-'^^ ~ 33
 
 International Relations Club 
 
 Given by the 
 
 Carnegie Endowment 
 for International Peace 
 
 to encourage the study of 
 international relations 
 
 ! 
 
 f A .TA\:^aBM^iA. CALIF 'BHU
 
 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
 
 DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF HABANA 
 
 CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL 
 
 ORGANIZATION 
 
 ADOPTED BY THE 
 
 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 AT HABANA, JANUARY 23, 1917 
 
 ADDRESS AND COMMENTARY 
 
 BY 
 
 JAMES BROWN SCOTT 
 
 President of the American Institute of International La^u 
 
 The first and greatest interest of the public is 
 always justice. All want equal conditions for all 
 and justice is this equality. The citiaen only de- 
 sires law and the observance of law. Everybody 
 among us knows that if there are exceptions they 
 will not be in his favor. Thus, all fear exceptions 
 and he who fears exceptions loves the law. 
 
 Jean Jacques Rousseau. 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 
 AMERICAN BRANCH: 35 West 32kd Street 
 
 LONDON. TORONTO, MELBOURNE, AND BOMBAY 
 
 HUMPHREY MILFORD 
 
 1917
 
 ?TAT ' T 
 
 i.a.ii-^- 
 
 FOREWORD 
 
 The American Institute of International Law held its second 
 annual meeting at Habana, January 22-January 27, 1917, upon 
 the invitation of the Cuban Government and under the aus- 
 pices of the Cuban Society of International Law. It will hold 
 its third session in the city of Montevideo upon the invitation 
 of the Government of Uruguay, and under the auspices of the 
 Uruguayan Society of International Law, in the course of 1918, 
 at a date to be fixed after conference with the Uruguayan 
 Government and the Uruguayan Society of International Law. 
 The Institute adopted sundry recommendations upon inter- 
 national organization which it decided should bear the name 
 of "Recommendations of Habana Concerning International 
 Organization"; and in addition, referred for an expression of 
 opinion various projects to the national societies of interna- 
 tional law, of which one is established in the capital of each 
 American republic. The text of the projects and of the action 
 taken in each case is contained in the Final Act of the Insti- 
 tute. 
 
 The address on the Piatt Amendment and Recommenda- 
 tions on International Organization was delivered in sum- 
 mary form by the undersigned as President of the Institute, 
 at the opening session of the Institute on the evening of 
 January 22, 1917, at which the President of the Cuban 
 Republic presided in person. The recommendations of Habana 
 concerning international organization were unanimously 
 adopted by the Institute on January 23, 1917, and they are 
 printed as adopted, with the addition of a commentary for 
 which the undersigned is responsible. 
 
 The American Institute of International Law, in its Declara- 
 tion of the Rights and Duties of Nations, adopted at its first
 
 session, in the city of Washington, on January 6, 1916, en- 
 deavored to lay a firm foundation upon which the temple of 
 justice may be raised and may securely rest, and in the recom- 
 mendations of Habana concerning international organization, 
 adopted by the American Institute of International Law at its 
 second session in the city of Habana on January 23, 1917, it 
 attempted to state the goal of its endeavor and to outline the 
 minimum of international organization consistent with the ad- 
 ministration of international justice. 
 
 James Brown Scott. 
 Washington, D. C, 
 April 21, 1917.
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The Piatt Amendment — Recommendations of Habana 
 
 Concerning International Organization 1 
 
 Text of Recommendations of Habana Concerning Inter- 
 national Organization 53 
 
 Commentary upon the Recommendations Concerning In- 
 ternational Organization 56 
 
 Appendix 
 
 Constitution of the American Institute of International 
 
 Law 80 
 
 By-Laws of the American Institute of International Law 87 
 Officers and Members of the American Institute of Inter- 
 national Law 95
 
 THE PLATT AMENDMENT— RECOMMENDATIONS ON 
 INTERNATIONAL 0R(;ANIZATI0N 
 
 Mr. President and Gentlemen : 
 
 It is almost nineteen years ago since I started for Cuba, as 
 I then thought, in response to a call of President McKinley 
 for volunteers, but the regiment in which I had the honor to 
 serve as a private was attached to the Philippine expedition- 
 ary forces, and it is only today that I have arrived; and very 
 happy I am to find myself at last in the beautiful city of 
 Habana, in the beautiful island of Cuba, and to see with my 
 own eyes the capital of Cuba Libre. 
 
 You will believe me when I assure you that this is no ordi- 
 nary event for me, and you will pardon me if I enter some- 
 what into the relations between Cuba and the United States, 
 because I would like to use them "to point a moral and adorn 
 a tale." When, in 1898, President McKinley informed Spain 
 that the situation in Cuba was intolerable and that it should 
 not be continued, and when Congress directed the land and 
 naval forces of the United States to be used in order to se- 
 cure the independence of Cuba, it was understood, and it was 
 so stated, that the war — for war it was to be — should be one 
 of independence, and that it should not be one of conquest. 
 By the treaty of peace, signed December 10, 1898, between 
 Spain and the United States, it was agreed that Cuba should 
 be occupied by forces of the United States, but the United 
 States intended then and always that Cuba, after a period of 
 reconstruction, should be handed over to its people. 
 
 Let me quote a few sentences from the documents in order 
 that we may see, from official sources, the facts in the case. 
 
 In his message to the Congress of April 11, 1898, President 
 McKinley recommended that the United States should inter-
 
 vene in Cuba "in the cause of humanity and to put an end to 
 the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries 
 now existing there ;"^ and on the 20th the Congress adopted 
 the following joint resolution, providing: 
 
 First. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of 
 right ought to be, free and independent. 
 
 Second. That it is the duty of the United States to 
 demand, and the Government of the United States does 
 hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once 
 relinquish its authority and government in the Island of 
 Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba 
 and Cuban waters. 
 
 Third. That the President of the United States be, and 
 he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire 
 land and naval forces of the United States, ... to 
 such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolu- 
 tions into effect. 
 
 Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any 
 disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdic- 
 tion, or control over said Island except for the pacifica- 
 tion thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is 
 accomplished, to leave the government and control of the 
 Island to its people.^ 
 
 On December 10, 1898, the treaty of peace between the 
 countries unfortunately at war was concluded at Paris, and 
 of this treaty two articles, the 1st and the 16th, are material to 
 the present question. Thus, the first reads: 
 
 Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and 
 title to Cuba. 
 
 ^Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898, p. 7/57. 
 ^ United States Statutes at Large, vol. 30, pp. 738-9.
 
 And as the Island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to 
 be occupied by the United States, the United States will, 
 so long as sucli occupation shall last, assume and dis- 
 charge the obligations that may under international law 
 result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection 
 of life and property. 
 
 And the 16tli Article is thus worded: 
 
 It is understood that any obligations assumed in this 
 treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba are lim- 
 ited to the time of its occupancy thereof; but it will upon 
 the termination of such occupancy, advise any Govern- 
 ment established in the Island to assume the same obliga- 
 tions.^ 
 
 The intention of the United States was, as I understand it, 
 that Cuba should be free, that it should not fall a prey to a 
 foreign enemy, that a government should be established which 
 would deal justly with foreign powers across the seas, so that 
 they would have no pretext for intervention; and that this 
 government, republican of course, representing the people of 
 Cuba, their hopes, their desires, their aspirations, should hus- 
 band the resources, contribute to tlie prosperity of the island, 
 and administer to the happiness of the people by whom and 
 for whose benefit it was to be created. 
 
 An illustrious American statesman and benefactor of Cuba, 
 and a friend of Latin America, appreciating what the relations 
 between the two countries should be, drew up a series of reso- 
 lutions defining those relations and calculated to safeguard 
 them when defined. These resolutions are commonly known 
 as the Piatt Amendment; but it was the mind of Elihu Root 
 w^hich conceived them, it was his skill which drafted them, and 
 it was his hand that executed them. The substance of the reso- 
 
 ^ United States Statutes at Large, yol. 30. pp. 1755, 17»)1.
 
 lutions he regarded as essential to the best interests of the two 
 countries, and, that there might be neither doubt nor miscon- 
 ception, he wished them to be made the law of each country 
 and to be incorporated in a treaty between the two republics. 
 
 As the matter is one of historic interest, as well as of funda- 
 mental importance, I shall ask your indulgence while I attempt 
 to trace the origin of the Amendment which states and defines 
 the relations between Cuba and the United States and which 
 is capable of even a larger application. 
 
 As the time drew near for the United States to withdraw 
 from Cuba, and to turn the island over to its people, Mr. Root, 
 as Secretary of War, and as such charged with the handling 
 of Cuban affairs, considered the conditions in instructions 
 of February 9, 1901, to Major General Leonard Wood, then 
 Military Governor of the island, and stated the relations which 
 should exist between Cuba and the United States in the in- 
 terest of both countries. In speaking of the government to be 
 established, he said: 
 
 It is plain that the government to which we were thus 
 to transfer our temporary obligations should be a govern- 
 ment based upon the peaceful suffrages of the people of 
 Cuba, representing the entire people and holding their 
 power from the people, and subject to the limitations and 
 safeguards which the experience of constitutional govern- 
 ment has shown to be necessary to the preservation of in- 
 dividual rights. This is plain as a duty to the people of 
 Cuba under the resolution of April 20, 1898, and it is plain 
 as an obligation of good faith under the Treaty of Paris. 
 Such a government we have been persistently and with 
 all practicable speed building up in Cuba, and we hope 
 to see it established and assume control under the pro- 
 visions which shall be adopted by the present convention.^ 
 
 ^ The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States, addresses and 
 reports, by Elihu Root, p. 209. Harvard University Press, 1916.
 
 Mr. Root then referred to the attitude of the United States 
 toward Cuba when the island was under the domination of 
 Spain, and the unwillingness to allow any foreign power other 
 than Spain to hold or to acquire possession of Cuba, "The 
 United States has," he said, "and will always have, the most 
 vital interest in the preservation of the independence which 
 she has secured for Cuba, and in preserving the people of that 
 island from domination and control of any foreign power 
 whatever." Mr. Root next entered upon an examination of 
 the conditions upon which Cuban independence might be 
 maintained, reaching the conclusion that the preservation of 
 the independence of Cuba "must depend upon her strict per- 
 formance of international obligations, upon her giving due 
 protection to the lives and property of the citizens of all other 
 countries within her borders, and upon her never contracting 
 any public debt which in the hands of the citizens of foreign 
 powers shall constitute an obligation she is unable to meet." 
 The role which the United States should assume in the preser- 
 vation of this independence Mr. Root thus stated: 
 
 We are placed in a position where, for our own protec- 
 tion, we have, by reason of expelling Spain from Cuba, 
 become the guarantors of Cuban independence and the 
 guarantors of a stable and orderly government protecting 
 life and property in that island. Fortunately the condi- 
 tion which we deem essential for our own interests is the 
 condition for which Cuba has been struggling, and which 
 the duty we have assumed toward Cuba on Cuban grounds 
 and for Cuban interests requires. It would be a most lame 
 and impotent conclusion if, after all the expenditure of 
 blood and treasure by the people of the United States for 
 the freedom of Cuba and by the people of Cuba for the 
 same object, we should, through the constitution of the 
 new government, by inadvertence or othersvise, be placed 
 in a worse condition in regard to our own vital interests
 
 than we were while Spain was in possession, and tlie peo- 
 ple of Cuba should be deprived of that protection and aid 
 from the United States which is necessary to the mainte- 
 nance of their independence.^ 
 
 After a further consideration of the question, Mr. Root thus 
 summed up his observations upon this subject: 
 
 The people of Cuba should desire to have incorporated 
 in her fundamental law provisions in substance as follow : 
 
 1. That no government organized under the consti- 
 tution shall be deemed to have authority to enter into 
 any treaty or engagement with any foreign power 
 which may tend to impair or interfere with the inde- 
 pendence of Cuba, or to confer upon such foreign 
 power any special right or privilege without the con- 
 sent of the United States. 
 
 2. That no government organized under the consti- 
 tution shall have authority to assume or contract any 
 public debt in excess of the capacity of the ordmary 
 revenues of the island, after defraying the current 
 expenses of government, to pay the interest. 
 
 3. That upon the transfer of the control of Cuba to 
 the government established under the new constitu- 
 tion Cuba consents that the United States reserve and 
 retain the right of intervention for the preservation of 
 Cuban independence and the maintenance of a stable 
 government, adequately protecting life, property, and 
 individual liberty, and discharging the obligations 
 with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris 
 on the United States and now assumed and under- 
 taken by the Government of Cuba. 
 
 4. That all the acts of the military government, and 
 all rights acquired thereunder, shall be valid and shall 
 be maintained and protected. 
 
 5. That to facilitate the United States in the per- 
 formance of such duties as may devolve upon her 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 210.
 
 under the foregoing provisions and for her own de- 
 fense, the United States may acquire and hold the title 
 to land for naval stations, and maintain the same at 
 certain specified points.^ 
 
 On the 19th of February, 1901, General Wood acknowledged 
 the receipt of Secretary Root's instructions in a letter which 
 was only made public last month, and in which he informed 
 Mr. Root that he had laid the five provisions before the Con- 
 stitutional Convention and in which he suggested to Mr. Root 
 the addition of an article concerning sanitation. On the first 
 point, General Wood said: 
 
 On receipt of the instructions by cable I immediately 
 assembled the Committee on Relations to Exist between 
 Cuba and the United States and made known to them the 
 five articles or provisions which, in the opinion of the 
 Executive branch of the Government, represent the wishes 
 of the United States in all that pertains to the proposed 
 relations between the Government of the United States 
 and the people of Cuba. 
 
 I was particularly careful [he continues] to impress 
 upon them that Congress might in its wisdom insist upon 
 different conditions or relations, but that the proposition 
 submitted embodied those which in the opinion of the 
 Executive branch of the Government should exist and that 
 they were the only ones which they could at present con- 
 sider.2 
 
 As to the question of sanitation. General Wood said : 
 
 There is another phase of this Cuban situation which 
 seems to be of vital importance; that is the sanitar^^ con- 
 ditions which will probably exist in Havana and other 
 large cities under a Cuban government. As I understand 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 211. 
 ^ Ibid., p. 186.
 
 8 
 
 it the purpose of the war was not only to assist the Cubans, 
 but, in a general sense, to abate a nuisance. It is probable 
 that if we leave the Island of Cuba without a definite 
 agreement with the government to come in reference to 
 the maintenance of good sanitary conditions, that we shall 
 soon find Havana and all other large cities in practically 
 the same condition of sanitation as during the Spanish 
 War and a menace to our Southern seaports and the con- 
 sequent interference with commerce will continue. As a 
 rule, the people of the island are immune to yellow fever, 
 and, consequently, take little interest in the elaborate sani- 
 tary precautions which have been instituted under the 
 American rule and which have resulted in reducing the 
 death rate in Havana alone, from 45 per 1000 as an average 
 death rate in times of peace to 24 and a fraction.^ 
 
 To General Wood's letter of the 19th, containing the sug- 
 gestion in the matter of sanitation, Mr. Root replied in a letter 
 of February 23d, from which I quote a paragraph outlining 
 the action which, in his opinion, the Government should take 
 in the matter of sanitation and which, as a matter of fact, it 
 took in regard to the entire Cuban situation : 
 
 Your letters of February 19th have been received. The 
 official one, acknowledging my communication of Feb- 
 ruary 9th, and treating of the sanitary question, has been 
 read to the President and also to Senators Piatt and 
 Spooner. Any sanitary control involves so great an in- 
 fringement of the independence and internal government 
 of Cuba, it is difficult to say how that can be dealt with 
 consistently with the Teller Resolution of April 20, 1898; 
 that is to say, how it can be dealt with except by Con- 
 gress. It will not be lost sight of in the treatment of the 
 subject here. 
 
 Senator Piatt, to whom Mr. Root referred in this very im- 
 portant letter, was Orville H. Piatt, United States Senator from 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 187.
 
 Connecticut, and Chairman of the Senate Committee on 
 Cuban Relations; and Senator Spooner, to whom Mr. Root 
 likewise referred, was John C. Spooner, Senator from Wis- 
 consin, and an influential member of the same Committee, 
 President McKinley approved Mr. Root's original instructions 
 and the additional article suggested by General Wood. Sena- 
 tor Piatt as Chaimian of the Committee on Cuban Relations 
 was requested by the President and Mr. Root to take charge of 
 the proposed legislation and to introduce the instructions and 
 article agreed upon as an amendment to the Army Appro- 
 priation Bill. Senator Piatt complied with the request, intro- 
 ducing tliem with slight modifications and additions as an 
 amendment to the bill. The amendment was adopted by the 
 Congress, and it thus became statutory law of the United 
 States, March 2, 1901, upon the President's approval of the 
 bill as thus amended. 
 
 Let me read the so-called Piatt Amendment: 
 
 That in fulfillment of the declaration contained in the 
 joint resolution approved April twentieth, eighteen hun- 
 dred and ninety-eight, entitled "For the recognition of 
 the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that 
 the government of Spain relinquish its authority and gov- 
 ernment in the island of Cuba, and to withdraw^ its land 
 and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and di- 
 recting the President of the United States to use the land 
 and naval forces of the United States to carry these reso- 
 lutions into effect," the President is hereby authorized to 
 "leave the government and control of the island of Cuba 
 to its people" so soon as a government shall have been 
 established in said island under a constitution which, 
 either as a part thereof or in an ordinance appended 
 thereto, shall define the future relations of the United 
 States with Cuba, substantially as follows: 
 
 1. That the government of Cuba shall never enter into 
 any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or
 
 10 
 
 powers which will impair or tend to impair the indepen- 
 dence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit 
 any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or 
 for military or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgment in 
 or control over any portion of said island. 
 
 II. That said government shall not assume or contract 
 any public debt, to pay the interest upon which, and to 
 make reasonable sinking fund provision for the ultimate 
 discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of the island, 
 after defraying the current expenses of government, shall 
 be inadequate. 
 
 III. That the government of Cuba consents that the 
 United States may exercise the right to intervene for the 
 preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of 
 a government adequate for the protection of life, prop- 
 erty, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obli- 
 gations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of 
 Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and under- 
 taken by the government of Cuba. 
 
 IV. That all acts of the United States in Cuba during 
 its military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, 
 and all lawful rights acquired thereunder shall be main- 
 tained and protected. 
 
 V. That the government of Cuba will execute, and as 
 far as necessary extend, the plans already devised or 
 other plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanita- 
 tion of the cities of the island, to the end that a recur- 
 rence of epidemic and infectious diseases may be pre- 
 vented, thereby assuring protection to the people and 
 commerce of Cuba, as well as to the commerce of the 
 southern ports of the United States and the people resid- 
 ing therein. 
 
 VI. That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the 
 proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title 
 thereto being left to future adjustment by treaty. 
 
 VII. That to enable the United States to maintain the 
 independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, 
 as well as for its own defense, the government of Cuba
 
 11 
 
 will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for 
 coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be 
 agreed upon with the President of the United States. 
 
 VIII. That by way of further assurance the government 
 of Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a per- 
 manent treaty with the United States.^ 
 
 The relation between Mr. Root's instructions of February 9, 
 1901, to General Wood, and the so-called Piatt Amendment, 
 and the respective shares of Mr. Root, Senator Piatt and Gen- 
 eral Wood in its authorship, are stated by Mr. Root himself in 
 the following passage from a letter which he wrote me under 
 date of October 24, 1916: 
 
 You will perceive that, with trifling changes of phrase- 
 ology. Article 1 of the Piatt Amendment was Article 1 of 
 my instructions; Article 2 was Article 2 of the instructions; 
 Article 3 was Article 3 of the instructions; Article 4 was 
 Article 4 of the instructions; Article 5 was the sanitation 
 provision suggested by General Wood in his letter to me 
 of February 19; and Article 7 was Article 5 of the instruc- 
 tions. Article 6 of the Amendment about the Isle of Pines 
 and Article 8 about further assurance by treaty were in- 
 serted in the committee. 
 
 On June 12, 1901, the Constitutional Convention of Cuba, 
 then in session, adopted the text of the Piatt Amendment as an 
 integral part of the Constitution of the Republic.^^ 
 
 The so-called Piatt Amendment is therefore a statute of the 
 United States and a provision of the Cuban Constitution. 
 
 Finally, in order that the law common to the two countries 
 should be binding upon both in their mutual intercourse and 
 relations, they form the sole subject-matter of the special 
 
 ^ United States Statutes at Large, vol. 31, pp. 897-8. 
 ^ Jose Ignacio Rodriguez: American Constitutions, rol. II, p. 146. 
 Washington, Government Printing Office, 1907.
 
 12 
 
 treaty of May 22, 1903, between the two countries, in which 
 they are embodied in their entirety.* 
 
 The so-called Piatt amendment, therefore, is a statutory, 
 constitutional and diplomatic right. 
 
 It is not my purpose to comment upon these articles, other 
 than to explain the sense in which the United States under- 
 stood the third article, for Mr. Root wished to make it clear 
 that intervention under the third article was to be in the in- 
 terest of Cuba, not, as is often the case, solely in the interest 
 of the intervening power, and he wanted it to be understood 
 that the right of intervention should only be exercised upon 
 specific, stated grounds, known and approved in advance by 
 the two countries, before the articles should I c made a part 
 of the Cuban Constitution. Therefore, Mr. Root, as Secretary 
 of War, placed the following gloss, or interpretation, upon the 
 third article in the following telegram of April 3, 1901, and had 
 it laid by General Wood before the Cuban Constitutional Con- 
 vention, so that its members in voting the third article should 
 accept it in the sense in which the article was intended to be 
 understood : 
 
 You are authorized to state officially that in the view 
 of the President the intervention described in the third 
 clause of the Piatt Amendment is not synonymous with 
 intermeddling or interference with the affairs of the 
 Cuban Government, but the formal action of the Govern- 
 ment of the United States, based upon just and substantial 
 grounds, for the preservation of Cuban independence, and 
 the maintenance of a government adequate for the protec- 
 tion of life, property, and individual liberty, and adequate 
 for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba im- 
 posed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States.^ 
 
 * United States Statutes at Large, vol. 33, p. 2248. 
 
 ^Annual Report of the Secretary of War for the year 1901, p. 48; 
 The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States, by Elihu Root: 
 Cambridge, Harvard Pres.s, 1910, p. 214.
 
 13 
 
 May I dwell for a moment upon the Plait Amendment and 
 upon the official interpretation of it given by its author, Mr. 
 Root, when Secretary of War and representing the United 
 States. The Piatt Amendment gives the United States a right 
 to intervene in Cuba for the protectiotT of the independence, 
 not for the destruction of the independence, of Cuba, thus 
 creating a legal right as distinguished from a political preten- 
 sion. The Amendment enumerates the conditions in which 
 and because of which this right of intervention may be exer- 
 cised. But in order that there might be no doubt as to the 
 meaning to be attached to the right of intervention and its ex- 
 ercise, Mr. Root, as Secretary of War and as representing the 
 United States, interpreted the third article of the Piatt Amend- 
 ment, and this interpretation was by his direction laid before 
 the Cuban Constitutional Convention, so that, in adopting the 
 Piatt Amendment, it should be adopted in the same sense by 
 both countries; that is to say, the sense which Mr. Root attached 
 to it in his telegram to General Wood, then Military Governor, 
 and by him laid before the Constitutional Convention, which 
 adopted the amendment and annexed it to the Constitution. 
 The Piatt Amendment creates the right; Mr. Root's interpre- 
 tation defines the right and limits its scope, and as both coun- 
 tries must have understood the right and its exercise as de- 
 fined and limited by Secretary Root, speaking for the United 
 States, it necessarily follows that, without violating its good 
 faith, neither country can be forced to accept another and a 
 different interpretation of this right. As I conceive it, the 
 Piatt Amendment not only guarantees the independence of 
 Cuba, but it also renders its guarantee effective. The United 
 States deemed it wise, indeed necessar>% to remove from 
 foreign countries all pretexts for intervention in the domestic 
 concerns of Cuba. In obtaining the right from and in behalf 
 of Cuba, the United States expressly defined the right, limited 
 
 its scope, and stated the conditions of its exercise.
 
 14 
 
 On the twentieth of May, 1902, the American flag was lowered 
 and the American troops withdrew from a sovereign, free 
 and independent Cuba. In 1906, the United States felt it 
 necessary to avail itself of the statutory, constitutional and 
 treaty right to intervene in Cuba for the purposes set forth 
 in the third clause of the so-called Piatt Amendment and in 
 accordance with Mr. Root's gloss upon it. On March 31, 1909, 
 the forces of the United States again withdrew from the island, 
 leaving Cuba for the second time to its newly elected and 
 duly constituted authorities. The United States pledged its 
 good faith that Cuba should be free and that when the pur- 
 poses of the first occupation were accomplished the island 
 should be turned over to its people and the American troops 
 withdrawn, and the United States kept the given word. Cuba 
 and the United States agreed that, under certain contingencies 
 the United States might intervene in Cuba, and each has lived 
 up to the obligation, with the result that the relations of the 
 two countries are friendly, confidential and without a trace 
 of suspicion as to the motives of either. 
 
 The two nations met upon a plane of equality, arranged 
 their future relations upon just terms, and each has observed 
 the spirit as well as the letter of its obligation. When nations 
 meet upon the plane of equality and arrange their relations 
 justly, that is to say, according to the principles of justice, 
 and when they observe the spirit as well as the letter of their 
 obligations, they dwell in peace and harmony. When, how- 
 ever, they do not meet upon the plane of equality, and the 
 sword of Brennus is thrown into the scale, and when they do 
 not arrange their relations justly, that is to say, in accordance 
 with the principles of justice, but in accordance with the de- 
 sire of the strong under threat of force, they can not expect 
 to live in peace and harmony, and, if they did, all history 
 would give them the lie.
 
 15 
 
 Standing here as I do before you, speaking of the rehitions 
 of our two countries, I do not need to hang my liead, or to ut- 
 ter words of apology, I regret nothing except that I did not 
 arrive in your beautiful country nineteen years ago. 
 
 * * 
 I have ventured to refer to the relations between Cuba and 
 the United States because I wish to take a concrete example, 
 to show that, if nations meet upon terms of equality and base 
 their relations upon principles of justice, and if in good faith 
 they keep the pledged word, we may expect peace; but that if 
 they do not do so, out of a mistaken regard to their own in- 
 terests, anarchy and destruction prevail. As Mr. Root said, 
 on May 11, 1908, on the laying of the cornerstone of the Inter- 
 national Bureau of American Republics : 
 
 There are no international controversies so serious that 
 they can not be settled peaceably if both parties really de- 
 sire peaceable settlement, while there are few causes of 
 dispute so trifling that they can not be made the occasion 
 of war if either party really desires war. The matters in 
 dispute between nations are nothing; the spirit which 
 deals with them is everything.^ 
 
 Feeling keenly as I do upon these matters, I desire to offer 
 some observations upon the methods whereby justice may 
 enter into the practice of nations; for, if the future is to be dif- 
 ferent from the past (and who does not hope and pray that it 
 will be?) we must think more of justice and the ways of peace 
 and less of force and the ways of war. 
 
 I consider three things indispensable in any consideration 
 of this subject, and, without an agreement upon them, it is in 
 
 ^ American Journal of International Law, vol. 2, p. 624.
 
 16 
 
 my opinion a waste of time to discuss international questions 
 and to plan for a happier future. The first is that we regard 
 all nations as equal. The second is that the relations of na- 
 tions be based upon principles of justice; and the third, that 
 the promises of nations, whether they be embodied in formal 
 documents, such as treaties and conventions, or preserved in 
 informal agreements, be scrupulously kept. 
 
 Let me touch briefly on each of these points and illustrate 
 by concrete examples the sense in which I would have them 
 understood. First, as to equality. We can not say, and if we 
 do we can not expect to be believed, that nations are equal 
 in all respects, for we know that they are not. Some are 
 larger in territorial extent and are thickly peopled. Some, 
 again, are rich in their natural and material resources; 
 whereas others, lacking territorial and material resources, are 
 rich in the things of the spirit. To confine ourselves to the 
 past, lest we offend the present, Rome possessed greater ter- 
 ritory, a more numerous population and greater material re- 
 sources and enjoyed, because of these, greater political influ- 
 ence than Athens; the Greek conquered the Roman intel- 
 lectually, just as the Roman conquered the Greek politically, 
 and the Greek spirit which conquered Rome today dominates 
 the modern world. The influence of each was and is different 
 — and how different! 
 
 If, therefore, thinking of these things, I should ask you to 
 accept equality as to them, you would justly refuse to be con- 
 vinced. But I do not speak of physical, mental or moral 
 equality. I have in mind equality before the law, and, in this 
 sense, I believe and therefore I state that nations have equal 
 duties and equal rights in and under the law. Indeed, I am 
 unable to conceive of a system of justice which does not recog- 
 nize legal equality, and I can not understand how relations not 
 founded upon equality before and under and in the law can 
 be permanent, and it is the permanent things we wish and
 
 17 
 
 must have. The truth that inequahty finds no phicc in jus- 
 tice was never better stated than by a great and high-minded, 
 generous and yet just French statesman at the First Hague 
 Conference. In speaking of the supposed inequality of the 
 powers, Leon Bourgeois said, for it is to him that I refer: 
 
 Gentlemen, what is now the rule among individual men 
 will hereafter obtain among nations. Such international 
 institutions as these will be the protection of the weak 
 against the powerful. In the conflicts of brute force, 
 where fighters of flesh and with steel are in line, we may 
 speak of great Powers and small, of weak and of mighty. 
 When swords are thrown in the balance, one side may 
 easily outweigh the other. But in the weighing of rights 
 and ideas disparity ceases, and the rights of the smallest 
 and the weakest Powers count as much in the scales as 
 those of the mightiest. 
 
 This conviction has guided our work, and throughout 
 its pursuit our constant thought has been for the weak. 
 May they at least understand our idea, and justify our 
 hope, by joining in the effort to bring the future of Hu- 
 manity under the majesty of the Law.^ 
 
 In the presence of this burst of eloquence, one might well 
 hesitate to continue the subject, and yet I may not dismiss it, 
 as it is so relevant to my argument. I would like to say that 
 it is only from the smaller states that we can hope justice to 
 enter into the relations of nations, to permeate the nations 
 and to prevail in their practice, because the larger countries 
 have the sword with which to enforce their views, however un- 
 just they may be, whereas the weaker nations, which are in- 
 deed the more numerous, have only justice for a defense and 
 a shield. 
 
 ^Conference Internationale de la paix. La Haye, 18 mai-29 juillet 
 1899. Nouvelle edition. La Haye^ 1907, pt. i, p. 97.
 
 18 
 
 We do not need to go beyond the confines of the United 
 States to seek an illustration of the arrogance of the larger 
 states and of their belief that they are entitled to greater rights 
 because of their bigness. On July 4, 1776, the English-speak- 
 ing colonies of North America, with the exception of Canada 
 and Newfoundland, proclaimed their independence of Great 
 Britain, and, in order to obtain it, they acted in unison. The 
 states thus proclaimed created a confederacy and in the 
 Articles of Confederation, as the instrument of government 
 is called, they declared themselves to be sovereign, free and 
 independent, and at the same time they reserved to them- 
 selves every right not specifically delegated by the Articles 
 to the United States in Congress assembled. The union under 
 the Articles of Confederation proving unsatisfactory, twelve 
 of the thirteen States met in conference by their delegates 
 in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, and, as the result 
 of their deliberations, drafted the present Constitution of the 
 United States, making of the Confederacy "a more perfect 
 union," safeguarding the equality of the States composing it 
 and investing the United States, as the agency of the States 
 as a whole, with certain powers in the interest and for the 
 well-being of the States themselves, creating two fields, in 
 one of which the United States are sovereign to the extent 
 of the powers enumerated and granted directly or indirectly 
 in the Constitution, and the other field, in which the States 
 are sovereign in the powers which they did not directly or 
 indirectly grant to the United States, or of which they did 
 not renounce the exercise. There was the contest between 
 the great and the small States which always takes place in 
 international conferences, where large and small States are 
 represented, for it is apparently in the nature of power to 
 wish to dominate. The larger States meeting in conference 
 at Philadelphia were no exception, and. in order that I may.
 
 19 
 
 without giving offense to foreign nations, illustrate the per- 
 petual struggle to which the smaller States are put to pre- 
 serve themselves from the aggression of the larger States, 
 I beg to quote three instances from tli^debatcs of the Phila- 
 delphia Convention as reported by James Madison, affection- 
 ately regarded as the Father of the Constitution and later a 
 President of the United States, whose more perfect union ho 
 helped to found. 
 
 The first instance happened before the opening of the Con- 
 vention, and is thus described by Mr. Madison in his invalu- 
 able notes of the proceedings: 
 
 Previous to the arrival of a majority of the States, the 
 rule by which they ought to vote in the Convention had 
 been made a subject of conversation among the members 
 present. It was pressed by Governeur Morris and favored 
 by Robert Morris and others from Pennsylvania, that the 
 large States should unite in firmly refusing to the small 
 States an equal vote, as unreasonable, and as enabling the 
 small States to negative every good system of Govern- 
 ment, which must, in the nature of things, be founded 
 on a violation of that equality. The members from Vir- 
 ginia, conceiving that such an attempt might beget fatal 
 altercations between the large and small States, and that 
 it would be easier to prevail on the latter, in the course 
 of the deliberations, to give up their equality for the sake 
 of an effective Government, than on taking the field of 
 discussion to disarm themselves of the right and thereby 
 throw themselves on the mercy of the larger States, dis- 
 countenanced and stifled the project.^ 
 
 ^ The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Con- 
 stitution of the United States, May-September, 1787, as recorded by 
 James Madison, edited by Gaillard Hunt (New York, 1908), vol. I, p. 6; 
 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, edited by Max Farrand 
 (New Haven, 1911), vol. I, pp. 10-11.
 
 20 
 
 Therefore, the States, large and small, were given an equal- 
 itj"^ of voice in the rules for the conduct of business. The dele- 
 gates of the larger States, however, acting apparently upon 
 Madison's advice, endeavored during the course of the session 
 to persuade or to force the small States to yield to the larger 
 a greater influence in the more perfect union than that which 
 was to be possessed by the smaller States, with the result that 
 the Convention well-nigh broke up within the first month of 
 its meeting. 
 
 For this second instance, I quote again the accurate 
 Madison, who thus recounts a passage at arms in which 
 John Dickinson, representing the small State of Delaware, 
 criticized and rebuked James Madison, representing the large 
 State of Virginia : 
 
 You see the consequence of pushing things too far. 
 Some of the members from the small States wish for two 
 branches in the General Legislature, and are friends to a 
 good National Government; but we would sooner submit 
 to foreign power, than submit to be deprived of an equality 
 of suffrage in both branches of the legislature, and thereby 
 be thrown under the domination of the large States.^ 
 
 The result was a compromise, by which the large and the 
 small States, respectively, renounced some of their preten- 
 sions, without, however, affecting the question of equality. 
 
 The third incident happened after the Constitution had 
 been drafted and but two days before the adjournment of the 
 Convention. The chief actors were Gouverneur Morris, who 
 had proposed that the small States be shown their place at 
 the very beginning, and James Madison, who felt that they 
 
 ^ Hunt's edition of Madison's Journal of the Debates in the Conven- 
 tion, vol. I, pp. 138-139; Farrand's Records of the Federal Convention, 
 vol. I, p. 242.
 
 21 
 
 could be forced to submit to their betters during the course of 
 the Convention. The matter under consideration was the 
 manner of amending the Constitution, and the incident shows 
 why it is that the Constitution can not be modified in such a 
 way as to affect the equality of the Sfates in the Senate, in 
 which each State is represented as such and in which each has 
 two votes. I now quote the third incident, without further 
 comment, from Madison's notes: 
 
 Mr. Govr. Morris moved to annex a further proviso — 
 "that no State, without its consent shall be deprived of 
 its equal suffrage in the Senate." 
 
 This motion being dictated by the circulating murnmrs 
 of the small States was agreed to without debate, no one 
 opposing it, or on the question, saying no.^ 
 
 * * 
 I accept and I beg you to accept the magnificent passage of 
 Rousseau, which I have ventured to place upon the publica- 
 tions of the Institute, in which the citizen of the little Re- 
 public of Geneva thus speaks of justice and the equal appeal 
 which it makes to all as the measure of their rights and there- 
 fore of their duties: 
 
 The first and greatest interest of the public is always 
 justice. All want equal conditions for all and justice is 
 this equality. The citizen only desires law and the ob- 
 servance of law. Everybody among us knows that if there 
 are exceptions they will not be in his favor. Thus, all 
 fear exceptions and he who fears exceptions loves the 
 law. 
 
 It is not necessary, at this time and in this place, to dwell 
 upon the need of a rule of law based upon justice to determine 
 
 ^ Hunt's edition of Madison's Journal of the Debates in the Convention, 
 vol. 2, p. 380; Farrand's Records of the Federal Convention, vol. 2, 
 p. 631.
 
 22 
 
 the relations of nations and to guide their conduct, because 
 the great war of 1914 is still raging and convinces the most 
 plebeian, bourgeois and dull-witted among us that, as Hamlet 
 would say, something is rotten in the state of Denmark; and 
 because the American Institute of International Law has con- 
 fessed its faith in justice as the basis of law, and has en- 
 deavored to state, and has actually stated, within the com- 
 pass of six articles, the fundamental principles of justice ob- 
 taining in civilized nations, and recognized as capable of ob- 
 taining between and among nations, in the Declaration of 
 Rights and Duties adopted by the Institute of International 
 Law at its first session at Washington, January 6, 1916. Al- 
 though you are familiar with the Declaration and with the 
 articles themselves, and the sense in which they are to be un- 
 derstood, as it is the sense in which they have been applied 
 by courts of justice in construing and deciding international 
 questions, let me repeat them for purposes of clearness, as 
 they are material to my argument, and let me also indulge in 
 a word of comment. Omitting the preamble, which, however, 
 is very important, as it lays the foundation upon which the 
 rights and duties of nations are based, the articles are : 
 
 I. Every nation has the right to exist, and to protect 
 and to conserve its existence; but this right neither im- 
 plies the right nor justifies the act of the State to protect 
 itself or to conserve its existence by the commission of 
 unlawful acts against innocent and unoffending States. 
 
 II. Every nation has the right to independence in the 
 sense that it has a right to the pursuit of happiness and is 
 free to develop itself without interference or control from 
 other States, provided that in so doing it does not inter- 
 fere with or violate the rights of other States. 
 
 III. Every nation is in law and before law the equal of 
 ever>' other nation belonging to the society of nations, and 
 all nations have the right to claim and, according to the
 
 23 
 
 Declaration of Independence ol" the United Slates, "to as- 
 sume, among the Powers of the earth, the separate and 
 equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's 
 God entitle them," 
 
 IV. Every nation has the right to territory within de- 
 fined boundaries and to exerciSe* exclusive jurisdiction 
 over its territory, and all persons whether native or for- 
 eign found therein. 
 
 V. Every nation entitled to a right by the law of nations 
 is entitled to have that right respected and protected by 
 all other nations, for right and duty are correlative, and 
 the right of one is the duty of all to observe. 
 
 VI. International law is at one and the same time hotli 
 national and international: national in the sense that it is 
 the law of the land and applicable as such to the decision 
 of all questions involving its principles; international in 
 the sense that it is the law of the society of nations and 
 applicable as such to all questions between and among 
 the members of the society of nations involving its prin- 
 ciples.^ 
 
 Now, the word of comment for which I must ask your in- 
 dulgence is that, if the first five of these articles are an analysis 
 and summary, as I believe they are, of the principles of justice 
 obtaining in every civilized country, and are the result of cen- 
 turies of development, it is possible to reverse the process and, 
 from these five principles of justice, to deduce and to frame 
 the rules of conduct based upon them and necessarj' to give 
 them effect. It may be easier to analyze, but we must syn- 
 thesize as well. We need only follow the experience of na- 
 tions with their internal law, and accepting the principles 
 of justice universally recognized, and therefore fundamental, 
 we can derive from them the rules of law which should con- 
 trol the conduct of nations. They may differ, perhaps, in 
 
 ■'■ Scott: The American Institute of International Law: its declaration 
 of the rights and duties of nations (Washington, 101 C), p. 88.
 
 24 
 
 form, perhaps in content, perhaps in sanction, because we are 
 dealing in one case with natural persons and in the other case 
 with artificial persons which we call States. As conditions 
 differ we will expect the rules of law concerning them to dif- 
 fer. But however that may be, we must build in accordance 
 with a definite plan and upon firm foundations if we exi^ect 
 our structure to stand and to prove itself adequate to the needs 
 of nations. 
 
 Let me indulge in a further comment. If the conduct of 
 nations is to be controlled by rules of law, based upon ex- 
 perience had with justice, we must agree that the State, how- 
 ever large, however powerful, however numerous may be its 
 people, is nevertheless subordinated to rules of law based 
 upon fundamental and generally recognized principles of jus- 
 tice, because, if the State be not subject to law but is a law 
 unto itself, there can be no general standard of conduct based 
 upon law; and we must further agree that the State shall not 
 determine for itself the rule of law which it will apply in a 
 given case, because if the State decides for itself we may have 
 anarchy instead of harmony, as we may find ourselves con- 
 fronted with as many different interpretations of the same 
 rule of law, based upon the same principles of justice univer- 
 sally recognized, as there are States. 
 
 * 
 * * 
 
 A rule of law must be observed, whether it be customary or 
 conventional — that is to say, whether it be usage hardened 
 into custom and evidenced by the practice of nations, or 
 whether it be in the form of treaty or convention negotiated by 
 nations and by ratification given the form of an international 
 statute. We know in our daily life that it is useless to make 
 contracts unless they are to be kept and unless they are kept. 
 If we believed that they would not be observed we would not 
 have made them, and we would hesitate to make contracts at
 
 25 
 
 all, or to make contracts with those who did not ohscrvo them. 
 The world of affairs needs contracts; the world of affairs in- 
 sists that they be kept; the world of affairs has provided agen- 
 cies to secure their observance. 
 
 Now, it is equally necessary that contfacts be made by na- 
 tions — and treaties are contracts — that they should be kept, 
 and that there should be agencies to secure their observance. 
 Otherwise, it is foolish to make them; indeed, it is worse than 
 foolish, because each contract broken discredits the system 
 and renders international law a source of merriment to the 
 unbelieving. 
 
 We do not need authority for the statement that contracts 
 between natural persons must be kept, and we do not need 
 authority for the contention — I use the word advisedly — that 
 contracts betw^een artificial (I had almost said unnatural) per- 
 sons must be kept. The system of jurisprudence of every civil- 
 ized country accepts the axiom of the Roman law that pacta 
 servanda sunt, which may be freely translated that agree- 
 ments are to be observed. And without arguing or elaborating 
 the point, I content myself with this brief quotation. 
 
 The case appears to be different with nations, if we test 
 profession by practice; and yet, if the reason in each instance 
 is the same, I should not need to reenforce the statement, 
 which I have called a contention, that treaties be kept, and I 
 should not need to elaborate the further statement, which 1 
 must likewise call contentious, that conventions can only be 
 modified or varied by the parties to them, just as contracts be- 
 tween individuals can only be modified or varied by the par- 
 ties. Yet if authority be needed we have it, and it is the 
 solemn declaration of the nations of light and leading and 
 which we have been accustomed to consider as holding aloft 
 the torch of civilization. Let me briefly state the circum- 
 stances of the important document to which I refer and which
 
 26 
 
 I shall presently quote, and let me premise that it is but a hun- 
 dred words, inasmuch as simple and fundamental truths are 
 felt and often need not be expressed, or, if expressed, are 
 indicated, as it were, rather than stated at length. 
 
 By the 11th article of the Treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856, 
 putting an end to the Crimean war, and to which Austria, 
 France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey were parties, 
 Russia and Turkey were forbidden to keep vessels of war in 
 the Black Sea. Let me quote the exact text of the article, as 
 it is very material to the present purpose : 
 
 The Black Sea is neutralized: its waters and its ports, 
 thrown open to the mercantile marine of every nation, are 
 formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the flag of war, 
 either of the Powers possessing its coasts, or of any other 
 Power, . . .^ 
 
 Taking advantage of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, 
 and of circumstances which need not be related here, Rus- 
 sia, by its own action, declared this provision of the treaty 
 to which it was a party to be abrogated. It was, in one 
 sense, a small matter, and it was no doubt as unwise in the 
 Powers as it was humiliating to Russia to have inserted such 
 a provision in the treaty; but, whether wise or foolish, or 
 humiliating, the clause in question formed an integral part of 
 the treaty and the claim of Russia to abrogate it was a claim 
 to modify or vary a solemn treaty at its whim or pleasure. 
 Nay more, it was a claim which, if allowed, would permit if 
 not actually authorize any, and therefore ever\% nation to 
 modify or vary a treaty to which it was a party, without the 
 consent of the signatories, whenever, in its opinion, a clause 
 
 ^ British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 46, p. 12; Thomas Erskine 
 Holland: The European Concert in the Eastern Question (1885), p. 
 247.
 
 27 
 
 agreed to and accepted had become burdensome and contrary 
 to what it professed to consider its best interests. 
 
 This was the attitude of the Powers at that time, and in con- 
 sidering "the question in whose hand lay the power of releas- 
 ing one or more of the parties to the treaty from all or any of 
 its stipulations," Lord Granville, then Her Majesty's principal 
 Secretary of State for Great Britain, said: 
 
 It has always been held that the right belongs only to 
 the governments who have been parties to the original 
 instrument. The despatches of the Russian Government 
 appear to assume that any one of tlie Powers who have 
 signed the engagement may allege that occurrences have 
 taken place which in its opinion are at variance with the 
 provisions of the treaty, and though their view is not 
 shared nor admitted by the co-signatory Powers, may 
 found upon that allegation, not a request to those govern- 
 ments for a consideration of the case, but an announce- 
 ment to them that it has emancipated itself, or holds itself 
 emancipated, from any stipulations of the treaty which 
 it thinks fit to disapprove. Yet it is quite evident that the 
 effect of such doctrine and of any proceeding which, with 
 or without avowal, is founded upon it, is to bring the en- 
 tire authority and efficacy of treaties under the discre- 
 tionary control of each of the Powers who may have 
 signed them; the result of which would be the entire de- 
 struction of treaties in their essence.^ 
 
 The signatories of the Treaty of Paris therefore met in con- 
 ference to consider the matter, and they adopted a declara- 
 tion on January 17, 1871, to which France adhered on March 
 13, 1871, which, with tlie signatures appended, reads as fol- 
 lows : 
 
 ^William Edward Hall: A treatise on international laic (Oxford. 
 1895), pp. 371-372.
 
 28 
 
 The plenipotentiaries of the North German Confedera- 
 tion, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, and 
 Turkey, assembled today in conference, recognize that it 
 is an essential principle of the law of nations that no 
 Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a 
 treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, except as the 
 result of the consent of the contracting parties, by means 
 of an amicable understanding. 
 
 In faith of which the said plenipotentiaries have signed 
 the present protocol. 
 Done at London, this 17th day of January, 1871. 
 
 Bernstorff. 
 
 Apponyi. 
 
 Granville. 
 
 Cadorna. 
 
 Brunnow. 
 
 MUSURUS. 
 
 13th March, 1871. Broglie.^ 
 
 There is no virtue in keeping an agreement when it is to our 
 advantage to do so. The virtue, if virtue it be, only appears 
 when the treaty hurts. Experience shows that treaties which 
 are advantageous are kept, as are treaties which do not lay 
 too great a burden or involve too great a sacrifice; and it may 
 be said in this connection that the less the sacrifice the greater 
 the observance of the treaty. Therefore, the part of wisdom 
 appears to be not to ask too much of the nations at any one 
 time, but that, instead of taking a leap, which may be a leap 
 in the dark, we should take an infinite series of little steps, 
 each in advance of the other, each springing naturally out of 
 its predecessor, and each confirmed by experience, before the 
 next step is taken. Tliis is indeed festina lente, but it is prog- 
 ress, although slow; it is sure, for what is gained in this way 
 is liable to be observed and not lost in times of storm and 
 
 1 British and Foreign State Papers, 1870-71, vol. 61, pp. 1198-99.
 
 29 
 
 stress. The fable of the Tortoise and the Hare is not wholly 
 confined to individuals; it applies as well to nations. The in- 
 cident of the dog grasping for its shadow and losing the bone, 
 applies as well to nations. Let me recount the fables to you, 
 for I fear that in these latter days we lose sight of the general 
 principles in our eagerness for the details; so that, as our Ger- 
 man friends put it, we can not see the forest for the trees. Let 
 me preface the fables with a proverb from Solomon: "Wis- 
 dom is the principal thing; therefore get wisdom; and with all 
 thy getting, get understanding." 
 
 Although Aesop has not hitherto been quoted as an author- 
 ity on international law and on international relations, I 
 nevertheless venture to vouch him as the safe and sure model 
 to follow\ "A Hare," he tells us, "was one day making fun 
 of a Tortoise for being so slow upon his feet. 'Wait a bit,' said 
 the Tortoise; 'I'll run a race with you, and I'll wager that I 
 win.' 'Oh, well,' replied the Hare, who was much amused at 
 the idea, 'let's try and see'; and it was soon agreed that the fox 
 should set a court for them, and be the judge. When the time 
 came both started off together, but the Hare w^as soon so far 
 ahead that he thought he might as well have a rest; so down 
 he lay and fell fast asleep. Meanwhile the Tortoise kept plod- 
 ding on, and in time reached the goal. At last the Hare woke 
 up with a start, and dashed on at his fastest, but only to find 
 that the Tortoise had already won the race." From this 
 Aesop draws the conclusion, which I would apply to nations, 
 "Slow and steady wins the race." 
 
 Again to quote Aesop, "A Dog," he informs us, "was crossing 
 a plank bridge over a stream with a piece of meat in his 
 mouth [other versions supply the dog with a bone] when he 
 happened to see his own reflection in the water. He thought 
 it was another dog with a piece of meat twice as big; so he let 
 go his own, and flew at the other dog to get the larger piece.
 
 30 
 
 But, of course, all that happened was that he got neither; for 
 one was only a shadow, and the other was carried away by 
 the current." 
 
 Aesop does not draw the moral from this little tale, because, 
 perhaps, it was obvious, in his opinion; and indeed, obvious it 
 has been from his day to this. Haste, the English proverb 
 says, "makes waste" — a fact which advocates of peaceable set- 
 tlement may one day learn. 
 
 If, then, there is a difference between the willingness of na- 
 tions to conclude those treaties which are advantageous and 
 which concern a subject-matter with which they are familiar 
 because the world has had experience with it, and treaties 
 which impose burdens or deal with a subject-matter in which 
 the world has not had experience, or but limited experience, is 
 it not the part of wisdom to recognize this distinction and, by 
 recognizing it, only lay upon nations burdens which experi- 
 ence shows that they can and, what is not less important, that 
 they are willing to bear; and is it not the part of wisdom, if 
 there be no experience, to go part of the way at one time and 
 to limit the application of the treaty to a short period, so 
 that, if the experience is unfavorable, the treaty does not need 
 to be renewed, but if the experience is favorable, the conven- 
 tion may be continued for a longer period, perhaps indefi- 
 nitely, and then a further step be taken in advance. 
 
 Without pausing to reenforce a general principle by un- 
 necessary illustrations, let me suggest that treaties of a 
 problematical character be limited to a very, very short time. 
 We can not be wiser than the rest of mankind, and inasmuch 
 as every-day experience shows us that individuals are will- 
 ing to pledge themselves to a line of conduct as to which 
 they have doubt or scruples, if they know \that they are 
 not bound for a long period, so nations, which after all are 
 but individuals grouped more or less artificially, may like-
 
 31 
 
 wise be willing to stretch a point if they are assured by the 
 very instrument to which they set their hands and seals that 
 they are to be bound but for a short time, and that the renewal 
 of the treaty, or rather its continuation, depends upon actual 
 experience, because if not denounced or' abrogated at the ex- 
 piration of the time for which it is concluded it should con- 
 tinue for a further period. And in this matter negative is as 
 good as positive experience; for if none of the consequences 
 which were feared or anticipated have happened we may 
 count upon a continuance of the treaty, just as if favorable 
 experience had been had, because nations, like individuals, 
 prefer the old rut to the new road, and they are willing to 
 keep on where they might have been unwilling to begin. In 
 this way we may stimulate the good faith of nations, we en- 
 courage them to act upon their good faith, and we do not 
 make it difficult for them to do so. 
 
 * * 
 
 Now, it must be understood that these three matters which 
 I have ventured to call essential to international relations must 
 be regarded by all nations as rights of all and placed under 
 the guaranty of all, that all have a like interest in equality, 
 that all have an equal interest in Justice and that the happi- 
 ness of all must depend upon the observance of law, cus- 
 tomary or international, and that in case of the violation of 
 any one of these it is the right, nay, the duty of each to pro- 
 test, not merely in its own right and in its own name, but in 
 the right and name of every member of the society of nations. 
 
 It is admitted to be the right and the duty of a neutral 
 nation to protest if the action of a belligerent affects injuriously 
 the persons or the property of that neutral. The books are 
 full of protests in such cases, and a large part of the cor- 
 respondence of neutral nations since the outbreak of the great 
 war in August, 1914, consists of the protests of neutrals to
 
 32 
 
 belligerents. It is not so generally recognized that a neutral 
 nation has a right to protest, although its citizens, or their 
 property, may not have been directly injured by belligerent 
 action, or that it be the right and duty for a neutral nation to 
 protest against a violation of neutral right, even although 
 neither the lives of its citizens nor their property are directly 
 affected. The reason is that the violation of the right of one 
 neutral is a violation of the right of all neutrals; for if a bel- 
 ligerent can violate at its pleasure a rule of law^ which today 
 affects nations A, B, or C, it may tomorrow violate the same 
 rule of law affecting the interests of nations X, Y, and Z. 
 Indeed it is not the injury to the person or the injury to the 
 property which matters. It is the withdrawal of the protec- 
 tion of the rule of law, upon which both life and property de- 
 pend. Withdraw the law, and the person and property of the 
 neutral are at the mercy of the belligerent. 
 
 It is correct to say that a foreign nation would not be justi- 
 fied in protesting a rule of municipal law until either its citi- 
 zens or subjects or their property be injured. It is not to 
 be presumed that a municipal law has been passed which will 
 be interpreted as contrary to international law, and it is a 
 canon of construction that a municipal law will be presumed 
 to be consistent with international law unless such a construc- 
 tion is impossible. Thus, in the case of the Charming Betsy, 
 decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1804, 
 Chief Justice Marshall said: 
 
 It has also been observed, that an act of Congress ought 
 never be construed to violate the law of nations, if any 
 other possible construction remains, and consequently, 
 can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to 
 affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the 
 law of nations as understood in this country.^ 
 
 ^ 2 Cranch, 64, 1 1 8.
 
 33 
 
 The presumption is either that the law is not inconsistent 
 with the rule of international law, or that it will not be applied 
 to foreign persons or interests in such a way as to violate the 
 rule of international law. Even in these cases it would be 
 proper to call attention to the probaBTe consequences of the 
 statute. 
 
 But the nation passing the statute is sovereign within its 
 territory, and it has the right to exercise its sovereignty in 
 such a way as to affect all persons, alien or native, and all 
 property within its jurisdiction. The case is entirely different 
 in international law. No nation has a right to make interna- 
 tional laws no nation has a right to give to its municipal stat- 
 ute international effect; no nation has a right to extend its 
 statutes in such manner as to interfere with the rights of other 
 nations. This arises from the independence and equality of 
 nations. As Sir William Scott, later Lord Stowell, put it in 
 1817, in deciding the case of Le Louis: 
 
 two principles of public law are generally recognized 
 as fundamental. One is the perfect equality and entire 
 independence of all distinct States. Relative magnitude 
 creates no distinction of right; relative imbecility, whether 
 permanent or casual, gives no additional right to the more 
 powerful neighbor; and any advantage seized upon tliat 
 ground is mere usurpation. This is the great foundation 
 of public law, which it mainly concerns the peace of man- 
 kind, both in their politic and private capacities, to pre- 
 serve inviolate. The second is, that all nations being 
 equal, all have an equal right to the uninterrupted use of 
 the unappropriated parts of the ocean for their naviga- 
 tion. In places where no local authority exists, where the 
 subjects of all States meet upon a footing of entire equal- 
 ity and independence, no one State, or any of its subjects, 
 has a right to assume or exercise authority over the sub- 
 jects of another.^ 
 
 ^2 Dodson, 210, 243.
 
 34 
 
 The language of i Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the 
 Antelope, decided in 1825, is no less positive, and can not be 
 too often quoted: 
 
 No principle of general law as more universally ac- 
 knowledged, than the perfect equality of nations. Russia 
 and Geneva have equal rights. It results from this equal- 
 ity, that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another. 
 Each legislates for itself, but its legislation can operate 
 on itself alone. A right, then, which is vested in all, by 
 the consent ,of all, can be divested only by consent; and 
 this [slave] trade, in which all have participated, must re- 
 main lawful to those who can not be induced to relinquish 
 it. As no nation can prescribe a rule for others, none can 
 make a law of nations; and this traffic remains lawful to 
 those whose governments have not forbidden it.^ 
 
 Now, if international law is largely a thing of usage and of 
 usage hardened into custom, nations can not afford to allow 
 one of their number to embark upon a course which, if con- 
 tinued, and if submitted to by them, will result in a precedent 
 binding their conduct, if not their conscience. Lest usage shall 
 harden into custom and silence seem to give consent, it is the 
 right and it ds the duty of neutral nations to state firmly and 
 positively that they will not allow a violation of international 
 right to become an exception to the rule, which it will be if, 
 without protest, they permit the belligerent to violate the rule 
 of law. 
 
 Again, if no one nation can make a law of nations, and if a 
 nation is only bound by what it agrees to, it follows that a rule 
 to be regarded as forming part of the law of nations must be 
 made by all or <^onsented to by all. Differing from municipal 
 law, which is made by one nation, international law is made 
 
 ^ 10 Wheaton, 66, 122.
 
 35 
 
 by the many, or by all in common. The very moment, there- 
 fore, that any nation, however powerful, arrogates to itself 
 the right to abrogate a rule of international law — for violation 
 of a right of neutrals without the consent of neutrals is in ef- 
 fect a claim to abrogate the rule — it is the right of neutrals to 
 interpose an objection; and if the view stated above be correct, 
 it is the duty of neutrals to do so, whether or not they seem 
 to be directly affected in the persons of their subjects or citi- 
 zens, or of )their property. If international law were as mu- 
 nicipal law, the rule of one country, this could not be so. But 
 as it is the rule of all countries, the violation of that rule is in 
 effect the violation of it for all neutrals, because it is the law of 
 all neutrals, and not merely the right of the particular country. 
 A case in point will make this clear; and in order that no 
 criticism may seem to be made of foreign countries, an Ameri- 
 can illustration will be \chosen. On November 8, 1861, the 
 United States man-of-war San Jacinto, under the command of 
 Captain Charles Wilkes, stopped the steamer Trent, took off 
 two civil passengers, Messrs. Mason and Slidell, commissioners 
 from I the Confederate States of America to Europe, and there- 
 after allowed the vessel to continue its passage. The Trent 
 was a British mail packet, therefore a neutral vessel, on its 
 way from Havana to St. Thomas. Under international law 
 then existing and as it now stands, the United States did not 
 have the right to remove Mason and Slidell, although Secre- 
 tary of State Seward claimed that it would have been proper 
 for Captain Wilkes to capture the vessel and to i take it into 
 an American port, in order to have it condemned for car- 
 rying the Confederate commissioners, who were apparently 
 regarded by the American authorities as in the nature of con- 
 traband. Great Britain protested against the removal of civil 
 passengers from a British and therefore neutral vessel, and 
 it was clearly both the right and the duty of Great Britain to
 
 36 
 
 protest. The United States yielded, and returned Mason and 
 Slidell to British custody. 
 
 But there was more to the incident than this, otherwise it 
 would not be cited in this connection. France, Prussia, and 
 Austria also formally protested against the action of the United 
 States in removing Mason and Slidell from the Trent, and 
 Russia called the matter informally to the attention of the 
 United States. On December 3, 1861, the French Imperial 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Thouvenel, instructed the 
 French Minister at Washington to wait upon Secretary 
 Seward, to read to him the instruction and to leave a copy 
 with him should he desire it. The Minister of Foreign Af- 
 fairs laid the foundation for his protest in the following pas- 
 sage: 
 
 The desire to contribute to prevent a conflict, imminent 
 perhaps between two Powers towards which it is ani- 
 mated by sentiments equally friendly, and the duty to 
 maintain certain principles essential to the security of 
 neutrals with the effect of protecting the rights of its own 
 flag from injury, have convinced it [the Government of 
 the Emperor], after mature reflection, that it can not under 
 these circumstances remain altogether silent.^ 
 
 After this expression of friendly regard, M. Thouvenel dis- 
 cussed the merits of the incident, and after expressing the 
 views of his government, thus continued: 
 
 Not wishing to enter into a more thorough discussion 
 of the questions raised by the capture of Messrs. Mason 
 and Slidell, I have said enough about it, I believe, to estab- 
 lish that the Cabinet at Washington would not be able, 
 
 ^Bernard: A historical account of the neutrality of Great Britain 
 during the American Civil War (London, 1870), p. 196.
 
 37 
 
 without infringing upon the principles for which all neu- 
 tral Powers are equally interested in assuring respect or 
 without contradicting its own conduct up to this time, to 
 give its approval to the proceedings of the commander of 
 the San Jacinto.^ 
 
 One more protest may be quoted as of more than passing 
 interest. On December 25, 1861, the Prussian Minister of For- 
 eign Affairs, Count von Bernstorff, a name familiar to the 
 American people at the present time because of the fact that 
 the present German Ambassador to the United States bears the 
 honored name of this minister, and is his son, instructed the 
 Prussian Minister to the United States, Baron von Gcrholt, to 
 call upon Secretary Seward to read him the contents of an in- 
 struction, and to leave a copy of it with him should the Ameri- 
 can Secretary of State desire it. This particular instruction of 
 the Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs dealt with the Trent 
 affair, courteously but firmly stating the rights of neutrals, and 
 protesting against their violation in this instance. He said: 
 
 The maritime operations undertaken by President Lin- 
 coln against the Southern seceding States could not, from 
 their very commencement, but fill the King's Government 
 with apprehensions lest they should result in possible 
 prejudice to the legitimate interests of neutral Powers. 
 
 These apprehensions have unfortunately proved fully 
 justified by the forcible seizure on board the neutral mail- 
 packet the Trent, and the abduction therefrom, of Messrs. 
 Slidell and Mason by the commander of the United States 
 man-of-war the San Jacinto. 
 
 This occurrence, as you can well imagine, has produced 
 in England and throughout Europe the most profound 
 sensation, and thrown not cabinets only, but also public 
 opinion, into a state of the most excited expectation. For, 
 
 1 Ibid., p. 198.
 
 38 
 
 although at present it is England only which is immedi- 
 ately concerned in the matter, yet, on the other hand, it is 
 one of the most important and universally recognized 
 rights of the neutral flag which has been called into ques- 
 tion.^ 
 
 It will be obsers^ed that Count von Bernstorff does not speak 
 in this passage of Prussian rights as such. He takes the 
 broader ground that a violation of the neutral rights of any 
 country is a violation of the neutral rights of all countries, 
 and therefore the rights of Prussia, He recognizes that the 
 claim to violate neutral rights in the case of Great Britain was 
 in effect the claim to violate the neutral rights of every other 
 State belonging to the society of nations, and because of that 
 fact, the incident had, to quote Count von Bernstorff's explana- 
 tion, "produced in England and throughout Europe the most 
 profound sensation, and thrown not cabinets only, but also 
 public opinion, into a state of the most excited expectation." 
 
 But strong as is this note, just as are its views, and admirable 
 as is its temper, the Prussian Government, as will be seen in a 
 further quotation from tlie instruction, did not wait for an in- 
 quiry or investigation to show whether Captain Wilkes' action 
 was by the direction of his government or whether it met 
 with the government's approval. In Count von Bernstorff's 
 opinion, it made no difference in effect whether Wilkes was 
 acting under instructions, or whether he acted upon his own 
 initiative. In either case the world was confronted with the 
 violation of neutral rights, and therefore a protest was justi- 
 fied and requisite. Thus: 
 
 In the absence of an}^ reliable information we were in 
 doubt as to whether the captain of the San Jacinto, in the 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 199.
 
 39 
 
 course taken by him, had been acting under orders from 
 his government or not. Even now we prefer to assume 
 that the latter was the case. Should the former supposi- 
 tion, however, turn out to be the correct one, we should 
 consider ourselves under the necessity of attributing 
 greater importance to the occurrence, and to our great 
 regret we should find ourselves constrained to see in it 
 not an isolated fact but a public menace offered to the 
 existing rights of all neutrals.^ 
 
 As Chief Justice Waite has said in the Arjona case, decided 
 by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1887: 
 
 International obligations are of necessity reciprocal in 
 their nature. The right, if it exists at all, is given by the 
 law of nations, and what is law for one is, under the same 
 circumstances, law for the other.- 
 
 In the society of nations as at present organized, there is no 
 central authority and there is nobody authorized to speak and 
 to act for the society as a whole. The maintenance of inter- 
 national law depends upon the enlightened judgment and 
 good faith of the different nations. Each acts for itself, but 
 in so doing it acts for all, because the right of one is the right 
 of all, and the duty of one, unless it be based upon a special 
 treaty, is the duty of all. 
 
 If we are not our brother's keeper, we are, or at least we 
 should be, conservators of the law. It is the right, and in- 
 deed it is the duty, of neutrals, not of any particular neutral, 
 to protest against the violation of neutral rights. 
 
 "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these, 
 my brethren, ye have done it unto Me." 
 
 » 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 200. 
 
 2 120 United States Reports, 4-79, 487.
 
 40 
 
 Although we recognize that all nations are equal before, in, 
 and under law, and that each is sovereign, free and indepen- 
 dent, we must nevertheless recognize that they are in fact in- 
 terdependent, that the interest of all is superior to the interest 
 of any one, however powerful, and that therefore the interest 
 of the society of nations, that is to say, of the nations in asso- 
 ciation, because they must associate unless they are to exist 
 in isolation, is greater than the interest of any one. We must 
 become conscious of the existence of nations in society, 
 of their rights in association or in society and of the rights 
 of the latter as against the privileges or rights of the indi- 
 vidual states. I do not need to prove by old saw or modem 
 instance that there is such a thing as the society of nations, 
 because I can refer to the book and chapter in which its ex- 
 istence and the purposes for which it exists are authoritatively 
 stated, and this particular book and chapter is the joint prod- 
 uct of all the civilized states, accepting and applying interna- 
 tional law in their mutual relations, invited to and partici- 
 pating in the First and Second Peace Conferences held at The 
 Hague in 1899 and 1907. The preamble to the Peaceful Set- 
 tlement Convention not only states the existence of the society, 
 but the reason for its existence, finding that reason to consist 
 in the solidarity of nations which is necessary to effect the 
 purposes required by their solidarity. The preamble states 
 the Powers participating in the conferences as recognizing "the 
 solidarity which unites the members of the society of civilized 
 nations." Now this simple statement appears to me to be 
 as fundamental as it is simple. In the first place, it recog- 
 nizes the interests of all as opposed to the interests of any 
 one; in the second place, it recognizes that the interests of the 
 whole are the bond uniting the nations; in the third place, it 
 states, it does not argue, the existence of the society of nations, 
 and, finally, in the fourth place, it limits the society to the
 
 41 
 
 civilized nations, which to nie at least seems to imply that a 
 nation can not be civilized without belonging to the society 
 and without recognizing the solidarity, that is to say, the in- 
 terests of the whole as superior to its own particular interests. 
 It is not necessary that the nations -should meet in confer- 
 ence and declare in a formal treaty that the high contracting 
 parties recognize that there are such bodies politic as civilized 
 nations, that these civilized nations are members of the so- 
 ciety of nations and that the society of nations is united by the 
 solidarity of interests of the nations as a whole as distinct 
 from the interests of a particular nation. Indeed, the recog- 
 nition in the preamble is more convincing as show ing that the 
 society exists, and that it does not need to be created or de- 
 clared. But, as I have just said, the statement is as funda- 
 mental as it is simple, because it is a fact that states in 
 association or states recognizing a society of which they are 
 members constitute a body politic without specific agreement 
 or convention to that effect. Important as is this fact and the 
 conclusions to be drawn from it, I do not need to prove by 
 elaborate argument that the existence of states in association 
 forms a body politic without any action taken to that end, 
 because we have a precedent in point and so fashioned to our 
 hand that we could almost think that it was made on purpose. 
 It is from the United States, in which the international element 
 enters so largely and is so important. In order to make the 
 case clear and its application inevitable, let me repeat, that 
 on July 4, 1776, the English speaking colonies of North Amer- 
 ica, with the exception of Canada and Newfoundland, pro- 
 claimed themselves to be free and independent states, that 
 the Articles of Confederation, composing a loose union in the 
 nature of a league and in which the states declared themselves 
 to be sovereign, free and independent, were concluded on 
 March 1, 1781, that the Constitution of the United States, 
 creating a more perfect union, was drafted in 1787 and went
 
 42 
 
 into effect March 4, 1789. Now, the particular case in ques- 
 tion, Respublica v. Sweers, was tried and decided in 1779, 
 previous to the Articles of Confederation and the Constitu- 
 tion, when the states were indeed acting together, but before 
 they had adopted any articles of union or had given to this 
 union legal form and effect. As stated in the report of this 
 interesting case, which was tried in the Supreme Court of 
 Pennsylvania — for at that time there was neither formal 
 union nor court of the union, supreme or inferior — one 
 Sweers, a deputy commissary-general of military stores in 
 the armies of the United States, was indicted in November, 
 1778, for forgery upon two counts, the first for altering a bill, 
 the second for forging a receipt, with, as the indictment says, 
 "intent to defraud the United States." Sweers was tried be- 
 fore a special jury on the 14th of April, 1779, when he was 
 convicted upon both indictments. Mr. Chief Justice McKean 
 of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania thus addressed the de- 
 fendant, in delivering sentence: 
 
 After a fair and full trial, you have been convicted of 
 the crime of forgerjs upon two indictments, by a special 
 jury of your country. . . . Your counsel have taken 
 several exceptions to the form and substance of these in- 
 dictments, upon a motion in arrest of judgment. 
 
 The first exception was, "that, at the time of the offense 
 charged, the United States were not a body corporate 
 known in law." But the court are of a different opinion. 
 From the moment of their association, the United States 
 necessarily became a body corporate; for, there was no 
 superior from whom that character could otherwise be 
 derived. In England, the king, lords and commons, are 
 certainly a body corporate; and yet there never was any 
 charter or statute, by which they were expressly so cre- 
 ated.^ 
 
 1 1 Dallas, 41, 44..
 
 43 
 
 The society of nations only needs to become conscious of 
 its existence in order to perceive thai it is a hody politic, and 
 in order to draw the necessary conclusions from its existence 
 as a body politic. The legal foundation is thus laid upon 
 which to erect any form of organizaticm, to create any agen- 
 cies and to invest them with such power in the interest of the 
 society as to the civilized nations composing it may seem meet 
 and proper. 
 
 If we return to the Pacific Settlement Convention and 
 analyze the preamble, we shall see to what extent the nations 
 have acted in the interest of the society as such, although ap- 
 parently unconscious of its corporate nature. 
 
 We find that the powers through their accredited delegates 
 express in the first two paragraphs of the preamble their pur- 
 pose, stating their countries to be "animated by a strong de- 
 sire to concert for the maintenance of the general peace," and, 
 because of this desire "resolved to second by their best efforts 
 the friendly settlement of international disputes." That is to 
 say, they first express a desire and then a determination. They 
 next recognize, as 1 have previously stated, the solidarity 
 which unites the members of the society of civilized nations, 
 and by so doing they state at one and the same time the exist- 
 ence of the society and the bond which holds its members 
 together. This bond they called solidarity, which I have in- 
 terpreted to mean the interests of all as distinct from the 
 interests of one, and which may therefore be called the com- 
 munity of interests as distinguished from particular or sepa- 
 rate interests. Or, to express it in a more general and per- 
 haps more definite form, the preamble to the Final Act of the 
 First Conference states that it was convoked by his Majestv', 
 the Emperor of All the Russias, "in the best interests of hu- 
 manity," and the preamble of the Second Conference of 1007 
 states that it was convoked "for the purpose of giving a fresh
 
 44 
 
 development to the humanitarian principles which served as 
 a basis for the work of the First Conference of 1899." We 
 thus have it stated upon the highest authority, namely, upon 
 the authority of the Second Conference, that the guiding prin- 
 ciple of tlie First was the best interests of humanity, and that 
 the guiding principle of the Second was a fresh development 
 of the principles of humanity proclaimed by the First Con- 
 ference. 
 
 I am therefore correct in stating that the bond of union is 
 solidaritj', that solidarity means a community of interests and 
 that these interests were, in the opinion of the Conference, the 
 best interests of humanity. I would myself personally state 
 those interests in a single word, — justice. To return to the 
 preamble to the Peaceful Settlement Convention. After ex- 
 pressing the desire for the maintenance of international peace 
 and resolving to settle international disputes in a friendly 
 manner, so as to preserve peace, and recognizing the solidar- 
 ity uniting the society of nations, the powers represented in 
 the First and in the Second Hague Peace Conferences pro- 
 claim in a later section of the preamble that "the security of 
 states and the welfare of peoples" depend upon "the princi- 
 ples of equity and right," and because of this fact, they de- 
 clare it to be "expedient to record in an international agree- 
 ment the principles of equity and right" on which they base 
 "the security of states and the welfare of peoples." Without 
 seeking to give to the terms of the preamble a meaning which 
 was not in the minds of the delegates or to pervert their 
 language to sustain a thesis, I am of the opinion that we would 
 be justified in concluding that the "principles of equity and 
 right" referred to, but not stated, are synonymous with justice, 
 and if it did not seem to be presumptuous on our part, I 
 would venture to suggest that the American Institute of Inter- 
 national Law in its first session not only expressed itself as
 
 45 
 
 sharing the opinion ol Ihc august initiator ol tlic international 
 peace conference, as to the expediency of stating the princi- 
 ples of justice in an international agreement, but that, per- 
 haps with the enthusiasm of youth, it went further and stated 
 and defined those principles in its Declaration of the Rights 
 and Duties of Nations in the form of an international agree- 
 ment or as the basis of such an agreement. 
 
 But, although the Conference did not attempt to define the 
 principles of equity and right, they nevertheless expressed 
 their deliberate opinion that, without the principles of equity 
 and right, states would lack security and the welfare of peo- 
 ples a guaranty, and we are, therefore, prepared to have them 
 declare themselves, as they do in another part of the pream- 
 ble, "desirous of extending the empire of law and of strength- 
 ening the appreciation of international justice," They recog- 
 nize, without arguing it, that justice can not bring forth its 
 perfect fruits unless there be appropriate agencies for its ad- 
 ministration; and without saying that the mere existence of 
 the society of nations requires a law of the society, they never- 
 theless admit the necessity of tlie law in proclaiming prin- 
 ciples of equity and right as the foundation upon which the 
 security of states and the welfare of peoples rest; and again, 
 without saying that an agency of the society is necessary in or- 
 der to ascertain, to interpret and to apph' the law in appropri- 
 ate cases, they nevertheless admit that such an agency would 
 contribute effectively to maintain the general peace, to settle 
 in a friendly manner international disputes, to extend the 
 empire of law, and to strengthen the appreciation of interna- 
 tional justice. That this is no forced construction is evident 
 from the language of the preamble, according to wliich the 
 contracting parties are "convinced that the permanent insti- 
 tution of a court of arbitration accessible to all in the midst 
 of independent powers will contribute effectively to this re-
 
 46 
 
 suit." If I may say so, the Conferences were very happy in 
 stating the consequences of establishing an international court 
 of justice and in defining its relation to the powers, for the 
 court was to be created by the society, of which it is therefore 
 to be the organ. It is to be the court of all, not the court of 
 one, because it is to be accessible to all, and, finally, and ad- 
 mirably stated, it is to be in the midst of independent powers. 
 We have heard much of a free church in a free state, and we 
 are, I am quite sure, destined to hear much in the future of 
 an accessible court in the midst of independent powers. 
 
 The delegates of the nations felt it necessary that the organ 
 of the society which they called a court of arbitration should 
 have its procedure stated and defined in advance, and it is not 
 among the least services of the Conference that it drafted a 
 code of procedure contained in the pacific settlement conven- 
 tion for the arbitration of disputes through the court which the 
 Conference established. And it should be stated in this con- 
 nection, although it is not mentioned in the preamble, that the 
 court created by the powers for the society of nations was to 
 act under the supervision of the powers forming the society 
 of nations. For this purpose the Conference created a per- 
 manent administrative council composed of the diplomatic 
 representatives of the signatory powers accredited to The 
 Hague and under the presidency of the Dutch Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs, "to settle its rules of procedure and all other 
 necessary regulations," to "decide all questions of adminis- 
 tration which may arise with regard to the operations of the 
 court," to communicate "to the signatory powers without de- 
 lay the regulations adopted by it," and to furnish them "with 
 an annual report of the labors of the court, the working of 
 the administration, and the expenditure." 
 
 Now, my purpose in dwelling upon the preamble and in 
 calling to your attention the administrative council is to make
 
 47 
 
 it clear that the Conference, unconsciously it may be, but 
 nevertheless assuredly, went a long way to recognize certain 
 fundamentals of organization with which the delegates were 
 familiar in their own countries, but which had not been hith- 
 erto applied to the nations as a whole. ""Tlius, the Conference 
 recognized, first, the existence of a society of nations com- 
 posed of the civilized states bound together by a community 
 of interests; second, the function of the Conference as a fac- 
 tor in developing "the humanitarian principles" which I have 
 ventured to identify with justice; third, the necessity of a 
 court for the society in order to administer justice between 
 and among the civilized states forming the society, by defin- 
 ing, by interpreting and applying the rule of law to disputes 
 between and among them; and fourth, the advisability of a 
 permanent administrative council, composed of the contract- 
 ing members of the society of nations to establish the court 
 as the organ or agency of the society and to supervise its con- 
 duct. 
 
 We have here an unconscious recognition it may be of the 
 three-fold division of powers in a political society, for the 
 society of nations is a political association and is, if it chooses 
 to be, a body politic. In the Hague Conferences we recognize 
 an international body which recommends, if it does not ac- 
 tually make, laws for the society, because the conventions and 
 declarations drafted by the delegates, and approved by the 
 Conference, are transmitted by the Dutch Minister of For- 
 eign Affairs to the civilized powers forming the society of 
 nations, to be ratified by the appropriate branches of the con- 
 tracting parties and to be adhered to by the appropriate 
 branches of the powers which did not attend the Conference, 
 should they be minded to unite themselves with the contract- 
 ing powers. In the administrative council we recognize the 
 germ of an executive, that is to say, of a body to carry into
 
 48 
 
 effect the projects of the Conference which have been ratified 
 by the nations and to supervise their execution and operation. 
 We also recognize in the proposal of a court of arbitration the 
 first step towards an international judiciary, as the organ or 
 agent of the society, just as a judiciary is an organ or agent 
 of every member of the society of nations. 
 
 Believing, as I do, that international organization is the 
 question of the day and that it must confront us until it is 
 solved, that the relations of nations can only be peaceable if 
 they are based upon justice, I am convinced that there must 
 first be some agency of the society to recommend, if not to 
 make, the law which is to govern the conduct of nations; that 
 there must, second, be some agency of the society to notify 
 the powers in order that the recommendations of the Confer- 
 ence may be ratified; to call to their attention tlie terms of 
 such acts of the Conference as have been ratified in order to 
 prevent their violation, and to exercise such supervision as the 
 society may decide to be compatible with the independence of 
 its members on the one hand and their solidarity on the other, 
 and that third, there must be a court of the society to ascer- 
 tain, to interpret and to apply the law of nations, customary 
 or conventional, to the disputes which necessarily must arise 
 between and among the members of the society, if peace 
 founded upon justice is ever to prevail in a war-ridden world. 
 
 I have ventured to put together certain suggestions which 
 have been made from time to time, and which if adopted seem 
 to me calculated to advance the cause of international organ- 
 ization. I have already invoked Aesop's authority in the 
 course of this address and I would like to invoke it again, as 
 his fable of the Mice in Council seems peculiarly applicable: 
 
 Once upon a time [he said] all the Mice met together 
 in Council, and discussed the best means of securing 
 themselves against the attacks of the Cat. After several
 
 49 
 
 suggesUons had been debated, a Mouse of some standing 
 and experience got up and said, "I think I have hit upon 
 a plan which will ensure our safety in the future, pro- 
 vided you approve and carry it out. It is that we should 
 fasten a bell round the neck of our^enemy the Cat, which 
 will by its tinkling warn us of her approach." This pro- 
 posal was warmly applauded, and it had been already 
 decided to adopt it, when an old Mouse got upon his feet 
 and said, "I agree with you all that the plan before us is 
 an admirable one : but may I ask who is going to bell the 
 Cat?" 
 
 The question thus propounded still awaits an answer. 
 Nevertheless, with a full appreciation of the difficulties with 
 which the subject bristles, and, I hope, a due and a becoming 
 sense of modesty, I venture to lay before you my little bell, 
 or, rather, a whole series of bells, well knowing that, without 
 charity, they will merely be "as sounding brass, or a tinkling 
 cymbal;" and I do so in the hope that, if you applaud the 
 project and decide to adopt it, the nations themselves may be 
 trusted to bell their enemy. Let me read the project. 
 
 I believe it to be feasible, and also to be the part of wisdom : 
 
 1. To urge the call of a Third Hague Conference to 
 which every country belonging to the society of nations 
 shall be invited and in whose proceedings every such 
 country shall participate. 
 
 2. To advocate a stated meeting of The Hague Peace 
 Conference which, thus meeting at regular, stated pe- 
 riods, will become a recommending if not a law-making 
 body. 
 
 3. To suggest an agreement of the States forming the 
 society of nations concerning the call and procedure of 
 the Conference, by which that institution shall become 
 not only internationalized, but in which no nation shall 
 take as of right a preponderating part. 
 
 4. To request the appointment of a committee, to meet
 
 50 
 
 at regular intervals between the Conferences, charged 
 with the duty of procuring the ratification of the Conven- 
 tions and Declarations and of calling attention to the 
 Conventions and Declarations in order to ensure their 
 observance. 
 
 5. To recommend an understanding upon certain fun- 
 damental principles of international law, as set forth in 
 the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations 
 adopted by the American Institute of International Law 
 on January 6, 1916, which are themselves based upon de- 
 cisions of English Courts and of the Supreme Court of 
 the United States. 
 
 6. To propose the creation of an international council 
 of conciliation to consider, to discuss, and to report upon 
 such questions of a non-justiciable character as may be 
 submitted to such council by an agreement of the powers 
 for this purpose. 
 
 7. To commend the employment of good ofl&ces, medi- 
 ation, and friendly composition for the settlement of dis- 
 putes of a non-justiciable nature. 
 
 8. To approve the principle of arbitration in the settle- 
 ment of disputes of a non-justiciable nature; also of dis- 
 putes of a justiciable nature which should be decided by 
 a court of justice, but which have, through delay or mis- 
 management, assumed such political importance that the 
 nations prefer to submit them to arbiters of their own 
 choice rather than to judges of a permanent judicial tri- 
 bunal. 
 
 9. To insist upon the negotiation of a convention cre- 
 ating a judicial union of the nations along the lines of the 
 Universal Postal Union of 1906, to which all civilized na- 
 tions and self-governing dominions are parties, pledging 
 the good faith of the contracting parties to submit their 
 justiciable disputes — that is to say, their differences in- 
 volving law or equity — to a permanent court of this union, 
 whose decisions will bind not only the litigating nations, 
 but also all parties to its creation. 
 
 10. To endeavor to create an enlightened public opin- 
 ion in behalf of peaceable settlement in general, and in
 
 51 
 
 particular in behalf of the foregoing nine propositions, 
 in order that, if agreed to, they may be put into pracUce 
 and become effective, in response to the appeal to that 
 greatest of sanctions, "a decent respect to the opinions 
 of mankind." ^^ 
 
 Let me quote, and, by quoting, make my own as far as one 
 can, tlie words of the great, the wise, and the generous French 
 statesman, Mr. Bourgeois, whose language I have already 
 quoted, uttered in a moment of inspiration at the Second 
 Hague Peace Conference and in advocacy of the very prin- 
 ciples for which the American Institute of International Law 
 stands : 
 
 The world longs for peace. 
 
 For centuries we have put our faith exclusively in the 
 formula: Si vis pacem, para helium; that is to say, we 
 have confined ourselves to the military organization of 
 peace. We have got beyond this, but we should not be 
 satisfied in forming a more humane organization, which 
 I was about to call the pacific organization of war. 
 
 The discussions which have taken place here in our 
 midst have shown us the progress made in our views in 
 this matter through education, and the new sentiment, 
 each day more insistent, of the solidarity alike of nations 
 and of mankind in the struggle against the fatality of 
 nature. We have confidence in the increasing effect of 
 these great moral forces, and we hope that the Confer- 
 ence of 1907 will force a still further development of the 
 humane principles which guided the Conference of 1899, 
 by assuring in fact as well as in theory the juridical or- 
 ganization of peace.^ 
 
 * 
 * * 
 
 ^ Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, 1907, Actes et Docu- 
 ments, tome ii, p. 349.
 
 52 
 
 Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen: 
 
 I can not close the address I have prepared for the open- 
 ing session and which has, I am sure, severely taxed your 
 patience, without expressing the very great pleasure which 
 your invitation has given us to meet in the city of Habana, 
 and without the assurance that the realization is greater than 
 the anticipation, for who does not look forward to a visit to 
 Habana. 
 
 The Institute and its members hope to show themselves 
 worthy of your consideration and of your courtesy, and, while 
 we shall always look back to the Habana session with pleas- 
 ure and with pride, we cherish the hope that you may never 
 regret opening your city and your hearts to us. 
 
 I have taken the liberty of offering in the introduction some 
 remarks upon the Piatt Amendment, which I regard as a pro- 
 tection against an assault from without, as a bulwark against 
 misgovernment from within, and as a shield and a buckler 
 even against the great republic to the north, should it be in- 
 clined to forget the responsibility it assumed and the solemn 
 promise it gave to a generous, devoted and trusting people. 
 
 I believe that Cuba will always be free and independent. 
 I hope that the United States will always stand by its promise. 
 In this belief I shall live and in this hope I shall die.
 
 THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF HABANA. CONCERNING INTER- 
 NATIONAL ORGANIZATION, adopted by the American 
 Institute of International Law at its Second Session in 
 the City of Habana, January 23, 1917. 
 
 WHEREAS tlie independent existence of civilized nations 
 and their solidarity of interests under the conditions of modem 
 life has resulted in a society of nations; and 
 
 WHEREAS tlie safety of nations and the welfare of their 
 peoples depend upon the application to them of principles of 
 law and equity in their mutual relations as members of civ- 
 ilized society; and 
 
 WHEREAS the law of nations can best be formulated and 
 stated by the nations assembled for this purpose in interna- 
 tional conferences; and 
 
 WHEREAS it is in the interest of the society of nations that 
 international agreements be made effective by ratification and 
 observance on all occasions, and that some agency of the so- 
 ciety of nations be constituted to act for it during the intervals 
 between such conferences; and 
 
 WHEREAS the principles of law and equity can best be as- 
 certained and applied to the disputes between and among the 
 nations by a court of justice accessible to all in the midst of 
 the independent Powers forming the society of civilized na- 
 tions; 
 
 THEREFORE the American Institute of International Law, 
 at its second session, held in the City of Habana, in the Re- 
 public of Cuba, on the 23d day of January, 1917, adopts the 
 following recommendations, to be known as its Recommenda- 
 tions of Habana.
 
 54 
 
 /. The call of a Third Hague Conference to which every 
 country belonging to the society of nations shall be invited 
 and in whose proceedings every such country shall participate. 
 
 II. A stated meeting of the Hague Peace Conference which, 
 thus meeting at regular, stated periods, will become a recom- 
 mending if not a law-making body. 
 
 III. An agreement of the States forming the society of na- 
 tions concerning the call and procedure of the Conference, by 
 which that institution shall become not only internationalized, 
 but in which no nation shall take as of right a preponderating 
 
 part. 
 
 IV. The appointment of a committee, to meet at regular in- 
 tervals between the Conferences, charged with the duty of 
 procuring the ratification of the Conventions and Declara- 
 tions and of calling attention to the Conventions and Declara- 
 tions in order to insure their observance. 
 
 V. An understanding upon certain fundamental principles 
 of international law, as set forth in the Declaration of the 
 Rights and Duties of Nations adopted by the American Insti- 
 tute of International Law on January 6, 1916, which are them- 
 selves based upon decisions of English courts and of the 
 Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
 VI. The creation of an international council of conciliation 
 to consider, to discuss, and to report upon such questions of a 
 non-justiciable character as may be submitted to such council 
 by an agreement of the Powers for this purpose. 
 
 VII. The employment of good offices, mediation, and 
 friendly composition for the settlement of disputes of a non- 
 justiciable nature. 
 
 VIII. The principle of arbitration in the settlement of dis- 
 putes of a non-justiciable nature; also of disputes of a justici- 
 able nature which should be decided by a court of justice, but 
 which have, through delay or mismanagement, assumed such
 
 55 
 
 political importance that the nations prefer to submit them to 
 arbiters of their own choice rather than to judges of a perma- 
 nent judicial tribunal. 
 
 IX. The negotiation of a convention creating a judicial 
 union of the nations along the lines -Vf the Universal Postal 
 Union of 1906, to which all civilized nations and self-govern- 
 ing dominions are parties, pledging the good faith of the con- 
 tracting parties to submit their justiciable disputes — that is to 
 say, their differences involving law or equity — to a permanent 
 court of this union, whose decisions will bind not only the liti- 
 gating nations, but also all parties to its creation. 
 
 X. The creation of an enlightened public opinion in behalf 
 of peaceable settlement in general, and in particular in behalf 
 of the foregoing nine propositions, in order that, if agreed to, 
 they may be put into practice and become effective, in re- 
 sponse to the appeal to that greatest of sanctions, "a decent 
 respect to the opinions of mankind."
 
 Commentary on the Recommendations of Habana Con- 
 cerning International Organization, Adopted January 
 23, 1917. 
 
 /. The call of a Third Hague Conference to which every 
 country belonging to the society of nations shall be invited 
 and in whose proceedings every such country shall participate. 
 
 If it be true that in a multitude of counselors there is safety 
 and, as we may hope, wisdom, it necessarily follows that the 
 larger the number of the nations met in conference the greater 
 the safety and the greater the wisdom. Indeed, there are 
 those, whose opinions are entitled to respect, who see in the 
 meeting of the Hague Conferences a greater hope and a 
 greater promise than in the work of their hands. The Hague 
 Conference of 1899 was composed of the representatives of 
 twenty-six States; its successor of 1907 represented officially 
 no less than forty-four sovereign, free, and independent States, 
 which, taken together, well nigh make up the society of civ- 
 ilized nations. 
 
 In speaking of the value of the Hague Peace Conferences of 
 1899 and 1907, Secretary Root said that: 
 
 The most valuable result of the Conferences of 1899 
 was that it made the work of the Conference of 1907 pos- 
 sible. The achievements of the Conferences justify the 
 belief that the world has entered upon an orderly process 
 through which, step by step, in successive Conferences, 
 each taking the work of its predecessor as its point of de- 
 parture, there may be continual progress toward making 
 the practice of civilized nations conform to their peace- 
 ful professions. 
 
 And, still further developing the same thought, the same 
 great statesman said:
 
 57 
 
 The question about each international conference is not 
 merely what it has accomplished, but also what it has be- 
 gun, and what it has moved forward. Not only the con- 
 ventions signed and ratified, but the steps taken toward 
 conclusions which may not reach practical and effective 
 form for many years to come, are^of value. Some of the 
 resolutions adopted by the last conference do not seem to 
 amount to very much by themselves, but each one marks 
 on some line of progress the farUiest point to which the 
 world is yet willing to go. They are like cable ends 
 buoyed in mid-ocean, to be picked up hereafter by some 
 other steamer, spliced, and continued to shore. The 
 greater the reform proposed, the longer must be the 
 process required to bring many nations differing wddely 
 in their laws, customs, traditions, interests, prejudices, 
 into agreement. Each necessary step in the process is as 
 useful as the final act which crowns the work and is re- 
 ceived with public celebration. 
 
 //. A stated meeting of the Hague Peace Conference which, 
 thus meeting at regular, stated periods, will become a recom- 
 mending if not a law-making body. 
 
 Without a radical reorganization of the society of nations- 
 difficult, time-consuming, and perhaps impossible to bring 
 about, the Conventions and Declarations adopted by the Con- 
 ference are to be considered not as international statutes, but 
 as recommendations, which must be submitted to the nations 
 taking part in the Conference for their careful examination 
 and approval. By the ratification of each of these, and by the 
 deposit of the ratifications at The Hague in accordance with 
 the terms of the Conventions and Declarations recommended 
 by the Conference, they become at one and the same time na- 
 tional and international laws: national laws because they 
 have been ratified by the law-making body of each of the 
 countries, and international laws because, by the ratification 
 and the deposit of \he ratifications at The Hague, they have
 
 58 
 
 assumed the form and effect of treaties, that is to say statutes, 
 of the contracting parties. 
 
 On the method of procedure of such an international con- 
 ference. Secretary Root said in his instructions to the Dele- 
 gates of the United States to the Second Hague Peace Con- 
 ference : 
 
 In the discussions upon every question it is important 
 to remember that the object of the Conference is agree- 
 ment, and not compulsion. If such Conferences are to be 
 made occasions for trying to force nations into positions 
 which they consider against their interests, the Powers 
 can not be expected to send representatives to them. 
 It is important also that the agreements reached shall be 
 genuine and not reluctant. Otherwise they will inevitably 
 fail to receive approval when submitted for the ratifica- 
 tion of the Powers represented. Comparison of views 
 and frank and considerate explanation and discussion 
 may frequently resolve doubts, obviate difficulties, and 
 lead to real agreement upon matters which at the outset 
 have appeared insurmountable. It is not wise, however, 
 to carry this process to the point of irritation. After rea- 
 sonable discussion, if no agreement is reached, it is bet- 
 ter to lay the subject aside, or refer it to some future Con- 
 ference in the hope that intermediate consideration may 
 dispose of the objections. Upon some questions where 
 an agreement by only a part of the Powers represented 
 would in itself be useful, such an agreement may be made, 
 but it should always be with the most unreserved recog- 
 nition that the other Powers withhold their concurrence 
 with equal propriety and right. 
 
 You should keep always in mind the promotion of this 
 continuous process through which the progressive devel- 
 opment of international justice and peace may be carried 
 on; and you should regard the work of the Second Con- 
 ference, not merely with reference to the definite results to 
 be reached in that Conference, but also with reference to 
 the foundations which may be laid for further results in
 
 59 
 
 future Conferences. It may well be that among the most 
 valuable services rendered to civilization by tliis Second 
 Conference will be found the progress made in matters 
 upon which the delegates reach no definite agreement. 
 
 The irreducible minimum may well be the maximum of 
 achievement at any given time, and in all our meetings, and 
 in all our discussions, we should bear in mind the wise counsel 
 of an illustrious French statesman at the First and Second 
 Hague Peace Conferences that: 
 
 We are here to unite, not to be counted. 
 
 ///. An agreement of the States forming the society of na- 
 tions concerning the call and procedure of the Conference, by 
 which that institution shall become not only internationalized, 
 but in which no nation shall take as of right a preponderating 
 part. 
 
 The delegation of the United States to the Second Hague 
 Peace Conference was thus instructed by the great and wise 
 statesman, then Secretary of State: 
 
 "You will favor the adoption of a resolution by the Con- 
 ference providing for the holding of further Conferences 
 within fixed periods and arranging the machinery by 
 which such Conferences may be called and the terms of 
 the program may be arranged, without awaiting any new 
 and specific initiative on the part of the Powers or any 
 one of them. 
 
 Mr. Root then went on to say: 
 
 Encouragement for such a course is to be found in the 
 successful working of a similar arrangement for interna- 
 tional conferences of the American Republics. The Sec- 
 ond American Conference, held in Mexico in 1901-2, 
 adopted a resolution providing that a third conference 
 should meet within five years, and committed the time
 
 60 
 
 and place and the program and necessary details to the 
 Department of State and representatives of the American 
 States in Washington. Under this authority the Third 
 Conference was called and held in Rio de Janeiro in the 
 summer of 1906, and accomplished results of substantial 
 value. That Conference adopted the following resolution : 
 
 "The governing board of the International Bureau of 
 American Republics (composed of the same official rep- 
 resentatives in Washington) is authorized to designate 
 the place at which the Fourth International Conference 
 shall meet, which meeting shall be within the next five 
 years; to provide for the drafting of the program and 
 regulations and to take into consideration all other neces- 
 sary details; and to set another date in case the meeting 
 of the said Conference can not take place within the pre- 
 scribed limit of time." 
 
 There is no apparent reason to doubt that a similar ar- 
 rangement for successive general international confer- 
 ences of all the civilized Powers would prove as practi- 
 cable and as useful as in the case of the twenty-one Ameri- 
 can States. 
 
 The delegation of the United States complied with both the 
 letter and spirit of these instructions, brought the subject of 
 a stated international conference to the attention of the dele- 
 gates of the forty-four nations there assembled, and secured 
 the following recommendation, a first step toward the realiza- 
 tion of a larger purpose: 
 
 Finally, the Conference recommends to the Powers the 
 assembly of a Third Peace Conference, which might be 
 held within a period corresponding to that which has 
 elapsed since the preceding Conference, at a date to be 
 fixed by common agreement between the Powers, and it 
 calls their attention to the necessity of preparing the pro- 
 gram of this Third Conference a sufficient time in ad- 
 vance to ensure its deliberations being conducted with the 
 necessary authority and expedition.
 
 61 
 
 In order lo attain this object the Conference considers 
 that it would be very desirable that, some two years be- 
 fore the probable date of the meeting, a preparatory com- 
 mittee should be charged by the governments with the 
 task of collecting the various proposals to be submitted 
 to the Conference, of ascertaining what subjects are ripe 
 for embodiment in an international regulation, and of 
 preparing a program which the governments should de- 
 cide upon in sufficient time to enable it to be carefully 
 examined by the countries interested. This committee 
 should further be intrusted with the task of proposing a 
 system of organization and procedure for the Conference 
 itself. 
 
 IV. The appointment of a committee, to meet at regular in- 
 tervals between the Conferences, charged with the duty of 
 procuring the ratification of the Conventions and Declara- 
 tions and of calling attention to the Conventions and Declara- 
 tions in order to insure their observance. 
 
 In Mr. Root's instructions to the American delegation to the 
 Second Hague Peace Conference, the governing board of the 
 International Bureau of American Republics, now called the 
 Pan American Union, was suggested as a possible method of 
 organization for the nations meeting in conference at The 
 Hague. The American delegation did not lay before the Con- 
 ference the method of organization found satisfactory to the 
 American Republics and did not propose that it be adopted, 
 because, as the result of private discussion, it appeared un- 
 likely that the method would at that time meet with favor, 
 and indeed it seemed probable that its proposal would preju- 
 dice those representatives of governments against the periodic 
 meeting of conferences who thought they saw in cooperation 
 of this kind a step toward federation. 
 
 There is, however, a body already in existence at The Hague, 
 similar in all respects to the governing board of the Pan
 
 62 
 
 American Union at Washington, which can be used for like 
 purposes if the governments only become conscious of the 
 services which it could render if it were organized and in- 
 vested with certain powers. The body at Washington forming 
 the governing board is composed of the diplomatic representa- 
 tives of the American Republics accredited to the United 
 States; the body at The Hague is formed of the diplomatic 
 representatives of the Powers accredited to the Netherlands. 
 If they should be authorized by their respective governments 
 to meet, either in the Foreign Office or the Peace Palace at The 
 Hague at regular intervals between the conferences, to be de- 
 termined by themselves or their countries, they would, by 
 the mere fact of this association, form a governing board in 
 which all nations would of right be represented which cared 
 to maintain diplomatic agents at The Hague. By the mere 
 fact of this association they would also, even without express 
 authority, gradually and insensibly assume the duty of pro- 
 curing the ratification of the Conventions and Declarations of 
 the Conference and of calling the attention of the Powers rep- 
 resented at The Hague to the Conventions and Declarations, 
 and in case of need to their provisions, in order that they 
 might be observed. 
 
 The first step toward this consummation has already been 
 taken. Twenty-six nations at the First created and forty-four 
 nations confirmed at the Second Hague Peace Conference an 
 organization for administering the affairs of the so-called Per- 
 manent Court of Arbitration by availing themselves of the 
 diplomatic agents accredited to The Hague, as shown in the 
 following extract from the Convention for the Pacific Settle- 
 ment of International Disputes: 
 
 A Permanent Administrative Council, composed of the 
 diplomatic representatives of the signatory Powers ac- 
 credited to The Hague and of the Netherlands Minister
 
 63 
 
 for Foreign Affairs, who will act as president, shall be in- 
 stituted in this town as soon as possible after the ratifica- 
 tion of the present Act by at least nine Powers. 
 
 This Council will be charged with the establishment 
 and organization of the International Bureau [of the Per- 
 manent Court of Arbitration], which will be under its 
 direction and control. 
 
 It will notify to the Powers the constitution of the 
 Court, and will provide for its installation. 
 
 It will settle its rules of procedure and all other neces- 
 sary regulations. 
 
 It will decide all questions of administration which may 
 arise with regard to the operations of the Court. 
 
 It will have entire control over the appointment, sus- 
 pension, or dismissal of the officials and employes of the 
 Bureau. 
 
 It will fix the payments and salaries, and control the 
 general expenditure. 
 
 At meetings duly summoned the presence of five mem- 
 bers is sufficient to render valid the discussions of the 
 Council. The decisions are taken by a majority of votes. 
 
 The Council communicates to the signatory Powers 
 without delay the regulations adopted by it. It furnishes 
 them with an annual report on the labors of the Court, the 
 working of the administration, and the expenses. 
 
 What has been done for one may assuredly be done for 
 another purpose, and, without changing the body, the nations 
 merely need to enlarge its scope by having it perform the 
 same services for each of the general interests affecting "the 
 solidarity which unites the members of the society of civilized 
 nations." If a governing board may act at Washington with- 
 out affecting the sovereignty, freedom, and independence of 
 twenty-one States, a governing board can likewise act at The 
 Hague in the interest of and without affecting the sovereignty, 
 freedom, and independence of forty-four States. There is 
 only one thing needed — the desire so to do.
 
 64 
 
 In the belief that the Powers may prefer to proceed more 
 cautiously, the American Institute of International Law ven- 
 tures to suggest on this point that the Conference might, upon 
 its adjournment, appoint a committee charged \\dth the duty 
 of procuring the ratification of the Conventions and Declara- 
 tions, and of calling attention to the Conventions and Declara- 
 tions in order to secure their observance; and in the appoint- 
 ment of the committee the Conference might specify both the 
 nature and extent of the authority with which it would be 
 clothed. This would not be an attempt on the part of a Con- 
 ference to bind its successor; it would be a recommendation 
 of the Conference to the Powers represented in it, the binding 
 force and efifect of which would result solely from the accept- 
 ance and ratification of the agreement, as is the case wdth The 
 Hague Conventions or Declarations. 
 
 The appointment of such a committee for limited and spe- 
 cific purposes is highly desirable, if other and better methods 
 are not devised and preferred, and it is not without a prece- 
 dent in its behalf and favor. Under the 9th of the Articles 
 of Confederation of the United States the Congress appointed 
 "a committee of the States," composed of one delegate from 
 each of the thirteen States, to sit during the recess of the Con- 
 gress, then a diplomatic, not a parliamentary body, to look 
 after the interests of the States as a whole and to exercise 
 some, but not all, of the powers delegated to the Congress by 
 the States, which in the 2d of the Articles had declared 
 themselves to be sovereign, free, and independent. It is im- 
 portant to note that in the Articles of Confederation we are 
 dealing with sovereign States and to bear in mind that sov- 
 ereignty is not lessened by its mere exercise, because after 
 as before the Articles the States were sovereign. What thir- 
 teen sovereign, free, and independent States have done, forty- 
 four sovereign, free, and independent States may do. if they
 
 65 
 
 only can be made to feci and to sec the consequences of tliis 
 simple step in international development and supervision. 
 
 In further justification of this modest recommendation, the 
 pacific settlement convention of the Hague Conferences may 
 be cited which contains the germ of ''the recommendation. 
 Article 27 of the Convention of 1899 and Article 48 of the re- 
 vised Convention of 1907 deal with this matter. Thus Article 
 27 reads : 
 
 The signatory Powers consider it their duty, if a serious 
 dispute threatens to break out between two or more of 
 them, to remind these latter that the Permanent Court is 
 open to them. 
 
 It will be observed that a duty is here either created or rec- 
 ognized, and either view is sufficient for present purposes. 
 
 Consequently, they declare that the fact of reminding 
 the conflicting parties of the provisions of the present 
 Convention, and the advice given to them, in the highest 
 interests of peace, to have recourse to the Permanent 
 Court, can only be regarded as friendly actions. 
 
 The objection to this article is that it leaves the Powers 
 free to take or not to take action, although it is stated to be 
 a duty to do so. It can not be too often said that everj'body's 
 business is nobody's concern, and to give effect to the pro- 
 vision some person or body should be appointed whose duty 
 it is to comply with the recommendation of the article. Tliis 
 defect was obvious to the delegates of the Second Conference, 
 who apparently sought to remedy it by tlie following addition 
 to the text of Article 27, which as amended became Article 48 
 of the revised Convention : 
 
 In case of dispute between two Powers, one of them can 
 always address to the International Bureau a note con-
 
 66 
 
 taining a declaration that it would be ready to submit the 
 dispute to arbitration. 
 
 The Bureau must at once inform the other Power of the 
 declaration. 
 
 The amendment is limited to the parties in dispute. The 
 signatory Powers appear to be overlooked, and yet the duty 
 was created or recognized by the article as the duty of the 
 signatory or contracting Powers to remind the disputants that 
 the Permanent Court is open to them, and the amendment 
 merely permits the Powers in dispute to avail themselves 
 of the International Bureau to transmit a proposal of arbitra- 
 tion. Something more is needed and yet the amendment 
 serves as a precedent. The article itself refers to the pro- 
 visions of the convention, and expressly states that reminding 
 the parties in dispute of the provisions of the convention is 
 not to be regarded as an unfriendly act. Following the prece- 
 dent created by the amendment and enlarging its scope, it 
 would seem to be a proper and friendly act on the part of the 
 signatory or contracting Powers to call the attention of the 
 Powers generally, not merely those in dispute, to all the pro- 
 visions of the convention and indeed to the terms of all the 
 Conventions and Declarations of the Hague Conferences, and 
 to invest somebody with the duty of acting in behalf of the sig- 
 natory or contracting Powers in the performance of what is 
 considered to be a duty. It is a detail, although a very impor- 
 tant one, whether the diplomats accredited to The Hague, a 
 special committee thereof, or a committee appointed by the 
 Conference itself, or the International Bureau, should be used 
 for this purpose. The acceptance of the principle carries with 
 it the creation of apt agencies, and the wisdom of the nations 
 may be trusted to devise the means if they agree upon the 
 need. 
 It may well be that the preparatory committee mentioned
 
 67 
 
 by the recommendation for a Third Conference, "charged by 
 the governments with the task of collecting the various pro- 
 posals to be submitted to the Conference, of ascertaining what 
 subjects are ripe for embodiment in an international regula- 
 tion," will develop into a standing committee entrusted with 
 international interests between the various Conferences. Es- 
 pecially would this be so if the committee were appointed by 
 the Conference, instead of being selected by agreement of the 
 Powers some time before the calling of the future Conference. 
 It would not be an executive; it would not be a government; it 
 would, however, as a committee, represent international inter- 
 ests during the periods between the Conferences. 
 
 V. An understanding upon certain fundamental principles 
 of international law, as set forth in the Declaration of the 
 Rights and Duties of Nations adopted by the American Insti- 
 tute of International Law on January 6, 1916, which are them- 
 selves based upon decisions of English courts and of the 
 Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
 1. Every nation has the right to exist and to protect and 
 to conserve its existence; but this right neither implies 
 the right nor justifies the act of the State to protect itself 
 or to conserve its existence by the commission of unlawful 
 acts against innocent and unoffending States. (Chinese 
 Exclusion Case, 130 U. S., 581, 606; Regina vs. Dudley, 15 
 Cox's Criminal Cases, p. 624, 14 Queen's Bench Division, 
 273.) 
 
 2. Every nation has the right to independence in the 
 sense that, it has a right to the pursuit of happiness and is 
 free to develop itself without interference or control from 
 other States, provided that in so doing it does not inter- 
 fere with or violate the rights of other States. 
 
 3. Every nation is in law and before law the equal of 
 everj^ other nation belonging to the society of nations, and 
 all nations have the right to claim and, according to the
 
 68 
 
 Declaration of Independence of the United States, "to as- 
 sume, among the Powers of the earth, the separate and 
 equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's 
 God entitie them." (Le Louis, 2 Dodson, 210, 243-4; The 
 Antelope, 10 Wheaton, 66, 122.) 
 
 4. Every nation has the right to territory within de- 
 fined boundaries and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction 
 over its territory, and all persons, whether native or for- 
 eign, found therein. {The Exchange, 7 Cranch, 116, 
 136-7.) 
 
 5. Every nation entitled to a right by the law of na- 
 tions is entitled to have that right respected and protected 
 by all other nations, for right and duty are correlative, 
 and the right of one is the duty of all to observe. (United 
 States vs. Arjona, 120 U. S., 479, 487.) 
 
 6. International law is at one and the same time both 
 national and international : national in the sense that it is 
 the law of the land and applicable as such to the decision 
 of all questions involving its principles; international in 
 the sense that it is the law of the society of nations, and 
 applicable as such to all questions between and among 
 the members of the society of nations involving its prin- 
 ciples. (Barbuit's case. Cases tempore Talbot, p. 281; 
 Triquet vs. Bath, 3 Burrow, 1478; Heathfield vs. Chilton, 
 4 Burrow, 2015; The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S., 677, 700.) 
 
 VI. The creation of a permanent international council of 
 conciliation to consider, to discuss, and to report upon such 
 questions of a non-justiciable character as may be submitted 
 to such council by an agreement of the Powers for this pur- 
 pose. 
 
 The prototype of this council is the International Commis- 
 sion of Inquiry proposed by the First Hague Conference, and 
 contained in its Convention for the Pacific Settlement of In- 
 ternational Disputes. Its form may well be that adopted by 
 Mr. Bryan in the various treaties for the advancement of 
 peace which, as Secretary of State, he concluded on behalf of
 
 69 
 
 the United States with some thirty foreign nations. In these it 
 is provided that all disputes which diplomacy has failed to 
 settle, or which have not been adjusted by existing treaties of 
 arbitration, shall be laid before a pennanent commission of 
 some five members, which shall have'lai year within which to 
 report its conclusions and during which time the contracting 
 parties agree not to resort to arms. 
 
 The Powers might agree to establish an international com- 
 mission as it is proposed to establish an international court, to 
 be composed of a limited number of members appointed for a 
 period of years, to which perhaps a representative of each of 
 the countries in controversy might be added, in order that the 
 views of the respective governments should be made known 
 and be carefully considered by those members of the com- 
 mission strangers to the dispute. In this case there would be 
 a permanent nucleus, and the Powers at odds would not be 
 obliged to agree upon the members of the commission, but 
 only to appoint, each for itself, a national member. In this 
 way the dispute could be submitted to the commission before 
 it had become acute and had embittered the relations of the 
 countries in question. 
 
 If an international commission of the kind specified should 
 be considered too great a step to be taken at once, the coun- 
 tries might conclude agreements modeled upon those of Mr. 
 Bryan, and as the result of experience take such action in the 
 future as should seem possible and expedient. 
 
 The conclusions of the commission are in the nature of a 
 recommendation to the Powers in controversy, which they are 
 free either to accept or to reject. They are not in themselves 
 an adjustment as in the case of diplomacy, an award as in the 
 case of arbitration, or a judgment as in the case of a court 
 of justice. It is the hope of the partisans of this institution 
 that its conclusions will nevertheless form the basis of settle-
 
 70 
 
 ment and that, under the pressure of enlightened public 
 opinion, the Powers may be minded to settle their differences 
 more or less in accord with the recommendations of the com- 
 mission. 
 
 VII. The employment of good offices, mediation, and 
 friendly composition for the settlement of disputes of a non- 
 justiciable nature. 
 
 Good offices and mediation were raised to the dignity of an 
 international institution by the First Hague Peace Conference, 
 and in its Peaceful Settlement Convention the signatory or 
 contracting Powers agreed to have "recourse, as far as cir- 
 cumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation of one or 
 more friendly Powers," and it is specifically stated in the Con- 
 vention, in order to remove doubt or uncertainty, that the offer 
 of good offices or of mediation is not to be considered as an 
 unfriendly act — and the Powers might also have added that 
 it is not an act of intervention, which nations resent. 
 
 The offer of good offices is a word of advice, it is not an 
 award or a decision. Mediation goes a step further, as the na- 
 tion proposing it offers to cooperate with the parties in effect- 
 ing a settlement. The agreement to ask and to offer good 
 offices and mediation is qualified by the expression "as far as 
 circumstances will allow." It is therefore highly desirable 
 that frequent resort be made to good offices and mediation, 
 in order that the nations may learn from experience that cir- 
 cumstances allow the offer and the acceptance of good offices 
 and mediation without danger to either and with satisfaction 
 to both. 
 
 Friendly composition is more than good offices or media- 
 tion, and may be less than arbitration. It is not limited to ad- 
 vice, and it is not restricted to cooperation ; it is the settlement 
 of a difference not necessarily upon the basis of law, but
 
 71 
 
 rather according to the judgment oi a high-minded and con- 
 scientious person possessing in advance the confidence of both 
 parties to the dispute and deserving it by his adjustment of the 
 dispute. 
 
 It may be a settlement in the nature of a compromise; 
 it may be an adjustment according to the principles of fair 
 dealing; it may be a bargain according to the principles of 
 give and take. This remedy has been found useful in the past, 
 and it can be of service in the future, where it is more to the 
 advantage of nations to have a dispute adjusted than to have 
 it determined in any particular way. 
 
 VIII. The principle of arbitration in the settlement of dis~ 
 putes of a non-justiciable nature; also of disputes of a justici- 
 able nature which should be decided by a court of justice, but 
 which have, through delay or mismanagement, assumed such 
 political importance that the nations prefer to submit them to 
 arbiters of their own choice rather than to judges of a perma- 
 nent judicial tribunal. 
 
 The arbiter is not, as is the friendly composer, a free agent 
 in the sense that he may render an award in accordance with 
 his individual sense of right or wrong, for, as the First Hague 
 Peace Conference said in its Pacific Settlement Convention, 
 "international arbitration has for its object the settlement of 
 differences between States by judges of their own choice, and 
 on the basis of respect for law." Even if law is not absolutely 
 binding it can not be arbitrarily rejected; it must be respected, 
 and the sentence, if it be not just in the sense that it is based 
 upon law, it must be equitable in the sense that it is based 
 upon the spirit of the law as distinct from the letter. 
 
 Hundreds of disputes have been settled since the Jay Treaty 
 of 1794 between Great Britain and the United States, which 
 brought again this method into repute and into the practice of 
 nations. As a result of this large experience, extending over
 
 72 
 
 a century, nations find it difficult to refuse arbitration when 
 it has been proposed. But if it is a sure, it is a slow-footed, 
 remedy, as in the absence of a treaty of arbitration one must 
 be concluded, and, in the practice of the United States, there 
 must be a special agreement submitted to and advised and 
 consented to by the Senate, stating the exact nature and scope 
 of the arbitration. The arbiters forming the temporary tribu- 
 nal must likewise be chosen by the parties, and unfortunately 
 at a time when they are least inclined to do so. It is a great 
 and a beneficent remedy, but the difficulty of setting it in mo- 
 tion and the doubt that the award may be controlled by law 
 suggest the creation of a permanent tribunal which does not 
 need to be composed for the settlement of the case and in 
 which law shall, as in a court of justice, control the decision. 
 
 There are many cases turning on a point of law and which 
 could be got out of the way, to the great benefit of the cause of 
 international peace, if they were submitted, when and as they 
 arose, to a judicial tribunal. Unfortunately, such a tribunal 
 has not existed in times past, and many a dispute, by delay or 
 mismanagement, has assumed a political importance which 
 it did not possess at the beginning. Nations may have taken 
 a position upon it, and in consequence be unwilling to change 
 their attitude. Again, there are matters, largely if not wholly 
 political, or in which the political element dominates, which 
 nations w^ould prefer to submit to a limited commission or 
 tribunal composed of persons in whose ability and character 
 they have confidence and whose training seems to fit them for 
 the disposition of the controversy in hand. 
 
 The reasons for a resort to arbitration, even although an In- 
 ternational Court of Justice be established and ready to re- 
 ceive and to decide the case, have never been better stated 
 than by Mr. Leon Bourgeois in the following passage taken 
 from an address advocating the retention of the so-called Per-
 
 73 
 
 manent Court of Arbitration and of creating alongside of it a 
 permanent court composed of professional judges, which was 
 proposed at the Second Hague Conference of 1907 and adopted 
 in principle: 
 
 If there are not at present judges at The Hague, it is be- 
 cause the Conference of 1899, taking into consideration 
 the whole field open to arbitration, intended to leave to 
 the parties the duty of choosing their judges, which choice 
 is essential in all cases of peculiar gravity. We should 
 not like to see the court created in 1899 lose its essentially 
 arbitral character, and we intend to preserve this freedom 
 in the choice of judges in all cases where no other rule is 
 provided. 
 
 In controversies of a political nature especially, we 
 think that this will always be the real rule of arbitration, 
 and that no nation, large or small, will consent to go be- 
 fore a court of arbitration unless it takes an active part 
 in the appointment of the members composing it. 
 
 But is the case the same in questions of a purely legal 
 nature? Can the same uneasiness and distrust appear 
 here? . . . And does not every one realize that a real 
 court composed of real jurists may be considered as the 
 most competent organ for deciding controversies of this 
 character and for rendering decisions on pure questions 
 of law? 
 
 In our opinion, therefore, either the old system of 1899 
 or the new system of a truly permanent court may be per- 
 ferred, according to the nature of the case. At all events 
 there is no intention whatever of making the new system 
 compulsory. The choice between the tribunal of 1899 and 
 the court of 1907 will be optional, and the experience will 
 show the advantages or disadvantages of the two systems. 
 
 IX. The negotiation of a convention creating a judicial 
 union of the nations along the lines of the Universal Postal 
 Union of 1906, to which all civilized nations and self-govern- 
 ing dominions are parties, pledging the good faith of the con-
 
 74 
 
 trading parties to submit their justiciable disputes — that is to 
 say, their differences involving law or equity — to a permanent 
 court of this union, whose decisions will bind not only the 
 litigating nations, but also all parties to its creation. 
 
 In the Universal Postal Union, which has been mentioned as 
 the prototype of a judicial union, all the civilized nations of 
 the world and self-governing dominions have bound them- 
 selves to submit to arbitration their disputes concerning the 
 interpretation of the Convention as well as their disputes 
 arising under it, by a commission of three arbiters, of whom 
 one is to be appointed by each of the disputants and the third 
 in case of need by the arbiters themselves. What the nations 
 have agreed to do after they can do before the outbreak of a 
 dispute, for the appointment in this case is a matter of time, 
 not of principle. 
 
 The American Institute of International Law calls especial 
 attention to the fact that sovereignty is not necessarily in- 
 volved in the formation of a judicial union, in the appoint- 
 ment of the judges, or in the operation of the judicial tribunal, 
 because in the Universal Postal Union self-governing do- 
 minions are parties, which could not be the case if sovereignty 
 were requisite, as they are not sovereign. 
 
 Should they create a judicial union, and at the time of its 
 formation install a permanent tribunal composed of a limited 
 number of judges, the Society of Nations would find itself pos- 
 sessed of a court of justice composed in advance of the dis- 
 putes, readj' to assume jurisdiction of them whenever they 
 should arise, without the necessity of creating the court, ap- 
 pointing its members, agreeing upon the question to be liti- 
 gated, and in many, if not in most, instances upon the proce- 
 dure to be followed. 
 
 The prototype of this international court of justice and its 
 procedure is the Supreme Court of the United States and its 
 procedure, which may be thus briefly outlined :
 
 75 
 
 1. The Supreme Court determines for itself the question of 
 jurisdiction, receiving the case if it finds that States are par- 
 ties and if, as presented, it involves questions of law or of 
 equity. (Rhode Island vs. Massachusetts, 12 Peters, 657, de- 
 cided by Mr. Justice Baldwin.) -" 
 
 2. If States are parties to the suit, and if it is justiciable, that 
 is, if it involves law or equity, the plaintiff State is, upon its 
 request, entitled to have a subpoena against the defendant 
 State issued by the Supreme Court. (New Jersey vs. New 
 York, 3 Peters, 461, decided by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall; 
 New Jersey vs. New York, 5 Peters, 284, decided by Mr. Chief 
 Justice Marshall.) 
 
 3. The plaintiff State has the right to proceed ex parte if the 
 defendant State does not appear and litigate the case. (New 
 Jersey vs. New York, 5 Peters, 284, decided by Mr. Chief Jus- 
 tice Marshall; Massachusetts vs. Rhode Island, 12 Peters, 755, 
 decided by Mr. Justice Thompson.) 
 
 4. The plaintiff State has the right, in the absence of the de- 
 fendant duly summoned and against which a subpoena has 
 been issued, to proceed to judgment against the defendant 
 State in a suit which the Supreme Court has held to be be- 
 tween States and to be of a justiciable nature. (New Jersey 
 vs. New York, 5 Peters, 284, decided by Mr. Chief Justice Mar- 
 shall.) 
 
 5. In the exercise of its jurisdiction the Supreme Court does 
 not compel the presence of the defendant State (Massachu- 
 setts vs. Rhode Island, 12 Peters, 755, decided by Mr. Justice 
 Thompson), nor does it execute by force its judgment against 
 a defendant State (Kentucky vs. Dennison, 24 Howard, 66, de- 
 cided by Mr. Chief Justice Taney). 
 
 The reasonableness of the judgment and the advantage of 
 judicial settlement have thus created a public opinion as the 
 sanction of the Supreme Court in suits between States.
 
 76 
 
 6. In the exercise of its jurisdiction the Supreme Court has 
 moulded a system based upon equity procedure between indi- 
 viduals in such a way as to simplify it, giving to the defendant 
 State opportunity to present its defense as well as to the plain- 
 tiff State to present its case without delaying or blocking the 
 course of justice by technical objections. (Rhode Island vs. 
 Massachusetts, 14 Peters, 210, decided by Mr. Chief Justice 
 
 Taney.) 
 
 As in the case of the Supreme Court, which has been sug- 
 gested as the prototype of an international tribunal, there 
 would be no need of a treaty of arbitration or of a special 
 agreement in addition to the Convention creating the court 
 and authorizing it to receive and decide justiciable disputes 
 submitted by the contracting parties. The plaintiff State could 
 set the court in motion upon its own initiative, without calling 
 to its aid the members of the Union, just as each member of 
 the American Union can file its bill in the Supreme Court 
 without the aid, and indeed without the knowledge, of the 
 other States of the American judicial union. 
 
 The employment of physical force either to hale a nation 
 into court or to execute against it the judgment of the inter- 
 national tribunal has not been mentioned. The sheriff did not 
 antedate the judge, nor did he come into being at the same 
 time. He is a later creation, if not an afterthought. He is 
 necessary in disputes between individuals; he is not neces- 
 sary — at least, he is not a part of the machinery of the Su- 
 preme Court in the trial of disputes between States of the 
 American judicial union and in the execution of its judg- 
 ments against States. It may be that an international sheriff 
 may prove to be necessary, but nations shy at physical force, 
 especially if they understand that it is to be used against them. 
 The presence of the sheriff armed with force, that is to say, 
 of an international police, would make an agreement upon an 
 international court more difficult, and if an international
 
 77 
 
 sheriff should prove to be unnecessary his requirement as a 
 prerequisite to the court would delay the constitution of this 
 much-needed institution. 
 
 If the sheriff is needed, or if some form of compulsion is 
 found advisable in order to procure tKe' presence of the de- 
 fendant State before the international tribunal, and to execute 
 the judgment thereof when rendered, it is the part of wisdom 
 to allow the experience of nations to determine when and 
 how the force shall be created and under what circumstances 
 and conditions it is to be applied. We should not unduly com- 
 plicate a problem already sufficiently complex by insisting 
 that the international court shall be, in its beginning, more 
 perfect than is the Supreme Court of the United States after 
 a century and more of successful operation. 
 
 X. The creation of an enlightened public opinion in behalf 
 of peaceable settlement in general, and in particular in behalf 
 of the foregoing nine propositions, in order that, if agreed to, 
 they may be put into practice and become effective, in response 
 to the appeal to that greatest of sanctions, "a decent respect to 
 the opinions of mankind." 
 
 If for physical force we would substitute justice, we must 
 create a public opinion in favor of justice, as we must create 
 a public opinion in behalf of any and every reform which we 
 hope to see triumph. The more difficult the problem, the 
 greater the need that we set about it, and the sooner we begin 
 the better it will be for the cause which we champion. There 
 are many who advocate short-cuts to international justice, 
 and therefore to international peace, just as there are many 
 who advocate short-cuts to knowledge; but the pithy reply of 
 Euclid to his royal but backward pupil is as true today as it 
 w^as when uttered centuries ago, that there is no royal road 
 to learning. To change the standard of conduct, and as a pre- 
 liminary to this to change the standard of thought, is indeed a
 
 78 
 
 difficult task; but if mankind is to prefer the test of justice to 
 the test of force, we must educate mankind to a belief in jus- 
 tice. If we succeed, justice will prevail between nations as 
 between men; if we fail, justice may partially prevail between 
 men, as it largely does today, but not between and among the 
 nations. The problem before us is therefore one of education 
 from a false to a true and an ennobling standard. If public 
 opinion can be educated in one countrj', it can be educated in 
 other countries, and we can confidently look forward to a 
 public opinion in all countries — universal, international, and 
 as insistent as it is universal and international. A mere statute, 
 we know by a sad experience, will not make men virtuous, 
 and a mere treaty — for a treaty is an international statute — 
 will not make the nations virtuous. We have failed in the 
 one, and we are doomed to failure in the other attempt, for 
 nations, composed of these very men and women, are not to 
 be reformed by statute any more than the men and women 
 composing them. Without public opinion the statute — na- 
 tional or international — is a dead letter; with public opinion 
 the statute — national or international — is a living force. With 
 public opinion all things are possible; without public opinion 
 we may hope to do nothing. Were Archimedes living today, 
 and if he were speaking of things international, he would 
 declare public opinion the lever that moves the world. 
 
 In speaking of public opinion, Mr. Root has recently and im- 
 pressively said: 
 
 There is but one power on earth that can preserve the 
 law for the protection of the poor, the weak, and the hum- 
 ble; there is but one power on earth that can preserve the 
 law for the maintenance of civilization and humanity, 
 and that is the power, the mighty power, of the public 
 opinion of mankind. 
 
 Without it your leagues to enforce peace, your societies 
 for a world's court, your peace conventions, your peace
 
 79 
 
 endowments are all powerless, because no force moves 
 in this world until it ultimately has a public opinion be- 
 hind it. 
 
 The thing that men fear more than they do the sherifif 
 or the policeman or the State's prisqais the condemnation 
 of the community in which they live. 
 
 The thing that among nations is the most potent force 
 is the universal condemnation of mankind. And even 
 during this terrible struggle we have seen the nations ap- 
 pealing from day to day, appealing by speech and by pen 
 and by press, for the favorable judgment of mankind, the 
 public opinion of the world. That establishes standards 
 of conduct. 
 
 May we not, on the eve of an International Conference, 
 say with Washington on the eve of the International Con- 
 ference of 1787: "Let us raise a standard to which the wise 
 and the honest can repair. The event is in the hands of God." 
 
 James Brown Scott.
 
 Appendix 
 
 CONSTITUTION OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 Article I. Name 
 
 An association is founded to be known as the American 
 Institute of International Law. 
 
 Article II. Object 
 
 The American Institute of International Law is an unoffi- 
 cial scientific association. 
 It proposes: 
 
 1. To give precision to the general principles of interna- 
 tional law as they now exist, or to formulate new ones, in 
 conformity with the solidarity which unites the members of 
 the society of civilized nations, in order to strengthen these 
 bonds and, especially, the bonds between the American peo- 
 ples; 
 
 2. To study questions of international law, particularly 
 questions of an American character, and to endeavor to solve 
 them, either in conformity with generally accepted principles, 
 or by extending and developing them, or by creating new 
 principles adapted to the special needs of the American Con- 
 tinent; 
 
 3. To discover a method of codifying the general or special 
 principles of international law, and to elaborate projects of 
 codification on matters which lend themselves thereto; 
 
 4. To aid in bringing about the triumph of the principles 
 of justice and of humanity which should govern the relations 
 between peoples, considered as nations, through more exten-
 
 81 
 
 sive instruction in international law, particularly in American 
 universities, through lectures and addresses, as well aa 
 through publications and all other means; 
 
 5. To organize the study of international law along truly 
 scientific and practical lines in a way tliat meets the needs of 
 modern life, and taking into account the problems of our 
 hemisphere and American doctrines; 
 
 6. To contribute, within the limits of its competence and 
 the means at its disposal, toward the maintenance of peace, 
 or toward the observance of the laws of war and the mitiga- 
 tion of the evils thereof; 
 
 7. To increase the sentiment of fraternity among the Re- 
 publics of the American Continent, so as to strengthen friend- 
 ship and mutual confidence among the citizens of the coun- 
 tries of the New World. 
 
 Article III. Membership 
 
 The American Institute of International Law is composed 
 of committees or delegates of the national societies of inter- 
 national law established in the different American Republics, 
 which are affiliated therewith and of which it is the permanent 
 representative. 
 
 It comprises: 
 
 1. Charter members; 
 
 2. Titular members; 
 
 3. Ex officio members; 
 
 4. Corresponding members. 
 
 The charter members are those who accepted this designa- 
 tion by signing, in 1912, the draft which has now become the 
 present Constitution. 
 
 The titular members, chosen exclusively from among the 
 publicists of the different Republics of the American Conti-
 
 82 
 
 nent, are elected by the Institute, in conformity with the next 
 article. No Republic may have more than five such members 
 at one and the same time. 
 
 If the secretary general of the national society of inter- 
 national law in any one of the American Republics is not 
 personally a member of the Institute, he becomes of right a 
 member ex officio, that is to say, by virtue of and for the 
 term of his office. Ex officio members have, as such, the same 
 rights as titular members. 
 
 Jurists of non-American nationality, who, through their 
 writings or their activity, shall have contributed to the prog- 
 ress of international law, may be elected corresponding 
 members. 
 
 Corresponding members are invited to attend all the ses- 
 sions of the Institute, with the same rights and privileges as 
 American members. They have not, however, the right to 
 vote either on administrative or scientific questions. 
 
 They are called upon to give their opinion on questions 
 submitted to the consideration of the Institute, and they are 
 active collaborators thereof. 
 
 They are exempt from the entrance fee and annual dues. 
 
 No one State can have more than three such members. 
 
 Article IV. National Societies 
 
 The national societies organized in each American Republic 
 for the study and popularization of international law, whose 
 members are jurists versed in international law, may affiliate 
 with the American Institute. The members of these societies 
 are entitled to attend the sessions of the Institute, but they 
 may not take part in its deliberations nor may they vote. 
 
 The affiliated national societies propose duly qualified per- 
 sons from among their nationals, for election as titular mem- 
 bers by the Institute.
 
 83 
 
 The members of the national societies, who are members of 
 the Institute, constitute, in their country, a governing com- 
 mittee of the said society, which committee is the intellectual 
 bond between the national society and the Institute. 
 
 The committee communicates, either directly, or through 
 the secretary general of the national society, with the secre- 
 tary general of the Institute, and sends him all the trans- 
 actions and projects of the said society or informs him of the 
 progress that has been made upon them. 
 
 The secretary general of the Institute transmits these trans- 
 actions and projects in full, in part, or a synopsis thereof to 
 the different national societies. 
 
 Article V. Officers 
 
 The officers of the Institute are an honorary president, a 
 president, a secretary general, and a treasurer. 
 
 Before the close of each session there is an election of an 
 honorary president and a president, who remain in office until 
 the election of their successors at the following session. 
 
 The application of the foregoing second paragraph is pro- 
 visionally suspended until the Institute shall have decided 
 otherwise. 
 
 In the elections individual ballots are cast, and only the 
 members present are permitted to vote. Nevertheless, absent 
 members are allowed to send their votes in writing, in sealed 
 envelopes. Candidates must receive a majority of the votes 
 of the members present, as well as a majority of all the votes 
 validly cast, in order to be elected. 
 
 Article VI. Executive Council 
 
 An Executive Council is the governing body of the Institute. 
 It meets at Washington, the seat of the Institute.
 
 84 
 
 It is composed of the president, the secretary general, and 
 the treasurer, who are members ex officio, and of two other 
 members elected at the beginning of each session. They are 
 eligible for re-election. 
 
 It has the right to increase its membership and itself elects 
 additional members, if it deems it necessary. 
 
 Article VII. Secretary General 
 
 The secretary general is elected by the Institute for three 
 sessions. He is eligible for re-election. 
 
 He has in his charge the drafting of the minutes of each 
 meeting, all the publications of the Institute, its routine work, 
 its correspondence, and the execution of its decisions, unless 
 the Institute provides otherwise. He is keeper of its seal and 
 of its archives. At the beginning of each session he presents 
 a summary of the work of the preceding session. 
 
 Article VIII. Assistant Secretaries 
 
 On the proposal of the secretary general, the Institute may 
 appoint one or more assistant secretaries, to aid him in the 
 performance of his duties or to represent him in his absence. 
 
 Article IX. Treasurer 
 
 The treasurer is elected for three sessions. He is eligible 
 for re-election. 
 
 He has in his charge the financial affairs of the Institute, 
 under the control of the Executive Council. He presents a 
 detailed report at each session. 
 
 Two members are designated at the first meeting as audi- 
 tors, and present, during the session, a report on the result of 
 their examination of the treasurer's accounts.
 
 85 
 
 Articld X. Reporters 
 
 The Executive Council submits questions for examination 
 and study to tlie affiliated national societies, or appoints re- 
 porters from among its members, or organizes committees for 
 the preparatorj' study of questions that are to be submitted to 
 the deliberations of the Institute. 
 
 In urgent cases, the secretary general himself prepares the 
 reports. 
 
 Article XI. Sessions 
 
 There shall be at least one session of the Institute every 
 two years; but the Executive Council may, during this inter- 
 val, call an extra session of the Institute. 
 
 At each session the Institute designates the place and the 
 time of the following session. It may leave this designation 
 to the Executive Council. 
 
 Article XII. Languages 
 
 French, the language of the Institut de droit international 
 and of the Peace Conferences, is likewise the language of the 
 Institute. 
 
 Nevertheless the use of Spanish, Portuguese, and English, 
 as national languages, is permitted as of right. 
 
 Every official document that is to be published is translated 
 into the language or languages selected by the officers. 
 
 Article XIII. Publication of Proceedings 
 
 After each session, the Institute publishes an account of its 
 proceedings. 
 
 Article XIV. Dues and Funds 
 
 The expenses of the Institute are covered: 
 
 1. By the dues of its members, as well as by an entrance fee.
 
 86 
 
 The dues are, unless the by-laws provide to the contrary, 
 an entrance fee of ten dollars and annual dues of five dollars. 
 The dues are payable from and including the year of election. 
 They entitle the member to all the publications of the Insti- 
 tute. An unjustifiable delay of more than three years in the 
 payment of dues may be considered as equivalent to a resig- 
 nation. 
 
 2. By foundations and other gifts. 
 
 It is proposed that a fund be gradually formed, the income 
 from which shall be devoted to the expenses of the sessions, 
 of the publications, of the secretariat, and of other routine 
 matters. 
 
 Article XV. Amendments 
 
 The present constitution may be revised or amended, in 
 whole or in part, at a regular session, on the request of a 
 majority of the members present and voting.
 
 BY-LAWS OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF 
 INTERNATIONAL JLAW 
 
 PART I 
 
 Members 
 
 Article I 
 
 The titular members of the Institute are elected by it from 
 the list of names presented by the affiliated national society. 
 
 Article II 
 
 Where no offiliated national society exists or where the 
 existing society neglects to present candidates, the Institute 
 provides for nominations or vacancies as it sees fit. 
 
 Article III 
 
 Corresponding members are elected by the Institute on the 
 proposal of the Executive Council, at the meeting devoted 
 to the election of titular members. 
 
 PART II 
 
 Preliminary Work between Sessions 
 
 Article IV 
 
 By article X of the Constitution the Executive Council 
 presents the questions for study, either by laying them before 
 the national societies, or by designating two reporters, or one 
 reporter and a committee of study for each question. 
 
 In the former case, the subject, with or without a question- 
 naire, is submitted to each national society.
 
 88 
 
 If two reporters are appointed, each of them prepares a 
 memorandum, after which one of them or a third reporter 
 designated by the Executive Council prepares a report on the 
 basis of and with the assistance of the memoranda presented. 
 
 If a reporter and a committee of study are designated, the 
 reporter must get into communication with the members of 
 the committee before the 31st of December of the year of his 
 appointment, and submit his ideas to them and learn their 
 views. 
 
 Every member, who signifies his desire to that effect, has 
 the right to be a member of such of the committees of study 
 as he shall indicate to the secretary general. 
 
 Article V 
 
 The national societies and the reporters must transmit their 
 studies or reports to the secretary general in ample time for 
 their publication and distribution before the session at which 
 they are to be discussed. 
 
 The secretary general does not provide for the printing or 
 distribution of other reports or documents prepared by the 
 reporters or by members of committees or of the Institute. 
 Such works are published only in exceptional cases and by 
 virtue of an express decision on the part of the Institute or 
 the Executive Council. 
 
 PART III 
 
 Sessions 
 
 Article VI 
 
 There may be no more than one session each year. The 
 interval between two sessions must not exceed two years. 
 
 At each session the Institute designates the place and time 
 of the next session. This designation may be left to the Execu-
 
 89 
 
 tive Council (Constitution, Article XI). In this case, the secre- 
 tary general informs the national societies affiliated with the 
 Institute, at least four months in advance, of the place and 
 date determined upon. 
 
 Article VII 
 
 The program of the session is drawn up by the Executive 
 Council, and the secretary general brings it to the attention 
 of the national societies as soon as possible. 
 
 The program must be accompanied by the summary of the 
 progress made on the preparatory work, as well as by all 
 other information that may facilitate the labors of the mem- 
 bers taking part in the session. 
 
 Article VIII 
 
 Members who desire to propose new questions for study 
 are invited to lay them before the Executive Council at the 
 beginning of the session. This invitation must be extended 
 by the president at the opening of the sessions. 
 
 Article IX 
 
 The president, after consultation with the Executive Coun- 
 cil and the reporters, determines the order in w^hich the sub- 
 jects should be treated; but the program is in all cases under 
 the control of the Assembly itself. 
 
 PART IV 
 
 Meetings 
 
 Article X 
 
 The meetings are devoted to scientific work. 
 
 The titular members and the corresponding members take
 
 90 
 
 part in them. The former have the right to vote; the latter 
 have the right merely to take part in the discussions. 
 
 The meetings are not public. The Executive Council may, 
 however, permit the attendance of the local authorities and 
 press, as well as of persons who request to be admitted. 
 
 Article XI 
 
 Unless otherwise resolved by a special decision of the Exec- 
 utive Council, the president delivers an address immediately 
 after the opening of the first meeting. 
 
 The secretary general presents a summary of the work of 
 the last session and makes known the names of the assistant 
 secretaries or editors whom he has appointed to aid him in 
 drawing up the minutes of the session. 
 
 The assistant secretaries or editors hold office only during 
 the session. 
 
 Article XII 
 
 The treasurer is then requested to present his accounts to 
 the Institute, and two auditors are thereupon elected to exam- 
 ine the accounts of the treasurer. The auditors present their 
 report in the course of the session (Constitution, Art. IX). 
 
 Article XIII 
 
 Each meeting is opened by the reading of the minutes of 
 the preceding meeting. 
 
 Separate minutes are dravni up for each meeting, even 
 when there are more than one on the same day; but the 
 minutes of the morning meeting are read only at the opening 
 of the next day's meeting. 
 
 The members present approve or revise the minutes. Re- 
 vision can be requested only in the matter of wording, of 
 errors, or of omissions. A decision can not be changed in the 
 minutes.
 
 91 
 
 The minutes of the last meeting of a session are approved 
 by the president. 
 
 Article XIV 
 
 If the Executive Council deems it advisable to consider a 
 matter as urgent, it may propose the immediate discussion 
 thereof, and, if the majority of the members present agree, 
 the matter may be put to vote in the course of this session; 
 otherwise the proposition is of right postponed until the fol- 
 lowing session. 
 
 Article XV 
 
 Committees may be appointed during a meeting for the 
 examination of certain questions. These committees may, in 
 turn, appoint sub-committees. 
 
 Article XVI 
 
 The propositions of the reporters and of the committees 
 form the basis of the deliberations in the meetings. 
 
 The members of committees have the right to complete and 
 develop their individual opinions. 
 
 Article XVII 
 
 The discussion is then opened. It takes place in the lan- 
 guages indicated in Article XII of the Constitution. 
 
 At the request of the members, the discussion may be 
 summed up in French. 
 
 Article XVIII 
 
 No one may speak without having been previously recog- 
 nized by the president. 
 
 The latter notes the names of the members who request 
 the floor and recognizes them in the order of their requests.
 
 92 
 
 The reporters, however, when the question on which they 
 have made a report is under discussion, are not subject to the 
 rule of speaking in turn. The same is true of the president 
 of the committee. 
 
 Article XIX 
 
 The reading of an address is forbidden, unless specially 
 authorized by the president. 
 
 Article XX 
 
 If a speaker digresses too far from the subject under con- 
 sideration, the president calls his attention to the fact and 
 requests him to speak to the question. 
 
 Article XXI 
 
 All propositions and all amendments are submitted, in writ- 
 ing, to the president. 
 
 Article XXII 
 
 If a point of order is raised during a deliberation, the dis- 
 cussion of the main question is suspended until the assembly 
 passes upon the point of order. 
 
 Article XXIII 
 
 The closing of the discussion may be proposed. The dis- 
 cussion may not, however, be declared closed, unless a two- 
 thirds majority of the assembly so votes. 
 
 If no one demands the floor or if it has been resolved to 
 close the discussion, the president declares the discussion 
 closed. Thereafter no one may be given the floor, except, in 
 special cases, the reporter or the president of the committee.
 
 93 
 
 Article XXIV 
 
 Before proceeding to a vote, the president submits to the 
 assembly the order in which the questions will be voted upon. 
 
 If there are objections to the order, the assembly passes 
 upon them at once. 
 
 Article XXV 
 
 Amendments to amendments are put to vote before amend- 
 ments, and the latter before the main question. Proposals 
 purely and simply to reject the question are not considered 
 amendments. 
 
 Where there are more than two alternate main proposi- 
 tions, they are all put to vote, one after the other, and every 
 member may vote for one of them. When a vote has thus 
 been taken on all the propositions, if none of them has ob- 
 tained a majority, the members decide, by another ballot, 
 which of the tv\o propositions receiving the least number of 
 votes must be eliminated. The remaining propositions are 
 then voted upon in the same manner until only one is left, 
 upon which a definitive vote may be taken. 
 
 Article XXVI 
 
 The adoption of an amendment to an amendment does not 
 bind a member to vote for the amendment itself; neither does 
 the adoption of an amendment obligate a member to vote in 
 favor of the main proposition. 
 
 Article XXVII 
 
 When a proposition is capable of being divided, any mem- 
 ber may request a vote by division.
 
 94 
 
 Article XXVIII 
 
 When the proposition under consideration is drawn up in 
 several articles, the proposition as a whole is first subjected 
 to general discussion. 
 
 After such discussion and the vote on its articles, the propo- 
 sition as a whole is put to vote. Such vote may be postponed 
 until a subsequent meeting. 
 
 Article XXIX 
 
 The voting is done by raising the hand. 
 
 No one is bound to take part in a vote. If some of the 
 members present abstain, the question is decided by the 
 majority of those voting. 
 
 In case of a tie, the proposition is considered defeated. 
 
 Article XXX 
 
 The vote may be taken by roll-call, if five members so re- 
 quest. There is always occasion for a roll-call on a scientific 
 proposition as a whole. 
 
 The minutes mention the names of the members voting for 
 or against and the names of those who abstain. 
 
 Article XXXI 
 
 The Institute may decide that a second deliberation should 
 take place, either in the course of the session, or during the 
 following session, or that its decisions be referred to a draft- 
 ing committee to be designated by itself or by the Executive 
 Council.
 
 OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN 
 INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 Officers 
 
 Elihu Root, Honorary President 
 James Brown Scott, President 
 Alejandro Alvarez, Secretary General 
 Luis Anderson, Treasurer 
 
 Executive Council 
 
 Elihu Root 
 
 James Brown Scott 
 
 Alejandro Alvarez 
 
 Luis Anderson 
 
 Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante 
 
 Joaquin D. Casasus* 
 
 Permanent Committee for the Study of Questions 
 Relating to Neutrality 
 
 The Executive Council 
 
 Charter Members 
 
 Argentine Republic: Luis M. Drago 
 Bolivia: Alberto Gutierrez 
 Brazil: Ruy Barbosa 
 
 ^Deceased.
 
 96 
 
 Chile: Alejandro Alvarez 
 
 Colombia: Antonio Jose Uribe 
 
 Costa Rica: Luis Anderson 
 
 Cuba: Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante 
 
 Dominican Republic: Andres J. Montolio 
 
 Ecuador: Rafael Arizaga 
 
 Guatemala: Antonio Batres Jauregui 
 
 Haiti: J. N. Leger 
 
 Honduras: Alberto Membreno 
 
 Mexico: Joaquin D. Casasus* 
 
 Nicaragua: Salvador Castrillo 
 
 Panama: Federico Boyd 
 
 Paraguay: Manuel Gondra 
 
 Peru: Ramon Ribeyro* 
 
 Salvador: Rafael S. Lopez* 
 
 United States of America: James Brown Scorr 
 
 Uruguay: Carlos M. de Pena 
 
 Venezuela: Jose Gil Fortoul 
 
 Titular Members 
 
 Argentine Republic 
 Eduardo Bidau 
 Carlos Octavio Bunge 
 Joaquin V. Gonzalez 
 Eduardo Sarmiento Laspiur 
 
 Bolivia 
 Daniel Sanchez Bustamante 
 Alberto Diez de Medina 
 Claudio Pinilla 
 Victor E. Sanjines 
 
 *Deceased.
 
 97 
 
 Brazil 
 Clovis Bevilaqua 
 
 LaURO MiJLLER 
 RODRIGO OcTAVIO 
 
 Manoel Cicero Perergino da Silva .^^ 
 Epitacio Pessoa 
 
 Chile 
 Luis Barros Borgono 
 Antonio Huneeus 
 Eddardo Suarez Mujica 
 Eliodoro Yanes 
 
 Colombia 
 Nicolas Esguerra 
 Francisco Jose Urrutia 
 Adolfo Urueta 
 Jose Maria Gonzalez Valencia 
 
 Costa Rica 
 Ricardo Gimenes 
 Leonidas Pacheco 
 Manuel Castro Quesada 
 C. Gonzalez Viques 
 
 Cuba 
 Pablo Desvernine 
 Octavio Giberga 
 Fernando Sanchez de Fuentes 
 Rafael Montoro 
 
 Dominican Republic 
 
 Federico Henriques Carvajal 
 Manuel J. Troncoso de la Concha 
 Manuel Arturo Machado 
 Adolfo Alejandro Nouel
 
 98 
 Ecuador 
 
 Alejandro Cardenas 
 GoNZALO S. Cordova 
 Victor Manuel Penaherrera 
 Jose Luis Tamayo 
 
 Guatemala 
 
 Haiti 
 
 Mariano Cruz 
 Jose Matos 
 Alberto Mencos 
 Carlos Salazar 
 
 Louis Borno 
 Edmond Heraux 
 Pierre Hudicourt 
 Solon Menos 
 
 Honduras 
 Fausto Davila 
 Alberto Ucles 
 Ricardo de J. Urrutia 
 Mariano Vasquez 
 
 Mexico 
 Francisco L. de la Barra 
 Manuel Calero 
 Victor Manuel Castillo 
 Pedro Lascurain 
 
 Nicaragua 
 
 Modesto Barrios 
 Alejandro Cesar 
 Pedro Gonzalez 
 Carlos Cuadra Pasos 
 Maximo H. Zepeda
 
 99 
 
 Panama 
 
 Paraguay 
 
 RiCARDO J. Alfaro 
 Harmodio Arias 
 EusEBio A. Morales 
 Belisario Porras 
 Ramon M. Valdes 
 
 EUSEBIO Ay ALA 
 
 Cecilio Baez 
 Antolin Irala 
 Fulgencio R. Moreno 
 
 Peru 
 Isaac Alzamora 
 Victor M. Maurtua 
 Solon Polo 
 Manuel V. Villaran 
 
 Salvador 
 Salvador Gallegos 
 Alonso Reyes Guerra 
 Victor Jerez 
 Manuel I. Morales 
 Francisco Martinez Suarez 
 
 United States of America 
 
 Robert Bacon 
 Robert Lansing 
 Elihu Root 
 Leo S. Rowe 
 
 Uruguay 
 Daniel Garcia Acevedo 
 Manuel Arbelaiz 
 Juan Antonio Buero 
 Adolfo Berro Garcia 
 Juan Zorilla de San Martin
 
 100 
 Venezuela 
 
 Simon Barcelo 
 Arminio Borjas 
 Jesus Rojas Fernandez 
 F. Arroyo Parejo
 
 Commendation of the American Institute of Inter- 
 national Law by Official Assemblies of a Legal, 
 Political and Scientific Nature, Composed of 
 Representatives of All the ^j^erican Republics. 
 
 The Third Committee of the Commission of American Jurists, 
 which met at Rio de Janeiro to consider the codification of inter- 
 national law, at its meeting of July 16, 1912, adopted a resolution : 
 
 Commending the initiative taken to found an American In- 
 stitute of International Law, as the Committee considers an 
 institution of this kind of great usefulness to assist in the work 
 of codification that the statesmen of the New World have in 
 view. 
 
 The Governing Board of the Pan American Union, at its meeting 
 held in the City of Washington on December 1, 1915, unanimously 
 adopted the following resolution : 
 
 Whereas the official inauguration of the American Institute 
 of International Law, founded in Washington October 12, 1912, 
 is soon to take place under the auspices of the Second Pan 
 American Scientific Congress, and 
 
 Whereas said Institute, consisting of representatives of every 
 one of the American Republics, recommended by the Inter- 
 national Law Associations of their respective countries, will re- 
 sult in strengthening, through the active cooperation of jurists 
 and thinkers of the whole continent, the bonds of friendship 
 and union now existing between these Republics, and will con- 
 tribute to the development of a common sentiment of inter- 
 national justice among them, 
 
 The Governing Board of the Pan American Union 
 
 Resolves to tender to the founders and members of the 
 American Institute of International Law a vote of commendation 
 and encouragement for the foundation of said organization, 
 which represents a step of the highest importance in the moral 
 advancement of the continent and in the strengthening of the 
 sentiments of friendship and harmony among the Republics. 
 
 The Second Pan American Scientific Congress, which met at 
 Washington December 27, 1915-January 8, 1916, adopted the fol- 
 lowing resolution, which is included in its Final Act : 
 
 The Second Pan American Scientific Congress extends to the 
 American Institute of International Law a cordial welcome into 
 the circles of scientific organizations of Pan America, and 
 records a sincere wish for its successful career and the achieve- 
 ment of the highest aims of its important labors.
 
 \
 
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