Int Upon the Present 
 Debates on Indian if fairs
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 AT LOS ANGELES

 
 HINT 
 
 UPON THE PRESENT 
 
 DEBATES 
 
 INDIAN AFFAIRS. 
 
 Fiat Juftitia, 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 Printed for J; FIELDING, in Pater-Nofter-Row 
 
 MDCCLXXXII. o%v 
 
 [Price One Shilling.] 

 
 HINT, 
 
 A 
 /"\ 
 
 N idea has for fome little time prevailed, that 
 the two Committees for examining Indian 
 affairs (however originally difconnecled in 
 their powers, and the nature or deftination of their 
 appointments) were inclined to coalefce: particularly 
 in their votes of perfonal ceofure. To thofe who 
 confidered the different fubje&s on which their pro-* 
 ceedings commenced ; who could not comprehend 
 wherein the inyafion of Hyder Ally in the Carnatic, 
 *"* or the ftruggles of the Mahrattas in Guzerat, could 
 be affec-tcd by the admijiiftration of civil and criminal 
 <^juftice in Bengal, fuch a conjunction did not at 
 firft feem likely : experience has at length proved it 
 to exift; at leaft the coincidence of the refolutions 
 lately exhibited by the feveral Chairmen of the Com- 
 mittees, ftrorigly countenances this belief. - ~The 
 fteady love of juftice, the fincere regard to candour 
 3nd impartiality, which aduate each of thofe very 
 refpeftable bodies, are not to be called in queftion. 
 It is to fuch venerable qualities, joined with, the 
 acuteft difcernment, and the mod extenfive talents, 
 to which the writer of this, and every honeft man, 
 exultingly make his appeal. The flrength of, 
 , and the fplendor of eloquence, which have 
 A 2, 
 
 354744
 
 ( 4 ) 
 
 already been fo amply and fo ably employed on Indian 
 fubje&s by all the firft abilities of this or any age, 
 almoft preclude the poffibility of contributing a new 
 thought or an elegant phrafe to the prefent difcuffion. 
 But the Reports (thofe honourable teftimonies of 
 the labour, the candour, the dignity, which have 
 aflifted in their compilation) are ftill free for ex- 
 amination. Upon the facts there recorded, each man 
 is at liberty to form his own judgment, and to com- 
 pare, according to the portion of understanding he 
 may poffefs, the fcope of the refolutions now 
 pending, wifh the tenor of the Reports from whence 
 they are drawn. Different men will of courfe found 
 their opinion on different facts, or different opinions 
 on the fame fact : the refult of the public decifion 
 will undoubtedly be more ftrictly juft, as the aggre- 
 gate body of opinions covers the greater fpace of 
 ground : and while a topic of fuch magnitude is ftill 
 cpen to confideration, no hint, however trifling, but 
 may have fome weight ; no fpark however fmall, but 
 may conduce by fome lucky accident to kindle a 
 flame that may light to the moft important difcove- 
 ries. 
 
 The late refolutions founded on part of the fifth 
 and the whole of the fixth Report of the Committee 
 of fecrecy, tend principally to affix an idea of politi- 
 cal injuftice and unwarrantable thirft for conqueft on 
 the court of directors of the Eaft-India Company, 
 and on the Governor General and fupreme council 
 of Bengal. The body indeed of the fixth Report, 
 after the moft careful and repeated perufals, does 
 not offer an infinuation of the kind : and therefore 
 it can onlv be fought in the appendix, which, unfor- 
 tunately for our hopes of fuller information, is ftill 
 unpublifhed. 
 
 We can only therefore fuppofe, that from the con- 
 tents of that appendix may be deduced incontroverti- 
 ble pro; fs of the propriety and neceflity of each 
 Refolution and we muft in the mean time reft fatif- 
 
 fied
 
 ( 5 ) 
 
 fied with the bare aflertion <c that the protection and 
 '< affiftance afforded to Ragoba, and a wifti to add to 
 * the advantages jald to have been procured by the 
 " treaty of Poorunder, were the fole and abfolutecaufe 
 *' as well as object of the Mahratta war." The re- 
 port itfelf merely {hews " that the Governor general 
 of Bengal agreed with the fentiments of his em- 
 ployers the Directors and thofe of the council of Bom- 
 bay, in reprobating the terms of that treaty," " that 
 the articles of it had not been puniiuaJly fulfilled by 
 the parties ;" and ct that new catife of uneafinefs 
 had arifen from the open favour afforded by the 
 Poonah Durbar to an agent of France." With thefe 
 events the report opens and the fubfequent pages 
 are almoft wholly occupied by a ftudied difplay of 
 that oppofition, which the meafures of the Governor 
 general for the alternative of " honourable peace or 
 vigeraus war" on the weftern fide of India, met with 
 in every ftage from the two junior members of his 
 council. 
 
 It is here neceffary to obferve, that this boafted 
 treaty of Poorunder was an eaiiy meafure of general 
 Clavering's majority ; that it was fet on foot con- 
 trary to the opinion ard vote of the two moft expe- 
 rienced members of the fupreme council (indeed 
 of thofe two who alone had any experience at ali) ; 
 that it was generally thought to have been purchafed 
 by the facrifice of the company's neareft arfd deareft 
 interefts ; that on thofe principles it was loudly pro- 
 tefted againft by the council of Bombay, with the 
 decifive fuperiority of local knowledge j and that it 
 was received with difapprobation by the court of di- 
 rectors, in whom lay (or was thought to lie) the 
 power of deciding on the general merits and actions 
 of all their fervants : proors of all which aflertions 
 abound in every page of the <;th and 6th reports. 
 Moreover, the i6th refolution exprefsly affirms, 
 " that the directors, by their letters of 5th February 
 41 and i6th April, 1777 manifeiud iumediflatisfaclion 
 
 at
 
 ( 6 ) 
 
 at the terms of the treaty of Pool-under, and as 
 " it had not procured for the company the furrender 
 c< of Baflein," gave great encouragements to all their 
 fervants to ufe their utmoft endeavours for more 
 favourable conditions. Now, if from thefe premifes 
 it be admitted that the court of directors ftimulated 
 their fervants abroad to thofe actions which the 
 xvifdom of the Committee has thought good to cenfure 
 as deficient in moderation, policy, and good faith ; 
 if their inftructions be allowed to have been the 
 motive of the Governor general's conduct; He, in 
 acting up to the declared fentiments of his imme- 
 diate employers, to whom in the great line of duty 
 he was bound to fubmit, undoubtedly cannot with 
 juflice be an object of the fame cenfure. He has 
 proved faithful to the exprefs commands of his 
 employers he has therefore given proofs of his 
 worthinefs to be employed again. 
 
 But tho' the 6th report, as has been already obferved, 
 cannot by any implication be brought to bear a 
 criminatory fliape, the refolutions founded on it con- 
 vey a decided condemnation on all the capital mea*- 
 fures which have marked Mr. Haftings's government. 
 For the grounds of that condemnation we are 
 therefore of courfe referred to the appendix yet 
 unborn and if we were now in pofTeflion of it, 
 no arguments can thence be deduced, but fuch as 
 have already dropped from the prompt pens of the 
 oppofing members of the fuperior council thefe 
 may perhaps be numerous and folid (that they are 
 worked up with all the artifice of party zeal, and 
 all the tinfel of interefted eloquence, is well known) 
 but all the powers of truth and of candour muft 
 cry out that they are hot, cannot be fatisfadtory or 
 conclufive Mr. Haftings has repeatedly anfwered 
 them irrefiftably refuted them all fuch at leaft as 
 were founded in any thing but malice or perfonality. 
 Surely it would not have been unworthy of the trouble, 
 or beneath the dignity of the Committee to have
 
 ( 7 ) 
 
 "urged fome reafons from itfelf, fome new and im- 
 partial reafons, for the introduction of fuch a fevere 
 feries of cenfure. If every political negotiation, 
 every ftroke in the cabinet or the field during Mr. 
 Haftings's actual enjoyment of authority, muft be 
 racked at the tribunal of rebuke, the inftruments 
 already applied by general Covering's party to that 
 fervice, are too effectually blunted to do much 
 execution. 
 
 The political conteft as it ftood at Bengal, muft 
 fyrely, by the moft curfory reader of the difgufting 
 volumes which contain it, be deemed at leaft to have 
 ended in a drawn battle if he will not allow the 
 victory, as it clearly ftands, to be with the Governor 
 general. To joiniffue then with the Committee on the 
 grounds of their own appendix -while it contains 
 no plea for the cenfure of Mr. Haftings, but fuch 
 as is gathered from the violent and clamorous mi- 
 nutes of Mr. Francis and his affiftants, the public 
 will draw from the fame fource ample proofs of the 
 Governor general's wlfdom,poltcy^moderatlon r good-faith^ 
 and above all of his fteady adherence to the real in- 
 terefts of his employers. He will there be found to 
 plead his own defence with fuch a cogency of ar- 
 gument, fuch an adherence to fact, and fuch a dif- 
 play of fuperior information, as muft inevitably infure 
 to him, in the opinion of the world, that full ac- 
 tquittal, and that merited applaufe, which he has at 
 length fo victorioufly obtaiaed from his long-deluded 
 matters. 
 
 An indifferent auditor of the debates on India mat- 
 ters, would naturally recollect, that, by the original 
 Regulating Aft, the Directors of the Eaft India Com- 
 pany were enjoined to communicate to his Majefty's 
 fecretaries of ftate all the information they fliould re- 
 ceive refpecting the politics of India, and all the or- 
 ders they meant to iffue in confequence. He would 
 then afk, whether or not this duty had been regularly 
 performed whether any proof exifted of failure in the 
 
 mode
 
 ( 8 ) 
 
 mode of compliance to this regulation, or of unwil- 
 Hngnefs to abide by fuch alterations in the orders in- 
 tended to be ilTued, as the miniftry might think fit to 
 recommend. Having been fattsfied in thefe points, 
 he \vould conceive that the Direftors muft at once 
 iiand exonerated from any retrofpedtive recrimination 
 on the fuhject of all fuch orders, admitted j(and fo 
 tacidy approve,!) by his. Majefty's MinifterSc For 
 otherwife, what could be the intention of parliament 
 in framing this regulation ? And if the Directors be 
 thus virtually armed with the fhield of a higher autho- 
 rity, there is infinitely greater caufe to admit, that 
 their own immediate fervants a&ing under the decided 
 approbation of their mafters, and under the implied 
 confent of the executive powers of the ftate, muft be 
 dearly and ipfo fafto acquitted. All political refpon- 
 iibility muft be confined, as it (hould feem, to two 
 heads, the conftruction of indecifive orders or atten- 
 tion to ftate neceflity : and in both cafes the fuccefs 
 of the meafure adopted is the ufual criterion for the 
 merits of the Statefman, and ftiil more for thofe of 
 the company's fervant. The Directors, as a commer- 
 cial body, governed by the general rules of mercantile 
 tranfa&ions, and fetting the gains againft the rifks of 
 all adventures, have been in ufe to confider territo- 
 rial acquifitions in India as lucky ftrokes in trade, the 
 pconrs whereof were regularly and without fcruple 
 carried to account. (No impeachment on their ho- 
 nefty and good faith, notwithftanding.) They found 
 the jus fortiori* to be univerfally allowed in Afra : and, 
 perhaps, like able merchants, adopted (as they had 
 good reafon), in their feveral dealings with Indians, 
 the cujlom of the Indian market. This may be thought 
 irony but it is common fenfe. A fhort revifal of the 
 Company's affairs through the rife and progrefs of its 
 Afiatic power, and a little attention, to the influence 
 of thofe circumftances which have uniformly biafled 
 the conduct of every European nation in its connexion 
 with India, will prefently decide thefaft* 
 
 Th*
 
 ( 9 ) 
 
 The principles of commerce were by no rrieahs 
 accurately underftood when the Portuguefe firit failed 
 to India. It is not then extraordinary, that rather 
 than return to Europe without cargoes, they fhould 
 force a trade where they could not perfuadeit. Being 
 confidered as interlopers, they were obliged to af- 
 fume a fuitable conduct in their own defence, and to 
 aflert the preference of the market by the rhetoric of 
 the mufket. Every where furrounded with hollow 
 friends, jarring rivals, and inlidious competitors, 
 they had no refuge but in their own force where 
 they could not impofe quiet, they were fure of molef- 
 tation. Hence the advance from an occafional reiidence 
 to a fixed factory, from an open dwelling to a tenable 
 fort, from a dependence on the capricious protection 
 of a barbarous prince, to a vigorous reliance on their 
 own ftrength, was in fome cafes filent and gradual 
 but in moft rapid and inftantaneous. By the (ready 
 and well-applied exertions of their own military fupe- 
 riority, they foon acquired a d'ecifive influence over all 
 India, and fecured that influence by extenfive terri- 
 tories. War was now grown to a fyftem, and plunder 
 to a regular courfe of trade. They fcourecf the Sea- 
 coafts from Point Natal to Cape Comorin, and frorri 
 thence to the extremities of China. They had every 
 where armies on the continent and on the illands : 
 and they maintained at different times war with all 
 the different powers of the peninfula^ and occafionally 
 with feveral at once. But war never ruined the 
 Portuguefe. The change of meafures which con- 
 flantly attended the change of governors that fatal 
 policy which invented a triennial adminiftration un- 
 hinged all the main fprings of government, and re- 
 duced the holders of public offices to the neceiiity of 
 '* feeking whac they might devour" (from the public 
 or wherever it was to be found), " knowing they had 
 
 ' but a fhort time." The languor, the corruption, 
 
 the difunion attendant on fo ruinous a fyftem, did not 
 
 efcape the eager penetration of felf-intereil in their 
 
 B com-
 
 tdmmtrcial rivals the Dutch, who alfo made political 
 alliances, acquired territory, and maintained armies, 
 all in the way of trade. Yet they at leaft (whatever 
 may be faid of the Portuguefe) were in the beginning 
 of the laft century the patterns of frugality, of pru- 
 dence, and of mercantile regularity, to all Europe ; and 
 indeed fo they continue to this day. For, tho'they have 
 never relinquifhed one foot of ground in Afia which 
 they could by any means appropriate : tho' by a ftretch 
 of management unknown in the annals of the world, 
 they fecuredto themfelves a monopoly of fpice by feiz- 
 ing all the widcly-diftant places which produced it, 
 they flill perfevere in the fimple and uniform plan 
 of conduit to which they owed their firft fuccefs. 
 The fame mode of adminiftration, which was originally 
 prefcribed to their firft infant factory, has proved of 
 fo pliant and univerfal a nature, as to fuit every differ- 
 ent fize and defcription of government to which they 
 have progreflively fucceeded. And it is this undevia- 
 ting attention to confiftency of meafures which alone 
 has guaranteed their political exiftence thro' every 
 poffible combination and revolution of things in the 
 four quarters of the world. 
 
 The infatiable fearch of modern curiofity has in 
 fome degree developped the advantage of their fyftem. 
 But the Dutch have ever been wifer no unprofpe- 
 rous turn of their affairs (and that they have not been 
 privileged from the general inftability of fublunary 
 events, witnefs the lofs of that very valuable ifland 
 Formofa) ever tempted them to an indilcreet difplay 
 of their wealth and their refources they have conti- 
 nued to fell their fpice, and to be filent. Nor has the 
 national government at home, by any intemperate in- 
 terference with the affairs of their company, ever 
 drawn forth from the (helves of the compting-houfe 
 thofe important records on which depended the prof- 
 perity, and perhaps the very being of fo grand a mem- 
 ber of the ftate : Ib that the profits of their territories 
 in point of revenue, and the means by which they are 
 
 rendered
 
 aerence. i ne mcumons or tne ivianrattas 
 gal, under Ally Verdy Khan's fubahfhip, had 
 the Dutch with a plaufible pretence for fortif 
 fettlement of Chinfura. The old fort at 
 
 ( II ) 
 
 rendered productive, ftilJ remain an impenetrable po- 
 litical arcanum.--' 
 
 Britain has been the lafl: of the commercial nations 
 of Europe to avail herfeif decidedly of her arms in 
 promotion of her mercantile concerns. Territory has 
 every where been forced on her by the necefiky of re- 
 fitting unprovoked attacks,and of conquering in her own 
 defence. The incurfions of the Mahrattas into Ben- 
 
 furnifhed 
 for fortifying their 
 at Calcutta 
 
 arofe at the fame time, and for the fame purpofe of 
 protecting our peaceable factors ; tho' it could oppofe 
 no efte&ual refiftance to the unmerited aflaults of an 
 avaricious tyrant. But fortune foon declared in our 
 favour : the aggreflbr was repulfed in his turn ; and 
 a courfe of victory, well followed up, gave us the 
 unexpected pofleifion of a mighty territory. Other 
 events, equally untorefeen, have led us to a partici- 
 pation of the powers of government in the Carnatic, 
 Here let us indulge a moment's reflection. 
 Had the fame ideas of moderation, and principles of 
 mere felf-defence^ then gone forth, which have lately 
 grown fo much into vogue, had prohibitory condem- 
 nations of all fchemes or enlargement of dominion 
 been then iflued, it will be worth while to turn back 
 a few pages of oriental hiftory, and compare our pro- 
 bable fituation on that fuppofition, to our actual one 
 under a more accommodating let of regulations. We 
 will, for inftance, conceive Lord Clive, at the two 
 grand periods of his glory, to have been cramped by 
 General Ciavering's moderating majority, or the felf- 
 denying refolutions of a fecret committee Seraje-ud- 
 Dowla would probably have had ample caufe to ex- 
 patiate on the difmterefted policy and unprecedented 
 moderation of the Britifti conqueror, but he would 
 certainly have thought them much too fublime for 
 imitation. Nor, indeed, would the treaty of llla- 
 habad .now exift to be held up by the committee as 
 B ^ the 

 
 ( It ) 
 
 the model of political forbearance, and as the necef- 
 fary boundary of future exertion. For by what right 
 could Clive make treaties fword in hand atlllahabad? 
 What plea of felf- 'efence could our armies urge for 
 pafling theMahra ta ditch ? Entrenched behind that 
 formidable buiwark, they fhould there have ftudied 
 ' *the maintenance of an inviolable character for mo- 
 * deratior, good faith, and a fcrupulous regard to 
 4 treaty, as the s MPLE grounds on which the Britifh 
 1 governments fhould have endeavoured to eftablifti 
 4 an influence fuperior to that of other Europeans 
 ' over the minds of the native powers of India.'' 
 His Highnefs the naboh Wawlaw Jaw would not, 
 at this inftant, have ceafed to deplore the inefficacy of 
 ihcfejtmp/e grounds of influence^ had we relied on them 
 for his eftablimment on the mufnud of the Carnatic, 
 and had we always refolutely refufed to ** f interfere as 
 <c a party in the domeftic or national quarrels of the 
 " country powers." And, at this prefent hour, 
 from our mouldering battlements of Fort St. George, 
 (if the French had deemed it too dcfpicable an acqui- 
 iition for themfelves,) and from the extenfive precincts 
 of the Bound-hedge, we might have viewed, without 
 concern, the fuccefsful ftruggles of ambition, or the 
 ravages of increafing defolation happy to procure a 
 fcanty fupply of provifions, and a refufe of rotten 
 goods for an occafional cargo, whenever a ftraggling 
 peafant or pedlar ihould think us worth his notice, 
 or the fhort intervals of peace freed h : m from danger. 
 For the example of Mr. Dupleix, to which we ought 
 gratefully to afcribe the nrft hint of our territorial ac- 
 quifitions in India, would have made little impreflion 
 on the inflexible moderation of that triumvirate which 
 prefided at the treaty of Poor under. 
 
 It 45 humbly prefumed that moderation^ juftice y good 
 
 * Fifth resolution. 
 J? Third refolution.
 
 ( .3 ) 
 
 faith, and all other virtues are of a very different na- 
 ture in morality and in politics. In the former they 
 are univerfal and unchangeable" ; in the latter, rela- 
 tive and reciprocal, and the terms of their defini- 
 tions confequently temporary and local. Thus that 
 which is to-day politically moderate, may be to- 
 morrow pufillanimous, and perhaps was infolent 
 yefterday: A demand, which would be weaknefs 
 at Fort William, is extravagance at Fort Malborough. 
 Moral virtues exift independent of intereft, or of 
 fuccefs ; both of which are effential to the merits of 
 all political exertion. Political virtue does not teach 
 us to offer the left cheek when the right has al- 
 ready been aflaulted, but to repel violence by vio- 
 lence : and indeed the balance of national power is 
 nothing but the perpetual fyftem of oppofition arifing 
 from the action and reaction of claming parties, as 
 the ex aft counterpoife of the centripetal and centri- 
 fugal forces neceflarily produces reft. 
 
 Under a fenfe of this natural diftin&ion between 
 the moral and political TO *;\ov, we can but cordially 
 confent to the commendatory part of the learned 
 Lord's firjl refolution, which fan&ions the treaty of 
 lllahabad. In the eye of mere abftra&ed morality 
 that treaty could never be juft, or moderate, or ex- 
 emplary : as it reduced to our fubje&ion ten millions 
 of people, over whom we had not the fliadow of pre- 
 tence to reign ; and as it obliged a vanquiflied prince 
 to cede to us, what he had neither option to refufe, 
 nor means to beftov/. But the meafure was politically 
 good, and expediency ftampt a merit on its articles. 
 So far, therefore, we are agreed. But \\\& prohibi- 
 tions of any future enlargement of dominion, which 
 are there pointedly brought to notice, and which, in 
 fa&, furnifh the ha/is for all the cenfure which 
 breathes in the following refolutions, demand a fhort 
 arreft of judgment. They were certainty moderate : 
 we may doubt if they were politic. Perhaps too they 
 were juft j but they are at leaft diametrically oppofue
 
 ( 14 
 
 to the fpirit of that fyftem which diaated the treaty 
 of Ulahabad. Yet tha^refolution conveys an implied 
 approbation of all our territorial acquifitions previous 
 to that period. As if at that inftant, nd at Ulahabad 
 only, moderation, jujiice, and good faith had fir It ftarted 
 into exigence : and as if the prohibitory condemna- 
 tions of conqueft, &c. ifiued by the Directors at that 
 period, had not arifen from the obvious principle of 
 momentary extacy on the prodigious ftroke they had 
 juft made: and perhaps from that over-abundant cau- 
 tion, which a fiu! den tranfition from fcanty mediocrity 
 to unexpected wealth is generally found to infpire. 
 
 The truth is, the Directors at the moment of their 
 acquifitionF, and for fome time after, were fo 
 dazzled with the magnitude of the poffeffi^n, as to 
 imagine it adequ te co the relief of all poflible exi- 
 gencies, and what no future probable advantage could 
 ever compenfate for the rifk of lofing. Long expe- 
 rience, and the inceflant demands of the miniftry at 
 home, have fince opened their eyc^ ; but, could they 
 have gained (as they undoubtedly ^ave gained by this 
 time) a territorial fupp^rt for the neceflary efla- 
 blifhment of Bombay, trey wou'd again, with plea- 
 fare, iflue forth prohibitory cwi,-mn,ithns of all fcbemes 
 if coKquijl and enlargement of dominion (\Vithatacit 
 leferve pr< bably for fuch fetihmer.ts, either now ex- 
 >r hereafter to exift, as may require territorial 
 fupport. ) 
 
 The original fource of all our profperity in India 
 has arifen, by an unforefeen chain of "vents, from un- 
 avoidable competition m trade ; and it is by trade only 
 that our Afiatic pofleflions are made productive in 
 Kuro 4 ie. Our great rivals in commerce the Dutch 
 have enjoyed undifturkd for more than a century and 
 a half, that very valuable branch of merchandize 
 which they had chofen for themfclves as the grand 
 object of all their oriental fchemes. Vigorous and 
 well-timed efforts might perhaps even now produce 
 as favourable an evem"for ourlelves. Could we but 
 
 fall
 
 fall on fome fimple and permanent plan for the 
 good adminiftration of our Afiatic pofleflions, could 
 we, with double the mercantile abilities of the Dutch, 
 be content to imitate their phlegm, there is no 
 prefent political impoffibility why Great Britain 
 fhould not exclufively furnifh Europe with the muflins 
 and callicoes of India, while Holland exclufively dif- 
 tributes its nutmegs and cloves. 
 
 But, however fpecious or practicable this idea of 
 a monopoly of Indian manufactures may appear, 
 there is no reafon to fuppofe the plan ever to have 
 been fyftematically adopted by the court of Directors, 
 nor their conquefts to have been pufhed i&o an extra- 
 vagant extent on this all-grafping, though mercantile 
 principle. They have never appeared to ftretch their 
 ambition beyond objec~b,of which the attainment was 
 equally obvious and neceflary : and for this purpofe 
 have conftantly exprefled their paternal wifh to pro- 
 vide fomething more than a precarious and eleemofy- 
 nary fubfiftance for one of their earlieft fcyons, 
 Bombay. The fortrefs of Baflein, and the iflands of 
 Salfette-and Caranja,arethe armswithoutwhichBombay 
 is but a barren trunk. The Portuguefe once poflefil-J 
 them all, by the only title which was then, or will 
 ever be, valid in politics, the tenure of the fworo 1 . 
 From them Bombay came into our hands by ceffion 
 (far be it from me to fay we became receivers of 
 Helen goods>, and its appendages were wrelted from 
 them long after by the Mahrattas, vi et armis : from 
 whom we have ever flnce wifhed to gain them on any 
 terms : by compofition, by treaty, --by purchafe,--and 
 have, at length, procured them nearly^by the means 
 which they employed to get them from the Portu- 
 guefe. The troubles of the Muhratta ftate gave 
 grounds for hopes of every advantage. So diftrn&ed 
 have been the councils of that nation for fome years, 
 fo divided their chiefs, fo fluctuating the authority, thac 
 the ruling power was hardly ever fix months with- 
 eut a revolution. The feeds of contention were fown
 
 ( 16 ) 
 
 in the very principles of the government, and would 
 Jong ago have ripened in our favour, were it not, 
 that thofe mini/fers, as they are called, had difcernment 
 enough to return the obfervation on pur Councils : 
 and to place all their own hopes of fecurity in the 
 want of harmony among thofe whom they have cho- 
 fen to ftyle the Englijb chiefs. 
 
 However, the infractions of the Poorunder treaty 
 (even fuppofmg them mutual) impofed the neceffity 
 of frefh negociation, and the indulgent reception which 
 the French experienced at Poonah demanded the moft 
 effectual interpofition ; and it was happy, that, by the 
 abfolute defection of one of thofe two only J minifters 
 who had figned the Poorunder treaty, we were re- 
 leafed in a great meafure from all attention to it. 
 Then it was that Mr. Haftings, (who, after fpending 
 feveral years at Calcutta, well knew the fatal effects of 
 that continual drain of fpecie which the exigencies of 
 Bombay caufed from Bengal, who knew intimately the 
 fentiments of his employers on this head, and who 
 felt the critical coincidence of the prefent circum- 
 flances,) ftepped forward with that vigour and promp- 
 titude of decifion which diftinguiflies the found ftatef- 
 man from the mere minifter ; and, by a meafure 4 worthy 
 of Clive himfelf, almoft fixed the very inconftancy of 
 fortune. Even the natives of India were imprefTed 
 with the higheft aftonimment at the boldnefs of the 
 attempt to march an army from Calpee to Bombay. 
 Mr. Francis oppofed it, (the Report overflows with 
 enumerations of his objections), and his opposition 
 betrays the ftrongeft fymptoms of timidity and alarm; 
 He conftantly/^rf where no fear is ; and in every ftep 
 of the march *" thinks the detachment incapable of 
 " furmounting the dangers and difficulties or a fur- 
 ' ther progrefs towards Bombay, and therefore ear- 
 * neftly recommends its immediate recall : notwith- 
 l (landing the avowed dlfcredit which would thereby fall 
 
 * Sixth report p. 8. \ Sicca Rarn Baboo, 
 
 upon
 
 ( '7 ) 
 
 * { upon the wifdom of our councils and tin power cf our 
 " arms,'" Luckily enough fur the credit both of our 
 councils and our arms thefe convulfions of timorous 
 apprehenfipn were fuffered to work themfelves ofF in 
 the feminine effufions of the tongue ; and Mr. 
 Francis's political hyfteric was at length effectually 
 relieved by the certainty of Col. Goddard's fafe arri- 
 val at Surat. 
 
 All extcnfive territorial p&fieffioh, partic- -larly on a 
 continent, implies the neceffity. of ^policical con- 
 nexions. The moment our India Com-panv had ao 
 ^uired; the provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and OnfTa, it 
 became necefiarily linked in a certain degree with the 
 furrounding provinces, and in general wi.th the poweri 
 of India. But as thefe powers mult at all times be 
 jealous of each other, and were frequently engaged in 
 acT.ua! hoftilities, it might not always be in the power 
 of our Company (as one member of this grand body) 
 to ftand neuter, and it might fometimes be ferviceable 
 to take a decided part. Our grand difficulty lay in the 
 choice of the connexions to be formed ; for the exift- 
 cnce of feme connexions, and therefore the neceffity of 
 a choice, cannot be difputed. 
 
 Mr. Haftings fucceeded to the government of Ben- 
 gal in February 1772, a period big with every poffible 
 calamity. The Company which he ferved, laboured 
 under a moft ruinous debt, and an utter want of rc- 
 fource. The country which he came to govern, was 
 juft emerging from the defolation of a famine. The 
 neighbouring provincesviewed us with no very friendly 
 eye, and there were alfo many fymptoms of probable 
 confufion in the interior parts of Hindoftan. A re- 
 trenchment of all unneceffary expence, a provifion of 
 additional means, the fecurity of our frontier, and 
 the formation of a profitable alliance, were the imme- 
 diate ccnfequences of his acceilion to the chair :--the 
 firftand fecond, by internal reform, and a withholding 
 of the king's ill-deferved tribute ; the third and fourth, 
 by an alliance offenfive and defenfive with Sujah-ud* 
 C Dowla.
 
 ( i8 ) 
 
 t)owla. The refult of thefe decifive meafures was a 
 great acceflion of wealth, and the return of general 
 profperity. In the grand mafs of political connexion, 
 it is very poflible to form offenfive alliances, to inter- 
 fere in national quarrels, and to profit by occafional 
 acquifitions, without the frhalleft derogation frorrt. 
 moderation, wifdom, and good faith. The fame 
 prudence which obliges a merchant in purfuit of the 
 immediate advantage of his baufe^ to enter into a 
 competition of trade, and to divert to his own coffers 
 profits which originally flowed in other channels, will 
 authorize in the politician ah attempt to extend, by all 
 fair and juftifiable pretexts, the influence of his own 
 nation in competition with that of other rival nations. 
 Acting on this general principle of political good 
 faith, Mr. Haftings, in his connexions and negotia- 
 tions with the powers of India, has always contrived 
 to turn the fcale of advantage on the fide of his em- 
 ployers. Things were precifely in this predicament, 
 when General Clavering, with a Majority of the Su- 
 preme Council, arrived in Bengal. On the n<yrth, 
 they found a part of our army engaged with that of 
 the Vizier, our ally ('and a very profitable one), in the 
 reduction of a province deemed by him to be in aclual 
 rebellion. Our troops were paid by the Vizier, and 
 our afliftance had been purchafed "by a very large pe- 
 cuniary compenfation. The political juftice of the 
 war refted with its Principal. Had he engaged in it, 
 and conquered, without our aid, we had no right to 
 interpofe as umpires in the difpute, nor to (hare in 
 the advantages of the conqueft. Had he fought, and 
 been vanquimed, the neceflity of fecuring our own 
 frontier would eventually have forced us to join him, 
 or lie open to other invafions from the Mahrattas. 
 So that, in fact, we, as having no right to controul 
 the actions of our immediate neighbour, the Vizier, 
 could not bind him down to a peace as having no 
 political, nor fo much as commercial or vicinal, in- 
 tercourfe with the Rohillas, could not rifle even a 
 
 coolnefs.
 
 ( 19 ) 
 
 coolnefs, much lefs a difpute with him at our doors 
 for their protection. And we had but the alternative 
 of being expofed to every poflible inconvenience on the 
 clofe of the war, or to interfere in its fuccefsful ac- 
 complifhment on the fide of the Vizier. Neceflity, I 
 repeat it, would in the end have driven us to folicit a 
 fecond alliance with him, had we at that time, by a 
 pointed refufal to join in his meafures, interrupted the 
 good harmony of the firft. We met his propofals, 
 and enfured the moft ftrilcing benefits to both parties. 
 On the weftern fide of India, the prefidency of Bom- 
 bay had but lately, by a fudden effort of vigour, fe- 
 cured pofTeflion of the iflands of Salfette and Caranja 
 not indeed without violence, but yet with a plauli^ 
 ble pretext and the acquifition had been ratified by 
 the approbation of the Court of Directors, who had 
 long wifhed to obtain them on any terms. The re- 
 fult, however, of the feizure was a war with the 
 Mahrattas, from whom we had taken them; and 
 which (though it had not been attended with unin- 
 terrupted fuccefs) gave fufficient hopes of a fortunate 
 and even of a fpeedy termination. 
 
 The vigorous profecution of our meafures had al- 
 ready fucceeded in Rohilcund, and on thofe in opera- 
 tion on the Bombay fide depended almoft all the future 
 profperity of the Company in that quarter ; and they 
 even nearly promifed fuccefs at the period when the 
 new Majority of the Supreme Council entered on 
 
 Indian affairs.-! Wholly occupied with the wifh to 
 
 drive Mr. Haftings from his government, and anxious 
 to eftablifh their own character on the ruin of that of 
 their rival, they had no means left but by a ftrong op- 
 pofition to all the leading principles of his adminiftra- 
 tion. Hence, as the nice management of political 
 connexion, and the critical exertion of well-directed 
 force, had already, in Mr. Haftings's hands, produced 
 the moft important confequences ; and as he was too 
 ftrongly entrenched on that ground to be difp laced by 
 any manoeuvre of chicane, the only method by which 
 C 2 they.
 
 ( 2 ) 
 
 they could poflibly hope to rife tq notice, was the adop- 
 tion of a fyftem which fhould diametrically oppofe the 
 plans of the General. Hence our brigade was recalled 
 from Rohilcund with a precipitancy which even alarm- 
 ed the Company at home : a peace was inftantly folli- 
 cited with the Mahrattas, on humiliating terms ; or on 
 any rerms- Our allies were taught that the Englifh 
 had now circumfcribed their politics as well as their 
 arms by an immoveable barrier: that neither the im- 
 porta'ice of their occalions, nor the profpecr. of our own 
 aggrandizement, could ever again induce us to .draw 
 th^ fword. Our enemies were inftru&ed, that we fate 
 qu 'tly at home to receive them, however hoftile might 
 be their profeflions, or well-appointed their force : 
 that, however unjiifl^ faithtefs, or immoderate their de- 
 mands might prove, Our's were now no more. It is 
 well that the Mahrattas forgot at that moment their 
 preteniions to the Chout ; and that the King neglected 
 to require reftitution of his provinces, under failure of 
 the treaty of Illahabad. Had Sujah-ud-Dowla lived, 
 He too would probably have had fome claims to make 
 on our moderation. He would little have brooked to 
 pay troops which he was not permitted to employ. He 
 would have fought for more fpirited and lefs fcrupulous 
 allies perhaps have recollected that he had once been 
 formidable even to .the Englifh. But He died in time, 
 and left a fon weak enough to imitate our treaty of 
 Poorunder, by that which he fubmitted to at Fyzabad. 
 
 It is from the moment that the Supreme Council in 
 Bengal aflumed an unlimited controul over the politics 
 of all the Company's fettlements, it is from the fpirit of 
 that oppofltion which dictated and concluded the pufilla- 
 nimous treaty of Poorunder, that we may date the 
 firft avowed do&rine of chimerical neutrality and 
 mere paffive felf-defence. k was that firft partial fa- 
 crifice of the Company's interefts in purfuit of private 
 ends, which has laid the foundation for the exagge- 
 rated preteniions and extravagant preemption of the 
 country powers. It is to this fource, and perhaps to 
 this alone, that we fhould in truth and caudour impute 
 the troubles in the Carnatic, and the war with the 
 
 Mah-
 
 Mahrattas. And, if we wouW preferve the footing we 
 Hill hold in thofe very diftant regions,- if we would 
 guarantee to the Company and to the Nation thofe 
 ineftimable advantages which our Indian fettlements 
 produce, -it can only be effected by the proper dele- 
 gation of difcretionary powers, and by the ielection 
 of fuch agents as may be entitled to a very liberal 
 fhare of public confidence. Pofitive and unconditional 
 orders will never operate with profperous effect to the 
 extent of half the globe. 
 
 :( In the breafts of thofe, whom the acknowledged 
 candour and applaufive ftyle of the firft refolution has 
 imprefled with fome degree of confideration for the 
 zeal and abilities heretofore exerted by the court of 
 directors, in the fervice and for the advantage of its 
 conftituents, the fubfequent refolutions cannot fail to 
 excite a little furprife. What an extraordinary 
 Change! How fhall we account for it! What? 
 the fame court which fo lately and fo allowably pro- 
 fited by the treaty of Illahabad, condemned merely for 
 turning a few Rupees at the treaty of Benaras ! ! ! 
 But by the latter theRohillas were exterminated. And 
 who were the Rohillas, that they fhould efcape poli- 
 tical juftice for their own atrocious ufurpations, and 
 denial of ftipulated tribute ? But the Rohillas were 
 not actuated bv the moderating principles of the 
 treaty of Illahabad, and therefore conquered where 
 they could, and had a right to every advantage of 
 temporary fuccefs. Be it fo But their neighbours 
 had alfo in their turn a right to fecure their own 
 tranquillity, or to profecute any other ufeful poli- 
 tical purpofe at the expence of the intruding Rohillas. 
 Of thofe who furvived their feveral defeats, the greater 
 part returned to thofe impenetrable hills from whence 
 they had defcended in fearch of plunder, and the 
 reft found a quiet afylum and even a liberal fupport 
 in the very dominions of the prince whom they had 
 
 grievoufly offended. The much -arraigned and ill- 
 
 underftood Rohilla war, after having caufed almoft as 
 great an effufion of ink as of blood, is now to be de- 
 
 cifwely
 
 cifively condemned. Still the reafans urged by the 
 late prefident and council of Bengal for the com- 
 mencement of that war, the pleas of neceifity and 
 others, which they have fince furniftied in defence of 
 the meafure, are not done away in the report. If we 
 look into the appendix, we may perhaps be bewildered 
 by the fophiftry of General Clavertng's majority but 
 by no means convinced by their arguments. The 
 contraft of praife and blame on the conduct of the 
 court of directors, which forms fo ftriking a feature on 
 the face of the resolutions, however ably and fpiritedty 
 drawn, almoft amounts to a diftinction without a 
 difference. The directors, probably, as little defer ved 
 applaufe for ratifyingthe treaty of lllahabad,as they now 
 merit cenfure for having admitted that fettled at Be- 
 naras, or for wifhingto improve the treaty of Poorun- 
 der. In either cafe, they feem to have adted perfectly 
 in character, confcientioufiy to have difcharged the 
 duties of their appointment, and fulfilled their 
 delegated truft, by confulting, to the utmoft of their 
 abilities, the grand interefts of their principals. They 
 were to be guided in all their operations by the original 
 charters of the company, none of which contain a 
 fyllable of that forbearing fyftem of policy which is 
 now recommended. By the charter, they may build 
 forts and acquire lands to an indefinite extent. It has 
 been amply demonftrated, that their acquisitions, both 
 now and heretofore, have been for the purpofe of im- 
 mediate felf-defence, or the fupply of neceflary emer-r 
 gencies nor is there in the Report, or elfewhere, any 
 proof of wanton violence or injuftice, that can be ap- 
 plied to any particular period. On the contrary, it 
 will be found, that as the pretence for our firft expul- 
 fion from Calcutta by the nabob Seraj-ud-Doula, was 
 the protection f we unwarrantably extended to one of 
 his rebellious fubjects ; fo one original caufe \ of the 
 
 f See Vanfittart's Narrative, Hollwell, Orrne, &c. 
 t Fifth report, p. 27. 
 
 Mahratta,
 
 Mahratta war was the afliftance afforded to Ragoba; 
 who, From having been adlual regent* of the Mahratta 
 empire, was thruft from his dignity, and treated as a 
 rebel, by thofe who in a violent manner fucceeded to 
 his place And that, in a fecond inftance, the aft 
 which furnifhed the principal pretext for the revival of 
 the fame war, fubfequent to the treaty of Poorunder, 
 was the fame protection again afforded by us to the 
 fame Ragoba. 
 
 But our refufal to deliver up f Kiflen Dofs, at the 
 repeated demands of his rightful fovereign, eventually 
 produced the conqueft of Bengal, Bahar, and Oriflk 
 and thofe acquifitions belong to the treaty of Illaha- 
 bad, confequently are confident with wifdom, mo- 
 deration, and juftice. Our obftinacy in refufing to 
 facrifice Ragoba to his revengeful rivals Nana Furnefe 
 or Tuckajee Hollcar, has certainly by this time en- 
 fured us the much-defired poffefiion of BafTein and 
 Salfette. That they might, indeed, have been ours 
 long before, a candid perufal of the fifth report will 
 hardly fail to evince had General Covering's majo- 
 rity taken another twelvemonth 10 learn their political 
 alphabet, and had .not the fanguine efforts of Mr. 
 Haftings for this valuable addition to the property of 
 his matters, produced from the oppofition that fcan- 
 dalous dereliction of all their deareft and beft interefts, 
 the Poorunder treaty. But our late fuccefles are too 
 modern not to be deemed ufurpations, They faji 
 within the denunciations of the firft fix refolutions, as 
 they are moft indubitably not '< founded on the princi- 
 " pie of the treaty of Illahabad." But thefe two bug- 
 bear treaties are for ever in our way. Let us once for 
 all difmifs them fairly. That of Illahabad was un- 
 doubtedly a wife and a politic meafure, and at the 
 fame time wonderfully advantageous but, for my 
 foul, I never could difcover wherein confided its mo- 
 
 * Fifth report, p. 26. 
 f Orme's hiftory, ad vol. pages 49, 50. 
 
 derct'ior
 
 ( 24 ) 
 
 Lord Clive himfelf would probably have 
 biuthed at fo extraordinary a piece of flattery. Of 
 the treaty of Podrunder nothing can be faid, but that 
 it was, in every refpedt the reverfe of the former ; and 
 therefore we will allow it to have been as moderate as 
 even Mahratta impudtnce could well demand. We 
 might at leaft have expected to fee it readily and fatis- 
 fafdtofily ratified. But the Poona Durbar had felt our 
 political pulfe, and found that an internal diforder 
 preyed on our vitals, and benumbed all the nerves of 
 our dominion. This treaty, therefore ( infamous 
 as it was), they delayed to execute ; and that very 
 delay in fome degree faved its credit, by contributing 
 moft inconceivably to the fomewhat more difgracef.ul 
 convention of Worgaum. 
 
 On the whole, it is moft earneftly entreated, that 
 a ftrict attention to the immediate circumftances which 
 led to the appointment of the fecret committee, as 
 well as a ccnfiderate review of 5th and 6th reports, may 
 prece'de any opinion on the refolutions. In England, 
 all public meafures (if unfuccefsful) occafion an imme- 
 diate alarm. " Sacrifice of national honour 5 ' " con- 
 tempt and difcbedience of orders"" wilful negleft 
 and corrupt practices" are loudly imputed to the 
 unfortunate men who devifed, or who were to have 
 executed, the defeated plan. We inftitute tedious 
 enquiries when we fhould urge inftant and vigorous 
 exertions. The Athenians idly difputed for the palm 
 of eloquence, till Philip was at their very doors but 
 .Icmans, when feverely beaten by Pyrrhus, would 
 not fo much as lifien to any terms of accommodation 
 until the conqueror had left Italy. In the prefent 
 c..fc, while feme of the ableft members of our legifla- 
 tiire have been anxioufly investigating the caufes of 
 the wars with the Mahrattas and with Hyder Ally; and 
 Taborioufiy fifting, from bufhels of dufty records, a 
 few choice grains of truth and common fenfe a 
 Coote has driven Hyder for ever from the Carnatlc, 
 and a Qoddard has turned the fcale of negotiation moft 
 
 decidedly
 
 decidedly in our favour with the Mahrattas. It can- 
 not but be remembered, under what gloomy appro- 
 henfions the honourable Committee took its feat. Let 
 it be remembered, in how glorious a reverfe it is now 
 about to clofe its reports. 
 
 The learned lord, to whofe undoubted abilities the 
 compilation of thofe reports muft ever do honour, in 
 his prefatory fpeech to the cdnfequent refolqtions, has 
 fo pointedly, fo folicitoufly , referred to the reports 
 themfelves for the foundation of all judgment has fo 
 warmly recommended a careful comparison of each 
 line and word of the refolutions with the original re- 
 port out of which they profefs to grow that no 
 weightier arguments need be urged, or can be added, 
 in effectual perfuafion of this neceflary purpofe. If 
 the preceding meets do not entirely coincide with the 
 opinions deduced by the learned lord from his own 
 ftalement of the cafe, it is with the utmoft deference, 
 and in confequence of the clofeft application to the 
 whole matter of the 6th report, and to part of the 5th, 
 that they are here fubmitted to the public. The com- 
 parifon fo repeatedly urged by the very learned and 
 refpetable compiler of both papers has been followed 
 up with the cooleft reflection; and the refult of it is 
 alfo here moft refpectfully fubjoinedj in the form of 
 fhdrt obfervations on each refolutidn. 
 
 ^SOLUTIONS OBSERVATIONS:. 
 
 read Monday, April 15, 178*. 
 
 I. That the orders of The orders of the court 
 the court of directors of of directors, founded on 
 the Eaft India company, the treaty of Illababad, 
 which have conveyed to moft certainly conveyed a 
 their fervants abroad a clear prohibition of en- 
 prohibitory condemnation larging our dominions on 
 of all fchemes ofconqueft that fide of India where 
 and enlargement of domi- the treaty took its rife 
 nion, by prefcribing cer- and the line was in after- 
 tain D times
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 tain rules and boundaries 
 for the operation of their 
 military force, and enjoin- 
 ing a ft rift adherence to a 
 lyftem of defence upon the 
 principle of the treaty of 
 Ijlahabad, were founded 
 no lefs in wifdom and po- 
 licy, than in juflice and 
 moderation. 
 
 2. That every tranf- 
 greffion of thofe orders, 
 without evident neceflity, 
 by any of the feveral Bri- 
 tim governments in India, 
 has been highly reprehen- 
 fible, and has tended in a 
 chief degree to weaken the 
 force and influence, and 
 to diminifh the refources, 
 of the company in thofe 
 parts. 
 
 3. That every interfe- 
 rence as a party in the 
 domeftic or national quar- 
 rels of the country powers, 
 and all new engagements 
 with them in offenfive al- 
 liance, have been wifely 
 and providently forbidden 
 by the Company in their 
 commands to their admi- 
 niftrations in India. 
 
 4. That every unnecef- 
 fary oravoidable deviation 
 from thofe well-advifed 
 rules, (hould be followed 
 with very fevere reprehen^ 
 fion 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 times precifely drawn by 
 the genertl limitation 
 which confined our armies 
 to our fide of the Caram- 
 nafla. 1 he expreffions, 
 indeed, of the court of di- 
 rectors to their fervants a- 
 broad, feem to have been 
 too general, and to com- 
 prehend all their fettle- 
 ments; but the whole 
 tenor of theirconducl: from 
 that period, the whole fpi- 
 rit of their correfpond- 
 ence, fhews that this pro- 
 hibition never v/as meant 
 to f-xtend to Bombay, for 
 which fettlement they 
 have inceflantly repeated 
 their wifhes to procure an 
 adequate territorial efta- 
 blifhment. 
 
 The firft grand confi- 
 deration of the court of 
 directors muft neceffarily 
 have been, to promote by 
 all means (confident with 
 the rules of trade, the 
 powers of their charter, 
 and the laws of nations) 
 the immediate interefts of 
 their employers, according 
 to the feveral exigencies 
 of the times, in their 
 days of profperity, they 
 procured the treaty of II- 
 Jahabad: in the moment 
 of deie&ion, they were 
 faddled
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 fion and punifliment for 
 it, as an inftance of wilful 
 difobedience of orders, and 
 as tending to difturb and 
 destroy that ftate of tran- 
 quillity and peace with 
 all their neighbours, the 
 prefervation of which has 
 been recommended as the 
 firft principle of policy to 
 the Britifh governments 
 in India. ^ 
 
 5. That the mainte- 
 nance of an inviolable 
 character for moderation, 
 good faith, and fcrupulous 
 regard to treaty, ought to 
 have been the fimple 
 grounds on which the Bri- 
 tifh governments fhould 
 have endeavoured to efta- 
 blifh an influence fuperior 
 to that of other Europeans 
 over the minds of the na- 
 tive powers in India ; and 
 that the danger and dif- 
 credit arifing from the 
 forfeiture of this pre-emi- 
 nence, could not be com- 
 penfated by the temporary 
 fuccefs of any plan of vio- 
 lence or injuftice. 
 
 6. That as any efTen- 
 tial failure in the execu- 
 tive condudt of the fu- 
 preme council or prefi- 
 dencies would make them 
 juitly liable to the moft 
 ierious 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 faddled with that of Poor- 
 under, Like fenfible men, 
 they have ftuck to the firft 
 bargain, which was clear- 
 ly profitable ; and, like 
 good merchants, they have 
 fhifted the latter from their 
 flioulders the inftant that 
 a flaw in the agreement, or 
 a non-performance of the 
 conditions, afforded them 
 a plea on commercial 
 grounds. 
 
 The company, as a - ^ 
 trading body, muft natu- 
 rally place the firft pre- 
 eminence of a merchant in 
 the good faith of his compt- 
 ing-houfe, and the honor 
 of his bills. No danger^ 
 no difcredit) could more 
 immediately operate or* 
 fuch a body, than the for- 
 feiture of this pre-emi- 
 nence. 
 
 The pretenfions of the 
 Company, like the hag- (' 
 glings of a dealer, though 
 dictated by felf-intereft, 
 have not been deficient in 
 the common and cufto- 
 mary appeals to reafon, 
 juftice, aid propriety. 
 
 i. If
 
 RESOLUTIONTS. 
 ferious animadverfions of 
 their fuperiors ; fo fhould 
 any relaxation, without 
 fufficient caufe, in thefe 
 principles of good govern- 
 ment, on the part of 
 the Dii colors themfelves, 
 bring upon them, in an 
 heavier degree, the refent- 
 ment of the legiflative 
 power of their country, 
 which alone can interpofe 
 an effectual correction to 
 the general mifrule. 
 
 y. w That the conduct of 
 the Company' and their 
 fervants in India to the 
 King and Nudjiff Cawn, 
 with refpecl to the tribute 
 payable to the one, and 
 the ftipend to the other, 
 and with refpecl to the 
 transfer of the provinces 
 of Corah and lllahabad to 
 the Vizier, was contrary 
 to policy and good faith j 
 and that fuch wife and 
 
 practicable meafures 
 fhould be adopted in fu- 
 ture as may tend to re- 
 deem the national honour, 
 and recover the confi- 
 dence and attachment of 
 the princes of India. 
 
 8. That 
 
 OBSERVATIONS 
 
 1. If the Company be 
 cenfured for withholding; 
 the kind's tribute and 
 Nudjiff Cawn's ftipend, 
 the Company's fervants 
 are ipfofaflo acquitted. 
 
 2. If it be meant to 
 " redeem the national bo- 
 nour" by paying up the 
 arrears of tribute ; or 
 even (which may perhaps 
 be all that is here implied) 
 by remitting it regularly 
 in future from Bengal ; 
 the treaty of lllahabad 
 will foon ceafe to be po- 
 pular. 
 
 3. We guaranteed Co- 
 rah and lllahabad to the 
 king, for himfelf, with 
 an exprefs ftipulation that 
 he fhould refide there. 
 We refumed them, when 
 we found he was deter- 
 mined
 
 RESOIUTIONS. 
 
 8. That too ftrong a 
 confirmation cannot be 
 given to the fentiments 
 andrefolutionsofthecourt 
 of directors, and of the 
 court of proprietors of the 
 Eaft India company, in 
 comdemnation of the Ro- 
 hilla war : that the con- 
 duel of the President and 
 Select Committee of Ben- 
 gal appears, in almoft every 
 ftage of it, to have been 
 biafTed by an interefted 
 partiality to the vizier, to 
 tranfgrefs their own as 
 well as the company's po- 
 fitive and repeated regula- 
 tions and orders : that the 
 extermination of the Ro- 
 hillas was not neceflary for 
 the recovery of forty lacks 
 of 
 
 29 ) 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 mined to quit all con- 
 nexion with us, to under- 
 take a knight-errant ex- 
 pedition to Dehli, and to 
 give up thofe provinces to 
 the Mahrattas. The King 
 muft long have been heart- 
 ily difgufted with the trea- 
 ty of Illahabad ; and, were 
 we now to pay the tribute 
 originally agreed by it, he 
 would probably employ 
 the money in armaments 
 to difturb us in the peace* 
 able enjoyment of its other 
 articles. 
 
 i The court of directors 
 and the court of proprie- 
 tors, did, inDecemben 775, 
 exprefs a difapprobation of 
 the principles of the Ro- 
 hilla war ; but they never 
 thought of refunding the 
 price of ouraffiftance. The 
 fia& is, they condemned 
 the meafure, becaufe they 
 feared it might afford a 
 dangerous precedent un- 
 der a lefs able governor. 
 They alfo pofitively dif- 
 claimed all fufpicion of 
 corrupt motives in their 
 prefidentWarrenHaftings, 
 efq. without proof. No 
 proof of interefted partiali- 
 ty to the vizier is to be 
 found in the report : and, 
 as the character of a man 
 of
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 of rupees ; and that, if it 
 was expedient to make 
 their country a barrier 
 againft the Marattas, there 
 is reafon to believe that 
 this might have been af- 
 fected by as eafy and by a 
 lefs iniquitous interference 
 of the government of Ben- 
 gal, which would at the 
 fame time have pruerved 
 the dominion to the right- 
 ful owners, and exhibited 
 an attentive example of 
 juftice as well as poiicy to 
 all India. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS* 
 
 of honour is infinitely 
 more wounded by the mere 
 imputation of criminal 
 felf-intereft than the full 
 conviction of erroneous 
 judgment, we will (till 
 fome proof {hall authorize 
 the prefent reading) ven- 
 ture at all events to fub- 
 ftitute the word political for 
 inter ejlsd, previous to par- 
 tiality. It will then itand, 
 that it might appear to 
 Mr.Hafting /W///W/y right 
 to afliftScujah 'udDowla in 
 the conque.l of the .o- 
 hillas, and tothe C^uimit- 
 tee's cool deliberation it 
 appears poiit'^Hy wrong. 
 Secondly, ^ntnriti^ that 
 the Vizier had a demand 
 on the Rohillas to; forty 
 Jacks of rupees ; if by their 
 pertinacious refufal tc ; y 
 a juft deb , they oV'?r;ed 
 him to rec-:r to f rcible 
 means, and then were in- 
 vincibly refolved to peiifti 
 in reftftance to his arms, 
 their extermination d^es 
 reaJly appear to nave been 
 necefiary for the recovery 
 ofthefe forty lacks. Juft 
 as a bailiff, in the ordinary 
 courfe of duty, may be re- 
 duced to the neceflity of 
 ki.ockina: down,maimi:ig, 
 or otherwiie ill treating a 
 refradtory
 
 RtSOLUTlOKs. 
 
 31 ) 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 rcfra&ory debtor, who op- 
 pofes the execution of a 
 writ. Thirdly,if there were 
 more modes than one bjr 
 which the Rohilla country 
 could be made a barrier 
 againft theMahrattas (in 
 which cafe aflertion muft 
 not ftand in the place of 
 truth), an error in the 
 choice of thofe modes does 
 not imply any iniquitous 
 interference. But it is 
 mod certain that the do- 
 minion of 1 that county 
 could natpoffibly be preferved 
 to the rightful owners,-, 
 without previoufly difpof- 
 fefling the Rohillas, whofe : 
 ufurpation had not even 
 reached the period ufually- 
 required to afcertain a 
 Tight of prefcription. 
 
 I. The company's wifli 
 to acquire fome territorial 
 
 . 9. That the company's 
 fervants in their prefidency 
 
 of Bombay, were guilty of fupports for their fettle- 
 very notorious inftances of ments on the weftern fide 
 of India, is of public and 
 undoubted notoriety. The 
 company's fervants, how- 
 ever they might originally 
 exceed the commands of 
 their m afters in the feizure 
 of Salfette, &c. yet arc 
 allowed to have received 
 the full remiffion of their 
 
 difobedience to the orders 
 of their employers, as well 
 in the proceedings a^ainft 
 the nabob of Broach, as 
 in the commencement of 
 the Marratta war, by the 
 feizure of the iflands of 
 Salfette and Caranja. 
 
 10. That it appears that 
 
 the court of directors made 
 
 ufe of very ftrong expref- 
 
 iions, 
 
 fm, in the fubfequent 
 
 countenance and fanclion 
 
 afforded
 
 RESOLUTION'S. 
 
 fions, to communicate 
 their ^iftf- of acquiring 
 thofe ifl-ands, and the for- 
 trefs of Baflein ; and al- 
 though in the month of 
 April 1775, previous to 
 the receipt of intelligence 
 that Salfette was taken, 
 they very explicitly confi- 
 ned their fervants at Bom- 
 bay to meafures of nego- 
 
 3* ) 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 afforded to the meafure by 
 the court of dire&ors ; 
 therefore are no longer 
 objects of cenfure. 
 2. Ragoba was firft re- 
 gent, and afterward Pefh- 
 wa of the Mahratta em- 
 pire, and, for aught that 
 is proved in the report, 
 had as much right to enter 
 into treaties, as his ma- 
 
 pany's prohibitions of of- 
 fenfive alliances, &c. clear- 
 ly related to the ftate of 
 their affairs on the other 
 fide of India. With re- 
 
 ciation, as the only means jefty Shah Allum himfelf ; 
 they authorized for ma- and had, at one time, 
 king the aequifition ; yet much more power to en- 
 after knowledge 1 of the force them. The corn- 
 event, they do not'feem to 
 have fignjfied any difplea- 
 fure at the tranfaclion, or 
 any farther anxiety than 
 about the prefervation of 
 the conqueft : and that the" fpet to their weftern pur- 
 court of directors in this fuits, they only * rather 
 inftance gave countenance ivijh they could be obtained 
 and fan&ion to the very by purchafe than war ; and, 
 meafure they had them- confining theit views to 
 fdves fo pointedly con- 
 demned, and are therefore 
 fo far chargeable with the 
 refponftbiltty of it. 
 
 ii. That in forming an 
 ofFenfive alliance with Ra- 
 goba, the government of 
 
 Bombay violated the orders 
 
 of the company again ft any 
 
 con- 
 
 the aequifition .of Salfette 
 and BalTein, &c. caution 
 their fervants, f in all their 
 treaties., negotiations, and- 
 military operations, to be 
 ever watchful to obtain them. 
 Their fervants, in confe- 
 quence, made a treaty w\l\\ 
 Ragoba, by which they 
 were 
 
 * 5 Report, page 60. Extract of General Letter to 
 Bombay, 18 March, 1768. 
 
 f General Letter to Bombay, 31 March, 1769.
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 connexions of that na- 
 ture, and agrainft any in- 
 terference in the quarrels 
 of the native powers : that 
 they undertook, without 
 a certainty of an adequate 
 revenue, or a fufficient 
 military force, and without 
 proper communication 
 with the fuperior govern- 
 ment upon which they 
 were to depend for fanc- 
 tion and fupport, to place 
 that chief on the rnufnud 
 at Poonah, and thereby 
 to involve themfelves in a 
 war with the ruling mini- 
 fters of the Mara, ta flate ; 
 while Ragoba himfelf was 
 not in the mean time able 
 to give the company fecure 
 pofleflion of any of the 
 grants he had made to 
 them for the purchafe of 
 their affirmance. 
 
 12. That the meafures 
 taken by the majority, 
 which then confifted of 
 Meflrs. Clavering, Mon- 
 fon, and Frances, in the 
 government of Bengal, 
 for the reftoration of peace, 
 were wife and juft in their 
 principle, and conforma- 
 ble to the fpirit of the 
 company's orders, not- 
 withftanding 
 
 ( 33 ) 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 were form, lly ct-J? J to us ; 
 \nevot i(>; .! times 
 
 with the other Muhn.ita 
 chiefs for. the delivery of 
 them, ant 1 , have at lad ob- 
 tained poffeffion by mili- 
 tary operations. 
 
 The method of inter- 
 ference adopted by Ge- 
 neral Clavering and his 
 majority in the buiinefs of 
 Bombay, was abrupt, im- 
 politic, perfonal, and dil- 
 advantageous to their em- 
 ployers. Abrupt, in that, 
 on their arrival at Bengal, 
 they proceeded to a deci- 
 fion on the itate of affairs, 
 befqr 
 
 See 5 Report, page 74, 16 and 1 7 lines.
 
 ( 34 
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 withftanding that their 
 method of interference 
 was not afterwards appro- 
 ved of by the court of 
 directors. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 before they could poflibly 
 become in any degree maf- 
 ters of the fub'iccl : im- 
 politic, in that, by the vi- 
 olent change introduced 
 
 13. That the 'erms of by their fyftem, they be- 
 trayed the weaknefs and 
 dilunion of our govern- 
 der, in the beginning of ment to all India : per- 
 Marc K 177% werc ho- foual, in prefuming to give 
 nourableand advantageous private verbal injlntftions 
 to the company; when to Colonel Upton, which 
 the circumfrances of the 
 
 the treaty concluded by 
 colonel Upton at Pooiun- 
 
 rife and progrefs of the 
 war, the want of refources 
 for carrying it on, the ftate 
 of the contending parties, 
 the inftruclions of the fu- 
 perior council, and the ge- 
 neral fentimems of the 
 company, are attended to. 
 14. That the perfeve- 
 rance of the fuperior go- 
 vernment, in directing the 
 execution of the articles 
 of accommodation, xvas 
 judicious and commenda- 
 ble, notwithflanding that 
 the prefidency of Bombay 
 
 muft n-Cfflaiily tend to 
 alarm the Governor-gene- 
 ral, and to lower him in 
 the eyes of the Company's 
 immediate fervants,as well 
 as their allies and connex- 
 ions : diladvantageou?, 
 in as much as there is 
 reafon to fuppofc, that we 
 might have retained, from 
 that moment, " all \tke 
 ceded territories ( except 
 BaJJein)" they being then 
 in our pofleffion ; and 
 that the blood and trea- 
 fure, which have fmce 
 been lavifhed in the ftrug- 
 
 protefted againtt: them, as gle for them, might have 
 
 inadequate and highly in- been entirely faved, f had 
 
 jurious to the reputation, Colonel Upton but Jhewn a 
 
 honour, and interefts of firrn determination net to 
 
 the company : and that part with them, 
 the court of directors, in 
 their 
 
 5 Report, page 82. 
 
 jj 5 Report, pages 88, 8c^ 
 
 \ 5 Report, page 82..
 
 ( 3S 
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 thtir letter of the i5th 
 December 1775, which 
 reached Calcutta on ift 
 Juiy 17/6, declared their 
 intentions of keeping all 
 territories and poflefiions 
 ceded to the company by 
 the treaty concluded with 
 Ragoba. 
 
 15 That the prefident 
 and council of Bombay, 
 in granting an afylum to 
 Ragoba after the conclu- 
 fion of the treaty of Poor- 
 under, did not thereby 
 commit any direct in- 
 fringement on the ftipula- 
 tions of that treaty, provi- 
 ded they had taken no 
 other oflenfive meafure in 
 fupport of his caufe : and 
 it appears, that this con- 
 dudt coincided with the 
 fentiments and inftruc- 
 tions of the court of Di- 
 re&ors, who made the per- 
 fonal fafety of Ragoba one 
 of the conditions of their 
 acquiefcence in the treaty 
 of Poorunder. 
 
 16. That it appears 
 that the Court of Direc- 
 tors, by their letters to 
 Bengal of 5th February, 
 and to Bombay of i6th 
 April 1777. manifefted 
 fome difTatisfa&ion at the 
 terms 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 The Governor-general 
 is here charged with 
 (hewing a flrong tenden- 
 cy for the renewal of the 
 Mahratta war, after it had 
 ceafed by the treaty of 
 Poorunder. Undoubt- 
 edly, the Governor-gene- 
 ral had always oppofed 
 that treaty ; the Council 
 of Bombay had protefted 
 agaioft it ; and the Court 
 of Directors difapproved 
 of it. But, in fadl> the 
 Governor- general's mea- 
 fures had no tendency to a 
 renewal of the war : his 
 words and his wifties were 
 alike for peace. But, as 
 the terms of the treaty 
 were Mill unfulfilled, he 
 thought himfclf entitled 
 to infift on the definitive 
 execution of them. The 
 inftru&ions to Bombay, 
 faid to contain a virtual 
 encouragement as well as 
 precife authority f *' to 
 form 
 f 19 Refolut.
 
 ( s 
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 term;; of the trea'y of 
 Pomander, as >t had not 
 p < -':-ed for the Company 
 th furrender of Baflein, 
 
 L>v'e very ftrong en- 
 co-iragement to both Pre- 
 fidencies, to feize the 
 ilighteft pretence of pro- 
 vocation from the Mini- 
 fters to renew their en- 
 gugcment with Ragoba. 
 
 17 That it appears 
 th.;' th.- p.opofiti <ns of the 
 Go/ernor - general, re- 
 
 . : cr\ the 26th J-i- 
 
 nuar\ i ; ^,were evidently 
 founded 'on thefe fenti- 
 mr >t^ Q the Court of 
 Dircvltars, contained de- 
 rm-ids on trie Maratta ad- 
 : -i - ifl ration greatly ex- 
 . ng the co{,d,;i')ns of 
 g , .oAty ef Poorunder, 
 3 d the firft de- 
 'ng a detach- 
 ment from Bengal to the 
 Malabar ro.ift. 
 
 . . That the refolution 
 ( e niajority of rhe Su 
 ; c Council on r he 2d 
 >'ebjuary 1778, whi^hby 
 the death oT Colonel Mon- 
 Ir/n >vas ;H^W decided by 
 t fting voice of the 
 
 C?^n Tiior general, had a 
 ftrong tendency to a re- 
 newal 
 
 6 ) 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 form a new alliance with 
 Ragoba, and to engage 
 with him in any fcheme 
 they {hould deem expe- 
 dient and fafe for retriev- 
 ing his affairs," wear a 
 very different afpedi, --hen 
 contrafted with the hypo- 
 thetical proportion imme- 
 diately preceding the clofc 
 of the paragraph. 
 
 J Jf, fay the Governor- 
 general and Council, the 
 prefent or future mem- 
 bers of the adminiftration 
 {hall either directly in- 
 fringe the treaty, or per- 
 mit it to be infringed by 
 perfons acting under their 
 authority, or fhall refufe 
 to fulfil the conditions of 
 it, (then, and in that cafe 
 only, is of neccfiity to be 
 underftood) we, as autho- 
 rized by the Company, do 
 inveft you with authority 
 to form a new alliance 1 
 with Ragoba, &c. 
 
 To be fure, with 
 
 great realbn. - Were we 
 not only to fit ftill under 
 a treaty exprefsly declared 
 to be inadequate, and high- 
 ly injurious to the reputation, 
 honour^ and interefls cf 
 the Company , but to fub- 
 rnit. 
 
 6 Report, page jo.
 
 ( 37 
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 jiewal of he Maratta war; 
 becaufe it gave a fanction 
 and confirmation to the 
 refolution of the Bombay 
 Council of the icth and 
 12th December preced- 
 ing, to co operate with a 
 confederacy of fome of the 
 Maratta Minifters, in car- 
 rying Ragoba to Poona. 
 
 19. That it appears 
 that the Court of Direc- 
 tors in their letter of 4th 
 July 1777, to the Prefi- 
 dent and Council of Bom- 
 bay, enjoined them to pay 
 a Ihicl adherence to the 
 treaty of Poorunder ; but 
 gave them at the fame 
 time orders to obey the 
 directions of the Superior 
 Council, who were pof- 
 feffed of a difcretionary 
 licence to refume the caufe 
 of Ragoba j and that the 
 proceedings of the Gover- 
 nor-general and Council, 
 on the 23d March 1778, 
 and the letter written in 
 confequence, containing 
 inftrudtions to the admi- 
 niftration at Bombay, a- 
 mounted to a virtual en- 
 couragement, as well as 
 authority to them, " to 
 " form a new alliance 
 "with 
 
 * 6 Report, page 6. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 mit alfo with patience to 
 every wanton vio!itr> , jr 
 perverfe raifconftruttiouof 
 that treaty ? 
 
 2. The refolution in fa- 
 vour of Ragoba had no 
 ncceflary tendency to a 
 renewal of the war. For, 
 if, ( *as was affc'rttdj 
 one of the two Maa- 
 ratta minifters who had 
 figncd the treaty of Poo- 
 runder really encouraged 
 a cooperation with Ra- 
 goba and the Bombay 
 Council, there was great 
 political probability, that 
 our weight thrown into 
 a caufe already equally 
 poifed, would decidedly 
 turn the fcale ; and it 
 might alfo happen, that 
 the party which propofed 
 a change of meafures by 
 a coalition with us, might 
 already poflefs fuch pre- 
 ponderance. The Poonah 
 miniftry might poffibly 
 have one general outline 
 of action, without the 
 unanimity of a Britifh 
 jury. 
 
 Sicca-Ram Baboe. 
 
 1554744
 
 ( 3S 
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 " with Ragoba, and to 
 " engage with him in any 
 '* Icheme they (hould deem 
 *' expedient and fafe for 
 " retrieving his affairs." 
 
 20. That it appears, 
 that a French agent had 
 been received at Poona, in 
 the beginning of the year 
 1777, and that negocia- 
 tions were fuppofed to be 
 thenceforward carried on 
 between him and the Ma- 
 ratta government, of a 
 tendency inimical to the 
 Britiih interefts ; that Ge- 
 neral Clavering had de- 
 clared his opinion, *' that 
 " all the acts of the Bom- 
 
 ) 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 The Mahrattas, as an 
 independent power, would 
 negotiate now,or at any o- 
 ther time, with theFrench, 
 Portuguefe, Dutch, or any 
 other European nation 
 which they thought could 
 be ferviceable to their in- 
 terefts or their arms. Gen. 
 Clavering's declared opi- 
 nion, that a Minifter from 
 the Superior Council re- 
 fiding at Poonah would 
 preclude all the poffibility 
 
 ' bay prefidency had been of French intrigue, does 
 *' fo manifeftly hoftile to no great honour to his 
 the IVLratta ftate, he politics. Information had 
 not furprized at at that moment been re- 
 ceived by Mr. Haftings, 
 through feveral channels, 
 that Choul was to be 
 ceded to the French, that 
 a body of troops was ac- 
 tually ready at the ifland 
 Mauritius to take poflef- 
 fion of it, and that the 
 Court of Verfailles had 
 definitively refolved to at- 
 tack us in India. All this 
 can be proved. General 
 Clavering was not infal- 
 lible. 
 
 was not lurpnzed at 
 " their endeavour to form 
 connections with the 
 French, to protect 
 " themfelves againft ftich 
 ' unfriendly and unjufti- 
 " fiable proceedings : " 
 That Colonel Upton had 
 afcribed to the Prefidency 
 of Bombay, the blame of 
 delay and obftruftion to 
 the conclufion of the trea- 
 ty ; and had given his o- 
 pinion, *' That when all 
 the conditions of it 
 *' fhould be carried into 
 ' execution,
 
 ( 39 
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 execution, the French 
 intrigues at the Maratta 
 Durbar would no longer 
 give any alarm ; and 
 that if a Minifter from 
 the Superior Council 
 was fent to refide there, 
 which the Pemwa and 
 the Minifters had ever 
 requefted, the intereft of 
 the Company with the 
 Poona Government 
 would be fecured a- 
 gainft every attempt to 
 fupplant it." 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 21. That it appears 
 that the Governor-gene- 
 ral on the ift June 1778, 
 profefled his refclution ot 
 fupporting Ragoba, as a 
 mere inftrument for de- 
 feating the projects of the 
 French, and of giving fe- 
 curity and permanency to 
 the peace of the fettlement 
 of Bombay : That on re- 
 ceipt of accounts from 
 Europe, of a rupture with 
 France, the majority of 
 the board, on the motion 
 of the Governor-general, 
 refolved upon a deputation 
 to Berar, to form an offen- 
 five alliance with the Ra- 
 ja- 
 
 The Governor-general 
 never was hearty in the 
 caufe of Ragoba He ufed 
 him as an inftrument re- 
 commended by his maf- 
 ters, until, on the news 
 of a rupture with France, 
 the neceffity of acquiring, 
 if poffible, a powerful In- 
 dian ally, fuperfeded the 
 duty of protecting Ra- 
 goba. 
 
 22. That 
 
 Whether
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 
 12. Thar ai ' fupport 
 ' >oba, incor.'titent 
 with th-.' treaty of T'oorun- 
 dr , does j.ot appear to 
 have been fo n -oer. y or 
 advifable a me'ns foi de- 
 i >. pro- 
 t-ie French in con- 
 . .1 the Marat- 
 fas, as to rifle the certain 
 cxpence and uncertain e- 
 vent of fuch an undertak- 
 ing. 
 
 23. That it does not 
 appear to have been a ne- 
 cefiary or advifable means 
 for defeating the fuppofed 
 projects of the French, to 
 depart from the fettled 
 maxim of the Company's 
 policy, and to hazard the 
 confequence of an offen- 
 five alliance with the Raja 
 cfBerar, for the avowed 
 purpofe of recovering for 
 him the conqucfts made 
 by the Nizam, and of u- 
 niting the dangerous pow- 
 ers of the Maratta empire 
 under one aclive com- 
 mand. 
 
 4 o 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 Whether fhe fupport of 
 Rap;oba as a means tr-coun- 
 teracl: French influence 
 were neceiTarv or advifa- 
 ble, mult depend on <he 
 eificacy allowed to that in- 
 fluence. General ( Ha- 
 vering, we fee by the f .ft 
 refolution, to evade this 
 c .moderation, only denied 
 the exiftence of French in- 
 fluence: which events have 
 amply r-f'utvd. 
 
 i. TheMahrat'a power?, 
 united under one aclive 
 comn:and,are indifputably 
 dangerous ; but they are, 
 for that fimple reafon, ena- 
 bled to oe f.rviceable The 
 Governor general's view at 
 the moment of this pro- 
 pofition, was to fee u re on 
 effective ally againu the 
 powers of France, which 
 may alfo be pronounced 
 fomewhat dangerous, and 
 might require to be well 
 matched. 
 
 2 The offer of recover- 
 ing for Moodajee Boofla 
 the capture made on his 
 dominions by NizamAlly, 
 was merely one of the 
 grounds on which the 
 Governor-general thought 
 * it might be poffible to 
 enter 
 
 * 6 Report, page 18.
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 
 24. That it appears 
 that the Nizam, in the 
 month of July 1778, 
 warned the Governor-ge- 
 neral, as he had before 
 done the Governor of 
 Madras, in the moft un- 
 equivocal manner, of the 
 nature of his connections 
 with the Poona govern- 
 ment, and of the hoftile 
 part which he fhould take 
 againft the Company, in 
 confequence of the fup- 
 port they might give to 
 the pretenfions of Ragoba : 
 And th-t it further ap- 
 pears, that he engaged to 
 infift upon the execution 
 of the treaty of Poorunder, 
 and to take part with the 
 Company againft the Ma- 
 ratta minifters, if they 
 fhould be found to give 
 any 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 enter into a negotiation 
 with that Raja. He pofi- 
 tively declared, that the 
 meafure, as it then ftood, 
 was purely defenfive ; and 
 the hint feems to have been 
 only thrown out as a lure 
 to encourage the Raja to 
 treat with us at all. No- 
 thing in the report goes to 
 prove that we muft have 
 pledged ourfelves at all 
 events to undertake a war 
 againft Nizam Ally. 
 
 I . Do/us an virtus , quis in 
 bojte requirit? Itfuitedthe 
 Nizam's purpofe of the 
 moment to deny the exift- 
 ence of French influence 
 at the Poonah Durbar, or 
 at leaft to aflert that he 
 could and would render 
 it ineffectual, &c. Sec. with 
 other magnificent brava- 
 does. But who can anfv/er 
 for the Nizam's fincerity ? 
 He appears to have acred 
 from a rooted perfonal dif- 
 like to Ragoba. 
 
 2. Whether fo politic 
 and fo felfifli a prince as 
 Niz-'.m Ally was quite 
 candid in his offers, and 
 whether an acceptance of 
 thofe offers would have 
 been a more wife, fafe, and 
 honourable plan of defence 
 againft the machinations 
 
 3 F of
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 any countenance or encou- 
 ragement to the French. 
 
 25. That a more cer- 
 tain means of completing 
 the flipulations of the 
 treaty of Poorunder, and 
 a more wife, fafe, and 
 honourable plan of de- 
 fence againft: the machi- 
 nations of the French, 
 might have been effected 
 at that period, than either 
 an offenfive alliance with 
 the Raja of Berar, or any 
 active inteference in fa- 
 vour of Ragonaut Row. 
 
 26. That under all the 
 circumftances of the times, 
 it was not only unneceffa- 
 ry but impolitic, to take 
 any meafurcs conducive to 
 a re - commencement of 
 hoftilities againft the Ma- 
 rattas, without a certainty 
 of the friendship and con- 
 currence of Hyder Ally, 
 and the effectual fupport 
 of a powerful party in the 
 Poona government; and 
 that 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 of the French, than any 
 other, is a doubt not en- 
 tirely cleared up by any 
 documents to be found in 
 the report. Facts are 
 unequivocal . We have de- 
 feated theFrench intrigues, 
 and we have done it with- 
 out the afliftance, nay in 
 the very teeth of the Ni- 
 zam ; who, after all his 
 blufterings, feems to have 
 acquiefced very quietly in 
 the afTurances of the Go- 
 vernor - general's pacific 
 intentions. Turn where 
 we will to the records, we 
 find the Governor-general 
 an advocate for reasonable 
 peace, but an utter ftran- 
 ger to the language of 
 alarm or of fubmiflion. 
 
 The cenfurable part of 
 the Mahratta war lies, it 
 muft be confeffed, on the 
 fhoulders of the Bombay 
 gentlemen ; - but not for 
 the protection extended to 
 Ragoba, which had been 
 thoroughly approved by 
 their matters. 
 
 f 6 Report page 20.
 
 ( 43 ) 
 
 RESOLUTIONS. OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 that therefore, the refolu- 
 tions of the Prefldent and 
 Select Committee of Bom- 
 bay, on the 2ift July, and 
 the conditional approba- 
 tion fent by the fuperior 
 board, on the lyth Au- 
 guft 1778, were fo far re- 
 prehenfible. 
 
 27. That the proceed- 
 ings and refolutions of 
 the Prefident and Majority 
 of the Select Committee 
 of Bombay, on the i2th 
 October 1778, and the 
 military operations under- 
 taken in confequence of 
 them, were rafh, unautho- 
 rized, and impolitic, and 
 therefore highly reprehen- 
 fible ; becaufe the fituation 
 and circumftances of their 
 own ftrength and refour- 
 ces, the uncertainty of 
 fupport from the Bengal 
 detachment, the impro- 
 bability of any material aid 
 from a party in favour of 
 Ragoba, and his reluctant 
 confent to the terms pre- 
 fcribed for his cwn con- 
 duct, concurred in ren- 
 dering the expedition to 
 Poona a very dangerous 
 and unpromifing enter- 
 prize. 
 
 28. That it appears, 
 that the Court of Direc- 
 tors, F 2
 
 ( 44 
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 tors, in their letter of 2yth 
 May 1779, gave a warm 
 approbation to the treaty 
 and negociation formed 
 with Ragoba, for the pur- 
 pofe of an expedition to 
 Poona, and gave it a de- 
 cifive preference over eve- 
 ry connexion with the 
 Rajah of Berar, which 
 might fet afide or counter- 
 aft it. 
 
 29. That as well the 
 undertaking as the failure 
 of the expedition were at- 
 tended with the moft un- 
 fortunate and diftrefling 
 circumftances for the 
 Company's affairs ; and 
 that as the fupport of Ra- 
 
 ) 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 it no way appears, that 
 the fupport'of Ragoba had 
 fhaken the general confi- 
 dence of the native princes 
 in our good faith. Ra- 
 goba, who at laft fought 
 our protection, might, in 
 his brighter days, have 
 
 goba had fhaken the con- commanded our alliance. 
 
 ridence of the native prin- The Nizam was, indeed, 
 
 ces in our good faith, the 
 
 defeat of the enterprize 
 
 lefTened their idea of our 
 
 power, and that in conle- 
 
 quence thereof, their in- 
 clinations and hopes were 
 
 incited and encouraged to 
 
 offended at our interfe- 
 rence, but merely on per- 
 fonal motives. The Poo- 
 nah minifters were parties 
 in the caufe, and their af- 
 fertions go for nothing. 
 Apoftacy of friends, and 
 
 hoftile oppofition againft encouragement to enemies, 
 us. is the neceffary confe- 
 
 quence of a defeat : a fall- 
 ing nation, like a falling 
 minifter, will be attacked 
 from many an unexpected 
 quarter. 
 
 30. That it appears, The fubterfuge at Wor^ 
 
 that another dittreffing gaum, like a later event 
 
 con- ' of
 
 ( 45 ) 
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 confequenceofthe engage- of the fame kind at Jerfey, 
 tnent with Ragoba, and was the refult of momen- 
 ifTue 
 
 the unfortunate 
 the expedition, 
 neceflity of having re- 
 courfe to fubteifuge at 
 the time of the conven- 
 tion at Worgaum, and to 
 fubfequent dtfavowal by 
 the Superior Council, to 
 evade the performance of 
 the articles of convention. 
 
 31. That itappears that 
 Sir Eyre Coote, in his let^ 
 ter of the iSth January 
 1779, condemned thecon- 
 du6l of the two Prefiden- 
 cies of Bengal and Bom- 
 bay, and with good rea- 
 fon denounced the pro- 
 bable bad confequences of 
 the expedition to Poo- 
 nah, and of the march of 
 the detachment *' which 
 ( was fent from Bengal at 
 ' an immenfe expence, 
 4 and could produce no- 
 c thing but diftrefs to the 
 ' company, not to fay dif- 
 ' honour to the nation, 
 whether fuccefsful or 
 
 of tary calamity in the courfe 
 was the of war. That the engage- 
 ment with Ragoba led to 
 this misfortune, is very 
 true but not therefore 
 criminal ; for the fame en- 
 gagement might have fet 
 Ragoba on the Poonah 
 mufnud. This refolution 
 therefore, confidered ab- 
 ftradcdly, goes no farther 
 than fimply to refolve 
 that the Report is the Re- 
 port 
 
 It is allowed that Sir 
 Eyre Coote did exprefs 
 fuch opinions in his letters 
 of 18 Jan. 1779. 
 
 He has proved himfelf 
 upon all occafions a molt 
 able and a moft fortunate 
 commander but cannot 
 here be exalted to a pro- 
 phet. Indeed, fo far as 
 concerns the diftrefs and 
 difhonour brought on the 
 company by the march to 
 Poonah, he was right 
 for that march turned out 
 unfuccefsfully. But the 
 prophecy failed of its com- 
 pletion with refped to the 
 Bengal detachment, v/hich 
 has already procured much 
 territory and confiderable 
 revenue to the company, 
 32. That as
 
 ( 46 
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 
 32. That it appears that 
 the prefident and fele& 
 committee of 'Fort St. 
 George, in their letter of 
 yth February 1779? with 
 no lefs forcible reafon, de- 
 nounced the like fatal con- 
 fequences of thefe mea- 
 fures, and juftly pointed 
 out the alarming influence 
 which the ill-timed and un- 
 fortunate enterprize from 
 Bombay might have on the 
 minds of the country pow- 
 ers, to the prejudice of the 
 Britifh interefts ; that they 
 forefaw with juftice that 
 it might operate as an en- 
 couragement 
 
 OBIERVATIOKJ. 
 
 as well as the immediate 
 diftrefs occafioned by hi 
 cxpences ; and which we 
 do not find to have been 
 concerned in any thing 
 immediately or ultimately 
 difhonourableto the com- 
 pany or the nation. The 
 meafure was bold and un- 
 precedented therefore it 
 might be deemed alarm- 
 ing Had it failed the 
 dishonour of its ill fuccefs 
 would have fallen on him 
 or them who adopted it. 
 Events have crowned it 
 with honour to all parties. 
 In a general diftribution 
 the Madras government 
 will naturally come in for 
 its proportion. 
 
 The conduft of that 
 prefidency in regard to the 
 Pefbcufh and the Guntoor 
 Circar,feems,on the cool- 
 eft and moft deliberate ex- 
 amination of the reports, 
 to have inftigated the Ni- 
 zam to the animation of 
 a general confederacy of 
 the country powers againft 
 the Englifh. And we 
 have more reafon to form 
 this judgment, as the 
 Nizam, having once re- 
 ceived fatisfadion on thofe 
 two articles, fuffered this 
 more than armed neutra- 
 lity to come to nothing, at 
 leaft
 
 ( 47 ) 
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 couragement to Hyder Al- 
 ly " openly to refift the 
 <c propofed attempt on 
 " Mane j" that there was 
 therein great foundation 
 for their apprehenfions of 
 the unfavourable impref- 
 fion which thoTe meafures 
 and events might fix in 
 the difpofition of the Ni- 
 zam, already biafTed a- 
 gainft the company j that 
 they reprefented with 
 truth, the danger to which, 
 in thofe circumftances, 
 their northern Circars 
 would be expofed, fliould 
 the Nizam be induced to 
 venture upon hoftilities 
 againft them ; . that they 
 therefore, with provident 
 policy, refolved to fend a 
 refident to his Durbar, who 
 might have the beft intel- 
 ligence of his temper and 
 motions. 
 
 33. That the firft often- 
 fible defign of the deputa- 
 tion to Hyderabad was 
 perverted to' a mofr. impo- 
 litic and dishonourable 
 purpofe, by the fteps taken 
 for obtaining a relinquifh- 
 ment of the Peflicufh, and 
 as fuch tended rather to 
 inflame 
 
 * See his letter, 6th Report, p. 20. " We arc 
 ' friends of the Pethwa and minifters, and fhall con- 
 " tmue fo while they arc our friends." 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 leaft as far as concerned 
 himfelf. The unjuflifia- 
 lie proceedings againft the 
 Mahratta government were 
 jujlified \ n three lines by the 
 * Governor- general, and 
 the Nizam acquiefced in 
 the juftification. Not but 
 that the real caufes of a 
 war are feldom to be found 
 in the manifeftoes and 
 public correfpondence of 
 the belligerant powers. 
 The Nizam obferved pro- 
 bably, that our armies had 
 employment enough on 
 their hands, and might 
 conceive that to be the 
 time to ftrike fome bene- 
 ficial ftroke forhimfclf" 
 but he was miftakcn.
 
 ( 4 
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 inflame than compofe the 
 refentment of the Nizam ; 
 which conduct was the 
 more unpardonable in the 
 prefident and felect com- 
 mittee of Fort George, 
 becaufe they had appre- 
 hended* with fuch Cf.rly 
 and jufl forefight, the dan- 
 gerous effects of his difla- 
 tisfaction and the necefli- 
 ty of averting it. 
 
 34. That the motives 
 as well as fuccefs of the 
 Nizam's inftigations, to 
 form and animate a con- 
 federacy of the great 
 country powers againft the 
 Britifh poffeflions in In- 
 dia, and the calamitous 
 events which enfued, may 
 be properly attributed both 
 to the unjuftifiable pro- 
 ceedings againfl the Ma- 
 ratta government and to 
 the conduit of the Ma- 
 dras presidency, in regard 
 to the Pefhcufh and the 
 Guntoor circar. 
 
 35. That it appears, 
 that the instructions and 
 powers given to Colonel 
 Goddard by the Superior 
 Council on 5thApril 1779, 
 fixed on them from that 
 time the chief direction 
 and refponfibility of the 
 treaty and war with the 
 Marattas. 
 
 ) 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 Admitted on all hands- 
 
 The
 
 c 
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 36. That whatever 
 backwardnefs was after- 
 wards manifefted by the 
 Maratta minilters to any 
 accommodation, unlefs up- 
 on very hard and humilia- 
 ting terms to the company, 
 muft be afcribed as well 
 to their too reafonable 
 diffidence in our fincerity, 
 as to their advantageous 
 pretenfions from the con- 
 vention of Worgaum, and 
 the well-known difcon- 
 tcnt or enmity which our 
 conduct had raifed in 
 oth-er powers agayift us. 
 
 37. That ttappears that 
 the expences ot the war, 
 and efpecially of the de- 
 tachment fent to the Ma- 
 labar coaft, were felt and 
 acknowledged t.o be in a 
 very ferious degree diftref- 
 fmg to the Bengal govern- 
 ment, and greatly overba- 
 lanced every probable ad- 
 vantage from fuccefs,even 
 before the irruption of 
 Hyder Ally into the Car- 
 natic 
 
 49 ) 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 The backwardnefs ma- 
 nifefted by the Mahratw 
 minifterstonny accommo- 
 dation, unlefs upon very 
 hardand humiliatingterms 
 to the company, merely 
 fhews that they, like our- 
 felves, wifh to make the 
 mcjl of the market. But 
 from the whole fpirit of 
 the Report, it is evident, 
 that the real origin of 
 all their backwardnefs was 
 the advantage given them 
 by our precipitate eager- 
 nefs for peace on any terms 
 at Poorunder. From that 
 moment they perceived 
 the childifli appreh&nfions 
 which operated on the 
 leading members of our 
 government, and a (Turn- 
 ed extravagant pretenfions 
 and infolent language ac- 
 cordingly. 
 
 The immediate ex- 
 pences of every extenfive 
 war can only be re-irr- 
 burfed by the long and 
 gradual advantages of a 
 good peace. It is, certain, 
 the charge of the detach- 
 ment was very burthen- 
 fome to Bengal But that 
 very burthen was a pow- 
 erful fpur to vigorous ac- 
 tions, and an additional 
 plea for the acquifition, 
 
 G if
 
 ( i 
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 natic made the misfortune 
 of being engaged at the 
 fame time in fuch a war 
 with the Marattas more 
 calamitous and alarming. 
 
 38. That immediately 
 upon advice of the fuccefo 
 of Hyder Ally in the Car- 
 natic, the Governor-ge- 
 neral and Council gave 
 proof of the readied: and 
 moft important exertions 
 for the affiftance of the 
 prefidency of Madras, arid 
 took immediate meafures 
 with a view to obtain 
 peace with the Marattas, 
 and to regain the friend- 
 ihip of the Nizam. 
 
 39. That it muft be 
 reckoned among the many 
 additional mifchiefs which 
 have arifen chiefly from 
 this improvident war with 
 the Marattas to the Com- 
 pany's affairs, that the 
 military force of the Car- 
 natic had been weakened 
 by reinforcements fent to 
 the Malabar coaft ; that 
 the Bengal government 
 have been under the ne- 
 cefiity of fupporting, on 
 their confines, the armj 
 of a power confederated 
 (however involuntarily) 
 againft them ; that they 
 have been obliged to fue 
 
 for 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 if poflible, of an adequate 
 compenfation. 
 
 A dozen Machaons are 
 worth an army : a good 
 ftatefman is worth a dozen 
 Machaons. In the midft 
 of accumulated diftrefs, 
 and perplexed by the 
 clamours of defpair, Mr. 
 Haftings planned and ex- 
 ecuted the relief of Ma- 
 dras. Rajah Chimnajee 
 Boofla had ftationed an 
 army where he had a right 
 to ftation it s in his own 
 dominions ; nor could our 
 troops march to theCarna- 
 tic, without eroding thofe 
 dominions : and the on- 
 ly poflibility of faving the 
 0arnatic depended on their 
 palling unmolefted. They 
 did pafs, and enabled bir 
 Eyre Coote to follow up 
 his firft doubtful victory 
 over Hyder Ally, which 
 was the origin of all our 
 future fuccels. Chimnajee, 
 though not an enemy to 
 our fchemes, watched 
 them with an interefted 
 folicitude; and having pri- 
 vate political rules for his 
 own conduct, would pro- 
 bably have profited bv our 
 ;i '
 
 ( 51 
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 for the mediation of the 
 fame power (the Raja of 
 Berar) have liibmitted to 
 a refufal, and purchafed at 
 Jaft an uncertain, becaufe 
 apparently an unautho- 
 rized treaty on moft ex- 
 travagant and difhono'ur- 
 able conditions with his 
 fan RajaChimnajee; and 
 finally, that being bur- 
 then ed "with the expences 
 of a variety of diftant ex- 
 peditions while th'eir allies 
 are in diftrefs and their 
 tributaries under oppref- 
 fion, there is alfo an alarm - 
 ing'deficiency in their own 
 rc'fources of revenue and 
 commerce, by the accu- 
 mulation of their debt and 
 the reduction of their in- 
 vefrment. 
 
 40. That 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 ill-fuccefs, as we could 
 not, at that moment, gua- 
 rantee him on a conjunc- 
 tion with us from thu at- 
 tempts of Nizarn Ally In 
 this fituation his alliance 
 was of the utmoft impor- 
 tance to us ; and to thofe 
 who know the perpetual 
 arrears of payment due to 
 Indian armies, it will not 
 feem wonderful that 'the 
 Raja fliould want money : 
 To thofe who would vote 
 a gratuitous donation of 
 26 lacks annually to the 
 king, the purchafe of 
 part of Chimnajee's troops 
 will feem very cheap at 16 
 lacks. 
 
 But it will be found 
 impoflible, by any num- 
 ber of Refolutions, to un- 
 ravel all the intricate 
 doublings of Afiatic po- 
 licy. In countries where 
 the balance of power is 
 uncertain, conteicsare in- 
 evitable. New events 
 give rife to new expedi- 
 ents, and thofe again to 
 newer events. Ultimate 
 fuccefs is the goal of each- 
 contending party. If we 
 would obtain the end, 
 we muft not neglect the 
 means. As the treaty 
 with Raja Chimn.'jee was 
 
 G 2 U1J2U-
 
 ( 52 ) 
 
 RESOLUTION'S. OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 unauthorized, the vigour 
 of the meafure is doubly 
 honourable for the Gover- 
 nor-general. Inftead of 
 being extravagant, it has 
 been proved moderate j 
 and Mr. Railings, with 
 the moft unexampled dif- 
 intereftednefs, flaked his 
 own private fortune to 
 procure it. 
 
 The fuddennefsand fuc- 
 cefs of the invafion by 
 Hyder Ally, hardly left aa 
 option of meafures for his 
 repulfe. State - neceffity 
 amply juitifted the offer 
 of a fmall part of thofe 
 territories, fuppofed to be 
 captured by him, for the 
 protection and recovery of 
 the whole. Had the Car- 
 naticbeen loft in theevent 
 of the invafion, and had 
 Mr. Haftings never ftart- 
 ed thepropofition of apof- 
 fibility of Dutch affift- 
 ance the omilfion would 
 have been branded with 
 terms of equal condemna- 
 tion, and with that juftice 
 which the prefent {rate of 
 the cafe will not admit. 
 
 Overturned ( while 
 pending) by an un- 
 doubted and favourable 
 change of affairs. 
 
 40. That the attempt 
 made by the Government 
 General, in the month of 
 January 1781, to form an 
 engagement of alliance, 
 offenfive and defenfive, 
 with the Dutch Eaft In- 
 dia Company, by the 
 means, and upon the 
 terms ftated in the pro- 
 ceedings of their council, 
 was unwarranted, impo- 
 litic, extravagant, and 
 unjuft. 
 
 41. That it appears, 
 that according to the iaft 
 official cii(p .tches from 
 Bengal, dated 15 May 
 1781, the profpecl of 
 peace 
 
 The
 
 ( 53 ) 
 
 RESOLUTIONS. OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 peace was not then propi- 
 tious, becaufe it did not 
 feem to be wifhed for by 
 the Marattas upon the 
 terms propofed, and be- 
 caufe the government of 
 Bengal not thinking it 
 defirable, without obtain- 
 ing even additional advan- 
 tages, had reprobated the 
 fyftem of defence, which 
 the Prefidency of Bom- 
 bay wifhed to have adopt- 
 ed j and that the conduct ' 
 of the Government Ge- 
 neral, as far as it might 
 tend to procraftinate ac- 
 commodation with the 
 Marattas, was evidently 
 injurious to the interefts 
 of the Company and to 
 the Nation. 
 
 42. That it appears, 
 that the Government Ge- 
 neral had been previoufly 
 in pofleflion of a letter from 
 the Duan of the Rajah of 
 Berar, containing over- 
 tures for mediation for 
 peace, and alliance with 
 the Pefhwa ; and that this 
 material information was 
 wholly fupprefled by them 
 in their difpatches to the 
 Court of Directors, but a 
 copy of it was fent by the 
 fame conveyance to the 
 private Agent of Mr. 
 Haftings ; 
 
 The Government Ge- 
 neral might as well be 
 deemed refponfible for the 
 arrival of all the Compa- 
 ny's (hips at a precife date, 
 or the continuance of the 
 monfoon a month beyond 
 the periodical change. 
 The failure of the intel- 
 ligence in queftion de- 
 pended on events out of 
 the reach of human fore- 
 fight or precaution. Mr. 
 Haftings's private Agent 
 is alone accountable, and 
 has already accounted for 
 the
 
 RESOLUTIONS. 
 Haftings ; and that in 
 thus negleting to make 
 immediate communica- 
 tion to the Court of Di- 
 reclors of fuch important 
 intelligence, the Govern- 
 ment General appear to 
 have failed in an eflential 
 part of their duty. 
 
 43. That it appears, 
 that the Coupt of Direc- 
 tors, in their lateft dif- 
 patches, have given in- 
 ftrufVtons, which, if duly 
 obeyed by their govern- 
 ments in India, may have 
 already perfected the defi- 
 rable work of peace ; and 
 that every encouragement 
 and afliftance which may 
 be thought neceffary, 
 fhould be ^iven by parlu- 
 mdnt to expedite the ac- 
 e6nrrp!;fh;nent : of it : 
 That the principle of 
 * pacificatio;v may be ex- 
 - tc-nrled as -foni/p.s poffi- 
 ' blc to a general reftora- 
 c tion of tranquillity with 
 c all the -neighbouring 
 4 powers, on terms of the 
 ' molt perfect modera- 
 c tion, in order that the 
 ' honour of the nation 
 ' may be retrieved, and 
 4 the feveral governments 
 c may be able to leiien 
 " their own infupport..ble 
 * c charges, 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 the circumftance with full 
 fatisfaction. 
 
 The due obedience to 
 bc> given in India!to orders 
 ifTued from Europe, muft 
 depend on the ftate of af- 
 fairs when thofe orders 
 fhall arrive. If parliament 
 fn ill think fit to annul the 
 exiit'cnre of all ditcretion- 
 r.-rs, as held by thd 
 Company's confidential 
 ferv'ants, thofe fervants 
 will of courfe implicitly 
 fubmit But if otherwife, 
 the cohciuft of the Gover- 
 nor-general through all 
 his adminifrration, and as 
 difplayed in the feveral 
 pages of; the Report's, 
 leaves no room to doubt 
 of his readinefs, of his 
 defire, and^of his ability, 
 to procure a proper com- 
 pletion to every paragraph 
 of the Company's hte' 
 orders. 
 
 The
 
 ( 55 ) 
 
 RESOLUTIONS. OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 cc charges, and to relieve 
 < their friends and allies 
 " from additional expen- 
 e ces and oppreffions in- 
 " curred on account of 
 *' war j and alfo that they 
 
 may 
 
 be able to exert 
 
 " their whole force againft 
 " the national enemies, if 
 " the continuance of Eu- 
 *' ropean troubles fhould 
 " make it neceilTary." 
 
 44. That for the pur- 
 pofe of conveying entire 
 conviction to the minds 
 of the native princes, that 
 to commence hoftilities 
 without juft provocation 
 againft them, and topur- 
 iue fchemes of conqueft 
 and extent of dominion, 
 are meafures repugnant to 
 the wifh, the honour, and 
 the policy of this nation ; 
 the parliament or Great 
 Britain fhould give fome 
 fignal mark of its dif- 
 pleafure againft thofe, in 
 whatever degree entrufted 
 with the charge of the 
 Eaft India Company's af- 
 fairs, who (hall appear to 
 have wilfully adopted or 
 countenanced a fyftem 
 tending to infpirea reafon- 
 able diftruft of the mode- 
 ration, juftice, and good 
 feith of the BritifrT na- 
 tion. 
 
 The wifdom of parlia- 
 ment will, no doubt, co- 
 operate with its juftice in 
 the felection of the proper 
 objects of its difpleafure. 
 As the blow will be fe- 
 verely felt, its direction 
 will be maturely weighed. 
 From the (trie! impartia- 
 lity, the unerring judge- 
 ment, and exemplary mo- 
 deration of the Britifil 
 legiflature, he would be 
 unworthy the name of a 
 Briton, who could feel a 
 wim, or drop a hint, to 
 remove his caufe.

 
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