r 
 
 A NEW SYSTEM 
 
 OF 
 
 BY 
 
 G. SPILLER 
 
 AUTHOR OF "THE MIND OF MAN", ETC. 
 
 LONDON 
 
 WATTS & CO. 
 17 JOHNSON'S COURT, FLEET STREET, B.C.
 
 THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES 
 
 FROM THE LIBRARY OF 
 ERNEST CARROLL MOORE
 
 A NEW SYSTEM 
 
 OF 
 
 SCIENTIFIC PROCEDURE 
 
 BEING 
 
 AN ATTEMPT TO ASCERTAIN, DEVELOP, AND 
 
 SYSTEMATISE THE GENERAL METHODS 
 
 EMPLOYED IN MODERN ENQUIRIES 
 
 AT THEIR BEST 
 
 BY 
 
 G. SPILLER 
 
 AUTHOR OF "THE MIND OF MAN", ETC. 
 
 LONDON 
 WATTS & CO. 
 
 17 JOHNSON'S COURT, FLEET STREET, E.G. 
 
 1921
 
 "Mais comment apprendre a bien conduire ses sens? 
 En faisant ce que nous avons fait lorsque nous les avons 
 bien conduits." Condiiiac. 
 
 "Neither the naked hand nor the understanding left to 
 itself can effect much. It is by instruments and helps 
 that the work is done, which are as much wanted for 
 the understanding as for the hand." Bacon. 
 
 "Ich sag' es dir: Bin Kerl, der spekuliert, 
 1st wie ein Tier auf dtirrer Heide, 
 Von einem bo'sen Geist im Kreis herumgefuhrt, 
 Und rings umher liegt schone grime Weide." 
 
 Goethe. 
 
 "La science s'avance parce qu'elle n'est sure de rien." 
 
 Duclaux. 
 
 "Natural philosophy is essentially united in all its 
 departments, through all of which one spirit reigns and 
 one method of inquiry applies." sir John Hetschei. 
 
 "The logic of Science is the universal Logic, applicable 
 to all inquiries in which man can engage." j. s. Mill.
 
 DEDICATED 
 
 TO 
 
 THE IMPERISHABLE MEMORY 
 
 OF 
 
 FRANCIS BACON 
 
 THE FOUNDER OF SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY 
 
 160718:
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 The present treatise may be regarded as an attempt at a 
 modern re-statement of Bacon's position in his Novum Organum, 
 and this principally ~ because the author follows the great Eli- 
 zabethan in his suspicion of all precipitate theorising and in 
 his conviction that the human mind may be made incalculably 
 more effective for the discovery of truth than it has hitherto 
 been. Like Bacon, he deems it eccentric to expect of men a 
 high degree of methodological competency, so long as there 
 exists no science of correct thinking grounded on a circumspect 
 and exhaustive analysis of the process of thought at its best. 
 Until such a science is established, the author opines, the pro- 
 gress of the sciences generally, especially those relating to the 
 individual and to society, will be both snail-like and ant-like. 
 This demand for a science of correct thinking not hasty or 
 laborious speculations on the subject is so eminently rational 
 that it is difficult to imagine how any soberly reflecting per- 
 son can forbear echoing it, whilst in respect of the obstacles 
 which might be encountered in such a truly formidable enter- 
 prise, there should be agreement that these obstacles must be, 
 manifestly, objectively discpvered, not hypothetically created. 
 The author fain hopes that, as a result of over a quarter of 
 a century of indefatigable attention to the methodological prob- 
 lem, he has substantially advanced by this contribution the 
 state of the science to which all the other sciences turn for 
 light, as the planets do to the sun. On the principles he has 
 adopted, there should be at last a possibility of changing the 
 whirling chaos in the psychological, moral, economic, and kind- 
 red sciences into a steady and relatively swift forward move- 
 mentto the intense relief and immense benefit of the entire 
 human race.- Moreover, whatever the problem or issue that 
 might arise, fair assistance towards its examination and reso- 
 lution will be probably found in this work by those who have 
 assimilated its proposals. 
 
 These pages have a predominantly practical object to aid 
 the inquirer in any investigation, extensive or restricted, which
 
 VI 
 
 he may desire to undertake. On this account the problems of 
 the nature of reality, of knowledge, and of the categories of 
 thought, have been left severely alone, and even the question 
 of whether science presents us with a vision of eternal truth 
 or offers only convenient conceptual models of a precarious 
 kind has been brushed aside. Such a course does not involve 
 a contemptuous dismissal of ancient and modern controversies 
 on a variety of philosophical topics, or even a doubt as to 
 their penetrating significance, but rather a desire to avoid all 
 needless complications and to fix the attention on the practical 
 aspect of the methodological problem. In fact, the composing 
 of these controversies can evidently not be hoped for anterior 
 to the establishment of an effective methodology. Accordingly, 
 the centre of gravity of this treatise must be sought in Book II, 
 where a series of working Conclusions have been formulated, 
 and only secondarily in Book I, the primary intention of which 
 is to clear the way for a due appreciation of the Book it pre- 
 cedes. 
 
 In conclusion, the author desires cordially to thank those who 
 at diverse times read through the work in typescript and as- 
 sisted him by valuable suggestions, most especially Prof. 
 Patrick Geddes, Prof. J. H. Muirhead, and Dr. Cecil Desch. 
 
 The work has been completed abroad under considerable difficulties, 
 entailing certain unavoidable shortcomings in regard to bibliography, 
 indexes, and verification of sources. My warmest thanks are due to the 
 staff of the printing office, more especially to its manager, my friend 
 J. Safranek, who practically saw the work through the press, reducing 
 the author's co-operation to a negligible minimum. 
 
 Geneva, 1921. 
 
 G. SPILLER.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 
 PREFACE v 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS vii 
 
 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 1 
 
 I. FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTION OF THIS TREATISE.-II. THE UNITY OF NATURE 
 AND OF LIFE. III. THE METHODOLOGIST'S PROCEDURE. IV. THE METHODOLOG1ST 
 AS SCIENTIFIC? DISCOVERER. 
 
 BOOK I. THEORY. 
 
 PART I. THE PROBLEM. 
 
 Section I. ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM IN METHODOLOGY .... 17 
 
 Section II. THE INFANT AND CHILD MIND 22 
 
 Section III. THE SCIENTIFICALLY UNTRAINED ADULT 24 
 
 Section IV. THE SCIENTIFICALLY TRAINED INDIVIDUAL .... 28 
 Section V. THE MAN OF GENIUS, AND THOUGHT AS HABIT-CON- 
 TROLLED AND AS A PAN-HUMAN PRODUCT 34 
 
 Section VI. THE PROGRESS OF METHODOLOGICAL THEORY ... 38 
 
 Section VII.- CONCLUSION 53 
 
 PART IL DEFINITION OF SOME IMPORTANT 
 METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 Section VIII. OBJECT, FACT, ENVIRONMENT 54 
 
 Section IX. OBSERVATION 57 
 
 Section X. EXPERIMENT AND USE OF INSTRUMENTS .... 80 
 
 Section XI. CAUSAL ENQUIRIES 85 
 
 Section XII. HYPOTHESES 89 
 
 Section XIII. GENERALISATION OR EXTENSION 98 
 
 Section XIV. VERIFICATION AND PROOF 113 
 
 Section XV. DEDUCTION 118 
 
 Section XVI. DEFINITE, EXACT, AND MATHEMATICAL PROCE- 
 DURE: 
 
 a) The Case for Mathematical Procedure 123 
 
 b) Definition of Terms 128 
 
 c) Precision in Statements 129 
 
 d) Definiteness in Scientific Work generally 130 
 
 e) Mathematical and Non-Mathematical Procedure . . 130 
 
 Section XVII. INDUCTION 132 
 
 Section XVIII. CONCLUSION 142 
 
 BOOK H. PRACTICE. 
 
 PART III. INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 Section XIX. INTRODUCTORY AND SUMMARY 145 
 
 Section XX.- 
 Conclusion 
 
 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 -STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS .... 
 1. Need of Procedure being determined Methodologically 
 
 154 
 154 
 
 Conclusion 2. Need of a Synthetic Methodology, and of a Historical 
 Appreciation of Differences in Methods and in the 
 Scope of Enquiries 163
 
 Vlll 
 
 Page 
 
 Conclusion 3. Need of Fixing Methodologically the General Nature 
 
 and Relations of Phenomena 174 
 
 Conclusion 4. Need of a Life-Time Object of Enquiry 180 
 
 Conclusion 5. Need of a Simple Starting-Point 181 
 
 Conclusion 6. Need of Shunning Vagueness and Over-Subtlety in an 
 
 Enquiry 185 
 
 Conclusion 7. Need of Recognising that Formal Rules are Barren 
 
 and that Psychical Prejudice is Baneful 190 
 
 Conclusion 8. Need of taking advantage of Special Scientific Methods, 
 of utilising Existing Knowledge, of having regard to 
 the Future, and of allowing for Personal Equation and 
 
 for Training 194 
 
 Conclusion 9. Need of Experimental Preparation in Methodology . 199 
 Conclusion 10. Need of securing the Mental, Physiological, and 
 Environmental Conditions conducive to Efficiency and 
 
 to Waste Elimination 201 
 
 Conclusion 11. Need of Systematically Framing Hypotheses . . . 210 
 
 Conclusion 12. Need of Co-operation in Scientific Work 211 
 
 Conclusion 13. Need of a Provisional Conception as to the Form 
 
 which an Enquiry should assume 216 
 
 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 Section XXL PRECISE NATURE OF PROBLEM TO BE INVESTIGATED 236 
 
 Conclusion 14. Need of Precisely Determining the Nature of the 
 
 Problem under Investigation 236 
 
 Conclusion 15. Need of Exact Terminology, of Conclusions in the 
 Form of Precise Definitions, and of Extreme Definite- 
 ness in Thought and Statements 242 
 
 Section XXII. OBSERVATION . . 256 
 
 Conclusion 16. Need of Applying the Categories; of Strenuous Mental 
 Application in the Process of Observation; and of the 
 Observations being Graded, Comprehensive, Important, 
 Numerous, Full, Rational and Relevant, Original, Auto- 
 matically Initiated, and Methodically Developed 257 
 
 Conclusion 17. Need of Critically Examining the Reality of Alleged 
 
 Divisions . 273 
 
 a) Complex Facts regarded as Simple. b) Simple Facts 
 regarded as Complex. c) Environment Ignored. 
 d) Influence of Time and of Position in Space and Mind. 
 
 Conclusion 18. Need of Keeping and Consulting Records, of Improving 
 the Memory Experimentally, of Employing the Imagi- 
 nation, and of utilising the Intelligence in its entirety 282 
 
 Conclusion 19. Need of Ensuring Easy, Exhaustive, and Impartial 
 
 Observation 293 
 
 Conclusion 20. Need of Searching for the Simplest Practicable Case 296 
 
 Conclusion 20a.-Need of Degree Determination within and between 
 Divisions, and, in this connection, need of searching 
 for Pure, Normal, Minimal, Maximal, Parallel, Distantly 
 Related, Seemingly Unrelated, Deviating, Morbid, 
 Eccentric, Border, and Transitional Instances 308 
 
 Conclusion 206.-Need of Proceeding Dialectically, /.e., need of searching 
 in connection with any facts for what is Con- 
 tradictory, Contrary, Opposite, Common, Disparate, 
 Dependent, Interdependent, Supplementary, Alter- 
 native, Complementary, and Relative 308 
 
 Conclusion 21. Need of Habitual Alertness in order to discover 
 Exceptional, Unobtrusive, and Unsuspected Facts, 
 and need of Unremitting Concentration in Scientific 
 Work generally 308
 
 IX 
 Page 
 
 Conclusion 22. Need of Collecting the Largest Number of Leading 
 
 Facts, and Ascertaining the Unlike as well as the Like 313 
 
 Conclusion 23. Need of Exhausting Classes of Facts, their Conditions, 
 
 and the Uniformities accompanying them ! 317 
 
 Conclusion 24. Need of a Critical Attitude, of Provisional Treatment, 
 and of Repeated Testing, throughout the Process of 
 
 Enquiry 319 
 
 Section XXIII. GENERALISATION .' 326 
 
 Conclusion 25. Need of Strenuous Mental Application in the Process 
 of Generalisation, and need of the Generalisations 
 being Graded, Comprehensive, Important, Numerous, 
 Full, Rational and Relevant, Original, Automatically 
 Initiated, and Methodically Developed 326 
 
 Conclusion 26. Need of Postponing Large Generalisations to near 
 
 the Conclusion of the Enquiry 342 
 
 Conclusion 27. Need of Exhausting the Degree of Applicability of a 
 Conclusion within and between Divisions, and also 
 of Extending it to Parallel, Distantly Related, Seem- 
 ingly Unrelated, Pure, Normal, Minimal, Maximal, 
 Deviating, Morbid, Eccentric. Border, and Transitional 
 Instances 343 
 
 Conclusion 28. Need of Proceeding Dialectically, i.e., need of 
 Searching in connection with any Conclusion for what 
 is Contradictory, Contrary, Opposite, Common, Dis- 
 parate, Dependent, Interdependent, Supplementary, 
 Alternative, Complementary, and Relative .... 356 
 Section XXIV. VERIFICATION AND PROOF 363 
 
 Conclusion 29. Need of Verifying and Proving all Conjectures . . 363 
 Section XXV. INTERIM STATEMENT 366 
 
 Conclusion 30. Need of Exhausting and Gradually Consolidating 
 Lines of Inductive Enquiry and of Aiming at a 
 
 Balanced Interim Statement 366 
 
 Section XXVI.-DEDUCTION 369 
 
 Conclusion 31. Need of Strenuous Mental Application in the Process 
 of Deduction, and need of the Deductions being 
 Graded, Comprehensive, Important, Numerous, Full, 
 Rational and Relevant, Original, Automatically Initia- 
 ted, and Methodically Developed 369 
 
 Section XXVII. APPLICATION 381 
 
 Conclusion 32. Need of Drawing Practical Deductions 381 
 
 Section XXVIII. CLASSIFICATION 392 
 
 Conclusion 33. Need of Judicious Classification 392 
 
 Section XXIX. FINAL STATEMENT 403 
 
 Conclusion 34. Need of Formulating a Final Statement 403 
 
 Section XXX. REPORT STAGE 404 
 
 Conclusion 35. Need of Being Concise, of Carefully Summarising, 
 
 and of Writing Acceptably 404 
 
 PART VI. CONCLUSION CONCERNING CONCLUSIONS. 
 
 Section XXXI.- CONCLUSION CONCERNING CONCLUSIONS 405 
 
 Conclusion 36. Need of Respecting each of the preceding Conclusions 
 in all the above Conclusions, of Improving them, 
 and also of applying them to Non-Scientific Matters 405 
 
 PART VIL- GENERAL CONCLUSION. 
 
 Section XXXII. GENERAL CONCLUSION .. 412 
 
 INDEX OF AUTHORS, INDEX OF SUBJECTS, BIBLIOGRAPHY.
 
 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. 
 
 I. FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTION OF THIS TREATISE. 
 
 1. A System of Scientific Procedure? Whewell 1 held that 
 an art of discovery is impossible, and, as if by contrast, 
 Macaulay- argued that all men instinctively practised this art. 
 Other thinkers have assured us that by familiarising ourselves 
 with any one science, our entire mode of thought becomes of 
 necessity scientific ; and still others that each science is unique, 
 and that consequently there cannot be a single methodology 
 embracing the whole field of knowledge. Finally, there are 
 few who do not shake their heads at the suggestion of framing 
 rules for the right conduct of the understanding. 
 
 Lest the reader, impregnated with views such as those just 
 alluded to, lay this treatise aside without reading it, or peruse 
 it convinced that its underlying conception is vitiated by a 
 gross fallacy, it will be well to outline in this and the following 
 paragraphs the fundamental assumption pervading the whole 
 work. Whether we note the remarkably slow progress through 
 aeons upon aBons in the development of implements, or the 
 infinite efforts which have yielded modern science in all its 
 incompleteness ; whether we observe how microscopically small 
 have been the individual contributions of the men and women 
 of far renown, as we shall see, compared to the vast stock of 
 human acquisitions existing in this age, or the sick man's pace 
 in the evolution of political and economic institutions, we become 
 equally confirmed in our belief that the individual is first and 
 foremost a cultural being, vitally dependent on general human 
 progress, and virtually a zero if thrown back on himself. 
 
 To cast this thought in the form of a tentative definition: 
 Man alone is primarily a civilisable or culturable being, that 
 is, Man alone possesses the power to absorb the substantial 
 part of a highly developed civilisation, together with the ability 
 of advancing this civilisation to an infinitesimal degree; or, 
 stated more abstractly and broadly, the stock of humanity's 
 
 1 See 17. 
 
 2 See 57.
 
 2 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. 
 
 acquisitions, divided by the number of human beings who 
 have lived, allowing for the actual physical and cultural con- 
 ditions, approximately yields the single individual's intellectual, 
 moral, and other capacities for invention and discovery. From 
 this definition, if substantially correct, it follows that the unaided 
 individual, reared in a cultureless environment, looms indiffer- 
 ently above his cousins, the apes. Fairly and squarely facing 
 the facts of general historical development from the most primi- 
 tive times to our day the gigantic evolution of intercommuni- 
 cation through language and transport, of buildings and furniture, 
 of implements and industrial processes, of domesticated animals 
 and cultivated plants, of discovered energies and raw materials, 
 of trade and tribal intercourse to internationalism, of dress 
 and education, of play and pastimes and the inner life and its 
 expression, of nutrition and care of health, of morals and reli- 
 gion, of science and art, of the family and other non-civic 
 groupings, of civic groupings, government, and law small doubt 
 should remain in regard to the general soundness of the above 
 position. 1 (For some details, see Conclusion 13.) 
 
 We may consider here with advantage the signification of three con- 
 nected expressions. 
 
 Culture is a term which is frequently, but unwarrantably, confused with 
 intellectual culture. Those who do so should remember that it is common 
 to speak of physical culture ; that there are organisations in many countries 
 calling themselves societies for ethical culture ; 2 and that the phrase artistic 
 or aesthetic culture is not unknown. Culture, then, simply implies culti- 
 vation, whether it be that of the soil, of the intelligence, of moral and 
 aesthetic sentiments, or of practical ability, on the basis of the inventions 
 and discoveries made by the human race. Culture, in other words, is a 
 comprehensive term to be employed in contradistinction to native power 
 or spontaneity. He who is truly cultured, is highly cultivated in respect 
 of every important part of his nature. 
 
 Secondly. It is often asserted that culture is a social product. The 
 term social provides, however, no insight into the fact that virtually the 
 whole of humanity, from earliest times to to-day, is collectively responsible 
 for the contemporary store of general culture. Alternative terms, such 
 as inter-individual, inter-social, super-social, are alike unsatisfactory because 
 of their indefiniteness. A new term is therefore required. In our genera- 
 tion we have heard much of Pan-Germans, Pan-Slavs, Pan-Islamists, terms 
 expressive of a universal category. Profiting by the current use of pan 
 as an adjective and adverb, we may speak of culture as pan-human. The 
 
 1 A signal example of collective advance is furnished by the fact that 
 the Royal Society, the Accademia del Cimento of Florence, the Academic 
 Royale at Paris, and the Berlin Academy were founded within a few years 
 of each other, plainly indicating a trend of the times rather than the 
 embodiment of novel ideas occurring to exceptionally gifted individuals. 
 
 2 Mill (System of Logic, bk. 6, ch. 10, 2) speaks of "intellectual und 
 moral culture".
 
 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. 3 
 
 term employed in this form would render it at once plain that our culture 
 is, for all intents, the cumulative product of the efforts of all mankind 
 past and present, and no doubt enthusiasts will be found who will go 
 further and speak of a pan-humanist movement and of themselves as pan- 
 humanists. 
 
 Lastly. For the reasons stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, 
 the term sociology appears to be misleading. It is generally taken to 
 mean that human beings live in groups; but since many animal species 
 live also in groups, the term does not hint at any distinctively human 
 characteristic. What is more, since man depends primarily on culture 
 and Culture is a pan-human product, he is not a social, but a pan-species 
 being a being whose mode of life is intimately related to, although not 
 identical with, that of his kind as a whole. Consequently, the term 
 sociology expresses a fact which holds of many animal species, but not 
 of man. We need, therefore, a term which shall have reference to man's 
 essential dependence on culture, and which shall, if possible, embody the 
 conception that culture is primarily a cumulative species-product. We 
 might accordingly speak of specio-psychics, to indicate that culture is the 
 product of the spiritual endeavours of the whole of humanity. Under- 
 standing, then, Specio-Psychics to be the equivalent of "science of pan- 
 species culture", we may regard it as concerned with one of the leading 
 aspects of nature, and constituting with Physics (the science of the in- 
 animate) and Biology (the science of the animate) the three most distinc- 
 tive departments of existence, to be ultimately subsumed under Cosmology 
 (the science of the whole). 
 
 Strictly interpreting our definition, there is practically nothing 
 which we can profitably leave to the individual as such. A 
 tendency towards co-operation extending to all ages and all 
 lands is, accordingly, the very life-breath of human society, 
 and so far as this factor is absent there is minimal advance, 
 stagnation, or retrogression, disguised maybe by ignorance, pre- 
 judice, and the weaving of mazes of error. However, since 
 truth is so difficult of attainment, aimless co-operation argues 
 profuse waste of energy, and co-operation should therefore be 
 informed by science which should consequently penetrate every 
 nook and cranny of human life. Even our views on health 
 and on happiness, the moral and the matrimonial relations, the 
 nurture and the education of the young, the methods of work- 
 manship and trading, our social affairs and politics, our arts 
 and our relations to near neighbours and distant peoples as 
 well as to domestic and wild animals, our thought and our 
 inner life all should be clarified and guided by considerations 
 drawn from a highly developed methodology, if they are not 
 to remain in perpetuity emblematical of confusion and of 
 twilight. 
 
 We ought hence to assume that the scientific mode of think- 
 ing is a slowly developing product of pan-human civilisation, 
 and that with the passing of the ages, and as the result of 
 mountains of experience, man gradually discovers how to 
 
 l*
 
 4 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. 
 
 employ his understanding most effectively. 1 It appears, there- 
 fore, right and proper to reject the narrowly individualistic 
 conception of human nature and human reason, which traces 
 the origin of leading methodological concepts to the superior 
 minds of a few distinguished thinkers, and to posit the liberat- 
 ing and the perfecting of the human intelligence through pan- 
 humanly developed methods of thought. Our great men, we 
 shall see, are first and foremost historic milestones; they con- 
 veniently, ably, and enthusiastically summarise for us the larger 
 and more definite results of an epoch in a specific direction. 
 
 II. THE UNITY OF NATURE AND OF LIFE. 
 
 2. The nineteenth century established in the minds of men 
 the concept of the uniformity of nature. No longer, therefore, 
 can it be asserted, without calling forth emphatic and almost 
 universal protest, that objects alter their nature indifferently, 
 or that there are countless occult forces whose activities make 
 reliance on experiment fatally precarious. 2 Men affirm now 
 boldly, and in the very act of affirming they lay the foundations 
 of science, that given a certain cause a certain effect will 
 invariably follow under certain defined natural conditions. 
 
 It will be the privilege of the twentieth century to lodge in 
 the human mind the notion of the unity of nature. The concept 
 is yet far from having been generally assimilated. There are 
 not a few men who consider that action at a distance should 
 be assumed as a simple fact, and that it savours of metaphysics 
 to seek for the proto-element or stuff out of which the chemical 
 elements have possibly been formed. Others not only doubt 
 whether we shall ever know intimately the stellar regions or 
 the world of atoms, but they discern a break between non- 
 
 1 See 73 for a historical analysis. 
 
 ' 2 "Pendant des siecles, les hommes ont cru que meme ies mineraux 
 n'etaient pas regis par des lois definies, mais pouvaient prendre toutes les 
 formes et toutes les proprietes possibles pourvu qu'une volonte suffisamment 
 puissante s'y appliquat. On croyait que certaines formules ou certains gestes 
 avaient la vertu de transformer un corps brut en un etre vivant, un homme 
 en un animal ou une plante, et inversement." (E. Durkheirn, in De la rne- 
 thode dans les sciences, 1910, p. 308.) 
 
 "In the 17th century Alexander Ross, commenting on Sir Thomas Browne's 
 doubt as to whether mice may be bred by putrefaction, flays his antagonist 
 in the following words: 'So may we doubt whether in cheese and timber 
 worms are generated, or if beetles and wasps in cow-dung, or if butterflies, 
 locusts, shell-fish, snails, eels, and such like, be procreated of putrefied 
 matter, which is to receive the form of that creature to which it is by forma- 
 tive power disposed. To question this is to question reason, sense, and ex- 
 perience. If he doubts this, let him go to Egypt, and there he will find the
 
 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. 5 
 
 living and living substance, between animals and man, and 
 most especially between mind and matter. And widely, pre- 
 valent is the view which insists upon the ultimate mystery and 
 inexplicability of the Universe. 
 
 Such a non possumus attitude acts as a relentless brake on 
 the man of science, since at every stride forward which he 
 desires to make there are voices warning him that it would 
 be presumptuous to strive to pierce to the depths or to attempt 
 to connect what is separated by an impassable gulf. Theo- 
 retically such an attitude may not only appear plausible, but 
 seems even to reflect the cautious scientific thinker in oppo- 
 sition to the reckless amateur; yet, once such a principle is 
 granted, the scope of science might be caused to shrink to a 
 mathematical point. Fortunately, men of science have possessed 
 a splendid and sturdy faith which has been amply justified by 
 results, and consequently the hypercautious counsellors and 
 critics are doomed to be disappointed. 1 
 
 fields swarming with the mice begot of the mud of Nylus, to the great calamity 
 of the inhabitants.' " (W. A. Locy, Biology and its Makers, 1908, p. 278.) 
 Shakespeare's lines on the bee reflect the fanciful science of his day: 
 
 "Cant. True: therefore doth heaven divide 
 
 The state of man in divers functions, 
 
 Setting endeavour in continual motion; 
 
 To which is fixed, as an aim or butt, 
 
 Obedience: for so work the honey-bees; 
 
 Creatures that by a rule in nature teach 
 
 The act of order to a peopled kingdom. 
 
 They have a king, and officers of sorts: 
 
 Where some, like magistrates, correct at home, 
 
 Others, like merchants, venture trade abroad; 
 
 Others, like soldiers, armed in their stings, 
 
 Make boot upon the summer's velvet buds; 
 
 Which pillage they with merry march bring home 
 
 To the tent-royal of their emperor: 
 
 Who, busied in his majesty, surveys 
 
 The singing masons building roofs of gold; 
 
 The civil citizens kneading up the honey; 
 
 The poor mechanic porters crowding in 
 
 Their heavy burdens at his narrow gate; 
 
 The sad-eyed justice, with his surly hum, 
 
 Deliv'ring o'er to executors pale 
 
 The lazy yawning drone." 
 
 (King Henry V., Act 1, Scene 2.) 
 
 See also Studies in the History and Method of Science, ed. by Charles 
 Singer, 1917; and L. Thorndike, Natural Science in the Middle Ages, 1915. 
 
 1 "The character of the true philosopher is to hope all things not im- 
 possible, and to believe all things not unreasonable. He who has seen 
 obscurities which appeared impenetrable in physical and mathematical
 
 6 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. 
 
 One scientific division after another has been swept away 
 by the torrential stream of time. The theory of gravitation 
 furnished the first signal indication of the unity obtaining in 
 nature, and in recent days astro-physics and astro-chemistry 
 have further confirmed this. The doctrine of the conservation of 
 matter has been succeeded by the doctrine of the conservation 
 of energy. As a result of a series of discoveries ranging over 
 a century, we have recognised the feasibility of linking up most 
 of the main forces in nature heat, light, electricity, magnetism, 
 and, possibly, chemical affinity. Thus, again, it has been shown 
 that by lowering sufficiently its temperature, every gas can be 
 ultimately reduced to a liquid and probably to a solid, and that, 
 therefore, we have grounds for believing that the three states 
 of matter gaseous, liquid, and solid are due to definite calo- 
 rific differences. Once more, the boasted barriers between the 
 elements are gradually being removed. If carbon can exist in 
 four different states ; if oxygen can possess an allotropic form ; 
 if the arrangement of the elements in order of their atomic 
 weights evidences such striking relations between them that the 
 discovery of new elements having certain properties can be 
 predicted ; and if elements are actually produced by the trans- 
 mutation of other elements, it almost betokens intellectual ob- 
 stinacy to doubt that the day is approaching when the simple 
 chemical substances known to us will be proved to be com- 
 pounds of one element or compound perhaps of hydrogen, 
 perhaps of some lighter element yet unknown, who can tell? 
 Nor need we fear that the present-day telescope and microscope 
 have the last word to say in the exploration of the far-off 
 spaces and the more intimate structures of bodies. 
 
 In biology the advance has not been less real, for the evo- 
 lution* of plant and animal life is now acknowledged universally, 
 and it is even exceptional to-day for any scholar to suggest 
 that man has not developed from a lower form. The old notion 
 of a vital chemistry has lost most of its scientific supporters, 
 and the struggle rages at the moment only round the mode of 
 the genesis of life itself. Who can doubt where the victory 
 will lie, if history and cumulative evidence are trustworthy 
 guides? The compartment theory unfortunately still holds the 
 
 science suddenly dispelled, and the most barren and unpromising fields of 
 enquiry converted, as if by inspiration, into rich and inexhaustible springs 
 of knowledge and power on a simple change of our point of view, or by 
 merely bringing to bear on them some principle which it never occurred 
 before to try, will surely be the very last to acquiesce in any dispiriting 
 prospects of either the present or future destinies of mankind." (Sir John 
 Herschel, Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy, 1830, [5.].)
 
 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. 7 
 
 field in psychology. Signs are, however, not wanting that 
 feeling, intellect, and volition will at no very distant date be 
 demonstrated to be complexes rather than primordial facts; 
 that all the sensations will be proved to be resolvable into the 
 same fundamental fact as the just-mentioned triad; and that 
 psychology will be regarded as the science which treats of the 
 neural or mental processes employed in the endeavour to satisfy 
 the needs which arise out of the various connected systems of 
 -the organism and out of the relations of that organism to its 
 environment. Similarly, the pan-human origin of culture in- 
 volves that the polygenetic theory of human purposes and 
 actions is ill-founded, whilst the rise of the "scientific manage- 
 ment "-movement suggests that theoretical and practical activi- 
 ties will be eventually governed by a single and undivided 
 scientific methodology. Furthermore, Mach and others, the pre- 
 sent author included, have proposed reasons for surmising that 
 the idea of a rigid division between matter and mind may be 
 traceable to inadequate analysis, and that the two are perhaps 
 one, not as the materialist, idealist, or pantheist, suspects, but 
 in the sense that the alleged separateness, duality, or difference 
 is non-existent. 
 
 Sufficient has been advanced to suggest that the conception 
 of the unity of nature is no longer a gratuitous assumption 
 destitute of probability and proof, even though we are still 
 groping for an explanation of gravitation and its complement 
 cohesion, and even though we cannot yet indulge in dogmatic 
 utterances of any kind. 
 
 The bearing of the doctrine of the unity of nature on the 
 methodology of science is manifest, for just as there was practi- 
 cally no scope for a methodology when the uniformity of 
 nature was denied, so, in the absence of the doctrine of the 
 unity of nature, the methodologist is bound hand and foot. 
 Once, however, there is limitless freedom for the man of science, 
 the methodologist can ceaselessly reiterate his cardinal postu- 
 late, i.e., the advisability and necessity of advancing in the 
 boldest manner possible wherever a legitimate opportunity pre- 
 sents itself. The objective foundations, then, of the methodo- 
 logy of science are laid in the comprehensive twin doctrine of 
 the uniformity and unity of nature. 
 
 Now just as the uniformity of nature involves uniformity in 
 every department of existence without exception, so the unity 
 of nature carries with it the unity of all departments what- 
 soever. In other words, the unity of nature implies the unity 
 of outward nature as well as of life. This leads us far beyond
 
 8 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. 
 
 the confines of science as delimited by the founders of the 
 Royal Society. In those far-off days science signified natural 
 philosophy, and natural philosophy was content to explore the 
 realm of what we designate to-day as physics, including her 
 handmaiden, mathematics. Since that period the double term 
 natural philosophy has been transformed into the single term 
 science, and the connotation of the latter term has been rest- 
 lessly expanded. One physical science after another was added 
 to the few which first existed, while slowly, very slowly, the 
 biological sciences vindicated their right to be classed methodo- 
 logically with the physical sciences. 
 
 The royal domain of systematised knowledge hence assumed 
 vaster proportions. The wheel of progress did not, however, 
 come to a standstill when this stage had been reached. One 
 by one the cultural or specio-psychical sciences proved at least 
 their theoretical right to enter the charmed circle of the estab- 
 lished sciences. Economists led the way; psychologists and 
 sociologists followed ; and, in time, not one department of cul- 
 tural knowledge remained which could be justifiably regarded 
 as falling outside the coveted pale. 
 
 Even so, however, the domain of science had to be further 
 extended. From the very dawn of systematising, the line be- 
 tween pure and applied science had proved elusive, and accord- 
 ingly it was only to be anticipated that the expansion of 
 science should tend to the development of a series of more 
 or less avowed applied sciences. Indeed, one distinguished 
 man of science after another became responsible for important 
 scientific applications to departments of practice requiring the 
 same methods of enquiry as the so-called pure sciences. The 
 introduction of gas light, and afterwards of electric lighting, 
 heating, and motor power, was an instance in point, and so 
 were the inventions and discoveries due to the need for com- 
 munal sanitation and for the prevention of infectious diseases,, 
 and previous to that the application of astronomical truths and 
 of the compass to navigation, whilst the universal employment 
 of machinery arid scientific instruments furnished the case par 
 excellence. The desire for economy in industries, and also for 
 the utilisation of waste products and the improvement of agri- 
 culture, similarly issued in applied scientific activity of prime 
 value. Naturally, once science was found to be lucrative in 
 the economic world, it was more and more wooed. Manufac- 
 turing companies employed scientific staffs for the specific pur- 
 pose of deriving the fullest benefits from science applied to 
 their sphere of activity; natural substances such as diamonds,
 
 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. 9 
 
 rubies, indigo, and rubber were artificially produced; and 
 universities and technical schools, observing this, began to pay 
 increased, often excessive, attention to applied science and to 
 scientific preparation in every practical department. Moreover, 
 psychological tests of generic or specific efficiency were eagerly, 
 perhaps hastily, utilised by industrial and commercial enterprises. 
 Thus action and reaction between theoretical science, education, 
 and applied science continued until, as at the present day, the 
 three are closely welded together into an integral totality. If, 
 perchance, on the one hand, much remains still to be done 
 to apply science in the economic world, yet, on the other hand, 
 there exists here and there a deplorable tendency to neglect 
 in favour of this the no less fundamental, but more theoretical, 
 aspects. 
 
 Manifestly, there could be no restriction of applied science 
 to the economic life. Criminologists entered on extensive stu- 
 dies of the criminal, his environment, and the means of re- 
 forming or deterring him. Eugenists warmly interested them- 
 selves in the question of how to discourage the increase of 
 the tainted, and encourage the augmentation of the healthy, 
 "stocks" among men and, of course, among animals and plants. 
 Educators busied themselves with child study and psychology 
 in order to elevate the children in accordance with scientific 
 methods. Politicians, with a taste for science, examined the 
 psychology of the crowd or collective man. Hygienists sought 
 to discover the best diet, physical exercise, and clothing, and 
 generally the best methods of keeping the body supple and 
 strong, and, as mental hygienists, the best means of preserving 
 intellectual and moral sanity and virility. And, alas! mainly 
 for aggressive purposes, the armaments of the nations have 
 been, with the aid of science, prodigiously raised in destructive 
 power. It is, therefore, only a question of time that the whole 
 of practical existence from the lowliest material needs to 
 our loftiest aspirations will be moulded and illuminated by 
 scientific insight. We should, in fact, not forget that the uses, 
 application, production, quality, value, desire, liking, love, 
 enjoyment, and preference of phenomena the utilisation of 
 things are but certain aspects of the one Existence. (See 
 the Table of Primary Categories in Conclusion 3.) 
 
 Again. A great science has been evolving during the last 
 quarter of a century whose object it is to replace the tentative 
 rule-of-thumb methods obtaining in industry and commerce by 
 rigidly scientific ones. No longer are haphazard traditions and 
 shortsighted common sense to govern the modes of production
 
 10 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. 
 
 and distribution. Every type of process is to be exhaustively 
 studied in order that it might be reconstructed on scientific 
 principles, ensuring ideal economy in movements, speed, effort, 
 thought, and the like, and products of the highest quality. 
 (See Conclusion 10.) So thorough is this new movement that 
 it is likely not only to revolutionise industry and commerce, 
 but science itself, by standardising universal modes of proce- 
 dure of a startlingly exacting character. 
 
 Lastly. The major and minor arts, whose mission it is to 
 irradiate beauty and joy in the highest as in the humblest 
 spheres, must become part of the infinite empire of the one 
 all-enveloping and all-connecting science, with its single and 
 all-sufficient scientific method. 
 
 Accordingly, the unity of nature must be acknowledged to 
 embrace inanimate and animate existence, including human life 
 in its various aspects ; and a scientific methodology itself 
 one and indivisible (Conclusion 2) has therefore no bound- 
 aries of any kind. The only reservation to be made is that it 
 will be some time yet before the later and latest sciences will 
 be fully worthy of being classed among the "established" 
 sciences. Rome was not built in a day! 1 
 
 Nor should we omit to notice the unity of the historic pro- 
 cess. Contrary to first impressions, we shall find, on closer 
 examination, that the expansion of the province of science is 
 also a natural one, the relative maturity of a lower or less 
 complicated branch of learning creating the possibility of the 
 formation of a slightly higher and more complicated branch of 
 learning. The fierce struggles for recognition by individual dis- 
 ciplines should be therefore regarded as virtual epiphenomena, 
 as being due primarily to the difficulty of settling the justice 
 of claims, no doubt aggravated by neither party adequately 
 appreciating the objective nature of the problem before them. 
 
 1 The attempt has been made to distinguish between science as that 
 which teaches us to know and art as that which teaches us to do. Medicine 
 is thus considered as an art in contradistinction to physiology which, is 
 described as a science. Yet to understand the normal and abnormal work- 
 ings of the organism, and how to prevent and destroy physiological dis- 
 equilibrium, assuredly involves identical methodological processes. The 
 scientific physician may, indeed, manifest a purely theoretical interest in 
 his labours; but even if his interest should be practical, this would merely 
 argue a special direction of scientific activity. The distinction, then, be- 
 tween a science and an art is, at least for the present and the future, me- 
 thodologically a dubious one, and refers to motive and object rather than 
 to mode of procedure. Science might be defined as primarily exact and 
 systematised knowledge as such, and true art as primarily exact and 
 systematised knowledge restricted to practical and idealistic ends.
 
 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. \\ 
 
 The applicability of scientific procedure to life and mind has, 
 however, been called in question. M. Henri Bergson, in his 
 L'Evolution creatrice, reasons that science is powerless to in- 
 vestigate super-physical processes. His argument is based on 
 the contention that the object of the intellect is to promote 
 action, and that this action concerns itself with inanimate 
 matter. Hence, M. Bergson concludes, the triumphs of science 
 in physics, and its dismal failure in biology and sociology. In 
 criticism of this attitude the following doubts may be advanced. 
 If the object of the intellect were to promote action, action in 
 animals is in great measure, perhaps mainly, concerned with 
 themselves and with fellow animals; and, moreover, if science 
 has thus far accomplished much in physics and little in biology, 
 this is only to be anticipated considering the primitive sim- 
 plicity of the subject-matter in the first, and the staggering 
 complexity of the subject matter in the second, department of 
 knowledge. The alternative, to have recourse to intuition a 
 .very nebulous term in reaching the verities of life, is unsatis- 
 factory, in view of the fact that "intuition" has been so em- 
 ployed for ages, with fatuously trivial and contradictory results. 
 The unclouded intellect appears to us to have proved itself 
 equal to the study of any known subject, however complicated ; 
 only that we cannot hope to grasp the complex as rapidly as 
 the simple, nor to solve the most abstruse problems without 
 the aid of an advanced methodology. As an illustration of the 
 complexity of biological facts, consider the following case: 
 
 "Take, for example, those small capsules which are found in the kidneys 
 at the very summit, so to speak, of the problem of renal secretion. These 
 small bodies each occupy a space of less than two-thousandths of a cubic 
 millimetre. Within their interior they contain different kinds of blood- 
 vessels that represent the structures of greatest mechanical interest when 
 dealing with the circulatory system, omitting, of course, the heart. This 
 almost complete sample of the circulatory mechanism, itself formed of a 
 congeries of parts and unitary mechanisms, is enclosed by two or three 
 thousand cells of specific glandular function. Every one of these cells 
 again is a complex of mechanisms about which we cannot rightly think 
 until we reduce our conceptions to the level of molecular dimensions. 
 Enclosed, then, in this minute space, within a mass that weighs two 
 thousandths of a milligramme, lie quite a series of the problems in which 
 physiology is interested." (Opening Address by Prof. J. S. Macdonald. 
 President of the Physiology Section of the British Association, 1911.) 
 
 It is for this reason that, for instance, protein compounds 
 are exceedingly difficult to isolate and study, first, because of 
 their close resemblance to one another; secondly, because of 
 their complexity e.g., the approximate formula for hemo- 
 globin is CiisHuaNivjOtisFeS*; and thirdly, because they
 
 12 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. 
 
 can only be built up by a series of complex transformations. 
 Even the specialisation common in science will be progressively 
 superseded, as more and more general facts of a scientific 
 order accumulate. 
 
 Men of science need not therefore be intimidated by the 
 suggestion that nature possesses no unity, or that the world 
 of life and mind can only be effectively explored by the in- 
 tuitionist. 1 
 
 III. THE METHODOLOGIST'S PROCEDURE. 
 
 3. A modern methodology of science should be the out- 
 come of an analysis of modern scientific procedure at its best ; 
 and yet such an analysis is well-nigh impossible, since what 
 is offered to us in publications are final results which veil, 
 rather than disclose, the concrete movements of the mind. As 
 the analyst of Darwin's method states: "The scientist, after 
 establishing a conclusion to his own satisfaction, is not con- 
 cerned with telling other people how he reached it, but with 
 convincing them of its truth." (Frank Cramer, The Method of 
 Darwin, 1896, p. 22.) For this reason it might appear neces- 
 sary that the methodologist should be an adept in most sciences ; 
 but here, again, the task imposed is more than human. The 
 author has, therefore, chosen a third road which Condillac 
 already clearly perceived when he wrote: "Mais comment 
 apprendre a conduire ses sens? En faisant ce que nous avons 
 fait lorsque nous les avons bien conduits." That is, we cir- 
 cumspectly observe ourselves whilst we are occupied in think- 
 ing, take diligently note of the ratiocinative successes we score, 
 warily apply as universally as possible to subsequent thought 
 what we have learnt, and by dint of persistent examination 
 and experiment we discover and realise, to express it theo- 
 retically, the most effective methods of thinking. 
 
 Yet, at the threshold, an initial obstacle has to be surmounted, 
 for every-day thought is far from interesting, arduous, or 
 coherent. On this account the present author spent several 
 years in preparing a text-book of psychology based on ori- 
 ginal research, 2 and engaged on other large and definite tasks, 
 in order to find opportunities for examining his mind when 
 
 1 "The biologist deals with a vast number of properties of objects, and 
 his inductions will not be completed, I fear, for ages to come; but when 
 they are, his science will be as deductive and as exact as the mathematics 
 themselves." (T. H. Huxley, Twelve Lectures and Essays, "The Educational 
 Value of the Natural History Sciences", ed. 1915, p. 14.) 
 
 - The Mind of Man, pp. 568, London, 1902.
 
 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. 13 
 
 systematically and strenuously at work, and so as to apply and 
 test the results of his studies. 
 
 Self-examination and self-training are, however, not likely 
 to be sufficiently far-reaching, because it is very probable that, 
 after every allowance has been made, peculiar grooves of 
 thought and blank ignorance have to be taken into account. 
 Accordingly, self-examination was supplemented by a study of 
 the great methodologists, by wading through libraries of books 
 on science, by perusing many of the works and the biographies 
 of the foremost thinkers of the race, by interviews, by visits 
 to laboratories, and, not least, by submitting successive drafts 
 of the typescript to competent scholars. In this way, it is 
 hoped, the personal equation was substantially rectified, and thus 
 a fair understanding reached of general scientific procedure. 
 
 When it is considered what diverse methods have been 
 applied through the ages in seeking to comprehend the world, 
 and also that modern psychologists are agreed that the process 
 of intellection presents no mystery, it will be conceded that 
 there is nothing monstrous or fantastic in the endeavour to 
 ascertain how man thinks at his best, and how to compress this 
 mode of thought into definite and utilisable statements. 
 
 IV. THE METHODOLOGIST AS SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERER. 
 
 4. Readers might be inclined to test the proposed me- 
 thodology by what its propagator has achieved thereby. They 
 might contend that if a scientific methodology is to help men 
 to assured and rapid advance in science, the methodologist, 
 inasmuch as he has found the pearl of great price, should sub- 
 stantiate this by his discoveries. Accordingly, the readers of 
 this treatise may be tempted to search in its pages for a long 
 chain of novel and epochal scientific truths. 
 
 The temptation to argue in this manner may appear warrant- 
 able at first sight; but further consideration will, we hope to 
 show, evince its unreasonableness. The duty of the elaborator 
 of a scientific methodology is, plainly, to evolve a methodology, 
 not to exploit it. From the very commencement of his attempt 
 to its consummation, he is ever groping his way, and slowly, 
 very slowly, assisting to create a relative cosmos where pre- 
 viously a relative chaos prevailed. Even if he could devote a 
 whole life-time to his enterprise, and was peculiarly fitted for 
 it, he would still require all the hours at his disposal to prevent 
 his methodology from being more imperfect than necessary. 
 He would be, therefore, obliged to publish his work long be-
 
 14 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. 
 
 fore he had truly completed it, and consequently he would 
 lack the time to apply his conclusions systematically in several 
 directions. 
 
 Moreover, this Methodology does not profess to furnish a 
 method whereby large numbers of important truths can be 
 arrived at by one individual ; it rather suggests that the estab- 
 lishment of comprehensive generalisations and deductions is 
 the task of ages and the effect of systematic co-operation. 
 Its aim is as much to warn against individual over-confidence 
 as to point to correct methods. Its keynote being the unity of 
 knowledge and the necessity of being satisfied with incomplete 
 conclusions for prolonged periods, no one should expect to 
 discover in these pages an imperial mint for the wholesale 
 production of scientific truths. 
 
 Finally, theory and practice, analysis and synthesis, are not 
 identical. A good dramatic critic need not necessarily be a 
 good dramatist, nor does it follow as a matter of course that 
 a methodologist should be skilful in the application of scientific 
 methods. Indeed, the very absence of adroitness and the very 
 hesitancy in decision, not improbably provide the occasions 
 which reveal the manifold methodological factors involved in 
 scientific activity. 
 
 The object of the methodologist is to supply the most 
 finished instrument of investigation he is capable of devising; 
 but the extensive employment of this instrument he must leave 
 to others who have not had the disadvantage of consecrating 
 a long life to its laborious construction and even more laborious 
 multiple revision. If, therefore, in the succeeding pages, most 
 of the profound observations are not original, and most of the 
 original observations are not profound, it is hoped that the 
 reader will regard this as inevitable, as in the nature of things, 
 and not as reflecting unfavourably on the endeavour to place be- 
 fore the world a comparatively ambitious work on methodology. 1 
 
 1 See, however, the author's The Mind of Man and his The Distinctive 
 Nature of Man (shortly to be published), for an attempted application of 
 the methodological viewpoint urged in these pages.
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 THEORY.
 
 PART I. 
 THE PROBLEM. 
 
 SECTION I. ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM IN METHODO- 
 LOGY. 
 
 5. The unity of the world of fact does not strike the ordi- 
 nary observer, because for his purposes a world divided and 
 subdivided into many independent parts and compartments is a 
 more profitable conception. Slight variations, border instances, 
 minute, remote, and invisible objects, as well as slow trans- 
 formations, escape him. Such being the case, it was natural 
 that the pioneer logicians of the West should have unsuspect- 
 ingly assumed that the ordinary spectator's point of view is 
 the correct one, and that they should have consequently taken 
 for granted the existence of the world of common sense, that 
 is, of a world composed of isolated objects and isolated classes 
 of objects with features too plain to be overlooked. This mode 
 of apprehending facts supplied a rigid criterion for the pro- 
 cesses of reasoning, and hence followed the absolutist character 
 of the older logic. A trait of this kind, since it appeared to 
 ensure certainty, was, reasonably enough, cherished beyond 
 anything else in the armoury of logic. 
 
 Francis Bacon, although he ardently expressed his belief in 
 "progressive stages of certainty", only fitfully applied this 
 pregnant conception of his. The notion of the correlation and 
 unity of the natural forces and -of phenomena generally, or of 
 the ultimate relations and reducibility of the elements, did not 
 suggest itself to him. It is true that he boldly sought for the 
 "simple natures" of things, 1 and that nothing less than the 
 discovery of these would satisfy him ; but it was simple natures 
 heaviness, malleability, fixity, fluidity, colour, etc., which he 
 was bent on discovering, not simple nature, nor did he appar- 
 ently suspect that the molecular world was the world of master 
 facts, and that this world could only be approached with the 
 greatest difficulty, if at all. For this reason he, like Aristotle, 
 believed in the molar and compartment theory of the world 
 and of the mind, and to this is partly attributable his exagge- 
 rated opinion as to what a perfected scientific method might 
 
 1 Francis Bacon frequently employs the term Form, and he offers as 
 equivalents of this term nature, law, simple nature, specific difference, true 
 definition, etc. By Form he almost certainly means what in modern ter- 
 minology is called Natural Law. (Novum Organum, bk. 2, 3.)
 
 18 PART I. THE PROBLEM. 
 
 accomplish if applied by even one adept. Had he divined the 
 interdependent unity of nature, as the latest science is increas- 
 ingly forcing it on our attention, he would have certainly 
 admitted that the most admirable of methods should allow for 
 progressive stages of certainty as regards conclusions, and for 
 an organic and historic development of the structure of know- 
 ledge from the simple to the complex. He would have there- 
 fore emphatically repudiated the idea of remaining reconciled 
 for a time to probable or incomplete results e.g., to X-rays, 
 cathode-rays, and Lenard-rays, 1 whose precise nature is as yet 
 a mystery, or to accessory food factors such as fat-soluble A, 
 water-soluble #, and the anti-scorbutic factor, where the func- 
 tions are only partially known and the chemical nature not at all. 
 It was this same laudable craving for certainty which obscured 
 for Descartes the practical value of the inductive method, and 
 which prevailed on him to exert his genius to the fullest 
 measure in order to elaborate a system of knowledge which 
 should remorselessly exclude all uncertainty. On this account, 
 he made in his Regulae a highly ingenious attempt by accen- 
 tuating intuitional truth, and coupling this with a stern deduc- 
 tive procedure where every movement is rigorously checked 
 to comprehend the Universe without an appeal to general 
 experience. Descartes was even jealous of the reasoning pro- 
 cess, and hence he proposed to fuse, through repeated attempts, 
 the links of a reasoning process, till it became one and 
 intuitional in character.- From the point of view of the 
 end aimed at, Descartes' attitude was irreproachable; only he 
 was unfortunately mistaken in his assumption that either the 
 reasoning process or the external world was composed of 
 discrete elements void of intricate and subtle interrelations. He 
 rightly distrusted reliance on the senses because of the evident 
 heterogeneity of what is presented to observation ; but he failed 
 to appreciate that words, being but symbols, are even more 
 elusive than facts, and that the most trifling slip in a com- 
 plicated train of reasoning may throw us altogether off the 
 track, whilst no amount of foresight can prevent such slips 
 from occurring where facts are not appealed to unceasingly. 1 ^ 
 
 1 The X-rays are now practically identified with the gamma-rays of the 
 radio-active substances, and much is known concerning them, and the 
 cathode-rays are now said to consist of streams of negatively charged particles 
 or electrons. 
 
 2 On the above, see the Regulae; also Boyce Gibson on these in Mind. 
 
 3 Leibniz drew up rules referring to probable knowledge. His second 
 rule in his L'art de bien raisonner reads: "When it does not seem possible 
 to attain to certainty, one must content oneself with probability." (Couturat, 
 La logique de Leibnitz.) The following formal rules of his specially refer 
 to this type of knowledge: "(1) Distinguish degrees of probability. (2) A 
 conclusion is never more probable than the principle from which it is 
 deduced. (3) When a conclusion is deduced from several principles which 
 are only probable, the conclusion is less probable than any of those prin- 
 ciples." (Ibid., p. 180.)
 
 SECTION 1. ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM IN METHODOLOGY. 19 
 
 John Stuart Mill, though an empiricist in philosophy, was 
 nevertheless, like his distinguished predecessors, an absolutist 
 in logic. He set little store by approximate generalisations, 
 and looked on them as definite though incomplete; his identi- 
 fication of inductive with causal investigations was apparently 
 due to his desire of disposing of something once for all; his 
 canons demanded proofs as unerring as those of the syllogism; 
 and his repeated use of letters of the alphabet to symbolise 
 the various unknown factors in a problem, illustrated how over- 
 simple was his conception of the Universe. The methodological 
 guidance he proposes is consequently only applicable in the 
 main to the concluding stages of an enquiry when bewilder- 
 ment has ceased and the principal facts are established and 
 classified. 
 
 Sheer indefinable probability, a groping one's way in the 
 dark, a chaos growing gradually less confused, a thinker feebly 
 illuminating a humble corner here and there or slightly intensify- 
 ing the light; in other words, the plastic form of the actual 
 process of concrete enquiry had not impressed itself upon the 
 older logicians. They were concerned with final products, not 
 with complicated and elusive facts; nor did they treat of hypo- 
 theses, generalisations, and certainties of an unfolding and 
 progressive character. Even where, as in Laplace's theory, pro- 
 bability was postulated, it was of a calculable character, and 
 not of the undefined quality which almost invariably attaches 
 to investigations as they develop under the hands of genera- 
 tions of men of science, as say in the progressive discovery of 
 the nature of flame, in the slow determination of the principal 
 causes of meteorological changes, in the gradual localisation of 
 the sensory and motor areas in the brain, in the involved 
 unravelling of the problem of heredity, or in the step-by-step 
 ascertainment of the nature of a perfect diet. Likewise in our 
 new century there are few savants who adequately recognise 
 that the most learned treatise written on any subject to-day is 
 bound to be comparatively crude because of its dependence on 
 other treatises which are being or will be written, e.g., a trea- 
 tise on what education should be depends, among other develop- 
 ments, on a perfected science of hygiene, psychology, ethics, 
 aesthetics, and technology, and on something like unexcep- 
 tionable physical, economic, intellectual, political, and moral 
 conditions in society as a whole. This interdependence is notice- 
 able throughout the groups of sciences, beginning with the 
 least dependent and terminating with the most dependent- 
 elementary mathematics, mechanics, ethereology, chemistry, 
 crystallography, biology, psychology, and the cultural or specio- 
 psychical sciences, 1 there being "scarcely any natural pheno- 
 menon which can be fully and completely explained in all its 
 
 1 For a classification of the sciences, see Conclusion 33.
 
 20 PART I. THE PROBLEM. 
 
 circumstances, without a union of several perhaps of all, the 
 sciences" (Sir John Herschel, Discourse, [183.]), a sentiment 
 which the eminent physicist Lord Kelvin endorses by saying : 
 "All the properties of matter are so closely connected that we 
 can scarcely imagine one thoroughly explained, without our 
 seeing its relation to all the others, without, in fact, having the 
 explanation of all." (The Constitution of Matter, 1901, p. 240.) 
 The common experience of one science dividing into a number 
 of others is a further verification of the above contention: "By 
 a law whose necessity is evident, each branch of the scientific- 
 system gradually separates from the trunk when it has de- 
 veloped far enough to admit of separate cultivation." (Auguste 
 Comte, The Fundamental Principles of the Positive Philosophy, 
 ed. 1905, p. 31.) 
 
 Some logicians have also thought that only instinct, sagacity, 
 imagination, and other alleged unanalysable mental qualities 
 can be advantageously utilised in the process of scientific 
 enquiry. As opposed to this view, i. e., that scientific ability is 
 an indeterminate X, and science itself necessarily absolute, we 
 shall endeavour to show in the sequel that an art of reasoning 
 relating to greater or smaller probabilities of an imperfectly 
 calculable character has developed through the ages, and may 
 be abstracted from the present practice of men of science. 
 Some writers on logic (Bosanquet, in his Logic, and Creighton, 
 in his Introductory Logic) argue that the reasoning process 
 presents a developing unity ; and it is to be hoped that logicians 
 generally will recognise that progressive stages of proof and of 
 certainty deserve to be circumstantially treated in works on logic. 
 
 Psychologists have spoken of the psychologist's fallacy. One 
 might with equal justice speak of the logician's fallacy. The 
 final product of a process of reasoning stated in formal terms 
 has been mistaken for the expression of the concrete process 
 itself, and reasoning in formal terms and modes has been 
 assumed as the only mode of reasoning. Logic is, however, 
 a progressive science, as we shall see. (Section VI.) In pro- 
 portion as convention favours the utilisation or the neglect 
 of hypotheses, so men accustom themselves to the one or the 
 other; as generalising is or is not encouraged, or as abstract 
 or concrete, dignified or petty interests prevail, so men adjust 
 their thoughts in conformity with the social trend; and when 
 reliance on books or on imaginative treatment rules, when it 
 is the fashion to think with or without aids, formally or in- 
 formally, the scientific mass mind faithfully reflects each of 
 these trends. This being the case, it may be conjectured, with 
 some degree of certainty, that the average individual of the 
 somewhat distant future as the eventual result of the discovery 
 and the assimilation by the masses of mankind of the modes 
 of thought which time has ripened, and which the modern 
 scientist at his best applies when engaged in expert investi-
 
 SECTION 1. ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM IN METHODOLOGY. 21 
 
 gations will possess a general power of analysis and synthesis, 
 a general capacity of bringing to light what is concealed and 
 correctly extracting the variety of implications of a fact or 
 a statement, which has heretofore only existed among distin- 
 guished men of science when they dealt with particular prob- 
 lems familiar to them. Unfortunately, the subject of the 
 education of man is too gigantic to be approached within the 
 narrow limits of this treatise, and we have therefore largely 
 restricted ourselves to an analysis of the mental process em- 
 ployed in scientific discovery. 
 
 We may, however, add that the primitive chaotic conception 
 of the world, as pictured by the fetichist and afterwards by 
 the polytheist, and even by a Lucretius, is being more and 
 more reduced to order by science as witness the gravitational 
 and astronomical conception of the Universe; the geological, 
 meteorological, geographical, cartographical, racial, and political 
 conception of the earth; our knowledge of the atmosphere, its 
 constituents, and its movements; the general facts of inorganic 
 and organic chemistry; the theories of the evolution of worlds 
 and of living forms; the insight gained into the static and 
 dynamic nature of the cell; the ascertained anatomy and physio- 
 logy of the members of the vegetable and animal kingdoms; 
 the knowledge of man's story and nature gained through archeo- 
 logy and scientific history ; the tolerable comprehension of the 
 furniture of man's mind and the stages of his life; the wonderful 
 instruments which are at the disposal of captains of industry 
 and men of science; the enlightenment traceable to the aid 
 rendered by mathematics and geometry and the systematisation 
 of sense knowledge; the internationalisation of ethical, political, 
 economic, and scientific methods; the development of universal 
 rules of conduct; and the spread of taste and of refinement and 
 that, with the ages, it will become increasingly easy to grasp 
 and comprehend the world of facts. Thus in time the main 
 forces and uniformities in nature will be discovered and syste- 
 matised, and man's outer and inner life more or less completely 
 understood and ordered. Hence absolutist doctrines and de- 
 ductive methods of a severely mathematical character will, in 
 the course of time, become more and more applicable, until, 
 on the advent of the mythic stage, when the world formula 
 has been evolved and the ultra-microscopic and ultra-telescopic 
 facts of nature have been revealed in their pristine simplicity 
 and hammered together into a series of facts or into one fact 
 by inter-planetary co-operation, Descartes' fascinating dream 
 of intuitively apprehending the Universe will be actualised. On 
 the present age rests the humbler and more prosaic task of 
 promoting a general comprehension of the mental processes 
 involved in the best contemporary scientific practice, and of 
 urging the reasoned application of the fruits of such an endeavour 
 to all spheres of possible investigation and activity. An abso-
 
 22 PART I. THE PROBLEM. 
 
 lutist methodology will therefore become practicable only in 
 the remote future, when the present state of knowledge will 
 have been almost infinitely transcended, that is, when most of 
 the leading facts of physics, biology, and specio-physics, will 
 have been ascertained and correlated into a closely-knit science 
 of the cosmos or cosmology. 
 
 In the succeeding four Sections we shall discuss the scientific 
 acumen to be anticipated from individuals who are not deliber- 
 ately trained in accordance with methodological canons faith- 
 fully abstracted from modern scientific procedure at its best. 
 
 SECTION II. THE INFANT AND CHILD MIND. 1 
 
 6. Men often smile at the extravagant conclusions reached 
 by children (as when a child who has heard that a driver, arriv- 
 ing from a certain village, is called Leonard, inquires whether 
 all drivers hailing from that locality bear this name); yet a 
 circumspect study of infant life throws some light on the prob- 
 lems of methodology. 
 
 We need not touch here on inherited aptitudes, or on the 
 learning, without imitation, of certain movements (such as 
 carrying the fingers to the mouth), nor the interesting stages 
 when by degrees concerted action ensues between pairs of 
 eyes and limbs, or collaboration develops between the several 
 senses. To enter into these genetic problems would lead us 
 too far afield. 
 
 The first concept of interest to us which the child acquires 
 is that of "things". The eyes supply the infant with its in- 
 formation about the world beyond the finger tips, but this only 
 when objects move, omitting here strong light and glaring 
 colours which fascinate rather than teach anything. Hence 
 when the child watches a curtain moved by the wind, an ani- 
 mated face, a figure passing by, the waving branches of trees, 
 the inrushing tide, it gradually singles out the moving object 
 from the motionless surroundings. Only motion, on our part, 
 or on the part of a portion of our environment, appears to 
 yield the individuality and separateness whfeh adults associate 
 with things. 
 
 At first, objects which pass .out of sight or out of the 
 grasp have passed out of existence for the child; but diverse 
 experiences teach him that out of sight is only out of mind. 
 The first truths learnt, then, by the infant are that objects 
 exist and persist; and, in an unreasoned way, no doubt, he 
 becomes convinced that all things exist and persist for ever 
 in the precise form in which he has sensed them. 
 
 The next stage is an equally important one. Motion has 
 unlocked the secret of things, and now stationary objects, first 
 
 1 See under Child in the Index of the author's The Mind of Man.
 
 SECTION 2. -THE INFANT AND CHILD MIND. 23 
 
 small ones and then large ones, are, to begin with, recognised 
 and then freely distinguished. A pencil, a glove, a hat, a chair, 
 a table; a little later a door, a wardrobe; and later still, a 
 house, a street, are separated with astonishing ease by the 
 eye. 1 Yet the word table, for instance, is not interpreted by 
 the child to mean: "This something, seen at this moment from 
 this angle." Rather will the child identify as a table any table 
 at any time, or even anything resembling a table. Thus san- 
 dals, slippers, shoes, and boots are shoes; all round objects 
 are balls ; every glass vessel is a glass. Given one object seen 
 and named, the child readily regards it as representing a class. 
 The reason for this tendency to generalise is probably as 
 follows. The child's glance is only arrested by the leading 
 features of the object, and he observes it therefore most in- 
 completely. Hence size, colour, variations in shape, position, 
 and the like, are very imperfectly apprehended, and the general 
 and particular are thus readily confounded. When, therefore, 
 an object appears a second time, or a similar object presents 
 itself, vague memory followed on loose observation will identify 
 what is more or less heterogeneous. Secondly, even so far as 
 differences are appreciated, they are nevertheless neglected 
 because not deemed of importance, or, to express this more 
 objectively, because only the known and that which interests 
 fall within the focus. For the child Generalisation signifies 
 psychologically that a certain object or what is for him the 
 same, a certain class of objects having been once singled out 
 will, because of the neural mechanism or the laws of asso- 
 ciation, be automatically isolated when it reappears. 
 
 The infant is practically incapable of associating one object 
 of one class with another of a different class. His griefs and 
 his joys are unaffected by any recollections or reflections, since 
 these are lacking, and reasoning, which implies cross-classi- 
 I fication of memories or associated recollection, is therefore 
 absent. A time, however, arrives when after the invaluable 
 repetitive stage of earlier childhood has passed where every 
 action tends to be repeated a number of times the association 
 of memories and ideas becomes possible, especially with the 
 aid of language. When this happens, random, though not 
 frequent, generalisations as to relations and classes of facts 
 follow in the wake of the similarly random, but frequent, gene- 
 ralisations as to separate facts. Until much later, when his 
 store of knowledge has assumed considerable proportions, the 
 child's interest is predominantly concerned with facts rather 
 than with classes of these. 
 
 1 The sense of touch, as a channel of external information, apparently 
 develops relatively late in the infant life of the individual. Besides, this 
 sense supplies only an infinitesimal portion of our knowledge of the Uni- 
 verse, and its high philosophical status is not easily vindicated before the 
 bar of fact.
 
 24 PART I. THE PROBLEM. 
 
 If the child's method of attacking problems developed from 
 within, his world of ideas might automatically grow to be or- 
 ganised and compact on approaching adulthood. As a matter 
 of fact, however, the modes of mental reaction beyond the 
 early animal stage are furnished by the cultural environment, 
 and hence, after the Rubicon of infancy is passed, his discrimi- 
 nations and classifications reflect in a rudimentary form this 
 environment which, as we shall see in the next Section, has 
 hitherto normally occupied a low scientific plane. That is to 
 say, since the cultural environment varies indefinitely in space 
 and time, and since methodical thinking is as yet socially un- 
 organised, we may expect children to develop a perplexing 
 number of markedly ineffective ways of approaching the every- 
 day problems of life. This we actually observe to be the case. 
 According to the opportunities afforded, and the conditions of 
 the social environment, we note in the young the profoundest 
 cultural divergences some are grossly ignorant, others are ex- 
 cellently informed ; some are stupid, others are brilliant; some 
 are credulous to a degree, others judiciously discriminate. 
 Especially if our survey be historical and geographical, do we 
 discern prodigious and capricious deviations in intellection, 
 moral insight, taste, and practical ability, manifestly determined 
 by cultural and not by hereditary factors. We are therefore 
 prepared to find that since the great majority of children 
 receive but a poor educational equipment, and live under any- 
 thing but ideal cultural conditions, they should exhibit as a 
 class a very modest methodological status. Following the child 
 from infancy to adolescence, we are thus struck with his essen- 
 tial dependence culturally on human advance as a whole, on 
 the constitution of his social environment, and on the nature 
 of his personal circumstances. 
 
 We note, therefore, in the child two characteristics: (a) the 
 development of the chief elements in the growth of thought 
 the impulse to know, apprehension of objects, observation, gene- 
 ralisation, imagination, reasoning, judgment, and, above all, pro- 
 fiting by the inventions and discoveries of others, and (6) the 
 absence of anything resembling the circumspection, comprehen- 
 siveness, and systematic procedure of scientific method, except 
 in so far as highly efficient methodological teaching and training- 
 are provided. 
 
 We will enquire now to what extent, intellectually, the ordi- 
 nary scientifically untrained adult differs from the child whose 
 offspring he is. 
 
 SECTION III. THE SCIENTIFICALLY UNTRAINED ADULT. 
 
 7. Prior to the formation of mental associations connected 
 with events in his life, the child does not deliberate. In the 
 course of growing older, however, he gains an enormous stock
 
 SECTION 3. THE SCIENTIFICALLY UNTRAINED ADULT. 25 
 
 of memories, and the possible number of associations becomes 
 therefore limitless. Consequently, especially with the priceless 
 aid of language, the process of deliberating, of reflecting, of 
 reasoning, steadily develops with experience and with guidance, 
 and in this particular respect there is, accordingly, a notable 
 distinction between the younger child and the average adult. 
 Still, the deviation, if we omit the earliest stages, is much less 
 clear between adult and child so far as the processes of in- 
 tellection are concerned, for, although the half-trained adult 
 will neither mistake the almonds on a cake for pebbles nor 
 assert that the chair is naughty, his cogitations only very 
 remotely suggest modern scientific procedure at its best. 
 
 The average man to-day labours under peculiar disadvantages 
 from which the man of science is exempt. The latter does not 
 grudge the expenditure of the time and energy requisite for 
 solving a problem, and, what is more, if no tangible solution 
 is forthcoming, as in Faraday's attempt to detect a relation 
 between gravity and other natural forces, he merely postpones 
 or abandons the search for an explanation. The average man, 
 on the contrary, is compelled to settle every day numerous 
 problems, and he is, therefore, little perturbed when any of 
 his ordinary solutions prove partially or wholly erroneous. 
 
 To generalise is a matter of mental economy both in practi- 
 cal life and in science, and in practical life economy is of such 
 moment that probability quickly reached is more prized than 
 certainty attained as the reward of protracted labours. The 
 average adult, no doubt, generalises excessively; but, on the 
 other hand, mere cautiousness is of doubtful positive value. 
 In certain strata of society "I think", "It appears to me", 
 "I don't know", are expressions in constant use. Precipitate 
 generalising is avoided here; but mechanical caution neither 
 dispels error nor extends the horizon of knowledge. In the 
 keen struggle for existence much must be staked, and indeci- 
 sion will not feed, clothe, house, or enlighten mankind. 
 
 Consider an instance of every-day problems. The train by 
 which a person travels to town has been occasionally late. 
 That person, if he desired to be precise in recording the fact, 
 would need to state the number of times the train has or has 
 not been late; the dates, the hours of the day, and any special 
 circumstances which might account for the tardy arrival of the 
 trains. Rather than conduct such an elaborate investigation, 
 he would prefer to proffer no statement at all, and yet a purely 
 negative attitude on all dubious points would tend towards a 
 mental standstill. Aware of these obstacles, we are satisfied 
 in daily life with probabilities, and we seldom strive to attain 
 to even approximate certainty. What, then, is the current 
 measure of the degree of probability? The question is em- 
 barrassing. Not a few individuals universalise in an extra- 
 vagant manner. If, for instance, a train chances to be late,
 
 26 PART I. THE PROBLEM. 
 
 the remark is made that all trains on the line in question are 
 late in arriving, or, more forcibly, that there is always some- 
 thing amiss with trains. A single act stamps a man as good 
 or bad, and an isolated transaction determines whether a 
 tradesman is a desirable person to have dealings with or not. 
 Similarly, manners, political parties, and religions other than 
 our own are freely condemned on the basis of one or a few in- 
 stances, whereas one or a few picked illustrations are presumed 
 to demonstrate the superiority of our manners, political party, and 
 religion. Likewise there is no argument so shallow or unsub- 
 stantial which is not often regarded by numbers of men as con- 
 clusive when it is, say, a matter of defending class interests or 
 inventing an excuse for declaring war. 1 
 
 In the absence of a discriminating public standard of pro- 
 bability it is hazardous to pass judgment on the average man 
 for indulging in precipitate statements. After all, the Universe 
 is not a multiverse. To-day closely resembles yesterday, and 
 to-morrow will not differ much from to-day. The general facts 
 of nature do not sensibly vary during brief periods ; towns, parks, 
 streets, houses, remain virtually the same from week to week ; 
 the number and the appearance of the folk we encounter in 
 our district from day to day remain approximately alike; and 
 our acquaintances apparently possess a permanent character. 
 Moreover, largely because we are trained to ignore everything 
 which is not palpable, obvious, or usable, the marvellous 
 development of plants and animals from shapeless and dimi- 
 nutive zygotes into astonishingly varied forms ; the links which 
 closely connect the most diverse living types ; the world of 
 causes which is almost invariably the region of the microscopic 
 and ultra-microscopic; and objects relatively distant in space 
 and time, fall outside the focus of common apprehension and 
 interest. Nor does fortuitous experience teach a man much, 
 for an undisciplined and confused memory, multitudinous pre- 
 judices, and rambling cogitations re-reduce the complex to the 
 simple, and mask the deeper truths. The method of thought 
 whereby he ordinarily proceeds, the average man opines, is 
 applicable everywhere. Besides, because of the intricacy of 
 most problems, it is difficult to prove to him that he is 
 mistaken, and even if he be convicted of a defect in his 
 reasoning, he will readily discover specious explanations to 
 reassure himself. Thus, if a man of ill repute happens to be 
 drowned when swimming at the seaside, it is regarded by 
 many as a divine punishment; if a man of good repute is 
 drowned under analogous circumstances, the deity is said to 
 have need of him. If unemployment increases in the country, 
 
 1 The World War, happily ended with the defeat of the principal aggressor, 
 painfully illustrates the last point. Austria's pretext for attacking Serbia, 
 Germany's for declaring war on Belgium, Russia, and France, and Bulgaria's 
 excuse for breaking with its neighbour, Serbia, are apt examples.
 
 SECTION 3. THE SCIENTIFICALLY UNTRAINED ADULT. 27 
 
 the Opposition attributes it to the incompetence of the Govern- 
 ment, whilst Ministers of State ascribe it to the disturbing effect 
 on the market of the unwarrantable and partisan criticisms of 
 the Opposition. 
 
 However, prejudice is immensely heightened by a mental 
 process the presence of which is habituaHy unsuspected, 
 namely, the psychological fact, to be discussed in Conclusion 7, 
 that only that which appeals to us tends to be recalled. For 
 this reason, the Musulman, the Jew, and the Christian; the Con- 
 servative, the Liberal, and the Socialist; the aristocrat, the 
 bourgeois, and the operative; the artist, the captain of industry, 
 and the man of the world, are each very often supremely con- 
 fident in their views. The opponent's contention, because of 
 the working of the psychic mechanism, has no justification for 
 them, and hence they feel immovably certain that their case 
 is strong, and that of their antagonist weak. In one limited 
 sphere alone the average man reasons scientifically, or nearly 
 so, namely in his avocation, where a knowledge of many of 
 the relevant facts and traditional methods resulting from dearly- 
 bought experience, frequently prevent slipshod observation, 
 reasoning, and generalisation. Since, however, he is not con- 
 scious 1 of the peculiarity of the method which he applies in 
 his avocation, this method is of no assistance to him in any 
 other department of life, especially because occasions vary 
 and divergent situations require relatively divergent treatment. 
 Nevertheless, even here, as the efficiency movement is daily 
 demonstrating, a multitude of blighting prejudices seriously 
 debases the value of his thought. 
 
 The average individual of to-day is not only hampered by 
 ignorance, bias, and narrow sympathies; he generally lacks 
 the determinate and desirable qualities which efficient training 
 provides. When confronted with a perplexing problem, he just 
 stares at it, loses heart, or seeks to overcome it by attempts 
 ascribable to the most fugitive suggestions ; when he discovers 
 two or three trivial points, he deems that he has discovered 
 everything relevant ; when an unfamiliar theory is propounded, 
 he thinks of some, more or less plausible objection, and decides 
 at once that this disposes of the theory ; every novel suggestion 
 relating to practice he stigmatises as unpractical or as contrary 
 to human nature; when a solution does not quickly present 
 itself, he conjectures that no solution is possible ; he confounds 
 mere plausibility with sheer truth; each ephemeral symptom 
 he regards as an independent and fundamental fact, overlooking 
 thus what is really of moment and far-reaching; he believes 
 that if he only waits, the truth will automatically sail into 
 view ; he despairs of there being any truth at all in the matter ; 
 
 1 An analysis of the nature of habit will be found in the author's The 
 Mind of Man, Ch. 3.
 
 28 PART L-THE PROBLEM. 
 
 he is not concerned about finding the truth; he hesitates and 
 vacillates ; he is unmethodical ; he occupies his time in brooding 
 and speculating, in grumbling or fumbling; he does not attack 
 the problem with sufficient energy; he has not learnt to con- 
 struct or to follow a lengthy train of reasoning; he jumps to 
 conclusions ; he is without resource ; he is not sufficiently 
 cautious; memory plays him false, and he forgets much; he 
 takes no accurate notes, nor does he make sure of his facts; 
 and so on, and so on. 1 
 
 Every competent observer will corroborate the statement 
 that average persons exhibit some or many of the defects 
 above mentioned, defects which bring into relief the need of a 
 methodology. It is evident, then, that thinking in conformity 
 with scientific standards is most rare among the scientifically 
 untrained, and it is at least a problem worth examining whether 
 proper methodological training, which is now curiously con- 
 spicuous by its absence, would not mend matters materially, 
 if not radically. It is difficult to see why defects such as those 
 enumerated in the preceding paragraph could not be eradicated, 
 and the corresponding desirable qualities firmly implanted. 
 Indeed, it is as unreasonable to anticipate that the untrained 
 thinker will be equal to the task of thinking effectively as that 
 he will not become expert in this direction when adequately 
 trained. The very growth to an illimitable extent of scientific 
 methods affords further presumptive evidence in favour of the 
 assumption that methodological thinking is a socio-historic and 
 pan-human product. 
 
 Let us now study the man who is "scientifically" trained, 
 in order to enable us to determine what distinguishes him from 
 the scientifically untrained adult. 
 
 SECTION IV. THE SCIENTIFICALLY TRAINED INDIVIDUAL. 
 
 8. The theory and the practice of the sciences are com- 
 monly assimilated by the student in the course of practical 
 scientific work and reading. He surmises that his teachers 
 proceed in certain ways, and imperceptibly he glides into those 
 ways himself. Hence, since the material of the sciences differs 
 notably in respect of composition and complexity, and since 
 the stages in their development also diverge widely, it is not 
 to be expected that the traditionally determined pursuit of some 
 particular science will unlock the secret of the general scientific 
 method. In some sciences, as in physiology, the facts are 
 relatively complicated, whilst in others, as in molar mechanics, 
 they are comparatively simple, and likewise the advanced stage 
 
 1 Corresponding defects, equally due to absence of right habits, account 
 for imperfect morals. The individual is as dependent here on inventions 
 and discoveries as in engineering or chemistry.
 
 SECTION 4. THE SCIENTIFICALLY TRAINED INDIVIDUAL. 29 
 
 of a science, owing to the presence of sifted facts and ex- 
 planations, may allow of ready and speedy generalisation and 
 deduction, whereas at the birth of a science the initial ignorance 
 may compel exhaustive enquiries and tediously slow advance. 
 Compare in this respect medieval alchemy with twentieth cen- 
 tury chemistry. So, too, the application of experiment, of de- 
 duction, of mathematical formula, of comparative or genetic 
 methods, depends on the subject matter and on the stage of 
 development of any science. As a consequence, when the 
 botanist, for example, turns to politics or to religion, one gene- 
 rally observes that there is no noteworthy distinction between 
 the precariousness of his judgments and those of the typical 
 politician or theologian. x Indeed, in his crude attempt to apply 
 in a generalised form the methods he employs in his highly 
 specialised science, he is not seldom grievously in error. Some 
 of the scientific light sheds no doubt a weak, phosphorescent 
 illumination over nearly his whole intellectual being ; but this is 
 of trifling account. The theory of teaching men to be scientific 
 in their general thought by bringing them into contact with some 
 particular science is, therefore, plausible, but nothing more. 
 The fallacy just referred to is interestingly illustrated by the 
 fortunes of psychology. In its earliest phases, and among the 
 ancients generally, it was allied to metaphysics. At a certain 
 point, as with Wolff and Kant, it became rational. When 
 scientific enquiries began to grow common, men thought, as in 
 England from the time of Hobbes to James Mill, that the method 
 of developing a science of the mind was to eschew transcen- 
 dental considerations and cultivate speculative introspection to 
 which movement was due the associationist school. Herbart, 
 who was much impressed with the grandeur of the science of 
 physics and the value of mathematics, looked, in imitation of 
 the physicists, upon ideas as isolated mind atoms governed by 
 a law of levity, and endeavoured to explain the nature of the 
 human mind by valuating these ideas and their relations 
 mathematically. Fechner, following Weber, devoted himself to 
 experiment, and constructed the science of psycho-physics. 
 With Wundt psychology became predominantly physiological', 
 and to-day the tendency is to place the emphasis on the in- 
 stincts and on the emotional and volitional life generally, whilst 
 new schools are emerging stressing the psychology of the un- 
 conscious, the aspect of behaviour, and the native psychic powers 
 alleged to be revealed by psychological tests. Nor can we do 
 more than allude to the efforts to comprehend the mind through 
 the study of abnormal states, through the growth of mind in 
 the individual, in races, and in animal life, or through all these 
 combined. Whether a haven of rest has been reached by psy- 
 
 1 The absence of a general methodology explains how men of scientific 
 distinction are frequently found to be outrageously unscientific when passing 
 judgment on problems outside their domain.
 
 30 PART I. THE PROBLEM. 
 
 chologists, is more than questionable. Here we need only note 
 the almost insuperable obstacles, due to subject-matter and 
 stage of development which have to be encountered in trans- 
 ferring the traditional method of one science to another passing 
 through a different phase. Ordinarily this is facilitated through 
 one science imperceptibly developing out of a closely related 
 one; but where there is a comparatively abrupt commencement, 
 there, as in psychology and in the cultural sciences generally, 
 owing to the lack of a scientific method of a general character, 
 no manifest point of departure presents itself, and hence cen- 
 turies may be lost in groping for the method proper to the 
 new enquiry. 
 
 The same difficulty, having its origin in identical causes, is 
 encountered in every attempt to skip several historic stages, 
 and it is for this reason that the development of science has 
 been so schematic from the simple to the complex and that 
 u the history of science presents us with no example of an 
 individual mind throwing itself far in advance of its contempo- 
 raries". 1 (Brewster, Life of Newton, 1875, p. 112.) Mathematics, 
 dealing at first with concrete and then with idealised data, 
 came first. Then followed Astronomy (where only the most 
 general facts were and are taken into consideration), Molar 
 Mechanics 2 (which is almost wholly a question of judiciously 
 defining the motions of visible masses of matter in space and 
 time), Ethereology (concerned often with imperceptible, but yet 
 relatively isolated, facts, such as gravity, heat, light, electricity, 
 magnetism, rays), Chemistry (where the combination of elements 
 introduces a new factor, complicated however by the existence 
 of inert elements refusing ttnsombine), Biology (which not only 
 treats of highly complex chemical compounds, but also of the 
 presence of intricate organic structures in the higher genera), 
 Psychology (which depends on introspection, on a high and 
 impartial standard of observation, and on a knowledge of the 
 organism's, the individual's, and the community's development 
 and needs), and the cultural sciences or specio-psy chics (which re- 
 
 1 Note that it is Newton's distinguished biographer who is responsible 
 for this statement. 
 
 2 "By far the most general phenomenon with which we are acquainted, 
 and that which occurs most constantly, in every enquiry into which we enter, 
 is motion, and its communication. Dynamics, then, or the science of force 
 and motion, is thus placed at the head of all the sciences; and, happily for 
 human knowledge, it is one in which the highest certainty is obtainable v 
 a certainty no way inferior to mathematical demonstration. As its axioms 
 are few, simple, and in the highest degree distinct and definite, so they have 
 at the same time an immediate relation to geometrical quantity, space, time, 
 and direction, and thus accommodate themselves with remarkable facility 
 to geometrical reasoning. Accordingly, their consequences may be pursued, 
 by arguments purely mathematical, to any extent, insomuch that the limit 
 of our knowledge of dynamics is determined only by that of pure mathe- 
 matics, which is the case in no other branch of physical science." (Sir John 
 Herschel, Discourse, [87.].)
 
 SECTION 4. THE SCIENTIFICALLY TRAINED INDIVIDUAL. 31 
 
 quire extensive physical, biological, and psychological knowledge 
 for their comprehension). 1 Evidently a general science of pheno- 
 mena, or a philosophy, will remain an unrealisable hope until 
 most of the sciences are firmly established, and have ascertained 
 the majority of the most comprehensive truths in their respective 
 spheres, together with most of the principal verities common 
 to them.- At first sight our contention that scientific tradition 
 begins in confusion as to subject-matter and method, seems 
 belied by the clear line .of advance from the simple sciences to 
 the less simple ones which history chronicles. Further reflection, 
 however, attests that man has always attempted to grapple with 
 the subject-matter of most of the sciences, that is, that centuries 
 of effort have been wasted in those cases, e.g., in the biological 
 sciences, where the subject-matter investigated is of a laby- 
 rinthine order, and presupposes the existence of certain as yet 
 undeveloped sciences, e.g., chemistry. It is, therefore, an irre- 
 sistible conclusion that scientific advance is only possible from 
 the simple to the complex, that the complex will be erro- 
 neously interpreted so long as the less complex has not been 
 reduced to comparative simplicity, and that scientific advance 
 must . remain tiresomely slow until general scientific methods 
 have been discovered and are generally accepted, freeing the 
 individual from the trammels of empirical and misleading tradi- 
 tions and practices. 
 
 A fruitful definition of science can only be attempted when 
 we restrict ourselves to asking What does science mean in our 
 day? Broadly speaking, it signifies for us moderns the deve- 
 loping and connecting of certain departments of knowledge, such 
 as theoretical and applied physics, biology, specio-psychics, and 
 cosmology, and this by traditional methods far more circumspect 
 than the ones commonly employed in practical life to-day. In 
 its higher reaches it means further, as a rule, the endeavour to 
 obtain a simple, unified, and incontrovertible view of nature 
 and of life, through guarded and exhaustive observation, through 
 subsequent bold and graded generalisation, and through verified 
 deduction of the same type. 3 When, therefore, we wax enthu- 
 
 1 For a history of the classification of the sciences, see R. Flint, Philosophy 
 as Scientia Scientiarum, and for a comprehensive scheme of classification, 
 Conclusion 33. 
 
 2 E.g., note the complete dependence on fact of the argument in Henri 
 Bergson's Donnees imm^diates. The neglect which overtakes philosophers 
 generally is primarily due to their reliance on crude observation and un- 
 sifted surmises. 
 
 3 "Experience presents to us a chaos of innumerable events, together and 
 in succession. In this chaos, science has first to ascertain the facts; then, 
 to ascertain 'what follows what', i.e., what facts are invariably connected 
 together; and then, to account for those regular connections, to show how 
 or why they are so connected." (S. H. Mellone, An Introductory Text-Book 
 of Logic, 1905, p. 291.) "A science is, in all cases, a systematic body of know- 
 ledge relating to some particular subject-matter." (James Welton, A Manual 
 of Logic, 1896, vol. 1, p. 10.)
 
 32 PART J.THE PROBLEM. 
 
 siastic about science, we have in mind chiefly the large results 
 achieved since the Renascence by the class of men conventionally 
 called men of science, and the ingenious methods employed by 
 them in research use of instruments, experiment, and mathe- 
 matics. Perhaps in a thousand years' time men will understand 
 by science something as far outstripping in serviceableness 
 modern science as modern science outdistances the science of 
 Aristotle's and Averroes' days in this matter. There is no 
 occult quality inherent in the word science, for the laxest 
 magic and the severest inductive procedure occupy one rising 
 plane. 1 Speculative or objective method, deductive or inductive 
 method, represent historic phases, all of which appear, and 
 even are, right at certain periods. Belief in dogma or rejection 
 of authority is also immaterial to the historical definition of 
 science. The one distinguishing feature of the method of science 
 observable historically is the progressive approximation to more 
 and more successful methods of systematically, definitely, and 
 convincingly establishing comprehensive uniformities. 
 
 For our own day we should draw a somewhat sharp distinction 
 between the world of science and the world of common sense. 
 This distinction is manifestly justified when we reflect that to- 
 day science aims primarily at theory and common sense pri- 
 marily at practice. Whereas, therefore, the scientist is absorbed 
 in understanding a microscopic section of existence, the layman 
 generally thinks of how to procure comforts and luxuries. For 
 this reason the layman perceives as a rule only the gross, 
 coarse-grained facts, and is frequently interested in these alone, 
 whilst his conclusions are crude ones, in harmony with his 
 narrow experience and his homely wants. The scientist, on 
 the other hand, esteems no effort too strenuous or too pro- 
 longed to achieve a slight advance in comprehending a small 
 part of nature. Therefore, as the one invents machinery in 
 order to augment wealth and render social life safe and tolerable 
 and co-operates with his fellows to this end, so the other, 
 joining with fellow-labourers, explores the rich mines of fact 
 by means of special instruments and the most patient syste- 
 matised thought. The one desires to possess the world; the 
 other to comprehend it. In the present age, therefore, com- 
 mon knowledge and scientific knowledge, the world of prac- 
 tice and the world of theory, tend too frequently to lie far 
 apart, with the significant exception of the applied sciences 
 and arts, scientific management of industry and commerce, 
 
 1 The following stages in the historical development of science may be 
 roughly discriminated: unconsciousness of problems; magic; fetichism ; 
 polytheism and philosophy; Greek, Roman, and Eastern science; theism; 
 Arab school; Aristotle revived; earlier and later renascence; seventeenth and 
 eighteenth century speculations, gropings, and advances; and the measurably 
 superior speculations, gropings, and advances, of the nineteenth and twentieth 
 centuries.
 
 SECTION 4. THE SCIENTIFICALLY TRAINED INDIVIDUAL. 33 
 
 and hygiene, where both meet. 1 In the distant past this was 
 not the case, because science, strictly speaking, was as yet 
 scarcely developed; in the distant future this will be again 
 different, for the scientific method will be, as we have already 
 intimations to-day, a universal possession universally cherished 
 and applied. Practice will then fraternise with theory, and 
 theory be a close ally of practice. In essence, as we have 
 seen, the world of experience is one and undivided, developing 
 from wholly unsystematised and practical thought to wholly 
 systematised and theoretico-practical cogitation. 
 
 More than two generations ago Comte proposed a solution of the problem 
 of how far the man of science should subordinate his researches to the 
 needs of practice. We present the solution in his own words, only premising 
 that the needs of applied science, and those of industrial and commercial 
 activities generally, increasingly demand the initiation of theoretical 
 researches; that in not a few cases it has been found practicable to pass 
 backwards and forwards from theoretical to applied sciences and arts; 
 and that, indeed, with the gradual subjugation of many scientific and 
 practical spheres, a compendious theoretico-practical treatment will be 
 effected with facility, and therefore grow common. "Immense as are the 
 services rendered to Industry by Science, and although according to the 
 striking aphorism of Bacon Knowledge is Power, we must never forget 
 that the Sciences have a yet higher and more direct destination, that of 
 satisfying the craving of our minds to know the laws of phenomena. . . . 
 The general tendency of our time is, in this respect, defective and narrow. 
 But, in the case of scientists, it is corrected, consciously or not, by the 
 strong natural craving of which I have spoken. Otherwise the human 
 intellect would be confined to researches of immediate practical utility, 
 and, as Condorcet very justly remarked, would for that reason alone be 
 completely arrested in its progress. This would be the case even as regards 
 those practical applications to which we should have imprudently sacrificed 
 the purely theoretical labours ; for the most important practical appli- 
 cations are constantly derived from theories formed for purely scientific 
 purposes, and which have often been cultivated during many centuries 
 without producing any practical result. ... It is, therefore, evident, that, 
 after the study of nature has been conceived in a general way as serving 
 for the rational basis of our action upon it, we must next proceed to 
 theoretical researches, leaving wholly on one side every practical con- 
 sideration. Our means for discovering truth are so feeble that if we do 
 not concentrate them exclusively upon this object, and if we hamper our 
 search for truth with the extraneous condition that it shall have some 
 
 1 Theory owes already much to practice. "Pour preciser par quelques 
 exemples les grands apports etrangers aux sciences naturelles qui les ont in- 
 sensiblement creees ou periodiquement bouleversees, ^numerous rapidement 
 et pele-mele les sacrifices religieux de victimes ani males et 1'examen de leurs 
 visceres, les voyages commerciaux des Egyptiens et des Pheniciens, les jeux 
 du cirque dans la Rome imp6riale, la decouverte de rAmerique et les ex- 
 plorations ulterieures, la combinaison de lentilles qui fit' le microscope, la 
 pose des cables transatlantiques qui conduisit aux grands dragages abyssaux, 
 les recherches de Pasteur que les besoins de la brasserie amenerent par des 
 etudes de chimie a transformer la biologic et la medecine." (Fr6de>ic Houssay, 
 Nature et sciences naturelles, about 1903, pp. 1-2.) 
 
 Thus chemistry had its origin in the desire for adornments, for fermented 
 liquors, for dyes, and other useful articles, for medicines, and for transforming 
 ordinary substances into gold. (See also Conclusion 32.)
 
 34 PART I THE PROBLEM. 
 
 immediate practical utility, it would be almost always impossible for us 
 to succeed." 1 (The Fundamental Principles of the Positive Philosophy, 
 ed. 1905, pp. 44-45.) 
 
 Under present circumstances the scientifically and unscienti- 
 fically trained adult agree in being g,uided by tradition, only 
 that in the former instance the method customarily employed 
 is immensely superior. In the true sense, the scientifically 
 trained adult will only come into being when a tried methodology 
 introduces the student to the meaning and methods of science. 
 
 There is no valid reason why deliberate methodological train- 
 ing should be postponed to the distant future. Far easier than 
 semi-conscious conjecturing and interpreting of supposed methods 
 on the basis of a medley of half-sifted facts and fancies, would 
 it be for students to be deliberately educated in conformity, 
 say, with the thirty-six Conclusions contained in Book II of 
 this volume. By a combined theoretical and practical study 
 (see Conclusions 8 to 10) the learner would in this manner 
 arrive at being tolerably proficient in reading the secrets of 
 nature and of life. If we imagine every teacher fairly trained 
 in this respect at his or her college, it is to be presumed that 
 the general instruction, work, and life of the school (and, it is 
 hoped, of the home) may become permeated with at least the 
 elements of the scientific spirit, especially if we note that the 
 world about the child offers boundless opportunities for pur- 
 poseful, methodical, and exact observation, generalisation, and 
 theoretical and practical deduction. What is true of the child 
 is a fortiori truer still of the adolescent and of the young men 
 and women of university age. It is most desirable therefore 
 that the introduction of this more excellent way of acquiring 
 scientific skill should not be indefinitely postponed. Men of 
 science should be surely the last in the world to insist on 
 continuing a tradition for no better reason than that it exists. 
 
 SECTION V. THE MAN OF GENIUS, AND THOUGHT AS HABIT- 
 CONTROLLED AND AS A PAN-HUMAN PRODUCT. 
 
 I. THOUGHT AS HABIT-CONTROLLED. 
 
 9. The super-chemistry of thought is more easily conceived 
 in the abstract than concretely analysed. Stimulated by in- 
 stincts and consequent desires, human thought enters the scene, 
 and is primarily dependent for efficiency on a more or less 
 complete and correlated memory. Yet, singularly enough, with 
 all its perfection there is scarcely anything more imperfect 
 than the human memory. First we note that our consciousness 
 is almost like a sieve, for most of our sensations no sooner 
 
 1 Comte's view was manifestly correct as far as the stage of scientific 
 development of his day was concerned. To-day already his reasoning is 
 only partially justified, and in the course of time it will become obsolete. 
 On the subject generally consult Conclusion 2B.
 
 SECTION 5. THE MAN OF GENIUS. 35 
 
 present themselves than they bow themselves out of existence. 
 What remains, after the sieving process, is the merest fraction 
 of that which has been perceived, or what has passed through 
 our mind. Add to this, a rapidly fading memory which progres- 
 sively obliterates most recollections of a few years' standing, and 
 plays such havoc with the residue that where there were images 
 full of colour and definiteness, the barest elusive half-shadow 
 survives, and our difficulties will be appreciated. Then there 
 is the fact that memories become frequently confused, mis- 
 leading, transmuted, and that they more often than not refuse 
 to appear when they are summoned. The Dreyfus trial in 
 France, a generation ago, afforded a striking object lesson in 
 regard to the short and erratic career of memories. 
 
 However, it is not only that the memory is inherently an 
 imperfect instrument, but the teleological or economic factor in 
 mental life acts as a powerful disintegrating agent. Consider 
 the case of a child who has learnt to write, and study the 
 adaptations which follow as a consequence: 
 
 When his studies commenced, he learnt that he must hold the pen in 
 a certain position if he wished to write with ease, that the arm should 
 not be placed as the reinless fancy prompted, and the like. He knew, 
 broadly speaking, why he did things and how he did them. This know- 
 ledge of the how and the why of the process was doqmed from the be- 
 ginning. Gradually losing his interest in writing as such, having no longer 
 any need to refer to that knowledge, and being eager to acquire other 
 habits, he slowly forgets the how and the why. At first there was a 
 bond of time and order : now all ties are gone. He cannot tell relationship, 
 time, or succession. Each point is recollected independently of every 
 other point. He cannot even indicate the what, though he knows what 
 to do. The what has departed as a notion, and exists as a remembered 
 act. As the child progressed there was no need to recollect the what, 
 the how, the why, or any other system of relationships, and so these are 
 forgotten. We detect here no substituted, transformed, or added con- 
 stituent, only certain once existing factors have been removed. All that 
 could be dispensed with has been cast aside. 
 
 Again : 
 
 If we are considerably interested in one thing, we cannot spare much 
 interest for another thing at the same time. Thus there is a constant 
 tendency for thoughts, as with animals in congested areas, to drive each 
 other out of existence. 
 
 Suppose a man thinks that it would be best to dismiss certain im- 
 practicable thoughts immediately they occur, by turning his attention into 
 other channels. An opportunity arrives, he remembers his resolution, and 
 carries it into effect. After a period of practice the resolution is forgotten 
 or not referred to; but whenever anything impracticable suggests itself he 
 dismisses it immediately. The resolution forms now no link between the 
 objectionable thought and the act of dismissal. As that thought appears, 
 so it is thrust back. There may be, after a time, entire ignorance that 
 certain thoughts are dismissed. The man may, e.g., either deny that such 
 is the fact, or he may give some plausible, but inaccurate explanation. 1 
 
 Imagine now this process to begin from infancy, and to be 
 carried up and on through life, afid it will be evident that human 
 thought is essentially irrational, except at a very few points 
 
 1 G. Spiller, The Mind of Man. pp. 96, 95, 116.
 
 36 PART I THE PROBLEM. 
 
 where the irrationality is less marked. Naturally, too, as we 
 advance in age and grow in wisdom we become more and more 
 irrational, since we employ more and more aids and means 
 whose intent eventually escapes us wholly or in great measure. 
 Habit grows out of habit until w r e find a vast congeries of 
 habits, practically each modified by each in a composite direction 
 difficult to detect. Moreover, the irrationality is magnified, 
 because unpremeditated and piecemeal adaptations play, apart 
 even from feelings and sentiments, a conspicuous part in the 
 process of mental growth. 
 
 The conclusion is, accordingly, inevitable that an absolutist 
 and atomist logic is impossible, for the reason that the human 
 mind is relativist and organic in structure. Our memory is 
 radically faulty, and our many urging desires add to the dis- 
 order by annihilating almost everything of an explanatory or 
 rational nature. Normally we do not act, therefore, in con- 
 formity with reason; but in agreement with character, i.e., in 
 accordance with a mass of more or less interconnected habits. 
 
 II. THOUGHT AS A PAN-HUMAN PRODUCT. 
 
 10. Were this all, we might conceivably recover most of 
 the threads which connect our mental life at every stage, by 
 preserving faithful and complete accounts of what happens to 
 a particular human being from infancy to maturity. In this 
 way we should ultimately recognise the raison d'etre of thought 
 and understand ourselves. Yet, granted that we could reduce 
 to calculable terms our instincts and our emotions, and granted 
 that we could follow the super-chemistry of thought in the in- 
 fant and the young child, we should not really have advanced 
 far, for thought is inter-individual and inter-social, and develops 
 through the ages, from primitive times forward. Our imaginary 
 observer would be obliged therefore not only to follow the life 
 of one individual, but the life of the whole of humanity from 
 ape-hood upwards, and he would notice that each generation 
 transmits to its successor a bulkier and further metamorphosed 
 bundle of habits in the form of records, traditions, customs, 
 and manners even more irrational or incomplete than those 
 passed on by one moment to another in the history of the indi- 
 vidual. 
 
 III. THE MAN OF GENIUS. 
 
 11. If towering geniuses existed who revolutionise the 
 whole world of thought in their time, as the popular imagination 
 is fond of surmising, much might be effected to re-form the 
 trend of life on the high plane of reason by learning how their 
 mind functions. Such geniuses, however, belong to the realm 
 of fables. 1 The fancy evolves these by attributing to them, on 
 
 1 For one of many examples of the deep indebtedness of our leading 
 thinkers, see "A Commemoration of Auguste Comte", by H. Gordon Jones,
 
 SECTION 5. THE MAN OF GENIUS. 37 
 
 the one hand, the work of generations, and by ignoring, on the 
 other hand, the virtually infinite mass of human reason which 
 obtains outside their sphere of activity. Men are very small 
 indeed, compared to Man. Myriads of so-called men of genius 
 could not have advanced us as far as plodding humanity has 
 actually done. It would be, therefore, idle to hope much from 
 a study of genius, for the roots of knowledge do not lie there. 
 The very vocabulary which the man of genius must employ 
 almost completely dominates and controls his thought, for therein 
 are embodied innumerable discriminations and the generalisations 
 accumulated by mankind, both as regards objects and methods, 
 positively binding him as to the broad road which he is to tread. 
 Consequently, for example, such terms as Conception, Obser- 
 vation, Comparison, Abstraction, Generalisation, Definition, are 
 accepted by thinkers from the past, and are interpreted primarily 
 according to traditional conventions. To learn these terms con- 
 scientiously by heart will no more lead to the appropriate actions 
 than the committing to memory of any series of undeciphered 
 hieroglyphics. And when we proceed a step farther and define 
 what we mean, say, by Observing, we effect this with the help 
 of other symbolic terms, which equally await interpretation by 
 a fresh set of terms, and so on ad ind6fimtum. We are con- 
 strained hence to assume that; the words we employ reflect 
 certain actions or states, and, given an imperfect memory, the 
 difficulty of correct interpretation becomes evident, especially 
 when we remember that from generation to generation actions 
 and states not only vary sensibly, but often conspicuously, to 
 the extent of acquiring a wholly different and even contrary 
 purport and connotation. The growth of languages admirably 
 illustrates this profound socio-historic influence on thought, 
 determined as this growth is by new discoveries, inventions, 
 ways, experiences, errors, and prepossessions. And inasmuch 
 as the task is principally humanity's and not that of any indi- 
 vidual, it follows that the man of alleged genius is also a crea- 
 ture of habit, and is almost completely dependent for proficiency 
 in thinking on the scientific methods very gradually discovered 
 by the race. 1 
 
 in the Positivist Review, Sept. 1st, 1913, where it is shoVn that Comte's 
 fundamental conceptions were not, strictly speaking, his own. Comte illus- 
 trates in this respect the rule. For a detailed refutation of the genius 
 theory see the present author's forthcoming work, The Distinctive Nature 
 of Man. 
 
 "The popular mind spares itself effort by crediting the house to the man 
 who lays the last tile and allowing his co-workers to drop out of view. . . . 
 The resolving of human achievement into contributions of tens of thousands 
 innovating individuals has, therefore, little in common with the theory of 
 progress which gives the glory to a few Great Men." (E. A. Ross, Foundations 
 of Sociology, 1905, pp. 227-228.) 
 
 1 Numerous illustrations in support of our contention in regard to tin- 
 true place of the man of genius will be ^ound scattered throughout this 
 volume. (See Index, under Genius.)
 
 38 PART I. THE PROBLEM. 
 
 IV. CONCLUSION. 
 
 12. Seeing that the struggle for existence among ideas in 
 individuals and generations tends to eliminate everything that 
 is superfluous in thought and conduct, all that is merely ex- 
 planatory is of necessity forgotten, especially having regard to 
 the imperfection of our memory. Consequently the individual 
 cannot possibly think rationally or in accordance with absolutist 
 standards. Since, moreover, culture is a pan-human and pro- 
 gressive product, and its assimilation is mostly determined by 
 capricious circumstances, we readily understand the egregious 
 blunders of the child and the haphazard generalisations and ex- 
 planations of the scientifically untrained adult. Nay more, we 
 discern now that though the modern student of science is guided 
 no doubt by more efficacious rules for the conduct of particular 
 enquiries, these rules, if we take into consideration the whole 
 sphere of thought, resemble oases in an illimitable desert, or 
 tiny islands in the ocean. For this reason also those who are 
 most distinguished are under the heaviest obligation to the 
 methodological legacy of the ages. Correct and methodical 
 thinking of a general character implies manifestly a special pro- 
 cedure which no intelligence can adequately apply, save on the 
 basis of an appropriate methodology which has been scienti- 
 fically abstracted from the most successful practice of men of 
 science, which practice is itself the outcome of mankind's growing 
 and clarifying experience. 
 
 A scientific methodology is therefore a sine qua non for rapid 
 progress. At the same time, since it is not a question of applying 
 new or rare mental powers in methodology any more than, say, 
 in machine construction, there is no reason why such a theory 
 of efficiency, pedagogically inculcated, should present in the 
 process of acquisition more obstacles than the many obscure 
 and unconnected rules which precariously pilot men's cogitations 
 in our age. Hence a high level of average thinking should 
 follow a completer systematisation of contemporary scientific 
 methods of enquiry. 
 
 We shall conclude Part I by tracing, agreeably to the rela- 
 tivist conception verified in the preceding five Sections, the 
 historic process of methodological theory as crystallised in the 
 works of the historically most prominent methodologists. 
 
 SECTION VI. THE PROGRESS OF METHODOLOGICAL 
 
 THEORY. 
 
 13. The gem of untold value in Aristotle's Organon is 
 undoubtedly his syllogism. The naming of its several parts, 
 its figures and moods, together with the establishment of the 
 nature of a good definition and a proper classification, the 
 determination of kinds of causes and of categories, an exposure
 
 SECTIONS. THE PROGRESS OF METHODOLOGICAL THEORY. 39 
 
 of fallacies 1 , and analogous sections, practically shrink into 
 insignificance before the syllogism itself. Here we are offered 
 a formal and infallible method of testing, a proposition, or at 
 least certain propositions, and this represents, therefore, a 
 discovery fraught with the utmost consequence in the realm 
 of ratiocination. Nor is there a doubt that Aristotle's syllogism 
 has entered the very marrow of social thought, and that even 
 his uncompromising opponents are deeply indebted to him. It 
 must be said also that many sophisms would never appear 
 plausible if men applied the syllogism more generally. 
 
 The syllogism constitutes a formal method of testing the 
 soundness of a statement by showing how it necessarily follows 
 from certain accepted premises ; it does not represent the whole 
 of the reasoning process. Not only does it disregard the fact 
 that all but the rarest conclusions deal with probability and 
 not with certainty ; but unless employed as a merely mechanical 
 test of the reasoning process, it is meaningless. If any one had 
 greeted a neighbour of Socrates with "All men are mortal, Socra- 
 tes is a man, Therefore Socrates is mortal!" this neighbour 
 would have been at once concerned about the questioner's 
 sanity. He would have protested: "Have I asked you whether 
 all men are mortal, or had you any reason to believe that I 
 was interested in man's mortality?" and he might have added: 
 "Why should there be a reference to Socrates; why do you 
 draw a conclusion; and why should you have launched the 
 three sentences at n%y head at all ? " Even the proposer of the 
 above syllogism would meet it with an uneasy note of inter- 
 rogation if it welled up in his mind a propos of nothing in 
 particular. Manifestly, the syllogism presupposes the desire to 
 know whether Socrates is mortal, and this desire arises again 
 out of an extensive succession of interrelated and mostly 
 undetermined situations which cannot be reduced to a chain of 
 syllogisms, as will be evident from the arguments advanced in 
 the preceding Section. When we further consider, also in con- 
 sonance with the last Section, that knowledge is commonly 
 acquired in a fortuitous fashion, and that habits and the associa- 
 tive processes provide many short routes to a conclusion, it 
 should be readily granted that the syllogism does not reflect 
 the normal process of reflective thought. In pure reason, seeing 
 a mushroom, I argue: "All mushrooms are good to eat; this 
 is a mushroom; therefore it is good to eat"; but, in practice, 
 I feel hungry, I chance to see a mushroom in the wood where 
 I am strolling, and, without thinking, I take it and eat it, as 
 
 1 The art of detecting fallacies is rendered almost superfluous when our 
 primary concern is with the facts underlying propositions. Under such con- 
 ditions terminological difficulties are reduced to a minimum. On the subject 
 of fallacies, Prof. Sidgwick's special work (Fallacies, London, 1883) may be 
 consulted with advantage. See also Mill's luminous and unconventional 
 exposition of the subject in Book 5 of his Logic.
 
 40 PART I. THE PROBLEM. 
 
 I have taken and eaten mushrooms on similar occasions. The 
 syllogism, in this particular instance, is altogether wanting. The 
 actual and the ideal. reasoning processes differ, therefore, fun- 
 damentally as a rule. 
 
 The specific value of the syllogism lies in its being a touchstone 
 for dogmatic statements. Where, however, statements are un- 
 dogmatic, its value is reduced almost to zero. If we said "It 
 is probable that all men are mortal ; Socrates is perhaps to be 
 classed as a man", we should be scarcely warranted to state 
 dogmatically more than that "there is an indeterminable pro- 
 bability that Socrates is mortal". It is true that we possess 
 relatively excellent reasons for believing that every human 
 being, born in any land on the earth, and at any period up to 
 some 120 years ago, has died, and that the men of the present 
 day and those of the comparatively near future are also eminently 
 likely to die; but dogmatically we are not entitled to state in 
 our age that mortality is a permanent attribute of every human 
 being as such. 1 We are dealing here with a purely empirical 
 generalisation. Accordingly, it is not certain, as the school 
 syllogism appears to prove, . that Socrates is mortal, save by 
 arbitrarily assuming that all men are mortal. Even the leading 
 facts of gravitation and evolution have nothing absolute about 
 them when regarded in the light of the eternities, and the laws 
 of mathematics and of thought have had their alleged im- 
 mutable character challenged; and, besides, who knows what 
 the science of to-morrow will be able to accomplish in the 
 matter of extending man's term of life ?' 2 From this it follows 
 that indifferent use can be made as yet of the syllogism as 
 an instrument of science, and this view is strengthened when 
 
 1 The most securely established generalisations in science frequently have 
 exceptions: "The presence of chlorophyll, which had always been associated 
 only with plant organisms, was detected by Max Schultze in 1851 in the ani- 
 mals Hydra and Vortex, and later on by Ray Lankester in Spongilla and by 
 Patrick Geddes in some Turbellarian worms." (Encycl. Britannica, llth edi- 
 tion, article "Parasitism", by P. C. Mitchell, p. 794.) And yet we must 
 remember that "in many cases where animals of some size have a green 
 colour and are apparently able to subsist on simple chemical substances, 
 this appearance has been shown to be due to the fact that their bodies are 
 the homes of multitudes of minute plants, which grow in them and give 
 them their colour by shining through the more or less transparent substance 
 of the body, but which sooner or later are digested by the animals in which 
 they live and serve as their food". (E. W. McBride, Zoology, 1911(?), p. 8.) 
 
 Again. "During the last ten years living larvae have been produced by 
 chemical agencies from the unfertilised eggs of sea-urchins, star-fish, holo- 
 thurians, and a number of annelids and molluscs." (Article by Jacques 
 Loeb on an "Experimental Study of the Influence of Environment on Animals", 
 in Darwin and Modern Science, ed. by A. C. Seward, 1909, p. 251.) 
 
 It should be remembered also that whilst some of the Ephemeridae live 
 only a few hours, certain species of trees have a life-span of several thousand 
 years. Nor should we forget that, barring accident, the protozoa are con- 
 sidered immortal, and that this is almost certainly true of the reproductive 
 germs. 
 
 2 E. Metchnikoff, The Prolongation of Life, 1910.
 
 SECTION 6 THE PROGRESS OF METHODOLOGICAL THEORY. 41 
 
 we consider that the overwhelming majority of syllogisms in 
 books on logic are fatuously trivial, mostly confirming what no 
 one would ever think worthy of contesting. 
 
 Psychologically the syllogism may be said to depend on the 
 emergence of a doubt concerning the validity of a certain 
 plausible statement; on the consequent suggestion that this 
 doubt would be removed if the statement could be shown to be 
 involved in a more comprehensive and indubitable statement; 
 and, lastly, after reflection, on the more formal setting out of 
 the more comprehensive statement if any such can be found, 
 the middle or mediating statement, and, in the form of a con- 
 clusion, the statement to be proved. The process might be 
 expressed by some such reasoning: "You desired to have it 
 proved that Socrates is mortal. Well, then, if you are able to 
 agree that all men are mortal, and if you can further agree 
 that Socrates is a man, it will follow of necessity that Socrates, 
 being a man, is mortal. Here is, therefore, the proof which 
 you were solicitous to obtain." That is, by employing an in- 
 genious formula, we convert a confused into a clear thought. 
 To avoid that the syllogism should be question-begging, it might 
 formally run: ''Problem: Desired to prove that Socrates is 
 mortal. Proof: If (it be agreed that) all men are mortal, and 
 if (it be agreed that) Socrates is a man, then (it must be agreed 
 that) Socrates is mortal. The proposition that Socrates is mortal 
 is thus proved (for him who agrees to the two conditional 
 statements)." 1 2 
 
 14. In early days, when scarcely anything was known of 
 the vast world, and the vast world seemed very small and like 
 an open book or rather pamphlet," men demanded verbal clearness 
 and consistency in statements as tests which are readily appli- 
 
 1 A well known university professor writes to the author: "I seriously 
 believe that the slow progress of science is largely due to the deterioration 
 of the scientific powers of the young mind in this long enduring official 
 logic oscillating between syllogistic platitudes and ingenious fallacy-hunting, 
 until all real interest in and inquiry into nature and life are lost sight of. 
 and the patient is ready to go on to the bar, or some kindred destination." 
 
 2 Before Mill, logic was almost universally identified with deductive or 
 syllogistic logic. "The rules of logic have nothing to do with the truth 
 or falsity of the premises, but merely teach us to decide (not whether the 
 premises are fairly laid down, but) whether the conclusion follows fairly 
 from the premises or not." (Whately, Elements of Logic, 1827, p. 210.) The 
 tendency is now to identify logic with the analysis of the nature of judgments. 
 "Logik ist Urteilslehre", says Windelband. (Logik, p. 189.) Algebraic or 
 symbolic logic does not concern us in this volume, inasmuch as according 
 to one of its exponents, "natural science is not immediately furthered by 
 the rules of the logical calculus". (A. T. Shearman, "Some Controverted 
 Points in Symbolic Logic", in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1905. 
 p. 99.) Earlier classics on the subject are: S.Boole, An Investigation of 
 the Laws of Thought, and De Morgan, Formal Logic. In Principia Mathe- 
 matica, Whitehead and Russell apply the logical calculus to mathematics. 
 
 3 To appreciate the remarkable contrast between pre-scientific naivete and 
 scientific profundity, let the reader compare John Ruskin's conception of the 
 origin of Alpine and English scenery in his Frondes Agrestes, with Lord
 
 42 PART l.THE PROBLEM. 
 
 cable under such inexacting conditions. 1 When, however, the 
 immeasurable expanse and complexity of the Universe came to 
 be suspected, verbalism lost its hold, and men turned from words 
 to things, transferring the emphasis from proofs to methods of 
 discovery.- As an outcome of this advance we have Bacon's 
 Novum Organum, an attempt mainly to facilitate the collection 
 of flawless major premises. Unfortunately, Bacon, unlike Aris- 
 totle, never exhausted and systematised his central thought. 
 The multitude of his prerogatives constitute tricks of a trade, 
 not a systematic procedure, and the deadly denunciation of the 
 speculative method possesses after all only negative value. 
 Instead of a system, we find many excellent hints and one 
 example. From this example the method employed in the 
 discovery of the nature of heat we learn most. Bacon bids 
 us turn to the facts, and cease drawing conclusions from pro- 
 positions which have not been established inductively. He 
 insists that "all interpretation of nature commences with the 
 senses, and leads from the perceptions of the senses by a 
 straight, regular, and guarded path to the perceptions of the 
 understanding". (Novum Organum, bk. 2, 38.) Observation 
 should be virtually exhaustive in regard to variety, so far as 
 classes of relevant facts are concerned. 8 We are to observe; 
 we are to move step by step, and not to aim directly at distant 
 conclusions; we are to watch for the presence of a quality 
 ("Instances agreeing in the nature of heat") or its absence under 
 similar circumstances ("Instances in proximity where the nature 
 of heat is absent"); we are to examine the degree of the pre- 
 sence of a quality ("Table of degrees or comparison in heat"); 
 we are systematically to exclude from the three preceding 
 collections what is immaterial to the issue ("Exclusion or re- 
 jection of natures from the form of heat"); and, finally, we 
 are to formulate a double conclusion, theoretical and practical 
 (First and Second Vintage). The purpose of science, on the 
 
 Avebury's The Scenery of Switzerland and The Scenery of England. The 
 pettiness of the former and the grandeur of the latter view well exemplify 
 what humanity has gained by an objective study of nature. 
 
 1 "Generalisations approximately true, or possessing a certain degree of 
 probability; hypotheses held loosely until verification is possible . . ., of 
 these Aristotle did not treat." (Naden, Induction and Deduction, p. 24.) 
 
 2 Modern logicians are reconciled to modern needs. "Applied logic", Lotze 
 tells us, "must . . . sacrifice the love of systematisation to considerations ot 
 utility, and select what the experience of science has so far shown to be 
 important and fruitful." (Logic, vol. 1, p. 11.) 
 
 "The mandate issued to the age of Plato and Aristotle was Bring your 
 beliefs into harmony with one another. . . . The mandate of the Mediaeval 
 Spirit was Bring your beliefs into harmony with dogma. . . . Then ... a new 
 spirit was roused, the mandate of which was, Bring your beliefs into har- 
 mony with facts." (W. Minto, Logic, Inductive and Deductive, 1893, p. 243.) 
 Arthur Lynch, in his Psychology: A New System, 1912, part 1, ch.2, deals 
 nt some length with modern scientific methods. 
 
 3 To this principle he remained faithful in the many investigations which 
 lie undertook.
 
 SECTION 6. THE PROGRESS OF METHODOLOGICAL THEORY. 43 
 
 theoretical side, Bacon defines to be "the knowledge of causes 
 and secret motions of things" (New Atlantis)-, or as he expresses 
 this in another place: "the true and lawful goal of the sciences 
 is none other than this : that human life be endowed with new 
 discoveries and powers". (Novum Organum, bk. 1, 81.) 
 
 There is a popular proverb to the effect that "the proof 
 of the pudding lies in the eating", and one would be justified 
 in maintaining that the proof of a method lies in its results. 
 Now in the above example Bacon reaches the conclusion that 
 "heat is a motion, expansive, restrained, and acting in its strife 
 upon the smaller particles of bodies" (bk. 2, 20), and modern 
 science concurs that heat is a mode of motion, that it is ex- 
 pansive, and is concerned with the molecules of which bodies 
 are composed. 1 All circumstances considered, this is an epoch- 
 making discovery. To arrive at this result Bacon examines 
 exhaustively classes of instances where heat appears as well 
 as the degree of the heat, and where it is absent under cir- 
 cumstances corresponding to those where heat is present. He 
 then excludes all factors not common to every instance of heat, 
 formulates a careful definition embodying the results obtained, 
 and draws certain deductions. 
 
 The virtue of this method is obvious. It involves a compre- 
 hensive and cautious general survey of the facts and a syste- 
 matic elimination of everything that is irrelevant to the matter 
 in hand a proceeding which, if universally imitated, would 
 invalidate partially or wholly most of the conclusions reached 
 in the more strictly human sciences, and would materially en- 
 rich the established physical and biological sciences where, as 
 a rule, only prominent thinkers follow this direction. It is the 
 very opposite of the all too common practice of cursory obser- 
 vation, chance generalisation, and casual verification. Up to 
 the present this central method of Bacon's is the only one 
 which has striven to arrive at truth through a series of syn- 
 thetically connected links instead of through some jumpy, vague, 
 or disconnected mode of procedure, and may therefore be said 
 still to be without a peer or even rival. Granted that it is 
 only applicable to less obscure problems of a general character, 
 that it requires subsidiary aids as Bacon concedes,- and that 
 its rigour may be somewhat relaxed under relatively favourable 
 circumstances where many relevant facts are scientifically estab- 
 lished, there is still enormous scope for its use. The method 
 seems to be in place in the cultural sciences generally, and in 
 all others so far as the facts are open to inspection. Reluctance 
 lo be bound by exacting rules, convenience in following others 
 
 1 Compare John Tyndall, Heat as a Mode of Motion, 1887, and J. Clerk 
 Maxwell, Theory of Heat, 1894. 
 
 2 In his "histories" there is no clear indication of the employment of 
 subsidiary aids, and yet the presence of such aids is the ultimate criterion 
 of a complete methodology.
 
 44 PART I. THE PROBLEM. 
 
 sheepishly, an adventurous delight in entrusting the bark of 
 science to good fortune, and a desire of reaching conclusions 
 rapidly, may have much to do with the prevalent neglect of 
 consciously employing, even in part, Bacon's method-in-chief. 
 Methodologists, however, may in time return to it, seeing that 
 they, through John Stuart Mill's Canons, have adopted, almost 
 in its entirety, the skeleton of the method, only separating it 
 into independent parts and neglecting the subsequent processes 
 of exact definition of the comprehensive conclusion or state- 
 ment arrived at and the theoretical and practical deductions 
 which are to be drawn therefrom. Indirectly Bacon thus con- 
 tinues to hold the field, and the sole alternative to adopting 
 his comprehensive and synthetic method of investigation is to 
 substitute an equally comprehensive and synthetic method of 
 a more modern character. It is inconceivable that educated 
 men and women will much longer tolerate the farrago of 
 blurred and inarticulated half-rules which now passes under the 
 name of methodology. They will ask that we either return to 
 Bacon, or that we transcend him through a method even more 
 comprehensive than his. (See Conclusion 2 for such a method.) 
 
 As we have seen, exception could hardly be taken to the 
 example analysed by Bacon, were it not that it is only an 
 example, and that an example which is not succeeded by a 
 number of other examples and a series of conclusions, is liable 
 to be interpreted in more ways than one, and cannot illustrate 
 every possible case. The nature of observation, experimen- 
 tation, generalisation, definition, deduction, and the process of 
 forming hypotheses as well as the mode of verifying them, in 
 conjunction with sundry other matters, including the categories 
 into which phenomena can be profitably divided, should have 
 been determined as precisely as possible by Bacon; and pro- 
 bably if his life had not been abruptly terminated through ex- 
 cessive scientific zeal, and if he had not attempted to achieve 
 what is beyond the powers of an isolated individual, he might 
 have given his Novum Organum a systematic form. 
 
 Bacon, as we shall endeavour to show in the sequel, was sub- 
 stantially right in respect of the method of science. His numer- 
 ous allusions to experiments undertaken by himself in order to 
 verify some conjecture, demonstrate his respect for the ex- 
 perimental method, whilst his fierce attacks on the deductive 
 mode of enquiry are really directed against utilising propositions 
 which are not based on a study of facts and are not succeeded 
 by scrupulous verification. Even an uncompromising critic like 
 Miss Naden admits that "his error is not the rejection, but the 
 postponement, of deduction". (Induction and Deduction, p. 45.) 
 
 1 "My directions for the interpretation of nature embrace two generic 
 divisions: the one, how to educe and form axioms from experience; the 
 other, how to deduce and derive new experiments from axioms." (Novum 
 Organnm, bk. 2, 10.)
 
 SECTION 6. THE PROGRESS OF METHODOLOGICAL THEORY. 45 
 
 When we remember that Bacon wrote at the very dawn of 
 modern science, that the few experimenters of his day were 
 scarcely distinguishable in the swarm of alchemists, astrologers, 
 and magicians, and that even the terminology at his disposal 
 was unspeakably confusing, we shall not be surprised at his 
 numerous misapprehensions and the comparative crudity which 
 he displays. The admiration lavished by Herschel on Bacon 
 as the father of inductive logic is richly deserved: "It is to 
 our immortal countryman Bacon that we owe the broad an- 
 nouncement of this grand and fertile principle, and the develop- 
 ment of the idea, that the whole of natural philosophy consists 
 entirely of a series of inductive generalisations, commencing 
 with the most circumstantially stated particulars, and carried 
 up to universal laws, or axioms, which comprehend in their 
 statements every subordinate degree of generality, and of a 
 corresponding series of inverted reasoning from generals to 
 particulars, by which these axioms are traced back into their 
 remote consequences, and all particular propositions deduced 
 from them; as well those by whose immediate consideration 
 we rose to our discovery, as those of which we had no pre- 
 vious knowledge." (Discourse, [96.].) Here we shall leave Bacon. 
 
 15. Reactions, if not inevitable, are common. Thus it is not sur- 
 prising that attempts should have been made to remove the laurel wreath 
 from Francis Bacon's brow and place it on Roger Bacon's. This method 
 of referring back systems of thought to some real or imaginary precursor 
 has its dangers, for the process permits of indefinite extension. Thus we 
 read concerning Roger Bacon: "Baco hatte seine philosophische Anregung 
 hauptsachlich aus den Arabern gescho'pft." (Karl Werner, Die Kosmologie 
 und allgemeine Naturlehre des Roger Baco, Vienna, 1879, p. 5.) Nor was 
 he inclined to be heretical in theology: "Bacon accepted the dominant 
 mediaeval convictions: the entire truth of scripture; the absolute validity 
 of the revealed religion, with its dogmatic formulation ; also (to his detri- 
 ment) the universally prevailing view that the end of all the sciences is 
 to serve their queen, theology." (H. O. Taylor, The Mediaeval Mind. 
 vol. 2, 1919, p. 515.) As for his ethics: "C'esf a Aristote surtout que sont 
 empruntees la plupart des idees de Bacon sur la vertu." (Emile Charles, 
 Roger Bacon, 1861, p. 257.) In respect of his Optics, this was "based 
 upon the great work of Alhazen" (J. H. Bridges, Life and Work of Roger 
 Bacon, 1914, p. 24); "Mathematics in Bacon's mind was little more than 
 astronomy" (D. E. Smith, in "On the place of Roger Bacon in the History 
 of Mathematics", in Roger Bacon, ed. by A. G. Little, 1914, p. 174); and 
 his experiments with burning glasses, etc., were repetitions of well-known 
 attempts. (A. G. Little, Part of the Opus Tertium of Roger Bacon, 1912, 
 p. xxxvii.) So also Charles informs us in the course of his erudite in- 
 vestigation that "la plupart des decouvertes de Bacon en optique ne sont 
 pas plus reelles que les precedentes" (op. cit., p. 302), that is, those re- 
 lating to bridges, gunpowder, and the like. And concerning his scientific 
 equipment we learn that Bacon was "trained in scientific method by 
 Grosseteste and other members of the English mathematical school". 
 (Bridges, op. cit., p. 24.) Indeed, nothing more fantastic and untrustworthy 
 can be imagined in our age, than the medieval science of Roger Bacon 
 borrowed from his contemporaries, as exemplified, for instance, in The 
 Mirror of Alchemy, etc., a translation of which treatises appeared in 1597; 
 in The Cure of Old Age and Preservation of Youth, ed. 1683 ; or in the 
 third part of Friedrich Roth-Scholtzen's Deutsches Theatrum Chemicum, 
 part 3, 1732.
 
 46 PART I. TEE PROBLEM. 
 
 Any such care on experiments as Francis Bacon bestows, appears to 
 be practically absent in Roger Bacon. His method was apparently urged 
 in self-defence of his views, rather than as an expression of his desire 
 to elaborate a methodology, and his conception of "experience" was, 
 because of his age, primitive in the extreme, and approached therefore 
 that of the scienceless "practical man" rather than that of the modern 
 savant. This appears to be borne out by Mr. Lynn Thorndike's Roger 
 Bacon and the Experimental Method in the Middle Ages : "The collection 
 of facts was another engrossing pursuit [of the Middle Ages], as the vo- 
 luminous mediaeval encyclopedias testify ; there was keen curiosity about 
 the things of this world." (P. 277.) "Bacon's discussion of experimental 
 science, on its positive side, amounts to little more than a recognition of 
 experience as a criterion of truth and promulgation of the phrase 'experi- 
 mental science'." (P. 283.) And Thorndike sums up: "On the whole, one 
 rather gets the impression that the experimental method that Bacon pleads 
 for, as if it were a novelty, is already assumed by other writers as a well- 
 established method." (P. 290.) Having stated so much in criticism, we 
 quote with pleasure a laudatory passage relating to Roger Bacon's con- 
 ception of method. Robert Adamson, in his Roger Bacon (Manchester. 
 1876, pp. 32-33) concludes: "So far as I can gather, the ideal natural phi- 
 losophy, according to Roger Bacon, consisted of the following steps : 
 (1) Application of mathematics to the determination of the simple laws 
 of force ; (2) observation and comparison of the complex phenomena of na- 
 ture; (3) deductive application of the elementary mathematical principles, 
 the laws of force, to the observed phenomena ; (4) experimental verifi- 
 cation of the results deductively obtained." 
 
 According to Charles, whose work is virtually exhaustive, Roger Bacon 
 recognised three ways of reaching truth "1'autorite, qui ne peut produire 
 que la oi, et d'ailleurs doit se justifier aux yeux de la raison; le raison- 
 nement, dont les conclusions les plus certaines laissent a desirer, si on ne 
 les verifie pas; et enfin 1'experience, qui se suffit a elle-meme". (P. 112.) 
 The only passage Charles quotes from Roger Bacon refers to "1'autorite 
 indigne et fragile, 1'empire de la routine, la stupidite du vulgaire, 1'amour- 
 propre des savants, qui leur fait cacher leur ignorance sous 1'etalage d'une 
 science apparente" (p. 99); or in English: "the example of frail and un- 
 worthy authority, long-established custom, the sense of the ignorant crowd, 
 and the hiding of one's own ignorance under the shadow of wisdom". 
 (H. 0. Taylor, op. cit., p. 524.) In fact, Roger Bacon did not pass beyond 
 methodological generalities: "For rules of induction, even faintly analogous 
 to those of the Novum Organum, the student of the Opus Magnum will 
 seek in vain" (J. H. Bridges, op. cit., p. 160), a dictum which is by no 
 means invalidated by the numerous quotations in J.V.Marmery's Progress 
 of Science, 1895. 
 
 Perhaps the following passage from Roger Bacon approaches most nearly 
 the methodological spirit of modern times: "The true method of research, 
 says Bacon in the Compendium studii, 'is to study first what properly 
 conies first in any science, the easier before the more difficult, the general 
 before the particular, the less before the greater. The student's business 
 should lie in chosen and useful topics, because life is short; and these 
 should be set forth with clearness and certitude, which is impossible 
 without experientia. Because, although we know through three means, 
 authority, reason, and experentia, yet authority is not wise unless its reason 
 be given, nor does it give knowledge, but belief. We believe, but do not 
 know, from authority. Nor can reason distinguish sophistry from demon- 
 stration, unless we know that the conclusion is attested by facts. Yet the 
 fruits of study are insignificant at the present time, and the secret and 
 great matters of wisdom are unknown to the crowd of students.'" (H. O. 
 Taylor, op. cit., p. 538.) 
 
 To sum up, Roger Bacon may be considered to have been among the 
 advance guard of his time, as Francis Bacon was of his. The elaboration 
 of a sound methodology was scarcely feasible in Francis Bacon's day when
 
 SECTION 6. THE PROGRESS OF METHODOLOGICAL THEORY. 47 
 
 the sun of science had just risen; it was altogether impossible in Roger 
 Bacon's period when pioneers were groping to escape from the pitch-dark- 
 night and superstition of the early Middle Ages. (See also J. E. Sandys, 
 Roger Bacon, 1914; and S. Vogl, Die Physik Roger Bacos, 1906.) 
 
 16. Descartes' method tends to lure us away from out- 
 ward nature, and lays the stress on speculatively obtained pro- 
 positions or general principles. The great desideratum, accord- 
 ing to the illustrious French philosopher, is to possess clear 
 and distinct 1 ideas, and to reject everything which does not 
 harmonise with these. Pursuing this method, we shall, he 
 assures us, discover the fundamentals of existence, and from 
 them all the other facts will be deducible. The vital step to 
 take is "to divest oneself of preconceptions and study propo- 
 sitions exhaustively and impartially, making as complete a sur- 
 vey of our material as possible, and simplifying our problems 
 to the uttermost. Induction is here the handmaid of deduction, 
 and the aim is to discover, right at the threshold, the highest 
 generalities, and utilise these for deductive ends. (Discourx 
 sur la methode, I, 19.) Leaving aside his solid contributions to 
 mathematics, Descartes' method has exerted but a feeble in- 
 fluence on scientific progress, for the sufficient reason that 
 terms such as Clear and Distinct, on which he places such 
 emphasis, do not admit of exact definition, that trains of 
 reasoning are even more dangerous to rely on than the per- 
 ceptions of the senses, and because he preferred reasoning from 
 speculative propositions rather than objective study, seeking in 
 this way to apply pre-scientific methods in a growingly scientific 
 age.' 2 Just as Bacon for all intents and purposes first developed 
 to a high degree the inductive method and over-stressed it, so 
 Descartes was virtually the first to emphasise the signal value 
 of deductive and mathematical treatment without appreciating 
 their severe limitations. In connection both with Francis Bacon 
 and Descartes it may not be amiss to notice that methodology 
 formed their principal life-interest. 
 
 Bertrand Russell, in his Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field 
 for Scientific Method in Philosophy, 1914, appears to aim at reviving the 
 Descartian point of view: "The nature of philosophic analysis, as illustrated 
 in our previous lectures, can now be stated in general terms. We start 
 from a body of common knowledge, which constitutes our data. On 
 examination, the data are found to be complex, rather vague, and largely 
 interdependent logically. By analysis we reduce them to propositions 
 which are as nearly as possible simple and precise, and we arrange them 
 in deductive chains, in which a certain number of initial propositions 
 form a logical guarantee for all the rest. These initial propositions are 
 premisses for the body of knowledge in question. Premisses are thus 
 quite different from data they are simpler, more precise, and less affected 
 
 1 Locke preferred "determinate or determined". (Essay on the Human 
 Understanding, Epistle to the Reader.) 
 
 - Jevons says in this connection: "Descartes and Leibniz sometimes 
 adopted hypothetical reasoning to the exclusion of experitnental verifica- 
 tion." (Principles of Science, p. 508.)
 
 48 PART I. THE PROBLEM. 
 
 with logical redundancy. If the work of analysis has been performed 
 completely, they will be wholly free from logical redundancy, wholly 
 precise, and as simple as is logically compatible with their leading to the 
 given body of knowledge. The discovery of these premisses belongs to 
 philosophy; but the work of deducing the body of common knowledge 
 from them belongs to mathematics, if 'mathematics' is interpreted in 
 a somewhat liberal sense." (P. 211.) 
 
 17. The grandiose and historically recognised 1 attempts 
 to unravel the problems of the scientific method have been 
 historically so few that we must pass at one bound to John 
 Stuart Mill, whose inductive logic is the first and, up to the 
 present, the last truly systematic attempt to deal with the 
 methodology of science, which has challenged the attention of 
 the modern world. That he has to some extent succeeded is 
 proven by the universal respect which his Logic still commands, 
 and by the fact that since his time books on logic pay at least 
 lip homage to inductive procedure. (See Conclusion 1.) From 
 the point of view of method, his cardinal achievement is no 
 doubt the list of scientific Canons which he compiled the 
 methods of agreement, difference, agreement and difference, 
 residue, and concomitant variation. These Canons do not possess 
 the rigidity and completeness of the syllogism, and have there- 
 fore been much criticised ; but they form nevertheless a monu- 
 mental landmark in the history of methodology. They also 
 agree in intention with the syllogism in that their object is to 
 obtain indisputable proofs; 2 and perhaps if all the Canons could 
 be applied, and were properly defined and respected, nothing 
 but what is rigidly true would be accepted. 
 
 Most of the praise bestowed on Mill's Canons should properly be trans- 
 ferred to Bacon who, it is persistently asserted, had no clear insight into 
 the method of science. Bacon's famous example of the investigation into 
 the nature of heat explicitly involves the Canons 3 , with the exception 
 of the admittedly least important joint method of agreement and difference, 
 which are now identified with Mill. The earlier methodologist formulates, 
 as we have seen, rules of affirmative and negative instances, of conco- 
 mitant variations and exclusions which, save for the immaterial exception 
 mentioned, are one with Mill's Canons; only Mill's Canons are more defi- 
 nitely conceived, though not articulated as those of Bacon are. On the 
 other hand, by ignoring the need, as pointed out by Bacon, for exhaustive 
 
 1 We say "historically recognised", for, e.gr., not a few would consider 
 Sir John Herschel's presentation of methodology in his Discourse as pro- 
 founder than that to be found in John Stuart Mill's Logic. 
 
 - "It is with proof, as such, that logic is principally concerned." (Mill, 
 Logic, bk. 3. ch. 9, 6.) " The appropriate problem of logic [is] the esti- 
 mation of evidence." (Ibid., bk. 4, ch. 1, 1.) "The business of Inductive 
 Logic is to provide rules and models (such as the syllogism and its rules 
 are for ratiocination) to which, if inductive arguments conform, those argu- 
 ments are conclusive, and not otherwise." (Ibid., bk. 3, ch. 9, 6.) Bain 
 (Logic, vol. 2, p. 49) largely agrees with this: "Proof, more than discovery, is 
 the end of logic." 
 
 3 "The principles on which [the Instances in Bacon] are arranged in Tables 
 bear a close analogy to the principles on which the Canons [of Mill] are 
 constructed." (Fowler, Logic, vol. 2, p. 211.)
 
 SECTION 6. THE PROGRESS OF METHODOLOGICAL THEORY. 49 
 
 examination and verification. Mill almost annihilated the virtues of his 
 Canons, and practically cut himself off from contact with actual scientific 
 work. 
 
 Moreover, a study of Herschel's brilliant Preliminary Discourse, fer- 
 vently admired by Charles Darwin, further reduces Mill's claims, for in 
 the rules suggested by this immediate forerunner of Mill, Mill's whole set 
 of Canons, with almost all its neatness, may be found approximately in 
 Mill's words. This i.s a beautiful illustration of our contention that truth 
 is progressive and represents a growing product of collective endeavour. 
 Mill, in his Autobiography, informs us that, "under the impulse given 
 me by the thoughts excited by Dr. Whewell, I read again Sir John Herschel's 
 Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy, and I was able to measure 
 the progress my mind had made, by the great help I now found in this 
 work". (Ch. 6.) Herschel [145.] submits the following "general rules for 
 guiding and facilitating our search, among a great mass of assembled facts", 
 for their common cause: "(1) Invariable connection, and, in particular, 
 invariable antecedence of the cause and consequence of the effect, unless 
 prevented by some counteracting cause. (2) Invariable negation of the 
 effect with absence of the cause, unless some other cause be capable of 
 producing the same effect. (3) Increase or diminution of the effect, with 
 the increased or diminished intensity of the cause, in cases which admit 
 of increase and diminution. (4) Proportionality of the effect to its cause 
 in all cases of direct unimpeded action. (5) Reversal of the effect with 
 that of the cause." In this chapter Herschel speaks of "Agreement", 
 'Concomitant circumstances", and "Residual phenomena", and also judi- 
 ciously illustrates the Method of Difference. With his noted candour Mill 
 admits his debt to Herschel, saying that in this scholar's Discourse, "of 
 all books which I have met with, the four methods of induction are 
 distinctly recognised". (Logic, bk. 3, ch. 9, 3.) 
 
 The following are Mill's Canons (bk. 3, ch. 8): 
 
 First Canon. If two or more instances of the phenomenon under in- 
 vestigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in 
 which alone all the instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the given 
 phenomenon. (See Herschel, Discourse, [146-148.].) 1 
 
 Second Canon. If an instance in which the phenomenon under investi- 
 gation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every 
 circumstance in common, save one, that one occurring only in the former, 
 the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ is the effect, 
 or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon. 
 (See Herschel, Discourse, [156.].)' 
 
 Third Canon. If two or more instances in which the phenomenon 
 occurs have only one circumstance in common, while two or more in- 
 stances in which it does not occur have nothing in common except the 
 absence of that circumstance, the circumstance in which alone the two 
 sets of instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable 
 part of the cause, of the phenomenon. 
 
 Fourth Canon. Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known 
 by previous inductions to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the 
 residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents. 
 (See Herschel, Discourse, [158.].) 1 
 
 Fifth Canon. Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever 
 another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause 
 or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some 
 fact of causation. (See Herschel, Discourse, [145.].) 
 
 These Canons possess at least three grave defects. In dis- 
 cussing the syllogism we pointed out that we are seldom in 
 a position to possess exhaustive data or incontrovertible proof 
 
 1 In the wording of Mill's Canons there is a remarkable similarity to 
 Herschel's sentences.
 
 50 PART I. THE PROBLEM. 
 
 of any matter, and from this it follows that in general scientific 
 work the Canons could play but a small part, whilst in cultural 
 investigations, for instance, there would be scarcely ever an 
 opportunity of applying them. No doubt, in the manipulation 
 of letters abode, abed, bed, ca,.dc we can readily detect what 
 purports to be the common or differentiating fact, but in nature 
 itself the component elements in a problem are unfortunately 
 not lettered, 1 and certainty is, therefore, an ideal to be respect- 
 fully approached rather than to be frequently attained in ex- 
 perience. A good illustration of this are the many obstinate 
 obscurities and difficulties encountered in consistently conceiving 
 and interpreting the Periodic Law in chemistry. What is hence 
 needed are additional Canons which shall deal with approximate 
 truths, for only such truths are the staple product of modern 
 science which has done once for all with the Noah's Ark world 
 postulated by the ancients. 
 
 Scores of passages like the following could be quoted to en- 
 force the teaching of history that certainty is attained only 
 slowly and laboriously: 
 
 "A good deal of evidence has been accumulated in favour of the view 
 that the meteorological conditions of our globe exhibit a periodicity of 
 thirty-five years in other words, that there is a tendency for a similarity 
 in the general run of the seasons to recur after the lapse of this interval 
 of time. Bruckner's study of the information available regarding the 
 variations of the water level in the Caspian Sea, first suggested this 
 period. Russian records also contain a good deal of information regarding 
 .floods or unusual shallowness of the rivers, and the dates of their opening 
 and closing to navigation, and a close examination of this material tended 
 to confirm the view. Subsequently, the investigation was extended to 
 the water levels of lakes in other parts of the world, having inland drain- 
 age, and the results were again in many instances broadly confirmatory 
 of Bruckner's cycle. Records of the advance and recession of Alpine 
 glaciers also supplied a certain amount of confirmation. The evidence 
 in favour of the existence of a periodicity of thirty-five years has had to 
 be culled, often with great labour, from historical documents in which 
 references to meteorological phenomena are only incidental. Only by 
 using such sources of information has it been possible to extend the 
 inquiry over the greater part of the last two centuries. Such indirect 
 evidence is not so satisfactory as we could wish, but the number of 
 meteorological records which are of sufficient length to be of service in 
 an inquiry of this sort is very small. Hann's examination of the rainfall 
 records from Padua, Milan, and Klagenfurt, which cover the years from 
 1726 to 1900, has shown some indications of the reality of a period of average 
 length of about thirty-five years. In the meteorology of the Southern 
 hemisphere, different authors have found indications of the existence of 
 a period of nineteen years. The records of Australia, South Africa, and 
 South America all show suggestions of such a period, but as yet the 
 evidence cannot be regarded as conclusive." (R. G. K. Lempfert, Weather 
 Science, pp. 76-77.) 
 
 A second defect is revealed when we attempt to apply the 
 Canons. How many times must I determine agreement before 
 the Canon of Agreement, for example, is satisfied? Or what 
 
 1 For an analogous criticism of Mill's alphabetic conception, see Whewell, 
 Philosophy of Discovery, pp. 263, 264.
 
 SECTION 6. -THE PROGRESS OF METHODOLOGICAL THEORY. 51 
 
 shall ensure the correctness of our observations ? Is it sufficient 
 to make one observation, or two, or five, or ten? Consider 
 an instance. The inhabitants of Uganda suffer from sleeping 
 sickness, and it is required to ascertain its cause. Some one 
 submits that the Tsetse fly is answerable for the many deaths 
 traceable to this disease. Does it, then, suffice to make one 
 or two observations, and to note the presence of the fly in 
 these cases ? But let us idealise our example, a process not 
 contemplated by Mill. Suppose we learn that everybody in 
 Uganda who is suffering from sleeping sickness has been molested 
 by a Tsetse fly, that no one who has not been so molested 
 has the particular sickness, and that more or fewer Tsetse flies 
 means more or less sleeping sickness, does it follow now that 
 the Tsetse fly is the direct cause of the sleeping sickness? 
 Now, skilful observation has shown that the cause is some 
 species of Trypanosome which, is harboured by the Tsetse fly. 1 
 Unless, therefore, we are absolutely sure with regard to the 
 number of possible causes, and are certain, too, that we have 
 observed correctly, the Canon can never be said to have been 
 truly applied. In other words, Mill was unconscious of the 
 impracticability of dealing with methods of 'proof apart from 
 methods of discovery. 
 
 Finally, the Canons only profess to be concerned with causes. 
 Mill, following Herschel 2 , speaks of "the notion of cause being 
 the root of the whole theory of induction" (Logic, p. 213), and 
 of "inductive inquiry having for its object to ascertain what 
 causes are connected with what effects" (p. 251). Yet in other 
 places he tells us that "induction may be defined the operation 
 of discovering and proving general propositions" (p. 186), that 
 "induction is that operation of the mind by which we infer 
 that what we know to be true in a particular case or cases, 
 will be true in all cases which resemble the former in certain 
 assignable respects" (p. 188), that "induction is a process of 
 inference" (p. 188), and that "induction, properly so-called,... 
 may, then, be summarily defined as Generalisation from Ex- 
 perience" (p. 200). We are confronted here with a palpable 
 contradiction, for we may generalise static facts as we may 
 generalise causes; but the establishment of a cause is not 
 called a generalisation, any more than the establishment of 
 a fact as such. Mill's Canons do not, therefore, propose any 
 tests dealing with generalisation as such, with generalisation as 
 to objects and causes, or with facts as such. 3 
 
 1 In certain parts of Africa the Tsetse fly is not infected, and therefore 
 innocuous. 
 
 2 Herschel, in this matter, followed Bacon, who was evidently following 
 in others' footsteps: "It is a correct position that 'true knowledge is know- 
 ledge by causes'." (Novum Organum, bk. 2, 2.) 
 
 * A spirited attack on the Canons will be found in Bradley's Logic. 
 pp. 331-342. 
 
 4*
 
 52 PART I. THE PROBLEM. 
 
 It is well known how scientists examine for months and years 
 the distinctive characteristics of a substance or the influences 
 which affect it, as is now the case with radium. Mill, on the 
 other hand, lauded to the skies the liberal use of hypotheses, 
 and left it to the art of education 1 , as distinct from logic, to 
 train the human mind to wrestle with the subtlety of nature 
 and prepare men for reading its secrets as if a fragmentary 
 methodology were a methodology at all. "In scientific investi- 
 gation," he writes, "as in all other works of human skill, the 
 way of obtaining the end is seen as it were instinctively by 
 some superior minds in some comparatively simple case, and 
 is then, by judicious generalisation, adapted to the variety of 
 complex cases." (Logic, bk. 6, ch. 1, 1.) With such an almost 
 superstitious regard for the value of instinct' 2 or intuition matters 
 are immensely simplified. Mill apparently never entered into 
 the spirit of indefatigable experimentalists like Faraday, to whom 
 it was "discomfort to reason upon data which admitted of 
 doubt" (Tyndall, Faraday as a Discoverer, 1868, p. 41), nor did 
 he consciously recognise that acknowledged scientific thinkers 
 are as much observers as they are generalisers. If we add 
 that Mill, agreeing in this with logicians generally, does not 
 provide us with an adequate analysis of such terms as object, 
 observation, hypothesis, generalisation, deduction, and verifica- 
 tion, we shall be convinced that he did not exhaust his subject. 
 In fact, an examination of Mill's Logic will show that, in the 
 main, it presents a philosophical discussion of certain inductive 
 principles rather than an attempt at constructing a compre- 
 hensive or systematic methodology. 
 
 We have seen that scientific thinkers grow into the methods 
 which they happen to employ. It is consequently readily under- 
 
 1 So Welton (Manual of Logic, vol. 2, p. Ill): "The means of training 
 the power of accurate observation belong to the general theory of education, 
 not to logic." 
 
 2 Mill's point of view on this matter 'resembles so closely that of his 
 immediate predecessor Whewell that there appears to be adequate reason 
 for believing that Mill was strongly and fatally influenced by him. Since 
 Mill abstracted the substance of the material for the inductive part of his 
 Logic from Whewell (Autobiography, ch. 6), this is not astonishing. Whewell, 
 in his Novum Organum Renovatum, 1858, says little in justification of the 
 title of his work. "An art of discovery is not possible. At each step of 
 the investigation are needed invention, sagacity, genius elements which 
 no art can give." (P. v.) "Scientific discovery must ever depend upon some 
 happy thought, of which we cannot trace the origin ; some fortunate cast 
 of intellect, rising above all rules." (P. 44.) Nevertheless he presents some 
 scheme: "We have the following series of processes concerned in the for- 
 mation of science: (1) Decomposition of facts; (2) Measurement of pheno- 
 mena; (3) Explication of conceptions; (4) Induction of laws of phenomena: 
 (5) Induction of causes; (6) Application of inductive discoveries." (P. 143.) 
 It was his objective manner of facing facts, his want of interest in the 
 psychological processes which determine the arriving at a conclusion, that 
 hid from Whewell the art of discovery. Unhappily his influence over Mill 
 was paramount. Yet Mill recognised that "observation and experiment are 
 the ultimate basis of all knowledge". (Bk. 3, ch. 10, 8.)
 
 SUCTION '.-CONCLUSION OF PART I. 53 
 
 stood that men acquainted closely with science, like Whewell 
 and Jevons, who were not psychologists, should be unaware 
 of the methods which they resort to in scientific enquiries, and 
 that spectators, like John Stuart Mill, who discern only the 
 final product, and that through the glasses of classicism, should 
 not be explicit concerning the complex process which precedes 
 the final drawing of a conclusion. 
 
 SECTION VII. CONCLUSION. 
 
 18. In the preceding Sections it was explained wherein 
 the problem of methodology lies. Individual minds left to their 
 own devices, we learnt, are lost in clouds of words, and are 
 prone to evolve error rather than truth. Thinking, however, 
 in concert, men correct one another, and gradually, through 
 the ages, develop methodological traditions of an increasingly 
 higher order. Yet since these traditions lack unity, because 
 each of them has developed in materially different circum- 
 stances, they cannot be readily applied to new problems, nor 
 can they be convincingly and systematically communicated. 
 
 Concurrently, and keeping pace with the growth of these 
 traditions, more or less crude systems of methodology, we 
 observed, develop, and then pass away into more or less im- 
 proved systems. The first impulse, encouraged by the belief, 
 due to limited experience and naive desires, that the world of 
 fact is devoid of complexity, was tacitly to postulate that final 
 truth is the goal of the man of science, and accordingly the 
 logic, associated for us with the name of Aristotle, held sway 
 for a score of centuries. Indeed even now works on logic 
 frequently regard the subjective intelligence and the objective 
 world as if their processes could be neatly analysed and sepa- 
 rated, at least by superior minds. So strong has been the 
 primitive absolutist influence that methodological thinkers of 
 later times, such as Descartes and Mill, oblivious of the changes 
 wrought by time in the scientific conception of the world, strove 
 to extend the old logical methods without attempting to shake 
 the principle of absolutism or finalism in knowledge and thought. 
 Only one eminent methodologist, Francis Bacon, explicitly re- 
 cognised that the complexity of facts required methods which 
 should accommodate themselves to the various imperfect phases 
 of a scientific enquiry, and that such methods were not given, 
 but had to be laboriously found. Lacking such a relativist 
 foundation in harmony with the data and the needs of modern 
 science, logic fell into disrepute, and the problem of this treatise 
 is therefore, on the basis of the recognition of the socio-historic 
 and consequently relativist nature of thought, to elaborate 
 a scientific methodology, and thus to re-instate logic into its 
 exalted position as the mistress of the sciences.
 
 54 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 DEFINITION OF SOME IMPORTANT METHODO- 
 LOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 SECTION VIII. OBJECT, FACT, ENVIRONMENT. 
 
 19. (A) OBJECT. The term Object is, as such, perhaps 
 undefinable. A given object is that (object) which we choose 
 to regard as having a separate or separable existence. 1 An 
 atom in a molecule, a molecule in a nucleus, the nucleus itself, 
 the cell, a piece of tissue, an organ, a system of organs, the 
 organism, and so on, may severally be regarded as entities. 
 (Conclusions 25 / and 22.) A tree, a wood, a landscape, a moun- 
 tain range, a country, a continent, the earth, the solar system, 
 the sidereal system, and the Universe, are objects. 2 In a puzzle 
 picture, whose primary object it is to deceive, and in many 
 geometrical designs, the same set of lines, according to the 
 manner in which they are viewed or interpreted, yield dis- 
 similar objects. Similarly with sounds. Uttering, for instance, 
 several times in rapid succession the word "plea", we may 
 imagine, according to choice or circumstance, that we are say- 
 ing "leap" or "plea". Again, we may disregard the changes 
 which are produced in the passage of time from the zygote 
 to the new-born babe, and from the new-born babe to the man 
 bowed down by age, or the transformations due to position 
 in space and to other circumstances. Furthermore, just as we 
 may ignore changes of time and space, we may pass over 
 determinate quantity, as in the concepts man, redness, solidity, 
 and the like, where the terms imply highly abstract and gene- 
 ralised facts. Similarly, inasmuch as animate beings derive 
 their nature from other animate beings, as a son from his 
 parents; an animal and a plant from other animals and plants; 
 one species from a preceding one; therefore mankind and the 
 whole of animate existence may be conceived as one and 
 undivided. The current methods of classification are, however, 
 based on practical considerations, and separate movable ob- 
 jectsan animal, a table are the conventional types of objects 
 as such. Beyond this necessarily limited view of apprehending 
 nature, convenience, interest, and an easy grasp and separation 
 
 1 "GegenstJinde oder Dinge sind von unserm Willen unabhangige Kom- 
 plexe von Empfindungen, denen raumliche Selbstandigkeit und zeitliche 
 Stetigkeit zukommt." (Wundt, Logik, vol.1, p. 454.) It need scarcely be 
 pointed out that a complex of sensations is a thing or object, and that no 
 sensation complex is entirely independent of discriminating intelligence. 
 
 2 "We can call a pile of wood, a pyramid of balls, or a heap of sand 
 a unity or a thing, although it contains a plurality." (Sigwart, Logic, vol. 2, 
 p. 82.) Sigwart discusses this subject somewhat fully, and Locke has a 
 few apposite paragraphs in his Essay on the Human Understanding, bk. 2, 
 ch. 23, 1-2.
 
 SECTION 8.- OBJECT, FACT, ENVIRONMENT. .~>5 
 
 by the senses or the intelligence, cpmmonly determine classi- 
 fication. 
 
 Sundry aspects in the conception of objects, derived from a 
 methodical analysis based on Conclusion 25 /, and in agreement 
 with Conclusion 20, should be noted: (1) the several atoms or 
 smallest particles in an apple, for instance, are judged to be 
 objects. (2) An apple, consisting as it does of various parts 
 (peel, pips, etc.), is regarded as one object. (3) We separate 
 sense impressions derived from many apples and name these 
 qualities, as solidity and sweetness. (4) We disregard those 
 special states of the apple which are ascribable to particular 
 causes, e.g., disease. (5) The apple, conceived as changing 
 from an arbitrary point (the fertilised ovum) to another arbitrary 
 point (the state of decay), is considered as possessing an in- 
 dependent existence. (6) As with the development of the apple, 
 so with its antecedent and subsequent states the time before 
 fertilisation of the ovum and after decay, practical reasons 
 induce men to pass them over. (7) We form classes of objects 
 in time sequence, of higher and higher categories, as in the 
 theory of evolution where the rich life of to-day, including our 
 apple, is traced back to the detachment of our planet and prior. 
 (8) We combine smaller into larger aggregates in order of 
 space apple, apple tree, orchard, village, district, province, 
 country, continent, earth, solar system, Western Universe, 
 Island Universe, Universe. (9) Influences of temperature and 
 moisture, of atmospheric pressure, of gravitation, the constant 
 removal and addition of minute particles, and the environmental 
 influences generally as summed up in external physical, bio- 
 logical, and cultural influences are, for practical purposes, 
 arbitrarily ignored in the concept of an apple. (10) In all 
 observation of an apple or of any other object memory enters 
 in at least two forms as (a) special memory, in that we cannot 
 focus an ordinary object in one single act or moment of time, 
 and as (b) general memory, in that we only recognise an object 
 by connecting it with preceding experiences. 1 
 
 Human convenience, then, determines the definition of an 
 object, and, omitting- the Universe as object, we might define 
 an object as a more or less arbitrarily selected or framed portion 
 of the differences-containing Universe- which, for the sake of 
 convenience, we choose to regard as having a more or less 
 
 * 
 
 1 We pass methodically, according to Conclusion 27, from extreme minimum 
 to extreme maximum. (1), (2), (3), and (4) are the four different aspects 
 of an average apple or object other than single "atom". (5) and (6) follow 
 development within, before, and after the apple's life time. (7) and (8) furnish 
 the relations in time and space. (9) enumerates environmental factors. And 
 (10) allows for the psychological aspect. 
 
 - The less differentiated we imagine the constitution of the Universe to 
 be, the greater will be our difficulty to perceive "objects". For instance, a 
 white sheet of paper, viewed from a little distance by even illumination, 
 can only be broken up with difficulty into subsidiary objects.
 
 56 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 separate and durable existence. Plato's permanent types do not 
 appear therefore to receive any warrant from an analysis of 
 the term Object, and Kant's Thing-in-itself apparently dissolves 
 in the examination. 
 
 Science is concerned with objects, and consequently it is 
 important that we should be methodologically aware of the 
 artificiality, ambiguity, or arbitrariness of the term Object. In 
 applying, therefore, methodological canons, we should assume 
 that the phenomenon we are scrutinising has only a separate 
 or definite existence in a very limited sense, and that we 
 should hence beware of isolating it too rigidly in our thought. 1 
 (The general nature of a given object is defined in Conclusion 3, 
 and some of the main practical difficulties encountered in de- 
 fining an object will be discussed in Conclusion 17.) 
 
 20. (B) FACT. Consonant with the preceding analysis 
 of the term Object, a fact may be defined as a valid theory - 
 in regard to the exact nature and relations of a certain portion 
 of reality. That the sun gives light, that fire burns, that we 
 are breathing, may appear to be occurrences so certain that 
 the expression "valid theory" hardly does justice to them. 
 Error, however, not only tends to invade the most unexpected 
 places, as men of science will be the first to admit, but dreams 
 and mental disorders further warn us against indulging in 
 absolutist statements. Giddings says in his Inductive Sociology 
 (p. 13): "A fact, in the scientific sense of the word, is the 
 close agreement of many observations or measurements of the 
 same phenomena." 
 
 21. (C) ENVIRONMENT. We may state that that which 
 surrounds any fact constitutes its environment. Thus the indi- 
 vidual's environment is the Universe minus himself, whilst he 
 forms the environment for the world external to him. In the 
 realm of ideas the same definition applies. When it is said, 
 therefore, that man is a creature of his environment, it should 
 be borne in mind that, being an integral part of the Universe, 
 he shares power and influence with his environment. Similarly, 
 when his impotence is sought to be demonstrated by fatalists 
 on the assumption that he is a product of antecedent causes, 
 we are bound to observe that as a component of the Universe 
 he also is a cause. The law of action and reaction applies 
 here. 
 
 * In his highly suggestive volume {'Evolution creatrice, M. Henri Bergson 
 provides good grounds for believing that it is only the practical nature of 
 our intelligence, aiming as it does commonly at results and not at knowledge, 
 which renders us sometimes forgetful of the fact that reality is in great 
 measure a flux, and that definite objects, spaces, and times are unreal or, 
 let us say, artifacts. Conclusion 27 emphasises, by its method of degree- 
 determination, the need of doing justice to this flux. Complete indefiniteness, 
 however, would be indistinguishable from blank nescience. 
 
 - "In its most proper acceptation, theory means the completed result of 
 philosophical induction from experience." (Mill, Logic.)
 
 SKCTION .9. OBSERVATION. 57 
 
 For practical ends the environment is frequently interpreted 
 in a narrower and more specific sense, as in Conclusion 17 c. It 
 is, in fact, of signal importance not only to employ the term with 
 caution, but to remember in every enquiry both the vital fact 
 involved therein, and the need of making thereof a limited use. 
 
 SECTION IX. OBSERVATION. 
 
 22. To marvel at the twinkling stars; to contemplate the 
 periodic transformations in the form of the moon and both its 
 path and that of the sun; to observe the ebbing and the rising 
 of the tide; to note stones falling and smoke rising; to perceive 
 the flash of lightning and hear the rolling thunder; to experience 
 sunshine, wind, rain, snow, and hail; to notice the conspicuous 
 seasonal changes in plant life, and the general facts of variety, 
 growth, and decay in animate beings; to learn of men of different 
 shades of colour, and of the fortunes and falls of empires and 
 nations; to visit churches, art galleries, factories, and homes, 
 and to take stock of other striking and patent facts in the way 
 the man in the street does, has scientifically a minimum value, 
 because in no such instance are the material factors revealed to 
 the unaided sense and the unassisted reason. Apart from 
 science, he who is uninstructed is unaware, for example, that 
 plants abstract from the air carbonic acid, and return to it oxygen 
 and water vapour; nor that the action of the sun on the chloro- 
 phyll, <jr the green colouring matter, of plants leads to the ini- 
 tial production of living matter from non-living matter; nor that 
 bacteria help plants in obtaining nitrogen from the soil; nor that 
 the action of earthworms prepares the soil for vegetation; nor 
 that the form, the bright colours, the scent, and the sugary 
 secretions of flowers have developed for the purpose of attracting 
 insects which act as fertilising agents; nor that plants evolve, and 
 are constituted of minute cells; nor indeed anything of conse- 
 quence regarding the vegetable kingdom; nor that enzymes, inter- 
 nal secretions, and vitamines exist, and are indispensable to the 
 maintenance of life, or that the cells possibly utilise molecular 
 energy, and are affected by molecular movements; nor that 
 ''physiology consists largely in tracing the way in which Oxygen 
 enters the body, the manner in which it is distributed to the 
 tissues, and the various phases of vital activity which it brings 
 about within the living tissues" (W. A. Locy, Biology and its 
 Makers, p. 183); nor that food is directly transformed into energy 
 without being first converted into heat. And what is true of 
 his ignorance of life is true quite generally. Astronomical, 
 geological, electrical, chemical, meteorological, and other leading 
 natural laws, are wholly beyond his conventional range, and 
 the genesis and meaning of cultural phenomena are wrapt for 
 him in an impenetrable fog. So far as observing what is
 
 58 PART IL- SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 significant is concerned, he is almost exactly in the position of 
 a blind man in respect of colours. 
 
 This is not astonishing when we ascertain how little is dis- 
 closed by ordinary experience. How is the uneducated man 
 to read the story of the stars, the earth, or the stratified rocks? 
 How is he to determine the depth of the strata or of the sea, 
 or the diameter of the earth or moon? How is he to follow 
 the system of mountain ranges; divine that volcanic regions 
 are situated close to the sea or to large lakes; or suspect the 
 existence or understand the cause of the trade winds? How 
 is he to surmise that the lump of flesh he is inspecting is a 
 muscle, and that buried in the lump are tendons, nerves, ar- 
 teries, veins, all held together by connective tissue ; or how is 
 he to determine the composition of the blood and its functions ; 
 or how is he to follow the processes of digestion and absorp- 
 tion of foodstuffs or the segmentation of the ovum? How is 
 he to decipher the history of mankind which stretches to the 
 tertiary period, and the complex signs of his own age? 
 
 The information of what is remote in time and space is to 
 be acquired only by collective enquiries frequently lasting for 
 generations. Such facts defy conjecture, and much less is the 
 world of molecular masses open to his gaze, seeing that this 
 world is wholly screened from unaided sight and touch. The 
 weight of radium which may be detected experimentally by 
 means of the electrometer is 0,000,000,000,001 of a gram; the 
 quantity of xenon in the atmosphere is one part in 170,000,000; 
 there are said to be about 640 trillions of hydrogen molecules 
 in one milligram of the gas; the diameter of a molecule is 
 perhaps about 2X10~ 8 cms.; the number of molecules in 1 ccm. 
 of air under normal conditions is about 2?X10~ 19 ; a molecule 
 collides about 6,000,000,000 times a second; and the mass of 
 the electron is about ^th part of that of the hydrogen atom, the 
 weight of the latter being 1 . 63X10~ 24 gms. When it is considered 
 that scientific knowledge as in biology, chemistry, light, heat, 
 electricity, and magnetism is vitally contingent on an acquaint- 
 ance, however indirect, with substances invisible to the naked 
 eye or imperceptible altogether except indirectly, as with cer- 
 tain classes of bacteria, the impotence of common observation 
 becomes manifest. Hence we find that most scientific inquirers 
 seek by increased refinement of methods to pierce into the 
 world of the infinitesimal. Consequently, so far from desultory 
 observation suggesting to the man of science an extensive and 
 true hypothesis, he and hundreds of his confreres almost ex- 
 haust themselves in establishing a few comparatively narrow 
 generalisations grounded on an astounding number of obser- 
 vations witness, for example, the almost infinitely laborious 
 process of discovery of the numerous glandular secretions 
 which, at different stages, prepare the ingested food for ab-
 
 SECTION 9. - OBSER VA TION. 59 
 
 sorption into the human system. Scientific observation therefore 
 commonly presupposes a rapidly growing arsenal of ingenious 
 and delicate instruments or other adjuncts, often devised or 
 perfected by the men of science themselves. 
 
 An illustration drawn from Herschel and Jevons exemplifies 
 the importance of circumspect observation. Shells had been 
 encountered on high mountains, and seven hypotheses had been 
 propounded to account for the shells. Some men contended 
 that the shells had been left behind by the retreating waters 
 of the "deluge"; Voltaire argued that pilgrims had dropped 
 them there; others thought they were freaks of nature, or that 
 they were due to fermentation, to the influence of the celestial 
 bodies, or to birds feeding on shell-fish; and a seventh group 
 of persons claimed that they were the remains of living forms 
 covered by accumulations of debris of various kinds, and sub- 
 sequently exposed or detached. Now the first six hypotheses 
 were practically gratuitous surmises, since they were evidently 
 not derived from anything like wide observation. And if the 
 seventh one was merely a fortunate hit, not grounded on, nor 
 to be succeeded by, exhaustive observation, it was to all intents 
 and purposes as unprofitable as the other six. Only the pro- 
 longed, extensive, minute, and accurate observations of such 
 men as Sir Charles Lyell and Archibald Geikie, have enabled 
 geologists to propose valid generalisations, and to proceed 
 deductively with some effect. "Comparison must be made 
 with facts purposely selected so as to include every variety 
 of case, not omitting extreme ones', and in sufficient number 
 to afford every reasonable probability of detecting error", and 
 all conclusions need to be "in exact accordance with numerous 
 observations purposely made under such a variety of circum- 
 stances as fairly to embrace the whole range of the phenomena 
 which the theory is intended to account for". (Herschel, Dis- 
 course, [219-220.].) 
 
 In earlier stages of a science when comparatively much 
 material has been accumulated, but yet far too little to permit 
 the detailed testing of a sweeping conjecture the formation 
 of a large hypothesis is only admissible when its purely pro- 
 visional character is stressed. Within these limits it has marked 
 advantages. If, however, the apparent and partial consistency 
 of the hypothesis with the imperfectly known facts is regarded 
 as of itself conclusive evidence for its correctness, we are 
 likely to be imposed on by a mirage, and the progress of 
 science is arrested. A pertinent illustration of the above is 
 offered by the story of the highly ingenious and purely hypo- 
 thetical phlogiston theory, which we accordingly quote: 
 
 'The theory of phlogiston was originally broached as a theory of 
 combustion. According to this theory, bodies such as coal, charcoal, wood, 
 oil, fat, etc., burn because they contain a combustible principle, which 
 was assumed to be a material substance and uniform in character. This
 
 60 PART II.- SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 substance was known as phlogiston. All combustible bodies were to be 
 regarded, therefore, as compounds, one of their constituents being 
 phlogiston: their different natures depended partly upon the proportion 
 of phlogiston they contain, and partly upon the nature and amount of 
 their other constituents. A body, when burning, was parting with 
 its phlogiston; and all the phenomena of combustion the flame, heat 
 and light were caused by the violence of the expulsion of that sub- 
 stance. Certain metals as, for example, zinc could be caused to burn, 
 and thereby to yield earthy substances, sometimes white in colour, at 
 other times variously coloured. These earthy substances were called 
 calces, from their general resemblance to lime. Other metals, like lead 
 and mercury, did not appear to burn ; but on heating them they gradually 
 lost their metallic appearance, and became converted into calces. This 
 operation was known as calcination. In the act of burning or of calci- 
 nation phlogiston was expelled. Hence metals were essentially compound: 
 they consisted of phlogiston and a calx, the nature of which determined 
 the character of the metal. By adding phlogiston to a calx the metal 
 was regenerated. Thus, on heating the calx of zinc or of lead with coal, 
 or charcoal, or wood, metallic zinc or lead was again formed. When a 
 candle burns, its phlogiston is transferred to the air; if burned in a 
 limited supply of air, combustion ceases, because the air becomes satu- 
 rated with phlogiston." (E.Thorpe, History of Chemistry, vol.1, pp. 71-72.) 
 
 Lavoisier's theory that in combustion substances combine with 
 the oxygen of the air the very reverse of the assumption of 
 the phlogiston hypothesis that substances lose in combustion- 
 was the product of a more advanced age. 
 
 The very ground we tread on has an immeasurably richer 
 meaning for the man of science than for the uncultivated: 
 
 "Turn up a sod of earth in a pasture in winter, and at first sight it 
 seems to consist of two well-marked portions, a living and a dead one 
 the green grass above and the black soil beneath it. But look closer 
 into the mass, and what then do you see? A whole network of living 
 beings. Matted roots of grass, just as much alive as the green blades 
 above, spread and interlace themselves through the seemingly dead portion. 
 Bulbs of bulbous buttercup, of orchids, of garlic, lie hidden in it every- 
 where. Root-stocks of plantain, of chervil, of pimpinel, of daisy, are 
 knotted among its clods. Gaze closer still, and you will see that it is all 
 full of tubers or stocks of lesser weeds, in their dormant condition, all 
 ready to spring afresh at the first breath of April. How the endless 
 bulbs and corns and tap-roots manage to stow themselves away in so 
 small a space is to me a perpetual mystery ; in winter you hardly notice 
 the little potato-like pills of the lesser celandine, but in spring the plants 
 cover the ground with their golden blossoms, to be succeeded in due course 
 by the spotted orchid, the buttercups, the centauries, the hawk-weeds, 
 and all the countless flowers of July and August. They are packed as 
 tight as sardines in a tin. As for the seeds of small annuals they lurk 
 there by the thousand; sift out a little of the soil, and plant it in a pot, 
 and, hi presto! to your surprise, weeds will spring from it in incredible 
 numbers. The whole mass teems with dormant germs innumerable. 
 
 "It is the same with animals. You think of this soil as dead; but it 
 is undermined by rabbits, rats, moles, and lizards. It swarms with in- 
 vertebrates. LarvaB of tiger beetles lie in wait in its crannies; grubs 
 and worms without end find a living in its hollows. Woodlice and petty 
 snails lurk under every stone; centipedes and wire worms crawl through 
 its interstices; testacella pursues earthworms as the ferret pursues the 
 rat ; a whole underground fauna lives and moves and has its being in 
 that seemingly dead congeries. Turn up a handful of earth, and examine 
 it with a pocket lens ; you will find it alive, like an ant-hill, with endless
 
 SKCTION .9. - OBSER VA TION. 61 
 
 tiny mites and crawling creatures. Even if we take into consideration 
 only the plants and animals visible to the naked eye, this soil beneath 
 our feet is one heaving, seething, moving mass of living organisms; it 
 has its jungle-law and its penalties, its feuds and its alliances, its fierce 
 struggle for life and its unspeakable tragedies. 
 
 "But when we pass from the visible to the invisible world, the 
 variety and fertility are even more conspicuous." (Grant Allen, The Hand 
 of God and other 'Posthumous Essays, 1909, pp. 96-97.) 
 
 A second illustration by Jevons indicates how observation 
 and generalisation melt into each other. Examining the problem 
 of the rainbow, he concludes that "a beam of light and par- 
 ticles of water, in a particular position, are the necessary 
 antecedents or causes of the bow of colours"; and he adds 
 that "this is nearly all that simple observation can tell us, and 
 it forms merely the first step of preliminary observation". 
 (Primer of Logic, p. 96.) Yet to many persons this statement 
 will appear to be a broad generalisation, since it comprises not 
 only all coloured bows due to rain, but all coloured bows 
 whether due to rain or to other states of water. The fact is 
 that by observation we scarcely ever mean the examination 
 of an individual object at one particular moment from one 
 particular angle, but a process involving the examination of 
 individual objects under different conditions and the conscious 
 comprehension of all material resemblances to other similar 
 objects, accompanied by the studied neglect of all immaterial 
 divergences. Not infrequently, however, men of science proceed 
 even further, and include the examination of a series of classes, 
 as Jevons' illustration indicates. 
 
 Telepathic theories offer an example of how seldom the 
 complexity of the process of observation is recognised. De- 
 sirous of verifying a passage in a volume which I am reading, 
 I betake myself to the sitting room of the lady at whose resi- 
 dence I am temporarily staying in order to borrow a Bible. 
 As I leave my apartment, I meet the lady with a Bible in her 
 hand. Did she divine my thought? Perhaps I determine to 
 note kindred instances, and, after collecting a certain number, 
 I possibly reach the conclusion, as so many individuals have 
 done before me, that telepathy represents a proved mode of 
 human communication. Yet, scientifically, the problem is not 
 simple at all, for we must search for instances which resemble 
 this one, except for the peculiarity of the arresting coincidence. 
 That is, I must ask myself : Do I often require a book, another 
 person, a thought, without the book, other person, or thought 
 being encountered unexpectedly? The self-evident answer to 
 this query at once casts doubt on the first interpretation, for 
 the number of possible to real and impressive coincidences is 
 almost as infinity to one. In fact, if we are thorough, as it is 
 our duty to be, we shall institute a systematic enquiry into 
 the nature and frequency of coincidences, and it is much to 
 be hoped that this will be undertaken by some learned body.
 
 62 PAR! II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 Or, to consider another related problem, that of telepathic 
 hallucinations. Some years ago the (London) Society for Psychi- 
 cal Research selected out of a very much larger aggregate 
 twenty cases of hallucinations alleged to have been experienced 
 by some one at the time of the death of some person known 
 but not expected to die. The investigators argued abstractly 
 that the law of probability made it extremely unlikely that 
 these very remarkable coincidences should have been "chance" 
 coincidences. Now, on closer scrutiny, we learn that these 
 hallucinations were experienced mostly about the time of wak- 
 ing, going to sleep, or dozing, including night time and post- 
 prandial siestas. 1 It would have been, therefore, desirable to 
 engage in an objective or even experimental study of these 
 conditions in order to throw further light on the problem. If 
 this had been done the present author has attempted it it 
 would have transpired that in such a peculiar state hallucina- 
 tions are not rare, and that in this condition men believe them- 
 selves to be awake when they are partially asleep. This has 
 a double bearing on the problem, for, first, it teaches us that 
 hallucinations are not infrequent, and that they have as a rule 
 what is admittedly a natural cause, to the extent of being indeed 
 almost wholly at the mercy of a competent experimenter (see 
 Mind of Man, pp. 433-436), and, secondly, that expectancy 
 favours hallucinations. Moreover, we appreciate the gravity of 
 the fact that in not one instance were those who were said to 
 have experienced the hallucinations able to produce a recording 
 note written at the time. (The editors facetiously speak of 
 ''mental" notes.) If to this be added that in not a few of the 
 cases there was anything but a "chance" coincidence, as the 
 theory assumes; that these hallucinations did not present them- 
 selves altogether or mainly to near or dear relatives and 
 friends; and that no hallucinations occur in myriads of daily 
 happenings of an analogous nature, we shall be compelled to 
 call in question the strictly scientific nature of the enquiry. 
 
 We are supported in our criticism of telepathy by other data, 
 which indicate that random surmises are of scanty use in 
 enquiries of this kind. To venture on one or two illustrations. 
 At a committee meeting I perceive my neighbour gazing half- 
 abstractedly at my notes. Presently he informs the chairman 
 that he desires to propose a certain motion a motion which 
 he had read off my notes without really being aware of this ! 
 Or a friend tells me that by "willing" he had compelled some- 
 body at the table, at which several of us are seated, to write 
 his name backwards, when the fact is that the "willing" was 
 suggested by what he saw somebody do, and not vice versa. 
 Or I observe that I ask myself regularly the question "Is the 
 blotting paper there?" when that article is perceived by me 
 
 1 Volume X of the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research.
 
 SECTION 9.OBSER VA 770 A 7 . 63 
 
 to be in its place, but as regularly omit it, when it is not 
 there the usual explanation being that the sight of the article 
 gives rise to the enquiry, and not the reverse. Or to consider an 
 even more telling and yet common occurrence: bent on recall- 
 ing an event when somebody with me is engaged on the same 
 quest, I think that we have simultaneously succeeded when in 
 reality I am confusing hurried repetition of what my neighbour 
 says with independent recollection. 1 Brushing aside, then, fraud 
 of every kind as well as gross self-deception, both of which 
 are far from being rarities, we still infer that it argues mon- 
 strously lax observation to collect at random a series of affir- 
 mative instances of a selected order and ground thereon a far- 
 reaching conclusion. Yet who would say that the examples 
 analysed here are not almost typical of most of the so-called 
 scientific work beyond the frontiers of the established sciences? 
 
 A kindred and related instance to telepathy is that of the 
 widely-obtaining attitude towards the problem of sub-con- 
 sciousness. Poincare had noticed that solutions of important 
 mathematical problems occurred to him not infrequently when 
 he was apparently absorbed in considering some matter extra- 
 neous to these problems; whence he concluded that the sub- 
 conscious activities of the mind possess greater value than its 
 conscious activities. Methodologically this seems a precipitate 
 conclusion to draw. Before we are entitled to deliver such a 
 verdict, we must be clear following Conclusions 27 and 28 
 concerning what "conscious" and "sub-conscious" mean; where 
 the two possibly pass into one another; whether "spontaneous" 
 solutions of an inferior character do not present themselves to 
 us; whether there are not multitudes of cases in which "sub- 
 conscious" thought is superficial like, or even more superficial 
 than, conscious thought; and we must be furthermore tho- 
 roughly satisfied about the precise facts relating to the alleged 
 spontaneous solutions whether, for instance, we are at the 
 particular moment really absorbed in something else, or whether 
 it is not a question of a pause favourable for recollection or 
 cogitation. 
 
 Prof. William James has sought the nature of religion in the 
 realm of the sub-conscious; Hartmann has written a ponderous 
 work on the Philosophy of the Unconscious; at the present 
 moment Freud's psycho-analysis is developing into the psycho- 
 logy of the sub-conscious; and it would require pages to 
 enumerate the various virtues and activities attributed to the 
 sub-conscious in man. Nevertheless one vainly looks for a 
 scientific analysis or cautious discrimination pertaining to funda- 
 mentals in the various dissertations on the subject. Without pro- 
 nouncing on the basic issue as to whether "sub-conciousness", 
 or unconscious consciousness, is a fact, we may say that the 
 
 1 An identical explanation frequently applies when two individuals are 
 said to yawn simultaneously.
 
 64 PART II.SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL .TERMS. 
 
 enquiry has been conducted in an unsatisfactory manner, and 
 that whilst normal psychology is yet a primal forest waiting 
 for pioneers to explore it, it is unlikely that any headway can 
 be made at present in matters connected with abnormal psycho- 
 logy. Observation, it is disconcerting to learn, is yet an art 
 almost entirely neglected outside the physical and biological 
 laboratory. So far as the sciences relating to man are concerned, 
 it is very much as if we lived in pre-Baconian days when the 
 need for scrupulously circumspect and varied observation was 
 unsuspected and audacious theorising or abject reliance on 
 authorities constituted usually the alpha and omega of the 
 method employed in discovery. 
 
 Consider, again, M. Henri Bergson's defence of indeterminism. 
 According to him "we are free when our acts emanate from 
 our entire personality" (Les donnees immediates de la con- 
 science, ed. 1906, p. 131); but in so far as we are prompted by 
 external or fragmentary incentives, our conduct, in M. Bergson's 
 opinion, is determined. In a methodological age we should 
 know what to expect of an essay where such a view is ad- 
 vanced. The author would propound his hypothesis, and then 
 proceed to its substantiation. He would be meticulously care- 
 ful to prove that we sometimes act with our whole nature ; 
 that in such instances we are not actuated by external influences 
 either directly or indirectly ; and that a higher or different value 
 is, for certain produced reasons, to be ascribed to decisions of 
 a purely internal nature. Unfortunately methodological pro- 
 cedure has not yet become second nature in man, and so 
 M. Bergson experiences no subjective qualms or objective diffi- 
 culties in concluding his exceedingly interesting psychological 
 study without any serious effort to convince us that we ever 
 act with our whole nature, or that, if we did so, our whole 
 nature is not an external or partially external product. Where 
 the man of science would feel that nothing short of a highly 
 developed science of mind could authorise him to entertain 
 such a hypothesis, the philosopher blandly assumes his facts 
 and is sublimely unconscious that he is merely indulging his 
 roaming fancy. 
 
 M. Bergson is but typical of this attitude of the philosopher 
 towards reality. For instance, Mr. Herbert Spencer, before him, 
 had sought to reconcile religion with science. Without even a 
 casual attempt to elucidate the meaning of religion, he in- 
 genuously postulated that "Religion under all its forms is 
 distinguished from everything else in this, that its subject 
 matter is that which passes the sphere of experience". (First 
 Principles, 1875, p. 17.) By such a procedure everything, of 
 course, can be demonstrated, and that is precisely what philo- 
 sophers unconsciously do, and men of science consciously and 
 severely leave undone. Only a universal conviction that truth 
 can be solely established by scientifically inspired socio-historic
 
 SECTION 9.OBSERVA TION. 65 
 
 research, will check the incessant, but fruitless, endeavours of 
 individuals to enlighten mankind on the most fundamental 
 issues of existence by advancing theories which are ambitious 
 and elaborate, but, at most points, out of touch with reality. 
 
 23. Without a close and full examination of facts we are 
 liable to be gravely misled, as is impressively illustrated by the 
 Shakespeare-Bacon controversy. The general argument of those 
 who contend that Bacon was the author of the plays commonly 
 attributed to Shakespeare, runs somewhat as follows. These 
 plays are of such supreme excellence that he who was respon- 
 sible for writing them should be regarded as one of the greatest 
 master minds. the world has known. Now William Shakespeare 
 was the son of humble parents, enjoyed only an elementary 
 education, was a mediocre actor, was primarily interested in 
 acquiring wealth, had no consciousness of his greatness, and 
 was so uninteresting to his contemporaries that few traces of 
 his life are discoverable even by the most diligent research. 
 This commonplace actor, this conventional figure, could never 
 have been the creator of the superb comedies and tragedies 
 ascribed to him. On the other hand, his contemporary, Francis 
 Bacon, was the dominant spirit of his age, and to him un- 
 doubtedly should be assigned the merit and the glory of having 
 ushered onto the world's stage the plays reputedly Shakespeare's. 
 If it be objected that the plays are ostensibly by Shakespeare, 
 the reply proffered is that, owing to Bacon's high social position 
 and the low status of Elizabethan playwrights, the authorship 
 could not be revealed. 
 
 Abstractly, at least on the negative side, the case for the 
 Baconian origin of the plays in question appears almost irre- 
 sistible. Now to the facts. Shakespeare's father, John Shake- 
 speare, occupied successively all the higher civic posts in the 
 fairly large town of Stratford-on-Avon,' where he lived; and his 
 wife belonged to a respectable country family. The sons of 
 numerous fathers of the merchant class similarly situated, have 
 risen to the most prominent ranks. However, financial mis- 
 fortune overtook John Shakespeare, and therefore his illustrious 
 son's education was probably limited by what the grammar 
 school of the town offered. There, we may assume, he assimi- 
 lated what such an educational establishment provided, which 
 need by no means have been negligible in quantity or quality. 
 Besides, fortunately, culture is not a mere matter of school 
 drill. For aught we know to the contrary pace Ben Jonson 
 he might have become a great scholar through private study. 
 Arbitrarily to limit his possible intellectual attainments, would 
 be unfair. Of course, Shakespeare's plays might have exhibited 
 such a grasp of the sciences, the arts, and other subjects taught 
 at the universities, that it woulH be difficult to account for 
 John Shakespeare's son acquiring them; but since philosophers, 
 men of science, politicians, and artists, do not ponder over his
 
 66 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 plays to increase their technical knowledge and insight, we 
 may ignore this aspect. 
 
 However, is it consistent with the nature of things that a 
 mere actor should be the author of incomparably great plays? 
 Well, a high percentage of the dramatists of his day were 
 temporarily or permanently actors. Not only f therefore, does 
 Shakespeare's authorship not militate against his having been 
 a dramatist, but it is almost what we should expect. As a 
 matter of fact, his intimacy with the stage, and his regular 
 income derived therefrom, were probably powerful aids to his 
 producing good plays. 
 
 And how is his obscurity to be explained? We answer, by 
 the general fact that there is not one Elizabethan playwright, 
 except Ben Jonson, who was a critic as well, of whom we 
 possess any but the most meager record. Even Beaumont and 
 Fletcher, who belonged to families noted in their day, are 
 without a private history for us. Nor is this difficult to under- 
 stand. In those days there were no daily papers or other 
 periodicals, nor did that age command other means of counter- 
 acting this deficiency. Hence playwrights, who were tabooed 
 socially, lived and died, without fame noising abroad their 
 private ventures and adventures. In reality, their very plays 
 were ordinarily not their property, and in rare cases only did 
 they publish or supervise the publication of their works. It 
 was even common for plays to be published without author's 
 name, as if the author was of no consequence. 
 
 We should, further, remember that Shakespeare was not 
 regarded by his own age as in any way unique or strikingly 
 different from other playwrights. From the documents which 
 have escaped the ravages of time, we are bound to conclude 
 that he was considered as one dramatist among a number, 
 though one of the first caliber. Shakespeare had therefore no 
 valid reason why he should conceive himself as differing mark- 
 edly from his fellow playwrights, or why he should not seek 
 to retrieve his family's financial losses. 
 
 Yet how could such a plain bourgeois write exquisitely, as 
 Shakespeare did? This, too, should be answered in the light 
 of his time. His manner of writing was that of a school of 
 playwrights, and the utmost that one could say is that whilst 
 he was on the whole the first of the school, he exhibited no 
 stateable peculiarities, except those of frequent superiority. 
 That is, practically all that has been said about Shakespeare, 
 is literally true of his fellow playwrights. Circumstances have 
 concealed this, but an impartial study of the school of Eliza- 
 bethan playwrights renders this manifest. His genius is there- 
 fore first and foremost an expression of his age, and is a social, 
 and not an individual, product. 
 
 If the above be conceded, it might still be argued that it is 
 incumbent on us to connect the actor with the author, and
 
 SECTION 9.OBSERVA TION. 67 
 
 both with the William Shakespeare of Stratford-on-Avon. This, 
 too, is not difficult to compass. Diverse documents render it 
 evident that an actor of that name existed at the time at the 
 very theatre where the Shakespearean plays were regularly per- 
 formed. Moreover, one of the Prefaces to the 1623 Folio, 
 which many Baconians claim to have been edited by Bacon 
 himself, contains definite statements by his fellow actors Heminge 
 and Condell, to the effect that the author of the plays and the 
 actor were one. They say that their object in publishing the 
 collected edition was "to keep the memory of so worthy a 
 friend and fellow alive as was our Shakespeare"; and Ben 
 Jonson, in a famous passage in his Timber, published in 1641, 
 takes this for granted (pp. 97, 98). In that Folio, too, there are 
 allusions directly connecting Shakespeare with Stratford- oil- 
 Avon, even his monument being referred to. Thus Ben Jonson, 
 in his Ode, addresses Shakespeare as the "Sweet Swan of 
 Avon", and Leonard Digges, in his poetical effusion, speaks 
 of ". . . thy Stratford monument". 
 
 Lastly, in Shakespeare's will there is mention of three of his 
 fellow actors, John Heminge, Richard Burbage, and Henry 
 Condell, whilst a fellow actor, A. Phillips, in his will, left "to my 
 fellowe, William Shakespeare, a thirty-shillings piece of gold". 
 (On Shakespeare, the actor, see Sir Sidney Lee's Life of Shake- 
 speare.) The chain of evidence in favour of the theory that 
 the reputed author of the plays is the real author, is, therefore, 
 as complete as we could wish, short of extensive biographical 
 documentation. 
 
 Now to Bacon and the plays. Is it not incredible that Bacon 
 should have published the plays under another's name, a man 
 well-known in the community, said by Baconians generally to 
 have been utterly incapable of composing them? To continue 
 successfully such a deception for twenty years or more, as is 
 implied, would be nothing less than miraculous. We do not 
 encounter here a fictitious pseudonym ; but an individual dwell- 
 ing in what was then the dramatic hub of the Elizabethan 
 universe, and perforce known to multitudes. Only a Shake- 
 speare, it is evident, could properly impersonate a Shakespeare. 
 
 Here is another small, but significant point. The title page of 
 the first Folio has a portrait described as that of Shakespeare's. 
 Now how extraordinary this is on the Baconian theory! Why 
 have had a portrait at all? And if there was to be one, why 
 not subtle suggestions of the person of Bacon? The portrait 
 is in flagrant contradiction with the assumption that the plays 
 were not by Shakespeare. 
 
 How strange, too, that not only should the sponsors of the 
 first Folio be two actors who speak of the author as a fellow 
 and friend of theirs, but state repeatedly that the author is no 
 longer among the living. They protest: "It had been a thing, 
 we confess, worthy to have been wished, that the author
 
 68 PART II.- SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 himself had lived to have set forth and overseen his own 
 writings; but since it hath been ordained otherwise, and he 
 by death departed from that right, we pray you do not envy 
 his friends the office of their care and pains, to have collected 
 and published them." 
 
 Again, according to Ben Jonson's Commemorative Ode in 
 the first Folio, amply and conclusively confirmed by Richard 
 Farmer in the succeeding century, Shakespeare had "small 
 Latine, and less Greeke". Indeed, few, if rny, of his fellow 
 playwrights seemed so dependent on translations from the 
 classics or quoted so little Latin. Yet Bacon was a brilliant 
 Latin scholar, and his acknowledged works abound in referen- 
 ces to untranslated passages, and quote not a few in the original. 
 Moreover, the later seventeenth and the eighteenth century 
 were in emphatic accord with Ben Jonson, that Shakespeare 
 lacked "art", which would constitute ar ludicrous statement if 
 applied to Bacon. That is, the judgment of his own and that 
 of the succeeding century conforms precisely to what we should 
 expect of William Shakespeare, the son of John Shakespeare, 
 of Stratford-on-Avon, and is in violent conflict with the theory 
 that the super-learned Bacon was the author of the plays in 
 dispute. Shakespeare's helpless dependence on translations 
 completely disposes, of itself, of the Bacon theory. 
 
 Much might have also been said of the different styles of 
 the two writers; of Bacon's absorbing and life-long interest in 
 scientific method, of which there is no sign in Shakespeare's 
 plays; of the absence of the romantic element in Bacon's 
 writings; of his wanting time to write over thirty plays when 
 his hours were already so full. 
 
 When the principal facts, only obtainable through close 
 historic studies, are thus focused, we learn that there is every 
 reason for believing that Shakespeare wrote the plays attributed 
 to him, and that Bacon did not. Yet bare surmises and dilet- 
 tante enquiries would have only led us into ever deeper 
 quagmires. Facts cannot be divined. 
 
 Even more impressive from the viewpoint of scientific method, 
 is the solution of the problem of Shakespeare's real status as a 
 dramatist. According to the conception generally prevalent at 
 the present day, Shakespeare is the prince of the dramatists 
 of the modern era. Compared to him, every other dramatist 
 is a Liliputian at the side of a giant, or rather Shakespeare 
 is altogether unique and incomparable. His fellow dramatists 
 of the Elizabethan and Jacobean ages are of a different, almost 
 infinitely lower, stamp; his contributions to dramatic literature 
 are quite individual; his genius cannot be explained by anything 
 but his innate greatness ; and, accordingly, in articles and works 
 on Shakespeare, his dramatic environment is almost uniformly 
 ignored. His predecessors are sometimes referred to, but mostly 
 in far from flattering terms. In fact, the theory that Francis
 
 SECTION 9. OBSERVATION. 69 
 
 Bacon wrote Shakespeare's plays is directly attributable to the 
 exceptionally high estimate placed on Shakespeare's plays. 
 Such being the general opinion three centuries after Shake- 
 speare's death, to question it is regarded as verging on boorish 
 ignorance or lamentable eccentricity. 
 
 Our problem, then, is to inquire into the soundness of the 
 present-day attitude towards Shakespeare. 
 
 As we might anticipate from the drift of our special studies 
 generally, Shakespeare was no freak of nature nor an eccentric. 
 Shortly before he began to write, a number of remarkable 
 dramas appeared on the stage. And so far as the lighter side 
 was concerned, it was well represented by John Lyly, who 
 was in diverse ways one of Shakespeare's prototypes, and by 
 Robert Greene's James the Fourth, which is a sort of model 
 for Shakespeare's comedies. Shakespeare's common people, 
 his brilliant repartee, certain of his famous comic figures, and 
 his typical women, are foreshadowed in Lyly, as well as his 
 superior poetical and reflective vein. Again, Marlowe was one 
 of Shakespeare's exemplars on the side of tragedy, of historical 
 plays, and of the grand style. His indebtedness to his pre- 
 decessors has been not infrequently acknowledged, as, for in- 
 stance, by Sir Sidney Lee, in his Life of Shakespeare, who 
 writes: "Kyd and Greene left more or less definite impressions 
 on all Shakespeare's early efforts. But Lyly in comedy and 
 Marlowe in tragedy may be reckoned the masters to whom he 
 stood in the relation of disciple on the threshold of his career. 
 With Marlowe there is evidence that he was for a brief season 
 a working partner." (Op. cit., p. 95.) 
 
 Indeed, the authorship, in part or wholly, of several of Shake- 
 speare's early plays, has been frequently called into question. 
 The generality of scholars favours the view that Titus Androni- 
 cus has been mistakenly ascribed to Shakespeare; that the 
 three parts of Henry VI. were slightly adapted, rather than 
 written, by Shakespeare; and that sundry other early plays of 
 his were more or less adaptations or imitations. These' dis- 
 cussions affect us fundamentally, for if scholars are divided in 
 opinion in respect of authorship of plays or part plays, the 
 self-evident implication is that there was only a measurable 
 difference and distinction between Shakespeare's dramatic- 
 efforts and those of his contemporaries. If he were really 
 unique, there could be no disagreement among experts. 
 
 In 1598 appeared Francis Meres' Palladis Taniia, wherein the 
 list of Shakespeare's plays to date is given, and where his work 
 is repeatedly and highly lauded. According to this volume, 
 Shakespeare was then already recognised as a first-class play- 
 wright and poet; but nevertheless his name appears frequently 
 in the lists placed lower than the names of others. There is 
 certainly no intimation in Meres that Shakespeare was in any 
 way unique, requiring to be classed apart. The subjoined quo-
 
 70 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 tations have a bearing on this subject, and are important because 
 they show Shakespeare in a variety of lights: 
 
 "As the Greek tongue is made famous and eloquent by Homer . . ., 
 so the English tongue is mightily enriched, and gorgeously invested in 
 rare ornaments and resplendent habiliments by Sir Philip Sydney, Spenser, 
 Daniel, Drayton, Warner, Shakespeare, Marlowe, and Chapman. ... As the 
 soul of Euphorbus was thought to live in Pythagoras, so the sweet witty 
 soul of Ovid lives in mellifluous and honey-tongued Shakespeare, witness 
 his Venus and Adonis, his Lucrece, his sugared sonnets among his private 
 friends, etc. ... As Plautus and Seneca are accounted the best for Comedy 
 and Tragedy among the Latins, so Shakespeare among the English is the 
 most excellent in both kinds for the stage. [Mentions Titus Andronicus] . . . 
 As Epius Stolo said that the Muses would speak with Plautus' tongue, if 
 they would speak Latin, so I say that the Muses would speak with 
 Shakespeare's fine-filed phrase, if they would speak English. ... As 
 Horace says of himself, Eregi monumentum sere perennius, ... so say I 
 severally of Sir Philip Sydney's, Spenser's, Daniels', Drayton's, Shakespeare's, 
 and Warner's works. . . . 
 
 ". . . [The best lyric poets are] Spenser, Daniel, Drayton, Shakespeare, 
 Bretton. . . . Our best for Tragedy, Lord Buckhurst, Dr. Leg, Dr. Edes, 
 Master Edward Ferris, the author of the Mirror for Magistrates, Marlow, 
 Peele, Watson, Kyd, Shakespeare, Drayton, Chapman, Dekker, and Benjamin 
 Johnson. . . . The best for Comedy amongst us be, Edward Earl of Oxford, 
 Dr. Gager, Master Rowley, Master Edwardes, eloquent and witty John Lilly, 
 Lodge, Gascoyne, Greene, Shakespeare, Thomas Nash, Thomas Heywood. 
 Anthony Mundy our best plotter, Chapman, Porter, Wilson, Hath way, and 
 Henry Chettle. . . . These are the most passionate among us to bewail 
 and bemoan the perplexities of love, Henry Howard Earl of Surrey, Sir 
 Thomas Wyatt the elder, Sir Francis Brian, Sir Philip Sydney, Sir Walter 
 Rawley, Sir Edward Dyer, Spenser, Daniel, Drayton, Shakespeare, Whetstone, 
 Gascoyne. Samuel Page, Churchyard, Bretton." 
 
 Shakespeare was not the sole successor to his predecessors. 
 On the contrary, there were a large number of successors, and 
 the evolution of the finer and superior type of play continued. 
 As a plain fact, there is nothing to suggest that Shakespeare 
 alone improved on the earlier dramatists, or that the other 
 dramatists were only servile imitators of his work. From all 
 the evidence at our disposal, we are forced to believe that 
 Shakespeare was classed with the other playwrights, and though 
 considered to be among the best, no one thought of proclaiming 
 him sovereign or greatly superior to all the others. The follow- 
 ing quotation from Webster's Preface to his White Devil well 
 illustrates the general attitude of his age towards him: 
 
 "Detraction is the sworn friend to ignorance: for mine own part, I have 
 ever truly cherished my good opinion of other men's worthy labours; 
 especially of that full and heightened style of Master Chapman ; the la- 
 boured and understanding works of Master Jonson; the no less worthy 
 composures of the both worthily excellent Master Beaumont and Master 
 Fletcher; and lastly (without wrong last to be named), the right happy 
 and copious industry of Master Shakespeare, Master Dekker, and Master 
 Heywood." 
 
 On the negative side there is abundant evidence to prove 
 that, in his time, Shakespeare was not regarded as paramount 
 among dramatists. This view may appear to be in flagrant
 
 SECTION 9.OBSERVA TION. 7 1 
 
 contradiction with the commemorative verses of Ben Jonson 
 and of others prefixed to the first Folio, which verses would 
 lead one to assume that his leadership was generally recognised. 
 However, when we find that there were far more numerous 
 poems of the same kind published at the death of Ben Jonson, 
 and also in connection with the first Beaumont and Fletcher 
 Folio, it becomes manifest that either the judgment passed on 
 Shakespeare changed, which is a somewhat gratuitous assump- 
 tion, or that commemorative verses were apt to be couched in 
 superlatives. Here are a few examples culled to illustrate the 
 above, the first referring to Ben Jonson: 
 
 "Great Jonson, king of English poetry." 
 ''. . . wit's most triumphant monarch . . ." 
 
 "Look up! where Seneca and Sophocles, 
 
 Quick Plautus and sharp Aristophanes. 
 
 Enlighten yon bright orb ! doth not your eye, 
 
 Among them, one far larger fire descry, 
 
 At which their lights grow pale? 'tis Jonson, there 
 
 He shines your Star, who was your Pilot here." 
 
 "One still will spin, one wind, the other cut, 
 Yet in despight of spindle, clue and knife, 
 Thou, in thy strenuous lines, hast got a life, 
 Which, like thy bay, shall flourish every age, 
 While sock or buskin move upon the stage." 
 
 '"Though (to our grief) we ever must despair. 
 That any age can raise thee up an heir." 
 
 "Who without Latin helps hadst been as rare 
 As Beaumont, Fletcher, or as Shakespeare were." 
 
 "Though there be many that about her brow, 
 Like sparkling stone, might a quick lustre throw ; 
 Yet, Shakespeare, Beaumont, Jonson, these three shall 
 Make up the gem in the point vertical." 
 
 "Poet of princes, prince of poets . . ." 
 
 "Shakespeare may make grief merry, Beaumont's style 
 
 Ravish and melt anger into a smile; 
 
 In winter nights, or after meals they be, 
 
 I must confess, very good company: 
 
 But . . ." 
 
 "The marble glory of thy laboured rhyme 
 Shall live beyond the calendar of time." 
 
 "Thou shalt be read as classic authors; and, 
 As Greek and Latin, taught in every land." 
 
 "That Latin he reduced, and could command 
 
 That which your Shakespeare scarce could understand?"
 
 72 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 And hear the encomiums passed on Beaumont and Fletcher, 
 more particularly on the latter: 
 
 "When Jonson, Shakespeare, and thyself did sit, 
 
 And swayed in the triumvirate of Wit. 
 
 Yet what from Jonson's oil and sweat did flow, 
 
 Or what more easy nature did bestow 
 
 On Shakespeare's gentle muse, in thee full grown 
 
 Their graces both appear." 
 
 ''Fletcher (whose fame no age can ever waste; 
 Envy of ours, and glory of the last)." 
 
 "Shakespeare to fhee was dull . . ." 
 
 "None writes love's passions in the world like thee." 
 
 ''Brave Shakespeare flow'd, yet had his ebbings too, 
 Often above himself, sometimes below; 
 Thou always best." 
 
 "Fletcher, the king of poets.". . . 
 
 ''Thou grew'st to govern the whole stage alone." 
 
 Such was the verdict on Shakespeare, we may say, up to 
 the year 1642, when the stage suffered a complete eclipse which 
 lasted some eighteen years. A new world had been born when 
 the theatres were reopened after this prolonged and gloomy 
 pause. A whole generation had grown up without seeing any 
 plays performed, and the memory of the playgoers must have 
 been greatly dimmed, especially as the interval was crowded 
 with exciting political events. But this was only a minor matter. 
 The Court had returned from France, where Corneille deserv- 
 edly ruled the stage, imbued with classic notions regarding the 
 structure and contents of plays, notions which were in rather 
 violent contradiction with the "lawlesness" which characterised 
 the Elizabethan dramatists who knew nothing of the unities of 
 time, space, and plot, and the rigid separation of tragedy from 
 comedy. To the anti-puritans, too, the theatrical fare proffered 
 by the Elizabethan playwrights far too strong for us was 
 looked upon as decidedly puritanical. Accordingly, a radical 
 re-valuation of values took place, and the Elizabethan stage 
 seemed as if it belonged to antiquity, and this was emphasised 
 by the development of higher and more fastidious literary stand- 
 ards. Lastly, interest in music generally, and the opera in 
 particular, helped to divert the attention from the Elizabethan 
 dramatists. 
 
 In these circumstances only what was quite exceptional would 
 tend to escape the clutches of oblivion: broadly speaking, 
 Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, and Beaumont and Fletcher. From 
 that age we have Dryden's Essay on Dramatick Poesy. In this 
 work Jonson largely monopolises the space, Beaumont and 
 Fletcher are fairly frequently referred to, and Shakespeare
 
 SECTION 9 OBSERVATION. 73 
 
 comparatively rarely. And yet, whilst by implication paying 
 deeper homage to Ben Jonson, and informing us that Beaumont 
 and Fletcher were greater stage favourites than Shakespeare, 
 two of their plays being performed for one of Shakespeare's, 
 a panegyric on Shakespeare appears which certainly is the 
 turning point in the fortunes of Shakespeare's fame. However, 
 the praise bestowed is hesitating. Summoning courage, Dryden 
 introduces the often quoted passage relating to Shakespeare, 
 by the following remark: "It will be still necessary to speak 
 somewhat of Shakespeare and Fletcher, [Ben Jonson's] rival 
 in poesy; and one of them, in my opinion at least, his equal, 
 perhaps his superior." (Ed. 1668, p. 47.) Dryden was, in fact, in 
 no sense an idolater, as witness the following passage : "I can- 
 not say he is everywhere alike. ... He is many times flat, 
 insipid; his comic wit degenerating into clenches, his serious 
 swelling into bombast." (Pp. 47-48.) "Shakespeare's language 
 is likewise a little obsolete." 
 
 A little later, in 1674, Edward Phillips, Milton's nephew, in 
 his Dictionary of Poets, speaks of a triumvirate consisting of 
 Ben Jonson, Fletcher, and Shakespeare, each excelling in cer- 
 tain directions. 
 
 To the end of the seventeenth century, there was no pro- 
 gress towards the recognition of Shakespeare's supremacy and 
 uniqueness. Before its close, Thomas Rhymer, who had already 
 unceremoniously examined Beaumont and Fletcher, turned his 
 attention to Shakespeare, and, in the same spirit, severely criti- 
 cised Shakespeare for a variety of defects in his dramatic 
 works, singling out Othello and Julius Caesar for dissection. 
 The eighteenth century repudiated Rhymer's negative attitude, 
 but accepted his criticism almost in its entirety. From Dryden, 
 until after Samuel Johnson, for approximately a century, the 
 editors and champions of Shakespeare tempered their enthu- 
 siasm with a scathing critique which would appear to most 
 Shakespeareans of to-day little short of blasphemous. Pope, 
 one of Shakespeare's first editors, did not mince his words, as 
 the following extracts from his edition of Shakespeare's works 
 show: 
 
 "For of all English poets Shakespeare must be confessed to be the 
 fairest and fullest subject for criticism, and to afford the most numerous, 
 as well as most conspicuous instances, both of Beauties and Faults of all 
 sorts. ... It must be owned that with all these great excellencies, he has 
 almost as great defects; and that as he has certainly written better, so 
 he has perhaps written worse, than any other. . . . With all his faults, and 
 with all the irregularity of his drama. . . . Nor does the whole fail to 
 strike us with greater reverence, though many of the parts are childish, 
 ill-placed and unequal to its grandeur." 
 
 So Dr. Johnson, in the Preface to his edition of Shakespeare : 
 
 "In tragedy he often writes with great appearance of toil and study, 
 what is written at last with little felicity; but in his comic scenes, he 
 seerns to produce without labour, what no labour can improve. In tra-
 
 74 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 gedy he is always struggling after some occasion to be comic, but in 
 comedy he seems to repose, or to luxuriate, as in a mode of thinking 
 congenial to his nature. In his tragic scenes there is always something 
 wanting, but his comedy often surpasses expectation or desire. . . . His 
 tragedy seems to be skill, his comedy to be instinct." 
 
 "Shakespeare, with his excellencies, has likewise faults, and faults 
 sufficient to obscure and overwhelm any other merit." 
 
 "The plots are often so loosely formed that a very slight consideration 
 may improve them, and so carelessly pursued, that he seems not always 
 fully to comprehend his own design." 
 
 "In his comic scenes he is seldom very successful, when he engages 
 his characters in reciprocations of smartness and contests of sarcasm ; 
 their jests are commonly gross and their pleasantry licentious; neither 
 his gentlemen nor his ladies have much delicacy, nor are sufficiently 
 distinguished from his clowns by any appearance of refined manners." 
 
 "In narration he affects a disproportionate pomp of diction and a weari- 
 some train of circumlocution, and tells the incident imperfectly in many 
 words, which might have been more plainly delivered in few." 
 
 And much more to the same effect. 
 
 In 1709 Rowe published an edition of Shakespeare's plays in 
 a number of volumes, prefacing it with a life of the author. 
 This "life", mostly based on traditions, did much to direct 
 attention to Shakespeare, and to spread his fame. We observe 
 here an interesting psychological reaction. The emphasis on 
 Shakespeare's humble origin and reputed lack of learning 
 magnified by contrast his dramatic achievements, and fixed 
 men's regards on him. His deficiencies cried out for an ex- 
 planation and evoked sympathy. They attracted scholars to 
 the interesting task of elucidating the work of that precocious 
 child of nature. 
 
 A series of critical editions of Shakespeare's plays was the 
 result, all introduced by very readable prefaces. The latter 
 dilate on Shakespeare's genius, but also on his ignorance of 
 the classics, his frequent lapses, his numerous imperfections, 
 and the corruptions and obscurities of the text of his plays. 
 The comparison is always between Shakespeare and the an- 
 cients, and references to other Elizabethan playwrights are not 
 only extremely rare, but there is every indication that, apart 
 from, Ben Jonson and Beaumont and Fletcher, the plays of the 
 Elizabethans were unknown, copies of their works being pro- 
 bably inaccessible to the editors in those days when there were 
 no great public libraries. In this we are supported by the fact 
 that all the high qualities which Dr. Johnson ascribes to Shake- 
 speare are qualities generically distinguishing the Elizabethan 
 and Jacobean drama. 
 
 Eighteenth century England found its energies only equal to 
 the task of critically studying one author, the number of com- 
 petent scholars being presumably too small to attempt the further 
 task of doing justice to other Elizabethan dramatists. Several 
 editions of Beaumont and Fletcher were published during the 
 century, but scholardom had no time left for examining the works 
 of these authors.
 
 SECTION 9.OBSERVA TION. 75 
 
 The succession of Shakespeare editors kept Shakespeare alive, 
 and contributed indirectly towards burying the other Elizabethan 
 playwrights. This double action had another serious conse- 
 quence. The already appreciated Shakespeare found a still 
 more effective populariser in Garrick, the intellectual actor- 
 manager. What the scholars planted, he brought to fruition, 
 the limelight of the stage incidentally still further obscuring 
 the neglected Elizabethans. 
 
 Criticism had done its best or worst, and scholars turned from 
 criticism to appreciation. Here was ample scope for the analytic 
 faculty and for literary taste. With the other Elizabethan drama- 
 tists many feet below the soil of time, Shakespeare's plays 
 appeared justly so marvellous that criticism carping or judi- 
 ciousceased, and the present-day wholehearted Shakespeare 
 worship was slowly ushered into the world. 
 
 However, Shakespeare was destined to find his greatest ad- 
 mirers abroad. The growing romantic movement of the later 
 eighteenth century in Germany was irresistibly attracted to 
 Shakespeare, and since the Elizabethan dramatists generally, 
 and the subsequent English criticism, were unknown to the 
 Germans, they could abandon themselves to unrestrained ido- 
 latry. Germany is thus said to have "discovered" Shakespeare; 
 England, with Charles Lamb, Coleridge, and Wordsworth, rather 
 tamely and lamely following. 
 
 Charles Lamb, in his Specimens of the English Dramatic 
 Poets, sought to direct attention to the priceless treasures 
 embedded in many of the Elizabethan playwrights, and opened 
 thereby a new era. The pendulum, however, had swung too 
 far away from the centre of sanity. Shakespeare having 
 become men's idol, any resemblance to him was regarded 
 as puerile imitation, and any difference as an unwarrantable 
 departure from the ideal norm. Accordingly, Shakespeare, 
 contrary to the views marking his own age. and those of the 
 leading literary men of the eighteenth century, was regarded 
 as incomparable and as infinitely superior to the other Eliza- 
 bethan playwrights. Lamb's example exercised little influence, 
 and Swinburne's later series of appreciations were widely 
 ignored or discounted. The comparative method was hence 
 almost entirely neglected. For all intents and purposes, for 
 instance, Sir Sidney Lee's Life of Shakespeare, the articles on 
 Shakespeare in the Dictionary of National Biography, and the 
 chapters on Shakespeare in the Cambridge History of English 
 Literature that is, our leading sources in Shakespeare criti- 
 cism ignore the comparative method. For these writers, and 
 they are strictly typical of our time, with the laudable exception 
 of Professor Ward, Shakespeare lived and wrought as if no 
 other playwright of any distinction had existed in his day. 
 
 We perceive that there is a very slender factual basis for this 
 extraordinary attitude in our generation towards Shakespeare
 
 76 PART II. -SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 and his fellows. His own time did not think of singling him out 
 as overwhelmingly superior and altogether different, nor did the 
 remainder of the seventeenth century. The first seventy years 
 of the eighteenth century recognised numerous limitations in 
 Shakespeare, and made no attempt at a comparative study of 
 the Elizabethan dramatists. The Germans of the same century 
 were without the necessary material for forming a discriminat- 
 ing judgment. And, similarly, the view prevalent to-day is 
 equally not the result of a sober, or even tentative, compara- 
 tive estimate of Shakespeare and his fellows. 
 
 We have therefore no reason for surmising that the present 
 verdict on Shakespeare will be the final verdict of history. 
 For example, whilst Shakespeare is regarded as unapproachable, 
 and towering sky-high above his fellows, we are presented with 
 the ludicrous spectacle of interminable discussions as to whether 
 a play or a part of a play attributed to Shakespeare is his. Some 
 critics, for instance, assert that certain portions of The Two 
 Noble Kinsmen could only have been written by Shakespeare., 
 whereas other orthodox Shakespeareans deny this flatly. On 
 the other hand, parts of Henry VIII. , which had been singled out 
 as characteristic of Shakespeare at his best, are now admitted 
 to be by another playwright. Over a dozen plays of Shake- 
 speare have thus given rise to keen discussions regarding the 
 genuineness of certain portions thereof, without a clear, let 
 alone an instantaneous, verdict on the issue having been arrived 
 at. The doctrine of the uniqueness of Shakespeare may be 
 therefore an irrational dogma that has no relation to fact, and 
 is possibly due to comparatively uncritical thought and feeling 
 which further study is bound to destroy. 
 
 The final pronouncement of history cannot far depart from 
 the estimate of his time. We ought to think of Shakespeare 
 as belonging to a great age, and as, on the whole, expressing 
 it slightly better than his fellow dramatists, whilst not un- 
 frequently falling below the others, and fairly frequently having 
 his best equalled. From the scientific standpoint the glory 
 belongs first and foremost to the Elizabethan drama as such, 
 or even more to his times which were directly responsible 
 for evoking this outburst of unparalleled dramatic splendour. 
 Critically considered, scarcely a characteristic in Shakespeare 
 can be mentioned which is not a characteristic of his time and 
 his fellow playwrights. The glowing panegyric extending over 
 several pages, which Johnson, in the Preface to his Shakespeare 
 edition, pronounced on Shakespeare, would hold true no less 
 of Beaumont and Fletcher and a number of other Elizabethan 
 and Jacobean playwrights. Another apt illustration is to be 
 found in Robert Greene's James the Fourth, published anterior 
 to any of Shakespeare's plays, which offers a surprising example 
 of what is said to be most distinctive of Shakespeare. Verse, 
 plot, motivation, men, women, humour, poetry, insight, philo-
 
 SECTION 9.OBSERVA TION. 7 7 
 
 sophy, are exact anticipations of Shakespeare, and, but for the 
 unavoidably primitive verse and its consequences, the play 
 is superior to sundry of Shakespeare's earlier works. 
 
 Shakespeare soars immeasurably above what our present-day 
 drama offers, because our drama is immeasurably inferior to 
 the drama of Shakespeare's time. What has been asserted of 
 his plays by perfervid admirers is roughly correct; but the 
 true author of these plays was an age, and not an individual. 
 This explains why his age failed to take our age's view of 
 Shakespeare, and why he himself appeared to be unconscious 
 of greatness, and lived and died conventionally. 
 
 The Shakespeare problem offers accordingly a superb illus- 
 tration of the indispensability of an exhaustive study of facts 
 when a serious issue is to be elucidated, and the fatal effects of 
 striving to remove difficulties by speculative considerations. 
 
 24. Where, then, a process is highly complex, such as 
 that of observation, the doctrine of method must needs frame 
 or discover canons which shall effectively deal with this pro- 
 cess. Else the other canons will be infected at the source. 
 The perfection of the process of observation should be con- 
 ceived accordingly as the corner stone of the correct method 
 of investigation. 1 Scientific advance has meant keener and 
 keener, closer and closer, wider and wider, more and more 
 varied, observation. Of course, where much scientific obser- 
 vation has preceded the initiation of an enquiry into a certain 
 subject, we may postulate much ; and it is exceptional illustra- 
 tions, drawn from highly developed and simple sciences, which 
 have deluded men into thinking that it is safe and profitable 
 to generalise on the basis of comparatively few instances. The 
 opposite cases are disregarded where observation imposes a 
 gigantic task in a novel enquiry, rendering it impossible to gene- 
 ralise even tentatively, save after exceedingly wide and varied 
 observation by many persons under changing conditions of time, 
 place, motive, habit, or other circumstances. 
 
 If what appears to us a "natural" object is as we have learnt 
 in the preceding Section a highly "artificial" and largely arbi- 
 trary product of the mind, it is truer still that observation, whose 
 scope is much ampler, entails as a rule extensive mental activities. 
 We might define the process of observation as that part of an 
 enquiry which aims primarily at the accurate determination of 
 detailed facts. If many logicians only burn incense before the 
 altar of deduction, and reason that a bold guess and subsequent 
 verification represent the true method of science, a study of 
 contemporary scientific procedure will convict them of being 
 idolaters. As a matter of fact, the weather-stained bones of slain 
 theories, which thickly strew the fields of history, should make 
 
 l> We are not to imagine or suppose, but to discover, what nature does 
 or may be made to do." (Bacon, Novnm Organum, bk, 2, 10.)
 
 78 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 it evident that nothing is gained and everything is hazarded by 
 obstinately clinging to a superstition wofully at war with reality. 
 The further science advances, the more patent it will become 
 that it is capital folly to ground a generalisation on aught but 
 exhaustively studied data. 
 
 The leading facts of nature are complex beyond anything anticipated 
 by those who extol to the heavens the deductive method. Take, for 
 example, the effect of the radiant heat of the sun on the different sur- 
 faces whereon it strikes. "The greatest contrasts are found between land 
 and water surfaces. If the solar radiation fall on a water surface, the 
 absorption in the uppermost layers of the water is not nearly so complete 
 as is the case with a land surface. The water is transparent to some of 
 the radiation which therefore passes through it to be gradually absorbed 
 by the lower layers. The heat is thus more widely distributed, and the 
 rise of temperature in the surface layers is proportionately reduced. Still 
 more important is the fact that water has a much greater so-called specific 
 heat than soil or rock that is to say, a much greater amount of heat has 
 to be absorbed by a pound of water than by a pound of earth to produce 
 a given rise of temperature. The net result is that the surface layer of 
 the water is warmed very much less than the land surface," and, as a result, 
 the air above the water is also warmed to a less degree. On the other 
 hand, at night time, a water surface radiates less heat into space than a 
 land surface under similar circumstances would do. Moreover, any cooling 
 which may take place at once calls into play convection processes in the 
 water itself. The cooled water becomes more dense and sinks, and warmer 
 water from below takes its place. Thus there is a great tendency for a 
 water surface to remain at a more or less constant temperature both by 
 day and by night, and for the changes of temperature due to changes 
 of season to be reduced in magnitude. This difference in the behaviour 
 of a water surface and a land surface has a most important climatic 
 effect. . . ." (R.G.K. Lempfert, op. c/Y., pp. 16-17.) 
 
 Even more striking is the fact of hibernation, since it demonstrates the 
 folly of rash generalising and abstract deductive reasoning: 
 
 "As far as mammals are concerned, the following are the principal 
 facts established: (1) All northern species, even those which find food 
 scarce during winter, do not hibernate, nor do all the species of the same 
 family, order, or genus. Even both sexes of the same species do not 
 always agree in this respect. The bear, the badger, the dormouse, the 
 hamster, the bat, the marmot, the zizel, and the hedgehog are among the 
 best known and most pronounced hibernators. But while all the burrow- 
 ing marmots, whistlers, woodchucks, ground-hogs, etc., are more or Jess 
 complete hibernators, the Alpine marmots indulge in this habit by fits 
 and starts. The sloth bear and other Indian UrsidaB differ from the other 
 members of their family in remaining awake during winter, though they 
 are sluggish during this season, moving about very little, and then only 
 occasionally when they require food ; and both the black and brown bear 
 of the Rocky Mountains and the polar bear are strict hibernators only 
 as regards their females, the male being often seen at large between 
 November and May. Most of the American squirrels differ from the 
 European species in being non-hibernating. (2) The same animal may 
 vary in this respect in different portions of its range. Thus, though the 
 American skunks are in the northern part of the region over which they 
 roam more or less complete hibernators, they get more and more wakeful 
 as their range extends equatorially, until in the most southern part of it 
 they move about freely at all seasons of the year. In like manner, the 
 prairie 'dog', or marmot, in the northern plains retires to sleep during 
 severe weather, as do also the woodchucks of the same region, but in 
 open winters and on pleasant days they display no such tendency; while 
 in the extreme southern limits of their range they are not hibernators
 
 SECTION 9.OBSERVA TION. 79 
 
 at all. (3) They do not all retire at the same time. Most of the true 
 hibernators take to their 'hibernaculum', or winter hole a burrow, a 
 hollow tree, a cave, the eaves of a house, or similar situation in late 
 autumn, varying the date slightly according to weather. But the great 
 bat is rarely seen after September, and often retires as early as the end 
 of July, when its insect food is abundant. (4) All of them do not sleep 
 the same length of time, or with the same torpidity, and several indulge 
 in hibernation and waking alternatively during the winter. The squirrel, 
 in Britain, lies dormant most of the cold season; but on sunshiny days 
 it often wakes, visits its hoards of food, eats freely, and then retires to 
 rest again. The hedgehog is sometimes S3en during the winter; and on 
 sunshiny days the common bat often emerges from its hibernaculum, and 
 flits about even when snow is on the ground. The dormouse also at 
 intervals wakes up, eats, and goes to sleep. Other animals, like the long- 
 tailed field-mouse, pass the winter in a drowsy state not far removed 
 from dormancy. There are thus all gradations between continuous winter 
 dormancy and the ordinary daily sleep of a few hours in which every 
 animal indulges. There is also every degree of torpidity exhibited. The 
 hedgehog and the dormouse may be rolled over and over like a ball, 
 without waking, and the black bear of America is extremely difficult to 
 arouse out of its winter' sleep. On the other hand, the brown bear of 
 Siberia hibernates lightly, and is very dangerous when awakened. The 
 hedgehog, if disturbed, 'takes a deep sonorous inspiration followed by a 
 few feeble respirations, and then by total quiescence'. This differs from 
 the stirring and then coiling itself up again which is the animal's way 
 when awakened out of an ordinary sleep. But, though sensation and 
 volition are dormant, the reflex and excitor-motory actions are keen, the 
 slightest touch applied to the spine of a hedgehog or to the wings of a 
 bat inducing one or two inspiratory movements. But the hibernating 
 badger is not difficult to reawake, and in its torpor, like all hibernating 
 animals, is not rigid. (5) Continuous hibernators do not lay in stores of 
 food. Intermittent winter-sleepers generally do, while some animals which 
 are not true hibernators, but remain only drowsy during the winter, 
 retire to their burrows to pass the days of famine above ground 
 amidst their abundant nuts and other provender. All of these food-storers 
 are vegetable-eaters. The arctic fox is indeed the only exception to this 
 rule, for though it is not any more than the beaver a hibernator, it hoards 
 up dead lemmings, ermines, geese, hares, etc., against the evil days of 
 winter. An exception to intermittent hibemators being thus provident is 
 afforded by the porcupine and the alpine marmot." (Chambers' Ency- 
 clopaedia, article '"Hibernation", by Robert Browne.) 
 
 An eloquent defence of observation as an invaluable scientific 
 asset is contained in a paper on "The Characteristics of the 
 Observational Sciences", which was read before the British Asso- 
 ciation in 1911 by Prof. H.H. Turner, President of the Mathe- 
 matics Section. Prof. Turner admirably expresses the point of 
 view we adopt: 
 
 "The perception of the need for observations, the faith that something 
 will come of them, and skill and energy to act on that faith these 
 qualities, all of which are possessed by any observer worthy the name, 
 have at least as much to do with the advance of Science as the formula- 
 tion of a theory, even of a correct theory. The work of the observer is 
 often forgotten it lies at the root of the plant; it is easier to notice the 
 theories which blossom, and ultimately produce the fruit. But without 
 the patient work of the observer underground there would be neither 
 blossom nor fruit."
 
 80 PART II SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 SECTION X. -EXPERIMENT AND USE OF INSTRUMENTS. 
 
 25. A decided approach towards experiment is made 
 where an action is intentionally performed in order to ascertain 
 the results where, for instance, I seek to recall a landscape 
 for the purpose of observing what can be recalled; where I 
 shut my eyes to note whether anything is visible with eyes 
 closed; where I pull at a heavy piece of furniture to study 
 the nature of the feeling of effort; where I pinch myself to 
 learn something concerning pain; where, with one hand, I play 
 with two pebbles for some time, throwing them successively 
 up into the air, and endeavour to catch them in the same hand 
 as they fall, in order to learn something of the development of a 
 habit; where I speak now gently and now sternly to a child, 
 to the end of determining which course is the most effectual; 
 and so on. 
 
 Experiments of this order are unsystematic in nature, and 
 the proof lacks exact determination. They are experiments 
 belonging to the pre-scientific stage, and only become veritably 
 trustworthy when the conditions are clearly defined and 
 systematically varied. Scientific experiment, in other words, 
 is systematic observation under conditions as far as possible 
 precisely defined and systematically varied and measured. 
 When, for example, we combine certain known chemical 
 elements present in a known proportion by means of special 
 apparatus which enables us to obtain exact quantitative results, 
 we experiment, in the scientific sense of the term. 1 The value 
 of such quantitative ' determination is often one of indirect 
 importance, inasmuch as its object may be to lend precision 
 to a statement which might aid us in obtaining reliable de- 
 ductions. 
 
 Pre-scientific experiments have, as a rule, relatively small 
 scientific value. On the other hand, methodical observation 
 closely approaches scientific experiment. To examine a plant 
 species in the sunlight, in the shade, at night, when it is 
 raining, in varying temperatures, soils, altitudes, and climates, 
 and at different seasons, is virtually equivalent to producing 
 the conditions artificially. It was, therefore, an inadequate 
 conception of the process of observation which condemned 
 observation as being wellnigh useless and unscientific, whilst 
 lauding to the skies the employment of experiment. The 
 genuine comparison is between pre-scientific observation and 
 pre-scientific experiment; and if this be conceded, indiscriminate 
 contempt for observation is as gratuitous as indiscriminate 
 commendation of experiment.- Scientific experiment forms an 
 
 1 Jevons has several excellent chapters on quantitative determination in 
 his Principles of Science. 
 
 - "At Greenwich Observatory in the present day, the hundredth part of 
 a second is not thought an inconsiderable portion of time. The ancient
 
 SECTION 10.- EXPERIMENT AND USE OF INSTRUMENTS. 81 
 
 extension of scientific observation, and constitutes really only 
 a refinement thereof. As a matter of fact, the more conclusive 
 kind of experiment is of recent origin, and many of the historic 
 truths have been reached by rough trials. Newton's investiga- 
 tions into the nature of light were not conducted by means of 
 elaborate apparatus. Franklin's kite or his pieces of variously 
 coloured cloths do not suggest modern experiments; and 
 Darwin's delightful study was anything but an up-to-date 
 laboratory. 
 
 The special object of methodical experiment is to obtain 
 assured knowledge of quantity, properties, cause and effect, 
 
 Chaldeans recorded an eclipse to the nearest hour, and the early Alexandrian 
 astronomers thought it superfluous to distinguish between the edge and 
 centre of the sun." (Jevons, Principles of Science, p. 271.) Psychologists 
 now resort to chronometers indicating the one-thousandth part of a second. 
 The best telescopes reveal a hundred million stars where sight disclosed 
 only about eight thousand, and where, with the aid of auxiliary photographic 
 processes, a thousand million may be registered. Spectrum analysis records 
 the 400-millionth of a grain. A good balance, containing in each pan about 
 a kilogramme, will indicate a difference of one-ten-thousandth of a grain. 
 The most efficient measuring machines will measure the millionth part of 
 an inch. There is literally no term to the refinement of instrumental 
 measurement. Where the unassisted eye detected a little over half a 
 dozen planets, five hundred are now known. With platinum resistance 
 thermometers "at ordinary temperatures the difference of temperature of 
 one-ten-thousandth of a degree can be deducted with moderate ease, while, 
 with great precautions, the hundred-thousandth of a degree can be esti- 
 mated". (Whetham, The Recent Development of Physical Science, 1906, 
 P- 71.) 
 
 ''Ordinary microscopical observation with the strongest lenses can show 
 particles of about 250 /m in diameter. We call particles of and above this 
 size microns. The ultramicroscope makes particles visible even down to 
 the size of 6 ,/', provided that the power of light applied is strong enough. 
 Such particles' are called submicrons." Those below this size are named 
 amicrons. (Frederick Czapek, Chemical Phenomena in Life, 1911, pp. 25-26.) 
 "Microtomes of the best workmanship have placed in the hands of histologists 
 the means of making serial sections of remarkable thinness and regularity." 
 (W. A. Locy, op. cit., p. 438.) "With our present instruments we can perceive 
 lines ruled on glass which are 1/90,000 of an inch apart. ... If ... we could 
 use the blue rays by themselves, their waves being much shorter, the limits 
 of possible visibility might be extended to 1 120,000." (C. S. Minot, The 
 Problem of Age, Growth, and Death, 1908, pp. 189-190.) 
 
 "The number of rods and 'cones in the human eye is enormous. At a 
 moderate computation the cones may be estimated at over 3,000,000, and 
 the rods at 30,000,000. (Lord Avebury, On the Senses, Instincts, and Intelli- 
 gence of Animals, with special reference to Insects", p. 123.) "Though not 
 thicker than a sheet of thin paper, [the retina] consists of no less than nine 
 separate layers." (fbid., p. 122.) "According to the view of Helmholtz, the 
 smallest particle that could be distinctly defined, when associated with 
 others, is about 1 80,000th of an inch in diameter. Now, it has been estimated 
 that a particle of albumen of this size contains 125,000,000 of molecules. 
 In the case of such a simple compound as water, the number would be no 
 less than 8,000,000,000." (Ibid., p. 190.) 
 
 "If we imagine a number of hydrogen molecules placed end to end, it 
 would require fifty millions of them to form a row one centimeter in length." 
 (W. C. McC. Lewis, "The Structure of Matter", in Science Progress, January, 
 1918, pp. 477-478.) 
 
 6
 
 82 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 relations, presence or absence of particular substances, etc.J 
 and in devising such experiments the utmost precautions are 
 required to secure a decisive result free from all complications 
 and entirely unequivocal. A scientific experiment of a high 
 order may be defined as consisting of observation or registration 
 of a methodical character by means of carefully constructed 
 apparatus under deliberately selected and varied conditions.- 
 Experiment, for instance, of a non-instrumental character, 
 but not less rigorous, is urgently needed in certain departments 
 of natural history. Books without number have been published 
 concerning the mentality of animals, and yet certainty in this 
 matter completely escapes us. What is required is systemati- 
 cally to observe dogs, cats, fowl, and other domesticated animals, 
 common birds, etc., preferably one male and one unrelated 
 female together (in order to include activities connected with 
 the perpetuation of the species and the rearing of offspring) 
 from birth to a natural death, in an environment where no 
 other members of the same or closely related species exist in 
 the vicinity, and to chronicle faithfully and intelligently the 
 behaviour of the individuals thus isolated. It seems almost 
 
 1 For a list of the general characteristics of phenomena, see the Table of 
 Primary Categories in Conclusion 3. 
 
 2 "Experience may be acquired in two ways: either, first, by noticing facts 
 as they occur, without any attempt to influence the frequency of their 
 occurrence, or to vary the circumstances under which they occur; this is 
 Observation; or, secondly, by putting in action causes and agents over which 
 we have control, and purposely varying their combinations, and noticing 
 what effects take place; this is Experiment." (Sir John Herschel, Discourse, 
 [67.].) "Passive and active observation might better express their distinction." 
 (Ibid.) 
 
 "Observation is finding a fact, experiment is making one " (Bain, Logic, 
 vol. 2, p. 43.) 
 
 "When we merely note and record the phenomena which occur around 
 us in the ordinary course of nature we are said to observe. When we 
 change the course of nature, by the intervention of our muscular ppwers, 
 and thus produce unusual combinations and conditions of phenomena, we 
 are said to experiment. . . . Experiment is thus observation plus alteration 
 of conditions." (Jevons, Principles of Science, p. 400.) "One of the most 
 requisite precautions in experimentation is to vary only one circumstance 
 at a time, and to maintain all other circumstances rigidly unchanged." 
 (Ibid., p. 422.) "One of the great objects of experiment is to enable us to 
 judge of the behaviour of substances under conditions widely different from 
 those which prevail upon the surface of the earth." (Ibid., p. 426.) 
 
 "Experiment is the practical means by which we furnish ourselves with 
 observations in such number, and involving such mutual differences and 
 affinities, as is requisite in order to the elimination of what is unessential 
 in them and the derivation from them of a pure case." (Lotze, Logic, vol. 2, 
 pp. 39-40.) 
 
 " Scientific experiment, therefore, is scientific observation performed under 
 accurately known artificial conditions." (Huxley, Introductory, 1900, p. 17.) 
 
 "Experiment is observation under artificial conditions." (Bosanquet, Logic, 
 vol. 1, p. 143.) "Experiment would usually be considered to begin where 
 we pass from intentional selection of our standpoint, and from the use of 
 contrivances auxiliary to perception, to actual analytic interference with the 
 object under observation." (Ibid., p. 143.)
 
 SECTION 10. EXPERIMENT AND USE OF INSTRUMENTS. 83 
 
 impossible to believe which incidentally and pointedly proves 
 the absence of an accepted methodology that this should not 
 have been accomplished already. Once numerous observational 
 experiments of this character have been completed, and the 
 general mentality of the species has been ascertained, the 
 situation could be complicated by subjecting the animals to 
 artificial tests. 
 
 Instruments are not indispensable to experiment, though little 
 can be achieved without them. Galileo, in his experiments 
 from the leaning tower of Pisa, employed no specially devised 
 instruments, and many experiments in agriculture and legis- 
 lation, and in other departments of knowledge, are executed 
 without their assistance. Not a few of Darwin's experiments 
 possessed a homely character, and Galton's famous enquiry 
 relating to mental imagery was markedly simple and non- 
 instrumental. 1 On the other hand, microscopes, telescopes, 
 spectroscopes, and a multitude of other aids, are employed in 
 observation, since instruments multiply the power and the 
 delicacy of the senses almost an infinite number of times. 2 
 We may, consequently, distinguish between instrumental and 
 non-instrumental observation and experiment. In observation 
 neither the object observed nor its environment would be de- 
 signedly altered ; in experiment one or both would be affected. 
 Instruments, again, may be divided into scientific and non- 
 scientific ones. Scientific instruments are such as are carefully 
 calculated to attain the end aimed at in an easy, an exact, 
 and a measurable manner. Non-scientific instruments more or 
 less lack these qualifications. Determining the weight of a sub- 
 stance by weighing it respectively in the hands and on a tested 
 and sensitive pair of scales, may fix the distinction between 
 the two. It is somewhat difficult to define use and non-use 
 of instruments. For practical purposes, however, the above 
 definition of instrument is passable, especially when it is a 
 question of scientific instruments. Similarly the meaning of 
 change in object and environment is only subject to a minimum 
 of misconception, because our presence, for instance, may be 
 readily discounted: our weight; shadow thrown; the air altered 
 
 1 According to the Encycl. Brit, (llth ed.), so distinguished a modern 
 physicist as Lord Rayleigh did not despise simple experiments: "The ex- 
 perimental investigations are carried out with plain and usually home-made 
 apparatus, the accessories being crude and rough, but the essentials thought- 
 fully designed, so as to compass in the simplest and most perfect manner 
 the special end in view." 
 
 2 Interesting chapters on the use of instruments will be found in Jevons 
 and Venn. We shall cite a certain modern instrumental mode of procedure 
 because of its important bearings in palaeontological enquiry. "By means 
 of spreading mucilage and tissue paper over delicate bones that crumble on 
 exposure to the air, and the wrapping of fossils in plaster casts for trans- 
 portation, it has been made possible to uncover and preserve many struc- 
 tures which, with a rougher method of handling, would have been lost to 
 science." (W. A. Locy, op. cit., p. 340.)
 
 84 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 and agitated through our moving, breathing, and speaking ; dif- 
 fusion of bodily warmth; and the like circumstances. These 
 are, in any case, not deliberately produced transformations, and 
 are generally not impossible to guard against when we are 
 aware of them. 1 
 
 Direct experiments cannot be resorted to in all forms of en- 
 quiry, as, for example, in astronomy or generally in geology. 
 Nor are they everywhere equally profitable. In the biological 
 sciences, where not only the same object differs materially at 
 different times and differs conspicuously from nearly related 
 objects the protein of no two species appears to be identical 
 in composition, but where interrelations and interactions of a 
 most complicated order. obtain, as illustrated, for instance, by 
 the cerebro-spinal system in man, experiment is at a decided 
 disadvantage, and its results are frequently found to be of 
 questionable value. On the other hand, where, as in mechanics 
 and chemistry, the material investigated is, relatively to life 
 forms, homogeneous in character, experiment achieves its most 
 signal triumphs. For the same reason, experiment becomes 
 progressively more profitable as the material investigated is 
 simplified through accumulated discoveries, whereas its value 
 diminishes in proportion as the amorphous mass of primitive 
 fact and fancy is unsifted. These limitations to experimental 
 enquiries should warn the methodologist against presuming that 
 experiment can be applied ubiquitously, and that it is in all 
 circumstances alike of telling benefit; and, more than this, a 
 survey of the sciences should convince him that an extensive 
 domain exists at present where observation, with or without 
 instruments, is resorted to on a comprehensive scale and with 
 eminently gratifying results. Indeed, in many directions as 
 in map and chart construction the information required is 
 derived, solely almost, from exhaustive observation and mea- 
 surement. 
 
 Bacon had a just conception of experiment, and incessantly 
 had recourse thereto. What could be more complimentary to 
 those who believe in addressing pointed questions to nature 
 than this? "The subtlety of experiments is far greater than that 
 of the sense itself, even when assisted by exquisite instruments ; 
 such experiments, I mean, as are skilfully and artificially 
 devised for the express purpose of determining the point in 
 
 1 Venn, in his Logic, pp. 416-417, says on this subject: "Our bodies are 
 heavy, and, therefore, the mere approach to the machine has altered the 
 magnitude and direction of the resultant attraction upon the scales. Our 
 bodies are presumably warmer than the surrounding air; accordingly we 
 warm and therefore lighten the air in which the scales hang, and if the 
 two scales and their contents are not of the same volume we at once alter 
 their weight as measured in the air. Our breath produces disturbing currents 
 of air. Our approach affects the surface of the non-rigid floor or ground on 
 which the scales stand, and produces another source of disturbance, and so 
 on through the whole range of the physical forces."
 
 SECTION 11. CAUSAL ENQUIRIES. 85 
 
 question. To the immediate and proper perception of the sense, 
 therefore, I do not give much weight; but I contrive that the 
 office of the sense shall be only to judge of the experiment, 
 and that the experiment itself shall judge of the thing." (The 
 Great Instauration, Plan of the Work ; vol. 4, p. 26, of Spedding's 
 edition of Bacon's works.) 
 
 The confusion enveloping the subject of experiment in relation 
 to observation is due, we should remember, to historical causes. 
 The modern idea of scientific observation is the product of a 
 protracted evolution. None of the ancients, not even Lucretius, 
 suspected the complexity of the process. To observe with micro- 
 scopic minuteness, for a prolonged period, under exhaustively 
 varying circumstances of space and other conditions, was only 
 slowly suggested by historic experience, so much so that even 
 now our conception of observation grows in profundity with 
 every decade. Moreover, the instruments which greatly increase 
 our powers of observation are a comparatively recent and still 
 growing acquisition, just as the lack, danger, and impossibility 
 of extensive intercommunication over prodigious distances, nar- 
 rowly limited an enquiry. So with experiment. To Roger Bacon, 
 the idea of appealing to experience appeared to embody a high 
 methodological ideal, and the notion of experiment was scarcely 
 distinguished from experiencing even by Leonardo da Vinci. 1 
 Experience itself had only partially the objective character we 
 attribute to it to-day. Similarly, the modern idea of a scientific 
 experiment has a long history. In Francis Bacon's time it had 
 already developed to no mean degree, as is illustrated by Gil- 
 bert's treatise, De Magneto, and by Galileo's labours generally. 
 And since his day, both on the side of method and of instru- 
 ments, there has been ceaseless improvement. Accordingly, it 
 is futile to examine the subject before us, save in the light of 
 history, in which case the ground is cut beneath the contro- 
 versy, and mutual appreciation follows mutual recrimination. 
 
 SECTION XL CAUSAL ENQUIRIES. 
 
 26. (a) Importance of Causal Enquiries. The object of 
 science is to determine unequivocally the nature and relations 
 of animate and inanimate objects and of psychic phenomena, 
 and one of the most important relations is unquestionably that 
 of cause. Indeed, to know precisely the cause of a phenomenon 
 is to be acquainted precisely with two facts the phenomenon 
 which is the effect and another in so far as it is the cause. 
 Objects of which we do not establish the cause are, as it were, 
 suspended by invisible cords, and the progress of knowledge 
 demands that facts shall not appear isolated. We inquire there- 
 fore into the cause of the cohesion and repulsion of particles 
 
 1 J. V. Marmery, op. cit.
 
 86 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 and masses; of chemical, crystalline, vital, and moral action; 
 of the origin of States and civilisations ; of the development of 
 the arts and the appreciation of the beautiful; and we cannot 
 rest satisfied until the causes are made plain to us. At the 
 same time our insight into causes must be exact and relatively 
 exhaustive, if it is to possess scientific validity. Any one may 
 be convinced that he feels hot because he closely faces a coal 
 fire fiercely burning in an open grate, or because he is exposed 
 to the scorching rays of a tropical sun; but such a legitimate 
 conviction leaves him in nearly complete ignorance of his own 
 physical being and of the nature of the coal fire, the sun, or 
 the heat. So, too, nations may empirically discover a tolerably 
 satisfactory diet, or physicians may prescribe dietaries, etc., 
 having decidedly beneficial effects; but the unveiling of the 
 actual causes has revolutionary consequences both in practice 
 and theory. It is only, therefore, when we know precisely and 
 circumstantially the nature of the cause and of the effect of a 
 phenomenon, e.g., the relation of ruminating to cloven hoofs, 
 that we are confronted by a truth which has scientific signi- 
 ficance. On this account, the causal aspect is to be regarded 
 as one of a number of indispensable aspects to be examined 
 in any general enquiry. 
 
 27. (b) The Causal View of Nature. The causal view of 
 nature conceives the world from the standpoint of time and 
 virtually disregards all other phases. We see, in this panorama, 
 one phenomenon producing a change in another ad indefinitum. 
 This is a possible and an important standpoint; but it cannot 
 be said to be the only one possible or of importance. Such a 
 conception involves that we think of facts as consisting of in- 
 variable and necessary antecedents and consequents without 
 defining the antecedents and consequents inquiring, say, into 
 the cause of heat without determining the nature of heat. It 
 misses, that is, the reverse side, the present constitution of the 
 objects which are changing or are to be changed, unless the 
 world is dissolved into featureless forces, whiqh Mill does not 
 contemplate, and which is a barren conception from the angle 
 of the investigator of to-day. The dynamic view of nature 
 must be therefore supplemented by a static view of nature. 1 
 
 28. (c) Static Aspects. Since, as we have just seen, science 
 needs be first conversant to a certain degree about phenomena 
 in their quasi-static aspects, before it becomes curious con- 
 
 1 A full discussion of the implications of the term Cause, from the causal- 
 istic standpoint, will be found in Mill. According to him "the invariable 
 [or rather "unconditional invariable"] antecedent is termed the cause; the 
 invariable consequent, the effect" (Logic, bk. 3, ch. 5, 2); "the notion of 
 Cause" is "the root of the whole theory of Induction" (ibid.); and "to 
 ascertain what are the laws of causation which exist in nature; to determine 
 the effect of every cause, and the causes of all effects, is the main business 
 of Induction; and to point out how this is done is the chief object of In- 
 ductive Logic". (Logic, bk. 3, ch. 6, 3.)
 
 SECTION 11,-CAUSAL ENQUIRIES. 87 
 
 cerning their causes, it cannot be said to deal exclusively with 
 the latter. A review of modern science appears to confirm 
 this. The determination of the nature and contents of geo- 
 logical strata ; of the distribution of sea and land, of mountain 
 ranges, earthquakes, and of volcanic craters and areas ; or the 
 attempt to produce and reduce organic compounds, and ascer- 
 tain their qualities and their internal arrangement, and to dis- 
 cover the existential relations of the elements; or the efforts 
 to ascertain the composition and the structure of protoplasm, 
 the cell nucleus, and the cytoplasm; or the investigations into 
 the nature of magnetic and electrical phenomena, or those 
 connected with the origin and evolution of life and of human 
 societies all imply that men of science are frequently employed 
 in discovering and in precisely defining properties, quantities, 
 composition, and the like, of objects, as distinguished from 
 causes. 
 
 29. (d) Facts should be studied both Statically and Dyna- 
 mically. When a student examines a phenomenon, he strives 
 to understand it in all its aspects. The relation of this pheno- 
 menon to other phenomena, and its origin, development, in- 
 fluence, transformation, and end, form an integral portion of 
 the aim of his study. He who on principle only studied facts 
 statically or dynamically, would represent a caricature of the 
 man of science. Ultimately, therefore, scientific enquiries cannot 
 be divided into static and dynamic ones those concerned with 
 the discovery of laws of nature and the causal explanation of 
 facts, nor can we, generally speaking, separate static from 
 dynamic fact. The office of the investigator is to comprehend 
 phenomena in all their particularity and bearings, and not only 
 to determine the law of their succession. Mill's insistence on 
 the causal element, to which alone his Canons have reference, 
 is probably due to his eminent predecessor, Herschel, who 
 himself follows Bacon therein. According to Herschel, "the 
 first thing that a philosophic mind considers when any new 
 phenomenon presents itself is its explanation, or reference to 
 an immediate producing cause". (Discourse, [137.].) But the 
 nature of the "new phenomenon" needs to be determined 
 with fair accuracy before we search for its explanation; else 
 we are ignorant of what it is we are seeking the explanation of. 
 
 30. (e) Facts and their Relations. The study of a phe- 
 nomenon entails the study of its relations to preceding, accom- 
 panying, and succeeding phenomena. Whatever causes are at 
 work, will be thus laid bare in the course of its examination. 
 
 31. (/) Introductory Study of Static Aspects. From the 
 foregoing considerations it follows that so long as the principal 
 static elements of a phenomenon are not ascertained, the 
 phenomenon's relations to other phenomena or to its past and 
 future will be almost certainly shrouded in obscurity. Hence 
 the study of causes should be normally preceded by an intro-
 
 88 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 ductory study of the chief static aspects of the phenomenon 
 investigated. 
 
 32. (g) Far-reaching Antecedents. Finally, we must aim 
 at discovering far-reaching antecedents, because a vast collection 
 of trifling causes is as untractable and unsatisfactory methodo- 
 logically as a similar number of static facts and generalisations 
 of an equally restricted order. (Conclusion 25.) Science, that 
 is, seeks primarily to discover universal facts, or such as have 
 a high degree of generality: The process of generalisation 
 passed over in Mill's Canons, should enter therefore to a vital 
 extent into the conduct of any causal enquiry. 
 
 33. (/*) Study of Effects. Nor should we overlook the 
 importance, methodologically, of studying effects, or causes as 
 effects and effects as causes. 
 
 34. (/) The Methodological Meaning of the term Cause. 
 It is difficult to over-estimate the value of the discriminations 
 precipitated in names. Men have reasoned ever since the 
 dawn of humanity's career, and animals, in fact, also reason. 
 But it is one thing, in a desperate way, to grope for and stumble 
 on the truth, and quite another thing with deliberation and 
 method calmly to proceed to its conquest. The latter presupposes 
 a gradually developed terminology containing gradually attained 
 and clarified discriminations. The word Method thus suggests 
 that we should proceed methodically, a thought which is the 
 ultimate outcome of much strenuous experience and reflection. 
 And if instead of humbly and clumsily striving after some 
 dimly apprehended object, we speak of truth and of proof, or 
 of observation, generalisation, definition, and so forth, and 
 arrange them in a rigorously synthetic order, as in Conclusions 14 
 to 35, we are aware of having stripped off our animality 
 and having become men who can see, and know that they 
 can see, almost infinitely beyond the animal's horizon. In this 
 sense the word Cause embodies a profound methodological 
 discrimination. Deprived of this word and its meaning, we 
 should be tempted to analyse objects or follow processes without 
 noting that we had ignored a category capable of enormously 
 simplifying and rationalising our mental labours. We might 
 be satisfied with determining the accidental relations of uni- 
 formities, and thus miss an insight into their crucially important 
 permanent and necessary connections. If, therefore, we depre- 
 cate over-emphasis of the causal viewpoint, it is only because 
 it is also methodologically imperious to mete out justice to the 
 various other methodological discriminations arrived at by 
 mankind. In methodology, as in all other spheres of life, we 
 should beware against being biassed in favour of some frac- 
 tional part of a whole. 
 
 We conclude, therefore, that an ordinary causal enquiry is 
 an enquiry into the more important unconditional and invariable 
 antecedents of certain phenomena.
 
 SECTION 12. HYPOTHESES. 89 
 
 SECTION XII. HYPOTHESES. 
 
 35. Consistently with the different views Bacon and Mill 
 adopt concerning the method to be employed in investigating 
 data, they disagree in the value to be assigned to hypotheses, 
 for whereas the former denounced hypotheses not based on 
 an extensive and diversified examination of facts, the latter 
 considered spontaneously arisen hypotheses the main instrument 
 of scientific advance. Jevons and most later logicians agree 
 with Mill, though it is strange that no determined effort should 
 have been made by these logicians to ascertain exactly and 
 in detail the process of arriving at a hypothesis. We know 
 how vigorously Newton denounced recourse to conjectures not 
 suggested by a responsible study of facts, and yet, by a per- 
 verse fate, the idlest of idle legends is eternally reiterated 
 to the effect that Newton derived his conception of the law 
 of gravitation from perceiving an apple fall while a youth. 
 Hypotheses are not only figured to-day by many logicians as 
 the sine qua non of science : they are looked upon as offering 
 almost the sole device for extending truth. In vain have 
 scholars like Herschel protested that "the liberty of specula- 
 tion which we possess in the domains of theory is not like 
 the wild licence of the slave broke loose from his fetters, but 
 rather like that of the freeman who has learned the lessons 
 of self-restraint in the school of just subordination". (Discourse, 
 [201.].) The protests have roused no echo, and the solid ob- 
 servational activities of the man of science have been placidly 
 ignored. 
 
 What is a hypothesis? 1 We may define it as a plausible con- 
 jecture suggested by a careful preliminary examination, for which 
 
 1 "An hypothesis is any supposition which we make (either without 
 actual evidence, or on evidence avowedly insufficient) in order to endea- 
 vour to deduce from it conclusions in accordance with facts which are 
 known to be real ; under the idea that if the conclusions to which the 
 hypothesis leads are known truths, the hypothesis itself either must be, 
 or at least is likely to be, true." (Mill, Logic, bk. 3, ch. 14, 4.) 
 
 "Hypothesen im wissenschaftlichen Sinne sind weder Tatsachen noch 
 \villkiirliche und unbegriindete Annahmen, sondern Voraussetzungen, die 
 um der Tatsachen willen gemacht werden, aber'selbst der tatsa'chlichen 
 Nachweisung sich entziehen." . (Wundt, Logik, vol. 1, p. 439. ) 
 
 "Die Hypothese ist die voiliiufige Annahme der Wahrheit einer un- 
 i^ewissen Framisse, die auf eine dafiir gehaltene Ursache geht, zum Zweck 
 ihrer Priifung an ihren Consequenzen." (Uberweg, System der Logik, 
 p. 394.) "Wissenschaftliche Hypothesen sind nicht (wie Apelt, Theorie der 
 Induct., sich ausdriickt) 'aus der Luft gegriffene Behauptungen', sondern 
 als Resultate zulassiger Riickschliisse aus Erfahrungen und zugleich als 
 PrMmissen versuchsweiser Deductionen die notwendigen Vorstut'en der 
 adaquaten Erkenntniss." (Ibid., p. 386.) 
 
 "It [hypothesis] means the suppositions, suggestions, or guesses, as to 
 any matter unknown, leading to experimental or other operations, for proof 
 or disproof." (Bain, Logic, vol. 2, p. 128.) "Many hypotheses are of the. 
 nature of analogies or comparisons." (Ibid., p. 147.)
 
 90 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 the completest proof obtainable is being sought in order to 
 convert it into a fact or established theory. Should an asser- 
 tion be self-evident, as Euclid's eighth axiom that things which 
 are equal to the same thing are equal to one another, we 
 conceive it as independent of, and as requiring no, proof. On 
 the other hand, if an assertion is patently incredible, as that 
 air is impenetrable by human beings, we dismiss it without 
 striving to prove or disprove it. Nor can we speak of a hypo- 
 thesis which is incapable of direct and indirect proof, for, by 
 the definition, partial proof alone entitles a conjecture to be 
 raised to the dignity of a hypothesis. A hypothesis, then, 
 asserts something which is neither self- evidently true nor self- 
 evidently false, nor incapable of some kind of proof, as when 
 it is, wrongly, asserted that the cortical substance of the rice 
 
 "Hypothesis is a name that may be applied to any conception by 
 which the mind establishes relations between data of testimony, of per- 
 ception, or of sense, so long as that conception is one among alternative 
 possibilities, and is not referred to reality as a fact." (Bosanquet, Logic, 
 vol. 2, p. 155.) "A hypothesis is a hypothesis because it is not, to begin 
 with, present in the data, and has to be brought there by mediation." 
 (Ibid., pp. 169-170.) 
 
 "The strength of a hypothesis lies in its power of co-ordinating ob- 
 served facts and of forecasting intelligently the discoveries of the future." 
 (Whetham, The Recent Development of Physical Science, p. 230.) 
 
 "Different suggestions present themselves with varying degrees of 
 plausibility. Some are passed by as soon as they arise. Others gain a 
 temporary recognition. Some are explicitly tested with resulting accep- 
 tance or rejection. The acceptance of any one explanation involves the 
 rejection of some other explanation. During the process of verification 
 or test the newly advanced supposition is recognised to be more or less 
 doubtful. Besides the hypothesis which is tentatively applied there is 
 recognised the possibility of others." (M. L. Ashley, "The Nature of Hypo- 
 thesis", in J. Dewey's Studies in Logical Theory, 1903, p. 155.) "The 
 predicate arises in case of failure of some line of activity going on in 
 terms of an established habit." (Ibid., p. 170.) "It is pointed out by 
 Welton that the various ways in which hypotheses are suggested may 
 be reduced to three classes, viz., enumerative induction, conversion of 
 propositions, and analogy." (Ibid., p. 171.) 
 
 "Aucune regie, aucun principe ne pent guider le savant dans 1'art de 
 construire des hypotheses ayant une valeur heuristique: qu'elles ne con- 
 tredisent a aucune loi precedemment etablie, qu'elles soient abandonnees 
 sans retard des qu'elles recoivent le moindre dementi de 1'experience, 
 c'est tout ce que 1'on peut exiger d'elles. Et, encore, que d'hypotheses 
 contraires a certaines lois qu'on croyait certaines, en contradiction avec 
 certains faits qu'on croyait expliques, ont cependant triomphe, demontrant 
 la faussete de ces pretendues lois auxquelles elles contredisaient, la fausse 
 explication des faits qu'on leur opposait. En somme, done, 1'hypothese 
 est affaire d'intuition; c'est le secret du savant, de 1'homme de genie." 
 (Paul Caullet, Elements de sociologie, 1913, p. 67.) 
 
 "Before we go further, however, we must be clear as to one general 
 truth. We must understand that the invention of hypotheses is the work 
 of the scientific genius." (S. H. Mellone, An Introductory Text-Book of 
 Logic, 1895, p. 332.) This appears to be also the view of Louis Couturat. 
 in his Les principes des mathematiques, 1905. 
 
 "The value of an hypothesis depends upon its usefulness and expe- 
 diency, and on its power of indicating the lines of future inquiry." 
 (E. Thorpe, History of Chemistry, vol. 2, p. 95.)
 
 SECTION 12 HYPOTHESES. 91 
 
 removed in milling counteracts the effects of an excessive starch 
 diet. A plausible assertion is not identical with a hypothesis, 
 because in ordinary life such an assertion is not regarded as 
 demanding proof: it is either conceived as being probable 
 without any reference to proof, or, what is more frequent, the 
 plausibility is at once mentally converted into a certainty. For 
 primitive thinkers proof is something subjective; that is, if a 
 statement forcibly appeals to the feelings, it is forthwith judged 
 to be true. The strongholds of ignorance and error are paved 
 with plausible assertions and sprinkled with stray facts. Hence 
 it would be advisable that terms, such as supposition, conjecture, 
 surmise, suggestion, guess, assumption, should not be considered 
 as co-extensive in methodological signification with the scienti- 
 fically well-established tepm Hypothesis *Which implies that we 
 are searching for proof of an assertion grounded primarily on 
 scientific observation or deduction. To this needs to be added 
 that hypotheses are near neighbours to appropriate fictions or 
 working hypotheses. 1 
 
 How is a hypothesis formed? Mill speaks of the "manner 
 in which a conception is selected suitable to express the facts", 
 and affirms "that the process is tentative; that it consists of 
 a succession of guesses ; many being rejected, until one at last 
 occurs fit to be chosen". Significantly enough, "the guesses 
 which serve to give mental unity and wholeness to a chaos of 
 scattered particulars are accidents [?] which rarely occur to any 
 minds but those abounding in knowledge and disciplined in 
 intellectual combinations". (Logic, bk. 3, ch. 2, 4.) "An hypo- 
 thesis", Mill declares, "being a mere supposition, there are no 
 other limits to hypotheses than those of the human imagination." 
 (Ibid., bk. 3, ch. 14, 4.) And further on: "The process of 
 tracing regularity in any complicated, and at first sight confused, 
 set of appearances, is necessarily tentative : we begin by making 
 any supposition, even a false one, to see what consequences 
 will follow from it; and by observing how these differ from 
 the real phenomena, we learn what corrections to make in our 
 assumption." (Ibid., bk. 3, ch. 14, 5.) Finally, in what seems 
 his most explicit passage on the subject, Mill states: "Let any 
 one watch the manner in which he himself unravels a compli- 
 cated mass of evidence ; let him observe how, for instance, he 
 
 1 Working hypotheses are frequently "leading" hypotheses, aud in their 
 case proof or disproof may occupy centuries, the largest working hypotheses 
 having the longest life as a rule owing to the difficulty of proving much 
 where relatively little is known. Such hypotheses are often admitted to be 
 seriously defective, but they are retained until more satisfactory ones are 
 forthcoming, e.g., Newton's corpuscular theory of light was displaced by 
 Young's undulatory theory of light, because the latter agreed better with 
 the known facts. (A combination of the two theories is now being tested.) 
 In ordinary hypotheses, of course, complete, or very nearly complete, proof. 
 is attainable, e.g., whether the shadow I observe is caused by a cloud or 
 a certain near object.
 
 92 PART II.-SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 elicits the true history of any occurrence from the involved 
 statements of one or of many witnesses: he will find that he 
 does not take all the items of evidence into his mind at once, 
 and attempt to weave them together: he extemporises, from 
 a few of the particulars, a first rude theory of the mode in 
 which the facts took place, and then looks at the other state- 
 ments one by one, to try whether they can be reconciled with 
 that provisional theory, or what alterations or additions it re- 
 quires to make it square with them." (Ibid.) In not one of 
 these instances, it will be perceived, is there a statement con- 
 cerning the precise whence of a hypothesis, i.e., as to how 
 "the first rude theory" was arrived at. 1 
 
 If a hypothesis were a "mere supposition", "any supposition, 
 even a false one", it is impossible to calculate the number of 
 guesses we should be compelled to venture upon before stum- 
 bling on the appropriate explanation. Kepler's twenty hypo- 
 theses to account for the apparent movements of the planet 
 Mars (which he minutely studied) would become 20,000 or even 
 20,000,000 hypotheses, and nothing would be more difficult to 
 reach in any instance than the truth. 2 Yet Mill's pregnant hint 
 that happy guesses "are accidents which rarely occur to any 
 minds but those abounding in knowledge and disciplined in 
 intellectual combinations", strongly suggests that scientific train- 
 ing and conscientious and wide examination of data should 
 precede the formulation of a hypothesis. 
 
 36. Moreover, many minds often concentrate on the pre- 
 paration of one hypothesis. A glance at the history of astronomy 
 from Copernicus to Kant, or at the evolution hypothesis from 
 Lamarck and Darwin to our day, will make this manifest; and 
 
 1 We recognise, with Lotze, that in the process of generalisation something 
 implicit is made explicit. "In most cases what leads us to make the deduction 
 is that a number of individual perceptions Si M, s 2 M, 83 M, thrust themselves 
 one after another on our notice, so waking in us the suspicion that the 
 ground of M is universally to be found in the nature of s, in various examples 
 of which we observe it." (Logic, vol. 2, p. 32.) On the other hand, Miss 
 Naden echoes Mill's condemnation of Bacon: "That hasty flight of the mind 
 from particulars to the highest generalisations, which he regards as funda- 
 mentally unscientific, is the necessary preliminary of investigation." (In- 
 duction and Deduction, p. 44.) And yet she admits that "a hypothesis never 
 comes into being without some preliminary induction; rude indeed and 
 imperfect, but as a rule clearly traceable". (Ibid., p. 69.) 
 
 2 "If Kepler had not known the geometry of conic sections, and had not 
 had in his mind the attributes of the ellipse as proceeding from purely 
 geometrical considerations, to serve as major premises for his calculations, 
 he would never have discovered his first law." (Sigwart, Logic, vol. 2, 
 ]>. 275.) And it might be added that if he had not had many facts at his 
 disposal, it would have been a pure miracle for him to have guessed that 
 the squares of the periodic times of the several planets are proportionate 
 to the cubes of their mean distance from the sun. We may also remark 
 in this connection that he made a life study of the motions of the planets, 
 and that he utilised the imposing collection of facts bequeathed him by 
 Tvcho Brahe.
 
 SECTION 12. HYPOTHESES. 93 
 
 when we reflect that Dr. Joule had been preceded by Davy and 
 Rumford (who had already dimly apprehended the far-reaching 
 theory of the conservation of energy), and was followed by 
 Grove, Maier, Helmholtz, Clerk-Maxwell, and others, who more 
 and more fully developed the theory of the conservation of 
 energy, we shall not be surprised that there are few exceptions, 
 if any, to the rule to which we have here called attention.' 
 Mendelyeff admirably illustrates this law of co-operation in the 
 establishment of a comprehensive hypothesis or theory: "I con- 
 sider it well to observe that no law of nature, however general, 
 has been established all at once; its recognition is always 
 preceded by many presentiments; the establishment of a law, 
 however, does not take place when the first thought of it takes 
 form, or even when its significance is recognised, but only when 
 it has been confirmed by the results of experiment, which the 
 man of science must consider as the only proof of the correct- 
 ness of his conjectures and opinions. I, therefore, look upon 
 Roscoe . . . and others who verified the adaptability of the peri- 
 odic law to chemical facts as the true founders of the periodic 
 law, the further development of which still awaits many fresh 
 workers." (The Principles of Chemistry, 1905, pp. 18-19.)- 
 Whetham, referring to the interdependence in physical enquiries 
 as illustrated by recent theories relating to chemistry, magne- 
 tism, electricity, Rontgen rays, and radio-activity, remarks in the 
 same vein: "The slow and patient work of many observers 
 through long years often leads up to and suggests the particular 
 step from which follows, almost of necessity, the practical appli- 
 cation or the far-reaching theory." (The Recent Development 
 of Physical Science, p. 198.) And the same author alludes in 
 these terms to the slow historic development of instruments, 
 which are but objective hypotheses: "The spectroscope itself 
 illustrates the progressive triumph of modern science, for it is 
 the work neither of one man nor of one century. Its principles 
 have been developed gradually, and its construction elaborated 
 throughout a couple of hundred years." (Ibid., p. 297.) That 
 epoch-making ideas issue spontaneously from the minds of great 
 
 1 Not only is one hypothesis frequently the product of many minds, but 
 in most instances the hypothesis undergoes a prolonged evolution in its 
 author's mind before it is communicated to the world. 
 
 Numerous examples might be cited of the social origin of ideas. The 
 following is selected at haphazard, and others will be found scattered through- 
 out this volume: "Galton and Jager, Brooks and Nussbaum, Hertwig and 
 Herdman, Na'geli and Weismann, and others, have all contributed to making 
 the fact of continuity more precise. Hopeful also are the suggestions of 
 Jager, Berthold, Gautier, and Geddes, which make towards a chemical ex- 
 pression of the continuity between germ and germ." (Chambers' Encyc- 
 lopaedia, article "Heredity".) 
 
 - Mendelyeff was preceded by Newbolt in 1864, and Lothar Meyer made 
 the same discovery as Mendelyeff in the same year, in 1869. See on the 
 periodic law, Charles L. Bloxam, Chemistry Inorganic and Organic, 1913, 
 and also the works of Thorpe, Soddy, and Crowther cited.
 
 94 PART II. -SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 men is therefore as mythical a belief as that animals came 
 suddenly into being. 1 
 
 In pure theory no reason exists why some thinker should 
 not have guessed a world formula which should irresistibly 
 reveal to us the whole mechanism and organism of nature; but 
 in practice, we have seen, the larger generalisations of any 
 value have grown out of smaller ones, and where relevant 
 knowledge did not abound, the hypotheses framed, even if true, 
 could not be verified. If the youthful Newton had observed 
 an apple fall from a tree, and had straightway committed to 
 paper his system of the worlds, Mill's view. might be upheld; 
 but the perusal of Newton's Principia, with its profuse allusions 
 to other authors, should convince anyone that the apple theory 
 is without justification. When, then, we study the actual facts 
 concerning Newton's theory, say in Sir David Brewster's Life 
 of Newton, we are not surprised to learn that many scholars 
 were responsible for the different portions of the solution and 
 that the solution slowly grew, and continued growing after 
 Newton, as the result of mountains of collective labour. We 
 should even experience some difficulty in deciding what vital 
 portion of the general gravitation hypothesis was ascribable to 
 Newton himself, considering that the conception of the unity 
 of the solar system, the revolution of the earth round its axis 
 and round the sun, the discovery of the concept of gravity 
 and its extension to the solar system, the quantitative determi- 
 nation of the velocities and the accelerations of falling bodies, 
 and even the law of inverse squares, were not apparently 
 discovered by the author of the Principia.' 2 
 
 Darwin freely adopted suggestions from others: 
 
 "The starting points of many of Darwin's researches were furnished 
 him by other intelligent men." (Frank Cramer, op. cit., p. 47.) "After his 
 return from the Beagle voyage, Mr. Wedgwood of Maer Hall suggested to 
 him that the apparent sinking of superficial bodies, ashes, marl, cinders, etc.. 
 in the earth is due to the action of earthworms." (Ibid., p. 48.) "Boitard 
 and Corbie merely made the observation that, when they crossed certain 
 breeds of pigeons, birds coloured like the Columba livia, or common dove- 
 
 1 Ernest Naville in his La logique de I'hypothese, recognises that hypo- 
 theses should not be accepted till after verification; but, starting with the 
 assumption that hypotheses are the product of genius, he is content to urge 
 his view passionately without examining the evidence. 
 
 Welton seems to waver between opposed explanations of hypotheses: 
 "Facility in framing hypotheses cannot be reduced to rule, and hence falls 
 outside the province of logic." (Manual of Logic, vol. 2, p. 86.) "In most 
 cases the attempts of previous enquirers have shown more or less plainly 
 in what direction explanation must be sought: either by the partial estab- 
 lishment of some hypothesis, or by making manifest the inadmissibility 
 of others." (Ibid., vol. 2, p. 86.) 
 
 2 On the same principles Jenner proves to be an enthusiastic summariser 
 and not a discoverer, and this is partly or wholly true of perhaps most 
 men of highest repute. Strange as it may seem, the "great" scientist or artist 
 only appears when the work of invention or discovery has been virtually 
 completed.
 
 SECTION 12.-HYPOTHESES. 95 
 
 cot, were almost invariably produced. It drew Darwin's attention and led 
 to numerous experiments on reversion due to crossing." (Ibid., p. 50.) 
 "Mr. W. Marshall knew that in the mountains of Cumberland many insects 
 adhered to the leaves of Pinguicula; he told Darwin, and Darwin told 
 the world. Mr. Holland's statement thnt water insects are often found 
 imprisoned in the bladders of Utricularia, is interesting, chiefly because 
 it led Darwin to investigate the genus." (Ibid., p. 51.) "When Lawson, 
 the Vice-Governor [of the Galapagos Islands] had declared to him that 
 the tortoises from the different islands differed from one another, Darwin 
 did not see the significance of the fact." (Ibid., p. 90.) 
 
 If we look narrowly into the matter we learn that all state- 
 ments are assumptions. Even in answering such questions as 
 Who did it? Why was it done? The answer "Foch", or 
 "Because he wished 4o outwit the Germans", are assumptions. 
 Such assumptions may be infinitely near the truth, as in the 
 assertions about the law of gravitation, or about what is taking 
 place "under our eyes", or they may be infinitely removed 
 from it, as in gratuitous conjectures. Assumptions may, there- 
 fore, be regarded as fundamentally co-extensive with active 
 thought. 
 
 37. We shall now study the origin of hypotheses. On a 
 visit to a literary friend I observe that he picks up a capacious 
 envelope, and I ask myself what he proposes to do therewith. 
 I reply, after reflecting a moment : He probably desires to stow 
 away a manuscript. How did I arrive at this hypothesis? I 
 endeavour to form an explanation, and I remember that on my 
 last visit I saw him place a manuscript in such an envelope. 
 This, then, provoked the reply. I cleared up one situation by 
 collating it with a kindred one. 
 
 The psychological aspect of the conclusion I reached is far 
 from self-explanatory. To begin with, sundry mental habits 
 need to be allowed for. There is the habit of interesting our- 
 selves in what occurs around us, and the habit of desiring to 
 understand and interpret occurrences. There is the habit of 
 seeking to recall analogous circumstances, and of connecting 
 the- new with the old in a more or less bold and methodical 
 manner. Granted, then, that we seek to determine the purpose 
 which the envelope is to serve, the answer must eventually 
 come, if it does come, through partial or total identification, 
 however indirectly, of the present action with a past action. 
 I might have recalled some one else utilising envelopes, or a 
 similar receptacle, for such an object or a related one, or even 
 have reasoned that he would utilise it thus, because I could 
 not think of any other object it could serve. In the latter case 
 I might have glanced round the room, and found that only the 
 manuscript appeared to fit the envelope; but if I had never 
 reasoned from the past to the present, and from the present 
 to the future, and if I had never appreciated the uses to which 
 different objects may be put, no conclusion would have been 
 sought or reached. Again, if I had remembered my literary 
 friend performing this action repeatedly, and many other authors
 
 96 PART II. SOME 'IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 also proceeding in that way, my conclusion would have been 
 visibly strengthened, and would have presented itself with virtual 
 spontaneity. 
 
 We have intentionally selected an incident where one fact 
 was observed; but where many facts have fallen under our 
 observation, or where one fact may be construed in diverse 
 ways, or only with difficulty, the process remains identical. 
 Only, we apply numerous methods in approaching the problem, 
 and fail more than once before we succeed to our complete 
 satisfaction. For this reason the expert, the person who has 
 at his beck and call many methods and facts, triumphs with 
 facility over the inexpert. That which leaves the layman wholly 
 at sea, is therefore often easily disposed of by the painter, the 
 lawyer, the doctor, the engineer, the navigator, or whoever be 
 the well-informed individual. Direct experience, followed on 
 and accompanied by study, is thus one of the most copious 
 sources of suggestive hypotheses. 1 
 
 Only a few further instances of the elaboration of hypo- 
 theses may be mentioned in passing. My opinion is asked con- 
 cerning a book which I have just concluded reading, and I 
 express it. Here, supposing that the book is brilliant, brilliant 
 passages recurred and were noted, and, recalling the contents 
 of the book, the most patent facts in connection therewith are 
 recollected, in accordance with the elementary facts of the pur- 
 poseful associating of feelings and ideas. The items which 
 recur oftenest, or appeal to me most, obtrude themselves, and 
 are therefore readily remembered. So it is with scientific prob- 
 lems generally.- After having attempted a somewhat ex- 
 haustive study of the subject of habit, I desire to know its 
 essential nature, and the element apparently recurring most 
 frequently, that is, the economisation of activity or the sup- 
 pression in a particular process of thought or action of steps 
 which have been rendered superfluous, suggests itself almost 
 immediately, whilst other less important features tend also to 
 be recalled. Should the hypothesis, on examination, prove 
 inadequate, I re-examine my memory and, if necessary, re- 
 examine the facts. Or, on ascertaining that many negroes have 
 graduated at universities, I tentatively frame the hypothesis 
 
 1 "The relation of the living animals to the fossil species in South 
 America, the manner in which closely allied animals replaced one another 
 as he proceeded southward over the Continent, the South American charac- 
 ter of the productions of the Galapagos archipelago, and especially the slight 
 but distinct differences of the flora and fauna on neighbouring islands of 
 the archipelago, impressed [Darwin] so strongly with the peculiar character 
 of the facts and the necessity of a definite mode of origin that he began 
 to see the difference in the logical character of the doctrines of creation 
 and descent." (Frank Cramer, op. cit., p. 214.) 
 
 - In these cases, perhaps in all cases, the more systematic and synthetic 
 the process of investigation, the more likely shall we arrive at "the truth, 
 the whole truth, and nothing but the truth".
 
 SECTION 12. HYPOTHESES. 97 
 
 that average members of perhaps all races of men are able 
 to graduate at universities. Here the habit of tentatively 
 generalising important statements ( 172) is mainly responsible 
 for the hypothesis. Or, striving to think of improvements, 
 I follow as regards a particular object, the rule of recollecting 
 acknowledged defects and clamoured-for perfections, and con- 
 ceive them as objects to be realised according to admitted prin- 
 ciples. (See 171.) Or, finally, we may develop our special 
 illustration of the mode of forming a hypothesis by extending 
 our generalisation thus: my friend sometimes, frequently, gene- 
 rally, always, keeps manuscripts in envelopes; he stores every 
 kind of manuscript, engraving, extracts from newspapers, 
 classes of letters, etc., in envelopes; he makes parcels of 
 everything. This last case implies that we often seek only for 
 a bare explanation of a single fact, and that it is indifferent 
 circumstances which frequently decide in our unmethodological 
 age how extensive or how reasoned a hypothesis will be. 
 
 Of course, certain distinctions should be presupposed. Where 
 much of a scientific character is known, as in certain portions 
 of physics, a cursory scrutiny of facts may suffice for forming 
 a legitimate and sweeping hypothesis. In such an instance, 
 however, we rely on the observations of previous investigators. 
 For this specific reason, i.e., the different developmental stages 
 of a science, years of indefatigable observation may issue in 
 no valid hypothesis, whilst in another department immediate 
 observation may play an inconspicuous part and yet an impos- 
 ing and true hypothesis readily emerges. 1 Naturally, too, some 
 individuals are better trained than others to appreciate con- 
 nections of objects and energies, or are more fitted by cir- 
 cumstances for investigating one science than another. 
 
 Mill claims that the deductive process consists of an induction, 
 followed by ratiocination and completed by verification. He, 
 however, recognises also a hypothetical method. "The hypo- 
 thetical method suppresses the first of the three steps, the in- 
 duction to ascertain the law, and contents itself with the other 
 two operations, ratiocination and verification, the law which is 
 reasoned from being assumed instead of proved." (Logic, bk. 3, 
 ch. 14, 4.) This method, Mill considers, is specially applicable 
 to social problems, and he judges that not until it is adopted, 
 shall we chronicle any noteworthy progress in social science. 
 This exemplifies Mill's extraordinary belief that by a species 
 of spontaneous generation the most far-reaching hypotheses can 
 
 1 The opposite contention, that hypotheses are necessary to observation, 
 is, of course, also true, since alertness involves readiness to be guided by 
 the merest hint. According to his son, Darwin "often said that no one 
 could be a good observer unless he was an active theoriser" (Charles Darwin, 
 p. 95); but this only refers to the lowliest grade of hypotheses, and to such 
 as are of methodological importance, as, for instance, the suggestions con- 
 tained in the Table of Categories.
 
 98 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 be formed. Unfortunately many scholars to-day proceed even 
 further on the downward slope and suppress both the first and 
 the third step, supplying us with a fantastic pell-mell of crude 
 conjectures. It is as if a nation desirous of augmenting its 
 wealth, concentrated its energies on opening for this purpose 
 an endless number of lotteries which offer countless prizes of 
 fabulous value, and deprecated all other activities for the 
 creation of wealth. 
 
 We may now direct our attention to the subject of general- 
 ising which is but another term for hypothetical extension or 
 eduction of statements. 
 
 SECTION XIII. -GENERALISATION OR EXTENSION. 
 
 38. The ideal end of science, on the theoretical side, is 
 to obtain a world formula, or a correlated or integrated series 
 of formula, which shall embrace and suggest all possible 
 general statements. 1 For example, we might arrive at a 
 mechanical or electrical theory of the Universe explaining the 
 physical and chemical properties of matter in terms of elec- 
 trons and their motions. As Bacon, Schopenhauer, Avenarius, 
 Mach, and a host of other thinkers have pointed out, the im- 
 mediate and practical object of generalising is an economic 
 one. 2 The narrowness of the field of consciousness, the slowness 
 marking the communication of ideas, and the quick fading and 
 deterioration of memories, lead to the desire to epitomise our 
 knowledge. 
 
 1 "The ideal of knowledge, no doubt, is ... in the progressive reduction 
 of reality to a single system or to comprehensive single systems." (Bosan- 
 quet, Logic, vol. 2, p. 174.) "Every great advance in science consists in a 
 great generalisation, pointing out deep and subtle resemblances." (Jevons, 
 Principles of Science, p. 625.) "Legitimate generalisation is the end and 
 aim of all philosophy." (Mill, Logic.) 
 
 2 "It is the duty and virtue of all knowledge to abridge the infinity of 
 individual experience." (Bacon, Advancement of Learning, bk. 2.) 
 
 "To diminish, as far as possible, the number of general laws necessary 
 for the positive explanation of natural phenomena ... is the real philosophic 
 purpose of all science." (Comte, The Fundamental Principles of the Positive 
 Philosophy, ed. 1905, p. 41.) 
 
 "The amount of our knowledge depends upon our power of bringing it 
 within practicable compass. Unless we arrange and classify facts and con- 
 dense them into general truths, they soon surpass our powers of memory 
 and serve but to confuse." (Jevons, Principles of Science, pp. 148-149.) 
 
 For an able statement, see Section 4 of Ch. 4, entitled "The Economy of 
 Science", in Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics, 1902. 
 
 "Science has been termed an economy of thought, a shorthand of know- 
 ledge, a simplified view of things, a compressed formulation of facts, a brief 
 statement of what is observable, and the like. If this very plausible stand- 
 point be correct, we have in it a striking illustration of the principle of 
 economisation. According to our reading of the facts the following happens 
 in the evolution of truths. Surrounded by innumerable interesting things 
 of most varying aspects, we try hard to comprehend them. Since little 
 time is at our disposal, we make desperate attempts to reach the simplest
 
 SECTION 13. - GENERALISA TION OR EXTENSION. 99 
 
 A generalisation, until proved, is an hypothesis which asserts 
 that what holds true of one fact holds true beyond that one 
 fact 1 For ordinary purposes the generalising process may be 
 supposed to succeed necessarily the preliminary process of 
 observation, since unclassified facts are scientifically of minimal 
 value. 
 
 In defence of the syllogism it has been urged that in all 
 reasoning we assume some general fact, and that an individual 
 fact only exists as a member of a class. In conformity with 
 this it has been argued that the universal and not the particular 
 is real, and that the class precedes the particulars it com- 
 prehends. Let us, then, examine what signification is to be 
 attached to the term "General".' 2 
 
 In the special example cited to illustrate the origin of hypo- 
 theses we only pre-supposed reasoning from one particular to 
 one other. I reflected: On my former visit my literary friend 
 stowed away a manuscript in a capacious envelope, therefore 
 his picking up a capacious envelope on my present visit is, 
 on general grounds of experience, to be interpreted similarly. 
 Particulars agreeing, likeness was posited. In my mind there 
 need not have been lurking any generalisation to the effect 
 that whenever any one seizes an unusually large envelope, he 
 wishes to stowe away a manuscript; or, what was true of the 
 
 possible formulation of the world of facts, and in these attempts lie defined 
 the object, motive and method of science. Apart from the process of 
 economisation, therefore, science, with all its implications, has no meaning; 
 and, for the same reason, every truth, every statement, and every generali- 
 sation, owes its existence solely to the process of economisation." (G. Spiller, 
 Mind of Man, 1902, p. 121.) This implies that science does not deal as a 
 rule with any whole, for such a whole is generally an intricate complex 
 and is, besides, related to the totality of things, rendering it impossible in 
 our day to make concerning it any intelligible statement. However, since 
 the very meaning of a whole is also a mental product, it is unjustifiable 
 to speak of science as not treating of reality because of the present limita- 
 tions of its scope. Moreover, since the sciences differ in the inclusion of 
 constituent parts as much as pure mathematics does from physiography, it 
 is unprofitable to set up artificial divisions between the subject-matter of 
 science and that of common thought. The latter, indeed, is frequently more 
 abstract than a train of scientific cogitations. 
 
 1 Generalisation is "the act of comprehending under a common name 
 several objects agreeing in some point which we abstract from each of them, 
 and which that common name serves to indicate". (Whately, Logic, p. 344.) 
 
 "The extension of the concurrence from the observed to the unobserved 
 cases" is alone generalising. (Bain, Logic, vol. 2, p. 2.) 
 
 "Generalisation consists in passing from observed phenomena to their 
 essential and invariable conditions; in the detection, as Jevons puts it, 
 of a true 'common nature'." (Welton, Manual of Logic, p. 193.) 
 
 2 Sigwart says: "The number of instances from which a universal pro- 
 position is obtained makes no fundamental difference in the logical process 
 involved, and the character -of the process is obscured when the colligation 
 of a number of similar instances is put forward as its essential feature." 
 (Logic, vol. 2, p. 310.) Boeanquet (Logic, vol. 2, pp. 177-179) argues along 
 the same line. A sharp distinction needs to be drawn here between formal 
 logic and practical methodology.
 
 100 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 given instance, will always hold true of similar instances in 
 the future. An examination of the nature of the General will 
 demonstrate the untenability of such a position, and it will also 
 indicate that often mere intensity or repetition of an experience, 
 rather than reasoning, accounts for a conclusion. 
 
 Let us consider an experience. An acquaintance is ascribing 
 to me to-day mistaken, though flattering, motives concerning 
 a certain action of -mine. This had also happened yesterday, 
 without my then launching any generalisation. To-day I say 
 to him that both yesterday and to-day the ascription to me of 
 the particular motives was presumably due to his assuming on 
 those occasions that he himself would have been prompted by 
 such motives in those circumstances. Here I reasoned from 
 one particular to a second particular. I now begin systemati- 
 cally to extend. My acquaintance, I think, (1) sometimes, (2) fre- 
 quently, (3) generally, (4) practically always, (5) invariably, attri- 
 butes to me certain motives, because he would, in such a situa- 
 tion, be himself actuated by such motives. I further extend 
 this to (6) some, (7) many, (8) very many, (9) most, (10) all 
 people. I continue to extend this to (11) some, (12) many, 
 (13) very many, (14) most, (15) all ideas and sentiments which 
 men possess. I venture* on the broad generalisation that (16) 
 people presume others to be and do what they are and do 
 themselves. And, finally, I vaguely surmise that (17) in the 
 Universe like assumes like. 
 
 39. The ambiguity involved in the conception of the 
 generalising process would be removed if we were to employ 
 the term Extension instead of the term Generalisation, for ex- 
 tension naturally suggests an indefinite number of stages, 
 whereas generalisation tends to direct attention to one stage 
 only. For instance, scrutinising the nature of the sensations, 
 I assume that special and general memory (vide 19) would 
 be required in viewing the inrushing tide (which 1 am now 
 watching) a second, third, fourth, or /zth time; I then reason 
 to similar objects seen, to sight generally, to sound, and to all 
 the senses. Thus, again, formulating a charter of liberty which 
 refers to individuals, I extend the charter methodically to politi- 
 cal and other groups, to humanity as a whole, to the inner 
 life, as well as to art, to all other human activities, and, con- 
 ditionally, to the whole animal creation. Or noticing that 
 3 2 1 is divisible by 2, 4 2 1 by 3, and so on, I generalise the 
 formula to n~ 1, and further to n m 1 divisible by n 1. (Sig- 
 wart, Logic, vol. 2, p. 212.) Clearly, the first generalisation in 
 any of these cases did not psychologically compel the last, and 
 historic progress is registered in extending generalisations to 
 undreamt-of realms, and to spheres which had been at first 
 expressly excluded from a generalisation. Prof. Creighton justly 
 remarks: "A conception, or mode of regarding things, which 
 has proved serviceable in one field is almost certain to dominate
 
 SECTION 13. GENERALISATION OR EXTENSION. 101 
 
 a whole age, and to be used as an almost universal principle 
 of explanation. The eighteenth century, for example, was 
 greatly under the influence of mechanical ideas. ... In these 
 later years of the nineteenth century we are dominated by 
 the idea of evolution. The biological notion of an organism 
 which grows or develops has been applied in every possible 
 field. We speak, for example, of the world as an organism 
 rather than as a machine, of the state and of society as organic. 
 And the same conception has been found useful in explaining 
 the nature of human intelligence." (Introductory Logic, p. 259.) 
 The fallacy in the absolutist theory of generalisation lay in 
 assuming that either men were ideal thinking mechanisms which 
 generalised everything to the fullest ; or that because we some- 
 times extend a proposition widely, therefore we always do so. 
 All one is entitled to assert is that when men will be thoroughly 
 trained to think in conformity with securely established scien- 
 tific principles, they will extend every proposition to the farthest 
 limits desirable and practicable in the circumstances. 
 
 Many illustrations of the concrete process of generalisation 
 might be cited. Standing on the famous hill which commands 
 Marseilles, one person will exclaim: "How beautiful to observe 
 the town from such an eminence!" Another will say: "I must 
 observe Rome also from an imposing height." Another still : 
 "I must seek to observe some other towns from a hill or 
 mountain." And yet another: "I will endeavour to see every 
 town and place from a 'convenient altitude." However, fatigue 
 of ascent, time absorbed in reaching a height, bad weather, 
 poor views, absence of eminences, will contribute materially 
 towards persuading the over-sanguine to restrict the generali- 
 sation. Another example. One person much enjoys a circular 
 tram trip in a town which he is visiting, and he in no way 
 generalises. Another one will cautiously generalise that when 
 any town is beautiful, and other circumstances are favourable, 
 he will also enjoy a circular trip. A third person will generalise 
 unconditionally, and, if he is on an extensive tour visiting many 
 towns, he will soon learn the folly of indiscriminately generalis- 
 ing. Or one person notices in a picture gallery, without gene- 
 ralising, that every exhibit has affixed to it the date, the name 
 of the artist, and the subject, whilst another person at once 
 thinks, on perceiving the superscriptions, that every kind of 
 exhibition in the world should be as convenient for the visitor 
 as is this picture gallery. Again, in Rome, the present author 
 noticed that the General Post Office was in a court yard. When 
 he saw that this was also the case in Florence, he merely 
 registered the "coincidence". Only when the experience re- 
 peated itself in Bologna, did he vaguely and provisionally gene- 
 ralise about General Post Offices in the larger towns of Italy. 
 When, however, the Venice Post Office was found to be in a 
 court yard, he consciously generalised.
 
 102 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 Moreover, the difficulty in generalising not infrequently lies 
 in the fact that generalising is inappropriate in multitudes of 
 cases. It is not always true, for instance, that whenever one 
 man imputes to another man certain motives, he reflects what 
 would be his own motives in such circumstances. On the con- 
 trary, and this is for us the determining factor to remember, 
 it is often true that men's reasons for ascribing motives to 
 others vary much, and it is not improbable that my acquaint- 
 ance had only yesterday and to-day acted in the manner 
 indicated, and that he would not again act thus. 1 Let any one 
 attempt to generalise mechanically: This book is well written, 
 therefore all books are well written; this residence is large, 
 therefore all residences are large ; Irene is fifteen years old to- 
 day, therefore everybody is fifteen years old to-day; "from 
 the age of zero to the age of one year the child is able to 
 increase its weight 200 /o" (S. Minot, op. cit, p. 109), therefore 
 we ^ach increase our weight each year by 200 /o; the blue 
 rays are most efficient for the heliotropic reactions of certain 
 plants, and the yellowish-green rays for the heliotropic reactions 
 of certain animals, yet these facts cannot be generalised; or, 
 since the fertilised ovum increases a billionfold in size within 
 nine months, therefore we increase a billionfold in size every 
 nine months ; and he will appreciate the limitations to mechani- 
 cal generalising. 2 From every point of view, then, we infer 
 that there is nothing rounded about a generalisation; that it 
 is not always justifiable to generalise; -that there is no dividing 
 line between an extension of one particular to one other or to 
 a comprehensive class ; and that it is often expedient to refrain 
 from generalising, to extend only to a second circumstance or 
 to several circumstances, and so on ad indefinitum. When to 
 generalise, 3 and to what extent to generalise, is in the present 
 day a matter of capricious habit, but will be in futurity a 
 question of science. (See on this point Conclusion 25 1.) 
 
 We thus comprehend why men resort to a universalised 
 form of speech. "In common discourse", Isaac Watts judi- 
 ciously remarks, "we usually denominate persons and things 
 according to the major part of their character. He is to be 
 called a wise man who has but few follies ; he is a good philo- 
 
 1 As Darwin incisively expressed this: '"Any fool can generalise and 
 speculate.' " (Frank Cramer, op. cit., p. 39.) 
 
 2 Dictionary makers frequently generalise mechanically. Thus one dic- 
 tionary gives as part of the definition of "Swiss" "the language of Switzer- 
 land", and another dictionary, "its language", when, of course, there is no 
 "Swiss language". 
 
 "Where we observe the same mark in different subjects, we are pre- 
 disposed to think that the agreement is not a chance one and that the 
 different subjects have not therefore stumbled upon the same predicate 
 each through a special circumstance of its own, but are all radically of one 
 common essence, of which their possession of the same mark is the con- 
 sequence." (Lotze, Logic, vol. 1, p. 134.)
 
 SECTION 13. GENERALISATION OR EXTENSION. 103 
 
 sopher who knows much of nature, and for the most part 
 reasons well in matters of human science ; and that book should 
 be esteemed well written, which has more of good sense in it 
 than it has of impertinence." (Logic, p. 178.) And in the 
 Preface to La Rochefoucauld's famous Reflections, we read: 
 "Common conversation teaches us that even where general 
 expressions are used, we take them in a limited sense, with 
 such and such restrictions. ... As, for example, when we hear 
 a man say, 'All Paris went to meet the king', or 'All the 
 court was at the play', every one knows that it only signifies 
 the greater part." Similarly there is value in an indefinife 
 generalised statement, as when it is contended that "the over- 
 whelming majority of organisms have a bilaterally symmetrical 
 structure". (J. Loeb, Forced Movements, 1918, p. 13.) 
 
 40. Besides, as we have seen ( 7), the Universe is as a 
 totality stable if brief periods are considered, and all but the 
 scientifically trained, misled by this, tend, therefore, to gene- 
 ralise where wiser men prudently discriminate. "Suffering 
 ennobles", "Suffering degrades"; "By answering injury with 
 kindness, we touch others' hearts", "By answering injury with 
 kindness, we invite and create callousness"; "Some persons 
 defy their environment, therefore environment is of no con- 
 sequence in morals", "Some persons are crushed by their en- 
 vironment, therefore environment is of infinite significance in 
 morals"; "Out of sight, out of mind", "Absence makes the 
 heart grow fonder"; "Religion (health, intellect, sympathy, 
 resoluteness) is everything in morality"; "There is a universal 
 conscience", "The conscience varies with each people and 
 age"; "Self-reliance is everything", "Social devotion is every- 
 thing"; and a hundred other popular but contradictory gene- 
 ralisations illustrate the fact that men are almost incurably 
 addicted to building broad generalisations on slender experience. 1 
 
 Nor is precipitancy by any means confined to the masses. 
 . Not a few educationists, for example, are fond of generalising. 
 Having perceived certain advantages accruing from the child 
 being interested in his school work, interest is forthwith con- 
 ceived as the be-all and end-all of education. Likewise, self- 
 dependence, collaboration, games, concrete study, science teach- 
 ing, the cultivation of the aesthetic sense, physical culture, manual 
 training, classics, religious lessons, vocational preparation, and 
 diverse other forms of education, are each in succession, and 
 on equally inadequate grounds, proclaimed to possess the power 
 of revolutionising the spiritual nature of the child. So, too, 
 arguing from a caricature of the earlier stages of man's history 
 and from imperfect observation of child life, it has been widely 
 maintained that the child tends to repeat the history of man 
 
 1 <4 Generalisation is the great prerogative of the intellect, but it is a power 
 only to be exercised safely with much caution and after long training." 
 <.l<-vons, Principles of Science, p. 626.)
 
 104 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 in its general outlines, and that his educators should respect 
 this tendency in the child, and even be ruled thereby. This 
 doubly dubious analogy could have been easily ascertained to 
 be spurious by noting that the children of primitive folk pass 
 through the same phases as those of Western people, and that 
 the life of primitive and semi-civilised men is intrinsically that 
 of adults and not of children. Educators, moreover, are prone 
 to surmise this is the educator's fallacy par excellence that 
 whatever children are taught in a certain place and in a certain 
 connection, they will appropriately generalise to all suitable 
 places and suitable connections, erroneously ascribing a power 
 to the immature which the ideally trained thinker would envy. 
 And, of course, what is so largely true of the teaching profession, 
 is in all probability equally true of most other professions and 
 callings. 
 
 Scholars, however, not infrequently indulge in the opposite 
 tendency of fixing limits. Bacon told us that "it is impossible 
 that air should ever be consistent, or put off its fluidity". 
 (Novum Organum, bk. 2, 33.) Comte confidently declared that a 
 sidereal chemistry is a chimera, and this on the eve of decisive 
 discoveries in this most fascinating domain of science. Bain 
 argues : "All assertions as to the ultimate structure of the par- 
 ticles of matter are, and ever must be, hypothetical. . . . That 
 heat consists of the motions of the atoms can never be directly 
 shown." (Logic, vol. 2, p. 132.) And very common is the assump- 
 tion that the stage of civilisation reached to-day will not be 
 appreciably excelled in the future, ignoring that since mankind 
 has made inconceivably great advances in the past, it is likely 
 to make inconceivably great advances in the future, advances 
 suggestive of a world as much ahead of our own day as ours 
 is ahead of early paleolithic times. Only a general training in 
 scientific method can save us from the two extremes, and place 
 us in a position to generalise warily whilst rejecting all hypo- 
 thetical limitations. 
 
 We have reasoned throughout this Section as if in the process 
 of generalisation we commenced invariably with observing parti- 
 cular facts, and then generalised our observations. The actual 
 process of thought, however, is often far from being so free 
 from complications. As everybody is aware, an enquiry is 
 seldom wholly novel, and even beyond this lies the fact that 
 we start as adults with a colossal army of more or less con- 
 fused notions and generalisations at our disposal. From this 
 it is to be inferred that perhaps more frequently than not we 
 are scrutinising a series of facts which, to our knowledge, has 
 been previously examined and generalised by others. Con- 
 formably, we find, as a rule, generalisations to hand, and our 
 concern is not seldom to correct, remould, or replace them. 
 Indeed, the steady historic advance in reliable information 
 implies that we are mainly modifying and extending, rather
 
 SECTION 13. GENERALISATION OR EXTENSION. 105 
 
 than creating, generalisations. Moreover, without an accepted 
 principle of classification to guide us, and a copious number 
 of generalisations to mark out for us the limits of our enquiry, 
 the process of generalisation would be probably to all intents 
 meaningless and vain, indeed impossible. (See Section V and 
 Conclusion 33.) 
 
 41. We ought to distinguish at least three classes of gene- 
 ralisation. First, simple generalisation, where what js asserted 
 of a phenomenon, say a new fact about a certain colour, is 
 extended to a second colour or to its own highest class, the 
 sense of sight. Secondly, compound generalisation, where what 
 is asserted of a class, e.g., a novel fact concerning the sense 
 of sight, is extended to more or less closely related classes to 
 some or all the remaining senses, etc. And, lastly, universal 
 generalisation, where we extend to what is remotely related, 
 as reasoning from the nature of the senses to the memory, 
 and thence to the brain and, beyond, to life and matter in 
 general. 1 
 
 42. It is also not unconditionally true that science is only 
 concerned with general facts. The chemist frequently reasons 
 from one substance to a second substance or to a small group 
 of substances. The physicist not seldom endeavours to connect 
 one force with one other, as magnetism with electricity, light 
 with heat, and light with electricity (as in Clerk-Maxwell's electro- 
 magnetic theory of light), or argues from the existence of a 
 magnetic field to the existence of a gravitational field. And, gene- 
 rally speaking, there are myriads of occasions when a scientific 
 extension does not pass beyond a second or a few facts. More- 
 over, astronomers will observe a single eclipse or a single star ; 
 physicists reduce one gas after another to the liquid and solid 
 state; 2 chemists add one element to another; seismologists will 
 inquire into the causes of a certain earthquake or volcanic 
 eruption ; geologists will describe the strata of a certain region ; 
 anthropologists will compose a monograph on a single tribe; 
 and economists will investigate the economic condition of a 
 particular district of a particular country at a particular time. 
 There is, in other words, a cumulative as well as a generalising 
 aspect to scientific enquiries, the former of which is well illus- 
 
 1 Here is a broad generalisation, summing up the general nature of all 
 waves, whether connected with light, heat, sound, etc.: 
 
 "1. The disturbance takes time to travel from one point to another. 
 
 2. The disturbance is propagated through a medium. 
 
 3. On meeting an obstacle the waves are reflected back, and the angles 
 of incidence and reflection are equal. 
 
 4. The course of the waves is changed, i.e., they are refracted, when 
 they pass from one medium to another in which the rate of travel is different. 
 
 5. The disturbance of a particle of the medium is alternating and not 
 continuous in one direction." (J. H. Poynting and J. J. Thomson, Sound, 1913, 
 pp. 3-4.) 
 
 2 This has now been accomplished as regards all gases.
 
 106 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 trated in the gigantic collection of facts pertaining to topo- 
 graphy, the charting of the seas, and weather lore. 
 
 43. We must touch upon two other aspects. The uni- 
 formity of nature is a fundamental assumption of science. 
 When, therefore, we have some pure nitrogen before us in a 
 flask, we are bound to assert that whatever holds good of this 
 sample in the given conditions will necessarily hold good of 
 all pure nitrogen under identical conditions. In instances of this 
 character, as in the problems of mechanics and chemistry, no 
 question of generalising arises, for he who would assume that 
 a particular body in motion would, but for friction and other 
 opposing forces such as gravitation, continue for ever in motion, 
 without implicitly positing that this was true of all bodies, 
 would appear to be necessarily confused in his thought. 1 When, 
 however, we venture on an assertion concerning a complex 
 matter, say a man's conduct, it is patent that unreasoned gene- 
 ralising in regard to that matter and the species to which it 
 belongs on the mistaken assumption that one member of a 
 class exactly resembles all its companions is unwarranted. 
 Undoubted truths are, therefore, as yet very limited, and we 
 should think of most of our generalisations as contingent rather 
 than as necessarily true. 
 
 This brings us to our second point. As we have just seen, 
 in the case of a chemical element or a primary mechanical 
 property, the existing simplicity renders elaborate generalising 
 superfluous and void of meaning. At the other end of the scale, 
 we discern such diversity that we cannot speak of classes in 
 the ordinary sense of the word. To reason that since Washing- 
 ton, Paris, London, Berlin, and Rome are capitals, therefore 
 their general architectural style is identical, would be to fly in 
 the face of the facts. Still, two landscapes may be much alike, 
 in which case we form the two into a class; or a certain 
 number of species resemble one another markedly, and we form 
 them into a genus. In other words, if we extend deliberately, 
 then all extension is generalisation, and no form of extension 
 should be deemed to fall outside the process of generalising. 
 
 44. In science generally the number of facts e.g., in 
 biology is so prodigious that simple enumeration is commonly 
 precluded. Nevertheless, in many directions complete or perfect 
 inductions, to use the antiquated expression for generalisations, 
 may be obtained, and there they are in place. The present 
 writer was once, as a visitor, in a school-room, and asked the 
 
 1 Animal bodies, on account of their instability and their possible self- 
 determined motions, raise a doubt as to the legitimacy of the generalisation ; 
 and if even the elements should be undergoing incessant change, and electri- 
 cal and other influences should be all-pervasive, the doubt would be uni- 
 versally extended in respect of this proposition. We assume, however, that 
 any such internal changes or external influences are absent, and that we 
 discount them if they are present.
 
 SECTION 13. GENERALISATION OR EXTENSION. 107 
 
 teacher the ages of the children. The teacher turned to the 
 first boy at the right hand termination of the first row, and 
 inquired of him "How old are you?" Then, so soon as the 
 reply came, rapidly to the second boy seated next to the first 
 one: "And you?" and so on to the last of the twenty-five 
 scholars. A few minutes later the visitor inquired what social 
 position the children's parents occupied, and the process of 
 complete enumeration was repeated. In scientific activities the 
 completest enumeration of classes is habitually resorted to where 
 feasible, as for instance in the subjoined example adverting to 
 Faraday's researches: "He subjected bodies of the most varied 
 qualities to the action of his magnet: mineral salts, acids, 
 alkalis, ethers, alcohols, aqueous solutions, glass, phosphorus, 
 resins, oils, essences, vegetable and animal tissues, and found 
 them all amenable to magnetic influences. No known solid or 
 liquid proved insensible to the magnetic power when developed 
 in sufficient strength. All the tissues of the human body, the 
 blood though it contains iron included, were proved to be 
 diamagnetic." (Tyndall, Faraday as a Discoverer, p. 91.) 1 Not 
 a few scientists would profit incalculably if they decided on 
 as large a survey of their subject as Bacon undertook when 
 examining the nature of heat, and the day is surely near when 
 methodologists will be agreed in the demand that Bacon's 
 example should be universally imitated where the facts are 
 ascertainable with fair ease. For instance, instead of stating 
 in a serious discussion that the great facts of life are nutrition, 
 growth, and reproduction, we ought to enumerate all the leading 
 factors: irritability, contractility, nutrition, adaptation, regene- 
 ration, growth, senescence, death, reproduction, variation, here- 
 dity, and evolution. 
 
 1 "All this Newton accomplished by the simple and elegant contrivance 
 of enclosing in a hollow pendulum the same weights of a great number of 
 substances the most different that could be found in all respects, as gold, 
 <*la<=*, wood, water, wheat, etc. . . ." (Herschel, Discourse, [179.].) 
 
 "Ramsay, in conjunction with Travers, spent several years in a hunt for 
 the missing elements. They heated upwards of a hundred minerals. . . . 
 Mineral waters were boiled, so as to expel dissolved gases. . . . Even meteo- 
 rites . . . were heated." (Sir William Ramsay, Essays Biographical and 
 Chemical, 1908, p. 153.) "By the analysis of an almost incredibly large 
 number of compounds, he [Berzelius] established on a firm basis the con- 
 stancy of the composition of compounds, and the law of multiple proportions." 
 (Ibid., p. 162.) To ascertain the systematic motion of stars, we are told in 
 the Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science for 
 1908, 1800 stars from all the parts of the sky were examined (p. 604). "In 
 the year 1900, M. and Mme. Curie made a systematic search of these 
 effects in a great number of chemical elements and compounds and in many 
 natural minerals." (Whetham, The Recent Development of Physical Science, 
 pp. 200-201.) 
 
 "So fand Kepler sein drittes Gesetz, dass die Quadrate der Umlaufszeiten 
 der Planeten sich verhalten wie die Wiirfel ihrer mittleren Entfernungen 
 von der Sonne, durch eine vollstandige Induction, namlich durch eine Ver- 
 gleifhung der mittleren AbstSnde aller damals bekannten Planeten von der
 
 1()8 PART ILSOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 It has been objected that complete induction is the equivalent 
 of simple enumeration, but psychologically this does not appear 
 to be so. The value of the complete enumeration, exactly as 
 in incomplete induction, resides in the comprehensive summing 
 up. 1 -f- 1 is commonly written 2, or 1 -f- 1 == 2 ; but really 
 1 -f- 1 is not equal to 2, it is not even equal to 1 -f- 1 ; it is 
 1 -f- I. 1 The 2 holds together the two 1's, and represents a new 
 fact. That is to say, since the one matter of consequence is 
 to arrive at a general statement, it follows that it is immaterial 
 whether we reach it by inference or by enumeration. 2 Indeed, 
 the word All indicates a process of thought not involved in the 
 enumeration, say, of twenty objects, for, abstractly speaking, 
 twenty objects may be but a portion of "all" objects, whereas 
 by the term All we judge that the class consists of no fewer 
 and no more than twenty objects. "All the books in this lib- 
 rary are English books" (Jevons), expresses a qualitatively 
 different statement from "435 books in this library are English 
 books". A study of the mathematical notions of children be- 
 tween the ages of three and five would help to fix these delicate 
 methodological and psychological distinctions. 
 
 Sonne mit ihren Umlaufszeiten." (C. S. Cornelius, Uber die Bedeutung des 
 Causalprinzips in der Naturwissenschaft, Halle, 1867, p. 7.) 
 
 "One would naturally suppose that the colours and lines of mother-of-pearl 
 were due to the chemical or physical character of the substance itself. Sir 
 David Brewster, however, happened to take an impression of a piece of 
 mother-of-pearl in beeswax and resin, and was surprised to see the colours 
 reproduced upon its surface. He then took a number of other impressions 
 in balsam, gum-arabic, lead, etc., and found the iridescent colours repeated 
 in every case. In this way he proved that the colours were caused by the 
 form of the substance, and not by its chemical qualities or physical com- 
 position." (J. E. Creighton, An Introduction to Logic, pp. 202-203.) 
 
 "To determine its position [the position of the cirriped] he studied the 
 structure of as many genera as possible. Dr. J. E. Gray, who had already 
 collected a large amount of material for a monograph of the group, turned 
 it over to Darwin." (Frank Cramer, op. cit., pp. 49-50.) In order to ascer- 
 tain whether the primrose and the cowslip were different forms of the same 
 species, "he transplanted cowslips from the fields inlo a shrubbery, and 
 then into highly manured land; the next year they were protected from in- 
 sects, artificially fertilised", and seed grown, which was sown in a hot-bed. 
 The young plants were set out, some in very rich soil, some in stiff, poor 
 clay, some in old peat, and others in pots in the greenhouse 765 in all." 
 (Ibid., pp. 82-83.) 
 
 "The presence of the fat-soluble factor . . . has also been found present 
 in many oils and fats derived from the animal kingdom, as for example, cod- 
 liver oil, shark-liver oil, beef fat, the fats of kidneys, heart muscle and liver 
 tissues, herring oil, cod oil, salmon oil, and whale oil." (Report on . . . 
 Vita mines, p. 21.) 
 
 " Sir Charles Lyell was preparing a third edition of his Principles, and, as 
 was his habit, visited every site in Europe where any discovery of note 
 had been made." (A. Keith, op. cit., p. 48.) 
 
 1 On the philosophical aspect of this problem, see Leon Brunschvicg, 
 Les etapes de la philosophic mathe~matique, Paris, 1912, ch. 21. 
 
 "The problem of all inferential processes is naturally this, from given 
 data or premisses to develop as much new truth as possible." (Lotze, Logic, 
 vol. 1, pp. 133-134.) It is new truths in which mankind is interested.
 
 SECTION 13. GENERALISATfpN OR EXTENSION. 109 
 
 In certain departments of knowledge it is hazardous to reason 
 from a few particulars to the general, and in those departments 
 enumerations tend to partake of completeness. For instance, 
 the population of a town or country, at a given date, as well 
 as many other social facts, are determined by complete enume- 
 ration. In the same way rain gauges, thermometrical and wind 
 records, graphs, questionnaires, and similar means are employed 
 for the purpose of obtaining a knowledge of general facts which 
 may afterwards form a basis for deductions. So, too, the number 
 of species of discovered animals and plants is counted, and a 
 census is taken of the host of stars. A related method is ex- 
 pressed by the law of averages where series of facts diverging 
 within certain limits are reduced to unity by extracting the 
 average of the series. Complete inductions play also an im- 
 portant part in textual criticism. The various Bibles and Classics 
 of the world for instance, the sacred books of the East have 
 been thus subjected to a treatment where almost every detail 
 is exhaustively enumerated, and nothing is taken for granted. 
 In these several cases the end general statements is identical 
 with ihat in incomplete inductions (which, after all, often tend to 
 approach completeness), and both kinds of inductions represent 
 methods utilised in science. Individuals are to be met with in 
 every walk of life who, if a moderate additional effort will secure 
 it, prefer the certain to the uncertain, and frequently perform 
 complete inductions, or the most complete ones practicable, 
 where they might have been satisfied with relatively incomplete 
 ones. Their procedure is to be commended methodologically. 1 
 
 45. A generalisation may, therefore, only be legitimately 
 attempted where appreciable time and thought would be saved 
 by its being posited. If, for example, some one desired to under- 
 stand the fundamental nature of the sensations, he would do 
 well to draw up, before venturing on a comparison between the 
 sensations with a view to learning how far they are distinct, 
 very complete lists of the leading characteristics of the various 
 senses, afterwards treating them synthetically in accordance with 
 Conclusions 14 to 35. In a preliminary survey utilising 172 
 more especially, and seeking pertinaciously by observation, 
 experiment, and comparison, for new points until no further 
 points reveal themselves- he might enumerate the peculiarities 
 
 1 On complete induction, see Bradley's Logic, pp. 329-330. 
 
 - Here is the vital test of a methodology. Granted fair acquaintance with 
 the subject of Sound as a whole, most of the material should be directly 
 derived through the application of methodological rules. E.g., Conclusions 19 
 and 20 would inform us where to find our material; the second Table 
 of the Primary Categories would direct us to other important aspects; and 
 Conclusions 27 and 28 would further ensure exhausting the subject. Also, 
 since the aim is to compare, comparison will be a fertile source of sugges- 
 tions. The task should be thus completed in one-tenth of the time and be 
 of ten times greater scientific value. This is presumably what Bacon meant 
 by "helps" for the understanding.
 
 HO PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 of (say) sound sensations as follows, omitting at first fine distinc- 
 tions : 
 
 A. SENSE APPARATUS. I. We connect sound with a spe- 
 cial sense apparatus: the two ears and their afferent continu- 
 ations. 2. However, sounds may, to a marked degree, reach 
 the internal ear directly, as seen in loud breathing with ears 
 closed. 3. We ordinarily hear with both ears. 4. The use of 
 only one ear makes comparatively little difference to the loud- 
 ness and to the quality of the sounds heard. (Compare with 
 monocular vision.) 5. In normal circumstances we cannot tell 
 whether we hear with both ears, except by indirect methods 
 or by trained attention. 6. The ears are so placed that sounds 
 are readily heard from all sides. 7. The ear, unlike the eye, 
 is never closed, presumably because of the need of alertness 
 to danger. 8. The ears can only be closed artificially, and even 
 then sound, when loud, penetrates as a rule to a certain extent. 
 (See also 2.) 9. As implied in 6, sounds, unlike sights, are not 
 readily localised in a direct line with the sense apparatus, though 
 "right" and "left" have a fairly definite meaning to the ears 
 as a* rule (e. g., sharply waving a finger close by the ear to 
 the right and left, above, below, and immediately opposite, 
 sound is only noticeable in the last instance, and then very 
 distinctly). 10. The direction whence sounds emanate can be 
 only imperfectly ascertained through hearing alone, and exact 
 aural localisation in respect of direction and distance is still 
 more difficult (as is evidenced by dogs who are at a loss to 
 trace their unseen master by his voice). (Movements of the 
 head assist to some extent in tracing sound direction.) 11. Cer- 
 tain parts of the external ear and meatus may possibly be more 
 sensitive to auditory vibrations, and thus help to guide in the 
 interpretation of direction, whilst sounds (e.g., occasioned by 
 strong air currents), definitely coming from right or left, more 
 distinctly, affect the correspondingly situated ear. 12. With 
 sounds, unlike with sights, their close proximity to the sense 
 apparatus does not markedly modify them, save in regard to 
 loudness. 13. In intently listening, we cease moving and breath- 
 ing, because of the disturbing noises created in these processes. 
 14. Sound is received with almost complete passivity. 15. Sounds 
 are correspondingly aggressive in their higher reaches. 16. The 
 degree of loudness in a sound, like all intensity in sensations, 
 is not appreciated by the sense of hearing, but by the attention 
 mechanism. 
 
 B. MEDIUM. 1. Sound is distinctly connected with traceable 
 wave media, commonly with the air ; but, as in gently rubbing 
 the temples, a vibration may be directly transmitted to the 
 internal ear. (See A 2 above.) 2. Because of 1, sounds manifest 
 timbre or quality, resulting from the specific form of the vibra- 
 tions; pitch, determined by the frequency of the vibrations; and 
 intensity, caused by the amplitude of the vibrations. 3. Echoes,
 
 SECTION 13. GENERALISATION OR EXTENSION. \\\ 
 
 single and multiple, are the result of the reflection of the vibra- 
 tions by a spacious obstacle at a certain distance, in certain 
 circumstances ; and resonance results from conditions where the 
 sounds are strengthened or reinforced. 4. Sounds often tend 
 to continue beyond the action which gave rise to them, because 
 they are due to the vibration of objects (as when we have 
 ceased striking a bell with a hammer). 5. Sound waves, and 
 therefore sounds, travel far more slowly than light waves 
 (1,120 feet against 186,000 miles per second!); hence the flash 
 from a distant gun at night reache's us some time before the 
 connected explosion is heard. 6. Sound waves are quickly ex- 
 hausted; hence ordinary sounds in an ordinary medium are 
 only heard from a short distance, say up to a quarter of a 
 mile, and no sounds are distinguished beyond (say) 50 miles. 
 
 7. The exhaustion of sound waves is gradual; hence sounds 
 fade with distance, detail and diversity gradually passing away. 
 
 8. Hence, per contra, only those infinitely few sound waves and 
 sounds reach us which emanate from comparatively near objects, 
 excluding some exceptional sounds of great violence. 9. Sound 
 waves, and therefore sounds, are also liable to deflection, and 
 hence a strong wind, according to its direction, favours or 
 opposes sounds reaching us. 10. Non-periodic and periodic 
 sound vibrations are said to account for "noise" and "har- 
 mony". 11. Sound waves, and therefore sounds, are only par- 
 tially affected by most intervening objects, such as windows 
 or walls. 12. Sound waves, and therefore sounds, interfere and 
 fuse with one another (e. g., a band playing). 13. Loud sounds, 
 as in a busy thoroughfare, "drown" low ones, and great stillness, 
 as at night, contributes to the discernment of comparatively 
 very low sounds. 14. Sound waves of no more than about 
 50 vibrations and over about 20,000 vibrations, are inaudible. 
 15. The world of sound is sometimes given in a co-existing 
 and successive series (e.g., a concert). 
 
 C. OBJECTS.l. Sounds emanate from objects. 2. Sounds 
 normally represent objects as a whole in their three dimensions, 
 and not, as with sight, surfaces only. (Note being in a room, 
 and hearing some one on the floor above stamp his feet the 
 whole thickness of the ceiling is involved.) 3. Sounds deal 
 with objects in motion, molecular and molar, there being usually 
 two objects concerned, the one acting, the other acted upon; 
 but in the case of wind, for instance, the object and the medium 
 are identical. 4. The source of sound in objects is a vibratory 
 motion sometimes visible, sometimes palpable, also illustrated 
 by 2. 5. Comparative voluminousness of bodies vibrating 
 explains massiveness and fineness of sound. 6. Sounds vary 
 according to the varying composition of objects. 7. In propor- 
 tion to the energy of a movement or vibration, sound is per- 
 ceived from a shorter or longer distance. 8. Sounds differ with 
 consistency, size, shape, and other physical qualities of sub-
 
 112 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 stances. 9. Sounds possess no extremely definite qualities, such 
 as vision proffers us in red and green, apparently because the 
 constitution of objects varies indefinitely. 10. There exists, for 
 the above reason, no practical limit to the number of different 
 classes of sounds. 11. If an object is prevented from continuing 
 to vibrate, the sound is deadened, and where there is no vibra- 
 tory medium, as in a complete vacuum, no sound is producible. 
 12. The world of sound, unlike that of sight, is generally dis- 
 continuous, and generally presents a complex object by a vir- 
 tually single-featured sound; consequently the world of sound 
 is almost infinitely poorer in material presented than the world 
 of sight; this because sound depends on the sensible action 
 and vibration of objects, because such action is as a rule ex- 
 ceedingly rare, and because ordinary sounds are only heard 
 for a short distance. (Compare looking at a dog and listening 
 to his occasional barking, or looking at and listening to a cricket 
 match from a distance of a few hundred yards, but allow for 
 waterfalls, etc.) 13. Sounds, implying as they normally do 
 occasional action on the part of objects, form only a forward 
 time series as a rule, that is, we cannot ordinarily return to a 
 sound as we can to something seen. 14. Involving intermittent 
 action in objects, sounds generally take us by surprise. 
 
 15. Diversity, frequency, and intensity of sounds, vary with 
 diversity, frequency, and intensity of vibration in an object. 
 
 16. Certain classes of sounds are connected with certain classes 
 of objects (e.g., the sounds emitted by vibrating silver or gold). 
 
 17. Knowledge of certain sounds is frequently connected with 
 certain known objects (e.g., a friend's voice). 
 
 D. THE VOICE. 1. We possess a special organ for producing 
 sounds, the vocal chords. 2. Sounds form the chief means of 
 direct communication between men (and between most terrestrial 
 animals). 3. Speaking is guided by hearing, and hence when 
 hearing becomes disordered, speech also suffers. 4. Speech 
 for man is both active (speaking) and passive (hearing). 5. Sinde 
 it is in our power to generate sounds, we can hear sound at 
 will, provided a vibrant medium is present and we are not 
 forced into silence. 6. Experimental knowledge of sounds, re- 
 sulting from a certain deliberate activity of the vocal chords, 
 etc., should be allowed for. 7. "Silent" reading and reflecting 
 are usually auditive in character. 
 
 E. IMAGERY, IMAGINATION, FEELING, INTELL1GENCE.- 
 1. Sound is second in order, sight being first, in respect of 
 the facility with which sensations can be imaged. 2. Subjective 
 sounds are represented by such sounds as singing in the ears 
 and hallucinations. 3. In growing tired or sleepy, and in 
 dreams, sound becomes either inaudible, or is disturbed or 
 distorted through misapprehension of its source. 4. Auditory 
 hallucinations are especially dangerous, because the origin of 
 sounds is usually problematical, sounds frequently breaking in
 
 SECTION U.VERIFICA TION AND PROOF. 1 1 3 
 
 on us unexpectedly. 5. Sounds have a strong pleasure-pain 
 quality, as music, rasping noise. 6. Loud sounds startle and 
 are painful. 7. Sounds stand first in order in regard to warmth 
 of feeling engendered. 8. Sound stands second in order, sight 
 being first, so far as gaining information is concerned. 9. With 
 the attention otherwise deeply engaged, ordinary sounds are 
 not heard. 
 
 F. THE MOST SALIENT FACTS. 1. Auditory apparatus; 
 dependence on the occasional sensible action and vibration of 
 comparatively near objects, on a medium (commonly the atmo- 
 sphere) easily thrown into vibration by that action and also 
 easily disturbed, and on the vibrations of that medium reach- 
 ing the ears; ill-defined qualitative distinctions; lowness and 
 loudness, also representing remoteness and proximity, of sounds; 
 massiveness and fineness; together with "noise" and "har- 
 mony" (ambiguous terms !), J constitute the principal audile facts. 
 
 2. Sounds can be imitated by gramophone, telephone, etc. 
 
 3. Very faint noises furnish the nearest approach to feelings 
 or touch. - 
 
 G. TENTATIVE GENERAL CONCLUSION. Sound sensations 
 are only classed separately from other sensations because of 
 the secondary circumstances enumerated above. 3 
 
 Having somewhat fully discussed what is implied in the term 
 generalisation, we .may venture on an analysis of the process of 
 verification which properly concludes the process of generalising, 
 but is no less essential to observation and deduction. That 
 generalisations should be graded, comprehensive, important, 
 numerous, full, rational and relevant, original, automatically 
 initiated, and methodically extended, we shall learn from Con- 
 clusion 25. 
 
 SECTION XIV. VERIFICATION AND PROOF. 
 
 46. (A) Verification may be defined as the critical comparison 
 of an assertion with the data to which it is alleged to correspond, 
 
 All that we have stated of the need of meticulous, minute, 
 and wide examination of facts holds with double force of veri- 
 
 1 For a discussion of these two terms, see Carl Stumpf, Tonpsycholotfie, 
 vol. 2, 1890, 28. 
 
 - So far as classes of facts are concerned. Bacon aimed in his tables at 
 complete enumeration, as niay be inferred from his enquiry into the nature 
 of heat and his essays on The Winds and on Life and Death. The list of 
 visual characteristics prepared by the author contains some three hundred 
 items. Only on the basis of such exhaustive analyses are we likely to 
 determine the fundamental peculiarities of sensations. Three centuries ago 
 Bacon stated that Music had received fair attention, but not Sound. In- 
 credible as it may appear, his dictum appears also to apply to to-day. 
 
 ;! Leading works on the subject of Sound are: H. Helmholtz, Die Lehre 
 von den Tonempfindungen, 1877; John Tyndall, Sound, 1893; and Lord 
 Rayleigh, Theory of Sound, 1902. An exhaustive work is Richard Klimpert, 
 Lehrbuch flcr Akustik, 4 vols., 1004-1907. 
 
 8
 
 114 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 fication. Just as it is unscientific to generalise in an unknown 
 field from one or a few instances, so verification, save in a 
 crucial experiment, is unscientific if it only embraces one or a 
 few occurrences, or if it rests "upon anything but a very ex- 
 tensive comparison with a great mass of observed facts". 
 (Herschel, Discourse, [219.].) Verification is peculiarly a process 
 employed in the sciences, a process which is mostly omitted in 
 ordinary life, or else is performed in a perfunctory manner. 
 
 Verification may signify in a certain connection re-examina- 
 tion, as when we desire to examine the correctness of a previous 
 observation ; or it may mean examination, as when a generali- 
 sation is to be tested. Verification may also proceed by cal- 
 culation, as in the discovery of the planet Uranus; by reason- 
 ing, as when the matter to be verified is a geometrical pro- 
 position; or by reasoning and feeling, as when beauty and 
 goodness are involved. Rules as to repeated examination, 
 exhaustion of conditions, a critical attitude, especially apply here. 
 (See Conclusions 22 to 24.) 
 
 Those who favour the unceremonious framing of hypotheses 
 frequently maintain that no .harm will ensue provided we are 
 careful to verify them. In this they assume that verification 
 is not encircled by obstacles, whereas verifying a justifiable 
 hypothesis may be the work of a generation, whilst the attempt 
 to verify unwarranted hypotheses usually connotes an endless 
 task leading often to deeper and deeper misconceptions. The 
 decline of Rome, for instance, has found many hypothetical 
 explanations, any one of which may conceivably be true. It 
 is contended that nations decay like individuals; that the 
 superior types had been eliminated by the wars; that the 
 Barbarians rushed and crushed Rome; that growing immorality 
 and luxurious living robbed Rome of its stamina; and that the 
 introduction of malaria sapped the health of its inhabitants. 
 Here are five hypotheses, and it would be easy to augment 
 their number. The difficulty, almost an insuperable one, mani- 
 festly lies in proving one or more of them to be correct. 
 Likewise, the apparent differences in the size of the full moon 
 on the horizon and at the zenith, have led to the formation of 
 sundry hypotheses, none of which have yet been substantiated. 
 Premature indulgence in speculation tends, in fact, to make 
 confusion worse confounded, and supplies the unwary with a 
 trap instead of with a bridge. 
 
 There are two grades of verification simple and deductive, 
 and the references above have only been to the first. In the 
 former case we only examine a number of impartially and 
 judiciously selected specimens to test the truth of a hypothetical 
 proposition. In the latter, we reason that if the proposition A 
 holds, the propositions Al, A2, A3 will also hold, and that if 
 we therefore perceive that Al, A 2, A3, do hold, A probably 
 represents the facts correctly. The supreme anxiety should be
 
 SECTION 14.-VERIFICA TION AND PROOF. 1 1 5 
 
 to frame legitimate inferences, and for both types of verification 
 it is of crucial moment that the basal generalisations shall be 
 lucidly expressed. 
 
 47. (B) Proof may be regarded as the process whereby 
 the truth of a statement is established beyond a reasonable 
 doubt. Bacon's synthetic procedure, which we follow in a 
 modernised form in Part V, is one eminently suitable for proving 
 propositions of a certain general order. By registering all rele- 
 vant affirmative class instances, then class instances similar 
 but negativing the former, then determining the degree of the 
 presence of a quality, then excluding automatically what is 
 not common to all cases, and then framing a general statement 
 in the form of a guarded definition, the greatest practical 
 assurance is obtained that we have a fully proved statement 
 before us. The comprehensive nature of the procedure, and 
 the reliance on fact rather than on sweeping hypotheses, further 
 accentuate its evidential value, especially when supplementary 
 dialectical methods, such as Bacon suggests, or as are suggested 
 in Conclusions 27 and 28, are employed to ensure that nothing 
 escapes from the closely woven meshes. 
 
 John Stuart Mill, following Bacon and Herschel, proposed, 
 as we have seen, five decisive methods of testing statements 
 dealing with causes: the Canons of Agreement, Difference, 
 Joint Method of Difference and Agreement, Residue, and Con- 
 comitant Variation. (For details, see 17.) These should be 
 all applied when practicable. However, two factors need to 
 be taken into account in respect of them. First, that the pro- 
 gressive nature of truth most rarely admits of the rigorous 
 application of these Canons, and, secondly, that, as a matter 
 of fact, most present-day scientific enquiries are in too un- 
 developed a condition to permit the Canons being frequently 
 utilised, except tentatively. And what holds of causal, holds 
 equally of static, facts. 
 
 Canons of probability are, therefore, needdd, both in regard 
 to static and dynamic phenomena, to supplement Mill's Canons. 
 The principal ones applied to a hypothesis are general agreement 
 with existing knowledge, withstanding deductive tests, leading 
 to new truths, and not being invalidated by fresh information. 
 However, many hypotheses are working hypotheses, and admit- 
 tedly do not harmonise with all the recognised facts. Further- 
 more, the special sciences apply, in addition, auxiliary tests. 
 In chemistry, reagents; in geology and in the historical sciences, 
 analogy; in botany, the test of fitting into the botanical scheme 
 of classification ; in physiology, staining; and in other sciences, 
 other acknowledged tests, are resorted to. Simple verification, 
 instrumental or otherwise, is a further criterion. To be sure, 
 every science acts as such as a check upon alleged additions 
 to knowledge, and almost invariably it possesses special methods 
 for testing its particular "class of truths. In art and in conduct
 
 116 PART II SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 the principal appeal would be probably to the achievements 
 of the great masters (as representing the flood level of great 
 epochs) and to educated thought and feeling. 
 
 As the interdependence, of facts obtrudes itself more and 
 more on the consciousness of men of science, they are less 
 and less inclined to seek for laws of nature or, what is their 
 equivalent, general facts to which no exception can be dis- 
 covered. 1 At the same time it is the earnest concern of science 
 to arrive at irreproachable statements, for only these can be 
 entirely relied on or fully utilised for deductive purposes. Such 
 statements should not be, however, platitudinarian, for to state 
 that gold is always yellow, the wind-lashed sea invariably 
 vocal, or that "air has weight", 2 would be puerile. Given, then, 
 a comprehensive and pregnant law established, we can defi- 
 nitely prove or disprove a statement by observing whether it 
 comports in all respects with the law. This is the highest 
 order of proof available at present and, strictly speaking, the 
 only unambiguous kind of proof. As Herschel declares: "The 
 grand and indeed only character of truth is its capability of 
 enduring the test of universal experience and coming unchanged 
 out of every possible form of fair discussion." (Discourse, [6.].) 
 Next in order follow the large working hypotheses in science 
 which represent provisional laws, and are employed as a staple 
 test. 
 
 Although, of course, preferring irrefragable proof, the man 
 of science naturally accommodates himself to whatever degree 
 
 1 "If I might impress any caution upon your minds, it is the utterly 
 conditional nature of all our knowledge the danger of neglecting the process 
 of verification under any circumstances; and the film upon which we rest, 
 the moment our deductions carry us beyond the reach of this great process 
 of verification. There is no better instance of this than is afforded by the 
 history of our knowledge of the circulation of the blood in the animal 
 kingdom until the year 1824. In every animal possessing a circulation at 
 all, which had been observed up to that time, the current of the blood was 
 known to take one definite and invariable direction. Now, there is a class 
 of animals called ascidians, which possess a heart and a circulation, and 
 up to the period of which I speak no one would have dreamt of questioning 
 the propriety of the deduction that these creatures have a circulation in 
 one direction; nor would anyone have thought it worth while to verify the 
 point. But in that year M. von Hasselt, happening to examine a transparent 
 animal of this class, found to his infinite surprise that after the heart had 
 beat a certain number of times it stopped, and then began beating the 
 opposite way, so as to reverse the course of the current, which returned 
 by-and-by to its original direction. I have myself timed the heart of these 
 little animals. I found it as regular as possible in its periods of reversal : 
 and I know no spectacle in the animal kingdom more wonderful than that 
 which it presents all the more wonderful that, to this day, it remains a 
 unique fact, peculiar to this class, among the whole animate world. At the 
 same time, I know of no more striking case of the necessity of the veri- 
 fication of even those deductions which seem founded in the widest and 
 safest inductions." (T. H. Huxlev, Twelve Lectures and Essays, ed. 1908, 
 pp. 13-14.) 
 
 - Mill, Logic, bk. 3, ch. 4, 1.
 
 SECTION 14.VERIFICA TION AND PROOF. 117 
 
 of demonstration is obtainable; but, strange to say, in the 
 cultural sciences verification or proof worthy the name is seldom 
 striven after, robbing the statements there made of all sterling 
 value. 
 
 48. "The words 'truth', 'truism', 'rule', 'generalisation', 'uniformity', 
 'regularity', and 'principles' are all often loosely used as more or less 
 nearly synonymous with the word 'law'. But it is important that they 
 be discriminated from one another, for the word 'law' has become pecu- 
 liarly specialised. Without stopping to define all of the above terms, it 
 must be said at once that most, if not all, of the so-called laws in the 
 social sciences belong to one of the above categories that is, they are 
 generalisations, uniformities or principles, rather than laws in the sense 
 in which the physical sciences would use that word. Thus Comte's 
 famous Law of the Three States is only a generalisation; while the so- 
 called law of least effort (that the greatest gain is always sought for the 
 least effort) is really a psychological principle. Now exactness in the 
 use of terms is desirable in science; hence it is important that we inquire 
 into the exact meaning which the word 'law' has acquired in the older 
 sciences the physical sciences. At first in the physical sciences law 
 meant the manifestation of an outer force, controlling the action of things. 
 But as the passive view of nature came to be given up, it came to mean 
 merely the uniform way in which things occur. Later, under the influence 
 of the growth of the mechanical view of nature, law came to mean a 
 fixed, unchanging, and so necessary relation between forces. The concept 
 of a law of nature thus became deeply tinged with the idea of physical 
 necessity. Indeed, in the physical sciences, it became practically synony- 
 mous with physical necessity. Hence the expression 'eternal iron laws', 
 embodying the idea that nature is a theatre of mechanical necessities." 
 (Charles A. Ellwood, Sociology in its Psychological Aspects, 1912, 
 pp. 74-75.) 
 
 "Wo immer uns Erscheinungen in derselben Form der Aufemander- 
 folge oder der Koexistenz entgegentreten, da sprechen wir von einem 
 dieser Gleichformigkeit zugrunde liegenden Gesetze. Es ist das offenbar 
 nur eine Analogic oder Metapher. Das Urbild desselben ist dem politi- 
 schen Leben entnommen. Wenn ein Gesetz fur bestimmte Falle die Beob- 
 achtung eines bestimmten Vorganges anbefiehlt, so geschieht dieses in 
 alien beziiglichen Fallen in derselben durch das Gesetz vorgeschriebenen 
 Form. Wo wir also in der Natur eine Erscheinung in derselben Form 
 sich wiederholen sehen, da stellen wir uns die Sache der grosseren Ver- 
 standlichkeit wegen so vor, als ob diese Gleichformigkeit die Folge irgend- 
 eines hfiheren, in einem Gesetz sich verko'rpernden Willens ware, und 
 sprechen kurzweg von einem Gesetz dieser Erscheinungen. Wir erlangen 
 durch diese Metapher fur eine Reihenfolge von Erscheinungen einen leicht 
 verstandlichen Ausdruck, eine einfache Formel." (L. Gumplowicz, Grund- 
 riss der Soziologie, 1905, pp. 103-104.) 
 
 "It is the custom in science, wherever regularity of any kind can be 
 traced, to call the general proposition which expresses that regularity a 
 law." (Mill, Logic, bk. 3, ch. 4, 1.) 
 
 "We may regard a law of nature either, 1st, as a general propositi 
 announcing, in abstract terms, a whole group of particular facts relating 
 to the behaviour of natural agents in proposed circumstances; or, 2ndly, 
 as a proposition announcing thg|a whole class of individuals agreeing 
 in one character agree also in anolher." (Herschel, Discourse, [91.].) 
 
 Since the term law, in its political acceptation, incorporates the con- 
 ception, at the one end, of arbitrary and ruthless decrees and, at the 
 other end historically, of a mature decision by a democratic assembly 
 aiming in a humane manner at the welfare of the whole community, it 
 is indispensable to bear in mind the evolution of political law when 
 interpreting the signification of law in the scientific sense.
 
 118 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 SECTION XV. DEDUCTION. 
 
 49. In a generalised statement much is often comprised 
 which was not suspected at first. 1 In consequence, when we 
 have reached our plain generalisation, and have embodied it 
 in a transparent definition, we begin to seek for all that it 
 involves. Here we do not rise from the minor to the major, 
 as in induction, but we descend from the major to the minor. 
 This process is named deduction, and is often of paramount 
 significance. Theoretically we might imagine a complete induc- 
 tion which exhausts every possible aspect, even to the past 
 and the future; in practice, however, comparatively few aspects 
 can be taken into consideration in an enquiry by a single 
 scholar. When, then, a generalisation is proposed or established, 
 we may descend in various ways to groups of particulars. 
 Manifestly, deductive reasoning forms an essential component 
 of the scientific process of investigation, and science would be 
 decidedly the poorer if the deductive process were discarded. 
 We may define deduction as that portion of a scientific enquiry 
 which, starting from a given statement, seeks to draw out its 
 implications in a desired direction or generally. 
 
 Deduction is especially fruitful and safe where exact and 
 quantitative determinations have been reached. Here the pre- 
 cise form of the generalisation allows of the fullest and minutest 
 deduction, as, for instance, in astronomy and mechanics. Mathe- 
 matics is, therefore, of increasing value as science progresses, 
 and accordingly, when most developed, science tends to clothe 
 itself in mathematical garb, i.e., tends to become deductive. 
 This is no reflection, as is often assumed, on the inductive and 
 reputedly non-mathematical method, for this method not only 
 prevails, but is necessarily supreme, in all but the last stages 
 of a science. We must be first cognisant of the rudimentary 
 facts yielded by an examination of relevant data, then reach 
 a sufficient number of wide generalisations, then embody these 
 in a crisp definition, and only after this can we securely and 
 with distinct advantage proceed deductively when weighty issues 
 are involved. Hence observation, generalisation, definition, and 
 deduction form interrelated component parts of one method. 
 
 Descartes searched in his mind for a clear and distinct idea 
 which he finally imagined that he had discovered. This dis- 
 covery he expressed in the now celebrated postulate Cogito, 
 
 - 1 "Axioms, duly and orderly formed from particulars, easily discover the 
 way to new particulars, and thus render sciences active." (Bacon, Novuin 
 Organum, bk. 1, 24.) "All true and fruitful natural philosophy hath a double 
 scale or ladder, ascendent and descendent, ascending from experiments, to 
 the invention of causes; and descending from causes, to the invention of 
 new experiments." (Bacon, Advancement of Learning, bk. 2.) And, rightly, 
 "that method of discovery and proof according to which the most general 
 principles are first established, and then intermediate axioms are tried and 
 proved by them, is the parent of error and the curse of all science". (Novuin 
 Organum, bk. 1, 69.) "The deductive method . . . consists of three operations
 
 SECTION 15. DEDUCT/ON. j j 9 
 
 ergo sum. He then proceeded to deduce from this statei 
 
 
 n 
 
 and here once more he came into contact, if not in coSn 
 w,th empirical data.' The difference, then between Drearies 
 and modern men of science is only that the latter assign a 
 more prominent position to induction, and not that the 
 proceeds deductively and the other inductively Bacon feehn 
 that he stood at the threshold of science, and that the' method 
 of hasty generalisations succeeded by hasty deductions hd I 
 
 n,l I*"!? i f f . 0neOUS theories > almost denounced the deduc 
 tive and almost ignored the connected mathematical met od * 
 Descartes, absorbed in mathematical studiestTnclfned to the 
 ther extreme, and restricted the influence of induction weUn h 
 
 but I 3 ! 1 " J^ P R 0int , WUh Desca rtes will he the f?n7 Wumph 
 only after Bacon's method shaH have paved the way 
 
 ' T*"* "' ^ third, 
 
 are base 
 
 
 . 
 
 even in the case of 1fferh P pT ^ T fe ^ convi nced by deduction, 
 
 extended staten """
 
 120 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 Aristotle's syllogism can neither be identified with the induc- 
 tive nor altogether with the deductive method. This is owing 
 to the fact that not only is the mode of obtaining major pre- 
 mises regarded as alien to the subject, but no provision is made, 
 outside the reasoning process itself, for substantiating the con- 
 clusion reached. Strictly speaking, it represents a mode of 
 testing a statement as to its consistency with a more general 
 proposition, and may be said to be applicable where major and 
 minor premise are already demonstrated. 1 
 
 Generalisation begins with the examination of the data. With 
 deduction the opposite obtains, i.e., examination principally 
 concerns itself with the verification of the deduction. With 
 this stage reached, the main scientific process of investigation 
 is completed on the theoretical side, save in so far as new 
 investigations are suggested. Jevons truly says: "The in- 
 vestigator begins with facts and ends with them. He uses facts 
 to suggest probable hypotheses; deducing other facts which 
 would happen if a particular hypothesis is true, he proceeds 
 to test the truth of his notion by fresh observations." (The 
 Principles of Science, p. 509.)- 
 
 1 For instance, the following would be a correct syllogism: 
 
 All men are immortal; 
 
 My dog Cato is a man; 
 
 Therefore my dog Cato is immortal. 
 
 Or, All multicellular beings are unicellular; 
 
 This mathematical point is a multicellular being; 
 Therefore this mathematical point is unicellular. 
 
 - A knowledge of facts makes a profound difference to the nature of a 
 hypothesis and to the possibility of proving it or disproving it with fair ease. 
 We may illustrate this from Arrhenius' theory of panspermia. Desirous of 
 proving that life may have reached our globe from other spheres, he assumes 
 that life might be transferred from world to world in the form of micro- 
 scopically minute spores. He states that the rate at which such a spore would 
 fall is so small that favourable upward currents of air could waft it upwards 
 a hundred miles, to the limit of our atmosphere. There it might take up 
 negative electricity, and be driven out into interplanetary space by other 
 particles positively charged. Then the radiation pressure of the sun would 
 drive it out into stellar space. Finally, it might find a resting place, aftei^ 
 travelling for some thousands of years, and there it might introduce life or 
 augment the existing life. Each step in this theory of Arrhenius, including 
 the assumption of the existence of microscopic spores, is based not on bare 
 suppositions, but on scientific knowledge of the first order, and in this 
 Arrhenius only follows the common practice among scientists. If the spores 
 and the other circumstances had been merely postulated, we should have 
 had an illustration of the ancient and useless conception of a deduction. 
 Mendelyeffs assumption that the ether is a chemical element incapable of 
 forming combinations, is similarly deduced from recent enquiries which in- 
 dicate that such inert elements exist. 
 
 Here are instances where the basis of the reasoning is of a very hypo- 
 thetical character. "Of supposed structural life units there is a great variety. 
 Besides the gemmules of Darwin, there were the physiological units of 
 Herbert Spencer. Professor Haeckel . . . has structural units of his own which 
 he terms plastidules. . . . Then came Nageli, the great botanist, who spoke
 
 SECTION 15. DEDUCTION. 121 
 
 On circumspectly examining the scope of deductive procedure, 
 it becomes patent that an investigation conducted according to 
 strict scientific rules involves the application of deduction almost 
 as frequently as that of generalisation. Just as from time to 
 time the investigator pushes his enquiry forward, so he loses 
 no occasion for testing the next step which he proposes to make 
 by sounding its implications. That is, instead of securing all 
 his middle axioms by induction, he arrives at many of them 
 through deduction. Naturally, therefore, when he has reached 
 his final generalisation, and has embodied it in a concise state- 
 ment, he will not neglect the momentous duty of probing it 
 deductively. Thus deduction is no stranger to generalisation, 
 and by further compelling exactness in statement at every 
 turn, it is of double benefit to him who generalises. 
 
 A deduction to be scientifically permissible and serviceable 
 must be grounded on a proposition well rooted in verified data, 
 for without this we are back in the age of scholasticism and 
 obscurantism. In fact, in modern enquiries a large number of 
 verified propositions are commonly employed to enable a single 
 deduction to be made. Theoretically speaking, it might be as 
 convenient to discover classes of facts by going backwards as by 
 proceeding forwards. In practice, however, the reverse is empha- 
 tically the case, and this constitutes the justification for seeking 
 for the fullest, as for the most comprehensive, generalisations. 
 For example, by attentively watching an individual who is 
 quick in his ways, we might finally discern the rationale of 
 quickness "a settled and eager desire to be expeditious, 
 coupled with fair intelligence, study of others who are ex- 
 peditious, and adequate practice", from which the diverse 
 methods he employs should follow logically. Yet, in reality, 
 the mere knowledge of the statement which subsumes the 
 inductive enquiry would deductively yield with great difficulty 
 a paucity of information, and much of this would be spurious. 
 Granted, however, the inductive statement, and a certain 
 number of the details on which it is based to illustrate its 
 inwardness, and methodised deductive procedure (see Con- 
 clusion 31) will yield substantial additions. For the sake, 
 therefore, of deduction, we plead that generalisations shall be 
 as full as possible, in order that the task imposed on it shall 
 not be excessive. 
 
 If a deduction needs to be rooted in justifiable generalisations 
 or facts, it must be no less subject to rigid verification, for a 
 merely plausible deduction has no more value than a merely 
 specious generalisation. Deduction, again, is fertile, in proportion 
 
 of Idioplasma-Teilchen. Then Weisner, also a botanist, who spoke of the 
 Plassomes. Our own Prof. Whitman attributed to his life units certain other 
 essential qualities and called them idiosomes. A German zoologist, Haake, 
 has called them gemmules. Another German writer, a Leipsic anatomist 
 Altmann, calls them granuli." (C. S. Minot, op.cit., pp. 234-235.)
 
 122 PART II.- SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 as it can depend at every juncture on already verified classes 
 of facts, without which its path leads straight into a morass of 
 idle suppositions, as the last Section has shown. 
 
 The layman who does not pretend to originate or exhaus- 
 tively scrutinise scientific theories, cannot be invited to verify 
 everything he hears, and the chief responsibility rests hence 
 on the experts who are either the inventors or the protagonists 
 of a theory. For instance, during the last generation, a move- 
 ment has become fairly popular which demands that since 
 natural and artificial selection is the law which governs advance 
 in the animal world, this law should be respected in regard to 
 the human species; and, consequently, this movement maintains, 
 the utmost should be attempted to encourage the fit 1 to pro- 
 duce abundance of offspring and the unfit' 2 to produce none. 
 Taking their stand on this doctrine, some extremists deductively 
 argue that the "lower" races and "lower" classes (according 
 to them four-fifths of mankind perhaps) should be sternly re- 
 pressed and legislated against, whilst other champions of this 
 view contend that scientific breeding and regimentation should 
 replace marriage and family life. In this place we are only 
 concerned with the initial deduction, and we therefore ask our- 
 selves whether it has been solidly proven that, first, in the 
 animal world generally selection is the principal law, and, se- 
 condly, that this law partly or wholly applies to the human 
 world. Assuming the first as settled affirmatively, we may 
 consider it legitimate to infer tentatively that selection should 
 not be disregarded in the human species; but scientific pro- 
 cedure requires proof that the human species does not con- 
 stitute an exception. This, however, has not been seriously 
 attempted by the teachers and preachers of eugenics, and the 
 position is that, without scientific warrant, grave and far-reaching 
 social proposals are confidently put forward, proposals which 
 withdraw all protection from the poor and give carte blanche 
 to the well-to-do. As we have endeavoured to indicate in our 
 Preliminary Considerations and in other places, especially in 
 Conclusion 13, the human- individual is primarily adapted for 
 the specio-psychic state, that is, he is part of a complex pan- 
 human civilisation developed through the ages by the inventions 
 and discoveries of the mass of men and women, and per- 
 petuated solely by traditions, imitation, and teaching. Human 
 progress, in consequence, depends first and foremost on cultural, 
 and not on biological, advance. A small dose of Baconian con- 
 tempt for haphazard and unverified generalisations and deduc- 
 tions would have delivered mankind from this theory and from 
 legions of kindred ones, and methodologists cannot but deplore 
 the many superfluous and extravagant theories which clog the 
 wheel of human progress. It is, therefore, indispensable that 
 
 1 and - See 143 for a definition of these terms.
 
 SECTION 16. DEFINITE, EXACT, AND MATHEMATICAL PROCEDURE. 123 
 
 however colourable a deduction may appear to be, it should 
 be scrupulously verified above all, needless to say, in matters 
 of life and death. The time should have passed when men, 
 in particular scholars and propagandists, are satisfied with a 
 collection, small or large, of affirmative instances or pretentious 
 deductions. We should insist that he who claims to be a 
 specialist, should, as an elementary duty, rigorously verify his 
 observations, generalisations, and deductions. 
 
 SECTION XVI. DEFINITE, EXACT, AND MATHEMATICAL PRO- 
 CEDURE. 
 
 50. (A) THE CASE FOR MATHEMATICAL PROCE- 
 DURE. If it be queried why highly developed sciences should 
 tend to assume mathematical form, and why complete absence 
 of mathematical apparatus argues crudity in any sphere of 
 knowledge, the answer is near at hand. The sciences ruled by 
 mathematics appear to be the only exact sciences, and accord- 
 ingly every science, since it strives to be exact, must needs 
 strive to be mathematical. 1 Out in the world of practice, ideas 
 are protean in character: a new meaning develops out of an 
 old one because a new need has arisen, and this meaning 
 gradually passes, for the same reason, from one shape to 
 another, a single word representing the multifarious meanings. 
 Analyse the terms morality, duty, virtue, ought,- for instance, 
 and observe how they alter in signification from age to age, 
 from country to country, and, to some extent, from individual to 
 individual, and even from occasion to occasion. These terms, 
 which are among our current ethical coin, symbolise countless 
 attitudes and actions, and this is approximately true of words 
 in general. Now mathematical procedure rescues us almost 
 totally from this vertiginous chaos. It measures phenomena, 
 and reduces data to a form which is as inflexible and universal 
 as the every-day terminology is accommodating and individual. 
 Once we have reached the mathematical level, it is no longer 
 necessary to define by indefinable terms, or explain by offering 
 equivocal illustrations. We are able then to make statements 
 which it is practically impossible to misconstrue, and which 
 therefore convey precisely the same signification to all persons 
 alike. Hence, perhaps, no science can be said to be fully estab- 
 lished so long as it is entirely or even fractionally non-mathe- 
 matical. 
 
 1 "Inquiries into nature have the best result, when they begin with physics 
 and end in mathematics." (Bacon, Novum Organum, bk. 2, 8.) 
 
 - "The word represented by 'cause' has sixty-four meanings in Plato and 
 forty-eight in Aristotle. These were men who liked to know as near as might 
 be what they meant; but how many meanings it has had in the writings 
 of the myriads of people who have not tried to know what they meant by 
 it will, I hope, never be counted." (W. K. Clifford, Lectures and Essays, 
 ed. 1918, p. 35.)
 
 124 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 Clifford lucidly sums up the practical difficulties involved in attaining 
 to complete exactness. We make no apology for quoting him at length: 
 "When a student is first introduced to those sciences which have come 
 under the dominion of mathematics, a new and wonderful aspect of Nature 
 bursts upon his view. He has been accustomed to regard things as essen- 
 tially more or less vague. All the facts that he has hitherto known have 
 been expressed qualitatively, with a little allowance for error on either 
 side. Things which are let go fall to the ground. A very observant man 
 may know also that they fall faster as they go along. But our student 
 is shown that, after falling for one second in a vacuum, a body is going 
 at the rate of thirty-two feet per second, that after falling for two seconds 
 it is going twice as fast, after going two and a half seconds two and a 
 half times as fast. If he makes the experiment, and finds a single inch 
 per second too much or too little in the rate, one of two things must 
 have happened: either the law of falling bodies has been wrongly stated,, 
 or the experiment is not accurate there is some mistake. He finds reason 
 to think that the latter is always the case; the more carefully he goes 
 to work, the more of the error turns out to belong to the experiment. 
 Again, he may know that water consists of two gases, oxygen and hydrogen, 
 combined; but he now learns that two pints of steam at a temperature 
 of 150 centigrade will always make two pints of hydrogen and one pint 
 of oxygen at the same temperature, all of them being pressed as much 
 as the atmosphere is pressed. If he makes the experiment, and gets rather 
 more or less than a pint of oxygen, is the law disproved? No; the steam 
 was impure, or there was some mistake. Myriads of analyses attest the 
 law of combining volumes; the more carefully they are made, the more 
 nearly they coincide with it. The aspects of the faces of a crystal are 
 connected together by a geometrical law, by which, four of them being" 
 given, the rest can be found. The place of a planet at a given time is 
 calculated by the law of gravitation; if it is half a second wrong, the fault 
 is in the instrument, the observer, the clock, or the law; now, the more 
 observations are made, the more of this fault is brought home to the 
 instrument, the observer, and the clock. . . . 
 
 At this point we have to make a very important distinction. There are 
 two ways in which a law may be inaccurate. The first way is exemplified 
 by that law of Galileo which I mentioned just now: that a body falling 
 in vacuo acquires equal increase in velocity in equal times. No matter 
 how many feet per second it is going, after an interval of a second it 
 will be going thirty-two more feet per second. We now know that this 
 rate of increase is not exactly the same at different heights, that it depends 
 upon the distance of the body from the centre of the earth; so that the 
 law is only approximate ; instead of the increase of velocity being exactly 
 equal in equal times, it itself increases very slowly as the body falls. 
 We know also that this variation of the law from the truth is too small 
 to be perceived by direct observation on the change of velocity. But 
 suppose we have invented means for observing this, and have verified 
 that --the increase of velocity is inversely as the squared distance from 
 the earth's centre. Still the law is not accurate; for the earth does not 
 attract accurately towards her centre, and the direction of attraction is 
 continually varying with the motion of the sea; the body will not even 
 fall in a straight line. The sun and the planets, too, especially the moon, 
 will produce deviations; yet the sum of all these errors will escape our 
 new process of observation by being a great deal smaller than the neces- 
 sary errors of that observation. But when these again have been allowed 
 for, there is still the influence of the stars. In this case, however, we 
 only give up one exact law for another. It may still be held that if the 
 effect of every particle of matter in the universe on the falling body were 
 calculated according to the law of gravitation, the body would move exactly 
 as this calculation required. And if it were objected that the body must 
 be s}ightly magnetic or diamagnetic, while there are magnets not an infinite 
 way off; that a very minute repulsion, even at sensible distances, accom-
 
 SECTION 16. DEFINITE, EXACT, AND MATHEMATICAL PROCEDURE. 125 
 
 panies the attraction ; it might be replied that these phenomena are them- 
 selves subject to exact laws, and that when all the laws have been taken 
 into account, the actual motion will exactly correspond with the calculated 
 motion. . . . 
 
 "The word 'exact '-has a practical and a theoretical meaning. When a 
 grocer weighs you out a certain quantity of sugar very carefully and says 
 it is exactly a pound, he means that the difference between the mass of 
 the sugar and that of the pound weight he employs is too small to be 
 detected by his scales. If a chemist had made a special investigation, 
 wishing to be as accurate as he could, and told you this was exactly a 
 pound of sugar, he would mean that the mass of the sugar differed from 
 that of a certain standard piece of platinum by a quantity too small to 
 be detected by his means of weighing, which are a thousandfold more 
 accurate than the grocer's. But what would a mathematician mean, if he 
 made the same statement? He would mean this. Suppose the mass of 
 the standard pound to be represented by a length, say a foot, measured 
 on a certain line ; so that half a pound would be represented by six inches, 
 and so on. And let the difference between the mass of the sugar and 
 that of the standard pound be drawn upon the same line to the same 
 scale. Then, if that difference were magnified an infinite number of times, 
 it would still be invisible. This is the theoretical meaning of exactness; 
 the practical meaning is only very close approximation; how close, de- 
 pends upon the circumstances. The knowledge, then, of an exact law in 
 the theoretical sense would be equivalent to an infinite observation. I do 
 not say that such knowledge is impossible to man, but I do say that it 
 would be absolutely different in kind from any knowledge that we possess 
 at present." (Op. cit., pp. 27-29 ) 
 
 The argument in favour of the preferability of mathematical 
 procedure in science is therefore complete. As Lord Kelvin 
 says: "In physical science a first essential step in the direction 
 of learning any subject is to find principles of numerical reckoning 
 and practicable methods for measuring some quality connected 
 with it. I often say that when you can measure what you are 
 speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something 
 about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot 
 express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and 
 unsatisfactory kind: it may be the beginning of knowledge, 
 but you have scarcely, in your thought, advanced to the stage of 
 science, whatever the matter may be." (Constitution of Matter, 
 1891, pp. 80-81.) Yet much maybe accomplished without recon- 
 dite mathematical formulae. We have it on Jevons' authority 
 that Faraday "has made the most extensive additions to human 
 knowledge without passing beyond common arithmetic". (Prin- 
 ciples of Science, p. 579.) And Tyndall, who concurs in Jevons' 
 estimate concerning Faraday's lack of mathematical equipment, 
 says of him: "Taking him for all in all, I think it will be 
 concede^ that Michael Faraday was the greatest experimental 
 philosopher the world has ever seen." (Faraday as a Discoverer, 
 p. 147.) It should not be supposed, therefore, that every distin- 
 guished discoverer is ipso facto a great mathematician, or, to 
 consider the reverse side of the shield, that there is no extensive 
 scope for measurement and computation in the ordinary practical 
 affairs of life.
 
 126 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 51. The case for measurement can be perhaps best stated 
 by allowing an old writer, the founder of methodology, one 
 who has been regarded as unfriendly to mathematics, to speak 
 (Bacon, Novum Organum, bk. 2, 44, 45, and 46): "The chief 
 cause of failure in operation (especially after natures have been 
 diligently investigated) is the ill determination and measurement 
 of the forces and actions of bodies. Now the forces and actions 
 of bodies are circumscribed and measured, either by distances of 
 space, or by moments of time, or by concentration of quantity, 
 or by predominance of virtue; and unless these four things 
 have been weH and carefully weighed, we shall have sciences, 
 fair perhaps in theory, but in practice inefficient." "The powers 
 and motions of things act and take effect at distances, not in- 
 definite or accidental, but finite and fixed ; so that to ascertain 
 and observe these distances in the investigation of the several 
 natures is of the greatest advantage. . . . But whether the 
 distances at which these powers act be great or small, it is 
 certain that they are all finite and fixed in the nature of things, 
 so that there is a certain limit never exceeded; and a limit 
 which depends either on the mass or quantity of matter in the 
 bodies acted on ; or on the strength or weakness of the powers 
 acting; or on the helps or hindrances presented by the media 
 in which they act; all which things should be observed and 
 brought to computation. Moreover, the measurements of violent 
 motions (as they are called), as of projectiles, guns, wheels, 
 and the like, since these also have manifestly their fixed limits, 
 should be observed and computed." "All these things with 
 their measures should in the investigation of nature be explored 
 and set down, either in their certitude, or by estimate, or by 
 comparison as the case will admit." "All motion or natural 
 action is performed in time; some more quickly, some more 
 slowly, but all in periods determined and fixed in the nature 
 of things. Even those actions which seem to be performed 
 suddenly and (as we say) in the twinkling of an eye, are found 
 to admit of degree in respect of duration. First, then, we see 
 that the revolutions of heavenly bodies are accomplished in 
 calculated times; as also the flux and reflux of the sea. The 
 motion of heavy bodies to the earth, and of light bodies towards 
 the heavens, is accomplished in definite periods, varying with 
 the bodies moved and the medium through which they move. 
 The sailing of ships, the movements of animals, the transmission 
 of missiles, are all performed likewise in times which admit (in 
 the aggregate) of measurement. As for heat, we see . boys in 
 winter time bathe their hands in flame without being burned, 
 and jugglers by nimble and equable movements turn vessels 
 full of wine or water upside down and then up again, without 
 spilling the liquid; and many other things of a similar kind. 
 The compressions also and expansions and eruptions of bodies 
 are performed, some more slowly, according to the nature of
 
 SECTION 16. DEFINITE, EXACT, AND MATHEMATICAL PROCEDURE. 127 
 
 the body and motion, but in certain periods. Moreover, in the 
 explosion of several guns at once, which are heard sometimes 
 to the distance of thirty miles, the sound is caught by those 
 who are near the spot where the discharge is made, sooner 
 than by those who are at a greater distance. Even in sight, 
 whereof the action is most rapid, it appears that there are 
 required certain moments of time for its accomplishment; as 
 is shown by those things which by reason of the velocity of 
 their motion cannot be seen as when a ball is discharged from 
 a musket. For the ball flies past in less time than the image 
 conveyed to the sight requires to produce an impression." 
 
 The application of the higher mathematics to science evidently 
 had its origin in the difficulties encountered in direct measure- 
 ment, difficulties which made recourse to complex calculations 
 inevitable. 1 On this subject also, we venture to quote Bacon. 
 This will serve a double purpose, demonstrating both the high 
 scientific and philosophic status of mathematics, and their 
 generous appreciation by Bacon. The gay medievalism of the 
 style renders the more remarkable the sober modernity of the 
 conceptions embodied therein. 
 
 "There remaineth yet another part of natural philosophy, 
 which is commonly made a principal part, and holdeth rank 
 with physic special, and metaphysic, which is mathematic ; but 
 I think it more agreeable to the nature of things, and to the 
 light of order, to place it as a branch of metaphysic: for the 
 subject of it being quantity, not quantity indefinite, which is but 
 a relative, and belongeth to philosophia prima, as hath been 
 said, but quantity determined, or proportionable, it appeareth to 
 be one of the essential forms of things ; as that that is causative 
 in nature of a number of effects ; insomuch as we see, in the 
 schools both of Democritus and Pythagoras, that the one did 
 ascribe Figure to the first seeds of things, and the other did 
 suppose Numbers to be the principles and originals of things ; 
 and it is true also, that of all other forms, as we understand 
 forms, it is the most abstracted and separable from matter, 
 and therefore most proper to metaphysic ; which hath likewise 
 been the cause why it hath been better laboured and enquired, 
 than any of the other forms, which are more immersed in 
 matter. 
 
 "For it being the nature of the mind of man (to the extreme 
 prejudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious liberty of 
 generalities, as in a champaign region, and not in the inclosures 
 of particularity; the mathematics of all other knowledge were 
 the goodliest fields to satisfy the appetite. 
 
 "The Mathematics are either pure or mixed. To the pure 
 mathematics are those sciences belonging which handle quantity 
 
 1 A comprehensive survey of this problem will be found in Leon Brun- 
 schvicg's work already cited.
 
 128 PART II.-SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 determinate, merely severed from any axioms of natural philo- 
 sophy; and these are two, Geometry and Arithmetic; the one 
 handling quantity continued, and the other dissevered. Mixed 
 hath for subject some axioms or parts of natural philosophy, 
 and considereth quantity determined, as it is auxiliary and 
 incident unto them. 
 
 "For many parts of nature can neither be invented with 
 sufficient subtilty, nor demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity, 
 nor accommodated unto use with sufficient dexterity, without 
 the aid and the intervening of the mathematics ; of which sort 
 are perspective, music, astronomy, cosmography, architecture, 
 enginery, and divers others. 
 
 "In the mathematics I can report no deficience, except it be 
 that men do not sufficiently understand the excellent use of 
 the pure mathematics, in that they do remedy and cure many 
 defects in the wit and faculties intellectual. For, if the wit be 
 dull, they sharpen it; if too wandering, they fix it; if too 
 inherent in the sense, they abstract it. So that as tennis is 
 a game of no use in itself, but of great use in respect it maketh 
 a quick eye, and a body ready to put itself into all postures; 
 so in the mathematics, that use which is collateral and inter- 
 venient, is no less worthy than that which is principal and 
 intended." (Advancement of Learning.) 
 
 52. (B) DEFINITION OF TERMS. However, a bridge 
 exists connecting mathematical rigidity with commonsense flui- 
 dity. This bridge comes into being so soon as a science com- 
 mences to define its terms with fair precision, and makes itself 
 thus independent of a fluctuating terminology. 
 
 Where the conceptions are, as in physics, of severe simplicity, 
 it is frequently practicable to define them, though not without 
 having to allow for the ambiguities incidental to the complexity 
 of objects and to the readjustments necessitated by new dis- 
 coveries. Every science must thus aim at evolving a termino- 
 logy of its own where each term is unequivocally defined, 
 and a science is therefore progressing indifferently when it is 
 without a terminology which is being fashioned more and more 
 to assume the form of a series of unvarying and universally 
 accepted definitions, as in the nomenclature of chemistry and 
 the terminology of botany. It is patent that we cannot satis- 
 factorily define what we are acquainted with only imperfectly, 
 and that if knowledge can only be acquired by degrees, a defini- 
 tion cannot be flawless all at once, but must grow in exactitude. 
 For this reason, the least advanced sciences are in a sorry 
 predicament. This is particularly noticeable where the termino- 
 logy of a science is bodily transferred from the every-day 
 terminology; and the evil reaches the highwater mark when 
 the tacit assumption prevails, as in psychology and ethics, that 
 the terminology of the market place is substantially satisfactory, 
 and that there is consequently no need for its improvement
 
 SECTION 16.-DEFINITE, EXACT, AND MATHEMATICAL PROCEDURE. 129 
 
 or definition. 1 Such an attitude is manifestly erroneous. Rather 
 should there be from the very first the most determined resolve 
 to define terms as accurately as possible, to ensure that the 
 term is comprehensive in meaning, and to remodel the defini- 
 tions incessantly according to need. The indeterminateness of 
 language constitutes one of the weightiest reasons for pressing 
 an enquiry to the furthest limits practicable in order to obtain 
 the maximum of clearness and definiteness, and this indeter- 
 minateness presents also the heaviest indictment against a loose 
 or undefined use of terms in science. Ideally speaking, there- 
 fore, individual investigations pertaining to a new science should 
 extend to a life-time, should be pursued with eyes ever vigilant 
 to detect new facts and new relations, and should restlessly aim 
 at an increasingly exact, exhaustive, durable, and convenient 
 terminology. A science, then, commences in perplexing indefi- 
 niteness, and tends to terminate in dogmatic definiteness. It 
 is even indispensable that there should be a clear consciousness 
 of the inappropriateness of attempting, at the beginning of a 
 new investigation, to cast the results achieved into a mathemati- 
 cal mould, just as it should be an ambition and aspiration from 
 the first to attain to progressively greater exactitude and, even- 
 tually, to mathematical formulation. 
 
 53. (C) PRECISION IN STATEMENTS If precision in the 
 use of terms is the pre-requisite of accurate scientific activity, 
 precision in general statements is its crowning glory. A vague 
 terminology bewilders the inquirer and gravely impedes advance, 
 and the circumstances are only slightly less disastrous when 
 instead of cautiously framed definitions, we are faced by an 
 interminable series of more or less nebulous generalisations.. 
 The methodological ideal is evidently that the material results 
 of an enquiry should be presented (as by Spinoza) in a chain 
 of definitions, accompanied by pithy explanations and a few apt 
 illustrations, because just as in the attempt to define terms 
 exactly, the maximum of error is eliminated, the endeavour 
 precisely to define general truths leads to a degree of reliability 
 in results otherwise scarcely ever attained. Any attempt at 
 consistent definition very speedily reveals that it is one thing 
 to formulate a general statement, and another to shape this 
 statement so faithfully that it should resist critical and minute 
 scrutiny. It is, therefore, essential for the scientific worker to 
 be aiming at definitions from the commencement to the con- 
 summation of the enquiry, both because it will clarify and con- 
 centrate his thought, and because it will place him in a posi- 
 tion to proceed deductively with increased assurance. Indeed, 
 deduction can only be pursued with full confidence and with 
 tolerable success when the scientific worker has been throughout 
 
 1 The advantages are dubious of substituting one series of terms for 
 another virtually equivalent in meaning, as when thinking, feeling, and 
 willing become cognition, affection, and conation. 
 
 9
 
 130 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 striving to frame incontrovertible definitions, and when the 
 anterior inductive enquiry is compressed into a definition. 
 Should these epitomised statements, however, be excessively 
 difficult to reach, then definitions as rigid as possible should 
 be the goal of scientific endeavour. 
 
 54. (D) DEFINITENESS IN SCIENTIFIC WORK GE- 
 NERALLY. This leads us naturally to recognise the need for 
 definiteness generally, leaving no more of the activities in a 
 fog or undetermined than is inevitable. Such an attitude of 
 mind will prick any number of iridescent bubbles which un- 
 warrantably arrest our untrained attention; it will secure that 
 we do not pass to the second stage before the first stage is 
 completed; it will circumvent mountains of errors; and it will 
 ensure a rapid and safe advance. 
 
 In a word, a true methodology demands definiteness (a) in 
 terms, (b) in general statements, and (c) in work generally, 
 requiring mathematical treatment wherever practicable. Pro- 
 cedure may be said to be exact when it is mathematical, and 
 when definiteness is aimed at in terms, in statements, and in 
 work generally. 
 
 55. (E) MATHEMATICAL AND NON-MATHEMATICAL 
 PROCEDURE. To conclude. In view of the opinion which 
 widely obtains that mathematics is separated, as it were, by a 
 gulf from the inductive sciences through its abstractness, its 
 irresistible demonstrations, and its mode of procedure, it is 
 interesting to find that, of recent years, three mathematicians 
 have sought to show that no such breach exists. The last of 
 the three utterances is that of Prof. E. W. Hobson, F.R.S., and 
 is contained in his Presidential Address to the Mathematical 
 and Physical Science Section of the British Association in 1910. 
 We shall let him speak: 
 
 "In the first place, it is a fact that frequently, and at various times, 
 differences of opinion have existed among mathematicians, giving rise to 
 controversies as to the validity of whole lines of reasoning aad affecting 
 the results of such reasoning; a considerable amount of difference of 
 opinion of this character exists among mathematicians at the present time. 
 In the second place, the accepted standard of rigour, that is, the standard 
 of what is deemed necessary to constitute a valid demonstration, has 
 undergone change in the course of time. Much of the reasoning which 
 was formerly regarded as satisfactory and irrefutable is now regarded as 
 insufficient to establish the results which it was employed to demonstrate. 
 It has even been shown that results which were once supposed to have 
 been fully established by demonstrations are, in point of fact, affected 
 with error." (British Association's Report of 1910, p. 514.) "That oldest 
 text-book of science in the world, Euclid's Elements of Geometry, has 
 been popularly held for centuries to be the very model of deductive 
 logical demonstration. Criticism has, however, largely invalidated this 
 view." (Ibid., p. 516.) "The actual evolution of mathematical theories 
 proceeds by a process of induction strictly analogous to the method of 
 induction employed in building up the physical sciences : observation, 
 comparison, classification, trial, and generalisation are essential in both 
 cases." (Ibid., p. 520.)
 
 SECTION 16. DEFINITE, EXACT, AND MATHEMATICAL PROCEDURE. 131 
 
 Our second citation is from a paper in a volume entitled De 
 la methode dans les sciences, 1910, contributed by M. J. Tannery, 
 Membre de PInstitut. The importance of the subject must justify 
 our rather lengthy quotation: 
 
 "Comme toutes les autres sciences, les mathematiques se sont deve- 
 loppees par 1'accroissement des verites particulieres, d'une part, et, de 
 1'autre, par 1'acquisition d'idges et de theories de plus en plus generates. 
 Tous les grands geometres ont eu, a la fois, le gout du particulier et du 
 general, des faits precis et des vastes speculations; quelques-uns, peut- 
 etre, preferaient regarder d'un cote on de 1'autre. Mais le progres dans 
 un sens s'est toujours mele au progres dans 1'autre ; d'une part, la con- 
 naissance d'une loi generate permet d'atteindre plus de faits particuliers ; 
 d'autre part, la generalite d'un raisonnement, d'une methode, apparait 
 mieux sur un fait particulier que sur un autre. 
 
 "Dire que tout accroissement d'une science resulte de Fetat de cette 
 science, au moment oil se produit cet accroissement, c'est faire une affirma- 
 tion bien banale, mais a laquelle on ne donne pas assez d'attention, quand 
 il s'agit des mathematiques, d'autant que toute proposition decouverte est 
 rattachee aux axiomes par cela meme qu'elle est demontree, et qu'il 
 semble qu'on aurait pu aussi bien la deduire des axiomes, n'importe 
 quand: cela semble a ceux qui regardent la science faite, non la science 
 qui se fait. 
 
 '"En vain', dit Galois 1 , 'les analystes voudraient-ils se le dissimuler: 
 ils ne deduisent pas, ils combinent, ils comparent; quand ils arrivent a 
 la verite, c'est en heurtant de cote et d'autre qu'ils y sont tombes. . . ." 
 (Ibid., pp. 62-63.) 
 
 "Dans les diverses sciences, la matiere et les instruments different, la 
 marche de 1'invention est la meme. Memes essais, memes tatonnements, 
 meme patience active et tendue, pour ainsi dire, vers un objet qui s'eclaire 
 parfois, memes espoirs trompes, meme finesse et meme imagination 
 pour saisir les analogies, les liens caches, les rapports inattendus. . . . Au 
 mathematicien, quand il a trouve une loi, on demande plus qu'au physi- 
 cien ; sans doute, celui-ci souhaite rattacher sa loi a une theorie generale ; 
 mais le mathematicien doit la demontrer; la proposition n'est vraiment 
 acquise, et certaine, que lorsqu'elle a ete rattachee aux axiomes. II est 
 fort remarquable qu'on ait donne le nom ^'induction a 1'un des precedes 
 de demonstration, qui consiste a decouvrir dans Fenonce une necessite 
 interne telle qu'il ne peut etre vrai quelquefois sans Fetre toujours: les 
 experiences ou on Fa trouve vrai suffisent a 1'entiere certitude. II y a 
 de tres beaux exemples de ce mode de demonstration. 
 
 "Sans doute, ce n'est pas toujours d'une fagon directe que 1'on applique 
 la methode experimentale en mathematiques. II reste vrai que la science 
 acquise, telle qu'il la possede, fournit au mathematicien une matiere et 
 des instruments tres puissants d'observation et de transformation. Que 
 de calculs numeriques auraient ete impossibles sans un instrument aussi 
 merveilleux que la numeration decimale! Que de ressources apportent 
 les methodes de calcul algebrique, de calcul integral, les transformations 
 geometriques! Que de moyens pour rapprocher Finconnu du connu, pour 
 eclairer Fun au moyen de 1'autre, pour changer une verite en une autre, pour 
 reconnaitre Fidentite de propositions qui semblaient, tout d'abord, ne pas 
 appartenir au meme domaine! Et ces moyens s'accroissent d'annee en 
 annee, se perfectionnent, deviennent plus aises a manier, se compliquent, 
 permettent d'atteindre plus loin. 
 
 "La matiere a ouvrer ne manque pas et ne manquera jamais. 
 
 "On peut faire des progres utiles, parfois importants, en cherchant a 
 mieux connaitre ce qui est deja connu, en appliquant des methodes connues 
 
 1 Manuscrits et papiers inedits de Galois. (Bulletin des sciences mathe- 
 matiques, 2 e serie, t. XXX, p. 260.)
 
 132 PART 1I.SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 a des fails connus. Certaines propositions apparaissent d'abord comme 
 isolees, ou bien Ton ne sait y parvenir que par un seul chemin; ou 
 encore on ne sait deduire que d'une facon une suite de propositions. 
 Pour relier ces propositions ou ces theories isolees, pour y parvenir par 
 des voies nouvelles, pour multiplier les chemins de traverse, le travailleuv 
 dispose parfois de methodes plus puissantes que celles dont ses predeces- 
 seurs ont du se contenter; il peut trouver des voies plus directes, des 
 demonstrations plus simples, et rencontrer, chemin faisant, quelque fait 
 important sur lequel 1'attention n'avait pas ete attiree. Les travaux de 
 cette nature, si meme ils sont modestes, contribuent a 1'organisation de 
 la science. Us peuvent avoir un caractere tres eleve et temoigner, chez 
 leur auteur, d'une rare imagination mathematique." (Ibid., pp. 65-67.) 
 
 "Par 1'observation et la comparaison des proprietes deja connues des 
 fonctions ou des figures, par la reflexion attentive sur ce connu, des 
 questions se posent au travailleur: quelques-unes se posent naturellement. 
 Elles sont, par exemple, resolues pour certaines fonctions ou certaines 
 figures, comment ne pas se les poser pour d'autres fonctions ou d'autres 
 figures, dont on connait deja quelques propriety? Les unes sont plus 
 ou moins aisees a resoudre, ou a aborder, par des methodes connues, et 
 les faits particuliers s'accumulent ainsi. D'autres restent ouvertes pendant 
 des siecles. 
 
 "Les questions s'enchatnent, se generalised, se multiplient." (/&/</., p. 68.) 
 
 "Que dire du genie d'invention, de 1'imagination creatrice? On ne 
 s'attend pas a ce que j'essaie d'en esquisser la psychologic. 1 Voici, autant 
 qu'on en peut juger par les oeuvres des grands geometres, quelques-uns 
 de ses efforts et de ses resultats, et cette enumeration ne sera qu'un 
 resume de ce que je me suis efforce de decrire plus haut: Decouvrir de 
 nouveaux liens entre les choses, attaquer des questions deja posees avec 
 les methodes perfectionnees que fournissent les progres de la science, 
 preciser un probleme qui, peut-etre, etait implicitement contenu dans les 
 travaux ant6rieurs, lui donner 'une forme telle qu'il soit toujours possible 
 de la resoudre', 2 pressentir la solution et y parvenir, choisir les questions 
 qui auront une grande portee, deviner cette portee, saisir, dans le pale 
 reflet qu'il laisse sur les faits particuliers le rayonnement d'une th6orie 
 generate, s'elever jusqu'a cette theorie, jusqu'au point ou les faits qui 
 ont permis de la decouvrir ne sont plus qu'une infime partie du monde 
 de verites qu'elle illumine. . . . Les exemples de pareilles decouvertes 
 ne manquent pas dans 1'histoire des mathematiques, et notre temps n'en 
 a pas ete prive." (Ibid., p. 71.) 
 
 " En s'organisant, les mathematiques tendent vers une forme deductive 
 plus parfaite. Mais ne peut-on en dire autant des autres sciences?" 
 (Ibid., p. 72.) 
 
 M. Poincare (Science et methode, 1908, p. 2) defends the 
 same standpoint: "Le mecanisme de 1'invention mathematique 
 ne differe pas sensiblement du mecanisme de 1'invention en 
 general." 
 
 SECTION XVII. -INDUCTION. 
 
 56. John Stuart Mill proposes several definitions of the 
 term Induction. He tells us that "Induction may be defined 
 as the operation of discovering and proving general proposi- 
 tions". (Logic, bk. 3, ch. 1, 2.) This would, therefore, in- 
 
 1 On trouvera dans Science et mtthode de M. H. Poincare (p. 43) un 
 chapitre extremement interessant sur ce sujet. 
 - Abel, CEuvres, Ed. Sylow, t. II, p. 217.
 
 SECTION 17. INDUCTION. 133 
 
 elude, according to our examination, the process of perceiving 
 objects, that of observing and experimenting with or without 
 instruments, that of generalising, and, finally, that of verifying 
 and exhausting our generalisations through deductive procedure 
 and otherwise. We could not adopt another definition of Mill's 
 which conceives induction to be conterminous with generali- 
 sation, as when he states: "Induction is the process by which 
 we conclude that what is true of certain individuals of a class 
 is true of the whole class, or that what is true at certain times 
 will be true in similar circumstances at all times" 1 (ibid., bk. 3, 
 ch. 2, 1); but we do appreciate the fact that generalising or 
 induction, as Mill names it if it be guarded and yet not defi- 
 cient in daring, is relatively the most useful, because most 
 far-reaching, portion of the process of induction. The first 
 definition prevents the confounding of the two terms Generali- 
 sation and Induction, and assigns a distinctive meaning to 
 each of those terms ; yet even this definition is not sufficiently 
 comprehensive, since it is not identical with an enquiry as 
 such. 
 
 It is difficult to define truly the process of induction, save 
 perhaps by such an ambiguous phrase, as that Induction sums 
 up the general method of procedure in modern science.- The 
 pre-scientific practice was to draw conclusions from insufficient 
 
 1 In Mill's opinion induction implies an inference from certain particulars 
 to a class. For this reason, when all the particulars are given, we have, 
 according to him, "Inductions improperly so called''. He thus identifies in- 
 duction with the more common form of generalising, and leaves no term 
 to denominate the scientific process as such. 
 
 2 Induction is "a kind of argument which infers, respecting a whole class, 
 what has been ascertained respecting one or more individuals of that class". 
 (Whately, Logic, p. 344.) 
 
 "The contrast of the deductive and inductive process is obvious. In the 
 former, we proceed at each step from general truths to particular applications 
 of them ; in the latter, from particular observations to a general truth which 
 includes them." (Whewell, History of Scientific Ideas, vol. 1, p. 28.) ''Each 
 induction supplies the materials of fresh inductions, each generalisation, 
 with all that it embraces in its circle, may be found to be but one of many 
 circles, comprehended within the circuit of some wider generalisation." tfbid., 
 p. 50.) "The process of induction may be resolved into three steps: the 
 selection of the idea, the construction of the conception, arid the determi- 
 nation of the magnitudes." (Novum Organon Renovatum, p. 186.) 
 
 "Induction is the arriving at general propositions, by means of Obser- 
 vation or Fact." (Bain, Logic, vol.2, p. 111.) "Induction so-called is merely 
 a certain collection of particulars, with generalised expression superadded; 
 deduction is the bringing in of new particulars." (Ibid., p. 419.) 
 
 "There are but three steps in the process of induction: (1) Framing some 
 hypothesis as to the character of the general law. (2) Deducing consequences 
 from that law. (3) Observing whether the consequences agree with the parti- 
 cular facts under consideration." (Jevons, Principles of Science, pp. 265-266.) 
 "In all cases of inductive inference we must invent hypotheses, until we 
 fall upon some hypothesis which yields deductive results in accordance 
 with experience." (Ibid., p. 228.) 
 
 "Every process of induction and deduction may be broadly described as 
 a cognition and a recognition." (Naden, Induction and Deduction, p. 92.)
 
 134 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 and generally spurious evidence, or lightly to postulate a general 
 truth or law of nature and recklessly to deduce consequences. 
 To-day facts are closely scrutinised, cautiously generalised, and, 
 in this form, utilised for deductive ends. Induction is, there- 
 fore, the process of discovering and proving general propositions 
 which summarise an enquiry, rather than the discovery and proof 
 of generalisations as such. One should even, as we have done, 
 include the process of deduction in the definition, because de- 
 duction, as an integral component of the general process of 
 
 'Induction is a process of cognition involving recognitions. Deduction is a 
 process of recognition involving cognitions." (Ibid., p. 100.) 
 
 "Induction, then, is the reference to reality of a system on the ground 
 of particular differences within it by which reality is taken as qualified." 
 (Bosanquet, Logic, vol. 2, p. 179.) 
 
 "Der Ausdruck Induction wird im eigentlichsten und strengsten Sinne 
 dann gebraucht, wenn von dem Einzelnen, das sich durch Beobachtung fest- 
 stellen lasst, auf das Allgemeine geschlossen wird." (Uberweg, System der 
 Logik, p. 371.) 
 
 "The inductive methods, it is certain, are the most effectual helps to the 
 attainment of new truth, but it is no less certain that they rest entirely on 
 the results of deductive logic." (Lotze, Logic, vol. 2, p. 22.) 
 
 "Induction is the operation by which we pass from the knowledge of 
 facts to those of the laws which rule them." (Lachelier, Du fondement de 
 {'induction, Paris, 1896, p. 3.) 
 
 "The process of induction [is] the method of obtaining universal pro- 
 positions from particular perceptions." (Sigwart, Logic, vol. 2, p. 288.) 
 
 "Nach dem Grad der Allgemeinheit . . . konnen wir nun drei Stufen der 
 Induction unterscheiden : (1) Die Auffindung empirischer Gesetze; (2) die 
 Verbindung einzelner empirischer Gesetze zu allgemeineren Erfahrungs- 
 gesetzen; endlich (3) die Ableitung von Kausalgesetzen und die logische 
 Begrundung der Tatsachen." (Wundt, Logik, vol. 2, p. 25.) 
 
 "Inductive logic aims at understanding and classifying the methods of 
 the sciences." (Mellone, Introductory Text- book of Logic, 1905, p. 245.) 
 
 "The essential steps in the inductive method are: (1) The formation of a 
 hypothesis suggested by a first observation of facts. (2) The deduction of 
 the consequences of this hypothesis. (3) The testing of these consequences 
 by a careful analysis of phenomena. (4) The consequent exact definition 
 of the hypothesis, which then, as expressing the true universal nature ot 
 reality, is verified and received as an established theory or law." (James 
 Welton, A Manual of Logic, vol. 2, p. 60.) 
 
 "Induction may be defined as the legitimate inference of the unknown 
 from the known. . . . Induction is not only an inference of the unknown 
 from the known; but, in virtue of that fact, of the general from the parti- 
 cular." (Thomas Fowler, Logic, Deductive and Inductive, vol. 2, pp. 9-10.) 
 
 "Die Induction ist nicht der Weg zu den nothwendigen Wahrheiten, sondern 
 der Weg zu der Verbindung der nothwendigen Wahrheiten mit den zufalligen 
 Wahrheiten." (E. F. Apelt, Die Theorie der Induction, 1854, p. 56.) 
 
 (See also A. C. Mukerji, A Text-Book of Inductive Logic, 1914 ; E. L. Haw- 
 kins, The Oxford Handbook of Logic, Deductive and Inductive, J.913; A. K. 
 Trivedi, Studies in Inductive Logic, 1914; A. C. Mitra, The Principles of Logic, 
 Deductive and Inductive, 2 vols., 1912; A. Subrahmanyam, Logic, Inductive 
 and Deductive, 1911 ; ,T. Dastets, Logic, Inductive and Deductive, 1905 ; J. Coffey. 
 The Science of Logic, 2 vols., 1912 ; W. R. Boyce Gibson, The Problem of 
 Logic, 1908; Paul Natorp, Die logischen Grundlagen der exacten Wissen- 
 schaften, 1910; A. Gratry, Logique, 2 vols., 1868; W. Minto, Logic, Inductive 
 and Deductive, 1893 ; J. Welton, Groundwork of Logic, 1917 ; Carveth Read, 
 Logic, Deductive and Inductive, 1906.)
 
 SECTION 1 7.IND UCTION. \ 35 
 
 scientific discovery, cannot be justifiably dissociated from in- 
 duction, especially if it originates in established generalisations 
 and terminates in verification. So long as some men relied on 
 sagacity, instinct, or other mysterious properties of the mind, 
 for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion and utilising it, 
 in an equally magical manner, for deductive ends, and other 
 men diligently sought for general truths only by mechanically 
 producing complete enumerations, a contrast and a separation 
 were possible; but in our day there can only be, in harmony 
 with practical necessities, a question of varying emphasis on 
 these two instruments of thought. The fundamental conception 
 underlying both terms may be said, therefore, to 'be the syste- 
 matic and conscientious reliance on, and exploitation of, direct 
 experience according to the most recent and most refined 
 methods of enquiry. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the pre- 
 sumed independence of, and rivalry between, the two primal 
 elements of the one scientific process will soon be regarded 
 as apparent rather than as real. 1 
 
 57. Macaulay denies all originality to Bacon, the founder 
 of the inductive method. He declares: "The inductive method 
 has been practised ever since the beginning of the world by every 
 human being. It is constantly practised by the most ignorant 
 clown, by the most thoughtless schoolboy, by the very child at 
 the breast. That method leads the clown to the conclusion that 
 if he sows barley he shall not reap wheat. By that method a 
 schoolboy learns that a cloudy day is the best for catching tr&ut. 
 The very infant, we imagine, is led by induction to expect milk 
 from his mother or nurse, and none from his father." (Essays, 
 ed. 1885, p. 407.) He even ventures so far as to aver that the 
 plain man has nothing to learn from Bacon's presentation of 
 that method. He furnishes this amusing instance: "A plain man 
 finds his stomach out of order. He never heard Lord Bacon's 
 name. But he proceeds in the strictest conformity with the 
 rules laid down in the second book of the Novum Organum, 
 and satisfies himself that mince pies have done the mischief. 
 'I ate minced pies on Monday and Wednesday, and I was kept 
 awake by indigestion all night.' This is the comparentia ad 
 intellectum instantianim convenientium. 'I did not eat any on 
 Tuesday and Friday, and I was quite well.' This is the com- 
 parentia instantiarum in proximo qua? natura data privantur. 
 'I ate very sparingly of them on Sunday, and was very slightly 
 indisposed in the evening. But on Christmas-day I almost dined 
 on them, and was so ill that I was in great danger.' This is the 
 comparentia instantiarum secundum magis et minus. 'It cannot 
 have been the brandy which I took with them. For I have 
 drunk brandy daily for years without being the worse for it.' 
 
 1 Comte uses the word Generalisation and Systematisation in the place 
 of Induction and Deduction.
 
 136 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 This is the rejectio naturarum. Our invalid then proceeds to what 
 is termed by Bacon the Vindemiatio, and pronounces that minced 
 pies do not agree with him." 1 (Ibid., p. 407.) And a little further 
 down he dismisses Bacon in this manner : " His rules are quite 
 proper ; but we do not need them, because they are drawn from 
 our own constant practice." (Ibid., p. 408.) 
 
 If Macaulay's remarkable illustration be typical of the way 
 men reason, Bacon was certainly altogether overrating the value 
 of his efforts, but, in truth, the plain man does not reason in 
 such matters once in a hundred times in accordance with 
 Bacon's precepts. 
 
 Huxley appears to echo Macaulay: "You have all heard it repeated, 
 I daresay, that men of science work by means of induction and deduction, 
 and that by the help of these operations, they, in a sort of sense, wring 
 from nature certain other things which are called natural laws and causes, 
 and that out of these, by some cunning skill of their own, they build up 
 hypotheses and theories. And it is imagined by many that the operations 
 of the common mind can be by no means compared with these processes, 
 and that they have to be acquired by a sort of special apprenticeship to 
 the craft. To hear all these large words you would think that the mind 
 of a man of science must be constituted differently from that of his fellow- 
 men; but if you will not be frightened by terms, you will discover that 
 you are quite wrong, and that all these terrible apparatus are being used 
 by yourselves every day and every hour of your lives. . . . 
 
 "A very trivial circumstance will serve to exemplify this. Suppose 
 you go into a fruiterer's shop, wanting an apple. You take up one, and, 
 on biting it, you find it is sour; you look at it, and see that it is hard 
 and green. You take up another one, and that too is hard, green, and 
 s8ur. The shopman offers you a third; but, before biting it, you examine 
 it, and find that it is hard and green, and you immediately say that you 
 will not have it, as it must be sour, like those that you have already 
 tried. 
 
 "Nothing can be more simple than that, you think; but if you will take 
 the trouble to analyse and trace out into its logical elements what has 
 been done by the mind, you will be greatly surprised. In the first place, 
 you have performed the operation of induction. You found that, in two 
 experiences, hardness and greenness in apples went together with sourness. 
 It was so in the first case, and it was confirmed by the second. True, 
 it is a very small basis, but still it is enough to make an induction from; 
 you generalise the facts, and you expect to find sourness in apples where 
 you get hardness and greenness. You found upon that a general law that 
 all hard and green apples are sour; and that, so far as it goes, is a perfect 
 induction. Well, having got your natural law in this way, when you are 
 offered another apple, which you find is hard and green, you say: 'All 
 hard and green apples are sour; this apple is hard and green, therefore this 
 apple is sour.' That train of reasoning is what logicians call a syllogism, 
 and has all its various parts and terms its major premiss, its minor 
 premiss, and its conclusion. And, by the help of further reasoning, which, 
 if drawn out, would have to be exhibited in two or three other syllogisms, 
 you arrive at your final determination 'I will not have that apple'. So 
 that, you see, you have, in the first place, established a law by induction, 
 
 "Look over the induction, and it will appear that the case is not made 
 out ; an exclusion is wanting : it may have been the mixture of minced pies 
 and brandy which did the mischief." (A. De Morgan, Formal Logic, 1847, 
 p. 218.) De Morgan challenges Macaulay's reasoning throughout. See the 
 above work, pp. 218-224.
 
 SECTION 17. INDUCTION. 137 
 
 and upon that you have founded a deduction, and reasoned out the special 
 conclusion of the particular case. Well now, suppose, having got your law, 
 that at some time afterwards you are discussing the qualities of apples 
 with a friend, you will say to him, 'It is a very curious thing, but I find 
 that all hard and green apples are sour!' Your friend says to you, 'But 
 how do you know that?' You at once reply: 'Oh, because I have tried 
 them over and over again, and have always found them to be so.' Well, 
 if we were talking science instead of common sense, we should call that 
 an experimental verification. And, if still opposed, you go further, and 
 say: 4 I have heard from the people in Somersetshire and Devonshire, 
 where a large number of apples are grown, that they have observed the 
 same thing. It is also found to be the case in Normandy, and in North 
 America. In short, I find it to be the universal experience of mankind 
 wherever attention has been directed to the subject.' Whereupon your 
 friend, unless he is a very unreasonable man, agrees with you, and is 
 convinced that you are quite right in the conclusion you have drawn. 
 He believes, although, perhaps, he does not know he believes it, that the 
 more extensive verifications are that the more frequently experiments 
 have been made, and results of the same kind arrived at that the more 
 varied the conditions under which the same results are attained, the more 
 certain is the ultimate conclusion, and he disputes the question no further. 
 He sees that the experiment has been tried under all sorts of conditions, 
 as to time, place, and people, with the same result; and he says with 
 you, therefore, that the law you have laid down must be a good one, and 
 he must believe it. 
 
 "In science we do the same thing the philosopher exercises precisely 
 the same faculties, though in a much more delicate manner. In scientific- 
 inquiry it becomes a matter of duty to expose a supposed law to every 
 possible kind of verification, and to take care, moreover, that this is done 
 intentionally, and not left to a mere accident, as in the case of the apples. 
 And in science, as in common life, our confidence in a law is in exact 
 proportion to the absence of variation in the result of our experimental 
 verifications." (Twelve Lectures and Essays, ed. 1915, pp. 39-41.) 
 
 First of all, note the fact that the effects of eating mince 
 pies are notorious ; and that, therefore, the argument begs the 
 question. Secondly, a "plain man" who remembered all appo- 
 site facts so completely and correctly, would be looked upon as 
 a nine days' wonder among plain men. Thirdly, as De Morgan 
 had pointed out, the plain man did not consider the effect of 
 a mixture in the diet. The following instance, perhaps, more 
 nearly typifies unaided reasoning concerning matters unknown, 
 and betokens simultaneously where Bacon's rules are sinned 
 against. Some one typifying vast multitudes had recourse to 
 a certain universal patent medicine for a certain ailment and 
 recovered; therefore that patent medicine, he tacitly concluded, 
 had cured him and will cure everybody of all ailments. Some 
 other universal patent medicine which he had tried previously 
 to this one, was not connected, so he surmises, with his reco- 
 very, therefore all other patent medicines are ineffective, if not 
 injurious. Or to mention a humorous case cited in an English 
 court of law during 1914 : A typhoid patient having recovered 
 despite of eating herrings, a medical student entered in his 
 diary the words: "Herring cures typhoid." Shortly afterwards, 
 whilst in Prance, this same student benevolently prescribed
 
 138 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 herring to a typhoid patient. On the latter dying, he made a 
 further entry: "Herring cures typhoid in England, but not in 
 France." 1 
 
 58. To consider a more important problem. Some one 
 does not sleep well, and desires to ascertain the cause. Does 
 he sleep perhaps too much or too little? Is he too warm or 
 too cold in bed? Are the bed-clothes too heavy? Is there 
 insufficient or too much fresh air in the room ? Does he breathe 
 under the bed-clothes? Does he eat or drink too much or too 
 little, or too late, or not late enough at night? Do the meat, 
 the vegetables, the cheese, the bread, the milk, the coffee, or 
 the condiments, disagree with him? Has he insufficient or too 
 much open-air exercise? Is he over- or under-worked, or has 
 he anxieties, or is he consumed by ennui? Is his health im- 
 paired? Etc., etc. Pity the man who will trust solely to ex- 
 periment in such a circumstance, or rush to a conclusion ! Yet 
 if he will consult his medical adviser, he will probably obtain 
 a satisfactory reply in a few minutes, for such is the power of 
 science, even an imperfect science like medicine. However, his 
 many questions are themselves reflections of scientific concep- 
 tions which the truly "plain man" is without. Not always have 
 we mince pies to aid us in arriving at a conclusion. 
 
 Or let us submit a problem dealt with by Dr. Fishberg, a 
 model investigator the stature of the Jews. Comparing the 
 average height of the Jews with the average height of the 
 contemporaneous population of Europe, we find that the Jews 
 are short of stature. Yet the problem is not so simple. Were 
 the ancestors of the Jews short? Should we not allow for the 
 fact that the conscripts measured had not grown to full stature ? 
 Since the Jews are mostly town-dwellers, may this not account 
 for the shortness ? May not their indoor occupation of a seden- 
 tary character, stunt them ? And are not the poverty and pri- 
 vation which exist among so considerable a percentage of the 
 Jews conducive to short stature? Since Jews do not dwell in 
 large numbers in countries where the stature of man is rela- 
 tively high, is it not feasible that in a general estimate they 
 should appear nearer the bottom of the scale ? Ought we not 
 to remember that Jews of different countries vary in height 
 relatively to the general population of those countries? And 
 does not consumption preferably attack the taller Jews, and 
 therefore tend to shorten average stature? 
 
 In the same cautious spirit, Dr. Fishberg investigates various 
 other alleged physical and mental characteristics of the Jews, 
 
 1 The illustrations which Macaulay supplies appear to show that he was 
 in need of Bacon's Canons. Because some boys learn that a cloudy day is 
 the best for trout catching, it does not follow that all boys learn it, nor that 
 schoolboys do not transgress countless times against Bacon's rules. Macaulay's 
 reasoning here is a fair example of precipitate inference, which respect for 
 Bacon's methods would have obviated.
 
 SECTION 17 INDUCTION. 139 
 
 showing the un-Baconian reasoning which commonly obtains 
 on this subject. 
 
 Let us examine an almost critical instance. Before 1884 the 
 personnel of the Japanese navy suffered cruelly from the disease 
 known as beri-beri. The ratio of illness from beri-beri per 100 
 of the force during 1878 to 1883 was 32.80, 38.93, 34.81, 25.06, 
 40.45, 23.12. "In 1882, when there was a prospect of war with 
 Korea, most of the crews of the five largest ships of war in 
 the Japanese navy were prostrated with the disease. . . . The 
 victims often suffered from three to four times a year from the 
 disease." In the following year, on a long cruise of a Japanese 
 warship, "there developed on the voyage over one hundred 
 cases of the disease out of less than 350 persons on board". 
 But beri-beri is found outside the navy. The army had its 
 liberal share of the affliction, and so had the general population. 
 The disease is very frequent with pregnant women, and is most 
 prevalent in summer. The "plain man" was baffled. Not so 
 Doctor Takaki, Surgeon-General of the Japanese navy. "He 
 noticed the great disproportion between the number of cases 
 occurring on warships and those in barracks, and he thought 
 this might result from the difference between the food supplied 
 aboard ship and that supplied ashore." On examination he 
 found "that the proportion, of carbo-hydrates in the food was 
 in excess of the requirements, and that the proteids were defi- 
 cient". 1 He made an experiment. He persuaded the admiralty 
 to despatch a vessel of the same type as the warship mentioned, 
 on the same long voyage, but with a new dietary. The result 
 was that when the Takauba reached Honolulu on her return trip, 
 she had three cases, as against 125 cases of the first vessel, on 
 board. Subsequently, the naval dietary was reformed, with the 
 magnificent result that during 1885 to 1889 the ratio of beri-beri 
 fell to 0.59, 0.04, 0.00, 0.00, 0.03. Such are, relatively and 
 absolutely, the ways and the practical effects of scientific pro- 
 cedure.- 
 
 1 As a matter of fact, the reasoning was at least partly incorrect. The 
 "polished" rice consumed by the sailors lacked the anti-neuritic factor re- 
 moved in the milling process, and this was rectified by increasing the quan- 
 tity of other eatables containing a sufficiency of that factor. (See on the 
 whole question, Report on ... Accessory Food Factors, London, 1919.) 
 
 The above account relative to beri-beri is taken from Surgeon-Major 
 L. L. Seaman's valuable work The Real Triumph of Japan, New York, 1908. 
 The prevalence of scurvy on British vessels before 1795 offers a precisely 
 parallel picture to beri-beri. Its ravages used to be appalling; but since 
 the introduction of lemon juice or a corrected dietary, the disease is practi- 
 cally unknown. It is to be hoped that equally efficacious cures for con- 
 sumption, cancer, and children's infectious diseases may be discovered, 
 although these afflictions belong to a different category. In reference to 
 scurvy, Herschel (Discourse) states: "So tremendous were the ravages of 
 scurvy, that, in the year 1726, Admiral Hosier sailed with seven ships of 
 the line to the West Indies, and buried his ships' companies twice, and died 
 himself in consequence of a broken heart." ([44.].)
 
 140 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 59. The plain man has been for ages occupied in wealth 
 production, and might be supposed to be a pastmaster in this 
 art. Yet the efficiency movement, inspired by science, puts to 
 shame his efforts in this domain. Here are some illustrations. 
 " We cite as an example a case of folding handkerchiefs. The 
 old method of folding was to have the worker seated at low 
 tables in chairs of ordinary height, working throughout the entire 
 day, with the only rest periods an hour at noon and such ceas- 
 ing from folding as took place when the workers went for 
 supplies, or took back finished product to be checked, or other 
 rest periods that they took at will, as the work was piece work. 
 After an intensive study of the problem, made not only to 
 increase their output but to better their working conditions and 
 allow them to earn more money with less fatigue, the following 
 schedule of work and rest periods was adopted. Each hour 
 was divided into ten periods. The work was placed on a work 
 table of the proper height. The handkerchiefs already folded, 
 those being folded, and those to be folded were arranged in the 
 most convenient and efficient manner. All variables of the work 
 had been studied, and the results of the study standardised. 
 The first four periods, that is, the first twenty-four minutes, 
 the girl remained seated. She worked five minutes and rested 
 one ; again worked five minutes and rested one. That is to say, 
 she had four minutes' rest out of the twenty-four, and spent 
 this rest seated so that she might lose no time in getting back 
 to the work. The next two periods, that is for twelve minutes, 
 the girl was standing. Again she worked five minutes and 
 rested one minute, and for the second time worked five minutes 
 and rested one minute. That is, she rested two out of the 
 twelve minutes in the same position in which she worked. The 
 third group, a space of eighteen minutes, she spent either sit- 
 ting or standing, as she pleased. Here also she worked five 
 minutes, rested one minute; worked five minutes, rested one 
 minute; worked five minutes, and rested one minute in the 
 position, either standing or sitting, which she herself had chosen. 
 The last period, which consisted also of six minutes, was spent 
 by the girl walking about and talking, or amusing herself as 
 she otherwise chose. With this might be combined the last 
 rest minute or period number nine, which thus gave her seven 
 consecutive minutes for unrestricted rest activity. This was the 
 schedule for all hours of the day except the hour before noon 
 and the hour before closing time at night. In these hours the 
 first nine periods resembled the first nine periods of the other 
 hours ; but the tenth period was spent in work, as a long rest 
 period was to follow. At the end of the day's work under 
 these conditions the girls accomplished more than three times 
 the amount of their previous best work, with a greater amount 
 of interest and with no more fatigue." (F.B. and L. M. Gilbreth, 
 Fatigue Study, 1919, pp. 127-129.)
 
 SECTION 17. INDUCTION. 141 
 
 Overhauling and cleaning a boiler may seem a matter in which 
 science has no suggestions to offer. The founder of the effi- 
 ciency movement manifestly thought otherwise. "Time study 
 showed that a great part of the time was lost owing to the 
 strained position of the workman. Thick pads were made to 
 fasten to the elbows, knees, and hips ; special tools and applian- 
 ces were made for the various details of the work; a com- 
 plete list of the tools and implements was entered on the 
 instruction card, each tool being stamped with its own number 
 for identification, and all were issued from the tool room in a 
 tool box so as to keep them together and save time. A separate 
 piece work price was fixed for each of the elements of the job, 
 and a thorough inspection of each part of the work secured 
 as it was completed. The instruction card for this work filled 
 several typewritten pages, and described in detail the order in 
 which the operations should be done and the exact details of 
 each man's work, with the number of each tool required, piece 
 work prices, etc. The whole scheme was much laughed at 
 when it first went into use, but the trouble taken was fully 
 justified, for the work was better done than ever before, and 
 it cost only eleven dollars to completely overhaul a set of 
 300 h. p. boilers by this method, while the average cost of 
 doing the same work on day work without an instruction card 
 was sixty-two dollars." (F. W. Taylor, Shop Management, 1919, 
 pp. 181-182.) 
 
 It is no wonder, then, that those conversant with the scien- 
 tific movement in industry hail it as the great liberator from 
 witless routine. '"I cannot prophesy the end, there is no end. 
 I am learning my trades all over again', testified a prominent 
 contractor in regard to the system, before the Interstate Com- 
 merce Commission. Scientific management is said to differ 
 from the ordinary systems of production 'much as production 
 by machinery differs from production by hand; and the re- 
 volution which must result from the introduction of scientific 
 management, is comparable only to that involved in the transi- 
 tion from hand to machine production'." (Josephine Goldmark, 
 Fatigue and Efficiency, 1912, pp. 192-193.) Untutored common 
 sense is thus being expelled from its last stronghold. 
 
 Macaulay was right in denying to Bacon the claim for com- 
 plete originality; but this claim the great Elizabethan methodo- 
 logist never advanced. What Bacon resolutely combated 1 , was 
 the common practice of reasoning from propositions to pro- 
 positions heedless of examining the data and verifying the 
 results. He would have expressed, for instance, nothing but 
 condemnation, we fear, for so brilliant a thinker as Herbert 
 Spencer who first issued an elaborate Syllabus, and then spent 
 forty years in filling in its outlines. It would be hard to refute 
 Bacon's reasoning in favour of a methodology: "If in things 
 mechanical men had set to work with their naked hands,
 
 142 PART //. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 without help or force of instruments, just as in things intellec- 
 tual they have set to work with little else than the naked 
 forces of the understanding, very small would the matters 
 have been which, even with their best efforts applied in con- 
 junction, they could have attempted or accomplished." (Preface 
 to Novum Organum.) 
 
 SECTION XVIIL CONCLUSION. 
 
 60. The foregoing discussion has no pretensions to being 
 exhaustive; it only strives to clarify a few of the principal 
 terms employed in scientific methodology. The signification of 
 Concept, Abstraction, Comparison, Judgment, and of a multitude 
 of other logical terms, will be found dealt with in the works of 
 classical and inductive logicians. The methodological aspect of 
 the memory, the imagination, and the intelligence is treated in 
 Conclusion 18, and that of the methodological process as a 
 synthetic unity, in Conclusion 2. Our limited purpose in this 
 Second Part has been achieved if we have thrown some light 
 on certain vital terms, terms which we hope will receive in the 
 future closer attention from logicians. Our discussion at the 
 same time has made it manifest, we hope, that in sundry 
 departments pf knowledge methodological canons are honoured 
 in the breach rather than in the observance, even in respect 
 of such elementary matters as adequate preliminary observation 
 and detailed verification. 
 
 We may now proceed to the consideration of the proposed 
 methods of thought which, we trust, fairly reflect on the whole 
 the process of modern scientific investigation at its best.
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 PRACTICE.
 
 PART III. 
 INTRODUCTORY. 1 
 
 SECTION XIX. INTRODUCTORY AND SUMMARY. 
 I. INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 61. Bacon characterises the scientific thinker by attribut- 
 ing to him largeness of capacity, faithfulness of memory, swift- 
 ness of apprehension, and penetration of judgment.' 2 (Advance- 
 ment of Learning, Dedication, second paragraph.) 
 
 Having perhaps this passage dimly in mind, Descartes ex- 
 presses himself in this form: "Pour moi, je n'ai jarnais presume 
 que mon esprit fut en rien plus parfait que ceux du commun: 
 meme j'ai souvent souhaite d'avoir la pensee aussi prompte, ou 
 
 1 It would be a grave and unpardonable error to suppose that every 
 invention and discovery of note dates from the rise of modern science; for 
 before that era man had invented language, alphabets, the arithmetical nota- 
 tion now in use, and customs, manners, morals, religions, and laws; domesti- 
 cated diverse animals; developed the cereals, vegetables, and fruits, and 
 discovered the use and safe production of fire ; extracted, utilised, and mixed 
 various metals; introduced the axe, the knife, the saw, the plough, the 
 wheel, glass, mirror, sails, bricks, windmill and watermill, the calendar, the 
 compass, spectacles, clocks, and scores of other inventions and discoveries 
 of far-reaching significance: built magnificent roads, waterways, carriages. 
 ships, and temples; produced unsurpassed works of art, and developed man's 
 sense of the beautiful; and laid the foundations of mathematics, astronomy, 
 logic, and medicine, besides those of poetry, the drama, and literature gener- 
 ally. In these circumstances, whilst determined to mete out ample justice 
 to modern science, it behoves us to speak with profound appreciation of 
 what men accomplished in the far past. According to Alfred Russell Wallace 
 the nineteenth century is responsible for the subjoined first-class intentions-- 
 railways, steam-navigation, electric telegraphs, the telephone, friction matches, 
 gas lighting, photography, the phonograph, RQntgen rays, spectrum analysis, 
 the use of anaesthetics, and the employment of antiseptics a truly wonder- 
 ful output for one century. 
 
 - Here is a more comprehensive Baconian summary: " For myself I found 
 that I was fitted for nothing so well as for the study of Truth; as having 
 a mind nimble and versatile enough to catch the resemblance of things 
 (which is the chief point), and at the same time steady enough to fix and 
 distinguish their subtler differences; as being gifted by nature with desire 
 to seek, patience to doubt, fondness to meditate, slowness to assert, readiness 
 to reconsider, carefulness to dispose and set in order; and as being a man 
 that neither affects what is new nor admires what is old, and that hates 
 every kind of imposture." (De Interpretations Naturae Procemium, Spedding's 
 translation ) 
 
 10
 
 PART IIL INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 1'imagination aussi nette et distincte, ou la memoire aussi ample 
 ou aussi presente, que quelques autres. Et je ne sache point 
 de qualites que celles-ci qui servent a la perfection de 1'esprit." 
 (Discours de la methode, 1668, second paragraph.) 
 
 Kant says: "Two things chiefly are required in a philosopher 
 1. Cultivation of talents and skill, so as to use them for various 
 ends. 2. Readiness in the use of all means to any ends that 
 may be chosen. Both must be united." (Introduction to Logic, 
 London, 1895, p. 16.) 
 
 Charles Darwin expressed himself thus: "I think I am superior 
 to the common run of men in noticing things which easily 
 escape attention, and in observing them carefully. From my 
 earliest youth I have had the strongest desire to understand 
 or explain everything I observed that is, to group all facts 
 under some general laws." (Frank Cramer, op. cit., p. 29.) 
 
 Bain particularises: "To possess the mind of a large store 
 of the related facts; often to refresh the recollection of them; 
 to come into frequent contact with objects that seem likely to 
 afford comparisons and analogies; not to stand too near at one 
 set of facts so as to be overpowered by their specialities; not 
 to be engrossed with the work of observing the facts; and, in 
 general, as of matters of great difficulty, to keep the mind 
 free from attitudes and pursuits antagonistic to the end in 
 view." (Logic, vol. 2, p. 415.) 
 
 La logique, ou I'art de penser, 1662, contains a section entitled "La 
 methode des sciences reduite a huit regies principales". 
 
 Spinoza formulated the following rules for the conduct of the under- 
 standing: "(1) There is the knowledge which we derive from hearing or 
 from some arbitrary sign. (2) There is the knowledge which we derive 
 from vague experience. ... (3) There is the knowledge which arises when 
 the essence of a thing is deduced from another thing, but not adequate- 
 ly. ... (4) Finally, there is the knowledge which arises when a thing 
 is perceived through its essence alone, or through the knowledge of its 
 proximate cause." (Tractatus de Intellectus Emendations, London, 1895, 
 pp. 9-10.) 
 
 Leibniz submits the following rules referring to the art of invention: 
 "(1) To know a thing, one must take into account all the requisites 
 ('requisits') of the thing, that is, everything necessary to distinguish it 
 from everything else. This we may name definition,, nature, reciprocal 
 property. (2) Apply the rule to each condition, or requisite, that enters 
 into the definition which has been found, and look for the requisite of 
 each requisite. (3) When the analysis has been pushed to the end, the 
 perfect knowledge of the thing proposed has been reached." (Couturat, 
 La logique de Leibnitz, p. 181.) 
 
 Kant has sundry allusions to practical scientific rules. According to 
 him, "Logic is not a general art of discovery nor an organon of truth; 
 it is not an algebra by help of which hidden truths may be discovered". 
 (Introduction to Logic, 1895, p. 10.) He claims that the "general rules 
 and conditions of the avoidance of error are (1) to think oneself; (2) to 
 put oneself in thought in the place or point of view of another; and 
 (3) always to think consistently. The first may be called enlightened; 
 the second enlarged; and the third consequent or coherent thinking". 
 (Ibid., p. 48.) Kant furnishes eight further practical rules (pp. 33-34) 
 which, for want of space, we cannot quote.
 
 SECTION 19. INTRODUCTORY AND SUMMARY. 147 
 
 Auguste Comte proposes the hereunder mentioned fifteen universal 
 principles or laws: "Law 1. Form the simplest and most sympathetic 
 hypothesis consistent with the whole of the known facts. Law 2. Regard 
 as invariable all laws whatsoever which govern phenomena and, through 
 them, beings. Law 3. All modifications of the universal order are limited 
 to the degree of intensity of the phenomena, their arrangement not ad- 
 mitting of alteration. Law 4. All subjective constructions are dependent 
 on objective materials. Law 5. The internal images are always less 
 vivid and less distinct than the external impressions. Law 6. The image 
 which is our immediate object must predominate over all that are simul- 
 taneously evoked by the excitement of the brain. Law 7. Every under- 
 standing passes through a succession of three states: fictitious, abstract, 
 and positive, in all its conceptions without exception, with a velocity 
 proportioned to the generality of the phenomena in question. Law 8. 
 Man's activity passes through a succession of three states: Conquest; 
 Defence; and, lastly, Industry. Law 9. Man's social existence has also a 
 succession of three states: the Family, the State, Humanity. It is domestic, 
 civic, universal, in accordance with the peculiar nature of each of the 
 three instincts of sympathy. Law 10. Every condition, statical or dyna- 
 mical, has an inherent tendency to continue as it is without change, 
 resisting all disturbance from without. (Kepler.) Law 11. Every system 
 maintains its constitution, whether in exercise or at rest, when its con- 
 stituent parts are subjected to simultaneous changes, provided that the 
 changes affect all the parts in equal degree. (Galileo.) Law 12. Reaction 
 and action are always equivalent, if the degree of each is measured in 
 accordance with the peculiar nature of each collision. (Newton.) Law 13. 
 The theory of motion must be subordinated to that of existence, by 
 looking on all progress as the development of the particular order in 
 question, the conditions of such order, whatever they may be, regulating 
 the changes which together make up the evolution. Law 14. Every 
 positive classification must proceed on the principle of the increase or 
 decrease of generality, whether subjective or objective. Law 15. The 
 intermediate state should be in all cases subordinated to the extremes 
 which it brings into connection." (Richard Congreve, Positivist Tables, 
 London, 1892, pp. 26-28.) 
 
 Huxley epitomises in this manner the method of science: "The methods 
 [of the sciences] are all identical: 1. Observation of facts, including under 
 this head that artificial observation which is called experiment. 2. Tfrat 
 process of tying up similar facts into bundles, ticketed and ready for 
 use, which is called comparison and classification; the results of the 
 process, the ticketed bundles, being named general propositions. 3. De- 
 duction, which takes us from the general proposition to facts again, 
 teaches us, if I may so say, to anticipate from the ticket what is inside 
 the bundle. And, finally, 4. Verification which is the process of ascertaining 
 whether, in point of fact, our anticipation is a correct one." (Twelve 
 Lectures and Essays, ed. 1915, p. 12.) 
 
 Here is a philosophical summary of the nature of the scientific process: 
 "The aim of the scientific process as it occurs in the individual is to 
 render the Objective in its actual determinations intelligible. This happens 
 when primary facts enter into an 'apperceptive system'. ... If the process 
 has been of the kind intended by the term scientific, it will have the 
 further property of leading to other determinations of the Objective, and 
 these further determinations are the actual achievements of science, and 
 its 'end', therefore, from the universal point of view." (T. Percy Nunn, 
 The Aim and Achievements of the Scientific Method, 1907, pp. 142-143.) 
 
 An expert thinker, it might also be suggested, will perennially 
 and intently concentrate his mental powers in order that he 
 might, with the aid of appropriate canons, rapidly discover, 
 record, verify, connect, preserve, and communicate static and 
 
 10*
 
 148 PART HI.- INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 dynamic facts, and expeditiously and discriminatingly extend and 
 apply them to all related cases, near and remote, self-revealed 
 and obscure, his interest being centred in one or a very few prob- 
 lems. Or we may vary this by stating that the end of an enquiry 
 should be (a) one or a moderate number of tolerably original, 
 comprehensive, and important conclusions, including theoretical 
 and practical applications possessing the same character; and 
 (b) to determine precisely the nature and relations of certain 
 facts. With regard to the form which an enquiry should assume, 
 it ought to be as sharply defined as possible, continuous, and 
 fairly limited in scope. Everybody is aware of what is signified 
 by the enquiry being sharply defined. By its being continuous, 
 we mean that the ground of the enquiry shall not shift unless 
 the enquiry itself imperatively demands it; and by its being 
 fairly limited we imply that the range of the enquiry shall 
 neither extend, as with the ancients, to the embracing of all 
 or most knowledge as one's province, nor to be too restricted 
 as in many modern monographs, for in the former instance 
 we obtain nebulous, in the latter petty, generalisations. 
 
 The object of a scientific methodology is to determine the 
 most efficient modes of conducting the operations of the human 
 understanding. 1 In the widest sense, therefore, a scientific 
 methodology relates to thinking in general, and, consequently, 
 to daily life as well as to methodical enquiries. Or, stated 
 formally and more ambitiously, a scientific methodology aspires 
 to transform men and women into as nearly as possible ideal 
 thinkers. Accordingly, the most effective means of collecting, 
 storing, teaching, and otherwise disseminating, truth are also 
 part of its province. For this reason, a coherent system of 
 methodology should concern itself as much with generalisation 
 as with deduction, -with theory as with practice, with certainty 
 as with probability, and with single events as with classes of 
 these. Different departments of methodology hence exist, 
 treating respectively of the discovery, the application, the 
 preservation, the teaching in educational establishments, and 
 the communication by other means, of truth. In this treatise, 
 however, we are chiefly- concerned with the methods leading 
 to the discovery of scientific truths. 
 
 1 "The general problem of methodology is to show how we may apply 
 our natural mental activities, in such a way that starting from a given 
 state of thought and knowledge, we may attain the object of human thought 
 by an ideally perfect process; a process, that is, in which none but fully 
 determined concepts and adequately grounded judgments are employed." 
 (Sigwart, Logic, vol. 2, p. 8.) And Wundt (Logik, vol. 1, p. 1) writes: "Die 
 Logik hat Rechenschaft zu geben von denjenigen Gesetzen des Denkens, 
 die bei der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis wirksam sind." It is also true 
 that "every science develops its characteristic methods, methods fruitful in 
 their results, which it employs in dealing with a given class of problems' . 
 (Lotze, Logic, vol. 2, p. 174.) 
 
 2 Incidentally the problem of general efficiency is somewhat exhaustively 
 treated in this work. See Index, and especially Conclusion 10.
 
 SECTION 19 INTRODUCTORY AND SUMMARY. 149 
 
 Having stated the most general precepts pertaining to scientific 
 investigation, we may, before 'proceeding to the detailed state- 
 ment which is the primary object of this volume, focus the 
 various synthetically connected main injunctions in the sentence : 
 " Examine minutely and circumspectly under the most varied 
 circumstances of space, time, and other conditions, and ex- 
 periment where practicable; generalise step by step, but yet, 
 within reason, exhaustively; proceed, more especially towards 
 the end, to deduce further truths issuing perhaps in fresh in- 
 vestigations; verify all observations, generalisations, and deduc- 
 tions meticulously, and determine their theoretical and practical 
 applications; judiciously classify the facts as you proceed, but 
 especially during the last stages; and luminously summarise 
 the theoretical and practical results in concise, definite, connected, 
 and comprehensive interim and final formula?." Bacon's con- 
 ception of method is also synthetic in character, and may be 
 paraphrased thus to satisfy, more or less, modern requirements: 
 "Collect all the classes of facts and their degrees bearing on 
 the enquiry; collect classes of facts similar to those found but 
 which do not bear on the enquiry, and exclude those and their 
 similars; seek, by the method of exclusion, for the facts common 
 to all the relevant classes of facts; precipitate the truths common 
 to the facts into a definition; proceed to draw theoretical and 
 practical deductions; classify the facts; verify throughout at 
 every step; and formulate a pithy and yet exhaustive statement 
 relating to the enquiry." In Bacon's conception of method 
 hypotheses play only an important part at certain turning 
 points. 
 
 II. SUMMARY OF PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS. 
 
 62. Human advance along every line has been due to the 
 gradual accumulation pan-humanly that is, inter-individually, 
 inter-socially, and inter-epochally of slight improvements, and 
 our sciences, arts, industries, and disciplines, have all grown 
 in this inconspicuous but effective way. The difference between 
 a high and a low stage of civilisation is accounted for in this 
 manner, and it is extremely probable that in any direction 
 where there has not been an advance thus determined, we 
 have tarried on a low level. The method of conducting the 
 human understanding, as we perceived in Section V, falls under 
 the same law, and its degree of evolution we can fairly judge 
 by gauging the history of methodology. This latter evidences 
 that apart from collectively determined progress in logic, 
 summed up in Aristotle, and, more especially, in Francis Bacon, 
 little that is fundamental has been done to establish a re- 
 cognised methodology. 
 
 Whatever substantial progress has been effected since Bacon 
 wrote is mainly to be attributed to the advance of the sciences 
 themselves, and the full methodological significance of this ad-
 
 150 PART III. INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 vance remains yet to be systematically recorded, if we abstract 
 the incomplete work accomplished in this treatise. Accordingly 
 Dame Fortune still decides as a rule what the method pursued 
 by any person shall be. That is, the outcome of an enquiry 
 may be a rambling essay, without commencement, middle, or 
 end. It may represent a mere formal treatment of a subject, 
 regardless of the facts of the case. It may be a deductive 
 statement, starting from some monstrous assumption, or from 
 a legitimate hypothesis. It may deal with a fraction of a sub- 
 ject or with the Universe itself. It may be determined almost 
 entirely by preconceptions, or maintain a hoary thesis of the 
 schools. In reality, the unaided intelligence is prone to disregard 
 everything but plausible coherence in argument and an enumera- 
 tion of a few affirmative instances of a more or less specious 
 character, whilst it tends to be sublimely unconscious of metho- 
 dical and cautious observation, measurement, use of instruments, 
 experiment, generalisation, deduction, verification, definition, 
 and whatever else a methodology of science postulates. 
 
 In these circumstances we can only expect what we find 
 a countless host of lectures and publications, a clashing of 
 opinions, a war of words, a struggle to make antagonistic theo- 
 ries triumph, with glimpses of the truth discernible here and 
 there. Judging by what man is able to compass in any depart- 
 ment of life without helps, being kept back by "the mist of 
 tradition, or the whirl and eddy of argument, or the fluctuations 
 and mazes of chance and of vague and ill-digested experience", 1 
 it is incumbent on us to consider as natural this slow and tor- 
 tuous progress in knowledge. An ideal methodology would 
 guide the man of science from the inauguration to the termina- 
 tion of his enquiry, and render it almost impossible for him to 
 go far astray. (See especially Conclusions 2, 5, 17, 19, 27, and 28.) 
 At such a consummation the methodologist must aim ; but since 
 even moderate perfection is the leisurely product of the ages, 
 he can only offer a work which shall form a stepping-stone 
 towards a growingly more accurate and complete methodology. 
 Yet the ideal should never be lost sight of by him, if only 
 because it will spur him on to essay his best, and because it 
 will convince him that even his best is something destined to 
 be far, far excelled. It is in this chastened mood that the series 
 of Conclusions which follow have been formulated, and it is 
 with the intention of supplying a bird's-eye view of these Con- 
 clusions that a summary of them is herewith subjoined. 
 
 I. GENERAL SUMMARY. 
 
 63. (A) Preparatory Stage, (a) We commence our enquiry 
 by establishing the need of methodological procedure. (Con- 
 clusion 1.) (b) We show the desirability, the nature, and the 
 
 1 Bacon, Novum Organum, bk. 1, 82.
 
 SECTION 19. -INTRODUCTORY AND SUMMARY. 151 
 
 origin of a synthetic methodology. (Conclusion 2.) (c) We de- 
 termine the special and general object of our enquiry. (Con- 
 clusions 3-4.) (d) We seek to do justice to certain other 
 preliminary considerations, including provision for experimental 
 methodological training. (Conclusions 5-12.) (e) We furnish 
 typical examples of the suggested mode of procedure. (Con- 
 clusion 13.) 
 
 (B) Working Stage, (a) We commence by contemplating the 
 precise nature of the problem to be investigated. (Conclu- 
 sions 14-15.) (6) We examine the facts in question according to 
 certain methods. (Conclusions 16-24.) (c) Having exhaustively 
 observed, we methodically generalise. (Conclusions 25-28.) 
 (d) We verify facts and statements. (Conclusion 29.) (e) We 
 formulate an interim statement. (Conclusion 30.) (/) We pro- 
 ceed to theoretical and practical deductions. (Conclusions 31-32.) 
 (g) We classify the material facts elicited by the enquiry. (Con- 
 clusion 33.) (h) We frame our final statement. (Conclusion 34.) 
 (i) We prepare a report for reference or for publication. (Con- 
 clusion 35.) 
 
 (C) Final Stage. We consider the wider application and the 
 improvement of the series of Conclusions. (Conclusion 36.) 
 
 II. SPECIAL SUMMARY. 
 
 64. (1) There is a pressing need of procedure being de- 
 termined methodologically. (Conclusion 1.) (2) There is an 
 eqnal need that the methodology shall possess a synthetic cha- 
 racter. (Conclusion 2.) (3) The special object of any enquiry 
 is to determine the general nature and relations of certain 
 phenomena, and to promote this end we frame tables of cate- 
 gories. (Conclusion 3.) (4) The general object of an enquiry 
 is to reach one or a few correct and comprehensive conclusions. 
 (Conclusion 4.) (5) Before beginning an investigation, we should 
 discover a practicable starting point, and acquire some notion 
 in respect of the complexity of the task which we can profitably 
 undertake. (Conclusion 5.) (6) We must next be resolved to 
 shun vagueness and over-subtlety (Conclusion 6); (7) beware 
 of trusting to formal rules or allowing ourselves to be influenced 
 by any kind of bias (Conclusion 7); and (8) take advantage of 
 special scientific methods besides utilising existing knowledge, 
 whilst allowing for the personal equation and for training. (Con- 
 clusion 8.) (9) We recognise the need for experimentally prepar- 
 ing ourselves for efficient investigation (Conclusion 9), (10) and 
 for securing the mental, physiological, and environmental con- 
 ditions conducive to efficiency. (Conclusion 10.) (11) Not having 
 at our disposal unlimited time to observe everything, we systema- 
 tically skip over battalions of facts and methodically jump to 
 a provisional conclusion, i.e., we frame hypotheses, never jump- 
 ing, however, unless we are tolerably assured of the result
 
 PART III. INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 through an extensive preliminary investigation. (Conclusion 11.) 
 (12) We can accomplish practically nothing of consequence by 
 ourselves, and therefore the widest collaboration is necessary 
 in scientific work. (Conclusion 12.) (13) We familiarise our- 
 selves through a few examples with the form an enquiry should 
 take. (Conclusion 13.) (14) We seek to determine the precise 
 nature of the problem to be investigated. (Conclusion 14.) 
 (15) Common experience resembles shifting sands, and common 
 terms and reflections mirror them. Accordingly, in seeking 
 to determine the precise nature of the problem, we need to 
 aim throughout the enquiry at rigidly defined terms, at precise 
 comprehensive conclusions, and at definiteness in thought and 
 statements generally. (Conclusion 15.) (16) We look around for 
 undisputed facts apposite to our enquiry, and note what patent 
 resemblances and divergences they present. We turn in every 
 direction in space and time to collect samples of the pheno- 
 menon until we are reasonably sure that we fairly apprehend 
 its specific nature. In observing, there is need of strenuous 
 mental application, and need of the observations being, among 
 other things, graded, comprehensive, important, numerous, full, 
 rational and relevant, original, automatically initiated, and 
 methodically developed. (Conclusion 16.) (17) We take now 
 a snapshot at a particular fact. We examine whether it is 
 really one and not composite, really composite and not one. 
 We distinguish it from its environment, and measure the in- 
 fluence of time and position in space and consciousness. (Con- 
 clusion 17.) (18) To observe, even for an instant, is mainly 
 to recognise; to observe for several instants involves that we 
 do not forget what we observe from instant to instant; and the 
 conduct of an enquiry therefore commonly implies an efficient 
 memory and keeping and consulting records. Furthermore, the 
 process entails adaptation to circumstances known and unknown, 
 and therefore a more or less full use and understanding of the 
 imagination and a systematic utilisation of the thought process. 
 (Conclusion 18.) (19) We acknowledge the need for ensuring 
 easy, exhaustive, 'and impartial observation. (Conclusion 19.) 
 
 (20) We search for the simplest practicable case. (Conclusion 20.) 
 
 (21) We are habitually alert, and keep our attention unremit- 
 tingly concentrated. (Conclusion 21.) (22) We collect the largest 
 number of facts accessible to an indefatigable investigator, and 
 ascertain the unlike as well as the like. (Conclusion 22.) (23) We 
 exhaust classes of static and dynamic facts, their conditions, 
 and their accompanying uniformities. (Conclusion 23.) (24) Our 
 attitude is throughout critical and our treatment provisional, 
 and we test results repeatedly. (Conclusion 24.) (25) Having 
 observed a number of instances, we collate the common charac- 
 ters, and form one or more generalisations. In generalising, there 
 is need of strenuous mental application, and need of the generali- 
 sations being graded, comprehensive, important, numerous, full,
 
 SECTION W. INTRODUCTORY AND SUMMARY. 153 
 
 rational and relevant, original, automatically initiated, and me- 
 thodically developed. (Conclusion 25.) (26) We also remember 
 to postpone indulging in large generalisations until near the 
 conclusion of the investigation. (Conclusion 26.) (27) We ex- 
 haust the degree of applicability of a conclusion, and also strive 
 to discover parallel, distantly related, and seemingly unrelated, 
 instances. (Conclusion 27.) (28) We proceed dialectically, and 
 search for what is contradictory, contrary, opposite, common, dis- 
 parate, supplementary, alternative, complementary, dependent, 
 interdependent, and relative. (Conclusion 28.) (29) We should 
 be on our guard against error, and therefore need to verify what 
 we deem that we have already ascertained. Moreover, generali- 
 sations and deductions being admittedly hypothetical, veri- 
 fication and demonstration are essential if they are not to prove 
 broken reeds. Indeed, verification must needs be resorted to 
 at every stage of the enquiry. (Conclusion 29.) (30) After 
 having exhausted and gradually consolidated the various lines of 
 the inductive enquiry, we aim at a balanced jnterim statement 
 which is also to serve as a basis for the fuller deductive pro- 
 cess. (Conclusion 30.) (31) The moment we possess statements 
 which are at all reliable, we endeavour not only to extend them, 
 but we see whether we can deduce anything from them. There 
 is need of strenuous mental application in the process of deduc- 
 tion, and need of the deductions being graded, comprehensive, 
 important, full, rational and relevant, original, automatically 
 initiated, and methodically developed. (Conclusion 31.) (32) We 
 complete the deductive enquiry by drawing whatever practical 
 deductions the circumstances permit. (Conclusion 32.) (33) We 
 also recognise the necessity, more especially in the last stages 
 of an enquiry, of judiciously classifying facts. (Conclusion 33.) 
 (34) We formulate a comprehensive final statement. (Con- 
 clusion 34.) (35) We acknowledge the need of being concise 
 in statements, of circumspectly summing up, and of writing 
 acceptably. (Conclusion 35.) (36) And, finally, we recognise 
 formally the need of respecting each of the above Conclusions 
 in all the above Conclusions, of improving these, and of applying 
 them systematically to the life of practice. (Conclusion 36.) 
 65. If, in imagination, we place ourselves in the hoped-for 
 future when practically all men and women will be models as 
 regards scientific thought, and when language itself will be a 
 scientifically fashioned instrument, we shall find the adage "non 
 multa, sed multum" exemplified there. Such will be the effec- 
 tiveness of thought and the treasure of accurate and syste- 
 matised information absorbed by each that, on an investigator 
 publishing merely the full definition or generalisation he has 
 arrived at, those interested will be mostly able to infer not a little 
 that is of moment with ease and promptitude. Conversely, the 
 investigator himself will be so perfect a methodologist aided by 
 classifications, notations, tables, diagrams, machines, etc. that.
 
 154 PA RT IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 apart from the process of collecting obscure facts, his work, 
 at least compared to that of a modern investigator, will be 
 almost like child's play. (See 114.) Indeed, all men and women 
 will be inventors and discoverers of an elevated order, and 
 comparatively little of secondary importance will need to be 
 imparted or learnt. The conception of the real and the possible 
 in this connection should act as a potent incentive to those who 
 desire to liberate mankind from groping ignorance and servile 
 dependence on chaotic traditions. 
 
 PART IV. 
 PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 SECTION XX. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGA- 
 TIONS. 
 
 CONCLUSION 1. 
 Need of Procedure being determined Methodologically. 
 
 66. The assumption underlying all methodological think- 
 ing is that we should be conscious of the need of proceeding 
 methodologically. At present such consciousness can scarcely 
 be alleged to exist. Method to-day is mostly a matter of tradi- 
 tion, and fortunate are those sciences where the traditions are 
 of a superior order. 
 
 In many of the social sciences, for instance, scientific method 
 is almost completely ignored. The writer on ethics, for ex- 
 ample, is as a rule unperturbed either in regard to making 
 sure of his facts or as to verifying his conclusions, unless in- 
 deed fugitive and haphazard attention to these is to be honoured 
 by such a name. He generalises, he deduces, he speculates, 
 he affirms and denies, irrespective of a stern and synthetic 
 guiding rule. No wonder, therefore, that ethical systems are 
 almost as plentiful as blackberry bushes in the country. Any 
 one with an exuberant imagination, well read in general, who 
 has acquainted himself with the airy speculations of the past, 
 can possess his own ethical universe of thought. 
 
 If we turn to psychology, we are on a relatively higher plane, 
 since much is made here of facts ; but rigorous method is also 
 in this instance deplorably lacking, witness the almost universal 
 acceptance of commonplaces which are the bane of science- 
 relating to the nature of the sensations, attention, habit, me- 
 mory, imagination, ratiocination, pleasure and pain, emotions, 
 will, and touching almost everything else in psychology. No 
 wonder that Herbart, Thomas Brown, and James Mill, who wrote 
 about a century ago, are scarcely out of date, except perhaps 
 for part of their plain terminology.
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 155 
 
 In sociology abundant and invaluable detail work has been 
 performed; but if we reflect that one may almost say "as many 
 sociologists, so many sociological systems", one feels that here 
 also too much freedom is given to the speculative fancy. 
 
 In short, over extensive tracts of modern thought, no true 
 scientific spirit broods. Unjustified generalisations and deduc- 
 tions abound, methodical observation and verification are neg- 
 lected, subtlety in argument is prized, traditions, conventions, 
 and prejudices are revered, affirmative instances are assiduously 
 collected and negative instances disposed of by ingenious argu- 
 ments, and were it not that our well-informed age has col- 
 lected many facts exacting a minimum of allusions to reality, 
 we could not be said in diverse departments to be far removed 
 from pre-Baconian days. 
 
 The first need, then, is to be aware that most generally men's 
 cogitations are not methodologically controlled, and that scienti- 
 fic advance would be immensely aided if the reverse were 
 the case. Unmethodological thinking is world-removed from 
 methodological thinking. Let us submit some examples in illus- 
 tration of this contention. (See also Section IX.) 
 
 67. In recent years the theory has become increasingly 
 popular that the human species, like animal species, is primarily 
 determined in its conduct by instincts, pace the works of Kirk- 
 patrick, McDougall, Ellwood, and others. At last we are supposed 
 to have struck the bedrock fact in psychology, sociology, and 
 ethics. Yet extreme vagueness is noticeable regarding the signi- 
 fication of the term Instinct. Sometimes it is conceived as an 
 impulse; sometimes as an inherited functional arrangement by 
 which impulses are gratified; sometimes it is confounded with 
 the total hereditary outfit; and its distant relation to automatic 
 and reflex action, on the one hand, and habit and deliberate 
 thought, on the other, is confidently commented on. That is, 
 a popular conception, misty in the highest degree, is proposed 
 as the basis of a number of sciences. 
 
 As a matter of fact, several factors are involved in the term 
 Instinct and should be made explicit. The existence of native 
 impulses or (a) inborn needs should be considered as forming 
 a separate fact. A child who is kept inordinately long without 
 food may become unhappy and complain of a pain somewhere 
 in the neighbourhood of the stomach. There is here a dis- 
 equilibrium, but without any connected tendency to right 
 itself. Should such an equilibrating tendency be inborn, we 
 frequently speak of an innately determined mode of procedure 
 or (b) instinct. But if instincts are dependent on needs, they 
 are no less dependent on (c) organs whereby to satisfy the 
 needs. These organs, again, are often of a specific character, 
 as the tiger's claws, the mole's snout, or the spider's spinning 
 apparatus. Beyond needs, modes of procedure, and means, 
 we should also allow for (d) the general adaptive structure of
 
 156 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 the animal, as in the suppleness of the cat, of (e) certain pro- 
 tective structures like the tortoise's armour, and for the so- 
 called (/) automatic and (<?) reflex acts which determine certain 
 bodily actions, internal and external. Only when the problem 
 is conceived in this many-sided way by allowing for at least 
 seven distinct inborn factors, is it probable that we shall not 
 be ensnared in a net of words when comparing, for example, 
 human and animal "instincts". Methodologically it is inconceiv- 
 able that a world-wide movement, inspired by scholars of dis- 
 tinction, should have existed for a number of years favouring 
 the instinct theory, and that yet the theory should remain in 
 a shockingly rudimentary state. 
 
 The kindred problem of heredity and culture is in the same 
 predicament. Scores of works, dealing directly or indirectly 
 with heredity, assert emphatically that just as the activities 
 of animals are determined primarily by congenital capacities^ 
 so are those of human beings. In whatever walk of life there- 
 fore men or women are superior to their fellows, they have r 
 it is contended, to ascribe their superiority mainly to their 
 native outfit. Education has assigned to it a certain value., 
 but a quite subsidiary one. Yet methodologically this consti- 
 tutes again an impossible attitude. Why not learn what primi- 
 tive peoples can and do achieve at school and at college 
 economic, scholastic, and other surrounding conditions being 
 approximately equal? 1 Why not observe cases of the adoption 
 of new-born infants where family circumstances have been radi- 
 cally altered? Or, as a matter of fact, why not pursue the 
 recognised experimental method, adopting children of different 
 peoples and social layers from birth, and giving each as nearly 
 as possible the very same and the very best education and 
 upbringing? Why not? Because our age is as yet mostly 
 unconscious of the need of procedure being determined methodo- 
 logically, and is too frequently content to pronounce magiste- 
 rially on matters for which it has no verified evidence. 
 
 Similarly with the cognate case of the historical advance of 
 culture. Here, from Darwin onwards, it has been ceaselessly 
 reiterated that the changes in species are too slow to be directly 
 observable. Nevertheless, Darwin and his followers have alleged 
 the existence of a chain of traceable biologically-produced trans- 
 formations in man, from the Australian aboriginal (whose men- 
 tality and morality were supposed to be scarcely higher than 
 those of the apes) to the advanced European (said to be capable 
 of acute logical penetration and limitless altruism). Methodo- 
 logical reflection would have forced the contradiction into the 
 foreground and would have shown that if natural selection has 
 produced the cultural differences between Australian and Cen- 
 tral European, it necessarily follows that about equally great 
 
 1 E. B. Sargant, Report on Native Education in South Africa, Part III, 1908.
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 157 
 
 differences should be visible in at least many of the higher 
 animal species, which is decidedly not the fact, as Darwinians 
 themselves are at pains to demonstrate. 
 
 68. Again. Scrutinise in this light Herbert Spencer's 
 thesis that "every kind of progress is from the homogeneous 
 to the heterogeneous". This interesting assumption he strives 
 to substantiate by adducing a liberal number of pertinent illustra- 
 tions in his essay "Progress: its Law and Cause". 1 Had metho- 
 dology been a recognised science in his day, he could never 
 have proceeded as he did. He would have automatically tested 
 his assumption by searching, as Darwin would have done, for 
 instances where the opposite tendency, that towards homo- 
 geneity, was expressive of progress, and generally applied 
 dialectical methods such as those incorporated in Conclusions 
 27 and 28. With but a modicum of labour he would have 
 accordingly reached the conclusion that his plausible thesis was 
 untenable and should be abandoned. For example. In our 
 generation integration has been a signal method of progress. 
 Speaking generally, the variety of meridians has been reduced 
 to one; a single gauge, in the place of the pre-existing multi- 
 tude of gauges, has been growingly favoured for railway tracks, 
 and a single universal keyboard for typewriters; screws and 
 numerous other industrial products have been standardised;- the 
 metric system has superseded the many local standards of mea- 
 surement in diverse countries, and bids fair to be universally 
 adopted; the standardising of Census and other statistics has 
 been suggested and partly realised;^ the rules of the sea and 
 those of warfare are each being gradually reduced to a single 
 system of rules; processes and methods of organisation are 
 coming to be standardised in industry and commerce generally ; 
 nations enter into compacts whereby numberless differences 
 bearing on international relations are abrogated and replaced 
 by uniform practices; scientific bodies are intermittently en- 
 gaged in elaborating international usages pertaining to their 
 special domain and also in coordinating endeavours ; the multi- 
 plicity of theories which erstwhile obtained is, in one depart- 
 ment after another, driven out of the field by a single one or 
 a modest few; comprehensive and unequivocal codes of law 
 
 1 Essays, London, ed. 1907. 
 
 - "The American Society of Automobile Engineers, finding that 1,100 sizes 
 of seamless steel tubes were being made, prevailed upon the manufacturers 
 to reduce the number to 160 ; again, finding that 600 sorts of lockwashers 
 were in use, they similarly reduced the number to 20." (M. and A. D. 
 McKillop, Efficiency Methods, 1917, pp. 60-61.) "A Government department 
 finds by classifying that 76 kinds of pennibs are used by its clerks; direct 
 economy and the simplification of storage follow by reducing these kinds 
 to seven or eight, with little or no inconvenience to anybody. A printing 
 plant finds, by classifying, that it has stocked 200 types of paper, whereas 
 85 will cover all possible needs." (Ibid., p. 64.) 
 
 ; Patrick Geddes, The Classification of Statistics and its Results, Edin- 
 burgh, 1881.
 
 15 g PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 take the place of a bewildering mass of dubious precedents; 
 the chaos in administration, both private and public, is progres- 
 sively being removed; and general advance entails the ulti- 
 mate abolition of individual and collective error, inequality, and 
 discord. An interminable aggregation of general facts could 
 be thus collected to illustrate that the tendency towards homo- 
 geneity comports with the tendency towards progress. Apply- 
 ing other rules comprised in Conclusions 27 and 28, we should 
 learn by degrees that progress is compatible both with increase 
 and decrease of heterogeneity, and that retrogression may be 
 equally accompanied by an augmentation or diminution of dif- 
 ferentiation. It would hence become manifest that the law of 
 progress does not lie in the direction surmised by Herbert 
 Spencer. Utilising subsequently other methodological rules, 
 but of a constructive character, the true lav/ and cause of pro- 
 gress would be partly or wholly revealed. Indeed, the uni- 
 versal acceptance of a single and reliable system of methodology, 
 displacing the present blind groping, would of itself denote an 
 epoch-marking stage in human progress. 
 
 69. Or consider a quite modern instance of precipitate 
 reasoning. Prof. Siegmund Freud, of Vienna, has developed a 
 theory, the substance of which is that sex is the predominant, 
 or rather the dominant, factor in life. 1 2 Hysteria and neur- 
 asthenia 3 are one of its fruits, as well as many forms of in- 
 sanity 4 , if not all; occurrences of forgetfulness and mistakes in 
 words have mostly the same origin 5 ; and dreams 6 are traced 
 to no other source. A few years have hardly elapsed, and 
 Freudism is threatening to become the fashion. In a sense the 
 theory as developed is complimentary to the moral atmosphere 
 of to-day, for it asserts that we hastily suppress our sex thoughts 
 and prevent them thus from forcing themselves into the strongly 
 illuminated focus of consciousness. However, according to Freud 
 these thoughts revenge themselves by masquerading as ever- 
 recurring innocent thoughts. Then, when the magician of the 
 Freud school is summoned by a patient, he produces a com- 
 plete and permanent change or cure, by transforming the sub- 
 conscious feelings and thoughts into conscious ones. Now there 
 is no reason in "the nature of things" as known to us, why 
 this theory should not be true. But is it well grounded ? This 
 seems not to be the case. Casual facts are cited in support, 
 a procedure which at best could only prove that such instances 
 occur. On the other side, any normal person who for a month 
 
 1 Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie. 
 
 - In England Freudism flourishes under the name of psycho-analysis and 
 the psychology of the unconscious, and has as a rule discarded the general 
 theory that sex reasons underlie all human abnormalities and defects. 
 
 :! Studien fiber Hysteric. 
 
 4 Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre. 
 
 "' Zur Psydiopathologie des Alltagslebens. 
 
 6 Die Traumdeutung .
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 159 
 
 has kept a faithful diary of matters or names he forgot, wrong 
 words he used, dreams he experienced, thoughts he suppressed, 
 and who had observed the origination of nervousness, would 
 be probably appalled on how ethereal a foundation a mighty 
 structure can be raised in the absence of methodological think- 
 ing. Taking life as a whole, as it passes from moment to 
 moment, and men and women in the mass, at least in certain 
 countries, sex has almost invariably no significant part to play ; 
 suppressed and disguised sex thoughts, save at certain junc- 
 tures, prove to be rare in the waking and dream life of all but 
 the few depraved or diseased; 1 fully conscious ideas often drive 
 individuals into insanity (Lady Macbeth and many in similar 
 positions); and overexertion and economic anxieties, and scores 
 of other causes, lead to nervous instability. A truth appli- 
 cable to a microscopic part of life, and valuable in itself, is in 
 this way metamorphosed into a gigantic and monstrous false- 
 hood because of lax methodological canons. Here the blame 
 lies less on the originator, whose time and thought are absorbed 
 in endeavouring to detect a new truth, than on the scholarly 
 sympathisers who could readily descry the limitations of the 
 theory, but unjustifiably fail to do this. As a result of this 
 neglect of methodological canons, entire generations are fre- 
 quently deluded by theories whose truth or error it would be 
 easy to ascertain in a methodological age. 
 
 70. Perhaps the acid test of the need of a recognised 
 methodology is the state of logic during the last half century. 
 Let us dispassionately, and without acidity, apply this test. A 
 large number of manuals of logic have been published during 
 this period, mostly entitled Logic, Deductive and Inductive. In 
 almost all cases, even where the title was different, the first 
 
 1 Normal mental life is honeycombed with half-suppressed, and especially 
 half-disguised, thoughts of every class. For instance, many individuals are 
 keenly critical of certain defects in others without noticing that the corres- 
 ponding defects in themselves induce them to fix their attention on the 
 same defects in their neighbours. Or they may constantly seem to dread 
 being tempted by others, when this is merely due to disguised self-indul- 
 gence. Or men, as is so often the case, will find "reasons" for rejecting 
 an unwelcome truth, quite unconscious that aversion to what is unwelcome, 
 and not reverence for truth, is the motive. In a society so complex and 
 so ill organised as ours, half-suppressed and half-disguised thoughts must be 
 of necessity very common in every direction where difficulties are en- 
 countered. (See 82.) Moreover, a thought sharply dismissed has no rever- 
 berations, as homely experiments will prove (see also end of 97), and 
 fixing a thought will equally lead to its definite dismissal. It is only when 
 we half-heartedly turn away from thoughts, or pretend that we dismiss them, 
 or half-coquet with them that they haunt us. However, this is true uni- 
 versally, underlies all sustained cogitations, and according to the life-history 
 of an individual or a people, the type of half-submerged thought may vary 
 indefinitely. Probably local reasons, imperfectly apprehended, suggested to 
 Prof. Freud that sex is the controlling factor of the conscious and sub-con- 
 scious life. Living in other regions, intoxicants, worldly ambition, religion, 
 for instance, would have appeared to Freud as constituting men's inmost 
 desire.
 
 160 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. . 
 
 part discussed the Aristotelian logic, and the second part induc- 
 tive logic. 
 
 To the man of science unfamiliar with text-books on logic, 
 but frequently having recourse to deduction in his scientific 
 labours, it would naturally occur to examine the first part of 
 one of those works on logic with a view to finding a detailed 
 exposition of the deductive method. Considering that there is 
 almost a consensus of opinion among logicians in regard to the 
 signal superiority of deduction over induction ( 49), this scholar 
 would anticipate a forcible and somewhat exhaustive treatment 
 of the subject. He would be therefore amazed when he dis- 
 covered scarcely a trace of anything directly dealing with, or 
 having a bearing on, what he calls deduction. Anxious to be 
 fair, he would be perplexed at the title of the books and marvel 
 what the Aristotelian logic had to do with deduction. Admirable 
 this logic is in its way, he would argue, but that it is a stranger 
 to the process of deduction in science is patent. 
 
 On further reflection he may reason that possibly, however 
 inconsistent it might appear, the problem of deduction is ade- 
 quately examined in the second part of these works, that is in 
 the part relating to induction. Turning to this, he will probably 
 discover pertinent references, but of the scantiest kind. Leav- 
 ing aside theoretical discussions of the precise signification of 
 the terms induction and deduction, he will presumably not find 
 half-a-dozen pages allotted to the subject, all save a page or so 
 being devoted to a general survey. Having virtually consulted 
 every recent volume on logic, he will wonder what advantage 
 accrues to young students who master any of these treatises. 
 Certainly, so far as deductive procedure in science is concerned, 
 they could scarcely know less after studying such manuals than 
 they knew before. 
 
 Thoroughly aroused, our man of science sets himself the 
 laborious task to learn what these manuals do teach. Having 
 completed his enquiry, we may imagine him summing up his 
 conclusions in this manner: "The Aristotelian logic, exhaus- 
 tively dealt with in the first part of these volumes, has, mani- 
 festly, a definitely practical object to ensure, so far as mere 
 reasoning about matters completely known is concerned, that 
 conclusions should be systematically tested by a certain pro- 
 cess. Tacitly or overtly, however, the hoary custom of re- 
 quiring students to assimilate the Aristotelian logic, has degene- 
 rated into a mere memorising and understanding of the text. 
 For sundry dubious reasons, the palpable and justifiable object 
 of the discipline is ignored or disputed. In our scientific age, 
 this logic may go but a little way; but intelligently appre- 
 hended, it is worth being acquainted with. What strikes one 
 in this respect, is how alarmingly illogical logicians can be, 
 discussing a plainly practical treatise as if it were a work 
 having not the remotest connection with practice.
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 161 
 
 "The second part of these manuals is more provoking. This 
 part is supposed to represent modernity and science, as the 
 first part obviously reflects antiquity and verbalism. Broadly 
 speaking, we have here a more or less close reflection of John 
 Stuart Mill's treatment of induction. Proceeding practically on 
 the assumption that discovery is due to innate and unana- 
 lysable capacities possessed only by the favoured few, the 
 contention of the authors generally is that inductive logic is 
 only concerned with proof. Even so, however, its object, it is 
 said, is not to impart practical knowledge enabling the student 
 to 'prove all things', but to comprehend the principles on 
 which the scholar of acknowledged scientific eminence proceeds. 
 
 "From the viewpoint of the man of science the inductive 
 logics exhibit a painful misapprehension of the nature of science. 
 Whilst investigators move in a world where practical certainty 
 is infrequent and theoretical certainty is almost altogether 
 absent, our logicians discuss, e.g., the philosophy of induction 
 and the precise meaning of the term hypothesis, from a purely 
 speculative and perfectionist standpoint. The great matter, if 
 one may indulge in a sweeping statement, is words, words, 
 words, and the means of illuminating the words is by words, 
 words, words, and the total result is still words, words, words. 
 
 "However, the man of science may not be competent to 
 appraise at their true value these discussions aiming at theo- 
 retical certainty. What, then, of the considered tests relating 
 to legitimate induction as they appear in the text-books? In 
 this matter one is astonished to note that whilst science has 
 during the last eighty years progressed by leaps and bounds, 
 Mill's rather incomplete analysis of the scientific process has 
 become more and more attenuated, till almost only its bare 
 shadow remains in the more recent books. His five Canons 
 are dutifully quoted and a few words are said in explanation ; 
 but the pages devoted to observation, generalisation, and deduc- 
 tion, have dwindled to a diminutive rump. 
 
 "Of course, our logicians may retort that the object of their 
 inductive logic is not practical. The difficulty, however, is to 
 discover what purpose, in that case, these manuals are supposed 
 to serve. Are we to assume that the few rules presented on 
 the various aspects of methodological procedure are the only 
 rules, or the most important rules, to be abstracted from the 
 best practice of men of science? They are certainly neither 
 the one nor the other; in fact, one's heart sinks when one 
 meditates that not one of the very able writers on the methods 
 of science appears to have made an actual study of the scienti- 
 fic process in their own labours, or even in those of men of 
 science. Had they done so, they would have much- restricted 
 the discussion of terms, only given a page or two to the prob- 
 lem of theoretical certainty, greatly extended the rules, and, 
 with each decade, exhibited an increasing superiority over 
 
 11
 
 IQ2 PART IV.- PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 Mill's text. Just as any science progresses, so in inductive 
 logic progress would be clearly perceptible when we compared 
 a recent work on logic with Mill's Logic. Here, as with deduc- 
 tion, one notices the surprising fact that the expounders of 
 inductive logic are as nearly as possible complete strangers to 
 their subject, if a scientific standard be applied. They offer 
 unintentionally a fundamentally inadequate presentment of the 
 scientific process, and, in this respect, therefore, mislead their 
 readers instead of guiding them aright. Insistence on theo- 
 retical certainty, and a conviction that this can be compassed 
 by speculation, mark perhaps every one of these manuals, and 
 render them useless for promoting an understanding of scienti- 
 fic method, for scientific method is no more concerned with 
 theoretical certainty than with pure speculation, but is con- 
 tinuously controlled and guided by carefully ascertained facts, 
 and by the belief that theoretical certainty is an ideal which 
 can only be distantly approached in practice." 
 
 71. Even in the physical sciences the lack of a methodo- 
 logy is sometimes strikingly exemplified, witness the works 
 relating to Sound. Here there has been a steady flow of text- 
 books from year to year during the last quarter of a century, 
 with scarcely any perceptible progress, precisely as if the 
 science of sound had already attained to the pinnacle of perfec- 
 tion. Yet on examining these text-books, they as a rule appear 
 plainly to bear the marks of patch-work knowledge, with little 
 order, many lacunae, not a little of questionable authenticity, 
 and no consciousness of the need of improvement. Surely, in 
 a methodological age, a writer on Sound would make an unr 
 prejudiced and exhaustive study of the subject, and appreciably 
 advance the science by filling in gaps,, correcting errors, and 
 clarifying concepts. By this day we ought to possess text-books 
 that are virtually complete so far as the main categories are 
 concerned, and that conveyed the truths in question in a lucid 
 and organic manner. Mechanical repetitions, where the problems 
 themselves are not abstruse, should be regarded as reflecting 
 small credit on a work. Nor should the occasional revision or 
 addition of a point or two be deemed adequate. The result 
 of such a poor conception of the role of a writer is that too 
 frequently scientific works are overloaded with traditional 
 matter, and offer little encouragement to the student to pursue 
 the paths of original research. Broadly speaking, he learns 
 his text-book by rote ; by rote he later teaches it ; and by rote 
 he writes a new text-book. In fact, leaving aside musical- 
 acoustics, which has been assiduously cultivated, the last gene- 
 ration or so appears only to muster in England two decidedly 
 stimulating books on Sound TyndalPs deservedly popular work 
 and Lord Raleigh's masterly treatise. 
 
 If traditionalism be one cause of comparative stagnation in 
 science, another is over-specialisation. Like bees fly indefati-
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 163 
 
 gably from flower to flower and sip drops of nectar in each, 
 so fractional parts of a fractional part of a fractional subject 
 are studied in indeterminate succession. This excludes a com- 
 prehensive survey, entails much ambiguity and stumbling in 
 the dark, involves numerous errors and immeasurably great 
 labour, and leaves every science in a ragged and chaotic con- 
 dition for long periods. Traditionalism and over-specialisation 
 fatally retard the progress of science, and these are largely the 
 result of the lack of an established methodology. Considering 
 the complexity, elusiveness, and vast multiplicity of facts, only 
 a thorough methodology can grapple with them effectively and 
 without the sad waste of an immense amount of energy and 
 time. 
 
 Sufficient has been stated to demonstrate the dire need there 
 is of researches, whether they be styled scientific, philosophical, 
 or practical, being methodologically determined and controlled. 
 
 CONCLUSION 2. 
 
 Need of a Synthetic Methodology, and of a Historical Appre- 
 ciation of Differences in Methods, and in the Scope of Enquiries. 
 
 A. NEED OF A SYNTHETIC METHODOLOGY. 
 
 72. It was the imperishable glory of Bacon not only to 
 have insisted on humbly interrogating nature instead of pre- 
 sumptuously speculating concerning her secrets, but to have 
 recognised the momentous importance of fusing the various 
 scientific methods into one method. Thereby alone, he rightly 
 felt, would the temptation be vanquished to emphasise or em- 
 ploy only certain fractional methods. Our plea in these pages 
 must therefore be both in favour of the utilisation of given 
 methods and of applying these in a certain determinate suc- 
 cession. Such a synthetic mode of discovery will preclude 
 investigators being satisfied with anything short of an exhaus- 
 tive enquiry. 
 
 Allowing for the moment that the following methods are to 
 be applied not only in succession but at each stage of the 
 enquiry according to need, and that we are contemplating what 
 may be designated a complete enquiry, the total process may 
 be summarised in this way: (a) Determination of problem to be 
 inquired into (Conclusions 14-15); (b) Observation, including, 
 where possible, experiment and calculations (Conclusions 16-24) ; 
 followed by (c) Generalisation (Conclusions 25-28), (d) Verifi- 
 cation (Conclusion 29), (e) Interim Statement (Conclusion 30), 
 (/) Deduction (Conclusion 31), (g) Application (Conclusion 32), 
 (h) Classification (Conclusion 33), (0 Final Statement (Conclu- 
 sion 34), and (/) Report (Conclusion 35).* 
 
 According to this plan a truth is not to be considered as 
 fairly established when only one or another scientific method 
 
 11*
 
 164 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 is applied, or when a number of these is fortuitously employed. 
 To attain our end, a mode of procedure has to be resorted to 
 whose initial stage is the determination of the precise problem 
 to be examined and whose final stage is the report. Obser- 
 vation, for example, is hence a mere preliminary to generali- 
 sation and admittedly without appreciable significance in the 
 absence of the latter, whilst generalisations which are not verified 
 and are not crystallised into a comprehensive interim definition 
 (itself the introduction to the process of deduction, etc.), remain 
 more or less meaningless. A truth may therefore be said only 
 to be established, or properly inquired into, when (a) to (/') have 
 been applied in orderly succession, no section of the process 
 being omitted and none being utilised out of place. 
 
 The logical connection of these methods will, it is hoped, 
 recommend itself on examination, (a) We should, to begin with, 
 naturally be clear as to the nature of the problem with which 
 we are concerned. (Here we are aided by the table of Cate- 
 gories incorporated in Conclusions 3 and 33.) To remain in 
 doubt on this score is to rob the whole enquiry of its meaning. 
 (b) Granted clarity in this respect, it is as obvious that nothing 
 is achieved when no more is attempted, as that the next step 
 should be the examining and ascertaining of the facts, for to 
 generalise or to treat deductively unverified statements would 
 be evidently fatal to solid progress. If the determination of 
 the problem must be and can be only followed by an examina- 
 tion of the facts, it is equally beyond question that the further 
 step is, where possible, resort to experiment, for this permits 
 of observation under relatively ideal conditions, (c) Since the 
 number of particulars in an enquiry is as a rule incalculably 
 great, this distinctly suggests that our goal is not reached, 
 and that we should accordingly somehow arrange or compress 
 these details into classes. The process of generalising follows 
 therefore necessarily on that of observing and experimenting. 
 (d) Yet to generalise is to conjecture that what we think holds 
 true of certain phenomena holds equally true of others, but of 
 that we cannot be sure without verification. Generalisation is 
 hence of necessity succeeded by verification and by nothing 
 else immediately, (e) Fairly embarked upon the process of 
 generalisation, we naturally generalise our generalisations, and 
 this issues in a summary statement or definition, epitomising in 
 the fewest terms possible the results thus far attained. Here 
 apparently our enquiry has reached its natural climax and con- 
 clusion. (/) If, however, we probe the matter, we discover that 
 we should be poor indeed if we proceeded no further. In fact, 
 we stand only before the golden gates. The circumspectly for- 
 mulated summary statement forms an ideal point of departure 
 for the process of deduction, whereby we not only obtain con- 
 vincing proofs of the general proposition we have reached, but 
 by which we also discover innumerable important truths that
 
 SECTION 20.- STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 165 
 
 open up hew vistas and new enquiries. In fact, we are now 
 reaching in a novel way the truths which it would have been 
 far more difficult to detect by continuing the process of obser- 
 vation and generalisation, (g) We have now learned what we 
 desired on the theoretical side ; but this leaves an arbitrary gap, 
 namely, the discovery of the causes whereby the facts are or 
 may be produced, and the satisfaction of men's practical require- 
 ments so far as this can be attained through applying the theo- 
 retical knowledge acquired, (h) Even now, however, most of 
 our labour may prove futile if the various particular and general 
 facts which we have gathered are not preserved to some extent. 
 We therefore classify our whole relevant material in an order 
 most convenient and profitable for inspection. These classified 
 facts prepare thus the way for our comprehensive definition, 
 as our comprehensive definition illumines them. The two form, 
 as a matter of fact, a single or interdependent totality. (*) This 
 need gratified, we are again threatened with a formless con- 
 clusion to our enquiry, and hence we compress our results in a 
 comprehensive definition which, at a glance, can instruct us as 
 to the total outcome of our enquiry, (j) One more step needs 
 to be taken to conclude the enquiry we must prepare a written 
 report. If we neglect to do this, our imperfect memory and 
 inarticulated memoranda will lead to the loss of the truth which 
 we have toilsomely built up, and, again, if we perform this task 
 indifferently, our statement may be too obscure and will there- 
 fore tend to nullify our- labours, or it may be so unattractive 
 because of its plain dress that it will arouse practically no 
 public attention. The interdependent and synthetic unity of 
 the scientific process of enquiry is thus readily demonstrated. 
 
 As already hinted, two reservations should be made in con- 
 nection with the preceding statement. Assuming that we are 
 concerned with a complete enquiry, it might be concluded that 
 once our observations are succeeded by generalisation, the 
 process of observation has drawn definitely to a close, and 
 that observation constitutes a self-contained mode of procedure 
 affected by nothing outside itself. Both these assumptions are 
 unjustified. The need for sedulously observing, examining, or 
 calculating, persists through every stage of the complete pro- 
 cess of enquiry, while the obverse is also true that each section 
 of the complete process should represent in miniature the com- 
 plete process. At every stage we shall hence have frequent 
 occasions to observe, to generalise, to verify, to define, 4x> 
 deduce, to apply, to classify, to re-define, and to write. Bare 
 observation, generalisation, etc., most imperfectly satisfy scienti- 
 fic requirements. 
 
 More serious is the objection that enquiries are not seldom 
 partial ones, and that therefore the synthetic method is not 
 uniformly applicable. To a certain extent there is a transparent 
 answer to this objection, for enquiries to-day are in countless
 
 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 instances partial when they should be and might be more or 
 less complete. As we have pointed out in Conclusions 4 and 25 
 more especially, the contemporary interest in fragmentary 
 enquiries is highly prejudicial and detrimental to the establish- 
 ment of truth and to rapid discovery, a fact which the tenor 
 of this Conclusion makes almost self-evident. This conceded, 
 however, it need only be remarked that in a necessarily partial 
 enquiry, consonant, say, with Darwin's life-long practice, every- 
 thing should be done to render it as comprehensive as possible 
 and, as suggested in the preceding paragraph, to introduce into 
 every one of its parts the components of the complete enquiry. 
 
 B. NEED OF A HISTORIC APPRECIATION OF DIFFERENCES IN 
 METHODS AND IN THE SCOPE OF ENQUIRIES. 
 
 73. The question of the general standard applicable to 
 methods and to the scope of enquiries is of such far-reaching 
 consequence that it is advisable to associate it closely with the 
 problem discussed in A. Without viewing methodological 
 matters in true perspective, there is danger of misapprehend- 
 ing them seriously and becoming enmeshed in delusive and 
 paralysing subtleties. We shall accordingly deal with the sub- 
 ject here at some length. 
 
 (a) In A we pleaded for a synthetic methodology. In this 
 place, however, we desire to dilate on the historic process which 
 has rendered possible such a system. This analysis should 
 therefore prove useful from more than one point of view. 
 
 In methodology, if anywhere, comparisons are odious. One 
 thinker will emphasise the importance of observation, another 
 of experiment, a third of generalisation or deduction, and so 
 on, and the reader will be tempted to pronounce himself in 
 favour of one or another school. The methodological con- 
 ceptions of different scholars and ages are also commonly judged 
 to be inferior or superior. A historical study of the problems 
 will lead us to deprecate indiscriminate comparisons. 
 
 Before much thought had been devoted to deliberate enquiries, 
 even the very notion of method had not suggested itself. At 
 first, with no positive knowledge to guide or check men's 
 cogitations, haphazard thinking and examination appeared satis- 
 factory, since there was nothing to indicate that the results 
 reached were fanciful or well-nigh worthless. Then, slowly, by 
 insensible gradations, sounder knowledge, on the one hand, 
 accumulated, and, on the other, casual experience and reflection 
 were increasingly found to be inadequate and disappointing. 
 Accordingly, one methodological aspect here and another there, 
 rose more and more into prominence. At each fairly developed 
 stage, too, individuals and schools, as now, imagined that the 
 ideal had been at last attained, only however to be superseded 
 by a somewhat higher placed school equally confident of having
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 167 
 
 arrived at finality. Granted, initially, a virtual chaos and scanty 
 positive knowledge whereby to appraise results, and we can 
 readily comprehend both the gradual and disjointed evolution 
 of methods as well as the step-by-step improvement of parti- 
 cular modes of procedure. 
 
 If, therefore, a modern observer appears to us greatly 
 superior, as an observer, to a Lucretius or a Pliny, we ought 
 to seek the explanation in the connected development of posi- 
 tive knowledge and of sounder methods, and not in inborn 
 capacity. Similarly, if the scholars of the Middle Ages implicitly 
 assumed that in the ancients all requisite information was to 
 be found, we shall appreciate their attitude if we place our- 
 selves in their position and recognise how immeasurably great 
 the Latin and Greek classics must have appeared to a people 
 which had practically no contemporary culture. Reliance on 
 authority was therefore defensible in those days. For the same 
 reason, encountering in Aristotle's works the syllogistic method, 
 it was natural for the scholastics to postulate that scientific 
 method and Aristotelian method were one. So, also, with 
 theology filling almost the whole sky of their non-material 
 interests, it was only to be expected that the Middle Ages 
 should have almost exclusively concentrated on the production 
 of theological treatises. Historic reasons, consequently, may 
 be said to proffer almost the complete explanation of the 
 differences obtaining between the mentality of the scholastics 
 and those of our men of science. 
 
 Again, consider Roger Bacon's conception of the right method 
 of investigation. As we might expect, the appeal to experience 
 and experiment was growing in his day, and he was only one 
 of the foremost champions of that method. However, represent- 
 ing a rather primitive methodological stage historically, we must 
 not be surprised to discover that his conception of experience 
 and experiment was exceedingly crude and confused, almost a 
 caricature of modern views on the subject. Only protracted 
 collective experience lays bare the comparative defectiveness 
 of any methods in use, and Roger Bacon, as an individual, 
 cannot be therefore charged with gross scientific incompetence. 
 
 His namesake, Francis Bacon, occupied a precisely analogous 
 position at a later historic stage. Experience and experiment 
 had enormously advanced Galileo and Gilbert are apt illus- 
 trations of this. About the same period the growth of mathe- 
 matics and the further accumulation of sifted facts brought 
 also the deductive method into vogue, as Descartes' Regulae 
 strikingly exemplify. In view of this methodological develop- 
 ment along multiple lines, Francis Bacon's enthusiasm, as well 
 as his methodological triumphs and failures, are readily under- 
 stood. He, also, represents primarily a historic stage and 
 epoch, and therefore manifestly could not have been a perfect 
 methodologist.
 
 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 Gradually thus, more and more, higher and higher, increas- 
 ingly synthetic, methods develop through the ages. If, then, 
 at some historic stage speculation, observation, or reckless de- 
 duction prevails, excellent reasons may usually be cited in justi- 
 fication. Nor may we forget that, since the development is 
 encouraged by but a few social factors, almost at every epoch 
 we encounter the comparatively highest developed and the 
 comparatively lowest developed methods and their inter- 
 mediatessocially diffused. 
 
 Such, broadly speaking, is the basis for the transitional syn- 
 thetic methodology which we have presented in the first part 
 of this Conclusion. It is not the result of an intrinsically 
 superior age or of profounder methodological acumen in an 
 individual ; it can be only compared with less elaborate metho- 
 dologies in the light of historical development; and the distant 
 future should be regarded as evolving a far more highly per- 
 fected instrument of enquiry than ours is. Above all, our 
 analysis suggests that methods and methodologies are first and 
 foremost historical products, and that therefore evolutionary, 
 and not personal, considerations should primarily enter in any 
 appraisement of their adequacy. 
 
 74. (b) 1 A cognate study casts a flood of light on a 
 complementary aspect of profound methodological significance, 
 especially for our day. In 5 we stressed the unity of nature 
 and life, and endeavoured to show how the domain of science 
 gradually widened until nothing appeared to be excluded there- 
 from, so much so that even "business" came to be compre- 
 hended by it, both on the side of bringing in science as an 
 auxiliary and of reorganising commerce and industry on a 
 scientific basis. 
 
 Not infrequently this successive, but often reluctant, admis- 
 sion into the charmed circle of the established sciences has 
 suggested the existence of a sheer struggle between those 
 within and those without that circle, those within appearing 
 to be animated by the- selfish motive of reserving for them- 
 selves the attendant privileges. Many a successful competitor 
 for this honour tends to regard his entry as a triumph over 
 unappreciative conservatism, and. the whole history of this 
 long process is often conceived as a forceful vindication of 
 justice against prejudice. However, here also it is objective 
 considerations which are the prime determining factors in the 
 struggle. Only as one science develops, does the possibility 
 arise of a slightly more complex science developing, and this 
 mode of addition to the established sciences continues through 
 the ages until from the simple science of mathematics we pro- 
 gress, by diverse well-marked stages, to the inclusion of the 
 
 1 The line of thought developed here was first suggested by an examina- 
 tion of the works of Professor Patrick Geddes.
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 169 
 
 most complicated mental and social sciences. Not schools of 
 thought, theories, or the defeats of conservatives, explain there- 
 fore the expansion of the circle of the sciences, but primarily 
 the slow emergence and maturing of one science after another 
 in a necessarily strictly defined order. 
 
 The relative status of the sciences is also grounded in his- 
 toric advance. The more abstract and therefore simpler sciences 
 are ipso facto more firmly rooted than the less abstract and 
 more complex sciences, and possess consequently superior 
 authority. In time, however, biology, for instance, became 
 almost austerely scientific, and then it was no longer regarded 
 with suspicion. With the passing of a certain number of gene- 
 rations the same remark will come to be applicable to the 
 specio-psychic sciences, until all depreciatory comparisons be- 
 tween sciences will appear out of place. 
 
 It was thus the appreciable chaos which ruled down to a 
 few years ago in the practical life, that suggested to scholars 
 the theory that the man of science should keep to pure theory 
 and pure science, and not crave for the fleshpots of utilitarian 
 results. Repeatedly the student was reminded that he could 
 serve practical ends better by ignoring them, and that meddling 
 in the affairs of life advanced neither theory nor practice. 
 The progress of the simpler sciences and the synchronous 
 clarification of practical issues, slowly invalidated this concep- 
 tion of the relation of science to life. Hence it became in- 
 creasingly practicable for the man of science to devote atten- 
 tion to the life of action, until the distinction between science 
 and the practical life lost much of its point. No one can now 
 doubt that there is illimitable scope for the man of science in 
 industrial laboratories; that commerce and industry are tending 
 to become more and more scientific in procedure; that agri- 
 culture in almost all of its aspects is ceasing to be empirical, 
 and is guided at nearly every step by scientific considerations 
 and methods; and that even the more intimate life of health 
 and happiness, come under the control of science. These drastic 
 changes are not the result of changes in theory, but the out- 
 come of the historic growth and purification of experience, 
 which, in turn, is modifying older theories that confused transi- 
 tional stages with the abiding nature of science. 
 
 The law of relativity proceeds a step further in methodology. 
 The man of science was implored to attend closely to his 
 researches, and leave practical deductions severely alone. When 
 this view widely prevailed, that was excellent advice to give. 
 With the simpler sciences, however, becoming surer of their 
 ground, and the life of practice being better grasped, the danger 
 passed away. This, and this alone, justifies our own view, 
 whereon we have laid such stress, that practical deduction 
 should form an integral part of the process of investigation. 
 That is, what at one time was rightly regarded as hazardous, may
 
 170 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 now be conceived as a solemn duty. And, indubitably, the more 
 the theoretical and practical sciences will develop, the more 
 peremptory will be the methodological demand that he who 
 is well versed in theoretical science shall not fail to apply his 
 knowledge to improving life along the line of his studies. In 
 fact, we ought to be prepared for a somewhat startling develop- 
 ment resulting from the closer contact of science and life. We 
 mean that he who is primarily concerned with the life of 
 practice should, noblesse oblige, aim also, both incidentally and 
 systematically, at enriching the realm of theory. In this way 
 the concurrent development of science and practice will lead 
 to their rendering each other invaluable services and even- 
 tually coalescing. 
 
 We approach now another aspect. Division of labour was 
 one of the earliest phenomena characterising advance in civili- 
 sation. Almost all the ancient cultures possessed the caste 
 system. There was the ruling caste, the warrior caste, the 
 priestly caste, the merchant caste, and the labouring caste. 
 By such a division of labour, rigorously enforced, efficiency 
 in a number of directions was ensured. However, the desire 
 for increased efficiency led ultimately to the formation of 
 countless sub-castes or classes. Hence the classical economists 
 fondly dwelt on, and insistently counselled, the minutest sub- 
 division of labour. Consequently, the ideal appeared to them 
 that a factory should turn out, for instance, only needles, only 
 screws, and so on. 
 
 The process of scientific development followed the same lines. 
 Thinkers of the olden time, as among the ancient Greeks or 
 Hindoos, took all or most knowledge as their province. As, 
 however, the centuries passed, and material and difficulties 
 accumulated, division of labour was gradually introduced. This 
 process became in time more intensive. Single sciences divided 
 and sub-divided themselves, and the range of interest of men 
 of science assumed insignificant dimensions compared with that 
 of the earliest searchers after scientific truth. So manifold 
 and embarrassing appeared the objective difficulties that speciali- 
 sation was carried to the point of the investigator concerning 
 himself only with a microscopic portion of a subject. In this 
 way alone, it was held, could science securely advance. The 
 historic process, as above depicted, was its own justification, 
 since necessity was its cause. 
 
 Then the theory became popular that specialisation in science 
 was inevitable, and that save for specialisation, and the minutest 
 specialisation, there could be no advance in science. Reality, 
 it was contended, -was many-sided and full-blooded, and science 
 a pale, almost featureless, abstraction. Things were complex, 
 but science, it was asserted, could only recognise the separate 
 constituents of these complexes. Truth and scientific truth 
 were regarded as being poles asunder. Inasmuch, however,
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 171 
 
 as the alternative was to know the separate constituents of 
 reality or nothing at all, the choice was not difficult for the 
 majority of thinkers, though some desired either to grasp reality 
 in its fulness or to abjure the search for truth altogether. 
 
 Yet here also we are dealing with a transitional state. The 
 immense ignorance compelled more and more minute division 
 of labour in science, and demanded virtually exclusive attention 
 to a narrowly circumscribed speciality. This was unfortunately 
 carried so far that in numberless cases hundreds of unconnected 
 and petty enquiries were conducted by individual men of science. 
 Against the continuance of this trend we have repeatedly pro- 
 tested in this volume, though even here the method was pro- 
 bably suggested at first by the impracticability in certain his- 
 toric stages of a subject, of doing more than just touching the 
 fringe of a small fringe of a general fact. 
 
 With the accumulation of organised data to a certain point, 
 extreme specialisation seemed to be inevitable ; but as the store 
 of important scientific material assumed ever more formidable 
 dimensions, a new methodological theory, widely diverging from 
 that prevalent a century ago, developed. 
 
 To begin with the practical life. The local trade union, 
 limited to one craft, entered into relations with similar unions 
 in adjacent localities. In the process it gained experience 
 sufficient to enable it to federate with other local unions, fur- 
 ther afield. New experiences gradually rendered it practicable 
 to form national and international unions. Tentative efforts 
 were also concurrently made to federate with cognate unions 
 and to form unions comprising a whole general branch of 
 industry until, once more with growth of experience, eventually 
 the whole of labour, professional, skilled, and unskilled, was 
 organised in unions, and these unions were welded into a 
 single national and, partly to anticipate, international federation. 
 
 Firms also profited by experience, and were thus enabled to 
 establish many scores of agencies and branches. Numerous 
 firms, interested in a certain speciality, amalgamated, until 
 maturing experience permitted all the firms of a country, and 
 even of several countries, who carried on a certain trade, to 
 form into one company. Such combines or trusts found it 
 advantageous to absorb auxiliary trades, with the result that 
 stupendous economic organisations came to be formed and 
 successfully conducted. Nor is this apparently the end of the 
 process. Increased knowledge of organisation has enabled com- 
 panies to manage numerous businesses having no special rela- 
 tions to one another, to establish factories where widely differ- 
 ing articles are produced, and to dot the country with "uni- 
 versal" stores selling almost every conceivable commodity and 
 ready to perform a multiplicity of other services. 
 
 With growth of experience, as we have seen, division of 
 labour tends almost, to disappear in the practical life. Tbis
 
 1 72 PAR T IV. PREP AR A TORY STA GE. 
 
 is also the case in the scientific sphere. Greater knowledge 
 enables the man of science to abandon mere flashes of enqui- 
 ries. It places him in a position to set himself comparatively 
 extended tasks. Much sifted knowledge being accessible, he 
 is enabled not only to study a whole subject, but, in doing 
 so, to profit by the conclusions reached in connected subjects. 
 Lastly, circumstances justify him frequently in dealing with a 
 series of allied subjects. 
 
 The antithesis between reality and scientific truth, between 
 specialisation and generalisation, is thus passing away. The 
 significance of this it is difficult to exaggerate. Fractional 
 studies seemed to be essentially irrational in a world of com- 
 plex realities. They were remote from life, and appeared to 
 yield little insight into the great facts of being and becoming. 
 The world of science seemed to form a universe of its own, 
 almost in challenging and crying contradiction with the world 
 of the senses and the reason. No wonder, then, that those of 
 little faith turned away from science in despair. Science is, 
 however, vindicating itself before the bar of history. The way 
 to reality lay through specialisation and through an intimate 
 knowledge of component facts, and once this was attained, 
 division of labour began to be more or less widely superseded 
 by comprehensive activities. For the far-off future, therefore, 
 narrow specialisation will only exist at the outskirts of the 
 world of knowledge, and large synthetic studies will be the 
 rule. Science will be then truly science and verily reflect 
 reality. 
 
 Already at the end of 5 we had occasion to direct atten- 
 tion to the ponderous block of sound knowledge in existence 
 to-day. These blocks are being progressively more utilised. Is 
 it a question of diet? He who is interested in the subject 
 may take into account the principal and other dietetical con- 
 stituents of food and foods, the accessory food factors or 
 vitamines, the aeration of the blood, and the need of water- 
 all quantitatively and qualitatively considered, and allow for 
 age, season, profession, hour of day, breaks between meals, 
 etc. The problems of mastication, digestion, assimilation, and 
 rejection, with the connected problems of anatomy, physiology, 
 and growth, also temperament, serving and enjoying of food, 
 exercise and rest, general health of mind and body, habits, 
 cost, requirements of the community and of humanity, may 
 be all more or less definitely envisaged by the investigator. 
 
 Is it a question of agriculture? He who is concerned with 
 it may learn much pertaining to general and local climatology, 
 drainage and irrigation, plants and variety of plants suitable 
 for special soils, the best manures, means of countering insects 
 and germ pests, the most efficient labour and machinery needed, 
 the organisation desiderated for success, the demands of the 
 markets near and far, the advantages of co-operation, etc.
 
 SUCTION 20 STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 173 
 
 Is it a question of town-planning? Local climate, geography, 
 geology, mineral wealth, configuration of district and town, 
 fauna and flora, surface soil, physical, economic, and other 
 relations of locality to neighbouring localities and nearest large 
 towns, building materials, roads, ventilation, heating, and light- 
 ing of buildings, water-supply, sanitation, hygiene, open spaces, 
 outdoor and indoor amusements, schools, public buildings, 
 churches, theatres and art institutions generally, industries and 
 commerce, past of town, customs and traditions of townsmen, 
 reconciliation of past and present ideals in town-planning 
 almost all of these can be examined in a fairly scientific 
 spirit. ' 
 
 In science in the narrower sense the same possibilities are 
 emerging. In studying such a subject as light, for instance, 
 not only can, besides special aspects, the entire field be covered, 
 but serious notice can be taken of the affiliated etheorological 
 or corpuscular sciences of heat, electricity, magnetism, radiation, 
 and even chemistry, without passing over the practical problems 
 of indoor and outdoor lighting. In this manner, much of the 
 crudity inseparable from earlier attempts can be successfully 
 avoided. So, too, the geologist may aim at being thorough, 
 taking effective note, primarily through the existence of a 
 number of somewhat highly developed sciences, not only of 
 the sheer spatial and chronological succession of rocks and 
 their component parts and contents, but of the factors respon- 
 sible for these effects of gravity, pressure, heat and cold, 
 fire and frost, moisture and dessication, lightning, atmospheric 
 and water currents and water generally, chemical changes in 
 rocks, subsidence and raising of land, earthquakes, volcanoes, 
 and hot springs, age of the rocks, position and distribution of 
 strata on the globe, far-reaching climatic changes in the course 
 of the earth's history, plants and animals and their actions and 
 remains, human interference, and the like. In a similar way 
 the meteorologist very largely depends on a multitude of data 
 collected by sister sciences. The chemist also can study the 
 important mechanical, physical, crystallographic, and vital 
 aspects in connection with his department of knowledge. The 
 biologist, too, in striving to understand the nature of life and 
 of life forms, may call to his aid almost scores of passably 
 developed sciences. Lastly, in the future the various mental 
 and social sciences will be as readily and as profitably utilised 
 in education, aBsthetics, morals, religion, civics, and politics. 
 In any case, the day appears to have definitely arrived when 
 narrow specialisation, except in rare instances, is becoming a 
 grave offence against present-day methodological demands. 
 
 1 A brilliant example of town-planning may be found in Town Planning 
 towards City Development. A Report to the Durbar of Indore. 2 vols. 1918. 
 l>y Patrick Geddes.
 
 174 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 A good general illustration of this advance in science is 
 offered by descriptive works pertaining to countries. The 
 volume may open with a geographical, geological, and clima- 
 tological survey, and may describe the terrestrial and aquatic 
 fauna and flora. It may give an account of the races and 
 stocks inhabiting the country, and a brief history of the people, 
 with some reference to neighbouring countries. It may enlarge 
 on its mineral and forest wealth, on the productivity of the 
 land and the nature of its crops, on the utilisation of pastures, 
 and on its principal trades. It may speak in precise terms of 
 its political constitution, its laws, its army, navy, and air force, 
 its local administrations and local activities, its family life, its 
 educational system, art, science, religion, and recreation. It may 
 furnish vital statistics, statistics of commerce, industry, and 
 finance, and of agriculture, forestry, and live stock ; and afford, 
 in a word, a tolerably correct general picture of the organisation 
 and of the life of the men, women, and children inhabiting the 
 country. Two centuries ago such a comprehensive statement, 
 if attempted, would have proved a tissue of fantastic guesses 
 and misinterpretations. 
 
 We are doubtless only at the threshold of the synthetic or 
 realistic age. For this reason, with the encouragement must 
 go a warning. In proportion as there has been little speciali- 
 sation, as generally in the mental and social sciences, synthetic 
 procedure is non-scientific if not anti-scientific, and therefore 
 only in proportion as there are scientifically sifted facts and 
 generalisations, are we justified in having recourse to the 
 synthetic method. Mere logical webs, constructed out of com- 
 monsense knowledge and shrewd surmises, are strangers to 
 science. 
 
 Growth through the ages is responsible for the diverse stages 
 of science and its method, as observed from various historic 
 angles. It is primarily a process of objective evolution. Neces- 
 sarily therefore the single individual is scarcely more than a 
 mirror of his age, and his theories, couched generally in finalistic 
 phraseology, constitute roughly only a valid defence of the 
 scientific status quo. A dynamic conception of scientific ad- 
 vance should prove an effectual solvent of many long-standing 
 controversies, and enable us to discern, and take advantage of, 
 the direction in which science and methodology are moving. 
 
 CONCLUSION 3. 
 
 Need of Fixing Methodologically the General Nature and Re- 
 lations of Phenomena. 
 
 75. Having ascertained that an enquiry should be conducted 
 in conformity with methodological canons, and having decided 
 that these canons form a synthetically connected unity, we
 
 SECTION 20 STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 175 
 
 shall now proceed to state the most general nature of the facts 
 to be examined. We might have simplified our task by merely 
 enumerating for this purpose Aristotle's Categories Substantia, 
 Quantitas, Qualitas, Relatio, Actio, Passio, Ubi, Quando, Situs, 
 and Habitus; 1 but his list of predicaments unfortunately no 
 longer satisfies scientific requirements. Consequently, we have 
 ventured to submit new lists of categories which, however, lay 
 no claim to completeness or finality. To have neglected this 
 delicate and responsible task altogether because of the difficulty 
 involved in its adequate execution, would have left a gaping 
 void in the methodological scheme propounded in this volume. 
 
 I. INTRODUCTORY CATEGORY. 
 
 76. We might say that the object of any enquiry is always 
 to determine the partial or total nature, and sometimes relations, 
 of a fact. A fact, again, we might define comprehensively as 
 a given or stated partial (e.g., portion of individual), single 
 (e.g., individual as a whole), collective (e.g., aggregations of 
 individual to species), grouped (e.g., beyond species, and in- 
 cluding larger wholes such as a science, or a group or groups 
 of sciences, to cosmology and the universe), or abstracted 
 (whiteness, etc.), physical or other something (i.e., anything 
 which partially or wholly exists, is coming into, or going out 
 of, existence, has existed, will, might, could, would, should, or 
 is believed, alleged, or feigned to, exist, or the contrary). 
 Liberally interpreted in this way, room is probably provided 
 for most orders of fact which obtrude themselves on the in- 
 telligence, and assistance is thus afforded in the most elementary 
 forms of classification. 
 
 II. PRIMARY CATEGORIES. 
 
 77. The Primary Categories may be profitably divided 
 into three main sections, and may be said to aim at indicating 
 and helping to ascertain the general nature and relations of 
 phenomena to be determined in an enquiry : 
 
 (1) Material Aspects J 
 
 (2) Modal Aspects J of a phenomenon investigated. 
 
 (3) Procedure Aspects J 
 
 (1) MATERIAL ASPECTS. The material aspects practically 
 include the bare facts alone, irrespective of anything measur- 
 able or changeable. 
 
 1 According to Mill "all the assertions which can be conveyed by language 
 express some one or more of five different things: Existence; Order in place; 
 Order in Time; Causation; and Resemblance. Of these, Causation, in our 
 view of the subject, not being fundamentally different from Order in Time, 
 the five species of possible assertions are reduced to four." (Logic, bk. 3, 
 ctt. 24, 1.)
 
 176 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 We classify them as follows: 
 
 1. Elementals of phenomenon 
 
 2. Constituents 
 
 3. Form ungeneralised phenomenon. 
 
 4. Dependence 
 
 5. Action 
 
 6. Cause p 
 
 7. Resemblances of phenomenon j 
 
 8. Classification > phenomenon classed. 
 
 9. Position J 
 
 10. Differentia of phenomenon \ henomenon defined> 
 
 11. Details I * 
 
 12. Value of phenomenon j 
 
 14. Appreciation 
 
 15. Description of phenomenon J description of phenomenon. 
 
 This skeleton does not, however, offer its own explanation. 
 We shall therefore develop each of the sub-sections: 
 
 A. Material Aspects of Phenomenon Investigated: 
 
 1. ELEMENTALS, or Precise fundamental sensory and other mental data 
 sought for in physical or mental investigations: (a) vision: light colour 
 shade transparency picture appearance; (b) touch and effort: softness- 
 smoothness evenness cohesion plasticity flexibility malleability, con- 
 figuration texture, gravity weight pressure resistance, attraction- 
 repulsion, fluid liquid viscid solid; (c) hearing: sounds noise har- 
 mony; (d) taste; (e) smell; (f) heat; (g) feeling: pain pleasure appetite- 
 desire mood excitement emotion sentiment; (h) volition: impulse 
 habit decision willing action ; (/') intelligence: observation memory 
 imagination reasoning judgment reflection; and (j) indirectly appre- 
 hensible: causes of heat, electricity, magnetism, etc., and unconscious 
 cerebration ; 
 
 2. CONSTITUENTS, or Precise static and dynamic, largest to smallest, 
 constituents, including ether, elements, compounds, minerals, vital con- 
 stituents, materials, and parts, and their precise disposition, connection, 
 interdependence, and relative homogeneity or heterogeneity; 
 
 3. FORM, or Precise form, shape, outline, design, of wholes, parts, 
 sub-parts, etc., and their precise disposition, connection, interdependence, 
 and relative homogeneity or heterogeneity; 
 
 4. DEPENDENCE, or Precise special facts and factors in the environ- 
 ment on which the phenomenon is more or less dependent (e.g., tree's 
 dependence on soil, atmosphere, and external temperature) ; 
 
 5. ACTION, or Precise action or effects of phenomenon; 
 
 6. CAUSE, or Precise cause or causes of the existence and properties 
 of phenomenon; 
 
 7. RESEMBLANCES, or Precise leading, major, and minor individual, 
 class, and other resemblances of phenomenon or phenomena (for forming 
 classes and schematic scale of classes);
 
 SKCTION 20 STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 177 
 
 8. CLASSIFICATION, or Precise methodical classification of the pheno- 
 mena observed, and placing the classes thus formed under a more com- 
 prehensive category; 
 
 9. POSITION, or Precise comparative position of phenomenon within 
 class or classes, and precise comparison of the parts of related wholes ; 
 
 10. DIFFERENTIA, or Precise leading, major, and minor individual, 
 class, and other differentiae of phenomenon (the ascertainment of the 
 leading differentiae is the primary object of most investigations) ; 
 
 11. DETAILS, or Precise secondary aspects or details of phenomenon 
 of interest in the enquiry; 
 
 12. VALUE, or Precise value and quality (hygienic, economic, moral, 
 aesthetic, philosophical, scientific, . . .) of phenomenon ; 
 
 13. UTILISATION, or Precise utilisation, application, and reproduction 
 of phenomenon in all spheres of life; 
 
 14. APPRECIATION, or Precise appreciation (desire, liking, preference, 
 love, and enjoyment, and their opposites) of phenomenon; 
 
 15. DESCRIPTION, or Precise nomenclature, terminology, definitions, 
 formulas, statements, tables, diagrams, and reports in connection with 
 the phenomenon. 
 
 Compressed, and evidently incomplete, as the immediately 
 preceding statements are, they ought nevertheless to throw a 
 blaze of light on the path which the investigator has resolved 
 to travel on. They should second him in the arduous task of 
 ascertaining everything material to his enquiry and of prevent- 
 ing his overlooking anything of moment. At present short- 
 sighted tradition and fumbling practice are his guides, supple- 
 mented by his own narrow experience and the imperfect criti- 
 cisms of others. However, such subserviency to the mercy of 
 chance is to be deprecated. Methodological pioneers should 
 have preceded him and made his progress as rapid as circum- 
 stances permitted. It is the very essence of cultural advance 
 that the obscure shall be illuminated, and that established facts 
 and methods shall be collected, methodised, and placed within 
 the easy reach of all. Nor does the tentativeness of the list 
 prepared seriously matter, for the inquirer must be expected 
 to expand and supplement the statements, as far at least as 
 his subject of enquiry is concerned. 
 
 (2) MODAL ASPECTS. Slightly arbitrary as any division 
 must be, it may nevertheless lay claim to certain advantages. 
 This apparently applies to the division of the Primary Cate- 
 gories into Material and Modal Aspects, for it enables us to 
 separate what is mainly material from what is mainly modal. 
 The Modal Aspects are: 
 
 1. Quantity. 
 
 2. Time. 
 
 3. Space. 
 
 4. Consciousness. 
 
 5. Degree. 
 
 6. State. 
 
 7. Change. 
 
 8. Personal Equation. 
 
 12
 
 178 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 These eight aspects may be profitably developed as here- 
 under : 
 
 B. Modal Aspects of Phenomenon Investigated: 
 
 1. Quantity (precise number magnitude calculation . . .); 
 
 2. Time (precise position and distribution in time, precedence suc- 
 cession, number of times, dawn day twilight night, seasons, past- 
 present future, duration age date, frequency periodicity, rapidity- 
 slowness, velocity acceleration retardation, chronological measurement 
 and chronological calculation generally); 
 
 3. Space (precise position and distribution in space, before behind 
 juxtaposition direction, magnitude, number, height depth breadth, 
 length distance, angle, degree, longitude latitude, compass points, metri- 
 cal and other measurements and calculation generally); 
 
 4. Consciousness (precise position and distribution in consciousness, 
 precedence succession, magnitude, number, vividness completeness- 
 durability, movement changes, and resemblance in these respects of 
 recalled phenomenon to phenomenon recalled, chronological, comparative, 
 and other measurements, and calculation generally); 
 
 5. Degree (precise degree of Material, Modal, and Procedure Aspects, 
 of mathematical, etheorological, mechanical, physical, chemical, crystallo- 
 graphical, vital, sensory, psychological, social, specio-psychic, and other 
 properties and relations of a static or dynamic character, and of resem- 
 blance, difference, dependence, interdependence, and other relations and 
 interrelations, quantitatively stated where possible); 
 
 6. State (precise pure, average, casual, momentary, time-produced, 
 environment-produced, individual, transitional, exceptional, abnormal, 
 perfect, imperfect, and . . . state); 
 
 7. Change (precise movement activity process, from commencement 
 of change to its end, external and non-external influences, fertilisation 
 kariokynesis prenatal development birth growth adaptation regene- 
 ration reproduction senescence death decomposition, evolution origin- 
 history development transformation or dissolution and further evolution, 
 improvement deterioration, production*- accumulation distribution ex- 
 change consumption, experiencing feeling reasoning concluding, auto- 
 matic reflex impulsive habitual deliberate action, and ways of living 
 and their formation and change . . .); and 
 
 8. Personal Equation (precise degree of more or less complete interest- 
 preparedness liberty opportunity, of possessing stranger's freshness in 
 viewing and weighing own facts and conclusions, and of more or less 
 permanent individuality, abnormality, unclearness ignorance error 
 prejudice deception, and . . .). 
 
 Manifestly our remarks regarding the value for the inquirer 
 of the Material Aspects, apply with equal cogency to the Modal 
 Aspects. 
 
 (3) PROCEDURE ASPECTS. -The justification for the in- 
 clusion of these in the Primary Categories is chiefly practical. 
 They are manifestly a mere selection, as the subsequent Con- 
 clusions will show. Nevertheless it is well to concentrate atten- 
 tion right at the commencement on certain methodological master 
 modes of procedure. Since the statements either explain them-
 
 SECTION 20.-STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 179 
 
 selves or are explained later, it will suffice to submit them 
 without comment in this place. They are: 
 
 C. Procedure Aspects of Phenomenon Investigated: 
 
 1. Precise determination of the problem under investigation. (Conclu- 
 sion 14.) 
 
 2. Accurate, minute, and, if possible, experimental examination, under 
 the most varied conditions of space, time, and other circumstances, and 
 immediate and scrupulous recording of results. (Conclusions 16, 18.) 
 
 3. Alertness, in order not to miss obscure, unobtrusive, and exceptional 
 facts. (Conclusion 21.) 
 
 4. Systematic exhaustion, plus simple case and testing of divisions. 
 (Conclusions 19, 20, 17.) 
 
 5. Degree-determination and dialectics. (Conclusions 27, 28.) 
 
 6. Luminous clearness and decided definiteness in thinking. (Conclu- 
 sion 15.) 
 
 7. Graded, comprehensive, important, numerous, full, rational and 
 relevant, original, automatically initiated, and methodically developed 
 generalisations, deductions, and applications. (Conclusions 25, 31, 32.) 
 
 8. Systematic verification, classification, balanced interim and final 
 statements, and lucid reports. (Conclusions 29, 33, 30, 34, 35.) 1 
 
 1 Originally it was contemplated that the Primary Categories should be 
 followed by Secondary Categories which should offer a conspectus of the 
 methods to be applied in investigations. This intention was finally abandoned 
 because of the danger involved in abbreviated statements. However, it may 
 not be amiss to print the original draft in a footnote, if only because the draft 
 is suggestive and has been utilised here and there in this treatise. 
 
 Secondary Categories. 
 
 (a) PURPOSE. State what is the precise object of the enquiry, and roughly 
 define the meaning of this object and the chief terms employed. 
 
 (b) EXISTENCE. Examine whether the alleged phenomenon exists at all 
 (e.g., men having tails), or whether its existence is relatively doubtful (e.g., 
 normal case) or relatively indubitable (e.g., human beings having eyes). 
 
 (c) INDEPENDENCE. Examine whether the alleged phenomenon is wholly 
 or partly unique (e.g., elephant's trunk), or to what degree it may be part 
 of a more comprehensive phenomenon (e.g., the ethical term Ought), or 
 composed of various (e.g., popular conception of grass or of a cold) or varying 
 (e.g., law, religion, or living according to nature) phenomena, or entering 
 largely or otherwise into other or all phenomena (e.g.. human equation). 
 
 (d) INTERRELATION. Examine the degree of the phenomenon's depend- 
 ence on preceding and co-existing, conditioning of co-existing and suc- 
 ceeding, or other relation to preceding, co-existing, and succeeding pheno- 
 mena of an identical or non-identical character (e.g., the digestive process). 
 
 (e) EXTREMES. Examine the phenomenon, from its one or more minimal, 
 through its one or more perfect or normal, to its one or more maximal 
 stages, for the purpose of determining its various phases (e.g., history of 
 civilisation). 
 
 (/) DEGREE. Examine whether differences of degree relating to any aspect 
 make any fundamental or what difference to the conception of the pheno- 
 menon and whether the phenomenon is related to other phenomena by a 
 chain of degrees (e.g., the evolution of species or of the solar system). 
 
 (g) EXPERIMENT. Examine, by gradually eliminating and also adding, 
 one by one and also in groups and in differing quantities, the alleged static 
 and dynamic constituents of the phenomenon, in order to determine the 
 real constituents (e.g., in chemistry). 
 
 12*
 
 180 PART IV. -PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 Conclusion 17 will complete our statement concerning the 
 general nature and relations of phenomena by dealing with 
 the subtle problem of the mode of determining what are, and 
 what are not, primary static and dynamic facts. 
 
 CONCLUSION 4. 
 Need of a Life-Time Object of Enquiry. 
 
 78. Considering the full statement of the general problem 
 of methodology presented in Section XIX, and the thirty-two 
 Conclusions which succeed this one, it is only necessary to 
 offer the briefest account of the nature of the problem with 
 which this Conclusion is concerned. 
 
 The wider object of science is to determine the most general 
 facts or laws of nature by methods likely to achieve this end 
 conveniently, rapidly, and satisfactorily. According to circum- 
 stances, an inquirer may select one or another field of study, 
 and pursue his investigations for a shorter or a longer period. 
 Leaving sundry accidental alternatives on one side and only 
 contemplating the ideal norm, we may say that the fully 
 equipped inquirer should propose to himself as weighty a problem 
 as a life-time of endeavour (say intermittently or uninter- 
 mittently twenty-five years of ardent devotion) may reason- 
 ably be expected to promote substantially. From Conclusion 5, 
 it will transpire what are the general limitations, and from Con- 
 clusion 25 c why one comprehensive problem only, rather than 
 many minor ones, should be selected for examination. 
 
 In regard to the particular question to be elucidated, no 
 guidance can be offered save that by preference one of the 
 many salient problems of the age should be attacked ( 167), 
 
 (h) MODALITY. Examine, stage by stage, or continuously, the pheno- 
 menon's modal aspects, according to the second table of Primary Categories. 
 
 (0 DIALECTICS. Examine, following Conclusions 27 and 28, for facts pos- 
 sibly contradictory, contrary, opposite, etc., to those alleged to have been 
 established in or between wholes and parts of wholes (e.g., are men born 
 good?). 
 
 (j) COMPARISON. Examine the phenomenon under profusely varied 
 conditions of space, time, and other circumstances, including phenomena 
 most similar and most dissimilar both as regards wholes, parts, and degree 
 (e.g., race superiority). 
 
 (k) RELATIONS. Examine the degree of the phenomenon's relations to 
 the science immediately in question and its applications, to the sciences 
 immediately related to that science, to the more remotely related sciences, 
 to the sciences and arts generally, and to the specio-psy chic sciences and 
 their corresponding practical activities (e.g., some aesthetic problem). 
 
 (/) STATEMENT. Examine the degree of the phenomenon's relation to 
 closely, less closely, and distantly connected phenomena in order to reach 
 the most relevant general statement (e.g., the sense of sight), and furnish, 
 after the fullest investigation, the tersest, most lucid, most definite, and 
 most comprehensive statement practicable of the peculiar nature of the 
 phenomenon, both as regards theory and practice, which approaches com- 
 plete exactness, and is offered as far as possible in mathematical form.
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 181 
 
 since sufficient general progress has been made to permit the 
 inquirer to pass down almost every great avenue of thought and 
 life from mathematics to politics. Perhaps a day may arrive 
 when an international academy, having the progress of science 
 in trust and at heart, will sketch, without prescribing, the chan- 
 nels in which research at any period can be most profitably 
 directed, and may coordinate the labours undertaken collec- 
 tively or individually. In our day, and probably for some appre- 
 ciable time to come, this has to be left almost altogether to 
 hazard (Conclusion 12), and nothing can be done except to urge 
 that an important enquiry should be only initiated after ade- 
 quately considering the general contemporary condition of 
 science, and the predilection, preparedness, opportunities, and 
 resources of the inquirer ( 86). 
 
 CONCLUSION 5. 
 Need of a Simple Starting-Point. 
 
 79. This is a Conclusion the practical importance of which 
 can scarcely be exaggerated. Its principal object is to emphasise 
 the historical and pan-human nature of truth, and to warn 
 against precipitate attempts at reaching conclusions prematurely. 
 Bacon desired to make all knowledge his province; Descartes 
 contemplated the same end ; and philosophers, generally speak- 
 ing, have often evinced no adequate appreciation of the mea- 
 sured growth of truth through the ages. The question, then, 
 raised by this Conclusion is When may we legitimately institute 
 an investigation? Shall we begin with the simplest facts or 
 with the most complex ones ? Shall we take up problems where 
 others have left them, or shall we disregard the efforts of 
 others? Or does the starting-point not matter? 
 
 In Section IV we learnt that in spite of the fact that men 
 had always attempted to resolve problems of every grade of 
 intricacy, and preferably the more intricate ones, the history 
 of science unmistakably evidences that all endeavours to grapple 
 with the more intricate problems before the simpler ones, have, 
 without exception, issued hitherto in failure, and that the body 
 of scientific knowledge has historically grown from the simple 
 to the complex. 1 The conclusion is therefore irresistible that 
 any breaking loose from organic succession with past scientific 
 
 1 This determinate sequence is well expressed by Henry Balfour, in the 
 Introduction to a work by A. Lane-Fox Pitt-Rivers, on the Evolution of 
 Culture, 1906. "Every form [in cultural products] marks its own place in 
 sequence by its relative complexity or affinity to other allied forms, in the 
 same manner that every word in the science of language has a place as- 
 signed to it in the order of development or phonetic decay." (P. 12.) "Pro- 
 gress is like a game of dominoes like fits on to like. In neither case can 
 we tell beforehand what will be the ultimate figure produced by the ad- 
 hesions; all we know is that the fundamental rule of the game is sequence." 
 (P. 19.)
 
 182 PART IV. -PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 thought will avenge itself, and that we should not commence 
 an investigation where the simpler facts are as yet unexplored, 
 unless indeed we set ourselves the task of ascertaining the 
 simpler facts. Elementary mathematics, concerned as it is with 
 idealised facts of the most primitive order was therefore the 
 first science, and cosmology, as the science of sciences, will, 
 because of its stupendous complexity, be the last. The latter 
 depends on the triumph of the physical, as well as of the bio- 
 logical and cultural, sciences, and since all, save the first, are 
 in their childhood, philosophers must yet for a long time wander 
 in the wilderness. 
 
 If Darwin had not had at his disposal the socially collected 
 facts relating to geology, paleontology, 1 zoological and botanical 
 morphology and physiology, embryology, the geographical dis- 
 tribution of animals and plants, and domestic breeding, and 
 still had pressed on the attention of the public his theory of 
 natural selection, he would have been an idle dreamer, and 
 not the honoured man of science he was. However, the as- 
 sistance lent to Darwin went even further. The evolution 
 theory had been popularised by Buffon, Lamarck, and Geoffrey 
 St.-Hilaire in France, and by Erasmus Darwin, Lyell, Chambers,- 
 Herbert Spencer, and sundry others, in England; the curious 
 tale told by the rocks forced biologists to speculate concerning 
 the genesis of species, and the principal dynamic fact in 
 Darwin's theory was supplied by Malthus. :! A close historic 
 survey would probably reveal that Darwin's conception was in 
 the air and would have developed irrespectively of him, as is 
 in reality illustrated by Alfred Russell Wallace arriving inde- 
 pendently, and about the same time, at the same conclusion. 
 In 1851 the Outlines of Comparative Physiology touching the 
 structure and development of the races of animals living and 
 extinct, by Louis Agassiz, appeared in a second edition. In 
 this work, itself the development of an earlier one, the last 
 chapter terminates with a series of conclusions, whereof the 
 
 1 "Since The Origin of Species was written, our knowledge of this record 
 has been enormously extended, and we now possess, not complete volumes, 
 it is true, but some remarkably full and illuminating chapters." (W. B. Scott, 
 Chapter on "The Palseontological Record [I. Animals]," in Darwin and Modern 
 Science, ed. by A. C. Seward, 1909.) 
 
 2 "Chambers himself only gave unity to thoughts already in wide cir- 
 culation." (Quoted from A. W. Benn, by A. C. Haddon, History of Anthro- 
 pology, p. 61.) 
 
 "Darwin's great achievement was to formulate this law; though it is 
 only fair to add that it was discovered by A. R. Wallace at the same 
 moment. Both of them got the first hint of it from Malthus." (R. R. Marett, 
 Anthropology, p. 69.) The theories of both Malthus and Darwin, again, were 
 reflections or expressions of the competitive spirit in social affairs prevalent 
 in their time. (See G. Papillault, in Le progres, 1913.) This method of 
 tracing the origin of ideas to other than logical or speculative sources is 
 admirably illustrated in those works of Rudolf Eucken which deal with the 
 history of philosophj-.
 
 SKCTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 183 
 
 first one is highly significant for our purpose: "From the above 
 sketch it is evident that there is a manifest progress in the 
 succession of beings on the surface of the earth. This progress 
 consists in an increasing similarity to the living fauna, and 
 among the vertebrata, especially, in their increasing resemblance 
 to man." (P. 417.) Sir John Herschel had, by 1830, adum- 
 brated Agassiz's conclusion which evidently demanded a natural- 
 istic explanation. He speaks of "a series of periods of un- 
 known duration, in which both land and sea teemed with forms 
 of animal and vegetable life, which have successively dis- 
 appeared and given place to others, and these again to new races 
 approximating gradually more and more nearly ' to those which 
 now inhabit them, and at length comprehending species which 
 have their counterparts existing". (Discourse, [316.].) In 1887 
 Grant Allen wrote a propos of this subject: "The species that 
 bear most closely upon the theory of organic evolution are 
 almost all of them quite recent additions to our stock of know- 
 ledge. The gorilla appeared on the scene at the critical moment 
 for The Descent of Man. Just on the stroke when they were 
 most needed, connecting links, both fossil and living, turned 
 up in abundance between fish and amphibians, amphibians and 
 reptiles, reptiles and birds, birds and mammals, and all of these 
 together in a perfect network of curious cross-relationships. 
 Lizards that were almost crows, marsupials that were almost 
 ostriches, insectivores that were almost bats, rodents that were 
 almost monkeys, have come at the very nick of time to prove 
 the truth of descent with modification." (The Fortnightly 
 Review, June, 1887, p. 882.) 1 
 
 In the matter of observation, therefore, the succeeding Con- 
 clusions would offer fatuous suggestions if this Conclusion 
 were not respected. If Darwin's time had been as ignorant of 
 geology and of the other sciences adverted to above, as the 
 times of Erasmus Darwin and of Lamarck were, the subject 
 of the origin of species would have been enveloped in such 
 obscurity that Darwin could have made no sensible progress 
 in unpicking the knot of facts. He would have struggled in 
 vain to develop half-a-dozen intricate sciences to serve as his 
 point of departure, and very likely he would have finished by 
 accomplishing just something in one science or another, never 
 coming even within hailing distance of the solution of the 
 problem he was interested in, and never being regarded as a 
 man of surpassing genius. 
 
 Moreover, in the light of fifty years of post-Darwinism, we 
 can more justly appraise Darwin's contribution. We thus learn 
 of numerous radical criticisms of his theory. It is said that 
 we ought to speak of a struggle for comfort rather than of a 
 
 1 For a further statement of pre-Darwinism, the reader is referred to the 
 author's forthcoming work, The Distinctive Nature of Man, ch. 9.
 
 184 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 struggle for existence; that affection and mutual aid occupy a 
 prominent place in the development process ; that evolutionary 
 progress is "essentially through the subordination of individual 
 struggle and development to species-maintaining ends" (Geddes); 
 that acquired characteristics are not inherited ; and that human 
 progress is cultural and not biological. Finally, the Mendelians 
 are furnishing certain reasons for surmising that many so-called 
 variations are post-natal and are not inherited ; that true varia- 
 tions are frequently due to a re-shuffling of unit characters; 
 that variations are more likely to be sudden, large, and definite, 
 than slow, small, and intermediate in form; and that other 
 factors, besides the natural selection of favourable variations, 
 require to be considered in accounting for the evolution of 
 living forms. 1 Hence it transpires that Darwin effected little 
 more than to marshal in a persuasive form the evidence in 
 favour of the theory that the variety of living forms is intimately 
 related, and that natural forces could be conceived explaining 
 the metamorphosis of species. 2 This case eloquently illustrates 
 the folly of tracing world-moving ideas to the fortuitous dis- 
 covery of some preternaturally endowed individual. 
 
 In conformity with this Conclusion, then, the scientific worker 
 should seek to extend some particular field of labour, or, if he 
 inaugurates some new science, it should not be one which 
 depends materially on other not yet developed sciences. In 
 any case, he would not think of investigating a problem where 
 the facts are at once decidedly complicated and very imperfectly 
 known to men of science. It may be said that the order of 
 fruitful investigation is the order of the sciences as commonly 
 classified at the present day, beginning somewhere with mathe- 
 matics and terminating somewhere with applied ethics. 
 
 We might epitomise the Conclusion in the following rule: 
 "In initiating an enquiry, begin with what is scientifically deter- 
 mined; but if nothing relevant is thus determined, ascertain 
 the commencement of the simplest relevant elements, and pro- 
 ceed thence in a forward direction, unless the beginnings lie far 
 back or are complicated, in which case abandon the enquiry." 
 In connection with this rule these two sub-rules may prove 
 useful: (a) "Only that is to be regarded as well-ascertained 
 which has been investigated and tested scientifically." (b) "All 
 commonly accepted statements, not the outcome of scientific 
 
 1 Two of the leading modern works on organic evolution are E. Weismann. 
 The Evolution Theory, 1904, which aims at disproving the inheritance of 
 acquired characteristics, and Hugo de Vries, The Mutation Theory, 1910-1911, 
 which argues in favour of sudden, large, and definite organic variations. 
 Bateson's Mendel's Principles of Heredity, 1909, ably expounds and develops 
 the new principles of heredity. 
 
 "The commanding superiority and wide scientific influence of Darwin 
 among naturalists are of course popularly, though groundlessly, associated 
 with the origin instead of the final popularisation of the conception of 
 descent." (Article "Biology", in Chambers' Encyclopaedia, 1908.)
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 185 
 
 research, are, at best, true and useful for practical purposes 
 only." 1 
 
 The fundamental thought incorporated in this Conclusion 
 should even guide those who are desirous of acquiring a know- 
 ledge of the sciences. As Comte points out: "Physicists who 
 have not first studied Astronomy, at least under its general 
 aspect; chemists who, before applying themselves to their special 
 science, have not previously studied Astronomy and then Physics; 
 physiologists who have not prepared themselves for their special 
 labours by a preliminary study of Astronomy, Physics, and 
 Chemistry: all these lack one of the fundamental conditions of 
 their intellectual development. This is still more evident in the 
 case of students who wish' to devote themselves to the positive 
 study of Social phenomena, without having in the first place 
 acquired a general knowledge of Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, 
 and Physiology." (The Fundamental Principles, etc., p. 59.) 
 Truly, as we have seen, all the sciences, arts, and crafts grow 
 to be intimately and organically connected. 2 
 
 CONCLUSION 6. 
 Need of Shunning Vagueness and Over-Subtlety in an Enquiry. 
 
 80. Every attempt to fasten in haste on an observation, 
 or for the matter of that on a proposition, and lose oneself 
 therein, is fatal to rapid progress. Where, therefore, a problem is 
 not definite in character, it should be approached and attacked 
 from a score of points, and rather than plunge into subtleties* 
 the problem, as in craniology, 3 for instance, should be waived 
 
 1 "Words, being commonly framed and applied according to the capacity 
 of the vulgar, follow those lines of division which are most obvious to the 
 vulgar understanding. And whenever an understanding of greater acuteness 
 or a more diligent observation would alter those lines to suit the true 
 divisions of nature, words stand in the way and resist the change." (Bacon, 
 Novum Organum, bk. 1, 59.) "The rational school of philosophers snatches 
 from experience a variety of common instances, neither duly ascertained 
 nor diligently examined and weighed, and leaves all the rest to meditation 
 and agitation of wit." (Ibid., bk. 1, 62.) 
 
 2 On reflection, it will become evident that an astronomer who is ignorant 
 of everything except astronomy, is likely to make grave mistakes as a con- 
 sequence. The recently developed problems relating to astro-physics, astro- 
 chemistry, and what one may call astro-biology, illustrate this. In addition, 
 the question of the personal equation including health, and that of compre- 
 hending others and communicating to them intelligibly his researches, involve 
 a corresponding knowledge of biology and specio-physics. We may proceed 
 even further, and point out the need, not only of the astronomer being 
 initiated into the mysteries of the life of practice, but of the practical man 
 and the artist not being neophytes in the domain of science. In fine, sober 
 thought suggests that every man, whatever his speciality, should be highly 
 cultured in the fullest sense of the word. 
 
 3 The following quotation from Dr. A. C. Haddon's History of Anthropology, 
 1910, well illustrates to what length uncontrolled specialism leads: "Dr.Hagen
 
 186 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 for a time or its solution abandoned altogether. Or it may be 
 allowed to stand admittedly imperfect, for time is precious and 
 subtlety is the thief of time. Most likely, as the general prob- 
 lem approaches solution, the special problem will also be 
 clarified. Subtlety is the complement of reckless generalisation, 
 and ends in hair-splitting and in deeper subtleties. Of course, 
 the implication here is that we are treating of the separate 
 aspects of a larger problem rather than of the larger problem 
 itself. The problem should not, naturally, be left shrouded in 
 anything like complete doubt at the end of the enquiry. It is 
 interesting and important to notice in this connection that 
 Aristotle's works almost remind us of note-books where, on the 
 basis of personal and relatively unbiassed study, conclusions 
 
 relates the extreme specialisation into which craniologists were led : 'A rage 
 for skull measurements, vast, vigorous, and heedless, set in on all sides, 
 especially after Lucae had discovered and perfected a method of accurately 
 representing the irregular form of the object studied. More skulls, was 
 henceforth the war-cry; the trunk, extremities, soft tissues, skin and hair, 
 might all go by the board, being counted of no scientific value whatever, 
 Anthropologists, or those who aspired to the title, measured and delineated 
 skulls; museums became veritable cities of skulls, and the reputation of a 
 scientific traveller almost stood or fell with the number of crania which he 
 brought back with him. 
 
 'After two decades of measuring and collecting ever greater quantities of 
 material from foreign lands, and from the so-called primitive or aboriginal 
 races, the inadequacy of Retzius's method became apparent. Far too many 
 intermediate forms were met with, which it was found absolutely impossible 
 to classify by its means. In accordance with the suggestion of the French 
 anthropologist Broca, and of Welcker, Professor of Anatomy at Halle, a third 
 type, the so-called Mesocephalic form, was interposed between the two forms 
 recognised by Retzius. Even this did not suffice, however. In the face of 
 the infinite variety of form of the crania now massed together, a variety 
 only comparable to that of leaves in a forest, this primitively simple scheme, 
 with its four and finally six types, failed through lack of elasticity. Then 
 began complication extending ever further and further. Attention was no 
 longer confined to the, length and breadth, but also to the height of the 
 cranium, high and low (or flat) skulls i.e., hypsicephalic and chamsecephalic 
 varieties being recognised. The facial part of the skull was examined not 
 only from the side, with a view to recording the straightness or obliquity 
 of the profile, but also from the front; and there were thus distinguished 
 long, medium, and short faces, and also broad and narrow facial types. The 
 nasal skeleton, the palate, the orbit, the teeth, and the mandible were investi- 
 gated in turn, and at last all the individual bones of the cranium and face, 
 their irregularities of outline, and their relations to one another, were sub- 
 jected to the closest examination and most subtle measurements, with in- 
 struments of extreme delicacy of construction and ingenuity of design, till, 
 finally, the trifling number of five thousand measurements for every skull 
 found an advocate in the person of the Hungarian Professor v. Torok (whereby 
 the wealth of detail obscured the main objects of study); while, on the other 
 hand, observers deviated into scientific jugglery, like that of the Italian 
 Professor Sergi, who contrived to recognise within the limits of a single 
 small archipelago, the D'Entrecasteaux group of islets near New Guinea, as 
 many as eleven cranial varieties, which were all distinguished by high- 
 sounding descriptive names, such as Lophocephalus brachyclitometopus i etc.' 
 
 "The misuse of Craniometry is also described by Professor Alexander 
 Macalister: 'Despite all the labour that has been bestowed on the subject
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 187 
 
 only, and those original and important ones, are jotted down 
 in large numbers, practically to the point of not overlooking 
 any. 1 This method well illustrates the difference between ex- 
 haustion and subtlety. 
 
 It should be also borne in mind that, as we proceed in an 
 enquiry, the dubious items will be either corrected or may 
 prove relatively unimportant or irrelevant. Hence it would be 
 unpardonable to pursue everything forthwith into the realm of 
 the infinite, and there is scarcely any danger that we shall do 
 this when numerous important and well-defined generalisations 
 are the object of our quest. Subtlety, particularly in the 
 cultural sciences, is frequently the cause that no general survey 
 of a problem is undertaken, that only one or a few general 
 conclusions of a somewhat indifferent character are arrived at, 
 
 craniometric literature is at present as unsatisfactory as it is dull. Hitherto 
 observations have been concentrated on cranial measurements as methods 
 for the discrimination of the skulls of different races. Scores of lines, arcs, 
 chords, and indexes have been devised for this purpose, and the diagnosis 
 of skulls has been attempted by a process as mechanical as that whereby 
 we identify certain issues of postage-stamps by counting the nicks in the 
 margin. But there is underlying all these no unifying hypothesis; so that 
 when we, in our sesquipedalian jargon, describe an Australian skull as 
 microcephalic, phaenozygous, tapeinodolichocephalic, prognathic, platyrhine, 
 hypselo-palatine, leptostaphyline, dolichuranic, chamaBprosopic, and micro- 
 seme, we are no nearer to the formulation of any philosophic concept of 
 the general principles which have led to the assumption of these characters 
 by the cranium in question, and we are forced to echo the apostrophe of 
 von T6rOk, Vanity, thy name is Craniology!'." (Pp. 40-42.) 
 
 Only recently have attempts been made to study the relation of the 
 cephalic index to the environment, with striking results. Prof. Franz Boas, 
 of Columbia University, conducted an enquiry into this question on behalf 
 of the United States Government, and the following is his startling conclusion : 
 "The investigation of a large number of families has shown that every single 
 measurement that has been studied has one value among individuals born 
 in Europe, another one among individuals of the same families born in 
 America. Thus, among the East European Jews, the head of the European- 
 born is shorter than the head of the American-born. It is wider among 
 the European-born than it is among the American-born. At the same time 
 the American-born is taller. As a result of the increase in the growth of 
 head, and decrease of the width of head, the length-breadth index is con- 
 siderably less than the corresponding index in the European-born. All these 
 differences seem to increase with the time elapsed between the emigration 
 of the parents and the birth of the child, and are much more marked in 
 the second generation of American-born individuals. . . . The old idea of 
 absolute stability of human types must evidently be given up, and with it 
 the belief of the hereditary superiority of certain types over others." 
 (Inter-Racial Problems, pp. 101, 103, edited by G. Spiller.) 
 
 1 Aristotle's "vast works in natural history were based mainly on what 
 he considered of primary importance facts of actual personal knowledge 
 derived from personal observation. On this account alone his writings 
 deserved the place which they held for many centuries." (A. C. Haddon, 
 History of Anthropology, p. 14.) According to Sir Edward Thorpe, "Aristotle 
 affirmed that natural science can only be founded upon a knowledge of facts, 
 and facts can only be ascertained through observation and experiment." 
 (History of Chemistry, 1914, vol. 1, p. 19.) On Aristotle's method, see also 
 F. W. Westaway, Scientific Method, its Philosophy and its Practice, 1912.
 
 188 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 and that the ultimate conclusion is neither substantiated nor 
 verified. The employment of subtlety is principally due to 
 the chaotic state of an unresolved general problem, for this 
 primitive chaos suggests countless inapposite questions. A prob- 
 lem, like a mist, clears up imperceptibly. 
 
 All subtlety, therefore, save in respect of the final solution 
 towards the conclusion of the investigation, is useless and 
 mischievous, for it is by a series of closer and closer approxi- 
 mations that a satisfactory solution is reached. In this con- 
 nection we ought to bear in mind that observation should be 
 relevant and rational ( 170), and that subtlety is often a 
 consequence of the neglect of these two precepts. The most 
 notable scientific practice of to-day, is for investigators to aim 
 at resolving or developing to a certain extent some large aspect 
 of an important problem in the light of the most general 
 aspects, "brushing aside for a time the non-essential and rising 
 above the confusion of detail". Triviality, completeness, dog- 
 matism, subtlety, are eschewed. 
 
 In the preceding Conclusion we learnt that the progress of 
 science is represented by a slow upward movement. Hence 
 we should take it for granted in this Conclusion that any 
 legitimate 'problem has its roots in other partly or entirely 
 solved problems, and that the solution we seek restricts itself 
 to some definite class of phenomena, and aspires to only a 
 comparatively moderate advance. Accordingly we may affirm 
 that, passing by general explanations concerned with groups of 
 established sciences, the circle of scientific interest should not 
 normally "extend beyond one particular science at a time, such 
 as geology, physiology, anthropology, or ethics. 
 
 Again, in the initial stages of an investigation it would be 
 futile to search for momentous conclusions, for we scarcely 
 yet know what we are inquiring into. Let it be a question of 
 the genesis of culture, for instance. First, ethnologists should 
 have roamed among practically all the peoples of the earth, 
 and should have published tolerably copious notes of their 
 customs, practices, and institutions. For the pioneer ethnologists 
 conclusions should be of the smallest import and facts of the 
 weightiest consequence. Yet working in the dark, as they 
 needs must do at first, there should be no attempt to exhaust 
 or even approach exhausting any series of phenomena. The 
 facts of ethnography are very nearly infinite, more particularly 
 when we contemplate the incessant changes in customs and 
 their interpretation. Ethnographers should, therefore, be accurate 
 and extensive in their observations, and endeavour to secure 
 many samples of facts and the more common features dis- 
 cernible in any community. Whatever offers obstinate resistance, 
 as the interpretation of the mentality of peoples or the as- 
 certaining of the customs which these peoples are reluctant 
 to divulge, they reserve for a later period. If the preliminary
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 189 
 
 investigation has been thorough, attempts to frame preliminary 
 conclusions would be in place. In that case, however, most 
 of the conclusions of any one worker would largely miss the 
 mark, and investigators would construe the data according to 
 widely varying principles. In fact, as we sought in the first 
 stage mainly for facts, so in the second we seek for the largest 
 number of conclusions which appear, after scrutiny, passably 
 consistent with the facts. With weighty facts and preliminary 
 conclusions collected, the third step may be ventured on, by 
 probably a fresh relay of investigators, of sifting these con- 
 clusions. Lastly comes the process of consolidating and perfect- 
 ing these conclusions, drawing pregnant inferences from them, 
 and re-examining the data. Everywhere great difficulties which 
 might needlessly absorb years of labour should be left unsolved, 
 unless we can effect nothing without attacking these. Mere 
 amassing of facts, formulating conclusions when the facts are 
 yet hardly known, elaborating some single conclusion - when 
 few conclusions have been as yet obtained, should be avoided. 
 The leading ethnographical verities will only come to the surface 
 through the collective labours of generations of ethnographic 
 students. 
 
 To sum up. We ascertain the more general facts and the 
 more general conditions under which these subsist; we study 
 the collected facts with a view to reaching a fair number of 
 important minor and then major conclusions; we leave at first 
 undisturbed refractory questions or solutions exacting lengthy 
 enquiries; we further assume that familiarity with some class 
 of fact or theory will make other classes of facts or theories 
 appear of less moment than they seem to us; and we take it 
 for granted that an individual's investigation of a large and 
 new problem possesses almost certainly only partial or con- 
 tributory value. 
 
 Each scholar, then, is concerned with a limited sphere of 
 investigation, and strives to discover the largest number of the 
 most important or most general facts and conclusions in con- 
 formity with the stage which his science or enquiry has reached. 
 Seeing the complexity of facts, this entails continuous devotion 
 for many years to one significant problem, and never entering 
 more into detail than is absolutely necessitated by the circum- 
 stances. Our leading thinkers, from Aristotle forwards, appear 
 to have followed the rule (1) of concentrating for long periods 
 (2) on reaching many weighty conclusions (3) in a particular 
 subject of fair extent, (4) which is either easy of approach or 
 where many facts have been already collected and colligated, 
 and (5) eschewing all vagueness, subtlety, argumentation, or 
 crude speculation as to matters obscure or unknown.
 
 190 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 CONCLUSION 7. 
 
 Need of recognising that Formal Rules are Barren and that 
 Psychical Prejudice is Baneful. 
 
 81. (A) FORMAL RULES. The first half of this Con- 
 clusion may be dismissed with one or two remarks. As we 
 have seen, and as we shall see (Conclusion 23), a critical attitude 
 permeating every portion of an investigation is indispensable. 
 A danger should, however, be guarded against mere formal 
 procedure. Formally to deny, or to assert the contrary of, 
 any proposition, may even prove worse than dogmatic acqui- 
 escence in bare plausibilities. So, also, the formal piling up of, 
 say, generalisations is to be deprecated. Our attitude should 
 not be mechanical; we should rather weigh in each instance 
 the merits of our doubt, of our affirmations, and so on. To 
 call, or even to seem to call, everyone we disagree with 
 ignorant, narrow-minded, prejudiced, unpractical, or ill-man- 
 nered, is to condemn ourselves to intellectual stagnation and 
 inanity. Dogmatic denial is the younger brother of dogmatic 
 affirmation. 
 
 82. (B) PSYCHICAL PREJUDICE. The second part of 
 our Conclusion is far-reaching in character, for without some 
 explanation such as we are about to tender, it would be difficult 
 to fathom the facility and perfection with which some of the 
 ablest minds have deceived themselves. 
 
 How otherwise could we account for a master spirit like 
 Descartes writing to intimate friends concerning his first pub- 
 lished work (which contained the Discourse on Method, to- 
 gether with the Dioptric, the Meteors, and the Geometry) "that 
 he does not believe that there are three lines in the book which 
 can be rejected or changed; and that if there be the least 
 falsehood in any the least part of what he had published, his 
 whole philosophy was not worth a straw"? (J. P. Mahaffy, 
 Descartes, 1901, p. 72.) Kant, in the Introduction to his epoch- 
 making Kritik der reinen Vernunft, almost repeats what Des- 
 cartes affirmed of his volume. In the Preface to the first 
 edition he states: "I make bold to say that there cannot exist 
 a single metaphysical problem which is not here either solved or 
 the key to the solution of which is not at least given." And 
 in the Preface to the second edition he writes of his magnum 
 opus that "any attempt to alter the least part of it would at 
 once lead to contradictions, not only in the system but in the 
 general human understanding". And John Stuart Mill is firm 
 in regard to his Canons: "The four methods which it has now 
 been attempted to describe are the only possible modes of 
 experimental inquiry. . . . These, then, with such assistance 
 as can be obtained from deduction, compose the available 
 resources of the human mind for ascertaining the laws of the 
 succession of phenomena." (Logic, bk. 3, ch. 8, 7.)
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 191 
 
 The most signal example, however, of this delusion is, perhaps, 
 Auguste Comte, one of the deepest and sincerest thinkers of 
 modern times. In him dwelt an imperturbable faith that he 
 had laid bare in all their essentials, and beyond the possibility 
 of a doubt, the nature of scientific thought and the course of 
 mankind's past, as well as the contemporary and the ultimate 
 stages of man's progress. Although he believed that he was 
 the first to recognise clearly the fact of human progress, he 
 confidently sketched in minute detail the final regime, and 
 though he placed humanity skies high above the individual, 
 he proceeded as if henceforth nothing remained for humanity 
 to do but to accept his explanations and to execute his schemes. 
 
 Now these four justly famous thinkers are typical exemplifica- 
 tions of the assurance with which, in their naivete, philosophers 
 generally speak, even though a study of history renders it 
 evident that such pretensions are, to say the least, painfully 
 exaggerated. 
 
 In the humbler sphere of observation, as we have endeavoured 
 to show (Section III; see also Conclusion 23), we encounter the 
 same fact. Men are convinced that they have exhausted classes 
 of facts and conditions, when all they have often accomplished 
 is fastidiously to pick and choose their evidence, and to 
 misconstrue inconvenient facts where it is not possible to dis- 
 regard them altogether. It is this psychological bias also 
 which, in spite of serious contradictions in the world of ex- 
 perience, fortifies the believers in widely differing religious 
 faiths. 
 
 The explanation we venture to advance is as follows. The 
 process of thought depends on the desire to arrive at some 
 particular conclusion. 1 When, then, we have habituated our- 
 selves to view with favour a certain theory and to be indifferent 
 or hostile to another that is, when the mind is concentrated 
 or set on a certain theory associations connected with the 
 favoured theory tend alone to be formed or entertained. 
 Moreover, any stray counter-evidence will be discounted on 
 superficial deliberation, whilst even direct observation of an 
 embarrassing character will be materially falsified by our 
 warped intelligence. So potent is this psychological force that 
 a subtle special pleader may for a time compel our unwilling 
 thought to run along his rails, and prevent us from thinking 
 of anything which would controvert what he advances. This 
 process grows by what it feeds on, and thus abundance of 
 favourable evidence, of a dubious kind frequently, and scarcely 
 any opposed thereto, however sound, comes to be stored in 
 our minds, and hence there is artificially created a conviction 
 of absolute certainty which, in not a few instances, is as 
 absolutely unwarranted. Habit accentuates this tendency to 
 
 1 G. Spiller, The Mind of Man, ch. 4.
 
 192 PART IV.- PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 partiality in such a measure that it requires the utmost effort 
 of a generous intellect to mete out the barest justice to a new 
 truth, and not to forget almost instantly that such a truth had 
 been presented and sympathetically entertained. Darwin was 
 fully aware of this. He "remarked that so easy "is it to pass 
 over cases that oppose a favourite generalisation, that he had 
 made it a habit not merely to hunt for contrary instances, but 
 also to write down any exception he noted or thought of 
 otherwise it was almost sure to be forgotten". (John Dewey, 
 How We Think, 1910, p. 90.) 
 
 In truly scientific enquiries psychical bias occasions little 
 havoc, because of the patent reason that trained men of science 
 love truth and hate error very much more than any particular 
 theory. (See, however, last paragraph of this Conclusion.) 
 Hence the psychological mechanism favours here a correct pro- 
 cedure. 1 But to counteract the commonly prevailing tendency, 
 several Conclusions have been suggested, such as 19, 23, 27, 
 and 28, and the objective nature of the Conclusions in the 
 aggregate is likely to defeat this partiality in all but the rarest 
 circumstances. The synthetic and progressive character of the 
 investigation will, moreover, generally veil the ultimate result 
 until the time when it manifests itself unequivocally and can 
 no longer be distorted with impunity. Furthermore, at the 
 service of an objective inquirer, the psychological principle 
 will perform destructive work as efficiently as constructive 
 work, inasmuch as modifying and contradictory evidence will 
 be searched for as zealously as evidence in support. In any 
 case, the thinker should presuppose the pan-human origin of 
 truth, and therefore take it for granted that, however satis- 
 factory his results, they are yet far from being exhaustive or 
 final. 2 
 
 In the cultural sciences, philosophical, religious, economic, 
 .educational, sex, class, national, and racial prejudices and 
 interests, more often than not effectually impede scientific 
 advance, men undertaking to prove or to disprove certain 
 theories because these appeal to them or because they are 
 repelled by them. In industry and commerce the yoke of 
 mechanical routine and narrow self-interest equally obstructs 
 progress. In most of these instances, the brain-twisting bias 
 is unsuspected by the theoriser, and nothing almost will move 
 
 1 " When once we have decided what we will think about, we must think 
 with perfect impartiality on both sides." (Mrs. Boole, Logic Taught by Love, 
 p. 71.) Darwin went even further, and always used the isolated phenomena 
 which were most difficult to explain as tests of the validity of his hypo- 
 theses. (Frank Cramer, op. cit., p. 230.) 
 
 "The chief sources of prejudices are: Imitation, Custom, and Inclination." 
 (Kant, Introduction to Logic, p. 66.) Ribot discusses the relation of the 
 feelings to logic in his La logique des sentiments, Paris, 1905. See also 
 Victor Brochard, De I'erreur, 1879.
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 193 
 
 him to look truth straight, in the face. Fortunately, however, 
 there is a growing feeling that the love of truth should be the 
 supreme arbiter in all enquiries, and that, especially in social 
 investigations, antipathy is the sworn foe of truth, and narrow 
 sympathy scarcely less. Were it not for psychical prejudice 
 selecting favourable, and ignoring or rejecting unfavourable, 
 evidence, this wholesale and consummate self-deception would 
 be impossible. 1 
 
 We have dilated above on a familiar form of prejudiced 
 thinking. Delving deeper, we encounter another and more 
 insidious form, which makes its home in the scientific process 
 itself. That is, the material we have collected and the con- 
 clusions we have arrived at, psychologically fill, and therefore 
 dominate, our minds, and we accordingly neither perceive things 
 in perspective nor as others would view them. The remedy 
 for this is a two-fold one. We should periodically suspend 
 our studies for appreciable periods at a time. This would lead 
 to a scattering of the mass of familiar but unimportant ideas 
 and divest those ideas of much of their feeling value. We 
 should consequently be able to assume a more critical and 
 objective attitude- towards our studies, and correct prejudiced 
 conclusions. (See 161.) Moreover, throughout our scientific 
 work we should cultivate the detachment and coolness of the 
 critic who comes fresh to an examination of our views. We 
 should therefore be habituated to see ourselves, from time to 
 time, as others see us. Unless we acquire this rare capacity, 
 together with the self-control needed in occasionally interrupt- 
 ing our labours for appreciable periods, we are in perennial 
 danger of reaching sophisticated results. 
 
 1 4i The information which an ordinary traveller brings back from a foreign 
 country, as the result of the evidence of his senses, is almost always such 
 as exactly confirms the opinions with which he sets out. He has had eyes 
 and ears for such things only as he expected to see. Men read the sacred 
 books of their religion, and pass unobserved therein multitudes of things 
 utterly irreconcilable with even their own notions of moral excellence. With 
 the same authorities before them, different historians, alike innocent of 
 intentional misrepresentation, see only what is favourable to Protestants or 
 Catholics, Royalists or Republicans, Charles I. or Cromwell; while others, 
 having set out with the preconception that extremes must be in the wrong, 
 are incapable of seeing truth and justice when these are wholly on one 
 side." (Mill, Logic, bk. 5, ch.4, 3.) "Before experience itself can be used 
 with advantage, there is one preliminary step to make, which depends wholly 
 on ourselves: it is the absolute dismissal and clearing the mind of all pre- 
 judice, from whatever source arising, and the determination to stand and 
 fall by the result of a direct appeal to facts in the first instance, and of 
 strict logical deduction from them afterwards." (Herschel, Discourse, [68.].) 
 
 "The temptations to make statements too broad, to neglect objections, to 
 smooth over difficulties artificially, are almost infinite." (Frank Cramer, 
 op. cit., p. 31.) 
 
 13
 
 194 PART IV PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 CONCLUSION 8. 
 
 Need of taking advantage of Special Scientific Methods, of 
 
 utilising Existing Knowledge, of having regard to the Future, 
 
 and of allowing for Personal Equation and for Training. 
 
 83. (A) RECOGNISED SCIENTIFIC METHODS.-The 
 following methods are among those generally applied: (a) Ap- 
 proaching the remote and unknown from the side of the 
 known and near, including analogy, as in geology and history ; 
 
 (b) proceeding by the law of probability, of approximation, or 
 of averages, as in the social and anthropological sciences; 
 
 (c) applying the comparative method, as in zoology, therapeutics, 
 and psychology, and quite generally the geographical method, 
 that is, allowing for possible factual differences to be found 
 in different localities ; (d) employing separately or together the 
 historical, the genetic, and the evolutionary methods, as in bio- 
 logical, economic, aBsthetic, and many other kinds of investiga- 
 tions; (e) using the teleological method, as in ethics, or in 
 botany e.g., the adaptation of flowers to pollen-carrying 
 insects; (/) approaching the complex and abstract from the side 
 of the simple and concrete, as illustrated by diagrammatic pro- 
 cedure and in Conclusion 19 ; and (g) imagining ideally simpli- 
 fied instances, as in astronomy or mechanics. According to 
 circumstances, as many of these methods as possible should be 
 employed in an enquiry. Of capital importance are (c) and (d). 
 In connection with (d) it should be remembered that, if suffi- 
 ciently brief or extensive periods are allowed for, time almost 
 always makes a crucial difference, and in this respect it is 
 advisable to extend the criterion to the future as well as to 
 the past and present to infinity backwards and forwards, 1 so 
 far as the largest problems are concerned. All these methods 
 are treated by implication in the subsequent Conclusions, and 
 are, as above intimated, individually more applicable to one 
 department of knowledge than to another. 
 
 A treacherous method is undoubtedly that of analogy. 2 Let 
 us provide a modern instance of this. Darwin repeatedly com- 
 pared the "intelligence" of animals with the intelligence of 
 human beings, and from his day to ours these comparisons 
 
 1 "The student who takes an equal interest in the history of the past, 
 the development of the present, and the destinies of the future, keeps his 
 mind balanced." (Mary E. Boole, Logic Taught by Love, p. 160.) 
 
 2 "An argument from analogy is an inference that what is true in a 
 certain case is true in a case known to be somewhat similar, but not known 
 to be exactly parallel, that is, to be similar in all the material circumstances." 
 (Mill, Logic, bk. 5, ch. 5, 6.) We should sharply distinguish analogies from 
 homologies. The latter are of considerable moment in science, e.g., inter- 
 minable homologies of structure have been discovered in the domain of 
 biology, and the sciences of heat, light, and electricity, are homologous so 
 far as undulatory motion and velocity of transmission are concerned. The 
 comparative method, as in reasoning from animals to man, occupies an 
 intermediate position, and requires scrupulous checking.
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 195 
 
 have flourished. Yet there is here no real analogy. If, for 
 example, we desire to know what a lump of ore is composed of, 
 we conduct a variety of complicated experiments ; but inasmuch 
 as the mode of our procedure in this case is the outcome of 
 aeons of. inventions and discoveries traditionally preserved, 
 the detailed examination of our procedure tells us nothing in 
 regard to our inborn "intelligence". To ascertain the latter, we 
 ought to examine an individual entirely without education, or 
 think of the "intelligence" of man before he acquired the 
 rudiments of culture. For the same reason, experiments on 
 animals which seek to elicit their mental capacity, are mislead- 
 ing if they are based on the supposition that all animal species 
 have the same wants, interests, or capacities as man. In such 
 experiments we should allot to each animal species its own 
 proper tasks, and decline to be deceived by vague analogies. 
 
 In the life of practice, however, when inventiveness or re- 
 sourcefulness are desirable, analogical reasoning is of some value. 
 Yet here also we should beware of dubious analogies, such as 
 the following one where different species and distinct breeds 
 are compared to a chance collection of human individuals form- 
 ing generally neither separate species nor distinct breeds: "Sup- 
 pose a contractor had in his stable a miscellaneous collection 
 of draft animals, including small donkeys, ponies, light horses, 
 carriage horses, and fine dray horses, and a law were to be 
 made that no animal in the stable should be allowed to do 
 more than 'a fair day's work' for a donkey. The injustice of 
 such a law would be apparent to every one. . . . And the 
 difference between the first-class men and the poor ones is 
 quite as great as that between fine dray horses and donkeys." 
 (F. W. Taylor, Shop Management, p. 189.) As Davy stated : 
 "Analogy is the fruitful parent of error." 
 
 84. (B) UTILISATION OF EXISTING KNOWLEDGE.- 
 There is considerable room for utilising knowledge acquired in 
 the past, which knowledge may be roughly said to fall within 
 five categories: 
 
 (a) General knowledge, such as this suggesting that; one, 
 many, all; beginning, middle, end; rise, fall; yes, no; infant, 
 child, adolescent, adult ; and all most widely recognised relations 
 and facts. Whilst criticism should be unsparing here, it must 
 be tempered by the recollection that this kind of elemental 
 knowledge enshrines the foundation of all the sciences, man's 
 first and greatest effort to think humanly. 1 
 
 1 "The child growing up learns, along with the vocables of his mother 
 tongue, that things which he would have believed to be different are, in 
 important points, the same. Without any formal instruction, the language 
 in which we grow up teaches us all the common philosophy of the age. 
 It directs us to observe and know things which we should have overlooked; 
 it supplies us with classifications ready made, by which things are arranged 
 (as far as the light of bygone generations admits) with the objects to which 
 
 13*
 
 196 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 (b) Knowledge of a concrete and a less universal character, 
 such as that embodied in science generally and in methodology. 
 Not only is a thorough grounding in the principal sciences 
 indispensable to him who desires to pursue any science in parti- 
 cular, but he must keep in touch with new discoveries. Unless 
 he compasses the former, he is almost certain to produce second- 
 rate work, lacking as he does the generous background for all 
 thorough researches which is so conspicuously present in our 
 best thinkers ; and unless he attempts the latter, his knowledge 
 will not only be antiquated but will become to some extent 
 useless through being, if not forgotten, imperfectly related to 
 the latest phases of development. For this reason the specialist 
 cannot be too particular in keeping abreast of the knowledge 
 of his time. What he loses thereby, will be amply compensated 
 by the stimulus and assistance he will receive. Narrow con- 
 centration is unmethodological, and leads to over-specialisation 
 and to trivial generalisations. The harmonious development and 
 interaction of all the sciences and arts can only be secured by 
 each specialist having a regard and a care for the whole ; and, 
 in fact,' the ablest specialists are precisely those whose swe'ep 
 of interests recognises no limits. The possession of extensive 
 and up-to-date knowledge of scientific and other data, should 
 be therefore presupposed in all scientific inquirers. 
 
 (c) Knowledge more especially of those sciences which have 
 a more or less close bearing on the subject of our investigations. 
 After what we have stated under (6), this is too manifest to 
 need elaborating. If we take a provincial view of our theme, we 
 are likely to miss its profounder implications. Any one, for in- 
 stance, interested in any of the cultural sciences e.g., anthro- 
 pology, psychology, education, aesthetics, ethics, economics, 
 law, politics should be to a certain extent interested in all, 
 and in his own department seek to do justice to each of them. 
 Owing to the scanty store of sifted knowledge in the past, 
 there was once a legitimate tendency to pay little attention to 
 all but an infinitesimal arc of a subject ; but with the impressive 
 growth of that store, the methodological demand becomes more 
 and more insistent that the specialist's horizon should be as 
 extended as circumstances permit. (See 73.) 
 
 (d) Knowledge of the special subject investigated, whence 
 many "suggestions may be derived. This knowledge is vital, 
 since the vast aggregate of relatively valid generalisations and 
 observations traceable to others requires to be fitted into the 
 structure of our own results. Unless therefore we are familiar 
 with our subject as known in our day, we are likely to squander 
 much time in arriving at conclusions already established, and 
 
 they bear the greatest total resemblance. The number of general names in 
 a language, and the degree of generality of those names, afford a test of the 
 knowledge of the era and of the intellectual insight which is the birthright 
 of any one born into it." (Bain, quoted by Mill, Logic, bk. 4, ch. 3, 1.)
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 197 
 
 miss the stimulus of intimate acquaintance with the trials and 
 labours of others in an analogous position to ourselves. 
 
 (e) The finished product is of comparatively trifling signifi- 
 cance in furnishing an insight into the origin or origination of 
 the sciences, an aspect of decisive importance for the man of 
 science who aspires to be a discoverer. Accordingly, the study 
 of older works and the study of the history of the sciences and 
 arts should be assiduously cultivated. Knowledge of antiquity 
 and antiquity of knowledge are indispensable. 
 
 (/) Comte made out a plausible case for an inter-specialist 
 science, a science which would act as a bond and intermediary 
 between all the sciences. In a certain sense as illustrated even 
 by the scope of this work his was a reasonable demand. 
 Nevertheless, when we remember that narrow specialisation 
 grows more and more anti-scientific as sound knowledge ac- 
 cumulates ; that there are now various groups of closely related 
 sciences ; that it is difficult to harmonise or generalise without 
 experience and verification ; and that the true scholar is encyclo- 
 paedic in his understanding of phenomena, it will be seen that 
 an inter-specialist science has limited possibilities. Indeed, if the 
 proposal of such a science should tend towards an intensification 
 of specialisation, its effect on progress would be prejudicial in 
 the extreme. We conclude therefore that the scholarly specialist 
 will probably overlook little that is relevant in the learning of 
 his day, and that what is additionally needed is a wide interest 
 in science as such, in order to ensure that a sufficient number 
 of scientific works of a comprehensive character is produced. 
 These would aim both at pointing out certain blanks in our 
 knowledge, and intimate how the sciences of the day might be 
 conveniently blended into a comparatively connected whole. 
 If there has to be a choice, it is far more important that the 
 investigator shall have breadth of knowledge than that he shall, 
 relatively or absolutely, exhaust the specialist literature. 
 
 Inasmuch as our more prominent thinkers are almost invariably in- 
 structors in higher educational establishments, and seeing that the scope 
 of their duties is decided for them by their governors whose interest 
 cannot be solely that of research, it may be contended that little can be 
 attained in practice to satisfy methodological demands. Consequently, it 
 may be argued that most of our academic teachers are compelled to take 
 for their province a whole series of sciences, whilst others are required to 
 specialise to a high degree, and all are expected to read prodigiously. Even 
 under such unfavourable conditions, however, much might be achieved. 
 The teacher of philosophy, for instance, who lectures on metaphysics, 
 logics, ethics, and aesthetics, may still devote a certain time to exploring 
 thoroughly one of these sciences, and his specialist colleague who lectures 
 on thermodynamics may engage on the converse task of grappling with 
 some large problem, say the properties of matter. Needless to remark, this 
 labour of love, pursued throughout a life-time, will exert an extremely 
 vitalising and beneficent influence on the official outpourings of the two 
 types of teachers. 
 
 The above objection appears at first sight almost completely fatal in 
 the economic life where every moment of a long day is supposed to be
 
 198 PART IV PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 devoted to visible results. This, however, is being progressively met by 
 trades and firms having research departments and re-organisers, and by 
 so arranging the duties of certain individuals that they may have, when 
 required, ample leisure to experiment and to think of ordinary and radical 
 improvements. 
 
 In any investigation the present Sub-Conclusion plays mani- 
 festly a weighty part, for unless we consult our contempor- 
 aries and the past, steady advance in an enquiry is sadly 
 hampered. 1 
 
 85. (C) REGARD FOR THE FUTURE. To ensure a true 
 perspective we should also pay heed to the demands of posterity. 
 Only when our vision extends to the future, are we likely to 
 gain a comprehensive view of our subject and be sufficiently 
 bold in our aspirations and conceptions. 
 
 86. (D) PERSONAL EQUATION AND TRAINING. We 
 naturally do not postulate in this treatise that everybody can 
 equally well undertake the solution of any and every problem 
 after a perusal of the Conclusions submitted in these pages. 
 There should be some guidance and practice initially, and a fair 
 general education to serve as a basis. We should, in the second 
 place, select a class of problem already under investigation (Con- 
 clusion 5), and enter on a discriminating study of what has been 
 hitherto accomplished rather than be entirely ruled by abstract 
 notions. Such a study, continued throughout the enquiry, will 
 act both as a check and as a spur. We manifestly should, 
 thirdly, make a direct and general survey of our subject before 
 actually launching our enquiry. Next arises the point of our 
 suitability for the task selected. Persons with relatively inade- 
 quate preparation, time, and resources should preferably select 
 scientific work which accords with their limitations, and these 
 will concentrate on comparatively restricted issues, or assist 
 others. 2 The varying personal equation, the need for training, 
 and the financial and other support tendered to scientific 
 institutions or to men of science are, therefore, presupposed 
 throughout these pages. 
 
 1 Without pretending to prescribe a course of reading, it may be pointed 
 out that the main conclusions in most departments of knowledge may be 
 found in comprehensive text-books, or even primers, written by competent 
 specialists, and that encyclopaedias and excellent manuals on physiography, 
 biology, etc., epitomise the contents of related sciences. There is therefore 
 no need to read every book on every subject in order to be passably well- 
 informed. 
 
 2 "There is scarcely any well-informed person, who, if he has but the 
 will, has not also the power to add something essential to the general stock of 
 knowledge, if he will only observe regularly and methodically some particular 
 class of facts which may most excite his attention, or which his situation 
 may best enable him to study with effect." (Herschel, Discourse, [127.].) In 
 the vocational life, for example, few are so unfavourably situated that they 
 cannot make and suggest improvements in their particular sphere. Even if 
 each one were only to perform his or her task conscientiously and intelli- 
 gently, the life of mankind would be revolutionised.
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 199 
 
 Here are a few detailed injunctions relating to self-training 
 at all periods of life: 
 
 (a) Follow precedent, follow the best precedents; 
 (6) Follow example, follow the best examples; 
 
 (c) Learn by the experience of others, learn by your own 
 experience ; 
 
 (d) Inquire of, and consult with, others; 
 
 (e) Profit by what is revealed by accident or special circum- 
 stances ; 
 
 (/) Learn through appropriate, and increasingly profounder, 
 reading and study; 
 
 (gr) Learn through frequently, and sometimes systematically, 
 reflecting over work, its minor and major problems, with a view 
 to its improvement; 
 
 (h) Experiment both on a limited and on an extensive scale; 
 
 (/) Seek to improve on, and generalise as widely as possible, 
 what you have learnt through precedent, example, experience, 
 enquiry and consultation, accident and special circumstances, 
 reading and study, frequent and also systematic reflection, and 
 experiments; and 
 
 (y) Continue all your life improving methods and products 
 by the above and by other means. 
 
 CONCLUSION 9. 
 Need of Experimental Preparation in Methodology. 
 
 87. The habit of methodical scientific procedure, a habit 
 than which it would be difficult to conceive one more important 
 to acquire, should be easily attainable by the student. 
 
 Consider the problem of generalisation. At the lowest stage 
 of training this would require habitual generalising as such. To 
 acquire this art, the student might proceed as follows. Sitting 
 in a room, he may, following the principle embodied in Con- 
 clusion 25, generalise everything he sees or hears. Thus "It 
 would be well if every sitting-room everywhere had a table, 
 had chairs, had a sofa, had pictures, had maps, had a globe, 
 had books, had wall paper, had central heating, had a carpet, 
 had rugs, had a door, had windows, had electric light, had a 
 clock, had ornaments", and so on with every object in the 
 room, and also with any sounds, such as that of the tickings 
 of the clock. This process may be repeated with every part 
 of the building, and may be then continued, on a monster scale, 
 with the world as revealed by tours round the town and country 
 and by examining the various senses and the furniture of the 
 mind. No doubt, before everything observed had been general- 
 ised in this crude way, the student will be obsessed by the 
 desire to generalise everything. After this, we may particularise 
 intensively before generalising. The table, that is, becomes a 
 specific kind of table, and so with the chairs, and with all other
 
 200 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 objects noted. Finally, each of the minutest features of the table, 
 etc., will offer further points of departure for generalising. 
 
 We have reached the second stage. Observing, for instance, 
 a notice relating to fares in an omnibus, the student generalises 
 to all omnibuses, then to tramcars, to other vehicles plying for 
 hire, to railways, and to craft for water and air. He further 
 generalises, in detail, to all possible places, like theatres, where 
 prices might be affixed in a convenient situation. He then 
 generalises, also in detail, the idea of notices on any topic 
 being posted in all private and public places all over the world 
 where such notices might prove advantageous. He proceeds 
 further and extends, in detail, the term notice to any statement 
 be it spoken, written, printed, engraved, tabular, diagrammatic, 
 symbolical, or otherwise. Having attained his end thus far, he 
 resumes his experimental practice by noting one after another 
 the innumerable constituent features of the omnibus and then 
 of other objects or of events, and treats them as he treated 
 the omnibus notice relating to omnibus fares. This also satis- 
 factorily disposed of, he commences to particularise, generalising, 
 say, the many aspects of the notice-board its material, its size, 
 its shape, its colour, its letters and figures, its total content, 
 its position in the omnibus, and so forth, and passes in this 
 way from object to object and from event to event. 
 
 We envisage now the third stage strictly methodical genera- 
 lisation. Here we proceed as in the second stage, save that 
 we act methodically. That is, if it be the notice relating to 
 fares in the omnibus, the moment we think of generalising this 
 matter, we imagine the humblest and shabbiest vehicle, and 
 cautiously and methodically continue to apply the generalisation 
 until we picture to ourselves the most gigantic and most sump- 
 tuously furnished ocean liner. We then resume as methodically, 
 but this time in a methodical order, all the other lines of en- 
 quiry intimated or implied in the preceding paragraph. 
 
 Only one further step is needed to complete the methodological 
 training, and this is to convert the aimless and indiscriminate 
 generalising into purposeful and discriminating generalising. 
 That is, returning again to the notice-board, we judge how far 
 and to what extent the notice particularising fares is justified 
 in the given omnibus at the given time, and how far we may 
 profitably generalise this particular mode of communicating 
 information. Repeating, on this higher plane, what has been 
 attempted on lower planes, there is every likelihood that 
 numerous valid and valuable generalisations will be obtained. 
 
 Thus we learn that the habit of methodical generalising can 
 be readily acquired, and, by implication, that if men commonly 
 generalise sporadically and unmethodically, this is most probably 
 incidental to the absence of appropriate training. 
 
 Needless to state that the procedure proposed in connection 
 with generalising should be also pursued in respect of all the
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 201 
 
 mental processes dwelt on in the series of thirty-six Conclusions. 
 Once methodology becomes a recognised science, experimental 
 methodological training of a methodical character, under the 
 supervision of trained teachers, will be universal. That is, the 
 student of methodology will not only strive to comprehend and 
 memorise certain propositions, but he will undergo a course of 
 experimental training. 
 
 CONCLUSION 10. 
 
 Need of securing the Mental, Physiological, and Environmental 
 Conditions conducive to Efficiency and to Waste Elimination. 
 
 88. Throughout our discussions in this treatise our minds 
 have been, and will be, almost exclusively concentrated on 
 the impersonal methodological means whereby our objective 
 methodological goal is to be reached. Seek truth, we urge, 
 and do this by scrupulous attention to certain conclusions which 
 have been, or which may be, formulated. First, we aver, 
 ascertain the precise nature of the problem to be investigated, 
 then examine the facts according to certain scientific canons, 
 and so forth. In each of these cases we may enter into minute 
 detail; but throughout we remain on the objective plane, ad- 
 vising what every one should do who is in quest of truth and 
 ignoring circumstances foreign to this objective standpoint. 
 
 In brief, we are assuming throughout that we are psycho- 
 logical and physiological automata, uninfluenced by anything 
 save inclination or aversion to truth. Of course, men pre- 
 suppose that insanity or serious indisposition will detrimentally 
 affect efficiency; but they also tacitly postulate that in the 
 case of what is called the normal individual the functioning 
 of the mind and body is virtually invariable and perfect. 
 
 Yet this is very far from being true. Haphazard movements 
 of the mind and body, unnecessary slowness, uneconomical use 
 of energies, overwork or unintelligent work resulting in para- 
 lysing fatigue, ill adapted instruments, materials, and surround- 
 ings generally, contribute towards sensibly depreciating the 
 quantity and the quality of work. Disregard of these and ana- 
 logous pre-requisites will result in an output markedly poorer 
 in every respect than that attained when the attendant non- 
 methodological circumstances are favourable. 
 
 Accordingly, we shall endeavour to formulate the general 
 conditions conducive to efficiency, comprehending every type 
 of labour. 1 
 
 Assuming output of high quality as the end, ideal economy 
 in its production will be achieved by securing the mental, 
 
 1 An essentially popular and able treatment of the subject will be found 
 in Le travail intellectuel el la volonte, by Jules Payot, Paris, 1920. "Pel- 
 raanism" is the name of a present-day system of mind-training recommended 
 by many literary and other notabilities.
 
 202 PART IV PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 physiological, and environmental conditions favouring efficient 
 performance. As will be seen, such economy will furnish pro- 
 ducts of a standard quality, and will therefore make towards 
 uniformly high quality as well as towards great quantity. The 
 problem of systematically improving what is given, which is 
 the complement to economy, is dealt with in 171, since this 
 forms an integral part of objective methodology. 
 
 The basic reconstruction of scientific, artistic, administrative, 
 professional, educational, economic, domestic, and other mental 
 and bodily activities with a view to maximum output of opti- 
 mum quality in minimum time with least effort and with no 
 avoidable depreciation or waste l of instruments, materials, and 
 material and mental energies, congruent with a long, rich, 
 worthy, and joyous life, involves the following factors : 
 
 89. 1. ECONOMY OF PURPOSE.- (a) The aiming at un- 
 ambiguity or clearness, of distinctness or decided distinctive- 
 ness, and of conspicuousness or ready apprehensibility, of pur- 
 pose or of the conception of the task to be realised. 
 
 (b) The application of the above to the purposes subsidiary 
 to the initial purpose. 
 
 2. ECONOMY OF VOLITION. (a) The unhesitating trans- 
 lation of the above purpose into the appropriate act, involving 
 maybe courage, resoluteness, strenuousness, and the resolve 
 to be persevering and adaptable. 
 
 (b) The application of a volition subsidiary to the initial 
 volition, including, besides independence of thought and judg- 
 ment, quickness of decision, initiative, originality, enterprise, 
 and forethought. (The elements of these qualities require to 
 be ascertained and recorded in detail.) 
 
 1 The question of the conservation of natural products, such as coal, 
 metals, forests, and countless others, merits the close attention of the eco- 
 nomist and the statesman. Not until we have harnessed the energies of the 
 ocean tides, of the sun, or of the atom to our engines, and have realised 
 by science the ambitions of the alchemists of old, shall we be justified in 
 lavishly consuming nature's wealth. E.g., "if it were possible to convert 
 the chemical energy of coal completely into work, without at first burning 
 it to liberate the energy as heat, the energy of 1 ton of coal would then be 
 sufficient to lift one of the largest liners, weighing 20,000 tons, 500 feet high." 
 (F. Soddy, Matter and Energy, p. 31.) Indeed, as our methodology compels 
 us to take into account the distant future, we have seriously, though without 
 alarm, to ask ourselves whether our remote descendants will know anything 
 of precious or useful metals, of material fuels and non-artificial fertilisers, 
 of natural precious stones, of wild, or even domesticated, animals, of na- 
 tural scenery, and much else that we find in the bowels or on the surface 
 of the earth, not excluding the moral, intellectual, artistic, and historic 
 treasures of the then hoary past. A less remote contingency is the elimi- 
 nation of the vast stretches of waste in our present economic system. To 
 the diverse aspects dealt with in this Conclusion, we may add organisation 
 for mass production and distribution, introduction wherever possible of 
 automatic labour-saving machinery, national and international organisation 
 of transport and power facilities, exclusion of unnecessary middlemen, and 
 elimination of anti-social methods in the conduct of undertakings.
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 203 
 
 (c) The methodical perfecting of the volitional powers. 
 
 3. ECONOMY OF SENSATIONS. Consequent on willing, 
 where a material act is to be performed, (a) the rapid recog- 
 nition and delicate and swift discrimination of the sensory 
 material offered. 
 
 (b) The application of the above to the sensings which suc- 
 ceed the initiating sensations at intervals. 
 
 (c) The careful education of at least the senses of sight, 
 hearing, and touch, in order to ensure the above. 
 
 (d) The favouring of neatness (or clearness), conspicuousness, 
 and distinctness (or decided separateness), in physical activities 
 generally (e.g., in writing), with a view to facilitating sensory 
 recognition and discrimination. 
 
 4. ECONOMY OF MEMORY. Consequent on willing, where 
 a mental act is to be performed, (a) instantaneous and correct 
 recollection or recognition of the mental movements contem- 
 plated. 
 
 (b) Application of the above to the memory processes suc- 
 ceeding the initiating recollections and recognitions; and, in 
 order to ensure their efficiency, 
 
 (c) The acquisition through training of a good general me- 
 morycomprehensive, durable, ordered, reliable, and respon- 
 sive; 
 
 (d) The acquisition of a good task memory for at least brief 
 periods (days or weeks), of a broad-span memory for briefest 
 periods (seconds or minutes), and the systematic and fauttless 
 memorising of frequently recurring movements, facts, and 
 figures ; 
 
 (e) Methodical and long-continued practice to ensure instanta- 
 neous and correct recollection at the appropriate moment- 
 mental, sensory, muscular of everything habitual relating to 
 a task; and 
 
 (/) The favouring of neatness (or clearness), conspicuousness, 
 and distinctness (or decided separateness), in observation and 
 thought in order to facilitate retention, recognition, and re- 
 collection. 
 
 5. ECONOMY OF MOVEMENTS. The theoretical aim should 
 be, ideally speaking, to complete a whole task with a single, 
 scarcely perceptible, continuous movement. 
 
 (a) The elimination of superfluous movements and operations. 
 
 (b) The substitution, wherever practicable, of a continuous 
 movement for a series of movements. 
 
 (c) The substitution, wherever practicable, of combined for 
 successive movements and operations (e.g., employing simul- 
 taneously, so far as practicable, both hands, every finger, the 
 limbs, etc., for separate operations). 
 
 (d) The utilisation of instruments (tray, note-book, generali- 
 sation, utilising an errand for several objects instead of one. 
 etc.), so as to minimise movements.
 
 204 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 (e) Arranging any series of movements with due regard to 
 their easily fitting into one another. 
 
 (/) The elimination of circuitous, haphazard, false, and non- 
 standardised movements. 
 
 (g) The maximum contraction of movements. 
 
 (h) Insofar as practicable, the omission or drastic simplifi- 
 cation or abbreviation of anything frequently recurring. 
 
 (i) The deliberate and methodical elimination from each new 
 or old task of everything which can be dispensed with. 
 
 (/) The encouragement of initial accuracy, leading as it does 
 to an extensive reduction of superfluous movements. ( 124.) 
 
 (k) Paying special attention to the larger and more important 
 aspects, since these render redundant much detail. 
 
 (/) The replacing, where possible, of human labour by labour- 
 saving appliances. 
 
 (m) Such a spatial distribution of individuals, groups, de- 
 partments, furniture, and materials as shall contribute to the 
 most economical collaboration in collective tasks. 
 
 (n) The establishment of a standardised and completely re- 
 corded series of movements for tasks and part tasks, and strict 
 adherence thereto. 
 
 (o) The provision for a periodical re-adaptation and improve- 
 ment of standards. 
 
 6. ECONOMY OF TIME IN MOVEMENTS. The theoretical 
 aim should be to complete the movements necessary within an 
 infinitesimal period of time. 
 
 (a) The determination of the average maximum speed practi- 
 cable for normal and exceptional individuals and circumstances. 
 
 (b) The maximum acceleration of movements. 
 
 (c) The selection of movements, and movement complexes, 
 which allow of highest speeds. 
 
 (d) The elimination, insofar as practicable, of (e.g., cumbrous) 
 movements which are inconsistent with highest speeds. 
 
 (e) The removal of impediments to fullest freedom in move- 
 ment. 
 
 (/) The encouragement , of rapid rhythmic movements. 
 
 (g) Methodical practice to accelerate speed. 
 
 (h} The elimination, or maximal contraction, of pauses be- 
 tween movements and operations. 
 
 (0 Methodical practice to eliminate, or maximally reduce, 
 pauses. 
 
 (/) The systematic utilisation of unavoidable pauses and par- 
 tially free mental energies. 
 
 (K) Planning a contemplated task, or part task, whilst en- 
 gaged on another. 
 
 (/) So organising the work that it can proceed without delays, 
 disturbances, and shorter or longer interruptions. 
 
 (772) Perennial alertness, without being engrossed in one 
 particular.
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 205 
 
 (n) The aiming at neatness (or clearness), conspicuousness, 
 and distinctness (or decided separateness), in every type of 
 mental and physical task, as favouring speed. 
 
 (o) The application of a trained intelligence to the expedi- 
 tious solution of difficulties. 
 
 (p) Having instruments and materials, of -an appropriate and 
 sterling character and in good condition, always ready to hand, 
 and having products systematically removed. 
 
 (q) Proper co-ordination, and hearty co-operation and collabo- 
 ration, of individuals, groups, and departments, engaged oh a 
 particular task or related tasks. 
 
 (r) The keeping down of fatigue to a level consistent with 
 the maintenance of a uniformly high hourly and daily average 
 speed. (See 7.) 
 
 (s) The establishment of an absolute and an average time 
 standard for a task and for parts thereof, and strict adherence 
 thereto. 
 
 (t) The provision for a periodical re-adaptation and improve- 
 ment of standards. 
 
 7. ECONOMY OF EFFORT AND FATIGUE IN MOVE- 
 MENTS. The theoretical aim should be to complete the move- 
 ments necessary for an operation with the expenditure of an 
 infinitesimal degree of effort and with a negligible amount of 
 fatigue. 
 
 (a) The determination of the average maximum effort practi- 
 cable for normal and exceptional individuals and circumstances. 
 
 (b) The elimination of superfluous exertions. 
 
 (c) The increase of exertions, where needed, to the maximum 
 limit consistent with hygienic or quickly removed fatigue- 
 that is, fatigue which does not reduce quantity or quality of 
 work, which does not leave the individual very tired after 
 working hours, and which permits of complete recuperation 
 by the following morning. 
 
 (d) The determination of the maximum average exertion 
 consistent with hygienic or quickly removed fatigue. 
 
 (e) The distribution of exertions over several organs and in 
 the least fatiguing order. 
 
 (/) The allocation of movements to organs and muscles best 
 able to produce them with least effort and least fatigue. 
 
 (g) The introduction, wherever practicable, of rhythms in 
 movements. 
 
 (/z) Methodical practice to raise the individual's power and 
 endurance. 
 
 (z) The elimination of unnecessary fatiguing movements (ex- 
 cluding, as far as practicable, bending, stooping, turning, twist- 
 ing, and extended arm work). 
 
 (j) The encouragement of a bearing and gait, as well as of 
 bodily proportions, and also of garments, conducive to maximum 
 exertion and minimum fatigue.
 
 206 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 (K) The re-arrangement of tasks and parts thereof, of the 
 hours and time-of-day of work, of meal-times, of rest-acces- 
 sories, of rest-periods within and outside working-hours, of 
 recreation, of daily hours of labour, of week-end pauses and 
 holidays, with the object of minimising debilitating fatigue and 
 maintaining mental and bodily vigour. 
 
 (/) The establishment of proper indoor or outdoor conditions 
 (1) pure air, avoidance of cold and heat, good light by day and 
 night, satisfactory rest room, canteen, mess room, committee 
 room, cloak room, and lavatory accommodation, effective dusting 
 and cleaning, provisions for first-aid, modern sanitary arrange- 
 ments and other conveniences, comparative silence, protection 
 from avoidable disturbance or interference, regard for aBsthetic 
 sense; and (2) equitable and courteous treatment by superiors. 
 
 (m) The eschewing of noxious foods, beverages, narcotics, 
 and amusements, and of deleterious habits generally. 
 
 (/z) The corresponding promotion of the proper functioning 
 of the respiratory, alimentary, circulatory, muscular, nervous 
 and neural systems, and of robust mental and bodily health 
 generally. 
 
 (6) The avoidance of nervousness, excitement, and pain, inas- 
 much as these tend to depress energy and intensify fatigue. 
 
 (p) The existence of an interest and pleasure in the task 
 and pursuit. 
 
 (q) The recognition of the high hygienic and happiness value 
 of strenuousness, and of the detrimental effect on health and 
 happiness of idleness or slacking. 
 
 (r) Love of work, a cheerful, buoyant spirit, and equanimity 
 and kindly disposition. 
 
 (s) Genial colleagues. 
 
 (f) Security of post, and adequate provision for self and family 
 for the present, for old age, and for all contingencies. 
 
 (u) Ample opportunities, and full liberty, to participate in 
 the bracing larger life beyond the particular pursuit. 
 
 (v) The establishment of an average standard, or of average 
 standards, for maximum effort and maximum fatigue consistent 
 with the maintenance of robust health. 
 
 (w) The provision for a periodical re-adaptation and improve- 
 ment of standards. 
 
 8. ECONOMY OF THOUGHT AND FEELING. The theo- 
 retical aim should be to complete the necessary movements 
 with a minimum of cogitation and feeling. 
 
 (a) A sound general education as a solid basis for efficiency 
 in a particular avocation, and a sound body (involving proper 
 nourishment, etc.) as a necessary basis for a sound education. 
 
 (6) The thorough early training in the particular pursuit, by 
 trained instructors who are acquainted with the best methods 
 of work and teaching, and the possession of the fullest up-to- 
 date information directly or indirectly germane thereto.
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 207 
 
 (c) Methodical practice in order to grow increasingly pro- 
 ficient in economising thought and feeling. 
 
 (d) The perfecting of the capacity to observe, of the reason- 
 ing process, of the judgment, of the imagination, of the aBsthetic 
 sense, of the desire to do one's duty, and of general mani- 
 pulative dexterity, mental and bodily. 
 
 (e) The encouragement of initial accuracy ( 124), resource- 
 fulness ( 135), and* self-training ( 86). 
 
 (/) The creation of pauses for critically reviewing the past, 
 planning the future, and thinking out well and at leisure com- 
 plicated tasks. (In large undertakings this would entail institut- 
 ing a planning, a progress, and a costing department.) 
 
 (g) The calculation of everything practicable by measurement 
 or mathematically, or at least arriving at quite definite, metho- 
 dical, and durable decisions or arrangements. 
 
 (h) The classification, and the subsequent separation and 
 standardisation, of procedures, materials, etc., and the elimi- 
 nation of unnecessary diversity. 
 
 (/) The generalising, and the deductive, exploitation of what 
 proves advantageous. 
 
 (/) The systematic specialisation of functions and subdivision 
 of tasks with the object of enhancing productivity (and quality), 
 allowing for fair insight into connected functions and tasks. 
 
 (k) The improvement and development of given processes 
 and products, the striking out along new profitable lines, and 
 the discouragement of mere routine and sheer love-of-change, 
 as all but the supreme duty of the worker. (See 171.) 
 
 (/) The evolution of a temperament and of emotional atti- 
 tudes stimulating and not depressing activity e.g., equanimity, 
 quiet cheerfulness, friendly feelings towards others, trustfulness. 
 
 (777) The establishment of an average general standard of 
 intelligence and feelings for (a) pursuits and for (b) tasks. 
 
 (ri) The provision for a periodical re-adaptation and improve- 
 ment of standards. 
 
 9. ECONOMY OF LOCALITY, ACCOMMODATION, FURNI- 
 TURE, INSTRUMENTS, MATERIALS, MACHINERY, AND 
 MATERIAL ENERGIES (a) The close adaptation of these to 
 the peculiarities and possibilities of the mind and body, as set 
 out in 1 to 8 above. 
 
 (b) The avoidance of depreciation and waste in the above. 
 
 10. ECONOMY OF PRODUCTS. (a) The creation of such 
 products only as tend to promote the lasting welfare of the 
 individual, the community, and mankind i.e., as tend to realise 
 the good, the true, the hygienic, and the beautiful. 
 
 (b) The creation of products of the highest quality only, as 
 being most economical. 
 
 (c) The avoidance of depreciation and waste of products. 
 
 11. ECONOMY OF INDIVIDUAL ACTION. (a) Systematic 
 and radical co-ordination of life and related pursuits and of
 
 208 PART IV.- PREPARA TORY STAGE. 
 
 pursuits generally in a hierarchical order locally, nationally, 
 and internationally, in order to increase productivity and 
 diminish waste. 
 
 (b) The widest dissemination and standardisation of what is 
 found to be of value. 
 
 12. SUMMARY. The radical reconstruction of processes and 
 procedures in order maximally to economise purpose, volition, 
 sensations, memory, and, more especially, (a) movements as 
 such, (b) time in movements, (c) effort and fatigue in move- 
 ments, (d) thought and feeling in movements, (e) locality, accom- 
 modation, furniture, instruments, materials, machinery, and 
 material energies, (/)- products, and (g) individual action. 
 
 Basic Reconstruction. Real economy implies basic reconstruction. "It 
 is as well to recognise first as last that real progress from the best pre- 
 sent method to the standard method can never be made solely by 
 elimination. The sooner this is recognised the better. Elimination is 
 often an admirable makeshift. But the only real progress comes through 
 a reconstruction of the operation, building it up of standardised units, 
 or elements." (F. B. Gilbreth, Motion Study, 1911, p. 91.) 
 
 As might be anticipated, basic reconstruction absorbs much time. 
 "Mr. Gantt says that the setting of each of his tasks meant at least a 
 year's preliminary work at a time and motion-study, general or special, 
 and in some cases two years." (M. and H. D. McKillop, Efficiency Me- 
 thods, 1917, p. 107.) 
 
 Motion-Study. "Motion study has been described as the dividing of 
 the elements of the work into the most elementary subdivisions possible, 
 studying and measuring the variables of these fundamental units sepa- 
 rately and in relation to one another, and from these studied, chosen units, 
 after they have been derived, building up methods of least waste." 
 (Frank B. and Lillian M. Gilbreth, Fatigue Study, 1919, p. 11.) 
 
 Motion study is largely instrumental. "The methods of measurement 
 of activity are motion study, micromotion study, the cyclegraph, the 
 chronocyclegraph, and the penetrating screen." (Ibid., p. 131.) 
 
 Here is an example of concrete motion study. "Gilbreth found that 
 with the customary way of laying bricks eighteen motions were employed 
 in laying a single brick, but eleven of these could be omitted altogether, 
 and some of the others could be combined, so that the required motions 
 were reduced to one and three-quarters." (Frederick S. Lee, The Human 
 Machine and Industrial Efficiency, 1918, pp. 19-20.) 
 
 J^ATIG UE. "Fatigue study is related to motion study in that both 
 are branches of waste elimination." (Frank B. and Lillian M. Gilbreth, 
 Fatigue Study, p. 17.) 
 
 "Even where fatigue is not materially cut down during working hours, 
 because measurement shows that the worker is not getting over-fatigued, 
 the general health is apt to improve because of greater regularity in habits 
 of work, and because of better physical and mental habits while doing 
 the work. The path along this line is a continuous, never-ending upward 
 spiral. Fatigue is eliminated by establishing proper habits. The proper 
 habits improve health. The improved health allows of more work with 
 less fatigue, etc." (Ibid., p. 143.) "At any stage in the process of fatigue 
 elimination the results may be tested. The general health of the worker, 
 his prolonged activity, his posture, his behaviour, act as such tests." 
 (Ibid., p. 151.) 
 
 It is usually the tired motorman who has the collision. The tired 
 locomotive engineer passes the stop signal. The exhausted motorist is 
 in the accident. The tired operator gets his fingers caught in the machine. 
 The overtired sickroom attendant gives the wrong medicine." (Ibid., p. 86.)
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 209 
 
 The first classic on the subject of fatigue is Industrial Health and 
 Efficiency, being the Final Report of the Health of Munition Workers 
 Committee of the British Ministry of Munitions. The volume shows that 
 only short hours of work are consistent with health and with large 
 output. 
 
 HABIT. We must allow for the gradual manner in which new habits 
 are acquired. "An operation took on an average 2.17 minutes. After the 
 method had been modified, the worker took 1.6 minutes. In a short time 
 she took only 0.5 minutes." (M. and A. D. McKillop, Efficiency Methods. 
 p. 110.) 
 
 HOURS OF LABOUR. The effect of reducing the number of hours 
 worked is sometimes startling. "I should like to quote an instance, 
 occurring recently in a surgical dressing factory where women were 
 engaged as yarn-winders, an occupation requiring much dexterity and the 
 constant repairing of broken threads. The daily hours of work were ten, 
 namely from 6-8, 8.30-12.30, 1.30-5.30, and in addition to these ten 
 hours, overtime was worked from 6-8 p.m. Among these yarn-winders 
 was a young unmarried woman of thirty-two who claimed that by not 
 working before breakfast (from 6 to 8 a.m.) and by refusing to work 
 overtime (from 6 to 8 p.m.), she turned out more in the remaining eight 
 hours than if she had worked the whole twelve hours. Her claim was 
 put to the test by comparing her monthly output during eight hours 
 per day with that of three first-class hands working during the first 
 fortnight at twelve hours per day and during the second fortnight at ten 
 hours per day. Despite the fact that the short-timer stayed away the 
 whole of one working day and three half-days during the month, her 
 output of 52,429 bobbins easily beat the average output of her three 
 competitors' 48,529 bobbins. In 32 per cent, less hours of work she 
 produced 8 per cent, more work. Further, the output of the three com- 
 petitors was greater by more than 5 per cent, during the second (as 
 compared with the first) fortnight, when no overtime was being worked 
 and the length of the working day was thus reduced by 16.6 per cent." 
 (Charles S. Myers, Present-Day Applications of Psychology, 1918, pp. 15-16.) 
 
 What appears to be true of this particular instance, seems to hold 
 generally, as the following excerpt implies: "We have an even more 
 significant case in Durham, where the hewers have for many years en- 
 joyed a seven-hour day from bank to bank. Nevertheless, the output per 
 underground worker in Durham is fully equal to that of the other districts 
 where more than an extra hour is worked. ... In the United States the 
 reduction of the hours of labour in coal mining from 10 to 8 presently 
 led. as is officially reported, to a positively larger output for each work- 
 man per day than the highest output of the 10 hours. The Industrial 
 Commission of the Supreme Court (Final Report, Vol. II, 1902) reports 
 that 'in the industry of coal mining the shorter working day has in- 
 creased the efficiency of both workmen and the management'. We see 
 no reason why a like increase in the efficiency of both workmen and 
 the management should not be manifested in this country on the now 
 projected reduction of hours from nine to seven per day." (Quoted from 
 the Coal Commission Report, in Engineering and Industrial Management, 
 March 27th, 1919, p. 208.) 
 
 METHOD OF DETERMINING STANDARD PROCEDURE. In certain 
 tasks the method of determining standard procedure would be to apply 
 the general methods of simplifying motions, increasing speed, reduciqg 
 fatigue, etc. In simple tasks of a transient character, and in the daily 
 attempts to economise wherever possible, general principles would form 
 the chief guides. In other tasks, however, where their nature is fre- 
 quently the result of historic development, and where tools and machinery 
 are involved, it is manifestly impracticable to re-invent the process, with- 
 out regard to established usage. In such cases the best current practice 
 has to be studied. Taylor suggests the following procedure : "First, Find, 
 say, ten or fifteen different men (preferably in as many separate establish- 
 
 14
 
 210 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 ments and different parts of the country) who are especially skilful in 
 doing the particular work to be analysed. Second. Study the exact 
 series of elementary operations or motions which each of these men uses 
 in doing the work which is being investigated, as well as the implements 
 each man uses. Third. Study with a stopwatch the time required to 
 make each of these elementary movements, and then select the quickest 
 way of doing each element of the work. Fourth. Eliminate all false 
 movements, slow movements, and useless movements. Fifth. After doing 
 away with all unnecessary movements, collect into one series the quickest 
 and best movements as well as the best implements." (The Principles 
 of Scientific Management, 1911, pp. 117-118.) Gilbreth pursues this study 
 by means of highly delicate recording instruments. 
 
 TRAINING. Taylor finely conceives of the training of the worker, 
 which evidently ought to be as thorough as that of the professional man. 
 He says: "It should be remembered that the training of the surgeon has 
 been almost identical in type with the teaching and training which is 
 given to the workman under scientific management. The surgeon, all 
 through his early years, is under the closest supervision of more ex- 
 perienced men who show him in the minutest way how each element 
 of his work is best done. They provide him with the finest implements, 
 each one of which has been the subject of special study and development, 
 and then insist upon his using these implements in the very best way. 
 All of this teaching, however, in no way narrows him. On the contrary, 
 he is quickly given the very best knowledge of his predecessors; and, 
 provided (as he is, right from the start) with standard implements and 
 methods which represent the best knowledge of the world up to date, 
 he is able to use his own originality and ingenuity to make real additions 
 to the world's knowledge, instead of reinventing things which are old. 
 In a similar manner, the workman who is co-operating with his many 
 teachers under the modern scientific management has an opportunity to 
 develop, which is at least as good as, and generally better, than that which 
 he had when the whole problem was 'up to him' and he did his work 
 entirely unaided." (Ibid., pp. 66-67.) 
 
 Owing to practical necessities Taylor was engrossed in what one might 
 term re-education. Early training is, however, an imperative need. "Skill 
 is largely a matter of training," say F. B. and L. M. Gilbreth, "and the 
 greatest skill can be acquired in the shortest amount of time when right 
 habits are acquired as the direct result of right methods having been 
 taught from the start." (Measurement of the Human Factor in Industry, 
 1917, p. 4.) The problem of a scientifically standardised form of training 
 apprentices is yet waiting solution. 
 
 CONCLUSION 11. 
 Need of Systematically Framing Hypotheses. 
 
 90. A fact may be defined as an assumption in closest 
 accord with sifted knowledge, and a theory as a proposition 
 about the complete correctness of which full assurance is lacking. 
 Wherever in a scientific enquiry, therefore, we take into con- 
 sideration what is not strictly before us in space and time, or, 
 what amounts to the same thing, wherever we utilise the me- 
 mory, we indulge in framing hypotheses. These may be infinitely 
 near the truth or infinitely removed from it, but hypotheses 
 they remain. The office of a scientific methodology is to ensure 
 that they shall be framed when required by the circumstances, 
 that they shall not be framed when not required by the circum- 
 stances, that they shall be discarded or modified when found
 
 SECTION 20.- STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 211 
 
 inapplicable, that they shall be verified when formed, and that 
 they shall be, as far as possible, extremely close to the truth. 1 
 
 Since all the Conclusions represent to a certain degree attempts 
 to satisfy the standard formulated in the foregoing sentence, 
 and whereas the problem is incidentally treated in some detail 
 in many of the Conclusions, besides having a special Section 
 allotted to it in Part II, it does not appear necessary to enter 
 into particulars in this place, but just to state the need of 
 habitually and methodically framing hypotheses. 
 
 Recapitulating the subject, we may say that the investigator 
 should systematically devise the most extensive hypotheses 
 consistent with the stage of an enquiry, whether it be in the 
 matter of observation, generalisation, deduction, definition, etc.; 
 that he should systematically verify, improve, and extend his 
 hypotheses; and that he should be aware that where a mo- 
 dicum is known, the hypotheses formulated are almost certain 
 to be substantially erroneous and that the time spent on veri- 
 fying them is likely to prove worse than wasted. Only this 
 need be added that the common practice of accumulating con- 
 jectures regardless of adequate preliminary observation and 
 subsequent adequate verification is a token of the absence, 
 rather than of the presence, of scientific proficiency. 
 
 Conclusions dealing somewhat circumstantially with the matter 
 of this Conclusion are 5, 6, 25, 28, and 29, and most especi- 
 ally 25 d. 
 
 CONCLUSION 12. 
 Need of Co-operation in Scientific Work. 
 
 91. Science knows no barriers of nationality, and contri- 
 butions receive fair consideration whether they emanate from 
 London or Paris, Tokio or Teheran. A moment's reflection will 
 convince any one that but for this frank national and interna- 
 tional co-operation, science would be yet embryonic in form, 
 and its text-books be mostly filled with hearsay. Indeed, but 
 for the fact of civilisation, with its open door, replacing bar- 
 barism, with its closed gates, there would be practically no 
 intercommunication between peoples, and without this it is diffi- 
 cult to conceive the existence of many sciences, inasmuch as 
 these are almost invariably dependent on data culled from every 
 region of the globe. 
 
 However, unpremeditated co-operation between peoples is 
 traceable down to the remotest antiquity. An illustration of 
 
 1 "Hypotheses have often an eminent use: and a facility in framing them, 
 if attended with an equal facility in laying them aside when they have served 
 their turn, is one of the most valuable qualities a philosopher can possess: 
 while, on the other hand, a bigoted adherence to them, or indeed to peculiar 
 views of any kind, in opposition to the tenor of facts as they arise, is the 
 bane of all philosophy." (Herschel, Discourse, [217.].) 
 
 14*
 
 212 PART IV. PREP A RA TORY STAGE. 
 
 this may be found in how Aristotle came to be pre-eminent 
 among the scholastics. Byzantine scholars acclimatised him in 
 their land and also popularised him in Egypt. When in the 
 seventh century the bellicose Arabs invaded the latter country, 
 they became disciples of Aristotle, and carried his fame to 
 wherever their conquests extended. Thus he came to be studied 
 in Spain, of which the Arabs had become the masters. And 
 thence the works were gradually introduced to the rest of Europe. 
 Collaboration, which Bacon so strongly recommended, is 
 becoming more and more prevalent. Dictionaries, encyclopedias, 
 and text-books are now frequently compiled by companies of 
 scholars; the heavens are at present being mapped out by 
 about a score of observatories concertedly; an International 
 Committee deals with the work done in relation to the exact 
 determination of atomic weights, whilst an International Com- 
 mission of Scientific Aeronautics directs the studies for upper 
 air research ; national and international scientific institutions, 
 academies, conferences, and periodicals, facilitate exchange of 
 opinions and co-operation ; and men of science, especially physi- 
 cists and biologists, not rarely keep in intimate contact with 
 others who are pursuing kindred lines of enquiry. 1 Except 
 for this fact of collaboration, scientific advance would be much 
 retarded. The knowledge we possess of radium, the advances 
 which are being recorded in chemistry, and the progress re- 
 gistered in the biological sciences are largely due to men readily 
 
 1 Here is an example : "About the middle of the nineteenth century there 
 came into existence in most countries organisations, either voluntary or 
 State supported, for collecting observations of weather from a number of 
 places and for summarising the observations when collected. At the present 
 time the land surface of the globe is covered by a network of stations at 
 which regular observations of weather are made on a definite plan. Over 
 wide areas, especially in the tropics, the network is of very wide mesh, 
 so that many facts which it would be desirable to record escape notice. The 
 organisation of the work is still imperfect in other respects also, but each 
 year sees a further approach to the meteorologist's ideal of securing regular 
 observations from the whole world, so that he may be able t.o study the 
 world's weather changes as a whole. Nor is the ocean neglected, for most 
 ocean-going ships keep a regular record of weather observations. Each 
 station or ship forwards its records regularly to the central institution of its 
 country for correlation with those taken elsewhere. In this way a vast amount 
 of material is collected and made available for study or for application to the 
 affairs of every-day life. The central institutions of different countries are 
 kept in contact with one another by periodic conferences of their directors, 
 which conferences elect from their members a committee to deal with current 
 questions." (R. G. K. Lempfert, op. cit., pp. vi-vii.) 
 
 The need for co-operation is also appreciated in the efficiency movement. 
 "Wherever possible more than one observer should be set to work, as the 
 statistics will be much more valuable if personal idiosyncrasies can be 
 eliminated by comparison and repetition." (M. and A. D. McKillop, op. cit., 
 p. 84.) So, too, Mr. and Mrs. Gilbreth urge that methods of efficiency 
 should be discovered by trade associations rather than by individuals or 
 firms, and that skill should be transferred to bodies of workers simultaneously 
 rather than to one individual at a time.
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 213 
 
 absorbing the conclusions which others have reached. "A Darwin 
 now no sooner propounds original ideas concerning the evolution 
 of living creatures, than those ideas are discussed and illustrated, 
 and applied by naturalists in every part of the world. In former 
 days his discoveries would have been hidden for decades of years 
 in scarce manuscripts, and generations would have passed away 
 before his theory had enjoyed the same amount of criticism and 
 corroboration as it has already received." (Jevons, Principles 
 of Science, p. 575.) 
 
 With the passage of time wide collaboration will become in- 
 creasingly recognised as indispensable in all scientific work, 
 and thereto will probably be added Commissions of Experts 
 who will offer advice and final criticism. An incalculable waste 
 obtains in private adventures of a scientific character, and it 
 is only consistent to demand that if truth be a collective pro- 
 duct, it should be arrived at by systematic co-operation. In the 
 place of the present-day motto "One man, six books", there 
 ought to be the device "Six men, one book", and such volumes, 
 not too bulky ones either, should cover much ground, embracing 
 preferably a substantial part of some subject or science. It ought 
 not to. be left to the undiscriminating fates to determine who 
 should initiate or continue a line of investigation, nor should 
 an individual toil for years without impartially examining the 
 labours of others and without soliciting and receiving from 
 many competent quarters the soundest advice, assistance, and 
 criticism. 
 
 Right to the end of the eighteenth century, and even beyond, 
 scurvy caused terrible havoc among the seafaring population. 
 Thousands and tens of thousands succumbed to this loathsome 
 scourge. Yet already in 1734 Bachstrom correctly diagnosed its 
 cause: 
 
 "From want of proper attention to the history of the scurvy, its 
 causes have been generally, though wrongfully, supposed to 
 be cold in northern climates, sea-air, the use of salt-meats, etc., 
 whereas this evil is solely owing to a total abstinence from 
 fresh vegetable food and greens ; which is alone the true primary 
 cause of the disease. And where persons, either through neglect 
 or necessity, do refrain for a considerable time from eating the 
 fresh fruits of the earth and greens, no age, no climate or soil 
 are exempted from its attack. Other secondary causes may 
 likewise concur, but recent vegetables are found alone effectual 
 to preserve the body from this malady; and most speedily to 
 cure it, even in a few days, when the case is not rendered 
 desperate by the patients' being dropsical or consumptive." 
 (Quoted in Report on ... Vitamines, p. 38.) 
 
 For those on the high seas the above advice may have seemed 
 a counsel of perfection. However, the appropriate remedy was 
 also not unknown. "Lind recounts the tragic history of four 
 ships which sailed from England to Bombay in April 1600,
 
 214 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 carrying 480 men on board, including merchants and other 
 officials, in order to establish the East India Company. The 
 Commodore upon his own ship had arranged for a regular issue 
 of lemon juice, three tablespoonfuls daily, to all hands, and four 
 months later, when the flotilla reached the Cape, his men were 
 all in good health. On the other three ships, however, the seamen 
 were so severely attacked by scurvy that the passengers had 
 to work as common seamen. In all 105 men died from scurvy 
 during the voyage, and when Bombay was finally reached the 
 entire work of unloading had to be performed by the crew of 
 the Commodore's ship." (Ibid., pp. 57-58.) 
 
 Thus a glaring lack of co-operation, of learning by the experi- 
 ence of others, has in this as in so many other cases been highly 
 prejudicial to the welfare and progress of mankind. 
 
 In the more highly developed sciences, where it is customary 
 to consult colleagues and to submit from time to time for public 
 criticism provisional results obtained in an enquiry, we are ap- 
 proaching the co-operative ideal, and the future will presumably 
 know little of scientific work not undertaken and executed in 
 collaboration. How this is to be accomplished, we cannot pro- 
 fitably discuss here; but why should there not be instituted 
 international bureaus for each branch of science, each bureau 
 publishing in an international or in an internationalised language 
 a periodical, a standard primer, and elementary and advanced 
 text-books to be used internationally ; and why should there not 
 be formed, besides intermediate bureaus embracing a complete 
 science and groups of sciences (physics, biology, etc.), a central 
 bureau of science connecting these and issuing a magazine and 
 standard primers of science akin to Huxley's Introductory and 
 Paul Bert's First Year of Scientific Knowledge, and one or more 
 advanced manuals? 
 
 At the same time the conditions of co-operation must be 
 respected. For those, for example, who concern themselves 
 with the cultural sciences, to co-operate as Prof. Small in his 
 inspiring The Meaning of Social Science proposes in ascertaining 
 the dynamic factors involved in a particular historical event, 
 would be, in our judgment, futile in most cases at present, 
 because feebly developed sciences applied in conjunction to one 
 complex problem would only augment the prevalent confusion. 
 However, as the stores of reliable knowledge grow through the 
 ages, such co-operation not only becomes practicable, but is 
 practised on an imposing scale. We have to no small extent 
 already reached this stage. 
 
 Co-operation in research work, incredible as it may seem to many, is 
 becoming a reality in industry and commerce. Owing chiefly to govern- 
 mental initiative and assistance, Research Associations are being formed 
 by the leading industries in England. Added to this, researches of all- 
 national importance are conducted by special governmental committees ; 
 and there is the brightest prospect of English effort being linked with 
 the efforts of other nations in the same direction. The condition for a
 
 SECTION 20.-STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 215 
 
 general and continuous advance in the solution of industrial and com- 
 mercial problems is thus given. Besides, it is a growing practice for 
 establishments to call in the "scientific manager" or "efficiency engineer" 
 for the purpose of reconstructing them on a scientific basis. We may hence 
 confidently look forward to the establishment of a science of efficiency, 1 
 produced and applied co-operatively. The era of secrecy, incompetence, 
 and isolation in business matters is happily passing. 
 
 As profound is the change which is proceeding in a cognate direction. 
 Collective bargaining was long resisted by employers (and in some quarters 
 is still resisted). However, not only is the principle now generally con- 
 ceded that workingmen may belong to a trade union and that they may 
 be represented by the officials of their unions, but the representatives of 
 the employers' and employees' unions meet and amicably arrive at collective 
 agreements. In the workshop, too, the worker is ceasing to be arrogantly 
 or philanthropically treated, and workshop and employment conditions 
 are coming to be decided by joint committees of employers' and workers' 
 representatives. Already, also, representation of the workers on boards 
 of management is being introduced, and to a share in the general manage- 
 ment a share in the profits is coming to be added. Legislation is being 
 similarly affected. Only a few years ago, the government of the country, 
 save for the voting at elections, was entirely out of the hands of the people. 
 A far-reaching democratic principle is at present making headway, and 
 men will soon be wondering how undemocratic the past was. In advanced 
 democratic countries, for instance, industrial legislation is now prepared 
 by Governments in close co-operation with employers' and workers' repre- 
 sentatives, and the same principle is tending to be applied in the prepara- 
 tion of all forms of legislation. It is one of the happiest auguries of the 
 coming co-operative world State that the diverse Peace Treaties concluded 
 between the late belligerents contain a provision for the holding annually 
 of International Labour Conferences. These have for their object the 
 iraming of international draft conventions on labour matters, and are 
 attended by a fixed number of representatives of Governments, employers, 
 and workers 2 Government, 1 employers', and 1 workers' representative 
 for each country. In other words, the day does not appear to be distant, 
 when Governments, firms, and other bodies, and individuals, too, will 
 tread the ethically and methodologically more excellent way of co-operation. 
 
 In the centuries to come there will be an end to producing 
 many or ponderous books, whilst unreliable accounts and inade- 
 quate theories will reach the vanishing point. Relatively few 
 comprehensive and fascinating pamphlets and lectures, in addi- 
 tion to reports, text-books, and encyclopedias, will enlighten 
 humanity, and it will be acknowledged both that science should 
 rule man's daily life and thought and that such science must 
 be the effect of collaboration* 2 
 
 1 A work on the subject, heralding the dawn, is Fundamental Sources of 
 Efficiency, 1914, by F. Durell. 
 
 2 "In 1907, 1042 authors presented to the world 2131 papers on meteorology, 
 229 on atmospheric electricity, and 180 on terrestrial magnetism." (Report 
 of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1908, p. 589.) 
 Manifestly men's ambition should be to spend practically a life-time in elu- 
 cidating a single large question as was the case with Gibbon, Adam Smith, 
 Darwin, and others, and to attempt this by consultation and co-operation. 
 The prevailing fashion, even in the highest quarters, of innumerable scholars 
 producing many varied essays is apparently not the best one. On reflection 
 it would be generally admitted that the quality of one's performance is 
 immeasurably raised in value if time is freely bestowed on it, and that, in 
 the absence of systematic provision for every thought being followed up,
 
 216 PART IV. -PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 CONCLUSION 13. 
 
 Need of a Provisional Conception as to the Form which an 
 Enquiry should assume. 
 
 92. In the Conclusions which succeed this one, we shall 
 deal with ' the various stages of an investigation in synthetic 
 order and with the methods applicable to them. In this place, 
 for the sake of providing a synopsis, we offer miniature illustra- 
 tions of the conception which should dominate the inquirer in 
 respect of his general procedure. Since, however, all that we 
 could state is necessarily contained in far greater fulness in the 
 subsequent portions of the treatise, the present Conclusion must 
 inevitably appear seriously incomplete. Its object may therefore 
 be said to be to indicate by a few unpretentious examples in 
 what spirit an enquiry is to be entered on rather than to deter- 
 mine every one of the methods which need to be employed for 
 the purpose of bringing it to a successful issue. 
 
 To level wits, was Bacon's methodological end, and this should 
 be manifestly also the ideal of every methodologist. The test, 
 that is, of a methodology, is the aid it renders the inquirer, 
 and the burden it removes from his shoulders. So far as Bacon's 
 chief example, the one relating to the investigation of heat, is 
 concerned, he supplies four definite rules, and implies that classes 
 of facts should be exhausted, that experiments should be made 
 whenever practicable, that utilitarian ends should be kept in 
 view as well as theoretical ones, and that opinions should be 
 loosely held until established by irrefragable proofs. Granted 
 that these helps- are invaluable, they are yet far removed from 
 according the inquirer all the guidance he requires. 
 
 Suppose we go much further. By Conclusion 19, the inquirer 
 is greatly aided in the collection of facts. By Conclusion 20 his 
 path is made comparatively smooth. By Conclusions 17 and 21 
 he is helped to avoid a number of concealed traps which might 
 seriously vitiate his conclusions. By Conclusions 27 and 28 
 much that is obscure and complicated would be illuminated and 
 disentangled. His course will be also determined to a crucial 
 extent by Conclusion 3. Conclusion 16 will, naturally, contribute 
 appreciably to his success. In all this, the general course of 
 procedure clarity in regard to the problem to be examined, 
 observation, generalisation, verification, deduction, application, 
 classification, and interim and final statement is assumed. 
 
 Even so, however, the methodological ideal is not completely 
 satisfied. We ought to postulate, besides, thorough intimacy 
 
 there is an appalling waste of energy. For instance, how much more just 
 the present author would have been to his readers and to his theme, if, 
 through exclusive devotion and through enlisting wide co-operation, he could 
 have dealt with the whole of his theme instead of with only a portion 
 thereof, and if he could have avoided many imperfections which no doubt 
 materially reduce the value of this treatise.
 
 SECTION 20 STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 217 
 
 with the whole of the methodology and some practice therein, 
 and being well-informed generally and in the particular subject. 
 
 The above being conceded, if the problem treated of in the 
 illustration which follows were placed independently before a 
 score of persons, the results arrived at by them, supposing they 
 agreed to become investigators, should be nearly the same. 
 The divergences ought to be trifling, more in the manner than 
 in the matter. Very little should be left to hazard or to agitation 
 of wits. 
 
 The illustration should be examined from this standpoint. 
 Much will be perceived to follow directly from methodological 
 premises ; but owing to the methodological system having been 
 slowly and laboriously evolved, others than the author should 
 be able to present a better articulated and more patently me- 
 thodological treatment of the subject proposed. In fact, the 
 criterion of a methodology is not what the methodologist accom- 
 plishes or fails to accomplish; but what a well-informed and 
 favourably situated individual can achieve by its means in a 
 particular enquiry. 
 
 I. FIRST AND DETAILED ILLUSTRATION. 
 
 First Stage. Statement of the Problem. 1 
 
 93. It is asserted that the white race is greatly superior 
 intellectually, morally, and practically, to all other races. I re- 
 solve to probe this assertion, and to examine it with a view 
 to detecting whether there exist any material differences be- 
 tween races in respect of the qualities mentioned. Having 
 regard, however, to the nature of the question, I cannot expect 
 to receive a quantitative reply in the rigid sense. I can only 
 ask for proof of "substantial" equality, inequality, or differ- 
 ence: for proof, for example, that- all peoples, with the possible 
 exception of a negligible fraction, are virtually or apparently 
 equal in respect of the characters mentioned. Again, in speaking 
 of superiority, I exclude for the sake of simplicity, as implied, 
 all superiority in the possession of humour, of beauty, and even 
 of physique apart from health, and include, as stated, only 
 intellectual, moral, and practical (such as initiative, enterprise, 
 determination, independence, courage, etc.) traits. Some of the 
 details as to the cultural capacity of individuals, can be ascer- 
 tained with relative ease in our age of education and travel 
 and the publication of reports, whereas the problem of the 
 interdependence of civilisations requires for its solution the 
 consideration of the facts elicited by history and anthropology. 
 
 Being clear in* our minds in regard to the problem to be 
 investigated, we may proceed. 
 
 1 Conclusions 14-15.
 
 218 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 Second Stage. Examination of Relevant Data. 1 
 
 94. Having formulated our problem, we examine the re- 
 levant facts in order that we may be in a position to gene- 
 ralise. Here we are specially guided by Conclusions 19, 20 
 and 17, and bear in mind Conclusion 21. Conclusions 3 and 
 16 are, of course, utilised to the full. 
 
 (a) TERMS. What do we roughly mean by "intellectual, 
 moral, and practical superiority"? What do we mean by 
 "race"? What do the terms "white" and "non-white" signify 
 to us? What do we mean by "greatly superior"? 
 
 (b) EXISTENCE. Do races exist at all, or is their existence 
 relatively doubtful or relatively indubitable? 
 
 (c) INDEPENDENCE. Is each nominal race wholly or partly 
 unique, or to what degree is it part of something larger, or 
 composed of various or varying races, or enters largely or 
 
 .otherwise into the composition of the human race in general? 
 Or, Are races radically distinct, or, if not, to what degree do 
 they resemble each other? 
 
 (d) INTERRELATION. Is each race culturally dependent, and 
 to what degree, on preceding and co-existing races? Does 
 each race constitute the cultural condition, and to what degree, 
 of co-existing and succeeding races? Or what other cultural 
 relation does it bear to preceding, co-existing, and succeeding 
 races ? 
 
 (e) EXTREMES. What is the result of examining each civili- 
 sation from its one or more earliest, to its one or more later, 
 stages? Or, Have white people always been superior? If not, 
 for what period have they been superior, equal, or inferior to 
 non-whites? Which white and non-white peoples, and where 
 and when, were the first to be more or less highly civilised? 
 And how far have the earliest to latest white civilisations been 
 independent of or dependent on non-white civilisations, and 
 vice versa? 
 
 (/) DEGREE. Do differences of degree relating to superior- 
 ity, race, or whiteness, make any fundamental or what differ- 
 ence to the conceptions underlying these terms, and are the 
 differences connected by a chain of degrees ? Or, Are all men 
 of one capacity, one race, and one colour, only differing, owing 
 to circumstances, in unimportant anatomical details, in being 
 lighter and darker, and in quantity of culture assimilated accord- 
 ing to opportunities? Or are the differences absolute and due 
 to heredity? In which case, what is the origin of the differ- 
 ences, and how far can they be deliberately produced? Or 
 are the differences relative and traceable to the environment? 
 In which case, what is the origin of the differences, and how 
 far can they be deliberately produced? 
 
 1 See Conclusions 16-24.
 
 SECTION 20 STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 219 
 
 (g) EXPERIMENT. By gradually and proportionately with- 
 drawing from, and also bestowing on, individuals or groups of 
 different races, educational, economic, social, and other ad- 
 vantages or disadvantages, do we find, as a consequence, that 
 the races do or do not differ substantially or appreciably in 
 intelligence, morals, or practical capacity? Or, What is the 
 effect of an excellent upbringing and schooling on members of 
 a race supposedly very backward and of corresponding neglect 
 on members of a race supposedly very advanced, or of the 
 same good or bad nurture on the several races? 
 
 (h) MODALITY. What is the precise distribution and posi- 
 tion in space and time of each race and civilisation ? What are 
 the numbers and the divisions of each race and the intensity 
 of influence of every part of each civilisation on the others? 
 What of the precise pure, average, casual, momentary, time- 
 produced, environment-produced, transitional, exceptional, ab- 
 normal, perfect, and imperfect states of each race and civili- 
 sation? What do we learn by examining the evolution, origin, 
 history, development, influence, and transformation or dissolu- 
 tion of each alleged race and its civilisation? What of the 
 precise degree of more or less permanent idiosyncrasy, ab- 
 normality, mental confusion, ignorance, error, prejudice, and 
 deception of the inquirer and of those who have previously 
 ventured on statements concerning the subject? 
 
 (/) DIALECTICS. What is revealed to us by searching for 
 facts possibly contradictory, contrary, opposite, etc., to those 
 alleged to exist in or between races or divisions of races in 
 respect of moral, intellectual, and practical superiority? 
 
 (/) COMPARISON. What appears to be the degree of the 
 resemblance or difference of the compared races and their 
 component parts, if we observe them under profusely varied 
 conditions of space and time including conditions most similar 
 and dissimilar? Or, Are there any or many white peoples or 
 individuals on the same plane as, or on a lower or higher 
 plane than, non- white peoples or individuals? (Note, so far as 
 features are concerned, preponderating resemblance of Austra- 
 lian, Ainu, Dravidian, and Veddas, to Caucasians.) Are there 
 any or many non-white peoples or individuals on the same 
 plane as, or on a lower or higher plane than, white peoples 
 or individuals? 
 
 Finally, following the first table of the Primary Categories, 
 we ask : What are the material aspects the precise Elementals, 
 Constituents, Form, Dependence, Action, Cause, Resemblances, 
 Classification, Position, Differentiae, Details, etc., suggested by 
 a circumspect preliminary investigation embracing the process 
 of observation?
 
 220 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 Third and Fourth Stage. Generalisation and Interim Statement. ' 
 
 95. After prolonged sifting of the chaff from the wheat, 
 and after applying the necessary generalising and verifying 
 methods indicated in Conclusions 25 to 29, we clarify our thought 
 by formulating, for instance, the interim statement that man is 
 the sole specio-psychic being, or, less tersely, that man is the 
 sentient being which, for satisfying its needs, primarily depends 
 on species-developed and environmentally preserved culture; 
 or, more exhaustively, that what differentiates man most truly 
 is that the necessary means for adequately gratifying his needs 
 are, in a growingly satisfactory form, provided not, as in 
 animals, by instinct, by individual intelligence, by learning a 
 few things from neighbouring members of the same species, 
 by incidental traditions, by group co-operation, or by a com- 
 bination of several or of all of the just enumerated means, 
 but by the steadily increasing collection of material and other 
 inventions and discoveries made and developed through the 
 ages by his species as a whole and transmitted traditionally or 
 environmentally from generation to generation. In more formal 
 terms: Man most nearly resembles the mammals belonging to 
 the order Primates, and is specially distinguished from (a) the 
 other Primates, by his completely erect posture and higher 
 development of extremities and brain, and from (b) all animals, 
 including the Primates, by his mode of life being a cumulative 
 and environmentally preserved species-product, that is, by his 
 depending, instead of on almost entirely inherited means and 
 methods for satisfying his desires, on in substance species- 
 discovered, invented, adapted, and improved means and methods 
 environmentally preserved. 
 
 These definitions satisfy the important canon ( 110) which 
 requires that a whole subject should be summed up in one 
 brief statement wherever possible; but, to be of no uncertain 
 value, the main implications of the definition should be stated 
 for the purpose of placing ourselves in a position to test the 
 correctness and the importance of the definition. With a crisp 
 definition and a compressed deductive statement before them, 
 author and reader obtain a bird's-eye view which naught else 
 could replace, and which should be, therefore, only omitted 
 when extraordinary circumstances render the attempt inadvis- 
 able or prohibitive. 
 
 Fifth Stage. Theoretical Deductions.- 
 
 96. The interim statement reached at the fourth stage 
 implies: (a) Since every species of animal known (other than 
 man) is for all intents hereditarily determined, and in no degree 
 
 1 See Conclusions 25-30. 
 
 2 See Conclusion 31.
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 221 
 
 can be species-determined, in its conduct, the mental outfit of 
 any member of any known animal species must be necessarily 
 almost infinitely poorer than that of the average human being 
 who, by nature just superior intellectually to his immediate 
 animal precursors, has assimilated the substance of the material 
 and other inventions and discoveries of his species past and 
 present. (6) Since the individual is a specio-psychic being, it 
 follows in the first place that his connection with the rest of 
 his species in space and time cannot manifestly be through 
 biological heredity, and must therefore necessarily be through 
 post-natal communication ; that such communication must express 
 the thoughts of others, and that these thoughts can be only trans- 
 mitted through some external medium and represent material 
 and other inventions and discoveries embodied in material and 
 mental tools and tool-made products; that each of the hundreds of 
 millions of individuals, allowing for favourable and other circum- 
 stances, pours his modest contribution into the common reservoir 
 of thoughts, as a consequence of which there ensues historically 
 a colossal growth and improvement of material and other tool 
 and tool-made products until the first cultural attempts of men 
 are almost infinitely transcended in scope and effectiveness ; 
 that circumstances being of such crucial importance, and the 
 single individual having such indifferent power of advancing 
 beyond what has been accomplished, the extremes of culture 
 and non-culture, errors innumerable, and serious cultural leak- 
 ages, will be found in the species until a very high state of 
 cultural, and consequent closely co-operative, development is 
 reached ; that, generally stated, human life is potentially to-day 
 of necessity almost infinitely richer, more varied, more pro- 
 gressive, more interdependent, and more perfect in regard to 
 peoples and ages than the life of any animal species, and that 
 this difference will be proportionately accentuated with the 
 flight of time; that since man depends on culture, since cul- 
 ture is constituted of material and mental tool-made tools and 
 their products, and since all men can benefit by this culture 
 and augment it, it seems irresistibly to follow that the indivi- 
 dual will, historically and broadly speaking, gradually come to 
 be culturally connected with the species as a whole, i.e., the 
 individual, on the side of his mentality, irresistibly develops 
 into a species-reflecting being, from which conclusion, again, all 
 the preceding and succeeding characteristics follow, (c) Since 
 the civilised state is an environmental datum, a human being, 
 if left to himself, or left with others who are completely un- 
 cultured, would not be appreciably more cultured than are any 
 of the other highly intelligent animals (vide [a]), (d) Man, be- 
 cause he is a specio-psychic being, is, in propitious circum- 
 stances, capable of assimilating virtually the substance of any 
 civilisation however advanced (making hypothetical allowance 
 for a few insignificant tribes), (e) Since man's self-culturability
 
 222 PART IV - -PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 is virtually zero (vide [c]), and his capacity for being cultured 
 is virtually infinite (vide [of]), there is virtually an infinite dis- 
 tance between the minimally and the maximally cultured man, 
 and consequently any differences between any two individuals 
 in respect of being cultured (Zulu in his Kraal, University 
 Professor in his Chair), are traceable first and foremost to the 
 circumstances in which they are placed, which is equivalent 
 to stating that human beings are, by birth and because they 
 are mentally species-dependent beings, almost infinitely more 
 like than unlike each other morally, intellectually, and practi- 
 cally. (/) It follows from (e) that the stock of humanity's moral 
 and other acquisitions, divided by the number of human beings 
 who have lived, positing the actual physical and cultural con- 
 ditions, virtually yields the latent capacity of the individual to 
 contribute to the stock of human acquisitions, and that, con- 
 versely, the quantity of effort put forth by one individual, 
 under the above conditions, multiplied by the number of human 
 beings who have lived, virtually yields the stage of culture 
 reached, (g) Since culture, as species-developed, is necessarily 
 a product of many minds and many ages (vide [/]), it is of 
 vital importance for each generation to preserve, adapt, im- 
 prove, and increase the stock of humanity's material and other 
 inventions and discoveries, which process, seeing the weakness 
 and the fallibility of the unaided human individual (vide [c]), 
 must be, in advancing stages, normally performed, so far as 
 non-material objects are concerned, by means of collective and 
 separate customs and institutions economic, educational, moral, 
 religious, legal, political, scientific, literary, artistic, etc. (h) Since 
 man is adapted for the specio-psychically determined state, he 
 lives exclusively and necessarily in that state and is unfit for 
 any other, which does not however preclude that in certain 
 departments of life man does live almost wholly still on the 
 animal stage that is, without the help of pan-species culture 
 (vide [/]). (/) Being primarily adapted for the specio-psychically 
 determined state, man is only truly himself when he is truly 
 cultured, and is the more himself the more he is cultured, be- 
 ing ideally himself when he is ideally cultured. (/) Being only 
 truly himself when he is truly cultured (vide [/]), he naturally 
 tends, if not discouraged, to improve the state of culture which 
 surrounds Mm, and cannot rest till the stage of culture becomes 
 in every respect ideal. (A) Since man ultimately aims at an 
 ideal state of civilisation (vide [/]), and since civilisation ignores 
 territorial limits, he ultimately aims at an ideally organised 
 universal civilisation and universal fellowship. (/) Since man 
 is by nature culturable, but not cultured, he does not, apart 
 from science, know that he is culturable, nor that he should 
 not depend on unenlightened instinct or passing reflections; 
 he therefore frequently entertains erroneous notions pertaining 
 to his essential nature, thinking that he is acting as a cultured
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 223 
 
 being when he is not, that he exercises control over himself 
 when he is really controlled by his impulses, that he is satis- 
 fying his true nature when he is not, and that he can rely on 
 his native capacity for guidance when this does not lift him 
 above the animal stage. (772) Innate appetites, instincts, feel- 
 ings, etc., are not distinctively human qualities, and are there- 
 fore excluded from our conception of man so far as cultured, 
 and, since man is indefinitely culturable (vide [rf]), it follows 
 that the enormous pressure of species-produced culture, when 
 concentrated, is capable of overcoming any resistance that 
 might conceivably be offered by man's sub-human nature. And, 
 (/?) the further humanising and socialising of man's nature, 
 consequent primarily on the growth of culture, with, later, the 
 aid of artificial biological selection, will lead to the educational 
 process meeting eventually with progressively fewer obstacles 
 and becoming therefore progressively less arduous. 
 
 To summarise. Our interim statement involves that, since 
 culture is a progressive pan-human product, humanity is capable 
 of achieving in the course of the ages virtually everything, the 
 individual as such virtually nothing; and, accordingly, our theo- 
 retical aim is satisfied when we learn that all moral, intellectual, 
 and practical distinctions between peoples or persons are, for 
 all intents, due to specie-cultural, and not to inborn, causes. 
 
 Sixth Stage. Practical Deductions. 1 
 
 97. Our task is not complete, our truth is only a partial 
 one, until we have formulated the practical deductions suggested 
 by the interim statement. Some of these we shall now proceed 
 to enumerate. 
 
 1. Society. The growth of species-determined culture pre- 
 supposes incessant contact and collaboration between indivi- 
 duals, and this involves increasingly co-operating and organised 
 societies, the process tending towards a universal civilisation 
 and a universal organised fellowship. The cardinal importance 
 of Societies is therefore self-evident, and anarchist and extreme 
 individualist theories are thereby disproved. 
 
 2. Equality. The men and women in a community are, by 
 definition, capable of assimilating, in favourable circumstances, 
 the substance of any civilisation known to us. They should 
 all therefore have the opportunity of living a life commensurate 
 with their capacity of enjoyment and work. Consequently 
 
 (a) All social, political, and other discriminations based on 
 family, on sex, on class, on caste, on nationality, or on race, 
 disregarding as they do the fact that man is first and foremost 
 a cultural being, should be abolished; 
 
 1 See Conclusion 32.
 
 224 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 (b) All individuals, being for all purposes equally dependent 
 on pan-human culture, should command identical opportunities 
 of developing, labouring, and living; 
 
 (c) The needs of specie-cultural beings being intrinsically 
 similar, one general standard of living should obtain, conse- 
 quently one standard for reward of services; 
 
 (rf) One unchanging moral standard should be applied to all 
 individuals and groups of individuals equal kindness, courtesy, 
 consideration, respect, etc., though this does not preclude paying 
 most, but not exclusive, attention to the nearest duties (our home, 
 vocation, country), and being guided by the actual requirements 
 of others; 
 
 (e) The sexes being equally dependent on pan-human culture, 
 self-respect demands that marriage should be monogamic and 
 that both partners shall share authority equally; and 
 
 (/) Social advance should depend on the well-directed and 
 well-organised individual efforts of the many rather than on 
 the activities of a capriciously selected or favoured few that 
 is, the spirit of democracy should dominate all human inter- 
 relations. 
 
 3. Education. Culture being the measure of man, we should 
 provide for its assimilation by each and all, and hence it follows 
 that thorough home and school education for all moral, intellec- 
 tual, hygienic, aesthetic, and vocational is indispensable, and 
 that it is a primary social necessity to perfect the educational 
 ends and the methods of educating teachers and children. 
 
 4. Science. Since abundance of sifted knowledge, combined 
 with deliberate collective thought, are man's distinguishing 
 weapon, and since all wholly or partially instinctive or indivi- 
 dual methods of dealing with general problems are pre-human 
 because not pan-human, science should be man's guiding genius 
 in all departments of life and thought. 
 
 (a) This involves that the desire for attaining strength, health, 
 happiness, and the satisfaction of appetites and impulses, should 
 be determined by ideas enlightened by science ideas which 
 would urge the implanting of the love of the good, the true, 
 the hygienic, and the beautiful, as well as the development of 
 a joyous temperament, and would, it is probable, rule out as 
 superfluous luxury, intoxicants, narcotics, gambling, playing for 
 stakes or otherwise than rarely, substantial dependence of 
 happiness on amusements, and would certainly condemn as 
 brutish unchastity in the unmarried and infidelity in marriage. 
 
 (b) It equally involves, on the social side, that all war, 
 rewards and punishments, unfriendly words and deeds, uncriti- 
 cal assignment of motives, anger, scolding, ridicule, indulgence, 
 coaxing, bribery, and argumentation are unwise and ineffective 
 when applied to personal, social, national, international, inter- 
 racial, and other human relations, and should be replaced by 
 methods resulting from scientific study, which counsel the ex-
 
 SECTION 20.- STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 225 
 
 elusive application of rules of conduct of the type mentioned 
 in paragraph 10 below. 
 
 Other deductions are: 
 
 (c) home education, like school education, should have its 
 roots in science; 
 
 (rf) the relationship between the two partners in marriage 
 should, besides love, manifest mutual understanding, respect, 
 forbearance, assistance, and companionship, and be illumined 
 by science; 
 
 (e) vocations should be grounded in science and should be 
 scientifically acquired and pursued, and the love of good 
 workmanship and of incessant improvement should displace 
 thoughtlessness and the love of routine; 
 
 (/) the public services which are visibly growing in im- 
 portance year by year should be re-organised, root and branch, 
 on a scientific and, inferentially, democratic basis; 
 
 (g) speculative thought should be discouraged, except where 
 it ensues on carefully ascertained facts; 
 
 (h) the best thought being a product of the slow growth of 
 culture, the utmost should be attempted to discover and 
 inculcate the soundest rules for the conduct of the human 
 understanding ; and 
 
 (/) whilst it is true that without appetites, impulses, and 
 organs, action is impossible, it is knowledge alone which creates 
 man's superiority, even in respect of generating breadth and 
 depth of feeling, and a puissant and unshakeable will. 
 
 5. Co-operation. If science is indispensable in every depart- 
 ment of life, co-operation is no less necessary, for since cul- 
 ture is a species-product, this implies that there can be no 
 science without the widest co-operation, and that all that 
 humanity has achieved has been through co-operation. Con- 
 sequently, co-operation is a requisite in every department of 
 thought and action, in the humblest as in the highest spheres, 
 in vocational, social, national, and international affairs, in the 
 inner life of the individual, and between generation and gene- 
 ration. Hence : 
 
 (a) Co-operation in science and in the economic life, and 
 thoroughly democratic and democratically organised govern- 
 ments and institutions, are requirements; 
 
 6) Modesty, broadmindedness, appreciation of other persons 
 and peoples, and readiness to learn and serve, as well as 
 virility, originality, initiative, enterprise, and the fixed resolve 
 to add a full quota to the achievements of others, should stamp 
 all individuals and groups of individuals; 
 
 (c) Since social conditions, according to this trend, represent 
 the most potent incentives and impediments to the growth of 
 culture in any community, they demand the closest collective 
 attention more especially they require sanitation and education, 
 the humanisation of the law, democratic rule, friendship among 
 
 15
 
 226 PART IV PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 nations and races, and liberal insurance against illness, incapa- 
 city, invalidity, unemployment, old age, and inadequate incomes ; 
 and 
 
 (d) International co-operation is destined to play a notable 
 part in the future. This may express itself mainly in the 
 adoption of a universal form of speech, writing, and printed 
 characters, to promote and symbolise the unity of the race; 
 in the acceptance of universal measures, coins, post, telegraph, 
 scientific and economic terminologies and units, and rule of 
 conduct; in building roads, railways, canals, air-stations, etc., 
 to connect conveniently every part of the world ; in encourag- 
 ing international free-trade, institutions, organisations, and 
 bureaus; and in establishing an International Legislature, 
 Judiciary, and Administration to decide on justice, and to pro- 
 mote common action, between the nations of the world. 
 
 (e) The most intimate form of co-operation should be offered 
 by the home, and should be exemplified therein. Here are 
 two individuals, almost infinitely alike and yet infinitely differ- 
 ent, who may strengthen themselves to an incalculable degree 
 by becoming one for life. Furthermore, they may devote them- 
 selves in common to the incomparable task of rearing worthy, 
 healthy, and happy offspring a task which only loving and 
 constant attention on the part of those most nearly concerned 
 can competently perform. 
 
 6. Institutions. If science and co-operation are essentials, 
 the necessity of storing in some manner the accumulations of 
 the past becomes evident. Hence institutions and their equi- 
 valents are of inestimable value, among the most important of 
 which should be counted the institutions of Government, Law, 
 Marriage, Religion, Arms (in earlier stages), Seats of Learning 
 and Schools, Trades and Professions, Organisations for reform 
 and for industrial, charitable, recreative, medical, intellectual, 
 and other purposes, Libraries, Museums and Galleries, Sciences, 
 Arts and Crafts, Classics, Text-books, etc. Indeed, institutions, 
 or more or less fixed collective aids, are to social advance what 
 the family is to the perpetuation of the species, and the social 
 reformer should have therefore his energies directed first and 
 foremost to the improvement of institutions. 
 
 7. Conservation and Conservatism. Since any one generation 
 can add but little to the accumulated treasures of the past, it 
 behoves us, almost above all things, to conserve the substance 
 of what has been transmitted to us by our ancestors, and not 
 to accede lightly to the suggestion of changing the present 
 order or wastefully exhausting the treasures of the earth or 
 of culture. 
 
 8. Progress. However, since culture no more originates than 
 ceases with the day and since strict adherence to the principle 
 of conservatism would have kept man in the lowest savage 
 state, progress should be perennially aimed at in all depart-
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 227 
 
 ments of life and thought and in all institutions. The past, 
 present, and future represent the one flowing and growing 
 stream of culture. 
 
 9. Perfection. Since man ultimately seeks to do justice to 
 human nature as a whole, his aim is to accelerate the creation 
 of the complete or perfect man, the man in whom and, by 
 implication, the world in which is realised the perfect, i.e., 
 the good, the true, the hygienic, and the beautiful combined. 
 
 10. Rules of Conduct and Action. Enlightened men and women 
 will necessarily manifest in all relationships of life a profound 
 fellow-feeling and self-reverence, guided by fullest information 
 and circumspect reasoning, accompanied by geniality and tact, 
 and intelligently realised by a strenuous and firm-bent will 
 which is inspired by the desire to serve the good of humanity. 
 
 11. Supreme End and Sense of Oneness. Since the individual 
 is only fully himself when fully cultured intellectually, physi- 
 cally, morally, and aesthetically, his supreme end is to become 
 highly cultured, and, by implication, to promote the cause of 
 culture until the all-comprehensive ideal of goodness, truth, 
 radiant health, and beauty, is attained; and since, moreover, 
 culture is in its essence an expression of the whole of humanity 
 past and present, his inmost thought and being, when truly 
 himself, feels itself one with humanity and identifies itself 
 necessarily and passionately with the life and good of mankind. 
 
 12. Fundamentals. All life, of whatever kind, seeks to 
 maintain, adapt, and expand itself, besides tending to develop 
 to higher forms. Accordingly, the prime object and test of 
 culture is harmoniously to maintain, perpetuate, adapt, expand, 
 and develop the life of humanity as a whole. It is true that 
 the fundamental needs of the higher animals are to be found in 
 man, but in man the manner of their satisfaction is determined 
 primarily by historically developed species-culture instead of 
 primarily by inherited predispositions and organs. 
 
 Seventh Stage. Classification of Data. 1 
 
 98. Note. The peoples and individuals of to-day differ conspicuously 
 in the stage of cultural development which they exhibit ; but this diversity 
 must be accidental, since, as recent educational experience and recent history 
 show, this stage is indefinitely raised and lowered by cultural circumstances. 
 It should be also noted in connection with the subjoined analysis that whilst 
 progress grows through the ages, it is not by any means unintermittent or 
 uniform in space. 
 
 1. Family (from quasi- animal families without fixed abode, 
 through polygamy, polyandry, and other phases), to fully or- 
 ganised monogamic family with home for centre (relations be- 
 tween children, parents, and other kindred; courtship; finding 
 means of subsistence for family, etc.). 
 
 1 See Conclusion 33. 
 
 15*
 
 228 PAR T 1 V.PREPARA TORY STAGE. 
 
 With the family should be correlated its environment, con- 
 sisting of 
 
 (a) Human Neighbours (from individual to clan, tribe, and to 
 all peoples, including travel, residence, and study abroad), Ac- 
 quaintances and Friends, also Voluntary Associations for local 
 and specialist purposes to International and Inter-Specialist 
 Organisations ; 
 
 (6) Animal Neighbours (wild animals useful, useless, and 
 dangerous to man, domesticated animals, and animals as pets, 
 friends, and fellow-beings); 
 
 (c) Plant Neighbours (wild plants useful, useless, and danger- 
 ous to man and to agriculture, frugiculture, horticulture, and 
 arboriculture) ; 
 
 (d) Inanimate Neighbours (soil, air, water, sky, etc., to na- 
 tural and transformed materials and forces utilised by man). 
 
 The product of family life, the child and adolescent, must 
 receive some kind of education, for men's abilities are derived 
 first and foremost from learning, that is, from education and 
 from tradition 1 ; hence: 
 
 2. Education of children ; acquisition of vocation ; later, histori- 
 cally, schools to universities, and life-long study and research. 
 
 With the family should be connected the 
 
 3. Community. More or less loosely organised families in 
 small hordes: later, clan; later still, growing and co-operating 
 territorial groups of mostly unrelated families, until Continent 
 State and World State are reached. 
 
 And with the community should be correlated: 
 
 4. Governments (through occasional Chieftain to Imperial 
 Dynasty and to democratically elected President, and from 
 Headman to Nobility and to a pure educated Democracy), dis- 
 placing customs more and more (legislative, legal, administrative, 
 productive, protective, and aggressive features of Government), 
 to Parliament of Nations, International Court of Justice, Inter- 
 national State Services, and Universal Official Bureaus of Labour, 
 Communications, Motive Power, Science, Art, etc. 
 
 The attitude towards others in the community should be well 
 defined; hence: 
 
 5. Customs (manner of living; then also manners; and, at 
 first, customs as general method of preserving past acquisitions) ; 
 from manners based on customs, finally, through intermediate 
 stages, to 
 
 (a) Love of humanity as the supreme standard of conduct 
 
 1 Professor F. H. Giddings thus sums up the various classes of traditions : 
 "The primary traditions are: the economic, or the tradition of utilisation; 
 the juridical, or the tradition of toleration; and the political, or the tradition 
 of alliance, homage, and obedience. . . . The secondary traditions are: the 
 animistic or personal, the Besthetic, and the religious. . . . The tertiary tradi- 
 tions are: the theological, the metaphysical, and the scientific." (The Prin- 
 ciples of Sociology, 1896, p. 141.)
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 229 
 
 for all, and feeling of oneness with humanity and then with 
 all living things and the Universe; and 
 
 (b) The whole of the life of humanity organised by science, 
 with the assistance of art, pursuant to the dictates of morality 
 and to the needs of man's complex nature generally. 
 
 Man's universal tool language was the condition to all 
 extensive collaboration and advance. Hence: 
 
 6. Language (growth from numberless tongues at first barely 
 surpassing animal cries, to, finally, one universal form of simpli- 
 fied and scientised language speech, writing, and printing). 
 
 Life means unintermittent metabolism of energy. Therefore 
 labour chiefly the expenditure of energy in order to maintain 
 energy is inevitable for man, as for all living creatures. Hence: 
 
 7. Labour (General, e.g., hunting; Special, e.g., making of 
 tools or shelters, to minute specialisation in processes, functions, 
 and localities, relating eventually and mainly to food and health, 
 garments, buildings and furniture, materials, lingual and mate- 
 rial modes of intercommunication, supply of raw material 
 energies, and machinery, and government, law, and education). 
 
 (a) Living on own work; robbing, enslaving, oppressing, ex- 
 ploiting, or employing others; co-operating more and more, to 
 occasional and organised inter-individual, civic, national, and 
 international co-operation ; 
 
 (b) Property, as mainly Land, Buildings, and Furniture, and 
 Raw and Manufactured Products ; and Grades of Producers and 
 Middlemen (gradually developing from chaotic private property 
 and private enterprise to property and enterprise in the service 
 of the organised common good); 
 
 (c) Collective Migrations (to follow game, escape enemies, 
 find fresh pasture land, settle in conquered territories, improve 
 status, etc.); later, Individual and, perhaps, Collective Emigration; 
 
 (rf) Means of Communication (commencing with beaten tracks 
 and human carriers, and developing into roads, canals, navi- 
 gated rivers and seas, tunnels and bridges, landcraft, water- 
 craft, and aircraft, postal and telegraphic communication, the 
 press, reports, and books, etc.); 
 
 (e) Internal Industries and Commerce (or division of labour 
 within clan or tribe, etc.) to world-wide Industries and Com- 
 merce, involving 
 
 (/) Means of Exchange (developing from barter to coins, 
 bank-notes, cheques, credit, etc.); 
 
 (g) Rude Products to (1) Products all instinct with beauty, 
 concluding in every vocation being enthused with the spirit of 
 art; and to (2) Products of the highest quality, serving only 
 the good, the true, the hygienic, and the beautiful. 
 
 There should be some relaxation from toil. Hence: 
 
 8. Leisure Daily, weekly, annual, and other periods of rest. 
 Children's play ; later, adults' games and festivities ; songs and 
 stories ; dance and music ; poetry, theatre, history, and literature
 
 230 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 generally; travel' and leisure pursuits or hobbies; and delight 
 in intimate converse with one's fellows and with nature, issu- 
 ing in 
 
 9. Art generally, and the eventual penetration and beautifying 
 of all spheres of life by the love and the realisation of the 
 beautiful. 
 
 In life's turmoil, body and mind are apt to lose their equi- 
 poise. Hence : 
 
 10. Medicine and Hygiene (sanitation, diet, recreation, birth, 
 illness, burial), leading to the triumphs of surgery and sanitation, 
 of preventive medicine of the body and of the mind, and of 
 hygiene, and finally to hygienic living, and a race sturdy in 
 mind and body. 
 
 The attitude towards the master problems of life and towards 
 the Universe should be also defined. Hence: 
 
 11. Religion later, with priests, temples, and religious houses 
 and organisations (philosophy of life and existence, nature, 
 fabled under- and over-world, death and all great occasions of 
 life, holy days, and supposed mysterious influences), developing 
 from almost pure superstition to almost a pure humanism 
 grounded on a scientifically based philosophy of life, and leading 
 also to 
 
 12. Philosophising, or speculative thought, because of lack 
 and confusion of data; thence to gradual evolution of 
 
 13. Science, theoretical and applied, specialised and cosmic, 
 and growingly reasoned love of goodness, nature, art, health, 
 strenuousness, and joy. 
 
 A classification such as the above subserves various ends: 
 
 (a) It aids in focusing a complicated issue having innumer- 
 able minor aspects; 
 
 (b) It presents a conspectus of the main facts; 
 
 (c) It demonstrates the truth of progress; 
 
 (d) It shows this progress commencing almost at a zero point ; 
 developing slowly through the ages to a remarkably high degree ; 
 and promising to evolve further, along old and new lines; 
 
 (e) It implies that culture is the outcome of pan-species 
 thought, and that the individual contributes only an infini- 
 tesimal proportion of the total culture; 
 
 (/) Moreover, the process of the education of children, of 
 adults, and of peoples, involves that culture is post-natally 
 acquired. 
 
 (g\ (h), etc., etc. 
 
 Eighth Stage. Final Statement. 1 
 
 99. Lest the enquiry should degenerate into a confusion 
 of detail, we strive to embody the total results in a single 
 formula, theoretical and practical. This formula may be con- 
 
 1 See Conclusion 34.
 
 SECTION 20.-STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 231 
 
 ceived as follows: Man is the sentient being which primarily 
 depends on species-developed and environmentally preserved 
 culture for satisfying its needs; and since this is his leading 
 differentia, he must aim at making universally prevalent: the 
 highest degree of the good, the true, the hygienic, and the 
 beautiful, at treating all men as culturally equal by nature and 
 capable of the highest and best, and at transforming the whole 
 of mankind into an organic unity. 1 
 
 Ninth Stage. Report: 2 
 
 100. As pointed out in Conclusion 2, the object of the 
 investigation can only be said to be properly attained when it 
 is duly, clearly, and attractively reported on. For this reason, 
 careful attention should be paid to the report, and this we 
 assume to be accomplished in accordance with the suggestions 
 submitted in Conclusion 35. 
 
 Having completed our enquiry, which was undertaken with 
 the object of ascertaining the comparative intellectual, moral, 
 and practical capacities of white and non-white races, we con- 
 clude that the cultural differences in races, nations, classes, 
 families, individuals, and sexes, are to be traced first and fore- 
 most to cultural causes, and that life should be organised on 
 this assumption. 
 
 II. SECOND ILLUSTRATION. 3 
 
 101. Consider a second example. We feel that our know- 
 ledge concerning our sensations is incomplete, and we desire 
 accordingly to inquire into the matter. Thinking the subject 
 over from the most comprehensive point of view after having 
 conducted a full and ample preliminary investigation, we ad- 
 vance the provisional and most convenient and obvious hypo- 
 thesis methodologically that fundamentally there exists but one 
 class of sensation. By casting our net so wide, we are pre- 
 pared for every contingency, though it generally appears, as 
 we proceed in an investigation, that our provisional hypothesis 
 needs to be radically modified. Every class of statement estab- 
 lished has, of course, its independent value, and we consult 
 naturally authoritative scientific works on the theme of our 
 enquiry. 
 
 We commence with a somewhat exhaustive examination and 
 record of the normal features of each surmised class of sen- 
 sations (following more especially Conclusions 19, 20, and 3, 
 and 45), and are helped to augment the list by noting whether 
 
 1 See Conclusion 34 for fuller statement concerning the distinctive nature 
 of man. 
 
 2 See Conclusion 35. 
 
 3 In this and the following illustrations, the course of investigation is 
 only roughly sketched. In practice the form proposed in the preceding 
 Illustration might be perhaps universally applied.
 
 232 PART IV PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 the features of one sense are not also features of one or more 
 of the other senses. 
 
 We inquire what features the various classes of sensations 
 possess in common, and what is the degree of the resemblance. 
 
 We strive to discover new classes of sensations. 
 
 We endeavour, following Conclusion 17, to divide each of 
 the classes of sensations into a number of classes of sensations, 
 and we also seek to show that several or all the reputed classes 
 of sensations fall under one head. 
 
 We examine into the elementary facts of any and every class 
 of sensations (ignoring, for the moment, memory, etc.), and deter- 
 mine, following Conclusions 20 and 19, that (a) there is present 
 a stimulus of a particular degree and character persisting for 
 an appreciable period of time ; that (b) the mind is not wholly 
 preoccupied, and is therefore affected and consequently reacts; 
 that (c) the mind must react continuously for a perceptible space 
 of time; that (d) the memory needs to be enlisted for the pur- 
 pose of classing the sensation or experience; and that (e) this 
 implies an attempt at judging and co-ordinating. 
 
 We search for instances where several sensations are sensed 
 simultaneously (as in eating an orange: temperature, touch, 
 smell, taste, sound, effort, and pain), beginning with two sen- 
 sations and gradually increasing their number. 
 
 We endeavour to examine sensations at their minimum inten- 
 sity or clearness (as seeing with eyes approximately or wholly 
 closed) with a view to determining any likeness between sen- 
 sations, and we examine sensations when minimally or margi- 
 nally attended to. 
 
 We examine more or less highly developed and intense sen- 
 sations, and from maximum to minimum, and vice versa. 
 
 We examine whether others' sensations are fundamentally 
 identical with ours, and whether youth, age, etc., or diverse 
 races or periods of history, create any difference, and, if so, 
 the degree of the difference. 
 
 We examine, following Conclusion 20, first the least obscure 
 sensations, such as sight and sound. 
 
 We examine into human activities which are apparently or 
 relatively unaccompanied by sensations, including automatic and 
 reflex actions, and impulses, and minimal sensations when the 
 attention bestowed on them is imperceptible. 
 
 We examine, later, into the nature of pleasure-pain, of the 
 appetites, of internal sensations generally, of the emotions, and 
 whatever other experiences of this character are distinguishable. 
 
 We examine, later still, into the nature of the memory. 
 
 We examine, last, into the processes of systematic feeling, 
 thinking, willing, etc. 
 
 We then complete our enquiry as in illustration I. 1 
 
 1 Mill assumes throughout his Logic that the various senses or classes of 
 sensations are ultimate in character and irreducible. Accordingly, he claims
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 233 
 III. THIRD ILLUSTRATION. 
 
 102. In the process of inhaling laughing gas, I accidentally 
 injure my knee, and observe that the injury is not accompanied 
 by pain, as would be normally the case. Assuring myself by 
 varied experiments that laughing gas produces this anaesthetic 
 effect, I conclude provisionally that all bodily pain may be thus 
 overcome, and that laughing gas, or some perhaps even more 
 effective gas, or other substance, should be administered in all 
 dental and surgical operations and wherever there is pain diffi- 
 cult to endure. I proceed then with the investigation on estab- 
 lished methodological lines, following strictly Conclusion 3. 
 
 /. Material Aspects. 
 
 1. We inquire what appeal nitrous oxide makes to the sen- 
 ses to sight, touch, effort, pain, hearing, taste, smell, and heat. 
 Also what feelings its presence or inhalation engenders, or what 
 is its effect on the will and the intelligence. Finally, whether 
 it is only indirectly apprehensible. 
 
 2. We inquire into the nature of the constituents of the gas. 
 
 3. We inquire into its form. 
 
 4. We inquire into the precise special facts and factors in 
 the environment on which the gas more or less depends for 
 its existence. 
 
 5. We make a study of its precise effects. 
 
 6. We trace the cause of its existence and properties. 
 
 7. We then consider the relation of laughing gas to other 
 anaesthetics. 
 
 8. We ascertain the points wherein it resembles other an- 
 aesthetics. 
 
 9. We classify the facts pertaining to laughing gas, and then 
 place the gas under a more comprehensive classification. 
 
 10. We determine the comparative position of laughing gas 
 among anaesthetics. 
 
 11. We inquire into the major and minor differentiae of 
 laughing gas. 
 
 12. And we consider the secondary aspects or details. 
 We take into account then the practical side: 
 
 13. We inquire into the hygienic, economic, moral, aesthetic, 
 scientific, philosophical, and other, value of nitrous oxide. 
 
 14. We consider the problems involved in its utilisation, 
 application, and production. 
 
 15. And we consider men's subjective attitude towards it their 
 like or dislike thereof. 
 
 that "the ultimate Laws of Nature cannot possibly be less numerous than 
 the distinguishable sensations or other feelings of our nature". (Bk. 3, 
 ch. 14, 2.) In reasoning thus he begs the question, for the various sensations 
 are most probably complexes, and therefore neither ultimate nor irreducible.
 
 234 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 16. Lastly, we prepare a report summarising the enquiry, and, 
 in doing so, respect the principles enunciated on the subject in 
 Conclusion 35. 
 
 II. Modal Aspects. 
 
 In seeking to ascertain the Material Aspects, we endeavour 
 to do full justice to what is suggested by the Modal Aspects. 
 
 1. Matters relating to time, space, and consciousness require 
 to be determined in detail, according to the table. 
 
 2. The degree of static and dynamic facts and factors need 
 to be studied. 
 
 3. The pure, average, casual, momentary, time-produced, 
 environment-produced, individual, transitional, exceptional, im- 
 perfect, perfect, and abnormal states should be taken into con- 
 sideration. 
 
 4. The changes undergone should not be overlooked. 
 
 5. And the personal equation should not escape attention. 
 
 III. Procedure Aspects. 
 
 1. We must be clear regarding the problem under investigation. 
 
 2. There should be accurate, minute, and, if possible, experi- 
 mental examination, under the most varied conditions of space, 
 time, and other circumstances, and immediate and scrupulous 
 recording of results. 
 
 3. We require alertness, in order not to miss obscure, un- 
 obtrusive, and exceptional facts. 
 
 4. We shall apply the day-to-day rule and other rules, the 
 simplest practicable case, and what we have learnt as to the 
 testing of divisions. 
 
 5. Conclusions 27 and 28, relating to degree determination 
 and dialectical procedure, will be followed. 
 
 6. We shall strive after luminous clearness and decided defi- 
 niteness in thinking. 
 
 7. We shall do methodically full justice to the collected rules 
 referring to generalisation, deduction, and application. 
 
 8. Lastly, we shall not forget systematic verification, classifi- 
 cation, balanced interim and final statements, and a lucid report. 
 
 By following the threefold method above suggested, we en- 
 sure a comprehensive and thorough investigation of any subject, 
 and this without excessive reliance on fortuitously arisen ideas 
 and without colossal waste of time and energy, as is commonly 
 the case. Familiarity with the contents of the volume would 
 soon render recourse to it almost unnecessary. 
 
 IV. FOURTH ILLUSTRATION. 
 
 103. In sundry other series of enquiries a large provi- 
 sional hypothesis might be also formulated after adequate pre- 
 liminary examination, although there may be as a rule no hope
 
 SECTION 20. STUDIES PREPARATORY TO ALL INVESTIGATIONS. 235 
 
 of any one person contributing more than a trifle towards its 
 being tested or established. Consider the case of telegraphy. 
 Already Galileo, in 1632, spoke of a method of conversing at 
 long distances by means of the sympathy of magnetic needles. 
 So little, however, was then known about electricity that it is 
 difficult to conceive his propounding any large provisional hypo- 
 thesis. When, however, many facts had been collected on the 
 subject of electricity, as at the dawn of the nineteenth century, 
 the idea of developing such a hypothesis came within the realm 
 of the practical. Wheatstone might have proposed the hypo- 
 thesis that a telegraphic system covering the entire globe was 
 feasible, and even have argued that telegraphy should include 
 telephony and the electric transference of designs, both with 
 wires and without, and much else pertaining to heat, light, 
 electricity, magnetism, and chemistry. 1 Such a working hypo- 
 thesis, if passably correct, would have insured the invention of 
 appropriate instruments with the least possible delay. However, 
 so complicated are the issues involved here that one man cannot 
 contribute much towards clarifying them. In agreement with 
 this we are bound to postulate in almost all the master inven- 
 tions and discoveries a successive series of workers gradually 
 bringing to relative perfection a particular theory, each man 
 being well informed in the subject and starting where his pre- 
 decessors left their task. In these circumstances, the discoverer's 
 or inventor's path is largely determined for him, and he need 
 only remember to formulate the largest practicable provisional 
 hypothesis and to explore his theme systematically, as proposed 
 in the First Illustration. 
 
 104. If we scrutinise the labours of the most eminent 
 discoverers in biology, chemistry, or physics, we remark in each 
 case both the wide range of their learning and the magnificent 
 scope of their efforts. Basing themselves on the ripest work 
 of their predecessors, they seek to extend, to re-cast, and further 
 to systematise it, whilst perfecting the traditional methods. 
 They display also a keen interest in the sister sciences, for these 
 may suggest novel lines of enquiry. The primary method is, 
 therefore, to "follow your leaders", and be as comprehensive, 
 thorough, and bold as they. The Conclusions submitted in this 
 treatise are designed to form a guide to this end. Even so, 
 however, no startling results may be anticipated, no final settling 
 of any capital issue which has not been mainly settled already 
 by other men. (Conclusion 5.) Concerning the mere detail in 
 any science or enquiry, it is doubtful whether much of such 
 detail exists for the trained inquirer; but granted that colossal 
 
 1 A case of such daring is to be found in Jacques Loeb's works, who 
 suggests that the theory of tropisms, almost certainly applicable to the 
 simplest organisms, may also be applied to the highest organisms including 
 man. Scientific examination will either partly or wholly confirm or confute 
 this theory.
 
 236 PART V WORKING STAGE. 
 
 problems may be out of reach, let them be as extensive as 
 practicable and not as restricted as possible. ( 166.) Detail 
 work is thoroughly consistent with sweeping aims; but detail 
 work is frequently almost wasted because it is performed in a 
 mechanical way, with the mind relaxed instead of tense. 
 Darwin's life-labours pointedly illustrate this: 
 
 "His works are a series of models of the scientific jnethod, because of 
 the rare and happy combination of minute and accurate observation and 
 daring speculation followed by ruthless testing and pruning of his hypo- 
 theses. He thought it worth while to notice and penetrate into the 
 meaning of the most insignificant fact, and was capable of sweeping 
 the whole earth for evidence in support of his largest theories. He could 
 take the time to count twenty thousand seeds of Lythrum salicaria." 
 (Frank Cramer, op. cit., p. 34.) "There can be no doubt that his great 
 interest in apparently little things, and his efforts to make the most of 
 them, were due to his conviction that important things were hidden behind 
 them, that they were illustrations of general laws." (Ibid., pp. 47-48.) 
 "Perhaps one of the noblest lessons he left to the world is this which 
 to him amounted to a profound, almost religious, conviction that every 
 fact in nature, no matter how insignificant, every stripe of colour, every 
 tint of flowers, the length of an orchid's nectary, unusual height in a 
 plant all the infinite variety of apparently insignificant things, is full 
 of significance." (Ibid., pp. 51-52.) Darwin refused to accept details at 
 their face value. 
 
 In view of the Conclusions which follow, and the variety of 
 material accumulated in the sciences, it is not necessary to pass 
 beyond these broad generalities when referring to the estab- 
 lished sciences. 
 
 PART V. 
 WORKING STAGE. 
 
 SECTION XXL PRECISE NATURE OF PROBLEM TO BE 
 INVESTIGATED. 
 
 CONCLUSION 14. 
 
 Need of Precisely Determining the Nature of the Problem under 
 
 Investigation . 
 
 105. Granting that the question which we desire to address 
 to nature is an admissible one (Conclusion 5) and that its 
 character is also such as to commend itself to the methodologist 
 (Conclusions 4 and 25rf), it only remains to provide that our 
 interrogation shall be unequivocally formulated. This may be 
 difficult, perhaps impossible, at the very commencement of the 
 enquiry. In that case, little is lost, however, if we are fully 
 conscious of the haze in which our conceptions are enveloped. 
 Many a problem only exists because it is not clearly framed, 
 that is, the mere proper framing not infrequently engenders 
 its solution. Every effort should be therefore made to devise a 
 formulation of the problem which shall be minimally ambiguous,
 
 SECTION 21. PRECISE NATURE OF PROBLEM TO BE INVESTIGA TED. 237 
 
 and which shall consequently enable us to approach its solution 
 with the least possible confusion and delay. 
 
 Darwin entitled his master work: "The Origin of Species". 1 
 If he had called it "Evolution", this would have probably argued 
 that he either regarded evolution as restricted to life forms or 
 that in his opinion all evolution exhibited an exactly similar 
 character. Even if the title had read "The Evolution of Life", 
 "The Evolution of Life Forms", or "The Evolution of Species", 
 we should have been some distance from the plain and 
 exceedingly pointed question involved in the actual title. The 
 word "origin" implies no contentious theories, and the selection 
 of the term "species" brings the problem from the clouds 
 down to earth. Compare this title with Lamarck's "Philosophic 
 Zoologique", which places us at the mercy of the speculative 
 fancy. In otfrer words, instead of floundering in a sea of 
 ambiguities, Darwin's formulation puts us in a position to 
 defend or attack the central problem forthwith. 2 No doubt, a 
 good title or an appropriate question is mostly the result of 
 protracted labours, and suggests in not a few instances that 
 a mass of intractable matter has been reduced to comparative 
 order. Such an attempt to construct a convenient formula 
 sometimes proves to be hopeless, and is accordingly abandoned, 
 whilst at other times the quasi-single problem divides into several, 
 or is solved in the sheer endeavour to state it with the least 
 obscurity of expression. 
 
 106. We present another significant illustration. Capita- 
 lists as a class contend that they are the source of the wealth 
 of the world, and that the rule of the worker would spell 
 universal economic ruin. On the other hand, Labourists as a 
 class aver that the wealth of the world is produced by the 
 workers, and largely wasted and most unfairly distributed by 
 the Capitalists. To the former, Labourism denotes anarchy; 
 to the latter, Capitalism signifies the social dominance of un- 
 scrupulous exploiters. To comprehend the issue, we ought 
 to affix, before proceeding any further, a precise meaning to 
 Capitalism and Labourism. If we regard the problem statically, 
 from the viewpoint of the present moment, both parties appear 
 to be, broadly speaking, in the right. If the Labourist were 
 to be placed forthwith in power, the economic structure of 
 
 1 The idea cannot be said to have been entirely novel, and Wallace uses 
 the expression suggestively. In writing to Bates, the naturalist, he states that 
 he would "like to take some one family to study thoroughly, principally 
 with a view to the theory of the origin of species". (Quoted by Edward 
 Clodd, Pioneers of Evolution, 1902, p. 61.) And writing to the same cor- 
 respondent subsequently, he speaks of gathering facts "towards solving the 
 problem of the origin of species." (Ibid., p. 62.) 
 
 2 Of course, the full title was On the Origin of Species by means of 
 Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle 
 for Life. Subsequently this was altered to The Origin of Species -by means 
 of Natural Selection.
 
 238 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 society would most likely collapse and drag down with it poor 
 and rich alike, since Capitalism is the linchpin in the economic 
 wheel of present-day society. At the same time, adhering to 
 the static view, the charge against Capitalism, of insatiable 
 greed, of ruthless exploitation of the masses, of appalling waste, 
 could not be readily rebutted ; and it is also true that, for ex- 
 ample, if the revenue of England for the past year could be 
 fairly divided between the family groups composing the country, 
 a tolerably adequate income, instead of a pittance, would be 
 assured to all. 
 
 The fact is that the vast wealth of to-day is, broadly speak- 
 ing, primarily the result of the enterprise, the encouragement 
 of inventions and discoveries, the exploitation of opportunities, 
 the alertness and venturesomeness, and the competitive spirit 
 of present-day Capitalism. Manual and clerical labour, as con- 
 ceived by many Labourists, would leave us in the sorry econo- 
 mic position of savagedom. Machinery, for instance, may enor- 
 mously increase the value of labour, and organisation on an 
 imposing scale also vitally contributes to augment possessions. 
 Wealth is like a spinning top which continues in its upright 
 position because it is kept moving. Only the short-sighted 
 would argue that the upright position of the top is independent 
 of the motion periodically imparted to it. Without the worker, 
 it is true, the entrepreneur would accomplish nothing; but 
 without the entrepreneur the productivity of the worker would 
 be comparatively insignificant. For instance, it is said that a 
 spinner now produces in a day what it would have taken his 
 eighteenth century forerunner a full year to produce. 
 
 However, the problem of Capitalism and Labourism is not 
 one peculiar to our day. To ascertain, therefore, the essential 
 meaning of the terms Capitalism and Labourism we must enter 
 more deeply into the question. 
 
 Turning to the past, we find, retrospectively, that Capitalism 
 may be readily divorced from enterprise and progress. At that 
 stage the economic value of the Capitalist was decidedly prob- 
 lematical, and in that case it was as nearly as possible true 
 that wealth is first and foremost the outcome of mechanical 
 labour, since enterprise, competition, and organisation were 
 then a minus quantity practically. On the other hand, if we 
 read aright the signs of our time the growth of the efficiency 
 and the humanitarian movements, we perceive that the Capita- 
 lism of our day will almost certainly undergo radical modifi- 
 cation. The employer will probably come to regard himself 
 as an organiser, and be ready to share equitably with the 
 worker the wealth produced, treating him as a fellow labourer. 
 Cut-throat competition, pitiless exploitation, the accumulation 
 of riches, may well be imagined as ceasing to characterise 
 Capitalism. The Labourist, on the other hand, will undergo 
 an analogous evolution. He will learn that wealth has a double
 
 SECTION 21. PRECISE NA TURE OF PROBLEM TO BE INVESTIGA TED. 239 
 
 source ; he will educate himself ; he will become an ardent 
 believer in the need and the potentialities of scientific organi- 
 sation and efficiency; he will be a brain worker as well as a 
 handworker, a tireless initiator and remodeller, ever aiming at 
 improving processes and products. The Capitalist will thus 
 evolve into an organiser with no superior controlling status, 
 and the Labourist will develop into an individual who, with 
 other individuals, appoints or dismisses the organiser, as share- 
 holders appoint or dismiss a board of directors, and who par- 
 ticipates to some extent in management. 
 
 As thoroughly democratic governments evolve by degrees out 
 of irresponsible despotisms, so democratic control and manage- 
 ment of wealth will gradually succeed the present-day capitalist 
 control and management of wealth. Intelligently to apprehend 
 the meaning of the problem we are to investigate, is in this 
 case also virtually tantamount to succeeding in its solution. 
 
 107. Again. Consider a cluster of problems arising out of 
 the World War. It has been argued that since a police force is 
 indispensable in intra-national affairs, therefore a police force is 
 also necessary in inter-national affairs. The case for an inter- 
 national army is thus, in nearly every one's opinion, regarded 
 as conclusively established, indeed so much so that doubt on 
 the point is regarded as a sign of sheer obstinacy. And yet, 
 is there a parity between a police force and an international 
 army? Visualise a London policeman on his beat, his only 
 weapon the truncheon, and his main duty to regulate the traffic, 
 prevent offences, and arrest flagrant offenders against the law. 
 Visualise now the so-called inter-national police, and you find 
 murderous instruments in profuse variety, and no intention 
 to be of use in peace or to arrest flagrant offenders against 
 the law and hail them before a magistrate. The contrast be- 
 tween the equipment and the duties of the intra-national and 
 the inter-national police force is so extreme as to verge on the 
 ludicrous. Manifestly, the connotation of the terms in the two 
 connections diverges radically, and we arrive therefore at the 
 conclusion that if the problem were properly posited, the com- 
 parison would be dismissed as fallacious. 
 
 Moreover, are we justified in reasoning from individuals to 
 territorial groups, as is done in the last illustration? The 
 police proper is here or there in constant requisition. Are we 
 to imagine that the inter-national police, pursuing the analogy, 
 will be also here or there in constant requisition? Is it not 
 nlore correct to draw a crucial distinction between individuals 
 and territorial groups? Thinking of the last fifty years, and 
 leaving aside Ireland which has never been truly assimilated, 
 we find that of the thousands of territorial groups of the island 
 kingdom, probably not one has either entertained the idea of 
 attacking other territorial groups or been cowed into submission 
 by the national ''police" or army. In other words, the problem
 
 240 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 of physical force has literally not arisen for these territorial 
 groups. From this and cognate considerations we may infer 
 that mobile individuals and immobile territorial groups belong 
 to two fundamentally different categories: the one, in modern 
 times, inconceivable without a police, the other capable of 
 existing for centuries, and presumably indefinitely, without 
 even the threat of physical force. An examination of the 
 differences between an individual and territorial groups would 
 show why this is so ; but this would lead us beyond the limits 
 of the present Conclusion. Suffice it that since physical force 
 is, one may almost say, never contemplated in intra-territorial 
 questions, its use in inter-territorial difficulties may be con- 
 ceived as equally unnecessary. Shifting the problem from the 
 margin into the focus, we discover that we are confronted with 
 two astounding, but exceedingly plausible, fallacies. A new 
 formulation hence ensues: "If physical force is not needed 
 in the governance of intra-territorial groups, is it indispensable 
 in the relations of sovereign territorial groups?" Here, too, 
 the historic and evolutionary method including as it does 
 past, present, and probable future should be applied. 
 
 What, again, shall we say to the suggestion that the arma- 
 ments of the nations should be limited ? Once more we have a 
 popular demand, universally deemed reasonable and feasible. 
 The essential implication in this instance is that armaments are 
 a definite quantity which can be mechanically reduced. A 
 hundred years ago, when inventions played an insignificant part 
 in war and peace, there could have been no grave logical 
 objection to this demand. Is this, however, so to-day ? Think 
 of the World War! Germany's first successes in Belgium and 
 France, and the great Russian "drive", were principally due to 
 the unexpected quantity of ammunition and machine guns used, 
 and to the influence of the unanticipated German and Austrian 
 monster guns. Moreover, the U-boat and its fiendish method, 
 as well as poison gas and other potent factors, were novel to 
 the world. Accordingly, if an Armaments Limitation Agreement 
 had existed before the war, it would have almost certainly not 
 provided for these unexpected instrumentalities, and would 
 have therefore left Germany in a highly advantageous military 
 position. It is hence likely that an Armaments Limitation 
 Agreement concluded now, would be very largely obsolete in 
 a decade or less, and prove perilous to nations relying thereon, 
 especially in view of the experience gained during the war and 
 the harnessing of science to the car of international slaughter. 
 Once more, a clear statement of the problem would have shattered 
 a fallacy which Is at present almost ubiquitously diffused. 
 
 Or, consider the enthusiasm engendered after the termination 
 of the World War by the proposal to form a League of Nations. 
 "We must have a League of Nations", was the cry of all parties, 
 save of the small ultra-militarist group. Yet what precisely is
 
 SECTION21.-PRECISE NATURE OF PROBLEM TO BE INVESTIGATED.^ 
 
 signified by a League of Nations ? One could read for months 
 in the press leading articles, special articles, and cables on the 
 subject, without this fundamental question being asked. Roughly, 
 it might mean an agreement between the leading governments 
 of the world to defend each other if attacked. For the inner 
 circle a certain number of experts it was a project in- 
 volving an International Court whose object it was to inquire 
 into justiciable cases, and a Council which was to act as mediator, 
 conciliator, and legislator, and some kind of internationalised 
 army. On one point unanimity appeared to exist, namely that 
 a League of Nations would form an effective bulwark against 
 another attentat on humanity. Why this should follow, it was 
 difficult to comprehend. Yet if the precise- nature of the problem 
 had been determined, the discussions would have been distinctly 
 more profitable. Even the advisability of a League of Nations 
 in any form might have been called into question, and a new 
 issue would have been raised: for example, whether a Legislature, 
 Court, and Administration, with total absence of armaments, 
 was not what existed in intra-territorial affairs, and what should 
 be introduced into inter-territorial affairs? In any case un- 
 biassed reflection would have shown that there was no virtue in 
 a League as such; that a League might be a reactionary body; 
 that a Court restricted in its scope, and confined merely to 
 platonic expressions of opinion, would very likely prove abortive ; 
 that a Council of Conciliation, constituted of Government nominees, 
 was a travesty of a democratic institution; and that our age and 
 its spirit demanded nothing more nor less for international 
 affairs than for national ones a democratic Legislature, Court, 
 and Administration. As a minimum, thinkers ought to have 
 made proposals which were unambiguous, and not proceeded 
 to assume the clarity of an expression which was really vague 
 in the extreme. Now that the League with its Secretariat, 
 Council, and Assembly exists, the object of reformers should 
 be to develop it into the positive direction indicated above. 
 
 Suppose, again, that the problem submitted is that of the 
 causes of peace and war. Here, unless the terms are properly 
 defined at the initial stage, the investigation may assume gigantic 
 proportions, and yet the results may only darken the issues 
 involved. As explained in 117 there is almost a universal 
 tendency to think of problems in the light of momentary and 
 local interests, and thus to mistake passing symptoms for 
 eternal verities. A state of war tends therefore to be defined in 
 certain extremist quarters as resulting from any and every kind 
 of social backwardness, and peace as only securable through 
 social conduct which is in every way irreproachable, whilst 
 other extremists reason that, e.g., wars have always been and 
 will for ever remain because demanded by human nature, a 
 period of peace being a transitional stage between one war 
 and another. Along this road advance is manifestly barred. 
 
 16
 
 242 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 The clear thinker will be resolved to fix the objective signi- 
 fication of the terms Peace and War, and to seek for real in- 
 stead of presumed causes. If he sets out with such an intention, 
 he fulfils the demands of the Conclusion. 
 
 108. Lastly. Reasoning hastily without fixing the problem, 
 we may be inclined, for instance, to ascribe India's industrial 
 backwardness to such factors as race, climate, tradition, and 
 religion. Yet if we attentively peruse the comprehensive Report 
 of the Indian Industrial Commission, 1916-1918, we learn that 
 such a conclusion would be decidedly dubious. The Commissioners 
 find that the intensive industrialism of the West is due to definite 
 causes, such as nation-wide elementary education, lower and higher 
 technical instruction and training, hygienic and sanitary reforms, 
 legislative protection of the worker, facilities for land acqui- 
 sition and banking, and, above and through all, to Government 
 support and initiative. Accordingly, the Report concludes in 
 effect that the industrial immaturity of India is no greater than 
 would be anticipated in the circumstances of any Western 
 country, and the Commissioners confidently expect that with 
 the necessary reforms realised, India will enter as an equal 
 the comity of highly developed industrial nations. Could one 
 not, we venture to ask, extend the Commissioners' conclusions 
 to all so-called backward peoples and races? Must we not be 
 as definite as the Indian Commissioners before we affirm that 
 an unbridgeable difference exists between one people or race 
 and another in any cultural direction whatsoever? 
 
 The frequent failure to define the problem to be solved is 
 not seldom the cause that an enquiry proves comparatively 
 barren, or is unnecessarily cumbersome and protracted. Granted, 
 however, that the nature of the problem under investigation has 
 been determined as precisely as circumstances permit, we proceed 
 to examine the detailed facts through inspection, observation, 
 and experiment. Before doing this, however, we shall consider 
 certain problems allied to the one discussed in this Conclusion. 
 
 CONCLUSION 15. 
 
 Need of Exact Terminology, of Conclusions in the Form of 
 Precise Definitions, and of Extreme Definiteness in Thought 
 
 and Statements. 1 
 
 109. (A) EXACT TERMINOLOGY. The need for simple, 
 exactly defined, fixed, and universally accepted terms, as well 
 as for a sufficiency of these, is commonly recognised. This 
 topic, however, need not be laboured, seeing the common 
 scientific practice which leaves little to be desired in this 
 
 1 "Everything relating both to bodies and virtues in nature [should] be 
 set forth (as far as may be), numbered, weighed, measured, defined." (Bacon, 
 Parasceve.) "Practical working comes of the due combination of physics 
 and mathematics." (Ibid.)
 
 SECTION 21. PRECISE NA TURE OF PROBLEM TO BE INVESTIGA TED. 243 
 
 respect. We may, nonetheless, stress the point that the terms 
 selected should embody descriptions rather than theories, and 
 that provisional terms should be replaced as soon as possible 
 by truly descriptive ones. 
 
 At the same time we should remember the cogent reasons 
 which underlie the demand for a precise terminology. For 
 instance, the technical employment in a treatise of such a term 
 as nature, religion, or morality, generally suggests to the reader 
 ideas diverging appreciably from those in the mind of the 
 writer; and if we add to this that each generation alters its 
 general outlook to some extent, it will be%.perceived how 
 desirable it becomes that a term shall be unequivocally defined. 
 For this reason mathematical terms are alone truly satisfactory, 
 because it is impossible, or nearly impossible, to misconstrue 
 their meaning. "How much we owe to the possession of 
 names," says Lord Kelvin, "is best illustrated by how much 
 we lose how great a disadvantage we are put to in cases in 
 which we have not names. We want a name for the reciprocal 
 of resistance. We have the name 'conductivity', but we want 
 a name for the ujiit of conductivity. I made a box of re- 
 sistance coils thirty years ago, and another fifteen years ago, 
 for the measurement of conductivity, and they both languished 
 for the want of a name. . . . We shall have a word for it when 
 we have the thing, or rather, I should say, we shall have the 
 thing when we have the word." 1 John Stuart Mill remarks on 
 this subject: "Hardly any original thoughts on mental or social 
 subjects ever make their way among mankind, or assume their 
 proper importance in the minds of even their inventors, until 
 aptly-selected words or phrases have, as it were, nailed them 
 down and held them fast."- (Logic, bk. 4, ch. 6, 3.) Yet 
 unless the terminology proposed (assuming strict and correct 
 definition), especially in a new science, is indubitably appro- 
 priate, or differs but slightly from that in common use, it stands 
 in danger of being disregarded, together with the facts indicate'd 
 by it. Indeed, from the standpoint of the popularisation of 
 scientific facts, a truly consistent methodology will demand 
 that terminologies and nomenclatures 3 be not derived from 
 foreign tongues, 4 for this creates immense and yet quite un- 
 
 1 The science of Sound is seriously hampered through lacking a term 
 intermediate between "noise" and "harmony". Similarly, an intermediate 
 term is needed between "tragedy" and "comedy". 
 
 2 Formulae and notations are important extensions of the above. They 
 should express the greatest practicable number of facts or relations in an 
 unequivocal manner. 
 
 3 "A nomenclature of a science is a collection of names of groups. A 
 terminology is a collection of the names (or terms) which distinguish 
 either the properties or the parts of the individual objects which the science 
 recognises." (Fowler, Logic, vol. 2, p. 92.) See, further, on this subject 
 Boyce Gibson, The Problem of Logic. 
 
 4 The obstacles alluded to in the text might be made considerably less 
 formidable by dictionaries comprising an etymological section where words 
 
 16*
 
 244 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 necessary embarrassments, and that the language, as in the 
 case of Greek, be so constructed or re-shaped as to permit of 
 an easy joining and fixing of terms and part terms. Already 
 academies and learned compilers of dictionaries have contributed 
 appreciably to making language less amorphous and more re- 
 liable ; but, to attain this end completely, it requires the employ- 
 ment of a method of automatically fixing the signification of 
 words and readily augmenting or lightening the vocabulary. 1 
 Till that day arrives there is perhaps some advantage in employ- 
 ing for scientific purposes the words of a dead language not 
 subject to the disastrous wear and tear of daily use in the 
 irresponsible market of the world. If this be so, everybody 
 should learn that language, although nobody should speak or 
 write it (which is virtually the case with Greek to-day). This is, 
 however, a clumsy and desperate device of overcoming what 
 in many languages is now a serious obstacle both to research 
 and to its popularisation. 2 
 
 110. (B) EXACT CONCLUSIONS. As with terms, so with 
 conclusions. Lack of precision in great measure invalidates 
 them. To venture therefore in a desultory manner on innumer- 
 able assertions concerning a subject, may be arresting because 
 of the very vagueness, but is not exactly enlightening. In con- 
 sequence, next to aiming at precise terms, we should endeavour 
 to reach precise and truly comprehensive definitions which shall 
 summarise an enquiry in a convincing manner. Such definitions 
 will alone enable us and others to test the correctness of our 
 results and to utilise them for deductive ends, for which reasons 
 they are indispensable. Leaving aside the various definitions 
 of methodological terms which we have offered in Part II, we 
 may further illustrate our meaning by calling attention to the 
 comprehensive definition regarding the nature of man furnished 
 in Conclusions 13 and 34. One might similarly, though tenta- 
 tively, gather up the total meaning and content of the science 
 of ethics, by speaking of it as "that branch of the general 
 science of specio-psychics which deals with the historic tendency 
 of human impulses, individuals, groups of individuals, and groups 
 
 derived from identical roots are classed together. That is, what we attempted 
 to do for English words developing out of the Latin "vertere", in Con- 
 clusion 20 d, might be effected for the whole vocabulary, including prefixes 
 and postfixes. Thys mastery of the etymology of at least the more common 
 words of foreign origin would then involve a comparatively modest effort 
 which might not be beyond the capacity of the older scholars in the primary 
 school and of adults generally. Not only would novel combinations be thus 
 readily comprehended, but the current vocabulary might be increased, say, 
 to the proportion common in literary works of distinction. 
 
 1 For a project of a scientific language, see 205. 
 
 2 The definition of a term may be verbal or real. In the first instance, 
 we merely explain how we propose to employ a term; in the second 
 instance, of which alone we speak in the text, we strive to define the 
 nature of the phenomenon implied in the term.
 
 SECTION 21. -PRECISE NATURE OF PROBLEM TO BE INVESTIGA TED. 245 
 
 of human groups, increasingly to satisfy human nature through 
 co-operation"; and one might join to this the practical deduc- 
 tion "until, in the place of the unreasoned need of the moment, 
 which almost exclusively dominates the individual in the first 
 stages of human development, the ideal of the complete and 
 correlated solidarity of the self and of mankind rules undisturbed 
 in man and human nature is completely satisfied"- The value 
 of aiming at, and reaching, comprehensive definitions of this 
 character can scarcely be exaggerated. We must become again, 
 but on a higher plane, dialecticians and scholastics. Moreover, 
 the wholesome caution and thoroughness involved in the fram- 
 ing of definitions, point to their being imperative throughout 
 every stage of an enquiry, more especially for deductive pur- 
 poses. 1 
 
 111. (C) DEFINITENESS IN SCIENTIFIC WORK GENE- 
 RALLY. Similarly, this tendency towards definiteness should 
 throughout stamp the activities of the man of science, because 
 without it there can be no decisive advance, and since con- 
 fusion is an even deadlier foe to truth than error. A famous 
 example of definiteness in method, which has been often quoted, 
 is that of the discovery of the manner in which dew is deposited 
 on plants. For over half a century, till 1885, Wells' theory was 
 thus not only accepted but admired. Yet the fact that plants 
 differed from all non-living objects in that they were animate 
 and that they were normally rooted in the ground, was uni- 
 formly overlooked a significant illustration of the absence of a 
 rigorously scientific method of enquiry in our day. This was, 
 of course, more pardonable in older writers. Van Helmont 
 (born 1577) thus reasoned that plants obtain all their constituents 
 from water. In proof he cited an experiment of his own. He 
 had planted a willow weighing 5 Ibs. in 200 Ibs. of earth. 
 After 5 years the willow weighed over 169 Ibs. and the earth 
 had only lost 2 ounces. Ergo, he reasoned, roots and wood 
 are transformed water. The transformability of the all-enfold- 
 ing air had necessarily escaped his attention. 
 
 The advance of science is distinguished by greater knowledge 
 leading to greater definiteness e.g., "the molecule has been 
 raised from a conception only realisable experimentally in mil- 
 
 1 The following definitions may prove useful. "A fact, in the scientific 
 sense of the word, is the close agreement of many observations or measure- 
 ments of the same phenomena." "A class, in the scientific sense of the 
 word, is a plural number of facts that resemble one another in some given 
 point or number of points." "A generalisation, in the scientific sense of 
 the word, is an affirmation that a constant relation exists between an unvary- 
 ing class of facts and some unvarying fact not in the class, or between one 
 unvarying class of facts and some other unvarying class." "A law, in the 
 scientific sense of the word, is an affirmation of a constant relation between 
 a fact of variation and some other fact of variations, or between a class of 
 variations and some other class ot variations." (F. H. Giddings, Inductive 
 Sociology, 1901.)
 
 246 PART V.-WORKING STAGE. 
 
 lions to the rank of a definite particle whose entry into our 
 apparatus produces a definite and measurable effect." (James 
 A. Crowther, Molecular Physics, 1919, p. 1.) A historical in- 
 stance is also that relating to scurvy. Green vegetables having 
 been found to be a specific in its prevention and cure, men 
 neglected to notice that long cooking or complete drying de- 
 stroy the anti-scorbutic factor in the vegetables, just as they 
 tacitly inferred that lime-juice, being acid, may be substituted 
 for lemon juice, a disastrous non sequitur, since the anti-scor- 
 butic factor is not to be identified with acidity and since lime- 
 juice contains that factor in negligible quantities only. Likewise, 
 whilst the fertilising agents in animal manure may be detected 
 and artificially produced or found in other substances, animal 
 manures may yet have their distinct value. So, too, unemploy- 
 ment, strike, lock-out, and especially industrial accidents statis- 
 tics, only became definite and truly comparable when they were 
 presented in terms of days lost, and wages only acquired a 
 definite meaning when they were related to the cost of living 
 for a family of five, and when the minimum requirements as 
 to food, etc., were scientifically ascertained. Similarly the con- 
 tention, as by Lord Leverhulme in his work The Six Hour-Day, 
 that modern industrial methods have increased productivity 
 a hundredfold would probably be modified to a modest fen- 
 fold, or fivefold, increase if the actual changes in productivity 
 were definitely envisaged. 
 
 112. Indefiniteness is at present the bane of social inves- 
 tigations. Here is, for example, the extremely important sex 
 problem. How simple and natural it would be to scrutinise 
 closely the facts, and, once for all, to sweep away at least the 
 grosser misconceptions on the subject ! Yet we have a formid- 
 able and ever swelling literature, dealing with one aspect or 
 another of the sex problem, but frequently throwing scarcely 
 a streak of light on the main issues involved. Some few facts 
 here and there have been observed or mal-observed, and forth- 
 with a pamphlet or book is written. For instance, in the high 
 interests of morality scores of publications have appeared which 
 advocate sex enlightenment. Finding that the young stumble 
 over the physiological relation arising out of marriage, ingenious 
 solutions of the difficulty have been propounded. To ensure a 
 sense of purity and a high ideal of marriage, the children should 
 be made acquainted, it is maintained, with the lives of flowers 
 and, more especially, with the general process of the fertilisation 
 of plants. This, bolder reformers supplement with illustrations 
 of the generative processes in fishes and some of the other 
 lower animals, and the most daring delicately encourage the 
 children to observe for themselves what the farm and the street 
 offer in this respect. Still others furnish accounts of the organs 
 of generation in human beings. Only few, however, have the 
 temerity to approach the subject of human paternity. Such
 
 SECTION21.-PRECISE NA TURE OF PROBLEM TO BE INVESTIGA TED. 247 
 
 enlightenment as has been indicated above is deemed by many 
 not only urgently desirable, but entirely satisfactory, in that 
 it is said to suffuse the hearts of the young with a feeling of 
 the nobility and sanctity of their body and of marriage. In- 
 cessant and mournful are therefore the complaints that parents 
 and teachers as a body cannot be induced to communicate this 
 life-giving information to their charges. 
 
 Yet if reformers had not hastily rushed to deal with a fugitive 
 symptom, if they had definitely faced the problem as such, they 
 would have been spared mortification. They should have asked 
 themselves, What is the meaning of human marriage? and 
 should have sought a clear answer to this question before 
 thinking of remedies for one or another related social disease. 
 It would have then transpired that it is monstrous to imagine 
 that a study of the farm-yard, or of the fertilising process in 
 flowers and the like, should be conceived to be a fair and ade- 
 quate introduction to a true conception of marriage. Examining 
 a number of unions of the type which they could commend, 
 reformers might have deduced the subjoined conclusions, among 
 others: 
 
 (1) Two human beings, man and woman, each of about the 
 age of twenty-five, after having felt for perhaps some years 
 that they appreciated, understood, and loved each other, agree 
 to marry and cohabit for the remainder of their lives as lovers 
 and comrades, and, if fortune does not frown, as parents. This 
 agreement they have socially ratified and sanctified by the law, 
 or by their religious organisation, or by both. 
 
 (2) Since any children born to them should be as healthy as 
 possible, the parents should be fully developed physically. This 
 stage is reached about the age of twenty-five, and marriage 
 therefore should not be contracted before that period. 
 
 (3) The child, when born, is altogether helpless, and therefore 
 to bring offspring into the world without taking care of it 
 after birth is to doom it to almost instant death. If marriage 
 involves, as a rule, the birth of children, the children thus born 
 demand parental devotion for a long period, perhaps even to 
 adulthood. 
 
 (4) Moreover, whereas with animals the process of rearing 
 offspring is almost entirely a matter of physical care, with 
 human beings the substance of all moral and other inventions 
 and discoveries made during the history of the race has to be 
 transmitted by teaching to the offspring. This entails, therefore, 
 an incalculably great extension of the responsibilities of human 
 parents. Accordingly, there should be also a solid preparation 
 for marriage on other planes than the physical, if our specie- 
 historic heritage, which alone makes us truly and distinctively 
 human, is to be transmitted to the coming generation. This 
 preparation comprises a high development of the general intelli- 
 gence, the attainment of a lofty moral standard in conduct and
 
 248 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 insight, the due appreciation of what is beautiful, the thorough 
 acquisition of a suitable vocation, a fair understanding of life 
 or the "world", the assimilation of the chief virtues demanded 
 by the intimate common life of husband and wife, sufficient 
 and practical knowledge of the education of children in the 
 home, and training in domestic economy generally. Such a 
 preparation is requisite if marriage is to achieve its significant 
 ends ; and this process of preparation, like that of physiological 
 maturing, necessitates that those who are to be married should 
 have reached man's and woman's estate that is, about the 
 age of twenty-five. 
 
 (5) If the children are eventually to become personalities and 
 cultured, both parents should be personalities and cultured. 
 
 (6) This implies a feeling and an acknowledgment of equality 
 between husband and wife. 
 
 (7) Intimate co-operation between the parents would be also 
 impossible unless a sense of comradeship prevailed. 
 
 (8) A life task of such magnitude as human marriage, pre- 
 supposes, of course, mutual and deep devotion between the 
 partners in marriage. With the above demands satisfied, the 
 flame of love, once it has been kindled, is easily kept alive. 
 Love is indispensable in every arduous enterprise in elevating 
 offspring, in social causes, in serving one's country. At the 
 same time, sustained love becomes almost an impossibility 
 when life is not rationally organised, and where there is no 
 adequate preparation for the state of matrimony. 
 
 (9) Marriage fulfils the universal, or all but universal, desire 
 for a home for a place and a world which one can claim as 
 one's very own, since mother, father, and children are one. 
 
 (10) Whatever be the attitude of the world, whether it is 
 appreciative or contumelious, there can be no greater boon than 
 to have a life companion another self with whom one can 
 confidently consult in every emergency, however intimate the 
 matters might be. What parents are to children, parents are 
 as truly to each other in respected families. This form of mar- 
 riage postulates, consequently, the indissolubility of the marriage 
 tie under all save the extremest circumstances. A marriage 
 lightly entered into, or lightly regarded or dissolved, is no ge- 
 nuine marriage at all. A form of marriage restricted to a certain 
 period, would imply absence of real intimacy the quintessence 
 of marriage. 
 
 (11) In a typical marriage of the best type it is generous ideals, 
 including mutual love and respect, which govern decisions, the 
 individual conceiving himself or herself as the servant of an 
 idea, and not as the ruler or exploiter of another. 
 
 (12) If the meaning and the implications of marriage are such 
 as we have sketched above, the well-nurtured youth and maiden 
 will look forward to marriage with a sentiment akin to sacred 
 awe and joy. They will be pure in spirit, and therefore pure
 
 SECTION 21 PRECISE NA TURE OF PROBLEM TO BE INVESTIGA TED. 249 
 
 in word and deed. Again, after they are married, infidelity in 
 any sense will be inconceivable to them. Indeed, chastity and 
 fidelity will signify to them respect for all that is implicit in 
 marriage and in human nature. 
 
 (13) Culture being that ingredient in every human being which 
 stamps him as human, both sexes will regard each other pri- 
 marily as human, and not as sex, beings. 
 
 (14) In conclusion. The truly typical human marriage is world 
 removed from the truly typical animal union without making 
 any aspersions on the latter, and the propagative instinct has 
 in man a limited and quite definite object to serve. Once this 
 is recognised and conceded, parents and teachers will not find 
 it difficult or embarrassing to introduce the children to the 
 manifold meaning of marriage. On the contrary, this task will 
 become a cardinal one for parent and teacher alike, and its 
 fulfilment will repay a hundredfold the efforts made. 
 
 Having acquired a definite conception of the meaning of 
 marriage as a starting point, the problems of home and school 
 education in relation to sex may be approached with confidence, 
 since the physiological aspects have been justly relegated to the 
 background. Nevertheless, or rather just because of this, there 
 should not be the least hesitation in the parents describing to 
 the young the processes of conception, gestation, parturition, 
 recovery, and lactation, thus leaving only for later treatment 
 the stage immediately preceding conception. No young child 
 but would be grateful for such information, and be very much 
 the better for its possession. No parent could hesitate to impart 
 such knowledge. To the young child, it should be remembered, 
 all things are pure. 
 
 Much mischief has Jbeen caused by assuming that at the age 
 of puberty the minds of the young are suddenly perturbed and 
 absorbed in matters of sex. Leaving aside sophistication through, 
 e.g., perverse companions and morbid literature, nothing seems 
 further from the truth. On the contrary, as we might expect, 
 the whole nature is opening out towards adulthood with its 
 innumerable phases. Cricket, football, the desire to be a sailor, 
 travel or hunting, keenness to become independent and prepare 
 for some vocation, notions of reforming the world, adventures 
 and new experiences generally, thoughts of maturity, such is 
 the adolescent's programme. Interest in the complementary sex 
 enters only later and, save for exceptional cases and causes, 
 scarcely captivates the mind of the semi-adolescent. The 
 adolescent desires to develop and assert the whole of his many 
 powers. In fact, if this were not so, the adolescent would reach 
 adulthood pitifully unprepared and entirely unfit for the tasks 
 of life and marriage. The alarmists those who hint that with 
 puberty should come satisfaction of the sex instinct, and those 
 others who contend that with the advent of puberty should 
 ensue a desperate struggle to curb and crush the rebellious sex
 
 250 PART V WORKING STAGE. 
 
 instinct should be converted to a saner view of adolescence, 
 a view in closer conformity with fact and the distinctive nature 
 of man. 
 
 After home and school enlightenment, follows the education 
 of young men and women, and finally that of adults and of 
 married folk. Here also a definite conception of the meaning 
 of marriage should render impossible the crude, revolting, and 
 unnatural views which so widely prevail, views portraying men 
 as miserable weaklings incapable of self-restraint and women 
 as the willing slaves to men's lusts. The psychology of the 
 whole matter requires to be assiduously examined. For instance, 
 it appears probable that much sex thought is incidental to the 
 general process of falling into a certain habit of thought and 
 is moreover normally unconnected with sex feelings, and that 
 sexual aberrations are to be primarily explained as matters of 
 depraved thought habits, and not as resulting from perverse sex 
 instincts. Likewise, in an individual who has not been socially 
 drilled into sex emphasis, bodily sex feelings may be present 
 and yet not issue into sex thoughts of any kind which should 
 be the normal experience. Again, bodily sex disturbances during 
 sleep should not normally result in sex dreams, and where they 
 do, it should be remarked that the dream is most frequently an 
 attempted interpretation and not the cause. It is also worthy 
 of consideration that sharply turning away the attention com- 
 monly wipes out any line of thoughts, including sex thoughts, 
 and that turning the attention intently on any bodily sensations, 
 including sex sensations, has the same modifying effect normally. 
 In a word, there is no justification for assuming a kind of fatal 
 connection between sex thoughts and sex feelings, and vice versa. 
 Perhaps most important of all is the psychological effect of a 
 true conception of marriage both before and within marriage 
 a conception restricting sex intimacy to the perpetuation of the 
 race, and the fact that sex demands are freely diminished or 
 heightened by the law of habit. 
 
 Thus a really definite conception of the meaning of marriage, 
 a clear apprehension of its total meaning, may lift many out 
 of the morass into which they have sunk. 
 
 113. Or consider the human problem par excellence, that 
 of conduct, from the point of view of definiteness of thought. 
 Preachers and prophets throughout the ages have vied with 
 one another in lamenting the hardness of men's hearts, their 
 ethical obtuseness, and their disloyalty to the moral law. Espe- 
 cially painful has been the almost universal impression that 
 belief in the ideal, on the one hand, and its realisation in our 
 conduct, on the other, are apparently diametrically opposed to 
 each other, so much so that it has been widely surmised that 
 men and women are by nature corrupt, and therefore incapable 
 of obeying the behests of the ideal. Yet definiteness of thought, 
 or facing the problem as a whole, would have dispelled this
 
 SKCT10N21. PRECISE NA TURE OF PROBLEM TO BE INVESTIGA TED. 251 
 
 paralysing despair and these corrosive suspicions concerning a 
 fundamental characteristic of human nature. 
 
 We perceive, for example, that it is one thing to say to one- 
 self, "A man should stand erect, not be held erect by others", 
 "Pass your life in honesty and purity of heart", "Be master 
 of your appetites", "Be perfect", and quite another matter to 
 realise these maxims in our conduct. Yet why should any one 
 be surprised at this? Suppose we said to those who desired 
 to paint beautifully, or to those who wished to be athletes, 
 "Be ye perfect", should we consider it just to expect that forth- 
 with there should stand before us perfect painters or perfect 
 athletes ? Yet where lies the difference ? The ordinary man- 
 would-be painter or lover of the right has many firmly rooted 
 habits to extirpate and many new habits to plant and tend. 
 Neither to exaggerate nor to understate, to place oneself in the 
 position of another, to become self-reliant, to feel kindly dis- 
 posed towards all whatever their character, to be alert in order 
 to perform some good act, to assume complete and easy control 
 over our bodily desires and long-established habits, to display 
 delicate insight into the needs of others, and much else that 
 a live conscience exacts, manifestly requires minute adjustments 
 which only long, deliberate, and experimental practice can 
 properly effect. Not a line can be written about the methods 
 of acquiring an art, which does not apply to the art of conduct. 
 
 We learn, accordingly, that absence of definiteness in thought, 
 i.e., of a proper perspective, is the cause of men and women 
 falling far short of their ideal and being in incessant conflict 
 therewith. Let the art of conduct become a genuine art, and 
 let children from infancy onwards be systematically trained to 
 develop all the virtues pursuant to the law of development in 
 all the arts, and we shall have a right and a reason to anti- 
 cipate lives where the ideal and the real almost meet. 
 
 114. Or let us probe the question of peace and war by 
 means of the test of definiteness. It is a common argument, 
 sometimes urged with regret, that war, like penury or vice, 
 has always existed and will consequently, it is alleged, con- 
 tinue for aye. If we definitely ask ourselves, however, what 
 war is, this depressing conclusion seems by no means self- 
 evident. For instance, erstwhile private war or revenge was 
 universal, and yet in the most civilised lands lawlessness has 
 virtually passed away. Again, towns and provinces were for- 
 merly often at war, whilst nobles boasted of their retainers 
 and fought one another a condition of society now wholly 
 obsolete. Small countries frequently at war with one another 
 have been fused together and have become large countries, 
 e.g., England, Germany, Italy, the old feuds never recurring. 
 It is, therefore, manifest that with the growth in humaneness, 
 the granting of personal and corporate autonomy, and the in- 
 tegration of international relations, the time must arrive when
 
 252 PART V. -WORKING STAGE. 
 
 the nations will be bountf to each other by innumerable ties, 
 when an inter-national parliament and administration will be 
 established, when inter-national courts of law will possess the 
 status of our national law courts, and when war between nations 
 will be as inconceivable as war between towns. In fact, as 
 intra-national consolidation proceeds, war is abolished within 
 the nation, and when the relations between different countries 
 will have been consolidated, war will have ceased altogether. 
 Such considerations evidence that those who believe in the 
 lasting continuance of warfare fallaciously postulate, because 
 of indefiniteness of thought, that feuds have only occurred be- 
 tween nations and that the closely cooperating nations of the 
 future will be reflexes of the practically self-contained nations 
 of yesterday. Viewing the problem, therefore, in the proper 
 perspective, we learn that war is bound to disappear. 
 
 115. Or, again, study the problem of the abolition of 
 poverty. To read any of the many inspired and inspiring 
 Utopias, one marvels that they have not been realised long ago. 
 We have only to socialise the means of production and of ex- 
 change, so the story runs, and everybody will possess more 
 than sufficient of the good things of life, whilst his or her hours 
 of labour will very nearly reach the vanishing point. The plan 
 is so enticing that it should not even meet with the opposition 
 of the rich who assuredly demand no more than a super- 
 abundance of desirable commodities and an ample allowance 
 of leisure, and still we do not appear to be approaching the 
 sanctified soil of the promised land. The fact is that definite- 
 ness of thought is wanting in many of our social reformers. 
 The well-to-do perceive no prospect of obtaining more than 
 they need in the socialist State, and therefore seek to frustrate 
 its advent. As we point out in Conclusions 6, 17, and 20, with 
 the views current as to how material satisfaction is to be ob- 
 tained, the socialist State must inevitably fail. It cannot offer 
 each individual .^50,000 a year, or its equivalent in kind, nor 
 permit him to draw up his own time table, nor provide each 
 person with a small army of secretaries, stewards, butlers, 
 lackeys, valets, housemaids, cooks, gardeners, chauffeurs, and 
 other attendants. So long, in fact, as men think as they do 
 at present concerning the sources of happiness, they would seek 
 to exploit the socialist State as they do the contemporary State, 
 with the inevitable result that the socialist State would de- 
 teriorate no sooner than it was instituted until it reached some 
 condition of disequilibrium resembling the States of to-day. It 
 is of no avail for the worker earning two pounds a week to 
 protest that he will be abundantly satisfied when he is in receipt 
 of what may be valued at six pounds a week. He nurses an 
 illusion, as the social facts prove, for in our day each class, 
 whatever its income, seeks as a rule to "better" itself. The 
 minimum required for arriving at the beatific state presupposes
 
 SECTION 21. PRECISE NATURE OF PROBLEM TO BE INVESTIGATED. 253 
 
 therefore a true conception of human nature, true insight into 
 what constitutes a satisfactory life, and, furthermore, a moral 
 enlightenment and training which shall render it easy for men 
 and women to live in the light of a high ideal. Granted these, 
 we should possess a basis for the socialist or social State which 
 would resist all onslaughts, and we could, and would, confidently 
 and cheerily labour for its speedy or rather more complete- 
 realisation. Lack of courage to face the problem as such, and 
 an insistence on what is transient, are the undoing of those 
 who seek happiness in wealth and those who work for an era 
 
 "When wealth no more shall rest in mounded heaps, 
 
 But smit with freer light shall slowly melt 
 
 In many streams to fatten lower lands." (Tennyson.) 
 
 These remarks, however, are by no means intended to dis- 
 courage the disinherited from looking forward to a socialised 
 State, and from demanding at present what they abundantly 
 deserve as their due an adequate living wage, shorter hours, 
 full employment, hygienic workplaces, respectful treatment, and 
 better conditions of labour generally. 
 
 116. Finally, there is the engrossingly interesting problem 
 of the nature of religion. Many thinkers not only restrict the 
 meaning of the term to their own creed, but limit it to their 
 particular interpretation of that creed. So, too, the term is 
 said to connote the existence of a supernatural and infinite 
 deity, or at least of deities. On the other hand, there are those 
 who speak of a religion of health, a religion of art, a religion 
 of love, a religion of goodness, or who identify religion with 
 some aspect of some religion or religions worship, devotion 
 to an ideal, and the like. Only a firm resolve to reach the 
 core of the meaning, a desire to be quite definite, to be quit 
 of delusions, can aid us here, as in social problems generally. 
 
 If, in this spirit, we analyse various religions, we discover 
 that he who is religious feels that he needs assistance such as 
 he does not find in himself or in his immediate environment, 
 or requires at least to be reassured concerning the rational and 
 moral constitution of his world. In the earlier religions, even 
 to the time of the Romans, living men, it is true, were also 
 sometimes worshipped, but on the understanding that they 
 were not like other men, whilst in these latter days many 
 individuals, most of them well favoured by the fates, have 
 been satisfied with the existence of a deity who had arranged 
 from eternity everything for the best. In either case self-con- 
 tainedness is excluded. In Judaism, Christianity, and Moham- 
 medanism, the individual regards himself as in a desperate 
 plight but for the support of his deity, and but for the as- 
 surance that his deity watches over mankind. Buddha, it is 
 said, came to save men from themselves and their miseries 
 by means of his discovery that they could rise superior to
 
 254 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 their destiny, by passing into the state of Nirvana, beyond the 
 realms of sense and thought, or at least beyond the reach of 
 selfishness into the elysium of altruism. Zeno, touching the 
 very heart of the problem, taught how the rational or dis- 
 tinctive element in man might rule the animal element of the 
 passions and the appetites. Confucius found in the study and 
 reverence of antiquity, with its moral treasures, release from 
 spiritual and moral bondage for his people. 
 
 Summing up the matter, we observe that, for certain reasons, 
 the individual distrusts his powers. He asks himself What is 
 the meaning of my life ? Is the good life really more satis- 
 factory than the bad life ? Is there an uncertain struggle 
 between evil and good, or will justice triumph? Is there any 
 help for me, here and now, in my anxieties, or have I only 
 myself to rely on? Am I to obey or to control my capricious 
 impulses? In a word, allowing for varied stages of social 
 development and experience, the individual desires to feel "at 
 home" in the world, and is convinced that this feeling can 
 only be his if support be forthcoming beyond that which self- 
 reliance or his fellows about him can proffer. He needs a 
 cheerful and bracing philosophy of life, an assurance that he 
 does not stand by himself and that the right shall not be mocked. 
 Sometimes, as Lucretius points out, the philosophy of life 
 believed in is neither very cheering nor very bracing, but it is 
 probably the most cheering and bracing within reach. Whether 
 the solution proposed be natural or supernatural, magical or 
 scientific, is indifferent to the fundamental problem of religion. 
 So long as the individual feels that he needs support beyond 
 what he may anticipate from his neighbours, a religion will be 
 to him a necessity, the particular form of the religion being a 
 secondary matter, save in so far as the demand for a cheerful 
 and bracing philosophy of life is well or ill satisfied. 
 
 Definiteness or comprehensiveness in thought thus leads to 
 a definition of religion which in all probability is substantially 
 correct, and which may aid us in distinguishing that which is 
 religion from that which is not. 
 
 The same method may help us to proceed a step further. 
 Is the central fact of all religions the individual's alleged self- 
 inadequacy established by science or not? The mere fact of 
 the existence of religions at all periods makes the supposition 
 eminently plausible. However, throughout this volume, and 
 especially in Conclusion 13, we have seen that, considered 
 from a purely scientific standpoint, the individual as such is , 
 virtually a zero. No religion, therefore, can make the isolated 
 individual appear more impotent than science proves him to 
 be. The religious craving has consequently an indisputable 
 foundation in reality. But what of its object the existence of 
 a power which is to re-assure him? Can science discover any 
 verity corresponding thereto, or propound any cheering and
 
 SECTION 21. PRECISE NATURE OF PROBLEM TO BE INVESTIGA TED. 255 
 
 bracing philosophy of life ? Here we are face to face with a new 
 problem, inasmuch as the various extant and extinct philosophies 
 of life have been parts of widely diverging systems of thought. 
 Yet one may be permitted to surmise that it cannot be a sheer 
 coincidence that in the conception of humanity as developed 
 in Conclusion 13, we are offered a philosophy of life intimately 
 corresponding in all its essential outlines with the older religious 
 conceptions. That is, in humanity embracing past, present, 
 and to come we discern a verifiable entity possessing virtually 
 all the attributes of the traditional deity practically infinite 
 goodness, wisdom, power, and omnipresence, and incorporating 
 a cheerful and bracing answer to the commanding questions 
 which lie at the heart of religions. 1 We learn, accordingly, 
 that religions have always been justified psychologically and 
 practically, and that modern science hints at a philosophy of 
 life closely corresponding in principle to the older religions, 
 but excelling them in geniality, helpfulness, and energising power. 
 
 117. In the problems in this Sub-Conclusion we observe 
 that the interest of the social reformer centres as a rule in the 
 vanishing point of what is momentarily and locally felt and ex- 
 perienced, instead of in the multiple, massive, and enduring 
 fact of which the former is but a single and transitory mani- 
 festation. We have thus abundantly proved Bacon's fundamental 
 contention that what' is regarded as obvious does not disclose, 
 but masks, reality, and that the enlightened seeker after truth 
 and the alert social reformer will invariably endeavour to 
 pierce through the cloud of contemporary commonplaces and 
 crude surmises by applying the methods proposed in Con- 
 clusion 19/72. He is indefinite in his thought who, in doc- 
 trinaire fashion, blandly assumes that he need not go behind 
 superficial symptoms or beyond unexamined current hypotheses, 
 or who, in other words, capriciously regards a fraction of an or- 
 ganic whole as an independent entity. We repeat. The layman 
 cannot be expected to probe to the kernel the legions of 
 theories recommended to him; but of him who specifically 
 devotes himself to a cause or truth we have a right to demand 
 that he shall examine the whole ground on which he stands 
 and not only a fraction thereof. 
 
 118. (D) DEFIN1TENESS IN STATEMENTS GENE- 
 RALLY. In present-day France, lucidity in expression has been 
 virtually carried to the stage of perfection. Other things being 
 equal, it will be agreed that the power of unequivocally 
 communicating our ideas in words, is not only of benefit to 
 him who hears or reads, but both prevents our thought from 
 being confused and our statements reacting disastrously on our 
 ideas. Methodological procedure, that is, demands that our 
 cogitations shall be clear as a crystal stream, and that our 
 
 1 See G. Spiller, Outlines of a New World Religion.
 
 256 
 
 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 language, which is to reflect our cogitations, shall be equally 
 perspicuous. Moreover, clarity of expression should not be the 
 outcome of painful toil, of a tortuous approximation to an ideal 
 of style through the medium of ceaseless emendations, but the 
 result of efficient training in earlier years. Else the actual 
 research work is impeded and interfered with, if it is not 
 seriously contracted and its quality materially depreciated. The 
 ripe thinker, in other words, should no more need to impart 
 clearness to his style by the sweat of his brow than be anxiously 
 concerned about his spelling and grammar. 1 Clarity of ex- 
 pression will, finally, react on language itself and permit the 
 allotting of definite meanings to definite articulate sounds, with- 
 out the apprehension that familiarity will breed contempt, or 
 that the words will be employed carelessly and be in this way 
 degraded and lose their definiteness. 
 
 SECTION XXII. OBSERVATION. 2 
 
 119. It is difficult to ascertain and examine the exact 
 fundamental facts underlying the process of observation as 
 such. We might, however, state that there needs to be some 
 circumscribing concept guiding us in our examination, that is, 
 we should search for similarities of a certain order and exclude 
 all other classes of similarities. If it is a question of the defini- 
 tion of a chair or table, for instance, we seek for general 
 similarities, and we neglect all special or individual ones, such 
 as material, colour, size, precise conformation, or ornamentation. 
 In fact, we always presuppose in investigations a general clas- 
 sification of phenomena, and endeavour to find similarities in 
 accordance with that classification. (See Section V, also Con- 
 clusion 3.) For this, reason, anything we can say in this work 
 on the subject, can only be in further elucidation of the re- 
 cognised mode of observing. Granted, then, a general pre- 
 paredness and a special object, we assume that in observation 
 we seek as a rule for intrinsic and important resemblances in 
 a group of individuals, and that we strive to divide this group 
 into as many important groups as possible, or merge it into a 
 wider group. We examine in this way a large assortment of 
 individual objects, and, having noted their features, we class 
 
 1 He who is, broadly speaking, perfectly educated will have a perfect 
 command of the whole of the non-technical vocabulary. This in itself will 
 clarify thought and effectively aid in clarity of expression. A danger should 
 be, however, guarded against, that of being fascinated and satisfied with 
 clearness as such. 
 
 2 The term Observation, in this Section and throughout the treatise, is 
 intended to include the term Examination observational and experimental 
 examination of physical and psychical objects, processes, and forces, of pro- 
 positions and proposals, of historical and other documents, of trains of 
 reasoning, of terms, of formulae, of statistics, etc.
 
 SECTION 22. - OBSERVA TION. 257 
 
 them together or apart according to their substantial resem- 
 blances or divergences, not, however, without re-examining the 
 facts and finally formulating the shortest practicable compre- 
 hensive statement. Nevertheless, in many instances our interest 
 may be to fasten on divergences rather than on resemblances, 
 in which case we search for heterogeneity rather than for 
 homogeneity. These few preliminary remarks must suffice, as 
 our object in this Second Book is practical and not theoretical. 
 
 CONCLUSION 16. 
 
 Need of applying the Categories ; of Strenuous Mental Application 
 in the Process of Observation; and of the Observations being 
 Graded, Comprehensive, Important, Numerous, Full, Rational 
 and Relevant, Original, Automatically Initiated, and Methodi- 
 cally Developed. 1 
 
 120. (a) Utilisation of the Categories. The purpose of 
 Observation is, mainly, by the application of the third table 
 of the Primary Categories to ascertain circumstantially the 
 Material and Modal Aspects of a phenomenon, as enumerated 
 in the first and second tables of the Primary Categories. That 
 is, the investigation will not be guided by chance suppositions 
 varying with occasions and inquirers, but by comprehensive 
 tables covering virtually the whole extensive ground. This 
 method should compass a gigantic saving of effort and secure 
 the reduction of incomplete or erroneous results to a minimum. 
 At the same time certain peculiar or special procedure aspects 
 need to be emphasised in relation to observation, and this we 
 are essaying in the subjoined paragraphs. 
 
 121. (b) Concentration. In observation, as in all forms 
 of mental activity, we should intently concentrate* all our 
 faculties, and avoid both over-confidence and over-anxiety. 
 Mechanical or routine observation is unscientific. ( 154.) 
 
 122. (c) Point of Departure. Facts of perception should 
 form the point of departure of an investigation. 
 
 123. (d) Direct and Original Observation. Observation 
 should be direct, or original. "Learn all things as much as 
 you can at first hand." (Watts, Logic, p. 73.) Occasional 
 recollections, oral accounts, pen descriptions in books, drawings, 
 paintings, models, and the like, should be only utilised when 
 observation, external or internal, is impracticable, or when the 
 accounts issue from a scientific source or are employed for 
 comparison. It needs scarcely stating how frequently scientists 
 pass deliberately and critically over ground which their fellows 
 have trod. 
 
 1 For the full meaning of these adjectives, see Conclusion 25. 
 
 2 Darwin "assigned supreme importance to the habits of incessant in- 
 dustry and concentrated attention. . . ." (Frank Cramer, op. cit., p. 17.) 
 
 17
 
 258 
 
 PART V WORKING STAGE. 
 
 It may not be out of place to supply a graded series of cases 
 for the purpose of elucidating the full signification of direct 
 observation: (1) Some one has completed a direct, extensive, 
 historical, and exhaustive study of the nature and habits of 
 sheep ; (2) he has had frequent occasions to observe and study 
 sheep 'in their appropriate surroundings ; (3) he has casually seen 
 sheep" on the hill slopes; (4) he has seen one hustled through 
 his street; (5) he saw once a stuffed sheep in a natural history 
 museum; (613) he has seen a large (small) coloured 
 (uncoloured) model (picture or print) of one or more sheep; 
 (1417) he has read (heard) a full and accurate (short and 
 inaccurate) description of sheep; (1819) he acquired his in- 
 formation a long time ago from vague hearsay about sheep, 
 and cannot, besides, trust his memory. It is manifest that a 
 very appreciable difference exists between (1) and (19), and it 
 is to be deplored that outside recognised scientific research 
 in the physical and biological sciences, there is no adequate 
 apprehension of the need of keeping closely to (1), whilst a 
 tendency exists to look indulgently on (18) and (19). 
 
 Owing to what seems an unconsciousness of the necessity 
 of examining facts at first hand and thoroughly, a century of 
 continuous movement in the sphere of psychology has yielded 
 no conspicuous fruits. The proper nature of the principal 
 divisions of the mind, even pleasure-pain and the sensations, 
 are to-day no less and no more known, one might almost say, 
 than they were a hundred years ago. The views of the psycho- 
 logist, as his terminology evidences, have remained in essence 
 those of the man in the street. This disregard of the rule of 
 turning directly to the facts and of challenging the scientific 
 value of pre-scientific classifications, has been powerfully pro- 
 moted by the belief that effective introspection is impossible a 
 belief grounded on speculative considerations and on the ex- 
 perience that beginners find it difficult to introspect impartially 
 or well, 1 as they would find it difficult to do ANYTHING impar- 
 tially or well. On this account an eminently simple science, 
 
 1 For instance, it has been said that we cannot examine the conditions 
 of fear and other strong feelings, when what should have been stated is 
 that we cannot examine directly the first moments of a fierce passion. Or 
 it has been contended that we cannot attend to what we are attending, when 
 we are engaged on this the whole day almost. Or it has been argued that 
 introspection only refers to one individual; but it has been fprgotten that 
 that individual lives for many years and must of necessity reflect the most 
 general laws of mind. Here is a comparatively recent statement pertaining 
 to the alleged drawbacks to introspection: "Analytic observation of mental 
 processes is difficult just because they are processes and not fixed, enduring 
 objects. We cannot examine at leisure and again and again the same mental 
 process; for, as we try to notice its peculiar quality and complexity, it changes 
 every moment, and it can never be perfectly recovered or restored; and it 
 changes, or rather gives place to another process, all the more quickly, 
 just because we direct our attention to it." (W. McDougall, Psychology, 
 1912, p. 46.)
 
 SECTION 22. OBSERVATION. 259 
 
 unlike that of physiology or medicine, has made no progress 
 worth remarking for several generations, solely because the 
 primary facts were not adequately investigated. 1 
 
 The case of the science of ethics is, in one respect, even less 
 satisfactory, for whereas the social factor necessarily complicates 
 matters here to a notable degree, almost the only promise we 
 have yet of this department of knowledge is the academic name. 
 Those who have made a faithful study of this nominal science, 
 can scarcely call into question that theory plays in this science 
 a prodigiously greater part than fact. Here also the irrelevant 
 views of common sense and scholasticism are triumphant. One 
 vainly searches for a systematic treatise telling of the various 
 notions men and women entertain, and have entertained, on 
 morals; of the relative place morals occupy in life and mind, 
 and their relation to other parts of life and mind ; of experiments 
 to test their genuineness, scope, and limits; of the nature of 
 the good man, and of the signification of ethical terms ; of the 
 development of morality in children and also in institutions, 
 such as charities, hospitals, schools, prisons, etc., etc. all per- 
 formed in a thoroughly impartial and scientific spirit, with an 
 eye to pristine fact and not to prevalent or ancient theories 
 and philosophies. 2 
 
 124. (e) Accuracy. Scrupulous accuracy as to constituents, 
 form, quality, quantity, time, place, degree, state, changes, and 
 the categories generally, should be aimed at in observation, and 
 on this point the present generation of men of science has be- 
 come almost preternaturally sensitive with magnificent results. 
 Accuracy prevents endless complications, and saves, therefore, 
 much time and thought. Thus he who concluded from his ob- 
 servations that each expiration emptied the lungs of air and 
 each inspiration filled them with air, or that the expelled 
 air had lost all its oxygen, would gravely misrepresent the 
 facts. 
 
 Faraday's infinitely precious rule should guide and inspire 
 the observer that no need should exist for repeating an ob- 
 servation or experiment, and we should ever recall that Darwin 
 "saved a great deal of time through not having to do things 
 twice". (Frank Cramer, op. cit., p. 29.) The accuracy should 
 also extend to the statement embodying the observations, and 
 for the same cogent reasons. 
 
 1 The present writer has attempted in his Mind of Man to deal with the 
 nature of the human mind, apart from tradition and on the methodological 
 lines sketched in earlier drafts of this volume. 
 
 2 In a recent work treating of the methods employed in the sciences, and 
 consisting of contributions by eminent specialists (De la me~thode dans les 
 sciences, 1910), M. Levy-Bruhl examines the methods of ethics, and arrives 
 at the conclusion that not even the beginnings of a science of ethics exist 
 as yet. In regard to the methods to be employed in ethical enquiries, see 
 the author's "De la methode dans les recherches des lois de 1'ethique", 
 in Revue philosophique, January, 1905. 
 
 17*
 
 260 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 The following are some of the conditions contributing to a 
 high degree of accuracy: 
 
 (a) Being exceedingly well acquainted with one's material and the means 
 of manipulating it. 
 
 (b) Being assured that one's senses (including aids like eye-glasses), 
 memory, nerves, strength, etc., are "normal"; that instruments and mate- 
 rials are of a proper kind, of a good quality, and in good condition ; and 
 that other attendant circumstances light, temperature, air, comparative 
 silence, hours of labour, desk, seat, etc. are satisfactory. 
 
 (c) Avoiding diffuse attention, and having the mind continuously, and 
 just more than sufficiently, concentrated on a task. 
 
 (d) Being mindful of, and eliminating where possible, known or habitual 
 sources of personal and common errors in task observation, memory, 
 reasoning, and execution, and being responsive to unsuspected ones. 
 
 (e) Altering, where practicable, arrangements which lead to the making 
 of mistakes. 
 
 (/) Recording, for personal, group, and social guidance, the various 
 methods whereby likely mistakes may be (1) circumvented and (2) recti- 
 fied in a particular task. 
 
 (g) Mental readiness to discern difficulties, exceptions, and deviations 
 of a known order. 
 
 (h) Sufficient alertness to detect unanticipated difficulties, exceptions, 
 and deviations. 
 
 (/) Verifying what is not quite obvious and clear. 
 
 (y) Taking nothing for granted. 
 
 (A) Shunning the habits of doubt, suspicion, and vacillation, which 
 confuse the mind and induce inaccuracy. 
 
 (/) Displaying neatness, or clarity in purpose, in reasoning, and in 
 execution, without which inaccuracy is frequently inevitable. 
 
 (m) Favouring a degree of conspicuousness and distinctness (or separate- 
 ness), such as facilitates correct apprehension by the senses, the intelli- 
 gence, and the feelings. 
 
 (n) Standardising the best methods for the individual, the group, or 
 generally, ruling out thereby treacherous idiosyncrasies. 
 
 (o) Taking special precautions by diminution of speed, of risk, etc., 
 and by rest or by more concentrated attention when mental or physical 
 fatigue supervenes or when appreciable distraction occurs. 
 
 The average degree of initial accuracy attained where the 
 above conditions are respected, may be said to be the equivalent 
 of average accuracy, plus self-checking, and plus checking by 
 another. In numerous tasks such accuracy may save fifty per 
 cent, or more of labour, and in not a few investigations the 
 saving may be incalculably great. 
 
 One example may be provided in illustration. It is said that 
 the motto "8 hours' work, 8 hours' play, and 8 hours' sleep", 
 offers an ideal method of dividing up the 24 hours' of a day. 
 Now let us set out its content in the form of a time table, 
 assuming Saturday afternoon to be a half-holiday: 
 
 6 to 7.30 attention to the person and breakfast; 
 7.30 to 8 going to work; 
 8 to 13 morning's work; 
 
 13 to 14 dinner hour; 
 
 14 to 18 afternoon's work; 
 18 to 18.30 going home; 
 18.30 to 19.30 supper, etc.; 
 
 19.30 to 22 time not definitely occupied; 
 22 to 6 sleep.
 
 SECTION 22. OBSERVATION. 261 
 
 Instead of 8 hours of play, we find therefore a maximum of 
 2 1 /* hours not accounted for; and if we allow for a little rest, 
 for family and social duties, for correspondence, etc., the 
 2 1 /* hours are easily reduced to a maximum of about 1 hour 
 for each of 4 days, and 2 hours for a 5th day, in the week. 
 Incidentally this conclusion decisively disposes of the fear lest 
 the universal introduction of the 8 hours' working day should 
 create a serious leisure problem for which elaborate preparations 
 and precautions are required. On the other hand, the younger 
 worker may find 7 hours' sleep sufficient, in which case the 
 leisure time may be increased by a full hour for all working 
 days, while older men engaged on heavy work may sleep 
 9 hours and have left no leisure at all for the greater part of 
 the week. 
 
 125. (/) Minuteness. Observation should be minute, and 
 not only what is palpable to the ordinary observer should be 
 chronicled. Minute examination, ever increasing in delicacy, 
 as the history of the sciences illustrates, alone ensures that 
 the most important facts and factors are not mistaken or in- 
 advertently overlooked. Compare, for instance, the popular 
 contention that thought is instantaneous, with the reaction 
 times in psychology; or the well-known amorphous appearance 
 of snow-flakes, with their beautiful geometrical structure when 
 microscopically examined; or consider the delicacy of observation 
 which revealed the satellites of Mars or the many hundreds of 
 asteroids, or, more recently, the correctness of Einstein's theory 
 in regard to the influence of gravitation on light rays; or 
 ponder the fact that by suitable instruments it has been shown 
 that each plant produces an abundant quantity of heat in 
 respiration; or note the perfection of observation which teaches 
 that plants seemingly devoid of chlorophyll have the green 
 hidden by some other colour; or that some plants obtain 
 nitrogen from the air with the help of certain bacteria; or 
 imagine the action of the radium emanation in the atmosphere 
 for ever causing infinitesimal amounts of nitrogen to combine 
 with the oxygen of the air; or think of the method whereby 
 M. and Mme. Curie obtained from pitch-blende ore a crystalline 
 salt 1,800,000 times more active than Becquerel's uranium; or 
 weigh the almost infinite patience exhibited by Mendelian and 
 other experimenters; or think of the exceedingly minute analysis 
 of bodily movements by experts in scientific industry. Or con- 
 sider "letting roots grow along polished marble plates. After 
 some weeks the marble surface clearly demonstrates the dis- 
 solving effect of growing roots and root-hairs. Delicate traces 
 are everywhere etched in the marble surface, where roots have 
 come into close contact with the plate." (Frederick Czapek, 
 Chemical Phenomena in Life, 1911, p. 51.) Or note that "minute 
 traces of iron salts, scarcely to be ascertained by chemical 
 analysis, possess the power of greatly accelerating growth and
 
 262 PART V.-WORKING STAGE. 
 
 respiration." (Ibid., p. 125.) Or note how minute observation 
 revealed that without the presence of infinitesimal portions of 
 several classes of as yet unidentified vitamines, an otherwise 
 perfect diet, consisting of pure proteins, carbohydrates, fats, 
 and mineral salts, fails to sustain health and life, and that an 
 addition to such a diet of 2 cc. of milk daily, sufficed to restore 
 the balance; or remember the shock the layman felt when he 
 heard (1894) that argon, a constituent of the air far from in- 
 significant in quantity, had escaped the notice of earlier chemists, 
 and his gratification at learning that helium, neon, krypton, 
 and xenon, which were found to exist in the atmosphere, are 
 present there in the proportion of one part in 245,300, 80,800, 
 20,000,000, and 170,000,000 parts by volume respectively. 
 
 We offer here two detailed instances where minuteness of 
 observation is strikingly evidenced: 
 
 Edwin S. Goodrich, in the Evolution of Living Organisms, 1912, thus 
 describes the process of indirect cell division or karyokinesis : "The 
 chromatin gathers together into a coiled thread, the linin network becomes 
 disposed as a system of fibres radiating through the cytoplasm from two 
 minute bodies, the centrosomes. Between these centrosomes the fibres 
 join across, forming a spindle. The centrosomes can be seen to originate 
 from the nucleus or its neighbourhood, as a single body which divides, 
 the two halves moving to the opposite sides of the nucleus. The chro- 
 matic thread now breaks up into a definite number of separate pieces, 
 the chromosomes, which arrange themselves in a circle round the equator 
 of the spindle. Each chromosome now divides into two halves which 
 travel to the opposite ends of the spindle. There they join together to 
 form a thread; the thread breaks up into granules; the system of fibres 
 disappears; and thus a new nucleus is reconstituted, similar to the resting 
 nucleus of the original cell. A division of the cell-body then yields two 
 nucleated cells. As a rule the centrosome persists to give rise to that of 
 the next division. Now it is important to notice the continuity of sub- 
 stance during this process of division. Cytoplasm, linin, centrosome, and 
 chromatin are all parcelled out to the two daughter cells; above all, each 
 daughter nucleus receives the same number of chromosomes, and apparently 
 exactly the same amount of chromatin." (P. 22.) 
 
 The nature of the "internal secretions" produced by certain diminutive 
 glands, regarded until recently as of no importance, has provided one of 
 me most fascinating chapters in physiology. "The chemical substances 
 contained in the internal secretions have been named hormones, or ex- 
 citants, by Bayliss and Starling. In certain cases the chemists have been 
 able to isolate these hormones, and in one case the chemical constitution 
 is known and the substance has been manufactured artificially in the 
 laboratory. In other cases, and these the majority, they are as yet only 
 known by their definite stimulating action. Quite recently it has been 
 shown that bodies similar in nature to the hormones must be present in 
 our daily diet, or certain typical nutritional diseases are produced. These 
 hormones are not foods in the sense of being necessary to provide energy 
 by their combustion; they are only required in minute amounts as ex- 
 citants, and in their absence certain very specific effects giving the clinical 
 symptoms of well-known diseases appear. In a liberal and mixed diet all 
 the necessary hormones required from outside are contained. But, when 
 the diet is very restricted, such as the rice diet used by the Indian coolie, 
 unless the thin brownish layer surrounding the inner white part of the 
 rice be eaten in the daily diet, a disease with marked nervous lesions 
 appears, called beri-beri. This disease long puzzled medical scientists, 
 but it is now clearly shown to be caused by the absence from the diet
 
 SECTION 22. OBSERVATION. 263 
 
 of an excitant contained in the outer layer of the rice. Addition of this 
 cleaned-off material in small amounts prevents, or relieves, the disease. 
 A similar condition can be produced in pigeons or fowls fed experimentally 
 on polished rice (as the European product with the outer layer removed 
 is called), and can be relieved immediately by small amounts of extracts 
 of the rice polish ings. Infantile scurvy is an example of an infantile 
 disease of our own country produced by restricted diet in a similar manner. 
 As Barlow first showed, it may rapidly be cured by treatment with fresh 
 vegetables, such as the portion of potato lying below the rind, or fresh 
 fruit of different kinds. There is little doubt that rickets and ship's 
 scurvy, which are now being investigated, will prove diseases of a similar 
 kind. 
 
 "These are examples of external hormones from outside the body 
 required in the daily food, but the body cells within require to manu- 
 facture internal hormones, to establish important correlating functions. 
 If the nervous system be compared to the telephonic or telegraphic system, 
 then these internal hormones might represent the postal system of the 
 body by which one part is kept in touch with another. The chemical 
 intercommunication of the hormones is slower than that of the nervous 
 system, but more detailed and complete. 
 
 "There exist in the body a number of glands with no external secre- 
 tions or obvious uses which were a great mystery to the earlier anatomists 
 and physiologists, who called them 'bodies' or 'capsules' and left the 
 matter at that. The chief of these are called the suprarenals, the thyroids, 
 the para-thyrpids, and the pituitary. It is now known that these are active 
 secreting glands, and in spite of their small size, and obscurity of function, 
 are absolutely essential to the life of the animal. Their removal invariably 
 causes death in a few days' to a few months' time, and any marked 
 disturbance of their function in the direction either of excess or defect 
 produces profound disease, often of a fatal character." (Benjamin Moore, 
 The Origin- and Nature of Life, pp. 232-235.) 
 
 More marvellous still is the action on the processes of life of the until 
 recently unsuspected enzymes. "Most, perhaps all, of the processes of 
 metabolism, take place with the help of special proteins, known as fer- 
 ments or enzymes, which have the property of facilitating and hastening 
 chemical actions. Just as a small trace of platinum black will cause an 
 indefinitely large amount of hydrogen peroxide (HaOa) to decompose into 
 oxygen and water, so a small quantity of ferment will cause an indefinitely 
 large amount of carbohydrate, fat, or protein, to break up into simpler 
 substances. Such ferments, which are not themselves affected, and which 
 are not involved in the end products of the actions they facilitate, are 
 called catalytic, and play a most important part in the mechanism of life." 
 (Edwin S. Goodrich, op. c/Y., pp. 12-13.) 1 
 
 126. (g) Wide, Varied, and Discriminating Observation. 
 We should not only inspect an appreciable number of instances, 
 but we should take heed that we diligently search for variations 
 and for circumstances which contradict partly or wholly the 
 hypothesis which we are endeavouring to substantiate. For 
 example, "gun cotton can usually be burned in the open air 
 without exploding. Yet, when it is exploded by detonation, its 
 power is not much inferior to that of nitroglycerin". (Blanchard 
 and Wade, Foundations of Chemistry, 1914, p. 423.) Innumerable 
 samples, culled from every imaginable and likely or unlikely 
 source near and far in space and time should be scrutinised. 
 One might roughly say that observation should be from twenty 
 
 1 On this subject consult James Beatty, The Method of Enzyme Action, 1917.
 
 264 
 
 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 to fifty times more abundant, wide, studiously varied, and dis- 
 criminating than it is at present outside first-class scientific 
 enquiries. Luther Burbank's surprising successes in improving 
 and transforming fruits and flowers, which have gained him the 
 title of the wizard of California, are largely to be traced to his 
 observations extending frequently to tens of thousands of spe- 
 cimens and over a long period of years. 1 Darwin was inde- 
 fatigable in varying his experiments : "Wherever it was possible 
 in his experiments, he varied the amount of a cause in order 
 to note the proportionate variation in the amount of the effect ; 
 and where he had to depend upon observation alone, he made 
 strenuous efforts to connect extreme instances by gradations 
 of character." (Frank Cramer, op.czY., p. 56.) 
 
 The local inter-relations between plants emphasise the need of wide, 
 varied, and discriminating observation. The botanist offers us here a 
 singularly felicitous picture. "The series of different kinds of plants 
 playing 'follow my leader' into the fresh water ponds is another good 
 illustration of the power of the unaided plants to change the nature of 
 a given spot. Into the open water of a mere or pond, with its minute 
 flora of microscopic algge, push out the underground rhizomes of the 
 Phragmites reed and the Bulrushes. They send up tall shafts with leaves 
 and flowers, and in the autumn these die down, and the half rotting and 
 fibrous remains are tangled together with the roots and rhizomes, and all 
 tends to catch any further fragments or detritus that is drifting in the 
 water. Gradually, by this means, the reeds collect a soil which tends to 
 make the edge of the pond shallower, so that the Bog-Bean and other 
 shallow water plants can come in and help in the work till so much soil 
 is accumulated that the water is quite shallow, and rushes and Queen of 
 the Meadow and King Cups grow on little marshy mounds with water all 
 round them. These close up, and grasses and sedges and buttercups grow 
 in between, and the land is almost firm and established enough to be 
 called meadowland. Behind the grassy strip creeps down the forest, and 
 the trees, keeping their distance behind the zone of grass, advance with 
 its advancing edge till in time the opposite shores meet and the forest 
 closes over the space once occupied by the pond. When this has hap- 
 pened, we see that the one community of plants, viz., the woodland, has 
 ousted the other, the community of water plants. It is not only indi- 
 viduals that struggle against each other, but whole communities that 
 usurp each other's place. Here, indeed, we can hardly say that there is 
 a struggle between the land and the water plants and those of the shallow 
 shore, because by their natural growth and accumulation the former merely 
 follow on where the latter have, by their own growth, rendered the place 
 no longer suitable for themselves, but well adapted for those which need 
 a built-up soil. 
 
 "Recently it has been recognised that there are definite laws which 
 govern the series of communities that inhabit a region, and a trained 
 ecologist, seeing one set of plants growing under certain conditions, can 
 predict accurately what type of community will follow it always supposing 
 that there is no great physical change, such as would be caused by the 
 sweeping away of the land by a great flood or its disturbance by a landslide. 
 
 '"We have long had various shades of black and crimson and white 
 poppies, but no shade of blue. Out of 200,000 seedlings I found one showing 
 a faintest trace of sky blue and planted the seed from it, and got next year 
 one pretty blue one out of the many thousands, and now I have one almost 
 pure blue.'" (Luther Burbank, as quoted by D. S. Jordan and M. L. Kellogg, 
 Ifie Scientific Aspects of Luther Burbank's Work, 1909, pp. 101-102.)
 
 SECTION 22 OBSERVATION. 265 
 
 "'When such a case as this occurs, and we have bare fresh land exposed, 
 it is of interest to watch the way it is colonised. The general law that 
 is followed is a series of changes, first from an entirely bare space to one 
 with a few species scattered at fairly regular wide intervals over the sur- 
 face, then by more species, the individuals growing closer together, but 
 each still with space to develop completely. At this stage there are 
 generally a very considerable number of species in proportion to the actual 
 number of individuals. Then the species really adapted to the soil and 
 the conditions begin to take a firm hold, and they grow more crowded 
 together and oust the others, till at the end, when the vegetation for the 
 spot is firmly established, there are great numbers of individuals which 
 completely cover the ground, but there are comparatively few species." 1 
 (Marie Stopes, Botany, 1912, pp. 55-57.) 
 
 127. (h) Exhaustive or Full Observation. Examination 
 should be repeated from time to time, long after a case appears 
 established. A measure full and unmistakably running over 
 should be applied. There need to be incessant trials and varia- 
 tions in modes of procedure in order to ensure that nothing 
 material has escaped detection. 
 
 When, however, we state that observation should be exhaus- 
 tive and full we mean that a liberal number of samples, derived 
 from the most varied sources, far and wide, has been accu- 
 rately and minutely examined. To ascertain, for instance, the 
 body's sensibility to touch or temperature, something like a 
 complete and minute examination of the surface of the body 
 may be desirable, and it is also indispensable that the examina- 
 tion should be repeated in part and wholly at different times, in 
 different places, and on sundry different bodies; but it would 
 be madness to settle down to an interminable series of exa- 
 minations. As Poincare (Science et methode, 1908, p. 8) well 
 says: "While the man of science discovers one fact, billions 
 upon billions take place in a cubic millimetre of his body." 
 Consequently, we signify by exhaustive examination, inspection 
 which ensures that we have satisfactorily examined a typical 
 sample of fact, with its more important variations, and not all 
 the facts as such. 2 
 
 To furnish one example. Calculations purporting to give the 
 minimum annual cost of healthy and decent living for a standard 
 family of five in a certain locality and climate (allowing for 
 different seasons) should at least comprise food ; rent ; wearing 
 apparel (including repairs); lighting; fuel (for warming rooms 
 
 1 The problems of commensality and symbiosis are of a kindred nature, 
 and are well worth the attention of the methodologist. See on the subject 
 J. Arthur Thomson, The Study of Animal Life, 1917. 
 
 2 "One of the most striking things in Darwin's Autobiography is the re- 
 lative importance . . . which he assigns, in his analysis of his own educa- 
 tion, to the accumulation of facts and to the development of mental habits." 
 (Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, vol. 1, pp. 51-52.) Darwin "always 
 wished to learn as much as possible from an experiment, so that he did not 
 confine himself to observing the single point to which the experiment was 
 directed, and his power of seeing a number of things was wonderful." 
 (Frank Cramer, op. cit., pp. 29-30.)
 
 266 PART V.-WORKING STAGE. 
 
 and bath, cooking, etc.) and firewood; rates and taxes; trade 
 union, political, church, and charitable contributions; full in- 
 surance and provision against illness, industrial and other 
 accidents, invalidity, unemployment, strikes, lock-outs, child 
 birth, old age, death (most especially of breadwinner), fire, 
 flood, and. burglary; household medicines ; occasional days lost ; 
 regular and irregular fares (bicycle) and papers; smoking and 
 drinking; stationery, other writing adjuncts, and postage ; home 
 shaving and barber; teeth, eye, ear, nose, and throat specialists; 
 soap, soda, and other materials for cleansing, toilet, mending, 
 and boot polishing; matches; some laundry out; one person's 
 aid one day weekly; recreation (including club subscriptions, 
 cinema, theatre, music hall, concert, and statutory holidays and 
 vacations) ; buying, repairing, and replacing of furniture, orna- 
 ments, linen, crockery, glass, eating implements (forks, knives, and 
 spoons), kitchen utensils, fireplace accessories, and other house- 
 hold articles, as well as pocket articles (purse, penknife, pencil, 
 fountain pen, diary, note case, watch, spectacles, toothpick, nail 
 cleaner, mirror, comb) and repairs of household and personal 
 articles generally; moving; children's education, toys, and 
 sweetmeats; adult education (including also books and music); 
 cat or dog; hobbies and pets; birthday, Christmas, marriage, 
 and other festivals and presents ; flowers ; visiting and visitors ; 
 a certain wages percentage of savings; a minimum for extra 
 needs and luxuries; pocket expenses; and miscellaneous. 1 
 
 128. (z) Prolonged and Continuous Observation, and 
 taking note of Proportion. Certain pills may exercise an 
 immediate desirable effect on the human system, but yet tend 
 to aggravate certain indispositions; physical exercise may, on 
 the other hand, at the commencement appear to prostrate the 
 body, while gradually steeling it; potatoes, again, may contain 
 a very small proportion of the anti-scorbutic factor, but the 
 considerable quantity ordinarily eaten, compensates for this; 
 and a certain treatment or neglect may only have visible con- 
 sequences weeks or months afterwards or at certain stages 
 of life. Similarly, the likelihood of the incessant forming and 
 unforming of habits needs to enter into all calculations re- 
 lating to character and conduct. For these varied reasons 
 distant effects should not be ignored. The prohibition of 
 monastic orders in France, for instance, created perplexing 
 problems in some of the countries to which the orders migrated, 
 and the establishment of a Bolshevist government in Russia 
 engendered an almost universal appetite and horror for Soviet 
 rule in the working and employing classes respectively. There 
 is also the profoundly important problem of desired, but still 
 unexperienced, pleasures which fascinate, and are apparently 
 
 1 For a minimum quantity budget, see Royal Meeker, Monthly Labor 
 Review, Washington, June, 1920, pp. 1-18.
 
 SECTION 22. OBSERVATION. 267 
 
 far more alluring than those actually experienced. Here the 
 intrinsic drabness of all pleasures when once experienced is 
 forgotten, with the disastrous consequence that legions of men 
 and women are for ever craving and remain for ever unsatis- 
 fied. They appear to be unaware that only a healthy, joyous 
 temperament is apt to find pleasures everywhere and ex- 
 periences comparatively unalloyed and unebbing happiness. 
 Therefore only when we have ascertained the law of a fact 
 are we safe, and hence in the absence of appropriate knowledge 
 we must be eternally vigilant, and not rest satisfied with 
 immediate or partial results or impressions. 
 
 Quantity may also issue in an appreciable or even crucial 
 difference. One excellent poem or speech no more makes a 
 great poet or great orator than one swallow makes a summer; 
 whether a handful or a million people are interested in a politi- 
 cal question, creates a vital distinction; infinitesimal objects 
 are difficult to detect; and the impossibility of collecting appreci- 
 able quantities, as of radium, restricts the sphere of experi- 
 mentation. Thus, again, by selecting a particular sun-spot for 
 observation and watching it, we discover that it passes from 
 the eastern extremity of the disc to its western extremity in 
 about twelve days, disappears for a period of the same length, 
 then reappears, demonstrating that the sun rotates round its 
 axis in approximately twelve days. The destructive action of 
 the sea on its shores, of the river on its channel, and of the 
 glacier on its bed, are further apposite illustrations of cumu- 
 lative effects which require prolonged observation. Already 
 Lucretius noted this aspect of nature : "After the revolution of 
 many of the sun's years a ring on the finger is thinned on the 
 under-side by wearing, the dripping from the eaves hollows a 
 stone, the bent ploughshare of iron imperceptibly decreases in 
 the fields, and we behold the stone-paved streets worn down 
 by the feet of the multitude ; the brass statues too at the gates 
 show their right hands to be wasted by the touch of the 
 numerous passers-by who greet them." (On the Nature of 
 Things, Book 1.) 
 
 129. (y) Quantitative Observation. At least the carefully 
 calculated average number, size, form, parts, texture, weight, 
 prevalence, distribution, frequency, periodicity, of the object, 
 process, or force should be supplied. (See Modal Aspects in 
 table of Primary Categories.) Statements concerning objects 
 should assume as nearly as possible mathematical, or at least 
 definite, form, and exact enumeration, measurement, computa- 
 tion, and statistical statement, should be resorted to where prac- 
 ticable. Until the quantitative stage has been reached, we are 
 properly outside the domain of science, and where this aspect 
 is not highly developed, we can scarcely speak of a highly 
 developed science. Words, such as often, far, much, large, fine, 
 should be used sparingly on account of their indefiniteness.
 
 268 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 Quantitative accuracy should be naturally proportionate to the 
 needs of the investigation. Calculable relations, of the kind 
 enumerated in our table of Primary Categories, need special 
 attention. 
 
 130. (K) Instruments. Observation should be, wherever 
 possible, instrumental. Dynamometers, ergographs, telescopes, 
 spectroscopes, transparent and graded glass vessels, scales, 
 diagrams, etc., and mathematical methods and formula? should 
 be employed. Instruments should be adapted, or new instru- 
 ments invented, to suit novel requirements. The unassisted 
 senses have wrested little from nature: they are altogether 
 too gross and clumsy for this purpose. The acquired capacity 
 of devising fresh and effective instruments constitutes, in some 
 sciences, an integral portion of the outfit of the man of science, 
 though enterprising firms of instrument makers materially 
 second his efforts. While the naked eye can detect only about 
 3000 stars, instruments acquaint us with a 100,000,000, and 
 while the reason wonders what the ocean depths harbour, the 
 deep-sea dredge lays their marvels at our feet. 
 
 131. (/) Experiment. Observation should, of course, as- 
 sume the form of experiment when circumstances are propitious. 
 A scrupulously arranged and conducted experiment, for instance 
 as to the solubility of food-stuffs with and without the ad- 
 mixture of certain glandular juices, singles out constituents and 
 factors with the greatest assurance, but only when Conclusions 5 
 and 20 are complied with. Consider the problem of the pro- 
 tective value of colouring: "An Italian naturalist, Cesnola, 
 tethered twenty green mantis among green herbage and twenty 
 brown mantis among withered herbage; they were all alive 
 seventeen days afterwards. He then tethered brown mantis in 
 a green environment, and green in brown grass, and found 
 that thirty-five out of forty-five were devoured within seventeen 
 days. Professor Poulten . . . fastened 600 pupa? on leaves, 
 fences, etc., and found that the mortality of the more con- 
 spicuous was ninety-two per cent. Professor Davenport found 
 that, of 300 chickens in a field, twenty-four were quickly killed 
 by crows, and that only one of the twenty-four was of the 
 less conspicuous spotted variety." (Joseph McCabe, The Prin- 
 ciples of Evolution, 1913, p. 117.) Or examine a very simple 
 problem. Walking in a certain direction at the rate of 3 J /2 miles 
 per hour, I experience no wind; returning at the same rate 
 in the opposite direction, I calculate the velocity of the wind 
 to be apparently 7 miles per hour. Standing still, however, I 
 simplify the conditions to the utmost, and am enabled to decide 
 whether there is a wind blowing and, if so, what is its direc- 
 tion and velocity. 
 
 Experiments are sadly needed to solve some of the problems 
 of heredity and instinct. Thus, as already adverted to, various 
 specimens of each of the domestic and of some other animals
 
 SECTION 22. OBSERVATION. 269 
 
 should be completely separated from their kind from the time 
 of birth to full maturity, in order to resolve what is owing to 
 contact with others of their species, and what is not. This may 
 be afterwards varied by rearing members of one species with 
 members of another species, and by attempts at changing the 
 environment in diverse ways for the purpose of ascertaining 
 the adaptability of a species. The same class of experiment 
 might be resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining how far 
 the characteristics of the members of one race, nation, class, 
 or family, are due to heredity or environment. Here, of course, 
 where the experiment is restricted to the human species, it 
 needs to be understood that the child should be unaware that 
 it is adopted, and also that the foster parents should treat the 
 child as their own. In the case of man, the problem may be 
 also elucidated by indirect experiments, e.g., by studying the 
 adaptability to varied social conditions of adopted children and 
 the lives of individuals settled or educated abroad, and likewise 
 by examining the re-active influences of an exotic religion, as 
 of Islam in India, or tracing the social adaptability of the 
 members of the same quasi-race in various countries, as in the 
 history of the Jews, or inquiring into the effects of wholesale 
 immigration, as in the United States, on the mental characte- 
 ristics of the immigrants and their hosts. In any new sphere 
 simple observation, with and without instruments, should precede 
 experimental observation of a refined and quantitative nature, 
 and the value of the latter is comparatively small where, as 
 in the organic and cultural sciences, the issues are either com- 
 plicated or still in an inchoate state. Experiment is to instru- 
 mental observation what the latter is to unaided observation. 
 In varying an experiment of any kind, more especially Con- 
 clusions 27 and 28 should be applied. Finally, it should be 
 remembered that truly scientific experiments are rigidly quanti- 
 tative and strictly segregate individual facts and factors. 
 
 132. (/n) Similarities. Observations should not slur over 
 any similarities, however different the accompanying circum- 
 stances and however unsuggestive at first the resemblances 
 seem. The discovery of the identity of the electric spark and 
 of the lightning is a case in point. 
 
 Of course, all rational observation consists in grouping objects 
 according to their similarities; but for the very purpose of 
 disclosing resemblances we needs must, to begin with, strive 
 also to ascertain all the existing variations relative to our 
 enquiry. 1 
 
 1 Darwin rightly expatiates on the importance of homologies : "What can 
 be more curious than that the hand of a man, formed for grasping, that of 
 a mole for digging, the leg of the horse, the paddle of the porpoise, and 
 the wing of the bat, should all be constructed on the same pattern, and 
 should include similar bones, in the same relative positions? How curious 
 it is, to give a subordinate though striking instance, that the hind-feet of
 
 270 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 133. (n) Relevant Observation. To commence seriously 
 the work of observation in any particular instance without 
 making preliminary observations, would render observation a 
 very circumlocutory proceeding. In examining an object, to 
 be obliged to valuate the influence of the stars, the light, the 
 temperature, the atmosphere, the dust, the surrounding objects, 
 the noises in the neighbourhood, the distant past, and the 
 thousand other latencies, would be disheartening. Yet the 
 greatest circumspection is requisite that no relevant facts are 
 passed over or classed as irrelevant, as, for instance, the direct 
 influence of sunspots on magnetic storms, of the sun and moon 
 on the tides, the sun on the leaves of plants, the times of day 
 and night on leaves and flowers, and the time of year on growth. 
 The attempt to reach the absolute zero of temperature and to 
 produce the highest possible degrees of heat is, for example, 
 of far-reaching importance, but such problems should be treated 
 separately, and not in connection with every enquiry. 
 
 134. (o) Rational Observation. Not only should the ir- 
 relevant environment be left unexamined, but sundry features, 
 as the precise configuration of an ordinary object, and hosts 
 of other aspects, should be generally disregarded. A danger 
 exists here that we shall consider as irrational what is rational ; 
 practice, however, will reduce the danger to a minimum. To 
 endeavour to provide the exact configuration of every leaf, or 
 the exact drawing of the veins in each leaf, would be irrational, 
 and yet even of these some very definite conception, even of 
 a quantitative and dynamic character, should be supplied. 1 For 
 similar reasons, we only study objects so far as they relate to 
 a particular investigation. (See 170.) 
 
 135. (p) Rapidity and Resourcefulness. Observation should 
 be rapid and the observer resourceful. Action should not be 
 paralysed by inaccuracy, by blundering awkwardness, by per- 
 sistent speculation, by overcautiousness or vacillation, or by 
 lack of method or resourcefulness. The immediate task needs 
 to be clearly conceived and energetically executed, without any 
 hitch or superfluous labour. 
 
 He who is intelligent, has an unmistakable desire to effect 
 his purpose expeditiously, and, if trained and practised, will 
 
 the kangaroo, which are so well fitted for bounding over the open plains, 
 those of the climbing, leaf-eating koala, equally well fitted for grasping the 
 branches of trees, those of the ground-dwelling, insect or root eating, 
 bandicots, and those of some other Australian marsupials, should all be 
 constructed on the same extraordinary type, namely with the bones of the 
 second and third digits extremely slender and enveloped within the same 
 skin, so that they appear like a single toe furnished with two claws. Not- 
 withstanding this similarity of pattern, it is obvious that the hind-feet of 
 these several animals are used for as widely different purposes as it is 
 possible to conceive." (Origin of Species, Chapter 14, Section "Morphology".) 
 Josiah Royce, in Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, vol. 1, 1913, deals with 
 the nature of a "fair sample".
 
 SECTION 22. OBSERVATION. 271 
 
 act in conformity with the principles developed at length in 
 Conclusion 10, to which we accordingly refer the reader. 
 
 Rapidity is a most desirable virtue. Consider, as an example, 
 the late Lord Avebury. He was during his life-time president 
 of some fifteen learned societies; he wrote over twenty volumes 
 on almost as many topics, a number of them of marked scienti- 
 fic value ; he contributed over a hundred memoirs to the Trans- 
 actions of the Royal Society ; he was a well-known constructive 
 politician and a supporter of many causes; and at the same 
 time he acted as one of the heads of a great banking firm and 
 was the chairman of the London Bankers and the president 
 of the Central Association of English Bankers. Darwin wrote 
 a dozen large works of the first order, though he was far from 
 robust in health. John Stuart Mill, whilst busy as an official 
 of the East India Company all his life, published a quantity of 
 classic treatises. Aristotle's intellectual output was no less re- 
 markable for its variety than for its quality. Consequently, 
 there is good reason for surmising that a colossal preventable 
 wastage of energy is the rule with most scholars. Those who 
 are quick, no doubt compass what they desire with the ex- 
 penditure of a minimum of energy. Lord Avebury, whom the 
 author had the privilege of knowing, certainly appeared neither 
 feverishly preoccupied nor engaged in a breathless race. On 
 the contrary, he was one of the most lejsurely scholars he 
 has been acquainted with. 
 
 He who has really a rooted desire to be swift will also tend 
 to be resourceful. Accordingly we shall state some of the rules 
 conducing to resourcefulness: 
 
 (a) Take for granted that most minor difficulties are easily resolved; 
 that most ordinary difficulties are really minor difficulties; and that 
 ready adaptability is the chief secret of resourcefulness. 
 
 (b) Be well acquainted with your subject: this will enable you to meet 
 many difficulties, since most present contingencies contain no novel 
 element. 
 
 (c) Hold fast, adapt, and generalise to the furthest degree for future 
 use, any ingenious method or idea, positive or critical, suggested by ac- 
 cident or otherwise. 
 
 (rf) Heed the manifold lessons of experience: this will frequently help 
 you to remember solved difficulties identical or similar to the one which 
 perplexes you. 
 
 (e) Be guided also by the lessons taught by the experience of others, 
 especially of those who are resourceful. 
 
 (/) To meet a particular case freely exploit (1) every cranny of the 
 past for relevant recollections and (2) near and distant analogies relating 
 to past and present. 
 
 (g) Ascertain the precise problem and find any method which will 
 resolve it. Example: Should the birds keep you awake in the early 
 morning, or the traffic at night, deal with the precise problem loud 
 sounds,* to which one simple solution might be cotton wool in the ears. 
 
 1 In connection with the nightly rest, this is a social problem of the first 
 magnitude in towns, to which it would be highly desirable to find a simple 
 solution. Neither closed windows nor living in suburbs offers the ideal
 
 272 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 (h) Grow accustomed to meet any difficulty by any convenient and 
 
 lawful means. 
 
 (/) If one condition e.g., a particular time, place, degree, size, number, 
 environment, connection, etc.,-is not satisfactory, probably another will 
 be. (Example: 10" o'clock or 12 o'clock will probably do for an appointment 
 as well as 11 o'clock.) 
 
 (/) If one means or object is not satisfactory, probably another will be. 
 
 (A) Define the problem in the largest term, e.g., something to resolve 
 or to fasten, some habit or receptacle, something to be made sure of or 
 secure, some attractive or heavy object and then seek its solution. (Ex- 
 ample: if a certain receptacle is inaccessible, another, never mind its 
 form, size, or ordinary use, may be at our disposal.) 
 
 (/) When you cannot obtain an object one way, try another and other 
 ways, and endeavour also to remember other, and others', ways. 
 
 (m) Assume that virtually everything can be accomplished, and that 
 it can be accomplished in more ways than one, and better. 
 
 (n) Even if one way will effect your purpose, essay other ways for 
 practice and delight. 
 
 (o) Undergo a course of training in resourcefulness, and periodically 
 experiment systematically and on an extensive scale by yourself. 
 
 136. (q) Graded, Comprehensive, Important, Full, Rational 
 and Relevant, Original, Automatically Initiated, and Methodi- 
 cally Developed Observation. Conclusion 25 deals indirectly, 
 but amply, with these aspects of observation, so far as they 
 are not already touched on in this Conclusion. We therefore 
 refrain from illustrating the latter in this place. 
 
 Lotze has many excellent remarks concerning observation; but he 
 scarcely meets the points mentioned in the above Conclusion. As to wide 
 observation, for instance, he only states: "The individual subjects from 
 the observation of which we start must be very numerous." (Logic, 
 vol. 2, p. 33.) Bain vaguely refers to "wide comparison of particulars". 
 (Logic, vol. 2, p. 403.) It is poor consolation when he adds: "The pre- 
 cautions common to all kinds of observation, in regard to accuracy and 
 evidence, would be worthy of being recited, provided there could be given 
 a sufficiency of illustrative instances to make the desired impression." 
 (Ibid., p. 414.) If, as Jevons (Principles of Science, p. 399) says, "all know- 
 ledge proceeds originally from experience", then no effort can be too 
 sustained to make sure that the raw material of thought shall be of an 
 irreproachable character. Whewell also expresses himself prophetically: 
 "Methods of observation and of induction might of themselves form an 
 abundant subject for a treatise, and hereafter will probably do so, in the 
 hands of future writers." (Novum Organum Renovatum, p. 144.) Mill 
 asserts: "It would be possible to point out what qualities of mind, and 
 modes of mental culture fit a person for being a good observer: that, 
 however, is a question not of Logic, but of the Theory of Education, in' 
 the most enlarged sense of the term. There is not properly an Art of 
 Observing. There may be rules for observing. But these, like rules for 
 inventing, are properly instructions for the preparation of one's own mind ; 
 for putting it into the state in which it will be most fitted to observe, 
 or most likely to invent. They are, therefore, essentially rules of self- 
 education, which is a different thing from Logic. They do not teach how 
 to do the thing, but how to make ourselves capable of doing it. They 
 
 answer required. Direct protection of the ears from aggressive sounds, it 
 appears, should rather be aimed at. (The author has empirically, and some- 
 what crudely, solved the problem for himself by covering both his ears 
 with his bed pillow in going to sleep and in the early morning when dis- 
 turbed.)
 
 SECTION 22 OBSERVATION. 273 
 
 are an art of strengthening the limbs, not an art of using them". (Logic, 
 bk. 3, ch. 7, 1.) Thomas Fowler (Logic, Deductive and Inductive, vol. 2, 
 pp. 45-50) furnishes four rules pertaining to observation and experiment. 
 The following instances form extreme illustrations of theories based on 
 inadequate observation: "It appears that, whenever oats sown at the usual 
 time are kept cropped down during summer and autumn, and allowed 
 to remain over the winter, a thin crop of rye is the harvest presented 
 at the close of the ensuing summer. This experiment has been tried 
 repeatedly, with but one result: invariably the Secale cereale is the crop 
 reaped where the Avena saliva, a recognised different genus, was sown." 
 (Robert Chambers, Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, ed. 1887, 
 pp. 166-167.) And a qualified scientific populariser, Mr. Edward Clodd, in 
 his work, The Story of Creation, tells an equally dubious tale, since 
 the exploits of St. Bernard dogs appear to be legendary in character : 
 "An interesting illustration of this was supplied by a St. Bernard dog 
 belonging to a relative. The dog was born in London and taken into the 
 country when a puppy. After a few months a sharp fall of snow happened, 
 and 'Ju', who had never seen snow before, was frantic to get outdoors. 
 When she was set free, she rolled in the snow, bit it, and dug it up with 
 her claws as if rescuing some buried traveller. The same excitement was 
 shown whenever snow fell." (P. 114.) A more interesting case even is 
 the alleged proof of the non-existence of spontaneous generation by boiling 
 the water which might presumably contain germs, and the counter claim 
 that such boiling destroys the conditions necessary for spontaneous genera- 
 tion. The difficulty of correct observation is also well exemplified in the 
 modern instance where a supposed organic form, christened the Eozodn 
 canadense, has been shown to be an inorganic substance, or in the more 
 recent circumstance where doubt has been cast on the human origin of 
 certain eoliths. 
 
 We have intentionally omitted a series of points concerning 
 observation, which, we deemed, require special treatment. We 
 shall now proceed to consider these. 
 
 CONCLUSION 17. 
 Need of Critically Examining the Reality of Alleged Divisions. 1 
 
 137. (A) Complex Facts regarded as Simple. In com- 
 mencing an investigation we should not assume that we are 
 dealing with isolated entities, without first ascertaining whether 
 this is so in fact. Under a close scrutiny the air proved to 
 consist virtually of two elements and to contain a number of 
 others; the nitrogen of the air was shown, further, to have 
 associated with it argon, and, in close connection with argon, 
 Ramsay and others found three more elements neon, krypton, 
 and xenon these, with helium, constituting the rare gases of the 
 atmosphere; the seemingly homogeneous air has been divided 
 into a lower Troposphere, where the temperature of the air 
 varies always both horizontally and vertically, and an upper 
 Stratosphere, where it only varies horizontally. Common salt, 
 on more careful examination, proved to be a compound; oxygen, 
 
 1 "No one can divide things truly who has not a full knowledge of their 
 nature." (Bacon, The Alphabet of Nature.) 
 
 18
 
 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 carbon, phosphorus, and sulphur were shown to have allotropic 
 forms, and the same fact, expressed as isomerism, was traced 
 in many compounds; radium was found to decompose into a 
 variety of elements, including helium ; the consumed taper and 
 the evaporated water were shown to persist in an altered form ; 
 for want of a critical attitude, the ancients spoke of earth, 
 water, fire, and air as the four elements, and only dimly dis- 
 tinguished as a rule between copper, bronze, and brass, whilst 
 until two centuries ago, all gases were regarded as the elemen- 
 tary substance air, modified by impurities; the blood proved 
 to be a treasure house of varied substances; the process of 
 digestion, instead of being carried on, as common sense sup- 
 posed, in the stomach alone and by some simple method, proves 
 to be an exceedingly lengthy and complicated process, com- 
 mencing with mastication and salivation, and continuing some 
 time after the modified food has left the stomach; and severe 
 epidemics were traced to certain animal parasites rather than 
 to the animals which carried the parasites. Death is regarded 
 as a sudden cessation of life, when the heart may be made 
 to renew its beating in certain conditions thirty hours after- 
 wards, when the beard and the nails continue growing, and 
 when the protoplasm in diverse parts is unaffected for some 
 time afterwards. The old atomic theory suggested the existence 
 of a simple atom, whilst the new atomic theory resolves the 
 atom into a complex system. The average townsman cannot 
 tell from the notes in the wood whether he hears many birds 
 or one; martin and swallow, or rook and crow, represent for 
 him a single species, and he fails to distinguish closely allied 
 kinds of flowers and trees; all grasses are grass to him. In 
 the mental realm, on this same account, the phrenologists 
 neglected the simple and general principles of mind, and most 
 students have been led to believe that the senses offer their 
 own explanation. This is true also of many popular terms, such 
 as beauty, imagination, skill, genius, character, goodness, truth, 
 love, etc. Piece-work seems fair, until we learn that increased 
 output may lead to a proportionate decrease of price per piece ; 
 gratuities may appear defensible, until we learn that a waiter 
 may actually have to pay for his post ; obedience loses its virtue 
 when it induces tyranny in the master; and wages lose their 
 simplicity, when the cost of living is taken into account. Or 
 to cite an example from anthropology, one of many similar 
 ones with which Prof. Franz Boas deals: "One of the striking 
 forms of social organisation which occurs in many religions 
 wide apart is what we called 'totemism' a form of society in 
 which certain social groups consider themselves as related in a 
 supernatural way to a certain species of animals or to a certain 
 class of objects. I believe this is the generally accepted defini- 
 tion of 'totemism'; but I am convinced that in this form the 
 phenomenon is not a single psychological problem, but em-
 
 SECTION 22 OBSERVATION. 275 
 
 braces the most diverse psychological elements. In some cases 
 people believe themselves to be descendants of the animal 
 whose protection they enjoy. In other cases an animal or some 
 other object may have appeared to an ancestor of the social 
 group, and may have promised to become his protector, and 
 the friendship between the animal and the ancestor was then 
 transmitted to his descendants. In still other cases a certain 
 social group in a tribe may have the power of securing by 
 magical means and with great ease a certain kind of animal 
 or of increasing its numbers, and the supernatural relation may 
 be established in this way." (The Mind of Primitive Man, 1911, 
 pp. 190-191.) Lastly, it is very general, for psychological 
 reasons, to favour a tripartite classification of facts, when the 
 number should be far higher as a rule. At all times, in short, 
 men have regarded the complex as simple and that which is 
 divisible as indivisible, and have been seriously deceived on 
 this account. 
 
 In the fiftieth aphorism of the first book of his Novum 
 Organum Bacon places his finger on the weakest spot in all 
 non-scientific speculation. He acutely remarks that "speculation 
 commonly ceases where sight ceases; inasmuch that of things 
 invisible there is little or no observation". Almost the entire 
 history of science is an exemplification of this aphorism, for 
 that which strikes the unassisted senses is most generally of 
 small consequence in leading to scientific advance. We have 
 only to think of chemical elements and their modes of com- 
 bining, of the constitution of the air, of heat, light, and electri- 
 city, of the formation of the strata of the earth, of protoplasm, 
 and of the cell structure of all that lives, of the assimilation 
 of food by plants and animals, of the specio-historical character 
 of man's mental outfit, of the bacterial origin of many diseases, 
 to appreciate the fact that the subtlety of nature escapes ordinary 
 perception, and that non-scientific or common speculation, must 
 needs be barren and erroneous since it is necessarily based 
 on unaided perception which brings together what is separate 
 and separates what is united. 1 Darwin rightly watched for ex- 
 ceptions, because these alone, generally speaking, point to 
 primary factors, whereas what is present to vision as such is 
 
 1 The recent investigations relating to radio-activity illustrate the above con- 
 tention: "The quantity of radium present in pitch-blende is extremely small, 
 many tons of the material yielding, after long and tedious work, only a small 
 fraction of a gramme of an impure salt of radium." (Whetham, The Recent 
 Development of Physical Science, 1904, p. 202.) Likewise, " Sir William Roberts- 
 Austen has shown that gold, if placed in intimate contact with lead, will 
 diffuse at ordinary temperatures to such an extent that, after the lapse of 
 some years, it can be detected in the lead by chemical analysis at distances 
 of a millimetre or more from the surface of contact."^ (Ibid., p. 247.) Also, 
 many metals occlude or absorb considerable quantities of hydrogen and 
 certain quantities of oxygen. (A. H. Hiorns, Principles of Metallurgy, 1914, 
 pp. 10-11.)-
 
 276 
 
 PART V WORKING STAGE. 
 
 habitually a highly complex compound already tainted with an 
 interpretation which is convenient only for practical purposes. 
 As Jevons (Principles of Science, p. 506) contends: "A pheno- 
 menon which seems simple is, in all probability, really complex, 
 and unless the mind is actively engaged in looking for particular 
 details, it is likely that the critical circumstances will be passed 
 over."' And in another place he asserts that "the progress of 
 science depends on the study of exceptional phenomena". (Ibid., 
 p. 644.) Sir John Herschel spoke without hesitancy when ad- 
 verting to the attitude of the scientific thinker: "He will have his 
 eyes as it were opened, that they may be struck at once with 
 any occurrence which, according to received theories, ought not 
 to happen, for these", he significantly adds, "are the facts which 
 serve as clues to new discoveries." (Discourse, [127.].) Without 
 alertly watching for exceptions to supposed laws, we are not 
 likely to discover the primary constituents and factors. 
 
 138. (B) Simple Facts regarded as Complex. We should 
 also specifically guard against the opposite misapprehension of 
 surmising complexity where there is simplicity. This is too 
 evident to need labouring. The Universe is a multiverse to 
 the mass of mankind. At one time the hundreds of thousands 
 of species were accounted for by special creation; the tower 
 of Babel was evolved to explain the diversity of tongues ; and 
 earth, moon, sun, and planets were regarded as independent 
 entities. The layman sees innumerable kinds of rock where 
 the geologist discerns only sandstone, granite, and limestone; 
 he counts many orders of clouds where the meteorologist dis- 
 tinguishes only three cirrus, cumulus, and stratus; he opines 
 numerous ways of communicating heat where the physicist 
 speaks of conduction, convection, and radiation; he conceives 
 sunstroke as only due to heat, when chemical and other factors 
 are involved ; he assumes diamond, graphite, lamp black, and pure 
 charcoal to be essentially different, when they are each forms of 
 carbon ; and he sees bodies, where the chemist recognises com- 
 pound molecules and the biologist compound cells. So, again, the 
 older chemists rigidly separated inorganic from organic chemistry, 
 the latter being dependent, according to them, on a vital principle ; 
 and now compounds are found to be related to higher com- 
 pounds as elements or radicles. The polygenetic theory of races 
 had many defenders, and in social matters special explanations for 
 individual occurrences, such as individual idleness or stupidity, 
 are proffered where general explanations economic chaos or 
 an unsatisfactory educational system, for instance are rightly 
 in place. If we analyse, again, an emotion, we shall probably 
 note that the definition properly comprises a mental excitement 
 aroused directly by some definite disturbing object or idea, 
 accompanied by a concomitant physical excitement, and ex- 
 cludes a host of facts usually included through inadequate 
 analysis -such as natural inclination, sentiment, temperament,
 
 SECTION 22.OBSER VA TION. 277 
 
 and moods. 1 An analysis of pleasure-pain furnishes analogous 
 conclusions. 
 
 139. (C) Environment Ignored. Another aspect of our 
 problem needs also to be considered here. If one substance, 
 as shown in (A), may be so intimately joined to another that 
 the two appear as one unless painstakingly examined, another 
 substance may depend on some factor in its immediate en- 
 vironment e.g., many diseases are traceable to parasites 
 and we may gloss over this factor, and seek to explain the 
 behaviour of the substance without regard to its surroundings. 
 Many illustrations of this oversight may be found in the realm 
 of specio-psychics. We explain French style, Italian art, German 
 scholarship, and English colonising skill by certain alleged in- 
 dwelling powers in the individuals belonging to these four 
 peoples, without fully inquiring whether perhaps all four qualities 
 are not produced by the respective environment geographical, 
 intellectual, moral, and economic. We read of a Shakespeare 
 and a Goethe, and we endeavour by their means to explain 
 their environment, without asking ourselves how far the con- 
 trary may hold true, and they be best explained by their 
 surroundings. We are dissatisfied with those around us, and 
 we decide that supermen are needed, when what is required 
 is perhaps a super-civilisation. We see men struggling success- 
 fully against their environment, and we insist that man is wholly 
 free to do as he listeth ; or we perceive men gravely deterior- 
 ated by their environment, and we bring in a plea of "not 
 guilty", and relieve the individual of every effort, when the 
 responsibility should be perhaps divided between individual and 
 environment. We observe Negroes in Africa dancing round fe- 
 tishes, and we forthwith consider them as more beasts than men, 
 when with Western nurture these Negroes might have graduated 
 in a European university, and some of them even have oc- 
 cupied university chairs. We notice women confined to their 
 homes and interested in balls and dresses chiefly, and we un- 
 hesitatingly decide that woman's place is the home, when, per- 
 haps, under reversed circumstances, men and women might ex- 
 change places. We encounter two men who differ widely in 
 intellectual leanings, and we declare that the difference lies 
 primordially in their innate intellectual aptitudes, when education, 
 opportunity, comfort, and many other causes, may enter as more 
 or less decisive factors. The enormous powers of home and 
 school education, of social traditions and institutions, of position 
 in the social scale, are frequently not even suspected, let alone 
 seriously weighed, whereas no enquiry relating to man should 
 consider them otherwise than as momentous. The environment 
 as a primary factor is thus habitually overlooked. 
 
 1 See G. Spiller, "The Problem of the Emotions", in American Journal of 
 Psychology, vol. XV.
 
 278 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 So, also, definite factors in the environment, rather than in- 
 herent virtues, explain much that is of moment economically: 
 "The dominant industrial position of England is due, in a large 
 measure, to her possession of an abundance of [iron and coal]." 
 (Banerjea, Indian Economics, p. 13.) Likewise, "natural water- 
 supply is the chief factor determining the density of population 
 and the state of civilisation in any particular part of India" 
 (ibid., p. 22), whilst "the Himalayas act as a climatic barrier 
 in shutting out the cold winds of Central Asia and keeping 
 within the borders of India the vapour-bearing winds of the 
 south-west monsoon" (ibid., p. 16). Furthermore, the far- 
 reaching social effects of the gulf-stream on England, and of the 
 great ocean currents generally, may be noted. 
 The apparent incapacity of the African Negro to civilise 
 himself may be said to be due equally to traceable environ- 
 mental causes. This will be readily seen when we examine 
 the Western method of introducing civilisation into Africa. It 
 is not that the European settles on Afric's shores, and by sheer 
 superior brain force evolves a high civilisation. It is rather 
 that European colonising Governments spend in Africa millions 
 of pounds on railways, roads, rivers, and ports ; that they apply 
 modern hygiene, sanitation, and knowledge of germ pests ; that 
 they experimentally and otherwise study the crops best suited 
 for the climate and soils, and by modern surveying methods 
 ascertain the existing mineral treasures ; that, in short, Western 
 Governments develop African countries with the aid of great 
 wealth, of science, and of tried administrative and commercial 
 experience. This renders it manifest that the African, even 
 in the most favourable circumstances, would require many 
 generations to do what a European State, by its accumulated 
 store of money, science, and power, could accomplish within a 
 comparatively few years. We have not, therefore, before us 
 a clear case of racial inferiority and superiority, but a matter 
 of great environmental resources, on the one hand, and trifling 
 environmental resources, on the other. 
 
 In order to eschew ignoring the temporal, spatial, and idea- 
 tional environment, the following rule may be applied with 
 advantage: "In any investigation assume only, initially, the 
 bare, naked fact (e.g., that there are at this moment universities 
 in Italy, but none in Mashonaland, or that one man is long- 
 headed and another round-headed). As to what was or what 
 will be, as to causes and environmental conditions, carefully 
 examine; assume and deduce nothing as a matter of course, 
 and beware of disregarding or undervaluing the environment, 
 present and past, physical,' biological, and cultural." Two sub- 
 rules are needed: (1) to prepare increasingly complete lists of 
 the general and special conditions for the subject matter of all 
 the sciences and arts. Among physicists this is well understood. 
 The possible or actual presence of gravity, cohesion, repulsion,
 
 SECTION 22. OBSERVATION. 279 
 
 strain, stress, motion, momentum, friction, vibration, light, 
 magnetism, electricity, heat, chemical affinity, diverse kinds of 
 rays, potential and kinetic energy, surrounding objects, moisture, 
 floating particles and diffused gases, the atmosphere and its 
 constituents, movement and pressure, impurities, and the need 
 for isolation, are circumstances almost never left out of account 
 in physical investigations. In cultural enquiries the standard 
 should not be less exacting. Latitude, longitude, general climatic 
 conditions, elevation and configuration of locality, soil, sub-soil, 
 mineral wealth, proximity to other localities and countries small 
 and large, and to plain, mountain, forest, sea, lakes, ponds, 
 streams, or navigable or other rivers, underground water, do- 
 mesticated and wild animals, cultivated and uncultivated plants, 
 temperature, light, purity and moisture of the atmosphere, 
 food, drinking water, fuels, sanitation and hygiene, habitations, 
 garments, free disease germs and diseases-carrying insects and 
 animals, size of community, language, race, and national affi- 
 nities, sex, age, family life, customs, morals, religions, economic 
 status, social position and differentiation, social and associational 
 life, friendship, means of communication, economic conditions, 
 resources, and development, occupations and recreations, state 
 of land exploitation and land laws, fisheries and navigation, 
 government and political liberties and parties, laws, militarism 
 and navalism, local administration, history, home, school, vo- 
 cational, and self-education, sciences and- arts, museums and 
 galleries, national, vocational, family, and personal ideals, love 
 of progress, etc., etc., should all be always respected in any 
 serious social study. 1 Furthermore, (2) where artificial experi- 
 ment cannot be applied, Nature's experiment should be heeded, 
 as revealed in history, in different countries, in apparent excep- 
 tions, and in the effects of intermixture and intercommunication. 
 140. (D) Influence of Time and of Position in Space and 
 Mind. It is also of consequence to allow for a fourth aspect, 
 alluded to already in the immediately preceding Sub-Conclusion. 
 Seeing the general uniformity obtaining in nature, we confound 
 the moment with eternity, the here with the there, and omit 
 to notice, for instance, that 
 
 "In the Spring a fuller crimson comes upon the robin's breast; 
 In the Spring the wanton lapwing gets himself another crest"; 
 
 whilst as for the wagtail, "he is black and white all over in 
 summer, with white cheeks and forehead, and black chin and 
 
 1 The American paper, System, published the following comprehensive 
 list of qualities to be taken note of in industry and commerce: "business 
 knowledge, technical knowledge, tact, reliability, perception, resource, manners, 
 foresight, energy, memory, pertinacity, accuracy, method, self-reliance, ini- 
 tiative, self-assertion, discipline, persuasiveness, education, temperance, punctu- 
 ality, morality". (Quoted from E. Waxweiler, Esquisse d'une sociologie, 1906, 
 p. 204.) Full lists would be invaluable in every subject e. g., the demands 
 of labour, the claims of capital. Endless disputations, due to lack of com- 
 prehensiveness, might be thus averted.
 
 280 PART V -WORKING STAGE. 
 
 throat; but in winter he changes and becomes grey instead of 
 black on the back and his chin and throat become white"; and 
 "the magpie, so wary in England, is tame in Norway, as is 
 the hooded crow in Egypt" (Darwin). Equally, who that had 
 seen but one dog would suspect the existing variety of dogs, 
 or who that had seen the plants of the valleys would suspect 
 the transformation some of them undergo when transferred to 
 the Alpine heights above. Similarly, an ancient Teuton would 
 not have been justified in reasoning that all men are fair, any 
 more than his brother in the tropics who judges that all men 
 are dark brown. Thus, again, whereas a census of school 
 children would furnish a given percentage of fair-hairedness, 
 that of adults would exhibit a conspicuous decrease in the 
 percentage, and whilst one part of a country may be wholly 
 literate or densely populated, another may be almost illiterate 
 or sparsely inhabited. Who, once more, living in the far south 
 would conjecture the existence of the far north, and who, 
 living in either extreme of climate, would surmise that there 
 are many places on earth where decided heat and decided cold 
 alternate during the year? 1 Who, again, living in a mono- 
 gamous civilisation is not surprised to hear of the prevalence 
 in other civilisations of polygamy and polyandry and vice versa ? 
 The towering Patagonian in his retreat imagines that some of 
 his fellows of no more than six feet in height are diminutive, 
 whilst the pigmy of the gloomy African forest would be amazed 
 to face a man who reaches five feet. It is equally a never- 
 ending comment of new-fledged travellers that there should be 
 
 1 "Over the British Islands the average rainfall is about 25 inches per 
 annum; but the amount varies greatly from year to year, and also from 
 place to place. It is greatest in the West and North-West of the country. 
 At Seathwaite in Cumberland, reputed the wettest spot in the British Isles 
 at which regular observations have been made over many years, the average 
 amount is 139 inches per annum. In tropical countries, where the air can 
 contain much larger amounts of water vapour by reason of its higher tem- 
 perature, much higher figures are recorded. Cherra Poonjee in Assam has an 
 average rainfall of 439 inches per annum, the highest known rainfall for 
 any station at which observations have been made for many years. 
 
 "A day on which the rainfall exceeds one inch is regarded as one of 
 heavy rain in all parts of the British Isles, though a glance through a set 
 of rainfall tables for almost any year shows that this phenomenon may be 
 expected to occur at least once in the course of each year at most British 
 stations. The heaviest fall of rain ever recorded in one day in the British 
 Isles again falls to the lot of Seathwaite, where, according to an interesting 
 table of phenomenally heavy rainfalls given in British Rainfall for 1910, 
 8.03 inches of rain were measured in November 12, 1897. Even in our com- 
 paratively dry Eastern counties very heavy falls may occur. The same 
 table records seven instances of falls exceeding 4 inches in 24 hours in the 
 county of Essex. 
 
 "In tropical countries these amounts may, again, be vastly exceeded. 
 
 r example, a typhoon which swept over the Philippine Islands between 
 July 14 and 17, 1911, deposited at one station on four consecutive days 35, 
 S'A T^*? inches respectively, or a total of 89 inches in four days." 
 (K. tr. K. Lempfert, op. cit., pp. 23-24.)
 
 SECTION 22 OBSERVATION. 281 
 
 in any country customs other than their own. One remembers 
 in this connection Mark Twain's genial Negro who could not 
 comprehend why the French people did not speak English. 
 The molecular movements of objects at rest or in the growth 
 of animate beings remain for this reason commonly unnoticed, 
 just as at first the isomeric aspects of compounds escape atten- 
 tion; we ignore the fact that a "given mass weighs slightly 
 less, and falls to the ground a little less rapidly, in the tropics 
 than elsewhere" (F. Soddy, op. cit., p. 25), or that the require- 
 ments of children often seriously differ from those of adults, 
 or that a remedy efficacious at one stage, or in one affection, 
 may be useless or even detrimental at an earlier or later stage, 
 or in another affection; and the influence of vast periods, as 
 in the formation of mountains, rivers, or land, or in the evolu- 
 tion of living forms or even of chemical elements, or in the 
 development of human institutions and human culture, demand 
 measurement, whilst in theoretical and practical problems, the 
 near and distant future equally require to be taken into account. 
 "At the time of Alexander's invasion a good part of the now 
 arid desert consisted of populous towns and prosperous villages. 
 So also, the jungle now known as the Sunderbun, and inhabited 
 by tigers and other wild beasts, was, a few centuries ago, the 
 seat of a flourishing kingdom." (Banerjea, op. cit., p. 8.) And 
 time sees important changes induced by man's interposition. 
 "The worst land can be converted into the most fertile by the 
 application of proper manures and the adoption of a well- 
 regulated method of agriculture. . . . Afforestation may lead to 
 an increase in rainfall where it is at present scanty, and irriga- 
 tion may be so practised as to carry water to any place where 
 it is wanted." (Ibid., p. 26.) What more wonderful substance 
 is there in nature than water? Now it is a transparent liquid 
 evaporating in almost any degree of temperature, saturating 
 the atmosphere, forming steam and clouds, descending from 
 the sky as rain, snow, sleet, and hail, appearing as sparkling 
 dew and lacy frost, turning into solid ice, splitting the rocks 
 because of its unique quality of expanding just anterior to 
 solidifying, and entering largely into the composition of living 
 forms. Sufficient has been adduced to show the need of always 
 calculating on the possibility that objects and their environment 
 do not possess that uniformity which they momentarily and in 
 certain localities appear to present. 
 
 "There rolls the deep where grew the tree. 
 
 earth, what changes hast thou seen! 
 
 There where the long street roars, hath been 
 The stillness of the central sea. 
 
 The hills are shadows, and they flow 
 
 From form to form, and nothing stands; 
 
 They melt like mist, the solid lands, 
 Like clouds they shape themselves and go." 
 
 (Tennyson, In Memoriam, cxxiii.)
 
 282 
 
 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 In dealing, then, with the nature and relations of pheno- 
 mena, we should suspect complexity where there appears to be 
 simplicity, simplicity where there appears complexity, environ- 
 mental influences where other influences are alleged, and we 
 should be prepared to find that influences of time and of 
 position in space and mind produce, as the case may be, an 
 appreciable or a substantial difference. 
 
 CONCLUSION 18. 
 
 Need of Keeping and Consulting Records, of Improving the 
 
 Memory Experimentally, of Employing the Imagination, and of 
 
 utilising the Intelligence in its entirety. 
 
 141. (A) KEEPING AND CONSULTING RECORDS. As 
 is evident from the very definition of a given impression as 
 entailing special memory, general memory, and reasoning or 
 inference from past to present experience, 1 it follows that in 
 the scientific process of investigation the place of the memory 
 cannot be left unconsidered. Furthermore, memories not only 
 fade rapidly, but become confused. Lastly, not only does 
 memory enter into the process of observation; but more 
 especially does it weave itself into the whole generalising and 
 reasoning process. We cannot recall all we have observed; 
 and even if we have kept adequate notes, these are not as 
 exhaustive as the original observations. 
 
 Since, then, the memory needs to be employed, we should 
 prepare rules for its guidance: (a) we should consult records 
 entered carefully at the time of observing, containing all we 
 observed and nought beyond, and succinctly, systematically, 
 and lucidly composed ; (b) only such memories are to be utilised 
 as are distinctly recollected to have been scientifically gathered ; 
 <c) these records and recollections, especially if much is to 
 depend on them, should be verified with meticulous care; and 
 (d), according to circumstances, these records should assume 
 the form of specimens, rough sketches, minute drawings, 
 coloured drawings, photographs, tables, statistics, graphs, and 
 the like. 
 
 142. (B) IMPROVING THE MEMORY. Moreover, stre- 
 nuous efforts should be made to improve the memory as such. 
 (a) By observing accurately with the object of accurately recollect- 
 ing, and then experimentally training the memory in this direc- 
 tion, we may hope to find our memories far more reliable than 
 at present, (b) Similarly, by pursuing an analogous method in 
 relation to completeness of memories, parallel results are likely 
 to ensue, (c) Kindred methods should be employed to create 
 an extensive store of memories, without which the task of 
 
 1 See 19.
 
 SECTION 22.OBSER VA TION. 283 
 
 investigation and elaboration proves slow and difficult. Then 
 (d) there is the problem of training the memory in order that 
 it should readily respond to the demands made on it. And 
 lastly, (e) a methodological memory is of vital import for rapid 
 methodological thinking. This last point needs to be developed. 
 Many -more or less coherent classifications exist in our day, 
 and through experimental training it might be possible that, 
 given certain terms, most relevant related terms should, in a 
 methodical manner, almost instantaneously appear in conscious- 
 ness. In this way, especially if the process be systematised, 
 and if it be extended to relevant facts, ideas, conclusions, etc., 
 the value of thought may be considerably improved. Even 
 this, however, should not satisfy the methodologist, for we 
 ought to aim at (/) so developing the memory by means of 
 experiment that everything involved in a thought shall be 
 readily evolved by the memory. That this takes place to some 
 extent normally will not be disputed; but if it occurs at all, 
 the conscious perfecting of the process should not meet with 
 insurmountable obstacles. Having successfully trained the 
 memory in this direction, methodological thinking would be, 
 comparatively speaking, lightning-like. 
 
 In our time, because of the subjective seclusion of thought, 
 the memory is relatively unsocial and therefore chaotic; but, 
 once controlled by collectively devised methods, it ought to 
 operate as smoothly and satisfactorily as high-grade machinery. 
 It will be understood, of course, that we assume a memory 
 well-stocked with sifted and organised facts and ideas, and 
 assisted by a series of methodological Conclusions of the type 
 proposed in this volume. 
 
 143. (C) SCIENTIFIC USE OF THE IMAGINATION. 1 The 
 memory has a further important function to fulfil in the course 
 of scientific investigation; "for not only do we require to recall 
 the bare facts specifically examined, but it is desirable to re- 
 collect related facts which might have a bearing on the subject 
 in question and help towards its elucidation. A well-stored and 
 responsive memory is thus of capital importance. In seeking 
 to explain, for instance, the alarming growth of a disease, such 
 as~ appendicitis or cancer, experts have not stumbled on any 
 explanation as the effect of studying actual cases. They, ac- 
 cordingly, seek for environmental influences. Is the disease 
 especially prevalent among the poor or rich, among the 
 educated or uneducated, among heavy or light eaters, among 
 those who consume much or little of particular food-stuffs or 
 beverages, among those who overwork or underwork, among 
 civilised or primitive peoples, and so on? Hasty solutions are 
 
 1 "Nourished by knowledge patiently won; bounded and conditioned by 
 co-operant Reason, Imagination becomes the mightiest instrument of the 
 physical discoverer." (John Tyndall, Scientific Use of the Imagination, and 
 Other Essays, 1872, p. 6.)
 
 284 
 
 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 easily offered; but the difficulty is to fix unmistakably on the 
 source of the evil, which only the widest and most searching 
 examination may be able to disclose. Cholera, plague, con- 
 sumption, insanity, and certain deficiency diseases, have been 
 in this manner more or less successfully traced to their causes, 
 and this has invariably entailed much circumspect drawing on 
 a copious memory, though, of course, not without detailed 
 attention to the circumstantial facts of the disease. In the 
 physical sciences the use of the imagination is for this reason 
 increasingly required, since gravitation, heat, light, electricity, 
 magnetism, radiation, chemistry, and now astronomy, begin to 
 melt into one another and to interpret each other, and since 
 so much is invisible owing to diminutiveness or bulkiness and 
 demands recourse to analogy for the purpose of determining 
 the nature and causes of objects and processes. Thus, to 
 venture on one illustration from geology, where the factors are 
 frequently difficult to trace and where the instructed imagination 
 proves to be a valuable auxiliary. "It is believed that the 
 accumulation of a sheet of ice, several thousand feet in thickness, 
 will depress that part of the earth's crust on which it rests. 
 On the other hand, the part of the crust which lies immediatly 
 to the south of the ice-sheet will well upwards, it is believed, 
 in the form of a wave, giving rise to such an elevation as is 
 occurring in Scandinavia now. Still further south, beyond the 
 wave of elevation, there is a secondary trough or depression." 
 (A. Keith, The Antiquity of Man, 1920, p. 45.) Also, once we 
 ascertain that man is primarily a specio-psychic being, the ex- 
 planation of innumerable human facts will be sought in the 
 multitudinous cultural forces in operation, and this can only be 
 accomplished by passing mentally in review apposite data and 
 reconstructing situations in the imagination. 
 
 For instance, here and there sundry writers have lightly 
 touched on the cultural nature of man; but through failing to 
 develop the conception, they have left the subject in a rudiment- 
 ary condition impotent to affect current theories. On this ac- 
 count it was relatively easy for Darwin, and those who followed 
 him, to overlook the real inwardness of the cultural factor. 
 If man possessed this, that, and the other quality, why, it was 
 reasoned, characters resembling these could be detected scattered 
 throughout the animal kingdom, 'and if culturists spoke of 
 human progress, it was not difficult to confuse cultural with 
 biological progress, and even to deny progress by citing ex- 
 ceptional or petty instances suggestive of the absence of 
 progress. A proper use of the imagination would have quickly 
 shown that, first, a relevant comparison could only be instituted 
 between man and some one particular animal species, not 
 between man and all animal species. Furthermore, by patiently 
 analysing the wealth of human culture as regards means of 
 communicating feelings and thoughts to one's fellow creatures,
 
 SECTION 22.OBSER VA TION. 285 
 
 roads and modes of transportation^ buildings and furniture, 
 callings and variety of implements and products, domestication 
 of animals and cultivation of plants, discovery and utilisation 
 of raw materials and natural forces, dress and education, nutri- 
 tion and care of health, trade and internationalism, morals and 
 religion, art and science, law and government, marriage and 
 other voluntary and territorial associations it would have 
 clearly revealed itself that every animal species is outdistanced 
 by man to an almost infinite degree. 
 
 Moreover, by breaking up the notion of richness, it would 
 have transpired that culture is distributed with extreme in- 
 equality among persons, peoples, and periods; that it has been 
 produced by a process of progressive accumulation and im- 
 provement from the earliest times to to-day; and that virtually 
 all mankind has co-operated to compass this. Human life is thus 
 perceived to differ from all animal life by being almost infinitely 
 richer, and almost infinitely more varied, progressive, unified, 
 and perfectible. Incidentally we learn, then, that cultural varia- 
 tions are primarily due to cultural causes; that a survey of human 
 history as a whole bears witness to illimitable progress, which 
 again we cannot conceive as ever ceasing; and that mankind 
 tends more and more to become a unity and its component 
 parts more and more perfect. Turning now back to the animal 
 world, we discover that no animal species, unless enormous 
 epochs are considered, possesses any richness of culture; any 
 notable variations in regard to individuals, groups, and periods ; 
 any discernible progress through the ages; or any approach 
 to the co-operation of the entire species in time and space, as 
 is to be witnessed in mankind. Nor is the thought exhausted 
 by the preceding analysis, for it is borne in on us that it is 
 misleading to speak of man as one social being among others, 
 when in man alone not the group at a particular period of 
 time, but virtually the species, or the totality of mankind past 
 and present, co-operates and interacts. This, again, suggests 
 that it is not the group which forms the human unit, but the 
 individual who absorbs more or less the culture of the race 
 and thereby becomes its representative. We finally reach by 
 this route the conception of the individual as the culture-requir- 
 ing, the social group as the culture-mediating, and mankind 
 as the culture-supplying, unit, a conception of superlative signi- 
 ficance for social theory and social practice, if true. There 
 probably exist no limits to the benefits accruing from a scientific 
 use of the imagination. 
 
 Besides being able to utilise reliable data accurately remem- 
 bered, we should strive to exhaust mentally and factually the 
 general and special conditions under which a fact presents 
 itself, always avoiding unnecessary subtlety and alertly watch- 
 ing for the most promising explanations. There should be, for 
 instance, no placid acquiescence in unanalysed catchwords. On
 
 280 PART V.-WORKING STAGE. 
 
 the one hand, men, e.g., extol to the heavens "democracy", 
 and, on the other, they judge "democracy" to be the grave of 
 greatness; and yet thera is almost never any very clear thought 
 underlying either line of argument. Is there virtue in numbers 
 irrespective of good qualities, or is there merit in an aristocracy 
 regardless of any reprehensible characteristics it may possess? 
 Should everybody, as in ancient Greece, be somebody, or should 
 the masses simply hand over the government and themselves 
 to experts? Should elections of various orders be multiplied 
 and rendered more frequent, or should the citizens, perhaps 
 once in a decade, elect perhaps one person for every million 
 inhabitants to a Parliament and do nothing further? Should 
 there be a small governing class in the world of politics and 
 business, or should all interests (workers, employers, consumers) 
 govern collectively through a comprehensive system of devolu- 
 tion? 1 Thus with the term "nature", where the expressions 
 "human nature", "nature" (that which lies outside human 
 nature), "a natural life" (in contradistinction to a conventional 
 life), "natural scenery", "natural law", "nature" (in its most 
 comprehensive sense), are repeatedly and disastrously con- 
 founded. Thus, too, with the noted phrase, "the elimination 
 of the unfit", wherein the word "unfit" is rarely defined by 
 Eugenists, sometimes signifying "physically unfit", sometimes 
 "not successful in coining wealth or pushing to the front", and 
 sometimes "not of service to mankind", its intrinsic meaning 
 being "elimination of those unfitted for a particular environ- 
 ment", whatever be the position of this environment in the 
 scale of human values. 
 
 Or examine the notion of "living in comfort", as conceived 
 by some socialists. Here it is tacitly assumed that an immutable 
 standard of comfort exists, and that with the advent of the 
 socialisation of the means of production and distribution com- 
 fort will be universal when, as a matter of fact, the man with 
 an income of 300 per annum agonises over his poverty, and 
 he who disposes of 3,000 annually deems himself a wretch 
 compared to his fellow who can expend ^30,000 a year. Mani- 
 festly, comfort for the masses is either unattainable, or else a 
 scientific and ethical view of comfort, equivalent to the scien- 
 tifically determined simple life, should be advanced. (See also 
 Conclusions 15 and 20.) A more judicious use of the imagination 
 would likewise compel a reinterpretation of the onesided theory 
 that men are mainly economically-motivated beings, or that radi- 
 cal changes in economic conceptions and processes can lead to 
 no difference in the amount of wealth produced in any com- 
 
 1 In considering the problem of democratic government and similar issues, 
 we ought, in the first place, to think of what would happen if the democracy 
 were highly educated. This would cut any number of Gordian knots, and 
 probably reconcile most of those who genuinely care for the welfare of 
 their country.
 
 SECTION 22. OBSERVATION. 287 
 
 munity, because wealth and labour, as is frequently alleged, are 
 interchangeable terms. 
 
 Finally, weigh the pregnancy of an expression such as "the 
 family is the nation's unit". As a slogan it signifies substan- 
 tially nothing ; but allowing the imagination to pursue the con- 
 sequences, we arrive at a comprehensive theory of the State 
 and of economics. The object of wealth, according Jp this view, 
 is primarily to secure the welfare of families, meaning by family 
 mainly the two parents and the children, with their home. 
 Wealth as such has, then, no value, and the wealth produced 
 does not appertain to the individual producer, nor can it be 
 legitimately disbursed save for promoting family welfare. The 
 State similarly is not concerned with glory, power, honour, or 
 wealth as such ; but its policy should be shaped first and fore- 
 most by the requirements of the families constituting the nation. 
 The home, then, is the true centre of national concern, and 
 the production of wealth and the regulations of the State 
 must subserve it. Domestic and child hygiene, home educa- 
 tion, home work simplification, family concord and concord 
 in the family of nations, become consequently all-important. 
 The young should be trained for the life of marriage, and the 
 husband should know much of the home as the wife should 
 know much of the world, both being educated to appreciate 
 the value of co-operation and the need for mutual respect. 
 A male-directed world proves therefore an abortion, due to the 
 men having come to confound the means (wealth) for the end 
 (family welfare). Rightly considered, legislators and wealth 
 producers should have for their principal object the creation and 
 maintenance of well-provided and morally and aBsthetically 
 beautiful homes. The woman's work in the home assumes 
 thereby a transfigured value, and she is also required to join 
 the councils of the State, since she is best informed regarding 
 that which most concerns the State. Erratic anti-family theories 
 are hence discountenanced; old maids and old bachelors virtu- 
 ally cease to be as a voluntary class, whilst everything is done 
 to maintain the numerical equality of the sexes; the man's 
 ideal companion is his wife, and vice versa; home education 
 and home management become matters of science; wealth 
 production is directed to serve primarily this new conception 
 of society; Utopias are converted into eutopias; etc., etc. 
 
 Again, a more virile use of the imagination would cast doubt 
 on some aspects of the theory of "genius" or inherited psychi- 
 cal capacity. That one man should be born with a perceptibly 
 stronger or more delicate physical constitution than another, 
 is easily understood; but how are we to picture to ourselves 
 a "born" baker, cook, accountant, merchant, manufacturer, 
 airman, lawyer, pianist, painter, musician, poet, saint, and the 
 thousands of other "somebodies" who are said to be "born, not 
 made", especially since, through the changes and developments
 
 288 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 of culture, the implications of these terms deviate definitely 
 from generation to generation! And this impossible view is 
 further complicated by the theory that genius, like murder, will 
 out, portraying a perfect social Babel where we find historically 
 almost uninterrupted change and progress along a certain line. 
 We have accordingly, to select an illustration, to imagine some 
 genius born who "invents" unison music, another part music, 
 another melody accompanied by a theme, another a musical 
 theme without melody, and others more and more intricate 
 themes, and practically never a genius appearing out of order. 
 When we, therefore, consider the slow and orderly transforma- 
 tions historically undergone by the human arts, crafts, and dis- 
 ciplines, and the instruments they employ, it seems inexpres- 
 sibly inept to propound the thesis that any one is born to 
 accomplish a certain cultural task. The attempt reminds one 
 of nothing so much as of square circles and round triangles. 
 Here, however, the scientific imagination ends, and the demand 
 arises for an ascertainment of the precise facts and factors 
 involved. 
 
 Similarly with scores of catchwords in those spheres of cogni- 
 tion where the method of cool and full analysis is in sharp 
 conflict with the courses of action proposed by passion and 
 prejudice : everywhere these catchwords would be either rejected 
 or would acquire fuller significance. Want of thought, more 
 than scantiness of facts, is therefore not infrequently the cause 
 of erroneous arguments and conclusions. 
 
 Active memory or imagination has thus its place in science ; 
 but it is rigorously limited in scope. If the particular fact under 
 consideration at any time has not been thoroughly examined, 
 or if the general facts are not familiar, imagination will be a 
 busy mischief-maker. Scientific imagination is therefore con- 
 cerned with what is securely established, and only aims at 
 mentally reviewing the possibilities of extending a truth where 
 it is not a question of generalising intimately known and already 
 classified facts. The almost preternaturally slow advance of 
 the knowledge of rays and of electric phenomena during the 
 last fifty years, in spite of hosts of well-prepared intellects 
 examining the phenomena, illustrates our contention that as a 
 rule the scientific imagination does not roam, but tramps round 
 and round a small and well-defined area. Only when prodigious 
 masses of facts and generalisations have been collected, collated, 
 and fused, is there room for a Newton, a Laplace, or a Darwin, 
 to propose sweeping truths, or for a Sophocles or Corneille 
 to write divinely. Here also the imagination is constrained 
 to travel in certain prescribed narrow paths, decided by the 
 countless established details and generalisations. The working 
 hypotheses in the sciences form no exception to this statement, 
 for they endeavour to interpret new facts by old facts, not 
 new facts by novel or ancient fancies.
 
 SECTION 22.OBSERVA T10N. 289 
 
 Scientific canons, therefore, demand that vigorous and rigorous 
 objective examination of the facts and conditions should be 
 accompanied by vigorous and rigorous subjective analysis and 
 reconstruction of facts and conditions so far as known. The 
 imagination is observable in action to the best advantage in 
 the contriving of experiments, the drawing of deductions, and 
 in the formulation of definitions. 
 
 144. (D) CONTINUOUS METHODOLOGICAL CONTROL 
 OF THE THOUGHT PROCESS. The emergence of a felt need 
 gives automatically rise to the problem of how it may be gratified. 
 If that problem be ideally simple, as when we desire to touch 
 some common object within convenient reach of the hands, 
 the task of the intelligence is minimal ; but when, for instance, 
 we wish to comprehend the inmost nature of reality, satisfaction 
 can only be secured, if at all, by the combined efforts of 
 the thinkers of myriads of ages. Customarily, however, the 
 problems posed by needs are such that a brief period of 
 reasoning suffices to reach the conclusion or end aimed at. 
 Thus when we desire to know how long it will occupy us to 
 complete some piece of work, or what shall be our next task, 
 or what we shall write to a colleague, or where we shall spend 
 the vacations, or how we shall furnish our laboratory, or what 
 shall be the contents of a memoir we contemplate presenting 
 to a learned body, we reason and labour for a shorter or longer 
 space of time, until a provisional or final decision is arrived 
 at and the need is at least partially satisfied. In the process 
 of reasoning the stimulating need is teleologically connected 
 with a seemingly appropriate detail recollected, that with another, 
 and so on with scores of memories, the controlling stimulus 
 remaining as a constant, till the need is satisfied so far as 
 circumstances permit. Reasoning being hence dependent on a 
 succession of relevant memories, it is readily appreciated that, 
 in the absence of deliberate and correct methodological training, 
 countless causes may contribute to prolong and sophisticate a 
 train of reasoning. On this account, the conclusion may be 
 instantaneously reached; it may not be reached at all; or a 
 partially or wholly false conclusion may be the fruit of our 
 cogitations. 1 
 
 In a certain sense we are supposed to deal in this Sub-Section 
 with the methodological process in its naked concreteness, as it 
 proceeds from moment to moment in the act of ratiocination. As 
 we have seen, the very fact that man's thought is as yet almost 
 wholly unorganised, renders it abundantly clear that what takes 
 place in the mind must vary alarmingly from individual to indivi- 
 dual, that most of the ideas occurring are chance products, and 
 
 1 See Mind of Man, ch. 4, for an analysis of the reasoning process. From 
 this statement it will be seen that the laws of association by contiguity and 
 by similarity are only secondary laws and do not account for the flow of 
 thought. 
 
 19
 
 290 
 
 PART V.-WORKING STAGE. 
 
 that in downright honest meditations of an original character the 
 process of mental synthesis is exceedingly circuitous and tortuous. 
 Indeed, steady continuity of strenuous and correct thought 
 becomes, in the circumstances, impossible, and the keenest efforts 
 are often unaccompanied by dependable results. It is probably 
 for this reason that in research work much is frequently made of 
 little, that the initial stage is mistaken for the final one, and that 
 thinkers and artists rapidly sink into mental grooves and abide 
 therein for the rest of their lives. Anything to escape the 
 primordial mental chaos. 
 
 Instead, therefore, of undertaking the unprofitable task of 
 sketching in detail a moving mental anarchy occasionally re- 
 lieved by the results of the application of a few precipitated cul- 
 tural rules, we must demand the rationalisation and socialisation 
 of thought on methodological models. Assuming this to be 
 accomplished, say to the extent delineated in this work, this 
 Sub-Section would draw the picture of the concrete process of 
 thought when any particular problem let it be the ethics of 
 journalism or the theory of art for art's sake is submitted for 
 consideration. Unfortunately, the present author, who is forever 
 learning and almost forever unlearning, cannot flatter himself 
 that he is in a position to provide such an account. Whilst 
 he hopes, for his own and for his readers' sake, that he has 
 profited by his methodological enquiries, there is none of the 
 consecutiveness and solidity in his concrete cogitations that one 
 would have a right to look for, say, in the third generation of 
 trained methodologists. All that he can therefore do is to pro- 
 pose that this enquiry be adjourned to the day when some one 
 will undertake it who, under propitious conditions, has been, 
 from infancy, thoroughly trained to reflect methodologically. 
 Since thought consists, on the psychological side, of the cross- 
 classification of memories, and since such cross-classification 
 may be enormously simplified and systematised, it certainly 
 appears as if the ideational thinking process of the future will 
 be as superior to that of our day as our most highly developed 
 machines exceed in efficacy the rude implements of primitive 
 man. 
 
 145. We will venture nevertheless on an illustration to 
 elucidate the position. Some twelve years prior to this paragraph 
 being penned, the present writer was responsible for a series 
 of magazine articles on the moral education of children. He 
 concluded the series by submitting how unreasonable it was to 
 assume that systematic experimental practice should be required 
 in all other subjects of the school curriculum where action was 
 involved, and yet to deplore man's moral juvenility although 
 neglecting systematic experimental moral practice. It being 
 conceded that this criticism was partly suggested by the author's 
 methodological activities, it may be admitted that, roughly 
 speaking, the elaboration of the criticism entailed no difficulties
 
 SECTION 22. OBSERVATION. 291 
 
 and that the article was written almost without halt in the author's 
 thought. To this extent the methodological ideal is satisfied. 
 
 However, when his methodology inclined the author to the 
 belief that a positive scheme should be developed, his mind 
 became nearly a blank so far as this subject was concerned. 
 Various items occurred to him, but, from his methodological 
 standpoint, nothing worthy of being advocated as a system. 
 For some ten years he recurred repeatedly to his favourite 
 theme of conceiving an adequate plan, but in vain. During 
 the last two years, however, he felt that just as his young 
 children learnt to play on the piano, so should they become 
 proficient in matters of right conduct; but still no luminous 
 inspiration came to indicate how this was to be accomplished. 
 One day, at last, whilst one of his children was playing the 
 piano, a feasible solution dawned on him. It was to the effect 
 that, accepting as a basis the golden rule enunciated in 97, 
 one might begin with posture training sitting, standing, walking, 
 etc., proceed to handshaking and simple salutation, then to 
 simple conversation, and so forth. The general methods em- 
 ployed would be those in common use for all arts. 
 
 This outline scheme was, again, prepared within an hour or 
 two in consequence of the application of methodological rules. 
 Here was a definite and hopeful beginning. Incidentally, he 
 pondered over the problem during the succeeding few weeks, 
 and though generally satisfied with his discovery, it did seem 
 to him that the art of conduct should be inculcated from earliest 
 infancy, a conclusion having no doubt a methodological origin. 
 Then it struck him that he had recently (The Training of the 
 Child: A Parents' Manual, 1912; revised edition, 1919) advocated 
 deliberate instruction and experiment in home education, and 
 that this would solve his difficulty. Light, therefore, came, first, 
 after a rule of life had been independently arrived at, simplifying 
 and systematising the teaching to be given, and, secondly, when 
 recollecting another recently systematised conclusion. So far as 
 the problem is concerned of developing the system for common 
 use, we need say nothing on this score here. 
 
 Assume now that the author had rigidly applied his fully 
 developed methodological system. On its occurring to him to 
 utilise the experimental method in the moral training of children, 
 he would have, following precedent, at once decided on examining 
 the nature of the experimental method in child training generally. 
 This decision would have been followed practically immediately 
 by the resolve to inspect the time table of a fully modern school 
 (Conclusion 20). Trusting to recollection, until such time as 
 verification was convenient, physical training, games, hand- 
 work, drawing and painting, piano playing, and other subjects 
 would have suggested themselves. 
 
 How was he to conceive the beginning of his experiments? 
 Clearly, on the methodological basis of commencing with the 
 
 19*
 
 292 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 simplest matters, and proceeding, with growing age, to the most 
 complex. And what were the simplest ? Of course, those gene- 
 rally required of the very young. And what form were the 
 experiments to assume? Those actually assumed with the young- 
 first as games, then as interesting matter, and subsequently as 
 love of the subject. 
 
 Beyond this, systematic procedure on the part of the ex- 
 perimenter, including regular times for regular periods, and 
 systematic teaching as in schools, could be assumed forthwith 
 as a matter of course. 
 
 Postulating much intimate experience with children and con- 
 siderable reading in pedagogy, with methodological rules to aid, 
 little difficulty would be experienced in drawing up a curri- 
 culum. Still, it would have been out of the question to have 
 formulated a working scheme at once. He would have appealed to 
 his memory for the simplest and most interesting actions to be ac- 
 quired by children, following the day-to-day rule (Conclusion 19) 
 in the effort to recollect, and these would have been only inter- 
 mittently obtained. Discontinuity of the concrete thought process 
 would have thus set in at this point, and he would have periodi- 
 cally returned to his task, alertly watching in the intervals for 
 suggestive experiences and ideas, besides deliberately studying 
 children, according to the day-to-day rule, and consulting books. 
 
 As he reflected over his task, it would have dawned on him 
 in fact, this is a methodological demand (Conclusion 20) that 
 he would be much helped by a simple and comprehensive rule 
 of life. He would directly endeavour to recollect, methodologi- 
 cally, known rules of life, and presumably not find them satis- 
 factory for his purpose. He would, for methodological reasons, 
 desiderate a rule which would embody in a simple form the 
 principal demands of the moral ideal. Again, we shall assume 
 here that the subject was far from being a novelty to him. He 
 would, accordingly, seek to remember such features. He had 
 been charmed and impressed by the geniality of kindergartners, 
 and had discovered the same virtue very widely in modern educa- 
 tional and institutional life. The kindergartners, too, triumphed 
 by being intelligent, instead of being obsessed by routine solutions 
 of difficulties or by authoritarianism. Automatically resorting to 
 generalisation, he would extend intelligence to feeling and will, 
 and thence to the utilisation of the whole of the mind. Here 
 was a great step forward. However, methodologically, this 
 would have led directly to the examination in a standard work 
 on psychology of the lists of the constituents of the human mind. 
 Acceptance and rejection of terms would have alternated, in 
 accordance with the needs of the case and of the experience 
 possessed. Other works on psychology would have been con- 
 sulted with the same object in view, as well as books on ethics. 
 Everything having to be carefully weighed, decision would have 
 been repeatedly postponed. Satisfied at last with the elements
 
 SECTION 22.OBSER VA TION. 293 
 
 to be incorporated in the rule, the shaping of the sentence would 
 commence. The author had spent over a hundred hours on 
 determining on a convenient phrasing, whereas two hours, 
 perhaps, would have sufficed if methodological rules had been 
 throughout respected. 
 
 Many are the causes for the slow and erratic workings of 
 the concrete intelligence. Methodological canons are only 
 fitfully applied. Owing to a poor vocabulary and an anarchic 
 memory, we are obliged to hunt for the right word. Fa- 
 scinated by our ideas, we fail to employ terms in their normal 
 connotations. Only partially trained in expressing ourselves 
 correctly, it is with infinite pains we convey to others, or 
 even to ourselves, what we mean. Not proceeding systemati- 
 cally, we fumble and stumble, and waste long stretches of time. 
 Reaching the end of our scanty resources, our mind becomes 
 a blank for a moment, and unconsciously the trend of our 
 meditations has changed, and perhaps a considerable time elapses 
 before we return to our subject. Or we build castles in the 
 air instead of on the solid rock, ignoring or slurring over 
 difficulties. Thus, in the absence of thorough methodological 
 training, the mind is a medley of disjointed irrelevancies, and 
 the quantity and quality of our cogitations are of the poorest. 
 Indeed, it is probable that, so far as the concrete intelligence 
 is concerned, there will be in the methodologically trained future 
 a saving of perhaps ninety-five per cent, of time in enquiries. 
 
 If, then, observation is to be truly scientific, it is imperative 
 that the concrete process of intellection, as it passes from 
 moment to moment, shall be controlled and guided in all its 
 aspects and phases by methodological canons of an irreproach- 
 able character. This presupposes adequate theoretical and prac- 
 tical methodological training from an early age until the mind 
 grows into an ordered unity, responding automatically to the 
 varied needs of a situation. 
 
 CONCLUSION 19. 
 Need of Ensuring Easy, Exhaustive, and Impartial Observation. 
 
 146. This Conclusion professes to provide the assistance 
 required to secure with ease abundant material for investigation, 
 and to defeat subjective influences. 
 
 (a) In dealing with matters psychological, anthropological, 
 historical, ethical, economical, meteorological, etc. wherever 
 changes are relatively rapid or where objects of the same class 
 are likely to vary a day-to-day rule is of conspicuous ad- 
 vantage. If, accordingly, we desired to learn something of the 
 ordinary life lived by some tribe or nation, we pursue for some 
 days the perambulations of a few average persons of that tribe 
 or nation, from the moment they rise in the morning to the 
 moment when they rise the succeeding day. We are thus in a
 
 294 
 
 PART V.-WORKING STAGE. 
 
 position to record accurately their normal habits, whilst other- 
 wise we should be likely to furnish an account of a few graphic 
 or accidental details. Corrections for locality, climate, season, 
 age, sex, social stratum, special circumstances, would not, of 
 course, be neglected. 
 
 (b) The just-mentioned rule may be extended to a season- 
 to-season rule in those instances where the stages are seasonal, 
 as with plants or some instincts and diseases, and beyond this 
 to stages of life, as when certain physiological and pathological 
 phenomena are connected more or less with an individual's age. 
 
 (c) The same rule may be also adapted to periodic changes 
 and occurrences of any length, extensive or brief, as in astro- 
 nomy or molecular physics, and 
 
 (d) to exhausting the varieties of any species or other object 
 by continuously searching in space, time, and consciousness 
 for divergences. 
 
 (e) Another rule refers to vegetation. 1 A plant may be 
 studied from rootlets upwards; from the zygote stage to the 
 time it decays; in the interrelation of its parts, and in its 
 relation to soils, allied and neighbouring plants, altitude, 
 moisture, atmosphere, light, bacteria, insects, larger animals, etc. 
 
 (/) A cousin of this rule comprehends animal life, though 
 here permanent standpoints are to be chosen for classes rather 
 than for the whole animal kingdom. Perhaps from head to 
 tail or to extremities of hind feet, from conception to dissolu- 
 tion, from cell to systems, of organs (alimentary system, cir- 
 culatory system, etc.) and to the system of systems (the or- 
 ganism) would satisfy methodologically in a general way in 
 respect of the higher animals and many of the lower. The 
 nature and the interrelations between the diverse organs would 
 be considered as well as relations to other members of the 
 species, to closely allied species, to enemies, to food supply, 
 to climate, and to the environment generally, animate and in- 
 animate, (a) and (b) would, of course,- apply to (e) and (/). 
 
 (g) A further group is concerned with objects which have a 
 commencement, and which are not comprised in the previous 
 groups. Thus a book is studied from beginning to end; so, 
 too, an organic or other process, a law case, an experiment, 
 a road, a concert, the history of an individual, of a reign, of 
 an era, or of a country. 2 
 
 (h) includes those aggregations of facts which cannot be 
 distributed under any of the above headings. Here arbitrarily 
 fixed standpoints are selected, that is, observing a ball, I fix 
 upon some arbitrary point or continuous line as the place 
 whence to proceed and whither to return in my examination. 
 
 "If we are enquiring into the vegetation of plants, we must begin from 
 the very sowing of the seed." (Novum Organum, bk. 2, 41.) 
 
 2 For some instances illustrating this rule, see Bacon's Novum Organum, 
 bk. 2, 5.
 
 SECTION 22 OBSERVATION. 295 
 
 The concerted choice of the meridian of Greenwich felici- 
 tously illustrates this rule. 
 
 (i) asks that the completest possible inductions or enumera- 
 tions should be aimed at. (Section XIII.) 
 
 (/') requires the universal application of the comparative, 
 geographical, historical, generic, and evolutfbnary methods. 
 
 (k) emphasises that each ascertained fact or series of facts 
 should be compared with other kindred facts regarding its 
 relative condition, position, or importance place, distribution, 
 number, size, age, utility, value, preferability, etc., according 
 to the table of Primary Categories in order to circumvent 
 marginal reasoning or unbalanced conclusions. 1 In matters 
 social this would mean that "circumstances frequently alter 
 cases". Perhaps the majority of serious personal and collective 
 differences in interpreting an individual's or a group's conduct 
 in daily life, or generally, may be said to be due to disregard- 
 ing unsuspected modifying circumstances. Grievous injustice 
 is thus often committed. This is even truer in relation to 
 matters pertaining to historical, ethnographical, and religious 
 problems. In this connection we may appositely adduce the 
 illuminating story of Confucius who, to the dismay of his dis- 
 ciples, counselled one inquirer, whom he knew, that he should 
 "act on first thoughts", and another immediately following him, 
 whom Confucius was also acquainted with, to "act on second 
 thoughts". 
 
 (/) asks that we should ascertain (or, where in deduction or 
 application inspection is not possible, imagine or realise) the 
 nature of a simple or compound state or action (a substance, 
 a school), first in its total normal condition, and then with 
 regard to varying and exceptional circumstances. The confusion 
 in reform movements, as we have repeatedly stated, is thus 
 perceptibly due to envisaging only that part of the truth which 
 is temporarily and locally exciting interest. 
 
 (m) demands that we should become habituated, more espe- 
 cially in social problems, to (1) gathering ALL the facts, both 
 pro and con, and objectively assessing their approximate value ; 
 (2) recognising that momentary and local feelings and views 
 
 1 "He ventured to think that an educated person should be one who 
 knew what was evidence : when a thing was proved, and when it was not. 
 Another attribute of the educated is the ability to know how many different 
 interpretations could be borne by the same verbal proposition; what weight 
 was to be attached to different authorities. Then an educated person should 
 be able to say how far circumstances transformed propositions which were 
 excellent at certain times and places but irrelevant patchwork when applied 
 to all sorts of places. He had been led to believe that parallels -and ana- 
 logies from history were the most deceptive things in the world." (Report 
 of a portion of a speech by Lord Morley of Blackburn, delivered at the 
 opening of the John Morley Laboratory, of the University of Manchester, 
 Oct. 4, 1909.) "Male and female winged ants are strongly positively helio- 
 tropic, but as soon as they lose their wings their heliotropism ceases." 
 (J. Loeb, Forced Movements, p. 116.)
 
 296 
 
 PART V.- WORKING STAGE. 
 
 may be perhaps only of momentary and local importance; 
 (3) taking into account the broad historical, and geographical 
 aspects of the subject; (4) allowing for further developments 
 in the near and more distant future; (5) connecting the prob- 
 lem, if possible, with wider, and also with more fundamental, 
 considerations; and (6) weighing the comparative importance 
 of the problem in order to determine the approximate place 
 due to it at present in the domain of theory and practice. 
 
 (ri) requires that we should compile a list of all the diffi- 
 culties involved in the solution of a problem, and also a list 
 of all reasonable solutions; and 
 
 (o) demands that we should incessantly and schematically 
 re-examine for the special purpose of discovering new and 
 independent facts, and pursue this course, until varied efforts, 
 repeated at sundry intervals, yield nothing of moment. (See 
 Conclusion 24.) 
 
 Methodical guidance of the above character is indispensable, 
 especially if subjective errors are to be weeded out and if the 
 enquiry is to be truly valid and exhaustive. In any particular 
 investigation auxiliary rules should be, of course, formulated. 
 
 CONCLUSION 20. 
 Need of Searching for the Simplest Practicable Case. 
 
 147. We should avoid plunging in medias res. If I desire, 
 for instance, as a beginner, to learn the principle of the addi- 
 tion (subtraction, multiplication, etc.) of vulgar (or other) frac- 
 tions, I ought not to write down a casual and arbitrary sum: 
 + T- 4- + ff I ought to select, instead, for study the sim- 
 plest possible example, say: y + y' 1 The more important and 
 complex the problem, the more imperative is it to start with 
 the simplest practicable case. In this manner a ready solution 
 will frequently be reached. Plato thus discussed a city instead 
 of an individual, as exemplifying the question of justice in a 
 simpler, because more conspicuous, form,' 2 and for the same 
 reason lecturers on physiology select the web of frogs, the ears 
 of guinea pigs, or the combs of fowls, to demonstrate the circula- 
 
 1 The simplest practicable case should be made the foundation principle 
 in all teaching. Commencing with that case, the teacher would proceed to 
 the case slightly less simple, and so on. It is also a deduction from this 
 Conclusion that before passing from one stage to another, the scholar's 
 former task should be thoroughly assimilated. Also, in learning a language, 
 for instamce, the supreme difficulty of accurate vocalisation might be over- 
 come with relative ease by learning to enunciate, accent, and pronounce 
 correctly a single paragraph of three or four lines, carefully comparing the 
 enunciation, the accent, and the pronunciation with that of the language 
 known. This could be followed by practice with meaningless rhymed syl- 
 lables (e.g., ten, ben, len) and sets of syllables until proficiency is acquired. 
 
 2 Plato, The Republic, bk. 2.
 
 SECTION 22. OBSERVATION. 297 
 
 tion of the blood, whilst astronomers refer to the plane pre- 
 sented by the sea rather than to the uneven land when they 
 desire to show the globular character of the earth, or call to 
 witness the polar star to prove that the earth's axis does not 
 suffer any material change with time. Physical geographers 
 thus colour the map of the world to indicate now geological 
 formations, now altitudes or temperatures, now barometric pres- 
 sure or rainfall, now winds or ocean currents, and now the 
 earth's Vegetation, and anatomists present us in their atlases 
 with a man now all muscles, now all circulatory organs, now 
 all skeleton, and so on. In arithmetic the unitary method offers 
 an illustration, as also the general formulae in mathematics 
 and the decimal system of measurement, 1 model experiments 
 where one factor at a time is tested, especially an experimentum 
 crucis, exemplify this Conclusion; and the simplest case includes 
 mathematical or some other rigidly definite form of statement, 
 and choosing for recollection, for study, for illustration, or for 
 constructive purposes, a single typical example in connection 
 with classes of facts. Thus, in comparing races, we may compare 
 the European with the Australian bushman, as races culturally 
 placed at the opposite sides of the scale, and in comparing 
 their respective capacities we may examine their scholastic 
 achievements under fairly identical circumstances, whilst in 
 comparing individuals we may contrast an average person in 
 intellect and moral attainments with a man of first-class scien- 
 tific or moral standing. Darwin was well aware of the advantage 
 of this Conclusion : "As soon as the idea of descent of species 
 took definite shape in [Darwin's] mind, he determined, after 
 deliberation, to take up the study of domestic pigeons. H& 
 selected these because the variations were more numerous and 
 plainer, more of them had arisen in the historical period than 
 is usual with animal groups, the material was abundant and 
 easily accessible, etc." (Frank Cramer, op. cit, p. 53.) 2 
 
 1 The English system of measurement and spelling and the Roman 
 numerals are painf'ul revelations of the opposite method. Compare also 
 the French naming of some figures: 99 = quatre-vingt-dix-neuf. 
 
 2 "In settling valencies, the greatest caution has accordingly to be observed 
 by the chemist. He deals, if possible, especially in studying the elements 
 with higher valencies, only with compounds of simple type containing if 
 possible only one atom in the molecule of the polyvalent element, and he 
 directs his attention to the compound which he can prepare with the 
 highest valency exhibited, and in that compound univalent elements so far 
 as possible occupying the available dynamic centres of the polyvalent 
 element." (Benjamin Moore, op. cit., pp. 91-92.) 
 
 "Long ago, physiologists learned that the quest for explanations of living 
 activities lay along the line of investigating them in their most rudimentary 
 expression." (W. A. Locy, op. cit., p. 104.) 
 
 The Report of the Indian Factory Labour Commission tells how "one 
 witness of long practical experience stated that any man would feel exhausted 
 if he merely sat in a chair in some of the workrooms for eight or nine 
 hours, the atmosphere was so foul". Given a regular succession of move-
 
 298 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 148. To venture on one somewhat circumstantial illustra- 
 tion. Suppose the question arises of the origin and development 
 of language. We start with imagining the simplest case, and 
 observe how far the facts depart therefrom. We assume that 
 we hear the word "shrill" pronounced by a young child who 
 is just able to read and does not know its import, and we 
 conclude, to abide by the simplest case, that the word is and 
 has always been pronounced precisely in the same manner by 
 everybody in all ages. Similarly we assume the signification 
 of the word to be as definite and immutable as its sound, and 
 the number of words in the language to be constant. We now 
 inquire how far the facts vindicate or refute our conclusion. 
 
 (a) We note, first, speaking historically, that no fixed standard 
 of pronunciation exists, and that, accordingly, in a relatively 
 short period of time, most especially before the era of writing 
 and printing, the pronunciation of a word may alter measurably; 
 that these alterations lead to further variations and adaptations ; 
 and that, therefore, other things being equal, practically every 
 people, or comparatively isolated human group, comes eventually 
 to possess a language of its own, which, with the ages, is 
 necessarily transformed into another and another. 
 
 (b) We have assumed that speech consists of words always 
 identically pronounced, and of nothing else. Applying again 
 the simplest case by comparing the reading of an intensely 
 dramatic passage by an uninterested child, on the one hand, 
 and a passionate actor, on the other, we find that, at least to 
 many a people, a different sound value is attached to the words 
 according to their position in a sentence and according to the 
 importance attached to them at a given time. We observe, 
 further, sounds indicative of emotion accompanying the words, 
 and we notice expressive facial gestures, and also gesticulations 
 made with hands, etc. In some languages and in some localities 
 we also trace a regular musical intonation in speech, especially 
 when there is strong feeling. We establish these variations, 
 from the spiritless word to the word intoned and accompanied 
 by gesticulations. We note, finally, the sound value of words 
 in songs and operas. 
 
 (c) We ask whether the word "love" has in reality a rigidly 
 fixed meaning, and we learn that it is liable to alter in signi- 
 fication as in sound, and for the same reasons. On this account 
 we discover transitional, transformed, supplementary, and 
 multiple meanings. Experience we ascertain to be in a fluid 
 condition, especially in earlier epochs, and we also learn that 
 knowledge expands from age to age, originating with the veriest 
 minimum, without there being, as there might conceivably be, 
 an immutable method of changing or of adding words and 
 
 ments, etc., in a habit, they may be ascertained by noting on one occasion 
 the first movement, etc., on a second occasion the second, and so on to the 
 end.
 
 SECTION 22. OBSERVATION. 299 
 
 meanings. Thus such terms as box, get, good, have, point, 
 virtue, and scores of other words, especially such in common 
 use, bewilderingly differ in meaning according to a particular 
 context, and scarcely any word, in earlier ages, can be said to 
 have possessed a single, definite, and fixed connotation. 1 Note 
 affect (pretend), affected (unnatural), affecting (impressive), 
 affection (love, illness); or, charging the enemy, charging the 
 prisoner, charging a fee, charging some one with a mission, 
 charging a gun, charging a boat. In our schools the two 
 emphatic adjectives "ripping" and "rotten", and the adverb 
 "awfully", replace literally hundreds of words among our 
 budding writers of prose and poetry, and, likewise, the poverty- 
 stricken vocabulary of the uneducated does not by any means 
 argue that their store of ideas is correspondingly scanty. 
 Assuming, then, a vocabulary altering in form in consonance 
 with (a), we are further bound to take for granted that the 
 meaning is also subject to mutation, since it, too, is fluid, 
 mainly because of the fluidity of experience. 
 
 (d) If (a) and (c) contained the whole truth, the vocabulary 
 of all languages would remain identical in magnitude, however 
 its form and meaning varied. Examining, however, by the 
 simplest practicable case, the vocabulary of the uneducated, 
 we reach the conclusion that a few hundred primary words 
 suffice in an undeveloped social state, as appears to be ap- 
 proximately the case among the Australian bushmen. We 
 further note, on analysing, that the primitive vocabulary refers 
 to the most common objects and to the commonest wants, and 
 that the names of uncommon objects and abstract objects and 
 wants are developed out of the primitive vocabulary. Thus 
 certain sentiments may be adverted to, as blazing, flaming, fiery, 
 incandescent, glowing, boiling, white hot, red hot, hot, warm, 
 tepid, lukewarm, cool, chilly, cold, frigid, freezing, glaciated, 
 arctic, icy, or we may alter concrete nouns to concrete and 
 other verbs, as in to screen, to mask, to veil, to cloak, to 
 disguise a person or thought. For this reason we are not 
 surprised to find that poetry and metaphor remind us of a 
 stage prior to cold prose which is almost void of imagery but 
 self-explanatory. We also perceive that words become impercep- 
 
 1 "'Turn in' is from this point of view one of the most astonishing words 
 in a language exceptionally active in extracting the last ounce of utility from 
 a single word. The verb 'to turn' has, in this its latest analysis, 47 main 
 senses and 65 sub-senses. Then there are 25 senses on special phrases, 
 such as 'turn the scale', 'turn colour', 'turn tail', and so on, and 16 com- 
 binations with adverbs, as 'turn in', 'turn off, 'turn about', and these too 
 have their subdivisions 'turn up', is used in 27 distinct ways so that, in 
 all, the sense divisions of this busy little vocable number 286. And even 
 then we have not begun on the substantive Turn, which fills 36 columns 
 and, we are not surprised to hear, accounted for no less than three months 
 of Sir James Murray's valuable time.' " (From a review of Sir James A. H.Mur- 
 ray's English Dictionary, in The Times Literary Supplement, July 29, 1915.)
 
 300 
 
 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 tibly modified to indicate certain differences in meaning, as in 
 love, loves, to love, loving, lovely, lovable, loveless, unloved, 
 beloved; 1 that words are doubled by prefixing or postfixing a 
 word to create an added meaning blackbird, black bird, house- 
 breaker, house breaker, the prefixes and postfixes frequently 
 losing their individuality and in their simplified form being 
 often employed to coin new words co-operation, co-education; 
 that the same word differently pronounced or accentuated has 
 sometimes a separate meaning allotted to it minute, retail; 
 that certain roots of words are fertile causes of new words, 
 as st: stable, stack, stall, stand, state, statics, stick, still, stock, 
 stone, etc.; that different parts of speech are freely formed 
 one from another bicycle, to bicycle; that names of persons 
 and places are framed from the names of objects or actions and 
 vice versa Stone, Taylor, mackintosh, boycott; that natural 
 sounds are imitated doves coo and crows caw, or to take a 
 striking series bash, clash, crash, dash, flash, gash, gnash, 
 hash, lash, slash, mash, smash, splash, quash, squash, rash, 
 thrash, trdsh,; that reasons of delicacy and temperamental 
 causes generally are productive of new meanings deranged, 
 demented, insane, neurasthenic, mentally disordered for mad, 
 or all right, quite right, quite all right for right; or compare 
 the original and modern meanings of pagan, knave, urbane, 
 silly; that certain forms and modes of combination are pre- 
 ferred efflux for exflux; the day before yesterday for foreyester- 
 day, that perfunctoriness and indolence impose heavy burdens 
 on frequently used words, such as have or get; that aversion 
 to repetition encourages diversity of expression in contiguous 
 passages prodigious, colossal, immense, huge, gigantic, stupen- 
 dous. Following the simplest case, we gain in this manner 
 considerable insight into the process by which a vocabulary 
 of, say, a few hundred words becomes transmuted into a 
 language boasting, perhaps, a few hundred thousand words 
 expressing several hundred thousand meanings and capable of 
 indefinite expansion. 
 
 The following are among prefixes employed in English: a, a, ab, ad, 
 after, alter, ambi, ana, ante, anti, arch, auto, back, be, bene, bi, bio, bis, 
 bi, circum, con, contra, counter, de, demi, dia, dis, dys, en, enter, epi, 
 equi, eu, ex, extra, for, fore, hemi, here, homo, hydro, hyper, hypo, in, 
 in, inter, infra, intro, juxta, long, mal, meta, mis, mono, multi, non, ob, off, 
 out, over, pan, per, peri, poly, post, pre, pro, re, retro, se, semi, short, 
 sine, sub, super, sur, syn, tele, there, trans, un, ultra, un under, uni, 
 vice, with; and these prefixes may be compounded as in in-de-com-pos- 
 
 1 Here is a longer list credible, credibly, credibility; incredible, incredibly, 
 incredibility; (to) credit, credited, crediting, credit, creditor; (to) discredit, 
 hscrediting, discredited; creditable, creditably, creditableness; discreditable, 
 iscreditably, discreditableness; credulous, credulously, credulousness, credu- 
 lity; incredulous, incredulously, incredulousness, incredulity; accredit, ac- 
 credited, accrediting; credence, credential; credo, creed; credal, credally, 
 creedlet.
 
 SECTION 22. OBSERVATION. 301 
 
 able. Postfixes play, of course, a complimentary part in the formation 
 of words. Many thousands of words owe thus their signification to affixes. 
 The Latin verb vertere (vertere, verti, versum) supplies us through this 
 channel with nearly three hundred words. Here is an almost complete 
 list: 
 
 versatile, versatility ; verse, verses, versicle, versicles; versify, versified, 
 versifying, versification, versifications, versifier, versifiers; versed; version, 
 versions; vertebra, vertebrae; vertebrate, vertebrate, vertebrates, inverte- 
 brate, invertebrates; vertex, vertices, vertical, vertically, verticalness; 
 vertigo, vertiginous; vortex, vortices, vortical. 
 
 avert, averted, averting, aversion, aversions; averse, aversely, averseness. 
 
 advert, adverted, adverting, adverting ; adverse, adversely, adverseness ; 
 adversary, adversaries; adversity; adversative, advertence, advertency; 
 inadvertent, inadvertently, inadvertence; advertise, advertised, advertising, 
 advertisement, advertisements, advertiser, advertisers. 
 
 animadvert, animadverted, animadverting, animadversion, animad- 
 versions. 
 
 convert, converted, converting, conversion, conversions; convertible, 
 convertibility; unconverted, inconvertible, inconvertibility; convert, con- 
 verts; converse, conversely, converseness; converse, conversed, conversing, 
 conversation, conversations; conversational, conversationally; conversa- 
 tionalist, conversationalists; conversazione, conversazione; conversable, 
 conversably, conversant; reconvert, reconverted, reconverting, reconversion, 
 reconversions; reconvertible, reconvertibility. 
 
 controvert, controverted, controverting, controverting; controvertible. 
 controvertibly; controversial, controversially, controversy, controversies, 
 controversialist, controversialists. 
 
 divert, diverted, diverting, diversion, diversions; divers, diverse, diver- 
 sely, diversity, diversities; diversify, diversified, diversifying, diversifi- 
 cation, diversifications; divorce, divorces, divorcee; redivert, rediverted, 
 rediverting, rediversion, rediversions. 
 
 invert, inverted," inverting, inversion, inversions; inversely, inversely, 
 inverseness; reinvert, rein verted, reinverted, rein version, reinversions. 
 
 malversation, malversations. 
 
 obvert, obverted, obverting, obversion, obversions; obverse, obversely, 
 obverse, obverseness. 
 
 pervert, perverted, perverting, perversion, perversions; perverse, per- 
 versely, perverseness; perversity; pervertible, pervertibility, impervertibi- 
 lity; perverter, perverters; unperverted; repervert, reperverted, repervert- 
 ing, reperversion, reperversions. 
 
 revert, reverted, reverting, reversion, reversions, reversionary, reversal, 
 reversals; reverse, reversely, reverseness; reverse, reverses; reversible, 
 reversibility; irreversible, irreversibility ; reverse, reversed, reversing, 
 reversion, reversions; revertible, revertibility, retroversion ; rerevert, re- 
 reverted, rereverting, rereversion, rereversions ; rereversible, rereversi- 
 bility, rerevertible, rerevertibility. 
 
 subvert, subverted, subverting, subversion, subversions; subversive, 
 subversively, subversiveness; subvertible, subvertibility; resubvert, resub- 
 verted, resubverting, resub version, resubversions; resubvertible, resub- 
 vertibility; insubvertible, insubvertibility. 
 
 tergiversation, tergiversations. 
 
 transverse, transversely, transverseness. 
 
 traverse, traversed, traversing, traversing; traversable, traversability ; 
 intraversible, intraversibility; traverser, traversers; retraverse, retraversed, 
 retraversing, retra versing ; retraversible, retraversibility. 
 
 universe, universal, universally, universality, universalism, university, 
 universities. 
 
 (e) From the above analysis we infer, through searching for 
 the simplest case, that given an insignificant vocabulary in- 
 numerable languages, with extensive vocabularies, special
 
 302 
 
 PART V,- WORKING STAGE. 
 
 grammars, and rich meanings, will evolve necessarily and with 
 astonishing rapidity. 1 
 
 (/) Needless to state that the application of the simplest 
 practicable case to the problem of the nature of an ideal lan- 
 guage should prove, as it is already proving in modern arti- 
 ficial languages, fruitful of good results. (See, however, 205.) 
 
 149. The whole of the above analysis suggests therefore 
 the decided advantage of simplifying our problem as completely 
 as possible, for this enables us with a minimum of effort to 
 explore a subject systematically. There is scarcely a sphere of 
 knowledge where the utilisation of the simplest practicable case 
 is not applicable and of appreciable value, as, for example, in 
 all cultural matters of a practical character where, instead of 
 beginning forthwith de novo, we should first search for the best 
 that has been accomplished in a particular or cognate direction. 
 Thus, for instance, instead of assuming that armies and navies 
 are necessary in the same sense as a police force is, we note 
 that neutralised States exist and flourish without rattling or 
 drawing the sword, 2 and that this is even truer of towns and 
 provinces. Or if national sentiment is said to be indissolubly 
 connected with a common tongue, the case of Switzerland is 
 an apt reminder of the limitations of the generalisation. 
 
 150. Another social problem of formidable dimensions 
 might with advantage be approached by the same avenue 
 that is, the question of an adequate normal income for all. As 
 is pointed out in Conclusions 14 and 15, the solutions custom- 
 arily proposed are on this subject disappointing. 
 
 We might, then, proceed as follows. Having found that ster- 
 ling material and efficient workmanship are really cheapest, 
 we consider, say, the durability of a suit of clothes worn by a 
 careful person. We repeat the enquiry in regard to each portion 
 of the suit, and assume throughout (a) that we select colours, etc., 
 which, other things being equal, are least affected by sun, wear, 
 or fashion, and (6) that the individual has been trained to be 
 careful with his garments and to undertake practically all minor 
 
 1 The problem of an effective medium of lingual communication is not 
 entirely solved until the question of the juxtaposition of words is considered. 
 For example, two words may express one idea, as silver wedding, golden 
 wedding, diamond wedding, and so with analogously framed word couplets 
 and triplets. Even beyond this, the more cautiously we examine cultured 
 speech, the more we discern the frequent associating of certain terms. Thus 
 we often speak, for instance, of an invincible army, an implacable foe, an 
 inexorable fate, an indomitable will, an inflexible determination, an unshake- 
 able conviction. Those who are best capable of expressing their thoughts 
 clearly and forcibly, exemplify in a convincing manner this trend of select- 
 ing and fixing the most appropriate correlates of words. This process is, 
 moreover, extended to sentences, as in idiomatic expressions, conventional 
 tormulae, and polished diction. The ordinary dictionary, which by its method 
 suggests that the nature and history of language are summed up in isolated 
 words, is seriously misleading. 
 
 - This sentence was penned before the war.
 
 SECTION 22. OBSERVATION. 303 
 
 repairs. Secondly, should circumstances favour it, we make an 
 analogous study of wearing apparel in general, the food, drink, 
 housing, furnishing, and recreation problems, where generally, 
 and especially in respect of food and drink, much might be 
 immensely and advantageously simplified and omitted, to the 
 confusion of doctors and even of preachers. And, thirdly, we 
 allow for certain other classes of expenditure, and for the fact 
 that the entire problem is primarily a family problem includ- 
 ing mother, father, and, say, three children. 1 
 
 Having reached this point in our enquiry, we are prepared 
 to venture on the second step, namely, to ascertain how much has 
 to be deducted (a) for superfluous middle-men, (b) for inferior 
 material and bad workmanship due to diverse social causes, 
 (c) for methods of management, production, and distribution 
 short of the most economical, and (d) for individuals not work- 
 ingultimately only children and the aged, since strikes, lock- 
 outs, unemployment, idleness, and illness would be virtually 
 annihilated in a well-ordered community. To simplify the en- 
 quiry, however, we only examine two or three articles and those 
 the simplest and most important. We obtain, as a result, by 
 judicious generalisation, approximately the true normal income 
 necessary for an individual, a family, and a people. Until this 
 calculation has been effected and a competent and progressively- 
 minded committee of men and women economists, with their 
 eyes open and going directly to the facts, could accomplish it 
 in a measurable time for all practicable purposes we shall 
 achieve little progress in the direction of discussing profitably 
 the paramount social problem of the abolition of poverty and, 
 with it, of riches and of unwholesome work and competition. 
 In fact, this Conclusion might aid us in formulating a scientific 
 utopia for our day, to realise which should be the combined 
 task of statesman, reformer, and ordinary citizen. Incidentally, 
 the conclusion arrived at would, in a practical manner, dispose 
 of the problem of the much lauded and debated simple life. 
 
 The vexing wages problem, so simple in appearance and so 
 complex in reality, may be approached by the same method. 
 Suppose all engaged in production and distribution have the 
 same income, and suppose the income is reduced 25/o. Then, 
 other things being equal, the price of all articles is reduced 25/o ; 
 but the income having fallen 25/o, the purchasing power will 
 be the same as before, the lower price corresponding to the 
 lower income. However, desire to earn 25/o more, may lead 
 to a 25% increase in output, which would mean a 25% de- 
 crease in price and a consequent 25/o increase in purchasing 
 power. Or disappointment at the 25/o decrease in income may 
 cause a 25/o decrease in output, when the purchasing power 
 will be reduced by 25/o. Looking at the problem another way, 
 
 1 For a list of family requirements, see 127.
 
 304 
 
 PART V WORKING STAGE. 
 
 the employing class may absorb the whole 25/o decrease in 
 wages, when the workers will be simply 25/o the poorer. Or 
 the profits may be so high that a 25% lowering of wages may 
 make only a 5/o difference in price, when the workers' purchas- 
 ing power will have fallen by 20/o . Again, the already inadequate 
 wages may be driven down 50/o. The consequence may be 
 that the efficiency of the workers is very seriously impaired 
 through malnutrition, overcrowding, and the mental and material 
 crippling of the new generation, the value of the output being 
 reduced thereby by 50/o or even 75%. Or the wages may be 
 increased 25% or even 50/o, and the output keep pace be- 
 cause of the vigour imparted to the working class by the higher 
 standard of healthy living created. Furthermore, when average 
 wages are considered, we may calculate that they must cover 
 the ordinary current needs of a standardised family of five, 
 plus perhaps 25% extra for various non-ordinary expenses and 
 contingencies. 
 
 151. Or examine the educational possibilities inherent in 
 children. 1 The majority of our future citizens attend the 
 publicly provided school from their kindergarten days to the 
 age of fourteen, by which time they seem to have acquired 
 only the rudiments of the elements of learning. The world in 
 its physical, intellectual, moral, aesthetic, and evolutionary as- 
 pects, except for the barest surface, has remained, and will pro- 
 bably*remain, practically a closed book to them. The position 
 is slightly, though not appreciably, improved when we weigh 
 the results obtained in the schools where the well-to-do send 
 their offspring. If we desire, however, to apply the simplest 
 practicable case to our problem, we shall search for an in- 
 stance where a teacher had one or a few children in charge 
 and was highly successful. This we find in the relation of 
 James Mill to his son John Stuart Mill. 2 Here we meet with 
 a magnificent result which suggests that the school, unless it 
 is thoroughly reformed, is an extremely inefficient institution, 
 and that the sooner it is replaced by home education, 3 the 
 sooner will the coming generations consist of men and women 
 of culture and insight, instead of being composed, as at present, 
 of a great mass almost void of any real ability, social enthusi- 
 asm, and refinement. . 
 
 It will be averred, perhaps, that the younger Mill was by 
 nature much superior to his fellows. To this two replies may 
 
 1 This may be taken to comprehend early training generally. Beyond 
 this, it also applies to youthful persons, though not to the same extent: "In 
 Mr. Gantt's training of factory girls he has been able to make the large 
 majority of each set into 'first-class workers', chiefly by the exercise of 
 patience and tact." (M. and A. D. McKillop, op. cit., p. 109.) 
 
 ! See for a similar instance: The Education of Karl Witte, ed. by 
 H. Addington Bruce, and for further illustrations Mr. Bruce's Introduction. 
 John Locke, in his Conduct of the Understanding, is emphatic in respect 
 of the advantages of home education.
 
 SECTION 22. OBSERVATION. 305 
 
 be tendered. First, John Stuart Mill explicitly and categori- 
 cally denied that such was the case. Secondly, the present 
 author has watched the early education of children in homes, 
 and has reached the conclusion that any child of nine or ten 
 ought not only to know, speaking generally, as much as child- 
 ren leaving the elementary school at fourteen, but vastly more, 
 so far at least as real education is concerned. The secret is not 
 a deeply veiled one. First, the child can be led to observe 
 and know most of the simpler natural phenomena, to acquire 
 manipulative dexterity, to make substantial progress in arith- 
 metic and drawing, as well as to listen to simplified stories 
 which would promote in him or her an understanding of, and 
 interest in, all kinds of important problems. Secondly, the 
 child is encouraged to read and re-read books, printed in large 
 type and written in plain language and well illustrated, on 
 many fundamental topics astronomy, etheorology, geology, 
 natural history, anthropology, psychology, history, geography, 
 inventions and discoveries of a practical character, etc. If to 
 this be added the older Mill's method of encouraging clear and 
 thoughtful expression in speaking and writing of things learnt 
 and considered, and a complementary training in morals and in 
 the appreciation of things useful and beautiful, the outcome is 
 quite beyond anything one could possibly hope for from the 
 school in its present form, especially if we also include in our 
 purview systematic methodological teaching of the type advo- 
 cated in this volume. 
 
 Assuming intelligent direction, one fairly well prepared mentor 
 could educate with facility, say, six children, until the age of 
 self-education arrives, that is, several years before the average 
 child now leaves the elementary school, after which period the 
 teacher could as easily assist double or treble this number of 
 children. 
 
 This analysis suggests several conclusions that the present- 
 day schools are, comparatively speaking, wofully inefficient; 
 that the supreme aim of education should be to create in the 
 young a love of truth, goodness, health, work, and beauty, and 
 not merely to pump into them in class and during certain hours 
 a given amount of "necessary" knowledge; that the schools 
 should primarily succeed, if they are to succeed at all, in per- 
 suading children intelligently to read and re-read for themselves 
 simply but ably written books on the leading topics of cultural 
 interest, 1 to study problems at first hand, to become dexterous 
 in every kind of manual activity, and to be habitually reflective 
 and judicious; that they should obtain the co-operation of the 
 home in order that the children are led to observe, examine, 
 reflect, and act with decision ; that the schools should raise their 
 
 1 According to Darwin "there are no advantages and many disadvantages 
 in lectures compared with reading". (Life and Letters, vol. 1, p. 33.) 
 
 20
 
 306 
 
 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 standard of attainment for the different ages to that of James 
 Mill's, and reduce the proportion of scholars under a teacher 
 to about six for the earlier and twelve or more for the later 
 stages; and, lastly, that the school is either doomed to be super- 
 seded partly or wholly by the home, or else should be trans- 
 formed root upwards in accordance with the above demands. 
 Indeed, from the point of view of a high conception of moral 
 education, the present method of herding the children together, 
 would be grotesque and criminal if it were not for the time 
 being, perhaps, inevitable. Those who profess faith in mass 
 education need to advance sterling reasons why it is necessary 
 to congregate large numbers of children, and how it is possible 
 in such circumstances to do justice to them either morally or 
 intellectually. Here, also, the simplest practicable case should 
 be applied. 
 
 152. The simplest practicable case might be profitably 
 divided into: 
 
 (a) centring an enquiry round one or a few instances which 
 can be easily and exhaustively studied in respect of the aspects 
 cited in our table of Primary Categories; 
 
 (ft) scientific experiments where factors are isolated and where 
 quantitative results are aimed at; 
 
 (c) use of instruments to aid the senses, and devising precise, 
 refined, and powerful instruments (as Davey's battery, Faraday's 
 magnet, the Ross telescope, Bose's magnetic crescograph, the 
 motor driven hammer and crane, the giant airship and aero- 
 plane, the towering factory chimney causing an enormous 
 draught, etc.), besides instituting well equipped laboratories, 
 experimental stations, and observatories; 
 
 (d) mathematical, quantitative, or definite form of procedure 
 and statement; 
 
 (e) idealised statements (e.g., the earth regarded as at rest 
 and as having an axis, conceptual and real models, economic 
 charts and diagrams, map projections and relief maps, sketches 
 and simplified substitutes generally where necessary); 1 
 
 (/) scientifically established and universally accepted measures, 
 formulae, processes, methods, terms, etc., and preserving one 
 or more standard measures, etc. ; 
 
 1 Simplification is very frequently resorted to in science. Here is a typical 
 example: "In connection with the general problem of aerial vibrations in 
 three dimensions one of the first things, which naturally offers itself, is the 
 determination of the motion in an unlimited atmosphere consequent upon 
 arbitrary initial disturbances. It will be assumed that the disturbance is 
 small, so that the ordinary approximate equations are applicable, and further 
 that the initial velocities are such as can be derived from a velocity-poten- 
 tial, or that there is no circulation. ... We shall also suppose in the first 
 place that no external forces act upon the fluid, so that the motion to be 
 investigated is due solely to a disturbance actually existing at a time (t = 0) 
 previous to which we do not push our enquiries." (Lord Rayleigh, Theory 
 of Sound, vol. 2, 1896.)
 
 SECTION 22. OBSERVATION. 307 
 
 (g) approaching the unknown and remote from the side of 
 the known and near (as in geology); 
 
 (h) selection of pure, conveniently large, and simplified in- 
 stances (as in botany and physiology), and excluding or intro- 
 ducing single factors (as oxygen, moisture, heat, and the like) 
 by suitable methods; 
 
 (i) observing, and experimenting with, myriads of instances, 
 and continuing this for many years (as exemplified in Luther 
 Burbank's enquiries); and 
 
 (y) proceeding by the law of averages and probability; 
 
 (k) ascertaining whether the senses or the instruments are 
 at the time of investigation in normal condition; 
 
 (/) following Descartes' injunction, and dividing, as far as 
 possible, complex problems into simple ones before investigating 
 them; and 
 
 (m) isolating objects and forces, phases and circumstances, 
 utilising here Mill's Canons of Difference and Residue (as in 
 the experimental determination of food-stuffs necessary to plants 
 or animals); 1 
 
 (ri) aiming at the ideally simple and minimal in thought, 
 movement, energy, means, material, conclusion, and statement 
 (e.g., the use of mercury instead of water in the barometer, 
 the tonic solfa notation, the continuous twenty-four hours' 
 system of measurement, summing the zeros as in 7X10 23 , 
 furnishing percentages, establishing international index numbers 
 and units in all departments, romanising the Japanese and 
 Chinese alphabets, fountain pens, rustless steel for knives) ; and 
 
 1 Professor Bateson, speaking of Abbe Mendel's experiments, says: "In 
 order to obtain a clear result he saw that it was absolutely necessary to 
 start with pure-breeding, homogeneous materials, to consider each character 
 separately, and on no account to confuse the different generations together." 
 (Mendel's Principles of Heredity, 1909, p. 7.) In this cautious manner Mendel 
 studied separately seven different characters of the pea, and his followers 
 have even excelled him in thoroughness. So, too, it was only after animals 
 were fed upon thoroughly purified proteins, fats, carbo-hydrates, and certain 
 mineral salts, that the need of other essential food factors became evident, 
 whilst, conversely, the addition of the latter produced a perfect diet. In 
 physical and mechanical enquiries it is common to assume a fact to be far 
 simpler than it is for the purpose of securing a point of departure. Hence 
 we read in mechanics of points, particles, rigid bodies, and perfect fluids. 
 When the solution for the idealised fact is obtained, less simple facts are 
 studied until, so far as possible, the fact is known in all its complexity. 
 That such is the procedure in geometry, with its perfect triangles, squares, 
 and circles, is a commonplace. The use of the magnetic needle in magnetic 
 experiments offers a further instance of circumventing the unnecessary com- 
 plexity which arises when ordinary magnetic substances are employed. 
 
 The principle of the simplest case is involved in the principles of "least 
 effort", "the line of least resistance", "the law of parsimony", and in the 
 phrases "entities are not to be multiplied without necessity" (William of 
 Occam), and "no more natural causes are to be assumed than such as are 
 true and suffice to explain the phenomena" (Newton). (See a short article 
 on "The Simplicity of Natural Laws", by Dr. C. H. Desch, in The Positivist 
 Review, May, 1912.) 
 
 20*
 
 308 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 (o) preferring the simplest form of generalising and generali- 
 sations, deducing and deductions, postulating and hypotheses, 
 verifying and verifications, defining and definitions, stating and 
 statements, etc. 
 
 This Conclusion should, among other things, aid in revolu- 
 tionising the methods of teaching in schools and colleges, and 
 its results should be developed more especially by means of 
 Conclusions 27 and 28. 
 
 CONCLUSION 20 a. 
 
 Need of Degree Determination within and between Divisions, 
 and,- in this connection, need of searching for Pure, Normal, 
 Minimal, Maximal, Parallel, Distantly Related, Seemingly Un- 
 related, Deviating, Morbid, Eccentric, Border, and Transitional 
 Instances. (For text, see Conclusion 27.) 
 
 CONCLUSION 206. 
 
 Need of Proceeding Dialectically, /.P., need of searching in 
 connection with any facts for what is Contradictory, Contrary, 
 Opposite, Common, Disparate, Dependent, Interdependent, 
 Supplementary, Alternative, Complementary, and Relative. (For 
 text, see Conclusion 28.) 
 
 CONCLUSION 21. 
 
 Need of Habitual Alertness in order to discover Exceptional, 
 
 Unobtrusive, and Unsuspected Facts, and need of Unremitting 
 
 Concentration in Scientific Work generally. 
 
 153. (A) HABITUAL ALEKTNESS.-We should, accord- 
 ing to this first part, bring into full consciousness what might 
 remain an obscure or passing observation or reflection. Every 
 hint should be tracked to its lair, and ours should be an 
 expectant attitude of mind always prepared to find that a 
 particular experience does not harmonise with our average ex- 
 perience, with another's experience, or with common experience. 
 Everything we perceive should teach us something new, even 
 when we have frequently encountered it before ; we should 
 keep alive the faculty of wonder, ever remaining sensitive, 
 receptive, responsive, approachable, awake. We need to dis- 
 courage lazy and hazy thinking, and be perennially on the alert 
 lest we miss what is significant in a fresh or an unexpected 
 connection. There should be an almost blind and instinctive 
 desire to reach the whole of the fact and nothing but the fact, 
 as well as to seize on what is of moment. Previous knowledge 
 should be held suspect, and the supposition should be made 
 that the form which common knowledge assumes is seriously 
 incomplete. Examination and reasoning should be guided by 
 the data rather than by preconceived notions, e.g., instead of 
 echoing the common assertion that the body renews itself every
 
 SECTION 22 OBSERVATION. 309 
 
 seven years, we should be ready to find that some cells are 
 replaced at frequent intervals, whilst others, such as the neural 
 cells, never, or altogether, pass away; or instead of assuming 
 that all twins intimately resemble each other, we might discover 
 that there are two types those closely resembling each other, 
 developed from the same egg, and those plainly different, 
 produced from two different eggs; or we might learn that 
 "there are upland geese with webbed feet, ground woodpeckers, 
 diving thrushes, and petrels with the habits of auks" (Darwin); 
 or we might discover that a certain lowland plant transferred 
 to a high plateau assumes the features of a certain highland 
 plant and loses these when returned to the valley, but that 
 the highland plant translated to the valley retains its highland 
 characteristics; or experience might enlighten us about whis- 
 pering galleries and opaque acoustic "clouds", and not only 
 teach us that cooling water begins to expand at 4 C., but that 
 in certain circumstances it may be cooled down to over ten 
 degrees below C. without freezing ; or experiment might 
 teach us that living larvaB might be produced by chemical 
 changes from unfertilised eggs in the case of diverse species- 
 starfish, sea-urchins, holothurians, and others; or alertness 
 might enable us to connect avian polyneuritis with human beri- 
 beri, and also to assume that there may be life-endangering 
 deficiency diseases which can be cured by the simple process 
 of supplying what is lacking; or we might find, contrary to 
 anticipation, that at the beginning of the week's work and the 
 first hour of work in the morning less is produced than after 
 the first day and after the first" hour, and that during the last 
 hour before lunch and before leaving work in the evening 
 more is produced relatively to some of the intervening hours, 
 and that those working fewer hours produce, within large 
 limits, correspondingly more. Seeming incongruities should be 
 fastened on as possible new centres of departure instead of as 
 matters to be ignored or explained away, as with the anomalous 
 position of argon and iodine in the Periodical Table of the 
 elements. 1 Darwin, according to his son, was above all things 
 a believer in alertness: "There was one quality of mind which 
 seemed to be of special and extreme advantage in leading him to 
 
 1 "If some opposite instance, not observed or not known before, chance to 
 come in the way, the axiom is rescued and preserved by some frivolous dis- 
 tinction; whereas the truer course would be to correct the axiom itself." 
 (Bacon, Novum Organum, bk. 1, 25.) Some famous instances of this kind should 
 not. be overlooked. When it was shown that water did not rise higher in 
 a pump than thirty-two feet, it was contended that nature's horror of a 
 vacuum ceased at that limit; when it was demonstrated that the supposed 
 loss of substance in combustion could be accounted for, it was argued that 
 phlogiston possessed the characteristic of positive levity ; and when Darwin 
 proposed his theory of natural selection, attempts were made to modify the 
 theories of special creation so that they might be in formal consonance 
 with the results of geological and biological research.
 
 310 
 
 PART V. -WORKING STAGE. 
 
 make discoveries. It was the power of never letting exceptions 
 pass unnoticed." (Charles Darwin, 1902, p. 94.) And his analyst 
 writes : "The starting points of his investigations were frequently 
 what seemed to other men interesting, but unimportant or in- 
 convenient, exceptional facts." (Frank Cramer, op. cit, p. 230.) 1 
 John Stuart Mill speaks in Chapter 4 of his Autobiography of 
 "a mental habit to which I attribute all that I have ever done, 
 or ever shall do, in speculation: that of never accepting half- 
 solutions of difficulties as complete ; never abandoning a puzzle, 
 but again and again returning to it until it was cleared up ; never 
 allowing obscure corners of a subject to remain unexplored, be- 
 cause they did not appear important ; never thinking that I per- 
 fectly understood any part of a subject until I understood the 
 whole". Of Lord Kelvin, his biographer says: "He believed 
 that light would come at last on the most baffling of problems, 
 if only it were looked at from every point of view and its con- 
 ditions were completely formulated." (Lord Kelvin, by Andrew 
 Gray, 1908, p. 306.) "It was a happy thought of Glauber", 
 writes Sir John Herschel, in his Discourse, "to examine what 
 everybody else threw away." (161.) "In case any exception 
 occurs, it must be carefully noted and set aside for re-examina- 
 tion at a more advanced period." (172.) "It is commonly stated", 
 writes Thorpe, "that the exception is a proof of the rule. The 
 history of science can show many instances whereby the rule 
 has been demolished by the exception. Little facts have killed 
 big theories, even as a pebble has slain a giant." (Op. cit., 
 vol. 1, p. 85.) Sir Michael Fyster, speaking of the scientific 
 worker, declares: "He must be alert of mind. Nature is ever 
 making signs to us, she is ever whispering to us the beginnings 
 of her secrets; the scientific man must be ever on the watch, 
 ready at once to lay hold of Nature's hint, however small, to 
 listen to her whisper, however low." (Presidential Address to 
 the British Association, 1899, p. 16.) 
 
 We should, furthermore, be alert in our thought, utilising all the 
 serviceable memories and rapidly elaborating as many provisional 
 conclusions and deductions as the circumstances permit. 
 
 Primarily we need to be guided by the consideration, illustrated 
 in Conclusion 19, that what obtrudes itself is most generally 
 indifferent scientifically, and that what is significant scientifically 
 has to be searched for in unsuspected quarters. Common ob- 
 servation would never have revealed to us the nature of the 
 white corpuscles or phagocytes which, according to Metschnikoff , 
 
 1 Adverting to how Sir William Crookes was led to his vacuum tube 
 experiments, Sir William Ramsay (Essays Biographical and Chemical, 1908) 
 remarks: "Here again we see the advantage of following up small trails; 
 they may widen to great and most important roads." (P. 124.) And he adds : 
 believe that Ro'ntgen's discovery arose from an accidental observation 
 that a box of photographic plates left near a Crookes tube became 'fogged', 
 and he too had genius to follow up this clue." (P. 125.) Poincare has a 
 suggestive passage on this point in Science et methode, 1908, p. 311.
 
 SKCTION 22. OBSERVATION. 311 
 
 are our protection against certain dangerous bacteria, nor would 
 observation of this kind have disclosed to us the existence of 
 countless classes of such bacteria, much less that in many in- 
 stances the malignant bacteria are carried and nursed by some 
 animal or insect, as in the case of malaria, the "Nagan" horse 
 and cattle disease, sleeping sickness, and the plague. Nor would 
 ordinary reasoning have led us to observe that the telegraph 
 wire guides, but does not carry, the electricity, that telegraphic 
 messages might be sent without any conductor, or that it might 
 be possible to be in London and yet make one's voice heard in 
 Paris or Rome. And it required alertness for a medical student 
 to notice that ether numbs pain, or for some one to identify 
 the specks of yeast with vegetable life, to be struck with the 
 nucleus of the cell, or to suggest that lunatics should be ordered 
 to bed. 1 The longer one revolves such discoveries, the more 
 one is astonished that most of them should not have been 
 made long ago, and the intenser becomes the conviction that, 
 when once a scientific methodology is established, obscure or 
 delicate hints will seldom be neglected by even amateur workers 
 in science. 
 
 However, alertness is not less a virtue in the domain of 
 practice, and this is admitted by business men. Yet so far as 
 officialdom is concerned, it is largely, allowing for certain 
 honourable exceptions, in an arrested stage of development. 
 Here we have, so to speak, an exemplification of the workings 
 of the more or less primitive mind. The typical official reasons 
 that in lack of caution lurk dangers, and he thus arrives at 
 the suspicious conclusion that in doubtful matters he must do 
 no more than he is absolutely bound to. Risks and there are 
 risks in practically everything are therefore to be avoided at 
 all costs, an attitude which every business man knows spells 
 disaster, if not ruin. Similarly, everything tends to be organised 
 on the Noah's ark principle. Every official has assigned to him 
 a narrowly and arbitrarily circumscribed sphere of action, and 
 a hierarchy of public servants is established with definite in- 
 elastic responsibilities and human relationships reduced and 
 degraded to an exchange of minutes. Initiative, adaptability, 
 and progress are hence seriously obstructed, and an organisa- 
 tion is created which will not only do nothing that is wrong, 
 but do nothing beyond what it is forced to do. Hence the govern- 
 
 1 Catalysers and enzymes form an excellent illustration of our thesis, for 
 nothing save dogged alertness would have revealed them. Here are some 
 examples relating to catalysers: "A mixture of oxygen and hydrogen im- 
 mediately explodes when it is brought in contact with platinum black. 
 Common coal gas inflames when brought in contact with finely divided 
 platinum. Sulphur dioxide is by the same agency quickly oxidised to sul- 
 phuric acid. Hydroperoxide is rapidly split into oxygen and water when in 
 contact with platinum black. In all these cases the quantity of platinum 
 black is not diminished after the reaction, and the products of the reactions 
 are never any of the platinum compounds." (Frederick Czapek, op. cit., p. 84.)
 
 312 
 
 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 ment machine is too frequently a gigantic treadmill where 
 mighty efforts produce intangible results. The intentions of 
 the bureaucrat, we perceive, are immaculate; but he is not 
 alert enough, and virtually strangles the great hopes reposed 
 in him. Not until the government machine has been converted 
 into an organism, will it be an instrument of social progress. 
 An alert community will insist on, and carry through, a radical 
 reform of public services, with the object that these services 
 should successfully compete in efficiency with the best com- 
 mercial, industrial, and scientific services. 
 
 Habitual alertness, lastly, will be immensely . aided by the 
 conscious assumption that all variations, however common or 
 slight, as in the size, shape, foliage, flowers, vigour, or resistance 
 of plants, should be regarded as demanding elucidation and 
 explanation, and as possibly exemplifying far-reaching principles. 
 
 154. (B) UNREMITTING CONCENTRATION The mind 
 should be ceaselessly concentrated in all scientific work, and 
 never be allowed to be greatly or entirely relaxed. Only in 
 this manner are we likely to escape superficiality and error, 
 and make certain that the wheel of progress shall perpetually 
 revolve and advance, for with the diverse mental powers 
 unstrung, we become mechanical and our work is of necessity 
 indifferently performed. The thinker reflects strenuously without 
 intermission, and he who would be a thinker must needs act 
 thus. To contend, therefore, that thought is only requisite at 
 certain defined critical moments in an enquiry, is to display 
 inadequate insight into the complexity of phenomena or into 
 the procedure of successful men of science. Novel facts may 
 present themselves at any moment, and old facts may appear 
 in a new light when a concentrated mind observes them. Every 
 situation or problem we are confronted with ought to call out 
 our best energies of thought. There are no indifferent details, 
 no automatic parts, one might say, in a scientific enquiry, any 
 more than in an up-to-date business transaction or in true art. 
 It is probably a grave misapprehension to assume that the 
 thinker need exercise no effort as a rule, and that he need 
 only think at intervals. In all affairs of life the contrary is 
 -true, and the more strenuous, and continuously strenuous, we 
 are, the more our powers will develop, whilst habitual absence 
 of strenuoushess will reduce our capacities to negligibility. It 
 is likewise 'an error to suppose that mental effort is exhausting 
 or impossible to the average mind; for, most probably, the 
 normal individual may become, through practice, accustomed 
 to hard mental as to hard physical exertion, the harder the 
 more intelligently and the more ceaselessly he practises. 
 
 Our conclusion is, then, that it is the distinguishing mark of 
 a properly conducted scientific enquiry that in all its phases 
 habitual alertness and unremitting concentration are exhibited.
 
 SECTION 22 OBSERVATION.' 313 
 
 CONCLUSION 22. 
 
 Need ol Collecting the Largest Number of Leading Facts and 
 Ascertaining the Unlike as well as the Like. 
 
 155. (A) ABUNDANCE OF LEADING FACTS. Out of 
 the multitude of methodological Conclusions it would be diffi- 
 cult to select many which are more gravely sinned against 
 than the present one, and with such dire consequences. For 
 this reason, we encounter references to such a need in several 
 of the Conclusions. It is the besetting fault of the average 
 thinker of to-day to assume that the one or few facts which 
 he professes to have discovered, are all the facts relevant to 
 the issue. 1 Thus the student of methodology has repeatedly 
 occasion to observe that whole systems of thought are grounded 
 on some few, out of a vast number, of relevant facts. Instead 
 of patiently collecting all that is material to a subject, the 
 majority of investigators shout Eureka! when they are only 
 at the threshold of their preliminary examination. And to 
 aggravate matters, it is common for one investigator with a 
 handful of facts to oppose another who is equally placed, on 
 the assumption that the two handfuls are necessarily irrecon- 
 cilable and that one of the handfuls comprises all the needful 
 data. Naturally, therefore, those inquirers who regard their 
 task as completed when it is scarcely begun, contribute very 
 little to intellectual progress, and hence it happens that advance 
 is drearily slow and proceeds by an interminable series of 
 corrections of older views until at last, in zigzag fashion, the 
 comprehensive truth is reached. Such a mode of progression 
 is assuredly as wasteful as it is questionable. 
 
 The inquirer should accordingly assume that only a prolonged 
 investigation yielding an extensive number of material facts 
 justifies any important or definite conclusions. For example, 
 the present author might have been satisfied with two or three 
 of the items in the heading of Conclusion 25. Instead, he did 
 not cease for many years to attempt to add to the list of 
 qualifications, and he has no doubt that additions of equal and 
 greater importance to those quoted are possible. Similarly, 
 with the sub-points in Conclusions 19 and 20, or with the number 
 of the Conclusions, or indeed with the general text of the Con- 
 clusions. Everywhere where it is not a question of direct observa- 
 tion, of generalising, or of more or less manifest relations, as 
 in Conclusions 27 and 28, nothing remains but persistently to sup- 
 plement material details and resolutely to dismiss the idea of 
 finality. If these details can be afterwards welded together and 
 augmented by a process of generalisation or deduction, this is 
 a matter for felicitation, but separate important facts apposite 
 
 1 "That fashion of taking few things into account, and pronouncing with 
 reference to a few things, has been the ruin of everything." (Bacon, 
 Parasceve.)
 
 314 
 
 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 to any investigation should never be hypothetically supposed 
 to be scanty in number or non-existent, because they are diffi- 
 cult to procure. For example, Lavoisier imagined that organic 
 compounds were combinations of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen. 
 Experiment has added to these in the course of time not only 
 nitrogen, but about a dozen other elements. 
 
 Another instance. How far can we legitimately speak of 
 common interests between nations? We might notice the 
 outstanding case of the imposing national imports and exports, 
 and rest satisfied therewith. Or we might add to this emigra- 
 tion and immigration statistics and the legions of individuals 
 travelling in search of enjoyment, health, study, and profit. 
 Pressing on, we might with advantage refer to the hundreds 
 of international associations and their congresses as well as to 
 the internationalisation of the sciences and the arts. If, however, 
 we aspire to a truly adequate conception of common interests 
 between nations, we should, according to Conclusion 25 /, run 
 systematically through the physical, biological, and cultural 
 sciences, together with the arts, crafts, and customs, as epito- 
 mised, for instance, in Conclusion 33. The haphazard selection 
 of one or a few unconnected particulars must be eschewed at 
 all costs. 
 
 Here is a further example. In reconstructing industrial pro- 
 cesses along scientific lines, attention was initially focused on 
 the most prominent factors elimination of unnecessary move- 
 ments, of slowness, and of sensible fatigue. If, however, we 
 desire to be veritably comprehensive, we commence at the 
 beginning intention to perform a task, willing it, sensing 
 material constituents or recollecting mental ones, studying simpli- 
 fication, rapidity, pauselessness, energy, and fatiguelessness of 
 movements, allowing for thought, volition, and feeling through- 
 out, and enumerating completely the principal external factors 
 influencing the quantity and the quality of the output as found 
 in Conclusion 10 and continuing thus right to the end. Only 
 in this manner can we ascertain whether some valuable con- 
 stituent .has not been overlooked. Moreover, there is no suffi- 
 cient methodological reason, apart from the absence of a me- 
 thodology, why the systematic enumeration of factors should 
 not have been undertaken at the very inception of the scientific 
 efficiency movement. 
 
 Similarly, with the general problem of dietetics. Instead of 
 fastening on one or a few important aspects, there should be 
 an endeavour to collect all that is relevant and of moment. 
 Such aspects might be considered to be (a) food containing 
 the necessary nutritive ingredients (including vitamines) for 
 ensuring and maintaining robust health; (b) such food as is 
 most easily digested and most fully absorbed; (c) clean and 
 well prepared food cleanly served; (rf) keeping close to the 
 minimum required for sound health and arranging for the
 
 SECTION 22. - OBSER VA TION. 315 
 
 largest suitable breaks between meals; (e) studied, but appro- 
 ximately minimal, variety at each principal meal and otherwise 
 and at different seasons; (/) proper mastication, no hurried 
 eating, and some rest after meals; (g) eating with pleasure; 
 (/?) good teeth; (/) allowance for physiological idiosyncrasies; 
 (y) proper feeding from infancy ; and (k) obedience to the other 
 principal demands of hygiene, more especially pure air all day 
 long, including good ventilation by day and night; sufficient 
 but not excessive mental and physical exercise ; adequate sleep 
 during the night; protection from extremes of cold and heat; 
 no dissipation; no intoxicants, narcotics, etc., affecting the 
 organism deleteriously ; avoidance of disease from infancy ; 
 no profound anxieties; and a cheerful temperament. Once a 
 fairly exhaustive statement is arrived at, the different classes 
 of facts can be evaluated, considered one in relation to the 
 other, a comprehensive statement formulated, generalisations 
 and deductions made, and further dietetic studies commenced 
 on that basis. 
 
 Likewise, the agriculturist will study the local climate, the 
 local soil, the plants and varieties best suited for the local soil, 
 the best manures, questions of drainage and irrigation, agri- 
 cultural machinery, efficient labour supply, local and distant 
 markets and their requirements, costs, and much else. 
 
 Lastly, instead of seeking to explain the economic crisis 
 following on the war by one or two causes, we should be well 
 advised to draw up an exhaustive list of the alleged influences, 
 assume that a large number of them are of vital importance, 
 and that the forces adduced act and react on one another. 
 Here is such a list, startlingly formidable in character, which 
 could be, however, reduced by classification (as, e.g., deficiency 
 in commodities and workers due to the war, etc.): 
 
 Lack of coal, raw materials, transport, machinery, commodities generally, 
 and foodstuffs; lack of capital (including watering of capital); lack of 
 credit intra-nationally and inter-nationally; lack of markets (due to 
 blockade, adverse exchange, poverty, etc.); exhaustion of stocks during 
 war-time; destruction of coal mines and of much other property; dis- 
 location and disorganisation through changes of boundaries; new fron- 
 tiers interfering seriously with railway systems of transport; customs 
 barriers; serious discriminations against certain classes of imports; worn- 
 out plants; readaptation of commerce and industry to peace conditions; 
 government restrictions on trade; disorganised exchanges preventing ready 
 interchange of goods (low exchange prevents buying and high exchange 
 selling); excessive speculation as regards commodities and in floating 
 companies; inflated and depreciated currency; continued large expenditure 
 on war forces and large government expenditure genei-ally; extravagance 
 in living and little saving; enormous burden of public debt and heavy 
 expenditure on pensions; heavy and excessive taxation crippling and 
 discouraging industry; high wages and high cost of living; rise in prices, 
 and driving up and keeping up of prices; wholesalers, retailers, and con- 
 sumers waiting for lower prices before buying; profiteering; fear of 
 repudiation of liabilities by firms and nations; lack, or presence, of a 
 gold basis; wars and fears of wars; blockade of Russia; non-declaration 
 of reparation amount to be asked from Germany; withholding of stocks
 
 316 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 from the market and of credits by banks; governmental absorption of 
 bank credits; over-production; ca' canny; eight hour day; millions of 
 people killed in war and by influenza epidemic; lower vitality of workers 
 generally, owing to malnutrition and want generally; large masses of 
 totally and partially disabled; large numbers nervously and physically 
 injured during the war without being "disabled"; lower proportion of 
 the physically fit, through the physically unfit having been rejected by 
 the recruiting officers; decrease in the proportion of skilled workers and 
 managers, and decrease in skill through the diminution of apprenticeship 
 and technical classes during the war; decrease in intelligence through 
 inferior education or no education during the war; many more widows 
 with children and many more children proportionately; smaller total 
 population, more especially in respect of workers (there being proportion- 
 ately many more "families" without wage earners than before the war); 
 younger workers (between 20 and 30) reduced in excessive proportion; 
 general and deep dissatisfaction of workers, leading to negative interest 
 in work and to consequent reduced output; uncertainty among manufac- 
 turers and merchants, leading to decrease of enterprise; and exploitation 
 by certain countries of the necessities of other countries. 
 
 156. (B) SEARCH FOR UNLIKE FA CTS. Given a certain 
 topic of enquiry, say that of the function of government, we 
 commence by searching as much for unlike facts and generalisa- 
 tions as for like ones. Our only concern is to exhaust all the 
 material facts, partly because such knowledge may aid us later 
 in obtaining generalisations by the detection of certain under- 
 lying intrinsic similarities in different classes of facts, and 
 partly because it is, in any case, desirable to be acquainted 
 with important facts. 
 
 In agreement with this, we require accurate and numerous 
 means to assist us in securing a variety of details, generalisa- 
 tions, and deductions. If, for instance, the sense of touch pre- 
 supposes immediate contact with objects, we may ask ourselves 
 whether the other senses also require immediate contact. Should 
 we discover that each sense has a separate means of coming 
 into contact with reality, this would equally constitute a positive 
 result. Or if we apply Conclusion 28, and obtain as regards 
 related classes of facts contrary or contradictory results, these 
 also may claim to possess positive value. Or we can utilise 
 the method of contrast. If certain factors actively assist a 
 process, we may seek for such as actively impede it. Or if 
 we find one means employed in one connection, we may look 
 for different means in this and in disparate connections. Or, 
 to take a specific example, if we find beef-fat to contain fat- 
 soluble A, we should be prepared to discover that lard is 
 devoid of it. In other words, we apply Conclusions 27 and 28, 
 and whatever other apposite Conclusions we have reached, not 
 only to abstract higher generalities, but sheer differences. The 
 first step, therefore, in every portion of an investigation ob- 
 serving, generalising, deducingmust be to reacH the utmost 
 variety within a given unity, and the second step should be 
 to prove the existence of the greatest unity within the given 
 variety.
 
 SECTION 22 OBSERVATION. 317 
 
 CONCLUSION 23. 
 
 Need of Exhausting Classes of Facts, their Conditions, and the 
 Uniformities accompanying them. 
 
 157. (A) EXHAUSTING CLASSES OF FACTS.-ln his 
 famous example of the investigation of heat, Bacon plainly 
 implies that classes of facts should be exhausted where prac- 
 ticable, and in connection with the problem of effective obser- 
 vation scientific methodology demands that the enquiry should 
 proceed till no new classes of relevant and material facts can 
 be found. With Prof. Karl Pearson we should cease to look, 
 initially, for one principal factor only, and examine all possible 
 factors, and with Prof. Schuster we should inspect all possible 
 freouencies. 
 
 158. (B) EXHAUSTING CONDITIONS. The conditions 
 should be also exhausted. We should endeavour to examine 
 all the conditions that we can possibly discover or utilise, and 
 we need to be searching for new classes of conditions long 
 after the first or second success or failure to discover any. 
 
 159. (C) ACCOMPANYING UNIFORMITIES We should 
 ceaselessly aim at ascertaining accompanying uniformities. That 
 earthquakes proceed along earth fissures and are specially 
 common and disastrous along ocean borders, mountain districts, 
 and around active volcanoes; that volcanoes are mostly situated 
 near the sea; that the daily retardation in the tides approxi- 
 mately equals the daily retardation of the moon, and that the 
 height of the tides locally is determined by sundry local factors; 
 that the configuration of a district regulates to some extent 
 the rainfall, and that its configuration is frequently determined 
 by its water courses; that day and night are caused respec- 
 tively by the presence or the absence of the sun; that the bisons 
 and other hoofed animals are, perhaps, related as cause and 
 effect to the treeless spaces which they haunt; that the preva- 
 lence of rats coincides with the occurrence of certain epidemics, 
 and that a certain relation obtains between stagnant pools and 
 mosquitoes, on the one hand, and open dustbins and houseflies, 
 on the other; that those addicted to alcohol have less power 
 of resistance to disease; that relatively moderate but moist 
 heats are far more oppressive than those of hotter but drier 
 localities; that the exceeding dryness of hot desert climates 
 causes the air to be hotter during the day and colder during 
 the night, as compared with more humid climates; that "the 
 presence of trees reduces the temperature of the atmosphere, 
 whilst radiation is hindered at night, that trees thus produce 
 the effect of equalising temperature, and, by keeping the atmo- 
 sphere moist, they induce the fall of rain"; that the physical 
 features of a district or a country (e.g., the presence of ex- 
 tensive coal measures) determine in no small degree its social 
 features; or that home education reacts on school education
 
 318 
 
 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 and one art on another, are some cases in point illustrating 
 the need of allowing for concomitant uniformities. (See also 
 139.) Diverse anomalies in astronomical data have thus been 
 removed by the assumption and subsequent discovery of cor- 
 related facts. The following passage from Darwin (Origin of 
 Species, ch. 3) well exemplifies the need of heeding accompanying 
 uniformities: 
 
 "I have found that the visits of bees are necessary for the fertilisation 
 of some kinds of clover; . . . [but] humble-bees alone visit the red clover, 
 as other bees cannot reach the nectar. . . . Hence we may infer as highly 
 probable that if the whole genus of humble-bees became extinct or very 
 rare in England, the heart's-ease and red clover would become very rare 
 or wholly disappear. The number of humble-bees in any district depends 
 in a great degree on the number of field-mice, which destroy their combs 
 and nests, and Col. Newman, who has long attended to the habits of 
 humble-bees, believes that 'more than two-thirds of them are thus 
 destroyed all over England'. Now the number of mice is largely dependent, 
 as everyone knows, on the number of cats; and Col. Newman says: 'Near 
 villages and small towns I have found the nests of humble-bees more 
 numerous than elsewhere, which I attribute to the number of cats that 
 destroy the mice.' Hence it is quite credible that the presence of a feline 
 animal in large numbers in a district might determine, through the inter- 
 vention first of mice, and then of bees, the frequency of certain flowers 
 in that district." 
 
 The more fundamental accompanying uniformities should, 
 however, receive our first attention. An ordinary plant, for 
 instance, depends on the relative compactness, and on the in- 
 gredients, of the soil; on sunshine; on the surrounding warmth, 
 especially at certain seasons; on the oxygen and the carbonic 
 acid of the atmosphere; on the visits of fertilising insects and, 
 perhaps, on other plants and animals; on nitrifying bacteria; etc. 
 Animals also cannot live without free oxygen in their environ- 
 ment, a certain degree of surrounding warmth, and light, food, 
 freedom of movement, and other external factors. And what 
 is true of classes of living beings of a higher or a lower 
 category, is true in regard to individuals and their component 
 parts. 
 
 Moreover, the most fundamental accompanying uniformities 
 require to be pondered over from time to time. It is manifest 
 that if we imagine the degree of heat to be sufficiently raised 
 generally, all solids and liquids will turn into gases, and the 
 chemical elements will be decomposed into some simpler form 
 of matter, whilst if we conceive the degree of heat to be 
 sufficiently lowered generally, all gases and liquids will turn 
 into solids, and life and chemical changes would cease. In 
 this connection it is well to take, periodically, a long view, 
 casting our glances forwards and backwards into the eternities 
 in connection with any given subject. Similarly a grave 
 disturbance in the amicable relations between our globe and 
 the sun, or a lapse from "neutrality" on the part of one of 
 the nearest stars, would be of momentous consequence to
 
 SECTION 22.OBSER VA TION. 31 9 
 
 everything on the earth. Thus, ta'king a very comprehensive 
 relativist view, Einstein questions the absolutist conception 
 of space and time, and deduces from gravitational influences 
 the curvature of light rays and of spectra reaching us from 
 distant stars. 
 
 CONCLUSION 24. 
 
 Need of a Critical Attitude, of Provisional Treatment, and of 
 Repeated Testing, throughout the Process of Enquiry. 
 
 160. (A) CRITICAL ATTITUDE. The critical attitude 
 should never forsake the inquirer. However cogent his reasons 
 for the conclusions which he has reached, he should still cease- 
 lessly call everything in question. Some few observations may 
 be erroneous, the argument may require buttressing, or an 
 unsuspected fallacy may vitiate the entire solution. The as- 
 sumption needs to underlie his procedure that the real and 
 complete truth will only emerge after a repeated re-inspection 
 of the facts, a repeated re-testing of his conclusions, and after 
 having collected and collated a considerable number of truths. 
 Alertness, and not formal scepticism, is the attitude desiderated 
 here. 
 
 Much of the thinking in the past has been critical, not of 
 oneself but of others. Men have written voluminously to prove 
 that some one else's theory is defective, and have at the same 
 time assumed that their own point of view, conceived as the 
 sole alternative, is thereby recommended, if not substantiated. 
 They have been, in fact, as stern and unreasonable towards 
 others, as they have been excessively lenient and conciliatory 
 towards themselves. Speaking generally, any discussion or 
 criticism of others should be incidental, and in such discussion 
 or criticism there needs to be full recognition of the ease of 
 misjudging, and the difficulty of dealing out justice to, others. 
 Extensive criticism is rare in the established and typical sciences, 
 and presupposes on the whole critical rather than scientific 
 acumen, since the removal of errors by criticism gives ge- 
 nerally place to other errors rather than to truth. 
 
 161. (B) PROVISIONAL TREATMENT AND REPEATED 
 TESTING. Whilst attempts within reasonable limits to exhaust 
 any part of a problem need to be made even in the incipient 
 stages, there should be the further assumption that the results 
 arrived at are provisional, and that we should revert frequently 
 to a re-examination with a view to perfecting or modifying the 
 conclusions. This provisional treatment renders subtlety and 
 speculation superfluous, and the repeated investigations, in the 
 light of connected examinations, are sure to alter many of the 
 earlier inferences. 
 
 Darwin's practice supports our contention. "Some of the 
 most important explanations under his theories did not occur 
 to him until years after he had begun their study. . . . His work
 
 320 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 on 'The Expression of the Emotions', began in 1838 and closed 
 in 1872; 'Insectivorous Plants', 1860-1876; 'Vegetable Mould and 
 Earthworms', 1837-1881." (Frank Cramer, op. cit., pp. 79-80.) 
 And his analyst reflects Darwin's attitude in the following 
 comments: "Nothing can be so demonstrative as the relative 
 permanence of work that has been done slowly and work that 
 has been done with promptness and apparent vigour. The latter 
 almost invariably takes a very subordinate place in the litera- 
 ture of the subject when once that subject is completely 
 worked out. . . . Where speed is felt to be necessary, a vast 
 outlay of energy is frequently required to discover what with 
 more time would almost come of itself. With the attention 
 steadily fixed, time brings to bear multitudes of facts that would 
 otherwise be lost." (Ibid., pp. 77-78.) And, again, epigram- 
 matically : "Time, as well as reason, is the handmaid of science." 
 (P. 80.) 
 
 Psychological and objective arguments emphasise the need 
 of this Sub-Conclusion. The very effort required in circum- 
 spect examination is fatiguing, and re-examination is therefore 
 expedient, whilst repeated recurrence will tend to remove sundry 
 objective limitations and provide an opportunity for fresh ideas 
 to play round the subject. We are also likely not to be ob- 
 sessed by fixed concepts, and to note errors that blurring 
 familiarity and a crowd of irrelevant and obtrusive particulars, 
 which will be forgotten in the course of time, screened from 
 us. On this account we should not proceed without appreciable 
 breaks in an enquiry. (Conclusion 7, last par.) Naturally, too, 
 some considerable period should elapse before we close an en- 
 quiry, in order to prevent precipitate decisions and allow ample 
 time for re-examination under varied conditions. 
 
 Moreover, in the interest of true scientific progress, it is in- 
 dispensable to apply these precautionary measures to existing 
 collections of knowledge, for it has not seldom occurred that 
 propositions said to be long and fully established are seriously 
 infected with error. Science does not recognise any infallibility in 
 its devotees, even though they may have flourished centuries ago. 
 
 162. It will be useful, now that we have concluded our 
 study of Observation, to append a long excerpt from Darwin, 
 the great observer and generaliser, to illustrate in detail the 
 extreme need of cautious procedure: 
 
 "Cell-making instinct of the Hive-Bee. I will not here enter on minute 
 
 details on this subject, but will merely give an outline of the conclusions 
 
 at which I have arrived. He must be a dull man who can examine the 
 
 exquisite structure of a comb, so beautifully adapted to its end, without 
 
 ithusiastic admiration. We hear from mathematicians that bees have 
 
 ctically solved a recondite problem, and have made their cells of the 
 
 roper shape to hold the greatest possible amount of honey, with the 
 
 least possible consumption of precious wax in their construction. It has
 
 SECTION 22.OBSERVA TION. 321 
 
 been remarked that a skilful workman with fitting tools and measures, 
 would find it very difficult to make cells of wax of the true form, though 
 this is effected by a crowd of bees working in a dark hive. Granting 
 whatever instincts you please, it seems at first quite inconceivable how 
 they can make all the necessary angles and planes, or even perceive when 
 they are correctly made. But the difficulty is not nearly so great as it 
 at first appears : all this beautiful work can be shown, I think, to follow 
 from a few simple instincts. 
 
 "I was led to investigate this subject by Mr. Waterhouse, who has 
 shown that the form of the cell stands in close relation to the presence 
 of adjoining cells; and the following view may, perhaps, be considered 
 only as a modification of his theory. Let us look to the great principle 
 of gradation, and see whether Nature does not reveal to us her method 
 of work. At one end of a short series we have humble-bees, which use 
 their old cocoons to hold honey, sometimes adding to them short tubes 
 of wax; and likewise making separate and very irregular rounded cells 
 of wax. At the other end of the series we have the cells of the hive- 
 bee, placed in a double layer: each cell, as is well known, is an hexagonal 
 prism, with the basal edges of its six sides bevelled so as to join an in- 
 verted pyramid of three rhombs. These rhombs have certain angles, and 
 the three which form the pyramidal base of a single cell on one side of 
 the comb enter into the composition of the bases of three adjoining cells 
 on the opposite side. In the series between the extreme perfection of 
 the cells of the hive-bee and the simplicity of those of the humble-bee 
 we have the cells of the Mexican Melipona domestica carefully described 
 and figured by Pierre Huber. The Melipona itself is intermediate in struc- 
 ture between the hive- and humble-bee, but more nearly related to the 
 latter; it forms a nearly regular waxen comb of cylindrical cells, in which 
 the young are hatched, and, in addition, some large cells of wax for hold- 
 ing honey. These latter cells are nearly spherical and of nearly equal 
 sizes, and are aggregated into an irregular mass. But the important point 
 to notice is, that these cells are always made at that degree of nearness 
 to each other that they would have intersected or broken into each other 
 if the spheres had been completed ; but this is never permitted, the bees 
 building perfectly flat walls of wax between the spheres which thus tend 
 to intersect. Hence, each cell consists of an outer spherical portion, and 
 of two, three, or more flat surfaces, according as the cell adjoins two, 
 three, or more other cells. When one cell rests on three other cells, 
 which, from the spheres being nearly of the same size, is very frequently 
 and necessarily the case, the three flat surfaces are united into a pyramid ; 
 and this pyramid, as Huber has remarked, is manifestly a gross imitation 
 of the three-sided pyramidal base of the cell of the hive-bee. As in the 
 cells of the hive-bee, so here, the three plane surfaces in any one cell 
 necessarily enter into the construction of three adjoining cells. It is 
 obvious that the Melipona saves wax, and what is more important, labour, 
 by this manner of building; for the flat walls between the adjoining cells 
 are not double, but are of the same thickness as the outer spherical por- 
 tions, and yet each flat portion forms a part of two cells. 
 
 "Reflecting on this case, it occurred to me that if the Melipona had 
 made its spheres at some given distance from each other, and had made 
 them of equal sizes and had arranged them symmetrically in a double 
 layer, the resulting structure would have been as perfect as the comb of 
 the hive-bee. Accordingly I wrote to Professor Miller of Cambridge, and 
 this geometer has kindly read over the following statement, drawn up 
 from his information, and tells me that it is strictly correct: 
 
 "If a number of equal spheres be described with their centres placed 
 in two parallel layers; with the centre of each sphere at the distance of 
 
 radius X j/2, or radius X 1.41421 (or at some lesser distance), from the 
 
 centres of the six surrounding spheres in the same layer ; and at the 
 same distance from the centres of the adjoining spheres in the other and 
 
 21
 
 322 
 
 PART V- WORKING STAGE. 
 
 parallel layer then, if planes of intersection between the several spheres 
 in both layers be formed, there will result a double layer of hexagonal 
 prisms united together by pyramidal bases formed of three rhombs; 
 and the rhombs and the sides of the hexagonal prisms will have every 
 angle identically the same with the best measurements which have been 
 made of the cells of the hive-bee. But I hear from Prof. Wyman, who 
 has made numerous careful measurements, that the accuracy of the 
 workmanship of the bee has been greatly exaggerated; so much so, 
 that, whatever the typical form of the cell may be, it is rarely, if ever, 
 realised. 
 
 "Hence we may safely conclude that, if we could slightly modify the 
 instincts already possessed by the Melipona, and in themselves not very 
 wonderful, this bee would make a structure as wonderfully perfect as 
 that of the hive-bee. We must suppose the Melipona to have the power 
 of forming her cells truly spherical, and of equal sizes; and this would 
 not be very surprising, seeing that she already does so to a certain ex- 
 tent, and seeing what perfectly cylindrical burrows many insects make 
 in wood, apparently by turning round on a fixed point. We must suppose 
 the Melipona to arrange her cells in level layers, as she already does her 
 cylindrical cells; and we must further suppose, and this is the greatest 
 difficulty, that she can somehow judge accurately at what distance to 
 stand from her fellow-labourers when several are making their spheres; 
 but she is already so far enabled to judge of distance that she always 
 describes her spheres so as to intersect to a certain extent, and then she 
 unites the points of intersection by perfectly flat surfaces. By such modi- 
 fications of instincts which in themselves are not very wonderful hardly 
 more wonderful than those which guide a bird to make its nest I be- 
 lieve that the hive-bee has acquired, through natural selection, her in- 
 imitable architectural powers. 
 
 "But this theory can be tested by experiment. Following the example 
 of Mr. Tegetmeier, I separated two combs and put between them a long, 
 thick, rectangular strip of wax: the bees instantly began to excavate minute 
 circular pits in it; and as they deepened these little pits, they made them 
 wider and wider until they were converted into shallow basins, appearing 
 to the eye perfectly true or parts of a sphere, and of about the diameter 
 of a cell. It was most interesting to observe that wherever several bees 
 had begun to excavate these basins near together, they had begun their 
 work at such a distance from each other, that by the time the basins had 
 acquired the above stated width (i.e., about the width of an ordinary cell), 
 and were in depth about one sixth of the diameter of the sphere of which 
 they formed a part, the rims of the basins intersected or broke into each 
 other. As soon as this occurred, the bees ceased to excavate, and began 
 to build up flat walls of wax on the lines of intersection between the 
 basins, so that each hexagonal prism was built upon the scalloped edge of 
 a smooth basin, instead of on the straight edges of a three-sided pyramid 
 as in the case of ordinary cells. 
 
 "I then put into the hive, instead of a thick, rectangular piece of wax, 
 a thin and narrow, knife-edged ridge, coloured with vermilion. The bees 
 instantly began on both sides to excavate little basins near to each other, 
 in the same way as before; but the ridge of wax was so thin, that the 
 bottoms of the basins, if they had been excavated to the same depth as 
 in the former experiment, would have broken into each other from the 
 opposite sides. The bees, however, did not suffer this to happen, and they 
 stopped their excavations in due time; so that the basins, as soon as they 
 had been a little deepened, came to have flat bases; and these flat bases, 
 formed by thin little plates of the vermilion wax leftungnawed, were situated, 
 as far as the eye could judge, exactly along the planes of imaginary inter- 
 section between the basins on the opposite sides of the ridge of wax. 
 In some parts, only small portions, in other parts, large portions of a 
 rhombic plate were thus left between the opposed basins, but the work, 
 from the unnatural state of things, had not been neatly performed. The
 
 SECTION 22 OBSERVATION. 323 
 
 bees must have worked at very nearly the same rate in circularly gnawing 
 away and deepening the basins on both sides of the ridge of vermilion 
 wax, in order to have thus succeeded in leaving flat plates between the 
 basins, by stopping work at the planes of intersection. 
 
 "Considering how flexible thin wax is, I do not see that there is any 
 difficulty in the bees, whilst at work on the two sides of a strip of wax, 
 perceiving when they have gnawed the wax away to the proper thinness, 
 and then stopping their work. In ordinary combs it has appeared to me 
 that the bees do not always succeed in working at exactly the same rate 
 from the opposite sides; for I have noticed half-completed rhombs at the 
 base of a just-commenced cell, which were slightly concave on one side, 
 where I suppose that the bees had excavated too quickly, and convex on 
 the opposite side where the bees had worked less quickly. In one well 
 marked instance, I put the comb back into the hive, and allowed the 
 bees to go on working for a short time, and again examined the cell, 
 and I found that the rhombic plate had been completed, and had become 
 perfectly flat: it was absolutely impossible, from the extreme thinness 
 of the little plate, that they could have effected this by gnawing away 
 the convex side; and I suspect that the bees in such cases stand on 
 opposite sides and push and bend the ductile and warm wax (which, as 
 I have tried, is easily done) into its proper intermediate plane, and thus 
 flatten it. 
 
 "From the experiment of the ridge of vermilion wax we can see that, 
 if the bees were to build for themselves a thin wall of wax, they could 
 make their cells of the proper shape, by standing at the proper distance 
 from each other, by excavating at the same rate, and by endeavouring 
 to make equal spherical hollows, but never allowing the spheres to break 
 into each other. Now bees, as may be clearly seen by examining the 
 edge of a growing comb, do make a rough, circumferential wall or rim 
 all round the comb ; and they gnaw this away from the opposite sides, 
 always working circularly as they deepen each cell. They do not make 
 the whole three-sided pyramidal base of any one cell at the same time, 
 but only that one rhombic plate which stands on the extreme growing 
 margin, or the two plates, as the case may be; and they never complete 
 the upper edges of the rhombic plates, until the hexagonal walls are 
 commenced. Some of these statements differ from those made by the 
 justly celebrated elder Huber, but I am convinced of their accuracy; 
 and if I had space, I could show that they are conformable with my 
 theory. 
 
 "Huber's statement, that the very first cell is excavated out of a little 
 parallel-sided wall of wax, is not, as far as I have seen, strictly correct; 
 the first commencement having always been a little hood of wax; but I 
 will not here enter on details. We see how important a part excavation 
 plays in the construction of the cells; but it would be a great error to 
 suppose that the bees cannot build up a rough wall of wax in the proper 
 position that is, along the plane of intersection between two adjoining 
 spheres. I have several specimens showing clearly that they can do this. 
 Even in the rude circumferential rim or wall of wax round a growing 
 comb, flexures may sometimes be observed, corresponding in position to 
 the planes of the rhombic basal plates of future cells. But the rough wall 
 of wax has in every case to be finished off, by being largely gnawed away 
 on both sides. The manner in which the bees build is curious; they 
 always make the first rough wall from ten to twenty times thicker than 
 the excessively thin finished wall of the cell, which will ultimately be 
 left. We shall understand how they work, by supposing masons first to 
 pile up a broad ridge of cement, and then to begin cutting it away equally 
 on both sides near the ground, till a smooth, very thin wall is left in 
 the middle; the masons always piling up the cut-away cement, and adding 
 fresh cement on the summit of the ridge. We shall thus have a thin wall 
 steadily growing upward, but always crowned by a gigantic coping. From 
 all the cells, both those just commenced and those completed, being thus 
 
 21*
 
 324 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 crowned by a strong coping of wax, the bees can cluster and crawl over 
 the comb without injuring the delicate hexagonal walls. These walls, as 
 Professor Miller has kindly ascertained for me, vary greatly in thickness ; 
 being, on an average of twelve measurements made near the border of 
 the comb, -^ of an inch in thickness ; whereas the basal rhomboidal plates 
 are thicker, nearly in the proportion of three to two, having a mean thick- 
 ness, from twenty-one measurements, of 229- of an inch. By the above 
 singular manner of building, strength is continually given to the comb, 
 with the utmost ultimate economy of wax. 
 
 "It seems at first to add to the difficulty of understanding how the 
 cells are made, that a multitude of bees all work together ; one bee after 
 working a short time at one cell going to another, so that, as Huber has 
 stated, a score of individuals work even at the commencement of the first 
 cell. I was able practically to show this fact, by covering the edges of 
 the hexagonal walls of a single cell, or the extreme margin of the circum- 
 ferential rim of growing comb, with an extremely thin layer of melted 
 vermilion wax; and I invariably found that the colour was most delicately 
 diffused by the bees as delicately as a painter could have done it with 
 his brush by atoms of the coloured wax having been taken from the 
 spot on which it had been placed, and worked into the growing edges of 
 the cells all round. The work of construction seems to be a sort of balance 
 struck between many bees, all instinctively standing at the same relative 
 distance from each other, all trying to sweep equal spheres, and then 
 building up, or leaving ungnawed, the planes of intersection between these 
 spheres. It was really curious to note in cases of difficulty, as when two 
 pieces of comb met at an angle, how often the bees would pull down and 
 rebuild in different ways the same cell, sometimes recurring to a shape 
 which they had at first rejected. 
 
 "When bees have a place on which they can stand in their proper 
 positions for working, for instance, on a slip of wood, placed directly 
 under the middle of a comb growing downwards, so that the comb has 
 to be built over one face of the slip in this case the bees can lay the 
 foundations of one wall of a new hexagon, in its strictly proper place, 
 projecting beyond the other completed cells. It suffices that the bees 
 should be enabled to stand at their proper relative distances from each 
 other and from the walls of the % last completed cells, and then, by striking 
 imaginary spheres, they can build up a wall intermediate between two 
 adjoining spheres; but, as far as I have seen, they never gnaw away and 
 finish off the angles of a cell till a large part both of that cell and of 
 the adjoining cells has been buijt. This capacity in bees of laying down 
 under certain circumstances a rough wall in its proper place between 
 two just commenced cells, is important, as it bears on a fact, which seems 
 at first subversive of the foregoing theory; namely, that the cells on the 
 extreme margin of wasp-combs are sometimes strictly hexagonal ; but I 
 have not space here to enter on this subject. Nor does there seem to 
 me any great difficulty in a single insect (as in the case of a queen-wasp) 
 making hexagonal cells, if she were to work alternately on the inside 
 and outside of two or three cells commenced at the same time, always 
 standing at the proper relative distance from the parts of the cells just 
 begun, sweeping spheres or cylinders, and building up intermediate 
 planes. 
 
 "As natural selection acts only by the accumulation of slight modifica- 
 tions of structure or instinct, each profitable to the individual under its 
 conditions of life, it may reasonably be asked, how a long and graduated 
 succession of modified architectural instingts, all tending towards the pre- 
 sent perfect plan of construction, could have profited the progenitors of 
 the hive-bee? I think the answer is not difficult: cells constructed like 
 those of the bee or the wasp gain in strength, and save much in labour 
 and space, and in the materials of which they are constructed. With
 
 SECTION 22. OBSERVATION. 325 
 
 respect to the formation of wax, it is known that bees are often hard 
 pressed to get sufficient nectar, and I am informed by Mr. Tegetmeier that 
 it has been experimentally proved that from twelve to fifteen pounds of 
 dry sugar are consumed by a hive of bees for the secretion of a pound 
 of wax; so that a prodigious quantity of fluid nectar must be collected 
 and consumed by the bees in a hive for the secretion of the wax neces- 
 sary for the construction of their combs. Moreover, many bees have to 
 remain idle for many days during the process of secretion. A large store 
 of honey is indispensable to support a large stock of bees during the 
 winter; and the security of the hive is known mainly to depend on a 
 large number of bees being supported. Hence the saving of wax by largely 
 saving honey, and the time consumed in collecting the hone^y, must be 
 an important element of success to any family of bees. Of course, the 
 success of the species may be dependent on the number of its enemies, 
 or parasites, or on quite distinct causes, and so be altogether independent 
 of the quantity of honey which the bees can collect. But let us suppose 
 that this latter circumstance determined, as it probably often has deter- 
 mined, whether a bee allied to our humble-bees could exist in large 
 numbers in any country ; and let us further suppose that the community 
 lived through the winter, and consequently required a store of honey; 
 there can, in this case, be no doubt that it would be an advantage to 
 our imaginary humble-bee, if a slight modification of her instinct led her 
 to make her waxen cells near together, so as to intersect a little; for a 
 wall in common even to -two adjoining cells would save some little labour 
 and wax. Hence it would continually be more and more advantageous 
 to our humble-bees, if they were to make their cells more and more 
 regular, nearer together, and aggregated into a mass, like the cells of the 
 Melipona; for in this case a large part of the bounding surface of each 
 cell would serve to bound the adjoining cells, and much labour and wax 
 would be saved. Again, 'from -the same cause, it would be advantageous 
 to the Melipona, if she were to make her cells closer together, and more 
 regular in every way than at present; for then, as we have seen, the 
 spherical surfaces would wholly disappear and be replaced by plane 
 surfaces ; and the Melipona would make a comb as perfect as that of 
 the hive-bee. Beyond this stage of perfection in architecture, natural 
 selection could not lead ; for the comb of the hive-bee, as far as we can 
 see, is absolutely perfect in economising labour 'and wax. 
 
 "Thus, as I believe, the most wonderful of all known instincts, that 
 of the hive-bee, can be explained by natural selection having taken 
 advantage of numerous, successive, slight modifications of simpler instincts, 
 natural selection having, by slow degrees, more and more perfectly led 
 the bees to sweep equal spheres at a given distance from each other in 
 a doublB layer, and to build up and excavate the wax along the planes of 
 intersection; the bees, of course, no more knowing that they swept their 
 spheres at one particular distance from each other, than they know what 
 are the several angles of the hexagonal prisms and of the basal rhombic 
 plates ; the motive power of the process of natural selection having been 
 the construction of cells of due strength and of the proper size and shape 
 for the larva?, this being effected with the greatest possible economy 
 of labour and wax; that individual swarm which thus made the best 
 cells with least labour, and least waste of honey in the secretion of wax, 
 having succeeded best, and having transmitted their newly acquired 
 economical instincts to new swarms, which in their turn will have had 
 the best chance of succeeding in the struggle for existence." (The Origin 
 of Species, final edition, chapter 8.)
 
 326 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 SECTION XXIIL GENERALISATION. 
 
 CONCLUSION 25. 
 
 Need of Strenuous Mental Application in the Process of Generali- 
 sation, and need of the Generalisations being Graded, Com- 
 prehensive, Important, Numerous, Full, Rational and Relevant, 
 Original, Automatically Initiated, and Methodically Developed. 
 
 163. Guided by Conclusion 20, we examine (1) the pre- 
 liminaries (Conclusions 1-13); we begin then (2) to determine 
 as precisely as possible the nature of the problem io be in- 
 vestigated (Conclusions 14-15); and (3) commence our observa- 
 tions (Conclusions 16-24). Having accomplished this, we embark 
 on the process of (4) generalisation. Just as we cautiously pass 
 from this fact as apprehended at this moment to the fact, so 
 we pass from the fact to the class which comprehends all most 
 closely resembling facts, and thence to remoter resemblances 
 and more extensive classes. By fact we mean, of course, any 
 and every kind of static and dynamic fact physical, vital, and 
 cultural. 
 
 164. (a) INTENSE CONCENTRATION. In generalising, 
 as in observing and deducing, we need intently and continuously 
 to concentrate all our faculties and to shun both over-confidence 
 and over-anxiety. (See 154.) 
 
 165. (b) GRADED GENERALISATIONS. The principles 
 of prudence applied to observation equally apply to what is 
 ordinarily termed generalisation. The formation of large generali- 
 sations based on slender data is hence as unjustifiable as state- 
 ments concerning individual facts based on scanty evidence. 
 Generalisations should be therefore graded, and investigators 
 should cautiously feel their way from class to class, seeing 
 that many generations of thinkers are frequently required for 
 developing a truly comprehensive and sound generalisation, as 
 is illustrated, for instance, by the evolution of astronomical 
 theory from Ptolemy to Copernicus and from Copernicus to 
 Laplace. In generalising, then, we should gradually pass from 
 closer to remoter resemblances, as from the falling of heavier 
 substances to the falling of lighter substances, to the falling of 
 the moon and the earth, and thence, progressively, to the 
 framing of the universal law of gravitation, forming in this 
 manner ever more extensive classes of facts. "The safest course, 
 when it can be followed, is to rise by inductions carried on 
 among laws, as among facts, from law to law; perceiving, as 
 k we go on, how laws which we have looked upon as unconnected 
 become particular cases, either one of the other, or all of one 
 still more general, and, at length, blend altogether in the point 
 of view from which we learn to regard them." (Sir John 
 Herschel, Discourse, [217.].) 
 
 Where, as in the example which follows, the more general 
 facts are established, it is of incalculable advantage to rise from
 
 SECTION 23. GENERALISATION. 327 
 
 law to law until we reach the pinnacle. Frequently, however, 
 the facts are represented by a heterogeneous mass which can 
 only be slowly reduced to order and understood. In such in- 
 stances we pursue our researches until some slight semblance 
 of order is created in part of the mass, and we finally resolve 
 on exploring as exhaustively as practicable one or another 
 direction suggested by the preliminary conclusions reached. 
 Here, obviously, there can be no rising from law to law, since 
 the value, or even the correctness, of the conclusions reached 
 is undetermined, since our most heroic endeavours will probably 
 yield only modest fruits, and since the discovery of a com- 
 prehensive law is, in the circumstances, a counsel of perfection. 
 For this reason we relegate the grading of generalisations to 
 the conclusion of the enquiry, and are content that our most 
 comprehensive generalisation should be a comparatively restricted 
 one. Accordingly, the scientific pioneer must toilsomely wrest 
 truths from nature wherever he can, without being truly cognisant 
 of their value, whereas, with the advance of science, it becomes 
 gradually easier to take advantage of established classifications 
 and proceed at a perceptible pace in a forward or upward 
 direction. To rise from law to law is therefore only practicable 
 when we are already familiar with many verified generalisations. 
 
 It will be well to define as precisely as possible the process 
 of graded generalising. Finding, for example, that consequent 
 on the application of pressure some hydrogen gas occupies less 
 space, I carefully ascertain the relation of pressure to density 
 in the sample at different times, and think I perceive that its 
 density is directly proportional to the pressure to which it is 
 subjected, that is, if the pressure be doubled, its volume is 
 halved, and when the pressure is halved, its volume is doubled. 
 I formulate then, after sundry experiments, the hypothesis that 
 hydrogen always behaves in this manner; but ascertain, on 
 closer investigation, that allowance needs to be made for tem- 
 perature, very high pressure, and so forth. This we might 
 term a simple generalisation : reasoning from a given fact at a 
 given time to the class to which it appertains. 
 
 I advance now a step further. I experiment whether the 
 gas nearest to hydrogen in specific gravity reacts in a similar 
 way to pressure and removal of pressure, and observe identity 
 of effect. I inspect then a few samples of gases of greater 
 and greater specific gravity, and tentatively conclude that the 
 volume of a sample of any gas normally varies inversely with 
 the pressure thereon. I test this conclusion repeatedly, applying 
 it perhaps to every gas I can procure, studious of including 
 the largest variety of gases, and recording the conditions under 
 which I obtain the results. I feel now warranted in converting 
 the simple generalisation into a compound generalisation, and 
 assert that the volume of any gas varies inversely with the 
 amount of pressure to which it is subjected. (Boyle's law.)
 
 328 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 It was natural to extend from (1) a sample of hydrogen at 
 a particular time to (2) that same sample at other times; from 
 this again to (3) other samples and (4) to the particular gas in 
 general. It was equally natural to extend the observation to 
 (5) some other gases less and less closely related to hydrogen, 
 and then (6) to all gases. Now since there are three states of 
 matter gaseous, liquid, and solid (including viscous), it is also 
 feasible to extend the generalisation tentatively to (7) some 
 liquid, then (8) to more liquids, thence (9) to all liquids, and 
 supposing that we ascertained that Boyle's law held good of all 
 liquids, we might, finally, extend the conclusion to (10) the 
 lightest solid body, (11) to a number of solid bodies more and 
 more heavy, and (12) to all solid bodies. I should then, granting 
 that the above-mentioned law also held good of all solids, state 
 the most general and universal law, namely, that the volume 
 of any given substance at any given temperature is inversely 
 proportional to the pressure to which it is subjected. This we 
 might name a universal generalisation. 
 
 However, as a matter of fact, Boyle's law 1 applies neither 
 to liquids nor to solids, and therefore we should be compelled 
 to rest content with the more restricted compass of our gene- 
 ralisation, and even be obliged to allow for deviations assumed 
 to be .due to the attraction of the molecules for each other and 
 to the volume occupied by the molecules. 2 Of course, had the 
 question been the problem of the indestructibility or the gravi- 
 tational force of matter, we should have been in a position to 
 extend the first intimation derived from the study of the sample 
 of one body which proved indestructible or affected the scales, 
 to all matter gaseous, liquid, and solid. 
 
 However, as in the science which deals with religious pheno- 
 mena, and in other new and intricate sciences, trustworthy 
 classifications may as yet not exist. In such an instance they 
 have to be created, and here the obstacles in the way of gene- 
 ralising may be most formidable. Or, what may be as bad 
 nearly, classifications may exist in abundance, as in proverbs 
 or in astrology, and these classifications may be unscientific 
 and misleading. In such circumstances the whole ground has 
 to be mapped out afresh, and the investigator needs to make 
 accurate studies of groups of facts, alertly seeking for significant 
 data and for multitudes of conclusions which should by degrees 
 enable him to formulate a classificatory scheme. 
 
 "Boyle himself only proved his law in the case of atmospheric' air; but 
 the observation was subsequently (1676) generalised by Marriotte." (Thorpe, 
 op. cit., vol. 1, p. 139.) 
 
 "Bodies which can support a longitudinal pressure however small, without 
 eing supported by a lateral pressure, are called solids. A liquid differs 
 essentially from a solid in being destitute of the power of sustaining pressure 
 unless it is supported laterally in every direction. The distinguishing feature 
 of a gas is that of indefinite expansion." (A. H. Hiorns, Principles of Metal- 
 lurgy, 1914, p. 8.)
 
 SECTION 23. GENERALISATION. 329 
 
 166. (c) COMPREHENSIVE GENERALISATIONS. The 
 desire to understand the world turns men away from particular 
 facts, for they feel that the number of these is so multitudinous 
 that it is humanly impossible to collect, remember, or understand 
 them. Unfortunately, men have not advanced a short distance 
 beyond and insisted that trifling generalisations are scarcely 
 distinguishable from particular facts, and that a vast array of 
 unconnected generalisations and relations tends to confuse rather 
 than to enlighten. Countless modern experiments, and especially 
 observations connected with the mental and social sciences, 
 illustrate this inference. For the future, therefore, all narrow 
 generalisations which are not intended to fit into a larger 
 scheme already formulated, should be esteemed as trivial and 
 suspect, unless it is quite impracticable to reach extended 
 generalisations. Probably the greatness of great men has mainly 
 consisted in doing what the average of investigators would also 
 have effected if it were generally recognised that the purpose 
 of a scientific enquiry is to reach sweeping generalisations. 1 
 Not only, therefore, are graded generalisations necessary, but 
 the constant endeavour should be to attain to the broadest 
 possible generalisations, and this has become increasingly 
 possible through the accumulation of scientific facts and con- 
 clusions. If this be conceded, it follows that the present practice, 
 of individuals engaging in a large number of relatively restricted 
 and unconnected investigations requiring no wide outlook, 
 should be replaced, now that science is sufficiently advanced 
 to permit this, by their undertaking, as a rule, one or two 
 investigations covering extensive ground and occupying them 
 for practically a life-time. 2 
 
 If it were merely a question of piecing together a great 
 number of petty generalisations into an imposing mosaic, no 
 
 1 "Then, and then only, may we hope well of the sciences, when in a 
 just scale of ascent, and by successive steps not interrupted or broken, we 
 rise from particulars to lesser axioms; and then to middle axioms, one above 
 the other; and last of all to the most general." (Bacon, Novum Organum, 
 bk. 1, 104.) It is not improbable that training would transform all investi- 
 gators into expert generalises. 
 
 2 "A. Comte signalait deja les inconvenients de la division du travail dans 
 1'ordre intellectuel. La specialisation a outrance dans le domaine scientifique 
 fait perdre au savant 1'habitude de la generalisation; en se cantonnant dans 
 sa petite sphere, il est prive de tout contact avec les autres spheres qui lui 
 deviennent de plus en plus etrangeres. Sans doute il augmentera plus 
 facilement, dans sa sphere, le nombre des connaissances precises. Mais la 
 science ne progresse pas seulement par 1'accumulation des petites decouvertes 
 eparses; c'est aussi et surtout a la coordination, a la synthese de toutes 
 ces verites isole'es qu'il importe d'apporter ses efforts; la science risque 
 de s'emietter en une multitude de petites sp^cialites si elle manque d'archi- 
 tectes, de tetes encyclopediques, d'esprits synthetiques pour rassembler, pour 
 coordonner les connaissances innombrables que les ouvriers de la pensee 
 ont accumulees de. toutes parts." (Paul Caullet, op. cit., p. 299.) The contrast 
 between the architects and the labourers seems a little strained, since in 
 science either the architects are simultaneously labourers and the labourers 
 architects or their work is of questionable value.
 
 330 PART V- WORKING STAGE. 
 
 harm would ensue ; but almost invariably daylight only emerges 
 when we have proceeded far in an investigation, and accord- 
 ingly fractional generalisations, more often than not, are largely 
 erroneous, and cannot be profitably combined. It is of decided 
 consequence, therefore, that the investigator should not relax 
 his efforts until he has virtually reached the heart of his 
 subject, which is but reaffirming our suggestion that men and 
 women should devote virtually a life-time to solving one prob- 
 lem to some extent. In view of the confusion, and even 
 apathy and antipathy, arising from the publication of a long 
 series of disjointed, necessarily crude, gravely misleading, and 
 often contradictory essays, there would be an enormous saving 
 of time and effort if concentration of interest and activity on 
 a large scale became universal in science. From another direc- 
 tion, then, we reach the conclusion that the watchword for 
 all investigators needs to be to aim at comprehensive generali- 
 sations. 
 
 In matters of practice the above is admirably illustrated by 
 two parallel lines of enquiry conducted during the last genera- 
 tion. On the one hand, psychologists and physiologists have 
 published a considerable number of monographs bearing on 
 industrial efficiency and increased productivity, and relating to 
 such subjects as expenditure of human energy, fatigue, and the 
 like. The practical effect of these isolated and exceedingly 
 limited efforts has been virtually negligible. On the other 
 hand, efficientists in America, imperfectly equipped scienti- 
 fically, decomposed certain industrial processes into their ele- 
 ments and recomposed them on strictly economic lines, taking 
 account, of all noteworthy accompanying circumstances. Their 
 interest lay in the totality of the process, and their practical 
 success was almost instantaneous and far-reaching. The very 
 comprehensiveness of their enterprise saved them from innumer- 
 able fallacies and removed countless complexities. 
 
 Whilst extremely wide, but unexplained, generalisations fre- 
 quently convey little meaning to the student, and are therefore 
 of small value, 1 it is of material importance in actual scientific 
 work to posit them sometimes in order to be clear as to the 
 final goal. 
 
 Thus, suppose we observe that comparatively hot water 
 issuing in a thin and weak stream from a tap feels relatively 
 tepid to the hand placed immediately underneath. Noting the 
 principle implied, we may then, without graded generalising, 
 
 "Bacon has judiciously observed that the axiomata media of every 
 science principally constitute its value. The lowest generalisations, until 
 explained by and resolved into the middle principles of which they are the 
 consequences, have only the imperfect accuracy of empirical laws; while 
 the most general laws are too general, and include too few circumstances, 
 to give sufficient indication of what happens in individual cases where the 
 circumstances are almost always immensely numerous." (Mill, Logic, bk. 6, 
 en. o, 5.)
 
 SECTION 23.-GENERALISATION. 331 
 
 strive to express the fact in the most comprehensive formula 
 for the specific purpose mentioned. This would be perhaps 
 " Wherever matters of degree (more generally stated, wherever 
 relations) are involved, there the influence of the degree (or 
 relation) should be allowed for or examined". Valuable as 
 such a generalisation may be for directive and future needs, 
 its bare statement would probably not elucidate or illuminate 
 the problem we strive to grasp. It would, however, compel us 
 to continue generalising our experience and our tentative ex- 
 tensions until the relevant limit to the enquiry is reached. For 
 instance, we should begin by fixing on the conspicuous fact 
 that the thinner or thicker the cylindrical stream of hot water, 
 the less or more shall we feel as hot the water falling on the 
 hand. We should, of course, provisionally and slowly gene- 
 ralise the word hand to any part of the body and to any 
 object, the word water to any substance, the word hot to any 
 temperature and to all the senses and all forces, until we 
 reached the most comprehensive generalisation. 
 
 Or, noting that a shadow is explained as a merely privative 
 fact the relative absence of illumination in a relatively lighted 
 locality we grope and find the widest term Obstruction under 
 which it can be profitably subsumed. We may then state 
 " Every where allow for partial or complete obstruction as a 
 possible explanation of a phenomenon". Here we meet with 
 a much obscurer statement than the preceding one one which, 
 unexpanded, suggests both too little and too much. 
 
 Or, consider the case of the notice-board analysed in 87, 
 where the most comprehensive statement arrived at is virtually : 
 "Make a statement wherever advisable". Exceedingly helpful 
 as such a proposition might be for the specific object of 
 guidance in the active process of generalising, its bare mention 
 might be merely irritating or amusing, though a concrete 
 analysis of the variety of statements, places, and circumstances 
 methodically exploited might lead us back to reality. Conced- 
 ing, however, that extremely comprehensive statements may be 
 sometimes also luminous or may be concerned with a subject 
 many details of which are well known, such statements would 
 prove useful both for generalising and deductive ends. Indeed, 
 with the progress of knowledge, statements of this character 
 will become more and more intelligible and therefore more 
 and more valuable per se. They would constitute the most 
 general laws of nature and of life. 
 
 A scientific methodology would make the search for large 
 generalisations an invariable attribute of the scientific worker ; 
 unfortunately even among the vanguard of scientific thinkers 
 there is often a general lack of the habit of comprehensive 
 generalising. Why should not Sadi Carnot have definitely pro- 
 posed the law of the conservation of energy? Why should 
 not the discovery of the nature of itch have been forthwith
 
 PART V WORKING STAGE. 
 
 generalised to the furthest limits by learned physicians ? Why 
 should so many generalisations have been so slowly evolved, 
 and why should they have so frequently met with prolonged 
 and stubborn opposition? Indeed, why should not many ex- 
 tensive generalisations have suggested themselves earlier and 
 to more individuals? It is, of course, a familiar fact that in 
 certain cases an extraordinary accident led to a step in-advance r 
 and, in addition, that it is not infrequently true that full or 
 even partial verification is difficult. Yet if men were trained 
 to generalise by habit and methodically, it is not easy to resist 
 the conclusion that the progress of science would be materially 
 accelerated, and that whilst fragmentary and slipshod generali- 
 sations would greatly diminish, comprehensive and defensible 
 generalisations would not only be proposed in abundance, but 
 be universally welcomed and impartially examined. The re- 
 markable fact that large and valid generalisations have been 
 frequently arrived at by young scholars or by those who were 
 not academic teachers, argues, from this point of view, that 
 numerous young scholars and laymen do not permit themselves 
 to be imposed upon so readily by tradition as many of those 
 who have become professed and professional teachers. Experts. 
 and bureaucrats as a body are noted for their disastrous love 
 of routine, and science also to a certain extent suffers from its 
 protagonists not seldom sinking unnecessarily into deep ruts. 
 167. (d) IMPORTANT GENERALISATIONS.- Sweeping 
 generalisations should also aim at being of the highest import 
 scientifically. They should, if possible, establish some general 
 fact which throws directly much light on a far-reaching ques- 
 tion and leads to countless important deductions and practical 
 applications. Merely for the sake of illustration we may men- 
 tion such widely appreciated problems for individual or collec- 
 tive solution as the evolution of (a) the earth, (b) the solar 
 system, and (c) our universe; the fundamental laws and rela- 
 tions of heat, light, electricity, magnetism, radiation, and chemi- 
 cal affinity; the nature, connection, and development of (a) the 
 chemical elements and compounds and (6) crystals; the con- 
 stitution and dynamics of the living cell, and the genesis of 
 life; the causes of irritability, adaptation, growth, reproduction,, 
 senescence, death, heredity, variation, and evolution in living 
 beings; the evolution of sensibility, the senses, of instincts, 
 and of the intelligence; the interaction and interrelations of 
 cells, tissues, organs, systems of organs, organisms, and neigh- 
 bouring groups of organisms ; the possible unity, or exact rela- 
 tions, of mind and matter; the distinctive characteristics of 
 man and of his immediate ancestry, and their explanation; the 
 nature, origin, and further development of (a) language, of (b) the 
 arts, of (c) economic processes, and of (d) the primary social 
 institutions; the foundations and precepts of (a) morality and 
 (b) aesthetics, and the effectual cultivation among human beings
 
 SECTION 23. GENERALISATION. 333 
 
 generally of a love of the good and the beautiful; (a) the 
 determination of a hygienic mode of living, and (b) the eradi- 
 cation of infectious diseases in children, adults, domestic animals, 
 and- cultivated plants; the scientific exploitation of agriculture 
 and of the products of the soil generally; the placing of in- 
 dustry, commerce, and home management, and the processes 
 involved in them, on a strictly scientific basis; the conservation of 
 natural utilities and beauties ; the relatively inexpensive supply 
 of an abundance of energy and its virtually complete and useful 
 absorption ; the full ascertainment and control of meteorological 
 conditions on land, sea, and air ; the causes and the prevention 
 of poverty; the re-organisation of (a) communities and states 
 and (b) governance on a truly democratic foundation; the 
 scientific basis, end, and methods of home, school, and vocational 
 education, and the effective training of teachers; the averting 
 of (a) floods, (b) conflagrations, (c) storms (especially at sea), 
 (rf) volcanic outbreaks, and (e) earthquakes; and, generally, 
 the systematic application of the sciences to the arts, of the 
 arts to the sciences, and of -both to life and men's highest 
 aspirations. If many of the tasks, or part tasks, 'here proposed 
 are naturally far too ambitious for the life-work of a solitary 
 individual, there is added reason why there should be extensive 
 collaboration, to the extent even of companies of scholars con- 
 certedly, or well-equipped national or international institutions, 
 concentrating on a problem (see Conclusion 12); and if, because 
 of inherent difficulties, partial success alone is obtainable, the 
 ideal of aiming, as a rule, at the establishment of momentous 
 general facts is none the less worthy of adoption. 
 
 Oh, if we draw a circle premature, 
 
 Heedless of far gain, 
 Greedy for quick returns of profit, sure 
 
 Bad is our bargain ! 
 
 (Browning, A Grammarian's Funeral.) 
 
 On the practical side our age is already keenly alive to the 
 need of bold conceptions. One of the demands is for the pro- 
 duction at the pits' mouth of sufficient electricity to satisfy 
 the industrial and domestic requirements of the whole country. 
 Apart fronr the patent economic advantages of this scheme, 
 the change would mean the break-up of the ugly centres 
 grouped around the coal districts, the even scattering of in- 
 dustrial activity to every part of the land, and the laying of 
 the horrid smoke-fiend. With the same general- end in view 
 of organising and developing the power supply on a nation- 
 wide basis, vast hydrographic surveys are being undertaken, 
 which will, at least in certain countries, end in radically trans- 
 forming the face of industry by making it dependent on hydro- 
 electricity and independent of foreign fuel or of coal-mining. 
 So, too, there is every prospect of motor-road traffic, preceded 
 by roadbuilding on a stupendous scale, becoming a serious
 
 334 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 rival to railways and rendering equally accessible every part of 
 every country. Similarly, the prevention of energy waste, the 
 irrigation of the land (more particularly in tropical countries), 
 the successful combating of insect and germ pests, the scientific 
 re-organisation of the industrial and commercial life, and the 
 development of wireless telegraphy and telephony, will soon 
 grow into problems grappled with by mighty national and inter- 
 national endeavours. In fact, we may look forward to a time 
 when numerous problems of every type affecting countries as 
 a whole will be dealt with nationally and with the required 
 breadth of outlook. The World War began universally by the 
 declaration of a national moratorium which saved the financial 
 systems of the countries involved from collapsing, and was 
 carried on by every country with such comparatively great 
 success because of the bold statesmanship exhibited in dealing 
 with internal problems of a colossal magnitude. 
 
 168. (e) NUMEROUS GENERALISATIONS. It is a uni- 
 versal temptation in the personal affairs of life, in the various 
 social problems, in the biological and even the physical sciences, 
 to think that a particular truth which we have found, or deem 
 that we have found, explains everything or will set everything 
 right. Much of the existing conservatism and fanaticism is due 
 to the exaggerated value placed on a particular truth, the tacit 
 assumption being that if something interprets or promotes any- 
 thing, it must interpret and promote everything in its peculiar 
 sphere, say in education, politics, or jurisprudence. On the 
 contrary, not every important generalisation is de facto a com- 
 prehensive, let alone an all-comprehensive, generalisation, and 
 until a generalisation is indisputably established as all-embrac- 
 ing, we should definitely and consciously assume that many 
 particular truths, rather than one of this class, explain a group 
 of facts or vitally promote an object. 
 
 For instance, the author might have regarded the process of 
 generalising as the only one of moment in methodology, or he 
 might have assumed that a methodology comprehending obser- 
 vation, generalisation, and deduction, exhausted the subject. 
 However, numerous as are his main divisions, it is eminently 
 probable that criticism would reveal not a few unanticipated 
 divisions. The fact is that an ideal methodology is as yet im- 
 possible, and that we need therefore not only aim at reaching 
 the most comprehensive and ideally most simple generalisations, 
 but compromise and be ready to attain to numerous, somewhat 
 complicated and imperfectly connected facts and generalisations. 
 Indeed, the final methodological ideal is fully as useful and 
 fully as unreal as that of the geometrician. 
 
 169. (/) FULL GENERALISATIONS. A generalisation, 
 to be of serious import, should be full, as well as wide and im- 
 portant. To assert, for instance, that gravitation or terrestrial 
 attraction explains the phenomenon of weight, that electricity
 
 SECTION 23 GENERALISATION. 335 
 
 and magnetism are one, or that man is primarily adapted for 
 the specio-culturally determined life, is to state almost nothing, 
 if no more be stated. And this is manifest in minor matters. 
 To generalise, for example, the assertion "Consult Baedeker in 
 regard to Florence", to "Consult always something when in 
 doubt", is practically a waste of mental force, unless we de- 
 finitely expand the assertion into something like this (somewhat 
 exaggerated) form : " Consult libraries, newspaper reading rooms, 
 dictionaries, encyclopedias, atlases, charts, text-books, books of 
 statistics, year-books, guide-books, address-books, books generally 
 (prefaces, contents, summaries, conclusions, and indexes), biblio- 
 graphies, catalogues, lists, museums, galleries, zoological and 
 botanical gardens, information bureaus, societies or persons in- 
 terested in the matter under consideration, guides, experts, 
 etc., etc.; and, in fact, consult whenever in doubt". 
 
 Similarly, if in our lengthy section relating to observation, 
 we had only dilated on the general virtue of observation and 
 had offered a miscellany of haphazard illustrations, we should 
 have fallen wide of the scientific mark. The real and far- 
 reaching value of observation is created by the many rules 
 which control the process: to observe exhaustively, minutely, 
 etc., etc. Else we have observations which are likely to prove 
 worthless. Fulness is of the essence here. Fulness in a gene- 
 ralisation, the provision of a number of particulars, should be 
 therefore habitually aimed at, for fulness alone endows it with 
 meaning and significance, forming as it also does the neces- 
 sary stimulus and point of departure for deductive reasoning. 
 Darwin's Origin of Species and Newton's Principia, or, even 
 better still, Aristotle's works, present illustrations of what is 
 signified by fulness in detail. 
 
 170. (g) RATIONAL AND RELEVANT GENERALISA- 
 TIONS. Generalisations should, moreover, be rational. An 
 enquiry is commonly undertaken for the purpose of elucidating a 
 particular subject matter. In attempting this there may be, and 
 should be, fulness of statements and of conclusions to a certain de- 
 gree ; but if absolute fulness be the goal, the enquiry degenerates 
 into a general investigation having no special end in view. To 
 prove exhaustively that man is fitted for the specio-culturally 
 determined state, and to draw up some of the principal impli- 
 cations, is right and proper; but to endeavour, having regard 
 to the peculiar subject of the enquiry, to render explicit all 
 that is implicit, and to pursue each of the implications into the 
 minutest particularity, that is, to write a complete science of 
 culture, including all the connected sciences, would be irrational. 
 Enquiries differ, of course, in intension and extension, and an 
 exhaustive enquiry will comprise much ; yet he who in connec- 
 tion with an investigation relating to the nature of protoplasm, 
 would write a compendium of astronomy, physics, botany, and 
 zoology, would act contrary to science and to modern common
 
 336 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 sense. His office is to adduce as large an array as possible 
 of salient facts and factors bearing on his special problem, and, 
 beyond this, to indulge in incidental excursions only. 
 
 171. (h) ORIGINAL GENERALISATIONS. Provided ge- 
 neralisations are at least in some measure original, they fall 
 outside the purview of science, unless, indeed, they serve the 
 important purpose of testing a theory. In fact, the more strik- 
 ingly novel an enquiry, the more valuable is it likely to prove. 
 
 Here are some rules relating to the cultivation of originality. 
 These should be supplemented by the methodological aids men- 
 tioned in connection with the promotion of economy (Con- 
 clusion 10), accuracy ( 124), resourcefulness ( 135), and 
 self -training ( 86) : 
 
 In a given direction improvements, discoveries, and inventions may 
 be effected (pre-supposing thorough training, long practice, and full up-to- 
 date information) by (1) our striving to become conscious of, or/and directing 
 attention to, e.flr., disadvantages, defects, deficiencies, absence of stand- 
 ardised methods and products, errors, confusions, unnecessary com- 
 plexity and wastefulness, or series of facts and activities not inherently 
 correlated or connected or not subsumed under a general or universal law, 
 and discrepancies between the real and men's ideal (economic, moral, in- 
 tellectual, hygienic, and sesthetic), be these generally admitted, easily 
 noticed, accidentally discovered, or perceptible on deliberate and systematic 
 individual and collective examination; then (2) inquiring where such and or 
 cognate improvements, inventions, and discoveries already exist, and apply- 
 ing or adapting them, and developing them to the furthest; and, where 
 (2) is inadequate, (3) ascertaining with meticulous care the precise defects, 
 etc., the general principles in removing such, and the known or likely 
 methods which are applied or applicable in connection with these prin- 
 ciples, and proceeding or inducing others to proceed, accordingly ; further- 
 more, by (4) examining the degree of each quality and its relations, 
 applying the dialectical Conclusions 27 and 28, and examining closely or 
 remotely related facts or activities akin in some respect, with a view 
 to conceivable or practicable improvements, inventions, and discoveries; 
 (5) fully profiting by ideas due to careful classification, to accident, -to 
 special and exceptional circumstances, and to novel or apparently insigni- 
 ficant facts, inventions, and discoveries; (6) applying the methods of 
 systematic examination, generalisation, deduction, and application; and 
 (7) seeking to invent or discover by the above methods new or ad- 
 ditional ways of satisfying given wants or creating others of a desirable 
 character. 
 
 Defects and imperfections should be in this manner brought 
 to the focus of consciousness and systematically dealt with. 
 The noiseless typewriter is a recent instance of the application 
 of this method; stainless steel is another. 
 
 172. (/) AUTOMATICALLY INITIATED AND METHOD- 
 ICALLY DEVELOPED GENERALISATIONS. In Section XIII 
 it was shown that we cannot with advantage generalise every 
 statement; but this should not deter us from habitually gen- 
 eralising, since we may be sure that, whilst we should thus 
 make many misses, we shall also make many unforeseen hits. 
 Wherever, for instance, we reach some conclusion regarding a 
 single fact, several facts, or a class of facts, we may with profit 
 attempt to generalise these at least to related facts or classes
 
 SECTION 23 GENERALISATION. 337 
 
 of facts, and, if we have been successful, we may extend the 
 generalisation in every direction so far as circumstances permit. 
 Thus Kopp, examining the specific gravity of liquids at their 
 boiling point, not only detected regularities among their specific 
 volumes, but also in the boiling points of related substances, 
 the temperature of ebullition, and the character of the com- 
 pounds; to-day the fact that uranium and radium change into 
 other elements, has suggested the subtle question whether all 
 elements are in process of decomposition and whether this is 
 also true of compounds ; the explanation of the inertia of electri- 
 city has suggested that somehow the inertia of matter might 
 have the same cause, that indeed matter may be composed of 
 electrons ; and the fixation of nitrogen by bacteria, may suggest 
 that various other useful substances are fixed by them, as 
 water in an arid climate, and that all such bacteria may be 
 artificially multiplied. The present custom is to generalise 
 when something accidentally suggests this course to be de- 
 sirable. We ought, however, to make it a habit to generalise. 
 It may be that we shall thus reach only a second or a third 
 fact, or one class, or, on the other hand, a very comprehensive 
 generalisation: it does not matter, so long as we have ex- 
 hausted the possibilities. Such a habit will develop our powers 
 of generalising and avoid our neglecting to generalise when 
 we ought to do so, and it will also prevent our reasoning to 
 a second fact alone or only to the nearest class. This process 
 presupposes substantially original, definite, and scientifically 
 arrived at statements respecting facts or classes ; because, to 
 attempt to generalise, for example, every statement in every 
 article or book which crosses our path, would be folly and 
 would lead to disgust of generalising. It also assumes habitual 
 resort to verification, without which the process proposed is 
 destitute of sense and value. 
 
 We may now offer a few illustrations in regard to methodical 
 procedure. In connection with a series of particulars relating 
 to the senses, I deliberately seek for something to generalise. 
 Noting a reference to the relative rapidity of one sense, I 
 determine to discover rapidity of apprehension in all the senses. 
 After this, I methodically arrive at the term Time, the most 
 comprehensive class to which rapidity belongs, and decide to 
 render definite all the propositions so far as they relate to 
 Time. Continuing the process of extension, [ pass from Time 
 to the other aspects named in our second part of the table of 
 Primary Categories, and successively endeavour to utilise these. 
 The limit of extension is then reached regarding the problem 
 which we set out to examine. Again, I observe in my notes 
 that some sense is assisted by some other sense. I amplify 
 this into the question: "How far is each of the senses assisted 
 by each of the other senses?" And, after studying this question 
 with a view to extending it to the furthest bounds, I obtain, 
 
 22
 
 338 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 by applying Conclusion 28, the query: "How far is each sense 
 and any group of senses assisted, not assisted, never assisted, 
 impeded, etc., by each sense and any group of senses, and by 
 movement, impulse, feeling, mood, habit, memory, imagination, 
 ratiocination, will, etc.?" Similarly, noticing the term bio- 
 mechanics, I extend to all the divisions of physics ; then, back- 
 ward, apply all biological divisions to physics; then, forward 
 again, from physics and biology to specio-psychics ; and, lastly, 
 all the sub-divisions of the above to all the sub-divisions of the 
 above, in the most methodical manner practicable. (See Con- 
 clusion 33, Scheme of Classification.) In generalising in this 
 manner, it should not be excessively difficult to reach an ap- 
 preciable number of useful and sometimes invaluable minor 
 and major statements. Yet it ought to be borne in mind that 
 such methodical generalising, if it is to proceed far, is only of 
 real utility after we have ascertained a prodigious variety of 
 uniformities. Else we are pumping mud, and are sacrificing 
 considerably more time in futile verification than we should 
 have spent in independent observation. 
 
 Once more. When examining a series of conclusions at which 
 we have arrived, we endeavour to note in what profitable order 
 they may be arranged. The suggestion is, perhaps, that a for- 
 ward, lateral, or some other order is most appropriate. As we 
 inspect the conclusions in the order which apparently most 
 nearly fits them, we observe, however, applying Conclusion 27, 
 that various links are missing. We, accordingly, complete the 
 chain by detecting and inserting the missing links. Mendelyeff s 
 periodic law is a prominent exemplification of this method, and 
 a kindred one would be the proper classification of the sciences. 
 (See Conclusion 33.) However, the problem here discussed is 
 not only one of completing a system. It may be a question of 
 proportion. There may be a too large or too small, a too 
 much or too little, a too this or too that. We then prune 
 or graft until there is a practically balanced or complete re- 
 sult before us. The multitude of existing classifications may 
 be utilised as auxiliaries, as well as the special classifications 
 which have presented themselves during the enquiry. Finally, 
 when several items have been collected, we endeavour not 
 only to arrange them in a certain order, but to connect them, 
 and, if possible, to marshal them as parts of a single organised 
 totality. 
 
 Or examine the problem of the elaboration of a rule of life. 
 Noting in the preliminary investigation that sundry fundamental 
 psychic qualities are comprised in the provisional rule, I strive 
 to complete these. Theoretically this means that we should act 
 with our whole mental nature, our whole mental nature being 
 defined in conformity with the text-books of psychology as 
 constituted of: the intelligence (interpreted as mainly memory, 
 imagination, reasoning, and judgment); the feelings (consisting,
 
 SECTION 23. GENERALISATION. 339 
 
 oh the side of the sentiments, of the sense of right or conscience, 
 of sympathy or fellow-feeling, refinement or tact, and of humour 
 or geniality); and the will (interpreted as mainly initiative, 
 resoluteness, perseverance, and strenuousness). The rule then 
 reads: "In your conduct (and, further generalising methodically, 
 in all your activities!) utilise all the powers of the mind, i.e., 
 carry out promptly and intelligently, in a sympathetic, genial, and 
 tactful manner, what a thoroughly enlightened and awakened 
 conscience (reason, taste, etc.) demands." We arrive in this 
 methodical way at a complete rule, so far as our present 
 knowledge extends. 
 
 Methodical procedure is of cardinal importance from the 
 commencement of an enquiry; but it should not be severely 
 pressed until we have made considerable headway and until 
 we are tolerably sure of our ground. For example, assuming 
 any two points reached, we search for any possible points 
 disregarded between or beyond the two points, and, having 
 reached some kind of scheme, we proceed to eliminate what is 
 irrelevant and add what is lacking. Even to the last, however, 
 the system constructed needs to be critically re-examined, and, 
 if required, recast, for especially towards the end of an enquiry 
 should gaps and flaws become visible or even glaring. (Con- 
 clusion 30.) So, too, the amount of time we have devoted to 
 a certain portion of our investigation or the amount of material 
 we have collected, will each, when examined, perhaps suggest 
 that adequate attention has not been paid to that portion, or 
 that the material collected or the time absorbed is more than 
 ample. And we shall not rest satisfied till we have done what 
 is necessary to weld all the details into a connected whole, or, 
 at the very least, to link them, so far as permissible, in a parti- 
 cular order. Unintermittently, therefore, we need to aim at 
 rounded or strictly serial and connected results, and arrange 
 that continuity and proportion are throughout respected. So 
 long as this object is not attained, our work is manifestly in- 
 complete, and to obviate such incompleteness we should have 
 recourse to methodological procedure. 
 
 From the foregoing it is evident that the value of proceeding 
 methodically cannot be overrated. Leaving matters to chance 
 or to half-chance, we not only progress with painful slowness, 
 but -we can never be confident in our conclusions. On the 
 contrary, by methodical observation, recollection, generalising, 
 deducing, application, and classifying, we advance with rapid 
 strides and safely. The collection of facts will proceed with 
 great rapidity, and the explanation of these facts will be con- 
 summated at the earliest possible moment, when methodological 
 canons continuously govern the process of enquiry. Darwin 
 never merely indulged in assertions, nor merely speculated; 
 but he systematically applied logical rules throughout all his 
 work. One might, indeed, claim that the truest token of intellec- 
 ts*
 
 340 PART V WORKING STAGE. 
 
 tual and other progress is progress in method, for the sufficient 
 reason that method, if socially available, places us in a position 
 to fix and multiply facts for the benefit of our contemporaries 
 and descendants. In its absence, we inherit the outcome of 
 others' labour, but remain ignorant of any valuable methods 
 they may have applied, and continue therefore very much in 
 the condition of Sisyphus. In the case of secret processes this 
 disadvantage is self-evident, inasmuch as the secret is some- 
 times interred with its custodian. 
 
 From the viewpoint of methodical procedure, granting the 
 existence of a general methodology, the first step is to classify 
 facts and processes, and to effect this in the manner above 
 indicated. (See also Conclusion 3.) Where in any science or 
 art a passable store of these classifications exists, the inquirer 
 is immensely aided, and is in turn able to improve them. So 
 far as methodical procedure in classification is concerned, it 
 consists in organically stringing together the facts under review 
 at any time. Wherever there are contrasts and opposites (as 
 good and bad, or long and short), the one should automatically 
 suggest the other, all that lies between the termini, and all 
 related divisions to the furthest limit. Degree-extremes, such 
 as pool to ocean, infancy to senility, or ingestion to excretion, 
 should be at once detected and methodically treated as ordinary 
 contrasts. Also, each alleged division needs to be examined 
 as to its homogeneity (as a given colour), and as to how far the 
 division between it and other supposed divisions may be bridged 
 (as deliberation and habit). Relations of quantity, time, space, 
 consciousness, degree, state, change, and personal equation, 
 noted in the second part of the table of Primary Categories, 
 should be methodically exhausted; as well as the processes 
 enumerated in the third part of the above table. 
 
 Another illustration. In connection with an international 
 movement of a humanitarian character, I contemplate writing 
 to a certain Speaker. I generalise this to all Speakers, to all 
 Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries, to all Cabinet Ministers, 
 to all Party Leaders, to all Ambassadors and Consuls-General, 
 to all Rulers, to all Presidents of international associations, to 
 all Principals of universities, to all notable thinkers, and so on ; 
 and I further generalise by mentally resolving to employ this 
 generalisation and improve or adapt it in any appropriate 
 future contingency. I press beyond to national and local activi- 
 ties, and then to other spheres of an international, national, 
 local, group, individual, and incidental (also physical, intellectual, 
 moral, aesthetic, and vocational) character. Or, watching close 
 by the performance of a first-rate pianist, I reason that his 
 extreme delicacy and enormous vigour of touch could be de- 
 liberately imparted to ordinary pupils ; that these qualities should 
 mark the musician generally, also the painter, the sculptor, the 
 architect, including the arts and crafts generally; that they might
 
 SECTION 23. GENERA LISA TION. 341 
 
 be applied to poetry, literature, and oratory ; and that they are, 
 perhaps, in place in all human activities. 
 
 Again. Suppose it is contended that nationalism is of supreme 
 importance because of its alleged distinctiveness and matchless 
 cultural value. 1 At once, automatically, we form as complete 
 a classification as we can of the relevant facts individual, 
 common interests of individuals (religion, municipal and political 
 parties, art, science, economics, health), family, neighbourhood, 
 city, district, county, province, country, empire, pan(Slavs, 
 Germans), religion, pan(Islamites), race, internationalism, cosmo- 
 politanism, humanity, life, nature and then ask ourselves how 
 far each of these is distinctive and possesses cultural value. 
 Our conclusion will evidently be that justice should be done 
 to all component parts of mankind, that several of these are 
 extremely important, and that it is deceptive, and even perilous, 
 to select one of them for general emphasis save in a limited 
 problem. That is, a methodical arrangement of the whole series 
 of pertinent facts within which nationalism falls, enables us 
 forthwith to correct a plausible and menacing error. 
 
 So, too, noting that a law term is appropriately applied 
 outside the arena of law, this observation is,^ subject to con- 
 venience, methodically generalised according to the cultural 
 list of categories in 1, to all terms of law, and, thence, pro- 
 gressively, to all classes of terms having a restricted signifi- 
 cation; or remarking that an appellative term is by some writer 
 narrowed in meaning, the process is methodically applied to 
 all such classes of terms, and, inversely, to the methodical 
 generalisation of restricted terms. Such a course should also 
 suggest the figurative use of concrete terms and proper names, 
 and the thorough exhaustion of the favourable possibilities of 
 language along all lines. 
 
 Assume, lastly, that I am struck with the variations in the 
 prefix con. Instead of examining these at haphazard, as sug- 
 gested by a capricious memory, I prepare the methodical 
 statement which follows: 
 
 Co - agulation 
 Co m 6ination 
 Co n ceal 
 Co n dition 
 Co - education 
 Co n firm 
 Co n gress 
 Co - /lesion 
 Co - incident 
 Co n /unction 
 Co k 
 Co 1 /ection 
 
 1 Regionalists, not without some excellent reasons, frequently advance 
 the same claim to-day. It is by admitting the great importance of the bulk 
 of the theories which emphasise one or another aspect of life, that we shall 
 most effectually promote the progress of the world.
 
 342 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 Com jnence 
 Co n nection 
 Co - operation 
 Complexion 
 Co n quer 
 Co r rection 
 Co n slant 
 Co n /inue 
 Co "- Unitarian 
 Co n yiction 
 Co w 
 Co x 
 Co y 
 Co z 
 
 Everything becomes now clear as day, and without delay I am 
 in the position to formulate the ensuing apposite conclusions: 
 
 (a) No con-combinations exist with non-Latin words, L e., 
 words beginning with k, w, x, y, z. 
 
 (b) Stems whose first letter consists of a vowel or the aspirate 
 are preceded by co, though exceptions exist. 
 
 (c) In certain cases where the n in con-combinations would 
 be difficult to pronounce, it becomes 772, as in words commencing 
 with b, p, m. 
 
 (d) For similar reasons as in (c), the n in con becomes / be- 
 fore /, and r before /. 
 
 (e) Rules (a), (c), and (d), apply presumably to in and other 
 prefixes terminating in /?, if others should exist imbibe, im- 
 pinge, z/legible, immaterial, zrreductible, etc. 
 
 Similar rules are presumably operative throughout the English 
 language in the words derived from Latin, e.g., rampant, e/fusion, 
 diffusion; or, ad adapted as follows: a/firm, aggrandise, a/lure, 
 ammunition, apparent, arrive, ascent, assume, attention. 
 
 From this lengthy statement it will be readily inferred that 
 habitual and methodical procedure as a whole, including of 
 course habitual and methodical generalisation, are of prime im- 
 portance. 
 
 The sub-headings in Conclusion 16, pertaining to Observation, 
 should be also utilised in connection with the process of gene- 
 ralisation. 
 
 CONCLUSION 26. 
 
 Need of Postponing large Generalisations to near the Conclusion 
 
 of the Enquiry. 
 
 173. Useful as is the formulation of comprehensive con- 
 clusions at the termination of an investigation, it is mischievous 
 to seek for these at the commencement, for the reason that 
 the conclusions then arrived at are almost certainly premature 
 and are likely therefore to be erroneous and misleading. Until 
 the field under inspection is scrupulously explored, the largest 
 number of conclusions are collected, and the ground is traversed 
 repeatedly, it is well to regard the conclusions reached as
 
 SECTION 23. GENERALISATION. 343 
 
 practically of equal value. Towards the close of the enquiry, 
 when verification is easy and misapprehensions are difficult, 
 the conclusions will be gradually valuated, graded, developed, 
 connected, completed, the paramount factors will be isolated, 
 and a point of view elaborated. For instance, the present author, 
 in writing his Mind of Man, launched upon his examination 
 of the chief psychological categories current, without reference 
 to any hypothesis concerning their nature, and he is at a loss 
 to conceive why in the investigation of any ordinary problem, 
 except for directive purposes, one should seek to anticipate the 
 final conclusion or expect that such anticipation will be con- 
 firmed by the examination. Are the secrets of nature and of 
 life to be more easily elicited by sheer speculation than the 
 melodies which may be charmed out of a violin? The answer 
 of history on this point is conclusive. 
 
 CONCLUSION 27. 
 
 Need of Exhausting the Degree of Applicability of a Conclusion 
 within and between Divisions, and also of Extending it to Parallel, 
 Distantly Related, Seemingly Unrelated, Pure, Normal, Minimal, 
 Maximal, Deviating, Morbid, Eccentric, Border, and Transitional 
 
 Instances. 
 
 174. (A) DEGREE-DETERMINATION.-Bacon, in his 
 analysis of the nature of heat, allowed for degrees of heat. 
 The use here proposed of the term Degree, however, extends 
 further, for in Bacon's analysis we should have gradually passed 
 from intense heat to imperceptible heat and thence to percep- 
 tible cold and intense cold, thus challenging his assumption 
 that heat and cold are separable facts; and we should have 
 been obliged to proceed even beyond and inquired as to whether 
 temperature represents a simple quality or a mixture or complex 
 of qualities, and how far it is one of a series of related 
 qualities how far it is, for instance, related to light and electri- 
 city. Similarly, the common notion that attention intensifies a 
 mental state, loses its meaning when this Conclusion is applied, 
 for attention proves to be merely an alternative term for 
 direction and relative concentration of mental activity. If an 
 assertion is made concerning a certain class of objects, we 
 ought to call into question its extending so far, and also learn 
 whether it does not extend indefinitely farther. A Conclusion 
 such as the present one will probably transpire to be most 
 valuable by sometimes narrowing the compass of a generalisation, 
 but more frequently in greatly extending its scope. It may be 
 automatically applied where contrasts are or may be brought 
 in question, such as once and always, one and everything, con- 
 cretest detail and abstractest generality, particular and universal, 
 simple and complex, large and small, far and near, light and 
 heavy, white and black, summer and winter, good and bad, 
 ignorant and well-informed, beautiful and ugly.
 
 344 PART V.-WORKING STAGE. 
 
 The passage from ether to electron, from electron to the proto- 
 elements, from the latter to the inert gases, from these to ordi- 
 nary elements and simple compounds, and from the last to 
 colloids and protoplasm; 1 from gases to solids; from freez- 
 ing point to boiling point; from the electric spark of a 
 toy battery to the flash of lightning; from the readily ob- 
 tained amount of energy required for effecting the combination 
 of phosphorus with warm air to the at present unobtainable 
 amount necessary for disintegrating a chemical element; from 
 opacity to transparency; from imperviousness to perviousness ; 
 from rarity to density ; from the feeble draught making its way 
 up a kitchen chimney in sultry weather to a tempest in mid- 
 ocean; from rill to river; from the centre of the earth to its 
 surface and from its surface to the periphery of the atmo- 
 sphere; from the tremours of a stretched wire to earthquake 
 shocks ; from the climate or the stratification of one geological 
 epoch to that of another; from antarctic to arctic zone; from 
 the temperature of trees to that of birds; from the degree of 
 plant metabolism in mid-spring to that of mid- winter ; from the 
 bright scarlet colour of arterial blood to the dark purple of 
 venous blood; from complete sterility to remarkable fertility 
 of hybrid and other offspring; from alert wakefulness to pro- 
 found sleep; from rasping noise to mellifluous harmony; from 
 imperturbable calm to neurotic excitement ; from high efficiency 
 to total inefficiency; from verbal exposition to concrete study; 
 from ultra-anarchist to ultra-conservative in politics and other 
 spheres; from Napoleonic artillery effective only at less than 
 a mile range to modern long-distance guns deadly at more 
 than sixty miles range; and from private altercations to world 
 wars; the discovery of the spheroidal nature of the globe, of 
 the planetary perturbations, the variations of the earth's magne- 
 tism, and of the presence of carbonic acid in the air in a small 
 
 "The degree of chemical complexity capable of existing in the materials 
 found on the earth is definitely and sharply fixed by temperature. At a 
 white heat, such as exists in the sun's atmosphere, we have seen that 
 only elements can exist, and many of these are decomposed into proto- 
 elements. At a somewhat lower temperature binary compounds, such as the 
 oxides, can remain in equilibrium, in incomplete combination, becoming 
 more and more complete as the temperature falls, and, as soon as their 
 existence becomes possible, these oxides do exist. Lower still in the scale 
 of temperature, saline compounds, such as chlorides of the alkalies, and 
 mutually neutralised acidic and basic oxides combined together, can stand 
 the heat. Such bodies as the carbonates of calcium and magnesium can 
 now be present in an incomplete state of combination, partially as oxide 
 and partially as carbonate, in labile balance as the temperature fluctuates 
 up or down, and the pressure of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere changes. 
 Whenever the environmental conditions make their presence possible, these 
 more complex forms must promptly make their appearance by chemical law. 
 But it is only at a very much lower temperature that compounds at all 
 complicated in chemical structure can exist in equilibrium, and for those 
 compounds of many hundreds of atoms which are a characteristic of life, 
 the range is narrowly limited." (Benjamin Moore, op. cit., pp. 184-186.)
 
 SECTION 23 GENERALISATION. 345 
 
 
 
 but definite proportion, as illustrating the need of a high degree 
 of exactitude; the retardation of ascending missiles through 
 the action of gravity and their parabolic trajectory; the possi- 
 bility of a continuous transition from the liquid to the gaseous 
 state, as evidenced by gaseous carbon dioxide turning into its 
 corresponding liquid gradually; the difference in the penetrat- 
 ing power of alpha, beta, and gamma rays; the degree of 
 conductivity and compressibility of different substances; the 
 effect of variations in degrees of temperature in determining 
 the consistency of a substance or in producing the trade winds 
 and land and sea breezes; the problem of the pump, and of 
 the use of mercury in connection with the thermometer and 
 barometer ; the use of gold-leaf in electrical experiments because 
 of its unrivalled thinness; the quantitative and qualitative dif- 
 ferences between the chemical elements; the point of greatest 
 and least density of water and of other substances; steam, 
 cloud, mist, rain, hail, sleet, snow, ice, frost, and dew as 
 forms of water; the state of the earth now and when it was 
 in a gaseous condition; the similarity of the light seen when 
 the temperature of a meteorite is slowly raised in a laboratory 
 with that of a comet approaching the sun; the displacement 
 in geology of the catastrophic by the Huttonian theory; the 
 links which connect the lowliest with the most developed forms 
 of life; the relation of fluctuations to mutations in biology; 
 nerve cells, muscular cells, sense cells, and glandular cells, as 
 modifications of epithelial cells; the significant part played by 
 bacteria and earthworms in the economy of nature; the slow 
 forming and fading of sensory impressions; the problem of 
 attention and inattention, of habit and deliberate thought and 
 action, and of the formation of character ; the educative process 
 in the race and individual, and human progress from eolithic to 
 modern times and beyond; the relative moral, intellectual, and 
 hygienic effects of small and large potions of alcohol; the 
 ability to resist appreciable doses of poison through becoming 
 habituated to them by the frequent absorption of inconsiderable 
 doses; 1 the comparative truth and importance of two opposed 
 assertions or courses of action in politics or social life; the 
 slow development of landscape painting from still and dark- 
 green landscapes to landscapes abounding in colour and 
 movement, or portraiture from passivity and stiffness to action 
 and vivacity, of buildings from mud hut to Rheims cathedral, 
 and of music from the primitive man's chant to a Beethoven 
 
 1 "It is only some fifteen years since Calmette showed that, if cobra 
 poison were introduced into the blood of a horse in less quantity than 
 would cause death, the horse would tolerate, with little disturbance, after ten 
 days, a full dose, and then day after day an increasing dose, until the horse, 
 without any inconvenience, received an injection of cobra poison large 
 enough to kill thirty horses of its size." (Sir Ray Lankester, The Kingdom 
 of Man, 1912, p. 79.)
 
 346 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 symphony; the place of diagrammatic curves in statistical and 
 other studies ; and countless other problems including the bulk 
 of the facts of geology and physiography, the steady growth 
 and further development of the arts, crafts, sciences, and 
 social institutions, and everything capable of being treated 
 quantitatively, need to be classified under this head. 
 
 In this way, by using the stereoscope with sets of photographs, 
 taken from half-an-inch to ten inches apart, we convincingly 
 demonstrate that our sense of the third dimension is due, in 
 part at least, to the distance between the eyes. Thus "Sir 
 H. Davy, from finding that the flame of hydrogen gas was not 
 communicated through a long slender tube, conjectured that 
 a shorter but slenderer tube would answer the same purpose; 
 this led him to try the experiments, in which, by continually 
 shortening the tube, and at the same time lessening its bore, 
 he arrived at last at the wire-gauze of his safety lamp". 
 (Whately, Logic, pp. 237-238.) 
 
 Again. Warm water at rest in an open vessel lacks deci- 
 dedly the character of a solid; yet "the water a foot or so 
 away from the fireman's hose, may be struck with a hammer, 
 and the latter will rebound as though from an anvil". Simi- 
 larly, chromium added to steel in a certain proportion renders 
 the latter rustless, and the best incandescent mantle contains 
 a mixture of 99 per cent, of thorium oxide and 1 per cent, of 
 cerium oxide. To borrow an example from Venn: "If we are 
 shown two glasses of water, one from the sea, and one from 
 the Lake of Geneva, no one can detect any difference in their 
 colour. But let us have enough of each in vessels side by 
 side, and any eye could detect the degree and nature of the 
 contrast." (Logic, p. 536.) So, too, if we place two ounce 
 weights side by side, no mutual gravitational effect is observ- 
 able; but a pendulum near a mountain is deflected sensibly. 
 Thus snowflakes appear white in masses and transparent when 
 detached, and the corpuscles of the blood seem red when in 
 numbers and somewhat yellow separately. Anthropology offers 
 us a pertinent illustration of some consequence. Human beings 
 are as a rule strictly divided into white, yellow, and black ; yet 
 not only does Prof. Tyler in his Anthropology (p. 67) inform 
 us that "on the whole it seems that the distinction of colour, from 
 the fairest Englishman to the darkest African, has no hard and 
 fast lines, but varies gradually from one tint to another", 
 but the facts appear rather to bear witness to a single colour 
 from the palest to the shadiest yellow. Darwin applies this 
 Conclusion perhaps more frequently than any other: "This 
 feather-mark [the ocellus on the tail-coverts of the peacock] 
 was properly considered a serious difficulty to Darwin's theory 
 because of its remarkable character. But with consummate in- 
 genuity he undertook to connect it by a series of less and less 
 remarkable markings with the ordinary feather-markings of the
 
 SECTION 23. GENERALISATION. 347 
 
 group to which the peacock belongs." (Frank Cramer, op. cit., 
 pp. 58-59.) "The first thing to be established in proof of the 
 derivation of climbing plants from non-climbers was the exis- 
 tence of gradations in the power of climbing, and the inter- 
 mediate stages between the different methods of climbing 
 by twining of the stem, by leaf-stalks, and by tendrils." (Ibid., 
 p. 166.) 
 
 175. Lastly. The dimensional theories appear to diminish 
 in persuasiveness when the measure of a high degree of exacti- 
 tude in analysis is applied. A point, a line, and a plane, as 
 limiting notions, are permissible concepts; but from the stand- 
 point of objective reality we are bound to assume that they 
 convey no distinct meaning. For instance, since, by definition, 
 a point does not, and a line does, occupy space, no number of 
 successive points however great, could form a line however 
 small. Similarly, since a line, by definition, is said to have no 
 width, an infinite number of juxtaposed lines could never form 
 a plane however limited; and since, by definition, a plane has 
 no depth, me superposition of any number of planes however 
 multitudinous, could not form a solid however thin. The three 
 sets of dimensions, as conceived separately, have therefore, it 
 seems, no relation whatever one to another. 
 
 From a different standpoint, the same criticism applies if a 
 .sufficiently high degree of exactitude is employed. Any actual 
 point must have three dimensions, and so must any actual line 
 and plane. A one or two-dimensioned being is apparently a 
 mere logical or verbal figment. So-called plane beings resolve 
 themselves into three-dimensional beings whom we, for theoreti- 
 cal purposes or owing to an insufficient degree of clarity of 
 thought, regard as two-dimensional. .For the same reason, when 
 we speak of four-dimensional beings, we are almost certainly 
 carried away by the verbal decomposition of solids into three 
 parts. As a matter of fact, every conceivable object is a solid, 
 no more and no less. It is as if, misled by a useful division, 
 men reasoned that we could imagine the existence of a single 
 horizontal direction east, or of horizontal directions, additional 
 to east, west, north, and south, and their intermediates. 
 
 Or to illustrate the matter differently. Conscious lines floating 
 in space and coming into contact or collision with other lines, 
 would become aware of the existence of those other lines. If 
 these lines collided with planes or cubes, they would be con- 
 scious of them, but only in so far as lines. So with planes, 
 colliding with lines and cubes. The planes would recognise the 
 lines as lines, and the cubes in so far as planes. Accordingly, 
 a four-dimensional being coming into collision with a three- 
 dimensional being would be recognised by the latter so far as 
 three out of the four dimensions are in question. The four- 
 dimensional being cannot consequently live more than one 
 fourth outside the three-dimensional world.
 
 348 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 However, ultra-three-dimensional beings are usually thought 
 of as living entirely on one plane, in the fourth dimension. If 
 so, they must be conceived as entirely unconscious of the three 
 other planes. Besides, recent speculations hiave acquainted us 
 with hypothetical beings having two and three dimensions; but 
 not with beings living exclusively in the second or third dimen- 
 sion. No one, if we mistake not, has yet pretended that such 
 existed or could exist. We certainly are not cognisant of them. 
 Hence a being living exclusively in the fourth dimension, poses 
 a new problem, and raises the perplexing question of the 
 existence of beings living entirely in the second or third 
 dimension. 
 
 Whatever way, then, we regard the dimensional problem, 
 it seems if our analysis is penetrating enough that nothing 
 but solids exist, and that we are wholly unconscious of the 
 existence of one or two-dimensional beings. Einstein's rigid 
 bodies and mollusks seem to fall both under the same definition. 
 Probably an analysis of the notions of curved spheroidal and 
 finite space would be equally non-confirmative of recent space 
 theories. 
 
 176. In practical life, matters of degree are constantly 
 overlooked. For this reason one school will declare itself 
 ostentatiously for the upholding of authority and another of 
 freedom, when wise moderation suggests that the utmost liberty 
 of personal judgment is congruent with the deepest general 
 respect for authority. Similarly, this Conclusion urges the 
 advantage of increasingly more precise, refined, and powerful 
 instruments and methods, which have frequently revolutionised 
 a department of science and general activity, and the need of 
 observation being of the extremest delicacy, of experiments 
 being completely unequivocal, and of calculations disregarding 
 no factor however seemingly insignificant. Moreover, it com- 
 prehends all analogical reasoning both in respect of degree and 
 qualitative resemblance, as the analogy between food and fuel 
 or a gland and a lung, or the determination of the ponderable 
 nature of the air by noting that it can be warmed, cooled, 
 moved, compressed, dilated, even seen in certain circumstances, 
 that it rises in water, occupies space, exerts palpable pressure 
 when strongly agitated, behaves like smoke, is capable of pro- 
 ducing sound, etc. The Conclusion is also, as we have noted, 
 most especially applicable to the systematic testing of the 
 homogeneity of any content and of the reality of divisions, of 
 the comparative importance or position of two or more related 
 facts, as well as to terms involving degree, contrast, similarity, 
 and, in general, relativity. If Descartes and Malebranche had 
 applied this Conclusion, they would have probably abandoned 
 their favourite terms Clear and Distinct as terms normally 
 lacking absolute, and needing relative, determination, and 
 M. Henri Bergson would probably find himself left, perhaps,
 
 SECTION 23. GENERALISATION. 349 
 
 without any inner world at all if, following this Conclusion, he 
 consistently excluded all experience, reflection, and classifi- 
 cation. 
 
 Furthermore, we alter the degree of an alleged cause for 
 the purpose of perceiving whether there is a uniformly cor- 
 responding change in the degree of its alleged effects, and 
 vice versa. (This is Bacon's and Mill's method of Concomitant 
 Variation.) We also search for pure instances, for extremes, 
 for that which may be regarded as the mean or the normal, 
 for deviating, morbid, eccentric, border, and transitional in- 
 stances, and for any other remarkable stages or divisions be- 
 tween the extremes or between maximum and minimum, en- 
 deavouring to reduce all exceptions to rules. We inquire whether 
 we are dealing with partly or wholly continuous or qualitatively 
 different states. We gradually eliminate constituents in order 
 to observe the residual phenomena which often prove to be of 
 far-reaching significance both theoretically and practically, and 
 also by stages add others with the same object, as in chemistry. 
 We endeavour to arrange all knowledge in a determinate 
 order atomic weight of chemical elements, specific gravity of 
 substances, influence of time on physical, vital, and cultural 
 components and processes, the evolution of the human eye and 
 other parts of the human body from the earliest manifestation 
 of life on the globe, etc., allowing for veiled or hidden resem- 
 blances and dissimilarities, as in subcutaneous processes or 
 structures in the living or superficially different but really 
 homologous vital functions and parts, as illustrated by the 
 "wings" of the bat, the "fins" of the whale, and the electric 
 organs of fishes. 
 
 177. Darwin, in his Descent of Man, reasoned circum- 
 stantially that man was essentially an animal, because in in- 
 numerable respects he resembles animals. Proofs in behalf of 
 this thesis he offered in profusion, inquiring into every con- 
 ceivable character which was alleged to be distinctive of man. 
 Throughout, he proceeded on the assumption that differences 
 of degree are of secondary importance. Yet by consistently 
 pursuing such a method he would have experienced no difficulty 
 in proving that all animals are plants, and possibly that no 
 division exists between living and non-living things. 
 
 The truth, however, is that degrees frequently indicate quali- 
 tative differences. E.g., a black piece of iron, as it is being 
 heated, grows successively red-hot and white-hot ; a certain 
 degree of friction produces a spark, and only at a certain stage 
 does chemical combination or decomposition take place. More 
 marvellous still, when the rate of oscillation of electrons is 
 very high, they emit rays which cause the sensation known 
 to us as light, and if "they oscillate even faster than required 
 for this effect, they produce rays of invisible light. Slower 
 oscillations produce rays of heat, and still slower frequencies
 
 350 
 
 V.-WORKING STAGE. 
 
 give rise to the wonderful wireless waves." Or, to consider a 
 different case: with both parents brunettes, the offspring may 
 be either fair or dark, and with both parents blondes, the 
 offspring is invariably blonde. Again, a certain minimum of 
 learning from the experience of others may be found among- 
 some animals; man, however, assimilates the substance of the 
 thoughts of all his kind past and present. Man, therefore, 
 almost infinitely transcends in degree the capacity of any animal 
 for learning from others, and this quasi-infinite difference argues. 
 that man has reached a unique stage which knows no limitation 
 to the assimilation of the thoughts of others. If that were 
 not so, we should only have a right to expect in this connection 
 a virtually negligible difference between man and ape. 
 
 Similarly with man and his tools. Viewing the matter com- 
 prehensively, men may be said to have manufactured and 
 employed thousands of millions of different tools or art-produced 
 means. Compared, therefore, to what is presented by Western 
 civilisation, for instance, the two or three unfashioned tools 
 used by animals, bear witness once more to some exclusive 
 quality in man. Otherwise it would be difficult to explain 
 why man should in this respect surpass almost infinitely any 
 known animal, instead of manifesting only an infinitesimal 
 difference. Had Darwin, therefore, observed not only the 
 abstract similarity, but the colossal degree of the difference, 
 he would have been necessarily obliged to search for the cause 
 which would explain this prodigious departure from animal 
 skill. He might have then perhaps discovered that through 
 man having reached the stage of intelligence (just above the 
 higher apes) where he could freely learn from others, a crucial 
 turning point had been attained in the history of living beings, 
 replacing individual and organic evolution by specio-psychic or 
 cultural evolution. It is, therefore, indispensable that not only 
 bare similarity, but the degree of the difference should be taken 
 account of in an enquiry. 
 
 In the opposite direction the same fallacy should be avoided. 
 The reality of progress has been frequently denied, because 
 there appeared to be inappreciable progress in certain directions, 
 and even retrogression in others. A general survey, however, 
 on the basis of a compendious classification, would have yielded 
 overwhelming evidence not only of the reality of progress, but 
 of its vastness and its virtual universality. Examine, for ex- 
 ample, in this connection the progress in matters relating to 
 language. "From a few inarticulate calls and cries a vo- 
 cabulary of a hundred thousand words or more, with a cor- 
 respondingly developed grammar, is evolved; the evanescent 
 word comes gradually to be fixed by the process of writing, 
 which translates the sounds into sight symbols; the invention 
 of printing follows, whereby, at a trivial cost of labour and 
 with almost lightning-like velocity, what is written may be in-
 
 SECTION 23. GENERALISATION. 351 
 
 definitely multiplied; 1 the telegraph is then developed, enabling 
 us to remain in uninterrupted contact with our fellows all over 
 the terrestrial globe; the telephone follows the telegraph, turn- 
 ing dots and dashes into the living, vibrating voice; and this, 
 lastly, is succeeded by wireless telegraphy saving tens of 
 thousands of lives at sea and rendering spiritual intercourse 
 independent of artificial media. If this be not progress, and 
 on a stupendous scale, it would be vain to attach any mean- 
 ing to the term. 
 
 "Or, consider the related problem of transport. Primitive 
 man has no paths and no vehicles. Gradually roads, canals, 
 bridges, tunnels, of a more and more scientific and extensive 
 character, are constructed; and by degrees conveyances innumer- 
 able fill the world, propelled by animals, by steam, by gas, by 
 electricity, by petrol, at a speed which would have terrified 
 early man, and comfort-yielding beyond the fancies of lords 
 and ladies of yore. Nor is the solid earth alone utilised. The 
 seas teem with magnificent boats, and the air is beginning to 
 be alive with aircraft. Would not a primitive have regarded 
 such an improvement as outwinging his most daring anticipa- 
 tions of what man could achieve? 
 
 "Or, to treat the rest summarily, shall we speak of the 
 startling and superlative advance embodied in modern science, 
 of the varied and brilliant triumphs of the arts, of the horde 
 spirit expanding into the international spirit, of man-sacrificing 
 superstition transformed into man-saving religion, of the rose of 
 morality blossoming out of the briars of barbarism, of the ven- 
 detta and the torture chamber issuing in comparatively impartial 
 and humane laws, of despotism forced to yield inch by inch to 
 democracy, of the haphazard acquisition of incoherent supposi- 
 tions melting into the dawn of an epoch of scientific and 
 systematic education and learning, or of the magic story of 
 architecture from the straw-hut to the marble palace? The 
 more closely we scrutinise the problem, the more manifest it 
 becomes that not only is progress a reality, but that the 
 advance from the use of unchipped flints to that of electrically- 
 driven machinery, from the era of speechlessness to that of 
 collectively-applied scientific methods, has been immeasurably 
 great so great that the imagination staggers and reels when 
 it strives comprehensively and without bias to envisage the 
 metamorphosis and transfiguration which have taken place." 
 (G. Spiller, Outlines of a New World Religion, 1918, pp. 16-17.) 
 
 1 To judge by present achievements, the highest aesthetic education and 
 satisfaction of all individuals will be successfully promoted in the future 
 through art reproductions in the home: the works of the great master 
 painters will be represented in plain monochrome or in the appealing colours 
 of the originals in frames or on walls; those of the illustrious sculptors and 
 artificers will be there in proxy; the sublimest music and song will fill 
 every home; and other adornments, no less magical, will be ubiquitous.
 
 352 P^ RT V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 Looking, then, in perspective at the problem of the reality 
 of progress we learn that the negative view loses itself in a 
 sea of trifles and ignores the mountains of evidence in its 
 favour. Quantity in proof can only be neglected at the risk 
 of missing a general law. 
 
 Yet even a comparatively insignificant degree of difference 
 may be due to new factors. Approaching the edge of a pre- 
 cipitous cliff, this is of no consequence to life and limb until 
 we are close to the edge. Working out a complicated problem, 
 the solution presents itself only at the very end. In this light, 
 it is contended here, ought we to consider man's intelligence. 
 From faintest sensibility, we advance in the animal kingdom 
 to the possession of a number of highly developed senses; 
 from simple and uncertain reactions, we come to complex and 
 definite instincts; and from scarcely perceptible intelligence, 
 we reach the acute sagacity of the higher mammals, and 
 especially of the monkeys and the apes. In the last of these 
 instances the quality and the scope of thought intimately 
 approaches man's. The manner in which the Orang Outang 
 in captivity studies his visitors, and visibly calculates and 
 adapts his actions (see Mind of Man, pp. 462-463), is confus- 
 ingly like man's. Why posit, then, a gigantic distance intellec- 
 tually between man and ape, when the two appear so closely 
 related? And still, scrutinising the subject circumspectly, we 
 find that the Orang Outang just misses being sufficiently 
 advanced intellectually to profit freely by the thoughts of 
 others. That is, a slight advance beyond the Orang Outang, 
 corresponding in some degree to man's completely erect attitude 
 and his larger brain, furnishes the possibility of freely learning 
 by the experience of others, and this, as is plain, opens a new 
 earth, nay a new universe. Just as the ultimate step at the 
 cliff's edge, or rather the ultimate line in our mathematical 
 problem, translate us, as if by magic, into a fresh world, so 
 the last step in the evolution of the intelligence, insignificant 
 in itself, is responsible for a fundamental change. 
 
 We should beware hence of mechanically reasoning in regard 
 to degrees of difference. Great differences of degree may or 
 may not be due to qualitative differences, and small differences 
 may be in exactly the same position. The cause of a difference 
 should be in each case separately and scrupulously inquired 
 into. 1 
 
 178. Inasmuch as the present and the succeeding Conclu- 
 sion are of extreme significance methodologically, we venture 
 to offer an example of how the two Conclusions may be applied 
 
 1 Of course, we should also search for fixed differences. It is believed, 
 for instance, that there are no degrees of inheritance, a factor being either 
 present or absent. Furthermore, definite facts and laws are said to exist 
 in abundance, as the chemical elements, the law of gravitation, and the 
 laws of motion.
 
 SECTION 23. GENERALISATION. 353 
 
 to a problem, premising that there is here no attempt to exhaust 
 the possible number of aspects. In all investigations we must 
 proceed in this manner if we are to escape serious error, and 
 if we are to proffer an appreciable contribution towards solving 
 a problem. We base the first portion of our example on the 
 now discarded table of Secondary Categories and the second 
 on the table of Primary Categories, emphasising in this place 
 only the former. 
 
 (a) State what is the precise object of the enquiry the nature 
 of habit, and roughly define^ the term Habit. 
 
 (b) Determine whether there is such a thing as a habit at all ; 
 whether its existence is relatively doubtful or' relatively indubit- 
 able. 
 
 (c) Determine to what degree a habit may be part of a more 
 comprehensive phenomenon embracing, say, automatic, reflex, 
 and deliberate action, or may be constituted of varying phe- 
 nomena, including now some psychic factors and now others; 
 or may represent as a totality or in part a qualitatively unique 
 phenomenon ; or may enter into the whole or part of the mental 
 life; or may be evanescent or last a life-time. 
 
 (rf) Determine how far one habit evolves out of preceding, 
 depends on or conditions co-existing, and forms a basis for 
 succeeding, habits and other activities, and determine how far 
 habits differ from one another as wholes or in their parts. 
 
 (e) Follow a habit from its one or more lowest, through its 
 one or more normal or perfect, to its one or more highest, 
 stages, 1 allowing for average, casual, momentary, time-pro- 
 duced, environment-produced, transitional, imperfect, perfect, 
 exceptional, abnormal, and morbid characteristics. 
 
 (/) Determine whether differences of degree as to any aspect 
 of a habit produce any fundamental or what difference, and 
 whether habits are related by a chain of degrees to other related 
 phenomena such as automatic, reflex, and deliberate action. 
 
 (g) Gradually eliminate and also add, one by one and also 
 in groups and in different quantities, the alleged static and 
 dynamic constituents of a habit and apply exact measurement, 
 calculation, experiment, and deductive method. 
 
 (h) Trace step by step, or continuously, the evolution, imme- 
 diate and more remote origin, development, dissolution or trans- 
 formation, further evolution, and general effects of habits or 
 of a habit, and apply the other modal aspects in the table of 
 Primary Categories. 
 
 (/') Allow in the investigation of a habit for possible contra- 
 dictory, contrary, opposite, common, disparate, dependent, 
 
 1 In following, for instance, the change in volume of water from boiling 
 point to freezing point, we shall be surprised to find that the volume of 
 water, when closely approaching the freezing point, ceases to contract and 
 begins to expand. Only tireless vigilance, which takes nothing for granted, 
 will disclose such eccentricities. 
 
 23
 
 354 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 interdependent, complementary, alternative, relative, parallel, 
 and distantly related or seemingly unrelated static and dynamic 
 facts, in or between habits as wholes, or in or between parts 
 of those wholes. 
 
 (y) Compare habits under varied conditions, including those 
 most similar and dissimilar. 
 
 (k) Determine the degree of a habit's relation to closely, less 
 closely, and distantly connected phenomena in order to reach 
 the most comprehensive relevant statement. 
 
 (/) Ascertain the degree of the relations of habits to psycho- 
 logy in general and its applications, to the sciences imme- 
 diatelyand those more distantly related to psychology, to 
 the sciences and the arts generally, and to the social sciences 
 and their corresponding practical activities. 
 
 (m) Lastly. Furnish, after the fullest investigation, the tersest, 
 most lucid, most definite, and most comprehensive statement of 
 the peculiar nature of habit, which approaches to complete exact- 
 ness and is offered as far as possible in mathematical form. 
 
 And in respect of the aim of the investigation, it is neces- 
 sary, in pursuance of the table of Primary Categories, to 
 determine the Material Aspects (Elementals, or precise funda- 
 mental sensory and other mental data relating to the nature 
 of habits; Constituents, or the precise static and dynamic 
 elements, materials, and parts of a habit, and their precise 
 disposition, connection, and relative homogeneity or hetero- 
 geneity; Form, or the precise form of a habit; Dependence, or 
 the precise dependence of habits on leading and other accom- 
 panying phenomena; Action and Cause, or the precise chief 
 causes and effects of habits; Resemblances, or the precise 
 degree and nature of the resemblances subsisting between 
 habits and between habits and related phenomena; Classifica- 
 tion, or the precise methodical classification of the facts col- 
 lected and their subsumption under a larger classificatory 
 scheme; Position, or precise comparative position of habits 
 within the class or classes in which they fall, and precise 
 comparison of the constituents of different habits; Differentiae, 
 or the precise leading and other differentia, of habits, the 
 ascertainment of the leading differentiae being the primary 
 object of. an investigation; Details, or the precise secondary 
 aspects or details relating to habits and of interest to the 
 inquirer; Worth, or the precise utilisation, application, reproduc- 
 tion, value, quality, appreciation, desire, liking, preference, love, 
 and enjoyment, and their opposites, of habits ; Description, or 
 precise nomenclature, terminology, and statements in connec- 
 tion with habits) and the Modal Aspects (comprising important 
 items pertaining to Quantity, Time, Space, Consciousness, Degree, 
 State, Change, and Personal Equation). 1 
 
 1 On the nature of habit, see the author's Mind of Man, and for an 
 analysis based on the table of Primary Categories, 102.
 
 SECTION 23 GENERALISATION. 355 
 
 179. (B) PARALLEL AND OTHER INSTANCES. If the 
 "opposite", as we shall see in the next Conclusion, may show 
 that the contrary of the proposition holds good, and if the 
 Sub-Conclusion relating to degree may in a more elastic way 
 indefinitely narrow or extend the limits of a proposition, the 
 Sub-Conclusion pertaining to parallel cases of facts endeavours 
 to extend an assertion to classes of facts which do not at first 
 sight appear to be closely filiated. For instance, by the Sub- 
 Conclusion of degree-determination or that of opposite instances, 
 the bad man may be proved to possess a conscience which 
 encourages him to commit wrong, and by the present Sub- 
 Conclusion it may be demonstrated that there is a faculty 
 within certain men which informs them not merely of what is 
 right or wrong, but what is inexpensive, what is pleasant, or 
 what is correct. Summing up the conclusions concerning this 
 faculty, we may advance the generalisation that conscience as 
 such implies "familiar activity", and that whatever class of 
 facts is familiar to an individual gives rise to a special con- 
 science. Equally so with such terms as ought, duty, respon- 
 sibility, praise and blame, merit and demerit, good and bad: 
 these may each be shown to apply outside of what is strictly 
 called the realm of ethics. The expression "You ought to do 
 this", for instance, which appears to mean "If you are a certain 
 kind of person (a good man, a bad man, an artist, a man of wit, 
 a physicist), you will do this", may be applied equally and is 
 so applied, as daily experience illustrates to moral, immoral, 
 and non-moral actions. Indeed, where doubt is excluded, the 
 word "ought" is inapplicable. To the good man we say "We 
 know you respect your mother", and to the bad man "We know 
 you do not respect your mother". To the former it would be 
 an insult to say "You ought to respect your mother", and to the 
 latter the word " ought " would lack all meaning on the moral plane. 
 
 The extension of the law that heat transforms work, but is 
 not lost, into the general law of the conservation of energy, 
 or that heat, light, and electricity, or various senses, have im- 
 portant properties in common, offer further apposite illustrations. 
 Finally, an application of this Sub-Conclusion is to be discerned 
 in Madame Montessori's educational method. Observing that 
 she could prepare defective children so well scholastically that 
 they equalled average children of the same age in their in- 
 tellectual attainments, she reasoned that the application. of the 
 same methods, appropriately modified for average children, 
 would correspondingly raise the educative capacity of the latter. 
 This Sub-Conclusion refers to lateral rather than to vertical 
 generalisations, to extending a proposition to more or less nearly 
 related facts which have not been considered as closely related 
 in respect of the particular item or items; 1 indeed, the Sub- 
 
 1 Huxley's famous essay on "The Relation of Man to the Lower Animals" 
 confines itself to a line of argument in conformity with this Conclusion. 
 
 23*
 
 356 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 Conclusion bids us keep our eyes wide open, prepared for 
 encountering resemblances in the most unexpected haunts. The 
 present Sub-Conclusion may be also utilised for arriving at the 
 largest number of independent propositions within any topic 
 (see Conclusion 22), and should be utilised for the supremely 
 important object of connecting one science with another, and 
 passing from theory to practice and from pure to applied science, 
 backwards and forwards. 
 
 CONCLUSION 28. 
 
 Need of Proceeding Dialectically, /. e., need of Searching in con- 
 nection with any Conclusion for what is Contradictory, Contrary, 
 Opposite, Common, Disparate, Dependent, Interdependent, Sup- 
 plementary, Alternative, Complementary, and Relative. 
 
 180. (a) CONTRADICTORY. For the purpose of checking, 
 verifying, or extending our generalisations, we should be ever 
 actively seeking the Contradictory, or the negativing of the 
 conclusion which we have provisionally or finally arrived at. 
 This being our goal, we must be eagerly watching for facts 
 which should aid us in placing the short particle "not" before 
 the predicate of the proposition which we have reached. 1 E.g., 
 we convert the proposition "All men are born depraved" into 
 the other "All men are not born depraved", and examine into 
 the truth of the formally modified statement. Or when we meet 
 the assertion that senile decay as such is due to arterial sclerosis, 
 we reflect that sundry living beings have no arteries and yet 
 are subject to senile decay. Thus also reflexes cannot be de- 
 pendent on nerves as such since tropisms exist among animals 
 which have no nerves ; unequal density in gases can be proved 
 to be unnecessary for diffusion by connecting together two 
 vessels containing gases having the same density, and noting 
 the result; vegetable oils and lard may be inferred to be in- 
 ferior in nutritive value to milk, cream, butter, and cod-liver 
 
 He sums up his reasoning in the following sentence: "Whatever systems 
 of organs be studied, the comparison of their modifications in the ape series 
 leads to one and the same result that the structural differences which 
 separate Man from the Gorilla and the Chimpanzee are not so great as those 
 which separate the Gorilla from the lower Apes". (Man's Place in Nature, 
 1909, p. 71.) 
 
 1 Chinese moral philosophy illustrates the different views relating to 
 man's moral nature. Confucius and Mencius held that man is born good. 
 Kao declared that righteousness can only be got out of man if we train 
 him properly. Hsun Tzu argued that the nature of man at birth is positively 
 evil. Yang Hsiung contended that the nature of man at birth is neither 
 wholly good nor wholly evil, but a mixture of both. Yan Han Yu asserted 
 that the nature of man is not uniform, but is divided into three grades 
 namely, highest, middle, and lowest. (Herbert A. Giles, The Civilisation of 
 China, 1911.) To this we might add that only the perfect truly satisfies 
 man, but that he may nevertheless be drilled into indifference or hostility 
 to the good.
 
 SECTION 23. GENERALISATION. 357 
 
 oil, from the experience that the former, being less expensive, 
 are yet neglected in favour of the latter; typically forced 
 movements in animals are not necessarily accompanied by pain 
 or pleasure, for typically forced movements in human beings 
 are not always accompanied by pleasure or pain ; when animals 
 move from the shade to the light, it is not because they "prefer" 
 the latter, for they will do the reverse, if they can thus remain 
 oriented with their heads towards the source of light (Loeb); 
 if certain fish tend to swim against the current, this is not due 
 to the friction of the water, for if the fish be placed inside a 
 bottle and the bottle be dragged through the water, there will 
 be an identical reaction, and the same is proved by either 
 darkness or blindness supervening, for then the fish becomes 
 indifferent to the current. If we hear the Western peoples 
 confidently spoken of as of Aryan, Caucasian, or European 
 descent, we provisionally call into question the correctness of 
 the popular doctrine, and we proceed similarly when we hear 
 it affirmed that the Caucasian race is a separate race, that it 
 is wholly or relatively free from racial admixture, or that it 
 stands inherently higher than other races. Prejudice being an 
 active force in weaving and controlling theories, it is specially 
 important to challenge, and subsequently to scrutinise, the 
 soundness of any statement where sex, race, nationality, class, 
 religion, custom, economic considerations, and political party 
 are in dispute. 
 
 181. (b) CONTRARY. Similarly with the term Contrary, 
 which we also employ in its ordinary logical acceptation. Here 
 we seek to cancel a statement by placing, if possible, a "no" 
 before the subject, as "All men are born depraved", "No man 
 is born depraved". Interest in evolving such negations should 
 be habitual, if only to prove an assertion unassailable, although 
 it will be found surprisingly often that either the contradictory 
 or the contrary of a proposition can be substantiated. The 
 double interest in affirmation and negation will also prevent 
 psychical prejudice from developing. The contradictory entails 
 a qualified denial ; the contrary a flat denial. Naturally, whilst 
 demonstrating that the contrary has sometimes far-reaching 
 and startling consequences, it is not probable that we can main- 
 tain it as frequently as the contradictory. When, however, 
 two nations, for instance, are at war, it is well to assume, until 
 adequate proof is forthcoming, that all grave accusations by 
 one side or the other, are presumably altogether baseless. 1 
 (See Conclusion 19/72.) So, too, the facts of primitive magic and 
 medicine are most profitably investigated by supposing the 
 
 1 This passage was written prior to the World War. In this war, for ex- 
 ample, the communiques of each of the opposing Combatants referred almost 
 exclusively to their own successes and to the failures of the enemy, the 
 interpretation of failure and success being frequently casuistical in the 
 extreme.
 
 358 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 complete erroneousness of the theories, except on the subjective 
 side. Religious "truths", which imply interference with the 
 order of nature, or a pre-established harmony which ensures 
 the triumph of the good irrespective of human effort, may 
 tentatively fall within the same category of treatment. Again, 
 it has been shown that the Jewish nose is, from the racial 
 standpoint, a distinctly unjewish characteristic, due, according 
 to von Luschan, to intermixture with the Hittites. Helmholtz 
 ascribed a certain important function to the organ of Corti, but 
 when it was pointed out to him that birds were without it, he 
 abandoned this theory, which supports by the way the crucial 
 significance of the comparative and genetic methods in the 
 biological sciences. In all cases naturally, where the contrary 
 is proven, we should satisfactorily trace the origin of the belief. 
 Psychological factors, determined by strong interests and a con- 
 fused apprehension of the world of fact, will be found to ex- 
 plain many prevalent errors. 
 
 182. (c) OPPOSITE. In formal logic we cannot pass 
 beyond the contrary, that is, when we have stated that no man 
 is born naturally depraved, we have reached the outer limits. 
 However, the true and concrete contrary, which we have named 
 the Opposite, affirms the "opposite", where one can be pre- 
 dicated. The opposite of "All men are born depraved" is "All 
 men are born good". If it be contended, for instance, that civilisa- 
 tion originated in the West, or that Eastern civilisation proceeds 
 from a strain of Occidental blood in Oriental peoples, we may, con- 
 sidering the evidence, speciously argue that civilisation originated 
 in the East and that Western civilisation is the result of an 
 Oriental strain of blood in Occidental peoples. In this example, 
 both statements may be crudely correct, the explanation being 
 probably that a mixture of civilisations and of races is uni- 
 versally present and universally beneficial. Thus also, whilst free 
 oxygen is indispensable most generally to living beings, certain 
 microbes die when exposed to it; "one by one the instances of 
 anomalous vapour density, which were so many stumbling blocks 
 to the universal acceptance of a system based upon the law of 
 gaseous volumes, have been shown to be not only not inconsistent 
 with it, but actually so many corroborative proofs" (Thorpe, 
 op. cit., vol. 2, p. 53); in some cases increase of temperature 
 appears to lead to diminished solubility; water, just before 
 freezing, expands; and a dose, according to its size, may cure 
 or kill.. Following the Mendelian theory, 1 the same reasoning 
 is applicable to Darwin's contention that small variations in 
 offspring form the foundation of evolutionary transmutations. 
 Again, Darwinians had maintained that only congenital dif- 
 ferences could explain the conspicuous cultural differences 
 existing between human groups and individuals. Applying this 
 
 1 Hugo de Vries, The Mutation Theory, 1910, 1911.
 
 SECTION 23 GENERALISATION. 359 
 
 Sub-Conclusion, we discern that since animal groups and in- 
 dividuals virtually do not vary so far as cultural characteristics 
 are concerned, human groups and individuals should likewise 
 be assumed virtually not to vary congenitally in this respect. 
 Consequently, instead of the theory of natural selection ex- 
 pressly demanding that human groups and individuals should 
 markedly vary, we discover that it expressly demands they 
 should remain unaltered. Similarly the theory of radio-acti- 
 vity suggests now that instead of the earth gradually cooling, 
 as was surmised until recently, it is most probably growing 
 hotter. Astronomy harbours such a contradiction. "The moon 
 at its rising and setting appears much larger than when high 
 up in the sky. This is, however, a mere erroneous judgment ; 
 for when we come to measure its diameter, so far from finding 
 our conclusion borne out by fact, we actually find it to measure 
 materially less." (Herschel, Discourse, [72.].) 
 
 183. (d} and (e) COMMON AND DISPARATE.- A. double 
 aspect should also be recognised: there may be no incompati- 
 bility between the principle of relativity and the law of the 
 propagation of light; nitrifying organisms abstract nitrogen 
 from the air, but certain bacteria reverse the process; certain 
 animals may be at one time positively, and at another time 
 negatively, heliotropic ; defects or virtues in one civilisation may 
 be present also in another ("six of the one and half a dozen of 
 the other", says the accepted proverb); an unfavourable rate 
 of exchange discourages buying and a favourable one selling; 
 some States succeed in one way, and some in an opposite or 
 different way, in dealing with certain social problems; certain 
 culturally backward peoples possess certain simian characteristics 
 which Europeans are without, but Europeans have other simian 
 characteristics which culturally backward peoples do not possess ; 
 bracing winds build up one man's constitution, wreck another 
 man's, and leave a third man's constitution unaffected ; excite- 
 ment now benefits and now injures a person; not only may 
 fatigue be induced by injecting into an animal the toxin pro- 
 duced by fatigue, but possibly fatigue may be removed by 
 introducing the complementary anti-toxin; binocular vision com- 
 monly emphasises the third dimension, yet monocular vision 
 sometimes exercises the same effect, as looking at a good land- 
 scape picture with one eye closed; the plants which abstract 
 carbonic acid from the air, also abstract oxygen; the earth 
 attracts the unsupported stone, but the stone also attracts the 
 earth ; two unrelated individuals bear the same name ; owing 
 to unequal digestibility, a certain food of a higher nutritive 
 value may be less nutritious than a certain other food of a 
 lower nutritive value. If it be argued that social life betokens 
 a sign of superiority and of advantage in the evolutionary 
 struggle, we may reason as follows: "We are naturally much 
 impressed by the habits of social bees, but we may notice that
 
 360 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 the solitary wasp, for instance, is not less remarkable in its 
 'instincts' than the social wasp. If the social parrot is an 
 advanced bird, the social duck and many other social birds 
 compare unfavourably with the solitary birds. If the beaver has 
 a remarkably complex activity (in which, however, we detect 
 no intelligence), the social deer or buffalo has not. The highest 
 non-human animal, the anthropoid ape, is not a social animal; in 
 fact, the more socially inclined gibbon or gorilla is less intelligent 
 than the less socially inclined chimpanzee or orang." (Joseph 
 McCabe, The Principles of Evolution, 1913, p. 66.) In the same 
 way with protective colouring: "In regard to the Arctic animals 
 we find that dark animals are more common than white. Of the 
 Arctic mammals three are perpetually white, five changing with 
 the season, and ten are coloured ; the birds show about the same 
 proportion. This objection might be weakened, perhaps, by a 
 more precise indication which of these animals are settled, or 
 have long been settled, in regions of perpetual snow, by setting 
 aside the aquatic mammals (walrus, whale, etc.), and by studying 
 the value of protection in each case. Yet a difficulty remains 
 when we find that only one goose out of many in the Arctic zone 
 is white, one seal out of many in the Antarctic is white, and the 
 Arctic fox is both white, coloured, and variable in different 
 species." (Ibid., p. 119.) Or if we sarcastically expatiate on 
 the ambitions, foibles, or masterfulness of a competitor, we may 
 profitably ask ourselves how far we see our own reflection in his 
 feelings and actions. Again, blankets preserve heat as well as 
 cold, and exposure acts similarly on hot and cold objects. 
 
 184. (/) and (g) DEPENDENCE AND INTERDEPEND- 
 ENCE. }? acts tacitly conceived of as independent, should be 
 tested in regard to whether they are dependent on one another,, 
 as growth on the accessory food factors, or mother's milk on 
 the food eaten by the mother; and, if dependent, as to which 
 is cause and which is effect. 
 
 Furthermore, series of facts should be also studied with a 
 view to ascertaining whether they are interdependent as in 
 double stars; in the gaseous laws of Boyle, Dalton, and Gay- 
 Lussac ; in the relation of temperature to pressure ; in the lique- 
 faction of gases; in seemingly unrelated neighbouring plants; 
 or in the main aspects of mind. 
 
 185. (h) SUPPLEMENTARY. We should, of course, beware 
 of positing one cause or fact when research might reveal a 
 number. 155 deals specifically with this problem of en- 
 deavouring to supplement what is given. Thus our patent foods 
 are said to be seriously deficient in the three accessory food 
 factors ; metals are, generally speaking, lustrous, ductile, malle- 
 able, insoluble, fusible, and conduct electricity ; the alpha, beta, 
 and gamma "forms of radiation render gases electrically con- 
 ductive, excite luminescence or fluorescence in certain sub- 
 stances, change the colour of glass, convert oxygen into ozone
 
 SECTION 23 GENERALISATION. 361 
 
 and yellow phosphorus into red phosphorus, and act upon photo- 
 graphic plates" (Thorpe, op. czY., vol. 2, p. 42), and "the mean 
 velocity with which the molecules of a gas move can be cal- 
 culated if we know the pressure it exerts, the weight of a 
 definite volume, and the value of the acceleration due to gra- 
 vity" (ibid., p. 71). 
 
 Thus climatic changes, migrations, novel classes of food, 
 physiological adaptation, sexual selection, segregation, and other 
 factors, may severally be responsible for the trend of evolution, 
 as colouring in animate beings may be due to mimicry, or to 
 the value of protection, warning, and attractiveness combined; 
 the cause of criminality may be manifold exceptional tempta- 
 tion, bad companions, economic circumstances, faulty upbringing, 
 imperfect or no schooling, lack of vocation, unemployment, 
 alcoholism, poor health, and inferior intelligence; again, moral 
 conduct should be distinguished by all, rather than by one or 
 a few of, the powers of the mind being utilised, whilst only 
 he should be regarded as truly cultured who has highly de- 
 veloped all sides of his distinctive humanity, and not only some 
 sides; and that a subject or object should only be esteemed 
 adequately examined when every important relevant aspect is 
 taken into consideration. Again, reproduction is effected by 
 fission, budding, regeneration, hermaphroditism, and bisexually ; 
 and numerous elements have been gradually discovered in 
 the bodily constitutions carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, 
 sulphur, phosphorus, iron, sodium, potassium, calcium, mag- 
 nesium, chlorine, iodine, fluorine, silicon, and lithium. So, 
 too, climate should be conceived as dependent on proximity to 
 sea and mountains, position in regard to prevailing winds, 
 forests, deserts, watersheds, altitude, latitude, and configura- 
 tion and soil of a district, whilst the agents of denudation 
 should include, at least, rain, rivers, ice, frost, heat, the sea, 
 and wind. 
 
 Accidents in factories are largely due to unprotected and in- 
 efficient plant ; to inexperienced, new, and ill-trained men ; to 
 bad tools and tools in bad condition ; and, of course, to fatigue, 
 indisposition, and carelessness. Types of men may be classed 
 as mental and manual, settled and roving, indoor and outdoor, 
 directive and dependent, minute and comprehensive, adapt- 
 able or self-satisfied, deliberate and impulsive, static and 
 dynamic. In fatigue we have to consider the draining of 
 energy, the accumulation of waste products, and the exhaustion 
 of nerves and of the central nervous system. The tests for 
 fatigue, again, are measurement of reaction time, of acuity 
 of sight and hearing, and of blood pressure. "Matter, what- 
 ever its origin, cannot be pronounced alive unless it is capable 
 of assimilating the unlike, of producing anti-bodies, of re- 
 producing itself, and of undergoing spontaneously a certain 
 degree of morphological differentiation." (D. Fraser Harris,
 
 362 
 
 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 "The Specific Characteristics of Vitality", in Science Progress, 
 April, 1916.) 
 
 The search for plurality of causes falls under this heading. 
 In all genuine scientific research supplementary classes of facts 
 and factors are hence continually being searched for and dis- 
 covered. 
 
 186. (0 ALTERNATIVES. We must equally allow for 
 alternatives ; a certain gas may be a new element with atomic 
 weight 3, or it may be an unsuspected allotropic form of hydro- 
 gen, Hs ; the accessory food factors may prove to be essential 
 structural components of living tissues, or act as necessary 
 catalysts; in weak light an organism may be positively helio- 
 tropic, in stronger light indifferent, and in strong light nega- 
 tively heliotropic; the ground of punishment may be expiation, 
 retribution, deterrence, or reformation; or a person convicted 
 may have the option between imprisonment and paying a fine. 
 Alternatives repeatedly remain unsuspected: "There were two 
 hypotheses to account for the existence of the great terraces 
 called benches, or parallel roads, of Glen Roy, in Scotland". 
 Of the two hypotheses marine or lake origin Darwin decided 
 for the former ; but the later and real explanation proved them 
 to be of glacial origin. "My error [Darwin said] has been a 
 good lesson to me never to trust in science to the principle of 
 exclusion." (Frank Cramer, op. czY., pp. 43, 45.) 
 
 187. (y) COMPLEMENTARY. We should endeavour to 
 ascertain whether a conclusion does not suggest an opposite 
 conclusion, and then discover whether the two conclusions are 
 not complementary. This will be found to be the case wherever 
 there is interdependence and interaction, as in the relation 
 of neighbouring plants, animals, social groups, ideational com- 
 plexes, and inanimate substances, or in the universal instance 
 of action and reaction. 
 
 188. (K) RELATIVE. Formal logic deals with extremes, 
 and we should also, in a sense, aim at extremes, that is, at 
 rounded and definite statements. At the same time relative 
 results or particular propositions should be welcomed. "Some 
 men are, or have been, to some extent, born partly good and 
 partly depraved", "some men will be born very good ", and all 
 possible intermediate stages should be conceived as alternatives, 
 between no exception at all to no order at all. Herbert Spencer 
 reasoned in his First Principles that since there was a likeli- 
 hood that the religion of the past embodied a verity, there- 
 fore religions will always remain. In arguing thus he in- 
 advertently overlooked the logical fact that religion might have 
 served a useful and even noble object in the past, but may in 
 the course of time lose its value, as is abundantly true of many 
 ancient and present social institutions. Absolute statements 
 should be only aimed at in the final conclusion. Besides, if 
 the application of this elevenfold Conclusion brings to light
 
 SECTION 24 VERIFICATION AND PROOF. 363 
 
 new particulars or generalisations, instead of supporting or 
 negativing old ones, the gain is equally real. 
 
 The following may serve as a model, for practice or for general appli- 
 cation, of this and the last Conclusion. Point of departure: "Every dog 
 has his day." Elaboration: Every dog has not his day; No dog has his 
 day; Every day has its dog; Every dog has its day and every day its dog, 
 and every dog has its day as well as its doom, etc. ; Every dog has its 
 day, but not every day its dog ; Every dog has his many days ; One dog 
 may have his day and another his hour ; Every dog depends on his day ; 
 Every dog depends on his day, and every day on its dog; Every dog acts 
 on, and reacts to, his day; Some dogs have their day, their hour, their 
 week, sometimes, somewhere, somehow; Some poodles, some newfound- 
 lands, . . . have their day; some cats, some bees, some oaks, some rivers, 
 have their day; Only one thing has its moment; All things have their 
 eternity ; Every dog has his bone, etc., etc. 
 
 189. In all the Sub-Conclusions mentioned above from 
 (a) to (k) we assume that given any conclusion provisionally 
 arrived at, we deliberately seek for what is contradictory, con- 
 trary, opposite, common, disparate, dependent, interdependent, 
 supplementary, alternative, complementary, and relative. 
 
 The almost total disregard of this and the preceding Con- 
 clusion is the normal and cardinal defect of most investigations. 
 These two Conclusions, which are neither abstruse nor re- 
 condite, should receive, therefore, particular attention, and be 
 applied constructively by investigators and destructively by 
 their critics. Their rigorous and fruitful application is, of 
 course, almost impossible when many statements are advanced, 
 and it is hence essential for thinkers to be well informed in' 
 regard to facts, to set their faces against bias and dogmatising, 
 to be in constant consultation with others, and to write little. 
 
 SECTION XXIV. VERIFICATION AND PROOF. 
 
 CONCLUSION 29. 
 Need of Verifying and Proving all Conjectures. 
 
 190. A generalisation remains intrinsically a hypothesis 
 until it is verified. Accordingly its scientific value becomes 
 apparent only when, through the act of verification, it has shed 
 its hypothetical character. For this reason we shall now con- 
 cern ourselves with the process of verification, which process, 
 of course, is not confined to the verification of hypothetical 
 generalisations. 
 
 The lowest form of verification is that of ascertaining whether 
 we have correctly observed a particular fact. Well-trained 
 observers can largely dispense with this form. ( 124.) Since, 
 however, it is always probable, especially with the majority of 
 investigators, that something has been incorrectly apprehended, 
 this form of verification should not be neglected. Such veri-
 
 364 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 fication, however, is not equivalent to re-examining the facts, 
 for in the latter case we strive to augment, rather than to 
 revise, our information. 
 
 In generalising we pass beyond the scrutinised facts, and, 
 therefore, unless we are, for instance, concerned with a chemi- 
 cal element or a kinetic problem, where the part fitly represents 
 the whole (Section XIII), it is necessary to test the correctness 
 of the generalisation. Wherefore, if we should surmise that 
 a low state of civilisation argues invariably a more poorly 
 endowed race, we are bound to apply every manner of test, 
 especially Conclusion 28, to ensure that we are not mistaken, 
 for possibly other explanations may more satisfactorily interpret 
 the known facts. Without verification, generalisations remain 
 hypotheses which, as a broad rule, are more likely to prove 
 erroneous than true. 
 
 It is the same with deduction. A deduction may be made 
 for the purpose of verifying a hypothesis or in order to ex- 
 tend knowledge, as when we infer the existence of positive 
 electricity from the existence of what is called negative electri- 
 city, or posit the ether in order to avoid the problem of action 
 across empty space, or argue for the materiality of the ether 
 from the fact that light and other forces are transmitted through 
 it at a quite definite rate (as sound through air which is indubit- 
 ably material), or seek to prove the double generalisation that 
 transparent solids are good insulators and metals and good con- 
 ductors opaque by ascertaining the truth of the inference that 
 then the transparent film of a metal would have lost its con- 
 ductivity. In both connections, the process of reasoning should 
 be tested in regard to their correctness, and the facts should 
 be examined in either case, inasmuch as the hypothesis or the 
 deduction may be unwarranted. 
 
 Lastly, where the memory, the imagination, and the processes 
 of reasoning are concerned, the like need for verification mani- 
 festly exists. 
 
 Given, then, the universal need for verification, we can only 
 add that its methods are those of observation or meticulous 
 scrutiny, as enumerated in Conclusions 16 to 24. Casual or par- 
 tial verification is, if possible, even less admissible than casual 
 or partial observation. 
 
 In Section XIV and Conclusions 8, 19, and 20, and in other 
 places, special expedients for verifying or testing facts have 
 been recited, and to these we would refer the student. We 
 require, then, tests, dealing with science as a whole, with special 
 classes of sciences, with particular sciences and with individual 
 portions of particular sciences, and with particular enquiries. 
 None of these can be dispensed with. 
 
 For the sake of completeness we may indicate some of the 
 lines along which proof of an assertion may be conveniently 
 sought. Direct proof may be obtained by (a) simple and
 
 SECTION 24.- VERIFICATION AND PROOF. 365 
 
 instrumental observation and scrutiny; (b) simple and instru- 
 mental experiment; (c) enumeration, measurement, and calcula- 
 tion; (d) obvious or involved deductive testing; (e) confirmation 
 of a prediction by discovering its basis or awaiting its fulfil- 
 ment ; (/) special tests, such as are commonly applied or other- 
 wise prove effective; and (g) applying all or more than one 
 of the above methods. Indirect proof, especially referring to 
 causes, may be obtained by noting in a virtually interminable 
 series of cases drawn from exhaustively varied sources and 
 circumstances, (a) invariable agreement, (b) invariable difference, 
 (c) invariable concomitant variation, (d) invariable residue, and 
 (e) applying, in any particular case, several or all of these 
 methods in conjunction, as in Bacon's method of investigation. 
 The dialectical procedure recommended in Conclusion 28 should 
 be also applied, and, failing complete proof, the degree of proof 
 should be stated. In respect of the matter of the proof, no- 
 thing short of ascertaining the unmistakably precise static or 
 dynamic constituents (mechanical, ethereological, physical, chemi- 
 cal, crystalline, biological, and cultural) should be aimed at, or, 
 if this cannot be satisfactorily achieved, the degree of com- 
 pleteness of the apparent proof needs to be recorded. 
 
 To verify a fact is not necessarily to explain it, e.gr., we 
 possess much verified knowledge concerning the law of gravi- 
 tation; but few scholars are satisfied that the law is an ex- 
 planation of the facts. Yet a particular fact is for all intents 
 and purposes explained when it can be shown to be in agree- 
 ment with some established fact more general than itself. 1 
 Consequently, the student should strive not only to establish 
 comprehensive laws of nature, but to prove given statements 
 by producing satisfactory evidence that they are special cases 
 of an acknowledged general fact. This is the ideal to be 
 aspired to; but, as we saw earlier, large working hypotheses, 
 and any kind of established propositions, may be utilised in 
 proving or explaining given facts. In other words, we should 
 first seek to verify, and then to explain, facts. We should, 
 however, remember that accord with theory is only to be 
 regarded as complete proof if no other theory is admissible 
 which would equally well or better explain an order of facts. 
 
 1 "An individual fact is said to be explained by pointing out its cause, 
 that is, by stating the law or laws of causation of which its production is 
 an instance. Thus a conflagration is explained when it is proved to have 
 arisen from a spark falling into the midst of a heap of combustibles; and, 
 in a similar manner, a law of uniformity in nature is said to be explained 
 when another law or laws are pointed out, of which that law itself is but 
 a case, and from which it could be deduced." (Mill, Logic, bk. 3, ch. 12, 1.) 
 
 "The truth of a given proposition is finally to be proved only by showing 
 that it is not inconsistent with any other propositions which we profess to 
 hold as certain." (J. M. Robertson, Letters on Reasoning, 1905, p. 237.)
 
 366 PART V WORKING STAGE. 
 
 SECTION XXV. INTERIM STATEMENT. 
 
 CONCLUSION 30. 
 
 Need of Exhausting and Gradually Consolidating Lines of In- 
 ductive Enquiry and of Aiming at a Balanced Interim Statement. 
 
 191. (A) EXHAUSTING LINES OF INDUCTIVE EN- 
 QUIRY. We reach now a more general and self-explanatory 
 Conclusion. Not only should we seek to exhaust classes of 
 relevant facts and the conditions under which they subsist; 
 but we should, as far as possible, solidly exhaust every line, 
 whatever direction it takes within that enquiry. Under this 
 heading fall especially the filling in of the interstices between 
 one generalisation and another, the connecting of generali- 
 sations, the extending a generalisation to the furthest limits, 
 and testing and extending by deductive procedure. Any in- 
 ferences or processes of reasoning ought to be also exhausted. 
 In short, when the final conclusion is established, the problem, 
 except for disguised, unimportant, and extraneous implications, 
 should have been, for all intents and purposes, dealt with as 
 far as possible exhaustively. 1 
 
 192. (B) CONSOLIDATING LINES OF INDUCTIVE EN- 
 QUIRY. The progress of an investigation cannot be ordinarily 
 compared to a straight line, e.g., first observing an object, then 
 ranging this into a class, and ultimately forming ever larger 
 classes, and drawing inferences. On the contrary, an investiga- 
 tion needs to proceed simultaneously in sundry directions. For 
 instance, wishing to make a study of the nature of the sensa- 
 tions, I begin to collect the facts relating to the special senses. 
 I also seek for their mode of development, for their connection, 
 for their possible unity, for their relation to the memory, and 
 so on. How such series of facts are to be linked is not usually 
 manifest at first sight. Consequently, as the enquiry proceeds, 
 tentative attempts are periodically instituted to consolidate it, 
 and this process is repeated with the progress of the investiga- 
 tion, until the totality of the results are as nearly as possible 
 revealed. This does not signify a mechanical consolidation, but 
 a series of rearrangements out of which many suggestions arise 
 for novel lines of investigation. Especially as the general prob- 
 lem approaches solution, will consolidation prove of consequence, 
 and the final attempts may lead to the discovery of much which 
 was unanticipated. This is admirably illustrated in the very 
 gradually and very indirectly obtained gaseous laws of Boyle, 
 Dalton, Gay-Lussac, Avogadro, and Graham, which now tend 
 to be explained by the single hypothesis that a gas represents 
 
 1 "An investigation, by stopping short of exhaustion of the field, may 
 lead, not only to imperfect, but to false, conclusions." (Frank Cramer, 
 op. cit., p. 198.)
 
 SECTION 25. -INTERIM STATEMENT. 367 
 
 a mass of molecules which move intermittently and with extra- 
 ordinary swiftness. 
 
 193. (C) BALANCED INTERIM STATEMENT. The 
 ideal consummation of an enquiry would be to satisfy fairly 
 the requirements of the table of Primary Categories. The 
 enquiry would lay bare the broadest general facts or leading 
 differentiae relating to the phenomenon, together with its more 
 important subsidiary laws or secondary aspects. lit would yield 
 the precise static and dynamic constituents, as well as the 
 causal connections and the relevant accompanying phenomena. 
 It would determine the precise degree and nature of the pheno- 
 menon's chief resemblances to other phenomena, the compara- 
 tive position occupied among related phenomena, and would 
 irreproachably classify, and subordinate to larger generalisations, 
 the facts and conclusions arrived at. The final statement, as 
 distinct from the interim statement, should also allow for the 
 precise utilisation, application, reproduction, value, quality, 
 appreciation, and, if possible, desire, liking, preference, love, 
 and enjoyment of the phenomenon. Furthermore, the principal 
 modal aspects of the phenomenon relative to quantity, time, 
 space, consciousness, degree, state, change, and personal equa- 
 tion, should be furnished. Should such a consummation be 
 unattainable, we ought yet to provide that an enquiry, when 
 concluded, approaches this ideal as nearly as circumstances 
 permit. 
 
 We will venture on an illustration. Let the subject of the 
 enquiry be the nature of bodily pain. We may reach the con- 
 clusion that the so-called sensation of pain is not the pain itself, 
 that pain (or pleasure) is not the invariable motive of action; 
 that men shun acute pain and therefore poverty and misery 
 which engender it; that we do not and cannot as a rule sum 
 or remember pain, and that some persons are more susceptible 
 than others to pain. If these conclusions alone are established, 
 we ought frankly to confess that we only offer a miscellaneous 
 assortment of important statements which do not inform us as 
 to the nature of bodily pain. 
 
 A balanced final statement, free from marginal reasoning, 
 would, initially, contain the solution of the central problem 
 that is, in this connection, inform us concerning the nature or 
 fundamental differentia of bodily pain. It might assert the 
 existence of (a) appreciable injury, direct or indirect, to some 
 portion of the sensitive parts of the body; (b) sensations aris- 
 ing out of that injury; (c) a simultaneous central nervous 
 disturbance at first exciting and then depressing, leading to 
 (d) instinctive or deliberate attempts, or to both, to allay the 
 disturbance or to remove its cause. Now inasmuch as an injury, 
 and the sensations connected therewith, may normally exist 
 without involving pain (as when we fix the attention sharply 
 on the persisting sensation), these cannot be the pain, and since
 
 368 PART V WORKING STAGE. 
 
 the allaying or removal are subsequent, therefore the exciting 
 or depressing nervous disturbance, it seems, must be the pain, 
 provided no factor or effect has been overlooked. Granting 
 (c) to be a justifiable assumption, which is problematical, 1 we 
 then marshal connectedly the most important apposite facts 
 as required by the table of Primary Categories, including, e.g., 
 the special facts relating to the universality, calculability, vari- 
 ability, degree, recollection, influence, fear, defiance, suppres- 
 sibility or otherwise, of physical and other pain. If we then 
 strictly, circumscribed or fused pain and pleasure, demonstrated 
 the relation in which the two stand to each other, and their 
 relation to other main facts of mind, including preferably their 
 relation to action and reflection generally, our task would be 
 truly concluded. Nothing less than a systematic approach to 
 such a balanced conclusion, expressed in a tersely worded defini- 
 tion where the central facts are all in the focus and are arranged 
 in an intrinsically articulated manner, should receive scientific 
 sanction. An interim statement of this character forms alone 
 a fit introduction to, and basis for, the process of systematic 
 deduction, a process which completes the process of generali- 
 sation, as it is itself completed by the process of application. 
 Having methodically ascertained all the features common to 
 every form and degree of the phenomenon investigated and 
 traceable in no other phenomenon (e.g., heat as a deter- 
 minate mode of motion), we ought to proceed methodically to 
 the last, but not the least, important step. This is to sum up 
 the inductive part of the investigation in a crisp and comprehen- 
 sive interim statement. Such a plan is easier conceived than 
 executed, and it is probably owing to this fact that here, as in 
 most other methodological directions, any kind of prolix, and 
 usually incomplete and imperfect, statement is preferred. If, 
 however, we consider the permanent and conspicuous advantage 
 of a fully adequate statement, the widely prevalent unmethod- 
 ical procedure to-day should no longer commend itself to circum- 
 spect thinkers. Moreover, since theoretical and practical de- 
 ductions might be necessary, such a form of statement is of 
 inestimable value and should be unconditionally demanded, if 
 for no other reason. The mathematical formulae and definitions, 
 so common in scientific work, are an excellent illustration of 
 the almost infinite superiority of strict definition over casual 
 summaries. How far definition and definiteness should be 
 resorted to beyond the purpose contemplated in the present 
 Conclusion, we shall see below. The question of a balanced 
 final statement, which also comprises the results of deduction 
 and application, will be dealt with in Conclusion 34. 
 
 1 In the lowliest forms of life repulsion and attraction are probably 
 automatic. In somewhat higher forms they are automatic, instinctive, fre- 
 quently accompanied by feeling, and modified by habit. In man they are 
 further affected by will, reflections and sentiments.
 
 SECTION 26 DEDUCTION. 369 
 
 SECTION XXVI. DEDUCTION. 
 
 CONCLUSION 31. 
 
 Need of Strenuous Mental Application in the Process of Deduc- 
 tion, and need of the Deductions being Graded, Comprehensive, 
 Important, Numerous, Full, Rational and Relevant, Original, 
 Automatically Initiated, and Methodically Developed. 
 
 194. In generalising facts we seek for such similarities 
 as might lead us to formulate a truth larger than the facts we 
 set out with initially. In the descending or deductive method 
 we search also for resemblances, but of a more restricted order 
 than the point of departure of the deduction. In the former 
 process we begin normally with facts; in the latter invariably 
 with a statement. 
 
 Concurrently certain methodological differences between 
 generalisation and deduction require to be elucidated. Roughly 
 speaking, in generalising we mechanically affirm of a whole 
 class what we had observed in a section thereof. E.g., for the 
 word some, we place the word all. If we reversed the process, 
 and for the word all, placed the word some, and called this 
 deduction, we should be trifling in a serious matter. In the 
 first case, we should have a statement of some consequence; 
 in the second, one of no moment. Deduction, therefore, argues 
 a movement which is not methodologically self-evident, as is 
 the movement in generalisation. E.g., "Socrates is mortal", 
 is not a self-evident conclusion from "All men are mortal", 
 for "Plato is mortal", "The Phrygians are mortal", would have 
 been as appropriate. Whilst in generalising there is but one 
 step from many particulars to one general; in deduction there 
 may be innumerable steps from the one general to the many 
 particulars. Once more we see, therefore, that there is a 
 profound distinction between generalising and what we may 
 term particularising. At the same time we should note that in 
 the verifying of certain generalisations, we had to proceed de- 
 ductively, precisely as if our object were to elicit new truth 
 from an established generalisation. In this sense, deduction 
 may be regarded as an auxiliary process in the establishment of 
 a generalisation. Yet we should not exaggerate the difficulties 
 inherent in the deductive process. As in verifying an ordinary 
 generalisation we are greatly assisted by the thorough know- 
 ledge of our subject as a whole, so in deducing we depend to 
 a decisive degree on our intimate acquaintance with the body 
 of truths involved. Total ignorance would spell operating in 
 a mental vacuum. 
 
 There are at least two conditions controlling deductive proce- 
 dure. First, an induction may not be full, that is, only a general 
 statement accompanied by few particulars may have been 
 published ; in which case we may deduce the important statement 
 
 24
 
 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 involved in the general statement. E.g., the one who framed 
 it may not have been aware of all there is known concerning 
 the subject in question; he feels constrained to skip facts yet 
 undiscovered; or he may Judge it superfluous to attempt to 
 state in his work everything relevant to the problem treated of. 
 To furnish a concrete example, Darwin was necessarily com- 
 pelled to leave his statement relating to the evolution of species 
 so incomplete that thousands of men of science have been 
 engaged since helping to complete it. Secondly, a generalisation 
 may be comparatively full, but it may yet be further exploited 
 to enable us to bring to light secondary implications. E.g., a 
 psychological statement regarding the nature of attention may 
 exhaust all that might be asserted with profit psychologically, 
 yet such a statement might be usefully applied, for instance, 
 in aesthetics, in ethics, and in pedagogy. 
 
 The above two conditions may be fulfilled in the ensuing 
 ways: (a) by continuing to proceed inductively, and (b) by 
 proceeding deductively. 
 
 (a) We seek to fill in the incomplete statement. We traverse 
 the ground passed over by the framer of the generalisation 
 and discover as many new and material statements as possible. 
 We similarly fit into the structure of the detailed generalisation 
 any freshly discovered facts. If only certain phases interest us, 
 as is commonly the case, we shall, of course, only re-traverse 
 the ground in the measure requisite for our purpose. Our 
 method, then, is to tread in the steps of the original investigator, 
 and, by exhausting all the methods of generalising procedure, 
 to supplement his work by appropriate minor generalisations. 
 
 (b) We seek to extend the statement to other spheres. E.g., 
 we apply the laws of attention to pedagogy. In this process 
 we examine either (1) certain minor generalisations (e.g., in 
 the major generalisation that man is a specio-psychic being, 
 we select the minor generalisation that scientific truth is a pan- 
 human product, and, regarding it in its turn as a major generali- 
 sation, we sedulously explore it) and treat them for our 
 purposes as major generalisations which are to be probed, or 
 we take (2) the major generalisation and develop it in spheres 
 outside the particular section of science or beyond the science 
 itself, as the psychological law of attention in pedagogy. In (1) 
 we attempt what the inquirer would have essayed who had 
 made a study of the facts of how truth is produced or found, 
 save that we possess a guiding thought. That is, we examine 
 and ascertain the modes of discovering truths, and deduce a 
 series of important minor generalisations (which, in their turn, 
 can be treated as major generalisations). In (2) we apply most 
 especially the Conclusions relating to parallel instances, then 
 to degree, contradictory, contrary, opposite, etc., and proceed 
 as in (a). E.g., I examine all the instances where the attention 
 enters as a salient factor in aesthetics, or in any of the cultural
 
 SECTION 26.DED UCTION. 371 
 
 or specie-cultural sciences, with a view to discovering where 
 and to what extent attention enters as a factor. 
 
 In any relatively new subject of enquiry deduction plays at the 
 commencement a subordinate part inasmuch as any statements 
 then reached are almost certainly of practically no value and 
 therefore worse than profitless for deductive ends. Nevertheless, 
 we should test even then all our statements in a passing manner, 
 because some suggestive minor deductions may emerge. As the 
 investigation develops, and we reach more and more definite 
 conclusions which we express in the form of careful, though 
 provisional, definitions, deduction becomes increasingly important 
 since we can employ it more and more to test, and indirectly 
 to enrich, our conclusions. When the inductive enquiry is on 
 the point of being concluded and comprehensive definitions are 
 formulated, deduction assumes superlative importance, in that 
 it, on the one hand, probes to the depths the value of our results, 
 and, on the other, places us in a position to gather in a definite 
 form the main implications of our investigation. In Conclusion 13 
 we sought to illustrate this. We assumed there that we had 
 reached the conclusion that man alone is dependent on species- 
 produced thought, and from that we deduced twelve subsidiary 
 practical conclusions of capital import. Regarding one of these 
 conclusions as a fresh point of departure, we might deduce 
 from it an entire department of conduct. These secondary 
 conclusions are in great measure no doubt not novel to the 
 framer of the fundamental definition; but the definition, de- 
 ductively explored, reveals much that is new, tests everything 
 otherwise reached, ever suggests fresh truths and investigations, 
 and confers a rigidity and reasonableness on the main con- 
 clusion that no other method affords. Accordingly, generalisation 
 and deduction are in no sense processes which can be ad- 
 vantageously separated, especially when we consider that in 
 the process of deduction advantage should be taken, per contra, 
 to generalise as far as possible the statements deduced. 1 
 
 195. An apt illustration of deductive procedure is provided 
 by the solutions of some of the problems of temperature. From 
 observations in regard to the dependence of plant growth on a 
 relatively high temperature, the hothouse was gradually evolved. 
 Much later, analogous observations gave birth to the incubator. 
 The cognate problem of heat-retention in cooking suggested 
 the self-cooker and also certain appliances having for their 
 object the prevention of heat waste in the preliminary cooking 
 
 1 ''It is very important to observe, that the successful process of scientific 
 enquiry demands continually the alternate use of both the inductive and de- 
 ductive method. The path by which we rise to knowledge must be made 
 smooth and beaten in its lower steps, and often ascended and descended, 
 before we can scale our way to any eminence, much less climb to the summit. 
 The achievement is too great for a single effort; stations must be established, 
 and communications kept open with all below." (Herschel. Discourse, [184.].) 
 
 24*
 
 372 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 process itself. Profiting by scientific experience, the thermos 
 flask came into existence. And, on the other hand, ice storage, 
 and particularly cold storage and refrigeration, have been 
 realised on a gigantic scale. Similar applications have been 
 made in regard to the problem of preventing the appalling 
 waste of heat in furnaces, and also in open fire grates from 
 80 to 92 per cent. So multiform, in fact, is the practical 
 temperature problem, that it might have with advantage an 
 international institute exclusively devoted to its solution. Con- 
 centrated attention to the principles involved, and systematic 
 deduction of the implications, could be pursued there with 
 enormous benefit to mankind. Without doubt, those concerned 
 in the kfndred problems of the most economical distribution 
 and use of fuel and the discovery of new sources of relatively 
 inexpensive heat and power supply, should also possess an 
 international habitation, and work in close co-operation with 
 the above institute. 
 
 Consider, again, a case in medicine. Somebody finds that 
 fruit acts as a strong laxative, or that the consuming of some 
 other substance induces decided stringency. From the symptoms 
 reported to him, the alert physician tentatively infers, condition- 
 ally and within limits, that these substances have probably an 
 analogous, though weaker, effect, even where there is no obvious 
 or direct sign thereof. Had he merely generalised, his con- 
 clusion would have been, as is evident, immensely more re- 
 stricted. Pursuing this method systematically, by generally 
 reasoning from conspicuous to inconspicuous cases e.g., in 
 everything relating to food factors, nervousness, fresh air, exer- 
 cise, self-control, existence of certain diseases, etc. he ratio- 
 nalises his art and makes numerous valuable discoveries. He 
 may proceed a step beyond. Returning to the first example, 
 he may seek to discover what ingredient in the fruit is mainly 
 responsible for the result noted. If successful in his search, 
 he infers that he need not proceed empirically, but that he may 
 find the laxative suitable for different circumstances, persons, 
 and ages, and obtainable in the most convenient and economical 
 form. He may also conditionally infer that if a certain property 
 exercises a certain laxative effect, the opposite property, if it 
 exists, will have a correspondingly astringent effect. Moreover, 
 he may infer that the states he is dealing with, are only in- 
 stances of more general, but obscured states, and draw appro- 
 priate conclusions. Needless to say, what is here done by the 
 physician, may be, with equal advantage, attempted in the arts, 
 crafts, and sciences generally. 
 
 196. We shall offer a further explicit illustration of de- 
 ductive procedure. Suppose we accept the definition of ethics 
 submitted in 110. We proceed then deductively: "Co-ope- 
 ration being the key-word of ethics, satisfaction of unclarified 
 desires, competition, and exploitation, in any and all spheres of
 
 SECTION 26 DEDUCTION. 373 
 
 life, are proved to be non-ethical or unethical. Nor is that 
 species of co-operation which entails antagonism to any one, 
 consonant with the plain meaning of co-operation. Furthermore, 
 since the term co-operation is restricted by no adjective, co- 
 operation should take place, as far as possible, between the 
 whole of mankind, and we need to aim at it in the family, in 
 economics and politics, in international affairs, in art and science, 
 and in daily life. Again, if co-operation is to be effective, 
 there should be, supplementary to an acquired fixed habit of 
 co-operation, the desire to co-operate, and if this is to exist, 
 co-operation must be capable, inter alia, of satisfying human 
 nature, both as to the object which it is to minister to and as 
 to itself. Since co-operation, moreover, represents by hypo- 
 thesis an irresistible historic growth or tendency, it can only 
 be alleged to prevail unchallenged when and where human 
 solidarity is completely established and rooted. Towards this 
 end men press since they desire co-operation, and so far as our 
 state of society falls short of the solidarity of mankind, so far 
 is it removed from the termination of the historic process. 
 However, since co-operation forms a historic growth, we shall 
 not be always able to act in conformity with our final ideal 
 as conceived to-day, though we should seek to satisfy it as far 
 as we can. Once more, since co-operation is a progressive 
 pan-human product, it follows that (a) as individuals we depend 
 primarily on the conclusions which mankind has arrived at, 
 and not primarily on our own experience and reasoning; hence 
 (b) our thought and character are determined by our cultural 
 environment primarily; consequently (c) we should aim at a 
 co-operatively developed science of methodology and ethics, 
 for of ourselves we know and effect virtually nothing; (d) we 
 should promote co-operation or ethical advance in all depart- 
 ments of life; and (e) we should, since the individual is far 
 from self-sufficient, be broad-minded, modest, and eager to learn 
 and serve, whilst putting forth the most strenuous efforts and 
 striving after the greatest originality in order to contribute our 
 full share to the common stock. Again, the definition implies 
 that co-operation should also constitute the characteristic method 
 of the inner life, and that a personal, social, and pan-human 
 life-ideal should replace action decided by more or less moment- 
 ary impulses and desires. Finally, by co-operation we mean 
 both (a) working together directly and (b) working together 
 indirectly, e.g., (1) writing a book in collaboration, and (2) dis- 
 seminating the ideas contained in a book written by some 
 one else. 
 
 197. Hypotheses used to play a large part in the gene- 
 ralising process, that is, a man trusted that by reflecting over 
 a few facts known or surmised concerning a subject, the master 
 fact or facts would present themselves to his mind. This pro- 
 cedure is frequently indulged in in all walks of life, and, of
 
 374 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 course, not without a modicum of success, more especially 
 where the data are patent and admitted. If, then, guessing at 
 a generalisation has sometimes its reward, it is manifest that 
 deductive divination is much more likely to be crowned with 
 success, inasmuch as the generalisations or statements whereon 
 it is grounded, if the outcome of scientific labours, offer distinct 
 and reliable guidance. Yet both generalising and deductive 
 conjecturing represent a crude substitute for orderly scientific 
 procedure, and may be only rightfully employed where, for the 
 time being, the intricacies of the subject permit of no other 
 advance. Deductive procedure will, we believe, become im- 
 measurably more effective, when it is . guided by scientific 
 canons. 1 
 
 Countless are the occasions when the most specious deductions prove 
 mistaken on examination. Here is a fascinating illustration: "A most inter- 
 esting and beautiful example of ... a rhythm dependent upon external 
 stimulation under normal conditions, but capable of becoming automatic 
 in the absence of the wonted stimulus, or its delayed arrival beyond the 
 accustomed time, is found in the case of the phosphorescent organisms 
 so abundant in our seas especially in the autumn months. 
 
 "It might be supposed at first thought that these phosphorescent or- 
 ganisms are not observed to emit light during the day because of the 
 presence of sunlight, and that, if taken into a dark room, such as is used 
 for photographic purposes, they would be found to phosphoresce just as 
 brilliantly as at night. Such is, however, not the case; not a spark can 
 be elicited from them even by vigorous shaking, so long as there is 
 daylight in the outer world. But if one stands by and watches in the 
 dark room, as twilight is falling outside, although the organisms have not 
 been exposed to light all day, one observes the little lamps light up and 
 flash out one by one like coruscating diamonds in the darkness, till the 
 whole dish is studded with flashing and disappearing light, a glorious 
 sight in the darkness and stillness. 
 
 " At daybreak, the series of changes are the reverse of those witnessed 
 at dusk; if the dish containing the organisms be observed in the dark 
 room about an hour before sunrise, it will be seen that at first the organ- 
 isms are still flashing out brilliantly, but about half an hour before sun- 
 rise, the number of flashes begins to diminish rapidly; at sunrise there 
 are hardly any showing, and half an hour later even violent stirring 
 will not produce a single sparkle. The most remarkable thing of all is 
 that this regular daily phasic action is kept up for as long as fourteen 
 days, by which time the organisms have perished in captivity. Regularly 
 every evening the lights come out, and as regularly every morning they 
 are extinguished, although all the intervening time the tiny living crea- 
 tures have been kept in darkness. 
 
 "A similar diurnal rhythm has been observed for shorter periods in 
 plant leaves which alter their position at day and night, when the plants 
 have been kept in darkness." (Benjamin Moore, op.cit., pp.250 252.) 
 
 198. Hypothetical deductions are common in scientific 
 enquiries, and usually there is nothing preternatural about them. 
 We shall supply a few examples. Einstein states: "We know 
 
 1 An extreme example of reliance on deduction, with almost complete 
 exclusion of induction, is to be found in Malebranche's De la recherche de 
 la vfrite, more especially in the latter portion of the Second Part of "De 
 la methode".
 
 SECTION 26 DEDUCTION. 375 
 
 with great exactness that this velocity [of light] is the same 
 for all colours, because if this were not the case, the minimum 
 of emission would not be observed simultaneously for different 
 colours during the eclipse of a fixed star by its dark neighbour." 
 (Relativity, 1920, p. 17.) Sir William Ramsay reasoned: "If 
 radium is disappearing, it must be continually in process of 
 formation, else there would be none on the surface of the 
 earth. ... As radium is always associated with uranium, it 
 appears not unreasonable to suppose that uranium, too, which 
 is a radio-active element, is slowly changing into radium." 
 (Essays Biographical and Chemical, p. 174.) Thorpe concluded: 
 "Experiments made by the method of Kundt and Warburg 
 i.e., by determining the ratio of the specific heats at constant 
 pressure and constant volume by the velocity of sound in the 
 gas prove that argon, like mercury gas, is monatomic. This 
 of itself indicates that argon is an element, since a monatomic 
 compound is a contradiction in terms." (Op. cit, vol. 2, p. 3^) 
 Professor Arrhenius argued: "If we calculate how much salt 
 there is in the sea, and how much salt the rivers can supply 
 to it in the course of the year, we arrive at the result that the 
 quantity of salt now stored in the ocean might have been 
 supplied in about a hundred million years." (Worlds in the 
 Making, 1908, p. 42.) Similarly Lord Kelvin disturbed the peace 
 of geologists and evolutionists by inferring from the rate at 
 which the earth's heat radiates into space that the age of the 
 solid earth is only about twenty million years, a deduction 
 which subsequently had to be drastically modified owing to 
 the discovery of radio-activity. Lord Lister cogitated thus : "If 
 putrefaction is always due to bacterial development, this must 
 apply as well to living as to dead tissues; hence the putre- 
 factive changes which oqcur in wounds and after operations 
 in the human subject, from which blood-poisoning so often 
 follows, might be absolutely prevented if the injured surface 
 could be kept free from access of the germ of decay." (H. S. 
 Williams, The Story of the Nineteenth Century, 1900.) Sir Ray 
 Lankester expresses himself as follows : "If, as seems probable, 
 the presence of helium indicates the previous presence of radium, 
 we have the evidence of enormous quantities of radium in the 
 sun, for we know helium is there in vast quantity. Not only 
 that, but inasmuch as helium has been discovered in most hot 
 springs and in various radio-active minerals in the earth, it 
 may be legitimately argued that no inconsiderable quantity of 
 radium is present in the earth." (The Kingdom of Man, p. 46.) 
 Lord Avebury declares: "If folded mountains are due to a 
 diminution of the diameter of the earth, every great circle 
 must have participated equally in the contraction." (The Scenery 
 of Switzerland, 1913, pp. 481-482.) E. W. McBride remarks : 
 "Since oxygen can only be taken into the living substance 
 and the poisonous excreta got rid of by the process of diffusion,
 
 376 PART V WORKING STAGE. 
 
 it follows that living substance can never be accumulated in 
 large masses, but can only exist in the form of small granules, 
 or of thin plates presenting relatively large surfaces to a cir- 
 cumambient fluid of some kind. . . . Since life is a fire, and 
 since this fire requires the constant diffusion of oxygen into 
 the living substance and of carbonic acid out of it, living sub- 
 stance must be a fluid, since only in fluids and gases can 
 diffusion exist." (Zoology, p. 20.) J. Arthur Thomson claims 
 that "if a portion of the germ plasma of a fertilised ovum is 
 preserved unchanged during development to form the rudiments 
 of the reproductive cells of the new organism, and if the germ- 
 plasma is as stable as Weismann makes out, then there is a 
 strong probability that no variations produced in the body by 
 use or disuse or by outside influences can be transmitted". 
 (Article "Heredity", in Chambers' Encyclopaedia, ed. 1908.) 
 Edison proceeds in the same manner: "If the indentations on 
 paper could be made to give forth again the click of the in- 
 strument, why could not the vibrations of a diaphragm be 
 recorded and similarly reproduced?" (Edison, as quoted in 
 Inventors at Work, by George lies, 1907, p. 311.) 
 
 And here is an illustration courteously supplied to the author 
 by Dr. Cecil Desch: "The success which attended the appli- 
 cation of the undulatory hypothesis to the explanation of light 
 led its supporters to follow out its consequences to their furthest 
 limits. It was found deductively, by mathematical reasoning, 
 that light must exert a minute pressure on a surface on which 
 it falls. The calculated pressure was so small that its measure- 
 ment appeared almost hopeless, but two very skilled investi- 
 gators succeeded in devising means for measuring it, and their 
 results have been confirmed by others. There is an interesting 
 consequence of this. The pressure on a particle due to light 
 is proportional to its surface. Imagine small particles exposed 
 to the sun, in free space. They are attracted by the gravi- 
 tational force of the sun, and repelled by the pressure exerted 
 by its light. The smaller they are, the greater is their surface 
 in proportion to their volume (or mass, if they are all alike). 
 Hence, at a certain limit of size, attraction and repulsion will 
 just balance one another, and still smaller particles will actually 
 be repelled from the sun instead of being attracted by it. Now, 
 there are spectroscopic reasons for saying that comets' tails 
 are composed of fine dust. The repulsion of such fine particles 
 by light falling on them explains perfectly why comets' tails 
 always point away from the sun." 
 
 Perhaps the most brilliant deductions recently made are those 
 by Einstein, resulting from his theory of relativity. From that 
 theory he inferred that the eccentric rotary movement of the 
 orbital ellipse of Mercury, which is 43 seconds of arc per cen- 
 tury, was not an exceptional, but an extreme case, the cor- 
 responding amount of rotation of the other planets being simply
 
 SECTION 26 DEDUCTION. 377 
 
 too small to be detected with the delicacy of observation pos- 
 sible at the present day. Also, he calculated the magnitude of 
 the curvature of light rays passing the sun at grazing incidence 
 to be 17 seconds of -arc, which has been apparently confirmed 
 by observations recorded during the solar eclipse of 29th May, 
 1919. Finally, Einstein inferred from his theory "a displacement 
 of the spectral lines of light reaching us from large stars, as 
 compared with the corresponding lines for light produced in an 
 analogous manner terrestrially" (op. czY., pp. 103-104), with what 
 success remains yet to be seen. 
 
 199. The extreme form of the deductive procedure, such 
 as Bacon condemned, is to venture on a bold conjecture and 
 to believe that the subsequent deductions will support or cancel 
 it. We have already dilated on the folly and the wastefulness 
 of this method. In scientific deduction we proceed from a 
 genuine hypothesis and endeavour to test it by noting its im- 
 plications. The first virtue, therefore, of a proper scientific 
 hypothesis about to be treated deductively is that it should be 
 in the form of an extremely definite statement, a statement 
 clothed, if possible, in mathematical garb; and, consequently, 
 the published inductive enquiry should not fail to contain such 
 a definite statement or statements. The inductive inquirer 
 must therefore pave the way for the deductive inquirer, and 
 deduction, like induction, should be regarded as a scientific 
 duty, which may not be neglected. Once the latter point is 
 admitted, a deductive code becomes a necessity, and it is prob- 
 able that this will demand that deductions, like observations 
 and generalisations, should be "graded, comprehensive, im- 
 portant, numerous, full, rational and relevant, original, auto- 
 matically initiated, and methodically developed". 1 By insisting, 
 then, that the inductive process should prepare the way for 
 the process concerned with theoretical deductions, as that should 
 prepare the way for deductions of a practical character; that 
 deduction is an integral component part of the scientific process 
 of investigation; and by assimilating its methods to those of 
 the other chief portions of scientific procedure observation and 
 generalisation, we round off our examination of the principal 
 methods employed in the sciences, we resist over-emphasis 
 or under-emphasis of any one of the principal methods, and 
 we secure an endless chain of investigations. 
 
 200. In view of the difficulties ordinarily encountered in 
 deduction, it may seem extravagant to ask that the deductive 
 process should be governed by rules, as suggested in the head- 
 ing of this Conclusion. Yet, audacious as the proposal appears 
 at first sight, it may, we believe, be frequently realised to a 
 considerable extent. In asserting this, we are in a fair way 
 of robbing the process of its mystery and magic, and of ap- 
 
 1 For the full significance of these adjectives, see Conclusion 25.
 
 378 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 preaching the standpoint of Francis Bacon who had the temerity 
 of seeking, by the ladder of methodological rules, 1 to raise the 
 mentality of the average man to the giddiest heights. To the 
 end of proving the reasonableness of automatically initiated and 
 methodically developed deductions, at least in certain cases, 
 we shall examine deductively the proposition "Culture is a 
 pan-human product". 
 
 For practical purposes, we shall assume the absolute truth 
 of the proposition, leaving it to him who makes the deductions 
 in the course of an enquiry to allow in each instance for the 
 corrections necessitated by special circumstances. Our aim will 
 be to show that by following certain methodological rules me- 
 chanically, appreciable headway may be made in rendering ex- 
 plicit the implications of a general proposition. Of course, 
 thorough acquaintance with the topic of the proposition is 
 presupposed. 
 
 The two terms of significance in the proposition are mani- 
 festly "culture" and "pan-human". Following Conclusion 19, 
 we commence at the beginning and analyse therefore the im- 
 plications of the first term, naturally in relation to the second. 
 
 1. As a first step, and in order to reduce complexity (Con- 
 clusion 20), we break up the word Culture into the principal 
 recognised types of culture moral, intellectual, hygienic, and 
 aesthetic culture, but ignore, for simplicity sake, their inter- 
 relations. 
 
 Following the simplest practicable case (Conclusion 20), and 
 the Conclusion mentioned in the penultimate paragraph, we 
 shall deal below with moral culture alone, and envisage in the 
 first instance only the individual. 
 
 2. Moral culture is a pan-human product. 
 
 3. Given 2, it follows that, in identical external (i.e., non- 
 congenital) circumstances, the moral contribution of any one 
 individual to the existing moral treasure is equal to the total 
 moral treasure existing, divided by the number of human be- 
 ings who have lived and who are living. 
 
 4. This involves that whatever differences exist in matters 
 moral among individuals are due respectively to favourable 
 or unfavourable external circumstances. 
 
 5. This further suggests (Conclusion 20) that the profoundest 
 sage a Socrates or a Buddha and, for example, the most 
 benighted Australian aboriginal, would, but for varying ex- 
 ternal circumstances, make the same moral contribution to the 
 moral treasure of the world. 
 
 6. The existence of the lower extremes, mentioned in 5, 
 again involves that the actual direct moral contribution of a 
 Socrates or a Buddha is practically infinitesimal. 
 
 "My way of discovering sciences goes far to level men's wits, and leaves 
 but little to individual excellence, because it performs everything by the 
 surest rules and demonstrations." (Novum Organum, bk. 1, 122.)
 
 SECTION 26. DEDUCTION. 379 
 
 7. And this involves that the reputed moral contribution of 
 a Socrates or a Buddha consists, for all intents and purposes, 
 of a portion of that part of the collected store of moral wisdom 
 which was at his disposal in his circumstances. 
 
 8. And, further, that save for the collected store, other circum- 
 stances being equal, a Socrates or a Buddha would, according 
 to 3 and 5, exhibit a wholly inappreciable amount of moral 
 culture, below that of the most neglected Australian aboriginal. 
 
 9. Again. Applying 8 to our day, and taking any examples 
 of the two extremes, it would follow that, save for external 
 circumstances, the difference between the moral culture pos- 
 sessed by them would be indifferent. 
 
 10. Thinking now of the realm of practice according to Con- 
 clusion 31, and for this purpose assuming ideal circumstances, 
 in conformity with Conclusion 20, every individual might be a 
 Socrates or a Buddha, even greatly surpassing both in moral 
 excellence, and every individual might strive to resemble them. 
 
 11. Finally, to conclude with a definition according to Con- 
 clusion 15, from the preceding it follows that the unit of the 
 moral contribution of an individual may be measured approxi- 
 mately by the moral contribution of the culturally most neglected 
 individual of the most primitive community extant to-day or 
 historically recorded. Etc., etc. 
 
 If we choose, we may pursue our examination by breaking 
 up the word "moral" into the cardinal virtues Justice, Temper- 
 ance, Prudence, and Courage, and proceed, as above, first, for 
 instance, with the analysis of the term Justice. 
 
 We might then break up the word Justice, and proceed 
 with the first constituent as above. 
 
 Etc., etc. 
 
 Inspecting now our deduced propositions, we note that we 
 had deliberately dealt only with the individual. Following re- 
 cognised classifications, we systematically extend our deductions 
 to sex, family, class, stock, people, nation, sub-race, and race. 
 
 Culture being pan-human, we infer, then, that what we 
 affirmed of the individual in regard to his moral contribution, 
 holds, mutatis mutandis, of sexes, families, classes, stocks, 
 peoples, nations, and races. That is, each has congenially the 
 same status as its congeners. 
 
 Summing up, according to Conclusion 34, we may state that, 
 save for varying external circumstances, the moral, intellectual, 
 hygienic, aesthetic, and other cultural contributions of any one 
 individual, sex, family, class, stock, people, nation, sub-race, 
 and race are equal to those of any other individual, sex, 
 family, class, stock, people, nation, sub-race, and race, and the 
 highest conceivable condition of perfection is attainable by all, 
 and should be aimed at both individually and collectively, in 
 conformity with varying external circumstances. 
 
 Etc., etc., with the eleven points.
 
 380 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 Examining our deduced propositions again, we notice that 
 external circumstances play a vital part in the moral position 
 occupied by an individual, etc., for if moral culture is a pan- 
 human product, it must be absorbed from the environment 
 through some form of learning. These circumstances, we may 
 broadly define, following a classification already at hand, as 
 (a) individual circumstances, (6) special social circumstances 
 (e. g., the section of society specially interested in moral culture), 
 (c) general social circumstances, and (d) special and general 
 contemporary moral and social circumstances insofar as they 
 affect the individual, etc., directly or indirectly. 
 
 Should we be desirous of a fuller analysis of the factor of 
 circumstance, we bring to our aid the ampler list of the environ- 
 mental conditions contained in 139. 
 
 1. To understand the moral position occupied by an indivi- 
 dual, etc., we should study the respective cultural effects of 
 the above conditions. 
 
 2. In proportion as the external circumstances are improved 
 or the reverse, so the moral position occupied by an indivi- 
 dual, etc., is improved or the reverse. 
 
 3. If we desire, and if it is our duty, to raise the moral 
 position occupied by an individual, etc., we should improve 
 the apposite external circumstances. 
 
 Having fairly exhausted the implications of the term "culture", 
 we turn to the term "pan-human", and develop the implications 
 as in the former case. 
 
 From our above examination we conclude that just as ob- 
 servation and generalisation can be methodically pursued, so 
 may deduction. There is no necessity to wait for inspiration, 
 for accident, or for need, before deducing the implications of 
 a proposition,^ and when accident or need raises a problem 
 connected with deduction, the new methodology requires that 
 the investigation shall be conducted, as far as possible, in 
 agreement with far-reaching canons which ensure the most 
 satisfactory and most exhaustive treatment a treatment which, 
 like that involved in generalisation, leads to deductions which 
 are graded, comprehensive, important, numerous, full, rational 
 and relevant, original, automatically initiated, and methodically 
 developed. 
 
 201. Deduction also occupies an important place in inter- 
 preting facts. The physician may admonish his patient: "Do 
 not cough more than you can help." Such an injunction may 
 serve its immediate purpose. If, however, he said, "Do not 
 encourage coughing; it may develop into a habit", his patient 
 would be helped to infer how he should act whenever he suf- 
 fered from a cough. If, finally, the physician had declared: 
 "Actions tend to become habits; gently resist the tendency to 
 cough", his' patient would possess a guide for life in countless 
 contingencies. The superiority of deduction 'for explanatory
 
 SECTION 27. APPLICATION. 381 
 
 needs, especially when the proposition is a comprehensive one, 
 is therefore manifest. To understand, accordingly, the prin- 
 ciples on which an instrument, a machine, a living body, or 
 an ideational complex is constructed, is to be in a position to 
 explain numerous facts which may otherwise each require a 
 separate explanation. 1 Hence with scientific advance it becomes 
 more and more appropriate to explain new facts by old facts 
 instead of seeking in each case for a particular and isolated 
 explanation. 
 
 202. Generalisation and deduction form, then, essentially 
 one process, consisting in the systematic search for ordered 
 similarities, only that in the former connection the statement 
 reached is more comprehensive than the one which formed our 
 point of departure and that we do not necessarily start from 
 a definite statement, whereas in deduction we set out necessarily 
 with a definite statement and our conclusion has a narrower 
 basis than this statement has. Indeed, deduction, we perceive 
 now, is intimately related to generalisation, because to discover 
 the implications of a leading generalisation is tantamount to 
 discovering certain classes of facts in the course of the gener- 
 alising process. We might speak of deduction as inverted 
 generalisation. Both processes tend, by means of hypotheses, 
 to extend the field of truth. 
 
 The need for verification (Conclusion 29) is, of course, im- 
 perative in deductive procedure, and general statements, in the 
 form of terse and luminous definitions, should be aimed at 
 here as in rounding off an inductive enquiry. (Conclusion 30.) 
 
 SECTION XXVII. APPLICATION. 
 
 CONCLUSION 32. 
 Need of Drawing Practical Deductions. 
 
 203. In 2 we sought to establish that the whole of 
 existence forms a unity, and that the scientific process cannot 
 be therefore restricted to what are styled physical and abstract 
 truths. There we showed how comprehensive had become the 
 sphere of applied science, and how scientific workers have 
 from time immemorial consecrated part of their energies to 
 making life more tolerable through those identical means 
 whereby they extended the sphere of theoretical truth. 
 
 In this Section we desire to advance a step beyond. We 
 wish to submit that the scientific process is also one, and that 
 accordingly it is only complete when fair attention has been 
 
 1 For this reason Bacon never tired of extolling the importance of Forms 
 or natural laws. According to Alois Riehl, "Logik und Erkenntnistheorie", 
 in Systematische Philosophic, 1907, Galileo aimed, not at induction or deduc- 
 tion, but at establishing laws.
 
 382 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 paid to the more intimate aspects of life. Otherwise, the truth 
 we have attained to is only a partial one and arbitrary to boot. 
 In all the sociological sciences the connection between theoretical 
 and practical deduction is so close that in any sociological in- 
 vestigation purporting to be comprehensive it would argue a 
 grave dereliction of scientific duty to pass cavalier-like over 
 what are called practical problems. Given that the deductive 
 enquiry is virtually completed on the theoretical side, it should 
 automatically open on the practical side. Thus the statistician, 
 the economist, the jurist, the historian, the philologist, the 
 psychologist, the anthropologist, the ethnologist, the educationist, 
 the moralist, the religious and aesthetic thinker, should conceive 
 it as part and parcel of their duty to begin with precisely de- 
 fining their task, proceed to observation, generalisation, verifica- 
 tion, interim definition, and deduction, and pass beyond to applica- 
 tion. In reality, as Conclusion 2 implies, the problem of drawing 
 practical deductions should be a living one for the inquirer from 
 the introductory to the terminal stages of his investigation, 
 especially now that the facts of the practical life have been 
 classified to a notable extent and that the life of practice is 
 becoming more and more organised and organisable. 
 
 The biological and physical sciences occupy an analogous 
 position. The varied problems of agriculture, frugiculture, horti- 
 culture, arboriculture, dairy farming, stock rearing, and fisheries ; 
 of hygiene (general, industrial, school, etc.), dietetics, appro- 
 priate clothing, and sanitation; of the combating of infectious 
 and other diseases ; and of insect pests, dangerous animals, and 
 premature old age and reckless living, should be ever pressing 
 for solution in the mind of the biologist. The physicist and 
 chemist have similar tasks before them the physicist's rays, 
 compass, and knowledge of mechanics, for instance, are of in- 
 calculable import, and so are his discoveries of novel or im- 
 proved material energies and raw materials, or his contributions 
 to the ventilation, lighting, heating, acoustics, cleaning, health, 
 design, safety, and soundness of every type of building and 
 boat, whilst the chemist's contributions in regard to manufac- 
 tures, agriculture, and medicine are invaluable. The meteo- 
 rologist may also help mankind to produce and avert, or at 
 least predict, rainfall, atmospheric humidity, heat, stronger or 
 weaker air currents, and clouds, whilst the astronomer, the 
 geographer, the geologist, the mineralogist, the seismologist, the 
 oceanographer, and all other types of scientists not least the 
 mathematician may equally render priceless service by ex- 
 tending and systematising the realm of practical truth. 
 
 For instance, psychologists and physiologists have been for a 
 generation engaged in inventions of a practical character relating 
 to industry. The energy expended in a particular task has been 
 examined by means of the dynamometer, the fatigue experienced 
 by the ergograph, the pain felt by the algesimeter, the vital
 
 SECTION 27 APPLICATION. 383 
 
 capacity by the spirometer, the speed by the stop-watch or the 
 film, and the relations subsisting between these diverse factors 
 have also been studied. Yoked to the "scientific management" 
 movement, these experiments may confer incalculable economic 
 benefits on the community. In addition to this, psychological 
 and physiological examinations of individuals, more particularly 
 on the side of nervous and sensory conditions, and of types 
 of mental association, have already been instrumental in fitting 
 square men into square holes and round men into round holes. 
 
 In short, he who examines a phenomenon from every possible 
 theoretical point of view, will be best able, if trained, to recog- 
 nise also its value for the furtherance of the practical uplift 
 and organisation of mankind. Just as we are bound to protest 
 against haphazard enquiries, against petty or too extensive in- 
 vestigations, and against unsystematic procedure or only attend- 
 ing to observation, generalisation, or deduction; so it is our 
 office as methodologists to plead that it is unmethodological, now 
 that science and the life of practice are so highly developed, 
 to neglect drawing practical conclusions in the proper place 
 and in due course. 
 
 Needless to state, he who is engaged in an enquiry of a quasi- 
 practical nature ought likewise to do his best to augment as 
 far as possible the sphere of quasi-theoretic truth. 
 
 204. The following quotation relating to the practical 
 aspect of biology well illustrates the interdependence of the 
 theoretical and the practical life : 
 
 "Our knowledge of animals, like the child's, obviously arises with their 
 chase; and that of the aspects and properties of plants, wholesome and 
 poisonous, perhaps even medicinal, with the hungry search for roots and 
 berries. The evolution through higher social states finds its reflection in 
 . widening zoological and botanical folklore, and the developed agricultural 
 conditions of civilised life not only admit of the increasing and syste- 
 matising of our knowledge, but even at length contribute valuable con- 
 ceptions, like that of selective breeding, of which Darwin has made such 
 especial use. The recent contributions of biology to the arts of life have 
 been of course primarily associated with the advance of medical treatment; 
 hence the popular and even medical conception of the botanist is still based 
 upon the traditional one of the herboriser in quest of specific remedies. 
 The increase of food-supply, through pisciculture and breeding, and through 
 the destruction of the enemies of useful species, is an application of more 
 recent but widening growth ; in fact those applications of our knowledge 
 of cryptogamic pests which have especially culminated in the labours of 
 Lister and Pasteur, at present furnish the stock illustration of the applica- 
 bilities of pure biology. New ideas are also germinating; thus specula- 
 tion is busy, e.g., with schemes of artificial human selection; while rapid 
 progress is being made in the transition from detailed medicine to whole- 
 sale hygiene i.e., beyond the mere application of specific remedies to 
 morbid individual variations, and towards a progressive and harmonious 
 re-organisation of the functions and environments which are afforded by 
 the human hive or city to its individuals . . . 
 
 "In tracing the progress of biology, we are simply following the reflec- 
 tion of the changing lights cast upon the organic world by each prevailing 
 mode of general thought and social life. In a word, the evolution of biology 
 forms part of the general social evolution; the science is no completed
 
 384 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 body of truth, but merely such portion of it as our stage of social pro- 
 gress enables us to see. Else the rise of science from art would be little 
 more than an almost prehistoric process, instead of being still and con- 
 tinually going on. Innumerable instances, large and small, might be given 
 of this; thus, the classificatory doctrine of the 'echelle des etres' due to the 
 naturalist Bonnet, is far more than a mere detail of the biographical history 
 of zoology ; for the conception of an unbroken series of beings ascending 
 in regular gradations from the lowest up to the highest is obviously the 
 projection upon nature of that established ecclesiastical and social hier- 
 archy in which the good abbe's mind was formed. Again, taking a larger 
 instance, the substitution of Darwin for Paley as the chief interpreter of the 
 order of nature is currently regarded as the displacement of an anthropo- 
 morphic view by a purely scientific one : a little reflection, however, will 
 show, that what has actually happened has been merely the replacement of 
 the anthropomorphism of the eighteenth century by that of the nineteenth. 
 For the place vacated by Paley's theological and metaphysical explanation 
 has simply been occupied by that suggested to Darwin and Wallace by 
 Malthus in terms of the prevalent severity of industrial competition, and 
 those phenomena of struggle for existence which the light of contemporary 
 economic theory has enabled us to discern, have thus come to be tem- 
 porarily exalted into a complete explanation of organic progress. 
 
 "Finally, the division of labour having become fully established in 
 industrial practice, and recognised in economic theory by Adam Smith, it 
 was frankly borrowed for biological application by Milne-Edwards, almost 
 a couple of generations later, with fruitful results. This industrial develop- 
 ment has indeed not only given us our present clear conception of separate 
 organic functions, where an earlier school could see only their general 
 resultant as 'temperament', but it has also determined the prevalent 
 intensity of scientific specialism within artificially restricted fields. Hence 
 too, the extreme specialist's not infrequent loss, if not indeed denial, of 
 definite responsibility to the science as a whole, and still more to that 
 larger progress of which it forms a part is simply the equivalent of that 
 loss of conscious relation both to the special task and to its general 
 bearings, from which at present the labourer also so frequently suffers. . . . 
 
 "The manifold importance of biology in education is seen not only in 
 its practical applications in the arts and in the study of medicine, but as 
 a potent agency of culture, and as preliminary to psychological and social 
 studies." (Patrick Geddes, Article "Biology", in Chambers' Encyclopaedia, 
 1908.) (See also G. Sarton, "L'Histoire de la science", in Isis, March, 1913; 
 T. B. Robertson, "The Historical Continuity of Science", in the Scientific 
 Monthly, October, 1916; and Arthur Dendy (editor), Animal Life and 
 Human Progress, 1919.) 
 
 Nor should Bacon's pregnant rule be overlooked that when 
 we have once established a fact, we should determine how it 
 is, and may conveniently be, produced or reproduced, or de- 
 stroyed if need be. 
 
 205. We will venture on one extended illustration in 
 regard to the application of science to practice. At the close 
 of the eighteenth century a French scientific commission ela- 
 borated the metric system, a system of measurement which is 
 not only signally superior to the "natural", or rather casually 
 developed, modes of measuring then or now in vogue, but 
 which .is irresistibly spreading over the globe. We suggest 
 that philologists might perform the same priceless service for 
 language, even though a distinguished litterateur, Viscount 
 Morley, should dilate on " how immutably the tongues of lead- 
 ing stocks in the world seem to have struck their roots".
 
 SECTION 27. APPLICATION. 385 
 
 (Notes on Politics and History, 1913, p. 92.) Indeed, according 
 to our methodological criterion, it is incumbent on the philo- 
 logist to concern himself with the practical as well as with the 
 theoretical aspects of his studies. Methodologically, he has no 
 option in this matter, and no doubt these practical investiga- 
 tions will beneficially react on his theoretical views. 
 
 With the metric system as his model, we shall assume that 
 he will desire to re-fashion language in its entirety, in con- 
 formity with ideals not less exacting than those which inspired 
 the French' commission adverted to. Familiar with the struc- 
 ture of a multiplicity of tongues, and conversant with every- 
 thing material which has been written on this topic, he will, 
 in a generalised and rationalised form, incorporate from those 
 sources whatever is of permanent value. Moreover, true to 
 the methodological ideal, he will devote his whole life to this 
 enterprise, seek the counsel and co-operation of the most com- 
 petent authorities, and succeed, we trust, in inducing some 
 international academy to assume the main responsibility for 
 the inauguration and execution of the monumental task. Prob- 
 ably the goal can only be reached by generations of scholars 
 collaborating. If so, the sooner the work is undertaken, the 
 better. 
 
 In the circumstances it will not be expected that we shall 
 here attempt more than the faintest adumbration of this project. 
 That is, in all important respects we shall only be able to 
 touch on the methodological aspects, and, even in this connec- 
 tion, much will be necessarily left unsaid or obscure because 
 of the present writer's painfully deficient philological equipment. 
 Only this should be added prefatorily that once an approxi- 
 mately satisfactory system is evolved, temporary and partial 
 applications may be made relating to existing languages, whilst 
 the very construction or existence of a scientifically elaborated 
 medium of lingual communication first naturally employed in 
 scientific work will indicate the path of lingual advance and 
 encourage its being trodden. 
 
 1. First, a few words anent the sounds of the language. In 
 this respect economy and euphony would be aimed at. Each 
 character would represent one distinctive uncompounded con- 
 sonantal or vowel sound, and wealth of elementary sounds 
 would be favoured, rather than reducing their number or keep- 
 ing them at a minimum. Approximately forty uncompounded 
 sounds are met with in European languages, perhaps twenty 
 consonants and twenty vowels. Assuming them to be expressed 
 in visible characters on the principle illustrated below, appreci- 
 ably more than half the time at present occupied in mere 
 writing would be saved, whilst a single alphabet could serve 
 for writing, printing, and other purposes. Capital letters would 
 be only employed initially, in the case of proper nouns, and 
 for emphasis and ornamentation. These capitals might be 
 
 25
 
 386 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 formed by simply commencing the upward stroke of a letter 
 from below the writing line, saving thus a separate series of 
 alphabetic outlines. Abbreviations of certain frequently recur- 
 ring words and syllables might enable ordinary writing to pro- 
 ceed at, perhaps, four to five times the present speed. This is 
 no indifferent consideration, for the handmaid of thought should 
 not fall far behind deliberate thought itself. Here is such an 
 alphabet: 
 
 t. ?- ? .? &{. <? L/./. // //// 
 
 J '4 ft? '"e" "' 
 
 (I) rotundity, rose; (2) fallow, mad; (3) fun, far; (4) Ml, feel; (5) fell; fa/1; 
 (6) full, fool; (7) falter, fall; (8) le, cceur; (9) Fulle, fi/Men; (10) yain, /ain; 
 
 (II) gain, cane; (12) 6ane, /?ain; (13) sin^, son/; (14) licftt, lacften; (15) leisure, 
 shun; (16) there, think; (17) (unused); (18) (unused); (19) do, to; (20) as, 
 so; (21) 7ot, roll; (22) yes, we; (23) net, /net; (24) he; (24a) y'eer, c/ieer; 
 
 (246) sigh, joy, now ; (25) Knowledge is Power. 
 
 The systematic order and the quality, as well as the time 
 value and desirable time variations, of primary sounds, would 
 be ascertained and fixed by phonograph, and preserved for 
 reference in record offices as are the metrical standards. 
 
 The consonantal and vowel compounds would be constructed 
 on the same basis of economy and euphony, eschewing as far 
 as practicable all cumbrous combinations and favouring those 
 which are mellifluous or characterful. 
 
 2. In the framing of the letters into words the above con- 
 structive principles would be also followed. 
 
 The present practice of only encouraging euphonious com- 
 binations would be continued, but on a strictly systematised 
 basis and independently of conventional standards. This might 
 be, perhaps, effectually aided by arranging that root words should 
 begin with a vowel, and be divided from prefixes and postfixes 
 by a y and w respectively. Prefixes would consist of a con- 
 sonant followed or not by a vowel, and postfixes of a vowel 
 followed or not by a consonant.
 
 SECTION 27. APPLICATION. 387 
 
 
 
 3. For the reasons already enumerated in 1, accentuation of 
 syllables would be preserved and regularised. Perhaps every 
 second, fourth, etc., syllable would be accentuated. Perchance 
 on the same account accents might be subdivided into weak and 
 strong ones, the strong syllable falling invariably on the second 
 syllable, the weaker on the fourth, etc. Furthermore, accentua- 
 tion, as in English, would be extended to the words composing 
 a sentence, e.g., in "a very large house" the word accent 
 steadily rises, enabling the comparatively greater emphasis to 
 be placed on the comparatively more important word in a 
 sentence, and rendering the language both less monotonous 
 and more intellectual. Lastly, accentuation for the sake of 
 particular emphasis, would be permissible, as in "that man!" 
 
 Thus far we might be said to have concerned ourselves with 
 the esthetic and with the crudely elementary aspects of the 
 problem, for the fundamental question in respect of a language 
 which professes to be constructed on a scientific basis is (a) how 
 the words can be shaped so as to possess a rigidly fixed meaning, 
 and (b) how we can arrange that that meaning shall reflect 
 scientific facts and the scientific spirit. Unless we are tolerably 
 successful in this phase of our enterprise, we may be said to 
 have broadly failed. At present, so far as the signification of 
 the constituents of a term are concerned, cat might mean, for 
 instance, dog or mountain, and therefore the term cat provides 
 us with no inner clue to its connotation. Here, then, our radi- 
 cal reform must have its starting point. Every letter, like every 
 cardinal number in arithmetic, should have a definite meaning 1 
 and one exhibiting a scientific character. In this matter the 
 signification of a word would consist of the sum of significations 
 of the separate letters arranged in a certain order. The unit 
 of significant language, that is, would be the letter and not 
 the word. 
 
 In consonance with this principle the scientific alphabet might 
 be assumed to be constructed of numbers having cardinal and 
 ordinal implications, and thus satisfy mathematical requirements. 
 The ten short vowels, in their proper phonetic order, would 
 represent, or rather be, the figures 1 to 0, and for convenience, 
 the corresponding long vowels would stand for 11 to 20. (In 
 the spoken language, when used for arithmetical purposes, the 
 decimal units above the first hundred, thousand, etc. would 
 be each represented by a consonant in a series corresponding 
 to the vowels, pronounced with the corresponding vowel which 
 
 1 In this connection note the tacitly recognised common meaning under- 
 lying so many words beginning with gl, most of them suggestive of light: 
 glabrate, glacial, glacis, glad, glade, gladiator, gladiolus, glair, glaive, glamour, 
 glance, gland, glanders, glare, glass, glaze, gleam, glean, glebe, glee, glen, 
 glibe, glide, glim, glimmer, glimpse, glint, glissade, glisten, glitter, gloaming, 
 gloat, globe, glomerate, gloom, glory, gloss, glottis, glove, glow, gloze, glu- 
 cose, glue, glum, glut, gluten, glycerin, glyptic. (See, however, 4.) 
 
 25*
 
 388 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 precedes it.) These numbers, especially from 1 to 20, and even 
 1 to 400, would enable us, according to the context, to express 
 differences of degree and number as well as difference in order 
 of fact. Moreover, the ordinal place of a letter in a word 
 would also convey an ordinal meaning. All this would hold 
 mutatis mutandis of consonants whose root meanings would 
 be identical with those of the vowels. 
 
 4. The twenty vowels and the twenty consonants would be 
 arranged in accordance with a strict phonetic scheme and fixed 
 by phonograph. This accomplished, the successive vowels would 
 have assigned to them a meaning corresponding to the, say, 
 twenty hierarchically ordered categories of facts, and the suc- 
 cession of consonants would possess the same signification. 
 For instance, the meaning implied in a if a be the first letter- 
 would be a universal one, and accordingly we should have, 
 for example, at ethereology, ag molecular physics, molar 
 physics ... to biology, morals, art, etc. We may further 
 assume all knowledge to be divided into kingdom, phylum, 
 class, order, family, genus, species, variety, and individual. 
 Assume that a root word consists, unabbreviated, of eight 
 letters. Then the number and places of the letters will convey 
 the inherent meaning. Should there be more than twenty of 
 a category, the vowel or consonant is doubled to express the 
 number, up to 20 times 20, or four hundred. However, the 
 need for double consonants or vowels would seldom occur. So 
 far as the meaning of the letters composing it are concerned, 
 the word "mammal" in the language of to-day is a bare jumble 
 of sounds. In the scientific language it would consist, say, 
 of the letters e (animal), b (nth phylum), o (mth class), or ebo. 
 Or if we thought of a tiger, we would, perhaps, have the word 
 ebonimu, indicating by its successive letters kingdom, phylum, 
 class, order, family, genus, and species. Millions of significant 
 terms could be framed in this wise, multitudes of them con- 
 sisting of one syllable. Granted ingenuity equal to the needs 
 of the case which is assuming much, we admit and a lan- 
 guage of a scientific character may be constructed, a language 
 where the letters of the alphabet reflect the scientifically deter- 
 mined categories of facts. Such a language, too, would not 
 only image the sciences; it would compel wide and sound 
 information, clear and scientific thinking, lucid and terse ex- 
 pression, and would be readily acquired, and difficult to forget, 
 to misunderstand, or to pervert. Nothing short of such a result 
 could satisfy the methodologist. Science is already far advanced, 
 and a scientific language has therefore become possible,; but 
 if it be contended that allowance should be made for the cor- 
 rection of errors, the reply is that for this also systematic 
 provision might be made. However, it should be remembered 
 that, to judge by the last hundred years, changes in language 
 proceed with extreme slowness. Perhaps, too, every century
 
 SECTION 27. APPLICATION. 389 
 
 a Commission could re-examine the language and bring it up 
 to date. 
 
 Needless to state, each radicle would have its significance 
 definitely determined and retain it until formally altered. 
 
 5. Each primary word should be automatically capable of 
 being employed, in a duly modified form, as arty part of speech. 
 Here is a paradigm: Noun: internment, interner, internress, in- 
 ternee (also special words for that which interns and that which 
 is interned general, masculine, and feminine; also selected 
 words for objects and persons professionally or frequently 
 interning or being interned, as filter or explorer), internability, 
 internness, internivity, internity, internage, internium, internism, 
 internation, etc.; verb: to intern, interned, interning (also 
 internify, internesce, etc.); adjective: internal (internal, intern- 
 able, internive, etc.), internative, interniform, interniferous, etc.; 
 adverb: internally (also internerally, etc.). Naturally only one 
 modification would exist for each form of speech: a, for instance, 
 as the sole adjectival form, and we should say, for instance, 
 I, thou, he, we, you, they, have. Similarly, the free and common 
 use of all parts of speech and of all modifications would be 
 encouraged, in accordance with methodological requirements. 
 Tenses would, of course, be formed by a single unmodifiable 
 postfix for each tense. Each modification would exhibit its 
 signification in the letters whereof it is composed e.g., inter- 
 nal-like. 
 
 6. Four hundred prefixes and as many postfixes could be 
 created to express the modifications which root words are 
 capable of. A word would be known to have a prefix if it 
 commenced with a consonant, and recognised as having a post- 
 fix if a w occurred therein, all letters before a y being a part 
 of prefixes and all letters after the w of postfixes. Modifiers 
 representing the categories and the principal human depart- 
 ments health, morals, intelligence, beauty, economics, politics, 
 happiness would, of course, be introduced, and at once enrich 
 and simplify the vocabulary. Already such prefixes as mis 
 (misunderstand) and mal (maltreat), for instance, express in- 
 tellectual and moral deficiencies respectively, and what is there- 
 fore needed is a full development of present right tendencies 
 in language. Nor should various other forms of prefixes be 
 forgotten, as, for instance, negative: in(curable); privative: 
 a(chromatic) ; opposite: un(lock); separation: disjointed); and 
 so forth. These modifiers would retain their form and meaning 
 integrally in all circumstances, and be applied, as required, to 
 all root words and their combinations, as unindecomposability. 
 It would be understood that the letters constituting the prefixes 
 would be one in form and meaning with the radicles whence 
 they are derived. 
 
 Similarly nouns would be freely joined, as window frame, 
 detention house, child cruelty prevention association (instead
 
 390 PART V WORKING STAGE. 
 
 of association for the prevention of cruelty to children). In- 
 numerable cumbersome and uncouth sentences would be thus 
 avoided and a wide range of expression secured, as in German. 
 
 7. Words should be connected in sentences in conformity 
 with a definite and simple order, as "This represents an alto- 
 gether correct version of what transpired at the conference 
 yesterday" not as in Latin or German where emphasis or 
 grammar sunder what should be united. Such a determinate 
 order would conduce to clarity, and appreciably reduce the 
 time required for learning how to express oneself appro- 
 priately. 
 
 8. The present system of punctuation should be, perhaps, 
 supplemented, especially so far as the comma is concerned, and 
 strictly regulated. Fine distinctions are to-day sometimes difficult 
 to express because of the comparative poverty of our system 
 of punctuation. In "ethics or the science of conduct" and 
 "ethics or psychology", for instance, where the or suggests an 
 alternative expression in the first case and a disjunction in the 
 second, the difficulty might be surmounted by finer punctuation, 
 or by having two words, an alternative and a disjunctive, in- 
 stead of one or. Abundant punctuation should be promoted, 
 as well as the habitual and standardised use of all the signs. 
 
 9. The problem of the length of sentences should receive 
 attention and, within the limits of clarity, theme, and necessity, 
 the fullest freedom and variety should be fostered in this con- 
 nection in order to satisfy assthetic and special demands. 
 
 10. Studious care should be taken to satisfy methodological 
 requirements. Assuming that the root words express only 
 general and positive facts, such as size and goodness, and not 
 modifications, such as smallness and badness, a uniform 
 arithmetical method of degrees of modification would be intro- 
 duced. This might be based on the principle that ordinary 
 discourse should demand, say, seventeen divisions, of which 
 five 1, 5, 9, 13, 17 would be in common use, whilst more 
 discriminating speech would tend to employ all the seventeen 
 divisions. (One, nine, and seventeen are chosen as yielding a 
 beginning, middle, and end, and a fair number of intermediate 
 divisions; and we postulate 1 as the lowest degree.) Where 
 negatives (good-bad) or extremes (top-bottom) occur, the seven- 
 teen divisions would be naturally employed, 9 forming the 
 point of indifference. Countless modifying words would thus 
 become redundant; the liability to depreciation and fluctuation 
 in the modifiers would be circumvented; unlimited delicacy and 
 variation in expression would be attainable; and a high minimum 
 of accuracy and clarity would be exacted. Already measurement 
 of time, number, distance, etc., is peremptorily demanded 
 wherever it is feasible by those of a reflective cast of mind, 
 and speech where vagueness is shunned and numerical factors 
 are frequently introduced, is not uncommon. Thus "this is
 
 SECTION 27. APPLICATION. 391 
 
 perceptibly, distinctly, markedly, considerably, conspicuously, 
 substantially, strikingly, remarkably, completely true", would 
 become "this is one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, 
 nine true", or if false be included, we reach the series 1 to 17, 
 and so with all modifications. Similarly, "one (to seventeen) 
 frequently", "one (to seventeen) altitude mountain", etc. Lan- 
 guage would probably gain immeasurably by such a method, 
 and emotions would attach themselves to these numbers as to 
 words. 
 
 11. The art of the poet and the orator would be universalised. 
 Terms and expressions possessing restricted meanings would 
 be systematically transferred to new subjects or generalised. 
 In this manner terms and expressions relating to law, religion, 
 commerce, the arts and sciences, etc., would be, though con- 
 trolled, systematically employed outside these realms whenever 
 convenient. Terms and expressions would be thus indefinitely 
 multiplied; the latest of these would be fully exploited; older 
 terms and expressions would not impose on us; and language 
 would be incomparably fresher, breezier, and more beautiful. 
 
 12. Lastly. Instead, as is now the case, of fortuitously col- 
 lecting a poor and corrupt stock of words, a vast treasure of 
 unequivocal and vivid terms, composed of a few root characters 
 and positional meanings, would be deliberately learned and 
 appreciated. In this way just and delicate discrimination gene- 
 rallyand specifically in connection with the master subjects: 
 morals, aesthetics, methodology, truth, civics, economics, health, 
 and happiness would be acquired by the child and adolescent 
 both practically and theoretically. Men and women would 
 systematically learn their philological, as they systematically 
 learn their metric, system. Each root and affix would possess 
 a fixed meaning and that meaning everybody would be 
 acquainted with and freely employ. Language would be a living 
 whole where every part is alive, and is related to all other 
 parts, and not a body of words mostly unconnected with one 
 another, capriciously changing, frequently meaningless in them- 
 selves, and living isolated, squalid, and short lives. This language 
 would naturally tend to be the universal language, as the 
 metrical system is tending to be the universal system of measure- 
 ment, and as the latter is capable of improvement perhaps 
 into a duodecimal system so our scientific language would be 
 perfected with the ages by regularly recurring periodical 
 revisions. It is inconceivable that mankind will continue much 
 longer to be satisfied with acquiring in a haphazard fashion a 
 cumbrously complex and exasperatingly obscure and confusing 
 language to serve as the principal medium of communication 
 with our fellows and chief means of communion with ourselves.
 
 392 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 SECTION XXVIIL CLASSIFICATION. 
 
 CONCLUSION 33. 
 Need of Judicious Classification. 
 
 206. Language is a vast repository of classifications. Let 
 us analyse an imaginary example. Suppose the vague idea of 
 good enters the primitive mind. Then it is an important step 
 in advance for that mind to evolve the idea of not-good or bad. 
 The primitive man makes headway, again, by conceiving the 
 individual good as becoming and ceasing, and by discriminating 
 in two directions, namely in relation to quality and quantity 
 very good and very bad ; and better, best ; worse, worst. Hav- 
 ing reached a higher stage, he then refines the very into (say) 
 imperceptibly, just perceptibly, perceptibly, slightly, passably, 
 fairly, moderately, appreciably, distinctly, considerably, con- 
 spicuously, substantially, almost completely, completely, abso- 
 lutely, extremely, and the good into countless virtues and duties, 
 e.g., kindness, honesty, uprightness, truthfulness, purity, self- 
 control. He further subdivides each of these subsidiary classes 
 in an analogous manner, and the adjectives he enriches by 
 prefixing to them a series of delicately discriminating adverbs. 
 
 Particulars tend thus progressively to become generals and 
 facts become more or less coherently ranged into classes. Thus 
 the early Greeks adopted a fourfold classification of the multi- 
 tude of virtues into Justice, Temperance, Courage, and Prudence ; 
 St. Paul preached the three graces Faith, Hope, and Love ; and 
 the French at the time of their Great Revolution introduced 
 the inspiring patriotic motto Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality. 
 We may also imagine that almost simultaneously with the 
 development of the confused conception of the good, the ideas 
 of the true and the beautiful struggled into being, and, accord- 
 ingly, that after aBons of development men select the phrase 
 the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, as most fitly expressing 
 what man most deeply aspires to, adding later to this trio, the 
 Hygienic. In this way more or less discriminative analysis 
 proceeds historically side by side with more or less discrimina- 
 tive classification till we obtain the highest or summum genus, 
 as Being and Action, on the one hand, and the lowest, or in- 
 fima species, such as electrical and arithmetical unit, on the 
 other. Not until, however, the sciences emerge from the incipient 
 stage, and a rudimentary methodology appears on the scene, 
 is there a consistent attempt at rigid classification or division 
 on the basis of exhaustive pan-human enquiries and tests. For 
 this reason classification in daily life is as common as it is 
 tentative in character, and on the same account the last word 
 of methodology may probably be the gradual reconstruction 
 of language on a strictly methodological foundation involving 
 a comprehensive classification.
 
 SECTION 28. CLASSIFICATION. 393 
 
 This reconstruction commenced, in essence, long ago. In 
 antiquity and in the Middle Ages, where consistency constituted 
 the ideal of sound thinking, nomenclatures and terminologies 
 were developed in connection with diverse subjects : the special 
 names connected with logics and with rhetoric may be cited 
 in illustration. With the development of the sciences, progress 
 was hastened in this direction. We have the early example 
 of botany, where a luxurious nomenclature and terminology 
 came into being. Chemistry can also boast of having built a 
 wall around its preserve, saving its terms from pollution by 
 the profane multitude. Other sciences have striven more or less 
 successfully to achieve the same end, seeking refuge wherever 
 possible in mathematical terms, symbols, and formulae. Defi- 
 ciencies in language, difficulties experienced in unequivocally 
 expressing distinctions without circumlocution, are among the 
 most formidable obstacles to progress in science. An invalu- 
 able service would be therefore rendered to science and its 
 popularisation if some learned international body occupied it- 
 self with the project of how to design stable and appropriate 
 nomenclatures and terminologies on a general and a scientific 
 basis. In this attempt, the secret of a scientific language, which 
 we sought in the preceding Conclusion, might possibly be dis- 
 covered. 1 
 
 The advantage is patent of classifying stars according to 
 their brightness into sixteen magnitudes, or the force of the 
 wind into twelve magnitudes: from 1 a light air, to 12 a hur- 
 ricane ; the chemical elements according to their atomic weights ; 
 living beings into kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus, 
 species, variety, and individual; the metabolism of life into 
 anabolism and katabolism; the problems of life into function 
 and environment; organisms into systems of organs, organs, 
 tissues, cells, and protoplasm; plants into Thallophyte, Bryo- 
 phyte, Pteridophyte, Gymnosperms, and Angiosperms; verte- 
 brates into fishes, amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals; 
 foods into proteins, fats, carbohydrates, vitamines, mineral mat- 
 ters, water, and oxygen ; languages into isolating, agglutinative, 
 
 1 A supplementary dictionary, where the words are divided into groups 
 conformably to their signification, should be of inestimable value in illu- 
 minating the nature of language and in outlining how it may be extensively 
 rationalised and developed. Of course, more than one tongue ought to be 
 studied in this way. Even now, however, much might be accomplished in 
 developing the intellectual powers by (a) training the young to the intelligent 
 every day use of the substance of the dictionary, and (b) thoroughly habitu- 
 ating them to the frequent and matter-of-fact employment of such terms as 
 judgment, balance, discernment, perspicacity, penetration, clarity, discrimina- 
 tion, sagacity, circumspection, caution, prudence, restraint, vigilance, heed- 
 fulness, correctness, exactitude, precision, tentativeness, diffidence, deference, 
 moderation, reserve, discretion, considerateness, etc., as well as to methodo- 
 logical terms and constant recourse to measurement generally. This educa- 
 tional method might be advantageously extended to the principal terms 
 employed in practice in connection with the cultural list referred to in 1.
 
 394 PART V- WORKING STAGE. 
 
 and inflectional or holophrastic and analytic; and the wealth 
 of human culture into departments relating to languag, trans- 
 port, etc. 
 
 In practical activities classification has a special and im- 
 portant part to play, for, having classified, we are enabled to 
 separate objects into groups. The grouping we may then utilise 
 for the elimination of faulty and superfluous groups, and for the 
 formulation of maximum number of standards, methods, tools, 
 machinery, material energies, and establishments. For this 
 reason, efficiency "engineers" regard classification as an in- 
 dispensable means for attaining their goal. 
 
 207. Classification may be, further, conceived as definite- 
 ness in arranging the final results of an enquiry. At a glance 
 we can then perceive, as in a well-constructed book, the skeleton 
 which forms the support of the general argument and which 
 betokens its harmony and its compactness. Without a proper 
 classification of 'the results, without divisions and headings, we 
 are in danger of surmising that our conceptions are translucent 
 when they are nearly opaque, and in leaving others in doubt 
 concerning the precise results which we have obtained. In this 
 connection we will examine a concrete example of classification, 
 namely this treatise. 
 
 At first the volume was divided into four parts, Part III being 
 sub- divided into several Sub-Parts. Eventually a new classi- 
 fication into two Books Theory and Practice was introduced, 
 the Sub-Parts becoming Parts. This furnished a more useful 
 division. 
 
 Originally, in starting the book, concrete processes of thought 
 were examined, and rough notes were kept of the observations. 
 Later, the notes were consolidated under more and more con- 
 venient headings. Some of these headings were socially deter- 
 mined such as Observation, Generalisation, Deduction. Con- 
 currently numerous observations were made which were less 
 amenable to classification to begin with, e.g., those in Part IV. 
 The headings in Part II equally suggested themselves to some 
 extent at haphazard. 
 
 "Preliminary Considerations" manifestly had to be placed 
 first, and the order of the Considerations, once these were 
 arrived at, were, broadly speaking, decided from the very com- 
 mencement. "The Problem" also had a predetermined position, 
 because of its logical place in the body of the work. Its intro- 
 ductory Section necessarily occupied its present place origi- 
 nally. The succession of the four Sections which followed this 
 one, was determined by the crescendo, from completest ignorance 
 to completest knowledge infant and child, uneducated, educated, 
 and man of genius. Not inappropriately this was succeeded by 
 the "Progress of Methodological Theory". Assuming the subject 
 exhausted, the "Conclusion" follows, and this should be so 
 methodologically with every Part.
 
 SECTION 28 CLASSIFICATION. 395 
 
 In Part II a logical order could be followed, as the processes 
 considered formed practically a time or order series, and this 
 was naturally done. 
 
 Part III had necessarily to precede Part IV, and to open 
 Book II. Part IV consisted of all the practical matter of a 
 preparatory or ancillary character. Of course, this matter was 
 placed in Part IV, only after mature reflection as to its proper 
 place in the scheme of the work. Even then the order was 
 difficult to ascertain in several cases, and the classification no 
 doubt still leaves something to be desired. Nevertheless 
 repeatedly attempts were made to classify the material in such 
 a manner that the Conclusions should at least appear to succeed 
 each other logically. 
 
 Part V formed the crux of the problem in classification. In 
 arranging the Conclusions in this Part in a rigid chronological 
 order, there was not only a gain for the reader, but for the author. 
 The latter could closely scrutinise the order he followed, and inter- 
 polate missing links which non-temporal considerations had not 
 suggested. Thus a comparatively rounded result was obtained, 
 classification rationalising the methodological process as a whole. 
 
 This very time order helped to focus the conception of finding 
 an inherent connection between the successive Sections of 
 Part V. Hence the final arrangement was reached, whereby 
 the whole methodological process of enquiry was conceived as 
 a single act, one part of the process following another neces- 
 sarily from the commencement until the terminating Conclusion 
 was reached. This ensured that an investigation could be only 
 considered as complete and consummated when in an enquiry 
 the whole series of Conclusions, in their particular order, were 
 respected. Observation, Generalisation, Deduction, etc., were 
 now no longer independent units, but links in a time chain. 
 
 Of course, ideally speaking, the whole of the working Con- 
 clusions ought to have been deducible in their precise order 
 from a single methodological principle; but that the author felt 
 he must leave to future research. 
 
 This examination of a concrete case illustrates the diversified 
 .virtues of a good classification aiding the author to arrive at 
 new truths and to clarify his mind; helping his readers by 
 avoiding unnecessary confusion, by assisting correct and ready 
 apprehension, and by compressing multitudinous details into a 
 very few terms; and, lastly, leading to the permanent enrichment 
 of the treasure of human knowledge by the establishment of 
 far-reaching similarities and of radical differentia among a 
 certain class of phenomena. 
 
 Or, to express our results more definitely. Having completed 
 some extensive enquiry, we seek to classify the facts under 
 the fewest divisions practicable, connecting them as closely as 
 circumstances permit. Each of these divisions, again, has 
 divisions subordinated to it also well articulated. Sir Ray
 
 396 PART V.-WORKING STAGE. 
 
 
 
 Lankester's classification of animals in the Encyclopaedia 
 Britannica (llth edition) may be taken as an illustration in this 
 respect. From an ideal viewpoint the classification should omit 
 nothing relevant, include nothing irrelevant, and each class 
 should be rigorously separated from every other. In practice, 
 however, this is frequently impossible, and the man of science 
 has therefore to content himself with a resolute attempt to 
 approach his ideal of classification, leaving it to a succession 
 of inquirers and scholars finally to fulfil abstract methodological 
 requirements. However, just as tentative classification should 
 be resorted to almost from the beginning of the enquiry, 
 especially when the Interim Statement is being reached, so the 
 ultimate step should be to find a higher class under which our 
 classes can be ranged, connecting in this way our enquiry 
 with others which have preceded it. Lastly, it should be noted 
 that, as a broad rule, intimate acquaintance with a subject 
 already involves a fairly advanced stage of classification, and 
 that the latter process is dependent thereon. It is rarely that 
 purely logical considerations account for a classification. Where 
 this seems to be the case, it represents usually either a super- 
 ficial classification or one borrowed from another subject. 
 
 208. It is to be expected that this treatise should suggest 
 how the aggregations of knowledge man has accumulated to 
 our day may be conveniently arranged, or rather re-arranged. 
 The scheme propounded here is neither an abstruse one nor 
 very novel. We naturally place at the head the most com- 
 prehensive science, that concerned with the Cosmos or All, 
 Cosmology. Next, pursuing again evident lines of cleavage, 
 we place all inanimate nature, under Physics; all life and con- 
 nected individual intelligence, under Biology; and the remainder, 
 pan-human, or species-produced, culture, under Specio-Psychics* 
 Each of these divisions is again developed not only along con- 
 ventional lines, but with the object of embracing the totality 
 of human life and activity, while the subdivisions following the 
 four principal divisions, suggest how our detailed knowledge 
 may be tentatively correlated and unified. 1 
 
 1 The following works or essays may be consulted with advantage in 
 connection with the problem of the classification of the sciences: 
 
 Andre-Marie Ampere, Essai sur la philosophic des sciences, 1834-1843. 
 
 Jeremy Bentham, Chrestomathia, Part II, 1817. 
 
 Auguste Comte, Cours de philosophic positive, vol. 1, L e con II. 
 
 M. Cournot, De I'enchatnement des idees fondamentales dans les sciences 
 et dans Vhistoire, 2 vols., 1861. 
 
 R. Flint, Philosophy as Scientia Scientiarium, 1904. 
 
 Edmond Goblot, Essai sur la classification des sciences, 1898. 
 
 Hugo Muensterberg, The Position of Psychology in the System of Know- 
 ledge, Harvard Studies, vol. 1. 
 
 Karl Pearson, The Grammar of Science, 1900. 
 
 Herbert Spencer, The Classification of the Sciences, 1871. 
 
 Carl Stumpf, Zur Einteilung der Wissenschaften, 1906. 
 
 Wilhelm Wundt, Uber die Einteilung der Wissenschaften, Philosophische 
 Studien, 1889.
 
 SECTION 28. CLASSIFICATION. 
 
 397 
 
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 -DAY METHODOLOGICA 
 
 RAL AND SPECIAL 
 
 idual and pan-species Psychos! 
 ersal Cosmology, 
 leral, Universal and Non-Unive 
 cts of Cosmology. (1) 
 iological and specio-psychic asi 
 ts of Physics, Biology and Spec 
 
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 398 
 
 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 210. To complete the classificatory scheme, we repeat 
 from Conclusion 3 the Introductory Category and the Primary 
 Categories. 
 
 I. INTRODUCTORY CATEGORY. 
 
 The object of an enquiry is always a phenomenon, a pheno- 
 menon being a given or stated partial (e.g., portion of indivi- 
 dual), single (e.g., individual as a whole), collective (e.g., aggrega- 
 tions of individuals to species), grouped (e.g., beyond species, 
 and including larger wholes such as a science or a group or 
 groups of sciences, to cosmology and the universe), or abstracted 
 (whiteness, etc.), physical or other something (i. e., anything which 
 partially or wholly exists, is coming into or going out of existence, 
 has existed, will, might, could, would, should, or is believed, 
 alleged or feigned, to exist, or the contrary). 
 
 * 
 
 II. PRIMARY CATEGORIES. 
 
 1. Elementals of phenomenon 
 
 2. Constituents 
 
 3. Form 
 
 4. Dependence 
 
 5. Action 
 
 6. Cause 
 
 7. Resemblance of phenomenon \ 
 
 8. Classification 
 
 9. Position 
 
 10. Differentiae of phenomenon 
 
 11. Details 
 
 ungeneralised phenomenon. 
 
 phenomenon classed. 
 
 )menon defined. 
 
 12. Value of phenomenon 1 
 
 13. Utilisation 
 
 14. Appreciation 
 
 > phenor 
 worth of phenomenon. 
 
 15. Description of phenomenon j description of phenomenon. 
 
 This skeleton does not, however, offer its own explanation. 
 We shall therefore develop each of the sub-sections. 
 
 A. Material Aspects of Phenomenon Investigated: 
 
 1. ELEMENTALS, or Precise fundamental sensory and other mental data 
 sought for in physical or mental investigations: (a) vision: light colour 
 shade transparency picture appearance; (b) touch and effort: softness 
 smoothness evenness cohesion plasticity flexibility malleability, 
 configuration texture, gravity weight pressure resistance, attraction 
 repulsion, fluid liquid viscid solid; (c) hearing: sounds noise har- 
 mony; (d) taste; (e) smell; (f) heat; (g) feeling: pain pleasure appetite 
 desire mood excitement emotion sentiment; (h) volition: impulse 
 habit decision willing action; (i) intelligence: observation memory 
 imagination reasoning judgment reflection; and (/) indirectly ap-
 
 SECTION 28. CLASSIFICATION. 399 
 
 prehensible: causes of heat, electricity, magnetism, etc., and unconscious 
 cerebration ; 
 
 2. CONSTITUENTS, or Precise static and dynamic, largest to smallest, 
 constituents, including ether, elements, compounds, minerals, vital con- 
 stituents, materials, and parts, and their precise disposition, connection, 
 interdependence, and relative homogeneity or heterogeneity; 
 
 3. FORM, or Precise form, shape, outline, design, of wholes, parts, sub- 
 parts, etc., and their precise disposition, connection, interdependence, and 
 relative homogeneity or heterogeneity; 
 
 4. DEPENDENCE, or Precise special facts and factors in the environ- 
 ment, on which the phenomenon is more or less dependent (e.g., tree's 
 dependence on soil, atmosphere, and external temperature); 
 
 5. ACTION, or Precise action or effects of phenomenon; 
 
 6. CAUSE, or Precise cause or causes of the existence, and properties 
 of phenomenon; 
 
 7. RESEMBLANCES, or Precise leading, major, and minor individual, 
 class, and other resemblances of phenomenon or phenomena (for forming 
 classes and schematic scale of classes); 
 
 8. CLASSIFICATION, or Precise methodical classification of the pheno- 
 mena observed, and placing the classes thus formed under a more com- 
 prehensive category; 
 
 9. POSITION, or Precise comparative position of phenomenon within 
 class or classes, and precise comparison of the parts of related wholes ; 
 
 10. DIFFERENTLY, or Precise leading, major, and minor individual, 
 class, and other differentia? of phenomenon (the ascertainment of the lead- 
 ing differentise is the primary object of most investigations); 
 
 11. DETAILS, or Precise secondary aspects or details of phenomenon, 
 of interest in the enquiry; 
 
 12. VALUE, or Precise value and quality (hygienic, economic, moral, 
 aesthetic, philosophical, scientific, . . .) of phenomenon. 
 
 13. UTILISATION, or Precise utilisation, application, and reproduction 
 of phenomenon in all spheres of life; 
 
 14. APPRECIATION, or Precise appreciation (desire, liking, preference, 
 love, and enjoyment, and their opposites) of phenomenon; and 
 
 15. DESCRIPTION, or Precise nomenclature, terminology, definitions, 
 formula?, statements, tables, diagrams, and reports in connection with the 
 phenomenon. 
 
 B. Modal Aspects of Phenomenon Investigated: 
 
 1. QUANTITY (precise number magnitude calculation . . .); 
 
 2. TIME (precise position and distribution in time, 'precedence suc- 
 cession, number of times, dawn day twilight night, seasons, past pre- 
 sent future, duration age date, frequency periodicity, rapidity slow- 
 ness, velocity acceleration retardation, chronological measurement and 
 chronological calculation generally); 
 
 3. SPACE (precise position and distribution in space, before behind 
 juxtaposition direction, magnitude, number, height depth breadth, 
 length distance, angle, degree, longitude latitude, compass points, metri- 
 cal and other measurements, and calculation generally); 
 
 4. CONSCIOUSNESS (precise position and distribution in consciousness, 
 precedence succession, magnitude, number, vividness completeness 
 durability, movement changes, and resemblance in these respects of 
 recalled phenomenon to phenomenon recalled, chronological, comparative, 
 and other measurements, and calculation generally); 
 
 5. DEGREE (precise degree of Material, Modal, and Procedure Aspects 
 of mathematical, etheorological, mechanical, physical, chemical, crystallo- 
 graphical, vital, sensory, psychological, social, specio-psychic, and 
 other properties of a static or dynamic character, and of resemblance, 
 difference, dependence, interdependence, and other relations and inter- 
 relations, quantitatively stated where possible);
 
 400 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 6. STATE (precise pure, average, casual, momentary, time-produced, 
 environment-produced, individual, transitional, exceptional, abnormal, 
 perfect, imperfect, and . . . state); 
 
 7. CHANGE (precise movement activity process, from commencement 
 of change to its end, external and non-external influences, fertilisation 
 kariokynesis prenatal development birth growth adaptation regene- 
 ration reproduction senescence death decomposition, evolution ori- 
 gin history development transformation or dissolution and further 
 evolution, improvement deterioration, production accumulation distri- 
 butionexchange consumption, experiencing feeling reasoning con- 
 cluding, automatic-refleximpulsivehabitual deliberate action, and 
 ways of living and their formation and change . . .) ; and 
 
 8. PERSONAL EQUATION (precise degree of more or less complete 
 interest preparedness liberty opportunity, of possessing stranger's fresh- 
 ness in viewing and weighing own facts and conclusions, and of more 
 or less permanent individuality, abnormality, unclearness ignorance 
 error prejudice deception, and . . .). 
 
 C. Procedure Aspects of Phenomenon Investigated: 
 
 1. Precise determination of the problem under investigation. (Conclu- 
 sion 14.) 
 
 2. Accurate, minute, and, if possible, experimental examination under 
 the most varied conditions of space, time, and other circumstances, and 
 Immediate and scrupulous recording of results. (Conclusions 16 and 18.) 
 
 3. Alertness, in order not to miss obscure, unobtrusive, and exceptional 
 facts. (Conclusion 21.) 
 
 4. Systematic exhaustion, plus simple case and testing of divisions. 
 {Conclusions 19, 20, 17.) 
 
 5. Degree-determination and dialectics. (Conclusions 27 and 28.) 
 
 6. Luminous clearness and decided definiteness in thinking. (Conclu- 
 sion 15.) 
 
 7. Graded, comprehensive, important, numerous, full, rational and 
 relevant, original, automatically initiated, and methodically developed 
 generalisations, deductions, and applications. (Conclusions 25, 31, 32.) 
 
 8. Systematic verification, classification, balanced interim and final 
 statements, and lucid reports. (Conclusions 29, 33, 30, 34, 35.) 
 
 FULLER LISTS. 
 
 211. 37. 
 
 3. (a) General Cosmology, comprises the fundamental pro- 
 perties of the Cosmos; 
 
 (b) Universal Cosmology Criticism and Theory of Knowledge, 
 Theory of Being, General Methodology and Logics, . . .; 
 
 (c) Non-Universal Cosmology Forms of matter and thought 
 (space, time, . . .); 
 
 (d) General, Universal, and Non-Universal Cosmology, divided 
 each, as far as practicable, into General, Universal, and Non- 
 Universal. 
 
 4. (a) General Physics, comprising the fundamental properties 
 of matter; 
 
 (b) Universal Physics Gravitation ; Etheorology Light, Heat, 
 Magnetism, Electricity, Radiation; Mechanics (molecular and 
 molar); crystallography; chemistry; transition to life forms; 
 
 (c) Non-Universal Physics (1) Astronomy (general, nebular, 
 stellar, solar, planetary, terrestrial, . . .); (2) Geognomy Gene-
 
 SECTION 28. CLASSIFICATION. 401 
 
 ral; (2a) Sciences of the earth's interior (Metallurgy, Seismo- 
 logy, . . .); (26) Sciences of the earth's solid surface and crust 
 (Mineralogy, Geology, Geography, and sciences of mountains, 
 valleys, shores, and waterbeds) ; and the general science of solid 
 and viscous substances; (2c) Hydrology or Sciences of water- 
 sheds (i.e., of seas, lakes, ponds, springs, runnels, brooks, rivers, 
 underground reservoirs, clouds, saturated air, and of other water- 
 affected and water-containing substances), and science of water 
 and of liquids generally; (2d) Aerology Meteorology and 
 sciences of lower and higher air constituents and currents, 
 clouds, air thermology and barology, relation of air to super- 
 aerial and sub-terrestrial, to animate and inanimate, and to 
 terrestrial phenomena generally, and (2e), general science of 
 gases ; 
 
 (d) General, Universal, and Non-Universal Physics, re-divided 
 each, as far as practicable, into General, Universal, and Non- 
 Universal. 
 
 5. (a) General Biology, comprising the fundamental properties 
 of organisms; 
 
 (b) Universal Biology Sciences of protoplasm, cell, tissue, 
 organ, system of organs, organism, and their animate and in- 
 animate environment; development of living forms generally, 
 of particular species, of fertilised ovum to birth, of birth to 
 death and decay, and further development of particular species ; 
 Sciences of sensibility, nutrition and excretion, adaptation and 
 regeneration, growth, reproduction, senescence, and death; 
 heredity, variation, and evolution; 
 
 (c) Non-Universal Biology General: (1) Botany General, 
 Flowering and Flowerless Plants . . . ; (2) Zoology General ; 
 Invertebrates : Annulates, Molluscs, Radiates ; Vertebrates : Mam- 
 malia, Birds, Reptiles, Amphibians, Fishes; Palaeontology, Em- 
 bryology, Anatomy, Histology, Physiology; Systems Circula- 
 tory, Respiratory, Alimentary, Excretory, Reproductive, Skeletal, 
 Epidermic, Muscular, Nervous, Sensory, Cerebral . . .; 
 
 (d) General, Universal, and Non-Universal Biology, each re- 
 divided, as far as practicable, into General, Universal, and Non- 
 Universal. 
 
 6. (a) General Specio-Psychics, comprising fundamental pro- 
 perties of pan-human or species-produced culture; 
 
 (b) Universal Specio-Psychics Sciences of societies, groups, 
 individuals, and their interrelations; Anthropology, Archaeo- 
 logy, Ethnography, Universal History, Socio-Geography, Demo- 
 graphy . . .; 
 
 (c) Non-Universal Specio-Psychics General: History (of in- 
 dividual, and of minor and major social, civic, provincial, sub- 
 national, national, continental, and universal groups, institutions, 
 and products); Philology, Phonetics, Etymology, Grammar, 
 Gesture and Picture Languages, Telegraphic and other Signs 
 and Signals, Paleography, Epigraphy; Economics (Wealth pro- 
 
 26
 
 402 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 duction, accumulation, distribution, and consumption); Morals; 
 Religion; Politics; Law; Arms; Medicine (Hygiene, Dietetics, 
 Sanitation, Pathology, Insanity; Physician, Surgeon, Medical 
 Specialist) ; Education (home, school, vocational, and self-educa- 
 tion, training of teachers, principles and methods of educa- 
 tion); Play; Arts (letters alliterative, rhyming, and blank, 
 metrical and non-metrical, verse; story, fiction, plays, appre- 
 ciations, criticism, description, essay, history; rhetoric reading, 
 reciting, orating; melody vocal and instrumental music; action 
 acrobatics, athletics, dancing, acting, deportment, refinement; 
 realised imagery drawing, decorating, painting [oil, fresco, 
 water colour], etching, engraving, sculpturing, and artistic 
 fashioning in all materials, architecture ; arranging dress, furni- 
 ture, ornamentation generally, gardening, parks, town planning, 
 and artistic crafts and crafts so far as artistic) ; Crafts (innumer- 
 able); Vocational Activities; Psychology; Aesthetics; Methodo- 
 logy (Classical and Symbolic Logic, General and Special Methodo- 
 logy), Metrology (Arithmetic, Algebra, Geometry, Higher Mathe- 
 matics, Statistics, Graphics, Cartography, and, generally, measure- 
 ment of quantity, time, space, consciousness, degree, etc.); 
 Philanthropy, Internationalism; and Life; 
 
 (d) General, Universal, and Non-Universal Specio-Psy chics, 
 each re-divided, as far as practicable, into General,- Universal, 
 and Non-Universal. 
 
 7. The classification is to be systematically pursued, from 
 the widest abstract truth to the most intimate experience of 
 life or the smallest detail, and every sub-department, extensive 
 or restricted, is to be subdivided, as far as practicable, into 
 General, Universal, and Non-Universal. 
 
 212. For methodological purposes of easy reference it 
 would be invaluable if a handy volume were prepared, supply- 
 ing in tables, charts, and by other means, a succinct survey 
 of the whole field of present-day knowledge. Tables of vary- 
 ing degrees of fulness would be needed to suit the convenience 
 of diverse classes of inquirers. At present methodological 
 thinking is slow, cumbersome, uncertain, and comparatively 
 ineffective, partly because of the difficulty of a comprehensive 
 grasp of a given sphere of knowledge. Systematic accounts of 
 a circumstantial character may be found in the best encyclo- 
 paedias, and also in good text-books and primers of special 
 departments, or groups of departments, of knowledge. 1 Natur- 
 ally, each inquirer will, in addition, prepare special tables and 
 digests to suit his particular needs. 
 
 1 Darmstaedter's Handbuch der Geschichte der Naiurwissenschaften und 
 der Technik, may also be consulted with advantage.
 
 SECTION 29. FINAL STATEMENT. 403 
 
 SECTION XXIX. FINAL STATEMENT. 
 
 CONCLUSION 34. 
 Need of Formulating a Final Statement. 
 
 213. In an Interim Statement we embody the essence of 
 what we learn through observation, experiment, generalisation, 
 and verification. On the basis of this Conclusion, we proceed 
 to deduction of a theoretical and practical order. Having 
 accomplished this, we formulate the Final Statement which 
 strives to subsume the whole of the knowledge provided by 
 the enquiry, in order to avoid leaving the subject unsummarised 
 and in confusion. Substantially this Statement will be only 
 distinguishable from the Interim one by being richer on the 
 theoretical side and by simultaneously incorporating the practi- 
 cal teaching of our enquiry; and as we have found it con- 
 venient to adumbrate the Final Statement in Section XXV, 
 little remains beyond referring the reader to that Section. We 
 shall, therefore, confine ourselves to supplying an example. 
 
 The story of mankind from earliest times to to-day, illustrat- 
 ing man's dependence' on pan-human thought and endeavour, 
 may be said to reveal the following laws of human life: 
 
 A. Past, Present, and Future: 
 
 (a) The law of the limitless accumulation and variation of 
 cultural or tool-made products, involving the subsidiary law 
 of the development of error and of cultural and social in- 
 equality ; 
 
 (b} The law of the limitless perfecting of cultural or tool-made 
 products, involving the subsidiary law of the elimination of 
 error and of cultural and social inequality; 
 
 (c) The law of the limitless growth of co-operation chrono- 
 logically and geographically, involving the subsidiary law of the 
 development and elimination of the spirit of excliisiveness ; 
 
 (d) The law of the limitless perfectibility of the individual, 
 involving the subsidiary law of the development and elimina- 
 tion of individual imperfections. 
 
 B. Future: 
 
 (a) The fact of the virtually completed accumulation and 
 variation of cultural or tool-made products, involving the sub- 
 sidiary fact of the virtual cessation of the development of error 
 and of cultural and social inequality; 
 
 (b) The fact of the virtually completed perfecting of cultural 
 or tool-made products, involving the subsidiary fact of the vir- 
 tually completed elimination of error and of cultural and social 
 inequality; 
 
 (c) The fact of the virtually completed growth of co-operation 
 chronologically and geographically, involving the subsidiary 
 fact of the virtually completed elimination of the spirit of ex- 
 clusiveness ; 
 
 26*
 
 404 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 
 
 (d) The fact of the virtually attained perfection of the indivi- 
 dual, involving the subsidiary fact of the virtual cessation of 
 the existence and development of individual imperfections. 
 
 C. Present: 
 
 (a) The resolve and striving to increase the accumulation and 
 variation of cultural or tool-made products, and to discourage 
 the development of error and of cultural and social inequality ; 
 
 (6) The resolve and striving to perfect cultural or tool-made 
 products, and to eliminate error and cultural and social inequality ; 
 
 (c) The resolve and striving to increase the growth of co- 
 operation chronologically and geographically, and to eliminate 
 the spirit of exclusiveness ; 
 
 (d) The resolve and striving to perfect the individual, and 
 to eliminate individual imperfections. 
 
 D. Finally, this dependence of man, and man alone, on 
 pan-species thought and endeavour, may be said to be due to 
 the fact that man, and man alone, has reached the stage in the 
 general evolution of the intelligence (just beyond the higher 
 apes) where the thoughts of others can be freely assimilated, 
 this leading, in turn, to his native outfit coming to be adapted 
 to cultural instead of to natural selection and living, and this, 
 again, to men's dependence on pan-human thought and endeav- 
 our. On the practical side this involves the virtually complete 
 dependence of the individual on mankind as a whole for the 
 adequate satisfaction of his nature, and the shaping of the in- 
 dividual and group life on this presumption. 
 
 SECTION XXX. REPORT STAGE. 
 
 V 
 
 CONCLUSION 35. 
 
 Need of Being Concise, of Carefully Summarising, and of Writing 
 
 Acceptably. 
 
 214. (A) CONCISENESS. In the course of an enquiry, we 
 should endeavour to crowd into a sentence or a few sentences 
 each result obtained. It is advisable to proceed similarly when 
 preparing the publication of the conclusions, for, in the latter 
 circumstance also, the pithiest form of statement consistent with 
 perspicuity is, for many reasons, expedient. 
 
 215. (B) SUMMARISING. Following Bacon, we should 
 strive to compress the final result in a concisely worded formula 
 or set of formulae. Such a form of epitomising is in harmony 
 with the process delineated in 111, and is attempted in Con- 
 clusion 34. Concise summaries of each chapter, of each part of 
 a volume, and a good table of contents and index, are desirable. 
 
 216. WRITING ACCEPTABLY. Much labour needs to be 
 consecrated to the ultimate grouping which should present the 
 conclusions in a brief, connected, luminous, and convincing form.
 
 SECTION 31. CONCLUSION CONCERNING CONCLUSIONS. 405 
 
 This arrangement, rigorously executed, will furnish the structure 
 of the essay or book. Nothing short of such a mode of grouping 
 is implied in the successful completion and publication of an 
 enquiry. A volume brightly and brilliantly written, dotted with 
 apt illustrations, prophetically inspired, sympathetic towards 
 fellow-labourers, distinguished by a rich and illuminating voca- 
 bulary and a clear and flowing style free from diffuseness and 
 acerbity, will materially enhance the probabilities of its conclu- 
 sions being attentively and impartially considered. A slovenly 
 or unconventional literary style retards in our age the recogni- 
 tion and the spread of truth. The investigator should, therefore, 
 acquire the difficult and beautiful art of writing well. On 
 the other hand, the perils inherent in this art are formidable. 
 A causeur will convincingly chat through a bulky volume ; one 
 who possesses a capacious memory will present with effect 
 countless superfluous and irrelevant illustrations; he who is in- 
 sinuating, imaginative, or emotional, will captivate his audience ; 
 the ponderously dogmatical or methodical mind will be im- 
 pressive; the sceptical or critical author will successfully deal 
 out destruction all with disastrous consequences normally on 
 the progress of truth, where the intrinsic scientific requirements 
 are partially or entirely ignored. 
 
 PART VI. 
 CONCLUSION CONCERNING CONCLUSIONS. 
 
 SECTION XXXI. CONCLUSION CONCERNING CONCLUSIONS. 
 
 CONCLUSION 36. 
 
 Need of Respecting each of the preceding Conclusions in all the 
 
 above Conclusions, of Improving them, and also of Applying them 
 
 to Non-Scientific Matters. 
 
 217. (A) EACH CONCLUSION REFERS TO ALL CON- 
 CLUSIONS. At this stage of the enquiry it is unnecessary to 
 intimate that each one of the foregoing Conclusions refers 
 more or less to all of them, inasmuch as the whole treatment 
 up to the present stage has evinced the oneness of the process 
 involved in scientific enquiry. Deduction, generalisation, ob- 
 servation, a disciplined memory, imagination, verification, and 
 definiteness should be resorted to, whether we determine any- 
 thing regarding this object at this moment, or whether we examine 
 some broad generalisation. Practically all the Conclusions and 
 Sub-Conclusions referring respectively to Observation, Gene- 
 ralising, Definition, Deduction, etc., as indicated in Conclusion 2, 
 need to be taken to apply with equal force to all of them and 
 not only to the particular Section in which they are circum-
 
 406 PART VI.-CONCLUSION CONCERNING CONCLUSIONS. 
 
 stantially treated. It was obviously inexpedient to crowd the 
 Sections with repetitions, and only slightly more marked appro- 
 priateness decided under which heading a Conclusion should 
 be scheduled, e.g., the Conclusion dealing with verification. 
 
 218. (B) IMPROVING THE CONCLUSIONS. The series 
 of Conclusions submitted herewith make no pretence to forming 
 a self-contained and immutable system. Hence if they should 
 commend themselves as a whole, the methodologists of the 
 future will regard it as incumbent on them to improve the body 
 of Conclusions in wording and in substance, to supplement them 
 freely, to remove what is redundant, and to co-ordinate and fuse 
 them to the furthest degree. The Conclusions are the outcome 
 of over twenty-five years of conscientious examination and ex- 
 ploitation of the author's own experience and opportunities; 
 and there exists hence every reason for believing that others 
 who accept this volume as the point of departure for their life- 
 long methodological researches, will be able to improve thereon 
 substantially, apart from developing fresh sides the practical 
 and pedagogical sides, for instance of the general problem of 
 scientific methodology. 
 
 219. (C) APPLICATION TO PRACTICAL LIFE. In the 
 economic life, in politics and city management, home and school 
 education, art, play, the organisation of associations and con- 
 ferences, in ordinary life and thought, in the world of feeling 
 and willing, everywhere in short, the performing of actions on 
 the most extensive scale and in agreement with scientific canons 
 should be the invariable endeavour. The foregoing Conclusions 
 apply, therefore, as repeatedly stated and especially in Conclu- 
 sion 2, to the whole realm of human activity and not exclusively to 
 what is styled pure science to-day, and their influence is likely 
 to prove beneficial in the wider sphere as in the narrower. 
 Most especially should they be made the foundation of all educa- 
 tion and of the urgently needed reform of the material and 
 moral life of man. In industrial enterprise this broad conception 
 is fast gaining adherents, and, indeed, internationalism in every 
 form stamps more and more the activities and purposes of this 
 age, as was dramatically illustrated by the late War and by 
 the ruinous economic crisis which followed it. The narrow in- 
 dividualist view of each man relying mainly on himself is being 
 superseded, and it is presumably only a question of a few years 
 when it will be acknowledged that a scientific methodology 
 should guide men's cogitations and that the many valuable 
 reflections and methods of individuals should be methodically 
 collected, systematised, and disseminated broadcast. 
 
 220. A generation ago the application of scientific methods 
 to the problems of industrial and commercial efficiency appeared 
 Utopian. Routine, common sense, incidental improvements, ruled 
 supreme, save in so far as machinery and organisation were 
 concerned. The idea of analysing a task into its component
 
 SECTION 31. CONCLUSION CONCERNING CONCLUSIONS. 407 
 
 elements, and then reconstructing it along purely scientific lines, 
 would have been dismissed as visionary. Employers would have 
 contended that such an investigation may occupy months and 
 even years; that it would interfere with production; and that 
 it could not materially improve the practice of their generation. 
 Yet to-day industrial methodology has reached in several direc- 
 tions almost the acme of scientific proficiency. The manner, 
 for instance, in which motion studies, whose aim is the reduc- 
 tion of human movements in operations to the lowest practicable 
 degree, are conducted, would probably not discredit the most 
 punctilious of physicists or chemists. Frequently a year/ or 
 even two years, are spent on doing justice to a single process; 
 machinery is created for the purpose; and the cost of such a 
 study would ruin many a small firm. 
 
 Hitherto only the more elementary processes and the organi- 
 sation aspects have been radically reconstructed (see Conclu- 
 sion 10 for reasoned summary); but this is merely because 
 one must begin with the lowest rungs of the ladder. Gradually 
 the problems of accuracy, resourcefulness, improvement, in- 
 vention and discovery, self-training, initiative, quickness of 
 decision, et hoc omne genus, will be just as thoroughly dealt 
 with as movements of mind consisting of elements capable 
 of being arranged according to an exacting ideal and yet 
 readily acquired by the average individual until an industrial 
 methodology will be elaborated of a character far exceeding 
 in thoroughness our present scientific methodologies. Com- 
 petition a generation ago induced employers to turn away with 
 scorn from the application of scientific methods to the problems 
 of efficiency. Competition to-day is leading many employers 
 to expend appreciable sums in order to increase the efficiency 
 of their establishments by having recourse to the scientific re- 
 organiser. Thus we are faced by the picture of the Cinderella, 
 Industrialism, coming to the aid of the Princess, Science, and 
 building up a system of methodology which is ultimately destined 
 to enhance prodigiously the progress of the physical, biological, 
 and specio-psychic sciences. 
 
 Commerce and Industry have therefore a great future before 
 them. Efficiency means elimination of waste, a studious care 
 not only of materials, but of human beings. Efficiency also 
 means training and organisation. The feverish competition of 
 the past, with the endless suffering which it entailed, the colos- 
 sal waste it was responsible for, and the poor type of morality 
 it encouraged, is hence bound to pass. Its place will be taken 
 by a system of production, accumulation, distribution, consump- 
 tion, finance, and insurance, based on scientific principles, and 
 conducted by communities rather than by individuals. The 
 stupid workman and the grasping capitalist will cease to be, 
 and individual productivity and general well-being will 
 greatly enhanced. Every factory and office will be a laboratory,
 
 408 PART VL CONCLUSION CONCERNING CONCLUSIONS. 
 
 and every worker and manager a miniature scientist. In a 
 word, the present economic system is industriously digging its 
 own grave and thoughtfully clearing the path for its successor. 
 What science has done for the growth and organisation of know- 
 ledge, it is beginning to do for the growth and organisation of 
 wealth. Stupendous progress in wealth production and well- 
 being may be therefore confidently anticipated. 
 
 Eventually, no doubt, the two methodological streams will con- 
 verge and travel down the ages as a single stream, each having 
 benefited the other. Before this, however, is realised, other 
 spheres of activity education, public administration, law, 
 hygiene, medicine, domestic life, religion, art will be seized 
 by the passion for scientific re-organisation, until science will 
 dominate the whole universe of man's life and thought. 
 
 The advent of the scientific efficiency movement offers thus 
 an auspicious omen for the triumph of the scientific method 
 in practical affairs. It represents the most hopeful sign of the 
 twentieth century, and probably spells the coming liberation 
 of humanity from the serfdom of drudgery, poverty, ignorance, 
 and barbarism. 
 
 To dwell for a moment on the relation between the efficiency 
 movement and the methodology of discovery. Thorough in its 
 way as the efficiency movement has been, the scientific founda- 
 tions were neglected, because, first, practical men were at the 
 head of the movement, men unskilled in the use of scientific 
 instruments, and, secondly, because the scientific studies by 
 means of dynamometer, ergograph, and the like, were not suf- 
 ficiently advanced to be of practical benefit. Ultimately, how- 
 ever, basis and superstructure must become equally scientific, 
 and the efficiency movement will be able to achieve its pur- 
 pose completely. 
 
 On the other hand, the efficiency movement has a profound 
 contribution to make to orthodox methodology. The latter's 
 attention was concentrated on what we might denominate ex- 
 ternals : truth and the mode whereby it may be reached. The 
 fitness of the organism psychological and physiological re- 
 ceived the scantiest attention. Yet the processes in discovery 
 are subject to the same laws as the processes in industry, 
 and if in the latter case far-reaching benefits accrue from an 
 analysis and reconstitution of the processes, advantages no 
 less desirable would ensue on a scientific analysis and basic 
 reconstruction of the elements constituting the process of dis- 
 covery on the subjective side. The prodigal waste of mental 
 and physical movements would be removed, swiftness and 
 labour- and time-saving methods would become universal, 
 strenuousness would be general, exhausting fatigue would be 
 reduced to a minimum, and everything tending towards rapidity 
 and efficiency would be standardised and practised. More than 
 this, the standardisation of efficiency processes will suggest the
 
 SECTION 31. CONCLUSION CONCERNING CONCLUSIONS. 409 
 
 standardisation of the processes of discovery, and the radical 
 reconstruction of industrial processes will suggest the radical 
 reconstruction of the general methodological process. Who 
 knows whether the waste of mind in scientific research is not 
 as great and detrimental at present as the waste of life under 
 the existing economic regime ? The two movements are, there- 
 fore, complementary, and destined to promote to a high degree 
 each other's ends. 
 
 Perhaps a word should be said regarding the scope of the 
 efficiency movement. It has been suggested that it constitutes 
 a revolutionary advance analogous to that of the introduction 
 of machinery in the closing years of the eighteenth century. 
 It differs, however, from the latter in several respects. Ma- 
 chinery, as in the textile and printing industries, increases 
 production sometimes more than a hundredfold, whilst, leaving 
 aside the higher reaches, the former can scarcely be said to 
 compare favourably in this respect: it may, speaking broadly, 
 increase the general productivity of our day three times under 
 favourable circumstances. On the other hand, whereas ma- 
 chinery is greatly restricted in scope, the efficiency movement 
 applies to every activity whatsoever. What it therefore misses 
 in intensity, it gains in extensity. The universality of its appli- 
 cability therefore differentiates it from machinery. At the same 
 time, in its higher reaches, it prodigally contributes to inventions 
 and new machinery, and therefore indirectly rivals machinery 
 in productivity. Moreover, and this represents another crucial 
 differentiation, the efficiency movement demands perfect physi- 
 cal fitness and decided mental preparation and satisfaction in 
 the worker, and thus abolishes for ever industrial exploitation 
 and intellectual inertia and obtuseness. Machinery, plus effi- 
 ciency, form hence the terminus of economic progress on the 
 higher as well as on the lower planes. 
 
 As a remarkable instance, illustrating the application of 
 science to industrial matters, we may regard the part played 
 by index numbers in (a) authoritatively fixing for a whole 
 country the relative increase or decrease in the cost of living, 
 and (b) forming the universally accepted basis for raising or 
 lowering wages in sympathy with the fluctuating cost of living. 
 Already, however, statisticians are beginning to move a step 
 further in order to decide on a minimum health-and-decency 
 standard of living which shall form an objective guide for fixing 
 "real" wages. Thus one of the most vital industrial problems, 
 the solution of which in any particular case was normally se- 
 cured at one time by the operation of casual prejudices and 
 crude speculation, is coming to be solved by the application 
 of a universal and purely scientific criterion. Nor is this all. 
 The attainment of a certain standard of living is conditioned 
 by a certain standard of individual productivity. Hence efforts 
 are beginning to be made to arrive at an average unit or in-
 
 410 PART VI. CONCLUSION CONCERNING CONCLUSIONS. 
 
 dex number of individual productivity corresponding to a reason- 
 able standard of life, and this will indubitably be followed by 
 successful endeavours to establish the educational, training, 
 workroom, and other conditions which shall yield this result. 
 Hence the inevitable intervention of science in industrial 
 affairs is bound to lead, among other things, to the realisation 
 of a tolerably high standard of universal well-being and to 
 a correspondingly high standard of average individual produc- 
 tivity. 
 
 221. (D) PERFECTING AND SATISFYING HUMAN NA- 
 TURE AS A WHOLE. The chief subject-matter of the thirty- 
 six Conclusions is the application of thought to the improvement 
 of thought. Since, however, intellect constitutes only one aspect 
 of psychic reality, the supplementary step should be encouraged 
 to apply thought to the purification and ennobling of the per- 
 sonal, moral, and aesthetic feelings and to the strengthening 
 and steadying of the will and character. In other words, the 
 thirty-six Conclusions ought to be strenuously applied to the 
 perfecting and satisfying of human nature as a whole. If our 
 object in this treatise has been mainly to improve the intelli- 
 gence, it is because knowledge is not only the one element 
 which grows almost to infinity with the ages, but is, when 
 truly apprehended, human nature groping for the means to 
 satisfy and perfect itself. 
 
 222. (E) SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS. The thirty-six 
 Conclusions may be thus epitomised for general purposes: 
 By habit and on principle intently, alertly, accurately, method- 
 ically, and rapidly observe, recollect, trace, generalise, deduce, 
 verify, apply, classify, define, and improve static and dynamic 
 facts separately and in combination, remaining always open- 
 minded. 
 
 (1) By habit that is, always, unceasingly, spontaneously, as 
 a result of thorough training. 
 
 (2) On principle consciously, unswervingly, courageously, 
 invariably. 
 
 (3) Intently all the faculties continuously concentrated, stre- 
 nuously employed, avoiding over-confidence and over-anxiety. 
 
 (4) Alertly allowing no fact to escape; unerringly noticing 
 exceptions and small items; all eyes and ears; keen; connect- 
 ing new with old and old with new. 
 
 (5) Accurately habit of unerring accuracy; not overlooking, 
 exaggerating, understating, or mistaking anything. 
 
 (6) Methodically developing every thought or suggestion 
 methodically, nothing material being slurred over and every- 
 thing material being embraced. 
 
 (7) Rapidly with one means or instrument, with one single 
 bodily or mental movement, exerting just the necessary energy, 
 and with decided rapidity and pauselessness, to perform a 
 great many desired actions; not to hesitate unduly.
 
 SECTION 31. CONCLUSION CONCERNING CONCLUSIONS. 411 
 
 (8) Observe shunning hearsay, being observant, and observ- 
 ing or examining minutely, widely, and exhaustively as to 
 space and time and circumstance ; considering nothing as com- 
 monplace, settled, or uninteresting; persistently re-observing 
 and re-examining for new facts; using instruments and ex- 
 periment wherever practicable; keeping the faculty of wonder 
 alive; being observant as to temporal, spatial, and ideational 
 environment and causes. 
 
 (9) Recollect observing with a view to remembering and 
 recalling; guarding against a bad or unreliable memory by 
 keeping adequate and accurate notes ; training the memory and 
 utilising it in constructive thought. 
 
 (10) Trace explain, follow, interpret, completely account for. 
 
 (11) Generalise to generalise, when practicable, every single 
 static or dynamic fact to the entire class, and not only to a 
 second or third fact ; and at once, but step by step, to generalise 
 from one class to a countless number of other classes related 
 by degree and variety, until an imposing generalisation is, if 
 possible, reached; to aim at circumstantial generalisations and 
 not at mere empty and abstract propositions. 
 
 (12) Deduce to deduce before being, and whilst, engaged in 
 generalising, and afterwards; to base a deduction on reliable 
 statements and test it adequately. 
 
 (13) Verify to verify, re-examine, re-calculate a supposed 
 fact; carefully to traverse ground passed over before; to ex- 
 amine in order to test a hypothesis, deduction, or statement. 
 
 (14) Apply to apply a theoretical truth in its corresponding 
 practical field, and convert a practical truth into a theoretical 
 one ; to let theory and practice minister to each other ; to utilise 
 every opportunity for as many purposes as possible. 
 
 (15) Classify to classify results in an orderly manner, show- 
 ing at a glance what has been attained, and connect the re- 
 sults with other and larger classifications. 
 
 (16) Define to define the principal terms and the main con- 
 clusions compactly and as exactly as possible; to let one's 
 reflections and statements tend to approximate rigid definiteness. 
 
 (17) Improve -always to think of how to improve upon what 
 one has achieved or is engaged on. 
 
 (18) Facts facts, imaginings, statements, events, happenings, 
 processes, including the environment as a fact, factors, causes, 
 forces, movements, conditions, relations, facts of space, time, 
 and consciousness, and of number, degree, state, change, and 
 persona] equation. 
 
 (19) Open-minded to regard all conclusions, results, and 
 statements as more or less subject to correction ; admitting the 
 possibility of error everywhere ; undogmatic, approachable, open 
 to reason.
 
 412 PART VIL GENERAL CONCLUSION. 
 
 PART VII. 
 GENERAL CONCLUSION. 
 
 SECTION XXXII. -GENERAL CONCLUSION. 
 
 223. Regarded as a connected body of precepts, the fore- 
 going thirty-six Conclusions will probably be acknowledged as 
 novel in the aggregate; but, historically speaking, they only 
 seek to register the general advance of science. They attempt 
 to perform for modern methodology what Bacon initiated, but, 
 owing to a cruel fate and to the backwardness of the sciences 
 of his time, did not consummate. They allow for the process 
 of deduction and of mathematical treatment which Descartes 
 championed. They recognise the historic and organic continuity 
 of scientific discoveries. They encourage the conduct of en- 
 quiries as comprehensive and manifold as the development of 
 the sciences at any period permits, enquiries occupying, if 
 practicable, the space of a life-time. And, in respect of an 
 ultimate aim, they, in a modern way, seek, as the precepts of 
 Bacon and Descartes did, to improve human life in general. 1 
 Bacon, guided by a very small number of highly developed 
 sciences, was at a distinct disadvantage in constructing his 
 methodology. In this we are more favourably placed. 2 How- 
 ever, the author is far from assuming that the Conclusions 
 formulated in this treatise uniformly reflect, as in a faithful 
 mirror, scientific procedure at its best. He feels too deeply 
 conscious of their incompleteness and imperfection, to claim 
 
 1 "The true and lawful goal of the sciences is none other than this : that 
 human life be endowed with new discoveries and powers." (Bacon, Novum 
 Organum, bk. 1, 81.) "The project of a universal science which can raise 
 our nature to its highest degree of perfection." (Mahaffy, Descartes, p. 65.) 
 "There cannot be a greater mistake than that of looking superciliously upon 
 practical applications of science. The life and soul of science is its practi- 
 cal application, and just as the great advances in mathematics have been 
 made through the desire of discovering the solution of problems which were 
 of a highly practical kind in mathematical science, so in physical science 
 many of the greatest advances that have been made from the beginning of 
 the world to the present time have been made in the earnest desire to turn 
 the knowledge of the properties of matter to some purpose useful to man- 
 kind." (Lord Kelvin, Constitution of Matter, pp. 86-87.) Contrast these 
 citations with the first sentence of Poincare's La valeur de la science: "La 
 recherche de la verite doit etre le but de notre activite; c'est la seule fin 
 qui soit digne d'elle "; but possibly Poincare included in his affirmation both 
 theoretical and practical truths. 
 
 2 "A technical science appears after the art with which it is concerned, 
 has been for some time practised, and it reduces to rules that which has 
 already been successfully carried out by proficients in the art." (Sigwart, 
 Logic, vol. 2, p. 20.) Accordingly, the task of the twentieth century methodo- 
 logist is manifestly far simpler than that of the seventeenth century methodo- 
 logist.
 
 SECTION 32 GENERAL CONCLUSION. 413 
 
 for them what John Stuart Mill claimed for his Canons: "The 
 mode of ascertaining those laws neither is nor can be any other 
 than the fourfold method of experimental inquiry." (Logic, 
 bk. 3, ch. 11, 1.) 
 
 224. There is nothing in the Conclusions submitted method- 
 ised observation and computation, methodised recollection and 
 reasoning, methodised generalising and deducing, methodised 
 proving and defining, methodised application and methodised 
 resort to these Conclusions in combination and in strict sequence, 
 and a judicial and non-dogmatic attitude towards any important 
 or unimportant conclusion reached which requires any sixth 
 sense, nothing which demands powers absent in ordinary mor- 
 tals. 1 Who would seriously contend that the present practice 
 in most of the cultural sciences to frame hypotheses without 
 reference to a close study of the facts or to circumspect veri- 
 fication involves an inborn mental deficiency in those who 
 proceed in this manner? Or why should it be alleged that 
 generalising and deducing represent a process which could not 
 be methodically and successfully pursued by all normal and 
 trained individuals ? Or that systematic work generally, or that 
 objectivity, demands special aptitudes? If the marvellous 
 machines and social organisations which mankind has evolved, 
 stagger no sane individual, why should we conjecture that 
 methodological modes of procedure, which are equally the 
 outcome of ages of pan-human development, should be con- 
 genital in certain individuals and caviare to the average fully 
 trained person? In fact, when one compares men's attitude 
 towards nature and towards fables to-day and a few centuries 
 ago, it is manifest that much of scientific thinking has already, 
 where an educational system exists, penetrated into practically 
 all layers of society, and this advance betokens that there is 
 literally no limit to the general diffusion of methodological 
 modes of thinking. Those who regard the operations involved 
 in the process of discovery as a mystery, would in the past 
 have probably imagined that natural and social events are 
 originated by mysterious powers. In the one case as in the 
 other we are face to face with a transitional mode of viewing 
 the universe of things. Granted that everything valuable in 
 humanity is the product of ages of co-operative reflection, then 
 thought itself should be imagined as indefinitely improvable by 
 the gradual discovery of the most efficient ways of conducting 
 the human understanding. Superb by comparison with primitive 
 times as is our present civilisation, it will become sublime and 
 virtually divine when the twilight of variegated traditions is 
 
 1 Our analyses of the processes involved in accuracy, resourcefulness, 
 economy, improvement, and self-training, go far towards demonstrating 
 that all proficiencies are composed of elements which any normal indivi- 
 dual can assimilate.
 
 414 PART VII. GENERAL CONCLUSION. 
 
 scattered by the all-penetrating noon-day sun of a conscious 
 and fully elaborated methodology. 1 
 
 Correct thinking is a pan-human product, whereas unscientific 
 thinking merely argues thinking without the aid of- a pan- 
 humanly developed scientific method. Concede that a scientific 
 method exists and is generally accepted and efficiently taught, 
 and the millenium of the intellect should not be far off. Or, 
 if this view should appear Utopian, it will scarcely be denied 
 that a relatively large minority would be able to profit sub- 
 stantially by the study of a body of Conclusions such as have 
 been submitted in this treatise. 2 
 
 225. Ultimately, the object of this methodology is to supply 
 a comparatively solid groundwork for the training of the masses 
 of mankind, assisting the teacher to raise the average intelli- 
 gence to a majestic level in comparison to the present one. 
 An analysis of the scientifically trained and the scientifically 
 untrained adult (Sections III and IV) justifies, we believe, such 
 a conception. Proximately, the aim of this methodology is: 
 (a) to supplement scientific tradition by a conscious general 
 scientific method; (b) to introduce the scientific spirit into every 
 line of enquiry and activity ; (c) to encourage more particularly 
 sound observation, sweeping though guarded generalisations, 
 careful verification, exact definitions, and extensive theoretical 
 and practical deductions, collectively applied in a certain se- 
 quence; and (d) to offer guidance to new sciences where, as in 
 the cultural sciences, no effective methodological traditions as 
 yet obtain. 
 
 1 "There are no special peculiarities inherent in the scientific mind." 
 (Prof. Arthur Schuster, in Presidential Address to the British Association 
 in 1915.) 
 
 2 "The course which I propose for the discovery of sciences is such as 
 leaves but little to the acuteness and strength of wits, but places all wits 
 and understandings nearly on a level." (Bacon, Novum Organum, bk. 1, 61.) 
 To which Professor Fowler rejoins: "Bacon's promise never has been and 
 never can be fulfilled." Of the two statements, Bacon's seems less extra- 
 vagant, we submit. 
 
 FINIS.
 
 INDEX OF AUTHORS. 
 
 ADAMSON, R., 46. 
 
 Agassiz, L., 182-183. 
 
 Allen, G., 60-61, 183. 
 
 Ampere, A.-M., 396. 
 
 Anderson, R., 119. 
 
 Anon., 41, 83, 93, 107, 108, 209, 
 
 213-215, 242, 297. 
 Apelt, E. F., 135. 
 Aristotle, 32, 38, 39, 42, 53, 120, 149, 
 
 160, 167, 175, 186-187, 189, 212, 
 
 271, 335. 
 
 Arrhenius, S. A., 120, 375. 
 Ashley, M. L., 90. 
 Avebury, Lord, 42, 81, 271, 375. 
 Avogadro, A., 366. 
 
 BABBAGE, C., and Atherton, W.H.,435. 
 
 Bachstrom, 213. 
 
 Bacon, F., ii, 17, 42, 43, 44, 45-47, 
 48, 51, 53, 65-77, 84, 85, 87, 89, 92, 
 98, 104, 107, 113, 115, 118, 119, 122, 
 123, 126-128, 135, 139, 141-142, 145, 
 149-150, 163, 167, 181, 185, 216, 
 242, 255, 273, 275, 294, 309, 313, 
 317, 329, 343, 349, 365, 377, 378, 
 381, 384, 404, 412, 414. 
 
 Bacon, R., 45, 47, 85, 167. 
 
 Bain, A., 48, 82, 89, 99, 104, 119, 133, 
 146, 195-196, 272. 
 
 Balfour, H., 181. 
 
 Banerjea, 278, 281. 
 
 Barnard, H. C., 
 
 Bates, H. W., 237. 
 
 Bateson, W., 184, 307. 
 
 Beatty, J., 263. 
 
 Beaumont and Fletcher, 66, 71, 72, 
 73, 74, 76. 
 
 Becquerel, A. C., 261. 
 
 Beethoven, 345. 
 
 Benn, A. W., 182. 
 
 Bentham, J., 396. 
 
 Bergson, H., 10, 31, 56, 67, 348. 
 
 Bert, P., 214. 
 
 Blanchard, A. A., 263. 
 
 Bloxam, C. L., 93. 
 
 Boas, F., 187, 274-275. 
 
 Boole, G., 41. 
 
 Boole, M. E., 192, 194. 
 
 Bosanquet, B., 20, 82, 90, 98, 99, 134. 
 
 Boyle, R., 327, 328, 360, 366. 
 
 Bradley, F. H., 51, 109. 
 
 Brahe, T., 92. 
 Brewster, D., 30, 94. 
 Bridges, J. H., 45, 46. 
 Brochard, V., 192. 
 Brooks, W. K., 93. 
 Brown, T., 154. 
 Browne, R., 78-79. 
 Browning, R., 333. 
 Bruce, H. A., 304. 
 Brunschvicg, L., 108, 127. 
 Buddha, 253. 
 Buffon, G. L. L., 182. 
 Burbanks, L., 264, 307. 
 
 CARKINS, G. N., 436. 
 
 Carnot, S., 331. 
 
 Caullet, P., 90, 329. 
 
 Chambers, R., 182, 273. 
 
 Charles, E., 45, 46. 
 
 Clifford, W. K., 123, 124-125. 
 
 Clodd, E., 237, 273. 
 
 Coffey, P., 135. 
 
 Coleridge, S. T., 75. 
 
 Comte, A., 20. 33, 34, 36, 37, 98, 104, 
 
 135, 147, 185, 191, 396. 
 Condell, H., 67, 67-68. 
 Condillac, E. B., ii, 11. 
 Confucius, 254, 295. 
 Copernicus, 92, 326. 
 CorneiUe, P., 72, 288. 
 Cornelius, C. S., 108-109. 
 Cournot, M., 396. 
 Couturat, L., 18, 90, 146. 
 Cramer, F., 11, 94-95, 96, 102, 108, 
 
 119, 146, 192, 193, 236, 257, 259, 
 
 264, 265, 297, 310, 320, 347, 366. 
 Creighton, J. E., 20, 100-101, 108. 
 Crookes, W., 310. 
 
 Crowther, J. A., 93, 246. 
 Curie, M. and Mme., 261. 
 Czapek, F., 81, 261, 311. 
 
 DALTON, J., 360, 366. 
 
 Darmstaedter, L., 402. 
 
 Darwin, C., 11, 49, 81, 83, 92, 94, 97, 
 102, 119, 146, 156-157, 166, 182-184, 
 192-194, 215, 236, 237, 259, 264, 
 
 265, 269, 271, 275, 280, 284, 288, 
 297, 305, 309, 310, 318, 319, 320-325, 
 335, 346, 349, 350, 358, 370. 
 
 Darwin, E., 182-183.
 
 416 
 
 INDEX OF AUTHORS. 
 
 Darwin, F., 97. 
 
 Dastets, J., 135. 
 
 Davids, T. W. R., 436. 
 
 Davy, H., 93, 195. 
 
 De Morgan, A., 41. 
 
 Dendy, A., 384. 
 
 Descartes, R., 18, 21, 47, 53, 118-119, 
 
 145-146, 167, 181, 190, 307, 348, 
 
 412. 
 
 Desch, C. H., 307, 376. 
 Dewey, J., 192. 
 Digges, L., 67. 
 Dryden, J., 72, 73. 
 Duclaux, ii. 
 
 Duhamel, J.-M. C., 436. 
 Durell, F., 215. 
 Durkheim, E., 4. 
 
 EDISON, T. A., 376. 
 
 Einstein, A., 261, 319, 348, 374, 376, 
 
 377. 
 
 Ellwood, C. A., 117, 175. 
 Eucken, R., 182. 
 Euclid, 90. 
 
 FARADAY, M., 25, 52, 125, 259. 
 
 Farmer, R., 68. 
 
 Fechner, G. T., 29. 
 
 Fishberg, M., 138. 
 
 Fletcher, J., 73. 
 
 Flint, R., 31, 396. 
 
 Foster, M., 310. 
 
 Fowler, T., 48, 135, 243, 273, 414. 
 
 Franklin, B., 81. 
 
 Freud, S., 63, 158-159. 
 
 GALILEO, 83, 85, 167, 235, 381. 
 
 Galton, F., 83. 
 
 Garrick, D., 75. 
 
 Gay-Lussac, L. J., 360, 366. 
 
 Geddes, P., 157, 168, 173, 184, 
 
 383-384. 
 Geikie, A., 59. 
 Gibbon, E., 215. 
 Gibson, B. W. R., 243. 
 Giddings, F. H., 56, 228, 245. 
 Gilbert, W., 85, 167. 
 Gilbreth, F. B., 208. 
 Gilbreth, F. B., and L. M., 140, 208-209, 
 
 210, 212. 
 Giles, H. A., 356. 
 Goblot, E., 396. 
 Goethe, J. W., ii, 277. 
 Goldmark, J. C., 141. 
 Goodrich, E. S., 262, 263. 
 Graham, T., 366. 
 Gratry, A., 135. 
 Gray, A., 310. 
 Greene, R., 69, 76. 
 Grove, W. R., 93. 
 Gumplowitz, L., 117. 
 
 HADDON, A. C., 182, 185-187. 
 
 Harris, D. F., 361. 
 
 Hartmann, E. V., 63. 
 
 Hawkins, E. L., 135. 
 
 Helmholtz, H. v., 93, 113, 358. 
 
 Helmont, Van, 245. 
 
 Heminge, 67, 67-68. 
 
 Herbart, J. F., 29, 154. 
 
 Herschel, J., ii, 5, 20, 30, 45, 48, 49, 
 
 51, 59, 82, 87, 89, 107, 114, 115, 
 
 116, 117, 139, 183, 193, 198, 211, 
 
 276, 310, 326, 359, 371. 
 Hiorns, A. H., 275, 328. 
 Hobbes, T., 29. 
 Hobson, E. W., 130. 
 Houssay, F., 33. 
 Hutton, J., 345. 
 Huxley, T. H., 11, 82, 116, 136-137, 
 
 147, 214, 355-356. 
 
 ILES, G., 376. 
 
 JAMES, W., 63. 
 Jenner, E., 94. 
 Jevons, W. S., 47, 53, 59, 61, 80-81, 
 
 82, 83, 89, 98, 103. 108, 120, 125, 
 
 133, 213, 272, 276. 
 Johnson, S., 73-74, 76. 
 Jones, H. G., 36. 
 Jonson, B., 65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73. 
 
 74. 
 
 Jordan, D. S., 264. 
 Joule, J. P., 93. 
 
 KANT, J., 29, 56, 92, 146, 190, 192. 
 
 Keith, A., 108, 284. 
 
 Kellogg, M. L., 264. 
 
 Kelvin, Lord, 20, 125, 243, 810, 375, 
 
 412. 
 
 Kepler, J., 92. 
 Keynes, J. M., 437. 
 Kirkpatrick, E. A., 155. 
 Klimpert, R., 113. 
 Kopp, 337. 
 
 LACHELIER, J., 134. 
 
 Lamark, J. B., 92, 182-183, 237. 
 
 Lamb, C., 75. 
 
 Lankaster, R., 345, 375, 396. 
 
 Laplace, 19, 288, 326. 
 
 La Rochefoucauld, 103. 
 
 Lavoisier, 60, 314. 
 
 Lee, F. S., 208. 
 
 Lee, S., 67, 69, 75. 
 
 Legge, J., 438. 
 
 Leibniz, G. W., 18, 146. 
 
 Lempfert, R. G. K., 50, 78, 212. 280. 
 
 Leverhulme, Lord, 246. 
 
 Levy-Bruhl, M., 259. 
 
 Lewis, W. C. McC., 81.
 
 INDEX OF AUTHORS. 
 
 417 
 
 Liebmann, O., 418. 
 
 Lister, Lord, 375. 
 
 Little, A. G., 45. 
 
 Locke, J., 47, 304. 
 
 Locy, W. A., 4, 57, 81, 297. 
 
 Loeb, J., 40, 103, 235, 295, 357. 
 
 Lotze, R. H., 42, 82, 83, 92, 102, 108, 
 
 134, 148, 272. 
 
 Lucretius, 21, 85, 167, 254, 267. 
 Luschan, von, 358. 
 Lyell, C., 59, 182. 
 Lyly, J., 69. 
 Lynch, A., 42. 
 
 MACAULAY, Lord, 1, 135-138, 141. 
 
 McBride, F. W., 40, 375. 
 
 McCabe, J., 268, 360. 
 
 Macdonald, J. S., 10. 
 
 McDougall, W., 155, 258. 
 
 McKillop, M., and A. D., 157, 208-209, 
 212, 304. 
 
 Mach, E., 6, 98. 
 
 Mahaffy, J. P., 190, 412. 
 
 Maier, 93. 
 
 Malebranche, N., 348, 374. 
 
 Malthus, 182. 
 
 Marett, R. R., 182. 
 
 Marlowe, C., 69. 
 
 Marmery, J. V., 46, 85. 
 
 Maxwell, J. C., 43, 93, 105. 
 
 Meeker, R., 266. 
 
 Mellone, S. H., 31, 90, 134. 
 
 Mendel, 184, 261, 307, 358. 
 
 Mendelyeff, 93, 338. 
 
 Meres, F., 69-70. 
 
 Metchnikoff, E., 40, 310. 
 
 Meyer, L., 93. 
 
 Milhaud, G., 438. 
 
 Mill, J., 29, 154, 304, 306. 
 
 Mill, J. S., ii, 2, 19, 39, 41, 44, 48-53, 
 56, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91-92, 97, 98, 
 115, 116, 117, 119, 132-133, 161-162, 
 175, 190, 193, 194, 196, 232, 243, 
 271, 272, 304, 305, 307, 310, 330, 
 349, 365, 413. 
 
 Minot, C. S., 81, 102, 120-121. 
 
 Minto, W., 42, 135. 
 
 Mitchell, P. C., 40. 
 
 Mitra, A. C., 135. 
 
 Montessori, Mme., 355. 
 
 Moore, B., 263, 297, 344, 374. 
 
 Morley, Lord, 295, 384. 
 
 Muensterberg, 396. 
 
 Mukerji, A. C., 135. 
 
 Murray, J. A. H., 299. 
 
 Myers, C. S., 209. 
 
 NADEN, C. C. W., 42, 44, 92, 133. 
 Natorp, P., 135. 
 Naville, E., 94. 
 
 Newbolt, 93. 
 
 Newton, I., 30, 81, 89, 94, 288, 335. 
 
 Nunn, T. P., 147. 
 
 PAPILLAULT, G., 182. 
 Paul, St., 392. 
 Payot, J., 201. 
 Pearson, K., 317, 396. 
 Phillips, E., 73. 
 Pitt-Rivers, A. L., 181. 
 Plato, 56, 296. 
 Pliny, 167. 
 
 Poincarg, J. H., 63, 132, 265. 
 Pope, A., 73. 
 Poynting, J. H., 105. 
 Ptolemy, 326. 
 
 RAMSAY, W., 107, 273, 310, 375. 
 
 Rayleigh, Lord, 83, 162, 306. 
 
 Read, C., 135. 
 
 Ribot, A., 192. 
 
 Riehl, A., 381. 
 
 Robertson, J. M., 365. 
 
 Robertson, T. B., 384. 
 
 Ross, E. A., 87. 
 
 Roth-Scholtzen, 45. 
 
 Rowe, N., 74. 
 
 Royce, J., 270. 
 
 Rumford, Count, 93. 
 
 Ruskin, J., 41. 
 
 Russell, B., 41, 47. 
 
 Rymer, T., 73. 
 
 ST.-HILAIRE, G., 182. 
 
 Sandys, J. E., 47. 
 
 Sargant, E. B., 156. 
 
 Sarton, G., 384. 
 
 Schopenhauer, A., 98. 
 
 Schuster, A., 317, 344, 414. 
 
 Scott, W. B., 182. 
 
 Seaman, L. L., 139. 
 
 Seward, A. C., 182. 
 
 Shakespeare, W., 4, 65-77, 277. 
 
 Shearman, A. T., 41. 
 
 Sidgwick, A., 39. 
 
 Sigwart, C., 92, 99, 100, 134, 148, 
 
 412. 
 
 Singer, C., 4. 
 Small, A., 214. 
 Smith, A., 215. 
 Smith, D. E., 45. 
 Soddy, F., 93, 202, 281. 
 Sophocles, 288. 
 Spencer, H., 64, 141, 157-158, 182, 
 
 362, 396. 
 Spiller, G., 11, 13, 22, 27, 35, 37, 62, 
 
 98-99, 183, 191, 255, 259, 277, 289, 
 
 291, 343, 351, 352, 364. 
 Spinoza, B. de, 129, 146. 
 Stopes, M., 265. 
 
 27
 
 418 
 
 INDEX OF AUTHORS. 
 
 Stumpf, C., 113, 396. 
 Subrahmanyam, A., 135. 
 Swinburne, C. A., 75. 
 
 TANNERY, J., 131. 
 
 Taylor, F. W., 141, 195, 209-210. 
 
 Taylor, H. 0., 45, 46. 
 
 Tennyson, Lord, 253, 279, 281. 
 
 Thomson, J. A., 265, 376. 
 
 Thomson, J. J., 105. 
 
 Thorndike, L., 4, 46. 
 
 Thorpe, E., 59-60, 90, 93, 187, 310, 
 
 328, 358, 361, 375. 
 Trivedi, A. K., 135. 
 Turner, H. H., 79. 
 Tyler, E. B., 346. 
 Tyndall, J., 43, 52, 107, 113, 125, 162, 
 
 283. 
 
 UEBERWEG, F., 89, 134. 
 
 VENN, J., 83, 84, 346. 
 Vinci, L. de, 85. 
 Vogl, S., 47. 
 Vries, H. de, 184, 358. 
 
 WADE, F. B., 263. 
 
 Wallace, A. R., 145, 182, 237. 
 
 Ward, A. W., 75. 
 
 Watts, J., 102-103, 257. 
 
 Waxweiler, E., 279. 
 
 Weber, E. H., 29. 
 
 Webster, J., 70. 
 
 Weismann, E., 184. 
 
 Wells, Dr., 245. 
 
 Welton, J., 31, 52, 94, 99, 134-135. 
 
 Werner, K., 45. 
 
 Westaway, F. W., 187. 
 
 Whately, R., 41, 99, 133, 346. 
 
 Whetham, W. C. D., 81, 90, 93, 107, 
 
 275. 
 
 Wheatstone, C., 235. 
 Whewell, W., 1, 50, 52, 53, 133. 
 Whitehead, A. N., 41. 
 Williams, H. S., 375. 
 Windelband, W., 41. 
 Wolff, J. C. v., 29. 
 Wordsworth, W., 75. 
 Wundt, W., 29, 89, 134, 148, 396. 
 
 ZENO, 254.
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 Absolutism and relativism in metho- 
 dology, 17-22; will gradually dis- 
 place relativism, 21-22; the mind 
 is relativist in structure, 36, and 
 why, 38; relativist logic needed, 53; 
 absolutist statements, 56 ; absolutist 
 theory of generalisation, 101; law 
 of relativity applied to relation of 
 science to life, 169-170; relative 
 results and absolutist statements, 
 362; Einstein's theory, 376-377; 
 relativism in classifications, 396. 
 
 Abstraction, 142. 
 
 Accuracy, definition of, 130; 259-261; 
 initial and scrupulous , 259; con- 
 ditions favouring , 260. 
 
 Action at a distance, 5. 
 
 Administration, the basic reconstruc- 
 tion of public administrative acti- 
 vities, 202; reorganisation of pu- 
 blic s on scientific and democratic 
 basis, 225; criticism of public s, 
 311312 
 
 ^Esthetics, 19, 86, 103, 115-116, 194, 
 230, 277, 312, 318, 344, 345, 354, 
 370, 372, 410; spread of taste and 
 refinement, 21; study of , 173; 
 basic reconstruction of art activities, 
 202 : education in , 224 ; art pene- 
 trating all vocations, 229; religion 
 of art, 253; main problems of , 
 332. 
 
 Agriculture, ceasing to be empirical, 
 169; study of, 172-173; method 
 in , 281; scope of agriculturist's 
 interests, 315; main problems of , 
 333. 
 
 Alchemy and chemistry, 29; al- 
 chemists, 45. 
 
 Alertness, need of habitual, 308-312. 
 
 Analogy, danger and value of, 
 194-195. 
 
 Anthropology, 105, 194, 274-275, 280, 
 281, 293-294, 297, 346, 357, 358, 
 359; craniology, 185-187; ethnology, 
 188-189. 
 
 Appendicitis, 283. 
 
 Applied science, 32, 411 ; line between 
 
 pure and elusive, 7 ; under- and 
 
 over-emphasis of - , 8; science 
 and life increasingly approach each 
 
 other, 169; need of drawing practi- 
 cal deductions, 381-391 ; the process 
 of enquiry must include practical 
 deductions, 381-382, 383; Bacon's 
 rule, 384; adumbration of a scienti- 
 fic language, 384-391. 
 
 Archaeology, 21. 
 
 Aristotle, his method, 186-187; his 
 introduction to medieval Europe, 
 211-212. 
 
 Assumption, fundamental, pervading 
 this treatise, 1-3. 
 
 Astrologers, 45. 
 
 Astronomy, 5, 8, 21, 30, 57, 58, 84, 
 92, 94, 105, 107, 109, 114, 118, 120, 
 185, 194, 261, 267, 268, 276, 297, 
 317, 318, 319-320, 326, 332, 344, 
 345, 360, 376, 382, 393. 
 
 Atmosphere, 21, 344; composition 
 of , troposphere and stratosphere, 
 273. 
 
 Authority, 32. 
 
 Bacon, Francis, as absolutist, 17-18; 
 on the nature of heat, and the pur- 
 pose of science, 42-43; on experi- 
 menting, 44 ; Shakespeare-Bacon 
 controversy examined, 65-68; on 
 deduction, 118; and Descartes, 
 119; on measurement and mathe- 
 matics, 126-128 ; criticism of by 
 Macaulay, 135-142; what com- 
 bated, 141 ; his case for a metho- 
 dology, 141-142; on the scientific 
 thinker and on himself, 145; 's 
 method, on the mist of tradition, 
 150; historic explanation of 's me- 
 thodology, 167. 
 
 Bacon, Roger, his methodological 
 position, 45-47 ; historic explana- 
 tion of his crudity, 167. 
 
 Bain, Alexander, on methodological 
 requirements, 146. 
 
 Beaumont and Fletcher, their praise, 
 71. 
 
 Bergson, on intuition, 10; reality as 
 a flux, 56; his defence of indeter- ' 
 minism, 64. 
 
 Beri-beri, in the Japanese navy, 139, 
 309. 
 
 Biology, 19, 22, 28, 30, 58, 84, 86, 108, 
 115, 194, 270, 274, 294, 307, 312, 
 
 27*
 
 420 
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 359, 362; organic evolution, man's 
 descent, vital chemistry, genesis 
 of life, 6; zoology and botany as 
 sciences, 7 ; localisation of sensory 
 and motor areas, problems of here- 
 dity, 19; nature of cell, ana- 
 tomy and physiology, 21 ; relation 
 of plants to air, sun, certain bac- 
 teria, earthworms, and flowers, 
 chlorophyll and non-living matter, 
 evolution and constitution of plants, 
 57 ; cells and molecular energy and 
 movements, 57; relation of phy- 
 siology to oxygen, 57 ; food di- 
 rectly transformed into energy, 57 ; 
 bacteria, 58, 261, 311; discovery 
 of glandular secretions, 58-59; 
 mentality of animals, 82-83, ex- 
 periment frequently difficult or 
 impracticable in , 84; ruminating 
 and cloven hoofs, 86; composition 
 and structure of protoplasm, cell 
 nucleus, cytoplasm, 87; growth of 
 fertilised ovum, 102; organisms 
 with bilaterally symmetrical struc- 
 ture, 103 ; the essential facts of life, 
 107; number of species counted, 
 109; blood circulating both ways, 
 116; Arrhenius' theory of pan- 
 spermia, 120; terminology of botany, 
 128; scope of , 173; flowers and 
 pollen-carrying insects, 194; Van 
 Helmont on the source of plant 
 substance, 245; respiration of plants, 
 hidden chlorophyll, plants obtaining 
 nitrogen through bacteria, roots and 
 marble plates, iron salts and growth, 
 261-262; process of karyokinesis, 
 262 (see enzymes, vitamines, inter- 
 nal secretions); Burbank's experi- 
 ments with flowers and fruits, 264 ; 
 local interrelations between plants, 
 264-265; deep-sea dredge, 268; 
 solubility of foodstuffs, 268; pro- 
 tective value of colouring, 268; 
 epidemics, death, 274; vital prin- 
 ciple 276; diseases and parasites, 
 277 ; wag-tail in summer and winter, 
 279-280; magpie in England and 
 Norway, 280; hooded crow, variety, 
 of dogs, plants on Alpine valleys 
 and Alpine heights, 280; demon- 
 strating the circulation of the blood, 
 296-297 ; alleged periodical renewal 
 of body, 308-309; two types of 
 twins, ground woodpeckers, lowland 
 and highland plants, 309; living 
 larvae from unfertilised eggs, 309; 
 phagocytes, 310-311; ether as 
 numbing pain, yeast, cell nucleus, 
 311; bisons and treeless spaces, 
 
 317; rats and epidemics, mosquitoes 
 and stagnant pools, alcohol and 
 resistance to disease, 317 ; moderate 
 and moist heats, dry and humid 
 climates, trees and rainfall, 317; 
 relation of cats to certain flowers, 
 318; fundamental biological accom- 
 panying uniformities, 318; cell- 
 making instinct of the hive-bee, 
 320-325; main problems of life, 332; 
 infectious diseases in plants and 
 animals, 333; combating of insect 
 and germ pests, 334; protoplasm, 
 335 ; fixation of nitrogen and other 
 substances by bacteria, 337 ; tem- 
 perature of trees and birds, 344; 
 seasonal plant metabolism, arterial 
 and venous blood, sterility and 
 fertility, 344; modified cells, bac- 
 teria and earthworms, effects of 
 alcohol and poison, 345; colour of 
 corpuscles, 346; analogy between 
 food and fuel, gland and lung, 348 ; 
 arterial sclerosis, reflexes, tropisms, 
 356; forced movements, 357; organ 
 of Corti, 358; effect of free oxygen, 
 358; nitrifying and heliotropic 
 organisms, bracing winds, excite- 
 ment, fatigue, 359; social life, 
 359-360; neighbouring plants, 360; 
 colouring in animate beings, re- 
 productive methods, elements in 
 organisms, live matter, 361; helio- 
 tropism, 362; hothouse, incubator, 
 371; medicine, 372; putrefaction, 
 375; living substance a fluid, 376; 
 use, disuse, and inheritance, 376; 
 the biologist must develop also the 
 life of practice, 382; practical aspect 
 of , 383-384; botanical termino- 
 logy, 393; classification of animate 
 beings, anabolism and katabolism, 
 function and environment, parts 
 of organism, classification of plants, 
 vertebrates, foods, 393; classifica- 
 tion of animals, 396; outline 
 scheme of biological sciences, 397, 
 401. 
 
 Bradley, on Mills' Canons, 51. 
 
 Cancer, prevention of, 139. 
 
 Capital and labour, contention be- 
 tween, 237-239. 
 
 Cartography, 21. 
 
 Caste system, 170; discrimination 
 to be abolished, 223. 
 
 Catalysers, 311. 
 
 Categories, 38, 268, 295, 306, 340, 353, 
 368; primary applied, 233-234; 
 
 applied to observation, 257, 259; 
 
 applied, 354, 367; re-stated, 
 398-400.
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 421 
 
 Cause, induction and causal investi- 
 gations, 19; the world of causes is in 
 the microscopic, 26; Mill's Canons 
 deal with s, Herschel and Bacon 
 on s, 51 ; causal enquiries, 85-88 ; 
 importance of causal enquiries, 
 85-86, 88 ; proper conception of , 
 86; the causal view of nature not 
 exclusive, Mill on causal view of 
 induction, 86; relation to static 
 aspects, 86-88; generalised causes 
 should be sought, study of effects, 
 88; definition of , 88; proofs of 
 causal facts, 115. 
 
 Chemistry, 19, 21, 30, 57, 58, 84, 86, 
 93, 105, 106, 107, 115, 274, 275, 
 345, 346, 360, 363, 393; the proto- 
 element, 5, 6, 17 ; allotropic forms, 
 prediction of elements, transmuta- 
 tion of elements, vital chemistry, 6; 
 ultimate relations of the elements, 
 17; nature of flame, 19; alchemy 
 and , 29; production and reduc- 
 tion of organic compounds, their 
 qualities and internal arrangement, 
 existential relation of the elements, 
 87; nomenclature of , 128; scope 
 of , 173; presence in the air of 
 argon, helium, neon, krypton, and 
 xenon, 262 ; gun cotton exploded by 
 detonation, 263; allotropic forms, 
 273-274, 276; lower and higher 
 compounds, 276; isomeric aspects 
 of compounds, 281 ; study of valen- 
 cies, 297; Lavoisier on organic com- 
 pounds, 314; influence of heat on 
 chemical elements, and of cold on 
 life, 318; leading problems of , 
 332; elements and compounds in 
 process of decomposition, 337; 
 from ether to protoplasm, 344; the 
 energy necessary, for disintegrating 
 elements, 344; diffusion of gases, 
 356; helium, argon, 375; chemist 
 must develop also the life of prac- 
 tice, 382; chemical nomenclature, 
 393. 
 
 Child, study and education, 8; the 
 mind, 22-25; influence of cultural 
 environment on , 24; dependence 
 on human advance, social environ- 
 ment, and personal circumstances, 
 24; opportunities for methodological 
 training, 34; learning to write, 35; 
 increase in weight, 102; school sub- 
 jects and the , 103 ; theory of the 
 repeating man's history dubious, 
 103-104; ren's alleged tendency 
 to generalise, 104; requirements 
 of ren and adults, 281 ; moral edu- 
 cation of , 290-293; educational. 
 
 possibilities in ren, 304-306; in- 
 fectious diseases in ren, 333. 
 
 Circumstances, Child's, 24; favour- 
 able for investigators, 97; alter 
 cases, 295. 
 
 Civics, study of, 17::. 
 
 Classification, 104, 153, 340, 349, 411; 
 
 of the sciences, 3,30-31,338; con- 
 crete example of of data. 227-230 ; 
 the process of , 392-402; sum- 
 mum genus and infima species, 392; 
 ancient nomenclatures and termino- 
 logies, 393; classifying final results, 
 394-396; s represent a historic 
 growth, 396; outline scheme of the 
 content of knowledge, 397; develop- 
 ment of outline scheme, 400, 402; 
 desirability of a volume giving a 
 succinct, survey of present-day 
 knowledge, 402. 
 
 Class interests, 26. 
 
 Comparison, 142. 
 
 Compass, relation of navigation to, 8. 
 
 Comte, on research regardless of 
 practical utility, 34; source of his 
 fundamental conceptions, 36-37; 
 his fifteen laws, 147; on articula- 
 tion of the sciences, 185; his plea 
 for an inter-specialist science, 197. 
 
 Concentration, need of , in obser- 
 vation, 257; in scientific work ge- 
 nerally, 312; in generalisation, 326; 
 in deduction, 369. 
 
 Concept, 142. 
 
 Conservation and conservatism, justi- 
 fication of, 226; narrowmindedness 
 and conservatism, 334. 
 
 Conservation of energy, 5, 93, 331, 355. 
 
 Conservation of matter, 5. 
 
 Consumption, 283; prevention of , 
 139. 
 
 Co-operation, the life-breath of human 
 society, 3, 225; in school, 103; 
 
 in scientific work, 211-215; - 
 should be nation-wide and inter- 
 national, 211; traceable to anti- 
 quity, 21 1-212; ubiquitous to-day, 
 212-213; systematic needed, 213; 
 advice, assistance, and criticism, 
 213; lack of -- highly prejudicial 
 to welfare and progress, 214; sug- 
 gested scheme of international - 
 in science, 214; becoming in- 
 creasingly practicable, 214; -- in 
 industrial research and relations, 
 also in preparing legislation, 214- 
 215; need of in every department 
 of life, 225; meaning of , 372-373. 
 
 Cosmology, as science of sciences, 3, 
 22, 182; outline scheme of , 
 397, 400.
 
 422 
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 Countries, study of, 174. 
 
 Criminology, 8 ; criminality, 361,362; 
 ground of punishment, 362. 
 
 Crystallography, 19, 86, 346; structure 
 of snowflakes, 261. 
 
 Culture, meaning of, 2; pan-human 
 origin of, 6, 378-380; problem of 
 heredity and , progress of 
 discussed, 156-157; test of , 227; 
 man's cultural nature, cultural pro- 
 gress, and cultural possessions, 
 284-285; true 361. 
 
 Darwin, Charles, freely adopted sug- 
 gestions from others, 94 ; on the 
 deductive method, 119; on him- 
 self, 146; the bases of his work, 
 and his theory discussed, 182-184; 
 his method of dealing with pre- 
 judices, 192; his respect, for detail, 
 236; on not doing things twice, 
 259 ; on the relation of cats to cer- 
 tain flowers, 318. 
 
 Deduction, 29, 32, 44, 47, 52, 77, 109, 
 118-123, 150, 161, 365, 366, 411; 
 
 - will eventually become more 
 important than induction, 21, 117, 
 118; relation of sifted facts to , 
 29; Mills' claim regarding the de- 
 ductive process, 97 ; deductive veri- 
 fication, 114; verification is pro- 
 moted by lucidly expressed s, 
 115; in we descend from the 
 major to the minor, forms an 
 essential part of scientific proce- 
 dure, definition of , especi- 
 ally fruitful and safe if based on 
 quantitative determinations, 118; 
 syllogism and deductive method, 
 deductive procedure frequently in 
 place, 120; a scientific is ground- 
 ed on a sound generalisation, full 
 generalisations help , s un- 
 scientific if not rigidly verified, 
 121 ; s useful, especially where 
 there are verified classes of facts, 
 121 ; s best based on definitions, 
 129-130 ; deduction included in in- 
 ductive process, 134; place of 
 in books of logic, 160-162 ; practi- 
 cal becomes progressively ad- 
 missible *and obligatory as the 
 sciences develop, 169-170; concrete 
 example of theoretical , 220-223; 
 and of practical deduction, 223-227; 
 
 - and verification, 364; process 
 of , 369-381; and generali- 
 sation, 369-371; example of , 
 372-373 ; example of unjustified , 
 374; examples of hypothetical s, 
 374-377; extreme form of deductive 
 procedure, 377 ; example of metho- 
 
 dical and systematic , 377-380: 
 explanation, 380-381 ; verification 
 imperative in , 381. 
 
 Definition and definiteness, 44, 88, 
 118, 150, 368, 377, 411 ; importance 
 of terms, 128-129; slight or restrict- 
 ed studies lead to ambiguous s, 
 129; statements should assume the 
 form of s, 129-130; definiteness 
 in scientific work generally, 130, 
 245-255, and in statements, 255-256 ; 
 Wells on dew, Van Helmont on 
 water and plants, of fact, class, 
 generalisation, law, 245 ; transcend- 
 ing momentary and local feelings 
 and experiences, 255, 295-296; 
 of morality and co-operation, 
 372373. 
 
 Degree determination, 343-354. 
 
 Democracy, life to be re-organised 
 on a strictly democratic basis, 
 225-226; meaning and problems 
 of , 286; main problems of , 
 333. 
 
 Descartes, Rene, as absolutist, 18; 
 his method, 47; his philosophy, 
 118-119; -- and Bacon, 119; on 
 himself, 145-146. 
 
 Detail, science recognises no mere , 
 235-236, 312. 
 
 Diagram, matic procedure, 194. 
 
 Dialectics, 356-363. 
 
 Diet, 8, 86, 382; study of , 172; 
 influence of vitamines on , 262 
 (see vitamines); problem of etics, 
 314-315; food values, 359; cooking, 
 371 ; food factors, 372. 
 
 Dimensional theories, 347-348. 
 
 Discovery, Whewell, Macaulay and 
 others, on art of , 1. 
 
 Dogma, 32. 
 
 Domestic activities, their basic re- 
 construction, 202; home education 
 should have its roots in science, 
 225. 
 
 Dreams, cause according to Freud, 
 158. 
 
 Earthquakes, 87, 105, 317, 333, 344, 
 382. 
 
 Economics, 3, 19, 21, 32, 105, 194, 312, 
 357; beginning of economic science, 
 7 ; economy in industries, utilisation 
 of waste products, improvement of 
 agriculture, scientific staffs in facto- 
 ries, artificial production of natural 
 substances, practical departments in 
 colleges, efficiency tests, 8; instru- 
 ments, 21; average man reasons 
 least unscientifically in his avoca- 
 tion, 27; economic anxieties lead 
 to neurasthenia, 159; caste system,
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 423 
 
 introduction and supersession of 
 division of labour, 170; development 
 of trade unionism and combines, 171 ; 
 obstructions to progress, 192; the 
 basic reconstruction of economic 
 activities, 202; individuals should 
 command identical opportunities of 
 developing, labouring, and living, 
 and there should be one standard 
 of living and for reward of services, 
 224; vocational education, 224; 
 scientific and ethical basis for voca- 
 tions, 225; international standardi- 
 sation, 226; historical classification 
 of labour, 229; India's industrial 
 backwardness, 242; rendering truly 
 comparable unemployment, strike, 
 lock-out, and industrial accident 
 statistics, 246; wages and cost of 
 living for standard family, and as- 
 certainment of minimum require- 
 ments, 246; increase in productivity, 
 246; abolition of poverty, 252-253; 
 adequate living wage, shorter hours, 
 full employment, hygienic work- 
 places, and respectful treatment, 
 253; labour and leisure, 260-261; 
 annual cost of healthy and decent 
 living, 265-266; piece-work, gratui- 
 ties, wages, 274; idleness due to 
 economic chaos, 276; meaning and 
 problems of democracy, 287; notion 
 of living in comfort, 286-287 ; family 
 as the national unit, 287; rule 
 regarding study of social facts, 
 295-296; foulness of factory air, 297; 
 problem of adequate income for 
 all, 302-303; the wages problem, 
 303-304; output at different hours 
 of day, 309; causes of post-war 
 economic crisis, 315-316; main 
 problems of , 332, 333; electricity 
 generated at the pits' mouth, water 
 power schemes, 333; motor road 
 traffic partly superseding railways, 
 prevention of energy waste, irriga- 
 tion, moratorium, 334; efficiency 
 and inefficiency, 344; exchange 
 problems, 359; causes of accidents, 
 types of men, industrial fatigue, 361 ; 
 economical use and distribution of 
 fuel and new sources of power, 372; 
 the Conclusions to be made the 
 foundation of the economic life, 
 406; index numbers relating to 
 the cost of living and forming 
 the basis of wage changes, mini- 
 mum health-and-decency standard, 
 minimum unit of individual pro- 
 ductivity, actualising this minimum, 
 409-410. 
 
 Economisation of activity, 35, 96; 
 underlies generalisation, causes 
 of , 98. 
 
 Education, 2, 3, 19, 228, 345, 370; 
 child study, 8; the of man. 21; 
 rash generalising in regard to school 
 subjects, 103; children's alleged 
 tendency to generalise experiences, 
 104; study of , 173; the basic 
 reconstruction of al activities, 
 202; necessity of thorough for all, 
 224; should be moral, intellec- 
 tual, hygienic, aesthetic, and voca- 
 tional, 224; primary social necessity 
 to perfect al ends and the methods 
 of educating teachers and child- 
 ren, 224; home , 225; enormous 
 power of home and school , 227; 
 moral of children, 290-293; sim- 
 plest practicable case in , 296; 
 fundamental al problems, 304- 
 306; home and school ,317; main 
 problems in , 333; Montessori 
 method, 355; the Conclusions the 
 foundation of all , 406. 
 
 Electricity, 57, 58, 87, 93, 105, 214, 344, 
 345, 364; electric lighting, heating, 
 and motive power, 7-8; relation to 
 wires in telegraphy, 311. 
 
 Electron, 58, 344, 349; matter perhaps 
 composed of , 337. 
 
 Environment, 82 ; influence on child, 
 22; definition of , 56-57 ; al con- 
 ditions conducive to efficiency, 
 201-210; neglect and importance 
 of -al factor, 277-279; list of al 
 factors, 279; methodological rules 
 relating to , 278-279; general ac- 
 companying uniformities, 317-319, 
 and fundamental, 318. 
 
 Enzymes, 57, 263, 311. 
 
 Equality, human, 223-224. 
 
 Etheorology, 19, 30. 
 
 Ether, 344, 364; as an Inert chemi- 
 cal element, 120. 
 
 Eugenics, 8; eugenists on "lower" 
 races and "lower classes", 122. 
 
 Evolution, 26, 57, 92, 101, 276, 281, 309, 
 345, 346-347, 349, 370, 375; or- 
 ganic and human, 6, 87; of or- 
 ganisms and worlds, 21; of law, 
 117; Darwin's theory, 182-184; 
 \-ary method, 194; fluctuations 
 and mutations, 345, 358; man and 
 animal, 349, 350, 352; causes of , 
 361. 
 
 Exceptions, always to be looked for, 
 116,275-276,308-312,353; man an 
 exception, 122. 
 
 Experiment, 29, 32, 44, 80-85, 150, 
 306, 365; nature and definition of
 
 424 
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 , 80,82; prescientific and scienti- 
 fic observation, 80-81 ; scientific 
 an extension of scientific observa- 
 tion, 80-81 ; s regarding the men- 
 tality of animals, 82-83; direct s, 
 and s generally, not always prac- 
 ticable, favourable conditions for , 
 limitations of al method, 84; ob- 
 servation, and experience histori- 
 cally considered, 85 ; al acquisition 
 of scientific procedure, 199; na- 
 ture's , 279; improving the me- 
 mory ally, 282-283; experimentum 
 crucis, 297; Mendel's s, 307; un- 
 equivocal s, 348. 
 
 Experts, 96; responsible for veri- 
 fying theories they adopt, 122, 159, 
 255; and bureaucrats, 332. 
 
 Fact, definition of, 56, 210, 245,411; 
 multiplicity of s, 265 ; exhausting 
 classes of , 317; scope of , 326; 
 when is explained, 365. 
 
 Fallacies, art of detecting, 39. 
 
 Faraday, on avoiding repetition, 259. 
 
 Fatigue, 140, 205-207, 208, 209, 359, 
 361. 
 
 Forgetfulness, cause according to 
 Freud, 158. 
 
 Freud, S., his theory of sex-pre- 
 dominance, 158-159; part played 
 by sex in normal life, 159 ; position 
 of semi-conscious thought in nor- 
 mal life, and origin of 's theory, 
 159. 
 
 Gas light. Introduction of, 7. 
 
 Generalisation, 25-26, 27, 44, 51, 52, 
 58, 88, 118, 150, 161, 326-342, 364, 
 366, 411; J. S. Mill on approximate 
 s, 19; and convention, 20; in 
 children, 23 ; to generalise is a matter 
 of mental economy, 25; unrestrained 
 generalising, relation of sifted facts 
 to s, 29; exceptions to s, 40; 
 scientists both observe and gene- 
 ralise, 52 ; relative scope of and 
 observation, 61; s should be 
 grounded on exhaustively studied 
 data, 78, 79 ; far-reaching antecedents 
 should be sought, 88 ; larger s 
 grow out of smaller ones, 94; habit 
 of generalising, 97; examples of 
 systematic , 97, 100; economisa- 
 tion underlies , causes of econo- 
 misation, 98; definition of , 99, 
 245; succeeds observation, 99; 
 the nature of the "general", no- 
 thing "necessary" as a rule about 
 the fact and scope of , 99-102; 
 preferability of term extension to 
 term , 100; tendency of a popular 
 - to be widely extended, 100-101; 
 
 examples of casual s, 101 ; 
 frequently inappropriate, 102; a 
 capricious habit now, 102; uni- 
 versalised speech, 102-103; con- 
 tradictory and rash s, 103-104; 
 tendency to fix limits, training 
 encourages wary, yet bold , 104 ; 
 we are mainly modifying existing 
 s, 104-105; simple, compound, 
 and universal s, 105; science not 
 only concerned with general facts, 
 105 ; position of complete or perfect 
 inductions, 106-109; great body of 
 fact as basis for a , example, 109- 
 113; s should be graded, etc., 113; 
 verification is promoted by lucidly 
 expressed s, 115; experimental 
 method of learning to generalise, 
 199-200; concrete example of , 
 220; definition of class, 245; con- 
 centration in , 326; graded s, 
 326-328; s must be based on 
 ample data, 326; example of graded 
 generalising, 327-328; comprehen- 
 sive s. 329-332; disadvantages of 
 fractional s, 330; wide s, 330- 
 331 ; important s, 332-334; leading 
 problems awaiting solution, 332- 
 333; numerous s, 334; full s, 
 334-335; example of full , 335; 
 rational and relevant , 335-336; 
 original s, and rules for promot- 
 ing originality, 336; automatically 
 initiated and methodically deve- 
 loped s, 336-342; examples given, 
 340-342; postponing large - s, 342- 
 343; s remain hypotheses until 
 verified, 363; and deduction, 
 369-371; meaning of , 411. 
 
 Genius, 53, individual contributions 
 of men of , 1; great men as 
 summarise.rs, 3; methodological 
 status of the average man of the 
 distant future, 20, 33, 153, 414; 
 individuals never far in advance 
 of contemporaries, 30; the man of 
 , his dependence and his limita- 
 tions, 36-37; Mill on superior minds, 
 52; Newton and the gravitation 
 hypothesis, 94 ; individual scarcely 
 more than a mirror of his age, 174; 
 the bases of Darwin's theory, 
 182-184; individual's investigation 
 has only contributory value, 189; 
 social advance should depend on 
 the many rather than on the few, 
 224; super-men and super-civilisa- 
 tion, 277; apparent inferiority of 
 African Negro, 278; some diffi- 
 culties in the theory, 287-288. 
 
 Geography, 21, 84, 106, 295, 297, 382.
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 425 
 
 Geology, 21, 57, 58, 59, 84, 87, 105, 
 108, 115, 173, 194, 276, 284, 307, 
 317, 344, 345, 361, 362, 375, 382. 
 
 Geometry, 21, 90. 
 
 Graphs, 109. 
 
 Habit, 39, 191-192,345,410; thought 
 as controlled, 34-36; as result- 
 ing from the struggle for existence 
 among ideas, 38; its nature, 96, 
 353-354; of generalising, 97, 
 336-342 ; generalising a capricious 
 now, 102; of methodical scienti- 
 fic procedure, 199-200; acquisition 
 of habits, 209; study of habits, 
 297-298; habitual alertness, 308-312. 
 
 Heat, 42-43. 58, 78, 86, 105, 276, 317, 
 343. 355, 368, 371-372, 375. 
 
 Heredity, 277, 352, 376; child mind 
 dependent on cultural rather than 
 on hereditary factors, 24; problem 
 of -*- and culture discussed, 156; 
 
 - in animals and man, 268-269. 
 Herschel, Sir J., on the character of 
 
 the true philosopher, 5; on Bacon 
 as the father of inductive logic, 
 45; his method, 49; on observa- 
 tional methods, 59; on causal view, 
 87 ; on liberty and licence, 89 ; on 
 ancient and recent species, 183; on 
 prejudice, 193; on hypotheses, 211; 
 on study of exceptions, 276. 
 
 Hibernation, 78-79. 
 
 History, 115, 194. 
 
 Homologies, importance of, 194, 
 269-270. 
 
 Huxley, L. T., on Bacon, 136-137; 
 
 - on the method of science, 147. 
 Hygiene, 2, 3, 19, 33, 169, 224, 382; 
 
 diet, exercise, clothing, moral sanity 
 and virility, 8; education in , 
 224; historical classification of 
 and medicine, 230; religion of 
 health, 253; main problems of , 
 and the prevention of infectious 
 diseases, 333. 
 
 Hypothesis, 44, 52, 77, 89-98, 365; 
 convention and , 20; Mill's re- 
 liance on hypotheses, 52; relation 
 of -- to observation, 59-60, 97; 
 logicians over-stress its importance, 
 89; definition of , 89-90; the 
 terms supposition, conjecture, sur- 
 mise, suggestion, guess, assump- 
 tion, not equivalents of , 91 ; 
 working , 91, 288; Mill's view 
 of the formation of a , 91-92; 
 a - - not a mere supposition, 92 ; 
 hypotheses have mostly a collec- 
 tive origin, 92-93 ; a slowly de- 
 velops in the individual's mind, 
 93; Newton and the gravitation , 
 
 Darwin freely adopted suggestions 
 from others, .lenner as summariser, 
 1)4; all statements are assumptions, 
 95; genesis of hypotheses, 95-97; 
 Mill's hypothetical method, 97; 
 a is frequently necessary to ob- 
 servation, 97; frequently almost 
 pure conjectures guide scholars, 
 98; a generalisation is a special 
 form of , 98; verifying an un- 
 substantial wasteful, 114-115; 
 proof of , 115-117; need of sys- 
 tematically framing hypotheses, 
 210-211; wherever we use the 
 memory, we frame hypotheses, 210; 
 what a methodology must assure 
 as regards hypotheses, 210-211 ; 
 aiming at the most extensive hypo- 
 theses practicable, systematically 
 verifying, improving, and extend- 
 ing it, having a sound foundation 
 for it, 211 ; in deductive pro- 
 cess, 373-374. 
 
 Hysteria, 158. 
 
 Imagination, 20, 364; scientific use of 
 , 283-289; limited scope of , 288. 
 
 Improvements, method of discovery 
 of, 97 ; each one can aim at in 
 his or her vocation, 198; rules for 
 suggesting , 336. 
 
 India's industrial immaturity due to 
 environmental causes, 242. 
 
 Induction, 32, 44, 45, 97, 132-142 ; - 
 will eventually become less im- 
 portant than deduction, 21, 118,119; 
 Descartes' attitude towards induc- 
 tion, 47; meaning of induction in 
 Mill, 51 ; Mill on causal view of , 
 86; position of complete or perfect 
 s, 106-108, 118; mathematical 
 and inductive procedure essenti- 
 ally identical, 130-132; Mill's de- 
 finition of , 132-133; definition 
 of , 133, 134; deduction included 
 in inductive process, 134; Macaulay 
 on Bacon, 135-142; Huxley on 
 Bacon, 136-137; place of in books 
 on logic, 161-162. 
 
 Infectious diseases, prevention of, 8, 
 139. 
 
 Insanity, cause according to Freud, 
 158. 
 
 Instinct, 20, 36, 52, 134, 294, 320-325; 
 theory of human conduct as prima- 
 rily determined by s, definition 
 of problem, 155-156; in animals 
 and man, 268-269. 
 
 Instruments, 21, 32, 150, 365; scienti- 
 fic , wide employment of , * s : 
 use of -- in observation and ex- 
 periment, definition of , use and
 
 426 
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 non-use of , 83 ; development of 
 , 93 ; observation should be pre- 
 ferably instrumental, 268; value 
 of , 306. 
 
 Internal secretions, 57, 262-263. 
 
 International academy, need of, 181 ; 
 
 standardisation, organisation, 
 and co-operation, 226; legislature, 
 judiciary, and administration, 226. 
 
 Intel-nationalisation, of methods, 21; 
 internationalism fast growing, 406. 
 
 Introspection, neglect of, 258-259. 
 
 Intuition and science, 10. 
 
 Irrationality, human thought essen- 
 tially irrational, 35-36. 
 
 Jenner, as an enthusiastic summa- 
 riser, 94. 
 
 Jews, stature of, 138-139. 
 
 Johnson, Samuel, his panegyric on 
 Shakespeare applies to the best 
 Jacobean play-wrights, 76. 
 
 Jonson, Ben, his praise, 71. 
 
 Kant, his "thing-in-itself", 56; on 
 methodological requisites, 146. 
 
 Knowledge, man's chief weapon, 225; 
 -outline scheme of the content of 
 , 397. 
 
 Language, as aid to thought, 25, 88; 
 
 influenced by social progress, 37; 
 
 - as a scientifically fashioned in- 
 strument of thought, 153; Bacon 
 on non-scientific terms, 185; Bain 
 on influence of , 195-196; univer- 
 sal , 226; development of , 229; 
 exact terminology, 242-244 ; clarity 
 of expression reacting on , 256; 
 Tower of Babel, 276; origin and 
 nature of , 298-302; problem of 
 ideal , 302; main problems of , 
 332 ; affixes, 341-342 ; adumbration 
 of a scientific , 384-391 ; is a 
 vast repository of classifications, 
 392; terminologies and nomencla- 
 tures, 393; classification of s, 
 393-394. 
 
 Law, masses of precedents compacted 
 into codes of , 157; humanisation 
 of the , 225; international legis- 
 lature and judiciary, 226. 
 
 Laws of nature, 365 ; difficult to dis- 
 cover them owing to the inter- 
 dependence of facts, 116; platitu- 
 dinarian laws, value of laws of 
 nature, 116; their meaning, 117; 
 their definition, 245. 
 
 Leibniz, on probable knowledge, 18; 
 
 on the art of invention, 146. 
 Leisure, historical classification,'230; 
 
 labour and , 260-261. 
 Light, 58, 105, 173, 359, 375; influence 
 of gravitation on rays, 261. 
 
 Logic, state of, -- during the last 
 half century, 159-162; the deduc- 
 tive part of , treatises on con- 
 tain no references to deduction, and 
 the inductive part very few, 160; 
 the Aristotelian misconceived, 
 160; misconception of science and 
 scientific method in , 161-162. 
 
 Love, of the good, the true, the hy- 
 gienic, and the beautiful, 224, 227, 
 229, 230, 392; of humanity, 
 228-229. 
 
 Macaulay, on Bacon's inductive me- 
 thod, 135-142; weakness of 's 
 argument, 136-138. 
 
 Machinery, 32; universal employment 
 of , 8. 
 
 Magicians, 45. 
 
 Magnetism, 58, 87, 93, 105, 107, 215. 
 
 Man, 86, 87, 106; a zero, if thrown 
 back on himself, 1-3; definition 
 of, 1, 220, 231; classification of 
 human facts, 2, 284-285, 394; 's 
 descent, polygenetic theory of hu- 
 man purposes and actions, 6; eu- 
 genics, 8; methodological status of 
 the average of the distant future, 
 20, 133, 153, 414; 's story and 
 nature, his mind and the stages of 
 his life, 21 ; only collective dis- 
 covers truth, 53 ; and fatalism or 
 free-will, 56; average and signi- 
 ficance of cultural phenomena, 's 
 history, signs of the age, 57-58; 
 negroes and universities, 96-97; 
 Mill would apply his hypothetical 
 method in social science, 97 ; the 
 remote future will excel the pre- 
 sent as the latter excels the remote 
 past, 104 ; demographic facts, 109 ; 
 causes of the decline of Rome, 
 114; proof generally ignored in the 
 cultural sciences, 117; the eugenic 
 theory, 122, 286; advance due to 
 pan-species accumulation of slight 
 improvements, 149; problems of 
 instincts in , heredity and cul- 
 ture, and historical advance of 
 culture discussed, 155-156 ; human 
 and animal intelligence contrasted, 
 194-195; problem of whether the 
 white race is greatly superior in- 
 tellectually, morally, and practi- 
 cally to all other races, 217-231; 
 as the sentient being which 
 primarily depends on species-de- 
 veloped and environmentally-pre- 
 served culture, 220 ; theoretical and 
 practical deductions as to the na- 
 ture of , 220-227; perfection, 
 supreme end, and sense of oneness,
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 427 
 
 227; fundamentals, 227; cultural 
 differences due to cultural causes, 
 231; report stage, 231,404-405; 
 super-men and super-civilisation, 
 277; men and women, 277; apparent 
 inferiority of African Negro, 278; 
 result of acceptance of specio- 
 psychic theory, 's cultural na- 
 ture and cultural progress, 284; 
 human life and animal life con- 
 trasted, 285; geographical features 
 influence social features, 317 ; hu- 
 man and animal mentality, 
 and his tools, 350; crucial dis- 
 tinction between and animals, 
 350, 352 ; East and West, 358 ; cul- 
 ture a pan-human product, 378-380; 
 outline scheme of specio-psychics, 
 397, 401-402; the three laws of 
 human life, an explanation of the 
 differential character of , and 
 his consequent main duties, 404; 
 pan-human reflection leads neces- 
 sarily to an ever more perfected 
 methodology, 413. 
 
 Mathematics, 7, 19, 21, 29, 30, 32, 46, 
 108, 118, 150, 182, 267, 297, 306, 
 348/365, 368, 382, 393 ; Bacon's and 
 Descartes' view of , 119; the case 
 for mathematical procedure, 123- 
 128; every science must needs 
 strive to be mathematical, 123; 
 difficulties involved in attaining to 
 complete exactness, 124-125 ; Fara- 
 day's lack of mathematical equip- 
 ment, 125; Francis Bacon on the 
 place of in science and life, 
 126-128; at first avoid, later aim 
 at, mathematical formulation, 129; 
 identity of mathematical with non- 
 mathematical methodology, 130- 
 132 ; the mechanism of mathema- 
 tical invention does not sensibly 
 differ from that of invention in 
 genera], 132. 
 
 Matter and mind, 6. 
 
 Mechanics, 19, 28, 30, 84, 106, 118, 
 194. 
 
 Memory, 366, 411; - - in the un- 
 trained, 26; imperfection of , 34- 
 36; its relation to generalisation, 
 98; wherever we utilise the , we 
 frame hypotheses, 210; keeping 
 and consulting records, and im- 
 proving the experimentally, 282- 
 283; why memory is to-day rela- 
 tively chaotic, 283; and imagina- 
 tion, 283-289. 
 
 Mentality, ascertainment of of 
 animals, 182-183, 195; comparison 
 between human and animal , 
 
 194-195,284-285, 350, 359; animal 
 and human , 268-269. 
 
 Meridians, reduced to one, 157. 
 
 Meteorology, 19, 21, 50, 57, 58, 78, 
 106, 109, 215, 276, 280, 317, 344, 
 345, 361, 382, 393 ; scope of , 17.'! : 
 main problems of , 333. 
 
 Method, evolutionary significance of 
 term, 88, 166. 
 
 Methodology, alleged scope of, 1 ; 
 basis of , 1-3, 7; a product of 
 pan-human civilisation, 3 ; and 
 scientific management, 6, 408-410; 
 and the unity of nature, 7; 
 applies everywhere alike, 9 ; its 
 applicability to biology and socio- 
 logy questioned, 10 (see speciali- 
 sation); final results veil concrete 
 thought, 11, 20; the methodologist's 
 task is to ascertain how man thinks 
 at his best, 12; the methodologist 
 as discoverer, 12-13, 217 ; its limited 
 possibilities for the individual, dis- 
 tinction between methodologist and 
 discoverer, 12-13; why the older 
 logic was absolutist, 17 ; the newer 
 logic is relativist, tentative, and 
 progressive, 17-22; Bacon, Descartes, 
 and J. S. Mill as absolutists, 17-19 ; 
 the concrete process of discovery, 
 19; instinct, sagacity, imagination, 
 unjustifiably alleged as methods, 
 20, 134; progressive stages of proof 
 and of certainty, 20, 52, 162 ; as 
 a progressive science, 20; methodo- 
 logical status of the average man 
 of the distant future, 20, 33, 153, 
 414; internationalisation of , 21; 
 an absolutist will become prac- 
 ticable in the distant future, 21-22; 
 child , 24; of scientifically 
 untrained adult, 24-28; men ignore 
 everything not palpable, obvious, 
 or usable, and also what is distant 
 in space and time, 26 ; average man 
 reasons least unscientifically in his 
 avocation, 27; how the untrained 
 meet perplexing problems, 27-28; 
 indispensability of methodological 
 training, 28; the "scientifically" 
 trained individual, 28-33; theory 
 and practice traditionally acquired, 
 why tradition is a bad teacher, 28 ; 
 degree of knowledge and generali- 
 sation and deduction, comparative 
 and genetic, methods, botanist > 
 judgment in politics or religion. 29; 
 scientists frequently unscientific 
 outside their sphere because of 
 absence of general ,29; histori- 
 cally considered, 32; its commence-
 
 428 
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 ment and goal, 33; scientific train- 
 ing dependent on a scientific , 
 - should be introduced without 
 delay, 34; in colleges, 34; thought 
 as habit-controlled and as pan- 
 human, 34-36; correct thinking 
 dependent on historically developed 
 , and not on new or rare mental 
 powers, 38 ; the progress of methodo- 
 logical theory, 38-53; syllogism 
 (see) ; symbolic logic (see) ; verbal 
 clearness and consistency first 
 demand, then methods of discovery, 
 41-42 ; methods applied by Bacon 
 in the discovery of the nature of 
 heat, 42-43; Bacon's method, and 
 why it is neglected, 43-44; the 
 skeleton of his method adopted 
 through Mill, 44; either return to 
 Bacon or transcend him, 44; Her- 
 schel's summary of Bacon's method, 
 45; trains of reasoning even less 
 reliable than the perceptions of the 
 senses, 47; Bacon and Descartes 
 respectively over-emphasised in- 
 duction and deduction, 47; proof, 
 not discovery, is the object of the 
 old logic, 48 ; certainty rarely attain- 
 able, nor usually to be sought for, 
 50; Mill on superior minds and on 
 instinct, 52; scientists both observe 
 and generalise, 52 ; Whewell, Jevons, 
 and Mill, as methodologists, 53; 
 relativist logic as the mistress of 
 the sciences, 53; alleged influence 
 of the unconscious, 63; conviction 
 that scientific method alone leads 
 to truth, 64-65; a bold guess and 
 verification favoured by logicians, 
 77; place and growth of scientific 
 experiment and observation, 84-85; 
 facts should be studied both stati- 
 cally and dynamically, 87; syn- 
 thetic , 88; logicians mostly over- 
 stress the importance of hypotheses, 
 89 ; Mill would apply his hypotheti- 
 cal method in social science, and 
 other scholars drop verification as 
 well as observation, 97-98 ; position 
 of complete or perfect inductions, 
 106-108, 134; mankind is interested 
 in new truths, 108; law of averages, 
 109; scientific verification and proof 
 generally ignored in the cultural 
 sciences, 115-117; danger of un- 
 scientific theories, 122, 159; in- 
 dividual investigations should ex- 
 tend to a life-time, 129, 180-181, 
 329, 330, 333, 406; a science com- 
 mences in perplexing indefiniteness 
 and tends to terminate in dogmatic 
 
 definiteness, 129; precision in gene- 
 ral statements of utmost value, 
 129-130; Bacon's case for a , 141; 
 methodological canons are fre- 
 quently ignored, 142; Bacon, Des- 
 cartes, Kant, Darwin, Bain, Spinoza, 
 Leibniz, Comte, and Huxley on the 
 conduct of the understanding, 145- 
 147; the expert thinker, the end 
 of an enquiry, the object, scope, 
 and aim of a scientific , 148; 
 main injunctions focused in a 
 sentence, 149; methodological pro- 
 gress best summed in Aristotle and 
 Bacon, 149; present-day methodo- 
 logical practice, 150-155; what an 
 ideal would do, 150; the in- 
 vestigator of the distant future, 
 153-154 ; need of recognition that 
 procedure should be determined 
 methodologically, 154-163; plan of 
 synthetic , 163-166 ; two reserva- 
 tions, 165-166; a historic appre- 
 ciation of differences in methods 
 and in the scope of enquiries, 166- 
 174; difference between a Pliny or 
 a scholastic and a modern observer 
 due to growth in positive know- 
 ledge and in sounder methods, 167; 
 sciences follow each other accord- 
 ing to the degree of their com- 
 plexity, 168-169; science and life 
 increasingly approach each other, 
 169 ; practical workers promoting 
 pure science, 170; comprehensive 
 and synthetic enquiries becoming 
 possible, 172-174, and when in- 
 admissible, 174; general nature and 
 relations of phenomena, 174-179; 
 introductory category, 175 ; primary 
 categories (material modal, and pro- 
 cedure aspects), 175-179 ; secondary 
 categories, 179-180; salient prob- 
 lems of the age preferably to be 
 attacked, 180; inquirer's suitability, 
 181 ; simple starting-point a pre- 
 requisite, 181-185 ; the order of 
 fruitful investigation, 184, and per- 
 tinent rules, 184-185, 189; vagueness 
 and over-subtlety to be avoided, 
 185-189; a satisfactory solution 
 reached by a series of approxima- 
 tions, 188; individual's investigation 
 has only contributory value, 189- 
 235 ; formal rules barren, 190 ; far- 
 reaching effects of psychical pre- 
 judice, 190-193; Descartes, Kant, 
 Mill, and Comte, their emphatic 
 opinions, 190-191 ; psychical pre- 
 judices within the methodological 
 process itself, 193; recognised
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 429 
 
 scientific methods, 194-195; utilis- 
 ing existing knowledge, 195-198; 
 ablest specialists encyclopaedic, 196, 
 235; importance of studying older 
 authors and history of science, 197; 
 difficulties of academic teachers, 
 197-198 ; regard for the future, per- 
 sonal equation, 198; personal equa- 
 tion and training, 198-199; course 
 of experimental preparation, 199- 
 201; mental, physiological, and 
 environmental conditions conducive 
 to efficiency and to waste elimina- 
 tion, 201-210; systematic framing 
 of hypotheses, 210-211 ; co-operation 
 in scientific work, 211-215; pro- 
 visional conception as to form en- 
 quiry should assume, 216-236; ob- 
 ject of provisional conception, 216; 
 to level wits, was Bacon's methodo- 
 logical end, 216; a result of an 
 ideal , 217; need of a , 225; 
 follow the leaders, 235; science re- 
 cognises no mere detail, 235-236; 
 precise nature of problem to be in- 
 vestigated, 236-242 ; exact termino- 
 logy and exact conclusions, 242- 
 245; we must become again, but 
 on a higher plane, dialecticians and 
 scholastics, 245; lucidity and ease 
 in expression, 255-256; examination 
 of the reality of alleged divisions, 
 273-282; methodological rules re- 
 lating to environment, 278-279 ; 
 influence of time and of position 
 in space and mind, 279-281 ; keep- 
 ing and consulting records, 282, 
 improving the memory, 283 ; scienti- 
 fic use of the imagination, 283-289 ; 
 continuous methodological control 
 of the thought process, 289-293; 
 erratic workings of the mind, 283 ; 
 rule regarding study of social facts, 
 295-296; search for simplest practic- 
 able case, 296-308 ; need of habitual 
 alertness, 308-312; what obtrudes 
 itself is generally indifferent scienti- 
 fically, 310; desirability of unremit- 
 ting concentration, 312; collecting 
 abundance of leading facts and 
 ascertaining the unlike as well as 
 the like, 313-316; exhausting classes 
 of facts and conditions, 317, and 
 also accompanying uniformities, 
 317-319; need of a critical attitude, 
 of provisional treatment, and of 
 repeated testing, 319-320; Darwin 
 systematically applied logical rules, 
 339; the terms Clear and Distinct, 
 348; residual phenomena, degree 
 sometimes indicates qualitative 
 
 differences, 349 ; parallel and other 
 instances, 355-356; dialectical 
 guides, 356-363; adequate examina- 
 tion, 361; plurality of causes, :{ii2: 
 dialectical model, 363; absolute 
 generalisations, 364; exhausting and 
 consolidating lines of enquiry and 
 aiming at balanced interim state- 
 ment, 366-368; the process of en- 
 quiry must include practical deduc- 
 tions, 381-391; judicious classifica- 
 tion necessary, 392-402; sumnnun 
 genus and inflma species, 392; out- 
 line scheme of the content of know- 
 ledge, 397; example of final state 
 ment, 403-404; preparing a metho- 
 dologically justifiable report, 404- 
 405; each Conclusion refers to all 
 Conclusions, 405-406; need of im- 
 proving the Conclusions, 406; appli- 
 cations of the Conclusions to practi- 
 cal life, 406-410; the Conclusions 
 should be made more especially 
 the foundation of the educational, 
 the industrial, and the moral life 
 of man, 406; perfecting and satisfy- 
 ing human nature as a whole, 410; 
 reasoned summary of Conclusions, 
 410-411; need of open-mindedness, 
 411 ; the Conclusions register the 
 general advance of science, their 
 aim, the body of Conclusions neces- 
 sarily imperfect, 412-413; the sub- 
 stance of the Conclusions, they do 
 not presuppose exceptional abilities, 
 413; pan-human reflection leads 
 necessarily to an ever more per- 
 fected , 413; correct thinking a 
 pan-human product, 414; ultimate 
 and proximate aim of this , 414. 
 
 Metric system, tending to be univers- 
 ally adopted, 157, and as model for 
 scientific language, 385. 
 
 Microscopes, 6, 26, 281. 
 
 Mill, J. S., as absolutist, his logic only 
 applicable to the last stages of an 
 enquiry, 19; his method, 48-53; 
 his debt to Bacon and Herschel, 
 48-49 ; his canons, and their de- 
 fects, 49-51, 115; dependence on 
 Whewell, 52; on causal view of 
 induction, 86,87; his view on the 
 formation of hypotheses, 91-92; 
 his definition of induction, 132- 
 133; on prejudice, 193. 
 
 Mind and matter, 6. 
 
 Molecular world, 58, 245-246. 
 
 Morality, 2, 3, 19, 21, 86, 194, 361, 
 370, 392, 410; rule of conduct, 21. 
 227, 292, 339; in -- also the in- 
 dividual is dependent on acquired
 
 430 
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 habits, 28; justification of moral 
 rules, 115-116; the vagueness of 
 ethical terms, 123, 128; ignoring 
 of scientific methods in ethical 
 research, 154, 259; study of , 173; 
 one moral standard for all, moral 
 education, 224; definition of , 
 244-245; sex problem,. 246-250; 
 problem of ideal and conduct, 250- 
 251; religion of goodness, 253; 
 main facts of , 259; main prob- 
 lems of , 332-333; meaning of 
 some ethical terms, 355 ; definition 
 of , 372; the Conclusions to be 
 the foundation of the moral life, 
 406. 
 
 Nationalism, 341. 
 
 Navigation and astronomy, 8. 
 
 Neurasthenia, 158. 
 
 Nomenclature, scientific, 128-129. 
 
 Nunn, T. P., on the scientific process, 
 147. 
 
 Object, 52; nature and definition of , 
 54-56. 
 
 Observation, 27, 44, 49, 52, 57-79, 88, 
 118, 150, 161,411 ; crude and philo- 
 sophers, 31, 50-51; scientists both 
 observe and generalise, 52; material 
 factors not revealed to the unaided 
 sense and the unassisted reason, 
 57-58; presuppositions for scienti- 
 fic , explanation of shells on. 
 mountains, Herschel on , 59; 
 minute - - and the soil, 60-61; 
 scope of , telepathic theories, 61- 
 62; increased thoroughness in , 
 when little or much is neces- 
 sary, definition of , 77; defence 
 of , 79; scientific closely ap- 
 proaches scientific experiment, 80; 
 domain of , 84; evolution of scien- 
 tific , 85; relation of to hypo- 
 theses, 97; the term includes 
 examination of every class of know- 
 ledge, 256 (see Section XXIII); in 
 we seek for important resem- 
 blances, 256-257; utilisation of the 
 categories, concentration needed, 
 facts of perception as point of 
 departure, 257; should be direct 
 and original, 257-259; lax and 
 rigorous methods of , 258; intro- 
 spection neglected, 258-259; main 
 facts of ethics, 259; accuracy 259- 
 261; initial and scrupulous accu- 
 racy, 259; conditions favouring ac- 
 curacy, 260; minuteness, 261-263; 
 wide, varied, and discriminating , 
 263-265; exhaustive or full , 265- 
 266; quantitative , 267-268; in- 
 struments and experiments, 268- 
 
 269; similarities, 269; relevant and 
 rational , 270; rapidity and re- 
 sourcefulness, 270-272 ; examples 
 of rapid thinkers, 271; conditions 
 favouring resourcefulness, 271-272; 
 Lotze and others on , 272; mal- 
 observations, 273; complex facts 
 regarded as simple, 273-276; simple 
 facts regarded as complex, 276-277 ; 
 environment, 277-279; influence of 
 time and of position, 279-282 ; me- 
 thods for ensuring easy, exhaustive, 
 and impartial , 293-296; cell- 
 making instinct of the hive-bee, 
 320-325; fulness in , 335; delicacy 
 in , 348. 
 
 Pan-human, culture as, 2; thought 
 as , 36. 
 
 Peace, compacts between nations 
 made uniform, 157; friendship 
 among nations and races, 225-226; 
 league of nations, 240-241 ; problem 
 of and war, 241-242/251; com- 
 mon interests between nations, 314. 
 
 Periodic law, 50, 309, 338; collective 
 product, 93. 
 
 Philosophy, presupposes all sciences 
 as highly advanced, 31. 
 
 Phlogiston and combustion, 59-60; 
 positive levity of , 309. 
 
 Physics, 7, 22, 58, 107, 128, 281, 284, 
 288, 307, 345, 346, 360, 365; the 
 three states of matter and tempera- 
 ture, 5-6, 318; unity of natural 
 forces, 17 ; X-rays, cathode rays, 
 Lenard rays, and gamma rays, 18; 
 rainbow, 61; cohesion and repul- 
 sion of particles and masses, 85-86; 
 gravitation, 94; connecting forces, 
 105, 332; electro-magnetic theory 
 of light, 105; reducing gases to 
 liquid and solid state, 105; law 
 of inertia, 106; colours of mother- 
 of-pearl, 107; Wells on dew, 245; 
 list of factors, 278-279; water, 281; 
 freezing water, 309; position of 
 argon and iodine, 309; Boyle's law, 
 327-328; definition of solid, liquid, 
 and gas, 328; specific gravity of 
 liquids, 337; from gases to solids, 
 34A; transition from liquid to 
 gaseous state, penetrating power of 
 rays, 345; solidity of water, 346; 
 ponderable nature of air, 348; va- 
 pour density, solubility, 358; mean 
 velocity of gas molecules, 361; 
 action and reaction, 362; explana- 
 tion of gaseous laws, 366-367; 
 physicist must develop also the life 
 of practice, 382; outline scheme 
 of, 400-401.
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 431 
 
 Plato, his permanent types, 56. 
 
 Politics, 19, 21, 26, 29, 345, 357, 359; 
 politicians and crowd psychology, 8; 
 study of , 173; all discriminations 
 to be abolished, 223; importance 
 of numbers, 267. 
 
 Practice and theory, historical rela- 
 tion, 33, 169; what theory owes 
 to , 33. 
 
 Prejudice, 155; s in average man, 
 26; only what appeals tends to be 
 recalled, 27; far-reaching effects of 
 psychical prejudices, 190-193. 
 
 Probability, 26, 194; place in science 
 of , 19. 
 
 Professional, the basic reconstruction 
 of activities, 202. 
 
 Progress, methodology and historic 
 growth, 1-3; multiplication of 
 sciences, 7-9; historic affiliation 
 of the sciences, 30-31; a scientific 
 methodology indispensable for ra- 
 pid , 38; human first and 
 foremost cultural, 122, and pan- 
 humanly determined, 149; problem 
 of and culture discussed, 156- 
 157; Spencer's view of consider- 
 ed, 157-158; entails eventually 
 the virtual abolition of error, in- 
 equality, and discord, 158; rapid 
 
 - in scientific enquiries dependent 
 on thoroughness, 185-189, and on 
 abundance of leading facts, 313; 
 
 - greatly impeded by prejudices, 
 192-193; lack of co-operation highly 
 prejudicial to , 214; justification 
 of , 226-227; -- in method the 
 highest type of , 339-340; from 
 eolithic times, 345; reality of 
 illustrated, 350-351. 
 
 Proof, 88; for the untrained, is a 
 matter of feelings, 91; definition 
 of , 115; a synthetic methodology 
 permits readily of , Mill's s, 
 only search for relative certainty 
 practicable as a rule, certain canons 
 of approximate , tests peculiar 
 to certain sciences, simple verifica- 
 tion, appeal to authority and educat- 
 ed thought and feeling, 115-116; 
 laws of nature highest , 116; 
 through working hypotheses, 
 116; degrees of to be sought, 117; 
 need of proving all conjectures, 
 363-365; modes of direct and in- 
 direct , 364-365. 
 
 Protein, differs from species to spe- 
 cies, 84. 
 
 Psycho-analysis, 158. 
 
 Psychology, 19, 20, 30, 105, 128, 194, 
 346,355,362; compartment theory, 
 
 sensations, definition of , 6; be- 
 ginning of - - as a science, 7; 
 psychological tests, and educa- 
 tion, of the crowd, 8; status of 
 the sense of touch, 23; vicissitudes 
 of because of absence of a me- 
 thodology, 29-30, 258-259; obscure 
 mental processes, telepathy, sub- 
 consciousness, Bergson's indeter- 
 minism, 61-64; nature of sound, 
 109-113; ignoring of scientific me- 
 thod in psychological research, 154; 
 semi-conscious thought in normal 
 life, 159; problem of the sensations, 
 231-232, 316, 337-338, 345; intro- 
 spection, 258-259; reaction times 
 in , 261; body's sensibility to 
 touch, 265; phrenology, senses, 274; 
 tripartite division, 275; nature of 
 emotions, 276-277; attention, 343, 
 345, 370; wakefulness and sleep, 
 344; binocular and monocular 
 vision, 359; types of men, 361; 
 nature of pain, 367-368; applied 
 to industry, 382. 
 
 Pure and applied science, line be- 
 tween elusive, 7 ; over-emphasis 
 of either, 8. 
 
 Quantitative determination, 80-81, 
 118, 269, 306, 314-346, B46, 352 ; 
 observation, 267-268 ; numerous 
 generalisations, 334. 
 
 Race, 21, 242, 277, 341, 357, 358, 359 ; 
 mental capacity of white race and 
 other races respectively, 217-231 ; 
 all discrimination to be abolish- 
 ed, 223; friendship among s, 225- 
 226 ; polygenetic theory of s, 276 ; 
 alleged incapacity of African Negro 
 to civilise himself, 278. 
 
 Radio-activity, 93, 107, 360-361. 
 
 Railway gauge, adoption of a single 
 one, 157. 
 
 Reading, general sources of informa- 
 tion, 198. 
 
 Reality, a flux in great measure, 56 ; 
 as not consisting of featureless 
 forces, 86 ; conflict between science 
 and terminating, 170-172; thres- 
 hold of realistic age, 174. 
 
 Reasoning process, nature of, 289. 
 
 Regionalism, 341. 
 
 Relativism (see Absolutism). Radium, 
 52, 58, 275, 337; action of emana- 
 tion on air, 261 ; paucity of , 267. 
 
 Religion, 26, 29, 63, 64, 103, 109, 226, 
 328, 357, 358, 362; study of , 17:5; 
 historical classification of , 230; 
 nature of , 253-255. 
 
 Resourcefulness, conditions favour- 
 ing, 271-272.
 
 432 
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 Rewards and punishments, 224. 
 
 Rontgen rays, 93 ; 's discovery, 310. 
 
 Rules of the sea and of warfare being 
 each reduced to a single system 
 of , 157. 
 ""Sanitation, communal, 8, 225. 
 
 Science, relation of to methodo- 
 logy, 1 ; slow growth of , 1 ; 
 classification of the sciences (see 
 Classification) ; uniformity and 
 unity of nature as basis of , 4-11, 
 106; alleged limits to scientific 
 enquiries, linking up the forces 
 of nature, 5 ; domain of , no 
 line between pure and applied , 
 7; applied -- in colleges, inter- 
 action between theoretical , edu- 
 cation, and applied , - - will 
 mould men's ideals, 8; as dis- 
 tinguished from art, 9 ; the histori- 
 cal affiliation of the sciences, 9-10, 
 18, 30, 168-169, 181-182 ; - - and 
 intuition, 10; simple and complex 
 sciences, 10-11 ; specialisation (see); 
 molecular world the world of 
 master facts, difficulty of approach, 
 17; interdependent unity of nature, 
 words more' elusive than facts, 18; 
 units of the^-s, 19-20; the scientific 
 mass mind, 20; primitive chaotic 
 conception of the world being pro- 
 gressively reduced to order by , 
 21 ; with the ages will render 
 easy the comprehension of the 
 world of fact, and nature and life 
 will be well understood and well 
 ordered, 21 ; the scientifically un- 
 trained adult, 24-28 ; difference be- 
 tween scientist and untrained adult, 
 25; things change insensibly, 26; 
 scientific advance only possible 
 from the simple to the complex, 
 31; swift scientific advance de- 
 pendent on the existence of a me- 
 thodology, 31 ; meaning and goal 
 of , 31-32 ; meaning of in the 
 remote future, 32 ; the world of 
 and the world of common sense, 
 32; will be a universal posses- 
 sion universally cherished, 33 ; as 
 develops, it can busy itself more 
 and more with the life of practice, 
 33 ; scientific and speculative re- 
 sults, 41-42; Bacon on the purpose 
 of , 42-43 ; - - concerned with 
 objects, 56; the object of , 85, 
 180; reality as consisting of feature- 
 less forces, 86 ; world formula, 94 ; 
 - teaching, 103; not only con- 
 cerned with general facts, 105-106; 
 a commences in perplexing in- 
 
 definiteness and tends to terminate 
 in dogmatic definiteness, 129 ; 
 achievements of the pre-scientific 
 era, 145; sciences follow each other 
 according to their degree of com- 
 plexity, 168-169 ; conflict between 
 - and reality terminating, 170- 
 171 ; basic reconstruction of scien- 
 tific activities, 202; as man's 
 guiding genius, 224-225; historical 
 development of , 230: outline 
 scheme of the content of know- 
 ledge, 397 ; men's attitude towards 
 - to-day and some centuries ago, 
 413. 
 
 Scientific management, 32,169, and me- 
 thodology, 6; to revolutionise 
 
 industry and commerce, 9 ; illustra- 
 tions of , 140-141 ; significance 
 
 of , 141 ; processes and methods 
 
 in industry and commerce being 
 standardised, 157 ; individual capa- 
 city, 195; finding time for research, 
 197-198 ; mental, physiological, and 
 environmental conditions conducive 
 to efficiency and to waste elimina- 
 tion, 201-210; economy of purpose, 
 of volition, of sensations, of me- 
 mory, of movements, of time in 
 movements, of effort and fatigue 
 in movements, of thought and 
 feelings, of locality, accommoda- 
 tion, furniture, instruments, mate- 
 rials, machinery and material ener- 
 gies, of products, and of individual 
 action, 202-208 ; real economy de- 
 mands basic reconstruction, 208 ; 
 motion study and fatigue study, 
 acquisition of habits, hours of la- 
 bour, standard procedure and train- 
 ing, 208-210; establishment of in- 
 dustrial research associations, cal- 
 ling in the efficiency expert, growth 
 of collective bargaining and ar- 
 rangements in industry, and legis- 
 lation by consultation and agree- 
 ment with the parties concerned, 
 214-215; motion study, 261, scope 
 of movement, 314 ; and scienti- 
 fic experiments, 330 ; main prob- 
 lems of , 333 ; duty of psycholo- 
 gists to apply their minds to in- 
 dustrial problems, 382-383; im- 
 portation of classification in , 
 
 394; the application of science to 
 industry and its relation to the -- 
 movement discussed, 406-409. 
 
 Scurvy, 139, 213, 214, 246. 
 
 Sex, Freud's theory of predomi- 
 nance, 158-159; -- discrimination 
 to be abolished, 223; monogamy
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 433 
 
 and equal authority in marriage, 
 224; unchastity and infidelity, 224; 
 marriage relations, 225, 226 ; family, 
 227; meaning of marriage and sex 
 education, 246-250; the family as 
 national unit, 287. 
 
 Shakespeare, on honey-bees, 4 ; Shake- 
 speare-Bacon controversy examined, 
 65-68 ; his status examined, 68-77 ; 
 his status, 77. 
 
 Sleeplessness, 138. 
 
 Society, necessity of , 223; historic 
 growth of and governments, 
 228. 
 
 Sociology, criticism of term, 2; be- 
 ginning of as a science, 7 ; little 
 regard for scientific method in , 
 155. 
 
 Sound, nature of, 109, 113; metho- 
 dological defects in works on , 
 16^ ; whispering galleries and 
 acoustic clouds, 309. 
 
 Specialisation, as a historic phase, 
 11 ; over as cause of stagnation, 
 162-163; development and super- 
 session of division of labour and 
 , 170-174, 196, 197; narrow 
 becoming a grave offence, 173 ; 
 ablest specialists are encyclopedic, 
 196; Comte's plea for an inter- 
 specialist science discussed, 197; 
 inconveniences of , 329. 
 
 Specio-psychics, 19, 22, 30, as sub- 
 stitute for the term sociology, 
 2-3. 
 
 Speculation, 32, 77, 89, 225, 275, 343; 
 - offers a trap not a bridge, 114. 
 
 Spencer, Herbert, his view of pro- 
 gress discussed, 157-158. 
 
 Spinoza, on the conduct of the under- 
 standing, 146. 
 
 Standardisation, of products and 
 methods growing, 157-158; inter- 
 national , 226. 
 
 Statement, concrete example of in- 
 terim , 220, and of final , 230 
 and 403-404. 
 
 Statistics, 267, 346; standardising of 
 Census and other , 157, 267. 
 
 Subtlety, in argument prized, 155; 
 danger of , 185-189. 
 
 Summary, general and special, of the 
 thirty-six Conclusions, 150-153. 
 
 Syllogism, 48, 99; its strength and 
 its weakness, 38-41 ; baneful effect 
 of syllogistic logic and its wide 
 prevalence formerly, 41. 
 
 Symbolic logic, nature of, does not 
 further research, 41. 
 
 Technology, 19. 
 
 Telegraphy, 235, 334. 
 
 Teleological factor, 35 ; method, 194. 
 
 Telepathy, 61-62. 
 
 Telescope, 6. 
 
 Terminology, scientific, 128; need of 
 exact , 242-244. 
 
 Theory, definition of, 210. 
 
 Tides, 317. 
 
 Time, 349, 362; importance in me- 
 thodology, 194; utilisation of exist- 
 ing knowledge, 195-198; import- 
 ance of studying older authors and 
 history of science, 197; regard for 
 the future, 198; effect of -, 267; 
 influence of, 279-281, 318; provi- 
 sional treatment and repeated test- 
 ing, 319-320; value of delay, 320; 
 laws relating to the past, present, 
 and future of mankind, 403; men's 
 attitude towards nature to-day and 
 some centuries ago, 413. 
 
 Town-planning, 173. 
 
 Tradition, 155; why - - is a bad 
 teacher, 28; and scientific train- 
 ing, 34; Bacon on the mist of , 
 150; mankind's dependence on 
 chaotic s, 154; method to-day 
 mostly a matter of , 154; alism 
 as cause of stagnation, 162-163; 
 al and inborn intelligence, 194- 
 195; superseded by a scientific 
 methodology, 413-414. 
 
 Training, why tradition is a bad 
 teacher, 28; tradition and scienti- 
 fic , 34; advantages of , 197; 
 
 encourages discrimination, 104; 
 personal equation and injunctions 
 
 for self , 198-199; experimental 
 
 acquisition of scientific methods, 
 199-201; of the worker, 210. 
 
 Tropism, 102. 
 
 Typewriter, universal keyboard fa- 
 voured for s, 157. 
 
 Uniformity and unity of nature, as 
 pillars of science, 4-11; they 
 imply the unity of nature and life, 7. 
 
 Universe, alleged mystery of, 5. 
 
 Verification, 44, 49, 52, 77, 94, 97, 
 150, 282, 411 ; definition of , 113; 
 the rules relating to scientific ob- 
 servation hold with special rigour 
 of , 113-114; peculiarly marks 
 scientific enquiries, it may mean 
 examination, re-examination, cal- 
 culation, reasoning, feeling, 114; 
 
 only profitable with sound hypo- 
 theses, 114, 211; is simple and 
 deductive, 114; experts responsible 
 for verifying theories which they 
 adopt, 122; futile , 338; the pro- 
 cess of , 3( i.'J-. '''"); methods of 
 those of observation, .'Ml.
 
 434 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 Vitamines, not directly known, 18;- War, 26, 224, 226, 302,357; arma- 
 
 indispensable to life, 57; mistaken ments, 8; rules of warfare being 
 
 assumption, 90-91 ; fat-soluble fac- reduced to a single system of rules, 
 
 tor, 108; beri-beri, 139, 309; scurvy, 157; problems arising out of the 
 
 139, 213, 214, 246; accessory food world : international police force, 
 
 factors, 172; influence of - - on limitation of armaments, league of 
 
 diet, 262, 262-263; deficiency dis- nations, peace and , 239-242; 
 
 eases, 284, 309; value of * certain peace and , 251-252; causes of 
 
 foods, 356-357; deficiencies "in pa- subsequent economic crisis, 315-316. 
 
 tent foods, 360. Whewell, his method, 52. 
 
 Volcanoes, 58, 87, 105, 317, 333. World Formula, 94, 98.
 
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