a 
 
 
 ^^7? i^/^fi. 
 
 REESE LIBRARY 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 
 
 Received ^^ <^2yeJ>^^ ., i8f/ 
 
 Accessions No.^.^^-^^"^ Shelf No.. 
 
 OS- 
 
 
f/ 
 
 AIVSWER 
 
 TO 
 
 DR. GILLIES'S SUPPLEMENT, 
 
N 
 

 AN 
 
 ANSWER 
 
 TO 
 
 DR. GILLIES'S SUPPLEMENT 
 
 TO HIS 
 
 NEW ANALYSIS 
 
 OF 
 
 ARISTOTLE^S AVORKS; 
 
 IN WHICH THE 
 UNFAITHFULNESS OF HIS TRANSLATION OF ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS IS UNFOLDEO. 
 
 BY 
 
 THOMAS TAYLOR. 
 
 Eij ifj.ot avS^x'Tof >7pt(7fj.vpioi' 01 d' a/fi^i9(j.ai 
 
 Ovin;' to.-^t' avJiu x.i( -rra^a, nc-jj-ifs-.tj. DIOC, tAERT. 
 
 Begone, yt blockheads ! Heraclitus cries, 
 
 And leave my labours to the learn' d znd wise ; 
 
 By zvit, by knowledge, studious to be read, 
 
 I scorn the multitude, alive and dead, Johnson". 
 
 'rRlNTED BT C. WHITTINCHaM, EEAX-STRtF.T, 
 
 FOR THE AUTHOR ; 
 
 AND SOLD BY H.D.SYMOND?, FATER NOSTERROW; J. WHITE, FLEF.T-STREET; 
 LONGMAN AND REES, PATERNOSTER-ROW; R. H. EVANS, AND E. JEFFERY, 
 Pall mall ; J. bell, oxford street ; S. HiGHLEY, FLEET STREET ; ]. COOKE. 
 OXFORD; DEIOHTON, CAMBRIDGE ; AND MESSRS. GILBERT AND HODGES, 
 DVBLwV. 
 
 1804. 
 
/^ ^ J" 
 
 ^^^ 
 
ANSWER 
 
 SUPPLEMENT OF DR. GILLIES, ^ c. 
 
 "P\R. GILLIES having thought proper to 
 attempts, confutation of the proofs which 
 I had brought forward to the pubHc of his 
 not having given either the manner or the 
 matter of Aristotle in a work which he calls 
 a translation of the Ethics and Politics of 
 that philosopher ; and as he has also pre- 
 sumed to ridicule the most sublime of Plato's 
 doctrines, and to calumniate the best of his 
 disciples, displaying in this attempt no less 
 ignorance than illiberal invective, it now be- 
 comes necessary that I should fully unfold to 
 the public the injustice which he has done 
 to Aristotle in that work, and also to the best 
 of the Platonists, in the Supplement to his 
 Analysis of Aristotle's speculative works. 
 
 I shall begin with examining what he lias 
 advanced in his Supplement, as preparatory 
 
to the specimens of ignorance and unfaith- 
 fulness which will be so copiously displayed 
 in criticizing his translation of Aristotle's 
 Ethics. In the first place, then, I think it 
 may be fairly presumed, that the man who is 
 so ignorant of the -style of Aristotle in his 
 acroamatic writings as not to know that it is 
 remarkably obscure, cannot by any means 
 have penetrated the depth which those writ- 
 ings contain. That he did not know this, is 
 abundantly evident from the following pas- 
 sage, in which, also, from his inability to 
 correct a very obvious error in the Greek 
 text of a quotation from Simplicius, he has 
 made that philosopher contradict himself. 
 The passage I allude to is in a note to the 
 Supplement of his Analysis, p. 215, octavo : 
 " That he (Simplicius) gave into the mode 
 of allegorical interpretation appears from the 
 following short sentence, containing the just 
 praise of Aristotle's perspicuity : Ovh ^vQoig 
 ov&i crujU.boA;x,(5/ff atviy^ao'i oog rcov ttpo avjov Tiv'-g 
 ^X^Wocvjo, ccXX ocvri Travjog ctXXov TrtPiTTsJoca-^ocjog 
 ryjv (rct(piiocv 7r^osTtiJi.r,(r£. Simplic. in Prooem. 
 Lib. Ti'jv Ticcjyiyopucy. *' He made not any 
 use of fables, or dark symbols, like some 
 
philosophers before hhn, but preferred per- 
 spicuity to every other ornament." Strange. 
 that Simplicius should praise Aristotle for ins 
 perspicuity, when, in another place quoted 
 by Dr. Gillies, he says, that Aristotle was 
 purposely obscure in liis acroamatic writings, 
 " ut segniores ab eorum studio rcpellerit ct 
 dehortaretur." Simplic. ad Auscult. Physic, 
 fol. ii *. See p. 'i3 of the Life of Aristotle, 
 prefixed to the translation of his Ethics, by 
 Dr. Gillies, octavo edition. It is evident, 
 therefore, that in the above passage for 
 
 irs^i'WSTao-ix.aJog We should read 7ra^a7rsTcca-i/.ciJog, 
 
 and for a-a<psiuv uo-aCpnav, and then Simplicius 
 
 * For the sake of tlie learned reader, I will give the whole 
 passage from which Dr. Gillies has made this extract. AixV 
 
 ie Sirj§yiij.Bi/wv avtov rvov <xvyy'^a.}x^cLtMV , £if rs to. e^Mte^ma, 
 Dia ra, iffTo^ixcc, koh to, SiaXoyMa, x.a.i oXujg ra, fj^rj a.Y,^a.i a^i- 
 f£(a; (|)fov7isOvra, kxi si; ra. o!.K^oa.iJ,ccriKa, ujv km aurr) ecrriv r) 
 rrccty^areia,, sv roi$ cx.Kcoa[ji.atuoig aG-a.<\>£iav sTrirrjhvTs, Six 
 Tavtrjs rovg ^aSujxorefouj airoK^ovoi^svog, cug -oraf £x.sivrjg (lege 
 icmrso £x£ivoig] imt/ Ssyey^a.^Sa.1 Boksiv. Toj ya§ ouv AK£^oi,vS§o'j 
 l/^sra rr^v ne^crwy y.v,^a.ipi(nv ra.h iT^og auroy ysy^a^orog. 
 AXe^avJfo; A^KrrorsKst ewn'^arlciv. ova o^Sc/jg ZTtoiritrag e%hvg 
 rovg aKpai^ccriKOvg ruiv Xoyujv. rivi ya.^ en Siot(roy.sv r^asig rujv 
 ccAkivv, £» xa9' ovg siraios-jh^y.av Xoyovg, ovrontxvlxv saovrcci 
 KOivoi ; syuj Ss foyAojp-r^v ay raig tTb^i ra a^jcrra siJ^irsi^iaig n 
 raig Swoci^sa-i SiccJpsoBiv. avrog rah avray^x^sv. AfifrroreAij; 
 ^acfiXei AX£^a.vSpjj avirparlekv. aypa^'ocg f.Oi irspi rcuv aKpoaixa- 
 TI-X.MV Xoywj, oictj^svog Ssiv avrovg ^uxarlaiv ev ccitopprjoig, ic^i 
 ouv avrovg xai E/iOsoOjicsvouf Kai jxij £}ihhix,£voug. cuvsroi ya,p 
 £i<ri i^Qvoig roig Tiy^ajv aKOvo-atriv. appwco. i.e. "The writings 
 of Aristotle receiving a twofold division, into the exoteric. 
 
will speak accurately and consistently, and 
 the translation of the whole passage will be 
 as follows : '* Aristotle neither employed 
 fables nor symbolical enigmas, like some 
 philosophers before him, but preferred ob- 
 scurity to every other veil." That this is 
 the true reading is likewise evident from an 
 ancient Latin version of Simplicius on the 
 Categories, printed at Venice, 1588, folio, in 
 which the above passage is thus translated : 
 *' Verumtamen neque fabulis, neque aenig- 
 mallbus, conjecturis metaphorisque impli- 
 citis, quemadmodum nonnuUi ante ipsum 
 
 tuch as the historical, and those composed in the form of dia- 
 logue; and, in short, those which do not pay attention to ex- 
 treme accuracy, and into the acroamatic, to which class the 
 present treatise belongs — this being the case, in his acroamatic 
 writings, he studies obscurity, through this deterring the more 
 ir.dolent, as if their very appearance evinced they were not 
 written for them. Alexander, then, after the subversion of 
 Persia, wrote to him as follows : Alexander wishing prospe- 
 rity to Aristotle. You have not done right in publishing your 
 acroamatic works : for in what shall we surpass others, if the 
 doctrines in which we were instructed become common to all 
 men ? I indeed would rather excel others in the knowledge 
 of the most excellent things than in power. To this Aristotle 
 returned the following answer: Atistotle to king Alexander, 
 wishing prosperity. You wrote to me concerning my acroa- 
 matic works, thinlcing that they ought not to have been di- 
 vulged. Know, therefore, that they are published and not 
 published : for they can be understood by my auditors alone. 
 Farewell." Simplicius adds, that, according to Plutarch, this 
 letter of Alexander refers to the metaphysics of Aristotle, 
 
iisiis est, scd pro omni alio velamine ct invo- 
 luto dicendi modo obscuritatem maxime 
 laudavit et probavlt." It is likewise indispu- 
 tably manliest, from what immediately fol- 
 lows this passage, in which Slmpllcius inves- 
 tigates the reason why Aristotle adopted this 
 mode of writing, as the learned reader who 
 has the original in his possession will imme- 
 diately perceive. It may be fairly con- 
 cluded, therefore, that Dr. Gillies knew not 
 that it was the general practice of the earliest 
 writers of antiquity to employ different modes 
 of concealing their wisdom from tlie vulgar, 
 and that Aristotle adopted for this purpose 
 obscurity of diction, though the former par- 
 ticular is well known to every tyro in the 
 history of philosophy, and the latter is obvi^ 
 ous to the meanest capacity. 
 
 Having premised thus much, T proceed, 
 in the next place, to examine his Supple- 
 ment. In p. 161, then, he endeavours 
 to show " that those supposed entities, called 
 by the Pythagoreans numbers, and by the 
 Platonists ideas, and considered by them as 
 eternal and immutable essences, the true 
 causes of the universe, have not any real sub- 
 stantial existence in nature, but are merely 
 
6 
 
 fictions of fancy, created from the fleeting 
 action of human thought, expressed and em- 
 bodied in language." This, he says, is evi- 
 dent from the doctrine of Aristotle, accord- 
 ing to which, " definitions are the pure 
 fountains of science only when they originate 
 in an accurate examination and patient com- 
 parison of individual objects; so that indivi- 
 duals have a real existence in nature -- but 
 general names, expressing many indi\ uals 
 of the same kind, have not any correspondent 
 archetypes." To this I answer, that I have 
 already shown, in the Introduction to my 
 translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics, that 
 Aristotle did not essentially differ from Plato 
 in the doctrine of ideas ; and I shall now 
 farther observe, that the Stagirite would not 
 be consistent with himself unless he admitted 
 that those ideas which subsist in Deity with 
 fabricative power and unerring knowledge, 
 subsist also in the human soul in a manner 
 accommodated to its nature ; so as to possess 
 partial instead of universal knowledge, to be 
 deprived of productive power, and to be 
 wakened from dormant capacity into energy 
 by objects of sense. This is evident from the 
 doctrine delivered by Aristotle in the im}^^ 
 
book of his Posterior Analytics, that univer- 
 sals for the purpose of demonstration are su- 
 perior to particulars; that demonstrations are 
 conversant with things more universal ; and 
 that the principles from which demonstra- 
 tions are composed have a priorifi/ of exist- 
 ence, and z precedency^ in nature to particu- 
 
 * Aristotle, in the second chapter of the first hook of his 
 Posterior Analytics, having enumerated the three conditions ot 
 true science; viz. 1st, that the cause of the thing must be 
 known, or, in other words, that the middle term of the de- 
 monstration must be the cause of the conclusion ; 2d, that this 
 cause muit be compared with the effect, so that we may 
 know it to be the cause of the conclusion ; and 3d, that this 
 conclusion must have a necessary subsistence, observes as fol- 
 lows: Ei foivvv sirn ro STtKyracr^ai, oiov s^e^sv avaynrj xcci tr^v 
 G.Ttohiy.mriV sinarrrjixriv s^ aK-^^u)v r' sivai, Kat ntpwru^v x.a,i 
 ay^sTcuv, -/.ai yyujot'/^wtspw/, y.a.1 itpoYspuv, xai cx,iriujv Ton 
 ffvif.Tt£poiiT^alog. ovrojg yap £<rovra.t koh ai a.^'XfH OiKSiai tou 
 SBiKvuixsvov, (TvXKoyic'ii.'ig ^sv yap s.T'fa.i nai avsu tourcuv 
 aTto^si^iS Ss ov/. e<rrai' ov yap Troiyjost sitiffrrjiJ.riv . aKr,^y] ju.£v oli-/ 
 ^£i sivai, on ovK so-ri ro [^rj ov znticrraa-^ar oiov on ij Siafx^erpog 
 cvit.it.zrpo 5. £% TTpc'jrwv ^'avaito^stKlwv, on ovk STrttrryja-slai [xt) 
 sy^ujv aTTo^si^iv avtcvv. to yap sTTJcracrSai wv aTtoSsi^i; sirn, y-yj 
 ■nata cruix^s^rjKOc, ro s^siv aito^Ei^iv sffnv. ama rs, x.ai 
 yvu}piu,wrspa Ssi sivai, ytai itporspa. ama |X£v, on Tots 
 £7ri<rtay.s^a, otav tr^v aitiav £i$uo[j.sv. xaj itpoteoa, snfsp aina. 
 xai 'n'poyivoj<ry.O[t.sva ov ^ovov toy £tspov tpoifov tat ^vvisvai, 
 akXa Kai tuj Eihvai or* ea-ti. Ttpotspa S'sTti Kai yvujpi^wtzpa, 
 Stycvg. ov yap tavtov, ifpotspov tt) ^vtzi, kcci itpos Tifx-a; 
 ntpotipov. ovis yyujpi[j.ujt£pov, xaj ij/^iv yywpiit.ujtepov. Xsyuj 
 Se If cos yua? fJisv ntpottpa Jtaj yyui^iij^wtspa ta eyyvtspov tr^g 
 a.id^ridsws' antXiog ?5 irpotepa Kai yvc/jpiy.ujt£px ra Ttoppictspov. 
 fcTTi Se Ttoppc/Jtalcu ij.£v, ta xaSoXov ^a\i<rta. syyuraljj 02, ta 
 xaSsnao-ra. y.aj avtrKSitai tavt' aAAijAoij, i. e. " If then 
 science is such as we have established it to be, it is aliO ne- 
 
lars, and are the causes of the propositions 
 they prove. If, therefore, the causes of de- 
 monstrations are yiiiversals, and these uni- 
 versals have a precedency in nature to particu- 
 lars, it is evident that individuals are not the 
 only things which have a real existence in 
 
 cessary that demonstrative science should consist from things 
 true, first, immediate, more known than, prior to, and the 
 causes of the conclusion: for thus they will be the proper 
 principles of that which is demonstrated. For there may be 
 a syllogism indeed without these conditions ; but there will 
 not be demonstration, since such a syllogism will not produce 
 science. It is necessary, therefore, that the things from which 
 demonstrative science consists should be true, because that 
 which is not cannot be scientifically known ; as, for instance, 
 that the diameter of a square is commensurable with its side. 
 It is also necessary that they should be from things first and 
 indetnonstrable, because they will not be scientifically known 
 without demonstration. For to know scientifically things of 
 which there is demonstration, and this not from accident, is to 
 possess demonstration. It is likewise necessary that they 
 should be the causes of, more known than, and prior to the 
 conclusion. Causes, indeed, because we then know scienti- 
 fically, when we know the cause: and prior because they are 
 the causes. They are also previously known, not only from 
 our understanding what they signify, but from our knowing 
 that they are irue. But things prior and more known subsist 
 in a twofold respect. For that which is prior to nature is not 
 the same with that which is prior to us ; nor is that which is 
 more known to nature the same with that which is more 
 known to us. By things prior and more known to us, I mean 
 such as are nearer to sense ; but things simply prior and more 
 known are such as are more remote from sense. And things 
 more remote from sense are such as are especially universal ; 
 but such as are most near to it are particulars, and these are 
 opposed to each other." 
 
nature, and that particulars are in the order 
 of things subordinate to univcrsals. 
 
 In the next place Dr. Gillies endeavours to 
 illustrate his remarks by presenting the reader 
 with what he calls a translation of the four- 
 teenth chapter of the seventh book of Aristo- 
 tle's Metaphysics, prudently omitting to give 
 the original, at the same time that he vi- 
 lifies my translation of the same chapter. 
 That the learned reader, however, may see 
 how he has deformed the text of Aristotle by 
 a rambling paraphrase, which neither pre- 
 serves the manner nor the matter of its au- 
 thor, I shall give both the original and the 
 Doctor's translation : ^ocvs^ov h e^ avroov tovtuv 
 
 TO (TV^^oiiVQV Kcti Toig Tocg i^iug Kiyovcri)' ovcriag t£ 
 xcci yjjo^iTocg nvoci u^u, Koci oci^ix ro sioog sk rov 
 ycvov'g 'TTOtovcri, kul roov ^ic!c(po^u)y. si yu^ S5'i tcc 
 iitvi xai TO ^oooy sv too ccy^^ccrroo xai iitttu:.) YiTOI 
 
 iV KCtl TOiVTOV T(t) U^lB ^(jO S^IV, yj STi^CV' TW ^i'J yOC^ 
 
 Koyoo ^YiKov on sj. rov ycc^ uvtov dis^iKri Kcycv o 
 Xsyouv sv SKocTS^oo, £1 ow s^t rig uvr^^c^TTcg avro 
 'KxQ'avrOy ro}: ri xoci xsy^uo^icr^zvov, uvayy.'/i ■kcci it, 
 oov, otov ro ^cajov, koci ro ^iTrow, rods ri c-ri^oiiviDi^ 
 xcci eLvoti %u}^i<3X xoii ovcriocg' cos's ncti ro Q^ov. J/ 
 jxcv ovv ro avTO Kcti fv t&) ittttoo, (aarvrs^ cd c«vtw, 
 TTCAjg (V xuj^ig ovtrrj fv ij(xi, Kui liu ri cv aot^ %w^if 
 
 C 
 
iO 
 
 OCVTOV 19CCI TO ^Ca)OV TCVTO ] STfclTtX SI ^SV IXS^S^cl TO'J 
 
 diTTOdog Kcci jov TToXvTrodog a^vvarov Ti (yvLc^ociVcC. 
 rocvavTioc ya^ a^oc VTra^^n ocvTCt}, evi kui raJe ovri. 
 ii oi ^/;, TIC TPOTi'ogy OTav cmv, Tig ti ^coov sivxi 
 
 OiTTOVV Yj 7r-i^CV \ (xXTC KTOOg (TVyKStTCXl KCCI aTfjfJoii, 
 
 7j ixsjxixjai. aXKci Travja aroTfa. aAX' sts^ov ?v iVM^Cf* 
 
 OVKOW OCTTSl^CC COg S'TTCg ilTTclV f5"a/, WV V] OlKTiOC ^ooov. 
 
 cv yu^ Kccjcc crv^^sQriyxg sk ^ooov o avBpooTrog. sti 
 TToXKcc i?ai uvTO TO (^ooov. cvcioc T£ ycc^ TO iv sxas-u 
 ^oocv. ov ya^ v.uT aK?\.cv Xsysjcxt. si ^s [u,yj, s^ 
 cTiiiyov s^cti ocvB^ooT.'cg, xcci ysvog uvtov sxcivo. Ktxi 
 cTi i^scii aTTcxyjoc s^ cajv o avS^^coTrog' ovtcow ovx, ocXXov 
 ^?v t^id ss'cciy aXKov dova-iu. cc^vvutov yoc^. ocvto 
 cc^cc ^cjoov iS'ui SKaS'ov toov fv "^oig ^cooig. sti, sx Ttvog 
 
 TOVTOV. VM.I TTCOg S^ aVTOV ^COOV ; KUt TTUg OlOV T£ 
 
 civcci TO ^c-:ov DV(riu tovto ocvto ttu^ uvto to ^coov ; 
 
 STI VsTTl TCOV CClCrByjTOOV TOiVTOC TS (TV^^OLlVSt, KOCl 
 
 Tovroov uTOTTciOTSoa. SI oYj ocovvoiTQv ovTOog sy^stv, dyjKov 
 OTi ovyc STiv i^sa dcvtoov ovTcogy cog Tivsg (poca-iv. 
 
 Dr. Glllies's translation of this chapter is 
 as follows : " With the same absurdities are 
 those chargeable who regard ideas as sub- 
 stances and separable substances ; consider- 
 ing the more general ideas as constituting 
 the less general included under the same 
 common term : for example, the ideas o?U' 
 mal, biped, reason, as constituting and cum- 
 
11 
 
 posing the idea man. Suppose ideas to be 
 substances, and the idea anijnal, for instance, 
 existing in man and horse ; this idea in those 
 two kinds must either be numerically one 
 and the same thing, or two different things ; 
 in definition it is plainly one and the same, 
 for we mean the same thing by the word 
 animal when we say that men are animals, 
 and that horses are animals. If the idea man 
 existed as a separate being or entity, it would 
 follow of course that the ideas animal^ biped, 
 reason, composing the idea man, should also 
 «xist as separate beings ; so that the ide^ 
 animal, if it were precisely one and the same 
 thing in man and horse in the sense in which 
 you are identically the same with yourself, 
 would subsist the same individual entity in 
 man and horse ; and thus the same individual 
 entity would subsist separately from itself ! 
 Farther ; if one and the same idea animal 
 subsists both in man and horse, in man a 
 biped, and in horse a quadruped, must not 
 the same individual be at once a biped and 
 a quadruped, and thus the same subject be at 
 once endowed with two mutually exclusive 
 attributes ? As this cannot happen by actual 
 participation of those attributes, so neither 
 
12 
 
 can it possibly be brought about by juxtapo- 
 sition, mixture, or in any other way. The 
 idea animal must therefore be numerically 
 different in man and horse ; and there must 
 be many separate entities having the idea 
 animal for their essential constituent, since 
 this idea enters not adventitiously, but essen- 
 tially, into their respective definitions. The 
 idea animal, therefore, is many, constituting 
 maji, horse, and other species or tribesyj' 
 whose different names cannot be reciprocally 
 predicated of each other, because in that case 
 all those different ideas would be one and 
 the same idea, which is totally absurd. It 
 is impossible, therefore, that the idea animal 
 can have any substantial or separable exist- 
 ence, or be any thing beside what is found in 
 all the different tribes of animals. The ab- 
 surdity of realising general terms will appear 
 still more monstrous if from species or tribes 
 we descend to the individual objects of our 
 senses, and say that this man or this horse is 
 constituted and composed of ideas. There 
 cannot, therefore, be any such ideas^ or entities 
 as those spoken of by some philosophers.'* 
 
 Such is Dr. Gillies's translation of a most 
 abstruse passage, from a book written by its 
 
13 
 
 • 
 
 author, as is evident, from what has been 
 above stated, with avowed obscurity of dic- 
 tion ; a book, written, as Plutarch well ob- 
 serves, not for the unlearned, but for men 
 who have made a proficiency in philosophic 
 attainments *. Such a passage from such a 
 book, when the extreme accuracy and unex- 
 ampled brevity of diction adopted by its au- 
 thor are also taken into account, ought indis- 
 putably to be translated with the utmost faith- 
 fulness and the most literal exactness. A 
 few instances will shew how little claim the 
 translation of Dr. Gillies has to these requi- 
 sites. In the first place, he has entirely per- 
 verted the meaning of the very first sentence; 
 for this, literally translated, is as follows: 
 *' From these very things that which hap- 
 pens to those who assert that ideas are sepa- 
 rate essences, and who at the same time 
 make form to consist from genus and differ- 
 eJiceSy is manifest." Compare this with the 
 translation of Dr. Gillies : " With the same 
 absurdities are those chargeable who regard 
 ideas as substances, and separable substances ; 
 
 ajX*"' veyjaTTXi. Plutarch in Alexan. p. 6"6S. 
 
14 
 
 considering the more general ideas as consti- 
 tuting the less general included under the 
 same common term." Here the reader will 
 easily perceive that what Aristotle says is a 
 deduction from prior reasoning ; but in the 
 translation of Dr. Gillies something else is, 
 as usual, substituted for the genuine mean- 
 ing. In the next place, Aristotle is speaking 
 of those who assert that ideas are separate es- 
 sences, and accordingly he uses the words 
 oxxTiocg T£ Kdi xtAi^i^ag, but, according to the 
 translation of Dr. Gillies, he must be sup- 
 posed to be speaking of those who regard 
 ideas as separable substances. This, how- 
 ever, is very far from being the case, for the 
 ideas of which Aristotle is here speaking are 
 incorporeal natures resident in Deity, and 
 perfectly separated from matter ; but separa- 
 rable ideas are the universals inherent in and 
 predicated of the multitude of sensible par- 
 ticulars, which Aristotle everywhere admits, 
 and which in modern language are no other 
 than abstract ideas. Dr. Gillies's translation 
 of the remaining part of the sentence is so 
 very remote from the accurate meaning of 
 Aristotle, that it may rather be called a con- 
 ceit of the Doctor's than a translation ; and 
 
15 
 
 any one who compares it with the original 
 might fairly conclude that the Doctor knew 
 not the distinction between genus and dif- 
 ference. 
 
 The next sentence, which, literally tranS' 
 lated, is : *' For if forms and animal are in 
 man and horse, there is either one and the 
 same, or a different animal in number," — is 
 entirely lost in the translation of Dr. Gillies. 
 This also is the case with the next sentence : 
 and in short, there is so little of the matter, 
 (for of the manner there is none) of Aristotle 
 in the whole of it, that it is in vain to com- 
 pare it with the original, as must, I presume, 
 be obvious to every Greek scholar, however 
 moderate his skill may be in that language. 
 Because my translation of this passage is 
 faithful and literal I am accused by Dr. Gil- 
 lies of having " travestied Aristotle into un- 
 intelligible gibberish ;" and this merely be- 
 cause I have not made that by translation to 
 be obvious to every one zvhich was fiever in- 
 tended by its author to be so, and because I 
 have been more solicitous, by endeavouring 
 to preserve the accurate meaning and man- 
 ner of the original, to gain the approbation 
 of the wise and worthy, than to do violence 
 
18 
 
 to Aristotle in order to please the vulgar, and, 
 in the language of trade, 7nanufacture a sale- 
 able book. 
 
 After this Dr. Gillies endeavours to show 
 that I have falsely charged him with igno- 
 rance, in the new arrangement which he 
 has made of Aristotle's Metaphysics. As a 
 full answer to this, I deem it will be merely 
 necessary to state to the reader, that in criti- 
 cizing Dr. Gillies's arrangement of the Meta- 
 physics, I regarded that order alone in which 
 those books have been transmitted to us from 
 the ancients ; in which order they were first 
 published by Aldus, and translated into Latin 
 by Bessarion. This too is the order, which 
 I presume every man of good sense would 
 suppose Dr. Gillies objected to in his new 
 arrangement. Far otherwise. Du Val, from 
 not understanding the Metaphysics of Aris- 
 totle, had, long before Dr. Gillies presumed 
 to alter the arrangement of some of the 
 books ; and Dr. Gillies in making a new ar- 
 rangement uniformly quotes Du Val's edi- 
 tion of Aristotle, and blames the order in 
 which the Metaphysics are there published, 
 as if it were the same with that adopted by 
 the ancients ; from which circumstance I 
 
17 
 
 think it is most evident that he knew not at 
 that time that Du Val's arrangement differs 
 from that of the ancients. Afterwards, how- 
 ever, and most Hkely from my animadver- 
 sions, he appears to have discovered his mis- 
 take, but with great subtlety endeavours to 
 fix the charge of ignorance in this particular 
 upon me. For in p. 173 of his Supplement 
 he says : " I think it right to observe, that 
 this deep student In Aristotle seems not aware 
 that the book published as the twelfth by Al- 
 dus and Bessarion stands as the fourteenth in 
 Du Val's noble edition.'* The liberal reader, 
 however, will, I trust, readily admit that in 
 criticizing Dr. Gillles's arrangement of the 
 Metaphysics, I had no right to suppose that 
 he referred to any other order than that in 
 which these books were at first published 
 from the most ancient manuscripts, especi- 
 ally as Dr. Gillies does not mention in any 
 part of his Analysis, that he alone blames the 
 arrangement of these books as published by 
 Du Val. 
 
 Again, Dr. Gillies, in p. 99 of his Ana- 
 lysis, had asserted, " that the real subject of 
 what is called Aristotle's Metaphysics is the 
 
 D 
 
vindication of the existence and nature of 
 truth against the cavils of sophists, and those 
 now called metaphysicians; and this doctrine 
 concerning truth illustrated in demonstrating 
 the being of one god, in opposition to athe- 
 ists on one hand and polytheists on the 
 other." To this, in p. 48 of the introduc- 
 tion to my translation of Aristotle's Meta- 
 physics, I replied as follows : ** That if by 
 polytheists Dr. Gillies means men who be- 
 lieved in a multitude of self-existent beings 
 independent of each other, and of one first 
 cause, there were no such men among the 
 Greeks and Romans, as must be obvious to 
 every one who is conversant with the writ- 
 ings of the heathens, and as is fully evinced 
 by Dr. Cud worth in his Intellectual System; 
 nor am I acquainted with any nation who 
 entertained an opinion so monstrous and 
 dire. But if by polytheists he intends to 
 signify men who believed in the existence 
 of divine natures the immediate progeny of 
 one first cause with which they are pro- 
 foundly united, Aristotle is so far from op- 
 posing this doctrine in his Metaphysics, that 
 in the eighth chapter of the twelfth book 
 
19 
 
 (Aldus's edition) he demonstrates their ex- 
 istence. In this chapter he expressly says, 
 ** It is necessary that each of the revolutions 
 of the celestial orbs should be moved by an es- 
 sentially immoveable and ctcriial essence ; and 
 that these essences should be as many in num- 
 ber as the revolving spheres *." And the con- 
 clusion of it is remarkably strong in support 
 of this opinion : " our ancestors," says 
 
 he, AND MEN OF GREAT ANTIQUITY, HAVE 
 LEFT US A TRADITION INVOLVED IN FA- 
 BLE, THAT THESE FIRSr ESSENCES ARE 
 GODS, AND THAT THE DIVINITY COiMPRE- 
 HENDS THE WHOLE OF NATURE. The 
 
 rest^ indeedj is fabulously introduced for the 
 purpose of persuading the multitude, enforcing 
 the laws, and benefiting human life. For 
 they ascribe to the first essences a hu- 
 man form, and speak of them as resembling 
 other animals^ and assert other things conse- 
 quent and similar to these, but IF among 
 
 xjvei^aj xa9 avro, xai aiJiou ovcrias. ■>) rg ya.§ rujv avr^ivv 
 (^vari^, a'tSios cvcria. r<f outra, y.ai to xivodv, ai'^iov, xa< -ff^orzcov 
 rqv xfvoupsvou* Kca to TTcorsfov oucjaj, ovffiocv avccyy.ociov hvoli. 
 eavs^ov rotvuv, on rotraura; ovaccg avayKcuoy sivcx.i, rr^v rs fu- 
 crjv aiStovg -KOLi ocKiyriTovs y.cc^' airoa, xa( kveu y.iyi^ov$, ha. try 
 
20 
 
 THESE ASSERTIONS ANY ONE, SEPARAT- 
 ING THE REST, RETAINS ONLY THE FIRST; 
 VIZ. THAT THEY CONSIDERED THE FIRST 
 ESSENCES TO BE GODS, HE WILL THINK 
 IT TO BE DIVINELY SAID : AND IT MAY BE 
 PROBABLY INFERRED ; THAT AS EVERY 
 ART AND PHILOSOPHY HAS BEEN INVENT- 
 ED AS OFTEN AS POSSIBLE, AND HAS 
 AGAIN PERISHED, THESE OPINIONS ALSO 
 OF THE ANTIENTS HAVE BEEN PRESERVED 
 AS RELICS TO THE PRESENT TIME. Of 
 
 the Opinions of our jatheis, tJicrefore, and men 
 of the highest antiquity, thus much only is ma- 
 nifest to us^." To these first essences also 
 he alludes in the following beautiful passage 
 in the second book : " yls arc the eyes of 
 
 vxTi^oLn Ha,raXsXEitj.tj,Eva. tois ytrrefov, on ^soi ts siffiv ovroi, 
 xai Tfe^iBy^si to ^aov rrjV oAr^v ^vaiv. to. Ss KoiVa iJ.vQfKws ijJij 
 Tf^oa-rj-^^rj if^os rrjv TtsiScv rcuv itoWuiv, xat ir^os tr^v sig vojxooj 
 Koci to 0-v[j.<^s^ov %f^<r<v. av^^unrosiSsis re ya§ rovtovg, aai' ruv 
 aXXujv l^ujcDv oi^oious tKn Xeyovtri, y.a.1 rourois srs§tx, axoXov^x 
 y.ai Tta^aitXTitna rois ei^tjixbvois' wv si ti; ^cv^Kras auto Xatoi 
 fj^ovov to Tt^ujrov, art ^soug wovro rag 'rt^oorag ou<nci,g sivai, ^eiwg 
 av £i^r)(r^aL vofjuasis, xai xala ro Bixog iroXXaxig ev^yjy.svy}g stg ro 
 Svvarov ixacrryig xcn rsyjrjg xai ^iXo<ro<^ioi.g, xai ifocXiv <J>^E/fO. 
 fi-evuiv, xai ravrag rai So^ag Emivcvv, oiov Xei4'0(,va ift^KTSirojcr^ai 
 /xe^^f J rov wv. ij u.£v ow ifal^iog So^a, r>ai t} itapa rouy '^ptjjrwv, 
 
bats to the light of day^ so is the intellect of 
 
 our soul to SUCH THINGS AS ARE NATU- 
 HALLY THE MOST SPLENDID OF ALL*." 
 
 So prevalent, indeed, was this doctrine 
 among the antients, that even so late as the 
 time of the Emperor Commodus the elegant 
 Maximus Tyrius observes, " That there is 
 in all the earth one according law and opi- 
 nion, that there is one god, the king and fa- 
 ther of all things, and many gods, sons of 
 God, ruling in conjunction with him. This 
 is asserted by the Greek and the barbarian, 
 by the inhabitant of the continent, and by 
 him who dwells near the sea, by the wise and 
 by the unwise. And if you proceed even as 
 far as to the utmost shores of the ocean, there 
 also there are gods, rising very near to some, 
 and setting very near to others "j-." 
 
 * €l<n{sp ya,p xa» ra, rouv vvy.rspi^wy o/x,jU,a.ra ifpog to ^eyyog 
 
 fa <j>ucrei ^avspunrccfa, icoLvtiuv. 
 
 \ 'Eva. j^'ojf av £v "csdcr-q yyi ot/^ofujvov vOfXyOv kxi Xoyov, on 
 ^soj £(j Ttavrujv tcx.<riXsvi xat itxrY^p, xa» ^eoi iroXXoi, ^sov 
 Ttaihs, ffvvapy^ovrss ^sw. ravra h o sWr^v Xsysi, noct o 
 ^ap^apos Xsysi, kcli o TjTteipiorvj; koci o ^aXarlto;, km o (rofc^ 
 xoci acrofo^- nay sifi rov wxcavoo e\Qr,s rag T^'iovcci, y.dxsi deoi, 
 rgis ft'tv ayicxovtss ay^ov y.x\a., roi; h ■Kxlahoar/m. Dis-r 
 sert. ], '.".••''•'" 
 
22 
 
 The only reply which the Doctor makes 
 to all this in his Supplement (p. 175) is the 
 following : " In the chapter alluded to by 
 Mr. Taylor, (which is the eighth of the four- 
 teenth book in Dii Val's edition) Aristotle, in 
 deference to the opinion delivered down by 
 the antients, and which prevailed in most 
 ages of paganism, speaks of different gods 
 presiding over the motions of the heavenly 
 bodies. But the sentence immediately pre- 
 ceding this passage, and which Mr. Taylor 
 entirely omits in his refutation of my opi- 
 nion, maintains the unity of the first cause, 
 the eternal spring of motion, himself im- 
 moveable. This principle, on which heaven 
 and earth depend, is one in number as well 
 as essence.*' 
 
 Is it possible that any reply can be more 
 foreign from the purpose than this ? Dr. 
 Gillies had asserted that one design of Aris- 
 totle in his Metaphysics was to demonstrate 
 the being of one god in opposition to poly- 
 theists. My answer to this most clearly 
 proved that Aristotle could have no such de- 
 sign, according to the proper meaning of the 
 word polytheist, or that meaning which was 
 
23 
 
 adopted by antiquity ; but in order to evade 
 this evidence, and, if possible, conceal his 
 ignorance. Dr. Gillies tells his readers tliat I 
 have omitted a sentence, in which Aris- 
 totle maintains the unity of the first cause. 
 As if the existence of divine natures the pro- 
 geny of one first cause invalidated the sub- 
 sistence of that cause. Surely not more so 
 than the existence of children subverts the 
 prior existence of their father. But this af- 
 fair will be more fully unfolded in the an- 
 swer to the Doctor's next paragraph. 
 
 *' The existence (says he) of divine na- 
 tures, the immediate progeny of one first 
 cause, with which they are profoundly 
 united, is not asserted by the Sagirite in the 
 chapter alluded to by Mr. Taylor, or in any 
 other part of his invaluable writings. Such 
 mysterious language, indeed, occurs fre- 
 quently in the works of Plotinus and other 
 eclectics, or new Platonists, as they are 
 called, the pretended reconcilers of Plato 
 and Aristotle ; visionaries whose wild dreams 
 seduced the old age and dotage of reason 
 under the declining empire of Rome, and 
 imposed on its childhood and imbecility at 
 
24- 
 
 the first revival of letters in modern Europe. 
 Of such philosophers Mr. Taylor, as will 
 presently appear, is not an unworthy pu* 
 pil/' 
 
 The man who, like Dr. Gillies, presumes 
 to analyse and translate the acroamatic works 
 of Aristotle without having even discovered 
 that in these works he is designedly obscure, 
 and that the profundity of his conceptions is 
 no less extraordinary than the brevity of his 
 diction, must also, like Dr. Gillies, perpetu- 
 ally err on subjects which are necessarily 
 from their very nature most arduous and ab- 
 struse. The truth of this observation was 
 never more fully displayed than in the above 
 paragraph, as will be at once evident from 
 the following observations : Aristotle having 
 demonstrated, in the seventh chapter of the 
 twelfth book of his Metaphysics, that there 
 is a certain eternal and immoveable essence 
 separated from sensibles, in the next chapter 
 enquires whether only one essence of this 
 kind * is to be admitted or more than one ; 
 and in this chapter he proves that there 
 
L'5 
 
 are many such like essences. Now if we at- 
 tentively consider that Aristotle uses the word 
 roiocvr/i, such like, on this occasion, and de- 
 monstrates that such like essences do exist, it 
 will most evidently appear ** that tlic Stagi- 
 rite does admit the existence of divine na- 
 tures, the immediate progeny of one first 
 cause, with which they are profoundly 
 united.'* For the term such like is equiva- 
 lent to similar to ; and similitude is defined 
 by Aristotle to be a participation of sameness, 
 and sameness to be a union of essence *. 
 Hence as Aristotle demonstrates the existence 
 of one first cause,, clearly asserting at the 
 same time that tliere can be but one first ; 
 and as he also proves that there are many es- 
 sences similar to this first cause, it necessarily 
 follows, from his own dQ^miiono^ similitude t 
 that these divine essences are united to their 
 great producing cause. This single instance, 
 as it shows the ignorance of Dr. Gillies in a 
 strong point of view, shows also the necessity 
 
 * Oaoja Xiyzra: to. re rccvra xeitov^ora.. i e. " Things 
 are said to be similar which are passive to (or participate) the 
 same thing." And 13 ravforr^f svotyiS n; sriv ton sivxi. i.e. 
 " Sameness is a certain unity of essence." Metaphys. lib. v. 
 cap. 9. 
 
 E 
 
2G 
 
 of adhering to the most rigid accuracy in 
 translating the acroamatic writings of Aris- 
 totle. 
 
 In the remaining part of Dr. Gillies's 
 Supplement there is but little deserving of 
 notice, as it chiefly consists of misrepresenta- 
 tion and invective. I shall therefore only 
 select two or three passages, as most incon- 
 testible proofs that he must necessarily ad- 
 vance absurdities and contradictions who 
 writes on subjects which he does not under- 
 stand, and who dares to calumniate where 
 he cannot confute. Of the truth of this re- 
 mark take the following specimen in p. 190 : 
 " The chimeras of those visionaries (^Mode- 
 ratus and Nicomachus) which would now 
 entitle their professors to cells in a mad- 
 house (so unaccountable to one age seem the 
 follies of another !) were adopted by the 
 whole tribe of later Platonists, and nearly a 
 century before their times by the learned 
 and sensible Plutarch, one of the finest paint- 
 ers of actions and manners in public and pri- 
 vate life. But this excellent writer, an exu- 
 berant source of instruction and entertain- 
 ment to all ages and nations, was both a Pla- 
 
'27 
 
 tonic philosopher and a priest of Apollo." 
 Thus, according to Dr. Gillies, Plutarch, 
 though a learned and sensible man, though 
 an excellent writer, and an exuberant source 
 of Instruction and entertainment to all ages 
 and nations; yet this same Plutarch, had he 
 lived in these luminous days, would have 
 been entitled to a cell in a madhouse ! 
 
 No less absurd and insane is the following 
 specimen : *' The main end of their philo- 
 sophy (that of the later Platonists) was to at- 
 tain intellectual union with God, and thus to 
 see all truths at one glance in the divine un- 
 derstanding. Deity they mysteriously de- 
 scribe as everywhere and nowhere ; pene- 
 trating and sustaining all things, yet in no- 
 thing present, and ever totally unmixed: 
 as the unity of unities, the root of being, the 
 perennial fountain of spiritual existences ; 
 and the more irreverently they strove in this 
 mystical language to exalt the Creator, the 
 more material became their images, and the 
 wilder the contradictions in which they 
 were inextricably involved." (Supplement, 
 p. 208.) According to the sagacious and 
 pious Dr. Gillies, therefore, that philosophy 
 is contemptible whose main end is to attain 
 
28 
 
 intellectual union with deity, and irreverent 
 are those conceptions of the Divinity which 
 assert him to be everywhere and yet no- 
 where; everi/ where, as illuminating all things 
 with divine light, and 7io where, as being per- 
 fectly exempt from the nature of the things 
 illuminated ; penetrating and sustaining all 
 things ; and subsisting as the root of all be- 
 ing. The man, however, who presumes to 
 call such conceptions as these irreverent is 
 (to speak Platonlcally) unconscious that the 
 greatest eye of his soul (to [xsyi^ov Trjg 
 ijyux>7? oju-ixa) is blinded with ignorance and 
 buried in error. 
 
 In the last place. Dr. Gillies, speaking of 
 me, observes : " If that translator of the Me- 
 taphysics had been as skilful in Greek as he 
 is profound in philosophy, he would not 
 have recommended, as essential to the right 
 understanding of Aristotle, the commentary 
 of Alexander Aphrodislcnsis. Alexander's 
 commentary on the Metaphysics now ex- 
 ists only in a Latin version, and cannot, 
 therefore, afford much assistance to a man 
 capable of reading the Greek original, and 
 who wishes to convey its sense clearly to his 
 countrymen in their native tongue." I am 
 
29 
 
 very much mistaken if there is not as much 
 nonsense in this passage as malevolence. For 
 can any thing he more absurd than to assert 
 that the commentary of Alexander cannot 
 afford much assistance to a man caj^able of 
 reading the Greek original of Aristotle, be- 
 cause it now exists only in a Latin version ? 
 when at the same time Alexander was one 
 of the most famous, and, except Simplicius, 
 the best of all Aristotle's interpreters. And 
 can any thing be more malevolent than the 
 insinuation that I am not skilful in Greek 
 because I availed myself of the assistance of 
 this commentary in a Latin translation, not 
 being able to consult the original because it is 
 lost ? Is it possible, likewise, that there can 
 be a greater contradiction in terms than to 
 suspect my knowledge of Greek, and yet 
 confess that I am profound in philosophy? 
 For if I am profound in philosophy it must 
 be in that of Plato and Aristotle, since I have 
 studied and profess no other. How then did 
 I acquire my profundity ? for, exclusive of 
 my own translations, there is no English 
 translation of any part of Aristotle's works, 
 except his Poetics and his Politics, nor of the 
 more abstruse of Plato's writings : and the 
 
30 
 
 Doctor observes, in the paragraph above 
 quoted, " That Latin translations from the 
 Greek are seldom intelligible except where 
 their assistance is superfluous to a Greek 
 scholar." As I have therefore no know- 
 ledge whatever of any languages but English, 
 Latin, and Greek, it is evident that this pro- 
 fundity must have been obtained from the 
 Greek. And thus the malevolent insinua- 
 tion of Dr. Gillies confutes itself, and is as 
 imbecile as his answers to my strictures and 
 his abuse of the Platonic philosophers. 
 
 Having therefore answered all those parts 
 of Dr. Gillies's Supplement which appeared 
 tome most deserving of notice, I shall, in the 
 next place, present the reader with speci- 
 mens of the manner in which he has trans- 
 lated, or rather mutilated and deformed, the 
 Ethics of Aristotle. I shall begin, then, with 
 the first chapter of the first book, and with 
 the very first sentence of that chapter, as 
 the extreme inaccuracy with which it is 
 translated aftbrds of itself a sufhcient proof 
 of the Doctor's total incapacity to translate a 
 writer so uncommonly accurate and pro- 
 found as Aristotle. The original is as fol- 
 lows : UcKO-oi icyjYi Kai Trcxa-oc /xj^o^og-, o^ou^g ^5 
 
31 
 
 ^OKii' ho KocXoog aTTsipmotvjo TccyocSov, ov ttuvJoc 
 £(pifJo(i. i. e. " Every art and every method, 
 and in like manner every action and delibe- 
 rative tendency to that which is in our power 
 (pre-election) appear to desire a certain 
 good : hence they well assert the good to be 
 that which all things desire." The transla- 
 tion of Dr. Gillies : ** Since every art and 
 every kind of knowledge, as well as all the 
 actions and deliberations of men, constantly 
 aim at something which they call good ; 
 good in general may be justly defined, " that 
 which all desire." Here, in the first place, 
 the word ^sQolog, method, which properly sig- 
 nifies a path to, or means of acquiring a cer- 
 tain end, and in which sense it is here used 
 by Aristotle, is translated by Dr. Gillies, 
 *' evciy kind of knowledge T^ In the next 
 place, the word 'n-^oxips<ng, pre-election, which 
 Aristotle himself, in cap. iii. lib. 3, defines to 
 be "a deliberative tendency to or desire of 
 things in our power:'* >/ Trpoxipio-ig av sivi 
 (iovKsvTiKvi o^B^ig 700V f^' Tj^iv, is translated by 
 Dr. Gillies merely " deliberation." And, in 
 the third place, the words ho KuKoog a7rs(pnmf]o 
 Tocytx^ov ovTvavja ^(pisjai, '* hcnce thcy well assert 
 
32 
 
 the good to be that which all things desire,*-' 
 are miserably perverted by Dr. Gillies, who 
 translates them, *' good in general may be 
 justly defined that which all desire.'* For 
 Aristotle alludes here to Plato and the Pytha- 
 goreans, who called the supreme principle of 
 the universe raya^ov, the good, and said that it 
 was the object of desire to all things, as must 
 be obvious to every tyro in the doctrines of 
 those philosophers. 
 
 Dr. Gillies, likewise, does not appear to 
 have had the smallest conception that Aris- 
 totle in this sentence passes gradually from 
 things more particular to things more univer- 
 sal. For art is less universal than method, 
 because every art is a method, but not every 
 method is an art, since many things are ef- 
 fected by inartificial methods. Again, action 
 is more imiversal than method : for every 
 method is a habit, but not every action is a 
 method ; since many things are done with- 
 out method. And pre-election is more uni- 
 versal than action^ because every true action 
 proceeds from pre-election, but many things 
 are the objects of this deliberative tendency 
 which are not performed. The proposition, 
 therefore, in this sentence, always proceeds to 
 
S3 
 
 things more universal, just as if, for instance, 
 it should be said, every ma7i^ every animal, 
 every bodi/, participates of being. 
 
 Again, from the following specimen, the 
 reader will see how little Dr. Gillies has pre- 
 served either the manner or the matter of 
 Aristotle. It is the first part of the second 
 chapter of the same book. E^ 5s t/ TzXog is-t 
 
 7MV tt^ockJcajv, ^i ccvTO /SouAojU.S'S'a, TCi a7<hu Oi dix 
 
 TQVTO, KOCl ^Y\ 'TTaVTU ll STS^OV Ul^OVI^iQx' (tT^OSKTI yOCO 
 
 ouTW y'sig utt^i^o-j, ws"' slvoci ksvviv xai ^araictv tyjv 
 o^s^iv'^ ^r,Xov, cug tout' ay sr/j luyu^ov^ K(Xt to oc^itov, 
 A^' ovv Kui TT^og Tov /3/oy >j y)/tJ0<Tig avrov ^syaK'/iv 
 
 Syjt ^077'/jV ; KCCl Xu9ci7rS^ TO^OTOil, (TKOTTOV S%OVT£gy 
 
 fxciXKov (XV Tvyyjxvot^sv tov liovjog ; si o ovrM, 
 
 TTSlPOiTSOV rVTTOO ys TTS^lKcc^SlV OCVTOf Tl TTOTi £5"/, ^Cii 
 
 Tivog tcajv siTi^yj^Cfjv -q ^vvoc^scvv' ^o^sis oocv TVjg 
 tvo^iMTUTvigy TtccL ^LxKt7oc a^xtTSJcroviKYig. TOiavTvi on 
 xoci r; 'TToKiTiKYi (pocivsjuu i. e. *' If there is a 
 certain end of practical objects, which we 
 wish for its own sake, but we choose other 
 things on account of this, and not every 
 thing for the sake of something else, (for 
 thus there would be a progression to infinity, 
 so that desire would be empty and vain,) — 
 if this be admitted, it is evident that this end 
 will be the good, and that which is most ex- 
 
 F 
 
$4f 
 
 celleht. May we not, therefore, say that 
 the knowledge of it is of great importance 
 with respect to life ; and that, like archersy 
 having this for a mark, we shall more readily 
 obtain what we want ? If, then, this be the 
 case, let us endeavour by a rude delineation 
 to show what this end is, and to what science 
 or faculty it belongs. It may indeed seem 
 to belong to the most principal and master 
 science, and such the political science ap- 
 pears to be." Dr. Gillies's translation of this 
 passage is as follows : *' But if there be art 
 ultimate end of all human pursuit, an end 
 desirable merely in itself, (and unless there 
 be such an end, desire^, proceeding, to infi- 
 nity, will terminate in a baseless vision,) this 
 ultimate end must be what is called good, 
 and of goods the best. The knowledge of 
 it also must greatly contribute to the benefit 
 of life ; serving as a butt to bowmen for the 
 direction of our views and actions. Let us 
 therefore endeavour to deliiieate it carefully, 
 first premising that the investigation of it be- 
 longs to that master science called politics." 
 
 Again, in the beginning of the fourth 
 chapter, the words iTrsilvj 'Ku<r<x yvooa-ig Ttai 
 7r^oo(t^?(ng ayoc^ov iivog o^syEJoei ; i, 6, ** since all. 
 
 # 
 
35 
 
 knowledge and pre-election aspire after a 
 certain good," are translated by Dr. Gillies, 
 " since all our thoughts and desires aim at 
 some kind of good ;'* and this, though the 
 word pre-election is considered by Aristotle 
 of such importance that he has devoted the 
 whole of one chapter to the investigation of 
 its nature. In the same chapter, too, the 
 words, iv yoc^ Kui JlXccjuv vjtto^si tovto xoci s^/jjsi, 
 i. e. " Plato well doubted and investigated," 
 are rendered by Dr. Gillies, " Plato there- 
 fore doubted ;" no notice whatever being 
 taken of the compliment which Aristotle 
 pays to his venerable master. 
 
 Again, in the beginning of the thirteenth 
 chapter, Aristotle says, (ttsi ^'sr/v >j sv^aiiMovia 
 T^/vxyig svspysioc'Jig xotT* ocDfjriv tsKuocv ; i.e. ** Since 
 felicity is a certain energy of the soul ac- 
 cording to perfect virtue ;" but by Dr. Gil- 
 lies he is made to say, ** since happiness 
 results from virtuous energies," which is very 
 far from his real meaning. For Aristotle 
 here repeats nearly the whole of tliat accu- 
 rate and beautiful definition of felicity which 
 he had before given; viz. *' that it is the 
 energy of the soul according to the most 
 perfect virtue in a perfect lite." Sq that fen 
 
36 
 
 licity, according to Aristotle, is not merely 
 the result of virtuous energies, but of the 
 energies of the most perfect virtue. Again, 
 in the same chapter, Aristotle says, si ^s tuv^ 
 
 ovTccg ^xsc, ^yjXoVy on ^si rov ttoXitikov stotvat Troog 
 Tu TTS^i \Ijv'XjVjv' cca-TTSP Ttai 7ov o(pBaKuovg Bsputtsv- 
 erovja, koci ttuv crooy^cc' kui jxdcKKov o<too ']i[xicoT£^u 
 xai f2eXru(}v vj ttoKitikvj 7Vjg larpDCVig. 2. 6. *' If 
 this be the case, it is evident that the politi- 
 cian (the man who is capable of managing 
 the reins of government) ought to know the 
 manner in whicli things pertaining to the 
 soul subsist, just as he who intends to admi- 
 nister remedies to the eyes ought to have a 
 knowledge of the whole body ; and this by 
 how much the more honourable and excel- 
 lent the political is than the medicinal sci- 
 ence." Compare this with the following 
 translation of Dr. Gillies : " The true states- 
 man, therefore, ought to know the mind as 
 much, or rather more, (because his pursuit 
 is still more excellent) than the physician 
 does the body." Here* the very beautiful 
 and important dogma contained in the ori- 
 ginal, and which Aristotle derived from the 
 Charmides of Plato, is entirely lost in the 
 translation of Dr. Gil lies. The dogma I al- 
 
37 
 
 lude to is tills: tliat he who intends to cure 
 a part ouglit to have an accurate knowledge 
 of the whole body, and that the former can- 
 not be properly eifccted without the latter. 
 Dr. Gillies too has destroyed by his transla- 
 tion the beautiful analogy implied by Aris- 
 totle in this sentence ; I mean that the most 
 exalted virtue, in which felicity consists, has 
 the same relation to the whole soul that the 
 eye has to the whole body. For the most 
 exalted virtue, as Aristotle shows in the tenth 
 book, is theoretic, which has evidently the 
 relation of an eye. 
 
 Again, near the end of die first book, 
 Aristotle says, " that of the virtues some are 
 dianoetic and others moral," K-yo^:v yuq 
 
 ocVTCov rccg ^sv ^layoyinx-xg, ^aq "%'- '/jBiKag ; and this 
 division he also repeats in the beginning of 
 the second book. Dr. Gillies, however, not 
 knowing the accurate meaning of the word 
 dianoetic, translates luxyonn-nug intellectual^ and 
 thus destroys all the accuracy of Aristotle's 
 meaning in this place, which is founded on 
 that scientific division of the parts or powers 
 of the soul made by him, particularly in his 
 third book on the Soul, and alluded to in 
 many of his other various works. For, ac> 
 
 I UNIVERSITY ) 
 
38 
 
 cording to Aristotle, in these writings lixvoix^ 
 or the dianoetic power, is, in its most accurate 
 signification, that faculty of the soul which 
 reasons scientifically, deriving the principles 
 of its reasoning from intellect ; but intellect 
 is that power which perceives truth without 
 affirmation or negation, because it does not 
 understand by composition or division, but 
 simply, and with immediate vision sees the 
 forms of things. See the sixth chapter of 
 the sixth book of his Ethics, the tenth book 
 of the same work, and the latter part of the 
 third chapter of his third book on the Soul. 
 There is an absolute necessity therefore of 
 using the word dianoetic in translating the 
 acroamatic works of Aristotle, because there 
 is no word in the English language, nor per- 
 haps in any other language, equivalent to its 
 accurate meaning : for even in Latin the 
 word cogitatio, which is the translation of it 
 given by Cicero, conveys a very imperfect, 
 or rather no idea whatever, of its primary 
 philosophical signification. 
 
 Farther still, the beginning of the second 
 chapter of the second book is as follows : 
 
S9 
 
 Cr^iTv;, (TKeTrjo^sBoc. cuKK' // ocyocSoi yiyu^i^u^ STret 
 
 ovhv av nv o(p=Xog ocvTrig. i. e. "Since then the 
 present treatise is not for the sake of theory, 
 like our other works : for we do not specu- 
 late that we may know what virtue is, but 
 that we may become good, since otherwise 
 it would be attended with no benefit, &c.'* 
 Which is thus translated by Dr. Gillies : 
 *' Since the present treatise is not merely a 
 theory, as other parts of our works (for the 
 inquiry is not * wherein virtue consists,' 
 but * how it may be best attained,' without 
 which the speculative knowledge of it is not 
 of the smallest value) &c." Here the reader 
 will easily see, that Dr. Gillies, by his ran- 
 dom translation perv'erts, as usual, the mean- 
 ing of Aristotle. For the inquiry in Ethics 
 is not *' how virtue may be best attained," 
 since a man may know this without being 
 virtuous ; but we speculate on this subject, as 
 Aristotle says, '* that we may become good ;" 
 the end of this inquiry, as he elsewhere ob- 
 serves, not being knowledge but action. 
 
 Again, near the end of the third chapter 
 of this book, Aristotle says, Ilf^/ 1= to xuKsttw- 
 Tjpov uii yjxt Tiyjy) yiysrai koci u^sty}' xoh yu^ to su 
 i3s7.T/ov fy TouTw. ?. e. " Both art and virtue are 
 
40 
 
 always Conversant with that which is more 
 difficult, for in this there is a more excellent 
 good." Compare this with the version of 
 Dr. Gillies : " But the most difficult part is 
 that best fitted for showing the excellence of 
 the performer." In this translation, as the 
 reader will easily perceive, neither the accu- 
 rate meaning, nor any thing of the manner 
 of Aristotle, are preserved. 
 
 Compare also the following passage, in the 
 fourth chapter of this book, with the Doctor's 
 version. It is the beginning of that chapter. 
 
 AiromTciS: Tc.v tic, ttc-jc Ksyo^sv on ^si tcc ^iv diKocioc 
 'TTPurJovTag ^ir^iovg yivscrBai, tu 5s a'oo(p^ovoi a-oo(p^ovixg' 
 £t yap TTPurJova-i tx dixuiu Kai tu crcAj(p^ovix, rjoyj skti 
 
 ^IKOCtOl yMl (TOOlpPOVSg' OOa-TTi^ SI TO. yi^Ci[XlJi!XTlK.OC KOCl 
 
 fj!,ov(nxa, y^oc^^oiTnioi xoa. ix.ovo-ixoi. ^ ov^s stti too'j 
 isyj/oijv ovroog s%ct ; svh%SToci yx^ y^ocix^^uTiKOv t/ 
 TTQiYia'ai TiCii (xivo rv%ric, koci xKKov vttoBs^evov' tots 
 ovv s^oii ypxu.^.urixoCf c-xv xai y^xfXfjixriKov ti ttol- 
 7i(rvi Tixi y^x^uxTixoog, tovto ^'ss"/ to kxtx tyjv fi/ 
 ccvTca y^aiLiJ^xTLy^viv. i. e. "It may be doubted 
 why we say that men from performing just 
 things must necessarily become just, and 
 from performing temperate things, tempe- 
 rate : for if they do such things as are just 
 and temperate, they are already just and tern- 
 
41 
 
 perate ; just as those who perform thuigs 
 grammatical and musical are grammarians 
 and musicians. Or may we not say that nei- 
 ther is this the case with the arts ? For it is 
 possible that a man may do something gram- 
 matical both casually and from the sugges- 
 tion of another. Hence he will then be a 
 grammarian, if heboth does something gram- 
 matical and in a grammatical manner ; that 
 is, if he does it according to the grammatical 
 art which he contains in himself." The 
 translation of Dr. Gillies is as follows : " A 
 doubt arises, why we should say that men 
 acquire justice by doing just actions, or be- 
 come temperate by observing the rules of 
 temperance ; since if they perform such ac- 
 tions and observe such rules, it should seem 
 that they must be already endowed with 
 those virtues ; in the same manner as a man 
 who writes or who performs according to the 
 rules of grammar and music is already a 
 grammarian and a musician. But this does 
 not hold time even with respect to the arts ; 
 for a man may write grammar merely by 
 imitation, by chance, or by the direction of 
 another ; but to be a grammarian he must 
 himself understand the art y Here one part 
 
 G 
 
42 
 
 of this passage, which is evidently a question 
 in the original, is made an assertive sentence 
 in the version of Dr. Gillies ; and in the 
 concluding part the meaning of Aristotle is 
 entirely perverted. For Aristotle says that 
 a man is then a grammarian when he both 
 does something grammatical and in a gram- 
 matical manner ; but he does not merely say 
 that to be a grammarian he must himself loi- 
 derstand the art. For simply to understand 
 the art of grammar does not make a man a 
 grammarian ; but to be so he must do some- 
 thing grammatical^ grammatically. 
 
 Again, in the second chapter of the 
 third book, pre-election {nr^oui^c(Tiq) is every- 
 where confounded in the translation of Dr. 
 Gillies with election and preference, though, 
 as we have before observed, it is defined by 
 Aristotle himself to be a deliberative tendency 
 to, or desire of things in our power. It is not 
 therefore the same either with election or 
 preference, since a man may choose or prefer 
 one thing to another without deliberation, but 
 in this case his energy is not pre- elective. 
 
 I sliall pass on to the fifth book ; for it 
 would be an endless task to enumerate all 
 the inaccuracies of Dr. GiJlies's translation. 
 
43 
 
 In the fourth chapter, tlierefore, of this book 
 Aristotle treats of corrective justice and its 
 analogy, and having shown that it holds the 
 middle place between loss and gain, and that 
 it is the business of a judge to find this middle 
 term, which is an arithmetical mean be- 
 tween the greater and the lesser extreme, he 
 illustrates his meaning as follows : Icra/ ul 
 
 c(p^ccv, ua, /3/3 yy, u7\K'/iKuig' uttq rrig cccc (x(p7!i^yicrS^uj 
 
 TO CCS, Kcci TT^oa-KsicrBcA} 771 yy, to s(p oov yd' cajS'S oX'/j y\ 
 
 §77, TJjf cci V7rs^s%ii tm y}, xai tcc y(^ ivig cc^oc pp 
 
 TM y^ I 
 
 a £ cc 
 
 7 C y 
 
 0. 
 
 2. e. " Let there be three equal right lines, 
 
 aa, bb, cc. From the line a a let there be 
 
 taken a part ae, and let this part be added to 
 
 the line cc. Let this part also be cd. This 
 
 being done, the whole line dec will surpass 
 
 the line aehy the line c d, and the line cf. 
 
 Hence it will surpass the line bb by the 
 
 line e d. 
 
 a ( a 
 
 b b 
 
 c f c d." 
 
 Dr, Gillies's translation of this passage is no- 
 
44 
 
 thing more than " This plainly appears in 
 geometry by means of a diagram !" 
 
 Again ; take the following specimen of 
 the Doctor's translation from the beginning 
 of the eighth chapter of the same book : 
 OvTooy ^f 100V diKaiujv xat a'^muv tcov h^'^^svcov^ 
 cx.hx.si fjLSV Kai ^iKccioTr^ayit, orav ^kcajv Tig ocVTOc 
 
 TT^aTJp,' OTUV dS UKOOV, OVT CXOlKcl OVTc dlKOCiOTTPOCyStf 
 
 aXyC Yj Kara (rv^^cQrjyiog' oig ya^ (TUjutSs^i^TCS ^lycaiotg 
 eiva: rj u^iKOig, Tr^a-fjova-rj. a^iTtrj^a ^5 kcxi ^iKaio- 
 TT^ocyvi^.Ci co^iS'ai too fxoucr/w, y.ai aTcovcioo' orav yap 
 SKOVcriov V, xyiysTar aua of Kai o^iKvi^a toJs s'FiV, 
 u>TS aoiKov Ti iSai f^EV, aoiK'iii^a ^c ov^sttco^ Bav uvi 
 TO SKOVcriov 'Tf^otryi. 'kzyuo ^5 SKOVcriov ^sv, ujcTTrs^ 
 KCci ir^OT&^ov si^vjrai, o av Tig tcjov £(p uvtoc ovtoov 
 siocog %ui u)j ayvooov 'TTParJ^j, yA]TS ov, uvjts «, uyjTS 
 ov svsjioc. oiov Tiva TVTrJsi, %ai tivi, koci Tivog evsTCoc, 
 xai sxsivujv cKaTov, ^v] koJoc cv^^s^Ti^og, ^>j^5 [Btcf,' 
 oiCTTTiP £1 Tig KaQc^v tjjv %si^a avrovy Tvifjoi srs^ov' 
 ov% sxcajv 5s* ov yr/.^ stt avTca. ivosy^sjat 5s tov 
 TVTrjoiMSvov Trcclspa eivai, tcv o oti [j.sv uv^^c^jTrog ij 
 TCOV TTuPOVTcov Tig yivMCTXsiv, on OS TTujYi^ uyvoiiv, 
 o^oioog 5s TO Toiovrov hcoPicrBoo xoci iiri tov ov svsxa, 
 nai Tispi TYiv TTPa^iv oXviv, to 5}? ayvoH^svov, vj ^vj 
 cxyvoi^LLivov u,£Vy UYj stt' avTco OS ov, fj [Siof- axovo'iov* 
 'KoKka yap xai ']oov (pvasi v7ra^%oyTOCv sioorsg xai 
 Ti^aTJo^sv xuL irayp^sv^ mv ov^sv qvtb skovctiov, out? 
 
45 
 
 lXK0V<riOV £9lV' 010]/ TO y^JPOCV, 71 eCTToBvYlCKSlV, 2. €' 
 
 *' Just and unjust actions then being those 
 which we have enumerated, a man acts 
 justly or unjustly when he does these things 
 voluntarily ; but when he does them invo- 
 luntarily he neither acts unjustly nor justly, 
 except from accident : for he does those 
 things which happen to be either just or un- 
 just. But an unjust and also a just deed are 
 defined by the voluntary and the involun- 
 tary : for when these deeds are voluntary 
 they are blamed ; but at the same time an 
 unjust action is then performed. So that 
 something unjust will indeed take place, but 
 will not yet be a7i unjust deed unless it is ac- 
 companied with the voluntary. But the vo- 
 luntary, as was before observed, takes place 
 when any one does that which is in his power 
 knowingly, and is neither ignorant of the 
 person to whom, nor with what, nor on what 
 account he does it ; as, for instance, when he 
 is not ignorant whom he strikes, with what 
 instrument, and on what account, and when 
 he does each of these things, not fiom acci- 
 dent, nor by compulsion, as would be the 
 case, if some one, taking his hand, should 
 strike another person with it ; since in this 
 
46 
 
 instance he would not strike willingly, be- 
 cause it was not in his power to prevent it. 
 It might also happen that he who was struck 
 was the father of him by whom he was 
 struck, and the son might know indeed that 
 he was a man, or some one of the persons 
 present, but might not know that he was his 
 father. A similar distinction must likewise 
 be made with respect to that for the sake of 
 which a thing is done, and with respect to 
 the whole action. Hence, that which is 
 done ignorantly, or if not ignorantly, could 
 not be prevented by him who did it, or was 
 done by him through compulsion, is an in- 
 voluntary deed. For we knowingly both do 
 and are passive to many things, none of 
 which is either voluntary or involuntary ; 
 such, for instance, as old age or death." 
 In order to understand the meaning of Aris- 
 totle fully in this passage, it is necessary to 
 observe, that, near the end of the seventh 
 chapter, he makes a very accurate distinc- 
 tion between the just and a just deed, and 
 also between the tmjust and a?i unjust deed, 
 " For," says he, ^^ the unjust ox the just dQ- 
 Tives its subsistence from nature or law ; but 
 the same thing when done is a just ox an 
 
 I 
 
47 
 
 unjust deed, and not before it is done. For 
 prior to this it is the just, or tlic unjust^ 
 
 Aicc(pspsi ^- TO a^iKyjUOc Kai ro aoiKOv, kui to oikxioo^x 
 KccL TO ^nKniov' a^iK.ov [J.:V yx() ss'i z'/i (pvcr-t, Vj rx^si. 
 
 TO XVTO ^5 TOfTO, OTXV TTpwXjByj, XOIKVI^X cS'i' TT^IV 
 ^i TTPX'Xj^yjVXl, UTTOOf a7\7C U^IKOV' O^OlOjg Oc 'Ax: 
 
 OiitxnoiJLx. 
 
 Dr. Gillics's translation of this passage is as 
 follows : ** Injustice, as applicable to actions, 
 consists in what we have now said, but it 
 does not belong to persons unless it be com- 
 mitted voluntarily ; for when a man acts 
 without intention the quality of his action, as 
 good or bad, just or unjust, is, in reference 
 to the agent, merely an accessary, not spring- 
 ing essentially from himself, and neither en- 
 titling him to praise nor subjecting him to 
 blame. That therefore which is unjust is 
 not injustice in the agent unless it be com- 
 mitted voluntarily ; that is, as formerly ex- 
 plained, unless the action, with all its cir- 
 cumstances, depend entirely on our own 
 power, and be performed knowingly, with 
 intention, and without constraint. Thus, to 
 make the act of striking parricide, we must 
 know the person whom we strike, the nature 
 of the instrument with which the stroke is 
 
48 
 
 inflicted; and the motive through which we 
 are impelled to such a horrid crime. The 
 action must also depend entirely on our own 
 power ; for in many natural events we are 
 both agents and patients knowingly, though 
 not voluntarily ; witness old age and death." 
 Here, in the first place, there is no vestige 
 whatever in this translation of the distinction 
 which Aristotle makes betwen the unjust 
 TO u^iKov, and an unjust deed, to a^iMi^^oc. In 
 the next place no notice is taken of the il- 
 lustration adduced by Aristotle of one man 
 taking the hand of another and striking a 
 third person with it. And, in the third 
 place, Aristotle says nothing about making 
 " the act of striking parricide ;" for this is 
 an interpolation of the Doctor. 
 
 Entire chapters, likewise, are translated by 
 Dr. Gillies with the same unskilfulness and 
 inaccuracy ; and in these the same unpar- 
 donable liberty is everywhere taken of arro- 
 gantly interpolating, and rashly omitting, as 
 may best serve the purposes of random para- 
 phrase. Of this the following chapters are 
 instances. The first is the third chapter of 
 the sixth book : A^^oc^svoi ow avwBsv, 'tts^i ocvtcov 
 
4t9 
 
 Xo^u(p'civoct YJ a7ro(puvat, 'TTivrs 70V oc^i^^ov' tocvxcx 
 yoi^ Koci ^c^rj svh%STcxi ^iccxlisv^aSca. STfi^rii^Yl jJ-^v ovv 
 
 Tl SS'li'f SVTcvBsV (pUVS^OVy SI hi OCX^l^oXoyiKT^Oil., XUl 
 
 ^Yi wkqKqvB'zIV rocig ou-OiofTjcri' TTuvrsg ya.^ VTToXa^" 
 havou.;v^ o s%i^(xu£9u jxy^ £yh%S(rB(Xt uKKc/og £X>siy. rot 
 ^£ iv^iyp^ivu uXKoog, otocv s^co tov BiM^siv yzv'i\ruiy 
 KocvBocvsi £1 S9iVi -yj jj.'i^. s^ avaynYtg a^oc s^i to stti- 
 TyjTOV' oc'i^iov apoc' ice yuo s^ uvayy^'i^g ovtcc oc7t7\Mgy 
 afhcc TTCfyrci' tu V u'Bioc^ ayvjYiTu v.dcl ccCpBoc^Toc. 
 en ^i^ocKt'/] 7ru<ru ■-Tris"/]^^'^ ^oksi ayui, vml to s'7ri5"j^rov, 
 u.ocBrjov. SK ir^cyr/iccr-Kc^j.vjcov tz 'Kuo'cc OiducrKocXiCi* 
 ua-TTSP KCii sv TOig ccvocKvTiKoig sKsyo^Si'. Vj ^iv yoc^ 
 1/ eTTocyooy'/jg, vj ^i o-vKKoyKr^cc. yj ^sv dY} STTuyuyYi 
 i>cp%7i f5"/ xai TOV Ku9oKov' ^i crvKAoytr^og sx, tmv 
 xecGoT^ov. £icriv a^a u^yj>i i^^ c^v o <rv?^Kcyi(r^og, mv 
 oiiK £91 (TvKKoyKT^og' £7Tocyu}yYi a^u, yj ^iv u^ct 
 sviTyjU-Yj ss'iv s^ig a7ro^s/X7/x/?, xu( ocra uKKix. tt^cC" 
 ^lOPi^oiisBu £v Toig avuT'.VTiKOig' oTuv ya^ 7Tu:g TriTcVYi, 
 
 KOCt yV'jC^l^Ol (lege yVOC^L^MTi^Ol *) UVT(x) wc/v ul 
 
 oc^oii, £'jri7<icTai' si ya^ jj^yj ^uKT^gv tov trv^Trs^ac-' 
 ^ocTog^ xuTDc crv^^sQ,Yi%og s^st S7ri5-Yii/.y,v. Tfs^i (xsv ovv 
 sTTisyi^ji'Yjg ^loo^icrBoc tov t^cttov tovtov. I. e. " As- 
 suming, therefore, a more elevated exor- 
 
 * The necessity of this emendation will be at once evident 
 to any one who reads the second chapter of the first book, of 
 Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. Indeed this is evident from 
 the words that immediately follow. 
 
 H 
 
50 
 
 dium, let us again speak concerning these. 
 And let those things through which the 
 soul asserts the truth, by affirming or de- 
 nying, be fiA'e in number ; viz. art^ science, 
 prudence, wisdom, intellect : for by hypolepsis 
 and opinion it is possible to be deceived. 
 What science therefore is, will be from hence 
 evident, if it be necessary to employ accu- 
 racy on this occasion, and not to attend to 
 similitudes. For v^^e all are of opinion that 
 what we know scientifically cannot admit of 
 a various subsistence. But with respect io 
 things which may subsist variously, when 
 they are out of our view, we are ignorant 
 whether or not they exist. The object of 
 scientific knowledge, therefore, is from ne- 
 cessity. Hence it is eternal : for all such 
 things as are simply from necessity are eter- 
 nal : and things eternal are unbegotten and 
 incorruptible. Farther still, all science ap- 
 pears to be capable of being taught, and the 
 object of science is the object of discipline. 
 But all learning is produced from things 
 previously known, as we have said in our 
 Analytics. For one kind of learning is ac- 
 quired by induction, but another by syllo- 
 gism. And induction indeed is a principle. 
 
51 
 
 and is the principle of that which is univer- 
 sal *, but syllogism is composed from univer- 
 sals. Hence the principles from which syl- 
 logism consists arc not derived from syllo- 
 gism. They are known therefore by induc- 
 tion. Hence, too, science is a demonstrative 
 habit, and whatever else we have added to its 
 definition in our analytics. For when a man 
 believes in a certain way that a thing is, and 
 the principles of that in which he believes 
 are more known to him than the conclusion, 
 he then possesses scientific knowledge. For 
 if they are not more known to him than die 
 conclusion, he will possess science acciden- 
 tally. Let science therefore be thus de- 
 fined." 
 
 Compare this with the following version of 
 Dr. Gillies : " Let these habits be the five 
 following ; art, science, prudence, wisdom, 
 intellect. In matters of opinion we are li- 
 able to be deceived, not so in matters of sci- 
 ence. The former relates to things variable 
 in their nature, of whose very existence we 
 may doubt, unless when they are actually 
 
 * By that which is universal, Aristotle means in this place 
 every indemonstrable principle, or, in other words, every 
 Qxiom, and definition. 
 
52 
 
 perceived ; the latter is conversant about 
 things unaherable, necessary, and eternal, 
 incapable of being generated, exempt from 
 Corruption ; the knowledge of which admits 
 not of degrees between total ignorance and 
 absolute certainty. All science may be 
 taught, and all teaching implies principles, 
 namely, those truths which are previously 
 known by experience or reason. The first 
 principles are acquired by induction, that is 
 by intellect operating on experience. Sci- 
 ence then may be defined a demonstrative 
 habit, distinguished by those properties which 
 we have ascribed to it in our Analytics. The 
 principles of science must be perceived with 
 the clearest evidence ; for unless they be 
 more evident than the conclusions drawn 
 from them, those conclusions will not form 
 science, strictly so called ; because their 
 truth does not necessarily proceed from the 
 truth of their premises, with which they are 
 connected, not essentially, but only by way 
 of accession or appendage." 
 
 In this translation of Dr. Gillies it is obvi- 
 ous that, in the first place, no notice what- 
 ever is taken of the word y7roAwi^/f, hi/polepsisy 
 though, considered as one of the powers pf 
 
53 
 
 the soul, it is a word of great importance in 
 the philosophy of Aristotle ; and though the 
 Doctor himself admits (in the introduction to 
 this book) that *' the powers of intellection 
 differ as widely from each other as those of 
 sensation." This word, howevTr, is used by 
 Aristotle to signify the definite assent of the 
 soul to the discursive energies of the dianoetic 
 poiver. And, in the next place, by the 
 rambling paraphrase of Dr. Gillies, the accu- 
 racy of Aristotle's reasoning is entirely dcr 
 stroyed, as must be obvious, by comparing it 
 with the original, to any one in the smallest 
 degree familiar with the very scientific mode 
 of writing employed by that philosopher. 
 
 Again, the sixth chapter of the same book 
 IS as follows : Ett?/ §'>/ fTr/r'/y/x)? tts^/ Twy yM9oXov 
 £<9iv i/7roA)}if//c, Koci tcajv s^ ocvayytYig ovTMVf sicri S'awa/ 
 ruv aTTo^siKToov Koct Trac-Yjg £7ri5"yiij.yig' ^stx Koyov ytxp 
 ri iins'Yi^vi' rvjg ct^x'/ig tov STTiTrirov, Hr ocv S7n9Yju.vi 
 
 f;>7, HT! TSXV71, UTS (p^OVVjO-ig. TO jU,£V yoc^ STTlTyiTOVy 
 
 ecTTo^siycJov' cci ^s Tvyxocvovcnv ovcroci tts^i tu sv^s%oy.£voi 
 aKKcAjg £%siv. ov^s ^i^ (ro(pix tovtcov ss'i' tov yocp <ro(pov 
 
 TTSPl SVIMV S%ilV OCTTO^cl^lV SS'iV. SI OTj Oig uK'^BiVO^cV^ 
 JtOCl U-'/i^iTTOTS ^tUyllcV^O^sBoc TTSPl TCC jJ^Yj iVdiy^O^SVUf 
 
 ^ jcoci iv^syp^svu aAAwf syjiv^ £7riS"f^iJ.y], kui (p^ov7j(rig_ 
 
 £9ly JCOCl G-0(pi0C, KOCl VOVg, TOVTOOV Oi T^IUV ^TlBiV 
 
54 
 
 i7ri<3V}^Viv' KEiTTejai vow sivcct rocv u^yjiov. l hat 
 is, ** Since science is a definite assent to 
 universals, and things which have a neces- 
 sary subsistence ; and since there are prin- 
 ciples of the objects of demonstration and of 
 all science (for science subsists in conjunction 
 with reason) — this being the case, of the 
 principles of the objects of science, there 
 will neither be science, nor art, nor pru- 
 dence. For the object of science is demon- 
 strable ;. but art and prudence are conversant 
 wdth things which have a various subsistence. 
 Neither can wisdom pertain to these things : 
 for it is the province of a wise man to possess 
 demonstration of certain things. If there- 
 fore the powers by which we assert the truth, 
 and are never at any time deceived either 
 about things which have not or which have 
 a various subsistence, are, science, prudence, 
 wisdom, and intellect; and if no one of 
 these three can have principles for its ob- 
 ject, (I mean by the three, prudence, wis- 
 dom, and science,) it remains that intellect is 
 conversant with principles, or is that power 
 by which we know the principles of sci-» 
 ence.'* 
 
55 
 
 Compare this with the following transla- 
 tion of Dr. Gillies : " Since the object of 
 science, as above observed, is universal and 
 demonstrable truth, and whatever is de- 
 monstrable must be founded on principles, it 
 is manifest that there must be primary prin- 
 ciples, which are not science any more than 
 they are art or prudence. They are not 
 science, because all science is demonstrable ; 
 they are not art or prudence, because these 
 have for their subjects things contingent 
 and variable : neither are they wisdom, be- 
 cause, as we shall see hereafter, wisdom, and 
 the highest wisdom, is conversant about 
 truths susceptible of demonstration. Since 
 then none of the four habits just mentioned ; 
 neither science, nor art, nor prudence, nor 
 wisdom, can afford those primary principles ; 
 and since all the habits of the understanding 
 are reducible to five, it follows that intellect, 
 operating on experience, is the only source 
 from which those great and primary truths 
 can be supposed to flow." 
 
 Here, in the first place, no notice whatever 
 is taken of the word vKoKr^-^ig -, and, in the 
 next place, science is confounded with the 
 object of science. For the words to ^bv yoc^ 
 
$6 
 
 'iT/5">jT(3v, ecTTchiKToVy 1. c. foT tlic objcct of sci- 
 entific knowledge is demonstrable, are rendered 
 by Dr. Gillies, *' because all science is de- 
 monstrable *." In the last sentence, too, of 
 Dr. Gillies's translation, Aristotle is made to 
 assert that concerning intellect which nei- 
 ther the text authorizes, nor his own doc- 
 trine as delivered by him in the second chap- 
 ter of his Posterior Analytics, which we have 
 already noticed. For he there expressly 
 says, '* that the principles of demonstration 
 (axioms and definitions) are by nature prior 
 to the conclusions of which they are the 
 source ;'* so far is he from asserting, " that 
 intellect operating on experience is the foun- 
 tain whence these principles flow. 
 
 Again : the latter part of the eighth chap- 
 ter of the same book is as follows : Or/ 5' n 
 
 (ppovyjcrig ovx, STriS'Vji^vj (pavs^oV rov ycx.^ £<r%(XTOV 
 e^iv, oocrTTSP simruL' to yoc^ Ti^cxJiTDiov toiovtov. ocv- 
 
 TIKSITOCI l^SV ^Yj T60 VCi)' [JiSV yOC^ VOVg, TC*JV O^OOV, UJV 
 
 OVJC ss'i "koyoq. vj ^s tov Z'^yjxTOV, o\) ovx. £9iv f7r/s"- 
 '^u.vif uKTC ui<rB7]<rig' ov% tj ioov i^tocv, aAA' oioc 
 ai<rBocvoiJ!.s9o( on lo sv loig ^u^vi^u'riKoig io-yjxTOv, 
 
 * This observation was made by me long since, in p. 44- 
 of the introduction to my translation of Aristotle's Metaphy- 
 sics; but Dr. Gillies very prudently takes no notice of it in his 
 Supplement. 
 
51 
 
 r^iycovov' (rTVjasroct yap xocksi' aKK aviv} jxaXKov 
 aicrBrjo-tg y] (ppovvjcrtg' SKStvvjg ^£, aKKo st^og. i. €. 
 
 That prudence is not science is evident: 
 for, as we have said, it is conversant with 
 that which subsists as an extreme : for that 
 which is practical is a thing of this kind. 
 But it is opposed to intellect :. for intellect is 
 conversant with terms or limits, (/. e. axioms) 
 of which there is no definition ; but prudence 
 is conversant with that extreme, the percep- 
 tion of which is not the province of science 
 but of sense. Not, indeed, that it is a sensi- 
 ble perception of things which are the pro- 
 per objects of sense, but it is of that kind, as 
 when we perceive that what is last in mathe- 
 matical figures is a triangle ; for figures stop 
 there *. This perception, however, rather 
 belongs to sense ; but that which pertains to 
 prudence is specifically different." 
 
 Compare this with the following transla- 
 tion of Dr. Gillies : *' Prudence is manifestly 
 different from science, being the perception 
 of those particular and practical truths which 
 admit not of demonstration ; whereas intel- 
 lect is employed about those general and pri- 
 mary principles which require not any proof. 
 In the chain of mental faculties intellect and 
 
 * i. e. All figures are ultimately resolved into triangles. 
 
 I 
 
58 
 
 prudence then form the two extreme links ; 
 prudence holding the extreme of individua- 
 lity, and intellect that of generalization.^ Pru^ 
 dence then may be called common sense, 
 since it is conversant about objects of sense ; 
 but in a manner specifically different from 
 that in which the other senses are respectively 
 conversant about their particular objects." 
 
 Here, in the first place, what Aristotle 
 says respecting a triangle is entirely omitted, 
 as I liave before observed in the introduction 
 to my translation of Aristotle*s Metaphysics ; 
 and, in the next place, no part of this pas-r 
 sage can with propriety be called a transla- 
 tion, as must be obvious even to the most 
 careless reader. 
 
 Thus much for Dr. Gillies's translation of 
 the sixth book. Without proceeding to no- 
 tice similar inaccuracies and deformities in 
 his translation of the seventh book, I shall 
 only observe, that he has entirely omitted 
 •the four last chapters of this book, which 
 treat of pleasure ; because, says he, *' they 
 are mere transcripts from the sixth book of 
 the Ethics to Eudcmus ; and the subject is 
 more fully and more philosophically ex- 
 plained in the tenth book of the Ethics to 
 Nicomachus," Can any thing be more abi 
 
59 
 
 surd than to omit translating these chapters 
 because they arc transcripts from another 
 work of which he has given no transla- 
 tion ? Besides, these chapters were evi- 
 dently designed by Aristotle to form a part of 
 this book, as appears from the concluding 
 sentence, which is as follows : Usoi ^sv ow 
 
 ^yKparsiag xut uKpuc-ictg, koci ttsoi vj^ovvjg xui KvTr-zig 
 sip'/jTxi, yjxi Ti £7{,a5"cv, Ttai TTujg ra txsv ayocSoc ocvjm'^ 
 55"/, va 0: XDCX.2C' KoiTTOv oi xoci TTspi (piXiocg ipovu-sv, 
 
 2. e. " And thus we have spoken concerning 
 continence and incontinence, pleasure and 
 pain, what each of them is, and in what re- 
 spect some of them are good and others bad. 
 It now remains that we speak concerning 
 friendship." Are such omissions as these to 
 be justified ? And will any man presume to 
 call him a translator who takes such liberties 
 with his original ? 
 
 Without proceeding to notice every thing 
 worthy of reprehension in the remaining 
 books, I shall finish this selection by present- 
 ing the reader with the original of the whol(? 
 of the seventh chapter of the tenth book, as 
 it is one of the most beautiful and important 
 in the Ethics of Aristotle; and will show in a 
 strong point of view how Dr. Gillies has de- 
 formed the manner, and destroyed the accu- 
 
60 
 rate meaning of the Stagirlte by his translatioil. 
 
 /iccjcc r'/jv y.^ariS"/!)/' oiVtvi V sivj tov cx^iTov sits drj vovg 
 rovTO, SITS aXKo Tiy o l'^ xaja (pvcriv ^ojisi oc^%siv "K-oci 
 TiysicrBoci, xxi svvoiocv sy^siv tts^i ■kccXoov %ai Bsioov' sits 
 Bsiov cv Ttai aVTO, sns toov sv tjimv to Ssiotoctov' rj 
 TOVTOV svs^ysia koctoc tyiv olksiccv cc^styjv sr/j av Vj TsXsia 
 svoociixovicK. OTi 6 s'si S'soup'r^TiTt'/] siP'AToci. iMoKoyov y,svov 
 ^s tout' av ^o^sisv sivai xoci Toig 'tt^ots^ov, koii tw 
 ecXvi^si' x^ccriS'Yi ts yoc^ uvt'/j s7lv tj svs^ysiu' xai 
 ya^ vovg tcov sv itjj^iv, xoci toov yvoos'cov, tts^i oc c 
 vovg. STi 5t (rvv'yj:-<yocT7i' Bsoc^siv ts ycc^ "^vvoc^sQa 
 (Tvvsyjjog LtaAXoy, jj Trpocfjsiv otiovv, oio^s9u ts osiv 
 Tj^dvYjV TTaPuasuAyJ^ai. tvi svouiuovia: TjoiS'yj os twv xoct 
 apzToov sv^^ysicoVf v] kutu tyjv cro^piocv o^oKoyov^-voog stu 
 '^oxsi yovv 7j a-o(piOi Bav^oc^ag Vj^ovag sy^siv xa'^a^iCTViTt 
 xai TOO (Bs^oaioo. svKoyov o; TOig si^ocri toov ^/jTOVVTuy 
 Tj^ioo TTjv aycAjyy]v sivcci. vjts 7\.syou.sv/\ avTa^xsia, tts^i 
 TTjV Bscfjoririxvjv /xaA/5"' cxv sr/j' toov fxc-v yoc^ Tr^ogfo 
 ^Y{v uvoiyKocidov^ Koci (ro(pog^ kui ^iKuiog, xui oi Koi'n'Qi 
 
 ^SGVTOCt' TOig S; TO/OL»TO/f IXOCVOOg XS%0^7jyYljJl.SVUJVf ^-v 
 
 ^ixxiog 031TOCI TT^og ovg ^ixociOTrpayyjcrsi, xat ^s^^ oov* 
 oiLOioog ^5 Koct (rui(pooov, xcci o ocv^pstog, xcci toov uXKmv 
 SKCX90C. c)s <ro<pog, xui kcxO^ uvtov oov, ^vvutcki Bsm^siv* 
 noci oa-Qo av (ro(pog »;, u.ocKXov' {^sKtiov 6" icroog (rvvs^yovg 
 syj-ov' a}jC oyMg (xvTix^KSS'cc}og. ^o^sis o av ocvth] 
 f/.ovi] 5/ avTViv DcyciTTao'Bcx.i* ovtsv yoc^ ait avTVjg yivsjat 
 -rrapx to Bsc<jpy-Txi. arro os tcov TT^oc'iiJoov^ vj TrXstov ^ 
 
61 
 
 iXarjov TrsoiTroiov^sBa Tra^u rriv 'tt^oc^iv. ^otcsi Tf r, 
 iv^ociiJLOVLOc sv T)i o-'X^oXyj sivoci' oca-'XjOXov^iQu yoco tva 
 
 TWV ^.-V OUV TTpaMT/ylwy OC^STCAiV, sv TOiq TToXlTl'AOig YJ 
 
 Toig TToKsuiHoig oci sv-pynai' oci ds tts^i tuvtoc ir^x^ng^ 
 dOKovo-tv u^ypKoi stvai. oci [^sv ovv 'iroKs^iy.oii^ Koci 
 'TTocvTsKiog' ov^sig yoc^ cci^siTxi to ttoKs^hv, rou TtoKi^iiv 
 SVSX.CX, ov^ii ira^aa-KSva^stv TroKi^ov* ^o^cci yu^ av 
 'TTocvTsXoog ^iai(povog rig iivui, si Tovg (piKovg 'TroXsjj.iovg 
 'TTOiono, ivoc [J^ocyjxi nai (povoi yiyvoiwo, fS"/ ts ncci ;j 
 tov TToXiTiKOV a<r%oKog, koci iru^ ocvto to TToAnsvscrBoci, 
 Trs^iTroiQVfxsvy] ^vvas'siocg xcxi rii^ocg, 7} rvjv ys sv^uiy-oviuv 
 ccvTco %ai TOig TroKirccig, srs^uv ovcrocv Tvig TToKnixi^g, 
 Tjv xoci ^TiTOVusv' ^rjXov cog stspocv ov(rc(V, si crj rcov 
 fjisv xujci Tocg a^STcxg vr^u^soov ai ttoXitikcci xca 
 'TroXsu.moci, ytuKKsi xxi u.sys9si 7roozypv<Tiv' cxvtui ds 
 a(rypXoi xoci rsXovg rivog s(pisvruif koci. ov ^/' avTxg 
 
 cKTl'J OClPSTUl' 7] 5t rOV VOV SVSPySlOi (TTTOU^JI TS ^locps^siv 
 
 doxsi, ^suj^TjiiK.'/j ova-ciy xai Tvoc^ avT'/jv H^ivog £(pis<y^cii 
 TsKcvg, sy^siv ts tj^ovvjv oncsiuv' avzi] h crwav^si tvjv 
 svs^ysiocv' xcci to avTcc^ztg ^s xoct cry^oKxs'iKov, xcci 
 UT^VTOVy oog av^^ooTTi'voVy %cii 0(roc uXKoc too uaxw- 
 ^lU) ocTrovs^fjocty Kccjoc '^avjrjv svs^ysiuv (pocivsjai ovtu' 
 
 y\ TSXSIOC dYj SVOOClUOVllX OCVrVj UV SIV\ CCV^PUJTTOV Xc(^cv<r<x 
 
 ^Yixog (3iov TsXsiov* ov^sy yocp arsXsg sen tccv Tvig 
 svoui^oviug. ^f ToiovTog av siyj xpsitJoov (2iog, /j xaja 
 av.^^wTTov' S yap vi uvBpooTrog ss'iv, brco (^ukxtstoHj 
 
 K 
 
62 
 
 7CVT0 Tov (TvvBsrov, ro(rovTCt) xcci vj sv-oysiu TVjg xcija 
 Trjy a7\X'/]v a^sryjv. si ^tj Bsiov o vovc Troog rov avBpooTfov, 
 xai xuru tovtov f^iog, ^siog vr^og rov avBpccTTivov 
 f3ioy. y^^yj ds cv Kccroc Tovg Tra^atvowTag, uv^pcjottivx 
 
 (P^OVSiV, UvB^C^'JTOV OVIIX, QV^i By}]TlX TOV Bvi^TOV' 
 
 ciXK s(p ocrov svd£%STai uTraBavccriQiv, kccl aitavioc 
 
 TTOlilV TT^Og TO Q]y XCCTU TO XPaTi'FOV TOCV iV aVTOO* 
 
 ii yu<^ X.OCI TCt) oyx-Ct) jj-ixpov iS'ij ^vvaijisi kccl tiu^iotyiTI 
 ttqKv ^.ocXKov vjTs^iy^ii Travjoov, "ho^ns ^' av xcci skutov 
 
 SlVOCl TOVTO, StTfi^ TO XVPIOV XUl a^-SiVOV. aTOTTOV ovv 
 
 yivon ocv, si [xyj tov uvtov (3iov ocipoito, aKKa Tivog 
 aXKov. TO Xsy^sv ts ttpotspov apuocrsi xai vw' to 
 yap oixsiov sxocyoo Tn (pv(rsi, xpuTiTov xoci vj^is'ov saS^* 
 sxas'Ct)' xoci TOO avBpooTrct) ^n o xocju tov vow (oiog^ sittsq 
 ^LuKi^tx TOVTO oivBpooTTog. ovTog oipa. XC61 sv^cciuovss'txjog. 
 i. e. '* But if felicity is an energy according 
 to virtue, it Is reasonable to suppose that it is 
 an energy according to the most excellent 
 virtue ; and this will be the virtue of that 
 which is best. Whether, therefore, this be 
 intellect, or something else which appears to 
 rule and be the leader by nature, and to 
 have a conception of things beautiful and 
 divine ; or whether it is itself divine, or the 
 most divine of all our parts, the energy of 
 this, according to its proper virtue, will be 
 
63 
 
 perfect felicity. But we have said that this 
 energy is contemplative. And this appears 
 to accord with what we before asserted, and 
 also with truth. For this energy is the most 
 excellent ; since intellect is the best of all 
 our parts, and of objects of knowledge those 
 are the most excellent about which intellect 
 is conversant. This energy also is most con- 
 tinued : for we are able to contemplate more 
 incessantly than to perform any action what- 
 ever. We likewise think that pleasure ought 
 to be mingled with felicity ; but the energy 
 according to wisdom is acknowledged to be 
 the most pleasant of all the energies ac- 
 cording to virtue. Wisdom therefore ap- 
 pears to possess pleasures admirable both for 
 their purity and stability. It is reasonable 
 also to think that those who possess know- 
 ledge live more pleasantly than those who 
 investigate. That too, which is called self- 
 sufficiency, will especially subsist about the 
 contemplative energy. For of the necessa- 
 ries of life, the wise and the just man, and 
 the rest of those who possess the moral vir- 
 tues, are in want ; but even when they are 
 sufficiently supplied with these, the just man 
 js in want pf those towards whom, and toge^ 
 
64- 
 
 ther with whom, he may act justly ; and in 
 like manner the temperate and the brave 
 man, and each of the rest. But the wise 
 man when alone is able to contemplate ; and 
 by how much the wiser he is by so much 
 the more does he possess this ability. Per- 
 haps, indeed, he will contemplate better 
 when he has others to co-operate with him ; 
 but at the same time he is most sufficient to 
 himself. This energy alone, likewise, will 
 appear to be beloved for its own sake, for 
 nothing else is produced from it besides con- 
 templation. But from things of a practical 
 nature we obtain something more or less be- 
 sides the action itself. Felicity also appears 
 to consist in leisure : for we engage in busi- 
 ness that we may be at leisure, and we wage 
 war that we may live in peace. The ener- 
 gies therefore of the political virtues consist 
 either in political or in military transactions ; 
 but the actions which are conversant with 
 these appear to, be full of employment. This 
 indeed is perfectly the case with military 
 transactions : for no one chooses to wage 
 war, or prepare for it, for the sake of waging 
 war ; since he would appear to be perfectly 
 a homicide who should make enemies of his 
 
65 
 
 friends for the sake of fighting and slaughter. 
 The energy too of the politician is of a busy 
 nature, and, besides the management of pub- 
 lic afiairs, is employed in procuring domi- 
 nion and honour, or a felicity for himself 
 and the citizens different from the political 
 energy, which also, as something different, 
 we evidently investigate. If, therefore, po- 
 litical and military actions surpass in beauty 
 and magnitude all other virtuous actions, but 
 these are of a busy nature, aspire after a cer- 
 tain end, and are not eligible for their own 
 sakes ; but the energy of intellect, which is 
 contemplative, appears to excel other ener- 
 gies in ardor, and to desire no other end be- 
 sides itself ; if also it possesses a proper plea- 
 sure, which increases its energy, and has, in 
 addition to this, self- sufficiency, leisure and 
 unwearied power, so far as the condition of 
 human nature will permit, with whatever 
 else is attributed to the blessed, and appears 
 to subsist according to this energy ; — if such 
 be the case this will be the perfect felicity of 
 man when it receives a perfect length of 
 life : for nothing belonging to felicity is im- 
 perfect. Such a life, however, will be more 
 excellent than that which is merely human : 
 
66 
 
 for man will not thus live so far as he is man 
 but so far as he contains in himself something 
 divine. And as much as this part excels the 
 composite so much does its energy surpass 
 the energy belonging to every other virtue. 
 If, therefore, intellect is divine with respect 
 to man, the life also according to intellect 
 will be divine with respect to human life. 
 Nor ought we, according to the exhortation 
 of certain persons, to be wise in human af- 
 fairs, since we are men, nor to regard mortal 
 concerns, since we are mortal ; but as much 
 as possible we should immortalize ourselves, 
 and do every thing in order to live according 
 to our most excellent part. For this part, 
 though it is small in bulk, far excels all 
 things in power and dignity. It would seem 
 also that each of us is this part *, since that 
 which obtains dominion is also more excel- 
 lent. It would therefore be absurd for a 
 man not to choose his own life but the life 
 of something else. That too which was be- 
 fore asserted accords with what is now said ; 
 for that which is intimately allied to any na- 
 
 * The true 7nan, both according to Aristotle and Plato, is 
 intellect: for the essence of every thing is the sumndt of its 
 jiature. 
 
67 
 
 ture is most excellent and most pleasant to 
 that nature; and hence a life according to in- 
 tellect will he most excellent and pleasant to 
 man, since this part is most eminently man. 
 This life, therefore, is also most happy." 
 
 Dr. Gillies's translation of this chapter is as 
 follows: " If happiness consists in virtuous 
 energies the greatest human happiness must 
 consist in the exercise of the greatest virtue 
 in man, which must be the virtue or perfec- 
 tion of his best part, whether this be intellect, 
 or whatever principle it be, that is destined 
 to command and bear sway ; having know- 
 ledge of things beautiful and divine, as being 
 cither divine itself, or at least that principle 
 in us which most approximates to divinity. 
 The greatest human happiness then is theo- 
 retic and intellectual, which well accords 
 with the properties which we formerly found 
 by investigation to be essentially inherent in 
 that most coveted object. The intellect is 
 the best principle in man ; its energies are 
 the strongest, and the objects about which it 
 is conversant are far the most sublime. The 
 energies of intellect are also the longest and 
 most continuous, since we can persevere in 
 theorizing and thinking much longer than in 
 
6§ 
 
 performing any action whatever. Pleasure, 
 it was observed, must be an ingredient in 
 happiness ; but contemplative wisdom offers 
 pleasures the most admirable in purity and 
 stability, and the pleasures of knowledge 
 continually increase in proportion to our 
 improvement in it : certainty concerning the 
 sublimest truths affording still higher delight 
 in proportion to the intense efforts of intellect 
 by which they were discovered. That all- 
 sufficiency, which we remarked as a pro- 
 perty of happiness, belongs to intellectual 
 energies more than to any other ; for though 
 the sage, as well as the moralist or the pa- 
 triot, stands in need of bodily accommoda- 
 tions, yet in exerting his highest excellen- 
 cies he is not, like them, dependent on for- 
 tune both for his objects and his instruments ; 
 for objects towards whom he may exercise 
 his virtues, and instruments which may ena- 
 ble him to effectuate his ends. Even unas- 
 sisted and alone, though perhaps better with 
 assistants, he can still think and theorize ; 
 possessing in the energies of his own mind 
 the purest and most independent enjoy- 
 ments. These enjoyments are valuable pe- 
 culiarly on their own account, since they 
 
69 
 
 terminate completely in themselves; whereas 
 all practical virtue has, beside the practice it- 
 self, some distinct and separate end in view. 
 The tranquillity of leisure is naturally more 
 agreeable than the bustle of business ; we 
 toil for the sake of quiet, and make war for 
 the sake of peace. But the practical virtues 
 are most conspicuously exercised in political 
 and military functions, the latter of which 
 none but the most savage and sanguinary 
 minds would submit to from choice, convert- 
 ing friends into enemies for the mere plea- 
 sure of fighting with them. Politics, too, 
 forms an operose and troublesome occupa- 
 tion, which would not be undertaken from 
 the sole love of exercising political functions, 
 independently of distinct and separate ends ; 
 power, wealth, and honour; in one word, 
 prosperity to ourselves, friends, or fellow- 
 citizens. But intellectual energies are com- 
 plete and perfect in themselves, supplying an 
 exhaustless stream of pure and perennial 
 pleasure, which in its turn invigorates and 
 enlivens the energies, and thus increases and 
 refines the source from which it unceasingly 
 springs; all-sufficient, peaceful, and perma- 
 nent, as far as is compatible with the condi- 
 
 L 
 
10 
 
 tion of humanity. AVere unalterable per- 
 manency added to such a lite, its happiness 
 would be more than human ; but even within 
 a limited term, its inestimable delights may 
 be enjoyed by those who attain the perfec- 
 tion of their ages and faculties ; living not 
 merely as partners with a frail and com- 
 pound nature, but according to the simple 
 and divine principle within them, whose 
 energies and virtues as far transcend all 
 others as the intellectual substance in which 
 they reside excels all other substances of 
 which our frame is composed. We ought 
 not, therefore, according to the vulgar ex- 
 hortation, though mortal, to regard only mor- 
 tal things ; but, as far as possible, to put on 
 immortality, exerting ourselves to taste the 
 joys of the intellectual life. This is living 
 according to the best part of what we call 
 ourselves, which, though seemingly small in 
 bulk, is incomparably greater in power and 
 in value than all things besides. The intel- 
 lect indeed is the best and sovereign part of 
 our constitution, and therefore strictly and 
 properly ourselves. It is absurd therefore to 
 prefer any other life to our own. What was 
 above observed will apply here. The plea- 
 
71 
 
 sure and good of each individual must con- 
 sist in that which is most congenial to bis 
 nature. The intellectual lile, therefore, must 
 be the best and happiest for man, since the 
 intellect is that which is peculiarly himself." 
 
 Such is the translation of Dr. Gillies, in 
 which, besides continual inaccuracy and 
 presumptuous interpolation, the manner of 
 the original is entirely destroyed. For where 
 in this translation is any vestige to be seen of 
 that most accurate and syllogistic method 
 which so eminently characterizes the writ- 
 ings of Aristotle ? Where is that invincible 
 force of reasoning to be discovered which 
 in Platonic language everywhere presents 
 itself bound with geometrical necessities f 
 (^yscu^sT^tTtixig avayxa/f.) Where that modcst 
 caution with which the Stagirite in this chap- 
 ter, in conformity to his general custom, 
 introduces the dogmas of his philosophy? 
 And, if we turn our attention to the matter, 
 we shall find it no less unworthy the beauty 
 and profundity of the original. For instance, 
 in the very tirst sentence, Aristotle says, " If 
 felicity is an energy according to virtue, it is 
 reasonable to suppose that it is an energy ac- 
 cording to the most excellent virtue ; and 
 
7<J 
 
 this will be the virtue of that which is best/*^ 
 Compare this with the version of Dr. Gillies : 
 *' If happiness consists in virtuous energies, 
 the greatest human happiness must consist in 
 the exercise of the greatest virtue in man, 
 which must be the virtue or perfection of his 
 best part/' Here th^e word wXoyov, " it is 
 reasonable to suppose," is translated by Dr. 
 Gillies ''''must:''' and thus the modesty of 
 Aristotle in this sentence is entirely destroyed. 
 That the reader too may see how Dr. Gillies 
 has deformed the most scientific method of 
 reasoning adopted by Aristotle, let him com- 
 pare the whole of the first sentence of the 
 Doctor's translation with the original. For 
 Aristotle's reasoning is as follows : ** If feli- 
 city is an energy according to virtue, it is 
 reasonable to suppose that it is an energy ac- 
 cording to the most excellent virtue. The 
 most excellent virtue is the virtue of the best 
 part : the energy of this part, therefore, ac- 
 cording to its proper virtue, will be perfect 
 felicity." Where is this geometric reason- 
 ing to be found in the following rambling 
 translation of Dr. Gillies : " If happiness 
 consists in virtuous energies, the greatest hu- 
 man happiness must consist in the exercise of 
 
73 
 
 the greatest virtue in man, which must be the 
 virtue or perfection of his best part, whether 
 this be intellect, or whatever principle it be, 
 that is destined to command and bear sway ; 
 having knowledge of things beautiful and 
 divine, as being either divine itself, or at least 
 that principle in us which most approximates 
 to divinity.** 
 
 Again, compare the following sentence 
 with the version of Dr. Gillies : *' This 
 energy, also (says Aristotle, i. e. the energy 
 of intellect) is most continued : for we are 
 able to contemplate more incessantly than to 
 perform any action whatever." But by Dr. 
 Gillies he is made to say, ** The energies of 
 intellect are also the longest and most conti- 
 nuous, since we can persevere in tlieorizing 
 and thinking much longer than in perform- 
 ing any action whatever.'* By this version 
 it is evident that Dr. Gillies had not the 
 smallest conception of what Aristotle means 
 by intellectual energy ; and that he is himself 
 unfortunately deprived of its possession. For 
 this employment, as Aristotle observes in this 
 chapter, is an energy according to wisdom ; 
 and wisdom, as he defines it in the sixth 
 book of these Ethics, is '* the intellectual 
 
74 
 
 perception of principles and things most ho- 
 nourable by nature," ^ (rc(pi'z lti vovg tcov 
 ri^icorccjujv ryj (pvcrsi, xizt vovg rccv a'^'yjjov. And 
 
 these principles and tlwigs most honourable by 
 nature are the first cause and his divine pro- 
 geny, as is evident from what we have al- 
 ready observed. By no means, therefore, 
 does this energy consist in merely theorizing 
 and thinking ; for this may be easily accom- 
 plished by any one, and the power of per- 
 forming it is not attended with the possession 
 of intellectual virtue. 
 
 Compare also the following with the 
 translation of Dr. Gillies : " Wisdom, says 
 Aristotle, appears to possess pleasures admir- 
 able both for their purity and stability. It 
 is reasonable also to think that those who 
 possess knowledge live more pleasantly than 
 those who investigate.'' " Pleasure, it was 
 observed (says Dr. Gillies) must be an in- 
 gredient in happiness ; but contemplative 
 wisdom offers pleasures the most admirable 
 in purity and stability, and the pleasures of 
 knowledge continually increase in propor- 
 tion to our improvement in it ; certainty 
 concerning the sublimest truths affording 
 still higher delight in proportion to the in- 
 
75 
 
 tense efforts of intellect by which they were 
 discovered." Mere much is added by Dr. 
 Gillies, which is not only unwarranted by 
 the original, but evidently shows that the 
 Doctor has entirely mistaken Aristotle's 
 meaning. For though it is true " that the 
 pleasures of knowledge continually increase 
 in proportion to our improvement in it ;" yet 
 this is not what Aristotle says, nor does it con- 
 tain the smallest vestige of his real meaning. 
 For Aristotle says, *' It is reasonable to think 
 that those who possess knowledge live more 
 pleasantly than those who investigate,''' In 
 which sentence the nature of intellectual 
 energy is indicated by the opposition of the 
 possession of knowledge to the investigation of 
 it. For as intellectual energy consists in di- 
 rect immediate vision of the intelligible^ or 
 the j)roper object of intellect, the full posses^ 
 sion oi' knowledge is previously necessary to 
 the exercise of this energy. Hence Aristotle, 
 in the twelfth book of his Metaphysics, 
 speaking of intellect, expressly says '* that it 
 energizes possessing*.'^ He, therefore, who 
 is capable of this energy, lives more plea- 
 santly than him who investigates ; because 
 
investigation is laborious, but intellectual 
 energy, Irom being i?mnediate vision, is un- 
 attended with labour, and is necessarily ac- 
 companied with delight. What Dr. Gillies 
 therefore adds, " that certainty concerning 
 the sublimest truths affords still higher de- 
 light in proportion lo the intense efforts of 
 intellect by which they were discovered," 
 has nothing to do with the meaning of 
 Aristotle in this place, but is, as usual, intro- 
 duced by the Doctor to conceal his igno- 
 rance and please the vulgar. Not to men- 
 tion that Aristotle's modest form of expres- 
 sion, " it is reasonable to suppose" (^svKoyov) 
 is entirely unnoticed by the Doctor. The 
 reader who is disposed to compare the re- 
 maining part of Dr. Gillies's translation of 
 this chapter with the original, even if he is 
 but moderately skilled in the philosophy of 
 Aristotle, will find that Dr. Gillies every- 
 where deforms the matter of the Stagirite by 
 unskilful interpolations, and completely de- 
 stroys the manner, by breaking his geometri- 
 cal chain of reasoning, in order, through the 
 medium of popular diction, to gratify the 
 public ear. 
 
 Having presented the reader with so many 
 
77 
 
 specimens of deformities and inaccuracies, of 
 important omissions and rash interpolations, 
 in the translation of Dr. Gillies, I shall leave 
 him to judge what opinion ought to be 
 formed of the following assertion in p. 23ff 
 of the Doctor's Introduction to the first book. 
 " My aim throughout ,'' says he, ** is to ad- 
 here rigidly to the sense of Aristotle ', to omit 
 nothing w/iich he says, to say nothing ivhich 
 he has omitted!" From these specimens, 
 too, I would hope it is nearly obvious to 
 every one, that in translating the abstruse or 
 acroamatic writings of Aristotle, it is necessary 
 to observe the most rigid accuracy and the 
 most literal exactness. For such is the preg- 
 nant brevity of diction, such the syllogistic 
 method uniformly adopted by the Stagirite 
 in these works, that in translating them it is 
 no less necessary to copy his manner than 
 faithfully preserve his matter-, since, from 
 the scientific nature of the composition, the 
 union between the two is so great that the 
 former cannot be neglected without essen- 
 tially injuring the latter. 
 
 Similar deformities, and equally nume- 
 rous, might be easily selected from Dr. Gil- 
 lies's translation of Aristotle's Politics; but 
 
 M 
 
78 
 
 the specimens which have been already ad- 
 duced afford, I trust, a sufficient proof that 
 the Doctor is very far from having fathomed 
 the profundity of the Stagirite's mind, and is 
 therefore unequal to the task of transfusing 
 that profundity into EngUsh. 
 
 And now, I presume, Dr. Gillies is by this 
 time furnished with a sufficient answer to the 
 iollowing observation in the conclusion of 
 his reply to my Strictures. " The nature 
 and scope," says he (p. 229 of his Supple» 
 ment) *' of my literary labours are so to- 
 tally different from those of Mr. Taylor, that 
 it is not easy to understand how our roads 
 could cross, or why he should step forth as 
 my determined antagonist. Utility, corri- 
 mon and vulgar utility, above which that 
 sublime author proudly soars, was my great 
 or rather sole aim." Had Dr. Gillies in his 
 translation faithfully given the manner and 
 matter of Aristotle to the best of his ability, 
 had he discovered by his translation that he 
 was a genuine lover of truth, that he was a 
 candidate for honest fame, and not for the 
 applause of the vulgar, my road, so far from- 
 crossing, would have been perfectly parallel 
 to his, and I should have rejoiced to find 
 
79 
 
 him running with me the same race, a com- 
 petitor for the same honours, and tending to 
 tliesame goal. But perceiving that Dr. Gillies, 
 so far from having been a legitimate student 
 of Aristotle's more abstruse writings, had not 
 even discovered that they were composed 
 with studied obscurity of diction, and that, 
 through a presumptuous confidence in his 
 own abilities, he despised the best of Aristo- 
 tle's Greek interpreters without being in the 
 smallest degree familiar with their works, 
 and in consequence of this had mutilated 
 and deformed some of the noblest produc- 
 tions of the Stagirite, I did indeed step forth 
 as his determined antagonist. Such, how- 
 ever, being the real state of the case, is it 
 difficult to understand why I should do so ? 
 Is it possible I could act otherwise, professing, 
 as I do, the sincerest regard for truth, and 
 believing it to be, as Plato says, the source of 
 every good both to God and man ? Could I 
 patiently submit to see a work presented to 
 the English reader as a translation of the 
 Ethics and Politics of Aristotle, in which the 
 sense is injured, and the beauty of the origi- 
 nal deformed, in every page ? especially as 
 I professed myself a student of Aristotle, and 
 
80 
 
 one who had employed no common labour 
 for a considerable number of years in the 
 study of his philosophy; gladly availing my- 
 self, in order to penetrate its depth, of every 
 assistance that could be obtained, and not 
 scorning the labours of his best disciples, 
 through an unlawful confidence in the 
 strength of my own mind, or a desire to 
 galn.a noble end by ignoble means. 
 
 But, after wondering that I stept forth as his 
 antagonist, Dr. Gillies adds, '* that utility, 
 common and vulgar utility, above which Mr. 
 Taylor proudly soars, was his great, or rather 
 sole, aim." Dr. Gillies is ignorant, I am 
 afraid, that in the human species, as well as in 
 every order of beings in the universe, there is 
 a first, a middle, and last, that the progres- 
 sion of things may form one unbroken chain, 
 originating from deity, and terminating in 
 matter. In consequence of this connexion, 
 one part of the human species naturally coa- 
 lesces through transcendency with beings of 
 an order superior to man ; another part 
 through subjection unites v/ith the brutal 
 species ; and a third part, which subsists as 
 the connecting medium between the other 
 two, possesses those properties which charac* 
 
81 
 
 ferlze human nature in a manner not ex> 
 ceedinsf, but exactly commensurate to the 
 condition of humanity. The first of these 
 parts, from its surpassing excellence, consists 
 of a small number of mankind. That which 
 subsists as the middle is numerous. And that 
 which ranks as the last in gradation is com- 
 posed of a countless multitude, 
 
 " Thick as autumnal leaves that strow the brooks 
 In Vallambrosa." 
 
 In consequence of this beautiful gradation 
 the most subordinate part of mankind are 
 only to be benefitted by good rulers, laws, or 
 customs, through which they become peace- 
 ful members of the communities in which 
 they live, and make a proficiency, as Maxi- 
 mus Tyrius * well observes, not by the ac- 
 cession of good, but by the diminution of 
 evil. 
 
 If Dr. Gillies, by professing to aim at com- 
 mon and vulgar utility, means an endeavour 
 to benefit this lowest order of the human race 
 by disseminating among them truths of a na- 
 ture so arduous and sublime, that they can 
 only be understood by the highest classof our 
 species, I own, and I glory in the confession, 
 
 ■* See p. 19 of my translation of his Dissertations. 
 
82 
 
 that I do soar above such an endeavour, be« 
 cause it is not attended with any advantage, 
 but is no less idle than profane. But if he 
 means by this an attempt to be useful to the 
 middle class of our species, (for such the 
 Ethics and Politics of Aristotle are calculated 
 to benefit) I am no less anxious than Dr. 
 Gillies to do good to this part of mankind 
 by the publication of such truths as they are 
 capable of understanding. A very consider- 
 able part of the Dialogues of Plato are 
 largely calculated to accomplish this end ; 
 but in translating these I have not violated 
 ^he meaning of the original in order to gra- 
 tify the most subordinate part of our species, 
 and sacrificed truth to vulgar applause. 
 
 And this brings me, in the last place, to 
 an apology for the manner in which I have 
 published to the world the philosophy of 
 Plato in an English garb. It is necessary 
 then to observe, that Plato, in conformity with 
 the earliest philosophers of antiquity, deli- 
 vered the abstruse dogmas of his philosophy 
 pbscurely, in order to conceal from the pro- 
 fane and vulgar eye certain sublime truths, 
 which that eye may fancy it sees, but which 
 it can never perceive in reality. That he 
 did so is abundantly evident from the fol- 
 
83 
 
 lowing passages extracted from his Epistles. 
 In his second epistle, then, which is to Dio- 
 nysius, he says : " According to the report 
 of Archidemus, you say, that I have not suf- 
 ficiently demonstrated to you the particulars 
 respecting the nature of the first (god). I 
 must speak to you tlterefore in enigmas, that 
 in case the letter should be intercepted cither 
 by land or sea, he ^aho reads it may not under- 
 stand this part of its contents'^.'' The pas- 
 sage which then immediately follows is one of 
 the most deeply mystical in all the writings 
 of Plato ; but he who has penetrated its depth 
 will acknowledge that it is no less admirable 
 than profound, no less sublime than ob- 
 scure. Near the end of this epistle also he 
 observes : " For as it appears to me there aix 
 scarcely any particulars which ivill be consi- 
 dered by the multitude more ridiculous than 
 these ; 7ior again, any whicli will appear more 
 wonderful and eiithusiastic to those that are 
 well born -}-." 
 
 ieiyjai a-oi tts^i tti^ rou •ff^utou (pvcsuis ^^atrreov Srj coi $i' 
 
 avayvoof jm^t; yvu. 
 
 f Sp^^sJov yap w? s^oi ^ok£i, ovk sa-ri rovtuv TTfo; love 
 
 3auj!AacrroT6oa re r.ai sySo-j<rtix<j-Tiy.wrE§a. 
 
84. 
 
 In his seventh epistle also he observes as 
 follows : *' Thus much, however, I shall 
 say respecting all those who either have writ- 
 ten or shall write, affirming that they know 
 those things which are the objects of my 
 study (whether they have heard them from 
 me or from others, or whether they have 
 discovered them themselves) that they have 
 not heard any thing about these things con- 
 formable to my opinion : for I never have 
 written nor ever shall write about them *. 
 For a thing of this kind cannot be expressed 
 by words like other disciplines, but by long 
 familiarity, and living in conjunction with 
 the thing itself, a light as it were leaping 
 from a fire will on a sudden be enkindled 
 in the soul, and there itself nourish itself." 
 And shortly after he adds : '* But if it ap- 
 peared to me that the particulars of which I 
 am speaking could be sufficiently commu- 
 nicated to the 7}iidtitude by wnt'ing or speech, 
 what could we accomplish more beautiful in^ 
 life than to impart a mighty benefit to man- 
 kind, and lead an intelligible nature into 
 light, so as to be obvious to all men ? I 
 
 * Plato means by this, that he has never written perspi- 
 cuously about intdligibles or true bangs, the proper objects of 
 intellect. 
 
85 
 
 think, however, that an attempt of this khid 
 would only be beneficial to a few, who from 
 some small vestiges previously demonstrated 
 are themselves able to discover these abstruse 
 particulars. But with respect to the rest of 
 mankind, some it will fill with a contempt 
 by no means elegant, and others with a lotty 
 and arrogant hope that they shall now learn 
 certain excellent things *." 
 
 As Plato therefore promulgated the most 
 sublime of his doctrines obscurely, in order to 
 conceal them from the vulgar, but at the 
 same time delivered them scientifically, in 
 translatins;; the writings which contain those 
 doctrines it is necessary to observe the most 
 
 x.ai y^x'^xvtwvy OTOi (fxTiv eihvoci its^i u)v eyuj a-itov^cc^u), sir 
 s[j.ov aY.r-AOOtzg , £jr' aXXcav, siS' o:g sv^ovts; avroi, ronronj ovx 
 s<m xata, ya rr^v B{x.-^y So^av tts^i tov Tfsocyixccrog Etxisiv cjCsv. 
 ou/C ovv £jU-&y ye nre^i avr-juy scrn cvyy^ajj^ixcx,, ovSs (J^r) ftoie 
 yevrjai. ^rirsv yccp cvSocauji eornv, wg aXXa fxa5i;aara, aAA 
 £/C TTsAAr/f crwovcnxg yiyvoy.avrj; its^i re TT^ayy^x xvro, y.a.i roD 
 o'v^y-fV, s^xi^yy); oiov x-KO itv^og irrjSriC-xvlos s^x<p^ev (pcvf, ev rn 
 
 Vi^'%1? yEv'j[X£vov xvro sxuro r^irj r^sfsi. ai oa [jiOt e^aivsTo 
 
 y^XTilsx S-' ixxvoo; sivxi ir^og rovg ttoKXovg %xi or^rx, r< rovro\) 
 y.xXKioy airsiroxKr av riU.iv av 7co /3(ai, rj rotg ts av^cwTTOicJ i^syx, 
 o^sXo: yfarj/ai, kxi rr^v (pv^riv sig fcug roi; itxTi Ti^oorxyxysr^ ; 
 aXX' ours av^pwTrofj r^youjj^xi rr^v aTrt^si^ri<riv irspt xvrouv 
 Aeyo|X£vr// xyxSov, ai (j.r} riciv oXiyoig, oiToo-oi Svvxroi xyevceiv 
 xvroi Six [j.iKpxg aySai^suj;. ruiy ts h] xXXcvy, rovg jxav y.xlx' 
 <ppoyri(Tau)g ova opSujg su.TrXrja'eisv av ov^Xfj^yi sij^aaXovg, rcivg ^s 
 •j-hr^Xv; xa» X'^'-''''^^ sAtTi^oj, aig asuv arlx ^i.eiJ.xSrr.olx;. 
 
86 
 
 rigid accuracy and the most literal exactness, 
 in the same manner as in translating the 
 acroamatic works of Aristotle. As all his 
 dialogues too are the progeny of consum- 
 mate science, he who in translating them 
 presumes to omit some words and interpolate 
 others, or to give what he conceives to be 
 the general meaning of the sentences ; and, 
 in short, alters the manner of Plato in order 
 to accommodate his matter to the multi- 
 tude, — he who docs this will inevitably de- 
 stroy the profound meaning of the original, 
 and obtrude his own rambling ideas on the 
 reader for the scientifically accurate concep- 
 tions of Plato. Let him who desires to be 
 convinced of this read any of those dialogues 
 in my translation of Plato's works, in which 
 the substance of the Commentaries of Pro- 
 clus, Hermeas, and Olympiodorus are given 
 in the notes. 
 
 And here 1 cannot help remarking con- 
 cerning these most excellent interpreters, 
 and the latter Platonists in general, as they 
 are called, how fully the prophecy of their 
 divine master has been verified in the fate of 
 their works. The prophecy I allude to is 
 contained in the latter part of the extract just 
 
87 
 
 cited from his seventh epistle, in which he 
 observes, that the man who writes perspicu- 
 ously on the sublime dogmas of his philo- 
 sophy will only benclit a few who are able 
 to discover these abstruse particulars, but that 
 in others he w^ill produce cither contempt or 
 arrogant hope. For these admirable men, 
 in order to preserve the recondite parts of 
 their master's philosophy to posterity, un- 
 folded all that is sublime and mystic in the 
 doctrines of Plato into the most pleasing and 
 admirable light. For more than a thousand 
 years, however, very few indeed appear to 
 have been in the smallest degree benefitted 
 by their labours ; and I know of none that 
 for this extended period may be said to have 
 studied them sufficiently to derive all that 
 advantage which they are largely calculated 
 to afford. Hence, as I have elsewhere ob- 
 served *, ** the beautiful light which they 
 benevolently disclosed may be said to have, 
 hitherto unnoticed, illumined philosophy in 
 her desolate retreats, like a lamp shining on 
 some venerable statue amidst dark and soli- 
 tary ruins." And yet though these philo- 
 
 * See the General Introduction to my translation of 
 Plato's works. 
 
88 
 
 sophers have been treated with such unde- 
 served contempt by a pigmy race of critics 
 and sophists, .will any man undertake to 
 prove, that since the age of Plato there has 
 lived a philosopher of so much profundity as 
 Plotinus, so learned as Porphyry, so skilled 
 in the deepest mysteries of theology as Jam- 
 blichus, so acute as Syrianus, or who has un- 
 folded such treasures of wisdom as Proclus ? 
 Till this at least is attempted to be proved let 
 critics be silent, and cease to defame writings 
 which they have never studied, and doctrines 
 which they do not understand. 
 
 But to return from this digression. Let 
 this then be my apology for endeavouring to 
 translate the works of Plato with such accu- 
 racy and literal exactness, — that it would not 
 have been otherwise possible to have pre- 
 served either his manner or his matter; and 
 that he who attempts to translate them with- 
 out diligently attending to the accurate mean- 
 ing of every word, may indeed compose a 
 book more conformable to modern taste, 
 and more captivating to the vulgar reader, 
 but his work v/ill cease to be a translation, 
 and will lose in faithfulness what popularity 
 can never compensate. Let the following 
 
89 
 
 also be my apology for liavliig introduced 
 into my translation of Plato certain unusual 
 words of Greek origin — that as the most ab- 
 struse doctrines of the Platonic philosophy 
 had never before been promulgated in Eng- 
 lisii, there were no words in our language 
 equivalent to their accurate meaning, and 
 tiiat a paraphrase of them could not be 
 adopted, because they very frequently occur; 
 that to introduce Greek terms into any mo- 
 dern language is to enrich that language ; 
 that every art and science is full of words 
 derived from the Greek ; and that philoso- 
 phy, as being the mistress of all arts and sci- 
 ences, has a much prior and more legitimate 
 claim to this privilege. 
 
 And now asrain dcclarincr that I have no 
 personal enmity whatever to Dr. Gillies, 
 and that what I have said against him has 
 been solely dictated by a love of truth, I 
 shall, most probably, take my leave of him 
 for ever. The accomplishment of a task, 
 no less arduous than glorious, will for some 
 years occupy all my leisure hours, and 
 call forth my most strenuous exertions — 
 that of translating into English the whole 
 of Aristotle's works, with the substance of 
 the commentaries of his best Greek interpre- 
 
90 
 
 tcrs. The completion of this Herculean la- 
 bour will so fully engage my attention, that 
 I shall neither have time nor inclination to 
 attend to the defamation of Dr. Gillies, or 
 any other writer who is a candidate for the 
 honours of the multitude, and whose eye is 
 not solely fixed upon truth. As this work 
 too, when completed, will be published in a 
 manner so truly independent, as to be, per- 
 haps, without a parallel in this respect since 
 printing was invented, I shall have nothing 
 to fear from illiberal criticism or malevolent 
 invective *. That in such an age as the pre- 
 sent both these should unite in opposing the 
 labours of a man who neither writes for hire 
 nor with any view to sordid emolument, is 
 so far from being wonderful, that it is the ne- 
 cessary consequence of extreme corruption 
 of manners and depravity of taste -f, Divi- 
 
 * The reader, who is desirous of seeing perfect specimens 
 of such criticism and such invective, is referred to an account 
 of my franslation of Plato's works, in two fungous produc- 
 tions, one of which is called The Imperial Review and the 
 other The Literary Journal. 
 
 t The hand of barbaric despotism having destroyed the 
 schools of the philosophers for more than twelve hundred 
 years, knowledge has become venal, and book-making a trade. 
 Science on moral and intellectual subjects has been in conse- 
 quence of this entirely lost; and through the attempt to make 
 everj/ man wise in cverij thin^ all real knowledge on the sublimest 
 subjects of speculation has been last. 
 
91 
 
 nity, however, has manifestly declared itself 
 in favour of my undertakings ; has obtained 
 for them the most noble and the most li- 
 beral patronage ; has enabled me, while en- 
 gaged in them, to struggle successfully with 
 adversity; and has made situations highly 
 unfavourable to the cultivation of the Pla- 
 tonic philosophy the instruments of its pro- 
 mulgation in my native tongue. Relying, 
 therefore, with firm confidence on the con- 
 tinuance of that support, compared with 
 which the strongest human aid is perfect 
 impotence, I shall devote the remainder, 
 as I have done a considerable portion of 
 the former part of my life, to preserve to 
 posterity the elements of the virtues and 
 the rules of truth, committing these to writ- 
 ing for common advantage, as a paternal 
 and immortal inheritance. 
 
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