduces good from evil is often rewarded by the event. It was made apparent in the close of the campaign, and the prophecy exactly fulfilled. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 77 When the army of St. Clair was ordered to re treat, boats were in readiness to receive the cannon, baggage and military stores. Major Hull, like the rest of the officers, lost every thing but the clothing he had on. Some valuable books, a good military library for that period, and his camp furniture, were captured by the enemy at Skeensborough. Trying as was their situation, and humbling to the feelings of the army, yet from the first, the ex pediency of the retreat was apparent to Major Hull, and he did every thing in his power to convince those of his brother officers who joined in the preju dice against St. Clair, of the necessity of the step. Major Hull availed himself of the first opportunity that offered, to communicate his views to the public, that he might justify his commander. At a halt of the army, not far from Fort Edward, he addressed a letter * to the Honourable Judge Mitchell, of Wethersfield, Connecticut the stump of a tree serving him for a table stating all the circum stances connected with an event, the author of which was so severely censured by his countrymen. About the fifteenth of July General St. Clair joined General Schuyler's army at Fort Edward. General Burgoyne did not prosecute the advantage he had gained at Ticonderoga. He lost some weeks at Skeensborough and Fort Ann, in bringing forward his heavy artillery and supplies. * See Appendix, No. II., for a 1 777, together with other letters pre- copy of this letter, which was pub- fixed in the Appendix in relation to lished by Judge Mitchell, in " The it, from the Honourable Horace Bin- Hartford Courant," of date July 17th, ney, of Philadelphia. 78 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL General Schuyler availed himself of this delay to recruit his army, but retreated when General Bur- goyne advanced towards Fort Edward, not being suf ficiently strong to defend the position he had taken. He crossed to the west side of the Hudson above Saratoga. Major Hull commanded the rear-guard in this retreat. When the troops halted in the evening near Sar atoga, Major Hull was directed to remain two miles in the rear, during the night. His command consist ed of about three hundred continental troops ; the remainder were militia. He formed his plan early in the evening, placing the continental troops on the right, extending to the river; and on the left, as far from the river as the numbers would admit. In front of his lines he stationed small patrols of observation ; one up the river, one on his left, and a third between these two parties ; w r ith directions to proceed as far as they could, and if no enemy ap peared, to return early in the morning. Soon after daylight, the patrols returned without having made any discoveries. About sunrise, the advanced guards were seen retreating. An officer was despatched to ascertain the cause. He was in formed that a large body of the enemy was ad vancing, and very near to our troops. Major Hull immediately formed the line, and shortly after, the enemy appeared, formed in his front, and commenced a fire. The fire was returned, which gave a tempo rary check to the assailants. In a few moments a body of regular troops and savages attacked the left flank, which, being com- LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 79 posed of militia, gave way and retreated in some disorder. The enemy then advanced, discharged a heavy fire on the centre and right ; being unsupported by the left, and the numbers opposed greatly superior, Major Hull ordered a retreat. As soon as it,com- menced, the enemy pursued with great rapidity, pour ing upon them an incessant fire, while the savages, like so many demons, were sounding their hideous yells in our ears. After retreating three quarters of a mile, some ris ing ground was perceived on the right, and it was determined to form and make a stand. Major Hull was now in the rear of his troops. He rode full speed past the retreating line, towards the front, and point ing to the hill, informed each officer, as he passed, that it was his intention to take possession of that ground. When the detachment came opposite to the hill, the officer most in advance was directed to wheel his men to the right and march up the hill. To prevent any of the men from continuing to retreat, an officer was posted in the road, with a small guard, with orders to stop them at all events. In a short time the line was formed, and the ene my advanced with great violence to break it. They were met with a heavy fire, and the position was sus tained until a reinforcement arrived, and compelled them to retreat with considerable loss. In this little rencontre, one officer was killed, two wounded, and about twenty men killed and wounded. Major Hull received the thanks of General Schuyler for his conduct on this occasion. 80 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL CHAPTER VIII. GENERAL ARNOLD MARCHES TO THE RELIEF OF FORT STANWIX. TRIAL OF BUTLER. RETREAT OF GEN. ST. LEGER. THE day following the events related in the pre ceding chapter, Major Hull was ordered to march his detachment to Albany, to join the residue of the re giment, the command of which now devolved on that gallant officer, Colonel Brooks. Fort Stanwix was at this time besieged by a large bddy of British troops and savages. Our regiment was ordered to join the detachment of General Ar nold, appointed to march to its relief. The name of this fort was now changed to that of Schuyler. It was situated on the Mohawk river, about one hun dred miles from Albany, on the site of the present town of Rome. It was garrisoned by one continental regiment, a company of artillery, and a small body of infantry, consisting in all of about six hundred men, and commanded by Colonel Ganesvoort. The Amer icans had established this post for the protection of the western settlements against the predatory incur sions of the British soldiers, loyalists, and savages. General Burgoyne, considering the occupation of the country on the Mohawk river would be of great im portance in his plan of operations, previously to his descent upon Ticonderoga sent a detachment against LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 3] the fort, of about fifteen hundred men, consisting of regulars, loyalists, and savages. As soon as the fort was reduced, the troops were to co-operate w r ith him in his expedition on the Hudson. Shortly after St. Leger invested the fort, the mili tia of Tryon county assembled under the command of General Herkimer, for the purpose of raising the siege. St. Leger, receiving the information of Herkimer's approach, detached a portion of his regulars and all his savages, arid formed an ambuscade on the route they were marching, within about four miles of the fort. The plan completely succeeded. The militia were attacked on each flank, before they knew that an enemy was near. Being thrown into disorder by the first fire, the Indians rushed upon them with tom ahawks and scalping knives, and a horrible slaughter ensued. More than four hundred fell victims to the fury of the savages ; among them were many of the most respectable citizens of New- York. After the defeat of General Herkimer, the divi sion of continental troops, under General Arnold,, consisting of about fifteen hundred men, marched in separate bodies, and assembled at the German Flats r on the Mohawk, then the most westerly settlements of the State of New- York. Here they remained a few days, waiting the arrival of the whole body and the necessary supplies. General St. Leger continued indefatigable in pressing the siege, and made his approaches to within a very small distance of the fort ; but the brave 6 32 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL Gansevoort constantly repelled the summons to sur render. During this state of things, General St. Leger despatched a subaltern officer by the name of Butler, to treat with the inhabitants ; expecting that after so severe a demonstration of his power against General Herkimer, they would be induced to take protection under his standard. The party sent out consisted of some influential loyalists, with a number of armed savages ; it went forth under a flag of truce. Butler proceeded down the southern side of the Mohawk, until he came opposite General Arnold's encampment. He had with him large bundles of General Burgoyne's and St. Leger's proclamations. They were addressed to the inhabitants only, and he was directed to have no communication with any civil or military officer. As soon as General Arnold received information of the progress of this party, he detached Lieutenant- Colonel Brooks with one hundred men, with orders to make prisoners of them. As Brooks approached, Butler paraded his men, as if he intended to give battle, though with his flag of truce flying before them. Colonel Brooks ordered him to lay down his arms. Butler refused. Brooks directed his men to advance with the bayonet, when the party imme diately surrendered. General Arnold appointed a board of officers to report to him in what character Butler should be considered, and what punishment should be inflicted. The Board reported that his bu siness was not with the civil officers of the State, nor with the officer commanding the American forces, and LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 33 therefore the flag was no protection to him. That as he was taken in our territory, and near the army, his object must have been, under the cover of a flag of truce, to have ascertained and informed the enemy of our situation and strength ; and that he ought to be considered a spy, and executed according to the laws of war. The sentence was not carried into execution. General Arnold sent him a prisoner to Albany. He was committed to jail, from which he shortly made his escape. It may be questioned whether the opinion of the court was correct. There was a difference between his situation and that of Andre. They both came within the American lines in full uniform. Both performed their business in their uniforms. Andre put off his to favour his escape ; when taken he was without it. Butler wore his uniform, believing that he was acting under the only proper authority, that of the King, and when exposed to arrest, assumed no disguise. Major Hull was present at the trial. Butler conducted himself with great fearlessness. When the charges were read to him, and when asked whether guilty or not guilty, he replied to the Board, that he was a British officer, and acted under the authority of the King ; and that he would not answer their questions until they showed by what authority they acted. He further said that he was then in the King's dominions, and was amenable to no other power than what was derived from his sovereign. The Court admonished the prisoner of his impru- 34 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL dence, and apprised him of the consequences of his not answering to their questions. He then remarked, that he could not be considered as a spy, as he ap peared without disguise, and his business was with the inhabitants of the country, whom his General and himself viewed as his Majesty's subjects. Among the loyalists taken with Butler, was a man by the name of Schuyler, sometimes by histo rians called Cuyler. His family was respectable, and resided in the neighbourhood of the German Flats. The father of Schuyler applied to General Arnold for the pardon of his son. General Arnold asked him, if he would be answerable for the fidelity of his son, if he intrusted him with a message to St. Leger. He replied, he would. Arnold then sent for the young man, and in the presence of the father inform ed him of the sentence, and probable fate of his com panion, Butler; that he was equally implicated, and his fate must be the same. He then asked Schuyler whether he was personally acquainted with General St. Leger, and whether St. Leger had confidence in him. To both questions he replied in the affirmative. General Arnold said, " To save your life, are you wil ling to go to the fort and inform St. Leger that But ler and his party were made prisoners ; that Butler had been tried as a spy, and was condemned to be executed; that, expecting the same fate, you had succeeded in making your escape, at the peril of your life ?* * Sparks, in his life of Benedict friendly Indian, wily by nature and Arnold, page 110, relates, "that a skilled in artifice from habit, pro- LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 35 " General St. Leger will naturally inquire of you, the strength of the force brought against him, and other particulars relating to our plans and future movements. " You must inform him, that my army consists of three thousand continental troops, with ten pieces of artillery. That it was to commence its march the next morning, and must be then very near the fort. Are you willing to go with this message ?" Schuyler answered that he was. General Arnold then turning to the father, said, " Are you prepared, if your son proves false, to re ceive his punishment ?" He promptly replied, " Yes." The father was then secured, and the son pro ceeded to the camp of St. Leger. On his arrival, the General received him most cordially, and requested him to give him all the news. Schuyler informed him of the manner in which they had been captured ; of Butler's fate, and what his fate would have been, had he not made his escape ; and that General Ar nold was marching on with three thousand continen tal troops, supported by ten pieces of artillery, and he would be before the fort in a few hours. General St. Leger, on receiving this information, immediately ordered a retreat, leaving his camp all standing, his provisions, intrenching tools, and other valuable equi page, behind. Our army arrived the following day, and found every thing as has been described. posed that bullets should be shot to his story ; which was accordingly through Schuyler's coat, which done." would give the greater plausibility 36 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL Schuyler remained, delivered himself up to Ge neral Arnold, and related the circumstances of his in terview with the British commander. General St. Leger retreated down Wood Creek to Oswego, thence to Montreal, and proceeded up Lake Champlain to join General Burgoyne. But it was too late. General Burgoyne with his whole army, were at that moment prisoners to the Ame ricans. General Arnold marched back, and joined the main army on the Hudson, LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 87 CHAPTER IX. GENERAL SCHTJTLER SUPERSEDED IN COMMAND OF THE NORTHERN ARMY BY GENERAL GATES. GENERAL SCHUYLER, who had commanded the Northern Army up to this period, was now to be su perseded by General Gates, an arrangement wound ing to the feelings of the former, who had been inde fatigable in preparing the way for the brilliant suc cesses which he was confident were soon to gladden the drooping hearts of his countrymen. But faithful to his country's interests, this good citizen, and gal lant soldier, for nearly three weeks previous to the arrival of General Gates in camp, was unremittingly active to repair the evils, and meet the exigencies of his difficult situation. Already, as we have seen, his efforts had not been fruitless, and victory now inclined in his favour. He feelingly complained to General Washington, that the course of his fortune was interrupted, and that the reward of his toils was now to be given to another, who would enjoy that victory for which he had prepared the way. But it was the desire of Congress to place at the head of an army, dismayed by its reverses, a general celebrated for his achievements : moreover, the troops of the Northern Army were principally from the 38 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL Eastern States,' in which part of the country General Gates held an unrivalled popularity. Both wings of Burgoyne's army had now been cut off. The detach ment at Bennington had met with a total defeat, and the retreat of St. Leger was equally fatal to the in terests of the British General. The discerning mind of Washington had antici pated these events, so favourable to the American cause. He thus writes in reply to General Schuy- ler, who had informed him of the plan of General Burgoyne's campaign, which was to act in detach ments. " Though our affairs for some days past have worn a dark and gloomy aspect, I yet look forward to a fortunate and happy change. I trust General Burgoyne's army will meet sooner or later an effec tual check ; and, as I suggested before, that the suc cess he has had will precipitate his ruin. From your accounts he appears to be pursuing that line of con duct which, of all others, is most favourable to us I mean acting in detachments. This conduct will cer tainly give room for enterprise on our part, and ex pose his parties to great hazard. Could we be so happy as to cut one of them off, supposing it should not exceed four, five, or six hundred men, it would inspirit the people, and do away much of their pre sent anxiety. In such an event, they would lose sight of past misfortunes, and urged at the same time by a regard for their own security, they would fly to arms, and afford every aid in their power."* " Meanwhile * Washington's Writings, Vol. IV., page 503. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 39 General Burgoyne continued in his camp on the left bank of the Hudson, where he used the most unre mitting industry and perseverance, in bringing stores and provisions from Fort George. Having at length, by strenuous efforts, obtained about thirty days' pro visions, he resolved on passing the river with his army, in order to engage the enemy, and force a pas sage to Albany. As a swell of the water, occasioned by great rains, had carried away his bridge of rafts, he threw another of boats over the river, at the same place. Towards the middle of September, he cross ed with his army to the right bank of the Hudson, and encamped on the heights and in the plains of Saratoga ; Gates being then in the neighbourhood of Stillwater, about three miles below. The two armies faced each other, and a battle was expected soon to follow. This measure of passing the Hudson, \vas by many greatly censured. It was considered the principal cause of the unfortunate issue of the cam paign. Some were of opinion, that, after the affairs of Bennington and Stanwix, Burgoyne would have acted more wisely, considering the daily increase of the American army, if he had renounced the project of occupying Albany, and made the best of his way back to the lakes. It appears, however, to us, but just to remark for his excuse, that at this time he had not received intelligence, either of the strength of the army left at New- York, or of the movement which Sir Henry Clinton was to make or had made, up the North river towards Albany. He calculated upon a powerful co-operation on the part of that General. 90 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL Such was the plan of the Ministers, and such the tenor of his own peremptory instructions. And to what reproaches would he not have exposed himself, if, by retiring towards Ticonderoga, he had abandoned Clinton to himself, and thus voluntarily relinquished all the advantages that were expected from the junc tion of the two armies ? " But though we think Burgoyne committed no error, in resolving to prosecute his expedition, it nevertheless appears that he ought not to have passed the Hudson. By continuing upon the left bank, he could retire at will towards Ticonderoga, or push forwards towards Albany. It was evidently more easy to execute this movement, while having between himself and the now formidable army of Gates, so broad a river as the Hudson."* The success which had attended the American arms at Fort Stanwix and Bennington, reanimated the spirit of the country, and reinforcements of militia were daily joining the army. General Schuyler was beloved, and his military character was highly appre ciated. Yet the appointment of General Gates to the command gave great satisfaction. He took a position on Bemis's Heights, about eight miles below Saratoga. Here we commenced a line of fortifications, the right extending to the Hudson, and the left in a westerly direction on high grounds, about a mile from the river. Our time was divided between hard labour and attending to the discipline of the troops. * Otis's Botta, Vol. II., page 305, 6, 7. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 9J It was at this period that General Burgoyne pre pared a bridge of boats, on which he crossed to the west side of the Hudson. He fortified the heights of Saratoga, advanced and took a position about two miles in front of our line of fortifications. Here he established works for the security of his encampment. His left extended to the river, and his right about the same distance to the west, as our line extended. He had about thirty days' provisions, and having abandoned his communication with Canada, he depended on the success of a battle for his future progress, in forming a junction with Sir Henry Clin ton, who was advancing up the North river with the strength of the British army. 92 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL CHAPTER X. BURGOYNE'S CAMPAIGN. BATTLE OF THE NINETEENTH OF SEPTEMBER. 1777. ON the nineteenth of September, about twelve o'clock in the morning, General Burgoyne selected the best part of his army, which he commanded in person, and advanced towards the left wing of the American lines. At three quarters of a mile from our position his advance guards were met by a regi ment of riflemen, led on by Colonel Morgan, and a detachment of rangers under the command of Major Dearborn. These parties of Burgoyne were repulsed by Morgan, who gave three cheers, which were heard in the camp, and greatly animated our troops. General Burgoyne then brought his effective force into action, when Morgan in his turn was compelled to retreat. But he was soon reinforced by a number of regiments from the left wing of the army, com manded by General Arnold, and about one o'clock the action was renewed with great obstinacy. On that day, Major Hull commanded a picket-guard in front of the left line of the camp, about half a mile from the ground where Morgan commenced the ac tion. His position being on elevated ground, it was considered important, and two regiments were imme- THE SURRENDER OF GEN BURGOYNE IN 1777. p/* J9, Sep tenth e.r exhibiting a view of the operations My. Hulk? Volunteer* Carps against apart of theJZritisTi Army ~. ,. 'itishJtinje. formed, in the Woods ^^ ';.' Mlt V ./'A'///,'///// l' !''"' LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 93 diately sent to reinforce him, when the first firing was heard. As soon as the action had recommenced, General Arnold rode to the ground which was occupied by the guard of Major Hull. He called the officers around him, and inquired what number of men was at that post. He was informed that it consisted of the guard of two hundred and fifty men, and two regiments. General Arnold then said, that three hundred volunteers, to be commanded by a field offi cer, must immediately reinforce the troops which were engaged. He repeated, that he wished them all to be volunteers. As none of the field officers offered their services, Major Hull observed to him, that he commanded the guard on that day, by an order from the Adjutant-General, but if he could be excused from that duty, he would be happy to com mand the detachment. General Arnold replied, that he would excuse him, and directed the colonels of the two regiments to call for three hundred volunteers and a suitable number of captains and subalterns to command them. In a few moments, the number re quired was paraded and formed into four companies, with the officers assigned to them. We at once commenced our march to the centre of the engage ment. Major Hull was directed to receive his orders from General Poor of New Hampshire, who com manded troops then closely engaged with the enemy. He marched the detachment in columns of eight platoons. When it arrived near the line of fire, General Poor perceiving the reinforcement, sent his 94 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL Brigade-Major, who informed Major Hull that the line was well supported in the centre and to the left, but that a body of militia were hard pressed on the right, and the General wished the detachment under a ' his command to march to their support. On arriving at the ground, Major Hull found the militia retiring, and the enemy preparing a body of troops to attack the right of General Poor's brigade. On the right of the brigade was an open field of about eight or nine acres of ground, and nearly in the centre of it stood a log-house. There were a number of large dry trees scattered over the field, in which wheat had been cultivated. On the south side was rising ground, on which was a thin growth of wood. The east and north sides of the field were covered with thick wood ; but the west, where the right of General Poor's brigade was engaged, was more open. It was from this position that the militia had retreated. After viewing the ground for a few moments, and perceiving a line of the enemy a short distance beyond the north side of the field, within the wood, Major Hull marched his detachment, and formed on the rising ground, at the south side of the field ; his right extending to the wood, and his left towards the right of General Poor's brigade. Behind the log-house, and near the wood, were two pieces of field artillery, which were not per ceived until the line had been formed for battle. These pieces were immediately turned upon us, while the infantry of the enemy were preparing to advance. The distance between the two lines was about thirty rods. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 95 Major Hull directed his officers not to fire until he gave the word of command. When the order was given, every man was directed to fire as low as the enemy's knees, it being descending ground on which they stood. As their artillery had little effect, their infantry advanced, extending from the right to the left of the field, and keeping up a heavy fire, which killed and wounded some of our men. When they reached the centre of the field, Major Hull ordered his troops to fire. Many of the enemy fell, and their line became partially disordered. They did not re treat, but slowly advanced, still continuing an inces sant fire. We returned it as rapidly as our men could load, and with such effect as checked their advance and created considerable disorder in their ranks. The distance at this time between the two lines was not more than ten rods. The detachment of Major Hull had not moved from the ground it first occupied. He now ordered it to make a rapid advance and charge with the bay onet. The enemy immediately retreated in confusion to the woods. We pursued, and the field was lite rally covered with the dead and wounded. As the left of Major Hull's detachment approached the log- house, he directed the men to advance and secure the pieces of artillery. When near, they \vere fired on from the house. The officer in command marched up to the door, forced it open, and brought out a sergeant-major and nineteen privates. During the operation of storming the house and receiving the prisoners, the pieces of artillery were removed into 96 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL the woods to which the enemy had retreated. Being thus covered, it was deemed inexpedient to advance, and the detachment fell back to the ground on which it had first formed. Major Hull here collected the wounded, which, together with the killed, amounted to nearly one hundred men. He sent the wounded, with about twenty prisoners, into camp. Captain Allen, a brave officer from Pittsfield, Massachusetts, was killed. Lieutenant John Clapp, who acted as adjutant, was shot dead at the moment that Major Hull was giving him an order to communicate to the troops. The enemy now moved around to the east side of the wood, in order to assail the right flank of our corps. Major Hull, perceiving this movement, changed his position. The contest was renewed, and on this ground, which was covered with wood, they fought the remainder of the afternoon. It was a sharp conflict, but very equal in point of strength. Some times our troops gave ground, and sometimes those of the enemy. The battle continued until near the dusk of the evening. Major Hull now observed a body of troops on their march. He sent to inquire if General Poor, or any officer superior to himself in rank was present, as he would be happy to receive his orders, that his detachment was fatigued, and its ammunition nearly exhausted. Colonel Cillery, of General Poor's brigade, was at the head of this corps. He replied, that he was marching into camp, and directed the troops under Major Hull to join him. Our men drew off from the field of battle, and the LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 97 enemy made no pursuit. Of the three hundred men who commenced the engagement, one-half were either killed or wounded. In this action Major Hull held a separate command. The eighth Massachusetts regiment, of which he was the Major, was led on in another quarter by Colonel Brooks. It was distinguished for its bravery, and the gallant conduct of its leader, and was the last to leave the field. This battle of the nineteenth of September com menced between twelve and one o'clock, and contin ued, with not more than half an hour's intermission, until nearly dark. There was a remarkable equality in the opposing forces, and it has justly been consid ered by historians, as the most obstinate that took place during the war. From the commencement of the campaign, there had been much skirmishing and sharp fighting ; but this was the first contest that was held with the main body of Burgoyne's army, and his troops fought with almost unexampled bravery. General Burgoyne claimed the victory, because his army retained and slept on the field of battle. We claimed it, because he had entirely failed in his object, which was to force our camp, and compel us to abandon our position ; and because we had met him, entirely checked his progress, defeated his ob ject, and retired to our camp without being pursued. The able historian, Judge Marshall, thus writes : " With reason, therefore, this action was celebrated throughout the United States, and considered as the 7 98 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL precursor of the total ruin of the invading army. Every where the utmost exultation was displayed ; and every where the militia were stimulated to fly to arms, and complete the work which was begun. 3 '* * Marshall's Life of Washington Vol. EL, page 288. LIFE OP GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 99 CHAPTER XI. BATTLE OF THE SEVENTH OF OCTOBER. SURRENDER OF THE BRITISH ARMY tfNDER BURSOYNE. 1777. AFTER the battle of the nineteenth of September, no operations of importance took place, until the se venth of October. General Burgoyne was in daily expectation of being informed that Sir Henry Clin ton was ascending the Hudson for the purpose of co operating with his army. As the forces of General Gates were continually augmenting by an accession of militia, he considered this delay favourable ; being well assured, that no immediate relief was at hand to extricate Burgoyne from his present critical situation. The interval was occupied by increasing the strength of our works, and disciplining the troops. The prospects of that formidable army which had advanced into our country with so much splendour and parade, now appeared gloomy and almost despe rate. The provisions for its support were nearly ex hausted, and the communication to the lakes was so interrupted, that no further supply could be obtained from Canada. Disappointed in not receiving that co-operation on which he had based his calculations ]QQ REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL there seemed nothing left to General Burgoyne to extricate himself from the difficulties by which he was surrounded, than a resolute appeal to the intre pidity and strength of his troops. The very subsistence of his army now depended on forcing General Gates from his position, and thus opening his way into the country, to obtain the ne cessary supplies. He took this desperate step on the seventh of October. In the afternoon of that day, he selected fifteen hundred of his most effective troops, with the addition of his grenadiers, light infantry, provincials, and savages. With this force he took the field, having with him ten pieces of artillery, consist ing of twelve-pounders, six-pounders, and howitzers, He formed on the right of his encampment, and was assisted in command by Generals Frazer, Reidesel, and Philips. His object was, to possess himself of rising ground on the left of General Gates's position, and from that eminence, with his artillery to enfilade his line of defences and under cover of as near a cannonade as could be made, to storm with his co lumns of infantry the whole left of the American en campment. To favour this operation, he detached a small body of regulars, loyalists and savages, to make a detour around our left, and take a position in the rear of our encampment, and attack the left as soon as he commenced his operations on the flank. On this day, Major Hull again commanded the advanced guard in front of the left wing of the Ame rican army. His guard consisted of about two hun dred and fifty men. He was in a situation to ob- LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. JQ1 serve the enemy's movement, and sent frequent intelligence to General Gates, that every disposition of the enemy's forces indicated a serious attack that afternoon on our left. About twelve o'clock, General Burgoyne com menced his march from his encampment. A part of Arnold's wing and Morgan's corps of riflemen were ordered to meet and attack him. The other part of Arnold's wing, with a part of the right, commanded by General Lincoln, were ordered to advance towards the enemy's lines and endeavour to cut off the com munication between Burgoyne and the remainder of his army, which had been left for the security of his encampment, and likewise to repel any bodies of the enemy advancing from that quarter. As General Burgoyne approached, he passed the guard commanded by Major Hull, at the distance of about a quarter of a mile. The three regiments of Arnold's division had advanced within a small distance on the left of Major Hull's position. He received orders from General Arnold to form on the right of these regiments. When General Burgoyne had nearly reached the ground he intended to occupy, he was furiously at tacked by Morgan's regiment of riflemen, and Ar nold's three regiments, including the guard com manded by Major Hull. It was not long after the action commenced, before the British line began to give way. At this moment, General Frazer came up with a second line, which had been held in reserve. He was immediately attacked by Arnold's three regi- ]02 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL ments, Morgan's riflemen, and the guard of Major Hull. The impetuosity of the assault, and the va lour and intrepidity with which it was met, soon thinned the ranks, and many fell on both sides. Burgoyne was compelled to retreat to his encamp ment; he was fiercely pursued, and says in his ac count of the action, u we retreated, hot pressed, but in good order." As soon as the retreat commenced, Major Hull was ordered to take his station where his guard had been first posted, and assist in removing the prisoners, the wounded, and the artillery and arms which had been left on the field of battle. The British General being now driven from his position, was hotly pursued by Arnold and Morgan* The termination of the battle, as described by Charles Botta, is taken from the translation of George Otis 9 Esquire. " Upon this occasion Brigadier-General Frazer was mortally wounded ; an officer whose loss was severely felt by the English, and whose valour and abilities justified their regrets.* Their situation now * Professor Silliman, in a journal pointing to Frazer, said, 'Do you of his travels over the battle-ground, see that gallant officer? That is says, " Frazer was the soul of this General Frazer. I respect and hon- battle of the seventh of October, and our him : but it is necessary that he was just changing the disposition of should die.' This was enough, the troops, to repel a strong impres- Frazer immediately received his sion which the Americans had made mortal wound, and was carried ofF and were still making on the British the field." High praise is certainly right, when Morgan called together due to this noble officer, but it may three of his best marksmen, and be a question, whether it should be LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. became extremely critical : even their camp was threatened ; the enemy emboldened by victory was advancing to storm it, and if he arrived before the retreating detachment, there could be little hope of defending it. Philips and Reidesel were ordered to rally with all expedition those troops which were nearest or most disengaged, to cover the retreat of the others, while Burgoyne himself, fiercely pursued by Arnold, retired with precipitation towards the camp. The detachment at length, though with ex treme difficulty, regained the intrenchments, having left however upon the field of battle a great number of killed and wounded, particularly of the artillery corps, who had, with equal glory to themselves, and prejudice to the enemy, displayed the utmost ability in their profession, along with the most undaunted resolution. Six pieces of cannon also remained in the possession of the Americans. " But the business of the day was not yet ter minated. The English had scarcely entered their camp, when the Americans, pursuing their success, as saulted it in different parts with uncommon fierceness; rushing to the lines through a severe fire of grape- shot and small arms, with the utmost fury. Arnold especially, who on this day appeared intoxicated with the thirst of battle and carnage, led on the attack against a part of the intrenchments occupied by the light infantry, under Lord Balcares. But the Eng- bestowed so entirely at the expense every thing that was possible, under of Burgoyne, whose military ability circumstances of such disadvantage, and undaunted resolution effected 104 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL lish received him with great vigour and spirit. The action was obstinate and sanguinary. At length, as it grew towards evening, Arnold having forced all obstacles, entered the works with some of the most fearless of his followers. But in this critical moment of glory and danger, he was grievously wounded in the same leg which had been already shattered at the assault of Quebec. To his great regret, he was constrained to retire. His party still continued the attack, and the English sustained it with obstinacy, till night separated the combatants. " The royalists were not so fortunate in another quarter. A republican detachment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks, having succeeded by a circuitous movement in turning the right wing of the English, fell, sword in hand, upon the right flank of their intrenchments and made the most desperate ef forts to carry them. This post was defended by Lieutenant-Colonel Breyman, at the head of the German reserve. The resistance at first was ex ceedingly vigorous ; but Breyman being mortally wounded, his countrymen were damped, and at length routed, with great slaughter. Their tents, artillery and baggage, fell into the possession of the assail ants. The Americans established themselves in the intrenchments. General Burgoyne, hearing of this disaster, ordered them to be dislodged immediately. But either in consequence of the approach of night, or from the discouragement of his troops, he was not obeyed, and the victors continued to occupy the po sitions they had gained with so much glory. They LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. JQ5 had now acquired an opening on the right and rear of the British army. The other American divisions passed the night under arms, at the distance of half a mile from the British camp. The loss in dead and wounded was great on both sides, but especially on the part of the English, of whom no few were also made prisoners. Majors Williams of the artillery and Ackland of the grenadiers, were among the latter. Many pieces of artillery, all the baggage of the Ger mans, and many warlike stores, fell into the hands of the republicans, who needed them greatly. They were impatient for the return of day to renew the battle. " But deplorable and perilous beyond expression was the situation of the British troops ; they bore it, however, with admirable temper and firmness. It was evidently impossible to continue in their present position, without submitting to a certainty of destruc tion on the ensuing day. The Americans, invigorated and encouraged, would certainly have profited by the access they had already opened to themselves on the right, and of other untenable points, to carry every part of the camp and completely surround the Brit ish army. Burgoyne therefore determined to operate a total change of ground. He executed this move ment with admirable order, and without any loss. During the night he silently drew off his troops, ar tillery and camp furniture, and occupied the heights higher up the river."* * Otis's Botta, Vol. II., pages 315, 16, 17. 106 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL Although Major Hull had a separate command on this momentous day, and acted not an unimportant part in the battle, yet he remarks : " I always re gretted, that as I was the Major and then second in command to Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks in the eighth Massachusetts regiment, that, by the routine of duty, I was absent from it at the time when it stormed and entered the intrenchments of the British on the right. " This was a brilliant close to the achievements of the seventh of October. Some historians of the Rev olution have stated that the regiment was led on by Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks, and myself as Major, having thus given me credit to which 1 am not en titled. The fact not being founded in truth. I feel a pleasure in contradicting it. My situation has been precisely stated." The fate of General Burgoyne's army seemed now decided. We had gained a complete victory over the most effective portion of his troops, com manded by himself in person, and assisted by his best Generals. We had advanced to his lines, and by the force of the bayonet, obtained possession of the most commanding part of them. All the artillery which he had carried into the field, and those in the works, had fallen into our hands. We had taken between two and three hundred prisoners, and killed and wounded more than that number, and all with comparatively a small loss on our part. General Gates declined giving battle the next day, sensible that nothing should be risked under his present superior advantages. He felt assured that there were other LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. JQ7 and less expensive means of reducing his foe_, than by blood and carnage. The impossibility of his es cape from a vigilant and ever-increasing army ; the want of provisions ; the want of the munitions of war, of which defeat had greatly deprived him ; and above all, the want of that co-operation, upon which he had reasonably relied, closed every avenue of hope to the British, while it opened the brightest prospects for the final success of the American arms. " General Burgoyne," says Major Hull, " com menced his retreat to Saratoga on the evening of the eighth of October. The following day it rained inces santly ; we continued in our tents until morning, when orders came to begin the pursuit. General Gates had in the mean time taken measures to advance parties in front of the enemy on both sides of the river, to obstruct his retreat to Lake George. At Saratoga, the British halted, and took possession of the fortifi cations, which they had erected on their march down wards. " The brigade to which our regiment was attached, was commanded by General Learned, and consisted of three regiments. It was directed to pass a creek, on which General Schuyler's mills were established, and which was much swollen by the rain, to take a position on the west side of Saratoga. While in this situation and near the fortifications, a deserter came from Burgoyne's camp and informed General Learned, that the whole British army had retreated to Fort Ed ward, and that only a small guard was left in the fort. The brigade was immediately ordered to attack ]08 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL the fort ; it advanced to within a very small distance, when General Wilkinson, who was Adjutant-General of the army, rode up and ordered an immediate re treat. At this time not a gun had been fired on us by the enemy, and in a few minutes more we should have been up to their breastworks. They rose from behind them, and commenced a tremendous fire upon us of grapeshot and musketry. We lost a few men, but soon took a position out of the reach of their guns. The pretended deserter disappeared. It was believed that he was employed by General Burgoyne to give this false information. Fortunately, General Gates had been apprised, before it was too late, that the whole British army was at Saratoga, and sent the counter orders, which saved us from impending de struction. We remained watching the enemy, and lying constantly on our arms." At this juncture the historian Bottathus writes : " It exceeds the power of words to describe the pitiable condition to which the British army was now reduced. The troops, worn down by a series of hard toil, incessant effort, and stubborn action ; abandoned by the Indians arid Canadians ; the whole army re duced by repeated and heavy losses of many of their best men and most distinguished officers, from ten thousand combatants to less than five thousand effec tive fighting men, of whom little more than three thousand were English ; under these circumstances, and in this state of weakness, without a possibility of retreat, they were invested by an army of four times their own number, whose position extended LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. JQ9 three parts in four of a circle round them ; who refused to fight, from a knowledge of their condition ; and who, from the nature of the ground, could not be attacked in any part. In this helpless situation, obliged to lie constantly on their arms, whilst a con tinued cannonade pervaded the camp, and rifle and grapeshot fell within every part of their lines, the troops of Burgoyne retained their ordinary constancy, and while sinking under a hard necessity, they showed themselves worthy of a better fate. Nor could they be reproached with any action or word which betrayed a want of temper or of fortitude. At length, no succour appearing, arid no rational ground of hope of any kind remaining, an exact account of the provi sions was taken, on the morning of the thirteenth, when it was found that the whole stock would afford no more than three days' bare subsistence for the army. In such a state, it was alike impossible to advance or to remain as they were ; and the longer they delayed to take a definitive resolution, the more desperate became their situation. " Burgoyne, therefore, called a council of war, at which not only the generals and field officers, but all the captains of companies, were invited to assist. While they deliberated, the bullets of the Americans whistled around them, and frequently pierced even the tent where the council was convened. It was determined unanimously to open a treaty, and enter into a convention with the American General. This was accordingly done, and by the articles of conven tion, the captured army was allowed to march out REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL with the honours of war, and pile their arms without the camp."* General Gates with the utmost delicacy withdrew his troops, while his gallant foe was performing this humiliating duty. Major Hull writes : " 1 was pre sent when they marched into our camp ; and words cannot describe the deep interest felt by every American heart ; nor was there wanting sympathy for those, who had so bravely opposed us in the con test. A general rejoicing of our country was now to take place, and scatter the gloom which but a few months back had deeply settled upon it. Dangers seemed past, and a bright future opened to our view. We were cheered by the hope that an overruling Providence was guiding our destinies, and leading us to a glorious termination of our long endured trials." Sir Henry Clinton did not arrive in the Highlands on the North river, until the fifth of October, when he debarked his troops at Stony Point, marched through the gorges of the mountains, and stormed Forts Clinton and Montgomery, which were com manded by Governor Clinton of the State of New- York, and General James Clinton, his brother. After the reduction of these forts, all the positions in the Highlands were abandoned by General Putnam, who commanded on that station, and the British fleet and army proceeded up the river as far as Esopus, and burned that flourishing village. This took place about the time that General Burgoyne surrendered. * Otis's Botta, Vol. II., pages 324, 5. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. \\\ Had Sir Henry Clinton early in October, after taking possession of the Highlands, advanced to the relief of Burgoyne, the fortunes of his army might have been very different. The probability is that the two armies would have formed a junction, and made a strong establishment in the Highlands. This would very much have interrupted the communication be tween the Eastern and the Southern States, and have afforded great facilities to the operations of Sir Wil liam Howe in Pennsylvania. How long they could have continued in possession of this important communication, would have depend ed on the spirit, the energy, and the patriotism of the New England States. Sir Henry Clinton not having sufficient force to retain his conquests in the Highlands, returned to New- York ; and his retreat every where exhibited the most wanton marks of plunder, burning, and deso lation. REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL CHAPTER XII. VALLEY-FORGE. SUFFERINGS OF THE AMERICAN ARMY. 1777-8. AFTER the close of the successful campaign at the northward, the eighth Massachusetts regiment was ordered, with other troops of General Gates's army, to march to Pennsylvania and reinforce the army under General Washington, at Whitemarsh. " When the order was communicated to our regiment," says Major Hull, " a feeling of disappointment was appa rent. It was now November, the usual season for the troops to enjoy the comforts of winter-quarters. They felt that they had done enough for one cam paign. The regiment had early in the spring marched from Boston to Ticonderoga ; had retreated through a wilderness from that place to the Hudson ; had marched to the relief of Fort Stanwix, on the Mo hawk ; had returned, and been engaged in all the battles that were fought with General Burgoyne's army. " After this severe service, by which the most important advantages had been rendered to their country, they expected to rest from their toils. Many hoped to be indulged in a visit to their friends, and realize the pleasing anticipations of relating to them LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. the wonderful scenes through which they had passed their ' hair-breadth 'scapes,' and the glorious re sults of their efforts ; to show their honourable scars, and to sympathize with the friends of those who had fallen around them in battle. But a sense of duty checked these natural feelings, and without a mur mur, with cheerful submission to orders, they marched, at this inclement season, to afford aid to their com panions, and gratify the wishes of the beloved leader of the armies of his country. " It was shortly after the battles of Brandywine and Germantown, in which the Americans had been repulsed, that the interesting meeting of the two armies took place. One had encountered defeat in its operations ; the other had triumphed in victory. Yet if skill, bravery, and resolution could command success, the troops of Washington had richly deserved it. But no presumption was exhibited on the one side, nor envy on the other. The kindest feelings mutually prevailed throughout the camp. " A few days after the junction of the two armies, General Howe marched out from Philadelphia with his principal force, and took a position about two miles in front of the American lines. " From this movement, it became apparent that his object was a general engagement. A strong posi tion had been taken by Washington, which he deem ed it expedient to retain. He was diligent in review ing his troops ; expressed the conviction that a gene ral action was now to take place, and his confidence that it would result in victory to the American arms. 8 ]]4 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL He suggested every consideration that could excite the ambition and animate the spirit of his army. He first addressed himself to those he had commanded in person during the campaign, and informed them, that an opportunity was now presented, and he was as sured that nothing else but such an opportunity was wanting, to demonstrate that they were equal in pa triotism and valour to the conquerors from the north, who were now to fight by their sides. To the north ern troops he said, that they would now have it in their power to add fresh laurels to those they had gathered with so much honour to themselves and glory to the nation. He then called on all, as they regarded the freedom and independence of their country, the fame of its arms, and its future happiness and prosperity, to decide on the manly resolution of meeting death or victory in the impending conflict. The earnest ness, the energy, and the ardour with which he spoke ; the self-devotion which his whole manner expressed, had an effect which it is impossible to de scribe. Every man believed himself a hero, and per haps the opportunity was only wanting, to prove that his thoughts were not far from the truth. The first day, the enemy appeared to be recon- noitering our right, and making demonstration, as if to commence an attack on that quarter. They then changed their position, and moved their princi pal force to our left, where the northern troops were stationed, and advanced within less than a mile of it. Not a doubt now remained, but that the attack would be made in that quarter the following morning. Mor- LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. gan's corps of riflemen, with some Pennsylvania mi litia, were engaged with light parties of the British, between the lines of the two armies. Major Morris, a brave and valuable officer, who had served in the northern campaign, was killed, with many of his men. As General Washington did not think proper to reinforce these troops, and thus risk a battle on that ground, Morgan was obliged to retreat. The enemy made no further advances, but returned to Philadelphia. Every disposition of their forces on this occasion indicated, that it was the intention of Sir William Howe to bring the Americans to a gene ral engagement. He was probably deterred by the strong position General Washington had taken, and likewise from a knowledge of the fact, that his army had been reinforced by troops from the north. " It must have been evident to the British Gene ral, that the American Commander had no desire to avoid an action, provided he was attacked in the po sition he had t alien. " General Washington now marched towards the Schuylkill, and on the twelfth of December crossed to the west side of the river, and halted at Valley Forge, about twenty miles from Philadelphia. " The ground selected for the encampment was covered with woods, and bounded on one side by the Schuylkill, on the other by ridges of hills. General Washington informed the army, that this was the place for their winter quarters. There were no houses, nor materials provided to build barracks. Axes were furnished to fell the trees, and in a little time log huts were erected to shelter the troops. REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL " Not a murmur or complaint was heard ; all cheerfully engaged in the labour, and soon the army was comfortably established. The huts were gene rally fourteen by sixteen feet. Twelve privates were allowed a hut, and the number of officers according to their rank. A General was entitled to a hut by himself. The encampment was regularly laid out ; the streets ran in parallel lines ; neatness and order prevailed ; and in viewing it from the hills, it had the appearance of a little city. " To render the condition of the soldiers more like home, General Washington directed that regi ments from the same State should occupy a certain street or division of the camp. The whole of the location was surrounded by intrenchments, and a bridge was thrown over the Schuylkill, to preserve the communication with the country, and to afford facilities to supplies for the army. " Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks united with me in preparing our new home. " The hut we occupied consisted of one room. This was dining-room, parlour, kitchen, and hall. On one side, shelves were put up for our books, hav ing been so fortunate as to purchase a part of a cir culating library that had been brought from Phila delphia. On another stood a row of Derby cheeses, sent from Connecticut by my mother ; a luxury of which the camp could rarely boast, and with which visiters to the hut were often regaled To give an air of greater comfort, we mixed some clay and wa ter, and with this preparation painted the domicil, which our neighbours now declared to be quite an LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. \\*] elegant mansion." Mrs. Washington was with her husband a part of the winter. She writes thus to a friend ; " The General's apartment is very small, he has had a log cabin built to dine in, which has made our quarters much more tolerable than they were at first." But while endeavouring to afford to their situa tion and that of others, every possible alleviation, famine and its natural consequence, mutiny, were threatening the army with dissolution. At this moment General Washington received in formation that Sir William Howe- had crossed the Schuylkill with a large body of troops, and advanced as far as Darby, to collect a quantity of forage, be tween the American camp and that place. The possession of the forage was so important to the British, that it was expected that General Wash ington would detach a superior force, to prevent its being obtained. His trying situation is best described by his letter to Congress at that time. "Yesterday afternoon, receiving information that the enemy, in force, had left the city and were ad vancing towards Darby, with the apparent design to forage and draw subsistence from that part of the country, I ordered the troops to be in readiness, that I might give every opposition in my power ; when behold, to my great mortification, I .was not only informed, but convinced, that the men were un able to stir on account of provisions, and that a dan gerous mutiny began the night before, and which, though with difficulty suppressed by the spirited exer- REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL tions of some officers, was still much to be apprehend ed, for the want of this article. This brought forth the only Commissary in the purchasing line in this camp ; and with him, this melancholy and alarming truth, that he had not a single hoof of any kind to slaughter and not more than twenty-five barrels of flour ! From hence, form an opinion of our situation, when 1 add, that he could not tell when to expect any. All I could do under these circumstances was, to send out a few light parties, to watch and harass the enemy, whilst other parties were instantly de tached in different ways to collect, if possible, as much provision as would satisfy the present pressing wants of the soldiery. But will this answer ? No ? sir ; three or four days of bad weather would prove our destruction." Extracts from two letters, received by General Washington on the twenty-second of December, will be enough to show the grounds upon which these statements are made. " I received an order," writes General Hunting- ton, " to hold my brigade in readiness to march. Fighting will be far preferable to starving. My bri gade is out of provisions, nor can the Commissary obtain any meat. I am exceedingly unhappy in being the bearer of complaints to head-quarters. I have used every argument my imagination can invent, to make the soldiers easy, but I despair of being able to do it much longer."* The next is from General Varnum " Accord- * The Writings of Washington, Vol. V., page 197, LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. ^9 ing to the saying of Solomon, hunger will break through a stone wall. It is therefore a very pleasing circumstance to the division under my command, that there is a probability of their marching. Three days successively we have been destitute of bread. Two days we have been entirely without meat. The men must be supplied or they cannot be commanded. The complaints are too urgent to pass unnoticed. It is with pain I mention this distress. I know it will make your Excellency unhappy, but if you ex pect the exertion of virtuous principle, while your troops are deprived of the necessaries of life, your final disappointment will be great, in proportion to the patience which now astonishes every man of human feeling." 4 General Washington finding himself unable to do more, now sent out small detachments to reinforce Morgan's riflemen and Lee's cavalry, with some Pennsylvania militia, who were advanced on the west side of the Schuylkill. Major Hull was directed to march on t]|is service, with three hundred men, and receive his orders from Colonel Morgan. During the week the British were engaged in collecting forage, we hovered around, availing of every opportunity to annoy and harass them. The weather was intensely cold ; the troops were twenty miles from the camp, and directly in the face of the enemy. They were in almost constant motion, and at night * The Writings of Washington, Vol. V., page 193. 120 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL could keep no fires or light of any kind lest they should be discovered by the enemy. Their safety depended on their vigilance. They rarely entered a house, and only kept from freezing by activity, and incessant marching from one point to another. Frequent rencounters with light parties of the en emy occurred, which usually terminated favourably to the Americans, and i n the capture of prisoners. When Sir William Howe returned to Philadelphia, we followed in his rear for some distance ; but the necessity for further effort ceasing, we retired to the encampment, and found our hut a very agreeable ex change for the exposed condition which the peculiar service had required. But though the army was now relieved of an out ward enemy, there was an internal foe more difficult to combat, more insufferable in its demands on their remaining strength : it was famine. Day after day passed and no provisions were issued.* At first the privation caused a little excitement and inquiry from the soldiers as to the cause. They were informed by the officers that the provisions were exhausted, and the heavy rains having rendered the roads almost im passable for the wagons, the supplies had not arrived, but were hourly expected. This satisfied them at first, but day after day passing without any relief, their complaints became louder and more serious. * Much of this distress was occa- had been opposed by General Wash- sioned by Congress having ordered ington, who foresaw the danger, but a change in the Commissary's de- was unable to convince others of its partment. An arrangement, which reality. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. They began to assemble, first by regiments, to con sult as to the measures they should adopt ; the excite ment soon extended to Brigades and Divisions of the army. The officers made no attempt to exercise their authority, but only used advice. The soldiers were told that General Washington was their best friend ; that he perfectly knew their situation, and deeply sympathized in their sufferings, "and was doing every thing in his power to relieve them. He informed them that provisions would soon arrive in the camp, and in the meanwhile, insubordination on their part, would only lead to unhappy consequences. The soldiers replied that they perfectly knew the impropriety of such a step in ordinary cases, but to prevent actual starvation, something must be done for their relief. They had been told some days before, that provisions were expected, but this did not satisfy the cravings of hunger. They then communicated to us the plan on which they had decided, and in which most of the army concurred. Their determi nation was, to march in an orderly manner into the country, collect sufficient provisions, wherever they were to be found, to supply their present necessities, and to give certificates as to the quantity and value, to those from whom they were taken. They would then return to the cantonment and their duty. The troops were desired to suspend this movement for an hour, until their distressed condition was again repre sented to their General. They consented. When the officers made this communication to General Washington, he was deeply affected. He said, that 122 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL he well knew the sufferings of his faithful soldiers ; that he admired their forbearance and moderation, and would now assure them that if by such an hour the wagons did not arrive, he himself would lead the troops into the country, and supply them with pro visions wherever they might be found. The soldiers agreed to wait : the provisions ar rived within the time, and the settled dissatisfaction which so generally prevailed, and which foreboded such fatal consequences, was quieted for the present. But afterwards the same distress recurred. The army was sometimes a week without receiving meat of any kind. Another letter from General Washington, written at a subsequent period, will show the miserable desti tution of that army, which was appointed for the defence, and looked to as the protector of the nation. " For some days past there has been little less than a famine in the camp. A part of the army has been a week without any kind of flesh, and the rest three or four days. Naked and starving as they are, we cannot enough admire the incomparable pa tience ano\ fidelity of the soldiery, that they have not been ere this excited by their suffering to a general mutiny and dispersion. Strong symptoms, however, of discontent have appeared in particular instances ; and nothing but the most active efforts everywhere can long avert so shocking a catastrophe." * * Letter to Governor George Clinton, February 16, 1778. " Writings of Washington," Vol. V., page 239. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. " Such was the scarcity of blankets, that many of the men were obliged to sit up all night by the fires, without. covering, to protect them while taking the common refreshment of sleep. Although the officers were better provided, yet none were exempt from exposure, privations, and hardships. Notwithstanding this deplorable condition of the army, there were not wanting those who complained of its inactivity, and insisted on a winter campaign. When the encamp ment was begun at Valley Forge, the whole number of men in the field was eleven thousand and ninety- eight ; of whom two thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight were unfit for duty, being barefoot, and otherwise naked." * In the midst of these calamities, the small-pox broke out in the camp. Those who had never taken the infection were innoculated. Destitute of the comforts so much needed in this dreadful disease ; lodged in huts illy calculated for sickness ; without a proper supply of blankets, and the necessary articles of clothing to shield the unhappy sufferers from the cold, the camp exhibited a scene of misery which it is not in the power of language to describe. Had Sir William Howe attacked our army under this accumulation of wretchedness and want, he would have forced General Washington from his can tonment ; the sick and the feeble must have become prisoners, and in retreating to the back part of Penn sylvania, to which step necessity would have com- * Sparks' Life and Writings of Washington, Vol. I., page 277. 124 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL pelled him, he could have carried but little more than the shadow of an army. But while so direful a calamity was averted by an overruling Providence, a new trial awaited General Washington in his perilous and difficult course. A faction w r as forming, the object of which was, to make an impression on the public mind that he was not equal to the important duties of his station. This faction was composed of several officers of the army, of high rank, some members of Congress, and a few persons of political distinction in the different States. General Conway, a foreigner, was conspi cuous in this cabal. To create a prejudice against Washington, his retreat from New-York into Penn sylvania, his retreat from the head of Elk, his defeat at the battles of JBrandywine and Germantown, with other circumstances of his conduct, represented in the most unfavourable colours, were circulated with great industry. General Gates was designated to succeed him. He was, represented as a great and consum mate commander. The splendid victories of the north, by which a great army had been captured, were owing to the wisdom of his arrangements ; and that were he the Commander-in-chief, the war would be conducted by the same wisdom, and the same glo rious results would be produced. The address and talents of the leaders of this fac tion, made little impression on the public mind ; and the momentary mist cleared away, like the morning dew before the splendour of the sun. Even the northern army, which had been commanded by Ge- LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. neral Gates, and from which he had great hopes of support, was indignant, and steadily adhered to their old and beloved Commander. Some time after, General Conway was wounded in a duel. He believed he was dying. In that solemn hour, ambition ceased to be the ruling pas sion of his soul ; and, sensible of his injustice, he thus wrote to General Washington : " I find myself just able to hold my pen, during a few minutes, and take this opportunity of express ing my sincere grief, for having done, written or said any thing disagreeable to your Excellency. My ca reer will soon be over, therefore justice and truth prompt me to declare my last sentiments. You are in my eyes, the great and good man. May you long enjoy the love, veneration, and esteem of these States, whose liberties you have asserted by your virtues. " I am, with the greatest respect, &c. "THOMAS CONWAY."* Other letters have been published, which give the details of this abortive attempt to darken, if not de stroy the fame of the leader of our armies. It was evident to all, that General Washington felt more concern on account of the public evils which must ensue, by creating divisions in the army and country, than from any effects by which he might be personally implicated. * Writings of Washington, Vol. V., page 517. 126 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL CHAPTER XIII. BARON STETJBEN APPOINTED A MAJOR-GENERAL IN THE ARMY. LAFAYETTE SENT WITH A DETACHMENT TO WATCH THE ENEMY. HlS ESCAPE FROM THE BRITISH ARMY. MAJOR HULL IN THE DETACHMENT SENT TO REINFORCE HIM. MEETING OF LAFAYETTE AND GENERAL HULL IN 1824. 1777-8. SOON after the establishment of the cantonment at Valley Forge, Baron Steuben was appointed by Congress a Major-General in the army. General Conway had resigned his situation of Inspector-Gen eral, after the defeat of the faction in which he had been a leader, and his office was now filled by Baron Steuben. This officer had served a number of campaigns in the armies of the King of Prussia, and came highly recommended to this country. He was perfectly familiar with the military tactics of the Prussian King, and established the same in our army as far as they would apply to its circumstances and organization. They were simple and uniform. He considered no part of the manual exercise essential, except to han dle the firelock in such a manner as to have the entire control of it, to load, take good aim, and fire as fast as possible. He likewise taught one uniform mode of forming columns, and drawing up in a line in any direction the situation of the enemy rendered expe- LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. dient ; either in front, to the right flank, the left flank, or the rear. Major Hull, among other field officers, was ap pointed to assist him in these duties, and from his teachings they received much valuable instruction. The advantages of the system soon became appa rent. Under the simple and beautiful exercises he introduced, the army moved like a great machine, whose various parts unite to form a perfect whole. On questions of military discipline, Steuben is appealed to, and his authority viewed as decisive. His system has been adopted in the training of the militia, our great national defence, and has been a powerful means of rendering it efficient. As long as his cotemporaries live, his talents and exertions will be remembered, while his name and his works will descend to posterity, among other great instruments which gave peace, independence, and prosperity to our country. Baron Steuben was amiable and intelligent, and highly respected by all who knew him. On the es tablishment of peace, he retired to the western part of the State of New- York, and resided in the town of Steuben, named in honor of him. In this chosen spot he spent the residue of his days. General Washington having received information which indicated an intention on the part of the Bri tish to evacuate Philadelphia, selected about twenty- five hundred of his best troops, giving the command of them to Major-General Lafayette. On the nineteenth of May this detachment crossed 128 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL the Schuylkill to the east, and proceeded down the river, about eleven miles towards Philadelphia. Gen eral Washington's instructions to Lafayette were, " The detachment under your command, with which you will immediately march towards the enemy's lines, is designed to answer the following purpose, namely : to be a security to this camp, and a cover to the country between the Delaware and Schuyl kill, to interrupt the communication with Philadel phia, to obstruct the incursions of the enemy's parties, and to obtain intelligence of their motions and de signs." Sir William Howe having been advised of this movement, and of the situation of the Marquis, formed the design of capturing the whole detach ment. To effect this he divided his army into three bodies, the right commanded by General Grant, the left by General Grey, and the centre by himself and Sir Henry Clinton. He directed General Grant, whose force consisted of five thousand men, to take the Delaware road, make a circuitous march to White- marsh, and at daylight in the morning, to take a po sition directly in the rear of the Marquis. General Grey was ordered to proceed up the road, on the east of the Schuylkill, and halt directly in front ; and the centre division, under hisown command, to occupy ground on the left flank of the Marquis's detachment. These movements having been executed by the ene my, the Marquis at once saw his danger ; his little army was surrounded on three sides, and each body of the enemy superior in numbers to his whole de tachment. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. With the most perfect calmness and intrepidity, which inspired his officers with confidence in his skill and power to extricate himself, he immediately or dered a retreat to Matson's ford, as the road to Swede's ford was then occupied by the enemy. A wood separated him from the division of General Grant. Lafayette masked his retreat by sending out small parties into the wood, that they might show themselves as heads of columns moving against the front of Grant's division. This ruse de guerre succeeded admirably ; for, while the attention of the enemy was distracted and their progress delayed, Lafayette made good use of the time, gained the ford, crossed the river, and posted himself in a strong position on the western side. General Washington received information of the advance of the British army before the Marquis retreated. Alarm guns were fired in the camp, and a detachment sent to reinforce him. Major Hull was with this detachment. It arrived and met the retreat ing troops near the ford, just after they had crossed the river. The British were on the opposite bank ; they soon, however, returned to Philadelphia, without having gained their expected prize. Some skirmishing took place, while the detach ment was crossing the river. The loss on our part was not more than nine or ten men. Two of the enemy's light-horse were killed, and several wounded. Lafayette was taken by surprise ; but the surprise is no reflection on his foresight or military skill. It was owing to the negligence of a body of six hundred 9 ]30 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL ] militia, stationed at Whitemarsh, to give information of the movements of the enemy. They had aban doned their post of duty, without the Marquis's orders or knowledge. This enabled General Grant to ad vance and gain his rear, from which dangerous situ ation the youthful General extricated his detachment by his calmness, skill, and celerity, in the critical moment of impending capture. The Marquis de Lafayette was a young noble man of one of the most ancient and respectable families of France. Under the age of twenty-one years, a Captain in the armies of his country, ardent for military fame, and before an alliance had been formed with this nation in 1776, he offered his ser vices to the American Commissioners, then in Paris. He considered the cause of America as just ; that she was contending for her rights ; importuned for years before, in a spirit of loyal forbearance, touching to every generous heart. His sympathies and his love of republican principles were enlisted in her behalf. At first his offer was accepted ; but shortly after, intelligence of new misfortunes arrived ; and so dark was the cloud which then hung over the destinies of our country, that all hopes of success in the Revolution seemed extinct, and the Commissioners generously endeavoured to dissuade him from his purpose. "No," replied the noble Lafayette, " this is the very moment to serve your cause." Nor was his ardour damped when they were " obliged to acknowledge to him the humiliating fact, that they possessed not the means nor the credit suffi- LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. cient for procuring a single vessel in all the ports of France, ' Then,' exclaimed the youthful hero, ' I will- provide my own !' and it is a literal fact, that when all America was too poor to offer him so much as a passage to her shores, he left, in his tender youth, the bosom of home, of happiness, of wealth, and of rank, to plunge in the dust and blood of our inauspicious struggle."* As a volunteer he arrived among us. He first distinguished himself in the battles of Brandywine and Germantown, where he was twice wounded. In 1777, he was appointed by Congress a Major- General. Lafayette was amiable, modest, indus trious, and skilled in his profession. His fortune was expended in our service, and he successfully employed every talent, to perform his duties, and reward the high confidence which had been reposed in him. He was beloved and greatly respected in the army ; nor were these feelings less lively, nor less sincere, among a long list of old officers whom he had superseded in rank. But his services were not confined to military duty. He returned to France, and by his represen tations, his zeal and influence, he not only aided in procuring for us arms, clothing, and loans, but was instrumental in convincing the King and his minis ters, of the advantage of forming an alliance with America, and assisting her with her fleets and armies. His name is identified with the glorious triumph of * Oration of Edward Everett, be- Cambridge, Mass., August 27, 1824, fore the Phi Beta Kappa Society at General Lafayette being present. 132 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL the Revolution ; he is viewed as one of the founders of our national existence ; and his memory lives in the heart of every true American.* * When General Lafayette was in Boston in 1824, it was the happi ness of General Hull, to receive, by General Lafayette's appointment, a visit from his old companion in arms. The venerable warriors met. The recollection of the past crowded on their minds, and the scene was one of touching solemnity. But the youth of two generations were be fore them, and their warm sympa thies soon flowed into the channel of present enjoyment. The children and the grand-children of General Hull were honoured with the atten tion of Lafayette ; and who that ever witnessed his warm reception of the friends of his youth, and his affec tionate manner to children, can be in sensible to the feelings of that hour, in which the interests of three gen erations were concentrated ! LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. J33 CHAPTER XIV. THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 1778. ON the seventeenth of June, the British army evacuated Philadelphia, under the command of Sir Henry Clinton, and passed into New Jersey. Gen eral Washington was then at Valley Forge. His force numbered rather more than that of the British. As the enemy slowly advanced up the Delaware, he manifested an intention of marching to New- York. It was however difficult to ascertain the route *he would take. General Washington called a council of officers to deliberate, whether it was expedient to march and take a position on his front or his flank, so as to bring on a general action, or only to harass his flank and rear with light parties. General Lee, who had been exchanged, was one of the council. Being next to Washington in rank, and possessing great military experience, his opinion had much weight. He contended that, under the circumstances, the Fabian policy was expedient. He urged that the alliance with France rendered our independence certain, and the possibility of failure in a general battle, ought not to be hazarded. A majority of the officers coincided with him, Washington held oppo- 134 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL site views, and was sustained by many of his officers? among whom were Generals Lafayette, Steuben, Greene, and Wayne. He remarked, that in an open country, a pursuing army had the advantage of one retreating ; that the British were ineumbered with invalids and baggage ; that the most direct road to Amboy was a long march ; and concluded by saying^ that so favourable an opportunity for attack, ought not to be lost. Sir Henry Clinton having commenced his march through New Jersey, General Washington detached General Maxwell's brigade, in conjunction with the militia of that State, to impede and interrupt his pro- gress ; that time might thereby be afforded to the army under his command to come up with them, and take advantage of any favourable circumstances that might be presented. Washington crossed the Delaware at Coryell's ferry, and from thence detached six hundred men, under Colonel Morgan, to reinforce General Maxwell. Brigadier-General Scott was sent with fifteen hun dred chosen troops to join those in the vicinity, and to annoy and delay the march of the British. General Washington having ascertained that the enemy were advancing towards Monmouth Court House, despatched one thousand men, under the command of General Wayne, and sent the Marquis Lafayette to take the command of the whole detach ment, including Maxwell's brigade and Morgan's light infantry. His orders were, to avail himself of the first opportunity to attack the enemy. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. General Lee, dissatisfied probably that his coun sel had been rejected, refused to take the command of these troops, and voluntarily yielded his claims to General Lafayette. The following day, however, he addressed a letter to Washington, in which he expressed regret at what he had done, and that he would now be gratified to have his command restored. Washington, ever conciliatory, when consistent with duty, and de sirous of rendering justice to his country, by securing to its services all the talent that was at command, acceded to the wishes of General Lee. As the enemy had now made a change in the disposition of their troops, placing the strength of their army in the rear, it became necessary to increase the advanced corps. General Washington availed himself of this circumstance, and despatched General Lee with two brigades, to join the Marquis Lafayette at Englishtown. The command of the whole then devolved on General Lee, he being the senior officer. But he was directed to render every assistance in his power to Lafayette, should he find him engaged in any plan or enterprise against the enemy. At the same time he wrote Lafayette, acquainting him with the circumstances, trusting to his usual generosity to be governed by the good of the cause, rather than by personal interest. Sir Henry Clinton, observing the movements of General Washington, and that he was preparing to attack his flanks and rear, ordered all the baggage to his front, protecting it with a body of his German REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL troops. He then formed the remainder of his army in the rear of the baggage, on the high hills of Mon- mouth, under the command of Lord Cornwallis and himself. The next morning, at daylight, the baggage of the enemy was discovered to be in motion. General Washington sent directions to General Lee, to com mence the attack, " unless there should be very pow erful reasons to the contrary." He was to order the troops on both flanks to attack at the same time ; Morgan on the right and General Dickinson on the left, and that he would closely follow to his support. The British descended from the heights into the plain : Lee advanced to meet them. As soon as the firing was heard, General Washington directed the main body to throw off their packs, and he advanced as rapidly as possible to their support. This firing was between the advanced guards of Lee and the rear guards of the enemy. Sir Henry Clinton, finding that both his flanks and his rear would be attacked, halted his army and advanced on the front of General Lee's division. This movement was perceived by Lee : and ignorant whether General Washington was sufficiently near to support him, and aware that his force was unequal to contend with the whole British army, he ordered a retreat to the high grounds. He was met by Washington, who expressed marked disapprobation of his conduct ; and directed him to form his troops and oppose the progress of the enemy. " Your or ders," replied Lee, " shall be obeyed, and I will not LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 137 be the first to quit the field."* Washington then came up with the main body, and proceeding to the rear of the corps, he found it closely pressed by the enemy. He writes : " 1 proceeded immediately to the rear of the corps, which I found closely pressed by the enemy, and gave directions for forming a part of the retreating troops, who, by the brave and spir ited conduct of the officers, aided by some pieces of well-served artillery, checked the enemy's advance, and gave time to make a disposition of the left wing and second line of the army upon an eminence and in a wood a little in the rear, covered by a morass in front. On this were placed some batteries of cannon by Lord Stirling, who commanded the left wing, which played upon the enemy with great effect, and, seconded by parties of infantry detached to oppose them, effectually put a stop to their advance."! The eighth Massachusetts regiment was attached to this division of Lord Stirling. It was commanded by Major Hull. He was the next officer in rank to Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks, who was appointed dur ing this day to act as Adjutant to General Lee. " Lord Stirling," says Major Hull, " took an advan tageous position on elevated ground, directly in front of the enemy's right. They formed on the opposite side of a hollow, ready to receive us. A severe can nonade was commenced from our division, during which a demonstration was made on the right of the * Ramsay's History of the Unit- f Writings of Washington, Vol. ed States, Vol. II., page 260. V., page 425. 138 ' REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL enemy's line, and the whole division advancing at the same time on the front of their right wing, they were compelled to retreat. General Greene and General Wayne successfully opposed the progress of their right wing, and com pelled it to retreat to the heights, from which it had marched in the morning. They afterwards made several attempts on our left, which were as often repulsed. In the evening, the whole British army took a strong position, and could only be approached through a narrow pass. General Washington made an effort to move round on their right and left, and directed the artillery to assail them in front. But so many impediments were in the way that night canie on before these operations could take effect. The troops remained on the ground near the enemy with the intention of attacking them at daylight, and the whole army continued lying on their arms on the field of battle, prepared to support them. General Washington, wrapped in his military cloak, passed the night in the midst of his soldiers. About twelve o'clock the enemy silently moved off, and though the Americans were so near, they had not the slightest intimation of their retreat. They took with them a large proportion of their wounded, but left four officers and forty privates, whose situa tion was too dangerous to permit of their removal. The intense heat of the weather and the great fatigue of the troops, forbad a pursuit ; and besides, it would have been fruitless, as the British had gained upon them a march in the night. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. Major Hull writes: "I went over the field of battle the next morning, and discovered a large num ber of dead bodies without any wounds, who proba bly died from heat. We buried four officers and two hundred and forty-five privates, and more must have been killed, for there were a number of new-made graves." Perhaps a complete victory might have been won by the Americans in this battle, had not the retreat of General Lee in the very onset, with a force of be tween five and six thousand men, given to the enemy a decided advantage. Yet, notwithstanding this movement, so calculated to damp the ardour of sol diers, there was a spirit, a skill, and an undaunted resolution manifested in the trying scenes of that day which was the earnest of still more successful effort. The officer and the soldier as he lay on his arms throughout the night, looked to the morning dawn, in the hope that a contest so equal and so severe, would then be decided in favour af his beloved country. The British fought with their usual coolness and intrepidity ; and felt, not for the first time, that they had a foe to grapple with, which required all the energies, the experience, and the skill of their war like profession to sustain them. General Washington in his report to Congress writes : <* Were I to conclude my account of this day's transactions, without expressing my obligations to the officers of the army in general, I should do injus tice to their merit, and violence to my own feelings. They seemed to vie with each other, in manifesting 140 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL their zeal and bravery. The catalogue of those who distinguished themselves, is too long to admit of par ticularizing individuals. 1 cannot, however, forbear mentioning Brigadier-General Wayne, whose good conduct and bravery through the whole action, de serves particular commendation. The behaviour of the troops in general, after they recovered from the first surprise, occasioned by the retreat of the ad vanced corps, was such as could not be surpassed. All the artillery, both officers andjnen, that were en gaged, distinguished themselves in a remarkable manner."* General Lee, at his own request, was tried before a Court Martial. The charges were : o 1st. Disobedience of orders, in not attacking the enemy, agreeably to repeated instructions. 2d. Misbehaviour before the enemy, by making an unnecessary, disorderly, and shameful retreat. 3d. Disrespect to the Commander-in-chief, in two letters, dated 28th June and the 1st of July. The Court sat for some weeks, when it declared General Lee guilty of all the charges, and sentenced him to be suspended from any command in the ar mies of the United States, for the term of twelve months. A majority in Congress approved of the sentence. The word shameful was struck out of the second charge. With respect to the correctness of the sen tence of the Court Martial, military men have dif- * Writings of Washington, Vol. V., page 427. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. fered in opinion. But the language and letters of General Lee to General Washington, met with uni versal disapprobation. The question, whether under his instructions and the circumstances of the case he was authorized to retreat, without fighting, need not now be discussed. But it must ever be regretted, that the division under Lee's command, did not or could not perform the duty to which it was assigned. Had there been no retreat, the results of that day, honourable as they were to the troops engaged, would doubtless have had a much more important bearing on the interests of the American arms. 142 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL CHAPTER XV. MAJOR HULL'S COMMAND ON THE LINES. 1779. LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BROOKS having obtained leave of absence, the command of the regiment de volved on Major Hull. He was directed to march it to Poughkeepsie, at that time the seat of government for the State of New- York. As soon as it arrived, the men were employed in erecting barracks, and hauling wood for the winter. As this was a pleasant and fertile part of the country, both officers and men were pleased with the location, and made great exertions to complete their accommodations for the winter. But their happiness was short-lived ; for scarcely were they established in their comfortable abodes, when Major Hull re ceived an order from General McDougall, who com manded at Peekskill, to march the regiment the next day, and take his station on the lines near Kings- bridge. The order produced some disappointment. Poughkeepsie being the seat of government, the Governor and other civil officers of the State resided there, besides many pleasant families, which had withdrawn from the city. Major Hull communicated the order to the regi- LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 143 ment, and gave directions to be prepared to march the next morning at eight o'clock. He passed the evening at the house of Governor Clinton. When he returned to his lodgings, he perceived a large roll of paper lying on the step of his door. He found it to be a remonstrance, signed by all the non-commis sioned officers and soldiers of the regiment. They stated how much they had endured in the last cam paign, and how hard they had laboured to build their barracks, procure their wood and other necessary comforts ; and that under these circumstances, they did not expect to be ordered to serve another cam paign that winter. Major Hull immediately sent for the officers of the regiment, and communicated to them the contents of the paper. The officers informed him that they had no knowledge of the paper, but had that evening observed unusual appearances and symptoms of dis content, and that they feared the men would refuse to march the next morning. They suggested to Major Hull whether it would not be expedient to send an express to General McDougall, stating the circum stances, and wait his orders. He replied, that this insubordination must be checked at once, and prepared to use the authority he possessed, which he believed would be sufficient, rather than appeal to a higher power. The troops might view this latter measure as an expression of weakness ; and from thence w r ould result greater dif ficulty in the exaction of strict obedience in the remote station to which they were now ordered. 144 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL Major Hull requested the officers to obtain all the information relating to what had passed, and endea vour to ascertain if there was not some self-interested mischievous person, who had influenced the men to take this stand. It was soon discovered that a sergeant of artillery had obtained leave of absence from his regiment, and had procured a small room in the neighbourhood, with the expectation of selling groceries and other articles that the troops wanted. In the morning when the hour to assemble had arrived, Major Hull and the officers only were pre sent ; none of the troops appeared. Major Hull di rected the officers to go into the barracks, and at all events to parade their companies. A few men from each company came forth ; the number soon increased, and in a short time the whole regiment was formed. Major Hull then stated, that he well knew how un pleasant it was to them to leave their comfortable quarters, and not only regretted it on their account, but likewise for his officers and for himself ; that they were very pleasantly situated, and had hoped to pass the winter in Poughkeepsie. But he observed to them, obedience to orders was the first duty of a sol dier. He then pointed out, in strong terms, the impropriety of their conduct ; that he feared, from information obtained, they had been unhappily in fluenced, and strong suspicions rested on the man whom they perceived was brought on parade under arrest. A Court Martial was at once ordered to sit in the LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. presence of the corps. The sergeant was tried, and found guilty of the charges brought against him. He w r as sentenced to receive severe punishment, which was immediately inflicted in the presence of the troops. The troops then commenced their march to the White Plains, where they arrived early in Decem ber. " Colonel Burr, afterwards Vice-President of the United States," writes Major Hull, " had com manded for several months on this station, from which duty I was now ordered to relieve him. He remained a few days, and furnished us with necessary and im portant information with respect to the situation of the enemy, the different routes leading from Kings- bridge, and the position he had taken for the security and defence of his corps. In justice to his military character, it must be said that his plans were highly judicious. " Our duties having now commenced, the advanced parties were directed to reconnoitre every day, within a few miles of the enemy at Kingsbridge ; while the position of the main body, consisting of about four hundred, was seven or eight miles from that post, and eighteen miles in advance of any of our stations above. Being in the face of the whole British Army, without fortifications for defence, our safety depended on unceasing vigilance." Several detachments had been recently cut off. The country between the Highlands and New-York, and between the North and East rivers, depended on this small body of troops for protection ere it could be reinforced from the cantonment of General 10 |46 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL McDougall. Major Hull had his main body compactly posted, occupying a central position between the rivers, at and below the White Plains ; but frequently changing its locality, and generally this change took place in the evening. Small parties were constantly on duty, patrolling to the right, above and sometimes below Dobbs' Ferry, and to the left, as far as the Sound at Mamaroneck, and below. Major Hull was aided by guides, selected from the most active, intelligent, and well-disposed inhabit ants, who were familiar with every part of the coun try. These persons received remuneration, were furnished with horses, and proved faithful and ex ceedingly useful in the service. Many families remained on their farms, and it was important to know their true characters. Major Hull therefore had the names of all the inhabitants registered between Kingsbridge and Croton river, and between the North and East rivers. The char acter of each individual was described by ciphers, the object being to prevent injury to those who were well disposed, should the book fall into the hands of the enemy. The commanding officer held a species of civil as well as military jurisdiction, as the situation of the country between the hostile armies was such, that the laws of the State could not operate. A conflict existed between the civil and mili tary enactments, the decision of which was necessarily assumed and enforced by the strongest power.* But * See Appendix, No. III., with several subsequent letters to Major Hull, commanding on the Lines. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 147 whenever cases of improper or irregular impressment occurred, recompense was made to the owners, and the teams, horses, &c., were returned. But it will be seen by reference to the Appendix that such was the state of things, that certain acts of the Senate and Assembly of New- York in relation to the impress ment of horses, teams, &c., were entirely superseded by martial law, and the power to seize and send to head-quarters all suspicious persons or any guilty of theft or other crimes, was lodged in the hands of the officer then commanding. Indeed this portion of the country, infested by a roving banditti equally cruel to all parties, was a scene of terror and suffering throughout most of the years of the war. The Cow boys and Skinners ravaged the whole region. The first, called Refugees, ranked themselves on the British side. They were employed in plundering cattle and driving them to the city : their name is derived from their occupation. The latter, called Skinners, while professing attachment to the American cause, were devoted to indiscriminate robbery, murder, and every species of the most brutal outrage. They seemed, like the savage, to have learned to enjoy the sight of the sufferings they inflicted. Oftentimes they left their wretched victims, from whom they plundered their all, hung up by their arms, and sometimes by their thumbs, on bam doors, enduring the agony of the wounds that had been inflicted, to wrest from them their property. These miserable beings were fre quently relieved by our patrols, who every night scoured the country from river to river. But unhap- 148 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL pily the military force was too small to render the succour so much needed ; although by its vigilance and the infliction of severe punishment on the offend ers, it kept in check, to a certain extent, this lawless race of men. The command on the lines covered an extensive section of country, and there were many roads leading from Kingsbridge to the different sta tions, which were occupied by the detachment. It was therefore necessary to avail of the friendly in habitants to obtain intelligence of the first movement of the enemy. Those who resided below the lines, being entirely in the power of the British, were obliged to feign an attachment they did not feel. Major Hull selected a certain number of families on whose fidelity he could rely, and formed a line of them, extending from Kingsbridge to his most ad vanced guards. He requested these persons to come to him at night, that he might communicate to them his plan of securing information, which he said would depend on their good faith, alertness, and se crecy. He told the man who lived nearest Kings- bridge, that whenever he perceived any extraordinary movement, or whenever the enemy passed the bridge, to take a mug or pitcher in his hand, and in a care less manner go to his neighbour who composed one of the line, for some cider, beer, or milk, and give him notice, and then immediately return home. His neighbour was to do the same, and so on, until the information reached the station of Major Hull. Every individual thus employed was faithful to the trust reposed in him. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. The enemy could make no movement, without the detachment being informed and prepared to meet or avoid them. Major Hull rewarded, as he was au thorized, these good people, who could not, in their situation, perform a duty of this nature, without much personal risk. Yet they ceased not to exhibit the virtues of patriotism and constancy, by a faithful devotion to their country's interests, while exposed to imminent danger and surrounded by hardships and privation. By the laws of the State of New- York, if they refused to take the oath of fidelity to the State, their property was liable to confiscation. The country they occupied was fertile and populous, and the land well cultivated. Any person who took the oath, would instantly find the Cow-boys robbing him of his all ; and to offer defence, was at the peril of life. Such as did not take the oath, were left to the ten der mercies of the Skinners, who, taking the law into their own hands, branded them as tories, confiscated their property, and went off secure, in the possession of their booty. In this condition of the social state, the innocent and guilty equally suffered. The descendants of these people, many of the present inhabitants of Westchester, and its neigh bourhood, who are now living in the happy enjoy ment of liberty, and the protection of law, have rea son to feel a generous pride in the virtue of their an cestors, W 7 ho so nobly stood the test of these trying times. 150 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL Major Hull, at this period, was about twenty-five years of age, and blessed with a good constitution. He remarks, while speaking of this service, " In a command so responsible, I adopted a system, to which I steadfastly adhered ; nor did storms, cold, or the darkness of the night, ever interfere with its per formance. Early in the evening, without taking off my clothes, with my arms by my side, I laid myself dow r n before a fire, covered only by a blanket, and gave directions to the sentinel to awake me at one o'clock in the morning. My adjutant, or some other officer was with me ; and one or two of the faithful guides, who have been mentioned. The troops were ordered to be paraded at the same hour 1 was called, and a portion to remain on parade until my return. After the whole were assembled, one half of them were permitted to go to rest, and the other half were formed into strong guards, which patrolled in front and on the flanks of the detachment until sunrise. This force was in addition to the small parties which were constantly patrolling with the guides. After making this arrangement, I rode with my adjutant and one or two guides, as far as my patrols were di rected to proceed, across to the North river, and then back on the line of my patrols, toward the East river, and continued riding in different directions, until sun rise. While on this duty, I visited a number of my confidential line of inhabitants, to ascertain the move ments of the enemy. I generally rode about twenty miles at night, and nearly the same distance during the day. This service on the lines was so severe, LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. that two hundred men, with officers, were sent from the army every ten days, to relieve one half of the detachment, while the half best fitted for duty re mained. As civil law was suspended, 1 was directed to preserve as much peace, security, and good order among the inhabitants as possible ; and particularly cautioned to prevent supplies being carried to the enemy. The country was fertile, and the people were required in due proportion to supply the troops with provisions, for which I gave them certificates. These various duties employed all my time, excepting the first part of every night given to sleep. The enemy made many attempts to surprise and destroy the detachment; but by the precautions taken, his plans were invariably defeated. In all the little ren contres which took place, the advantage was on our side ; and the country, in a great degree, was pro tected, both above and below my station, from cruel depredations. Only those families suffered who re sided nearest to the British lines." In the latter part of May, it was evident prepa rations were making for some important expedition, in which the strength of the British army was to be employed, aided by the co-operaiion of their navy. Major Hull wrote to General McDougall, that ap pearances indicated that the enterprise was to be di rected against the army in the Highlands, and that the detachment on the lines would be the first object of attack. General McDougall having received simi lar intelligence, directed Major Hull, in case the enemy advanced in force over Kingsbridge towards 152 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL the White Plains, to retreat before they came so near as to compel him to action ; to observe their move ments up the river, and to proceed in such a manner as not to be in the rear of the fleet, as in such case, his communication might be cut off from the army in the Highlands. About the last of May, Major Hull received infor mation from his faithful line of inhabitants, that a large column of the enemy had passed Kingsbridge, and was marching towards the White Plains. His detachment, excepting some small patrols, were as sembled in a compact body in that place. Previous to this, he had given notice to the inhabitants of the movements of the enemy, and of his intention to re treat to the Highlands. Many of them removed their families and fled to a more peaceful region. When the enemy had arrived within about two miles of the White Plains, Major Hull called in the patrols and marched to the road on the North river. He soon perceived the fleet, which was but a small distance below his position. As he advanced slowly up the river, he was informed that the column which had passed Kingsbridge, was making a forced march on his right, with a view to gain his front and cut off his retreat. He hastened his march, and crossed the Croton river, where he halted. The enemy approached him by land, and he perceived their troops debarking from the fleet. He then made a rapid march to Peekskill, and joined the forces under the command of General McDougall. The British army proceeded up the river, and took possession of Stony and Ver- LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 153 plank's Points. Works had been erected by the Amer icans at these places, but when the enemy approached the workmen retired. A small garrison at Verplank's Point surrendered. From the preparations of Sir Henry Clinton, it was expected that he would attack West Point, and the other fortresses in the Highlands. General Washington, considering the Highlands of great importance, concentrated a large part of his army for their defence. Major Hull was ordered to West Point. His detachment erected a fort on the summit of a hill which overlooked and commanded the other works established at that place. The object was to defeat the plans of the enemy, should he at tempt to march by a circuitous route, through the gorges of the mountains, to obtain possession of this eminence. Sir Henry Clinton, however, after establishing garrisons at Stony and Verplank's Points, returned to New- York. His object, it w r as believed, in ascending the river, was, to possess himself of all the fortresses in the Highlands ; but the prompt and wise measures taken by General Washington, in recalling the troops from New Jersey, and concentrating his strength in their defence, defeated the plans of his adversary. Sir Henry Clinton then changed his mode of op erations, but with a view to the same object. He commenced a predatory warfare on the Sound, and the defenceless inhabitants of Connecticut experienced, in a war of extermination, the horrors and brutal cruelties of an unlicensed soldiery. 154 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL By this course he hoped to draw off Washington from his strong-hold in the Highlands, and thus se cure to himself their complete possession. But in every part of his plan, he was defeated by the sound judgment and superior skill of the American Com mander. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. CHAPTER XVI. CAPTURE OF STONY POINT. 1779. IT is a darkened view of the human mind that induces the belief that outrage and cruelty will com mand submission, sooner than a generous and just appeal to the better feelings of man. The spirit may bend under oppression, but not break, while, by its reaction, it acquires new strength for resistance. The study of our own hearts, and the example of Him, in whom there is no variableness, would furnish safer and more kindly views. God endeavours to win by love and by persuasion ; when these fail, he sends a severe, healthful, but not an irritating discipline, dictated equally by wisdom and mercy. During our contest with Britain, plunder and de vastation overspread our beautiful southern land ; while at the north, fire laid waste our peaceful dwell ings, and the sword did its work on the defenceless inhabitants of the sea-coast. What the enemy could not effect by contest in the open field, he vainly thought could be done by sweeping from the earth every vestige of home and domestic peace. But the earth and man were left ; and the Spirit of the Almighty, guiding the destinies of America, 156 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL overruled, to her final good, the violence of her enc mies, and the sufferings of her children. The head-quarters of General Washington were now at New Windsor, a short distance above West Point. The troops he had drawn from New Jersey, were stationed on both sides the river below, to give check to the enemy should he again ascend the Hud son. " But their plan of devastation and plunder on the sea-coast was vigorously pursued. About the beginning of July, a detachment of two thousand six hundred men, under Governor Tryon, sailed from New- York into Long Island Sound. They first landed at New-Haven, plundered the inhabitants indiscriminately, and burnt the stores on the wharves. This being done, they embarked and landed at Fair- field and Norwalk, which towns were reduced to ashes. Dwelling-houses, shops, churches, school-houses, and the shipping in the harbours were destroyed. The soldiers pillaged without restraint, committing acts of violence, and exhibiting the horrors of war in some of their most revolting forms. " It does not appear that there were troops, mag azines, or public property in either of the towns. The waste and distress fell on individuals who were pursuing the ordinary occupations of life. The peo ple rallied in self-defence, and a few were killed ; but the enemy retired to their vessels, before the mi litia could assemble in large numbers. The British Commander hoped that this invasion of Connecticut would draw away the American army from the High lands, to a position where he might bring on an LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 157 engagement under favourable circumstances. Wash ington's habitual caution guarded him against allowing such an advantage. On the contrary, while the enemy's forces were thus divided, he resolved to at tack the strong post at Stony Point. The necessity of doing something to satisfy the expectations of the people, and reconcile them to the defensive plan which he was obliged to pursue ; the value of the acquisition in itself, with respect to the men, artillery, and stores, which composed the garrison ; the effect it would have upon the subsequent operations of the campaign, and the check it would give to the depre dations of the enemy, were, as he said, the motives which prompted him to the undertaking. He recon- noitered the post, and instructed Major Henry Lee, who was stationed near it with a party of cavalry, to gain all the information in his power as to the con dition of the works, and the strength of the garrison. " The enterprise was intrusted to General Wayne, who commanded a body of light infantry in advance of the main army, where he was placed to watch the movements of the enemy, to prevent their landing, and to attack separate parties whenever op portunities should offer. " Having procured all the requisite information, and determined to make the assault, Washington communicated general instructions to Wayne, in writ ing and conversation, leaving the rest to the well- tried bravery and skill of that gallant officer.' 53* * Sparks' Life and Writings of Washington, Vol. I., page 223. 1 58 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL The regiments which formed the corps of Gene ral Wayne, were commanded by Colonels Webb, Febiger, and Butler. The detachment which Major Hull marched from the White Plains, when Sir Hen ry Clinton ascended the Hudson, and established posts at King's Ferry, was stationed on the high grounds about West Point, and employed in building several forts, which at this period were nearly com pleted.* On the morning of the fourteenth of July, Major Hull was ordered to march to Sandy Beach, and to unite his corps to that of General Wayne. Two companies of North Carolina light infantry, commanded by Major Murfee, were directed to join the troops at Sandy Beach. These were placed in the detachment of Major Hull, whose command now consisted of about four hundred men. At eleven o'clock on the morning of the fifteenth of July, the march was commenced over rugged and almost impassable mountains, and continued for four teen miles, when the detachment arrived, a little be fore dusk in the evening, within a mile and a half of * The Editor is indebted to Ben- gallant captors of Stony Point. Jamin Russel, Esq., of Boston, for Though only a private, during the the following facts : " Four forts war, he was among the faithful sup- were building. Their names were, porters of his country's rights, and Fort Webb, Fort Willis, Fort Ar- ready to use his energetic mind and nold (afterwards called Fort Clin- strong arm in the struggle for her ton), and Fort Hull. The highest independence. After the war, he was Fort Hull, a point of look-out, was for thirty years Editor of " The It was three miles from Fort Clin- Boston Sentinel" a paper well con- ton." Mr. Russel was one of the ducted and highly respectable. Verplanks Point H U O S O LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 159 Stony Point. Here it halted. General Wayne, with his principal officers, reconnoitred the works, and now, for the first time, was communicated to his troops the object of the enterprise. He stated that the attack was to be made on Stony Point at twelve o'clock that night. That the detach ment was to be divided into two columns ; to ad vance with unloaded muskets, and depend entirely on the bayonet ; that it was his determination to per severe^ until in complete possession of the fort ; and that if any man attempted to load his piece, leave his station, or retreat, he was instantly to be put to death by the officer or soldier next him. General Wayne then gave in detail, the disposi tion of the troops. The column on the right was to consist of Febiger's and Meigs' regiments, and Ma jor Hull's detachment, and to be led on by General Wayne himself. The column on the left, was to consist of Colonel Butler's regiment. Major Hull was directed to de tach Major Murfee's two companies, to form in the centre of the two columns, and to advance near to a part of the fort that was not to be assailed, and keep up a constant fire, with a view to distract and draw off attention from the real point of attack. Lieutenant Colonel Fleury and Major Posey, to command a corps of one hundred and fifty volunteers, to precede the column on the right ; and Major Stewart, with one hundred volunteers, to precede the column onthe left. A forlorn hope of twenty men was attached to each column : one led on by Lieutenant 160 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL Gibbon, the other by Lieutenant Knox. Their duty was, to remove the abattis and other obstructions in the way of the troops. After the orders were com municated, Major Hull recollected that there was a captain in his detachment, to whom cowardice had been imputed, on account of his conduct in the battle of Monmouth. He sought the young man and re quested him to walk aside for a few moments, having something to communicate. When alone, he said, " It is a subject of much delicacy, my dear sir, of which I am about to speak, and my motive to serve you, must be my apology for the liberty I take. You are aware that reports, injurious to your character as a soldier, have been in circulation since the battle of Monmouth ; as no inquiry has been made into your conduct on that occasion, your brother officers still view you, as wanting in bravery. You have, no doubt, a distinct recollection of the nature of your feelings at that time, and if conscious that there was a want of fortitude to meet the dangers to which you were then exposed, you must be sensible that in the duties now to be performed, they are of a character much more imposing ; but that they are so, is favour able, as you are furnished, in the hazardous enterprise before us, with a better opportunity to eradicate im pressions for which nojust cause may exist. But what ever might have been the truth, I leave you to decide whether to return to the camp, and give your com pany to the command of your Lieutenant, or to lead it yourself." Captain * * * * replied, " I thank you, sir, for your consideration and candour, and hope LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. to prove myself worthy of it. Wait a few moments, until I return." He came, accompanied by his Lieu tenant, and related to him, in the presence of Major Hull, the conversation which had just taken place. Then, with a calm but resolute expression of coun tenance, said : " I request you to observe my conduct during the assault, and if I do not acquit myself with the bravery which my rank and the occasion demands, I beg you to kill me on the spot." The Lieutenant assured him his request should be complied with. So gallantly did Captain * * * * acquit himself in the assault, that from that time his courage was never questioned. After the orders were communicated, both officers and men appeared inspired with a spirit that no dan ger could appal, and no barrier keep from the prize before them. Before giving an account of the action, a description of the grounds on which the fortifica tions were erected may be desirable. " Stony Point is a commanding hill, projecting far into the Hudson, which washes three-fourths of its base. The remaining fourth is in a great measure covered by a deep marsh, commencing near the river, on the upper side, and continuing into it below. Over this marsh there is only one crossing place ; but at its junction with the river, is a sandy beach, pass able at low tide. On the summit of this hill was erected the fort, which was furnished with a sufficient number of heavy pieces of ordnance. Several breast works and strong batteries were advanced, in front of the principal works ; and about half way down 11 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL the hill, were two rows of abattis. The batteries commanded the beach and the crossing place of the marsh, and could rake and enfilade any column which might be advancing from either of those points, towards the fort. In addition to these defences, sev eral vessels of war were stationed in the river, so as in a considerable degree to command^ the ground at the foot of the hill. The fort was garrisoned by about six hundred men, under the command of Lieu tenant-Colonel Johnson.'" " About half past eleven o'clock," writes Major Hull, " the two columns commenced their march in platoons. The beach was more than two feet deep with water, and before the right column reached it, we were fired on by the out-guards, which gave the alarm to the garrison. We were now directly under the fort, and, closing in a solid column, ascended the hill, which was almost perpendicular. When about half way up, our course was impeded by two strong rows of abattis, which the forlorn hope had not been able entirely to remove. The column proceeded silently on, clearing away the abattis, passed to the breastwork, cut and tore away the pickets, cleared the chevaux-de-frise at the sally-port, mounted the parapet, and entered the fort at'the point of the bay onet. All this was done under a heavy fire of artil lery and musketry, and as strong a resistance as could be made by the British bayonet. Our column on the other side, entered the fort at the same time. * Marshall's Life of Washington, Vo 1 . TV., page 122, LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. Each of our men had a white paper in his hat, which in the darkness distinguished him from the enemy ; arid the watchword was, i The fort's our own.' " Our troops reached the area of the garrison not having fired a gun, the enemy still firing on us. The men made free use of the bayonet, and in every direction was heard, ' The fort's our own.' We were compelled to continue the dreadful slaughter, owing to the fierce and obstinate resistance of the enemy. They did not surrender until nearly one hundred men were killed and wounded ; after which their arms were secured and they were assembled under a strong guard in an angle of the fort, until morning. Major Murfee acted his part with great address, keeping up an incessant fire between the two columns ; thus di verting the attention of the assailed from the point of attack. His two companies were the only American troops that fired a gun. In ascending the hill, just after he had passed the abattis, General Wayne was wounded in the head by a musket-ball, and imme diately fell. He remained on the spot, until the Bri tish surrendered, when some other officers and my self bore him into the fort, bleeding, but in triumph. Three loud and long cheers were now given, and re verberating in the stillness of night, amidst rocks and mountains, sent back, in echo, a glad response to the hearts of the victors. They were quickly an swered by the enemy's ships of war in the river, and by the garrison at Verplank's Point, under the fond belief that the Americans were repulsed. " Our troops lost no time in collecting the cannon REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL of the garrison, and turning them against the shipping in the river. The officer of the British artillery was requested to furnish the keys of the powder maga zine ; he hesitated, and said that he only received his orders from Colonel Johnson. He was informed that Colonel Johnson was surperseded in command, and that there must be no delay, or the consequences might be unpleasant. The key was produced, the pieces of ordnance loaded, and the news of what had happened sent to the shipping from the mouths of the cannon. Duplicates and triplicates were sent, which appeared to excite a good deal of agitation. They made no return to our fire, and the tide being strong, they slipped their cables and were carried down by the current. " In the same manner, the intelligence was an nounced at the fort at Verplank's Point, but no re ply was made. " Soon after the surrender, a Lieutenant of my detachment informed me, that he had killed one of the men, in obedience to orders, and that he regretted it, more than he could express. He said, that as the column was ascending the hill, the man left his station and was loading his musket. His commander ordered him to return and desist from loading. He refused, saying, that he did not understand fighting without firing. The officer immediately ran him through the body. I replied, ' You performed a pain ful duty, by which, perhaps, victory has been secured, and the life of many a brave man saved. Be satisfied.' " Colonel Johnson remained in his marquee until LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. morning, with others of our officers. I was frequently with him during the night. It was intimated by some one, that the garrison had been surprised. Co lonel Johnson observed, that we certainly should not do ourselves or him the injustice to say, that he had been surprised. He begged the gentleman who made the remark, to recollect the fact, that the firing commenced before we passed the marsh ; that all his men were at their stations, with their arms, and com pletely dressed, before our columns began to ascend the hill. That an incessant fire had been kept up, until we entered the works and the garrison surren dered. The officer explained, that he did not mean exactly as was understood. Colonel Johnson replied, that his works were too extensive ; that they were planned for a much larger number of troops than Sir Henry Clinton had left for their defence, and that he was perfectly satisfied that his men had done their duty. " Yet it has been represented by some historians of the Revolution,, that the British were taken by sur prise. But the distance from the fort, from which our columns were fired upon ; the incessant roar of musketry and artillery, while we were ascending the precipice ; the condition of the troops when the gar rison surrendered, are facts which show that success was owing to the valour, perseverance, and superior physical strength of the assailants. Fifteen Ameri cans were killed, and eighty-three wounded. " Colonel Johnson, in his return, reports twenty killed of the British, including one officer, and sixty- REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL eight privates wounded. The prisoners amounted to five hundred and forty-three. " The following day we were employed in bury ing the dead. I had two narrow escapes. One ball passed through the crown of my hat, another struck my boot." Chief Justice Marshall, in his account of this enter prise, says : " The humanity displayed by the con querors was not less conspicuous, nor less honourable, than their courage. Not a single individual suffered after resistance had ceased. All the troops engaged in this perilous service manifested a degree of ardour and impetuosity, which proved them to be capable of the most difficult enterprises ; and all distinguished themselves, whose situation enabled them to do so. " Colonel Fleury was the first to enter the fort, and strike the British standard. Major Posey mounted the works, almost at the same instant, and was the first to give the watchword, c The fortfs our own.* " Lieutenants Gibbon and Knox performed the service allotted to them, with a degree of intrepidity which could not be surpassed. Out of twenty men who constituted the party of the former, seventeen were killed or wounded."* Major Hull writes : " The following day General Washington came to the fort, and the interesting scene of his arrival is perfectly fresh in my remembrance. I recollect how cordially he took us by the hand, and the satisfaction and the joy that glowed in his coun- * Marshall, Vol. I., page 325. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. tenance. I attended him, with a number of other field officers, General Wayne being prevented by his wound. " Washington minutely viewed every part of the fortifications. His attention was particularly drawn to those places, where the two columns ascended the hill, mounted the parapets, and first entered the works. He expressed his astonishment, that we had been enabled to surmount the difficulties, and attain our object, with so inconsiderable a loss. And here he offered his thanks to Almighty God, that he had been our shield and protector, amidst the dangers we had been called to encounter." Sparks, in his " Life of Washington," says : " The action is allowed to have been one of the most brilliant of the Revolution. Congress passed Re solves, complimentary to the officers and privates, granting specific rewards, and directing the value of all the military stores taken in the garrison to be di vided among the troops, in proportion to the pay of the officers and men. Three different medals were ordered to be struck, emblematical of the action, and awarded respectively to General Wayne, Colonel Fleury, and Colonel Stewart. Congress also passed a vote of thanks to General Washington, ' for the vigilance, wisdom, and magnanimity, with which he had conducted the military operations of the States.'" Among other things, Major Hull received a com plete camp equipage. A marquee, with a mattress, bedstead, curtains, a large pair of horse canteens, REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL bottles, plates, and furniture of every kind, sufficient for a small table. This marquee, bed, &c., he could carry on a sin gle horse, during a march. When the army halted, in a very short time he had a good room and a bed, closed on all sides with curtains. General Wayne received many complimentary letters on this occasion. Major- General Charles Lee thus writes : " What I am going to say to you, will not, 1 hope, be consid ered as paying my court, in this your hour of glory ; for as it is my present intention to leave this conti nent, I can have no interest in paying my court to any individual. What I shall say, therefore, is dic tated by the genuine feelings of my heart. 1 do most sincerely declare, that your assault on Stony Point is not only the most brilliant, in my opinion, through out the whole course of this war, on either side, but that it is the most brilliant that I am acquainted with in history. The assault on Schweidnitz, by Marshal Landau, I think inferior to it." * It was the intention of General Washington, in the event of success at Stony Point, immediately to have attacked the garrison on the opposite shore. For this purpose, he had ordered a brigade to advance from Peekskill, under the command of General Mc- Dougall, and take a position near Verplank's Point, * Life of General Anthony Sparks' American Biography, Vol. Wayne, by John Armstrong, in IV., page 47. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. so as to make the attack as soon as he was informed that Stony Point was reduced. The messenger sent to General McDougall, by some accident, failed to deliver the letter, which prevented the attack at the time appointed. General Washington then changed his plan, by augmenting the number of troops, and giving the command to Major-General Howe. He likewise ordered a number of heavy pieces of artillery to make a breach in the works. From some neglect in the Ordnance Department, unsuitable cartridges were sent. This delay gave the enemy time to in crease the means of defence, and place the garrison in entire security. Had there been a sufficient number of boats to have transported the conquerors across the river, the reduction of this fort would have been almost certain. The number of men at the two posts was about the same, but the fort at Verplank's Point was inferior in point of strength. The object, however, of General Washington was accomplished ; for he had compelled Sir Henry Clin ton to abandon his desolating system in Connecticut, and ascend the Hudson for the protection of his gar rison at Verplank's Point. The works of Stony Point were so extensive, that a sufficient number of troops could not be spared for its defence ; besides, the enemy possessed the advan tage of commanding the water. The American General, therefore, decided to abandon the post. Every thing was carried off but one heavy cannon. 170 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL In a few days the British again took possession, strengthened the fortifications, and established a nu merous garrison for its defence. Late in the autumn, both of these forts were evacuated, and came into the possession of the Americans. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. CHAPTER XVII. PROMOTION OF MAJOR HULL TO THE RANK OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL. HE IS TRANSFERRED FROM THE ElGHTH TO THE THIRD MASSACHUSETTS REGI MENT. APPOINTED A COMMISSIONER TO PRESENT a PETITION TO THE LEGIS LATURE OF MASSACHUSETTS, FOR THE RELIEF OF THE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS. APPOINTED INSPECTOR IN THE ARMY, UNDER BARON STEUBEN.* 1779. DURING the remaining part of this campaign, the light infantry, under the command of General Wayne, was stationed in different parts of New Jersey, to extend protection to the inhabitants, who were expos ed to frequent inroads of the enemy from New- York. Our troops had frequent rencontres with these parties, but none of sufficient importance to render a detail of them necessary. Late in the autumn, the de tachment of Colonel Hull returned to West Point, and was established in winter quarters. From the commencement of the Revolution, a period of nearly five years, the American army had been paid in continental bills of credit. No provision was made for their final redemption. Two hundred millions of dollars in these bills were in circulation. The army had not only been paid, but its supplies of every kind were purchased with them. When first * General McDougall refers to jor Hull, while commanding on the this appointment in his letters to Ma- Lines. 172 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL issued, in 1775, they passed currently, and were con sidered equal in value to silver and gold. To refuse them, was considered a want of patriotism, and still more, a disaffection to our cause. Every month, new emissions were made to meet the expenses of the war, and the amount in circulation was thereby continually increased. The most patriotic citizens became alarmed and distrustful of them. Gold and silver began to be preferred, and at first the Govern ment-paper passed secretly at a small discount. The depreciation increased. The price of the necessa ries, as well as the luxuries of life, was augmented. Congress and the Legislatures of the States adopted various expedients to support the credit of the paper currency, and the bills were made a legal tender for the payment of all bona fide debts which had been or should be contracted. But the poverty of the country rendered it impossible to provide the basis of a solid fund, which would have ensured a faithful redemption of the bills. Although the officers and soldiers depended on these bills to provide for the support of themselves and their families, and suffered more than any other class of citizens from their continual depreciation, yet they were the last who hesitated to accept them, or to complain under the difficulties and privations to which they were subjected. The whole pay of an officer or soldier could not furnish him with comfort able clothing. A month's pay would not purchase a pair of shoes. Such was the state of things, when a meeting was held by the officers of the Massachu- LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. setts line of the army, to consult on the subject. The discussion was temperate and patriotic. It re sulted in preparing a petition to the Legislature, stating the circumstances and praying for relief, in such manner as their wisdom and justice should dictate. Before it was sent, it was submitted to General Wash ington, and by him approved. He was requested to permit three officers, chosen for the purpose, to re pair to Boston and present the petition. Lieutenant- Colonel Hull was selected as one of the Commis sioners. When the petition was presented, a disposition was manifested to do the most perfect justice ; but there was no money in the treasury, and only pro mises could be given. A Committee of the Legisla ture was appointed to confer with the Commissioners, and it was admitted that gold and silver was the standard on which the pay of the army had been es tablished ; but owing to the depreciation of the bills of credit, the army had not been paid according tcf the original intention. It was advised that the Legislature should estab lish a scale of depreciation, to regulate the value of the bills which at different times had been paid to the troops. The Committee admitted that such bal ance as was due ought to be paid. As there was no money in the treasury, it was finally decided that the Treasurer should give to each officer and soldier a cer tificate, bearing interest on such sums as were actu ally due. The prices of the most necessary articles, such as corn, beef, wool, and sole-leather, were made 174 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL the standard by which their value was to be deter mined. This plan being reported to the Legislature, it was adopted, the accounts settled, and the certifi cates issued. Great efforts were made to give credit to these certificates ; notwithstanding which, they considera bly depreciated in value. This was owing to the necessity the officers and soldiers were under, of of fering them in market, to procure necessaries for the support of themselves and their families. These certificates were afterwards paid, accord ing to the nominal value expressed on the face of them ; and those who had purchased and held them at the time they were funded and paid, received the benefit. When Colonel Hull returned to the army on the Highlands, he made a report to the officers, who ex pressed their approbation and tendered their thanks to the Commissioners, for the manner in which the trust committed to them had been executed. During the campaign of 1780, the attention of Colonel Hull was devoted to the discipline of the division of the army commanded by Major-General Howe, of which he was appointed Deputy Inspector under Baron Steuben. These duties were peculiarly interesting to him, and he remarks : " Could any thing have induced me to have left this department at that time, it was an appointment then offered me. " General Parsons called one morning, and in formed me, that he was requested by General Wash ington to inquire, if it would be agreeable to me to LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 175 come into his family, as one of his aids, and if so, the appointment would be made. " I replied to General Parsons, that I felt deeply impressed for this proof of confidence placed in me by the Commander-in-chief, and that 1 would give an answer the following day. I mentioned to Baron Steuben the appointment offered, and that I had but one objection to its acceptance ; the regret I should feel in leaving his department. He kindly observed, 4 The regret would be mutual.' He said, that he was sensible of the honour of the station to which I was invited, but hoped I would see fit to continue in my present situation. That the discipline of the army had commenced on a new system, and great progress had been made, and he soon hoped to render it as perfect as the discipline of the European armies. That we should soon be called to act with the French under Count Rochambeau ; and that it was his ardent desire, that our army should not be*found inferior to his in the knowledge and application of military tac tics. That I had been associated with him since the commencement of his duties ; was acquainted with his system and mode of teaching it. That if his assistants were constantly changed, it would be im possible to bring the system to that degree of perfec tion which he believed would finally insure success to the American arms, and terminate, on our part, so distressing a war. He concluded by saying, that I would be more useful in the office of Inspector than in any other situation, and hoped that such consider ation would influence my decision. 176 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL " 1 replied, that I had not pledged myself, and when I considered the subject, I felt it a duty to re main where I could be of most service, however much I might desire distinction, or however great my at tachment to the Commander-in-chief. " Baron Steuben then remarked, that if I had no objection, he would himself see General Wash ington, and state to him his views. " When General Parsons called for my answer, I informed him of the conversation which had passed between Baron Steuben and myself, and his wishes in regard to the arrangement ; that if it was true, that I could do more for my country in the discharge of my present duties, I felt compelled to decline the honour of an appointment, so gratifying to my feel ings, and so well calculated to elevate me in the eyes of my countrymen. " I requested, that when my answer should be given to General Washington, that all rny views should be stated to him. I then observed to General Parsons, that he knew the character and situation of our mutual friend, Colonel Humphreys ; that he had served as Aid-de-camp to General Putnam, who on account of a^e and bodily infirmities would not again be called into active service. That Colonel Humph reys still ranked as a Captain, and would now return to the command of his company. Being satisfied with his qualifications, I would take the liberty to recommend him to General Washington for the ap pointment with which he had intended to honour me. LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. ^77 " Colonel Humphreys was appointed and remained in that situation until the end of the war. 1 have been induced to narrate the circumstances of this transaction, because I perceived in a newspaper, after the death of Colonel Humphreys, a statement made, which was not founded in truth. In the article to which I allude, it is mentioned, that Major Alden and Colonel Hull were candidates with Colonel Humphreys for the appointment, and that the prefer ence was given to Colonel Humphreys." The whole of this campaign of 1780, Colonel Hull continued with the main army, a part of the time in the Highlands, performing the duties of In spector. It was at this period that the distressing events of General Arnold's treason and the capture and execution of Major Andre took place. The his tories of the Revolution have recorded these trans actions. 12 178 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL CHAPTER XVIII. STATE OF THE CURRENCY. MUTINIES IN THE PENNSYLVANIA AND JERSEY LINES. EXPEDITION OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL HULL AGAINST MORRISSANIA. MARRIAGE OF COLONEL HULL. 1781. LATE in the autumn of 1780, the main body of the army was concentrated at West Point and its vicinity in the Highlands, for winter quarters. The Pennsylvania line, under the command of General Wayne, was stationed at Morristown, and the Jersey troops at Pompton, in New Jersey. When this arrangement was made, Lieutenant-Colonel Hull was ordered with a detachment of four hundred men towards the White Plains, to form the most advanced post of the army and protect the country lying between the Highlands and the enemy's post at Kingsbridge. His principal station was on the right bank of the Croton river, near Pine's bridge. He established the same regulations and encountered the same arduous duties, which he had performed in the winters of 1778 and 1779. The condition of the army at this time was truly distressing. The continental bills of credit, which had been the funds, not only to pay the troops, but to furnish them with subsistence and clothing, had become almost entirely worthless. They had depre- LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. dated in such a manner, that it was no uncommon thing to give a month's pay for a breakfast.* The country was inundated with these bills, and they were of so little value, that Congress had ceased to make further emissions, and had called on the Legislatures of the States, to furnish specific articles for the sub sistence and clothing of the army. The States were slow in complying with these requisitions, and the soldiers suffered all the calamities which cold, hunger, and nakedness could produce. Both officers and men severely felt their wretched condition, and com plaints were heard from every quarter. Each succes sive day increased the excitement, and a fearful crisis seemed approaching. The most fatal consequences were predicted, and the States adopted no measures to prevent the evil. On the first of January, 1781, the Pennsylvania regi ments at Morristown, under the command of General Wayne, rose in a state of mutiny. They assembled under the directions of their non commissioned officers, for the purpose, they declared, of marching to the seat of government, to obtain re dress of their grievances. General Wayne and the officers attempted to ex ercise their authority. In making the effort, Captain Billing was killed, and several officers wounded. So great was the fury of these men, that had not Gene- * Copy of a receipt, found among Ham Hull, eleven thousand two hun- the papers of General Hull : dred and fifty dollars, for a chaise, "Boston, March 16, 1781 Re- with a double harness, ceived of Lieutenant-Colonel Wil- (Signed) JONATHAN FOWLE." 1 80 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL ral Wayne desisted, the sacrifice of himself and his officers would most probably have been the con sequence. The excitement increased, and the mutineers marched to Princeton. They were followed by Ge neral Wayne, and a number of the most influential officers, who did all in their power to dissuade them from their purpose. Their efforts were unavailing. A Committee of Congress, the President and Execu tive Council of Pennsylvania, immediately repaired to Princeton, and opened a treaty with the mutineers. When General Washington, who was at West Point, received information of this revolt, he delibe rated what course it was expedient to take. He was sensible that there was too much truth in the griev ances complained of, and that the whole army was in the same unhappy condition, in equal want of the necessaries of life. As, however, the civil authorities of the State had opened a negotiation, he determined not to interfere, but leave the adjustment of the busi ness with that body. The Committee of Congress shortly retired, and the non-commissioned officers negotiated with the authorities of the State. Sir Henry Clinton considering this defection as a most auspicious event, immediately sent three per sons as spies, from New-York, with instructions to invite the disaffected to march within his lines, and to offer them the most liberal rewards. But Ameri can blood rose at these degrading propositions ; the emissaries were made prisoners, and the men de- LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. elared that they had no intention of deserting the standard of their country. After the terms of accom modation were settled, they removed to Trenton, de livered up the spies, who were tried and executed. The negotiation ended in a discharge of all who had enlisted for three years or during the war, and had actually served three years. The indefinite manner in which the enlistments were expressed, to serve for three years or during the war, left the soldier at liberty to demand his discharge at the end of three years, while the officer claimed his services to the end of the war. Another source of discontent arose from the fact, that such soldiers as were not bound by previous en listments, received great bounties ; while those who had served three years, were required to continue without a bounty ; neither had they been remunerated for the services they had already rendered. Under all these irritating circumstances, insubordination be came ascendant, and the mutineers obtained, with arms in their hands, every thing they demanded. A part of the Jersey line, stationed at Pompton, perceiving how easily the Pennsylvania troops had succeeded in the attainment of their object, followed their example, and at once arose and asserted their rights. Sir Henry Clinton detached a part of his army into New Jersey, under the command of one of his Generals, to invite the Jersey troops to join the Brit ish standard ; endeavouring to seduce them from their allegiance, by rewards similar to those which he 182 REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL had proffered to the Pennsylvania line. But they exhibited the same patriotic indignation as their brethren, and turned with disdain from his insidious proposals. General Washington, though extremely mortified at the result of the proceedings of the Pennsylvania line, was yet fully aware, that the Executive Coun cil could make no better terms. He, however, viewed the example as extremely dangerous ; and on the rising of the Jersey troops an opportunity was given him to act with that energy and decision, which, while it sustained military authority, convinced the enemy and his country, that disaffection and mutiny had not pervaded the whole of the American army. A detachment was immediately formed under the command of Major-General Howe, with orders to march against the mutinous troops, and, by force, to reduce them to submission. The prompt and able manner with which Gene ral Howe performed the duty assigned him, by the execution of several of the ringleaders, crushed the threatened mutiny, and every effort of the British General to encourage and increase it, was thereby entirely defeated. Colonel Hull, with a detachment of four hundred men, was at this time at his station on the right bank of the Croton river, for the protection of the inhabit ants in the county of West Chester. When the mutiny of the Pennsylvania line com menced, he was directed to obtain all possible infor mation respecting the enemy's posts at and about LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL. 183 Kingsbridge, on the east side of Harlem river, and as low down as Morrissania. General Washington was not only anxious to suppress this spirit of insub ordination, but also of striking a blow which would give a new direction to public opinion, and awaken the enemy to a more just appreciation of American patriotism.* After obtaining all the information in his power, Colonel Hull made a communication to General Heath, in which he described the fortifica- * General Washington to Major- General Heath : " JVew Windsor, 7th January, 1781. " DEAR SIR You will be pleased to observe, on the subject of your letter of last night, that although I am not very sanguine in my expec tation of the success of the enterprise proposed, yet I think, in our present circumstances, it will be advisable to encourage it. Colonel Hull may therefore have permission to make the attempt, in conjunction with the militia : but I would not advise the destruction of any houses, except the temporary huts, built by the Refugees. Colonel Drake may be supplied with five thousand car tridges for the militia: he to be accountable for the expenditure of them. " By a letter from General Wayne, I am informed the Pennsylvania line still continued in the same state at Princeton, and that he had received intelligence, that the enemy were preparing to make a movement into Jersey. Their attention being drawn that way, may possibly make the plan in contemplation, more practicable. I wish the guard-boats to keep a vigilant look-out, and the officers to give you the earliest information of any movement below. Colonel Hull and the militia Colonels should be strongly impressed with the idea, that the whole success depends ab solutely upon the secrecy and rapid ity of the movement. It will also be well, to give a reinforcement of an hundred men, from the New Hampshire line." Note by Jared Sparks : " Colonel Hull was now stationed at Pine's bridge, near the lines, and the plan referred to, was, that of an attack upon the Refugees of Delancey's corps at Morrissania, in conjunction with a party of militia under Colonels Drake and Crane. The project had been communicated by Colonel Hull to Genera] Heath, with a request to be fa\oured with his opinion." Writings of Washingt in the County of West Chester, for the time being." General McDougalTs Reply to Major Hull, in reference to the subject of Justice Sherwood's letter respecting im pressment, fyc. HEAD-QUARTERS, PEEKSKILL, April 13, 1779. SIR When I wrote you on yesterday, your favour of the 7th was overlooked in my drawers. I approve your conduct in ordering the horses stolen to be returned to the well affected, on salvage. This will endear the army to the distressed inhab itants. As to your intended position, I own I am not clear on its expediency, especially if the troops on your left do not advance. If a superior force to your command should surround the houses of your ad vanced pickets, they will be lost. However, if your intelligence is good and frequent, I have no objection 280 APPENDIX. to your taking it. In a little time you can change your position so frequent in barns, that it will be extremely difficult, with alertness, for the enemy to surprise you, or any of your parties. The Carolina Infantry I intended to relieve. One of Nixon's parties, and one from Poor's is ordered to day to relieve the other from that brigade. These reliefs are designed to facilitate a review of Nixon's brigade, so that I desire every officer and man from it may be sent up, when Poor's detachment reaches you. I shall do every thing in my power for the exchange of the citizens in the hands of the enemy. I am, in haste, your humble servant, ALEX. McDOUGALL. To Major HULL, Commanding on the Lines. WEST POINT, April 19, 1779. DEAR SIR I received your favour enclosing some York papers, for which I return you my hearty thanks. Agreeable to General McDougall's order, received last evening, send you Captain Drew, who I think is an officer calculated for an advanced corps. Also send a sub. from General Patterson's brigade, to relieve Lieutenant Morton, of the first Massachusetts regi ment, as the company he belongs to is destitute of an officer. Colonel Bailey desires that Lieutenant Hay- wood would stay for the present, there being now an officer to that company. Your transmitting to this garrison the York papers when there is an opportunity, will much oblige, sir, Your humble servant, L. BAILEY. Major HULL, Commanding on the Lines. APPENDIX. 28 1 WEST CHESTER COUNTY, ) SiNG SING, April 28th, 1779. \ Agreeable to the law and acts of the Legislature, in the State of New- York, for the impressment of any teams, horses, carriages, or drivers, are not to be made on any pretence whatever, without the leave of the law of this State; and as perpetual complaints are made from time to time, of unlawful taking of teams and horses, contrary to the law, I do therefore desire these or such unlawful practices may be stopped; and as they have an evil tendency to subverting good order, I am in the next place to desire, that your Ho nour will be pleased for to return the horses taken from Jacob Rider and Robert McCord ; i ask this on account that these horses and teams of Rider and McCord have served at the bridge and in carting o O forage to that part of the army, and as the season of the year is come that something must be carried on in the field, and the team of McCord is taken from the plough, and the team of Rider, to my knowledge, was going to Fishkill for to carry something to his son, and inasmuch as these teams have not been granted at any time from the service, I ask the return of these horses, and desire for the future your Honour will be pleased to take the steps of the law, whenever there shall be occasion for an impress of horses, teams, or drivers, which will afford the same supplies and stop the clamour of the people, and create good order and do honour to ourselves and country. I am, sir, in all respects, Your very humble servant, SOLOMON SHERWOOD, ESQ. Justice of the Peace. \ To Major HULL, on the Lines. 282 APPENDIX. HEAD-QUARTERS, PEEKSKILL, Feb. 29, 1779. SIR Your three favours of the 27th inst., and one of 28th, have been received. I am sorry to hear of Dykeman's illness hope he will soon recover. I approve your plan of altering your position in the manner you mention on the 27th. You need not send up the express every day, unless you have advi ces of the enemy's movement, either by land or by water, on the river, or some very important intelli gence. Colonel Greaton's regiment will be sent down to cover your left as soon as it can be got ready. In the mean time, cover the country as well as you can. Your letter to the Commander-in-chief shall be for warded with the other papers. Your humble servant, ALEX. McDOUGALL. Major HULL, Commanding on the Lines. HEAD-QUARTERS, PEEKSKILL, April 30, 1779. SIR Colonel Greaton's regiment will march from Crompond to-morrow, for the Purchase. I wish you to consult and arrange with the commanding officer as to the best mode of covering the country. Let him have half of your guides and horsemen, best acquaint ed in that quarter. That regiment, or any other which may relieve it, is to retire by forced marches to these posts, whenever the commanding officer shall be advised from you, of the enemy appearing in force on the North river. You will therefore please to give him information when that event happens. When Colonel Lorin is settled and fixed in his position, send up the detachment from Poor's brigade, as they are to march from hence the eighth of next APPENDIX. 283 month. I have directed Colonel Bailey to send you as many of the light infantry as can be well shod, to relieve the like number of Patterson's and Learned's with you. I am, sir, your humble servant, ALEX. McDOUGALL. MAJOR HULL, Commanding on the Lines. HEAD-QUARTERS, PEEKSKILL, May 22, 1779. SIR I duly received your two favours of yesterday. I think it very probable the enemy intend an attack on your parties, or a movement out in pursuit of stock. If it is the former, he will make a disposition to at tack both, at the same time, and at night or very early in the morning. I wish you, therefore, to advise Major Oliver of the enemy's movements, and desire him to be very alert. I need not repeat the necessity of having things in train for a quick move ment. If the enemy move in such force, as that you have reason to conclude he has a greater object in view than that I have mentioned, it will therefore be expedient that the whole command on the lines, ex cept the militia parties, retire in such manner as will give the enemy every prudent opposition in the route to join their corps. The inhabitants should be ad vised of the position of the enemy, to be prepared to remove their cattle. When the enemy is in motion, drop a line of advice, if you can, to General Nixon, and keep me advised every day, till further orders. I am, sir, your humble servant, ALEX. McDOUGALL. MAJOR HULL, Commanding on the Lines. 284 APPENDIX. Letter from John Nixon, B. G., to Major Hull, Com manding on the Lines. COLLABURG, May 22, 1779. DEAR SIR I received your favour of last even ing at nine o'clock, in which you inform me of the approach of the enemy as far as Courtlands. I im mediately forwarded your letter to General McDou- gall. Should be glad you would let me know by bearer, whether the enemy has advanced any further since you wrote me last evening, and if they have, which road, and in what direction. I have the honour to be, with the truest esteem, Sir, your very humble servant, JOHN NIXON, B. G. MAJOR HULL, Commanding on the Lines. IV. RELATIVE TO THE ASSAULT ON MORRIS SANIA. Extract of a letter from Mrs. Hull to one of her daughters. NEWTON, Massachusetts, April 12, 1822. " We have been reading the Spy, with a good deal of interest. It brought to your father's recollec tion the days of yore. The scenes were laid on ground he had often travelled over ; and that part of the book in relation to the Skinners, is no fiction. Your father has no recollection of the families the au thor mentions, although he knew almost every indi vidual in that part of the country, for twenty or thirty miles around. He commanded on the lines, be APPENDIX. 285 tween our army and the British, for three winters ; and a hard time he had of it, he says ; for he made it his constant rule, never to take off his clothes at night, but merely to lay down and take a nap, and be called at one o'clock, and mount his horse and re connoitre the country till morning. " The author begins his history in 1781. It was an interesting year it was the year we were mar ried. Your father applied to General Washington for leave of absence : the General replied, it was ne cessary for a scouring party to go down to West Chester ; and as he had been there, and was ac quainted with the grounds, he wished him to go ; after that,, he would give him leave of absence till the opening of the spring campaign. Previous to this, he wrote me that he should be here early in January. I, not knowing of the secret expedition, nor hearing a word from him, a long month passed, in wonder to me, you may well think ; but after he had scoured the grounds around West Chester, and brought off old Tillo (whose history you have heard long ago) ; he came, and we were married. I returned with him to the army. There I met Dr. Thomas, a surgeon of the regiment. He congratulated me on my arri val, and gave me the history of the engagement at Morrissania, which was a pretty warm one, he said. He was on the top of a hill, where he had a full view of the manoeuvres ; and his whole thoughts were on me ; and knowing that I hourly expected your father, and what I expected him for, he trembled at what might be the events of this day. " The closing scene of the history was affecting 286 APPENDIX. to us ; it ended in Lundy's Lane, where jour unfortu nate brother was killed.* Thus, beginning on the ground where your father fought, and ending where your brother fell." v. TOUR TO UPPER CANADA. Extracts from a Journal of Colonel Hull, while Com missioner to treat -with the British and hold Treaties with the Indians. January 27,1794. This day 1 rode through the Oneida country. Here is a large Indian settlement, with an extensive tract of land for their use. They are perfectly civil and well disposed towards the United States. They form a part of the Six Na tions. They have a mill near their castle, arid a blacksmith, who is paid by the United States ; a schoolmaster, who constantly instructs the children, and a clergyman, who officiates among them. God grant, that the avarice of this country may never disturb these native proprietors, but that they may long live to enjoy their innocent customs, be enlight ened, and made respectable and happy. At night arrived at. Canandaigua. General Cha- pin, the Superintendent of Indian affairs, resides here. I was invited to attend a Council of about thirty Seneca chiefs and warriors. At ten in the * Captain Abraham Fuller Hull was killed in the battle of Lundy's Lane, in the war of 1812. APPENDIX. 287 morning, the council fire being built, the chiefs and warriors were paraded in the most, solemn order. One of the chiefs arose and made a long speech, with a belt of wampum in his hand, to which he re ferred, while speaking. This belt, over which he had studied his matter, now aided to remind him of the thoughts he wished to communicate. General Chapin made a short re ply, informed them who I was, and the nature of my business to Niagara; which was, he said, to make ar rangements for a general peace with the hostile Indians. I then made a speech to them, to which they re plied in a handsome and very interesting manner. They seemed much pleased, especially when I in formed them that I should leave a sum of money to be applied to their entertainment. January 28. To-day 1 passed through a country but thinly settled ; a poor looking building perhaps in ten or fifteen miles met the eye. Excellent land, and will no doubt become a most important part of America. At evening arrived at a small house on the banks of the Cayuga Lake. Here 1 met Colonel Seth Reed and his son, who reside at Geneva, about fifteen miles from this place. I had dismissed my sleigh and horses procured at Schenectady, and was about engaging another, when Colonel Reed, without any solicitation on my part, offered me his sleigh and horses, and his son to attend me to Niagara. I accepted the offer. About twelve o'clock I commenced my journey to the Geneva river ; accompanied by Colonel Taylor 288 APPENDIX. and Mr. Reed. Here we had arrived to the extent of our settlements, and between this and Niagara is only a small foot-path, and two Indian settlements, the Tonawantas and the Tuscaroras. February 1. This morning Colonel Taylor, Mr. Reed and myself, mounted our horses and rode about eight miles over an entire flat country. On this flat, near the river, is a small Indian settlement. We fully expected to have slept in the woods this night. After riding twenty miles without making a stop, we arrived at a good fire, which the Indians had only just left. Here we refreshed ourselves for about fifteen minutes. We then proceeded on through the little path, which was very deep and miry. Night overtook us about four miles from Tonawanta. I was inclined to stop, but my companions thought best to proceed to the village. About eight o'clock we ar rived at the river opposite to the village. It was frozen about half over, and quite deep. We called, and an Indian soon came to the opposite bank. He could not speak English, and we could understand nothing he said. We finally broke away the ice and plunged in with our horses. The water was up to the saddles. The Indian guided us to his wigwam. It was not long before a great many of the Indians assembled. I spoke to them in the most friendly terms possible, and continued to speak until exhaust ed by fatigue, I fell asleep, and did not awake until daylight. In this wigwam there were as many as fifty bushels of corn, and a considerable quantity of wild meat. The com was hung upon poles, and the meat upon strings. Before I left, I gave them money APPENDIX. 289 enough to make the whole village happy. I told them to drink the health of Honontagalios, the In dian name of General Washington. I told them we were going to make peace with all the nations, and that they must not suffer any of their warriors to join the hostile nations. They appeared to be very happy and very thankful. " Feb. 2. At sunrise began our journey ; took some of these Indians as our guides, and in the eve ning arrived at the Tuscarora village, ten miles from Niagara. Here the Indians assembled to meet me. 1 had a talk with them, and said every thing in my power to convince them of the friendship of the Uni ted States. " I told them we wished for peace, and should have it ; and they must not suffer their people to join the nations who were carrying on war with the United States. I urged upon them the importance of all the chiefs going to the Sandusky Treaty. When I took leave, I gave them money, and told them to drink the health of their Father and friend, General Washington." Colonel Hull gives a description of the Falls of Niagara ; of his reception by Governor Simcoe ; of the company assembled to meet him ; of the rare ac complishments of Mrs. Simcoe ; her exquisite draw ings ; her maps like copper-plate. He says : " Indeed, she sustains a most excellent character, and the Governor seems to be the idol of the people." After dinner, Colonel Hull retired with the Governor, to converse on the subject of his mission. He continues : " On my account the Governor 19 290 APPENDIX. ordered supper in his canvas-house, which he brought from Europe. It was joined to his dwelling-house- It is a room twenty-two feet by fifteen, with a floor, windows, and doors, and warmed with a stove. It is papered and painted, and you would suppose you were in a common house. The floor is the case for the whole of the room. It is quite a curiosity. About eleven o'clock I was conducted to my chamber. Perceiving me so much pleased with the canvas-house, the Governor ordered breakfast in it. After break fast, I had another long conversation with him re specting the business of my mission." THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OP DETROIT. BY JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE, NEW-YORK: D. APPLETON & CO., 200 BROADWAY. PHILADEDPHIA : GEO. S. APPLETON, 148 CHESNUT-STREET- M DCCC XLVIII. PREFACE. THE preceding portion of this volume contains the history of General Hull's Revolutionary services and civil life from 1775 to 1805. This, which was mostly written by himself, was prepared for the press by his daughter, Mrs. MARIA CAMPBELL, wife of ED WARD F. CAMPBELL, Esq., of Augusta, Georgia. It was a favourite and cherished object of this lady to erect this monument to the memory of her father, and her life was spared by a kind Providence just long enough to enable her to complete it. Amid painful sickness and the languor of disease, she la boured diligently until it was finished. This labour of love seemed to sustain her failing strength, and when she reached its termination she could say, " Lord, let me now depart," and the daughter passed into the spirit-land, to meet the parent whom she had so tenderly loved. But another labour yet remains to be performed. Mrs. Campbell did not attempt the history of the Campaign of 1812, and Surrender of Detroit; for though well qualified to write it, from an acquaint ance with all the facts and arguments which justify, to any unprejudiced mind, the surrender of Detroit ; 296 PREFACE. and though deeply convinced that her father deserved praise, and not blame, for his share in this transaction, yet she shrank from a work which she feared might involve her in angry controversy, and prevent the simple narration of her father's Revolutionary labours from being appreciated. She left to another hand, and another time, this part of the work. Still it has been thought best that the account of General Hull's Revolutionary services should be accompanied with at least a brief statement of the facts and reasons which refute the charges so long ignorantly brought against the memory of this much injured servant of his country. This task has been committed to the present writer, who, with no qualifications except a strong conviction of the justice of the cause he advocates, founded on careful study and examination, joined with an earnest wish to be candid and conscientious, has undertaken the work. He is indeed about to defend a grandfather, and one whom he remembers with mingled feelings of affection and respect. From his earliest childhood he recalls the image of a vener able white-haired old man, living in the midst of his children and grandchildren ; employing in the peace ful pursuit of agriculture the last years of a life, the first part of which had been spent in public employ ment and honours. All outward disgraces seemed to have fallen upon his head, yet all were borne with cheerful equanimity. A soldier, he had been branded as a coward ; a patriot, he was esteemed a traitor ; loving the approbation of his fellow-men, he was an PREFACE. 297 object of universal censure ; naturally fond of public life, and ambitious of public usefulness, he was under a sentence of irrevocable ostracism. But how cheer ful, how happy were these declining years of his life. Happy in his affections, in the love of relatives, in the esteem of wise friends, in the inward conscious ness of having done right, to him it might be said, " Thou hast been As one, in suffering all, that suffers nothing, A man that fortune's buffets and rewards Hast taken with equal thanks." No peevishness, no complaint, no querulous refer ence to a nation's ingratitude, ever fell from his lips. Remembering this, I cannot but feel a strong desire to do full justice to his cause, yet I feel also, that if his spirit could now communicate to me his wishes, he would charge me to use no art but that of truth, not to overstate his side of the question, nor to under state that of his opponents ; to extenuate nothing, and set down nothing in malice. And I shall en deavour to conform to this rule and write in this spirit. I will not, if it can be avoided, use a harsh word, even toward those from whom he has received the most cruel injuries. He has gone where nothing can touch him further. His enemies still live and are in pursuit of public honours, and are liable to be injured by the exposure of their past errors. But this injury, I have no desire to inflict, except where it becomes necessary to defend General Hull's mem ory, by stating the simple truth. After the Court Martial in 1814 had closed, Gen eral Hull returned to his farm in Newton, which he 298 PREFACE. had inherited through his wife, and there passed the last years of his life in the pursuits of agriculture. While the public, misguided by false rumours, was accusing him of having sold his country for " British gold," of having built a splendid palace, and having married his daughter to General Brock ;* he, with difficulty, supported his family by farming. In re moving to Detroit, he had expended much of the small property he had previously accumulated. He had also paid out money of his own, for his army, while on its march, which was never repaid him, because the vouchers had been destroyed in the destruction of the Adams, when she was burnt by Capt. Elliott. But his active mind devoted itself to experiments in practical agriculture, many of which he communi cated to the magazines devoted to that science. So passed his years until the time arrived when the clouds which rested on his fame, were partially dis persed, and his setting sun shone forth for a brief space in a serene sky. In the year 1824, General Hull published a se ries of letters in defence of his conduct during the campaign of 1812. These letters, first printed in the " American Statesman," a Boston newspaper, and copied into many other papers, of both political par ties, and afterwards reprinted in a collected form, ex ercised great influence on the public mind, wherever they were read. The North American Review, in a notice of these letters, understood to have been writ ten by Jared Sparks, said, " that from the public * Such reports have been widely circulated. PREFACE. 299 documents collected and published in them, the con clusion must unequivocally be drawn, that General Hull was required by the Government to do, what it was morally and physically impossible that he should do."* Many other periodicals throughout the Union expressed the same opinion. A public dinner was given in Boston to General Hull, by citizens of both political parties. He also received very gratifying letters from various quarters, particularly from old companions of the Revolution ary army, expressing their pleasure at his having vin dicated so completely his conduct and his character.f General Hull did not live long after these events. He, however, had the pleasure of meeting Lafay ette, in 1825, who paid him a visit, when in Boston during that year. He was present at the celebration of the Battle of Bunker Hill, and afterwards visited his mother in his native town of Derby, in Connec ticut, the citizens of which gave him a public dinner. Returning home, he was attacked by a disease which soon proved mortal. On his death-bed he declared, in the most solemn manner, his conviction that he had done right in surrendering Detroit, and expressed his happiness that he had thus saved the lives of the peaceful citizens of Michigan from being needlessly sacrificed. He died in Nov. 1825, in the 73d year of his age. It was not, however, to be expected, that a preju dice so deeply rooted and widely spread, as that which held General Hull to be a coward or a traitor, * See Appendix, Note 1. f See Appendix for some of these letters. 300 PREFACE. would be immediately overcome. Men love their prejudices too well they hug them to their hearts, as their dearest treasures. General Hull had been made the scape-goat for the sins committed by the Administration arid war party, in precipitating hostil ities before the country was prepared for them, and for the faults of those who ought to have aided him, and co-operated with him. To admit that General Hull was an injured man, was, with many persons, to admit that they themselves had committed great errors or faults. Few are capable of a magnanimity like this. Accordingly the old charges continue to be repeated in various shapes, though all respectable writers have abandoned the worst accusations. Few are yet able to rise to the platform of impartial his tory, and say with Mr. Sparks, that under the cir cumstances in which General Hull was placed, there was no possibility of his effecting what was required of him. Yet we find now a very general ad mission, that others were, at least, as much to blame as he, for the failure of the Canada campaign. Thus General Armstrong, one of the most bitter and vindictive assailants of the character of General Hull, is obliged to admit, that the Administration was in error, in not acquiring previous knowledge of the forces to be encountered in Canada ; in not recalling the garrisons of the remote and indefensible posts ; in not transmitting to General Hull information of the declaration of war, until long after the British in Canada had knowledge of it ; in not following General Hull's repeated and urgent suggestions, that a fleet PREFACE. 301 be constructed on Lake Erie and a large co-operating force assembled at Niagara ; and finally, in not furnish ing a sufficient number of troops to General Hull, to accomplish the objects of his expedition.* Recent writers, therefore, who have written on the history of the last war, or had occasion to refer to its events, while they have been obliged to admit that the main cause of the failure of the invasion of Canada and the surrender of Detroit, was to be found in the unprepared state of the country, the errors of the Administration, and the absence of an American fleet on Lake Erie, have nevertheless continued to accuse General Hull of military faults, in a greater or less degree. Some ignorantly repeat the sweep ing and contradictory charges of treason and cow ardice. One writer speaks of " the surrender of a large force with the important post of Detroit by General Hull, under circumstances which made it al most certain, that he had been purchased by the Brit- ish."\ This sentence is in a biography published only four years ago, when the writer possessed every opportunity of knowing that there was not the shadow of evidence to be found in support of such an accu sation. Loose charges of this kind are so often made, that they have their effect on public opinion. The errors of one writer are copied by another, and * Armstrong's "Notices of the of Infantry, how different would War of 1812," Vol. L, pp. 46-51 : have been the issue of the cam- " Had the Government invited Gov- paign !" ernor Shelby of Kentucky or Gov- f From a Memoir of Henry Clay, ernor Meigs of Ohio, to follow in prefixed to Clay's Life and Speech- Hull's track, with two thousand es. Greeley & McElrath, 1843, gun-men and Winchester's Brigade p. 71. 302 PREFACE. even the writers of history, instead of recurring to the original sources, are accustomed to repeat, without examination, what is asserted by previous writers of no authority. It is to be hoped that the present work will correct some of these popular impressions. The sources from which I derive the facts and state ments herein contained, are as follows : Certified copies of public documents, referring to the campaign of 1812, from the office of the Adju tant-General at Washington. Forbes' Report of the Trial of General Hull, by a Court Martial at Albany, containing the testimony of the witnesses on that trial. Hull's Memoirs of the Campaign of the North western Army, collected and published, Boston, 1824. Life and Correspondence of Major-General Sir Isaac Brock, London, 1845. Dawson's Life of Harrison. Lanman's History of Michigan. Histories of the War of 1812, by McAffee, Ingersoll, James, &c. Christie's War in Canada. Armstrong's Notices. Private papers, files of letters, &c., left by General Hull, and referring to his administration while Gov ernor of the Territory of Michigan. The Appendix will contain some documents and letters, illustrating the history of the campaign of 1812. CONTENTS. PREFACE 295 CHAPTER I. WILLIAM HULL APPOINTED GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN. EVENTS OF HIS AD MINISTRATION. INDIAN SETTLEMENTS IN MICHIGAN. TREATIES WITH THE INDIANS. TROUBLES 305 CHAPTER II. WAR OF 1812. GOVERNOR HULL APPOINTED BRIGADIER-GENERAL TO LEAD THE TROOPS FROM OHIO TO DETROIT. MARCH TO DETROIT. INVASION OF CANADA. FALL OF MICHILIMACKINAC, AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS 325 CHAPTER III. SITUATION OF GENERAL HULL BROCK'S ARRIVAL AT MALDEN. SUR RENDER OF DETROIT. ITS REASONS. STATE OF COMMUNICATIONS, TROOPS, PROVISIONS, &c 360 CHAPTER IV. THE COURT MARTIAL. How CONSTITUTED, AND ITS CHARACTER. ITS DE CISION AND SENTENCE. CONCLUSION 396 APPENDIX. NOTE 1. EXTRACT FROM A NOTICE OF GENERAL HULL'S "MEMOIRS OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812," FROM THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW . . . 411 NOTE 2. MEMORIALS BY GENERAL HULL, RECOMMENDING A FLEET ON LAKE ERIE 413 NOTE 3. LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY AT WAR TO GENERAL DEARBORN 417 NOTE 4 GENERAL VAN RENSSELAER'S LETTER, AUGUST 19, 1812 . . 418 304 CONTENTS. NOTE 5. SIR GEORGE PREVOST'S LETTER TO GENERAL BROCK, CONCERNING THE PROPOSED ARMISTICE 418 NOTE 6. EXTRACT FROM INGERSOLL'S HISTORY OF THE WAR OF 1812 . 419 NOTE 7. LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR TO GENERAL DEARBORN 421 NOTE 8. MILLER'S TESTIMONY ON THE COURT MARTIAL . . 421 NOTES 9, 10, 11, 12. TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES ON THE COURT MAR TIAL 421 NOTE 13 EXTRACT FROM GENERAL HULL'S " MEMOIRS OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812," UPON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COURT MARTIAL . . 423 NOTE 14. LETTERS FROM REVOLUTIONARY OFFICERS AND OTHERS, TESTIFY ING TO GENERAL HULL'S CHARACTER 425 NOTE 15. LETTER FROM ROBERT WALLACE, GIVING HIS RECOLLECTIONS OF THE SURRENDER OF DETROIT, PUBLISHED IN KENTUCKY, IN 1842 . . 443 NOTE 16. LETTER FROM A GENTLEMAN OF PENNSYLVANIA/ DESCRIBING PERRY'S DIFFICULTIES IN BUILDING HIS FLEET, &c 461 NOTE 17. LETTER FROM WILLIAM SULLIVAN, ESQ., TO A DAUGHTER OF GENERAL HULL 479 NOTE 18. LETTER FROM S. HALE, Esq., TO MRS. N. B. HICKMAN, A DAUGHTER OF GENERAL HULL . ... 481 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, AND SURRENDER OP THE POST OP DETROIT. CHAPTER I. WILLIAM HULL APPOINTED GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN. EVENTS OF HIS ADMIN ISTRATIONS. INDIAN SETTLEMENTS IN MICHIGAN. TREATIES WITH THE INDIANS . TROUBLES. IN 1805, March 22d, William Hull received from Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, the appointment of Governor of Michigan, which had been erected into a separate territory by Act of Con gress, January llth, of the same year. The Legis lative power of the territory was vested in the Gov ernor and Judges, who were authorized to adopt and publish its laws from the codes of the original States. William Hull was also appointed Indian Agent, an office which was then connected with that of Exec utive Magistrate. The duties of Indian Agent were not the least considerable of those belonging to the office of Gov ernor. The white inhabitants of Michigan, collec- 20 306 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, tively, amounted six years after this time to only 4860 persons ; four-fifths of whom were French, and the remainder Americans, with a few British. But the Indian settlements within the territory were numerous. They consisted of the Pottawatamies, who inhabited the upper branches of the river Raisin, Huron, &c. ; the Miamis, Wyandots,* Chippewas, Winnebagoes, Ottawas, and others, whose villages were scattered through the region between the present States of Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan, and within the penin sula itself. These were the tribes who were after wards united with Tecumsehand the Prophet against the United States, and as allies of England, as they had formerly been united under Pontiac against the English and as allies of France. They felt that the people of the United States were their natural enemies because their lands were perpetually encroached upon by them. Just so they had before felt that the English were their enemies, so long as it was from the Eng lish that they apprehended the loss of their lands. General Hull, as Indian Agent, had in view two ob jects, which he communicated to the President, in letters to General Dearborn, Secretary at War, dated January 10th and 17th, 1806.f The first object was, to extinguish gradually and regularly the Indian title ; the second, to instruct the tribes in farming and the mechanic arts. At this time the Indian title in Michigan had been extin guished only in the following tracts : * Most of the Wyandots were on f Copies from General Hull's pri- the Upper and Lower Sandusky. vate papers, in possession of the writer. AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 397 First, at the post of Detroit, and a district adja cent, bounded north by Lake St. Clair, south by the river Raisin, and west by a line six miles distant from Detroit river. Secondly, the post of Michilimackinac, (now Mackinaw,) and the island itself, and the mainland adjacent, extending six miles on Lake Huron, and three miles back, and the island De Blois Blanc. The Indian title was also extinguished in north western Ohio, at the Rapids, and at the mouth of the Maumee, and on Sandusky bay. Thus it will be seen, that except a strip of land, all of Michigan was in possession of the Indians. Meantime American settlers were anxious to come in. Governor Hull, therefore, was strongly desirous of making some satisfactory treaties with the Indians. He says, in his communication of January 14th, 1806: " 1 should think it would be expedient to purchase all the land in the territory, south of a line drawn due west from the most westerly point of Saganaw bay to Lake Michigan. In that case, probably some small reservations for the Indians might be necessary; one probably on the river St. Joseph, which empties itself into the southerly part of Lake Michigan, where many of the Pottawatamies now reside, one on the upper branches of the river Huron, which empties into Lake St. Clair, and one on the Saganaw river, which falls into Saganaw bay." He goes on to mention other reservations, and adds, that " the Pot tawatamies and Chippewas are the proprietors of the country. Some of the other tribes, probably by com- 308 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, pact or understanding among them, may consider themselves as having other rights, by which they may claim some part of the compensation, and conse quently it may be necessary to make them parties to the treaty." * Pursuing this plan, in 1807 Governor Hull en tered into a treaty, at Detroit, with the Ottawa, Chippewa, Pottawatamie, and Wyandot tribes, by which they ceded to the United States an extensive territory on the southeastern side of Michigan, bounded south by the river and bay of Miami ; west by a line running north and south, through the middle of the territory, nearly as far north as Saganaw bay, and north by a line running from this point to White Rock in Lake Huron. In payment for this land, annuities were given to several tribes.f This cession was not accomplished, however, without difficulty and opposition. Among Governor Hull's papers, is a letter dated June 10th, 1807, from Captain Dunham, commanding at Michilimackinac y in which he speaks as follows : " Immediately on the receipt of your Excellency's favour of April 29th, I summoned together the chiefs of the Chippewa and Ottawa tribes, and laid before them the subject of your letter, respecting the council or treaty to be held at Detroit. They decided instantly and unanimously not to attend the council, nor to have any thing to do with alienating their lands. They say ' our brethren * Copy of a letter to Hon. H. f Lanman's History of Michigan, Dearborn, Secretary at War, dated page 183, January 14, 1805. Hull's papers. AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 3Q9 below are forgetting their children ; if they are fools enough to throw away their hunting grounds, let them do it ; we, however, in this quarter, will do no such thing and we hope, my brother, that you will not think of taking away one hand's breadth of our lands, for we have not so much to spare.' In short, they appear to be much alarmed on the subject, and indi cate a disposition by no means friendly. I believe they have been tampered with, and I suspect some unauthorized individuals of a neighbouring nation are endeavouring to throw obstacles in the way of the intended treaty." * This last suspicion was quite unnecessary, though perhaps natural. It needed no suggestion from the French or British to make the Indians reluctant to give up their territory. It was owing to natural and inevitable causes, that the Indians grew more and more hostile to the Americans, and ever more friendly to the British. Those who wanted their lands, were their natural enemies ; those who could assist them to retain them, were their natural allies. These causes had but a few years before made them friendly to the French and hostile to the English ; they now made them friendly to the English and hostile to the Americans. The flood of American immigration was beginning to flow into northwestern Ohio and In diana, but no such emigration was taking place toward the west of the British possessions. The Americans were farmers, and would occupy the lands perma- * Copy of Captain Dunham's letter, in Hull's papers. 310 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, nently. The only British who came near them, were hunters, like themselves, or traders to buy their furs. These deep-lying and permanent causes of a state of things, which no wisdom nor energy on the part of the territorial government could alter, had already begun to produce that confederacy against the United States, of the Indian tribes, of which the Shawnee Prophet was the head, and his brother Tecumseh both head and hand. As early as 1806, the Prophet commenced his operations. His object was to unite all the north western Indians against the progress of the American settlements. The Prophet affirmed, that he had seen the Great Spirit ; and that he was his agent. He said that the Americans were intending to push the Indians into the Lakes, as they had driven them from the sea-coast; that the Indians must take a stand where they were, and drive the Americans to the other side of the Alleghany mountains. This effort of the Prophet excited great interest through all the Bribes, and produced manifest effects on the tempers of the Indians. From all quarters Governor Hull was informed of the hostile spirit which began to be manifested. The first notice of the Shawnee Prophet which appears in Governor Hull's correspon dence, is contained in a letter addressed to the Gov ernor, by William Wells, from Fort Wayne, dated September 5, 1806.* He says, " that a number of Shawnee Indians have settled at Greenville, on lands * Hull's papers. AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 3^ belonging to the United States. They have a man among them that pretends to be a prophet. This fellow is well calculated to lead the Indians astray, and it appears that it is his determination to do so." But the most remarkable evidence of the Pro phet's sagacity and influence, is found in a speech, delivered on the 4th May, 1807, by an Indian named Le Maigouis, or the Trout.* . This speech was deliv ered at the entrance of Lake Michigan (Le Maioui- tinong,) and a full account of it was transmitted to Governor Hull by Captain Dunham, from Mackinaw, with a letter, from which we make the following ex tracts : " FORT MICHILIMACKINAC, May 20, 1807. " SIR, I have thought it my duty to state to your Excellency, that there appears to be an exten sive movement among the savages of this quarter, which seems to carry with it a good deal of the dark and mysterious. Belts of wampum are rapidly circu lating from one tribe to another, and a spirit is pre vailing by no means pacific. What I have been able to learn, through sources to be relied on, leaves little room for conjecture as to the object of their hostile intentions ; and the enclosed talk, which has been in dustriously spread among them, and which seems to have had considerable effect on their minds, needs no comment. " It ought to be observed, that this Talk is com- * Called by Lanman, Le Mar- manuscript it is always spelt Mai- quois : probably a misprint, as in the gouis. 312 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, municated in open council, where old and young of both sexes are allowed to assemble. There is, how ever, another Talk, known only in the private coun cil of the chiefs and warriors. From the letter and spirit of the former, we may easily infer the com plexion and views of the latter. There is certainly mischief at the bottom, and there can be no doubt in my mind, but that the object and intention of this great Manitou, or second Adam, under pretence of restor ing to the Aborigines their former independence, and to the savage character its animal energy, is, in re ality, to induce a general effort to rally, and to strike somewhere a desperate and decisive blow. " I cannot say that I apprehend an immediate at tack. Perhaps my character as a soldier might be called in question, were I to suppose the possibility of a thing which some would deem so improbable. But, aware as 1 am of the insidiousness and treachery of this people, I have thought it no more than a dic tate of prudence to watch their motions, and to be in constant readiness to receive them, either with the olive branch or the bayonet, as circumstances might require. " Many fabulous and foolish stories are circulated, to impress the idea of their great progenitor's divinity and mission ; but whether he is really the envoy of heaven, or only an emissary from the Cabinet of St. Cloud, I will not presume to say. He is represented as being seen only on an elevated scaffold, sitting or kneeling on a cross, and in a constant attitude of de votion. It is even said, that he can fly; and that the AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. multitude of his disciples who visit him, are miracu lously fed by a profusion of wild animals, which are thronging about him for that purpose. All this is eagerly swallowed ; and the severe denunciations of his penal code, terrify them at once into an adoption of his creed. His system is so artfully interwoven with their ancient superstitions and their modern pre judices, that they receive the whole with a religious enthusiasm. " How long this frenzy may last,, or whether the Indians immediately in this vicinity may eventually come in to the extent of the measure, I cannot say. The herald of this new religion, Le Maigouis, is a bro ther of the principal chief at Arbre Croche. He is now gone to Lake Superior, to initiate the savages of that quarter into its mysteries. " I have the honour to be your Excellency's obe dient and humble servant, (Signed) J. DUNHAM." Substance of a talk delivered at Le Maiouitinong, entrance of Lake Michigan, by the Indian Chief Le Maigouis, or the Trout, May 4th, 1807, as coming from the first man whom God created, said to be in the Shawnese country, addressed to all the different Tribes of Indians. Le Maigouis, holding in his hand eight strings of old wampum, four white and four blue, said : " Brothers, These strings of wampum come from the Great Spirit. Do not despise them, for he knows every thing. They are to go all around the 314 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, earth, till they are lost. They were sent to you by the first man he created with these words : " Children, I was asleep, when the Great Spirit addressing himself to another Spirit said, 1 have closed my book of accounts with man, and am going to destroy the earth : but first I will awaken from the Sleep of the Dead, the first man I created ; he is wise. And let us hear if he has aught to say. He then awoke me and told me what he was about to do. " I looked around the world and saw my Red children had greatly degenerated, that they had be come scattered and miserable. When I saw this, I was grieved on their account, and asked leave of the Great Spirit to come to see if I could reclaim them. I requested the Great Spirit to grant, in case they should listen to my voice, that the world might yet subsist for the period of Three full Lives, and my re quest was granted. "Now, therefore, my children, listen to my voice, it is that of the Great Spirit ! If you hearken to my counsel and follow my instructions for four years, then will there be two days of darkness, during which, I shall tread unseen through the land and cause the animals, such as they were formerly, when I created them, to come forth out of the earth. The Great Spirit bids me address you in his own words, which are these : " My children, You are to have very little inter course with the whites. They are not your Father, as you call them, but your brethren. / am your Fa- AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. tfier. When you call me so, you do well. I am the Father of the English, of the French, of the Span iards, and of the Indians. I created the first man, who was the common Father of all these people as well as yourselves ; and it is through him, whom 1 have now awakened from his long sleep, that I now address you. But the Americans, I did not make. They are not my children, but the children of the Evil Spirit. They grew from the scum of the great water, when it was troubled by the Evil Spirit, and the froth was driven into the woods, by a strong east wind. They are numerous, but 1 hate them. They are unjust. They have taken away your lands, which were not made for them. " My children, The whites I placed on the other side of the Great Lake, that they might be a separate people. To them I gave different manners, customs, animals, vegetables, &c., for their use. To them I have given cattle, sheep, swine, and poultry, for themselves only. You are not to keep any of their animals, nor to eat of their meat. To you I have given the deer, the bear, and all wild animals, and the fish that swim in the rivers, and the corn that grows in the fields, for your own use ; and you are not to give your meat or your corn to the whites to eat. " My children, You may salute the whites when you meet them, but must not shake hands. You must not get drunk. It is a great sin. Your old men and chiefs may drink a little pure spirits, such as comes from Montreal : but you must not drink 316 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, whisky. It is the drink of the Evil Spirit. It was not made by me ; but by the Americans. It is poi son. It makes you sick. It burns your insides. Neither are you on any account to eat bread. It is the food of the whites. " My children, You must plant corn for your selves, for your wives, and for your children. And when you do it, you are to help one another : but plant no more than is necessary for your own use. You must not sell it to the whites. It was not made for them. I made all the trees of the forest for your use, but the maple I love best, because it yields sugar for your little ones. You must make it only for them ; but sell none to the whites. They have an other sugar, which was made expressly for them ; besides, by making too much, you spoil the trees and give them pain, by cutting and hacking them ; for they have a feeling like yourselves. If you make more than is necessary for your own use, you shall die, and the maple will yield no more water. " If a white man is starving, you may sell him a little corn, or a very little sugar, but it must be by measure and by weight. " My children, You are indebted to the white traders, but you must pay them no more than half their credits^ because they have cheated you. You must pay them in skins, gums, canoes, &c. But not in meat, corn, and sugar. You must not dress like the ivhites, nor wear hats like them, but pluck out your hair, as in ancient times, and wear the feather of the eagle on your heads. And when the weather is not severe, AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 3] 7 you must go naked, excepting the Breech-cloth. And when you are clothed, it must be in skins or leather, of your own dressing. " My children, You complain that the animals of the forest are fled and scattered. How should it be otherwise ? You destroy them yourselves, for their skins only, and leave their bodies to rot, or give the best pieces to the whites. I am displeased when I see this, and take them back from the earth : that, they may not come to see you again. You must kill no more animals, they are necessary to feed and clothe you, and you are to keep but one dog : because by keeping too many you starve them. "My children Your women must not live with the Traders or other White men, unless they are law fully married. But I do not like even this ; because my White and Red children were thus marked with different colours, that they might be a separate peo ple." Here follow certain regulations respecting court ship and marriage, &c., which are too minutely de tailed to be repeated. The Great Spirit also directs them to bathe every morning, to wash away their sins. Upon the observance of which regular times they are to be pardoned four times for the same of fence ; such as stealing, getting drunk, or the like but the fifth time, says the Great Spirit, " you shall surely die." " Your wise men (or conjurers) have bad medicine in their bags. They must throw away their medicine- 318 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, bags, and when their medicine is in blossom, collect it fresh and pure. You must make no feasts to the Evil Spirits of the Earth, but only to the Good Spirit of the Air. You are no more to dance the Wabano, nor the Poigan or Pipe-dance. I did not put you on the Earth to dance these dances. But you are to dance naked, with your bodies painted, and with the Poigan mangum (war club) in your hand. You must all have this weapon and never leave it behind you. When you dance this, I shall always look on with pleasure. You are to make yourselves Paka tonacas (or crosses) which you must always carry with you, and amuse yourselves often with that game (a kind of bat-ball, common among the savages, which requires great agility). Your women must also have handsome Passa quanacles, that they may play also : for I made you to amuse yourselves, and I am delighted when I see you happy. You are, however, never to go to war against each other : but to cultivate peace between your different tribes, that they may become one great people. " My children, No Indian must sell rum to an Indian. It makes him rich, but when he dies, he be comes very wretched. You bury him with all his wealth and ornaments about him, and as he goes along the path of the dead, they fall from him. He stops to take them up, and they become dust. He at last arrives almost at the place of rest, and then crumbles into dust himself. But those who, by their labour, furnish themselves with necessaries only. AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. when they die, are happy. And when they arrrive at the land of the dead, will find their wigwam fur nished with every thing they had on earth." (Thus far the Great Spirit.) " Now my chil dren," said the first created man, "listen to what I am about to add :" " The Great Spirit then opened a door, showing me a Bear and a Deer, both .very small, and very lean, and said, i Look here, my son. These are the animals that are now in the Earth. The red people have spoiled them, by killing them too young and by giving their meat to the whites, and also by greasing themselves with their fat, which is very wrong. The women, when they grease their bodies or their hair, should do it only with the fat of the smaller animals, of Racoons, of Otters, of Snakes,' &c. " The Great Spirit then opened another door and showed me a Bear and a Deer, extremely fat, and'of a very extraordinary size, saying, ' Look here, my son. Those are the animals placed on the Earth when I created you.' Now my children, listen to what I say and let it sink into your ears it is the orders of the Great Spirit. " My children, You must not speak of this Talk to the whites. It must be hidden from them. I am now on the Earth, sent by the Great Spirit, to instruct you. Each village must send me two or more princi pal chiefs to represent you, that you may be taught. The Bearer of this Talk, will point out to you the path to my wigwam. I could come to iheArbre Croche myself, because the world is changed from what it 320 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, was. It is broken and leans down, and as it declines, the Chippewas and all beyond will fall off and die. Therefore you must come to see me and be instructed, in order to prevent it. Their villages which do not listen to this Talk and send me two deputies will be cut off from the face of the Earth." In a subsequent letter of Captain Dunham, dated July 23d, 1807, he repeats his belief that the savages were combining with hostile intentions against the Americans. " It seems," he says, " a very extensive league is forming, which is to include all the differ ent tribes north of the Ohio and east of the Missis sippi. They have avowed their object to several of the most respectable traders. They complain much of the Americans having deprived them of their lands. They say that if they unite they shall be strong ; that they are taking each other by the hand, for the pur pose of forming a great circle ; that this circle is nearly completed, there being now only two or three gaps ; that when these are filled, the circle will ex tend itself rapidly and crowd off every white man that now dares to set foot on their ground." Such were the communications received by General Hull as early as 1806,, in respect to the great confederacy under the Prophet and Tecumseh. Similar alarms and rumours concerning the hostility of the Indians continued, up to the battle of Tippecanoe and the breaking out of the war in 1812. The cause of this Indian hostility was one which could not be removed. It was their natural dread of losing all their hunting grounds, by the encroachment of the whites. AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 321 In a Council held with General Harrison in 1811, near Vincennes, Tecumseh declared that " the sys tem which the United States pursued, of purchasing lands from the Indians, he viewed as a mighty water, ready to overflow his people, and that the confederacy which he was forming among the tribes, to prevent any tribe from selling land without the consent of the others, was the dam he was erecting to resist this mighty water " In pursuit of this object, Tecumseh visited all the Indian tribes, and urged upon them this plan of combination. In addition to these Indian troubles, General Hull had many more difficulties, external and inter nal, to contend against, in the administration of his Territory. In the first place, the difficulty of com munication was no trifling one. To get from Albany to Niagara, in 1805, with his family, General Hull found it was best to go in boats up Lake Ontario, and then to wait till a vessel should be sailing from Buffalo to Detroit, an event which occurred only occasionally. The State of New-York, which is now traversed from east to west in twenty-four hours, by three trains of railroad-cars each day, was then, in many places, an unbroken forest. The ports on Lake Erie, which are now visited many times a day by steamers, bound up and down the lake, were then entered only once in many days by a lonely vessel. Northern Ohio, filled at present with thriving villages and prosperous cities, was then a wilderness. Again, when Governor Hull reached Detroit, he found that a large part of the place had recently been destroyed by fire, and there 21 322 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, was not a house in which he could be properly ac commodated. He was obliged to build himself a house. There were no public offices, no council-house for the Indian Department ; and he even had to write to the Secretary at War for a boat, with which to communicate with the distant Indians.* The inhab itants of the Territory wanted the titles to their lands secured, and the Governor must urge this matter at Washington. There was no printing-press at Detroit, and the Governor must correspond with printers at Herkimer, to induce them to come to Detroit, which they apparently did not do, as after this time he sends his public orders to Washington, to be printed there* Laws were to be made and put in operation. A militia system was to be established, a matter of no small diffi culty, though of great necessity. Colonel Anderson, of the second regiment of militia, writes many letters from the river Raisin, complaining of his officers, be cause they will not get their uniforms. The poor Colonel at last wishes to resign his commission, for " the French gentlemen, headed by the Lieutenant- Colonel, w 7 ill not get their uniforms ; and the troops? the more I exercise them, the less they learn." " Out of twenty French gentlemen, officers, only five that have any uniform." Driven desperate, the Colonel, on June 26, 1806, writes that he has arrested his officers ; and they write to the Governor, demand ing a court-martial, " as they wish to know their fate." While at Washington, in December, 1805, Gov- * Hull's files of private papers. AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 323 ernor Hull receives letters and affidavits, giving an account of an affray between the citizens of Detroit and some British officers from Maiden, who, with the assistance of some of the American officers from the fort, attempted to arrest a deserter. Governor Hull must write to Archbishop Carrol, to request him not to remove from Detroit a useful and much-loved Catholic priest. Mr. Badger, a Presbyterian minis ter, missionary to the Indians at Sandusky, writes to the Governor that he can put his finger through the blankets sent to the Indians in payment of their an nuities, and that he must send new ones. Great difficulties arise concerning the assignment of donation-lots to the inhabitants of Detroit, and here the Governor is obliged to differ from Judge Wood ward, from which an alienation ensues. It is well kno\vn, that the seat of a territorial government is very apt to be the scene of constant contention, strife, and party-spirit. The offices under such a govern ment are so numerous, in proportion to the inhabit ants, that almost every body thinks he has a claim, or at least a chance, to obtain one. Money is usually scarce, and this enhances the value of an office, the salary of which is regularly paid in cash. But all cannot have offices, and those who are disappointed, become the enemies of the more successful, or of those whose influence secured them the appointment. Governor Hull seems to have had his share of these embarrassments, and occasionally friends were turned into enemies, by his opposing their opinions 324 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, or their interests. Yet he appears' to have been popular with the people generally, and when his term of office expired, was re-appointed by Mr. Jefferson ; a proof, at least, that his proceedings were approved at Washington. AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 325 CHAPTER II. WAR OF 1812. GOVERNOR HULL APPOINTED BRIGADIER- GENERAL TO LEAD THE TROOPS FROM OHIO TO DETROIT. MARCH TO DETROIT. INVASION OF CANADA. FALL OF MICHILIMACKINAC, AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS. IN February, 1812, Governor Hull being at Wash ington, received accounts from the Territory of Mich igan, that the Indians were becoming hostile to the defenceless inhabitants of that exposed frontier.* He urged upon the administration the expediency of pro viding a force for their protection. War with Great Britain was imminent : Congress was augmenting the army, and messages had been sent by the British officers in Canada to all the powerful tribes of the Northwest ; accompanied with presents of arms or clothing, urging them to take part with Great Britain, their natural ally. Accordingly, the President called upon the Governor of Ohio to detach twelve hundred militia, and prepare them for actual service. These militia were to be joined by the 4th United States regiment, then at Post St. Vincennes. After these arrangements were made, the Secretary of War, Mr. Eustis, stated to Governor Hull, that it was the wish of the President to appoint him to the command of these troops, with the rank of Brigadier-General, in order that he should march them to Detroit. * Hull's Memoirs of the Campaign of 1812, page 15. 326 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, Governor Hull declined the appointment in the most unqualified manner, stating that it was not his wish to receive any military appointment. Colonel Kingsbury was then ordered to Washington, to take command of these troops, and to receive his instruc tions to that end. He fell sick on his arrival, and became thus unable to perform the duty. The propo sition being again made to Governor Hull, he finally consented to accept any military appointment, either that of Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel, or Brigadier- General, which would give him the command of the troops, and enable him to lead them to Detroit. He was immediately nominated Brigadier-General, and accepted the appointment with reluctance, and with no other object, he says, than to aid in the protection of the inhabitants of Michigan against the savages.* He was to retain his office of Governor of Michigan, and received orders to perform his civil duties as usual. In his anxiety for the safety of the people of the Territory, Governor Hull here committed an error ? which a more selfish man would have avoided. The people of the United States generally were expecting the conquest of Canada. It had been stated repeat edly on the floor of Congress, that in case of war with Great Britain, Canada would at once be over- ,:^j* Hull's Memoirs of the Cam- late Secretary at War, with his an- paign, &c., page 16. Also Hull's swers, under oath." In these an- Trial (reported by Col. Forbes), Ap- swers, Governor Eustis confirm?* pendix, page 3. " Interrogatories what is stated in. the text* put by Win. Hull to Wm. Eustis, AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 327 run and conquered by the armies of the United States.* Governor Hull knew and had repeatedly represented to the Government the difficulties in the way of such an enterprise. The Lakes were in pos session of the British ; the Indians were on their side, and the militia of Canada numbered twenty to one of the militia of Michigan. In three separate memorials, addressed to the War Department in April 1809, June 1811, and March 1812, he had urged the necessity of a fleet on Lake Erie. Again, after his appointment as Brigadier-General, he urged the same thing in a memorial to the President. In a conversation with the President and Secretary at War, he insisted on the same course of conduct so strongly, that Commodore Stewart was actually ordered to Washington, to receive the appointment of Navy Agent on Lake Erie, and orders concerning the build ing of a fleet on that Lake.f General Hull well knew, and had earnestly stated, that to conquer Canada, or even to preserve Michigan, * Speeches in Congress in 1812 qner her on the ocean, is to drive by Eustis and Henry Clay. " We her from the land. I am not for can take -Canada without soldiers, stopping at Quebec or any where We have only to send officers into else, but I would take the whole the Provinces, and the people, disaf- continent from them and ask them fected toward their own Govern- no favours. We must take the ment, will rally round our standard." whole continent from them. I wish i: It is absurd to suppose, that we ne\er to see peace till we do." shall not succeed in our enterprise Thus spake Henry Clay in 1812 : against the enemy's provinces, but better advised in 1814, he signed, We have the Canadas as much un- as Commissioner, the Treaty of tier our command as Great Britain Peace at Ghent. bus the .ocean, and the way to con* f Sec Appendix, Note 3d. 328 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, it was necessary either to have command of the Lake ? by means of a fleet superior to the British, or to in vade Upper Canada with two powerful and co-operat ing armies at Detroit and Niagara. He therefore believed that the Government, in case of w r ar, would adopt one or both of these measures. He did not think that he should be expected to conquer Upper Canada with an army of fifteen hundred men, fotii -fifths of whom were militia, while the British held the Lakes with their ships, and the forests with their Indians. He depended on efficient support both by water and land. But while his object \vas the protection of Michigan and its inhabitants, the object of the Gov ernment and people was the conquest of Canada. He regarded himself as Governor and Protector of the Territory ; he was regarded by the nation as gen eral of an invading army, which was shortly to over run the whole of Canada. A selfish man, therefore,, foreseeing the impossibility of meeting the expecta tions of the Government and people, would have per sisted in refusing this appointment of Brigadier-Gen eral. But hoping to protect the inhabitants from immediate Indian hostilities, and confiding that the Government would support him in case of war, he accepted the appointment, and went to Dayton, Ohio^. to take command of the troops.* * In the 10th No. of his Memoirs of Ohio, I felt a very deep interest of the Campaign of 1812, General in the object of my mission. The- Hull thus speaks of his position at consideration that I was clothed with this time : " In leaving Washing- the authority and furnished with ton, in April, 1812, to take command the means of affording safety and of the forces assembled in the State security to, the frontier injaabitaats. AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 329 On the 10th May, 1812, General Hull arrived at Cincinnati, in Ohio. Here he met Governor Meigs, who had made great exertions in collecting the of the country ; and particularly to those of the Territory of Michigan, of which I was Governor, was soothing to my feelings and animat ing to my exertions. Although about thirty years had then elapsed since my sword had lain useless in its scabbard, and time had necessari ly enfeebled my strength and con stitution, yet it was impossible for me to see a country in which from my situation, I was so particularly interested, exposed to the fury of the savages without raising an arm for its safety. Convinced that the forces intrusted to my command were sufficient for the protection of the frontier settlements and the se curity of the Territory while we were at peace with Great Britain ; and knowing that I had communi cated what measures, in my opinion, would be indispensably necessary, in the event of war, which communi cations had been received as official documents and approved by the Government, and feeling a generous confidence in the justice and honour of the administration, I had little anxiety with respect to any conse quences which might have attended my command. " If it were to be my fortune to protect the defenceless inhabitants of our country, against the cruelty of savages, and prosperity was to at tend the exertions of the army, the satisfaction of having promoted the cause of humanity would have been an ample reward. But if, after hon estly discharging my duty, in the best manner I was capable, misfor tune was to be my lot, I believed that a generous government and a generous people would at least have shielded me from censure and re proach. At that time, indeed, I con sidered there was little or no hazard. It was a time of peace with Eng land, and while that remained, there was no danger, excepting from the savages. Some excitement then existed, through the influence of the British Agents, in preparing them for events which they anticipated might take place. In the event of war, I considered that such arrange ments would have been made, as would have enabled the army I com manded to have operated with suc cess against the enemy. As the Government continued me in com mand of the Northwestern army after the declaration of war, I had a right to believe, that such measures would have been adopted, as I had stated W 7 ere deemed by me essential to success. The measures to which I alluded in the event of war, I have mentioned, were a navy on Lake Erie, sufficient to preserve that com munication; and an army of suffi- 330 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, twelve hundred militia which had been ordered by the President. Their rendezvous was Dayton. Al though officers and men seemed to be animated with zeal, yet they were without discipline, and destitute of proper arms and clothing.* The three militia regiments elected their field officers at Dayton. Duncan Me Ar thur was chosen Colonel, and James Denny and Wil liam A. Trimble Majors, of the first regiment ; James Findlay, Colonel, and Thomas Moore and Thomas Van Home Majors, of the second regiment ; Lewis Cass, Colonel, and Robert Morrison and J. R. Mun- son Majors, of the third regiment. On May 25th, General Hull was invested with the command of the militia, and made them an ad dress. On the first of June, the army marched to Staunton ; on the 10th, they were joined, at Urbana, cient strength in co-operation with to furnish clothing ; no public stores the one I commanded, to make a to resort to, either for good arms or conquest of Canada. suitable clothing ; and no powder in " In all these communications, I any of the magazines fit for use. gave it as my opinion, that unless And what is more extraordinary, no we had the benefit of this co-opera- contract, nor any measures adopted, tion, the posts of Detroit, Michili- to supply these troops with the ne- mackinac, and Chicago, would inev- cessary articles of provisions during itably fall into the hands of the their march through a wilderness of enemy." more than two hundred miles, until * " Their arms were totally unfit they arrived at Detroit. On my own for use, the leather which covered responsibility, I sent to powder-mills their cartouch boxes was rotten, and in Kentucky and purchased powder, no better security to the cartridges collected a few blankets and other than brown paper ; many of the necessary clothing from the inhabit- men were destitute of blankets and ants of Ohio, and employed private other necessary clothing ; no ar- armorers at Cincinnati and Dayton, tnorers were provided to repair the to repair the arms." Hull's Me- arms ; ao means had been adopted moirs, page 34, AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 33 J by the fourth United States regiment, under Lieuten ant-Colonel Miller, consisting of about three hundred effective men. From this place, which was then a frontier town, the distance to Detroit was more than two hundred miles, through a wilderness. Here the want of discipline of the militia appeared, in some of them refusing to march, and other signs of insubordi nation.* In marching from Urbana to Detroit, a road was to be cut by the army, through the forest. The difficulties and labours were great, of opening a road, building bridges and causeways ; but were borne with patience by the army. Four block-houses were built on the route, for the convenience of reinforcements, and security of convoys. The army marched first to the Scioto; then to Blanchard's Fork, which is a branch of the Maumee ; then to the Rapids of the * The Ohio Volunteers were the troops left Urbana, Captain Hull militia just called into the field, and came to Colonel Miller in his official were deficient in discipline, and capacity and informed him that there some of them were frequently was another mutiny among the disorderly. " Generally speaking Ohio Volunteers, and wished a halt the Ohio Volunteers and Militia to take place. After a short halt, were insubordinate : one evening at General Hull rode up and said to Urbana, I saw a multitude, and Colonel Miller, ' Your regiment is heard a noise, and was informed that a powerful argument ; without them a company of Ohio Volunteers were I could not march these men to De riding one of their officers on a rail, troit.' One soldier was shot in a In saying that the Ohio Volunteers quarrel. There were companies were insubordinate, witness means among them who were under better that they were only as much so as discipline than others." Lieutenant undisciplined militia generally are. Bacon's testimony (4th Regiment). Some thirty or forty of the Ohio Minutes of the Court Martial for the militia refused to cross into Canada Trial of General Hull, from the files at one time, and thinks he saw one of the War Office, Washington. Seo hundred who refused to cross when also Forbes' Report of the Court the troops were at Urbana. When Martial, page 124, 332 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, Maumee, which was reached about the end of June.* War was declared on the 18th of June ; but General Hull received no information of it until July 2d, four teen days after, though the British officer at Maiden had heard of it, officially, two days before. f In con sequence of this delay in transmitting to him this most important intelligence, a vessel was taken, on which he had shipped important baggage, stores, and the invalids of the army. General Hull gives the fol lowing account of this transaction : * McAffee's History of the late War. Hull's Memoirs. f "Armstrong's Notices of the War of 1812." General Arm strong, late Secretary of War, an opponent of General Hull, thus speaks of this transaction, page 47-8. " We have seen that Gene ral Hull lost his own baggage and that of the army, the whole of his hospital stores and intrenching tools, and sixty men, in consequence of the ill-judged and tardy manner employed in transmitting to him the declaration of war. A fact so ex traordinary in itself and so produc tive of injury to the public, calls for more development than has yet been given to it. It will be remembered that a declaration of war was au thorized on the 18th June, 1812. On this day Secretary Eustis wrote two letters to General Hull. In one of these no mention was made of this important event; in the other, it was distinctly and officially an nounced. The former of the two, was carefully made up and expedited by a special messenger, who arrived in the General's camp on the 24th of June : while the latter was com mitted to the public mail as far as Cleveland, and thence through a wilderness of one hundred miles, to such conveyance as ' accident might supply. ,' " The result was, that the declara tion did not reach its destination un til the 2d of July, two days after it had been received by the enemy at Maiden. On this occasion, the British Government was better served : Provost received notice of it on the 24th of June, at Quebec ; Brock on the 26th, at Newark ; St. George on the 30th, at Maiden; and Roberts on the 8th of July, at St. Joseph's. But a fact still more extraordinary than the celerity of these transmissions is, that the infor mation thus rapidly forwarded to Maiden and St. Joseph's, was receiv ed, under envelopes, franked by the Secretary of the American Treasury." AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 333 " On the 2d day of July I received a letter from the Secretary of War, dated the 18th of June, inform ing me of the declaration of war. It was in these words : " * Sir, War is declared against Great Britain. You will be on your guard; proceed to your post with all possible expedition ; make such arrangements for the defence of the country as in your judgment may be necessary, and wait for further orders.' " The day before this letter was received, the Quarter-Master had been directed to hire a small vessel, at the foot of the Rapids of the Miami, to transport the invalids and the baggage, &c., not want ed on the march to Detroit. The horses being worn down on the march, rendered this measure, in my opinion, expedient. At this time I had received no information of the declaration of war, and did not consider there was any hazard in the measure. On the 24th of June I received a letter from the War Department, dated in the morning of the 18th of June, directing me to march to Detroit, with all pos sible expedition. In that letter, not one word w r as said respecting a declaration of war. " The British garrison at Maiden having a num ber of days before received the information, this ves sel was taken in passing that fortress. The court- martial could not find any ground to censure me for employing that vessel, as I had no information of the declaration of war, and was obliged to acquit me of the charge growing out of that event. The circum stances of this transaction are particularly related in 334 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, my defence. Thus it appears, that I did not receive information of the war, until fourteen days after it was declared ; that the British garrison had official knowledge of it four or five days sooner ; that it is proved to demonstration, that I might have received it eight days earlier, as I actually did receive a letter from the Secretary of War, on the 24th of June, dated on the same day, viz. the 18th of June, in the morning, which gave no information of the declara tion of war. The person who brought me this letter, announcing the war, informed me he was employed by the Postmaster of Cleveland, in the State of Ohio, and that it was brought in the mail to that office. In time of peace with England, there could have been but one opinion, with respect to engaging this vessel, in the manner it was employed. Having no inform ation of the declaration of war, I must necessarily have believed it was a time of peace, and consequent ly no blame could be attached to me. The following is the opinion of the court-martial on this subject: " * The evidence on the subject having been pub licly given, the Court deem it proper, in justice to the accused, to say, that they do not believe, from any thing which has appeared, that Brigadier-General William Hull has committed treason against the Uni ted States.'" On July 5th, the army under General Hull ar rived at Detroit. A few days were then occupied in cleaning and repairing arms, and in giving the sol diers rest from the fatigues of the laborious march. The enemy were then erecting fortifications on the AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 335 opposite bank, and an impatience prevailed among the officers and men of the American army, to cross the river, and commence offensive operations. Gene ral Hull called a council of the field officers, and in formed them that he had as yet received no authority to invade Canada, and requested them to restrain the impatience of their men. After this council was dis missed, on July 9th, the following letter was received from Washington : "WAR DEPARTMENT, June 24th, 1812. " SIR, By my letter of the 18th instant, you were informed that war was declared against Great Britain. Herewith, enclosed, you will receive a copy of the Act, and of the President's Proclamation, and you are authorized to commence offensive opera tions accordingly. Should the force under your com mand be equal to the enterprise, consistent with the safety of your own posts, you will take possession of Maiden, and extend your conquests as circumstances may justify. (Signed) WILLIAM EUSTIS." On the same evening that this letter was received, the following answer was given : "DETROIT, July 9th, 1812. " SIR, -I have received your letter of 24th June. The araiy under my command arrived here on the 5th of July, instant. Every effort has been, and is still making by the British, to collect the Indians under their standard. They have a large number. I am 336 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, preparing boats, and shall pass the river in a few days. The British have established a post directly opposite this place. I have confidence in dislodging him, and being in possession of the opposite bank. I have little time to write : every thing will be done that it is possible to do. The British command the water and the savages. I do not think the force here equal to the reduction of Amherstburg (meaning the fort at Maiden), you therefore must not be too san guine. (Signed) WILLIAM HULL." Hon. WM. EUSTIS. In consequence of this communication, General Hull crossed into Canada, July 12th, as soon as boats could be collected for that object, in such a manner as to deceive the enemy, and cause him to withdraw his forces, so that the American troops landed without opposition. The reasons for invading Canada were, first, the expectations and orders of the Government, for the phrase "you are authorized to commence offensive operations," contained in the Secretary's letter, was equivalent to an order. Secondly, the enemy was erect ing fortifications on the bank opposite Detroit, w hich, being higher than the American side, would have se riously annoyed the army and town, when complet ed. Thirdly, the impatient spirit of the army made it desirable to give them active employment. Fourthly, it seemed likely that the Canadians and Indians would be kept neutral, and prevented from joining AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 337 the British standard, by a display of American force on both banks of the river. Fifthly, it was desirable to obtain forage and provisions from the river Thames, and cut off the supplies from that region to Maiden. The provisions in Detroit and Michigan were not sufficient for the inhabitants and army ; and had it not been for supplies obtained in Canada, would have fallen short before the capitulation.* General Hull, as is well known, issued a procla mation to the Canadians upon entering their country. In it he declared, that he came to bring no injury to the peaceable and unoffending inhabitants, but offered them protection, peace, and security. He tells them to remain at their homes, and pursue their occupa tions. He tells them he does not ask nor need their aid, but will accept it if they tender their services vol untarily. He threatens them with retaliation, if they adopt the Indian mode of warfare, and fight by the side of savages, who scalp and tomahawk their pris oners. There are some curious circumstances connected with this proclamation. It has been praised as a spirited and strong paper, and condemned as pom pous and improper. After General HulVs death, the authorship of it was claimed for General Cass, then a Colonel of militia. Up to that time, that is, for fifteen years, no one even suggested, that it was writ ten by any other than General Hull himself. Gene ral Hull's family, in all that they had heard and read * Hull's Memoirs, page 44. 22 338 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, about the proclamation, had never before received the suggestion that General Cass was the author. As the matter now stands, whenever the proclamation is condemned, General Hull is treated as the author when it is praised, it is said to have been written by General Cass.* This proclamation was approved by the President in a letter to General Hull, from the War Department, of August lst,f and was de clared by the American Commissioners at the Treaty of Ghent, to have been unauthorized and disapprov ed by the Government. f General Hull has been * " heralded by pompous and habitants, which I hope will be ap- threatening Proclamation. " HulTs proved by the Government.' vapouring Proclamation" Inger- " Answer : soil's History of the War. " < War Department, August 1, 1812. "Here he issued his Proclamation, "'Sir Your letters of 13th and which was an impressive and ener- 14th, together with your Proclama- getic paper" "this bold and elo- tion, have been received. Your quent document was from the pen of operations are approved by the Pres- Governor Cass" Lanman's Mi- ident.' " chigan. \ As regards that part of the Mr. Tupper, the author of the Proclamation which promises pro- "Life of Brock," (published Lon- tection to the Canadians, General don, 1845.) considers it able, and as- Hull thus speaks ("Hull's Me- signs its authorship to some one at moirs," pp. 47, 48) : "Before I pro- Washington, which is of course an ceed to any particular explanations, impossibility. " General Hull is- I ask you to bear in mind the situa- sued the following insidious but able tion in which I was placed by the Proclamation, which was doubtless orders of the Government. I was written at Washington." in an enemy's country, with the f Hull's Memoirs, page 49. " On command of a small body of militia the 13th of July, the day after it and a few regulars, nearly three (the Proclamation) was published, hundred miles from any magazines a copy of it was sent to the Govern- of provisions, munitions of war, or ment. The paragraph of the letter reinforcements. The enemy with is in these words : ' Enclosed is a which I had to contend, was all the copy of a Proclamation to the in- British troops in Upper Canada, all AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 339 condemned for that part of the proclamation which declares that no quarter would be given to those who should be found fighting by the side of the Indians, the militia of that Province, and the Northern and Western Indians, both in the Territory of Canada and the United States, together with the strength and resources of the wealthy and powerful Northwest Company. Placed in this insulated situation, with but a small stock of provisions on hand, and no possibil ity of obtaining a further supply, as the Lake was commanded by a Bri tish naval squadron, and the only communication by land, a wilder ness of more than two hundred miles, filled with hostile savages, I saw no possibility of even sustaining iny situation, unless the militia could be prevented from taking a part in the war and joining the British standard. " A large portion of the people of that province had emigrated from the United States. They had been educated with the principles of free dom and independence; and some of them and many of their fathers, had fought and bled in defence of our Revolutionary contest They were situated more than three thousand miles from the country to which they were subjected, and had no participation or interest in the mea sures it adopted. Having for a number of years lived in their neigh bourhood, I had often heard them express their sense of the injustice they suffered, and their natural right and strong wishes to partici pate in the same freedom and inde pendence which their brethren of the United States enjoyed, and under which they were so prosperous and happy. They were informed that the force I had, was but the vanguard of a much greater. I considered that I had solid grounds to make this declaration, " In the first place, it will be seen that I was authorized to pledge the faith of the Government, that they should be protected in their persons, property, and rights. Could I have believed that the Government would have authorized me to make this pledge without furnishing the means of redeeming it ? I beg you, my fellow-citizens, to look back and consider what took place before 1 left Washington, on this subject. In my official communications to the Government, I stated that in the event of war with Great Britain, it would be necessary to command the waters of Lake Erie, by a naval force superior to that of the enemy ; to provide reinforcements to secure the communication through the wilderness I was to penetrate, and a powerful army to co-operate from the States of New-York and Penn sylvania, which border on the east part of the lake ; that without these measures, it would be impossible for me to sustain my situation ; and 340 HISTORY 01 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, and announces to those who practice the Indian mode of warfare, of killing women, children, and prisoners, that a system of retaliation will be pursued. But how can General Hull be condemned for this, when it is well known that the Governments, both of Great Britain and the United States, adopted, in this very war, the same principle of retaliation, and threatened to put to death, in cold blood, prisoners innocent of any crime. If it be justifiable, on prin ciples of civilized war, to hang prisoners taken in a fair field, for offences committed afterwards by their own government, it surely must be allowable, on the same principles, to warn those who have not yet en listed, that if they shall be taken fighting in company with those who give no quarter, no quarter will be extended to themselves. On Christian principles, both proceedings are wrong, but those who defend the conduct of their respective governments in the one case, show either hypocrisy or extreme prejudice, in condemning the declaration of General Hull in the other. This proclamation, therefore, has had the singular fate of being approved by the Government when first issued, and disavowed by the same Government at the close of the war, of being considered a vapour ing and weak paper, when ascribed to General Hull, but becoming an able and bold document, when as- the posts of Detroit, Michilimacki- be satisfied there were sufficient nac, and Chicago, would fall into grounds on my part for making this the possession of the enemy. I declaration." hope, and indeed believe, you will AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 34] cribed to the Government, or to General Cass ; and, finally, of confusing military ethics so far as to make it cruel and unjust to threaten retaliation as a punish ment for acts which may be performed by individuals themselves, which it is just and merciful to threaten, and partially execute against them, for the actions of their Government, with which they have nothing to do. General Hull having crossed into Canada (July 12th), immediately proceeded to fortify his camp with a breast-work ; despatched a reconnoitering party under Captain Ulry, towards Maiden, who brought back word, that there were many Indians in the neighbourhood, and detached Colonel Me Arthur to pursue the Indians (July 14th), and to go to the river Thames or French for provisions. He returned on the 17th, with two hundred barrels of flour, and military stores, having penetrated sixty miles. Mean time, on July 16th, Colonels Cass and Miller were detached with two hundred and eighty men towards Maiden, and took possession of the bridge over the Aux Canards ; the British picket-guard flying at their approach. Thinking it desirable to retain this bridge, they sent a message to General Hull, asking permission to do so. But General Hull was not yet prepared to attack Maiden, for want of cannon, and considered that the distance of the bridge from the camp, and its proximity to Maiden, rendered it too great an undertaking to be maintained by a small de- achment. Colonel Cass therefore returned to camp. The officers and soldiers of the army being impa- 342 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, tient to be led to the attack of Maiden, General Hull called a council of officers, and explained to them his reasons for postponing an attack. This council was held two days after the invasion of the enemy's territory. General Hull explained to them, that the Indians and Canadian militia had begun to desert, and that by waiting a little time, the force at Maiden might be materially weakened ; that at present he considered that fort too strong to be carried by his own force, especially until heavy artillery could be procured for making a breach in the defences ; and that all the artificers who could be procured, were then at work in mounting cannon. Nevertheless,, he informed the council, that as there was so much anxiety expressed for the attack on Maiden, he was willing to lead the army to storm the fort with the bayonet, provided they should advise this step, and were of opinion that their troops could be depended upon. Colonel Miller said that his regiment of regulars could be relied on, but the three militia colonels very wisely declined giving any such assurance for the soldiers under their command ; and a majority of the council, therefore, decided against an immediate at tack on Maiden. Meantime, events were occurring which threat ened to make the position of the American army a very dangerous one. These were, first, the fall of Mackinaw, or Michilimackinac ; second, the inter ruption of General Hull's communications with Ohio; third, the armistice, signed by General Dearborn and Sir George Prevost. AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 343 First. The British officers in Canada had, as we have seen, early intelligence of the declaration of war. Sir George Prevost heard of it at Quebec on June 25th, and it was known on the 24th, both at Montreal and Fort George, in Upper Canada. While General Brock, the Governor of Upper Canada, was thus made acquainted with the war in six days after it was declared, General Hull did not receive this information till the 2d of July, or fourteen days after the declaration. The news was imme diately communicated to the British officer posted at St. Joseph's, in the neighbourhood of Michilimacki- nac, and at Fort William, on Lake Superior. On the 16th of July, Captain Roberts set out with a flotilla of boats and canoes, containing 45 men of the Royal 10th, 180 Canadians, and 400 Indians, and landed next day at Michilimackinac, which fort, com manded by Lieutenant Hanks, with a garrison of only 61 officers and men, immediately surrendered by capit ulation. The Indians were encouraged by this event to unite in open hostility against the Americans, and the way was opened for the whole body of northern Indians, and all the forces of the British Northwest Company, to march upon Detroit.* The character and amount of this force will appear more particu larly from the following extracts from General Hull's Memoirs, pp. 58, 59, 60: * " A quantity of military stores dians, a large number of whom and 700 packs of furs were found now joined in open hostility to the in the fort, and its surrender had a Americans." Life ,ojf Block, page farcmjable effect upon the IB- 207, 344 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, " Information had now been received that the fortress at Michilimackinac, situated on the navigable waters above me, and which the enemy commanded, had fallen into the possession of the. British and savage forces which surrounded it. The news of this event was accompanied with information which cast a shade over my prospects, and greatly encouraged and strengthened the force of the enemy opposed to me. " Immediately after the fall of Michilimackinac, messages \vere sent by the Indian chiefs, who attend ed the British troops in the reduction of that place, and who inhabited the adjacent country, to all the villages south, as far as Miami, informing them that they had joined the British standard ; that Michili mackinac had fallen into their hands ; that Chicago was invested, and that they were all preparing to proceed to Maiden ; that they expected there to meet all their warriors, and assist in the reduction of Detroit ; that an express had likewise been sent to General Brock, informing him of the event, and that the Canadians and savages were coming to join the army at Maiden. About the. same time, viz. 4th August, I received in formation that Captain Chambers, of the British army, with a detachment of regular soldiers, and brass field pieces, had landed on the west part of Lake Ontario, had penetrated as far as the river Le French, and was collecting all the Canadian militia and sava ges of that part of Canada, to lead them against my army. At this time I likewise received information that Colonel Proctor, of the British army, had arrived Jrom Fort Erie by water, with reinforcements, at Mai- AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 345 den. As their reinforcements were guarded by an armed vessel, I had nothing to oppose to them, to prevent their junction at Maiden. Indeed, the ad vantage to the enemy of commanding the Lake be came everyday more apparent. Both reinforcements and supplies could be transported with facility from one post to another, whenever it became necessary.* " At this time I had intercepted a letter from a Mr. McKenzie, a member of the Northwest Compa ny, at Fort William, to a Mr. Mclntosh, of Sandwich, the principal agent of that Company in Upper Cana da, dated July 19th, 1812. The genuineness of this letter was proved on my trial, and admitted in evi dence. It affords such clear evidence of the force on the borders of the lakes above me, and that it was to be directed against me, that I shall here recite the following extracts from it : " ' The declaration of war reached us on the 16th instant (July), but we are neither astonished nor alarmed. Our agents ordered a general muster, which amounted to twelve hundred, exclusive of sev eral hundred of the natives. We are equal in all to sixteen or seventeen hundred strong. One of our gentlemen started on the 17th instant, with several * The statement concerning Ma- having made frequent and extensive jor Chambers, which is contained inroads from Sandwich, up the river in the extracts above from General Thames. I have in consequence Hull's letters, is confirmed by the been induced to detach Captain following extract from an official Chambers with about 50 of the 41st letter of General Brock, of July 25. regiment to the Moravian town, Life of Brock, page 197. " I have where I have directed 200 militia to received information of the enemy join him." 346 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, light canoes, for the interior country, to rouse the na tives to activity, which is not hard to do on the pre sent occasion* We likewise despatched messengers in all directions with the news. I have not the least doubt but our force, in ten days hence, will amount to five thousand effective men. Our young gentle men and engagees, offered most handsomely to march immediately for Michilimackinac. Our chief, Mr. Shaw, expressed his gratitude, and drafted one hun dred. They are to proceed this evening to St. Jo seph's. He takes about as many Indians. Could the vessel contain them, he might have had four thousand more. It now depends on what accounts we receive from St. Joseph's, whether these numerous tribes from the interior, will proceed to St. Joseph's or not.' " At the time I intercepted this letter, its contents were confirmed by the information I received from Lieutenant Hanks, Doctor Day, and Mr. Stone, who had arrived at Detroit from Michilimackinac, prison ers on parole. They stated, that before they left Michilimackinac, a number of boats and canoes had arrived, in which several gentlemen came passengers, who, they were informed, were agents of the North west Company, and had come from Fort William, af ter the news of the declaration of war had been re ceived there, and that they gave the same account of the Canadian and savage force, and its destination, as is contained in Mr. McKenzie's letter. They fur ther stated to me, that a large body of savages were collected at the outlet of Lake Superior, and that two thousand savages, according to the best estimate they AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 347 could make, were at Michilimackinac, prepared to proceed and join the British force at Maiden. Lieu tenant Hanks was killed in the fort at Detroit, which deprived me of his testimony. Doctor Day and Mr. Stone, who were both at Michilimackinac, and pre sent when Lieutenant Hanks made the communica tion to me, in their testimony on my trial, fully con firmed the statement here made." Second. Another and more important source of danger and difficulty in the position of General Hull, was, the interruption of his communications with Ohio, by the British and Indians. This source of embarrassment, its cause, and the fatal results to which it led, cannot be better stated than in General Hull's own language. We therefore give the follow ing extract from the eighteenth letter of his Memoirs on the Campaign of 1812, pp. 67, 8, 9, " On the 18th of June, after war was declared against Great Britain, the Secretary of War wrote me a letter, in which he informed me of the event (which letter was not received until 2d July), and ordered me to march the army I commanded to Detroit, with all possible expedition. At the time this order was given, the President of the United States well knew that no preparation was made to build a navy on Lake Erie, and that the enemy commanded it with a number of armed vessels and gun-boats. When, therefore, these fatal orders were given, those by whose authority they were given well knew, that the communication through the Lake would be closed against us, and that no reinforcements or supplies of 348 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, any kind could be obtained for the army through that channel. They well knew, that the State of Ohio was the nearest part of our country from which the necessary supplies could be furnished. They well knew, that the distance from any magazines where these supplies could be obtained, to the point where they ordered the army, was more than two hundred miles ; and to the other posts, was more than five hundred miles. They also knew, that this distance was almost entirely a wilderness, filled with savages, who, in the event of war, would probably become hostile, and that the supplies could only be carried on pack-horses. The Administration also knew, that in three separate statements which 1 had made to the President, through the Secretary of War, I had ob served, that, in the event of war, a navy on Lake Erie, superior to the British, was essential to success ; and that without preserving the water communica tion, an arrrfy could not be supported at Detroit ; and that Detroit, Michilimackinac, and Chicago, would in evitably fall into the hands of the enemy. Near the Miami of the Lake, I received the order which has been referred to, informing me of the declaration of war, and to march to Detroit. Had I not received this order, and the operations had been left to my discretion, I should not have marched to Detroit, eighteen miles in rear of the enemy, from a different quarter. I had served under General Washington from the- commencement to the end of the Revolution ary war. I had observed how cautious he was in all his movements, to preserve a communication with his magazines." AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 349 Colonel Proctor had arrived with reinforcements at Maiden, and taken the command. One of his first acts was, to throw a detachment across the river to Brownstown, consisting of a small number of the 41st and of Indians, under Tecumseh, to occupy the woods and prevent provisions from reaching General Hull's army, along its communications. General Hull at the same time received intelligence, that a party of volunteers from Ohio had arrived at the river Raisin, escorting some cattle, destined for the supplv of the army. General Hull detached two hundred men, un der Major Vanhorne, with orders to proceed to the river Raisin, and guard these cattle safely to the camp. Major Vanhorne's party was suddenly attacked by the Indians, and entirely defeated. Brock's biographer says, that but seventy Indians were engaged, and no British, and adds, that " in this affair, General Hull's despatches, and the correspond ence of his army, fell into the hands of Tecumseh, and it was partly the desponding nature of their con tents, which afterwards induced Major-General Brock to attempt the capture of the American army." * * " On this occasion the force of The enemy had a great advantage the enemy was greatly exaggerated, in the ground, but in point of num- as it was in many other instances, bers, he was not superior. I do not Major Vanhorne, though a gentleman wish to detract from the real merit and a soldier, was certainly not en- of Vanhorne, but at Detroit in Oct. titled to the praise bestowed upon 1813, I was informed by an Ameri- him by some of his countrymen. Be- can gentleman^of high standing, who ing warned of his danger, he should had made particular inquiry, that have taken care to prevent a sur- the force of the enemy in this case, prise, and had he done so, he would did not exceed 40 British and 70 doubtless have been victorious. Indians, and this statement is cor- 350 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, Neither Major Vanhorne nor his troops appear to very great advantage in this affair. Vanhorne, in his tes timony, says, that when they were attacked he order ed them to retreat to the edge of the wood, instead of attempting to charge ; that he imagined from the num ber of guns fired, the enemy to be most numerous ; that the men retreated a quarter of a mile before they could be got into line, and that even then, though no enemy was in sight, and the firing had ceased, he or dered them to retreat again whereupon, it seems, they ran away in disorder, and the loss was 18 killed, 12 wounded, and 70 missing. Yet Major Vanhorne was one of the officers who afterwards testified, on General Hull's trial, that his Commander was, in his opinion, under the influence of fear at the time of the surrender. General HulFs communications were now effectually cut off, and this was the second source of difficulty in his situation. Third. It will be remembered that, according to the plan of the Northwestern Campaign, advised by General Hull and approved by the Secretary of War, it was determined that Canada should be invaded by two co-operating armies. From two points, Detroit and Niagara, armies were to march simultaneously into Upper Canada. The charge of one had been confided to General Hull, and he had thus far per formed all that had been required of him. He had roborated by the fact, that the main a large detachment to the American army was still in Canada, and the side." See McAffee's History, page British being in daily expectation of 75. an attack on Maiden, would not send I AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 35] cut a road through the wilderness, and with an ener gy and celerity, to which even the British bore testi mony,* had reached Detroit, and invaded Canada. He did this, fully relying on promised co-operation and support. He had so often and so urgently repre sented the necessity of a fleet on Lake Erie, co-op eration at Niagara, and reinforcements from Ohio, that he had depended on his Government for this support. He was disappointed in all. All these measures were seen and admitted to be important, but their execu tion was delayed, until the fate of his army was sealed. Large reinforcements were ordered from Ohio and Kentucky, but not soon enough to open General Hull's communications, or afford him any relief. A fleet was placed on Lake Erie, but it was not till a year after the surrender of Detroit. Forces were at last assem bled at Niagara, but not until General Hull's army had been captured. As early as June 26th, Major General Dearborn was ordered to proceed to Albany and prepare the force to be collected at that place, for actual service^ In this letter it was said, " Preparations, it is pre sumed, will be made to move in a direction for Nia gara, Kingston, or Montreal." This was in accord ance with a plan of the campaign submitted to the * " Should General Hull be com- nary character of enterprise." Sir pelled to relinquish his operations George Prevost's letter of July 31st against Amherstburg, it will be pro- to General Brock, per that his future movements be f See appendix for the official cor- most carefully observed, as his late respondence of General Dearborn march exhibits a more ^than ordi- and the Secretary of War. 352 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, Secretary of War by General Dearborn himself, by which Canada was to be invaded from Detroit, Nia gara, Sacket's Harbour, and Lake Champlain the two last armies being destined for Kingston and Mon treal. But owing either to the want of preparation in the country at large, to the dilatory proceedings of the Administration, the negligence of General Dear born, or all these causes united, the result was, that General Hull's army was the only one which was able to invade Canada at all, till long after this time. Indeed, so great was the confusion and want of plan at Washington and Albany, that General Dearborn did not even know whether or not he was to have the command of the troops at Niagara. The Secretary of War writes to him July 26th, telling him of General Hull's arrival at Detroit, and saying, " arrangements should immediately be made by you for co-operating with him at Niagara" But General Dearborn meantime writes to the Secretary of War from Albany, July 28th, asking " who is to have the command of the operations in Up per Canada ? I take it for granted, that my command does not extend to that distant quarter"* No troops being collected at Niagara, and it being very appa rent to General Brock that there was no attack to be feared in that quarter, he was able to send troops to reinforce Malden.f No troops being collected at Sack- * Defence of General Dearborn " My last to your Excellency was by his son, Boston, 1824. dated the 12th inst., since which f Letter of General Brock to nothing extraordinary has occurred Sir George Prevost, July 20, 1812 : in this communication. The enemy AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 353 et ? s Harbour, and no movement being made on Lake Champlain, Sir George Prevost was able to send troops to Upper Canada.* Nor was this all. Instead of co-operating with General Hull, General Dearborn acceded to an armistice, proposed by Sir George Pre vost, by which he agreed that the troops opposed to each other at Niagara should act on the defensive only : thus allowing General Brock to send reinforce ments to Maiden, while he deprived himself of the power of aiding General Hull by demonstrations on the Niagara frontier. General Hull found himself therefore entirely de prived of the assistance on which he had depended.! has evidently diminished his force, and appears to have no intention of making an immediate attack. * * * * Should the communication between Kingston and Montreal be cut off, the fate of the troops in this part of the province will be decided. * * * It is evidently not the intention of the enemy to make any attempt to penetrate into the province by this strait, unless the present force be diminished." * " You may rely on every exer tion being made to preserve uninter rupted the communication between Kingston and Montreal, and that I will also give all possible support to your endeavours to overcome every difficulty. One hundred effective of the Newfoundland, and fifty picked men of the Veterans, left this in boats on Thursday ; they were in tended to reinforce the garrison at 23 Kingston. I am glad to find that the new arrival of the Royals, expected at Quebec to-morrow, will give you the reinforcement of the 49th Regiment, which, with the de tachment of the Newfoundland and Veterans, and gun-boat No. 7, will add something to your present strength. I shall order Major Ormsby, with three companies of the 49th Regiment, to proceed from Montreal to Kingston, to be disposed of as you may find necessary." Letters to General Brock from Sir George Prevost and his officers at Quebec, from 31st July to 2d Au gust. f "Those who are most severe in their condemnation of General Hull admit the injury inflicted on him by these measures of the Com manding General. Thus Arm strong (Notices, &c., Vol. I. p. 97) 354 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, He is told by the Secretary of War (June 24), which letter was not received until the 9th of July, that " an adequate force cannot soon be relied upon for the speaks as follows : " We have al- British posts in his front, as would ready stated, that to lessen the pres- have the effect of preventing them sure on General Hull and to rein- from reinforcing the garrison of state the ascendency he had lost on Maiden ; or otherwise altering the the Detroit, Major General Dear- relations as to strength, which had born, who, in the distribution of hitherto existed between Hull and service for the year 1812, had been Proctor. But for this service, the assigned to the command of the Major-General had made no pre par- Northern army, was directed to ation, and appeared to have little make such movements against the relish,* as on the very day on which * In the General's letter of the 8th August, we find an apology for this in action, quite as unjustifiable as the inaction itself. " Till now," he says, " I did not consider the Niagara frontier as coming within the limits of my com mand" an assertion directly contradicted by the armistice entered into between him and Prevost, and utterly inconsistent with the orders he received from the 26th of June to the 1st of August. For these orders, see Appendix No. 10 to Armstrong's Notices of the War of 1812, as follows : " Orders given to General Dearborn by the Secretary of War, in relation to the Niagara frontier. " June 26, 1812. Your preparations (at Albany), it is presumed, will be made to move in a direction for Niagara, Kingston, and Montreal. " July 15. On your arrival at Albany, your attention will be directed to the security of the Northern frontier by the Lakes. July 20th. You will make such arrangements with Governor Tompkins as will place the militia, detached by him for the Niagara and other posts on the Lake, under your control. July 29th. Should it be advisable to make any other disposition of Jhese restless people (the warriors of the Seneca Tribe of Indians), you will give orders to Mr. Granger and the commanding officer at Niagara. August 1st. You will make a diversion in favour of him (General Hull) at Niagara and Kingston, as soon as may be practicable/' How, we would ask, is it possible for the General, with these orders in his Portfolio, to believe that the Niagara frontier had not been within the limits of his command? And if he did so believe, by what authority did he extend the armistice (entered into be tween him and Prevost), to that frontier? As, however, the inaction which enabled Brock to leave his posts on the Niagara undisturbed and unmenaced, and even to carry with him a part of his force to Detroit, and there to cap ture Hull, his army and territory, was not noticed by any kind of disapproba tion on the part of the Government, the inference is fair that it (the 'Government) was willing to take the responsibility on itself. No. 11 of Armstrong's Notices in the Appendix, is the following. "Ex tract of a letter from Sir George Prevost to General Brock, dated 30th of Au- ,gust, 1812: " I consider it most fortunate, that I have been able to prosecute this AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 355 reduction of the enemy's posts below you." From the north he hears of the fall of Michilimackinac and of the approach of 2000 hostile Indian warriors and 1200 employees of the Northwest Company. In front of his own army, he finds reinforcements continually arriving, of regulars and militia, to strengthen the British troops at Maiden. On the Lake, his communi cations were cut off by the British fleet ; on the south, by land, his communications were cut off by the In dians, and an attempt to restore them by Vanhorne's detachment, had been unsuccessful. Within his own army, ignorant and incapable of understanding this state of things, there was a spirit of insubordination and mutiny, fostered and encouraged even by the militia officers themselves. In this state of affairs, on the 7th of August he received letters from General Hall and General Porter, commanding at Niagara and Black Rock, informing him that a large number of boats filled with British troops had passed over Lake he was thus instructed by the Gov- by vigorously assailing the British ernment, (though sufficiently ap- posts in his front, (now rendered prised that detachments had been comparatively weak by the absence sent to Maiden, and that the situation of Brock and the troops carried of Hull was becoming more critical with him,) or by extending to him every moment,) he did not hesitate and his army the benefits of the to enter into an armistice, by which temporary suspension of hostilities he completely disabled himself from into which he had entered." giving any aid to that officer ; either object of the Government (the armistice), without interfering with your oper ations on the Detroit. I have sent you men, money, and stores of all kinds." See Life and Services of Sir George Prevost ; a ruse de guerre, as credita ble to the shrewdness and sagacity of Sir George Prevost, as it was disrepu table, for the obtuseness or treachery of General Dearborn.] 356 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, Ontario to the west part of it, and were directing their course to Maiden ; and likewise that the British forces, with the Canadian militia and savages, on the opposite side of the Niagara river, were moving by water to the same point ; and what was more deci sive still, General Hull was informed by the same letters, that no assistance or co-operation would be afforded from that quarter to the troops under his command. Under these circumstances to attack Maiden, even if the attack were successful, would have been useless. To take Maiden, would not open the Lake nor the forest ; would bring no supplies to his troops, and it must soon have fallen again for want of them. The first thing to be done was, to re-open the communica tion through the wilderness to Ohio. For this pur pose, General Hull re-crossed with his army to Detroit on the evening of the 7th of August, leaving a suffi cient body of troops intrenched and fortified on the other bank, to enable him to regain the British shore, as soon as his communications were clear. The afternoon of the day in which the army completed crossing the river, Colonel Miller of the 4th regiment was detached with a body of 600 men, consisting of the effective men of his own regiment and a selection of the most effective of the militia. They took with them a company of artillery, with a six-pounder and a howitzer, and a company of cavalry. About fourteen miles from Detroit, at Maguago, they met a body of British soldiers and Indians in trenched behind a breastwork of logs AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 357 The British were commanded by Major Muir of the 41st, and the Indians by Tecumseh. Notwithstanding the advantages of their position. Colonel Miller was enabled, by a gallant charge, to break their line, and force them from it at the point of the bayonet. The British and Indians retreated, and were pursued about two miles. The communications with the river Raisin were now opened, and the distance from the battle ground was only sixteen or eighteen miles, and yet, instead of marching on. Colonel Miller and his troops return ed to Detroit. The reasons assigned were, that the troops had thrown down their knapsacks of provisions at the beginning of the action, which were lost ; that they had to wait till provisions could be sent from Detroit the next day ; that they did not get these pro visions till late the next day, and they were only sufficient for one or two meals, and that Colonel Miller sent for a further supply, and a storm of rain coming on, they were ordered back to Detroit.* * " It is plain," says Armstrong, enemy, could have reached the river ! that Col. Miller should have Raisin in a day, and without suffer- niarched on, even if it had been ne- ing much from the want of provi- cessary to carry him in a litter, for sions." he was not more than twenty-two It seems evident either that Miller miles" (Miller says in his testimony, was to blame for not going on, or sixteen or eighteen) "from Col. that the difficulties of the road along Brush, who had 150 men and plenty the river were so great that it could of provisions. If he had been too not be kept permanently open by sick to proceed in any manner, one any force Gen. Hull was able to of the other Colonels should have employ. As Colonel Miller has al- been sent in his place, without wait- ways shown himself an able and Ing for more supplies from Detroit, gallant officer, the last supposition The detachment having beaten the is no doubt the true one. 358 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, General Hull's account of this transaction and his subsequent steps, is as follows : Extract from Hull's Memoirs, page 73 : " As soon as I received an account of the action, a rein forcement of one hundred men, with a supply of provisions under the command of Colonel McArthur, was ordered to join Colonel Miller's detachment at Maguago. As soon as the detachment had recruited from its fatigue, my intention was, that it should have proceeded on the expedition to the river Raisin. A severe storm of rain intervened, and the troops were exposed to it, without any covering. I therefore thought it expedient, on account of their great fatigue, to order them back to Detroit, and make an arrange ment by another route to open the communication. " The road to the river Raisin, which passed through the Indian village of Browristown, being principally on the margin of the Detroit river, both troops and convoys could easily be annoyed by the gun-boats and armed vessels of the enemy. Besides, in its course, there was only the river which sepa rated it from the enemy^s principal post at Maiden. Being thus situated, it was almost impossible to se cure it in such a manner as that convoys could pass with any kind of safety. After Colonel Miller's re turn to Detroit, therefore, seeing the indispensable necessity of obtaining the supplies which had arrived at the river Raisin, and being informed of a circuitous route, distant from the river, I thought it expedient to make the attempt in that direction. I communi cated my intentions to Colonels McArthur and AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 359 and they not only fully approved of the measure, but offered their services as volunteers, on the expedition. I likewise communicated to them a letter from Cap tain Brush, who commanded the escort of provisions, informing me that he should take the back road, and should have occasion for support. I authorized Colonels McArthur and Cass to select the most healthy and effective men of their regiments, and di rected the Quarter-Master to furnish pack-horses to carry provisions for them during their march. On the 14th of August, they commenced their march, under the command of Colonel McArthur, attended by Colonel Cass." 360 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, CHAPTER III. SITUATION OF GENERAL HULL BROCK'S ARRIVAL AT MALDEN. SURRENDER OF DETROIT. ITS REASONS. STATE OF COMMUNICATIONS, TROOPS, PRO VISIONS. WE have seen that General Hull made three at tempts to open his communications to Ohio. The first was on August 4th, by means of Major Van- home's detachment of 200 men, which was defeated by a small body of British and Indians. The second was on August 8th, by Colonel Miller's detachment of 600 men, who defeated the enemy, but returned to Detroit without effecting their object. The third was by means of McArthur and Cass's detachment, which set out August 14th, to go by a back route. While these operations were taking place in the American camp, Major-General Brock had been making energetic efforts to reinforce and relieve Maiden. He had sent Colonel Proctor, an officer in whom he placed much confidence, to take the com mand in the place of St. George. Reinforcements had been sent with him, and previously some militia were ordered to proceed to Long Point, on Lake Erie, where General Brock soon followed. He left York on the 6th of August,* taking with him a body * Life of Brock, page 224. AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. of 250 militia from that place ; on his way he held a Council with the Mohawks on Grand river, who promised him a reinforcement; and embarked at Long Point on Lake Erie, with about 300 militia, besides his regulars, and proceeded by water to Am- herstburg or Maiden. He reached Amherstburg on the 13th of August, and had an interview with Te- cumseh, and held a Council, which was attended by 1000 Indian warriors.* They expressed their joy at General Brock's arrival, and their determination to assist him to the last drop of their blood. On the 15th of August, he sent a summons to General Hull, calling on him to surrender the fort.f General Hull answered that he had no other reply to make, than to say, that he was prepared to meet any force at his disposal, and any consequences which might result from the exercise of it. * Life of Brock, page 228. The join in a war of extermination ; but number here incidentally given, you must be aware that the numer- shows the actual Indian force at ous bodies of Indians who have at- Detroit, to be much greater than tached themselves to my troops, was afterwards stated. Indians will be beyond my control, the mo- love war, and these were inflamed ment the contest commences. You with animosity and hope of plunder, will find me disposed to enter into It is not likely that any of this such conditions as will satisfy the thousand were absent at the time of most scrupulous sense of honour, the attack, nor is it probable, that all Lieutenant-Colonel McDonnel and the Indians were present at the Major Glegg are fully authorized to Council. conclude any arrangements that f General Brock's letter was as may lead to prevent the unnecessary follows : " The force at my disposal, effusion of blood, authorizes me to require of you the (Signed) ISAAC BROCK, immediate surrender of Fort De- Major- General." troit. It is far from my intention to 362 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, That afternoon a fire was opened upon Detroit, from a battery erected opposite, at Sandwich, and the cannonade was returned by an American battery of 24-pounders. General Hull immediately sent word to Colonels McArthur and Cass to return to Detroit, with their detachment. Early the next morning General Brock crossed the river about five miles be low Detroit, having sent over a large force of Indian warriors the night before, to protect his landing, which was also made under cover of two ships of war. According to his own official account, his forces con sisted of 330 regulars, 400 militia, and 600 Indians, or 1330 in all ; but no doubt it exceeded this number, as we have seen that 1000 Indians met at the Coun cil two days before, and that commanders are very apt, even when meaning to tell the truth, to exaggerate the enemy's forces and underrate their own. General Brock certainly did the one, in estimating General Hull's force at 2500, since there is no possible mode of making it amount to one-half of that number. Colonel Cass, whose object evidently was to make Brock's force as small, and Hull's as large as possi ble, and who estimates the former at 300 less than General Brock's own estimate, does not make Gene ral Hull's effective force more than 1060 in all. We shall see, hereafter, that it was much less than this. General Brock's intention in crossing the river was, to wait in a strong position the effect of his force, displayed before the American camp ; but hear ing of Colonel McArthur's absence with 500 men, AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. he decided on an immediate attack.* He there fore advanced toward the fort, and was preparing for an assault, when General Hull determined to surren der ; an act which, condemned as it has been, we cannot but consider, on maturest reflection, the bravest and noblest action of a life, hitherto universally re garded as that of a brave and patriotic man. It would have required very little courage to fight. General Hull had been in many battles of the Revo lution. There probably was not an officer or soldier in his whole army, who had seen half as much of war as himself. He had led a column of seven companies at the taking of Stony Point with the bayonet, under General Wayne ; for his conduct in which action he received the thanks of Washington, and promotion in * General Brock's despatch of 17th of August. General Brock knew very well what he was about. He knew the weakness of the American camp and the difficulties with which they were surrounded. He knew that they were probably in want of provisions, for he had expressed the opinion in a letter to Sir George Prevost, that this want had induced General Hull to invade Canada : " I doubt whether General Hull had instructions to cross on this side the river. I rather suspect he was compelled by want of provisions" (Letter of Brock, July 29/fc), and he knew that his supplies had been since cut off for a long time. General Brock thus speaks in a letter of Sep. 3d ; " Some say that nothing could be more desperate than the measure ; but I answer, that the state of the province admitted only of desperate remedies. I got possession of the let ters my antagonist addressed to the Secretary of War, and also of the sentiments which hundreds of his army uttered to their friends. Con fidence in their General was gone, and evident despondency prevailed throughout. I crossed the river, contrary to the opinion of Colonel Proctor, &c., it is therefore no won der that envy should attribute to good fortune, what in justice to my own discernment, I must say, pro ceeded from a cool calculation of the pours and con/res," Brock's Life, page 267. 364 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, the service. He was in the midst of the battle of White Plains, and was there w r ounded. He was in the battles of Trenton and Princeton, and was promoted for his conduct in those engage ments. He fought at Ticonderoga, at Bemis' Heights, in the battle of October 7th, at Monmouth, Morrissania, and other places, and led regiments and battalions in most of these actions. Now the courage o which can engage in a battle is very much a thing of habit. Many men are cowards in their first battle ; almost all men are brave in their tenth. Is it likely, therefore, that General Hull should have been the only man in his army, disabled by fear, from fighting General Brock ? Is not this supposition an absurdity ? What then were his reasons, as given by himself? Ge neral Hull was now in the position in which, as he had stated before the war to the Administration, De troit must fall. His communications to Ohio were cut off by the Indians in the woods ; his communica tion by the Lake, by the British vessels ; and he had no co-operation below, at Niagara. Under these cir cumstances, the fall of Detroit was inevitable. If he should fight a battle and defeat the British army, this result would not be less inevitable, for a victory would not re-open his communications. Besides this, his forces were vastly inferior to those of the enemy ; his provisions were nearly exhausted, and there was no possibility of obtaining a supply from any quarter. If he were to fight, he would save his own reputation, but could not save the army or territory, and he would be exposing the defenceless inhabitants of AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. Michigan to all the horrors of Indian warfare, without a reason or an object. Under these circumstances, it would be the part of a selfish man to fight ; it was the part of a brave and generous man, to hazard the sacrifice of his own reputation as a soldier, and his own selfish feelings, to his duty as a Governor and a man. General Hull did the last and to the time of his death, never regretted it for a moment. In dis grace ; condemned to death as a coward ; believed to be a traitor by the ignorant ; seeing the success of his calumniators, who built their fortunes on the ruin of his own ; he was always calm, tranquil, and happy. He knew that his country would one day also under stand him, and that history would at last do him jus tice. He was asked, on his death-bed, whether he still believed he had done right, in the surrender of Detroit and he replied, that he did, and was thank ful that he had been enabled to do it. The defence of General Hull rests mainly on the following propositions : 1. An army in the situation of that of General Hull, August 16th cut off from its supplies, and with no adequate means of opening its communications must inevitably fall. 2. That in this situation, to fight, would have been a useless expenditure of life, and would have unnecessarily exposed the inhabitants of the Territory to Indian cruelties. 3. That this situation was not his fault, but that of the General Government, of General Dearborn, and of circumstances for which no one is perhaps respon sible. 366 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, 4. That the troops of General Hull, on August 16th, were much inferior in number to General Brock's. 5. That the provisions of the army were nearly exhausted, and no further supplies could be obtained. We will now advance the arguments and facts which will establish these propositions. I. An army in the situation of that of General Hull, August 16th, must inevitably fall. This appears from the following considerations. General Hull was posted twenty miles in the rear of the enemy's principal fortress. He was between two and three hundred miles distant from the base of his operations, from which all his supplies were to be drawn. His communication with those supplies was through a wilderness, filled with hostile Indians, and for seventy-five miles along a river and lake, exposed to the cannon of the British ships. This communica tion was now completely cut off, and two attempts at re-opening it had failed. The Lake was in the ene my's power, and could not be taken from them. He was informed that no diversion was to be made in his favour at Niagara, to draw off the enemy's troops from before him. If he should fight, and destroy the army in his front, the enemy's ships and Indians would still remain controlling the line of his commu nications. No proposition in military affairs is more univer sally admitted than this, that an army separated from its supplies, must fall. History is full of instances in support of it and one of the main efforts of strat- AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 357 egic art, is always to protect one's own communica tions from the approach of the enemy, and to cut off his. The line between an army and its magazines is its most vital and tender part. Every thing in fact goes to show, that the power which held the Lake, must also keep possession both of Detroit and Maiden. When General Harrison had advanced with a large army in September, 1812, to the neighbourhood of Detroit, he first proposed to take it by coup de main. He then relinquished this plan as impracticable, and formed a second, which was to accumulate large supplies of men and provi sions at the Rapids of the Miami, and then to move forward from that point in October. But he found it necessary to relinquish this project also, and next de termined to accomplish the same result by a winter expedition. But he was finally obliged to wait a whole year, until Perry's fleet was built, and the naval victory of September, 1813, gained, which gave the control of Lake Erie to the Americans. As soon as this event took place, the British Commander evacuated Detroit and Maiden, without even waiting for the American forces to appear. Detroit and Mai den fell naturally into the power of the United States, almost without an effort, the moment that Lake Erie was under its control. II. It has been frequently said that supplies of provisions might have been procured by General Hull from the Territory itself. This statement was first made by Colonel Cass, in his celebrated letter of September 10th, 1812, and has been repeated after 368 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, him by a multitude of writers, none of whom have taken pains to examine whether there was any foun dation for it or not. Colonel Cass's words are : " The state of our provisions has not been generally under stood. On the day of surrender we had fifteen days' provisions of every kind on hand. Of meat, there was plenty in the country, and arrangements had been made for purchasing and grinding flour. It was calculated we could readily procure three months' provisions, independent of 150 barrels of flour, and 1300 head of cattle, which had been forwarded from Ohio, and which remained at the river Raisin, under Captain Brush, within reach of the army." If this statement is correct, of course the surrender of General Hull's army cannot be defended on the ground of a want of provisions. We shall show here after, that it was impossible that fifteen or even five days' provision should have been on hand at the time of the surrender, and that Colonel Cass had no means of knowing it, and no ground for making the state ment. As to the cattle and flour at the river Raisin, " within reach of the army," we have seen, that be fore General Brock crossed the river, Major Van- home and Colonel Miller had both attempted to reach it, the one with 200 and the other with 600 men, and that both had failed. Was it more attain able now, when General Brock's regulars and militia, and a thousand Indians, at least, under Tecumseh, were between it and Detroit ? In the statement, that three months' provisions could be obtained in the country, Colonel Cass gives no authority. He cau- t AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. tiously says, " It was calculated." Who made the calculation does not appear. But it is very remarka ble, that only one month before the date of this let ter,' and four days before the surrender, Colonel Cass should have made quite a different statement to Gov ernor Meigs. In a letter to Governor Meigs, dated August 12th, and signed by Colonel Cass, he says : " The letter of the Secretary of War to you, a copy of which I have seen, authorizes you to preserve and keep open the communication from the State of Ohio to Detroit. It is all important that it should be kept open. Our very existence depends upon it. Our supplies must come from our State. This country does not furnish them. In this existing state, nothing but a large force, of 2000 men at least, will effect the object.* But this was not the only letter in which Colonel Cass expressed his opinion. On General Hull's trial, Willis Silliman, a brother in-lavv of Colonel Cass by marriage with his sister, testified, that he had received a letter from Colonel Cass, dated August 12th, which said : " Our situation is become critical. If things o get worse, you will have a letter from me, giving a particular statement of this business. Bad as you may think of our situation, it is still worse than you believe. I cannot descend into particulars, lest this should fall into the hands of the enemy." Silliman testified, that he had another letter from Colonel Cass, dated 3d August, in which he urged him to use his exertions to hasten the march of troops * McAffee, page 83. 24 370 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, from Ohio ; and said, that men and provisions were both necessary, and would be necessary ; and that "provisions are or would be necessary for the existence of the troops" Two other witnesses, who had read these letters, confirmed Silliman's testimony.* Colonel Cass as we have seen, in his letter of September 10th, declares, that " three months' provisions" could easily be procured in Michigan, for the supply of the army. As a witness on General Hull's trial, he testified to the same effect, under oath. General Hull was on trial for his life, and Colonel Cass swore, " that his opinion, founded on the opinion of the inhabitants and upon experience, was, that provisions might have been procured there, sufficient for the support of the army for three or four months." It was very improper that an opinion should be received as evidence on a trial for a capital offence ; and yet this opinion, we have seen, was in contradiction to his previous statements to Governor Meigs and Mr. Silliman. Colonel Snelling also testified on General Hull's trial (Forbes, page 41), that he did not know of any scarcity of provisions. * Hull's Trial, Forbes' Report, p. Brock," it is said, that at the defeat 135. Silliman's testimony, and that of Vanhorne's detachment, " General of Peter Mills and Daniel Conyers. Hull' s despatches and the corres- Also of Public Records, War Office, pondence of his troops, fell into the Washington. If many such letters hands of Tecumseh, and it was as this were written by the officers partly the desponding nature of of General Hull's army, we can un- their contents which afterwards in- derstand how those taken by Brock duced Major-General Brock to at- should have encouraged him to at- tempt the capture of the American tack Detroit. In the "Life of army." Page 223. AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 37 1 Captain Baker (page 85) said, on the same trial, " lam of opinion , that there was plenty of cattle and grain in the country." But of any facts on which he grounded that opinion, he was wholly silent. On the other hand, what was the testimony of those who had a knowledge of facts, and something else besides a vague opinion to adduce ? It was proved by com petent witnesses, that so far from there being a sur plus of cattle and grain in the country, to support the army for three months, the country had never pro duced enough for the supply of its own inhabitants in time of peace.* Captain Maxwell (Forbes' Report, p. 128) testi fied on Hull's trial, that he had lived thirteen vears in Ohio, and had been engaged every year in driving cattle and hogs from thence to Detroit market ; from 1000 to 1500 hogs annually, and from 150 to 200 head of cattle. Captain Dyson, of 1st artillery, testified (Hull's Trial, page 134) " that he, witness, was in command at Detroit from 1805 to 1808; that a great number of cattle and hogs were driven thither from Ohio ; that the contractors got the principal of the pork by that means ; that the inhabitants could buy cheaper than they could raise them, and there was not enough raised to subsist the inhabitants ; that the Canadian people were not industrious in cultivating their farms." * " The population of Michigan miserable farmers, and depended at this time, was about 5000 souls, chiefly on hunting, fishing, and trad- Most of those who cultivated the ing witlr the Indians, for their sup- land, were Canadians, They were port." Hull's Memoirs, page 76, 372 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, Colonel Watson testified (Hull's Trial, page 148) that he had lived in the Territory of Michigan six years., up to the time of the surrender ; that in 1810 he had taken the census, and found the number of inhabit ants in the whole Territory 4762, of which the dis trict of Detroit, which extended 35 miles along the river, contained 2227 ; that in taking the census he had particularly inquired of the heads of families as to the produce of the country, and that into De troit district " great quantities of flour and whisky were brought from New-York and Pennsylvania, and of cattle and hogs from Ohio ; these last are pur chased by the inhabitants for their consumption, and in times of peace, they are also purchased by the British agents, and carried to Maiden. The cattle and hogs were consumed by the inhabitants." We have, then, on the one side, the opinions of Colonel Cass and others, after the surrender of De troit, founded on vague impressions, conversations with persons unknown, and upon ignorance of any thing to the contrary, that there was provision enough in the country to last an army of 1500 men two or three months. On the other hand, we have the written opinion of Colonel Cass before the surrender, that supplies must come from Ohio, for that Michigan did not furnish them ; and testimony to prove that the in habitants did actually purchase provisions for their own consumption, from Ohio and elsewhere. If any thing more is needed to show that no supplies could be procured in Michigan, we have an incidental proof in General fkock's letters. Before the surren- AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 373 der, we have seen, that he supposed that General Hull had been driven into Canada by want of provi sions. And in a letter, dated September 9th, 1812,* he writes thus to Sir George Prevost : " It appears evident the enemy meditates a second attempt on Amherstburg. The greater parts of the troops which are advancing, marched from Kentucky, with an intention of joining General Hull. How they are to subsist, even for a short period, in that already exhausted country, is no easy matter to conceive. This difficulty will probably decide them on some bold measure, in the hope of shortening the campaign. If successfully resisted, their fate is inevitable." If it be suggested, that if General Hull had de fended himself, supplies would have been brought from Ohio for his army, accompanied by a force suffi ciently large to open the communications, and keep them open, we answer this, by referring again to Ge neral Harrison's vain attempts to reach Detroit in the fall and winter of 1812. He had ample means both in men and supplies, but he writes, (October 22d, 1812,) " to get supplies forward, through a swampy wilderness of near 200 miles, in wagons or on pack- horses, which are to carry their provisions, is abso lutely impossible."! If it be said that General Hull might have saved iiis army by a retreat to the Miami, the answer is this : He suggested this measure to his officers, when the army re-crossed the river from Canada, and was * Life of Brock, page 286. Armstrong, Notices^ &c. VoL 1, f Harrison's letter, quoted by page 59- 374 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, told that if he did this, the militia would desert to a man. Nor was a retreat at that time absolutely ne cessary, for there were still hopes of the communica tion being opened by Millers detachment. When General Brock arrived, it was too late to retreat, as General Hull shows, in the following passage of his Memoirs of the Campaign, pp. 98 and 99: " I must ask you, in this case, to examine some general maps of the country, from Detroit to the foot of the Rapids of the Miami of Lake Erie. The dis tance is about seventy miles. The only road through which I could have retreated, runs from Detroit as far as Brownstown, on the banks of the Detroit river^, about twenty miles, and from Brownstown to the foot of the Rapids, about fifty miles ; in some places on, and in others near the borders of Lake Erie. This road was very difficult to pass, a great part of it be ing through a wilderness, and had only been opened by an army, when advancing to Detroit. Its course, for seventy miles, being on the margin of a navigable river and the Lake ; and General Brock with his army being opposite to Detroit, with a number of armed vessels, gun- boats, and a sufficient number of flats?, to move his troops on the water ; he would have had such an advantage in attacking a retreating army, es pecially when aided by his numerous tribes of savages,, that I then thought, and I now think, that an attempt of the kind would have resulted in the total destruc tion of the army. With his boats, protected by his- armed vessels and gun-boats, his troops might have been moved on those smooth waters,, with the great- AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 375 est celerity, and landed in the front, rear, or on the flank, and harassed my march in such a manner, that it would have been impossible to have effected it : besides, we must have encountered the difficulty of passing a number of rivers, without boats, and over which there were no bridges. The only places where some of these rivers could have baen crossed, were near the navigable waters, commanded by the ene my's naval armament, and no boats could have been provided for the purpose. There would have been no other mode of effecting the passage, but by swim ming or constructing rafts, in the face of the enemy." General Hull might, no doubt, -have taken mea sures which would have conduced to his personal ad vantage, far more than those which he adopted. If he had had less reason and judgment, he might have attempted to take Maiden by storm, with his militia and the 4th regiment. No one who knows the conduct of our militia in all the battles in which they were engaged in 1812, can doubt, that, in attacking without cannon, a forti fied place, defended- with artillery, they would have been repulsed with disgrace and serious loss. There would have been a useless waste of life on the part of the army, but General Hull would have had the cre dit for courage and energy, and his soldiers would have been made more cautious by the lesson. Then, when General Brock attacked Detroit, if General Hull had been a less disinterested man, and had acted in reference to his own military credit, he would have attempted to defend himself. But General Hull 376 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, had long since, during the war of the Revolution, es tablished his character as a man of courage, and a soldier skilled in the science of war. He considered that it devolved upon him to protect the inhabitants of Detroit from the tomahawk of the savages, and he therefore assumed the responsibility of a capitulation, leaving to his officers and troops the safe glory of boasling what they would have done, had they only been permitted to fight. We will now show what was the state of the pro visions at Detroit, at the time of the surrender, and we think it will appear by documentary and unques tionable evidence, that they must have been nearly exhausted at that time. Here also we have, on one side, bold, repeated as sertions, unsupported by any facts; and on the other side, we have arguments and proofs, it has been as serted over and over again, and continues to be re peated, that there were ample supplies of provisions at Detroit, at the surrender ; and yet the testimony of the Government witnesses themselves, goes to prove the contrary. Colonel Cass, in his testimony (Hull's Trial, page 23), asserts, " that the situation of the army in re spect to provisions, was a subject of frequent conver sations between General Hull and the officers that he never knew or understood, that the army was in ivant,, or likely to want" Yet we have seen above, that he wrote to Governor Meigs, that the very exist ence of the army depended on supplies being sent from Ohio; and to his brother-in-law, Silliman, that pro- AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 377 visions were, or would be, necessary for the existence of the troops. Colonel Cass, in giving this account of his con versations with General Hull, evidently means to con vey the impression, that the fear of wanting provi sions, was an afterthought with General Hull him self, and intended merely to justify his surrender. But a letter of General Hull to the Secretary of War,* dated July 10th, only five days after the arrival of the army at Detroit, speaks in the strongest manner of the want of provisions which must ensue, if the com munication with Ohio is not kept open by troops sent from that State. " The communication must be se cured, or this army will be without provisions. This must not be neglected : if it is, this army will perish with hunger." It is certainly extraordinary, that when General Hull spoke thus strongly to the Secre tary of War, of the probable wants of his army, that he should never, " in the frequent conversations," which Colonel Cass says he had with him on this sub- * Hull's Trial, Appendix, page 9. either hire or purchase pack-horses "Sir, Mr. Beard, Augustus For- to transport the flour. I shall draw ter's agent here, informed me, that on you for the money necessary for in consequence of the Lake being the purpose. The communication closed against us, he cannot furnish must be secured, or this army will the necessary supplies of provisions, be without provisions. Troops will I have therefore authorized Mr. Jno. be absolutely necessary on the road H. Platt of Cincinnati (now here) to protect the provisions. This must to furnish two hundred thousand not be neglected : if it is, this army rations of flour, and the same quan- will perish by hunger, tity of beef. I have engaged to I am, &c., give him 5 per cent, on the amount (Signed) WILLIAM HULL." of purchases, and pay his necessary Hon. Wm. Eustis. expenses of transportation : he will Detroit, July 10, 1812. 378 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, ject of provisions, have suggested that the army was even likely to be in want. It seems singular, that they should have talked so frequently on the subject, if there was no possible danger of want. Why did they talk about provisions at all, if they were in no danger of wanting them ? The whole evidence which exists upon the state of provisions in Detroit, at the time of the surrender, is contained in the testimony given upon General Hull's trial. This evidence cannot be better summed up than in General Hull's own language, in his Me moirs of the Campaign of 1812 : " Augustus Porter, of the State of New-York, was the contractor for furnishing this army. David Beard was his agent, and was present at Detroit. Mr. Beard was not only the agent, who did all the business at Detroit, but, I understood from him, had some share in the profits of the contract. He could have no mo tive to have diminished the quantity, because the Uni ted States must have paid for all that was on hand at the time of the capitulation. It will appear from the minutes of the trial, that his testimony was the last before I made my defence. By the contractor's agent's certificate, it will appear that, on the 9th of July, 1812, there was at Detroit 125,000 rations of flour, and 70,666 rations of meat ; and that on the 28th of July, there was 70,000 rations of flour, and 21, 000 of meat. " Mr. Beard has certified that this statement was handed to me, containing the provisions in the con tractor's store, and signed by him, as will appear by AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 379 tne proceedings of the Court Martial on my trial. By this return, it will be seen what quantity was con sumed from the 9th to the 28th of July, what quan tity remained on hand the 28th of July and by ob serving the same rule of consumption, it will appear what quantity would have been in store on the 16th of August, the day of the capitulation. " By the data here given it will be shown, that if a ration of meat had been issued, the meat would have been exhausted on the 6th of August, ten days before the capitulation. And if, during those ten days, after the meat was exhausted, an additional quantity of flour had been issued, to make up the ra tion, as was the case, the whole of the flour would have been exhausted on the 16th of August, the day of the capitulation. It appears by the return of the contractor, that from the 9th to the 28th of July, 5334 rations of flour more than of meat were issued, and that practice was continued, in about the same proportion, until the 16th of August. " Perhaps it may be asked by those unacquainted with my situation and the practice of armies, why so many more rations were daily issued than the num ber of effective men which composed the army : I will give the answer. It will appear by the foregoing memoirs, that the officers and soldiers from Michili- mackinac had arrived at Detroit, prisoners on parole, and they had no other means of subsistence, but to receive rations. It likewise appears, that a large number of old Indian chiefs and sachems daily visited our camp, and were fed from the public stores, by or der of the Government." 380 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, III. We will now examine more particularly the number of troops under the command of General Brock and General Hull, respectively, at the time of the surrender of Detroit. The most erroneous accounts have been given and repeated upon this point ; one writer copying another, and no one going back to .examine the evi dence on either side. General Hull's troops have been exaggerated to numbers far greater than even the Government witnesses testified as composing his army, at the surrender. General Brock's troops have, in the same way, been reduced below the number which he himself admits to have crossed the river with him to the attack. Sometimes writers have contradicted themselves as well as the facts. Thus Mr. Charles J. Ingersoll, the latest historian of the War, says (page 81), that Brock crossed " the straits from Sandwich to Detroit with some 1200 men ;" and presently after (page 82) says, " when Brock crossed the straits to attack Detroit, his whole force, white, red, and black, was but 1030." Meantime Brock himself, in his official report of the surrender, which Mr. Ingersoll might have found in half a dozen histories, admits his force to have been 1330, and specifies the number of regulars, militia, and In dians.* * General Hull's force has been General Brock (Off. Rep.), 2500. thus variously estimated by different Colonel Cass (Letter September writers; ' 10th, 1812), 1060. In " Defence of General Dear- Ingersoll (History of Second born," by his son, at 2465. War, page 82), 1350. AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 33] General Brock's account of his troops, as con tained in his official report to Sir George Prevost, dated August 17th, 1812, states his forces to have been as follows (Brock's Life, p. 250) : " The force which I instantly directed to march against the enemy, consisted of 30 artillery, 240 of 41st regiment, 50 Royal Newfoundland regiment, 400 militia, and about 600 Indians, to which were attached three six-pounders and two three-pounders." General Brock's numbers then, by his own account ? which he led to the attack of Detroit, were at least 1330. But he does not profess to give the number of the Indians with accuracy, and the probability is, that it was much greater than is here stated. By a statement of Captain Glegg, General Brock's aid-de camp, it appears, that three days before, a thousand Indians attended a Council ; and that these were war riors, appears from his saying, that their equipment was generally very imposing.* Moreover, Lieutenant Forbush, an American prisoner at Maiden, testified, on General Hull's trial,f that he counted, on 15th of August, six hundred warriors, passing up (that is to say, from Maiden to Sandwich), some on horseback and some on foot. But a large body of Indians had attended General Brock's army, the previous day, from Maiden to Sandwich, and were seen by hundreds of persons from the opposite bank. Now, as Sand wich is 18 miles from Maiden, the 600 Indians whom Forbush counted at Maiden, on the 15th, must have * Brock's Life, p. 228. f Forbes' Report, p. 146. 382 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, been exclusive of the hundreds who were at Sand wich that very time. General Brock, then, had with him probably at least 1600 or 1700 men, when he at tacked Detroit. Let us now see how many General Hull had with him at the same time. By a letter of the Secretary of War, dated April 9th, 1812, the number of troops* originally put under his command were, 1200 militia from the State of Ohio, and the 4th United States regiment, consisting of 300 men. By a return dated Fort Findlay, June 26th, while on his march, General Hull's army at that time, amounted to 2075. But this included all those on the rolls of the regiments, whether absent or present. It also included a number of straggling volunteers, who were not under General Hull's com mand, because unauthorized by the President's order to Governor Meigs ; it' included also the wagoners, pack-horse men, and other camp attendants, whose names must be in the returns, in order that they might draw rations. Thus the number of the 4th regi ment is stated in this return at 483, whereas its actual number was much less. Captain Snelling states that it had not more than 320 effective men, and in the aggregate about 400.f Colonel Miller states the effective force of the regi ment on 16th August, at 250 or 260.J The troops originally put under General Hull's * Hull's Memoirs, page 55. was the strength of the 4th regi~ f Snelling's testimony, Hull's ment on the last day of July, or the Trial, page 42. first of August, including the de- I Colonel's Miller's testimony, tachment of the first ?" Ans. " I Hull's Trial, p. 111. Ques. "What cannot say precisely, about 300, AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 333 command, consisted of 1500 men. To these are to be added the garrison of Detroit, consisting of 50, the volunteers who remained with the army amount ing to perhaps 100, and the militia of Michigan. The whole population of Michigan consisted of 5000 souls, and was scattered along the shores of the lake and river, v and was exposed to Indian depredations and attacks. Few of the militia, therefore, could be spared from the defence of their homes. Major Jes- sup states the number of Michigan militia at 400, but this yicludes those absent from Detroit. The only testimony to the number of militia ac tually present on the 16th of August, is that of Co- loriel Watson (Trial of Gen. Hull, p. 149), who states the number under Colonel Brush on that day, at 150, he being himself with them at the time. The whole number of troops under General Hull's com mand from the beginning of his march until the sur render, was therefore, 1. Ohio Militia, . . . 1200 2. 4th United States regiment, . . 300 3 Michigan Militia, . 150 4. Garrison at Detroit, ... 50 5. Ohio Volunteers, ... 100 1800 From this number, we must subtract those left behind killed, missing, detached, &c., namely : principally in good health." Ques. were about 250 or 2GO, effective for " What was its force on the morning duty." of the surrender ?" Ans. " There 384 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, 1. Three Block-houses, built and garrisoned, say, 2. Fort on the Miami, garrisoned, ( 2 ) 3. Made prisoners on vessel, ( 3 ) 4. Left sick at River Raisin, ( 4 ) 5. Killed, wounded, &c., 4th August, ( 5 ) 6. Do. do. 8th do. ( 6 ) 7. Detachment under Me Arthur, ( 7 ) 8. Sick, (") Subtract 840 from 1800 leaves 960. 0)30 30 50 25 75 80 350 200 840 We will now give other testimony as to the^num- ber of General Hull's troops. * (1) Ten men for each block house is certainly not a large allow ance. (2) A subaltern officer and 30 men were left at this place, by order of the Secretary of War. (Hull's Memoirs, p. 119.) (3) Forbush's testimony. "Dr. Edwards was directed to take chief part of the hospital stores, and as many of the men, most sick, as the vessel could carry." Cass's testimony, Trial, p. 17. " About 40 or 59 men, invalids, his (witness's) own servant, and part of his baggage, were in the vessel." (4) Hall's Memoirs, p. 119. (5) Vanhorne's testimony, Hull's Trial, page 70. Hull's Me moirs, p. 119. (6) Colonel Miller's testimony, Hull's Trial, p. 108. "The loss in the battle, in killed and wounded was 81 : he thinks 17 killed on the ground and 64 wound ed. -(7) Hull's Trial, Cass's testi mony, p. 23. " Colonel Cass then said, that he left Detroit on the 14th August, in the evening, with a de tachment of about 350 men, under Colonel McArthur. (8) As the hospital stores and medicines had been taken in the packet by the British, the sick were numerous. We estimate them at 200, for the following reasons. Captain East man, of 4th U. S. regiment, testified on Hull's Trial, p. 99, that " the grand aggregate of that regiment, including a small detachment of the Is/, then unfit for duty, and the sick, was 345, on 15th August. Colonel Miller testified p. Ill, that on the morning of August 16, there were about 250 or 260 effective for duty," consequently there must have been nearly 100 men disabled and sick in this single regiment. We cannot therefore estimate the number of sick in all four regiments at less than 200 men. AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 335 1. General Hull, in his official despatch giving an account of the surrender, says : " At this time the whole effective force at my disposal at Detroit, did not exceed 800 men." 2. Major Jessup's testimony is more particular. In Forbes' Report of Hull's Trial, it is as follows : " He stated also that he had received a report from different adjutants of different corps, estimating the men fit for action, and thinks that the amount (as stated in General Cass's letter) exceeded 1000 men, including the Michigan militia of 400, and the de tachments absent with Colonels Cass and McArthur ; perhaps this estimation includes the Michigan legion. * * * There were also some 30 or 40 armed wagoners." Hull's Trial, p. 94. If we subtract from 1060 the 350 men absent under Cass and Mc Arthur, and add the 40 wagoners, the whole number of troops present, according to Major Jessup, would be about 750. 3. Major Jessup, in his testimony on the trial, page 96, furnishes us with another estimate of the number of General Hull's troops on 16th of August,, which makes it considerably larger than that just given. During his cross-examination by General Hull, he was asked, " Do you recollect the paper now presented, and in the words 'effective aggregate of the three regiments, about 700 '?" Answer. " It is in my handwriting, and was hand ed by me to General Hull, on the evening of August 15th. The wagoners of the regiments, I believe, were included in the estimate, but the 4th regiment 25 386 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, was not ; it was only what remained of Cass and Me Arthur's, and the whole of Colonel Findlay's re giment, and so explained at the time." Major Jessup evidently included in this estimate all the effective force, except the 4th regiment, even to the wagoners. He makes it about 700 : add the effective of the 4th, (by Colonel Miller's testimony, 250 or 260 men,) and we have, as the total effective force under General Hull's command at the time of the surrender, about 950 men. But as he says "about 700 men," he may have exaggerated the numbers. We have then the following estimates of General Hull's troops : 1. Calculation of the numbers originally under his command, by subtracting those killed, detached, sick, &c. 960 2. General Hull's own statement, 800 3. Major Jessup's first statement, 750 4. Major Jessup's second estimate, 950 5. Colonel Cass's estimate in his letter of Sept. 10, makes the number 1060 But Colonel Cass was absent at the time, and Major Jessup tells us that the estimate in Colonel Cass's letter was derived from himself. Now, accord ing to Forbes' Report of the Trial, Major Jessup's testimony, given under oath, makes the number 300 less. Almost all subsequent writers, in giving the number of General Hull's troops, have followed Co lonel Cass, and made it amount to 1060, instead of recurring to the testimony, which would have shown it to be much less. If we take the average of the AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 337 first four estimates, which is 865, we shall probably have the number of General Hull's effective force, as nearly as it can now be ascertained. IV". We have shown, that an army destitute of provisions, and cut off from its supplies, and which cannot re-open its communications, must inevitably fall: that General Hull's army was thus destitute, and thus incapable of opening its communications. We have shown that to succeed in the enterprise intrusted to General Hull, there was necessary the command of Lake Erie ; ample reinforcements from Ohio, to keep open the road through the wilderness, and to support his army in its movements ; and co-operation at Niagara. We have seen that he had no reinforce ments from Ohio, that the Lake was under the con trol of the British, and from the absence of co-ope ration at Niagara, and the armistice of Dearborn, Prevost and Brock were enabled to accumulate troops at Maiden and Sandwich. We have seen that by the fall of Mackinaw, the Indians and British from the Northwest were thrown upon Detroit : finally, we have endeavoured to prove, that at the time of the surrender, General Hull's effective force could not have exceeded 865, while those of Brock must have amounted at least to 1600 or 1700 men ; besides large numbers of Indians near at hand, ready to reinforce him. It only remains for us now to prove, that this condition of things was not the fault of General Hull, but was owing to the neglect, ignorance, errors, or inability of the Administration at Washington, and of the Commander-in-chief, General Dearborn. 388 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, 1. It was certainly not General Hull's fault, that the British had the command of Lake Erie, for we have shown that in 1809, 1811, and 1812, he ad dressed official communications to the American Government, urging upon them the importance of gaining the control of the Lakes. 2. It certainly was not the fault of General Hull that his communications through Ohio were inter cepted. It could not possibly be expected that with an army of less than 1200 men, he should stretch back along a line of two hundred miles, through a wilderness filled with savages, while he was at the same time defending himself against a superior force in front. He made three separate attempts to re-open his communications, one of which, though victorious, did not succeed in penetrating twenty miles. 3. It certainly was not General Hull's fault that he was not reinforced from Ohio, for as early as July 5th he wrote to the Secretary of War, that " troops would be absolutely necessary on the road, to protect provisions." On July 29th he wrote to Governor Meigs of Ohio, Governor Scott of Kentucky, and to the Secretary of War, requesting an immediate rein forcement of 2000 men. And before assuming the command of the army, he informed the Secretary of War that three thousand men would be necessary.* 4. It certainly was not General Hull's fault that there was no co-operation at Niagara. According to the plan of the campaign, as understood and agreed * Gen. P. B. Porter's testimony, mode of supplying them, and then Hull's Trial, page 127. " Gen. proposed 3000 men." Hull talked of provisions, and the AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 339 upon between General Dearborn and the Secretary of War, Canada was to be invaded simultaneously by four armies, one at Detroit, one at Niagara, one at Sacket's Harbour, and one at Lake Champlain, If any thing like this had been attempted, there is no doubt that it might have been easily accomplished, and Canada must have fallen. All the preparations should have been completed before the declaration of war. But in fact General Hull's army was the only one which was ready for action. Yet even then, by a vigorous effort, forces might have been accumulated at Niagara and at Sacket's Harbour, which would have made it impossible for Prevost or Brock to send any reinforcements to Maiden, But nothing could ex cuse the dilatoriness of Government in its prepara tions and movements. It was not till eight days af ter war was declared, that the Secretary wrote to General Dearborn, to tell him that after he had made the necessary arrangements for the defence of the sea board, he was to go to Albany and make preparations to move in the direction of Niagara, Kingston, and Montreal.* In this letter he is told to " take his own time," as though a little delay might be of service, and the danger to be apprehended, was that, of too great despatch. On the 9th of July, thirteen days after this, the Secretary of War remembers, that there was some plan for invading Canada, and writes to General Dearborn, telling him, " the period has arrived, when * Note .2(1 in Appendix- 390 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, jour services are required in Albany," and orders him after he shall have placed the works on the sea-coast in the best state of defence, to " order all the re cruits not otherwise disposed of, to march immediate ly to Albany."* The principle of the worthy Secre tary evidently was, one thing at a time. First arrange every thing on the sea-coast, and then it will be time enough to think about Canada. As to Gen eral Hull's army, that is a good way off, and we have not heard any thing about it yet, and we can leave that to take care of itself just now. July 20, that is, ten days after this, the Secretary begins to wonder what has become of General Hull's army, and to think, that a little co-operation would be desirable. He therefore writes to General Dearborn, that he is in daily expectation of hearing from General Hull, who probably arrived at Detroit on the 8th instant. "You will make such arrangements with Governor Tompkins, as will place the militia detached by him for Niagara and other posts on the Lakes under your control, and there should be a communication, and if practicable a co-operation throughout the whole fron tier." By this time, it seems, the Secretary has come to think a co-operation in the movements of his armies a desirable thing, though not very practicable. But after reflecting upon it six days longer^ he writes to General Dearborn, on July 26th, telling him that he had heard of General Hull's arrival at Detroit^ and says, " arrangements should be immediately * Records of War Office, VoL 6, Folios 15 and 16. AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 39] made by you to co-operate with him at Niagara," co-operation he evidently now believes to be practi cable, as well as desirable. While these reflections were passing through the mind of the Secretary of War, how was General Dearborn occupied ? Pursuing the wise and military maxim of ' one thing at a time,' he was busily en gaged in dividing his recruits among the forts along the sea-coast, putting twenty men in one and fifty in another, as might be necessary. After this important business was settled, the Commander-in-chief goes to Albany, to carry on the campaign against Canada. One thing, however, rather puzzles him " Who has the command at Ni agara ?" On the 20th July, some three weeks after General Hull's arrival at Detroit, he writes to the Secretary of W r ar to ask, whether it was he himself or some one else, who was in command of the oper ations in Upper Canada.* One would think it was about time for him to know. Finding by the Secre tary's letter of July 20th and 26th, that it was actually himself who was to command on the frontier, he pro ceeds, not without due deliberation apparently, (for it is eighteen days after the date of the Secretary's first letter, and seven days after the receipt of the second at Albany,) to order troops toward Niagara. Probably this delay of a week in issuing his orders * Extract from a letter from Gene- mand of the operations in Upper ral Dearborn to the Secretary of Canada ? I take it for granted that War, dated Greenbush, July 20th, my command does not extend to. 1812, " Who is to have the com- that distant quarter." 392 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, after he had received the Secretary's letter of the 26th, containing the most unequivocal instructions to make a diversion on the Niagara, was owing to his being aware, that it would be too late to be of any service. For he says in his letter of August 7th to the Secretary, after speaking of the reinforcements which he had ordered to Niagara, " I trust they will move soon, but too late, 1 fear, to make the di version in favour of General Hull, which is so desira ble." However, on the 7th and 8th August General Dearborn did at last begin to order troops to Niagara, to effect a diversion in General Hull's favour. But on the 9th he concluded an armistice, by which he bound himself to act solely on the defensive, thus al lowing General Brock to take all his troops from Ni agara, if he chose, and carry them to Detroit, to act offensively there, while he prevented himself from making any attack at Niagara. The course of Gen eral Dearborn in all this affair, is really most extraor dinary. On July 20th he writes to know who has the command at Niagara. On July 31st he receives the Secretary's letter, telling him that he has the com mand, and instructing him to co-operate with General Hull immediately, by offensive movements at Niagara. August 7th and 8th he proceeds to obey these in structions, by ordering troops and artilleries to move without delay to Niagara. And August 9th he signs an armistice, by which he prevents himself from making any offensive demonstrations at Niagara or any where else, but allows General Brock to march AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 393 all the troops in Upper Canada against General Hull. The terms of the armistice were, that the troops on both sides should confine themselves to defensive ope rations, except at Detroit, but that General Hull was to be left at liberty, either to accede to the armistice or to continue offensive operations. After depriving himself of all power for aiding General Hull by offen sive movements, the next best thing for General Dearborn to have done, would have have been, to have given General Hull an immediate opportunity of deciding whether to come into the armistice or not. A communication might have been sent by express, and have reached General Hull in six or seven days. If this had been done, it would have prevented the surrender of Detroit : for the letter would have ar rived there on or before August 15th, and the orders of Sir George Prevost for a cessation of hostilities, which were imperative, might have been communicat ed to General Brock. But instead of sending this important communication by express, it was actually nine days in going from Albany to Lewistown,* travelling at the rate of about 35 miles a day ! General H. A. S. Dearborn, in his defence of his fa ther, argues, that the armistice concluded by him with Sir George Prevost, could not have been inju rious to General Hull, because General Brock says in a letter, dated August 25th, that he did not hear that a cessation of hostilities had been agreed upon, until his return to Fort Erie from Detroit.! It may be * Note 4th in the Appendix. f Defence of General Dearborn by his son. 394 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, true that General Brock did not hear that the armis tice had been actually concluded, before his departure for Detroit, but there is every reason to believe, that he knew it was in contemplation. General Brock did not leave York till the 6th of August,* and on the 2d of August, Sir George Prevost wrote to him express from Quebec, informing him of the pro posed arrangement, and also that he had ordered re inforcements to proceed to Upper Canada. f But even though General Brock had not heard of the ar mistice before his return from Detroit and Niagara, this does not justify General Dearborn in agreeing to it, to the exclusion of General Hull. He ought to have known, that its effect would be to enable Gene ral Brock to move with his whole force against De troit. And there is no doubt that General Brock would never have ventured to leave Niagara with so large a body of troops, had he not been satisfied that no movement of hostile aggression would be made by the Americans from that point. For this want of co operation, General Dearborn or the Administration is certainly answerable. We do not wish to speak with undue severity of either. General Dearborn had probably no other motive in all his operations than to fulfil his duty, but the effect of his supineness in ac tion, and his unjustifiable armistice, were as fatal to General Hull as though there had been a determina tion to sacrifice him by inaction, or by connivance with the enemy in entering into the armistice. * Life of Major-General Brock, f Note 5th in Appendix, page 224. AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 395 No doubt the Administration carried on the war in as efficient manner as its means and ability permitted. But no reflecting person who studies the history of the war can avoid the conclusion, that our failures and misfortunes in the first campaign, were owing almost exclusively to the want of sufficient preparation be fore war was declared, and the want of co-operation and celerity of action after it had commenced. For neither of these can blame be attached to General Hull. Some may blame him for not fighting. 'Tis true, that by pursuing an opposite course, he would have rescued his reputation from the imputation of coward ice, but a man who had fought nine battles during the Revolutionary War, and had twice been promoted for his bravery and gallant conduct, did not feel him self called upon, unnecessarily to expose to the ruthless tomahawk of unrelenting savages, men, women, and children, who had fled to the fort for protection, merely to shield a reputation, which many years be fore had been severely tried, and had established for itself a character for unquestioned courage. General Hull cannot justly be blamed for the fall of Detroit, arid the surrender of his army, for both must have occurred, however he might have acted. Want of preparation and co-operation on the part of the Government and General Dearborn, with the ar mistice of the latter, made these events inevitable. 396 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, CHAPTER IV. THE COURT MARTIAL. How CONSTITUTED, AND ITS CHARACTER. ITS DECISION AND SENTENCE. CONCLUSION. WE now pass to speak of General Hull's Trial by a Court Martial, and to show what influences were used against him, and by what means the public mind became possessed with the belief that he was either a traitor, or a coward, or both. We have mentioned the extravagant expectations which had been entertained by great numbers of the people, at the commencement of the war, of the ease with which the Canadas would be conquered by the armies of the United States. Men of more wisdom and experience, however,who knew the real difficulties of such an enterprise, had formed quite a different opinion. Among these was General Harrison, who, as will be seen from the following extracts from his letters to the Secretary of War, early foresaw^ the probable defeat of General Hull's army, and the fall of Detroit. In a letter of August 6th, 1812,* he says : "The information received a day or two ago from Detroit, is of the most unpleasant nature : the loss of Mackinaw will probably be followed by the capture of Fort Dearborn (or Chicago) ; and the suspension of * Dawson's Life of Harrison, p. 275. AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 397 offensive operations by General Hull's army will, I fear, give great strength to the British party among the Indians. * * * It is my opinion, that it will be the object of the British, to draw as many of the Indians as possible towards Maiden, to cut off the supplies from, and ultimately to capture, General Hull's army." In a letter of August 10th, he thus speaks : " If it were certain that General Hull would be able, even with the reinforcement which is now about to be sent to him, to reduce Maiden and retake Mackinaw, there would be no necessity of sending other troops in that direction. But I greatly fear, that the capture of Mackinaw will give such eclat to the British and In dians, that the Northern Tribes will pour down in swarms upon Detroit, oblige General Hull to act on the defensive, and meet and perhaps overpower the convoys and reinforcements which may be sent to him. It appears to me, indeed, highly probable, that the large detachment which is now destined for his relief under Colonel Wells, will have to fight its way. I rely greatly on the valour of those troops, but it is possible that the event may be adverse to us, and if it is, Detroit must fall arid with it every hope of re establishing our affairs in that quarter, until the next year. I am also apprehensive that the provisions which are to be sent with Colonel Wells, are by no means equal to the supply of the army for any length of time, increased as it will be by this detachment. They must then depend upon small convoys, which can never reach their destination in safety, if the British and Indians think proper to prevent it. Com- 398 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, manding as they do the navigation of the Lake, the British can, with the utmost facility, transfer their force from the one side of it to the other ; meet our detachments and overpower them, if they are small, while performing a laborious and circuitous march through a swampy country, at any point they think proper. To prevent these disasters, or to remedy them should they occur, a considerable covering army appears to me to be the only alternative : for should any of my apprehensions be realized, it is out of the question to suppose that troops could be collected time enough to render any essential service."* It will be seen how exactly General Harrison points out all the difficulties in the way of General Hull's army, and how clearly he anticipated the probability of its overthrow. These views, however, were shared by very few persons in the United States. Ignorant of the real state of things, it was universally supposed, that General Hull was to cap ture Canada with scarcely any opposition, and the news of the surrender of Detroit came upon the country without any warning. The party opposed to the war very naturally made use of this disaster to show that their views had been correct, and threw the blame upon the Administration and the opposite party, who had plunged the country into war without adequate preparation. At first the Administration scarcely attempted to defend itself. f But it soon found a man ready and * Note 6th in Appendix. f Note 7th in Appendix. AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 399 willing to assist it to throw the whole blame of the disaster upon the unsuccessful General. Colonel Cass, having by the terms of the capitulation liberty to return home, went to Washington, and wrote his celebrated letter of September 10th, 1812, which has been the principal source of all subsequent charges against General Hull, and was even received as evidence on his trial. The object of this letter was, to convince the public that the whole blame of the surrender was chargeable to the Commander o that he wanted neither men nor supplies of any kind, and that the British might have been defeated with perfect ease, but for the cowardice of the General. His letter was not without its effect on the public also, who did not know that Colonel Cass had writ ten to Governor Meigs and to his brother-in-law, only a few days before the surrender, that the army was in want of every thing, and must perish unless soon assisted. As soon as General Hull was exchanged and returned to the United States, he was placed under arrest, and the Administration exhibited charges for capital offences against him. A Court Martial, of which General Wade Hampton was President, was summoned to assemble at Philadelphia, when Gen eral Hull appeared, and was ready for his trial. But this Court Martial was dissolved by the President, without giving any reason for its dissolution. After General Hull had been another year under arrest, a new Court Martial was summoned, of which General Dearborn was appointed President. 400 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, It was at Albany, January 3d, 1814. A majority of the officers were young men, Lieutenant Colonels, lately promoted to that rank, some of whom had been the aids of General Dearborn, and had been intro duced into the army by his patronage. General Hull made no objection to the manner in which the Court was constituted, for he was anxious for his trial. Special and very able counsel were employed by the Government to assist the Judge Advocate, but Gen eral Hull's counsel was not allowed to address the Court in his defence. Although this exclusion of the prisoner's counsel has been an established custom of foreign Courts Martial, there appears no good reason why it should have been followed in this country ; especially as it conflicts with the provision of the Constitution, which declares that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the assistance of counsel for his defence. Charges of treason, cowardice, and neglect of duty, were exhibited against General Hull, under the following specifications. The specifications under the charge of treason were : First. " Hiring the vessel to transport his sick men and baggage from the Miami to Detroit." Second. "Not attacking the enemy's fort at Maiden, and retreating to Detroit." Third. " Not strengthening the fort of Detroit, and surrendering." The specifications under the charge of cowardice were : First.-" Not attacking Maiden, and retreating to Detroit." AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 4Q1 Second. " Appearances of alarm during the can nonade." Third. " Appearances of alarm on the day of the surrender." Fourth. " Surrendering Detroit." o The specifications under the charge of neglect of duty, were much the same as the others. As regards the charge of treason, the decision of the Court was, that it had no jurisdiction of the of fence, " but the evidence on the subject having been publicly given, the Court deem it proper, injustice to the accused, to say, that they do not believe, from any thing that has appeared before them, that General William Hull has committed treason against the Uni ted States." The Court found the accused guilty of the second and third charges, and sentenced him to be shot to death ; but on account of his revolutionary services and advanced age, earnestly recommended him to the mercy of the President. The President approved of the sentence of the Court, but remitted the execution of it. It is impossible to read the report of the trial, and not feel that Hull was sacrificed to the necessity of; preserving the Administration from disgrace and ruin. Some victim was necessary, and the unsuccessful General was the one upon whom the public indigna tion could most easily be directed. He therefore be came the scape-goat for the President and his party. The argument which influenced many, conscious ly or unconsciously, was like that of Caiphas : " It 26 402 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, is expedient that one man perish, rather than the whole party be destroyed." A political expediency made the destruction of General Hull inevitable. The constitution of the Court was singular. The President, the .Commander-in-chief, General Dear born, was taken from his duties at an important pe riod of the war, and he was the man, who, of all others, had perhaps the greatest interest in the con viction of General Hull. If the fall of Detroit was not owing to the incapacity of General Hull, it was owing, in part, to the errors of General Dearborn, in not co-operating at Niagara, and in concluding the armistice with Prevost, to the exclusion of General Hull and his army. The acquittal of General Hull would be the condemnation of General Dearborn. A man with so deep a personal interest would not be permitted to sit as juror in a matter of dollars and cents ; but General Dearborn was brought from his duties at the head of the army, in time of war, to be made President of the Court which was to decide on the life or death of General Hull. The principal witnesses on the trial gave their testimony, like men arguing a cause. They evident ly evinced an anxiety throughout, to show that Gen eral Hull was to blame in all that occurred. They remembered every thing that made against him no thing that could tell in his favour. This strong de termination to do their commander all the mischief in their power, whether arising from prejudice or a worse motive, deprives their testimony of the weight AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 4Q3 it might otherwise possess. Thus in General Cass's testimony, we find a very remarkable power of re collection in regard to some matters, and an equally remarkable forgetfulness as to other things. If any question is asked, the answer of which might bene fit General Hull, he finds it impossible to remember any thing about it. He remembers that the defences at Maiden were poor, and " was of opinion that the works were not defensible," but he " does not recol lect about the guns or gun-carriages at Detroit," and is not very sure that the enclosures and platforms were defective, though he rather thinks they were. Though his memory thus fails him in regard to the defective guns and enclosures, he distinctly recol lects the good picketing at Detroit i( it was in re markably good order, and as good as he ever saw." He cannot recollect, within four days, the time of crossing from Detroit to Canada it was " on the 12th or 16th (he could not be precise about the time)" he cannot even remember whether Colonel Miller's detachment went to Brownstown, before or after the evacuation of Canada. Yet his testimony is positive to his conversation with General Hull, in which he recommended more active measures, and in his letter of Sept. 10th he recollects facts which oc curred in Detroit during his absence from that place, such as that of 500 of the Ohio militia shedding tears be cause they were not allowed to fight. The testimony of Snelling, McArthur, Vanhorne, and some other of ficers, is still more strongly marked by this evident predetermination to say as many things as they can 404 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, to injure General Hull, and as few as possible in his favour. Very possibly they might not have been conscious of this bias, but it is none the less apparent on the face of their testimony. One peculiarity in this trial was, that the opin ions of the witnesses in regard to military measures, were constantly received as evidence. This is justly regarded as very improper by all writers on Courts Martial. It is the business of the witnesses to tes tify to actions and conduct ; that of the Court, to form an opinion as to their force and application. O'Brien, in his late work on American Military Courts, says: "When it is a question of military science, to affect the officer on trial, questions of opinion are inadmissible. For it is obvious, that the Court has met for nothing else, than to try that ques tion, and they have before them the facts in evidence, on which to ground their conclusions. Courts Mar tial should be very cautious in receiving evidence as to opinion, in all instances ; and the opportunities and means of the witness for forming an opinion, should be made to appear." The witnesses all gave in evidence their opinions that General Hull ought to have retained the bridge Aux Canards ; ought not to have evacuated Canada ; ought to have sent a larger number of troops with Vanhorne ; ought to have exercised his troops more ; &c., &c. Subtract that part of their testimony which is made up of their opinions, and the bulk is much reduced. General Hull was acquitted of the charge of trea- AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 495 son, because the principal fact on which this charge was based, would have proved the Secretary of War guilty of treason, rather than the General. This fact was, his sending a vessel by the lake, after war was declared, containing his invalids and hospital stores. But when he sent the vessel, he had received no notice of the declaration of war, though notice might easily have reached him, if proper measures had been taken to expedite so important a document. Mean time the British at Maiden had received notice of the declaration of war, in a \etterfranked by the Secretary of the Treasury; in consequence of which they at tacked and took General Hull's vessel. General Hull was found guilty on the charge of cowardice. The principal evidence under this charge, was that of the militia officers, derived from his per sonal appearance on the 15th and 16th August. They testified that he looked frightened, that he chewed tobacco, and that he sat against a wall, as they sup posed to protect himself against the cannon shot. Other officers, with quite as much experience as these militia gentlemen, saw no evidence of fear in the con duct of General Hull. Thus Major Vanhorne, Cap tain Baker, Major Jessup, Captain Fuller, Captain McCormick, and especially Captain Snelling, testified that they thought General Hull under the influence of fear ; that he seemed agitated ; that his voice trembled, &c., fee. But other officers saw nothing of the kind or rather, seeing the same appearances, they interpreted them more justly and generously. They knew that General Hull had endured much fa- ligue and exposure ; that he had hardly slept for sev- 406 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, eral nights ; that he had much responsibility on his mind ; and they attributed to those causes any ap pearance of depression, or any physical infirmity which they noticed. Brave men do not suspect others of being cowards, on such slight grounds* Colonel Miller could not be brought to say that he thought his General under the influence of personal fear.* Lieutenant Bacon did not suspect that any such alarm existed in the mind of his commander.f Captain Maxwell, who had been in twenty-three battles, in three wars, saw nothing like fear in the General's manner.} Major Munson gave a similar testimony.^ So did Captain Dyson and Colonel Watson. || The charge of cowardice rests, then, upon certain personal appearances, which a part of the witnesses supposed to arise from fear of bodily harm, and which another part ascribed to fatigue of body and anxiety of mind. Which of these interpretations is most probable ? Is it probable that, amid an army of heroes, General Hull was the only man who was a coward ; that while the militia, who had never been in battle, were shedding tears because they could not fight, he who had fought bravely in nine pitched battles was trem bling with terror ? Is it probable that while those who were exposed in the open field were calm, he whose duty required no such exposure was agitated with personal fear ; and that he who had shown m * See Note 8, in Appendix. See Note 11, in Appendix, f See Note 9, in Appendix. U See Note 12, in Appendix^ | See Note 10 a m Appendix., AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 4Q7 the midst of danger a daring courage, should be in an agony of terror when no danger was near? The supposition is entirely absurd, and we may safely predict, that the judgment of history will so deter mine. If, then, it be said that the Court Martial found General Hull guilty, and that therefore he was so, we reply The Court, by its constitution and situation, was under a bias, that made it almost im possible for it to do justice to the prisoner. The public mind had been excited against him, from one end of the land to the other, by the whole force of the Administration presses and of the war party. Scurrilous pamphlets, filled with the grossest abuse of his conduct, were hawked about for sale, at the very doors of the house where he was being tried. The President of the Court had a personal interest in his condemnation. All those who testified against him had been rewarded beforehand with promotion in the service several of them without having been in any other campaign, except that with General Hull ; and it was therefore very evident, that the way to favour and rank was to be found in taking the same side.* The prosecuting officer was assisted by special counsel, while General HulFs counsel was not al lowed to speak. The opinions of witnesses against him were freely admitted, as evidence concerning mi litary operations ; and hearsay testimony was also received, under circumstances not dissimilar. In reviewing the history of this campaign, it seems. * Note 13, in Appendix. 408 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812, to us that the following points may be regarded as fully established : First. That so long as Lake Erie was com manded by the British, and the woods by hostile In dians, and by the fall of Mackinaw the Northern Indians were let loose against General Hull, and no co-operation or diversion in his favour was attempt ed at Niagara it was impossible for Detroit to be preserved from falling into the hands of the British. Second. This state of things was not the fault of General Hull, but that of the Administration, in not making adequate preparations in anticipation of war of General Dearborn, in not affording the ex pected co-operation and of the condition of the country, and the inherent difficulties incident to the genius and policy of our government. Third. The charge of treason was dismissed, as wholly groundless, by the Court Martial ; and the charge of cowardice, when examined, becomes in credible and absurd. The only questions, therefore, which can now be raised by reasonable men, are these : Did not Gen eral Hull err in judgment in some of his measures ? Might it not have been better to have attacked Mai den ? and was the surrender of his post at Detroit, without a struggle for its defence, reconcilable with his situation at that time ? The reason assigned for not attacking Maiden, we have seen, was the deficiency of suitable cannon for that purpose, and a want of confidence in the militia, as acknowledged by the officers in command, to storm the works at Maiden, which were defended AND SURRENDER OF THE POST OF DETROIT. 4Q9 by cannon batteries, while reliance on the part of the Americans, was on militia bayonets almost entirely. In considering the conduct of General Hull in o surrendering Detroit, we ought always to bear in mind that he was Governor of the Territory as well as General of the army that he accepted the com mand of the army, for the express purpose of de fending the Territory, and that though in compliance with the orders of the Government, he had invaded Canada, a principal object was still the defence of the people of Michigan. If therefore his situation was such, that even a successful temporary resistance could not finally prevent the fall of Detroit ; had he any right to expose the people of Michigan to that universal massacre which would unquestionably have been the result of a battle at Detroit? It must also be remembered, that at the time of the surrender the fort was crowded with women and children who had fled thither for protection from the town, which tended still more to embarrass the situa tion and move the sympathies of their Governor. If therefore some persons, with whom military glory stands higher than humanity and plain duty, may still blame General Hull for not fighting a use less battle, and for not causing blood to be shed where nothing was to be gained by its effusion, we are confident that all high-minded and judicious persons will conclude, that to sign the surrender of Detroit was an act of greater courage and truer manliness on the part of General Hull, than it would have been to* have sent out his troops to battle. 410 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812. Such has already been the verdict given by thousands throughout the land. In the Appendix will be found letters from some of these, men of the highest distinction ; accompanied by other let ters from the associates of General Hull during the Revolution. Their testimony is valuable as showing the opinion entertained of him by his companions, and it shows what will be the judgment of posterity, when temporary interests, passions, and prejudices shall have passed away. To that ultimate tribunal the friends of General Hull confidently appeal. They call upon future histo rians of the war of 1812, to rise above the influence of prejudice and to render justice to the memory of their fellow-citizen. If his feelings can no longer be com forted by this tardy recompense for the unmerited abuse and calumnies from which he suffered ; the truth of history may at least be vindicated. He sleeps in his tranquil grave, and can never hear that his countrymen have at last understood him. But our country itself will be honoured, if it can be shown, that though, like other republics, it is sometimes un grateful to its servants, yet that it will at last do jus tice to their memory ; and that though clouds of mis representation may long overshadow the name of an upright man, that the sun of truth has at last illumi nated it. "Respexit tamen, et longo post tempore venit." APPENDIX. NOTE 1. Extract from a Notice of General Hull's Memoirs of the Campaign 0/1812, from the North American Review. " ' Memoirs of the Campaign of the Northwestern Army of the United States, A. D. 1812, in a series of Letters addressed to the citizens of the United States, with an Appendix, containing a brief sketch of the Revolution ary services of the author. By WILLIAM HULL, late Governor of the Territory of Michigan ; and Brigadier- General in the service of the United States. 8vo. pp. 240. Boston : True & Green : 1824.' " Most of our readers remember the principal events of the disastrous campaign to which this work relates, and the decision of the court martial by which General Hull was tried. This officer has always considered his case as standing in a very unfair and partial light before the public, and has at last brought forward what he deems a correct detail of all the transactions pertaining to his connexion with the army. " We have no disposition to take any part in the controversy between General Hull and his opponents, 412 APPENDIX. nor to revive a subject which, for the credit of the country, had better be forgotten than remembered ; yet, if we were to judge simply by the public docu ments collected and published in these Memoirs, we must draw the conclusion, unequivocally, that he was required by the General Government to do, what it was morally and physically impossible that he should do that he was surrounded by difficulties which no human agency could conquer ; and in short, whatever may have been his mistakes of judgment in any par ticular movement, he deserved not the unqualified censure inflicted on him by the court martial. " The trial was evidently conducted without a full knowledge of all the testimony in his favour ; import ant documents in the public offices he could not then obtain ; they are now published, and throw new light on the subject. " The precipitancy with which war was declared, the total want of preparation, and the deficiency of means, afford an apology, no doubt, to the General Government, for not providing an immediate and ad equate defence for the northwestern frontier ; but it is an extremely hard case, that an officer should suffer in consequence of the neglect of higher powers. " General Hull has no right to complain, that his orders were not sufficiently clear and explicit ; but he has a right to complain, that he was ordered to defend a long line of frontier, and invade an enemy's pos sessions, without being provided with means to effect such an enterprise ; and above all, has he a right to complain, that he was formally condemned by a grave APPENDIX. 413 military tribunal for the issue of unfortunate events, as mortifying to him in themselves, as they could pos sibly be to any other person less interested, and over which he had no control. We aim not to defend General Hull ; his defence must rest on his book ; let it be conceded that he was guilty of mistakes the question still recurs, and it is one of vital conse quence to the party accused, whether these mistakes may not, in the main, be very easily traced to his cir cumstances to his confident expectation of aid from government, which he never received, and of co-ope ration with other branches of the armv, which never took place, and without both of which there was no possibility of his effecting what was required of him. The public documents and letters published by him, answer this question decidedly in the affirmative, and ought to produce an impression, on the public mind at least, far different from that left by the decision of the court martial. " In addition to their personal bearing, these Me moirs contain many facts of historical value, relating to the last war. The appendix speaks of the author's services in the Revolution." North American Review, January, 1825. Vol. XX. NOTE 2. Memorials by General Hull, recommending a fleet on Lake Erie. The following extracts from memorials by General Hull, concerning a fleet on Lake Erie, show how early he drew the attention of the Government to 414 APPENDIX. this important subject, and with what arguments he urged it upon their attention : Memorial of April 3d, 1809. " I would suggest for consideration the expediency of building some armed vessels on Lake Erie, for the purpose of pre serving the communication ; consider you have three military posts to the north and west of these waters, and no other communication with them." Hull's Memoirs, p. 19. Memorial of June 15, 1811 : u From the present state of our foreign rela tions, particularly with England, I am induced to be lieve there is little prospect of a continuance of peace. In the event of a war with England, this part of the United States (meaning the Michigan Territory) will be peculiarly situated. The British land forces at Amherstburg and St. Josephs, are about equal to those of the United States at this place and Michili- mackinac. The population of Upper Canada is more than twenty to one, compared to this territory. That province contains about one hundred thousand inhab itants, while our population does not amount to five thousand. A wilderness of near two hundred miles separates this settlement from any of the States. Besides, the Indiana Territory and States of Ohio and Kentucky are thinly inhabited, have extensive frontiers, and their own force will be necessary for their own defence. With respect to the Indians, their situation and habits are such that little depend ence can be placed on them. At present they appear friendly, and was I to calculate on the profession of their chiefs, I should be satisfied that they would not APPENDIX. 415 become hostile. Their first passion, however, is war. The policy of the British Government is to consider them their allies, and in the event of war, to invite them to join their standard. The policy of the American Government has been to advise them, in the event of war, to remain quiet at their villages, and take no part in quarrels in which they have no interest. Many of their old sachems and chiefs would advise to this line of conduct. Their authority, however, over the warriors would not restrain them. They would not listen to their advice. An Indian is hardly considered as a man, until he has been engaged in war, and can show trophies. This first and most ardent of all their passions will be excited by pre sents, most gratifying to their pride and vanity. Unless strong measures are taken to prevent it, we may consider, beyond all doubt, they will be influ enced to follow the advice of their British Father. This then appears to be the plain state of the case : the British have a regular force equal to ours. The province of Upper Canada has on its rolls a militia of twenty to one against us. In addition to this there can be but little doubt, but a large proportion of the savages will join them : what then will be the situation of this part of the country ? Separated from the States by an extensive wilderness, which will be filled with savages, to prevent any succour, our water communications entirely obstructed by the British armed vessels on Lake Erie, we shall have no other resource for defence but the small garrisons, and feeble population of the territory. Under these cir- 416 APPENDIX. cumstances it is easy to foresee what will be the fate of this country. " It is a principle in nature, that the lesser force must give way to the greater. Since my acquaint ance with the situation of this country, I have been of the opinion that the government did not sufficient ly estimate its value and importance. After the Rev olution, and after it was ceded to us by treaty, the blood and treasure of our country were expended in a savage war to obtain it. The post at this place is the key of the Northern country. By holding it, the Indians are kept in check, and peace has been pre served with them to the present time. If we were once deprived of it, the Northern Indians would have nowhere to look, but to the British government in Upper Canada. They would then be entirely influ enced by their councils. It would be easy for them, aided by the councils of the British agents, to com mit depredations on the scattered frontier settlements of Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, &c. They would be collected from the most distant parts of their villages, where the English factors have an intercourse with them, and would become numerous. Under these circumstances, if there is a prospect of war with England, what measures are most expedient ? In my mind there can be no doubt. Prepare a naval force on Lake Erie, superior to the British, and sufficient to preserve your communication" HuWs Memoirs, pp. 19-20. Memorial of March 6, 1812 : " If we cannot com mand the ocean, we can command the inland lakes APPENDIX. of our country. I have always been of opinion, that we ought to have built as many armed vessels on the Lakes as would have commanded them : we have more interest in them than the British nation, and can build vessels with more convenience." Huffs Memoirs, p. 21. NOTE 3. The following letter is from the Secretary of War to General Dearborn : "WAR DEPARTMENT, 26th June, 1812. " SIR : Having made the necessary arrange ments for the defence of the seaboard, it is the wish of the President that you should repair to Albany, and prepare the force to be collected at that place for ac tual service. It is understood, that being possessed of a full view of the intentions of the Government, and being also acquainted with the disposition of the force under your command, you will take your own time, and give the necessary orders to the officers on the sea-coast. "It is altogether uncertain at what time General Hull may deem it expedient to commence offensive operations. The preparations it is presumed will be made, to move in a direction to Niagara, Kingston, and Montreal. On your arrival at Albany, you will be able to form an opinion of the time required to pre pare the troops for action. " To Major-General DEARBORN." Huffs Memoirs, p. 173. Records of War Office, Vol. V., folio 458 27 41 8 APPENDIX. NOTE 4. "LEWISTOWN, August 19th, 1812. " In the night of the 17th I received your letter of 8th inst. The inclosures have been delivered to Lieutenant-Colonel Myers, commanding at Fort George, who has since acknowledged the receipt of the letters, and pledged himself strictly to observe the terms of the armistice, " I am, &c. S. VAN RENSSELAER." NOTE 5. Letter from Sir George Prevost to General Brock. "AUGUST, 2, 1812. " Last evening an officer of the 98th Regiment arrived here, express from Halifax, the bearer of despatches to me dated on 22d ult., from Mr. Foster, who was then in Nova Scotia. I lose no time in making you acquainted with the substance of this gentleman's communication. He informs me that he had just received despatches from England, re ferring to a declaration of Ministers in Parliament, relative to a proposed repeal of the ' Orders in Coun cil' provided that the United States Government would return to relations of amity with us, the con tents of which may possibly induce the American Government to agree to a suspension of hostilities, as a preliminary to negotiations for peace. As I propose sending Colonel Baynes immediately into the United States, with a proposal for a cessation APPENDIX. 419 of hostile operations, I enclose for your information, the copy of my letter to General Dearborn, or the Commander-in-chief of the American forces. * * * A report has been made to me that a frigate and six transports, with the Royal Scots (1st Battalion) on board, from the West Indies, are just below Bic ; in consequence of this reinforcement I have ordered the company of the 49th Regiment sent to Kingston, to remain there ; and in addition to the Royal New foundland Regiment, and a detachment of an officer and fifty veterans, most fit for service, now on their route to that station, I shall order Major Ormsby, with three companies of the 49th Regiment to pro ceed from Montreal to the same post, to be disposed of as you may find it necessary." Life of Brock, p. 214, NOTE 6, Mr. Charles J. Ingersoll, with much naivete, nar rates his own expectations, and how they were cooled by the opinions of a man of military experience. In his History of the War of 1812, pp. 85-87, he thus speaks : " My first doubt or uneasiness was the suggestion of an old soldier, whose residence I sometimes visited in the summer season. This gentleman raised a full company of a hundred hardy mountaineers, on the first outbreak of the war of the Revolution, and marched them, before even the Declaration of Inde pendence, through the trackless wilds of a northern 420 APPENDIX. winter, to join Montgomery, whose army he did not reach till the day after his defeat and death before Quebec. From that time throughout the war he was every where, as the hardest service called, from Long Island to Georgia, conspicuous in every battle, at Long Island, Morimouth and Yorktown, closing seven years of constant and arduous, yet, to him, always cheerful and pleasant campaigning, at the last action of the war, the siege of Savannah ; from Quebec to Savannah, never off duty, foremost in all encounters, a soldier in every qualification. " It was from this veteran soldier, meeting him at the chief town of his county, that I heard with incredulous annoyance, the first doubts of Hull's success. I had no doubt that he was in full and tri umphant march from Maiden to Queenstown. Gen eral Craig expressed his apprehensions of the reverse, He knew the difficulties, the chances, the obstacles in the way ; had attentively read all the newspaper ac counts of the expedition, could estimate probabilities of Indian enmity ; had experienced the force of Eng lish armies : shook his head at my confidence, and advised me not to be too sanguine. Not from any disparagement of Hull, but from the inherent mishaps of military proceedings; the fortune of war : this Nestor of another war, questioned the success of our outset, and disturbed my dreams of triumph." APPENDIX, 421 NOTE 7. The following letter from the Records of the War Office (Vol. VI. page 253) shows that the Secretary of War expected at that time to bear the blame of the misfortunes of the campaign, which he seemed to think might perhaps have otherwise rested on the Commander-in-chief. "WAR DEPARTMENT, Dec. 18, 1812. " SIR, Your letter of the llth is received. Fortunately for you, the want of success which has attended the campaign, will be attributed to the Sec retary of War. So long as you enjoy the confidence of the Government, the clamour of the discontented should not be regarded. You are requested to make an exchange of General Hull as soon as possible." (Signed) WILLIAM EUSTIS." " To Major-General DEARBORN." NOTE 8. " Witness cannot say whether the agitation pro ceeded from personal alarm or from a consideration of the heavy responsibility in which he was involved ; and he does not know whether at the time he formed any decided opinion on the subject." Miller's Tes timony, Trial, p. 110. NOTE 9 " General Hull appeared engaged as usual, and agitated more than usual, on the morning of the 16th 5 422 APPENDIX. but witness does not know the cause ; he had no suspicion that it proceeded from personal fear ; nei ther did he hear any of the officers at the time ex press the opinion that it did," Bacon's testimony^ p. 124, Hull's TriaL NOTE 10. " I saw General Hull riding on horseback, and cast my eye upon his countenance ; his voice appeared cool and collected ; 1 saw him ride off; I saw nothing like agitation ; my reason for looking particularly at the General's countenance was, because there was* a clamour that he was intimidated." Captain Max well's testimony, Hull's Trial, p. 128. NOTE 11. " The General's situation was a critical one. He had a great deal of responsibility, and great care on his mind, if he had any feelings. I saw nothing in his conduct but what might be accounted for without recurring to personal fear." Major Munson's testi mony, Hull's Trial, p. 131. NOTE 12. Question by General Hull to witness " How did 1 appear on that morning (of the surrender) ? Answer. " You appeared perfectly tranquil and collected." Testimony of Colonel Watson, Hull's, Trial, page 149, APPENDIX. 423 NOTE 13. The following account of the Court Martial is by General Hull. "Young General Dearborn has pub lished the names of the officers who composed the Court Martial, with his father at the head, as Presi dent. It required two-thirds only of the members to pronounce the sentence. It is very certain that it was not unanimous, as it is said, ' two-thirds of the members agreed to it.' Had it been unanimous, it would have been so stated. It must be evident that a part of the Court were opposed to it. I should be happy, indeed, were it in my power to designate the characters who were only influenced by disinterested and honourable motives. " I have stated the reasons why I did not object to the President or any of the members of this Court Martial. I had been much more than a year a prisoner in arrest ; was conscious of having faith fully done my duty, and in my official communication to the Government requested an investigation of my conduct. It had been delayed in an unprecedented manner, during this long time, and I believed, had I made objections to the President, or any members of the Court, it would have caused further delay. Be sides, most of the members of the Court were stran gers to me ; men whom I never before had seen, and whose names I had never heard, excepting General Dearborn, General Bloomfield, Colonel Fenwick, Colonel House, and Lieutenant-Colonel Conner. By examining the list, published by young General 424 APPENDIX. Dearborn, you will perceive the other members be longed to new raised regiments, which did not exist during the campaign of 1812. They were appointed to regiments numbered from thirty-two to forty-two. They had no military rank at that time. "It is well known that officers were selected to form these additional regiments, from the most violent partisans of the Administration, and this alone was a sufficient qualification. Officers of this description constituted a majority of the Court. They were pledged to any measures which the Administration^ my persecutors, wished. With respect to General Dearborn, the President, the deep interest which he had in the issue of the trial, has been presented to you. General Bloomfield was a meritorious officer of the Revolution, and served with credit to himself. He was an amiable and much respected citizen at the termination of the Revolutionary war, and 1 believe retained the esteem of society to the close of his life. Colonel Fenwick and Colonel House, I have ever believed, were governed by the purest and most honourable motives, and were under no other influ ence than a sense of duty. Lieutenant-Colonel Conner received his commission about the time that General Dearborn was appointed the first Major- General. He was in his family, and one of his Aids. But a short time before the Court Martial was or dered, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant- Colonel, by the same patronage, and selected as a member of the Court for my trial. To the President of the Court Martial he owed both his first appoint ment and his sudden promotion*' 3 APPENDIX. 425 NOTE 14. Major Bannister's letter to General Wade Hamp ton (the latter having been appointed, in the first in stance, the President of the Court Martial on the trial of General Hull, to convene in 1813 ; but the Court did not meet, it having been superseded by another Court, with General Dearborn as President, which met in February, 1814, at Albany Hull's Trial, Ap pendix, page 1) is as follows: " BROOKFIELD, February 17th, 1813. "MR. PRESIDENT: Having learned that my war-worn companion in arms, General William Hull, is called upon to answer to some of the highest charges which can be preferred against a military character, and that you, sir, are the President of the Court before whom he is to be tried,! take the liberty of addressing to you a few observations on the sub ject, which are dictated by the interest I feel for my country, as also the reputation and character of my friend, who stands highly criminated before you. My first acquaintance with General Hull was in times the most unfortunate ' the times that tried men's souls.' The services which he rendered to his country during the Revolutionary war, ought not to be forgotten. He was then young, active, brave and faithful ; high in the estimation of his superior officers, and respect ed even by his enemies, for his fidelity to his country. 1 will not unnecessarily take up your time, in de tailing the innumerable hardships, fatigues, privations and sufferings to which we were subjected, during 426 APPENDIX. the worst of times. It is sufficient for my purpose on this occasion, to notice particularly the capture of Burgoyne, and the well known battle of Monmouth. In these two memorable events, where the ground was covered with the dead bodies of the slain, and the air resounded with the groans of the dying, Hull was unshaken. He bravely fought, and a grateful country acknowledged his bravery. I was then Bri gade-Major to General Learned, in whose brigade General Hull was a Major, in Colonel Brooks's Re giment. The welfare of his country was apparently as dear to him as his life ; but if he has now fallen, he has fallen indeed. Having associated with him in times so interesting, and in no other character than that of a brave man, I shall be unhappy to learn that he has terminated his patriotic career by meanly act ing the coward. (Signed, SETH BANNISTER." General Heath's Certificate, Hull's Trial, Appendix, p. 2. " I, William Heath, of Roxbury, in the county of Norfolk, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts, having served as a General Officer in the American Revolutionary war, from the commencement of hostilities on the 19th of April, 1775, until peace took place in 1783, hereby certify, and on my sacred honour declare (and to which I am ready to make solemn oath), that in the said war William Hull, now a Brigadier-General in the army of the United States, served as an officer in various places, in all APPENDIX. 427 of which he sustained the character of a brave and good officer possessed the particular esteem and confidence of General Washington, who was anxious for his promotion, as will appear from extracts of his letter to this deponent on that subject, which are exhibited herewith. That this deponent being in the immediate command of the American troops in the Highlands of New-York, on Hudson river, in the month of January, 1781, an enterprise was contem plated against the enemy at Morrissania, the then advanced post of the British army, which enterprise was to be intrusted to the Lieutenant-Colonel Hull, now Brigadier-General Hull. The success of this enterprise was doubtful, in the opinion of General Washington, when it was communicated to him, as will appear by an extract of a letter from him here with exhibited. But Lieutenant Colonel Hull, with the troops under his command, were successful. With great address and gallantry, they forced a narrow passage to the enemy, and with the loss of one subaltern, one drummer and ten privates killed, one captain, one sergeant and eleven rank and file wounded, completely defeated the enemy, and be sides the killed took upwards of fifty prisoners, cut away the pontoon bridge, took a considerable quan tity of forage, a number of cattle, &c., for which they were thanked in the public orders. This depo nent during the Revolutionary war, having at differ ent times had the honour to command the State lines of the army from New Hampshire to New Jersey, inclusive, and two brigades of more southern lines ; 428 APPENDIX. Lieutenant-Colonel Hull sustained a conspicuous character as a brave, faithful and good officer. (Signed) WM. HEATH." " Roxbury, December 20th, 1813." Extracts of Letters from General Washington., to Major General Heath, mentioned in the deposition. "HEAD QUARTERS, Morristown, Dec. 13, 1779. " The case between Major Hull and Major Cogs well is of more delicacy and very important. Major Hull was not appointed by the State to the Majority in Colonel Jackson's regiment ; he was appointed by me at the intercession of several officers of the State line, and not without authority. He is an officer of great merit, and whose services have been honourable to himself and honourable to his country. 1 was then persuaded, as I still am, that a good officer would, and ever will be, an object of the State's regard ; and there has been no injustice done to Major Cogswell. Perhaps by your repre sentation you may be able to get matters put right, and I am sure you can scarcely render any more essential service than prevailing on the Honourable Assembly to preserve the arrangement inviolate, and to pursue the rules of promotion which have been established. In the case of Major Hull, he might, as I have been long since told, been arranged as Lieu tenant-Colonel, on the Connecticut line, by the Com mittee of Congress at White Plains in 1778." APPENDIX. 429 On the Enterprise against the Enemy. "HEAD QUARTERS, New Windsor, Jan. 7, 1781. "You will be pleased to observe, on the subject of your letter of last evening, that although I am not very sanguine in my expectation of the success of the enterprise proposed, yet I think in our present circumstances it will be advisable to encourage it. Colonel Hull may therefore have permission to make the attempt." " The foregoing are true extracts from the ori ginals. (Signed) WM. HEATH." " Roocbury, Dec. 20, 1813." Salmon HubbeWs Certificate, Hull's Trial, Appendix, p. 6. " I, Salmon Hubbell, of Bridgeport, in the State of Connecticut, being duly sworn, do depose and say, that I was a Lieutenant in the 5th Connecticut Regiment of Continental Troops, and was acquainted with General William Hull, in the Revolutionary army, and always considered him a gentleman in every respect, as well as a brave and a good officer. He was in the attack on Stony Point, which took place in the morning of July 16th, 1779, under the immediate command of General Wayne ; (the mode of attack now before me) wherein is ordered that Colonel Meigs will form next in Febiger's rear, and Major Hull in the rear of Colonel Meigs, which will be the right column. The result speaks in the highest language for the good conduct of each officer and soldier. This deponent further saith that he did 430 APPENDIX. aid and assist in said attack on Stony Point, and was therefore knowing to the conduct of General Hull therein. (Signed) SALMON HUBBELL." " Bridgeport, January 20, 1814." " Sworn to before me, Joseph Backus, Justice of the Peace." Deposition of Adjutant Tufts, Hull's Trial, Appendix, p. L "BOSTON, Feb, 3, 1814. " To the President and members of the General Court Martial, sitting in Albany, for the trial of General Hull. "GENTLEMEN Having been solicited by the friends of General Hull to state my knowledge of his character and conduct during the Revolutionary war, I have the honour of submitting the following particulars. I was with him as Sergeant-Major of the 8th Massachusetts Regiment at Ticonderoga, and in the same regiment at taking Burgoyne's army, and was with the regiment he commanded in taking Stony Point, and his Adjutant. " His character for courage and firmness on all these occasions W 7 as unexceptionable ; and he was a good military man, and was universally esteemed by his brother officers, and beloved by his soldiers. (Signed) FRANCIS TUFTS." APPENDIX. 431 Certificate of J. Brooks, late Governor of Massachusetts., Hull's Trial, Appendix, p. 5. "BOSTON, Feb. 4, 1814. " Having been requested by Brigadier-General Hull to state any information in my power to you, respecting his character as an officer, during the late Revolutionary War, I would observe, that I became acquainted with this gentleman in the month of February, 1776, and that from that time I was well acquainted with his character and conduct to the close of the war in 1783. During that period it fell to the General's lot frequently to meet the enemy in combat; and in every instance he acquitted himself much to his honour, and to the satisfaction of his supe rior officers. No officer of his rank (as far as my knowledge of that subject will enable me to speak) stood higher in the estimation of the army generally than General Hull ; not only as a disciplinarian, and an officer of intelligence, but as a man of great enter prise and gallantry. I can add, that he possessed in a high degree the confidence of General Washington. Notwithstanding my long acquaintance with General Hull, as an officer, I never had an opportunity to witness his conduct in action more than once, al though I have often seen him under circumstances of great danger from the fire of the enemy. "In the month of September, 1776, at White Plains, he acted under my immediate orders, and was detached from the line, with a company he then commanded, to oppose a body of light infantry and Yagers, advancing upon the left flank of the American 432 APPENDIX. army. His orders were executed with great promp titude, gallantry, and effect. Though more than double his number, the enemy was compelled to retreat, and the left of the American line thus enabled, by a flank movement, in safety to pass the Bronx. " With great respect I am, sir, your servant, (Signed) J. BROOKS." " To the President of the Court Martial, Albany." Certificate of Joseph McCaken, Hull's Trial, Appendix, page 6. " ALBANY, 17th February, 1814. " To the Court Martial appointed for the trial of General Hull : " I say, on my sacred honour, that I was a Cap tain, in the year 1777, in Colonel Vanscock's Regi ment, of the State of New-York; that I served with General Hull in the year 1777, in the expedition un der General Arnold, which relieved Fort Stanwix ; that I likewise served with General Hull in the cam paign of 1778, and was with him in the battle of Monmouth, when 1 was wounded, and lost my arm ; that there was no officer of General Hull's rank that stood higher in my estimation, and, as far as I knew, in the estimation of the army ; that he was consider ed as a brave and excellent officer. (Signed) JOSEPH McCAKEN, A Major in the New-York line in 1778." APPENDIX. 433 Letter from John Stacy, a Revolutionary soldier, to General William Hull "HARVARD, 20th August, 1824. " GENERAL WILLIAM HULL : " SIR, Permit a soldier of the Revolutionary war, who served six years previous to its close, and who is a native of the county of Middlesex, to con gratulate you on the honourable testimony borne by General Heath and others, Highly distinguished in that war, for your having acted so distinguished a part in our Revolutionary struggles. I am probably one of the few remaining who was under your command in the hazardous expedition at Morrissania, and I feel myself happy in living to this period, that I may wit ness to the gallantry and address with which the en terprise was effected ; not only as it respects the as sault on the enemy in that place, but on the morning after, in decoying the enemy some miles from its lines, without any material injury to our troops, and until it came in contact with our reinforcements, which immediately checked the enemy and drove it back with considerable loss. We were nearly forty hours from our quarters and the whole time on the alert, without any respite from duty. Well knowing the courage and enterprise of the commander on this occasion inspired every soldier with a noble ardour ; animated everyone to a prompt and cheerful per formance of duty, and stimulated them to follow their leader, not knowing whither going or what the object. " Would to God, Sir, I could add one mite, to have your character as an officer and soldier, placed on its 28 434 APPENDIX. proper basis ; and to have it entirely acquitted from what I consider, and I believe thousands of your fellow-citizens do also, the vile, wicked, and corrupt proceedings, that have been had against you, in con sequence of the failure of the expedition against Canada in the late war, and that those who formed the scheme of your destruction, might soon feel the weight of their own iniquitous conduct. " From an old soldier, who still feels the high value of a soldier's reputation. (Signed) JOHN STACY." Letter from Daniel Putnam, Esq., Son of General Putnam, to General Hull. "BROOKLYN, Ct., Sep. 25, 1824. " MY DEAR Sm, The renewal of a correspond ence that has been suspended almost half a century, in all which time there has been little personal in tercourse, is an awkward left-handed business, which one knows hardly how to begin. " Like a mariner without a compass on the track less ocean, who steers his bark by guess, and while he remembers where his home was, is ignorant of the course that will conduct him to it, so am I, alike un certain whether any advance on my part can bring me back to your remembrance, with the kindness of olden time, and if any, how I shall set myself at work to make it most successfully. " If I advert to the season of youth, when under the appellation of < Rebels,' and, as it were, with hal ters about our necks, we were among the number APPENDIX. 435 who opposed a powerful enemy and never quailed at his approach, why then, I know not how to asso ciate a lofty spirit and a patriot heart with dishonour. " If I call to remembrance the laurels w r hich then encircled your brow, and the deeds of renown which drew forth the thanks of Washington in general or ders, and those of Congress inscribed on their jour nals, I recognize you as the gallant Colonel Hull, at the head of his partisan corps, and do not forget how I rejoiced in the well merited fame of my friend. " But when I heard of you in more advanced life as a general officer, at the head of an army destined for the conquest of an enemy's province, I doubted the extension of your fame, and feared for the safety of that which had already been acquired ; not that your valour was questioned, but because you had embarked without adequate means, in an enterprise where suc cess was so necessary to conciliate public favour, and so indispensable to preserve the public confidence, that disaster, however unavoidable, must be attended with certain ruin. " When the news of your capitulation reached us, and the epithets of Coward,' ' Traitor,' &c., were bellowed lustily from so many mouths, and rung long and loud in our ears, I thought, as I now think ; and when, after a long delayed trial, I read your de fence before the Court Martial, and the cruel sen tence of that Court, I marked you as the ' scape-goat ' on whose head the errors of others were laid, to di vert the public indignation from their own ; but I never did believe your blood would be shed to expiate their sins ; it was a sacrifice too daring. 436 APPENDIX. " It is the property of narrow minds, when in flated with success, that they are commonly hurried on to deeds of arrogance ; and you have witnessed another attempt to consign another name to infamy. All that I can wish for you is, that yours may rise as far above the intrigues of your enemies, as that has done, above the imputations suggested by malice and envy. " It was thirty years after death, before the ven omous dart was sped, and ere you shall have slept like time in dust, history will do you justice, and no recreant hand shall change the sentence. " Accept my best wishes for the peace and happi ness of your remaining life, and believe me your friend, (Signed) DANIEL PUTNAM," " General WM. HULL." Letter from Charles P. Sumner, Esq., to General Hull. "BOSTON, March 11, 1825. " SIR, I perceive by the publications you have made in the course of the year past, in the ' States man,' and in your pamphlet, that you are desirous to dispel the clouds that for a while seemed to rest upon your name. I therefore feel it my duty to express to you my humble opinion, that your Memoirs have had and are having the desired effect, of reinstating you in the good opinion of impartial and disinterested men : this is the effect, wherever 1 have had an op portunity of hearing their opinion, and it is the effect on me, although I am one of those who had some degree of prejudice to your disadvantage. APPENDIX. 437 " There are Gates and Bedloes in more countries than England ; and in other times than those of Charles II. ; and you have afforded an instance of the truth of a remark of Charles J. Fox, in his history of a short period previous to the English Revolution ; that one of the chief evils attendant on times of high political excitement, is the facility it gives a dominant party, to brand their rivals with opprobrium, and make even the records of the history of their country speak the language of malice and falsehood, couched in the forms of law. " I am unknown to you., but there are thousands equally unknown, that are daily imbibing and recov ering the most respectful sentiments towards you, and believe that your character will not suffer in the estimation of unprejudiced posterity by any compari son that can be instituted between you and any of your more successful cotemporaries ; two of whom have so recently bid farewell to the smiles or frowns of men. " Whoever may be your survivor, I sincerely hope your sun may set in a cloudless sky. (Signed) CHARLES P. SUMNER." " General Wai. HULL." Letter from Roger M. Sherman, Esq., to General Hull. "FAIRFIELD, Ct. } March 21, 1825. " DEAR SIR, I cannot forbear expressing to you the great satisfaction 1 have derived from the perusal of your * Memoirs of the Campaign of the North western Army.' So far as I know the public senti- 438 APPENDIX. ment, they are deemed a satisfactory and unanswera ble vindication. Your proofs are conclusive ; and no mind, however prejudiced, accustomed to the weigh ing of evidence, can resist the inferences you make from them. This remark is extensively verified in the circle of my own observation. I am happy that you possessed such ample means of doing an act of justice to yourself, your friends, and your country. " Please to accept from Mrs. Sherman and my self, and present to Mrs. Hull and your family, assu rances of our very sincere esteem. (Signed) ROGER M. SHERMAN." " General WM. HULL." Letter from Dr. James Thacher (the historian) to General Hull " PLYMOUTH, April 4, 1825. " DEAR SIR, I have perused your Memoirs with great satisfaction. It has confirmed my conviction, and I have no doubt but it has had the same effect on every candid and unprejudiced mind. I am decid edly of opinion, that justice and duty require that you should no longer estrange yourself from the so ciety of your fellow-citizens and your compatriots, and I hope you will resume that standing with the public to which you are unquestionably entitled. 1 expected to have seen you in our ranks, at our inter view with General Lafayette. Since the much lamented death of our excellent and amiable friend, General Brooks, I have suggested to several of our APPENDIX. 439 brethren, that you ought to succeed him as President of our Society (Cincinnati). Some few have ob jected, and Dr. Townsend (our Vice-President) and Major Alden have been mentioned, and the result is uncertain. " I understood that you have received a letter from General Lafayette, and should be glad to know the purport of it. He has promised me that he will visit this town before he leaves the country, and I shall wait on him immediately on his arrival at Bos ton. Being in Boston not long since, I was much gratified to learn, that you had written a Memorial to Congress, in favour of our Revolutionary claims. Some months ago, I addressed through the ' Centi- nelj the surviving officers on the same subject, and wrote to General Brooks, requesting his opinion re specting a special meeting of our Society, to take the business into consideration, while the enthusiasm ex cited by the presence of General Lafayette was in operation. At no period have the surviving officers been held in higher respect and more grateful recol lection than the present, and never perhaps was public money appropriated more to the satisfaction of the people, than that for pensions and the grant to General Lafayette. " I cannot believe but Congress will be disposed to do justice to the few survivors, who are so fairly entitled to consideration, if a proper application should be made. I will thank you to forward to me a copy of your Memorial, if not too bulky for a mail kter, or inform me of the purport of it, and whether 440 APPENDIX. you include the heirs of deceased officers and the soldiers. " I am jour friend and very humble servant, (Signed) JAMES THACHER." " General WM. HULL." Letter from the Honourable Horace Binney of Philadelphia to Mrs. Maria Campbell, a daughter of General Hull. "PHILADELPHIA, March 4, 1841. " MY DEAR MRS. CAMPBELL, Your letter of 24th February gives me great pleasure, in the assurance that a grandson of General Hull is preparing himself to present to his countrymen that portion of our history which is particularly connected with the life and actions of his ancestor. It will be a worthy employment of his talents as a scholar, and an inter esting record of his filial piety. " TheVe are perhaps too many still living who are interested in sustaining the unjust sentence of the day, to permit us to hope for the universal acceptance of any work that shall bring it and them to reproach, by exposing the prejudices and party interests which led to it. But the truth, dispassionately told, and sustained by evidence, is sure to triumph, sooner or later. It is one of the common incidents of our condition, a state of war between evil and good, that its triumph is frequently too late for the happi ness of those we respect and love. " You ask me what I think about asking the Government for a revocation of the sentence of the APPENDIX. 1 Court Martial. As this is a question which involves the opinions and sentiments of others, rather than myself. I should of course think it best to leave a decision upon it, until the work you speak of shall have appeared, and had its effect. " The want of regular and legal authority in any branch of the Government, to reverse such a sen tence, will always be the refuge of such as may be opposed to the reversal, and can find no reasons against it in justice. Governments are, moreover, unwilling in general to record their own injustice, even when the injustice has been the work of party, and the party that perpetrated it has passed away. " You must be familiar with the case of Admiral Byng the deepest stain I think upon the memory of Chatham, and the deepest disgrace of George II. and his ministers. Byng was sacrificed, without a solitary reason in his own conduct or character, and with no motive, but to screen the incompetency of the ministers of that day. Posterity has reversed the sentence, fully and unanimously. But there has been no other reversal of it. " After all, a reversal by the Government is a form. The true reversal is by the voice, and in the hearts, of the people. With those who know the case of General Hull, that reversal has, I think, been already pronounced. The thing to be desired by the personal friends of himself and his family is, to make that reversal the sentence of history. " How much I shall be gratified to see, to live to see, I may say, all your wishes attained on this, a 442 APPENDIX. subject among the nearest to your heart, I need not say. " I am, my dear madam, " With great regard, your friend, (Signed) HOR. BINNEY." Letter from Colonel Trumbull to Mrs. Julia K. Wheeler, a daughter of General Hull. "NEW HAVEN, June 3d, 1841. " MADAM, I received in due time the letter of the 15th May, which you was pleased to address to me, accompanying the Memoir, written by your father, General Hull, which explains the events of the cam paign of 1812. I am very much obliged to you for giving me this opportunity to know and understand the true history of that period, better than I did before. " The declaration and conduct of that war, 1 have always regarded as one of the least honourable passages of the American history, but I now view it with increased disgust, as a most disgraceful period of the grossest ignorance and misconduct ; and what is worse, a vile endeavour to divert public indignation from its authors and conductors, by a sacrifice of the reputation, and even life, of one of the bravest offi cers of the Revolution. " I had not the pleasure of a personal acquaint ance with your honoured father during the Revolu tion, as we were employed in quarters distant from each other, but I always regarded him as one of the ornaments of the service. " With sincere respect, I have the honour to be, madam, your faithful servant, (Signed) JNO. TRUMBULL,'* " Mrs. JULIA K. WHEELER." APPENDIX. 443 NOTE 15. Robert Wallace's Account of the Surrender of Detroit. The following letter was published May 28th, 1842, in the Licking Valley Register, at Covington, Kentucky, and was written by Robert Wallace, a gentleman who was one of the Aid-de-Camps of General Hull. This testimony to the character of General Hull is valuable, because it was given volun tarily, without solicitation, and without communica tion with General Hull's friends, who did not even know that Mr. Wallace was still living. It is a graphic and evidently correct account of the principal inci dents of the campaign and surrender. The letter is here reprinted without alteration, except the omission of a single phrase, concerning Captain Hull, which might be misunderstood. All the remarks of Mr. Wallace upon General Hull's con duct, whether favourable or otherwise, are given with out alteration or comment. "HULL'S SURRENDER, " Mr. R. C. LAXGDON : " SIR, In compliance with your request, and the solicitations of several other friends, I have written out, from recollection, a brief detail of circumstances connected with the surrender of Detroit in 1812. My situation as Aid-de-Camp, afforded every oppor tunity for information, and I am satisfied that nothing 444 APPENDIX. of any importance transpired in Hull's campaign without my knowledge of the motive. " The prudence and despatch of our march through a wilderness, making our road through woods and swamps ; fortifying our camps, and guarding against a surprise from the Indians, inspired us with confidence in our old but experienced commander. His letters from the War Department urged him on, but our heavy wagons and constant rains retarded our pro gress. On reaching the rapids of the Miami river, we found an American schooner bound for Detroit. Anxious to comply with his instructions, General Hull directed our surplus baggage to be shipped, and set an example to his officers, by sending his own trunks on board. His son, Captain Hull, (who was also an Aid,) in executing this order, unfortunately shipped a small trunk, containing the papers and reports of the army, for which he was afterwards se verely reprimanded by his father. This circumstance was since considered an evidence of treachery, but without the least foundation whatever. On the fol lowing night, in camp, we received the declaration of war. A council was immediately called, and an officer despatched with some men to intercept the schooner, at the river Raisin ; but the wind had been fair, and she had passed that river before our messenger reached its mouth. The British had received the news of war by the Lake, before it reached us, and the schooner was captured at Maiden. She had on board the most of our baggage, our hospital stores, our in trenching tools, an officer and three ladies, belonging APPENDIX. 445 to the 4th regiment, and a number of invalid soldiers. On the 4th of July we delayed at the river Huron to build a bridge for our wagons. We remained under arms all day, and in order of battle, being surrounded by Indians, and in sight of a British frigate full of troops. During that day it was remarked to me by several officers, that General Hull appeared to have no sense of personal danger, and that he would cer tainly be killed, if a contest commenced. This was said, to prepare me for taking orders from the next in rank ; and I mention it to show their opinion of him at the time. " We encamped that night on an open prairie, without timber to fortify, or tools to intrench. Our rear was protected by the river, our front and flank by fires at some distance from the lines. Picket- guards were posted, scouts kept in motion, and half the troops alternately under arms all night. All lights were extinguished in the camp but one that was for the use of the Surgeon, for we expected an attack be fore day. 1 give this as a specimen of vigilance, which could never have been taken by surprise ; our camp and line of march were always in order of battle. " The extent of General Hull's instructions were, 4 to protect Detroit.' On our arrival there, most of our officers and men were eager to cross the line, which the General was not authorized to do, but on receiving permission, he moved over at the head of two regiments, and sent back his boats for the re mainder. We looked for a warm reception, but a 446 APPENDIX. feint towards Maiden on the previous evening had induced the enemy to retire to that post in the night. Our camp was fortified immediately opposite Detroit, where a council was held on the propriety of attack ing Maiden without a battering train of artillery, which was not then in readiness. Some of our officers were willing to try the experiment, but a majority was opposed to the risk of assaulting a regular fort with raw troops, and without artillery to make a breach. Consequently it was determined that we should wait for the mounting of some heavy guns which lay at Detroit, and two floating batteries Were prepared for their transportation by water. " This determination occasioned a delay of nearly three weeks, which proved most fatal to the results of the campaign. Had we been prepared for an immediate attack upon Maiden, our campaign would have been as glorious as it was otherwise disastrous, and the name of General Hull would have been ex alted to the skies. " During this unfortunate interval, we subsisted in a great measure upon supplies obtained in Canada. Our own stock would not have sustained us, and all communication with our country was cut off. The romantic policy of our Government, in refusing the aid of our own Indians, turned them against us, cut off our supplies by land, and increased the strength of the enemy. " A company of volunteers from Ohio, under Cap tain Brush, arrived at the river Raisin with some cattle and flour. Four hundred riflemen, commanded APPENDIX, 447 by Major Vanhorne, were sent to escort them to De troit. This detachment fell into an ambuscade of Indians, and was routed with serious loss. About this time we received intelligence of the surrender of Mackinaw and Chicago, the only American forts above us on the Lakes. Two vessels came down, loaded with furs and American prisoners, under white flags, and expected to pass us in the character of cartels ; but they were captured and placed between our bat* teries at Detroit. Those surrenders let loose upon us all the Indians and Voyageurs of the upper Lakes. " About the 4th of August our guns were ready ; orders were given to prepare three days' provisions, to remove all surplus baggage to Detroit, and the long anticipated movement on Maiden was to have been made on the following day. Our troops conjectured that such was the intention, and were animated with the prospect of a decisive blow. But that night the unfortunate intelligence arrived, that a considerable force of British, Canadians and Indians, was coming upon our rear by an interior route. " Here a ruinous error was committed. Instead of making the attack on Maiden before the reinforce ments of the enemy could arrive, General Hull order ed a retreat to Detroit, leaving a small and imperfect fortification with three hundred men, to hold his footing on the Canadian shore, and prevent the bom- bardment of Detroit. After two or three days occupation, this miserable concern was abandoned. General Hull's instructions < to protect Detroit,' 448 APPENDIX. seemed ever uppermost in his mind, but he lacked the energy necessary to accomplish that object by vigor ous operations against the enemy. His policy was altogether on the defensive. After our return to De troit, another detachment of about 800 men, under Lieut. Col. Miller, was despatched to meet Captain Brush. They met a superior force of British and Indians at Brownstown, and after a severe engage ment, drove the British to their boats ; but were too much disabled to proceed. At the solicitations of Colonels Cass and McArthur, those two enterprising officers were permitted to take the pick of their regi ments and try the circuitous route of Wayne's old trace through the woods. They left Detroit on the 14th of August, whilst a movement was made down the river bank, to deceive the spies of the enemy, and the detachment escaped their observation. Our pro visions were now a subject of serious concern, and these circumstances show what prospect we had to replenish them. " When General Hull accepted the command of the Northwestern Army, he stipulated for the speedy possession of Lake Erie, and the most active opera tions at its lower extremity. In all his correspond ence with the War Department, and with Generals Dearborn and Hall at the lower end of the Lake, he continued to urge those subjects, but our Government was unprepared at every point on the Lakes. At this important crisis in the situation of Detroit, Dearborn entered into an armistice with General Brock (commander-in-chief of the enemy's forces), APPENDIX. 449 for thirty days, and excepted the command of General Hull from its operation.* " In this manoeuvre General Dearborn was entirely outwitted. Brock came up the Lake with every vessel, and all the forces he could muster; and the first intimation we received of his arrival was, a sum mons to surrender. On the morning of the fifteenth the messengers of Brock came over, and were de tained some hours, under pretext of deliberation, but in reality to place ourselves in a better state of de fence. Several attempts were made to recall the detachment under Cass and McArthur, which had marched the day before, but our spies reported the woods to be swarming with Indians, and they could not get out. The absence of Cass and McArthur, with perhaps 800 picked men, our deficiency of num bers to protect the city on all sides, and our limited supply of provisions, were circumstances deeply re gretted. Nevertheless, a firm and decided answer was given in about these words : ' I am prepared to meet the forces under your command, and all the consequences attending.' This reply had no sooner reached the opposite shore, than the batteries opened on both sides, and a scene ensued sufficient to astound * This statement of Mr. Wai- cross Lake Erie and attack General lace is in part erroneous. The ar- Hull with his whole force, which, mistice was entered into between but for the armistice, would have Sir George Prevost and General been detained, in defence of the Dearborn ; the effect of which, how- post, he was, under the circum- ever, was to enable General Brock, stances, enabled temporarily to who was advised of the manoeuvre leave, of Sir George Prevost, at once to 29 450 APPENDIX. the senses of inexperienced troops. Still there was but little appearance of dismay. Steady determina tion appeared to be the expression of almost every eye. On removing a frame building directly oppo site the fort, a bomb-battery was displayed, and its shells were showered upon us in abundant profusion. Chimneys and every other object above the walls of the fort, were levelled with despatch, except the flag of our country. The stars and stripes still waved amidst the smoke, a thrilling appeal to every Ameri can heart. Soon after dark the firing ceased, but was renewed with the dawn of day. Until the morning of the fatal 16th of August, I saw no flinch ing in the countenance of General Hull. I had been with him both in and out of the fort ; his only appa rent concern was to save our ammunition, for our long twenty-four pounders were consuming it very fast ; and I was sent repeatedly to the batteries with orders ' to fire with more deliberation.' " About nine o'clock in the morning Captain Hull found some straggling soldiers in the town. He ordered them immediately to their post ; and seeing them disposed to hesitate, he pursued them on horse back, sword in hand, to their regiment. Their Colonel having given them leave of absence, was exasperated, and made his way to the General, demanding the arrest of his son. The Captain soon made his appearance, and challenged the Colonel to fight him on the spot. This circumstance produced the first agitation that 1 discovered in General Hull. He begged me to take care of his imprudent son, APPENDIX. 451 and he was confined to a room in the officers 5 quar ters. " Soon after this a more serious disaster occurred, which increased the General's agitation. A number of ladies and children, the families of officers on duty, occupied a room in the fort. General Hull's daughter and her children were among them. A ball entered the house, killing two officers, who had gone in to encourage their families. The ladies and children, many of them senseless, were hurried across the parade to a bomb-proof vault, which had been cleared out for them. The General saw this affair at a dis tance, but knew not whom nor how many were destroyed, for several of the ladies were bespattered with blood. Other incidents soon followed. Several men were cut down in the fort, and two other officers received a ball through the gate. All this time the General was walking back and forth on the parade, evidently in a very anxious state of mind. Several propositions were made to him, all of which, I believe, he rejected. For instance, Brigade-Major Jessup proposed to cross the river, and spike the enemy's guns. I think he replied, it was a desperate experi ment, and as the enemy was advancing, he could not spare the men from their posts. Captain Snelling proposed to haul down one of our heavy guns, to annoy the enemy, then three miles below the fort. He replied, that the slender bridge below the town would not support its weight, and the gun would surely fall into their hands, and be turned against us ; diat the men were posted to the best advantage, and 452 APPENDIX. he did not wish to move them. The gun alluded to weighed, with its carriage, about 7000 Ibs. " General Hull was then at least sixty-five years of age, and no doubt felt incapable of the bold exer tions that his situation required.* He appeared ab sorbed in anxious thought, and disposed to avoid all conversation. My duty required me to remain near the General, but seeing that he appeared to have no commands for me, I stepped across the parade to as sist in the amputation of an officer's limb. Whilst occupied in this unpleasant task, Captain Burton, of the 4th regiment, passed me with a table-cloth sus pended to a pike. I inquired what that was for* He hastily replied, ' It is the General's order,' and mounting one of the bastions, began to wave it in the air. I ran immediately to the General, and in quired the meaning of the white flag. < I ordered it, sir,' was the reply ; and facing about, he contin ued his walk. The firing soon ceased, and mounting the breast-work I saw two British officers, with an American officer, all on horseback, approaching the gate. Thinking their entrance improper, I informed the General, and he directed me c to keep them out of the fort.' I met and conducted them to the Gen eral's marquee, which was still in the open camp. General Hull, with Colonel Miller, of the U. S. Army, and Colonel Brush, of the Michigan militia, made * This conjecture of Mr. Wallace day of surrender, he would be only is incorrect. As General Hull was 59 years and not quite two months born on the 24th of June, 1753 ; old. on the 16th of August, 1812, the APPENDIX. 453 their appearance. The articles of capitulation were then drawn up and signed by Miller and Brush on our part, and by the two British officers on theirs. It was reported to General Brock, who shortly entered the fort, escorted by his advanced guard. Brock was shown into a room, in the officers' quarters, where Hull was waiting, and after settling some details, the capitulation was ratified by their signatures. While these matters were progressing, Captain Hull, awaking from a sound sleep, discovered the British grenadiers in the fort. Breaking through a window, he ran up unarmed and without a hat, to the com manding officer, and demanded his business there * with his red-coat rascals.' The officer raised his sword to cut him down, but I reached them in time, to stay the blow, by informing the officer that the gentleman was partially deranged. He instantly dropped his arm, and thanked me for the timely in terference. This same Captain Hull afterwards fought a duel, in defence of his father's reputation, and was at last killed at the head of his company, in a gallant charge at the battle of ' Lundy's Lane.' I mention these particulars, in connexion with a re mark since made to me by Commodore Hull, that * he knew his uncle was neither traitor nor coward, for there was no such blood in the family.' General Hull, discovering that the British had been permitted to enter the fort before the surrender was completed, remonstrated with General Brock, who apologized for the indecorum, and ordered his troops to retire. 454 APPENDIX. Our troops were then marched out, in gloomy silence ? and stacked their arms on the esplanade. When the British flag was raised the Indians rushed in from the woods a countless number jelling, firing, seizing our horses, and scampering through the town like so many fiends. In addition to Tecumseh's band, and the Wyandotts, they had gathered in from all the regions of the northern lakes. The British regulars and Canadians, were about three thousand men ; but the number of the Indians could not have been known by General Brock himself. Our effective force was probably fifteen hundred ; about four hundred regulars, and the re mainder volunteers and drafted militia.* Most of them would have fought with desperation, for there was no possible chance of escape. " We had every reason to suppose that the de tachment under Cass and McArthur, was at the river Raisin, but to our surprise and mortification, they had returned of their own accord, having heard the can nonade at the distance of forty miles. They were * In representing the effective after : " This detachment, and the force of General Hull at the time of company under Captain Brush, were the surrender at " probably fifteen included in the surrender, for their hundred," the author of this letter, preservation, as they might have Robert Wallace, it will be perceived, been surprised and cut off by the evidently included the force to which Indians, of which we had no way to he refers on page 449, as being apprise them." But Wallace does absent with Cass and McArthur, in not undertake to be precise as to his computation, and also that of numbers, and speaks from genera* Captain Brush, for he says soon recollection. APPENDIX. 455 close in the rear of the enemy, at the time of the surrender, but without any possible means of commu nicating their position to us. This detachment, and the company under Captain Brush, were included in the surrender, for their preservation, as they might have been surprised and cut off by the Indians, of which we had no way to apprise them. As it hap pened, two or three British subjects, who had gone out with us, unwilling to fall into the hands of their former masters, made a desperate escape through the woods, informed Captain Brush of our disaster, and his party made a rapid retreat to the settlements. Cass and McArthur were soon apprised of their con dition, and marched to Detroit. Our meeting with them was truly distressing. Cheeks that never blanched in danger, were wet with tears of agony and disappointment. Yet I saw no ranting or raving, such as I have since heard described. I heard but one officer abuse the General indecorously, and he had been extremely quiet and useless throughout the campaign. " A circumstance which has often been cited, as a proof of treachery on the part of General Hull, took place on the river bank, just before the surrender. Lieutenant Anderson, of the U. S. Artillery, had drawn his guns from behind our lower battery, charg ed them with grape-shot, and pointed them down the road on which the enemy were approaching. When the first platoon of their column appeared, his men were eager to fire. Anderson forbid them, at the peril 456 APPENDIX. of their lives, to touch a gun, without his orders, wish ing to get the enemy in a fair raking position, before they should discover their danger ; but the officer at the head of the column, perceiving the snare, gave notice to General Brock, who immediately changed the position of his troops, and advanced under cover of the thick orchards which stood between them and the fort. Anderson was said to have reserved his fire by the special order of General Hull, which I know to be false for I had just delivered a different order, and was waiting by his side, to see the effect of his intended explosion. When the white flag was raised, this same Lieutenant broke his sword over one of his guns, and burst into tears. " After the surrender, General Hull retired to his own house, where he had lived while Governor of Michigan. It was occupied by his son-in-law, Mr. Hickman, and his family. One of General Brock's Aids suggested to me the propriety of a British guard, to protect the General's house from the Indians ; to which I assented without consulting General Hull, as they had already seized our baggage in the street. This British guard, was considered another strong ground of suspicion ; but General Hull supposed it was sent to prevent his escape. " General Brock took up his quarters at a vacant house on the main street ; Tecumseh occupied a part of the same building, to whom I had the honour of an introduction. He was a tall, straight, and noble looking Indian ; dressed in a suit of tanned buckskin, APPENDIX. 457 with a morocco sword-belt round his waist. On being announced to him, he said through his inter preter, < Well, you are a prisoner, but it is the fortune of war, and you are in very good hands.' " On the 17th, General Hull with his staff and the officers and soldiers of the regular army, were ordered on board the c Queen Charlotte,' a frigate of thirty-six guns. While sitting in the after-cabin with General Hull, alone, he suddenly addressed me to this effect : < My young friend, 1 remember a promise I made to your relatives at Cincinnati, that if it was within my power, to return you safe to them, it should be done. You, as a volunteer, are entitled to your parole, and 1 think you had better claim it.' Having a desire to see the world and perhaps obtain some in formation that might be useful to my country, I de clined the proposition, and told the General, I preferred to share his fortunes ; that I had been with him in prosperity, and would not desert him in adversity. The General was deeply affected, but, in a few mo ments replied, ' that he regretted the necessity of our separation, but must redeem his pledge, and thought it inexpedient for me to remain a prisoner in my youth, perhaps for years, and the loss of time might be a serious disadvantage to me.' I was obliged to accede to his wishes. He then sent for Commodore Bar clay, and claimed my privilege, to which that noble officer readily assented. He then wrote a certificate of my correct deportment, &LC., while under his com mand, in the form of a letter ; and when the boat was ready to convey me on board a merchant vessel, 458 APPENDIX. bound to Cleveland, he pressed my hand for some moments, and then exclaimed, * God bless you, my young friend ! you return to your family without a stain as for myself, 1 may have sacrificed a reputa tion, dearer to me than life, but I have saved the in habitants of Detroit, and my heart approves of the act.' The Commodore insisted on a parting glass of wine, which we drank in silence, and I left the ship. " General Hull was a man of tender feelings and accomplished manners ; his hair was white with age, his person rather corpulent, but his appearance was dignified and commanding. In the army of the Rev olution, he was esteemed a brave and gallant officer, which was attested by Washington and other distin guished men ; and while upon his trial, the letters of those who survived, poured in, in his behalf. The man who led the attack on Stony Point, could not well be a coward ; Wayne would not have selected one for that desperate assault ; nor can I ever believe he was a traitor, no man of his age could have mani fested more general devotion to the service of his country. What then (you would ask) was the cause of his surrender ? I can answer this question ac cording to my own impressions. " First. It was the want of preparation when the war commenced. Had our guns been mounted, we should have taken Maiden without delay, which would have kept the Indians quiet, and turned the whole tide of events in our favour. It was General Harrison's opinion, that < Hull's army must be sacri- APPENDIX. 459 ficed, for the want of communication with his coun try.' It was Perry's victory on the Lake, that cap tured Maiden and restored Detroit. " Second. It was the want of co-operation at other points, to prevent the concentration of the enemy at Detroit. The armistice of Dearborn was a finishing touch to us. " Third. It was the want of that energy and en terprise which a man may have in the prime of life, but which is seldom retained, in civil life, at the age of sixty-five. " Fourth. It was his fatherly attachment to the citizens of Detroit, whose Governor and protector he had been for years, and knew them personally, man, woman, and child. " Hull might have defended the fort while his pro visions held out, but whether the inhabitants of De troit would not have been butchered, on the night of the 16th, is a question 1 cannot answer. Perhaps the more immediate cause of the surrender, was the absence of Cass and McArthur. He had the utmost confidence in Colonel McArthur, as a brave executive officer ; and in Colonel Cass as an intelligent and able adviser. Had they been present with their men, or had we even known their position, there would pro bably have been no surrender at that time. "The cry of traitor spread among the soldiers, and it became a popular cry through the country. But I have not met with a field officer of that army, who believed there was treason in the case. General Cass has since declared to me, that he thought the 460 APPENDIX. main defect of General Hull, was ' the imbecility of age,' and it was the defect of all the old veterans, who took the field in the late war. A peaceful gov ernment like ours, must always labour under similar disadvantages. Our superannuated officers must be called into service, or men without experience must command our armies. " It may be supposed, that I am a little partial to my old commander, who treated me with all the kindness of a father ; but he is long since dead, and I have no inducement to disguise the truth or to cover his defects. I was not examined at his trial, and 1 will state the circumstances that prevented me. When the trial was first ordered at Philadelphia, I attended, but it was postponed for ten or twelve months, and afterwards held at Albany, in New-York. Having changed my residence, my summons did not reach me until the trial had commenced, and I arrived there just in time to hear the closing speech of Mr. Van Buren, who was Prosecutor on the occasion. I remember his identical words in relation to the prin cipal charge ; viz., ' The charge of treason is not only unsupported, but unsupportable? and from that charge General Hull is entirely acquitted.' Hull was condemned for cowardice and sentenced to be shot, but recommended by the Court to the mercy of the President, on account of his Revolutionary services. The President remitted the sentence, but dismissed him from the army. He afterwards wrote a defence, which was so highly approved in Boston, that a public din ner was tendered him, as an evidence of their appro- APPENDIX. bation. My situation with General Hull was thrown up to me in a taunting manner, by a distinguished editor in Louisville, during the glories of 1840. I paid no attention to it then, but will now remark, that the appointment was eagerly sought for by older men than myself, of the first respectability, who would then have been proud to have taken my place. " The result of the campaign was a sore disap pointment ; but I served my country faithfully, with out pay or reward ; lost my horses and equipage into the bargain, and have never regretted the sacrifice. If this brief sketch affords amusement to your readers, or adds one mite to the truth of history, I shall be satisfied. " Respectfully yours, (Signed) ROBERT WALLACE," NOTE 16. Letter respecting the destitution of the country in 1812, and the building of Perry's fleet. [The following letter has been kindly communi cated by a gentleman who has resided for many years in Western Pennsylvania, and who was well acquainted with the transactions in that region in 1812. Its details concerning Perry's efforts to pre pare his fleet, will be found to be especially inter esting.] 462 APPENDIX. "MEADVILLE, April 6, 1846. " MY DEAR SIR, You ask me to give you my recollections as to the state of destitution in which the country found itself, when it was soimprovidently involved in war in 1812, and as to the mismanage ment of matters during the continuance of the con test. This I will cheerfully do, premising, however, that, from my local situation, most of my information was necessarily derived from public papers, discus sions in Congress, or from hearsay ; and further, that I am speaking of matters which occurred upwards of thirty years ago. The facts, however, to which I shall advert, may perhaps be of use to you, in leading you to a more extended inquiry in regard to them. " Seldom had a nation better cause for going to war than we had in 1812. Our seamen impressed; our commerce interrupted ; our vessels captured and condemned, and one of our public vessels attacked, and some of the crew taken out of it; in one W 7 ord, every injury and insult was offered us which a haughty, overbearing nation could offer to a weak and enduring one. England knew our national im becility, and, presuming on that knowledge, thought that she could play the bully with impunity. This was one of the main causes which led to the war of 1812. " Mr. Madison and his cabinet were fully sensible of the unpreparedness of the country, and wished to avoid war. They made no preparation for a coming contest, either by an augmentation of the army or navy, or by a repair of our forts, or by filling our APPENDIX. 463 arsenals. It appeared as if the Government intended to keep down the war-spirit, bj keeping the country in a state of utter destitution. If so, they were mis taken. It is said that the w r ar party in Congress presented to the Administration the alternative either of war, or of their (the war-party) opposing the Ad ministration, and Mr. Madison's re-election. Unfor tunately Mr. Madison preferred his popularity ; and we were hurried into a war in such a state of total unpreparedness, that the commercial portion of the community would not believe that such an act of insanity was possible, until war was actually de clared. If Mr. Madison, even at the opening of the session of 1811-12, had recommended to Congress to prepare the country for war, and had refused to declare war until the country should be prepared for it, I feel confident that the war would have been avoided. England did not wish to go to war ; she only presumed on our forbearance. The moment she found we were in earnest, she repealed her orders in council, one of the most objectionable of her aggressions. " I shall now mention a few instances of the unpre paredness of the country, when war was declared, in 1812. " During the administration of the elder Adams, a small navy was created, consisting of a few frigates, and some smaller vessels. On Mr. Jefferson's coming into power, two of the frigates (perhaps some other of the public vessels) were sold, and the public money was wasted in building gun-boats, a JefTersonian 464 APPENDIX. philosophical experiment, which proved worse than useless. I am not aware that a single shot was fired from one of these gun-boats (unless it were at or near New Orleans) during the whole course of the war. In 1804 our small naval force was still further diminished by the loss of the frigate Philadelphia (one of the finest in our navy), which was wrecked near Tripoli, and afterwards burned. None of these defalcations were supplied by the substitution of other vessels. " But I shall pass to the situation of the naval force on Lake Erie, as being more intimately con nected with the object of your inquiry. " During the administration of the elder Adams, a vessel of war was built (bearing his name), which, at the time, gave us the command of Lake Erie. To judge of the importance of having the command of that Lake, we must take into consideration the situa tion of the country bordering on it. That was, pre vious to 1812, with few exceptions, an unbroken wil derness, yielding no supplies. All the provisions, and most of the warlike stores, for the forts on the Lakes, Detroit, Michilimackinac, Chicago, and I believe even Niagara, were drawn from the neighborhood of Pittsburgh, ascended the Alleghany river and French creek, and were shipped at the port of Erie for their several places of destination. The three first-named forts were totally dependent on the navigation of the Lakes for their supplies. That cut off, and these posts became, in a great measure, untenable. The Gov ernment appears to have been aware of this fact, but APPENDIX. 465 no adequate measures were taken to secure the com mand of the Lakes. No new vessels of war were built there. The only thing done was to haul up the Adams, in order to have her lengthened, so as to ren der her better able to cope with the English war vessels on the Lake. But such was the improvidence of our Government, that the Adams was yet on the stocks when war was declared. She was, I believe, subsequently launched fell into the hands of the En glish at the surrender of Detroit was cut out from under Fort Erie, Upper Canada, by Captain Elliott, and was, on that occasion, wrecked on the rocks in the Niagara river. The English having thus the un disputed possession of Lake Erie, and the upper Lakes, the fate of the upper posts was sealed. There were then no roads connecting these posts with the settled parts of the country, by which sup plies could be obtained. The communication with Detroit, (the only one of these posts which might be supplied by land,) was, by reason of intervening swamps, forests, and rivers, so difficult, as to be easily cut off by an enemy ; and hence Messrs. Cass and McArthur, who, with a considerable force, were sent to bring provisions to the Fort, did not bring them, because the enemy would not let them. When in 1813, Harrison's army penetrated to Fort Meigs, it was with the utmost difficulty, and at an immense expense of money, that its most indispensable wants could be supplied, and yet the only existing obstacle arose from the badness of the roads and the distance of transportation. But the worst part of the road to 30 466 APPENDIX. Detroit was situated north of the Maumee river ; and that portion of the road, from its contiguity to the Lake arid to Maiden, was constantly liable to in terruption by the enemy. Hence Harrison could never advance beyond the Maumee, until Perry's victory gave us the command of the Lakes. He then easily advanced invaded Canada defeated and captured the whole of the British force, and then stopped short in his career of conquest, having by that time probably become sensible, that the project of conquering Canada by the way of Detroit, was a most miserable military blunder. " It is perfectly clear that all our early disasters on the upper Lakes were to be attributed to the En glish having the command of the Lakes ; and that, if the Adams had been fitted out in time, and perhaps another vessel of war added, so as to give us the de cided superiority on the water, the loss of Detroit and Michilimackinac, and the massacre of the garri son of Chicago, would not only have been prevented, but we should also have saved the enormous ex penditures attendant on Harrison's campaign, and the fitting out of Perry's fleet on Lake Erie. " To the gross error of not securing a naval supe riority, was added the neglect of putting our military posts in a proper state of defence, and of furnishing them with ample supplies. I was told that the works of all these posts were in a state of dilapida tion, and that even the gun-carriages at Detroit were unfit for service, and had to be repaired, or replaced by new ones, before the guns could be used. On APPENDIX. 467 this point, the papers of General Hull will probably give you more correct information. " But a far more guilty piece of negligence, was the omission to give the commanders of the different posts timely notice of the intended declaration of war. Instead of getting the information of the de claration of war from their own Government, they learned it through the enemy ; and the consequence was, that Michilimackinac was surprised before it was known that there was war ; that a part of the baggage of Hull's army was captured ; and that the garrison at Chicago, which ought either to have been ade quately strengthened, or withdrawn in time, was mas sacred by the Indians immediately on leaving the fort to fall back on Detroit, as they had been directed to do. The loss of Mackinaw and Chicago removed every check on the incursion of the western Indians, and their operations soon rendered the communication between Detroit and the settled portions of Ohio impracticable, and thus the fate of that post, and of Hull's army, became unavoidable. The latter de feated the Indians at Maguaga ; they might perhaps have beaten the English under General Brock, but this could only postpone their fate, not avert it. Cut off from all intercourse with those points from which their supplies were derived, they must either starve or surrender, there was no third alternative. " The impracticability of General Harrison's penetrating beyond the Maumee, and the enormous expense incurred in supplying his army there, that he might cover that section of country against the 468 APPENDIX, enemies, at length convinced the Government of the absolute necessity of obtaining the mastery of Lake Erie ; and in the spring of 1813, the construction of a fleet was commenced at the port of Erie. This fleet was to consist of two brigs, carrying twenty guns each ; three gun-boats, and an advice-boat. No previous preparation had been made for the building and equipment of this fleet. On the 1st of April ? 1813, nearly all the timber used for the construction of this fleet, was still standing in the forest. This y however, was on the spot, but all the other materiel for this fleet, such as cordage, blocks, anchors, guns y ammunition, &c., had to be brought from a distance, most of it from Philadelphia. To form some idea of the trouble and expense attending the transportation of this materiel, you must recollect that at that time the turnpike from Philadelphia westward, extended only to Harrisburgh ; that from thence to Pittsburgh. a distance of 200 miles, the road, particularly in the mountains, was very rough ; and that from Pittsburgh to Erie, a distance of about 130 miles, the roads being common country roads, were very soon so cut up by the heavy hauling on them, as to become nearly im passable. To give some idea of the expense of transportation I would observe, that previous to the war of 1812, and after the close of it in 1815, the expense of transportation from Philadelphia to Mead- ville, might be computed at 12J cents per pound. If we now add to this the 37 miles increased distance from Meadville to Erie, and make due allowance for the increased expense during a state of war, and take APPENDIX. 469 also into consideration that in the hauling for the public there were no return freights, 1 think we shall not be far wrong in estimating the expense of trans portation from Philadelphia to Erie at about 20 cents per pound. The officer selected to superintend the construc tion of this fleet, and to command it, was Oliver H. Perry, a young man of about 27 years of age, and then a Master-Commandant in the navy. Happily for the West, a more judicious selection could hardly have been made. To a sound practical judgment, Perry joined an uncommon degree of energy, and an untiring industry, and these enabled him, with very inadequate means, to have his fleet ready for service in August, and to achieve, on the 10th Sep tember 1813, the memorable victory, which will hand his name down to posterity. Most people in this country know Perry only as the hero of the 10th of September. This is doing him great injustice. I, who was intimate with him, and was acquainted with the difficulties he had to contend with in the equip ment of his fleet, always considered that he showed more real greatness by the courage with which he bore up under these difficulties, than by his victory. To form some idea of Perry's situation, you must know that, up to the end of August, he had under him but a single commissioned officer (the present Capt. Turner), then a young man without experience, and who had but recently been commissioned. The rest of Perry's officers were young midshipmen. Just previous to the action, Capt. Elliott (then a 470 APPENDIX. Master-Commandant) joined the fleet, and this made three commissioned officers to a fleet of six vessels of war. In point of men, Capt. Perry's means were still more deficient. The marines for the fleet, furnished by the Government from the Depot at Washington, consisted of a Capt. or Lieut. (Brooks, killed in the ac tion), and of a Sergeant, a drummer, and a fifer. Two or three men were recruited on the route to Erie, and the rest of the marines had to be recruited at Erie. As to sailors, Perry's means were also greatly defi cient. By one of those arrangements so common during the war in question, the expediency of which it is difficult to reconcile with common sense, Perry was put under the orders of Chauncey, the Com mander of the naval force on Lake Ontario, and all the supplies of men, intended for Lake Erie ? wherever enlisted, were in the first instance sent to Sacket's Harbour. The consequences were such as might have been expected. So long as men could be used on Lake Ontario, to fill up the crews of the vessels there to their full complement, none were sent to Perry, and when any were sent, they were the refuse of the drafts. Captain Elliot stated sub sequently, in my presence, that, serving at that lime on Lake Ontario, he had himself had the picking of the men to be sent to Lake Erie, and that none were sent but the worst ; and that if he could then have foreseen that he himself should be sent to Lake Erie, his selections would have been very different. Perry y in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, expressed APPENDIX. 471 some surprise that so large a portion of the prime New England sailors, enlisted in the cities, should be turned into negroes and mulattoes before they reached him ; but acknowledged himself grateful for getting even such. And well he might be so, con sidering how alarmingly deficient he was in men. After the si vessels, built at Erie, were all launched, and while he was fitting them out, he had but about a hundred men, of which, from sundry causes, a large number were on the sick list. As all fit for duty had to work hard the whole day in fitting out the fleet, there were no spare men to row even a single guard- boat, to give notice of any night attack which might be made on the fleet. An English fleet of five ves sels of war was at that time cruising off the harbour, in full view. That fleet might, at any time, have sent jts boats, during a dark night, and the destruction of the whole American fleet was almost inevitable, for Perry's force was totally inadequate to its defence, and the regiment of Midland Pennsylvania Militia, stationed at Erie expressly for the defence of the fleet, refused to keep guard at night on board. ' I told the boys to go, Captain,' said the worthless Colonel of this regiment, in excusing himself for not sending a guard on board, ' 1 told the boys to go, but the boys won't go.' " In this state of destitution Perry was left for weeks ; and a more trying one cannot well be im agined. Intrusted with the command of an impor tant squadron, for the safety of which he was held responsible, without being furnished with the means 472 APPENDIX. to defend it, he never could go to sleep with the reasonable certainty that before morning his fleet would not be destroyed, and his reputation and pro fessional prospects be blasted for ever ; for he knew well enough that, in case of any accident, he would be made the scape-goat. " Under these trying circumstances Perry con stantly bore up with a constancy and fortitude which excited my admiration more than did his subsequent victory. I never knew his fortitude to forsake him except once, and then his despondency was only momentary. He had been promised that, by a cer tain day, Chauncey would be at the head of Lake Ontario, and land there the men necessary to man Perry's fleet. Perry had sent an officer to receive this detachment, and to conduct it to Erie. He was elated with the prospect of having his wants at length supplied ; and it was when his officer returned, and reported that Chauncey had been at the head of the Lake at the appointed time, had received his letter, and had sailed again down Lake Ontario without landing a man, or sending any answer, that Perry's fortitude, for a moment, appeared to give way, and that he complained bitterly to me of the state of abandonment in which his country left him. " When, ultimately, the vessels were ready to sail, Perry called on the militia for volunteers, to serve on board, while the vessels were getting over the bar at the mouth of the harbour, it being expected that he would be attacked during the slow process of getting the vessels over. After the vessels had APPENDIX. 473 been got over, he again called for volunteers to make a short cruise with him to Long Point, and the lower part of the Lake, in quest of the enemy. How many volunteers he obtained I do not now recollect, but among them was a rifle company, consisting of 72 men from this neighbourhood. It was while Perry was absent on this cruise, that Elliott arrived at Erie with a reinforcement of 100 seamen. Thus rein forced, Perry sailed up the Lake to Sandusky Bay. Here he got an additional supply of about 60 sailors, from some of the regular regiments in Harrison's army, and a considerable number of volunteers to serve as marines. Notwithstanding all these rein forcements, Perry had, on the day of the action, on his own vessel, a crew of only 120 men, of whom about 20 were on the sick list. " From what I have said, it must not be inferred that Captain Barclay, Perry's opponent, was wanting either in courage or enterprise. He was a brave man, but placed, like Perry, under the orders of the commander on Lake Ontario, and, like his antago nist, treated in the most niggardly manner. " The mismanagement respecting the army was equally great. The officers appointed to the new re giments were, with some exceptions, totally ignorant of all military knowledge. Too many of them were young men of dissipated habits, unfit for civil pur suits or occupations ; or political brawlers who had recommended themselves to the Government by their noisy patriotism. The common men were mostly enlisted in taverns and beer-houses. At first, the en- 474 APPENDIX.] listments were, if my recollection serves me, for three years, or during the war. As the difficulty of obtaining men increased, the bounty was increased, and the term of service shortened, until, at last, a heavy bounty was given to men who were enlisted only for nine months. A more ruinous system it would be difficult to conceive. As the recruiting stations were generally at a considerable distance from the scenes of action, and as at least a number of men must be collected at a depot before they could be sent off, the term of enlistment of these men was nearly, if not quite, expired, by the time they reached the army. " On the breaking out of the war, it became ne cessary to furnish arms to the militia of this section of Pennsylvania. The Governor accordingly sent us a number of boxes filled with muskets, and their usual accompaniments from the State Arsenal. I was pre sent at the unpacking of these guns, and never, I believe, in modern days, has such a collection been seen. In some, the touch-hole was so covered by the lock as to have no communication with the pan. In others, the touch-hole was half an inch above the pan when shut, and some had no touch-hole at all. Many of the barrels were splintered, or had other internal defects. In one word, the whole were useless until armourers were set at work on them, when a portion of them were rendered fit for service. " The militia of this section of Pennsylvania were repeatedly called out to march to Erie, though the object of the call was not always obvious, unless it were to let the officers earn some money ; for patriot- APPENDIX. 475 ism then, as now, had a special care of number one. There never was a shot fired there. On some of those occasions the troops, on their arrival at Erie, were destitute of ammunition ; and on one occasion there were no flints. An Aid-de-Camp of the Major- General was sent off on horseback to liarrisburg to communicate this want to the Governor. The Gov ernor went round among the stores in the town, arid purchased what flints were to be had, putting them in his pocket as he purchased them. The Aid-de- Camp brought them in his saddle-bags to Erie. A supply might, in the same manner, have been obtained nearer Erie in one-third the time, and at half the ex pense. "In 1812, a brigade of Pennsylvania militia, of about 2000 men, partly drafted men, but mostly vol unteer companies, were assembled at Meadville, des tined to reinforce General Smyth's army at Buffalo. I have seldom seen a finer collection of men, but they were rendered totally useless for want of proper offi cers. The troops elected here their own superior officers. The Colonels, with one exception, were totally inefficient, and the General, though I believe physically brave, was morally a coward, and dared not either to introduce proper discipline, or to enforce the few orders he issued. Hence that which might have been a fine, useful body of troops, was nothing but an armed mob. They remained lying here in camp for a couple of months, doing nothing. They were then marched to Buffalo, where they were left in the same state of inaction, until sickness broke out 476 APPENDIX. among them, when some deserted, and the rest were dismissed, without any of them having seen an ene my. Smyth had abundant means of invading Can ada (the object for which he was at Buffalo), but I believe he was deficient in personal courage. He was a mere braggadocio. He kept constantly proclaiming that he would cross the Niagara river forthwith. Two or three times the troops for the invasion were actu ally embarked, but were countermanded after remain ing some hours in the boats. Once he appeared to have brought his courage to the right pitch. The troops were embarked in the evening. A party of sailors was sent over to storm the English battery. This was gallantly accomplished, though with some loss. Instead of crossing immediately, Smyth re mained on the American side till morning. This gave time to the English to receive reinforcements from below. The few men who had crossed were overpowered, and Smyth disembarked his troops. He was one of Uncle Sam's hard bargains. " If the military operations were badly managed, the fiscal affairs of the country were not managed better. Our fiscal system is defective, in that all our revenue is derived from import duties. The conse quence is, that when at war with one of the large maritime powers of Europe, our revenue is diminished, because our importations are interrupted ; and besides, this system does not admit of being extended so as to yield an increased revenue when wanted. It would be much better, both for the country and the revenue, to prohibit altogether the importation of all such ar- APPENDIX, 477 tides as we can manufacture ourselves in sufficient quantity to supply the wants of the country, and then to lay a tax on the home manufactures. Such a sys tem of revenue would be unaffected by war, and ad mit of the necessary expansion when an increase of revenue was required. This per parenthese. " When war was contemplated, Mr. Gallatin y then Secretary of the Treasury, endeavoured to cool down the war party in Congress, by representing that war would render it necessary to resort again to a stamp act and tax on whisky, taxes which, on ac count of former associations, were peculiarly unpopu lar. But the war spirits were not thus to be deterred. They declared that the money to carry on the war was to be raised, not by taxing but by borrowing ; and Gallatin, who did not wish to risk his reputation as a financier on such a philosophical experiment, soon withdrew from the concern, and procured for himself a mission to France. " He was succeeded by G. W. Campbell, an honest, well-meaning man, I believe, but destitute of all fiscal talents. He tried the borrowing scheme, forgetting that to borrow there must be lenders, and that people are not inclined to lend to government unless the regular payment of the interest be secured by a permanent revenue. The result of this experi ment was a rapid declination of the credit of the United States. I do not now recollect what was the precise price of stocks in each particular year of the war, but I know it kept constantly decreasing. In 1811 United States stock was at 103^ per cent. In 478 * APPENDIX. 1813, 1 took part in a loan at 88| per cent. Stocks afterwards fell considerably lower, but 1 do not now recollect the worst terms on which money was bor rowed, but I think it was 78 a 80 per cent. A single fiscal blunder will show Mr. Campbell's utter incapa city. He made a contract with Mr. Jacob Barker for a loan of several millions of dollars, I think at 85 per cent, but with a proviso, that if the Secretary, the next time he borrowed, had to give more advan tageous terms to the lender, Barker was to have the same terms for his loan. Barker's loan was, of course, divided among the chief money lenders of that day, and when the Secretary was obliged to go next into the market for a new loan, these moneyed men had a direct interest to prevent his getting it, except on the most usurious terms. It has lately been stated in Congress, by Mr. Calhoun and others, that the United States borrowed money at, at least, 30 per cent, discount. The fact is literally true, though as nominally the United States did riot issue $100 scrip for $70 in money, it may require some explanation. During the war, the southern and mid land Atlantic ports were blockaded. The New Eng land ports became thus the main ports of importation, and the foreign commerce of the country was through these ports. As our exports were greatly diminished, the goods imported had to be paid for in cash. This drained gradually, first the more distant parts, and afterwards those nearer to New England, of specie, and the consequence was a stoppage of all the Banks south and west ot New- York. This suspension of APPENDIX. 479 specie payments naturally caused a depreciation of their paper, and that depreciation was greater or less in proportion to the distance at which such Bank was situated from New England. Now it was in the de preciated paper of such suspended Banks that the United States loans were paid. " During the progress of the war (I think chiefly after Campbell had left the Treasury), some direct and indirect taxes were imposed, but this return to common sense came too late, and was too inefficient to restore the fast sinking credit of the United States. In the latter part of 1814, we presented to the world the spectacle of a nation, whose resources were nearly untouched, and which was yet on the verge of bankruptcy, merely because its rulers had not had either the skill, or the moral courage, to call these re- 7 o ' sources into action. If the war had continued six months longer, the Government would probably have been in an open, declared state of bankruptcy. " Believe me ever most truly, your friend." NOTE 17. Letter from William Sullivan, Esq., to a Daughter of General Hull. "BOSTON, July 27, 1835. " DEAR MADAM, I did not receive your letter of 27th April until last evening. I well remember your father, as a visiter of my father, when I was a youth, more than forty years ago. 1 always considered him to be a personal and political friend of my father, and 480 APPENDIX. as belonging to the Democratic or Republican party of the times which followed the adoption of the Na tional Constitution. You know that, from 1789 to the end of the late war, the citizens of the United States were divided into two great parties and all persons who were of importance enough to belong to any party, belonged to one or the other of them. " There were shades of difference among the members of these two parties, but not so distinct as to enable me to distinguish among individuals of that party, to which I did not belong myself. " If I were asked whether General Hull belonged to the Jeffersonian or Republican party, I should answer, that 1 think he did. If I were asked whether he approved of National Policy in Mr. Jefferson's time, in all respects, I should answer, that I had no opportunity of knowing that he disapproved of any of it. If I were asked whether he disapproved of National Policy in Mr. Adams' time, I should say, I think he did, because that disapprobation was com mon to his party. What his peculiar views and opin ions were in the time of Washington (1789-1797), I know not. In all these times there was little room for compromising as to opinions. " The tyranny of party was as powerful then as it has been at any time since. Partisans on both sides were in full communion, and the neutral or the wavering were of no account. I think, therefore, that your father would be ranked among the distinguished men in Massachusetts, who were of the Democratic party, and thought and acted as they did : and what APPENDIX. 481 they thought, and how they acted, is now matter of history. The precise line pursued by your father I cannot designate. I began to be in the Legislature in 1804. I do not remember to have met your father there. I saw him only when he came into Boston, and called to see my father in a friendly way, or on business. I have no remembrance of any conversa tion on these occasions, which would indicate any dif ference between your father's sentiments and those generally entertained by his party. I always enter tained a high respect for your father, as he was al ways, in my view, a courteous and honourable gen tleman. I regarded his trial and condemnation as a State affair and was gratified in any opportunity of showing a personal respect for him. " I have the honour to be, with great respect and esteem, your obedient servant, (Signed) WILLIAM SULLIVAN." " To Mrs. MARIA CAMPBELL." NOTE 18. Copy of a Letter from S. Hale, Esq. to Mrs. N. B. Hick- man, a daughter of General Hull. "KEENE, New Hampshire, Sept. 27, 1847. " MADAM, 1 thank you for the ' Memoirs of -the Northwestern Army,"* under General Hull, which * The " Memoirs of the North- of public opinion throughout the western Army," above referred to, United States in favour of General were published by General Hull in Hull. 1 825, and produced a great change 31 482 APPENDIX. you were so good as to send me. That public senti ment has been unjust to him, I do not doubt, and have never doubted ; and now, after having had my attention again fixed on the subject, and called to mind all I have read and heard, I am convinced that to others rather than to him, should the disasters of that campaign be attributed. I have no doubt of his patriotism, nor of his personal courage. " I am now convinced that the Administration of that day did not contemplate the conquest of Canada. " It is sad, my dear madam, to reflect how care lessly and unjustly praise and censure are often dis pensed in this world. " Very respectfully, yours, (Signed) S. HALE." " MRS. N. B. HICKMAN. THE END. THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW RENEWED BOOKS ARE SUBJECT TO IMMEDIATE RECALL LIBRARY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS Book Slip-25m-6,'66(G3855s4)458 2661^5 E353.1 Campbell, M.H. H9 Revolutionary services C18 and civil life of General William Hull. LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DAVIS