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 F THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY I 
 
The Imperial Parliament 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 SYDNEY BUXTON, M.P. 
 
 ; In every free country it is of the utmost importance 
 that all opinions extensively entertained, all senti- 
 ments widely diffused, should be stated publicly 
 before the nation." BAGEHOT. 
 
REPRESENTATION 
 
 BY THE RIGHT HON. 
 
 SIR JOHN LUBBOCK, BART., M.P. 
 
 F.K.S., D.C.L., LL.D. 
 
 SIXTH 
 
 THOUSAND. 
 
 LONDON 
 SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO. 
 
 PATERNOSTER SQUARE 
 1890 
 
THE VOLUMES OF THE 
 
 IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT SERIES 
 
 1. Imperial Federation. 
 
 By the MARQUIS OF LORNE. 
 
 2. Representation. 
 
 By Sir JOHN LUBBOCK, Bart., M.P. 
 
 3. Local Administration. 
 
 By WILLIAM RATHBONE, M.P., ALBERT PELL, Esq., and 
 F. C. MONTAGUE, M.A. 
 
 4. England and Russia in Asia. 
 
 By Right Hon. W. E. BAXTER, M.P. 
 
 5. Women Suffrage. 
 
 By Mrs. ASHTON DILKE and WILLIAM WOODALL, M.P. 
 
 & Local Option. 
 
 By W. S. CAINE, M.P., WILLIAM HOYLE, and Rev. 
 DAWSON BURNS, D.D. 
 
 7. Leasehold Enfranchisement. 
 
 By H. BROADHURST, M.P. and R. T. REID, M.P. 
 
 8. Disestablishment. 
 
 By H. RICHARD, M.P., and T. CARVELL WILLIAMS. 
 
 9. London Government and City Guilds. 
 
 By J. F. B. FIRTH, M.P. 
 
 10. Church Reform. 
 
 By ALBERT GREY, Hon. the Rev. CANON FREMANTLE, 
 and others. 
 
 11. Reform of the House of Lords. 
 
 By JAMES BRYCE, M.P. [In preparation. 
 
 SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LONDON. 
 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. PAGE 
 
 I. INTRODUCTORY I 
 
 II. SINGLE MEMBERED CONSTITUENCIES . . 8 
 
 III. SCRUTIN DE LISTE . . . . . .28 
 
 IV. THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE . . 33 
 
 V. REPLY TO OBJECTIONS TO THE SINGLE TRANS- 
 
 FERABLE VOTE 44 
 
 VI. THE CUMULATIVE VOTE .... 5! 
 VII. THE FREE LIST OR TICKET . . 59 
 
 VIII. THE LIMITED VOTE 62 
 
 SUMMARY 64 
 
 APPENDICES 
 
 I. MR. PRAED 67 
 
 EARL RUSSELL 6/ 
 
 MR. CALHOUN . ' 69 
 
 EARL GREY . 7 
 
 EARL CAIRNS ...... 73 
 
 LORD SHERBROOKE 74 
 
 II. REPRESENTATION IN DENMARK : REPORT BY 
 
 MR. LYTTON ....... 76 
 
 INDEX 89 
 
REPRESENTATION. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 SIR G. C. LEWIS, in his work " On the Best Form of 
 Government," tells us that neither his profound study of 
 ancient history, nor his great experience in national affairs, 
 had enabled him to arrive at a decided opinion on this 
 important question. 
 
 "The controversy," he says, " is one consisting of a 
 debtor and creditor account; the difficulty lies in striking 
 the balance fairly. The weights in one scale may be less 
 heavy than the weights in the other scale, but they are 
 nevertheless weights. . . . The difficulty is to determine 
 which of two sets of valid arguments preponderates." 
 
 The remarkable saying of the late Prince Consort that 
 Representative Institutions are on their trial has been so 
 often quoted, that I almost hesitate to do so again. 
 
 Yet it might well have seemed that government " ot 
 the people, for the people, and by the people," was so 
 obviously wise and just, that it must almost of necessity 
 
2 REPRESENTATION. 
 
 work well in any intelligent community. This, however, 
 has certainly not been the general experience. 
 
 Why, then, has Democracy so often failed in the past ? 
 Why have we seen that in State after State power has 
 oscillated from one extreme to the other from the Tyrant 
 to the Demagogue, and back again from the Dema- 
 gogue to the Tyrant ? The true reason, I believe, is 
 to be found, not in any fault of the principle, but because 
 the principle has not been correctly applied because, in 
 fact, no country has ever yet adopted a true system 
 of Representation. 
 
 This has been well pointed out by a distinguished 
 American statesman, Mr. Calhoun. 
 
 " The effect," he says, "of the ordinary systems of representation, 
 is to place the control of the parties in the hands of their respec- 
 tive majorities ; and the Government itself, virtually, under the 
 control of the majority of the dominant party, for the time, 
 instead of the majority of the whole community ; where the theory 
 of this form of government vests it. Thus, in the very first 
 stage of the process, the government becomes the government of 
 a minority instead of a majority a minority, usually, and under 
 the most favourable circumstances, of not much more than one- 
 fourth of the whole community." 1 
 
 John Stuart Mill has stated the case still more forcibly. 
 
 "In a representative body," he says, " actually deliberating, the 
 minority must of course be overruled ; and in an equal democracy 
 (since the opinions of the constituents, when they insist on them, 
 determine those of the representative body) the majority of the 
 people, through their representatives, will outvote and prevail over 
 the minority and their representatives. 
 
 1 "A Disquisition on Government," p. 41. See also Buckalew, 
 " On Proportional Representation," p. 168. 
 
INTRODUCTORY. 3 
 
 " But does it follow that the minority should have no representa- 
 tives at all? Because the majority ought to prevail over the minority, 
 must the majority have all the votes, the minority none ? Is it 
 necessary that the minority should not even be heard ? Nothing 
 but habit and old association can reconcile any reasonable being to 
 the needless injustice. 
 
 " In a really equal democracy every or any section would be repre- 
 sented, not disproportionately, but proportionately. A majority of 
 the electors would always have a majority of the representatives ; 
 but a minority of the electors would always have a minority of the 
 representatives. Man for man, they would be as fully represented 
 as the majority. Unless they are, there is not equal government, 
 but a government of inequality and privilege : one part of the people 
 rule over the rest ; there is a part whose fair and equal share of 
 influence in the representation is withheld from them contrary to the 
 principle of democracy, which professes equality as its very root and 
 foundation." * 
 
 And again 
 
 " The majority," he says, "would indeed outnumber the others, 
 as much as the one class of electors outnumbers the other in the 
 country. They would always outvote them, but they would speak 
 and vote in their presence, and subject to their criticism. When 
 any difference arose, they would have to meet the arguments of the 
 instructed few by reasons at least apparently as cogent ; and since 
 they could not, as those do who are speaking to persons already 
 unanimous, simply assume that they are in the right, it would occa- 
 sionally happen to them to become convinced that they were in the 
 wrong. 
 
 " Now, nothing is more certain than that the virtual blotting-out 
 of the minority is no necessary or natural consequence of freedom ; 
 that, far from having any connection with democracy, it is diametri- 
 cally opposed to the first principle of democracy representation in 
 proportion to numbers. It is an essential part of democracy that 
 minorities should be adequately represented. No real democracy, 
 nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible without it." 2 
 
 1 J. Stuart Mill, " Personal Representation," p. 4. 
 
 2 Ibid. p. ii. 
 
4 REPRESENTA TION. 
 
 This evil is remedied by the system of Proportional, 
 or, as it is sometimes called, " Minority " representation. 
 The latter name is, however, misleading. 
 
 The supporters of proportional representation have 
 no desire to give the minority a larger share of poli- 
 tical power than that to which their numbers justly 
 entitle them. On the contrary, as Lord Sherbrooke 
 said during the debate of 1867 in the House of 
 Commons, he did not "argue for any protection to 
 the minority . . . but that between the members of the 
 constituency there should be absolute equality; the 
 majority should have nothing given to it because it was a 
 majority." 
 
 Mr. Fawcett, again, in his last speech to his constituents 
 at Hackney, truly pointed out that 
 
 ' ' Far from those who advocate proportional representation wishing 
 to give to the minority the power which properly belongs to the 
 majority, I think I shall have no difficulty in showing that one of 
 the chief dangers which the advocates of proportional representa- 
 tion desire to guard against, is the minority obtaining a preponderance 
 of representation which ought to belong to the majority." l 
 
 Nay, so far from this, a true system of proportional 
 representation is in the words of Mill " not only the 
 most complete application of the democratic principle 
 that has yet been made, but its greatest safeguard." 
 
 In fact, although it may seem a paradox, it is never- 
 theless true that the systems of representation hitherto 
 adopted, not merely through inequalities of area or re- 
 
 1 Speech at Hackney, Oct., 1884. 
 
INTR OD UCTOR Y. 5 
 
 strictions on the right of voting, but as a consequence 
 necessarily ensuing from the system of voting hitherto 
 adopted, have had the effect of placing power in the. 
 hands, not of the majority, but of a minority. 
 
 Let us first take a theoretical case. Suppose a country 
 in which there are 1,200,000 Liberal voters and 1,000,000 
 Conservative. Now if the two parties are evenly distri- 
 buted over the whole country, it is clear that, under 
 the ordinary systems of Representation, the weaker party 
 will be utterly swamped. To use a familiar illustration, 
 wherever you drop a bucket into the sea you will bring 
 up salt water. In such a case, therefore, the 1,000,000 
 will be practically unrepresented. But we must carry 
 the matter a little further. In the House so elected, let 
 the majority bring forward some Bill of an advanced 
 character, and carry it by two to one that is to say, by 
 the votes of members representing 800,000 electors, and 
 against those representing 400,000. It is clear that in 
 such a case the minority in, the House would have with 
 them also the 1,000,000 in the country who were left 
 unrepresented ; so that in fact the measure would repre- 
 sent the wishes of only 800,000 electors, and would be 
 opposed to those of 1,400,000. Thus the result of what 
 we are told is a just system, and of "government by majo- 
 rities," is, on the contrary, to enable a minority of 800,000 
 to override a majority of 1,400,000. 
 
 This is, I believe, the main reason why so-called repre- 
 sentative institutions have often worked so badly. 
 
 We have a practical illustration of this in Switzerland. 
 
6 REPRESENTATION. 
 
 The Swiss in combination with a wide suffrage have 
 also what is called a Referendum ; that is to say, Bills 
 which have passed the Assembly are referred directly 
 to the whole electorate. Now the Bills so referred are 
 often rejected by large majorities. For instance, in one 
 year alone in 1882 a Bill on the reorganization of the 
 Departments of Justice and Police, which had passed 
 the Chamber, was rejected by 214,000 to 150,000; a 
 Revised Penal Code by 202,050 to 159,000; a Bill on 
 Patents by 190,000 to 174,000; and an Education Bill 
 by 317,000 to 170,000. 
 
 Thus we see proved to demonstration in practice, 
 that which in theory was perfectly obvious that the 
 majority of a majority may be, and often is, a minority. 
 The evidence afforded by a country like Switzerland, 
 where there is in actual operation an appeal to a general 
 vote, makes it hardly possible for any one to shut his 
 eyes to the clear evidence afforded. 
 
 The systems of representation which have been 
 adopted in one country or another are numerous, and 
 differ greatly from one another. I shall not attempt to 
 give any history or description of them all, but will 
 confine my remarks to three which are either most pre- 
 valent or most important, namely the system of "Single- 
 membered Seats," of " Scrutin de Liste? and of " Propor- 
 tional Representation." Under the first, each constitu- 
 ency returns a single member, and each elector has a 
 single vote. Under Scrutin de Liste each constituency 
 returns several members, and each elector has a number 
 
INTRODUCTORY. 7 
 
 of votes equal to the number of representatives, but 
 cannot give more than one vote to any one candidate. 
 Lastly, under Proportional Representation the consti- 
 tuency returns several members, but provisions are 
 adopted which secure a fair representation of the various 
 sections of the constituency. This object may be effected 
 in several ways, of which the principal are (i) the Limited 
 Vote, in which each elector has a number of votes some- 
 what less than the number of representatives ; (2) the 
 Free List, in which the elector votes for a list ; (3) the 
 Cumulative Vote, in which each elector has a number 
 of votes equal to the number of representatives, but can 
 distribute them as he chooses ; and (4) the Single Trans- 
 ferable Vote, in which the elector has only one operative 
 vote, but is permitted to indicate to which candidate he 
 would wish it to be transferred if it be not required by 
 the one to whom he first devotes it. 
 
 We will now consider in order these different systems 
 of representation. 
 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 SINGLE MEMBERED CONSTITUENCIES. 
 
 UNDER this system, which is that adopted in the new 
 Redistribution Act, the country is divided into approxi- 
 mately equal constituencies, each returning one member, 
 and of course each elector has one vote. 
 
 The first objection to the system of single member 
 seats is that it involves the arbitrary division of natural 
 communities. The result is to weaken local life and 
 undermine the strength of local self-government. One 
 great evil in our system of local government has always 
 been the multiplicity of areas. We have municipal 
 areas, areas for poor-law, for education,, for water rates, 
 and many other purposes, and the system of single 
 membered seats multiplies them of course still further. 
 
 In support of the system of single seats, the high 
 character of the representatives from Scotland and 
 Wales has often been referred to. But Scotland and 
 Wales are not cases in point. 
 
 The constituencies in those countries are either natural 
 communities or several communities in association, while 
 if the system of single seats is to be adopted generally, 
 
SINGLE MEMBERED CONSTITUENCIES. 9 
 
 and the constituencies are to be equalized, then it follows 
 as a necessary consequence that large communities must 
 be broken up into arbitrary and unnatural sections ; and, 
 as Mr. Morrison observed in the debate of 1872, "a 
 district liable to entire change at the end of every ten 
 years is a mere fortuitous concourse of atoms." x 
 
 Mr. Rathbone, who so ably represented Liverpool for 
 many years, has justly said that " we were a country 
 of historic greatness; we could not break from those 
 old historical recollections without a feeling of pain, 
 and, he was afraid, to a certain extent, a weakening 
 of the dignity and power that those associations ex- 
 cited. He spoke from experience when he said that 
 in the House of Commons votes and voices were not 
 only counted but weighed, and for a man speaking as the 
 representative of the greatest seaport in the world 
 speaking on great commercial and other questions that 
 had found their solution in a great town like Liverpool 
 he felt that he was listened to in a way that was not due 
 to any personal merits of his own, but due to the weight 
 given to him by the great constituency he represented. 
 He did not think when a man came forward as the 
 representative of Castle Street, or Rodney Street, or 
 Toxteth, or of Everton, that he would speak with the 
 same authority as he would do if representing Liverpool ; 
 nor would he deserve so to speak." 
 
 Moreover, if the constituencies are to be maintained 
 of equal size, the boundaries will require continual re- 
 1 House of Commons, July 10, 1872. 
 
io REPRESENTA TION. 
 
 arrangement. This not only involves an immense amount 
 of unnecessary labour, but would in many cases also give 
 rise to the suspicion of the unfair manipulation of political 
 boundaries for party purposes. 
 
 The difference in the character of politics between 
 England and America has long been a subject of com- 
 ment. It may be difficult to say how far that contrast 
 is due to the system of ward representation which exists 
 in America, and which has now been introduced here ; 
 but that that system is one cause can hardly be doubted. 
 
 In 1869 tne Senate of the United States appointed a 
 committee to report on representative reform, and the 
 committee adopted unanimously a very able report drawn 
 up by Senator Buckalew, in which they emphatically 
 condemned the system of single seats. For this they 
 gave several reasons. They pointed out that political 
 areas were often unfairly arranged with the view to party 
 advantage, in the manner which has given the name of 
 Governor Gerry an unenviable immortality. 1 
 
 1 The term "Gerrymander" dates from the year 1811, when 
 Mr. Elbridge Gerry was governor of Massachusetts, and the 
 Democratic, or, as it was then termed, the Republican party, ob- 
 tained a temporary ascendency in the State. In order to secure 
 themselves in the possession of the government, the party in power 
 passed the famous law of Feb. n, 1812, providing for a new 
 division of the State into districts, so contrived that in as many 
 districts as possible the Federalists should be outnumbered by their 
 opponents. To effect this all natural and customary lines were dis- 
 regarded, especially in some parts of the State, and particularly in 
 the counties of Worcester and Essex. Maps were published showing 
 the new boundaries, and a certain Mr. Gilbert Stuart, seeing in the 
 office of the Columbian Sentinel an outline of Essex County, in 
 
SINGLE MEMBERED CONSTITUENCIES. 11 
 
 The committee went on to say : " There is hardly a 
 State of our Union in which the Congressional districts 
 are not gerrymandered in the interests of party." 
 
 which the outer district nearly encircled the rest of the county and 
 presented a rude resemblance to an animal, added with his pencil a 
 beak to the upper end and claws below, exclaiming, " There, that 
 will do for a Salamander ! " " Salamander ! " said Mr. Russell, 
 the editor. "I call it a Gerrymander!" The saying was repeated, 
 and a rude cut of the figure published in the Sentinel and in the 
 
 Salem Gazette with the natural history of the monster duly set forth, 
 served to fix the word in the political vocabulary of the country. 
 So efficient, we are told, "was the law that at the elections of 1812, 
 50,163 Democratic voters elected twenty-nine senators against eleven 
 elected by 55,766 Federalists ; and Essex county, which, when 
 voting as a single district, had sent five Federalists to the Senate, 
 was now represented in that body by three Democrats and two 
 Federalists. It was repealed in 1814, and the death and burial of 
 the monster were celebrated in prose and verse throughout the 
 country " (American " Law Review," pp. 28, 29). 
 
1 2 REPRESENTA T10N. 
 
 Again, the same committee observed that the system 
 of single seats " has not secured fair representation of 
 political interests, while it has continued in existence in 
 a somewhat mitigated form the evils' of the plan of selec- 
 tion by general ticket. Besides the single district plan 
 has called into existence inconveniences peculiar to itself, 
 and which did not attach to the former plan. It excludes 
 from Congress men of ability and merit, whose election 
 was possible before, and thus exerts a baneful influence 
 upon the constitution of the House. Two causes operate 
 to this end ; in the first place, no man who adheres to a 
 minority in any particular district can be returned, and 
 next, great rapidity of change is produced by fluctuation 
 of party power in the district. Single districts will almost 
 always be unfairly made. They will be formed in the 
 interest of party." One great evil of the American 
 system, as they pointed out, was that members were 
 never secure in their seats ; that, in fact, a large number 
 in the House only sat for a single term. And of this 
 they reported that the system of single seats was the chief 
 cause. The single seat system had carried the idea of 
 local representation to excess. The insecurity of their 
 seats, they stated, prevented members from devoting them- 
 selves to public business with zeal and confidence. They 
 were engaged in a perpetual struggle for existence. " In 
 brief," the committee" said, "his time and his efforts, 
 instead of being expended for the public, must be ex- 
 pended on personal objects, if he desires to remain for 
 any considerable time a representative of the people. 
 
SINGLE MEMBERED CONSTITUENCIES. 13 
 
 Undoubtedly, many of the best men of the country must 
 be deterred from entering upon a Congressional career, 
 continuance in which requires such sacrifices to an evil 
 system, so much of unpleasant effort attended with un- 
 certainty and probable mortification." And, in con- 
 clusion, they endorsed the opinion of Mr. John Stuart 
 Mill, that the result of the single-member system, 
 which Parliament has now adopted here, had in 
 the United States brought things to such a pass, 
 that " it is an admitted fact that in the American 
 democracy, which is constructed on this faulty model, 
 the highly cultivated members of the community, except 
 such as are willing to sacrifice their own judgment and 
 conscience to the behests of party, and become the servile 
 echo of those who are their inferiors in knowledge, do 
 not allow their names as candidates for Congress or the 
 Legislatures, so certain it is they would be defeated." 
 
 Lord Spencer also has pointed out in the House of 
 Lords x that " in America for many years past great com- 
 plaints have been made that large numbers of persons, 
 men of influence, of intellect, of wealth and position, 
 refrained from taking any part in political life. Why 
 was that ? Because they felt that they were a hopeless 
 minority, whose opinions were crushed by the overwhelm- 
 ing mass of the majority." 
 
 In France, again, where the system of single seats has 
 also been tried, it has been found to work so badly that 
 
 1 July 30, 1867. 
 
H REPRESENTATION. 
 
 the Chamber has recently decided to relinquish it by the 
 enormous majority of 410 to 67. 1 
 
 It is hardly necessary to point out how the system of 
 single seats limits the freedom of the elector. The Liberal 
 Committee put forward one candidate, the Conservative 
 another, and all the elector can do is to choose between 
 them. Perhaps the elector does not approve of either. 
 This is no doubt one reason why, in large constituencies, 
 we see so many abstentions. But, however little he 
 may be disposed to support either candidate, he cannot 
 bring forward a third without dividing his party, and 
 generally ensuring the return of a political opponent. 
 
 Professor Ware, of Columbia College, New York, has 
 forcibly pointed out that under this system, though the 
 elector is " nominally free to vote for whom he pleases, 
 the knowledge that his vote is thrown away unless it is 
 given for the regular candidate binds him hand and foot." 
 
 Again, this system has a tendency to promote bribery. 
 It often happens that in a constituency the two great 
 parties are evenly balanced, and a few votes suffice to 
 turn the scale. There may be, say, 2,500 Liberals, 2,500 
 Conservatives, and 250 persons with no political views. 
 In the hands of these last, then, the whole representation 
 rests. If the agent of either party purchases 100, or 50, 
 nay, even 10 of them, the weight of the constituency is 
 thrown into the scale of the party for which he acts. 
 
 Again, and for a similar reason, the system of single 
 seats greatly increases the influence of small cliques. 
 1 The Times t March 23, 1885. 
 
SINGLE MEM BE RED CONSTITUENCIES. 15 
 
 Wherever the two great parties are evenly divided, a small 
 section of 100, or even 50 electors, who may be suffi- 
 ciently enthusiastic to subordinate all other considera- 
 tions, say, to the question of vaccination, are in a position 
 to put great pressure on a candidate. Of this they are 
 perfectly aware. In one of my earlier political contests 
 I had an amusing illustration. The supporters of a 
 particular measure asked me to see them one afternoon 
 at six. They came, however, an hour before the time. 
 I told them I was glad to see them, but had not expected 
 them so soon. The spokesman hesitated a little, and 
 then said that I was quite right : they were coming at 
 six, when they proposed to bring a reporter and press me 
 on the subject ; but that they were anxious for my 
 success, and fearing that I might not know how weak 
 they were in the constituency, they had come privately to 
 put me on my guard, for fear I should say too much. I 
 thanked them for their consideration, and they went 
 away, returning again at six with a reporter. At this 
 second interview they pressed me strongly, but I stood as 
 firm as a rock. It is not always, however, that consti- 
 tuents are so thoughtful. 
 
 There has been much difference of opinion expressed 
 as to whether the single seat system will secure a repre- 
 sentation of minorities or not. This depends very much 
 on the sense in which the term is used. 
 
 Those who support the single member system appear 
 to be under the impression that if constituencies were 
 
1 6 REPRESENTATION. 
 
 equalized the present mode of voting would roughly, 
 indeed, but surely secure that the majority of electors 
 would rule the country. But this is not so. A majority 
 of electors in every constituency is by no means the 
 same thing as a majority of all the electors. Suppose, 
 for instance, a community of 60,000 electors is divided 
 into three divisions, each containing 20,000, and that 
 there are 32,000 Liberals and 28,000 Conservatives, the 
 division might be, and very likely would be, as follows : 
 
 1st Division. 2nd Division. 3rd Division. 
 
 Liberals ... 15,000 9,000 8,000 
 
 Conservatives ... 5,ooo 11,000 12,000 
 
 20,000 20,000 20,000 
 
 And thus, though in a minority, the Conservatives would 
 actually return two members out of three. This is no 
 hypothetical case. 
 
 By the constitution of 1841 Geneva was divided into 
 four colleges. The Liberal electors were massed in one 
 ward, which they carried by an immense majority ; while 
 the Conservatives, though in a minority, secured the 
 other three ; and the extreme dissatisfaction thus created 
 greatly contributed to the revolution of 1846. In fact, 
 as already stated, a majority of electors in each constitu- 
 ency is by no means the same thing as a majority in 
 all the constituencies. 
 
 President Garfield pointed this out most forcibly. 
 Speaking in Congress, in 1870, he said : 
 
 "When I was first elected to Congress in the fall of 1862 the 
 state of Ohio had a clear Republican majority of about 25,000, but 
 
SINGLE MEMBERED CONSTITUENCIES. 17 
 
 by the adjustment and distribution of political power in the State 
 there were fourteen Democratic representatives upon this floor and 
 only five Republicans. 
 
 "The State that cast nearly 25,000 Republican votes was repre- 
 sented in the proportion of five Republicans and fourteen Democrats ! 
 
 " In the next Congress there was no great political change in the 
 popular vote of Ohio a change of only 20,000 but the result was 
 that seventeen Republican members were sent here from Ohio and 
 only two Democrats. 
 
 " We find that only so small a change as 20,000 changed their re- 
 presentatives in Congress from fourteen Democrats and five Republi- 
 cans, to seventeen Republicans and two Democrats. 
 
 " Now no man, whatever his politics, can justly defend a system 
 that may in theory, and frequently does in practice, produce such 
 results as these." 
 
 But it is unnecessary to go to foreign countries for 
 illustration of this fact. Our present system also throws 
 some light on the question, for though the inequalities in 
 size and the existence of double seats must be taken 
 into consideration, still, so far as this point is concerned, 
 the difference will not be so great but that our experience 
 in the past may throw some light on the future. Now in 
 my own county of Kent, the Liberals polled in the three 
 divisions, at the last election, over 13.000 votes, against 
 16,000 given to their opponents, and yet the latter had 
 all the six seats. Taking all the contested seats in the 
 county, the Liberals polled 32,000 votes against 36,000, 
 and yet the Conservatives carried 16 members and the 
 Liberals only 2. 
 
 If we draw a line across England from Lincolnshire to 
 Devonshire, there were in 1880, on the south-east side, 99 
 county seats. In many of these the Conservatives had no 
 
1 8 RBPXESENTA TION. 
 
 contest, but the majority of the seats were fought, and the 
 Liberals polled 96,000 votes against 116,000 given to the 
 Tories. On this basis therefore -the Liberals ought to have 
 had, say, 40 seats and the Conservatives 59. As a matter 
 of fact, however, they only secured 15 against 84. More- 
 over of this 15, five were minority seats; so that, but for the 
 introduction of the principle of proportional representa- 
 tion, limited though it was, they would have only had 10 
 seats in the whole district, though fairly entitled to 40. 
 
 Out of 60 members from Scotland and 28 from Wales, 
 only 9 and 2 respectively are Conservatives. 
 
 The Roman Catholics are a very large and respectable 
 portion of the nation ; yet in the whole of England and 
 Scotland they have never, I believe, for years past secured 
 more than a single seat at any one time. 
 
 To tell the Liberals of Kent and Surrey that they are 
 represented by the Liberal members for Scotland and 
 Wales is just the old and exploded argument which 
 used to maintain that the people of Birmingham and 
 Manchester were virtually represented by the members 
 for some other borough. The Liberals of Kent are 
 glad, no doubt, that Scotland and Wales send such 
 admirable representatives : it is some consolation, but it 
 is not the same thing to them as if they were directly 
 represented. Perhaps the one question about which 
 Kentish farmers care most is the subject of extraordinary 
 tithes. Mr. Gladstone will sympathize with them, 
 because he has so powerfully advocated the cultivation 
 of vegetables and the growth of fruit. But the farmers of 
 
SINGLE MEM BE RED CONSTITUENCIES. 19 
 
 Kent cannot expect the Liberal members from Scotland to 
 help them as regards extraordinary tithes. It is possible 
 that they do not even know what extraordinary tithes are. 
 
 Moreover, the geographical differentiation of political 
 views tends to become more and more accentuated, and 
 might, I think, constitute a real danger. At present 
 Scotland is overpoweringly Liberal, while the south-eastern 
 counties of England, with scarcely an exception, are 
 represented by members sitting on the opposite side of 
 the House. It is but a small consolation to the unrepre- 
 sented Liberals of Kent to be told that the Conservatives 
 of Scotland share the same grievance, and are as badly 
 off as they are. 
 
 But further than this, it will be a great misfortune to 
 the country if one part becomes and continues over- 
 whelmingly Liberal, and another Conservative if their 
 distinctive differences become questions of geography 
 and locality rather than of opinion. The different portions 
 of our Empire are not yet so closely fused that we can 
 afford to despise this danger. In my own county of 
 Kent we look on the shires as distinctly lower and less 
 civilized than we are. 
 
 Look, again, at the case of Ireland. I am not now 
 speaking of how far the present representation of Ireland 
 represents the true sentiments of the people, but how 
 far it reflects the views of the actual voters. At 
 the general election of 1880, 86 seats were contested. 
 Of these the Home-rulers secured 52, the Liberal and 
 
 4 
 
20 REPRESENTA TION. 
 
 Conservatives together only 34. Yet the Home-rule 
 electors were only 48,000, while the Liberals and Con- 
 servatives together were no less than 105,000. The 
 numbers then stand as follows : 
 
 Voters. Members 
 
 Liberals and Conservatives 105,000 34 
 
 Home-rulers 48,000 52 
 
 I may add that if the uncontested seats were estimated 
 for, the results would remain substantially the same. 
 
 At any time, and in any country, there would then, it 
 seems to me, be conclusive arguments against the single 
 member system, but the present condition of Ireland 
 renders the question in our case one not only important 
 but of vital consequence. 
 
 It is estimated that in Ireland more than one-third of the 
 population are moderate, loyal, and desirous of maintain- 
 ing the integrity of the Empire. But we are told, on high 
 authority, that under the new Redistribution Act the 
 Home-rulers will secure 90 seats out of 100, leaving only 
 a dozen to the Liberals and Conservatives together, 
 whereas it is clear that under any just system of repre- 
 sentation they ought to have over 30. Moreover, out of 
 Ulster it is probable that scarcely a single Liberal or 
 Conservative member will be returned. The result of 
 this system, then, will be that Ireland will be entirely 
 misrepresented, and that we shall have gratuitously 
 created serious and unnecessary difficulties for ourselves. 
 
 To adopt, indeed, a system of representation by which 
 we shall exclude from the representation of Ireland one- 
 
SINGLE MEM B ERE D CONSTITUENCIES. 21 
 
 third of the electors, and give almost the whole power to 
 two-thirds, would, under any circumstances, be unjust; 
 but to do so when the one-third comprise those who are 
 moderate and loyal, while the two-thirds are led by men 
 not only opposed to the Union, but in many cases 
 animated by a bitter and extraordinary hatred of this 
 country, seems to be an act of political madness. 
 
 From this point of view the recent history of America 
 has peculiar significance. The committee of the United 
 States Senate, to which I have already referred, were 
 of opinion, that if America had adopted proportional 
 representation, instead of single seats, their disastrous 
 civil war might have been prevented. 
 
 "The absence of proportional representation," they say, "in the 
 States of the South when rebellion was plotted, and when open 
 steps were taken to break the Union, was unfortunate, for it would 
 have held the Union men of those States together, and would have 
 given them voice in the electoral colleges and in Congress. But 
 they were fearfully overborne by the plurality rule of election, and 
 were swept forward by the course of events into impotency or open 
 hostility to our cause. By that rule they were deprived of represen- 
 tation in Congress. By that rule they were shut out of the electoral 
 colleges. Dispersed, unorganized, unrepresented, without due voice 
 and power, they could interpose no effectual resistance to secession 
 and civil war. 
 
 " Their leaders were struck clown at unjust elections and could 
 not speak for them, or act for them in their own States, or at the 
 capital of the nation. By facts well known to us we are assured 
 that the leaders of revolt, with much difficulty, carried their States 
 with them. Even in Georgia, the empire State of the South, the 
 scale was almost balanced for a time between patriotism and dis- 
 honour ; and in most of those States it required all the machinery 
 and influence of a vicious electoral system to organize the war 
 against us and hold those communities compactly as our foes." 
 
 
22 REPRESENTA TIO.V. 
 
 England is now in a condition not very unlike that of 
 the United States before their great civil war. We may 
 hope that the single member system will not here have a 
 result so disastrous. At the same time, the supporters 
 of Proportional Representation have done their best 
 to warn their countrymen, and have been supported by 
 almost all those Irishmen who wish to maintain the 
 union between the two countries. In a minority, I fear, 
 they are ; but why deprive them even of that which 
 is their right ? To adopt a system which will silence 
 friends and give opponents more than on any just system 
 they could claim, seems to be most unwise. While, 
 then, a just and equitable system of proportional re- 
 presentation would be important in any community, in 
 our own case, and under existing circumstances, it is 
 almost vital to the good government and even to the 
 integrity of the Empire. 
 
 Let me, as one more illustration, take the general 
 results of the 1874 general election in Great Britain. 
 
 Mr. Roberts, the able central agent of the Liberal 
 party, has stated that, in his judgment, the voting power 
 of the Liberals in 1874 was 200,000 more than that of 
 the Conservatives, although the Conservatives obtained 
 a large majority. Mr. Lefevre questions this, the 
 divergence of opinion between them arising from their 
 estimating differently the voting power of the two great 
 parties in the uncontested constituencies ; but, with all 
 respect to Mr. Lefevre's great abilities, I suppose no one 
 on such a question is a higher authority than Mr. Roberts. 
 
SINGLE MEMBERED CONSTITUENCIES. 23 
 
 Still, whatever the voting power in the uncontested seats 
 may have been, as regards those which were contested, 
 there can be no question; and I am ready, for the 
 purpose of argument, to accept the figures given by Mr. 
 Lefevre. 1 He makes the Conservative vote 610,000, and 
 the Liberal 640,000, while on the other hand the Con- 
 servatives secured 198 seats, and the Liberals only 
 1 68. 
 
 Mr. Lefevre admits that the election of 1874 resulted 
 in the return of 312 Conservative Members and 230 
 Liberals a majority of 82, or, according to his calcula- 
 tion, 72 in excess of what should have been their majority 
 in proportion to the votes given. "In 1880," he says, 
 " the polling strength of the Conservative party was 
 1,022,000, while that of the Liberals was 1,119,000 
 a majority of 177,000, or about 7^3 per cent, of the 
 aggregate votes. This majority on the proportional 
 system would have given 290 Liberal Members and 
 252 Tory Members a majority of 38. The actual 
 return was 335 Liberals and 208 Tory Members 
 a majority of 127, or 89 in excess of the true pro- 
 portion." 
 
 Thus, then, though Mr. Lefevre upholds this system, 
 he finds himself compelled to admit that it gave the 
 Liberal party 72 seats too few r in 1874, and 89 too many 
 in 1880 a difference between two consecutive elections 
 
 1 Mr. Frisby had previously called attention to the same faets, 
 but I prefer to take Mr. Lefevre's figures (which do not substantially 
 differ), as being those of an opponent. 
 
24 REPRESENTATION. 
 
 and in the same constituencies of 161 seats out of 658 ! x 
 Surely it cannot be wise to leave so much to the chapter 
 of accidents. 
 
 This difference, it may be observed, had nothing to do 
 with the Liberal wave of opinion which passed over the 
 country in 1880. That affected of course the number 
 of votes, but I am now speaking only of the effect of the 
 votes as given. Nor was it due to the small boroughs. 
 Sir Henry James, indeed, speaking lately at Bury, said 
 
 "If you have both very large and very small constituencies, and 
 the very small constituencies by very small majorities return a large 
 number of Tories, and if, on the other hand, Liberal members are 
 returned by great majorities in the large constituencies, of course 
 you may obtain the result that was arrived at in 1874 that is, of a 
 majority of Tory members being returned by a minority of the aggre- 
 gate electors." 
 
 But what are the facts ? If we take the small boroughs 
 which have been disfranchised, or at any rate lost one 
 member under the new Act, we shall find that they 
 were divided nearly equally between Liberals and Con- 
 servatives. This explanation therefore entirely fails. 
 
 The truth is that such inconsistencies are inherent in 
 the single member system, which renders the result of a 
 general election uncertain, to a large extent a matter of 
 chance, and leads to violent fluctuations in the balance 
 of political power. 
 
 In fact, it is clear that under mere majority voting, the 
 minority may at one election secure far more than their 
 
 1 I ought, however, in candour to observe that I do not myseh 
 make the difference quite so great. 
 
SINGLE MEMBERED CONSTITUENCIES. 25 
 
 due proportion of political power, or even, as in 1874, 
 obtain a majority of the representatives, while at another, 
 perhaps the very next, they may be almost extinguished. 
 
 Before quitting this part of the subject, I ought to 
 allude to another consideration, which renders single 
 seats specially unfavourable to the Liberal party. That 
 party always comprises great differences of opinion. 
 There are many ways of moving, but only one of standing 
 still. In most foreign assemblies this objection is met 
 by the system of second elections ; that is to say, if no 
 candidate secures an absolute majority of the votes given, 
 a second ballot is held. Without such a provision, it 
 would very often happen that, owing to some division in 
 their ranks, or some miscalculation of their strength, 
 the majority would fail to secure the candidate. In the 
 recent German elections, out of 397 constituencies it was 
 found necessary to have a second election in no less 
 than 97, or in round numbers 25 per cent. 
 
 Under the system of single member seats the electors 
 are divided by Commissioners into districts, which in 
 many cases must necessarily be more or less arbitrary : 
 under any system of Proportional Representation, on the 
 contrary, they would be able to arrange themselves accord- 
 ing to their own sympathies and opinions. This would 
 add greatly to the genuine interest felt in elections. Mr. 
 Courtney, to whom all those who are interested in this 
 subject are so deeply indebted, pointed this out very 
 clearly in his speech at Manchester (Dec. 16, 1884). 
 
26 REFKESEN7 A T10N. 
 
 " You would," he said, "have as a consequence a revival 
 of life and spirit where there is now listlessnessr and 
 intelligent interest in the national conduct where there 
 is now apathy or repugnance." 
 
 It is indeed admitted on all hands that under the old 
 system the country has not been satisfactorily represented, 
 but it is generally supposed that this has been due to the 
 unequal size of constituencies, and to the restriction on the 
 right of voting in counties. Let us then consider what 
 the effect would be in a country with a wide franchise, 
 single seats, and equal, or approximately equal, electoral 
 districts. 
 
 The effect of the single member system will depend 
 very much on whether the electors belonging to the great 
 parties in the State are uniformly distributed or not. In 
 the former case it is obvious, as I have already pointed 
 out (ante, p. 5), that the minority will be everywhere 
 excluded, and the majority will secure all the seats. 
 
 But now, let us suppose that the electors belonging 
 to the two great parties are not uniformly distributed 
 throughout the constituencies ; but that those of one 
 party are more or less concentrated in particular dis- 
 tricts the Liberals, for instance, in great cities. In 
 this case it is obvious that their electoral strength would 
 be to a great extent wasted. 
 
 Apart, then, from any other collateral, though important, 
 disadvantages such as the temptation to unfairness in 
 the determination of boundaries, the necessity for con- 
 
SINGLE MEMBERED CONSTITUENCIES, 27 
 
 tinual changes in the electoral areas, the separation of 
 the parliamentary area from the municipal, the limita- 
 tion in the choice of the elector, the increased 
 efforts which the representative must make in order 
 to retain his seat, the greater temptation to bribery, 
 the consequent tendency of eminent men to withdraw 
 from political life, &c. the system of single seats will 
 but seldom give a fair representation of the electorate. 
 If the minority is small, as for instance in Scotland and 
 Wales, say one-third or one-quarter of the whole, it will 
 be almost annihilated. If the minority is large, the two 
 great parties being nearly equal, then the result will 
 depend on the manner in which the voters are distri- 
 buted; if the electors belonging to the two parties are 
 evenly diffused, then, as in the preceding case, the 
 minority will be almost obliterated ; while, on the other 
 hand, if the electors of the majority are much con- 
 centrated, as it is likely the Liberals may be in large 
 cities, then the minority may obtain more than their 
 share of power, or even secure a majority of the repre- 
 sentatives. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 SCRUTIN DE LISTE. 
 
 We now turn to the system known as " Scrutin de Lisfc" 
 or "General Ticket," under which each constituency 
 returns several members, and every elector has a number 
 of votes equal to the number of members to be returned, 
 but can only give one vote to any one candidate. 
 
 Assume a constituency which returns seven members. 
 The two great parties may be very evenly balanced, but 
 whichever had the majority, however small, would return 
 the whole of the seven representatives. If Liverpool, 
 for instance, contained 31,000 Conservative electors and 
 30,000 Liberals, under this system the 31,000 electors 
 would have seven members while the 30,000 would have 
 none at all. 
 
 But then it is often said, that any other system would, 
 under such circumstances, reduce a great city to the 
 level of a town returning a single member. But that is 
 only because parties are evenly balanced there. If one- 
 third of the voters are Conservatives, why should they 
 not have one-third of the members ? Why should two- 
 thirds of the constituency monopolize the whole of the 
 
SCRUTIN DE LISTE. 29 
 
 representatives ? Liverpool will have nine members 
 because it has 63,000 electors, of whom perhaps 30,000 
 may be Liberals, 30,000 Conservatives, 2000 Irish Home- 
 rulers, and 1000 without distinctive political opinions ; 
 and I do not understand how any one can really wish 
 that these last 3000 should practically return all the mem- 
 bers. We know that they often vote for the Conserva- 
 tives, and the result would be that 30,000 Liberals 
 would be unrepresented. But if it were not for the 
 30,000 Liberals, Liverpool would have had only four 
 members. It comes, therefore, to this : that because 
 there are 30,000 Liberals in Liverpool, the Conserva- 
 tives are given twice as many members as they would 
 otherwise have had. If it is said that any proportional 
 system is objectionable because it might reduce the 
 voting power of Liverpool on balance to a single vote, 
 then we may ask, How far is this principle to be carried ? 
 In Lancashire, at the last general election, the Conserva- 
 tives polled 38,000 votes, the Liberals 36,000, and the 
 members are four to four. This seems as it should be. 
 The votes are nearly equal, and the members are equal. 
 But can it be said that Lancashire is unrepresented ? 
 Would any one propose that the 36,000 Conservative 
 electors should have returned the whole eight members, 
 and the 34,000 Liberals none at all? Yet this is what 
 would come about under the system of Scmtin de Listc. 
 
 A striking instance of the results given by this system 
 was afforded by the recent elections in Belgium. The 
 Chamber is elected in sections, and in June, 1874, 
 
30 REPRESENTATION. 
 
 fifty-two seats were contested with the following 
 result : 
 
 RESULTS OF THE BELGIAN 
 
 JUNE, 1884. 
 
 ANTI-MINISTERIALISTS. 
 Voters. Elected. 
 Bruxelles <mi 16 
 
 ELECTIONS OF 
 
 MINISTERIALIS 
 Voters. E 
 70'M 
 
 >TS. 
 lected. 
 
 O 
 O 
 O 
 O 
 O 
 
 o 
 o 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 o 
 o 
 o 
 
 Louvain 
 Nivelles 
 
 2340 . . . 
 
 c 
 
 1241 
 
 1655 ... 
 
 4 
 
 1568 
 
 Bruges 
 
 1658 
 
 
 
 Ostende 
 
 ^72 
 
 j 
 
 ccfi 
 
 Ypres . 
 
 1182 ... 
 
 
 55 
 600 
 
 Arlon 
 
 240 . . . 
 
 o 
 
 
 Harche 
 
 282 
 
 
 22Q 
 
 Neufchateau... 
 Virtors 
 Dinant 
 
 
 I 
 
 286 
 
 293 . . . 
 
 o 
 
 
 818 ... 
 
 1825 
 
 2 
 
 
 Namur 
 Philippe ville... 
 Anvers 
 
 4 
 
 I ^22 
 
 605 ... 
 
 ... 2 
 
 
 6818 , 
 
 , 8 , 
 
 -??- 
 
 Total 27930 50 22117 2 
 
 According to their just proportion, the Anti-Minis- 
 terialists ought to have carried 30 seats out of the 52, 
 but they actually secured all but two. 
 
 This election took place in June. In the following 
 month the same constituencies had to elect representa- 
 tives in the Senate. Warned by their recent defeat, the 
 Ministerialists exerted themselves to the utmost, and 
 polled 6000 more votes. This increase, small as it was, 
 turned the scale, and this time they secured 19 seats out 
 of 31. 
 
SCR UTIN DE L ISTE. 3 1 
 
 RESULTS OF THE BELGIAN ELECTIONS OF 
 JULY, 1884. 
 
 ANTI-MINISTERIALISTS. MINISTERIALISTS. 
 
 Voters. Members. Voters. Elected. 
 
 Bruxelles .. 
 
 .... 8969 ... 
 
 o 
 
 95 J 7 
 
 8 
 
 Nivelles .. 
 
 .... 1552 ... 
 
 o 
 
 1650 . 
 
 2 
 
 Gand 
 
 .... 3926 ... 
 
 4 
 
 3547 
 
 O 
 
 Ostende . . 
 
 .... 569 ... 
 
 i 
 
 548 . 
 
 
 
 Soignies . . 
 
 .... 1365 ... 
 
 2 
 
 1246 . 
 
 
 
 Charleroi .. 
 
 .... 2728 ... 
 
 O 
 
 2855 . 
 
 3 
 
 Ath 
 
 .... 8 95 ... 
 
 I 
 
 875 
 
 o 
 
 Liege 
 
 .... 2477 ... 
 
 O 
 
 3800 . 
 
 4 
 
 Huy 
 
 .... 59 6 ... 
 
 
 
 658 . 
 
 i 
 
 Verviers . . 
 
 .... 1803 ... 
 
 2 
 
 1620 . 
 
 
 
 Namur 
 
 1746 ... 
 
 2 
 
 1558 - 
 
 
 
 Arlon 
 
 .... 560 ... 
 
 O 
 
 593 
 
 I 
 
 Total 27186 12 28467 19 
 
 Thus the city of Brussels in June sent all its 16 
 members to oppose the Government in the Chamber; 
 while in July it sent its 8 Senators to support them ; so 
 that it is now represented by 16 Conservatives in the 
 Chamber and 8 Liberals in the Senate. 
 
 Nor are results of this character at all unprecedented ; 
 for instance, in the elections of June, 1882, 29,142 
 Liberals secured 39 seats, while 28,052 Conservatives 
 only carried n. 
 
 The journal published by the Electoral Reform Asso- 
 ciation of Belgium, gives a striking illustration of the 
 results which such a system involves. In the 1882 
 elections the Liberals carried their election in the city of 
 Ghent by a majority of 40 votes. Now Ghent returns 8 
 members to the Chamber, out of 138. If, therefore, 21 
 
32 REPRESENTA T10N. 
 
 electors had gone over to the other side, Ghent would 
 have returned 8 Roman Catholics, counting 16 on a 
 division. Thus the change of 21 voters, presumably not 
 the most honest or intelligent, would have affected the 
 balance of power in the Chamber to the extent of 16 
 votes, would have given a Roman Catholic instead of a 
 Liberal majority in the Chamber, and have led to a 
 change of government. 
 
 Scrutiii de Liste, then, gives an unfair preponderance 
 to the majority ; while where parties are at all evenly 
 balanced, the transfer of a few votes from one side to the 
 other may entirely alter the balance of power. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE. 
 
 IN the previous chapters I have endeavoured to show that 
 neither the system of Single Seats, nor that of Scrutin de 
 Listc, gives a fair and just representation ; it now remains 
 to consider the various plans of Proportional Representa- 
 tion which have been proposed with the view of effecting 
 this important object. Of these the four principal are 
 the Single Transferable Vote, the Cumulative Vote, the 
 Free List or Ticket, and the Limited Vote. Under 
 all these systems natural communities, no matter how 
 many representatives they may return, are left undivided. 
 Under the system of the " Single Transferable Vote " 
 each elector has a single vote. To avoid, however, the 
 loss of voting power, which might otherwise ensue, it is 
 provided that each elector, though he has only one 
 operative vote, may indicate on the ballot paper other 
 candidates in the order of his preference, to whom he 
 would wish his vote to be transferred in case it is not 
 required by the candidate of his choice. This ingenious 
 plan was devised independently, by a Danish statesman 
 
34 REPRESENTA TION. 
 
 and mathematician, Mr. Andrae, in 1855, and by Mr. 
 Hare in 1857.* 
 
 It was adopted by Denmark in 1855, and when the 
 Constitution was re-modelled in 1867 it was adopted for 
 the present " Landsthing." 2 In that year, there was 
 considerable discussion with reference to certain minor 
 details, but the main principle was generally accepted, 
 and is still in operation. The system, therefore, has 
 stood the test of thirty years' experience. 
 
 The practical operation is indeed very simple. Sup- 
 pose a constituency of 24,000 voters returning three 
 members. Each elector would have one vote. But 
 if that were all it would be evident that under some 
 circumstances the minority might secure two members 
 out of the three. For instance, if there were 14,000 
 Liberals and 10,000 Conservatives and each party had 
 two candidates, then it might very well happen that if 
 one of the two Liberal candidates was pre-eminently 
 able or popular, he might receive 10,000 votes out of the 
 14,000, leaving only 4000 for the second Liberal candi- 
 date ; so that if the Conservatives divided their votes at 
 all equally between their two candidates, giving 5000 to 
 each, they would, though in the minority, secure two seats 
 out of the three. To avoid this, it is proposed that though 
 each elector should only have one operative vote, yet the 
 
 1 "The Machinery of Representation," 1857. See also "The 
 Election of Representatives," 1859, by the same author. Mr. Hare, 
 however, proposed to treat the whole county as one constituency. 
 
 2 See Appendix II. 
 
THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE. 35 
 
 vote should be transferable, that is to say, the elector 
 should be permitted to indicate what he would wish to be 
 done with it in case it is not required by the candidate of 
 his choice. 1 In the case I have assumed, 10,000 Liberals 
 would have voted for candidate A by placing i against 
 his name, but they would be permitted to indicate the 
 order of their preference by placing 2, 3, and so on, 
 against the name of the other candidates. In this in- 
 stance it is obvious that any candidate receiving 6001 
 votes would be sure of election, because there were sup- 
 posed to be 24,000 electors and three representatives ; 
 and as three times 6001 make 18,003, which being de- 
 ducted from 24,000 leaves only 5997, any candidate 
 having 6001 votes must be elected. Consequently of 
 the 10,000 votes given to the first Liberal candidate he 
 would only require 6001, leaving 3999 to be transferred; 2 
 and of these, according to all electioneering experience, 
 the vast majority would go to the second Liberal can- 
 didate. Consequently in this case the two Liberal 
 candidates would be elected, together with whichever 
 of the two Conservative candidates had received the 
 largest number of votes. That is simple enough. But 
 even if there were three or more Liberal candidates 
 there would be no difficulty in transferring the votes. 
 
 1 The number of votes sufficient to secure election is called the 
 "Quota." 
 
 2 It has been proposed by Mf. Baily that each candidate should 
 be allowed to distribute his surplus votes as he pleases. This of 
 course has the merit of simplicity, but appears to deprive the elector 
 of a right which properly belongs to him. 
 
 5 
 
REPRESENTA T20N. 
 
 The Committee of the Proportional Representation has 
 drawn up the following leaflet to illustrate the system : 
 "Suppose there are 3 members to be elected for a 
 constituency, and 5 candidates stand 2 Conservatives 
 (Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir R. Cross), 2 Liberals (Mr. 
 Gladstone and Lord Hartington), and i Independent. 
 The voting paper would be printed as now 
 CROSS - 
 GLADSTONE 
 HARTINGTON 
 INDEPENDENT - 
 NORTHCOTE 
 What would the Voter have to do ? 
 He is entitled to one vote only, but he can pass it on 
 if his first favourite does not want it, 
 
 He would put i against the first man of his choice, 2 
 against the next, and 3 against the third, if he wanted to 
 go so far. 
 
 The paper would, in fact, be filled up something as below. 
 
 Most Liberals would probably vote: Gladstone (i) and 
 
 Hartington (2), and their third votes might be divided 
 
 between Northcote and the Independent, so that their 
 
 papers might be marked as follows 
 
 CROSS - - - i 
 
 GLADSTONE i 
 
 HARTINGTON 2 
 
 INDEPENDENT 
 
 NORTHCOTE I 
 
 (In most papers the Independent would be marked (3) 
 
 but in some, possibly, Northcote.) 
 
THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE. 
 
 37 
 
 Most Conservatives would probably vote : Northcote 
 (i), and Cross (2), so that their papers might be 
 
 CROSS - 
 GLADSTONE 
 HARTINGTON 
 INDEPENDENT - 
 NORTHCOTE - 
 
 and their third votes might be divided between Hartington 
 and the Independent. 
 
 A Non-partisan might vote 
 
 CROSS - 
 
 GLADSTONE 
 
 HARTINGTON 
 
 INDEPENDENT i 
 
 NORTHCOTE - ! 3 
 
 Here the Voter's work is finished. 
 Can any one who does not understand this be called a 
 capable citizen ? 
 
 What would the Returning Officer and his clerks have 
 to do? 
 
 Suppose T 2,000 voted. Everybody will see that 4000 
 votes would certainly suffice to return a candidate ; but a 
 little reflection will show that less than this number would 
 be enough. If the 12,000 is divided into four lots of 
 
 3000 each, being one more than the number of seats, 
 any one who got more than 3000 must get it by reducing 
 another lot under 3000, and therefore any one who gets 
 
 3001 must be elected. 
 
REPRESENTA TION. 
 
 The Returning Officer must mix and then distribute the 
 voting papers, placing in different heaps those in which 
 the different candidates are numbered i. 
 
 Suppose the result is as follows on the First Count 
 
 CROSS - 
 GLADSTONE - 
 HARTINGTON 
 INDEPENDENT 
 NORTHCOTE - 
 
 1500 p 
 
 5000. -I 
 2000 I sag 
 
 500 ]w.JS (u'S 
 
 3000 f* 
 
 We have seen that 3001 is enough to elect; therefore, 
 as Gladstone only requires 3001, he has 1999 more than 
 he wants, which would be transferred to Hartington, he 
 being second on the Liberal voting papers. 
 
 Second Count 
 
 CROSS - 
 GLADSTONE - 
 HARTINGTON 
 INDEPENDENT 
 NORTHCOTE - 
 
 f 2000 
 1 + 1999 
 
 I5OO 
 3001 
 
 = 3999 
 
 500 
 
 3000 
 
 Lord Hartington now has 998 superfluous votes, and 
 if any of these passed to Northcote they would bring him 
 at once above the quota, while, even if all passed to the 
 Independent, Northcote would still be elected. 
 
 Thus, Gladstone, Hartington, and Northcote would be 
 elected." 
 
 In the various meetings which the Proportional Repre- 
 sentation Society has recently held, it has been found 
 that an actual illustrative election gives a clearer idea of 
 
THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE. 39 
 
 the system than any description can convey. I will 
 therefore give an additional instance founded on one 
 of the Society's meetings. Suppose, for instance, that 
 we are holding one of these illustrative elections. 
 The constituency is to return three members, and there 
 are five candidates ; Mr. Gladstone and Lord Harting- 
 ton are the two Liberals; Sir Stafford Northcote and 
 Sir R. A. Cross the two Conservatives ; and Sir W. 
 Lawson is supposed to stand as an Independent. I 
 take the number of votes recorded at one of our meet- 
 ings, namely 1400, though of course in real political life 
 a constituency would not return three members unless it 
 contained a much larger number of electors. 
 
 If 1400 persons vote, and there are three members to 
 be elected, it is obvious that 351 votes would be sufficient 
 to secure election, because 351 multiplied by 3 is 1053, 
 which deducted from 1400, would leave 347; so that if 
 three candidates each received 351 votes, no one else 
 could secure as many. 
 
 First Count 
 
 Cross 143 
 
 Gladstone 632 
 
 Hartington 134 
 
 Lawson 155 
 
 Northcote , 336 
 
 1400 
 
 At the first count, therefore, Mr, Gladstone is elected 
 with 281 votes to spare. These then are distributed 
 according to the names marked " 2 " on the paper, and 
 the result is, as may naturally be expected, that while a 
 
40 REPRESENTATION. 
 
 few of the second votes pass to Sir Stafford Northcote, 
 Sir R. A. Cross, and to Sir W. Lawson, the great 
 majority go to Lord Hartington. The second count 
 then results as follows : 
 
 Second Votes transferred 
 
 Original Votes. from Mr. Gladstone. Total. 
 
 Cross 143 2 145 
 
 Gladstone 351 
 
 Hartington 134 237 371 
 
 Lawson 155 27 182 
 
 Northcote.... 336 2 338 
 
 1387 
 
 The result of the second count then is that Lord 
 Hartington is elected with 20 votes to spare, which are 
 again distributed, with the result that at the third count 
 the numbers are- 
 Cross ; 146 
 
 Gladstone 351 
 
 Hartington 351 
 
 Lawson 1 96 
 
 Northcote 340 
 
 1384 
 
 No third candidate having reached the necessary num- 1 
 ber of votes, those given to the candidate lowest on the 
 poll, namely Sir R. Cross, are then distributed in the 
 same way, and of these 14 are marked for Sir W. 
 Lawson, and 120 for Sir Stafford Northcote, so that 
 the final numbers stand 
 
 Gladstone 357 
 
 Hartington 35 l 
 
 Lawson 210 
 
 Northcote 4 6 
 
THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE. 41 
 
 Mr. Gladstone, Lord Harrington, and Sir S. North- 
 cote are consequently elected, a result which fairly 
 represents the views of the electors. Out of 1400 
 electors there were 766 Liberals, 155 Independents, 
 and 479 Conservatives, so that 2 Liberals and i Con- 
 servative representative would be the just proportion. 
 
 But if the same constituency had had to elect under 
 Scrutin de Liste, they would have returned three Liberals, 
 which would have been manifestly unjust. 
 
 If the election had been under the cumulative system 
 there would probably have been elected one Conservative, 
 one Liberal, and one Independent, which would have also 
 been .unjust. 
 
 On the other hand, if the constituency had been divided 
 into three single seats, the result would have entirely 
 depended on the distribution of the voters of the different 
 parties. If they chanced to be distributed equally, then 
 all three representatives would have been Liberals, because 
 the division would have been as follows 
 
 Constituency I. Constituency II. Constituency III. Total. 
 
 Liberal 255 255 256 766 
 
 Conservative ... 160 160 159 479 
 
 Independent ... 52 52 51 155 
 
 467 467 466 1400 
 
 If, on the contrary, the Liberals were concentrated, 
 the result might have been that the Conservatives secured 
 two seats out of the three, as follows 
 
 Constituency I. Constituency II. Constituency III. Total. 
 
 Liberal 390 200 176 766 
 
 Conservative ... 60 210 209 479 
 
 Independent ... 17 57 81 155 
 
 467 467 466 1400 
 
42 REPRESENTATION. 
 
 So that under the single member system the result 
 would have entirely depended on the chance how the 
 votes were distributed. 
 
 / The single transferable vote, then, would, most certainly, 
 and most fairly, represent the views of the electors. 
 
 I subjoin the rules which are suggested in order to 
 carry out this system. 
 
 RULES FOR THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE. 
 
 1. Each voter shall have one vote, but may vote in 
 the alternative for as many of the candidates as he pleases, 
 by writing the figures i, 2, 3, &c, opposite the names of 
 those candidates in the order of his preference. 
 
 COUNTING VOTES. 
 
 2. The ballot papers having been all mixed, shall be 
 drawn out in succession, and stamped with numbers so 
 that no two shall bear the same number. 
 
 3. The number obtained by dividing the whole number 
 of good ballot papers tendered at the election, by the 
 number of members to be elected, plus one, and increas- 
 ing the quotient (or, where this is fractional, the integral 
 part of the quotient) by one, shall be called the Quota. 
 
 4. Every candidate who has a number of first votes 
 equal to, or greater than, the quota, shall be declared 
 elected, and so many of the ballot papers containing 
 those votes as shall be equal in number to the quota 
 (being those stamped with the lowest numerals), shall be 
 
THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE. 43 
 
 set aside as of no further use. On all other ballot papers 
 the name of the elected candidate shall be deemed to be 
 cancelled, with the effect of raising by so much in the 
 order of preference all votes given to other candidates 
 after him. This process shall be repeated until no can- 
 didate has more than a quota of first votes, or votes 
 deemed first. 
 
 5. Then the candidate or candidates having the fewest 
 first votes, or votes deemed first, shall be declared not to 
 be elected, with the effect of raising by so much in the 
 order of preference all votes given to candidates after 
 him or them ; and Rule 4 shall be again applied, if 
 possible. 
 
 6. When, by successive applications of Rules 4 and 5, 
 the number of candidates is reduced to the number of 
 members remaining to be elected, the remaining candi- 
 dates shall be declared elected. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 PR OPOR TIONAL REPRESENTA TJON> 
 
 REPLY TO THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN 
 URGED AGAINST THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE. 
 
 WE will now proceed to discuss the various objections 
 which have been raised to the Single Transferable 
 Vote. 
 
 The first objection urged, is that the system is too dif- 
 ficult. To this it is surely a sufficient reply that not only 
 have illustrative elections been held in many places, but 
 that actually during these public meetings many thou- 
 sands of votes have been recorded. The spoilt papers 
 were remarkably few, and the consequence has been 
 that resolutions in favour of the system have been passed 
 by overwhelming majorities. 1 During the winter of 
 1884 large public meetings were held at Liverpool, 
 Manchester, Glasgow, Nottingham, Leicester, Oxford, 
 Norwich, Newcastle, Greenwich, Westminster, the Tower 
 
 1 Moreover, while Cumulative Voting is more difficult for the 
 voter, the number of spoilt papers even under that system is very 
 small. For instance, at a recent School Board election in Finsbury, 
 out of 14,000 votes 180 only were spoilt ; in Greenwich, 178 out of 
 17,000. 
 
REPLY TO OBJECTIONS. 45 
 
 Hamlets, Lambeth, Islington, St. Pancras, and other 
 places; and Greenwich is the only one which expressed 
 a preference for the system of single seats. 
 
 The next question which is frequently raised by 
 objectors, is, how are the votes selected which are to be 
 transferred ? Take, for instance, one of the illustrations 
 given in the last chapter, in which Mr. Gladstone re- 
 ceived 10,000 votes and requires only 6000, leaving 4000 
 to be transferred. 
 
 The transfer might of course be made in the propor- 
 tion in which the whole of the second votes are given. 
 Suppose, for instance, there were three Liberal candidates 
 A, B, and C. A has 10,000 votes, of which 4000 have 
 to be transferred. If the 10,000 votes were marked 
 in the second place, half for B and half for C, 
 then the 4000 votes would obviously give 2000 each 
 for B and C. If, in the 10,000, B had three-quarters 
 and C one-quarter, the numbers would be 3000 for 
 B and 1000 for C. This would be absolutely fair as 
 between B and C. But it would probably be scarcely 
 worth while to adopt this course. The present law 
 provides that the voting papers shall be well shuffled, 
 and after this has been done, if the first 6000 votes are 
 put on one side, and the 4000 surplus votes simply 
 divided in accordance with the preference marked on 
 thein, the result (which has been calculated out by Mr. 
 Parker Smith and others) would, in a constituency of 
 24,000, generally be true within 16, and the odds would 
 
46 REPRESENTATION. 
 
 be 44,000 to i against chance making a difference of 100 
 from the true result. 
 
 The opponents of the system have over and over again 
 asserted that under the system we propose, the element 
 of chance is, on the contrary, very considerable. I 
 have, however, in vain endeavoured to induce any of 
 them to produce any calculation in support of their 
 statements, or to say what they themselves calculate the 
 chances to be. Under these circumstances, therefore, I 
 addressed the following letter to Professor Stokes, Sec- 
 retary of the Royal Society, and Professor of Mathematics 
 in the University of Cambridge, whose calculation I am 
 sure every impartial person will accept as conclusive. 
 
 "HIGH ELMS, Feb. 3, 1885. 
 
 "MY DEAR PROFESSOR STOKES, The opponents of Propor- 
 tional Representation frequently object that under the system we 
 propose much would depend on chance. 
 
 "This, of course, might be entirely obviated by distributing the 
 second votes in proportion, but we have not thought this necessary 
 because the chance is so small. 
 
 "According to our calculation, supposing a constituency of 
 twenty-five thousand electors returning three members, and that a 
 candidate receives ten thousand votes, of which one-half are marked 
 in the second place for a candidate ' B,' and one-half for ' C,' and 
 suppose that four thousand have to be distributed, the element of 
 chance would generally affect the result by less than twenty. 
 
 " Your authority on such a question would, of course, be accepted 
 as conclusive. 
 
 " Will you, therefore, allow me to ask you whether this is so, and 
 also to state what the odds would be against the result being affected 
 by chance to the extent of one hundred. 
 
 "I am, yours very truly, 
 
 (Signed) " JOHN LUUBOCK, 
 
 11 G, Stokes, Esq., M.A., D.C.L., &c." 
 
REPL Y TO OBJECTIONS. 47 
 
 Professor Stokes kindly replied as follows 
 
 "CAMBRIDGE, Feb. 5, 1885. 
 
 " MY DEAR SIR JOHN, I have carefully calculated the chances, 
 and quite verify your result. I find that the average difference 
 from two thousand in the votes assigned to ' B ' or ' C ' in the case 
 you mention would be as nearly as may be sixteen, and that the 
 odds against the difference being as great as one hundred would be, 
 in round numbers, forty-four thousand to one, 
 
 " Believe me, yours sincerely, 
 
 (Signed) " G. G. STOKES. 
 
 "Sir John Lubbock, Bart., M.P., &c." 
 
 I suppose that a difference of 100 votes in a consti- 
 tuency of 25,000 would not affect the result (at the 
 outside) once in 20 times. If the country were divided 
 into constituencies returning three or more members, 
 there would not in all be more than 200 such consti- 
 tuencies ; now assuming a general election every four or 
 five years, and making a certain allowance for bye elections, 
 we should have, say, something more than 4000 elections 
 in a century. Consequently it follows that the element 
 of chance would not affect a single election more than, 
 say, about once in io,ooo'years. 
 
 Moreover, it must be remembered that the element 
 of chance, microscopical as it is, lies not between 
 candidates of different parties, but between two almost 
 equally acceptable candidates belonging to the same 
 party. For instance, in the case I have taken above, 
 a vast majority of the surplus votes taken from the first 
 Liberal candidate would be given to the second. In all 
 ordinary elections, the votes split between a Liberal and 
 
48 REPRESENTATION. 
 
 a Conservative are a very small minority of the whole. 
 But if, between two candidates, there is very little to 
 choose, and the electors are all but evenly divided, then, 
 from a national point of view, it cannot much matter 
 which of them comes in. 
 
 I do not, however, wonder that the opponents of the 
 system should have pressed this objection, because many 
 of them appear to ,be under a singular misapprehension. 
 They have tried experiments on a small scale, and seem 
 to think that the element of chance would increase 
 with the numbers. For instance, one of the ablest 
 opponents says 
 
 "In an experiment made to test the scheme, with 70 voting 
 papers, where 9 candidates were supposed to contest 7 seats, the 
 main parties being nearly evenly divided, and an independent 
 candidate having nearly the quota, I found that 12 shuffles of the 
 papers, filled always in the same manner, brought out 5 different 
 results of the poll when counted on thS principle of the system pro- 
 posed, and it is clear that, with 70,000 voting papers, the result 
 would be equally the subject of chance. . . . Generally, it may be 
 said, that the larger the district and the more numerous the members, 
 the greater the elements of chance." l 
 
 I read this with much surprise, and I need hardly say 
 that it is founded on an entire misapprehension. The 
 element of chance would of course be very large in a 
 constituency of 70, but diminishes rapidly as the numbers 
 increase. On this basis, indeed, the whole system of 
 insurance is bas.ed. 
 
 Considering the magnitude of the element of chance 
 
 1 The Fortnightly Revieiv> Feb. 1885, p. 208. 
 
REPLY TO OBJECTIONS. 49 
 
 under the system of majority voting, it is remarkable that 
 such an infinitesimal element of accident should be re- 
 garded as an objection. Under no system, perhaps, is 
 chance in reality so much reduced to a minimum. 
 
 I must repeat, however, that, as already pointed out, 
 the element of chance might be altogether eliminated 
 by distributing the secon.d votes proportionally, and it 
 might be desirable to leave any candidate the right to 
 claim that this should be done, if he thought it worth 
 while. 
 
 Another objection which has been frequently urged is 
 "that every elector in either party would be provided 
 with a list, and would be told that if he did not mark 
 it in exactly the same order as every other elector, the 
 party to which he belonged would go to the wall." 
 That, however, is evidently a misapprehension. In fact, 
 as long as the Liberals vote for all the Liberals, and 
 the Conservatives for the Conservatives, it does not 
 matter, so far as party is concerned, in what order the 
 votes are arranged. The number of representatives 
 carried by each party would be determined by the 
 number of their supporters ; the order in which the 
 names were placed would not in any way affect the 
 number of representatives returned belonging to the 
 party, but would secure the election of the most able and 
 popular candidate or candidates within each party. 
 
 Mr. Lefevre has brought forward another objection, 
 which seems to me very extraordinary and uncom- 
 
50 REPRESENTA TION. 
 
 plimentary to his fellow-countrymen. "If the party 
 organizers," he said, "give no such advice, but recommend 
 their followers to vote in the order of their own preference, 
 it may well be that large numbers would vote for the 
 candidates in the alphabetical order in which they stand 
 on the voting paper." 
 
 The " capable citizen " must indeed have fallen low 
 before he can be capable of such stupidity. 
 
 The last objection which has been urged, is that the 
 system, by giving too accurate a representation, might 
 prevent the formation of a strong Government. This 
 is, in effect, to maintain that an unjust system is better 
 than a just one. It is the old argument in favour of 
 despotism. But, as already pointed out, mere majority 
 voting and single seats will not secure a strong Govern- 
 ment. Sometimes, indeed, it might annihilate the 
 minority, but at others it would reduce the majority, 
 and sometimes as in 1874, even give the minority of 
 electors a majority of the House of Commons. Propor- 
 tional representation is, in fact, the only system which 
 would fairly reproduce the views of the country. 
 
 Under this system, all necessity for interference or 
 dictation by any caucus, agent, or committee is entirely 
 obviated. The elector can freely vote for whom he 
 pleases, without any fear that his vote will be thrown 
 away. The majority would be fairly represented, the 
 minority would obtain a hearing, and the most eminent 
 and trusted leaders would be sure of election. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 PR OPOR TIONAL REPRESENTA TION. 
 
 THE CUMULATIVE VOTE, 
 
 THE Cumulative Vote is that system under which each 
 elector has as many votes as there are members to be 
 elected in his constituency, and may "cumulate" them 
 all on one candidate, or divide them between the different 
 candidates in any proportion he pleases, 
 
 This system was first suggested by Mr. James Garth 
 Marshall in 1857. In 1870 it was adopted for the 
 election of School Boards. It is also in actual operation 
 in Illinois, and elsewhere. 
 
 It was considered that the introduction of proportional 
 representation into School Board elections would con- 
 tribute to the satisfactory working of our educational 
 system, because a School Board, composed entirely of 
 Churchmen on the one hand, or of Dissenters on the 
 other, would, however unjustly, be regarded with sus- 
 picion. 
 
 On the other hand, the result of the cumulative system 
 has been that the School Boards in our great cities contain 
 representatives of every important section in the con- 
 
 6 
 
5 2 REPRESENTA TION. 
 
 stituency ; and the representatives of the Education De- 
 partment .have recently given evidence before a Com- 
 mittee of the House of Commons that this has greatly 
 contributed to the successful working of the Education 
 Act. 
 
 Still it must be admitted that the system leads to a 
 great loss of voting power. For instance, in the first 
 Marylebone election (November, 1870), seven members 
 having to be returned, the votes were as follows 
 
 MARYLEBONE. 
 
 Successful Candidates. 
 
 Garrett 47,858 
 
 Huxley 13.494 
 
 Thorold 12,186 
 
 Angus u,472 
 
 Hutchins 9,253 
 
 Dixon 9,03! 
 
 Watson 8,355 
 
 Unsuccessful Candidates. 
 
 Mills 7, 927 
 
 Powell 7,852 
 
 Whelpton 5,759 
 
 Waterlow 4,994 
 
 Garvey 4,933 
 
 Marshall 4,668 
 
 Guedella 4,635 
 
 Cremer 4,402 
 
 Edmunds 3,973 
 
 Verey 2, 1 30 
 
 Stanford 1,486 
 
 Wyld 334 
 
 Dunn 258 
 
 Brewer 1 03 
 
 Beare 62 
 
 165,165 
 
THE CUMULATIVE VOTE. 53 
 
 It will be seen that Miss Garrett received no less than 
 47,858 votes, while, under the circumstances, 8,000 
 would have elected her. Nearly 40,000 votes out of the 
 48,000 were therefore wasted, and it is obvious that if 
 Miss Garret t's supporters had known their strength, they 
 would have desired to vote so as to secure the return of 
 other candidates sharing their opinions. The Maryle- 
 bone election was certainly an extreme case, but there 
 have been many others in which the same phenomenon 
 has been repeated. 
 
 It must be observed that when the cumulative vote was 
 proposed by Mr. Marshall, voting was open, and it is 
 obvious that the introduction of the Ballot has greatly 
 affected the problem, by rendering the operation of the 
 system more uncertain than would otherwise have been 
 the case. 
 
 No doubt the cumulative vote works much more 
 satisfactorily in constituencies returning only three mem- 
 bers. It has been adopted in the amended constitution 
 of the State of Illinois, and the results have been thus 
 described in a letter by Mr. Medill to the Cincinnati 
 Commercialese* 2, 1872) 
 
 " For the first time in the history of political organizations each 
 party is represented from every portion of the State, and the aggre- 
 gate representation is exactly in proportion to the numerical strength 
 of each party. Thus the Republicans have elected 86 members of 
 the House, and the Democrats 67. The Republican vote of the 
 State was 240,837 ; the Democratic vote (including O'Conor's) was 
 187,250. This would give an average of 2800 Republican votes 
 cast for each Republican member, and 2790 Democratic votes cast 
 for each member of that persuasion. 
 
54 REPRESENTATION. 
 
 "What could be more equal or mathematically exact? The 
 majority party have complete control, but the minority party have 
 just the representations they are entitled to on principles of equality. 
 Had the House been elected on the "grab-all" method, it would 
 stand, Republican 99, Democrat 54. We elected our Senate by 
 single districts, and the Republicans carried 33 districts and the 
 Democrats but 18. Divide the total Republican vote by the 
 number of senators elected, and the quotient is about 7300 votes to 
 each. Divide the Democratic vote by their senators elected, and 
 their quotient is about 10,400. Thus you perceive the Democrats 
 are not nearly represented in the Senate in proportion to their 
 strength ; but in the House, which was elected on the minority 
 representation plan, they have secured precisely the number of 
 members they should have on principles of right and justice. 
 
 "The practical working of the two systems, viz., the " grab-all " 
 and the proportional, was strikingly exemplified in this county, 
 which is divided into seven senatorial districts. The Republicans 
 carried 6 of them, and the Democrats only I ; but for the other 
 House the Democrats elected 8, and the Republicans 13 members, 
 and that .is exactly the number of members each party was entitled 
 to in proportion to its strength at the polls in this county. 
 
 " For the first time for many years will the Democrats of this 
 city be represented in the General Assembly by men of their choice 
 and sentiments ; and for the first time since the Republican party was 
 organized in Illinois (in 1854) have the Democrats secured a repre- 
 sentation from Northern or the Republicans from Southern Illinois, 
 with rare exceptions. The strongest and bitterest Democratic 
 districts down in * Egypt ' have now, for the first time in the history 
 of existing parties, elected Republicans to the General Assembly. 
 
 " I send you a list of the members elect from all the districts 
 beginning with Chicago and ending with Cairo. Mark the number 
 of Republicans who have been chosen to the House from the Thirty- 
 third to the Fifty-first District inclusive. These, with two or three 
 exceptions, have heretofore constituted the Democratic strongholds 
 of our State. Also note the number of Democrats who have been 
 returned in the districts from the First to the Twenty-third. (This 
 territory is called ' Canaan ' in contradistinction to ' Egypt ' at the 
 opposite end of the State.) From this ' Canaan's fair and happy 
 land ' Democratic members have, therefore, been as scarce as white 
 blackbirds. 
 
THE CUMULATIVE VOTE. 55 
 
 "Some of the politicians, before the election, predicted that 
 cumulative voting would cause so much confusion and mischief that 
 it would have to be abolished right away. The people, they said, 
 would never comprehend it or know how to vote by that method ; 
 and the judges of the election, they predicted, would be unable to 
 count up the votes and make correct returns. But none of their 
 evil prognostications came to pass. The people seemed to under- 
 stand their new power of cumulative voting, and exercised it freely. 
 In some instances they elected two Republicans in a Democratic 
 district, or two Democrats in a Republican district. This was done 
 by ' plumping ' for favourite candidates or transferring a part of a 
 vote to a political opponent on account of his personal merits or 
 popularity. But the general result did not change the proportional 
 representation of parties. 
 
 "Again the Chicago Times (28th November, 1872) adverting to 
 the statement of Mr. Medill, observes that, clear as it is, it still 'fails 
 to exhibit with due precision and force the most remarkable contrast 
 between the new proportional system and the old ' grab-all ' system 
 The Times yesterday directed attention to the fact that in the 
 new Illinois Congressional delegation only 250, 181 of the 434,252 
 citizens who sought to gain representation are actually represented, 
 while no less than 184,071 of the number seeking representation 
 are actually unrepresented or misrepresented. The like fact 
 appears no less conspicuously in the election of our State senators. 
 In the seven senatorial districts in Cork county 50,355 votes sought 
 to gain representation in the State senate. Of this number only 
 31,935 will be actually represented, leaving no less than 18,420 
 wholly unrepresented or misrepresented. The table of votes, 
 showing the represented and unrepresented voters in each of the 
 seven senatorial districts is as follows 
 
 Districts. Represented. Unrepresented. 
 
 First 3,342 2,263 
 
 Second 6,740 3,077 
 
 Third 3,995 4,109 
 
 Fourth 4,304 3,886 
 
 Fifth 6,175 1*167 
 
 Sixth 2,663 2*634 
 
 Seventh 4>7i6 1,284 
 
 Total 3 r >935 18,420 
 
56 REPRESENTATION. 
 
 " Seven senators to be chosen by 50,355 voters gives 7193 as the 
 representative quota. From the table it will be seen that there 
 were two full quotas of voters and a surplus of 4034, making in 
 fact three senatorial quotas who were unable to choose a single 
 senator, while no more than four quotas (justly entitled to four 
 senators, but no more), elected all seven of the senators, taking to 
 themselves a monopoly of the whole senatorial delegation. And 
 this is what * free and intelligent ' American citizens are told by the 
 professional office-begging politicians is popular representation ! 
 
 " Some critics of the free vote have expressed fears that it might 
 result in a great 'waste of votes.' By 'waste votes' they mean 
 votes that fail to elect anybody. The 18,420 unrepresented voters 
 shown in the foregoing table would be described by them as citizens 
 who wasted, or threw away, their votes. They * threw away their 
 votes ' because the law arbitrarily excluded them from the right of 
 representation and conferred upon four representative quotas all the 
 representatives (senators) to which seven quotas were entitled. 
 They ' threw away their votes ' because the law, in order to give a 
 monopoly of the representation to a part of the constituency, dis- 
 franchised them in the senate of Illinois. 
 
 " But how was it in the choice of representatives, by the same 
 voters, for the other branch of the Legislature, in which choice the 
 free or cumulative vote prevailed ? How many voters in the seven 
 Cook County districts, threw away their votes, or failed to gain re- 
 presentation, under the operation of the new system? The following 
 table shows the number of represented and (apparently) unrepresented 
 voters in each of the same districts under a free vote 
 
 Districts. Represented. Unrepresented 
 
 First 4,448 993 
 
 Second 7, 906 1,799 
 
 Third 6,798 204 
 
 Fourth 7,491 1,018 
 
 Fifth 4,945 1,109 
 
 Sixth 3,870 1,520 
 
 Seventh 4,927 834 
 
 Total 40,385 7>477 
 
 " This table shows that the whole number of voters in the seven 
 
THE CUMULATIVE VOTE. 57 
 
 Cook County districts, who sought to be represented in the Lower 
 House of the Legislature, was 47,862, of which number 40,385 
 actually gained a representative or representatives of their choice. 
 In reality, the number who actually gained representation was 
 much more than that, and the number who failed to gain represen- 
 tation much less than 7,477. The column ' unrepresented ' in this 
 table is reduced from all the votes given to candidates that were not 
 elected, and is therefore largely made up of voters who gave only 
 a portion of their three votes to the defeated candidate and the rest 
 to a successful candidate. All such are, therefore, not unrepresented, 
 but are actually represented by one representative of their choice. 
 The actual number of unrepresented would, of course, be only those 
 voters who gave all their votes to a defeated candidate. It is 
 impossible to ascertain the exact number of such without an exami- 
 nation of the ballots. It may, however, be fairly presumed that 
 the actual number of voters in the seven districts who failed to gain 
 representation would exclude a few more than those who, in the 
 Third, Sixth, and Seventh Districts, voted ' plumpers ' for Mr. 
 Lowe (204), Mi*. Buckingham (600), and Mr. Plowe (324). 
 Assuming this to be the fact, the total number of voters in an 
 aggregate of 47,862, who, by the use of the free or cumulative 
 vote, failed to gain representation was only 1128. 
 
 " The comparison, then, of the results of the old and new system, 
 operating side by side in these seven districts, at the same election 
 is as follows 
 
 Voters Voters 
 
 Represented. Unrepresented. 
 
 Old System 3i>935 18,420 
 
 New System 46,734 1,128 
 
 "These facts are recommended to the thoughtful consideration of 
 all men who believe in popular representative government." 
 
 The Chicago Dally Tribune (Nov. 21, 1872) expressed 
 a similar opinion 
 
 "There are a number of defeated candidates who declare minority 
 representation a humbug, and demand its repeal at the earliest 
 possible time ; but, on the whole, it has worked admirably ; it has 
 secured the great end sought, and has enabled the people, in many 
 
58 REPRESENTATION, 
 
 instances, to defeat the objectionable candidate by the election of 
 better men. The principle of minority representation has been 
 fully indicated by the results. '' 
 
 The World *A.te 
 
 " If the work of this ' reformed ' House of Representatives makes 
 good the promise given by the nearly equally balanced state of 
 parties and the defeat of objectionable candidates at the polls, we 
 may expect to see the principle which has brought about these 
 results incorporated into the various State constitutions." 
 
 It is clear, then, that the Cumulative Vote secures a 
 share of representation to all important sections of the 
 community ; but when more than three members have 
 to be returned, it must be admitted that the almost 
 inevitable waste of votes is a serious objection. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 THE FREE LIST, OR TICKET. 
 
 THIS system was proposed by Mr. Gilpin, of Philadelphia, 
 in 1844, in a pamphlet, which seems to have been the first 
 attempt to place Representation on a true basis. Under 
 this system the elector would vote for a list. Several 
 modifications have been proposed. To meet the objec- 
 tion that it places too much power in the hands of party 
 managers, Mr. Baily has suggested that the list should 
 be prepared by the candidate himself, instead of by the 
 committee. 
 
 Mr. Westlake has pointed out that this system might 
 be combined with the Cumulative Vote by the adoption 
 of the following rules : 
 
 1. At every such election every voter shall be entitled 
 to a number of votes equal to the number of members to 
 be elected. 
 
 2. Any two or more candidates may be nominated 
 together as a list, in which their names appear in a certain 
 order. The name of no candidate can appear on more 
 than one list. 
 
6o REPRESENTA TION. 
 
 3. Any voter may give all or any of his votes to any 
 list so formed, and may also give all or any of his votes 
 to any candidates on any list, just as if they had stood 
 separately. 
 
 4. The number obtained by dividing the whole number 
 of good votes given at the election by the number of 
 members to be elected, plus one, and increasing the 
 quotient, or the integral part of the quotient, by one, 
 shall be called the Quota. 
 
 5. The votes given to any list shall be attributed to the 
 first candidate on it until thereby, together with any votes 
 given to him singly, he has obtained the quota. They 
 shall then be attributed to the second candidate on the 
 list, until he has similarly obtained the quota, and so on. 
 
 6. Any residue of the votes given for a list which is in- 
 sufficient to make up the quota for the last candidate on 
 it reached under the preceding rule, shall be attributed to 
 the next lower candidate on the list, if any, for whom it 
 can make up the quota, until his quota is made up, and 
 so on. Any final residue, which is insufficient to make 
 up the quota for any candidate remaining on the list, shall 
 be attributed to the candidate remaining on it to whom 
 the most votes have been given singly, and, in case of 
 equality, to the first such candidate. 
 
 7. Those candidates shall be declared to have been 
 elected to whom the largest numbers of votes shall have 
 been given or attributed. 
 
 Another form of the " Free List " has been proposed 
 by Mr. Seebohm and Mr. Parker Smith, and explained 
 
THE FREE LIST, OR TICKET. 61 
 
 by Mr. Albert Grey in a very able article in the Nine- 
 teenth Century of 1884. The following rules explain 
 the manner in which the elections would be held : 
 
 1. Every voter may vote for as many candidates as he 
 pleases. If he vote for one candidate only, his vote 
 shall count one to that candidate ; if for two candidates, 
 it shall count a half to each, and so on. 
 
 2. Any two or more candidates may be nominated as 
 joint candidates. The names of such candidates shall 
 be bracketed together upon the voting-papers. 
 
 3. Votes given to a candidate so nominated may be 
 attributed either to that candidate, or to any of the candi- 
 dates nominated as joint candidates with him. 
 
 4. The order of priority of joint candidates shall be 
 determined by the number of votes polled by each, and 
 the votes of such candidates shall be applied, according 
 to the regulations of the schedule, to elect in that order 
 as many as possible of such candidates. 
 
 Regulations for the Returning Officer : 
 
 1. The votes of every candidate in each set of joint 
 candidates shall be distributed equally among all the 
 candidates in that set. 
 
 2. The candidate with the fewest votes after this dis- 
 tribution shall be declared not elected; or if a set of joint 
 candidates stand equal with fewest votes, then the candi- 
 date who polled fewest votes in that set shall be declared 
 not elected, and the votes of that candidate shall be dis- 
 tributed amongst the remaining candidates of the set. 
 
 3. Candidates shall be successively rejected in this 
 manner until there remain no more candidates than the 
 number of members to be elected, when the candidates 
 so remaining shall be declared elected. 
 
 The Free List system has many able advocates, and 
 presents no doubt considerable advantages. On the 
 other hand it perhaps interferes unduly with the freedom 
 of the elector. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 THE LIMITED VOTE. 
 
 Summary. 
 
 UNDER this system the constituency returns three or 
 more members, but the elector has a number of votes 
 somewhat less than the number of members to be elected ; 
 the commonest and most convenient arrangement being 
 for the constituency to return three members, each elector 
 having two votes, of which, moreover, he cannot give 
 more than one to any one candidate. This plan appears 
 to have been first suggested by Mr. Praed in 1832. 
 Speaking in the House of Commons on the Reform Bill, 
 he said : T 
 
 " If large counties were not divided, each freeholder might have 
 four votes. He wished to restrict them to two, and he thought this 
 object might be attained even without the division of counties, by 
 allowing each freeholder to only vote for two members, though four 
 were to be the number returned. This was a new principle, and he 
 threw it out for the consideration of the House, and would not 
 further press it at present ; but, as he understood the object of a 
 representative assembly was to allow all classes to be heard, it fre- 
 quently happened, as in the case he had stated (Northamptonshire), 
 that a bare majority returned both members. He was therefore of 
 opinion some measures should be taken to make the voice and views 
 of a large minority known in the legislature." 
 
 1 January 27, 1832. 
 
THE LIMITED VOTE. 63 
 
 Mr. Praed did not press the suggestion. Four years 
 later it was proposed by Lord Grey for adoption in Irish 
 Municipal Elections, and again by Lord John Russell in 
 the Reform Bill of 1854. 
 
 The Reform Bill of 1867 originally contained no pro- 
 vision for any proportional representation, and a proposal 
 by Lord Sherbrooke then Mr. Lowe to introduce the 
 Cumulative Vote was rejected by a large majority. In 
 the House of Lords the Limited Vote, for the three- 
 membered constituencies, was proposed and carried by 
 Lord Cairns, and subsequently accepted by the House 
 of Commons. It was only applied, however, to thirteen 
 constituencies, returning forty members. These " three- 
 membered constituencies " have been abolished by the 
 Redistribution Act of this year. 
 
 On the whole, it cannot be denied that under the 
 Limited Vote, the views of the electors have been fairly re- 
 presented. The system, however, becomes less applicable 
 in constituencies returning a larger number of representa- 
 tives than three. Moreover, if either party think them- 
 selves strong enough to endeavour to secure all three repre- 
 sentatives, they can only attempt this, with any chance of 
 success, by careful organization and strict party discipline. 
 For instance, in Birmingham, when the Liberals contested 
 and succeeded in carrying all three seats, the party 
 managers had to instruct the electors in each ward how 
 to distribute their votes, so that there might be as little 
 waste as possible. This is, no doubt, a drawback, but 
 
64 REPRESENTATION. 
 
 in other respects this system has certainly much to recom- 
 mend it. 1 
 
 I have thus described briefly, and I fear very imper- 
 fectly, the effect of the principal systems of voting which 
 have hitherto been proposed. Those who may wish to 
 consider the advantages which would probably result from 
 the adoption of a just system of representation, I may 
 refer to the works of Mill, Hare, and others. 
 
 I have assumed that Parliament should be " a mirror 
 of the nation ; " if the object were to secure unity of action 
 rather than freedom of discussion, to form an executive 
 body, such as a Government, a Board of Directors, or a 
 Vestry, the case would be quite different. It is, however, 
 I presume, our wish that Parliament should be a delibera- 
 tive assembly, in which all parties should be fairly repre- 
 sented. The system of single seats may give us such a 
 body, but not always, and only as it were by accident ; 
 this great object can only be secured by some form of 
 Proportional Representation. 
 
 Among the various systems which have been proposed, 
 I believe that the Single Transferable Vote is on the whole 
 the best ; that any country which adopts it will secure 
 the three great requisites of Representation,, namely, power 
 to the majority, a hearing to the minority, and lastly 
 what is of scarcely less importance, the representation of 
 every considerable party and section by its best and ablest 
 leaders. 
 
 1 In Italy, by the law of 1882, the Limited Vote is applied to the 
 constituencies, thirty-three in number, which return five members. 
 In these cases each elector has four votes. 
 
APPENDICES. 
 
APPENDIX I. 
 
 APPENDED are expressions of opinion on the subject of 
 Representation from various eminent statesmen. 
 
 MR. PRAED. 1831. 
 
 PRESENT SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 
 
 " If we desire that the representatives of a numerous constituency 
 should come hither merely as witnesses of the fact that certain 
 opinions are entertained by the majority of that constituency, our 
 present system of election is certainly rational, and members are 
 right in their reprobation of a compromise, because it would 
 diminish the strength of the evidence to a fact we wish to ascertain. 
 But if we intend, as surely we do intend, that not the majority only, 
 but the aggregate masses of every numerous constituency, should, so 
 far as is possible, be seen in the persons and heard in the voices of 
 their representatives should be, in short, in the obvious literal 
 sense of the word, ' represented ' in the House then, Sir, our 
 present rule of election is in the theory wrong and absurd, and in 
 practice is but partially corrected by the admission of that compro- 
 mise on which so much virtuous indignation has been wasted." 
 
 EARL RUSSELL, 1854. 
 
 CHECKS AND BALANCES* 
 
 "Now it appears to us that many advantages would attend the 
 enabling the minority to have a part in these returns. In the first 
 
68 APPENDICES. 
 
 place, there is apt to be a feeling of great soreness when a very consi- 
 derable number of electors, such as I have mentioned, are completely 
 shut out from a share in the representation of one place. . . . But, 
 in the next place, I think that the more you have your representa- 
 tion confined to large populations, the more ought you to take care 
 that there should be some kind of balance, and that the large places 
 sending members to the House should send those who represent the 
 community at large. But when there is a very large body excluded, 
 it cannot be said that the community at large is fairly represented." 
 
 1865. 
 
 MINORITY REPRESENTATION. 
 
 In his Essay on the English Constitution (Edition of 1865) he 
 wrote as follows : 
 
 "If there were to be any deviations from our customary habits 
 and rooted ideas on the subject of representation, I should like to 
 see such a change as I once proposed in order to obtain representa- 
 tives of the minority in large and populous counties and towns. If, 
 when three members are to be elected, each elector were allowed to 
 give two votes, we might have a Liberal country gentleman sitting 
 for Buckinghamshire, and a Conservative manufacturer for Manches- 
 ter. The local majority would have two to one in the House of 
 Commons, and the minority would not feel itself disfranchised and 
 degraded." 
 
 1867. 
 THREE-CORNERED SEATS. 
 
 In the House of Lords, in 1867, he gave a vigorous and able 
 support to Lord Cairns' amendment : 
 
 " I believe (he said) by means of such a plan you would intro- 
 duce into the House of Commons men of moderate views, whose 
 influence would tend to reconcile parties on those occasions which 
 now and then arise when neither extreme is completely right, and 
 when the influence of moderate men is of much use in allaying the 
 heat of party passion. 
 
 " Suppose a town has 20,000 voters, and that 12,000 are of one 
 side in polities and 8,000 of the other : would not that town be 
 
RUSSELL CALttOUN. 69 
 
 better represented if both the 12,000 and the 8,000 were repre- 
 sented, than if only the 12,000 were represented? The gentleman 
 who first impressed me with these opinions as to three-cornered 
 constituencies mentioned to me that, in a great manufacturing 
 town where there was a very considerable Conservative minority, 
 men of the greatest respectability, men of wealth and men of 
 education, were in such a state of political irritation, from the 
 fact of feeling themselves reduced to the position of mere ciphers 
 at elections, that they were sometimes ready to support candidates 
 of even extreme democratic opinions. ... I can well understand 
 men who are extremely intolerant and exclusive in politics objecting 
 to give any voice to those whose political views are distasteful to 
 them, but I cannot understand such an objection being urged by 
 those who are in favour of having public opinion fairly represented. " 
 
 CALHOUN. 1854. 
 
 FALSE REPRESENTATION. 
 
 c ' The radical error, the consequence of confounding the two, and 
 of regarding the numerical as the only majority, has contributed more 
 than any other cause to prevent the formation of popular constitu- 
 tional governments, and to destroy them even when they have been 
 formed. It leads to the conclusion that, in their formation and 
 establishment, nothing more is necessary than the right of suffrage, 
 and the allotment to each division of the community a representa- 
 tion in the government, in proportion to numbers. If the numerical 
 majority were really the people, and if to take its sense truly were 
 to take the sense of the people truly, the government so constituted 
 would be a true and perfect model of a popular constitutional 
 government ; and every departure from it would detract from its 
 excellence. But, as such is not the case as the numerical majority, 
 instead of being the people, is^only a portion of them such a 
 government, instead of being a true and perfect model of the 
 people's government, that is, a people self-governed, is but the 
 government of a part over a part the major over the minor 
 portion " (" The Works of John C. Calhoun," vol. i. p. 30). 
 
70 APPENDICES. 
 
 NOMINAL MAJORITY NOT TRUE MAJORITY. 
 
 " The conflict between the two parties, in the government of the 
 numerical majority, tends necessarily to settle down into a struggle 
 for the honours and emoluments of the government ; and each, in 
 order to obtain an object so ardently desired, will, in the process of 
 the struggle, resort to whatever measure may seem best calculated 
 to effect this purpose. The adoption, by the one, of any measure, 
 however objectionable, which might give it any advantage, would 
 compel the other to follow its example. In such case it would be 
 indispensable to success to avoid division and keep united ; and 
 hence, from the necessity inherent in the nature of such govern- 
 ments, each party must be alternately forced, in order to insure 
 victory, to resort to measures to concentrate the control over its 
 movements in fewer and fewer hands, as the struggle became more 
 and more violent. This, in process of time, must lead to party 
 organization and party caucuses and discipline ; and these to the 
 conversion of the honours and emoluments of the government into 
 means of rewarding partisan services, in order to secure the fidelity 
 and increase the zeal of the members of the party. The effect of 
 the whole combined, even in the earlier stages of the process, when 
 they exert the least pernicious influence, would be to place the 
 control of the two parties in the hands of their respective majori- 
 ties ; and the government itself, virtually, under the control of the 
 majority of the dominant party for the time, instead of the majority 
 of the whole community where the theory of this form of govern- 
 ment vests it. Thus, in the very first stage of the process, the 
 government becomes the government of a minority instead of a 
 majority a minority, usually, and under the most favourable 
 circumstances, of not much more than one-fourth of the whole 
 community " (" The Works of John C. Calhoun," vol. i. pp. 40, 41). 
 
 EARL GREY. 1864. 
 
 THE CUMULATIVE VOTE. 
 
 " The first of the reforms of a conservative tendency which I 
 should suggest, and one which I should consider a great improve- 
 ment under any circumstances, but quite indispensable if any 
 changes favourable to democratic power are to be admitted, would 
 
GREY. 71 
 
 be the adoption of what Mr. James Marshall has called the * Cumu- 
 lative Vote ' that is to say, the principle of giving to every elector 
 as many votes as there are members to be elected by the constituency 
 to which he belongs, with the right of either giving all these votes 
 to a single candidate, or of dividing them, -as he may prefer. 
 
 " The object of adopting this rule would be to secure to minorities 
 a fair opportunity of making their opinions and wishes heard in the 
 House of Commons. In order that it might fully answer this 
 purpose, the right of returning members to Parliament ought to be 
 so distributed that each constituency should not have less than three 
 representatives to choose. Supposing that three members were to 
 be elected together, and that each elector were entitled to three 
 votes, which he might unite in favour of a single candidate, it is 
 obvious that a minority exceeding a fourth of the whole constituency 
 would have the power of securing the election of one member. It 
 is probable that in general three members would be thus returned, 
 each representing a different shade of opinion among the voters. 
 
 " The advantages this mode of voting would be calculated to 
 produce, and the justice of making some such provision for the 
 representation of minorities, or, rather, the flagrant injustice of 
 omitting to do so, have been so well shown by Mr. Marshall in the 
 pamphlet I have already referred to, and by Mr. Mill in his highly 
 philosophical treatise on representative government, that it is quite 
 needless for me to argue the question as one of principle. But I 
 may observe that, in addition to its being right in principle, this 
 measure would be in strict accordance with the lessons of experience, 
 if read in their true spirit. One of the most remarkable peculiarities 
 of the British House of Commons, as compared with other represen- 
 tative bodies, is that it has always had within its walls members 
 representing most of the different classes of society, and of the 
 various and conflicting opinions and interests to be found in the 
 nation. 
 
 "Much of the acknowledged success with which the House of 
 Commons has played its part in the government of the country, has 
 been attributed (I believe most justly) to this peculiarity. The 
 changes made by the Reform Act, and especially the abolition of the 
 various rights of voting formerly to be found in different towns, and 
 the establishment of one uniform franchise in all the English boroughs 
 (with only a small exception in favour of certain classes of freemen). 
 
72 APPENDICES. 
 
 tended somewhat to impair the character of the House in this 
 respect. The greatly increased intercourse between different parts 
 of the country, and the rapidity with which opinions are propagated 
 from one extremity of the kingdom to another, have had a similar 
 tendency ; and there is no longer the same probability as formerly 
 that different opinions will be found to prevail in different places, so 
 as to enable all parties to find somewhere the means of gaining an 
 entrance to Parliament for at least enough of their adherents to give 
 expression to their feelings. 
 
 " Hence there is a danger that the House of Commons may cease 
 to enjoy to the same extent as formerly the great advantage of 
 representing the various classes and opinions to be found in the 
 nation. That danger would be greatly aggravated by rendering the 
 constituencies more nearly equal than they are ; but the simple 
 change involved in adopting the cumulative vote would do much 
 towards guarding against it, since with this mode of voting it would 
 be impossible that any considerable party in the country should be 
 left unrepresented in Parliament. The tendency of the alteration 
 would be conservative in the best sense of the word, while at the 
 same time, in many cases, it would have the effect of relieving 
 Liberal politicians from a disadvantage to which they are unfairly 
 subjected. On the one side it would prevent the representation of 
 the large town constituencies from being monopolized, as at present, 
 by candidates ready to pledge themselves to the support of demo- 
 cratic measures. Even in the metropolitan boroughs we might 
 reasonably expect that some members would be returned really re- 
 presenting the higher and most educated classes of their inhabitants, 
 who are now practically without any representation at all, except 
 that which they obtain indirectly by means of members chosen by 
 other constituencies. Thus, in the large towns, it would put an end 
 to the unjust monopoly on the part of Radical politicians ; and, on 
 the other hand, in those counties where a Conservative majority now 
 excludes a strong Liberal minority from any share in the representa- 
 tion, it would correct a similar tendency in the opposite direction. 
 In both cases this system of voting would be calculated to give more 
 weight to the independent electors, who are not thorough-going 
 partisans on either side, and to favour the return of candidates 
 deserving their confidence" ("Parliamentary Government, con- 
 sidered with reference to Reform," ed. 1864, p. 203). 
 
CAIRNS. 73 
 
 LORD CAIRNS. 1867. 
 
 THREE-CORNERED CONSTITUENCIES. 
 
 " These must obviously be looked at from three points of view : 
 the advantages to the general legislation of the country, the advan- 
 tages to the members who would be selected under an arrangement 
 of this kind, and the advantages to the constituencies themselves. 
 Now, with regard to the legislature, the advantages which I think 
 would be gained by this system would be these : you would obtain, 
 in the persons of those who would be the representatives of the 
 minority in these large constituencies, a body of men of great intelli- 
 gence and of great independence ; you would have those elements of 
 advantage which exist in the representation of small boroughs, and, 
 at the same time, you would be perfectly free from the disadvantages 
 and defects of the small borough system. . . . Questions are con- 
 stantly arising which, in one aspect, are questions of general political 
 interest, but which are more or less connected with local interests, 
 and bear upon local claims ; and thus a question which, in a general 
 point of view, is of political interest to the whole country, is some- 
 times coloured and affected in many ways by the way in which it is 
 viewed in different localities. 
 
 "No doubt, in discussing general questions of political interest, 
 it would be of the greatest possible advantage to hear how those 
 questions were viewed, not merely by different localities, but by 
 different bodies of men in the same locality. That result you would 
 obtain by the plan which I propose. ... I will pass to the consi- 
 deration of the advantages which would be gained by the represen- 
 tatives of these large constituencies themselves. . . . You would 
 have from the same constituency two members representing the 
 majority and one representing the minority, communicating freely 
 with each other, and without the slightest tinge of jealousy or appre- 
 hension that the interests of one would jar or conflict with the 
 interests of the other in the constituency. . . . Again, with regard 
 to the constituency itself and this is one of the most important 
 views of the case observe the advantages which would be gained : 
 
 "First, I believe you would gain the greatest possible local 
 satisfaction ; there is nothing so irksome to those who form the 
 minority of one of those large constituencies as finding that from the 
 mere force of numbers they are virtually excluded from the exercise 
 of any political power, that it is vain for them to attempt to take 
 
74 APPENDICES. 
 
 any part in public affairs ; that the elections must go in one direction, 
 and that they have no political power whatever. On the one hand 
 the result is great dissatisfaction, and on the other it is disinclination 
 on the part of those who form the minority to take any part in 
 affairs in which it is important they should take a prominent and 
 conspicuous part. ... In addition to that, it would do much to 
 soften the asperities of political feeling which sometimes, though 
 not often, prevails in large constituencies .... Of this I am sure 
 (and although some treat it as an objection I think it a great advan- 
 tage of the scheme), that contests would be very much diminished 
 in large constituencies where contests are most expensive so expen- 
 sive that the mind almost recoils at hearing the sums which they 
 cost. Contests, practically, would come to an end ; and, as they 
 did, so would danger of bribery and corruption. You would have 
 great constituencies divided into great component parts ; you would 
 have each portion well represented ; you would have freedom from 
 expense, freedom from the irritation of political feeling, and from 
 the curse of all elections, bribery " (3 Hansard clxxxix. pp. 433- 
 441). 
 
 LORD SHERBROOKE. 1867. 
 
 The Rt. Hon. R. Lowe, on moving his amendment for the intro- 
 duction of the Cumulative Vote said that : 
 
 ' f He must not be understood as coming forward to argue for 
 any protection to the minority . . . but between the members of 
 the constituency there should be absolute equality ; the majority 
 should have nothing given to it because it was a majority ; the 
 minority should have nothing taken away from it. ... Let each 
 voter have an equal number of votes not dependent upon the use he 
 makes of them ; let him be at liberty to dispose of them as he likes. 
 . . . The tendency of the present system was to make that stronger 
 which was already strong, and that weaker which was already weak. 
 By an arbitrary and unreasonable rule it strengthened the majority ; 
 by the same arbitrary and unreasonable rule it weakened the mino- 
 rity. On abstract justice, therefore, the present rule could not be 
 maintained. The proper way to alter it was to give each elector as 
 many votes as there were vacancies, and leave him absolutely free 
 to dispose of them as he pleased to give all to one person, one to 
 each of three, or two to one, and one to another. 
 
SHERBROOKE. 75 
 
 " By that means they would be doing nothing unjust or unfair to 
 the majority or to the minority. They would be merely putting 
 them on a level, or leaving them on perfectly fair ground. That 
 was the abstract argument. There were different ways by which 
 the end might be accomplished. Some proposed to give only a 
 single vote to each elector, others recommended that when there 
 were three candidates each elector should have two votes. He 
 preferred to give each elector three votes and allow him to dispose 
 of them as he pleased. The objection to the two first proposals was 
 that they would operate in the way of disfranchisement, and would 
 take away something people already possessed ; because on the 
 supposition that there were three candidates they had already three 
 votes. The system he proposed had greater flexibility and better 
 adapts itself to the general purposes of elections. . . . They would 
 find that in this way opinion in constituencies would ripen. Opinion 
 in that House would ripen to changes, and the House would become 
 a more delicate reflex of the representation of opinion ; would, to a 
 great extent, prevent the necessity of external agitation, and be a 
 great discouragement to it. There was nothing more worthy of the 
 attention of statesmen in the new state of affairs than anything which 
 would have the tendency to prevent that violent oscillation which 
 they now witnessed. What happened in the United States ? The 
 minority of thousands might as well not exist at all. It is absolutely 
 ignored. Was their country (England) in like manner to be formed 
 into two hostile camps, debarred from each other in two solid and 
 compact bodies ? Or were they to have that shading-off of opinion, 
 that modulation of extremes, and mellowing and ripening of right 
 principles,, which are among the surest characteristics of a free 
 country, the true secrets of political dynamics, and the true preserva- 
 tives of a great nation ? He said, then, that what he proposed to 
 the House was in itself just, equal, and fair, founded on no undue 
 and unfair attempt to give a minority an advantage they were not 
 entitled to exercise, and that it was peculiarly applicable to the 
 state of things on which they were entering. ... He might justly 
 add that the principle of the amendment was large enough to include 
 boroughs returning two members, as well as those which had three ; 
 and if it were worth while he was prepared to contend that upon 
 abstract principle it ought to be applied to both classes of borough " 
 (3 Hansard clxxxviii. pp. 1037-41). 
 
APPENDIX II. 
 
 THE DANISH SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION. 
 
 EXTRACTS from a report by Mr. Lytton, Her Majesty's 
 Secretary of Legation in Denmark, on the election of 
 Representatives for the Rigsraad. July, 1863. 
 
 In conformity with the instructions contained in the Earl of 
 Clarendon's circular despatch of February 27, 1857, and in the 
 circular despatches upon the same subject addressed by Earl Russell 
 to Her Majesty's Missions in the months of January and March, 1860, 
 I have the honour to submit to your inspection, with the request that 
 you will be so good as to transmit the same to Her Majesty's Secretary 
 of State for Foreign Affairs, the present Report upon the system now 
 in use in Denmark for the election of Representatives to the Rigsraad, 
 or Supreme Legislative Council of the United Kingdom of Denmark 
 and the Duchies of Schleswig, Lauenburg, and Holstein. 
 
 In the first place, the mode of direct election for the Danish 
 Rigsraad is a subject of which the interest, indeed, cannot be ex- 
 hausted by the few general remarks to which this Report must be 
 necessarily confined ; but which, nevertheless, furnishes within com- 
 paratively close compass more matter for interesting inquiry than 
 any other of which I can possibly think. 
 
 In the next place, it enables me to place on record some facts 
 which I believe to be but little known, and which appear to me de- 
 serving of an attention greater and more serious than they have 
 hitherto received. 
 
 In the third place, this is a subject which I venture to think of 
 singular and special importance,because it illustrates by the experience 
 of eight years (although, indeed, within limits much narrower than 
 I could wish) the practical working and effect of a system of election 
 which indeed has hitherto only been considered in England as a 
 theory, but which has, nevertheless, been recently recommended to 
 public attention by the mature approval of a profound and accurate 
 
REPRESENT A TION IN DENMARK. 77 
 
 thinker, whose opinion upon all questions of social and political 
 progress is, perhaps, the most generally esteemed in Europe. 
 
 I believe that it was in the year 1857 that Mr. Thomas Hare first 
 published his now well-known treatise on the " Election of Repre- 
 sentatives." In 1860 some modifications of Mr. Hare's system were 
 suggested in a pamphlet by Mr. Henry Fawcett, and the work has 
 subsequently appeared in amplified form, but with greater condensa- 
 tion and simplification of the original system. In 1 86 1 the proposals 
 of Mr. Hare received additional weight from the concurrence and 
 authority of Mr. John Stuart Mill, in whose recent work upon Re- 
 presentative Government one of the most interesting chapters is 
 devoted to the explanation and advocacy of those proposals. 
 
 But in the year 1855, that is to say four (two) years previous to the first 
 publication of Mr. Hare's theory of representation, a Danish states- 
 man of great eminence and ability, considering the same subject from 
 a different point of view, and arriving at almost identical results by a 
 different process, had fully anticipated every essential principle and 
 part of the electoral system first advocated in England by Mr. Hare. 
 
 It is obvious that in England this system, as yet barely promulgated, 
 must, whatever its merits or defects, so long as it represents only a 
 theoretical conclusion, be encountered by that mass of permanent 
 and preconceived objection which adheres to all theory, and which 
 is, indeed, itself the result of conclusions equally theoretical. 
 
 "Among the ostensible objectors to Mr. Hare's scheme, some 
 profess," says Mr. Mill, " to think the plan unworkable." 
 
 There must always be ground sufficient to support objections of 
 this nature to a scheme which has not been worked. It is, therefore, 
 a fact by no means unimportant that in Denmark, at least, the scheme 
 in question, or one precisely similar, has actually been working for 
 eight years. For if the question " Will it work ? " can be eliminated, 
 the more important question of "What may be the result of its 
 working ? " will be entitled to increased attention. Nor is it unin- 
 teresting to find that, as regards the main question, the same result 
 has been sought and attained in two instances by a dissimilar process. 
 For if a disputed problem should present precisely the same result to 
 two persons, one of whom undertakes to prove it by mathematics 
 and the other by geometry, the conclusion will then stand upon 
 double grounds that this result is accurate. The grounds upon 
 which both Mr. Hare and Mr. Mill have probably formed the con- 
 
78 APPENDICES. 
 
 elusions in which they agree, as to the best basis of an electoral 
 system, would appear to have been chiefly political. Those upon 
 which the basis they recommend has been established in Denmark 
 are no doubt chiefly mathematical. 
 
 With the details of Mr. Hare's electoral theory the purpose of this 
 Report is not immediately concerned. That purpose is merely to 
 make intelligible the main features of the Electoral Law established 
 in Denmark in the year 1855 for the election of Representatives to 
 the Rigsraad. 
 
 To do this, however, the speediest and simplest means will be to 
 take Mr. Hare's scheme as a point of comparison and reference. It 
 will therefore be necessary to state what is the substance of this 
 scheme. I will endeavour to do so as briefly as I can. 
 
 It will then be possible to contrast this scheme, in its chief 
 characteristics, with that which is now law in Denmark, and which I 
 propose to describe, pointing out to what extent the two systems 
 coincide and in what respect they differ. Rightly to appreciate 
 either the one or the other, it is necessary to bear in mind the ends 
 which in both cases, it has been sought to attain, and the reasons 
 for which these ends have, in each case, appeared desirable. I must, 
 therefore, ask permission to refer in passing to this important part 
 of the subject. I shall do so as rapidly as is compatible with the 
 claim of such a subject to be seriously considered. It will also be 
 necessary, in referring to the Electoral Law of 1855, to point out the 
 peculiar circumstances which unfortunately, by limiting the applica- 
 tion of that Law, diminish its value as a practical example. Finally, 
 I shall endeavour to record what, so far as I can yet judge from such 
 conversation as I have been able to hold with persons of intelligence 
 aud impartiality interested in the subject, is the general impression in 
 this country, after eight years' experience, of the practical effects of the 
 electoral system devised by Mr. Andrae, and how far the result of it 
 may be considered as having satisfied the intentions of the author. 
 
 Notwithstanding the length of time during which Representa- 
 tive Government has existed under various forms, it is not surprising 
 that the majority of questions concerning government by representa- 
 tion should still be open to debate ; for the conclusion to be formed 
 upon any question of this kind must always be in relation to circum- 
 stances peculiar to the country in respect of which the question has 
 to be solved, But in regard to the fundamental principle upon 
 
REPRESENTATION IN DENMARK. 79 
 
 which all government by representation is based, and to the complete 
 realization of which every form of Representative Government must 
 approximate, in a greater or less degree according as the develop- 
 ment of it is favoured or impeded by local circumstances, there would 
 seem to be no reasonable ground for difference of opinion. It has 
 been admitted on all sides that the completest form of Representative 
 Government must be that in which the greatest number of interests 
 and opinions are completely represented ; that form of government, 
 in short, which most nearly approximates to the government of the 
 whole by the whole. But by those who have arrived at the conclu- 
 sions which have dictated, in the one case Mr. Hare's electoral 
 scheme, in the other Mr. Andrae's electoral law, it is argued that 
 such a result is incompatible with any system of representation which 
 tends to assume the part as tantamount to the whole ; in other words, 
 to confound the majority with the people. 
 
 If, it is argued, the representatives of the majority be suffered by 
 a political fiction to represent more than the majority, not only an 
 arithmetical misstatement, but also a great political injustice, takes 
 place. For the minority is then not merely unrepresented, but it is 
 actually misrepresented. It is compulsorily incorporated into the 
 majority ; and this forced fellowship is, to use the words of Mr. 
 Burke, "conquest and not compact." If it were possible to suppose 
 (what is never the case) that the whole of a country were, indeed, 
 divided into only two sections of opinion, of which one was more 
 numerous than the other in the proportion of three to two, the 
 minority in that case, if adequately represented, would stand in the 
 representation at a proportion of two to three ; but if it should occur, 
 as it naturally would occur without some provision to the contrary, 
 that the majority in each constituency were to dispose of the entire 
 representation of that constituency to a member of the more numerous 
 class, instead of there being in the Legislature two of the less 
 numerous to every three of the more numerous sect, the minority 
 would, in fact, have no means of meeting their adversaries in the 
 Legislative Body at all. " They are," says Mr. Hare, " previously 
 cut off in detail ; " and in qualifying such a result he cites the autho- 
 rity of M. Guizot, "Si la minorite est d'avance hors de combat il y 
 a oppression." 
 
 But the evil, it is further argued, does not stop here, For all 
 customary majorities are, indeed, only an agglomeration of minorities, 
 
So APPENDICES. 
 
 each of which, rather than remain altogether unrepresented, has pre- 
 ferred to secure a sort of partial and collateral representation as part 
 of an aggregate, which coheres only, perhaps, upon a single and 
 often secondary point. The majority is thus only a majority of a 
 majority, "who maybe," says Mr. Mill, "and often are, a minority 
 of the whole. Any minority," he adds, " left out, either purposely 
 or by the play of the machinery, gives the power, not to a majority, 
 but to a minority in some other part of the scale." 
 
 And, although this inequality is, no doubt, balanced to a great 
 extent, in a system of representation such as that which obtains in 
 England, by the fact that opinions, predominating in different places, 
 find rough equivalents for the minority with which they are swept 
 away in one place by the majority they secure in another ; yet, if the 
 suffrage were to be extended much further (and it cannot be con- 
 sidered as final at a point which leaves out of direct representation 
 the most numerous class in the country), the danger which, under 
 the present system, must then arise of government by a single (and 
 that, on the whole, the least educated) class has long been apparent 
 to statesmen of all parties. At the same time it would be palpably 
 unjust and humiliating to advocate the permanent exclusion of this 
 numerous and important class from all direct representation, on no 
 better grounds than those which involve the admission that the whole 
 representative machinery of the country i? constructed upon a prin- 
 ciple so erroneous that the motive power cannot be augmented 
 without throwing the entire machine out of gear. 
 
 To these considerations is added that of the deterioration of poli- 
 tical character to which voters may be exposed by any sort of com 
 pulsion, to select as their representatives, not those men whom they 
 regard as the most enlightened and most honest exponents of their 
 opinions or interests, but those who seem most likely to conciliate 
 the local, and often ignoble, animosities by which majorities them- 
 selves are divided. 
 
 The above summary, although very imperfect, is sufficient to 
 indicate the principal motives which, both in this country and in 
 England, have suggested to eminent statesmen the necessity of de- 
 vising, if possible, some modification of the Electoral system, 
 calculated to secure a more adequate representation to the interests 
 of minorities. 
 
 Of all men in this country M. Andrae was, in many respects, the 
 
REPRESENTA TION IN DENMARK. Si 
 
 most filled by antecedent experience and natural qualifications to 
 succeed in the difficult task which he thus spontaneously attempted. 
 
 Mr. Anclrae is a man of original and speculative intellect, a keen 
 investigator, a bold thinker, admitted by all his countrymen to be 
 the first mathematician in Denmark, and, from his position as 
 Minister of Finance, experienced in the art of bringing the funda- 
 mental principles of abstract calculation practically to bear upon 
 complicated facts. 
 
 The scope of his experiment, however, was painfully limited by 
 conditions over which he had no control ; and the law of which he 
 is the sole author forms only the incidental part of an institution 
 shaped rather by the force of uncongenial circumstances than by the 
 deliberate option of the ostensible founders of it. 
 
 According to the Census of 1860 the entire population of the 
 Kingdom and Duchies amounted to 2,604,024, so that it was only 
 for the direct election of 30 members out of a population of upwards 
 of 2,000,000 to an Assembly of 80 members, that the electoral 
 system of Mr. Andrae was empowered to provide. 1 Holstein and 
 Lauenburgh have always refused to send members to the Rigsraad. 
 For these Duchies the Constitution of 1855 is suspended ; and, 
 therefore, 20 members must be deducted from the total of 80 
 nominally composing the Rigsraad, and 8 members from the 30 
 originally contemplated as the quota of direct representation in the 
 Rigsraad ; consequently, it is only the choice of 45 out of 60 
 members that is practically affected by the electoral system of Mr. 
 
 This, no doubt, diminishes the value to be attached to the success 
 or failure of the system as an example. It is somewhat like an 
 experiment in a pond upon principles of navigation which, if good 
 for anything, must be good for the ocean. Nevertheless, it is an 
 example ; and, in questions of this sort, an example of any kind is 
 most valuable. Eight years' practical experience of the working of 
 an electoral system devised for the realization of an important 
 principle applicable to all representative institutions is, no matter 
 
 1 The indirect election of members to the Rigsraad by the local 
 legislative bodies is, however, conducted upon the principle, and in 
 conformity with the stipulations, of Mr. Andrae's Electoral law. 
 This should be borne in mind. 
 
82 APPENDICES. 
 
 how "cabined, cribbed, confined " be the sphere of that experience, 
 a great and noteworthy addition to the knowledge of mankind. 
 
 There are two ways in which local majorities may, if unrestrained 
 by law, exercise their power in questions of representation, to the 
 detriment no less of minorities than of themselves. They may do so 
 both in the selection and in the election of candidates. They may 
 virtually dictate the vote of the elector by indirectly circumscribing 
 the freedom of his choice. By this means, indeed, apparent 
 unanimity may be obtained ; but the greater the unanimity the 
 greater the mischief, if it be only a unanimous submission to 
 " Hobson's choice this or none :" and when this is the case, it 
 may be truly said of the majorities themselves, " dominationis in 
 alias sei~vitium smitn mercedeni dcint^ " they are content to pay so 
 great a price as their own servitude to purchase domination over 
 others." x For in order to secure unanimity in the choice of 
 the majority, it is previously necessary for the majority itself to 
 abdicate individual action on the part of its own members. Men 
 are more likely to admit unanimity in their passions and prejudices 
 than in their sober judgments : and the candidate thus selected may 
 perhaps represent only a selfish compromise between narrow interests 
 and petty animosities. When this happens majorities, indeed, may 
 show their power by converting a bad candidate into a worse 
 representative, but in doing so they will have also shown that their 
 power is incompatible with their freedom ; and that may be said of 
 them which Socrates is supposed to say to Polus in the Gorgias, 
 when speaking of other tyrannies, " They do not do what they wish, 
 although they do what they please." 
 
 But, on the other hand, it is undoubtedly true that all political 
 action necessitates a compromise between opinions in matters of 
 minor import. The absence of this compromise is anarchy. It is 
 only when the compromise is compulsory, instead of spontaneous, 
 that it can be called tyranny. For the foundation of all society is 
 confidence in others. All human creeds must originate in faith of 
 some sort, and men can do nothing without taking something on 
 trust. In the public business of life, individual action will always 
 be guided and controlled by collective opinion : and, practically, the 
 opinion of the many is controlled and guided by the wisdom of the 
 few. Every man has a right to think and choose for himself ; but 
 
 1 Cowley, " Essay on Liberty." 
 
REPRESENTA TION IN DENMARK. 83 
 
 all men are not equally able to think and choose well, or equally 
 disposed to think and choose at all : so that as long as there exists 
 in the world that discreet deference to the judgment and that whole- 
 some confidence in the character of others without which political 
 combination is impossible, no conceivable electoral system will 
 prevent the choice of constituencies from being greatly influenced by 
 the bias of those local notables who, by personal capacity or social 
 position, are fitted to guide the conduct of their neighbours. The 
 object of Mr. Andrae's Electoral Law is, not to annihilate this 
 controlling power, but, on the contrary, to give the amplest scope 
 to its natural operation, by relieving it from the crippling circum- 
 scription of arbitrary conditions. 
 
 By enlarging the scope of the voter's choice, moreover, you 
 elevate the quality of his judgment. When he is free to choose 
 whom he will, not constrained to choose merely whom he must, it 
 is probable that if he gives the preference to a person from his own 
 immediate neighbourhood, the person thus preferred will be, not 
 simply the slavish nominee of a perhaps insignificant but petulant 
 party, but a man whom the voter regards with affectionate con- 
 fidence and respect. Surely it would be unwise to extinguish (even 
 were it possible) those kindly influences which infuse into the public 
 life and spirit of a nation the enthusiasm of local affections, whether 
 they be embodied in a respect for noble names and illustrious 
 houses, or in the grateful recognition of those good deeds which not 
 seldom associate a particular family with a particular neighbourhood. 
 But is it not rather the local demagogues than the real local aristoi 
 who would have anything to fear from the most extended competi- 
 tion with intelligence and virtue ? In any case, if the voter, by 
 confining his vote to a single candidate, be exposed to the risk of 
 diminishing its value without thereby benefiting the object of his 
 special preference, it is to be presumed that he will extend the scope 
 of his judgment and his sympathies, and provide for those contem- 
 plated contingencies in which his countrymen elsewhere may benefit 
 by the exercise of his franchise. In doing so he will have to look 
 further and think more carefully. It is probable that he will select 
 the other objects of his choice from men of eminence and distinction 
 because those who are neither eminent nor distinguished cannot then 
 be arbitrarily thrust upon his notice. The voter who does this will 
 
 8 
 
84 APPENDICES. 
 
 elevate his own character and class ; and if the whole class of voters 
 do this, the whole class of candidates will be improved. 
 
 In the next place, it is no doubt intended by the clauses abeve 
 mentioned to withdraw from the voter every reasonable excuse for 
 disregarding and neglecting the duty of exercising his franchise, as 
 well as to provide for him every reasonable inducement to perform 
 that duty with the most serious reflection, and to the fullest possible 
 extent. 
 
 Two other results are involved in the arrangements of this law 
 as concerning the question of personal canvass. It is undoubtedly 
 to be desired that every facility should exist for free personal inter- 
 course and interchange of opinion between candidates and voters, 
 and it is not to be desired that the candidate should be to the voter 
 not a man, but merely a name, an abstraction. Whether, however, 
 it be not possible to provide for this reasonable and necessary inter- 
 course without exposing it to the possible degradation of degenera- 
 ting into one of barter and beggary, is a question worthy of con- 
 sideration. 
 
 Whether, however, the personal canvass be a good thing or a 
 bad thing, according to this Electoral Law of Mr. Andrae it is quite 
 out of the question. 
 
 And with the personal canvass also disappears a very influential 
 personage intimately connected therewith, viz., the electioneering 
 agent. How far the complete effacement from the electoral 
 dramatis persona of this important but costly character is a result to 
 be admired or condemned, involves a question which will be best 
 answered by those who have had personal experience of the part he 
 plays, both in connection with the pockets of candidates and the 
 morals of voters. 
 
 Finally, it appears to be the intention of this law to increase the 
 sense of individual responsibility in matters of public trust ; to place 
 the conscience of each voter in his own keeping, and to take it out 
 of the hands of those careless investors of other men's moral capital 
 who flourish in all large communities, and who appear to consider 
 themselves a sort of joint-stock company for conscience, with limited 
 liability. Moreover, it may be said that this law is, in its tendency, 
 a civilizing law, for civilization is the parent of variety in 
 opinions ; and it is the intention of this law to provide, not only 
 the amplest expression for all varieties of opinion, but also to utilize 
 
XEPRESEtfTA TION iM DENMA RK. #5 
 
 to the utmost all manner of ways and means provided by the kindly 
 providence of civilization for the formation of these wholesome 
 varieties. 
 
 That these intentions are wise and good will hardly be denied. 
 The only practical questions that remain are, first, whether these 
 intentions are fully realized by the mechanical operation of the law ? 
 and, secondly, whether (if so) their realization is accompanied by 
 any incidental injury to the salutary interests of the virtual majority? 
 
 I have no experience which would justify me in offering a personal 
 opinion upon these issues. I shall endeavour to report with fidelity 
 and impartiality the opinions which (so far as I have yet been able 
 to ascertam them) appear to be entertained in Denmark in regard to 
 the questions thus raised. 
 
 I approach this part of the subject with extreme hesitation. Only 
 a few months have elapsed since I came to this country ; the time 
 which I have been able to devote to the consideration of the elec- 
 toral system is still shorter. I am convinced that, in order to form 
 an accurate estimate of the practical results of this system, it would 
 be necessary to visit the various constituencies which are affected 
 by its operation, to compare by personal observation the various 
 classes of the voting population, and to ascertain by personal inter- 
 course their general character and sentiments. But it would be idle 
 to attempt such a task without a knowledge of the language much 
 greater than can be acquired in the course of a few months ; and I 
 must therefore premise that the remarks I am about to offer are the 
 results of inquiries which, however carefully made, are much too 
 limited to be satisfactory. 
 
 In speaking of public questions, all men are disposed to represent 
 their own opinion as the opinion of the public. It is not easy for a 
 bystander, unacquainted with the crowd, to discriminate between 
 public opinion and public prejudice. Whatever is most flimsy and 
 superficial in opinion floats lightly on the surface of the national 
 mind, and readily reveals itself to casual notice ; the more weighty 
 elements lie deep, and are not so quickly detected. 
 
 An astute student of human character has said that " in the 
 capacities of mankind there are three degrees : one man under- 
 stands things by means of his own natural endowments ; another 
 understands things when they are explained to him ; and a third 
 
86 APPENDICES. 
 
 can neither understand them of himself, nor when they are explained 
 to him by others. The first -are rare and excellent, the second have 
 their merit, but the last are wholly worthless." x 
 
 Mr. Andrae may, I think, congratulate himself that many of the 
 most vociferous opponents to his Excellency's electoral system belong 
 to this last-mentioned category ; whose opinions, since there would 
 appear to be good authority for regarding them as utterly worthless, 
 need not occupy any portion of this Report. Elaborate objections, 
 however, have been made to the law by persons whose natural 
 acuteness entitles their opinion to be gravely considered. Before 
 adverting to these objections in detail I must avow that the impres- 
 sion I have derived from the general result of my inquiries is, that 
 the law is not popular in this country, and that as yet it has taken 
 no root in the national character. 
 
 To sum up the result of the foregoing inquiry into the mechanical 
 operation of the Electoral Law of 1855, it appears, firstly, that the 
 most ingenious and elaborately devised combination of objections 
 to the electoral mechanism of Mr. Andrae's system is fixed upon two 
 postulates, the one political, the other mathematical, of which the 
 first is preposterous, and the second impossible. Secondly, that the 
 utmost ingenuity of artifice is only able to erect upon a basis, thus 
 enormous in its unsubstantially, an hypothesis minute in its material 
 import, of injustice to a single candidate out of three, in a single 
 district out of all. Can as much be affirmed of any other existing 
 electoral system ? 
 
 In this Report, which has already, I fear, greatly exceeded its 
 legitimate limits, no more need be said as to the practicability of 
 the law, and the accuracy of its mechanical operation. 
 
 Other and perhaps yet more important considerations, however, 
 are involved in the questions of what are its political results in this 
 country, and how far it may be applicable to other European com- 
 mumities. 
 
 These considerations are hardly within the province to which the 
 present remarks must be confined ; for they raise an infinite number 
 of collateral and secondary inquiries, which cannot be followed out 
 without bringing the inquirer into a disquisition upon the necessity 
 and value of government by party, as well as upon the nature of 
 the various answers which may be returned to the paramount prac- 
 
 1 " The Prince," cap. xxiii 
 
REPRESENTA TION IN DENMARK. 87 
 
 tical question of, "How is the Queen's government to be carried 
 on?" 
 
 I may mention, however, that, on lately referring to some of these 
 topics in conversation with a Danish gentleman well acquainted with 
 the political life of this country, I was assured that, in the discussion 
 and settlement of great public questions by the Supreme Council of 
 the realm, no disinclination is found to exist upon the part of repre- 
 sentative minorities to combine and concur in the formation of a 
 judicial majority for the decision of what is expedient. 
 
 I may also mention that I have been assured by Mr. Andrae that, 
 in his opinion, the general standard of representative character 
 supplied by this law is the best and highest in the country ; and that 
 although he does not consider that a sufficient time has yet elapsed 
 whereby to test the effects of the law upon the constituencies them- 
 selves, he is nevertheless of opinion that, under its operation, the 
 character of the voter as a class has improved and is improving, 
 I have every reason to believe, moreover, that bribery is almost 
 unknown to the constituencies for the Rigsraad. It appears to me, 
 however, that the permission contained in clause 18 of Mr. Andrae's 
 law, and which equally appears in Mr. Hare's scheme to fill up 
 the voting-paper in private might, under very conceivable circum- 
 stances, facilitate intimidation. 
 
 A full and complete investigation into the character and operation 
 of this law is a task which I should rejoice to see assumed by some 
 person of known impartiality, capacity, and experience. For, 
 whatever may be the character or the consequence of the law, I 
 venture to think that its existence is one of the most remarkable 
 events in the history of representative institutions. 
 
 There is a saying of Lord Coke's, repeated by Junius in reference 
 to a matter of some importance in our parliamentary history, that 
 " discretion, taken as it ought to be, is discernere per legem quid sit 
 
 JUStUftt." 
 
 I shall not presume, sir, to strain the meaning of these words to 
 fit a partial application. But some excuse for the great, and I fear 
 undue, length to which this Report has now extended may, I hope, 
 be found in the wish which I have felt to bring into notice those 
 peculiar features of the Danish Electoral Law of 1855, the consider- 
 ation of which may, perhaps, enable others more competent than 
 
88 'APPENDICES. 
 
 myself to weigh the justice of the theory by the practice of the law, 
 et disccrnere per legem quid sit jnsliim. 
 
 The Report from which the preceding extracts are 
 taken was written in 1863. As already mentioned, when 
 the constitution was remodelled in 1867, the Andrae law 
 was applied to the " Landsthing," and is still in operation. 
 We can here therefore point to the experience of over a 
 quarter of a century. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 A. 
 
 America, Representation in, 10-13, 2I 
 Andrae, Mr., and the Single Transfer- 
 able Vote, 34, 78-83. 
 
 B. 
 
 Baily, Mr., and Free List, 35, 59. 
 Belgium, Elections of 1884, 30. 
 Birmingham, Limited Vote in, 63. 
 Bribery promoted, 14. 
 Brussels, Election of 1884, 31. 
 Buckalew, Senator, 10. 
 
 Cairns, Lord, and Limited V^te, 63, 
 
 Calhoun, Mr., 2, 69. 
 
 Caucus, 50. 
 
 Cliques, 14. 
 
 Counting Single Transferable Votes, 
 
 42. 
 
 Courtney, Mr. L., 25. 
 Cumulative Vote, 7, 33, 44, 51-58. 
 
 D. 
 
 Denmark, Representation in, 76-88. 
 ,, Single Transferable Vote 
 in, 34- 
 
 E. 
 
 Election, General, of 1874, 22. 
 
 ,, ,, of 1880, 17, 23. 
 
 ,. ,, Rules for, under 
 
 Single Transfer- 
 able Vote, 42. 
 
 ,. Under Free List, 
 
 59. 
 
 F. 
 
 Fawcett, Right Hon. H., on Propor- ! 
 
 tional Representation, 4. 
 France, Single Seats in, 13. 
 Free List, 7, 33, 59, 61. 
 
 Garfield, General, 16. 
 
 Garrett, Miss, Election of, 53. 
 
 General Ticket, 28, 32. 
 
 Geneva, Parties in, 16. 
 
 Gerrymander, Origin of term, 10 
 
 Ghent, Representation of, 31. 
 
 Gilpin, Mr., proposes Free List, 59. 
 
 Grey, Earl, on Cumulative Vote, 63, 
 70. 
 
 Grey, Mr., and Free List, 6r. 
 
 Guizot, M., and Minority Representa- 
 tion, 79. 
 
 H. 
 Hare, Mr., and Single Transferable 
 
 Vote, 34, 79. 
 Home Rulers, Representation of, 20., 
 
 29. 
 
 I. 
 
 Illinois, Cumulative Vote in, 51, 53- 
 
 Ireland, Representation in, 19-22. 
 Italy, Limited Vote in, 64. 
 
 J. 
 James, Sir Henry, 24. 
 
 L. 
 
 Landsthing, 34. 
 
 Lefevre, Right Hon. G. S., 22, 49. 
 
 Lewis, Sir G. C., i. 
 
 Liberals in South of England, 17-19. 
 
 ,, and Present System, 25. 
 Limited Vote, 7, 33, 61, 62. 
 Liverpool, Representation of, 29. 
 Lowe, Right Hon. R., 4, 63, 74. 
 Lytton, Mr., on Danish Elections, 76- 
 88. 
 
 M. 
 
 Majority of 1874, 22. 
 of 1880, 17-23. 
 
9 o 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Marshall, Mr. J. G., 51, 71. 
 
 Marylebone, School-board Election in, 
 
 Medi'.l, Mr., on Cumulative Vote, 53- 
 
 MiU', Mr. J. S., 2, 4, 77. 
 
 Minority Representation, 2, 4, 15, 68, 
 
 Morrison, Mr., 9. 
 
 O. 
 
 Objections to Single Transferable 
 Vote, 44-58. 
 
 P. 
 
 Parker-Smith, Mr., 45, 60. 
 Praed, Mr., and Limited Vote, 62. 
 ,, and Present System of 
 
 Election, 67. 
 Proportional Representation, 4, 6, 25, 
 
 33-85. 
 
 Proportional Representation Society, 
 36-42. 
 
 R. 
 
 Rathbone, Mr., on Single Seats, 9. 
 Redistribution Act, 1885, 8, 20. 
 Representation, Present System of, 5, 
 
 26. 
 Representation, Proportional, 4, 6, 25, 
 
 33-85. 
 Returning Officer, Work of, under 
 
 Single Transferable Vote, 37. 
 Roberts, Mr., 22. 
 Roman Catholics' Representation, 18. 
 
 Russell, Earl, 63. 
 
 ,, on Checks and Balances, 67. 
 ,, on Minority Representation, 
 
 68. 
 ,, on "Three-cornered" Seats, 
 
 68. 
 
 S. 
 
 School Board Elections, 51-53. 
 Scrutin de Liste, 6, 28, 32. 
 Second Ballots, 25. 
 Seebohm, Mr. F., Free List, 60. 
 Senate (U. S. A.), Report of, 10, 21. 
 Sherbrooke, Lord (see Lowe). 
 Single-Membered Constituencies, 6, 
 
 8-27. 
 Single Transferable Vote, 7, 33. 
 
 ,, Objections to, 44. 
 
 ,, Difficulty of, 44. 
 
 Selection of Transferred 
 Votes, 45. 
 
 ,, Chance in, 46-49. 
 
 ,, Dictation under, 49. 
 
 and Strong Government, 50. 
 Spencer, Earl, 13. 
 Stokes, Professor, 46. 
 Switzerland, Representation in, 6. 
 
 T. 
 
 "Three-cornered" Constituencies, 33, 
 
 61, $. 
 Ticket, Free, 33, 59. 
 
 W. 
 
 Ware, Professor. 14. 
 War, Civil, U. S. A., 21. 
 Westlake, Mr., 59. 
 

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