THE TWO CHANCELLOBS. 
 
/ 
 
 THE .TWO CHANCELLORS- 
 
 PRINCE GORTCHAKOF AND PRINCE BISMARCK. 
 
 M. JULIAN KLAOZKO, 
 
 EX-DEPUTY OF THE PARLIAMENT OF VIENNA. 
 
 TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY 
 
 MRS. TAIT. 
 
 CHAPMAN & HALL, 193, PICCADILLY. 
 
 1876. 
 
CHARLES DICKENS AND EVANS,. 
 CRYSTAL PALACE PRESS. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 DUKING the last few years various highly interesting 
 publications have revealed to the world many of the 
 most hidden secrets of diplomacy. The historian is forced 
 to collect these testimonies, and to extract from them their 
 teachings; although conscience, as well as State reasons, 
 cannot but condemn these much-to-be regretted revela- 
 tions, which compromise, in so striking a degree, every 
 principle of authority, and every law of international 
 relationship. 
 
 The Author is therefore anxious to make known that, 
 although he has given up his political career since 1873, 
 he still considers himself bound by the obligations laid 
 upon him by professional secrecy, and by the elementary 
 rules of State service. 
 
 None of the documents or despatches quoted in this 
 work possess the doubtful merit of being unpublished; 
 all are public property, and the minute information which 
 is given as to their various origins and dates, renders it 
 easy for them to be found in the works and Parliamentary 
 papers indicated. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 PRINCE GOETCHAKOF'S MISSIONS . .... 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 FIRST APPEARANCES OF M. DE BISMARCK . . , .37 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 A NATIONAL MINISTER IN RUSSIA . . 79 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 A "FRONDEUR" DIPLOMATIST AT ST. PETERSBURG . . 104 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE VISTULA AND THE ELBE . . 133 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE WAR IN GERMANY 162 
 
Tiii CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER VIT. 
 
 PAGB 
 
 THE ECLIPSE OF EUEOPE 205 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE EAST AND THE WEST 247 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 THE FRENCH WAR 284 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 A TEN YEARS' PARTNERSHIP ...... 314 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PRINCE GORTCHAKOF'S MISSIONS. 
 
 The Gortchakofs of History Alexander Mikha'ilovitch Lyceum of Tsar- 
 skoe-Selo The Friendship of Pouchkine Indiscreet good Wishes and 
 brilliant Prognostications Long Probation of Prince Gortchakof The 
 Leuchtenberg Marriage A matrimonial Revenge The Grand Duchess 
 Olga and the Heir-apparent of Wurteniberg Well-advised Patience 
 A Post of Observation at Stuttgart The Revolution of February, and 
 the Agitation of Unionists in Germany The Frankfort Parliament 
 A Rising at Stuttgart : memorable Speech of the old King William 
 of Wurtemberg Restoration of the Diet of Frankfort Prince Gort- 
 chakof Minister at Frankfort Prestige of the Emperor Nicholas after 
 the Revolution of February The real Mission and benevolent Influence 
 of the German Confederation Friendship and Intercourse in Frankfort 
 A young Lieutenant of Landwelir The Salon of the Joukofskis 
 Nicholas Gogol Mystics and Signs of the Times The Eastern 
 Crisis -Prussia's Humane Politics Fidelity and Devotion of the 
 secondary States Austria and its "Ingratitude" The Russian Inter- 
 vention in Hungary Austria's Political Straits in Eastern Affairs 
 Its Conduct during the Crimean War What it might have done against 
 Russia Prince Gortchakof at Vienna Patriotic Sorrows and Anger 
 Conferences at Vienna Diplomacy of bygone Times Fall of Sebas- 
 topol Austria's Ultimatum Saying of Prince Gortchakof with regard 
 to Austria Congress of Paris Napoleon III. suddenly changes his 
 Policy Prince Gortchakof as Minister of Foreign Affairs in Russia. 
 
 IN common with the Odoiefskis, the Obolenskis, the 
 Dolgoroukis, and many other noble families on the 
 banks of the Moskva and the Neva, it is the boast of 
 
the Gortchakofs that they are the descendants of the 
 Kouriks. More particularly, however, they trace their 
 origin from one of the sons of Michael, grand-duke 
 of Tchernigof, put to death towards the middle of 
 the thirteenth century by the Mongolians of Batou- 
 Khan, and since proclaimed a martyr to the faith, and 
 even canonised as a saint of the orthodox Church. 
 
 The name of Gortchakof, however, is seldom met 
 with in the sombre and stirring annals of old Eussia. 
 In the period which precedes the accession of the 
 Eomanofs we meet with a Peter Ivanovitch Gortchakof, 
 an unfortunate commander of Smolensk, who, after 
 an energetic and desperate resistance which lasted for 
 two years, finally gave up this celebrated stronghold 
 to the Poles. He was taken to Warsaw, where, in 
 1611, in company with the Czar Vassili, the two 
 princes Schouyski, Sehine, and a number of powerful 
 boyards, he was forced to take part in the celebrated 
 "procession of captives" which the great constable 
 Zolkiewski offered one day honorificentissime, says 
 the historian of the times to the king, and also to 
 the senate of the most serene republic. It is only in 
 the second half of the last century, during the reign 
 of Catherine II., that a Prince Ivan Gortchakof suc- 
 ceeded, chiefly owing to his marriage with a daughter 
 of the wealthy and powerful Souvorof, in re-esta- 
 blishing the splendour of his ancient house, which 
 since then has never ceased to distinguish itself in 
 various branches of state service, and especially in 
 the career of arms. The France of to-day retains 
 the memory of two princes Gortchakof, two old 
 
PRINCE GORTCHAKOF'S MISSIONS. 3 
 
 soldiers of the Borodino, who added to the glory of 
 their names during the war in the East. The one 
 commanded the left wing of the Eussian troops 
 during the battles of Alma and Inkermann ; the other, 
 Prince Michael, was commander-in-chief of the Czar's 
 forces in the Crimea, and joined his name for all time 
 to the heroic defence of Sebastopol. He afterwards 
 assumed the government of Poland, as the emperor's 
 lieutenant, and became thus striking example of the 
 vicissitudes of history- the supreme representative of 
 a severe foreign rule in that same town of Warsaw 
 where, centuries before, one of his ancestors had 
 figured in a procession of captives. However, if this 
 coincidence ever presented itself to the mind of Prince 
 Michael, he only drew from it a moral worthy of 
 his mind, for he governed the conquered country with 
 moderation and benevolence, leaving behind him the 
 reputation of being as upright in civil administration 
 as he was courageous in war. 
 
 The cousin of Prince Michael and present Chan- 
 cellor of the Empire, Alexander Mikhailovitch Gort- 
 chakof, was born in 1798, and was educated at the 
 Lyceum of Tsarskoe-Selo, which occupies a place 
 of distinction in the scholastic history of Russia. 
 Founded by the Government as a model house of 
 education for the youthful aristocracy of Russia, the 
 Lyceum shone with great brilliancy during the reign 
 of Alexander L, although a Rollin or a Pestalozzi 
 might have raised more than one objection to a 
 college whose pupils were brought up only to adorn 
 the higher circles, and which esteemed the weightier 
 
 B 2 
 
4 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 classical studies too heavy a burden with which to 
 soar into the ethereal spheres of pleasure and elegance. 
 Nearly all the professors of "the establishment were 
 foreigners, men bearing the stamp of the eighteenth 
 century freethinking, frivolous, and Voltairian. The 
 most eminent among them, the professor of French 
 literature he who initiated the future chancellor 
 into the language of Voltaire, of whose beauties and 
 subtleties he is now so competent a master was a 
 Swiss of Neuchatel, who, under the inoffensive name 
 of De Boudry, concealed another of a far more ter- 
 rible sound. M. de Boudry was no other than the 
 brother of Marat, the infamous conventionalist. * It 
 was the Empress Catherine who, in order "to put 
 an end to scandal," compelled Professor Marat to 
 change his name, without, however, being able to make 
 him change his opinions, which remained " Jacobin " 
 to the very end. He died impenitent, proclaiming 
 with his last breath his deep admiration for the basely- 
 maligned "friend of the people." From this doubtful 
 style of education the young Gortchakof drew a 
 generous and healthy sustenance. He left Tsarskoe- 
 Selo rich in solid and varied acquirements, and, more 
 extraordinary still, he left it a good Latin scholar, 
 which last point has always been a source of astonish- 
 ment to his fellow-students as well as to succeed- 
 ing generations. It is nevertheless certain that the 
 chancellor can quote Horace with all the cl propos 
 of the late King Louis XVIII. of sainted memory ; 
 one of his most celebrated despatches contains an 
 
 * ATIB der Petersburger Gesellschaft, t. ii., p. 156. 
 
PRINCE GORTCHAKOF'S MISSIONS. 5 
 
 eloquent passage, in which he quotes from Suetonius 
 the distinction to be established between liberty and 
 anarchy. 
 
 Next to his classical acquirements, the youthful 
 memory dearest to the chancellor is the fact of his 
 having been the co-disciple, and that he has remained 
 the steadfast friend, of Pouchkine, the great national 
 poet memories that are all the more creditable to 
 him, as, at times, this intimacy must have proved 
 most embarrassing. When, in consequence of some ob- 
 noxious ode, the young author of " Eouslan et Loud- 
 mila " was exiled by the Emperor Alexander I. to an 
 obscure village in the depths of Eussia, two only, 
 from among his former Lyceum comrades, had the 
 courage to visit him and offer him their sympathy, 
 and one of those intrepid youths was Prince *Gort- 
 chakof. There are to be found among the works of 
 Pouchkine a few couplets written in a style of gaiety 
 and raillery, the interest of which is centred in the 
 name of Alexander Mikhailovitch, to whom they are 
 addressed. In one of these juvenile pieces, Pouchkine 
 desires that " Love should accompany his friend to the 
 shores of the Styx, and that he should fall asleep on 
 the bosom of Helen even in the boat of Charon . . . ; " 
 indiscreet good wishes of a kind to have offered ample 
 food for scandal, had not the chancellor been wise 
 enough to keep his old age free from all seductive de- 
 ceptions and avoid even the appearance of a northern 
 Euy Gomez. 
 
 The poet's inspirations are more fortunate at a 
 later period, when, in speaking of the difference in 
 
6 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 their vocations, he foretells the splendid destinies of 
 Alexander Mikhailovitch, and calls him " Fortune's 
 favoured son." 
 
 Fortune, however, was somewhat slow to recog- 
 nise her child, and to award him the portion he 
 merited. Entering, at an early age, the Office of 
 Foreign Affairs, and becoming attached to the suite of 
 M. de Nesselrode from the time of the Laybach and 
 Verona congresses, Prince Gortchakof had already 
 long passed that which Dante calls the " mezzo del 
 cammin di vita," and at the age of fifty was only 
 minister plenipotentiary at a small court in Germany. 
 A fortunate event brought him at last under the 
 benevolent notice of his master, and rescued him 
 from that diplomatic limbo, those regions " free from 
 tears but filled with sighs," which in diplomatic 
 parlance are termed secondary appointments. 
 
 In a moment of paternal weakness the Emperor 
 Nicholas had consented to the marriage of his daughter 
 the Grand Duchess Maria with the Duke of Leuchten- 
 berg son of Beauharnais, and catholic officer in the 
 service of the King of Bavaria as it was mournfully 
 whispered in the private circles of the "Winter Palace. 
 
 Nicholas was not the man to retract his given 
 word, but none the less did he feel the sting of what 
 his surroundings termed a mesalliance, and the 
 bitterness of his feelings increased when all the 
 foreign members of the imperial family absented them- 
 selves from the brilliant fetes which preceded and 
 followed the nuptial ceremonies. As ill-luck would 
 have it, soon afterwards a cousin of the newly-made 
 
PRINCE GORTOHAEOF'S MISSIONS. 7 
 
 imperial son-in-law, a daughter of the ex-King Jerome, 
 espoused a Eussian whose wealth sprang from com- 
 mercial sources a prince in the valley of the Arno, 
 but scarcely a gentleman on the banks of the Neva 
 a disagreeable incident, which in the eyes of the hor- 
 rified courtiers placed the Autocrat of all the Kussias 
 in the position of relationship to one of his own 
 subjects. It now became a matter of necessity to 
 wipe out all these painful impressions, and, by an 
 alliance whose splendour should be incontestable, be 
 revenged on so many mortifications. For awhile 
 flattering hopes were held out that the Grand 
 Duchess Alexandra might be accepted by an arch- 
 duke of Austria, but finally a prince of Hesse had 
 to suffice. For the Grand Duchess Olga, the most 
 beautiful and best-beloved of the emperor's daughters, 
 had been chosen the heir -presumptive to the throne 
 of Wurtemberg, of the ancient and illustrious house 
 of Swabia, he being at that time the only available 
 royal prince. 
 
 This project was, however, not so easily carried 
 out. The good Swabian people had no taste for it ; 
 a Eussian alliance roused their fears for their constitu- 
 tional liberties. What was still more serious, the old 
 King William of Wurtemberg, an honest and liberal 
 sovereign, but obstinate beyond belief, showed him- 
 self somewhat recalcitrant, and seemed to delight in 
 proposing every dilatory objection he could think of. 
 Other objections were raised on various sides; but 
 the Eussian plenipotentiary at Stuttgart, the former 
 fellow-pupil of Pouchkine, set them aside with con- 
 
8 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 summate ability; by dint of skill and dexterity he 
 succeeded in establishing the Grand Duchess Olga 
 in the royal family of Wurtemberg. The joy of the 
 Emperor Nicholas was deep and wide-spreading, 
 and the Winter Palace joined in the public eulogiums 
 lavished on the triumphant diplomatist. After such 
 a success, Prince Gortchakof might well expect to 
 be advanced in his career, to be brought a few 
 steps nearer to that ambassadorship at Vienna, 
 which was the supreme object of his ambition. It 
 was not to be, however, and the patience he dis- 
 played was admirable like that of the Patriarch 
 Jacob serving Laban, son of Nahor. To the term of 
 four years which he had already served at Stuttgart, 
 Alexander Mikhailovitch declared himself ready to add 
 another term still more lengthy, if necessary ; he 
 promised the empress-mother to remain any length 
 of time near the Grand Duchess Olga, to be her 
 guide and counsellor in a strange country among 
 strangers. However barren the prospect, he did not 
 despair of improving his position while sunned by 
 such rays of beauty and grace, coming, as they did, 
 direct from the great northern sun, and, in fact, 
 he retained his post at Stuttgart for another long term 
 of eight years. Tenues grandia conamur ! 
 
 But every post of observation is of use to him 
 who knows how to fix his telescope and question 
 the stars. The minister plenipotentiary at Stuttgart 
 was the recipient of wide-spreading information, and 
 found means to inform his government of many 
 things which occurred far beyond the narrow limits, 
 
PEINGE GORTCH'AKOF'S MISSIONS. 9 
 
 of the little kingdom of Wurtemberg. Then came 
 the year 1848, with its terrible catastrophes, with 
 its revolutionary shocks, adding to the experience 
 of the most experienced, lighting up with sudden 
 brilliancy the hitherto unknown depths of human 
 nature, and, to use Milton's language, making the 
 nethermost darkness light. 
 
 Such a lesson in history did not pass without leaving 
 its impressions on the former pupil of Tsarskoe-Selo, as 
 can well be imagined. Saloons and cabinets had long 
 ago confided all their secrets to him ; now he became 
 the recipient of those of the forums and the byways. 
 
 The close vicinity of Frankfort, seat of the cele- 
 brated parliament, permitted him to study from life, and 
 in all its extent, the agitation prevailing in Germany at 
 this memorable time. He noted, in advance, its various 
 phases at first simple, then burlesque and odious 
 and predicted, at an early hour, the inevitable mis- 
 carriage of a revolution whose vanquished floods were 
 yet, however, to scatter their impotent foams over 
 the usually tranquil streets of Stuttgart. 
 
 It was the month of April, 1849. Anticipating by 
 twenty years the formidable work of 1870, the Parlia- 
 ment of Frankfort had just constituted a German 
 empire, to the exclusion of Austria, offering the crown 
 to the King of Prussia, Frederick "William IV. The king 
 hesitated and finally refused it, and the other German 
 princes were still less anxious to accept a decree which 
 implied their abdication. But this did not meet the 
 views of the German demagogues. Seized with a 
 sudden enthusiasm for a constitution which the day 
 
10 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 before they had denounced as reactionary and inimical 
 to the liberties of the people, they tried by force to 
 impose on the various sovereigns of Germany the 
 vassalage of Prussia as decreed at Frankfort. 
 
 In Wurtemberg the Chamber of Deputies voted an 
 address of a pressing and imperious nature, with 
 the object of extorting from the king the recognition 
 of the Emperor Frederick William IV. The monarch 
 replied by a refusal. Eioting took place in the public 
 square, and the court had to take refuge at Lud wigs- 
 burg from the frenzy of a delirious capital. 
 
 " I will not submit myself to the house of Hohen- 
 zollern," said the old King William of Wurtemberg to 
 the deputation from the Chamber. " I owe it to my 
 country not to submit ; I owe it to myself and to my 
 people. But it is not for myself that I speak thus ; I 
 have but a few more years to live ; it is my country, 
 my house, my family that impose this duty on me." 
 
 When an agitated witness of these stormy scenes, 
 and of the pathetic appeals of the father-in-law of 
 Olga for " the house, the family of Wurtemberg," 
 Alexander Mikhailovitch little thought that one day, 
 as chancellor of the Eussian Empire, he would become 
 the most useful auxiliary, the most faithful support 
 of an audacious and enterprising policy that would 
 realise in every respect that riotous programme of 
 Stuttgart, and make Queen Olga a vassal of the 
 Hohenzollerns. This was, however, but the stormy 
 prologue of a drama still hidden in the future ; and 
 the year 1850 even hoped it had seen the last traces 
 of an agitation which had only astonished Europe, 
 
PRINCE GORTCHAKOF'S MISSIONS. 11 
 
 instead of enlightening and warning it. Towards the 
 end of the year 1850, the German Confederation was 
 re-established on the terms of the old compact of 
 Vienna ; the Bundestag was about to resume its peace- 
 ful deliberations, and Prince Gortchakof naturally 
 found himself appointed representative of the Eussian 
 Court at the Diet of Frankfort. From that time 
 Alexander Mikhailovitch occupied a marked place 
 in that great centre of political affairs, where the 
 personal merits of the minister borrowed an ad- 
 ditional brilliancy from the extraordinary prestige 
 which late events had created for his august master. 
 
 Eussian influence, at all times very considerable 
 at the courts of Germany, had grown prodigiously ; 
 and, it will be recollected, had reached its height in 
 consequence of the whirlwind of February. Standing 
 alone as the only country untouched by the revolu- 
 tionary storms which had devastated nearly all the 
 other continental States, the empire of the Czars 
 appeared then as the solid bulwark of every principle 
 of order and conservatism. 
 
 " Humble yourselves, nations : God is with us !" 
 the Emperor Nicholas had exclaimed in a celebrated 
 proclamation ; and without being too much dazzled 
 by a language that in some sort made God the accom- 
 plice of a gigantic human vanity, monarchical Europe 
 had but acclamations for a prince who, in truth, was 
 working with a remarkable disinterestedness to re- 
 establish legitimate authority and to maintain the 
 world's equilibrium. 
 
 It is but just to recollect that during those tur- 
 
12 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 bulent years 1848-50, the Autocrat of the North 
 made use of his influence as of his sword, but to 
 consolidate tottering thrones, and enforce respect for 
 treaties. He effectively protected Denmark, towards 
 which the rapacious hand of Germany was already 
 pointing, and was the most energetic in calling 
 together a council of the Powers that ended by 
 tearing from the Germans their much-coveted prey. 
 
 He interfered personally in Hungary, and sent 
 his troops to crush a formidable insurrection which had 
 shaken to its very foundations the ancient empire of 
 the Hapsburgs, already mined by internal troubles and 
 an aggressive war waged against it on two occasions 
 by the kingdom of Piedmont. Already but little in- 
 clined by his principles and his interests to favour 
 that united Germany,* " whose first wish was for an 
 unjust extension of territory, and whose first cry was 
 a cry of war/' he employed all his influence to bring 
 about the re-establishment, pure and simple, of the 
 German Confederation on the basis it occupied before 
 1848. 
 
 The ties of family and of friendship which united 
 him to the Court of Berlin, were never powerful 
 enough to make him abandon for a single instant 
 the cause of the minor sovereigns and of the inde- 
 pendence of their states ; and in spite of the sincere 
 affection he felt for " his brother-in-law the poet/' 
 he spared King Frederick William IV. of Prussia 
 neither the evacuation of the Duchies nor the irksome 
 
 * Expressions contained in the Russian circular of July 6th, 1848, from 
 Count Nesselrode to his agents in Germany. 
 
PRINCE GORTCHAKOF'S MISSIONS. 13 
 
 conditions of Olmiitz. Defender of European rights 
 on the Oder and the Main, of monarchical rights on 
 the Theiss and the Danube, peacemaker in Germany, 
 and, so to say, chief justice of Europe, Nicholas 
 possessed at that period of history a grandeur and 
 a prestige well merited on the whole, and that 
 increased the -influence of the agents who ^were 
 charged to represent abroad a policy whose perfect 
 uprightness and immovable firmness none dared 
 contest. 
 
 In accrediting Prince Gortcliakof to the German 
 Confederation, the Emperor Nicholas, in an autograph 
 letter dated the llth November, 1850, recognised in 
 the reunion of the Frankfort Diet " a pledge of the 
 maintenance of general peace," and characterised thus, 
 by a stroke at once profound and judicious, the 
 honourable and liberal mission awaiting this Diet in 
 the order of things created by the treaties of 1815. 
 However legitimate may have been the objections of 
 liberal Germans to the internal politics of the Bund 
 and its antagonistic attitude with regard to the de- 
 velopment of a constitutional regime, one cannot 
 deny that from an European point of view, and 
 with regard to the equilibrium and the universal 
 peace of the world, it was a marvellous conception, 
 well calculated to ensure the independence of States, 
 and prevent all great perturbation in the Christian 
 community. 
 
 Chimerical and mercantile spirits of the time, 
 leaders of the Manchester school, and writers rich 
 in at least "one idea a day," had just persuaded 
 
14 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 themselves that now the moment had arrived to 
 declare "wax against war," to insist on universal 
 disarming, on the abolition of military slavery ; and 
 they assembled for this object noisy peace congresses 
 at different points of the globe. They had even one 
 day the simplicity to assemble one at Frankfort, not 
 suspecting that at their side, and precisely in this 
 Bundestag of modest appearance, had existed for 
 some time past a genuine and permanent peace con- 
 gress a congress that strove to do good within the 
 limits of possibility, and that had, moreover, the great 
 advantage of not appearing ridiculous. Placed as it 
 is in the very centre of Europe, separating by its 
 massive and immobile bulk the great military forces 
 which border, so to say, our old continent, its power 
 forcibly neutralised and placed almost in the position 
 of arbitrator on those vast plains where once the 
 destinies of empires were decided, the German Con- 
 federation formed a body of States sufficiently coherent 
 and compact to repulse all shocks from outside, but 
 not sufficiently so to become aggressive itself, and 
 menace the security of its neighbours. 
 
 Many years later, when a minister holding in his 
 hands the reins of the empire, Prince Gortchakof was 
 yet in a celebrated circular to render homage to the 
 salutary combination of the Bund " a combination 
 purely and exclusively defensive," which permitted the 
 localisation of an inevitable war, instead of general- 
 ising it, and giving a character and proportions to the 
 contest which sometimes outrun all human foresight, 
 
PRINCE GORTCHAKOF'S MISSIONS. 15 
 
 and which in every case accumulate ruins and shed 
 torrents of blood." "* 
 
 In truth, if, during the long half-century which sepa- 
 rates the congress of Vienna from the unfortunate battle 
 of Sadovva, the frontiers of the different States have 
 altered so little in spite of the great changes which have 
 taken place in their interior politics ; if the revolution 
 of July, the campaign of Belgium, and even the wars of 
 the Crimea and of Italy have been able to take place 
 without notably disturbing the equilibrium of the 
 nations, or injuring them in their independence, we 
 have to thank this misjudged Bundestag, which, by its 
 very existence, and by the wheels within wheels of its 
 complicated machinery, prevented each conflict in its 
 turn from becoming at once a general conflagration. 
 It is much to be doubted whether the cause of 
 humanity and civilisation, or the cause which the 
 Russian chancellor represents more especially with 
 such facility and splendour, have gained by seeing 
 this ancient " combination" replaced in our days by 
 another, much more simple, it is true, but perhaps 
 much less reassuring. At the same time that he was 
 performing the duties of his mission to the German 
 Confederation, Alexander Mikhailovitch continued 
 to occupy the post of minister plenipotentiary at 
 Stuttgart. He made it a point of honour to fulfil to 
 the end his mission of confidence and friendship to 
 the Grand Duchess Olga, and divided his time between 
 the free town on the Main, the seat of the Bund, and 
 
 * Russian circular of May 27th, 1859, a. propos of the Italian war. 
 
16 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 the little capital on the banks of the Neckar, where he 
 always met with a warm and amiable reception. 
 
 At Frankfort, he was especially fond of the society 
 of his Prussian colleague, a young lieutenant of 
 Landwehr, and a perfect novice in the career of 
 diplomacy, but for whom waited a prodigious future. 
 There also had settled for many years a great Russian 
 celebrity, a poet who w r as at the same time an in- 
 fluential courtier, and who could not fail to be sought 
 after by a diplomatist fond of literature and a former 
 co-disciple of Pouchkine. 
 
 The good and gentle Vassili Joukofski had cer- 
 tainly none of the genius of Pouchkine, nor had he 
 his independence and vigour of character. A clever 
 versifier and ingenious translator rather than a creator 
 or an originator, of a nature somewhat soft and con- 
 templative, the author of " Ondine," once so re- 
 nowned, had at an early date made his peace with 
 that official society which the despotic will of Nicholas 
 had created, and had ever since basked in the rays 
 of imperial favour. Dignities and honours did not 
 fail to be awarded him during his long career as 
 pleasing courtier and right-thinking poet. He received 
 an important and honourable mission in being selected 
 to direct the education of Alexander, the heir-ap- 
 parent and present . emperor, and also that of his 
 brother, the Grand Duke Constantine. Joukofski de- 
 voted himself to this task with zeal and intelligence, 
 and retained the affection of his young pupils to the 
 end of his life witness a correspondence which he 
 maintained with them while he was at Frankfort, and 
 
PEINCE GORTCHAKOF'S MISSIONS. 17 
 
 whicli has recently been published. After completing 
 their education, Joukofski took a pleasure trip through 
 Germany ; and, finding in Dusseldorf a companion of 
 life, who, though much younger than himself, shared 
 not only his tastes, but even his charming weaknesses, 
 he decided to settle down on the banks of the Main at 
 Frankfort. As has happened to many of his fellow- 
 countrymen, although remaining abroad and showing 
 the greatest repugnance to return to his native land, 
 Joukofski devoutly considered the Western countries 
 miserably fallen to ruin and corrupted, and centred all 
 his hopes in " Holy Russia " as the deliverer of a world 
 invaded and possessed by the demon of revolution. 
 
 The occurrences of February only served to 
 strengthen these sombre visions, and to envelope 
 Joukofski more and more in an unquiet state of mys- 
 ticism, sometimes of an irritating nature, but more often 
 inoffensive, and not without a certain feeble grace. 
 
 The campaign of Hungary caused a momentary 
 diversion to these sad thoughts, and filled him with 
 joy. It was not so much the glory which covered the 
 Russian army that cheered his spirit, nor even the 
 triumph of the Russian sword that sword of St. 
 Michael, "smiting the foul beast;" his prayers, his 
 hopes, soared far higher. He hoped thus he writes to 
 his imperial pupil that the great Czar would profit by 
 the power God had placed in his hands, and "solve 
 a problem before whicli the Crusaders had recoiled ; 
 that is to say, that he would drive the infidel from 
 Byzantium, and deliver the Holy Land. 
 
 Madame Joukofski, though born a Protestant, 
 
18 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 was in unison with her melancholy spouse ; her soul 
 required a " principle of authority " which failed her 
 in the Eeformed Church, and which she sought, to the 
 great joy of the poet, in the arms of the orthodox 
 faith, without, however, finding perfect peace. 
 
 The salon of the Joukofskis was the arena of the 
 strangest and most varied of discussions on literature, 
 politics, the glorious destinies of " Holy Kussia," the 
 inanity of modern civilisation, "the necessity for a fresh 
 outburst of Christianity," and many other topics treat- 
 ing of the invisible and " ineffable." From time to time 
 appeared in their midst, like a fantastic apparition 
 or spirit from another world, a genius far superior in 
 its originality and power, but also far more tormented 
 and ravaged, than the good court poet and preceptor of 
 grand dukes. After tearing with ruthless and im- 
 placable hands the veil from off the hideous sores of 
 Russian society, after having presented to his nation, 
 in the " Dead Souls " and the " Inspector," a frightful 
 picture of its vices full of truth and life, Nicholas Gogol 
 suddenly gave up all hope of civilisation, of progress, of 
 liberty, and turned to adore that which he had for- 
 merly despised. He esteemed nothing but barbarian 
 Muscovy, saw no salvation but in despotism, believed 
 himself to be in a state of " unfathomable" sin, and set 
 to work to find a divine mercy that ever fled before 
 him. He journeyed from St. Petersburg, sometimes to 
 Borne, sometimes to Jerusalem, sometimes to Paris, 
 seeking everywhere rest for his tortured soul ; then 
 from time to time he would return to the Joukofskis, 
 spending weeks together in their house, exhorting 
 
PRINCE GORTCHAKOF'S MISSIONS. 19 
 
 them to prayer, to contrition, and to the contemplation 
 of divine mysteries. Then followed endless discus- 
 sions concerning the heathens of the West, on a sup- 
 posed approaching crusade, on the redemption of 
 erring humanity by an untarnished race which had 
 retained the faith. On several occasions the doctors had 
 to interfere and break up an intimacy that was not free 
 from peril. One day Gogol was found prostrate and 
 insensible from inanition Jbefore the holy images in 
 whose adoration he had lost himself ! . . . We trust 
 this short digression may be pardoned us; it gives an 
 insight into the minds of a certain class of Eussian 
 society towards the close of Nicholas's reign, and adds 
 a singular trait to the tableau of causes which led to 
 the Eastern war. 
 
 It is interesting, too, to imagine Alexander Mik- 
 hailovitch in this salon of the Joukofskis, on such 
 or such an evening, during some spiritual assault 
 of arms with poor Gogol. The diplomatist, as deeply 
 versed in literature as he was sceptical, was certainly 
 well capable of recognising the lightning darts full of 
 fire and life that pierced the clouds of a great but 
 disordered mind, and to unravel more than one 
 powerful and striking thought from among the 
 strange vagaries that treated of an approaching 
 crusade or of the deliverance of Zion. 
 
 Yet, who could have believed it? these mystics, 
 these visionaries, were possessed with correct pre- 
 sentiments and read the true signs of the times ! 
 While Joukofski was composing his " Commentaries 
 of Holy Kussia," and Gogol was mortifying him- 
 
 C 2 
 
20 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 self before his images, the Emperor Nicholas was 
 revolving in his mind the great scheme of a crusade, 
 and was preparing, under the profoundest mystery, 
 the mission of Prince Menschikof. . . . That 
 the monarch who had contributed so much towards 
 the peace of Europe and the balance of power should 
 suddenly have resolved to cast such a torch of war 
 into the midst of the Continent, at that time scarcely 
 settled, and yet that he should have waited 
 for this period of comparative calm and for the 
 re-establishment of general order to announce his 
 designs, instead of boldly carrying them out some 
 years before during the revolutionary shocks which 
 were paralysing nearly every State, when his armies 
 were already in the very heart of Hungary, and 
 dominating the banks of the Danube will be for 
 the impartial historian a striking proof of the good 
 faith in which the Czar undertook his fatal campaign, 
 of the mystic blindness which possessed his spirit at 
 this moment, and of his profound conviction that his 
 cause was a just one. 
 
 Did Prince Gortchakof share his master's delusions 
 to the same extent ? 
 
 "We are permitted to doubt it ; we are permitted 
 to suppose that, in common with Kisselef, Meyendorf, 
 Brunnow, and all the most distinguished diplomatists 
 of Eussia at that time, including the chancellor of the 
 empire the old Count Nesselrode he was aware of 
 the enormous error into which a prince too proud to 
 listen to objections, and who insisted on being his own 
 minister of foreign affairs, was falling. This did not, 
 
PRINCE GORTCHAKOF'S MISSIONS. 21 
 
 however, prevent the Kussian envoy to the German 
 Confederation from fulfilling his duties with all the 
 zeal that such a critical period demanded, nor from 
 exerting, in the service of his country, all his varied 
 mental resources in the sphere of action that was 
 reserved for him. The events which took place in that 
 sphere did not fail to prove of the first importance. 
 
 In the Bundestag were not only concentrated all 
 the efforts of the secondary States of the German 
 Confederation, but there also were conceived and 
 ripened all the plans, preparations, projects, even to 
 the slightest wishes, of the two principal powers of 
 Germany, whose concurrence, Eussia on the one side, 
 and France and England on the other, were equally 
 desirous of securing. 
 
 Prince Gortchakof had not much reason to 
 complain of the attitude things were assuming in 
 Germany. The fidelity of Frederick William IV. was 
 proof against everything. The Czar might rely in 
 any emergency on his brother-in-law the poet, and 
 Alexander Mikhail ovitch had an equally faithful sup- 
 porter in his colleague of Prussia, the young officer of 
 landwekr. The Cabinet of Berlin, though consenting 
 from time to time to unite in the representations that 
 the Allies were sending to St. Petersburg, and to sign, 
 in concert with them, such or such an identical, 
 similar, or concordant note, showed before long that 
 it was acting thus only to slacken their progress, and 
 turn them aside from any energetic resolutions. When 
 the decisive moment came it stopped short, and stood 
 .aside, asserting that it wished to keep its " hand 
 
22 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 free " (freie hand}. Even far more sympathetic and 
 more openly expressed in their feelings were the other 
 members of the Bund ; they saw nothing exorbitant 
 in the demands of the Czar on Turkey, and cared very 
 little for the health of the " Sick Man." 
 
 They also maintained their right to keep their 
 "hand free," closed up their ranks in the famous 
 conferences of Bamberg, and now and again were 
 ready to draw the sword. In truth, Alexander 
 Mikhailovitch showed in later days, during the fatal 
 year of 1866, a very short memory, very little feeling 
 or distributive justice towards these poor secondary 
 States, who had proved themselves so devoted, so ser- 
 viceable, so unshaken in their attachment to Russia 
 during the Eastern crisis. 
 
 While London and Paris were vehemently dis- 
 cussing the celebrated despatches of Sir Hamilton 
 Seymour, and were denouncing the ambitious projects 
 of Eussia ; Hanover, Dresden, Munich, Stuttgart, and 
 Cassel were equally loud in their condemnation of the 
 proceedings of the Allies and their "usurpations;" and 
 Berlin groaned to see Christian kingdoms espousing 
 so hotly the defence of the Crescent. One solitary 
 German power the greatest among them, it is true 
 assumed a different attitude, and was of one mind 
 with the Allies, seeming even at times inclined to 
 make common cause with them. And this power was 
 Austria Austria, that but lately had been succoured 
 by Eussian arms ; rescued by the Czar's strong and 
 generous hand at the very edge of the precipice, saved 
 by him from sudden destruction ! The astonishment, 
 
FRINGE GORTCHAKOF'S MISSIONS. 23 
 
 the stupefaction, the exasperation of the Emperor 
 Nicholas knew no bounds ; the whole Eussian nation 
 shared his sentiments, Alexander Mikhailovitch in 
 common with every other Muscovite patriot. 
 
 "The immense ingratitude of Austria" thence- 
 forward became the unanimous cry, the siboleth of every 
 political creed in the vast empire of the north, and has 
 remained so to our day It is of im- 
 portance to dwell upon this feeling which arose in 
 Eussia after the Eastern- conflict, and to discuss its 
 true basis, for this sentiment has had the most 
 gigantic consequences. It has largely contributed 
 towards recent events. It has dictated more than 
 one extreme resolution in the Cabinet of St. Peters- 
 burg, has caused it to abandon secular traditions, 
 principles consecrated by the experience of genera- 
 tions, which till then had seemed to be immovable, 
 and which had become the very arcana imperil of 
 the descendants of Peter the Great; and this same 
 feeling has dominated, so to say, the politics of the 
 successor of Nesselrode during the last twenty 
 years. 
 
 It is incontestable that Eussia had every right to 
 reckon on the gratitude of Austria after the signal 
 and important services she had rendered her in 1849. 
 The armies which the Czar sent to help the tottering 
 empire of the Hapsburgs contributed powerfully to stifle 
 a dangerous and menacing insurrection ; and if it is 
 true that in order to obtain this help it was sufficient 
 to remind the Czar Nicholas of a promise previously 
 made, in a moment of friendly effusion, the action 
 
24 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 becomes still more meritorious, and does still more 
 honour to the heart of the autocrat.* 
 
 It is undeniable that the intervention in Hungary- 
 bears the stamp of a generous and chivalrous 
 nature, and was in itself an undertaking that 
 astonished its contemporaries and confounded the 
 wisest. The most skilful statesmen of Europe, who, 
 during that troubled period, had sufficient leisure 
 to glance occasionally towards the Danube, Lord 
 Palmerston among others, remained for a long time 
 quite incredulous, and tried to guess the reward that 
 must have been stipulated upon in return for such 
 assistance. Was not the Czar to retain Galicia ? was 
 he not to receive some positive assurance about the 
 Principalities ? were questions repeatedly asked in 
 Downing Street. Yet no such thing happened. 
 The Russians quitted Austria as unencumbered by 
 
 * A writer, whose position as a former Under- Secretary of State during 
 the ministry of Prince Schwarzenberg gives his statements weight, offers 
 the following account of the origin of the Russian intervention in Hungary, 
 tracing it back as far as the year 1833, to the celebrated interview at 
 Munchengratz, between the Emperor Francis I. of Austria and the Emperor 
 Nicholas. During one of the confidential conversations which then took 
 place, Francis spoke sadly and apprehensively of the sickly and nervous 
 state of his son and presumptive heir, and begged the Czar to continue 
 the same friendship for the son which he had always entertained for 
 the father : " Nicholas fell on his knees, and, raising his right hand 
 to heaven, swore to give the successor of Francis all and every assistance 
 he might ever stand in need of. The old Emperor of Austria was deeply 
 touched, and laid his hands on the head of the kneeling Czar in sign of 
 benediction." This strange scene had no witnesses, but a few moments 
 later both emperors related it to an officer who then commanded the army 
 division stationed at Munchengratz. This officer was no other than Prince 
 Windischgraetz, who later on, in 1848, being appointed commander-in-chief of 
 the Austrian armies at the time of the Hungarian insurrection, took upon 
 himself to write to the Emperor Nicholas, reminding him of the promise 
 given at Munchengratz. The Czar replied by placing his whole army at the 
 service of his Imperial and Apostolic Majesty. (Cf. Hefter, " Geschichte 
 CEsterreichs." Prague, 1839, t, i., pp. 68, 69.) 
 
PRINCE GORTCHAKOF'S MISSIONS. 25 
 
 any reward as they had entered it free of any 
 after-thought, and the troops of Paskevitch evacu- 
 ated the land of Carpathia with hands empty of 
 any sign of booty. 
 
 A young and stormy orator in the Prussian 
 Chambers bearing the then unknown name of Bis- 
 marck he who fifteen years later was to meditate 
 " the death-blow " of Austria, and arm the legions of 
 Klapka admired at that time the brilliant conduct 
 of the Czar, and expressed his patriotic regret that 
 this magnanimous task should not have devolved upon 
 his own country of Prussia. It was for Prussia to 
 render assistance to its elder Germanic brother "its 
 old companion-in-arms." But we are at liberty to 
 suppose that, even by a king as loyal and poetical 
 as Frederick William IV., things would have been 
 managed less romantically than by the barbarian of 
 the North, and that a similar assistance lent by 
 Prussia would have cost the House of Hapsburg 
 either a portion of Silesia or a share of its influence 
 on the banks of the Main. 
 
 But are we then to understand that in intervening 
 in Hungary the Emperor of Eussia was only acting 
 from the purest feeling of chivalry and platonic friend- 
 ship, regardless of his personal interests and the 
 welfare of his empire ? No, certainly not ; and the 
 Czar was too frank to conceal his ulterior motives. 
 
 He intervened in Hungary not only as the friend of 
 the Hapsburgs, not only as the champion of the cause 
 
 * Uttered in the sitting of the Prussian Chamber of September 6th, 1849. 
 This speech does not appear in the official collection of M. do Bismarck's 
 speeches, published at Berlin. 
 
26 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 of order against the cosmopolitan spirit of revolution, 
 but because in the ranks of the Hungarian army were 
 to be found Polish generals and officers, whose aim 
 it was to carry the war even into countries subject 
 to the dominion of Eussia. In his manifesto of the 
 8th of May, 1849, Nicholas expressed himself as 
 follows : " The insurrection maintained by the in- 
 fluence of our Polish traitors of 1831 has given to 
 the revolt of the Magyars an importance which is 
 becoming more and more menacing. . . . His 
 Majesty the Emperor of Austria invites us to take 
 arms against our common foe. . . . We have 
 commanded our forces to advance, to stifle revolt and 
 anarchy, and to destroy those audacious rebels who 
 not only disturb the peace of Austria, but who 
 threaten that of our own provinces." This language 
 was clear and open, such as beseemed a sovereign 
 conscious of his power and dignity. In rendering 
 this service to his ally, Nicholas did not neglect the 
 interest of his own country. He extinguished a 
 conflagration on his neighbour's domain because it 
 menaced his own, and accomplished an act of inter- 
 vention simultaneously with one of self-preservation. 
 Now it will be granted that every sense of justice 
 dictates that gratitude should be measured by the 
 service rendered, and that the law of self-preservation- 
 supreme law of nature should bear with equal force 
 upon the recipient as upon the giver of favours. There 
 has never been a policy in the world, not even in Scrip- 
 ture, which has counselled voluntary slavery, and there 
 is no law, however sublime one may choose to deem 
 
PRINCE GORTCHAKOF'S MISSIONS. 27 
 
 it, which places suicide among the duties of gratitude. 
 Well, it was nothing less than complete slavery com- 
 plete abnegation of its position as a great European 
 state, that Eussia demanded of Austria in proposing 
 that it should subscribe to its pretensions in the East. 
 
 In geographical position, in spirit of race, in 
 religious feeling, Eussia, in its intended enterprises, 
 would have struck a death-blow at the empire of Haps- 
 burg, if that empire had allowed them to triumph. 
 
 A Danubian power herself, Austria had to take 
 care that the Lower Danube remained neutral, lest 
 it should fall into the hands of a powerful neighbour, 
 who would thus become master of this great river. 
 
 A Slavonic power in her Eastern provinces, she 
 had to guard against coming into immediate contact 
 with an empire that was traditionally Pan-Slavonic, 
 and could not wish to see it implanted in the 
 Principalities, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
 Lastly, as a Catholic power, it was forbidden her 
 to recognise the influence and the protectorate which 
 the Czar claimed over the Christians of the Greek 
 ritual, whom she counted, by several millions among 
 her subjects. 
 
 " My conduct with regard to the Eastern question 
 is inscribed on the map," said, at Vienna, Count Buol, 
 the Austrian minister, to his brother-in-law, M. de 
 Meyendorf, the Eussian ambassador; and he added 
 that it was equally inscribed in history. " I have 
 introduced no innovation, I have only continued the 
 policy bequeathed to me by M. de Metternich." And 
 in truth, in former years, during the Greek insurrection 
 
28 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 and the war of 1828, the great chancellor of the Court 
 and of the Empire had upheld the principle of 
 Ottoman independence with a steadfastness nothing 
 could shake ; had upheld it during eight years, bear- 
 ing the brunt of the storm, discouraged neither by 
 the unpopularity of the Turkish cause, nor by the 
 desertion of France. 
 
 How then could the Russians expect that Austria 
 would now desert a principle of such vital importance 
 to her, and at the very moment when she was about to 
 triumph over the indifference of the West, and reckon 
 England and France among her warmest champions ? 
 
 Divided whatever may have been said to the 
 contrary between the keenest feelings of gratitude 
 and a great political necessity, the Austrian Govern- 
 ment certainly gave to the cause of gratitude what it 
 owed. It overwhelmed the Emperor Nicholas with 
 warnings, with prayers, with offers of service, with 
 attempts at mediation. Austria forgave Russia more 
 than one want of respect, more than one burst of ill- 
 humour ; forgave it even the light tone in which her 
 Government was spoken of in the despatches to Sir 
 Hamilton Seymour ; the manner in which a certain 
 autograph letter of the Emperor Francis Joseph was 
 received at St. Petersburg ; the scornful, almost pro- 
 voking attitude of Count Orlof during his mission at 
 Vienna. She was unceasing in her endeavours to calm 
 the irritation of the Allies, to modify and attenuate 
 their programme, to make the most of any conciliatory 
 disposition on the part of the Czar, and to the end 
 hoped against hope. All that Austria pleaded for 
 
PRINCE GOETCHAKOF'S MISSIONS. 2 
 
 was a return to the static quo, repudiating any idea of 
 humiliating or circumscribing Eussia ; she only de- 
 manded the liberty of the Danube, the renunciation 
 of the protectorate ; and refused to join the Allies 
 in their demands concerning the Black Sea. Un- 
 fortunately, but, as it happens only too often to 
 those who wish to act justly and equitably by two 
 antagonists, the Austrian Government succeeded in 
 offending both France and England, and at the same 
 time exasperated the Russians. In the summer of 
 1854, when Prince Gortchakof was exchanging his 
 post of ambassador to France for that of Vienna, a 
 celebrated political writer, Eugene Forcade, who was 
 then, so to say, the mouthpiece of the generous im- 
 pulses of the West, almost despaired of Austria, and 
 exclaimed bitterly that over there, at the Burg, the 
 Russian alliance was held in as sacred a light as a 
 religion, as fixed as a law, as popular as a fashion ! 
 In the spring of the following year, the Cabinets of 
 Paris and London rejected, as too favourable to Russia, 
 a fresh project of arrangements presented by Count 
 Buol, and the French Government took this oppor- 
 tunity to reproach Austria, in the Moniteur, for 
 offering " an expedient rather than a solution." 
 
 The solution the Emperor Francis Joseph certainly 
 held in his hand, and it only depended on him to 
 make it as radical and as^decisive as the direst enemies 
 of Russia could have wished. 
 
 Why should we not confess it ? When we con- 
 sider the bitter fruit gathered by Austria as the 
 harvest of her honest endeavours during the Eastern 
 
30 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 crisis, when we recognise the implacable hatred and 
 the cruel disasters her attitude at the time has since 
 drawn down upon her, we find ourselves regretting 
 that the Cabinet of Vienna was so scrupulous during 
 that memorable epoch ; we find ourselves reproaching 
 it for not having shown that selfishness of heart which 
 now, alas ! is becoming every day more necessary 
 more indispensable to the independence of states. 
 Had Austria been a little less grateful and a little 
 more politic during the war with Turkey, she would 
 have entered the fray side by side with France and 
 England, and instead of keeping the Allies prowling 
 for years round the confines of Russia in the Baltic 
 and Black Seas, would have opened for them the 
 gates of Poland and gone in with them. Instead 
 of "tickling the feet of the Colossus or cutting one 
 of his nails/' as was later remarked by Russian 
 writers, a death-blow would have been dealt him 
 such as the great hermit of Varzin knows so well 
 how to devise and how to strike. 
 
 It was certainly not in the Cabinet of the 
 Tuileries that any objections would have been en- 
 countered, for M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in his despatch 
 of March 26th, 1855, boldly proposes the Polish ques- 
 tion ; nor, certes, would the Cabinet of St. James have 
 raised any serious objections. 
 
 As to the probable result of such an enterprise, it 
 suffices us to remember that Russia had come to an 
 end of her resources ; that Prussia had not yet re- 
 formed her military organisation was not yet in 
 possession of her " instrument ;" and, lastly, that on 
 
PRINCE GORTCHAKOF'S MISSIONS. 31 
 
 the Hohenzollern throne sat Frederick the Romantic, 
 and not William the Conqueror. 
 
 The human spirit quails as it contemplates the 
 awful results that must have ensued upon such a 
 decision on the part of Francis Joseph ! The face 
 of the globe would have been changed ; Austria would 
 have known no Sadowa in 1866, Europe would have 
 never seen the dismemberment of Denmark, the 
 destruction of the Bund, nor the conquest of Alsace 
 and Lorraine. 
 
 It was, we have already said, in the summer of 
 1854 that Prince Gortchakof was made envoy to the 
 Court of Vienna. He replaced, at first provisionally, 
 but definitely in the following summer, the Baron de 
 Meyendorf, to whom the post had become very painful 
 on account of his near relationship to the Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs in Austria. Alexander Mikhailovitch 
 held at last the office to which he had so long aspired, 
 and which, during the reign of Nicholas, was, in 
 common with the same office in London, held to be 
 the greatest prize the marshal's bdton in the diplo- 
 matic career of Eussia ; but his honours were now 
 steeped in bitterness, for what patriotic sufferings 
 were now joined to a distinction once ardently 
 desired, but now accepted through love of king and 
 country ! 
 
 On the ground once so smiling and pleasant the 
 envoy of the Czar would now see nothing but weeds 
 and thorns ; in a capital renowned for its wild and 
 frivolous gaiety, he received nothing but the most 
 disastrous, heartrending news ; finally, "that Austrian 
 
32 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 ingratitude " which he had only heard of and com- 
 bated from afar at Frankfort, he had now to see 
 face to face and meet with a smile .... There 
 is a greater sorrow than the ricordarsi tempi felici 
 nella miseria, and it is to wake from dreams of happi- 
 ness to a reality of misery; and one can easily imagine 
 what a store of bitterness that sojourn at Vienna must 
 have accumulated in the heart of the Eussian patriot/'" 
 
 It would be superfluous to mention the activity 
 displayed by the Czar's new envoy during this painful 
 mission, the infinite variety of resources which he em- 
 ployed in his country's service, notably during those 
 conferences at Vienna which were held after the death 
 of Nicholas, and on the accession of Alexander II. 
 
 Nothing could be more touching or more sublime 
 than the aspect then presented by the two Gortchakofs, 
 one behind the ramparts of Sebastopol, the other before 
 the ministerial table at Vienna, each defending his 
 country with equal tenacity, fighting with desperation 
 
 * May we be allowed, in reference to this subject, to relate a piquant 
 scene, which has also its instructive side. At the Viennese Foreign Office 
 there was, at that time, a most original being, an usher, whose singularities 
 are still remembered at the Ballplatz. He bore the odd name of Kader- 
 noschka, and, placed in the large hall outside the cabinet of the Minister, 
 it was his duty to escort the different visitors to his chief. His style was of 
 the grandest, and, having been appointed to the post by the old Prince 
 Metternich, he loved to recall the fact of his having exercised his functions as 
 far back as the time of the celebrated Congress of 1815 ! . . . One day, 
 after a long interview with Prince Gortchakof, M. de Euol was surprised by 
 the entrance of Kadernoschka, whose countenance was more than usually 
 solemn, and by the news that he wished to lay before his Excellency infor- 
 mation of great importance to the State, which turned out to be that the 
 Russian envoy, after leaving the cabinet of his Excellency, had demanded 
 a glass of water, had paced the great hall for nearly half an hour, gesticu- 
 lating violently, muttering to himself, and from time to time exclaiming in 
 French, " Oh ! they shall pay for this one day ; they shall pay for it ! . . . " 
 
PRINCE GORTCHAKOF'S MISSIONS. 33 
 
 for every inch of ground, driven to the last extremity, 
 Tmt honoured to the end by their loyal and chivalrous 
 adversaries. 
 
 To-day, when an epoch of " blood and iron " has 
 accustomed us to the summary proceedings we had 
 almost said to the executions of Nikolsburg, Ferrieres, 
 Versailles, and Frankfort, and when martial law laid 
 down by helmeted diplomatists has taken the place of 
 that which old-fashioned and prejudiced Europe for- 
 merly called the rights of the people; we say that, 
 witnessing the present order of things, we cannot 
 refrain from a sentiment of astonishment, almost of 
 incredulity, when we glance over the protocols of 
 those Viennese conferences, where all was propriety, 
 politeness, urbanity, and mutual respect we fancy 
 ourselves carried back to some far away and idyllic 
 time, quite to a world of bonshommes Jadis. 
 
 M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 in France, and Lord John Russell, then Prime Minister 
 of England, did not consider it beneath their dignity 
 to go in person to Vienna, in order to discuss with 
 Prince Gortchakof the possible conditions of peace. 
 
 Eussia had lost several great battles, the allied 
 fleets were blockading all its seas, and menacing 
 even its capital ; this, however, did not prevent the 
 English and French plenipotentiaries from treating it 
 with the utmost respect, and with all those attentions 
 which diplomatists made use of in the good old 
 times. They displayed a perfect art in the invention 
 of polite terms ; striving to find the softest expres- 
 
34 THE 7'iro CHANCELLORS. 
 
 sions, terms the most acceptable to the representative 
 
 Of a vanquished power. 
 
 Tin* worthy Lord John Russell carried his good 
 nature to such a pilch as to refer, ami that in the 
 presence of M. Prouyu de Lhuys, to the tar harder 
 and more humiliating conditions which England had 
 imposed on Louis XIV. : this was, perhaps, the only 
 Want of tact that could be reported during those con- 
 ferences ai Vienna ; and it was but a pleasantry from 
 one ally to another. 
 
 As to Austria, she never wearied in watching over 
 the susceptibilities of Russia, and ended by presenting 
 a project of arrangement that was considered inad- 
 missible by the Cabinets of London and Paris, and 
 that drew down upon her that reproach of the 
 .1/0-, ..'.'<;.: Ojficiel, ot which we have already spoken. 
 
 The negotiations \\ere broken otV. and nothing 
 remained to be done but to await the issue of the 
 tiual encounter that was taking place under the walls 
 of SebaMopol. 
 
 The Russian plenipotentiary awaited the result, 
 enduring alike the combined ;. M' a patriot and 
 
 a kinsman. 
 
 f the Crimea fell, and Russia found 
 
 herself in a most critical situation. She 
 
 hausted, far more so even than Europe SUT poaed ; and 
 
 any prolongation of the war would undoubtedly have 
 
 ed hostilities into Poland. is juncture 
 
 -tria again intervened. 
 
 She supported the demands insisted upon by the 
 Allies at the Cv .onna : even the d 
 
PRINCE GORTCHAKOF'S MISSIONS. 35 
 
 which, until then, she had rejected as too injurious 
 to Kussia namely, the neutralisation of the Black 
 Sea ; indeed, it was almost impossible to refuse 
 this satisfaction to the Allies after the fall of Sebas- 
 topol. In truth, they were the mildest conditions ever 
 imposed on any power after so long and sanguinary a 
 war, and after such undoubted conquests. Austria 
 AUMit i' von farther, and sent these conditions under 
 the form of an ultimatum, declaring that she would 
 make common cause with the Allies if they were not 
 accepted. And Kussia accepted. 
 
 Here was, in truth, a service rendered to a young 
 sovereign, who had inherited a disastrous war. It 
 offered him, at the same time, the means of guarding 
 tho memory of his predecessor and the pride of his 
 people ; it allowed him to state that he only con- 
 cluded peace in the face of this new enemy which 
 had arisen by the side of the former ones, and whose 
 existence his father had not suspected. 
 
 This was the report circulated in Eussia, and which 
 was believed all the more readily as there was such 
 satisfaction in believing it. The Eussian people were 
 soon reconciled to the conquerors of the Alma and the 
 Malakof ; one power alone remained in their opinion 
 responsible for every disaster that power which, 
 during the whole war, had never drawn its sword ! 
 To this very hour every Eussian heart beats with in- 
 dignation at the thought of Austria, at the thought 
 of her colossal ingratitude, her profound treachery. 
 Alexander Mikhailovitch shared these bitter feelings, 
 these rancorous popular views, and became their most 
 
 D 2 
 
36 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 energetic and outspoken advocate, giving vent to 
 his sentiments on these topics in a manner that at 
 times bordered on ostentation. A saying of his was 
 quoted, made at Vienna, while the Congress held still 
 their sittings in Paris: "Austria is not a state, she 
 is only a government." This saying preceded him to 
 St. Petersburg, and made his fortune there. Public 
 opinion pointed him out as the future avenger of 
 Kussia, as the man destined to offer his nation the 
 means of a terrible retaliation ; and the cunning diplo- 
 matist had no wish to give the lie to so favourable 
 an opinion. Besides, at this Congress of Paris, certain 
 tendencies, certain inclinations, were revealed, which 
 opened out fresh vistas and inspired new hopes. The 
 name of Italy was pronounced ; even Eoumania found 
 unexpected favour. 
 
 During this singular Congress, in which the con- 
 ditions of peace that France, England, and Austria 
 imposed on Russia were finally decided upon, Austria 
 appeared sombre and morose, England irritated and 
 nervous ; France and Russia alone exchanged the 
 most polished amenities, the most gushing expressions 
 of cordiality. The sword of Napoleon III. seemed 
 transformed into the lance of Achilles, healing where 
 it had wounded, wounding where it -had healed. 
 "There was balm in Gilead," and hope could still 
 be placed in the sovereign presiding at the Tuileries 
 .... The day after the Congress, in the month 
 of April, 1856, the old Count Nesselrode, pleading 
 his advanced age, retired, and Alexander Mikhailo- 
 vitch became Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 FIRST APPEARANCES OF M. DE BISMARCK. 
 
 The Bismarcks of History Their Ancestor, Rulo, Master Clothier The 
 Grandfather, the "Poet," and the Great-uncle, the "Adventurer" 
 Otto Edward Leopold de Bismarck-Schoenhausen The "Grey Cloister" 
 and the " Georgia Augusta " Disputed Question of the " State Exami- 
 nation " Cultivation and Mind of M. de Bismarck as compared to 
 Prince Gortchakof The Orator An Effort of Oratory derived from 
 the " Freischiitz " The Writer Letters to Malvina The Style of 
 M. de Bismarck Failures in the Administrative and Military Careers 
 "Years of Storms and Torment" Life as Country Gentleman at 
 Kneiphof and Schoenhausen Bismarck "the Furious" Aspirant to 
 the Post of Superintendent of Dykes Parliamentary D'but of M. 
 de Bismarck His Share in the " Cross Party " A Resolute Adversary of 
 Modern Ideas and Constitutional Theories The Christian State 
 Opinion on Schleswig-Holsteinism and German Unity The Attempt 
 of General de Radowitz Prince Schwarzenberg and the Humiliation 
 of Olmiitz M. de Bismarck as Champion of Austria Minister at 
 Frankfort " His Excellency the Lieutenant" Friendship with Prince 
 Gortchakof Letters to Malvina on the Diet of Frankfort and the 
 Diplomatists of the Bund Lassitude and Disgust The Eastern Crisis 
 Growing Antipathy to Austria Community of Antipathies with 
 Prince Gortchakof Ferro et igne Contests with M. de Rechberg 
 Agitation and Travels Minister Plenipotentiary at St. Petersburg. 
 
 DURING the four years which Prince Gortchakof spent 
 in Frankfort, as the representative of his Government 
 with the German Confederation, he had, as we have 
 already seen, formed an acquaintanceship, and, in- 
 deed, was on the most intimate terms with a colleague, 
 whose singular qualities, both of heart and mind, he 
 peculiarly appreciated. 
 
38 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 The two friends separated in the summer of 1854. 
 when the Kussian plenipotentiary left in order to fulfil 
 his painful mission at Vienna ; but they were to meet 
 again before long, and to find in each other that 
 complete community of ideas and sentiments which 
 they experienced during the early days at Frankfort, 
 and which lasted uninterruptedly during twenty-five 
 years : grande mortalis cevi spatium. 
 
 This friend, won by Prince Gortchakof on the 
 smiling banks of the Main, was no other than M. de 
 Bismarck, the future Chancellor of Germany. 
 
 Otto Edward Leopold de Bismarck-Schoenhausen 
 was born on the 1st of April, 1815, at Schoenhausen, 
 the ancestral seat of his family, in the Old-Mark of 
 Brandenburg, and cannot pride himself, as may his 
 friend, Alexander Mikhailovitch, on having the blood 
 of saints in his veins. His biographer mentions, with 
 an evident complaisance, that at least two of his 
 ancestors were excommunicated by the Church, and 
 died impenitently under the ban. What is still more 
 serious is, that some of the best historians of the 
 Mark of Brandenburg, M. de Riedel among others, 
 deny that his family springs from a noble origin ; 
 they show that the first of the line of whom 
 mention is made in any authentic document of the 
 fourteenth century was called Eulo Bismarck, and 
 also that he was " Prevost of the Guild of Master 
 Clothiers " at Stendal, a small borough in the Old- 
 Mark. 
 
 The fact does not appear to admit of a doubt ; but 
 might not the burghers of Stendal, in common with 
 
FIRST APPEARANCES OF M. DE BISMARCK. 39 
 
 those of certain towns of Tuscany, have obliged every 
 country noble who wished to inhabit the city to in- 
 scribe his name on one of their guilds ? Such is the 
 opinion on the Tory side of this curious genealogical 
 question ; and to give it credence one must believe 
 that the good burghers of Stendal occupied in the 
 fourteenth century a social status similar to that of 
 the great citizens of such towns as Florence and Pisa, 
 and that Kulo Bismarck was a master tailor as much 
 .as Dante, his contemporary, was an apothecary. The 
 Whigs, on the contrary those biographers whose 
 standard bears the "National-Liberal" colours take a 
 different view, and one of them, concludes, ingeniously, 
 that however it might have been, Kulo, the ancestor, 
 *' must look down from heaven with pride and satis- 
 faction on the splendid imperial mantle that his 
 descendant has cut for King William out of the cloth 
 of Europe " 
 
 In more modern times the house of Bismarck 
 presents, in common with many other noble country 
 families of Brandenburg, an uninterrupted succession 
 of modest and faithful servants of the state, some- 
 times fulfilling military, sometimes civil duties. 
 
 The eighteenth century offers us two specimens of 
 a rather more interesting type, the grandfather and 
 the great-uncle of the Chancellor, the one surnamed 
 "the Poet," the other "the Adventurer." 
 
 The poet, we are sorry to say, composed his verses 
 in French, and the best known is an "elegy or 
 epitaph to the memory of Christina de Bismarck, 
 born at Schoenfeld, by Alexander de Bismarck, Berlin, 
 
40 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 1774." It is to the memory of his defunct wife that the 
 retired captain of cavalry has thought proper to raise 
 this monument of words and bad rhymes, full of the 
 sickly sentimentality of the age. 
 
 The adventurer, Ludolf- Augustus, does more justice 
 to his name. In a fit of rage he killed his servant ; 
 was pardoned ; entered the Eussian service ; and, be- 
 coming mixed up in some political intrigues in Cour- 
 land, was exiled to Siberia. 
 
 Pardoned for the second time, he entered the 
 Eussian diplomatic service, fulfilled several missions, 
 and, as a general officer, fell at Poltava. 
 
 It may here be mentioned that this Ludolf was 
 not the only member of his family who served under 
 the Eussian flag, and that, in consequence, the name 
 of Bismarck had for years been well known in St. 
 Petersburg. His Whig biographers make a great 
 point of the fact that the mother of the youthful Otto, 
 " an intelligent, ambitious, but somewhat austere 
 woman," was a burgher's daughter, a Miss Menken, 
 a member of a well-known family of learned scholars 
 in Leipsic. 
 
 In this manner they love to show that the restorer 
 of the empire springs, on his mother's side, from the 
 middle classes from those studious and learned 
 middle classes which constitute the great strength of 
 Germany ; though on his father's who was a retired 
 captain of cavalry, as was his grandfather the poet 
 from the nobility. 
 
 These abstruse Germans have, as we know, a 
 weakness for symbolism, and give this name to what 
 
FIRST APPEARANCES OF M. DE BISMARCK. 41 
 
 is often a mere insignificant trifle ; and thus they 
 attach a certain importance to the trivial coincidence 
 of the young Otto having been confirmed at Berlin by 
 Schleiermacher, the celebrated doctor of divinity, 
 whose science was of a far more respectable nature 
 than his life, and say " that thus, for one fleeting but 
 solemn moment, the youth who was called to such an 
 eminently active life was brought into contact with 
 our learned theology and our romantic philosophy. 
 
 They also do not fail to remember the name of 
 "Grey Cloister" (Grauer-Kloster] borne by the Lyceum 
 at which the future destroyer of convents pursued his 
 early studies ; nor to note the French origin of one 
 of its principal professors, Doctor Bonnell, a descen- 
 dant of a Huguenot family which had sought refuge 
 in Brandenburg after the edict of Nantes. 
 
 After having finished his studies at the Lyceum of 
 the Grey Cloister, Otto de Bismarck went to the uni- 
 versity of Gottingen,to the celebrated Georgia- Augusta, 
 professedly to take his degree, but in reality to lead the 
 life of those sons of the muses who have at the same 
 time the good or bad fortune to be also sons of the no- 
 bility, cavalieri. Here, neglecting all else, he adopted 
 as his chief pursuits hunting, riding, swimming, gym- 
 nastics, and fencing. Otto de Bismarck fought more 
 than twenty duels, and fully justified the proud title 
 of bursche* which clung to him for many a year, even 
 when replaced by the graver titles of ambassador and 
 minister. 
 
 One can easily imagine that, devoting so much 
 
 * Fighting student. 
 
42 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 time to bodily exercise, lie could have little left in 
 which to attend to any mental cultivation, or to 
 pursue the study of law ; and even the removal from 
 the noisy Georgia- Augusta to the calmer and quieter 
 academy at Berlin was found to be a remedy more 
 heroic than efficacious. 
 
 Did M. de Bismarck ever pass that " government 
 examination" (Stoats Examen) which in Prussia 
 forms an indispensable prelude to every public career ? 
 A serious question, which was freely and lengthily dis- 
 cussed in Germany, and used as a weapon for twenty 
 years against M. de Bismarck when chief of his party, 
 when deputy, when ambassador, and when prime 
 minister. It is worthy of notice and thoroughly charac- 
 teristic of the formal and pedantic spirit of the nation, 
 that M. de Bismarck had defied all Europe and dismem- 
 bered the Danish monarchy, and still the opposition 
 papers in Germany were exploding from time to time, 
 like tardy fireworks, over this much discussed and pro- 
 blematic question of his " government examination." 
 
 It is only since the period of Sadowa that this 
 misplaced spite has ceased : Sadowa cast a veil over 
 this and over many other irregularities assuredly of a 
 far more serious nature. 
 
 This is perhaps the fittest time in which to ask 
 what benefits M. de Bismarck derived from his uni- 
 versity education, and to scan, if but cursorily, the 
 cultivation and style of his mind. It certainly ap- 
 pears that M. de Bismarck is neither a studious nor a 
 scientific man, and that his liberal education presents 
 more than one gap. 
 
FIR8T APPEARANCES OF M. DE BISMARCK. 43 
 
 What a curious contrast is presented by the two 
 chancellors, Kussian and German the one educated 
 in a Lyceum of more than doubtful worth, the other 
 having frequented the most renowned gymnasium and 
 alma mater of the learned Germans ; and yet ifc is 
 the pupil of Tsarskoe-Selo who, in point of classical 
 learning and true humaniora, shines superior to the 
 fortunate nursling of the Georgia- Augusta. Still, we 
 must not omit to state that M. de Bismarck quite 
 fulfils, and even exceeds, the rules laid down by the 
 witty and lamented St. Marc Girardin, as being 
 necessary for a well-educated man of the world. " I 
 do not ask," says this writer, " that they should know 
 Latin ; I only ask that they should have forgotten it." 
 
 From his university career, however, the German 
 Chancellor still retains certain fragments of cultivation, 
 of which he well knows how to make use at times ; 
 and he possesses a very ample knowledge of his Bible, 
 his Shakespeare, his Goethe, and his Schiller, four ele- 
 ments that are usually included in the most ordinary 
 German education precious and much-to-be-envied 
 quadrivium of the children of Armenius ! Prince 
 Gortchakof possesses all the subtleties, joined to all the 
 weaknesses, of the man of letters ; the expressions he 
 employs are highly finished, his sentences are modelled 
 and remodelled ; and, from the extreme beauty of his 
 compositions, he has been surnamed the Narcissus of 
 the desk. In his exquisite tastes and artistic instincts 
 he shows a marked superiority over his former col- 
 league of Frankfort ; but this latter rises to his level 
 when we consider the stamp of originality which he is 
 
44 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 capable of giving to liis thoughts and words, when 
 we note his individuality, his creative power, the 
 mens agitans molem that mysterious and powerful 
 something which the antique sculptors depicted so 
 ingeniously by placing a flame on the brow of certain 
 of their statues. The Chancellor of Germany is not 
 a man of letters in the strict and somewhat vulgar 
 acceptation of the word ; nor is he, to speak correctly, 
 either an orator or a writer. He cannot develop a 
 theme, or graduate his arguments, 'or thoroughly 
 weigh his speeches ; he cannot construct his periods, 
 and does not endeavour to do so ; he is often troubled 
 to find suitable expressions, in the rostrum as when 
 holding the pen ; his style clashes, is often very in- 
 correct, and as little academic as possible ; he is even 
 confused, halting, and trivial at times. With many 
 reservations we might compare his style of expression 
 to that of Cromwell ; but even more than in Cromwell 
 are we forced to admire the lightning-like thoughts, 
 the powerful and unforeseen imagery, those words 
 which strike and penetrate, and remain indelibly 
 engraven. 
 
 Lately, during an argument of a somewhat inco- 
 herent and embarrassed nature, which treated of his 
 conflict with Rome, he suddenly exclaimed : " Rest 
 assured of one thing, gentlemen, ive shall not go to 
 Canossa ! " expressing in that one sentence a kind of 
 menacing cceterum censeo, and a whole world of 
 memories and passions. In a very different spirit, in 
 a time already long past, it is true twenty years ago, 
 perhaps speaking one day of the principles of revolu- 
 
FIRST APPEARANCES OF M. DE BISMARCK. 45 
 
 tions and counter-revolutions, lie said, meaning to 
 imply that no parliamentary debate would ever decide 
 between these two principles: "The decision will only 
 come from God ; from the God of Battle, when He 
 shall shake the iron dice of destiny from His hands." 
 
 We fancy, in hearing such phrases, that we are 
 listening to M. de Maistre ; and, similar to M. de 
 Maistre, the German Chancellor has uttered a passage 
 suitable for an executioner we mean his invocation of 
 iron and of blood ; an invocation that must be placed 
 side by side with the events that produced it in order 
 to extract its value from its incontestable brutality. 
 The invocation was made in the days when the 
 National-Liberals, now so subservient, so obedient to 
 him, would have opposed his army reforms, but de- 
 manded at the same time the union of Germany. 
 The man, feeling in his soul the rising storms of 
 Sadowa and Sedan, thundered back the defiance 
 which he has since carried out but too truly. " It is 
 not by speech-making that you will unite Germany ; 
 to cement this union, what is wanted is blood and 
 iron !" . . . . The orator is not at his ease 
 in the tight uniform which he never quits, and he 
 generally confines himself to short sallies and freaks 
 of speech. 
 
 It is with effort that he piles up the clouds 
 of his rhetoric though in the end the lightning- 
 glances from them, illuminating the entire situation. 
 In order to be understood he will employ the loftiest 
 or the most familiar imagery, and will cite as may 
 be most apposite Shakespeare or Goethe in the same 
 
46 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 breath with " les Guepes " of Alphonse Karr or some 
 Vaudeville couplet. 
 
 One of these most happy, most memorable inspi- 
 rations he suddenly wrested on one occasion from the 
 libretto of the " Freischiitz." May we be permitted to 
 call to mind this episode, even at the risk of losing 
 a little time in preliminary explanations 'which a 
 German audience, well versed in all appertaining to 
 the " Freischutz," did not, of course, require. In this 
 opera of Weber's, Max, the good but unfortunate 
 hunter, borrows a cartridge from Robin, the evil 
 genius, and with it immediately brings down an eagle, 
 one of whose plumes he proudly fixes in his cap. 
 
 He asks for a few more of these cartridges, but 
 Eobin tells him that they contain "magic bullets," 
 and in order to possess them he must sell his soul to 
 Satan. Max draws back, and Robin then informs 
 him, amid infernal laughter, that it is too late now to 
 draw back, that the compact is concluded, and that he 
 is already compromised by the cartridge of which he 
 has made use. " Dost thou think yonder eagle was a 
 free gift ? " . . . 
 
 Well! when, in 1849, the young Brandenburg 
 orator implored the Prussian Chamber not to accept 
 the Imperial crown offered to the king of Prussia by 
 the Frankfort Parliament, he ended by exclaiming : 
 "It is the hand of Radicalism that offers the king this 
 gift ! Sooner or later Radicalism will rise up before 
 the king, will ask for its recompense, and, pointing to 
 the emblematic eagle on the new imperial flag, will 
 say : ' Dost thou think this eagle was a free gift ? ' ' 
 
FIRST APPEARANCES OF M. DE BISMARCK. 47 
 
 An imagery as striking and profound as it was in- 
 genious ! One cannot make use with impunity of the 
 " enchanted bullets of revolution, and one cannot con- 
 clude a compact with the demon of popularity without 
 giving up some shreds of one's soul. Sooner or later 
 the evil genius whose help you have invoked, the 
 Eobin of the woods and streets, will rise up, and, 
 grasping your salvation, will tell you that he is not 
 in the habit of working for nothing." 
 
 This splendid burst of oratory on the part of the 
 youthful deputy of the Mark might well have been re- 
 membered with pride, and been the source of fruitful 
 meditation to the Chancellor on more than one deci- 
 sive occasion ; on the day, for instance, on which he 
 overthrew such or such a secular throne, or on 
 the day when he gave the signal to begin the war of 
 civilisation. 
 
 What he is as an orator he is also as a writer, 
 and in mentioning this last acquirement we have most 
 prominently before us the intimate and familiar letters 
 which have been published in George Hesekiel's book, 
 and which have met with such well-merited success in 
 Germany. 
 
 We find in these letters the same obscurity, the 
 same halting elocution, the same confusion, yet lit up 
 from time to time by life-like and original expressions, 
 by the most astounding figures of speech, by a bitter 
 and derisive humour, which grinds and crushes with 
 cruel voluptuousness. 
 
 The letters are mostly addressed to his sister, his 
 " dear Malvina" (married to an Arnim), and we shall 
 
48 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 have to glance more than once at their pages during 
 the course of these remarks. 
 
 In them have been pointed out to us certain 
 descriptions of nature of moonlight, of the North 
 Sea, of the Danube from the heights of Buda-Pesth : 
 pictures not without merit, and somewhat in the 
 style of Heinrich Heine ; as we might also say 
 that there is a something of Hamlet (and what a 
 Hamlet !) in the following sentence, the only one 
 breathing the slightest sentiment of melancholy among 
 so many robust and sanguinary outbursts : 
 
 " Thank God everything is in reality but a question 
 of time countries and individuals, wisdom and folly, 
 peace and war ! After all, everything in this world 
 is but hypocrisy and jugglery, and, once denuded of 
 their fleshly mask, the fool and the sage must be 
 wonderfully alike ; and, their skeletons properly pre- 
 pared, it must be very difficult to distinguish between 
 a Prussian and an Austrian. Surely this ought to 
 cure us of any very special patriotism." And these 
 are lines graven by the same hand that has since- 
 guided, we must suppose, by a very special patriotism 
 handed over so many subjects to the skeleton 
 makers ! 
 
 One sees in these letters that M. de Bismarck began 
 
 o 
 
 early to practise the style of irony in which he is now 
 a past-master; irony of the coldest, most contemptuous 
 kind, merging from time to time into bitter laughter. 
 It appears in his speeches, in his conversations with 
 ministers and ambassadors, and in his diplomatic nego- 
 tiations, at moments of the utmost historical importance. 
 
FIRST APPEARANCES OF M. DE BISMARCK. 49 
 
 At such times his irony will take the form of the 
 greatest openness or the most urbane politeness ; 
 but an openness that inclines one to fall down and 
 worship the first tolerably decent lie, and an urbanity 
 that makes one welcome an outspoken incivility as a 
 positive relief. 
 
 Once, on the eve of the war of 1866, Count 
 de Karolyi, Austrian ambassador, acting in the name 
 of his Government, summoned M. de Bismarck to 
 declare categorically whether his intentions were to 
 annul the Treaty of Gastein. " No/' was the answer ; 
 " I have no such intentions ; but, if I had, should I 
 have given you a different answer ? " This is an 
 example of a frankness that utterly puts one to rout, 
 that dismays, and cries in one's ears with the devil 
 in the " Inferno "- 
 
 " Tu non pensavi ch' io loico fossi ! " 
 
 As to that cloak of murderous politeness in which 
 M. de Bismarck's sarcasm at times veils itself, we may 
 cite as an example the speech which he cast in the 
 faces of the negotiators of Versailles, when they came 
 to him to treat of the surrender of famished Paris, and 
 offered two hundred millions. " Oh !" exclaimed he, 
 " Paris is too important a town to be treated so 
 meanly, let us do it the honour of a thousand 
 millions ; " and this is the peculiar form which the 
 emulator of Heine gives to the maxima reverentia 
 which we owe to misfortune ! . . . When in riper 
 years one is destined to exercise one's wit at the ex- 
 pense of princes and countries, it is not surprising 
 
50 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 that in youth one should have exercised the same wit 
 over so trivial an object as a poor Pomeranian peasant 
 who had drunk too much water. 
 
 In one of his letters to his dear Malvina, the 
 youthful country gentleman speaks with the greatest 
 hilarity of an inundation which had just covered 
 one of his domains traversed by a little " affluent " 
 of the meagre river Hampel. This inundation had 
 cut him off from his neighbours, and had carried 
 away several barrels of his eau-de-vie, "causing an 
 interregnum of confusion from Schievelbein to Damm;" 
 and he concludes his letter with this stroke " I am 
 proud to be able to say, that, in my little affluent of 
 the Hampel, a waggoner, along with his horse and load 
 of tar, has actually been able to drown himself ! " . . . 
 
 With what an increase of pride this gentleman 
 must have witnessed, later in life, when Europe had 
 become his domain, a chief and his army, an empire 
 and its ruler, vanish beneath another inundation, 
 whose waves were blood : currus Gallice et auriga 
 ejus / . . . 
 
 Yet, in spite of this, at another time the youthful 
 country gentleman threw himself bravely into the water 
 to save his groom, and gained that medal for saving 
 human life which for years was the sole decoration on the 
 broad breast of the Minister of Prussia at Frankfort. On 
 being questioned one day, by a colleague at the Bund, as 
 to his decoration, of the nature of which the diplomatic 
 corps was ignorant, he replied, in that tone of voice 
 peculiarly his own, that once by accident he had saved 
 a man ; in a moment of idleness, of course ; and it would 
 
FIRST APPEARANCES OF M. DE BISMARCK. 51 
 
 have taken but little further questioning for him to 
 have replied that it was but to take exercise in 
 swimming that he had done it. 
 
 But now to resume. From the days of his appren- 
 ticeship at the Grey Cloister and the Georgia- Augusta, 
 Otto de Bismarck carried away with him a load of 
 literature neither weighty nor complete, but which has 
 proved sufficient, and has enabled him to travel round 
 the world of politics with care and honour. And even 
 at that early period his mind revealed many precious 
 qualities which still distinguish him a lively and 
 powerful imagination, a rare wealth of expression, at 
 times full of grandeur, at times vulgar, but always 
 striking; and, lastly, a humour which has not- its 
 equal, and which, to use the expression of Jean Paul, 
 "is a sirocco to the mind." But in all this there is 
 a complete want of grace, of charm, of distinction, of 
 delicacy no generous fibres, no soft or sympathetic 
 chords, none of that " milk of human kindness " of 
 which the poet speaks, an utter absence of the charity 
 which, according to the great Christian moralist, is 
 the celestial perfume of the soul. As to the art, or 
 rather the trade, which consists in the laborious study 
 of sentences, in the consideration of their affinity 
 and their coherence, in the introduction of harmony 
 and light into the different parts of a speech in 
 one word, as to his style, M. de Bismarck has either 
 never learnt or always scorned it. 
 
 If we dared to apply to his style one of those 
 trivial but expressive comparisons of which he himself 
 offers us many examples, we would willingly compare 
 
 * 2 
 
52 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 it to a certain strange and almost incredible beverage 
 which the Chancellor of Germany has always loved 
 namely, a mixture of champagne and porter. His 
 language is like his beverage, containing the piquant, 
 sparkling elements of the champagne at the same 
 time as the heaviness, blackness, and especially the 
 bitterness of the stout. 
 
 Finally, we must consider the strange anomaly that 
 the man who was one day to impose the severe Prussian 
 bureaucratic and military rules on all the German 
 States ; who was, to use his own expression, " to place 
 Germany in the saddle/' and to restrain it in the bonds 
 of obligatory service who indirectly, even, was to 
 excite all Europe to military exercises, and make it leave 
 the plough for the sword, quit liberal occupations for 
 summer and autumn manoeuvres; we must consider 
 the anomaly that this man himself could never bow his 
 neck to scholarly tasks, nor endure the regular work 
 of an office or of a soldier's life. We have it on 
 his own confession that a space of two hours was the 
 whole extent of time ever devoted to any course of 
 lecture during his stay at the Georgia- Augusta. His 
 university life being terminated, he made several 
 attempts to pursue an administrative or judicial 
 career ; he tried it at Aix-la-Chapelle, at Potsdam, 
 at Greifswalde, then again at Potsdam ; but each time 
 abandoned it, either in disgust at the monotonous office 
 work, or from quarrels with his superiors. Touching 
 on this last reason, there is on record a piquant 
 answer from the young referendarius (barrister) to 
 his chief, who had made him wait in the ante-room 
 
FIRST APPEARANCES OF M. DE BISMARCK. 53 
 
 for upwards of an hour : " I had come to ask you 
 for a short holiday ; but during this long hour I have 
 had time to reflect, and I now beg to offer my resigna- 
 tion." He afterwards twice tried the army, without 
 attaining a higher rank than that of lieutenant of 
 landwehr, a rank which he, however, greatly prized, and 
 the uniform of which he wore on every solemn occasion, 
 even as minister at Frankfort ; we know that since then 
 Sadowa has brought him the insignia of a general. 
 
 Those ten or twelve years which filled for M. de 
 Bismarck the period between his much - discussed 
 government examination and his entry into the 
 Prussian Chamber, are honoured by his German bio- 
 graphers with the fine-sounding title of " years of 
 storm and struggle," which calls to mind the name 
 given to one of the most brilliant epochs of German 
 literature/"" 
 
 They were certainly years filled with miscarried 
 schemes of every description, financial embarrassments, 
 and, perhaps, with a disappointed love. We are in- 
 clined to believe this last fact from a passage taken 
 from one of his letters to his sister Malvina : "It is 
 in vain for one to rebel ; I know I shall marry * 
 the world expects it ; and nothing, perhaps, is more 
 natural as we are restes tons les deux sur le carreau. 
 She does not inspire me with any warm affection, it is 
 true ; but none of them do that ; and after all one is not 
 so badly off but what one can change one's feelings 
 as one does one's linen, however long the latter may 
 liave been worn." 
 
 * Sturm und Drang Periode early period of Goethe and Schiller. 
 
54 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 He seems to have felt a sincere affection for thi& 
 sister, and lavishes on her the tenderest epithets ; 
 sometimes he calls her " his dear little one," or " dear 
 little Malvina," " his good little Arnim," his " Creusa," 
 and sometimes he calls her (forgive him, oh ye gods 
 of Walhalla !) simply, and in French, " ma sceur ! " 
 In all his letters of this period, dating in a great 
 measure from his estates of Kniephof or Schcen- 
 hausen (it was only in later years that M. de 
 Bismarck purchased the famous estate of Varzin), 
 we trace, mingled with his usual bitterness of mind, 
 a certain disenchantment ; also traces of pecuniary 
 troubles, while his views for the future are of the 
 most modest description, and rarely touch upon 
 politics. In 1846 he attaches great importance to 
 being nominated captain of the dykes for his district 
 (deichhauptmann). " The place is not a remunerative 
 one," he writes, " but is of importance with regard to 
 Schcenhausen and other estates, for on its occupant 
 depends, in great measure, whether we shall be 
 under water, as during last year. . . . Bernard (a 
 friend) insists on my going to Berlin ; I should like 
 to know what he means by it. He maintains that my 
 inclinations and character adapt me to the service 
 of the State, and that sooner or later I shall 
 enter it." 
 
 Then suddenly, and on the very eve of the meeting 
 of the first Prussian Parliament, one is taken aback by 
 his planning an immediate journey to the Indies, with 
 the probable intention of making his fortune and 
 settling out there ; and involuntarily the mind turns 
 
FIRST APPEARANCES OF M. DE BISMARCK. 55 
 
 to Cromwell, who once intended to embark for 
 America on the eve of the Long Parliament. 
 
 My readers must not, however, fancy that time 
 passed sadly at Kniephof or Schcenhausen ; on the 
 contrary, the style of life was that of the German 
 junker (country squire), and the officers from the 
 neighbouring garrisons afforded company of a merry 
 and substantial nature : " We empty great cups filled 
 half with champagne half with porter ; we waken our 
 guests in the morning by firing off pistols close to 
 their, pillows ; we terrify our lady-cousins by letting 
 loose four foxes in the drawing-room ; and we do 
 justice to the name given to the proprietor of the 
 domain by the whole neighbourhood namely, that of 
 'the .mad Bismarck (der tolle Bismarck}.' ' 
 
 We hear of his violence and of his duels with 
 sword and pistol, and even to his condescending now 
 and then to a pugilistic encounter. One day, being in 
 a beer-saloon at Berlin, the former pupil of the 
 Georgia-Augusta broke his mug of beer over the 
 head of an unknown person, who had delivered him- 
 self of certain disrespectful speeches concerning a 
 member of the royal family not, however, without 
 having previously addressed a charitable word of 
 warning to the insolent speaker, nor, afterwards, 
 without quietly and politely asking the waiter the 
 cost of the breakage. This occurred in 1850. M. de 
 Bismarck had already occupied the post of deputy 
 for several years, and was on the point of becoming 
 minister plenipotentiary to the German Confederation. 
 
 It was not only at Kniephof and Schcenhausen that 
 
56 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 the future Chancellor of Germany bore the name of 
 " der tolle Bismarck ;" the Berlinese themselves had no 
 other name for him for a long time, during the whole 
 parliamentary career of the young deputy ; from the 
 time of his maiden speech and his first appearance in 
 the tribune when, after provoking an indescribable 
 tumult by a violent attack upon the Liberals, he 
 drew a newspaper from his pocket and sat down 
 tranquilly to peruse its pages, awaiting the subsiding 
 of the storm till his last speech of the 3rd of 
 December, 1850, which raised the indignation of the 
 Chambers to its height, but gained the orator a diplo- 
 matic appointment. 
 
 The law of success works backwards, similarly to 
 the law of nobility in China, and embellishes and 
 brightens with its rays the doubtful antecedents of 
 the favourite of fortune. 
 
 It would only be to confuse all historical per- 
 spective to say that in M. de Bismarck could be fore- 
 shadowed, from 1847 to 1850, any tokens of the 
 important part he was to play fifteen years later. 
 The truth is that the part he thus played during this 
 early period was neither sufficiently important nor 
 sufficiently conspicuous to have tempted anyone to 
 draw any inference at all from it. As an active and 
 restless member of the Junker party, in 1847, and of 
 the important body of the Party of the Cross, which 
 was formed after the revolution of February, the squire 
 of Schcenhausen was very far from occupying the 
 position of a Gerlach or a Stahl, or the proud position 
 of a feudal lord of Silesia or Pomerania. 
 
FIRST APPEARANCES OF M. DE BISMARCK. 57 
 
 In spite of his audacity, his impetuosity, and cool- 
 ness in spite of many striking outbursts of an 
 eloquence which was far rougher and more em- 
 barrassed than it is to-day, M. de Bismarck was at 
 that time only the Hotspur, or F enfant terrible, of 
 the sacred ranks which defended the throne, altar, 
 and conservatism. He was, in some sort, a kind of 
 General du Temple of the skirmishers of Borussia a 
 General du Temple with a dash of a Marquis de Pire. 
 
 Take him for all in all, he was but a successful 
 edition of Thadden-Triglaff, that heroic M. Thadden- 
 Triglaff who declared that he wished for nothing more 
 than the liberty of the press, but on one condition, 
 " that, side by side with every journal should stand 
 a gibbet, on which to hang its contributors.' 7 
 
 The propositions of M. de Bismarck (a friend and 
 neighbour of this ingenious legislator for the press) 
 were often not more reasonable, for did he not publicly 
 exclaim on one occasion " that all large towns should 
 be destroyed and razed to the ground for being, as he 
 termed them, the eternal hot-beds of revolution ? " 
 
 The Athenians of the Spree laughed at these 
 sallies, and repeated his humorous saying, especially 
 admiring the argument ad hominem of the blow 
 with the beer-mug. 
 
 Sometimes also they commented maliciously on the 
 advances made to the democrats by the country squire 
 of Schcenhausen. These advances were made inter- 
 mittently, and when he was in a good humour. Even 
 twelve years later, and at the moment when returning 
 from France, he was about to assume the reins of 
 
58 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 government, he amused his surroundings with the 
 well-known olive branch, which he displayed one day 
 to a former colleague in the Chamber, the very radical 
 Doctor d'Ester. 
 
 "This branch," said he to the doctor, "was 
 gathered as I passed through Vaucluse, on the grave 
 of Laura and Petrarch. I keep it carefully in my cigar- 
 case, and intend to offer it at some appropriate time 
 to the gentlemen of the Eed, "in sign of reconciliation." 
 It is a most singular trait in this extra- 
 ordinary man's career, that he is only believed to be 
 serious when he becomes terrible. " Mad Bismarck " 
 was his appellative in Germany during 1850. At 
 Frankfort, the Count Eechberg called him disdainfully 
 abursche, and as late even as 1864 he was regarded 
 by a French minister of considerable ability as being 
 a very contemptible person. In the following year, 
 on the historic sands of Biarritz, he pursued the 
 Emperor Napoleon III. with his plans, who, leaning 
 on the arm of the author of " Colomba," whispered 
 from time to time to that academic senator, " He is 
 mad ! " Five years later, the visionary of Ham sur- 
 rendered his sword to the madman of the Mark. 
 
 "I belong," says M. de Bismarck, defiantly, in 
 one of his early speeches in the Chambers, " I belong 
 to a party that glories in the reproach that its 
 opinions are old-fashioned and belong to a bygone 
 age. I belong to that great multitude which you 
 oppose with disdain by the more intelligent classes 
 of the nation." He wanted a Christian state. "With- 
 out ft religious basis," he says, "the State becomes 
 
 
FIRST APPEARANCES OF M. DE BISMARCK. 59 
 
 nothing but a chance conglomeration of interests, a 
 sort of bastion in a war of all against all ; without 
 this religious basis, all legislation, instead of seeking 
 fresh strength at the well of eternal truth, becomes 
 tossed to and fro by humanitarian ideas as vague as 
 they are changing/' 
 
 It was for this reason that he opposed the emanci- 
 pation of the Jews, and rejected with horror the 
 institution of civil marriage, an institution which, 
 to use his own words, degraded the Church to the 
 position of train-bearer to a subaltern bureaucracy.*"" 
 
 He showed himself as exacting for the throne as 
 for the altar; he denied the sovereignty of the people; 
 and universal suffrage (which he himself introduced 
 later on throughout the entire German empire) 
 appeared to him as a social danger and an outrage on 
 common sense ! 
 
 He denied the rights of the nation, the crown 
 alone had any rights : the old Prussian spirit recog- 
 nised none other; " and," he added, "that old Prussian 
 spirit is a Bucephalus, docile enough in the hands 
 of his legitimate master, but who would fling to 
 the ground any audacious cockney-rider (sonntags- 
 reiter) I " 
 
 As the resolute adversary of modern ideas, of 
 constitutional theories, and of every item which was 
 contained in the programme of the then Liberal party 
 
 * Sitting of the Chamber on the 15th November, 1849. It is well 
 known that since then the German Chancellor has lately instituted a law 
 which introduces civil marriage into Prussia. It maybe added that none of 
 the speeches which we are about to quote will be found in the official 
 collection of M. do Bismarck's speeches published at Berlin. 
 
<30 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 in Prussia, the deputy of the Mark combated with 
 energy the two great national passions of this 
 party ; the " deliverance " of Schleswig-Holstein, and 
 the unity of Germany. He regretted that ' ' the royal 
 Prussian troops should have been employed to up- 
 hold the revolution in Schleswig against its legiti- 
 mate sovereign the King of Denmark ; " and affirmed 
 that they were provoking a regular old wives' quarrel, 
 a squabble " cl propos of nothing ; " and finished by 
 declaring, in the midst of an indignant Chamber, that 
 the war they were stirring up in the duchies of the 
 Elbe was " an eminently iniquitous, frivolous, disas- 
 trous, and revolutionary enterprise."' 
 
 As for the unity of Germany, the young orator 
 of the Ultras rejected it in the name of justice, in the 
 name of the sovereignty and of the independence of 
 its princes, as well as in the name of real patriotism. 
 He was a Prussian a Prussian of the old school 
 (stockpremse) and had little wish to see, grafted on 
 to the old and steady Borussian tree, " the shifty, 
 changing growths of the South." He appealed to 
 the army. Did it ask to exchange its old national 
 colours, black and white, for that German tricolour, 
 which had ever been the emblem of revolution ? 
 Did it wish to exchange the old Dessauer march 
 for some song composed by Professor Arndt on the 
 " German Fatherland ? " We have already mentioned 
 his speech in opposition to the offer of the imperial 
 crown by the Frankfort Parliament, and his in- 
 
 * Sitting of the Chambers on the 21st April, 1849. See also the inter- 
 pellation of M. de Temme in the sitting of the 17th April, 1863. 
 
FIRST APPEARANCES OF M. DE BISMARCK. 61 
 
 genious quotation from the libretto of the "Frei- 
 schiitz." Although Frederick William IV. refused 
 the imperial crown, he nevertheless strove during 
 1849 and 1850 to save a few spars from the wreck of 
 the plan of German unity, and with the help of the 
 German Liberals he succeeded in grouping around him 
 a notable portion of the Germanic body, and in creat- 
 ing a sort of Northern Confederation. " The restricted 
 union " became for a time the watchword of a pro- 
 gramme which General Radowitz was empowered 
 to realise by the aid of the Parliament of Erfurth. 
 M. de Bismarck condemned without pity or hesitation 
 all these vain efforts, and, in common with the great 
 theorist of his party, the celebrated Professor Stahl, 
 pleaded for the return to the statu quo which pre- 
 ceded 1848. These two demanded "that the broken 
 column of justice in Germany should be raised up 
 anew ;" that the Bund should be replaced on its 
 legal basis, according to the terms contained in the 
 Treaty of Vienna ; and unceasingly warned Prussian 
 politics from taking any " Phaeton-like flights " into 
 regions of clouds and storms. 
 
 The storms, indeed, did not fail to burst, and 
 "Phaeton's course" was brusquely arrested by the 
 hand of that great Austrian minister, who himself 
 only flashed like a meteor through the most elevated 
 regions of power to disappear as suddenly, leaving 
 behind him the most enduring regrets. The Prince 
 Felix of Schwarzenberg calls to mind in many respects 
 the school of statesmen of whom England has shown 
 the most surprising examples the Peterboroughs, the 
 
62 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 Bentincks, and others of a similar type who, sud- 
 denly abandoning a life of pleasure and the vanities of 
 society, appeared before the world as political marvels, 
 only to die in their prime, after having drained to the 
 dregs the very different cups of happiness and glory. 
 
 We know with what a firm and daring hand the 
 prince grasped the helm of public affairs in Austria, 
 and in how short a space of time he succeeded in 
 re-establishing a monarchy that was tottering on the 
 brink of an abyss. Was his conduct irreproachable 
 on every point ? Was it clear-sighted to the end ? 
 These are questions on which we cannot at present 
 dilate : we must restrict ourselves to the statement 
 that rarely has any minister met with more good 
 fortune in so short a career, been more confident in 
 his own success, or assumed a prouder or more dis- 
 dainful tone when placed in the most painful straits. 
 
 On this occasion Prince Schwarzenterg spoke with 
 all the authority with which he was invested spoke, 
 perhaps, too harshly and for a time Prussia seemed 
 on the point of picking up the gauntlet. Frederick 
 William IV. asked the Chambers to vote fourteen 
 millions of dollars, with which to place his army in 
 readiness for war, and delivered a warlike speech. 
 Europe became attentive ; the National Assembly of 
 France was on the point of levying fresh troops ; and 
 like a prophetic prelude to a tragedy which was not 
 to be performed till fifteen years later in 1850, as in 
 1866, Louis Napoleon thought fit to encourage the 
 Cabinet of Berlin, to encourage it secretly, and in 
 direct opposition to the sentiments of his country. 
 
FIRST APPEARANCES OF M. DE BISMARCK. 63 
 
 While the French National Assembly was declaring 
 itself most emphatically in favour of neutrality, and 
 the Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed even to incline 
 towards Austria, the President of the Eepublic was, 
 sending a confidential envoy, M. de Persigny, to 
 Berlin, charged with the mission of encouraging the 
 King of Prussia as much as possible to engage in war. 
 "War seemed inevitable ; the troops on both sides had 
 already taken up positions ; there had even been a few 
 skirmishes at the outposts. Suddenly, and in conse- 
 quence of a menacing ultimatum on the part of Vienna, 
 backed up by some friendly advice from St. Peters- 
 burg, M. de Manteuffel, the President of the Prussian 
 Council, proposed a meeting on the frontier at Oder- 
 berg to the Austrian Premier. A few hours later he 
 telegraphed to him (a most unusual proceeding in those 
 days) that, in accordance with the positive orders of 
 his king, he would start 'for Olmiitz without awaiting 
 his reply. He went there, and on the 29th of 
 November, 1850, signed the preliminaries of peace 
 the celebrated "punctuations," in which Prussia 
 agreed on every point to the demands of Austria. 
 
 It was not surprising that such a profound humilia- 
 tion preceded by an act so indicative of distress, 
 until then unheard of in the annals of diplomacy, 
 and followed by an Austrian despatch which need- 
 lessly envenomed the wound*'" filled the Liberals in 
 
 * A circular of Prince Schwarzenberg's, published by an intentional 
 mistake, after setting forth the incident of the telegraph, and the truly 
 desperate pursuit of the Austrian Minister by M. de Manteuffel, added, 
 "H.M. the Emperor could not refuse the wishes of the King of Prussia, 
 when they were so modestly expressed." 
 
64 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 Prussia with pain and indignation. It was in vain 
 that M. de Manteuffel tried to justify his conduct 
 before the national representatives, declaring that he 
 would rather " face conical balls than such sharp 
 speeches " (lieber spitzkugeln als spitze reden) ; the 
 Chambers of Berlin passionately re-echoed the com- 
 plaints of the country, and M. de Vincke concluded 
 a most vehement philippic with the words, " Down 
 with the Ministry !" 
 
 Only one orator had the courage to defend the 
 minister, and at such a time to exculpate Austria. In 
 the preceding year M. de Bismarck had already coveted 
 for his country the part that was played by the 
 Emperor Nicholas in Hungary, and since then had 
 never neglected an opportunity of revenging every 
 insult offered to the Hapsburgs by the German 
 Liberals ; he remained faithful to this line of politics 
 amidst the extraordinary circumstances of the hour, 
 and face to face with the tumultuous clamour of the 
 Assembly. He maintained that in Germany there 
 was no possible or legitimate Federation outside of 
 Austria. 
 
 One of the greatest grievances of the Teutons 
 against Austria has always been that it does not form a 
 purely German state, but is composed of different popu- 
 lations, and partly of an " inferior " race. These were 
 the first arguments brought forward in the Frankfort 
 Parliament in favour of a German Constitution which 
 was to exclude the empire of the Hapsburgs ; and 
 M. de Bismarck did not fail to reproduce them in 
 a well-known circular of the year 1866. 
 
FIR8T APPEARANCES OF M. DE BISMARCK. 65 
 
 In 1850 the deputy of the Mark did not hold 
 these opinions. He was convinced that " Austria 
 was a German power, in every sense of the word, 
 although fortunate enough to have alien nationalities 
 under its dominion ; " and concluded boldly that 
 "Prussia ought to submit itself to Austria, in order 
 to combat in union with her a menacing democracy." 
 
 Certes, in calling to mind this session of the 
 Prussian Chambers of the 3rd of December, 1850, one 
 is enjoying, to use the words of Montesquieu, the 
 spectacle of the extraordinary vicissitudes of history : 
 but the irony of destiny assumes truly fantastic pro- 
 portions when we consider that it was precisely this 
 discourse of the 3rd of December, 1850, which decided 
 the vocation of M. de Bismarck, and opened to him 
 the career of foreign affairs. Forced to consent to the 
 restoration of the Bund, and resigned to the pre- 
 ponderating influence of the empire of Austria, the 
 Prussian Government considered that it could not 
 give a better token of its dispositions than by ap- 
 pointing as its minister plenipotentiary to the German 
 Confederation that fiery orator whose devotion to the 
 house of Hapsburg had resisted even the humiliation 
 of Olmiitz ; and it was as a most decided partisan of 
 Austria that the future conqueror of Sadowa made his 
 entry into the arena of diplomacy. . . . 
 
 The Chamber was prorogued after this stormy 
 discussion. The rupture with the national party 
 was consummated, and M. de Manteuffel, whose 
 cold and bureaucratic mind had in reality very 
 little sympathy with the Ultras, still judged it to 
 
66 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 be advisable to make them a few concessions in order- 
 to consolidate the Government. 
 
 Several important posts in the Civil Service were 
 confided to members of the extreme right : M. de 
 Kleist-Eetzow, among others, received the presidency 
 of the Ehine provinces. To employ the talents of the 
 whilom barrister of Potsdam and Greifswalde in a 
 similar manner was, however, not to be thought of ; 
 he had already shown too little taste or aptitude for 
 an administrative career, and, for reasons already 
 mentioned, it was decided to send him to Frankfort 
 as first secretary of legation, but with the assurance of 
 being promoted to the post of representative after 
 a while. This selection naturally caused some surprise, 
 as it was quite a novel proceeding (they became used 
 -to it in time) to reward a deputy by a diplomatic 
 mission for any vote he might have given, or for any 
 attitude he might have assumed in the Chamber. It 
 was also generally questioned whether the eccentric 
 and impetuous knight of the Mark could possibly be 
 the right man in the right place in the midst of 
 such delicate circumstances. The timid and scrupulous 
 M. de Manteuffel was not without some apprehensions 
 on this point, and the eagerness with which M. de 
 Bismarck accepted the post only increased the dis- 
 comfiture of the premier. The king, Frederick 
 William IV., who personally was much attached to 
 the fiery " Percy," of the faction of the Cross, was 
 himself not without his doubts. 
 
 " Your Majesty can but try me," said the aspirant 
 to diplomacy, " and if it won't do, your Majesty is at 
 
FIRST APPEARANCES OF M. DE BISMARCK. 67 
 liberty to recall me at the end of six months, or even 
 
 sooner." 
 
 Eight years were to elapse before he was re- 
 called, and then it was by the successor of Frederick 
 William IV. 
 
 This is, however, the manner in which he expresses 
 himself during the early days of his mission (June, 
 1851), in a confidential letter speaking of the men 
 and things he had to deal with : 
 
 " Our relations here are full of suspicion and 
 mutual espionage. And had we but something of 
 consequence to hide or to find out ! but it is on 
 the score of the veriest trifles that these people 
 torment themselves. 
 
 "These diplomatists, retailing their bric-d-brac with 
 such airs of importance, seem to me to be even more 
 ridiculous than deputies of the second Chamber stand- 
 ing on their little dignity. Unless we are pompously 
 stirred up by some outside events, I can check off on 
 my fingers all that we shall do during the next two, 
 three, or five years, and which might all be done in 
 four-and-twenty hours if we could only be sincere and 
 reasonable for one whole day. I never doubted but 
 that these gentlemen mixed a good deal of water with 
 their cuisine ; but anything so thin and poor as their 
 soup it is impossible to imagine such a thing as a 
 globule of fat on the surface is not to be seen. . . . 
 
 " I am making the greatest progress in the art of 
 saying nothing in a great many words. I fill several 
 pages with reports, as neat and as well rounded as 
 
 F 4 J 
 
68 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 leading articles ; and if, after having read them, 
 Manteuffel understands one word, his intelligence is 
 greater than mine. . . . 
 
 "No one, not even the most spiteful democrat, can 
 form an idea of the amount of nullity and charla- 
 tanism that is concealed under the name of diplomacy." 
 
 A few years later on, during the Eastern com- 
 plications, he writes to his sister Malvina : 
 
 " I am at a session of the Bund ; a much-esteemed 
 colleague is reading a very tiresome report on the 
 disturbed situation of the Upper Lippe ; and it seems 
 to me that I cannot employ my time to greater ad- 
 vantage than by pouring forth the sentiments of my 
 brotherly love. 
 
 " These Knights of the Eound Table, surrounding 
 me at present on the ground-floor of the Taxis Palace, 
 are most honourable men, but certainly not very 
 amusing ; the table is twenty feet in diameter, and is 
 covered with green cloth. 
 
 "Think of X ... and of Z ... in Berlin ; they 
 are just the style of these Bundestag gentlemen. I 
 conform to everything with a delightful sensation of 
 languid innocence. My mind is in a state of the 
 completest tranquillity (ganzliche wurschtiglceit) , after 
 having brought the Bund little by little to a 
 despairing consciousness of its own utter nonentity. 
 Do you remember Heine's song, ' O Bund, dog, 
 thou art not well/ &c. ? Well, this song will soon be 
 raised, and by an unanimous vote, to the post of the 
 German national anthem." 
 
FIRST APPEARANCES OF M. DE BISMARCK. 69 
 
 The lassitude, the disgust, as well as the contempt 
 which he feels for the Bund increase from year to 
 year. In 1858 he almost decides on giving up the 
 diplomatic career. He has had enough "of this diet of 
 truffles, despatches, and grand crosses ; " he speaks of 
 retiring under the cannons of Schcenhausen, or, better 
 still, of growing young again by ten years and taking 
 up the post of attack he had held in 1848 and 1849. 
 He would like to fight without being hampered by 
 official laws and rules, to lay down his uniform, " and 
 lay about him in political swimming-drawers " (in poli- 
 tischen schwimmhosen) . . , And was it surprising ? 
 Of all political men, M. de Bismarck was certainly the 
 least likely to feel any respect or taste for a de- 
 liberative body that was essentially moderating and 
 moderate, where everything took place privately, with 
 long and elaborate reports, lengthily justified and 
 still more lengthily debated, and where thrusting 
 and parrying were utterly unknown. A great peace 
 congress can scarcely offer much attraction to the 
 fiery Percys on whom the smallest conference of 
 Bangor has such exciting effects,"' and the Bundestag, 
 we have already said, was a permanent peace congress 
 whose mission it was to maintain the statu quo, and 
 to turn aside any cause of conflict. 
 
 Small incidents the petty manoeuvring, the 
 puny struggles for influence were, it is true, not 
 wanting in this community, any more than in others ; 
 they served to maintain the good temper of the 
 ordinary diplomatists, and were generally considered 
 
 * Shakespeare (Henry IV., Part I., Act iii., Scene 1). 
 
70 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 as useful stimulants to the better digestion of their 
 affairs and their dinners ; but no doubt they appeared 
 contemptible in the eyes of a man of action and of 
 war no doubt they must have irritated and at times 
 exasperated him. 
 
 To observe the workings of the world from this 
 post on the Main, from whence they could be 
 grasped in their entirety ; to profit by the abundant 
 sources of information to collect and compose des- 
 patches fit to instruct and especially to amuse his 
 august master ; to discover now and then a witticism 
 full of malice ; to enjoy it himself and share it with 
 others ; to carry it, still fresh, to Stuttgart, and confide 
 its further extension to a gracious Grand- duchess ; 
 these were occupations which could content a Prince 
 Gortchakof and charm the leisure hours of a man 
 brought up in the school of Count Nesselrode, and 
 grown old in his career. 
 
 But how to render such an existence bearable to 
 the knight of the Mark suddenly turned into a pleni- 
 potentiary to find the means of enclosing in so 
 narrow though so enchanting a circle " a betrothed of 
 Bellona," all quivering yet from battles fought during 
 four years without cessation on a resounding battle- 
 field ! In order to find some kind of compensation 
 in the new sphere where he had just been placed he 
 wanted at least some intricate European combination, 
 or some great negotiation capable of straining his 
 faculties and proving their worth ; and instead of these, 
 all that saluted his ears was the " tittle-tattle " from 
 the Upper Lippe ! Such an insignificant negotia- 
 
FIRST APPEARANCES OF M. DE BISMARCK. 71 
 
 tion as that which, took place with the unfortunate 
 Duke of Augustenburg, and which ended in the 
 year 1852, certainly cannot be reckoned among the 
 triumphs worthy of a Bismarck;"" and yet this affair 
 was the only miserable globule of fat ever discovered 
 by him in all the soup set before him, during the years 
 he spent at Frankfort ! . . . 
 
 It is true that before long the Eastern question 
 burst over them, and seemed for a while to open out a 
 vast field of enterprise. Prussia showed herself favour- 
 able to Eussia ; the secondary States were even more 
 demonstrative, and gave themselves the most warlike 
 airs ; so much the worse for Austria, if she persisted 
 in making common cause with the Allies; her doing so 
 might bring about the most important territorial altera- 
 tions, and be of the greatest advantage to the House 
 of Hohenzollern ! . . . And, indeed, the Prussian repre- 
 sentative at the German Confederation ("his Excellency 
 the Lieutenant," as he was then called, on account of 
 
 * And yet this negotiation is not without interest, and even great piquancy. 
 Pull of the conviction that the war which had been made against Denmark 
 was "eminently iniquitous, frivolous, and revolutionary," the Prussian 
 plenipotentiary at the Bund worked very actively, in 1852, to set aside for 
 the future any possible cause of disturbance, and negotiated an Esau-like 
 treaty with the Duke Christian Augustus Augustenburg, the former abettor 
 of Schleswig-Holsteinism, and eventual pretender to the Duchies. Thanks to 
 the intervention of M. de Bismarck, for the sum of one and a half million of 
 rix dollars, given by the Government of Copenhagen, the old duke signed a 
 solemn deed, by which he bound himself and his family, on his word and 
 honour as a prince, never to undertake anything which might disturb the 
 tranquillity of the Danish monarchy. That, however, did not prevent the 
 son of Christian putting forward his pretended claims in 1863, nor did it 
 prevent M. de Bismarck from supporting them during a certain period, until 
 the moment when the famous syndics of the crown threw a doubt into the 
 soul of the first minister of Berlin, and proved to him that as the Duchies 
 legally belonged to no one, King William was entitled to them by right of 
 conquest. 
 
72 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 the landwehr uniform lie was so fond of wearing) lent 
 during the crisis the warmest and most faithful support 
 to his Eussian colleague, then his most intimate friend. 
 Discovering, however, before long, that the German 
 Confederation had no intention of changing its neutral 
 position, that the secondary States, in spite of all their 
 agitated conferences at Bamberg, were not going to 
 take any active part either on one or the other side, 
 and that the seat of war would be confined to the 
 Black Sea and to the Baltic, he conceived the most 
 profound contempt for the Bund, feeling convinced 
 " in his inmost soul of its utter nullity," and while 
 seated at the green table in the palace of Taxis 
 hummed Heine's song on the Diet of Frankfort. 
 
 Moreover, he had to pass through a very mortifying 
 phase at this period which he never forgot, and which 
 he alluded to years afterwards in a confidential 
 despatch now become famous. In 1859 he wrote as 
 follows to M. de Schleinitz : " During the Eastern 
 crisis Austria outweighed us in everything at Frank- 
 fort, in spite of our sympathy and community of 
 ideas with the secondary States. These States, 
 after every oscillation, return with all the per- 
 sistence of the magnetised needle to the same point 
 of attraction." . . . And what could be more- 
 natural. It was not from the empire of the Haps- 
 burgs that Hanover and Saxony had to dread an- 
 nexation, as later events have only too clearly 
 proved ; but the man who could condemn all great 
 towns to utter destruction for being the hotbeds of 
 revolutionary spirits, would not hesitate in condemning 
 
FIRST APPEARANCES OF M. RE BISMARCK. 73 
 
 little States for being tlie hotbeds of Austrian sym- 
 pathies. 
 
 As will be seen, Austria soon became the obnoxious 
 object, and filled the space once occupied in the mind of 
 the Knight of the Mark by the hatred of democracy ; 
 and the valorous champion of the Hapsburgs in the 
 Berlin Chambers became by degrees their most im- 
 placable, most untiring enemy in the Bund. But it 
 is a notable fact that all Prussia's great men to begin 
 with the Great Elector and Frederick II., not ex- 
 cluding William I.- have at all times held two 
 opinions with regard to Austria ; have, on this point, 
 had, like Faust, "two souls in their bodies ;" or, like 
 Rebecca, " two children struggling in their bosom;" two 
 principles, in fact, one of which bound them to respect 
 the ancient and illustrious imperial house, whereas the 
 other goaded them on to its spoliation and conquest. , 
 
 In the month of May, 1848, the honest and 
 poetical King Frederick William IV. declared to a 
 deputation of German statesmen * that he should 
 " reckon that as the happiest day of his life on which 
 he should hold the ewer (ivaschbecken) at the coro- 
 nation of a Hapsburg as Emperor of Germany ; " which 
 sentiment, however, did not prevent him, later on, 
 from quietly encouraging the work of the Frankfort 
 Parliament, nor from attempting the " restricted 
 union," under the auspices of General Eadowitz. 
 
 M. de Bismarck was, no doubt, perfectly sincere 
 in his attachment to Austria when, as Prussian 
 deputy, he rose, and, in the name of Conservatism, 
 
 * At the head of this deputation was Baron Max de Gagorn, the Nassau 
 Minister, 
 
74 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 energetically defended the house of Hapsburg against 
 the aggressions of the German Liberals. But now he 
 was the representative of his government in the Palace 
 of Taxis ; Austria stood in his way, disputed his in- 
 fluence over the secondary States, and disagreed with 
 him on the Eastern question ; and now, slowly but 
 surely, began the growth of those feelings which reached 
 their climax when he dealt Austria its " death-blow." 
 
 Thus arose, at the time of the same Crimean war, 
 and in the same town of Frankfort, a hatred of 
 Austria in the hearts of the two future chancellors of 
 Russia and Germany, that hatred of Austria which 
 was to bear such fatal fruit ; for most undoubtedly it 
 was the connivance of these two men, assisted by the 
 fatal ideology of Napoleon III., which brought about 
 the terrible catastrophes we have witnessed in our 
 day the calamity of Sadowa, the destruction of the 
 Bund, the dismemberment of Denmark, as well as 
 that of France ! With Prince Gortchakof this senti- 
 ment of hostility was conceived with the rapidity of 
 lightning, in consequence of the erroneous view he took 
 of Austrian politics, and was shared by his whole nation. 
 
 M. de Bismarck's hatred of Austria was of a slower 
 growth ; it did not spring, for example, from the 
 humiliation at Olmutz, for the deputy of the Mark 
 had triumphed lightly over that; it was long in 
 coming, slow in its development, became solidified after 
 a daily course of lengthy disputes in the Bund, and in 
 consequence of a conviction acquired, after years of 
 wasted efforts, that the house of Hapsburg would 
 
FIRST APPEARANCES OF M. DE BISMARCK. 75 
 
 never voluntarily desert tlie secondary States, and 
 would defend them against any attempt at annexation. 
 
 Summing up the teachings received during his 
 eight years' sojourn in Frankfort, the representative 
 of Prussia to the German Confederation writes in 
 1859, in his well-known despatch to M. de Schleinitz, 
 " I see a vice in our Federal relations that must, 
 sooner or later, be extirpated ~byferro et igne." Ferro 
 et igne ! This is the first known version of the text 
 " blood and iron," given out officially, however, in 
 later years by the President of the Council in a speech 
 to the Chambers. At the same time that M. de Bis- 
 marck's devotion to Austria was being so radically 
 effaced, a change no less singular was taking place in 
 his mind with regard to the other articles of his 
 party's faith. 
 
 Eemoved from the thick of the fight, and no 
 longer participating in any parliamentary battles, he 
 began to consider more coolly questions on which he 
 had once debated with the greatest heat, and to be 
 more temperate than in former days in some of his 
 old antipathies. " There is," he writes, on his 
 return from a trip to Berlin in 1852, " something 
 demoralising in the air of the Chambers ; the best of 
 men become vain there, and as fond of the tribune as 
 a woman is of her toliet. ... I consider those par- 
 liamentary intrigues to be hollow and base beyond all 
 belief. So long as we live in their midst we are 
 deluded by them, and consider them to be of im- 
 portance. . . . Whenever I come back from Frank- 
 
76 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 fort, I experience the feelings of a man who has 
 been fasting and comes suddenly into the midst of 
 drunkards." 
 
 Many things and persons that were formerly 
 despised and abhorred now took a more pleasing form 
 in the eyes of the statesman occupied in forming 
 vast projects for the future. " The Chamber and the 
 press might become the most powerful weapons of our 
 foreign policy," was, in 1858, the opinion of the man 
 who once so strongly despised parliamentary rule, the 
 friend of M. Thadden-TriglafF; and similarly we find, 
 in his correspondence at this time, the vague idea of a 
 national representation of the Zollverein, and even an 
 inclining towards universal suffrage, so long as these in- 
 stitutions could be used as instrumenta regni. The ex- 
 ample of the second empire was then diffusing an influ- 
 ence which the historian will do well to note. That system 
 of absolute power, interwoven with popular passions 
 " striped with red," to use one of M. de Bismarck's 
 characteristic remarks seduced the imagination of 
 more than one aspirant to coups d'etat and to 
 political thunderbolts ; and the former colleague of 
 Doctor d'Ester must have thought more than once 
 that Hanover and Saxony were well worth "a brief 
 plunge into the muddy waters of democracy." 
 
 But how far off was still the distant goal ; how 
 veiled in obscurity the half-seen future ! It was 
 not under Frederick William IV., whose intelligence 
 was becoming daily more clouded, that any action 
 was to be thought of; even the advent of the 
 regent (now the reigning king) seemed at first to 
 
FIRST APPEARANCES OF M. DE BISMARCK. 77 
 
 bring with it but little hope of change. The 
 ministers of the regent ministers of the new era, 
 as they were then called were honest philosophers, 
 who talked about the development of existing liberties 
 and the solidification of representative government ; 
 good and simple creatures, who allowed King 
 William I. later on to proclaim solemnly " that 
 Prussia's conquests over Germany should only be of a 
 moral nature ! " Evidently this ' l new era " was not 
 exactly that of M. de Bismarck. During the years 
 that elapsed from the time of the Crimean war until 
 his embassy in Russia, we find M. de Bismarck in 
 a constant state of agitation, travelling continually 
 through Germany, France, Denmark, Sweden, Cour- 
 land, and Upper Italy ; seeking for entertainment, 
 perhaps also for information ; and returning each time 
 to Frankfort, only to raise a storm, or to break through 
 some " tittle-tattle," and to drive the nervous and 
 bilious Count Eechberg, the Austrian representative and 
 the President of the Bundestag, almost to desperation. 
 
 His frequent excursions to Paris opened his eyes 
 to the coming events in Italy, and made him still 
 more aggressive, till at last his recall to Berlin seemed 
 indispensable for the maintenance of peace. It was 
 then that he seriously contemplated abandoning the 
 diplomatic career, throwing aside his uniform, and 
 carrying on his political warfare " in swimming- 
 drawers." 
 
 He consented, however, to carry it on a little 
 longer " on caviare and in bearskins," as he ex- 
 pressed it in one of his letters ; to speak more 
 
78 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 clearly, lie consented to exchange his post at Frankfort 
 for a similar one at St. Petersburg. 
 
 It was hoped thus to remove him to a cooler 
 sphere " to put him in ice " (another expression of 
 M. de Bismarck) ; but he himself, perhaps, conceived 
 very different hopes of his change of office, and, at any 
 rate, found much consolation in the society of his 
 former colleague at Frankfort, now become Prime 
 Minister of the great empire, and with whom he 
 had always agreed so well. On the 1st of April, his 
 natal day, M. de Bismarck presented his letters of 
 credit in the capital of Eussia. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 A NATIONAL MINISTER IN RUSSIA. 
 
 Prince Gortchakof' s Predecessors : Panine, Bestoujef, Nesselrode Secular- 
 Traditions and fundamental Principles of Eussian Foreign Policy until 
 the Retirement of Count Nesselrode New Style of Politics inaugurated 
 by Prince Gortchakof His personal Popularity His Endeavour to 
 promote it His Hatred of the Germans and his French Sympathies 
 The Emperor Napoleon III. prepares the War in Italy Unity of 
 the two Cabinets of Paris and St. Petersburg on the Questions of" 
 Montenegro, Servia, and the Principalities of the Danube (1856-59) 
 Italian Complications : Services rendered to France by Kussia during 
 the War in Italy (1859) Annexation of Savoy and Eupture of the 
 Anglo-French entente (1860) Profits derived by Eussia from this new 
 Situation Circular of the 20th May, 1860, on the Subject of the Chris- 
 tians in the East Isolation of France Interview of the Sovereigns of 
 the North at Warsaw and Embarrassment of the French Diplomatists 
 (1860) Eussia becomes more friendly but at the same time more 
 exacting Marked Ability shown by Prince Gortchakof during this early 
 Period of his Ministership He takes Advantage of the French Alliance 
 without compromising the Conservative Principles of his Government. 
 
 DURING the period of immense development which 
 followed the impulse given by Peter the Great to the 
 Eussian empire, we meet with more than one Minister 
 of Foreign Affairs whose name is worthy of a place in 
 history. 
 
 For instance, Count Panine could have been a 
 man of no ordinary stamp to conceive the idea of 
 an "armed neutrality at sea," and get it accepted 
 
30 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 by various States, at a time when Russia barely held 
 a second or third-rate place among the maritime 
 powers. 
 
 If in this daring undertaking, as well as in his 
 more interesting attempts to limit the absolute power 
 of the Czars by the establishment of aristocratic insti- 
 tutions, we trace the influence of an Italian origin 
 (the Panines are descended from the Pagnini of Lucca), 
 we cannot deny the pure nationality, the grandly 
 primitive character of another celebrated minister of 
 the same century of the Chancellor Bestoujef, of 
 whose character Rulhiere gives us a most original 
 outline. 
 
 Bestoujef, who was a perfect speaker, feigned to 
 stutter, and had the persistence to simulate this defect 
 during seventeen years. In his conversations with 
 foreign ambassadors he stuttered in such a manner as 
 to be unintelligible ; he complained in the same way of 
 being deaf, and that he was not able to grasp or under- 
 stand all the subtleties of the French language, causing 
 the same thing to be repeated to him again and again. 
 
 He was in the habit of writing his diplomatic 
 notes himself in a totally illegible hand : they would 
 be returned to him, and at times he has been known 
 to alter their contents. Falling into disgrace, Bestoujef 
 immediately recovered his speech, hearing, and, in 
 fact, all his senses. Very different is the type pre- 
 sented to us during the first half of this century by 
 the immediate predecessor of Gortchakof, the Chan- 
 cellor of the Emperors Alexander I. and Nicholas. 
 Attached to Germany by his origin and the interests 
 
A NATIONAL MINISTER IN RUSSIA. 81 
 
 of his family, never even having acquired the lan- 
 guage of the country whose international relations 
 were confided to his care, Charles Eobert de Nesselrode, 
 however, fulfilled a long and laborious career to the 
 satisfaction of both his august masters, and figured 
 with honour at all conferences and congresses side 
 by side with Talleyrand and Metternich. Without 
 adopting the too Asiatic subterfuges of a Bestoujef, 
 Count Nesselrode knew and practised all the known 
 tricks of the trade ; and few men could equal him in 
 the art of maintaining his dignity and ease of manner 
 under the most trying and embarrassing circum- 
 stances. 
 
 He understood how to change his line of con- 
 duct without too great a change of tone, and among 
 other achievements most delicately softened the 
 transition from the anti-Greek politics of Alexander I. 
 to the frankly expressed sympathy for the Greek 
 cause shown by his successor. During the Eastern 
 crisis he exerted all the powers of an astute and 
 subtle understanding in the service of a cause 
 whose most serious dangers alone, however, he fore- 
 saw, and to whose national and religious side he was 
 completely blind. 
 
 In contrast to Bestoujef, and more European in 
 this respect as in every other, M. de Nesselrode lost 
 in his disgrace, or rather his retreat, the greater part 
 of his faculties and his virtues ; in consequence of 
 which his posthumous memoirs, composed in the 
 decline of life, and painfully wanting in importance, 
 caused great disappointment. But who can tell ? 
 
82 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 Perhaps these memoirs were the last stroke of his 
 cunning and of his diplomatic malice, and were 
 written with the intention of disappointing all profane 
 curiosity, by leaving behind him as empty and as 
 little instructive a record as could well be penned of 
 a life so crowded with stirring events. 
 
 Yet none of those Eussian statesmen, whose names 
 we have just mentioned, were actually great ministers 
 in the Western acceptation of the term. None of 
 them (to confine ourselves to comparisons drawn only 
 from absolute monarchies) occupied the position of a 
 Duke de Choiseul in France during the last century, 
 or wielded the authority of a Prince Clement de Met- 
 ternich in Austria during the present century, or even 
 were as celebrated and as popular as Prince Gortchakof 
 is at this present moment in Eussia. 
 
 Bestoujef, Panine, and Nesselrode were, so to say, 
 better known abroad than in their own country, and 
 their contemporaries never attributed to them those 
 qualities which posterity (thanks to the revelations of 
 posthumous archives) awards them. Not one of them 
 was ever raised to power by the current of public 
 opinion, or sustained in his post by public favour; not 
 one of them ever attempted to give a personal direc- 
 tion, or to stamp with his own individuality the 
 affairs over which they had control. The truth is 
 that, from the time of Peter the Great until the present 
 reign, the splendour of the imperial name in Eussia 
 threw all others into the shade, and, unless occupying 
 the position of chief favourite or that of a great 
 warrior, all the servants of the State were passed over 
 
A NATIONAL MINISTER IN RUSSIA. 83 
 
 in obscurity, as the humble executors of an absolute 
 and solitary will. 
 
 Foreign policy in particular was considered to be 
 the sovereign's exclusive domain, and the unalterable 
 fixity of its system made the person chosen to fulfil 
 the work a matter of secondary importance. 
 
 Since the days of Peter the Great we notice in 
 effect that, in its relations with Europe, Eussia has 
 always maintained certain traditions which have been 
 well tried by experience, and certain sacred principles 
 from which it has seldom deviated. 
 
 Whoever the Foreign Minister at St. Petersburg 
 might be, he had always the same programme to fulfil. 
 His duty was to foster the growth of Kussian prestige 
 among the Christian populations of the East, to 
 maintain the balance of power between Austria and 
 Prussia, and to increase the influence of his Govern- 
 ment among the secondary States of Germany. 
 
 To the few rules, which we may designate as the 
 elementary and invariable axioms of Eussian foreign 
 policy, were' added, in 1815, a principle of inter- 
 national conservatism a sort of coalition among the 
 various governments for the defence of public order a 
 sentiment of self-preservation, inspired in all repre- 
 sentatives of monarchical authority by the sight of 
 the overwhelming and destroying passions born of 
 the Great Eevolution ; and it was this outcome 
 of the views and convictions of the Emperors 
 Alexander I. and Nicholas, that Count Nesselrode 
 had to disseminate through all the acts and docu- 
 ments that issued from the Eussian Foreign Office. 
 
 Q 2 
 
84 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 Destiny reserved for the successor of Nesselrode 
 the task of breaking loose, by degrees, from all these 
 traditions and principles, and of inaugurating in the 
 empire of the Czars a completely new style of foreign 
 policy. We may dispute the merits of this new policy ; 
 dispute it the more as it is far from having borne 
 all its fruit ; but one fact is indisputable, and strikes 
 us at a glance, that Prince Gortchakof knew how to 
 attach his name to an historic change in the annals 
 his country's diplomacy, to put forward his own 
 individuality as Kussian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
 and to occupy a position of importance such as none 
 of his predecessors ever held. Alexander Mikhailovitch 
 is not only his august master's faithful servant, he is 
 the real chief of his department, the guiding minister, 
 taking his part openly in all responsibility, and also 
 in the celebrity reflected from the various transactions 
 of Europe. 
 
 A phenomenon of an equally startling character to 
 the Eussian mind was the sight of a minister depend- 
 ing, not only on the favour of his sovereign, but also 
 on that of the nation ; husbanding the public opinion 
 of his country, caring for it, even flattering it at times, 
 and finding it remunerative. 
 
 The Eussian nation has had its moments of infatua- 
 tion for Alexander Mikhailovitch, as was shown by the 
 burst of enthusiasm after the transactions in Poland ; 
 and we might even call him a creation of the people, 
 as its voice was not the least among the elements that 
 raised the Vienna plenipotentiary to the lofty position 
 vacated by Count Nesselrode in April, 1856. 
 
A NATIONAL MINISTER IN RUSSIA. 85 
 
 In 18 15, after his triumphal return from the 
 Congress of Vienna, Alexander I. had time to select, 
 at his leisure, from among the many celebrated men 
 who then formed the staff of the Kussian diplomatic 
 corps, the least known and the most humble member 
 of that illustrious body. Passing over the Capo 
 d'Istrias, the Pozzo di Borgos, the Bibeaupierres, the 
 Eazoumovskys, the Stakelbergs, the d'Anstetts, it 
 suited him to confide the direction of his foreign 
 policy to a German gentleman of Westphalian extrac- 
 tion, born at Lisbon, and Kussian only by naturalisa- 
 tion. In 1856, after the Congress of Paris, the 
 nomination of Prince Gortchakof to the same post 
 was, we will not say dictated, but was certainly 
 indicated to the Emperor Alexander II. by the voice 
 of the people; or, if we prefer to use another expres- 
 sion, by the voice already pervading the salons of 
 the nobility, and which was but the faithful echo 
 of popular opinion. 
 
 We see in effect that, immediately after his debut 
 in the Hotel de la Place du Palais, the former pupil of 
 Tsarskoe-Selo distinguished himself by his liberal 
 opinions and the advances he made to the public 
 spirit of the times advances that must often have 
 astonished his still living predecessor, who yet enjoyed 
 the honorary title of Chancellor. For the first time a 
 Kussian Minister arranged his speeches not only to 
 .satisfy the salons, but also the lecture-halls and the 
 newspaper offices ; speeches which touched alike the 
 heart of the great lady and the country gentleman, the 
 humble student and the haughty officer of the Guards. 
 
86 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 His saying about Austria was known over all 
 Eussia.* 
 
 Another aphorism, borrowed from one of his cir- 
 culars, enchanted the nation : the celebrated sentence, 
 " Kussia does not sulk, she meditates," seemed to be 
 dictated by the very heart of the nation, and drew 
 from it a cry of enthusiasm. 
 
 It was at this period, it will be remembered, that 
 the Eussian spirit roused itself, after a long period of 
 compression ; the newspapers, the periodicals, began 
 a new life, and writers and scientific men assumed 
 an importance hitherto unknown. Alexander Mik- 
 hail ovitch, the former companion of Pouchkine, the 
 diplomatist who had at all times shown great taste 
 and sympathy for Eussian literature, appeared in 
 the light of a patriotic statesman to such men as 
 Pogodine, Axakof, Katkof, &c. His hatred for 
 Austria was well known, as also his leaning towards 
 a French alliance ; and the nation, which shared 
 both these sentiments in the highest degree, hailed 
 him as a genuinely national minister. 
 
 What a strange coincidence, and how strikingly 
 formed to show us the instability and hollo wness of all 
 earthly things, it is to consider that it was, as the 
 warmest partisan of the house of Hapsburg, that 
 M. de Bismarck, the future conqueror of Sadowa, made 
 his entry into the diplomatic circle; and that it was 
 the implacable enemy of the Germans and the warm 
 friend of France that the Eussians particularly 
 
 * " Austria is not a state, it is only a government." 
 
A NATIONAL MINISTER IN RUSSIA. 87 
 
 cherished in 1856, in the person of their Vice- 
 Chancellor, of that statesman who later on, by a policy 
 of omission and commission, favoured more than any 
 other the dismemberment of France, and the con- 
 stitution of a greater, a more powerful Germany than 
 had ever been known in past history. 
 
 It is true that by " the Germans " the Eussians of 
 1856 especially meant the Austrians,"* and that in 
 the France of that day they especially admired a 
 certain democratic absolutism which had shown such 
 sympathy for the misfortunes of Italy, for those of 
 Eoumania, Servia, and Montenegro, and which had 
 not yet pronounced the ill-fated name of Poland. 
 
 ''' Be satisfied," said the Emperor of the French 
 to M. de Cavour, in the month of April, 1856, after 
 the dissolution of the Congress of Paris, " be 
 satisfied, I have a presentiment that the existing 
 peace will not be of long duration, "t 
 
 Prince Gortchakof no doubt shared this presen- 
 
 * It is well known that many of the different branches of the Eussian 
 service were encumbered by large numbers of Germans, who were either 
 naturalised subjects or born in Eussia, and who exercised a very important 
 influence over the administration of the empire. On his accession to the 
 post of Minister, Alexander Mikhailovitch declared his intention of purging 
 his department of all these intruders. He found, however, that official 
 routine and Slavonic laziness (which willingly leaves all work that demands 
 any perseverance or application to " intruders ") did not fail to triumph over 
 any principle of nationality ; and the Minister's regenerative plans, which 
 were announced with so much noise, evaporated quickly in a very insig- 
 nificant change which took place among the inferior officials. It was 
 precisely from among the Germans that he found his two most capable 
 and devoted aides M. de Westmann, who died last May (1875) at Wies- 
 baden, and M. de Hamburger, recently appointed to the post of Secretary 
 of State. 
 
 t Letter of M. de Cavour to M. Castelli. Bianchi, "Storia Documentata," 
 t. vii., p. 622. 
 
88 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 timent, and, perhaps, was in possession of still 
 more positive facts. The thought of " fighting for an 
 idea," of liberating Italy, was fixed from that 
 time in the mind of Napoleon III. ; and when he 
 signed the Treaty of Paris with " a pen torn from 
 an eagle's pinion," his veiled and dreamy glance was 
 already wandering over the classic plains of Lombardy. 
 
 But in order to carry out the enterprise which 
 France contemplated against Austria, it was necessary 
 to secure the friendship of Kussia and Prussia ; for at 
 that time England's neutrality was scarcely to be 
 relied upon. Prussia had come forth sadly shorn of 
 political influence after the Oriental crisis ; England, 
 Austria, and Turkey scarcely cared to admit it to the 
 honours of the congress. The Prussian Prime Minister, 
 M. de Manteuffel, was kept out in the cold long 
 after the plenipotentiaries of Europe were already 
 in full deliberation, and it was only at the request of 
 the Emperor of the French that the Prussian envoy 
 was finally admitted. 
 
 Napoleon III. insisted in 1856 in aiding Prussia 
 in the resumption of its former rank in Europe 
 that same Prussia which fourteen years afterwards 
 was to dethrone him. As for Eussia, we have 
 already spoken of the cordiality and politeness which 
 Count Orlof received from the French during the 
 time of the congress. 
 
 Since then,"* it is also noticeable that in the 
 
 * See, in reference to this and to all that follows concerning the relations 
 of France with Russia in the years 1856-63, our " Studies of Contemporary 
 Diplomacy," Part I., chaps, i. iii. Paris, 1866. 
 
A NATIONAL MINISTER IN RUSSIA. 89 
 
 arranging of the various difficulties which arose in 
 the fulfilment of certain clauses in the Treaty of 
 Paris (Bolgrad, Island of Serpents, Navigation of the 
 Danube, &c.), the suggestions or explanations 
 made by the Russian plenipotentiary were invariably 
 seconded by the plenipotentiary of France. 
 
 In the various and numerous conferences and com- 
 missions which followed each other during 1856-59 
 for the purpose of regulating divers impending ques- 
 tions, the distribution of voices was almost invariably 
 as follows : on one side, England and Austria ; on the 
 other, France, Russia, and Prussia. Prince Gortchakof 
 graciously received all the cordialities of the Cabinet 
 of the Tuileries, though he was not so com- 
 plaisant as to join it in a wordy campaign of 
 remonstrances directed against the government of 
 Naples a campaign which was undertaken in concert 
 with the Cabinet of St. James in consequence of 
 well-known letters addressed by Mr. Gladstone 
 to Lord Aberdeen respecting the rule of King 
 Ferdinand II. 
 
 Such an interference with the internal affairs of an 
 independent State seemed scarcely correct in the sight 
 of Count Nesselrode's successor ; but he was all the 
 more eager to second the Emperor Napoleon III. in 
 his generous designs, whenever the question arose of 
 improving the state of the Christian subjects in the 
 Ottoman Empire, of enlarging their privileges, and, 
 as it was then expressed, " of reforming the Turk." 
 
 In order to reform the Turk it would be necessary, 
 according to the malicious opinion of M. de Thouvenel, 
 
90 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 French ambassador at Constantinople, " first of all to 
 impale him;" and, indeed, he was put to the torture 
 of the hatt-houmayoum, was interrogated as to his 
 intentions in favour of the raias of Bosnia, of Bul- 
 garia, and of Herzegovina; causing thus an infinity 
 of trouble to the Cabinets of Vienna and London. 
 Naturally, even a much greater solicitude was ex- 
 pressed for the vassal States of the good Padishah 
 for Moldavia, Wallachia, Servia, and Montenegro ; 
 these States were already in the enjoyment of a semi- 
 independence, and everything was done to render that 
 independence complete. 
 
 The petty Prince of Montenegro, the former salaried 
 protege of the Emperor Nicholas, visited the sovereign 
 of France, after the conclusion of peace, in Paris ; and, 
 indeed, raised such disturbances with the Sultan on 
 his return, that two vessels, the Algesiras and the 
 Impetueuse, appeared before Eagusa. 
 
 French vessels in Eastern waters, menacing Turkey 
 a great mortification to England and Austria, and a 
 great source of satisfaction to Kussia, more especially 
 as it occurred scarcely two years after the Crimean 
 war ! . . . The sight was certainly an original one, 
 and prepared the world for a series of surprises. 
 
 About the same time, Servia dethroned Prince 
 Alexander Kara George vitch, and appointed in his stead 
 the old Miloch Obrenovitch. The Porte protested, 
 England and Austria joined in the protestations, but, 
 thanks to the united efforts of Russia and France, the 
 Servian Assembly were able to persist in their choice, 
 
A NATIONAL MINISTER IN RUSSIA. 91 
 
 and dethrone a prince whose chief error in the eyes of 
 his people was having shown too much sympathy for 
 the Allies in 1853 ! 
 
 The question of the Danubian Principalities was 
 far more interesting and of greater importance. In 
 the Congress of Paris, France and Kussia pleaded for 
 the complete union of Moldavia and "Wallachia, to which 
 the other powers were opposed. At last, weary of the 
 contest, it was decided to accept a combination, 
 which, though assimilating the administration of the 
 two countries, yet allowed the countries themselves to 
 remain separate. It was, as might be seen later on 
 in July, the plan of confederation opposed to that of 
 union ; and the first example of that kind of national 
 strategy was shown us on the banks of the Danube, 
 that was soon to be repeated on a vaster scale on the 
 plains of Tuscany. The double election of Prince 
 Couza was the first act of this style of popular 
 diplomacy, which at a later period, in Italian matters, 
 so often confounded the combinations of plenipoten- 
 tiaries and powerful statesmen, and offered to the world 
 the spectacle of deeds accomplished solely by the 
 suffrage of nations. To see popular voting reversing 
 the decisions of diplomatists, and to see France and 
 Kussia agreeing to respect these votes, were among the 
 most marked features of the politics of 1856-59 
 politics which the liberal opinions of Europe received 
 with favour, but not without being surprised at the 
 sight of such a harmony in the views of the Cabinets 
 of the Tuileries and St. Petersburg, on that same 
 
92 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 Eastern ground yet reeking with the fumes of war- 
 that ground from which the Allies had thought, in 
 1853, Eussia was for ever to be excluded, but where 
 she was again taking root and gaining influence, as 
 yet but modestly it is true, and under the protecting 
 shadow of France. 
 
 When, at last, the complications in Italy reached 
 their climax, the Government of the Czar redoubled 
 its expressions of goodwill towards the Cabinet of the 
 Tuileries. " Our relations with France are cordial" 
 replied Prince Gortchakof to Lord Napier on being 
 sounded by him as to the intentions of Eussia in such 
 serious circumstances. England at that time was 
 making the most vigorous efforts to prevent the out- 
 burst of the Italian war. Lord Cowley was despatched 
 somewhat noisily on a mission to Vienna, and tried by 
 every possible means to discover a basis on which to 
 found some sort of reconciliation ; and the Cabinet 
 of St. James was already flattering itse]f that it had 
 succeeded in allaying the tempest, when Prince 
 Gortchakof suddenly proposed a congress, pronouncing 
 that fatal word which then, as on many other occa- 
 sions, has been but the signal for a rupture. 
 
 A congress ! A treaty of peace preceding all 
 hostility ; the glory of triumph without the peril of 
 victory ! This was the eternal liysteron-proteron of 
 Napoleonic theory, the chimera pursued by the dreamer 
 of Ham in the Papal question, in the questions of 
 Poland and Denmark, even in the catastrophe of 1870, 
 after the declaration of war ; and it is curious to see 
 Prince Gortchakof as the first hawker of a remedy 
 
A NATIONAL MINISTER IN RUSSIA. 93 
 
 that imperial France was so often to recommend for 
 all the chronic ailments of Europe. * 
 
 The head of the English Government, the late 
 Lord Derby, complained bitterly of the trick played 
 him by the proposition from St. Petersburg; and in 
 London it has always been suspected that it was 
 prompted by a telegraphic hint from Paris. Again, 
 in his circular of May 27th, 1859, the Eussian Vice- 
 Chancellor proved himself equally useful to France 
 by calming the warlike ardour of the German secondary 
 States ; and it is in this celebrated despatch that he 
 pronounces a wise judgment, and at the same time a 
 well-deserved eulogium, on the " purely and exclu- 
 sively defensive combination " of the Bund, a salutary 
 combination which could enforce the localisation of 
 an inevitable war, " instead of allowing it to spread 
 and to assume proportions exceeding all human 
 anticipation." 
 
 Napoleon III. descended into the plains of Lom- 
 bardy ; Austria was beaten at Magenta and Solferino ; 
 and Russia enjoyed her first taste of vengeance on that 
 
 * It is true that, in a circular of May 27th, 1859, the Knssian Vice-Chan- 
 cellor was careful to offer some comment on his proposition, and to prove 
 to the world that the congress which he had proposed had nothing chimerical 
 in its nature. "This congress," he says, "does not place any Power in the 
 presence of the unknown : its programme has already been considered. The 
 fundamental idea which forms its basis is not prejudicial to any essential 
 interest. On the one hand the present status of territorial possession is 
 maintained, and on the other this congress may bring forth results neither 
 exorbitant in their demands nor unusual in international relationship." 
 It is worth while to read over this remarkable circular, and to weigh well 
 its every word. In it will be found the most peculiar criticisms, made 
 as it were in anticipation of the various projects for congresses which 
 Napoleon III. presented in later years to the gaze of Europe, notably the 
 eccentric project which astonished the world in the imperial speech of 
 November 5th, 1863. 
 
94 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 ungrateful House of Hapsburg which had " betrayed " 
 her under the walls of Sebastopol. The following 
 year, in consequence of the annexation of Savoy, Lord 
 John Russell declared solemnly in Parliament that his 
 country " ought not to separate itself from the rest of 
 the European nations ; that it ought always to be pre- 
 pared to act in concert with the other States if it did 
 not wish to hear of such or such an annexation taking 
 place to-day, and such another to-morrow." 
 
 This proved to be the funeral oration of the Anglo- 
 French alliance. Four years after the Crimean war 
 France had lost both the great allies she had possessed 
 during the Eastern crisis, and, as we may well 
 imagine, Eussia was not the one to regret it. 
 
 Russia never protested against the annexation of 
 Savoy, declaring it even to be a " perfectly regular 
 transaction ;" but she took advantage of the moment 
 to resume her place in European politics, and again to 
 bring before the world the question of -the Ottoman 
 Empire ! On the 4th of May Prince Gortchakof 
 called together the various ambassadors of all the great 
 Powers, in order to examine with them the "painful 
 and precarious position in which the Christians of 
 Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria were placed ;" 
 and soon after a circular from- the Vice- Chancellor 
 (May 20) insisted on the assembly of a conference 
 in order to re-negotiate the stipulations agreed upon 
 in the Treaty of Paris. "The time for illusions is 
 past," are the words of Alexander Mikhailovitch ; 
 " any hesitation, any adjournment, might now bring 
 about the most serious results ; " and he used even the 
 
A NATIONAL MINISTER IN RUSSIA. 95 
 
 recent emancipation of Italy as an argument in favour 
 of the future independence of the populations for 
 whose welfare he showed himself so solicitous. " The 
 events which have occurred in the west of Europe 
 have re-echoed in the east, awakening hope and 
 bringing encouragement ! " 
 
 Thus, barely four years after the Treaty of Paris, 
 Eussia was again drawing the attention of the world 
 to the state of the " Sick Man ;" but no longer, as in 
 the conferences and commissions of 1856-59, under 
 the protection of France, but acting alone, and taking 
 the initiative in the debate. 
 
 This, however, was not all. In that one year of 
 1860 the Cabinet of St. Petersburg was to regain 
 nearly all the ground it had lost during the Crimean 
 war. It was a peculiarly fortunate year for Kussia, 
 for it was also a year of universal distrust towards 
 France. 
 
 The acquisition of Savoy, the strange and pro- 
 foundly immoral spectacle afforded by the negotia- 
 tions of the Treaty of Zurich a treaty which was rent 
 before it was even signed the Piedmontese annexa- 
 tions in Italy, the expedition of Garibaldi into Sicily, 
 the " new right " of which the French official journals 
 were speaking, and the famous pamphlet on " The 
 Pope and the Congress," had alarmed and roused in 
 the highest degree the anxiety of Europe. 
 
 Lord Palmerston declared that he would " only 
 offer one hand to his former ally, and that in the 
 other' he would grasp the buckler of defence," and at 
 once organised his volunteers. Switzerland was in a 
 
96 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. ^ 
 
 tumult ; the National- Verein swore to die in defence 
 of the Ehine ; and even the honest and peaceful 
 Belgians thought it necessary to declare, in an address 
 to their king, "that if their independence was 
 threatened, they would know how to endure the 
 hardest trials." 
 
 High above all these popular alarms rose the 
 murmur of king]y meetings. The German princes- 
 assembled at Baden, and the Emperor of the French 
 thought fit to surprise them, so to say, in the middle 
 of their deliberations by making that " rapid journey " 
 which, according to the Mbniteur, " was to have such 
 happy results." 
 
 " The spontaneousness of such an important 
 action/' added the official paper, " was just what was 
 required to put an end to this unanimous concert of 
 malevolent reports and misapprehensions. The very 
 fact of the Emperor going in person to explain 
 frankly to the sovereigns assembled at Baden that his 
 policy had never deviated from the paths of rectitude 
 and of justice, was sufficient to convince minds so 
 superior and so free from prejudices as, indeed, 
 statements of truth loyally explained never fail 
 to do." 
 
 It would appear, however, that the conviction was 
 not sufficient to eradicate prejudice, for, after the 
 meeting at Baden, there followed a second at Tceplitz, 
 between the Emperor of Austria and the Prince 
 Eegent of Prussia ; where yet a third was agreed 
 upon, to take place at Warsaw, with the Emperor of 
 Eussia ; and the Czar accepted the rendezvous. 
 
A NATIONAL MINISTER IN RUSSIA. 97 
 
 "It is not coalition, it is conciliation, that I 
 wish to bring about at "Warsaw," were Alexander II. 's 
 words to the French ambassador, the Duke de Monte- 
 bello ; and at the Tuileries there was naturally much 
 agitation, in consequence of the turn affairs were 
 taking. 
 
 In truth there was no lack of conciliatory forms 
 in the despatch in which Prince Gortchakof " invited 
 the French Government to inform him how far they 
 could assist Eussia in the efforts it was about to make to 
 avert the crisis with which Europe was menaced ; " 
 but however polite these forms might be, they never- 
 theless concealed a slight demand for explanation. 
 
 The Cabinet of the Tuileries replied by a memo- 
 randum, in which it pledged itself first of all " to 
 abstain from offering any assistance to Piedmont in 
 case of Austria being attacked in Venetia." The 
 Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin made several remarks 
 on the French memorandum, and addressed them 
 to the Eussian Vice-Chancellor, who transmitted 
 them to Paris, demanding at the same time fresh 
 explanations of a more reassuring and more explicit 
 nature. In a word, after all these discussions no 
 positive results were arrived at in this meeting of the 
 three Northern potentates, which at one time had 
 caused France such serious apprehensions; and the 
 reason of this was that the Emperor Alexander had, 
 in reality, gone to Warsaw with but one special object. 
 He wished neither to coalesce nor to conciliate : he 
 simply wished to show his influence and his power. 
 It flattered him to see these sovereigns, these German 
 
 H 
 
98 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 princes, assembling in the ancient capital of Poland 
 in order to deliberate on the situation of things in 
 general, and to receive from him the word of com- 
 mand. It reminded him of the glorious days of the 
 Emperor Nicholas. Again, Kussia was only too pleased 
 to make France sensible of the value of her friend- 
 ship ; to make her understand how high the value of 
 Kussian services now stood how high, perhaps, their 
 price. The successive skilful diplomatic despatches 
 which issued during 1856-60 from the Kussian 
 Foreign Office indicate very distinctly the gradual 
 rise, of Eussian power ever since the Peace of Paris. 
 In the first of these celebrated circulars Kussia declares 
 herself to be "meditating, and not sulking;" in the 
 second, on the occasion of the Italian complications, 
 she was already tl shaking off the reserve which she 
 had imposed on herself since the Crimean war." After 
 the annexation of Savoy, "her conscience reproached 
 her for keeping silence so long on the unfortunate- 
 state of the Christians in the East," &c. Lastly, 
 in the month of October, 1860, she became the 
 mouthpiece of the combined interests of Europe the 
 intermediary who demanded explanations from the 
 Tuileries. From being the modest protege of France, 
 and enveloped in " reserve " up to the time of the war 
 in Italy, she rose in 1859 to the rank of "confidential 
 friend;" and became, after the interview at Warsaw, 
 an important and almost indispensable ally an ally 
 who would no longer play a secondary part, but who 
 intended to assume a position of the most marked 
 influence, and to take a large share in all future com- 
 
A NATIONAL MINISTER IN RUSSIA. 99 
 
 binations. Most assuredly, Napoleon III., by his 
 disconnected, undecided, and contradictory policy, 
 played incessantly into the hands of Eussia ; and 
 it is only just to recognise that Prince Gortchakof 
 never allowed the slightest turn of fortune to escape 
 him ; and, without creating events, well knew how 
 to profit by them. The superiority of the statesman 
 shows itself especially in the moderation which he 
 preserved alike in his " cordiality " and in his ven- 
 geance by the wary spirit which never deserted him 
 even in the midst of success. 
 
 It does not admit of a doubt, for example, that 
 the warnings of Eussia, subsequent to the battle of 
 Solferino, the fears which she suddenly expressed as to 
 her incapability of restraining Germany any longer 
 from succouring Austria, contributed greatly to the 
 hasty Peace of Villafranca ; and however fatal this event 
 proved to the interests of France, and even to those of 
 Austria, we cannot deny that Eussia found it admirably 
 suited to her own plans. In truth, had the programme 
 been completely carried out from the " Alps to the 
 Adriatic," it would probably have given a very different 
 aspect to Italian affairs, and might have rendered a 
 sincere reconciliation between France and Austria 
 possible at some future time ; whereas the partial 
 solution afforded by the Peace of Villafranca, which 
 left so many questions undecided, could have no 
 other result than to envenom the relations between 
 the two belligerents, and render the Eussian friendship 
 all the more precious to France. From another point 
 
 of view, the campaign in Lombardy, while satisfying 
 
 H 2 
 
100 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 the rancorous Muscovite feelings born of the Crimean 
 war, was yet very far from destroying one of those 
 fundamental elements of traditional policy which the 
 Czars always pursued with regard to Germany. In 
 spite of the loss of Milan, Austria still preserved her 
 situation intact in the centre of Europe, as a counter- 
 poise to Prussia ; and the meeting at Warsaw only 
 tended to show that Kussian influence had not dimi- 
 nished in the German states. 
 
 The Eussian Chancellor also showed himself no less 
 astute than circumspect in avoiding, during his con- 
 nivances with Napoleon III. in 1856-60, any com- 
 promise of certain general principles of conservatism, 
 which had formed the grandeur and the strength of 
 Nicholas's reign. 
 
 Doubtless, in Servia, in the Danubian Principalities, 
 Alexander Mikhailovitch did not show such rigorous 
 orthodoxy, and suffered popular votes to annul arrange- 
 ments that had been agreed upon in treaties ; but with 
 regard to these Eastern countries, Eussia has always 
 allowed herself a certain political licence. 
 
 With respect to Western matters, Prince Gortchakof 
 was careful to remain as much as possible within the 
 boundaries of tradition, and not to use the " new right " 
 too freely. He allowed the journals and periodicals 
 of Moscow and St. Petersburg to glorify at their 
 leisure the power which Eussia was displaying in the 
 deliverance of nations, and in triumphing over nation- 
 alities. For himself, and in all documents dating from 
 the Foreign Office, he carefully avoided any affectation 
 of words, or any use of new forms of speech, preserving 
 
A NATIONAL MINIS fm ' 13^' &UMf 101 
 
 steadily the formulas in use with the old style of 
 diplomatists. In these documents, when Milan and 
 Savoy changed hands, there was no mention made of 
 patriotic aspirations, nor of popular voting : in the 
 eyes of the Kussian Vice-Chancellor, these events were 
 only the natural results of war, " most regular trans- 
 actions." Still less did he take upon himself the 
 character of a revolutionary missionary abroad, or 
 associate himself with the traffic of exportation which, 
 according to a spiteful remark made at the time, 
 Napoleon III. had undertaken, along with other liberal 
 ideas. He declined categorically to participate in 
 any form whatever in the remonstrances addressed to 
 the King of Naples, and declared in his circular of 
 September 22nd, 1856, "that to endeavour to obtain 
 concessions from a sovereign respecting the internal 
 arrangements of his States by condemnatory means or 
 by menacing demonstrations, was simply a violation of 
 that sovereign's authority an endeavour to usurp his 
 place, and to plainly assert the right of the strong 
 over the weak." 
 
 Lastly, in his famous note to Prince G-agarine, of 
 October 10th, 1860, he smartly rebuked the Sardinian 
 Government for its conduct with regard to Tuscany 
 and the Duchies of Parma and Modena, and most 
 forcibly expressed his disapproval of those disposses- 
 sions of princes and those annexations of provinces 
 which six years later on he tolerated and even ap- 
 proved of in Germany. 
 
 " This is no longer," he wrote in his despatch to 
 Prince Gagarine, " a question of Italian, but one of 
 
102 ' '^THE ' VWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 general interest, to every government ; it is a question 
 bound up in those eternal laws without which neither 
 order, nor peace, nor security can exist in Europe." 
 
 He slyly rallied those political Jenners, who re- 
 commended the vaccination of anarchy in order to 
 deprive it of its pernicious nature, and who stole 
 the baggage of the republicans under pretence of 
 depriving them of their weapons : 
 
 " The necessity which the Sardinian Government 
 feels of subduing anarchy does not justify it, as it is 
 only keeping pace with the revolution in order to 
 enjoy its inheritance." 
 
 In one word, the Eussian Vice-Chancellor took 
 advantage, with the most marvellous dexterity, of all 
 the favourable dispositions of France, and still more 
 of its faults ; and while avoiding any sacrifice to it 
 of the will, of the usages, or of the principles of 
 his own Government, he made use of the Emperor 
 Napoleon III. without ever being much used by him, 
 or without ever having lent himself to any order of 
 ideas which could possibly have made Russia a victim 
 of deception. For the good of Russia and the welfare 
 of Europe, it might have been desired that Prince 
 Gortchakof had retained a little later, in his intimacy 
 with Prussia, some of that measured conduct and that 
 intelligent egotism of which he gave us so brilliant an 
 example during his intimacy with France. " In order 
 to feel love you must remain separate," said the great 
 theologian of the middle ages in reference to what 
 centuries of faith have called " divine love," or the 
 relations of the human soul with its divine Creator : 
 
A NATIONAL MINISTER IN RUSSIA. 103 
 
 .and the precept is still more to be recommended with 
 regard to the far less mystical relations existing be- 
 tween earthly powers. The Eussian Vice-Chancellor 
 always kept this precept in mind during his years of 
 " cordiality " with the Tuileries. It was only later 
 on in the second period that the heart of Alexander 
 Mikhailovitch began to triumph over State reasons, 
 and that his love for M. de Bismarck proved stronger 
 than the rest of the world stronger even than Russia 
 -and her interests. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 A "FRONDEUR" DIPLOMATIST AT ST. PETERSBURG. 
 
 M. de Bismarck at the Court of St. Petersburg Italian Complications 
 Pious Desires and patriotic bitterness of Heart of the Prussian Envoy 
 Private Letters during 1859-60 The Courland Nobility Affection 
 for everything Russian M.de Bismarck a Favourite in Russian Society 
 Slow Tendency of the Court of Berlin towards a Policy of 
 Action Effect of the Mobilisation of the Army in 1859 Military 
 Reform The Prince Regent His reactionary Antecedents His long 
 Unpopularity The Princess Augusta Reconciliation with modern 
 Ideas and the Cause of Progress The Regency and "the New Era" 
 The Moral Conquests in Germany Opposition of the Chamber and 
 the Country to Military Reform Serious Constitutional Conflict 
 The "New Right" and the " Piedmontese Mission" of the House 
 of Hohenzollern The Prince Regent becomes King of Prussia under 
 the Name of William I. (January, 1861) His Visit to Compiegne 
 (October, 1861) Reports as to an Alliance between the three Courts 
 of the Tuileries, of St. Petersburg, and of Berlin M. de Bismarck 
 Master of the Situation His attentions to William I. A Review at 
 Berlin and the "Polignac of Prussia" (May, 1862) Mission to France 
 (June September, 1862) The Diplomacy of Frankness Language 
 of M. de Bismarck to the French Statesmen A Visit to M. Thiers 
 Journey to the South of France Appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 (September, 1862) An Olive Branch gathered on the Tomb of Laura, 
 and a Word of Farewell to the Office on the " Quai d'Orsay." 
 
 WHILE Prince Gortchakof was gathering the fruits 
 of his " French " policy, the sweetest among which 
 was assuredly the vengeance he had wreaked on 
 Austria, his former colleague of Frankfort, having 
 become the representative of Prussia at the Eussian 
 court, was being consumed by the restless fever of a, 
 
A "FRONDmR" DIPLOMATIST. 105 
 
 man of action condemned to forced idleness. He 
 arrived at St. Petersburg in the spring of 1859, three 
 months after the famous New Year's Day reception 
 given by the Emperor Napoleon III. to M. de Htibner. 
 The Italian complications were coming to a climax, 
 and the Eussian Vice-Chancellor was lending himself 
 to all those diplomatic subtleties which, according to 
 the wishes of the Tuileries, were to force the Emperor 
 Francis Joseph to declare war. The new Prussian 
 plenipotentiary at the Court of St. Petersburg was 
 not for one moment in doubt as to the course which 
 his Government ought to pursue under the circum- 
 stances. It was at this time (May 12, 1859) that he 
 wrote his confidential despatch to M. de Schleinitz, in 
 which he recommended a rupture with the Bund, by 
 the radical means of sword and fire -ferro et igne. 
 In the previous year he had been to Paris, and had had 
 an interview with the Emperor of the French, during 
 which he had listened to his good intentions towards 
 Prussia, and to the astonishing good wishes .prevail- 
 ing at the Tuileries for the prosperity of the land 
 of Frederick II. and of Blticher. In the month 
 of November of the previous year (1858) Na- 
 poleon III. had enjoined the Marquis de Pepoli, 
 then en route for Berlin, to represent in their 
 most favourable aspects all the advantages which 
 would accrue to the Hohenzollerns from a rupture with 
 Austria. " In Germany," said the Emperor of the 
 French, "Austria represents the past ; Prussia repre- 
 sents the future. In binding herself to Austria, Prussia 
 becomes condemned to a state of inaction which cannot 
 
106 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 satisfy her ; for a higher destiny awaits her, and 
 Germany expects her to fulfil it." 
 
 These were the thoughts of the future prisoner of 
 Wilhelmshohe on the eve of Magenta and Solferino, 
 and " His Excellency the Lieutenant " certainly found 
 nothing to object to in so splendid a programme ; but 
 the worthy ministers of the "new era" in Berlin 
 Jiad unhappily not the slightest notion of the " new 
 right," and the Prince Begent himself was contented 
 with visions of purely moral conquests. At Potsdam 
 it was even asked whether Austria ought not to be 
 assisted whether they were not under Federal ob- 
 ligations to the Emperor Francis Joseph ! The 
 Samson of the Mark struggled in vain to burst the 
 withes wound round him by the " Philistines of the 
 Spree/' and the war in Italy became his Delilah. It 
 is in truth from this period that dates the notorious 
 baldness of the Chancellor of Germany. 
 
 It is interesting to study the state of mind of M. de 
 Bismarck as depicted in his private letters to Malvina 
 during 1859-60. At the commencement of hostilities, 
 -evidently despairing of seeing his Government adopt 
 that line of conduct which he had never ceased to 
 recommend to them, he leaves his post, and visits 
 Moscow and the Kremlin, passes a short and agreeable 
 time at a villa all the more agreeable as "he is out 
 of the reach of the telegraph." The news of a great 
 battle fought in Lombardy (Magenta) brings him back 
 to St. Petersburg. " Perhaps there will now be some- 
 thing for diplomatists to do." At St. Petersburg 
 
 * Massari, " II Conte Cavour," p. 268. 
 
A "FRONDEUR" DIPLOMATIST. 107 
 
 he is informed of the strange weakness which is 
 prevailing at Berlin in favour of Austria ; that the 
 mobilisation of the Federal armies is under consider- 
 ation; and he is filled with the greatest apprehensions 
 for his country. He falls ill, and a serious attack of 
 liver complaint places his life in danger. 'They 
 covered my body with innumerable cupping-glasses as 
 big as saucers, with mustard poultices and enormous 
 blisters; and I was already half-way to a better 
 world when I succeeded in convincing my doctors that 
 my nerves were shattered by eight years of ceaseless 
 worry and trouble (the eight years at Frankfort), and 
 that in continuing to enfeeble me in this way they 
 were driving me into a typhus fever or into imbecility. 
 "My good constitution triumphed in the end, 
 however, thanks especially to several dozens of good 
 
 Nevertheless his "good constitution" did not enable 
 him to shake off all his cares, and he remained sad 
 and morose, confessing two months later that he 
 would not have regretted having done with life alto- 
 gether. Austria was vanquished, it is true; she had lost 
 two great battles and one of her wealthiest provinces 
 to boot, but Prussia had reaped no benefit from 
 these disasters to the House of Hapsburg, and the 
 knight of the Mark was not the sort of man to cherish 
 a purely Platonic hate, such as his friend Alexander 
 Mikhailovitch indulged in. He consoled himself, 
 however, with the thought that the Peace of Villa- 
 franca was but a truce. " To try and reconcile 
 Austria with France, under existing circumstances, is 
 
108 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 to attempt to square the circle. I shall try," he 
 writes in the beginning of the autumn of 1859, "to 
 hide myself in my bear-skins and to allow the snow 
 to cover me ; and, when the thaws of spring return, 
 I shall see what is left of me and of our affairs, and if 
 there is too little, I shall close my account for ever 
 with political life." The following spring brought 
 with it several important events. The annexation 
 of Savoy spread that universal distrust throughout 
 Europe of which we have already spoken ; but the 
 Cabinet of Berlin still persisted in its former errors, 
 and the Prince Eegent held an interview, in July, 
 with the Emperor Francis Joseph at Tceplitz. 
 hear," writes the Prussian representative at the Court 
 of St. Petersburg, with scarcely disguised anger, "that 
 we have been nicely humbugged at Tceplitz, and that 
 we have allowed ourselves to be taken in by Viennese 
 good-humour ; and all for nothing not even for a 
 tiny dish of lentils." 
 
 Finally, in the month of October, after Castel- 
 fidardo and the conquest of the kingdom of Naples, 
 the Cabinet of Berlin addressed an energetic note to 
 M. de Cavour, on the conduct of the House of Savoy 
 in the Italian Peninsula. The note declared that 
 "it is only by the legal road of reform, and by re- 
 specting existing rights, that a regular government 
 can pretend to realise the legitimate desires of 
 nations," and terminated with the following passage : 
 " Called upon, as we are, to pronounce our opinion on 
 the actions and principles of the Sardinian Govern- 
 ment, we cannot but deplore them profoundly; and we 
 
A "FRONDEUR" DIPLOMATIST. 109 
 
 consider that we are only fulfilling a necessary duty 
 in expressing as explicitly and as formally as it is 
 possible, our entire disapprobation of these principles 
 and of the application which has been made of them." 
 
 "We can well imagine what an access of ill-temper 
 these innocent simplicities must have caused the future 
 destroyer of the Bund, the coming despoiler of Den- 
 mark, of Hanover, and of so many other States. He 
 again thinks of abandoning his career, and is resolved, 
 at any rate, "to retire to the position of a philosophic 
 observer " of the monstrous policy in favour at Berlin. 
 He is quite surprised at the scandal caused by the 
 publication of M. de Varnhagen's posthumous diary, 
 a diary filled with piquant disclosures about the 
 Court of Prussia. " Why so much indignation ? is 
 it not all perfectly true ? Yarnhagen was vain and 
 spiteful, but who is not ? Does not everything de- 
 pend on the manner in which nature has ripened our 
 life ? Some of us get worm-eaten, some drift into 
 damp places, some bask in the sun, and so we turn 
 out sweet, bitter, or altogether rotten. 7 ' 
 
 All this, however, did not hinder him from culti- 
 vating his intercourse with the political world of St. 
 Petersburg with the greatest care (1859-60), from 
 taking root there, or from attaching the fortunes of his 
 country, by a thousand ties, to that Eussian friendship 
 whose value he understood so well. The position of the 
 Prussian representatives at St. Petersburg has at all 
 times been quite an exceptional one ; thanks to the 
 bonds of close relationship existing between the two 
 courts, they enjoy the confidence and the intimacy of 
 
110 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 the Winter Palace to a degree unknown to the envoys 
 of other States. 
 
 M. de Bismarck knew how to increase these favour- 
 able conditions by the influence of his personal merits, 
 and by the .good name he had earned in the eyes of the 
 Eussians during his long sojourn in Frankfort. His 
 former travels in Courland had made him acquainted 
 and beloved by the German nobility of the Baltic 
 provinces, by the Keyserlingks, the Uxkiills, the 
 Noldes, the Brewerns, &e., families who had always 
 possessed influence at Court, at the Foreign Office, and 
 in Eussian diplomacy. 
 
 "The first prophets of the future grandeur of 
 M. de Bismarck," says a writer well versed in Eussian 
 society, " the first to predict the mission reserved for 
 him in Germany, were, perhaps, those barons of 
 Courland and Livonia with whom the present Chan- 
 cellor of Germany used to spend many a hunting 
 season, sharing their banquets, their amusements, and 
 their political discussions."" 
 
 The Prussian representative at the Court of St. 
 Petersburg was, however, very careful not to abandon 
 himself too freely to his liking for the Courland and 
 Livonian nobles ; he was careful to allot the largest 
 half of his affections, or at least of his caresses, 
 to Eussian Eussia, to aboriginal (nastaiastchala) 
 Muscovy. 
 
 Was this enthusiasm for the manners and peculi- 
 arities of the " Scythians," this love of " bearskins and 
 caviare/' genuine ? We may be permitted to doubt it; 
 we may be permitted to suppose that the man who, in 
 
 * " Aus der Petersburgcr Gesellschaft," t. i\., p. 90. 
 
A "FRONDEUR" DIPLOMATIST. Ill 
 
 virtue of his German superiority, had so often and so- 
 loudly expressed his disdain for the Latins and the 
 Wallachians, felt in reality a still greater contempt 
 for that Slavonic race which every good German 
 despises as a race of slaves. * 
 
 But however this may have been, never had any 
 previous ambassador shown so much devotion for the 
 Polar Star as M. de Bismarck, nor carried to so great 
 an extent his love for everything Eussian. 
 
 He pushed his admiration so far as to have several 
 little bears in his house, which (like the foxes at 
 Kniephof) would rush into the dining-room during 
 dinner, causing a delightful commotion among the 
 guests, would lick, their master's hands, and nip the 
 calves of the servants, t 
 
 A devoted Nimrod, he never missed any expedition 
 against the black king of the northern forests, and 
 was always careful on these occasions to adopt the 
 Muscovite hunting costume ; the Eussian style of 
 driving, indeed, is still dear to him, even in the streets 
 of Berlin. He affected a similar interest in the 
 literary efforts of the country ; he kept a professor of 
 Eussian in his house, and learnt sufficient of the 
 
 * In 1862, when he was finally about to quit his post at St. Petersburg, 
 M. de Bismarck received the visit of a colleague, a foreign diplomatist. 
 Russia being mentioned, the future Chancellor of Germany said : " I have 
 the habit, when I leave a country in which I have sojourned for any length 
 of time, to dedicate to it one of the trinkets on my watch chain, on which I 
 cause my final impression of the country to be engraven ; would you like to 
 know my final impression of Eussia ? " And he showed to the somewhat 
 puzzled diplomatist a little trinket on which were engraven the words: 
 " La Russie, c'est le neant ! " 
 
 f M. de Bismarck has since then presented these quadrupeds to the 
 Zoological Gardens of the ancient free town of Frankfort. 
 
112 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 language to enable him to give his servants their 
 orders in their native tongue, and even to surprise 
 the Emperor Alexander one day by a few sentences 
 spoken in the language of Pouchkine. The Kussians 
 could not do otherwise than give a most cordial recep- 
 tion to a diplomatist who showed himself so ena- 
 moured of their customs, pleasures, and " peculiarities;" 
 and who, moreover, had the advantage of succeeding 
 the worthy M. de Werther, whose reputation there 
 and elsewhere was not that of being an uproariously 
 cheerful individual. 
 
 Indeed there had never been known on the banks 
 of the Neva so charming a Prussian as M. de Bismarck 
 such a capital boon companion, so lively, cheerful, 
 good-natured, and witty. 
 
 There was no limit to his jokes about the " Philis- 
 tines of the Spree," about the " periwigs of Potsdam ;" 
 and all these jokes met with the greatest success. A 
 plenipotentiary speaking ill of his own Government, a 
 diplomatist quarrelling with and grumbling about the 
 very policy which it was his mission to represent 
 and to forward, was a novel spectacle, and exactly 
 to the taste of a circle always seeking something 
 piquant and highly flavoured. He won the good graces 
 of the Empress-mother, and also those of the Grand 
 Duchess Helena, whose influence at Court was con- 
 siderable, and whose warm friendship never after- 
 wards failed him, even during some of the most 
 critical moments of his ministerial career. The Emperor 
 showed a great liking for him, invited him regularly 
 to his bear-hunts ; and did him the honour of including 
 
A "FRONDEUR" DIPLOMATIST. 113 
 
 him in his suite, during his journeys to Warsaw and 
 Breslau, to meet the Prince Kegent of Prussia. As for 
 Prince Gortchakof, he enjoyed more than ever the 
 society of his former colleague of Frankfort, and many 
 a malicious saying, many a spiteful joke, generally at 
 the expense of Austria, circulated through the St. 
 Petersburg saloons, which were attributed indifferently 
 to one or the other of these two inseparable friends 
 friends whom unkind intriguers were striving to 
 separate ! As early as the end of 1859, M. de 
 Bismarck wrote in a private letter : " Austria and her 
 dear confederates are intriguing to have me recalled 
 to Berlin ; yet I have been very good, but the will of 
 God be done ! " Meanwhile, in Berlin, Prussian 
 politics had begun little by little to slide down the 
 rapid descent which was to bring them from the 
 cloudy regions of the "new era" to that land of 
 reality and action where the friend of Alexander 
 Mikhailovitch had so long wished to see them ; and, 
 singular to relate, it was precisely the mobilisation of 
 the Prussian army in 1859 the same mobilisation so 
 much condemned by M. de Bismarck which became 
 the immediate cause of the change which led to such- 
 incalculable consequences. It is now the fashion in 
 France to represent the Prussian Government as medi- 
 tating, during half a century, on a war of revenge 
 and conquest ; slowly brightening her arms, and 
 training successive generations to meet the decisive 
 hour. Nothing, however, can be more erroneous. 
 
 Neither the Government of Frederick William III., 
 nor that of Frederick William IV., ever nourished 
 
114 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 warlike projects, and even the humiliation of Olmtitz 
 failed to sting the Minister of War at Berlin. The two 
 predecessors of William I. sacrificed only just so 
 much to their army as was necessary to keep pace with 
 the other great Powers just enough to hold reviews 
 and to be able to speak of their faithful troops and 
 their ever valorous swords ; in reality they were in- 
 clined to exclaim, with the Grand Duke Constantine, 
 brother of the Emperor Nicholas : "I hate war ; it 
 spoils one's armies ! " 
 
 The swords of Bliicher and of Scharnhorst had 
 grown rusty since 1815. Even the adoption of the 
 needle-gun, in 1847, was merely an incident a 
 scientific experiment; and in 1848 and 1849 the 
 Prussian troops did not shine with any very great 
 splendour during the war in the Duchies, and were even 
 miserably disconcerted by the undisciplined bands of the 
 insurgents of Posen and Baden. The brother of the 
 king, who commanded the troops in Baden, was pain- 
 fully moved by the spectacle presented by his soldiers; 
 and after his accession to the regency of the kingdom, 
 in October, 1856, turned his thoughts incessantly to 
 the reformation of the army. It was, however, only 
 during the attempted mobilisation, which was essayed 
 in consequence of the Italian complications (in the 
 summer of 1859), that all the deficiencies and inco- 
 herencies till then existing in the Prussian military 
 organisation became palpable. Two men of superior 
 ability, MM. de Molfcke and de Eoon, then joined the 
 Prince Eegent in reforming the military system from 
 its very foundation. They showed an intelligence, an 
 
A "FRONDEUR" DIPLOMATIST. 115 
 
 energy, a rapidity without equal in history ; they knew 
 how to take advantage of every scientific discovery ; 
 and, above all, they did not allow the precepts to escape 
 them that were soon to be taught to the world by the 
 formidable civil war in America precepts rich in 
 experiences and in inventions of every kind. 
 
 In spite of the opposition with which they were 
 met on every side, these two men created, in the short 
 space of six years, an armed force on a totally new 
 .system powerful, invincible and "the instru- 
 ment," * as yet but in a rough and rudimentary stage, 
 that was to give proofs of its terrible "perfection" 
 on the fatal day of Sadowa ! No less erroneous is 
 also the opinion, widely spread nevertheless, that the 
 Prussians demanded victories and aggrandisements 
 of their Government. In order to refute all these 
 gratuitous suppositions, it will suffice to remember 
 that the several Parliaments of Berlin never ceased 
 opposing the plans of army reform, and that they had 
 with them the unanimous voice of the people. Ideas 
 of German grandeur, of German power, of German in- 
 fluence, haunted the minds of professors and writers 
 far more than those of the people. They formed the 
 subjects of academical themes, of fine pieces of 
 rhetoric, of grandiloquent essays, and even these 
 opinions were more frequent south of the Main than 
 to the north of that river. Here, indeed, we have a 
 
 * " In order to come out victorious from this war (against Austria) I 
 -wanted two things : a conviction of the justice of my cause and ' the in- 
 strument ' capable of ensuring my triumph. I mean by this the Prussian 
 army. I had no doubts 'as to the perfection of the instrument.' "Reply 
 of William I. to the Hanoverian deputation, August Ifth, 18G6. 
 
 i 2 
 
116 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 striking proof of the astonishing art of M. de Bismarck 
 in having, to use the words of Mtinchhausen, " changed 
 fogs into stones, and reared up with them a solid and 
 gigantic edifice/' in having turned the dreams and as- 
 pirations of philosophers into an overwhelming popular 
 passion. Strength of will, strength of character-- 
 genius, in fact can still, in this century of democratic 
 equality, play a part of which our poor philosophy has 
 but little suspicion, when it lays every responsibility 
 and every initiative on the blind fatality of the 
 " masses," and, as the German proverb has it, "can 
 no longer distinguish the trees from looking so long at 
 the forest." Take away from the recent history of 
 Prussia the three or four men who answer to the 
 names of William I., Moltke, Eoon, and Bismarck, 
 and old Barbarossa might still be sleeping his sleep 
 of ages in the caverns of the Kyffhauser. 
 
 Nature is as fond of analogies as of contrasts, and 
 thus we find that the antecedents of the Prince Eegent, 
 who bears to-day the name of William L, Emperor of 
 Germany, are not without some parallelism to 
 the past life of the extraordinary man who, at the 
 appointed hour, was to forge for him, ferro et igne, 
 the imperial crown of Barbarossa. In order to throw 
 light upon these antecedents we must refer to the 
 posthumous diary of M. von Varnhagen of Ense 
 the liberal, biting, compromising, yet amiable Dangeau 
 of the Court of Berlin the same diary which M. de 
 Bismarck defended in a private letter, in which he 
 expressed his surprise at the clamours which the 
 publication had given rise to in Berlin. There is no 
 
A "FRONDEUR" DIPLOMATIST. 117 
 
 doubt that Prince William strenuously opposed the 
 liberal weaknesses which distinguished the early period 
 of his brother Frederick William IV. 's reign. He caused 
 certain elaborate memoranda to be drawn up in 
 which his right to interfere in all the fundamental 
 changes taking place in the State was asserted. The 
 rumour that a formal protestation had been put for- 
 ward in his name and in that of his descendants, 
 against any fresh constitutional projects, obtained 
 some credence even in the bosom of the Ministry ; 
 at all events he only gave his consent to the " feudal " 
 charter granted by his brother on the 3rd February, 
 1847, on the express conditions that the States were 
 not to interfere in the budget, and were never to 
 meddle with foreign affairs. 
 
 Thus the unpopularity of the heir-presumptive was 
 very great before the revolution of 1848 ; and during 
 the fatal month of March of that year it was more 
 especially against him that the fury of the Berlinese 
 was directed they attributed to him (and wrongly) the 
 order which had been given to fire upon the people. 
 He was obliged to quit the country, to undertake a 
 " mission " to London, and the populace satisfied their 
 malice by inscribing on his palace " national property." 
 On his return from England after the revolutionary 
 effervescence -had subsided, he placed himself at 
 the head of the army (1849), in order to subdue an 
 absurd insurrection in Baden, and gave out that " im- 
 portant military operations" were keeping him in 
 the South of Germany, in order to avoid being pre- 
 sent at a solemn sitting of the 6th February, 1850, 
 
118 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 when King Frederick William took the oath to the 
 statutes of limitations. 
 
 After a while, however, and towards the close of 
 the disappointed and morose reign of his brother, the 
 Prince of Prussia relaxed in his reactionary rigour, 
 and opposed with vigour the "pietist" influences 
 pervading at that time the Court of Potsdam. Family 
 affections and interests all combined to isolate the 
 prince, and create for him a place apart. The esteem 
 and tenderness which the King Frederick William IV. 
 lavished on his queen scarcely consoled her for the 
 barrenness by which she was afflicted ; and the 
 sight of her more fortunate sister-in-law, mother of 
 several children, heirs to her husband's crown, inspired 
 her with feelings of irritation and jealousy, which were 
 keenly resented by the wife of the heir -presumptive. 
 
 The Princess Augusta was not one to submit tamely 
 to any slight. A descendant of that House of Weimar 
 which has always been distinguished for its love of art 
 and pleasure, she had early collected round her a circle 
 of her own, and had assumed an attitude which con- 
 trasted sufficiently with that of the court to make the 
 contrast seem intentional. These tendencies of the 
 Princess Augusta were not without their influence on 
 her princely husband; and even the project so long 
 contemplated by the royal couple, of uniting their 
 son to' the daughter of Queen Victoria, which was 
 finally carried out in 1857, was considered an ad- 
 vance made towards gaining popular opinion. There 
 were, however, not wanting at Potsdam certain 
 courtiers who, according to the terrible M. de 
 
A " FROND EUU" DIPLOMATIST. 119 
 
 Varnhagen, were asking themselves whether it was not 
 beneath the dignity of the House of Hohenzollern to ally 
 itself with a dynasty which held but a divided sceptre, 
 and which was subject to a House of Commons ! How 
 greatly must the times and the habits at the Court of 
 Potsdam be changed, when we hear of the presumptive 
 heiress to the throne of Prussia that same daughter of 
 Victoria sending affectionate telegrams to the dying 
 Doctor Strauss, rendering to the author of <e The Life 
 of Jesus " an homage in extremis that filled with 
 enthusiasm all the valiant knights of the " battle of 
 civilisation." Grown accustomed, as it were, for some 
 years past, to see in the brother of the king a disciple of 
 modern ideas and a champion of the cause of progress, 
 the Prussians were not surprised, but were none 
 the less pleased, to hear him, on his accession to the 
 regency, express himself liberally and constitutionally. 
 A " new era " was about to dawn for Prussia, and this 
 expression was almost officially adopted, in order to 
 express the change which had taken place in the 
 system ; and in a noteworthy address of November 
 8th, 1858, which the Prince Eegent delivered to 
 the cabinet which he had just formed, he traced the 
 programme of a healing policy, and recommended his 
 councillors to ameliorate all that was arbitrary or 
 contrary to the wants of the times. 
 
 While on one hand he restrained himself from in- 
 clining too much towards liberal ideas, and expressed 
 the will " to withstand courageously any demands that 
 have not been agreed to," on the other hand he pro- 
 claimed his intention of loyally keeping any engagement 
 
120 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 he may have contracted, and of not repulsing useful 
 reforms. The address ends with the sentence, since 
 become famous and often quoted, "that Prussia was 
 only to make moral conquests in Germany." 
 
 The good understanding between the regent and 
 the nation was not, however, to be of long duration ; 
 the relations between them increased in bitterness 
 and led to a complete rupture, caused more especially 
 by the projected army reforms. 
 
 The prince had this reform particularly at heart. 
 The events of 1859 had served to convince him of the 
 urgency of a measure which he had secretly cherished 
 for several years ; but the deputies of the nation 
 declined to agree with him on this point, and opposed 
 him in the most tenacious, unshaken manner. They 
 could not understand the obstinacy with which the 
 prince clung to a plan which fulfilled neither the 
 wishes nor supplied the wants of the country ; and they 
 laughed at those who pretended that, once in possession 
 of his new " instrument," the Hohenzollern might also 
 in his turn fair e le grand ! 
 
 " We resisted," writes a judicious German writer, 
 " the temptations of the Frankfort Parliament in 
 1849 ; we resisted the provocation of Olmlttz in 1850 ; 
 we allowed the opportunities of the wars of 1854 and 
 1859 to pass by us. Love of peace has become 
 absolute ; there is a complete want of ambition ; all 
 are satisfied with the political situation which we now 
 occupy, and no one can suppose that so peaceful a 
 kingdom can be in danger of being menaced by its 
 neighbours. Considering, then, this state of affairs, 
 
A "FRONDEUR" DIPLOMATIST. 121 
 
 any aggrandisement of the army, bringing with, it an 
 increase of military and civil taxes already sufficiently 
 heavy, appears to the country as an inconceivable 
 caprice on the part of the Government."* 
 
 The Chambers refused the supplies asked for ; the 
 Government did without them, and continued to incur 
 expenses. The military question thus grew into a 
 financial one, and soon became a topic of perpetual 
 constitutional conflict. Towards the end of 1861 
 the only remedy for the dead lock seemed to be a 
 coup d'etat. 
 
 No less great and irresistible was the change which 
 soon took place in the ideas of the Court of Potsdam 
 with regard to foreign politics. As the " instrument" 
 grew more perfect (and its growth was most rapid) 
 questions were asked as to how it could best be 
 employed. As yet no one knew precisely what was 
 wanted ; but whatever that want might be, it was 
 desired with vigour with a vigour drawn from the bat- 
 talions which day by day were increasing in strength. 
 
 Certainly " moral " conquests in Germany could 
 hardly now be the only ones aimed at, but it was 
 thought that a moral activity, supported now and 
 again by the needle-gun, might have the most excel- 
 lent results. The atmosphere was charged with elec- 
 tricity and with principles of nationality ; and it was 
 no longer only the rhetoricians and the professors of 
 the National- Verein who recommended "a Germany 
 united by a Prussian needle" (mit Preussischer spitze). 
 
 * Constantino Roessler, " Graf Bismarck uncl die deutsche Nation." 
 Berlin, 1871. 
 
122 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 When, in the month of October, 1860, the envoy of 
 Prussia, Count Brassier .de Saint-Simon, read M. de 
 Schleinitz's celebrated note against the Italian annexa- 
 tions to Count Cavour, the President of the Sardinian 
 Council listened in silence ; then, after expressing his re- 
 gret at having displeased the Berlin Cabinet, he declared 
 that he felt himself consoled by the thought that 
 " Prussia would one day be grateful to Piedmont for the 
 example the latter had just set her." In France, the 
 democratic journals the organs devoted to the "new 
 right "-could not sufficiently praise "the Piedmont ese 
 mission " of the House of Hohenzollern ; and we have 
 already mentioned the encouragements that Napo- 
 leon III. sent to Berlin in the year 1858. The visit of 
 "William I. to the Emperor of the French at Com- 
 piegne, in October, 1861, was in this respect a still 
 more significant symptom, as none of the northern 
 sovereigns had as yet paid this mark of courtesy to 
 the elect of universal suffrage. Strange rumours 
 began to circulate from that time as to an alliance of 
 the three courts of the Tuileries, St. Petersburg, and 
 Berlin, which continued until the month of March, 
 1868. Publications whose origin was mysterious, 
 but which showed a great fund of information re- 
 specting political affairs spoke of "great agglo- 
 merations of States to be resolved by the three races 
 the Eoman, the Slavonic, and the Germanic, with 
 which corresponded the three centres of gravitation- 
 France, Prussia, and Eussia ; alluded also to the 
 definite establishment of the peace of the world by a 
 triple alliance of these universal monarchies, whose 
 
A "FRONDEUR" DIPLOMATIST. 12$ 
 
 distinguishing features would be not only the three 
 principal races of the European system, but also its 
 three great Christian Churches !" * 
 
 Lord Palmerston declared about this time in 
 Parliament, with his British ingenuousness, " that the 
 
 ' O ' 
 
 situation was pregnant with at least half-a-dozen 
 respectable wars ; " and, in spite of the obscurity which 
 still overclouds the transactions of 1861-62, we cannot 
 doubt that Napoleon III. cherished in the recesses 
 of his soul some vague and gigantic combination that 
 should embrace at once the East and the West, and 
 which Prince Gortchakof prepared with his usual 
 dexterity to take advantage of. Whatever may 
 have been the truth of these hidden designs, the 
 Hohenzollern could not but be satisfied with hi& 
 sojourn at Compiegne, which he remembered with 
 some emotion two years afterwards in his polite reply 
 to the invitation to the congress. In October, 1861, 
 Napoleon III. employed, no doubt, the same language 
 in which he afterwards expressed himself by the 
 mouth of the Marquis Pepoli, a language prophetic 
 of " the great destinies which awaited Prussia in 
 Germany, and which Germany expected her to 
 fulfil." ' 
 
 It was thus that internal difficulties and exterior 
 facilities, internal parliamentary conflicts and external 
 political friendships, combined towards the end of 
 1861 in impelling the King of Prussia to form ener- 
 
 * See the remarkable pamphlet entitled " Europa's Cabinete und Alii- 
 anzen," Leipzig, 1862. It is the work of a Bussian diplomatist celebrated 
 in political literature, the same whose book on the Pentarchie had so great a 
 success at the time of the July Monarchy. 
 
124 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 getic resolutions. A vigorous man was wanted for the 
 vigorous measures that were in contemplation, and 
 all eyes were naturally turned towards the railing 
 (frondeur) diplomatist at St. Petersburg, who during 
 several successive years had never ceased criticising 
 the ministers of the " new era," nor ceased condemning 
 their foreign as well as their home policy. In spite of the 
 promise which he had made to himself, " to take up 
 the position of a philosophic observer," M. de Bismarck 
 did not fail to score his points from time to time 
 during 1860-61, and to repeat most untiringly the pre- 
 cept of Stafford "to be thorough" (a Toutrance /). We 
 see him making several tours in Germany during this 
 time, seeking to meet the chief of the State, to inform 
 him of his ideas, and to present him with divers 
 memoranda. In October, 1861, on the very eve of 
 the journey to Compiegne, he submitted to the king 
 a small work which he hoped would obtain some 
 success ; a work whose tenor it is not difficult to 
 divine, if we take the trouble to read a private letter 
 written by him a few days previously (September 
 2nd, 1861), filled with opposition to a programme 
 of politics which the Prussian Conservative party had 
 just published. In this curious letter he inveighs 
 most violently against the Bund, "that hotbed of 
 'particularism,' demands a closer (straff er) concen- 
 tration of the armed forces of Germany, and a more 
 natural outline for the frontiers of the States." But, 
 first of all, he warns his party against the dangerous 
 fiction of a unity which, it is supposed, would exist 
 between the different conservative interests. Indeed, 
 
A "FRONDEUR" DIPLOMATIST. 125 
 
 to triumph over this dangerous fiction, so deeply- 
 engrafted in many minds, was the one great difficulty 
 of the future minister of William I. : his omne tulit 
 punctum ; for it is not easy in such matters to dis- 
 tinguish reality from fiction ; it is even sometimes 
 perilous to discuss them ; and a Ketz would certainly 
 have repeated, with regard to conservative interests, 
 the saying he had so subtly uttered about the rights of 
 the people and those of the king, " that they never 
 agree so well as by keeping silence." M. de Bismarck 
 had yet many times to fight against this " fiction " at 
 Berlin as at St. Petersburg ; and if the enlightened 
 and acute mind of his friend Alexander Mikhailovitch 
 allowed itself to be convinced without much resistance, 
 it was not so with the Hohenzollern, who, at a later 
 period, and on several decisive occasions, was to be 
 beset by scruples, by shiverings, and by what FalstafF 
 terms " tertian agues of the conscience." 
 
 On the return of William I. from Compiegne, 
 the nomination of the Knight of the Mark to the 
 direction of affairs was already regarded as settled. 
 M. de Bismarck arrived immediately afterwards, in 
 order to assist at the king's coronation at Konigsberg, 
 and only returned to St. Petersburg in order to take 
 his final farewell. In the beginning of May, 1862, 
 he was again at Berlin, and was present at the great 
 military parade which took place in the capital on the 
 occasion of the consecration of the statue of Count 
 of Brandenburg (May 17th). Politicians, deputies, 
 and great functionaries already looked upon him as 
 the future "Polignac" of Prussia. The hopes and fears 
 
126 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 that such anticipations were sure to awaken were, 
 however, not so soon to be realised ; and society was 
 disconcerted by learning that M. de Bismarck had 
 been appointed to the post of ambassador at Paris. 
 Was it that he still hesitated to lift up the burden 
 of power, or did he prefer to await the results of 
 the new elections to which Prussia was about to have 
 recourse ? It is more probable that, before inaugu- 
 rating his combative government, he may have wished 
 to add yet a few more interviews to those which 
 he had already had at Compiegne, to take once more 
 the measure of a man on whom it was then univer- 
 sally believed depended the destinies of Europe, and 
 to generally prepare French opinion for the new policy 
 he was about to attempt. 
 
 He only remained two months in Paris, during 
 the lovely months of June and July ; but this short 
 sojourn was more than sufficient to complete his 
 studies and clear up his doubts. He had more 
 than one conversation with the sovereign of France, 
 whose profound ideas, whose least word, whose very 
 silence, furnished topics of admiration to the whole 
 world at this epoch ; and whom the future con- 
 queror of Sedan did not hesitate to designate, in 
 his confidential moments, as " the embodiment 
 of misunderstood incapacity." He also associated 
 with the influential men of the government and of 
 society, and tried to rally them round his ideas and 
 his projects. He did not conceal the fact that his 
 sovereign would very soon require his services, and 
 he demonstrated with great openness the line of 
 
A "FRONDEUR" DIPLOMATIST. 127 
 
 conduct he intended pursuing under the circum- 
 stances. That which history will the most admire 
 in the present Chancellor of Germany is the supreme 
 art with which he makes use of the truth ; he is a 
 genius who has known how to give to truth itself all 
 the political virtues of falsehood. Very cunning 
 and very astute as to his means, he has, for all that, 
 always displayed in pursuit of his ends an in- 
 genuousness and an amount of indiscretion that has 
 never had its equal; and it was thus that in Paris, 
 during 1862, he imparted some of those astonishing 
 confidences which only amused when they ought to 
 have caused the most serious reflections. " r 
 
 " France," said M. de Bismarck then and after- 
 wards, in 1862, in 1864, in 1865 in short, at all his 
 interviews with French statesmen, "France would 
 be wrong to take umbrage at the growth of Prussian 
 influence, or be offended by her possible territorial 
 aggrandisement at the expense of the smaller States. 
 Of what use, of what assistance, are those petty States 
 without a will, without strength, without an army ? 
 However wide-spreading the desires and wants of 
 Prussia may be, they must necessarily be bounded 
 by the Main the river Main is Prussia's natural 
 frontier. Beyond that river Austria will retain, will 
 even increase, its preponderance ; so that in Germany 
 there will always be two powers acting as a useful 
 counterpoise one to the other. Public peace will be 
 benefited, and France will certainly lose nothing ; she 
 
 * See " Preliminaires de Sadowa," chap. i. 
 
128 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 will even derive immense advantages in her politics 
 and in her transactions with the world. 
 
 " Prussia is, in effect, very badly made, and of an 
 impossible shape ; on the side of Cassel and Nassau 
 she has ' no stomach/ and on the side of Hanover 
 'her shoulder is out of joint; ' she floats in the air; 
 and this painful situation condemns her necessarily to 
 follow in all things the politics of Vienna and St. 
 Petersburg, and to revolve unceasingly in the orbit of 
 the Holy Alliance. Were she better shaped, more 
 solidly placed, complete in her members, she would 
 be independent, would have more liberty in her 
 movements, ' the liberty to form alliances ;' and what 
 alliance could be more desirable for her than that of 
 the French empire ? More than one question now 
 undecided, and almost insoluble, might then be 
 entered into with perfect safety the Venetian, the 
 Eastern question who can tell ? Perhaps even that 
 of Poland ! 
 
 " Lastly, if the possibly increasing size of Prussia 
 threatened to become excessive and destroy the 
 balance of power, what is to prevent France from 
 enlarging her own territory in her turn ? "Why should 
 she not take possession of Belgium, and, in so doing, 
 ' stamp out that nest of demagogues ? ' Certainly 
 the Cabinet of Berlin would not oppose it ; suum 
 cuique, that is the ancient and venerable motto of the 
 Prussian monarchy." 
 
 All this was lightly, attractively, and wittily said, 
 and accompanied by various bon mots, more or less 
 ingenious or malicious, at the expense of the men and 
 
A ( ?FRONDEUR DIPLOMATIST. 129 
 
 things of the period ; for example, at the expense of 
 the House of Lords at Berlin, composed of respectable 
 perruques ;* at the expense^ of the Chamber of 
 Deputies, composed equally of perruques, but not so 
 respectable; and at the expense of an august personage, 
 the most respectable, but the most unmanageable, of 
 all the perruques. 
 
 M. de Bismarck's success in Paris during his two 
 months' stay was almost as great as that achieved 
 during his sojourn of three years on the banks of the 
 Neva. 
 
 Men of importance, those occupying high positions, 
 were careful, however, not to rate him too high ; they 
 readily acknowledged that he was a clever man, but 
 could not make up their minds that his cleverness 
 had any serious side. 
 
 Nor was he better appreciated by a sage who at 
 that time was living in retirement, but who, in the 
 midst of his favourite studies, yet followed with atten- 
 tion, even with ardour, the great events of the world. 
 
 One evening in the month of June, 1862, in the 
 well-known salons of the Place St. George, where 
 the brilliant and caustic talents of M. Thiers drew 
 around him all the more moderate opposers of the 
 Second Empire, the suddenly-announced name of 
 his Excellency the Prussian ambassador fell like a 
 thunderbolt at the feet of the astonished host and 
 his equally astonished guests, the ambassadors at 
 the Court of the Tuileries being at that time very 
 careful to avoid the marked house of " the illustrious 
 
 * Wigs ; meaning wigs with no brains under them. 
 
130 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 national historian." The general astonishment 'be- 
 came even greater when ]\. de Bismarck, joining 
 immediately in the conversation, began an exposition 
 of his future political plans, should his royal master 
 ever place him at the head of affairs. 
 
 The assembly agreed unanimously that the ambas- 
 sador was very bizarre, and his frankness appeared 
 to them " a sort of ironical challenge addressed to 
 their credulity." 
 
 A few days later M. Thiers returned the call of the 
 ambassador, who said to him suddenly, in the midst of 
 the interview, in the most good-natured and off- 
 hand manner : " Confess it, you are sulking in your 
 retreat with your friends and your books." "I must 
 respect my opinions," replied the French statesman. 
 " You are right," was the answer ; " one ought to 
 entertain strong opinions, but one ought to strive for 
 power to carry them into effect. And having given 
 vent to this characteristic maxim, the Prussian envoy 
 added .: " See here ; I will arrange your affair with 
 the Emperor ; " and in the look which accompanied 
 this proposition, his listener seemed to read the secret 
 thought, Be minister, and we two will remake the 
 map of Europe. 
 
 The former minister of Louis Philippe turned the 
 conversation, setting aside by a gesture both the offer 
 and the idea, and was not long in taking leave of 
 this extraordinary man. 
 
 He was not to see him again until he met him, 
 eight years later, at Versailles, conqueror of Napo- 
 leon III. and master of France. 
 
A "FRONDEUR" DIPLOMATIST. 131 
 
 During the latter part of July, the new repre- 
 sentative of Prussia at the Court of the Tuileries 
 undertook a pleasure trip through the South of 
 France. He successively visited Chambord, Bor- 
 deaux, Avignon, Luchon, Toulouse, and made an 
 excursion in the Pyrenees. " The Castle of Cham- 
 bord," he writes, in a letter dated the 27th July, 
 1862, "resembles, in its isolation, the destiny of its 
 possessor. Those great halls and porticoes, where 
 once kings and their mistresses held their festivals, 
 are now empty but for a few of the childhood's toys 
 of the Due de Bordeaux. The porteress, who was my 
 guide, took me for a Legitimist, and squeezed out 
 a tear as she showed me a small cannon that had 
 once belonged to her prince. I paid her an extra 
 franc for the tear, although my sympathies little incline 
 me to swell the subscription lists of Legitimism." 
 
 At Bordeaux he was delighted to be able "to 
 study in the original, and at the door of their cellars, 
 the great masters named Laffitte, Mouton, Pichon, 
 Larose, Margaux, Branne, Armillac," &c.-, who are 
 only known in Germany by means of "very bad 
 translations." He was delighted with his tour in 
 the Pyrenees, but more especially with the baths of 
 Biarritz and St. Sebastian. He " devotes himself 
 entirely to the sun and the salt sea;" he completely 
 ignored all politics, and ignored the very meaning of 
 journals or despatches. It was at this moment (end of 
 September, 1862) that he received an imperative notice 
 from his sovereign to return to Berlin. The elections 
 had produced the most deplorable results ; and an 
 
 K 2 
 
132 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 immense majority of the new Chamber was composed 
 of progressists. They had not been able to come to- 
 any decision in Berlin as to the choice of a future 
 president for the Ministry " a lid for the government 
 saucepan/' as M. de Bismarck expresses it. He was to 
 take the portfolio of foreign affairs, filling at the 
 same time the other post for a while. 
 
 Burnt by southern suns, and fortified by the waves 
 of the ocean " browned and salted " the whilom 
 aspirant to the post of superintendent of dykes in a 
 district of the Mark returned to his country to assume 
 the highest post in the State. 
 
 As he passed through Avignon, he gathered that 
 olive branch which has been so often commented on 
 that sign of his future reconciliation with the demo- 
 crats which he showed to M. d'Ester on his first 
 entry into the Chamber. He only, so to say, passed 
 through Paris this time, but still remained there long 
 enough to utter a characteristic speech, which defined 
 his whole programme. " Liberalism," said the chosen 
 chief of the Prussian Government, in bidding farewell 
 at the office on the Quai d'Orsay, " Liberalism is but 
 a child, easily brought to reason ; but Eevolution is a 
 power, and you must know how to use it." 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE VISTULA AND THE ELBE. 
 
 Combination of Genius and Chance in the Achievements of M. de Bismarck 
 Situation of Europe on his Accession to the Ministry (September, 1862) 
 Intimacy existing between France and Russia The Polish Insurrection 
 (January, 1863) A Nation's Suicide European Folly Lord John 
 Russell Wise Hesitations on the Part of the French Government 
 Remonstrances in favour of Poland Exasperation of Russia Popu- 
 larity and great Position of Prince Gortchakof Benefits derived by M. 
 de Bismarck from the Change in the Situation His first Efforts Views 
 of Prussia with regard to the Vistula Singular Conversation with the 
 Vice-President of the Chamber Saying of M. de Bismarck d propos 
 of the Spectateur profane The Duchies of the Elbe M. de Bismarck 
 simulates Indifference on the Question of the Duchies Profound 
 Satisfaction of Lord John Russell and M. Quacle Minute of the 14th 
 October, 1863 Last Despatches on the Subject of Poland Withdrawal 
 of England, and Displeasure of France The Emperor Napoleon III. 
 proposes a Congress (November 5th, 1863) Anxieties of Lord John 
 Russell, and Rupture of all European Unanimity M. de Bismarck 
 precipitates the Federal Execution in Holstein Sudden Death of the 
 King of Denmark, Frederick VII. (November 15th, 1863) Resolution 
 and Acuteness of M. de Bismarck : he sets aside England, France, 
 Austria, and the secondary States Revolutionary Europe of 1848, and 
 Monarchical Europe of 1864 The Dismemberment of a Monarchy 
 Russian Services rendered to Prussia in the Campaign of the Elbe. 
 
 HOWEVER great a share genius may have had in the 
 achievements of M. de Bismarck, it is impossible to 
 deny that much of their success has been due to 
 chance, to a most extraordinary concourse of for- 
 tuitous circumstances in one word, to that goddess 
 
134 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 Fortune, whose praises the minnesingers of the 
 middle ages were never tired of celebrating, and 
 whom even Dante has not failed to commemorate in 
 his immortal lines as " flashing on its way like a 
 meteor through the skies, its destination ever hid 
 like a snake in the grass." 
 
 We must doubtless admire the wonderful audacity 
 with which the German Chancellor has again and 
 again cast the "iron dice of fate," and we may 
 even suspect, with the witty Abbe Galiani, the pre- 
 sence of at least one loaded die in such a per- 
 sistent run of sixes. It is nevertheless a fact that, 
 in his long career, the President of the Berlin Council 
 has often met, at the most decisive moments, with 
 extraordinary turns of good fortune which could not 
 have been calculated upon or foreseen by the most 
 astute politician, and where the daring of the player 
 has had but the merit but that no inconsiderable 
 one of having taken the tide of fortune at its flood, 
 and of not having missed the smallest eddy of the 
 rushing waters of luck. 
 
 One of these splendid turns of fortune, one of 
 these perfectly astounding events befell the minister 
 of William I. on his accession to power in the month 
 of January, 1863. This event laid the foundation 
 of his future grandeur, was the starting-point of his 
 action in Europe the fulcrum of Archimedes from 
 which he eventually raised a whole world of daring 
 projects, and one we must fully take into considera- 
 tion. 
 
 The idea with which M. de Bismarck was imbued 
 
CAMPAIGNS OF THE VISTULA AND ELBE. 135 
 
 when first lie assumed the reins of government, was 
 the aggrandisement, " the rounding off " of the 
 monarchy of Frederick II. He had already declared 
 his feelings on the subject during his stay in Paris, 
 and he repeated them openly in the first sitting of 
 the Commission in the Chamber at Berlin, barely a 
 week after his accession to the Ministry (September 
 29th, 1862). 
 
 He certainly did not foresee to what extent he 
 was to carry out his ideas, to what extent he was to 
 carry through Germany conquests no longer only of 
 a "moral nature;" but he foresaw from the beginning 
 that Austria would always be his resolute adversary, 
 and he shaped his course accordingly/"" 
 
 The only question which preoccupied him was the 
 attitude which the other great powers of Europe might 
 assume with respect to certain eventualities. Among 
 these he did not reckon England. "With his usual 
 political perspicacity he had seen at an early date to 
 what a state of tameness and gentleness the excellent 
 Manchester schooling had reduced the once fiery lion ; 
 and his conviction that " proud Albion " would not 
 rebel, but would even quietly submit to be slighted, 
 was more than justified during the piteous Danish 
 campaign. " England has for many a year been erased 
 from all my political calculations," said he, in course of 
 private conversation a few years afterwards ; " and do 
 you know since when I began to reckon without her ? 
 
 * See the celebrated circular despatch of M. de Bismarck, dated January 
 24th, 1863, in which he describes his curious interviews with M. de Karoyli, 
 the Austrian ambassador, during the closing months of 1862, shortly after 
 his accession. 
 
136 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 Since the day on which she renounced, of her own 
 free will, her right to the Ionian Islands. A power 
 which ceases to take, and begins to give up, is 
 an exhausted power." There still remained France 
 and Eussia ; and he was not without hope that, by 
 careful management, he might bring both of these 
 powers to regard with favour, or at the least not to 
 interfere with, Prussian designs. 
 
 On the banks of the Neva the old grievances born 
 of the Crimean war still flourished, but half pacified 
 by the war in Lombardy. There were the still 
 older ties existing between the Gottorps and the 
 Hohenzollerns ties which had become stronger of 
 late, thanks to the efforts of M. de Bismarck during 
 his sojourn in St. Petersburg. Lastly, there was his 
 friend Alexander Mikhailovitch, his former colleague 
 at Frankfort, so attached to the new minister of 
 William I., so at unison with him in his hatred of 
 Austria, so thoroughly aware of the " dangerous 
 fiction" of a combination between all Conservative 
 interests. On the banks of the Seine, at the 
 Tuileries, so much feared in those days, a sove- 
 reign held sway who, in striving to accomplish the 
 welfare of humanity, was fast endangering that 
 of France, and whose dimmed and vacillating sight 
 could easily be dazzled by dangling before it the 
 glories of the " new right " and the freedom of 
 Venice. 
 
 Besides, since the Congress of Paris there had 
 arisen between the two Cabinets of the Tuileries and 
 St. Petersburg an ever-increasing "cordiality," in 
 
CAMPAIGNS OF THE VISTULA AND ELBE. 137 
 
 which Prussia was beginning to largely share. Were 
 there not, after taking all these things into considera- 
 tion, strong hopes that these two powers, so friendly 
 to one another, and so antagonistic to Austria, might, 
 if they did not assist, at least maintain a benevolent 
 neutrality towards Prussia in her meditated designs ? 
 And yet these designs were profoundly antagonistic 
 to all the interests and deeply-rooted traditions of 
 Russia as well as to those of France. To substitute 
 in the centre of Europe a great military and aggres- 
 sive kingdom in lieu of a peaceful and " purely de- 
 fensive " confederation, would be to create such 
 manifest drawbacks, such palpable dangers to the 
 security and the equilibrium of the world, that M. 
 de Bismarck was not able to flatter himself with 
 too much Mpe from these quarters. The bitter ani- 
 mosities of the Winter Palace and the gentle dreams 
 of the Tuileries would scarcely long prevail against 
 geographical realities and stern facts. 
 
 Unless at Paris and St. Petersburg there was a com- 
 plete want of statesmen possessing even the slightest 
 political discernment, or the slightest knowledge of 
 their national histories, it would be impossible for the 
 two governments of Russia and France to witness 
 with indifference so complete a revolution in the 
 balance of the Continent. From benevolent their 
 neutrality would not fail to become watchful and 
 then alarmed would even change into actual hos- 
 tility in the face of Prussian success ; and the very 
 " cordiality " that existed between the two empires, 
 apparently so favourable to Prussia, would only 
 
138 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 become one peril the more by facilitating any 
 prompt and decisive measures they might wish to 
 undertake against the House of Hohenzollern. This 
 being the situation of Europe at the beginning of 
 1863, it naturally ensued that the minister of Wil- 
 liam I. should ardently desire should, in his most 
 sanguine moments, invoke some unexpected incident 
 that would irremediably estrange the two emperors 
 Alexander II. and Napoleon III., that would re- 
 awaken in St. Petersburg all the old rancorous feelings 
 against Vienna, and permit Prussia to unite herself to 
 Eussia by ties of a yet stronger and more indissoluble 
 nature, while yet maintaining her friendly intercourse 
 with the French Cabinet. "Chimeras!" would have 
 been the exclamation of even the hardiest constructor 
 of hypotheses ; " such a problem of political alchemy 
 and algebra is not worthy the contemplation of a 
 serious mind!" Yet chance, that Providence of the 
 fortunate ones of earth, was not long before it brought 
 about an event which solved in M. de Bismarck's 
 favour every condition of this problem, fulfilling his 
 seemingly visionary wishes on every point. 
 
 " If Italy did not exist we should have to in- 
 vent her," was the saying in 1865 of the President 
 of the Council at Berlin.* In the month of January, 
 1863, this was probably his opinion respecting the 
 Polish question. History offers few examples of so 
 rapid, so humiliating a descent from the sublime to 
 the odious and disastrous, as that which was presented 
 to the world in the lamentable drama played out on 
 
 * La Marmora, " Un p<5 piu di luce," p. 59. 
 
CAMPAIGNS OF THE VISTULA AND ELBE. 139 
 
 the banks of the Vistula, which, after running its 
 course full of bitter agonies for two years, ended in a 
 final catastrophe in the month of January, 1863, 
 in celebration, as it were, of the joyous accession of 
 M. de Bismarck to the head of affairs. 
 
 Certainly there was much that was elevated and 
 poetical in those first manifestations at Warsaw, when 
 a populace, so long and so cruelly tried, knelt in 
 unison before the palace of the king's lieutenant, in 
 silent appeal, holding nothing in their hands but the 
 symbol of Christ's crucifixion, and asking for nothing 
 "but their God and their country !" The king's lieu- 
 tenant, who was no other than the old hero of Sebas- 
 topol, Prince Michael Gortchakof, shrank with horror 
 from so unequal, so strange a contest ; he appealed 
 to St. Petersburg, and miracle of divine mercy ! 
 from the source from whence during thirty years had 
 issued no other orders than those of blood and torture, 
 now for the first time issued mandates of clemency 
 and moderation. 
 
 A generous instinct seemed to pervade the govern- 
 ing and intelligent classes in Eussia at this period; 
 ideas of reform and emancipation were abroad; the 
 esteem of Europe and the friendship of France were 
 valued; and there was a sincere desire to conciliate 
 Poland. The Emperor Alexander II. sent his brother 
 to Warsaw, and a patriot of exceptional vigour of 
 mind and character undertook the civil government ; 
 education, law, administration, all were invested with 
 the stamp of nationality, and a degree of modest in- 
 dependence was guaranteed to the country. 
 
140 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 The precepts of the most commonplace wisdom, 
 the instincts of self-preservation, the fearful lessons of 
 the past, ought to have counselled the Poles to have 
 taken advantage of the friendly intentions of their 
 sovereign, to have given the newly-granted institu- 
 tions a trial, to have accepted with eagerness the 
 hand of mercy. Everything, in truth, seemed to 
 counsel them to follow this course, but they were 
 under the curse which Holy Scripture has long ago 
 pronounced on every nation which allows itself to 
 be guided by women and children. The women and 
 the youth of the schools resolved to hold out, and 
 to multiply hitherto successful manifestations which, 
 in ceasing to be spontaneous, became theatrical and 
 sacrilegious. The demagogues of Europe made haste 
 to plant their emblems in so convulsed a soil, to bring 
 with them their passwords of disorder, their secret 
 societies, and their instruments regni ; and from afar, 
 from the depths of the Palais-Royal, came the advice 
 " to throw away their Catholic mummeries and up 
 with the barricades." The great Conservative party 
 showed itself as pusillanimous here as elsewhere, as in 
 fact it does everywhere and at all times, and, in wish- 
 ing to save its popularity, it ruined a whole population. 
 
 Solitude environed the brother of the Emperor 
 and the patriotic minister a solitude soon to be 
 peopled with horror, terror, and crime. 
 
 The Government struggled in vain to free itself 
 from the trammels of a mysterious organisation which 
 surrounded it on every side, and adopted contradic- 
 tory and violent measures. The demagogues were 
 
CAMPAIGNS OF THE VISTULA AND ELBE. 141 
 
 victorious, and succeeded in plunging into futile 
 revolt an unhappy people who for the last century 
 seem to have taken upon themselves the task of 
 astonishing the world by periodical resurrections, and 
 by disappointing it, at the same time, alas ! by equally 
 frequent periodical suicides. 
 
 The criminal folly of this nation was only equalled 
 by the no less guilty folly which Europe displayed 
 in encouraging it. 
 
 Europe, which had not dared to touch on the 
 Polish question during the Crimean war, thought fit 
 to sympathise and sport with it at this most unseason- 
 able and desperate moment ! Lord John Eussell was 
 the first to enter the lists. In 1861 he had written the 
 famous despatch to Sir J. Hudson, and had persuaded 
 England, as well as himself, that in doing so he had 
 delivered Italy. In the following year, in the cele- 
 brated Gotha despatch, he had invented for Denmark 
 a- constitution of the most original description, divided 
 into four parts, with four parliaments ; and had thus 
 given the signal for the dismemberment of the Scandi- 
 navian monarchy. This time he thought proper to re- 
 commend parliamentary institutions for Poland, and on 
 the observation of the Russian ambassador that it would 
 be difficult for the Czar to give to his Polish subjects 
 privileges not even possessed by the Russians, he asked, 
 with the greatest simplicity, why the same benefit 
 should not be extended to the whole of Russia ! * 
 
 * "Why indeed should representative institutions not be accorded, at 
 the same time, to the kingdom of Poland and to the empire of Kussia ?" 
 Despatch of Lord John Russell to Lord Napier, 10th April, 1863. 
 
142 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 Count Eechberg, that fatal minister then at the 
 head of foreign affairs in Vienna, also wished to show 
 himself compassionate, and gave himself the malicious 
 and somewhat expensive pleasure of repaying the 
 Cabinet of St. Petersburg in Polish coin for the sym- 
 pathies which it had lavished on the Italian cause. 
 As though Austria had not already sufficiently suffered 
 from .the imaginary grievances of the Muscovites on the 
 subject of the so-called "treachery" during the Crimean 
 war, it meant now to afford Bussia some really tan- 
 gible grievances by a very palpable "connivance" 
 in Galicia, a province that became in effect the refuge, 
 the armoury, and the centre for supplies for the in- 
 surgents of the kingdom. ]/ 
 
 It is but right to say thai it was only after 
 prolonged hesitation that the French Government fol- 
 lowed in this perilous track. In the beginning of the 
 Polish agitation, a note, published in the Moniteur, 
 put the press and the public equally on their 
 guard against "the supposition that the Emperor 
 would encourage any hopes which he had no means of 
 satisfying." " The generous plans of the Czar," con- 
 tinued the note, " are a certain pledge of his desire to 
 carry out every amelioration possible in the state of 
 Poland, and we can only hope that he may not be 
 thwarted in his designs by any irritating manifes- 
 tations." 
 
 The French Government persevered in this sensible 
 
 * "This connivance on the part of Austria is not the least remarkable 
 feature in the history of this insurrection." Confidential Despatch from 
 M. de TengoborsU to M. d'Oubril, 4-th February, 1863. 
 
CAMPAIGNS OF THE VISTULA AND ELBE. 143 
 
 and friendly attitude towards the Czar during 1861 
 and 1862, in spite of the interest taken by the Parisian 
 press in the " dramatic " incidents at Warsaw ; and in 
 spite of several animated debates which took place 
 in the English Parliament, which referred to France, 
 however, more than to Eussia. British, statesmen, 
 indeed, had thought fit, during, the two consecutive 
 years of 1861-62, to embarrass the Cabinet of the 
 Tuileries in no small degree in its Kussian leanings, 
 by frequent and sympathetic allusions to Poland. 
 
 Lord Palmerston especially, in a very clever speech 
 of April 4th, 1863, took an opportunity of extolling 
 the Poles, of celebrating their " untamable, inextin- 
 guishable, exhaustless patriotism ; " and did not neglect 
 to remind them of the cruel deceptions practised upon 
 them " at a former period " by a French emperor. 
 
 Napoleon III. continued to withstand all unwise 
 emotions from within, as well as all interested sug- 
 gestions from without. Even on the 5th February, 
 after the event of the fatal rising, M. Billault, the 
 spokesman of the Corps Legislatif, sternly condemned 
 the Polish insurrection as the work of " revolutionary 
 passions," and forcibly insisted on the danger " of 
 useless speeches and vain protestations ; " but the noisy 
 language of the English minister, the enigmatical 
 -attitude of Austria, and finally the military convention 
 concluded by M. de Bismarck with Kussia (February 
 8th, 1863), and which he loudly proclaimed, at last 
 turned the scale After having laboured so hard 
 during seven years in order to gain Russian cor- 
 dialite, after having sacrificed to this object nearly all 
 
144 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 the fruits of the Crimean war, Napoleon III. shat- 
 tered by one blow the whole edifice erected with such 
 pains, and set himself to address a " great European 
 remonstrance " to the Government of the Czar, the 
 first terrible effect of which was naturally to swell 
 the torrent of blood and tears already flowing in 
 Poland. The universal cry in Warsaw thenceforth 
 was, to " continue " the insurrection, in order to 
 justify the interference of Europe ; * so long as the 
 sympathetic ink flowed from the pens of foreign 
 chancellors, so long also should the blood flow from 
 Polish veins. We all know the deplorable end of 
 this diplomatic campaign, which lasted nine months, 
 and only served to show how completely the Western 
 Powers disagreed with each other. 
 
 The pride of Eussia was deeply wounded by foreign 
 interference, and she undertook against the Polish 
 nation a work of methodical and implacable extir- 
 mination, which since then has never ceased. However 
 frivolous and unstable the diplomatic tournament in 
 favour of Poland may in reality have been, the Eus- 
 sians nevertheless believed themselves to have been for 
 some time in imminent peril, and to have only es- 
 caped from it through the firmness of their " national" 
 minister through his patriotic courage and clever, 
 dignified, and vigorous despatches. 
 
 It was certainly not in human nature to have 
 protested against so flattering a belief ; and the 
 
 * The Emperor Napoleon III. said himself (November 5th, 1863) that 
 the length and duration of the Polish insurrection had " stamped it with a 
 national character." 
 
CAMPAIGNS OF THE VISTULA AND ELBE. 145 
 
 minister is quite excusable for not having done so. He 
 let them have their say and cover him with the glory 
 of having repulsed a fresh invasion, and " vanquished 
 Europe : " scripsit et salvavit ! 
 
 He was loaded with favours by his august master, 
 received the enthusiastic ovations of his compatriots, 
 and became the idol of the nation, side by side with 
 M. Katkof and the sanguinary Mouravief. During 
 an entire year, throughout the whole of Eussia, even 
 in its most obscure corners, no banquet was ever 
 held without the three " blessed saviours " being eulo- 
 gised in speeches, pledged in toasts, or congratulated 
 by telegrams ; and, whatever repugnance the des- 
 cendant of the Eouriks and the nursling of the 
 classical humanities may have felt at being coupled 
 with a raging journalist and a bloodthirsty execu- 
 tioner, he sacrificed his feelings to the love of 
 country and of popularity. In his benevolent anxiety 
 to receive the homages which were being showered 
 upon him on all sides, he forgot himself so far as to 
 thank, with his stereotyped smile, the German no- 
 bility of the Baltic for a diploma of honorary citizenship 
 which they had sent him ; and the national party re- 
 proached him somewhat bitterly for the " culpable 
 effusion " which he had displayed on the occasion. 
 
 Alexander Mikhailovitch received all the honours 
 of the melancholy campaign of 1863. The profits 
 were absorbed by another by his former colleague at 
 Frankfort, the President of the Council at Berlin, who 
 used them to construct a secure and solid foundation 
 for his future plans. 
 
 L 
 
146 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 We are now able to contemplate, from a Prussian 
 point of view, the situation created about the end of 
 1863 by the great European interference in the affairs 
 of Poland. 
 
 England's state of beatific quiescence had been 
 duly verified; France and Russia were irreparably 
 embroiled ; the ill-feeling against Austria had be- 
 come even stronger in St. Petersburg ; the Prussian 
 minister had more than ever the right to reckon upon 
 the grateful friendship of Prince Gortchakof ; and, 
 lastly,, it was not difficult to foresee that, after his 
 palpable repulse at "Warsaw, the Caesar of the " new 
 right" would hasten to cast his eyes on Venice, 
 would wish to " do something for Italy," arid would 
 show himself all the more favourable towards " a 
 youthful Northern power " in its enterprises against 
 the Hapsburgs, as the Napoleonic spirit of prophecy 
 had already long ago assigned to this youthful power 
 "the highest destinies in Germany." 
 
 It would, however, be doing too much honour to 
 human genius to suppose that M. de Bismarck had 
 any clear or precise idea of the benefits which would 
 accrue to him through the Polish insurrection. Many 
 circumstances tend rather to indicate that, especially 
 at first, the Prussian minister was only groping in the 
 dark, and seeking a path in a somewhat haphazard 
 direction and by cross-roads. Another fact worthy to 
 be noted, and which now offers some food for reflec- 
 tion, is, that M. de Bismarck, who had lived for several 
 years in Russia, and made the country his especial 
 study, seems to have entertained the most serious 
 
CAMPAIGNS OF THE VISTULA AND ELBE. 147 
 
 doubts as to the strength of that empire in 1863, and 
 to have even carried his doubts so far as not to believe 
 it capable of quelling the foolhardy rebellion of the 
 unfortunate Polish youths. 
 
 He expressed his apprehensions on this point to 
 the plenipotentiaries of England and Austria, * and 
 actually went so far as to make some astonishing con- 
 fidences on this subject to the Vice-President of the 
 Prussian Chamber, M. Behrend.t 
 
 " This question/' said, in the month of February, 
 the minister of William I., "may be decided in two 
 ways : either we must lend our prompt assistance 
 to Eussia, and aid it in quelling the insurrection, 
 so as to be able to lay before the Western Powers a 
 fait accompli; or, .we must allow the situation to 
 become more developed and more aggravated, wait 
 until the Eussians have been driven from the 
 kingdom or reduced to ask for help, and then 
 advance boldly, invest the kingdom with troops, 
 and take possession on Prussia's account ; at the 
 
 * " At every preceding interview M. de Bismarck has always mentioned 
 to me the probability that the Russian army would not be sufficiently strong 
 to stifle the insurrection." Despatch of Sir Andrew Buchanan, February 21, 
 1863. He held the same language to the Austrian minister, Count Karolyi. 
 On the other hand, immediately on hearing of the arrival of the Prussian, 
 envoys for the conclusion of a military convention, the Grand Duke Con- 
 stantine's diplomatic Secretary wrote, on February 4, " While duly recog- 
 nising the courteous intention of these gentlemen's' mission, I cannot quite 
 see its motive. There is no pericolo (sic !) in mora, and we scarcely yet 
 
 require the co-operation of foreign troops The Prussian Govern. 
 
 ment is painting the devil much blacker than he is in reality." Confidential 
 Despatch of M. de Tengolorski to M. D'Oubril, Russian minister at Berlin. 
 
 f The German papers of the time published this conversation as 
 coming from M. Behrend himself, who never contradicted them. See > 
 among others, the Cologne Gazette, February 22nd, 1863. 
 
 i 2 
 
148 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 end of three years everything down there would 
 be Germanised." " But you mean this for a ball- 
 room joke ! " cried the stupefied Vice-President (this 
 conversation took place at a court ball). " No," was 
 the answer, " I am speaking seriously on serious 
 topics. The Russians are weary of the kingdom ; 
 the Emperor Alexander told me so himself at St. 
 Petersburg." 
 
 This plan of recovering the frontier of the Vistula, 
 lost since the battle of Jena, often haunted the mind 
 of M. de Bismarck during 1863. Let it, however, be 
 well understood that this "rectification of the Prussian 
 frontier " was only meant to be obtained with the 
 willing acquiescence of Alexander II., though means 
 were not neglected that might have forced him to 
 give it. 
 
 M. de Keudell, one of the most confidential 
 friends of the minister and the present representative 
 of Germany at the Court of Victor Emmanuel., was 
 then a very large landed proprietor in the kingdom 
 of Poland, and took advantage of his intercourse with 
 the leaders of that unhappy country to insinuate the 
 advisability of their appealing to Berlin, and asking 
 for a temporary occupation of the country by Prussian 
 troops, who would protect them from Eussian cruelties ! 
 
 If we were to go more deeply into the history 
 of this fatal insurrection, we might light upon other 
 Prussian agents, more obscure perhaps, but far more 
 compromising than M. de Keudell. 
 
 Did the President of the Berlin Council ever 
 seriously hope to obtain such important results from 
 
CAMPAIGNS OF THE VISTULA AND ELBE. 149 
 
 the " weariness " of the Emperor Alexander, or from 
 the friendship of Prince Gortchakof ? 
 
 Whatever may have been his hopes or his after- 
 thoughts, M. de Bismarck displayed an almost feverish 
 anxiety in airing before the Western world his thorough 
 agreement with the Bussian Vice-Chancellor. He 
 made him the spontaneous, almost impetuous offer of a 
 military convention ; defended him on every occasion ; 
 and never failed to assist him most faithfully in every 
 passage of arms with the Cabinets of England, France, 
 and Austria ; bearing with pleasure the first fire of 
 M. Drouyn de Lhuys' notes, cheerfully enduring the 
 universal clamours of the press, and haughtily replying 
 to all interrogations put to him by his Parliament. 
 The great men of the " progress " party were puzzled, 
 and on this occasion, as on many others, could not 
 understand the politics of their " Polignac ; " they 
 considered them to be inopportune, even perilous, 
 and demanded where in all this lay the interests of 
 Germany ? To which the " Polignac" replied one day 
 by this veiled but significant imagery, that, " placed 
 before the diplomatic chessboard, the uninitiated spec- 
 tator thinks the game finished with every fresh move, 
 and often fancies that the players must have lost sight 
 of their original plans." 
 
 Certainly M. de Bismarck never lost sight of 
 his one object, namely, the aggrandisement of 
 Prussia ; but it is certain that up to the autumn 
 of 1863 he had not yet settled upon any plan, 
 but was " moving his pieces forward in various 
 directions, waiting for the inspiration of chance to 
 
150 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 direct him as to where he was to strike his first 
 blow, whether on the banks of the Main, of the 
 Vistula, or of the Elbe. For one moment he had 
 thought of Cassel, and had thrown himself, with some 
 heat, into the constitutional conflict then taking place 
 in that country with the Elector ; and by so doing had 
 offered the somewhat strange spectacle of a minister 
 interfering with a neighbouring State in order to 
 force its prince to a stricter regard of parliamentary 
 rule, while governing his own country regardless of 
 the constitution, and by means of taxes raised in 
 opposition to the vote of the Chamber. Without 
 speaking of the adventurous projects that were formed 
 in Berlin respecting the possible rectification of the 
 frontier in the direction of the Vistula, there still 
 existed on the banks of the Elbe the ancient but ever- 
 renewed question of the Duchies, a question that had 
 lain dormant since the Treaty of London, but that had 
 been re-awakened in 1859, in consequence of the events 
 in Italy, and that had grown to importance since the 
 well-known despatch, so fatal for Denmark, which 
 Lord John Eussell had had the inconceivable folly of 
 writing at Gotha, September 24th, 1862, the very 
 day of M. de Bismarck's accession to the ministry. 
 
 The secondary States, the Diet of Frankfort, and 
 M. de Kechberg himself, developed the strongest feel- 
 ings of German patriotism on the question of Schleswig- 
 Holstein, believing all the time in their hearts that it 
 was a mere chimerical question, but seizing it as a 
 weapon against Prussia and as a means of accusing 
 her of patriotic lukewarmness. 
 
CAMPAIGNS OF THE VISTULA AND ELBE. 151 
 
 Prussia was greatly tempted to take the secondary 
 States, the Diet of Frankfort, and M. de Eechberg at 
 their word, and to drag them into a war against 
 Denmark, which would endow Prussia with the 
 magnificent harbour of Kiel, and permit it to make a 
 first trial of " the instrument " which William I. had 
 been toiling to " perfect " during the last four years, 
 if it could but have felt convinced that the war 
 would remain local, and that the other European 
 powers would not interfere as in 1848 ! The President 
 of the Council at Berlin did not despair of obtaining 
 his object by means of patient and wise manoeuvring. 
 He reckoned on the friendship of Prince Gortchakof, 
 on various political accidents, and lastly, on the 
 strange confusion, and, to speak with Montaigne, on 
 the " noisy clatter of brains " which some of the 
 principles of the "new 'right" had evoked in a 
 certain foreign office of the Continent. 
 
 He often thought that in this serious enterprise 
 the only declared enemy that he would have to en- 
 counter would be the worthy Lord John Eussell, 
 who, after his fatal despatch from Gotha, had thought 
 better of it, and had constituted himself the advocate, 
 protector, and mentor of the unfortunate Danish 
 Government ; but such an adversary did not appear 
 very formidable in the eyes of the Knight of the Mark. 
 At first, however, and as long as the Polish nego- 
 tiations were pending, M. de Bismarck thought fit to 
 display much prudence in dealing with the Cabinet of 
 St. James, and to express the greatest indifference to 
 the vexatious topic of the Duchies. 
 
152 THE TWO CHANCELLORS . 
 
 Nothing can be more instructive than to follow 
 in the State papers and in the documents sent to the 
 Rigsraad, the various confidential disclosures which 
 M. de Bismarck indulged in almost daily, in order to 
 convince Lord John Eussell and his envoy, Sir A. 
 Buchanan, as well as M. de Quade, the Danish 
 minister at Berlin, that this Schleswig - Holstein 
 question was merely a hobby ridden by Austria and 
 the secondary States, and that Prussia, so far from 
 sharing this German covetousness, was doing all in 
 her power to restrain and modify it ! On the 14th of 
 October, 1863, a fortnight after the Diet of Frankfort 
 had decreed the federal execution in Holstein, M. de 
 Bismarck actually declared, in a minute to the envoy 
 of Great Britain, that he would prevent this execution 
 if Denmark would accept the English mediation. "* 
 
 Denmark accepted, and Lord John Russell breathed 
 again. Later on (November 6th, 1863) M. de Quade 
 wrote from Berlin to his Government : " The Prussian 
 Premier, whether influenced by his personal views or 
 by the attitude assumed by England, has placed the 
 affair in a position which surpasses all ive could ever 
 have hoped. I am not sure whether the question has 
 been taken up with as much clearness and warmth 
 (warmth for the Danish interests !) in Vienna as here." 
 This was the opinion shared by M. de Quade and 
 Sir Andrew Buchanan until the 6th of November, 
 when they were roughly undeceived by a piteous 
 
 * Despatch of Sir Andrew Buchanan, October 17th, 1863. (Inclosure : 
 Minute of Conversation between M. de Bismarck and Sir Andrew 
 Buchanan.) 
 
CAMPAIGNS OF THE VISTULA AND ELBE. 153 
 
 despatch from the English Secretary of State, dated 
 November 9th, in the following terms: "If the 
 information which I have received is exact, M. de 
 Bismarck no longer offers any objection to the federal 
 execution in Holstein ; and Her Majesty's Government 
 can but leave the responsibility to Germany of exposing 
 Europe to a universal war." The information was 
 but too exact, and the mortifications of poor Johnny 
 were about to begin. 
 
 Two important events had taken place during the 
 interval of three weeks which had elapsed since the 
 minute of October 14th. In that interval the Cabinet 
 of St. James had sent to Eussia an acquittance in full 
 on account of the Polish question, and the Emperor 
 Napoleon III. had given to the world a fantastic 
 project for a congress which should settle all impend- 
 ing questions ! Delighted beyond measure at the co- 
 operation afforded him by M. de Bismarck in the 
 Danish difficulties during the month of October, the. 
 First Secretary of State had at last resolved to sacrifice 
 to him the Polish question, and had even recalled, 
 by a telegraphic despatch, a courier carrying a very 
 threatening note to the Eussian Government, and had 
 replaced this missive by one of a very humble nature, 
 in which he agreed to abandon any further interference 
 on the subject of Poland (October 20th).~* 
 
 * In seeking a decent exit from the foolish campaign in which he had 
 engaged himself, the chief of the Foreign Office had thought fit to declare 
 that the Emperor Alexander had forfeited his rights over Poland, " as he 
 had not fulfilled the conditions on which he had obtained possession of the 
 kingdom in 1815." France was to make a similar declaration; but M. 
 Drouyn de Lhuys, becoming cautious (and with good reason), would not 
 expedite his note until the English despatch was in the hands of Prince 
 
154 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 On his side the Emperor of the French, fully 
 aware of all these underhand proceedings, was pro- 
 foundly displeased by the defalcation of England, and 
 not being able to make up his mind quietly to accept 
 the repulse, nor especially to confess it to the Legislative 
 Body, had formed the plan (November 5th) of calling- 
 together a general congress ; a plan which only served 
 to increase the universal uneasiness felt in Europe, and 
 inspired more particularly the diplomatist of Downing 
 Street with the utmost consternation. 
 
 Not satisfied with replying in the bitterest terms 
 to the invitation of the French Cabinet, Lord John 
 Russell actually exerted himself to preserve all other 
 foreign courts from the contagion of the French idea ; 
 he almost lost sight of the dangers menacing Denmark 
 in his eagerness to frustrate the project of Napoleon III., 
 a project that could scarcely be very long-lived, and that 
 
 Gortcbakof. Lord John Eussell, therefore, wrote his despatch; it was 
 read to the cabinet, approved of by Lord Palmerston, and a copy given 
 to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in France. Lord Napier had already 
 received notice that he was to inform Prince Gortchakof of a "very im- 
 portant communication " which he was about to have the honour of laying 
 before him ; and the Duke de Montebello had been equally instructed by the 
 French Government to support his English colleague in his solemn decla- 
 ration. Already had the important document left for its destination, and 
 was proceeding rapidly towards St. Petersburg, when suddenly, to the utter 
 astonishment of the initiated, a telegraphic message stopped the bearer of 
 the note in Germany, and another telegram informed Lord Napier that 
 nothing more would be heard of the " important communication." The fact 
 was, that in the interval Count Bernstorff had read to the Foreign Office a 
 Prussian despatch, in which M. de Bismarck bade the Secretary of State be 
 careful as to what he was about ; for if the Czar was declared to have for- 
 feited his rights to Poland by his violation of the Treaty of Vienna, the 
 German Governments on their side might well declare that the King of Den- 
 mark had forfeited his rights to the sovereignty of the duchies of the Elbe 
 for not having fulfilled all the engagements of the Treaty of London. Lord 
 John Russell recalled the courier, and tore up the despatch." See " Mudes 
 de Diplomatie Contemporaine" part i., chap. i. 
 
CAMPAIGNS OF THE VISTULA AND ELBE. 155 
 
 would certainly have died a natural death without so 
 much unnecessary exertion on the part of the English 
 minister. The President of the Prussian Council 
 thought the moment had arrived to show his hand. 
 The last shadows of a western alliance had faded from 
 the horizon ; alone the bond between Eussia and 
 Prussia remained intact, immovable in the midst of 
 the general confusion existing in the various cabinets. 
 No European combination for the protection of Den- 
 mark was to be feared. M. de Bismarck now might 
 " have no further objection " to the federal execution 
 in Holstein, and soon an unlooked-for event, one of 
 those splendid strokes of fortune which have so often 
 befallen the minister of William I. in his marvellous 
 career, occurred to prove that he was decidedly in a 
 lucky vein. 
 
 The sudden death of Frederick VII. (November 
 15th, 1863) was in itself so tragic, so fatal an event 
 for the destinies of Denmark that it reminds us of one 
 of the most desolate sayings bequeathed to us by 
 antiquity, that lugubrious cry of the historian : Non 
 esse curce deis securitatem nostram, esse ultionem. 
 
 This death effectually gave an entirely new shape 
 to the German demands on the unhappy Scandinavian 
 monarchy. Germany no longer declared herself satis- 
 fied with a federal execution in Holstein ; no longer re- 
 cognised the sovereignty of the new King Christian IX. 
 over the Duchies; but demanded the instalment there 
 of the intriguing and treacherous family of Augusten- 
 burg, for whom M. de Bismarck himself had already 
 obtained one million and a half of rixdalers from the 
 
156 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 Copenhagen Government on condition that they gave 
 up all further claims to the Duchies. It seems as if 
 it was only at this juncture that the mind of M. de 
 Bismarck came to a final decision. It was evidently 
 towards the Elbe that Prussia was going to begin to 
 fill out her outlines and complete her unity ! 
 
 His resolution once taken, M. de Bismarck brought 
 all his energy, all his audacity and incomparable 
 astuteness to bear upon the accomplishment of his 
 design. His first attempt was a masterly one, and 
 the great Machiavelli himself would have taken a 
 " divine " pleasure in contemplating the address, or, 
 as he would have said, the virtu with which the 
 Knight of the Mark, in the space of a few weeks, 
 managed to trick poor Lord John Russell, make a 
 fool of the Emperor Napoleon III., draw Austria off 
 on a distant, unjust, and foolish expedition,, put for- 
 ward the Bund and set it aside at the same time, 
 terrorise the secondary States and turn out their pro- 
 tege in a word, take into his own matchless hands 
 the holy cause of the German fatherland, and, as the 
 apostle has it, be all things to all men ! 
 
 The spectacle which Europe presented at the 
 beginning of 1864 was certainly the most curious and 
 the most afflicting which history has ever witnessed. 
 Two great Powers, jealous of each other, and destined 
 to quarrel over the remains of their victim ; two great 
 Powers, urged on and condemned at the same time 
 by a whole league of German peoples and German 
 princes, were to be seen attacking a State which, 
 though feeble, was yet an ancient and glorious- 
 
CAMPAIGNS OF THE VISTULA AND ELBE. 157 
 
 monarchy whose existence had at all times been de- 
 clared by the various cabinets to be necessary to the 
 balance of power in Europe ; and attacking it on the 
 most futile pretext, in the name of a cause which was 
 once stigmatised by its present chief as " eminently 
 iniquitous, frivolous, disastrous, and revolutionary." 
 It was moreover, to punish King Christian IX. for his 
 disobedience to the Bund that Prussia and Austria 
 undertook this work of "justice;" and they began 
 their work by a formal declaration of their own dis- 
 obedience to the same Bund. They were acting as the 
 " agents of Germany," and the whole of Germany pro- 
 tested against the assumption ! Europe contemplated 
 these monstrosities and remained quiescent ; the same 
 Europe which, in 1848, at the time of the first 
 German aggression against the Scandinavian king- 
 dom, had not failed to do its duty nobly, in spite of 
 the revolutionary troubles which were then dis- 
 tracting it, and which might have served as an excuse 
 for inaction. The Powers w r ere then unanimous in 
 their defence of the weak against the oppressor. 
 The Emperor Nicholas was agreed on this point with 
 the Eepublic of General Cavaignac, and even the 
 newly fledged diplomatists of the "surprise" of 
 February showed their appreciation of the necessity 
 to maintain the balance of power. It was reserved 
 to experienced statesmen, to chancellors grown old 
 in the service, imbued with the respect due to 
 treaties, to the representatives of strong and well- 
 established monarchies, to witness, unmoved, * the 
 consummation of a revolutionary work which such 
 
158 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 as Bastide and Petetin had thought it their duty to 
 forbid/" 
 
 Without doubt England will bear in the eyes of 
 posterity the shame and disgrace of Denmark's ruin, 
 for it was she who took in hand the cause of the Scan- 
 dinavian kingdom, who counselled it, guided it, and 
 nursed it till the very end, and who solemnly declared 
 that in the hour of danger it should not fight alone ; 
 but nevertheless it would be incorrect to exonerate 
 completely all the remaining European powers from 
 blame. More than one clear-sighted and honest mind 
 predicted that this dismemberment of a monarchy in 
 the nineteenth century would prove as full of dis- 
 astrous consequences as had done another dismember- 
 ment in the previous century, and looked forward with 
 the greatest anxiety to the formidable confusions and 
 catastrophes looming in the future. The more simple, 
 or, to use M. de Bismarck's words, the " uninitiated 
 spectators/' might fancy the game finished after this 
 first blow dealt to the rights of nations, after this 
 first exploit of the marvellous "instrument" which 
 the Prussian Government had devoted so many years 
 in bringing to perfection ; but the cannon of Missunda 
 was to the Knight of the Mark only what the 
 cannon of Toulon had been in former years to a 
 young officer from Corsica, and the short campaign in 
 
 r " * In 1848 Denmark demanded the protection of France; M. Bastide, 
 then Minister for Foreign Affairs under the Republic, took up its cause 
 with warmth, and it was even suggested to send 10,000 men to assist the 
 Danes in the defence of their country. Despatch of Lord Cowley, February 
 13th, 1864. (See also the curious despatches of M. Petetin, the Republican 
 Envoy at that time at Hanover.) 
 
CAMPAIGNS OF THE VISTULA AND ELBE. 159 
 
 the Duchies revealed a new future to the eventual 
 conqueror of Europe. He learnt therefrom that legiti- 
 mate rights, pledged words, treaties sacredly sworn to, 
 stipulated conditions, and many other old-fashioned 
 and respectable usages, once considered inviolable, were 
 now even more feeble and worn out than the poor 
 fortresses erected in past ages by the Danes ; and, 
 if Moltke and Eoon were quite satisfied during this 
 war with the execution done by their needle-guns, 
 he, on his side, was equally contented with the 
 precious and overwhelming qualities of his own " in- 
 strument/' 
 
 It is incontestable that throughout the entire ex- 
 pedition against the Danes, Prince Gortchakof was un- 
 ceasing in his efforts in favour of the Prussian minister, 
 and was always extending a hand, generally a stealthy 
 one, to aid him in his frequently perilous predicaments. 
 
 His concurrence was absolute, and all the more 
 efficacious, as it assumed the outward appearance of 
 a neutrality busily seeking to compass pacific ends. 
 
 Thus he aided the President of the Prussian 
 Council to infuse the idea into the muddled head 
 of Lord John Eussell that the occupation of Holstein 
 by the federal troops would act as a ratification 
 of the validity of the title of the King of Den- 
 mark. ' ' M. de Bismarck tells me," wrote Sir Andrew 
 Buchanan, November 28th, 1863, "that a federal 
 execution will prevent all revolutionary movements in 
 Holstein, and will be at the same time a kind of in- 
 direct recognition of King Christian IX. 's claims to 
 the dukedom of Holstein on the part of the Diet of 
 
160 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 Frankfort. His Excellency affirms that the alarming 
 state of Germany requires that this step should in- 
 stantly be undertaken, but he cannot or will not 
 explain how such an execution can possibly be a 
 recognition of King Christian's rights or avoid the 
 appearance of an armed occupation." 
 
 Three days later,, on the 1st of December, Lord 
 Napier wrote from St. Petersburg : " The language 
 of Prince Gortchakof leads me to suppose that he is 
 persuaded that M. de Bismarck's views are moderate 
 on this subject. The Vice-chancellor is favourably 
 disposed towards a federal execution if well carried 
 out, and considers it in the light of a conservative 
 measure. In his opinion the federal troops, acting 
 on judicious instructions, will preserve order, and will 
 maintain the necessary distinction between the legis- 
 lative and the dynastic questions." " I deprive, there- 
 fore I recognise ! " said M. de Bismarck, in that style 
 of logic so peculiarly his own, but which at this time 
 was shared by his friend the Prince Gortchakof, and 
 which the pair tried to apply to Schleswig, as soon as 
 the Minister of Downing Street had given way to 
 them in Holstein.* 
 
 " The Eussian Vice-Chancellor made the suggestion 
 to me this morning," wrote Lord Napier again from 
 St. Petersburg, January llth, "that we ought to advise 
 Denmark to consent to the occupation of Schleswig by 
 
 * The official journals at Berlin renewed this style of reasoning in their 
 recent discussions on the laws of guarantee accorded to the Papal seat. The 
 Pope, they argued, cannot be treated as a sovereign, as we cannot exercise 
 against him the law of reprisals and seize his States. 
 
CAMPAIGNS OF THE VISTULA AND ELBE. 161 
 
 the Austrian and Prussian forces, in return for a 
 guarantee to be given by these two powers with 
 regard to the German population of the duchy." 
 
 In this way we are instructed and edified by the 
 " State papers " and documents sent to the Rigsraad : 
 we cannot discover a single insinuation or sugges- 
 tion issuing from Berlin which was not immediately 
 countersigned at St. Petersburg. And yet Denmark 
 had always been the friend and the protege of the 
 Empire of the Czars ! 
 
 To Russia, more than to any other power in 
 Europe, was it of importance to preserve the freedom 
 of the Baltic, and not to prevent the harbour of Kiel 
 from falling into the hands of the Germans ; it was 
 also of more importance to her than to any other to 
 remember that the people of Courland and Livonia 
 spoke a much purer and more harmonious German 
 than the people of Schleswig ! 
 
 Lastly, this quarrel on the Eider was in truth a 
 quarrel of the revolution warring against legitimate 
 sovereignty. Old Count Nesselrode, in a celebrated 
 circular, had once declared it to be so ; and what 
 would the Emperor Nicholas have said to a Russian 
 Vice-Chancellor allowing these privileges to the spirit 
 of revolution ? But Alexander Mikhailovitch will 
 astonish history by the immensity of his gratitude to 
 M. de Bismarck. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE WAR, IN GERMANY. 
 
 Second Period of Prince Gortchakof's Ministry Reveries of Napoleon III., 
 and sulky Attitude of Alexander Mikha'ilovitch " Napoleonic Ideas " on 
 the Subject of Germany Isolation of France in 1864 Convention of 
 September Arrival of M. de Bismarck in Paris (October) Tenor of 
 his Language while there The Parti de V action in the Councils of the 
 Empire Enconragement carried to Berlin by M. de Bismarck 
 Prussian Circular of December 24th concerning the Duchies Con- 
 sultation and Decision of the Syndics of the Crown (1865) Proposition 
 made to Austria Threatenings of War First Campaign in Bohemia 
 (July, 1865) Convention of Gastein (August) The Madame Lucca 
 Incident, and Letter to M. Andre (de Roman) Austrian Sympathies of 
 M. Drouyn de Lhuys Prussian Sympathies of the Parti de Vaction 
 Chimerical Project of the Emperor Napoleon III. : he reserves for him- 
 self the R3le of Umpire and Protector of General Rights Interview 
 at Biarritz (October) The Word of the Sphinx Venice and the 
 great War for German Nationality Daring Policy of Prussia (1866) 
 Germany shows itself Hostile to the Enterprise of M. de Bis- 
 marck Violent Opposition of the Chambers and the Prussian People 
 The Perruques of Potsdam and the Scruples of William I. Secret 
 Negotiations with Italy, and with the European Revolutionary Party 
 General Govone's Mission, and Treaty with the Cabinet of Florence 
 (April, 1866) Fresh Indecision on the Part of William I., and peaceful 
 Manifestations in France The Speech of Anxerre (May 6th) The 
 Battle of Sadowa (July 3rd) Terrible Awakening at the Tuileries 
 Prince Gortchakof rejoices and meditates. 
 
 THUS was inaugurated, in the Polish and Danish 
 questions, the first action of that mutual combination 
 between the two Ministers of Russia and Prussia, 
 which was to endure for so Ions: and exercise so con- 
 
THE WAR IN GERMANY. 163 
 
 siderable and so disastrous an influence over the affairs 
 of the Continent. 
 
 With the year 1863 begins the second period 
 of the ministry of Prince Gortchakof, "his second 
 manner/' certainly more questionable than his first. 
 To the French "cordiality," on the whole a mode- 
 rate and a healthy one, succeeds the Prussian friend- 
 ship, which assumes a far too absorbing and too 
 passionate a form. During this second period, 
 Alexander Mikhailovitch no longer preserves the 
 calm reserve and the intelligent selfishness which 
 made his fortune during his intimacy with Napo- 
 leon III. ; he adopts all the opinions, maintains all the 
 ideas of his powerful Prussian friend, but with- 
 out, unfortunately, possessing his astonishing flexi- 
 bility of mind, or his marvellous art of twisting 
 and adapting himself to the situation. 
 
 Nothing, for instance, can equal the tact with 
 which, when occasion demands it, M. de Bismarck can 
 forget an unpleasant past,* and particularly the wrong 
 he may have done to others, explaining everything 
 away under the delightful name of a "misunder- 
 standing." 
 
 This is the gentle term he has often publicly applied 
 to his long and outrageous quarrels with the Parlia- 
 ment, and even to the war with Austria in 1 8 6 6 (a slight 
 misunderstanding which cost 40,000 lives) ; and it is 
 
 * And yet the Emperor William I. was not wrong in saying one day, to M. 
 d'Arnim, that rancour was the dominant passion in M. de Bismarck's cha- 
 racter ! (Pro nihilo, " Vorgeschichte des Arnimschen Processes," p. 77.) The 
 following is a very characteristic maxim of M. de Bismarck's, written in a 
 lady's album: " I sometimes forget, I never forgive !" . . . 
 
 M 2 
 
164 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 impossible to refrain from admiring the affection, the 
 enthusiasm even, with which he has at last inspired 
 the worthy Lord John Russell, the statesman whom, 
 among all others, he had the most ridiculed and ill- 
 treated during the Danish negotiations. 
 
 As to his Polish quarrels in the same year (1863) 
 with the "Western Powers, he was all the more prompt 
 to wipe them from his memory, as those Powers 
 showed themselves conscious of having committed 
 a great folly. He dictated to King William one of 
 the politest answers, filled with tender souvenirs of 
 Compiegne, in reply to a letter from Napoleon III. 
 concerning the congress ; and towards the close of 
 the year he was on the most intimate terms with the 
 Cabinet of the Tuileries on the subject of the Treaty 
 of London, a treaty which had guaranteed the integrity 
 of the Danish monarchy, and which M. Drouyn de 
 Lhuys now qualified as an "impotent work." As for 
 Austria, he soon granted her plenary indulgence for 
 her Polish mistakes in the spring, and even for her far 
 more culpable enterprise of the month of August, on 
 the " Day of Princes," at Frankfort ; and in the month 
 of November he had already made her his companion 
 and accomplice in the war of the Duchies. Far other 
 was the conduct of Prince Gortchakof : he never could 
 forgive France and Austria for their interference in 
 the affairs of Poland, and rejected every offer of 
 reconciliation. He no longer remained intimate with 
 any other cabinet but that of Berlin, and his former 
 colleague of Frankfort became his sole confidant and 
 ally. 
 
TEE WAR IN GERMANY. 165 
 
 The famous maxim of 1856 underwent from that 
 time an important modification; from 1863 the Kussian 
 Chancellor began to sulk as well as to meditate, and 
 the Achaeans had to pay dearly for this ill- temper of 
 Achilles ! The sulks of Alexander Mikhailovitch were 
 nearly as fatal to Europe as the reveries of Napoleon III. 
 
 A vision a very Midsummer Night's Dream 
 does the Napoleonic policy with regard to Germany now 
 appear to us ; a policy that was at once chimerical 
 and yet reasonable, clever and yet foolish, having only 
 worthy aims and yet accumulating nothing but ruin 
 and disaster. 
 
 A splendid dream was one day dreamed in the 
 Tuileries : Italy was to be united, Austria raised up 
 again, Prussia rendered more homogeneous, Germany 
 more satisfied, Europe regenerated, and France re- 
 assured and glorious. All this depended only on one 
 event an event that was a certainty; on a battle 
 fought and won by the Kaiserliks those brave and 
 tried warriors against that Prussian landwehr which 
 for half a century had not smelt powder."" 
 
 * The following is a specimen of what was being instilled into the 
 minds of the French soldiers respecting the two German powers on the very 
 eve of Sadowa : " The Prussian army, in which service is of very short dura- 
 tion, is nothing but a kind of landwehr school. It is a magnificent organisa- 
 tion on paper, but a very doubtful weapon of defence, and most useless 
 during the first period of an offensive war. Austria, whose population 
 numbers about thirty-seven millions of inhabitants, has a large and splendid 
 army, which is far superior in its organisation to the Prussian or Eussian 
 armies. After France, she occupies the first rank as a military power." 
 Course of Artillery at the Practical School of Artillery and Engineering at 
 Metz, 1864. In the beginning of 1866, it is true, the military attache of the 
 French Embassy at Berlin, M. de Clermont Tonnerre, drew the attention of 
 his Government to the new Prussian arms " armes terribles." But even 
 taking them into consideration, Prussia still seemed to have but a poor 
 chance in a very unequal contest, whose issue could be in nowise doubtful. 
 
166 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 And it was in this frail skiff, this " nutshell," as Puck 
 in "The Midsummer Night's Dream" would have said, 
 that the fortunes of France and of Caesar were em- 
 barked ! The whole world believed at that time in 
 the immense superiority of Austria's army over that 
 of her daring rival in Germany. No one admitted the 
 possibility of a Prussian victory, still less of a victory 
 as decisive and as annihilating as that of Sadowa. 
 "That was," said M. Eouher later on, during a memor- 
 able sitting of the Legislative Body, "that was an 
 event which Austria, which France, which every 
 soldier, which every citizen, had considered as im- 
 possible ; for it was universally believed that Austria 
 would be victorious, and that Prussia would have to 
 pay, and pay dearly, for her imprudence." This belief, 
 so universal at that time, will remain in history as 
 the sole excuse for Napoleon III. as the sole pallia- 
 tion for the lamentable phantasmagoria which he 
 introduced to the world in his speech at Auxerre in 
 the month of May, 1866, but whose origin dates back 
 to the convention of September, and to the first 
 visit of M. de Bismarck to France after his Danish 
 campaign, in the autumn of 1864.'" 
 
 " I have at least one superiority over my con- 
 queror," said the Emperor of Austria, Francis I., with 
 subtle dignity to M, de Talleyrand, the negotiator of 
 the peace of Presburg after the battle of Austerlitz. 
 " I can re-enter my capital after so great a disaster ;. 
 whereas your master, with all his genius, could scarcely 
 
 * See " Prelimiuaires de Sadowa ; " also the instructive work of General 
 La Marmora, " Un po piii di luce," Firenze, 1873. 
 
THE WAR IN GERMANY. 167 
 
 do as much in a similar situation." This remarkable 
 speech defines in the most striking manner the 
 deep, the incurable vice of all Csesarism. Not any 
 more than for the victor of Austerlitz was it possible 
 for Napoleon III. to accept a defeat : he was bound to 
 faire grand, condemned to success and to prestige. 
 Immediately after his misadventures and mistakes in 
 the affairs of Poland, in those of Denmark, and in 
 the matter of the congress, he had to think of a 
 retaliation, to turn his attention north and south, and 
 to " take up a position " in the convention of Sep- 
 tember, which should appear as the preface to a new 
 and great work. He was isolated in Europe, embit- 
 tered against England, awkwardly placed with regard 
 to Eussia, more than .cold towards Austria ; and 
 M. de Bismarck's visit to France, immediately after 
 the convention concluded with the Turin Cabinet, 
 caused an inward thrill of satisfaction. Evidently 
 " something would be able to be done for Italy." 
 AVithout ill-feeling, and utterly unprejudiced, the Pre- 
 sident of the Prussian Council came to renew the 
 conversations begun two years ago during his short 
 mission to Paris. He brought no fresh news ; he 
 simply declared that his alliance with the Hapsburgs 
 during the Danish war was a mere incident, and 
 clearly showed his desire to retain for Prussia the 
 countries recently taken possession of on the Elbe in 
 the name of the German Confederation. 
 
 Beyond this, he did nothing but revert to the old 
 theme of the inevitable and impending duel between 
 Berlin and Vienna ; on the advantages that Italy might 
 
168 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 derive from it ; on the benefit it would be to France 
 if Prussia were better outlined and more securely 
 situated, in which case she would naturally become the 
 unfailing ally of France in. every question of progress 
 and of civilisation. Such confidences, coming from a 
 minister who had just given proof of his importance in 
 the Danish campaign, were received in a very different 
 spirit than had been accorded to those in which he 
 had indulged in 1862. 
 
 Without, as yet, giving him credit for any great 
 depth of character, his hearers were agreed to recog- 
 nise in him all the qualities of a useful man, a man 
 of the future, whom it would be well for Italy to 
 cultivate, whom France, on her side, would do well to 
 watch, to urge forward, and to prompt. The leaders 
 of Imperial democracy first among them Prince 
 Napoleon were especially delighted with the pros- 
 pects opened out before them. A distinguished 
 member of this group, a diplomatist of renown, and 
 whose very name inclined him towards the Italian 
 cause, was drawn from his retreat, and placed at the 
 head of the mission to Berlin, now promoted to the 
 rank of an embassy. Another member of the parti 
 de faction, then equally at liberty, a former ambas- 
 sador to Eome, was also recalled to the councils of 
 the Empire, and, side by side with M. Eouher, was 
 intended to form a " make-weight " to the somewhat 
 antiquated ideas of M. Drouyn de Lhuys. Lastly, be- 
 yond the Alps, at Turin, a general well known for his 
 Prusso mania had taken in hand the direction of poli- 
 tical affairs on September 23rd. Each of these three 
 
THE WAR IN GERMANY. 169 
 
 personages M. Benedetti, M. de La Valette, and 
 General La Marmora will have his part to fulfil in 
 the great drama of 1866. 
 
 At this time, however (in the autumn of 1864), no 
 plans were formed or even discussed. Nothing took 
 place of more importance than a few confidences, a 
 few private and desultory conversations, scarcely to 
 be termed an exchange of ideas ; but the impres- 
 sion which the Prussian minister carried away with 
 him from this rapid trip to France was sufficiently 
 favourable to induce him to issue that circular of 
 December 24th, 1864, which was the first step in his 
 subsequent undertaking against Austria. In this 
 circular, M. de Bismarck touches for the first time 
 on the question of the Duchies, which he well knew 
 was a question of war. Six months before this, in the 
 peremptory declaration made at the conference in 
 London, Austria and Prussia had demanded "the re- 
 union of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein into a 
 single state under the sovereignty of the hereditary 
 prince of Augustenburg," and the Berlin Cabinet was 
 then careful to add that this prince " was regarded in 
 Germany as having the greatest right to the succes- 
 sion, and that his recognition by the Bund was in 
 consequence a certainty ; and that, moreover, he was 
 assured of the certain votes of the great majority of 
 the populations of the two provinces." 
 
 But very different to the above were the opinions 
 held by the Prussian minister towards the close of 
 the same year, shortly after his return from Paris. 
 In a circular despatch addressed to the German Courts, 
 
170 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 the President of the German Council now declared 
 (December 24th, 1864) that his mind was assailed 
 by the most serious doubts touching the titles of the 
 Duke of Augustenburg ; that several important aspi- 
 rants, such as the Princes of Oldenburg and of Hesse, 
 had arisen during the interval ; * that, amidst so 
 many and such confused claims, he was puzzled ; that 
 his conscience was by no means certain of the right 
 path ; and that he felt it was necessary to pause and 
 consult the jurists. 
 
 We know the splendid decision pronounced by 
 these "jurists" the syndics of the Crown and we 
 also know what conclusions were drawn from it by 
 this " conscientious " minister. 
 
 " There were judges at Berlin," and they proved it 
 by rejecting every one of the claimants, and declaring 
 all their pretensions to be null and void ; Hesse, Olden- 
 burg, Brandenburg, Sonderburg-Augustenburg, were 
 one and all without any just claim to the Schleswig- 
 Holstein duchies ; alone, the King of Denmark held 
 any recognised right ! But as the King of Denmark 
 
 * It is of some interest to notice, in passing, the circumstances under 
 which these new candidates arose. Summoned by the conference in London 
 to declare his pretensions, M. de Bismarck could not do otherwise than 
 follow Austria's lead, and declare himself (May 28th, 1864) in favour of 
 the Duke of Angusfcenburg. On the 2nd of June, when the conference 
 met again (the telegraph had had time to work), the Russian Plenipotentiary 
 declared most unexpectedly that the Emperor, his august master, " desiring 
 to facilitate the impending arrangements in every way that lay in his- 
 power," had given up his eventual rights, as chief of the House of Holstein- 
 Gortorp, to his relative, the Grand Duke of Oldenburg ! On the 18th of June 
 another relative of the Emperor Alexander II., Prince Frederick William 
 of Hesse, came in his turn to lay his rights to the succession before the 
 conference in London. This is an example of the numerous and discreet 
 services which Prince Gortchakof rendered to his Prussian friend during 
 the sad campaign of the Duchies. 
 
THE WAR IN GERMANY. 171 
 
 had been forced by the war to abandon the provinces 
 of the Elbe to the sovereigns of Austria and Prussia, 
 M. de Bismarck concluded that these two sovereigns 
 were at liberty to dispose of their "property" as it 
 might seem fittest to them, and without any inter- 
 ference on the part of the Bund ; and he demanded of 
 the Emperor Francis Joseph that he should give up 
 his share in the conquest for a compensation paid 
 down in hard cash. This impudent demand was 
 contained in a haughty and menacing despatch dated 
 from Carlsbad, July llth, 1865 ; from the very spot 
 where the old King William was enjoying the hospi- 
 tality of the Austrians during the watering season. 
 For a short time everyone was on the alert. M. de 
 Bismarck did not attempt to conceal the negotiations 
 into which he had just entered with Italy; he said 
 to M. de Gramont "that so far from dreading a war,, 
 he desired it above everything ; " and shortly after- 
 wards he even declared to M. de Pfordten, President 
 of the Bavarian Council, " that Austria could not 
 sustain a campaign that it would require but a single 
 blow, a single battle fought in Silesia, to bring the 
 Hapsburgs to their senses." * 
 
 In reality he was only feeling his way and re- 
 connoitring. At this time he did not feel sufficiently 
 sure of the Emperor Napoleon III. to risk any very 
 great stake ; and he also required time in which to 
 persuade the pious Hohenzollern to pronounce the 
 " God wills it " of a fratricidal war. He was forced 
 to content himself with the convention of Gastein 
 (August 14th, 1865), which was only a provisional 
 
172 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 arrangement, a first breach, made in the rights of the 
 Bund, and which operated as an indirect confirmation 
 of the conclusions which he had drawn from the 
 judgment pronounced by the famous syndics of the 
 Crown. The same day on which M. de Bismarck signed 
 this equivocal transaction at Gastein, he wrote as 
 follows to his wife : " For some days I have not had a 
 moment's leisure in which to write to you. Count Blome 
 is here again, and we are doing our best to maintain 
 peace, and stop up all the cracks in the edifice. The 
 day before yesterday I devoted an entire day to hunt- 
 ing. I think I told you that on the first occasion I 
 returned empty-handed from my expedition ; this time 
 I at any rate brought down a doe, but that was all I 
 saw during the three mortal hours which I passed in 
 prey to all sorts of insects, and while the eternal 
 noise of the cascade overhead forced me to exclaim : 
 Petit ruisseau, laisse Id ton murmure.* After all it 
 was a splendid shot across the precipice ; the animal 
 fell from a height of several church -steeples dead 
 into the torrent at my feet." It was also not a 
 bad shot which brought down and totally disabled 
 that cherished candidate of the Bund, the unhappy 
 Augustenburg, and filled the Prussian game-bag 
 with the little duchy of Lauenburg ! The noise 
 of this diplomatic hunting feat re-echoed loudly 
 throughout Germany and France, and even Lord John 
 Eussell experienced a shock. The Secretary of State 
 felt himself bound to join M. Drouyn de Lhuys in a 
 very eloquent protestation against the conclusions de- 
 
 * A line of a German song. 
 
THE WAR IN GERMANY. 173 
 
 termined upon at Gastein ; and the British ironclads, 
 which had kept out of the Baltic, during the Danish 
 campaign, now paid a visit of ceremony to the French 
 fleet at Cherbourg ; but that was the sum total of the 
 demonstrations made by the two Western Powers, 
 and M. de Bismarck was left to enjoy his triumphs 
 in peace, and to wear the count's coronet which he had 
 gained during the successful campaign of 1865. 
 
 May we be allowed to depart from the gravity of 
 history and relate another incident which occurred at 
 Gastein : a little sketch of life and manners which 
 drew a great deal of attention upon him at the 
 time, and even led to private explanations be- 
 tween the President of the Council and a devoted 
 friend ? And why should we not, if the letter of 
 M. de Bismarck to M. Andre (de Eoman) on the 
 subject of Mademoiselle Pauline Lucca is one of the 
 most curious pages of his private correspondence, if it 
 illumines with a picturesque light the vast and de- 
 nuded brow that William I. had just graced with a 
 count's coronet ! It appears that, in the midst of his 
 political negotiations and his doe-hunts, M. de Bismarck 
 had found time to have his photograph taken in a 
 romantic attitude with Mademoiselle Lucca, the prima 
 donna of the Eoyal Opera at Berlin. The photographs 
 were a source of considerable scandal on the banks of 
 the Spree ; the heads of the " Cross party " were more 
 especially shocked at the watering-place licence in 
 which the former Levite of the Tabernacle, the fervent 
 disciple of MM. Stahl and Gerlach, was indulging. M. 
 Andre (de Roman) was kind enough to take upon 
 
174 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 himself the character of a modern Nathan, and, in an 
 epistolary and confidential sermon, he sorrowfully spoke 
 of the operatic Bathsheba, adding a few touching words 
 on the duellistic reparation which the Prussian minister 
 had wished to impose quite recently on the good 
 Doctor Yirchow, the wise and peaceful discoverer of 
 trichina. M. Andre did not consider this to be the 
 conduct of a true Christian ; nor did he conceal the 
 fact that his former friends were groaning in spirit 
 at the non-appearance of their Eli at divine service, 
 and were even very uneasy as to the state of his soul. 
 To this tremendous lecture M. de Bismarck replied 
 by the following confidential letter, which a fortunate 
 indiscretion has since made public a most character- 
 istic letter, reminding us of those peculiarities of 
 Cromwell, which have been more than once alluded 
 to in these pages : 
 
 "DEAR ANDRE/'" Although my time is very 
 limited I cannot deny myself the satisfaction of re- 
 plying to a summons addressed to me by an honest 
 heart, and in the name of Jesus Christ. I pro- 
 foundly deplore that I should have caused any 
 scandal among Christians holding the faith, but I 
 am convinced that it is sometimes unavoidable in 
 rny position. I do not speak of the sections 
 politically opposed to me, and who nevertheless 
 reckon many Christians among them people who 
 are far in advance of me on the heavenly road, 
 
 * We have tried to preserve the edifying style of obscurity which charac- 
 terises the original. 
 
THE WAR IN GERMANY. 175 
 
 whom I have yet to oppose in matters which in their 
 opinion, as in mine, are purely terrestrial. I will only 
 deal with that which you yourself assert. You say, 
 ' that nothing which is done or left undone in ele- 
 vated spheres remains hidden/ Where is there a 
 man in such a position who willingly or unwillingly 
 does not cause a scandal of some sort or another ? 
 Again, your expression, e does not remain hidden,' is 
 not correct. Would to God that, outside of all the 
 sins of which the world knows me guilty, I had not 
 others for which I can only hope for pardon through 
 my faith in the blood of Christ ! " 
 
 " As a statesman, I think that I am too careful I 
 am even cowardly at times ; and that because it is not so 
 easy to discern, amid the entanglements placed before 
 me, that light which springs from a perfect confidence 
 in God. He who reproaches me for being a statesman 
 devoid of conscience does me a wrong ; he ought to 
 begin by exposing his own conscience to a few trials 
 in the same arena. As for the Virchow affair, I am 
 long past that age in which one asks advice of flesh 
 and blood ; if I expose my life for a cause, I do it in 
 the faith which I have fortified by long and painful 
 conflict, and by fervent and humble prayers to God ; 
 that faith, no word of man can shake it ; not even the 
 word of a friend in the Lord, and a servant of his 
 Church. 
 
 " It is not true that I never go to church. For the 
 last seven months I have been either ill or absent from 
 Berlin ; who, then, has been able to take notice of my 
 negligence ? I confess most readily that I may have 
 
176 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 sometimes omitted to go, not so much, from want of 
 time as out of regard to my health, more especially 
 during the winter ; and I am quite ready to offer more 
 circumstantial evidence to anyone who considers he 
 possesses the vocation of being my judge in this matter. 
 As for you, I know you will believe me without any 
 further investigation. As for the Lucca photographs, 
 you would perhaps be less severe in your judgment if 
 you knew to what a mere accident they owe their 
 origin. Besides, Madame Lucca, although a public 
 singer, is a lady who has 'never been reproached, 
 any more than myself, with any improper liaisons. 
 Nevertheless, I should certainly have been careful 
 to keep myself out of the range of the lens turned 
 upon us, had I for a moment foreseen all the scandal 
 my friends would have discovered in so simple an 
 occurrence. You see, by the attention I give to 
 the details of your letter, that I consider it to be 
 well meaning, and that I do not think of placing 
 myself above the judgment of those who share the 
 same faith with myself ; but I expect from your friend- 
 ship, and from your Christian enlightenment, that you 
 will recommend to others to be more indulgent and 
 more charitable in their judgments in the future; 
 believe me, we all stand in need of indulgence. I am 
 among the crowd of sinners to whom the glory of God 
 is wanting, but, with them, I do not despair that in 
 His mercy He will not take away from me the staff 
 of humble faith with which I seek my way amid the 
 doubts and dangers of my position ; this faith, however, 
 does not make me deaf to the reproaches of my 
 
THE WAR IN GERMANY. 177 
 
 friends, nor impatient of their scornful, harsh judg- 
 ments." 
 
 Let us lay aside the hair-shirt and knotted 
 rope, and only see the diplomatist in his tunic and 
 helmet " the iron count " (der eiserne graf), as his 
 fellow-countrymen soon called him. It is time for 
 us to consider the feelings of France towards him at 
 the time when, after having quitted the rocky valley 
 of Gastein, he was preparing himself for a visit to the 
 gentle sands of Biarritz, to salute the sphinx, to 
 question, to divine, and to cast it down ! 
 
 In France, in the councils of the empire, the 
 debates were every day becoming more and more 
 lively between the ancients and moderns between 
 the zealous adherents of the "new right," and the 
 partisans of a more circumspect and traditional policy, 
 in proportion as the Austro-Prussian conflict became 
 more accentuated and aggravated. 
 
 The more ardent among them would have insisted 
 on a defensive and offensive alliance with Prussia. 
 They pointed to the irresistible movement that was 
 drawing Germany on to a complete union, and to the 
 great advantages which France would reap if she 
 encouraged instead of opposing this movement, and 
 so drew to her, in the bonds of an eternal gratitude, 
 the Piedmont of Germany as she had drawn to her 
 that of the Peninsula. 
 
 As the passionate friends of Italy, and the still 
 more passionate enemies of Austria, whom they con- 
 sidered the bulwark of reactionary feeling, of legiti- 
 
178 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 macy, and of the temporal power, they saw in the 
 kingdom of Frederick the Great the incontestable 
 representative of civilisation, and trembled at the 
 thought of its being exposed to certain defeat in an 
 unequal combat with the Kaiserliks. According to 
 their opinion, it only required the co-operation of 
 France, Prussia, and Italy to ensure the cause of pro- 
 gress, and to settle Europe on a new and immovable 
 basis. Then again, why should not Belgium become 
 the legitimate reward of the French efforts in favour 
 of Germany, just as Savoy had done after the forma- 
 tion of the kingdom of Italy ? And why reject 
 such a combination, by means of which each of the 
 three nations principally representing modern ideas 
 on the Continent might complete their respective 
 unity ? 
 
 Very different on these topics was the opinion 
 of the " ancients," of the statesmen of. the old school, 
 of a complete political group, whose most authori- 
 tative and clear-sighted representative in the cabinet 
 was M. Drouyn de Lhuys. 
 
 Setting aside at once all weak delusions regarding 
 Belgium as being an inevitable source of war with 
 England, they affirmed that it would be impossible to 
 find any compensation for France to equal the damage 
 she would sustain by the union of Germany. Without- 
 overlooking the German aspirations towards a Federal 
 reform, and towards a more united and more homo- 
 geneous constitution, they asked themselves wherein 
 the necessity lay for France to hasten such a work, 
 and whether in every case it would not be more 
 
THE WAR IN GERMANY. 179 
 
 desirable that such a transformation should be accom- 
 plished by the more enlightened and peaceful classes, 
 by the Diet, even by Austria at all times a respecter 
 of acquired right and of the lesser princes rather 
 than by a power whose ruling principles were of the 
 military, bureaucratic, and centralisation order. And 
 was not this also the prevailing opinion on the 
 opposite shores of the Rhine, the opinion of dynasties 
 as well as of parliaments, of princes as well as of 
 the people ? and had not the pretensions of Prussia 
 to appropriate to herself all profit derived from the 
 conquest of Denmark caused universal dissatis- 
 faction ? 
 
 Only the Italian and French press continued to 
 speak of the " Piedmontese Mission " of the Hohen- 
 zollerns ; on the banks of the Main and the Elbe 
 everyone else scouted the idea of this so-called mission ; 
 and even the discredited National- Verein, while con- 
 tinuing to cherish hopes of a " Germany united by 
 means of a Prussian needle," nevertheless repudiated 
 M. de Bismarck, and declared him to be unworthy 
 of undertaking such a holy cause. 
 
 As to the danger of Prussia being defeated in the 
 contest, and so rendering the House of Hapsburg all- 
 powerful in Germany, there was a very simple way to 
 avoid such an eventuality, by refusing all assistance 
 to the Berlin Government in the enterprise she was 
 contemplating. However bold M, de Bismarck might 
 be, he still was not thought capable of defying Austria 
 and her allies of the Bund, in the face of a formal 
 veto pronounced by the French Government, which 
 
 N 2 
 
180 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 would at the same time deprive him of any hope of 
 assistance from Italy.* 
 
 The line of conduct to be pursued under such 
 circumstances seemed, therefore, to be clearly marked 
 out and easy to follow. Without interfering directly 
 in the affairs of Germany, without hurting German 
 susceptibilities, an impassable barrier might be raised 
 in opposition to Prussian ambition. All that was 
 to be done was to maintain the statu quo. Such a 
 policy would certainly receive the warmest support 
 from England, and would encourage Austria and the 
 secondary States in their resistance. No doubt this 
 would set aside the Venetian question, but the peace 
 of Europe and the grandeur of France were worth 
 more than "the pearl of the Adriatic;" and, besides, 
 it was not forbidden to hope that the city of the 
 lagoons might profit by the progress of time and 
 the increasing good understanding between France 
 and Austria. Eemainirig silent in the midst of these 
 contradictory debates, preferring to soar above the 
 passions and agitations of his surroundings in all 
 the sereneness of a calm and meditative mind, the 
 Emperor Napoleon III. was slowly bringing a project 
 
 * " Whatever may be the opinions held at the present time, if France 
 had opposed these proceedings (the treaty of Italy with Prussia), we could 
 not have encountered the risk of finding ourselves face to face with an 
 Austro-French alliance. Prussia was as anxious as ourselves, perhaps even 
 more so, about the attitude which France might assume in the case of a 
 war against Austria, undertaken by the combined forces of Italy and 
 Prussia." La, Marmora, " Un po piti di luce," p. 80. Three days before the 
 signature of the secret treaty with Italy, M. de Bismarck said to General 
 Govone, " All this, understand, if France is agreeable, for if she objects, 
 nothing can be done." Despatch of General Govone to General La Marmora, 
 April 5t/i, 1866, ibid., p. 139. 
 
THE WAR IN GERMANY. 181 
 
 to perfection which in his eyes would answer the 
 difficulties on both sides of the disputed question ; 
 and which, moreover, would carry out the maxim 
 which he was instilling at that time into the mind of 
 his Minister for Foreign Affairs inertia sapiential 
 Italy was naturally more dear to him than to M. 
 Drouyn de Lhuys ; to him it was a passion, a relic of 
 his youth ; and even the Empress Eugenie had be- 
 come an eager partisan for the liberation of Venice 
 since the accession of M. de La Valette to the 
 Ministry, and also since the day on which M. de 
 Nigra had composed certain couplets full of grace 
 and allusions to a gondola which she had caused to be 
 constructed for the lake at Fontainebleau. No less 
 fatal and inveterate was Louis Napoleon's love for 
 the land of Bliicher and Scharnhorst : " the great 
 destiny " of the monarchy of Brandenburg was one of 
 the articles of his cosmopolitan faith. " The geogra- 
 phical situation of Prussia is badly defined!" were 
 still his words in the following year in a too-much- 
 forgotten document."" 
 
 He certainly had no intention of destroying the 
 Empire of the Hapsburgs, nor of extending that of the 
 Hohenzollern from the Sund to the Adriatic, as might 
 be imagined by the politicians possessed of but one 
 idea, and the " know-nothings " of the principle of 
 nationality. Keenly appreciative of the use of 
 logic in political affairs, and in that (in that alone, 
 
 * Letter of the Emperor to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, June llth, 1866. It is 
 from this letter, which was solemnly laid before the Legislative Body, that 
 ihe following quotations are taken. 
 
182 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 perhaps) displaying a really French disposition, the 
 former prisoner of Ham would willingly have attempted 
 the construction of a new Prussia, essentially Pro- 
 testant, side by side with a new Austria, traditionally 
 Catholic, in the heart of Germany ; leaving the 
 secondary States in a kind of intermediary position, 
 and differing both in their religion and in their 
 politics. A Prussia, enlarged and amplified on the 
 Elbe and the Baltic, and thus rendered stronger and 
 more "homogeneous to the north/' seemed to him to be 
 a useful and almost necessary combination with regard 
 to Kussia; and it was only just that in return for the 
 new and vast Protestant territories which she was 
 about to acquire, the monarchy of Frederick II. should 
 give up Silesia, a Catholic country, and the ancient 
 patrimony of the Hapsburgs ; and that she should 
 also give up the Catholic provinces of the Khine, as 
 being situated outside of her natural sphere. 
 
 " Thus Austria would still maintain her powerful 
 position in Germany," and more especially her power as 
 a great Catholic state ; and the acquisition of Silesia 
 would amply compensate the Emperor Francis Joseph 
 for the Venetian province which he would then give up 
 to King Victor Emmanuel. As for the secondary States, 
 several of the smaller and more useless principalities 
 should be abolished and annexed to them, perhaps 
 even the Ehine provinces which were to be taken from 
 Prussia might be added to them as a new member of 
 the Bund ; and, at any rate, " a more complete union, 
 a more powerful organisation, and a more important 
 position," would be assured them, such as the leaders 
 
THE WAR IN GERMANY. 183 
 
 of the Wurtzburg party, MM. de Beust, de Pfordten, 
 and de Dalwigk, were incessantly demanding. 
 
 Yet, strange to say, in the midst of these vast 
 projects which embraced the Continent, and were 
 intended to satisfy " the legitimate wants " of Italy, 
 of Prussia, of Austria, and of the German Confedera- 
 tion, the only question which remained obscure and 
 was never fully realised in the mind of the French 
 sovereign was that of the compensation which he 
 might demand, in return for this universal setting to 
 rights, on behalf of his own country. " I dare not 
 touch on the Belgian question : it would be," he very 
 honestly said, "an act of robbery.""''" "Nor did he 
 delude himself as to the possibility of annexing any 
 important German territory ; he more frequently 
 stopped at the simple rectification of his frontiers on 
 the banks of the Sarre, and towards the Palatinate, 
 and at a neutralisation of the line of German 
 fortresses on the Ehine. 
 
 Eeduced even to such modest proportions, his aim 
 did not appear to him to be less worthy of being 
 ardently pursued, seeing how great a moral satisfac- 
 tion France would derive from the accomplishment of 
 her work in Italy, and in a rational settlement of 
 German affairs. 
 
 Moreover, that which flattered his naturally 
 generous and vaguely humane instincts, was the hope 
 
 * He made use of this expression more than once, and in tones of con- 
 viction, in the councils of his ministers before 1866. It was only at a later 
 period, after Sadowa, that he gave way for a moment to the parti de V action 
 in its views respecting Belgium, and gave his consent to the concealed 
 negotiations of the month of August, 1866. See further on, chapter vii. 
 
184 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 of reaping considerable benefits for his country for 
 the whole universe, indeed without drawing his 
 sword or shedding a drop of blood, " by moral 
 strength alone," by the ascendency of the name of 
 France. He was resolved to maintain an attitude of 
 " attentive neutrality," and only to quit it in the 
 extreme case of one of the belligerents becoming 
 too completely victorious, and attempting to menace 
 "the equilibrium, or alter the map of Europe to 
 its own advantage." He proclaimed this loudly and 
 on several occasions, priding himself on such a " dis- 
 interested " policy a policy of a very strange nature, 
 nevertheless, and one that, according to the very 
 judicious speech of Prince Napoleon, declared itself 
 beforehand as hostile to the victor ! "You have 
 changed the address of your letter," said the con- 
 queror of Austerlitz, with subtle raillery, to the 
 Prussian envoy, when he brought him the felicitations 
 of his sovereign. The nephew of Napoleon I. placed 
 himself in a position that would render any change 
 of address impossible, and would render the yet 
 unknown victor antagonistic to him. It is true that 
 he thought he already knew him, that, in unison 
 with the rest of the world, he assigned that post to 
 the Emperor of Austria, and that he thought it wise 
 to adopt some preventive measures towards him. 
 
 Even should the army of William I. show itself 
 to be far superior to the general opinion which the 
 world held of it and more clear-sighted on this point 
 than his surroundings, he fully admitted the possi- 
 bility of such an eventuality he only foresaw in this 
 
THE WAR IN GERMANY. 185 
 
 case a long and fatiguing contest which would exhaust 
 both combatants, and would permit him all the more 
 easily to intervene as military judge and protector of 
 the right of nations. He always hoped to be able, 
 at his own time and convenience, to pronounce a 
 word of peace, of equity, and of equilibrium, con- 
 vinced that his word would be listened to. 
 
 The important point now was that Prussia should 
 declare war, and in order to encourage her to do so, 
 her alliance with Italy must be insured. It was 
 also needful to avoid entering into any unseasonable 
 debates with the Berlin Cabinet on the subject of 
 compensations and combinations to come ; the slightest 
 insistence on these topics might ruffle the patriotic 
 sentiments of William I., cool his warlike ardour, 
 and crush in its shell a whole world of great events, 
 novus rerum ordo ! Better to ask for nothing, promise 
 nothing, and compromise nothing. What object, 
 indeed, was there in demanding the promissory notes 
 of a bankrupt, in taking sureties from one to whom 
 destiny seemed to assure so little, and whom, in all 
 probability, he would soon have to protect and defend 
 against the too severe conditions which his Austrian 
 conqueror would most probably impose upon him ? 
 
 However complicated and specious the strategy 
 imagined by the French Emperor may have been, 
 there is not the slightest doubt that M. de Bismarck 
 saw through it from the very beginning that he 
 divined it, foresaw it in some way, even before it 
 was completely fixed in the mind of its author. 
 We have a most striking proof of the truth of this. 
 
186 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 In the month of August, 1865, at the time 
 the ' first conferences hostile to Austria took place 
 between Prussia and Italy, conferences brusquely in- 
 terrupted by the armistice at Gastein, M. de Nigra 
 wrote to General La Marmora, inspired, evidently, 
 by the observations of his Prussian colleague in Paris, 
 Count Goltz : "The Berlin Cabinet has no wish that, 
 war being once declared, France should start. up, like 
 the Neptune of Virgil, to dictate peace, lay down 
 conditions, or convoke a congress in Paris."'"" 
 
 Thus all is foreseen in these few lines written 
 anterior to Biarritz, even to the congress which a 
 Napoleon III. naturally would not be able to abstain 
 from proposing, and which he actually did propose 
 in the month of May, 1866. " The difficulty consists, 
 therefore," pursued M. de Nigra, in his despatch, " in 
 obtaining from France a promise of absolute neutrality. 
 Will, and can, the Emperor Napoleon give such a 
 promise ? and will lie give it in writing, as Prussia 
 desires ? " 
 
 M. de Bismarck was certainly not able to obtain 
 this promise of absolute neutrality while at Biarritz 
 (October, 1865), and still less was there mention made 
 there of any engagement in writing ; but he learnt 
 there from august lips that Italy was right in " seeking 
 to complete her unity," and that she would no doubt 
 seize the first favourable opportunity of doing so ; 
 that France was resolved to respect Germany, and not 
 to interfere with her " national aspirations." Unless 
 the map of Europe were to be altered to her detri- 
 
 * Despatch of M. de Nigra, August 8th, 1865. La Marmora, p. 45. 
 
THE WAR IN GERMANY. 187 
 
 ment, France would remain neutral, and her neutrality 
 would not fail to be favourable to any combination by 
 which the Italian cause would benefit. 
 
 It is curious to note a reminiscence of the Biarritz 
 interview in a remark made six months later by 
 M. de Bismarck to General Govone, to the effect " that 
 without considering any profit he might derive from 
 it, and only considering it from the standpoint of his 
 principles, the Emperor would more readily approve 
 of a war of German nationality than of the war 
 for the duchies of the Elbe I" 
 
 That which, during his sojourn in Biarritz, must 
 especially have impressed the sagacious Prussian, was 
 the hold which the Italian cause had on the mind of 
 Napoleon ; there was the very key of the position, the 
 answer of the sphinx ; and the certainty of this 
 compensated the Prussian minister for many other 
 disturbing doubts, and made him overlook many 
 reticences on the part of his taciturn Majesty. * 
 
 In a certain sense, he was able even to congratulate 
 himself on the reticence observed towards him, on the 
 care which was taken to avoid entering into any de- 
 tailed discussion ; it kept him free, on his side, from 
 any precise engagement, from any premature offers ; it 
 permitted him to confine himself to generalities, to 
 take fantastic flights through space and time. He 
 spoke of Belgium and a part of Switzerland as 
 being the necessary and legitimate complements to 
 
 * It was on his return from Biarritz that M. de Bismarck made use of 
 the following significant language to M. de Nigra : " If Italy did not exist, 
 we should have had to invent her." La Marmora, p. 59. 
 
188 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 French unity ; of the joint action of France and 
 Germany in the cause of progress and humanity ; of a 
 future combination between Paris, Berlin, and Flo- 
 rence, and even London and Washington, that should 
 regulate the destinies of Europe nay, those of the 
 whole world ; that would give back to Eussia her true 
 vocation in Asia, and to Austria her mission of 
 civilisation on the Danube. How many times on those 
 Biscayan sands, now so historical, Napoleon III. was 
 to be seen pacing slowly to and fro, leaning on the 
 arm of Prosper Merimee, while at a respectful distance 
 M. de Bismarck followed alongside, gesticulating, 
 perorating, and generally receiving as his answer a 
 look half dim, half incredulous ; and how painfully 
 our thoughts revert now to that singular group to 
 the romantic Csesar, the Caesarian romancer, and the 
 terrible realist, who, then so obsequious to his imperial 
 host, was four years later sternly to assign him to the 
 prison of Wilhelmshohe ! 
 
 From time to time Napoleon III. would, by a fur- 
 tive pressure on the arm of the author of " Colomba," 
 indicate his amusement at the fertile imagination of 
 this diplomatist, this representative of a more than 
 problematic Power, and smile to hear him lightly 
 speak of the parcelling out of Europe and the dis- 
 tribution of kingdoms. "He is mad!" was his 
 whispered commentary on one occasion to his com- 
 panion ; but before condemning an opinion so bitterly 
 expiated in later years, we should do well to read 
 .an extract from a despatch written in the following 
 year by General Govone : " In mentioning M. de 
 
THE WAR IN GERMANY. 189 
 
 Bismarck to me, M. Benedetti told me that he was a 
 mad kind of diplomatist;"'"" and M. Benedetti 'was 
 careful to add that he had known his man for a long 
 time, and had closely followed his political career 
 during the last fifteen years. And, indeed, was it 
 not necessary to be somewhat of a madman to possess 
 that little grain of folly which Moliere attributes to 
 all great men, and which Boerhaave maintains to be 
 present in every great mind, t to have been capable of 
 launching the monarchy of Brandenburg on such an 
 eminently perilous adventure as that of 1866 ? The 
 minister of William I. admitted the fact, when in 
 Paris, that perhaps he was about to encounter a second 
 Olmtitz ; and his biographers cite a still more charac- 
 teristic saying of his : " That death on the scaffold, 
 under certain circumstances, was neither the worst nor 
 the most dishonourable exit from life." From a 
 diplomatic point of view his only assurance lay in 
 the deep love of Napoleon III. for the Italian cause ; 
 and after, as before Biarritz, "the Neptune of Virgil " 
 was always rising up before him, with a threatening 
 expression, and about to pronounce his quos ego. 
 War once declared, France might always dictate 
 terms of peace, lay down conditions, and convoke a 
 
 congress. 
 
 The great object was, therefore, not to give 
 Napoleon's benevolent neutrality time to undergo 
 these inevitable changes ; a blow must be struck, siid 
 struck quickly and well a blow that should dictate 
 
 * Despatch of General Govone, April 6th, 1866. La Marmora, p. 139. 
 f "Est aliquid delirii in omni magno ingenio." Boerhaave. 
 
190 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 peace in Vienna and respect in Paris. And this blow 
 must be dealt by the hand of victory. Now, besides 
 that in all earthly matters are found indifferently 
 fortune and misfortune, and that " Almighty God is 
 capricious/' according to a singular expression of 
 M. de Bismarck, uttered on a most solemn occasion;* 
 up to what point could he reckon on an army, formed 
 during the last few years, and that never, any more 
 than its chiefs, had gone through a great war ? It is 
 a most extraordinary circumstance, and one fruitful 
 of much astonishment to coming generations, that of 
 the two eminent men who took upon themselves the 
 frightful responsibility of the coming war, neither had 
 ever held any command of importance, nor had made 
 their names illustrious on any field of battle. 
 
 Previous to 1864, the only campaign in which 
 General von Moltke had ever taken part was that in 
 Syria, between the Turks and the Egyptians. In 
 1864 he had carried arms against his native land in 
 that invasion of Denmark which was certainly not cal- 
 culated to produce Turennes or Bonapartes. General 
 von Eoon had joined a "party of observation" in 
 1832, to watch the French besieging Antwerp, and 
 since then had only distinguished himself by his books 
 on military geography. 
 
 " From all that we have heard from the officers," 
 writes General Govone from Berlin, April 2nd, 1866, 
 " we think that the army is not enthusiastic about the 
 war against Austria ; on the contrary, there is a con- 
 
 * At the very moment of the commencement of hostilities. Despatch 
 of M. de Barral, June 15th, 1866. La Marmora, p. 332. 
 
THE WAR IN"&ER&ANY. 191 
 
 4h 
 
 siderable amount of Austrian sympathy in its ranks. 
 I have no doubt that war once declared the army 
 will rouse itself and do its duty bravely,- but at 
 present its mood is neither a stimulant nor a support 
 to the policy M. de Bismarck is so anxious to make 
 popular. " * 
 
 As to public opinion in Germany as to the 
 national sentiments of the fair-haired sons of Arminius 
 the policy of M. de Bismarck, far from finding in 
 them a stimulant and a support, found only repug- 
 nance and condemnation. 
 
 It required all the Napoleonic ideologic to see in 
 the contest that was about to begin " a great war for 
 German nationality ; " it required all the blindness 
 of the official and democratic press in France to 
 compare the work of M. de Bismarck in Prussia 
 with that of M. de Cavour in the Peninsula. 
 
 German nationality was not being either oppressed 
 or menaced in any quarter ; none of the States of 
 the Bund were oppressed by foreign dominion ; the 
 reigning houses of Hanover, Saxony, Wurtemberg, 
 Bavaria, &c., were indigenous, antique, and glorious 
 dynasties, popular and liberal ; the greater number of 
 these States were in the enjoyment of a constitutional 
 and parliamentary system unknown in Berlin ; the 
 towns of Frankfort, Hamburg, Liibeck, and Bremen 
 were even republics ! Now that success has obscured 
 not only the public conscience, but even the very 
 memory of the present generation, and that some 
 pitiful historic philosophy is always at hand to justify 
 
 * Despatch of General Govone, April 2nd, 1866. La Marmora, p. 131. 
 
192 THE r 'WO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 the present by falsifying the past, every one is ready 
 to recognise the " providential " and irresistible move- 
 ment which drew Germany on towards a Prussian 
 union, and even to join M. de Bismarck in calling the 
 campaign of 1866 " a simple misunderstanding." The 
 truth is, that the campaign of 1866 was nothing less 
 than a civil war, a fratricidal contest, the thought of 
 which was repudiated by the Prussian people, and 
 whose author they cursed on the very eve of Sadowa. 
 
 On the eve of Sadowa the principal cities of the 
 kingdom Cologne, Magdeburg, Stettin, Minden,&c.-~ 
 sent addresses to the sovereign in favour of peace and 
 condemnatory of " the fatal policy of the Cabinet ; " 
 and the powerful corporation of Kant's city of 
 Konigsberg actually decided to discontinue the illu- 
 minations on the king's birthday. 
 
 Immediately after his arrival in Berlin, General 
 Govone wrote as follows : " Not only the upper, but 
 also the middle classes, are averse to the war. This 
 aversion is palpable in the popular journals ; and 
 I cannot detect any hatred of Austria. Moreover, 
 although the Chamber does not enjoy any great popu- 
 larity or prestige, its debates continue to increase the 
 number of M. de Bismarck's enemies." Two months 
 later, when hostilities were about to begin, he wrote : 
 " Unfortunately, the public spirit of Prussia does not 
 rouse itself in any marked fashion, even in the face of 
 a situation so decisive, so full of vital importance for 
 the country/" 
 
 * Despatches of General Govone, April 2nd and May 22nd, 1866. La 
 Marmora, pp. 131, 245. 
 
THE WAR IN GERMANY. 193 
 
 It is true that none of these obstacles were of a 
 nature to shake the Prussian Prime Minister in his 
 resolution, nor to turn him from the path which he 
 had marked out for himself. His real difficulties 
 he met at the court itself; they were really caused 
 by the perruques of Potsdam, more especially by 
 his sovereign ; and in more than one circumstance 
 he might well have exclaimed with a certain car- 
 dinal, " that the cabinet of the king and his petit- 
 coucher gave him more trouble than the whole of 
 Europe." 
 
 In spite of William I.'s belief in his " mission from 
 on high," and in spite of his strong desire to retain, 
 at any price, his good harbour of Kiel, he could 
 not regard a contest with the venerated House of 
 Hapsburg in any other light than that of a last 
 expedient, which ought not to be brought to bear 
 until every amicable effort had been exhausted. In 
 this doubtful position his views were very similar 
 to those of Napoleon, and he infinitely preferred the 
 petty war for the Duchies to "the great war for 
 German nationality ; " but that which was, above all, 
 repugnant to his soul, was the idea of a compact with 
 Italy ; of a genuine offensive and defensive alliance, 
 instead of a " generical " treaty, bearing the vague 
 title of an " alliance of friendship," and only destined, 
 as he was at first made to believe, to make Austria 
 reflect and bring about a composition. He, the loyal 
 Hohenzollern, to fight with a Hapsburg, and partly 
 on account of a foreigner ! he, the Lord's anointed, 
 the old warrior of the Holy Alliance, to become the 
 
194 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 brother-in-arms of a Victor Emmanuel, that represen- 
 tative of revolution, that usurper, who had overthrown 
 so many legitimate princes, besieged and dethroned 
 his own nephew, and placed by his side, in the royal 
 carriages, Garibaldi in his red shirt ! These faintings 
 of the spirit and remorseful feelings were really 
 sincere, and it took all M. de Bismarck's marvellous 
 art to cure these syncopes of the " mission," and to 
 operate successfully on these tumours of the con- 
 science. 
 
 " There is my doctor ! " said the old Prussian 
 monarch, one day, to a Eussian princess who was 
 congratulating him on his health ; and he pointed to 
 his minister/" 
 
 The difficulties of drawing on the king, of triumph- 
 ing over his prejudices, over his antique ideas, and 
 his legitimate scruples, made up the list of M. de 
 Bismarck's daily toil, and were incessantly on his lips 
 during the confidential interviews of the spring of 
 1866, as we are able to gather from the invalu- 
 able reports which General Govone has fortunately 
 preserved for futurity. 
 
 When we study these reports, as well as others 
 which General La Marmora has given to the public, 
 we seem to have unfolded before us a comedy in some 
 hundred acts, all very little to the honour of human 
 nature ; and we are forced to ask ourselves who are 
 the better masters in brazen duplicity the grandsons 
 of Machiavelli or the heirs of the Teutonic order ? 
 It is, however, amusing to watch to employ the in- 
 
 * George Eesekiel, iii., p. 271. 
 
THE WAR IN GERMANY. 195 
 
 genious expression of the Italian negotiator the way 
 in which the southern viper essays to bite the 
 northern charlatan, and the charlatan essays to tread 
 down the viper. * 
 
 The most curious and the most instructive part of 
 these documents is, perhaps, that which shows us 
 what an enormous number of novelties M. de Bismarck 
 was able to teach his royal master in the short space 
 of a few months, and also what a vast number of 
 things he was able to make him forget. One of 
 the most remarkable cases of this forgetfulness was 
 most decidedly when the word of honour of a certain 
 august personage was given in June, 1866, to the 
 Emperor Francis Joseph, that there had been no treaty 
 signed with Italy ,t though at that very moment a 
 treaty offensive and defensive, duly drawn up and 
 signed on the 8th of April by the respective plenipo- 
 tentiaries, ratified by the king of Italy in Florence on 
 the 14th, and subsequently ratified on the 20th by 
 the king of Prussia at Berlin had been in existence 
 for more than two months. 
 
 Besides uniting himself to official Italy, the minister 
 of William I. was equally careful to win the friendship 
 of that subterranean Italy which lurked and plotted 
 beneath the throne of the youthful monarchy ; and 
 General La Marmora complains several times in his 
 
 * "... E la yipera avra morsicato il ciarlatano." Despatch of General 
 Govone, March 15th, 1866. La Marmora, p. 88. 
 
 f It was Queen Augusta who stated this in a letter to the Emperor of 
 Austria, saying that she had received the word of honour of her royal hus- 
 band to that effect. See the curious despatch of M. de Nigra, June 12th, 1866, 
 as well as General La Marmora's telegram of the same day. La Marmora, 
 pp. 305, 310. 
 
 2 
 
196 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 interesting work "of the intimate and cordial relations 
 existing between Count Usedom, the Prussian minister 
 at Florence, and several members of the parti de V ac- 
 tion, whose ill-judged advice he too often followed. 
 
 In the meantime, the Prussian consul at Bucharest 
 held in his hands (February, 1866) the threads 
 of a conspiracy that was to end in the overthrow 
 of Prince Couza, and bring considerable gain to 
 the Government of Berlin. " Liberalism is child's 
 play, and easily checked ; but Kevolution is a power 
 which one must know how to employ," was the saying 
 of the knight of the Mark when in Paris, and he lost 
 no time in proving the truth of his two maxims. 
 We know that his intercourse with Mazzini continued 
 even long after Sadowa,"* and the engagements entered 
 into by the Magyar chiefs with Prussia in 1866 have 
 weighed (and continue to do so) more heavily than 
 is generally supposed on the foreign policy of the 
 Hapsburgs. 
 
 It was in the consultations of the revolutionary 
 party that the fantastic campaign was first thought 
 of which M. d'Usedom sought to force on General 
 La Marmora in his famous despatch of June 17th.t 
 He urged him to commence a " thorough " campaign, 
 to outflank the Quadrilateral to skirt the shores of 
 the Adriatic, and to penetrate Hungary, which would 
 
 * After the death of the great Italian agitator, the Florentine journals 
 published his letters to M. de Bismarck during 1868-69. Foreseeing a war 
 between France and Germany, Mazzini suggests the overthrow of Victor 
 Emmanuel should the latter become the ally of the Emperor Napoleon III. 
 
 f Ifc will be of importance to observe that the strategic portion of M. 
 cl'TTsedom's note was almost a literal copy of one of Mazzini's articles pub- 
 lished in the Dovere of Genoa, May 26th, 1866. 
 
THE WAR IN GERMANY. 197 
 
 rise to a man at the very name of Garibaldi ; " we 
 should thus deal Austria a blow which would strike, 
 not her extremities, but her heart." 
 
 As to the attempt of forming a legion composed of 
 deserters from the Austrian army under the command 
 of the refugee general Klapka, the Prussian Premier 
 affirmed, in the presence of the Chambers at Berlin, in 
 his celebrated discourse of January, 1874, that he had 
 energetically repulsed all such offers at the begin- 
 ning of the war. " It was only after the battle of 
 Sadowa, at the moment when Napoleon III., in a 
 telegraphic despatch, intimated the possibility of his 
 intervention, that, in self-defence, I did not order, but 
 merely tolerated, the formation of the Hungarian 
 legion." Unfortunately, the dates by no means tally 
 with the German Chancellor's declarations. 
 
 The battle of Sadowa took place on July 3rd ; but 
 it was on the 12th of June that M. de Bismarck made 
 known to the Italian Government that he had defi- 
 nitely accepted the assistance of the Slavonic and 
 Hungarian deserters,"" and the fact remains that long 
 before Sadowa, even before the beginning of the war, 
 the Prussian Government had had recourse to means 
 which, to use the Chancellor's own expressions, would 
 "excite the Dalmatian and Magyar regiments of 
 Austria to revolt and desertion." 
 
 Neither must we forget to mention that, while 
 treating secretly with Mazzini and M. Klapka, the 
 minister of William I. was openly denouncing the 
 
 * See M. d'Usedom's notes of June 12th and 17th, as well as Count Barral's 
 despatch of June 15th. La Marmora, pp. 316, 331, 345318. 
 
198 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 Jacobin spirit of the House of, Hapsburg : " The 
 King, our august master," so ran a Prussian despatch 
 of January 26th, 1866, "is grievously affected by the 
 sight of the anti-monarchical and revolutionary 
 tendencies which are being displayed (in the duchies 
 of the Elbe) under the protection of the Austrian 
 eagle. If Vienna can witness unmoved the trans- 
 formation of a country hitherto distinguished by its 
 conservative sentiments into a hotbed of revolutionary 
 agitation, we, on our side, cannot, and will not, do so." 
 It was thus, in the midst of similar underhand 
 devices, of more or less regular negotiations, of pre- ' 
 parations for war, of a continual exchange of notes, 
 of daily contests with the Chambers and with the 
 perruques of the court, that the President of the 
 Council passed the first six months of 1866, and 
 rarely has any statesman had to pass through a more 
 troublous or more bewildering period. The tide of 
 events sometimes carried him towards the shore, some- 
 times carried him out to sea, and flung him back 
 farther than ever, as it seemed, from the goal of his 
 wishes. For instance, the revolution in Eoumania, 
 and the acclamation of the Hohenzollern prince 
 by the people of Bucharest, was a great stroke of 
 good fortune ; for this incident brusquely closed a 
 door through which, according to the opinion of 
 more than one politician of the time, the Venetian 
 question might have gone its way in peace;* 7 ' and it was 
 
 * In a despatch, of March 1st, 1866, M. de Nigra informs General La 
 Marmora that, agreeably to his instructions, he had attempted to open the 
 question of exchanging the Danubian Principalities for Venice. He had set 
 
THE WAR IN GERMANY. 199 
 
 French influence which had contributed to install the 
 young Prussian prince on the banks of the Danube ! 
 
 Immediately afterwards, however, M. de Bismarck 
 was aroused from his state of security by vague 
 rumours of conferences taking place between Austria 
 and France respecting Venice. He took advantage of 
 them to induce the king to sign the secret treaty of 
 April 8th with the Florentine Government ; but 
 soon after the offer of disarmament made by the 
 Viennese Cabinet, the debates in the Corps Legislatif 
 and the manifestations of public opinion in France, 
 which were more and more favourable to the cause of 
 peace, brought about a desperate state of stagnation, 
 and infused fresh courage into the Austrian sympa- 
 thisers at the court of William I. The Emperor 
 Napoleon III. then rendered a signal service to the 
 Prussian minister by setting the flagging political 
 machine again in motion ; he made his speech of 
 Auxerre on May 6th, in which he threw a scornful 
 defiance at the treaties of 1815. This, however, did 
 not prevent him from utterly routing all M. de Bis- 
 marck's plans by the sudden proposition of a congress, 
 and, under the shock of this fresh incident, which 
 seemed to compromise everything, M. de Bismarck 
 spoke, for the first time, of compensations for France. 
 41 1 am far less German than Prussian," said he to 
 General Govone ; "I should have no difficulty in 
 giving up to France all the territory which lies 
 
 forth the advantages which this termination to the question would have for 
 England and France, who would thus behold the peaceful accomplishment 
 of the two programmes of the Crimean and Italian wars. The minister 
 adds that Napoleon HI. seemed struck with the idea. La Marmora, p. 119. 
 
200 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 between the Moselle and the Rhine, but the king 
 would have the greatest scruples on this point."" 
 
 Of course he would have demanded in return from 
 the French Government their active co-operation in 
 the war a demand which would not have suited the 
 views of Napoleon III., and which public opinion in 
 France would have made it impossible to listen to. 
 " The congress and the peace/' wrote M. Benedetti t 
 on May 29th, " would completely upset all the 
 projects of M. de Bismarck, and that on the very- 
 eve, as he supposes, of their realisation. He is not 
 one of those minds who delude themselves easily, and 
 he feels convinced that, brought face to face with the 
 powers assembled in conference, his ambitious policy 
 would be checked, and perhaps annulled . . . He 
 also fears to facilitate by his absence (in attending 
 the congress in Paris) the success of the occult in- 
 fluences which have never ceased to attempt the 
 reconciliation of the two great German sovereigns. 
 Were he to absent himself, the king might be 
 prevailed upon to consent to an interview with the 
 Emperor of Austria, and it is of importance that he 
 should keep watch in person over all the avenues to 
 the palace. His fears in this respect are so keen that 
 he intends to follow the king on the campaign in case 
 war should be declared . . ." 
 
 Mean while, 'he learned that fresh negotiations had 
 been entered into between France and Austria on the 
 subject of Venice, and that in another direction the 
 king was, unknown to him, making friendly offers to 
 
 * Despatch of General Govone, June 3rd, 1866. La Marmora, p. 275. 
 t "My Mission in Prussia/' pp. 125, 129. 
 
THE WAR IN GERMANY. 201 
 
 the Emperor Francis Joseph of an amicable arrange- 
 ment. William I. still preferred the little question of 
 the Duchies to the great war for German nationality. 
 
 It is almost possible to question what must have 
 been, at this time, the state of mind of the minister, 
 who for several months past had been complaining 
 to Count Barral, the Italian plenipotentiary at 
 Berlin, of the treachery of his agents in London, 
 Florence, and Paris. He, moreover, had thought 
 his life in danger, ever since the attempt made 
 on his person on May 7th, and was not without un- 
 easiness concerning his sojourn in Paris during the 
 congress which he was to attend, and which he 
 dreaded for so many other reasons. " He no longer 
 goes out unaccompanied," writes Count Barral, " and 
 French detectives are to meet him on the frontier, 
 and escort him throughout his entire stay."" 
 
 The journey never took place, as we know. 
 Prussia, to use the expression of M. d'Usedom, was 
 " saved from the congress," and Prince Gortchakof 
 had no small share in the work of salvation. 
 
 Always ready with his friendship, he was the first 
 to consider that the Austrian reservations t would 
 leave the congress no " practical aim/' thus giving 
 the signal for a general dispersion. From that time 
 M. de Bismarck set himself to " work the mind of 
 his royal master," and finished by removing his 
 very last scruple. " His Majesty " (telegraphs Count 
 
 * Telegrams of Count Barral, April 7th and June 1st, 18G6. La Mar. 
 mora, pp. 141, 266. 
 
 f Telegram of M. de Launay, from St. Petersburg, Juno 1st, 186G. 
 La Marmora, p. 266. We can also see, in the same work, with what 
 alacrity M. de Bismarck seized this opinion of the Russian chancellor's, and 
 transmitted it by telegraph to the various Cabinets. 
 
202 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 Barral, May 23rd, from Berlin) " was deeply touched 
 by the situation, and spoke of it with great tears in 
 his eyes." A fortnight later (June 8th), the king no 
 longer wept, "but there was still a sadness in his 
 voice, indicative of the feelings of a resigned man, 
 who has come to an unavoidable but unwished-for 
 decision. His Majesty tells me that he is fully con- 
 vinced of the justice of his cause. ' I have a clear 
 conscience,' he said, laying his hand on his heart, 
 and apparently much moved ; ' I have been for a 
 very long time accused of being led by ambitious 
 motives to undertake this war, but now the whole 
 world knows who is the aggressor/"'" 
 
 "I shall return through Vienna or through Munich, 
 or I shall charge with the last squadron with the 
 squadron that never comes back," said M. de Bismarck 
 to a foreign ambassador at the moment of leaving 
 Berlin with the staff, June 30th. 1866. Two days 
 later he was already at Gitschin, on the field yet reek- 
 ing with the fumes of a great battle. " I have just 
 arrived/' he writes to his wife ; " the ground is yet 
 covered with corpses, horses, and arms. Our victories 
 are much greater than we at first believed. . . . 
 Send me some French novels to read, but not more 
 than one at a time, and may God have you in his 
 keeping ! " 
 
 This was written on the 2nd of July, 1866. The 
 morrow was the day of Sadowa the morrow all 
 Germany was at the feet of this singular amateur of 
 French romances, and the Emperor Napoleon III. was 
 painfully awakened from his romance from his long 
 
 * Telegrams of M. de Barral. La Marmora, pp. 218, 294. 
 
THE WAR IN GERMANY. 203 
 
 humanitarian dream. Like Titania, in "A Mid- 
 summer-Night's Dream," imperial France suddenly 
 perceived that, possessed by some inconceivable hallu- 
 cination, she had caressed a monster. 
 
 While so many terrible and marvellous events 
 were taking place in the arena of the world, Eussia 
 continued to sulk and to meditate to meditate 
 in a perpetual adoration of Prussia. We seek 
 in vain for any trace of her influence in events 
 which yet so closely concerned her interests, her 
 family alliances, her ancient traditions. " As I am on 
 the Kussian topic," said M. Benedetti, writing to his 
 chief in the spring of 1866, "allow me to mention 
 that I have always remarked, and not without sur- 
 prise, the indifference with which the St. Petersburg 
 Cabinet has regarded, from the very first, the 
 pretensions of Prussia and the probability of a war 
 between the two great German powers. Nor have I 
 been less impressed by the constant security in which 
 I have always found M. de Bismarck indulging with 
 regard to the attitude and the intentions of the Empire 
 of the North". . . Eussia remained silent in 1865 during, 
 the crisis of Gastein ; in the month of May, 1866, she 
 only accepted the invitation to the congress in order to 
 be the first to despair of its utility and to discourage 
 the other powers from attending it ; she was absent 
 from the deliberations of Nikolsburg and Prague, and 
 left to France the task of exerting herself there on be- 
 half of the south of Germany and of Saxony ; she 
 even delegated to her the honour of stipulating one 
 poor little clause in favour of unhappy Denmark, the 
 country of her future empress. 
 
204 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 For one moment, it is true, M. d'Oubril, the Russian 
 ambassador at Berlin, a diplomatist of the old school, 
 showed himself greatly alarmed at the conquests of the 
 Hohenzollerns. He was recalled in haste to St. Peters- 
 burg, " and came back, after an absence of a few weeks, 
 totally reassured, and affecting an amount of satis- 
 faction that was not dimmed for a single instant either 
 by the reverses of the German princes allied to the 
 House of Eussia, or by the development which Prussia 
 was giving to her military power. "* 
 
 Prince Gortchakof did not sacrifice at the ancient 
 altars of the rights of nations and of European equi- 
 librium ; he did not share in certain prejudices con- 
 cerning " the union that ought to exist between all 
 conservative interests ; " and his soul was too lofty to 
 be jealous of a good neighbour. Besides, had he not 
 also " vanquished Europe " three years before, in the 
 memorable Polish campaign ? In vain might august 
 personages, princesses, and grand-duchesses say, with 
 the women in Holy Scripture, that Saul had killed his 
 thousands, but David his tens of thousands ; in vain 
 point to their spoliated relatives and their confiscated 
 inheritances. Alexander Mikhailovitch was not en- 
 vious of the laurels of his former colleague of Frank- 
 fort, now become Chancellor of the Northern Con- 
 federation. He rejoiced to see Austria well punished 
 and France thoroughly mortified ; further than this, 
 he considered that there was but little difference on 
 the face of the globe, only that there was one more 
 great chancellor in this century. 
 
 * Benedetti, " My Mission in Prussia," pp. 99, 254. The proposition of 
 a congress made by Prince Gortchakof, the day after Sadt wa, but abandoned 
 by him as soon as made, we mention in a later chapter. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE ECLIPSE OF EUROPE. 
 
 Illusions of M. Thiers in the Autumn of 1870 The Russian Portfolio at 
 Versailles Precise Date of the Understanding between Russia and 
 Prussia antagonistic to France The Months of July and August, 1866 
 Fears prevailing at the Court of the Tuileries after Sadowa 
 Measures proposed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys Opposition of the 
 Palais-Royal Party and of M. Rouher What was to be done? 
 Urgent Necessity for a Congress Napoleon III. decides upon an 
 isolated Mediation, and sends M. Benedetti to the Prussian Head- 
 quarters Peculiar Language used by M. de Bismarck in the Presence 
 of M. Benedetti at Nikolsburg and Brunn Trap laid for France Shs 
 frees Prussia from all European control, and hastens on the Prelimin- 
 aries of Nickolsburg, July 26th Saying of M. de Bismarck on the 
 politique de pourboire Secret French Despatch of August 5th, demand- 
 ing the Left Side of the Rhine with Mayence M. de Bismarck's 
 haughty Refusal Dilatory Negotiations Journey of M. Benedetti 
 to Paris, and Abandonment of the Despatch of August 5th Difficult 
 Situation of M. Benedetti : he pleads for a Secret Alliance -with Prussia 
 on the Subject of Belgium Conferences concerning this Secret Treaty 
 Inconceivable Folly on the Part of the French Ambassador at Berlin 
 Final Peace with Austria, August 26th M. de Bismarck's sudden 
 Suspicions : he hesitates to Sign the Secret Act Resignation of 
 M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and Circular from the ad interim Minister, 
 M. de Lavalette, September 16th Use made by M. de Bismarck of the 
 Two Secret Propositions of France relative to the Rhine and to Belgium 
 Military Conventions with the States of the South, August 17th-23rd 
 General Manteuffel's Mission to St. Petersburg, August Agreement 
 entered into between Prussia and Russia in case of a War with France 
 Chief Fault of the Napoleonic Policy after Sadowa Elimination of 
 Europe. 
 
 IN the beginning of the gloomy month of November, 
 1870, two illustrious persons were seated by the 
 fire in the small parlour of the " Maison Jesse," 
 
206 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 situated in the Rue de Provence, at Versailles, two 
 persons whose slightest act all Europe was watching 
 with anxiety at the time. 
 
 Leaning with both arms on a work-table, on which 
 " two bottles, with candles stuck in their necks, did 
 duty as candelabra/' * M. de Bismarck asked permission 
 of M. Thiers to smoke a cigar, and relaxed, after the 
 negotiations which they had been discussing through- 
 out the day, relative to the armistice and to the peace, 
 into a gossiping conversation full of abuse of the 
 war. Among other things, he mentioned the fact 
 that the Emperor Napoleon III., on seeing him ap- 
 proach in the little garden, in which they met after 
 the capitulation of Sedan, armed with a pair of pistols, 
 had turned pale : "He thought me capable of an act 
 of bad taste/' There is no doubt that in this, the 
 man who, ever since the attempt of Blind, had shown 
 the greatest nervousness about his own personal 
 safety,t attributed, and most ungenerously, to the 
 unhappy monarch thoughts he was very far from 
 entertaining. 
 
 * These details, as well as the subsequent ones, are borrowed from 
 the account of this interview given by M. Thiers himself, a few days 
 later, at the Bishop's Palace at Orleans, and published by M. A. Boucher 
 in his " Recits de 1'Invasion," pp. 318325. 
 
 f We have already quoted the despatch of M. de Barral from Berlin* 
 June 1st, 1866, three weeks after Blind's attempt : " M. de Bismarck no 
 longer goes out alone, and French detectives will meet him on the frontier 
 and accompany him throughout the journey." M. Jules Favre ("Histoire du 
 Gouvernement de la Defense Rationale," vol. i., pp. 163, 164) speaks of the 
 uneasiness displayed by the Prussian minister during the interview at the 
 Castle of Haute Maison, at Monfcry : " We are very badly placed here; your 
 franc-tireurs can take aim at me through any of those windows." We may 
 also recall the language used, later on, in the Chambers, by the German 
 Chancellor, on the subject of Kulmann's attempt on hie life. 
 
THE EGLIPSE OF EUROPE. 207 
 
 With anecdotes and reminiscences of this de- 
 scription the Prussian minister amused himself for 
 several hours ; M. Thiers, on his side, only just re- 
 turned from his forty days' journeying, in which he 
 had twice crossed Europe, and had negotiated with so 
 many sovereigns and ministers, was not in want of 
 piquant anecdotes and lively sketches. He found it 
 to be necessary after a while, however, to recall to 
 M. de Bismarck's mind the important topics which 
 had brought him to head-quarters ; but M. de Bis- 
 marck that "savage filled with genius," as the French 
 statesman called him later on in his confidences at the 
 bishop's palace at Orleans seemed desirous of pro- 
 longing the delightful gossip as much as possible. 
 Taking the hand of M. Thiers, he cried : " Let me con- 
 tinue yet a little while ; it is so delightful to find one- 
 self once more in the society of a civilised being !" 
 The civilised being, when at last permitted to plead 
 his cause anew, found that the " Iron Count " was 
 still there, though for a short time it had pleased 
 him to assume the role of agreeable companion. 
 Contact with civilisation had not at all softened the 
 political manners of the savage. M. Thiers then re- 
 membered the favourable dispositions which he had 
 met in Eussia, and thought it advisable to make use 
 of them at such a critical moment. 
 
 While at St. Petersburg, M. Thiers had already sent 
 a very sanguine telegram to the delegates at Tours. 
 In it he said : "I have every reason to be satisfied 
 with the reception I have received from the emperor 
 and from the imperial family, from Prince Gortchakof 
 
208 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 and other dignitaries, as well as from Russian society 
 in general. The emperor and his chancellor have 
 expressed themselves very strongly against the exor- 
 bitant demands of Prussia ; they have declared that 
 Russia will never give her consent to any unjust con- 
 ditions, and that consequently the consent of the 
 other powers will equally be wanting. The exactions 
 of Prussia would therefore be only the exactions of 
 brute force, and would not be founded on any sane- 
 tion."* 
 
 Without entering into any details, M. Thiers spoke 
 to the Prussian minister in general terms of the marks 
 of solicitude shown him by " his friend, Prince Gort- 
 chakof," and concluded by saying that Russia was 
 becoming alarmed and irritated. At these words 
 M. de Bismarck rose and touched a bell. " Bring 
 me the portfolio containing the Russian papers." The 
 portfolio was brought. " Read," said he ; " here are 
 thirty letters from St. Petersburg." M. Thiers was 
 not slow in profiting by the permission : he read, and 
 his eyes were opened. 
 
 It must be said, however, that the illustrious 
 historian of the Consulate and the Empire brought 
 this cruel deception on himself. He might have 
 spared himself this, as well as many another mis- 
 
 * These details are taken from a despatch of Lord Lyons, of October 6th, 
 1870. M. de Chaudordy had communicated M. Thiers' telegram to the 
 British ambassador. It is curious to compare this singular telegram of 
 M. Thiers with the opinion expressed by Prince Gortchakof in the presence 
 of the English ambassadors, " that the conditions indicated in the circular of 
 M. de Bismarck, September 16th, could only be modified by military events, 
 and that nothing could at present authorise such a conjecture." Despatch 
 oJSir A. Buchanan, October l?th. The conditions then indicated in the Prussian 
 circular were already Alsace and Metz. 
 
THE ECLIPSE OF EUROPE. 209 
 
 take of his rapid journey across Europe, had he but 
 consulted competent men, or even paid them the 
 slightest attention. M. de Beust, for example, was 
 eminently in a position to have given him the most 
 edifying details as to the real state of the relations 
 existing between Eussia and Prussia. There was also 
 M. Benedetti, who could have given him the precise 
 date of the agreement entered into between the courts 
 of Berlin and St. Petersburg in case of a war with 
 France, and who could at the same time have in- 
 formed him of the extraordinary circumstances under 
 which this agreement was made. Let us call these 
 circumstances to mind, and strive to free them from 
 the cloak of mystery with which certain interested 
 persons continue to envelope them ; let us once more go 
 back to the day after Sadowa, to the public and secret 
 transactions which followed that sad event. The 
 majority of the political combinations, which were 
 to prove so fatal to France in the war of 1870, were 
 woven and consolidated during that fatal epoch 
 during the two months of July and August, 1866. 
 
 " None of the questions which affect us will be 
 settled without the assent of France," was the decla- 
 ration made by Napoleon III., in a solemn document 
 laid before the Corps Legislatif on the 1 1th of June, 
 1866; and among these questions the "modification 
 of the map of Europe to the exclusive benefit of any 
 great Power," naturally held a prominent position. 
 Now, in virtue of the victories, as vast as they were 
 unexpected, of the 3rd July, 1866, Prussia intended 
 altering the map to her exclusive benefit. Instead 
 
210 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 of " maintaining Austria in her great position in 
 Germany/' as the imperial letter of the llth of 
 June demanded, Prussia exacted the entire exclusion 
 of the Empire of the Hapsburgs from the German 
 Confederation; instead of granting " a more important 
 role, a more powerful organisation " to the secondary 
 States, she claimed jurisdiction over the whole of 
 Germany ; and contemplated into the bargain annexing 
 large portions of the countries occupied by her troops. 
 
 In fomenting this war, which was to end in such 
 an unexpected manner, the imperial policy had in- 
 tended, above all, to secure two results : the freedom 
 of Venice, and an equitable arrangement of affairs in 
 Germany. 
 
 Venice had been given up given up even before 
 the war, and in accepting this cession, in announcing 
 this "important event" in the Moniteur, after General 
 Benedeck's great disaster, the Emperor Napoleon, 
 according to the opinion of his Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, was all the more* bound to protect Austria and 
 her allies, as it was now a question of the vital interests 
 of France herself. 
 
 The minister, in consequence, advised his august 
 master to convoke the Corps Le'gislatif, to send to 
 the eastern frontier an army of observation, which 
 Marshal Eandon at that time was rapidly organising, 
 and to declare to Prussia that France would occupy 
 the left bank of the Ehine unless she showed herself 
 more moderate towards the vanquished, or if she 
 attempted any territorial acquisitions that might 
 endanger the equilibrium of Europe. 
 
THE EGLIPSE OF EUROPE. 211 
 
 Certainly, after the terrible experiences of 1870, 
 we may feel some very reasonable doubts as to .the 
 propriety and wisdom of the measures proposed by 
 M. Drouyn de Lhuys in the month of July, 1866 ; but 
 still, we must bear in mind that the prestige of France 
 was then very great and almost unshaken, that in a 
 week Austria would be able to bring back 120,000 or 
 130,000 soldiers from Italy, and that General Moltke's 
 troops were already beginning to feel the effects which 
 every war even a fortunate one will produce. 
 " Prussia is victorious/' said the French ambassador 
 at the Court of Vienna, " but she is exhausted. From 
 the Rhine to Berlin you will scarcely meet with 15,000 
 men. You may make yourself master of the situa- 
 tion by a simple military demonstration, and in perfect 
 security, as at this moment Prussia is incapable of 
 entering on a war with France. Let the Emperor make 
 a simple military demonstration, he will be astonished 
 to find with what facility he will, without striking 
 a blow, become the arbiter and the master of the 
 situation." 
 
 In the private letters of M. de Bismarck to his 
 wife during this campaign, can be found traces of 
 the cares which at the time assailed his spirit, 
 especially of the trouble it cost him to moderate 
 the enthusiasm of his hot-headed friends, "good 
 people who cannot see beyond their own noses," 
 " et quinagent a leur aise sur la vague ecumante de la 
 phrase." The week after Sadowa, during his march 
 to Vienna, he wrote from Hohenmauth : " Dost thou 
 yet remember, dear heart, that nineteen years ago we 
 
 p 2 
 
212 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 passed through here on our way from Prague to 
 Vienna ? Neither then nor later on, when I travelled 
 along this same line with the amiable Lynar, did I 
 imagine what the future had in store for me ! . . . 
 All goes well, and we shall have a treaty of 
 peace worth the making if we do not exaggerate 
 our demands, and fancy that we have conquered the 
 world. Unfortunately we are as prone to become 
 intoxicated with success as we are to despair of it ; 
 and the ungrateful task devolves upon me of pouring 
 water into heated wine, and of showing that we are not 
 alone in Europe, but that we have three neighbours." 
 
 Again, in his celebrated speech of the 16th of 
 January, 1874, to the Eeichstag, the Chancellor of 
 Germany, in speaking of those decisive days, made 
 the important confession that, "although France 
 herself had at that time but a limited number of 
 troops at her disposal, nevertheless, a few of them 
 would have sufficed to form a very important 
 army when united to the numerous forces of 
 the south of Germany, which, on its side, 
 could furnish excellent materials, and whose only 
 fault was a defective organisation. Such an army 
 would immediately have forced us to fall back to 
 protect Berlin, and to abandon all our successes in 
 Austria." 
 
 Let us add to this that Germany was still 
 violently averse to the " fratricidal" policy of Prussia, 
 and that the proceedings and exactions** of the two 
 generals ManteufFel and Vogel von Falkenstein had 
 caused the greatest exasperation among the people on 
 
THE ECLIPSE OF EUROPE. 213 
 
 the banks of the Main. For one moment, one very 
 transitory moment, it is true, the sight of French troops 
 on the Rhine would not have wounded Germanic 
 susceptibilities, and would even have been hailed 
 with joy. " Sire," said at this time one of the most 
 eminent ministers of the German Confederation to 
 the Emperor Napoleon III., " Sire, a simple military 
 demonstration on your part may save Europe, and 
 Germany will be eternally* grateful to you. If 
 you allow the present opportunity to escape, before 
 another four years have elapsed you will have to go 
 to war with Prussia, and you will have the whole of 
 Germany against you." But the terror which the 
 prodigious victories of the Prussians had infused into 
 the ruling mind of the Tuileries w T as too great to 
 allow it to retain the coolness of judgment so 
 necessary in such a momentous crisis. The needle- 
 gun was also a novelty, whose importance, now ex- 
 aggerated, now depreciated by authoritative opinions, 
 contributed in no small degree to add to already 
 numerous perplexities ; and, finally, there arose a 
 doubt as to the possibility of raising the number of 
 men fixed upon by the Minister of War ; the fatal 
 Mexican expedition had swallowed up nearly all the 
 arms and troops of France.""" 
 
 The French Government was thus forced to confess 
 
 * This was the opinion set on foot by the parti de faction, and it was 
 even rumoured that Marshal Randon (Minister of War) had been arrested 
 and imprisoned at Vincennes. In April, 1867, the chief political personages 
 of the Empire, notably the members of the Privy Council, received a con- 
 fidential memorandum from the former Minister of War, who had been 
 superseded in the month of January by Marshal Niel. In this document 
 
214 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 that it had arduously desired, favoured nay, even 
 provoked one of the greatest European compli- 
 cations, without having asked itself whether, in the 
 event of a crisis or of the rupture of the equilibrium 
 of Europe, it was even in a position to make a simple 
 military demonstration. 
 
 The parti de Taction henceforward had an easy 
 task to uphold Prussia as the powerful agent of 
 civilisation and of progress, to condemn the Austrian 
 sympathies that perennially clung to the offices of the 
 Quai d'Orsay, and to recommend more than ever an 
 alliance with M. de Bismarck : he was to be given 
 carte Nanche in Germany, and the unity of France 
 was to be completed by the seizure of Belgium. 
 
 M. Drouyn de Lhuys did not fail to point out the 
 weakness and folly of such suggestions, and asked 
 with some bitterness how France, who was not even 
 capable of organising an army of observation on the 
 Khine, could possibly be strong enough to attack 
 Antwerp, to provoke England, and bear the probable 
 hostility of all the other European Powers Prussia, 
 no doubt, among the rest. He did not spare his 
 reproaches, and exposed the officious and culpable 
 zeal that had been employed in bringing about a 
 war whose consequences he had never ceased to dread, 
 and inveighed more especially against the uncon- 
 ditional freedom of action granted to the most dan- 
 
 Marshal Eandon endeavoured to expose the folly of all the accusations 
 brought against him, and maintained that after Sadowa it would have been 
 easy for him to have assembled at the shortest notice at least 100,000 men on 
 the Rhine frontier. This confidential paper was published, at the desire of 
 the author, in October, 1870, under the title, "De la Situation de 1'Armee 
 en 1'Annee 1866. Grenoble, 1870." 
 
THE ECLIPSE OF EUROPE. 215 
 
 gerous, the most powerful side to the very side from 
 which sureties should have been exacted. 
 
 Where he had been at liberty to do so, he had 
 taken every precaution that lay in his power. In 
 the event of Austria being victorious, Venice would 
 always have remained to Italy. " In my opinion," 
 added the minister ingenuously, " from a French point 
 of view, this was a bad result ; but, as the emperor 
 desired it above everything, I procured it for him." 
 
 It was now the least that could be done, he 
 thought, to allow him to obtain from the other side 
 some compensation for France, this time, which would 
 justify in the eyes of the nation the indulgence 
 shown to Prussia. For several days the debates were 
 prolonged and lively, and agitated by conflicting 
 influences. The Palais-Royal party was not the only 
 one to advocate the desertion of the Austrians : up 
 to a certain point this line of action was upheld 
 by several statesmen whos.e judgments and opinions 
 were usually most moderate. 
 
 M. Rouher was one of the first to oppose any 
 military demonstration on the eastern frontier; he 
 was soon, indeed, to make a speech in favour of " a 
 necessary and remunerative alliance between France 
 and Prussia." "Austria," according to the opinion 
 of another important member of the Privy Council, 
 " now only inspires that amount of interest which is 
 next door to indifference, and which is always inspired 
 by the strong when they have lost their strength by 
 their own fault, by their own want of foresight and 
 care. Up till now everything has happened for the 
 
216 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 best." * While M. Magne was thus pronouncing the vce 
 victis over the House of Hapsburg little dreaming, 
 alas I that four years later Europe would pronounce 
 an almost identical sentence with regard to France an 
 august lady, a sister of the King of Wurtemberg, and 
 closely related to the French imperial family, was 
 expressing herself very differently. "You are de- 
 luding yourselves strangely," said she ; "your prestige 
 has diminished more during this last fortnight than 
 during the whole of the imperial reign ! You coun- 
 tenance the destruction of the weak ; you tolerate 
 the unlimited insolence and brutality of your next 
 neighbour; you accept a gift, and you have not 
 even a good word for the giver. I regret that you 
 should think that my interests dictate my opinions 
 on this subject, and that you do not foresee the 
 fatal danger of a powerful Germany and of a powerful 
 Italy. It is the dynasty which is menaced, and which 
 will have to bear the consequences. 
 
 " Do not think that the disasters which have be- 
 fallen my country have made me unjust or suspicious. 
 Venice given up, you should have succoured Austria, 
 have advanced your troops to the Ehine, and laid 
 down your own conditions ! To permit Austria's 
 annihilation was worse than a crime, it was a mistake." 
 
 Whether mistake or crime, the French had 
 decided how to act before this spirited appeal of the 
 Queen of Holland reached the Tuileries.f 
 
 * Confidential note of M. de Magne for the Emperor. Papers and Corre- 
 spondence of the Imperial Family, vol. i., p. 240. 
 
 f This letter, addressed to a former French minister at the Hague, and 
 laid before the Emperor, was found at the Tuileries, after the 4th Septem- 
 ber. Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial Family, vol. i., p. 14. 
 
THE ECLIPSE OF EUROPE. 217 
 
 Napoleon III. was very ill at the time, suffering 
 from the first effects of a painful malady (from 
 which he was never afterwards to be free), and, in 
 consequence, less than ever inclined to adopt any 
 vigorous measures ; so that on the 10th July, after 
 a council of ministers held in the Emperor's pre- 
 sence, Prince Metternich had to inform Vienna that 
 France would interfere no further in the conflict 
 than by means of her diplomatists. 
 
 Yet, something more efficacious, more loyal at any 
 rate, might have been attempted than such an empty 
 and isolated mediation, filled, as it was, with perilous 
 reticences and egotistical calculations. The whole of 
 the European Powers might have been interrogated on 
 such an eminently " European " question a question 
 which so closely affected the equilibrium of the Con- 
 tinent. A word from France on the subject " would 
 certainly have been listened to," to use an expression 
 contained in an imperial letter of June llth; for even 
 Prince Gortchakof himself spoke of the necessity of 
 a general congress at this time."" 
 
 Under the first and violent shock caused by the 
 sudden foundering of Austria and her hopes, at the 
 spectacle of so many of his august master's relatives 
 menaced by spoliation and ruin, the Russian Chan- 
 cellor had indeed involuntarily expressed the true 
 remedy for the situation. 
 
 However devoted he might be to his old Frankfort 
 
 * This was, however, but a passing weakness on the part of Prince 
 Gortchakof, a suggestion carrying no weight, and whose only authentic 
 source can be traced to an obscure sentence in a despatch of the French 
 ambassador at Berlin. See Benedetti, My Mission in Prussia, p. 226. 
 
218 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 colleague, however fascinated by his genius, Alexander 
 Mikhailovitch had still too much of the old Adam 
 about him too much of the attache of Prince Nessel- 
 rode, in the days of Lay "bach and Verona to admit, 
 at the first onset, the possibility of such a con- 
 siderable alteration in public affairs being effected 
 without the knowledge of Europe and without his 
 consent. 
 
 Why did not the Cabinet of the Tuileries take the 
 Chancellor at his word ? Why did it not at least 
 attempt .to convene an assemblage of the Powers in- 
 presence of an upheaval which threatened to overthrow 
 the balance of the States ? Why did it not see that 
 in treating separately with M. de Bismarck, it was- 
 but playing the conqueror's own game ? 
 
 In spite of his triumphs, in spite even of his 
 audacity, the Prussian minister could not but have 
 been embarrassed had he been called upon to face the 
 Areopagus of the Powers, and propose to them the 
 almost entire abolition of the treaties of 1815, the de- 
 throning of the ancient House of Guelph, and the ex- 
 clusion of the empire of the Hapsburgs from the bosom 
 of the German Confederation ; and we shall see what 
 subtleties he practised in order to save himself from 
 such a necessity, and to make France his accomplice in 
 this eclipse of Europe. 
 
 Strange fatality of the Napoleonic idea ! the 
 dreamer of Ham had passed his whole life in pro- 
 posing congresses, in calling them together at the 
 most inopportune moments, under the most inau- 
 spicious circumstances ; and yet he neglected to apply 
 
THE ECLIPSE OF EUROPE, 219 
 
 his much-esteemed and celebrated panacea on the 
 only occasion when justice and good sense demanded 
 it on the only occasion when it might have proved 
 useful or salutary ! 
 
 Fortunate, surprisingly fortunate, was the minister 
 of William L, who, according to Count d'Usedom, 
 was thus " saved from the congress " twice over 
 during the space of a few weeks in the month of 
 June, thanks to the kindness of Prince Gortchakof ; 
 in the month of July, thanks to the infatuation of 
 France ! The passing weakness of Alexander Mik- 
 hailovitch was certainly not unknown at the Tuileries ; 
 but the treaties of 1815 had been so eloquently de- 
 nounced in the Auxerre speech, so much importance 
 Paris had been illuminated had been attached to 
 the cession of Venice. The reigning sovereign there 
 still clung to his "prestige" still to his character 
 of the " Neptune of Virgil," were it only in the eyes 
 of the uninitiated ; and still hoped to receive some 
 good reward by obliging once more " the Piedmont of 
 Germany." In consequence, M. Benedetti received 
 orders to repair to head- quarters in Moravia, to offer 
 the French mediation to M. de Bismarck, and to " sift 
 him " also as to the advantages which he, with his 
 sense of justice, could not fail to grant to so warm a 
 mediator. 
 
 Nothing can be more singular than the language 
 of the Prussian minister during these interviews in 
 Moravia with the French ambassador. M. de Bismarck 
 began by renewing his fantastic Biarritz speeches ; 
 it was a travesty of Tilsit that he seemed to be per- 
 
220 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 forming at his head- quarters at Bru'nn. The son of 
 Frederick William III., the conquered of Jena, was to 
 divide the world with the nephew of Napoleon L, and 
 divide it to the detriment of Eussia and England ! 
 " He tried to prove to me," wrote M. Benedetti 
 (July 15th), "that Austria's reverses would permit 
 France and Prussia to recast their territorial pos- 
 sessions, and at once end the difficulties which 
 were continuing to menace the peace of Europe. 
 I reminded him of the existence of certain treaties, 
 and that the war which he was desirous of hinder- 
 ing would be the very first result of such a policy. 
 M. de Bismarck replied that I was mistaken ; that 
 were France and Prussia united by solemn engage- 
 ments, and resolved to alter their frontiers, they 
 would together be in a position to do so without 
 having to fear any armed resistance either from 
 England or from Russia." In other words and 
 these words are also in the report of M. Benedetti 
 the Prussian minister " wished to free himself 
 from all European control," and thought to 
 obtain this freedom by means of a separate under- 
 standing with France. As for the means by which 
 this valuable understanding was to be effected, they 
 were of the simplest description. France was to seek 
 her fortune along the banks of the Maese and the 
 Scheldt. " It will not be news to your Excellency," 
 wrote M. Benedetti to his chief, a few days after 
 Nikolsburg, " when I inform you that M. de Bis- 
 marck is of opinion that we ought to look .for com- 
 pensation in Belgium, and that he has offered to come 
 
THE ECLIPSE OF EUROPE. 221 
 
 to an understanding with us." He did not, however, 
 abandon all idea of giving France something on the 
 Ehine not in Prussian territory, which it would 
 be impossible to make King William give up ; but 
 " something might be found in the Palatine," that 
 is to say, in Bavaria. He was still " far more Prus- 
 sian than German/' and it was possible to come to 
 terms with Walhalla. The French Government fell 
 completely into the trap laid for it, and afforded 
 Prussia, from the first, the help it required " to free 
 itself from the control of Europe/' by assisting it to 
 complete the preliminaries of Nikolsburg, which were 
 signed on the 26th July, and by which the exclu- 
 sion of Austria from Germany was accomplished, and 
 which created a Northern Confederation under the 
 sceptre of the Hohenzollerns. 
 
 Once this serious assault on public right and on the 
 equilibrium of the world was consummated, and the 
 war virtually at an end, compensations were again 
 talked of. In a letter from M. Drouyn de Lhuys to 
 M. de Goltz, dated from Vichy (August 3rd), he says 
 that the Emperor, his august master, " had not wished 
 to complicate the difficulties of a work of European 
 interest, by treating prematurely with Prussia on the 
 subject of territory;" but now the time seemed to 
 have come at which to touch upon these questions, 
 and all the more as Prussia was preparing to annex 
 considerable territories on the north of the Main. 
 "The king," had already written M. de Bismarck 
 to M. de Goltz (July 10th), "the king attaches less 
 importance to the constitution of a political confede- 
 
222 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 ration in the north, than he does to the annexation 
 of territory; he would prefer to abdicate sooner than 
 return without some important territorial acqui- 
 sition."* 
 
 In addition to the possession of the duchies of 
 the Elbe, already claimed at Nikolsburg, Prussia now 
 wished to absorb the free towns, also Cassel, Hanover, 
 and even Saxony ; and in the Tuileries it was thought 
 possible to measure French exigencies according to 
 the number of human souls and square miles William 
 the Conqueror would demand for himself. 
 
 " The great war for German nationality," so much 
 recommended by the popular Caesar at Biarritz, was 
 thus turning into a " market of human animals," 
 the reproach bitterly addressed to the Congress of 
 Vienna, to the "accursed" treaties of 1815 ; and it is 
 undeniable that in all this France played a part that 
 was but little worthy of her. She ignored every 
 ancient and modern right, the principles of national 
 will as well as those of hereditary sovereignty; and 
 all this, moreover, in the hopes of an illegitimate and 
 petty reward which was to be derived from a great 
 and universal calamity. In the words of the English 
 humorist, it was taking advantage of an eruption of 
 Vesuvius to boil an egg ! M. de Bismarck made use 
 at this time of a cruel but not altogether unmerited 
 expression : " France's policy," said he to a former 
 minister of the German Confederation, "France's 
 policy is one of taking tips " (fait une politique de 
 pourboire). 
 
 * Despatch in cipher, intercepted by the Austrians, and published in the 
 " History of the War of 1866," by the Austrian Staff. 
 
THE ECLIPSE OF EUROPE. 223 
 
 A letter written by M. Kouher, August 6th, 1866, 
 ;and since found among the papers of the Tuileries/* 
 reveals to us the strange delusions cherished at this 
 time by the French Government delusions which the 
 Prussian ambassador in Paris encouraged to the best 
 of his ability. " M. de Goltz considers our demands 
 to be correct in principle," wrote the minister ; "he 
 considers that the sole desire of our country ought 
 to be satisfied, and a necessary and remunerative 
 alliance formed between France and Prussia. The 
 difficulty is to decide the limit of our demands. 
 The Empress would ask for much or for nothing, in 
 order to avoid compromising our final preten- 
 sions." As for M. Eouher himself, he thought that 
 " public opinion would have something to satisfy it if 
 to-morrow we could say officially : ' ' Prussia consents to 
 our retaking the frontiers of 1814, and thus obliter- 
 ating the consequences of Waterloo." But, be it well 
 understood, the minister did not admit "that this 
 rectification was to be an acquittal in full of all future 
 demands." 
 
 " Doubtless fresh events must precede fresh de- 
 mands, but fresh events will most certainly take place. 
 Germany has only accomplished one of the many 
 oscillations she will require to make before she steadies 
 
 * " Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial Family," vol. ii., pp. 225, 228. 
 The editors affirm that this letter was addressed to M. de Moustier, which 
 must be an error, as M. de Moustier was then at Constantinople. We are 
 inclined to think that it was destined for M. Conti, who had accompanied the 
 Emperor to Vichy. Napoleon III. was at that time very ill, and in an 
 irritable state of mind, and had gone to Vichy on the 17th of July, where 
 M. Drouyn de Lhuys saw him for a moment. The Chief of the State was 
 not, however, able to prolong his visit at the watering-place, and returned 
 to Paris on the 8th of August. 
 
224 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 herself on her new basis. Let us be more ready in 
 future to profit by passing events, they will not be 
 wanting." 
 
 "The States south of the Main will, no doubt, 
 become during the next few years an apple of discord 
 or a subject of barter. M. de Goltz even now does 
 not disguise his feelings of covetousness for this group 
 of confederates." Thus, at the very time when the 
 French Government was priding itself on "saving" 
 the Southern States ; on establishing, on the opposite 
 banks of the Ehine, a new political combination - 
 a combination to which the Minister afterwards gave 
 the famous name of " les trois trongons" and declared 
 most reassuring to France, it was already contem- 
 plating the desertion of this combination, or the sale 
 of it for "a reasonable price ! " 
 
 But what folly it was to think, after Sadowa 
 and Nikolsburg, after the downfall of Austria, after 
 all European intervention had been set at naught, 
 and the military weakness of France exposed on every 
 side/'" that Prussia would ,fee accessible to arrange- 
 ments which she had declined to agree to before -her 
 immense victories ; in her time of perplexity, when 
 she was in the very throes of a crisis which the whole 
 world recognised as perilous in the extreme ! As 
 early even as the 8th of June, on the eve of the 
 war, M. Benedetti described, in the following manner, 
 
 * " There has been too much said lately about the unreadiness of France." 
 Confidential note of M. Magne, July 20th (Papers and Correspondence of 
 the Imperial Family, vol. i., p. 241). M. de Goltz had penetrated this secret 
 at an early hour, and continually advised M. de Bismarck to maintain a 
 firm attitude with regard to France. 
 
THE ECLIPSE OF EUROPE. 225 
 
 the state of public opinion in Prussia with regard to 
 France : " The apprehensions with which France fills 
 Prussia are still as great as ever, and would be aroused, 
 in a violent and unanimous manner, at the slightest 
 indication on our part of a wish to extend our pos- 
 sessions towards the east. By no Prussian, from the 
 king to the humblest of his subjects, would the bare 
 supposition of any sacrifice on the Ehine be endured 
 at this moment. The Crown Prince, though con- 
 vinced of the political dangers by which he is sur- 
 rounded, declared not long ago, with great energy, 
 to one of my colleagues, that he would prefer war 
 to the cession even of the small county of Glatz.""* 
 
 And it is this same diplomatist who showed such 
 a complete appreciation of the situation before the 
 Bohemian campaign it is this same ambassador who 
 afterwards took upon himself to present to M. de 
 Bismarck the demands of the Cabinet of the Tuileries, 
 going actually so far as to submit to him, on the 
 5th of August, an outline of a secret treaty, aban- 
 doning to France the whole of the left bank of the 
 Ehine, without even excepting the great stronghold of 
 Mayence ! 
 
 " In contemplating the important acquisitions which 
 
 * " My Mission in Prussia," pp. 171, 172. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who had 
 already obtained the cession of Venice from Austria, whatever might be the 
 result of the dispute, insisted, at this time, on sureties being in a like 
 manner taken from Prussia, "the cleverest and most dangerous of the two 
 contending parties." M. Benedetti did not cease to oppose such a step, in 
 the fear that, if it were suggested, Prussia would entirely abandon her 
 designs against Austria ; and the despatch of July 8th was only a fresh 
 appeal in favour of the unconditional freedom (laisser-aller) to be accorded 
 to M. de Bismarck. 
 
226 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 the peace would ensure to Prussia, I was of opinion 
 that some fresh territorial arrangement was necessary 
 to our security. I provoked nothing, neither did I 
 guarantee success ; I only allowed myself to hope for 
 it so long as our tone remained resolute and our 
 attitude firm." 
 
 Was there too great a show of resolution, or was 
 there a want of firmness ? In M. de Bismarck's 
 retort there certainly did not seem, however, to be 
 any want of firmness. " Very good," was his reply 
 to the pressing entreaties of the ambassador, " then 
 we shall have war ! But do not fail to remind his 
 Majesty the Emperor that, under certain circum- 
 stances, such a war might be waged with revolutions, 
 and that, in the presence of revolutionary dangers, 
 German dynasties would prove to be built on more 
 solid foundations than that of Napoleon." 
 
 This was not, however, to be the Prussian 
 minister's last word. Although fully decided not 
 to admit any discussion on the subject of the 
 Ehine provinces, he still did not wish completely 
 to discourage the French ambassador, and con- 
 tinued a game with him that he designated later 
 on in his circular of July 29th, 1870, by the epi- 
 thet, hitherto unknown to diplomatists, of "dila- 
 tory negotiations." He spoke of his affection for 
 Napoleon III., of the ambition he still cherished of 
 resolving in concert with him the many important 
 problems of the future. 
 
 * Benedetti, " My Mission in Prussia," pp. 177, 178; Prussian Moniteur 
 (ReicTcsanzeiger), October 21st, 1871. 
 
THE EGLIPSE OF EUROPE. 227 
 
 " Prussia requires the alliance of a great Power : " 
 this was his supreme conviction, which he unceasingly 
 instilled into the mind of his august master; and 
 what alliance more desirable, from the standpoint 
 of progress and civilisation, than that of the French 
 empire ? 
 
 Returning thus to his former confidences of Nikols- 
 burgandof Bninn, he insinuated "that other arrange- 
 ments might be made that would satisfy the respective 
 interests of the two countries,""'' 5 " and strengthened 
 M. Benedetti in his resolution of returning to Paris 
 to explain the situation. 
 
 In Paris, the battle of influences had begun with 
 renewed vigour between the Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs and the Prussian ambassador, M. de Goltz, 
 who was powerfully seconded by the parti de 
 faction, and to whom the arrival (August llth) of 
 M. Benedetti proved of great service. M. Drouyn 
 de Lhuys did not show the slightest surprise at the 
 " Prussian ingratitude," as M. Benedetti had termed 
 it in one of his last despatches," t but by a logic 
 which we fail to understand, he was all the more satis- 
 fied to see the French demands take a definite shape. 
 
 " They could be withdrawn at a suitable time;" 
 
 * " My Mission in Prussia," p. 181. This assertion of M. Benedetti is 
 fully confirmed by a note found among the papers in the Tuileries, of which 
 mention will be made later on. 
 
 t " Prussia would be ignoring the rights of justice and would be display, 
 ing at the same time a depth of ingratitude were she to deny us the guaran- 
 tees which her extension of territory obliges us to demand." Despatch 
 from M. Benedetti, August 5th y 1866, found in the chateau of Cercay, among 
 the papers of M. Rouher, and published in the Prussian " Moniteur " of the 21st 
 October, 1871. About the same time the ingratitude of Italy also became 
 the topic of the day. " The unjustifiable ingratitude of Italy irritates even 
 
 Q 2 
 
228 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 little suspecting to what uses the project of the treaty 
 of August 5th would soon be put to on the banks of 
 the Spree ! He hoped, moreover, that the repulse 
 which French views had received at Berlin would 
 offer food for reflection to those ardent promoters of 
 dangerous connections, and prevent certain engage- 
 ments for the future, which he especially dreaded ; 
 but here also his judgment was at fault. M. de Goltz 
 suddenly informed him that he had come to an agree- 
 ment with the Emperor as to the annexations to be 
 made by William I. in the north of Germany, and a 
 letter of the 12th of August, addressed to the Marquis 
 de Lavalette by the head of the State cut short all 
 controversy with Prussia. " I gather from my con- 
 versation with Benedetti," wrote Napoleon III. to the 
 Minister of the Interior, "that we should excite all 
 Germany against us, and should derive but a very 
 small benefit. It is of importance that public opinion 
 should not err on this subject." The misfortune was, 
 however, that the Imperial Government allowed its 
 opinion to be at fault on a far more difficult point, 
 and that it allowed Belgium henceforth to become the 
 object of a negotiation as deceptive as it was fatal, 
 from the overpowering responsibility of which it 
 
 the calmest mind," wrote M. Magne in his confidential note to the Emperor, 
 July 20th. The Cabinet of Florence was indeed causing endless trouble to 
 France by its susceptibilities and exigencies, which were, to say the 
 least, very misplaced. After having been defeated by land and by sea, at 
 Custozza and Lissa, and after having received as a recompense the mag- 
 nificent gift of Venetia, the Italians still extended their demands to the 
 Tyrol. For a moment the Emperor was tempted to resign the fatal gift 
 which he had received, and to release Austria by an official act from her 
 pledged word. See the curious note of M. Eouher for the Emperor : Papers 
 and Correspondence of the Imperial Family, vol. ii., pp. 229, 230. 
 
THE ECLIPSE OF EUROPE. 229 
 
 vainly essayed to escape on the outbreak of the war 
 of 1870. 
 
 That M. de Bismarck was from the very first 
 the originator of the gloomy conspiracies against the 
 land of the Maese and the Scheldt, that he was also 
 the tempter of the French Government a tempter 
 oftentimes repulsed cannot now be doubted, as au- 
 thenticated documents have since been published of a 
 nature to convince the most incredulous minds. It 
 was not only in his conversations with General 
 Govone that the Prussian Prime Minister clearly 
 indicated Belgium and certain portions of Switzerland 
 as being the most suitable territories " for the indem- 
 nification of France." Even prior to the spring of 
 1866, even before the interview of Biarritz, M. de 
 Bismarck had essayed to sell the bear's skin (vendre 
 lapeau de lours), as Napoleon III. said to him on one 
 occasion. General Marmora, whose knowledge was 
 tolerably acute, adds, " that the bear lived neither in 
 the Alps nor in the Carpathians ; it was perfectly well 
 in health (stava benone), and had no intention either 
 of dying or of being locked up in a cage.""* 
 
 Such suggestions were not of a kind to inspire much 
 aversion in the hearts of the parti de faction in the 
 councils of the Empire ; they were even well received ; 
 but M. Drouyn de Lhuys rejected them scornfully. 
 Stigmatised as " projects of robbery" by the chief of 
 the State, they had to await the hour of patriotic 
 
 * La Marmora, " Tin pd piu di luce," p. 117 ; Keport of General Govone, 
 June 3rd, 1866, Ibid., p. 375. 
 
230 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 anguish, which M. Benedetti's arrival announced, to 
 be taken into serious consideration. 
 
 Certainly the French ambassador at the Court of 
 Berlin occupied during 1866 a very onerous and 
 painful, we might almost say pathetic, position. He 
 had devoted himself to bring about that connubio of 
 Italy with Prussia, which seemed in his eyes to be of 
 such value to the Imperial policy, to be such a signal 
 victory over the ancient order of things, such a benefit 
 to the idees Napoleoniennes, and to the "new right." 
 In the well-grounded fear of seeing his work collapse 
 and Prussia draw back, if there were any mention made 
 of future compensation or of preventive engage- 
 ments, he was unceasing in his endeavours to dissuade 
 his government from any attempt of the kind, and 
 depicted the fierce, intractable, and gloomy patriotism 
 of the House of Hohenzollern so strongly that he 
 was sometimes suspected at the hotel on the Quai 
 d'Orsay of using rather strong colours, and of paint- 
 ing a certain devil rather blacker and more German 
 than he was in reality. 
 
 The work had succeeded succeeded beyond all 
 expectation succeeded in a manner which convinced 
 M. Benedetti " that a territorial reformation was neces- 
 sary for the security of France." This reformation he 
 had for a moment fancied he might have obtained on 
 the Khine ; "he did not guarantee its success, but 
 allowed himself to hope for it." 
 
 Firmly, even, haughtily rejected on this point, and 
 " having sounded the depths of Prussian ingratitude," 
 he yet started again with renewed hope as soon as the 
 
THE ECLIPSE OF EUROPE. 231 
 
 minister of William I. had insinuated to him " that 
 other arrangements might be come to that would suit 
 the respective interests of the two countries," and he 
 'clung to the expedient thus held up to his dazzled 
 gaze with a feverish energy that was all the greater, 
 as he thought he foresaw a fresh triumph of the " new 
 right," and of the principles dear to his party. 
 Anxious to repair the consequences of a policy, 
 whose consummation he, more than any other, had 
 assisted in bringing about, conscious of the imprac- 
 ticability of hoping that the Berlin Court would give 
 up the smallest portion of German soil, and still con- 
 vinced of the sincere desire of M. de Bismarck " to 
 indemnify France/'"" he constituted himself the inter- 
 preter to the Emperor Napoleon III., in this decisive 
 hour, of the ideas which he had collected at the Brunn 
 head-quarters, and warmly advocated that " necessary 
 and remunerative alliance " with Prussia, which had 
 for so long been extolled by the Palais-Koyal, and 
 which recently had even found favour in the pon- 
 derous mind of M. Kouher. 
 
 There was of course no intention of undertaking 
 any immediate steps, the military state of the country, 
 if nothing else, forbade it ; it was only a question of 
 unity of purpose, of a bond to be established to meet 
 future eventualities to meet the moment, for instance, 
 more or less in the distance, but none the less inevitable, 
 
 * " The numerous efforts which he (M. de Bismarck) has unceasingly made 
 to cement an agreement with us, are sufficient proofs that in his opinion, 
 it is most essential to indemnify France." My Mission in Prussia, p. 192. 
 These were the opinions of the ex-ambassador of France even in 1871. 
 
232 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 when Prussia would seek to crown her work, would 
 cross the Main, and extend her territories from the 
 Baltic to the Alps ; it was with this movement in view 
 that they must now boldly take up their stand on 
 the basis of nationality ! " If France boldly takes up 
 its position on the basis of nationality," says a curious 
 note found among the papers of the Tuileries, and 
 which undoubtedly reflects the ideas of the parti de 
 faction at that period/" " it is important at once to 
 establish that there is no such thing as a Belgian 
 nationality, and to settle this essential point with 
 Prussia." 
 
 "As the Cabinet of Berlin seems disposed to enter 
 into the arrangements France finds it convenient to 
 make with it, it will be necessary to negotiate a 
 secret treaty which will be binding on both parties. 
 Without supposing that this treaty can be a sure 
 guarantee, it will serve a twofold object in com- 
 promising Prussia, and in being a pledge of the 
 Emperor's political sincerity and of his intentions. . . . 
 In order to inspire the Berlin Cabinet with the con- 
 fidence which is always necessary to the maintenance 
 of friendly relations, we must endeavour to dissipate 
 the apprehensions which it has always entertained, 
 and which our recent communications have served to 
 reawaken and excite. This result cannot be obtained 
 by words, it will require acts ; and the act of 
 regulating the future destiny of Belgium in concert 
 
 * " Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial Family," vol. i., pp. 16, 17. 
 The editors fancied they recognised the handwriting of M. Conti, chief of 
 the Emperor's cabinet, but was it not more likely to be in that of 
 M. Benedetti ? 
 
THE ECLIPSE OF EUROPE. 233 
 
 with Prussia, in proving to Berlin that the Emperor is 
 in truth seeking elsewhere than on the Ehine for the 
 extension of France, which has become necessary since 
 the events of which Germany has just been the 
 theatre, will also afford us a relative certitude that the 
 Prussian Government will not oppose our extensions 
 in the north." 
 
 It was, therefore, charged with the mission to 
 negotiate a secret treaty, which was to bind both 
 parties in the sense indicated by the foregoing note, 
 that M. Benedetti left Paris towards the middle of the 
 month of August, 1866. The treaty was to recognise an 
 offensive and defensive alliance between the two States, 
 and in exchange for the Emperor's recognition of 
 deeds already done or about to be done in Germany, 
 was to contain a promise of Prussian diplomatic con- 
 currence in the acquisition of Luxemburg, and its 
 armed concurrence whenever France thought fit to 
 annex Belgium. 
 
 As soon as he returned to his post, the French 
 ambassador set himself resolutely to work, and con- 
 ducted the negotiations unknown to his immediate 
 chief/"" referring only to the Emperor and to M. Eouher. 
 
 * "At the time of my departure from Paris, towards the middle of the month 
 of August," says M. Benedetti in his book, "My Mission in Prussia," "M. Drouyn 
 de Lhuys had tendered his resignation, and I had sufficient reasons for sup- 
 posing that his place would be filled by M. de Moustier, then ambassador at Con- 
 stantinople. There was therefore, at that time, no Minister for Foreign Affairs ; 
 and, under existing circumstances, I considered it more fitting to address the 
 letter to M. Eouher, in which I gave an account of my interview with M. de 
 Bismarck, and in which was enclosed the project of a treaty relating to 
 Belgium. . . ." M. Drouyn de Lhuys did not send in his resignation in the 
 saonth of August; rightly or wrongly he believed at this time " that he was 
 acting in an honest and disinterested manner in remaining," and his portfolio 
 
234 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 He begged the Prussian minister to consider the pro- 
 positions of the 5th of August those relating to the 
 left bank of the Ehine as meaningless, as a freak 
 on the part of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, during the 
 illness of his august master, and submitted a new 
 treaty, in five articles, concerning Belgium. It 
 matters but little whether the French ambas- 
 sador brought the project with him, or whether 
 he wrote it out in the study of the Prussian 
 minister ; perhaps " to his dictation " and at his 
 demand. This we know, that M. Benedetti was 
 acting in- accordance with instructions received in 
 
 was only taken from him on the 1st September, 1866. Up to that time 
 M. Drouyn de Lhuys did not cease to direct his department ; the ambassador 
 himself quotes in his book several despatches which passed between them on 
 serious topics, dated the 21st and 25th August (pp. 204, 223), and M. 
 Benedetti must hold very singular views on hierarchical duties if he can 
 think it fitting to escape from the control of his actual chief on account 
 of his coming retirement. The continuation of the passage quoted from 
 M. Benedetti's work is no less peculiar : " M. Kouher never deposited the 
 letters, which I wrote to him at the Foreign Office, as he never assumed the 
 direction of affairs there. If I were to give them here I could not refer my 
 reader to the archives, so that he might verify their correctness, as I feel 
 bound to do with all the documents I quote." What can this matter ? 
 Once having made up his mind to disclose his doings, M. Benedetti might as 
 well have produced his correspondence with M. Eouher on such a debatable 
 question, and at the same time have conscientiously warned his readers that 
 the originals were not to be found in the archives. (We know that these 
 originals were seized by the Prussians, with a large number of other im- 
 portant documents, in the chateau of M. Eouher at Cergay.) As we are 
 attempting to throw "a little more light" on all these unnatural obscurities 
 we may also remark that it is wrongly stated (but with what design is clearly 
 to be seen) by M. de Bismarck, in his celebrated circular of July 29th, 1870 
 (at the outbreak of the war) that the secret treaty on Belgium was negotiated 
 at a later date that of the year 1867 immediately after the settlement of the 
 Luxemburg question. This allegation cannot hold good after the slighest 
 examination, or after a simple comparison of the different papers which have 
 been given up to the public. The mysterious negotiation on the subject of 
 Belgium took place in the latter part of the month of August, 1866, as 
 declared by M. Benedetti. 
 
THE ECLIPSE OF EUROPE. 235 
 
 Paris/"" and that M. de Bismarck, on his side, did not in 
 the least decline his overtures ; he even made several 
 observations on certain terms employed in the wording 
 of the treaty, and insisted on several alterations being 
 introduced into the text. The project, thus amended, 
 was sent to Paris and returned to Berlin with the 
 rectifications made by the Emperor and M. Eouher. 
 On the banks of the Seine, in the meetings of the few 
 who were in the secret, the most joyful expectations 
 were felt ; the question of the probable successor of M. 
 Drouyn de Lhuys was discussed, and opinions were 
 divided between M. de Lavalette and M. Benedetti ; 
 ideas were exchanged which were soon to be embodied 
 in a document of sorrowful celebrity, and great were 
 the rejoicings to see "the treaties of 1815 torn up, the 
 coalition of the three Northern Powers broken, and 
 Prussia rendered sufficiently independent and suf- 
 ficiently compact to be able to break away from her 
 traditions." t 
 
 Suddenly a piteous despatch from the French 
 ambassador at the Court of Berlin (August 29th) filled 
 all hearts with dismay, and fresh apprehensions arose 
 on the subject of that "necessary and remunerative 
 alliance " which it had been hoped to establish. 
 
 The conferences had been continued until the 
 close of August, and M. de Bismarck had lent him- 
 
 * The Prussian Moniteur of October 21st, 1871, gives some extracts 
 (gleaned from the papers seized at Ce^ay) from the instructions cent from 
 Paris (August 16th) to M. Benedetti concerning the secret treaty. A passage 
 of these instructions contains the "names of the persons to whom this 
 negotiation was to be alone confided." 
 
 f Expressions used in the circular of M. de Lavalette, September 16th, 
 1866. 
 
236 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 self most graciously to these " dilatory negotiations." 
 Meanwhile, the Peace of Prague the conclusive 
 peace with Austria had been signed (August 26th) ; 
 the Southern States had unanimously adhered to the 
 stipulations of Nikolsburg, and had solemnly recog- 
 nised the Confederation of the North, as well as the 
 territorial acquisitions of Prussia. The secret treaty 
 concerning Belgium was in the hands of the minister 
 of William I., and only required to be copied and 
 signed ; but at this moment M. Benedetti was sud- 
 denly met with the strangest, the most inconceivable 
 suspicions, which did not fail to wound him deeply. 
 M. de Bismarck began to hesitate, to express his fears 
 " whether the Emperor Napoleon would not make 
 use of such a negotiation in order to create ill-feeling 
 between Prussia and England." The stupefaction of 
 the French ambassador was extreme. " What confi- 
 dence can we, on our side, give to men capable of 
 such suspicions ? " he asks in his despatch of 
 August 29th.* 
 
 This new behaviour seemed most unjustifiable to 
 him, and in order to avoid being tempted to express 
 an opinion respecting it, he thought fit "to go to 
 Carlsbad for a fortnight, where he held himself in 
 readiness to return to Berlin on receipt of the first 
 telegram sent him by M. de Bismarck." 
 
 Though slightly disturbed by this incident, the 
 Court of the Tuileries still remained unshaken in 
 its belief in the secret treaty which was being 
 
 * These details, as well as the following, are taken from papers seized 
 at Cer^ay, and published in the Prussian Honiteur, October 21st, 1871. 
 
THE ECLIPSE OF EUROPE. 237 
 
 prepared at Berlin. M. Drouyn cle Lhuys received 
 his dismissal, and long before the arrival from Con- 
 stantinople of his successor, M. de Moustier, haste was 
 made to publish the famous circular of September 
 16th, which bore the signature of the minister 
 pro tern., M. de Lavalette, and which was but another 
 pledge in the hands of the victor of Sadowa. 
 
 The manifesto lauded the theory of agglomeration, 
 and affirmed that "Prussia, enlarged, and freed hence- 
 forth from all bonds, secured the independence of 
 Germany." As to the hopes which were secretly 
 cherished, they were only alluded to in the following 
 expressions: "France can but desire the accomplish- 
 ment of territorial enlargements which would not 
 affect her own powerful cohesion "... Nothing 
 ensued, however, and M. Benedetti waited in vain, 
 under the shade of the elms and the pine trees of 
 Carlsbad. M. de Bismarck gave no sign of life. He 
 left Berlin for his estates, and did not return until 
 the month of December. 
 
 The "dilatory negotiations" had borne all their fruit 
 by the month of August, and the French Government 
 might have congratulated themselves had these under- 
 hand negotiations been nothing worse for them than a 
 deception. They were to recoil upon them as a chas- 
 tisement. And yet M. Benedetti had declared that he 
 knew his man had followed his course for fifteen 
 years. He had most certainly followed him during 
 the spring negotiations, which ended in the treaty 
 between Prussia and Italy : he had then been able to 
 observe the interesting tournament between the viper 
 
238 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 and the charlatan, and had happily characterised a 
 situation in which the plenipotentiaries of the two 
 countries had surpassed each other in miracles of 
 true Punic faith. "M. de Bismarck and General 
 Govone have all along distrusted, and continue to 
 distrust, each other," had written M. Benedetti in his 
 despatch of March 27th, 1866. "It is feared in 
 Florence that Prussia, having in her possession an 
 act which to a certain extent places Italy at her 
 mercy, may divulge its contents in Vienna, and by 
 intimidating the Austrian Cabinet, force it to give up 
 pacifically the concessions which she covets. In 
 Berlin it is feared that, if negotiations are continued 
 on these foundations, Italy will disclose all to Austria 
 before concluding anything, and will essay by these 
 means to obtain the cession of Venice/' 
 
 After such experience in anima vili, how could 
 M. Benedetti leave on the Prussian Premier's table 
 his autograph on the compromising Belgian question, 
 an autograph which to a certain extent put France at 
 the mercy of Prussia ? How could he be surprised 
 that his interlocutor "should be assailed by certain 
 suspicions," when he himself was imbued with similar 
 feelings ? It was but very natural to credit M. de 
 Bismarck with the desire to do to others that which 
 he would not allow others to do to him. The French 
 ambassador would not have been far out had he 
 credited M. de Bismarck with this charitable, though 
 scarcely scriptural desire; for the most amusing, or 
 rather the saddest part of this affair the humour of 
 the whole embroglio, as Shakespeare's Bardolph has 
 
THE ECLIPSE OF EUROPE. 239 
 
 it is that the knight of the Mark had already 
 executed the manoeuvre (scarcely a knightly one, 
 indeed) of which he pretended to suspect the Emperor 
 Napoleon III. ; and that the trick was already done 
 by this cunning conjurer at the very time he was 
 pretending to be anxiously watching the hands and 
 the pockets of the rival wizard. Two secret and 
 highly dangerous documents had been confided to his 
 care the two projects of treaty on the Khine and 
 Belgium;* and he did not delay to. disclose them to 
 the parties who were most interested in them, and 
 whom he was particularly desirous of attaching to 
 himself. 
 
 The preliminaries of Nikolsburg, as may be re- 
 membered, had stipulated that the Southern States 
 should not be included in the new confederation 
 governed by Prussia, and that they were to form a 
 restricted union among themselves. This was the great 
 triumph obtained by French mediation, this advan- 
 tageous combination of " les trois trongons " which, 
 it was alleged, was to be far more favourable to 
 France than that of the Bund, that unlucky cre- 
 ation of 1815. It is true that very soon the 
 persons to whom the secret of Benedetti's mission 
 had been confided, considered this " group of con- 
 
 * The two projects of treaties have since been published by the Prussian 
 journals of July 29th and of August 8th, 1870. The Prussian Government 
 is at present in possession of two French autographs on the subject of the 
 Belgian project : the one, left by M. Benedetti at M. de Bismarck's in the 
 month of August, 1866 ; the other, also in the writing of M. Benedetti, 
 with marginal notes by Napoleon III. and M. Eouher. This last document 
 was seized at Cercay. For their description, and for other details, see the 
 Prussian Moniteur of October 21st, 1871, and the article in the Gazette of 
 Northern Germany on the subject of the "La Marmora" incident. 
 
240 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 federate states " as a mere object of barter, to be 
 turned to the best possible account ; meanwhile, 
 however, the south was still being " saved," and M. 
 Drouyn de Lhuys exerted himself honestly during the 
 month of August, 1866, in assisting the unhappy 
 plenipotentiaries of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Hesse, &c., 
 who were seeking to conclude peace at Berlin. 
 
 M. de Bismarck had scared them at first by his 
 fiscal and territorial demands ; they had invoked and 
 obtained the help of the Emperor of the French ; and 
 the Court of the Tuileries flattered itself that it had 
 brought the minister of William I. to a more reason- 
 able frame of mind. As late as August the 24th, 
 M. Drouyn de Lhuys wrote to his agent in Bavaria : " I 
 am glad to think that our last proceeding has not been 
 without some influence on the results of a negotiation 
 which is ending in a more satisfactory manner than 
 the Cabinet of Munich at first was able to hope;" 
 and even M. Benedetti assumed in this matter the 
 charming role of a moderator.* 
 
 The truth of the matter is that, if M. de Bismarck 
 ended by moderating his views, and even became 
 very friendly towards the Southern States, he was 
 influenced by a totally different motive to the desire 
 of being agreeable to the Cabinet of the Tuileries. He 
 simply laid before the assembled confederates the pro- 
 jected treaty of the 5th August, and proved to them 
 that the French Government, while pretending to 
 protect them, was seeking an understanding with 
 
 * Private letter from M. Benedetti to the Duke de Gramont, August 22nd, 
 1866. My Mission in Prussia, p. 193. 
 
THE ECLIPSE OF EUROPE. 241 
 
 Prussia at their expense, and was demanding portions 
 of Hesse and the Palatine. Instead of demanding 
 from them those sacrifices which they dreaded, the 
 minister of William I. offered to protect them from 
 their " hereditary foe." There could be no hesitation ; 
 the Southern States gave way, and Prussia concluded 
 with them (August 17th and 23rd) secret offensive and 
 defensive treaties. 
 
 The contractors mutually agreed to protect the 
 integrity of their respective territories, and, moreover, 
 the Southern States agreed, in case of war, to put all 
 their military forces at the disposal of the King of 
 Prussia/"" 
 
 "The object of barter," on which M. Eouher had 
 counted, was now no longer available ; the boundary of 
 the Main had been overstepped before it had even been 
 traced out on the official map of Europe, and from the 
 month of August, 1866, M. de Bismarck was able to 
 rely upon the armed co-operation of the whole of 
 Germany. 
 
 The military conventions with the Southern States 
 were rigorously kept secret for a considerable time ; 
 it was only in the following spring that M. de 
 Bismarck thought fit to publish them to the world, 
 in his sarcastic reply to a speech of M. Rouher on 
 " les trois trongons." Up till then M. Benedetti, 
 like the rest, had remained in total ignorance of 
 their existence, though he had displayed more pene- 
 tration with respect to another very important event, 
 
 * Albert Sorel, "Diplomatic History of the Franco. German War," 
 pp. 29, 30. 
 
242 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 which was contemporary with the conventions in 
 the South, and had recognised from the very first the 
 ominous importance of General Manteuffel's mission to 
 St. Petersburg, in the month of August, 1866. It 
 must not be overlooked that at the bottom of the 
 "new policy," which the Tuileries hoped to inau- 
 gurate during this month by an entente cordiale 
 with the Court of Berlin, lay a Russian problem. 
 Would the House of Brandenburg, " now being suf- 
 ficiently compact to break loose from former traditions, 
 and freed henceforth from all bonds," decide to 
 shake off the traditional ties which bound her to 
 Russia, and which had never, as yet, been loosened ? 
 Here was the true and vital question of the future. 
 " Prussia must be allied to a great power," was the 
 eternal dictum, at this time, of William I.'s minister; 
 and, as Austria was crushed and England for years 
 past had condemned herself to single blessedness, 
 there remained but France and Russia, between whom 
 the fortunate hero of Sadowa stood like Mozart's Don 
 Juan, hesitating between Donna Anna and Donna 
 Elvira. Surprised in the dark, taken advantage of 
 in a moment of deplorable misunderstanding, the 
 proud and passionate Donna Anna assumed airs of 
 scornful courage, and uttered vows of venganza ; 
 but oftener, alas ! cast looks yet full of ardour, looks 
 which betrayed her secret flame, which told, only 
 too well, that she was ready to forgive, so long as 
 some reparation were made, so long as a marriage, 
 even a clandestine one, might be hoped /or. 
 
 Russia was the Donna Elvira the first, the rightful 
 
THE ECLIPSE OF EUROPE. 243 
 
 love, somewhat put out by recent neglect, injured 
 even in her family dignity, but still loving, still fas- 
 cinated, and awaiting but a kind word to throw 
 herself into the arms of the truant. We can scarcely 
 tarry to allude to Zeiiina, to Italy, that lively and 
 obliging waiting-maid, also in love, poor thing, with 
 the irresistible Don Juan, and though often very 
 cavalierly treated, yet happy and contented by a 
 passing caress and the " protection " of such a grand 
 personage. 
 
 This being the situation during this decisive 
 month, the French ambassador felt a violent shock on 
 hearing of the sudden departure for St. Petersburg 
 of M. de Manteuffel, the diplomatist-general, less 
 general than diplomatist, the prime confidant of the 
 king, and at all times the man selected for secret 
 missions. 
 
 " I asked M. de Bismarck, immediately," wrote 
 M. Benedetti to Paris, " what conclusions I was to 
 draw from this mission, so suddenly confided to a 
 general whose troops were still in campaign. M. de 
 Bismarck, after pretending that he thought he had 
 already made me acquainted with the project, assured 
 me that he had informed M. de Groltz of the occurrence, 
 in order that he might report it to the .French Cabinet." 
 
 After all it was, perhaps, only natural that the king 
 should desire to lay before his imperial nephew the 
 extenuating circumstances of a painful situation, in 
 which he had been forced to lay violent hands on the 
 crowns and goods of many relatives of the House of 
 Homanof ; but the French ambassador was especially 
 
 B 2 
 
244 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 struck by the fact that the journey of M. de Man- 
 teuffel had been decided upon on the very day follow- 
 ing that on which he had submitted his treaty. " I 
 asked the President of the Council," he continued in 
 the same despatch, " if this general officer had been 
 informed of our negotiation, and he replied that he 
 could not assure me that the king had not made 
 him acquainted with its substance. I must add, as I 
 have already told you in my telegram, that I gave M. 
 de Bismarck a copy of our project on Sunday morning, 
 and that General Man teuffel, who had but just esta- 
 blished his head-quarters at Frankfort, was summoned 
 on the following night to Berlin." 
 
 Towards the end of August, when M. de Bismarck 
 was giving the first tokens of his disinclination to sign 
 the secret treaty concerning Belgium, M. Benedetti 
 again mentioned, in a letter to M. Kouher, the confi- 
 dential mission to St. Petersburg which M. de Man- 
 teuffelwas continuing to fulfil : " Prussia has obtained 
 assurances elsewhere, which will dispense her from 
 coming to an arrangement with us/' he wrote ; "if 
 she declines our alliance it is because she has already 
 formed, or is on the eve of forming, another." 
 
 General Man-teuffel remained for several weeks in 
 St. Petersburg ; remained there long enough to dissi- 
 pate a certain melancholy caused by the recent misfor- 
 tunes of the Houses of Hanover, Cassel, Nassau, &c., 
 allied by ties of blood to the imperial family of 
 Russia ; long enough to communicate the secret of 
 
 * Papera seized at Ce^ay. Prussian " Moniteur" of October 21*, 1871. 
 
THE ECLIPSE OF EUROPE. 245 
 
 the autograph projects by which it had been per- 
 fidiously attempted to turn the Hohenzollern from his 
 loyal and unshaken affection for his northern relative. 
 Thanks to all these proceedings and attentions, the 
 harmony existing between the two courts became 
 greater than ever ; the past was easily explained away, 
 the future was arranged, and the French ambassador at 
 the Court of Berlin was not mistaken in his suppo- 
 sition as to the " bear," whose skin the diplomatist- 
 general was disposing of on the banks of the Neva. 
 To use the language of the Marquis La Marmora, it 
 was a bear of the Balkan, who had not felt well for 
 some time past, and whom the Emperor Nicholas had 
 declared to be very sick twenty years before. 
 
 It will be seen presently that Alexander Mikhailo- 
 vitch did not fail to take his aim at the poor animal 
 during the universal battue which took place in 1870, 
 and that he barely succeeded in securing a tuft of 
 hair with which to decorate his cap. But this does 
 not detract from the perspicacity displayed by the 
 unfortunate negotiator of the secret Belgian treaty on 
 this occasion. M. Benedetti soon perceived the over- 
 whelming truth, which M. Thiers was only to discover 
 at the bottom of the Russian portfolio that M. de Bis- 
 marck abandoned to his gaze on that eventful evening 
 at Versailles, with a freedom that was not altogether 
 free from malice. In striving, after the frightful 
 disaster of the Bohemian campaign, to obtain com- 
 pensations from Prussia now on the Rhine, now on 
 the Maese the Emperor Napoleon III. had only 
 facilitated during these months of July and August, 
 
246 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 1866, the two great political combinations which 
 were later on, in 1870, of such prodigious utility to 
 M. de Bismarck namely, the armed co-operation of 
 the Southern States, and the moral assistance of 
 Bussia in the event of a war with France. The chief 
 fault, however, of the Napoleonic policy after Sadowa 
 lies in having assisted Prussia in her desire to emanci- 
 pate herself from the control of Europe, and in having 
 sanctioned from the outset such an immense shock to 
 the equilibrium of the world without first laying the 
 cause before an Areopagus of the different Powers. 
 This neglect of what was due to the great Christian 
 family of nations was revenged, but too soon and 
 too cruelly, alas ! and Prince Gortchakof only followed 
 recent and fatal example in allowing France and Ger- 
 many, in 1870, to fight out their quarrel alone, and in 
 preventing any combined interference on the part of 
 the other European Powers. 
 
 " I see no Europe !" was the exclamation of M. de 
 Beust in a now celebrated despatch of 1870, and 
 there was no attempt to give the lie to his melan- 
 choly assertion. A few only sadly remarked that the 
 eclipse had now lasted for several years, and that it 
 dated from the time of the preliminaries of Nikols- 
 burg and from the Treaty of Prague. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE EAST AND THE WEST. 
 
 Profound Disappointment of M. Benedetti -The Luxemburg Affair (Spring 
 of 1867) Insurrection of Crete Important Advances made by France 
 and Austria to Eussia on the Eastern Question Kemarkable Despatch 
 from M. Beust, January 1st, 1867 : the Question of the Black Sea, a 
 Question of Amour propre French Project of Uniting Crete to the 
 Kingdom of Greece Eeception given by Prince Gortchakof to the 
 Offers of MM. Beust and de Moustier He seeks to compromise the 
 two Powers, but maintains his close Allegiance to Prussia In magnis 
 voluisse Chimerical Hopes entertained by the Slavophile Party of 
 Moscow and of St. Petersburg : the West for Germany and the East 
 for Russia Programme of M. Halkof The Congress of Moscow 
 (Spring, 1867) Plots of the Pan- Slavistic Party in the Provinces of the 
 Danube and the Balkan (1867-68) Prince Gortchakof pleads for the 
 Revolutionary Party in Roumania and Greece Ultimatum of the Porte 
 to the Hellenic Government, and Conference in Paris on the Subject of 
 the Turko-Greek Disputes (January, 1869) Subsiding of the Slavonic 
 Agitation during the year 1869 Last Will of Fuad-Pacha : His Fears 
 for the Future of the Ottoman Empire. 
 
 " AN alliance has been formed elsewhere " was the 
 melancholy conviction of the French ambassador 
 at the Court of Berlin during the closing days of the 
 month of August, on seeing Prussia break off so sud- 
 denly the "dilatory negotiations" on the subject of 
 Belgium ; and it is but just to acknowledge that from 
 that time he formed a correct opinion as to the 
 situation, and never failed to keep his government 
 
248 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 Constantly alive to the fact of the close and intimate 
 friendship which ensued between the two Courts of 
 Berlin and St. Petersburg in consequence of the mission 
 of M. de Manteuffel. If for awhile he still persisted 
 in seeking a compensation for his country (com- 
 pensation of a very modest description, it is true, and 
 suited to the altered fortunes of France) if, especially 
 during the early months of 1867, he flattered himself 
 that he might obtain permission from M. de Bis- 
 marck's benevolence to purchase Luxemburg from 
 the King of Holland if he even went so far one day, 
 on the occasion of a hurried trip to Paris, as to 
 declare in a private conversation that the fortress of 
 Alzette "was already in his pocket" he had never- 
 theless entirely abandoned all hope of ever being able 
 to return to the fair dreams of Brunn head-quarters, or 
 to realise that " necessary and remunerative alliance 
 with Prussia," which had been the decoy at one time 
 of so many sanguine temperaments on the banks of 
 the Seine. He only thought that surely the victor of 
 Sadowa would not begrudge France the paltry satis- 
 faction of the Luxemburg ; that he would even be 
 pleased to "indemnify" the Emperor Napoleon III. 
 at so low a price ; that, to quote the poet, " the 
 lion would only yawn at so trifling a morsel." The 
 lion roared, however, and shook his mane in fury, 
 and signified that an end had come to all politique 
 de pourboire ; which but confirmed the opinion 
 already formed by M. de Benedetti that an alliance 
 had been formed elsewhere, and that for the future 
 Prussia felt she had nothing to fear. He judged rightly 
 
THE EAST AND THE WEST. 249 
 
 that M. de Bismarck must be very sure of the sup- 
 port, in every emergency, of his former colleague at 
 Frankfort, to dare to refuse France even this modest 
 windfall, and to display to such an extent " the depth 
 of his ingratitude." Simultaneously with the Luxem- 
 burg affair, the events of Crete proved in their turn 
 to the Cabinets of Vienna and of the Tuileries how 
 intimately Prince Gortchakof was united with M. de 
 Bismarck, and how determined he was to sacrifice 
 even the most brilliant prospects to his friendship 
 with Prussia. 
 
 Any one perusing the curious exchange of notes 
 which the troubles in Crete gave rise to, will at once 
 perceive that, from the month of November, 1866, to 
 the month of March, 1867, the two governments, of 
 Austria and France were attempting to sound the 
 dispositions of the Court of St. Petersburg, and were 
 making most significant advances. The Candian 
 insurrection, it will be remembered, occurred in the 
 autumn of 1866, and caused fresh surprise and emotion 
 in Europe, which had scarcely yet recovered from the 
 shock of Sadowa. The proportions of the insur- 
 rection, exaggerated by newsmongers more or less 
 interested, after having excited the lively sympathies 
 of Russia, ended by seriously occupying the various 
 chancellors ; and seemed for a moment destined to 
 re-awaken the whole Eastern question. Certain 
 cabinets, however, did not seem to be dismayed at 
 this possibility. Instead of conforming to the usual 
 diplomatic usages with regard to Ottoman affairs ; 
 instead of essaying to hush up the matter, and to 
 
250 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 diminish as much as possible its proportions and in- 
 fluence, M. de Moustier thought that " means ought to 
 be found to pacify the East," and attempted to " call 
 together a sort of medical consultation in order to 
 ascertain the remedy to apply to the evil."' Still 
 more astonishing was the language held by the Vien- 
 nese Government, by the Power that hitherto and. in 
 all times had been contented to support Turkey per 
 fas et nefas, without demanding anything either for 
 the immediate subjects of the Sultan or for the 
 tributary provinces. Breaking resolutely with these 
 customs of the past, M. de Beust, who had just 
 assumed the guidance of affairs in Austria, wrote on 
 the 10th November, 1866, to his ambassador in Paris 
 that, "however much Austria might wish to see the 
 Sultan retain his throne, she could not refuse to 
 sympathise with and assist, up to a certain point, 
 the Christian population in Turkey, who had often 
 just cause of complaint, and who were bound to 
 several of the races under Austria's sway by the 
 bonds of blood and of religion/' Questioned a few 
 clays later (28th November) as to his views, by the 
 Russian envoy at the Viennese Court, the Austrian 
 minister did not hesitate in replying that he was 
 disposed to encourage among the Christians of 
 the East "a wider development of their privileges, 
 and to promote the establishment of a system of 
 self-government, to be limited only by a tie of 
 vassalage." 
 
 * Despatch from Count Miilinen to Baron de Beust, December 30th, 
 1866. 
 
THE EAST AND THE WEST. 251 
 
 Lastly, in a remarkable despatch addressed to 
 Prince Metternich, and bearing the date of January 1st, 
 1867, M. de Beust went so far as to propose "a 
 revision of the Treaty of Paris of March 30th, 1856, 
 and of the subsequent acts," and announced before- 
 hand his desire to assign in the impending arrangement 
 a very great role to Russia. He found no difficulty 
 in demonstrating that " the remedies, which had been 
 applied during the course of the last few years to the 
 maintenance of the statu quo in the East, had proved 
 themselves powerless to master the difficulties which 
 were increasing every day." 
 
 " The Eastern question, taken as a whole," con- 
 tinued the despatch, " presents a very different aspect 
 to that it did in 1856, and the stipulations of that 
 period, exceeded as they have been on more than one 
 important point by events which have since then 
 arisen, no longer suffice to the necessities of the 
 present situation." In a word, M. de Beust aimed 
 at nothing less than a collective interference of the 
 Powers in the affairs of Turkey, without disguising 
 from himself that it would become necessary "to take 
 into consideration the natural part which a com- 
 munity of religious institutions assigns to Eussia in 
 the East," and that it would also be necessary to 
 release the Empire of the Czar from the onerous con- 
 ditions imposed upon it in the Black Sea," in order to 
 obtain the sincere co-operation of this power in the 
 questions of the Levant. 
 
 The project was certainly a bold one, and did not 
 fail to surprise the public mind of France. Was it 
 
252 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 not in truth an obliteration of the last ten years ? a 
 yielding-lip of the fruits of the Crimean war ? It was 
 repugnant to own that the treaty of 1856 no longer 
 existed, alas ! since the day when the French 
 Government, by its gratuitous indulgences towards 
 Kussia, burst the bonds that united the three great 
 Western Powers, which alone could have assured its 
 efficacious working. Since that time the treaty had 
 been crumbling away piecemeal, and the greater 
 number of its stipulations had been violated. 
 
 The Conference of Paris, which was nominally 
 charged with the guardianship of the treaty, had 
 contented itself (as it was stated in the Austrian 
 despatch) " with sanctioning, after the fact, deeds 
 accomplished without its sanction, and which were 
 in opposition to the conventions placed under its 
 care." Moreover, immediately after the battle of 
 Sadowa, Prince Gortchakof had profited by the very 
 first occasion to write, as it were, the epitaph of the 
 Treaty of Paris. 
 
 " Our august master," writes the Eussian Chan- 
 cellor, in a document stamped with a refined irony, 
 and bearing the date of August 20th, 1866, "our 
 august master does not intend to insist upon the 
 general fulfilment of treaties ivhose only value de- 
 pended on the agreement existing between the great 
 Powers to see them respected, and which have re- 
 ceived, from a ivant of that collective agreement, 
 such frequent and serious attacks as to have be- 
 come invalidated." It was precisely this " collective 
 agreement " that M. de Beust wished to revive and 
 
THE EAST AND THE WEST. 253 
 
 dignify by his proposal to revise the treaty of 
 1856. 
 
 According to his opinion, the Treaty of Paris had 
 not fulfilled its object, which was to secure the integ- 
 rity and vitality of the Ottoman Empire. On the one 
 hand the Western Powers had imposed on the shores 
 of the Euxine restrictions on Russia of its sove- 
 reign rights, that no great empire could submit to 
 for long, and from which it would sooner or later seek 
 to free itself. On the other hand, with regard to the 
 Levantine populations, it had been considered suffi- 
 cient to register a firman promising reforms, and 
 to leave Turkey to herself, instead of reserving to 
 Europe the means of bringing a gentle and permanent 
 pressure to bear on the Ottoman Government in 
 order to induce it to fulfil its duties towards the 
 raias, and to become, by wise and honest administra- 
 tion, independent and strong. 
 
 The Treaty of Paris, in the opinion of the Austrian 
 minister, had only given back to Russia that which 
 the Crimean war should for ever have deprived it of 
 namely, the monopoly of influence over the va'ias; a 
 monopoly it continued to exercise as in the past, after 
 a more concealed fashion, perhaps, but the more- 
 dangerous owing to the absence of competition. M. 
 de Beust wished to re-establish this competition, or 
 rather wished to establish a general agreement "to 
 put the Christian populations of the Sultan under 
 obligations to the whole of Europe, by endowing 
 them, under guarantees from all the courts, with in- 
 dependent institutions in accordance with their various. 
 
254 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 religions and races."'"" And he was all the more 
 inclined to sacrifice to this vast conception the article 
 concerning the Black Sea contained in the Treaty of 
 Paris, from the fact that Austria had opposed it from 
 the first, only consenting to it in the end in order 
 to satisfy the Western Powers and to put a stop 
 to the Crimean war ; and also that succeeding events 
 had since exposed its complete uselessness. 
 
 It was under the influence of the disaster of 
 Sinope that France and England had thought fit to 
 restrain the Czar's naval power in the Euxine ; they 
 imagined that by doing so Constantinople would be 
 sheltered from any sudden attack from Eussia ; but 
 in this respect, as in so many others, the Eastern 
 aspect had materially altered. Eussia no longer me- 
 ditated any sudden attack ; she was advancing more 
 slowly, but more surely, towards her aim.t The 
 pacification of the Caucasus, the incurable weakness of 
 the Porte, the daily increase of dissatisfaction among 
 the rams who were as impatient of the Turkish 
 yoke as they were devoted to the Czar, their sole 
 protector were of more value to her than the presence 
 of her ships in the Black Sea. Besides, had Con- 
 stantinople ever really been delivered from all danger 
 in that direction ? asked the Austrian minister. 
 " Supposing Eussia were to construct ships of war 
 
 * Despatch of M. de Beust to the Baron cle Prokesch at Constantinople, 
 January 22nd, 1876. 
 
 f " That which alarms me most, is the important change wrought in the 
 Eussian position by the pacification of the Caucasus. It is clear to me 
 that in the future Eussia will direct her most serious operations against our 
 provinces in Asia Minor." This was the opinion of Faud Pacha in his 
 political will addressed to the Sultan. (See note on page 282.) 
 
THE EAST AND THE WEST. 255 
 
 in the Sea of Azof, would war be declared in order to 
 prevent her from doing so ? " Finally, the Cabinet of 
 Yienna summed up in the following characteristic 
 words : "Amour propre ought to be set aside in the 
 presence of such immense interests as are now at 
 stake." And, in fact, one cannot give this truth a 
 too important place ; the clause on the subject of the 
 Euxine had been for a long time past but a question 
 of amour propre between the Western Powers and 
 Eussia ; and M. de Beust showed himself to be clear 
 and far-sighted in his despatch of January 1st, 1867.*" 
 After Sadowa he sought to reconstitute Europe 
 to rediscover her, if we may use the expression and he 
 knew what price would have to be paid for doing so. 
 In a different direction France was exerting herself to 
 meet the views of the St. Petersburg Cabinet by con- 
 centrating her principal efforts on the vital question of 
 the hour namely, the Candian insurrection, which 
 
 * No doubt the project set forth by the Austrian minister was 
 simply that of making Turkey a ward of Europe ; but was not this also 
 the plan formed nine years later by the firmest upholder of the integrity 
 of the Ottoman Empire, he who was sometimes called the originator of 
 the Crimean war ? It is interesting to compare the despatch of M. de 
 Beust, of January 1st, 1867, with the manifesto published by Lord Stratford 
 de Redcliffe (formerly Turkish ambassador), on the last day of the year 
 1875, relating to the Eastern question, in which we read the following, 
 remarks : " Objections may be raised to necessary measures, but their neces- 
 sity makes them a part of the lesser evil, and, in consequence, they, must 
 be accepted with it. The measures in question are a joint organised super- 
 vision within, and a pressure agreed upon by convention from without. 
 The difficulties which this double arrangement would have to encounter 
 are far from insurmountable, and its inconveniences would be compen- 
 sated by its results. These measures, reduced to a system, would no 
 doubt be equivalent to a guardianship ; but the Turkish Empire has for 
 some time past been virtually in that position, a position which, had it 
 been firmly imposed upon it as a right, would have saved the Porte from 
 its present embarrassments." Letter from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to 
 " The Times," December 31st, 1875. 
 
256 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 was meeting with so much sympathy in Russia. 
 M. de Moustier proposed to Prince Gortchakof that 
 they should come to " an agreement as to the even- 
 tualities which were arising in the East/' and, after 
 having already spoken of a " medical consultation," 
 went so far as to pronounce the words "heroic remedies," 
 in a despatch to the French ambassador at Constan- 
 tinople (December 7th, 1866). 
 
 By this medical allegory the Parisians understood 
 the joining of the island of Crete to Greece, " the only 
 possible escape," as Prince Gortchakof had affirmed on 
 November 16th, 1866, "open to the Powers from the 
 course of expedients and palliatives which up to the 
 present time had but served to increase the difficulties." 
 The marriage of the young King of Greece with the 
 Grand Duchess Olga was at this time decided, and the 
 Court of the Tuileries would have been delighted to 
 " dower" the Russian princess with the island of Crete, 
 and would not even have objected to increasing the 
 dowry by the addition of Epirus and Thessaly. This 
 was going very far, farther even than Russia desired, 
 for that empire had no wish "to see Greece assume 
 the proportions of a powerful State."' 
 
 It is certain, however, that from the friendship 
 formed between France and Russia was arising the 
 project of a combined demand, to be addressed to 
 the Turkish Government, requesting the realisation 
 of internal reforms and the cession of Crete, to be 
 disguised under the proposal of a plebiscite, a demand 
 
 * Words used by the Emperor Nicholas to Sir Hamilton Seymour. For the 
 rumours concerning Thessaly and Epirus, see, more especially, the despatch 
 of Fuad Pacha to his ambassadors in Paris and London, February 27th, 1867- 
 
THE EAST AND THE WEST. 257 
 
 which was actually preferred in the month of March, 
 1867, and in which Austria, Prussia, and Italy joined. 
 No doubt the situation was as yet very disjointed and 
 vague, but it was gradually assuming more decided 
 characteristics ; and it was to be regretted that France 
 and Austria had not been able to come to some 
 previous agreement as to the nature of the offers 
 they intended to make to Russia. Nevertheless, 
 their offers were very real and very valuable, and it 
 only depended on the successor of Count Nesselrode 
 to combine and adjust them, and turn them to the 
 profit and glory of his august master. England was 
 not in a position to offer any serious resistance to the 
 united wishes of France, Russia, and Austria concern- 
 ing the Levantine question indeed, she was already 
 resigned to their will ; and, certainly, the fruit which 
 Prince Gortchakof saw ripening in the spring of 1867, 
 if it had not the attraction of being forbidden, was 
 still far better flavoured and more wholesome than 
 that which he picked up four years later from among 
 the ashes of Sedan. 
 
 It is true that the French and Austrian Govern- 
 ments had no intention of making a gratuitous pre- 
 sent. It was understood that, in exchange for these 
 important cessions in the East, they were to obtain the 
 support of the Russian Cabinet in the menacing com- 
 plications of the West ; and many existing circum- 
 stances seemed to plead in favour of such a combina- 
 tion. After all, if we deduct the vengeance wreaked 
 on the " ungrateful " House of Hapsburg, Russia had 
 derived but very little profit from the achievements of 
 
258 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 M. de Bismarck. Without mentioning several relations 
 of the imperial family whom the Hohenzollerns had 
 dethroned and despoiled with a firmness softened only 
 by a few tears, there had generally prevailed in all the 
 proceedings and principles inaugurated on the banks 
 of the Main and the Elbe a strong revolutionary tone, 
 which could hardly be pleasant to a court still pro- 
 tected by the shadow of Nicholas. And still more 
 serious was the fact that the battle of Sadowa had 
 given a violent shock to, and had even threatened 
 completely to overthrow, the venerable traditions of 
 Russian policy with regard to Germany. 
 
 Since the days of Peter the Great, but more 
 especially since those of Catherine II., Russia had 
 always sought to acquire a preponderating influence 
 among the various German courts ; and the Czars 
 had on more than one occasion carried things with 
 a high hand in German quarrels. 
 
 1 'The Romanof enjoys the right of a first-born 
 among his brethren, our sovereigns of the Bund," 
 once said a celebrated journalist beyond the Rhine, 
 somewhat bitterly; and the attitude of the secondary 
 States during the Crimean war certainly did not 
 contradict the truth of his assertion . It was, there- 
 fore, the labours of several reigns, and a policy, until 
 then immovable, that Russia saw placed in jeopardy 
 by the unforeseen results of the Bohemian campaign. 
 The north of Germany had already escaped from 
 Russian influence, and only those who were very 
 simple-minded could delude themselves as to the 
 destiny reserved for the south at no distant period. 
 
THE EAST AND THE WEST. 259 
 
 "As early as the month of September, 1866, the 
 Cabinet of Berlin had, in a circular which was de- 
 signedly published, claimed for the Confederation of 
 the North and the States of the South alone, to the 
 exclusion of all the other powers, without excepting 
 Austria, the right of uniting themselves as closely as 
 they might think fit ; giving thus an interpretation to 
 Article IV. of the Treaty of Prague which it did not 
 allow of. In his speeches delivered at the opening 
 of the Prussian Chambers and the Northern Parlia- 
 ment, the king himself had, in addressing them to 
 Germany to the brother nations, to the land which 
 extends from the Alps to the Baltic made use of 
 allusions which, to use the expression of the official 
 journals, "had stirred the heart of every patriot."' 
 
 On his side, M. de Bismarck had said in a 
 speech in the same Parliament (making use of the 
 gambling similes which have become so familiar 
 to us in his language, and so characteristic of his 
 nature) : " Our stake has become greater since our 
 victories ; we now have more to lose, and the game 
 is far from being completely won." Indeed it was 
 evident that unless some combined and resolute step 
 were taken by Europe, the entire absorption of Ger- 
 many by Prussia remained only a question of time ; 
 and if we consider the matter rightly, such an ab- 
 sorption would affect Russia more than France. 
 
 France only beheld the closer union of kingdoms 
 and principalities which had always been hostile or 
 opposed to her ; but Russia, on the contrary, lost a 
 
 * Benedetti, " My Mission in Prussia," p. 249. 
 
 S 2 
 
260 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 whole league of States whose fidelity and devoteclness 
 had never failed, which had served as a kind of barrier 
 between her and those western dominions that were 
 seldom in harmony with her. Their place was to be 
 filled by a formidable power, which had proved itself 
 enterprising and invading from the very beginning, 
 and which was destined sooner or later, by the neces- 
 sities of history, or the fatality of race, to repre- 
 sent the Germanic idea and oppose it to the Slavonic. 
 
 At any other epoch of the Northern Empire in the 
 good old times of Count Nesselrode, for instance, when, 
 instead of a policy of spite and propaganda, the policy 
 practised on the banks of the Neva was conserva- 
 tive, and in favour of European equilibrium the 
 conduct of a Russian chancellor under such circum- 
 stances would not have admitted of a doubt ; a coali- 
 tion between Eussia, France, and Austria would have 
 been formed immediately after Sadowa for the safety 
 of Europe, and it is not saying too much when we 
 affirm that in the spring of 1867 Alexander Mikhailo- 
 vitch held in his hands the destinies of the world. 
 
 Thus, placed in a position to make his choice, 
 Prince Gortchakof was careful not to decline the 
 Austrian and French advances on the Eastern ques- 
 tion ; on the contrary, he hastened to sonorously 
 welcome them, soaring at times into a lyrical style 
 but little in vogue in the language of diplomacy. 
 
 He was charmed with the new Austrian minister, 
 and let loose floods of a somewhat forced enthusiasm. 
 " M. de Beust," he wrote to the Russian ambassador 
 in London, " is inaugurating a new era in the political 
 
THE EAST AND THE WEST. 261 
 
 history of Austria an era whose views will be liberal 
 and lofty ; he is the first statesman of that country 
 and of our period who has courageously attempted to 
 quit the field of paltry rivalry." 
 
 As for France, he was careful to note that the 
 initiative had come from her, " and in begging the 
 Emperor Napoleon III. to remember the interviews 
 which the Emperor Alexander had had with him at 
 Stuttgart" (in 1860) he seemed as though he wished 
 to invest the present conferences with an unusual 
 character of importance and generality. " His Imperial 
 Majesty," continued the Russian Chancellor in his 
 despatch of November 16th, 1866, to M. de Budberg, 
 " has received with satisfaction the proposals which 
 M. de Moustier has made to us with the view to 
 an understanding between ourselves and the French 
 Cabinet on the eventualities now arising in the East. 
 The general principles which his Excellency the French 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs has expressed, the assur- 
 ances which he has given us, have a peculiar value in 
 the eyes of our august master, since they emanate 
 directly from the thoughts of the Emperor Napoleon, 
 and that it is by his Majesty's express orders that 
 M. de Moustier has touched upon these questions." 
 The raptures of Alexander Mikhailovitch became 
 greater and greater ; he even ended by talking Latin, 
 and crushing the unhappy Turkish envoy with a 
 classic quotation. 
 
 " This," he wrote in the month of February, 1867, 
 " is what I said to Comnenos-Bey : The island of 
 Crete is lost to you. After six months of such 
 
262 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 desperate fighting, reconciliation is no longer to be 
 thought of. Admitting even that you were able to 
 re-establish for a time the authority of the Sultan, you 
 could only do so over a heap of ruins and corpses." 
 
 " Tacitus has told us long ago how full of danger 
 is that reign of silence which succeeds* to devastation : 
 ( solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant J ' 
 
 Unfortunately it soon became palpable that while 
 congratulating Austria and France on their Oriental 
 evolutions, and making them compromise themselves 
 as much as possible in that direction,'" the Eussian 
 Chancellor was extremely careful to maintain his inti- 
 mate friendship with his former colleague of Frank- 
 fort, and not to run counter to any of his views with 
 regard to the Eastern question. Although very eager 
 for the plebiscite in Crete, he displayed the utmost 
 indifference to an analogous case on the Eider, a 
 far more legitimate obligation, one guaranteed by 
 solemn treaties,t and one of the most vital import- 
 ance to the noble and unfortunate country of the 
 future Czarina. He maintained a no less significant 
 silence on the subject of the publication made in the' 
 month of March, 1867, by M. de Bismarck, of the 
 conventions with the States of the South, conventions 
 
 * " I have no objection to see your carriage standing before my door 
 on the condition that you really enter my house," was the witty remark to 
 M. de Budberg of one of M. de Moustier's predecessors a few years before, 
 at the Hotel on the Quai d'Orsay, under similar circumstances, when Russia 
 was publishing the advances of the Cabinet of the Tuileries, but taking care, 
 at the same time, to avoid entering into any positive engagement with it. 
 
 t The preliminaries of Nikolsburg, as well as the Treaty of Prague, 
 had stipulated for the return to the King of Denmark of the districts north 
 of Schleswig, after a popular vote to that effect. We know that up to the 
 present day Prussia has evaded the fulfilment of this engagement. 
 
THE EAST AND THE WEST. 263 
 
 which made the military forces of Germany subject 
 to Prussia, and abolished " the international and 
 independent position " which the preliminaries of 
 Nikolsburg had guaranteed to Bavaria and Wur- 
 temberg.* 
 
 Alexander Mikhailovitch held Wurtemberg as 
 cheaply as Denmark ; the throne of Queen Olga was 
 as little to him as the cradle of the Princess Dagmar. 
 
 In the meanwhile occurred the incident of Lux- 
 emburg, and the French Government were able to 
 measure the amount of good feeling with which they 
 had been able to inspire the Eussian Cabinet by 
 their " heroic remedies " with regard to Turkey. The 
 Kussian Chancellor was certainly correct, and very 
 sincere in his desire for peace ; he did not, however, 
 show that consideration for the position in which 
 France was placed which even England thought 
 proper to display on this occasion, but seemed to be 
 indifferent to everything so long as he was able to 
 avoid giving offence to his illustrious friend at Berlin. 
 
 While praising M. de Beust for his " courageous 
 attempt to break with paltry rivalries," the Russian 
 Government did not fail to encourage, at the same 
 time and in a most provoking and dangerous manner, 
 the violent Slavonic opposition then rife in the 
 Empire of the Hapsburgs by means of its famous 
 
 * M. de Beust writes with resigned subtlety on the subject of these 
 military conventions : " An alliance established between two states, one o 
 which is strong, the other weak an alliance which depends on no particular 
 stipulations, but which is to be permanently maintained in every and 
 any war is not of a kind to inspire much belief in the international and 
 independent existence of the feebler state." Despatch to Count Wimpffen, 
 at Berlin, March 28th, 1867. 
 
264 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 Congress of Moscow, of which mention will be made 
 later on. Other deceptions, less known to the 
 world, but not less bitter, were probably added to the 
 list of all these misunderstandings ; for Austria, as 
 well as France, lost no time in operating their retreat 
 from the shifting ground of the East, and in effecting a 
 junction with England to maintain steadfastly for the 
 future the rights of the Sultan. The " medical con- 
 sultation " was at an end, and the traditional " sick 
 man " was none the worse ; but from that time 
 the terrible eventualities of the future were clearly 
 visible. 
 
 " There exists an understanding between St. Peters- 
 burg and Berlin," was the reiterated warning of M. de 
 Benedetti in the following year (January 5th, 1868) ; 
 and he still designated the mission of General 
 Manteuffel as the starting-point of this understand- 
 ing that caused him so much anxiety. " Is it not, in- 
 deed, from this time," he asked, " that the policies of 
 the two courts have assumed a more decided shape 
 Eussia in the East and in the Slavonic provinces of 
 Austria, Prussia in Germany without the slightest 
 cloud ever arising between them ? Constantly of 
 one mind on every question, they each pursue 
 their separate ways, and work out their plans .with 
 a confidence that bears witness to the mutual 
 guarantees which must have been exchanged be- 
 tween them." And the ambassador added that 
 this conviction was beginning to be felt by many : 
 notably by Lord Loftus, his English colleague, who 
 for a long time had remained incredulous. "His 
 
THE EAST AND TEE WEST. 265 
 
 views have visibly altered, and he is now no less per- 
 suaded than are the other members of the diplomatic 
 body that arrangements for the future have been made 
 between the government of King William and that of 
 the Emperor Alexander. I, for my part, have seen it 
 clearly demonstrated in the firm and unvarying reso- 
 lution which the Cabinet of Berlin has displayed in 
 bringing about the union of Germany, a union which 
 is the mere prelude to a unity solely profitable to 
 Prussia, without allowing itself to be turned aside for 
 one moment in its designs by any fear of a future war 
 with France. I have seen it in the care which M. de 
 Bismarck takes to avoid explaining himself on the 
 Eastern question. When he is interrogated, he replies- 
 that he never reads the correspondence of the king's 
 envoys at Constantinople, and your Excellency will 
 not have forgotten the consideration he always dis- 
 plays for the views of Prince Gortchakof." 
 
 M. Benedetti also noticed the fresh impulse which 
 had been given, since the preceding summer, to the 
 " Pan-Slavonic propaganda ;" he pointed out, with 
 great truthfulness, the vast designs and wide-spreading 
 hopes of the St. Petersburg Cabinet in its connivances 
 with Berlin ; 'and in general gave a higher and more 
 just description of Russian politics at that period than 
 is given by certain ill-advised panygerists of our days, 
 who, in order to prove that Prince Gortchakof has 
 fulfilled his part as completely as possible and with as 
 much success as could be desired, cannot find a better 
 way of doing so than by diminishing and narrowing it. 
 
 It is the fault of most conventional praise to be 
 
266 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 either forced in tone or in a wrong key. Incense has 
 both perfume and ashes, said the ancients ; and there 
 is something equivocal in praising the Kussian Chan- 
 cellor for his " triumph " on the Euxine. To affirm 
 that Prince Gortchakof had only favoured the audacious 
 designs of Prussia, in order to liberate Eussia from its 
 bonds in the Black Sea that he first gave up the 
 world to M. de Bismarck, in the solitary hope of being 
 able some day to repudiate the treaty of 1856 is, 
 indeed, to do small honour to his genius and his 
 patriotism. Certainly the eminent statesman, whose 
 prophetic " foresight " the grandsons of Washington 
 celebrated at St. Petersburg in the year of Sadowa, 
 praying that the Eternal God "who had arrested 
 the sun's course for Joshua" might stay the hand 
 of death for Alexander Mikhailovitch, " so that the 
 eyes of two worlds might long rest upon him"* the 
 consummate diplomatist who, in the spring of 1867, 
 treated so lightly the considerable advances made to 
 him by the Cabinets of the Tuileries and Vienna this 
 minister, certainly, would not have failed to set aside, 
 with a disdainful smile, the paltry supposition that in 
 the evident and approaching European convulsion, all 
 that was to be assigned to Eussia, its only victory or 
 conquest, was to be the abolition of a certain - painful 
 article contained in a treaty which events had already 
 for some time past pronounced "invalid." It was not 
 for such a " dish of lentils/' to use M. de Bismarck's 
 
 * Speech of Mr. Fox, Under- Secretary of State, at a l^ateguet given by 
 the English Club at St. Petersburg to the Mission Extraordinary of the 
 United States in 1866. 
 
THE EAST AND THE WEST. 267 
 
 language, that he intended selling the birthright of the 
 Komanofs ; it was not for such a contemptible price 
 that he intended giving up the West. He aimed higher, 
 and reckoned on the lion's share in the coming 
 slaughter. Fortune may have betrayed his hopes, 
 confounded his calculations, and forced him to bend to 
 many unforeseen necessities ; but, if it is puerile to 
 wish to create virtues out of all these painful neces- 
 sities with which to endow him, or to attempt to 
 compose an aureole for his brow with the lightning of 
 the thunderbolts of 1870, history, in its impartiality, 
 should give Prince Grortchakof fair credit for his 
 intentions, which were equal to the occasion, and, 
 without seeking to hide the repulse he received, 
 should grant him the full benefit due to one that 
 in magnis voluisse. 
 
 Mighty projects had indeed been cherished on the 
 banks of the Moskva and the Neva during the whole 
 of the feverish and agitated period which separated 
 Sadowa from Sedan. The most enchanting prospects 
 were there entertained ; the world was to be divided 
 between Slavonia and Germania; and the " national" 
 minister in truth but responded to the ardent wishes 
 of his country in making the Prussian alliance the 
 pivot on which his policy turned, an alliance he 
 considered to be the one condition, the certain 
 pledge, of a whole future of glory and prosperity 
 for Russia. We must turn our thoughts back to 
 the shock which was universally felt after the pro- 
 digous and unexpected victories of Prussia in 1866, 
 to the numerpus and fantastic plans which suddenly 
 
268 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 arose for the reconstruction of empires and races we 
 must remember the endless flight of Minervas, fully 
 armed, which the blow from the hammer of the 
 Germanic Vulcan caused to spring from so many 
 cracked brains that believed themselves to be Olym- 
 pian the general re-melting which poor historical 
 philosophy underwent in an hour we must re- 
 member all this in order justly to appreciate the 
 current of strange and imperious ideas by which 
 the people of Peter the Great and Catherine IL 
 were then carried away by. "An irresistible power 
 was impelling all nations to form great agglomer- 
 ations, and to abolish all minor States ; and this 
 tendency is perhaps inspired by a sort of provi- 
 dential foreknowledge of the destinies of the world." 
 These were the expressions contained in an official 
 document of incontrovertible authority, a diplomatic 
 manifesto which announced urbi et orbi the lofty 
 thoughts of the Imperial Government of France.* 
 
 How can we then feel any astonishment that the 
 children of the Rouriks reasoned in a similar manner, 
 that they should have openly asked themselves whether 
 the battle of Koniggratz (Sadowa) had not given up 
 Central Europe to the Hohenzollerns, and Eastern 
 Europe to the Romanofs ? After a short period of 
 hesitation and fear, Muscovite patriots resolved in 
 consequence to take no offence at the ambition of 
 King William L, but they immediately proclaimed 
 that Russia had also a mission to fulfil, that she too 
 had an " idea " to realise, and that the sun of national 
 
 * M. de Lavalette's Circular, September 161 b, 1866. 
 
THE EAST AND THE WEST. 269 
 
 unities and great agglomerations must shine equally 
 on all the world. 
 
 There was, then, in the ancient capital of the Czars, 
 a celebrated newspaper which, although it has since 
 fallen off, and only now occupies the rank of an ordinary 
 although still important journal, had at that time a 
 preponderating, tyrannical influence, which was felt 
 from the Dvina to the Oural mountains. At one 
 time it was nicknamed " the first power of the 
 empire after the emperor." Ever since the fatal 
 insurrection in Poland the Moscow Gazette had 
 been the representative of the people's feelings 
 and passions in Holy Russia, the office from whence 
 issued the word of command to public opinion in the 
 vast empire of the North, and even sometimes formal 
 instructions for the ministers at the head of affairs at 
 St. Petersburg. Once again the all-powerful organ 
 of M. Katkof became the mouthpiece of the nation, 
 and imperiously dictated the programme of its future 
 policy. Shortly after the treaty of Prague the 
 Moscow journal had already decided "as an incon- 
 testable fact that the march of events had created 
 interests which invited the two powers of Eussia and 
 Prussia to draw more closely together than they had 
 ever done in the past ; " it also affirmed that M. de 
 Bismarck had made advances with this object in view 
 " advances which were all the more acceptable, as 
 Prussia has no interest to bias her in the East ; so that 
 the Berlin Cabinet, in concert with that of Russia, 
 may take up any position on this question which may 
 be most convenient to it." This theme was taken up 
 
270 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 from time to time and developed under various forms 
 and in various articles, until a leading article of 
 February 17th, 1867, stamped it as a great principle of 
 speculative humanitarianism : " A new era is dawn- 
 ing," so ran the article, " and for us Eussians it is one 
 of great importance. This era is ours : it calls to life a 
 new world, which until now has slumbered in the shade 
 awaiting its destinies the Greco-Slavonic world." 
 
 " After centuries passed in resignation and servi- 
 tude, this world is about to begin a period of renova- 
 tion ; that which has for so long lain forgotten now 
 returns to the light, and prepares for action. Exist- 
 ing generations will witness great changes, great 
 deeds, and great formations. On the peninsula of 
 the Balkan, and from under the rotten stratum of 
 Ottoman tyranny, are already rising three nation- 
 alities, strong and full of life the Hellenic, the 
 Slavonic, the Eoumanian. Closely allied to each 
 other by the similarity of their faith and their historic 
 destinies, these three groups are equally bound to 
 Russia by all the ties of their religious and national 
 life. Once let these three groups of nations be 
 reconstructed, and Eussia will stand revealed in a 
 new light. She will no longer be alone in the world ; 
 instead of the sombre Asiatic power she has until 
 now appeared, she will become a great and indis- 
 pensable moral force in Europe ; a Greco- Slavonic 
 civilisation completing that Germanic-Latin civilisa- 
 tion which by itself would be incomplete, and would 
 remain imperfect and inert in its sterile solitude." 
 Descending shortly afterwards from these somewhat 
 
THE EAST AND THE WEST. 271 
 
 abstract heights to the more practical plains of ways 
 and means, the fiery apostle of the new era wrote, 
 on April 7th : "If France assists the revival of the 
 Latin races with its arms and its political influence, 
 if Prussia acts in a similar manner towards Germany, 
 why should not Russia as the only independent 
 Slavonic power support the Slavonic races, and 
 prevent foreign powers from placing obstacles in the 
 way of their political development ? Eussia ought to 
 employ all her forces to effect among her southern 
 neighbours a similar transformation to that which has 
 taken place in central and western Europe ; she 
 ought, without the slightest hesitation, to adopt 
 towards the Slaves the same course of action which 
 France has adopted towards the Latin nations, and 
 Prussia towards the Germans. The task is a noble 
 one, for it is free from egotism ; it is beneficent, 
 for it will achieve the triumph of the principle of 
 nationalities, and will give a solid basis to the modern 
 equilibrium of Europe ; it is worthy of Eussia and 
 of her greatness, it is immense, and we have the 
 firm conviction that Eussia will fulfil it." 
 
 It was under the stimulus of such theories, hopes, 
 and passions, that the strange ethnological exhibition 
 of Moscow * was opened. It soon became the pre- 
 text for a great popular demonstration a demon- 
 stration too inoffensive in appearance to cause any 
 diplomatic inconvenience, yet thoroughly calculated 
 to produce its effect on simple and inflammable 
 
 * See a paper in the Revue des Deux Mondes, September 1st, 1867 :: 
 " The Congress of Moscow and the Pan-Slavonic Propaganda." 
 
272 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 minds, to fascinate unhappy and disinherited nations, 
 far richer in imagination than in cultivation. 
 
 Certainly true science was likely to derive but 
 little benefit from this projected assemblage of all the 
 Slavonic "types," with their costumes, their arms, 
 and their domestic utensils, in the riding-school at 
 Moscow ; but the enterprise was, nevertheless, con- 
 sidered worthy of the most august protection. The 
 Emperor and Empress offered considerable sums to 
 defray the expenses of the undertaking; the Grand 
 Duke Vladimir accepted the post of honorary pre- 
 sident ; the highest dignitaries of the church and 
 the state undertook its direction. The warmest 
 appeals were addressed to the Slaves of Austria and 
 Turkey, to their various historical, geographical, or 
 other scientific societies, urging them to contribute, 
 by numerous deputations, to the magnificence of the 
 exhibition ; and a whole cloud of emissaries over- 
 spread the countries of the Danube and the Balkan 
 in quest of adherents, samples, and " types." 
 
 Committees were formed all over the empire 
 to organise a suitable reception for the " Slavonic 
 guests," who would not fail to attend this " national 
 jubilee ; " and soon a congress was suggested in which 
 the wants and interests of so many " brother nations " 
 would be considered, and where the hopes and suffer- 
 ings of their great common country, their ideal 
 fatherland, would be discussed. This, we must re- 
 collect, was the very moment when the Cretan in- 
 surrection was at its height ; when, excited by Greece 
 and exaggerated by journals more or less well in- 
 
THE EAST AND TEE WEST. 273 
 
 formed, it served to keep the Christian populations of 
 Turkey in a state of ferment and expectation ; the 
 very moment, also, when the Czechs of Bohemia, 
 drawing after them nearly all the Slaves of Austria, 
 were protesting against the Cis-Leithan constitution, 
 and refusing to take their seats in the representa- 
 tive chambers of the empire. 
 
 The Kremlin, therefore, became the Mons Sacer of 
 the agitators from both banks of the Leitha; the 
 Congress of Moscow assumed all the appearance of a 
 counter -parliament opposed to the Eeichsrath in 
 Vienna ; and the language of the organs most in 
 favour with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg was cer- 
 tainly not of a kind to calm the susceptibilities of 
 interested governments, nor to dissuade their sub- 
 jects from exasperating demonstrations. 
 
 Speaking of the pious pilgrims from Turkey and 
 Austria who were preparing to visit Moscow, that 
 "holy Mecca of the Slaves," the Russian Corre- 
 spondence, the pre-eminently ministerial journal/" 
 expressed itself as follows in the month of April, 1867: 
 " It cannot reasonably be expected of us that we 
 should deny our past. We shall, therefore, allow 
 our guests to consider that they are visiting a sister 
 nation from whom they have everything to expect 
 and nothing to fear. We will listen to their griev- 
 ances, and the recital of their woes will only serve 
 to draw them closer to us. If they choose to compare 
 
 * It emanated directly from the Ministry of the Interior, and was written 
 in French for the "enlightenment" of foreign opinion on the acts and 
 intentions of the Russian Government. 
 
274 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 their political state with our own, we shall certainly 
 not be so foolisn as to persuade them that they enjoy 
 conditions which are the most favourable to Slavonic 
 development. These conditions we believe, on the con- 
 trary, to be very bad ones. We have already said so 
 a hundred times, and we are ready to repeat it." 
 
 No doubt these underhand proceedings of Eussia in 
 the countries of the Danube and the Balkan were not 
 altogether of recent date : they were even of remote 
 origin, and dated as far back as the reign of the 
 great Catherine. 
 
 In an underhand and secret manner the Pan- 
 Slavonic mission had been encouraged and protected 
 for more than a century ; but it was for the first time, 
 during the summer of 1867, that the Russian Govern- 
 ment had openly assumed the responsibility of such a 
 propaganda, and had unfurled the banners of St. Cyril , 
 and St. Methodius. In an empire where everything 
 is overlooked, regulated, and ordered from above ; 
 where nothing is done spontaneously; where every- 
 thing is arranged and willed beforehand ; " Slavonic 
 strangers," subjects of two friendly neighbouring 
 powers, were admitted, encouraged to relate their 
 grievances, to bring complaints against their re- 
 spective governments, to demand assistance and deli- 
 verance in the name of a new right, in the name 
 of a newborn principle of great agglomerations and 
 national unities. Eussia was not foolish enough to 
 send away these strange " deputies," or to preach 
 reason and resignation to them. On the contrary, 
 they were soothed with hopes "of a better fate soon 
 
THE EAST AND THE WEST. 275 
 
 to be realised;" they were conducted throughout all 
 the towns of the empire in the midst of the 
 most enthusiastic manifestations got up by the 
 officers of the army and the archimandrites ; were 
 overwhelmed with expressions of sympathy, with 
 ovations and demonstrations in which the army, 
 the magistracy, and all the more important officials 
 joined. Generals, admirals, and ministers presided at 
 banquets, where the disaster of Sadowa was celebrated 
 us a providential and fortunate event by subjects of 
 Francis Joseph ; where appeals were addressed to the 
 Czar "to avenge the ancient wrongs of the White 
 Mountain and of Kossovo, and to plant the Russian 
 banner on the Dardanelles and on the basilica of St. 
 Sophia. The shock given by such demonstrations to 
 a whole race, to a whole religious world, was great 
 and prolonged ; and certainly contemporary annals 
 have rarely known a period so at variance with the 
 dictates of international right, and with the usual 
 practices of diplomacy, than that which began with 
 the Congress of Moscow and ended in the Conference 
 at Paris on the subject of Greece. 
 
 It was, indeed, a peculiar epoch, with its presi- 
 dents of council such as Ratazzi, Bratiano,. Kouman- 
 douros ; with its generalissimos such as Garibaldi, 
 Petropoulaki, and " Philip the Bulgarian ;" with its 
 expeditions of Mentana, of Sistow, of the Arcadion 
 and of Enosis ; with, in a word, its German, Italian, 
 Czechian, Croatian, Roumanian, Servian, Bulgarian, 
 Greek, and Pan-Slavonic agitations. Without entering 
 any further into the tedious history of these compli- 
 
 T 2 
 
276 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 cated and as yet unexplained events, it will suffice, in 
 order to appreciate their general character and to 
 grasp their inner workings, to read with all the 
 attention it deserves, the report, which we have 
 already mentioned, of the French ambassador at the 
 Court of Berlin, dated January 5th, 1868. " M. de 
 Bismarck," writes M. Benedetti, " requires a disturbed 
 Italy, an Italy permanently estranged from France, in 
 order to force us- to maintain a considerable number 
 of regiments in the States of the Church ; and in 
 order to bring about, whenever it may suit him, with 
 the help of the revolutionary party, a violent rupture 
 between the government of the Emperor and that of 
 Victor Emmanuel to neutralise, in one word, our 
 freedom of action on the Rhine. ... I should not be 
 surprised either if M. de Bismarck were the instigator 
 of the fresh impulse given since last summer to the 
 Pan-Slavonic propaganda it has, to him, the ad- 
 vantage of annoying Austria by means of Russia. 
 Russia would certainly be less enterprising, and 
 Prussia would certainly not advise her to reawaken 
 the Eastern question, for the simple reason that 
 Prussia herself could derive no benefit from it, if 
 M. de Bismarck did not consider it the price 
 he must pay for the liberty which he demands in 
 Germany. The doubtfulness of the situation only 
 draws Russia and Prussia more closely together, and 
 makes one cause of the German ambitions of the one 
 and the Eastern ambitions of the other." 
 
 A permanent committee to watch over the 
 interests of Slave unity was formed shortly after 
 
THE EAST AND THE WEST. 277 
 
 the Congress of Moscow, under the auspices of a 
 grand-duke, and its action did not fail to be felt 
 among the Euthenes, the Czechs, and the Croatians 
 of Austria; but it was principally in the provinces 
 tributary or subject to the Ottoman Empire that the 
 agitation became as chronic as it was perilous. The 
 unhappy Turk was assailed on all sides one day the 
 Vladika of Montenegro would demand such or such a 
 port on the Adriatic ; another day the Prince of 
 Sorvia would exact the evacuation of some fortress, 
 and would enforce his demand by an unusual 
 display of arms. Numerous exportations of weapons 
 from Russia entered the Danubian provinces under 
 the false designation of materials for the construc- 
 tion of railroads ;* while Greek ships of war un- 
 ceasingly attempted to provoke to fresh vigour the 
 Cretan insurrection, which was now dying out, and 
 which had never been of great importance. 
 
 It was the period of " committees of help " and of 
 '" liberating bands," now invading the Papal States 
 with cries of " Roma o morte ! " now making incursions 
 into Thessaly to revenge the " outraged shades of 
 Phocion and of Philopcemen," or even crossing the 
 Danube, in the direction of Roumania, five times in 
 the space of one year, in order to awaken in the 
 Balkan " the Lion of the Golden Mane ! " 
 
 " My brethren, it is now for us to prove to the 
 diplomatists .of Europe that there still exist some 
 
 * See on this subject the English, French, and Austrian parliamentary 
 documents of 1868, and notably the reports of the Austrian agents at lassy 
 and Bucharest. 
 
278 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 descendants of the terrible Krum ; the Lion of the 
 Golden Mane and the trumpet of war summon you." 
 This was the tenor of a proclamation dated from " the 
 Balkan," and signed " Provisional Government." 
 
 " It is a fact/' wrote the Baron d'Eder, the Austrian 
 agent in the Principalities, to M. de Beust, Feb. 6th, 
 1868, "it is a fact that at Bucharest, as in various 
 other towns on the banks of the Danube, there exist 
 Bulgarian committees, whose aim is to provoke dis- 
 turbances in Bulgaria, to support them, and to give 
 them greater proportions than those of last year. It 
 was quite recently the opinion here, that on the 
 return of fine weather the most serious complications 
 would take place in Western Europe, which would 
 permit Eussia to declare war against Turkey, and, in 
 the event of these occurrences taking place, preparations 
 were made to energetically assist the Bulgarian rising. 
 
 "Although the government of the Principalities 
 is in the hands of the radical party, always hostile 
 to Eussia, it inclines for some time past towards that 
 power, and looks to her for the realisation of its 
 hopes and efforts. 
 
 " The journals of the opposition party (Conservative) 
 fight against the Russian tendencies of the Govern- 
 ment; they accuse it of acting in concert with Prussia, 
 and of raising up difficulties for Austria in the event 
 of a war between France and Prussia. The Govern- 
 ment journals reply by asserting that the national 
 party is, on principle, the enemy of no power, and 
 
 * Enclosed in a despatch from the Consul of Knappitch to Baron de 
 Prokesch at Constantinople. Ibraila, August 24th, 1868. 
 
THE EAST AND THE WEST. 279 
 
 that there can be no reason for opposing Russia, 
 while that power is defending the cause of right and 
 the cause of oppressed nationalities." 
 
 It would assuredly be most unjust to lay upon the 
 Russian Government the responsibility of all the 
 disorderly agitations which took place at this time in 
 the Greco-Roumanian and Slavonic world, but it is 
 nevertheless certain that it never attempted to stop or 
 even to disown them. In reading the various par- 
 liamentary documents, the red, green, yellow, and blue 
 books of 1867-69, we are struck by meeting, at every 
 step, numerous and energetic representations, addressed 
 by the Cabinets of London, Paris, and Vienna to 
 Roumania and to Greece on the subject of their 
 military preparations, on their clandestine ctespatch 
 of arms and of invading bands, while the Cabinets 
 of St. Petersburg and Berlin seem to have care- 
 fully abstained from ever mentioning any of these 
 topics. 
 
 By a curious change in earthly matters, which 
 must have astonished the Nesselrodes and Kamptz 
 in their celestial abode, the voices of the Western 
 Powers those of England, France, and Austria 
 were now denouncing the underhand- and revolu- 
 tionary proceedings of the European demagogues, 
 while Prussia was silent and Russia denied the fact 
 or pleaded " extenuating circumstances." 
 
 Prince Gortchakof found excuses for the Athenian 
 Government in the Hellenic constitution. " This con- 
 stitution/' said he, " gives every Greek the liberty to 
 quit his native country and engage in conflicts such 
 
280 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 as took place recently in Crete."' This was certainly 
 an odd spectacle, to see the minister of an autocrat 
 explaining to such an old whig as Lord Clarendon the 
 inexorable conditions of a legal and parliamentary 
 system. The Porte, it will be recollected, could not 
 understand a legality so detrimental to its interests ; 
 and, at last, losing patience, addressed an ultimatum 
 to the Athenian Government. The result was a con- 
 ference convoked in Paris in order " to find the means 
 for smoothing away the differences which had arisen 
 between Turkey and Greece." 
 
 Some good souls fancied that the Eussian Chan- 
 cellor would feel somewhat embarrassed when con- 
 fronted with such an Areopagus, and even thought 
 him capable of putting obstacles in its way ; but they 
 little knew the resources of a man as subtle as he was 
 learned, and who actually took the opportunity of 
 giving vent to his famous j est on Saturn. 
 
 " I am told," he wrote to Baron Brunnow in 
 London, January 13th, 1869, "that some persons are 
 accusing Eussia of wishing to prevent the conference. 
 Yet it is known that the conference springs from the 
 Emperor's brain. The fable of Saturn will not apply 
 to this last mistake of the Imperial Cabinet." 
 
 Alexander Mikhailovitch had not exhausted his 
 temerity ; he became bitter, almost aggressive ; spoke 
 of " excitement stirred up abroad," of " a drifting 
 policy artfully prepared beforehand/' and of " the 
 suspicion attached to every step taken by Eussia ; '' 
 
 * Despatch, of Sir Andrew Buchanan to Lord Clarendon, December 19th, 
 1868. 
 
THE EA8T AND THE WEST. 281 
 
 and even went the length of accusing the Western 
 Powers of devising a great conspiracy to disturb the 
 peace of the Levant. " We cannot avoid remarking," 
 he wrote to Baron Brunnow, in a despatch of January 
 17th, 1868, "that this discordant note is not the only 
 one that has disturbed the echoes of the East. We 
 have already beheld Servia become the focus of an 
 agitation which has spread from the press to diplo- 
 macy. Prince Michael Obrenovitch was suspected : 
 and it needed his tragic death to disarm the hostilities 
 undertaken against him. The next thing was that ac- 
 cusations were raised against the government of the 
 United Principalities, the Bulgarian bands formed a 
 motive for recriminations, and that government was 
 reproached with having tolerated even accused of 
 having encouraged, them. Scarcely has this com- 
 plication been cleared up, when a fresh crisis springs 
 up in the relations between Turkey and Greece : a 
 more serious crisis and more dangerous for the general 
 peace." 
 
 Decidedly, in default of the " Fable of Saturn," 
 that of the "Wolf and the Lamb" could certainly be 
 applied to the proceedings of the Imperial Cabinet of 
 St. Petersburg. 
 
 The conference of Paris succeeded, nevertheless, 
 in its efforts ; the Turco-Grecian difficulties were 
 smoothed over; and in the spring of 1869 the northerly 
 blasts of the propaganda raged less fiercely in the 
 valleys of the Danube and the passes of the Balkans. 
 A sort of calm ensued ; but the combustible materials 
 still remained accumulated, ready to take light at the 
 
282 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 first spark. The radicals of Koumania were not the 
 only ones to foresee that Eussia would assume an 
 offensive position in the East as soon as any serious 
 complications took place in Western Europe. It was 
 the universal belief, and one which the sons of the 
 Eouriks were the first to adopt. 
 
 The close of the year 1869 was marked by an 
 incident which did not fail to impress all thoughtful 
 minds with a sense of its importance. 
 
 St. Petersburg was celebrating the centenary of 
 the institution of the order of St. George, the greatest 
 military order in Eussia, and whose first class is only 
 conferred on the hero of a brilliant victory. 
 
 The Emperor Alexander II. sent this distinction to 
 William I., to the victor of Sadowa, and the combatant 
 of 1814. " Accept it," so ran the telegraphic message, 
 " as a renewed proof of the friendship which unites us; 
 friendship founded on the memory of the great epoch 
 when our united armies fought together for a holy and a 
 mutual cause." The King of Prussia replied, imme- 
 diately also by telegram : " Profoundly touched, and 
 with tears in my eyes, I thank you for the honour you 
 have done me, and "which I was far from expecting. 
 But that which overjoys me most are the expressions 
 you have made use of in conferring it on me. I in- 
 deed read in them a fresh proof of your friendship and 
 of your remembrance of the days when our united 
 armies fought side by side for the same holy cause."' 1 
 
 In the beginning of the same year, while the con- 
 ference was sitting in Paris, a faithful servant of the 
 
 * Official Journal of the Russian Empire, December 12th, 1869. 
 
THE EAST AND THE WEST. 283 
 
 Sultan one of the last of great Turkish statesmen 
 passed away at Nice. Before his death, Fuad Pacha 
 wrote with his dying hand an address to his august 
 master, which he designated as his last political testa- 
 ment. The document was to remain secret, and, 
 indeed, has but recently been published.'" 
 
 " When this writing is laid before your majesty, I 
 shall no longer be of this world. You may/' so runs 
 the document, " therefore listen to me without suspi- 
 cion, and become persuaded of the painful truth that 
 the great Ottoman Empire is in danger." And after 
 having passed in review the different states of the 
 Continent, and pointed out the approaching inevitable 
 conflict between France and Prussia, Fuad Pacha 
 concludes with these words: "An internal war in 
 Europe, and a Bismarck in Russia, and the face of 
 the globe would be changed." 
 
 * This remarkable document, which bears the date of January 3rd, 
 1869, may be found in an interesting pamphlet of Mr. T. Lewis Farley, " The 
 Decline of Turkey," pp. 2736. London, 1875. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE FRENCH WAR. 
 
 Surprising Foresight of M. Benedetti after 1867 He continually draws 
 Attention to the complete Understanding between Russia and Prussia 
 Curious Illusions at the Tuileries on the Subject of General Fleury's 
 Mission The Interview at Ems between the Emperor Alexander and 
 William I. (June, 1870) M. Benedetti's Estimate of M. de Bismarck's 
 Sincerity towards the Cabinet of St. Petersburg : Kussia, in reality, 
 only [a Card in his Game M. de Bismarck's successive Accomplices : 
 M. de Eechberg, Napoleon III., and Prince Gortchakof The Candida- 
 ture of the Hohenzollern Prince for the Spanish Throne The Russian 
 Chancellor's significant Opinion of this Candidature Declaration of 
 War (July 15th) Russia taken by Surprise Russia prevents Austria 
 from allying herself with France The First Disaster Public Feeling in 
 Russia, and the Opportunity for a Congress Prince Gortchakof and 
 the League of Neutral Powers Austria's vain Efforts to bring about 
 Concerted Action between the Great Powers The Russian Chancellor 
 will only hear of "Isolated Action" Nature of this Action The Peace 
 of Versailles, and the Telegram of William I. to the Emperor Alexander II. 
 (February 26th, 1871) Curious Similarity between the Catastrophe 
 of 1866 and that of 1870 The Triumph of Prince Gortchakof in the 
 Black Sea Question What he might have accomplished II gran rifiuto. 
 
 To the Deity alone, perhaps, has it been given to look 
 back upon his completed labour and "see that it was 
 good." Mankind seldom tastes such a pure enjoy- 
 ment, and the parti de I action in the councils of the 
 Second Empire certainly did not become acquainted 
 with it after those momentous events of 1866 it had 
 so powerfully helped to bring about. Amongst those 
 whose eyes were opened was the ambassador of 
 
THE FRENCH WAR. 285 
 
 France at the Court of Berlin. The completion of 
 Italian unity but little consoled him for the dangerous 
 blow which the disaster of Sadowa had struck at his 
 own country. His disenchantment was great. But 
 nothing better whets and sharpens a naturally 
 sagacious mind than to have been grossly and pain- 
 fully deceived ; and if Pascal has spoken of a second 
 ignorance which dawns upon the man who has deeply 
 drank of knowledge, there is also a second experience, 
 and something like a second sight, awaiting a certain 
 stamp of politician after a passing defeat. 
 
 It would be impossible to speak too highly of the 
 remarkable keenness of observation and judgment 
 displayed by M. Benedetti during the last four years 
 of his mission at Berlin. A remarkably unfortunate 
 and imprudent diplomatist and negotiator in the fatal 
 year 1866, he afterwards became a most active and 
 reliable fountain of information ; thenceforward the 
 welfare of France occupied in his inmost thoughts the 
 place too long usurped by his zeal for Italy. 
 
 From 1 867, in fact, the ambassador found a patriotic 
 delight in instructing his government as to the real 
 condition of Europe, and in recommending it to adopt, 
 one way or the other, a decisive resolution ; either 
 to calmly resign itself to the inevitable, or to prepare 
 itself beforehand for a struggle near at hand and full 
 of extreme perils. He strove to persuade it that 
 Prussia was ceaselessly labouring at the assimilation 
 of the whole of Germany, regardless of the risk of 
 provoking a quarrel with France ; being, indeed, but 
 too often inclined to consider such a quarrel as the 
 
286 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 surest and most direct road to its end. In the event 
 of such a conflict he entertained no hopes at all of 
 the particularists of the south. " When a national 
 war," he said, " once breaks out, the most headstrong 
 among them will be powerless in presence of the 
 masses of their countrymen, who will look upon the 
 struggle, no matter how it arises, as a French war 
 of aggression against their country; and if success 
 should happen to be on their side, there will be no 
 limit to their exactions." 
 
 He also took care to point out the " extraor- 
 dinarily active propagandism " M. de Bismarck was 
 carrying on beyond the Main ; " with the exception 
 of a few journals in the pay of the governments (of 
 Bavaria and Saxony) or belonging to the extreme 
 Eadical party, he is backed up by the entire press 
 of all the Southern States." He wrote to Paris that 
 King William's minister continued his intrigues with 
 the revolutionary party in Italy ; that he was in the 
 habit of receiving Garibaldi's agents ; and that even 
 the members of the regular government of King 
 Victor Emmanuel, the obliged personal friend of 
 Napoleon III., had, at the time the Mentana compli- 
 cations occurred, sounded Prussia, to discover " under 
 what conditions it would come to their aid." : 
 
 He, too, was the first to call attention to the 
 hidden intrigues with Prim about the Hohenzollern 
 
 * See, on this subject, the interesting despatch of November 10th, 1867. 
 Mazzini's correspondence with M. de Bismarck daring 1868 and 1869, sug- 
 gesting the idea of dethroning Victor Emmanuel if he allied himself with 
 Napoleon III., was not made public till later quite recently after the 
 death of the celebrated Italian agitator. 
 
THE FRENCH WAIL 287 
 
 candidature to the Spanish throne. And it has been 
 already shown that he had at once recognised the 
 alarming character and the real purport of General 
 ManteuffeFs mission to Russia. 
 
 " Difficult as it may be for a great power like 
 France to determine beforehand its line of conduct 
 in the actual condition of affairs," wrote M. Benedetti 
 to his government in the beginning of 1868, "and 
 ample as may be the allowance it is right to make 
 for the unexpected, the concentration of Germany 
 under ,a strong military government a government 
 that in many respects possesses nothing of a parlia- 
 mentary regime but the external form touches too 
 nearly our national security to permit us to avoid 
 the immediate resolution of the following question : 
 Is the unification of Germany in reality a danger to 
 the independence or position of France in Europe, 
 and is war the only means to parry this danger ? 
 If the Emperor's government believes that France 
 has nothing to fear from such a radical alteration in 
 the relations of the central states of the Continent, 
 it seems to me desirable, in the interests of peace 
 and public prosperity, to assume an attitude entirely 
 in unison with this belief. If a contrary conviction 
 is entertained, it is our duty to thoroughly prepare 
 for war ; to ascertain beforehand of what use Austria 
 might be to us ; and to take steps to bring to a 
 speedy settlement, one after the other, the Eastern 
 and the Italian questions. We should certainly require 
 the whole of our resources to triumph on the Rhine. 
 
 It is particularly in his estimate of the close rela- 
 
288 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 tions between the Courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg 
 that M. Benedetti showed the exactness and precision 
 of his foresight. He was keen enough to detect from 
 the first their mutual understanding, and to firmly 
 believe in it to the very last. In September, 1869, 
 Napoleon III. selected as his envoy at the Russian 
 Court one of his most trusted confidants a zealous 
 co-operator in the events of the 2nd of December, 
 and one of his grands ecuyers a general officer as 
 conspicuous for his intelligence as for his bravery. 
 
 This was to show clearly enough Napoleon's desire 
 to cultivate the nearest and most direct understanding 
 with the Emperor Alexander ; and, in fact, in spite of 
 the telegrams exchanged on the Fete of St. George, 
 the French Cabinet was, at the beginning of 1870, full 
 of hopes : it believed that " I' affaire marchait toute 
 seule."* The French ambassador at St. Petersburg, 
 General Fleury, certainly a clever man, was speedily 
 taken in by the bear hunts, the sleigh excursions, and 
 the many other tokens of august kindness prepared 
 for his benefit : favours which he modestly set down 
 to the account of his master's policy, instead of attri- 
 buting them, as with much better reason he might 
 have done, to his own many agreeable qualities. 
 
 The ambassador's belief was shared by his suite, 
 particularly by his aides-de-camp ; who, in their con- 
 fidential letters home, were continually alluding to the 
 "great results" brought about by their chief, and to 
 his increasing favour in the eyes of the Emperor of all 
 
 * Confidential letter from M. de Verdriere, St. Petersburg, February 3rd, 
 1870. Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial Family, vol. i., p. 129. 
 
THE FRENCH WAR. 289 
 
 the Russias, in terms that savoured more of military 
 frankness than of diplomatic insight/''" M. Benedetti, 
 however, paid little attention to these hymns of 
 triumph, and still retained his old convictions. In- 
 deed, as late as June 30th, 1870, on the very eve of 
 the declaration of war, he reiterated them in a luminous 
 despatch, from which we shall have to quote more 
 than one significant passage. Speaking of the inter- 
 view between the Emperor Alexander and the King 
 of Prussia at Ems, which occurred during the first 
 four days in June, he thinks it probable that M. de 
 Bismarck, as usual, showed himself on the one hand 
 favourable to the Emperor's Eastern policy, while on 
 the other he endeavoured to awaken the Czar's sus- 
 ceptibilities in connection with the questions of Austria 
 and Galicia. 
 
 " While the minister," says M. Benedetti, " was 
 probably occupied in- reassuring the Emperor on the 
 first point, and in endeavouring to alarm him on the 
 second, the King, doubtless, was employing his gra- 
 cious charm of manner, which he has always known 
 to turn to such good account, in winning the sym- 
 pathies of his august nephew ; and I have no doubt 
 both King and minister succeeded in their task. But, 
 whatever may have been the means they had recourse 
 to, their purpose was certainly to strengthen the 
 Emperor in holding the views they managed to instil 
 
 * "The Emperor of Russia has taken a very great fancy to the General. 
 He is continually inviting him to bear-hunts, and often asks him to ride with 
 him in his own sleigh that only holds two. This last is considered a supreme 
 favour, and I think it looks well for our policy." Confidential letter from 
 M. de Verdriere, January 25th, 1870. Papers and Correspondence of the 
 Imperial Family, vol. i., p. 127. 
 
 U 
 
290 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 into him ; and it is certain that they more or less 
 achieved it." 
 
 M. Benedetti, however, by no means admitted that 
 any formal arrangement existed between the two 
 cabinets by no means thought that the Prussian 
 minister had in reality and all sincerity abandoned 
 the solution of the Eastern question to his former 
 colleague at Frankfort and it is in these nice grada- 
 tions of appreciation that the French ambassador at 
 Berlin showed his uncommon perspicacity. It was, of 
 course, easy to believe that M. de Bismarck, to suit 
 the needs of the moment, would play the indifferent 
 in Eastern affairs ; pretend that " he never took the 
 trouble to read his Constantinople despatches," and 
 even appear to believe the pretension of Russia " to 
 introduce a measure of unity into the intellectual 
 development of the Slaves""" a perfectly legitimate 
 aspiration. But the care he was at the same time 
 taking to keep up the most intimate relations with 
 his Hungarian allies of 1866 ought to have opened 
 the eyes of Russian zealots to the emptiness of their 
 dreams of a partition of the world between the 
 Teutons and the sons of Rourik. 
 
 "The Hungarians consider the Russians as their 
 future protectors against Vienna," wrote Baron de 
 Werther in a confidential despatch of June, 1867, on 
 his return from the coronation at Buda, with the 
 object of reassuring the Berlin Cabinet as to the 
 recent enthusiasm of the Magyars, just reconciled to 
 
 * An expression used in the North German Gazette (Bismarck's principal 
 organ) of July 20th, 1867, in speaking of the Moscow Congress. 
 
THE FRENCH WAR. 291 
 
 their King. But it is not only against Vienna, it 
 is much more against Moscow and St. Petersburg, 
 against all Slave preponderance on the banks of the 
 Danube, that the children of Arpad will demand in 
 the future the aid of the Hohenzollern. 
 
 " Prussia has no interests in the East," was a favourite 
 assertion of M. de Bismarck between 1867 and 1871 ; 
 and M. Katkof s organ lost no opportunity of repeating 
 this much-discussed expression. From the day, how- 
 ever, that Prussia became identified with the whole of 
 Germany, or rather assimilated it, she perforce inherited 
 all German interests and German influences on the 
 shores of the Danube and at the foot of the Balkans. 
 Thenceforward her share in Eastern policy became 
 a large one, far larger than that either of France or 
 England. 
 
 M. Benedetti well realised all this, and from time to 
 time shrewdly drew attention to it in the despatches 
 he wrote during the closing years of his stay at Berlin. 
 Speaking, in his report of January 5th, 1868, of the 
 obliging manner in which the Chancellor of the 
 Northern Confederation had always agreed with 
 Prince Gortchakof s views, he added : " He (M. de 
 Bismarck) is doubtless convinced that there are other 
 powers who have the greatest interest in shielding the 
 Ottoman Empire from Kussian greed, and he leaves 
 the task to them ; but he knows that in the Eastern 
 question no definite solution can be arrived at with- 
 out the permission or adhesion of Germany, if only 
 Germany be united and powerful. He thinks, there- 
 fore, that just at present there is not the slightest 
 
 u 2 
 
292 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 objection to whetting the appetite of Russian ambi- 
 tion, if he can obtain in return an obliging abstention 
 from all his own undertakings in Germany." " In 
 Eastern affairs," wrote the French ambassador a little 
 later, " M. de Bismarck wishes to take up a position 
 that commits him to nothing, and that will allow him, 
 as circumstances turn out, either to lend a hand to 
 Eussia or to extend it to the Western Powers. This 
 position he can only retain by refusing to take any 
 step that would compromise him with either the 
 friends or the foes of Turkey/' 
 
 These views were soon fully justified by the 
 attitude taken up by Prussia during the conference at 
 Paris on Greek affairs (January, 1869). It became 
 evident that the Berlin Cabinet was not quite inocu- 
 lated with the ardour of Alexander Mikhailovitch ; it 
 did not, like him, recognise the personification of 
 persecuted innocence in young Roumania or in the 
 Servian Omladina ; and it was especially careful to 
 avoid the assumption of a huge conspiracy between 
 England, France, and Austria against the tranquillity 
 of the Levant. In truth, the Prussian minister was 
 by no means anxious for the decease of the Porte, 
 still less for the collapse of Hungary, the van- 
 guard of the " German mission " in the East ; * and 
 his sympathies with an "ideal unity" of the Slaves 
 grew colder as the hour of real German unity 
 approached. 
 
 " A struggle in the East would force him to 
 follow Russia's lead," wrote M. Benedetti, on January 
 
 * Drang nach osten. 
 
THE FRENCH WAR. 293 
 
 27th, 1870, " and he will do his best to prevent one ; 
 he showed that this was his policy last year, on the 
 occasion of the controversy between Turkey and 
 Greece. He looks on Eussia as a card in his game, to be 
 played in case of complications on the Ehine ; and he 
 will be particularly careful not to change rdles and 
 become a card in the game of the St. Petersburg 
 Cabinet." 
 
 A few months later, immediately before the out- 
 break of the war with France (June 30th, 1870), 
 M. Benedetti, while thinking that the tie betwixt 
 Kussia and Prussia had necessarily been strengthened 
 by the interview at Ems, concluded a despatch with 
 the following observations : "It must not, however, 
 be thought that M. de Bismarck has determined to 
 closely identify his policy with that of Kussia. In my 
 opinion he has not entered into, and is not disposed 
 to enter into, any agreement, which, by compromising 
 Prussia in any future Eastern complications, might 
 throw England into the arms of France, and cast 
 obstacles in his own path on the Ehine. The 
 courteous attention paid by the Chancellor of the 
 Northern Confederation to Eussian views, will never 
 go so far as to limit his own liberty of action ; he 
 promises more than he intends to perform ; or, in 
 other words, he cultivates the friendship of the 
 St. Petersburg Cabinet with the intention of profiting 
 by its good offices in case of a struggle in the West, 
 but with a full determination never to pre-engage 
 German resources or German forces in an Eastern 
 crisis. On this account I have always felt sure that 
 
294 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 no formal agreement has been entered into between 
 the two courts, and it is tolerably certain that nothing 
 of the kind was suggested at Ems." 
 
 Everything, in fact, seems to show that at Ems 
 no treaty was signed, no conditions were formally dis- 
 cussed; an apparent common point of view and 
 harmony of intention rendered unnecessary the 
 fatiguing discussion of details. It would, moreover, 
 have been very difficult, in any but the very gravest 
 questions, to draw up regular stipulations applicable 
 to coming events of which neither the exact date, the 
 immediate effects, nor the ulterior consequences were 
 known. It was probably considered sufficiently satis- 
 factory that the two sovereigns were actuated by no 
 opposing interests ; were, on the contrary, penetrated 
 with sympathetic ideas ; and that an understanding 
 existed that when the hour struck each was to fight 
 for his own hand, and God for them both. 
 
 The Eussians, it should also be remembered, are 
 not, in their views on the Eastern question, entirely 
 free from illusion. The rest of Europe is inclined to 
 credit them with a more methodical programme than 
 they really possess. Their feelings on the subject are 
 deep and tenacious ; but their projects are numerous, 
 vague, and wanting in concentration. This powerful 
 nation seems in this respect more under the sway of a 
 fatalistic fascination than under the guidance of a 
 systematic scheme of conquest. It pursues its be- 
 setting phantom without gaining upon it. It is worth 
 notice that Russia has never found itself so far from 
 its aims as when she has attempted to hasten the 
 
THE FRENCH WAR. 295 
 
 catastrophe. In 1829, when her armies were almost 
 in sight of Constantinople, she was forced to with- 
 draw ; in 1854 the fruits of her campaign in Hungary, 
 and the pre-eminence accruing to her from her im- 
 munity from the revolutionary wave of 1848, were 
 entirely swept away ; while, on the other hand, her 
 prospects were never really so brilliant as on the clay 
 the signature of the Treaty of Paris seemed to exclude 
 her for ever from the Black Sea ; for, though she 
 lost Sebastopol, she gained the Caucasus and a new 
 world on the shores of the Amoor and of the Syr- 
 Daria. 
 
 It was natural, therefore, when she foresaw the 
 tremendous struggle preparing after 1867 in the 
 centre of Europe, that she should determine rather to 
 wait the outcome of the coming storm, than attempt 
 to regulate it and direct its course. A war between 
 the two most powerful States of the Continent a 
 war that promised to be a long and a disastrous one, 
 and that might end by exhausting both combatants 
 and dragging other powers into the struggle would 
 certainly afford Kussia, so it was thought on the 
 banks of the Neva, plenty of opportunities of pro- 
 nouncing its own fiat, and of snatching its own 
 plunder. Such a course of conduct, forsooth, seemed 
 to naturally suggest itself to a chancellor who had 
 already reaped so many advantages by biding his 
 time ; it appeared the logical outcome of a policy, the 
 infinity of whose aspirations was only measured by 
 the unknown possibilities of the future. In such 
 cases an infinite ambition frequently runs on all-fours 
 
296 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 with an indefinite purpose, and a vague emptiness 
 often causes an impression of profound depth. 
 
 With cruel irony the founder of German unity 
 has generally chosen for his accomplice in one enter- 
 prise the dupe destined to be the victim in his next 
 one. His great superiority has partly consisted in the 
 facts that his aim has always been a clear one, his object 
 always well defined, limited, and perfectly attainable ; 
 while his associates of the moment generally allowed 
 themselves to be entangled in the perilous web under 
 the impulsion of abstract principles, vague desires, 
 and confused combinations. 
 
 At the time of the invasion of the Duchies his 
 first attempt to shift the equilibrium of Europe it 
 was certainly scarcely necessary to ask M. de Bismarck 
 for his real intentions. There was his prey lying 
 openly before him ; the roadstead of Kiel displayed its 
 ample splendours to all who had eyes to see. Yet 
 M. de Kechberg still amuses himself with discovering 
 and explaining the motives of his co-operation in 
 that iniquitous scheme. " It was necessary to put 
 a curb on the passions of the democracy, to give a 
 tangible check to the spirit of revolution." Such are 
 the pompous and sonorous phrases, borrowed from 
 antediluvian diplomacy, with which the former Austrian 
 minister attempted to veil, in presence of the Austro- 
 Hungarian delegates, his piteous and fatal policy of 
 1863. 
 
 At Biarritz the president of the Prussian Council 
 demanded in plain terms the Main as a boundary for 
 his country, while the dreamer of Ham was vaguely 
 
THE FRENCH WAR. 297 
 
 recommending a great campaign for the consolidation 
 of German unity, and letting his procrastinating 
 glance stray now on the right bank of the Khine and 
 Mayence, now on the old boundaries of 1814 ; and now 
 and again, with a perhaps more resolute gaze, fixing 
 his visionary eyes upon the winged lion of St. Mark. 
 
 From 1867 to 1870 the Chancellor of the Northern 
 Confederation steadily occupied himself with preparing 
 the unification of Germany and the conquest of Alsace 
 and Lorraine, content to leave to his old colleague of 
 Frankfort the idle task of "awaking the echoes of 
 the East/' and of asking from them the password of 
 Kussian destiny. 
 
 In each and all of these prophetic circumstances 
 we see the same great man of action playing at his 
 pleasure with the different fantasies of the deluded 
 ideologists ; we see the same Fortinbras of Shakespeare 
 the strong in arm, indeed, of Germany riding 
 roughshod to his ends, where doctrinary Hamlets, 
 melancholy or epigrammatic, were only able to blindly 
 wander into chimerical and puerile machinations 
 dreamers who, face to face with crimes that cried to 
 heaven, could only feebly utter, " The times are out of 
 joint ! " 
 
 " Prussia's increase of power can never cause 
 Russia any anxiety," ' said Prince Gortchakof, in 
 
 * From one of Sir A. Buchanan's despatches, dated July 9th, 1870. For 
 a detailed account of the diplomacy of 1870 and 1871, see the instructive 
 work of M. Albert Sorel, " Diplomatic History of the Franco-German War." 
 Paris, Plon, 1875. We can only find two faults with this book, written with 
 careful truth and impartial ability ; its author betrays a decided weakness 
 for the " Tours Diplomacy," and scarcely allows sufficient breadth to Prince 
 Gortchakof 's original designs, in his understanding with Prussia, since 1867. 
 
298 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 answer to the representations made to him at the com- 
 mencement of the Hohenzollern proposal as to the 
 peril in store for Russia from the aggrandisement of 
 Prussia, and the growth of its influence in Europe. 
 And the Prince reminded the alarmists that when, in 
 spite of Russia and with the support of France, Prince 
 Charles of Hohenzollern became, in 1866, sovereign of 
 Roumania, the Russian Cabinet had, after merely 
 remonstrating, accepted the position ; he could not 
 see, therefore, why on this occasion Prussia should 
 be made more responsible for the election of another 
 member of its reigning family to the throne of 
 Spain. 
 
 Thus spoke the Czar's Minister at the outbreak of 
 the struggle, on July 8th, 1870; before Prince Antoine's 
 renunciation, before the French Cabinet had madly 
 lashed itself into a state of excitement, and while 
 Europe was still inclined to approve the legitimate 
 susceptibilities of France. And when the French 
 Government, giddy and blinded, soon, by its violent 
 language in the Corps Legislatif, by its exactions at 
 Ems, and by its fatal declaration of war on July 15th, 
 lost all it had gained in its marked diplomatic victory, 
 jt was impossible not to clearly understand the real 
 sentiments of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. "If General 
 Fleury will permit me to say so," sarcastically wrote 
 M. de Beust to Prince Metternich on July 20, "Russia's 
 alliance with Prussia is so determined upon, that, in 
 case of certain contingencies, the intervention of the 
 Russian forces may be considered not only probable but 
 certain." In fact, immediately after the declaration of 
 
THE FRENCH WAR. 299 
 
 war, on July 15th, the Kussian Government clearly 
 and distinctly informed the Viennese Cabinet that it 
 would not permit Austria to make common cause with 
 France ; and General Fleury, indeed, may have con- 
 sidered himself fortunate that he was able to pre- 
 vent the express mention of this injurious clause in 
 the declaration of neutrality issued by the Emperor 
 Alexander on the 23rd of July/"" 
 
 " Eussia has done us an immense amount of injury," 
 exclaimed the Duke de Gramont, referring to this 
 interdiction laid upon Austria, t A similar warning 
 was sent to Copenhagen, and forced Denmark to remain 
 neutral, in spite of the enthusiasm of that unfortunate 
 nation for an alliance with France ; an alliance in 
 which a project of disembarkation in the north was a 
 principal item. General Trochu, who was to take part 
 in it, was of opinion that such an undertaking would 
 prove of immense strategical importance. 
 
 The United States minister at St. Petersburg 
 agreed with one of the official newspapers of that 
 capital, "that Eussia has done more to ensure neutrality 
 than any other nation ; its threats have prevented 
 Austria from moving, and the influence of its Emperor 
 and of the Czarovitch have succeeded in hindering 
 Denmark from espousing the cause of France." J 
 
 England, it is just to add, in all this powerfully 
 assisted the Eussian policy. She was more than ever 
 
 * From Sir A. Buchanan's despatches, July 20th and 23rd. Valfrey's 
 History of the Diplomacy of the Government of National Defence, vol. i., p. 18. 
 
 f " La France et la Prusse," p. 348. 
 
 Despatch from Mr. Schuyler to Mr. Fisk, dated St. Petersburg, 
 August 23rd. " Pour la Verite," by General Trochu, p. 90. 
 
300 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 indifferently disposed towards France, in consequence 
 of M. de Bismarck's recent terrible revelations of 
 the "dilatory negotiations" of August, 1866, about 
 Belgium. 
 
 It is evident that the torch was kindled a little 
 too soon to exactly suit Prince Gortchakof. The 
 military preparations of Eussia were by no means 
 finished. Its moral influence, even, over the Slave 
 world had received a check since the conference on 
 Greece. M. de Bismarck had not precisely fixed the 
 hour to suit his colleague of the Neva ; as was 
 remarked by M. Benedetti, he had been particularly 
 careful not to invert the roles, and to act only at his 
 own convenience, to only seize his own opportunity. 
 Alexander Mikhailovitch, however, none the less 
 strove to carry out his part to the best of his 
 ability. 
 
 A very sagacious observer, the United States 
 minister already mentioned, wrote about this time to 
 his government : " The general opinion here seems 
 to be that if Eussia had been ready it would have 
 declared war, and striven to obtain from the confusion 
 certain advantages. . . . The government is doing 
 its utmost to prepare for all contingencies. The 
 cartridge factories are at work night and day ; an 
 order for a hundred Gatling cannon has just been 
 sent to America/' Thus the Eussians hastened to 
 arm themselves, and to hinder and intimidate all the 
 possible allies of France, thinking that by so doing 
 they were equalising the chances between the two 
 
THE FRENCH WAR. 301 
 
 belligerents. ** They flattered themselves that a war, 
 which Napoleon III. himself had declared would be 
 " long and painful," would be sure to afford them more 
 than one favourable opportunity. 
 
 But the dreadful disasters that overwhelmed France 
 at the very beginning of the campaign v put a sudden 
 stop to these vain imaginings, and broke up the dream 
 of a new Greco- Slave world, which, since 1867, had 
 ever and again haunted the dwellers on the banks of 
 the Moskva and the Neva. The remarkable political 
 and matter-of-fact aptitudes of the Eussian nation 
 enabled it at once to understand that all chances of 
 an Eastern crusade were gone for the moment, that 
 the destinies of the world were, for the time, being 
 fought out at the foot of the Vosges mountains, and 
 that it only remained for it to turn its attention to 
 that which was pressing and possible. 
 
 It is a curious phenomenon that the Balkan penin- 
 sula was never so peaceful, so undisturbed by the 
 "supreme idea," as during these years 1870-71; 
 during that " intestine struggle in Europe " which the 
 dying Fuad Pacha had declared would bode so much 
 ill to the Ottoman Empire. Towards the close of 
 August, before the catastrophe of Sedan, public opinion 
 in Russia could think of nothing but the unpopular 
 clause in the Treaty of Paris concerning the Black Sea. 
 
 * Prince Gortchakof was far from believing, at first, that the Prussians 
 would be victorious. He told M. Thiers many interesting stories on this 
 subject M. Thiers' Depositions before the Committee of Inquiry, p. 12. In. 
 an interview, indeed, with a politician whom he knew to have intimate 
 relations with Napoleon 111., he is said to have remarked : " Tell the 
 Emperor of the French to be moderate." Valfrey, vol. i., p. 79. 
 
302 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 " Russia," said an influential St. Petersburg journal, *" 
 " has not prevented the compulsory unification of 
 Germany, neither, in its turn, does it contemplate the 
 compulsory unification of the Slaves ; but it has the 
 right to ask that its position in the Black Sea and on 
 the shores of the Danube be improved ; we trust that 
 these legitimate demands will be taken into considera- 
 tion at the European congress which will probably 
 follow the present war." 
 
 A European congress ! This in fact would have been 
 the only logical and moderately reassuring upshot of 
 the important events that were disturbing the world's 
 equilibrum ; and it is only doing justice to the general 
 Eussian feeling of the moment to say that it was in 
 accordance with the real necessities of the situation, 
 and that it only looked forward to its country playing 
 a part as honourable as it was legitimate. The Eussians 
 wished to satisfy their amour-propre, but they were 
 far from desiring to sacrifice to it France and the 
 general interests of the Continent. The lesser ques- 
 tion was, in their eyes, but the corollary of the greater. 
 Even at Constantinople, where the behaviour of 
 the Eussiari Cabinet was looked forward to with 
 anxiety, no different expectation was, in reality, 
 entertained. As early as September 2nd, Mr. Joy 
 Morris, the American minister to the Sublime Porte, 
 wrote to his government that the general opinion on 
 the Bosphorus was that Eussia w^ould take advantage 
 of the crisis to insist upon the revision of the treaty 
 of 1856. "It would be strange if she did not suc- 
 
 * The Golos ; quoted in Mr. Schuyler's despatch of August 27th. 
 
THE FRENCH WAE. 303 
 
 ceed in her endeavours," added Mr. Morris, " since it 
 will fall to her to obtain honourable conditions of 
 peace for France, and to exercise a predominant in- 
 fluence upon the terms of the settlement." 
 
 Unfortunately, and for the first time during his 
 long and popular tenure of office, " the national 
 minister " divorced himself from the general feeling of 
 his countrymen, and, instead of behaving " like a 
 patriotic European," to use M. de Talleyrand's favourite 
 expression, he sought first and foremost to show his 
 friendship for his old Frankfort colleague. He did 
 not neglect the question of the Black Sea he owed 
 this little piece of consolation to his country to make 
 up for his huge miscalculations but he determined 
 to separate two questions which Russia wished to see 
 remain united ; and it desired that they should so 
 remain from political rather than' from generous 
 motives from an instinctive perception of the vital 
 interests of the future, rather than from a wish to 
 satisfy the keen but passing inclinations of the moment. 
 The Russian Chancellor deemed the fittest way to 
 serve Russian interests on the Euxine was to damage 
 those of Europe in Alsace and Lorraine, and did his 
 utmost that France and Germany should be left un- 
 disturbed to fight their quarrel out. In accordance 
 with this policy, he, immediately after the first French 
 disaster, jumped at the ingeniously treacherous idea of 
 the league of neutral powers, an idea of Italian origin,, 
 afterwards naturalised as an English one by Lord 
 Granville, and turned, in the hands of the Russian 
 Chancellor, as was cleverly remarked at the time, into 
 
304 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 a splendid means of " organising the impotence of 
 Europe." M. de Beust had vainly endeavoured, while 
 adopting the foundation of the English proposal of 
 August 19th, to alter its character, and to make it the 
 basis of a concerted intervention. He suggested not 
 separate efforts, but one made in common to mediate 
 on behalf of France, instead of the abortive scheme 
 which only " leagued " the powers together in order to 
 prevent them from making any collective proposal. 
 "The combination suggested at this moment by the 
 Austrian minister," says a judicious historian, " was 
 incessantly proposed by him during the rest of the 
 war ; if it had been adopted it would probably have 
 altered the course of events. It may be said, indeed, 
 that this explains why Europe refused to adopt it." 
 
 This is the reason why Prince Gortchakof, in 
 particular, opposed it from first to last. For one 
 passing moment England felt a slight compunction of 
 conscience, and showed some desire to intervene. 
 This supervened on M. de Bismarck's circular an- 
 nouncing to Europe Germany's terms of peace Alsace 
 and Lorraine. The Prussian ambassador communi- 
 cated this circular to the Russian Government, and 
 Prince Gortchakof abstained from any comment. 
 Sir A. Buchanan informed him that the Court of 
 St. James was, to a certain extent, inclined to follow 
 the initiative of St. Petersburg. The Chancellor re- 
 
 * S Orel's " Diplomatic History of the Franco-German War," vol. i., p. 254. 
 From a despatch of M. de Beust, dated September 29th, and intended for 
 London, we may also quote the following : " Do not let us be afraid to say 
 it, what is now helping to turn the struggle into a horrible war of exter- 
 mination, is, on one side, illusions and unfounded hopes ; on the other, the 
 indifference to, and selfish contempt of, the conflict manifested by Europe." 
 
THE FRENCH WAR. 305 
 
 plied that as Prussia had not asked his advice he had 
 not given it.* 
 
 Lord Granville had the courage a very unusual 
 courage in him to return to the subject; and Sir A. 
 Buchanan read to the Kussian Chancellor a memo- 
 randum timidly asking "whether it might not be 
 possible for England and Russia to come to an under- 
 standing upon the terms of peace, and to make, in 
 concert with the other neutral powers, an appeal to 
 the King of Prussia's humanity, recommending at 
 the same time moderation to the French Govern- 
 ment." 
 
 Prince G-ortchakof drily and scornfully received 
 these overtures. " Prussia/' said he, " has declared 
 its terms of peace ; a French victory alone can alter 
 them, and a French victory is not likely to happen. 
 Confidential conversations, therefore, between Eng- 
 land and Russia are useless. Concerted representation 
 would assume a more or less threatening character; 
 isolated action on the part of each neutral power is to 
 be preferred."! 
 
 Isolated action ! And this was all that could be 
 got out of Alexander Mikhailovitch, who contented 
 himself with allowing the august nephew to personally 
 address a few letters to his royal uncle beautifully ex- 
 pressed letters, talking of peace and justice, humanity 
 and moderation which the conqueror of Sedan 
 always affectionately answered with a swelling heart 
 and tearful eyes, dwelling upon his duties towards 
 
 * Sorel's " Diplomatic History of the Franco-German War," vol. i., p. 402. 
 f Sir A. Buchanan's Report, October 1st. 
 
 X 
 
306 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 his allies, his troops, his people, and his fron- 
 tiers."* 
 
 This -" euphemistic policy," as the historian has 
 well termed it, was persisted in on the banks of the 
 Neva during the whole of the war. General Fleury, 
 as well as M. Thiers and M. de Gabriac, were treated to 
 it, and the whole upshot of this " isolated action " of 
 Prince Gortchakof was to utterly abandon France to 
 the tender mercies of her conqueror, alone in her 
 exhaustion usque ad fine m. 
 
 It is well known in what terms this end was 
 announced at St. Petersburg. 
 
 " It is with a feeling I cannot express, and in 
 returning thanks to the Almighty," telegraphed from 
 Versailles the Emperor of Germany to the Emperor of 
 Kussia, on February 26th, 1870, "that I inform you 
 that the preliminaries of peace have just been signed. 
 Never will Prussia forget that to you it is due that 
 the war did not assume larger proportions. May God 
 bless you for it. Your grateful friend for life." 
 
 " Long and painful," indeed, was this war, as the 
 unhappy Emperor had predicted ; long enough, at any 
 rate, to let Europe measure the depth of its degrada- 
 tion, and to " give its blushes time to reach their 
 highest," as the poet happily says. If anything could 
 be more humiliating than this degradation, it would 
 
 * Even the simple proposal of armistice, which could have had no 
 influence upon the final terms of peace, Prince Gortchakof avoided making 
 in concert. M. d'Oubril, his envoy at Berlin, was left at the last moment 
 without instructions on this point. " It is singular enough," wrote Lord 
 Loftus, on October 26th, "that Kussia, after repeatedly proving its desire for 
 peace, should thus hold itself aloof, and prefer isolated to concerted 
 action." 
 
THE FRENCH WAR. 307 
 
 be the recollection of the exact similarity between the 
 two catastrophes that had happened within the short 
 space of four years. Fate, in producing its second 
 tragedy so soon after its first, had such a contempt for 
 our generation that it did not even think it worth 
 while to alter the plot or to make any outlay of 
 imagination. The work of 1870 was a mere copy of 
 that of 1866. 
 
 " You can take the East," said M. de Bismarck 
 at St. Petersburg, through his mouthpiece, General 
 Manteuffel ; as on the beach at Biarritz he had told 
 the Emperor Napoleon to take Belgium, making 
 always the same kind of offer of what was not his 
 to give, the same gracious gift of dragon-defended 
 fruit. 
 
 The dreamers of Moscow believed in a new era, in 
 " a new Greco-Slave-Roumanian world," as, in like 
 manner, Napoleon III. had dreamt of a new Europe, 
 repar celled out in accordance with the principle of 
 nationalities. " Prussia's increase of power can never 
 cause Russia any anxiety," had declared Prince 
 Gortchakof at the commencement of the Hohenzollern 
 incident, just as the zealots of the "new law" had 
 said at the outbreak of the Bohemian campaign that 
 France need feel no alarm. In both of these terrible 
 years France and Russia alike counted upon the 
 chances that would occur in a protracted and even 
 struggle ; they had even in each case respectively set 
 to work to hypothetically equalise the chances of the 
 two combatants, and the surprise and confusion were 
 not greater at St. Petersburg after Reichshoffen and 
 
 x 2 
 
308 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 Sedan, than they had been in Paris after Nahod and 
 Sadowa. 
 
 Kussia was behindhand in her military prepara- 
 tions in 1870 as France was in 1866, and the out- 
 break of both these calamities, that desolated and 
 upset the Continent, was followed by nothing but 
 paltry and selfish thoughts. All collective interven- 
 tion was purposely checked ; Prussia was helped to 
 entirely free herself from the control of Europe ; in a 
 word, a policy of justice, of preservation, and of 
 mutual equilibrium was sacrificed to one as erroneous 
 as it was sordid to a line of conduct the famous 
 humorist of Varzin once designated as "a pourboire 
 policy." 
 
 The Eussian Chancellor, it is true, was more for- 
 tunate after Sedan than was Napoleon after Sadowa. 
 He did manage to get his Luxemburg ; he succeeded 
 in procuring the abrogation of the second article of 
 the Treaty of Paris, " an abrogation of a theoretical 
 principle without any present application," as he 
 himself did not forget to repeat in a despatch. "" 
 
 It is within the recollection of all what estimate 
 was placed by the different cabinets of Europe upon 
 this victory really only a nominal one, and of very 
 little consequence, when compared with that Alex- 
 ander Mikhailovitch had allowed his old colleague to 
 obtain. 
 
 Prince Gortchakof gained his point, but not by 
 legitimate means, not with the brilliant and just 
 
 * Despatch from Prince Gortchakof to Baron Brunnow at London, 
 November 20th, 1870. 
 
THE FRENCH WAR. 309 
 
 triumph hoped for in Russia, dreaded in Constan- 
 tinople. He did not obtain the revision of the treaty 
 of 1856, in "endeavouring to obtain honourable con- 
 ditions of peace for France, and in exercising a pre- 
 dominant influence upon the terms of settlement."""" 
 He purposely made choice of the psychological moment 
 of France's weakness, of Europe's dismay, and of the 
 fatal blow that had befallen its public rights, to deal 
 it in his turn a last humiliating stroke a telum 
 wibelli, but not sine ictu. 
 
 With his own permission alone he freed himself 
 from an engagement entered into with the Powers, 
 as he had freed his friend at Berlin from the control 
 of Europe. " Hussia's act," said Lord Granville in 
 his remarkable despatch of November 10th to Sir A. 
 Buchanan, " annihilates all treaties. The object of a 
 treaty is to bind the contracting parties one to the 
 other ; according to the latest Russian doctrine, each 
 party obeys its own authority alone, and feels bound 
 only to itself." 
 
 In the beginning of 1868, a large intellect soon to 
 be restored by his country's disasters to the political 
 life shut out from him by the Second Empire, inveighed 
 with passionate eloquence against "the ever-increasing 
 neglect of that elementary principle of international 
 justice which public honour and public good sense 
 term the faith of treaties. "t "We see every day," 
 said he, " springing up under our eyes a luxuriant 
 jurisprudence, whose rapid growth does not surprise 
 
 * Despatch of Mr. Joy Morris, previously quoted. 
 
 f See " Diplomacy and Principles of the French Kevolution," by Prince 
 Albert de Broglie, in the Remie des Deux Mondes of February 1st, 1868. 
 
310 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 those who know what strength false principles now 
 borrow of, now lend to, the passions they encourage. 
 A few years ago this one-sided breach of unanimously 
 accepted treaties was not possible without incurring 
 risks that made want of faith, if not more legitimate, 
 at least of less frequent occurrence and of a less evil 
 example. It was still admitted that before a State 
 could pretend to repudiate a regularly signed treaty, 
 it must show that within its limits had occurred one 
 of those general upheavals of institutions, persons, 
 and things, termed a revolution. A revolution was 
 the political writ by which a nation informed all 
 whom it concerned that it was going into moral liqui- 
 dation, and no longer intended to pay its debts. 
 This, it seems to me, was already a large privilege ; 
 but the latest fashion of the new international code 
 thinks it insufficient. The formality of a revolution is 
 a troublesome and a costly one. A change of ministry, 
 or, better still, a parliamentary vote, is less incon- 
 venient. For the future this is all that is required 
 to be able, one twelvemonth, to tread under foot an 
 agreement which God, public honour, and public 
 conscience have been called upon to witness in the 
 previous one." 
 
 But, indeed, since this cry of alarm was uttered 
 by an honest conscience, we have lived to see this 
 new-fashioned code of rights called into play without 
 the excuse of a revolution, a change of cabinet, or 
 even a parliamentary vote ; to hear its legitimacy 
 proclaimed by the minister of a regular, absolute 
 monarchy by a Russian Chancellor. The Italians, 
 
THE FRENCH WAR. 311 
 
 it is true, were in a similar hurry to take advantage 
 of France's misfortune to break a solemn engagement 
 they had contracted with her. It cannot be denied that 
 in 1870 they set Prince Gortchakof an example in this 
 new-fangled style of public honour. But it was scarcely 
 from a government born but yesterday that Count 
 Nesselrode's successors should have stooped to take a 
 lesson. Once, indeed, Alexander Mikhailovitch re- 
 proached Italy for "siding with the revolution for 
 the sake of receiving its inheritance."* Since then 
 he, too, has sided with the revolution with one of 
 the most audacious, most violent revolutions that 
 have ever upset a throne and overwhelmed a kingdom. 
 He has not received its inheritance, it is true (for the 
 revolution, alas ! is still alive), but he has accepted an 
 ante-mortem legacy a deed of gift, a trifling present 
 out of all proportion to the services he rendered, 
 but one that bears the stamp of treacherous gain, and 
 that is an injury and an insult to the rights of 
 nations. 
 
 The triumph of Alexander Mikhailovitch would 
 have been of a somewhat noble, more enduring kind, 
 if, in the month of October, 1870, "the national 
 minister," inspired by the legitimate ambition of the 
 Eussian nation, had brought about a European under- 
 standing to make peace betwixt France and Prussia, 
 and to settle the tremendous troubles of the Con- 
 tinent. 
 
 " We have always thought," wrote M. de Beust as 
 early as the 10th September to St. Petersburg, "that 
 
 * Letter to Prince Gagarine at Turin, dated October 10th, 1860. 
 
312 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 Kussia should take the initiative." And, in truth, her 
 importance abroad, her security at home, her intimate 
 relations with the conqueror, properly assigned it to 
 her. There is no room for doubt but that Austria, 
 Italy, and England would immediately have ranged 
 themselves under her banner. No need was there of 
 any threatening intervention, no occasion even for the 
 armed neutrality suggested by Mr. Disraeli."" The 
 will of all the Continental powers firmly expressed in 
 unison would have amply sufficed. In this manner 
 the losses of France might have been lessened, and 
 Germany might have been restricted to a less formid- 
 able position, more in harmony with the aspirations 
 and the liberal tendencies of our century. The great 
 vassals themselves of the new Emperor would have 
 hastened to proffer their co-operation, and a general 
 disarming would have restored to fruitful and recu- 
 perative labour a hardly-tried generation, unable, as 
 matters now stand, to gain even repose from its 
 idleness. 
 
 Who can doubt that after such services Russia 
 would not have failed to obtain from a grateful 
 Europe the abrogation of the obnoxious clause in the 
 treaty of 1856 ? France, for one, would certainly 
 never have dreamt of standing in the way ; Austria 
 would not have desired to retain a clause which she 
 had opposed from the first, and which, four years 
 previously, she had solemnly declared to be merely 
 " a question of pride," whose sacrifice was demanded 
 by the most weighty interests. As for England, it is- 
 
 * Speech in the House of Commons, August 1st. 
 
THE FRENCH WAR. 313 
 
 well known that of late it has been possible to make 
 her agree to a great deal, or rather, that for some time 
 past she accepts everything."* 
 
 What influence, what vigour, such a benefit, 
 obtained for humanity by an absolute monarchical 
 government, would have lent to the cause of order 
 and conservatism ! What a legacy of life it would 
 have been to the monarchical principle ! What pres- 
 tige it would have shed upon the Eussian nation 1 
 What imperishable renown it would have linked to 
 the name of Alexander II. ! The call of fate was 
 plainly audible, the path it pointed out was easy. 
 Count Nesselrode's successors were deaf to the one, 
 and refused to see the other. It was but an offence 
 of omission, perhaps ; but of a kind never forgiven by 
 that great doer of justice, Alighieri, when committed 
 against his ideal of justitia et pax. Such was the sin 
 he stigmatised with the name of il gran rifiuto. 
 
 * Lord Granville, in his bitter despatch of November 10th, 1870, 
 hastened to acknowledge that England would not have refused to examine, 
 in concert with the co-signatory powers, what modifications might have 
 been made in the treaty of 1856, " if Eussia had only gone to work in 
 another way." 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 A TEN YEARS PARTNERSHIP. 
 
 The Emperor William's Journey to Russia in the Spring of 1873 Twelve 
 Days of Fete at St. Petersburg The Two Chancellors on the Banks of 
 the Neva Russian Opinion on the Ten Years' Partnership For and 
 Against M. de Bismarck's Reassuring Words Serious Apprehensions 
 for the Future. 
 
 ON January 9th, 1873, Napoleon III. mournfully 
 expired in exile at Chislehurst, and shortly afterwards 
 William I. entered the seventy-sixth year of a life 
 certainly not lacking in Fortune's most extraordinary 
 favours. Germany celebrated the birthday of her 
 new Emperor with a delight all the more exuberant 
 and sincere, that he had marked the anniversary by 
 ratifying a last convention with the Versailles govern- 
 ment, which assured the payment in advance of the 
 fifth milliard of ransom, and the speedy return of the 
 army of occupation beyond the Vosges mountains. 
 Having thus finally settled accounts with his heredi- 
 tary enemy, the conqueror of Sedan resolved in his 
 turn to pay a debt of gratitude. He determined 
 to personally convey to the Emperor Alexander II. 
 his grateful thanks for the loyal assistance he had 
 
A TEN YEARS' PARTNERSHIP. 315 
 
 rendered him through a long period of trial and 
 of struggle. Long announced, and often deferred, 
 the journey to St. Petersburg at last took place in 
 the spring ; and M. de Bismarck was careful that 
 both the date of the visit, and the visit itself, should 
 remind the world of the intimate association of 
 interests that had grown up between Kussia and 
 Prussia, and that had proved so fatal to the "West. 
 " The common aim," said the official organ of the 
 German ministry,* " which brought about the alliance 
 between Prussia and Russia in 1863, at the time of 
 the Polish insurrection, was the starting-point of the 
 present policy of the two powers ; a policy that the 
 great events of the last four years have confirmed a,nd 
 strengthened. From the attitude assumed by Russia 
 in the Schleswig-Holstein question, down to the im- 
 portant proofs of sympathy given to Germany by 
 the Emperor Alexander during the last war, every- 
 thing that has occurred has helped to cement this 
 alliance." 
 
 Obeying that species of historical glamour, some- 
 times clever enough to partially deceive dispassionate 
 examination, which the sovereign will casts over the 
 public acts, and often indeed infuses into the public 
 monuments of Russia, it is the fashion in official 
 circles at St. Petersburg to consider the campaign of 
 1870 as the continuation of the work of 1814, as the 
 final episode of " that momentous period in which 
 the united armies of Russia and Prussia fought for a 
 
 * Provincial Correspondence of May 1st, 1873. 
 
316 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 sacred cause common to both of them."* Within the 
 Kremlin, iii the splendid hall devoted by the Emperor 
 Nicholas to his country's military triumphs, a hall 
 that may be termed the Arc de 1'Etoile of Holy 
 Russia, the stranger is surprised to see graven in 
 golden letters on its marbles the names of Moltke, of 
 Roon, and of the other German leaders who dis- 
 tinguished themselves in the last war with France, t 
 In fact, the conqueror of Sedan, as he crossed the 
 wide plains of Muscovy, might have fancied that he 
 was still surrounded by his own admiring subjects. 
 From the frontier to the Gulf of Finland the journey 
 was one long succession of triumphs and ovations. 
 
 At every station the imperial train stopped at, 
 was seen in waiting a guard of honour, was heard 
 the strains of the German national hymn. The 
 Czar met his illustrious guest at the Gatchina, and on 
 April 27th the two sovereigns made their public 
 entry into Peter the Great's capital. The skies were 
 dark and cold, and the sun refused to illumine " the 
 city of damp streets and arid hearts," as it has been 
 called by one of its own poets. But human industry 
 had done its best to supplement nature and to conceal 
 the rigours of the climate, " Every hothouse in the 
 
 * Telegram sent by the Czar to King William I. on December 9th, 1869. 
 Only the other day, at the last of the St. George's banquets, the Emperor 
 Alexander II. observed : " I am glad to be able to declare that the close 
 alliance between our three empires and our three armies, founded by our 
 illustrious predecessors, for the defence of the same cause, exists intact at 
 the present moment." Official Journal of the Russian Empire, December 
 12th, 1875. 
 
 f " A Visit to Moscow," by Count Tarnowski, in the Cracovia Review, 
 November, 1875. 
 
A TEN YEARS' PARTNERSHIP. 317 
 
 capital, including those in the Imperial gardens," says 
 an eye- witness,'"" " were laid waste for the purpose of 
 building up round the doors and windows a delusive 
 spring, which, in our tardy north, never comes before 
 
 summer." 
 
 Kich carpetry, displayed for miles along the sides 
 of the houses, occasionally tempted the visitors to 
 mistake the cold capital of the North for the smiling 
 city of the Lagoons. " The Izmailovsky Prospect, 
 the Voznessensky Prospect, the vast Morskai'a, formed 
 one continuous avenue of Russian, German, and 
 Prussian flags. On hundreds of balconies the busts 
 of both monarchs were displayed, crowned with laurel 
 and surrounded with verdure and flowers. The fagade 
 of the large Preobrajensky riding-school was sur- 
 mounted with a cluster of flags, grouped round a 
 colossal cross of that military order of St. George of 
 which his Majesty the Emperor William is the oldest 
 knight and the only grand cordon." The crowd 
 pressed hotly round the guests from Berlin. The 
 talkative Bismarck and the silent Moltke, were par- 
 ticularly objects of curiosity. 
 
 For twelve days there was an endless succession 
 of reviews, parades, illuminations, balls, routs, ban- 
 quets, concerts, and gala performances. Amongst 
 the latter were specially chronicled the two magni- 
 ficent ballets of " Le Eoi Candaule" and "Don 
 Quixote." Nor was the populace without its share 
 in the rejoicings ; particularly on the evening of the 
 
 * From the St. Petersburg Gesellschaft. The rest of the description is 
 taken from the St. Petersburg Journal and the Invalide Russe of the date. 
 
318 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 29th of April, when a gigantic fete was given in the 
 Palace Square, The two sovereigns witnessed the 
 mammoth concert from the palace balcony. 
 
 As they stepped on to the balcony the huge 
 square was suddenly lighted up by five electric lights, 
 with such intense brilliancy that the features of every 
 face in the immense crowd were easily distinguishable, 
 and the orchestra struck up the national Prussian 
 hymn. Fifteen hundred and fifty performers took 
 part in this, besides 600 trumpeters and 350 drum- 
 mers. The Prussian air was followed by the March 
 of King Frederick William III, and then by a whole 
 series of military marches the Steinmetz March, the 
 (t Wacht am Ehein," the March of the Guards of 
 1808, to the tune of which the Eussian regiments had 
 re-entered St. Petersburg after the Eylau campaign ; 
 and the March of Paris, which had once resounded 
 in the ears of the allied armies as they triumphantly 
 entered the capital of France. 
 
 The military prayer, " How great is the Lord in 
 Zion," produced a tremendous effect. It is a little 
 difficult to understand how Weber's plaintive air 
 " The Praise of Tears " (Lob der Thranen) wandered 
 into the midst of these strains consecrated to Mars 
 and Vulcan ; unless as a discreet homage to the 
 well-known sensibility of the veteran Hohenzollern, 
 authentic evidences of which will be found by history 
 in hundreds of his speeches, letters, and telegrams. 
 Indeed, he did not leave St. Petersburg without 
 displaying this characteristic sensitiveness. As the 
 two sovereigns were bidding each other adieu in the 
 
A TEN YEARS' PARTNERSHIP. 319 
 
 imperial saloons of the Gatchina terminus, "William of 
 Germany was obliged to hurriedly break away, to pre- 
 vent himself from yielding to his emotion. With 
 bent head and twitching features he left the saloon 
 with hasty footsteps, and buried himself in his rail- 
 way carriage, without once looking back. 
 
 If, however, during this Prussian visit to the 
 banks of the Neva the honours were all for the Czar's 
 uncle, the eager and almost feverish curiosity of the 
 public was a good deal more occupied with the 
 celebrated minister whose white cuirassier's uniform 
 lent an extra emphasis to his conspicuous stature 
 with the famous German Chancellor, who in one brief 
 lustrum had known how to found an empire on the 
 ruins of two other oi>es. St. Petersburg had not 
 yet had time to forget the free-spoken diplomatist, 
 who, from 1859 to 1862 had astonished and amused 
 Kussian society by his abuse of his own Court, by 
 his ridicule of the " perruques of Potsdam " and 
 the "Philistines of the Spree;" and who sometimes 
 quoted always taking care, however, to be the 
 first to laugh M. Prudhomme's famous saying, "If 
 I were the government !" 
 
 Now he was, indeed, the government he was 
 even the master of Europe ; and before his star those 
 of a Hapsburg and a Napoleon had paled their 
 ineffectual fires ! The topic was in truth one that 
 suggested many a striking comparison, many a piquant 
 reminiscence; nor was it one that refused to lend 
 itself to idle comments, to the plerisque vana miran- 
 
320 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 tibus alluded to by the immortal historian when 
 speaking of striking changes of fortune. 
 
 As the great ladies in the "Winter Palace looked 
 at the man of the five milliards, they remembered an 
 ambassadress of ten years ago who was heard one 
 day to roundly declare that she really could not afford 
 to pay forty roubles for a dish of early asparagus ; 
 and who, on another occasion, very candidly owned 
 that her new diamond earrings were the result of the 
 exchange of a valuable snuff-box, an old gift of the 
 Prince of Darmstadt."" This ambassadress was the 
 wife of M. de Bismarck, then only a baron, now a 
 prince, but still a good fellow, and as affable as ever. 
 He was as easy-tempered, lively, and obliging as 
 when he was envoy. He inquired after his friends, 
 after his acquaintances, after both the great and little 
 people he used to meet ; and seemed as though he 
 was taking up the thread of intimacies interrupted 
 but a day ago. The statesman disappeared, and 
 gave place to the courtier and the man of the world. 
 We are told by a sagacious observer that even with 
 Prince G-ortchakof he made a point of stepping out of 
 the foreign minister, and appearing in the undress of 
 -an old companion, almost a fellow-countryman. M. de 
 Bismarck paid his Eussian colleague the affectionate 
 deference of a friend to an elder friend, of a disciple 
 to his master, artlessly enough said his flatterers, for- 
 getting the old saying, discipulus supra magistrum; 
 though Alexander Mikhailovitch, a good Latin scholar, 
 probably remembered it. 
 
 * From the St. Petersburg Oesellschaft, vol. ii., p. 89. 
 
A TEN YEARS' PARTNERSHIP. 321 
 
 The pair often appeared side by side in public at 
 fetes and receptions : the one conspicuous by his great 
 height and remarkable head ; the other easily recog- 
 nisable by his more delicately-cut features, by his keen, 
 witty, and slightly cunning expression. Obeying the 
 ingenious precept of court etiquette first introduced by 
 good old Homer when he made Glaucus and Diomede 
 exchange armour, the Russian minister wore the 
 Order of the Prussian Black Eagle, and the Prussian 
 minister that of St. Andrew of Eussia. In truth, 
 tins interchange of orders seemed typical of the 
 community of views which had so long united these 
 illustrious diplomatists. 
 
 Such a cordial, stable understanding between a 
 couple of statesmen at the helms of two different 
 empires was assuredly an unusual spectacle. It was 
 certainly a striking one, and amidst the solemn 
 pomps of St. Petersburg, it gave reflecting minds 
 much food for thought. The annals of the past were 
 ransacked in vain for such an enduring and brilliant 
 instance of harmonious action. A few celebrated 
 political intimacies, such as those between Choiseul 
 and Kaunitz, Dubois and Stanhope, Mazarin and 
 Cromwell, were only called to mind to be instantly 
 recognised as comparatively misleading and merely 
 apparent analogies. 
 
 Nobody miscalculated the considerable and deci- 
 sive influence which the understanding between the 
 two Chancellors had lately exercised upon the destinies 
 of Europe ; nobody was blind to the prodigious use 
 M. de Bismarck had made of this understanding in 
 
322 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 his hazardous undertakings. Opinions only began 
 to differ when it became a question of auditing the 
 Kussian ledger, of reckoning up the exact profit 
 gained by the Empire of the Czars during this part- 
 nership of ten years the most stormy decade 
 through which the Continent had passed since that 
 which ended on the day of Waterloo. 
 
 Some thought that the situation created by Sadowa 
 and Sedan was one of pure gain to Eussia. They 
 pointed to the torn fragments of the humiliating 
 treaty of 1856; to Austria, punished for the treachery 
 she had been guilty of at the time of the Crimean 
 war ; to France, fallen and diminished ; to England, 
 a resigned spectatress of General Kaufman's ad- 
 vance on Bokhara ; and, finally, to Kussia, rapidly 
 recovering her old prestige, and quietly tasting 
 her revenge that delicious morsel for the gods, 
 and for such favourites of the gods as Alexander 
 Mikhailovitch. 
 
 Is there not, they asked, a marvellous good for- 
 tune, an impressive singleness of purpose in the 
 career of a minister, who, after the conference at 
 Vienna, solemnly swore to avenge the degradation 
 of his country, and who has so well kept his oath ? 
 Does there not seem to be a splendid Nemesis in 
 the punishment, one after the other, of those 
 haughty "allies," who, in 1853, undertook the de- 
 fence of the Crescent against the Cross of St. Andrew, 
 and who, ten years later, dared to raise the Polish 
 question ? To-day, Austria and France outvie each 
 other in obsequious flatteries at the feet of the 
 
A TEN YEARS' PARTNERSHIP. 323 
 
 "northern barbarian" they then professed to despise; 
 while England humbly begs of him a modus Vivendi 
 in Central Asia. And Eussia has attained this 
 enviable and glorious position without a struggle, 
 without a sacrifice ; by merely biding her time, 
 while she developed her internal prosperity, and 
 allowed her neighbour an old and tried friend, 
 whose devotion has never faltered full liberty of 
 action. 
 
 It is but simple justice that Prussia should have 
 reaped the harvest of her bravery and her good faith ; 
 and the well-known sentiments entertained by the 
 Emperor William towards the Czar, the family ties 
 which have so long united the two courts, the 
 destinies of the two countries, so distinct, and yet so 
 conformable, are the certain pledges of a permanent 
 and unalterable understanding for the future. How 
 often has not Prussia solemnly sworn that she has no 
 interest in the Eastern question ! When the inherit- 
 ance of the Ottomans comes to be decided, the House 
 of Hohenzollern will show its gratitude to the House of 
 Romanoff. Petty jealousies and petty rivalries have 
 had their day, in common with petty States, and petty 
 artifices to catch influence and to balance power. The 
 future belongs to a rational policy based upon the 
 nature of things, upon geographical facts, and upon 
 homogeneity of race. This policy assigns to Eussia 
 and to Germany rdles that, while differing, are but 
 the corollaries one of the other. 
 
 Taking a broad view, it is, in truth, a matter of 
 congratulation that the sceptre of the West has slipped 
 
 Y 2 
 
324 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 from the hands of a turbulent, volcanic nation- 
 al ways engaged in some propaganda, now Jacobin, 
 now Ultramontane, but ever revolutionary to fall 
 into the grasp of the most orderly, most hierarchical, 
 and best disciplined State in Europe. 
 
 And finally, Sadowa and Sedan were Protestant 
 victories over the two chief Catholic powers, and the 
 struggle against Koman Ultramontanism, into which 
 M. de Bismarck has just plunged, is only the logical 
 consequence of these important events in history. 
 Without going so far as to accept certain ideas ideas, 
 however, very widely spread as to a possible future 
 fusion of the Protestant and orthodox beliefs, it may 
 certainly be said that it is not for the Church of 
 Photius to lament because the Vatican has been 
 dealt a mortal blow. 
 
 To such reasonings, supplemented besides by 
 captious and sarcastic arguments, those who thought 
 differently furnished objections inspired by an equally 
 sincere but a much less sanguine patriotism. They, 
 too, agreed in admiring the ease and the rapidity with 
 which Russia had recovered from the disasters in the 
 Crimea ; but they contended that this result had been 
 obtained long before M. de Bismarck had come upon 
 the scene, long before any understanding had been 
 entered into with him ; and that, as far back as 1860, 
 when the sovereigns of Austria and Prussia and 
 many minor German princes came to greet the Czar 
 and recognise his moral supremacy at Yarsovia, and 
 when Napoleon III. was seeking his friendship and 
 accepting his arbitration, the Russian empire had 
 
A TEN YEARS' PARTNERSHIP. 325 
 
 already reassumed the great position in Europe 
 which of right belonged to it. 
 
 The remarkable tact with which Prince Gortchakof 
 had made use of the goodwill of France to promote 
 Russian interests, without yielding a single point of 
 essential importance, without compromising any of 
 the conservative and traditional principles of Eussian 
 policy, would always prove his surest claim to his 
 country's gratitude ; but it was a matter of regret 
 that he had not shown the same prudent reserve in 
 the close relations with Prussia, which, after the 
 Polish insurrection, took the place of the old under- 
 standing with the Tuileries. It was impossible not 
 to perceive that Nesselrode's successor had exaggerated 
 the purpose of the notorious French " remonstrance " 
 about Poland, and the danger likely to accrue from it ; 
 as well as the true character of the not really disinte- 
 rested services at that time rendered to him by his old 
 friend at Berlin. At any rate, the latter constituted 
 no sufficient reason for sulking with the rest of Europe 
 after the matter had been settled to the signal ad- 
 vantage of the Eussian Government for persistently 
 sulking with it year after year, for positively refusing 
 to entertain the idea of any other alliance but that 
 of Prussia, and for obstinately and constantly allowing 
 that power to go where it pleased, do what it pleased, 
 and take what it pleased. 
 
 In short, these enlightened patriots were strongly 
 of opinion that, generally speaking, the pith of the 
 mistakes of the last fifteen or twenty years lay in this : 
 that rancour, spite, and ill-nature had been allowed to 
 
326 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 play too large a part in the settlement of the weightiest 
 affairs. A wretched basis of policy, forsooth ! and 
 one which the German Chancellor alone had had the 
 wit to despise. 
 
 A rancorous recollection of the behaviour of the 
 St. Petersburg Cabinet in the Italian question had 
 led Austria to extend a helping hand to the Polish in- 
 surgents. A feeling of ill-temper against England, 
 for its conduct at the time of the congress, had 
 induced Napoleon III. to throw up the cause of 
 Denmark ; while, more than all others, Alexander 
 Mikhailovitch had been actuated by these petty 
 motives. He had been the first to yield to them 
 in indulging his " policy of spite " against Austria 
 for the imaginary wrongs she had committed during 
 the Crimean w r ar he had been, in truth, the most 
 eager to adopt the contemptible " pourboire policy," 
 and to promote the selfish " league of neutral powers," 
 that had effectually barred all concerted and generous 
 action. 
 
 Many indeed were the splendid opportunities of pro- 
 moting the welfare of Europe, his country's glory, and 
 the fame of his illustrious master, that had slipped 
 through the Eussian Chancellor's hands, as, in infa- 
 tuated friendship, they obstinately grasped Prussia's 
 calculating fingers. One, for instance, in the spring of 
 1867, at the time France and Austria offered him such 
 ample concessions in the East ; another, in the autumn 
 of 1870, when Austria and England begged him to take 
 the initiative in the work of peace. Much indeed were 
 those mistaken who believed that Prince Gortchakof 
 
A TEN YEARS' PARTNERSHIP. 327 
 
 had sacrificed nothing during his ten years' under- 
 standing with his formidable colleague. 
 
 Is it nothing, forsooth, that Kiel, the key of the 
 Baltic, has been delivered into the grasp of Germany ? 
 is it nothing that the kingdom of Denmark, the home 
 of the Czarevna, has been rent and dismembered ? 
 nothing that Queen Olga now sits on a vassal's 
 throne ? nothing that a whole phalanx of reigning 
 families, closely akin to the House of Komanoff, have 
 been dethroned and plundered ? nothing that the 
 minor States, from time immemorial the devoted and 
 loyal partisans of Kussia, have been robbed of their inde- 
 pendence ? In a word, is it nothing that the ancient 
 balance of power scales, lever, and fulcrum has been 
 roughly dashed to pieces, and that the Chancellor's 
 whole policy has resulted in the immoderate, gigantic 
 aggrandisement of his country's nearest neighbour ? 
 
 " The greatness of a State is relative, and a country 
 that suffers no material loss may, in reality, become 
 diminished as new forces accumulate around it."* This 
 saying, addressed to Napoleon III. after Sadowa, might 
 have been well taken to heart by Eussia after Sedan, 
 for it is impossible to pretend that the abolition of the 
 second article of the Treaty of Paris was an equivalent 
 for the new resources accumulated by Prussia in the 
 centre of Europe. It may be urged, perhaps, that the 
 recent Kussian conquests in Asia constitute the real 
 compensation. But their value is at least doubtful ; 
 they have only hitherto succeeded in waking Eng- 
 
 * Confidential note of M. Magne, July 20th, 1866. Papers and Corre. 
 spondence of the Imperial Family, vol. i., p. 241. 
 
328 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 land's suspicions, and the time may yet come when 
 they may prove a cause of serious embarrassment 
 to the Empire. 
 
 If a huge European conflagration should ever 
 break out, Russia will be obliged either to abandon 
 these distant conquests, impatient of her rule ; or else 
 to double and triple her occupying forces there, and 
 so weaken herself in the West, where will lie the 
 real brunt of the struggle. As to her hopes on the 
 Bosphorus, they are mere contingencies, like other 
 expectations of inheritance. The " Sick Man " has 
 over and over again proved the falsity of the prognos- 
 tications of his doctors ; crisis after crisis that was 
 positively to carry him off has passed away. Nor is 
 the postponement of his death-agony, perhaps, alto- 
 gether a misfortune for Eussia ; for it is an open 
 question whether the Northern Empire is yet prepared 
 to enter upon such a vast inheritance whether its 
 outfit of tools and workmen is yet exactly proportioned 
 to such a huge establishment if, in a word, it is ready 
 with the necessary military and financial resources, 
 with the administrative organisation indispensable for 
 the occupation of such wide territories. 
 
 It is impossible to take possession of European 
 provinces in the easy fashion the same extent of soil 
 is annexed on the banks of the Amoor or the Syr- 
 Daria. A second restless Poland may rear its head by 
 the waters of the Danube, at the foot of the Balkans ; 
 and the reign of a single system of law, the uniform 
 dominion of the Svod, may not prove so easy to 
 establish in lands where the most incongruous institu- 
 
A TEN YEARS' PARTNERSHIP. 329 
 
 tions, from the rule of the scimitar to that of parlia- 
 mentary government, have, side by side, confusedly 
 flourished and run riot. Nor is it impossible that the 
 absorption of Turkey may in its turn transform the Mus- 
 covite nation, and that history may not have, one day, 
 to inculcate afresh the pathetic lesson of Grcecia capta. 
 
 A Russia, mistress of the Eastern Peninsula, may 
 no longer, perhaps, be Russia ; and an empire bathed 
 by the blue waters of the Bosphorus may no longer be 
 able to boast a capital on the ice-bound shores of 
 Finland. 
 
 These are weighty and difficult problems problems 
 that naturally cause hesitation, apprehension, and in- 
 decision. On the other hand, one thing is certain, and 
 that is, that when the moment is at hand Prussia will 
 lay down her conditions and stipulate for her compen- 
 sation. When the hour verily strikes, to pay her old 
 debt of gratitude will be far from her thoughts ; she 
 will only think of driving a new bargain. And what 
 will her price be ? Holland, or Jutland, or the German 
 territories of Austria ? the frontier of the Vistula, or 
 the provinces of the Baltic ? 
 
 Perhaps, after all, this long drama of Turkish 
 decadence is destined to wind up with a very un- 
 expected denouement, as illogical as it will be original. 
 Public writers and patriots of Berlin have, before now, 
 been heard to speak of Austria's mission by the 
 Danube and 011 the Bosphorus have long ago been 
 heard to say that she was intended by Providence to 
 carry thither Teuton interests " German civilisation." 
 Since Sedan, particularly, Austria has been eloquently 
 
330 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 exhorted to "seek her centre of gravity elsewhere 
 than at Vienna," to justify her name of Ost-reich, and 
 to become in reality an Empire of the East. 
 
 It may well be that a monarchy, constantly 
 threatened with the loss of its German possessions 
 on the banks of the Leitha, may at last be tempted 
 to take this advice and run the risk ; especially if it 
 is continually dinned into her ears that the risk is a 
 virtue nay more, a necessity. 
 
 A State that has never undergone any serious pro- 
 cess of centralisation, a State that has always oscillated 
 between a dual system of government and a more or 
 less defined federal one, might indeed appear to 
 Europe to possess the very framework with which to 
 enclose and assimilate the medley of races, of creeds, 
 of institutions, which swarm between the Iron Gates 
 and the Golden Horn. 
 
 On the Bosphorus, an Empire of the East, subject 
 to German influences and inheriting German traditions ; 
 to the south, a kingdom of Greece, enlarged by 
 Thessaly and Epirus ; to the north, a united Germany, 
 completed and rounded off by the absorption of the 
 Cis-Leithan Provinces this is an arrangement that 
 would give satisfaction in many quarters, not ex- 
 cluding England. It is perhaps as good a solution as 
 any other of the tremendous Eastern question ; and it 
 is permissible to suggest any hypothesis, any extrava- 
 gance, when dealing with the world of the fantastic 
 Orient, or with that equally mysterious and portentous 
 world that seethes in the brain of the hermit of 
 Varzin. 
 
A TEN YEARS' PARTNERSHIP. 331 
 
 The Emperor Alexander, however, is even now 
 face to face with a position that has nothing to do 
 with the world of hypothesis and speculation ; a situa- 
 tion that is, unfortunately, but too evident and too 
 palpable. In the place of "a purely and exclusively 
 defensive combination," as Prince Gortchakof once 
 correctly described the ancient Bund in the place of 
 a league of peacefully inclined States, all the obliged 
 friends of Russia, and forming for her, as it were, a 
 continuous line of rampart, he now sees before him, 
 firmly settled down along the whole line of his 
 frontier, a gigantic power, the strongest of the Con- 
 tinent ambitious, full of enterprise, and obliged by 
 its very position to henceforward stand up against 
 Russia as the natural champion of what it has been 
 agreed to call " Western interests." 
 
 Whenever this power chooses, it can, if it suits 
 it, bring even the Polish question into the arena, and 
 in a somewhat more dangerous manner, forsooth, than 
 that erewhile adopted by the Cabinets of Paris and 
 London. Indeed, a proposal to strike Russia such a 
 mortal blow was warmly discussed in 1871 by a group 
 of Hungarian statesmen, supposed to be to some con- 
 siderable extent in M. de Bismarck's confidence. 
 
 The conduct of the Berlin Government at the time 
 of the last insurrection in Varsovia is no criterion for 
 the future. The passionate speeches uttered by M. de 
 Bismarck in 1849 against the Magyar rising did not 
 prevent him at a later period from encouraging General 
 Klapka. Nor is it possible to be blind to the views 
 held by Prussia in 1863 as to the left bank of the 
 
332 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 Vistula, "the natural frontier;" and even now it is 
 sometimes hinted at Berlin that there perhaps lies the 
 most efficacious road to the final annihilation of Polish 
 dreams. 
 
 No word, as yet, has been spoken as to the Baltic 
 provinces, as before Sadowa no one had broached the 
 idea of even wishing to cross the Main. But Teuton 
 aspirations are ever on the increase in Courland and 
 Livonia, and the world has by this time learnt to 
 what painful sacrifices the Hohenzollerns are capable 
 of resigning themselves when it is given out that they 
 are summoned by that all-compelling voice the voice 
 of their German brethren. 
 
 In truth, the prince-regent would have shuddered 
 if, in 1848, it had been whispered to him that he 
 would one day find himself arrayed against the Haps- 
 burgs, with Garibaldi as his companion-in-arms ; yet, 
 when the time came, he yielded to a supposed neces- 
 sity, and gave the signal for the fratricidal struggle 
 with grief in his heart and tears in his eyes. It is, 
 moreover, childish to attempt to measure the destinies 
 of nations by the career or the disposition of any single 
 monarch. Germany may one day hail an emperor 
 with neither affection for nor remembrance of Alex- 
 ander II. " a Pharaoh who knew not Joseph ;" and 
 even if not, there exists a mightier power in the world 
 than that of czar or emperor the stern force of cir- 
 cumstances, the overmastering necessities of race. 
 
 Formidable, indeed, is the race of the victors of 
 Sadowa and Sedan, whose ancient invading and con- 
 quering genius has survived a hundred transforma- 
 
A TEN YEARS' PARTNERSHIP. 333 
 
 tions, has accommodated itself to a hundred changes 
 of fortune ! Humble and yet daring, temperate but 
 prolific, expansive and yet tenacious, devoutly carry- 
 ing into practice the spirit of their ancient proverb, 
 ubi bene, ibi patria, yet ever preserving a keen 
 affection for their mother country, the Germans 
 insinuate themselves into every country, penetrate 
 into every region, are found in every corner of the 
 habitable globe. 
 
 Their connections and their descendants sit on 
 every throne of the world and stand behind its every 
 counter, throng the industrial centres of Europe 
 and people the solitudes of the Far West, throw 
 the casting votes into the Presidential urns of the 
 great Kepublic and monopolise most of the impor- 
 tant posts in the administration of the northern 
 Empire where people still talk of a statistical return 
 showing that out of every hundred officers of the 
 higher grades in the Kussian army, at least eighty 
 per cent, were of German origin/" 
 
 Such already were the characteristics of the Ger- 
 man before his great strokes of fortune in 1866 and 
 1870, before the era of "blood and iron," before 
 M. de Bismarck had revealed to him the secret of his 
 might, before he had heard the magic whisper tu 
 regere imperio populos ! 
 
 * This return was published in the Golos, some years ago, when it created 
 considerable stir. A story is told to the effect that the sufficiently common- 
 place name of Kozlof enjoyed a brief popularity in Eussia for the following 
 reason : The Czarovitch was holding a levy of officers, and after an inter- 
 minable list of purely German cognomens had been called out, the name 
 of Kozlof was suddenly pronounced. " At last ! thank God," exclaimed the 
 Czarovitch. Russland seit Aufhebung der Leibeigenschaft. Laibach, 1875. 
 
334 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 It is scarcely necessary to recall the hatred which 
 the Germans have always felt towards the Slave, or 
 the extermination to which they have already devoted 
 him by the Elbe and the Oder. The mind recoils 
 horror-struck at the mere idea of a new meeting 
 between the two races a meeting now more than 
 ever likely to occur. It is the fashion, it is true, to 
 treat such apprehensions as mere pedantic dreams, 
 the empty visions of professors and scribblers ; but 
 when has any important problem been less lightly 
 regarded by the conspicuous statesmen, the profes- 
 sional political prophets of our day ? Did they not 
 pooh-pooh the Schleswig-Holstein question and the 
 German intentions towards Alsace ? did they not 
 laugh to scorn the unity of Italy and the programmes 
 of the National- Verein ? 
 
 A chapter upon " Diplomatists versus Professors " 
 would make an interesting passage of contemporary 
 history, and would show that the most pedantic, the 
 most ideologist of the two classes, are not precisely 
 those generally so considered. 
 
 Is it not, for instance, asked the same disapprovers 
 of Prince Gortchakof s policy more thoughtful for 
 the future and anxious for the present, than blindly 
 fascinated by unseasonable remembrances of the past 
 is it not simple pedantry to compare the two periods 
 of 1814 and 1840, and to recognise in Moltke the 
 successor of Koutouzof ? At the time of the memor- 
 able war that followed the heroic burning of Moscow 
 the whole of Europe turned against an insolent 
 master, and brought safety and deliverance to 
 
A TEN YEARS' PARTNERSHIP. 335- 
 
 kingdoms bruised and down-trodden by a foot that 
 aspired to universal dominion. 
 
 Were the circumstances the same in the last 
 campaign ? Should it not rather be said that France, 
 this time, was fighting for the balance of power and 
 the independence of Europe, that she was trying to 
 repair, by a late and badly conceived effort, a whole 
 series of culpable mistakes that had endangered others 
 besides herself? 
 
 In truth, the two periods were widely different 
 in their underlying motives, and as broadly con- 
 trasted in their external signs and tokens. The 
 Prussian minister at the outset informed M. Benedetti 
 that " he would fight him with revolutions," and he 
 kept his word. He showed attention to, made 
 excuses for, and displayed a sympathy with the 
 Commune he would find it difficult to justify. And 
 later on, he openly protected the Kepublic against all 
 attempts at monarchical restoration, thus sacrificing 
 the monarchical principle and the weightiest considera- 
 tions of public order to a selfish and vindictive policy. 
 This was not the spirit that swayed the allies in 
 1814. The magnanimous Alexander I. held a very 
 different view of a sovereign's duties, and of the 
 sympathy that should exist between all animated 
 with the spirit of conservatism. And the Emperor 
 Nicholas can there be any doubt as to the crushing 
 verdict he would have pronounced on the whole gist 
 of the Berlin policy, upon the regeneration of 
 Germany ? a regeneration that, in reality, has ever 
 revealed itself as a species of revolution from above, 
 
336 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 from its federal execution in Holstein to its arrest of 
 the syndics of the Crown ; from its destruction of 
 the Bund to its overthrow of the Guelf dynasty ; 
 from its formation of Hungarian legions and its 
 intrigues with Mazzini to its Kulturkampf against the 
 Catholic Church. 
 
 Let there be no mistake, said the antagonists of 
 the two Chancellors ; it is the revolution alone which 
 will profit by the campaign against Catholicism 
 undertaken by Germany. Great and surprising 
 indeed are the illusions of those who flatter them- 
 selves that Protestantism and orthodoxy, or tolerant 
 religious feeling in general, will gain anything by 
 the losses the Papacy may suffer. A glance at the 
 swollen battalions of the Kulturlcampf reveals their 
 god ; their banners are plainly embroidered with the 
 symbol in whose name they hope to conquer. 
 
 Is it supposed that the sincere Protestants, the 
 Evangelicals to whom the Holy Scriptures are a 
 great truth, are leading the assault, or are even 
 following it with their wishes and their prayers ? 
 Assuredly not. All true disciples of the Eeformed 
 Church, those who cling not to the empty shadow of 
 the name but to the substance of its doctrine, openly 
 repudiate the struggle, and lament it. 
 
 They rightly believe that in our revolutionary 
 epoch an epoch so undermined by the spirit of 
 negation there should be such a thing as unity 
 of religious interests as well as political unity of 
 conservative interests. Those eager for the fray, the 
 zealots, " full" forsooth ! "of the divine Spirit," are, 
 
A TEN YEARS' PARTNERSHIP. 337 
 
 in reality, the very minds who admit the existence of 
 neither deity nor soul, and who have no positive 
 belief but that of positivism. In them a resus- 
 citated Luther would certainly fail to recognise his 
 children. 
 
 The great antagonist of Rome in the sixteenth 
 century believed in revelation, in his Bible, in his 
 doctrine of grace are not all these things ridiculous 
 rubbish in the eyes of the disciples of Strauss and 
 Darwin ? The apostle of Wittemberg believed in 
 justification by faith ; the apostles of Berlin pin their 
 solitary belief to justification by success. 
 
 It is a serious thing, finally observed these 
 alarmed patriots, a very perilous thing, for a great 
 State to abandon, in its relations with the other 
 Powers, certain established maxims, certain rules of 
 conduct assayed by long experience, and become, as 
 it were, arcana imperil. Napoleon III. has but just 
 paid a ruinous price for his disobedience to the 
 ancient traditions of French foreign policy. 
 
 Eussia, on her side, owed Europe a certain 
 obedience to the venerable traditions which had been 
 the foundation of the splendour and the strength of 
 the preceding reigns. In those reigns the liberty of 
 the Baltic was jealously defended, care was taken to 
 maintain a proper balance of power between Austria 
 and Prussia, the friendship and devotion of the minor 
 States of Germany were properly appreciated, and 
 respect for the monarchical principle was everywhere 
 enforced upon the presuming spirit of the revolution. 
 It is devoutly to be wished that Kussia may never have 
 
338 . THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 cause to regret having turned aside from the track 
 beaten by the triumphant chariot-wheels of Peter. 
 the Great, of Catherine II., of Alexander L, and of 
 Nicholas. 
 
 Thus thought and spoke on the banks of the Neva 
 many independent minds, while the official world was 
 busy displaying the magnificence of the north in 
 honour of William the Conqueror. Their thoughts 
 and words were, in truth, only the connected ex- 
 pression of a vague presentiment, a deep but veiled 
 doubt that was secretly stirring the heart of Eussia. 
 
 "With that habit of obedience and discipline, which 
 some call a servile instinct, but which in this nation 
 is often the expression of a deep and admirable 
 patriotism, the masses were far from thinking of an- 
 noying their Government in the brilliant reception 
 it was giving its Prussian guests ; they were content 
 to remain impassive spectators of a display which 
 made no appeal to their hearts. 
 
 The press maintained a great sobriety of tone in its 
 descriptions; its remarks were more reserved still. So 
 marked was its reserve, indeed, that with the best will 
 in the world all that could be found to be said at 
 Berlin was that the St. Petersburg press showed a 
 " proper " tone. On the whole, the general feeling in 
 Kussian society was a similar one. In the palace 
 itself the true moral was pointed by the surroundings 
 in the foreground a mass of hot-house flowers, in the 
 distance a perspective of ice. The guests appeared to 
 notice this curious contrast. Mixed with the exquisite 
 perfume of exotic flowers, there occasionally reached 
 
A TEN YEARS' PARTNERSHIP. 339 
 
 them a keen blast of the outer air, the bitter, icy wind 
 of the north. 
 
 Even M. de Bismarck himself seemed to feel the 
 effect of this treacherous atmosphere. He displayed 
 more mechanical vivacity than real dash and warmth ; 
 his words were far more measured than was usual 
 with him ; he seemed to purposely avoid any decided 
 opinion, any too lively discussion. 
 
 It is a curious fact that during his fortnight's stay 
 in the Kussian capital the once plain-spoken diplo- 
 matist gave utterance to none of the sallies, none of 
 the jokes he is generally addicted to ; to not one of 
 the bewildering indiscretions which have so often been 
 the delight of society and the dread of men in office. 
 
 But one single sensational saying was heard to 
 issue from the lips which had so often pronounced 
 destiny's fiat, the expression that " he could not even 
 admit the thought of ever being hostile to Russia.' 7 
 It seemed an explicit and reassuring declaration 
 enough, offered, perhaps, in reply to concealed appre- 
 hensions. But the incredulous and the suspicious felt 
 inclined to remark that, only ten years ago, such an 
 assurance proffered by a Prussian minister to the 
 Eussian empire, would have seemed more than super- 
 fluous, it would have seemed laughable. 
 
 Here ends the task undertaken in writing these 
 two sketches. The meeting of the two Chancellors in 
 the capital of Peter the Great, in the spring of 1873, 
 may be considered the epilogue of the joint action that 
 
 z 2 
 
340 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 has lasted ten years, and that has so much contributed 
 to change the face of the world. 
 
 Since that period Europe has been free from storms, 
 though angry and threatening clouds have now and 
 again crossed its ever gloomy horizon. Every now 
 and then, indeed, a slight and passing flash has seemed 
 to reveal that the ancient and fatal harmony between 
 the Cabinets of Berlin and St. Petersburg is not more 
 absolute than it was of old, and that it is still inter- 
 rupted by certain differences of opinion and intention. 
 
 The Czar's government, for instance, declined to 
 accompany the German Chancellor on his Spanish 
 campaign, in his feverish adhesion to the presidency 
 of Marshal Serrano ; and there seems little doubt that 
 the personal intervention of the Emperor Alexander, 
 strongly backed by England, averted from France 
 last year an iniquitous attack, and prevented a tre- 
 mendous calamity. 
 
 Since then Austria has, to some extent, joined 
 the intimacy of the two northern Empires ; and it 
 would be difficult to say whether her arrival has com- 
 pleted or complicated a partnership in which it be- 
 comes daily more difficult to discover any common 
 interest, and which up till now has found harmony 
 only in silence. The future alone can unveil the 
 meaning and the value of this triple alliance, so much 
 praised and, perhaps, so little understood. But it is, 
 even now, by no means too .soon to be sure that in 
 this interesting trinity it is M. de Bismarck who has 
 really the best of it. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 The different chapters of this volume appeared in 
 successive numbers of the Revue des Deux Mondes 
 for 1875. The second number for the month of 
 September contained the chapter headed, " The 
 Eclipse of Europe ; " and in the number dated 
 October 1st appeared the following : 
 
 "We have received the following letter from 
 M. Benedetti : 
 
 TO THE EDITOR OF THE 'KEVUE DES DEUX MONDES.' 
 
 PARIS, September 24th, 1875. 
 
 SIR, In the last number of the Revue des Deux Mondes 
 you published an article by M. Klaczko, which compels me 
 to ask you to insert a short rectification. I should be the 
 last to deny any one the right of placing his own construc- 
 tion upon the events of which M. Klaczko has penned an 
 anecdotic history, or of independently criticising the share 
 in them which fell to me. On the contrary, I am most 
 anxious, both for my own sake and for that of the Govern- 
 ment which I had the honour of serving, that they should 
 be discussed and examined. The light that has already 
 been thrown upon them, the reversal of erroneous verdicts 
 that has already taken place, have produced the best results 
 
342 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 for both of us; but an examination of the past can only 
 prove searching and useful if it is impartially made, and it 
 cannot be impartial if it refuses to notice positive and un- 
 deniable facts. 
 
 M. Klaczko says : ' Certainly the French Ambassador 
 at the Court of Berlin occupied during 1866 a very onerous 
 and painful, we might almost say, pathetic, position. He 
 had devoted himself to bring about that connubio of Italy 
 with Prussia which seemed in his eyes to be of such value 
 to the Imperial policy, to be such a signal victory over the 
 ancient order of things, such a benefit to the (e idees Napo- 
 leoniennes," and to the " new right. " In the well-grounded 
 fear of seeing his work collapse and Prussia draw back, if 
 there were any mention made of future compensation or 
 preventative engagements, he was unceasing in his endea- 
 vours to dissuade his government from any attempt of the 
 kind . . ' / (page 445). And at page 442, in a note, 
 M. Klaczko remarks : ' M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who had 
 already obtained the cession of Venice from Austria, what- 
 ever might be the result of the dispute, insisted at this time 
 on sureties being in a like manner taken from Prussia, the 
 cleverest and most dangerous of the two contending parties. 
 M. Benedetti did not cease to oppose such a step, in the fear 
 that, if it were suggested, Prussia would entirely abandon 
 her designs against Austria/ 
 
 Now, these assertions either mean nothing at all, or they 
 convey that I was the real originator, perhaps, I should say, 
 the negociator, unknown to my government, of the treaty of 
 alliance concluded in 1866 between Prussia and Italy; and 
 that I had perseveringly prevented M. Drouyn de Lhuys 
 from carrying out his intention of obtaining from the Berlin 
 Cabinet, before the Austrian war, the pledges necessary for 
 the future security of France. 
 
 M. Klaczko corroborates these assertions by no quota- 
 tion of known facts, by no extracts from any official docu- 
 ments. He offers no proof of them in any shape or form. 
 
 Yet, he must have been aware, since he continually 
 quotes a work I published in 1871, bearing the title of 
 ' Ma Mission en Prusse/ that I repudiated any participa- 
 
APPENDIX. 343 
 
 tion in the Prusso-Italian treaty ; lie must have known that 
 I had fully shown this. In such a case, it is scarcely suffi- 
 cient to offer a simple contradiction ; it is necessary, rather, 
 to give proofs to the contrary, to plainly establish that, far 
 from having had nothing to do with the understanding 
 between Prussia and * Italy, I had been its principal 
 instigator. 
 
 I am desirous that the readers of the Revue des Deux 
 Mondes should know the truth. They have seen M. 
 Klaczko's article ; it is only right to submit to them a few 
 words at least of the despatches I have published. 
 
 ' The approaching arrival is announced/ I wrote on 
 March 14th, 1866, 'of an Italian officer, General Govone, 
 who is coming to Berlin on an important mission. This 
 news . . . has caused some considerable stir. If it should 
 turn out to be true it will certainly be believed that Prussia 
 and Italy are negotiating a treaty of alliance/ 
 
 Two days later I added, l General Govone reached 
 Berlin the day before yesterday. According to Count 
 Bismarck and the Italian ambassador his mission is simply 
 a military one, and its aim is merely to examine the improve- 
 ments lately made in weapons of all kinds/ 
 
 A couple of days later still I was able to give my 
 government more precise information, and I wrote : 1 1 
 informed you, when I reported General Govone' s arrival, 
 that, according to M. de Bismarck and the Italian envoy, 
 the general's only object was to study the military organi- 
 sation of Prussia. Forgetting, no doubt, what he had 
 said to this effect, M. de Bismarck informed me yesterday 
 that General Govone was authorised to -treat with the 
 Prussian Government. The gist of the communication he 
 has made to the President of the Council is in fact . . / 
 In concluding this despatch, I added, ' The Italian legation 
 maintains an attitude of complete reserve towards me. 
 Perhaps I ought not to regret it. M. de Bismarck's con- 
 fidences, which, however, it is impossible for me to decline, 
 already place me in a sufficiently delicate position/ 
 
 Finally, on the 27th of March, by which date the pleni- 
 potentiaries had already held several conferences, I wrote to 
 
344 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 M. Drouyn rle Luliys : c M. de Bismarck has conversed 
 with me about his negotiations with General Govone and 
 the Italian envoy .... and I feel all the more able to 
 give you an account of them as M. de Barral, the Italian 
 envoy, has AT LAST decided not to entirely hide from me the 
 proceedings and the intentions of his government.' 
 
 Either M. Klaczko must admit that my official corres- 
 pondence was sincere, or he must suppose that it was 
 concocted with the object of concealing my real conduct, 
 and the share I was secretly taking in the negotiations. 
 In the first case it is difficult to see on what grounds he 
 affirms that I ( had arduously and passionately laboured to 
 bring about the understanding between Italy and Prussia/ 
 In the second the circumstances assume a different aspect, 
 and I will wait till M. Klaczko has explained himself before 
 I make any further observations. 
 
 For the present I will content myself with producing the 
 only evidence that nobody can possibly suspect that of the 
 Italian plenipotentiary. Since General Govone's death, and 
 subsequent to the publication of l Ma Mission en Prusse/ his 
 correspondence has been given to the public by General La 
 Marmora, who has omitted nothing. In this correspon- 
 dence, where everything is minutely detailed, my name is 
 twice mentioned ; the first time in a telegram of the 28th 
 of March, twelve days after the Italian plenipotentiary's 
 arrival at Berlin ; and this is what he says about me : ( I 
 ought to tell you that the president (M. de Bismarck) keeps 
 M. Benedetti informed of everything/ 
 
 In the letter in which my name appears for a second and 
 last time, a letter dated the 6th of April, two days before 
 the actual signature of the treaty (the dates are most im- 
 portant, and it is necessary to remember them), General 
 Govone gives an account of a visit he paid me, and of what 
 I said to him with reference to the negotiations. I quote 
 word for word : ' Yesterday, after my visit to M. de Bis- 
 marck, I had an interview with M. Benedetti ; he thought 
 that it would be better for us to sign no treaty, but to have 
 a project proposed, agreed to, and ready to be signed as soon 
 as Prussia had completed her mobilisation/ 
 
APPENDIX. 345 
 
 Do these two extracts, sir, authorise the belief that I was 
 the confidant and the adviser of the Italian envoy ? Do they 
 not, on the contrary, entirely confirm the sincerity of nay 
 correspondence ? Where has M. Klaczko seen or found that 
 I laboured to bring about the understanding between 
 Prussia and Italy ? Should he not have told us this before 
 he made such a serious accusation ? Can he pretend that it 
 is a matter of reproach to me that I endeavoured to learn 
 what was going on, and kept my government informed 
 of it? 
 
 As to M. Klaczko's assertion, twice repeated, that I was 
 continually, before the war, dissuading M. Drouyn de Lhuys 
 from demanding at Berlin conditional compensations and 
 preventative engagements, for fear of arresting Prussia in its 
 coming struggle with Austria, I will answer it by the 
 following extract from a letter which M. Drouyn de Lhuys 
 himself wrote to me on the 31st of March, while negotia- 
 tions were still pending between Berlin and Florence. 
 
 f l have read with a great deal of pleasure/ he wrote, 
 i the private letters you have sent me in the course of the 
 month. I beg to thank you for them. I did not answer 
 them immediately because I had nothing to add to or alter 
 in the instructions I have at different times given you. 
 Our opinions remain the same. We fully recognise the 
 gravity of the present crisis, but we cannot see that its 
 latest phase contains anything to persuade us to abandon 
 our neutral attitude. We have frankly explained this to 
 the Prussian court. When our intentions were asked by the 
 Cabinet of Vienna we declared our firm intention of re- 
 maining neutral, though it was remarked to us that our 
 neutrality would be more favourable for Prussia than for 
 Austria. We shall await, therefore, the coming war, if one 
 is to break out, in our present attitude. The king himself 
 has been good enough to acknowledge the justice of your 
 view, that present circumstances afford no foundation for 
 the understanding his majesty desires. The progress 
 of events, the nature and bearing of the interests that may 
 be at stake, the dimensions which the war may assume, as 
 well as the questions to which it may give rise, will then 
 
346 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 furnisli a basis for an agreement to be possibly entered 
 into between Prussia and ourselves/ 
 
 In this same letter, which is given at full length on 
 the 77th page of ' Ma Mission en Prusse/ M. Drouyn de 
 Lhuys pointed out the reasons which compelled us to 
 maintain a reserved attitude with respect to the efforts 
 made by Prussia and Italy to agree upon concerted 
 action ; and he added in conclusion, ' I have now 
 thoroughly laid before you our manner of viewing the 
 question. I quite approve of your attitude and your lan- 
 guage, and I shall be obliged to you if you will continue 
 to keep me equally well informed of the minutest details of 
 this crisis/ 
 
 Are these the expressions M. Drouyn de Lhuys would 
 have used in acknowledging the receipt of my despatches if 
 their object had been to prevent him from making any con- 
 ditions for the future with Prussia ; if between the minister 
 and his ambassador there had existed differences, the entire 
 responsibility of which M. Klaczko wishes to cast on me ? 
 I will not insist any further, but wiH leave to the penetration 
 of your readers the task of discovering the truth. I may 
 add, however, that if M. Klaczko made himself acquainted 
 with the above letter before writing his article, and I have 
 a right to assume that he did so, it becomes impossible to 
 account for the errors into which he has fallen. 
 
 I regret to be obliged to say, moreover, that I should 
 have to refer to every chapter of his work if I wished to 
 point out all its shortcomings ; but I will not take undue 
 advantage of my right of reply, and I will go no further. 
 One other mistake, however, on account of its particular 
 importance, you must allow me to correct. 
 
 In answer to a telegram from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, I 
 wrote to him on June 8th, 1866, that not a single Prussian, 
 from the king down to his humblest subject, with the ex- 
 ception of M. de Bismarck, would consent to cede us an acre 
 of German territory on the Rhine. After quoting from this 
 despatch, M. Klaczko adds: 'And it is this same diplo- 
 matist, who showed such a complete appreciation of the 
 situation before the campaign in Bohemia, it is this same 
 
APPENDIX. 347 
 
 ambassador who afterwards took upon himself to present to 
 M. de Bismarck the demands of the cabinet of the Tuileries ; 
 going actually so far as to submit to him, on the 5th of 
 August, an outline of a secret treaty abandoning to France 
 the whole of the left bank of the Khine, without even ex- 
 cepting the great stronghold of Mayence ! ' 
 
 M. Klaczko is mistaken. This proposal was not made 
 by me; and his assertion, which is corroborated by no 
 proofs, surprises me the more as he might have seen in ' Ma 
 Mission en Prusse/ that the real circumstances were very 
 different ; that, on the contrary, I had pointed out the new 
 and serious difficulties to which this proposal would give 
 rise j and that I had asked permission to return to Paris to 
 discuss it before making it to M. de Bismarck, but that I 
 had been instructed to the contrary. Whether I was right 
 or wrong is another matter ; but it was all the more incum- 
 bent on M. Klaczko to avoid treating this incident in the 
 manner he has done, since, as he takes care to point out, 
 its consequences have been serious and fatal. 
 
 If this is the way M. Klaczko interprets the duties of 
 an historian, I can only express my surprised regret. He 
 has doubtless not remembered that party-spirit and personal 
 sympathies suggest statements which a loyal impartiality 
 disavows. I regret this error in judgment in an author 
 who has accustomed the readers of the Revue des Deux 
 Mondes to more carefully-prepared and more impartially- 
 written essays. For myself, personally, you will allow, sir, 
 that it was impossible for me to give assent by silence to 
 such utterly unfounded assertions ; and that M. Klaczko has 
 driven me to make this protest, in spite of a sincere desire 
 to avoid all controversy, and of a determination, which it is 
 painful to me to forego, to keep aloof from all discussion. 
 This letter has no other object, and in asking you to insert 
 it in the next number of the Revue, I beg you to accept 
 the assurance of my distinguished consideration. 
 
 BENEDETTI." 
 
348 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 " We thought it right to forward M. Benedetti's 
 letter to M. Klaczko, who returned it with the 
 following remarks : 
 
 M. Benedetti confounds the two very different negoti- 
 ations mentioned in our contributions to the Revue des 
 Deux Mondes, as well as the two equally distinct conclusions 
 we drew from them. It was only in the matter that 
 occurred in August, 1866, concerning the treaty in reference 
 to Belgium, that we found fault with M. Benedetti' s be- 
 haviour to his minister. We did not condemn his attitude 
 in March and April of the same year, with reference to the 
 secret treaty between M. de Bismarck and General Govone; 
 and we certainly did not reproach him with having, un- 
 known to his Government, suggested that treaty. We 
 merely attested that his despatches of that date were 
 calculated to prevent the French Government from attempt- 
 ing any preliminary understanding with Prussia, providing 
 against possible results of the war. 
 
 M. Benedetti, in fact, continually represented the Berlin 
 cabinet as deaf to any proposal of the kind. On the 
 8th of June, 1866, just before the war, he wrote : ' The 
 apprehensions with which France fills Germany are still as 
 great as ever, and would be aroused in a violent and 
 unanimous manner at the slightest indication 011 our part 
 of a wish to extend our possessions towards the east. By 
 no Prussian, from the king to the humblest of his subjects, 
 would the bare supposition of any sacrifice on the Rhine be 
 endured at this moment. The Crown Prince, though con- 
 vinced of the political dangers by which he is surrounded, 
 declared not long ago, with great energy, to one of my 
 colleagues, that he would prefer war to the cession even of 
 the small county of Glatz/ (' Ma Mission en Prusse/ 
 pp. 171,172.) 
 
 In his other reports and throughout his book, M. Bene- 
 detti is always laying stress on the fact that he ' never 
 encouraged any hope ' in this direction, and that he ' had 
 plainly pointed out that in no case would Prussia willingly 
 
APPENDIX. 349 
 
 make us any territorial concession on our Eastern frontier. 
 (' Ma Mission en Prusse/ p. 176.) 
 
 These, however, were not the opinions of the Italian 
 diplomatists at Berlin. M. de Barral, in a telegram sent on 
 May 6th to General La Marmora, expressed himself thus : 
 ' Considerable stir has been caused here by the busy negoti- 
 ations which are said to be going on between Austria and 
 France, with the purpose of assuring the neutrality of Italy. 
 Austria is reported to have gone so far as to offer France 
 the frontier of the Rhine. When I remarked to M. de 
 Bismarck on the danger of such an offer by a German 
 power, he shrugged his shoulders, clearly giving me to 
 understand that if he was compelled to face it he would not 
 shrink from such a solution himself/ 
 
 And General Govone, in a detailed report of the 7th of 
 May, alludes to the same story in a still more explicit 
 manner. ' M. de Bismarck is anxious to know the inten- 
 tions and desires of the Emperor (Napoleon III.) ; he has 
 mentioned his anxiety to M. de Barral, and has asked him 
 to endeavour to ascertain them through M. de Nigra. M. 
 de Bismarck has, in fact, given ground for the belief that 
 he feels disposed to cede Napoleon III. the line of the Rhine, 
 his agents having informed him that the Emperor has been 
 carrying on negotiations with Austria, and that Austria had 
 shown herself willing to give up Venetia, and had even 
 suggested that France might take the left bank of the 
 Rhine. On M. de Barral, to whom the Prussian minister 
 was speaking of these Austrian suggestions, exclaiming, 
 " But Austria would never compromise herself with Ger- 
 many by ceding territories which belong to the Confedera- 
 tion/' M. de Bismarck shrugged his shoulders, as much as 
 to say, " I would cede them too." ; 
 
 Moreover, in his report of the 3rd of June, five days 
 previous to the date of M. Benedetti's despatch about ' the 
 king and the humblest of his subjects/ General Govone 
 quotes the following reply of the Prussian Minister to his 
 question whether ' some geographical boundary/ might not 
 be found to indemnify France. ' There is the Moselle,' said 
 M. de Bismarck. ' I am/ he added, ' much less of a German 
 
350 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 than a Prussian,, and I should feel no difficulty in agreeing 
 to cede to France the whole territory between the Rhine 
 and the Moselle the Palatinate, Oldenburg, a small part of 
 Prussia, &c. But the King would be much more scrupulous, 
 and would never be able to arrive at such a decision unless 
 at some supreme crisis, when it came to be a question of 
 losing or gaining everything. Before, however, the King 
 can be brought to agree to any kind of arrangement with 
 France, it is necessary to be acquainted with the minimum 
 (il limite minima) pretensions of that Power/ * 
 
 It will be seen, therefore, that the Italian negotiators 
 took a very different view to that of M. Beiiedetti on this 
 important point. In the confidential, and evidently trust- 
 worthy communications they made to their own Govern- 
 ment, they treated a preliminary terrritorial arrangement 
 between France and Prussia as an arrangement difficult to 
 settle, no doubt, but still as a very possible one. 
 
 We refrained from discussing in the pages of the Revue 
 whether General Govone or M. Benedetti had shown the 
 truest appreciation of the situation ; we did not even allude 
 to their difference of opinion ; we contented ourselves with 
 asking M. Benedetti, how he could possibly have expected 
 to find Prussia, after Sadowa and Nikolsburg, ready to 
 agree to terms, which she had declined to accept before her 
 stupendous victories, and in the midst of an extremely 
 hazardous crisis; how he came to undertake, f on the 
 5th of August, to dema,nd for France the whole of the left 
 bank of the Rhine, including the important stronghold of 
 Mayence, when, on the 8th of June, he was convinced that 
 it would be impossible to obtain from Prussia such a pitiful 
 handful of territory even as the small county of Glatz ? 
 
 * La Marmora, " Un po piu di luce," pp. 211, 221, 275. 
 
 t Our words were : "How came he to take upon himself (pris sur lui) 
 to present to M. de Bismarck the demands of the Cabinet of the Tuileries ? " 
 And M. Benedetti sees in these words, to take upon himself, an insinuation 
 that he initiated the proposal. Yet we explicitly said the demands of the 
 cabinet of the Tuileries, and we added M. Benedetti's own expressions : 
 u I provoked nothing, neither did I guarantee success ; I only allowed 
 myself to hope for it." None of our readers could have misunderstood the 
 meaning of our words, or seen in them the insinuation M. Benedetti gra- 
 tuitously attributes to them. 
 
APPENDIX. 351 
 
 We have given the only possible explanation of this 
 contradiction, the only one, it seems to us, that can possibly 
 suggest itself to anyone who has studied these events. 
 
 Before the campaign in Bohemia, we said, M. Benedetti 
 did not think himself in a position to obtain territorial 
 concessions from Prussia ; and had the more strenuously 
 insisted upon the difficulties that would attend such a de- 
 mand, that he feared to see Prussia draw back, and its 
 connubio with Italy come to nothing, if too much stress 
 were prematurely laid upon the necessity of compensation. 
 He preferred to rely for the advantages that ought to 
 accrue to his country, upon the upshot of military opera- 
 tions, 'upon the straits to which war might reduce the 
 Prussian Government ' ('Ma Mission/ page 172). He ex- 
 pected the thunderbolt of Sadowa as little as any human 
 being. 
 
 After Sadowa the success of the Hohenzollerns alarmed 
 him. Patriotic anxiety for his country took the place in 
 his heart of his whilom generous sympathy for Italy ; and, 
 as he himself said, ' the important acquisitions of Prussia 
 convinced him that a fresh territorial arrangement was 
 henceforth necessary for France's security' ('Ma Mission/ 
 p. 167). This fresh arrangement he had first hoped to 
 find on the Rhine, ' if only the language of his government 
 were firm, and its attitude a determined one' (p. 178). 
 Afterwards he sought it on the Meuse and the Escaut, and 
 allowed himself to be dragged into the secret negotiations 
 about Belgium, which were destined to prove so fatal to 
 France. 
 
 Our having attributed to M. Benedetti a patriotic anxiety 
 on the morrow of Sadowa can scarcely have irritated him. 
 Is he then displeased because we credited him with Italian 
 sympathies ? But a marked partiality for M. de Cavour's 
 cause and country was always a principal and conspicuous 
 feature in the political existence of the former French 
 ambassador at Berlin. By one and all M. Benedetti has 
 ever been considered one of the most distinguished members 
 of a party which wielded a very great influence in the 
 councils of the Second Empire ; the party which considered 
 
352 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 Italian unity as the most glorious and useful work of the 
 reign, and which looked upon the connubio between Italy 
 and Prussia as an immense piece of good fortune for the 
 Imperial policy a brilliant victory achieved over the 
 traditions of the past in favour of the ' new right ' and 
 the ' idees Napoleoniennes.' 
 
 M. Benedetti' s diplomatic career in this respect, indeed, 
 is marked by a concentrated singleness of purpose that 
 ought to ensure him the eternal gratitude of all Italian 
 patriots. In 1860 he negotiated, and brought to a success- 
 ful conclusion, the treaty of Savoy and Nice ; in exchange 
 for which the Imperial Government allowed the agreement 
 of Zurich to be torn up, and formally recognised the annex- 
 ations of Tuscany and Emilia. In 1861 he was 'appointed 
 Minister Plenipotentiary of France at Turin, to console 
 Italy, as it were, for Cavour's untimely death, and to re- 
 establish beyond the Alps the friendly relations temporarily 
 jeopardised by the invasion of the kingdom of Naples. 
 
 In the following summer (August, 1862), fresh troubles 
 arose between France and Italy ; brought about by Aspro- 
 monte, and by General Durando's circular of the 10th of 
 September, demanding the evacuation of Eome. M. 
 Thouvenel found himself obliged to retire from the hotel 
 on the Quai d'Orsay, in favour of M. Drouyn de Lhuys; 
 and M. Benedetti as did also his colleague at Rome, M. de 
 Lavalette hastened to tender his resignation, in order to 
 mark his strong disapproval of a new policy less favour- 
 able to Italy's aspirations. 
 
 He did not return to his career till two years later, till 
 the 7th of October, 1864; after the convention of the 
 15th of September had satisfied the wishes of the Turin 
 cabinet with regard to Eome ; after, too, M. de Bismarck 
 had paid a visit to Paris, and had there laid the foundations 
 of the combination against Austria. The rank of the 
 French mission at Berlin was then raised to that of an 
 embassy, and M. Benedetti was sent to fill it. His old 
 Roman colleague, M. de Lavalette, was simultaneously 
 summoned to the councils of the Empire ; and about the 
 
APPENDIX. 353 
 
 same time General La Marmora, well known for his Prusso- 
 mania, assumed the lead in the Turin cabinet. 
 
 The year 1865 had scarcely dawned before M. de 
 Bismarck inaugurated his first campaign against Austria on 
 the question of the Duchies, and made his first overtures 
 at Florence to compass an understanding with Italy. The 
 connubio was not definitively settled till April, 1866, under 
 the eyes of M. Benedetti. 
 
 As far as we are aware, no one ourselves certainly have 
 not has reproached M. Benedetti with having, unknown to 
 his Government, favoured this connubio ; though he will 
 scarcely deny that he gave it his best sympathies. We 
 allow that General Govone had no gushing confidences for 
 him at Berlin ; it was M. Benedetti, on the contrary, who 
 confided important secrets to the Italian diplomatist ; among 
 others, that ' M. de Bismarck was a kind of madman whom 
 he (Benedetti) had known and observed for nearly fifteen 
 years/* M. Benedetti also advised the General ' to sign no 
 treaty, but to have a plan discussed, agreed upon, and 
 ready to sign as soon as Prussia had completed her mobi- 
 lisation/ Will M. Benedetti seek to persuade us that in 
 giving this advice he was striving to prevent the connubio ? 
 Scarcely. In offering it M. Benedetti was simply recom- 
 mending General Govone to act prudently. He was giving 
 him a piece of good advice ; and people are not in the habit 
 of giving good advice about schemes they wish to see break 
 down. 
 
 Besides, there was no necessity to waste time in persuad- 
 ing the Italians of the advantages of the connubio. They 
 were already more than anxious for it. The real importance 
 lay in winning over the Court of Berlin, in dispelling its 
 scruples, in reassuring it, especially, as to the intentions of 
 France. ' I think it right to inform you/ telegraphed on 
 the 28th of March, the Italian envoy to General La Marmora, 
 ' that the president (M. de Bismarck) keeps M. Benedetti 
 
 * Del conte Bismarck dice (M. de Benedetti) che e tin diplomatico, per 
 cosi dire maniaco ; che da quindici anni che lo conosce e lo segue.' General 
 Govone's Report of the 6th April, 1866. ' La Marmora,' p. 139. 
 
 2 A 
 
354 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 informed of everything that is going on.' * M. de Bismarck 
 would scarcely have kept M. Benedetti so well posted in the 
 matter if he had thought him averse or even indifferent to 
 the Italian understanding. 
 
 Then as now, in France as abroad, in the opinion of 
 public writers as in that of his own chiefs (we shall 
 prove this presently), the former French ambassador at 
 the Court of Berlin was always considered as the one 
 servant of the Imperial Government who most ardently 
 desired the success of the Prusso-Italian combination. 
 f Ma Mission en Prusse' has not in the least shaken a 
 conviction which we need not hesitate to call a general one. 
 
 We should never have thought of intruding into such an 
 important question our obscure individuality and our humble 
 writings; but as M. Benedetti has been good enough to 
 call some of our former contributions to the Revue des Deux 
 Mondes, ' better-prepared and more impartially- written 
 essays/ we feel less hesitation in quoting from them a page, 
 written seven years ago, dealing with this pathetic episode of 
 contemporary history. Speaking, in our 'Preliminaires de 
 Sadowa/ of the treaty negotiated between M. de Bismarck 
 and General Govone, in the spring of 1866, we observed : 
 'Only such an intellect as that of M. de Bismarck could 
 have come to terms with this messenger of evil, who was 
 backed up by his colleague, Count Barral, while across 
 the background flitted, from time to time, M. Benedetti. 
 Here one involuntarily looks round for one of Machiavelli's 
 volumes ; one is seized with a desire to read a chapter of 
 his ' ' Legazioni." How it would have pleased the great 
 Florentine to see his three countrymen matched against a 
 barbarian ! .... In Paris they could see nothing in 
 this treaty but the unique, prodigious fact of an agreement 
 concluded between a monarch by divine right and a sove- 
 reign of the national will. They went into ecstacies about 
 M. Benedetti ; only a diplomatist of the new school could 
 have worked such a miracle ! ' 
 
 And in the beginning of the same article, in relating 
 the events which in 1864 recalled to political life the men 
 
 *" La Marmora," p. 110. 
 
APPENDIX. 355 
 
 who had fallen into disgrace in consequence of the Durando 
 incident, we said : ' It was . unpleasant, no doubt, to 
 M. Drouyn de Lhuys to have to receive as a colleague 
 M. de Lavalette, who made no secret of his desire to 
 deprive him of his portfolio. It was perhaps still more 
 disagreeable to find himself compelled to accept as his 
 principal agent abroad such a declared adversary as M. 
 Benedetti. Two years later, after Sadowa, the very day 
 he resigned office, the same minister had to sign a decree 
 raising M. Benedetti to the dignity of Grand Cross. Yet, 
 perhaps, in the secret thoughts of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, 
 the second signature somewhat avenged the first. It might 
 almost be said to be a keen stroke of humour, a Parthian 
 shot, thus to highly distinguish a diplomatist for having 
 too well served a policy all responsibility in which for 
 oneVself one firmly repudiated/ * 
 
 Did the former chiefs of the ex-ambassador of France 
 entertain a different opinion ? M. Benedetti himself fur- 
 nishes us with some important evidence on this point, 
 evidence we must not forget to mention. In ' Ma Mission ' 
 (p. 148), he tells us that in January, 1870, Count Daru, 
 then Minister of Foreign Affairs, had alluded in a letter 
 to the events of 1866 in a manner that keenly affected him. 
 ' The territorial condition of Prussia/ M. Daru wrote, ' is 
 the outcome of a series of events which you, perhaps , were 
 unable to prevent/ It seems, therefore, that four long 
 years after Sadowa the French Foreign Office still attri- 
 buted to M. Benedetti a large share in these fatal events. 
 
 The ambassador took an opportunity, in a private letter, 
 dated January 27, 1870, of explaining to his chief ' the part 
 he had played in these matters/ He says : ' I am well aware 
 of everything said on the subject ; but a feeling, which I have 
 no doubt you will appreciate, has prevented me from ever 
 publicly repudiating the responsibility thrown upon me, as 
 also from correcting the erroneous statements that have been 
 too easily accepted by a badly-informed public/ He then 
 .goes on to show that the information he sent to his Govern- 
 ment was ' minute, correct, and far-seeing/ and he refers 
 
 * See the Revue des Deux Mondes for Sept. 15th and Oct. 1st, 1868. 
 
356 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 Count Daru to the despatches written by him which were to 
 be found in the archives of the Foreign Office. ' I ought to 
 add/ he says, further, ' that never, in any of the diplomatic 
 posts which I have held, have I interchanged any political 
 correspondence except that which you will find in my de- 
 partment, or in the hands of your predecessors ; and that at 
 no period of my career have I ever accepted any other orders 
 than those they directly gave me/ 
 
 But this was not sufficient for M. Benedetti, and in the 
 pages of ' Ma Mission/ he thus triumphantly comments 
 upon his letter : ' The assertion I made in my despatch (to 
 Count Daru), that I had never had the honour on any occasion 
 (the italics are M. Benedetti's) of holding a confidential 
 correspondence directly with the Emperor is a perfectly 
 honest and accurate one. His Majesty deigned to repose 
 confidence in me, and to sometimes make me aware of his 
 satisfaction ; but he always sent me his orders through his 
 foreign minister, with whom alone I corresponded. Nobody 
 will suppose, I think, that I would have declared this in the 
 positive terms I used in my letter to Count Daru, my imme- 
 diate superior, if I had not been perfectly free to do so/ 
 
 Unfortunately, a few pages further on (p. 194) M. Bene- 
 detti is obliged to acknowledge that in the course of his 
 negotiations about the secret Belgian treaty, he had ex- 
 changed some despatches which never saw the Quai 
 d'Orsay,* and which the Foreign Minister was quite un- 
 aware of. ( I thought it right/ we read, ' to forward to 
 M. Rouher the despatch in which I gave an account of my 
 interview with M. de Bismarck, and which accompanied the 
 outline of the proposed treaty concerning Belgium. As M. 
 Rouher never presided over the Foreign Office, he never 
 placed in its archives the despatches which, for several days, 
 passed between us/ It is true that in palliation of this 
 serious irregularity, M. Benedetti pretends that M. Drouyn 
 du Luhys had offered to resign the seals of the Foreign 
 Office about the middle of August, so that ( there was 
 actually no Foreign Minister at that moment ; ; but we have 
 
 * Seat of the French Foreign Office. 
 
APPENDIX. 357 
 
 shown him that M. Drouyn de Lhuys kept his post till the 
 1st of September, 1866. Up till that date M. Drouyn de 
 Lhuys had continuously directed his department, and had 
 indulged the hope of remaining there, and preventing the 
 complete abandonment of the traditional French foreign 
 policy. 
 
 Indeed, M. Benedetti himself, in his book, quotes 
 several despatches exchanged with M. Drouyn de Lhuys on 
 important matters as late as the 21st and the 25th of 
 August (pp. 204, 223) ; the negotiations about the treaty 
 relating to Belgium were alone deemed a subject unfit to be 
 unfolded to his immediate chief, and suited only for the 
 information of M. Rouher. These negotiations were not only 
 begun but ended (they were broken off by M. de Bismarck 
 on the 29th of August) during M. Drouyn de Lhuys 3 term 
 of office, and entirely without his knowledge. 
 
 Thus, then, there was one occasion when M. Benedetti 
 failed to correspond exclusively with the Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs ; there was one period in his career when he accepted 
 orders that did not reach him from the Quai d'Orsay. 
 Count Daru, therefore, can scarcely be reproached for 
 supposing that what had happened in August, 1866, might 
 very well have also happened in March and April of the 
 same year. 
 
 M. Benedetti passes over in complete silence the incident 
 of the treaty relating to Belgium. Yet this is the culmin- 
 ating point, the only really serious one of the argument ; 
 and the only matter in which we permitted ourselves to 
 reproach him for having acted without the knowledge, not of 
 his Government, but of his Minister. Does M. Benedetti, 
 by chance, deem this topic an anecdotic incident, unworthy 
 of the dignity of history ? He did, in fact, in a letter 
 published in the Moniteur of the 29th July, 1870, attempt 
 to give this most unfortunate circumstance quite a light and 
 anecdotic turn ; to assign to this most compromising docu- 
 ment a kind of spontaneous generation; he had merely 
 wanted to get a clear perception of M. de Bismarck's ideas, 
 ' had consented to set them down, as it were, from his 
 dictation/ 
 
358 THE TWO CHANCELLORS. 
 
 The ex-ambassador was not long able to persist in tLis 
 trifling. In his book he found himself compelled to ac- 
 knowledge that he had been engaged in a serious negotia- 
 tion; and M. de Bismarck has since given himself the 
 malicious pleasure of throwing a little light upon the 
 different phases of this negotiation by publishing, in the 
 Prussian Moniteur, divers extracts from the records of 
 Cercay, by way of answer to M. Benedetti's book. 
 
 ' During my long career,' says the ex-ambassador to 
 Berlin, in his preface to ' Ma Mission/ ' I have been en- 
 trusted on only three occasions with the task of opening 
 a negotiation that had a fixed object, and that, while allow- 
 ing me a certain share of independent initiative, left me 
 also a proportional share of responsibility/ He enumerates 
 these three negotiations, and proves that he satisfactorily 
 completed them all ; but he is careful not to include his 
 negotiation with respect to Belgium, in which, however, 
 he was assuredly allowed a certain share of independent 
 initiative, and in which we are content to leave him, also, 
 his proportional share of responsibility. 
 
 Nor will we attempt to rival his controversial tone ; like 
 his diplomacy, it is sui generis. We will only say, with 
 M. de Bismarck, ' M. Benedetti est trop fin pour nous. 3 y 
 
 THE END. 
 
 CHARLES DICKENS AND EVANS, CKYSTAL PAJUACE 
 
APR 88 
 
 2lJant>2PF 
 
 DEC 2 7 1961 
 
 REC D LD 
 
 JAN 2 9 196? 
 
 USC 
 
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 FEB291956Ll> 
 
46923 
 
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 THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY