THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES GIFT OF Carle ton Shay RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM Books by JOHN SPARGO RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BOLSHEVISM BOLSHEVISM AMERICANISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY SOCIAL DEMOCRACY EXPLAINED HARPER & BROTHERS, NEW YORK ESTABLISHED 1817 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM BY JOHN SPARGO AUTHOR OF " BOLSHEVISM " " TUE PSYCHOLOGY OF BOLSHEVISM " " SOCIAL DEMOCRACY EXPLAINED" ETC. ff^ HARPER fcf BROTHERS PUBLISHERS NEW YORK AND LONDON Russia as an Amkrican Problem Copyright. 1920. by Harper & Brothers Printed in the United States of America Published, February, 1920 DK J75r' CONTENTS CHAP. PAGE Preface vii I. Russia as an American problem i II. Russia and Western civilization 46 III. Russia's subjection to Germany 100 IV. Japan as Germany's successor 142 V. Japan and Siberia 199 VI. Russia's needs and resources 259 Postscriptum 337 APPENDICES //. Autonomy for different nationalities in Russia 349 B. Russian economic concessions granted by THE BOLSHEVIKI 353 C. Statistical tables illustrative of Russia's GR.OWTH 356 D. Japan's territorial aims 358 E. Japan's demands on China , 360 F. Russian water-power project on river Vyg . . 373 G. Development of Russian and Siberian Co- operatives 381 //. Correspondence between the Allied and As- sociated Powers and Admiral Kolchak . . . 392 /. Soviet government of Russia on alleged secret German-Japanese treaty 402 Index 405 O ' PREFACE This book is an earnest attempt to interest my fellow-citizens in the great problem of Russia's reconstruction. I have tried to present that prob- lem as a challenge to America in the hope that I might thereby render a service of friendship to Russia and a service of loyalty to my own country. My interest in Russia dates back to my boy- hood. Thirty years ago it was my good fortune to fall under the inspiration of that great Russian, Sergius Michaelovitch Kravchinski, best known by his pseudonym, "Sergius Stepniak." That brave and brilliant revolutionist first aroused my interest in the Russian revolutionary struggle, and through all the intervening years that interest has grown. It has been my good fortune to know intimately and well many of the brave men and women whose courage and sacrifice maintained the long struggle against czarism. Inspired and guided by these friends, I have tried to under- stand Russia and its great political and economic problems. This brief autobiographical note will serve to explain to the reader why I have felt justified in writing so freely about Russian problems, both in this volume and elsewhere. My studies of Russian history and politics antedated the Revolu- tion by many years. PREFACE Shortly after the outbreak of the World War in 1914 I contributed to the pages of a weekly review an article upon the relation of Russia to the war which my friend, George Plechanov, one of the greatest of Russian Socialist thinkers, generously approved and translated. In that article I set forth my reasons for believing (1) that the cause of freedom in Russia would be served by an Allied victory, even under czarism; (2) that any attempt to establish a Socialist regime in Russia, until an extensive capitalist development and a long period of democratic government had paved the way for it, would fail and lead to terrible reaction. That forecast has certainly been literally fulfilled. Russia is not ready for anything like a Socialist state. The only economic basis upon which a Socialist commonwealth can possibly be established, namely, a highly developed indus- trialism, is lacking. Russia may in some future time organize her life upon Socialist lines, but first of all she must be developed economically. At present she needs capital and capitalist enterprise. I trust that I have succeeded in conveying through these pages my profound faith in Russia's future. Her present position is lamentable indeed, and her needs are so great and so numerous that the mind is almost incapable of comprehending them. Yet I do not for one moment doubt that she will survive and become a great democratic nation. Perhaps it is hardly necessary for me to call attention to the fact that this book has been written during a period of unrest and uncertainty almost unparalleled. As these lines are being written the PREFACE fate of the League of Nations is undetermined. Sometimes during the progress of the book it has seemed that the overthrow of the Bolshevist government was a matter of a few days at most; now the tide has turned and in a military sense the Bolsheviki seem more strongly intrenched than ever. In a word, everything is unsettled. Yet, disadvantageous and unpropitious as such con- ditions are for serious writing upon problems of vital importance, it was not possible for me to wait. Any appeal for active assistance to Russia, upon the scale necessary to enable her to recon- struct her economic life, must be made without delay if it is to produce any good result. There- fore, fully conscious of the difficulties and dangers which confront the writer who chooses to write of contemporary political and economic problems, I have felt impelled to prepare this somewhat elaborate statement of the problem of Russia's reconstruction. Because I believe that the future of our own country depends to a very large extent upon the manner in which the Russian problem is met, I have ventured to entitle my book Russia as an American Problem. It is my earnest hope that my fellow-citizens will regard that as a challenge, and that they will give to the Russian problem the attention which its relation to our own place in civilization warrants. John Spargo. "Nestle down" Old Bennington, Vermont, November iS, IQTQ. RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM A RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM I T the time of the outbreak of the World War the Russian Empire embraced practically one- sixth of the land area of the globe. It stretched from the Baltic Sea to the Gulf of Anadyr and from the Black Sea to the Sea of Japan. In that vast territory, which could easily be made to sustain a population several times greater, there were, according to official figures, about 179 mill- ions of people, excluding the population of Fin- land. 1 It was a population of heterogeneous 1 The figures published by the Czar's Ministry of the Interior were, for 1914, 182,182,600 persons, including the population of the Grand Duchy of Finland, or 178,905,500, if the population of Finland be excluded. 1 he representatives of the Soviet government have claimed, however, that these figures which were estimated greatly exaggerate the population. They say that the total was not more than 155 millions, made up as follows: European Russia, 107,800,000; Poland, 12,400,000; Caucasus, 15,200,000; Siberia, 10,400,000; Central Aiia, 11,200,000. See Soviet Rustic, June 28, 1919, for an interesting study oi this subject. 2 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM composition, embracing many diverse races. We get some idea of the great Babel of peoples from the fact, related by Ross, 1 that a "certain booklet prints the Lord's Prayer in each of the languages spoken within the empire, and the number is 103." The Treaty of Versailles and the various separa- tist movements arising out of the Revolution have seriously dismembered European Russia, and until normal conditions have been restored it will be practically impossible to know its boundaries, its area, or its population. At the present time it can best be described as an undefined area occupied by an undetermined number of inhabitants. A great historical process of the utmost importance to Russia and the rest of the civilized world has been violently interrupted. If the separation from Russia of numerous small states, such as Ukraine, Esthonia, Livonia, Lithuania, Georgia, and others, is permitted to stand, each setting up its own independent sovereignty, European Russia will be in danger of "Balkanization." In the case of the petty "independencies " of the Caucasus there is danger not only of sacrificing Armenia to wild tribes, but of sacrificing a relatively high culture to barbarism. Here at least Russian sovereignty brought about a great advance in civilization. It was Mr. Balfour who first sounded the much- needed warning against the dangers of a Balkani- zation of Europe. By that term the British statesman meant the breaking up of great nations into a lot of little states with opposing interests. 1 Ro^, Russia in Upheaval, p. 116. RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM 3 The narrow limits within which the vital interests of such petty states are circumscribed tend always to exaggerate the inevitable friction incidental to their mutual relations and to produce a cor- respondingly narrow circumscription of vision. Such states are always prone to quarrel and fight. The League of Nations might easily be wrecked against this rock. The chances of success for the League of Nations are necessarily in inverse ratio to the number of small states existing. Among the numerous idealizations of the demo- cratic war aims of the Allied nations, which proved of such tremendous importance and value, Presi- dent Wilson indulged in some very questionable rhetorical declarations about the right of small nationalities to self-determination and self-sover- eignty which have given, and will continue to give, a good deal of trouble. Followed to its logical con- clusion this principle would result in the dissolu- tion of every great nation and the creation of a vast number of little states, with an endless multi- plication of boundaries and frontiers and a result- ing increase of local prejudices and petty aggres- sions. In the crude form in which it was expressed by President Wilson, and understood by the host of petty nationalists who hailed it with rejoicing, without careful and elaborate qualification, this doctrine of the self-determination of nationalities is both exceedingly reactionary and exceedingly dangerous. Except in very rare instances, the secession of small states and nationalities from the larger states and nations to which they have been welded by the historic processes of national 4 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM development is a backward step, quite inconsistent with the ordered and peaceful progress of man- kind. In an interview widely published in the French press, in July, 19 19, M. Sazonov set forth in detail the Russian view of the place of the different nationalities within reconstituted Russia and the degree of autonomy to be enjoyed by them. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed out that over-centralization was one of the cardinal defects of the old system. No other living Rus- sian possesses a more extensive knowledge of the evils which resulted from "the endeavor to direct details of life in the remotest corner of the huge empire from a far-away bureaucratic center." M. Sazonov points out that "autonomous arrange- ment for nationalities naturally complies with the general system of decentralization to be applied in the reconstruction of Russia." Provincial self- government is quite compatible with the sover- eignty of a single unified state. The best safe- guard of the culture and essential freedom of the various nationalities in Russia lies in unity with Russia upon conditions which give them a generous measure of local autonomy. 1 There is no good reason for permitting a small nationality to erect a Chinese Wall around the territory which it inhabits, and so to be an obstacle to the development of larger political entities. A brief study of the geographical distribution of small nationalities will show that they are com- monly found occupying coastal territory which 1 See interview with M. Sazonov, Appendix A, RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM 5 becomes essential to the economic development of much larger hinterland areas and populations. It is preposterous to set up, in the name of democ- racy and internationalism, the doctrine that a people occupying a narrow strip of coast border- ing on a great sea, the means of ingress and egress for a continent, must be given exclusive sover- eignty over that coastal territory. The rights of nationalities, like all other human rights, are only valid in so far as they harmonize with the rights of mankind. Let us take Russia as an example: During four hundred years Russia strug- gled to gain access to the sea. Must we now acknowledge the right of Esthonia, Livonia, and Lithuania, with a population of some five millions of people, to set up exclusive sovereignty over the Baltic coast territory of the former Russian Em- pire, and thus deprive a hundred and fifty millions, or more, from access to the ocean and its trade routes? Peace treaties may decree such arrangements, and powerful leagues and alliances of nations may, for a time, enforce such decrees. There is, how- ever, a law that is both older and stronger than any league or alliance, the law, namely, that wherever great masses of people, whether tribe or nation, occupying a hinterland find the way to the sea blocked by a less numerous people occupy- ing the coast, they do not accept the status quo, but push their way seaward until they have access to the sea. Russia will not long suffer little states to shut her off from the Baltic. Not to under- stand this primary law of the evolution of states 2 6 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM is to fail to comprehend one of the plainest lessons of history. It is an interesting fact that the crude concep- tion of the right of nations, -per se, to self-deter- mination and self-sovereignty is common to those who advocate the most narrow and selfish forms of exaggerated nationalism, and those who advo- cate, in the name of internationalism, the repudia- tion of national interests and obligations lian- ll.ii ,iiio\ sky, Vol. I, pp. fcs 12. 7 o RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM the earlier commercial capitalism, which for a long time depended on foreign enterprise, the new industrialism was almost altogether Russian. It was an indigenous product. The rich Muscovite merchants became the owners of the factories, sometimes as individuals, sometimes as corporations or gilds. When we remember that the whole period of the reign of Peter the Great was one of war and adjust- ment of territorial rights and boundaries, the industrial progress achieved during that time seems all the more astonishing. Some of that industrial achievement was, of course, due to the exigencies of war and to the determination of the Czar to create a great navy, following the success- ful attainment of a hold on the Baltic seaboard. By granting valuable privileges and monopolies to stimulate private industrial enterprise, by means of state contracts and by state monopoly, Peter the Great hastened the process of industrial evolu- tion, and it is reasonable to believe that if his successors had manifested anything like equal wisdom and energy to his, Russia to-day would be one of the most highly developed industrial nations in the world. He brought to Russia the most able technical advisers, directors, and organizers of in- dustry, taking great care that Russia should profit by the experience of countries like England and Germany, and have the full advantage of every improvement in technic. By these means Peter the Great sought to "Europeanize" Russian economic life. In the externals of civilization, too, he ardently sought to RUSSIA AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 71 mold Russia to a likeness to western European nations. It is greatly to his credit as a statesman that he should have seen so clearly that the future of Russia lay in a community with western Europe rather than with the Far East. On the other hand, his statesmanship shows little trace of the liberal idealism that even then was stirring the western nations. Nor does it show anything of that sturdy individualism which characterized the life of those nations. Alarmed by their Czar's introduction of so many new ways and customs, the conserva- tives of the time begged him to " stop all the chinks " through which the methods and spirit of the West could enter, even to suppress all postal communica- tion. 1 Peter was wise enough not to heed these narrow reactionaries, but he did stop all or nearly all the chinks against the introduction of those spiritual and intellectual ideals which were shaping the life of western Europe. It may be said in his defense that incessant war- fare, the necessity of welding a heterogeneous assortment of races together, and of establishing order in vast newly acquired territories, made the introduction of anything like liberal ideals impos- sible. Be that how it may, it is a remarkable fact that Peter the Great took from western Europe only its material advantages. The institution of serfdom was utterly unsuited to factory pro- duction. The factory system requires large num- bers of workers, skilled and unskilled. By far the greater part of the labor of Russia was bound to the soil in serfage. But the nobles who owned 1 Alcvinskv, op. rit., p. ' 72 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM the serfs were not the owners of the factories; these belonged to merchants, native and foreign, who could not command the labor of serfs. How to get workers for their factories immediately became a matter of urgent and vital concern. The Czar granted the factory-owners the right to employ either Russian or foreign workmen for wages, but as far as the former class was concerned and of necessity it was the main source of supply there were only the "free" workers, consisting principally of ex-serfs who had run away from their masters, to be drawn upon. The owners of these serfs naturally demanded that they should be returned to their villages and their serfdom. Peter the Great could not well deny the validity of this claim, but, on the other hand, he could not afford to com- ply with the demand and destroy the new indus- tries on which so much depended. It was quite evident that the new industrial sys- tem, in Russia as elsewhere, could not flourish within the confines of serfdom and feudalism. Peter was confronted by an emergency which, had he possessed any liberal ideals at all, any spiritual sympathy with or insight into the Europeanization whose material advantages he saw so clearly, must have led him to declare that serfdom could no longer be maintained. On the contrary, while he forbade the return of the serfs who had already become factory-workers to their lawful owners, in another ukase he authorized the owners of industries to buy peasants to work in them, stipulating that the peasants must be bought, not as individuals, but by the whole village, and that everv such village RUSSIA AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 73 must be attached to the industrial undertaking itself and not to the person of the owner. The despotic spirit displayed in this order is Oriental rather than European. It takes no account of the individual at all. By it Peter the Great gave to serfdom a new lease of life as well as a harsher character than it had ever before possessed. Instead of industrialism putting an end to serfdom and to the superstructure of feudalism which rested upon it, as it had done in the western nations, Russian industrialism adopted serfdom and both brutalized it and prolonged its existence. Not only so, but in doing this it placed a heavy burden upon the new industrial system, almost sufficient to crush it. No greater blow could have been directed against the growing industrial system than that which made it dependent upon serf labor. In the most critical period of his great work of uniting Russia to western Europe Peter forged a chain binding it to Asia. vi Peter the Great died in 1725. From that time to the accession of Catherine II in 1762 the influence of Germany over the political and economic life of Russia grew with astonishing rapidity. The male line of the Romanov dynasty having become extinct, the succession passed to various members of the female line connected with Germany by marriage ties. In this manner the influence of Germany in Russian court eireles increased in the most amazing degree. Thus Anne of Courland, 74 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM assisted by her lover and Minister, Biihren, and a host of German officials, imposed upon Russia a typical German regime. While Elizabeth, who fol- lowed her, hated the Germans and greatly lessened the influence they had acquired under Anne, she found herself compelled to name as heir apparent Charles Peter Ulrich, a German of the Germans, who worshiped Frederick the Great of Prussia as intensely as Elizabeth had hated him. Curiously enough, it was left to his consort, who succeeded him, herself a petty German princess, to bring back the Russian spirit to the Russian court. Catherine II aimed to continue the great work of Peter the Great, and her success in prosecuting that aim was remarkable. Like Peter the Great, she desired to unite Russia, economically, at any rate, to western Europe. In the second year of her reign she published a ukase inviting foreigners to enter Russia upon terms remarkable for their liberality. She promised them full religious liberty with subventions by the state toward the cost of establishing places of worship, perpetual exemption from compulsory military duty, exemption from all forms of taxation for a long period, local auton- omy, and a fairly liberal measure of self-govern- ment. By this method she attracted a large num- ber of foreigners, including English, Germans, French, Swedes, Italians, and Bulgarians. Many of these immigrants became factory- workers. A small percentage of each nationality consisted of capitalists who established factories of their own or acquired existing factories which their Russian owners desired to sell. These were RUSSIA AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 75 the very ends the astute Catherine sought. Rus- sian industry was in a bad way and needed rein- forcement by foreign capital, foreign labor, and foreign technical skill. The policy of Peter the Great in linking the new industrial system to serf- dom was the primary cause of this serious con- dition. Secondary causes were the incompetence, corruption, and indifference of Peter's immediate successors, and the opposition of the old nobility to the manufacturers and their interests. So long as serfdom remained as the basis of the labor-supply industrial production was bound to be costly. Every factory was burdened with inemcients and wastrels, simply because there was no selective process. The manufacturers had to buy whole village populations, and every serf so bought was bound for life to the particular indus- trial establishment for which he had been pur- chased. However low the price paid for such forced mass-labor might be, it was bound to prove terribly expensive, as all human experience shows. The labor cost of the commodities produced was therefore very high. In the second place, the transference of whole masses of peasants to factory production, village by village, seriously affected agriculture. So much for the primary factor in the industrial decline. When we come to the secondary factors we are brought face to face with the manner in which the German parasites battened in luxury upon the spoils of the nation's economic life. The enormous wealth heaped upon the infamous Biihren by his roval mistress Anne is an illustration of how indus- 76 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM try was robbed to sustain these parasites. A host of adventurers flocked around the weak and silly woman who reigned over the great empire, like greedy vultures, receiving vast sums of money, lands, and whole villages of serfs. After the death of Peter the Great the nobles set themselves in bitter opposition to the manufacturers, especially to their right to own serfs. By the time Catherine II came to the throne the power of the nobility had become so great that even that great monarch could not resist it. In the very first year of her reign a law was passed forbidding the purchase of serfs and their employment in factories by persons not belonging to the nobility. This law, the last of a series of measures aimed to destroy the mer- chant-manufacturing class, practically gave the nobles a monopoly of industry. Thus the organi- zation of industry to a very large extent became the function of a class wholly unfitted to perform that function. They lacked almost every necessary qualification for the direction of industry. At the bottom of the industrial system was a mass of inefficient forced labor; at the top equally ineffi- cient directors. Like Peter the Great, Catherine II equally great as a sovereign lacked the vision and the courage to decree the abolition of serfdom and thus free the pathway of industrial development. Like her great predecessor, again, while she desired to appropriate the material advantages of the western nations, she shrank from and feared their political and spiritual ideals and turned instinc- tively to Germany for political support and co- RUSSIA AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 77 operation. She was a Prussian at heart, possessing all the vices and weaknesses of the Prussian au- tocracy. She was vain, arrogant, coarse, aggres- sive, unscrupulous, greedy, and brutal. Yet withal she possessed a certain genius for statecraft and empire-building. When the ferment of the French Revolution began to manifest itself as a serious and vital challenge to the existing order she threw off every pretense of sympathy with it, as one discards an old garment, and set about exterminat- ing every heterodox opinion and belief. She wanted Frederick William II of Germany to lead a crusade to suppress the French Revolution. Early in her reign she had introduced a scheme to es- tablish a sort of consultative parliament, a fairly democratic elective body, together with other liberal legislative reforms. Finding that these logically led to the emancipation of the serfs, she abandoned them and adopted a policy that was utterly reactionary. Like Peter the Great, Catherine II made the mistake of supposing that the material advantages of western European nations and their cultural refinements could be transplanted in Russia with- out changing the political and social structure. Both monarchs believed that the immigration of a few thousand people from the western nations would result in spreading western efficiency and prosperity throughout the nation. They were, of course, blind to the plainest of all the lessons of history. As a result of her ukase of 1763 there was a great influx of German agriculturists, who established agricultural villages along the Volga. 78 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM Ten years later there was a similar influx of Ger- man-Dutch Protestants. It soon appeared that these colonists were more prosperous than the Russian peasants around them, a fact partly due to their superiority and partly also to the special privileges they enjoyed as a reward for settling in Russia. There was not and there has never since been any evidence that the immigration had raised the general level of prosperity or efficiency. Similarly, in the industrial sphere immigration failed to give life to Russian industry. The foreign settlers might succeed as manufacturers, but they did not impart the capacity to succeed to the natives. When Peter the Great died practically all the existing industries were owned and con- trolled by Russians. Only an insignificant number were owned by foreigners. At the time of the death of Catherine II, seventy years later, a very large percentage of the existing industries were owned by foreigners Germans, English, French, Swedes, Italians, and Bulgarians. In St. Peters- burg 22 per cent, of the factories belonged to foreigners, and in Moscow conditions were similar. In considering the nature and extent of western influence upon Russia in the eighteenth century it is important to observe two consequences of the policy initiated by Peter the Great and continued by Catherine II which have exerted a profound influence upon Russia right down to our own day. In the first place, the preservation of serfdom for more than a century set a gulf between the workers of Russia and those of western Europe. In the RUSSIA AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 79 second place, the artificial bolstering up of the nobility and the restrictions placed upon the merchant-manufacturing class, at the time when the great middle class, the bourgeoisie, was gain- ing ascendancy in the western nations, was directly responsible for the fact that there was not enough power in the Russian bourgeoisie to force the adoption of constitutional government in the nineteenth century, or to carry on the government when the rotten fabric of czarism fell in the twentieth. VII It was during the reign of Alexander I that the idealism of western Europe reached Russia through what may be termed the channels of natural inter- course in volume sufficient to produce a lasting influence. Prior to that time various sovereigns had tried to impose some of the refinements of western civilization upon Russia, as well as some of its material advantages. To this end they had encouraged immigration and colonization, with what result we have already noted. As far as possible, they had strenuously tried to "stop all the chinks" through which liberal political ideas might enter Russia, and when the French Revolu- tion generated a pulsing current which swept from Paris to Moscow Catherine II used every possible means to prevent Russia's contamination. Alexander I began his reign as a libera! democrat, instituting many reforms. Before long, however, it became evident that he was essentially a tyrant at heart, despite his acceptance of certain liberal 80 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM ideas and ideals. "If civilization were more ad- vanced, I would abolish this slavery if it cost me my head," he said, but his whole course of action proved that this intellectual liberalism did not penetrate his soul. Clearly perceiving the evils of serfdom, this royal disciple of Rousseau and his gospel of humanity suffered the ancient evil to continue. When he conceived reforms it was only as an autocrat. It was said of him that "he would gladly agree that every one should be free, if every one would do exactly as he desired." He thought of himself as the chosen instrument of divine Providence, set apart to confer happiness and order upon the world. This he was ready to do with the most ruthless brutality. It was in this spirit that he planned with Napoleon the division of the world at the memorable meeting at Tilsit, following the Russian-French war of 1807. The final downfall of Napoleon at Waterloo left Alexander the most powerful sovereign in Europe, not merely because of the size and might of his empire, but also because of his own leadership. It was then that he launched the Holy Alliance, a product of extreme pietism, for which the teachings of Rousseau had prepared the way. It was quite characteristic of Alexander at this period to press his liberal ideas into the mold of evangelical religion. The genesis of the Holy Alliance takes us back far beyond the days when he fell under the influence of the religious mystics and the leaders of the great evangelical revival. It dates from the proposal for a European Confederation submitted to Pitt in 1804. In that document RUSSIA AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 81 Alexander argued that the outcome of the war must be the universal triumph of "the sacred rights of humanity." He wanted a Confederation of European Powers, and asked, "Why could not one submit to it the positive rights of nations, assure the privilege of neutrality, insert the obliga- tion of never beginning war until all the resources which the mediation of a third party could offer have been exhausted?" He argued that this would mean "a league whose stipulations would form, so to speak, a new code of the law of nations . . . while those who infringe it would risk bringing upon themselves the forces of the new union." Clearly this is derived from Rousseau and forms a very significant anticipation of the League of Nations. It was quite in keeping with the character of Alexander that he should have joined hands with the arch-reactionary, Metternich, in attempting to suppress by force the revolutionary movements in Germany, Italy, and Spain. It was equally characteristic of him to adopt a brutally reactionary policy at home. While he continued to indulge in liberal phrases he ruled as a tyrant. He saw his people impoverished, but did nothing except impose new burdens upon them. Acknowledging serfdom to be a monstrous evil, he permitted it to continue. Such was the character and the record of the great "Liberal Czar," the Muscovite who preached liberal ideals to western Europe and practised tyranny at home. It was not through the Czar that Russia was influenced by the social idealism which stirred France and England in the early part of the nine- 82 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM teenth century. The war of 1812 has been called "the first war of the Russian people." It was not the Czar and his nobles who won the war, but the masses of the people. They were the conquerors of Napoleon. During the Napoleonic invasion there was born in the hearts of the Russian people a genuine and strong patriotism, coupled with a profound contempt for the Czar and the nobility. After the Grand Army of Napoleon had been driven from Russian soil, Alexander joined with the Emperors of Prussia and Austria in pursuing it across Europe. In this manner many of the young Russian offi- cers were brought into close personal contact with European civilization. They found in Germany and in France a degree of prosperity which con- trasted strangely with the terrible poverty of the masses in Russia. They found, too, in both coun- tries a degree of freedom, a regard for the individual life, which they could not at first comprehend. They became acquainted with the numerous societies which were promulgating radical political and social theories. During their stay in France these Russian officers were drawn into close rela- tions with various revolutionary groups, secret, conspiratory societies for the most part, whose teachings possessed for them all the fascination of novelty. When they returned to Russia, at the end of 18 1 5, they returned as revolutionary idealists and saw their country and its problems in a new light. Moreover, they had established personal relations with the leading spirits of the revolu- tionary movements of Europe, RUSSIA AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 83 These youthful and ardent idealists had very- little idea of the strength of the autocracy. They did not understand the terror with which their generous visions would inspire the Czar and the nobility. They were thwarted at every turn, and after ten years of baffled effort they resorted to armed revolt, in December, 1825, only to be crushed by the government. The Decembrists, as they came to be known, were defeated, but they did not fail. Martyrdom for a great cause never fails. Their success was greater than they realized: they had planted in fertile soil the seed of Europe's vision of a free life for mankind and linked Russia and western Europe together in a spiritual union. Five of the Decembrists among them the brill- iant poet Ryleef were hanged and about a hun- dred more -"young men who represented the flower of Russian intelligence" * were sent to Siberia. How deeply and profoundly they im- pressed the intellectual life of their time is reflect- ed in its literature. Ryleef, Pushkin, LermontofF, Gogol, and Turgeniev all reflect that influence. Their writings are all tinged with the passion for social regeneration, which was the gift of western civilization to the great Slav nation's culture. The reign of Nicholas I, who succeeded his brother, Alexander I, in 1825, was a period of dark reaction. The crushing of the Decembrist agita- tion and uprising was the prelude to a reign of tyranny and resistance to progress. In 183 1 the Polish insurrection was suppressed with brutal 1 Kropotkin, Ideals and Realities in Russian Literature, p. 35. 8 4 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM severity, and after that had been accomplished the administration which was established by Nicholas I was extremely harsh and cruel. The aim was to destroy every vestige of Polish national- ism, and even the Polish language. To keep out foreign revolutionary ideas he established a rigid and severe censorship, and practically made it impossible for Russians to visit foreign countries. His policies, domestic and foreign, were all governed by his fear of revolution and his determination to maintain the principle of absolute autocracy. He died before the end of the disastrous Crimean War, and was succeeded by his son, Alexander II. On the 3d of March, 1861, Alexander II signed the Act of Liberation by which serfdom was abolished. He believed that by this radical step the revolutionary agitation and unrest would be brought to an end, and that a new era of prosperity would be inaugurated. This was the belief like- wise of many of the revolutionists themselves. Thus Alexander Herzen in his brilliant agitation for the abolition of serfdom through his Kolokol had contended, as did Tchernyshevsky, who was in large measure responsible for inducing the Czar to sign the Act of Liberation. Alexander might well be pardoned for his roseate confidence in view of the optimism of those two great founders of the modern Socialist movement. Llerzen exercised a profound and far-reaching influence upon his native land, despite the fact that he never saw it after 1847. All the rest of his life, until his death in 1870, was spent in exile in Fiance, England, Italy, and Switzerland. When RUSSIA AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 85 he was twenty-two years of age he was sent into exile for singing students' songs in praise of the Decembrist martyrs, and spent six years in the Urals. Returning to Moscow, his native town, in 1840 he joined Bakunin and other friends in revolu- tionary propaganda for which he was again sent into exile in 1842. He remained in exile until 1847, when he received permission to leave Russia. Notwithstanding the brief period of his active participation in the Russian revolutionary move- ment in Russia itself, the influence he exercised upon the movement from abroad through his writings, which were clandestinely circulated, was enormous. The first years of the reign of Alexander II were characterized by a degree of liberalism in marked contrast to the policy of repression and suppression pursued by Nicholas I and by Alexander II him- self later on. The liberalism of the early period made possible Tchernyshevsky's Contemporary Re- view, the great literary forum of the period. It was Tchcrnyshevsky who popularized the theories of Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Proudhon, the French Utopians, and of Robert Owen, the English Utopian. Of these social thinkers, Fourier and Owen probably made the deepest and most lasting impression upon the revolutionary Socialist movement of Russia, though Saint-Simon roused the greatest amount of purely intellectual interest. Tcherny- shevsky himself was perhaps equally influenced by Owen and by Fourier. Owen's practical experi- ments, his sense of the value of concrete example, appealed to the great Russian. At the same time 86 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM he was convinced that Fourier was right in looking to a highly developed industrial technic and large- scale production as prerequisite to a Socialist society. 1 It is not difficult to understand why the emanci- pation of the serfs failed to produce the results which these men had foretold and the Czar had believed to be certain. In the first place, not enough land was allotted to satisfy the needs of the people, whose agricultural methods were exceed- ingly primitive. The average allotment per house- hold was something less than six and a quarter acres, and, in most cases, a proportion of this land was of a very poor quality. Moreover, the change did not bring individual land ownership, but simply extended the mir. The individual peasant was simply a partner in the ownership of an area of communal land owned jointly by all the house- holders of his village. It was the custom of the mir to divide this communal land into patches of equal area, each household receiving its share of the land graded according to its quality. Thus the holding of one household would consist of a strip of good land in one place, a strip of poorer land in another, and a strip of still poorer land else- where. Sometimes these strips would be no more than four feet wide. In many cases some of the strips allotted to a household would be situated ten or twelve miles away from the cottage. Bearing in mind the fact that most of the peasants lacked capital and that their methods were unscientific and primitive, it is not difficult to see why the 1 G. Plechanov, N. Tchernyskevsky, pp. 75, 301-302. RUSSIA AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 87 land problem became the dominant economic and political concern of 80 per cent, of the Russian people. Furthermore, the land was not given to the peasants. It had to be "redeemed" that is to say, paid for and the price fixed was so high that the "redemption tax" of necessity added greatly to the impoverishment of the people. Among the peasants the idea spread that the Czar had really given them the land and that it was only the greed of the nobles and officials which imposed upon them the necessity of paying for it. From im- memorial times the land had, they believed, be- longed to them and not to the nobles. There was a folk-saying which summed up their belief, "The nobles own us, but the land is ours." In the discontent which resulted from this method of dealing with the land problem the "land hun- ger" of the peasants, their poverty, their sense of being cheated, the crushing burden of taxation the peculiar agrarian Socialism of Russia arose and flourished. The emancipation did, indeed, bring one form of relief. It abolished the adscriptio glebes by which the peasants were bound to a particular piece of land and to its owner, and set them free to go wherever they would as "free" laborers. This made it possible for many to be- come wage-laborers on the large estates, and for others to work in the factories of the industrial centers for a portion of each year, the season when work on their land was not possible. But while this mitigated their suffering considerably, gave them a feeling of personal independence, and made it possible for them to earn the money with 88 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM which to pay their taxes, it did not materially lessen their discontent. On the contrary, by bringing masses of peasant workers into the towns in pursuit of this seasonal employment it provided facilities for agitation which had not existed before. Thus the agrarian Socialism of the peasants and the Nihilism of the Intellectuals a doctrine of negation which, stimulated by Darwinism, paved the way for Bolshevism made considerable head- way. VIII In this period of Nihilism there is disclosed a remarkable development of the attitude of Russia to western civilization. Instead of the old attitude of unrestrained admiration and idealization which characterized the Intellectuals, there is a tendency to regard western Europe generally, and France particularly, much more critically and to idealize Russia. The conservatives for the most part con- tinued to deplore all European influences and to struggle against them. In part the change in the attitude of the Russian liberals was a natural reaction. At first they had idealized France and the western nations in general in the most extravagant fashion, surrounding them with a glamour which seems almost childish in its romanticism. The case of Herzen illustrates in an admirable way the reaction which took place in many minds. He had gone to France and Eng- land a reverent worshiper. In bitter revolt against Russian government and Russian social conditions, he saw little or nothing admirable in his native RUSSIA AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 89 land. In the western nations he had great faith and looked forward to visiting them with some- thing of the reverence with which a religious devotee approaches a sacred shrine. Herzen him- self wrote long afterward that at this period of his life he "illumined Europe with magical colors," that he "believed in Europe, and above all in France." He lived in Paris through the Revolu- tion of 1848 and was astounded by the manner in which force was used against the revolutionists. He saw the great and growing power of the bour- geoisie as though his disappointment were a great magnifying-glass. This embourgeoisemcnt sickened and terrified him. All was so different from his preconceived fancy. With much bitter humility, he renounced his passion for France and turned to Russia with new admiration and hope. 1 The changed attitude of many of the Russian liberals using this term in a very wide sense was due, however, less to any loss of faith in France or western democracy than to a new con- ception of Russia, a conception mainly derived from French Socialist thinkers. These French Socialists saw in the mir the basis for an equali- tarian social system. Here, indeed, was com- munism in the fundamental economic element, t he land, already existing. Proudhon rejoiced that the mir had not been abolished with serfdom, but remained for "free laborers" to develop, lie contended that there could be nothing better than this communal land system, "which is con- trary to inequality" and which provided, he said, 1 Sec Herzcn's account of this change in his book, The Other Shore. 9o RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM the only foundation necessary for a Socialist system of society. 1 This view was also adopted by Herzen, Tchernyshevsky, Bakunin, and many other Russian Socialists, with the result that they saw Russia in a new light, as a nation destined to fill a great role, as perhaps the first nation in the world to realize Socialism after all. This was entirely contrary to the Marxian theory of social progress, first outlined in the Com- munist Manifesto in 1847. Herzen and Marx had met in Germany and in France in 1848 and 1849. They were not over-friendly, even at that time, mainly on account of Marx's bitter attack upon Herzen's bosom friend, Bakunin. Marx had ac- cused Bakunin of being a paid spy in the service of the Russian Ambassador, alleging that the information came from "George Sand," who held documentary proof of the fact. The great French novelist indignantly denied the statement in so far as it concerned her. "I never had any reason, or authority, to express any doubts as to the loyalty of his character and the sincerity of his views," she wrote. Although many years afterward Marx revived the ugly charge, he withdrew it at the time and published Madame Sand's letter. There was a formal reconciliation of the two men, effected through a mutual friend, but the wound rankled in Bakunin's breast. Herzen took the side of Bakunin and cordially hated Marx. Later on, in 1852, an article, believed to have been written by Marx, accusing Herzen of being a paid spy of the Russian government, appeared in a German news- 1 P. J. YtouH\\on,(Euvres Posthumes, Paris, 1866, Vol. I, p. 89. RUSSIA AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 9 i v paper. The charge was as baseless as the similar charge against Bakunin. The opposition of Bakunin and Herzen to Marx did not depend upon these personal incidents, however. Its roots lay far deeper than that. In the great controversy which so profoundly affected the development of Russian Socialism there were fundamental philosophical issues at stake. In 1849 Bakunin published his pamphlet, An Appeal to the Slavs, in which he set forth his doctrine of "Panslavisme." He urged the union, cultural and political, of all the Slavs for the purpose of destroying the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian empires. He believed that a great Federation of Slavs could be formed upon a communistic basis, urging that the Slavs were communists by in- stinct. Against this theory, which was so vio- lently opposed to his own, Marx contended with great spirit, contending that the Slav nations and provinces must, like the western nations, pass through a process of industrial development, and that only a fully developed capitalism could give birth to the new social order. In a scathing criti- cism of Bakunin which infuriated Herzen, Marx wrote in a contemptuous spirit concerning the Slavs, a spirit quite commonly encountered in German Socialist writings down to the present time. He denounced Panslavisme as "a move- ment which strives only to subject the civilized West to the barbarian East; the city to the vil- lage; commerce, industry, science, and progress to the primitive culture of the Slavish serfs." 1 1 Xtu? Rhenische Zeiturg, February 14, i c .}9. 92 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM The controversy thus begun extended over many years and engaged the attention of practically all the Socialist Intellectuals of Russia. Herzen not only gladly accepted the view that the com- munism which western Europe was struggling toward as an ideal to be attained was in Russia a reality, but he accepted the view of Bakunin, Proudhon, and others that the laboring masses of Russia, the peasantry, could avoid the long struggle of parliamentary politics. His argument was to this effect: the communism instinctive in the Russian mind had withstood every political change; it was not necessary for Russia to pass through a period of embourgeoisement, for whenever the Russian people should revolt it would not be to replace the tyranny of a Czar by that of a bour- geois parliament, nor even a republic with a Presi- dent, but to attain "a veritable and complete liberty." l We have here another of the numerous anticipations of Leninism to be found in the writ- ings of Herzen. He saw in the Russian muzhik not only the equal of the "class-conscious" French artisan, but even his superior, destined to succeed sooner in creating a Socialist state of society be- cause of his communistic mentality. Very similar views were put forward by Bakunin, Tcherny- shevsky, and other writers of the period, as well as by their successors in the eighteen-seventies and eighteen-eighties. It is practically impossible for the Western World to understand the intensity of the struggle which ensued from this philosophical difference. 1 Vide Herzen's Open Letter to Linton, the English Chartist. RUSSIA AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 93 The Marxian view had its champions, and it is a curious fact that, as Marx himself wrote to his friend Kugelmann, it had many among the "Russian autocrats." On receiving from Russia, in October, 1868, news of the publication of his Capital in Rus- sian, Marx wrote: "It is strange that the Russians should always have been my well-wishers, for I have fought against them for twenty-five years. In 1843-44 tne Russian autocrats thought a lot about me in Paris, and my books against Proudhon in 1847 and against Duncker in 1848 were received with great favor in Russia. Of course, the Russian aristocracy have been influenced by French and German culture." In 1879 arose that peculiarly Russian movement, the Narodnya Folya, the terroristic People's Will party. This movement was based upon the teach- ings of Herzen, Bakunin, Tchernyshevsky, and Lopatin as against those of the Marx-Engels school. There were, however, some supporters of the latter in Russia, and the relation of the Marxian theory of historical development to Russia became the subject of much discussion. Would the viir and the communist mentality of the Russian masses prove obstacles to the development of capitalism in Russia? Would these be destroyed by capital- ism, or would they survive and become the basis of a truly Russian form of Socialist society? These questions were submitted to Marx, and his reply to them was published in the leading radical magazine of the period, Fatherland's Records. Most of the copies of the issue seem to have been confiscated by the police, causing Lavroff to re- 94 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM publish Marx's article, in 1886, in his Messenger of the People's Will, edited from Paris. In this article, which holds an important place in the literature of Russian Socialism, Marx took up the theory of Tchernyshevsky and his friends that, instead of going through a long process of capitalist development, Russia might "adopt all the fruits of this system without going through the tortures connected with it, and develop in accord- ance with its peculiar historical environment." Marx did not consider this altogether impossible. In one pregnant sentence he lays significant stress upon the element of national choice as a factor in social evolution, showing that to Marx the economic motivation of history was not the rigid and absolute process which the Marxists who were "more Marxist than Marx" believed it to be. "If Russia will follow the way chosen by it after 1 86 1, it will lose one of the most convenient oppor- tunities which history ever offered to a people to evade all the features of the capitalist system." This reads more like a passage from the writings of Proudhon or Bakunin than a passage from Marx! After a discussion of the extent and manner of the application of his theory of capitalist accumulation to Russia, he summed up in these words: "If Russia endeavors to become a capitalistic land like western Europe (and during late years it has labored sufficiently in that respect) it will not reach it without first transforming a good portion of its peasants into proletarians. But after this, first having fallen under the yoke of a capitalistic regime, it will be compelled to submit to the cruel RUSSIA AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 95 laws of capitalism on a par with other unsuspecting nations." Events in Russia since the overthrow of czarism lend some interest and importance to the discus- sion of this same great question by Marx and Engels in their joint preface to Plechanov's trans- lation of the Communist Manifesto, published twenty-eight years ago, "// the Russian revolution is the signal for the labor revolution in the West, so that both complete each other, the modern Russian communal land ownership might become the basis for a communistic development." It is not difficult to discern in this passage the intellectual parentage of Lenin's policy of desperately striving to spread Bolshevism in the western nations. On more than one occasion Lenin has openly declared that the sole chance for the permanent success of his policy depended upon Bolshevist revolutions in the western nations. Besides the conflict between the two rival phi- losophies we have thus far discussed there was a third element in the development of the Russian revolutionary movement, namely, the tactics in- spired by the great French revolutionist, Auguste Blanqui. Just as Russian Marxists were often "more Marxist than Marx," so the Russian Blan- quists were "more Blanquist than Blanqui." The school of Herzen, Bakunin, and Tchernyshevsky idealized both the mir and the muzhik. They held that the muzhiks were communists by nature; that the difficulties which seemed so great to the Intellectuals, who had lost contact with reality, did not exist for the peasants with their peculiar 96 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM genius. All that was needed was for the Intel- lectuals, with their intellectual consciousness of the communist ideal of society, to go down "among the people" who were innately communists, but not conscious of the fact or its significance. A touch of intellect would, they believed, liberate a great mass spiritual movement. How miserably they failed is well known. Only here and there did a few peasants respond to their appeal. Gen- erally the peasants fell upon the propagandists, beat them mercilessly, and, in many cases, bound them and turned them over to the police or to the landowners. It soon became obvious that a long, long time must elapse before anything like an overwhelming majority of the peasants could be induced to join in a revolution. The central idea of the " Bakunin- ists" was thus discredited. On the other hand, there was no ground for hoping that the proletarian revolution, which was the central idea of Marxism, could take place within any reasonably near time. The industrial proletariat was an almost infinites- imal part of the population. For many Russian Intellectuals it was at once impossible to accept the Bakunist idea of abolishing the state and the Marxist idea of bringing it under the rule of the proletariat. There could be no thoroughgoing change, they said, without capturing and using the governmental power. But for this the ma- jority of the people could not be prepared. Must the struggle be abandoned, then? No. It was possible to capture the state, as Blanqui had shown. All that was necessarv was for a deter- RUSSIA AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 97 mined, revolutionary minority to seize the state by force and liberate the people. Trust in the Russian people themselves was wholly lacking in this policy. "Never, neither to-day nor in the future, would the people, left to itself, be capable of achieving a social revolution. We alone, the revolutionary minority, might achieve it, and we must do so as soon as possible." ! These Blanquist apostles of conspiratory action looking to coups d'etat by revolutionary minorities, who despised the reliance of such leaders as Lavroff on the education of the masses, were the real progenitors of Bolshevism. On its practical side Bolshevism is mainly a revival of Blanquism. There are, indeed, elements of Marxism in its theoretical propaganda, and its vocabulary is notably that of Marx. Its practical methods, however, are chiefly those of Blanquism, from which it derives its anti-democratic, despotic character. IX In the dark period which followed the Act of Liberation, the famous Circle of Tchaykovsky and the Land and Freedom Society made a brave strug- gle against the ever-increasing despotism of the government, on the one hand, and the ignorance of the peasants, on the other. Their failure led to the adoption of terrorism by a majority of the Land and Freedom Society, which split in 1879. Two years later, March 1, 1S81, Sophia Perovskaya 'Quoted from I*. [.avroff's Thr Propagandist Namdniki of (he Years 1873-78 by Al'-vir^ky, o/>. cit,, p. 343, 98 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM and her associates assassinated Alexander II, a few days before the date he had privately set for the introduction of extensive reforms. The assas- sination did not temper the despotism of the regime, which, instead of becoming better, became very much worse. It was feared by the peasants that serfdom was to be restored. Poles and Jews were mercilessly persecuted and all "foreign" influences repressed with great brutality. It was in this period that the Marxian Socialist movement began to make headway under the leadership of Plechanov, Deutsch, Vera Zasulich, and others. The revolutionary thought of Russia was turned into the channel through which it was destined to flow for the next twenty years. Then terrorism was revived with most disastrous results. Then followed the great revolutionary movement of 1905, which the bureaucracy drowned in blood. Throughout the whole period of the modern revolutionary movement that is to say, since the Decembrist uprising in 1825 the minds of pro- gressive Russians have been most profoundly influenced by the democratic thought of western Europe and, in recent years, the United States of America. On the other hand, the reactionaries have cultivated German friendship and sought to lessen the influence of the western nations on Russian life, economically, politically, and cultur- ally. One very considerable section of the reac- tionary elements frankly stood for a close economic union with Germany, for the control of the Balkans by Austro-German imperialism, and for Russia to leave European affairs severely alone in order to RUSSIA AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 99 become "the great Asiatic power.'* The logical result of that policy would be a bloc composed of Russia, China, and Japan. That in the event of such a union being effected Japan, and not Russia, would be the leader is almost self-evident. rn Russia's subjection to Germany RUSSIA'S economic policy in the quarter of a century following the conclusion of the Russo- Turkish War and the Treaty of San Stefano was dominated by political and military considerations, by the interests of the bureaucratic oligarchy into which czarism had developed during the reign of Alexander III. This is not less true of the policy prevailing during the regime of Witte, the arch- foe of the bureaucracy, than of that which pre- vailed under his immediate predecessors, Vishne- gradski and Bunge, who were with and of the bureaucracy. "We sell our military prestige for the economic prestige we lack," said Vishnegradski on one occasion. Throughout his official career Witte was in a most anomalous position. He was essentially a capitalist statesman, trying to carry out a vast policy of capitalist development in a nation gov- erned by motives and methods incompatible with capitalism. If ever a statesman found himself out of his proper time and place, Serge Julievich Witte did. He was a keen if not a profound student of history. At the same time he was a shrewd capitalist with a remarkable genius for RUSSIA'S SUBJECTION TO GERMANY 101 organization and a not less remarkable creative imagination. In many respects his mentality greatly resembled that of the great American capitalists, James J. Hill, Edward H. Harriman, and others. At the very time when the bureaucracy was bent upon intensifying the Orientalism of Russia he saw the need of modernizing and Euro- peanizing it. He wanted to make Russia a great modern state, its vital forces dependent upon and springing from industrial and commercial capi- talism. He wanted the policies of the state to be controlled by the interests of capitalist develop- ment, instead of the development of capitalism being controlled and conditioned by the policies of the state. The very nature of a bureaucratic oligarchy was incompatible with this theory and purpose. As head of the Railroad Department under Minister of Finance Vishnegradski, Witte undoubt- edly saved the railway system of Russia from ruin, and greatly extended it. He made the Trans- Siberian Railroad possible. As Minister of Finance following Vishnegradski, he was compelled by the very nature of the bureaucracy to devise and im- pose upon the country a fiscal policy which was artificial, oppressive, and fundamentally unsound, a policy which was, moreover, essentially antago- nistic to his hopes and his aims, as he could not fail to recognize. Coming into office at a time of the most appalling poverty, before the country had recovered from the terrible famines of 1891-92, In found himself compelled to resort to the most extraordinary financial juggling, the net results of 102 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM which were increased taxation and inflated prices, the imposition of new economic burdens upon a people already crushed. Witte was too brutal and callous to pay much heed to this fact were it not that it was in the interest of a s} r stem funda- mentally antagonistic to his own ideas and plans. Witte was far from opposing the desire of the bureaucracy to extend Russia's Asiatic dominions. He favored the extension of Russian influence in northern China and Persia, especially the domi- nation of Manchuria by so-called "spontaneous infiltration" and other methods. His motives, however, were quite different from those of the bu- reaucrats. He saw in this Asiatic expansion great economic resources to be exploited by western methods. A cardinal feature of his policy was the development of industry, to which end he both fostered protection and encouraged the intro- duction of foreign capital for industrial purposes. By increasing indirect taxation, by enormous prof- its derived from the state monopolies through excessively high charges a disguised form of taxa- tion and foreign loans, Witte built up that great fiscal system which year by year added to the impoverishment of the people and, by limiting their purchasing power, restricted the volume of effective demand for commodities upon which the "infant industries" depended. The whole policy resulted in enriching the bureaucracy's treasury far more than it helped Russian industry. The average gross income per head at the end of the nineteenth century was five times higher in Ger- many than in Russia, yet prices in Russia were RUSSIA'S SUBJECTION TO GERMANY 103 so much higher that the advantage of the German consumer over the Russian consumer was even greater than indicated by the difference in income. It is to the credit of Witte that he very clearly saw that Russia was greatly menaced by the aggressive economic policy of Germany, that she was in fact in danger of being reduced to a con- dition of economic dependence upon Germany amounting to vassalage. He was among the first Russian economists to recognize the "German colony" peril, as it came to be known. His stout resistance to Germany's aggressiveness was in large part responsible for the opposition of a powerful section of the bureaucracy, which was strongly attached to Germany by many ties. Ger- man intrigue and the Germanophile bureaucracy's hatred were directed against him. For years Witte was the foreign statesman most feared and most cordially hated in the Wilhelmstrasse, Berlin. Had the relations between Russia and England been more friendly Witte would undoubtedly have turned to English capitalists for a very large part of the capital needed to develop Russian industry. As it was, England was suspicious of Russia and in no mood to assist in building up her railways and her industries, thus making her a more formidable potential foe, capable of leveling a dangerous attack against India. Thus it was that Witte had to rely mainly upon French, Bel- gian, and German capital. The protective policy of Witte was far from being a success. Despite the high tariffs imposed, imports steadily increased. Home manufactures grew, it is true, but not so io 4 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM rapidly. 1 Germany, thanks to her system of "ex- port bounties" and other devices, acquired an ever-increasing share of this import trade and steadily enlarged her control over the economic life of the Czar's empire. Witte was thus checkmated on all sides. He had believed that the desire of the oligarchy for military and political expansion in Asia could be made to serve his ambitious program of economic expansion. He imagined Russia Europeanized by a rapid process of industrial evolution, trans- formed in a few years into a great manufacturing country. As such, he believed, Russia would profit by her Asiatic colonization, finding both a market for her goods and an almost inexhaustible source of supply. Asiatic expansion meant, therefore, one thing to the oligarchy and quite another thing to Witte. The former wanted a great Oriental empire, while Witte wanted Russia to step from Orientalism to Occidentalism, from Oriental feudal- ism to modern industrialism. It must be remem- bered that Japan had not yet become a great nation, either politically or industrially. So Witte saw in Asia only an effete civilization and was strengthened in his resolve to link Russia more closely to the Western World. He was almost equally unfortunate in his domestic policy. In the first place, the measures devised to foster Russia's native industrial development and emanci- pate her from Germany's economic domination had the contrary effect of impeding rather than accelerating the former and of increasing the latter. A. Ular, Russia from Within (1905), p. 152. RUSSIA'S SUBJECTION TO GERMANY 105 Industry increased, it is true, but neither so fast as Germanj r 's trade nor as the impoverishment of the masses. This impoverishment grew so serious that the most bounteous harvests mattered little or nothing: despite good harvests there was under- consumption amounting to actual famine in the land. Neither at this period nor later did famine in Russia necessarily mean shortage of food, it must be remembered. There was generally food enough in the land. Under the old regime there was always an immense exportation of grain, even in the worst famine years. True, this so-called "sur- plus" was in fact not a surplus at all. "Grain was exported from some provinces when in others thousands were dying of starvation, or only keeping body and soul together with bread made from the bark of trees," says Wilcox. 1 The same well- informed writer tells us that, "In the worst of the famine years there was no very considerable fall in the amount of grain exported, and Englishmen grew fat on bread made of Russian wheat, while the entire population of Russian villages lay through the winter in a kind of hibernation, to which they had trained themselves as the only means of husbanding their physical resources and preventing themselves from dying of hunger." 2 11 1 he failure of \\ itte was relative, not absolute. Moreover, it was due mainly to the fact that he was attempting the almost impossible task of 1 A'uj ,:d ' s Ruin-, by h. H. Wilcox, p. 6. 2 Idem, p. 7. 106 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM accelerating industrial progress within the rigid circle of a political system essentially antagonistic to industrialism. If the gain made was far from commensurate to the size and population of Russia, her possibilities or the magnitude of the efforts made by Witte, it was great enough to demon- strate the fact that Russia possessed the poten- tialities of a vast industrial development. The only full census of the population of Russia was made in 1897. From it we can gather some idea of the growth of urban populations itself an indication of industrial growth. In 1867 there were twelve cities with a population of 50,000 to 100,000; in 1897 there were thirty-seven such cities, with a total population of 2,401,000 as against 834,000 in cities of this class thirty years before. The population of St. Petersburg in 1867 was 539,471; in 1897 it was 1,267,023, a gain of over 136 per cent Moscow in the same period increased its population from 351,609 to 1,035,664 an in- crease of nearly 195 per cent. In Lodz, the center of the textile industry in the Polish provinces, the population was 32,437 in 1867 and 315,209 in 1897 an increase of 872 per cent. In Ivanovo- Vosnesenk, the center of the textile industry in central Russia, the population rose from 1,350 in 1867 to 53,949 in 1897 an increase of over 3,896 per cent. If we turn from textiles to iron, we find that in Ekaterinoslav, the center of the coal industry of southern Russia, the population in 1867 was 19,908 and had risen in 1897 to 121,216 an increase of 508 percent. The population of Baku, center of the oil industry in the Caucasus, on the RUSSIA'S SUBJECTION TO GERMANY 107 Caspian Sea, increased about 702 per cent. from 13,992 in 1867 to 112,253 in 1897. Libau, a Baltic seaport, grew from 10,227 in 1867 to 64,505 in 1897 an increase of 540 per cent., while Tzaritzyn, a port on the Volga, grew from 8,456 in 1867 to 55,967 in 1897 an increase of 562 per cent. 1 In the year 1887 there were employed in textile manufacture 399,178 workmen, and the value of the textile production was 463,044,000 rubles. In 1897 the number of employees in this industry had risen to 642,520 and the value of the product to 946,296,000 rubles. In 1887 the coal production amounted to 4,534,000 tons, valued at 13,839,000 rubles; in 1897 the production rose to 11,203,000 tons, valued at 38,945,000 rubles. In the same period the oil industry was marked by a similar development, the product in 1887 was 2,733,000 tons, valued at 5,006,000 rubles; in 1897 the pro- duction was 7,831,000 tons, valued at 36,558,000 rubles. Iron and steel the barometer industry shows very similar progress. For instance, the increase of cast-iron production amounted to 125,000 tons yearly in the same period, the figures being 594,000 tons in 1887, valued at 25,405,000 rubles, and 1,848,000 tons, valued at 77,731,000 rubles in 1897. Steel in finished products to the amount of 157,000 tons, valued at 22,094,000 rubles, was produced in 1S87, and in 1897 the production was 920,000 tons, valued at 125,942,000 rubles. 2 1 These figures arc taken from V. I. Pokrovsky's Russia at the End of the A inrtcevth Century, published hy the Russian Ministry ot Finance, and quoted hy M. Ol^in, The Snul of ik<- Russian Revolution, in an appendix which pives the entire tabic. See Appendix C, Table I. 2 See Appendix C, Table II. 10S RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM Naturally, this industrial progress was attend- ed by a considerable concentration of workmen in factories that is to say, by the growth of the industrial proletariat. According to Toughan- Baranovsky, in 1879 there were 203 cotton factories each employing more than 100 persons, the total number of employees being 153,332. In 1894 there were 224 such factories, the number of em- ployees being 234,506. The distribution of these reveals a growth of large factories and a decrease in the number of small ones. Thus, in 1879 there were 118 factories in the class employing from 100 to 500 persons, while in 1897 there were 108. In the fprmer year the total number of persons em- ployed in factories of this class was 28,212, while in 1894 it had dropped to 27,050. Factories employ- ing from 500 to 1,000 workers increased from 44 in 1879 to 48 in 1897, the total number of workers employed in factories of this class also showing a small gain, the numbers being 32,591 in 1897 and 33,462 in 1894. In 1879 there were 40 factories employing from 1,000 to 5,000 workers, the total number of employees being 83,583. In 1894 the number of such factories had risen to 60 and the total number of employees to 119,013. In 1S79 there was only 1 factory employing more than 5,000 workers, the number employed being 8,946. In 1894 there were 8 such factories and the number of workers employed was 54,981.* These figures relate only to cotton manufacture. If we turn to the statistics of general industrial 1 Toughan-Baranovsky, The Russian Factory in ihe Past and Present. See also Appendix A, Tabic II. RUSSIA'S SUBJECTION TO GERMANY 109 production we find the same tendency even more plainly indicated. In 1897 mining, manufacture, and transportation gave employment to about 3,000,000 persons. In 1879 there were 979 fac- tories employing between 100 and 500 persons each, the total number of employees in such fac- tories being 219,400. In 1894 tne number of such factories was 1,136 and of employees 252,700. Factories employing between 500 and 1,000 persons numbered 164 in 1S79, the total number of persons employed in them being 113,900. In 1894 there were 215 such factories, employing 143,500 persons. In 1879 there were 86 factories employing over 1,000 persons each, the total number employed being 163,000. In 1894 there were 1 17 such factories, the total number of persons employed in them being 259,50c. 1 In the eleven-year period 1887-97 the total pro- duction of Russian mining and manufacture rose from 1.3 billions of rubles in 1887 to 2.8 billions of rubles in 1897. From 1887 to 1890 the annual increase was 56 millions of rubles; from 1893 to 1897 it was 276 millions of rubles. 2 These and similar figures illustrative of the industrial develop- ment of Russia in this period may be considered from two separate and distinct points of view. On the one hand they invite comparison with similar statistical data relating to other nations. So considered they serve mainly to show Russia's backwardness from the point of view of industrial ' I lifse fi:;:irts arc taken from tables by Po^oshcv, quoted by M. Ol^in, op. - OI -in, op. ill., p. 8. no RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM development. Having regard to the long time which had elapsed since the introduction of the factory system under Ivan the Terrible, to the area and population of the empire, and to its vast natural resources, the totals are impressively meager, especially when we compare them with American, British, and German figures. Such a comparison shows quite clearly how czarism hin- dered the economic growth of the nation. On the other hand, such figures as we have been consider- ing show that by the last decade of the nineteenth century industrial capitalism had become firmly rooted in the life of the great Slav nation. It was truly an era of industrial revolution. Not even the reactionary regime of the czarist bureaucracy could longer hold in check the great economic forces which had been so slowly developed. Once a certain momentum was attained by those forces they became irresistible: the bureaucratic regime might continue to harass and obstruct, but it could not prevent the progress of indus- trialism. The war between Japan and China in 1894-95, and the victory of the former, exerted a profound influence upon Russian industrial devel- opment as well as upon her foreign policy. The great increase in the number of new joint-stock companies formed in the years immediately fol- lowing Japan's astonishing demonstration of mili- tary and industrial strength are very illuminating. In the three years 1893-95 there had been formed 197 new joint-stock companies with a capital stock of about 191,800,000 rubles. In the three years 1896-98 there were 467 such companies formed RUSSIA'S SUBJECTION TO GERMANY in with a capital stock of about 604,000,000 rubles. If we take the average of the three-year period 1893-95, we find that in each of the three years there were organized 66 joint-stock companies, with a total capital stock of something less than 64,000,000 rubles. In the four years 1896-99 the average number of joint-stock companies formed was 193 and the average total capital stock, roughly, 236,400,000 rubles. The progress of this movement is shown in the following table: TABLE A STOCK COMPANIKS IN RUSSIA Year No. of Nezv Companies Capital Stock in Rubles 1893 55 56,600,000 1894 64 57,600,000 1895 7 77,600,000 1896 127 180,700,000 1897 136 187,500,000 1898 204 236,100,000 1899 305 341,400,000 In the same period there was an extensive, almost feverish, growth of railway mileage. This was doubled between 1S90 and 1897 and there was a corresponding increase in equipment, in the number of locomotives and passenger and freight- cars. Of course, it is true that a very considerable part of this railroad development was due to reasons of military strategy and should be credited, therefore, to the foreign policy of the bureaucracy rather than to the natural development of indus- trialism. Nevertheless, in Russia, as in every ii2 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM country, the development of railway transporta- tion forms an essential part of the industrial develop- ment of the country. Lack of railway facilities has greatly hampered Russia's industrial progress. Take, for example, the immense possibilities of iron production in the Ural Mountains, which was begun as far back as the reign of Ivan the Terrible. Because until recently there was no coal mined in the Ural Mountains, it was necessary to bring coal from western Siberia. Lack of adequate rail- way transportation has been one of the chief factors in retarding the development of this great industry. How inadequate Russia's railway system has been and is may be seen by comparing her rail- road mileage with that of other countries. The Russian Empire, as it was constituted at the time of the outbreak of the World War in 1914, embraced an area three times the size of the United States, an area approximating almost one-sixth of the land of the globe. Yet it had only 39,706 miles of railroad as compared with 258,782 in the United States. 1 Whereas in the United States there was a mileage per 10,000 of population of practically 29 miles, in Russia there was less than 3 miles. With a population of 160,000,000, excluding present Poland and Finland, Russia possessed, at the out- break of the war, a railway system whose freight- carrying capacity only slightly exceeded that pos- sessed by the railways of Canada, a country with a population of 8,ooo,ooo. 2 1 United States figures are for 1910. 2 Russia, Her Economic Past and Future, by Dr. Joseph M. Gold- stein, p. 52. RUSSIA'S SUBJECTION TO GERMANY 113 The conclusion which these figures of railway transportation suggest is that Russia is a country as yet undeveloped, whose industrial evolution is barely begun. The statistics of every department of Russia's economic life lead irresistibly to the same conclusion. Lest we exaggerate the un- doubted progress in industrial development which occurred in Russia in the years immediately pre- ceding the World War, it may be well to remember that before the Revolution in 1917 the total capital represented in all the industrial and commercial joint-stock companies of Russia, exclusive of banks and railroads, was only around two billion dollars about one-ninth of the capital invested in the stocks and bonds of the railways of the United States. The stock-and-bond capital of one American cor- poration the United States Steel Corporation was almost equal to the entire capital of Russia's industrial and commercial joint-stock companies, exclusive of railroads and banks. 1 With a popula- tion of 179,000,000, the total paid-up capital of all Russian industrial and commercial corporations was less than two billions of dollars, as against twelve billions of dollars for England with a popula- tion of 45,000,000, the English figures being exclu- sive of the immense sums invested in the railway companies of the nation. In Russia with 179,000,- 000 people there were barely 2,000 joint-stock companies; in England with 45,000,000 people there were more than 56,000 such companies. 2 The inference to be drawn from these and similar statistics is that Russia is a land that offers 1 Goldstein, op. cit., p. 7. J Idem, p. 7. ii 4 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM almost unlimited opportunities for industrial de- velopment. Her known natural resources are immeasurable. They are greater in sum and variety than the known natural resources of any other nation. As yet only the merest fringe of these has been touched, just enough to indicate the immense stored reservoir which lies waiting for labor and enterprise to create channels for the distribution of its riches. HI As we have already observed, the war between Japan and China, and the emergence of Japan from obscurity to a place among the great powers, greatly afFected the foreign policy of Russia and also stimulated her industrial growth. The war was terminated by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed on April 17, 1895. By that treaty Japan imposed upon China the following conditions: 1. Recognition of the complete independence of Korea. 2. Cession by China to Japan of the Liaotung Peninsula and adjacent waters, Port Arthur and Talien-wan, the islands of Formosa and the Pescadores. 3. Payment by China to Japan of an indemnity of 200,000,- 000 taels, Wei-hai-wei to be held in pledge by Japan until this was paid. 4. Opening up to trade of Saslich, Chungking, Suchow, and Hangchow, and of the Yangtse-kiang to navigation. 1 The gains made by Japan at the expense of the Celestial Empire were such as would practically 1 Japan, From the Age of the Gods to the Fall of Tsingtau, by F. Had- land Davis, p. a68; Japan, the Rise of & Modern Power, by Robert P. Porter, p. 139. RUSSIA'S SUBJECTION TO GERMANY 115 make impossible the fulfilment of Russia's great plans for Asiatic expansion. The bureaucracy had been anxious to bring the whole of Manchuria within the sphere of Russian control and, ulti- mately, absorb it into the Russian Empire. To that end the Trans-Siberian Railway, a large part of the eastern section of which traversed Chinese territory, logically tended. This policy really dated from 1854, when Count Muraviev seized the Amur River during the blockade of the Black Sea in the Crimean War. The Treaty of Aigun, in 1858, supplemented by another treaty made two years later, began the intimate relations between Russia and China which lasted for the next half-century. By those treaties Russia ac- quired the whole coast of Manchuria to the frontier of Korea and the right to establish the great harbor of Vladivostok as an eastern seaport and the gate- way to Siberia. 1 The bureaucracy also wanted to secure a footing in Korea, which possessed splendid harbor and port facilities greatly desired by Russia. Once estab- lished in Korea, Russia would undoubtedly have absorbed it and incorporated it into the empire. That this was the grandiose scheme of the bureau- cracy there can be no possible doubt. To that scheme the Japanese, by acquiring domination of Korea which was the reality masked by the diplomatic rhetoric about the "recognition of the complete independence of Korea" dealt what would have been a death-blow if the Treaty of Shimonoseki had been permitted to stand. 1 See "Vladimir," Russia on the Pacific, p. 317 el scq. n6 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM Six days after the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki the Russian government made the following remonstrance to Japan: "The government of his Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, in examining the conditions of peace which Japan has imposed on China, finds that the possession of the Peninsula of Liaotung, claimed by Japan, would be a constant menace to the capital of China, would at the same time render illusory the independence of Korea, and would henceforth be a perpetual obstacle to the permanent peace of the Far East. Consequently, the government of his Majesty the Emperor would give a new proof of their sincere friendship for the government of his Majesty the Emperor of Japan by advising them to renounc * the definitive possession of the Peninsula of Liaotung." * Back of this formidable threat disguised as advice prompted by "sincere friendship" a subtle and sinister chain of diplomatic intrigue was hid- den. It is hardly to be doubted that Germany had exercised a great, and perhaps controlling, influence in the shaping of Russia's policy. In February, 1895, Russia, seeing the inevitable out- come of the war, had circularized the great Euro- pean powers and the United States on the question of the terms which Japan should be permitted to impose upon China. The Japanese knew, of course, that France and Russia would be opposed to having Japan gain possession of Dalny and Port Arthur and equally to her virtual annexation of Korea. In the first place, these were obvious 1 Italics arc mine. The Author. RUSSIA'S SUBJECTION TO GERMANY 117 Russian objectives. In the second place, not only were Russian and French interests practically identical, owing to the large French investments in the Russian loans which furnished the capital used by the Russian government in constructing the Trans-Siberian Railway, but the interests of France in Asia, her possessions in Tongking and Annam, naturally made her averse to seeing a great, militant Asiatic power arise. That France supported Russia's remonstrance against the Treaty of Shimonoseki did not surprise the Japanese. Japan had no reason to believe that Great Britain would interfere with her. On the contrary, it was reasonable to expect her support against Russia and France. She was not allied with China in any waj*, as the war had shown. Indeed, her attitude had been uniformly friendly to Japan. Furthermore, not only were Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian relations strained at the time, but, what was more important, the possession of Man- churia and the Liaotung Peninsula by Russia meant a potential danger to India. Nor had Japan any reason to expect that the attitude of German}- would be hostile to her. Germany had no territorial interests in the Far East; it was well known that her foreign policy had always aimed at preventing Russia from becoming a great naval power. In the extension of Russia to the Liaotung Peninsula or to Korea, and the acquisition by her of great ice-free ports, German} - , it was naturally expected, would see a menace to her own ambitions. Just before the war began, indeed, Germany had clearly shown n8 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM that she would not permit Russia to establish a protectorate over Korea. Finally, there were two acts on the part of Germany which Japan was justified in regarding as pledges of exceptional friendship. The first was the friendly warning conveyed to her in March, 1895, that Russia and France intended to intervene should Japan acquire any territory in Manchuria. The second was the telegram sent to Count Mutsu, the Japanese For- eign Minister, by Baron von Gutschmid, the Ger- man Minister at Tokio, warmly congratulating Japan upon the conclusion of peace at Shimonoseki. Like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky, on April 23, 1895, immediately following the deliverance of the Russian note advising Japan to "renounce the definitive possession of the Liaotung Peninsula," Baron von Gutschmid delivered on behalf of the German government a brutally offensive note, also advising Japan to give up the Liaotung Penin- sula and pointing out that Japan could have no chance of victory in a war against Russia, France, and Germany! The German Ambassador was induced to withdraw this note on the pretext that the Japanese translation was defective and did not correctly represent the German original, and to substitute another note identical with that of Russia and France. It was, of course, out of the question that Japan should resist a demand presented with such a show of force. She could not expect Great Britain to quarrel with Germany, Russia, and France, and go to war with them to help Japan. Lord Rosebery refused to join with the three European powers in coercive measures RUSSIA'S SUBJECTION TO GERMANY 119 against Japan, but he could not be expected to challenge them to war. Consequently, Japan abandoned her claims in Korea and the Liaotung Peninsula and received from China an additional indemnity of 30,000,000 taels, payment of which was secured by a loan to China guaranteed by Russia. 1 Toward the end of 1897 Germany using the murder of two missionaries as a pretext began to bring pressure upon China to cede to her the im- portant strategic harbor of Kiaochau, on the Shantung Peninsula, and on March 6, 1898, the Kiaochau district was formally turned over to her on "a lease for ninety-nine years," a diplomatic fiction intended to cover permanent occupation. Thus Germany had acquired one of the most com- manding strategic naval bases in the Far East. So far Germany's policy seems simple enough. It appears as an ordinary bit of diplomatic chicane and spoliation. What is less explicable is the fact that the Kaiser suggested to Czar Nicholas II that Russia take Port Arthur and Talien-wan. Thus with the connivance of Germany, and at her instigation, Russia forced China to cede to her the southern part of the Liaotung Peninsula for "a lease of twenty-five years," and so acquired Dalny and Port Arthur, ice-free ports of the highest strategic value. Russia occupied these ports on March 28, 1898, and twelve days later France secured a "lease" of Kwang-cho-wau, between Tongking and Canton. Chi na was being partitioned and, at the same 1 Porter, op. cit., pp. 140-142; Davis, op. cit., pp. 269-270. 120 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM time, an iron ring was being drawn around Japan. It was a great relief to the latter when the British government, unwilling to see Germany and Russia intrenching themselves in such strong strategic centers without securing some point of equal advantage, proposed to take over Wei-hai-wei, on the Shantung Peninsula, which Japan held as a pledge under the terms of the Treaty of Shimo- noseki. Great Britain, therefore, took over Wei- hai-wei from Japan, "leasing" it from China with Japan's hearty assent, the "lease" to terminate only when Russia evacuated the Liaotung Penin- sula. Even now, after the lapse of more than twenty years, and the numerous revelations of the diplo- matic intrigues of Germany and Russia which have occurred as the result of war and revolution, Germany's motives in apparently advancing Rus- sian imperialistic designs are by no means certain- ly established. Was it a deliberate attempt to bring Russia into conflict with Japan? There is much to suggest that this question must be answered in the affirmative, but the further question then arises, what German purpose would such a war serve? Certainly the treacherous policy pursued toward Japan so recently precludes any suggestion that the Kaiser was actuated by friendship for that country. A victory by Japan over Russia might, indeed, cause her to attempt to take Kiao- chau. On the other hand, a victory by Russia would be a blow to what the world recognized to be the central principle of Germany's foreign policy. Can it be that Germany was counting RUSSIA'S SUBJECTION TO GERMANY 121 upon Russia's defeat by Japan, and upon revolu- tion following such defeat, as a preliminary con- dition for an attack upon France and for the conquest of Europe? Russia was rotten with cor- ruption, as the Germans well knew. England was involved in great difficulties in India, Egypt, and South Africa. With Russia crushed militarily and financially and perhaps disintegrated politi- cally Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey would be invincible, the United States of America not being considered as entering into the problem at all. It would be too great a digression from our main purpose to enter upon a detailed discussion of the questions raised in the foregoing paragraph. The principal reason for sketching the events which led Russia into the disastrous war with Japan in 1904 is the fact that the war and the foreign policy which led up to it were important factors leading to a great acceleration of Russia's industrial progress. The bureaucracy pushed on in Manchuria and Korea against the advice of General Kuropatkin, who saw that war in the Far Fast would pave the way for European war. The Czar himself was be- lieved to have sided with Kuropatkin, but to have been overruled by the bureaucracy. 1 Kuropatkin, finding the force against him so strong, attempted to resign, but was prevented from doing so. In August, 1903, Japan proposed a treaty the substance of which was that Russia should dominate Manchuria and leave Japan to dominate Korea. Russia submitted, nearly two months later, a 1 Purur, '.;>. c'.:., p. i ' i. 122 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM counter-proposal in the form of a treaty under which Japan would undertake to refrain from using any part of Korea for strategic purposes or erecting any military works of any kind. There was also to be a neutral zone in northern Korea. Russia, on the other hand, was to have absolute freedom in Manchuria. In December Kuropatkin proposed that Russia should agree to confine her interest in the Far East to northern Manchuria, restoring the whole of the Liaotung Peninsula to China. He insisted that the Japanese army was fully equal to that of any European nation and not to be lightly regarded. On January 13, 1904, Japan renewed, practically as an ultimatum, the proposals made by her in August. No reply being received from Russia, war was declared on Febru- ary 10, 1904. This is not the place even to sketch the history of the Russo-Japanese War. 1 As all the world knows, Russia was subject to a series of humiliating defeats, notably the disastrous defeat at Mukden, in March, 1905, and the destruction of her great Baltic fleet, off the island of Tsushima, in May. In June President Roosevelt interceded and pro- posed peace negotiations, acting on suggestions emanating from Russia. The war came to an end with the Treaty of Portsmouth, signed on September 5th, by which Russia agreed to cede to Japan the half of Saghalien Island she had annexed in 1875, to recognize Japan's suzerainty over Korea, to evacuate Manchuria, surrender her 1 Perhaps the best story uf trie war is that by Major F. B. Maurice, Cambridge Modern History, Vol. XII. RUSSIA'S SUBJECTION TO GERMANY 123 lease of the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur, and to pay Japan the sum of 40,000,000 rubles, not as indemnity, but as payment for the main- tenance of Russian prisoners. With the calamitous ending of its "great advent- ure" in the Far East, Russia had to abandon the grandiose imperialistic vision of becoming the master of Asia. That was the role chosen by Japan. Russia was forced back toward Central Asia precisely where the Pan-Germanists desired that she should be. Of course, baffled in the East, the Russian bureaucracy would turn to the West. If Russia's future was not in the Far East, after all, it must be in Europe. But the Pan-German philosophy and the military policy based upon it had made provision against that very thing. Blocking the way to the Mediterranean, command- ing the principal channel of her trade, was Germany, master of the empire of the Turks, and therefore of the Dardanelles, as absolutely supreme in her domination of the maritime highway from the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov to the Mediter- ranean as of the other great highway, the Baltic Sea. "Turkey opposes an obstacle to the pene- tration of the Mediterranean by the mighty Eurasian nation, Russia. This obstacle resides rather in the fortified works on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles than in the international treaties concerning these straits. Germany also is greatly interested in the maintenance of this barrier. // is greatly to the interest of Germany that this barrier should be maintained and that Russia should not penetrate the Mediterranean.''' Thus a noted Ger- i2 4 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM man militarist had written in 1902. 1 Another influential writer of the same school pointed out that the treaty relating to the Bagdad Railway not only tended to exclude Russia from Asia Minor, but also to isolate her from Europe and confine her to Central Asia, "her true sphere." 2 In this way Russia would be so hemmed in and so hampered in her economic development that she could hardly escape becoming virtually a German colony. Japan's defeat of Russia was, therefore, a victory for German}-. In no country in the world, outside of Japan itself, was the Japanese victory hailed with such great rejoicing as in Germany. The military caste of Germany was elated, because the victory of Japan was regarded as a vindication of German military methods, the Japanese army having been trained by German officers. The exultant Japanese sent telegrams to their German instructors in the hour of their triumph and pride. It is not without reason that the Japanese have become known as "the Prussians of Asia." It was Prussia that Japan selected as the model to copy, and the whole Japanese army was imbued with the ideals and the spirit of Prussian mili- tarism. In vain do the Japanese and their cham- pions protest against such statements as this: the evidence that by 1904 Japan had been thoroughly Prussianized and militarized is quite overwhelming and indisputable. 3 It was natural that her victory 1 Colonel Rogalla von Bieberstein, quoted by Andre Cberadame, La Question d'Oriait, La Macedoine. Le chemin de fer de Bagdad, p. 253. - Colonel Hiidebrandr, quoted by Cberadame, op. cit., p. 255. s See pj). 145-148. RUSSIA'S SUBJECTION TO GERMANY 125 over Russia should evoke rejoicing in Berlin. When the battle of Mukden up to that time the biggest battle in history ended so disastrously for Russia, there was exultation in the Wilhelm- strasse. Russia was now in no condition to help France. It was, therefore, a favorable moment for opening up the dispute with France over the Moroccan question. A few days after the Japanese triumph the Kaiser visited Tangier. 1 Wilhelm was pursuing a cunningly conceived policy which had become well recognized. In the eighteen-eighties Bismarck told Prince von Biilow: "In Russia there is a serious amount of unrest and agitation for territorial expansion which may easily result in an explosion. It would be best for the peace of the world if the explosion took place in Asia, and not in Europe. We must be careful not to stand in the way, otherwise we may have to bear the brunt of it." 2 The same thought is expressed more brutally in these words by General Friedrich von Bernhardi: "The political rivalry between the two nations of the yellow race must be kepi alive. If they are antagonistic, they will both probably look for help against each other in their relations to Europe, and thus enable the European powers to retain their possessions in Asia." 3 The Russian bureaucracy had played precisely the role Germany desired. Russia had been beaten and humiliated, on sea and on land, by a nation of little over 45,000,000 people, possessing not a 1 March 21, 1905. See Porter, op. cit., pp. 205-206. 2 Quoted by Kawakami, Japan and World Peace, p. 4. 3 ka'.sakami, \deni, p. 6. 126 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM tithe of her resources, human or material. With a population three times larger than Japan's, with an annual budget of two billions as against Japan's paltry budget of sixty millions, the Russian giant had been thrashed. Here was positive proof of the inefficiency and utter incompetence of the bureaucratic oligarchy. It had not been driven into the war, which could have been easily averted without loss of honor. It had been fully warned by Kuropatkin concerning Japan's preparedness. No modern army was ever subjected to anything like the incompetence which characterized the government of Czar Nicholas II. Many Russians of liberal, and even revolutionary, sympathies have vigorously protested against such criticisms as this, denying that the bureaucracy of Russia was more incompetent than bureaucracies generally are. However that may be, the evidence of gross incompetence in this instance is overwhelming. Even worse than the incompetence, if that were possible, was the terrible corruption and graft which ran riot. Here again it may be urged, with some justice, that the Russian bureaucracy was not more corrupt than the French, for example. With that question we are not here and now con- cerned. The horrible scandals of the Turkish war in 1877 were outclassed. Everywhere was looting and graft. The army and navy were honey- combed with this form of treachery. Kuropatkin himself managed to amass a personal fortune of over six million rubles, it was charged at the time. 1 Generals and officers on campaign levied enormous 1 Ular, Russia from Within, 1905, p. 257. RUSSIA'S SUBJECTION TO GERMANY 127 percentages on the allowances made to them for maintenance of the army. The negotiations to purchase cruisers from Argentina were held up because high officers insisted on dealing only with an American agent who had agreed to pay them enormous commissions. Arsenals supposed to be full were in fact empty. "Gold-mines" had been paid for which never existed. Funds of the Red Cross, intended for the relief of the soldiers, were embezzled by an intimate friend of the Dowager Empress. Treason was rampant in the army. In the famous trial of Colonel Grimm, the accused, addressing the officers conducting the trial, said, "I am guilty, but three-quarters of you deserve to be at my side on this bench." The war cost Russia more than #1,600,000 a day, and of that sum it was estimated that at least 20 per cent, found its way into the pockets of the officials. 1 And it is as certain as anything can be that German influences had long been at work systematically corrupting the Russian bureaucracy, the army, and the navy, thus sapping the giant's strength. IV The period of the Japanese war, and the nine years which intervened between the Treaty of Portsmouth and the outbreak of the World War witnessed a remarkable growth of Russian industry and commerce. A few statistical illustrations will make this growth quite plain: In 1900-01 Russia produced 16,750,000 tons of 1 Sec Liar, np. c;t., for a striking summary of this subject. i28 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM coal. In 1902-03 the amount produced was 17,200,000 tons. In 1 91 2-1 3 it was 34,000,000 tons. When the war broke out in 1914 coal pro- duction was at the rate of 40,000,000 tons per year. In 1902-03 the production of copper was about 9,000 tons. In 191 2-13 it was over 34,000 tons. In the first half of 1914 production was at the rate of 40,000 tons a year. In 1902-03 the production of iron ore was 4,200,000 tons for the year. In the year 1912-13 the production was 8,900,000 tons. In 1902-03 the amount of pig-iron produced was 2,500,000 tons. In 191 2-1 3 it was 4,400,000 tons. In the first half of 1914 production was at the rate of 5,000,000 tons a year. In the case of oil only do we find an exception to this rule of industrial progress. The exhaustion of some oil-fields, and governmental action restrain- ing the development of others, resulted in a decline from an annual production of 10,800,000 tons in 1902-03 to 9,200,000 tons in 1912-13. This was a temporary and incidental check, however, and not indicative of a general decline in this important industry. 1 The industrial progress indicated by these figures, and the equally great increase in the volume of agricultural production, brought about an immense growth of commerce. In 1901 there were 862,000 commercial houses in Russia. By 191 1 the num- 1 For most of the figures on this subject I am indebted to the admi- rable monograph by Prof. J. M. Goldstein, Russia, Her Economic Past, Present, and Future. Professor Goldstein is acknowledged to be th** f oremost Russian authority on the subject of trade development. RUSSIA'S SUBJECTION TO GERMANY 129 ber had increased to 1,117,000, and in June, 1914, to i,5co,ooo. 1 It is very interesting to follow the steady increase in the volume of Russian com- merce. The total value of Russian imports and exports during the first quarter of the nineteenth century averaged 112,300,000 rubles per annum. From 1825 to 1849 it was 221,200,000 rubles. From 1875 to 1900 it was 1,092,000,000. In other words, the commerce increased by 972 per cent., nearly ten times what it was. 2 During the first five years of the present century the total of Russia's foreign trade increased by one-third, the amount for 1905 being 1,702,000,000 rubles. By 1910 it had risen to 2,533,000,000 rubles, and by 1913 to 2,690,000,000 rubles. 3 Russia, like the United States, may fairly be called a self-sufficing nation. That is, it has within its boundaries the material requisites to supply all the fundamental needs of its people. It pro- duces, or can produce, enough grain and other foodstuffs to feed them, wool, flax, and cotton to clothe them, lumber and metals to house them and provide them with tools and machinery. Like the United States, Russia could, under favorable conditions, live in some degree of comfort if con- fined absolutely to its own resources. The United States does not, however, confine itself to its own resources in this manner, but imports many things, its pre-war importations amounting to nearly two 1 A. J. Sack, America's Possible Share in tlu Economic Future of Russia, p. 7. s Alexinsky, op. cit., p. 47. 3 If !<<: e figures arc :;ivcn m rhc Report of the Minister of Finance on ike BaJt ' F- :>/.;!: of IQ14, Part II. i 3 o RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM billion dollars a year. On the other hand, the United States exports a great many things, es- pecially foodstuffs and manufactured articles. Rus- sia likewise imports many things and exports many. The value of her imports prior to the outbreak of the World War was about 700 million dollars a year. The main difference between the two coun- tries, as a leading Bolshevist journal has pointed out, lies in the fact that Russia imports a smaller proportion of raw materials or articles of luxury than the United States, and a larger proportion of manufactured goods, such as tools, machinery, electrical supplies, and so forth. Her exports are principally of foodstuffs and raw materials. The United States, on the other hand, exports large quantities of manufactured goods. 1 In the five-year period 1909-13 Russia's imports averaged 1,136,900,000 rubles annually, and her exports in the same period averaged 1,501,400,000 rubles annually. For the three-year period 1911-13 the figures were higher, being imports 1,236,000,000 rubles per annum and exports 1,544,000,000 rubles. Of the imports, foodstuffs of all kinds amounted to 218 millions of rubles; raw materials and materials partially manufactured to 592 millions of rubles; manufactured goods ready for use, 412 millions; animals, 14 millions. Of the exports, foodstuffs amounted to 893 millions of rubles; raw and un- finished materials, 544 millions; manufactured goods ready for use, 76 millions; animals, 31 millions. The following tables give the imports and exports for the five-year period 1909-13: 1 Soviet Russia, Vol. I, No. 5, p. 8, July 5, 1919. RUSSIA'S SUBJECTION TO GERMANY 131 TABLE B IMPORTS INTO RUSSIA, IOO9-I3 Commodity Average Value per Year fur Period (Rubles) 1 Percentage of Total Imports Foodstuffs of vegetable origin Machinery and implements. . . . 155,800,000 135,600,000 139,900,000 125,400,000 110,300,000 97,100,000 64,600,000 55,400,000 51,200,000 47,500,000 1 6 1 ,900,000 13 II 11 II 9 8 5 4 4 4 r T 7 9 9 Silk, flax, and all kinds of tissues. . . . Animal products, fish, etc Raw cotton 7 5 7 9 5 2 Metals and manufactures of metal.. . Minerals Lumber and forest products Wool All others TABLE C KXPORTS FROM RUSSIA, I909-I3 Commodity Wheat. Barley. Oats. . Corn . . Rye . . . Bran. . Flour. . Forest products Flax and hemp Eggs Butter Sugar. . Oil and oil products. . Oil cake Hides and skins (raw) Oil seeds Furs Platinum All others Average Value per Year for Period (Rubles)* 293,000,000 175,700,000 56,500,000 34,100,000 33,700,000 30,400,000 20,300,000 Total 643,700,000 145,100,000 89,300,000 76,400,00 62,500,000 40,900,000 36,700,000 35,500,000 30,600,000 24,200,000 16,600,000 14,200,000 285,900,000 Percentage of Total Ei]>orts 429 9-7 5-9 5-i 4i - 7 2 -5 2.4 2 .0 1.6 1 .1 1 .0 19 .0 ' In round figures "Id? 132 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM Of the total volume of imports into Russia food- stuffs naturally constituted a minor part, the total value of all foodstuffs of vegetable origin and of all animal products, a large part of which consisted of other than food articles, was in 191 2 about 280,000,000 rubles, as against about 653,000,000 rubles for machinery, implements, and raw materials and semi-manufactured goods. With the sole exception of machinery and implements, for which she remains dependent upon the outside world, Russia's imports before the war were already become of second ary importance to her home pro- duction. For example, in 191 2 the importation of wool amounted to 2,150,000 poods, 1 but in the same year the domestic production was 13,500,000 poods. That is to say, Russia produced 86 per cent, of all the wool she consumed. In the same year she imported 306,000,000 poods of coal, but produced 1,887,000,000 poods, 87 per cent, of her total coal consumption. How vastly more important was her trade with the western nations than with the Far East is indicated by the fact that of the total volume of her international trade by far the greater part passes by way of her European frontier. For the five-year period 1907-11 the value of the goods passing her western frontiers, both imports and exports, averaged 2,083,700,000 rubles a year, while the value of those passing her Asiatic frontiers averaged only 202,702,000 rubles, or less than one- tenth as much. The Russian Social Democrat, Alcxinsky, quoting these figures, points out that l A pood equals 36.1 American pounds. RUSSIA'S SUBJECTION TO GERMANY 133 though under the old regime Russia's political life was far from being truly Europeanized, her eco- nomic life was interwoven with that of Europe and its connections with Asia of minor importance only. 1 Of all Russia's export trade fully one-third was sent from the ports of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov through the Dardanelles, including not less than 80 per cent, of the total exportation of cereals. Almost another third, over 30 per cent., of the total export trade was by way of the Baltic. And Germany dominated both routes, being in a position to close them to Russian commerce almost at a moment's notice. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the economic supremacy of German)' in Russia im- mediately prior to the World War was the fact that this supremacy was attained despite the vast preponderance of French and British capital invested. Foreign capital has entered Russia in two principal ways, namely, through loans raised in the bourses and exchanges of luiropcan countries by Russian municipal and state authorities, and by foreign investments in Russian industrial and commercial enterprises. A portion of the latter represents capital invested in enterprises of Rus- sian origin that is to say, enterprises founded on Russian capital mainly, and the rest capital in- vested in enterprises due to the initiative of, and controlled by, the foreign investors themselves. It is a fact of the utmost importance, though frc- 1 Alcxinsky, op. cii., p. .(*. 10 134 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM quently overlooked, that, while foreign investment represents a very considerable proportion of the total capital invested in Russian industry, only a very small part of the total foreign capital in- vested in Russia represents investment in indus- trial and commercial concerns. By far the greater part represents loans to the state and to municipali- ties, and represents a bonded indebtedness to be met from public revenues. The splendid solvency of Russia immediately prior to the World War, despite her unsound financial policy, was due to her immense resources. The reckless borrowing and the inefficiency of the old regime were such that any other nation than Russia would have been in danger of being brought to a state of bankruptcy. The outbreak of the war actually found Russia behindhand in the payments to meet her liabilities. 1 Of the foreign capital invested in Russia up to 1914 the greatest part was French. Although exact figures are not available, the total French capital invested probably far exceeded the combined totals of Ger- man, British, Belgian, and American investments. Owing to the somewhat strained relations between Russia and Great Britain from, say, 1880 to 1906, British capital did not flow freely into Russia. Therefore, Russian development depended mainly on French, Belgian, and German capital. From 1908 to 1914 there was a great increase in the in- flow of British capital, particular^ in connection with the development of the oil industry. In 1890 there were in the whole of Russia only 16 joint-stock companies wholly owned and con- 1 See Hynclman, The Awakening of Asia, p. 232. RUSSIA'S SUBJECTION TO GERMANY 13 trolled by foreign capitalists. The following figures show with great clearness the relative importance of foreign capital in Russian industrial and com- mercial development: No. of Joint-stock Companies Formed on Period Foreign Capital 1891-1900 215 1901-1910 160 I9II-I9I3 8 ~ In the last-named period of three years, 1911-13, 774 companies were formed on Russian capital. Thus one-fifth of the new undertakings were of foreign origin. The average share capital of the Russian companies was 1,220,000 rubles per com- pany, while the average capital of the companies of foreign origin was 1,736,000 rubles. While the French and the English financial in- vestments in Russia far exceed those of Germany, which are, indeed, relatively unimportant, this is not true of the general economic relations. In the matter of economic exchanges Germany at the outbreak of the war was far ahead of both countries. This means that her influence upon the economic life of Russia, and the profit derived from trade with Russia, were disproportionate to the amount of her invested capital. In other words, Germany profited at the expense of France and England as well as of Russia. This is a form of economic parasitism the significance of which has not generally been understood. In the middle of the nineteenth century the trade of Russia with Germany and France was fairly well balanced, the volume of French trade, imports 136 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM and exports, being about nine-tenths that of the trade with Germany. By the end of the nine- teenth century the volume of French trade had grown to be three times what it was fifty years before, while the volume of trade with Germany had grown to eleven and a half times what it was. In the five years 1901-05, of the total imports into Russia 35.8 per cent. w T ere from Germany and 4.3 per cent, from France. In 191 3 Germany's share in Russia's total imports was 52.7 per cent., and that of France 4.6 per cent. In five years, from 1908 to 191 2, inclusive, German imports rose from 331,000,000 to 519,000,000 rubles, while French imports rose only from 35,700,000 to 56,000,000 rubles. In considering these figures we must remember that the amount of French capital in- vested in Russia is many times that of the German capital so invested. It should also be remembered that Russian exports to France have increased faster than French exports to Russia. The figures are significant: Year Russian Imports From 1908 Germany .331,800,000 rubles 1908 France .. . 35,700,000 " 1913 Germany .642,700,000 " 1913 France... 56,000,000 " Year Russian Exports To 1908 Germany .278,900,000 rubles 190S France. . . 64,600,000 " 1913 Germany .452,600,000 " 1913 France.. .100,800,000 " It will be seen that the volume of commercial transactions, importations and exportations, be- tween Russia and the two countries was: 1908 With Germany 610,700,000 rubles With France 99,300,000 " I913 With Germany 1,095,300,000 " With France 156,800,000 " RUSSIA'S SUBJECTION TO GERMANY 137 England's trade with Russia is second to Ger- many's in importance. This statement alone indi- cates the enormous changes which have taken place since the middle of the nineteenth century. Then England's share in Russia's commerce was twice that of Germany, whereas when the war broke out in 1914 Germany's share was practically four times that of England. The steady progress of Germany toward the goal of absolute mastery of the commerce of Russia is shown very clearly in the following table relating to imports: TABLE D 1 SHOWING RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF BRITISH AND GERMAN IMPORTS Percentage of Total Percentage of Toial Period Russian Imports From England Russian Imports From Germany 1846-1S48 29.2 15-7 1898-1902 18.6 34-6 1903-1907 14.8 37-2 1908-1912 13 -4 41 .6 January > 1913-June, 19 4 12. S 4S.9 January -June, 1914 1.3-3 49.6 1 his table, compiled from Russian official figures, shows how rapidly German)' was ousting England in supplying the Russian market. It is equally important to know that Germany was making very similar gain over England as a customer. Russia's exports consisted mainly of raw materials and foodstuffs, grain products alone amounting to 'Compiled from figures cited ly Professor Goldstein, op. cit., pp. 2^-26, also his pamphlet, America's Opportunities for Trade and I cstmcnl in Russia. 158 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM 43 per cent, of the total exports for the five years 1909-13. Her imports consisted chiefly of ma- chinery, tools, appliances, metals and metal prod- ucts, and cotton. In 1908 her exports to Germany were valued at 278,900,000 rubles, and to England at 220,100,000 rubles. In 1913 her exports to Germany were valued at 452,600,000 rubles, and to England at 226,800,000 rubles. Thus English im- ports from Russia increased by 6,700,000 rubles, while in the same period Germany's imports from Russia increased 173,700,000 rubles. In 1911-12, 46 per cent, of Russia's total volume of exports went to Germany, while 45 per cent, of her total imports were from Germany. It will be seen, therefore, that nearly one-half of Russia's foreign trade was controlled by Germany shortly before the war. Moreover, her control was steadily increasing. TABLE E value of Russia's trade with various countries, 1908-13 (In Rubles) Country Germany England Holland France Austria-Hungary Italy Belgium Denmark Turkey Sweden Norway Exports To 1908 278,900,000 220,100,000 93,500,000 64,600,000 49,000,000 29,900,000 34,400,000 31,500,000 2I : 500,000 4,7oo ; ooo 5,800,000 1913 452,600,000 226,800,000 177,400,000 I OO; 800,000 65,200,OOC 73,600,000 64,6O0,OO0 35,700,000 34400,000 11,400,000 8,600,000 Imports From 1908 331,800,000 1 19,900,000 11,500,000 35,700,000 26,400,000 1 2,900.000 8,100,000 8,700,000 7,100,000 10,100,000 8.700,000 1913 642,700,000 170,300,000 21,500,000 56,000,000 34,600,000 16,700,000 8,600,000 12,800,000 16,900,000 16,100,000 9,800,000 RUSSIA'S SUBJECTION TO GERMANY 139 VI The foregoing statistics show conclusively that when the World War began Germany possessed a strangle-hold upon the life of the great Russian Empire. The story we have outlined is almost without a parallel in modern history. Other great nations have been subject to conquest, both eco- nomically and politically. China is a case in point. Nowhere, however, do we find a great nation pos- sessing vast human and material resources, aggres- sive in extending its dominions, yet helplessly sub- ject to slow but steady and certain strangulation at the hands of a nation much poorer in natural resources and possessing less than half its popula- tion. The cold-blooded, relentless manner in which Germany encompassed Russia on every side, in Asia and in Europe; the systematic manner in which she debauched and weakened the govern- ment of her victim and exploited her economically, suggest the crushing of Laocoon and his sons^by the serpents. The Trojan victims were not more helpless in the deadly coils of the monsters than was Russia under the hands of Germany. It is quite true that the German succeeded in the foreign market very often because his methods were better adapted to the market than were those of his competitors. He made cheaper goods, of inferior quality, of course, because the people among whom he traded demanded low-priced goods. He made price and not quality his concern. If people could only afford "cheap and nasty" wares, why should he try to sell wares of quality? He followed 1 4 o RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM the customs of the country in which he was trading in the matter of extending credits, in packing goods, and so on. His catalogues were printed in the language of the country with which he was trading, his business correspondence was in that language, and it was spoken by his agents and salesmen. These things meant much in Russia, just as they did in the South American countries. The advan- tages derived from such enterprise were fairly and creditably won. German competition did not limit itself to such creditable and honorable methods as these, how- ever. A common device was to usurp the prestige enjoyed by rivals through fraudulent marking of German-made goods as "English," "Swedish," "French," and so on. This was not commercial competition, as that term has been understood by other nations, but a cowardly and odious form of economic warfare. And the system of export bounties can only be described as economic warfare. But we shall miss the significance of Germany's policy toward Russia, and the real menace of Ger- many to that nation and to all the world, if we do not grasp the fact that the whole structure of her imperialism was involved. That rested upon a close co-ordination of political and financial interests. Nowhere in the world was there such a highly organized co-ordination of finance, industry, and diplomacy. We see German finance in Russia governed by a scientifically calculated regard for German industry. Instead of fostering Russian industrial development, it took care to use every opportunity to foster Russia's dependence upon RUSSIA'S SUBJECTION TO GERMANY 141 Germany's industrial production and to secure for the latter an ever-increasing share of Russia's raw materials. The German Foreign Office was the link binding the financiers and the industrial capi- talists together in a common purpose. Like a mighty machine, the whole vast system diplo- macy, army and navy, finance, industrialism was directed to the achievement of that purpose. German capital invested abroad must directly serve home industries. German foreign policy must find and preserve markets for German goods. No other nation in history has achieved anything like such a synergy. Japan is the only other modern nation which has seriously attempted to do so. IV japan as Germany's successor IN recent years it has become the habit of writers on the Far Eastern question to present Japan as another Prussia. It cannot be denied that there is a certain fitness and justness in the characteriza- tion of the Island Empire of the Orient as the "Asiatic Prussia." Since the fall of the Shogunate and the restoration of the Emperor 1867-69 and the introduction of Occidentalism Japan has developed her government, her industry and com- merce, her foreign policy, and her military organi- zation upon lines curiously similar to those upon which modern Germany developed under the leadership of Prussia. There has been the same arrogant and aggressive attitude toward other nations; the same unscrupulous expansion through the war; the same exaggerated nationalism. Pan- Germanism has its parallel in Pan-Nipponism. Precisely as Germany sought to attain the hegemony of Europe, so Japan has aimed at the hegemony of Asia. Moreover, her actions since the war with China, in 1894-95, have made it quite clear that her foreign policy aimed at the exclusion of western nations from the exercise of political or economic JAPAN AS GERMANY'S SUCCESSOR 143 influence in Asia. To that end all her energies have been consciously bent. It was for the purpose of overcoming western power that she adopted western methods. From the middle of the seventeenth century until the coming of Commodore Perry, Japan lived in seclusion, an artificial seclusion. Perry brought flattery and gifts together with a sufficient number of thirty-two-pounders to enforce accept- ance of the proffered friendship. It was essentially a case of "Shake hands and be friends or I will knock your teeth out." Thus the first breach was made in the wall of seclusion. In 1636 the Shogun Iyemitsu had issued a decree forbidding, under penalty of death, any Japanese to leave, or attempt to leave, the island of Japan, ordering the expulsion of all persons of Spanish blood and forbidding forever the building of ocean-going ships in Japan. The next twenty years witnessed the practical isolation of Japan from the rest of the world, an isolation which was to last for two hundred years. In 1638 an edict was issued that all Portuguese ships coming into Japan should be burned and their crews put to death, and when in 1640 a Portuguese ship did arrive at Nagasaki most of the crew were put to death. The sur- vivors were sent back to their own country with this message, "So long as the sun warms the earth, any Christian bold enough to come to Japan, even if he be King Philip himself or the God of the Christians, shall pay for it with his head." 1 It is only just to Japan to recognize the fact that 1 Porter, op. cit., p. 77. i 4 4 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM this bitter and brutal intolerance was a complete reversal of her previous policy, a violent reaction brought about by the intolerant fanaticism of the Christian missionaries and their political intrigues. After the opening up of Japan to foreign trade, following the successful enterprise of Commodore Perry and the commercial treaties with the United States and the principal European nations which Townsend Harris made possible, it was quite impos- sible for the Shogunate to long survive. With the reorganization came a new era. Japan under the new regime entered upon a policy of Europeaniza- tion. Experts were obtained from the principal western nations and placed in charge of the reor- ganization of the nation's jurisprudence, education, military and naval forces, commerce, and so on. At first the greatest influence was that of France. The new educational system was patterned after the French system, and so was the criminal law. The army was patterned after the French model and placed under French military instructors. It will be seen at once how powerful and far-reaching French influence was at the inception of the new order. There was one very powerful Anglo-Saxon in- fluence, namely, the English language. Because England was pre-eminent in trade with the Orient, English was a vital necessity to a nation situated as Japan was. Therefore the study of the English language was made compulsory in Japanese uni- versities and colleges. Thus there was established a means of communication with the Occident especially advantageous to the great Anglo-Saxon JAPAN AS GERMANY'S SUCCESSOR 145 nations, England and the United States. Yet, notwithstanding this great advantage, these nations influenced the political and economic development of Japan during the latter half of the nineteenth century far less than Germany did. After the end of the Franco-Prussian War, in 1 87 1, Japan turned to Germany for inspiration and for expert guidance. Changes were made in the educational system in 1873, 1879, and 1886, all of them increasing German influence and lessen- ing that of the French. The German language rapidly took the place of the French, the teaching of English remaining compulsory, however. The universities and the normal and intermediate schools were dominated by Germans. So, too, were the medical and engineering schools. The whole body of commercial law was patterned after that of Germany, and German technical experts were employed in large numbers in developing Japanese industry and commerce. Furthermore, the army was reorganized upon German lines and placed under the direction of noted Prussian officers. From 1873 to 1903 the Europeanization of Japan meant its Germnnization. It is scarcely an exag- geration to say that the whole national spirit of Japan was thoroughly Prussianized during this period. It is fairly easy to understand the eager readiness with which the Japanese accepted Prussian leader- ship, with its militarism, its unscrupulousness in dealing with other nations, and its low cunning in diplomacy and in commercial relations. Japan had with good reason become thoroughly alarmed at 146 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM the menace of European domination. The allied war upon China had done much to stimulate that alarm and to create a passionate determination to establish a strong army. The sweeping victory of Prussia over France, and the immense gains in territory and money which the victors derived from that struggle, induced the Japanese to regard the conquerors with envious admiration. It was quite natural that Japan should want her army to be trained by the Germans. It was equally natural that the Germans should extend their influence into every department of Japanese life. There is another and more fundamental reason for the rapid assimilation of German methods by Japan, namely, the marked similarity of their relation to other nations. Germany, like Japan, was still essentially a feudalistic empire. It was meeting with astonishing success in its attempt to unite the divine right of kings and other feudalistic principles to modern science and industry, which was precisely what the rulers of Japan wanted to accomplish. There is a close relationship between the theocracy of Japan with its god-king and the German system. Neither Germany nor Japan wanted that growing responsiveness of the govern- ment to the freely expressed will of the people which characterized other great western nations. We must remember, too, that the birth of the new Japan was practically simultaneous with the birth of modern Germany. What Japan saw, therefore, was a nation reborn at the same time as herself, surrounded by powerful nations, overcoming every obstacle and every disadvantage due to her late JAPAN AS GERMANY'S SUCCESSOR 147 entrance into the family of nations and forging rapidly ahead. It was natural, therefore, that the Japanese should feel great admiration for the Germans, and that they should feel a certain kinship with the western nation. Their problem was in many respects like that of Germany. They wanted "a place in the sun," and Germany's great military and political prestige, so rapidly acquired, led them to believe in and to idealize German methods. The result was the adoption by Japan of the German political system, the German phi- losophy of world power, German methods of diplo- macy, and German military organization. This is not the unfriendly judgment of a mind equally prejudiced against Germany and Japan. It is recognized by many of the most capable thinkers in Japan. An influential Japanese publi- cist said to the present writer in the early summer of 1918, when German triumph seemed imminent: ''We Japanese have, unfortunately, been too com- pletely Germanized in all our ways, especially in our political thinking. Whether Germany triumphs in this war or loses, the greatest task before Japan will be the undoing of this great mischief. We must un-Germanize Japan if we are to live happily and at peace with the world." Dr. Yujiro Miyake, a patriotic Japanese publicist of large influence, wrote in December, 1918: "The Japanese army was organized in accordance with the German system. So with Japanese politics, laws, science, and everything else. The admirers of the German military system were apt to think that the German political system would be the best in the world, i 4 8 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM just as her military system was. The followers of the German science, on the other hand, blindly declared that Japan should follow Germany in all departments of her national activity." l It may fairly be urged in defense of Japan that her aggressive policy of imperialist expansion was forced upon her by the extreme pressure of popula- tion upon the too meager means of subsistence. Supersaturation and overpopulation are very real and very serious facts for Japan. For fifty years her population has been increasing at the rate of 400,000 a year. In 1917 the increase was 800,000. There were 33,000,000 Japanese fifty years ago; to-day there are about 55,000,000, excluding Korea, Formosa, and Japanese Saghalien and counting only the inhabitants of Japan proper that is, of the islands constituting the Japanese mainland. The following figures show the rapid and steady growth of the population: Year Population 1S72 33,110,796 1891 40,718,677 1899 44,260,652 1903 46,732,876 1908 49,588,804 1910 50,984,844 I9I5 2 54,282,898 This population is crowded upon an area of only 148,756 square miles, the area of Japan proper, the density of population being about 357 per square mile. This is indeed below the density of 1 Nihon Yitjiro Nihomjin, December, 1918. Quoted by Millard, Democracy and the Eastern Question, p. 44. 2 Estimated. See F. Iladland Davis, op. cit., p. 300. JAPAN AS GERMANY'S SUCCESSOR 149 population in Belgium, Holland, and Great Britain, while higher than that of Italy, Germany, and France. It should be remembered, however, that less than 16 per cent, of Japanese land 15,00x3,000 acres is arable. 1 Other nations with densely crowded populations have secured large colonial possessions to absorb some of their surplus popula- tion and to provide raw materials and foodstuffs. Thus in 1914, when the war broke out, Belgium possessed 900,000 square miles of colonial territory, Germany more than 1,000,000 square miles, Holland almost as much. Japan's recent annexations bring her colonial territories up to about 96,000 square miles, but for the most part these are quite thickly populated. Moreover, the European nations have always enjoyed the great advantage of emigration to other lands, whereas the amount of relief to Japan through emigration has been very small. The Japanese possessions have afforded very little opportunity to relieve the mainland from the ter- rible pressure of its teeming millions of surplus population. Formosa and even Korea are already quite densely populated and afford very little room for colonists, their population amounting to almost 190 persons per square mile. The Japanese have been under the very distinct disadvantage that many countries discriminate against Japanese immigration. The surplus popu- lation of England, Belgium, Germany, and other crowded countries can find a place in the United States, Canada, Australasia, and South Africa, whereas these countries have either prohibited Jap- 1 I'ortcr, op. ';., p. 269; Woodruff, The Expansion of Race.', p. 44. 11 ISO RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM anese immigration entirely or so greatly restricted it as to make it of small importance so far as the Japanese problem was concerned. It is quite easy, therefore, to understand the economic motivation of Japan's aggressive policy of territorial expansion. She must expand or degenerate and decay. One may appreciate this fact, however, without accept- ing it as a sufficient justification of her intrigues and her imperialistic aspiration to the hegemony of Asia. II It is said that in tne latter part of the sixteenth century the famous Great Councilor, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, said to the Regent Nobunaga: "When Kyushu is ours, if you will grant me the revenue of that island for one year, I will prepare ships of war, and purchase provisions, and go over and take Korea. Korea I shall ask you to bestow on me as a reward for my services, and to enable me to make still further conquests; for with Korean troops, aided by your illustrious influence, I intend to bring the whole of China under my sway. When that is effected, the three countries (China, Korea, and Japan) will be one. I shall do it as easily as a man rolls up a piece of matting and carries it under his arm." This vision of the great "Japanese Napoleon" still dominates the foreign policy of Japan. Korea, the troublesome little kingdom so inappropriately named "The Land of Morning Calm," from the time of Hideyoshi's invasion in 1592 down to the present has been in constant turmoil. During JAPAN AS GERMANY'S SUCCESSOR 151 almost the whole period from Hideyoshi's brutal invasion down to the Chinese-Japanese war Korea was subject to infamous treatment by Japan and looked upon China as a protector. Although Korea continued to pay tribute to Japan and so to acknowledge the latter's suzerainty over her down to 1875, the treaty she signed with Japan in Febru- ary, 1876, declared her to be "an independent state" enjoying "the same sovereign rights as Japan." In 1894 there was a great uprising in Korea, and it is notorious that both Japan and Russia had a share in its instigation. In spite of the Treaty of Tientsin, China sent an army to Korea, at the request of the Korean government, to quell the uprising, and in notifying Japan said, "It is in harmony with our constant practice to protect our tributary states by sending troops to protect them." Japan seized upon this use of the term "tributary states" as constituting a declara- tion of Chinese suzerainty over Korea and war became imminent. Japan tried to get China to agree to conjoint action in Korea, but China refused on the ground that the Koreans must be left to work out their own problems. Then Japan tried by means of an armed force to compel the Korean government to adopt various reforms, which the Korean government, supported by China and Russia, declined to consider, at the same time demanding the withdrawal of the Japanese troops. On July 25, 1894, without the formality of a dec- laration of war, Japan began hostilities by sinking a transport laden with Chinese soldiers bound for Korea. 152 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM By the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki China recognized the independence of Korea. This was a prelude to Japanese annexation of Korea. It meant that China formally renounced any special interest in the Land of Morning Calm and would not interfere with Japanese policy there. Japan wanted the Korean peninsula, not only because of the strategic value of its harbors, but also because in its 82,000 square miles are considerable deposits of coal and iron, so much needed by Japan, as well as gold and copper. As we have seen, her triumph was short-lived. Russia wanted Korea herself and was not willing to see it virtually annexed by Japan. Acting in concert with Germany and France, she compelled Japan to renounce her claims to Korea. Japan was obliged to submit, but she obtained her revenge and took another great step toward her goal when, in 1905, just ten years later, she forced Russia to recognize her suzerainty over Korea. Five years after the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth Korea was formally annexed by Japan. The steps leading to that end are very interesting. On August 12, 1905, an agreement was reached between Great Britain and Japan by which the former agreed to recognize the special interest of the latter in Korea and acknowledging her right to control Korea's foreign policy. On the other hand, Japan agreed to guarantee the integrity of Korea and to maintain the Korean dynasty. The Treaty of Portsmouth three weeks later im- posed substantially the same agreement upon Russia, There was a great native protest in JAPAN AS GERMANY'S SUCCESSOR 153 Korea against being placed under the suzerainty of Japan, the traditional enemy, and many riots took place which the Japanese put down by force of arms. In 1907 the Korean government sent a delegation to the Hague Conference to protest against Japanese oppression. In the summer of that year there were great uprisings in Korea against the Japanese and the latter insisted upon the disbanding of the Korean arm}*. In 1907 a Japanese Resident-General was established in Korea with instructions to hasten annexation, and in August, 1910, the Korean emperor surrendered his crown and his throne and Korea became a part of the Japanese Empire. Up to the present her rule in Korea has been extremely brutal and op- pressive. The story thus hastily sketched in its broad out- lines admirably illustrates the unscrupulous methods of Japan in dealing with a weaker nation. She fomented strife and civil war in Korea and then made the resulting disturbances her pretext for seizing the nation by the throat and destroying its independence. Of course, this is not an uncom- mon practice for nations to indulge in. Russia under the bureaucracy also fished in troubled waters, for example, and intrigued in Korea with a view to ultimate annexation of the kingdom to the Russian Empire. The Japanese methods, how- ever, were particularly brutal and ruthless and quite Prussian in their disregard of both law and morality. The parallel between Japanese imperialism and Prussianism can be readily seen by comparing the 154 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM policy which Japan has pursued toward China with that which Germany pursued toward Russia. In the latter case there was a vast territory, the Russian Empire, possessing an abundance of natural resources and capable of very great indus- trial development. Prussianized Germany made it a cardinal principle of her foreign policy to hamper and impede Russia's economic and politi- cal development, and to that end used every device which a perverted political genius could suggest. She corrupted the government of Russia, fomented dissensions and plots within the Russian Empire, and on every possible occasion involved her in dif- ficulties with other nations. Japan's policy toward China was practically identical, and so were the reasons which prompted it. She wanted to prevent China from becoming a great industrial nation. She wanted China to be economically her vassal a vast market for her goods and a provider of an almost unlimited supply of raw materials. More- over, just as Germany aimed at European hege- mony so Japan aimed at the hegemony of Asia. All this was quite clearly evidenced by the Chinese-Japanese war. It was even more apparent from 1905 onward. "By every device known to industry and commerce Japan's trade with the Eighteen Provinces l was encouraged. Heavily subsidized steamers plied the waters of the Yangtse and its tributaries; Japanese post-offices and con- sulates were opened in the main treaty ports; Japanese merchants came in by the hundreds; and Japanese teachers were to be found in Chinese 1 A name given to China proper. JAPAN AS GERMANY'S SUCCESSOR 155 government schools. Since 1901 Chinese students had flocked to Japan by the thousands, finding in Tokio a nearer and less expensive source of western learning than the university centers of the Occident. Returning, they had given a decidedly Japanese flavor to the reform movement in their home land." x Coming from a well-known Japanese apologist, this description cannot be set aside as the exag- gerated account of an unfriendly critic. As a matter of fact the description gives only the barest intimation of the extent to which the Japanese were intrenching themselves in China. Not only were they using the German weapon of export bounties and trade subsidies, but they were also, as befitted pupils of Germany, corrupting and weakening Chinese government and, at the same time, fostering revolution against it. Even the German corruption of the Russian bureaucracy did not equal the corruption of the Chinese govern- ment by Japan. Agents of the Japanese govern- ment prepared elaborate lists of Chinese officials, civil and military, their habits, debts, financial interests, and so on. If a Chinese official needed money for any purpose he was almost certain to be approached by a Japanese agent, or some Chinese intermediary, suggesting how the neces- sary money could be readily obtained. Sometimes this took the form of a bribe disguised as a per- sonal "loan." Sometimes a contract would be let in such a manner that the impecunious official was made a nominal partner and enabled to draw big ' Kenneth Scott I-atourette, The Development of Japan, pp. 189-190. [talks arc mine. J. S. 156 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM dividends. In other cases the contractor had to pay rich commissions to the official acting as "agent" for the Japanese corporation in whose name the contract was made. One of the most common methods was to induce public officials to raise large loans in Japan for public works, giving local revenues or concessions as security, and to appropriate large sums for themselves. In this way not only was China undermined through the corruption of her officials, but, at the same time, Japan secured control of immense economic interests in China, a veritable mortgage upon her future. 1 A most sinister feature of this last-named form of financial debauchery was the fact that it became the method whereby Japan financed and fostered revolts and factional strife in China. That this grave charge is true there can be no rational doubt, for it was tacitly admitted by the Japanese Foreign Office soon after the O'Hara Ministry took office. No one who is at all familiar with the subtleties generally employed in Japanese official statements will fail to understand the confession implicit in this statement, issued by the Foreign Office in December, 191 8: Mischievous reports of Japanese activities in China, more particularly with regard to the granting of loans, have for some time past been in circulation and have imputed to the Japanese government intentions which are entirely foreign to them. For obvious reasons, the Japanese government cannot under- take to discourage financial and economic enterprises of 1 This whole question is discussed in great detail by Millard, Democ- racy and the Eastern Question, pp. 174-2^0 JAPAN AS GERMANY'S SUCCESSOR 157 their nationals in China, so long as those enterprises are the natural and legitimate outgrowth of special relations between the two neighboring and friendly nations. Nor is the Japanese government at all receding from its readiness to render needed financial assistance to China, consistently with the terms of the declarations and engagements to which it is a party, should the general security and welfare of China call for such assistance. At the same time, it fully realizes that loans supplied to China, under the existing conditions of domestic strife in that country, are liable to create misunderstandings on the part of either of the contending factions, and to interfere with the re-establishment of peace and unity in China, so essential to her own interests as well as to the interests of foreign powers. Accordingly, the Japanese government has decided to with- hold such financial assistance to China as is likely, in its opinion, to add to the complications in her internal situation, believing that this policy will be cordially participated in by all the powers interested in China. 1 According to Prof. J. B. Powell, than whom there are few more competent authorities upon this subject, the greater part of the Japanese loans to China have been used for purposes of internal warfare in China. At the same time as she was weakening her big neighbor Japan was obtaining mortgages upon practically everything China pos- sessed. He says: Between January I, 1909, and June 30, 1918, Japanese bankers have advanced to China yen 178,770,000 and, in addition, three other loans to the amount of yen 106,000,000 have practically been agreed upon, and probably will be signed before the end of July. Of the yen 178,770,000 already ad- vanced, yen 164,100,000 has been advanced since May I, 1915, showing that Japanese activity in the Chinese field really did not begin until eight months after the opening of hostilities 1 Japan Advertiser, December, 191S, 158 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM in Europe. Outside of a comparatively small part of the yen 164,100,000 which was used for purposes of flood relief and to combat the plague last winter, most of the money has been used in internal warfare in China. About twelve million yen has been advanced to the southern Chinese provinces, pre- sumably for military use on the southern side, and the rest has been used by the northern, or Peking, government for similar purposes. To pay for these loans China has mortgaged rail- way lines, gold, coal, antimony, and iron mines. She has mortgaged the government printing-office at Peking, the Hankow electric light and waterworks, and native forests in various parts of the country. There is a clause in each of these loan agreements to the effect that the Chinese authorities shall not obtain additional funds upon these securities unless the consent of the Japanese bankers first has been obtained. As to the expenditure of this money, so far as is known the Japanese bankers have placed no restrictions whatever upon the uses to which the money was to be put. For example, the Chinese authorities make a loan agreement with the Japanese bankers to extend a railroad, develop a coal or iron mine, or to construct telegraph lines. After the money has been obtained and the bankers and negotiators receive their commissions, the rest of the loan is apportioned out among various military governors, who use it to pay their soldiers and keep them loyal. 1 Ill Anything like a comprehensive surve) r of Japanese relations with China would take us too far afield. At the same time, the attitude of Japan toward her neighbor is of the utmost importance to the serious student of the great problem of Russia's reconstruction and future development. Obvi- ously, if Russia is to have extensive political and economic relations with Japan, and perhaps fall 1 Millard's Review, July 20, 1918. JAPAN AS GERMANY'S SUCCESSOR 159 under her control, the character of Japan becomes a matter of very great moment to Russia and to students of Russian affairs. And nothing better illustrates the character of Japan as a world power than her foreign policy as it relates to China. There is much food for thought in the brief sequence of dates marking the entrance of these two nations into the World War. On August 1, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia and France. On August 4th, Great Britain declared war on Germany. Eleven days later, August 15th, Japan sent an ultimatum to Germany and on August 23d declared war against her. It was not until August 14, 1917, that China declared war against Germany and Austria-Hungary, notwithstanding the fact that in the three years of bitter struggle the Entente Allies had been very hard pressed, and that there were times when it. seemed that the entrance of China on their side would have a beneficial, and perhaps a determinative, effect. In considering these dates two principal ques- tions arise, namely, why did Japan enter the war when and how she did, and why did China keep out of the war so long? Germany had not made any attack upon Japan nor any threat against her. On the contrary, there were evidences that, for reasons which are obvious, Germany courted Japan's friendship at this time. On the day of Germany's declaration of war against Russia there was an enormous pro-Japanese demonstration in Berlin. Clearly, then, Japan did rot enter the war because of any provocative act by German)-. The Japanese official pretext was that Japan was i6o RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM obliged, under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, first made in 1902 and subsequently extended, to enter the war as the ally of Great Britain. This view is indeed set forth in the Imperial Rescript of the Emperor Yoshihito de- claring war: We, by the Grace of Heaven, the Emperor of Japan, on the throne occupied by the same Dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make the following proclamation to all Our loyal and brave subjects: We, hereby, declare war against Germany and We command Our Army and Navy to carry on hostilities against that Empire with all their strength, and We also command all Our com- petent authorities to make every effort in pursuance of their respective duties to attain the national aim within the limit of the law of nations. Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the calami- tous effect of which We view with grave concern, We, on Our part, have entertained hopes of preserving the peace of the Ear East by the maintenance of strict neutrality, but the action of Germany has at length compelled Great Britain, Our Ally, to open hostilities against that country, and Ger- many is at Kiaochau, its leased territory in China, busy with warlike preparations, while her armed vessels, cruising the seas of Eastern Asia, are threatening Our commerce and that of Our Ally. The peace of the Far East is thus in jeopardy. Accordingly. Our Government, and that of His Britannic Majesty, after a full and frank communication with each other, agreed to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of the general interests contemplated in the Agreement of Alliance, and We, on Our part, being desirous to attain that object by peaceful means, command Our Govern- ment to offer, with sincerity, an advice to the Imperial German Government. By the last day appointed for the purpose, however, Our Government failed to receive an answer accept- ing their advice. It is with profound regret that We, in spite of Our ardent JAPAN AS GERMANY'S SUCCESSOR 161 devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to declare war, especially at this early period of Our reign and while We are still in mourning for Our lamented Mother. It is Our earnest wish that, by the loyalty and valor of Our faithful subjects, peace may soon be restored and the glory of the Empire be enhanced. On the other hand, various Japanese statesmen and publicists have declared that Japan did not enter the war because of any obligation imposed by her alliance with Great Britain. Many have contended that the terms of the alliance could not be fairly interpreted as imposing such an obligation. No less responsible a statesman than Viscount Ishii, head of the special mission sent by Japan to America in 1917, declared in Boston, on the Fourth of July of that year, that Japan did not enter the war on account of her alliance with Great Britain, that the terms of that alliance placed no such obligation upon her. Japan had entered the war, he said, because she recognized how seriously the whole civilized world would be menaced by a victorious Germany. In short, her motives were identical with those of the United States. 1 Certainly it is difficult for the lay mind to inter- pret the text of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance other than as Viscount Ishii did in the speech referred to. The Anglo-Japanese offensive and defensive alliance set forth that the two governments were interested in maintaining "the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea." That pledge had already been broken by Japan and treated as "a scrap of 1 fide Associate! Pfss rc-porr of the speech, 1 62 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM paper." The layman reading the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance is forced to conclude that either party was bound to come to the assistance of the other in the event of its being attacked by two or more powers. Only the diplomatic mind is capable of so interpreting the events of July and August, 1914, as to make it appear that Great Britain, Japan's ally, had been so "attacked." Nevertheless the Imperial Rescript declaring war and the speeches and statements of Count Okuma made it appear that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was the only reason for Japan's entrance into the war. Certain it is that the British Foreign Office had urged that action upon Japan. Why any friend of Japan should see in her course of action anything like an honorable fulfilment of a solemn obligation it is difficult to discern. If she was bound to enter the war on the side of her ally, automatical!}', then her ultimatum to Germany on August 15, 1914, was a piece of treachery. Why an "ultimatum" at all if Japan had no choice? Why offer terms the fulfilment of which by Ger- many would have kept her out of the war despite the treaty? Japan demanded that Germany with- draw her ships from Chinese and Japanese waters and surrender Kiaochau with a view to its eventual restoration to China, and allowed one week for reply. By all the laws of nations and by every moral code, had Germany agreed to these demands and proceeded to fulfil them Japan would have to stay out of the war or find some other pretext for entering it. As the record stands, then, if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance did obligate her to enter JAPAN AS GERMANY'S SUCCESSOR 163 the war as England's ally, Japan was willing to repudiate that obligation for a consideration. If it did not so obligate her, then her real motives for entering the war were not those which she avowed. The plain and unvarnished truth is that Japan was very little influenced by the treaty with Great Britain. She had already flagrantly violated it in connection with Korea. Her ultimatum to Ger- many shows that a price would have kept her from joining with her ally. Japan was actuated by two motives, revenge and aggrandizement. The ter- minology of her ultimatum to German}^ was obviously suggested by a rankling memory of the note presented to her by the German Minister at Tokio in April, 1895. Just as she had bided her time and then settled the score with Russia, so she had bided her time and was now about to settle with Germany, the worst offender of all. It was a very human motive. Her other motive was less sentimental, even though it was shot through with an exaggerated national pride, a passionate Pan-Nipponism, an Asiatic parallel to Pan-Germanism. In the first place, she wanted the leased territory of Germany in China, the Shantung Peninsula. She also wanted the South Pacific islands belonging to Germany. From the point of view of Japanese imperialism it was most important that none of the Entente nations should be permitted to dis- place Germany, either at Shantung or in the Marshall and Caroline islands. These latter were and are practically worthless for purposes of i6 4 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM colonization. Germany had, indeed, called* them "colonies," but that was a misnomer. The total population of both groups at the opening of the war was only about 26,000 and the European population less than 250. These figures show clearly enough that it was not for purposes of colonization that Japan wanted the islands. They at least offered no relief from overcrowding in Japan. As a matter of fact, Japan wanted them for the same reasons as led Germany to acquire them, namely, for strategical purposes and for the economic value of the great deposits of potash. The islands possess a very considerable value as naval bases and wireless stations. Their deposits of potash are large and Japan is a great consumer of phosphates, for which she has largely depended upon Germany. The poor quality of much of her soil makes high fertilization necessary for profitable rice-culture. The islands are also rich in copra and other tropical products. The Japanese imperialists wanted Shantung and the South Pacific islands. They realized per- fectly well that in a short time these would be taken by the British navy and in all probability become British holdings. This Japan wanted to prevent. It was no part of the Japanese scheme to sit back and watch Great Britain increase her hold upon China and the Pacific. In reality, her entrance into the war on the side of the Entente Allies was a shrewd move against the principal Entente nation. Her plan and purpose was to take possession of the German holdings in China and the Pacific before they could be taken by JAPAN AS GERMANY'S SUCCESSOR 165 Great Britain. It was a policy subtly directed against England as well as Germany. It was, moreover, part of a well-conceived plan to increase Japanese control of China, as subsequent events proved. The demand made upon Germany to deliver the territory of Kiaochau to Japan, "with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China," scarcely veiled the real purpose of Japan, which was annexation. It is very well known that at the outbreak of the war China tried hard to protect herself against being drawn into the conflict. President Yuan seemed from the first to realize that, owing to Japan's well-known policy of "fishing in troubled waters," China had every reason to fear her neigh- bor. He proposed, therefore, that all the terri- tories in China leased to belligerent nations should be declared neutralized and placed, for the duration of the war, under China's control. Under this arrangement, the British-leased territories, Kowloon and Wci-hai-wei, would have been neutralized as well as Kiaochau. Because Japan was then a neutral, China sought her "friendly offices" as well as those of the United States of America. Yet, as all the world knows, Japan opposed the plan and defeated it. The terms of the Japanese ulti- matum to Germany show that she was determined that, instead of China controlling her own national domain, that control, throughout the German- leased territory, should be exercised by Japan. In point of fact, her ultimatum virtually asserted a suzerainty over China. President Yuan's next step was to propose a 166 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM plan for limiting military operations against Tsing- tau to the leased territory of Kiaochau. In this Yuan failed, again owing to Japan. The reason for Japan's opposition appeared later on when, in the Tsingtau expedition, Japan actually spread her troops over a wide region outside the German- leased territory and seized the Tsingtau-Tsinan railway. As a final effort, President Yuan pro- posed that China should join the Entente Allies in declaring war against Germany, that with such forces as she cou!4 command she should join in expelling the Germans from the Kiaochau territory, being assisted by Japan and other Allies who should withdraw as soon as the Germans were expelled, leaving China in control of her original domain. It was also provided that any military measures to be taken in China outside of the German-leased territory should be by Chinese troops only. This proposal was first made in the middle of August to the British Minister at Peking, Sir John Jordan. It was rejected, doubtless at the instigation of Japan. In August, 191 5, President Yuan again proposed that China should enter the war on the side of the Entente Allies upon certain conditions. These were (1) that the Allies would agree to protect China against any attempted German reprisals later on; (2) that the German leasehold and Ger- man concessions in China should revert to China; (3) that the Allied governments would agree to hand over to China revolutionary plotters who were operating against China from the safe shelter of the foreign settlements in China. Japan again JAPAN AS GERMANY'S SUCCESSOR 167 blocked this effort, which might have brought an end to the war so much earlier than was the case. It is a fact that in November, 191 5, the British, French, and Russian Ministers at Tokio called upon the Japanese Foreign Minister, Viscount Ishii, to formally request on behalf of their govern- ments that Japan join in inviting China to enter the war. Viscount Ishii demurred and protested that "Japan could not regard with equanimity the organization of an efficient Chinese army such as would be required for her active participation in the war, nor could Japan fail to regard with uneasi- ness a liberation of the economic activities of a nation of 400,000,000 people." It will be seen that throughout the first fifteen months Japan set her own imperialistic interests above the Allied cause and that she virtually dominated the Entente so far as its policies were concerned with the Far East. When, on August 14, 1917, influenced by the United States, China entered the war it was in the face of Japanese opposition. This is the fact, notwithstanding official statements of the Japanese government which practically attributed China's action to the persuasion of Japan. Chinese statesmen and pub- licists were not very enthusiastic about entering the war in the summer of 1917, when the military situation was so discouraging. America had not yet developed any military force, and it was by no means certain that she could do so in time. The Chinese were morally certain that there existed secret agreements between Japan and England, Russia and France, whereby the three great Entente 1 68 RUSSIA AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM powers were pledged to uphold Japan in her designs upon China and acknowledging her paramountcy there. Only her confidence that the United States would disavow such agreements and champion Chinese independence and sovereignty induced China to enter the war at last. As a matter of fact, Japan would greatly have preferred China to have entered the war, if at all, on the other side. That would have given her a splendid pretext for occupying China. There was indeed much pro-German, or rather anti-Entente, sentiment in China, carefully fostered, there is every reason to believe, by Japanese agents. There is no doubt at all that Japanese agents, plentifully supplied with money, had instigated no small part of the unrest in China in the period between China's severance of diplomatic relations with Germany and her declaration of war six months later. We know now that as soon as it became apparent that China was drifting on toward war on the side of the Allies Japan tried to get assurances from England, France, and Russia that in return for the withdrawal of her opposition to China's en- trance into the war they would uphold her claims to Shantung and the South Pacific islands and acknowledge her special interest in China. This request was made also of the United States govern- ment, and in February, 1917, the Japanese Ambas- sador at Washington told Secretary of State Lansing that his predecessor, Secretary W. J. Bryan, had actually given such a promise! We know, thanks to the publication of Russia's secret JAPAN AS GERMANY'S SUCCESSOR 169 diplomatic correspondence by the Bolshevist gov- ernment, that negotiations for such an agreement by Russia were proceeding when the Russian Revolution took place. On the 8th of February, 1917, M. Krupensky, Russian Ambassador at Tokio, wrote to the Russian Foreign Office an account of a conversation with Baron Motono, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which the following passages occur: The minister pointed out the necessity for him, in view of the attitude of Japanese public opinion on the subject, as well as with a viezu to safeguard Japan s position at the future peace conference, if China should be admitted to it, of securing the support of the Allied powers to the desires of Japan in respect of Shantung mid the Pacific islands. These desires are for the succession to all the rights and privileges hitherto possessed by Germany in the Shantung province and for the acquisition of the islands to the north of the equator which are now occu- pied by the Japanese. Motono plainly told me that the Japanese government would like to receive at once the promise of the Imperial government to support the above desires of Japan. In order to give a push to the highly important question of a break between China and Germany, / regard it as very desirable that the Japanese should be given the promise they ask. This the more so as, so far as can he seen here, the relations between Great Britain and Japan have of late been such as to justify a surmise that the Japanese aspirations zcould not meet with any objections on the part of the London Cabinet. 1 IV Before leaving the subject of the subjection of China by Japan it is necessary to go back to 1 1 or tin- full t