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 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 
 
 AND 
 
 THE SIEGE OF TOULON 
 
 INAUGURAL-DISSERTATION 
 
 ZUR 
 
 ERLANGUNG DER DOKTORWURDE 
 
 DER 
 
 HOHEN PHILOSOPHISCHEN FAKULTflT 
 
 DER 
 
 RDPRECBMARLMNIVERSITAT zu HEIDELBERG 
 
 VORGELEGT VON 
 
 CHARLES JAMES FOX 
 
 AUS 
 
 BOSTON, MASS., U. S. A. 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 
 
 LAW REPORTER COMPANY, PRINTERS. 
 1902. 
 
NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 
 
 AND 
 
 THE SIEGE OF TOULON 
 
 INAUGURAL-DISSERTATION 
 
 ZUR 
 
 ERLANGUNG DER DOKTORWURDE 
 
 DER 
 
 HOHEN PHILOSOPHISCHEN FflKULTflT 
 
 DER 
 
 RUPRECHMARLS'UNIVERSITAT ZU HEIDELBERG 
 
 VORGELEGT VON 
 
 CHARLES JAMES FOX 
 
 AUS 
 
 BOSTON, MASS., U. S. A. 
 
 UNIVE 
 
 ilNGTON, D. C. 
 
 LAW REPORTER COMPANY, PRINTERS. 
 1902. 
 

 
 
THE 
 
 CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS AND 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 A. CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS. 
 
 Reports in : * Archives de la Guerre a Paris; Archives 
 Nationales a Paris : Manuscript Department, British 
 
 Museum : Public Record Office London. 
 Periodicals: Monitenr; The London Gazette; Gazeta 
 
 de Madrid. 
 
 B. BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 The Naval Chronicle, July to Dec. 1793. London, 
 
 1799. 
 
 Speeches of the Hon. W. Pitt 4 vols. London, 1806. 
 Speeches of the Hon. C. J. Fox 6 vols. London, 1815. 
 Precis historique sur les evenements de Toulon, d'lm- 
 
 bert, Paris, 1814. 
 Notes et pieces officielles relatives aux evenements de 
 
 Marseilles et de Toulon, Abeille, Paris, 1815. 
 Revolution royaliste de Toulon, de Brecy, Paris, 1816. 
 Parliamentary History of England Vol 30. London, 
 
 1817. 
 
 Memoires pour servir a 1'histoire de France sous Na- 
 poleon ecrits a St. Helnepar Montholon 5 vols; par 
 
 Gourgard 2 vols. Paris, 1823. 
 Memoires politiques et militaires du General Doppet 1 
 
 vol. Paris, 1824. 
 Memoires de Freron Paris, 1824. 
 Memoires pour servir a 1'histoire de la ville de Toulon 
 
 en 1793, Pons, Paris, 1825. 
 Historic de la Revolution franyaise Tome sixie"me 
 
 Thiers, Paris, 1834. 
 Memoires du Prince de la Paix Don Manuel Godoy 4 
 
 vols. Paris, 1836. 
 Biographic de Napoleon Bonaparte, Coston, Paris, 1840. 
 
 l Many of the reports, especially in the Archives de la Guerre, are full 
 of orthographical errors. I have copied them exactly as I found them. 
 
 176927 
 
IV CONTEMPORANRY ACCOUNTS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 Extraits de Memoires inedites du due de Bellune, Paris, 
 
 1846. 
 Memoires de Claude Victor Perrin due de Bellune 
 
 Paris, 1847. 
 Life and correspondence of Admiral Sir W. Sidney 
 
 Smith, Barrow 2 vols. London, 1848. 
 Memorials and correspondence of C. J. Fox, Russell 
 
 London, 1853. 
 
 Correspon dance de Napoleon Vol. 1. Paris, 1853. 
 Journal and correspondence of William Lord Auck- 
 land 4 vols. London, 1862. 
 Oestreich und Preussen gegeniiber der Franzoesischen 
 
 Revolution bis zum Abschluss des Friedens von 
 
 Campio Formio, H. Hueffer, Bonn, 1868. 
 Memoires sur la guerre des Alpes tires des papiers du 
 
 Comte Ignas Thaon de Revel, Turin, Rom, Florence 
 
 1871. 
 Vertrauliche Briefe des Freiherren von Thugut, von 
 
 Vivenot, Band I Vienna, 1872. 
 Life and Letters of Sir Gilbert Elliot first Earl of Minto, 
 
 1751 to 1806 3 vols. London, 1874. 
 Life of Thomas Graham Lord Lynedoch A. M. Dela- 
 
 voye London, 1880. 
 Bonaparte et son temps, 1769-99. 3 vols. Jung Paris, 
 
 1880-81. 
 Campaignes dans les Alpes pendant la Revolution 
 
 1792-93 Krebs et Morris, Paris, 1891. 
 Recueil des actes du Comite de Salut Public avec la 
 
 correspondance officielle des representants en mission. 
 
 F. A. Aulard Paris, 1894. 
 
 Memoires de Barras 4 vols. Duruy Paris, 1895-6. 
 The manuscripts of J. B. Fortesque Esq. Vol. 2 London, 
 
 1894. 
 Napoleon Bonaparte et les Generaux Du Teil, Baron 
 
 Joseph du Teil, Paris, 1897. 
 
 Toulon et les Anglais en 1793. Paul Cottin Paris, 1898. 
 La Jeunesse de NapolSon, Chuquet Paris, 1899. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The siege of Toulon in 1793 is interesting and important, 
 as a military event in the War of the First Coalition ; as a 
 political combination of the European Powers during the early 
 part of the same war; and as a personal incident in the life 
 of Napoleon Bonaparte. The following pages are the result 
 of a study of the siege in which I have tried to give special 
 attention to the second and third phases of the question. I 
 have come to the conclusion that the political importance of 
 the siege was considerable and that the English entered 
 Toulon unexpectedly and intended to hold it simply as a 
 pledge of indemnification ; and secondly that the role of 
 Bonaparte was very important and that he by directing 
 the course of this siege, had here for the first time an influ- 
 ence upon the events of his time and consequently enters 
 history. As the last point has been much disputed and as 
 the others have not yet been brought out, I have in attempt- 
 ing to demonstrate each, given as much as possible of the 
 material used, together with frequent references, allowing 
 him whom the subject may interest to draw his own conclu- 
 sions, hoping however that they will coincide with those 
 which in my opinion are the logical and just ones. 
 
 The first accounts of Napoleon's actions were written dur- 
 ing, and under the influence of, the grandeur of the Consul- 
 ate and First Empire. The part he played at Toulon was 
 generally considered great'and brilliant; but this prevalent 
 opinion was based principally upon more or less inexact rem- 
 iniscences of those who took part in the siege with him. 
 Everybody accepted without going into particulars that the 
 First Consul, or Emperor, began his career at Toulon, where 
 his genius first attracted attention. At the Restauration roy- 
 alists who had served at Toulon published accounts of the 
 siege, which with regard to the role of Bonaparte, had rather 
 the opposite tendency. But as their principal aim was to 
 
VI PREFACE. 
 
 bring forward their own actions and thereby win the favor 
 of Louis XVIII, and as anti-Bonapartist statements needed 
 then no foundation on fact, these writings are of no ob- 
 jective value. They reflect but the anti-Bonapartist and 
 pro-English sentiment of the Court at this time. Thiers 
 throws some light on Bonaparte's role at Toulon, attributing 
 principally to him the fall of the city; but Thiers' Work was 
 to vast to permit him to make any special study of the af- 
 fair of Toulon. His account of it is filled with errors. The 
 Memoirs of Barras (not published until 1895) furnish ample 
 but quite untrustworthy material to those who wish to les- 
 sen the role of Bonaparte at this siege. This same spirit of 
 hostility to Napoleon prevails in Jung's "Bonaparte et son 
 temps" He too denies the importance of the role of Bona- 
 parte at Toulon but he does not go much into particulars, 
 nor did he study the question without prejudice. The eager- 
 ness with which he seeks an opportunity of defaming the 
 name of Bonaparte is shown where he himself speaks of 
 Napoleon (page 372 vol. I) as an officer of 25 years when he 
 wrote the "Souper de Beaucaire", and then again deliber- 
 ately accuses him (page 396) of giving a false age in stating 
 that he was 25 after the siege of Toulon. Krebs and Morris 
 in their work on Campagnes in the Alpes give a good gen- 
 eral account of the siege, but the role of Bonaparte is passed 
 by with the mere assertion that in the official records noth- 
 ing is found to prove its importance. It is true that in the 
 documents of the Archives de la Guerre at Paris, no direct 
 statement can be found that Napoleon Bonaparte took a 
 very important part in the entire affair; but indirect proofs 
 are by no means wanting, either here or in the English offi- 
 cial reports. The two latest works on Toulon are those of 
 Cottin and Chuquet. Cottin leaves the role of Bonaparte 
 rather aside and using the English sources, writes on their 
 action at Toulon. His work has the value of publishing im- 
 portant documents hitherto inaccessible in printed form; 
 but with the same he has combined much doubtful detail 
 
PREFACE. VII 
 
 derived from rather untrustworthy and contradictory 
 sources. His book has an anti-English tendency and fails to 
 bring out the political importance of the affair of Toulon. 
 Chuquet's work, an enlargement of two articles published in 
 Cosmopolis, is of rather a popular character but it publishes 
 for the first time some letters of Bonaparte and other impor- 
 tant pieces. He goes into detail which is very difficult to 
 control and the sources of which he has not always care- 
 fully considered. The role of Bonaparte is emphasized, but 
 not in a manner convincing enough for a question so much 
 in dispute. 
 
 In publishing this small volume I wish to take advan- 
 tage of the opportunitjr to express my sincere gratitude to 
 all my Professors at Heidelberg, and to mention my appre- 
 ciation of the kindness of the late Professor Erdmannsdorf- 
 fer and Professor Schafer, whose generous aid and hospitality 
 to foreigners I shall always try to emulate. 
 
PART I. 
 
 CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH TOULON SUR- 
 RENDERED TO THE ENGLISH AND 
 SIEGE OP TOULON. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 FRANCE IN 1793 TOPOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF TOU- 
 LON NEGOTIATIONS PRECEEDING SURRENDER PROC- 
 LAMATION OF HOOD HOOD'S ENTRANCE ARRIVAL OF 
 NEWS IN LONDON POLITICAL SITUATION OF ALLIES AT 
 TIME OF SIEGE OPINIONS ON HOOD'S DECLARATION 
 ENGLISH IDEA AS TO RETENTION OF TOULON. 
 
 In 1793 the French Revolution had advanced far in its 
 impetuous course. In its commencement ill denned, its 
 course hard to foresee, and uncertain, it had at its culmina- 
 tion formed itself into a definite, cruel and reckless system, 
 the Terror. Power had passed from the right to the extreme 
 left of the National Assembly, and there into hands which 
 were capable of holding and using it. The execution of 
 Louis XVI, the crowning act of the Revolution took place 
 at the beginning of this year; shortly after followed the re- 
 volt in the Vendee : the first attempt at military rule was de- 
 feated as Dumouriez went over to the Austrians: the Giron- 
 dists were overthrown by their more reckless and energetic 
 rivals: then followed the uprising of two-thirds of the de- 
 partments and of many large cities, Lyons, Marseilles, Tou- 
 lon and Bordeaux. The situation in the interior of France 
 was very uncertain, and the dangers from without were 
 great. After Neerwinden Belgium was lost and the Austrians 
 advanced victoriously into Northern France. The Prussians 
 retook Mayence and put an end to its revolutionary exces- 
 ses. The Piedmontese forced their way over the Alps, the 
 Spaniards came over the Pyrenees. The English were every- 
 where on the seas. It was under these conditions that France, 
 or more strictly Revolutionary France, stood alone against 
 the nations of Europe united in the pursuit of their differ- 
 ent political ambitions, and in the hope of future advan- 
 tages. For whatever may have been the origin of the Revo- 
 
 2192-1 
 
lutionary Wars, the European nations, once united against 
 France, were striving after their own interests, and these 
 at the expense of France, who at this time seemed inevita- 
 bly lost. This however was not the case. Everyone knows 
 the Peace of Campio Formio which followed that of Basel 
 and others, yet it is by no means easy to explain clearly how 
 the Kepublicans performed the seemingly impossible and 
 forced upon the entire Continent such advantageous terms. 
 The history of the Siege of Toulon gives an insight into 
 these conditions, for one might almost say that here the 
 War of the First Coalition took place on a smaller scale. 
 The same forces stood opposing each other. On the one side, 
 the European powers, England, Spain, Sardinia, Naples 
 even Austria, as well as the French Royalists and Emigres; 
 on the other the enthusiastic, almost fanatical, self-sacrific- 
 ing, but uncertain Republican army, directed by a few in- 
 genious leaders, among them Bonaparte and Victor, and 
 supported at home by an active energetic government under 
 the organizing genius of Carnot. Everything was sacrificed 
 to the object of the war. On the one side was discord, dis- 
 trust, jealousy, and ill-directed egotism. The best energy of 
 the European nations exhausted itself over the division of 
 spoils which were still to be won. On the other side was 
 geographic and political unity, together with a fanatical de- 
 votion to the one object. All passions, the ambition of the 
 demagogue and of the soldier, even the fear of the Repub- 
 licans, lead to the same end; namely, the liberating of 
 France from the foreign invader. On the one hand it was a 
 question of obtaining certain advantages, in the distribution 
 of which lay the cause of future disagreement ; on the other, 
 it was a question of life and death ; and this struggle for 
 existence was carried on by energetic reckless men who had 
 risen by their own force and ability, and who in the choice 
 of thier means were unhampered by any traditional, relig- 
 ious or even human considerations. 
 
 To understand a siege it is necessary, first to have an idea 
 
of the topographical and other military conditions of the 
 place in which it is carried on. In the year 1793 Toulon, 
 a city of some 28,000 inhabitants, was enclosed by a circle 
 of fortifications which dated from the time of Vauban, but 
 which had been continually improved and were now in 
 fairly good condition. It was reputed one of the strongest 
 fortifications in Europe. On the land side Toulon is sur- 
 rounded by high mountains especially the massive ridge of 
 Mount Faron on the north. From the city one road leads to 
 Marseilles and another eastward toward Italy. The Riviere 
 Neuve flows from the north past the western side of the 
 city, into the inner of the two harbors, which are called the 
 Grande and Petite Rade. This river is dry in the summer. 
 The fortifications on the north-west were Fort Pomets and 
 the Redoute St. Andre (completed but not armed) ; on the 
 north-east, Fort Rouge, Fort Blanc, and the intrenched 
 camp, Ste. Anne. Mont Faron also protected the city on the 
 north. On the east, to defend the road to Italy was Fort La 
 Malgue. According to Napoleon, this fort was very carefully 
 built. It protected also the Grande Rade. Fort Ste. Catherine 
 and Fort L'Artigues, likewise on the east, were supported 
 by Mont Faron. On the west was Fort Malbousquet. It 
 was merely a temporary fortification, but important through 
 its position. Fort Missiessy was also on the west, on the 
 north shore of the Petite Rade. The entrance to the Grande 
 Rade was covered by Fort La Malgue, that of the Petite 
 Rade by Fort Grosse Tour, on the eastern side, and by the 
 coast batteries, Balaguier and Eguillette, on the western 
 side. In general, more importance had been placed on the 
 fortifications on the east of the city than on those on the 
 west. It was supposed that all attacks were to come from 
 the Italian side. 
 
 In Toulon, as in most of the cities and many of the De- 
 partments, there was a revolutionary and a Royalist party, 
 each striving to obtain power. In Toulon the Republicans 
 found support in the Republican army under Carteaux. 
 
The Royalists, in accordance with their policy at that time, 
 sought help from outside. 1 The English squadron had 
 been seen for weeks before Toulon, where tur Admiral, 
 Lord Hood, stood watching the large French fleet in the 
 harbor. To destroy this formed part of his plan; which was 
 to win and hold for England the supremacy of the Mediter- 
 ranean. The Royalists of Marseilles and Toulon were in con- 
 stant communication, and were secretly forming plans. A 
 certain undecided portion of the population was to be won 
 over to their side. For some time they cherished the plan of 
 inviting the English to enter. In some manner the English 
 representative in Turin, John Trevor, who was well in- 
 formed on the affairs of Italy and the Mediterranean, got 
 news of this intention and wrote as early as July 21 to Hood, 
 informing him of the possibility of an appeal for help from 
 the people of Toulon. Hood seemed, however, to have given 
 the matter but little -attention. His object was still the 
 French fleet. A few days before, on July 19, he had sent a 
 Lieutenant Cook into Toulon to negotiate an exchange of 
 prisoners; permitting him to wait twenty-four hours for a 
 reply. 
 
 Cook returned bringing with him a list of the French 
 ships in Toulon, and other useful information. It is possi- 
 ble, although all evidence is wanting, that Cook, who was 
 Hood's nephew, entered even at this time, into communica- 
 tion with the Royalists. The Royalists resorted to a trick 
 to win over the still undecided portion of the inhabitants. 
 The fear of a bread famine was held out before the people; 
 although there were provisions for three months at hand. 
 Thaon de Revel, the commander of the Piedmontese troops 
 wrote: u L'apprehension de la famine fut la consideration 
 qui decida les habitans. Les chefs avaient persuade a la 
 multitude que bientot elle manquerait de pain si V on ne 
 
 1 de Bre"cy. "Un sentiment presque unaninie inspira le projet d'en- 
 voyer un parlementaire au commandant anglais pour lui demander son 
 concours et son assistance." 
 
traitait avec les Anglais ; quoique dans le fait il y eut du 
 grain pour plus de trois rnois." l Nelson, who at the time of 
 the siege, was sailing in and out of the harbor of Toulon, 
 wrote " Famine had done what force could not have done." 2 
 In this manner the people were deceived and won over. 
 Negotiations with Hood commenced first from Marseille, 
 then from Toulon, the latter being of much more interest 
 to the English. At first one spoke of an importation of 
 grain into Marseille, finally of the conditional surrender of 
 Toulon to the English. 
 
 After holding a Council of War Hood gave out, on August 
 23, a preliminary declaration, which was soon followed by 
 a proclamation. Both were sent to Marseille and Toulon. 
 The declaration said : That if the people of Toulon and Mar- 
 seille declare openly for monarchy ; if the vessels are dis- 
 armed and the harbor and forts put provisionally in Hood's 
 charge, the people of Provence may count upon the assist- 
 ance of the British fleet: the rights of property and of 
 the individual shall be protected : further, that Hood's only 
 object is the restoration of peace and that then all will be 
 returned " conformement a 1'inventaire qui en sera fait". 
 In the Proclamation Hood gives a " tableau fiedle" of the 
 "malheureuse condition" of the French nation during the 
 last four years, and declares that the European nations see 
 no remedy to such evils other than reestablishment of mon- 
 archy in France. He offers his protection and aid to estab- 
 lish "un gouvernment regulieret de maintainirlapaix et la 
 tranquillite dans 1'Europe." Hood's proclamation arrived 
 too late in Marseilles; the approaching Republican army 
 made it impossible to continue the negociations. In Toulon 
 the most stormy debates took place in the Sections when 
 Lieutenant Cook announced Hood's offer. The Royalists 
 carried off the victory, in spite of all opposition of the other 
 party, and of the hostile attitude of the French ships in 
 
 1 Memoirs. 
 
 2 Letters Sept. 14th. Nelson dispatches. 
 
the harbor. The Sections decided for the entrance of the 
 English, but under several conditions. Among others; the 
 present constitution was to be replaced by the monarchical 
 government, under the Constitution of 1791 j 1 civil and 
 military officers were to retain their places. The provis- 
 ioning of the city was to be assured ; an inventory was to 
 be made of the vessels and of all material in the port. These 
 conditions were carried back by Cook to Hood, who ac- 
 cepted them. His present fleet was however not strong 
 enough to risk entering alone. He therefore asked assist- 
 ance from the Spanish Admiral Langara who at first re- 
 fused, but consented on a second invitation from Hood, who 
 accompanied this invitation with a copy of his intended 
 proclamation. In the meantime Hood published his second 
 proclamation to the inhabitants of Toulon. It was dated 
 August 28th and declared : ' as the Sections of Toulon have 
 declared Louis XVII as their legitimate sovereign and for 
 monarchy according to the constitution of 1791, he takes 
 possession of Toulon and will guard it "en depot pour 
 Louis XVII jusqu' au retablissementde la paixen France". 
 The next day as the Spanish fleet appeared in sight Hood 
 sailed into the harbor, the Spanish following. 2 The sea- 
 men of the French fleet were divided into two parties, the 
 Jacobins and the Royalists. The first showed in the begin- 
 ning a determination to oppose the landing of the English, 
 but were held in check by the Royalists and the land bat- 
 teries. Finally, threatened by the English and Spanish, the}^ 
 found it better to take advantage of a chance to escape, than 
 to offer resistance. The crew of seven ships succeeded in 
 getting away. Hood and Langara received a most enthus- 
 iastic reception from the inhabitants and officials of Toulon. 
 An excellent understanding existed between the two ad- 
 
 1 This constitution was always referred to, and is .spoken of in the 
 following pages, as the constitution of 1 789. 
 
 2 Journal of Samuel Lord Hood. Admiralty Records. Public Record 
 Office. 
 
rairals. A thousand marines and about 300 sailors from each 
 fleet were landed immediately at Fort LaMalgue. 1 
 
 On September 12th the news of the fall of Toulon reached 
 London by way of Turin. It caused in government circles 
 quite as much surprise as satisfaction. It was decided to col- 
 lect troops and send them to Hood without deranging the 
 plans of campaign in general. The first intention was to 
 send 5000 British troops, raised in Ireland, and 5000 Hes- 
 sians. 2 As early as September 14th, and at Pitt's sugges- 
 tion, 8 instructions were sent to Sir Morton Eden, the English 
 ambassador at Vienna to ask for Austrian troops. These 
 were promised, but never arrived. More about the negocia- 
 tions concerning the will be given later. 
 
 Here it might be well to insert an account of the political 
 situation of Europe at this time. Three important questions 
 preoccupied more or less, the different cabinets. The war 
 against the Republic, affairs in Poland and Austria's re- 
 sumed plan of exchanging the Netherlands for Bavaria. 
 Nearly all the nations were joined in the struggle with 
 France but the attention of several of them Austria, Prussja, 
 Russia, an others was much diverted by the other two ques- 
 tions. The news of the second division of Poland brought 
 Thugut, whose anti-Prussian policy was well known, into 
 power in Vienna. An understanding between Austria and 
 England was the result. This power, (England) as well as 
 the other European nations, now taking for granted, (and 
 under existing conditions it was almost pardonable) that 
 France would fall, directed its best thoughts and energy to 
 her future dismemberment, arid to its share of the "Indem- 
 nification." The plans of the English government, having 
 taken rather a definite form, full instructions were sent to 
 
 1 Letter from Graham to Sir William Hamilton. Correspondence. 
 British Museum. Manuscript Department. Egerton 2638. 
 
 2 Letter Dundas to Sir James Murray. Sept. 14. War Office. British 
 Army on Continent. 1793. Record Office. 
 
 3 Letter Pitt to Grenville. Sept 7. Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue. 
 
8 
 
 Eden in Vienna. They were dated Whitehall. Sept. 7. l 
 and contained, first, an account of Austria's plans, as they 
 have been stated in England, namely " the making perma- 
 nent acquisitions, to as large an extent as they are practi- 
 cable, in the Low Countries, in Alsace and Loraine, and in 
 the intermediate parts of the frontier of France. No similar 
 communication has as yet been made on the part of His 
 Majesty, but the circumstances and situation of affairs have 
 made it sufficiently evident that whatever indemnification 
 is to be acquired by this country must be looked for in the 
 foreign settlements and colonies of France. In these ob- 
 jects the interest of the two Courts are so far from clashing 
 that His Majesty has an interest in seeing the House of 
 Austria strengthen itself by acquisition on the French fron- 
 tier, and the very circumstance of that interest should make 
 the Emperor see with pleasure the relative increase of the 
 naval and commercial resources of this country beyond 
 those of France As to the Powers who are al- 
 ready engaged in the war it does not appear that much can 
 be done by Austria, at least in the present moment towards 
 securing the co-operation of Spain. But no endeavours will 
 be omitted by His Majesty for that purpose ". . . In 
 speaking of the coolness between Austria and Sardinia, 
 " the idea once entertained by the Court of Vienna of ex- 
 tending the frontier of the Milanese at the expense of the 
 King of Sardinia is, I trust, abandoned, but if brought for- 
 ward again, must be strongly discouraged by you " . . . . 
 As regards Prussia, " it is obvious that the interest of the 
 Emperor is as much concerned as that of His Majesty in 
 securing even at the expense of some sacrifice the co-opera- 
 tion and assistance of the King of Prussia. If no step is 
 taken to remove the increasing jealousy between those two 
 courts the worst consequences may be expected from them" 
 . . . . Then follows advice to Austria to renounce her 
 
 1 Foreign Office. Austria. Sir Morton Eden. Aug. to Oct. 93. Public 
 Record Office. 
 
9 
 
 claim on Bavaria in order to avoid Prussia's jealousy. The 
 Elector might then take an active part in the war, might 
 send troops to His Majesty " who would not be unwilling 
 to incur a considerable expense for an object of so much im- 
 portance to the common cause." .... As to Russia, 
 " His Majesty's endeavours to obtain the active co-operation 
 of that power have proved ineffective. The assistance of a 
 body of troops having ultimately been refused to His Maj- 
 esty except on terms which, independant of other objections, 
 would have committed this country with respect to the in- 
 terior of France beyond what His Majesty judged to be 
 advisable or prudent." . ..." In the Mediterranean 
 the interests of this country are, that our naval superiority 
 over France should be maintained and there is no reason 
 to doubt of this point being sufficiently secured" .... 
 Here Grenville mentions the necessity of the assistance of 
 12 or 15,000 Austrian troops for affairs in the Mediterranean. 
 . . . a I have mentioned to you His Majesty's disposi- 
 tion to connect himself by a defensive alliance with the Em- 
 peror, and I have stated that you are at liberty to give the 
 strongest assurances on this head. The basis of such an 
 alliance would naturally be, as I have explained to Count 
 Starhenberg the same with of the ancient system by which 
 the two countries were formally united : the securing a bar- 
 rier against France, the retaining the Netherlands under 
 the lawful sovereignty of Austria, the securing and aug- 
 mentation of the commerce of the Maritime Powers, and 
 the Mutual guaranty of all possessions antecedent to the 
 war." 
 
 The foregoing instructions give an insight into political 
 relations at this moment. The following extract from a let- 
 ter to Grenville, from Lord St. Helens, the English Ambas- 
 sador at Madrid, completes it to some extent. l lt was dated 
 Madrid, August 28. "I understand that the Duke of Alcudia 
 
 1 Foreign Office. Spain. Lord St. Helens and Consuls' dispatches Aug. 
 to Dec. 1793. Public Record Office. 
 
10 
 
 has testified a great deal of Pique and Dissatisfaction to the 
 Prussian and Austrian Ministers on account of the late 
 capitulations of Mentz and Valanciennes concerning that 
 from the vague and indefinite terms they were drawn the 
 French government will consider themselves as at liberty to 
 employ these garrisons in their armies on this Frontier. 
 There appears great reason to hope that these alarms may 
 prove groundless. However this seeming want of attention 
 to the interests of this crown on the part of the Emperor 
 and the King of Prussia has increased the sentiments of 
 jealousy against those sovereigns, which have been so long 
 entertained here, and which I observe to be studiously kept 
 up and inflamed by the agents of the French Princes. 
 With regard to England, the Spanish Minister's language 
 is still friendly and cordial, however, I am told that some 
 ill-intentioned Persons have been endeavouring to persuade 
 him that we have acted un-candidly by this Court in con- 
 cluding a Treaty with Naples without their knowledge, and 
 I therefore take the liberty of submitting to your Lordship 
 whether if that Treaty contained nothing of a secret nature 
 it might not be advisable to communicate it here without 
 loss of time " . . . . 
 
 Here is the political situation in a few words. England 
 looked for indemnification outside of Europe; an increase 
 of her commerce and supremacy over France in the Medi- 
 terranean. Her object was to bring the war to a fortunate 
 termination and for that reason to hold the European nations 
 together. She was willing to make financial sacrifices for 
 the common cause. She would not commit herself as to the 
 future government in France. Austria wished to increase 
 her possessions in the Netherlands and in Alsace; she was 
 jealous of Prussia. She hoped also to extend her Milanese 
 territory, and there was jealousy between her and Sardinia. 
 She was not quite so decided about continuing her plan of 
 obtaining Bavaria. Spain had cause of ill-will against 
 Austria and Prussia. Russia continued her policy of refrain- 
 
11 
 
 ing from any active part in the war against France. Eng- 
 land had signed treaties with Sardinia, Naples, Hesse and 
 Baden, by which they agreed to furnish her troops. Prus- 
 sia's attention was turned toward Poland and she was already 
 wavering in her policy of war against the Republic. 
 
 The English government was not quite satisfied with 
 Lord Hood's declaration. Grenville wrote to Eden Sept. 14. 
 2 "Lord Hood has been induced by circumstances and by the 
 great advantage which was in view, to go further with re- 
 spect to the Interior state of France and to the Futur Gov- 
 ernment to be established there, than was in contemplation 
 according to the ideas stated to you in my late dispatch. 
 You will explain the circumstances to the Austrian Minis- 
 ter and you will add that on this account as well as from 
 the Change which the event of Toulon produced in our sit- 
 uation it may perhaps be advisable that some public meas- 
 ure should be taken on this subject by this court, and that 
 of Vienna jointly. The ideas on this subject which are enter- . 
 tained by His Majesty's Ministers will be transmitted to you 
 with as little delay as possible." In Spain the news of Tou- 
 lon's surrender was well received. St. Helens wrote to Gren- 
 ville, Sep 6. 3 "I need not say that this court are highly 
 satisfied with these advices, and above all with Lord Hood's 
 invitation to Admiral Langara to partake in his success, and 
 that they profess the utmost readiness to co-operate with us 
 cordially in every step of the business." The news of Hood's 
 entrance was also welcomed by the Royalists and Emigrants, 
 and for a time it was supposed that other cities would follow 
 the example of Toulon. In the information sent to the For- 
 
 1 Letter Dundas to O'Hara. 18th Dec. Letters from Secry. Dundas to 
 Lieut. Gen. Dundas. 1793-94. British Museum. Mss. Dept. Additional 
 27,594. 
 
 " By treaty 26. April. Sardinian Majesty in consequence of payment 
 of subsidy has bound himself to furnish his majesty 20,000 troops free of 
 any further expense." 
 
 2 Public Record Office. 
 
 3 St. Helens. Public Record Office. 
 
12 
 
 eign Office; dated Sept 20. ^ne reads "On croit que les 
 Royalistes a Brest dont il y a grand norabre feront en 
 sorte que la flotte renterra sous peu de jours et qu'oii y 
 proclamera comme a Toulon Louis 17 " . . . . De Saint 
 Croix, one of the Emigrants in London, wrote to Grenville, 
 dated London, Sept. 15. l " Lorsque j'eus avant bier 1'hon- 
 neur d'ecrire a Votre Excellence je ne connaissais point les 
 deux proclamations de M. L'Amiral Hood. Permettez-moi 
 mi-lord de vous en exprimer et comme francais et comme 
 individu toute ma reconnaissance. Puissent tons les cabi- 
 nets adopter ce language: il y a plus de gloire a parler 
 ainsi qu'a vaincre. . . . Vous nous rendez Mylord quel- 
 que corifience et quelque securite: vous commandez 1'estime 
 de PEurope et vous lui donnez un grand exemple." 
 
 The opinion in England was somewhat divided as to the 
 advisability of retaining Toulon, even temporarily, but all 
 were united in rejoicing that the French fleet was in English 
 hands. It was even suggested that upon a good opportunity 
 it might be burned and the town given up. As the seige 
 went on it was not hard to see that the question of what was 
 to be done with the French fleet became a most delicate one. 
 It was partly upon this point that the difference arose be- 
 tween the English and Spanish Admirals, and later their 
 respective Governments. Lord Sheffield wrote September 
 15th to Auckland 2 " I see no use of encumbering ourselves 
 with Toulon unless we carry home the French fleet. I 
 should certainly have taken advantage of the kind of resist- 
 ance made by the French fleet, by hauling into the inner 
 road and would have burnt them all to save further em- 
 barrassment." Pitt speaks of the taking of Toulon as 
 a " most fortunate event." 3 The Marquis of Buckingham 
 wrote to Grenville Sept 15. " We have only to pray that the 
 
 1 Foreign Office. Domestic Papers. March to Dec. 1793. Public Record 
 Office. 
 
 2 Auckland Papers. British Museum. Mss. vol 12. Additional 34,452. 
 
 3 Letter to Grenville. Sept 7. Manuscripts of Fortescue. 
 
13 
 
 patriots may besiege Toulon and that the issue of the con- 
 test may be the conflagration of the docks and fleet." l And 
 on Sept 29th. " You must be prepared to meet much 
 opposition to the idea of indemnification which the emi- 
 grants now in London are loud in reprobating. At the same 
 time the people of Brest and Toulon can not be very anxious 
 for the slices which may be required from France on the side 
 of the Pays Bas and of Lorain, or even of Piedmont; and 
 whether they are or no it is good to habituate people early 
 to the sound of such a proposition" l . . . .on Oct. 4th. 
 "I conclude that our fleet winters at Toulon and refits with 
 French stores taken upon a valuation ; but at all events, I hope 
 that you will retain the superiority in those seas even over 
 the Spaniards, whose operations except those of Langara do 
 not please me" 1 Nelson wrote Oct. 7th. "Whether we shall 
 be able to maintain our most extraordinary acquisition time 
 only can determine, however one hour will burn the French 
 fleet " 2 . . . . The plan of D' Alcudia, the Spanish min- 
 ister was 3 that the combined squadrons should seize the first 
 opportunity of forcibly removing all the Toulon ships to 
 some place of greater security, as Port Mahon or Carthagena. 
 When the Comite du Salut Public heard of the surrender 
 of Toulon they sent off the following laconic note to the u Rep- 
 resentants du Peuple" with the Republican army at Toulon. 
 " Citoyens collegues . . Nous avons appris avec indigna- 
 tion la perfide trahison de Toulon dont vous nous informez 
 par votre depeche du 29 (sic) Aout: du courage, de la fer- 
 mete de la Constance: nous vaincrons les royalists, les des- 
 pots et les traitres." 4 
 
 1 Letter to Grenville. Sept. 7. Manuscripts of Fortescue. 
 
 2 Nelson Dispatches. 
 
 3 St. Helens, to Grenville Oct. 2. Record Office. 
 
 4 Reponse du Comite". Aug. 28. Re cueil Aulard. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 ARRIVAL OF CASTEAUX IN MARSEILLES FIRST ENGAGE- 
 MENT ARRIVAL OF BONAPARTE REPRESENTANTS DU 
 PEUPLE EFFECT OF FIRST BATTERIES ATTACK ON 
 HEIGHTS OF GRASS E ATTACK ON MOUNT FARON MIS- 
 UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN CARTE AUX AND LAPOYPE 
 ATTACK ON SABLETTES ATTACK ON CAP *BRUN DE- 
 PARTURE OF CARTEAUX BONAPARTE DURING ABSENCE 
 OF GENERALS ARRIVAL OF DOPPET ENGAGEMENTS 
 ON Nov. 15. 
 
 Carteaux, the Republican General, entered Marseilles on 
 August 25. l He did not march directly on Toulon as he 
 was waiting for reinforcements from the army of Italy, which 
 were approaching from the east, nor did he dare leave Mar- 
 seilles unprotected. Toulon was threatened from the east and 
 west by two armies, just as the allies arrived. The English 
 especially were ill prepared in a military way, having no 
 soldier of a higher rank than captain. 2 It was impossible to 
 do much towards fortifying the town, which, especially on 
 the western side, where the French had never expected an 
 attack, was rather exposed. One feared somewhat a "coup 
 de main" by Carteaux, aided by the discontented in the 
 town, of which there were a large number. From the begin- 
 ning the Republicans were not idle. "Nous avons donne 
 Tordre de faire sonner le tocsin dans toutes les communes 
 du department du Var et de faire marcher tous les citoyens 
 depuis Page de 16 ans jusqu'atiO". This shows a praise- 
 worthy activity, but to allow such crowds to be hurled by 
 incornpetant generals against a fortified city was worse than 
 foolish. 
 
 1 Lettre de Salicetti. Aug 25. R. A. 
 
 2 Letter. T. Graham to Sir William Hamilton. British Museum. Mss. 
 Egerton. 2638. (14) 
 
15 
 
 Carteaux's advance guard occupied the passes of Ollioules 
 on the 29th of August. The English and Spanish hearing 
 of it, promptly drove the Republicans back. This was the 
 first action and there were but a few casualties. This position 
 however, was important, as it commanded the road to Mar- 
 seilles, and also the communications with La Seyne, a vil- 
 lage on the south-west corner of the Petite Rade ; but it 
 was too far from Toulon for the Allies to hold it in their 
 present condition. Carteaux who had just (Sept 4.) been 
 appointed to the command of the beseiging army, l which 
 was to be independant of the army of Italy, made prepara- 
 tions to retake it. On September 7. the attack took place 
 and was successful. 2 The Allies retreated to the town with 
 a small loss: the Republicans lost but one man, and Don- 
 martin, who commanded the artillery was severely wounded. 
 This slight success of the Republicans caused a somewhat bad 
 impression in the town. The Republicans now closed in from 
 the east and west. Carteaux, who commanded the western di- 
 vision in person, established his head-quarters at Ollioules 
 and extended his position from Faubregas to Baon-de-Qua- 
 tres-Heures. Lopoype, who had come from the Italian Army, 
 commanded on the east. His head-quarters were at Sollies- 
 Farlede. Lapoype was an ex-marquis whose Jacobinisme 
 was much less to questioned than his ability as a general. 
 He was not much inferior to Carteaux however, especially 
 in this kind of military work. His wife was a prisoner in 
 Toulon and this fact hampered him in his movements. 3 The 
 Republicans were very weak in artillery, and some of it had 
 to be left in Marseille " pour foudroyer cette ville s'il s'y 
 manifestait quelque mouvement." Now they were even de- 
 prived of their chief of artillery, Donmartin. With the ma- 
 terial at hand however, Carteaux had erected a battery on the 
 
 1 Arme"e du Siege de Toulon. Archives de la guerre. 
 
 2 Lettre de Carteaux a I/apoype. Sept 8. Archives de la guerre. I^ettre 
 Capt. Cook to Gen. Ed. Smith. Sept 7. Barrow's life of Sidney Smith. 
 
 3 Ivapoype a Bouchotte. Sept 11. Archives de la Guerre. 
 
16 
 
 west side, to burn the fleet: but its position, far out of range 
 of either the fleet or town, was laughable. 1 Reinforcements 
 continued to arrive on each side and both parties pre- 
 pared themselves for the struggle. Spain was especially 
 prompt in sending reinforcements. 2 By returns taken on 
 Sep 12. 3 there were over 5000 troops and sailors on shore: 
 of these 3400 were Spanish and about 1600 English. This 
 force quite exceeded that of Carteaux in efficiency and proba- 
 bly in numbers. Hood wrote on Sept 14 the a Enemy not 
 yet provided with artillery." The hopes of the Allies might 
 well rise, for who could have suspected, unless it was the 
 young Corsican himself, and at this very moment the be- 
 sieging army had received a most formidable reinforcement? 
 On September 16 or 17 4 the direction of the principal 
 
 1 Carteaux a Lopoype. Sept 8. 
 
 2 Letters from St. Helens. Sept 18. Record Office 
 
 3 Letter from St. Helens Sept 25. R. O. 
 
 Graham to Hamilton. Sept 14. 
 
 Correspondence. British Museum. Mss. 
 Bgerton. 2638. 
 
 4 The exact date when Napoleon arrived in Toulon is difficult to place. 
 He says in his Memoires the 12th. of Sept. Chuquet believes he has 
 proved that he arrived on the 16th. of Sept. (Page 171 note) "On 
 ignorait jusqu'ici le jour ou Bonaparte arriva devant Toulon. Ses mem- 
 oires disent tantot le 12 Sept. tantot douze a quinze jours apres la prise 
 d'Ollioules, du 19 au 22 Septembre. Mais il est surement le 15 a Mar- 
 seille (cf. piece LXIX ; a letter from Marseille, dated Sept 15) et, suivant 
 une lettre de Salicetti, il fait le 17 a Ollioules les preparatifs d'une attaque ; 
 il est done arrive le 16 au quartier general du Beausset. N' ecrit-il pas 
 d'ailleurs pendant les siege " les batteries furent etablies trois jours apres 
 son arrivee ? " Or la batterie de la Montagne date du 19 Septembre." In 
 the first place the contradiction in Napoleon's Memoirs can be explained. 
 There are accounts of Toulon in two volumes written by different Generals. 
 According to the First volume Napoleon arrived 12 or 15 days after the 
 taking of Ollioules, which according to this volume took place on Sept 
 10 The arrival of Bonaparte would therefore have taken place between 
 the 22nd and 25th of Sept, and not the 19th and 22nd as Chuquet puts 
 it. This volume was corrected by Napoleon, but he probably gave no 
 great attention to such details. The third volume was dictated by Napot 
 leon and contains a twice as lengthy account of Toulon. Here he says 
 expressly that he arrived on the 12th of Sept. 
 
 As to the date of the battery L,a Montagne, Chuquet gives it (page 
 
17 
 
 arm of Carteaux's army was put under the control of Napo- 
 leon Bonaparte, then 24 years of age, and a captain of Artil- 
 lery. A new period in Napoleon's life began here. In after 
 years when he was preoccupied about his own history, he 
 wished that it should begin with the siege of Toulon. This 
 is seen especially in his Memoirs from St. Helena. It is 
 usually said that in so doing his object was to pass over the 
 preceding period in Corsica, which would not tend to make 
 him popular in France. This may no doubt be partially 
 true, but it is none the less so that these three months, be- 
 fore the walls of Toulon, were three of the most important 
 in his life. Here his entire career was changed. Others be- 
 sides himself were convinced of his ability, even of his genius. 
 He was thrown into close contact with the French people; 
 and became at last one of them. His ambition was freed 
 from the little island of Corsica, and bound itself to the des- 
 tinies of the French nation; soon afterwards to control them. 
 
 172) as Sept. 9., then (page 179) as Sept 12, and finally (page 206) Sep- 
 18. The evening of the 17th is the proper date, as on the morning of the 
 1 8th the battery fires on the ships. (Hood's Journal) On the 16th Dom- 
 martin was still, at least nominally, head of the artillery (Carteaux a 
 Lapoype, Archives de la Guerre) and on the 17th Napoleon directs it. 
 (Lettre Salicetti Sept 26. R. A.) Salicetti writes "nous arretames le 
 citoyen Buonaparte et nous lue ordonnames de remplacer Dommartin ". 
 It is quite possible that Napoleon was employed for a few days about 
 Toulon before he received Dommartin 's position. He must have first 
 proved his ability to the Representants ; or have influenced them in some 
 way (he knew Salicetti) before receiving the position which should other- 
 wise have fallen to Lieut-colonel Sugney, who commanded the artillery 
 under Lapoype. It is a significant fact that on Sept 16, Carteaux writes 
 to Lapoype, " c'est 1'artillerie qui fait toute la besogne", as if it were a 
 fact of which he has just become convinced : also in direct contradiction 
 to his previous ideas. Napoleon may have arrived on the 12th and yet 
 have returned to Marseilles on the 1 5th. If he did not arrive until the 16th 
 then his statement that he found almost no artillery, is incorrect, be- 
 cause just at this time some artillery at least begins to arrive. ( Carteaux a 
 Lapoype, Sept 16. A. G.) Napoleon probably forwarded it himself from 
 Marseille where he was employed at the arsenal. By the September 19 Car- 
 teaux is aiding him as he writes to Bonaparte (Letter, A. G. ) "Je viens 
 de recevoir votre lettre et je vais envoy er a la Municipalite pour vous 
 procurer tous les objets que vous me demandez ". 
 21922 
 
18 
 
 At the end of these three months he was no longer a ne- 
 glected captain but a young general with a career behind 
 him, as well as a far greater and more definite one before 
 him. He had had an insight into the world of that day, and 
 understood the political situation of his time. The means 
 by which he was to satisfy his ambition were no longer 
 vague dreams of the imagination but definite and deep-laid 
 plans founded on an experience of men and a knowledge of 
 conditions. His actions in Corsica must have now appeared 
 to him as youthful. Feeling that he had matured in these 
 three months it was no wonder that he should have believed 
 that his career commenced at Toulon. 
 
 When Napoleon arrived he found the army in a most 
 pitiable state ; very little artillery l and what there was placed 
 in a position harmless to the enemy; 2 the Generals without 
 a plan, or rather with a new one each day, but most of them 
 useless. 3 The staff did not even have a map of the town and 
 surrounding country. 4 Napoleon saw what any other in- 
 structed officer would have seen, that the first object was to 
 attack the fleet in the harbor, and soon selected the best po- 
 sition for doing so. He set to work immediately but before 
 long he had a misunderstanding with Carteaux, who knew 7 
 little about artillery. However, Bonaparte had very wisely as- 
 sured himself of the all-powerful Representants du Peuple; 
 with one of these, Salicetti, a Corsicau, he had been in per- 
 sonal connection before. In fact, in September Salicetti had 
 caused Napoleon's brother Joseph to be appointed Commis- 
 saire de Guerre with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. 
 
 These representants du peuple were characteristic of this 
 period of the Revolution. Sent out to the armies and into 
 
 1 Letter from Barras, 6 Sept. R. A. 
 
 " " I/apoype to Carteaux Sept. 14, A. G. 
 
 2 Letter from Albitte 9 Sept. R. A. 
 
 3 L/etter from Lapoype to Bouchotte, 11 Sept. A. G. 
 
 " " Carteaux to Lapoype 14 Sept. A. G. 
 
 " " " to Mtre. de la Guerre 15 Sept. A. G. 
 
 4 Carteaux au Ministere de la Guerre, Sept 12 and Sept 15. A. G. 
 
19 
 
 the cities by the Central Government, their duty was to 
 watch the Generals, spur them on, and excite the patriotism 
 of the people ; also to send frequent information to the Gov- 
 ernment in Paris. They were all powerful, and at the same 
 time quite independent. All mistakes were attributed to the 
 Generals, for whom the guillotine was not an unusual pen- 
 alty; the representants simply appointed new ones in their 
 places. They incorporated the idea of the absolute suprem- 
 acy of the civil power over military and all other. No other 
 instances of a similar character are found in history. Sali- 
 cetti, Barras, Gasparin, Albitte and others were at Toulon; 
 Salicetti during the entire siege. Little they suspected that 
 the young artillery officer, who courted their favor, flattered 
 their pride, and won their confidence, would in a few years 
 change the face of things, overturn the despotism of the 
 demagogue, and erect. in its place a quite as despotic mili- 
 tary power but less unjust, creative and lawgiving. The 
 beginning of this transition was seen in the Italian cam- 
 paign of 1796-97, when General Clark sent out to watch 
 the young General Bonaparte, decided to cast in his lot with 
 Napoleon rather than with the Directory. Napoleon got 
 an excellent insight into the ways of these representatives 
 at Toulon, which no doubt aided him much in winning 
 over Clark. 
 
 On September 17 l Napoleon erected his first battery. The 
 next day it began to take effect, and the first serious attack 
 commenced. On the 18th and 19th the ships of the Allies 
 and this battery had a tremendous engagement. 2 On the 
 20th, the second battery was erected and "fired with more 
 effect on the ships"; "Gunboats suffered considerably and 
 the St. George had 21 men killed and wounded by the 
 bursting of one of her lower deck guns, the land batteries 
 were silenced before two o'clock, but altogether we had lost 
 
 1 Lettre Salicetti, Sept. 26. R. A. 
 Letter Mulgrave-Gazette. 
 
 2 Hood's journal, September 18th. 
 
20 
 
 about 70 men wounded or killed. Lord Hood became 
 anxious about the shipping and that evening it was deter- 
 mined to occupy the heights of Grasse". 1 On September 20 
 the following was inserted in Lord Hood's journal. " The 
 floating battery No. 1 hauled off, having received much 
 damage." This is the official record of Napoleon's first hos- 
 tile act against the British. On September 21st " Cannonade 
 still in the northwest arm". "Mr. Gourly and people re- 
 turned from the Floating battery No. 3, it being sunk by the 
 Enemy's shot in the N. W. arm ". 
 
 Napoleon's first batteries had been firing but a day or so 
 when the possibility of being forced to leave the harbor was 
 brought forcibly home to the two Admirals. The question 
 immediately arose what was, in such a case, to be done with 
 the French fleet. From now on this question remained a source 
 of contention between the Admirals, and also between their 
 respective courts. This difference had disastrous results and 
 Napoleon's cleverly placed batteries were the cause of it. It 
 was his first act that had any influence upon the events of 
 his time, and it took place within the first few days of his 
 arrival before Toulon. On October 3rd the Duke of Alcudia 
 wrote to St. Helens. "As the case tho' remote may possibly 
 occur in which the Spanish and English squadrons may be 
 obliged to abandon the anchorage of Toulon from there 
 being so much molested by bombs and red hot shells, as not 
 to be able to remain there, His Majesty's pleasure upon this 
 point has been signified to Admiral Langara by the Minis- 
 ter of Marine on the 1st instant, leaving, however, to the 
 prudent discretion of the admiral, to settle and resolve in 
 concert with Lord Hood whatever may according to existing 
 circumstances, be found most advisable." 2 This is an official 
 record of Napoleon's work during the first few days at Tou- 
 lon. In the same letter the Spanish Minister proposed that 
 in case it became necessary to leave the port, "Admiral 
 
 1 Letter from Thomas Graham, September 25th. Life of Graham. 
 
 2 St. Helens. R. O. Published by Cottin. 
 
21 
 
 Langara shall sail, with all french ships that can be put to 
 sea to the islands of Hieres, or whatever other place he may 
 appoint in concert with Lord Hood, as most convenient, 
 carrying in them all the artillery, ammunition, arms and 
 stores which they can bring; leaving a manifest or protest 
 to the government of Toulon, if the latter should not 
 abandon the place that all ships of the french navy shall 
 be kept and taken care of, to be delivered, at a proper op- 
 portunity, to their lawful sovereign". "This instruction" 
 writes St. Helens " was prepared in consequence of the in- 
 formation that had been received from thence stating that 
 the enemy had succeeded in establishing a battery which in 
 some sort commanded the harbors and roads". 1 It will be 
 seen that the " manifest or protest" referred to by Alcudia 
 was apparently all that was to be left to the people of Tou- 
 lon who had confided themselves to the English and Span- 
 iards. Alcudia further proposed that such ships as could not 
 be removed should be sunk or set on fire. As this was later 
 on actually done, it will be seen bow the Spanish regarded 
 their own proposal, (see part II). I do not mean to imply 
 in the least that the English were any more sincere in their 
 dealings with the people of Toulon or that they had any 
 more scruples in disposing of the French fleet. Hood wrote 
 to London that he used the French ships against the bat- 
 teries thinking it better that they should be sunk than his 
 own. 2 
 
 To prevent the enemy's batteries from being placed in a 
 still more dangerous position, on the heights of Grasse, 
 Admiral Gravina and Lord Mulgrave, the English com- 
 mander landed at midnight Sept. 21st with about 500 men 
 at Balaguier, and gained the wooded heights above without 
 seeing any of the enemy. A post was established before day- 
 break on the most commanding point: in the afternoon it 
 
 1 St. Helens to Grenville. Oct. 9th. R. O. 
 
 2 Hood to Philip Stephens. Oct. 7. Admirals dispatches Mediterranean 
 1793. R. O. 
 
22 
 
 was attacked by 600 men who approached under cover of 
 the wood. They were repulsed. The next day more troops 
 were sent out, woods were cut down in abatis, and the post 
 was well supplied with cannon. There were now 800 men 
 on the spot. Here the Allies gained a most deceided advan- 
 tage; they had seized and fortified the most vulnerable 
 point surrounding Toulon, and the harbor. Napoleon on 
 his arrival had recognized the importance of this position 
 and went to Carteaux " pour lui offrir de le faire entrer dans 
 Toulon avant huit jours, s'il voulait faire occuper en force 
 la position du Caire (the Heights of Grasse) de maniere que 
 1'artillerie put sur-le-champ placer des batteries a 1'ex- 
 tremite des caps de 1'Eguillette et de Balaguier". 1 Carteaux 
 whose favorite tactics were the use of the arme blanc failed 
 to see the importance of this position and allowed the allies 
 to proceed him. 2 Finally when he did make the attack, it 
 was done in such a half-spirited manner as to be easily 
 repulsed. Napoleon took no part in this attack, but on the 
 very same day his battery sunk one of the floating batteries 
 of the enemy. He as well as the Represantants du peuple 
 were loud in accusing Carteaux and lamenting his failure 
 to take the position. "Pourquoi ne 1'avons-nous pas fait? 
 Parceque le general que nous avions cru comprendre et 
 adopter notre plan n'y avait aucune confiance quoique celui 
 que vous aviez envoye de Paris ftit exactement le meme: 
 parce ceux qui 1'entourent sont encore plus ignorants et 
 plus entetes que lui : parceque ni les uns, ni les autres n'ont 
 aucune connaissance ni des hommes qu'ils menent ni des 
 machines militaires, ni de leurs effets: parce que toute 
 1'armee n'ayant trouve jusqu'a present aucune resistance 
 dans son expedition est toute decouragee de celle que lui 
 presente Toulon si 1'absence de Carteaux (it was supposed 
 that he was going to the Army of Italy) nous donne un 
 
 1 Memoires de Napoleon. 
 
 2 Attack on Hauteurs de Grasse. Hood's Journal. Letter of Mulgrave 
 in Gazette. Letter from Graham, Life of Graham. Memoires and Cor- 
 respondence of Napoleon. Salicetti to Comite" Sept. 26 R. A. 
 
23 
 
 general et des officiers superieurs qui sen tent mieux 1'im- 
 portance de la point des Vallons nous tenterons encore d'en 
 chasser les Anglais". 1 Napoleon wrote on Nov. 14th to the 
 Minister of War, referring to this attack : 2 " Dans ce moment 
 la (while his batteries were fighting the enemy's ships) les 
 ennemis comprenant 1'insuffisance de leur artillerie navale 
 risquerent le tout pour le tout et debarquerent a 1'Eguillette ; 
 ils ussent du etre ecrase dans leur descent; la fatalite ou 
 notre ineptie voulut qu'elle leur reussit. Peu de jours apres 
 ils y eurent des pieces de 24, un chemin convert et des palis- 
 sades, quelques jours apres, des secours considerables leur 
 arriverent de Naples et d'Espagne. Je compris que 1'affaire' 
 de Toulon etait manquee et qu'il fallait se resoudre a un 
 siege ". 
 
 From here up to the first of October nothing of great im- 
 portance happened. The fleet and land batteries continued 
 an artillery duel; reinforcements arrived gradually for each 
 side. Part of the French squadron was put in commission 
 under the French Admiral Trogoff. Toulon was declared a 
 free port and well supplied with provisions, chiefly from 
 Spain and the Spanish islands. On Sept 23 the Republicans 
 heard the fire of 21 guns from each ship of the fleet. It was 
 in honor of the coronation of Louis XVII. 3 
 
 On Oct. 1 Carteaux received the following note. "Les 
 troupes de la Republique viennent d'enlever la montague 
 du Faron, ses retranchements et sa redoute. Signe La 
 Poype". 4 The commanding position of Faron was of great 
 importance and La Poype decided to attack it. From the 
 northern side it was considered inaccessible, except at Pasde 
 la Masque, where one might reach the top by a narrow zig- 
 zag path ; the English considered a strong post of sixty men 
 sufficient to hold this pass. On the night of Sept. 30 La 
 
 1 lyettre de Salicetti, Sept. 26th. R. A. 
 
 2 Correspondance de Napoleon. 
 
 3 Hood's Journal. 
 
 4 Lettre de Salicetti. Oct. 1. R. O. 
 
24 
 
 Poype formed his three attacking columns. The one on the 
 right was to ascend the northwest end; it was under the 
 command of Victor. La Poype commanded the center col- 
 umn, which was to attack at Pas de la Masque; the column 
 on the left was to make a false attack. Victor led his column 
 up the hill, along the ridge of the mountain eastward to 
 Pas de la Masque; he drove the picket back into the re- 
 doute of Faron, assailed this on all sides at once, and cleared 
 it out just as the enemy had run up their signal for help. 
 While La Poypes triumphant note was on its way to Car- 
 teaux the alarming news of the taking of Faron reached 
 the town. Reinforcements, of the best troops and in large 
 numbers, as well as field pieces should have been hurried 
 to Victor and his men. But this was not done. A few men 
 did arrive before the end of the day, but they were such as 
 did more harm than good. The ridge of Faron is formed by 
 several heights running east and west. A deep ravine run- 
 ning northward from Toulon cuts deep into Mount Faron 
 perpendicularly; it runs almost through to the northern side 
 leaving only a narrow ridge connecting the heights on the east 
 and west of this valley, which is called Valbourdin. On the 
 south-western side of the ascent was Fort St. Antoine and on 
 the south-eastern Fort Faron. The Allies, in contrast to the Re- 
 publicans, showed the greatest activity and determination. 
 At 7 o'clock the news reached the town : a council of war 
 was held and the immediate attack determined upon. At 8 
 o'clock the troops started. English, Spanish Piedmontese 
 and Neapolitans, good troops and of four nationalities, 
 started forward to attack Victor and his small force. The 
 result would not have been at all certain, had Victor been 
 able to rely upon his troops; they were new, of inferior 
 quality and such as are easily panic-stricken. Lord Mul- 
 grave and Colonel de Revel lead the English and Pied- 
 montese column up the south-west side of the mountain. 
 On the most western ridge they met about 200 of the enemy, 
 whom they drove back, aided by the guns of Fort St. 
 
25 
 
 Antoine. The Republicans retreated eastward leaving a few 
 prisoners in the hands of the English. As they discovered 
 the Spanish column under Gravina, supported on the right 
 by the Neapolitans who approached up the Valbourdin, they 
 saw the possibility of their being cut off and quickened their 
 march eastward. The English learned from the prisoners 
 that the French, about 1500 strong were drawn up on the 
 eastern end of Faron. They continued along the ridge to 
 Valbourdin, and found Victor's force arranged in the form 
 of a triangle one side facing west, the other south. The re- 
 doute of Faron lined with men, was in his rear, and be- 
 tween this redoute and his lines was placed the reserve. The 
 valley Valbourdin widens off to the south-east in descend- 
 ing and thus protected Victor's left flank. Mulgrave got his 
 men under cover before the narrow ridge, about 15 yards 
 wide, which connects the height east and west of Valbourdin. 
 To attack the French he had to cross this valley. It was de- 
 cided to send Gravina, who had been approaching on the 
 west side of Valbourdin, accross to the east to attack the left 
 of the enemy. He turned off to the right, but in starting to 
 cross he received a heavy fire from the French. This forced 
 him to cross further down. The English waited for him to 
 take up his position against the left of the enemy. This he 
 did, following his advanced guard which was led by a Span- 
 ish sergeant who greatly distinguished himself. At first the 
 left of Victor's force was exposed to a flank fire from the 
 English and he moved part of it around to the right. As 
 Gravina's column came up Victor's left had to be protected 
 again and reinforced. When Gravina engaged it, it began to 
 waver, and by doing so gave the English and Piedmontese 
 the signal to advance over the narrow pass. This double at- 
 tack by a superior force was too much for the French. They 
 broke and retreated in the wildest disorder. The two attack- 
 ing columns entered the redoute of Faron at the same mo- 
 ment. The French were persued and many of them were 
 dashed to pieces in falling over the cliffs. The small English 
 
26 
 
 force in Fort Faron seized this chance to fall upon the 
 flank of the retreating Frenchmen. Victor with the few 
 men he was able to keep around him, retreated in good 
 order. In spite of his defeat he was the hero of the day. 
 " Le chef de bataillon Victor, a qui on avait confie ce poste 
 s'est conduit a merveille et dans 1'occupation et dans la 
 resistance qu'il a faite ; il aete nomine chef de brigade, une 
 voix unanime s'est levee pour lui." One of the English 
 officers wrote U A M. Victor is said to have been killed. He 
 was reckoned a good officer and all his dispositions that day 
 were in the style of a man who understood his business." 
 Victor distinguished himself later on during the siege. 
 The Republican loss on this day is very hard to give. The 
 Allies lost about 100 men. Gravina was wounded " in the 
 course of his able arid spirited exertions at the head of the 
 Neapolitans grenadiers". All the troops fought well, writes 
 Mulgrave, " I should do injustice, should I particularize any 
 corps or any nation." The retaking of Mount Fafon was 
 very important to the Allies. " Hood was glad it was as it 
 gave an opportunity of recovering it so handsomely." 1 
 
 This failure on the part of La Poype increased the ill- 
 feeling between him and Carteaux 2 . Carteaux relieved him 
 of his command. La Poype however was the brother-in- 
 law of Freron, the Representant du peuple, and for this 
 reason he was soon reinstated. From now up to the end of 
 October the Republican army was in the most pitiable state 3 ; 
 there was jealousy between the commanding generals, and 
 ill-will between Carteaux and the Representants. On Oct. 
 12 Salicetti wrote "Carteaux a besoin, outre la bonne 
 volonte, des moyens personnels, et nous ne lui connaissons 
 
 1 For the attack on Faron. Memoires de Thaon ; de Victor. Letters 
 from Graham. Mulgrave in Gazette. Letter from Hood, in Admirals' 
 Dispatches, Mediterranean 1793, R. O. Lettre de Gasparin et Salicetti 
 Oct. 4. R. A. 
 
 2 Lettre Carteaux a La Poype. Oct. 3. A. G. 
 
 3 Lettres de Ricord, Oct. 8 : de Salicetti, Oct. 10, 12, 23, 27 : de Freron- 
 Oct 20. R. A. 
 
27 
 
 pas d'autres que sa reputation." On Oct. 6th Carteaux wrote 1 
 "Mais elites ail Ministre, vous qui connaissez ma franchise 
 que si Ton croit quelqu'un plus capable que moi pour rem- 
 plir cette mission, que c'est avec reconnaissance que je ced- 
 erai un fardeaux que la trahison la plus noire m'a rendu 
 insupportable, car quel nom voules vous que je donne a 
 une Phrase qui dit tout simplement que je 1'eusse voulu les 
 Anglais ne seraient plus a Toulon et que peut penser de 
 moi le comite de Salut Public, a qui Ton fait entendre que 
 c'est pour avoir rejette son plan que les Anglais ne sont 
 pas chasses." 
 
 The Republican soldiers were raw recruits, uncertain, 
 undisciplined and poorly armed ; many ofthe troops who ar- 
 rived had no arms at all. 2 Salicetti and Gasparin went them- 
 selves to Marseilles and with great difficulty obtained 3000 
 guns. The one redeeming feature of the Republican army 
 was the artillery. 3 Napoleon showed the greatest activity, col- 
 lecting cannon, powder, and material of every kind. He was 
 untiring in his efforts and definite in his purpose. His first 
 two batteries have already been spoken of. La Montague 
 opened fire on Sept 18; Les Sans Culottes, on the the 20th. 
 "'Situee au bord de la mer a la pointe du Bregaillon ; elle a 
 fait son effet, elle a chassse tous les pontons, les bombardes 
 et les fregates qui se tenaient sur la gauche de 1'Eguillette". 
 These two batteries cleared the petite rade north of I/Eguil- 
 lette. The village La Seyne was thus protected. The next 
 battery, Les Sablettes was erected against Fort Mulgrave, 
 which continued to be Napoleon's object of attack. Les 
 Sablettes opened fire on Oct. 7 
 
 The Allies decided to attack it. They had learned from a 
 
 1 L,ettre de Carteaux a 1'adjoint du Mtre de la Guerre, Archives de la 
 Guerre. 
 
 2 Lettre de Veyrenne a Carteaux Oct. 6. Lettre de Carteaux au Min 
 istre de la Guerre. Oct. 7. Proclamation de Carteaux. Oct. 8. Archives 
 de la Guerre. 
 
 3 Lettres de Carteaux. Sept. 29. Oct. 18. A. G. Lettre de Salicetti 
 Sept. 25. A. G. 
 
28 
 
 deserter who knew the watchword, that it was defended by 
 troops of the last conscription. At half past two in the morn- 
 ing of Oct 9, 400 English and Spanish left Fort Mulgrave 
 to attack the battery. Led on by a French deserter, who 
 answered the sentinels, they entered the battery; the first 
 sentinel was killed, all who resisted were bayoneted. The 
 enemy was completely routed, after making a short stand. 
 They numbered about 300. The English spiked the guns, 
 sawed the gun-carriages and destroyed the ammunition 
 which was found in quantities At 4 o'clock they marched 
 back, having lost but 4 men killed and 7 wounded. The 
 Republicans lost 7 men killed and 10 wounded; also a few 
 prisoners among them 3 officers and the lieutenant of artil- 
 lery who commanded the battery. The damage was not very 
 great. " A trois heures aprSs midi la batterie se trouve par- 
 faitement retablie et en etat de jour. Vous avez ci. joint des 
 proclamations que les enemis ont laissees en profusion en 
 abandonnant la batterie. nos soldats ne croient pas au ten- 
 dre interet des puissances coalisees pour la dynastie que 
 nous avons culbute due trone." 
 
 1 Napoleon's activity continued, new batteries were con- 
 stantly being erected. Hood's record for these days is full 
 of " heavy cannonading between the ships and batteries." 
 " The enemy's gun and rnortar Batteries are constantly 
 playing upon our posts and shipping without our having 
 the means of driving them to a greater distance." 2 At this 
 time the Allied forces amounted to about twice the number 
 of the besieging army: their troops were undoubtedly better. 
 Why they did not make some successful sallies is hard to 
 explain. In the meantime however the number of con- 
 scripts raised in the Var amounted to about 13,000 young 
 men ; and fresh battalions arrived daily. Were they all 
 
 1 Attack of Sablettes. Gasparin. Oct 7. R. A. Memoires de Napoleon 
 Mulgrave in Gazette. Hood in Gazette. 
 
 2 Letter from Hood to John Trevor. Public Record Office. Foreign 
 Office. Sardinia. 1793. Oct to Dec. Letters from Trevor to Grenville. 
 
29 
 
 armed, it would perhaps have been possible to have made 
 an attack one of the posts. As it was, the artillery was the 
 only arm which annoyed the Allies in the least. The Petite 
 Hade was gradually cleared of the ships, which were taken 
 back to a safer position. 
 
 On Oct. 13th. news arrived of the fall of Lyons. The 
 besieging army celebrated it in true republican style. Extra 
 rations of eau-de-vie were distributed. There was dancing, 
 music and singing. Whole battalions danced around in 
 rings. The news was announced to the town by the shot and 
 shell from a new battery which Napoleon had just com- 
 pleted : Breguart, about 300 yards south of Les Sablettes 
 "elle balaye les rives de la droite de 1'Eguillette et toute 
 cette partie de la Grande Rade." 1 The Allies decided to stop 
 this rejoicing and the next day, they made a sortie. Thaon 
 de Revel termed it "une etourdie militaire". At 11 o'clock 
 in the morning 3000 of the Allies took up a defensive posi- 
 tion behind the Riviere Neuve. 100 men were sent out to 
 Hauteur des Arennes to discover the movements of the 
 enemy. A patrol of 800 men was sent out on the left. 
 These advance bodies got too far forward and in protecting 
 their retreat a general action came on. The Allies retired to 
 their position, and awaited the attack of the Republicans, 
 but as night came on they retired to Fort Malbousquet. In 
 giving an account of this engagement Carteaux praised 
 Almeras highly. 2 "L'intelligence et les talents du citoyen 
 Almeras ont force nos ennemis a se reployer ". He did not 
 mention Bonaparte, nor can I find anywhere a justification 
 for Chuquet's saying that he led the troops on this day. 
 3 Carteaux praised the work of the batteries in the same 
 letter, however "Tant qu'a nos Batteries elles font le rneil- 
 leur effet possible surtout la batterie des Sans-culottes . . . 
 elle coupe de temps en temps quelques mats et maltraite les 
 freegates ". 
 
 1 Correspondance de Napoleon. 
 
 2 " Carteaux au M. de la Guerre, Oct. 18, A. G. 
 
 3 Chuquet page 188. 
 
30 
 
 The next day, October 15, it was the Republican's turn to 
 take the offensive. Lapoype made an attack on Cap Brun, 1 
 but after a stubborn fight was driven back. The post was 
 supposed to be in safety, but before long a second and much 
 stronger column advanced, covered by the artillery. This 
 time the Allies were soon driven from the post ; four English 
 officers fell in defending it. Once more a hurried Council of 
 War was held at Toulon on the news of the loss of the post. 
 " On delibera a Toulon si Ton attaquerait le Cap Brun de 
 vive force, ou si Ton obligerait 1'ennemi a 1'evacuer par un 
 rnouveinent qui menaca de les envelopper ". It was decided 
 to outflank the Republicans. The position of the enemy was 
 reconnoitred and it was found that they had abandoned 
 Cap Brun, forming their whole line on a height further to 
 the east, their left covered by Castle Ste Marguerite, which 
 had two twelve pounders turned toward the land. Field 
 pieces could be seen well distributed along the front of the 
 enemy's line. The Allies inarched under the protection of 
 the guns of Fort Faron to La Vallette, leaving behind them 
 140 men with two 18 pounders, who with the guns from 
 Fort Faron were to block the Vallon Favieres and prevent 
 the enemy from sending reinforcements by this pass from 
 their post at Tourris and Revest. From La Vallette, they 
 started for the Hauteurs de Thouars, a position commanding 
 La Garde, and which would have given the allies control of 
 the entire plain and of all the roads to the east of Toulon. 
 From this position the Republicans might have been forced 
 miles away from the east side of the city. The Republicans 
 saw their danger and moved in all haste from their position 
 toward La Garde. Owing to the mistake of the guide, and 
 to the rather slow manoeuvres of the Spanish and Neapoli- 
 tan infantry which headed the column, the Republicans 
 reached La Garde at the same time as the Allies gained the 
 heights of Thouars. The battle now resolved itself into a 
 heavy cannonade from each side. " Les Fran^ais firent un 
 l Attack on Cap Brun. Thaon. Elphinstone in Gazette. 
 
. 
 
 V X 
 
 31 
 
 mouvement comme pour couper au.x allies le chemin de 
 Toulon mais leur cavalerie mise en desordre par le canon, 
 se retire bientot. Les dragons de la Reine espagnole manoeuv- 
 rirent avec audace et succes". 160 of these cavalrymen 
 had just arrived three days before. When night came on 
 the noise of the artillery and wagons leaving La Garde was 
 distinctly heard, and as the Republicans did not answer the 
 heavy guns of the allies, it was supposed that they had 
 evacuated the place. A few men were sent ahead " pour s'en 
 assurer, mais le feu violent qui en partit, fit connaitre qu'il 
 etait encore occupe". The object of the allies had been ac- 
 complished and they returned to Toulon. This was the only 
 fight around Toulon of skillful manoeuvring where all three 
 arms were employed. 
 
 The operations dragged on slowly, but the outlook for the 
 Republicans was not bright. Freron and Barras wrote from 
 Marseilles : " A present les ennemis se sont renforces et se 
 renforcent tous les jours. Carteaux n'a aucune des connais- 
 sances militaires propres a s'emparer d'une des places les 
 mieux fortifiees de la Republique" Reinforcements were 
 looked for from Toulon. In these days of depression Bona- 
 parte was the only one who was active. On October 18th he 
 opened a new battery, Des 4 Moulins, situee a 700 toises de 
 la redoute anglaise." 1 For the same day, can be read in 
 Hood's Journal : " A heavy fire commenced from Hauteur 
 de Grasse and ships in the N. W. Arm." The garrison of Fort 
 Mulgrave began to see the danger of their position. For 
 three days they kept up a continual fire on Napoleon's bat- 
 teries, but failed to destroy any of them. And on October 22 
 they were attacked by still another; La Grande Rade, "elle 
 fait le meme effet que celle du Breguart ". Hood's attention 
 was continually called to Fort Mulgrave. On October 23 he 
 wrote in his Journal; "Made the General signal to assist 
 Camel with boats". This short sentence is proof that the 
 Camel approached too close to Bonaparte's battery. About 
 
 1 Correspondance de Napoleon. 
 
32 
 
 this time the powder became rather scarce and the batteries 
 were not so noisy. In the meantime Napoleon was busily 
 employed on four or five new ones; all in different stages 
 of completion. 
 
 The constant yet somewhat unjust complaints against Car- 
 teaux had at last taken effect, and on October 21 he received 
 notice that he was to be replaced at Toulon by General 
 Doppet, who had commanded at Lyons. From now on until 
 the departure of Carteaux on November 7 the siege rather 
 dragged, although the monotony was broken now and then 
 by a day of "heavy cannonading", as it was termed in 
 Hood's Journal. No great harm seems to have been done. 
 On October 30th the Terrible " signalled for assistance," 
 but in general the ships keep at a safe distance. The last 
 week in October troops and cannon began to arrive from 
 Lyons and Grenoble, as well as many troops from the new 
 levies; for the Representants were quite- busy dispatching 
 raw and useless recruits to the walls of Toulon. 1 On Octo- 
 ber 25 Salicetti and Gasparin received news from Doppet 
 informing them that he had sent off 3,000 troops. As they 
 had expected 20,000 this information gave them a good deal 
 of alarm, which they quickly made known to the Comite 
 de Salut public. The Allies also received reinforcements, 
 which added to the discouragement of the Republicans. 
 Discipline in the Republican army was still bad and deser- 
 tion frequent. At last on November 5 some good troops ar- 
 rived from Lyons. Two days afterwards Carteaux left, com- 
 plaining bitterly against Doppet " qui n'a point de talents 
 militaires," 2 and against Lapoype "qui s'est conduit de 
 maniere a faire soup^onner sa fidelite " J He accused even 
 the Representants ; something which was very dangerous to 
 do in that day. " Quel role me fait-on jouer? Les forces de 
 Lyons devoient sans retard marcher sur Toulon, il semble 
 
 1 Letters under date of November 2. A. G. 
 
 Letters from Oct. 22 to Nov. 5 from Representants. R. A. 
 
 2 Lettre de Carteaux au Ministre de la Guerre. Nov. 5th. A. G. 
 
33 
 
 qu'urie main les retienne et je suis oblige de surveiller jour 
 et nuit une troupe fatigue de trois mois de Bivouac, et lors- 
 que les moyens d'agir avec efficacite arriveront ceux qui 
 m'ont lies les bras viendront pour que je leur cde la place, 
 ils se sont bien gardes de hater les secours ils n'ont ecoute 
 que leur ambition et la chose publique ne pouvant &tre 
 sauve par eux, ils n'ont pas voulu qu'un brave homme la 
 sauve 'V Carteaux was quite right in saying that he was 
 being removed just at the moment when things were taking 
 a brighter turn. 2 
 
 On Nov 5th. the Minister of War sent word to Doppet that 
 he was to go to the Pyrenees : Carteaux was to be put in com- 
 mand of the Army of the Alpes to hold the Piedmontese in 
 check : and General Dugommier was to take command at 
 Toulon. 3 Doppet did not arrive until the 13th. From the 
 6th until this time Lapoype held the command. The real 
 head of the army however was Salicetti, with whom at this 
 time Napoleon had the greatest influence. He therefore 
 practically had his hands free and if he felt that he was him- 
 self capable of directing an attack on Toulon he might 
 through the influence of Salicetti attempt it ; in spite of the 
 fact that Doppet had given Lapoype instructions to remain 
 on the defensive. 4 It seems in reality as if such an attack was 
 made altho it is impossible to get positive proof of it. The 
 following is found in Pon's Memoires. It is said to have 
 happened on Nov. 9; "La matinee 1'ennemi attaquait le 
 camp Balaguier rnais sans succes. L'aprs-midi il feignait 
 de marcher sur Malbousquet et Saint-Antoine dans le temps 
 que le General Lapoype simulait une attaque contre le Cap 
 Brun. puis tout & coup se porta de nouveau sur Belaguier 
 avec 12 a 1500 homines et fit encore une fois contraint de 
 se retirer. II revint a la charge ver les sept heures du soir 
 avec 2 13 3000 hommes. Le camp menace venait de recevoir 
 
 1 Lettre de Carteaux a 1'Adjoint au Ministre de la Guerre. Nov. 4. A. 
 
 2 Lettre de Salicetti. Nov 9. R. A. 
 
 3 Mtre. de la Guerre au Gen. Doppet. Nov. 5. A. G. 
 
 4 Lettre Salicetti. Nov. 9. R. A. 
 21923 
 
34 
 
 des troupes fraiches et des munitions. On laissa les repub- 
 licans s'approcher des retranchements et au moment ou ils 
 croyaient se rendre maitres un feu trs vif de mousqueterie 
 et une decharge a mitrallle de 1'artillerie les forcerent a 
 abandonner precipitamment le champ de bataille qui resta 
 couvert de inorts et de blesses ". This is rather a circum- 
 stantial account and is strengthened by the following which 
 Salicetti wrote on Nov. 9th. 1 " II nous arrive enfin des muni- 
 tions, des pieces d'artillerie de I'arm^e de Lyon. . . . 
 nous sorames maitres d'une position ou nous sommes occu- 
 per a nous fortifier, d'ou nous pourrons incendier les ede- 
 fices de 1'infame Toulon, en les designant au doigt . . . 
 on se prepare a attaquer les ennemis en mme temps dans 
 la rade, dans la ville et dans plusieurs forts". In other 
 words Salicetti said they had just received more munitions 
 and artillery, that they occupied a strong position ; (he must 
 have referred to the heighs upon which the Battery, the 
 Convention, was situated, and that they were planing the 
 very kind of an attack which according to Pons was made. 
 In Hood's Journal- Nov 9. " Terrible made signal for as- 
 sistance, made Royal and Robust signals for their boats to 
 go to the assistance of the Terrible". Here at least is proof 
 that the attack upon the Rade was made. It seems quite 
 probable that this was the work of Bonaparte who had in- 
 duced Salicetti to risk an attack. As Lopoype and probably 
 all the officers were involved in it ; as it was a failure ; and 
 as it was carried out against orders, it is not surprising that 
 there should be no official account of it. The affairs of the 
 Republican Army were carried on in such a loose manner, 
 that even such an attack might be passed over without being 
 noticed. The attack was, according to Pons' description, a 
 spirited one, but it proved somewhat premature and at all 
 events a failure. During this period before the arrival of 
 Doppet, Napoleon had been especially active in the erec- 
 tion of batteries : the material for these was furnished by 
 
 1 Recueil Aulard. 
 
35 
 
 Lyons and Grenoble. On Nov. 9th. Salicetti wrote " On 
 terminera la nuit prochaine une batterie qui produira dans 
 la Grande Rade le mme effet que les Sans-Culottes dans la 
 Petite". Nov 12. 1 u le 22 au 23 Brumaire la batterie des 
 Sablettes a fait une feu terrible sur la redoute des Anglais, 
 a fait sauter un magazin a poudre et tu6 beaucoup de monde 
 par Peclat des bombes qui ont pris feu. Demain une nou- 
 velle batterie, dite les hommes-sans-peur fera feu sur la Bat- 
 terie ennerni. une autre dite la convention nationale battera 
 Malbousquet ". Nov 13th 2 "0n travaille avec ardeur a la 
 construction de nouvelles batteries. A I'arrive'e du general 
 nous esperons de frapper de grands coups et d'avoir des 
 nouvelles importantes a vous cornmuniquer". Hood wrote 
 on Nov 13th. 3 " their batteries approach by degrees both 
 toward the town and the fleet and it is of the highest im- 
 portance that the garrison should be made strong enough 
 to go out and destroy their works ". As is seen, by the arrival 
 of Doppet Bonaparte's branch of the army had made the 
 greatest progress : Napoleon had selected the position of, and 
 started to erect, every battery which was used up to the fall 
 of Toulon. 4 Therefore to him and to him alone belongs the 
 credit of the principal arm of the besieging army at Toulon. 
 
 Doppet arrived on November 13th. He saw at once that 
 he did not possess the necessary qualifications for carrying 
 on a seige such as that of Toulon and Consented to stay 
 only if it would be under the orders of Dugommier. Luck 
 would have it however that the few days in which he was 
 in command were rather exciting ones. 
 
 On November 15 an engagement took place. The follow- 
 ing is Napoleon's account of it. 6 The soldiers of the battalion 
 
 1 Lettre Salicetti. Nov 12th. Archives de la Guerre. (Not published 
 in Recueil Aulard. ) 
 
 2 Lettre Salicetti. R. A. 
 
 3 Letter to John Trevor. Record Office. Sardinia. 
 
 4 Letter Nov 14th. Correspondance de Napoleon. Here the future posi- 
 tion of every battery afterwards erected is mentioned. 
 
 5 Salicetti. November 17th. R. A. 
 Memoires de Napoleon. 
 
36 
 
 Cote d' Or stationed opposite Fort Mulgrave, seeing the Span- 
 iards ill-treat a French prisoner, seize their arms and rush 
 to his assistance. Other battalions follow and soon a whole 
 division is engaged. Doppet and Bonaparte rush to the 
 Scene. " Le vin est tire, il faut le boire " says Napoleon "in 
 advising Doppet rather to continue the action than to with- 
 draw the troops. Doppet allows him to direct the attack. 
 Bonaparte places himself at the head of the tirailleurs who 
 cover the hill, and forming two columns tries to penetrate 
 into the Fort at its gorge. O'Hara, the Governor of Toulon, 
 sees the action and hastens to Fort Mulgrave to urge on his 
 troops, he makes a sortie which is vigorously supported by a 
 cannonade from the ships and Fort. Doppet, seeing one of 
 his aids killed at his side, gives the signal for retreat. Na- 
 poleon is furious and galloping toward Doppet exclaims, 
 "Toulon est manque, et un . j . f . . . . a fait battre la re- 
 traite." Such is Napoleon's account which Cottin x puts aside, 
 and then relates how it was "en realite." In the War Ar- 
 chives a contempory and detailed report of this engagement 
 exists and I shall give it about in full. It will be seen that 
 it is quite reconcilable with Napoleon's account. 
 
 2 "Rapport du Citoyeii Brule, Chef du 2 ie Bon de la Cote 
 d'Or, commandant la division ditte de la Plaine a 1'armee 
 Revolutionnaire pres Toulon. 
 
 1 Cottin. page 266. 
 
 2 Cottin's authorities are Thaon de Revel: Boullement de Lachenaye. 
 Journal de Vernes. Raports Napolitains. (He admits that the Journal de 
 Vernes is inexact: Thaon de Revel's account does not conflict with Na- 
 poleon's: I found the Raports Napolitains in London, but put them aside 
 as scanty and containing nothing of value). With these Cottin relates 
 how it was "en realite*." Napoleon's account is corroberated by the 
 report of Brule*, the account of Doppet (letter Nov 17th. Archives de la 
 Guerre) and a letter from O'Hara under date of Nov 15th. in the 
 Gazette. Attacks on this day were frequent. Doppet writes, "L'ennemi 
 voyant commencer des travaux trop pres de lui et s' clever des batteries 
 qui rendroient la prise des siennes moines difficiles a pris le parti de faire 
 a chaque instant des sorties du cote* de nos travailleurs " . . . " Le me me 
 jour (15th Nov.) nous avons etc* attaque a notre droite du cote* des Sab- 
 lettes au centre du cote de Malbousquet, et a la gauche du cote* du fort 
 St. Antoine. non contentes de les repousser, nos troupes ont a la gauche 
 et a la droite poursuivi 1'ennemi jusque dans ses retrenchements, cepen- 
 dant cette affaire e*tant ge"nerale n'ayant eu ni donne" aucune plan d'at- 
 
37 
 
 Le 25e jour du 2 Mois de la de annee 2 de la Republique 
 frari9aise une patrouille ennemie s'etant presentee devant la 
 Seine nos postes avancees furent & sa rencontre. Le combat 
 s'engage entre elles. Ces patrouilles se grossirent de Part et 
 d'autre de manieire qu'au bout de trois quarts d'heures on 
 eut dit que c'etait deux armees au lieu de Patrouilles. Moi 
 sousigne m'etaut transporte sur les lieux je ralliai les troupes 
 de la Republique et ordonnai la charge. Alors nos troupes 
 fondrent sur Fennemi avec un tel acbarnement que je ne 
 pus les empecher d'aller jusqu'a la redoute ennemie. M'y 
 etant transporte moi-m&me je jugqai qu'il aurait ete impru- 
 dent de tenter un assaut puisque ce poste ne nous aurait 
 ete d'aucune utilite pour le moment attendu Pimpossibilite de 
 pouvoir le conserver. En consequence je ordonnai la retraite 
 qui s'effectua dans le meilleur ordre possible. Nous avons 
 perdus dans cette affaire qu'a dure 5 heures 10 & 12 homines 
 qui sont morts sur le champ de bataille et environ 15 
 blesses. . . . L'ennemi a eu environ 60 ou 70 hommes tues 
 dont la pluspart out ete tues dont leur redoute, nous leur 
 avons fait aussi un prisonnier." Here the chief of the Bat- 
 talion Cote d'Or admits that his men got away from him, 
 and it is quite possible that while he was sounding the 
 retreat, Napoleon was trying to form the scattered, but still 
 advancing troops into column to enter the fort. It is also 
 not surprising that Napoleon thought Doppet had given 
 orders to sound the retreat ; which lie may also have done. 
 
 taque, les forces etant de plus trop divisees pour en esperer en avancant 
 des avantages reels et durables chaque chef de colonne fit engager ses 
 postes a sa troupe ". This shows that Doppet had no plan of attack, that 
 each chef directed his own affair, and that regarding the engagements in 
 such a light, it is quite possible that Doppet sounded the retreat when 
 he found his soldiers too far advanced. Cottin says the "1'objectif re*el 
 des republicans e*tait toujours Balaguier, centre lequel Doppet lanca 
 d'abord 50, puis 500, enfin 1500 hommes ". The attack on Balaguier was 
 the all important one, but it was not Doppet who directed it, nor were 
 the other attacks false ones, made by Doppet, as Cottin puts it. Napoleon 
 took part in the attack of Balaguier, and nothing can be found to dis- 
 prove his account of it. 
 
 O'Hara writes, " Mulgrave vigorously and repeatedly attacked by a 
 large corps of the enemy. ' ' 
 
38 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 DUGOMMIER MARESCOT COUNCIL OF WAR BONAPARTE'S 
 PLAN MARESCOT'S INFLUENCE UPON THE SIEGE AT- 
 TACK ON CONVENTION ARTILLERY BEFORE FINAL AT- 
 TACK ATTACK ON EGUILLETTE COUNCIL OF WAR 
 DEPARTURE OF ALLIES DESTRUCTION OF THE SHIPS 
 ENTRANCE OF REPUBLICANS BONAPARTE AND THE 
 MASSACRES. 
 
 On Nov. 17 Dugommier arrived. He was far a better gen- 
 eral than Carteaux, Lapoype, or Doppet. Fifty-five years 
 old, he had seen some service. He was formally an officer 
 in a marine battery; he took part with some distinction in 
 the Seven Years War, and also in the American War of 
 Independence. Then he retired to his estate in the West 
 Indies, from whence he had been sent as a deputy to Paris ; 
 later he re-entered the army, was made brigadier general in 
 Oct. 1792. In the Italian army he likewise distinguished 
 himself, became general of division : in short he was a good 
 soldier. 
 
 An old artillery general, Du Theil, arrived two hours 
 after Dugommier. Doppet and Albitte had brought him to 
 take charge of the artillery, but he was forced to remain a 
 few days in Marseilles, and consequently did not arrive with 
 Doppet. About this time a decided and continual improve- 
 ment took place in the condition of the besieging army. 
 Reinforcements, artillery and ammunition arrived in great 
 quantity : these came principally from Lyons. The taking 
 of this city had a great effect upon the attack of Toulon, as 
 it permitted about all the forces employed there to be turned 
 against the Allies in Toulon. There was however difficulty 
 in finding provisions for the Republican army, and toward 
 the end of the siege this question became one of great im- 
 portance. 1 
 
 On Nov. 24 the chef de bataillon, Marescot, a friend of 
 Carnot's arrived, " pour diriger le genie ". The next day he 
 i Lttres de Salicetti. Nov. 9 to 13. R. A. 
 
39 
 
 wrote to Carnot; " J'ai ete visiter les attaques qui ne sont autre 
 chose que quelques batteries provisoires dresse"es par les of- 
 ficiers d'artillerie destinees a combattre les batteries avancees 
 des rebelles et a favoriser les premieres operations qui 
 doivent avoir lieu le plus tot possible 'V This was his first 
 impression, a little later he wrote somewhat differently. On 
 Jan 9th. 1794 in a Relation de la prise de Toulon he wrote 
 " nos dispositions d'attaque n'etaient autre chose que des 
 batteries provisoires placees avantageucemeiit par le chef de 
 bataillon Bonaparte, commandant en second de Partillerie ". 2 
 Here he admitted that the batteries were placed "avantag- 
 eusement" and by Bonaparte. His terming them " batteries 
 provisoires" was quite wrong; he probably meant that in 
 their construction they had not all the complete details such 
 as would appeal to the eyes of an engineer. This was the 
 case, but under the circumstances (dirth of workmen etc.) 
 was quite unavoidable. It will be seen what success the 
 engineers had in trying to complete these batteries. Their 
 positions were their strong points and, as it has been seen, 
 the course of the siege proved this to Marescott. 
 
 On Nov 25th. Dugommier held a council of war: the Rep- 
 resentants, the generals, Bonaparte, Marescot and others 
 were present There has been a good deal written about the 
 plan of attack followed at Toulon ; attempts made to prove 
 that Napoleon was its originator, as well as to prove the con- 
 trary ; yet no one seems to have laid stress upon the fact 
 that on Nov 14, therefore 10 days before the council of war, 
 Bonaparte in a letter to the Minister of War, 3 proposed a 
 plan of attack which corresponded in almost every detail 
 with that decided upon in the Council : As Napoleon drew 
 up the proces verbal of the council, both the plans are pub- 
 lished in his Correspondance. The war council decided : to 
 make the principal attack on Eguillette: 4 to attack Mal- 
 
 1 Letter from Marescot. Nov 25th. R. A. 
 
 2 Relation de la prise de Toulon, e*crit le 9 Janvier 1794. par le Ge*ne*ral 
 Marescot, Archives de la Guerre. 
 
 3 Correspondance de Napole*on. 
 
 4 L,ettre 25 Novembre. Correspondance de Napoleon. 
 
40 
 
 bousquet with the batteries la Convention and la Poudriere, 
 so to deceive the enemy as to the point of attack, and to pre- 
 pare the way for the infantry " si les evenements en permet- 
 tent 1'attaque": to establish a battery against Cap Brun to 
 deceive the enemy as to the point of attack ; to take Faron: 
 all attacks were to be made at the same time : the " division 
 de droite"was to attack Eguillette and to make a false 
 attack on Malbousquet (this " false " attack was to be carried 
 out if possible) the "division de gauche" was to make the 
 attack on Faron and a false attack on Cap Brun. Much of 
 the plan related to the batteries. It was decided ; to erect 
 batteries " a Fextremite du promontoire de 1'Eguillette, afin 
 d'obliger Fescadre a evacuer la rade et in6me de la bruler, 
 si un vent contraire s' oppose a sa sortie": to erect one against 
 Cap Brun; another " de 6 mortiers a grande portee centre 
 Toulon " between la Convention and Malbousquet : to estab- 
 lish a " redoute de protection sur la gauche de la montagne 
 de la Convention pour empcher que 1'ennemi favorise par 
 le feu des redoutes de Sainte Antoine ne tourne et n'elve 
 la batterie de la Convention ". Napoleon wrote in his above 
 mentioned letter of Nov 14th. "Chasser les ennemis de la 
 rade est le point preliminaire .... pour se rendre 
 maitre de la rade il faut se rendre maitre de la pointe de 
 1'Eguillette. Au meme moment que nous serious maitres de 
 la pointe de 1'Eguillette, il faudrait bombarder Toulon avec 
 8 ou 10 mortiers. Nous sommes maitres de la hauteur des 
 Arnes qui n'en est pas a 900 toises et nous pourrons facile- 
 men t nous approcher a 800 toises sans passer la riviere 
 iieuve : dans le meme temps Ton placerait deux batteries 
 devant le fort Malbousquet, et une contre le fort 1'Artigues. 
 . . . Aujourd'hui il serait possible que quoique la 
 flotte fut oblige d'evacuer la rade la garnison tint encore et 
 soutint le siege. Alors les 2 batteries que nous aurions etab- 
 lis contre Malbousquet seraient promptement renforc6es par 
 une troisieme : les mortiers qui pendant 3 jours auraient 
 bombarde" Toulon se tourneraient pour ruiner les defenses 
 
OF 
 
 _[ORN\J 
 41 
 
 de Malbousquet. Le fort ne resistera pas 48 heures et rien 
 ne nous arrete alors jusqu'au front de Toulon. Nous atta- 
 quons le front compose par le bastion du Marais et le bas- 
 tion de Farsenal par une attaque brusque"e qui nous conduit 
 tout de suite a la deuxieme parallele favorises par les batteries 
 placets au Malbousquet et par celles placees sur le revers 
 des Are"nes. Nous serious gene's dans cette operation par le 
 fort FArtigues mais 4 mortiers et les 6 pieces de canon qui 
 y aurait 6t6 place's au premier moment de Fattaque, y res- 
 teraient et feraient alors un feu plus vif " . . . . Then 
 he continued "La prise de FEguillette, Fexpulsion des An- 
 glais des rades et le bombardement et dans le m6me temps 
 attaquer le Faron". From carefully comparing these two 
 plans, it will- be seen that Napoleon's was practically the 
 same as the one decided upon in the council of war. Napo- 
 leon did not speak of the false attack against Cap Brun, and 
 proposed batteries to be erected against Fort Artigues and 
 not against the redoute Sainte Antoine, as it is mentioned 
 in the final plan. With these two exceptions they are about 
 identical. This shows conclusively that Napoleon was quite 
 decided as to the proper plan of attack before the arrival of 
 Dugornmier. It is wrong however to say that Bonaparte was 
 the sole originator of this plan, or to attribute any great 
 merit to him if he had been. There were at least three vital 
 points around Toulon ; the most vital was certainly Fort La 
 Malgue ; this the Republicans could not well attack as it was 
 strong for two reasons : the English had first landed there, 
 and used it as a point of protection for their fleet ; again all 
 the Forts on the east side of Toulon had been better built, 
 as it was from the east that any possible land attack on 
 Toulon was supposed to come. Faron was also a position of 
 great importance. This had been recognized at once by the 
 Republicans, but their attack upon it had failed in the end. 
 Lastly the Eguillette : this was also a splendid point of at- 
 tack and the easiest to approach. Napoleon had recognized 
 this immediately; but any well instructed officer would have 
 
42 
 
 done so. That Carteaux, who understood nothing about the 
 use of artillery and whose tactics consisted in using the Bay- 
 onette, had not seen this, is not so surprising. 
 
 Someone had however sent this advice, the attacking of 
 Eguillette, from Paris. Salicetti wrote on Sept 26th. to the 
 Cornite du Salut Public, 1 accusing Carteaux for having 
 allowed the English to get possession of Eguillette. " Le 
 general que nous avions cru comprendre et adopter notre 
 plan n'y avait aucune confiance quoique celui que vous 
 avez envoye de Paris fut exactetnent le meme ". On Sept 
 25th. he wrote to the Minister of War. " Nous 1'aurions 
 force de quitter la rade, si ce general avait voulu executer 
 le plan que nous lui avons propose et qui etait celui du 
 comite de Salut Public ". 2 The idea of attacking the Eguil- 
 lette came therefore from Paris. Bonaparte, as was natural 
 had seen that it was the best point to attack and his bat- 
 teries were erected against it, and did the greatest part to- 
 ward taking it. The Republican Army had however, after the 
 council of war, a plan which was agreed upon by all ; it 
 was no longer Bonaparte's idea only. Every one went to 
 work to carry it out. The condition of the army was how- 
 ever far from satisfactory in many ways. Barras wrote from 
 Marseilles on Nov 19th. " La situation de Tarmee n'est pas 
 satisfaisant " Victor said in his Memoires " Notre armSe 
 etait jeune, pleine d'ardeur, mais il n'etait point facile de la 
 soumettre aux lois d'une exacte discipline". Marescot le 
 chef du genie, had the greatest difficulty in trying to carry 
 out his elaborate plans of a " sige en rgle ". The workmen 
 were wanting, implements were hard to obtain, and he met 
 with little encouragement on all sides. Finally however he 
 became convinced that one must proceed in the most prac- 
 tical manner, and get along without that which it was im- 
 possible to obtain: but when at last, he was convinced of 
 this fact the siege was about over; consequently Marescot, 
 
 1 Recueil Aulard. 
 
 2 Archives de la Guerre. 
 
43 
 
 even as chef du genie, had no influence 'upon the direction 
 of the siege. Dec 10 he wrote " je vois que chacun ici est 
 persuade qu'il ne sera pas necessaire de devellopper des 
 attaques regulie*res pour reduire Toulon, j' aime a le croire 
 et mme je le presume " ; and after frequent complaints to 
 his friend Carnot of the insufficiency of the material neces- 
 sary for his branch of the army he ended by admitting that 
 up to Dec. 10 he had done nothing. 1 Those who strive to 
 deminish the role of Bonaparte at Toulon lay stress upon 
 the fact that Marescot arrived at the same time as Dugom- 
 mier; and to direct the siege. 
 
 One branch of the army continually and regularly in- 
 creased, and that was the artillery. From now on to the end 
 it will be seen how the Republican artillery kept up a con- 
 stant and effective fire upon the entire western side of 
 Toulon, until the Allied fleet sailed from the harbor in 
 haste. Nelson wrote on Dec 1st. 2 "shot and shells are very 
 plentiful all over the harbor. I wonder more damage has 
 not yet been done ". General O'Hara I hope will be able 
 to drive the French from the heights near the harbour or 
 we shall be unpleasantly situated, not that I think Toulon 
 is in the slightest danger. At all events we can destroy the 
 French fleet and Arsenal in a very short time". 
 
 On Nov 28th the battery La Convention was opened 
 upon Fort Malbousquet ; it apparently did no very great 
 damage; but its commanding position worried the Allies a 
 great deal, and it was decided to make a sortie and try to 
 destroy it. 3 About 3000 troops, British, Spanish, Neapoli- 
 tan Piedmontese and French refugies left the garrison about 
 
 1 Marescot a Carnot. Dec. 10th. Archives de la Guerre. 
 
 2 Nelson's Dispatches. 
 
 3 Attack on Convention. 
 
 Lettre du General Gamier. Nov 30th. Archives de la Guerre. 
 
 Lettre de Salicetti. Nov. 30th. Letter from Elliot. 
 
 Thaon. Letter to Sir W. Hamilton, Correspondence. British Museum 
 Mss. Egerton2638. 
 
 Relation de Marescot. Lettre de Dugommier, Archives Nationales 
 A. F. 1,281. Letters from Hpod and Dundas in Gazette. 
 
44 
 
 four in the morning, and supported by field artillery and 
 the guns of Malbousquet, marched upon the Hauteur des 
 Arenes. The Republicans were taken more or less by sur- 
 prise and driven back in great confusion. The Allies how- 
 ever instead of forming on the height and preparing 
 themselves for a counter attack which was certain to come, 
 pursued the French along the road towards Ollioules, or 
 stopped to plunder. Even the spiking of the guns was car- 
 ried out slowly and imperfectly. The news of the success of 
 the Allies was soon spread through tho camp. General Gar- 
 nier, who commanded in this division, was making a stub- 
 born retreat with the few reliable men which he could 
 gather around him, when Dugommier, Bonaparte and others 
 soon carne on the scene with reinforcements. The Allies 
 were attacked with decision by superior forces, in the flank, 
 and at a moment when they were in confusion. Threatened 
 to be cut off from the town they retreated in great haste 
 and disorder, the Republicans following close on their heels. 
 The Piedmontese went back in less disorder than the others,and 
 they were also about the only ones prepared to make a stand 
 on the Heights : alone, however, they could do nothing. The 
 Allies brought their field pieces back from the Riviere Neuve 
 with great difficulty, as the Republicans followed them so 
 closely, and with such determination right up to the works 
 of Malbousquet, which they tried to enter by repeated at- 
 tacks. The guns of this fort and those of the Redoute Ste. 
 Antoine forced them to retire. " Le combat a 6t6 bien 
 chaude" wrote Salicetti ; and Napoleon "La matine a 6t6 
 belle". The fight was clearly to the advantage of the Re- 
 publicans, as the Convention and three other batteries were 
 blazing away harder than ever in a day or so; and the 
 Allies in their attempt lost about 700 of their best troops 
 killed, wounded, or taken prisoners : among the latter was 
 General O'Hara and about 17 officers. O'Hara was at first 
 with the reserve on the Riviere Neuve, but after the Allies 
 had taken the Convention, he advanced for some unknown 
 
45 
 
 reason to the battery, received a wound in the arm and as 
 the Allies fell back he was left behind and a few Republican 
 soldiers from the bataillon d'lsere made him prisoner. It 
 was not only around the Hauteur des Arenes but on the 
 entire western side that the fight took place. The Republican 
 batteries hurled shot at Fort Mulgrave and at the fleet, both 
 of which answered in the most spirited manner. The artil- 
 lery played an important part in driving the Allies back 
 from the Convention, as well as in protecting Garnier's re- 
 treat at the beginning of the engagement. Just what part 
 Napoleon took in this affair is hard to say, as accounts are 
 so conflicting. But at all events tliere is absolute proof that 
 he distinguished himself. l " Parmi ceux qui se sont le plus 
 distingue"s et qui m'ont le plus aid6 a rallier et a pousser en 
 avant, ce sont le citoyens Buonaparte commandant 1'artil- 
 lerie, Arena et Cervoni, adjudants g6n6raux ". Salicetti'wrote 
 on this day, " Le general Mouret, Gamier et Buonaparte se 
 sont dans cette occasion conduits d'une maniere distin- 
 guee ". 2 It will be noticed that he was mentioned by Dugomier 
 first among those who aided him, and that by Salicetti he 
 was mentioned with two of the generals, and lastly, that he 
 is the only one who is named in both reports. 
 
 The next two weeks were spent in preparing the batteries 
 and in frequent artillery duels. This arm had at last as- 
 sumed most formidable proportions 3 , thanks to the activity 
 of Bonaparte in procuring material of every description from 
 Marseilles, Lyons, Grenoble, Biancon, etc., and to his judge- 
 ment in selecting the positions of his batteries. Victor wrote 
 that by Dec. 6. 194 bouches a feu were turned against Tou- 
 lon; " orcespuissantsmoyens e"taient dirige"s par Bonaparte; 
 car le Ge"n6ral Dutheil emervill6 de la justesse et de la su- 
 periorite de ses vues s'6tait complement effac6 devant lui ". 
 4 Some idea of the amount of work required in the artillery 
 
 1 Lettre de Dugommier. Nov. 30. Archives de la Guerre. 
 
 2 Lettre de Salicetti Nov. 30 R. A. 
 
 3 Letter from O'Hara. Archives Nationales AF II 9. 
 
 4 Memoires de Victor. 
 
46 
 
 may be gathered frim the following report of Dutheil to the 
 Minister of War, on December 2nd. l " Personnel de 1'artil- 
 lerie il faudrait 6 officierssuperieurs, autants d'adjutants 
 majors, undirecteur du Pare, un sous directeur, un commis- 
 saire des guerres un propos^ du payeur general, 20 conduc- 
 teurs des charrios il n'y a pas le quart de cannoniers 
 necessaires. . . . il faudrait au moins 8 commissairesde 
 plus. Les cannoniers auxiliaires n'ayant que de la valeur et 
 aucune instruction. . . . Poudrede la Guerre Gassendi 
 chef de Bataillon envoy6 par les representans du peuple dans 
 toutes les places jusqu'a Metz et Strasbourg pour notre appro- 
 visionnement de siege anonce que c'est la partie qui nous 
 rnanquera le plus, quelque soit ses efforts pour nous en pro- 
 curer " The question of infantry cartridges was a most 
 
 vital one. Bonaparte, and later Duteuil were loud in de- 
 nouncing the wasteful expenditure here, especially in the 
 affair of November 30. At last Salicetti took most severe 
 measures for stopping this. Even as late as December 10 
 Dugommier wrote to the Minister of War "La poudre et 
 les autres munitions de guerre exigent encore ta sollicitude. 
 Je t'ai mande que nous Stions bien loin de la quantity cal- 
 cul6e raisonablement et n6cessaire a notre but." A day or so 
 before the attack of the Convention three new batteries were 
 opened. The Convention; the Homme-sans-peur, " situe"e sur 
 un mamelon doming par le camp anglais (Fort Mulgrave) 
 Le general en a arret6 la construction par ce qu'il croyait 
 1'infanterie trop faible pour s'y soutenir". ; and the Petite 
 Rade, destinee a 6loigner les batiments de la cote et des 
 voisinages de la poudriere". 2 On December 1 the Poudriere 
 opened fire on Malbousquet. " Observed a great deal of can- 
 nonading and musketry at the different Posts & more es- 
 pecially near Fort Malbousquet ", Such was the account of 
 it in Hood's Journal. 
 
 Dugommier became more and more enthusiastic over the 
 
 1 Archives de la guerre. 
 
 2 Correspondance de Napoleon. 
 
47 
 
 artillery. On November 30 he wrote to the Minister of War 
 "J'attends la perfection de deux batteries qui doivent jouer 
 tin beau role dans cette journSe". 1 Dec. 4, "Les batteries 
 necessaires a 1'execution du dernier plan sont presque entiere- 
 ment acheve"es - - Nous sommes pauvres en artilleurs." 
 Dec. 10 "Chaquejour notre position s'ameliore par la per- 
 fection des batteries necessaires a 1'attaque des postes exte- 
 rieures qu'occupe 1'ennerni et mdique"s dans mon plan 
 d'attaque. Je voudrais pouvoir t'en dire autant des autres 
 moyens qui doivent contribuer & nos succes." About this 
 time the batteries La Fariniere, to the right of the Convention, 
 and Jacobins to the left of Hommes-sans-Peur, and directed 
 against Fort Mulgrave, were opened on the enemy. On Dec. 
 13, Lord Hood wrote that there was nothing of importance 
 since the 30th of November, but that new batteries were going 
 up on all sides, and that two of them " did us some mischief, 
 on the 9th and 10th." " We shall soon have more men in 
 the hospital than are fit for service". 2 Dundas wrote on De- 
 cember 12 "The enemy have increased number of mortars 
 which have much annoyed our two posts of Cap Brim and 
 Fort Mulgrave". 3 On December 12 a new Council of War 
 was held, where it was decided to continue the old plan. 
 Dugommier, however, seerned to doubt its success; his views 
 were too pessimistic for a good general. On December 13 
 he wrote to the Comite " La moitie" de cette armee est nulle, 
 sans etre connaisseur il ne faut que voir pour en etre con- 
 
 vaincu " Les officiers ne valent pas leur sub- 
 
 ordine"s. Les trois quarts ne s'occupent que de leurs plaisirs 
 et de la nouvelle existance dont ils jouissent". 4 Duteil 
 seemed to be in the same state of uncertainty and on Decem- 
 ber 14 he wrote to the Minister of War telling of the canon- 
 iers which were wanting etc. 4 Napoleon was confident. And 
 holding an important position in the principal arm of a 
 
 1 Archives de la Guerre. 
 
 2 Hood in Gazette under date of December 13. 
 
 3 Dundas in Gazette under date of December 12. 
 
 4 Correspondance de Napoleon. 
 
48 
 
 great siege, with 64 officers and 1600 men under him, and 
 but one old artillery general, with whom he was in the best 
 understanding over him, seeing his many and well placed 
 batteries taking a constantly increasing effect on the enemy 
 he could not but feel certain of success. On December 24 
 after the siege was over he wrote to Dupin" Je t'ai -annoncS 
 de brillants succes et tu vois que je te tiens parole". 1 On 
 December 14 the final cannonading commenced, " A heavy 
 cannonade from and against Fort Mulgrave"as Hood wrote 
 in his Journal. The principal point of attack was Fort Mul- 
 grave, and it was bombarded for three days. Thaon wrote 
 " Le feu etait continuel et si violent que Ton comptait jus- 
 qu'a 7 bombes en Fair a la fois La cannonade 6tait vio- 
 lente. Tout e"tait en jeu. La perte journaliere eiait forte et 
 les troupes harasses de fatigue. Un feu continuel de 5 bat- 
 teries de canon et de mortiers durait depuis 3 jours et 3 
 nuits contre les ouvrages de Balaguier. On s'attendait a une 
 attaque, on envoya un renfort de 350 hommes a Balaguier.'' 
 Further on he said " les defenses avaient 6t6 fort endomma- 
 gees par le feu ennemi". Victor wrote in his memoirs " 1'en- 
 nemi ne restait point inactif. Apres le feu terrible et 
 continuel que Ton faisait depuis plusieurs jours sur ses pos- 
 tes principaux, il s'attendait a une attaque generale". Dun- 
 das wrote "works (of Mulgrave) suffered much. The 
 number of men killed & disabled was considerable." 2 Lan- 
 gara wrote that Fort Mulgrave " which they had bombarded 
 and cannonaded from different quarters with the utmost 
 
 vivacity during the three preceding days 3 " Smith 
 
 wrote 4 "Asa prelude to the general assault the enemy di- 
 rected an uninterrupted fire of shot and shells against the 
 Post of the Hauteur de Grasse for several days & nights. 
 The troops being unsheltered from the shells suffered much 
 and were so harrassed that it. is not to be wondered at that 
 
 1 Correspondance de Napoleon. 
 
 2 Dundasto Henry Dundas, Dec. 20. Correspondence of Smith -Barrow. 
 
 3 Langara to Alcudia. Dec. 21 . St. Helens. R. O. 
 
 4 Smith to Hamilton. Dec. 24. Correspondence of Smith-Barrow. 
 
49 
 
 they were not able to resist the attack." I have quoted so 
 much on the events and state of the army from the arrival 
 of Dugommier up to the final attack on Fort Mulgrave, to 
 show that in the siege of Toulon the artillery played by far 
 the greatest part; that it was the one arm which inspired 
 Dugommier with more or less confidence; that furthermore, 
 it received from the corps of engineers under Marescot prac- 
 tically no support, and very little from the infantry, which 
 was bad from the officers down; and that in the successful 
 attack on Fort Mulgrave the greatest part of the credit falls 
 to the artillery which for three days preceding had gradu- 
 ally destroyed the work and harrassed the garrison to such 
 an extent that they were driven out by inferior infantry, 
 and in spite of the fact that an attack was expected. 
 
 The final attack on Fort Mulgrave took place on Decem- 
 ber 17 l It had a garrison of about 700 men, made up of 
 English, Spanish and Neapolitans. On the evening of 16th, 
 about 7,000 of the best Republican troops were gathered at 
 La Seyne. The plan was to make the attack in two columns, 
 of about 2,000 nien each, with a third column of about the 
 same number as a reserve. Victor commanded the column 
 which was to move along the coast of the promontory and 
 attacking the fort on its right side, cut off all help which 
 might be sent from Balaguier or Eguillette. The second 
 column commanded by Brul6 was to march against the 
 front of the redoute. The reserve column was to hold itself 
 ready to come to the assistance of whichever column needed 
 it. It was a very stormy night, and at the last moment 
 there was some hesitation as to whether the attack should 
 
 1 For the final attacks, and departure of the Allies ; 
 
 Memoirs de Victor, Thaon, Napoleon. Relation de Marescot. Hood's 
 Journal. Letters : Salicetti a Albitte, Archives Nationales AF II 2151 
 Langara to Alcudia, Dec. 21. St. Helens R. O. Dugommier au M. de la 
 Guerre Dec. 18. A. G. Barras Dec. 16. A. G. and Dec. 18. Recueil Aulard. 
 Dundas in Gazette. Cook to Auckland Dec. 20. and Elliot to same, Dec. 
 24 Correspondence Auckland. Hood to Henry Dundas Dec. 20 ; Smith 
 to Hood Dec. 20 ; David Dundas to Henry Dundas Dec. 20 ; and Smith 
 to Hamilton Dec. 24. Correspondence of Smith ? Barrow. 
 2192-4 
 
50 
 
 be delayed until the next day or not. The Representants 
 and Dugommier each seemed anxious to shift the responsi- 
 bility. Bonaparte's advice was to go ahead, as bad weather 
 was not at all disadvantageous for such an attack. The ex- 
 citement caused by uncertainty and impatience at last seized 
 them, and between one and two in the morning the signal 
 was given. The plan of attack was quite forgotten. The 
 fort was to be taken, and both columns, forming into one, 
 rushed forward in the true Republican revolutionary 
 manner straight for the fort. To the noise of the storm, the 
 cannon, and the Marseillaise, was added at the first resist- 
 ance the usual cries of sauve qui pent ! & la trahison ! In this 
 way the cowardly tried to excuse their dastardly retreat. 
 The others, who were fortunately the greater part, pushed 
 on up to the reboute, where they were met with a deter- 
 mined resistance. Victor was wounded, and already Dugom- 
 mier cried "je suis perdu!" and started for the reserve 
 column. It was already on its way, led on by Bonaparte 
 and an artillery captain Muiron, who knowing the ground 
 well, lead the advance guard. By a third and last effort 
 they entered the fort, and after a few minutes deadly fight 
 in the dark, the enemy retreated to Balaguier and Eguil- 
 lette. At 4 o'clock the news reached Hood that Fort Mul- 
 grave was taken. Bonaparte put Marmont, the future due de 
 Raguse in charge of the artillery of the captured post and 
 directed him to turn the guns against the ships. In the 
 morning when the other troops at Balaguier and Eguillette 
 discovered the enemy in possession of Mulgrave they crowded 
 " to the water like the herd of swine, that ran furiously 
 into the sea possessed of the devil." * The ships and mortar 
 boats of the Allies bombarded Fort Mulgrave, but before 
 long the Courageux made the signal " wanting boat to tow". 
 Smith wrote, " The idea of sauve qui pent now seemed to pos- 
 sess everybody, the fleets of the different nations alarmed 
 at the idea of being burnt by red hot shot or shells from 
 1 Account] of Sir Sidney^Smith. 
 
51 
 
 Fort Mulgrave, Balaguier and Eguillette (now in possession 
 of the enemy) weighed anchor and crowded out of the road 
 in such haste as to alarm the troops on shore lest they 
 should be left behind." 
 
 This same morning Faron was attacked on three sides at 
 once, east, west and north. After some resistance and the 
 usual " sauve qui peut!" and " la trahison", after which the 
 cowardly no longer impeded the advance, the Republicans 
 succeeded in establishing themselves there. " Lapoype tant 
 calomnieS s'est aussi parfaiternent bien cornporte"". Thaon de- 
 scribed this success as "aussi funeste qu'incroyable". Na- 
 poleon, after making his dispositions at Fort Mulgrave, 
 proceeded to turn his batteries on Fort Malbosquet, for al- 
 though he felt certain that the Allies would soon evacuate 
 the city, he was determined that his shot and shells should 
 hasten their departure. Fre"ron wrote Dec 18 "Us ont pris 
 des mesures pour mettre leur flotte a 1'abri de nos canons 
 et de nos bombes qui n'ont cess6 de les accableV'. This 
 constant Artillery fire had a most demoralizing effect upon 
 the Allies. In the night of the 17th. they abandoned Fort 
 Malbousquet and Fort Pomets and very soon all the outside 
 posts were in the hands of the Republicans except Fort Mul- 
 grave which the Allies were forced to hold to protect the em- 
 barcation. 
 
 As soon as the news reached Hood that Mulgrave was 
 taken a hurried council of war was called, on the morning 
 of the 17th. Hood, Langara, Gravina, Dundas, Elliot, 
 Thaon de Revel and others were present. The question was 
 whether after the loss of Balaguier and Faron it was advis- 
 able to hold the town. Hood and Gravina, counting upon 
 the reinforcements promised from Gibraltar, and on the 5000 
 Austrian troops who were on their way, voted for resistance, 
 but gave in at last to the opinion of the majority ; which 
 was to abandon the city. It was decided ; that the garrisons 
 of Malbousquet and Misiessy should hold out to the last ex- 
 tremity to cover the retreat; to inform the inhabitants that 
 
52 
 
 the powers would use all means to carry away those who de- 
 sire to leave the city ; to embark the sick and wounded at once; 
 to carry off the French vessels which remained armed during 
 the siege and to destroy the others, as well as the magasins 
 de la Marine and the arsenal. Immediately afterwards prep- 
 arations were made for the embarkation although it was not 
 until the next morning, Dec. 18 that the time was set. At 
 first the inhabitants of the town, kept in ignorance of the 
 intended departure, were quiet and orderly. The next day 
 things began to change. As the Republicans drew nearer 
 and nearer, as the troops were seen getting ready for depart- 
 ure in such large numbers, and especially as the shot and 
 shell began to create havoc in the town and harbor, it 
 dawned upon the inhabitants what was taking place. Then 
 the wildest confusion reigned, some rushing to the shore for 
 boats, others donning the red cockade, and vowing vengeance 
 upon their fellow-citizens, who still remained royalists. 
 Blood was shed in the streets between the rival factions. This 
 state of affairs was rendered more terrible by the fire of the 
 enemy. It will be remembered that Napoleon turned his bat- 
 teries against Malbousquet after the fall of Mulgrave. He had 
 said, a month before, that under such conditions Malbousquet 
 would not hold out 48 hours. That evening it was evacuated, 
 in spite of the formal orders of the council of war, that it was 
 to be held. The further work of the artillery is well de- 
 scribed by Thaon de Revel. " L'ennemi travailla a des bat- 
 teries pendant tout la journSe et la nuit (of the 17th) et les 
 fit jour de bonne heure. (on the 18th) Les Frangais maitres 
 de 1'artillerie qui 6tait a Malbousquet canonnaient et bom- 
 bardaient la ville. Ils avaient de mme des enclouS et tourne 
 contre les Allies toutes les bouches a feu des postes aban- 
 donnSs. C' 6tait un feu infernal et continuel contre la ville, 
 la rade et le port". It was decided on the morning of the 
 18th to embark at 12 o'clock that night ; but the constant 
 advance of the Republicans upset the plans of the- Allies 
 
53 
 
 somewhat and caused them to hasten their departure. 1 It 
 took place in comparatively good order ; the troops were all 
 taken off without the loss of a man. This was not the case 
 with the refugees ; they hurried in large and terrified crowds 
 to the water's edge : the war ships and all boats in the har- 
 bor were put at their disposal, but still many were lost in 
 their wild flight by overcrowding the boats, and some of the 
 boats were sunk by the shells of the enemy. The fact that 
 90 anchors were picked up in the harbor afterwards shows 
 how quickly the boats must have departed. The whole affair 
 was a terrible sight. Elliot wrote to Lady Elliot Dec 20. 
 " There has seldom been crammed more misery and more 
 terror in a short space than we have witnessed these last 
 four days" . . . Fortunately the weather was good. "Had 
 the weather been such as it has been ever since that is to 
 say blowing strong from the eastward we must have all, 
 fleet, army and refugees inevitably perished ". On the Eng- 
 lish and Spanish fleet were about 6000 refugees, who had 
 been'taken from the town. Some French accounts of Toulon 
 contain long literary descriptions of the horrors of this day, 
 and do not hesitate to follow them with a sharp condemna- 
 tion of the action of the Allies, especially the English, in 
 not taking off all the inhabitants. In the first place all de- 
 tailed accounts of these incidents are more or less untrust- 
 worthy; to discriminate between the behavior of the Allies 
 is quite wrong as no proof exists that the English were any 
 less anxious to help the refugees than the Spaniards: they 
 each had about an equal number on their fleets. De Brecy, 
 directeur des douanes royales at Toulon, who was one of the 
 fugitives wrote " L'Amiraux Hood, Goodal et Parker, Elliot 
 et d'autres firent des offres les plus gene"reuses aux fugitifs. 
 Le gouvernment anglais payait en outre tous les secours 
 accordes aux fugitifs a Livourne, Tile d'Eibe et la Corse ". 
 
 Hood in Gazette under date Dec 20. " It became unavoidably neces- 
 sary that the retreat should not be deferred beyond that night as the 
 enemy commanded the town and ships by their shot and shell ". 
 
54 
 
 As to taking them all off on such short notice it was next to 
 impossible. Again these writers might, with more justice 
 and far greater success, criticise and condemn the cruelty of 
 the Republican army which made such a measure necessary 
 in a civilized country at the end of the 18th century. It is 
 true that Fox criticised the action of the English bitterly, 
 but it was part of the plan of the opposition. "We do not 
 know to what number but it is certain that thousands of 
 poor wretches who have been deluded by our promises are 
 now left by us to the guillotine. It must be a strong case of 
 necessity which can justify such a proceeding . . ." 
 
 One thing remained still to be done before leaving the 
 city, namely, to burn or destroy the ships, which could not 
 be taken away, and the Arsenal. Sir Sidney Smith and the 
 Adjutant of the Spanish navy were ordered to perform this 
 duty. According to the agreement in the council of war it 
 was to be done at the last moment, but they started either a 
 little too late or the Republicans advanced a little too 
 quickly. At all events Smith did not complete his work 
 and the Spaniard did his stupidly. As Smith approached 
 the Arsenal, preparing to burn everything, he found a num- 
 ber of the inhabitants, principally prisoners who had liber- 
 ated themselves, ready to dispute him. The shouts of the 
 Republicans could be heard not far off and the musket balls 
 of the people in the town took effect. This delayed him 
 somewhat, as did also a rather stupid act on the part of the 
 Spaniards. They had been ordered to sink the ships in the 
 basin, but finding it impracticable, they blew up two of the 
 Frigates and in so doing sank two English gun boats, which 
 were near, killing a lieutenant and several seamen. Smith 
 wrote to Hood "Having now set fire to everything within 
 our reach, exhausted our combustible preparations and our 
 strength to such a degree that the men absolutely dropped 
 on the oars, we directed our course to join the fleet running 
 the gauntlet under a few ill directed shot from the forts 
 BalguS and Aiguette". Langara wrote "In like manner 
 
55 
 
 were blown up two Frigates loaded with 4000 Quintals of 
 Powder, on each of which a chemin de sou fire was placed 
 by the Adjutant to the Squadron Don Francisco Riquelme 
 who acquired in that service the most distinguished honor, 
 as did likewise the other two officers who were exposed dur- 
 ing a considerable time to the fire of Musquetry from the 
 Insurgents belonging to the Town". 
 
 On the morning of the 19th the Republicans entered Tou- 
 lon. What the remaining inhabitants of the town had to 
 expect, is well shown by what the Representants wrote the 
 day preceeding. Barras wrote " L'inf&me Toulon est & nous 
 rien ne peut le soutraire aux vengeances nationales. De- 
 main le royaume de Louis XVII n 'aura pas un pouce de 
 terre". ^icord, Freron and Robespierre jeune wrote "de- 
 main nous serons dans Toulon occup^s a venger la Repub- 
 lique" 2 The Republicans found a great deal of booty and 
 many provisions in Toulon. These were increased each day by 
 the ships which sailed in, thinking the city still in the hands 
 of the Allies. The booty was gathered together, sold and 
 the money divided among the soldiers. In the meantime 
 the executions took place. In general it was a repetition of 
 the punishment of Lyons; since thousands of the citizens 
 left with the Allies, those who remained behind had to take 
 their place, in spite of their remonstrances and declarations 
 of republicanism. The Representants wrote on Dec 20th 3 
 " La vengeance nationale se deploie. L'on fusille a force. 
 Deja tous les officiers de la marine sont extermine's. La Re- 
 publique sera vengee d'une maniere digne d'elle. les manes 
 des patriotes seront apais6es". As to the vessels which came 
 in daily; "Tout ce qui est etranger sur ses batiments est 
 fait prisonnier tout ce que est fran9ais est fusill ". Therep- 
 resentants were in their element. Nowhere did they display 
 their activity more than in " avenging the Republic ". After 
 
 1 Barras 18th Dec. R. A. 
 
 2 Ivetter 18th Dec. R. A. 
 
 3 Recueil Aulard. 
 
56 
 
 about a week they seemed to have had enough. On January 
 5th they wrote l " Hercule, dit-on, eut plus de peine a net- 
 toyerles etables d'Angias qu'a dompter les lions etlesmon- 
 stres. Pour] nous nous preferons mille fois de nouvelles 
 redoutes a attaquer plutot que d'etre condamn6s a purger ce 
 sol impur et grangrene. Nous se somines entoures que de 
 ruines, de supplices, de vengeances, de pleurs et de larmes 
 que la rage du de"sespoire et non le repentir fait repandre". 
 The enemies of Bonaparte, and of his name, have tried 
 to connect him with these orgies of the Representants. In 
 1814 the Baron d'Imbert published in a pamphlet on the 
 siege of Toulon, which was nothing more than a praise of 
 himself and other refugies, together with a bid for the favor 
 of Louis XVIII, the following letter as written by Bona- 
 parte. " Lettre de Bonaparte a la Convention. Citoyens Rep- 
 resentants, C'est du champ de bataille, marchant dans le 
 sang des traitres que je vous an nonce avec joie que vos or- 
 dres sont execute's, et que la France est veng6e. Ni 1'age, ni 
 le sexe n'ont e"te" Spargnes: ceux qui avaient seulement Ste" 
 blesses par le canon republican out e"te" de'p&ihe's par le 
 Glaive de la Iibert6 et par la bayonette de I'6galit6. Salut et 
 admiration. Signe", Bonaparte, citoyen sans-culottes. Others 
 have said that of course Bonaparte must have taken part in 
 the massacres as the artillery was used to execute the peo- 
 ple "en masse". They seemed to forget that there were 160 
 other artillery officers under him. The above letter is, it 
 seems to me, most decidedly a false one. Why should Bona- 
 parte write to the Convention? Why should he sign himself 
 simply " Bonaparte " as if he were known to all of them ? 
 Again had he, adopting the plan of the Representants, de- 
 cided to distinguish himself in this manner, he would surely 
 have received some mention from the Representants, at least 
 from his friend Salicetti. Further, there is absolutely no 
 
 1 Recueil Aulard. 
 
57 
 
 other indication that he was a party to these executions. 1 
 Like most of the officers, he propably looked upon them in 
 a cold half indifferent way, with some pity for the victims 
 and much contempt for the patriotic murderers. It must not 
 be expected that Bonaparte, brought up in the atmosphere 
 of the revolution, absorbed in his own ambition, and looking 
 on revolution as the means of satisfying it, should regard 
 such scenes with the same amount of human compassion 
 as one would expect to find in a man today. A letter which 
 he wrote at this time, 2 seems to indicate that he looked upon 
 such measures as so much a matter of course, as not to men- 
 tion them, one way or the other; but that the first few days 
 he spent in examining the fortifications, and the naval and 
 military stores of Toulon. "Les Anglais n'ont fait que per- 
 fectionne" et augmente les fortifications de la place, ainsi Tou- 
 lon est plus dans le cas de se defendre aujourd'hui que 
 
 jamais Je m'occupe & faire construire lesfoures 
 
 & re"verbere. . . . nous avons trouve" dans Toulon la 
 meme artillerie qui y etait avant leur entree, il nous reste 
 encore 15 vaisseaux." These few lines indicate that he was 
 occupied with quite different things than " avenging the re- 
 public ". The 15 vessels of which he spoke formed part of 
 those which took him later from this very port over to 
 
 Egypt. 
 
 1 The Due de Raguse says in his memoires that Napoleon opposed this 
 general execution of the people. 
 
 2 Correspondance de Napoleon. 
 
PART II. 
 
 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OP THE 
 
 ALLIES AND RESULTS OP THE 
 
 FALL OF TOULON. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 DISPUTE BETWEEN HOOD AND LANGARA COMMISSIONERS 
 AT TOULON INSTRUCTIONS TO COMMISSIONERS DEC- 
 LARATION PUBLISHED AT TOULON CORRESPONDENCE 
 
 WITH AUSTRIA AS TO DECLARATION CORRESPONDENCE 
 WITH SPAIN AS TO DECLARATION ENGLAND'S OBJECT 
 IN HOLDING TOULON PUBLICATION OF DECLARATION. 
 
 Toulon came into possession of the English so unexpect- 
 edly that Hood and others were quite unprepared with in- 
 structions relative to such an event. As Spain was much 
 nearer, Langara received instructions early and the Spanish 
 Court took such prompt measures as to procure them certain 
 advantages which the English were afterwards unwilling to 
 admit. Consequently there arose between these two powers 
 disputes which lasted during the entire siege, and which 
 were beginning to take dangerous proportions just as the 
 fleets were forced to leave the harbor. Dundas wrote to 
 O'Hara, Dec. 20 ul lt must be remembered that from the 
 manner in which Toulon came into Bis Majesty's possession 
 it was impossible to be prepared with a force adequate to his 
 wishes or to the importance of the acquisition ;" and on the 
 same day to Dundas l "you must be aware that Toulon came 
 into our hands at a moment when it was impossible for us 
 to have made any preparations for such an event." That the 
 English were not quite satisfied with Hood's declaration has 
 
 l Letters from Sec. Dundas to Lieut. Gen. Dundas 1793-4 British Mu- 
 seum Mss. Addit. 27,594. 
 
59 
 
 been seen. At first the English Admiral, Goodall, was ap- 
 pointed governor of the town, and the Spanish admiral, Gra- 
 vina, commander of the garrison. Hood wrote September 14 
 lu We derive great assistance from Gravina who is the best 
 sailor general imaginable; quick, intelligent, but not pre- 
 tending to much military skill ; and agreeing most cordially 
 with the English." The Spanish believed that the command 
 of the troops was to remain in their hands. St. Helens wrote, 
 September 25; 2 "They (the Spanish troops) are to be ac- 
 companied by the marechal de Camp Don Rafael de Valdes 
 (brother to the minister of the marine) who is to take the 
 chief command of the troops on shore in the room of ad- 
 miral Gravina. I heartily wish that he may succeeed equally 
 well in maintaining a good understanding between the 
 troops of the two nations." The English however did not 
 care to have their forces (including those of their allies) un- 
 der the command of a Spanish General and resorted to un- 
 derhanded methods to avoid it. General O'Hara was to be sent 
 as governor to Toulon, and on September 21 he was ap- 
 pointed a lieutenant-general ; which rank made him supe- 
 rior to the Spanish commander whom he must consequently 
 supercede. 3 In the meantime the dispute broke out between 
 Hood and Langara. Langara wrote to Hood October 19; 4 
 
 "Notwithstanding that the king is very well satisfied with 
 the good conduct of rear-admiral Gravina during the time 
 that he has been commandant general of the combined 
 Troops at Toulon His Majesty, not to deprive the fleet of a 
 general of his merit has resolved to relieve him from that 
 command and that he should return to his ship to be em- 
 ployed in other important services, and has named Major- 
 General Don Raphael Valdes to succeed him in the Com- 
 mand. I communicate it to your Excellency for your due 
 
 1 St. Helens to Grenville Sept. 25. R. O. 
 
 2 Record Office. 
 
 3 Dundas to O'Hara Nov. 30 Dundas to Gen. Dundas Dec. 20. British 
 Museum Mss. 
 
 4 St. Helens to Grenville No. 8 R. O. 
 
60 
 
 information and I hope that you will be pleased to give the 
 necessary orders as I have done for his being, acknowledged". 
 Hood answered; "I return to your Excellency a thousand 
 thanks for your obliging communication of the arrival of 
 Don Valdes to take upon him the command of his Catholic 
 Majesty's troopes in the room of our most esteemed friend 
 admiral Gravina and have not a doubt but the service of 
 the common cause in which Spain and England are so very 
 cordially united will as cordially be carried on. I beg to offer 
 to your Excellency my sincere congratulations that Admiral 
 Gravina is going on so exceeding well". 
 
 It will be seen that the difference lay between Langara's 
 " commandant general of the combined troops " and Hood's 
 " the command of his Catholic Majesty's troops " ; yet neither 
 admiral approached the question directly. A few days latter 
 however, Oct. 23, Langara informed Hood that Gravina had 
 been promoted to the rank of lieutenant-genneral of the fleet 
 and that the king had confirmed him 1 "the general com- 
 mand of the allied forces, in the possesssion of which he has 
 been by the agreement between your Excellency and me ". 
 Major-general Valdes was to command the Spanish troops. 
 Hood no longer answered in an evading manner, but ex- 
 pressed himself so clearly as by no means to contribute to a 
 good understanding between the admirals: " No one can 
 more sincerely rejoice than myself at my much esteemed 
 friends promotion, but his Sardinian and Sicilian Majesty 
 having been graciously pleased to confide their respective 
 troops entirely to my disposal or to act under such british 
 officer as I may judge fit to put them I am very much at a 
 loss to conceive upon what ground Admiral Gravina can 
 take upon him the title of commander in chief of the com- 
 bined forces at Toulon ; more especially as the town and its 
 dependant forts were yielded up to the British alone and 
 taken possession of by me. I shall therefore feel it my duty 
 to put the Sardinian and Sicilian troops together with the 
 
 l Record Office. Better published by Cottin. 
 
61 
 
 british under the command of major general O'Hara, the 
 moment he arrives (who is now off the port) eventually subject 
 to such orders as I may see fit to give". 1 Then followed a 
 long letter from each of the admirals ; Langara declared 
 that from the day they went on shore together, on Sept. 2, 
 it was agreed that the command should be divided. Hood 
 claimed that Toulon surrendered to him alone. This was 
 true, as the English officers had been on shore and had ar- 
 ranged for the surrender before the arrival of the Spaniards; 
 and the English fleet entered as soon as the Spanish was 
 seen in the distance ; Hood did not dare enter before. It was 
 also true however that the Spaniards considered themselves 
 on an equal footing with the English and had exerted 
 themselves from the beginning upon this understanding. 
 St. Helens wrote to Grenville 2 " In general tho' this Court 
 certainly conceive themselves to be in strictness entitled to 
 the Nomination of the commander in chief of the forces on 
 shore, in virtue of the agreement to that effect, which they 
 suppose to have been concluded at the outset of the business 
 between the two admirals, it seems to me that they are by 
 no means disposed to insist pertinaciously upon that Claim, 
 being aware that it it can hardly be considered as reason- 
 able now that the Spanish troops in the garrison bear so 
 small a proportion to those of Great Britain and her allies, 
 but their feelings are of course very deeply wounded by those 
 expressions in Lord Hood's letter to Admiral Langara on 
 the 25th of October which so positively assert that the rights 
 which have been acquired over the town and port of Tou- 
 lon with its ships belong not to the two crowns jointly but 
 solely and exclusively to Great Britain, contrarary to the no- 
 tions which have been hitherto entertained by this govern- 
 ment, which they have so ostentatiously announced to their 
 subjects and in consequence of which they have made such 
 great and expensive efforts for the securing that important 
 
 1 Record Office. Published by Cottin. 
 
 2 St. Helens to Grenville, Nov. 8. R. O. 
 
62 
 
 possession and I therefore cannot help taking the liberty of 
 expressing a wish that their share in this joint right may at 
 least nominally be preserved to them, since otherwise there 
 is reason to fear that besides their withdrawing immediately 
 from Toulon all their ships and land forces the effect of our 
 late endeavors to cultivate a good understanding with them 
 will be entirely lost and that they will cease to look towards 
 England with any kind of cordiality or confidence." This 
 was his official report ; the same day he wrote to Grenville 1 
 " I am more anxious than I can express that for the reasons 
 mentioned in my dispatch some means may be found for 
 calming the very great degree of pique and ill-humor which 
 this court have conceived on account of the Toulon business, 
 by giving them at least nominally an equal share with us 
 in the Possession or Trusteeship of that place and its apper- 
 tenances. It is certainly true that at the outset of the enter- 
 prise Admiral Langara had great reason to presume that it 
 was upon that footing that he had been invited to concur in 
 it: witness his joint proclamation with Lord Hood, the cere- 
 monies of the landing etc. Besides which even supposing 
 that the motives which he and his court entertained upon 
 that head were founded merely upon self delusion, we cer- 
 tainly were not ignorant that they acted from the impulse 
 of that conception however erroneous, and therefore the de- 
 ferring to undeceive them till the precise moment when 
 their services were no ^longer needed would surely have an 
 appearance, if not of ill-faith at least of Machiavelism, which 
 would ill accord with the general character of the British 
 Government. The Dukede la Alcudia seems to wish for some 
 written agreement upon this subject but I imagine that that 
 will hardly be found practical." These two letters just given 
 show that even the English ambassador at Madrid saw the 
 justice of the Spanish claims. This dispute continued dur- 
 ing the entire time of the occupation of Toulon, but before 
 following it further it is necessary to speak of the Commision 
 which was sent by the English to Toulon. 
 
 1 Helens to Grenville Nov. 8. R. O. 
 
63 
 
 O'Hara had been appointed Governor of Toulon before 
 the end of September ; and Sir Gilbert Elliot, who was to 
 have been .governor of Dunkirk, was sent out also to take 
 charge of the civil affairs. O'Hara and Elliot were to form 
 with Hood a joint commission for the government of Tou- 
 lon. Elliot left England the llth of October, but it was not 
 until the 22nd that Grenville, after consulting Pitt, informed 
 the Court of Madrid, through St. Helens, of the appoint- 
 ment of this commission. 1 To settle on the spot such ques- 
 tions as may arise, His Majesty has " in execution of the 
 trust undertaken in His name by Lord Hood authorized Sir 
 Gilbert Elliot to proceed to Toulon to act conjointly with 
 His Majesty's officers commanding his sea and land forces 
 in the execution of a Commission respecting all the points 
 of a Civil nature which may present themselves in the course 
 of events at Toulon. His Majesty has also in consequence of 
 the surrender of that place and from the sense of the neces- 
 sity of relieving Admiral Goodall from the duties of a situ- 
 ation incompatible with the naval service, appointed Lieu- 
 tenant-General O'Hara to succeed that officer as Governor of 
 Toulon, and to take upon him the command of His Majes- 
 ty's forces in that part of France. Lord Hood, Sir Gilbert 
 Elliott and General O'Hara are severally directed to main- 
 tain the most cordial and confidential intercourse with the 
 Persons employed by his Catholic Majesty, and to endeavor 
 to the utmost to continue that good understanding which 
 has hitherto prevailed there so much to the advantage of 
 the common cause." 
 
 The foregoing was inserted in a letter to St. Helens on 
 Pitt's advice. Pitt wrote October 17 to Grenville; 2 " We 
 think there ought to be a sentence inserted distinctly men- 
 tioning that we have appointed a governor of Toulon in 
 consequence of the place being surrendered to us; adding, 
 of course, every proper assurance of our desire to cooperate 
 with Spain in that question. We must take this line respect- 
 
 1 Grenville to St. Helens Oct. 22. R. O. 
 
 2 Pitt to Grenville Oct. 17. Mss. of Fortesque. 
 
64 
 
 ing Toulon whenever any question occurs between us and 
 Spain on that subject." Pitt foreseeing the possible objection 
 of Spain added, "The sooner this step is taken, the more 
 likely to avoid disgust". Henry Dundas wrote to Grenville 1 
 " It occurs to Mr. Pitt and to me that it is better not to keep 
 back our having appointed a governor. The grounds on 
 which we obtained possession, and the impossibility of Hood 
 and the officers acting under him continuing to exercise the 
 office and duties of Governor, are reasons too obvious for 
 adopting the measure to be concealed ". 
 
 Buckingham wrote to Grenville, asking about the division 
 of command and added refering to the French ships at 
 Toulon, 2 " it does not seem wise to risk the only safe deposit 
 which the war has placed our hands". The foregoing, as well 
 as the tardiness in informing Madrid of the measures taken 
 in London, shows that the English government was not 
 dealing openly with Spain in reference to Toulon. 
 
 On Oct. 18 long and detailed instructions were sent to 
 the English Commissioners at Toulon. The substance of 
 these was as follows. 3 The possession of Toulon and the 
 prospect of its extensive consequences in the South of France 
 have given occasion for the Commission. It is to have three 
 principal objects ; 1st, to govern Toulon ; 2nd, (" which is 
 more extensive and more important ") to induce other parts 
 of France to have recourse to His Majesty's protection; to 
 aid in the re-establishment of a regular government which 
 is to end the internal disorders in France and open the way 
 to a satisfactory termination of the war: 3rd., to take charge 
 of any provinces or districts which should be occupied by 
 his Majesty's arms or place themselves under his protection, 
 "till some regular and general system shall have been re- 
 established and a regular and a definite pacification con- 
 cluded". The Commission is also to publish immediately, 
 
 1 Dundas to Grenville Oct. 20. Mss. of Fortesque. 
 
 2 Buckingham to Grenville Oct. 24th. Mss. Fortesque. 
 3 Record Office. Published almost in full by Cottin. 
 
and in His Majesty's name, a declaration addressed to the 
 people of Toulon, " according to the tenor of the paper 
 herewith transmitted". The powers of the other members 
 of the commission must not interfere with the authority of 
 the military governor in any matters of military detail. As 
 far as is consistent with this principle, due regulations ought 
 to be framed for protecting as far as possible the persons of 
 the inhabitants and for providing for the ordinary course of 
 justice in civil affairs. The possibility of retaining the in- 
 habitants in their civil and military employments must de- 
 pend upon the dispositions they manifest and upon circum- 
 stances. The suffering of public meetings, or of authorizing 
 and recognizing the deliberations of any committee must be 
 governed by similar circumstances. A power must be ex- 
 ercised wherever it is necessary of confining, or sending 
 away, suspected persons. " On all these points it is im- 
 possible to form specific instructions; the Commissioners 
 will jointly exercise their discretion." The second general 
 head of instructions gives the following : His Majesty's 
 primary object is to terminate the war as speedily as possi- 
 ble. Whatever may be the form of government in France 
 His Majesty will feel himself entitled to demand such terms 
 as may afford to himself and his allies reasonable indemni- 
 fication for the past and security for the future. His Majesty 
 is not disposed to prescribe any particular form, he is per- 
 suaded it is only on the foundation of hereditary monarchy 
 (subject to such limitations as may be found advisable) that 
 a rational prospect at present exists of any regular govern- 
 ment being reestablished. All parts of France whicli may 
 wish to deliver themselves from the tyrany of the present 
 rule and concur in the restoration of a regular government, 
 on the foundation of hereditary monarchy and accept His 
 Majesty's protection, shall be well governed, and restored at 
 the conclusion of a definite treaty of peace, " unless by the 
 terms of such treaty it shall be agreed that any such place 
 or district shall, for the purpose of indemnification or secur- 
 
 2192-6 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 L Of 
 
66 
 
 ity be ceded to any of the powers who are engaged in con- 
 cert with His Majesty in the present war. No idea is enter- 
 tained of pushing that principle to the extent of proposing 
 any plan of partition or dismemberment applicable to the in- 
 terior of France ; but it can only relate to such possessions 
 on the frontiers as shall appear on fair discussion to come 
 within the real objects which are professed. As this consid- 
 eration is naturally more applicable to Austria than to any 
 other continental power it does not appear that in the south 
 of France, this exception can be material with respect to 
 any district but such as may be contiguous to the frontier 
 either of Spain or Sardinia, or possibly Switzerland, in case 
 the Cantons may be brought to take an active part in the 
 war". No alarm is to be created from the idea of extensive 
 projects of aggrandizement and dismemberment such as are 
 not in His Majesty's contempletion. The declaration which 
 you are to publish at Toulon will be circulated as speedily 
 as possible in the interior of France. You will be par- 
 ticularly careful to state on all occasions His Majesty's con- 
 viction that the acknowledgement of a hereditary monarchy, 
 affords the only probable ground for restoring regular gov- 
 ernment in France. His Majesty is far from meaning to 
 pledge himself to any approbation of the articles of the Con- 
 stitution of 1789 and is on the contrary persuaded that 
 every part of the French nation which wishes for the re- 
 establishment of Monarchy will ultimately see the impos- 
 sibility of retaining many parts of that constitution, yet His 
 Majesty has not felt this as any reason for withholding his 
 protection from the people of Toulon, under the circum- 
 stances in which it was sought for. Under the third bead of 
 instructions is found: 'all such places as choose to put 
 themselves under the protection of His Majesty will be gov- 
 erned under His " general superintending power", but this 
 authority must be subject to no fixed limitations, and must 
 in time of war be inforced wherever it is necessary, by the 
 military power. l " The Re-establishment of the former 
 1 Following not published by Cottin. 
 
67 
 
 modes of Judicature, of the former Ecclesiastical establish- 
 ment and particularly of the Provincial states in the prov- 
 inces where they existed in a known and established form 
 previous to the late troubles seem likely if they should be found 
 practicable to be productive of great advantage and to lead 
 to the restoration of Order and good government. l But 
 even in looking to these objects great caution will be neces- 
 sary not to do violence to existing prejudices and it may be 
 necessary unless the minds of the people at large should be 
 disposed to such measures as I have stated, to postpone them 
 for a time and to make no alteration in whatever may be 
 the Train and order of things which you may find exist- 
 ing father than is necessary for the fundamental object of 
 acknowledging a monarchical government." 2 " The meas- 
 ures to be taken with respect to property which has been 
 confiscated, and afterwards sold under the authority of the 
 Convention, as well as that which may belong to persons 
 who may continue in hostility to His Majesty ; with respect 
 to the circulation or suppresion of assignats, and also with 
 respect to the collection and appropriation of any publi c 
 revenues, are also points of so much delicacy, and may de- 
 pend so much on local circumstances, that it is not thought 
 right, at present to make them the subject of positive in- 
 structions." 
 
 This resume" of the instructions sent to the Commissioners 
 at Toulon shows the ideas of Pitt, and the political views of 
 the English at this time. 
 
 The declaration which was published at Toulon differed 
 from that of Hood in two particulars: 1st; His Majesty was 
 not willing to commit himself to the constitution of 1789, 
 but simply regarded the reestablishment of an hereditary 
 monarchy as the necessary form of stable government with 
 
 1 This proposal to reestablish the old provincial states as well as the 
 idea that the people of the South of France would care very little what 
 was taken on the frontiers or in the North shows that the new spirit which 
 was awakened in the large majority of the French people was ill under- 
 stood in London. 
 2 Following published by Cottin. 
 
68 
 
 which he hoped to make peace. He did not wish to specify 
 any particular form nor to interefere with the internal af- 
 fairs of France. 2nd; It was expressly stated that at the ter- 
 mination of a treaty of peace His Majesty expected for 
 himself and his allies a just indemnification for the costs 
 and dangers of a war which was forced upon him by France. 
 This declaration had been drawn up after a diplomatic cor- 
 respondence with the courts of Austria, Spain and Sardinia. 
 On Sept. 14 information was sent to Sir Morton Eden in 
 Vienna that a public declaration would be made as to His 
 Majesty's views on the war with France. On Sept. 25 Eden 
 wrote to Grenville, ' that Thugut had informed him that 
 Austria agreed not to take any step toward the interior ar- 
 rangement of France l " without a previous and confidential 
 
 communication with his Majesty Sentiments 
 
 entertained here were he (Thugut) added that France should 
 
 be so far weakened as no longer to be dangerous. 
 
 On the subject of Indemnification the acquisition for 
 
 Great Britain being to be looked for in the Foreign settle- 
 ments and Colonies of France, no jealousy, he observed, nor 
 clash of interests could arise." On Sept. 27 Grenville for- 
 warded a draft of the proposed declaration to Eden. Speak- 
 ing of the form of govenment in France 1 "it is infinitely 
 better that this should be left to the feelings and experiences 
 of the French nation itself than that Foreign Powers should 
 seek to impose jupon that country particular points with 
 respect to the modification of a monarchical govern- 
 ment to which it may still be adverse. the 
 
 claim for indemnification is no less carefully attended to. It 
 appeared neither necessary nor advisable to specify particu- 
 lar objects of indemnification because these must of necessity 
 
 depend on the events of the war. If on the whole 
 
 the proposed declaration should meet with the concurrence 
 of that Court it will be right for you to lose no time in re- 
 turning the Messenger in order that it may be published in 
 His Majesty's name." 
 1 Record Office. 
 
69 
 
 On Oct. 12 Eden sent off his answer in which he said 
 that the Austrian minister agreed with the declaration but 
 speaking of the indemnification wished l " that the expres- 
 sion ' telles que les Puissances Belligerantes ne peuyent se 
 dispenser de demander' might be omitted, as it might give 
 a handle to all those who are engaged either actively or 
 only apparently in the war, equally to bring forward claims 
 of indemnification and increase the difficulties of the paci- 
 fication. The King of Prussia would, he (Thugut) said, be 
 the first to found on it pretensions for the further aggran- 
 dizement to which this court could never assent, till it has 
 itself made acquitions equal to those of His Imperial Ma- 
 jesty in Poland. In the place of these words he proposed to 
 insert ' Sa Majeste ne peut se dispenser etc'. I told him that 
 I would transmit his observations for your Lordship's con- 
 sideration thb' I could not agree with him in the propriety 
 of the change proposed, as in a declaration of this kind the 
 making no mention of the other Belligerent Powers might 
 give them umbrage, might make them apprehensive of a 
 separate peace without any attention to their interests & 
 consequently render them less inclined to cooperate heartily 
 towards the termination of the war. The invitation to 
 France to follow the example of the inhabitants of Toulon, 
 he said he looked upon to be salutary as much as it regarded 
 the towns situated at a distance from those parts to which 
 his Imperial Majesty's views of indemnification were di- 
 rected ; but he trusted that should Lille or any other place 
 contiguous to the Belgic provinces offer to surrender to His 
 Majesty on the same conditions as Toulon that His Majesty 
 would look upon himself as an auxiliary Power on that 
 side of France, and consider them as being to form the fu- 
 ture Barrier of those provinces, would accept them for the 
 Emperor & to be governed in His name till the Peace. This 
 afternoon I waited again by appointment on M. de Thugut 
 who delivered me a copy which I have the honor to inclose, 
 of the Emperors proposed declaration. In reading over the 
 
 1 Record office. 
 
70 
 
 paper I pointed out to him the words " par les moyens que les 
 lois fondamentales de sa constitution autorisent". I wished 
 him to supress them as they appeared to go beyond your 
 Lordship's meaning & they might be construed to imply an 
 intention to interfere in the internal arrangement of France 
 & I particularly insisted on the advantage of a perfect 
 union of sentiment on this important point of the declara- 
 tion. He however adhered to these words as being more 
 consistent with the form of government of his Imperial 
 Majesty's Dominions I spoke again to M. de Thugut on 
 the subject of Prussia and Sardinia. As to the former I had 
 the satisfaction to find him disposed could the King of 
 Prussia's effective cooperation for the conquest of Alsace and 
 Lorainebe absolutely secured to recommend to the Emperor 
 to make a formal renunciation of any exchange whatsoever 
 for Bavaria but in such a form as may save the Emperor's 
 dignity. l He seemed however to have but little hopes of 
 any effective support being procured from Prussia which 
 opinion he considered as sufficiently justified by the events 
 of the Campaign. Offers of futher assistance may he thinks 
 be made, but he expects to find them clogged with such pro- 
 posals of compensation as cannot be admitted in order that 
 the refusal may be seized as a pretext to withdraw from the 
 war. 2 He added that his expectation would be fully grati- 
 fied if it could be possible to obtain from His Prussian 
 Majesty His several contingents to the King, the Emperor 
 and the Empire". 
 
 The foregoing gives one a further insight into the political 
 relations at the time of the King's declaration. The English 
 Court was anxious to act in consert with the Austrian in 
 taking this step and had awaited her answer before publish- 
 ing the declaration. It was not quite so particular about 
 
 1 It is interesting to see now under the influence of England Thugut 
 is willing to modify his policy. 
 
 2 As early as 1793 Thugut seemed to have foreseen the possibility of a 
 "Treaty of Basel." 
 
71 
 
 Spain. This is shown by the fact that the draft of the 
 declaration was sent a week later to Lord St. Helens, and 
 that his answer would not necessarily be waited for before 
 publishing the declaration. This is another proof that Eng- 
 land was less open to the Spanish Court than to the Austrian, 
 even on the subject of Toulon where the two Courts were 
 supposed to act in consert. The communication to St. 
 Helens is dated October 4. It ran as follows : l " I transmit 
 to your Excellency by His Majestys command the draft of 
 a declaration which his Majesty proposes to publish for the 
 purpose of explaining to the well disposed part of the 
 French nation His Majestys views with respect to the prose- 
 cution of the present war. The circumstances of the late 
 transaction at Toulon and the great probability that a 
 similar disposition exists in many parts of France, have in- 
 duced His Majesty to believe that the present moment is 
 favorable for a declaration of this nature. It is uncertain 
 whether the rapid succession of events by which the present 
 crisis is marked may not render it expedient not to delay 
 the publication of this paper till an answer can be received 
 from the Spanish government respecting its contents. But 
 even in that case His Majesty has felt that an early and 
 confidential communication of it to the Court of Madrid 
 was an attention on his part due to the union and friend- 
 ship subsisting between the two crowns, and in case circum- 
 stances should admit of the delay, His Majesty will be 
 extremely desirous of receiving from the Catholic King the 
 fullest communication of His sentiments respecting it. His 
 Majesty natters himself that in all events the principles 
 manifested in that declaration are such as will be found to 
 correspond entirely with those of His Catholic Majesty. I 
 feel it unnecessary for me to enter into any detailed dis- 
 cussion of these, as the paper itself will naturally suggest to 
 your Excellency what is to be said upon it. You will not 
 fail to remark that in any intervention respecting the in- 
 
 l Record Office. 
 
72 
 
 terior of France the King looks rather at the affording sup- 
 port to well disposed persons in that Kingdom than to the 
 establishing there by external force any particular gov- 
 ernment. In recommending to the French to unite in the 
 cause of monarchy His Majesty advises that only, which 
 seems essentially necessary to the re-establishment of ex- 
 ternal or internal tranquility, but carefully avoids discussing 
 the various modifications and limitations of that form. His 
 Majesty is persuaded that the entire re-establishment of an 
 arbitrary Monarchy there, is neither practicable nor desir- 
 able. His Majesty is on the other hand far from approving 
 as an ultimate state of things the constitution accepted by 
 the late King during the constraint which followed His being 
 brought back from Varennes. But all the particular details 
 of any intermediate system must as it appears be left to the 
 discussion of the French themselves and foreign powers have 
 no immediate object in looking farther than to the general 
 principles stated in the inclosed draught. With respect 
 to the principle of indemnification I have before stated to 
 your Excellency that His Majesty in asserting His right on 
 that subject as resulting from the unprovoked aggression of 
 France admits in the most express manner the right of 
 Spain founded on the same rule of equity and reason. His 
 Majesty even authorizes you to assure the court of Madrid 
 of his sincere disposition to co-operate with that court as 
 far as circumstances will permit in the attainment of such 
 objects as His Catholic Majesty may have in view for that 
 purpose. And His Majesty will receive with satisfaction and 
 return with openness any confidence which the King of 
 Spain may be disposed to place in His Majesty on that sub- 
 ject. Nothing could be more pleasing to His Majesty than 
 to see the union and cordiality which has subsisted between 
 the naval and military forces of the two Crowns on the oc- 
 casion of the late event of Toulon. His Majesty flatters 
 himself that the result of that transaction must lead to 
 establishing a still more intimate union between the two 
 
73 
 
 courts as well as among those who are respectively employed 
 by them. it is obviously to be desired that the combined 
 forces of the powers engaged in the war against France 
 should be enabled to profit of further openings and to make 
 Toulon a center of operations which may extend themselves 
 as far as possible in the South of France where so much dis- 
 position exists to favour the cause of monarchy". On Oct. 30 
 St Helens answered lu Alcudia has acquainted me verbally 
 that His Majesty's intended Declaration to the French Na- 
 tion has been read by His Catholic Majesty with much sat- 
 isfaction" The Spanish were preparing a similar declaration. 
 On Nov. 8 St. Helens wrote further that the declaration of 
 Spain was quite satisfactory and corresponded with the Eng- 
 lish. As to the indemnification; la Your Lordship will 
 observe that the Duke de la Alcudia's Letter admits and 
 recognizes the justice of that Claim in the fullest and most 
 explicite terms so that a discussion of the details of that sub- 
 ject may now be brought forward whenever circumstances 
 may render such a measure advisable." The following is an 
 extract from Alcudia's Letter. l " With respect to the point 
 of indemnity it appears to the King to be just that England 
 should demand it for the expenses of the war which the 
 French themselves have declared and His Majesty would 
 contribute so far as he may be able to its being realized, 
 at the same time that His Majesty claims the rights which 
 in like manner belong to him upon the self-same ground, 
 being well assured that both sovereigns will co-operate 
 with mutual good faith in forwarding the just views 
 which each of them may propose to himself on the point 
 in question." 
 
 Alcuda stated also that the Spanish King was quite satis- 
 fied with the declaration. On Nov. 30 Grenville wrote to 
 St. Helens 1 " Monsieur del Campo having communicated to 
 me the draughts of the proposed declaration to be published, 
 
 l Record Office. 
 
74 
 
 by the court of Madrid I assured him in general terms of 
 the King's approbation of that paper and your Excellency 
 will not fail to express the same sentiments to the Duke of 
 Alcudia. It has however not escaped the attention of this 
 court that while in a letter written to you as well as in 
 other communications between the two governments the 
 principle of indemnity is not only recognized by the court 
 of Madrid but it is even insisted upon as applicable to the 
 situation of Spain 110 notice is taken of any views of this 
 nature in the declaration which is to be addressed to the 
 people of France. Whatever may be the real views of Spain 
 in this respect it seems very desirable that the Spanish Gov- 
 ernment should if possible be brought to enter into some ex- 
 planation of this kind on that important and delicate point. 
 With respect to the indemnity of Spain, your Excellency 
 will take an early opportunity to enter into some explana- 
 tion with the Duke of Alcudia on this subject and you will 
 endeavor to convey to him in a general manner such as may 
 not excite jealously His Majesty's wish that in the result of 
 the war the Spanish indemnity may be acquired on the 
 frontier of France, by which means Spain would obtain a 
 great and valuable accession of strength, particularly as to 
 means of defense and would no longer be exposed to the in- 
 vasion of France and continue thereby in some degree de- 
 pendent on that Country. Your Excellency's ability and 
 experience will suggest to you the means of placing this 
 proposal in its most favorable lights and of supporting 
 it by the arguments the most likely to make impression. 
 In asking this explanation and in urging this proposal it 
 will be proper that your Excellency should avow, on His 
 Majesty's part, that the indemnity to this country can be 
 found only in the French Possessions out of Europe, and 
 you will therefore employ all your attention to convince the 
 Spanish minister how little cause of jealousy to the Court of 
 Spain arises from such acquisition, the immense territorial 
 possessions of Spain in America are such as to furnish ample 
 
75 
 
 scope for the exertions of all the industry, capital and skill 
 which Spain can employ and any acquisitions particularly 
 in the Leeward Islands may truly be stated as being much 
 less desirable to Her than to any other of the European Na- 
 tions. His Majesty conceives therefore and you will urge it 
 as a proposal to the Spanish Ministers that both courts may 
 with advantage further the views of each other in the points 
 above mentioned. His Majesty by exerting His influence at 
 the peace as far as circumstances will then admit, for pro- 
 curing to Spain a valuable accession of territory on the fron- 
 tier of France; and the Court of Spain by favoring in the 
 like manner His Majesty's views of acquisition in the Lee- 
 ward Islands. With respect to St. Domingo it is conceived 
 that the views of Spain may not unreasonably be turned to 
 that Quarter, and altho' the small advantage which Spain 
 actually derives from the part of that Island now in His 
 possession might seem to afford a sufficient reason against 
 Her looking to further acquisition there, yet it is probable 
 that views of that sort are in fact entertained both by the 
 hope of advantage and also as a means of deriving security 
 against the dangers with which the Spanish colonies are 
 menaced from the establishment of the principles on which 
 the French have lately acted in the West Indies, and partic- 
 ularly in St. Domingo. You will be aware that His Majes- 
 ty's views also are in part directed towards that island, but 
 it is by no means conceivable that these projects entertained 
 by the two Courts are incompatible with each other. The 
 extent of that Island and the distance of the Spanish Quar- 
 ters from the parts nearest to Jamaica leaving full scope for' 
 arrangements being taken in concert respecting this Island 
 such as maybe mutually beneficial to both Countrie3. It is 
 not the King's pleasure that you should actually propose 
 any precise plan for this purpose or indeed any positive 
 agreement with respect to the other objects of indemnifica- 
 tion above mentioned, but it is judged to be extreemely im- 
 portant for His Majesty's service that your Excellency should 
 
76 
 
 without delay enter into explanations on these points with 
 the Spanish government, and endeavour to learn to what ex- 
 tent the Court of Madrid would be disposed to enter into en- 
 gagements with His Majesty on the principles already laid 
 down, and that you should transmit to me an account of the 
 result of your conferences on this subject in order that a 
 judgment may be formed of the best manner of bringing 
 forward those discussions which the situation of Two Courts 
 in the present moment seems to render indispensable". 
 
 In another letter of the same date Grenville wrote : " With 
 respect to the political considerations with which this busi- 
 ness is connected, I have in my other dispatch of this date 
 stated to you at large the sentiments and views of His Maj- 
 esty as tp the general State of affairs, but I think it right in 
 this place to give Your Excellency the fullest authority for 
 entering into unreserved Explanations with the Spanish 
 Government on the subject of Toulon. His Majesty has in 
 no case any view respecting that place different from that 
 which has already been avowed in His name: That at the 
 Conclusion of Peace that Port should be restored to the 
 Crown of France, and that in the Interval it should serve 
 in His Majesty's Hands as a means of carrying on the war, 
 and as a Pledge of indemnity to Him and His allies, in- 
 cluding in that Description the Crown of Spain whose claim 
 to Indemnity His Majesty has already distinctly avowed." 1 
 Before its publication the declaration had also been com- 
 municated to the Sardinian Court, " as additional proof of 
 confidence". 
 
 On November 20 the declaration was published at Tou- 
 lon. Elliot wrote November 23. In regard to the ships 2 " the 
 words "out e"te* rendus" appeared to give a little uneasi- 
 ness to one or two members of the deputation as it conveyed 
 something mortifying to their national spirit. I therefore 
 substituted the word " confieV', which gave entire satisfac- 
 
 1 These lines state clearly England's intentions at Toulon. 
 
 2 Record Office. Commissioners to Toulon 1793. Hood, Elliot, O'Hara. 
 
77 
 
 tion and is at the same time consonant with the truth ". 
 
 It is hoped that the foregoing extracts have given a clear 
 idea of the circumstances under which this declaration arose. 
 It may be regarded as the official statement of England's in- 
 tentions in the beginning of the War of the First Coalition. 
 As the fortunate termination of this war was regarded as 
 near at hand, this declaration was to form a preliminary 
 basis for the peace negotiations. Austria and Spain had 
 agreed to it. It was not communicated to Prussia. It was 
 Pitt who really framed the declaration, and his idea was to 
 treat with any kind of a stable government in France. Her 
 internal affairs as long as she remained quiet were a minor 
 consideration. The ''indemnification" was the main object 
 in London as also in Vienna and Madrid. On October 5 
 Pitt wrote to Grenville 1 " We can treat with any form of 
 regular government if it be solidly established". Austria, 
 however, was somewhat concerned as to the internal govern- 
 ment of France, arid it was out of consideration for her that 
 England declared for hereditary monarchy. This difference 
 in the drafts of the declaration had been noticed by Elliot, 
 who wrote to Secretary Dundas on October 18 : 2 " The de- 
 claration as at last settled by you and Pitt differs from the 
 last draft as to the following words, " Quand la paix sera 
 faite (et Sa Majeste declare par la presente qu'elle sera prete & 
 la faire aussitot qu'un gouvernement regulier sera 6tabli en 
 France)". The words in the draft as last settled are " When- 
 ever the Hereditary Monarchy of France shall be restored 
 & a Treaty of Peace concluded ". 
 
 The English Government has been reproached for not 
 making this declaration agree entirely with the proclama- 
 tion of Lord Hood, and with his understanding with the peo- 
 ple of Toulon. In the first place, Hood acted without positive 
 instructions, and more or less on his own responsibility ; 
 again, Toulon was not at that moment in a condition to give 
 
 1 Mss. Fortesque. 
 
 2 Commissioners to Toulon. 
 
78 
 
 the people a right to expect England, or any nation, to ac- 
 cept their terms unconditionally. Hood might possibly have 
 avoided the phrase " the Constitution of 89 "; but the fact that 
 he did not was not sufficient reason for the English to with- 
 draw from the city, rather than commit themselves to a form 
 of government which might have made a future peace im- 
 possible. England's object was to allow such latitude in this 
 respect as to win over the greatest number of the inhabitants 
 of France. "A stable form of government" was Pitt's idea, 
 but it was finally agreed to insist upon " hereditary mon- 
 archy ". 
 
 Although England had now come to a definite under- 
 standing with her allies Austria and Spain, there were still a 
 number of questions pending between the different Courts; 
 questions which excited jealousy and distrust, and thereby 
 prevented combined action. Had the Allies put as much 
 thought into their military operations as is found in their 
 diplomatic negotiations, this vast scheme of indemnification 
 might have been realized ; but at Toulon, as elsewhere, the 
 reckless Republican army, directed by a few men of genius, 
 above all by Napoleon, proved more than equal to the dis- 
 united Allies. Three disputed questions 'preoccupied the 
 courts at London and Madrid. First, were the Spanish to be 
 on an equality with the English in the Government of Tou- 
 lon? Second, what was to become of the French ships in 
 case the Allies were forced to retire? Third, were the broth- 
 ers of the late King to be permitted to enter the city in an 
 official capacity, or at all? Finally, the question of the Aus- 
 trian reinforcements, which were promised but failed to ar- 
 rive, became a serious one between the courts of London and 
 Vienna. The first stages of the dispute between England and 
 Spain as to the command at Toulon have already been men- 
 tioned, and will be further spoken of in connection with the 
 questions of the French princes, and of the fleet. 
 
79 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 QUESTION OF THE FRENCH PRINCES END OP DISPUTE AS TO 
 
 AUTHORITY AT TOULON QUESTION OF THE EMIGRANTS 
 
 THE AUSTRIAN REINFORCEMENTS. 
 
 Quite early the English government received intimation 
 that the French Princes wished to go to Toulon. On October 
 2 St. Helens wrote * " The Agents of the French Princes are 
 extremely desirous to obtain permission for Monsieur to re- 
 pair immediately to Toulon, and I am afraid that the Span- 
 ish Minister has given but too much encouragement to this 
 idea although I have written to engage him to lay it aside, 
 at least for the present". On October 18 the Spanish Minis- 
 ter in London, Marquis del Campo, wrote to Grenville, and 
 speaking of the affair of Toulon as a 2 " nouveau chemin pour 
 parvenir au grand but de calmer les troubles qui agitent et 
 dechirent la France", and as " ce grand point d'appui pour 
 regenererla monarchic francaise", claimed that England and 
 Spain "se trouvent dans 1'obligation de proportionner tout 
 soutien ettoute aide sinona son captif monarque Louis XVII, 
 au moins a celui qui se trouve a meme de representer sa 
 Personne". "Les pretentious de 1'Oncle du Roy doivent 
 par consequent tre regardees comme justes". "II faut 
 qu'il soit reconnu a Toulon en qualite de Regent de France. 
 Ce Prince se trouvant sur le lieu pourra agir d'une ma- 
 nie"re active, augmenter le parti du Roy, s'attirer les esprits 
 encore vacillants et contribuer personelle et efficacement a 
 voir realiser les intentions des Puissances. Par ce moyen 
 nos deux souverains auront la gloire d'avoir pos6 les pre- 
 miers fondemens de la Paix dans le Royaume en Stablissant 
 dans la dite ville le plus proche Parent de-son monarque 
 legitime: celui-ci benira eternellement les auteurs de son 
 bonheur et les deux puissances allies auront encore la satis- 
 
 1 Record Office. 
 
 2 Record Office. St. Helens' papers. 
 
80 
 
 faction d'avoir triomphe par sa puissance et sa justice de 
 tous les efforts de 1'iniquite. C'est par les ordres express de 
 ma Cour que j'ai Phonneurde transmettre a V. Exce. ces con- 
 siderations Le Roy mon maitre se flatte de trouver en elle 
 (Sa M. Britannique) la meme maniere de penser et les 
 memes dispositions & soutenir Monsieur dans Toulon, favor- 
 isaht de toutes les mamres possibles son e"tablissement dans 
 la dite ville, et ses progres dans cette partie de la France ". 
 It may be readily seen that del Campo's arguments would 
 not appeal to the English government. On October 22 
 Greri ville wrote to St. Helens "It is by no means part of 
 His Majesty's plan to exclude the late King's brother from 
 taking such share in the final- arrangement of that business 
 (the internal affairs of France) as even in the intermediate 
 measures leading to it as their situation and events which 
 may arise in the interior of France may hereafter point out. 
 But when the circumstances which have attended the sur- 
 render of Toulon are taken into consideration it must surely 
 be felt that the admitting the French Princes into that Port 
 is a step leading to the most material and important conse- 
 quences, and which cannot be taken without mature delib- 
 eration. His Majesty is by no means an advocate of the 
 Constitution of 1789 and is on the contrary persuaded that 
 no persons sincerely wishing the restoration of Monarchy in 
 France can ultimately wish that it should rest on so precari- 
 ous and insecure a footing. But it must not be forgotten 
 that the people of Toulon have declared for Monarchy as 
 established by that Constitution, and in consequence of that 
 declaration put themselves under the King's protection ; 
 that under that Constitution as finally settled, the Comte de 
 Provence has no absolute claim to the Regency nor can the 
 office of Lieutenant-General be conferred on the Comte 
 d'Artois. And that in general the situation of the French 
 Princes and the conduct, principles and supposed resent- 
 ments of the persons by whom they are surrounded cannot 
 
81 
 
 be considered as likely in the present moment to conciliate 
 the minds of the inhabitants of that place. There is besides 
 an essential and necessary condition before the King can 
 consent to join His measures to those of the French Princes 
 to the degree that would be done by admitting them into 
 Toulon. It is indispensable that they should enter into pre- 
 vious explanation respecting the principle of pacification 
 and that they should recognize the justice of the claim of 
 His Majesty and His Allies, including the Catholic King to 
 a fair indemnification for the risques, expenses and losses of 
 a war commenced by the unjust aggression of France. His 
 Majesty by no means wishes the Court of Madrid to under- 
 stand this communication as meant to operate as a final bar 
 to the idea of employing the French Princes in France and 
 particularly in the South. But His Majesty expects that no 
 step towards this important determination should be taken, 
 but in consert, and He thinks it absolutely necessary to ascer- 
 tain beforehand, first whether the appearance of the Princes 
 at Toulon would in fact be advantageous or prejudicial to 
 the common interests in the present moment. Secondly 
 whether the Princes themselves are disposed to act reason- 
 ably and according to the exigencies of the moment relative 
 to the interior of France ; whether they and those who advise 
 them are sensible of the necessity of laying aside animosities 
 and resentments of waving inadmissable claims, and of sub- 
 mitting to be guided in their conduct by those powers whose 
 support they ask, and lastly whether they are ready to enter 
 into full and unequivocal explanation respecting the princi- 
 ples of indemnification above stated". It is interesting to 
 compare this communication, inspired by Pitt, with the 
 foregoing sentimental note from Del Campo. 
 
 The English had taken prompt and decided measures to 
 prevent the Spaniards from sharing their authority at Tou- 
 lon, and they were naturally determined not to allow Mon- 
 sieur to precede to that place as regent. On October 22, the 
 
 21926 
 
82 
 
 same day as the foregoing communication was sent to Lord 
 St. Helens, instructions 1 were forwarded to Francis Drake, 
 (the English representative at Genoa, where Monsieur was 
 supposed to go previous to embarkmg for Toulon,) to in- 
 form Monsieur of the impossibility of his proceeding to 
 Toulon; of "the inconvenience which would result, both per- 
 sonally to that prince, and also to the general interests from 
 any eclat taking place on this subject"; and also of the ques- 
 tion of its being "agreeable to the inhabitants of Toulon". 
 Further if Monsieur insisted, Drake was to inform the Com- 
 missioners at Toulon that they were not authorized to per- 
 mit him to enter without having first received instructions 
 
 from His Majesty "but you (Drake) will use every 
 
 endeavour in your power by respectful and conciliatory rep- 
 resentations, to prevent recourse being had to this extrem- 
 ity, and you will endeavour to persuade the ministers of the 
 allied powers at Genoa to support you in these representa- 
 tions". Meanwhile Monsieur, being in secret communication 
 with Spain, took the matter into his own hands, and in- 
 formed the English government through the Due d'Har- 
 court, the representative of the Princes in London, of his 
 decision to proceed to Toulon to assume the duties of regent. 
 The English court was determined to prohibit him. On No- 
 vember 30. instructions 2 were sent to the Commissioners at 
 Toulon not to admit him. On the same day orders were 
 hurried to John Trevor in Turin to stop Monsieur as he 
 passed through the city: to say to His Sardinian Majesty 
 that it is impossible for Monsieur to go there without the 
 approbation of the King of Great Britain. 3 " If Monsieur 
 should have already quitted Turin previous to your receiv- 
 ing this despatch you will urge the King of Sardinia to send 
 after him some proper person for the purpose of making 
 these representations both in the King's name and in that 
 
 1 Record Office. Published by Cottin. 
 
 2 Commissioners to Toulon. Record Office. 
 
 3 Foreign Office, Sardinia. Record Office. 
 
83 
 
 of the King of Sardinia and in order if possible to prevent 
 the eclat which must arise from Monsieurs persisting in His 
 project and being exposed to a public refusal on the part of 
 His Majesty's officers at Toulon ". Long and precise instruc- 
 tions were sent to St. Helens, by Grenville. on November 30. 1 
 "With respect to the great question of a recognition of the 
 authority of Monsieur as Regent, it seems to depend in a 
 great degree upon the result of discussions of the nature al- 
 ready mentioned and also upon the course of events to 
 which the war may give rise. His Majesty is by no means 
 adverse to this recognition but in order that it should be 
 rendered advantageous to the common cause it must be 
 combined both with circumstances in the interior of France 
 favorable to it, and also with such explanations on the part 
 of the Princes as may shew that their views are not in op- 
 position to those of the principal Powers of Europe, whose 
 aid they seek, and that they are willing rather to listen to 
 the advice of those Powers and to yield to the necessity of 
 the existing circumstances than to give scope to the passions 
 and prejudices of those by whom they are surrounded. Soon 
 after the note on this subject was presented to me by Mon- 
 sieur Del Campo an application was received from the 
 Comted'Artois praying His Majesty's assistance to transport 
 himself into Brittany, and to maintain himself there. The 
 answer . . . was favourable, tho' not conclusive. We ex- 
 pressing an inclination on His Majesty's part to comply with 
 the request, but stating the necessity of previous explana- 
 tion You will communicate these particulars to the 
 
 Court of Madrid as forming the answer to the proposal made 
 by that Government on the subject of Monsieur, and as 
 manifesting the King's disposition to concur with His Cath- 
 olic Majesty by every means in His Power for the promotion 
 of those salutary objects which the two courts have in view." 
 
 In another letter of the same date Grenville wrote i 1 
 
 1 Record Office. 
 
84 
 
 " In addition to what I have already written to } 7 our Ex- 
 cellency on the subject of Toulon I am now to mention a 
 circumstance respecting that place which his Majesty has 
 seen with much concern. A letter for his Majesty from the 
 Comte de Provence was yesterday delivered to me by the 
 duke d'Harcourt. By the copy which I enclose to your 
 Excellency of this letter you will see that in it, the Comte de 
 Provence announces to the King, as a resolution already 
 taken, His design of going to Toulon, and that he takes upon 
 himself to say that he goes there to exercise the Functions 
 of Regent, and I am informed that he is actually set out 
 upon this journey. If no other considerations had prevailed, 
 the respect due to His Majesty required that no steps should 
 be taken by Monsieur with regard to Toulon, without first 
 submitting it to His Majesty's consideration & decision. The 
 Question whether the Comte de Provence should go there at 
 all, in the present moment, is one worthy of much delibera- 
 tion. His going there as regent, while the place is in its 
 present situation, is liable to still more question ; but attempt- 
 ing to take these steps without the King's previous consent 
 while the Port and Town of Toulon are held by His Maj- 
 esty and occupied by His Forces, cannot in any manner be 
 permitted. It is proper that I should not conceal from Y. 
 Exy. the suspicion entertained here that this step has been 
 secretly suggested or at least encouraged by the Court of 
 Spain, as one, the success of which would tend to increase 
 their influence in Toulon. The Possibility of this only in- 
 creases the necessity of your holding a firm and decided 
 language both as to the absolute command to be exercised 
 at Toulon by Governor O'Hara, as also to this particular 
 Point of Monsieur's admission there. Information having 
 been, some time since, received which seemed to make it 
 not improbable that Monsieur would take the step, which 
 he has now announced, provisional orders were put to his 
 Majesty's Officers at Toulon directing them not to admit of 
 Monsieur's coming there, without His Majesty's previous con- 
 
85 
 
 sent being signified to them, and measures were taken to 
 prevent the eclat which a public demand and refusal on 
 this subject might produce, by previously apprising Monsieur 
 of the embarrassment to which such an event would expose 
 him. I have now taken further steps for this purpose, but 
 as they may fail in their effect I have received the King's 
 orders expressly to instruct Y. Exy. to represent, in the 
 strongest terms, to the Spanish government the disrespectful 
 conduct of Monsieur toward His Majesty on this occasion, 
 and to announce to them the orders which His Majesty has 
 thought proper in consequence of it, to send to Gov. O'Hara 
 positively prohibiting him from suffering Monsieur to enter 
 Toulon. In your communication on this subject you will not 
 appear to believe that the Spanish government could be 
 in any way a party to this inconsiderate and improper step 
 on the part of Monsieur. But you will remark that this 
 instance of disrespect towards the King obliges him to sus- 
 pend the discussions which he had been willing to open 
 with Monsieur, respecting the recognition of His claim to 
 the Regency of France, according to the desire which had 
 been expressed by the Court of Madrid. You may however 
 add that His Majesty on being informed that Monsieur has 
 abandoned his present Project and is sensible of the impro- 
 priety of his conduct towards His Majesty, will be ready to 
 resume the consideration of that Point on the grounds which 
 I have stated to you at large in my other letter of this day." 
 Before this time the agents of the Princes were active in 
 Toulon also, and apparantly in understanding with the 
 Spaniards. On Nov. 23 the Cornite de Surveillance and the 
 Sections of Toulon announced to Elliot their desire for the 
 restoration of the ancient form of government, for the ac- 
 knowledgment of Monsieur as Regent, and for the immedi- 
 ate exercise of his authority in Toulon. I shall give here the 
 original reports relating to this question. The tfrst is a letter 
 from Elliot to Henry Dundas; l dated Toulon Nov. 24. "I 
 
 1 Record Office. 
 
86 
 
 have received the enclosed paper from the ComitS de Sur- 
 veillance and the sections of Toulon, by which you will 
 see how decided the public mind is at Toulon for the res- 
 toration of their ancient government. The warmth with 
 which they desire the acknowledgment of the Regent and 
 the immediate exercise of his authority here, without touch- 
 ing at all on the constitution of 1789, confirmes extremely 
 the Idea I had formed of their dispositions. It is worthy of 
 remark that the sections are the most popular assemblies 
 that can be conceived, being composed without distinction 
 of all inhabitants who think proper to attend them. I 
 confess that every view I have on the subject inclines me 
 strongly to think that the acknowledgment of the Regent 
 by all the combined Powers is a measure highly desirable. 
 The interests of the monarchy which (though His Majesty 
 is not ultimately pledged to that principle) we have in the 
 meanwhile avowedly espoused, and the restoration of which, 
 is infinitely the most important object of the war, would 
 surely be much promoted by the advantage of an osten- 
 sible and legitimate representation of the royal authority. 
 I am persuaded it would detach from us no support on 
 which we can depend, and it would add a greater accession 
 of numbers and zeal to the service. It is a measure so likely 
 to work on the imagination of Frenchmen that one can not 
 help considering it as at least possible, that a general and 
 sudden turn might be given to the affairs of France by this 
 single change in our system. I am aware that other objects 
 may justly, and perhaps must in point of policy, as well as 
 of fidelity to our allies, be taken into the consideration of 
 this subject and that on these accounts, this resolution can 
 not be adopted otherwise than in consequence of a previous 
 discusion with the Princes, and by a general concert with 
 the combined Powers. I am therefore glad to hear that the 
 first steps seem to have been taken, and considering that one 
 of our allies, the court of Spain, has already declared its 
 sentiments, I flatter myself with the hope of the negotiation 
 
87 
 
 being brought to an early and favorable conclusion the 
 more I learn of the true nature of the counter-revolutionary 
 spirit in France, the more I am inclined to the opinion, I 
 have taken the libert} 7 of delivering, and the more essential 
 I think it to our success that the measure should be adopted. 
 With regard to the application made to me by the sections 
 of Toulon on this subject, I shall be able to prevent their 
 carrying any measure into execution until I have the honor 
 of receiving His Majesty's commands. I can not say that I 
 see any local inconvenience in the admission of the Regent 
 into Toulon, and the establishment of his authority here, 
 and it might possibly produce a good effect in the adjacent 
 country, and even in the besieging Army, at the same time 
 it must be observed that by such a condescension His Maj- 
 esty would perform his engagements for the redelivery of 
 Toulon earlier than can be claimed by the terms of the 
 convention : and possibly some advantage might be lost in 
 treating for the terms of peace. But if anything were gained 
 by it, towards accelerating the settlement of France, I confess, 
 I should think all disadvantages on other points sufficiently 
 compensated. There is too much reason to fear that Austria 
 is more indifferent to the main object of the war, and more 
 attached to points of her own, than she professes to be. 
 Prussia we know is not to be depended on, and if Great 
 Britain does not throw her whole weight into the scale of a 
 more enlarged and sounder policy, there is great reason to 
 fear for the issue of this contest." 
 
 Elliot enclosed the following: Answer of the Commis- 
 sioners at Toulon to the comite" de surveillance respecting 
 the Regent. 1 27th of Nov. " Nous avons re9U avec beau- 
 coup d'interet la communication qui nous a ete faite de 
 vos deliberations et de celles des sections de Toulon, rela- 
 tivement & la Regence. Nous y reconnaissons avec le plus 
 grand plaisir des sentiments dignes & la fois du patriotisme 
 et de la sagesse de cette ville .respectable. Nous partageons 
 
 l Record Office. 
 
88 
 
 avec elle non seulement le d6sir de voir renaitre 1'ordre sous 
 un gouvernment fond6 sur des bons principes, non sen le- 
 nient les sentiments de Ioyaut6 et d'attachment pour votre 
 jeune et infortun6 monarche, mais aussi ceux du respect et 
 de la ve"ne"ratiou, pour la famille de vos rois, et surtout pour 
 Pauguste personnage qui est 1' object de vos veux. Nous 
 nous trouvons nSanmoins dans PimpossibilitS de concourir 
 imme'diatement a Paccomplissement de vous souhaits et 
 nous de"sirons vous faire part des obstacles qui s'y opposent. 
 La Regence de la France interesse 1'Europe entiere et sur- 
 tout les Puissances coalise"es, puisque dans le circonstances 
 actuelles PautoritS du Regent conime celle du trdne m6me 
 ne peut etre re"alise"e que par leur s6cours et par des efforts 
 immense de leur part. Get object done doit de toute ne"ces- 
 site", comme par toutes les obligations taute de la saine poli- 
 tique que des sentiments honngtes (les seuls qui puissent 
 animer ces Princes illustres) etre trait6 directement avec les 
 cours qui combattent les ennemis de votre Roy. Une affaire 
 aussi importante et qui embrasse des relations politiques 
 aussi 6tendues et aussi combinees ne peut e^tre terminee 
 avec effet ni peutetre meme tente"e avec avantage par une 
 seule ville respectable & la verite a toutes sortes de titres, 
 mais pour le moment non seulement isole"e du reste de la 
 France, mais ayant contracts pour P interet du royaume, 
 comme pour son propre salut, des relations re"centes et 
 sacre"es avec une autre puissance. II est evident dans tous 
 les cas que les ministres de sa Majest6 Britannique doivent 
 etre absolument iiicompetens a decider sur ces objets sans 
 avoir specialement consult^ leur cour et obtenu des pouvoirs 
 directs. Tout ce qu' ils pourront faire pour seconder le ze"le 
 louable des habitans de Toulon, est de soumettre sans delai 
 cette matiere interessante a la sagesse et aux lumieres de 
 Sa Majest6 et d'attendre ses ordres. Jusqu'alors ne nous 
 trouvant point autorise"s ^ compromettre sa Majeste sur la 
 question de la Regence, nous pouvons encore moins con- 
 sentir &, la proposition qui a 6t6 faite d'appeller Monsieur le 
 
89 
 
 Comte de Provence a Toulon, pour y exercer les fonctions 
 de Regent parce que ce serait destituer Sa MajestS Britan- 
 nique avant 1'epoque stipule de 1' autoritS qui lui a 6te" 
 dernierement confine a Toulon. Ces raisons ne nous obligent 
 cependant point de nous opposer au desir que pourraient 
 avoir les habitans de cette ville de parter leurs hommages 
 aux pieds de ce Prince et de lui exprimer tous les voeux 
 que doivent inspirer ses vertus personelles ou que peuvent 
 r^clamer les droits de sa naissance. 
 
 A Toulon ce 27 de Novembre 1793. Signe; Hood, Elliot, 
 O'Hara. 
 
 Elliot commented on this answer in another letter to Henry 
 Dundas, on the same day: "We have endeavoured to con- 
 form ourselves to the spirit of His Majesty's commands as 
 conveyed in your despatch of the 22 of October. . . 
 But although we have been careful not to commit His 
 Majesty on the question and have positively refused to ad- 
 mit the Princes into Toulon, without His Majesty's orders 
 we did not think it necessary to prevent the inhabitants 
 from paying to him any compliment they thought fit, or 
 acknowledging in their own name his right to the Regency. 
 We thought it might even be advantageous that they should 
 execute that part of their intentions because in the first 
 place it will unite great numbers of them in a measure in 
 which the constitution of 1789 is not mentioned, and in 
 the next place, will afford security for their steadiness, as it 
 renders their case more desperate with the convention." 1 
 
 The retreat of the Allies from Toulon brought this ques- 
 tion to an end. The English whose main object in the war 
 was the " indemnification " regarded a stable form of gov- 
 ernment as the necessary condition for the obtaining, as 
 well as for the peaceful enjoyment of, this indemnification. 
 Toulon they intended to hold as security for it. The in- 
 terests of the French monarchy for which England had 
 declared principally out of consideration for Austria, and 
 
 l These three communications just given are all from the Record Office. 
 
90 
 
 perhaps for her other Allies, were not thought of as suffi- 
 ciently important to justify her sacrificing her authority at 
 Toulon by the admission of Monsieur. Again, the French 
 fleet was to be considered. Although nowhere mentioned, it 
 is certain that the English were conscious of the fact that 
 by the admission of Monsieur, the ships also would be under 
 his command and consequently neither come into English 
 hands nor even be destroyed. The removal of the- fleet 
 formed part of England's plan for supremacy in the Medi- 
 terranean. Spain, however, beside her natural inclination 
 to aid the French princes from dynastic interests, was not 
 at all adverse to the idea of the English authority at 
 Toulon being superceded, more especially as her own influ- 
 ence would be far greater with the Regent than with the 
 English. The Sardinian Court to which the Princes had % also 
 applied, was at this time quite subject to the interests of 
 England. Neither from Hood's declaration which recognized 
 the constitution of 89, nor from the King's declaration 
 which declared for hereditary monarchy, was England 
 under any binding moral obligation to recognize Monsieur 
 as Regent. Asa political move it is hard to say what would 
 have been the result. In all probability Monsieur would 
 have arrived too late to have had any material influence 
 upon the affairs of Toulon. 
 
 The dispute as to the division of authority always re- 
 mained an unsettled one. In the beginning of November 
 St. Helens advised Alcudia to wait until he (St. Helens) re- 
 ceived news from England and meanwhile that both Gen- 
 erals should command. On November 8 St. Helens wrote to 
 Grenville: lu The Duke de la Alcudia has nominated M. 
 Ocarez (who was charge" d'affaires in France, at the time of 
 the death of the late King) to reside at Toulon as Plenipo- 
 tentiary from this court; an appointment which seems to 
 have been created in imitation of that of Sir Gilbert Elliot, 
 however I do not find that he is invested with any similar 
 
 1 Record Office 
 
91 
 
 Commission, his instructions being merely to correspond 
 regularly with the Department of the first secretary of State." 
 On November 13. St. Helens wrote further: 1 that the dis- 
 pute between the admirals continued, but that Hood assured 
 him that it would not interfere with the cause, "O'Haraand 
 Gravina waving entirely the Question relative to the chief 
 Command:" on November 27, that the differences were 
 arranged and that O'Hara was to have the chief command 
 of the combined forces on shore and Gravina the govern- 
 ment of the city. Hood however was not in a very concilia- 
 tory mood especially as he had a very low opinion of the 
 Spanish. As early as October 11 he wrote to Trevor 2 " I 
 must mention to you in confidence that no dependence can 
 be placed in the Spanish or Neopolitians, they cannot be left 
 anywhere to themselves." On November 20 Elliot wrote to 
 St. Helens, complaining of the quality of the Spanish sol- 
 diers; 3 " It is his (O'Hara' s) opinion, and I believe Lord 
 Hood's, that if you can by any means obtain better troops, 
 or if not, if you can even withdraw those that are here you 
 will render a service to the Garrison If any dis- 
 aster should take place here it will become a very serious 
 question, in what manner the French ships should be dis- 
 posed of. In that event if Spain in persuance of their present 
 notions of equality should set up any claim of participation 
 in the possession of those ships our measures will be ex- 
 posed to great Embarrassement. I need say no more to satisfy 
 your Lordship of the Importance of this matter and we leave 
 it with great confidence in your hands". This shows con- 
 clusively that even Elliot, who falsely regarded the restora- 
 tion of monarchy as the principal object of the war, and who 
 was in favor of recognizing Monsieur as Regent, had no in- 
 tention of ad mi ting any " equality ", in fact any share, in 
 the distribution of the French ships. In such a state of af- 
 fairs a more serious turn in the old dispute seemed inevita- 
 
 1 Record Office. 
 
 2 Foreign Office. Sardinia 1793. R. O. 
 
 3 Commissioners to Toulon 1793. R. O. 
 
92 
 
 ble; but the position of the Allies having become gradually 
 quite precarious, the political questions fell into the back- 
 ground. Even before November 30, the English more than 
 doubted the strength of their hold on the town. On Nov. 
 23 Elliot wrote to Dundas l " It seems to me that the posses- 
 sion of this place is precarious, and that every day is criti- 
 cal ": the next day to Lady Elliot, "O.Hara thinks as ill as 
 possible of this business as it now stands; but reinforce- 
 ments may be expected before the worst may happen. Lord 
 Hood is over confident and will never admit the slighest 
 doubt of our keeping the place." 
 
 The English had changed their opinion on another ques- 
 tion also. On Oct 19. Mulgrave wrote to Trevor 3 "You 
 must not send us one emigre of any sort; they would be a 
 nuisance, they are all so various and so violent in their 
 principles of gouvernment whether for despotism, Constitu- 
 tion or Republic, that we should be distracted with their 
 quarrels and they are so assuming, forward, dictatorial and 
 full of complaints, that no business could go on with them. 
 Lord Hood is adverse to receiving any of them. You must 
 therefore put them off as civilly as you can." A little more 
 than a month later Elliot informed Dundas 4 that they had 
 sent to Italy for twenty to eighty emigrant officers, and on 
 December 8, 5 Hood, Elliot and Dundas informed the emi- 
 grants that they might serve under their own officers, but 
 subject to the Government of Toulon. Not many were to 
 serve as officers, but principally as private soldiers which 
 "1* amour de la Patrie eyait coneilier avec 1'honneur de la 
 noblesse Fran9aise". They were also directed to ask the ap- 
 probation of the Princes as that would help the cause. On 
 Dec. 18. Trevor wrote to Grenville, 6 "The emigrants wait 
 
 1 Commissioners to Toulon. R. O. 
 
 2 Life of Elliot, Minto. 
 
 3 Sardinia, Foreign Office. R. O. 
 
 4 Letter Nov. 27th. Commissioners to Toulon. 
 
 5 Elliot to Trevor. Dec. 8. Foreign Office. Sardinia. R. O. 
 
 6 Foreign Office. Sardinia. R. O. 
 
93 
 
 for His Royal Highness orders before they determine upon 
 accepting our offers of receiving them at Toulon. I cannot 
 doubt but that he will tell them to go." The emigrants were 
 still negotiating in Switzerland when Bonaparte's batteries 
 had driven the Allies from Toulon. On Dec. 1. Elliot wrote 
 to Dundas: l "Nothing very important has occured in the 
 political affairs of this place and indeed that department is 
 naturally rather in the background, while our situation is so 
 critical". This marks the end of the dispute between the two 
 nations in the city itself. Other thoughts occupy their atten- 
 tion. Elliot wrote Dec. 9. 2 "I consider our possession of this 
 place very precarious, which is not surprising, considering 
 that I have heard that opinion from every military man of 
 rank since I came here": On Dec. 12 " General Dun- 
 das is in very low spirits and seems to dispond more than 
 ever". The tone of the two courts, especially of the Spanish, 
 was far from being conciliatory. The two following cum- 
 rnunications show that the disputed question bade fair to 
 become insoluble. The fall of Toulon rendered a solution 
 unnecessary. 
 
 Grenville to St. Helens. Whitehall. Dec. 1. "The original 
 tenor as well as the particular expressions of Monsieur Del 
 Campo's late notes, are so entirely inconsistent with the rela- 
 cions in which the two courts have been placed with respect 
 to each other by the late negotiations and by the circum- 
 stances which still exist that it is thought absolutely neces- 
 sary that Your Excellency should ascertain whether the form 
 and language of those notes were prescribed to him by his 
 court, or whether they arise solely from ill disposition to- 
 wards this country of which he has given such repeated 
 proofs. And if the latter should be found to be the case Your 
 Excellency will no doubt judge it absolutely necessary to 
 adopt some proper expedient by which the Duke of Alcudia 
 may be apprised how little Monsieur Del Campo's conduct 
 
 1 Commissioners to Toulon. R. O. 
 
 2 To Lady Elliot. Life of Elliot. Minto. 
 
94 
 
 appears calculated to promote union and good understand- 
 ing between the two countries." 
 
 St. Helens wrote to Grenville on Dec. 25. " But at any rate 
 I think it my duty to acquaint your Lordship without Loss 
 of time, that this court does not hitherto appear to be dis- 
 posed to relinquish voluntarily their pretended Right to the 
 perpetual nomination of the Commander in Chief of the 
 combined Forces in Toulon unless it be on the evidently in- 
 admissable condition, of their being allowed to remove from 
 that Port and to retain under their sole Custody, the greater 
 part, if not the whole, of the French fleet now lying there: 
 .... and that they have also rendered the arrange- 
 ment of this disputed point still more difficult than before 
 by nominating to the command of the Spanish Troops at 
 Toulon the celebrated Count O'Reilly who (not to mention 
 the objections that might be stated against his personal char- 
 acter and dispositions) is a Lieutenant General of near 30 
 years standing and consequently superior in Point of senior- 
 ity to any officer of that Rank in the British Army ". 
 
 One other question which preoccupied the British cabinet 
 during the entire siege was, that of the Austrian reinforce- 
 ments. In the rapprochement between London and Vienna 
 which came about in the War of the First Coalition, and 
 which had by the publication of the King's Declaration 
 taken the form of an explicit policy of "indemnification", 
 the English court had expected the assistance of from 12 
 to 15,000 Austrian troops for any offensive operations which 
 might take place from the Mediterranean. On hearing of 
 the surrender of Toulon, Pitt wrote to Grenville telling him 
 to press the Emperor to send troops, and on Sep. 14 such 
 instructions were sent to Eden. As early as Sep. 11 Eden 
 informed Grenville 1 that he had demanded troops from 
 Thugut, who made excuses saying that they were needed on 
 the Rhine, and complaining of the backwardness of Prussia. 
 On Sept. 25 Eden wrote that he urged that a force should 
 be sent to Toulon and Thugut replied that he would recom- 
 
 1 Austria. Sir Morton Eden. Record Office. 
 
95 
 
 mend it to His Majesty. Butt at the same time Eden wrote 
 to Trevor telling him that the troops were coming; as if it 
 had been already settled. Austria did promise the troops 
 however, but under conditions. Eden wrote to Auckland 1 
 "This country gives us 5000 men . . . but will not allow 
 them to be employed offensively to make conquests for the 
 King of Sardinia unless that Sovereign will (if any are made) 
 yield them, though in a very inferior proportion something 
 in return for the share of this court in the Novarese ". 
 Thaon de Revel says in his Memoirs; "Les troupes autrich- 
 iennes qui 6taient dans les garnisons de Fe"tat de Milan y 
 etaient restees paisiblement an lieu de marcher sur Lyon,ce 
 qui en eut empeche la chute et port6 un coup mortel & la 
 revolution. L'Angleterre demandait que les Autrichiens 
 reunis aux Piedmontais chassassent les Franyais du comte 
 de Nice d'une partie de la Provence et que Foil entr'ouvrit 
 uue communication directe et sure avec Toulon. L'appre- 
 hension de la Gourde Vienne que le Eoi de Sardaigne n'eut 
 des succes, s'opposa dans cette occasion comme dans toutes 
 les autres a tout ce que le lien commun de la coalition con- 
 seillait si fortement. Elleesperait que si le Hoi de Sardaigne 
 se trouvait dans Fembarras il consent! rait & lui ceder une 
 partie des acquisitions faites anciennement sur Fetat de 
 Milan." 
 
 This jealousy of Sardinia, a distrust of England and a 
 failing to see any tangible and immediate gain were the 
 real reasons why Austria did not send the troops. The 
 reasons she put forward were others. 2 On Oct. 30 Eden 
 wrote: 3 " In a conversation with the Austrian minister he 
 repeated with some appearance of alarm the danger of their 
 present situation unsupported b}^ Prussia and the Dutch and 
 their numbers reduced by repeated losses, particularly in 
 the affair before Maubeuge, and asked me if in the case 
 
 1 Correspondence of Auckland. 
 
 2 On Nov. 4. Thugut received information from London "assez propre 
 a calmer nos inquietudes sur les intentions des Anglais relativement & 
 Dunkerque. ' ' Vertrauliche Briefe von Thugut. von Vivenot. 
 
 3 Eden to Grenville R. O. 
 
96 
 
 Toulon should be found from the reinforcements already ar- 
 rived there not to stand in need of the troops promised from 
 hence." 
 
 The troops were looked for at Toulon and Hood dis- 
 patched Admiral Goodal to Genoa to bring them but the 
 ships returned as empty as the departed. Finally however 
 the English Cabinet, impatient at this delay, assumed more 
 and more express terms in demanding the troops, as the fol- 
 lowing instructions to Eden will show. They are dated 
 Nov. 11. 1 " You will remonstrate in the strongest terms 
 against this delay as a positive breach of faith and as likely 
 to be in its consequences highly injurious to the common in- 
 terests." . . . Nov. 24. 1 " You will therefore now admit 
 of no further excuse but formally claim the immediate 
 execution of the engagement and lose no time in apprizing 
 me of the result." On Dec. 8 Eden replied 1 " I called 
 on Thugut .... and in obedience to your Lord- 
 ship's express directions demanded, in His Majesty's 
 name, an order for the immediate march of the reinforce- 
 ments promised to His Majesty for the support of Toulon." 
 It was not until Dec. 16. that Eden was finally able to 
 assure John Trevor that 2u every Difficulty is removed " and 
 "that His Imperial Majesty has issued his orders for the 
 immediate march of the troops for Toulon." This time the 
 Austrians were undoubtedly sincere but as is seen, it was 
 too late. Before this note could reach Trevor, Toulon was 
 lost. The English had been over-confident at Toulon. Al- 
 though Dundas, the secretary of war, had been repeatedly 
 warned, he could not realize that it was possible to lose the 
 place. He counted too much on the bad quality of the Re- 
 publicans. As late as Dec. 27. troops were being em- 
 barked at Cork for Toulon, 3 and but a few days before Pay- 
 master General Lennox was sent from London. 4 
 
 1 Record Office. 
 
 2 Letters from Dundas. British Museum. Mss. Additional 27, 594. 
 
 3 War Office Letter Books. Commander-in-chief. (1792-94) R. O. 
 
 4 Admiralty Records, War Office. (1782-1794). Dec. 20. R. O. 
 
97 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 NEWS OF THE FALL OF TOULON IN SPAIN, FRANCE AND ENG- 
 LAND RESULTS OF THE FALL OF TOULON FATE OF 
 SHIPS AT TOULON ROLE OF BONAPARTE MEMOIRES 
 OF BARRAS INFLUENCE OF THE SIEGE ON BONAPARTE. 
 
 The news of the fall of Toulon caused in republican 
 France and especially in Paris, the wildest joy. On Dec. 24. 
 it was announced by Barrere in the Convention. At the same 
 time he made a motion that " I>armee dirigee contre Toulon 
 a bien merits de la Patrie." The entire assembly arose with 
 loud shouts of approbation. A few days later Robespierre 
 began one of his long speeches with, " laissons 1'Europe et 
 1'histoire vanter les miracles de Toulon et preparons de nou- 
 veaux triomphes a la liberte". The Convention decided to 
 declare a general holiday and on Dec. 30. the great u fete de 
 rejouissance " took place. David was ordered to prepare it. 
 The entire Convention took part in the tremendous proces- 
 sion. For weeks the Theaters gave popular performances 
 " en rejouissence de la reprise de Toulon," and " La prise de 
 Toulon" was often read in the papers of that time as the 
 title to a play which was supposed to win popular favor. 
 Not only in Paris and in France, but even in America and 
 in Constantinople one celebrated the fall of Toulon. As to 
 the reception of the news in Spain, St. Helens wrote on Jan- 
 uary 8. 1 "With regard to the sensations produced here by 
 the late abandonment of Toulon it seems to me that if this 
 court feel any concern on that account it arises rather from 
 certain collateral considerations than from their conceiving 
 that event to be in itself prejudicial to the common inter- 
 ests the}' are of the opinion that by the destruc- 
 tion of the arsenal and shipping of Toulon we have secured 
 all the essential advantages which the surrender of that place 
 was ever likely to have afforded without the Burthen and 
 
 1 Record Office. 
 2192-7 
 
98 
 
 Risk of maintaining possession of it, this seems to be like- 
 wise the opinion of the public at large". Lord St. Helen's 
 opinion was corroborated by the Gazetta de Madrid which 
 gave the accounts of the evacuation. But from now on, an 
 enmity gradually developed between England and Spain, 
 and in the Declaration of War by Spain in 1796 is found 
 the following passage " This ill faith became manifest in 
 the most critical moment of the 1st. campagne .from the 
 manner in which Lord Hood treated my fleet at Toulon 
 where he attended to nothing but the destruction of what he 
 could not carry away with him." As the Spaniards were by 
 no means an inactive party to the destruction referred to, 
 this passage is open to some criticism ; but it shows none 
 the less that the differences between the English and Span- 
 ish left some impression. Later on it was even stated openly 
 in London that the Spanish blew up the ships in the harbor 
 of Toulon purposely to destroy the English boats. This state- 
 ment is no doubt false, but it shows to what extent the ill 
 feeling between the two countries went. 
 
 In England the news was received with surprise but with 
 no great amount of disappointment. The Opposition wel- 
 comed it however as they hoped to use it against the gov- 
 ernment. Nelson's opinion was in general the most preva- 
 lent one. 1 " For England the getting rid of such a place is 
 a most happy event. Our money would have gone very fast. 
 The quitting of Toulon by us I am satisfied is a national 
 benefit". The Earl of Elgin wrote to Grenville on the 2 " un- 
 fortunate news" but added " the destroying the fleet and 
 arsenal and saving the garrison are great palliatives". At 
 the opening of Parliament on Jan. 21, 1794. the following 
 reference is made to Toulon, in the King's speech: "the 
 temporary possession of the town and post of Toulon has 
 greatly distressed the operations of my enemies; and in the 
 circumstances attending the evacuation of that place an im- 
 
 1 Nelson's Dispatches. 
 
 * Elgin to Grenville. Dec. 29. Fortesque Mss. 
 4 
 
99 
 
 portant and decisive blow has been given to their naval 
 power, by the distinguished conduct, abilities and spirit of my 
 commanders, officers and forces both by sea and by land ". 
 This was to a great extent the opinion in official circles. 
 Lord Star in the address of thanks replied "Since the mem- 
 orable battle of La Hogue a more brilliant enterprise had 
 not been achieved than that at Toulon by Lord Hood. The 
 destruction of the Arsenal and naval stores of the second sea- 
 port of France was a circumstance that she could not repair 
 for years. It must necessarily cripple her navy for the pres- 
 ent and for years to come and. prove the most fatal blow 
 that was struck at the French marine". The Opposition in 
 Parliament however used the affair at Toulon as an oppor- 
 tunity of condemning the conduct as well as the object of 
 the war. Fox was especially bitter in his criticism, while 
 Pitt defended the government. On the opening of the session 
 in Jan. 94. in his attack upon the government Fox referred 
 frequently to Toulon. " When we have been driven from 
 Toulon in a manner so afflicting if not disgraceful " . . . . 
 He then pointed out the difference between the object of 
 gaining "some solid advantage for ourselves, as an indem- 
 nification for the expenses of the war and that of giving 
 such a government to France as ministers might think it 
 safe to treat with " .... "Toulon was taken by the 
 British in consequence of certain conditions stipulated by 
 the inhabitants. And yet even with the certainty of the 
 guillotine before them these inhabitants were so unwilling 
 to assist the British, that no other than an ignominious evac- 
 uation could be effected. If it was right so to take it, it be- 
 came a matter of indespensible duty to defend it. Toulon, 
 purchased by compromise you have lost with disgrace; you 
 have placed yourselves in a point of view entirely new to 
 British character, you have proved yourselves neither use- 
 ful as friends, nor respectable as enemies ". On May. 30. in 
 speaking of the King's declaration he said ; "A declaration 
 in the name of his majesty afterwards came out different 
 
100 
 
 indeed from this: verbose, obscure and equivocal like the 
 production of men who are afraid of saying anything dis- 
 tinctly, who wish not their meaning to be clearly under- 
 stood : that stript of all the elegant rubbish with which it 
 was loaded declared only this, that the restoration of mon- 
 archy without specifying what kind, was the only condition 
 upon which we could treat with France". Pitt replied; "the 
 right honorable gentleman proceeded to bring forward a 
 charge of inconsistency from the declaration of Lord Hood 
 at Toulon and that afterwards published by His Majesty, 
 addressed to the people of France. These declarations, I 
 affirm, are perfectly consistent. That of Lord Hood only 
 promises protection to the people of Toulon, as far as he 
 could grant it without specifying any particular form of 
 government they chose to pledge themselves to the Consti- 
 tution of 1789. The declaration of His Majesty offers pro- 
 tection to all the people of France, who shall approve of an 
 hereditary monarchy". Pitt was not quite honest here as he 
 gave rather how he wished Hood's declaration should be 
 interpreted, than how it was in reality. It will be remem- 
 bered that the English government was not satisfied with it. 
 The affair of Toulon remained however a favourite point of 
 attack for Fox, and as late as March. 95 he made allusion 
 to it. 
 
 From a military stand -point the results of the fall of Tou- 
 lon were the following. First. The moral effect of the ex- 
 pulsion of the combined forces of four nations from the soil 
 of France was great. Second. The large army employed at 
 Toulon was now free to swell the ranks of the armies of 
 Alpes and of the Pyrenees ; the friends of royalty in the 
 south of France had no longer a "point d'appui" in Toulon, 
 and the barbarous punishment of the rebellious city could 
 not but have its effect upon other cities with similar inten- 
 tions. Third. The occupation of Toulon by the Allies had 
 struch a severe blow at the French navy, a very large part 
 of which was stationed here. It was of this fact that the 
 
101 
 
 English most boasted and with which they consoled them- 
 selves for the forced evacuation. Of the 31 ships of line in 
 the harbor, 11 were burnt, 4 sent away with the French sea- 
 men at the begining of the siege (this caused a good deal of 
 criticism in England), 3 were carried off by the English and 
 the rest saved, thanks to the rapid advance of the Republi- 
 cans on the last two days of the siege. Of the 12 frigates, 5 
 entered the service of the English, 1 was given to Sardinia, 
 3 burnt and the rest saved by the Republicans. There were 
 13 corvettes of which 7 went to England, 1 to Spain, 1 to 
 Naples, 2 burnt and the rest saved by the Republicans. As 
 is seen, the English received about all the ships. They were 
 taken to be guarded for the King of France : which meant 
 that the English had the use of them until the Restoration, 
 20 years afterwards. She then made excuses for keeping 
 those of them which were left at that time. Besides the ships, 
 the yards and naval stores of all kinds were destroyed at 
 Toulon; but the large guns, as well as the fortifications 
 erected by the Allies themselves, could not be destroyed for 
 want of time. Bonaparte rejoicing over this fact wrote on 
 Dec. 24. "Toulon est plus dans le cas de sedefendre aujour- 
 d'hui que jainais." 
 
 As to the historical significance of the affair of Toulon, its 
 fall was one of the most important successes of the Repub- 
 licans which rendered the peace of Campo Formio possible; 
 its occupation by the Allies was the occasion of England's 
 forming a brilliant scheme of indemnification, which ex- 
 pressed her intentions during the War of the First Coalition. 
 But the siege of Toulon will be known principally as the 
 action in which Napoleon first distinguished himself. The 
 exact part which he played in this important event has be- 
 come a question of dispute, giving rise to various opinions. 
 After studying the question I have become convinced and 
 hope to be able to prove that those who attribute to Napo- 
 leon a great part in the success of the Republican Army are 
 quite right. The grounds upon which they base their opin- 
 
102 
 
 ion may often be false however. It has frequently been said 
 that Napoleon alone, with the eye of a genius, discovered 
 the one vulnerable point in the outskirts of Toulon, namely 
 the Eguillette, and by this one act decided the fate of the 
 city. This is false. He choose, as any other well schooled 
 officer would have done, the Eguillette as a point of attack, 
 but he is entitled to no great credit for having done so. 
 Again according to his own statement and to that of the 
 Representatives, this plan corresponded practically with that 
 sent on from Paris; and again, the Allies themselves recog- 
 nized the importance of this point, and seized and fortified 
 it before the Republicans could take advantage of it. This 
 was due to the slowness of Carteaux. The great merit of 
 Bonaparte lay in the fact that he alone organized and com- 
 manded the artillery, which at all sieges and most especially 
 at Toulon, played the important part. Bonaparte showed 
 the greatest activity in the equiping as well as in the direc- 
 tion of this arm. Even many of the officers were called to 
 Toulon by him personally. He showed excellent judge- 
 ment in placing his batteries; so much so that, as has been 
 seen, the shots from the first one erected, after Bonaparte had 
 been but a few days at Toulon, announced to the Allies the 
 possibility of their being forced to evacuate the place. The 
 notes of the Spanish Minster, of the English ambassador at 
 Madrid, and of Hood are eloquent proofs of this. Almost 
 up to the end the Republican Army was in a most deplor- 
 able state. The Artillery was the one redeeming feature, the 
 one arm which gave the Allies any concern. All their sallies 
 were made in order to destroy the steadily approaching bat- 
 teries. The daring and disasterous sortie in which O'Hara 
 was captured, was rendered necessary by the opening of the 
 fire of the Convention. The great part which the artillery 
 played in the final attack on Eguillette has been seen. The 
 shots from the newly erected batteries were what forced the 
 Allies to hasten their retreat on the last day, and conse- 
 quently made it impossible for them to complete their work 
 
103 
 
 of burning the ships and yards. In fact the proofs of the 
 great activity of the artillery stand out in vivid contrast to 
 the inefficiency of the other branches of the army. The ar- 
 tillery was entirely the work of Bonaparte ; he had the sole 
 command until the arrival of Du Thiel, and the real com- 
 mand even then, for Du Theil was old, ailing and could 
 not take any active part. The council of war had approved 
 all the batteries erected by Bonaparte, and the positions of 
 all those erected after Du Theil's arrival had been chosen 
 by Napoleon ; and most of them already commenced. Du 
 Theil was brave, well instructed and made a good impression 
 on Dugommier. He recognised immediately the talent of 
 Bonaparte as is shown by the following lines written to the 
 Minister of war on the day of the entrance of the Republi- 
 cans in Toulon. 1 " Je manque d'expression pour te peindre le 
 merite de Bonaparte ; beaucoup de science, autant d'intelli- 
 gence, et trop de bravour, voila une faible esquisse des vertus 
 de ce rare officier. C'est & toi citoyen ministre de les con- 
 sacrer a la Gloire de la Republique." Victor wrote in his 
 Memoirs ; " Or ces puissantes moyens (the artillery) etaient 
 diriges par Bonaparte ; car le general Dutheil emerveille de 
 la justesse et de la superiorite de ses vues s'etait complete- 
 ment efface devant lui ; noble et rare abnegation ! hommage 
 magnifique qui honore a la fois celui qui le rendait et celui 
 qui en fut Fobjet". The Due de Raguse wrote in his Me- 
 moirs; " Duthiel fut venu pour prendre le commandement 
 en chef de 1'Artillerie. Celui-ci vit le pouvoir en si bonnes 
 mains et si bien exerce et les commandements avaient sou- 
 vent alors des consequences si graves qu'il laissa faire le 
 jeune officier et ne prit aucuue part a la direction du siege." 
 He made the same statement as Victor, but attributed Du 
 ThieFs action to different motives. His implying that Du 
 Thiel feared the responsibility of the command is no doubt 
 unjust. General Doppet said in his Memoirs, written in 
 1797 ; " Duthiel fit avec moi la visite des batteries etablies 
 
 1 War Archives. These lines have been frequently published. 
 
104 
 
 avant mon arrive et je vis avec aatant d'etonnement et de 
 satisfaction que cet ancien Artilleur applaudit a toutes les 
 mesures qu'avait prit le jeune Bonaparte." Many other 
 less important proofs are found in the writings of those who 
 took part in the siege. Carteaux's final praise of the Artil- 
 lery and Dugommier's and Salicetti's special mention of 
 Bonaparte during the siege have already been spoken of. 
 
 Barras also wrote in his Memoirs on the siege of Toulon, 
 and it is principally upon his writings that those who deny 
 the importance of Bonaparte's role, base their opinion. That 
 Barras' Memoires are hostile to Napoleon is admitted by all 
 who know them. That Barras' account of the siege of Toulon 
 is full of mistakes and consequently almost worthless as a 
 source, will be seen by everybody who compares it with any 
 trustworthy acount of the siege. And yet he tried to demon- 
 strate that Bonaparte's role at Toulon was only secondary. 
 It seems to me that he has really proved the contrary. Here 
 are a few of his sentences. " Des sa premiere recontre avec 
 moi je fut frappe de son activite ". . . . "je lui donnai 
 devaut tout le monde des preilves de ma -bienviellance". 
 . . . " Bientot ad mis a ma table il fut toujours place It 
 cote de rnoi ". . . . " Dugommier accorda de suite la 
 plus grande confiance & celui qu'il appelait " mon petit prot- 
 ege ". Bonaparte ne tarda pas ^ enabuser ; il prit bientot un 
 ton absolute et decisif qui deplut au general en chef ". . . . 
 " Bonaparte commandait rartillerieprovisoirement. Ce n'etait 
 pas assez pour lui de ce cornmandement important, il fallait 
 qu'il se mela de tout et de tout le monde ". These lines 
 show that Napoloen made himself everywhere conspicuous. 
 The hostile tone of the same may easily be attributed to 
 Barras' prejudice, Further he continued. " Bonaparte donna 
 quelques prouves de son talent militaire qui commenyait a 
 se developper; mais il n'agit que secondairement dans cette 
 circonstance : je le repete le veritable " preneur" de Toulon, 
 c'est Dugommier." When one recalls the fact that on the 
 13th. Vendemiaire Barras placed his entire fortune in the 
 
105 
 
 hands of Bonaparte, and a few days later said to the Con- 
 vention, "J'attirai Pattention de la Convention nationale 
 sur le general Buona Parte, Vest lui, c'est & ses dispositions 
 savantes et promptes qu'on doit la defense de cette enciente 
 autour de laqaelle il avait distribue des postes avec beaucoup 
 d'habilite ",(he then proposed him for " general en second de 
 1'armee de Finterieur ") and when one remembers that 
 Barras was largely instrumental in procuring for Bonaparte 
 the command of the army of Italy, one is justified in believ- 
 ing that his opinion of Bonaparte at this time was somewhat 
 different from that at the time he wrote his Memoires. 
 Barras' contempory opinion of Dugommier has been pre- 
 served and differs much from that which he gave in his 
 Memoires. On Nov. 29. he wrote to the Comite du Saint Pub- 
 lic " La situation de 1'armee n'est pas satisfaisante. Je suis 
 loin d'inculper le general Dugommier. Cependent ce general 
 questionne par moi n'a pu me dire le nombre de troupes 
 qu'il commande ; il ignore le nom des bataillons arrivees, le 
 nom et le nombre de ceux qu'il attend ; il n'avait encore 
 fait ni fait faire aucune revue, il ne connaissait pas la situa- 
 tion de ses principales batteries ; je 1'ai exhorte a s'occuper 
 plus serieusement de la grande affaire dont vous 1'avez 
 charge et de surveiller toutes les parties de l'administration 
 qui m'ont paru tres negligees ; il m'a tout promis ; il m'a 
 paru tres bien intentione, puisse-t-il tenir parole ". Barras' 
 opinion of Dugommier may be of no great value but it seems 
 strange to see him write in this tone of him whom he after- 
 wards termed the " veritable preneur de Toulon." Further 
 he wrote. "La prise du general O'Hara attribue a Bonaparte, 
 le vaiseau qu'il aurait coule bas, le plan de campagne auquel 
 il aurait participe sont autont d'assertions fausses, imaginees 
 par celui qui en a imagine bien d'autres, repetees par ses 
 flatteurs le jour ou il a eu 1'argent pour les payer." These 
 lines show the style and spirit in which Barras wrote of 
 Napoleon. The statements are quite false. It is true that 
 Bonaparte did not personally take O'Hara prisoner, and he 
 
106 
 
 nowhere said that he did. It is however practically certain 
 that he commanded the body of troops who found the 
 wounded English General. As for the"vaisseau anglais," 
 he sank several shortly after his arrival at Toulon, as has 
 been seen. As for the plan of attack, it has been shown how 
 he selected it as the proper one from the very first and fol- 
 lowed it up to the end. Barras' ideas on the proper manner 
 of attacking Toulon I have found in a letter -written by him 
 at that time, and as it is unpublished I have given it in full, 
 (see Appendix II) Reading it one cannot but admit that it 
 is merely a mass of phrases put together by one who feels 
 he is bound to say something on a subject of which he 
 knows little. It shows that Barras is not a military man : 
 consequently his opinion of Bonaparte's participation in a 
 plan which he himself did not appreciate, is worthless. On 
 Nov. 29. he wrote of the plan decided upon by the council of 
 war. . . . " Je 1'ai trouve trs bien ecrit, fort bien redige, 
 meme assez bien concu." Again nothing but phrases, where 
 Barras' criticises the handwriting and literary merit of a 
 military plan. It must surely be admitted that to judge of Na- 
 poleon's role at the siege of Toulon from Barras' memoires 
 is quite untrustworthy, in fact worse, as they are incorrect 
 and biased. Others l who have written on this event, say that 
 nothing in the official records shows the great role played 
 by Bonaparte. It is true that in the War Archives in Paris 
 there is no exact statement, nor is it mathematically demon- 
 strated that Bonaparte played the principal part in the 
 siege of Toulon : but indirect proofs abound even here and 
 are also to be found in the sources of the English and of the 
 other Allies. History is not an exact science ; therefore a 
 fact which, even through an indirect proof appeals to the 
 reason of an unprejudiced person is taken as truth. It is 
 quite as wrong to deny a fact which is clear, as to assert one 
 which is false. Toulon was Bonaparte's opportunity and he 
 took every advantage of it. 
 
 l Jung ; Krebs and Morris. 
 
107 
 
 It is instructive to follow as closely as the material per- 
 mits, Bonaparte's actions during these three important 
 months: to see how during this time of jealousy, distrust 
 and open enmity between the different officers, and between 
 the commanding officer and Representatives, Bonaparte 
 understood how to remain on excellent terms with them all 
 and to continue his part of the undertaking, conscious of his 
 aim and uninterrupted in his progress. Napoleon, spured 
 on by his restless ambition and armed with an excellent 
 technical instruction, needed yet something more to forward 
 him in his wonderful career;, to keep him on the proper 
 path, and from wasting his untiring energy against impos- 
 sibilities. He needed a broad knowledge of men and a clear 
 insight into the conditions of his day. Without this he might 
 have been a Hoche, a Kleber or a Ney, but never a Napoleon 
 nor even a Bernadotte. His intuitive genius could not of 
 itself have supplanted such knowledge; it made him quick 
 in comprehending, arranging and generalizing his experi- 
 ence, but the experience itself was necessary. Napoleon may 
 have needed less than others, but he needed some. Such an 
 experience of the world of his day could not have been ac- 
 quired in an artillery school in'Brienne, nor in the little 
 Island of Corsica, dealing with a unique people, nor had 
 Bonaparte obtained it as yet in France. His Souper de Beau- 
 caire shows that his views and ideas were still limited. It is 
 first at Toulon that he acquired this broader and valuable 
 experience. Here he took an active and important part, 
 right in the center of an event of European importance. He 
 was in touch with revolutionary France, with the represen- 
 tatives, and generals; an interested spectator of party strife 
 and of the conflict of political and social ideas. He came 
 into contact with the European nations, lived in an atmos- 
 phere of uncertainty, danger and intrigue. Even from a 
 military stand-point he must have learned a great deal. 
 Here he witnessed the combined action of the different 
 arms, with a preponderance of his own special one. He real- 
 
108 
 
 ized the importance of that department which provides for 
 the provisioning of the army. All this must have made a 
 vivid and lasting impression on the mind of Bonaparte, 
 then a young man, awaiting an opportunity. How well he 
 understood human nature is demonstrated by the tact with 
 which he won the confidence of all those with whom he 
 came in contact, the Representatives, among them Barras; 
 the Generals Dutheil, Doppet and Dugommier. His naming 
 an exposed battery in which the gunners hesitated to serve, 
 La batterie des Hommes-sans peur, and in this way so touch- 
 ing their pride that everyone strove for the honor of serving 
 in it, shows how well he understood his soldiers. One is re- 
 minded of his address to his army in Italy two years later. 
 Napoleon made many friends at Toulon; among them several 
 of his future lieutenants, Junot, Marmont, Victor and others. 
 His relations with the younger of the Robespierres nearly 
 dragged him down in their fall, and it was undoubtedly 
 here that arose the enmity between Napoleon and his coun- 
 tryman Arena who was afterwards executed for an attempt 
 on the life of the First Consul. But these were exceptions. 
 It was certainly not at Toulon that lie won the hatred of 
 Barras; quite the contrary. Men as well as conditions he 
 used to his best advantage. Yet one cannot accuse him of 
 ingratitude. All of those who still lived when he was in 
 power, and the sons and grandsons of those who did not 
 were rewarded; many of them in his will from St. Helena. 
 It is a grand sight to see how the dethroned Emperor re- 
 calls and rewards those who helped him in his early career. 
 All this experience, good luck and self-satisfaction was no 
 doubt what made Napoleon feel that his history should 
 begin with the siege of Toulon. Yet he seemed to forget 
 that his thoughts, sentiments and actions before this period 
 were also of great interest to those who wished to study the 
 career of one of the world's exceptional men. 
 
109 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 [Record Office.] 
 Trevor to Grenville. TURIN Dec. 14. 
 
 ' Monsieur is expected here the 16th 
 
 and your Lordship may depend on a faithful Execution of 
 the Instructions therein alluded to, the Importance of which 
 I see in the strongest sense and the more so because sus- 
 picions I have for sometime entertained are more than ever 
 confirmed that the Spaniards are at the bottom of a secret 
 intrigue of placing Monsieur at Toulon in his Character of 
 Regent. Your Lordship heard enough of their Behavior at 
 Toulon to conceive what suggestisns and what hopes their 
 jealousy and disappointed Pride may have given birth to. 
 The Princes of the blood have had some secret agents at 
 Toulon and I learn from thence in a private Letter of the 
 seventh Instant that His Majesty's commissaries knew noth- 
 ing of Monsieur's Journey towards that place that the Span- 
 iards had found means to gain a Party amongst the sections 
 and that a sort of wish had been expressed by them that 
 Monsieur should be called there as regent that this Idea 
 had been communicated to Sir Gilbert Elliot and that he did 
 not seem to consider it liable to any great inconvenience. 
 
 If it is indeed true the dispositions at Toulon are 
 
 such, a part of our objections would be removed but there 
 still remains others which I shall consider as an Insult, till 
 I receive from your Lordship positive orders to the Con- 
 trary; and first the surreptitious manner in which it appears 
 to be conducted and the want of any previous application 
 for His Majesty's Permission which was equally necessary 
 from a Principle both of Policy and Respect and secondly 
 the weighty consideration that it is not enough that this 
 measure should be thought politic by the Inhabitants of 
 Toulon. It must also be considered so by His Majesty's 
 Ministers and as consistent with those Principles which 
 constitute the wish for the support of a vigorous govern- 
 ment." 
 
110 
 
 APPENDIX II. 
 
 . [Archives Nationales.] 
 
 Paul Barras ft ses wllegues & Ollioules. 
 
 J'ai reflechi mes chers collegues sur le plan d'attaque pro- 
 pose par le general et approuve par vous. je crois devoir 
 vous reiterer par ecrit et pour Finteret de la Republique 
 une partie de mes observations. Les deux divisions de 
 Fouest et de Test dirigees contre Toulon doivent attaquer 
 dans toute leur etendu tous les postes des ennemis, parmis 
 ces attaques il en est d'effective et de fausses. J'ose croire 
 d'abord que les principales de ces attaques doivent e~tre 
 diriger contre Pharon, la chartreuse Paiguillette ou Balag- 
 uier et Malbousquet. Deux attaques que je regarde comme 
 decisives et devant produire subitement la prise de Toulon 
 si elles reuississent sont celles de Pharon et de Malbosquet. 
 Je pense done qu'il faut surtout s'attacher plus particulaire- 
 ment a la pris de ses deux positions et que les colonnes ou 
 les differentes corps destines pour ces deux attaques doivent 
 etre nombreuses et bien choisis. Je pense que les aproches 
 doivent etre faites avant le jour et le lendemain d'une grande 
 canonade qui aura d6mont6 les canons de Fenemie et de- 
 moli ses travaux. Je pense qu'il doit 6tre defendu de tirer 
 un seul coup de fusil, qu'il faut joindre Fennemi et user de 
 Farme blanche, qu Fimpetuosite francaise rend presque tou- 
 jours favorables. Je pense qu'il faut aussi prevoir tous les 
 cas ; que le resultat des attaques les mieux conbinees est 
 quelque fois contrariS et qu'alors des pointes de ralliement 
 doivent etre convenues ; des lignes ou retranchements Sieves 
 pour y recevoir les troupes repousses ou poursuivis ainsi que 
 des pieces de position placees dans ces retranchements. Je 
 pense qu'il faut choisir les travailleurs et preparer en ab- 
 bondance tout ce qui sera necessaire pour se loger et se 
 retrancher aussitot qu'on sera maitre de quelque poste en- 
 nemie. Si des postes et Pharon surtout sout pris le general 
 doit s' attendre a de grands efforts de la parte des ennemis 
 
Ill 
 
 pour reprendre ces positions d'ou depend leur salut; il doit 
 en consequence s'y fortifier sur le champ y caserner des 
 troupes sures et nombreuses, en longer meme sur les derri- 
 eres pour les appeller au besoin. Pour attaquer & la fois une 
 lingue aussi etendue que celle de la droite de la rade de 
 Toulon a sa gauche il faut de bonnes troupes, je suis d'avis 
 d'attaquer sans retard mais je tiens a ce que 6000 soient sur 
 le champ detaches de Farmee d'ltalie et envoye sur Toulon 
 alors je ne considere plus le succes de F attaque projettee 
 comme incertaine, alors je n'hesite plus d'assurer que les 
 infames brigands renferes dansjoulon n'auront autre parti 
 que la fuite et la mort qui les poursuivera. Quelles sont les 
 forces effectives de Farmee de la Republique sous les murs 
 de Toulon? quelest le nombre des bataillons qui les compo- 
 sent? je n'ai pu avoir a cet egard qu'une donnee aproxima- 
 tive qui la porte a 30,000 homines et parmi laquelle on 
 pent compter moitie de p. requisition. Si 1'ennemi a 15, 18 
 ou vingt mille hommes, car je n'ai encore a cet egard aucune 
 certitude vous hasardez peutetre en attaquant de cette ma- 
 niere iion seulement le sort de Farmee francaise mais celui 
 du midi; vous perdez au moins Fespoir d' entreprendre de 
 nouvelles attaques et vous etes obliges d'attendre les forces 
 et Fattirall immense, mais necessaire pour faire un siege 
 auquel 1'ennemi aura tout le temps de se preparer. observez 
 encore que par la distance et la nature de vos positions il 
 est impossible qu'elles se soutienent et se protegent mutuelle- 
 ment. L'armee d'ltalie est f'ermee par les neiges, le tableau 
 que nous en a fait Dugomier est tres rassurant. 6000 
 hommes de troupes experimentees et agueries en seroient 
 detachers pour 1'attaque de Toulon, cela nous donnerait 
 alors une masse de force une preponderance une confiance 
 meme a nos troupes qui nous assure du succes. Ces 6000 
 hommes seroient rem places a Farmee d'ltalie par des batail- 
 lons de premiere requisition, ainsi nul inconvenient d'exe- 
 cuter de suite cete mesure. Je vous soumisde nouveau toutes 
 ces observations peser les dans votre sagesse communiquez 
 
112 
 
 les au general, ne perdez pas de vue que la destruction de 
 Toulon tient au salut du midi qu'il n'est aucun sacrifice 
 aucune consideration qui doivent vous arreter lorsque il est 
 question de chasser 1'ennerai de ce post important observez 
 aussi qu'alors vous pourrez disposer d'une armee victorieuse 
 et sauver la Republique en admettant tous les moyens que 
 je vous ai demontre. Au reste il faut que Toulon soit attaque 
 et qu'il le soit vigoreusement si mes observations sont rejet- 
 tees je me rendrai a 1'armee et avec nos propres moyens 
 nous executerons le plan propose. 
 
 A Marseille le 8 frimaire Fan 2 de la Republique. 
 
 PAUL BARRAS. 
 
113 
 
 Contents. 
 
 Page 
 Contemporary Accounts and Bibliography iii 
 
 Preface iv 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Conditions Under Which Toulon Surrendered to the Eng- 
 lish and Siege of the Town viii 
 
 Chapter I. 
 
 France in 1 793 Topographical description of Toulon Negotiations 
 preceding Surrender Proclamation of Hood Hood's Entrance 
 Arrival of News in London Political situation of Allies at 
 time of Siege Opinions on Hood's Declarations English idea 
 as to Retention of Toulon 1 
 
 Chapter II. 
 
 Arrival of Carteaux in Marseilles First Engagement Arrival of 
 Bonaparte Representants du Peuple Effect of First Batteries 
 Attack on Heights of Grasse Attack on Mont Faron Misun- 
 derstanding between Carteaux and Lapoype Attack on Sab- 
 lettes Attack on Cap Brun Departure of Carteaux Bonaparte 
 during absence of Generals Arrival of Doppet Engagements 
 on Nov. 15 14 
 
 Chapter III. 
 
 Dugommier Marescot Council of War Bonaparte's Plan Mare- 
 scot's influence upon the Siege Attack on Convention Artil- 
 lery before Final Attack Attack on Eguillette Council of War 
 Departure of Allies Destruction of the Ships Entrance of 
 Republicans Bonaparte and the Massacres 38 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Diplomatic Correspondence of the Allies and Results of 
 the Fall of Toulon.. . . 58 
 
114 
 
 Chapter I. 
 
 Dispute between Hood and Langara Commissioners at Toulon In- 
 structions to Commissioners Declaration published at Toulon 
 Correspondence with Austria as to Declaration Correspond- 
 ence with Spain as to Declaration England's object in holding 
 Toulon Publication of Declaration 58 
 
 Chapter II. 
 
 Question of the French Princes End of Dispute as to authority at 
 Toulon Question of the Emigrants The Austrian reinforce- 
 ments 79 
 
 Chapter III. 
 
 News of the fall of Toulon in France, Spain, and England Results 
 of the Fall of Toulon Fate of the Ships at Toulon Role of 
 Bonaparte Memoires of Barras Influence of the Siege on 
 Bonaparte 97 
 
 Appendix I. Letter from Trevor to Grenville Dec. 14 109 
 
 Appendix II. Letter from Barras to his Collegues at Toulon 110 
 
SEP 29 1932 
 
 24Mar'58;T 
 REC'D LD 
 
 MAR 10 1333 
 
 1 7 1964 
 
 WTER-LIBRARY 
 
 SENT ON ILL 
 
 MAR 2 3 199 
 
 U -C. BERKELY 
 
 ,'32 
 
176927