>n;iHi:iHili!'.:i;:i!;i'll!il lliiil 1 ] ^Mm LIBRA i-^^ yUtVERSlTf OF S/^ DIEGO Notable New Books i"^^^ BELGIUM By Brand Uliitlock Jj ^ Unquestionably the greatest book which has come out of the War. The story of the Cjerman invasion by the one man whose testimony is final. With portraits. Two vols. $10.00 net FRENCH WAYS AND THEIR MEANING By Edith Wharton An intimate, brilliant study of the French by one cf America's foremost writers. $1.50 net SIBERIA TODAY By Capt. Frederick F. Moore An unusually interesting account of present day Si- beria, showinjj the results cf Bolshevism. $2.00 net SMALL THINGS By Margaret Deland Small things — little stories, everyday episodes whicli a great novelist experienced in France. $1.50 net THE CAREER OF LEONARD WOOD By Joseph Hamblen Sears A sketch of an unusually varied and eventful life, presenting General Wood as a great American, a fine man and a distinguished patriot. Illustrated, $1.75 net GEORGES CLEMENCEAU, Tiger of France By Georges Lecomte An intimate study of the man and his work by a well-known French journalist. $1.75 net THE STORY OF GENERAL PERSHING By Everett T. Totnlinson An up-to-the-minute and accurate account of Gen- eral Pershing's career and personal life. Illustrated, $1. 75 net At all Booksellers These are Appleton Books •n CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS BY RAYMOND LESLIE BUELL SOMETIME FELLOW IN POLITICS IN PRINCETON UNIVERSITY WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY CARLTON J. H. HAYES PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY D. APPLETON AND COMPANY NEW YORK LONDON 1920 COPYRIGHT, 1920, BY D. APPLETON AND COMPANY PBINTED IN THE UNITKD STATES OF AMERICA TO MY MOTHER PREFACE To many, the results of the French elections of Novem- ber 16, 1919, came as a welcome surprise. An American observer in Paris who had perhaps taken but a casual interest in French domestic problems would have been convinced, upon visiting the Palais Bourbon, that France was on the verge of being engulfed in a tidal wave of Bolshevism from the Russian deep. He would have heard aghast, the Extreme Left, led by the grandson of Karl Marx, Jean Longuet, shrieking its defiance at all things bourgeois. Possibly to his dismay, he would also have heard the thunderous stamping of feet by which the Socialists drowned the sound of the huge silver bell, through insistent ringing of which the President of the Chamber bravely struggled to maintain order. To the Americans at home the situation must have appeared no less ominous. Judged by the press reports, the tumult arising from the First of May celebrations, and the So- cialist vituperations against the Peace Conference, surely gave cause for grave foreboding. But a deeper knowledge of the currents which under- lie the surface of the political waters in France belied any such catastrophe as the "storm prophets" had predicted. Those currents were deep; they were silent. Indeed, to their depth they owed their relentless power and their persistence in their normal course. The strongest of these forces was the sterling char- acter of the French people themselves. Only a very superficial estimate of national temperament will judge the French to be excitable, unpractical and unstable. Although the historj' of France has been marked by whirlwinds in which the nation has been blown hither vii PREFACE and thither by the gust of every fresh political doctrine, French character possesses at least three qualities of impregnable strength. The first of these is a personal attachment to property, whether a farm or a wine shop, which no gilded theory of Communism can shake. This attachment is nearly universal, for it is based upon the small holdings of 20,000,000 peasants and petit hourgeais. Moreover, the sentiment embodied in the Code Napoleon has been and is likely to remain the breakwater protecting the Republic against the lashing waves of the ''Interna^ tionale." This great legal monument has given to France a scheme of social and economic principles which has exalted individualism and encouraged an almost devout attachment to property. The second characteristic is a respect for authority. To us Americans who were recently in France, and to all Americans accustomed lightly to regard constituted power, the innate obedience and discipline of the French was something to be wondered at. It was first noticeable at the very gates of the city, where French farmers complacently allowed gendarmes to search their vehicles for objects upon which to levy the time-revered and superlatively irritating octroi tax. It appeared again amidst the solemnity of public bodies, whether at the Chamber of Deputies or the Hotel de Ville, where chamberlains and attendants, girt about with great sashes and clanking swords, rendered due homage to officials whom they served. Even in the Chamber of Deputies, where members were allowed the greatest license, those who constituted the crowd filling the vis- itors' gallery were kept in docile submission by elab- orately uniformed and decorated guards who did not hesitate to eject those who might attempt too boister- ously to join in the Chamber's levity. At the universities, this characteristic love of cere- monial and order was yet more noticeable — doubly viii PREFACE so in contrast to American institutions of learning. French professors invariably deliver their lectures wear- ing their academic gowns; they are followed into class by an attendant who carries the lecturer's notes and deposits them respectfully upon his desk. At the pro- fessor's entrance, his class rises and maintains a re- strained silence until he has taken his seat; and when he leaves at the close of the hour, they again dutifully stand until he has left the room. One must not alto- gether scoff at these niceties. They may be an inherit- ance from the Monarchy and the Empire, observed under the Republic to give it an added discipline which the force of kings formerly imposed. They may be a reflection of the ceremonialism dear to the Catholic Church — last vestiges of the union of Rome with the State. But whatever their causes, they apparently oppose one of the staunchest obctacles to any elements endeavoring to snatch authority from those in whom it has been legally vested. Finally, the French possess a civic spirit which amounts to more than enthusiasm, is wider than pa- triotism and different from religious zeal. It is a whole- souled devotion to the cause each man feels is his own, yet at the same time extending beyond worship at par- ticularistic shrines and uniting before the altar of La Patrie. The difference between French and Ameri- can temperament was illustrated on the night of the armistice. Poilus and midinettes forgot their cherished cynicism to join in singing, with a genuine spirit of thankfulness, the "]\Iarseillaise." How could such as they understand the Americans, who, on the other hand, serpentined along the rues and houlevards, singing, not the "Star Spangled Banner," but "Hail, Hail, the Gang's All Here!" America cheered at the finishing of a dirty job and went out to celebrate. France thanked Providence for winning a Crusade. The passionate devotion to La Patrie allows the ship ix PREFACE of state to drift on the swells, but always within the limits which the length of this spiritual anchor chain imposes. Whether it be foniid in the street song of "Conspuez Guillanme," which French students shouted day after day during the first weeks of the armistice, or in some Catholic Te Deu-m, a devout and enthu- siastic nationalism, completely submerging class selfish- ness, is the dominant trait in French character to-day. France, in spite of the fact that Paris has ever been a fecund breeding ground for new creeds and theories of social and moral destruction, is nevertheless the most conservative country in the world. There are some singular misconceptions in America as to the nature of French political organizations. Text- books, when they can be persuaded to deal with the subject, often assert that in reality French political parties do not exist. Organizations spring up in the cool of the night, only to have the burning sun of a new political faction wither them away on the following day. But although France does not have the two-party system as it exists in England and America, I have tried to point out what are the lasting and the continuous fea- tures in French political organization and to prove that party multiplicity is not due entirely to an undisciplined resentment to control, but has causes which, if existing in any other country, would produce identical effects. Also I have tried to show that, although some parliamentary grmips vaQ.y be transient and unstable, French parties possess an organization and a personnel which are well defined. I may have burdened the reader with wearisome de- tails, but I have felt these necessary to show the ele- ments of organization and the differences in the doc- trines of present political groupings. The first part of the book may perhaps be described as a study of the political forces of France. Along with the political parties, I have included the French Press, for it pos- X PREFACE sesses distinctively political characteristics and it as- sumes an aggressive political leadership. The second portion of the book may be called a study of the movements for political reform. Under this heading I have discussed the recent electoral bill which has offset the predominance of the Radical and Socialist vote in the Chamber of Deputies, a predominance to which, hitherto, they were not wholly entitled. The demand for constitutional reform — including decentral- ization of government administration — is most insistent. I have attempted to show the causes of these demands and also the likelihood of the adoption of the proposed remedies. Of special interest to Americans should be the attempt to do away with the present system of parliamentary government and to substitute for it a gov- ernm,ent modeled upon that of the United States, in which the President plays a more prominent role. Like- wise, the question of the demand for experts in adminis- tration, and^ even for professional representation in political bodies, that is to say, legislatures composed of business men to supplement, if not entirely to replace, political assemblies, should be of added value, in view of our own problems. The policy of the French Government during the past war has also been touched upon, notably, the ques- tions raised by the state of siege, the censorship, the State control of nearly every phase of industrial life, the prohibition of importations, and the "consortium" policy followed up to and throughout the armistice. Americans who have witnessed the gradual development of the power of their President should also be interested in the exactly opposite phenomenon noticeable in France, viz., the increasing dominance of French legislative au- thority. It has been impossible to separate completely a con- sideration of political forces from the study of the various movements of reform. Indeed the raisoii d'etre xi PREFACE of many of the political parties is, logically, to bring about these reforms. The latter questions all figured more or less prominently in the November elections. Many people believed that the issues of this election lay between those who sanctioned the war and those who opposed it. The Unified Socialists were the prin- cipal opposition. Personal antagonism to M. Clemen- ceau, partly arising from a faction within his own party, led by M. Franklin Bouillon, also played a part. The issue of Bolshevism was of even more importance. The Unified Socialist party in its Easter congress defi- nitely pledged itself, as we shall see, to work for the inauguration of a Soviet form of government and the complete establishment of proletariat control. The issue which they brought before the voters was therefore clear-cut. The temper of the French people again proved its conservatism and its loyalty by an over- whelming defeat of such extremists as Jean Longuet, Jacques Sadoul, Raffen-Dugens, and Brizon, who had insistently preached the Social Revolution. Their hopes of bringing about the revolution through peaceful means have been sadly disappointed. Whether or not this fail- ure will dampen their efforts to achieve a coup de poing for the same end, is another question. But the third issue in the French election, one ob- scured by the two larger issues, yet of equal importance in the eyes of many electors, was the question of prin- ciple involved in the opposition of State Socialism and individual initiative. This issue I have tried to outline in a chapter on the "French Bureaucracy and State So- cialism," and to show how the war has accelerated the participation of tlie Government in industrial activities which have hitherto been reserved to individual effort. The French Radical party — wliich lias maintained the balance of power in the French Chamber since the be- ginning of the century — is definitely pledged to Collec- tivism. Us program is to lake over all public services xii PREFACE and all industrial enterprises when the latter become sufficiently organized to permit the experiment, at least, of State operation. This tendency, differing widely from the pure Marx- ism preached by the rnified party, which demands a complete bouleversenient of the present order and the directorate of the proletariat, conflicts with the sturdy individualism which is one of the most distinctive traits of the French i)eoi)le. The existence of State Socialism in France is partly accounted for by the fact that nearly all of the public services owe their origin to the State and not to individuals, as in America. The adven- tures of American private initiative in the develop- ment of virgin resources have no counterpart in French history. Furthermore, the French character is conserva- tive, while the American character is sanguine and given to "plunging." A Frenchman does not often possess that large share of imagination and business capacity which has made American "steel kings." Again,' the Radical party has been maintained in power upon issues other than economic, such as anti- clericalism. Their collectivist program has been partly imposed by the strength of their own position. The war, which so exaggerated the Statist tendency, placed the issue squarely before the French public. IMeasures taken permanentl}' to fasten this incubus upon France were legalized by a Parliament and a Ministry whose mandate had been extra-legally prolonged and which owed its election to other issues. Business elements, such as the Union of Economic Interests, and all of the Conservative and Centrist parties proclaimed against a further injection of State effort into industry. It became certain that the issue would come up before the elections for settlement. Signs of this discontent were evidenced by the fall of Victor Boret, Minister of Agri- culture, in July, 1019. The elections apparently placed the seal of disapproval on the Government's anti-individ- xiii PREFACE ualistic program by the defeat of five members of the Government, two of whom, at least, M. Clementel, Min- ister of Commerce, and M. Morel, Undersecretary of the Liquidation of War Supplies, were directly respon- sible for many of the more radical features of the policy. Finally, the reduction of the Radical repre- sentatives by a hundred at the last election seemed to have been caused partly by their over-insistence upon policies of State Socialism. The last part of this book deals with French opinion as it was expressed toward the peace settlement. Orig- inally, France demanded terms of peace which would either erect the Rheinish provinces into a buffer state or annex them to France. She also asked for military guarantees which would supply the only security of which the "old diplomacy" was capable. America's insistence on a League of Nations, however, led to the abandonment of many of the old theories of "guar- antees," and to the formal adoption of the policy of a League of Nations as furnishing the only means (1) of providing permanent international security and (2) of enforcing well-defined rules of justice. It has often been said that at no time was France convinced of the efficacy and the practicability of a League of Nations, but that her only trust was in a permanent alliance of her present allies. However, this assertion is open to grave doubt. During the early weeks of the Peace Conference, there was abundant evidence that French opinion had been whole-heartedly won over to the League of Nations and that it was exert- ing itself toward the creation of a League which would actually provide guarantees. To secure this end her representatives at the Peace Table advanced some very definite proposals. The first of these was for the pool- ing of that part of the war debt of Iho Allies wliich the indemnity could not pay. France believed that if the Allies were sincere in their repeated declarations that xiv PREFACE she had saved the world from ruin, they would agree to apportion equally among themselves the material charges of the war. The second measure to vitalize the League was the proposal to create an international police force, subject to the direction of an international executive. This force would be immediately available for the suppression of illegal international disorder. France did not wish to be placed in the position of fearfully waiting for months — perhaps even years — until her former Allies should decide whether or not to aid her again. These suggestions were both rejected by the Peace Conference, principally because of Ameri- can opposition. Doubtlessly, President Wilson and his advisors favored them in modified form ; but the opposi- tion in the United States had already shown itself so opposed to the creation of any league imposing defi- nite responsibilities upon America that they believed an extension of its powers would mean its total re- jection. The refusal of the Conference, at America's instiga- tion, to create an efficient — in the military sense — league was largely responsible for the exaggeration of French demands based upon the policies of a discredited di- plomacy. When some of these demands were in turn rejected (such as the annexation of the left bank of the Rhine), the most violent protests were made by public opinion. These protests were very natural. The League of Nations was acceptalile to France only upon the as- sumption of providing an equally secure guarantee of safety. This substituted promise of guarantees pre- vented the annexation of the Rhine, which at least seemcil to offer temporary security against German aggression. But the final form of the League did not live up to its promised remedies. It offered no positive military guarantee commensurate with the policy it sup- planted. Consequently, France felt that her safety had been jeopardized for the empty satisfaction of realizing XV PREFACE an ideal wliich America urged in form yet now refused to adopt in fact. It is needless to say that the treatment which the United States Senate accorded the Treaty aroused a further skepticism among Frenchmen as to the real worth of a League of Nations. The obligations accumulated in the writing of this book are many. IMy first is due to the Government of the United States. To one who holds Tennyson's "do or die" conception of a soldier, it may seem rather au- dacious of an enlisted man in the American Expedition- ary Forces to have departed beyond the customary fields of guard mount and "K. P." But, at any rate, I am grateful for having had the opportunity to go to France, to do what little I did, and when it was over, to spend four delightful months at the French Univer- sity of Grenoble. I was there fortunate to find myself in the very heart of France, not the France of Paris, but the France of the Provinces. I wish to thank the different political organizations in Paris who, by means of personal interviews or through correspondence, very graciously accorded me whatever information I desired. To Monsieur Chastenet, the editor of the Droit du Peuple of Grenoble, a fiery Bolshevik and a late can- didate for the Chamber of Deputies, I also owe my thanks. His amiability and kindly spirit somewhat dissipated, I must confess, my natural bourgeois terror of the class struggle and its missionaries. On the other hand, to Paul Bozon-Verduraz, likewise of Grenoble, a modern knight upholding the ideals of medieval kingsliip, a sturdy follower of Philippe VIII, I owe much inspiration. Through him, my confidence in republics lias been rudely shaken and my prejudices against the doctrine of Divine Right somewhat removed. Finally, to Madame J. Fournier T am greatly indebted. From the aloof colonial vantage point of Morocco, she xvi PREFACE is able to pass serene judgment upon all the works of human frailty — political and otherwise. To her nothing can be perfect. Although the Republic has its vices, it governs France "pretty well, — just as it is." Space does not permit me to name the many friends in America who have given assistance and encourage- ment in the writing of this book. But I am under espe- cial obligation to Professors Edward S. Corwin, Henry R. Shipman, and Philip IMarshall Brown of Princeton University; to Professor Carlton J. 11. Hayes of Colum- bia; to W. P. Cresson and C. L, Barrett. I also am greatly indebted to Stoddard Dewey, Henry Adams Gibbons, and Wm. Morton Fullerton for the kindly interest they have shown in, and the advice they have given upon, a subject concerning which they have a much more profound knowledge than the author, Raymond Leslie Buell CONTENTS PAOK PREFACE Vii INTUODUCTION CHAPTER I PARTY PHILOSOPHIES I. Reasons for party multiplicity. — II. The Royalists. — III. The Action Liberate Populaire. — IV. The Progres- sists. — -V. The Democratic Republican Alliance. — VI. The Republican Radical and Radical Socialists. — VII. The Unified Socialists. — ^VIII. The Republican Social- ists. — IX. Reform Societies. 1 CHAPTER II PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT I. The theory of parliamentary government. — II. Par- hamentary groups, their relation to parties, and their manner of functioning. — III. Ministerial instability, a result of the group system. — IV. Dominance of Parlia- ment, a second result. — V. The growth of parliamen- tary power during the war 46 CHAPTER III THE "rLOc" and the SACRED UNION I. Former party combinations, the Bloc. — ^11. The internal relations of the members of the Bloc. — III. Party regroupings before the War. — IV. The origin of the Sacred Union. — V. Socialist opposition to the Sacred Union, the minoritaires, Zimmerwald, Kicnthal. — VI. The victory of tlie minoritaires, the \'illain trial. . 79 CHAPTER IV PARTY REALIGNMENTS I. The Socialist platform, an effort to conciliate Revolu- tionists and Heformists. — II. The Easter Congress, the xix CONTENTS pAoa Loriot Soviet program. — III. The motion on "General Policy." — IV. The Third Internationale; more victo- ries for the minoritaires. — V. A bourgeois Bloc against the Socialists. — VI. Future party regroupings, the decadence of the Radicals and the Action Lib^rale, the hope for three major parties 112 CHAPTER V WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND THE "r. P." I. The movement for woman suffrage. — II. The Family Vote. — III. The demand for the scrutin de liste and proportional representation. — IV. Legislative efforts for the "R. P."— V. The Electoral Reform Bill of July 12, 1919— VI. Effect of electoral refonn on French parties 141 CHAPTER VI THE 1919 ELECTIONS I. The Peace Treaty, the first issue. — 11. Two party con- ventions. — III. The formation and the program of the National Bloc. — IV. The election campaign. — V. Bourgeois opposition to the Bloc. — VI. The effect on the election law upon th? Bloc. — VII. The results of the elections. — VIII. The New ParUament. — IX. The Socialist Strassburg Congress 172 CHAPTER VII THE DEMAND FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION I. The demand for a government based upon the doctrine of the separation of powers. — II. The conflicts in the French Constitution of 1875, a cause for present de- fects. — III. Theoretical objections to the proposed remedy. — IV. Historical objections to an independent executive in France 212 CHAPTER VIII syndicalism: program and tactics I. The difference between syndicalism and sociaHsm; the Confeflerntion Geniralc du Travail. — II. The Minimum XX CONTENTS PAGE Demands of the C. G. T. — III. French wages, the cost of livinjj;, strikes. — IV. The passage of the Eight- Hour Day law. — V. A turbulent First of May. — VI. Some resignations and the Socialist withdrawal from the Chamber. — VII. The failure of the political strikes. 236 CHAPTER IX THE PRESS AND THE CENSORSHIP I General characteristics of the French press. — II. The conservative press, L' Action Franqaise, La Vieille France, Le Temps. — III. The liberal press, La Democratie Nouvelle L'CEunre. — IV. The Socialist press, L'Humanite, La France Libre, Le Populaire, Le Journal du Peuple, La Vague, Notre Voix. — ^V. The Censorship, its legal basis, functioning and repeal. . 270 CHAPTER X THE BUREAUCRACY AND STATE SOCIALISM I. The malfunctioning and extent of the bureaucracy. — II. — Government food control. — III. The consortium policy. — IV. The prohibition of importations after the armistice. — V. The protests against, and the final repeal of this prohibition, July, 1919. — VI. General growth of and movement against State Socialism. . 302 CHAPTER XI A GOVERNMENT BY INTERESTS AND EXPERTS I. The reform of the bureaucracy by decentralization of services.^II. Experts in French administration. — III. Necessity of organization of functionaries; his- tory and extent of their organization. — IV. Demand for professional government, a Parliament of Interests. — V. A demand based on syndical organization of industrial groups; extent of industrial organization in France. — VI. The defects of professional government. 340 CHAPTER XII REGIONALISM I. The ext(>nt and result of the centralization of local gov- xxi CONTENTS PAGE erning activities. — II. The history of French central- ization. — III. The movement for regionaUsm. — IV. Legislative efforts toward regionaUsm. — V. The ob- jections to regionalism 373 CHAPTER XIII WHAT THE FRENCH PEACE TERMS MIGHT HAVE BEEN I The universal demands for guarantees of security. — II. The devices of the Old Diplomacy: the disintegration of the German Empire, the annexation of the left bank of the Rhine, a Rhenish Republic, the annexation of the Saar. — III. The total disarmament of Germany and an inter-Allied alliance. — IV. The defects of the Old Diplomacy. — V. The substitute which the League of Nations theoretically offered 402 CHAPTER XIV THE FRENCH CONCEPTION OF A LEAGUE OF NATIONS I. The nominal acceptance of the League of Nations idea. — II. The French demand that the League assume the War Debt. — III. The French exclusion of Germany from the League ; its effect ; the demand for an inter- national police force. — IV. The effect of the League, as created, upon the French territorial demands : a defeat and a compromise. — V. Dissatisfaction, partly caused by the character of the League created 433 CHAPTER XV WHAT FRANCE THOUGHT OF AMERICAN " IDEALISM" \. Early enthusiasm for President Wilson. — II. Readjust- ment of personal estimates.— III. The reappraisal of American help. — IV. The attempt to divide the Presi- dent and American opinion. — V. The charge of im practicability of American idealism. — VI. The charge of its inconsistency. — VII. The French opinion of the Senate's action 4Q8 xxii CONTENTS APPENDICES l-AOB A. Georges Clemenccau 497 B. Frencli Taxation durinj^ the War 501 INDEX 507 INTRODUCTION One hundred and forty-two years ago the proud French Monarchy of the Old World came to the active military and naval assistance of thirteen obscure colonies that were struggling in the New World for their freedom and independence. One hundred and thirty-one years ago these colonies put into effect the Constitution of the United States and set up the federal, republican gov- ernment under which they have since prospered and expanded and grown powerful ; and in the same year was inaugurated in France the Great Revolution which, amid terrors and travail, was destined to uproot the hoary traditions and habitual abuses of the old Bourbon monarchy and to plant in European soil the fructifying seeds of modern and contemporary France. No wonder that for more than a century a potent sympathy has existed between the French nation and the people of the United States. Since the schism of the English-speaking peoples m the eighteenth century, the development of the United States has been, in certain respects, more akin to that of France than to that of England. Present-day France is a country of farmers and business men and laborers, quite devoid of a privileged, land-owning nobility and of a state-supported ecclesiastical establishment ; she is a country without a king, a country in which republican institutions and thoroughly democratic practices and the spirit of social equality have taken firm root, a country which has repeatedly been stirred b}' sincere altruism and lofty idealism. What truer description could be given of outstanding national traits of us Americans? Despite the community of major interests and ideals, XXV INTRODUCTION there are certain obvious thongli minor differences be- tween the United States and France. The latter, politi- cally speaking, is a highly centralized state, while the former is a decentralized federation of autonomous com- monwealths. Government in the United States is car- ried on alternately by two well-organized political par- ties, while in France the existence of multifarious and transitory political groups gives to French public life an appearance of the gravest and most alarming in- stability of governments and even of policies. Moreover, the French nation is as homogeneous and as long estab- lished as the American people are heterogeneous and recently come together, a contrast which accounts in part for the fact that patriotism has more often pro- duced chauvinism among the former than among the latter, and likewise for the fact that the former have been more handicapped, perhaps more victimized, than the latter by tradition and antique usage. Certainly the problems of the appropriate relations between Church and State have harassed Americans less than French- men, and, on the whole their solution has been happier and more just in the United States than in France. Be- sides it should be noted that France is a relatively small country whose boundaries have always been exposed to attack by powerful neighbors, and that both in 1814-1815 and in 1871 her capital city was captured by military foes. To Americans, inhabiting the richest and widest portion of an isolated continent and never menaced by numerous or greedy neighbors, what has been repre- sented by the French to be merely precautionary has too often appeared to be selfish and glaringly vindictive. It is the facade of a temple that first arrests the eye — and a fa(^ade is not necessarily the index of the beauties and familiarities of the temple's interior. If the average American, before the late war, could have pressed past the obvious external strangeness of France and gotten into the mind and soul of the French people, he would xxvi INTRODUCTION have found much the same temple as he had reared at homo and much the same sort of worsliip as he him- self paid, albeit in a different language and with some variations in detail, to the spirit of liberty and equality and human brotherhood. But before the war, the aver- age American stopped short at the facade: he was alien- ated by the strange language and deceived by writers and critics who unsympathetically stressed what was peculiar to the French rather than what was common to French and Americans ; his traditional morality was shocked by the ** realism" in French literature and art — the "realism" that was typically unrevealing of the truest and deepest aspirations of the French people ; and he came to believe, while he continued to do senti- mental homage to the land of a Lafayette and a Rochambeau, that contemporary Frenchmen were de- generate descendants of illustrious sires. The Great War has given us a new perspective. * ' De- generate" people could not fight as unflinchingly and as heroically as did the French during the ])ast five years. To put if mildly, France and the French people surprised and astonished us Americans. And on the other hand, the United States availed herself of a su- preme opportunity to repay with interest the debt she OAved France since the days of 76. At Montdidier, at Chriteau-Thierry, in the Belleau Woods, at St. Mihiel, in the Argonne, and on the Somme, was consecrated anew the Franco-American entente. That the newer perspective may not be lost, that the recently hallowed entente may not be destroyed, is a hope which will be realized only if on both sides of the Atlantic there is a systematic and sympathetic in- terpretation of one people to the other. Vague rhetorical sentimentalizing will not suffice. There must be sound study and understanding; there must be adequate and unpre.iudiced presentation of all phases of national life — political, social, economic and cultural. xxvii INTRODUCTION Among the hundreds of thousands of young Ameri- cans who journeyed to France in 1917-1918 as modern knights and crusaders in the cause of democracy and international solidarity were a goodly number who pondered the meaning of the Great War and who in their camps or on furloughs or even in the trenches studied France and the French people freshly and at close range and without the prejudice of bookish pro- fessors or pedantic publicists. To the goodly number belongs the author of this book, Mr. Raymond L. Buell, ]\Ir. Buell utilized to the full his military experience in France. With amazing insight and perseverance he col- lected first-hand a vast amount of reliable information concerning contemporary French politics — the condi- tions which have shaped them, and the direction toward which they tend. And with no little skill and literary ability has he incorporated his information in this vol- ume. If one wishes to know about the political groups in France, about the French parliamentary system, about the last elections, about the most recent phases of French socialism and syndicalism, about current agi- tations for woman suffrage, for constitutional amend- ment, for proportional and professional representation, one will read this book. Furthermore, if one desires to obtain an idea of what the bulk of the French people themselves think of the Peace Treaty, of the League of Nations, of President Wilson, and of American ideal- ism in general, one will do well to study this volume. The volume is interesting, but it is neither dogmatic nor sentimental. It describes and analyzes; it never flatters or scolds. In its tone as well as in its content, it occupies a unique position among American com- mentaries on political France ; it forms a vital contribu- tion to a sound and lasting accord between the first Republic of the Old World and the first Republic of the New. Carlton J. II. Hayes CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS La 'politique, cest notre sang, notre argent, noire honneur. — LE Duc d'Audiffret Pasquier CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS CHAPTER I PARTY PHILOSOPHIES Pour rester unis, le veritable tnoyen est de rester distincts. Jules Ferby. The system of party government in France, if indeed it can be characterized by such a term, is perhaps the most interesting and baffling feature of French political organization. Semi-organized, sporadic, over-numerous, these parties follow out an uncertain existence, each drawing its support from a devoted following. Their characteristic of multiplicity is usually attributed to the French type of mind which is unwilling to com- promise and associate differing shades of thought. The greatest diversity of opinion exists upon every political subject ; and each element feels that it must seek repre- sentation in a "group," which, despite its fluctuating and dissolving composition, continually puts forward its candidates upon a complete program and doctrine. An undisciplined independence of political beliefs is thus one of the causes of the multiplicity of French parties — an independence which does not allow Frenchmen to be 1 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS bound by caucuses, and at tbe same time precludes political opportunism. This individualism a French author accounts for in these words: It is said that Frenchmen are rebels to association. That is true. Unfortunately in our divisions and in our quarrels our chief desire is not to do as our neighbors. You say White, I say Black; you go to the Left, I go to the Right. Is not this our temperament? At all times we are seeking to find the things which separate us, rather than a common ground. We form a party, we divide ourselves into factions which fight each other and detest each other reciprocally. We are imited before an immense peril, but only when necessity constrains us. . . . Circumstances have aggravated this natural defect. At the head of these, we may place, first, the existence of a gov- ernment ordinarily without authority ; secondly, our resistance to all sanction — our unacknowledged quest for a "comfortable" life where every one may take his ease and do only what pleases huu; thirdly, our false pride of equality which in reality makes us hostile to superiority and to talent. Finally, there is the insufficiency of our moral education which de- velops a sentiment of personal dignity and aspirations for independence without giving as a counterbalance, the spirit of sacrifice and of submission to authority. It is very well to drive superstitution from our schools and to abolish old ideas which do not accord with progress, but nothing can be gained by sujipressing even these if they are not replaced by some equivalent. If the i)rinciple of authority or of sub- ordination of all to the common good is no longer understood as it was formerly, its value is not less apparent. In the spirit of our present institutions, obedience is voluntary; never- theless, it must bo obtained or we will play into the hands af the reactionaries who lie in wait for us.* * Lysis, Vers la Dcmocratie Nouvclle 144. 2 PARTY PHILOSOPHIES Pointinf? out tlie motives which inspire French voters, anotiier writer adds: It cannot be denied that the clearly individiialisfic and independent spirit of the Frenchman adapts itself with diffi- culty to the rigorous discipline of Biitish parties. And in fact, by observing the results of an election, it wiU be noted that at present a deputy who is elected does not often obtain the entire number of the votes of his political sympathizers. On the contrary, he receives votes of electoi-s who, although not supporting his ideas, nevertheless give him their votes from considerations beaiing upon his person, his family, his situ- ation, his past, and the services which he has rendered. . , . They vote for an individual and not for an idea or a program. If this were general, it would make any party regime imjiossible.- ' L6on Jacques, Les Partis PoUiiques sous la III Republujuc, 451. One of the best descriptions of the temperament of the French people was portrayed by Alexis de Tocqueville many years ago : ' ' When I examine that nation in itself, I cannot help thinking it is more extraordinary than any of the- events of its history. Did there ever appear on the earth another nation so fertile in contrasts, so extreme in its acts — more under the dominion of feeling, less ruled by principle; always better or worse than was anticipated — now below the level of humanity, now far above; a people so unchangeable in its leading features that it may be recognized by portraits drawn two or three thousand years ago, and yet so fickle in its daily opinions and tastes that it becomes at last a mystery to itself, and is as much astonished as strangers at tlie sight of what it has done ; naturally fond of home and routine, yet, once driven forth and forced to adopt new customs, ready to carry jiriiieiples to any lengths and to dare anything; indocile by disposition, but better pleased with the arbitrary and even violent rule of a sovereign than with a free and regular government under its chief citizens; now fixed in hostility to subjection of any kind, now so passionately wedded to servitude that nations made to serve cannot vie with it; led by a thread so long as no word of resistance is spoken, wholly ungovernable when the standard of revolt has been raised — thus always de- ceiving its masters, who fear it too much or too little; never so tree that it cannot be subjugated, nor so kept down that it can- not break the yoke; qualified for every pursuit, but excelling in nothing but war; more prone to worship chance, force, success, 6clat, noise, than real glory; endowed with more heroism than 3 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS This French attitude is not wholly a weakness for, although a lack of party discipline may be a civic defect, one of its chief causes — the vigor of political thought — is a virtue. Theoretically a party regime necessitates a minimum of political issues, or at least their reduction to two broad categories, each one of which some party supports. But as a matter of fact, the complexity of modern political life, when accomjjanied by a keen in- terest in its problems, makes this simplification almost impossible. Furthermore, as noted above, the French- man in his attitude toward political issues does not seek a solution of each limited in itself; but he molds these immediate issues into a larger philosophy, be it political, religious, or economic. He is not content with the solu- tion of single and isolated problems. He will only be satisfied by working for. the complete attainment of his ideal. It is upon this ideal that his party rests. Party programs are really unchanging doctrines — expounding philosophies which more than fill the theoretical omis- sions of the Constitution of 1875. Upon immediate issues they are often vague, but their real purpose, at least, attempts to be logically homogeneous. Among other factors which account for party diversity virtue, more genius than common eense; better adapted for the conception of grand designs than the accomplishment of great enterprises; the most brilliant and the most dangerous nation of Europe, and the one that is surest to inspire admiration, hatred, terror, or pity, but never indifference?" De Tocqueville, The Old Beginie and the Ecvolution (transla- tion by John Bonner) 253, 254. Guy do Maupassant's characterization of the French people ia of equal interest (see his short story The Tlorla) : "The populace is an imbecile Hock of sheep, now stupidly pa- tient, and now in ferocious revolt. Say to it: 'Amuse yourself,' and it amuses itself. Say to it: 'Go and fight with your neighbor,' and it goes and fights. Say to it: 'Vote for the Emperor,' and it votes for the P^mperor, and then say to it: 'Vote for the Eepublic, ' and it votes for the Republic." 4 PARTY PHILOSOPHIES and which are perhaps even more tangible than this tendency of mind just noted, arc certain historical is- sues, peculiar to France. These have been either long since solved or else never arose in other countries pos- sessing a similar form of government. The Monarchy presents the first of these issues. France has not had to choose merely between the Monarchy and the Re- public, but between three different sorts of Monarchy and the Republic. These divisions were illustrated in the National Assembly of 1871-1875 where the Legitimist party, led by the Count of Chambord and supported by the more reactionary landlords, officers, and churchmen, stood for the unrestricted restoration of the Bourbons to the throne. They wished to govern the country "abso- lutely" and under the dra/peaio hlanc. The second divi- sion was formed by the Bonapartist party, or the Imperialists ; under the leadership of Prince Jerome and Rouher, they endeavored to restore Napoleon HI, who had sought refuge in England. His sole claim to the throne rested on "the will of the people." The death of the ex-emperor in 1873 upset the immediate plans of the Bonapartists ; but under the leadership of the Em- press Eugenie, they placed their hopes in her son, the Prince Imperial.^ The third division, the Orleanist party, wished to restore the line of Louis Philippe ; they were loud in their promises to govern constitutionally and liberally. The Count of Paris was the candidate of this party for the throne.* Aside from the Monarchist issue, Clericalism has *The Prince Imperial, son of Napoleon III, joined the British expedition to Zuhdand, in 1879, where he met his death (.Tune 1). * The history of the struggle of these factions may be found in detail in G. Ilanotaux, Contemporary France, ii. Jacques, op. cit., 90-169, also gives a good summary of the Assembly period. 5 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS caused party divisions. In the period following the AVar of 1870, and for some fifteen or twenty years there- after, the Catholic cause was completely associated with that of the IMonarchy. The Count of Chambord declared himself in favor of the restoration of the Pope's tem- poral power. Since then, the Catholic interests have been openly espoused by the Orleanists. But the Republic created a division. Its establishment on a firm basis, despite Catholic and monarchial opposition, finally led Leo XIII, a skilled politician as well as a learned priest, to issue the famous Encyclical letter, "Inter innumeras sollicitudines" (tenth of February, 18^2). It besought Catholics not to judge the Republic by the irreligious character of its government, and explained that a dis- tinction must be drawn between the form of the govern- ment, which should be accepted, and its laws, which should be improved.^ The policy enunciated in this letter, known as RalUement, gave rise to a Catholic party, known as the Conservateurs Rallies, which pledged its support to the Republic.^ This policy was " The early Catholic attitude toward the Tliird Republic and democracy in general, was illustrated by the following words of M. de Mun, one of the founders of the Liberal Action party: "The Revolution is neither an act nor a fact, it is a political doctrine, which pretends to found society upon the will of man instead of founding it upon the will of God, which places the sovereignty of human reason in place of divine law. This is the Revolution, the rest is nothing, or rather all the rest results from it, from this proud revolt from whence the modern State has emerged, the State which has taken the place of all, the State which has become your God and which we (the Catholics) refuse to adore with you. The counter-revolution is the contrary prin- ciple; it is the doctrine wliich makes society rest upon Christian law! . . . " From a speech in the Chamber of Deputies, Novem- ber, 1878, quoted in Dcbidour, Jiappnrts do I'Efjlisc ct de I'Etat en France dc nS'J-lH70, G."?:?. •A good account of the origin of the "Rallies" will be found in the Cnthnlic Encyclopedia, vi, 177, under "France." On May G^ 1S92, Leo XIII wrote to the French cardinals: 6 PARTY PHILOSOPHIES also later expressed in the movements represented by the parties of the Actian Libcrale Populmre, the Sillon, and the Jeiine RepuMique. But the Monarchist Catholics vigorously protested against any policy of concession, asserting that the Republic and the Church were organ- ically antagonistic/ A third cause for party division has been Socialism, which had its birth in France and received its political baptism in 1848. Succeeding years gave rise to two differing tendencies in this doctrine : the tendency of Reform versus tlic tendency of Revolution. The latter, of Marxian origin, has largely controlled the French Socialist party; but the first, which is directed toward participation in bourgeois governments and the improve- ment of bourgeois society, has led to the creation of an independent Socialist party. Both tendencies have at one time or another given rise to half a dozen Socialist party divisions. Finally, the supporters of the Republic have divided themselves into first, the Conservatives, headed originally b}'- Thiers, and standing for a conservative Republic in which the people would have little participation; second, 'the Liberals or Radicals, at first headed by Gambetta, then by Clemenceau, and standing for popular govern- ment and collective reforms. Both of these divisions "Accept the Ecpublic, that is to say, the power now con- stitute(i and existing among you, — respect it. As representing the power coming from God, submit to it." E. Zevort, Ilistoire dc la Troisicme Bepublique, iv, 171. 'For the Monarchist view upon the "Rallies", see Charles Maurras La Politique religieuse, 345. Many writers, nside from the Monarchists, question the success of the policy of ralliement. M. Paul Sabaticr says, "The policy of Leo XIII, far from bringing about a reconciliation between the Church and Democ- racy, had quite the opposite result. It made their incompatibility more conspicuous." Disestablishvicnt in Fran-ce, 60. 7 CONTEIilPORARY FRENCH POLITICS have been united in the defense of the Republic against the IMonarchists ; but they have differed widely concern- ing the conception of the character of Republicanism and the powers to be given to its government. These tendencies have been very potent in French party history. They are based upon differences which cannot be charged merely to fickleness of mind or to a frivolous resistance to authority. They have formed very natural bases for party divisions, and it is difficult to see how, under similar circumstances, even England or the United States could have avoided party multiplicity. • II The history of modern party organization begins about 1900. In 1898 a "Comite d 'Action Francaise" an- nounced the birth of the "Ligue de la Pafrie Fran- gaise. " Becoming more mature in its program, it pro- claimed its Royalist (Orleanist) aspirations in 1905 un- der the changed title of the "Ligue d 'Action Fran- Qaise," In 1899 a group was formed in the Chamber of Deputies under the name of the "Action Liberale Popu- laire. " In 1901 the Republican Radical and Radical So- cialist party was founded. In 1902 the Democratic Re- publican Alliance was likewise created. In the same year, the Sillon announced itself. In 1905 the So- cialist groups became united and took the name of the "French Section of the International Workingmen 's As- sociation." Soon after, in 190G, the moderate Repub- licans organized the Republican Federation. Finally, in July, 1911, the Socialists who had refused to adhere to the pact of Amsterdam of 1904, formed the Republi- can Socialist party, which during the war took the name of the National Socialist party. In the same year, PARTY PHILOSOPHIES ion, the Democratic Republican Alliance cliangcd it- self into the Democratic Republican party. Dividing the parties according to their doctrines and according to the manner in which they sit in Parliament ^ they may be classified as the Eight, composed of: (1) the iMonarchists, in turn divided into (a) the Orleanists, (6) the Bonapartists ; (2) the Nationalists, including the so-called plebiscitaires and conservatives, differing little from the Monarchists; (3) the Liberal Action party or Catholic Republicans; the Center, composed of (1) the Moderate or Progressist Republicans, whose party is the Republican Federation; (2) the Republican Democratic party or Alliance; the Left, composed of (1) the Radi- cal Socialist party; (2) the Republican Socialist party; (3) the Unified Socialist party. Of these parties, at least seven are strong enough to warrant a discussion of their doctrines, organization, and strength. Two of the three aspirants to the French throne have been virtually eliminated from among the Royalists. The death of the Count of Chambord in 1883 left no heir to the Legitimist or elder Bourbon line, and the succession passed to the Count of Paris, the grandson of Louis Philippe, of the younger Bourbon or Orleanist line. Although the Emperor, Napoleon I, has no direct male descendants living, the line established by his brother Jerome, is now represented by Prince Victor Napoleon, the acknowledged candidate of the Bonapart- ists for the French throne. Before the war he found refuge in Brussels, where he married the third daugh- * To avoid confusion, it must be stated that this classification is not by parliamentary groups, but by outside party organizations. Thus the Right contains only t^vo groups, but three or four parties. 9 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS ter of Leopold I, the former king of Belgium. As he was born in 1862, age M-ill soon eliminate his suitability for the throne, while his only direct descendants are a daughter born in 1912 and a son born in 1914 — the lat- ter are rather unpromising candidates for the succes- sion.® Victor Napoleon is a son of Prince Napoleon (Napo- leon-Joseph-Charles-Paul Bonaparte). The latter was the son of the ex-King Jerome, and was known for the part he played i:i the movement for Italian unity. Na- poleon III is said to have urged a plan of Italian con- federation as opposed to Cavour 's plan of a united Italy, in order to give the Prince the throne of one of the minor states, probably of Tuscany. The marriage of the Prince (who was a cousin of Napoleon III) with the daughter of Victor Emmanuel II, king of Sardinia, sealed the Franco-Piedmontese alliance in the war against Austria for Italian unity. From this union two chil- dren were born, Victor and Louis. The Prince was ex- pelled from French territory in 1872 by order of Thiers. He was never popular even among Bonapartists, al- though he attempted to assume the leadership of the Bonapartist party. The ex-Empress Eugenie was bit- terly opposed to him for fear he would usurp the rights of her son who was born in 1856. The majority of the party supported Victor, the Prince's son, as the Bona- partist pretender, even while the Prince was alive. In 1911, the Bonapartists, through a Comite politique plchiscitaire, published a program calling for a Bona- partist Republic. They also took a small part in the elections of 1914. A majority of the Independent group ' The Baroness Adolphe do Rothschild is reported to have de- scribed Victor Napoleon as "an eaj^let whose wliolc life is spent in molting." E. A. Vizetelly, Republican France, 185. TO PARTY PHILOSOPHIES in the Chamber of 1914 were Bonapartists, among them being some brilliant men, such as Fernand Engerand. In the elections of 1919, many Bonapartists appeared on the tickets of the Republican Bloc. Prince IMurat was , olected to the Chamber from the provinces. L'Ordre Public, established in the winter of 1919, is strongly suspected of being a Bonapartist newspaper. But despite the distinguished men connected with the movement, the Bonapartists have ceased to figure among the Republic's disturbers. The I\ronarchist movement in France, on account of the death of the Count of Chambord and of the feeble- ness of the Bonapartist heir and following, is now led by the Orleanists through the organization known as the Ligne d'Action^Frangaise. The Orleanist candidate for the throne is the Duke of Orleans, Philippe VIII. He acquired this title and became chief of the Orleans house in 1894 at the death of his father, the Count of Paris.^** The Duke was born in England in 1869, was partly edu- cated in France, but was exiled shortly after the estab- lishment of the Third Republic, by a law passed in 1886. In 1890 he made a great show of patriotism by entering France despite the decree of banishment against him, and presenting himself for the military service to which every French youth is subject. As a result, he was tried by the government and imprisoned for four months. After being freed, he went to America and visited the battlefields of the Civil War upon which his ancestors, his father and the Prince of Joinvillc, had fought. In 1905, 1907, and 1909 he undertook three voyages to the Arctic regions. Before the war he lived in Belgium. ^" The Count of Paris was a prandson of Louis Philippe. He wrote a six-volume history of the American Civil War and a work on the Englisli trades unions. 11 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS Upon its outbreak he tried to enlist in the French army, but M. Viviani, then President of the Council, refused the request because of the law of banishment. He sug- gested, however, that the Duke apply for admittance in the armies of the other Allies. A similar request ad- dressed to the King of England, of Belgium, and to the Emperor of Russia, was also refused. Consequently the Duke of Orleans had no opportunity to show his military prowess, and, as his opponents feared, to establish a dangerous prestige. Although the Orleanists describe their candidate, the Prince, as "an energetic and resolute man, of prompt spirit and sure judgment," ^^ his enemies call him "Phil- ippe the Red Nosed, ' ' because of his fondness for strong liquors. Socialists point to his marriage with Maria Dorothea Amelia ^^ the daughter of Archduke Joseph, cousin of the former Emperor of Austria, as proof of the inconsistency of the party's vaunted patriotism. Generally it is believed that the Prince has none of the outstanding qualities necessary in a man who could over- come the present regime by personal force. The philosophical justification of the Royalist position is set forth in a very talented book by Georges Valois, L' Homme qui vient. M. Valois attributes the pernicious theories of the Revolution to "the three great criminals, the three great impostors. Fathers of Lies, who have turned our intelligence, at the end of the nineteenth cen- tury, against our welfare : Jean Jacques Rousseau, the false Man of Nature ; Immanuel Kant, the false Man of Duty ; and Karl Marx, the false ]\Ian of Necessity. ' ' ^^ ^ Ahna7iach de I' Action Fran^aisc for 1919, 46. "The Duko has no cliildren. Uj)on liis death the headship of the House of Orleans will pass to his brother, Ferdinand, Duke of Montpensier. " L' Homme qui vicnt, preface, x. 12 PARTY PTTTLOSOPITTES The doctrine of the Monarchy itself is completely em- bodied in the Enqm'te s-ur la Monarchie, a compendium of Monarchist opinion, edited by Charles Maurras, and containing interviews with the Duke of Orleans, and such men as Sully-Prudhomme, Paul Bourget, Jules Lemaitre, Jacques Bainville, Henri Bordeaux, and Henri Vaugeois, all of whom expound some phase of the Monarchist program. After first condemning the Republican regime as based on false principles and maintained by Jews, Ma- sons, Protestants, and Mctcquos,'^'^ a regime from which real Frenchmen are excluded, it offers, as the one re- demption of France, the kingship based on the following principles : The monarchy must be traditional. . . . The monarchy must be hereditary . . . the monarchy must be anti-parliamentarian ... in favor of a nominative, personal, and responsible gov- ernment. . . . The monarchy must be decentralized.^^ Holding liigh the principle of integral nationalism, the monarchists offer a program containing definite political and religious changes. When the kingship is established. Parliament will be supplanted by an as- sembly of professional interests of practically no polit- ical power. The framing of laws will be entrusted to a body of experts directed by the King. Political parties will have no reason to exist, and the King will direct every national affair. Decentralization of administra- tion through regionalism " will overcome the abuses of Republican administration. " Metiquc — a class of foreigners exploiting the government for their own ends. ^'' Enquitc sur hi Monarchie, 182. " See Chapter XII. 13 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS The religious program of the Orleanists is frankly reactionary. It gives to the Catholic Church a "mani- fest privilege over other confessions" because of its his- toric and national rights. In the economic field, the hours of labor will be unrestricted for adults, any limi- tation being a "reflection on their dignity." Labor, however, will be protected from all disorders; and the King will organize both labor and capital into offsetting and collaborating bodies. Generally speaking the King W'ill be absolute ; in this respect the Orleanists have de- parted from their liberal and constitutionalist tendencies exhibited in the policies upheld in the National Assembly of 1871-1875. The Royalist plans for the restoration of the Mon- archy, set forth in the last chapter of the Enqucte, are of interest: "The Monarchy must be set up just as all the governments of the world have been established since the world has been the world: by force." ^^ Such a res- toration would not be opposed by the country. "A vig- orous solution would not be unpopular. It would even be extremely popular. He who said: 'France loves the sword,' has uttered a great truth." At the beginning of the war the Duke of Orleans urged his adherents to support the national defense, and throughout its course the French Royalists were the most vigorous defenders of the Fatherland. Although they have been charged with plotting to restore the king, they have never been accused of pro-Germanism. In fact, hatred of Germany is an essential element in their nationalism. By means of the vigorous campaigns of L' Action FranQaise, the official paper of the party, edited ^''Enqucte, 499. 14 PARTY PHILOSOPHIES by Charles IMaurras and Leon Daiidet, many traitors and pseudo-traitors have been exposed."^ Although the Orlcanists profess to disdain ordinary parliamentary taetics, they possess a remarkably com- plete organization. The LUjuc, whose center is in Paris, has sections in most of the larger cities of the provinces. The younger Royalists are formed into the auxiliary organizations of the Camelots dii Hoi and the Etudiants de r Action Frmiqaise, while the Royalist women and girls are similarly grouped. IMembers of the League must sign a pledge ending in these words: "I associate my- self in the work of monarchical restoration. I promise to serve it by every means." Each must pay minimum dues of three francs a year. The intellectual activity of the League- is not only carried on by the daily journal, L' Action Frangaise, but by an Institute in which courses are given upon the problems which the monarchy will have to solve. In addition there is a Review, which likewise studies these problems (suspended during the war), an annual Al- manac, and a publishing house, the Nouvelle Lihrairic Natiomxdc, which issues books of Royalist sympathies. The list of the adherents to this party is not pub- lished. Naturally it is not large, although they claim to have doubled their number during the war. The old nobility, residing chiefly in Touraine and the INIidi, is its chief support. There is little likelihood of the Restoration. The many admirers of Charles ]\Iaurras, the leader of the party, do not necessarily adopt his Royalist theories. It is his patriotism, scholarship, and vigor which attract them. The party is not completely reactionary, as its decentral- "See pp. 278, 274, 277. 15 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS ization and its labor platforms suggest. The incom- patibility of its doctrines with modern tendencies, was completely illustrated during the Peace Conference. But despite this, the French Royalist movement offers a unique and interesting feature of French politics. The remote probability of their success permits a certain respect for Royalists by Republicans. Their sincerity, their love for La Patrie, and their unmistakable, if mis- directed desire to serve and advance the land of their birth are traits which all parties might emulate. Closely akin to the Royalists may be placed the Ligue des Patriotes, an organization purely nationalist in pur- pose. This League was founded in 1882 ; and, under the leadership of its first two presidents, Henri Martin and Anatole de la Forge, it limited its activities to the urging of patriotic and military education. But after 1885, when Paul Deroulede became its head, it turned into U.A active, jingoist organization, which urged the return to France of all territory hitherto forcibly taken from it — especially Alsace and Lorraine. It strove to awaken the idea of La Revanche, by preaching against the dis- sipation of national effort in colonial enterprise. In 1889 the League was suppressed for its support of Gen- eral Boulanger, but it was soon afterward reestablished. During the Dreyfus affair, Deroulede attempted another sensational overthrow of the Republic, but failed. ^^ The League, with which the so-called plchiscitaires are asso- ciated in sympathy, is supposed to stand for a Republic headed by an executive of dictatorial powers. Maurice Barres, the present head of the League, is accused by '■' .Soo Maurifo Barres, Scenes et Doctrines du Nationalisme, v, La Part de Deroulede. For the rlissolution of the TAfjue des Patriotes, see E. Zevort, Bistoire de la Troisieme Eeyublique, iv, 79. 16 PARTY PHILOSOPHIES I the Royalists of not having the courage of his pre- decessors, while the Socialists genuinely hate him. He is particularly ridiculed by Leon Werth in Cla(vel Sol- dat, a novel suppressed during the war. In this book M. Barres was represented as arising every morning to stretch his arms, and saying: *'I am Joan of Arc ; I am Napoleon." In another place, Clavel is sent with the army to Alsace-Lorraine, where he supposes he will find M. Barres, gun in hand, at the crossroads to meet him, but to his well-feigned surprise, M. Barres is nowhere to be found ! As the Socialist press pointed out, his field of action lay in a Paris office, far from the battle-line! M. Barres is naturally a strong Catholic as the Church is an essential element in his doctrine of nationalism. But his relation to the Church appears to be merely political, for, so far as his religion goes, he seems to be much more pantheist than Christian. For instance : The thoughts of our remote ancestors always exercise their mysterious and powerful influences on our lives. The people of the fairies and the spirits who lived in the waters, the wood and the caves, have disapjieared, but in dying, they have bequeathed to the places which they loved, titles of ven- eration. They still guard our race with the tears of their friendship or of their terror. The centuries but little con- sider those who in the solitude listen to their own consciences and receive from them profound murmurs and the source of their being, — dispossessed Gods. Fantastic woods, sweet fairies of the meadows and springs, mysterious emanations of the trees! The night wind which passes across the copses! Oh, fragmentary sentiments! . . . Nature for me is filled with the essence of Gods half wasted! . . . These vanquished hosts sleep at the bottom of the lakes and in the valleys under dead leaves . . ., waiting for the people of France to awaken to their beauties.^*' ""From tlie "Grande Pitie des Eglises de France," quoted in Le Mcrcure de France, November-December, 1916. 17 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS It is in this literary style that IM. Barres urges France to rally round la terre et les morts, the only substitute for the kingship as a guardian of national permanency. Apart from its insistence on the French annexation of the left bank of the Rhine and on the "Family Vote," the League, under his direction, takes little part in poli- tics. It has buried the body of Deronlede in Alsace as a fitting tribute to his passionate struggle for the recovery of the lost provinces ; and likewise, since the war it has published a beautifully illustrated work commemorating their restoration to France. Ill The Liberal Action party (the Action Liherale Popu- laire) is another organized party of the Right. It was founded in 1902 and until lately directed by ]\IM. Piou and ]\Iun, for the purpose of defending and securing "all the freedom essential to the life of the nation, par- ticularly religious libertj^ which is of a superior order and which to-day suffers the greatest injury, "^^ In as much as it is an offspring of the "Rallies," a religious issue naturally constitutes its principal basis. Firm in its devotion to the Republic, it insists upon freeing the Catholic Church from the anticlerical legislation passed since IDOl,^^ Nevertheless it is opposed to a distinctively Catholic party in which issues of cult w^ould be the only ones insisted upon and which would be subjected to the direction of ecclesiastical authorities. The party is intended for Catholics, but it must be open to all — "Jacques, op. cit., 321. " It seems, however, that the anticlerical lopcialation has strength- ened the Churclj'B position instead of weakened it. 18 PARTY PHILOSOPHIES evon those who, believing in religious freedom, are not Catholics. In addition to this conception of religious liberty, the A. L. P. Avishes to inaugurate a society based upon Chris- tian principles. Although standing for an advanced program of social reform, it asserts that "the increase of salaries will remain but a powerless palliative if the soul of the people is not saved from the yoke of ma- terialist doctrines and docs not find a divine ideal. . . . The Ten Commandments and the Gospel are the great factors in true social progress. . . . The solution of the social problem lies in Christianity." "^ Politically, the party program demands nine major reforms: A Declaration of Rights, a Constitution, a Supreme Court, election of the President by a special electoral college, professional organization and repre- sentation, proportional representation, the referendum,^'* provincial and municipal decentralization, and the granting of a definite status to government officials. As a religious program, it declares that there can be no possible legal organization of the Church without a preliminary agreement with the Pope. It affirms the absolute right of the father and the mother of a family to form their child "in their own image and resem- blance, to educate him according to their views and con- victions, and to have him share their ideals in this world and their eternal hopes in the one beyond. . . ."-^ As it is the first duty of Catholic parents to oversee the education of their cliildren, they must not be. contami- nated by lay education. Ideally they should be taught " Jacques, op. cit., 331. " The LiT)enil Action party is one of the few to advocate the popular review of any legishitivo act. " Jacques, op. cit., 326. 19 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS Catholic doctrines in the public schools. But as this is impossible under an anticlerical government, in a coun- try where there are many different cults, the party ad- vocates the proportional division of school funds, so as to enable each sect to establish its own schools to which the children of each would be sent and educated in the religious faith of their parents. From the duty of Catholic parents to send their children to Catholic schools, arises the practice generally followed by them in France even now, although the proportional division of resources never has been, and is not likely to be, achieved. To carry out its theories of religious educa- tion, the party has created the Association of the Fa- thers of Families, which before the war contained over 800 associations divided into seventeen federations. The party's advocacy of repartition proportionnelle of school funds, of representation professionnelle, and of representation proportionnelle^ has won for itself the name of "The party of the Three R's. " In addition to the religious program of the party, it is characterized by its interest in the amelioration of labor conditions. Believing in the moderate interven- tion of the State in economic questions, it stands for the regulation of the hours of work, the establishment of a minimum wage for liome work, labor conciliation and arbitration, and professional and technical education. The party appeals to all classes to assist the working- men. Under its auspices, Catholic syndicates have been organized — the so-called "free" unions — which are in- dependent of the General Confederation of Labor, and have been brought into frieiully touch with Catholic employers' organizations.^" " The Ijibcral Action party is one of the best orfjanizcd in France. Along with a central committee established at Paris, a 20 PARTY PHILOSOPHIES Before the war tliis party had nearly forty federa- tions, over 2,005 committees or groups of adherents, and 265,000 members. It appears to have h)st weiglit in suecessive elections, for in 1902 it had seventy-nine rep- resentatives in the Chamber of Deputies, sixty-four in 1906, and thirty-one in 1910. In 1914, however, its numbers rose to thirty-two, while in 1919 the party was successful in electing sixty-nine deputies. In conclusion it may be said that the Action Liberate Populaire presents a very powerful organization with a very definite program. Both its demands for constitu- tional reform and for social betterment are practicable and meritorious. Although the party's idea of liberal- ism is perhaps warped by its Catholic prejudices, it is one of the few parties, beyond those of strictly clerical composition, which builds its platform upon a mioral and religious foundation. The Sillon, now disbanded, is another Catholic Re- publican group. Although it never claimed to be a party, it loyally attempted to reconcile a sincere at- tachment to the Republic with a love for Catholicism. "Secretariat fjeneral" exists, subdivided into sections. The party organization is composed of (1) the committees constituted or agreed to by this central committee; such as the auxiliary groups of the Jcunesse Liberale, the Jeuncsse CathoUque, the Union of Free Workmen, and some unions of employers; (2) active members, paying a sum of one hundred dollars and an annual fee of at least five dollars; (3) associate members paying an annual fee of at least one franc. Women may belong to the party. The members are divided into communal, cantonal, and department committees. An effort is being made to establish a central committee in every department as the head of all party activities in that district. Every two years the party holds a general or national Congress at wiiich discussions are held concerning "organization," "elec- toral questions,''' and "social reform." A weekly Bulletin is issued to its active members, a quarterly Bulletin and an almanac to its associate members. 21 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS Its purpose was to bring about in France a "democratic, honest, just, and fraternal Republic." Like the Action Lihcralc, it insisted upon the fundamental importance of religious principles in society, and upon Christianity as "an incomparable source of democratic energy, since it identities the individual and the general interest." -^ It advocated the organization and protection of both labor and capital and the extension of cooperative societies. Strangely enough it also stood for the development of communal property, which every laborer might in turn enjoy. It especialh' urged popular education as a means of spreading its doctrines. In 1909, however, the Sillon, whose advanced teachings angered certain conservative Catholics, was dissolved by order of the Pope. It was succeeded by a group called the Jeune Repuhlique, which especially urged the referendum, proportional representation, and a protected status for government officials. It existed for the propaganda of opinion rather than for the mere election of deputies, a characteristic, it may be added, of all leagues as opposed to parties. -IV Turning now to the parties composing the Center, we first find the Moderate or "Progressist" Republicans organized under the title of the Republican Federation. Since this was the most conservative of all the Repub- lican parties, it practically controlled the government during the first twenty years of the Repul)lic under the direction of such men as Ferry, Ribot and Meline. In 1898, however, the Moderates began to lose power — some of its members adhering to the ' ' Rallies ; ' ' while the Bloc, "Jacques, op. eit., 345. 22 PARTY PHILOSOPHIES formed by Waldeck-Rousseau, uniting the Radicals, Rad- ical Socialists, and Socialists, secured control of the Chamber. The recent organization of this party dates from the 18th of November, 1903, when a meeting was held at which the Republican Federation was organized.^'* At that time the National Republican Association, which had been headed by I\I. Audiffret, the Liberal Republi- can Union, w'hich had been headed by ]\I. Barboux, and the Alliance of Progressist Republicans, which had been headed by Jules Meline, were fused into the Republican Federation. The Moderates vigorously opposed the gov- ernment of M. Combes, and especially his anticlerical policy. In 1906 the party underwent a reorganization and gained new members ; and in 1910 it made a net gain of thirty seats in the Chamber, a sign w^hich the party interpreted as indicating the return of the country to its program. In 1914 it practically maintained its par- liamentary strength, polling about ten per cent of the votes cast (1,810,679). Although the number of adher- ents is not published, it is estimated to be between 7,000 and 8,000. The party's influence is much wider than its limited membership — a statement true of all French parties. The ]\Ioderate or Progressist Republican party is the most idealistic of the parties of the Republic. Strongly imbued with the principles of 1789, it is founded on the principles of the dignity and worth of the indi- vidual ; consequently it is strongly against State Social- ism, tolerant in religious matters, and liberal in its eco- nomics. Three marked divisions may be found in its ranks: the Progressists proper, to whom stability and '^ La Federation Eepublicaine, December, 1919, the monthly Bulletin of the Ecpublican Federation. 23 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS immobility is the controlling doctrine; the moderates, who do not fear radicalism, and are willing to sacrifice old doctrines to regain political power ; and between these two, a conciliatory group, playing the part of juste mi- lieu. Composed largely of the wealthy upper classes, the party is insistent upon the rights of private property ; it is vigorously opposed to state monopolies and to the so- cialization of the means of production. Its motto, "Prog- ress by Order," and its watchword, "Conserve and Create," have indicated its parliamentary policy.^^ As to political reforms, the party desires a Bill of Rights, a Supreme Court (to decide the constitutionality of laws) proportional representation and the scrutin de liste,^^ the representation of interests in the Senate, and the enactment of stringent laws against fraud. It also asks for administrative decentralization through an in- crease of the powers of departmental assemblies. As judicial measures, it asks for the reduction of arron- dissement tribunals, for the simplification of procedure, and for the reduction of the expenses of justice. It also stands for public assistance to the old, the infirm, and the sick.^^ " For details of the Federation 's Program, see Compte Rendu du Congres, from 1906 to 1914, tlie reports of the Annual Con- ventions of the party. Charles Bcnoist, French minister to Holland, Alexandre Ribot and Jules Meline, two former prime ministers, are prominent members of this party. "See pp. 152, 153. "The organization of the party is known as the "Republican Feileration." It is administered by a general council of fifty members elected by itself. The council merely gives its advice, while a directing committee of twenty members proposes measures for the consideration of a bureau consisting of a president, six vice-presidents, a secretary-general and a treasurer. In each ar- rondisscment or commune and department, cither a committee, a federation, or a union, directs the party activities. In some centers, such as Lyons and Toulouse, there are regional organizations. A 24 PARTY PHILOSOPHIES In its electoral methods, the party is often willing to support candidates of other parties professing similar doctrines, if its own have no chance of success. As long as the purely progressist element of the party is in con- trol, its prospects for electoral victories are slight ; but under more advanced leadership, it would doubtless have a considerable following among the great class of ' ' moderate ' ' Frenchmen. The ** Democratic Republican Alliance" is the other great party of the parliamentary Center. It is not so conservative as the Progressists, and it is not radical. It announces its platform as "Neither Reaction nor Revolution, Neither Imprudence nor Adventure." Its part has been to reconcile the conservatism and the radi- calism of the Republic. The Alliance was the first party after the war to an- nounce a program of reconstruction and reform. It de- nounced all attempts to stir up class antagonism as an invention of Teutonic imperialism, and it pleaded for the union of all parties in the task of reconstruction. It emphasized the necessity for the creation of a great Republican party, "boldly reformist as well as firmly resolved to prevent the outbursts of revolutionary or reactionary violence ; this party must be strongly enough organized, numerous enough and powerful enough, to give stability and duration to the government which gains its support. ' ' ^^ national congress closing with a banquet is held annually. The Federation has the pledged support of nearly three hundred publicists and nearly eight hundred newspapers; consequently, it exercises considerable influence. " From a brochure distributed by the Alliance. 25 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS It has advocated electoral and administrative reforms, the introducitioin of industrial methods in the public services and decentralization; a law for the protection of government employees (including the prohibition of the right to strike) ; complete reparation by the State for the damages of the war; the early return to com- mercial liberty and the cessation of State control over industry ; the confederation of representatives of indus- try, commerce, and agriculture to consider the economic needs of the country; technical education; the concilia- tion of labor and capital ; the development of social in- surance,- measures combating the "rural exodus"; measures destined to increase the birth rate and to cur- tail infant mortality and alcoholism ; the financial sec- tion of a League of Nations, and the reform of the taxa- tion sj'stem. ^Finally, the Alliance stands for "any measure cal- culated to ensure for the country general prosperity, liberty, social justice, economic advancement, intellectual renaissance and moral grandeur." ^^ The party's strength is not exactly known,^* but it includes many of the most representative statesmen of the Republic. Among its honorary presidents have been " Ibid. ""Although the Alliance was founded as early as May, 1901, by Adolphe Carnot, it was not until 1911 that it first took a prominent and independent part in French politics. M. Carnot is still its president, holding his office for life. On account of his age he attempted to resign lately, but was reelected. He is assisted by a secretary-general, an assistant secretary and a secretary of committees, surrounded by a superior council composed of one delegate from each department, the whole forming a central executive committee. The cantons, arrondissemcnts, and depart- ments have their respective committees. A weekly bulletin is issued by the party while the local associations carry on, by means of circles, libraries, and social organizations, an active cam- paign tending to develop civic education and communal life by every means. 26 PARTY PTTTLOSOPITIES Emile Lonbot, former Prosiilciit of the Republic, M. Waldeck-Rousseau, who founded the famous Bloc, and Joseph IMangin, one of France's prominent generals. Raymond Poineare is vice-president of the organization. Paul Deschanel, the new President of the Republic, is also a member. In 1911 the Alliance had 140 Depu- ties in the Chamber — seventy-one belonging to the group of the Democratic Left, fifty to the Radical Left, and about fifteen to the Radical Socialist Left. In the Senate it had eighty members inscribed in the group of the Re- publican Union. In the 1914 elections it polled the highest number of votes of any party, receiving 1,564- 578. In the 1919 elections 133 of its members were elected to the Chamber. VI The principal party of the parliamentary Left and one of the most powerful in the Republic, is the "Re- publican Radical and Radical Socialist Party," often known as the "Unified Radicals," the "Radical Social- ists," or plainly, the "Radicals." This party, rooted in the Jacobin clubs of the Revolution and in the followers of Ledru-Rollin during the Revolution of 1848, really came to light with the dawn of the Third Republic. About 1880 a group of advanced Radicals detached them- selves from the "Republicans," and because of their bitter opposition to the conservatism of Thiers and even to the opportunism of Gambetta, they soon became known in contrast with the "Opportunists," as the "In- transigeants." They stood solidly and without com- promise for the absolute achievement of Republican ideals. This group increased in 1885 and 1899 until it became a factor in the elections of the latter year. In 27 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS 1887 it fought for the suppression of the right of the Senate to authorize the President to dissolve the Cham- ber; from 1888 to 1898 it opposed the moderate Repub- licans, although uniting with them whenever the Re- public was threatened. Thus many so-called concentra- tion ministries contained many Radical leaders — Flo- quet, Brisson, Goblet, Sarrien, and Ricard. Clemenceau was one of the most destructive leaders of the group. His particular delight was the defeat of ministries, and he became known as the "Ministry Smasher." He is said to have tried to defeat twenty-three of them and to have been successful in the case of eighteen. In 1892 many Radicals became Radical Socialists, urging collective reforms and the general betterment of labor conditions. But in 1893 the group was success- ful enough to elect 120 members to the Chamber. Be- side them were grouped the Radical Socialists, some of whose members, notably M. Millerand, were passing over to pure Socialism. The Radical Socialists and the Socialists in this Chamber had about sixty members. Upon a strongly anticlerical, an income tax, and social reform platform, the Radicals, combining forces with the Radical Socialists, and pure Socialists, were successful enough in 1895 to establish a completely Radical min- istry, headed by M. Bourgeois. In 1901 the fusion of the Radicals, the Radical Socialists, and the Socialists, was officially made. The adoption of the formula, "No ene- mies on .the Left, ' ' led many Radicals, who were unwill- ing to associate with pure Socialists, to desert the party and adhere to the Democratic Alliance. But nevertheless the Radical party gained power.^^ " An intorestinfj story is told of the initial success of the reor- p^anizod Radicals shortly after 1900. There was a certain jeweler and his brother who were conducting a very successful business 28 PARTY PIIILOSOPITTES The Radicals assert that they are essentially a party of the middle class, the petite hourgeaisie, wishing to establish a united, fraternal and social Republic in which every citizen will be rewarded upon a basis of his own labor and merit. The party still adheres to the ** Program of Nancy" adopted in 1907, which contains a complete outline of its political, economic, and social reforms. Although annual "declarations" have subsequently interpreted or modi- fied this program, it still remains the creed of their political beliefs. Politically, the party stands for the direct election of senators. Until 1919 it refused definitely to commit itself to proportional representation, although it has stood for the scrutin de liste. It also seeks certain ad- ministrative reforms, the supremacy of the Chamber of in Paris in a shop on the Boulevard de la Sebastopol. The firm grew to such an extent that its traveling salesmen carried the firm 's jewelry into every part of France. At the time of the elections, the jewelers, through some sort of negotiation with the Radical chiefs, turned over their salesmen to the party as propagandist agents. They were so successful that the" country returned an overwhelming majority for the Radicals and with it, the government. The Radicals, as a reward, promptly elected the jeweler to the Senate, an extraordinary step for one who had not first served in the Chamber. The gentleman is still serving very prominently in that capacity, and is very proud of his remark- able achievement. From 1902 to 1906, the Radical party formed, with the Social- ists and the moderate Radicals of the Democratic Alliance, the Bloc of the Left; in 1906 they and the Socialists won an ag- gregate of 400 seats; in 1910, excluding the Socialists, they had 334 seats. At the Congress of Pau in 1913 the party reorganized itself, deciding that all of its deputies must adhere to a strictly Radical group. After this, the party became known as the Unified Radicals. The elections of 1914, partly because of the bitterness of their anticlerical policy, their pacifism, and this measure of reorganization to which many deputies refused to adhere, reduced their number to 2;')7 nieml)ers. In 1919 this number was still further reduced to 143. 29 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS Deputies over the Ministry and the Senate, and the reorganization of the Judiciary. It was, however, the anticlerical platform of the party which brought it to power and still constitutes the sine qua non of its existence. Although the issue is prac- tically dead, the party is still pledged to the rigid main- tenance of all anticlerical legislation, the suppression of illegally existing religious orders, and the exclusive control of education by the State. In addition to anticlericalism, the party's support of collectivism is its principal characteristic. Although recognizing the value of private property and of in- dividual initiative, it desires to correct the abuses of the present regime through the assumption by the State of every actually existing monopoly. The conclusions of M. Chauvin at the Congress of Dijon in 1908 still repre- sent the party 's position upon State control of industry : 1. Individual property, properly so called, arising from labor, and maintained by labor, Ave must conserve as sacred. 2. Individual property must give way to the general inter- est when the interest of the proprietor is found to be in manifest contradiction to the interest of society. 3. Finally, if for the creation or for the conservation of industrial property, where all the work and all the efforts of the proprietor have ceased to exist, and if this property is a monopoly in the possession of a single person, or if it is wealth entirely created by society or by others, this property, truly capitalistic, can and should be taken over by the State.38 These principles the Radicals have extended to in- clude natural resources and industrial enterprises now dangerously centralized. "Quoted by A. Cliarpcntier in Le Parti Eadical et EadicaX- Socialiste a travers ses emigres, 445, 30 PARTY PHILOSOPHIES Socially, the party "attempts to give to the prole- tariat the full conscioiisnes.s of its rights and duties, and, with the responsibility for its action, the authority necessary to establish a more rational and just social constitution." ^^ It is ready to take every legal measure to guarantee to each the product of his toil and to pre- vent capitalistic domination of the consumer. "Reso- lutely hostile to the egotistical conceptions of the school of laissez faire," the party favors State inter\'ention in the relations of capital and labor. It promises assist- ance to needy children, the sick, the infirm, and the old. It promises a pension to workers overcome by work or age. It has demanded the enactment of a labor code embracing laws (1) upon the employment of women and children in industry, (2) upon labor and apprentice- ship contracts, (3) upon the regulation of differences between labor and capital by compulsory arbitration, (4) upon labor accidents, the risks and diseases of in- dustrj^ and the responsibility of employers, (5) upon the limitation of hours of labor and a weekly rest, (6) upon the organization of government insurance in favor of every worker in industry, commerce, and agriculture against the risks of accidents, sickness, and unemploy- ment, (7) upon mutual insurance and savings funds to improve the condition of labor, (8) upon conditions of health and hygiene in industrial and commercial estab- lishments. Financially the party has stood for the income tax and the suppression of the "four direct contributions"; it is also against consumption taxes, stamp and registry fees, and taxes weighing on agriculture, commerce, and small industry. ^ Program of Nancy, a brochure distributed at party head- quarters. 31 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS As an agrarian program, it urges the development of agricultural education, cooperative associations, agricul- tural credit, and insurance against tire, hail, frost, and the death of cattle. ^* Many prominent men are associated with the Radi- cals — among them being MM. Clemenceau ; Caillaux, now in disrepute ; Combes and Herriot, two prominent Sen- ators; Rene Renoult, former president of the Executive Committee of the party and president of the Army Commission of the Chamber; Franklin Bouillon, former head of the Foreign Affairs Commission ; and Senator Leon Bourgeois, president of the Senate and a repre- sentative on the French Peace Delegation.^^ *'' On July 26, 1919, a petit congres of the Radical party was held in Pans where a reconstruction program was drawn up. It contained little in addition to previous platforms except to urge more vigorous measures against speculators, modification of the income tax so as to exempt small salaries, and the abolition of the three-year military service law and gradual disarmament in view of the League of Nations. ^ The organization of the Radical party is very coherent. It is based on the communal committee, upon which repose arrondisse- ment, canton, department, and regional federations. The arron- disscment and d'^partment committees are the most active. A central Executive Committee with offices in Paris directs all party activities. The members of the party in each locality form its committee. In each department, delegates of these committees meet at least once a year and choose department delegates to tiro Annual Congress. Since 1909 the Executive Committee has been composed of (1) all of the deputies and senators, adherents of the party, members by right; (2) delegates elected at the Congress by the department delegates. Before the war the Exe- cutive Committee contained over six hundred members. From its own members, it elects a president, sixteen vice-presidents (eight of M'hom must be members of Parliament), sixteen secretaries (eight of whom also must be members of Parliament), an admin- istrative secretary-general and a treasurer, — a total of thirty-five. The president is not immediately eligible for reelection, and this bureau is renewed, one half each year. Tliia committee is sub- divideil in turn into committees on rules and discipline, finance, preparation for Congrea.ses, propaganda, and j)arty organization. The bureau is divided into five permanent committees: party administration, elections, propaganda, bulletin, and demands. 32 PARTY PHILOSOPHIES VII Following the parliamentary groupings toward the Left we find the Socialist representatives, divided into the Republican Socialists and the Unified Socialists. This division is the result of events which must be briefly summarized. The earlier groupings of the French Socialists after the banishments following the Commune, occurred at the Congress of the French Workingman's party held in 1874. Several years later the organization then formed broke up into two groups: the Marxist group, recruited in the North, and led by Jules Guesde, and the French Federation of Socialist Workingmen. This latter or- ganization was of reformist tendencies and consequently became known as the "Possibilists. " It was led by Paul Brousse. In 1890 this Federation of Socialist Workingmen split into two branches, the cause being a question of centralization of party organization. The revolutionary element became known as the "Alleman- ists," from the name of their leader, Allemane. The other section continued under the leadership of Brousse. Under the guidance of Guesde and Allemane, most of the divisions of the Socialist party supported Marx's advo- cacy of the Social Revolution in contrast with the purely French idea of progressive reform. At this time a fourth section of the Socialist following, that led by Blanqui,^" *'Blanquism, M. Hanotaux describes as "the traditional party of insurrection, conspiracy, and sedition. It possessed hardly any other political conception except that of opposition to the last breath, by all means, to all governments. It was integral, republican, leveling, the adversary of social order, but neither communist, separatist, nor socialist: in fact, anarchist." Can- temporary France, i, 164. 33 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS constituted about a quarter of their forces. In the Chamber of Deputies there were also attempts to form a Labor party. Thus at least five Socialist organizations, many of them antagonistic to each other, came into ex- istence, each struggling for the labor vote. In addition to them, a strong group of men unassociated with parties but having collectivist doctrines, are to be noted : Miller- and, Viviani, and Andre Lefevre. In view of the elect- ions of 1893 reformist elements among the Socialists and some discontented Radicals united in a "League of Revolutionary Action for the Inauguration of the So- cial Republic. ' ' This coalition was successful in electing fifty-five Radical Socialists, who took their seats in the Chamber at the extreme Left. Twenty-five Socialists were elected, more than half of them coming from the department of the Seine.*^ In 1899 an effort was made to unify further the differ- ent factions, and a general Socialist committee was or- ganized to effect a union. This combination was prac- tically achieved when an incident arose which resulted in the withdrawal of the Guesde following. This was the noted ''Millerand Case." M. Millerand had been ai)pointed Minister of Commerce in the Waldeek-Rous- ■ seau Ministry in 1899, but as he was affiliated with the Socialist party, Guesde and Sembat insisted that it was contrary to the teachings of Karl Marx for a Socialist to collaborate in any way with a bourgeois government. In opposition to these out-and-out revolutionists, how- ever, another group within the party, men of a reform- ist tendency, content with a policy of improving present society, men such as Aristide Briand, Rene Viviani, Paul Brousse, and Jean Jaures, asserted Millerand 's right to " Soo P. F. Dcsmartros, "La France Polituiuc a la Vcille des Scrutiny;" Europe Nouvcllo, March 22, 1919. 34 PARTY PHILOSOPHIES be associated with the government. In a party congress held at Paris in 1899 ministerial participation was con- sented to by a vote of 818 to 634; but the International Congress held in Paris, in 1900, virtually resulted in a negation of this decision by adopting a motion (offered by Jules Guesde) to the effect that this was only to be considered a measure of expediency caused by excep- tional conditions. At Bordeaux in 1903 IMillerand was again justified by a party declaration for remaining a member of the Cabinet, but was censured for not follow- ing party principles in his ministerial policy.*- The un- willingness of the party to expel Millerand led Guesde to withdi-aw, and, joining the Blanquists in 1901, he formed the rarti Socialiste de France. Soon afterward, the followers of Jaures, who had now become the leader of the reformists, together with the independents, formed the Parti Socialiste Frangais. In 1902 the Cham- ber contained forty Socialist members. In 1904 the International Socialist Congress at Am- sterdam not only settled the Millerand case, but secured the definite triumph of Marxism over the purely French doctrine of "reformism." Despite the vigorous defense of the latter by Jean Jaures, the German delegation, led by Rosa Luxemburg and Bebel, forced the Congress to adopt a resolution "rejecting in the most energetic man- ner revisionist attempts ... to substitute a policy of concession to the established order for the conquest of political power through an open struggle against the bourgeoisie. " *^ It pronounced itself frankly against any "party satisfied with reforming bourgeois society"; and ■" Millerand was expelled from the Federation of the Seine in 1904. "Zeva&s and Prolo, Une Campagne Politiq^ie: Ic Parti Eepuhli- caiti Socialiste, 8. 35 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS further declared tliat "socialist democracy cannot ac- cept any participation in a government of a bourgeois society. " *^ M, Jaures, though defeated, loyally accepted this decision; and upon his return to France, all his personality and great intellectual powers were exercised successfully in uniting the Revolutionary Socialist "Workingmen 's party, the Socialist party of France, the French Socialist party, and five autonomous Federa- tions, into the Unified Socialist party. This union was finally consummated at the Congress of Rouen in March, 1905. The decision of Amsterdam, however, displeased not only Millerand, but also many other prominent men, such as Yiviani and Briand, who refused to join the Unified party. That party now took the official name of the French Section of the International Working- men's Association. Beginning with the elections of 1906 the party, ostens- ibly at least, repudiated the Bloc, and pursued an inde- pendent policy even to the extent of voting against ap- propriation bills. Under the leadership of Jaures, how- ever, who was still at heart a reformist, it took an active part in urging social reforms. Because of its splendid unity and discipline, its electoral successes were aston- ishing. In 1910 the party elected 75 deputies ; and in 1914, 101. The latter election was won upon a purely pacifist and antimilitary platform as well as upon the reassertion of a new social and financial policy. The unity of the party in the 1914 elections was so complete that only five of its candidates were defeated in the provinces, and but tlirco in Paris. As will be seen later ^' however, this unity has been seriously disrupted ' Ibid. 'See p. 97. 3G PARTY PHILOSOPHIES during the war.- Unless present divisions are mended, future party successes appear improbable. Little need be said of the doctrine of the Socialist party, which in most of its outstanding features re- sembles that held by Socialists everywhere. The real purpose and aim of the party was set forth in the "Mu- tual Declaration of Socialist Organization," adopted January 13, 1905, a part of which follows : 1. The Socialist party is a party of Class which has for its object the socialization of the means of production and exchange, that is, to transform capitalistic society into a collectivist or a communist society, and for a means, the economic and political organization of the proletariat. Its object, its ideal, and the means which it employs, make the Socialist party (while pursuing the realization of immediate reforms demanded by the working-class) not a party of re- form, but a party of class struggle and of revolution. 2. The representatives of the party in Parliament form an independent group o]iposing all the political factions of the bourgeoisie. The Socialist group in Parliament must there- fore refuse to the government all the means which assure the domination of the bourgeoisie and its maintenance in power; it must consequently refuse military credits, credits for colonial conquest, secret funds, and indeed the entire budget.*^ On one point in its doctrine, the French Unified So- cialists have become frankly opportunistic and from the standpoint of pure Socialist principle, despicably so. Realizing that the doctrine of the class struggle and the socialization of property is incompatible with the ideas of the peasant population of France, whose adher- ence to the Socialist cause is necessary for success, the party has made exceptions to the Marxian dogma. The peasant population, comprising about 15,000,000, is *' Eeglement du Parti Socialiste, issued by the National Coun- cU. 37 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS divided into so many different categories that the rough division of "capitalist" and "laborer" cannot possibly be made. There are thousands of small farmers own- ing their farms and at the same time working several days of the week for larger owners/^ Owners who ex- clusively occupy their ov/n places, and employ doz- ens of laborers — cannot be called capitalists because they themselves engage in manual labor and borrow capital. Even tenant farmers hire help and invest capi- tal; they are evidently both capitalist and employer, employee and debtor. In short, the agricultural situa- tion in France completely belies the doctrine of the struggle and the opposition of classes. It illustrates, on the other hand, their actual interpenetration. The last attempt to meet this situation was made by the Administrative Commission of the party in the early summer of 1919, when a declaration was framed de- " In 1882, there were 2,150,000 i^easants cultivating their own lands, to the exclusion of all other work; there were 1,374,000 peasants cultivating their own lands and in addition working for some one else, — making a total number of 3,524,000, not including their families. Illustration of Increase in THE Number op Peasants 1862 1882 1892 Peasants cultivating their own land exclusively 1,812,000 1,987,000 2,150,000 1,374,000 2,199,000 Peasants working for another . . . 1,888,000 Although figures for a later period are not available, these just cited would seem to disprove the Socialist thesis that the peasants are gradually being expropriated by and subjected to capitalism. As a matter of fact, independent proprietors are increasing in numbers, while peasants working for a landlord, etc., are decreas- ing. See La Mevue Politique et Parlcmentaire, November 10, 1919, " L'accroissemcvt du nomhrc des jxvjsans-proprietaircs." 38 PARTY PIIILOSOPIIIP]S noiincing "men wlio are rocognizod by tlioir conservative opinions," and parties "wlio, disguising their reaction- ary desires under cfiuivoeal labels," wish to antagonize the peasants against socialism. The manifest stated that the Socialist party is not the adversary of the rural masses, that it is not concerned solely -with protecting the city workers to the detriment of those in the coun- try. Socialism, it maintains, wishes "to bring back to the laborers themselves the means of production. . . . It docs not struggle against the small owners who them- selves produce, whether they be in the country or in the city." The Socialists net only wish to defend these small holders, but they even appear to wish to increase them. "The Socialist party," it continues, "does not wish to rob you of your labor — which it wishes only to render more productive — but to guarantee to you its posses- sion." The manifest concludes by outlining a program dealing with the means of agricultural reconstruction and proposing new methods in production, and projects in favor of increased salaries. But the matter of * ' com- munal ownership" of rural property is assiduously avoided."^ The contradiction betw^een this concession to peasant prejudices and the principles of the party formulated in 1905 is conspicuously evident. Moreover, the peasant population of France is so conservative and individual- istic, that the successes won by this abdication of prin- ciple appear too meager to justify the means employed. Indeed the Socialists must place their revolutionary hopes in the Paris mobs, the factor from which, since the days of Marcel, the Commune, and the last "First of *" Manifesto reported in Lc Temps, June 1, 1919. 39 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS May," disorder in France has always been evoked. Their enemy and the source of their defeat will come from the paysans who have sacrificed most for La Patrie and who now cherish more than ever their personal share in its prosperity.*^ Before the war the Socialist party had about eighty department federations. Its adherents in 1905 were 34,688, a number which increased to 63,000 in 1912. On account of the war this number decreased to 37,073 in 1918, although by the middle of April, 1919, it had re- trieved most of its former strength — mustering 57,159 " In keeping with its idea of democracy, the Socialist party haa no permanent president; but there is a permanent administrative commission (known as the C. P. A.) of twenty-two members, and a secretary, who is charged with the execvitive work of the party. These members are elected by the National Congress, an annual meeting of the party, which decides its policies. The delegates to this Congress are elected by congresses of the department federations in proportion to their dues-paying members — one dele- gate for the first hundred members, and one for every two hundred thereafter. Between congresses the party is directed by a National Council composed of (1) the Socialist members of Par- liament, (2) delegates from the department federations, (3) the administrative commission above described. This national council is the supreme body of the party when the Congress is not in session. It meets ordinarily once every two months; it is charged with the general propaganda and with executing the decision of the Congress. The Administrative Commission acts in its absence and for it. The Socialist group in the Chamber is required to sub- mit an annual report to the party Congress and each deputy is required to pay a monthly fee of fifty dollars. Tho only requirements for joining the party are the obligations to subscribe to its declaration, pay an annual fee of five cents, and belong to the labor union of tho members' trade. Tho party maintains a section in every commune — which holds a meeting at least once a month. These sections are administered by a commission which holds bimonthly meetings. At Paris and Lyons there are sections for every arrondisscmcnt. These sections form a federation in every department which is admin- istered by a federal committee. There is also a Federal Council, composed of delegates of the sections, wliich is a deliberative boiity. Elected by the Ke])iil)li('an Socialist party from St. Etienno, he belnn{,'s to no parliamentary group, al- through the Republican Socialists are organized in one. 5G PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT the French Cliaiiihcr, the President of the Rei)uhlic must select a man as President of the Council of ^lin- isters (the I*riine IMinister), avIio will connnand the sup- port of sevei'al parties. The dileinnia of the Premier is increased by the necessity -of selecting an entire cabinet from tliese difT(>rinfi:, often hostile elements. In England the task of choosing a Prime ]\Iinister is comparatively simple because the leader of the party in power is gener- ally distinguishable. But in France, on account of the reason above given, the President is allowed to use a great deal of personal discretion because no outstanding party leader can exist. There may be three or four avail- able candidates, but because of their number, the final choice must rest with the President of the Republic alone. As a result of this" condition, long intervals frequently elapse between the fall of one cabinet and the formation of another. Even when a Prime Minister is chosen, he must carry on negotiations with groups, securing their adherence by the judicious distribution of seats, and often by the creation of new ones merely to satisfy certain representations. This necessity was increased during the war when the willing collaboVation of every group in the ]\Iinistry became a necessity. The Viviani Cabinet, already in power when war was declared on August 3, 1914, immediately enlarged itself to include MM. Delcasse, Ribot, Millerand, Briand, Sembat and Guesde. (The latter was given no administrative posi- tion, but was merely denominated "IMinister without Portfolio." It is said that he did nothing in the Council of Ministers^" except draw a salary and insure the So- ^"The Council of Ministers as opposed to the Cabinet is the administrative body of ministers recognized in tlie Constitution ; the Cabinet is tlic ]>oliti<'al body. The President of the Kepublic meets witli the former but not with the latter. 57 CONTEIMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS cialist support of the war.) In the Briaiid Cabinet, which followed that of Viviani, a new device was used to secure the political representation of all parties. This was the creation of ]\Iinisters of State, of whom there were five. MM. Freycinet, Emile Combes, Leon Bour- geois, Jules Guesde and Denys Cochin occupied these new positions, the first being a ]\Ioderate, the second two, Radical Senators, the fourtli, a Socialist, and the fifth, a member of the Extreme Right. The Yiviani i\Iinistry which came to power on June 13, 1914, illustrated the dif^culty of the formation of a new cabinet. On June 2, 1914, the Doumergue Cabinet resigned, and because of the increased strength of the Left, Rene Yiviani, a Republican Socialist, was imme- diately asked to form a ncAv government. It took him exactly eleven days to come to terms with the Radicals, notably upon the three-year military service law to which the Radicals Avere opposed- Concessions were passed back and forth unsuccessfully until June 9, when President Poincare, despairing of Yiviani 's success, asked A. Ribot, a Moderate belonging to the Republican Union of the Senate, to make the attempt to form a cabinet. M. Ribot judiciously selected a cabinet from the Left and Center groups, but because of his support of the three-year law, the Unified Socialists and the Rad- icals overthrew him on June 12 by a vote of 306 to 262. Finally, upon June 13, Yiviani succeeded in coming to terms with the Radicals, and took over the ]\Iinistry. In his cabinet were five Radicals, two Republican Social- ists, three Senators from the Democratic Left, one Re- publican of the Left, and one member from the Radical Left. More than half of these twelve ministers had voted for the three-year law of August 7, 1913, al- though collectively the cabinet had come to power 58 PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT pledged to overcome it. P)Ut as soon as llie ('al)iiiet ^vas firmly seated in power, it announced its firm intention to give it its support. Such a change of policies is a frequent occurrence under the French regime. Although the Unified Socialists withdrew their support, the Radi- cals were able to muster a majority which kept M, Vi- vian! in i)ower. The attempt of M. Ribot to form a government, as above related, resulted in what was kno^vn as the One Day Government from the length of its tenure. This affords an illustration of the uncertainty and the in- stability of French ministries. According to figures compiled by ]\I. Leon ]\luel," during a period of a hun- dred years, from 1789 to 1890, France has had ninety- four IMinisters of Justice, 117 of the Interior, ninety- nine of Foreign Affairs, ninety-nine of Finance, 109 of War, and eighty-eight of IMarine. Thus the average term of office of the IMinisters of Justice, Finance, and Jlarine, was a little over a year ; that of the Llinisters of the Interior and of War, a little less than a year. From the advent of the cabinet of Jules Dufaure, on IMarcli 9, 1876 (who was the first President of the Coun- cil under the Third Republic), to the accession of the Clemenceau Ministry in November, 1917, there were fifty-six ministries — during a period covering forty-one years. In other words, a French ]\Iinistry has had an average life of less than nine months. Contrasted with the ministerial tenure in England, where from 1873 to 191-1 there have only been eleven ministries, the ad- vantages of a stable party organization can readily be seen. During the same length of time — 1876 to 1917 — France had five times as many ministries as England. " Cited in Etlmond Villey, Les Vices de la Constitution Fran- faist', 122. 59 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS Although both countries nominally have the same par- liamentary form of government, they work quite dif- ferently in practice. Of course the essential thing about a "cabinet" government is that it holds office only so long as it maintains the sympathy of the majority of Parliament or of the country. But as already noted, •«'hile this majority in England is organized and stable, and its sympathies definitely determined and expressed, in France there can be no majority in the English sense. There are combinations, coalitions, and blocs, tempo- rarily held together by a common ambition.^^ The num- ber, the independence, the changing interests, and the lack of discipline of these groups do not long allow them to endure. AVhen these combinations break up, it usual- ly means that another combination will be formed, an- tagonistic to the Ministry — and the latter must fall. The result upon the conduct of the government is plain. An ordinary Ministry will try to perpetuate its power as long as possible. To do this, it will have to satisfy the demands of the four or five groups supporting it. But these demands are usually conflicting and they cannot be carried out to the satisfaction of all. Con- sequently a Ministry usually "marks time"; at least it is subjected to the temptation of temporizing. Re- forms which it is pledged to enact are found impossible of realization if it wishes to remain in power. Measures demanding immediate adoption drag through successive Parliaments, their principle not being accepted because groups differ on details. This has been especially true of the income tax. Promised by the Radical party in 1906, advocated many years before, it was finally en- acted in 1914. This has been true also of electoral re- " For a history of tlioso conibinationa, sec Chapter I IT GO PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT form, advocated in one form or another ever since the creation of the Third Republic, and only enacted in 1919. Unless a IMinistry is couraj^eons beyond the ordi- nary, it is not likely to urge reform measures which may react against the self-interest of some parliamentary group. If a strong Ministry urges them it is sooner or later bound to fall. As a result pressure for reforms does not usually come from the Government. This is true especially in matters of social and economic legisla- tion. It comes, if at all, from independent members of Parliament outside the IMinistry, and more strongly, from great, organized extra-parliamentary bodies such as the General Confederation of Labor who, by threat, have forced the passage of greatly needed measures. ^^ In fact, the weakness of the Government and the inability of Parliament to accomplish results seem to be one of the chief reasons for the strength of these outside, and purely extra-legal bodies. As far as the French Ministry is concerned, its virtual powerlessness to initiate reform legislation and its uncertain lease on life, has a strong tendency to keep the stronger men of the country out of the cabinet. But their places are greedily held by successive swarms of men who in other countries would be wholly unable to hold ministerial positions. Criticism upon this score is often exaggerated, how- " The demand of the National Association of Functionaries, for salary increases by July 21, 1919, seems to have been the only reason why Parliament provided them. Other orgjanizations, such as the Civic League, the League of the Rights of jMen, the League for Proportional Representation, the League for Regional Action have led figKts for reform. The Electoral Reform Bill of July, 1919, is an instance of a great reform which was spon- sored by members of Parliament, without the support of the Ministry. In fact, the Clemenceau Ministry appeared to be se- cretly opposed to it. 61 CONTEIMTORARY FRENCH POLITICS ever, for the effects of the imstable tenure of ministries is partlj' overcome by several offsetting institutions and practices. In the first place, the officials who directly manage the Government services and administration have been given a status, assuring them permanency in office. This has resulted largely from the demands of organizations composed of these employees. To a certain extent this has overcome the so-called "Spoils System" by which a new Government fills all positions with its camp-followers. Consequently, government administra- tion has a permanence and a. stability on which even frequent ministerial changes have little effect. The granting of a permanent status to functionaries has been further necessitated bj^ the centralization of the French, government and the vast control which it exercises over business enterprises. For example, it would be incon- ceivable for university professors or tobacco manufac- turers to be removed upon every change in ministry. Their permanency of position has overcome what would otherwise be a hopeless and impossible situation. Secondly, a change in ministry is not so wide-sweep- ing in its effect as it is in England. In the latter coun- try, it is customary for an entirely new cabinet to take the place of the one just fallen ; and the new body adopts an entirely different policy. But in France, ministers of old cabinets are usually found on new. There are always some ''hold-overs," men who have had previous experience in cabinet positions. A defeat of a Govern- ment often amounts to nothing more than a ministerial shake-up. Such a defeat is usually caused by the aroused hostility of one of the four or five groups constituting its majority; and a re-formed cabinet is often changed only to the extent of containing representatives of an- other group to take the place of the one whicli has 62 PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT drifted away. It is ciistoiuary for a defeated Prime IMinister to take a portfolio in tlie cabinet succeeding his own. Tims Viviani after his fall became ]\Iinister of Justice in the Briand Cabinet which succeeded him on October 29, 1915. Upon the last Clemenceau Cabinet, three members, ]\IM. Clementel, Claveille, and Loucheur, ''held over" in the same positions from the Painleve cabinet. The IMinister of Finance, Louis Klotz, served in the same position on three previous cabinets, those of Caillaux, Poincare, and Briand. The Minister of Commerce, M. Clementel, held a similar position on four previous cabinets; at one time he was also Minister of Agriculture in the Barthou Ministry and Minister of Finance in the Ribot Cabinet of 1917. M. Pains, IMinis- ter of Interior, was Minister of Agriculture in the Cail- laux and Poincare Cabinets ; M. Lafferre, Minister of In- struction, was IMinister of Labor under the Briand IMin- istry of 1910 ; I\r. Leygucs, Minister of Marine, was Min- ister of Colonies in the Sarrien Cabinet of 1906 ; while Stephen Piehon, IMinister of Foreign Affairs, held a like office in previous Briand (1910), Clemenceau (1906), and Barthou (1914) Cabinets. Thus a French cabinet, despite its shifting composition, is assured of members who have had previous political and ministerial ex- perience. Finally, the instability of French governments can- not be charged only to organic defects in the parlia- mentar}' system of the Third Republic. The whole his- tory of France has been one of constant turmoil, one form of government forcibly turning into another, — Rei)ublic, IMonarchy, and Empire, each following the other in kaleidoscopic rapidity. Since the beginning of the Revolution eleven constitutions have, at one time or another, governed France; but until the Fundamental 63 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS Laws of the Third Republic, no one of them has been in effect longer than twenty years." France has been twice an Empire, and three times a Constitutional Monarchy; she has seen the regime of three Republics. Since the death of Louis XIV only two monarchs died in the occupancy of the throne. Under the Third Republic, the fii"st three Presidents, MM, Thiers, IMac^Iahon and Grevy, were forced to re- sign ; the fourth, M. Carnot, was assassinated ; the fifth, Casirair-Perier, voluntarily quitted office in disgust ; and the sixth, Felix Faure, died prematurely — even mj-steri- ously. It was not until the Republic was in its thirty- sixth year that a President at last quietly laid down his office at the expiration of his term, as Loubet did in 1906. The present parliamentary system in France surely can- not be responsible for the instability of past history or for the checkered careers of its Presidents who were re- moved from its operation. IV The second defect of French parliamentary govern- ment arises in part from the first. This is the tyran- nical dominance which Parliament — or the Chamber of Deputies — maintains over the Government. In England the Cabinet directs Parliament ; it not only handles gov- ernment administration, but it actively leads legislative work. It is nearly a free agent in the direction of the chief duties of the central government ; Parliament in- tervenes only to liold it aceountal)le to its trust. The French Parliament, on the other hand, shows no such "For a list of these laws and constitutions, see F. E. Dareste, Lcs Constitutions Modemes, i, 1 -9. 64 PARTIP]S AND PARLIAMENT amiable disposition. It constantly interferes in the af- fairs of the IMinistry, it dictates its policies, and con- tinually demands explanations and defenses. Generally, it assumes a hif^hly dictatorial attitude. The IMinistry often finds itself at its absolute mercy, — not of that of a stable, reasonable majority, — but of a whimsical and often insignificant group. Patience, therefore, becomes a cliief — even essential — ministerial virtue. There are several devices by which Parliament may control the IMinistry. Oral questions may be asked a Minister at the beginning of a session. They cannot be debated and the author is the only one allowed to re- spond to the IMinister's reply. Written questions may also be submitted to the President of the Chamber ; they are printed in the Official Journal along with the re- sponse from the proper minister within eight days. The latter, however, may declare in writing that the public interest does not allow an answer. The chief means by which Parliament lays a heavy hand on the cabinet is by the means of "interpellations." An interpellation is the act by which a member of either the Senate or the Chamber can force a minister to answer questions and generally to defend his administration. The President of the Council may even be brought to defend the entire general policy of the Government. ^^ Indeed, interpella- " The following is a summary of tlie Rules of the Chamber in regard to interpellations: The Cliamber fixes the day upon which interpellations are heard. Interpellations upon interior policies cannot be post- poned more than a month. No order of tiie day motive upon interpellations can be pre- sented unless it is in writing. The order of tlie day yur ct simple, if it is requested, always has priority. If the order of the day pur et simple is not adopted and if it is not ordered to the bureaus, the presitlent submits the order of the day motive to the vote. 65 CONTEJIPORARY FRENCH POLITICS tions are seldom used raercl}^ to obtain information; they more often constitute a challenge to a debate in which all members of the Chamber and of the Ministry may participate. Originating in technical and unim- portant matters, such discussions often end in the over- throw of the Grovernment. An interpellation is made in writing and it becomes a special order of the day, the time for the debate it provokes being definitely set in advance. After such a debate — in which the inter- pellators may place the IMinister under a grueling ex- amination, which is limited by no restriction of time — the vote ''of the order of the day" is taken. This vote usually includes an expression of confidence in the Government. For example, last June (1919), after an interpellation in which certain members of the Chamber questioned the Government as to searching certain of- fices, the Chamber passed the following order of the day : The Chamber, respectine: the guiding principle of the sepa- ration of powers and confident that the Government will allow justice to follow its course in full independence, passes to the order of the day. If the Chamber refuses to pass such a motion, "lack of confidence" is expressed and the Minister individ- ually, if not the cabinet collectively, is bound to resign. The latter result may be avoided, if a new IMinister is appointed who will conform to the Chamber's wishes. The order of the day imr ct simple is a vote which neither censures nor praises the (Jovernment, but wliich proceeds to the other business of the Assembly without comment. The order of the day motive expresses a definite opinion upon the interpellation; i.e., it either exonerates or condemns the government policy under debate. See licglemcnU de la Chamhrc dcs Deputes, Chapter VI, Articles 39-40, quoted in Moreau et Delpech, Les Bcglcmcnts des As- semblces Legislatives. 66 PARTIES AND l^ARLTAMENT The Clianil)cr, however, may vote the "oixler of the day" with no mention of confidence. This novel pro- ceeding in the French system has often raised questions as to its exact status. For instance, on the TSth of July, 1919, after listening unfavorably to the I\Iinister of Agriculture {M. Boret) in a defense of the eco- nomic policy of the Government,^" the Chamber of Depu- ties passed the following resolution: The Chamber, believing thai the price of living has dimin- ished one half in Belgium since the tnontli of January, 1!)19; That the price of living has diminished one quarter in Eng- land since the armistice; That it has not ceased to increase in France since that date, and judges this result to be due to the economic policy of the government ; Passes to the order of the day. Although perhaps it was the intention of the Cham- ber that the IMinister of Agriculture should resign, the resolution contained no word of confidence or lack of confidence. In the minds of many, there was a question whether the IMinister was under the obligation to resign and whether it was the intention of the Chamber that he should do so or whether it merely desired to bring about the change of his policy. But whether or not the Cham- ber directly expresses lack of confidence, such a motion clearly indicates that the IMinister does not have its ap- proval. In connection with this incident, the Unified Socialists asserted that this vote should be interpreted to mean that the whole Clemenceau ]\Iinistry had fallen. But- such a contention in French practice was inad- missible, although it would perhaps be valid in England, The whole system of interpellation is subject to the greatest criticism. Its use and abuse are too frequent; " See p. 326. 67 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS its causes are so superficial that the mere debating of them is often a waste of time. The public, indeed, re- gards them rather facetiously, for every Friday (the principal day set for interpellations) Parisians throng the Chamber to enjoy the spectacle and do their best to assist the opposition in unseating a ministry ! ^^ The frequency of these interpellations is illustrated by the two yeai*s' tenure of the Meline Ministry in which there were 218 interpellations, one about every two days. The Socialists became so obnoxious in introducing interpella- tions under the Clemenceau Government that during the war the latter actually refused to consider most of them, moving for adjournment sine die on the ground that the national defense would not allow public discussion, — a practice which led the Socialists to brand the Clemen- ceau Ministry as the sine die Government. During the armistice, this device was especially abused ; every week, two or three interpellations would be filed upon the Government's financial policy, the evacuation of troops from Russia, the Government's attitude toward strikes, and the debates at the Peace Conference. By these means the Government is kept in a continual state of belligerent defense; and an enormous amount of the time of its ministers is wasted in discussion which ordi- narily adds no light, and which clears up no misunder- standings. Tlie Socialists, who make the greatest number of these interpellations (although they constitute but a sixth of the Chamber) are already fixed in their opin- ions. They intentionally pursue an obstructionist policy to which the interpellation is readily adaptable. If the interpellation would be utilized as is the "question" or the vote of confidence in England, the Chamber and "This pastime, a]on<]^ with others, was largely foregone during the war. G8 PARTIES AND PARLFAMENT the Government could cooperate witli and clearly under- stand each other. As it now stands, however, it is a l)()litical discouragement to the Ministry and a tremen- dous and largely useless handicap to its administrative duties. By a decree of September 3, 1914, the extraordinary session of the French Parliament, called August 4 on account of the German declaration of war, was closed ; and another session was not convoked until December 22, 1914. During the interval between these two ses- sions, the Government exercised both executive and legis- lative functions ; under the powers granted to it by the laws establishing the state of siege, it exercised great powers, and, by means of its decrees, it virtually and repeatedly enacted legislation. In accordance with the law of July 16, 1875, the Chambers were again convoked on the second Tuesday, that is, the 12th of January, 1915, by the President of the Republic. According to this constitutional provision, the Chambers must remain in session at least five months.^^ Thereafter the President of the Republic may close the session and call an extraordinary session when- ever he may wish during the remainder of the year. But in the course of the year 1915, the Government, without any other official declaration, made it known to the press ^^ that during the period of hostilities it would not use its right of closing Parliament. As a result, since the beginning of 1935 and until the end of the war Parliament in the fall of 1919, the Chambers sat "See Art. 2 of the law of July 16, 1875. "See L. Du^iit, Manuel de Droit Const itutionncl, 203. 69 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS in a permanent session. Recesses were frequently taken, it is true ; but all adjournments Avere made by the Cham- bers themselves. Parl^ment in this manner took over a power which the Ministry in a parliamentary govern- ment usually exercises. This war practice was the outgrowth of another French practice which marks a difference from that fol- lowed in England. Under a parliamentary government, the Ministry may in times of dispute dissolve Parlia- ment, order a general election, obtain a majority and remain in power, or vice versa. Such an occurrence was illustrated in the special elections in England in 1910. In France the President of the Republic enjoys this theoretical right of dissolution of the Chamber — a right which differs from that of closing the ordin^y sessions of Parliament above described. It may be exercised at any time, but it must have the assent of the Senate, an- other difference from the British practice. But a more essential factor is that the President has never exercised this right since 1877 when INIaCiMahon used it in an at- tempt to secure an anti-Republican majority. The abuse of this power was so evident that its exercise has since been held in disfavor. As a result, a French Min- istry has no recourse to the people in a conflict with Parliament. There is, therefore, no means of knowing if it is pursuant to the will of the people rather than to the mere will of Parliament that a certain IMinistry is caused to fall. This distinction is vital because it makes the French Parliament absolutely supreme, in contrast to the American Congress which has no control over the composition of the Executive once the latter is estab- lished,-'^ and it is more powerful than the British Parlia- "• Except l)y impcacliment, etc. 70 PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT raent, which is responsible to the people like the Cabinet itself. The Frencli Parliament is kept within bounds by the multiplicity and contradiction of its own compo- nents. If these components were ever fused into one mind under a powerful leader, there would be no limits to the usurpation of powers by Parliament. Two other instances will illustrate the growth of par- liamentary ])ower during the war. One of these was the utilization of the Permanent Committees of both the Senate and the Chamber in assisting and supervising the Government in military and industrial preparations ; the other is by the exercise of the power arising from de- cisions reached in secret sessions. Commissions of Inquiry have always been used by Parliament to investigate the acts of a Government when an interpellation would divulge secrets of state. But until the passage of a law on the 23rd of IMareh, 1914, (after the scandalous "Rochette affair") the Chamber had no general right to summon witnesses to appear be- fore it, although it could call Government officials. Now, however, this right has been granted and Commissions of Inquiry (such as the Commission of Metallurgy at present investigating the alleged intervention of the Committee of Forges in the operations of the army) activel}^ search out the administrative activities of the Government in a manner far more efficient than the method of interpellatioiis. The Government's refusal to give the Chamber infor- mation concerning army operations in 1915 and the early months of 1916 was very irritating to the members of that body. Especially upon matters such as Balkan diplomacy, the High Command, the removal of General Joffre, and the independence of the General Staff, did the Deputies wish to be informed. The Government's 71 CONTEJklPORARY FRENCH POLITICS refusal to divulge this information was upon the ground that such public discussion in Parliament would aid the enemy. To overcome this difficulty and to assure parliamen- tary supremacy, the Unified Socialist group introduced a bill into the Chamber which provided for the nomina- tion of a special commission charged with investigating all questions bearing upon national defense in the zone of the armies as well as in the zone of the interior. An- other proposition supported by the same party provided for the creation of an "organism" composed of Senate and Chamber delegates with the same powers as that of the commission above. Both of these propositions were defeated upon the 9th of February', 1916. This idea, however, made great progress in the Cham- ber, and upon June 22, 1916, by a vote of 41-i to 80, it adopted an "order of the day," a portion of which read as follows: "The Chamber decides to institute and organize a direct delegation which will undertake, with the cooperation of the Government, to exercise the ef- fective and immediate control in situ of all the" services whose function it is to supply the needs of the army. ' ' ^^ This bill, providing for a new organ of government, which might interfere directly with every phase of army operations — excepting perhaps the actual disposition of troops in combat, met with the greatest resistance from the Government, After an eloquent discourse from the President of the Council, on the 20th of July, 1916, this bill was abandoned. But on the 27th, a proposition in- troduced by M. Chaumct was passed by a vote of 269 " For a more detailed discussion of the work of the ' ' Govern- ment of Bordeaux," the regime of decrees, and tlic eventual establishment of parliamentary control over war ministries, see L'(Kuvrc dc Guerre da Parlcmcnt, par un Kei)ublieaiii, published in " Le Fait de la Scmain^" series, Librairio Grasset. 72 PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT to 200, which placed on the "permanent commissions of the Chamber" the control of tlie government in regard to the conduct of the war. This control, according to the bill, tlie commissions already exercised. The only addition it made was to require the commissions to make a quarterly report to the Chamber. Thereafter the commissions took a considerable part in all questions dealing with army supplies. It was due to the activities of the Senate Committee on the Army that the Under- secretary of Aviation resigned. The commissions also succeeded in securing the resignation of a Minister of AYar who cherished superannuated doctrines upon ar- tillery. Later they also brought about the creation of the Undersecretaryship of ^lunitions. They even suc- ceeded in speeding up the inertia of other government services, — the reorganization of the health service and an adequate suppl}^ of artillery, munitions, and machine guns being attributed to them." Although strictly limited in the exercise of their powers, the French com- missions appear to have functioned very successfully. The original decision of the Chamber to constitute a "direct delegation" was taken in secret session. These secret sessions were themselves an innovation which Parliament forced upon the Government for the same reason as it forced the commission jurisdiction. The Constitutional law of July 16, 1875, provided that each Chamber might go into "secret committee" at the re- quest of a certain number of members, to be fixed by the house regulations. This right, however, like that of dissolution, had never been exercised. But finally, in order to -obtain a more intimate knowledge of the con- duct of the war and to exercise more fully the right ^ See Joseph Barthelemy, Democratie et Politique Etrangere, 335. 73 CONTEMPOKARY FRENCH POLITICS of interpellation, both the Senate and the Chamber, overcoming old precedents, decided to constitute them- selves into "secret committees" in the spring of 1916. In June, the Chamber held seven such sessions. Through- out the year it held ten others, — both series followed by votes of confidence in the Briand Ministry. On January 26, 1917, another secret session was held to discuss affairs in Greece, and upon the 28th a new vote of confidence was given to the Briand Ministry. Upon the 14th of March, 1917, the Chamber in secret session discussed an interpellation upon the aircraft service ; and as a result of an incident following this session. General Lyautey, Minister of AVar, resigned. This resignation finally brought about the fall of the Briand Cabinet. Similarly, the Senate held secret sessions, interpellating the Govern- ment upon its conduct of the war. Neither assembly emitted votes of confidence within their so-called secret committees; tliey were always voted upon in public session.^^ On the part of the executive, an attempt was made by the Briand Ministry on the l-ith of December, 1916, to arrogate distinctly legislative powers. The project of law laid before the Chamber at that time would give it power virtually to legislate by decree. Promptness, it was urged, necessitated immediate action which the slow processes of legislation could not give. This sug- gestion raised such a storm of protest, however, that the bill was not pressed, although the Chamber, upon agree- ment with the IMinistry, enacted a law providing for emergency legislation. The bill stipulated that in time of war the Government might introduce a law with a declaration that its enactment was immediately neces- ^ L'OSuvrc dc Guerre du Farlcnicnt, 46-61. 74 PARTIES AND I'ARLIAMKNT saiy. The Chamber then fixed the maximum delay, at tlie most not to exeeed five days after the "deposit" of the project, in Avhieli it must be discussed. ^^ Aside from the extraordinary powers exercised by tlie Government under tlie rights granted by the declaration of. the State of Siege, the Chambers have suffered a diminution of control in only one respect. Ordinarily one of the most sweeping and detailed methods of con- trol over the Government has been by the annual voting of the budget. By the discussion of the different minis- terial requests, by refusing to vote certain items, etc., the Chambers could virtually dictate Government poli- cies. But during the war no regular budget was voted, and the Chambers merely granted en bloc the credits which tlie Government asked. This was done by what is known as the douzicmes provisoires. The financial year in France commences the 1st of January and ends the 31st of December. This requires that the budget, in peace time, be voted and promulgated not later than December 31st. But it frequently happens that Parlia- ment does not vote the budget by that time, although without it, the Government cannot raise taxes or pay expenses. To overcome this difficulty, it has become cus- tomary to grant the Government provisional authority to raise taxes and make expenditures necessary to the operation of the public services during a period of one, two or three months, as the case may be. (As the amount of this expense is estimated by the month, or by -' Discussion upon tho bill is ^limited to the rapporteur of the commission and to a speaker chosen by the minority of the commission, except when a Minister speaks. Upon amendments only the Government, the president and the rapporteur of the commission nnd the author of the amendment may speak. Under no circumstance can an orator other than those of the Government or of the commission have the floor more than once every quarter of an hour. Duguit, op. cit., 436, 518. 75 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS a twelfth of the year's total, the system is called the douziemes provisoires. ) This system was employed dur- ing the war, credits being granted every three months. An annual budget was impossible because no one knew what war expenditures, etc., would be. But it resulted that Parliament, in not debating and voting the budget chapter by chapter as was its jDrevious practice, lost one of its most effective means of ministerial control. The end of the war and the possibility of again accu- rately estimating necessary expenditures will undoubt- edly bring back the old system. Taken as a whole, through the systems of interpella- tion, permanent sessions, the war commissions and the secret committees, the Chamber of Deputies as well as the Senate, has increased its power over the executive branch of the government during the last five years. Such an increase is opposed to the evolution of execu- tive power which war activities elsewhere produced. Ordinarily, increased legislative power may be consid- ered a sure defense against those who might overturn the Government for personal interests. But in the French Chamber, whose power is based on changing, independent, and even rebellious groups, many regard recent events as a sign of increased impotency of the French executive and a tyrannical usurpation of legis- lative authority. The importance of the intrusion which the French Parliament has theoretically made into the province of executive power may, liowever, be exaggerated. The fact yet remains that the personal equation in French politics may still override tlie processes of parliamen- tary machinery. As long as the Frencli party sj^stem continues as it is, political leaders, who naturally occupy Cal)inet positions, will always enjoy greater personal in- 76 PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT fluence than in countries where party discipline me- chanically organizes and directs party activity. The in- flnence which M. Clemenceau maintained over the French Chamber during a time when public opinion was severely critical was extraordinary. In debates on min- isterial policies, such as the censorship, which when con- sidered individually different parliamentary groups had roundly condemned, M. Clemenceau won sweeping ma- jorities.^^ This inconsistency illustrates a weakness in the pres- ent system of parliamentary government: Parliament often refuses to press an isolated reform in the face of ministerial opposition if it believes that a ^Ministry whose continuance in power is necessary for the solution of more important problems, wdll resign on account of its passage. In the case of the Clemenceau Ministry, there is little question that a majority of the Chamber opposed the maintenance of the state of siege and the censorship during the armistice, the prohibition of im- portations, and even the Government's reconstruction policy. But the primordial necessity which faced Par- liament was the belief that Clemenceau and no one else could secure a peace settlement which would guarantee France against future invasion. Consequently, when the Prime Minister appeared before the Chamber and made any consideration of Government policies to which ihe Chamber objected, a matter of confidence upon which the Ministry would resign if the Chamber voted against it, complaints were hushed up or parliamentary grum- blings vented on lobby walls. " This statement is somewhat inconsistent with that made in the first of this chapter in regard to Parliamentary domination. But the lack of party discipline allows dominant personalities to gain an ascendancy which for a time may olTset group control. 77 conte:\ipoRxVry French politics From another standpoint, the personal element in the French political situation prevents an undue arrogance of parliamentary power. In England and in the United States, parties are nationalized. The organization of each party supports candidates, often with no expense to themselves, with the aid of a vast machinery and upon a party platform. It is not for the candidate so much as the principles for which the candidate stands, that ballots are cast ; he is a brick in the wall for which his party supplies the mortar. In France, on the contrary, party organizations do not have the inherent strength or the discipline to select a candidate or to provide him with the support necessary for his election. A French candidate is largely dependent upon his immediate con- stituency for his election and continuance in office. Upon their favor he stands or falls, unsupported by the backing which American or British parties afford their representatives. As a result, French elections usually turn upon personalities ; and a French Deputy, and even a Senator, continually keeps his ear to the ground in an endeavor to follow the opinions of those upon whom his reelection is dependent. A desire for reelection is as keen among Frenchmen as it is among Americans. Their utter dependence upon their political constituencies keeps their parliamentary activities within bounds established by public opinion. CHAPTEE III THE "bloc" and the SACRED UNION La France sera hero'lqucment def endue par tous ses fils, dont ricn nc brisera dcvant I'ermc'mi I'union sacree. — Raymond Poincar^. 1 As pointed out in tlio last chapter, the large number of political groupings in the Chamber necessitates their frequent, though often temporary, combination in order to assure and maintain a ministerial majority. A dis- cussion of past combinations and of the complete union of political parties which the war exacted, may indicate the efforts which have been made to improve and facili- tate the processes of French party government. After the elections of 1885 there were three general groupings in the Chambers, — the Conservatives, the Re- publicans (Opportunists), and the Radicals (Intransi- geants). As no one of the three was capable of muster- ing a majority alone, combinations became necessary. When the two Republican groups, the Opportunists and the Intransigeants, united their efforts to offset the Con- servative or ]\Ionarchist group, such a combination was known as "Hepublican concentration." "When one of the Republican groups united with the group of the Right, it became knoAvn as a union of "pacification." Until 1898 parliamentary government was generally car- 79 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS ricd on by the two policies or expedients of "concentra- tion" or "pacification." The first "Concentration Cabinet" was formed by Henri Brisson, a Radical, in April, 1885. It contained elements from all the Moderate and Radical gronps, — despite the hatred which already showed itself between the Union des GaucJics, led by Gambetta and Ferry, and the Radicals properly so-called. The Rouvier IMinistry, formed in 1887, was the first "Pacification Ministry." In the following years, attempts were made to form ex- clusively party cabinets, but without success until the Bourgeois Ministry of 1895-1896 came into power upon a purely Radical platform of social and financial re- form. Forced to resign because of its policy in ]\Iada- gascar, in turn it was succeeded by a nearly homogeneous cabinet of Moderate Republicans under Meline. These instances aroused the hope that France might at last settle down to a stable system of two-party govern- ment. But this belief, partly founded on the elimina- tion of the ]\Ionarchist-Clerical element from all serious participation in the Government after its discreditable support of General Boulanger, was in the end thwarted by this very element itself. The Dreyfus^ case, reawak- ening a fear of Clericalism, resulted in the fusion of the groups of the Left in the famous Bloc.^ The elections of 1898 returned about 250 deputies divided among the Radicals, the Radical Socialists, and the Socialists. With 'See p. 2.34. - Tlic name of the Bloc is said to have boon invented by Clemeneeau in 1891. A play, by the name of Thermidor, •written by Sardou, in which Eobespierre played the lead, was forbidden, after one performance at tlie (!oiiu''dio Fraiicaiso. M. Clemeneeau Jiphehl tins sujipression of the play in Parliament, saying, "The First Kevohition is a 'bloc,' which you must take or leave." 'I'lie name still lives in French politics. See .lerrold, France To- dn>i, 10I5, note. 80 THE ''BLOC" AND THE SACRED UNION the aid of the Liberal Repn})li('ans (who soon formed the Democratic Republican Alliance) these groups ef- fected an alliance which controlled the Government at least until 1906. Originally under the leadership of AValdeek-Rousseau, President of the Council from 1899 to 1902, this Bloc accomplished the separation of the Church and State by passing the Associations law of 1901, and by abrogating the Concordat in 1905, which in turn was supplemented by the law of 1907. The policy of the Bloc was vindicated in the elections of April, 1902, when 321 adherents were returned, the opposition electing only 268. It was in this year that the line between Conservatism, represented by the Mon- archists, Nationalists, and Liberal Catholics, Progress- ism, represented by the remnants of the Moderate Left of the Assembly of 1871, and a portion of the Republican Union which followed Gambetta, and Reformism, repre- sented by the Radicals and Radical Socialists, the Demo- cratic Republican Alliance and the independent Social- ists, — became clearly drawn. Reformism constituted the Bloc; while Conservatism and Progressism were its deadly enemies. The Bloc maintained a government of the Left through the Alinistry of Emile Combes, a Radical (1902- 1905), through the Rouvier Ministry (1905-1906), and through the Sarrien Ministry, which came to power in ]\larch, 1906. The program adopted by the Socialist Congress at Amsterdam in 1904 caused the Radicals to fear that the Socialists might be obliged to withdraw from the Bloc. But although they officially refused to allow their members to become cabinet ministers, and even to cooperate with reformist parties, in reality, under the leadership of Jaures, they supported Radical measures of reform. The election of 1906 increased the 81 CONTEIVIPORARY FRENCH POLITICS combined power of the Left, its seats rising to 375 ; the Progressists were reduced one half, while the Reaction- aries maintained their numbers. The entire Right was able to muster only 140 votes. In October, 1906, Georges Clemenceau took over the leadership of the Sarrien IMinistry. He was himself re- sponsible for the first real break in the Bloc. Of a dictatorial and independent character, he relied upon the Radicals alone ; and although his achievements were reformist, they were apparently accomplished without seeking the active cooperation either of the Republicans of the Alliance or of the Socialists. In fact, the first event of the new JNIinister's reign was his acrimonious debate with Jaures upon Socialism in the Chamber. He further antagonized the Socialists by refusing to allow Government officials to form syndicates and adhere to the General Confederation of Labor.^ Likewise, the wholesale discharge of the postal employees (who struck in IMarch, l309) offended the labor vote. The Briand Ministry, coming into power in 1909, included, in addi- tion to the Premier, men of distinctly socialistic tenden- cies. In spite of this fact, they nevertheless came in conflict with the Unified Socialists. This became ap- parent as the result of the Government's action in sup- pressing a nation-wide railway strike in the autumn of 1910, by mobilizing the employees subject to military service, and making them operate the roads under a military regime. Opposition from the Socialists was so intense that in 1911 Briand was forced to resign. In 1910 the Dreyfus incident had become ancient his- tory, and the questions of anticlericalism and the re- organization of the army had been solved to the satis- »See p. 350. 82 THE "BLOC" AND THE SACRED UNION faction of the Radicals. The purposes for which the Bloc had been formed had thus been achieved, while new issues were arising, such as the income tax, proportional representation, and militarism, upon which not only the parties of the Bloc but divisions in them could not agree. IMoreover, the members of the Democratic Re- pul)lican Alliance felt that the anticlerical movement had now gone far enough and that a policy of concilia- tion should be undertaken. This attitude was especially objectionable to the Combists of the Radical party, who believed that their future successes depended upon the maintenance of clerical issues. There were thus many reasons for the disintegration of the Bloc when the elec- tions of April-]\Iay, 1910, divided it further. The new Chamber was composed as follows : Right, 19 ; Liberal Action, 34 ; Progressists, 76 ; Democratic Left, 73 ; Rad- ical Left, 112; Radical Socialists, 149; Independent So- cialists, 30 ; Unified Socialists, 75 ; Independents, 20.* The ]\Iinistry of Joseph Caillaux, which came to power in 1911, did much to discredit the Radical party with the country and to shake its confidence in the old Bloc — now fast disappearing so far as it represented any com- mon feeling between the parties of the Left. Caillaux, having defeated Glemeneeau for the Radical leadership, aimed to follow a policy of pacification toward Germany. lie also stood for the maintenance of the two-year mili- tary service law, adopted by the Rouvier Ministry, in place of the old three-year service law, a measure which those who feared German armament were now trjdng to reenact. The questionable financial dealings of M. Cail- laux, especially his speculations on the Bourse, com- * Election figures for 1910 vary greatly according to sources. The above are taken from the Annual Register (Loudon) for 1910, 289. 83 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS pleted the formidable list of charges against him, re- sulting in the do^\^lfall of his IMinistry and the retire- ment of the Radical party from power. On January 13, 1912, M. Raymond Poincare became President of the Council. A member of the Democratic Republican Al- liance, he brought into being a cabinet of moderate ten- tencies. By this time not only the homogeneity but the numerical force of the Bloc had been overcome, and new groupings and combinations were in the process of formation. II Before discussing the new groupings, however, the in- terior relations of the members of the Bloc must be re- viewed in order to understand to what extent they were willing to bring about real party combinations. This Bloc had actually been formed in 1901 at the first Congi'ess of the Radical and Radical Socialist party, where a union between all Socialists was organ- ized, and where the slogan. Pas d'ennemis a gauche, was adopted, and indeed continued as a party motto until very recent times. Thus in the Radical Congress of 1904, 'M. Debierre secured the adoption of a motion affirming "the neces- sity of alliances with other parties of the Left . . . dur- ing the elections."^ None the less he asserted the com- plete independence of the Radical program. This mo- tion showed that the contemplated alliances were not to be considered as fusions, but merely as opportunistic combinations. The French electoral system lent itself ((uite readily to such temporary junctures. Elections to the Chamber are decided by an absolute majority vote. •^ Quoted in Charpentier, Le Parti Eadical et Badical-Socialiste, 428. 84 THE "JiLOC" AND THE SACRED UNION If no candidate received a majority of all the votes cast, a supplementary election must be held two weeks later at which the same candidates may present themselves and where their fate is decided by a simple plurality.*' Now under this system, every party usually ran a can- didate in every arrondissement during the first ballot- ing. In case no party candidate received a majority, combinations between parties for the second election were ordinarily effected. It was by this method that the Bloc secured the return of its candidates, Radicals voting with Socialists or with Alliance Republicans upon the second ballot. Despite the decision taken at Amsterdam, the Radi- cals did not give up the hope of Socialist support.'^ However, the antipatriotie preaching of Gustave Herve, actually urging soldiers to desert, caused the Congress of Radicals held at Nancy in 1907 to declare that although the Bloc must continue, the members of the party would, refuse "their votes to any candidate who advocates the disorganization of the armies of the Republic, either by desertion in time of peace, or by in- surrection and the general strikes in the face of the enemy. . . . " ^ This motion was a direct attack upon th§ entire So- cialist party program because at its Congress of Limoges in November, 1906, it had voted to prevent the outbreak of war "by every means, from parliamentary interven- tion, public agitation, and popular manifestations, to the general workingmen's strike and insurrection."^ But the Radical Congress held at Dijon in 1908, while "This systcMii has been changed by the Electoral law of 1919. See pp. 16")- 169. ''Sec Cliarpenticr, op. cit., 430. "Ibid., 4.32. " Alexandro Zevaes, Le Parti Socialiste Unifie et La Guerre, 13. 85 CONTEJMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS repiidiating aiw alliances with the progressist or liberal parties, declared "itself ready to reconstruct the old Bloc of the Left in order to realize social and economic reforms." This olive branch not being accepted by the Socialists ("whose Marxist tendencies, on the contrary, continued to develop), the Radicals at the Congress of Xiines (1911) decided to postpone the matter of their future relationship with them for a year. This decision was taken in order to conciliate and compromise the ele- ment who wished to repudiate all relations with the Socialist party (when the latter had refused to vote confidence in the JMonis Government, simply because it was a "bourgeois" government). ]\Iany Radicals, how- ever, still felt the necessity of Socialist cooperation. Thus, while the rupture between the Radicals and the Socialists was not quite complete, the hearty understand- ing existing between the two parties in 1901 certainly continued no longer in 1911. The union between the Democratic Republican Alli- ance and the Radicals, which constituted the other part of the Bloc, experienced a similar evolution. Between 1901 and 1910, both parties acted in complete accord, and it even appears that until 1911 these liberal Repub- licans were regarded as the right wing of the Radical party. Consequently the definite constitution of a Democratic Republican party by the Alliance in 1911 somewhat antagonized the Radicals, especially as many of them belonged both to the Alliance and to their own l)arty at the same time. ^lorcover, the Radicals in 1910 bad formall}' disai)proved these double affiliations and at the Congress in Rouen it was decided that the re- actionary peril having been removed, each party should devote itself to its own organization and platform. The Alliance received the decision that Radicals could no 86 THE "BLOC" AND THE SACRED UNION longer bo affiliated with their organization with some resentment, which later led to a complete separation of the two. Lastly, the Republican Socialists eKd not maintain wholly cordial relationships with the Radicals, although before 1911 they acted in cooperation with them and formed part of the Bloc. At a congress of the party held in Toulouse in 1911, the Radicals were declared to be solely a party of anticlcricalism ; while the Unified Socialists were condemned as exponents of direct action and antimilitarism, neither of which the Republican Socialists could support. In June, 1912, when the Radi- cals attempted to form an alliance with the Republican Socialists in the Paris municipal elections, the later re- plied that while they would support the Radical clerical program, they exclusively reserved entire freedom upon all other questions. Ill Such were the respective attitudes of the parties of the Left at the time of the accession of the Poincare Ministry in 1912. Although it was a Moderate Ministry, it contained such Radicals as Leon Bourgeois, Pams and Steeg upon it. Despite this the Radical Congress at Tours, October, 1912, expressed a deep resentment toward the Democratic Alliance of which M. Poincare was a member, accusing it of voting for clerical candi- dates in the Chateaudun, Apt, and Ilaut-Rhin.^" ]\Iean- while Aristide Briand was urging the policy of pacifica- tion towards the Church and the union of the moderate *" See Bcmsieme Congres du Parti Bepublicain, Eadical et Badi- oal-Socialiste, Tours, brochure, 21. 87 CONTE]\IPORARY FRENCH POLITICS elements into a single party. His efforts were also re- pudiated by the Congress of Tours which condemned what it termed "an intolerable policy of pacification." Upon the election to the Presidency of Rajonond Poin- care over Jules Pams, the Radical candidate, M. Briand, a bitter opponent of the Radicals, was made Premier. At his fall upon the issue of electoral reform in March, 1913, another Republican of the Alliance succeeded him, Louis Barthou. Thus three successive ministries were headed by anti-Radical men. ]\I. Barthou 's Cabinet was especially attacked by the Radicals because it contained a Progressist Republican, M. Thierry, When Charles Dumont, one of the vice-presidents of the Radical partj' bureau, was asked to join the Barthou Ministry, the officers of the Executive Committee vigorously pro- tested against Radical participation in any other but a strictly Left Ministry. Beginning with the Poincare Cabinet and continuing through the Barthou Ministry, there was a movement to unite all the moderate elements of the Chamber in order to appease certain antagonistic elements in the Republic, especially the Catholics. One of these attempts was known as the Entente Democratique et Sociale, organ- ized in the Chamber by M. ]\Iaginot, with the object of combining the deputies in a "Center group," complete- ly independent of other political combinations. This group later came to be known as the Centre Gauche, and included members of both the Radical and Independent Socialist parties. This grouping soon was vigorously at- tacked by the Executive Committee of the Radical party; and as the result of a letter written on the 18th of June, 1913, it succeeded in securing the withdrawal of eiglit Radicals from this coml)iiiati()n. Both of tlicse developments, i.e., Radical participa- 88 THE "BLOC" AND THE SACRED UNION tioii iu a Cabinet which iiichuled a I'rogrcssi.st Repul)li- can and Radical adherence to a group based upon a policy of conciliation, were condemned by the Congress of Pau, in October, 1913, as throwing the Republic back into the hands of the Clericals. The fundamental im- portance in a democracy of "distinct parties, conflicting in their ideas, opposing program to program," was emphasized. ^^ The month following the Congress (in December, 1913), M. Aristide Briand, in a famous speech at St. Etienne, proclaimed the necessity of a Republican entente. He protested against socialistic attempts at revolution, strongly attacking the Radicals; he pleaded for reconciliation with the Catholics ; he urged propor- tional representation and the three-year military law; and, finally, he denounced Joseph Caillaux in no uncer- tain terms. It was about this same time that the Radicals, who now were called the "Unified Radicals," were able to win control of the IMinistry, Senator Doumergue becom- ing its head. This Cabinet was pledged to carry out the Pau program which called for (1) the repeal of the three-year law which the Barthou Cabinet had enacted ; (2) "laic defense," or further legislation to drive Cath- olic schools out of France; (3) an income tax. The Cabinet, however, was very opportunist ; Senator Dou- mergue supported the three-year law and did virtually nothing with respect to laic defense ; no agreement could be reached with the Senate over the inclusion of rentes in the income tax ; and as Senator Clemenceau was hos- tile to proportional representation on the grounds that it would increase Catholic power, the party made no " Troisieme Covnrrs du Parti Bepublicain, Badical et Eadical- Sociali^te, Pau, 1913, brochure, 387. 89 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS progress with electoral reform. Finally, the activities of M. Caillaux, Minister of Finance and the acknowledged leader of the Radicals, at last became openly disrepu- table. He was accused of using his position not onlj^ to favor foreign banks in which he was interested, but also to forward his speculations on the Bourse. In addition, he was accused of obstructing the course of justice in the Rochette case, that of a notorious swindle involving Mexican railway stock. These factors increased hostil- ity to the Radicals and also the demand for a great Re- publican and ^Moderate party. This demand finally cul- minated in the formation of a group called the Fed- erated Parties of the Left, or simply, the Federation of the Left, upon January 14, 1914. This group was composed of 124 members, including M]\I. Barthou, Baudin, ]\Iillerand, Klotz, and Berenger, Naturally, !M, Briand was its president. It included most of the "Centrist" elements, a few Radir-als, and some independent Socialists. It announced a program of labor and social legislation, of parliamentary reform, and of conciliation with the Church. It denounced the Radicals for their equivocal attitude in officially protest- ing against the three-year law and then, when in power, of supporting it. It also criticized the vagueness of their social reform program, and their eternal pleading for "liberty" in contrast to their severe oppression of the Church. Against the Federation of the Left, then, stood the Unified Radicals and the Unified Socialists. This was the last stage of party evolution before the outbreak of the war. Meanwhile, Jean Jaures was manfully trying to swing the Socialists back into line, and to bring about a union of the Radicals and the Socialists. Such a restoration of the old Bloc would mean the con- 90 THE "BLOC" AND THE SACKED UNION trol of the Chanibor by the Left— without the help of the Federation of the Left— which was tlie bitter enemy of both Unified parties. At the Socialist Congress of Amiens, held in the latter part of January, 19U, Jaures urged that upon second ballots, Socialists should cooperate with Radicals. In order to avoid the appear- ance of too flagrantly violating their cherished princi- ples, he introduced a carefully worded resolution which reaffirmed the absolute unwillingness of the Socialist party to enter any alliance with a bourgeois party, but which suggested that upon second ballots Socialist voters might support "the candidates of other parties who most clearly and vigorously combat the three-year law, war, chauvinism, and the military-clerical combination." As this could obviously mean none other than the Cail- laux Radicals, the motion met with the greatest oppo- sition from such leaders as Allemane, Chauvin, Negre, and Le Gleo, who said that "the resolution voted at the International Congress of Amsterdam which forbade Socialists of all nations to form agreements, coalitions or ententes with bourgeois political parties, has been trodden under foot by the majority of the Socialist party. The majority has hypocritically concluded an illegal alliance with the most despicable and the most criminal of all political parties, the Radical party." Upon the adoption of the Jaures motion, under the leadership of Allemane, these protestauts withdrew and attempted to form a Labor party, an attempt, however, which proved unsuccessful, and the break was soon mended. The ensuing provisional union between the two Uni- fied parties, and the purely pacific program of both re- sulted in the return of a Chamber strongly Left in its tendencies as the result of the elections of the spring of 91 CONTEMPORAKY FRENCH POLITICS 1914.^- The Unified Radicals and the Unified Socialists, as we noted in the last chapter, were strong enough to drive the Ribot Ministry out of power, June 12, 1914, because it supported the three-year law^ In the Cabinet of Viviani, who was a Republican Socialist, which fol- lowed, the names of five Unified Radicals appeared ; but, in keeping with their policy, no Unified Socialists were included. Following the decision of the Viviani Govern- ment to support the three-year law, the Unified Social- ists withdrew their support, and the Government was maintained by purely bourgeois parties. Amidst the growing signs of a conflict with Germany, a congress of the Unified Socialists, held on the 16th of July, 1914, adopted the following motion: "The results of the 1914 elections were as follows: Kepublican Democratic Alliance 1,564,578 Unified Radicals 1,496,058 Federation of the Left 1,396,447 Unified Socialists 1,408,114 Eight and Liberal Action 1,297,712 Republican Federation 810,679 Republican Socialists 323,326 In the Chamber, the groups presented this composition (these figures differ according to sources; but those given below seem to be the average). Radical Socialist group 172 Unified Socialist 101 Republican Socialist 30 Liberal Action 32 Republican Federation 36 Democratic Left 34 Radical Left 66 Republicans of Left 54 Republican Union 21 Right 15 ' ' Non-inscrits ' ' and independents 41 602 It will bo noted that tlio Federation of the Left maintained no distinct parliamentary group. About seventy Radicals were also to be found divided among other groups. 92 THE "BLOC" AND THE SACRED UNION Among all means employed to forestall and prevent war and to impose upon governments a recourse to arbitration, the Congress considers as particularly effective the method of a general labor strike simultaneously and internationally organized in the interested countries. In addition to its oft-repeated refusals to vote appro- priations, especially war credits, for a bourgeois govern- ment, and to act in collaboration with the Ministry of such a government, the party now reiterated its threat of a general strike in the face of imminent hostilities. It was with considerable misgiving, therefore, that the patriotic elements of the country saw war being forced upon them ; and it was doubtless with considerable en- couragement that Germany pushed her preparatory moves. IV On the 3rd of August, 1914, Germany declared war on France ; and on the 4th of August, the Parliament was assembled in extraordinary session. In the Chamber of Deputies, M. Paul Deschanel pronounced a eulogy upon Jean Jaures who had been assassinated upon the 31st of July.^^ From the grave of the man," he said, "who has perished, a martyr to his ideas, rises a thought of union ; from his clay-cold lips rises a cry of hope for the fatherland, for justice, for the human conscience. Is this not the most worthy homage we can render him?" It was on the same day that M. Poincare, President of the Republic, issued his famous call for unity in the face of danger: "France," he wrote, "will be heroically " For a short discussion of the life and work of this great Socialist leader, see Jean Jaures, with a preface by Pierre Kenau- del, published in "Le F.ait de la Scinaine" series. 93 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS defended by all of her sons, united in the Sacred Union which nothing can break. They will stand before the enemy, bound together by a common indignation and in a common political faith." The members of the Socialist party, joining with every other group in the Chamber, unanimously voted to accept the eighteen projects of law which the Govern- ment considered necessary to meet the circumstances. The Unified Socialists approved the credits requested by the Government. They moreover unanimously voted to declare the State of Siege, and for a law restraining the liberty of the press. Three weeks later the Viviani Cabinet was enlarged to include, not only representa- tives of all parties (except the Right), but the most fiery opponents of ministerial participation among the Unified Socialists, — Jules Guesde and Marcel Sembat. Thus France saw the Socialist party in this hour of national peril deserting all the principles of "bourgeois" opposition, laid down in the Congress of Amsterdam, to become completely identified with the Sacred Union, upon which the safety of France now depended. Yet even in the face of this crisis the Socialists at- tempted to explain the abandonment of their Marxian tenets in a declaration published on August 28, 1914, which read as follows: Citizens, As the consequence of a mature deliberation and after a decision carefully arrived at, the Socialist party has authorized two of its members, our comrades, Jules Guesde and Marcel Sembat, to form part of the new government ; and it has made them its delegates in the work of national defense. Every representative of the Socialist group in Parliament . . . has agreed to assume with them the grave responsibilities which they have consented to undertake. If it were only a question of readjustment within the 94 THE "BLOC" AND THE SACRED UNION Ministry, if it were only a (lueslion of contril)iitin,i^ to an old gDvermuent some of the forces in which our party is so rich; even more, if it were only a question of ordinary partici- pation in a bourj2^eois government, neither the consent of our friends or of ourselves would have been obtained. It is, however, the future of the nation, the life of France which is the question to-day. The party has not hesitated. . .-. In these words the party justified its collaboration in a Ministry of the bourgeoisie, and for the first time since the organization of the i)arty in 1905, permitted a member of the Unified Socialists to serve on such a Ministry. Of the sincerity of the patriotism shoAvn by the other groups there was no question. The German peril be- came infinitely more near and real than Monarchism, Clericalism or Combism. Every element united in the national defense ; the union of French political antago- nisms proved a possibility when the welding force, ex- ercised from without, was of sufficient strength. The spectacle was now afforded of ^I. Ribot working side by side with the Socialists who had just turned out his Ministry, and of M. Guesde once more cooperating with his former bitterest enemies — IMillerand, Viviani, and Briand — whose "heresy" had excluded them from the Socialist party. Outside of Parliament, the same transformation united every effort in the national defense. Even Gus- tave Ilerve exhibited a most remarkable change of heart. Originally the most rabid antimilitarist among the So- cialists, a preacher of desertion and of sabotage, he now freely offered himself for enlistment in the army. Upon January 1, 1916, he changed the name of his formerly revolutionary paper, La Guerre Socialc to La Victoire, 95 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS and while carrying on an ardent campaign of criticism — exposing defects in the military administration — his policy was adopted solely for the purpose of better assuring victory. As a climax to his reformation he finally became so nationalistic that he was at last read out of the Socialist party! The General Confederation of Labor, likewise, urged its adherents (nearly a mil- lion) to fight and overcome German imperialism, as the first essential step in the achievement of social democ- racy. Among clerical circles, thousands of members of the excluded religious orders hurried back to France and entered the army ; equally large numbers of priests joined its ranks either as chaplains or combatants. In January, 1915, the Socialists in the Chamber — who had previously nominated a separate list of candidates for the presiding officers of the Chamber — decided to do away with this practice and unite with the other groups in an almost unanimous reelection of M. Des- chanel as President. Well might the President, in his inaugural address, enlarge upon the Sacred Union and praise the willingness of all parties to forget political antagonism in the face of a common danger ! The Briand Cabinet, formed on the 29th of October, 1915, even more forcefully acknowledged the strength of this Union, for out of its twenty-two Ministers, eight were former Prime Ministers : Doumergue, Ribot, Viviani, Combes, Bourgeois, Freycinet and Meline, representing widely different shades of political opinion. One member came from the irreconcilable Right (Denys Cochin) ; a So- cialist Minister of State (Jules Guesde), and another Socialist, as Minister of Munitions (Albert Thomas), completed a ministerial combination the like of which had never been thought possible in France. 9G THE "BLOC" AND THE SACRED UNION While these adjustments were taking place, certain Socialist elements, secretly clinging to the old Marxist theory of the "inherent class struggle," and convinced that the war was caused as much by French as by Ger- man capitalistic exploitation, were beginning to chafe under the bonds of the Union. Fresh courage was given this group by the widespread depression which German successes brought to French morale. The Unified So- cialist Federation of the Haute-Vienne in May, 1915, passed a resolution — now famous — addressed to all the federations of the party, announcing what purported to be "its criterion and its judgment upon present events." The language of this resolution, very moderate in com- parison with those which followed, reproached certain members of the party for writing chauvinistic articles, and proposed that the Socialists keep a receptive ear open for "any propositions of peace, from wherever it may come." The federations of the Isere and of the Rhone approved the resolution of the Haute-Vienne; and a very strong minority in the federation of the Seine, led by Jean Longuet, the grandson of Karl Marx, also adhered to its program.^* This resolution marked the birth of the first division in the Socialist party, the first sign of a tendency which step by step caused its with- drawal from the Sacred Union. The majoritaires of the party, i.e., those who held a majority in the Socialist group in Parliament, opposed the Haute-Vienne motion. They attempted to conciliate the national duty with the "At a congress of the Federation, December 19, 1913, the Renaudel-Fiancette motion received 6,000 votes; while the Longuet motion received 4,000. 97 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS care of international labor interests, and they believed that Germany was completely responsible for the war. Moreover, they did not believe in the opening of inter- national negotiations with the enemy Socialists until the war had ended, and they even opposed a discussion of peace terms until victory had been won. To insure this victory, the majoritaires believed in Socialist par- ticipation in the Government and in the voting of credits. The leaders of this section of the Socialists were Albert Thomas, Alexandre Varenne, and Compere-j\Iorel. In opposition to the majoritaires, the minor itaires arose, led by Jean Longuet, Mistral, Mayeras, and Presse- manne, who were the original supporters of the Haute- Vienne motion.^^ Although they still supported the prosecution of the war, they began little by little to question its enemy origin, attributing it to universal capitalism. They more and more insistently stigmatized the "imperialism" of the Entente, and began to de- mand a declaration of Peace Aims which should define the Allies' exact position. Between these two major divisions of rather indefinite principles a small Centrist group arose, attempting to conciliate both extremes. This group was led by ]\Iarcel Cachin, Pierre Renaudel, and ]\Iarcel Sembat. Of these, Cachin was of undoubt- edly minoritaire sympathies, while Renaudel represented the majoritaire bent (although, because of his editorship of L'Humanite, the official Socialist newspaper, he at- tempted to remain neutral). In July, 1915, at a meeting of the National Council, the majoritaires showed their preponderating desire for " The dissident movement started by the Hauto-Vienne federation was supported by the Limousin Deputies, wliose Socialist con- stituents liad been turnetl against the Government because of a number of military executions. 98 THE "BLOC" AND THE SACRED UNION the continuance of the war — a determination wliich was voted for by an overwhehning majority. In September, however, another split occurred in the party of even more extremism tlian that caused by the minoritaires. This element, bolder and perhaps more honest than the latter, condemned capitalism outright as the cause of the war, affirming that it was waged in the interest of capi- talist oppression of Labor. Pure Marxists, the adher- ents of this group urged the immediate opening of negotiations with the enemy Socialists to the end of stopping the war by the hitherto unsuccessful interna- tional strike, a means which now meant a refusal longer to bear arms. To this element the "class struggle" was still the fundamental issue which the war, far from belying its truth or postponing its application, had em- phasized. From the 5th to the 9th of September, 1915, at Zim- merwald, in Switzerland, this extremist element of the French Socialist party met representatives of the Italian, Roumanian, Bulgarian, German, Swedish, Nor- wegian, Swiss, Polish, Dutch, and Russian Socialists. They agreed to a manifesto addressed to the "Prole- tariat of All Nations" condemning the war, demanding an immediate peace, and proclaiming that the "national defense is not socialistic." MM. Bourderon and Merr- heim signed this declaration as representatives of the French Socialists. But at the Christmas Congress of the Unified party in France (toward the end of 1915), the Zimmerwald program and the German proposals for peace were voted down by the overwhelming majority of 2,736 against 76 — the majoritaires thus again exhibit- ing their supremacy. But w'hat the minoritaires, par- ticularly the extreme element who had attended the Zimmerwald conference, lacked in numbers, they made 99 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS up in enthusiasm. In the latter part of April, 1916, a second "International Congress" was held at Kien- thal, another little town in Switzerland. Forty dele- gates attended this congress, chiefly from the official Italian Socialist party, and from the Swiss and Russian parties. Two German representatives, one of whom was the editor of Vorivdrts, were present. The French So- cialists were represented by three Deputies — MINI. Blanc, Brizon and Raffin-Dugens. Their attendance indeed was a remarkably bold act because of the official position they held in a Parliament charged with the prosecution of the war. The Kienthal meeting emphasized the pro- gram adopted at the meeting of the previous autumn. Thereafter, the three French Deputies systematically voted against all war credits, and upon the 22nd of September, 1916, Raffin-Dugens aggravated this atti- tude and created a sensation in the Chamber by speaking of "his comrades in Germany." The vigor of this extremist movement, and the force of the agitation which was now being carried on through- out all the Socialist federations, was shown at a meet- ing of the National Council of the party, held on April 9, 1916. Here the minoritaires were able to muster about one third of the votes. Their strength was exhibited in the Longuet-Pressemanne motion to renew international relations with the German Socialists and for the imme- diate discussion by the Government of peace terms with Germany ; it was defeated by a vote of 1,996 against 960. The majority motion, which was finally adopted, con- tained many concessions to the minority. Although it demanded the liberation of Serbia and of Belgium as the sine qua non of peace, it made no mention of the return of Alsace-Lorraine. Finally, the motion recommended that the other sec- 100 THE "BLOC" AND THE SACRED UNION tions of the International Workingmen's party should frame principles which Socialism should exact in the peace settlement, and that they should also determine the responsibility for the war's origin. Concerning the result of this important meeting, Le Droit du Peuple, a minority organ of the Federation of the Isere, said : Certainly, the result obtained is not that which we had desired. But it nuist be admitted that the niinonty is not a neg'liirible quantity since it includes a third of the party. The elements which compose it are capable of deploying the greatest energy and of becoming, perhaps sooner than it is generally believed, the majority of the party.^^ M. Chastenet, the author of these words, was a better prophet than he knew. Gustave Herve in La Victoire pointed out the moral of this vote according to his own lights : The gravest and the saddest thing about this decision is that the socialism of Zimmerwald which controlled only a handful of votes three months ago, has this time united a third of the party. This is surely a bad day for the national defense.^^ Meanwhile, the minoritaires were gradually gaining control of whole federations, especially in the industrial centers of France, where assertions of the war's "im- perialism," the impossibility of victory, and the neces- sity of an immediate peace, were boldly made. The National Congress of the party, held in Paris from the 2-lth to the 28th of December, 1916, again resulted in definite minoritaire increases. On a motion which ex- pressed confidence in the parliamentary group, and stated ' ' that no act be done by the group which would "Grenoble, issue of April 12, 1916. " Issue of April 10, 1916. 101 CONTE]\IPORARY FRENCH POLITICS result in liindering the national defense," 1,595 favor- able votes were cast representing the majoritaire ele- ment; 233 votes were cast against it, representing the Kienthalian element; but there were 1,104 abstentions, representing the minoritmres. Thus nearly one half (1,337) of the Congress refused directly to authorize its representatives in Parliament to continue their sup- port of the National Defense! At the same convention, Albert Thomas Avas authorized to continue in office as ^Minister of Munitions in the Briand Cabinet ; but his collaboration was to be exercised "under the responsi- bility of the Administrative Commission of the party." This decision, however, was barely agreed to by a vote of 1,637 against 1,372. Thus it appeared that the So- cialist party was on the verge of breaking the Sacred Union, and of refusing longer to support the vigorous prosecution of the war. The vote upon another resolution concerning interna- tional relations showed the gravity of the situation. This was a substitute for a Kienthalian motion intended to open the way for negotiations with the German Social- ists and for immediate peace "at whatever price." How- ever, the substituted motion provided for cA'entual nego- tiations subject to certain conditions. This motion re- ceived 1,537 votes while 1,407 opposed it. IMeasured by figures, .therefore, the growth of the minoritaires had increased (since the vote in April when they obtained 960 as against 1,996), to a present voting strength of but a hundred less than the majoriiaires. Tliis cer- tainly was a remarkable and a disconcerting evolution toward the Left. The supremacy of tlie minoritaires meant that the Sacred Union would be sliattered and that the party Avould resume its Amsterdam program even in Ihe face of German invasion. 102 THE "BLOC" AND THE SACRED UNION In Iho sprinj? of 1!)17 the Stockholm agitation arose. Connnonly supposed to have been of Russian origin, a movement was inulerlaken to hold a meeting of all of its sections, Allied and Germanic, of the International AVorkingmen's Association. The purpose of this gather- ing was to define tei-ms of peace and to bring an imme- diate end to the war. All the well-known arguments for such a Conference were put forwai'd : it would prove to both the Russian and German Socialists that the Allies had no imperialistic ambitions, and that as a result, Russia would stay in the war, and the German Social- ists would resist its prolongation. The Allied Govern- ments, however, suspected the conference to be of Ger- manic origin, and purely defeatist in its pur- poses. This attitude indeed was taken at first by the French Socialist party which, at the end of April, 1917, voted not to participate in the Stockholm conference. However, agitation for participation grew with the gath- ering strength of the minority element, until on May 28, 1917, the French decision was changed and it was de- cided to go to Stockholm "to define war aims and to prepare for a full meeting of the Internationale." The not illogical refusal of the French Government to give passports to this conference naturally angered the So- cialists. At its Bordeaux Congress, held in October, 1917, the party (with the remarkable exceptions of MM. Guesde, Bracke and a few others), was determined to go to Stockholm. This unanimity was itself a victory for the Kienthalians, the party now officially recogniz- ing the legitimacy and the value of the action taken by the few extremists who had attended the conferences at Zimmerwald and Kienthal if! the fall of 1915 and the spring of 1916. In addition to the Stockholm question, the Congress 10:3 CONTE]\IPORARY FRENCH POLITICS was again faced with that of ministerial participation. Albert Thomas had continued to be the Socialist repre- sentative in the Ribot Ministry, which had succeeded Briand on March 19, 1917. M. Ribot was forced to re- sign on September 10 and his successor, Paul Painleve, a Republican Socialist, also retained Albert Thomas in his Cabinet. But because of the violent criticism of the minoritaires as to the war aims of the Government — as well as to the principle of ministerial participation, he resigned in order to preserve the unity of the party. In the preceding Ministries (notably those of Viviani, of Briand and of Ribot), the Socialists had been repre- sented. Consequently, the withdrawal of Socialist sup- port from the Government was generally interpreted as the breaking up of the Sacred Union — the return to the Marxian theory of unmitigated opposition to a bour- geois government. Moreover, on account of the loss of the Socialist support on which his Government largely depended, M. Painleve was forced to resign. He was re- placed on November 13, 1917, by M. Georges Clemen- ceau, a vigorous Radical. Here was a man of different stamp. Accepting the Socialist challenge, he declared a relentless war on their antipatriotic . maneuvers — • openly declared as such; and thoroughly antagonistic toward their antipatriotisra, and confident in his own powers, he successfully formed a Cabinet without their representation or support ! ^^ Thus, so far as the safety of the Sacred Union was concerned, the Bordeaux Congress made little difference. The Socialists now found themselves unable to reenter the Government even had they chosen so to act. But the Congress nevertheless voted a majoritaire motion, '"For .1 sliort account of M. Clcninnccau 's life, soe Appendix A. 104 THE "BLOC" AND THE SACKED UNION which declared for representation at Stockholm, for sup- port of the war, for voting war credits, for participation in the Government,^^ and for the revision of Allied war aims. 'This motion was adopted by a vote of 1,552. An- other motion, introduced by the minoritaires, was some- what similar. It expressly favored, however. Socialist adherence to the National Defense only so lon<^ as the war continued to be a defensive war. This motion re- ceived 831 votes. The third motion, introduced by M. Brizon, representing the Kienthalians, demanded imme- diate peace and suggested that the Socialists should re- fuse to vote war credits; a motion which received 385 votes. A still more extreme group fostered another motion against war credits, which received 118 votes. The comparatively stVong vote for the majoritaires (1,552), did not necessarily indicate a weakening of the minority ; first, because the former adhered in the latter 's demand for the Stockholm Conference; secondly, the minority was really divided between the supporters of the three motions — their total being 1,334 votes. VI After the Bordeaux Congress, the minority carried on an increased agitation against the "imperialism" of the Government. The failure of the Allies to state definitely their war aims and the success of the Bolsheviki in Russia, gave the minority some ground for the belief that a bourgeois Government could never inaugurate a policy leading to democratic peace. In the spring of 1918, the minority organized itself into a definite group, and through the columns of Le Populaire, edited by its "Subject to certain qualifications. 105 CONTEIMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS leader, Jean Longuet, carried on a systematic campaign for peace. To meet the increasingly extensive and effec- tual activities of the minoritaires, the majority started a new paper, La France Lihre, the first number tippear- ing in July. Thus the fight between the tAvo divisions of the Socialist party became more bitter than ever. Victory finally came to Longuet and his following at a meeting of the National Council of the party, held on the 29th and 30th of July, 1918. The minority, with the assistance of its vanguard, the Kienthalians, was at last able to muster a clear majority of votes. Upon the Longuet motion asking for a revision of war aims, definite conditions of peace upon the basis defined by the Russian Revolution, and a determined refusal to vote further military credits in case the Government per- sisted in refusing passports to an international confer- ence, 1,544 votes were mustered. The Renaudel majori- taire motion calling in general terms for the mainte- nance of the war, received only 1,172 votes. To the ma- jority now held by Longuet should be added 152 votes received by a strictly Kienthalian motion, offered by M. Loriot, the new leader of the group. Thus the element in the Socialist party which demanded the renewal of relations with the German Socialists, a peace which would not necessarily include the return of Alsace and Lorraine, and which meant the virtual recognition of the Bolsheviki, came into power. The victory was even more complete than the vote showed, for the Renaudel motion also provided for an international conference and for the refusal of war credits if the Government longer denied the issuance of passports for the delegates. In October, 1918, the National Congress of the party definitely confirmed the lately acquired power o^ the old minoritaires. The former majority, led by Albert 106 THE "BLOC" AND THE SACRED UNION Thomas, Vareniie and Compere-Morel, now became known as the ex-majoritaires, and the new majority, led by Longuet and IMistral, beeame the ex-minorit aires. The control of TTvmanite had already passed out of the hands of Renaiidel, who now belonged to the ex-majori- taires, and its control Avas placed with INIarcel Cacliin, a Centrist, but of minority sentiment, subject to the direc- tion of a committee of fifteen. Thus the Socialist party gradually had broken away from the Sacred Union in spirit, if not in fact. Froia a patriotism which called the war a crusade "of jus- tice" and the national defense "the highest duty," it now turned to ]Marxian concepts which denounced both as of oppressive injury to the working class. Deserting its new-born nationalist conceptions, it had again re- turned to its theories of class consciousness and in- ternationalism. It no longer was represented in the Ministry, and with the exception of twenty-eight ex- majoritaires, many of whom subsequently left the party, it refused to vote the military credits for the second quarter of 1919. By the. end of the war the party had completely returned to the principles of the Congress of Amsterdam. The patriotic, nationalist ele- ments in France were beginning to oppose the Unified Socialists not only because of their Marxian theories, but because of the domination of the part}^ by Jean Longuet, a grandson of Karl IMarx — a connection which public opinion invariably interpreted to be associated with the service of Germany. One other event, although it occurred after the close of the war, Avill indicate tlie final severance of the So- cialist party from the spirit of the Sacred Union — an event in fact which confirmed the Socialist conviction that injustice was inherent in a bourgeois regime. This 107 CONTEIVIPORARY FRENCH POLITICS was the Villain trial. It will be recalled that Jean Jaures, the great reformist leader of the Socialists, was assassinated on July 31, 1914, by Raoul Villain, a mem- ber of the old Sillon party and a fanatical nationalist. Arrested immediately after the act. Villain admitted his guilt. He justified himself by saying that Jaures was a traitor who, in opposing the three-year military law, wished to deliver France to the enemy. From the legal standpoint, the case was quite clear. A murder had been committed, the murderer had been appre- hended in the act, and had confessed his guilt. Although his justification was entirely irrelevant, the majority of the country believed that Jaures was a great patriot, striving to keep France in a state of honorable peace. Villain should have been brought before the Court of Assizes within three months, tried and convicted. But the Government perhaps imprudently kept him in prison nearly five years without even a hearing. Unfortunate- ly, French justice is not acquainted with the habeas corpus proceeding and so Villain remained in prison, as the friends of Jaures suggested, safely protected from the trenches where otherwise he would have gone. The motives for the murder were variously interpreted. Ac- cording to the prevailing opinion, Jaures was assassi- nated through German instigation so as to stir up in- ternal turmoil in France. Divided internally upon such an issue, France would the more easily succumb to a German attack. To offset this possibility, the Viviani Government issued a proclamation, condemning the "abominable attack," and urging that "all should have confidence in the law" and give in this "hour of peril the example of coolness and of union." The manifesto recalled that the country was in danger and promised that the assassin would be punished. 108 THE "BLOC" AND THE SACRED UNION The probable reason for the postponement of the trial was the fear that it might stir up class dissension fatal to the national defense, if held during the war. The case finally came before the Court of Assizes on the 24th of March, 1919. The President of the Court informed the jury that the case was very simple since Villain had assumed complete responsibility for the act. But not- withstanding the admitted guilt of Villain and the testi- mony of the most prominent men in the Republic as to Jaures' patriotism, the juiy, after a deliberation of an hour and a half, returned a verdict of not guilty ! ^^ At one time the procedure of French justice may have justified Alexandre Dumont's remark: "If I am ever accused of stealing the towers of Notre Dame, I am going to get out of the country." Now, however, as the trial of I\Ime. Caillaux for the murder of Gaston Cal- mette in 1914 had already showed, the contrary is ap- parently true. As a strong contrast to the Villain case, a contrast whicli the Socialist press was not slow in pointing out, was the trial of Emile Cottin, wlio had attempted to assassinate M. Clemenceau, at about this same time. He only succeeded in wounding him in the shoulder; but within four weeks of the crime,^^ he was brought before a Council of War, convicted in a session of a few hours, jand sentenced to death.^^ On the other hand, Villain, avowedly guilty of a worse offense, was confined fifty- one months before trial; he was then brought before a civil, not a military court, and acquitted. In the first case, the Socialists pointed out, the head of the Govern- "On March 29, 1919. "Cottin attacked Clemenceau on February 19, 1919; ho was sentenced on March 14. " President Poincarc later commuted this sentence to ten years' imprisonment, at the request of M. Clemenceau. 109 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS ment had been wounded; in the second, an opponent of the Government, a representative of the proletariat, had been killed.-^ The parallel was too obvious to pass with- out scathing criticism. The Paris press, with the exception of L' Action Fram- gaise, was unanimous in condemning the Villain verdict. But despite this empty sympathy, the Socialists and the labor elements finally judged the verdict as a case of pure class discrimination. On the 1st of April, the Union of Syndicates of the Seine declared that the ' ' ver- dict of the 29th of March brutally reminds us that there is nothing in common between good sense and bourgeois justice. It leads us to a clearer vision of realities and shows the immense effort which must still be made to bring about the advent of a trulj^ just society." La Yerite, a Socialist paper, on March 30, in an edi- torial entitled, "La Parole est au Pi)i)sition and policy. Tlicrc seems to be no reason why a jury could not have convicted Villain and at the same time condemned the war tactics of the party, if such a distinction was necessary. 110 TIIP] "BLOC" AND THE SACRED UNION Thus this verdict, wliose iiijuslice was adiiiittod by all, pive to the growth of the cx-niinoritiiirc inoveiiicnt, now the majority element oi' the Socialist parly, an im- mense impetus. It bi'ought countless adliei'ents to a freshened failh in i)ure Marxism and it renewed the reality of the class struggle. It was the final stej) in 1he complete abandonment of the policy of oi)portunism in- augurated by Jaures, which the inferior leaders who had succeeded him had vainly attempted to perpetuate dur- ing the war. .Moreover, in the imperialistic demands which various delegations were making at the Peace Conference, the Socialists found new excuses to justify this return to their former creed. From this brief review of the combinations which French parties have recently effected, it Avill perhaps be noted that these have always been for mere electoral pur- poses. Indeed none of the parties has shown any real willingness to sacrifice their doctrines or independence to form greater and more stable groupings. Roughly, these party coalitions have been directed from the be- ginning of the Republic till about 1809, first, against IMonarchism, and secondly (from 1900 to 1912), against Clericalism. From 1912 to 1914, while no definite com- bination seemed realizable a division appeared to be forming upon the subject of militarism. But when the war was forced upon France, the third Bloc arose, in- cluding all parties, against Germanism. The next chap- ter will discuss probable future combinations and group- ings. CHAPTER IV PARTY REALIGNMENTS Nous voulons un pays plus large qu'un drapeau. — GW)YABD. I The divisions of the Unified Socialist party into ex- maj or it a ires and ex-minoritaires was of serious concern to party leaders. Together with the Centrists and the Kienthalians, these divisions were upon the point of disrupting the unity of the party which Jaures had so carefully maintained. The. real differences between these four divisions, however, did not arise from the war, although the Socialist leaders generally attributed them to that overshadowing cause. But as subsequent events proved, these dissensions were caused by the fun- damental difference separating the supporters of Ke- visionism and Revolution. Realizing how fatal such party discords might prove to future electoral successes, a program was drawn up and presented to the Federation of the Seine, on March 31, 1919, which seriously attempted to compromise and reconcile both the majority and minority elements. This program^ asserted that the war had but proved that the ^ The Socialist program, quoted in part, is taken from L'Hu- manite. The accounts of the Congres's are also taken from L 'Humanite. 112 PARTY REALirxNMENTS tenets of Socialism, which had predicted it as a result of capitalism, were true ; and that it illustrated once more the fundamental principle of the class struggle by creating new wealth in the hands of a few, ^Vhile at the same time increasing the miseries of Labor. Socialism, the program asserted, is the sole solution for the over- whelming problems which the war has produced ; it is the only preventative of another and larger war. "In- ternational Socialism is the ultimate stage of human civilization." Strengthened by this conviction, the So- cialist party "declares that the final aim of its efforts is the social revolution." Such a revolution is nothing more or less than the "substitution of a colleetivist regime of production, of exchange and of consumption for the present economic regime, founded on private property, an economic order which belongs to a past period of history." The social revolution must finish the task which the French Revolution began by effacing the hereditary privileges of property and the hereditary servitudes of Labor. The program next analyzes the party's attitude toward violence. Whether this revolution shall come "by the legal transmission of power under the pressure of universal suffrage, or, by a movement of force," depends solely upon the future. "The Socialist party does not confuse revolution with violence. ... It ardently desires that its victory be accomplished in peace. . . . But the pro- letariat cannot renounce any means of combat which will forward tlie conquest of political power; the form of the revolution will finall}^ depend . . . upon the nature of the resistance opposed to it." This was the first compromise contained in the pro- gram. To satisfy the new majority, led by Jean Lon- guet, it proclaimed the necessity and the imminence of 113 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS the revolution. At the same time it softened the fierce- ness of such a prophecy, doubly bold in the face of Russian and Hungarian excesses, by drawing a fine dis- tinction between revolution and violence. Thus, if the bourgeoisie would peacefully acquiesce in the demands of the party, there would be no bloodshed — quite natu- rally. This empty declaration was intended to appease the moderates of the party while it pledged no one to any definite course of action. Soothing the compla- cency of the old majoritaires it palliated the revolution- ary verbalism of the Left. On the other hand, it an- tagonized the Kienthalian group, led by Loriot, which demanded the immediate revolution, if need be by fire and sword, overturning bourgeois parliaments and sub- stituting therefor "Councils of AVorkingmen. " The program also contained this significant Marxian statement: "Whatever the form which the revolution may take, the assumption of power by the proletariat will probably be followed by a period of dictatorship." But this dictatorship, meaning the exclusion of the bour- geoisie from power, will be "transitional," lasting only until a communist regime is firmly established. To minimize the terrors which such a dictatorship has Caused in Russia the party urges Labor to complete its organization so it may intelligently direct society. Thus the revolution is hailed as a "supreme necessity"; but "whether its coming be near or still far off," it is the duty of the party, the "presumptive heir of the capi- talist world whose wealth is made from the accumulated lal)or of generations," to "preserve and prepare for its heritage." While awaiting the revolution, however, the party is urged to continue its efforts to reform present society so tliat tlie transition to a new social order will be less 114 PARTY REALIGNMENTS difficult." The party manifesto, therefore, stands for the complete organization of labor. It asks for the re- vision of the Constitution so that it will be based on (1) universal suffrage of both sexes, (2) direct consultation of the peoi)le, (3) right of popular initiative, (4) inte- gral proixirtional representation by regions, (5) a single legislative assembly, (fi) administrative decentralization, (7) refusal of legislative positions to the heads of public business enterprises, etc., (8) creation of economic Chambers, (9) reorganization upon an industrial basis of all public services and state monopolies. The mani- festo also demands the complete reestablishment of the constitutional liberties of the press, assembly, and of opinion. Under the heading of economic reconstruction, the party condemns the penury and disorder into which a capitalist war has thrown France. Asserting that Ger- many will not be able to pay for the damages it has in- flicted upon France, it asks that the difference be raised by (1) State seizure of excess profits, (2) conscription of fortunes, (3) a tax on capital and on increasing wealth, (4) the strict collection of the income tax, (5) the establishment of new monopolies, (6) State participa- tion in ever\^ sufficiently centralized industry, (7) the nationalization of the railways, and all other means of river and land transportation, of the great steel fac- tories, of water power, of refineries, of banks, of insur- ance, and the manufacture of alcohol. This is a much more inclusive plan of government ownership than that which the Radical party supports. The party does not conceal the fact, however, that these measures may prove inadequate to meet the pres- " As we shall see, thcso reforms wore a direct concession to the okl majority. 115 CONTEI^IPORARY FRENCH POLITICS ent crisis. "The capitalist regime may succumb under the weight of the charges which it itself has created." What is fundamentally needed is an increase of produc- tion. To secure this end the State must not "spend less, but more and more." To bring about this increase (and under the heading of "Immediate Reforms"), the party demands that labor be made compulsory, idleness to be punished by law. It also asks that education be gratuitous, dependent not upon the means of parents but upon the child's aptitude. To insure Labor its com- plete share of the products of civilization, the party wishes to impose certain principles, Concerniyig the orgamzation of labor: (1) the suppression of unemploy- ment by means of employment bureaus, (2) increase of social insurance, (3) the protection of the health and security of workmen, (4) the reduction of hours of work, (5) a minimum income, (6) unreserved recognition of a right to organize. Concerning agricultural labor, the following proposals are made: (1) extension of laws of industrial labor to agriculture, (2) alleviation of the tenant system, (3) cooperative organization of small proprietors and tenants for production, sale of products, purchase of seed, machinery, and insurance. Concern- ing measures of social welfare: (1) rigorous protection of mothers and children, by the medical control of chil- dren, the creation of nurseries, school sanatoriums, and open air colonies, (2) the fusion of all education, free and compulsory, under national control, "permitting, by a series of selections and of si)e(!ialization, the utiliza- tion to the best end of the social interest, of the varietj'' of individual aptitudes." Concerning the welfare of lahor: (1) the general expropriation of unsanitary ])rop- erty, (2) the creation by the communes, of a pul)lic hous- ing service, (3) the immediate use of public funds for 11 r, . PARTY REALIGNMENTS the construction of hcaltliy lodgings, (4) tlie organiza tion of a public food service, (5) the public oiganiza- tion of leisure, by sports, theatrical representations, art, and culture. This program, the party asserts, cannot be carried out until peace is inaugurated. As a further compromise and concession to the old majority, the program says: "Convinced that the integrity and the independence of nations are fundamental to the international organiza- tion itself, the Socialist party has unstintingly spent it- self for the defense of the country." But its efforts were premised upon the acceptance of a Wilsonian peace. And the party "remains opposed to every con- dition of peace which exalts the decrepit forms of an exasperated nationalism, forms which will but tend to unloose the confused mclce of imperialistic ambitions, protecting in every country the efforts or the revenges of reaction. ... It also deplores the fact that the Gov- ernment did not support whole-heartedly the intentions and the propositions of President AVilson." The party denounces the practices of a secret diplo- macy wliich "threatens to falsify the significance of peace which it forestalls." It is "ardently attached to the idea of a League of Nations, considering that it should embrace every people, equal in rights and duties — and not merely a few governments." It demands that it be provided with sanctions capable of assuring its au- thority. But this League of Nations, in addition to its role of Peacemaker, must gradually direct and regulate the economic life of the world. International legisla- tion must supplement national reconstruction, through regulation of labor and economic competition between nations. "The League of Nations ... is, therefore, obliged, by tlie very fact of its existence, to regulate the 117 CONTEm^ORARY FRENCH POLITICS conditions of production and of consumption suitable to each country. It must control the ectablishing of rates of transportation, assuring between nations ... an equitable distribution of raw materials and of products. ... It must facilitate by every means the exchange of food supplies, of" capital and of persons. ... In work- ing for the cooperation of peoples, toward prosperity and peace, the League of Nations will necessarily move forward along the path of international socialism. ..." But now deserting at last this program of reformism, the document we are considering returns to its funda- mental Marxian basis by declaring that in the end it is the revolution which ''must always inspire the means, and the means must never be diverted from the end." "While the outlines of a Socialist regime may be laid down under a bourgeois society, the ultimate goal of the party is the social revolution, wherein not only the gov- ernment but industry, education, and culture, wall be dominated by the dictatorsliip of the proletariat. Finally, the program under analysis closes with this peroration : There will be true equality only when the sole recognized distinetion between men shall be that of their social value. True justice will exist only when the sole property recognized in men will be that which arises from man's own labor; when the tithe levied by the employer ujion the employee, by the proprietor of the soil upon the tenant, shall have disap- peared with tlie form of property of which it is the direct expression. There will only be true harmony when the activity of each man shall be applied to his natural task and the com- monwealth of the soil is exploited for the good of all. The Socialist party therefore calls upon all laborers to assist by their elTorts in this beneficent evolution of histoiy. It calls upon them to assist it in the wo?-k of social resreneration which is its end and object. The general interests of the na- tions, and those of entire civilization, are indissolubly con- 118 PARTY REALIGNMENTS founded with oiii- own. Heirs to the benefit of every effort of oryani/ation wliicli has developed in the world, we must ourselves realize a i)rojiTam, the acconiplLshnient of which a fallen bourgeoisie and a covetous capitalisui would not even dure to attempt. It will be noted that this program contains many finely balanced distinctions between immediate reforms and the revolution. In fact, the principles of reform- ism even assume a predominant position. The meas- ures advocated, although more advanced, are practically the same in principle as those for which the Radical party stood — a program of collectivism. As such, many non-Marxian liberals could have sincerely supported them. And for this very reason they were severely at- tacked by the Loriot group. This group was opposed to any program attempting to improve bourgeois society. It believed that the adoption of immediate reforms and the amelioration of the economic conditions of Labor would benumb Labor's revolutionary desires. Economic content under the present regime would kill the chief stimulus which urged the revolution on. The aim of the proletariat should not be "the full stomach" alone — it should aim to seize and achieve power and work toward the entire assumption of political, social and economic activity. To secure the adoption of reforms would but weaken the impelling incentive to revolution. The increase of poverty, of misery, and of discontent was the best guarantee of the Internationale. Such was the argu- ment of the Loriot group ; from the Marxian standpoint, it was admittedly logical. Its adoption, however, would certainly have meant the destruction of the French Socialist party. Consequently, the draft of the program retained its reformist features, and the Loriot group re- fused its adhesion. 119 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS II The extraordinary session of the National Congress of the Unified Socialist party was held in Paris on April 20, 21, and 22, 1919. It was called primarily to adopt this program and to settle other issues upon which the party was still divided. Mme. Saumonneau, for the Loriot group, opened the attack on the program during the first day's session of the Congress. She made the following motion, which embodied the extreme demands of the Kienthalians — largely patterned upon the ideals of the Russian Soviets: 1. The complete assumption of power by the proletariat. 2. Institution of compulsory labor. 3. Socialization of the means of production and exchansre, land, industries, mines, means of transportation, under the direct management of the peasants, workmen, miners, railway men and sailors. 4. Distribution of products by cooperative societies and municipal stores under collective control. 5. Mimicipalization of private dwellings and of hospitals. 6. The forced transformation of the government services and their transfer to the direct management of the employees. 7. Universal disarmament as a result of the union of all the proletariat Republics in a Socialist Internationale. A second group, led by M. Verfeuil and Paul Faure, introduced another program, containing the reforms of the original one, but more boldly demanding the revolu- tion. The debate upon these programs was very acrimo- nious — the 20th and 21st were marked by a scathing ad- dress from ]\I. Loriot declaring a program of reforms to be "monstrous," and reproaching the party with weakness. He was followed by M. Leon Blum, speaking 120 PARTY REALIGNMENTS in favor oi' the original progi'am, avIio made wliat was considered the best speccli of the convention. It was finally decided to refer tlie three programs to the com- mittee on resolutions. But on the 22nd the committee reported it could reach no decision and that it liad de- cided to have a representative of each speak before the convention, after Avhich a vote Avonld be taken. After this was done, the following decision was announced: For the original program, 1,304: votes; for the Verfcuil program, 29G ; for the Loriot program, 245. Thus the compromised measure was adopted and so far, at least, a nominal unity between the two major elements of the party had been assured. Ill However, there w^re certain matters of importance which this program, because of its compromised char- acter, had omitted, and which the new majority, sup- ported by the Kienthalians, felt should receive party sanction. Thus no declaration had been made with re- spect to the Russian and German revolutions, the causes of the war, participation of Socialists in bourgeois gov- ernments, party discipline, and the reconstruction of the Internationale. Consequently, two motions were made on "general policy" to supplement the program and to supply its omissions. Discussion upon these two mo- tions, presented by the new majority and by the Loriot group, led to scenes of disorder and ill-feeling in which Renaudel, an ex-majoritaire, accused Longuet, the new leader of the party, of being in German pay.^ The mo- tion on general policy, submitted by the new majority 'See p. 274. 121 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS and finally adopted, declared that the war was "the direct consequence of the economic political anarchy in which the capitalist system maintains the world." It declared that events justified the present policy of the new minority and condemned the compromises which the party maintained during the first years of the war. This war, represented by the bourgeoisie as a war of Right, the party condemns as imperialistic. "The party denounces the hyprocrisy of the French Government which, after having exploited the ignorance and the credulity of the people by making them believe that it urged only a war of national defense, a war to secure the liberty of peoples to dispose of themselves, a war for the destruction of armaments, now prepares to give to the results arising from this war a purely imperialistic and capitalistic solution from which new conflicts will emerge if the international proletariat does not soon become master of his destinies." The motion also condemned the League of Nations, as constituted by the Peace Conference. A real ' ' League of Nations must be the international organization of the proletariat finally delivered from capitalist oppres- sion." The conflicting policies of imperialism illus- trated by the proceedings of the Peace Conference, it declared, again proved the incapability of the bour- geoisie to reorganize society upon a just basis. Conse- quently the revolution was more necessary than ever. As an equitable basis of peace, "the Socialist party extends a fraternal hand to the German people. It stigmatizes the excessive pretensions which, under pre- text of material reparations, tends to reduce the entire German people to slavery. ... It greets the German revolution. ... It likewise greets every revolution which the great shock of war has caused to arise. . . . 122 PARTY REALIGNMENTS Its sympatliies are addressed to every oppressed people without distinction, whether they be oppressed by the Central Powers or wliether they still undergo tlie yoke of the Entente capitalists. . . . The unquestioned strengthening of the Republic of the Soviets . . . the courage and the tenacity with which the working and the peasant class of Russia are carrying on their strug- gles . . , prove how much tlie French Socialist party was right in placing confidence in the Russian Revolu- tion and in combating tlie criminal intervention by which the bourgeoisie of the Allied countries have aimed and still aim to destroy it." The motion again emphasized the declarations of the program by asserting the "inalienable riglit of the dis- posseSvSed class to expropriate the possessing class by means of the revolution." It affirms that the "dictator- ship of the proletariat at the beginning of every tri- umphant revolution" is a necessity. To this end, force is also necessary. Again recurring to the principles set forth at the convention of Amsterdam, the motion declares: The stnicfgle of classes demands uncompromising opposition to bourgeois power; it condemns any participation in the exer- cise of this power under whatever form tliis may present itself; it implies the systematic refusal of militaiy and civil credits — and the rejection of the whole budget. The absolute autonomy of the Socialist party as the political part}' of the working class naturally excludes all possibility of alliance or electoral coalition with a bourgeois party. To enforce party unity, those who will not recognize these principles and who "will continue to grant credits to a bourgeois government" will be read out of the party. Finally, the "Socialist party makes an appeal to the 123 CONTEIVIPORARY FRENCH POLITICS revolutionary force of the proletariat, against capitalist society which is responsible for the war. It appeals for the total destruction of militarism and for the emanci- pation of the workingmen bj^ the estal)lishment of col- lective production and property. It intends to employ "every possible form of action" to bring about these ends. After another bitter debate wherein the old tnajori- taires and the Sacred Union were l)oth bitterly criti- cized, the Faure motion was adopted by a vote of 962 ; the Loriot motion, going to still further extremes, re- ceived 232. There were 789 abstentions representing the old majority who, not having a motion of their own, nevertheless refused to condemn the war as imperialistic and the Sacred Union as discreditable to the ideals of Socialism. To carry out the motion respecting a general policy, another motion was almost unanimously adopted on electoral discipline. This declared that: (1) No one can be a party candidate without expressly adhering to its program; (2) any kind of electoral coalition in the com- ing general elections, with bourgeois parties, is expressly prohibited; (3) any candidates opposing this last pro- vision will find themselves opposed by other candidates, supported by the entire party organization. These two motions — on general policy and on electoral discipline — seemed to nullify completely the compro- mises which had been made in the program for the sake of the old majority. In fact, the policy of the latter during the war w^as expressly condemned. The party now denounced the war as being French as well as German in origin. The program which originally ex- tolh'd tlie League of Nations, now denounced it as but another device to enchain the Labor world. The motion 124 PARTY REALIGNMENTS emphasizod tbe necessity of a social revolution by force ; while the program alleged its peaceful advent. The mo- tions made no mention of reforms, but they implied their uselessness by forl)idding Socialist particii)ation in a bourgeois IMiuistr}^ and the voting of the budget. How could collectivistic reforms be carried out without an appropriation? The Socialists in condemning the one had to condemn both. Hence the Loriot group had real- ly triumphed. The party program henceforth laid its emphasis upon the revolution. Despite this doctrinaire victory, the disunity which the program attempted to heal was now definitely exaggerated by these motions, condemning outright the old majority policy and its con- tinuance. The Socialist party thus virtually rejected a policy of reconstruction, through which France might have been aided, and relapsed into the hopeless and de- structive ideology of pure Marxism. IV The last matter of importance to come before the Con- gress was that of the Third Internationale. The First International Workingmen's Association was founded at London in 1864 in response to the now classic appeal terminating the Communist manifesto, "Workers of all countries, unite ! ' ' By no means purely Socialist in its original tendencies, the eloquence of ]\Iarx gradually won it over to his doctrines until at the Congress of Brussels in 1868 it became definitely a Socialist organization. The disap- pearance of the First Internationale in 1873 was brought about by struggles between the Russian an- archist, Bakunin, the British Unionists who believed in the formation of labor parties, and the German Marx- 125 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS ists. The stigma which the Paris Commune fastened upon Socialism hastened the dissolution. Between 1873 and 1888 numerous attempts were made to create an- other "International Congress of Workingmen. " Final- ly, in 1889, a new organization, the Second Internation- ale, was effected at Paris. From that date to 1914 the Internationale made great advances ; thirty nations were represented in its organization and its congresses were often composed of a thousand delegates. But despite the elaborately arranged plans of this organization, it failed to stop the war in 1914 by means of an international strike. Its efforts to hold international conferences dur- ing the war also largely failed ;* and for five years the union of its different national sections was prevented. The close of the war and the desire to bring pressure upon the Paris Peace Conference led to the resurrection of this organization at the conference of Berne, Switzer- land, which was held on the 1st of February, 1919. But in many respects, tliis meeting of the Second Interna- tionale was unsatisfactory. There were only about a hundred delegates present. Neither Italy, the United States, Russia, Serbia, nor Belgium was represented. The convention was marked by disorganization and con- fusion, by the defense and special pleading of the Ger- man majoritaircs, and by indecision toward Bolshevist Socialism — perhaps the most vital issue discussed. The failure of the Second Internationale to prevent the war, its impotency during the five years of the war's progress, the half-hearted support which Labor gave to the congress of Berne, and the conservatism which de- veloped in its steering committee gave the extremist So- * Tho Stockholm conforoncc was ono attempt. Chapter TTT does not attcmi)t to give them all — merely those affecting the Sacred Union. 12G PARTY REALIGNMENTS cialists an incentive to oryani/.e a Third Tnternationalo, Under the fi^nidance of the JJolslieviki, the Tliird or Com- munist Internationale met at Moscow on i\rarch 2, 1910. Thirty-two delegjates with full })ower to act, were present from parties or groups in Germany, Russia, Hungary, Sweden, Norway, Bulgaria, Roumania, Finland, Ukrai- nia, Esthonia, and Armenia ; and consultative repre- sentatives were present from groups in Switzerland, Holland, Bohemia, Jugo-Slavia, France, Great Britain, Turkestan, Persia, Korea, China, and the ITnited States.^ M. Guilbcaux, an outcast renegade M'ho had been con- demned to death by a French Council of "War, took it upon himself to act as a representative of the French party.® The Third Internationale, thus formed of minority groupings principally from Russia, Italy, Switzerland, and Germany, condemned the Internationale at Berne for its impotency and for deserting the fundamental principles of Socialism — notably the principle of the so- cial revolution. It asked the parties of all nations who could adhere to the tenets of the newly-organized Bol- shevist regime, to desert the Second and adhere to the Third International AVorkingmen 's Organization. The French Socialist part}^, therefore, again found it necessary to decide where to cast its allegiance. Three views were represented at this congress. The first, held by the old majority, was for the retention of membership in the Berne Internationale as at present constituted; the second view, held by the new majority, under Lon- guet, was for adhesion to the old Internationale pro- 'A full account of this meeting will be found in the Liberator, July, 1919. •Tliis unauthorized representation was denounced by the Fed- eration of the Seine, April 13, 1919, by a vote of 5,022 against 970. 127 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS vided it moved toward the Left. The third view, held by the Kienthalians (whom, in fact, the BoLsheviki had declared, "were alone "advanced" enough of the French Socialists to adhere to their organization), was for ad- hesion to the Third Internationale. M. Jean Longuet, in the last session of the congress, declared that the old Internationale was "mutilated and incomplete," that it had failed to prevent the w^ar be- cause the French ex-maj&ritoires would not agree to its assembly during the war, and that it needed the ex- purgation of its conservative elements and the vigorous reconstruction upon a radical basis. With such changes, the Berne Internationale, in his opinion, would be more satisfactory than that of INIoscow because it already had the support of a greater number of parties. The motion which he read invited the sections not represented at the meeting at Berne, to send delegates to the next con- gress, with the purpose (1) to expel its conservative members, (2) to restore fully the principles of the class struggle and of the irreconcilable opposition to bour- geois parties and government, (3) to direct the Inter- nationale toAvard the social revolution, following the ex- ample of Russia, Hungary, and Germany. At the same time, the French Socialist party declared itself walling to enter into "fraternal relations" with the Moscow organization. This motion was finally adopted by a vote of 894 against 757 for the motion of the old majority, and 270 for the Loriot motion for the Third Internationale. The congress thus took one more step toward a repu- diation of the moderate policy which liad controlled the party during tlie war. It did not immediately enter the new Internationale — which the Bolsheviki controlled — but it limit ed ils adherence to the old Internationale 128 PARTY REALIGNMENTS by insisting that tlie laller prepare for a revolution along lines which the Bolsheviki had already made effective. Thus it assured tlie moral dominance of Bolshevism over the old Internationale and over the policies which the French party would pursue at home. "Within three days the French Socialist party had burnt down all the bridges of nationalism and of re- formism liberal well-wishers had built for it. It now centered its hopes upon the revolution. Inspired by the examples of Lenin and Bela Kun, it henceforth preached the "Red" Gospel with tireless insistency. Its task appears to be a hopeless one. The French people are extremely individualistic. Despite their theorizing, de- spite the fantastic projects which their ready political imaginations often devise, Frenchmen are realists. As lovers of personal independence, they cherish their small holdings, whether a vineyard or an epicerie. In theory, they may understand and even admit the advantages of collectivism. But these theoretical advantages are completely outweighed by the repulsion which the ex- cesses of Russian Bolshevism have produced. The Frenchman is essentially a pragmatist ; although he may admit the defects in the present form of society, he will not sacrifice certainty for uncertainty. Revolutions generally have their causes in deep-laid political or social misery. These conditions are usually the product of years of abuse and of oppression ; they are tolerated until misery makes them intolerable, or until external forces, such as military defeat, break down the oppressing power. But no such conditions can be said to exist at present in France. Although Labor has many just grievances,^ it is by no means 'See pp. 244-246. 120 CONTEIMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS ■v\-eighed down by that economic hardship which La Bruyere so forcibly described, preceding the Revolution of 1789: Certain wild animals, male and female, dark, pale, burned by the sun, niiiilit be seen spread over the countryside, bound to the soil which they dug- and which they tilled with strange obstinacy. They had an articulate voice, and when they rose to their feet they displayed a human face; in short, they were men. At night they returned to their hovels where they lived on black bread, water and roots. They saved other men the trouble of sowing, working, and gathering for their food. It would be hard to find the counterpart of such be- ings in France to-day ! There were few Frenchmen who accepted the Social- ist theory that the war was a product of capitalist gov- ernments. Liberals in other countries have indeed sus- tained this thesis. But among Frenchmen, outside of some fifty thousand simon-pure Socialists, it had abso- lutely no support. To them the present economic dis- order is not conceivably part of a capitalist scheme of oppression ; it is the result of a war outwardly imposed. Consequently, the great majority of the nation joined as one to build up what had been torn down. A class struggle is beyond their comprehension. In the future, the nation may adopt collective methods in carrying out its reconstruction tasks, but that these methods will go to the extent of overturning the broad outlines of the existing order, is an extremely remote possibility. The definite proclamation of a revolution of the Rus- sian type as the goal of one of the most powerful polit- 130 PARTY REALIGNMENTS ical parties in France carae as a distinct shock to the other parties. The continuance of the Sacred Union had been advocated even before the close of the war by a few members of the press. The Socialist decision to abandon its moderate stand consequently gave the dis- tinctively "bourgeois" parties another motive for con- tinuing the policy of a Bloc Avhich they had faithfully maintained during the war. As has been noted, ]\Ion- archism, Clericalism and Germanism have each in turn been the three causes powerful enough to bring about party combinations. Party combinations have been suc- cessful in overcoming all three of these dangers. But these issues having passed aw^ay, there is little possibility of another Bloc unless an equally threatening menace again appears. For the future, there appears to be only one outstanding danger likely to threaten the Republic : the social revolution which the Unified party is now preach- ing assiduously and which it hopefully expects soon to accomplish.^ It is quite certain that every bourgeois party in the Republic, except possibly some Radicals, would combine to offset the Socialists. The fourth great Bloc of the Third Republic, it can confidently be said, will be against the peril of the Revolution. Signs of this new Bloc soon made their appearance. As early as December, 1918, a group was formed, a Re- publican entente, upon the basis of the solidarity of classes. It was not until the summer of 1919, however — after the Socialist party had declared its intention of 'M. Chastenet, a Kienthalian Socialist, and editor of the Grenoble Droit du Pcuple, told the author that the party ex- pected tho revolution witliin a year; and lience it made no dilference to them whether the Senate killeil the bill giving Gov- ernment employees the right to organize or any other I^abor bill. He confidently expects that within a year I'ariiaments will- be overcome and workingmen 's councils established in their place. 131 \^ CONTEIMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS bringing about the "Fourtli Republic" — that signs of an extended union appeared. Some elements wished to continue the Sacred Union — ■ including IMonarchists as well as Radicals. Thus on the 18th of July the Duke of Orleans issued a manifesto which urged the continuance of the Sacred Union against the Socialist danger. About the same time, the Liberal Action party, at a banquet presided over by Jacques Piou, asked for a "national party" grouping in a Bloc all the patriotic elements against "every attempt at dictatorship on the part of one class." On the 8th of July at a meeting of the Democratic Republican Al- liance, M. Chaumet, director of the propaganda of the Alliance, said, "The time has come to constitute a great and all-embracing Republican party in which all our different groupings may find a place." VI In addition to the new Bloc which it is certain every party of a bourgeois character in the Republic will join against the Unified Socialists, there are signs that some other and perhaps more stable and coherent party re- alignment is under way. The causes which brought the old parties into existence are largely disappearing. It is certain that the monarchy will never be reestablished. If the occasion for it should conceivably arise, there is no candidate able to attract a following strong enough to seat him on the throne. The Ligue d'Action Fran- gaise will probably outlast the lifetime of its leaders, MM. IMaurras and Daudct. But signs are not wanting that in the future its criticism will be largely destructive and nationalistic. Little will be said of the kingship. 132 PARTY REALIGNMENTS As far as the Liberal Action party is concerned, there is slight probability of the repeal of the anticlerical legislation. The Government appointment of bisliops in Alsace-Lorraine aronsed Catholic hopes, but this anom- alous action was explained by the fact that Alsace- Lorraine has to be governed under the old Concordat until the anticlerical legislation is extended to its juris- diction. The policy of the Government toward the Church was brought out in the Chamber of Deputies last July W'hen Jean Bon accused it of having a secret rep- resentative at the Vatican. This, M. Pichon, IMinister of Foreign Affairs, vigorously denied, adding, "the policy of separation as now practiced in conformity to the law, satisfies the Government." The Catholic strength has been dissipated between the "Rallies" and the ]\Ionarchists. They may unite ; but it seems that the Church is losing popularity as an issue in politics, and that it is secretly satisfied with its present independence from the control which the Concordat formerly imposed. As for the social doctrines of the Liberal Action party, they find their embodiment elsewhere. The Progressists, as already pointed out, have split into a conservative and a moderate group. There seems to be some indication that the former may unite with sympathetic elements in the Right, although both are so independent and unreasonable in holding to their anti- quated doctrines that as a parliamentary force it does not appear that they will ever be effective. Similarly, it is quite possible that the moderates of the Republican Federation may unite with the Democratic Alliance. Upon this latter organization (the Democratic Alliance), the future control of French politics is probably cen- tered. Its program is a moderate one ; it is thoroughly Republican ; it stands for a policy of pacification. Un- 133 CONTEIklPOKAEY FRENCH POLITICS ^ der its present leadership, it may even prove strong enough to absorb other parties within its organization. The Radical party, on the other hand, has passed the zenith of its career. It rode to power on the issue of clericalism. Now that this issue is dead, the party, like the Action Lihcrale Populaire, has lost its chief reason for existence. In its enforcement of the clerical laws, especially during the Ministry of ]\I. Combes, the party was untactful and overviolent. In driving the religious orders out of France, nuns were driven into the streets, and Good Friday was deliberately chosen to remove the crosses hitherto hung in court rooms ; every effort was apparently made needlessly to antagonize the Catholics. Now that this issue appears definitely settled, it would be the worst of policies to harp continually upon a past menace. Yet it is this policy which the Radicals are fatuously trying to perpetuate, and because of which they are vigorously opposed to the "pacification policy" proposed by the Democratic Alliance and M. Briand. Secondly, the Radicals have been found guilty of the worst opportunism. The Doumergue Ministry came into power in 1913 pledged to fulfill the Pan program, calling for the repeal of the three-year military service law. Yet the Llinistry supported it. As far back as 1906 the party promised the income tax, but when in I)Ower it failed to enact any such measure until the out- break of the war made it a necessity. Upon the issue of electoral reform, the party was equally vacillating. Al- ways opposed to the representation of minorities, it was not until 1919 that it finally agreed to the partial in- corporation of this principle in the electoral reform law. Finally, the Radicals had become vague and lukewarm in regard to questions of social reform; their declaration of July, 1919, seemed merely to mark time until the 134 PARTY REALIGNMENTS coming of some wind should point the direction of suc- cess. Tliirdly, the party is suffering from a discreditable leadership. Until the beginning of the war at least, M. Caillaux was in complete control. He alone determined its program, a principal feature of which was pacifica- tion with Germany, obviously unpopular, to say the least, in France at the present moment. Not only in his cabinet but as Minister of Finances in the Doumergue Ministry, he was guilty of shielding embezzlers, as the Rochette case proved ; and he was moreover frequently and openly charged with financially profiting by his position as Minister of Finances. The murder of Gaston Calmette, editor of Le Figaro, by Mme. Caillaux, through fear that he would continue to reveal the per- sonal and financial immoralities in Caillaux 's life, fur- ther implicated him. His record during the war has also been discreditable. Its treasonable extent has not yet been decided ; but his actions appear to have been very far from patriotic.^ Two other prominent Radicals, Malvy and Desclaux, have also brought the party into disrepute. Llalvy, Minister of the Interior in several war cabinets, in July, 1918, was judged by the French Senate, sitting as a High Court of Justice, to have "ignored, violated, and betrayed the duties of his charge." Desclaux, who had been Caillaux 's secretary when the latter was Minister of the Interior, was an army contractor who was ac- cused of stealing army supplies. A prominent Paris dressmaker was found to have concealed the stolen goods; and upon the basis of this proof Desclaux was * In the latter part of April, 1920, the French Senate voted Caillaux guilty of having had "conimerco" and "correspondence" with the enemy. 135 CONTE]\IPORARY FRENCH POLITICS sentenced to seven years of solitary confinement. And by a strange perversion of loyalty the Radical party has stood behind their former leaders to the bitter end. This statement is proved by the fact that Caillaux was again nominated by the Radicals as a candidate for the Cham- ber of Deputies from the Sarthe, in the elections of No- vember, 1919, But on the refusal of the High Court of Justice to grant M. Caillaux "temporary liberty" in which to carry on his campaign, he declined the nomina- tion. It now appears that Clemenceau has taken the leader- ship of the Radicals away from Caillaux ; but the latter still retains some of his old following in the Left wing of the party, the Radical Socialists proper. The divi- sion caused by this issue has not been the only one in the party. Countless other differences have arisen, near- ly as serious and quite as numerous as those in the Uni- fied Socialists. Thus an element led by Franklin Bouil- lon, has bitterly opposed M. Clemenceau. There are some moderate Radicals who are opposed to the exten- sion of collectivism ; there are extreme Radicals who wish to ally themselves with the Unified Socialists, de- spite the latter 's revolutionary program. There are Radicals who stand for a peace of annexation; many others who condemn the present treaty as violating principles of justice. These countless divisions will all inevitably contribute to the weakening of a party whose ascendancy was reached several elections before the war. But the chief of these weaknesses is the lack of lead- ership. Among the senators, MM. Bourgeois, Combes, and Ilerriot figure prominently. M. Bourgeois is a scholarly man, but not gifted with any brilliant qualities of leadership. M. Combes, it seems, has already contrib- uted his full share to the direction of the party; only 13G PARTY REALIGNMENTS M. Herriot, an intellectual leader, appears likely to be- come Prime ]\linister some day, altliough he is also de- prived of the magnetism of M. Clemenecau. As for the Republican Socialists, they have profited by their patriotism, and have won over to their doctrines many former believers in Socialism of the 'Utnifie" variety, who have become dissatisfied with its "pro- Bolshevist" domination. Pure reformists, believers in collectivism, there seems to be little difference between them and the Albert Thomas ex-majoritaire type of Unifies or the extreme Radicals. A grouping of these three elements upon a Reformist-Collectivist program, such as that urged by the British Labor party, can easily be imagined. As for the future of the Unified Socialists, the out- look from their standpoint does not appear bright. We have already indicated the reasons why they have such small chances of bringing about a revolution "by force." This chance has still further diminished since the signa- ture of peace. Politically, they have absolutely no pros- pect of winning a majority on account of the Bloc which will always be formed against them in the elections, a Bloc representing the overwhelming majority of the French people, absolutely opposed to a replica of the Russian and Hungarian experiences. The extremism of the Unified Socialist party is the natural source of its ' weakness, for it has hopelessly divided it into factions and deprived it of its leaders. Such men as Briand, Millerand, Viviani, and Herve, who refused to be swept into an avowal of the revolutionary tenets which have continually controlled the party, have been ex- cluded from its membership. The party thus has lightly cast away the only elements which cantassure its success, with each step in its evolution toward the Left. This 137 CONTE]\IPORARY FRENCH POLITICS evolution has already deserted the scholarly opportun- ism of Jaures for the milk-and-water Bolshevism of Lon- guet. It bids fair to seek its inspiration in the icono- clasm of Loriot. The real issue in France to-day, aside from the ques- tion of Bolshevism, is the projection of the State into industry — that is, State Socialism. This movement is not the same as the Socialism preached by the ' ' Unifies. ' ' It advocates no change in the direction of industry as far as the proletariat assumption of power is concerned ; on the other hand, it advocates the gradual absorption of industries by the State as at present constituted. This program of collectivism or of nationalization is ad- vocated by the Radical party and the Republican So- cialists. But it is even more vigorously opposed by the Republicans of the Alliance and of the Federation. Be- cause of this additional issue, it seems reasonable to believe that two strong bourgeois groupings will arise in France — one, probably centering around the Repub- lican Alliance, which Avill oppose collectivism, and the other, grouped around the Radicals and nationalist So- cialists, which will advocate collectivism. In addition to these parties, the Unified Socialists will always exist. But whenever the latter threaten the Government, it is equally certain that the two bourgeois combinations will unite to overthrow them. The Clerico-Monarchists like- wise will exist — a ghostly community — until the old nobilitj^ becomes only a historical tradition. It may be hoping too much to prophesy the elimina- tion of all but these three major groupings in France.^" "In the first dcays of the 12th Cliambcr of Deputies (1919- 1923), cncourapjinfT indications Avere given of the desire to elimin- ate and to consolidate parliamentary groups. Attempts were mado by the Eadicals, led by M. Ilcrriot, to form a Union dcs Gauchcs, out of the two old groups of the Radical Socialists and tlic Ro- 138 PARTY REALIGNMENTS The fmal settlement and elimination of old issues may not materially affect present party alignments ; the inde- pendence dear to the Frenchman and the attitude of je m'cn ficlie may prevent any serious readjustment of parties and the stabilization of the party regime. However, it hardly need be recalled that a successful party government is not dependent upon the elimination of all l)ut a majority and a minority party. Even in England, the home of party governments, there are four or five parties, the smallest one of which, the Irish Home Rulers, held the balance of power in Parliament for years. In the German elections of January 19, 1919, under the new Republic, six parties received a consider- able number of seats. In the Italian elections of No- vember 16, 19""^, six parties polled great numbers of votes. In the Spanish elections of 1919, as many as twelve parties likewise secured a sprinkling of seats in the Cortes. Finally under the Bolshevist dictatorship in Rus- sia, fifteen or more groupings were brave enough to ex- press different remedies for the hierarchy which at- tempted to keep them silent. Thus the multiplicity of parties is not limited to France alone, or caused by any special defect of the French political mind. There is, moreover, a strong probability that the Third Republic may yet enjoy the benefits of a stable, party government. Some scholars, notably ]\Ioisei Ostrogorski, believe that party regimes in all countries will give way to temporary organizations, springing up to accomplish some reform, dissolving again upon its achievement. Although this publicans of the Left. Because of the vital difference between these two groups, the union naturally failed. But upon tlie 15th of January, 1920, a union of the group of the Republicans of the Left with the group of the Radical Left was effected. This united the forces of tlie Democratic Alliance into what was called the Group of the Republican Democratic Left. 139 CONTEIMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS tendency is visible in France (as the activities of the various electoral reform leagues show), it is not likely to do away completely with permanent parties in France, because, as noted above, party programs are really philosophies, which remain after the achieve- ment of many of their immediate demands. CHAPTER V WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND TIIK " R. P. " ^ Bcaucoup pcnscnt qu'il vaut viicux ne rien cluiiiger. — Midas. I Purely electoral issues have induced lively discus- sions and important differences throughout the course of modern French history. Two revolutions — those of 1830 and 1848 — were in a large part caused by them; Ministries have come to power and have fallen on their account. Universal manhood suffrage has existed in France since the time of the Constituent Assembly -of May 4, 1848, a body which was elected upon that basis. Although in 1850 the principle of universal manhood suffrage was virtually abrogated for a time by requir- ing a three-year domicile as an electoral qualification, its full acceptance has long since ceased to make it a possible political issue in France. But lately, there has arisen a demand for a further extension of the suffrage, first, to women, and secondly, by the so-called plural or multiple vote. French women already may vote for members of the conseUs de prudlwmmcs, arbitral bodies comi)()scd equally of employers and employees, and for judges of * Tho " li. P. " is the French nickname for proportional rep- resentation {representation proportionnelle). 141 CONTEIMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS the commerce courts. But as they do not otherwise possess the ballot, a movement has naturally arisen for its acquisition, following those in other countries. But because of the French conception of a woman's sphere in life, the French feminist movement has not yet ob- tained either the following, adherents, or the temper of its counterpart in America or England. To quote an eminently French opinion : ' ' The Frenchwoman is no feminist as yet. She has little faith in the political sys- tems devised by mere men, and thinks she wields far more power in her informal way than she could ever exert if she were an elector. ' ' ^ This French attitude was perhaps better illustrated by the replies received during a symposium which a popular review conducted in the winter of 1918-1919. In this connection Professor Edouard Barthelemy W' rote : ' ' Political dualism in families must not be risked. A legal political dualism, in case of dissension, would certainly disintegrate the home . . ."; while M. G. Deherme, a prominent editor, expressed himself even more frankly: ''The feminists are barbarians and enemies of woman, since they wish to make a beast of her by lucre and pride, degrade her in the factory, and disgrace her by the promiscuity of the street and by dissoluteness. The progress of civilization has always consisted in the increasing preeminence of persuasion and devotion over constraint, of the spiritual over the temporal, and therefore in the extension of feminine in- fluence."^ These arguments singularly approach those until recently heard in America. But the feminists have two things in their favor : First, the very important part which French women jilayed * p]. Saillions, Facts about France, 276. ' Jc Sdi-f Tout, issues of Jamiiiry-Fcbrviary, 1919. 142 I WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND THE "R. P." in the war; seeoiul, their greatly needed lielp in tlie solu- tion of moral problems. It may be true tliat French women did not engage in gratuitous war- work as ex- tensively as did Anieriean or English women. They were indeed cxeluded (the majority of them, at least) from such a comparatively nonessential work, by the very vital necessity of maintaining the greater part of the economic system of France. 32,000 women were em- ployed upon the railways and 684,000 in munition works; countless peasant women tilled the soil and fed their sons and husbands, engaged in the unproductive work of war. Their heroic work in sustaining the indus- trial processes of the country, as well as in carrying on works of mercy in the French armies,* earned for them the unending gratitude of the country. This experience also gave them a much needed lesson in independence, organization, and solidarity. As a result many women partially, at least, lost the customary conception of their inevitable domesticity. Moreover, the enormous de- mands which the task of reconstruction is making upon French women and the necessity of taking the places of men fallen in battle, are still further contributing to , the movement whi h seeks to grant them rights com- mensurate with the duties they now willingly and joy- ously perform. Organizations such as the French Union for Woman Suffrage (having eighty departmental groups), the National Council of French Women (com- posed of one hundred and fifty women's associations), the French League for Women's Rights, the Women's • Fraternal Union, the Society for the Improvement of the Condition of Women, and even such journals as La Vmx des Femmes (extremely Socialistic though it he), * The French Kcd Cross has a membership of over 25,000. 143 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS illustrate the widespread organization supporting this campaign for woman suffrage. As for the moral problems of France, Parliament has not even attempted a serious legislative solution. Alco- holism is the first of these problems. By a decree of 1851, drinking places were subject to supervision and license by local authorities; but these restrictions were completely removed by a law passed in 1880,^ and now in force, which provides that any person desiring to open a cafe, or to engage in the retailing of liquors, has only to serve a notice on the mayor of the town in which he resides.'^ Permission cannot be refused any one wish- ing to sell liquors, unless he has been convicted of cer- tain serious crimes. The sale of liquor is restricted only by the power of local authorities to forbid drinking places within certain distances from schools, cemeteries, churches, hospitals, etc., — a power which it is under- stood is never exercised. The effect of this law has been to increase the number of drinking places in France from 179,000 in 1872 to 1,070,451 in 1913,— one for every thirty-nine inhabitants. Despite the worthy ef- forts of the lAgue Nationale contre I'Alcoolisiftie, the per capita consumption of absinthe doubled between 1907 and 1911, and the consumption of 100 per cent alcohol tripled between 1830 and 1912. Parliamentary efforts to control this ever-growing evil have almost always failed, largely because of the wine- merchant element within the legishitui'c. Aside from the prohi1)ition of absinthe, heavy taxes on drinks, and the state monopolization of industrial alcohol during the ' For tlic decree of December 29, 1851, see A. Carpcnticr, Codes ft Lois pour la France, I'AUjeric et Ics Colonics, ii, 457. For the law of July 17, 1880, s.ee ibid., 858. " Excc[)t in Paris, ■where notification must bo filed Avitli tho I)rofecture of police. 144 WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND THE "R. P." war, every controlling measure has been defeated. For example, on the 14th of IMarch, 1918, ]\I. Siegfried asked the Chamber to prohibit, for the period of the war, the sale to consumers, on the place or to be carried away, of all drinks containing more than 18 per cent alcohol. The measure was defeated by a vote of 442 to 43, a sig- nificant majority. The Government even refused to entertain a suggestion tliat "drinkless days" be inaugu- rated as a measure of war economy. However, Parliament, though not choosing to curtail the sale of liquors, attempted (by a law passed October 1, 1917) to punish drunkenness. It imposed a fine upon any one found in a state of ''manifest drunkenness,"* the penalty increasing to imprisonment for three days for the second offense, and from six days to a month for the third offense, in addition to the fine. The law further deprived habitual drunkards of electoral and certain other civil rights. It prohibited shops from selling liquors to minors of less than eighteen. Any one who succeeded in getting such a minor intoxicated became liable to imprisonment from six days to a month. The law, however, has remained a dead letter, despite its moderateness. It offers a very good example of the use- lessness of legislation when unsupported by public opinion. The inability of man-composed Parliaments or munici- pal bodies to curtail this vice has led such men as Joseph Reinach and Senator Herriot to ask that women should be given the vote, at least in municipal and de- partment elections, wnth the principal hope that they will secure the enactment of restrictive if not prohibitive laws. This demand for moral purification has also extended to prostitution, which at present is subject to practically 145 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS no control by municipal authorities. The chief argu- ment for woman suffrage is therefore an appeal to their moral superiority. Whether or not that moral superiority can be any more effectively exercised through the ballot than it is now through persuasion and example, is another question. The two distinctively French arguments'' against woman suffrage are economic and clerical. Although great numbers of women entered the war industries, they were largely compelled to do so through economic needs, — that is, by poverty. It is this class of women who want the ballot and who, it is feared, would be the only ones to use it. The women of the higher classes did not enter French industries because they were under no economic compulsion. Their patriotism exercised it- self in more philanthropic and non-remunerative war work. Thus they have not experienced the same feeling of feminine solidarity as have their poorer sisters. Ac- cording to the conservatives, the women of the better families of France, with few exceptions, do not want the right to vote, and would not exercise it if it were granted to them ; and their neglect of the ballot would disproportionally increase the political power of the labor and Socialist vote, aided by the support of women in industry. The anticlerical argument is substantially this: France is still nominally a Catholic nation. Although, many men have come to oppose Catholic dogma and its influence, large numbers of women, because of their more emotional and religious natures, are still complete- ly controlled by the priesthood — so the argument goes. The anticlericals fear that the priesthood will utilize its 'For the Trcncli aifjiiment in general against woman suffrage, SCO I"]smcin, Vroit Constitutionncl (5th cd.j, 300-304. 146 WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND THE "R. P." religious iiifluoneo, as it lias so frequently done before, to obtain political advantages; in other "words, it is feared that the priesthood will dictate what candidates its women parisliioners should vote for, under fear of displeasure of God and the Church.^ This argument, very energetically urged in the debate on the Suffrage Bill in IMay, 1919, seems to be of little real value. The control of the Church over its members appears nomi- nal, even in religious affairs ; while many women of the working classes, — at least the feminists imbued with So- cialist teachings, — are decidedly anti-Catholic. The Church, one would naturally think, would be op- posed to woman suffrage. Yet, possibly because of the prospect of increasing its political power, it has taken an advanced stand on the question.' At a Journee Diocesaine, held on the 19th of February, 1919, in Paris, a report of the "Action social de la femme" was adopted, stating that if the right to vote w^ere granted to them, women were under the moral duty of exercis- ing it, and asking that, in the future, this duty be taught young girls by the Church, Legislative activity for woman suffrage began in 1906 wath the introduction of a bill by ]\I. Dussausoj^, granting women the ballot in municipal affairs, and in the election of general councilors. The proposition was adopted by the Commission on Universal Suffrage, but discussion was delayed during four years, finally to be dropped. Later projects are numerous. In 1918, ]\L Magniex, deputy from the Somme, drew up another proposition, which granted the ballot to women in municipal, can- ' For this and otlier arguments, see three articles by Louis Narquet,. on "La Frangaise de demain d'apres sa psychologic de guerre," Revue Blcue, Sept. 28, Oct. 12, Oct. 27, 1918. 147 CONTEMPORAEY FRENCH POLITICS tonal, legislative, and senatorial elections, under the same conditions as it is exercised by men. Senator Mar- tin also advocated the unrestricted riglit to vote for women above twenty-five years of age. During the de- bate on the electoral bill in April, 1919, ]\I. Louis An- drieux moved an amendment to include woman suf- frage in the bill. Although it was defeated by a vote of 325 to 116, the Commission on Universal Suffrage promised to introduce it later as a "special measure." This promise was in part fulfilled by the introduction of the so-called Flandin bill, which granted women the limited right to participate in the election of municipal, arrondissement and general councilors. They were not, however, to vote for members of the Chamber of Deputies. This bill came up for discussion on Tuesday, May 20th, 1919. It was evidently a compromise between the Feminists and their opponents, — a compromise necessitated, the Commission urged, by Senate op- position. But this did not satisfy the Chamber, and, after vigorous arguments in support of granting the complete right of suffrage to women, from two former prime ministers, Rene Viviani and Aristide Briand, the Bon amendment was adopted by a vote of 329 to 95, giving the women identical suffrage rights with men. Although some believed that the opponents of suffrage had voted for the integral right in the belief that the Senate would kill the entire measure, it was generally felt that the Chamber was at least sincerely desirous of acknowledging the country's debt of gratitude to the women of France. The measure thus passed by the Chamber was sent up to the Senate. No one seemed to expect tliat this body would ratify tlie bill. The arguments against it weighed too heavily with these conservative dignitaries. Upon 148 WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND THE "R. P." May 22 tlie Senate appointed a coniniission to examine the bill ; and on the IStli of July, the Coininission re- ported it unfavorably. It in still pending before the Upper Cliain])er, but tliore is slif^ht clunicc of its passage. On October 7, 1919, the Deputies i)assed a resolution urging the Senate to act on the Chamber's Woman Suf- frage bill. On the Senate's failure to act before the elections of November 16th, L' Excelsior, a Paris newspaper, held a mock election for the Deputies upon the IGth, in Paris, at which the women might vote. The candidates voted upon were identical with those of the general election. II Plural voting has been advocated under some very unique forms. On April 4, 1919, M. Roulleaux-Dugage introduced an amendment to an electoral bill under dis- cussion, to the effect that fathers of families should be given a vote, in addition to their own, for every one of their children: He again introduced a similar proposi- tion during the debate on woman suffrage which read: Any person enjoyint^ French nationality, whatever his age or sex, possesses a right of political suffrage which is the corollary of his civil personality. The father of a family exercises the right of suffrage for himself and for all the per- sons legally placed under his civil authority, that is to say, for his legitimate wife and for his minor children of both sexes, legitimate or recognized. The idea that every person, irrespective of age or of sex, is entitled to the "right of political suffrage," is indeed a novel one. P>ut it is also pointed out that there are about 11,000,000 voters in France; over 7,000,000 of them are either bachelors or the fathers of but one or 119 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS two children ; only 4,000,000 are fathers of three or more children. The first class, which represents but 16,000,- 000 inhabitants, has one vote for about every two per- sons; w^liile the fathers of large families, representing 23,000,000 people, have less than one vote for each six persons — obviously an injustice if the premise of the argument is correct. This innovation is also urged to secure another end of the utmost importance to the coun- try, viz., as a reward and stimulus to large families.^ But there is considerable doubt both as to the right ° The depopulation question ' in France is generally considered serious; •with the exception of twenty-one departments, the death rate is annually in excess of the birth rate; nearly 2,000,000 out of the 11,000,000 families have no children whatever. Since 1867 the Prussian population has increased four times faster than the French. Figures compiled by the Ministry of Labor, published in Le Temps for October 8, 1919, show that the depopulation crisis in France is increasing. For the two years 1918 and 1917 mortality figures were as follows : 1918 1917 Births 399,041 343,310 Deaths 788,016 613,148 Excess of Deaths over Births 389,575 269,838 Marriages 177,872 158,508 Divorces 8,821 5,572 The executive committee of the National Congress of Natality and Population, wliich held a national congress at Nancy, Septem- ber 25-28, 1919, has urged the following program to overcome this crisis: 1. The Family Vote. 2. Correction of ' ' fiscal inequalities ' ' weighing upon heads of numerous families. 3. Allotments, premiums and gifts to families with a large number of children. 4. (Jamj)aign against poor housing and for sanitary and com- fortable lodgings for large families. 5. Su{)[)rcssion of abortion, neo-Malthusian proi)agan(la, and prostitution. 6. (.'reation of a National Oflice of Natality. 7. The exem[)tion, in times of peace, of fathers of largo families from military service. 150 WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND THE "R. P." of a child to llie ballot (even if exercised by the father as a trustee), or as to the effect of such a iiK^asure upon increasing the size of families. To otfer an additional vote as a solution of the depopulation question appears so weak that it is a wonder it is seriously considered. It is sip^nificant, however, that M. Roulleaux-Dugage's amendment nearly succeeded in passing — and was only defeated by the vote of 219 to 200. Moreover, no less than eleven societies interested in measures of reform are sponsoring the idea, in addition to many of the can- didates at the recent election (November, 1919). Still another phase of the plural voting plan is urged (for different reasons, however,) by Maurice Barres, the president of the League of Patriots. In an ingenious appeal to sentiment and patriotism, Maurice Barres advocates the plural vote as a recogni- tion and memorial of the sacrifices of the dead. For every member of a family killed upon the battlefield, he would give a "family" vote to be cast by the father, mother or widow, as the case may be. Thus he would create a "family" instead of a "father's" vote, as advo- cated in M. Roulleaux-Dugage's plan. The "family vote" was formulated in an amendment to the electoral bill, and was introduced by Jules Delahaye, in the Chamber of Deputies on April 19, 1919. This amend- ment gave the right to vote to the widows, or in their default, to the mothers of soldiers killed by the enemy; it was defeated by a vote of 375 to 113. All of these projects of plural voting, while finding a certain following, appear to be rather fanciful as well as inconsistent with the trends of modern democ- racy. The progress of electoral reform, in recent times, has been away from — rather than toward — the system of plural ballots. Some of these projects introduced in 151 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS the French Chamber, projects which only a politically imaginative Frenchman can devise, illustrate the length to which the theory, so prevalent in France, of the right of representation of interests as opposed to that of the nation, can be permitted to go. That these s^'stems of plural voting violate the simplest maxims of sovereignty, that thej^ misrepresent and misplace the will of the na- tion, and that they are practically impossible of applica- tion, is, without deep study, apparent. Ill But the greatest electoral issue in France has not been so much in the extension of suffrage as in the adjust- ment of the methods through which suffrage is exer- cised and in the devising of means by which one voter may enjoy as much influence as another. The "rotten boroughs" of England, the old three-class tax-qualifica- tion system in Prussia, and the practice of "gerryman- dering" in the United States, through which great num- bers of voters have been deprived of their ballots, are approximated, to a much less extent, in France by a faulty method of election known as the scrutin d'arron- dissement. The Chamber of Deputies is elected by districts, known as arrondissements (until the law of 1919), each electing one deputy, unless its population exceeds 100,- 000. In the latter case a new district is formed, elect- ing another deputy for every 100,000 or fraction there- of.^'* The vital question in France has been whether there should be a large number of small districts, such as the arrondisscment, each electing a deputy, independently "A new districting is made after every quinquennial census; the last law fixing these districts was of March 27, 1914, based on the census of 1911. The number of districts was set at 602. Tlie return of Alsace and Lorraine increased the number to 626. 152 WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND THE "R. P." of the others ; or whether there should be a smaHer num- ber of larger districts, such as the department, each electing several deputies on a general ticket, as Presi- dential electors in tlie United States are ordinarily chosen. The issue has therefore been between the scrutin d'arrondissement and the scrutin de liste. The former method of election was established in 1875, although Gambetta and Rieard vigorously demanded the latter. The sturdy arguments of these Radicals, however, final- ly led to the adoption of the scriitin de liste in 1885. But it was only in use for four years.^^ In fact, at that time the ease with which General Boulanger, making use of the "multiple candidacy" privilege, threatened to win the elections, led to its hurried repeal by the Republicans. To control departmental elections was within the physical power of the Government ; but to dominate arrondissement elections, so numerous were the districts, was an impossible task. From 1889 to 1919, this old arrondissement system was consequently maintained. Despite long established usage, the scrutin d^ arron- dissement is open to some grave objections. The elec- toral district is so restricted in extent that the election of a deputy depends too often upon the promises he makes to local interests. He usually regards himself as the mandataire of a restricted and privileged district, in the service of which he neglects the wide interests of *Ha nation toute enticre," as the Constitution of 1791 defined it. "For the "organic law" of November 30, 1875, see Les Con- stitutions Mndcrnes, i, 24. For the law of June 16, 1885, establishing the scrutin de liste, see ihid., 35; for the law of Feb- ruary 13, 1889, repealing it, see ibid., 36. 153 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS The restricted size of the arrondissement also makes bribery more probable. The use of money and wine has been a feature of many elections. The Chamber Com- mission on Universal Suffrage, as far back as 1905, in its report on the Klotz bill said that the deputy was too often nothing more than a veritable local "charge d'af- faires" at Paris. For this reason he had little time to consider propositions of law because the obligation of his arrondissement needed his exclusive attention. In regard to bribery, the commission was "struck by the increasingly preponderant part played by money in the elections. ..." "But what," it asks, "can be said of the scandalous habit of certain districts, happily rare, where wine distributed broadcast takes the place of dis- cussion and a program? . . . Such practices constitute a double danger: they falsify the expression of na- tional sovereignty, and they demoralize the locality where they are practiced." Furthermore, the arrondissement method permits the effectual control of elections by the Government. There is little question but that by bringing pressure through the Sous-prcfet (the administrative head of the arron- dissement), the Government is tempted to interfere in elections to secure its own ends.^^ The Sous prefet some- times appears to be little more than the "election agent" of the Prefect, whose advancement depends upon his swinging the elections in a sense favorable to the Govern- ment, The evil of such an interference, Avhich has long been practiced in France, ^^ is tolerated because nearly every party has in turn profited by it. "At least in the elections in country districts; city elections arc nioro difficult to control. " Tlio Provisional (iovoniincnt durinjif tlic devolution of 1848, througli Lct aside for advertising was strictly limited: five in communes having 500 voters or less; ten in other communes, plus one for every ;?,000 voters or fraction greater than 2,000, in communes having more than 5,000 voters. Any bill posting done outside of these public bill-boards is pro- hibited under penalty of fine. See Duguit, Manuel de Droit Constitutionncl, 371-72. 182 THE 1919 ELECTIONS one edition, known as La Presse de Paris, the first num- ber of which appeai'cd on November 11. This combina- tion paper appeared both morning and evening. About half of it was given over to editorial expression. Each of the contributing papers alternated in writing edi- torials, a dozen or fifteen appearing daily. All but three of the papers which combined in La Presse de Paris supported the National Bloc. Those who opposed it were La Democratte NouvcUe and L' Action Frangaise, which supported their respective parties, and La Voix Nationale, which leaned toward the Royalists. On election day La Presse de Paris had a circulation of 6,000,000. At no time during the campaign was there any doubt as to the result of the election. The Socialists them- selves seemed to realize that their doctrine of the Social Revolution was completely unacceptable to the greater part of the nation. Consequently their campaign em- phasized present economic distress and the necessity for immediate reform. For example, one flaming document asked ''citizens" to vote for Socialist candidates for these reasons: In unitedly supporting, as so many of you are, the pro- gram of the Socialist party which represents your aspirations and your class 'interests, you not only will support candidates ready to struggle in your name: For the Maintenance of the Eight-Houb Day and the Right to Organize; For the Harmonizing op Political Institutions with the New Economic Necessities; For the Taking Over, for the Benefit of the Nation, OP all the Great Systems of Transport, of Insurance, of Great Steel Factories, Etc.; For a Single Service op National Education Gratu- itously Accessible at Every Stage; 183 CO'NTEMPORAKY FRENCH POLITICS For Universal Disarmament of Which the Disarma- ment OF Germany Must be the Preface; But you will have done much more: You will have responded by your own progi'ess to the prog- ress of your brothers of labor throughout the civilized world. You will have struck at the roots of a regime which, resting upon the antagonism of competing interests, is only able to maintain war as a permanent state. You will have contributed to establish The True Republic in which a pretended political equality will not be condemned as a falsehood by economic inequalities. You will have assured The Disappearance of Classes, and by this very fact, you will have established conditions of con- stant peace between individuals and between nations. Such a manifesto could have emanated from the Radi- cals as well as from the Socialists. Uniquely Socialist theories were veiled under insignificant catchwords as "The True Republic." Demands for complete revolu- tion, so insistently urged at party congresses, were now noticeable by their absence.^ Moreover, many Socialist Deputies carried on their campaign upon a nationalistic platform. Despite the party's official attitude toward the war, many candidates openly supported the Allied cause. So in reality the Socialists acknowledged defeat from the beginning. Aristide Briand, one of the most outstanding figures in French political life, played a very disappointing part in the election campaign. Naturally M. Briand has I)olitical ambitions. But at the same time he is a true patriot and an able leader. As Prime IMinister upon six different occasions he has shown the highest type '"As a matter of fact, Socialist deputies would obtain very few votes if they did not manage to convince the general public that they are very reasonable people, great enemies of the old practices of bloody men, and solely occupied in meditating on the jthilosopliy of future law." Georges Sorel, lic/lcctions on Violence, 107. 184 THE 1919 ELECTIONS of statcsmaiisliip. lie exhibited his great power in the conciliatory i)art he played in the struggle with the Church in 1905-1907. He frequently attacked the Clem- enceau IMinistiy during the annistice, figuring promi- nently in the debates on electoral reform, on woman suffrage and on the eight-hour day. Despite the shadow which rests upon his last ]\Iinistry on account of the Greek fiasco, he remains a powerful leader at the Palais Bourbon. At the end of the w^ar M. Briand realized the necessity of organizing a great Republican party to fight social disorder and monarchical reaction. It seems that he was trjang to resume the work he started with the Federa- tion of the Left in 1914. In August, 1919_, he made a speech at St. Etienne which was so widely misinter- preted that it completely deprived him of further lead- ership in a bourgeois coalition. In this speech he said the time had come to put an end to the Sacred Union, because it had contained both Royalists and Socialists who were avowed enemies of the Republic — now that the war was over Republicans should rid themselves of their temporary bedfellows. Furthermore, the contin- uance of the Sacred Union would mean necessarily vague programs and the submersion of the real issues before the country. Therefore he favored the estab- lishment of a great Republican party upon definite, clear-cut issues. Objecting to the principles laid doAvn in this speech, M. Jonnart, ex-Governor General of Algeria, engaged in a lively debate with M. Briand in the columns of Le Temps; ^ he interpreted M. Briand 's remarks as a desire to hold himself aloof from a Republican coalition against the Bolsheviki. This obviously was not M. Briand 's meaning; but, neverthe- " Letters published iu Le Temps, August 25, 1919. 185 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS less, he found moderates turning away from his leader- ship. The ascendancy of M. Briand was also prevented by the fact that he is a Socialist in doctrine. It will be recalled that he was one of the original members of the Republican Socialist party. Although he and his party differ completely with the Unified Socialists upon the class struggle, he believes in increased goyernment own- ership and interference in private industry. Upon Oc- tober 31st he made a speech at Nantes in which he out- lined his platform of political and religious reforms. Le Temps afterwards inquired why he did not definitely disclose his plan of economic reconstruction. Did M. Briand believe in an extension of State Socialism or did he believe in the restoration of private initiative? The natural fear that M. Briand was a collectivist deprived him of the support of those opposed to the increase of the industrial power of the State. As for the Radicals, they are INI. Briand 's most bitter enemy because he has preached a policy of reconciliation with the Church for many years. Naturally the Unified Socialists detest him. So this statesman found himself not socialist enough for the Socialists, not radical enough for the Radicals, and not conservative enough for the Con- servatives. M. Clemenceau's popularity added to the almost tragic isolation in which M. Briand was placed. However, M. Briand proved his attachment to the Na- tional Bloc by refusing to run on a ticket from liis home district in the Loire because it excluded members of the Democratic Alliance. But he was nominated on a ticket from the Lower Loire, and elected to the Chamber. His victory was one of personality and not of leadersliip. He goes back to the Chamber a free lance, and without an organized following. 186 THE I'JJ'J ELECTIONS Although every sign pointed to the overwhelming vic- tory of the National Bloc, it by no means united every bourgeois party against the Socialists. The first in- surgent was the Republican Committee of Commerce and Industry which, shortly after the Bloc's formation, refused to join it because of the presence of the Radicals. The Committee implied an unwillingness to associate itself with any party proclaiming the doctrine of State Socialism. The next faction to withdraw was the New Democracy party, headed by Lysis. This party stated with poorly feigned self-interest, since it had no repre- sentatives in the Chamber, that the Bloc was merely a device to secure the reelection of deputies whose incom- petence had been repeatedly proved. This party placed tickets in three out of the four districts in Paris. Among its candidates w^ere Andre Cheradame and Victor Cam- bon. The party was successful in polling a total vote of only about 22,000, and it did not win a single seat in the Chamber. Thirdly, the Royalists refused to join the Bloc — or rather, they were not invited to join it because of their avowed hostility to the Republic. Consequently L' Action FranQaise placed tickets in every one of the districts in Paris — for the first time in its history. It polled about 40,000 votes, and it succeeded in electing Leon Daudet, one of the editors of L' Action Franqaise, to the Chamber, A fourth opponent to the Bloc was found in a few Catholics who believed that the anticlericalism of the Radicals was a greater enemy than the Bolshevism of - the Socialists. Happily the majority of the Catholics did not openly harp upon the clerical issue. But La 187 CONTE]\rPORARY FRENCH POLITICS Croix, the leading clerical journal, illustrated its re- ligious bias by demanding "pas de cartel" with can- didates who did not promise to work for the modifica- tion of existing clerical legislation. However, this atti- tude was offset by such pastoral letters as that from Mgr, Amette, archbishop of Paris, dated October 31, 1919. It advised Catholic voters that it was better to vote for candidates from whom useful service to the country could be expected, although they did not prom- ise to satisfy Catholic demands — than for others whose platform might be more "perfect, but whose defeat would more certainly run the risk of opening the door to the enemies of religion and of social order"; — a ref- erence to the Unified Socialists. A very interesting feature of French elections is the part played by the Catholic clergy in advising their parishioners how to vote. With few exceptions, Catho- lics receive pastoral letters which lay down the prin- ciples which should guide them in the exercise of their electoral duties. Many of these principles are of com- mon morality; others are strictly clerical. The whole spirit of the letters is naturally directed toward in- fluencing elections so that the "legitimate interests" of the Church shall not be harmed. The Catholic clergy apparently feel it a divinely imposed duty to guide po- litical thought from a religious point of view. The final bourgeois opponents of the Bloc were odds and ends of "dissident" groups. Some were opponents of M. Clemenceau, such as Gustave Tery, editor of L'CEuvre. Others were Radical Socialists who opposed association with the parties of the Right. Thus the Radical Socialist group of the Radical Federation of the Seine on November 24th denounced "the treason of the Radicals who, under cover of the National Bloc, have 188 THE 1919 ELECTIONS become the accomplices of the worst reaction." They demanded the restoration of the old Bloc of the Left. Other dissidents were Republican Socialists such as Paul Painleve, IM. Clemenceau's predecessor as Prime Minister. He insisted on placing tickets in the field against those of the National Bloc; and he was responsi- ble for splitting the vote of the Bloc in Paris between three tickets, upon which such men as General Sarrail and Professor Aulard ran. Much sympathy has been expressed in America for M. Painleve because of his de- feat (his defeat is by no means certain, for the Com- mission on Recount decided to refer his seat to the Chamber of Deputies, which was convened in extraor- dinary session on December 8 for decision). But if M. Painleve had entered heartily into the National Bloc instead of doing everything he could to oppose its suc- cess, he doubtless would have been returned to the Chamber without a question.^ These examples will show that the bourgeoisie were by no means solidly united against the Socialists. In Paris alone, ten different tickets appeared upon the bal- lot. In the departments the confusion was even worse. Here party coalitions usually did not exist. Usually the Liberal Action party would run a separate ticket; sometimes it would be the Democratic Alliance and more often, the Radicals who refused to combine. Programs of the widest variance were announced by those depart- ments in which hlocs could be effected. Thus the Repub- lican Union of the Isere was so conservative that it asked for the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Pope, repeal of anti-Catholic legislation, and the pro- portional division of school funds. These were distinc- " The Chamber of Deputies declared M. Painleve legally elected on January 23, 1920. 189 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS tively Catholic measiures to which no Radical would agree. In other words, the coalition activities in the Novem- ber election completely bore out the oft-repeated accusa- tions against the lack of French organization. These activities were totally decentralized. The National Bloc in Paris maintained no control over the few Mocs estab- lished throughout the provinces. In fact, it was unable to create them in most departments on account of local disagreements among parties. So the attempt to fuse all bourgeois parties against the Unified Socialists was not so successful and the fusion was not so complete as both the French and American press reported. It was not as narrow and it did not function as well as the Sacred Union. The reason for this was quite evi- dent : the menace of Bolshevism was by no means as real to France as the menace of Germany had been.^*' There was no fear of Bolshevist invasion. If Bolshevism should win it would be a purely moral victory, for even if So- cialist majorities were returned to the Chamber, every Frenchman knew that Soviet methods would never be instituted. The bourgeois character of many of the So- cialist candidates was an eloquent testimony to that. VI Very oddly, one of the strongest factors in bringing about the formation of the National Bloc was the Elec- toral Law of July, 1919. Under the provisions of this '"Voting in this election was not as heavy as it was represented to be. In the first district of Paris, for exami)le, there were 68,000 abstentions out of 260,000 registered; in the second dis- trict, there were 53,000 abstentions out of 221,000 registered; in the third district there were G4,0()0 abstentions out of 254,000; and in tho fourth district 102,000 abstentions out of 380,000 registered. 190 THE 1919 ELECTIONS law, the bourp:oois jiartics were oblif^cd to unite, if the compact and well-disciplined organization of the Unified Socialists was not to win. For example, if the National Bloc in Paris should muster 92,000 votes and if the Socialist ticket should re- ceive 70,000, all of the Bloc candidates would be elected, because they all receive a majority. However, if the Re- publican vote should be divided between two tickets, this advantage would be overcome. Thus if the Bloc vote should be split between two tickets, each receiving 46,- 000 votes, and if the Socialists should maintain their 70,000, the Socialists would receive the majority of the seats. If there are five deputies to elect, the Bloc would receive all five, in the first case. In the second case, when the Bloc vote is divided, the Socialists w'ould win three seats, and each of the Republican pai-tics, one seat. In both cases the Socialist ticket poll exactly the same number of votes. But in the first case, where the Republicans are united, the Socialists would receive no seats; while in the second case, where the Republicans are divided, they (the Socialists) would win three seats — a majority of one. "When it dawned upon the bourgeois parties that such would be the result of the election law, a great clamor arose. Although they had voted for it originally, they now denounced it as another device of the Socialists to win the elections. This argument together with the arrondissementer's fear of losing his seat led to at- tempts in the Chamber to postpone the application of the electoral law until the elections of 1923. Fortunately this attempt was unsuccessful, and the maintenance of the election law became one of the greatest auxiliary factors in cementing the different factions of the bour- geois parties. In the face of a united and well-organized 191 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS opposition, such as the Unified Socialists presented, fac- tional groupings had little hope to survive. VII The events of the election day itself, November 16th, may be passed over with little comment. There was no disorder; and there was a heavy vote cast. The results were not known until the 30th of Novem- ber, and even then sixteen seats had not been disposed of. The composition ^^ of the new Chamber ^- may, how- ever, be summarized as follows : Republicans of Left . . Radical Socialists .... Republican Socialists . Unified Socialists .... Dissident Socialists . . Progressists liberal Action Conservatives Reelected New Total 55 78 133 77 66 143 18 9 27 35 33 68 5 1 6 34 99 133 14 55 69 12 19 31 250 360 610 " These figures are taken from La Bcvue Politique ct Parlc- mcntairc for Dee. 10, 1919. "In the Bas-Khin there were 160,957 voters in 1914; in 1919, after the elimination of tho (jcrnian elements, there were 155,707. Of these, i;50,737 voted. The fact that there were no more eliminations seems to show that the election was conducted fairly. Alsace did not return a sinj^le Socialist or Kadical to tho Chamber. In both Alsace and Lorraine, "patriotic" or pro- French candidates were returned, and the election was ample evidence of tho desire of tho provinces to return to France. See two articles in La licvuc dcs Dctix Mondcs for December 15, 1919, on " TjC Vote do I'AJsacr," by P. Douraon, and "Le Vote (h* la Lorraine Libereo," by P. Braun. Alsace-Lorraino wfis al- lotted 24 seats — 8 for tho Moselle, 7 for tho llaut-lihiu, and 2 for the Bas-Khin by party representation. 192 THE 1919 ELECTIONS The Chambor of ]914:^' compared with that of 1919: 1914 1919 Difference Republicans of Left 77 257 30 101 36 32 27 133 143 27 68 6 133 69 31 gain — 56 Ra(li(!al Socialists Republican Socialists Unified Socialists loss — 114 loss — 3 loss — 33 Dissiilent Socialists gain — 6 gain— 97 gain — 37 Progressists Liberal Action Conservatives gain — 4 '* " By party representation. "The classification of tlie new Chamber by profession may also bo interesting to note. It contains: 140 lawyers. 41 doctors or surgeons. 50 manufacturers. 52 proprietors. 52 agriculturists. 27 merchants. 32 professors. 44 publicists and men of letters. 5 secondary school teachers. 13 engineers. 8 judgely and somewliat successfully attempting to unite the moderate Republicans into one organization. Its success is indicated by the fact that it is already the largest group in the Chamber. Unfortunately, there were some Republicans, in- cluding many members of the Democratic Alliance, who refused to join the "Entente." They had formerly constituted the groups of the Republicans of the Left and 1jie Radical Left. In the 1920 Chamber most of the members of these two groups have united into the ' ' Re- publican Democratic Left." Among its prominent mem- bers are ]\IM. Andre Lefevre, Barthou, Berard, and Boret. Still other members of the Democratic Alliance (old Republicans of the Left) refused to unite with either of the above groups. Consequently, they formed or rather maintained the old group of the "Republicans of the Left." A few progressists and moderates, disturbed at the preponderance of the liberals in the Entente, have also joined this group. MM. Ignace, Loucheur, Tardieu, Le Trocquer, and Paul Simon are among its prominent members. The "Action Republicaine et Sociale" is an entirely new group. It has been formed by the younger men of the Chamber, belonging to nearly every party from the Catholics to the Republican Socialists. The group de- sires to work without regard to party lines, and places social reform in the foremost part of its program. The three groups of the Unified Socialists, the Radi- cals, and the Republican Socialists exist as they were in the lOU Chamber.^^ "Sec L'Kuropc Nouvdlc, "Sur Lcs (i radius, dans Ics Cou- loirs," February 7th and 14tli, 1920, and December 27, 1919. 205 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS The question arises: what may be expected of this new Chamber? In the first place, there is slight prob- ability that the National Bloc will remain intact. Its centrist and conservative elements will doubtless hold together ; the Radicals proper may also adhere. But the Radical Socialists, the extreme Left of the Radical party, will unquestionably separate themselves from the Bloc and probably come to an understanding with the Unifies. Such was the intention of the Radical Socialist group of the Radical Federation of the Seine, above quoted. But even if the eighty-six members of this group do cooperate with the Unified Socialists, the Ex- treme Left will only have some 130 votes to oppose to the rest of the Chamber. But the chief significance of the intention of the Radical Socialists to side with the Bol- sheviki is that it marks a growing cleavage between them and the Radicals proper. The problem of unity between the Right and the Left divisions of this party has been very grave. The Radicals believed it was solved at the Pau Congress in 1913; but the National Bloc of 1919, and the official decision of the party to cooperate with the parties of the Right, again opened up this wound. Its existence will be fatal to future party suc- cesses, just as divisions among the Unified Socialists have decreased their strength and prestige. In neither party are there signs of recuperation. It may prove true that Radicalism will be consumed by its own chil- dren and bring upon itself an abrupt end. Secondly, it is- probable that the new Chamber will be unalterably opposed to the State Socialist policies inaugurated by the Clcmenceau Government and wliich the Left now insistently urges. However, the Demo- cratic Alliance and the Liberal Action party, if not the 20G THE 1919 ELECTIONS more conservative orgfanizations, are pledged to a plat- form of soeial reform and la})or amelioration. From the standpoint of foreign poli(;y, the Cliamber will probably support a Ministry which will restore French dii)lomacy npon its old basis. This will un- doubtedly occur if the United States refuses to lend its aid to European affairs. If the League of Nations does not materialize and if America rejects the Alliance, the French Chamber will doubtlessly demand the annexa- tion of the Rhine. It will support a policy which will build up a network of alliances protecting France from Germany. It will purchase these alliances with con- cessions in principle ; i, e., it will consent to the Italian annexation of Fiume and the Polish annexation of Eastern Galicia in return for pledged support. Finally, the Chamber will stand for a policy of aggressive na- tionalism. As to clericalism, the Catholics now have a fighting chance to secure the repeal of existing anticlerical legis- lation. Despite the assertion of Stephen Pichon last June that there was no prospect for the resumption of diplomatic relations Avith Rome, a recognition of the temporal authority of the Pope is by no means impossi- ble.^^ Le Jaurnal des Debats is already advocating such a recognition ; and former Prime IMinister Viviani and Aristide Briand are even quoted as being in favor of it. The Liberal Action party's demand for the proportional " In a speech made, February 6th, 1920, Premier Millerand saiil that a resumj)tion of relations with the Vatican was pos- sible. If diplomatic relations arc renewed, however, it is not probable that the separation regime in Franv^e will be altered in any way. See an article, entitled "A propos de la politique reli(jieiisc," Journal dcs Debats, Edition Hebdomadaire, Feb. 6, 1920. 207 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS division of school funds and the separate maintenance of Catholic schools also may possibly be granted. French conservatism has won the day. Upon it rests a tremendous responsibility. If it shows an ability to solve outstanding social questions, the present organiza- tion of society will undoubtedly be maintained, and the conservatives will remain in power. On the other hand, if it turns a deaf car to genuine demands for recon- struction and if it stubbornly maintains outworn formu- las, its days will be numbered. The French people may be driven in despair from one extreme of the so- cial order to the other. Although Socialism has its vital defects it may appear to them to be superior to the "stupidity" and rock-like immobility of the present regime. This belief, which can be acquired only through generations of abuse, is the one force of sufficient strength to bring about the advent of Socialism in France. In this respect Socialism is in practically the same stage in France as it is in the United States. Its surest preventive is neither in force nor in a reign of terror ; it is in a righteous policy of social reform. The French conservatives are thoroughly aware of tlieir re- sponsibility. They have the interest of the whole nation at heart. There is every reason to believe that they will use their opportunity to heal the burning sores with which France so long has been afflicted. IX The Socialist Congress, wliich was held at Strassburg the 251h of February, 1920, illustrated the growth of the extremist tendencies witliin tlie party. This Congress had been preceded by a meeting of the Socialists of the 208 THE 1919 ELECTIONS Department of the Seine (February 8, 1020), at which a program, to be placetl before the Strassburg convention, was discussed. The chief question of importance was tliat of adherence to the Third Internationale — the same subject which liad caused so much debate at the Easter Congress, Three motions were introduced, calling for (1) adherence to the present Internationale, (2) recon- struction of the present or Second Internationale, (3) unconditional adherence to the Moscow or Third Inter- nationale. The extremists had gained control of the Socialist organization of the Seine so completely that the Loriot motion demanding immediate adherence to the Bolshevist organization was adopted. The victory of the "Ultras" in the Seine Congress presaged a severe struggle by them for the control of the Strassburg convention. Here three motions were likewise 'introduced. The "Reconstructionist" motion, which proclaimed, first, that none of the fundamental declarations of the IMoscow Internationale were incon- sistent with the essential principles of Socialism ; that the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in so far as it might be utilized to assure the transition from a capitalist to a socialist regime, was the basis of every revolutionary conception ; and that the creation of workingmen's councils and Soviets was a legitimate method of exercising proletariat power. Thus the first part of this motion was an indorsement of the Russian Bolsheviki and their principles. Secondly, the motion provided that the French Section of the Second Inter- nationale should withdraw immediately from the old organization, and that they should call a meeting, in cooperation with the German Independent Socialists, of the members of the Third Internationale, to effect a platform upon which they all could stand. This mo- 209 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS tion was important because it reallj^ meant the eventual adhesion of the French Socialists to the Third Interna- tionale of ]\Ioscow. But of even greater significance, it meant that the French party must expel its members who were opposed to Bolshevist principles. This point was clearly brought out by Loriot in the debates: The Russian Socialists will not associate themselves with opponents or even lukewarm sympathizers of their doc- trines. The second motion was that introduced by the Kien- thalians. It called for an unconditional and immediate adherence to the Third Internationale. It was an un- abashed declaration in favor of the principles of Bol- shevism and their adoption in France. The third motion was introduced by M. Renaudel, representing the old majority, now so pitifully reduced, which had supported the prosecution of the war. This motion was for adherence to the Second Internationale, providing certain etanges were made in its organization and its program. The vote on these motions was : The Reconstruction- ist motion, 3,031 ; the Third Internationale motion, 1,G22; the Second Internationale motion, 337. Thus 4,652 votes were cast in favor of withdrawal from the old Internationale. Although the motion sup- ported by the Longuet element (the Reconstructionist motion) had been adopted, it was a virtual victory for the Kienthalians for, as shown above, it (the Recon- stnietionist motion) was openly sympathetic with the Bolshevist program. Furthermore, the devoted followers of Loriot, measured by the supporters of his motion, had increased at a rate which must have been alarming to those who still hoped that the Socialists would de- vote themselves to the needs of the country, rather than 210 THE 1019 ELECTIONS to the sterile expression of "fraternal" sympathies. It will be remembered lliat at the Easter Conpjress the Loriot element numljered less than a seventh of the members of the convention. At Strassburg it had in- creased to over one-half. This rapid devolution toward the Left thus proceeded unhindered by the results of the November elections. The extremist leaders Avho now controlled the Socialist party, desi)ite the fact that they had been defeated at the polls, profited little by the lessons of that election. Perhaps their very defeat had but increased their dis- regard for the will of France and their desire to in- augurate a minority rule. It is needless to add that this extremism will result only in the impairment of the unity of the party and in the diminution of its parlia- mentary strength. CHAPTER VII THE DEMAND FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION Tant que I'idee rcpublicaine ne se sera pas reconciliee avec I'idee autoritaire, la democratie frangaise restera inorganique et discutee. — Henry Leyret. The Government of the Third Republic is perhaps the most abused and criticized in the world. This criticism does not come from foreigners dissatisfied with the man- ner in which the French Government fulfills its inter- national obligations or in which it represents its people. But it comes and comes vigorously from Frenchmen themselves. There are a multitude of explanations for this. The French temperament is critical and the "demon of reforms" governs it in a tyrannical fashion. Dissatisfaction is always rampant among a few. More- over, history has left its survivors, from the Monarchy, the Empire, and the Commune, who, through the cur- tain of a roseate past, magnify ancient virtues and multiply present vices. The warning of Joseph de Maistre, "Misfortune to bad governments, thrice mis- fortune to those who try to mend them, ' ' does not daunt their demands for political reconstruction. The charges against the parliamentary form of gov- ernment in France are the most varied. For the Royal- ists, Leon Daudet arraigns "this antiquated, useless, 212 DEMAND FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION expensive, and fatal instrument, called Parliament, an institution which can only live on civil discords which it stirs up and exploits."^ The Party of the New Democracy, although not de- nouncing the Republic as organically evil, attacks its present malfunctioning as responsible for the com- mercial and industrial ills of France as well as her political misfortunes. These reformists point to the fact that during the history of the Third Republic, France has failed to advance as a material power. Com- pared with Germany she has woefully and fatally lagged behind. If France is to be thoroughly renovated after the war, the government "must be purged on the inside of the band of adventurers and parasites who have taken pos- session of the Republic . . . and transformed it into an immense employment bureau ..." for their friends. * ' To-day progress has ceased. The mockery of the cleri- cal peril is worn out. The people are aware that what they defended was not the Republic, but very simply the privileges, positions and favors — the seats of Deputies, the profiteers of the Republic of Comrades. . . . The Republic is common property. No one any longer can think of confiscating it to his profit or to the profit of a sect, but unanimous opinion is that it must be reformed to be rendered habitable. . . ."^ In addition to these somewhat far-fetched attacks, there are many who seriously believe that parliamentary government in France will always be inlierently and hopelessly defective. They have no hope that the French party regime will ever approach the stability which is necessary for a satisfactory parliamentary government. ^L' Action Fran^aise, Dec. 1.3, 1918. 'La Democratic NouvcUc, May 3, 1919. 213 CONTEIMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS But in its place they really advocate a government based on the principle of the Separation of Powers, such as exists in the United States, with an executive of fixed tenure, and independent of parliamentary control. On the other hand, many believe that the Constitution of 1875 is being violated, that its provisions have been de- serted, especially in the reduction of some members of the government to impotency and the elevation of others to virtual supremacy. They therefore demand a clari- fication of the powers of each governmental branch, and although they are not clear as to the powers they would grant to each, they are very insistent upon elevating the power of the Executive, and making him a force coordi- nate with Parliament. To effect this, a new constitu- tion really becomes necessary. The distinction between a government based upon par- liamentary responsibility and one based upon the Sep- aration of Powers is very marked. The essentials of the former have already been noted.^ The latter, which Montesquieu * popularized and which the American Gov- ernment put into practice, assumes the existence of three governing departments : the legislative, the executive and the judiciary, the two former, at least, deriving their powers from the electorate. Each functions in its own sphere and limits the other by a carefully de- vised system of checks and balances. Thus the legisla- ture makes the laws, but subject to the veto power of the President and the annulling power of the judiciary. The legislature itself is divided into two bodies, each of which prevents usurpation by the other. The Presi- dent or executive administers the government, limited by the legislative ratification of appointments, appro- * See p. 46. *See Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Book XI. 214 DEMAND FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION priation of funds, directions of law, and when neces- sary, by impeachment. The judiciary' really possesses no positive powers; it merely prevents encroachments; in turn it is indirectly influenced by the appointive and financial power of the executive and the legislature. Such a system, based upon the existence of bodies of nearly equal powers, constantly offsetting each other, is directly opposed to the parliamentary theory, based on the supremacy of the legislative, from which emanates both the executive and the judiciary power.^ II In point of fact, the French Constitution of 1875 does not definitely assert one or the other of these two prin- ciples. France has a Republican form of government to-day, not through choice but through circumstance. Consequently, its structure has been molded hy custom and usage, even in violation of the spirit of its funda- mental document. The Constituent Assembly of 1871-75 was Roj^alist in composition, and had no intention of bequeathing a Republic to the State. If it .had not been for the obstinacy of the Count of Chambord and his in- sistency that * ' The king reigns and governs, ' ' it appears likely that the monarchy would still exist. But the Na- tional Assembly of 1871 did not represent-JFrench .opin- ion upon this point, for it had been elected purely upon an issue of peace with Germany, The Republicans, led by Gambetta and Clemenceau, were not for peace ; but, on the other hand, the INIonarchists were, and the coun- try, completely disarmed by the diplomatic and military "Judiciary to the extent of itself passing on the constitu- tionality of laws. 215 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS stupidity of Napoleon III, was for peace, whatever tlie cost. Consequently a majority of Monarchists were elected to this Assembly whose original purpose was to "decide on the question, whether the war ought to he continued, and on what canditions peace ought to he made."^ But it did not stop when this was achieved. Neces- sity compelled it to declare a provisional government; in August, 1871, Thiers was given the title of President ; and he directed the government until he was forced to retire two years later. His successor, Marshal INIac- Mahon, was elected for a term of seven years (law of the Septennate, November 20, 1873). Meanwhile debate continued between the Royalists, divided among them- selves, and the Republicans. As the result of these divi- sions, and of the country's repugnance to the renewal of the monarchy, a governmental system was designed as a mere modus vivendi, operative only so long as neither royalist nor republican tendency became domi- nant. As a result, the constitution was no complete chart of governmental powers and limitations, contain- ing individual guarantees, such as the eighteenth cen- tury philosophers had designed, or sueli as the Ameri- can Constitution embodied.^ On the contrary, it was composed of only five fundamental laws ^ which created ° G. Hanotaux, Contemporary France, i. .'H. ' Many lef^al autliorities take the position that personal liber- ties are still f^uarantecd to Frenchmen by the Declaration of the Kights of Man of 1789, despite tlic fact that the Constitution of 1875 does not renew this declaration. They hold that any law abridging these liberties would be unconstitutional. See Duguit, op. cit., 220, and Esniein, Droit Constitutionncl (.Ith ed.), 499. "These laws were (1) on the organization of the Senate, Feb- ruary 24, 187.'); (2) on the Organization of the Public Powers, February 2-'), 187.5; (3) on the Relation of Pulilic Powers, July 16, 1875; (4) on the Election of Senators, August ."5, 1875; (5) 21 (i DEMAND FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION certain public powers, and established their relationship and method of election. Those laws made no direct mention of the Repu])li(', although they did speak of the President of the Republic in defining his functions; it was not until the amendment of 1884 that "the Re- publican form of government" was mentioned. The Con- stituent Assemblies of 1791, of 1793, and of the Year III, preceded their work by a Declaration of the Rights of Man; and the Assembly of 1848 prefaced its Constitu- tion by defining its purpose as the establishment of the Republic; but the laws of 1875 made no mention either of it or of the sovereignty of the people. They are silent upon the nature of the State, its extent and its limitations. No mention is made of even the annual budget or the judiciary. But as is so well known, no new Constitution was de- vised at the end oi MacMahon's Scptennate in 1879. Although the accession of M. Grevy to the presidency definitely assured a Republican form of government, the Constitution originally designed as a makeshift, still re- mains the law of the land. It appears that the framers of these laws of 1875 were partly inspired by the theory of parliamentary responsi- bility, necessary to a constitutional monarchy, and by the theory of the separation of powers, so dearly held in 1791 and in 1848. Professor Duguit denies that this latter conception influenced the Assembly. He says: "The Assembly of Versailles had too much experience on the Election of Deputies, November 30, 1875. Amendments have been made to these laws in 1879, 1884, 1885. See Lcs Hcglemcnts des Assemblees Legislatives, edited by Felix Moreau and Joseph Delpeeh, ii, France, 179-263. This work gives in addition to extracts from the Constitutional and Organic Laws, the Regulations governing the procedure and organ- ization of the French Senate and Chamber of Deputies. 217 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS with political affairs to consider for a moment as the basis of the political legislation it was to vote, the meta- physical theory of the division of sovereignty into dis- tinct powers. . . . " ^ But if the Assembly was not inspired by this doctrine, it very indistinctly recognized the other. In fact, it appears to have attempted to incorporate both. The French laws of 1875 provide for a legislative body of two houses, the Chamber and the Senate. Both repre- sent the entire nation, although the first is elected di- rectly and the second indirectly.^" The executive power • Leon Duguit, Manuel de Droit Constitutionnel, 157. However, in another place Prof. Duguit seems to contradict himself and even to confuse the essential difference between a government of parliamentary responsibility and one of separation of powers. On page 198, after mentioning the cheeks the Constitution of 1875 placed upon the President and the Chambers, he says, "Notwith- standing these precise provisions, France certainly does not prac- tice the parliamentary system. The political preponderance be- longs exclusively to the Parliament, and in Parliament to the Chamber of Deputies. The President of the Eepublic is in f j,ct no longer considered as a representative organ of the national will, the equal of Parliament, but simply as an executive agent, a parliamentary clerk. . . . Thus without being expressly vio- lated, the Constitution of 1875 has been deformed; it estab- lished a parliamentary regime; and up to the war we have come to a sort of an oligarchical regime where omnipotence belongs to a group of politicians who do not represent even a numerical majority of the electoral body." But the essential nature of a parliamentary regime is the subordination of the executive to it; as we shall try to point out, even the President is not the execu- tive; the real executive being a Ministry ordinarily chosen from Parliament and virtually by Parliament itself. As long as this system is maintained, the President will always be a "parlia- mentary clerk." Prof. Duguit 's confusion between these two types of government is general throughout France; those urging an independent and powerful President do not see that such a creation would instantly kill the theory and the practice of parliamentary responsibility. "The Chamber is elected as described in the chapters preceding; the Senate originally was composed of 75 Senators chosen by the National Assembly, and 225 ordinary Senators chosen by departmental electoral colleges, formed of the deputies, general councilors, the arrondissemcnt councilors, and one elected delc- 218 I DEMAND FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION is vested in a President, elected every seven years by a joint session of the Chamber and the Senate, sitting as the National Assembly at Versaillcs.^^ Here the first contradiction of the theory of separation of powers and of parliamentary responsibility appears. Under the former theory, the President should be elected by the general electorate, directly or indirectly, in order to assure his independence from Parliament. But the French Constitution provides that he shall be elected by Parliament, thus necessarily making him dependent upon Parliament, as the theory of parliamentary re- sponsibility would do in the case of the IMinistry. But the Constitution again returns to the Separation theory by providing that he "is responsible only in case of higli trea.son."^2 Thus in his origin he is dependent on Parliament; in the exercise of this power he is theoreti- cally not responsible to it. But to prevent the abuse of such a fictitious independence, the Constitution further says that "the Ministers are solidarily responsible be- fore the Chambers for the general policy of the Govern- ment, and individually for their personal acts." ^^ This provision is certainly based on the theory of parlia- mentary responsibility. The Separation theory is again returned to by providing the President with a suspen- sive veto and the right of adjournment. But the ob- trusion of the executive into the legislative power, in accordance with the English theory, is assured by grant- ing him the initiative in lawmaking and the right of dissolution of the Chamber. But here again, the theory gate from each municipal council. An amendment of 1884 abol- ished the life senators, and granted a greater number of delegates to the munieipal councils, according to size. "Article II, law of February 25, 1875. "Ibid., Article VI. " Ibid. 219 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS of checks and balances bobs up by making the assent of the Senate necessary for the Chamber 's dissolution. In theory, the French Constitution granted the Presi- dent, many of the powers of the executive of both a parliamentary and congressional government,^* accentu- ated by the extreme centralization of government activi- ties. If he were allowed to exercise them with the free- dom of an executive under a government based on the principle of the Separation of Powers, such as the Presi- dent of the United States, he would become a powerful, independent and perhaps aggressive authority. This power would be increased by the added authority in legislative affairs which the Constitution grants him. Consequently, there grew up the idea of ministerial responsibility, first used under the presidency of Mar- shal MacMahon ; and the acts of the President have not only been controlled by his Ministry, it being necessary for some one of them to countersign presidential acts, but it has arrogated to itself nearly all of the Presi- dent's theoretical powers. The President has neces- sarily become what the English King became when Eng- lish parliamentarism asserted itself — a symbol of power with its substance held elsewhere. The French Presi- dent has fared even worse than the English King. As Sir Henry Maine put it, the Kingiof England rules but does not govern, but the President of France neither governs nor rules; he has become, as Casimir-Perier somewhat bitterly remarked after his resignation (he held the ofifice for only 180 days), a mere master of ceremonies. lie is paid a salary of $240,000, and given a spacious residence at the Elysee Palace, enabling him to enjoy a brilliant social existence. He guards the "Article III, law of February 25, 1875. 220 DEMAND FOR A NEAV CONSTITUTION hospitality of the nation toward foreigners, to a certain extent he personifies the State, and he contributes to the continuity of the government, sadly distui-bed by pass- ing cabinets. Aside from this, he is dependent on Par- liament for his election and on his IMinisters for the exercise of executive power." The Constitution, in creating a responsible Ministry and an irresponsible President, even though it theoreti- cally endowed the latter with vast powers, really cre- ated two executives, both of which could not exist under either form of government. Under a government of the separation of powers, the Ministry is solely responsible to the President. Under the theory of parliamentary responsil)ility, the IMinistry is responsible to the Parlia- ment ; this can only mean that Parliament may poten- tially, at least, control the acts of the Ministry. The Ministry cannot be subject to Parliament and to the President at the same time. Legally dependent upon Parliament, the Ministry is under no obligation to the President, whom it controls by the necessity of counter- signing his measures. By this means, the President is bound to the Ministry and to Parliament. In sum, a strong independent President and a responsible IMinis- try are as inconsistent under the French Government as an absolute King and a responsible Cabinet would be "The duties of the President of the Republic were eloquently described by a writer in La Bevue Politique ct Parlcvicntaire (Feb. 10, 1920), as follows: "M. Poincare has given the example of seven years of dis- interested service, even going to the point of abnegation. Indeed a particularly difficult task for such an intelligent man! To occupy the highest office in the Republic and to be nothing; to understand everything, to be able to say nothing, except to people who do not hear you; to see everything being done, but not to be allowed to command that something l)e done; — is certainly a sor- rowful t;isk, especially in these troublesome times in wliich tlic fate of tiie Republic is daily at stake." 221 CONTEMPORAKY FRENCH POLITICS under tlie British Government. If parliamentarism is to dominate, a strong President cannot exist. It "was very far from the intention of the framers of the French Constitution thus to reduce the President. On the contrary, as seen from his wide grant of powers, they — a monarchist majority — wished to elevate his authority. As a concession necessary to even a consti- tutional monarchy, a Ministry was created, responsible to Parliament.^® But no provision was made that mem- bers of the Ministry should be chosen from members of Parliament, a custom invariably followed in England, and almost necessary to secure parliamentary control. In France, although a majority of the Ministers are usually taken from the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate, Cabinets often contain members having abso- lutely no connection with either legislative body.^^ Furthermore, although the right was incorporated in the Constitution, the President, as we have seen in a previous chapter,^® has never used the right of dissolu- tion of the Chamber since 1877. Thus the people have been given no opportunity to pass on the merits of a parliamentary-executive struggle ; and as Parliament can always overthrow a ]\Iinistry, while nothing can overthrow Parliament, the latter, until the regular elec- tions, reigns supreme. The revival of the exercise of the right of dissolution seems to be essential if the theory of parliamentary responsibility is to be fully carried out. " For a thorough description of the government of France, Poincare's Tfow France Is Governed, is of value. The latest work is Joseph Barthelemy 's, Le Gouvernement de la France, Payot et Cie, Paris. "MM. Loucheur and Claveille, on the 1917 Clcmcnceau Cabinet ■were not members of Parliament. "Seo p. 70. 222 DEMAND FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION III The weaknesses arising from these constitutional in- adequacies have led to the demand for a strengthened presidency. The reformist organization, the National Association for the Organization of Democracy, headed by Probus, demands a President chosen by regional as- semblies, to serve for a term of six years. This would in a measure sever his original dependence on Parlia- ment. The association also demands that the IMinisters be named by the President and be responsible only to him. The political program of the Party of the New Democracy likewise asks that the ''President be chosen by the Chambers of Commerce and the general Coun- cils of the country . . . who will propose laws and select his Ministers from men of Avorth, no matter from what circles they come."^^ The Party even demands that members of Parliament be specifically excluded from ministerial positions. The Liberal Action party asks for the extension of presidential powers, and the so- called plebiscHaires owe their name to a demand for his popular election; the conservative press generally de- plores executive impotency and asks for the actual par- ticipation of the President in the government. Most of these organizations demand that the Presi- dent's election be taken away from Parliament- and placed with the people, either by direct vote or by the creation of an electoral college, apart from Parliament. Tliere is considerably more agitation for the latter than the former. If this cliange is ever effected, it will open the way for his resumption of power. But this involves " This program is daily printed in La Democratie Nouvelle. 223 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS a much greater problem — that of the relation of the Ministry to the President and to Parliament. The I\Iinistry cannot continue in a responsible rela- tionship with Parliament if the President is to become independent. The two things are mutually inconsistent. If the President is to be independent of parliamentary control, he must be his own Prime Minister, direct Gov- ernment policies himself, and act as the real head of the government. His Cabinet will assume the same respon- sibility as the American Cabinet assumes, an individual obligation to the President alone. This will mean the total suppression of ministerial responsibility, the fixity of ministerial tenure, the suppression of parliamentary control, in a word, the substitution of a government based on a separation of powers for the present form based on parliamentary responsibility, partial as it is. There are at least two other reforms urged to remedy present defects, and which will complete the separation of powers in the French Government. The first of these is in strengthening the French Senate. The long term (nine years) of its members and its indirect system of election naturally make it conservative. In the spring of 1919 it defeated the Chamber's bill granting govern- mental officials the right to organize r° until recently it repeatedly rejected Chamber bills of electoral reforms ;^^ it appears to have also defeated the bill for woman's sufi^rage. Still it feels the weight of opinion, as its passage of the eight-hour law shows. Its opposition, however, seems to be the chief source of its influence ; and as it is gradually lessening, the conservative ele- ments demand a rebirth of power. Many ask a change in the manner in which the Senate is chosen. The =%S(istrial competition. It was probably a larger attempt at an all-inclusive State Socialism than even the demagogic advocates of the theory had contemplated. That a group of inexperienced Government officials, unstimu- lated by business interests, should attempt intelligently to determine the vast needs of national industry, upon which the minds of thousands of the most intelligent men have been occupied, was an absurdity, a few of the results of which may now be pointed out. This inability of the State to determine industrial needs was partly recognized in the summer of 1918 by M. Clementel, the IMinister of Commerce. He consented to allow the consortium in American cotton to make its purchases direct ; but for some unknown reason, he re- served the preliminary sanction of these purchases. This approval took so much time that when his signature finally was obtained, us,ually ten or twelve days after its request, the market had changed, prices had mounted, and the consortium had to pay tens of mil- lions more for the product because of the intervention of the Government. The State rationing of industry also had another ef- fect. According to the rules of the consortium, mate- rials were divided among its members according to the amount of stock originally procured by each. This pro- vision absolutely overlooked the varying needs of differ- ent manufacturers. Contraction or extension of indus- try had no influence upon the amount of raw material each would receive. Consequently, those manufacturers wishing to develop and extend production were handi- capped for want of supplies ; those who for one cause or another diminished output had a surplus of supplies on hand. In the one Instance, progress was discouraged 323 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS and in the other, extravagance and waste stimulated. The result of the consortium policy upon general price levels was another indication of Government in- efficiency. Before the war there was practically no dif- ference in the price of cotton in France and England. The first restriction in French importations raised the price of cotton in France until it was twenty-four dol- lars higher per hundred kilograms than in England. In 1918 this difference increased as follows : ^° Francs January 136.50 February 131. March 150.50 April 151. May 145. June 173.50 July 180.50 August 221. September 223. October 171. Consequently, in the month of September the French cotton mill had to pay 223 francs ($-44) more for cot- ton than the English mill, and for a material which in both instances came from the United States. This dif- ference upon a free market, subject to speculation, might have been explained; but under a State regime especially designed to avoid such a condition, it had no justification.^^ Other instances of a like effect upon prices are cited in a report issued by the Marseille Chamber of Com- merce upon November 26, 1918.'- In one instance the '" For the average of the ten months the French mills ])ai(l 168 francs more per hundred kilognims than tiie England mills. Multiplied by the 700,000 bales imported, this represents a differ- ence of nior'.' than $51, 700,000. " Quoted from L'Europc Nouvclle, May 4, 1918. "Ibid., December 14, 1918. 324 BUREAUCRACY AND STATE SOCIALISM French Government bouglit rice, a food necessity, from Enjijland and resold it in France at an increase of 140 per cent upon the purchase price. Many such oc- currences offer a ready explanation for the extreme cost of living. In another case the State imposed a price upon requisitioned distilleries for a liter of alcohol, of one franc (.20), which was 100 per cent above the usual price. It then forced the distilleiies to sell this alcohol, on the State's account, to the manufacturers of colors and varnishes, to perfume makers, and to vinegar manu- facturers for three francs and a half. In the mean- time, Switzerland was selling exactly the same alcohol for forty-two centimes ; the French price was over eight times greater than the Swiss price. Newsprint paper, six months after the armistice, was selling for 45 francs per 100 kilograms in England and 200 francs in France, a difference of over 400 per cent. During the war, the Ministry of Armament by an inter- Allied agreement obtained a monopoly of the American market on lintcrs. This made the French Government the sole purchaser, which should have permitted it to operate under extremely favorable circumstances. Pri- vate manufacturers, given such an opportunity, cer- tainly would have profited by the monopoly. On the contrary, it happened that each time the French Gov- ernment decided to make a purchase, the price of linters went up one or two hundred, to fall again as soon as the Government had finished its buying. In another instance the French Government was of- fered Plata tallow by private firms at fifty-eight dollars a ton. Asserting that the price was too dear, the Gov- ernment itself negotiated for the tallows at a supposed price of fifty-six dollars a ton. Despite this appear- ance that the State was a better buyer than free com- 325 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS merce, its price amounted to a great deal more, for the fifty-six dollar quotation did not include expenses of purchase operations, such as cablegrams, and of admin- istration which a broker includes in his prices. These the Government can write off into general budget ex- penses, falling upon the taxpayer. Furthermore, this State purchase included wastes which the brokers elim- inated ; moreover it was of frozen fats, lacking the qual- ities of standard tallow. These instances demonstrate the effect of the con- sortium policy upon French industry and upon the French consumer. In drying up the wells of private enterprise the French consortium policy seemed to be on the verge of causing an economic drought. This, at any rate, appeared to be the opinion of the Chamber of Deputies, when it voted M. Victor Boret, the Minis- ter of Agriculture, out of office because of the height to which prices were continuing to rise. On the 18th of July, 1919, the Chamber voted the following order of the day: The Chamber, believing that the pi-iee of living: has dimin- ished one-half in Belijium since the month of January, 1919, That the price of living has diminished one-quarter in England since the armistice, That it has not ceased to increase in France since the same date, Judging this result to be due to the economic policy of the Government, Pa.sses to the order of the day. Immediately after the passage of this resolution, the Minister resigned.-^ ".Sonic of the other features in this poli.'v, namely, tlie general prohibition of importations, which caused the Minister's resigna- tion, will be discussed in the following pages. 326 BUREAUCRACY AND STATE SOCIALISM Of the most serious importance was the evident in- tention of the State to continue this consortium policy as a permanent basis of industry after the war. Sus- picions to this effect were aroused by the stipulations inserted in consortium contracts which provided for their renewals after the signature of peace. M. Clemen- tel, ]\Iinister of Commerce, was accused by many of con- ceiving of the methodical and administrative reorgan- ization of French industry in which individual indus- trial enterprise would be completely suppressed. Moved by this prospect, the Bordeaux Chamber of Commerce, in a session upon March 20, 1918, adopted this resolution: Whereas, declarations publicly made by persons in touch with the Ministry of Commerce g'ive the impression that the consortium system is to be considered ... as the basis of economic organization after the war; Whereas, if it is legitimate and in certain cases necessary that, during hostilities, the public powers, . . . conti'ol impor- tations, and the apportionment and the sale of certain prod- ucts, it cannot be admitted that the Government may profit from the patriotic self-denial with which the French producers have inclined themselves before the necessities of the hour, to prepare an even partial dispossession of enterprises which their capital and their labor have successfully established; Whereas, the regime of consortiums, represented as a pact between the State and those interested^ is in fact imposed upon the latter by an administrative measure and without any possibility of discussing the solutions presented to them, since any firm which does not adhere to the combination finds itself immediately deprived of raw materials; Whereas, this regime, which completely overthrows the con- ditions of national economic life and which places those upon which it is imposed in a situation of inadmissible inferiority toward other French producers, has been adopted without Parliament's having been called to deliberate upon it, and without its having thought best to consult preliminarily the 327 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS qualified representatives of the great economic interests of the countiy such as the Chambers of Commerce and the profes- sional g:roups; Whereas, it would be easy to show by precise and sugges- tive examples, that the results obtained up to the present by the consortiums in functioning are far from encouraging, that, on the contrary, they bring to light the insufficiency and the errors of State management, the excessive expenses which it involves for a feeble return, its absence of elasticity, and its incapacity to adapt itself to the changing exigencies of a troubled period; Resolved, that it protest energetically against every measure tending to give as its basis, for the economic organization after the war, an industrial "eorporalism," which would certainly be a costly and sterile regime of incompetence and indolence.^^ IV After the signing of the armistice, reconstruction needs added another aspect to the commercial policy of the Government. Attention now became centered upon the general prohibition of importation and ex- portation, a restriction which the Government was forced by public opinion to raise in the spring and sum- mer of 1919. This policy was followed for two rea- sons: First, a flood of importations would completely unsettle the state of exchange, already so unfavorable to France; second, the protectionist argument carried to the extreme, — namely, French industry must be al- lowed to reconstitute itself, unhindered (as well as un- aided) by foreign competitors. The unrestricted en- trance of foreign products into France would over- whelm French manufacturers. The solution of the first of these arguments, which had some weight, appeared ** Quoted in L'Europe Nouvelle, May 4, ]918. 328 BUREAUCRACY AND STATE SOCIALISM to rest in the arrangement of credit in foreign coun- tries for French importers, instead of in the total ex- clusion of foreign products. The second argument had little foundation. France needed foreign products to rebuild her devastated regions; she needed foreign ma- cliinery if she was to manufacture products for exporta- tion. To create the tools herself for her rebuilding would be fatal to the success of reconstruction and of foreign trade. A few examples of the working of this protectionist policy will demonstrate its weakness. Occasions were numerous during the armistice of French manufacturers whose factories had been ruined in the war, who wished to reestablish their industries immediately. Machinery formerly purchased in Ger- many now could only be obtained in the United States where, largely in sympathy for France, the orders were filled. But to import it, permission from the French Gov- ernment became necessary. At the manufacturers' re- quest, the Government replied that such an importa- tion was impossible without the payment of a seventy- five per cent ad valorem tariff. In addition, a certain number of French manufacturers must declare to the Government that this machinery was not to be found in France and that it could not be manufactured. All this to encourage French production! It was useless for the French manufacturer to point out to the Govern- ment that machinery had to be obtained before his factory could be reopened; and that if he could not import it from the United States, it would take five years to build the outlay and to manufacture the ma- chinery in France. If the importation were allowed, the machinery could immediately produce the materials which France sorely needed and which could not else- where be obtained. Furthermore, hundreds of work- 329 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS men would be given inunediate employment. These arguments were vain, because the consortiums or the inter-ministerial committees had decided that French industry must be "protected." The Government was obdurate ; for the sake of a theory French industry was forced to lose invaluable time and effort in manufactur- ing implements which foreign merchants already had on hand and at a cheaper figure than the French could hope to produce them. There was one other alterna- tive — to do without; and in most cases, this was what French industry was obliged to do. What appeared to be an inexcusable application of this theory, was the difficulty which the Ford Automo- bile Company had with the French Government. Dur- ing the war t-he Government had purchased 4,500 com- mercial automobiles from this company which, on ac- count of the armistice, were never used. They were stored in Bordeaux, new, and ready for use. Accord- ing to the terms of the Ford Company's contract with the Government, the former had a privilege of repur- chase, with the Government's consent, of all unused cars at half the original price. The company now offered the Government the full price for the cars, plus a profit of 10 per cent, the 70 per cent ad valorem customs duty, and the luxury tax. From the financial standpoint alone, the revenue resulting to the Government from such a transaction would have been nearly 9,000,000 francs ($1,800,000). The Government would have recuperated the sum of 8,437,000 francs which it had ])aid for the cars, and the French automobile dealers, who held the Ford agency, would have made a gross ])rofit of 8,000,- 000 francs by the sale of tlie cars to Freiich firms. The sale would have immodiatoly resulted in the termi- nation of warehouse and upkeep expense of the ma- 330 BUREAUCRACY AND STATE SOCIALISM chines. It would have partially alleviated the great transportation crisis, then paralyzing French industry ; it would have employed thousands of dealers, me- chanics and repair-men, and in a number of other ways it would have contributed to the stimulation of French industry. But the Government did not see fit to accept the proposition, saying that French automobile manu- facturers would soon fill all French needs. Incidentally, M, Loucheur, the jMinister of Industrial Reconstruc- tion, had considerable interests in the Citroen Company ; but so far this company has not supplied automobile needs, although it enjoys considerable profits on those it does sell. IMonopoly privileges apparently are en- joyed as much by Government officials as by mere busi- ness men. In any case, it was better to allow several thousand automobiles to continue in a state of forced idleness than to permit an American firm to profit by their utilization ! Another regrettable incident arising from this policy followed the Lyons Trade Fair, an annual event of na- tional importance. Canada had had an important sec- tion at the Fair, and her merchants took a large num- ber of orders upon samples exhibited. AYhen they at- tempted to fill them, the French Government refused the permission to import the goods. LTpon the inter- vention of Sir George Foster, the Canadian Minister of Commerce, the Government responded that the "Lyons Fair, being purely a local enterprise, the Gov- ernment could not grant it special favors." Le Temps,^^ always a vigorous opponent of the statist policies of the Government, commented as follows upon this instance: "Issue of May 15, 1919. 331 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS As a result, it is no longer necessary for individuals, manu- facturers, agriculturists or merchants to be aware of their needs and to supply them, at their own risk and perils, by exercising their knowledge, experience, and ambitions for the country; but following such and such resolutions, taken in such and such administrative bureaus, these needs are now catalogued, estimated, submitted to regulations; always chang- ing, however, in a manner to dominate individual initiative which is too much given to boldness, — deemed unreasonable. The Mayor of Lyons, M. Herriot, responded to the Temps' comment, in part as follows : The Canadian incident is only an example. Merchants and manufacturers, highly qualified, eagerly attempt to obtain results; but a small anonymous bureaucracy completely annuls their efforts. The Minister of Commerce makes solemn en- gagements ; he promises some liberties ; but no engagement is kept. Clients whom we have gained with gi'eat difficulty are going away irritated and exasperated. . . . We want less talk and more action. We do not ask that they be interested in our work. That would be an indiscretion. But at least, they can let us workP'^ Aside from the evil effect upon the internal welfare of the country of the Government control of importa- tions, it was creating an international difficulty. Al- lied merchants were very glad to trade with France. They were not prompted solely by commercial motives — though the French Government seemed to believe this was their single preoccupation — but by sympathy. They desired to give French reconstruction needs every pri- ority; but when the French Government, indiscreetly, it seemed to them, refused their cooperation, it was only natural that they should look for markets else- where, Germany included. Not only was France los- ^Le Temps, May 29, 1919. 332 BUREAUCRACY AND STATE SOCIALISM ing Allied trade, but slie was losing markets which she could have had in Roumania, Greece, South America and the Orient. If she would not import their offerings, she could not expect to export to them. Consequently, France was beginning to face an economic isolation. As we have already seen, the commercial policy of the Government was by no means acquiesced in. In- dustrial sentiment, save that of a few large firms profit- ing from the benefits of a monopoly market, was wholly against it, and carried on a vigorous campaign for its repeal. Among political parties, only a few Radicals and Socialists upheld it. Moderate Republicans to Royalists were its strenuous opponents — opponents not only of this restrictive regulation but of statism in general. The National Association of Economic Expansion, after an investigation of the consortium, ^^ roundly con- demned them as wastefuUy exhausting raw materials necessary to national industry. In regard to the effect upon reconstruction, the Federation of the Architects . of Northern France, upon whom such a task would naturally fall, declared: Private initiative ... is the only means for the rapid reconstruction of our cities and villages.^s Similarly, after hearing the report of its President, M. Maurice Charpentier, the Chartres Chamber of Commerce resolved that "the return to the commercial -'Quoted in Le Temps, January 24, 1919. '■Ubid. 333 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS and industrial life of before the war be effected with the briefest possible delay. ' ' ^^ The French Society of Political Economy, an organization including many eminent economists, likewise accused the Government not only of violating the most fundamental economic principles, but of awkwardly and inefficiently control- ling industry. At a meeting of the Republican Committee of Com- merce and Industry, attended by 500 delegates from all over France, upon May 14, 1919, its President, Senator Mascuraud, denounced Government Statism in these words : We have seen how the State buys, manufactures, and sells. We have seen, under its management, a deplorable discrep- ancy produced between the cost of production and that of the products, so much so that the cost of living and the level of salaries always increase without satisfying any one. The experience is conclusive. There is only too much of it. Enough of State socialism and of monopolies ! If we wish to heal our wounds, to meet the needs of a formidable budget and to overcome our foreign indebtedness, we must have lib- erty in importations and in exportations, liberty in production and in circulation, and liberty in exchange. The Union of Economic Interests also declared that "every one who wants to work for the resumption of economic life conflicts with the State. In place of en- couraging good intentions and of aiding initiative, it discourages the one and paralyzes the other. The State wishes to regulate everything and to control everything: importations, exportations, production, distribution, and exchange." ^° In addition to these business elements, Labor entered "Meeting held on Dec. 17, 1916, Le Temps, Jan. 24, 1919. "° Quoted in ibid. 334 BUREAUCRACY AND STATE SOCIALISM the lists against one feature, at least, of this policy. At a meeting of the Confederal Committee of the General Confederation of Labor, held on July 22, a resohilion in favor of Free Trade, the suppression of custom bar- riers, and the free entry of raw materials and manu- facturers, was adopted by a vote of ninety-one to six- teen. This was a somewhat radical departure for this Labor organization ; but it was strongly supported by the Socialists — all of the Socialist papers demanded the suppression of the exportation ban — and the city dwellers generally, who were sorely afflicted by high prices. For the public, L'Q^uvre and Le Frogres Civique denounced the theorj^ of Protection and de- manded the institution of Free Trade. It seemed that only the extremity to which the Government had car- ried the theory could rouse France from its traditional belief in this doctrine. Under the great pressure which the most divergent interests were bringing to bear upon the Government, it gradually removed some of the restrictions upon the liberty of commerce. On January 20, 1919, a decree was issued removing the bans on exportation from all but 140 articles of the 654 upon the tariff. Another measure placed all purchases for the public services under the supervision of the Minister of Finances, a move of economy. A further decree, announced in Le Temps, on May 14, 1919, removed the ban still more on exportations, only nineteen articles remaining subject to the prohibition. These included many important items such as live animals, chemicals, metals, and paper. These removals did not ai)ply to importations and consequently did not allay public criticism. But upon the 17th of iMay, a letter was published written by M. Loucheur, IMlnister of Industrial Reconstruction, 335 CONTEaiPORARY FRENCH POLITICS to M. de La Tremoille, who had laid a resolution before the Chamber asking for freedom of importation of raw materials, manufactured articles necessary to French export trade, and agricultural machinery. In this letter, the Minister stated that the ]\Iinisters had de- cided to ask the President of the Republic to sign a decree almost completely restoring the liberty of impor- tation so far as raw material was concerned ; and after adjustments with the Allies, another decree would be issued, more nearly suppressing all restrictions on im- ' portations. The ]\Iinister, who had apparently forsaken the desire to fasten this policy upon peace-time indus- try, closed by saying: "We are thus completely in accord with you . . . upon the projected resolution which you have presented." Perhaps to the surprise of the French public, the Government kept its word, for upon May 20, the Journal Officiel published a decree allowing the impor- tation of principal raw materials necessary to the re- sumption of French production. Further decrees were announced on June 19, July 7, and 8, which suppressed nearly all prohibitions on importations, about a dozen articles remaining. The value of the decrees, however, was largely overcome by the fact that they increased certain tariff rates on needed commodities to an almost prohibitive height.^^ Thus it was about eight months after the close of hostilities before the French Govern- ment surrendered its control over private enterprise. There may have been some justification to its policy ; but the dangers in which it resulted appear much greater than those it avoided. "See L'Ecnnamiste Francois, July 19, 1920, 74, " Le ESgime commercial frangais." 336 BUREAUCRACY AND STATE SOCIALISM VI The defects in functioning and the defects in theory of the French bureaucracy have been vigorously at- tacked. In addition to those opposed to the war poli- cies of the Government, there are many equally opposed to the ordinary extent and mode of operation of the Government administration. The remedy which the business interests, including the upper bourgeoisie, urge, is the return to private enterprise of activities now directed by the State. As it is extremely improb- able that the State will ever surrender any of its pres- ent industrial prerogatives, the success of such a remedy seems slight. Realizing this unlikelihood, the anti- collectivist movement has limited its demands to the prevention of future State extensions into industry. The Union of Economic Interests, embracing about sev- enty-five commercial organizations, is the leader in this movement. It was organized in 1909 with 201 insur- ance syndicates as its basis. Its purpose is to combat State Socialism and to defeat any candidate for Par- liament who does not promise to vote against measures increasing it. In the elections of 1910, the activities of the Union succeeded in pledging 366 Deputies to vote agaiust the creation of new State monopolies. In 1910, Le Reveil Economique was founded ; it has proved an energetic organ in carrying on the Union's campaigns. On the 15th of December, 1913, it assembled the presi- dents or delegates of forty great national groupings of commerce, industry, and agriculture, to inaugurate an anti-statism program for the 1914 elections. As a re- sult of its activities, 270 Deputies declared themselves against the extension of Government activities in indus- 337 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS try, 127 opposed the program set up by the Union, 29 were for it with reservations, and 164 were doubtful. At a meeting held at Paris upon the 12th of INIay, 1919, the Union adopted another program which pledged it- self to ''formal opposition to the establishment of new monopolies, to any attempt at colleetivist socialization, to any encroachment of the State upon services of a commercial and an industrial character, to the opera- tion by the State of services at present leased to indi- viduals, and, generally, to any interference of the State in the management of private enterprise. ' ' ^^ This program was submitted to the candidates for election to the Chamber of Deputies last November. Each candidate was asked to subscribe to its principles. As a result of this canvass and of the election, it was found that 377 of the elected Deputies approved the program ; 35 made reservations to it ; 96 were doubtful, and 81 were opposed to it. Despite the activities of the business interests, the statist movement seems to be growing and the evils of the bureaucracy remain unchecked. The Government has decided to convert all of its munition plants into industrial factories, operated upon a peace-time basis. It is not apparent why these plants were not sold to private firms. Bills have been introduced into the Chamber for tlie Government monopoly of insurance ^^ and for the monopoly of petrol ; the Chamber has voted a bill providing for Government participation in the profits and eventually in the operation of mines; like- wise, a bill monopolizing industrial alcohol has been " Article II of the program, printed in brochure, Union des Intercts Economiques. "Sec article on "La question du mnnopole des assurances" in Le Parlement et I'Opinion, March, 1919. 338 BUREAUCRACY AND STATE SOCIALISM passed. Agitation for Government ownersliip of hydrau- lic power is strong. In the latter part of June, 1919, M. Albert Thomas, supported by the railway men's federations, introduced a project for the nationaliza- tion of the railways. Despite the distinction which some Socialists attempt to create between Statism and Socialism,^* the French Socialists with the left wing of the Radical-Socialists are the supporters of statist policies and projects. The statist activities of Parliament are being strenuously objected to by moderate elements because of the fact that the powers of Parliament should have expired in 1918, if the war had not prevented it. It has no right, according to them, to impose its will upon an uncon- sulted country. This issue doubtlessly was one of the most important in the elections of 1919. Anti-statism is always certain to be the rallying cry of moderate Republicans. They will be supported by many collectivists because of the antipatriotism and Bolshevism with which the chief supporters of Statism, the Unified Socialists, are asso- ciated.^^ "See Emile Vandervelde, Le Socialisme contre I'Etat. ^° Two other solutions suggested for the defects of the French bureaucracy will be considered in the next two chapters: (1) decentralization by service and professional government, and (2) decentralization by regions, or the extension of local govern- ing powers. CHAPTER XI GOVERNMENT BY INTERESTS AND EXPERTS Aux lois politiques vont de plus en pliLS succeder des lots economiqiies au administratives. — Pour Gouverneb. The increase of State control over industry, of which the period of the war has given an illuminating ex- ample, is regarded by many Frenchmen as an inevitable if not a welcome evolution. Unlike the interests which desire a return to the old freedom and to the policy of laissez faire, this new school after reorganizing the basis of the present State, wishes to extend its functions. It offers one of the two real suggestions for remedying the defects of French administration — decentralization by service as opposed to decentralization by geographic regions.^ Finally, it goes much farther and suggests an entirely new political framework for the State. French administration, as previously noted, owes many of its faults to the concentration of power at the head of its various departments. Thus the Cabinet Ministers are not only part of the political government responsible to Parliament, but they are chiefs of all the public services belonging to their departments. De- pendent upon them, a great number of directors, under- directors, chief of services and inspectors exist, whose * See Chapter XII. 340 GOVERNMENT BY INTERESTS powers arc more or less extensive aeeording to the ]\Tin- istry ; and who, under the authority of the Ministers, act as agents of the Government, exercising, as a French legal authority- has stated, the tliree powers of com- mand, surveillance and control. In otlier words, these ofificials are directly controlled by, and at the absolute mercy of, the Government ; they have no other than a political status. The Government exercises complete freedom in choosing or removing them. Beneath these political agents are several hun- dred thousand ordinary employees performing the most diverse functions, many of whom, on account of their organization, already enjoy a relative permanency of position. Decentralization of service means that Government officials, particularly Government agents, will no longer be placed under the command of department Ministers, but only under their control. The increase of public services is forcing this evolution, for it has become an impossible task for the head of the department to com- mand what should be done in every case where a deci- sion is necessary. In the interest of the good manage- ment of the public services, initiative in decisions must be left with under-officials. With a decentralized ad- ministration,^ the heads of departments will only refuse to approve measures taken by subordinates when they are in violation of law, and not when they are ill- judged. The power of surveillance accompanied by a power of revocation will still rest with the central authority but it will be strictly limited to the above pur- poses. Thus the decentralized agent will have an initia- ' Leon Duguit, Traite de Droit Constitutionnel, i, 447-457. ' For an impartial discussion of administrative decentraliza- tion, sec Ilauriou, Precis de Droit Administratif, 143-154. 341 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS tive, as well as a comparative freedom from officious interference of department heads now frequently exer- cised for political or other reasons.* As a necessary complement to the granting of initiative must go the personal responsibility of the agent. Otherwise his freedom would be unrestricted. At present the ]\Iinis- ter, as head of the department, is alone responsible to Parliament, a responsibility which often amounts to nothing at all. Under a thoroughly decentralized ad- ministration, every negligent or careless service would imply a personal responsibility of the official concerned for which he could be held pecuniarily liable. The creation of a common fund by the organizations of the functionaries, supplied with a share in the profits which the French public services make, would furnish a source * Professor Jeze classifies public services into two categories: (1) those who interest the inhabitants in general, i.e., the na- tional defense, posts and telegraphs, etc.; and (2) those who, while interesting the nation as a whole, more particularly concern individuals residing in each locality, i.e., tramways, street lighting, paving etc. The second class of public services may become de- centralized to a certain point. M. Jeze states the argument as follows: "Centralization seems to have the advantage of a more impar- tial administration because the centralized agents arc less engaged in local quarrels; but this is not ahvays the case. On the contrary, a centrahzed administration is very slow, since it is necessary, for the most insignificant things, to await tlie decision of distairt authorities. Centralization places an enormous rcsiionsibiiity upon the Government, since it not only must take account of na- tional considerations, but also of the smallest details of local administration. Finally centralization does not interest the in- habitants in the management of public affairs and does not accus- tom them to govern themselves. "This, on the other hand, is the great advantage of decentrali- zation. The dominant idea of modern political science is that individuals rnust (jovern . . . themselves. The time seems to have passed when families or social classes were charged with governing or administering others. Tiulividuals more and more desire them- selves to direct tlieir affairs and to escape from the selfish rule of so-called directing families and classes and their agents. ..." Droit Public et Administratif , 132-33. 342 GOVERNMENT BY INTERESTS from which their joint responsibility could be met. Ac- cording to Professor Duguit, the sujjporter of this system, some such reorganization must be effected if the growth of the public services and the protection of the individual against the omnipotence of Government authorities is to be reconciled. This theory further implies the supplanting, by tech- nicians and experts, of those officials in the Government service who are incompetent and who owe their appoint- ments solely to political influence. The greater number of public services are technical; and, to be efficiently operated, they require skilled direction. If initiative and responsibility are to be placed on subordinate offi- cials, they must be granted to those who, by training and aptitude, are able to exercise them intelligently. This applies likewise to officials at the head of adminis- trative departments. Hence this is a movement to place the expert in the Government, and to place it upon a scientific basis. II The participation of subordinate functionaries and of experts in the control of the public services already exists to a very limited extent. By a law of 1896 the national service of education, through councils elected largely by teachers themselves, became partially decen- tralized. The University Councils are composed of the deans and two delegates elected from each faculty of the same university. Although the deliberations of this Council must be submitted to ministerial approval, nevertheless they practically control the direction of the university concerned. By decrees issued in January, 1910, M. Millerand, 343 CONTEIVIPORARY FRENCH POLITICS then Minister of Public Works, provided for the repre- sentation of the emploj'ees of the Posts, Telephones and Telegraphs in the regional councils of discipline, in the central council of discipline, and in the central promo- tions council. The personnel also choose delegates to serve with the IMinister, the department directors, and the chief of the service. As members of M. Clemenceau's last Cabinet, M. Cla- veille, the Minister of Transportation, was a railroad man; M. Victor Boret, Minister of Agriculture, was a grain merchant; M. Loucheur, I\Iinister of Reconstruc- tion, was a financier and manufacturer; M, Vilgrain, Undersecretary of State to the Food Ministry, was a miller. Thus even a few heads of departments have been selected because of their technical knowledge and experience. The Chambers of Commerce have a few governmental powers delegated to them. According to a law of April 9, 1898,^ the Government is obliged to consult their national assembly, which meets every two months in Paris, upon all matters or changes considered in com- mercial, tariff, or economic legislation. The Govern- ment, however, is not compelled to follow its advice. Of more importance, the Chambers may themselves operate certain public works and services, especially those involving ports and navigable ways; and they may conduct technical education. They may also issue certain denominations and quantities of paper money for local circulation. A special Chamber of Commerce '^ Parlemcnt et I'Oinnion, March, 1919, Du Role des Chambres de Commerce. Unlike the American Chamber of Commerce, the French Chamber is a public institution; it is established by a Government decree. There is one for every department. See Chamber of Commerce organization law, April 9, 1898, Codes et Lois, ii, 1441. 344 GOVItlRNMENT BY INTERESTS tax," pjranted tliein by the Government, insures their financial support. Except for one otlier, the President of the National Assembly of the Chambers, was the only technician appointed on the Committee of Impor- tations, a body in general charge of war importations. The Chambers are also represented in the Regional Committees of Economic Action and in local committees charged with adjusting terms for sliips requisitioned by the Government. On April 7, 1919, Le Journal Officiel announced that 136 of the Chambers of Commerce were authorized to organize themselves into seventeen groups, according to economic regions. M. Clementel, the Min- ister of Commerce, was responsible for this grouping. It was his idea '^ to associate these Chambers in a com- mon action, giving them general power to supervise the economic reconstruction of the different regions of France. A regional committee was to be formed in which the Chambers were to be represented according to their numbers. This committee was to ' ' receive from the JMinistry of Commerce a letter of service accrediting it to the different public administrations," implying that the committees would be given a part in the admin- istration of the regions and departments in which they were located. The powers which were to be accorded to these purely professional bodies were left vague ; and although the idea is received with favor in regionalist circles, it remains a question whether the Government will ever willingly give these bodies any amount of ef- fective authority. Aside from the Chambers of Commerce, other profes- "M. Lcroy, " Lcs Productcurs au pouvoir," La Grande Revue, March, 1919. '' "L 'Opinion Begionaliste," L'Opinion, April 26, 1919. 345 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS sional bodies are supposed to be consulted by the Gov- ernment. According to a law of 1852,^ Consultative Chambers of Agriculture were created to give advice upon subjects of agricultural development and coordi- nation. This functit)n, when now carried out, is left to the smaller unions of agriculturists. During the war, they have been represented upon many commit- tees such as those of Economic Action and of Agricul- tural Labor. They were likewise charged with distrib- uting fertilizer to wine growers. An old law further created the Consultative Cham- bers of Arts and IManufactures, but it is lifeless. Ac- cording to a decree of 1894 a Superior Council of Com- merce and Industry comprised of appointed members was established, which the Minister of Commerce was obliged to consult upon tariff laws and treaties of com- merce. A similar function was delegated to a Superior Labor Council, composed of seventy-two members, twenty-nine of whom were to be elected by labor unions, twenty-nine by employers' organization, one by coopera- tive societies, one by the Chamber of Commerce of Paris, one by the Bourse du Travail of Paris; there were also to be three Senators and five Deputies upon it. This Council has only a consultative role, but it has dor.e a great service in supplying the IMinistries of Labor and Commerce with invaluable Labor information, and in penetrating them with a new social spirit. A Consultative Committee of Railways is also in existence, which now has seventeen representatives of the Railway Unions upon it. During the war the Min- istry of Armament constituted permanent committees • For the law creating the Consultative Chambers of Agricul- ture, March 25, 1852, sec Codes ct Lois, ii, 477. 346 GOVERNMENT BY INTERESTS of conciliation and arbitration, composed equally of employers and workers. In the Government committee of Chemical Products, there were four specialists who were chemical manu- facturers, and two merchant specialists in chemical products. In the Central Committee on steam engines, there were five business men ; on the Inter-ministerial Committee charged with determining the national ma- chinery needs, there were five representatives of em- ploj'^ers' organizations using machinery, three machin- ery dealers and two manufacturers, as well as other representatives of the business world.® Presumably in response to the demand for compe- tence in Government, the President of the Council an- nounced on July 16, 1919, the formation of an "Eco- nomic Council charged with assuring the preparation and the execution of general measures concerning the supply and distribution of products and supplies of any nature, the diminution of the cost of living, the re- pression of si)eculation, the development of economic life and the reconstruction of the liberated regions." This council was to meet at least once a week. It was presided over by the President of the Council. It in- cluded the Ministers of Public Works, Commerce, In- dustrial Reconstruction, Agriculture, Colonies, Labor of the Liberated Regions. Its resolutions are submitted to the Council of IMinisters. To this Economic Council (which, as will be noted, is nothing but a division of the Cabinet) is to be added a commission charged with framing propositions to pre- sent to it. This commission is partially of professional " For discussion of those "War Committeos and for other examples of experts in French administration, see M, Leroy's article quoted above. 347 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS composition, for it contains: (1) the Undersecretaries of State of the President of the Council, and of the Ministries of Public Works, Finance, Interior, Food Supply; (2) the commissioner of maritime transports; (3) the president of the Section of Economic Studies of the Presidency of the Council; (4) the president of the inter-ministerial commission in the Liberated re- gions; (5) three representatives of employers' organiza- tions; (6) three representatives of labor organizations. This commission will receive opinions from munici- palities, agricultural, industrial or commercial groups, workingmen 's and employers ' organizations, and co- operative societies. The experts thus delegated to a share in the adminis- tration have been too few, according to the reformists; their powers, when exercised at all, have been merely consultative and of no binding force ; and they have always been outweighed by non-expert officials, actu- ated largely by political motives. The decentralization movement must permeate the regular Government ser- vices with this professional element which the Govern- ment has been in a partial degree forced to take into its war administration. It must increase their numbers and their power, and ultimately, it must place the com- plete control of these services in their hands. In the spring of 1919 the Ligue dcs Gauverncs was organized by ]\Iaxime Leroy, Henri Dumay, and others to agitate this development. The purpose of the organ- ization is declaredly non-partisan, and is solely directed toward the improvement of the administrative system. One of its brochures says: "We (the public) are never consulted upon the organization or the improve- ment of services wliich at every instant and in a serious manner affect our interests and our welfare. Arbitrary 348 GOVERNMENT BY INTERESTS power, negligence, and carelessness, blind and injure us. It is to reform this state of things that the Ligue des Gouvernes is founded. By its specialists of every order, it will study . . . the improvements whose need is revealed on every side, and will pursue their im- mediate application by every legal means." The League announced that it would concern itself with all of the public services which the State now exer- cises ; and its definite purpose is to improve the service of the railways, telegraphs, post offices, telephones, omnibuses, street cars, taxis, water, gas, electricity, ports, navigation, State and other monopolies, bridges and roads, tariffs and octrois, tax collection, munici- palities, burials, ministerial offices, police, insurance, recruiting, public assistance, public hygiene, and edu- cation. The more comprehensive purpose of the League is to work out a plan of organized cooperation between the Government employees and the general public through great professional groupings. The organisation of public employees is an essential element in the decen- tralization of administration and in the establishment of their responsibility. Of equal importance is the neces- sity for developing some relationship between the gen- eral public and the functionaries to insure the proper use of their decentralized power. As a matter of fact, this plan of administration is founded on syndicalism or guildism, that is, upon numerous autonomous group- ings, cooperating with each other, independent of a continued Government intervention. According to the proponents of this theory, this is really taking authority away from the State and conferring it upon experts, responsibly and efficiently organized. 349 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS III The organization of Government functionaries has met the same resistance in France which it has ex- perienced in other countries, France has two laws upon professional organizations: One, the law of 1884, which permitted the organization of professional associations, such as labor unions, for the urging of professional demands and which stated "that professional syndi- cates have as an exclusive object the study and defense of economic, industrial, commercial and agricultural interests"; the other, the law of 1901, which permitted the general organization of "associations" among those excluded from the benefits of the law of 1884. These associations were intended to be of a social and cultural nature rather than for the furtherance of strictly economic improvement.^" The Government has repeatedly refused to interpret the law of 1884 to include Government officials. By circulars issued in 1892, 1895, 1897, and 1904, different ministries denied all requests of their functionaries to organize themselves into syndicates. In 1910 the tri- bunal of the Seine declared that Government officials could not form professional syndicates such as were provided for in the law of 1884.^^ The case was upon the legality of a syndicate formed by post office em- ployees. But the Council of State in 1909 had ruled "The Organization law of March 21, 1884, is given in Codes et Lois, ii, 954. The Association law of July 1, 1901, is found in the same volume, 1483-84. " The Government has always allowed mere workers holding no authority to organize into syndicates of the 1884 type. Tlius the arsenal workers and those engaged in labor on State monopolies are legally syndicalized. 350 GOVERNMENT BY INTERESTS that functionaries might form associations under the law of 1901. The chief practical difference between the two was that a syndicate formed under the law of 1884 would probably adhere to the General Confedera- tion of Labor, in order to increase its bargaining power. The Government did not relish demands for increased Avages nor, in ease of their refusal, strikes and the dis- ruption of public services essential to the nation. A functionary, in accepting public employment, entered into a special status carrying with it the obligation to insure the continuance of governmental activities. The functionaries' retort has always been that if theirs is a special status, which limits them in this respect, it should offer offsetting compensations in permanency of position and adequac}' of income. Despite the illegality of syndicates among the postal employees, they per- sisted in maintaining their organizations and in 1009 they adhered to the C. G. T. The school-teachers (instituteurs) , a majority of whom it is said are Socialists, were pioneers in the function- aries' struggle for the privileges of the law of 1884. Their campaign was begun in 1887 when they first con- ceived the material advantages of organization. Upon Government intervention, organized labor in France was very quick in coming to their support. As a result of a motion voted in 1902 at a Congress of the Bourses du Travail, a committee on Syndical Education was ap- pointed, composed of six teachers and five workmen. In 1905, upon the occasion of a great syndicalist move- ment in France, an open struggle began between the Government and the school-teachers for the possession and exercise of this right. In the same year, the leaders in the "Instituteurs' " organization in the Seine dis- trict were arrested by the Government for attempting 351 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS to enforce its recognition ; a year later a project of am- nesty was passed and the proceedings against them were dropped. In the meantime a Central Committee for the De- fense of the Syndical Right of the employees of the State, the Departments and the Communes, was organ- ized; while on February 26, 1907, the National Federa- tion of Teachers' Syndicates was created and its statutes were filed with the Government. A year later, the Cen- tral Committee addressed to M. Clemenceau, the Presi- dent of the Council, an open letter exposing their con- ception of a new social organization and asking the benefit of the law of 188-1 upon syndicates. M. Cle- menceau denied this request, stating that the law was framed only for industrial workers, and that the Gov- ernment would not countenance a movement antago- nistic to it. The Government, however, was asked by Parliament to tolerate the syndicates of "instituteurs" already existing, while forbidding the creation of any new group. This modus vivendi existed for a number of years. But finally after the Congress of Chambery in 1912, M. Briand ordered -the syndicates dissolved, accusing them of being centers of political agitation and national disintegration. Some of the teachers obeyed ; others did not, and the members of the Syndical Coun- cil of the Syndicate of the Seine were again prosecuted. Proceedings were soon dropped, but the teachers' organizations continued to develop.^^ At present the functionaries, 300,000 of them, are grouped into a National Federation of Functionaries. "At the " I list itui curs' " Conyrcss nt Marseille, June 8, 1919, thirty-threo synilJeatcs, eig^hteen "amieal" associations, and forty- two frroups of nioliilizeil teacluTs (still in tlic army) were repre- sented. 352 GOVERNMENT BY INTERESTS They are divided into so-called Amicales, associations of the 1901 type, and illegally constituted syndicates of the 1884 type which the Government has been powerless to suppress. Their organization lias been accentuated by the almost pitiful salaries which French function- aries receive. By all odds they are the poorest paid Government officials in the world. An English official, corresponding to the French grade of redacteur, re- ceives $1,000 a year, while the French employee receives $400. When he becomes chief of a bureau the English official receives $5,000 ; the similar position in France pays $2,400. The French Ministry of Marine presented some particular abuses. Candidates for positions are re- quired to be university graduates, but such low salaries are paid (9,025 francs for the chief of the bureau down to a third-class redacteur, who receives only 2,375 francs ($■475), that it is impossible to fill the positions, fifteen of them having been open since the beginning of the war. On the 22nd of June, 1917, the Senate unanimously passed a law extending the civil capacity of professional sjnidicates by removing some of the restrictions as to property-holding, placed upon them by the law of 1884. No mention was made of extending the rights of the law of 1884 to functionaries. The bill did not come up for discussion in the Chamber until the winter of 1918. A Socialist prepared the report upon it, and when it appeared before the Deputies it contained some interesting additions, the chief one of which granted nearly all of the functionaries the right to organize. The Socialists had wished that this right be made uni- versal in its extension to 'all employees of the state, departments, and communes. But the Chamber, reticent to extend a right which would even include the judges 353 CONTP]MPORARY FRENCH POLITICS of the country and other officials upon which the public welfare vitally depended, passed a law on February 21, 1919, granting the right to organize to the func- tionaries and employees of state, departments, and com- munes, except members of the military forces, the po- lice, the magistrates, prefects and sub-prefects. The Government wished a provision inserted to prohibit defi- nitely the right to. strike among functionaries; but the Chamber, under Socialist impulsion, voted it down. On the 19th of April, the Senate voted the Chamber's law with two definite modifications. Firstly, it granted the right to organize to those functionaries holding no part of the "public power." This was an attempt to introduce a principle into the question which the Cham- ber had attempted to settle merely by a list of exemp- tions. The Senate feared that the Chamber's precedent would lead to the easy and gradual repeal of the exemp- tions until every class of Government official could le- gally organize. The Chamber, on the other hand, argued that it was impossible to draw a distinction between employees holding and those not holding public power. Secondly, the Senate included a provision to the effect that any Government employee, striking in a concerted effort to stop public services, by that act would become discharged. On the return of the bill to the Chamber, both of these jorovisions w^ere stricken out ; and on July 18, the bill was again voted with substantially the^same exemptions. The question of the legality of functionary syndi- cates, however, is largely an academic one. Not only did the organizations among the school-teachers and postal employees persist in spite of their formal pro- hibition; but other groups of Government officials or- ganized in the spring of 1919, and became affiliated 354 GOVERNMENT BY INTERESTS with the General Confederation of Labor. Many ac- cused the Government of a fatal weakness in allowing these wholesale violations of the law of 1884. The Government itself verbally protested ; but by refusing to increase the unbelievably low salaries of its officials it allowed the greatest reason for organization to re- main. On the 8th of March what was known as the "Revolt of the Functionaries" occurred. Three great federa- tions of tlie public services, the railway men, the func- tionaries, and workers of tlie State, took part at a meet- ing directed by the secretary-general of the C. G. T., and adhered to the Bourse du Travail at Paris.^^ On the 13th they voted "that all the administrative em- ployees should adhere as quickly as possible to the C. G. T. so they might participate in the organization of a more humane and just society." The "revolt" aroused the fear among public and Government circles that these organizations would now resort to strikes in order to force their demands. This insinuation was vigorously denied by functionary leaders.^* This example was followed on April 5 by the General Association of Under-Agents of the Posts which changed itself into a national syndicate affiliated with the C. G. T. On June 9, 1919, the National Union of the secretaries and employees of the French IMayors^ in its twelfth national congress, voted by 2,200 to 300 to affiliate with the C. G. T, At the same time, the French tax col- lectore at their tenth congress transformed tlieir asso- ciation into a syndicate ; and although they did not ad- here to the C. G. T., they opened negotiations with the Treasury employees to effect a union. On May 3, " The Bourses du Travail are part of the C. G, T. "See Petit Journal, March 13, 1919. 355 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS the National Federation of State, Department, and Com- mune employees expressed a desire to adhere to the C. G. T. On the 13th of May at their annual congress at Strassburg, the General Union of Customs Agents, representing twenty-seven regional groups, decided to change their association into a sjmdicate and to ask to be affiliated in the C. G. T. On the 24th of September, the Congress of the School- teachers' "Amicales," or associations of the 1901 type, voted to join the C. G. T., and become syndicates by a vote of 170 against 43. These examples suffice to show the universal organi- zation of French Government employees. "With the ex- ception, of course, of soldiers and sailors, it seems that every class of functionary is compactly grouped. The professors in the lycees'^^ are even associated through the Federation of Lycee and College Professors. The em- ployees of every Government service, postal clerks to policemen, are organized, most of them in syndicates of the 1884 type. If the present evolution continues, they will all be in syndicates and members of the Gen- eral Confederation of Labor. So far, purely economic demands have occasioned this mania for organization. This the National Congress of Functionaries, meeting on July 6, 1919, illustrated. At that time the immediate realization of salary increases by July 20 and the recognition of the syndical right in every class of officials were demanded. The Congress also invited "all the federated associations to transform themselves- into syndicates affiliated with the C. G. T. before October 1. . . ." Due to their insistent agita- tion, the Government, upon July 8, asked credits for — — f ^'^ Lycee, a school corresponding to our high school and first two years of college. 356 OOVP]RNi\IENT ]iY INTP]RESTS salary increases. Ui)()n the lOtli, the Cliainber voted necessary credits so as to advance 200 francs to all functionaries, to apply on future salary increases. To the Socialists and to the revolutionary Syndical- ists, the organization of Government employees means quite another thing than tlie amelioration of living conditions. To them it is an essential step in the as- sumption of power by the proletariat. To the advocates of decentralization, on the other hand, this organization is welcomed as the basis of administrative reform. By no means going to the length of the Socialists, they would extend the powers of functionary organizations to a direct participation in the management of public services. For example, the secondary school-teachers, through their officials, would be empowered to decide the character of education, rather than accept policies dictated by the IMinistry of Education. The Ministry might lay down a few general principles to be fol- lowed, but the teachers themselves would be given the initiative and independence in carrying on the work. Doubtless, such a system of decentralization would go to the extent where the heads of the IMinisterial de- partments and even the IMinister would be chosen from, if not elected by, the educators themselves. Competence and democracy, it is urged, would then be instilled into French administration. The organization of French functionaries is an as- sured fact ; the next step, and one of equal importance to the success of the decentralization movement, is to bring them into relationship with, and make them re- sponsible to, the public, whose interest they must serve. So far no one has offered a practical way of bringing this about. If it is not solved, any amount of power granted to great organized bodies of public employees 357 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS risks serious abuse. The public services must always be administered by officials directly responsible to the electorate. The present elective method, or that of ministerial responsibility to Parliament, to a certain theoretical extent, supplies this need. Without the establishment of responsibility, it will be impossible to allow organizations of employees any considerable in- dependence in the management of the public services. IV There are those who do not stop with the revision of French administration. They would install profes- sional competence in the legislative as w^ell as in the executive branch of the government. In other words, they advocate professional representation in Parlia- ment. Their conception of the State is that of a mere "cooperation of public services, organized and con- trolled by" ^^ the governing power. With the evolution of society these services are being continually diversi- fied. The governing power which administers these services, has no legitimate basis and there is no such thing as sovereignty.^'^ The gouvernanfs govern because they are the strongest, and tlie gouvcrncs are governed because they are weaker tlian the goiivernants. But "Leon Duj^it, Manuel do Droit Constitutionnel, 72. Professor Duguit's doctrines may be found in greater detail in his L'Etat, le Droit Objcctif ct la Loi Positive, 229 ff. Lc Droit Social, le Droit Individuel ct Ics Transformations dc VEtat, 25 ff, scq. "Professor Esmein is the most vignrons opponent of Professor Duguit, in France. Ho declarrs tliat it is anarcliy to deny the existence of sovereignty. See Ksmein, Droit Constitutionnel (4th ed.), 40. Professor Esmein also says that the Duguit theory of group control is a return to feudalism. See the 6th edition of his Droit Constitutionnel, 45. 358 GOVERNMENT BY INTERESTS the governing force is under the obligation of exercising itself through the liens of social solidarity and in the interests of all. Furthermore, the old political basis of the nation is passing away; social units such as the home and geographic political entities are being sup- planted by groupings founded upon a community of professional interest and the promise of mutual assist- ance. This grouping of French professional interests is defined as "the movement by which all of the differ- ent social classes tend to organize themselves and to give themselves a definite juridicial structure for the defense of class interests and for the conciliation, by collective contracts, freely consented to, of divergent interests. . . . Thus two governing forces actually ap- pear in France: the numerical majority of male citi- zens, and the professional syndicates. " ^^ As the func- tion and the composition of the State have changed, the government must be directed by professional group- ings, fitted for tlie task by strength and competence. In other words, the homme de 'politique must give way to the hamme des affaires — the politician to the busi- ness man. Maxime Leroy in his very remarkable book, Pour Gouverner, devoted to this new conception of govern- ment, says that the old State is based upon regalian conceptions; it is monarchical. Political philosophers have hitherto addressed their observations to it. Their arguments against State Socialism apply only to this old State based upon privilege and authority. Even our idea of democracj^ has been false. "The wisdom of number," he says, "the equality of individuals, the idea of the 'General Will' inspiring the role of citizens " Esmein, op. cit., 62. 359 CONTE]\IPORARY FRENCH POLITICS by a sort of quasi-divine illumination, the infallibility of the peojjle in its assemblies and of the Government de- liberating in its councils , . . who still dares conscien- tiously to defend these democratic forms -with a dis- interested voice ? " 19 The principles of the Revolution are unsound, but they still are retained in government ; they must be supplanted by doctrines recognizing the fundamental factors in modern life. "At our head, we ask fewer drivers of crowds, fewer professional leaders, fewer pontiffs ; but more observers, endowed with an experimental sense ; fewer masters of our spirit, but more stewards, capable of assuring the management of our common goods. . . ."^o According to M. Leroy, we must be skeptics in gov- ernment, we must be penetrated with the experimental method, which is as necessary to politics as to science. Our gouvernants must be more eager to learn than im- petuous to command. What the State needs is the participation of pro- ductive forces in its control ; and he firmly believes *'that the association of producers, employers, em- ployees, savants, artists, each of these groupings re- maining in its original sphere, without a false con- fusion of interests, is destined to regulate the tradi- tional antagonism between the gouvernants and the gouvernes, between workers and employers, between those administrating and those administered." ^^ Professional groupings are becoming stronger and are demanding an effective part in the Government. Both laborers and employers are insistent on the destrue- " Maxime Leroy, Pour Gouverner, 342. '"Ibid., 324. ^Ibid., 52. 360 GOVERNMENT BY INTERESTS tion of the old centralizing unity which excluded them from Government. The most scathing as well as the most unscientific at- tack against the system of political representation in France, has been made by Lysis, the head of the party of the New Democracy: Our method of understanding' universal suffrage is an insult to good sense. We invite 20,000 citizens living- in a certain area^^ to designate a person to represent their interests and their conceptions which they may have upon every economic, social and political question. It is easy to understand that this consultation must end in the nomination of a person who represents no one at all. From the first, he does not represent the interests of his electoi-s since the latter exercise the most diverse and often the most antagonistic professions, and since they are emjiloy- ers and woi'kers, producers and consumers, proprietors and lodgers, large merchants and small shopkeej^ers. All these interests neutralize and annul each other. There is no means of defending them all at the same time; to protect one is to destroy the other. . . . Thus a deputy inserts in his profession of faith words with a double meaning, able to make the most opposed interests believe that they are the object of the can- didate's particular solicitude. . . . Our electoral system ter- minates in selecting and bnnging into power, it may be said, mechanically, the most unfit and the most skeptical men, those the most destitute of beliefs and ideas; in a word, those who are morally and intellectually the least meritorious.^^ As a solution Lysis advocates professional representa- tion, or a legislature composed of delegates elected from and by economic interests, grouped in great categories. The Orleanist party, as part of a Royalist regime, advocates an assembly based upon professional inter- ** Under the old system, an arrondissement was the electoral district. *^ Lysis, Vers la Democratic Nouvclle. 361 CONTEMPORAEY FRENCH POLITICS ests, entirely supplanting the present political Parlia- ment. Its powers would be confined to purely profes- sional subjects. Although it does not go to this ex- treme, the Liberal Action party includes professional representation in its platform. At its Congress in 1909 it expressed the belief that "the epoch of purely politi- cal Parliaments is closed, ' ' ^* and that the Senate should be formed of professional elements. The party's advo- cacy of such a measure is suspected of being based upon a desire to secure recognition of Catholic interests in the Government. Professor Leon Duguit also outlines a system of pro- fessional representation, applying it to the Senate, but leaving the composition of the Chamber of Deputies as it now is.^^ M. Charles Benoist, as far back as 1895, advocated the election of a Chamber of Deputies by voters grouped into seven classes according to their pro- fessions: (1) agriculture, (2) industry, (3) transports, posts and telegraphs, (4) commerce, (5) public ad- ministration, (6) liberal professions, (7) capitalists.^'' Thus, according to ]\I. Benoist, instead of having 300 lawyers, professors and journalists in the Chamber, under a system of professional representation their number would be reduced to 13, while the number of deputies representing agriculture, industry, commerce, transportation, workers and employers, would rise from 120 to 450 ! A carefully worked-out plan of professional repre- sentation was devised by the League of Professional Representation and Regionalist Action, in a bill pre- sented to the Chamber upon the 29th of April, 1915. " Quoted in Jacques, op. cit., 330. "Duguit, op. cit., 167. ** Villcy, Lcs Vices de la Constitution Frangaise, 94. 362 ; GOVERNMENT BY INTERESTS Its application was limited to tlie Govcrtiment of the new regions wliieli it wished to create."' Voters of each region were to be grouped into five classes, eaeli of Avhich would elect representatives to the regional as- sembly. I'rofessions were to be divided into (1) agri- culturists, (2) merchants, (3) manufacturers, (4) lib- eral professions, (5) Government employees. It was not comiiulsory to be inscribed upon any one of these lists; those not wishing to inscribe themselves upon a pro- fessional list and tJiose not coming within the classifica- tion would be placed upon a general list. No one could be inscribed upon two lists nor could one be elected by electors of a list upon which he was not enrolled. For each of these professional electoral lists, whatever the number enrolled on each might be, there was always to be one representative. Before each election the num- ber of seats in the Assembly was to be divided among the lists; the first half was to be apportioned equally; the second half was to be divided among the lists ac- cording to their numerical importance. To insure labor representation, it was provided that upon the petition of a quarter of the legally constituted labor unions in the region, half of the seats in the first half of those equally apportioned to each professional list would be reserved for employees, the other half for employers. This proposition was not adopted by the Chamber in 1915; and it is interesting to note that in the last re- gionalist bill reported to Parliament this provision was omitted. The reason for such an omission was given by M. Jean Hennessy, the rapporteur for the Administra-« tion Commission, himself an enthusiastic advocate of the theory of professional representation, who said : "See p. 395. 363 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS It seemed desirable to many to enter upon a discussion of regional interests, that is, economic interests, representing economic groupings of the region. If an equitable solution would have been proposed, it would have been accepted by a great many of the members of your commission. But can one be found? How can the share of each association in the deliberations of the regional council be determined? The right of association . . . exists; but it is a right, not an obli- gation; in each profession an unlimited number of groups can be constituted, . . . many of them formed only of one or two persons. The practical difficulties in the proper rep- resentation of these interests appeared so insurmountable to the Commission that it was unanimous in deciding that the members of the Regional Council should hold their powers from the whole of the electoral body.^^ Such is the theory of professional representation and such are the proposals for its application. The basis of the plan is that of the grouping tendency which for the past thirty years has swept over France. Professional organization, extending to every class of French trades- men, to every form of laborer, even to the choir singers, who are organized in an Amical Association, is un- doubtedly the most marked characteristic in modern French political life. Cooperation is now the dominant form of industry. On January 1, 1914, there were 16,- 713 syndicates in France, containing: 6,GG7 agricidtural syndicat&s with 1,029,727 members. 4,9G7 industrial and commercial employers' syndicates with 403,143 members. 4,846 labor syndicates with 1,020,302 members. 233 mixed syndicates with 51,111 members. ''Jean Ilcnnessy, Beorganisation Administrative dc la France, 159. 364 GOVERNMENT BY INTERESTS Tlio.se s^'iulicatcs are in turn combined into 485 unions of syndicates : 98 ayriculttiral uuions* of syndioates. 177 employers' unions of syndicates. 201 labor unions of syndicates. !) mixed unions. The employers' unions contained 4,092 syndicates. The labor comljinations contained 4,380 syndicates. Tlie organization of French labor has been discussed in another chapter.^" The General Confederation of Labor (C. G. T.) is a powerful and an extensive organi- zation ; but it has two serious problems to face. The first is that of securing the organization and adhesion of the labor elements not yet included in it. There are 5,64:2,000 laborers in France (including woman and foreign labor), and the C. G. T. contains only 1,000,000 of them at the most. The larger part of this out- side labor is doubtless unorganized ; but a good share of it is grouped in organizations, such as the National Fed- eration of Labor, the Christian Syndicates, containing about 55,000 laborers, and the Union of Free Workmen, — antagonistic toward the C. G. T. and its high-handed direction. The C. G. T. 's second problem is that of securing the adherence of other than strictly proletariat elements, but which are necessary to the strength of the organiza- tion. AVe have already seen its success in winning over the functionaries. Going even farther, it has welcomed purely intellectual and bourgeois groupings to its bosom, surely horrifying to the shades of Karl IMarx and Georges Sorel. These accessions have increased its -"Cheron report on syndical bill passed by Senate, June 22, 1917. ^"See pp. 237-239, 365 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS membership to at least 2,000,000. It was announced on April 26, 1919, that certain university professors, be- cause of discontent with salaries and the powerlessness of their present associations to bring pressure upon the Government, were to ask the National Federation of Professors to convert itself into a sj^ndicate and join the C. G. T. On the same day the lyrical and dramatic artists, at a meeting at the Paris Bourse du Travail, organized a syndicate and adhered to the Labor Con- federation; the journalists were reported to be consid- ering the same thing. To disseminate "intellectual" propaganda, Parisian authors of radical tendencies or- ganized a group called "Clarte"; its members included such notables as Anatole France, Charles Gide, Henri Barbusse, Remain Rolland, Victor Margueritte, Georges Duhamel, and Cyril Berger. This movement appeared to be spreading so rapidly that many Paris editors be- gan to wonder* facetiously if the French Academy was going to adhere to the C. G. T. ! The stumblingblock in the way of the C. G. T. is the adherence of the peas- ant population. In imitation of the Socialists' effort, on May 17, it addressed a circular to all of its federa- tions and departmental organizations asking them for opinions upon an agrarian program. At a meeting of the Confederal Committee on May 27, it was decided to create a union federative terrienne, which after Jan- uary 1, 1920, is to have a place in the C. G. T. If the C. G. T. is successful in winning the adherence of these non-proletariat groups the failure of revolutionary syn- dicalism will be assured. The intellectual and the peas- ant classes of France are very jealous of their individ- ualism ; they will countenance no revolution ; and tlieir position in life makes the doctrine of the class struggle repugnant to them. 366 GOVERNMENT liY INTERESTS The Government has undertaken to organize group- ings in order to offset the predominance of the C. G. T. In Marcli, 1919, M. Clementel, INIinister of Commerce, organized a Federation of the Employers of Labor. M. Victor Boret, ]\Iinister of Agriculture, seemed to be re- sponsible for the organization of a General Confedera- tion of Agriculture, to include the peasant workers of France and to be independent of the General Confed- eration of Labor. 'Anotlier organization among the peasants has been effected in the Liguc des Paysans, whose purpose is ''the extension of individual property and the protection of the interests of all the producers of the soil." Among the employers 149 Chambers of Commerce provide the most general organization. The French Association of Industry and Agriculture ; the Society of Agriculturers ; the Committee of Forges ; the Committee of Forests ; the National Confederation of Commerce and Industry, composed of 150 employers' syndicates; the General Association of Textile Commerce and Industry; the Syndical Alliance of Commerce and Industry; the Union of National Industries ; the Union of Commerce and Industry; the Federation of French IManufacturers and Merchants; and the Central Committee of Coal Mines of France, are other examples of the extended organization among French business men. • The Union of Economic Interests, not solely a pro- fessional organization, but existing for propagandist purposes, is composed of the largest employers' organi- zations in France, containing about seventy-five Asso- ciations, Syndical Chambers, Federations, Alliances, and Committees, from the greatest diversity of industries. This organization represents one of the first attempts toward the representation of interests in Parliament. 367 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS In July, 1912, it organized the "Republican Group of Economic Interests," composed of over 100 members pledged against State Socialism. At the same time "The Republican Group of Economic and Social Stud- ies" was formed with an identical program. Both of these groups later united in the French "Parliamentary- Committee of Commerce." Other groups have been formed in both the Senate and the Chamber, upon purely professional bases. In the Senate there are a half dozen of such groupings, including those based upon agriculture, insurance, commerce and industries. In the Chamber there have been thirty-six economic and social groups, ranging from the defense of Breton interests to those of phy- sicians. VI From this review of economic organization in France it will be seen that the foundation for a government based on professional representation is now partl.y laid. Whether these organizations will ever be strong enough to bring about the creation of such a government is an- other question. The advantage of their existence is that they make collective bargaining l)etween labor and capi- tal a possibility. Restricted to purely economic activi- ties, functioning outside the realm of government, the creation of great economic groupings bargaining with each other, offers an application of industrial democracy which may go far in curing social ills. It is ver}^ unlikely, however, that the movement will go farther than this and take cliarge of the legislative and administi'ative functions of government. The ex- pert has his place in government, but it is a limited one ; 368 GOVERNMENT BY INTERESTS the fact that he is an expert handicaps him in the direc- tion of large affairs or in the making of great decisions stretching beyond the field in which he is skilled. Men with a general knowledge of a great number of things, men with tact and an intimacy with human nature, men who can compromise means without compromising ends, must always be the gouvernants. Technicians, by all means, should be given a free field and full responsi- bility in the activity in which they are expert ; but the coordination of politics must be left to men of larger capacity who are directly responsible to political bodies. As Professor Joseph Barthelemy has pointed out in his recent book on Le Problcnhe de la competence dans la dcmocratie, a strong democracy should be conducted by men of general culture, administered by specialists, and controlled by public opinion. But it is essential for a democracy, as for any regime, to possess an elite well prepared for the task of direction. The professional man in legislation presents even stronger difficulties than in administration. However successful a porcelain merchant may be, he is probably ignorant of other economic affairs, such, for example, as the tariff on steel. A Chamber composed of pro- fessional men, elected purely for their business knowl- edge, would individually be competent in regard to everything; but collectively it would be competent in nothing.^^ Furthermore, despite the assertions of such philoso- phers as Professor Uuguit and Maxime Leroy, govern- ment has not only economic problems to solve ; legisla- tion is not wholly a matter of commerce, markets or stocks ; representatives are not intended to be mere '^ For an aroriiment against professional representations, see Villey, op. cit., 92-96. 369 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS lobbyists, securing appropriations or protection for their constituents. Especially in France, legislative prob- lems are becoming increasingly economic ; but they will never become entirely so and they must be approached from other than economic points of view. Questions of national education and of culture ; questions de- termined purely by political philosophies, i.e., federal- ism versus centralization, have only an indirect bearing on economics. In regard to questions of foreign policy, daily becoming more important and requiring a general knowledge of history, geography, diplomacy and human nature, a glass-blower or even an iron merchant would doubtless be ignorant. On the other hand, questions considered from mereh^ a productive standpoint will receive an entirely different solution when coordinated with other considerations; for example, the extension of the government into private enterprise, from the economic standpoint is wasteful, inefficient, and some- times even corrupt. • From the standpoint of labor, of industrial democracy and of the prevention of profiteer- ing and private monopolies, such an extension may be- come desirable. What is necessary is a balancing of interests, involving a broad knowledge of them all and a capacity for fair judgment, in which a system of pro- fessional representation would fail. From the standpoint of national unity the results of professional representation would again be highly ques- tionable. The excessive number of French political parties, it is recognized, causes a great many of the defects in French government ; but a system of pro- fessional representation, to include all the industrial categories of the country, would undoubtedly exag- gerate the number of groupings in Parliament. Each grouping, having the material interests of its own pro- :57() GOVERNMENT BY INTERESTS fession at heart, would onp:age in barters and conces- sions fatally harmful to the national unity and wel- fare. There would not be the Three Estates of feudal assemblies but a countless number of equally harmful antagonisms. As M. Jean Hennessy concluded, the practical diffi- culties in the way of professional representation are in- surmountable. Groupings and professions are changing in composition and character. The proletariat is con- stantly merging into the jyetit hourgeais, and the latter merges into the rentier, making their accurate classifica- tion into professional categories impossible. These objections many upholders of competence in government realize. The Liberal Action party, the Union of Economic Interests, the National Association for the Organization of Democracy restrict their pro- fessional bodies to purely consultative duties. Consulta- tive bodies, composed of professional representatives, would doubtless improve legislation. As noted, the French Government is utilizing their services, but the very fact that they are merely consultative prevents the enforcement of their advice upon Parliament. That force can come only from a vigorous and an enlightened public opinion guided, as Parliament must be, by other than strictly economic motives. There appears to be only one cause which will force, the institution of professional representation upon France. That is the imminence of Socialist and Syn- dicalist success. The alarming growth of the C. G. T. has already caused the bourgeois interests, partly in- stigated by the Government, to group themselves in self- defense. If the Socialists and the C. G. T. become able seriously to threaten the overthrow of the present form of government, these other bourgeois organizations will 371 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS be willing and doubtless strong enough to substitute a government based upon all economic interests. Such a government of "guild" syndicalism, offered as a com- promise, may appease the advocates of revolutionary syndicalism. The defects in theory of such a "professional" gov- ernment appear to be grave. Yet it is very doubtful if they will outweigh the defects in our present govern- mental systems. Democracy is still in its apprentice- ship, and it contains many defects whose real cause of existence is public apathy. In France, especially, ma- terial considerations rather than political theories in- fluence governments. This perhaps is due to the French tendency to appeal to the State for all personal as well as collective needs. This tendency itself appears to be both a cause and a result of French statism. At any rate, the present generation has no Montesquieus or Benjamin Constants to expound theories to it. If it had, perhaps the governments of all democracies would be improved. But it is more reasonable to believe that, however logical their doctrines, this age woiild not listen to them. Practical considerations and an eco- nomic opportunism seem to rule the political world. CHAPTER XII regional.ism:^ II y a en France trop d' influence centrale; je voudrais rrwins dc force a Paris ct 2>lius dans cliaque localitc. — Napoleon. A product of long centuries, France has a centralized or "unitary" government, the direction of which is almost entirely vested in Paris.^ Although the French Parliament now exercises immense power, this authority has often varied with an altered constitutional regime. But in matters of administration, especially of local af- fairs, there has been slight change since Napoleon I left France its present form of administrative organization. Powers of local bodies have been extended or con- tracted; but the fundamental principles of French de- partmental administration^ have remained aloof from political battles. ^ This chapter, dealing with decentralization by the creation of regions, outlines the third remedy proposed for the defects of the French bureaucracy. ^ ' ' Paris is in the habit of governing France. For two centuries in this centralized country, the word of commafid has come from the capital. ..." G. Hanotaux, Contemporary France, i, 15. "France, inhabited by a population of different origins, subject on her frontiers to the attraction of neighboring Powers, can only preserve her power, and perliaps her existence, by making constant sacrifices to the cause of unity. ' ' Hanotaux, op. cit., i, 239. *For a discussion of French administrative law, see the dif- ferent Traites de Droit Administratif , by Professors Berthelemy, Hauriou, Mor^au, and Jeze. 373 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS France is divided into eighty-six departments,* each one of which is directed by a Prefect who is appointed and removed at will by the President of the Republic through the Minister of the Interior. The office is therefore a political one and the incumbent is usually displaced with a change in ]\Iinistry. Two principal duties fall to it — that of directing matters of general administration, applicable to the whole country, and that of the direction of the local department affairs. The Prefect is theoretically an immediate agent of the Ministry of the Interior, but really he carries out or- ders from all the IMinisters. He is absolutely subject to them in the execution of general laws and decrees; but in such matters as the direction of the police and the supervision of local bodies, he has more freedom. In the greater number of cases, he can still be overruled by the Government and he can always be removed. ^Vhatever independence he may have is largely lost by the pressure which the deputies of the department exert upon him. Consequently questions of policy usually are referred to Paris for decision. Thus the centralized control over department administration is nearly ab- solute, and- the Government at Paris concentrates tre- mendous powers in its hands. In theory this power is not exercised irresponsibly, for the parliamentary re- sponsibility of the Minister of the Interior prevents too flagrant abuses of administration. But at the same time, the vast centralization of power and the tremen- dous extent of governmental activity enables an enor- mous amount of patronage to be disposed of, for politi- * Excluding the three new departments (Moselle, Haut-Ehin, and Bas-Rhin) formed out of Alsaee-ljorrainc. 374 REGIONALISM cal purposes; and the actions of the Prefect are largely controlled by such considerations."' The Prefect is assisted in matters of general admin- istration by a Prefectoral Council, composed of three or four members ajipointed by the President of the Re- public. But with tlie exception of its duties as an ad- ministrative tribunal, its powers are purely advisory. The representative body of the Department is the General Council.^ Each canton of the Department elects one member to this Council for a term of six years, one half of the members retiring every three years. The Council holds only two short sessions a year; and, as may be imagined, it has no important powers. It may adopt resolutions upon purely local matters not connected with general politics. It appor- tions direct taxes among the arrondissements. It may participate in the administration of highways and edu- cation, etc. But all of its acts are subject to the veto of the Government. The Prefect carefully guides its deliberations. He prepares the budget which it must vote. When the Council does vote a measure which it regards as a law, its execution is entirely dependent upon the Prefect; the Council cannot enforce it. The Prefect, on the other hand, can enforce his own decrees as law. The very existence of the Council is dependent upon the Central Government for the latter may dis- solve it, except when Parliament is in.session. °Sce Jean Hennessy, Beorganisaiion Administrative de la France, 12. • For a detailed study of the powers of the governing bodies in France, particularly tliose of administration, see Gaston Jeze, Elements (in Droit Public ct Adnii>tist)-atif. The powers of the department, the arrondissement, and the commune are discussed, 138-160. See also Hauriou, Precis de Droit Administratif, 258- 333. 375 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS Unfortunately, the powers of tlie general councils appear to be in the process of curtailment. Under a law passed August 10, 1871,^ these bodies could defi- nitely legislate upon the construction and the conces- sion (lease) of local railways. But this power was taken away from them in a law passed July 31, 1913, which provided that thereafter departmental assemblies could not even enter into a formal inquiry of such pro- jects without first securing the authorization of the Government. The State justified this law on the ground that it already subventioned local railways, and that General Councils had appeared too radical and too ex- travagant in the granting of privileges. But, neverthe- less, another step was taken toward the decrease in local governing power.* In the matter of public works, the Central Govern- ment has also intruded upon the Council's activity. Formerly, the highway service of every vicinity was controlled by the General Council of each department under the terms of the Organization law of 1871, a power which apparently had been exercised with profit and discretion. But the Government, wishing to unify the road services under the Board of Bridge and Road Engineers already in charge of national roads, recently deprived the General Council of another of the few pre- rogatives left it. Similarly, the Central Government has taken over the service of social assistance and of public hygiene, an essentially departmental and local function. By a law passed on March 15, 1893, ui)on gratuitous medical as- Tor the General Council law of August 10, 1871, see Codes et Lois, COG. "Sec Boueheron, "La 1\ (forme Administrative aprrs la- Guerre" in the June, July, August, IIMS, numbers of La Revue Politique ct Varlcmcntaire. 376 REGIONALISM sistanc'o, the right of individuals to medical aid was substituted for former optional assistance, limited to public resources. This law was of unquestionable social benefit ; but it necessitated additional funds. However, instead of levying a special tax upon the departments or communes, Parliament preferred to subvention groups of departments directly; the departments, in turn, each receiving their share, were to subvention the communes within them. With the establishment of State financial aid, the Central Government in Paris laid down rigid rules, making for complete and unintelligent uniformity in the administration of medical assistance. The law virtually provided for the detailed operation of this charity, and .under the guise of financial support, it passed wholly out of the competence of the Depart- ments and the General Councils. The law of February 15, 1902, on the Protection of Public Health contained the same financial and regula- tory provisions. Likewise the law of 1905 upon Old Age Assistance, the law upon Numerous Families, and the law on Maternal Assistance provided for the in- direct control of the Central Government over charities hitherto and more intelligently directed by local bodies. Localities no longer care for their poor as under the ecclesiastical laws and the laws of the Revolution. The result of the change, according to French students," has been to create an undignified scramble among com- munes ^for department subventions, to overlook the needs of intelligently administered charities, and to im- pose upon the dignity of the poor. From the financial standpoint, extravagance in charity administration has greatly increased. ' See Louis Boucheron 's article cited above. 377' CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS By these means, the powers once exercised by the General Councils have gradually been taken away by the Central Government until, as representative bodies, they are inactive and uninfluential. When the General Council is not in session, a Departmental Commission, usually composed of from four to seven members, sits as a permanent bodj^; but like the Council, it has no power of control over the Prefect. The arrondissement is an administrative subdivision of the department. There are 362 of them in France. Each is directed by a sub-prefect, a representative of the' prefect and the Central Government, who usually amounts to nothing more than a political ^gent, relying for advancement upon winning the electoral support of the arrondissement for the Government. The people are represented in an Arrondissement Council, usually com- posed of nine members elected by manhood suffrage for a term of six years. But this Council has little power because the arrondissement has no property and no budget. Consequently, its activities are restrained to apportioning among the communes the quota of taxes allotted to the arrondissement by the General Council. The arrondissement is an artifical unit, and especially since the abolition "of the scrutin d' arrondissement in the elections to Parliament,^*^ there are few reasons for its existence. The arrondissoments, in turn, are divided into can- tons, of which there are now about 3,000. The canton likewise has no personality although it is used as an electoral and a judicial unit. It serves as a district for the Justice of the Peace and for choosing members of "See pp. 162 ff. 378 REGIONALISM the General and tlio Arrondissemcnt Councils. It has few, if any, adniinisti'ative functions. The commune, of Avhicli tliere are more than 36,000, is the hasis of local govennnent in France. ^^ Its size varies from the smallest village to the largest city. With the exception of Paris, Lyons, and Marseille, every commune possesses the same form of government. The Mayor of the commune corresponds to the Prefect of the department. He is the agent of the Central Government and the administrator of local affairs. Although not directly appointed by the President of the Eepublic, he is not directly responsible to the people, for he is elected by the communal council of which he must be a member. He serves for a term of four years and is assisted by adjaints whose number varies with the size of the commune. The Mayor has considerable ap- pointive power, and, with the exception of the police, he also may suspend or dismiss any municipal officer. The only authority able to review his acts in this regard is the Council of State, the highest administrative court in the Republic. He also has general charge of the financial affairs of the commune. But the Mayor's de- cisions upon matters such as communal policy and pub- lic health can usually be annulled by the Prefect, who in many instances can order him to carry out certain measures. Financial accounts must be submitted to the Prefect for approval. The Prefect may suspend the ]\Iayor from office for a month ; the Minister of Interior, for three months; and the President of the Republic may remove him altogether. Thus the Mayor is actually " For an extended account of the powers of communes, com- munal councils, mayors and other municipal officials, see L. Mor- gand, La Loi Munidpale, 2 vols. 379 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS subjected to the ^*eatest restraint, and conformity -with the desires of the Central Government is assured. The Communal Council, the representative body of this unit, varies in size, according to the population, from ten to thirty-six members. It is elected by man- hood suffrage for a term of four years. The powers of this body are much more extended than those of the General or Arrondissement Councils. Many of these powers, however, are subject to approval by higher officials, such as measures involving the disposal of municipal property, the control of streets, and the framing of the communal budget. In the latter, the Prefect may increase or diminish receipts ; but with several exceptions, he can only reduce and not increase expenditures. In the matters of fire protection, mu- nicipal cemeteries, parks and other local services, how- ever, the Council and Mayor exercise an independent control. But the Prefect can always suspend the Mu- nicipal Council for a month ; while the President of the Republic may entirely dissolve it and appoint a com- mission with limited powers to direct the commune for a period not longer than two months, when a new coun- cil must be elected. Here again the Central Government weighs down with a firm hand.^^ The extent of Government intervention in strictly communal affairs is shown b}' several incidents con- nected with the municipality of Lyons, the second largest city in France. During the war when the Cen- tral Government shoukl have been completely occupied with problems of national defense and when the cities would naturally have been allowed to exercise their " For a more extended description of the local system of govern- ment in France, see Munro, Tlw Government of European Cities, Chapter I. 380 REGIONALISM greatest initiative, the city of Lyons could not even revise a street-cleaning contract without securing the approval of the Government in the form of a regular decree. This case was in regard to an agreement with a IMadame INFonin relative to the collection of dirt upon the city streets; tlie decree was issued September 24, 1917. Another example occurred on the same day when the Government approved an agreement entered into by the Mayor of Lyons and a Blast Furnace Company at Pont-a-Mousson for the delivery of some water pipes.^^ By these means the Central Government at Paris defi- nitely checks, or at least controls, local autonomy and independence. Particularly as to the commune, a French student writes : UnfortvTnately, the French commune does not yet have its liberties. Placed under the nominal dependence of the pre- fect and his ministers ... it can only act, develop and pros- per with the permission of irresponsible bureaus; it can only reform with the consent of foreign scribes and be resigned to interminable delays. In order to make a local affair "emerge," as it is said, from a ministry . . . veritable exorcisms are necessary.^* Such is the present state of centralization in local government. It presents two vital objections : Firstly, it deprives the people of a direct participation in what should be purely communal activities. With the excep- tion of a very few local officials, the only elected repre- sentatives are deputies, and the members of the general arrondissement, and communal councils. Elections do not come with the frequency necessary to inspire public interest in local affairs. In addition to the small num- " Quoted in E. Hcrriot, Crccr, ii, 187, note. '*Ibid., ii, 186. 381 conte:\iporaiiy French politics ber of officials popularly chosen, interest in their selec- tion is further diminished by the complete subordina- tion in which they are held. AVhen representative bodies have their natural powers absorbed by a distant au- thority, the training of citizens in the responsibility of government — a training which they must have if a democratic regime is to be a success— is prevented. The success of American Government institutions has its roots in the New England town meetings, and in local governments everywhere carried on by citizens, inde- pendent of bureaucratic interference. In France, on the other hand, and for historic reasons previously dis- cussed, the Republic is fed from above. This is per- haps its greatest weakness. Secondly, the centralization of local governing powers in Paris makes for confusion and inefficiency. The testimony of Frenchmen offers the most conclusive evi- dence. M. Barthe, in introducing a resolution for de- centralization, said to the Chamber : Conceived and developed by the adminLstrative authority it- self, our administrative system is too visibly inspired by the solicitude of hierarchical control and not enough by the solici- tude of sei-\'ice. Fonnalistic to an excess, our administrations are increasingly clogged with red tape and routine. They create serious obstacles to the economic activity of the country by their systematic ignorance of the realities ... of produc- tion and exchange.^^ M. Jean Hennessy, one of the foremost advocates of decentralization by the increase of self-governing pow- ers, has written: Before 1914 an over-centralized France adapted itself with difficulty to the great economic transformations of the cen- tury; it did not exploit all of its natural resources; it did not profit from its incomparable geographic jiosition. Its " Quoted in Hennessy, op. cit., 134. 382 REGIONALISM economic wealth was developed too slowly; the convergence of its railway system tuwaid Paris did not sullieiently place its different rejjions in relation with each other and with f(jr- ei.c:n countries. The interior of the country was not connected by means of communication directed toward the ports, with foreitjn countries; liver navigation Avas not organized; new Avaterways had not been develojjed; heavy merchandise could not reach the coast without being overburdened with enormous freight; lacking return freiglit and because they could not find well-equipped ports, the great ships of commerce turned away from our coasts; and our merchant marine, notwith- standing large subventions, did not, so to speak, exist.^^ Senator Ilerriot expressed the opinion of perhaps the majority of Frenchmen when he wrote in regard to the accnmnlating ills of over-centralization, as follows: Our administrative regime appears to-day as a mosaic. It bon'ows elements from all the former regimes. The concep- tion of authority has prevailed over the tendency to liberty. The French communes lack liberties granted to similar units in foreign countries. The departments are administered by prefects whom usage has made sort of electoral intendants, displaced according to the caprices of central or local politics. The communes remain in wardship. The department no longer has the advantages of liberty nor the benefits of national administration. . . . The Kepublie has had eminent Prefects in general, entirely due to their own personality. But to what removals have they not been coudenmed? Hazard reduced them; hazard raised them. The political shoal has little by little corrupted the institution. Gari"otted mayors, imcertain prefects; this is what our democracy retains to assure our future. It deserves better. A victorious France cannot, with- out essential injuiy, be content with such a regime — which is neither that of authority or that of liberty.^" The celebrated words of Lamonnais epitomize these defects as follows: "AVith centralization, yon have apo- plexy at the center and paralysis in the extremities." "Ibid., 114. " Creer, ii, 179. 383 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS To understand the movement, present and historical, for the restoration of local governing powers in France, a brief history of their development will first be given. II French centralization is a result of long centuries which worked for the creation of French unity and the French nation. From a country originally composed of feudal holdings, independent and antagonistic, in which the king was merely a baron upon his limited estates along the Seine and the Loire, a nation has emerged. The feudal domain was gradually absorbed into the royal domain; seigneuries were united and feudal power was transferred to the king. A continual series of foreign wars, of attacks by or upon enemies on every side — Spain, England, Austria, Prussia, Swe- den, and the Netherlands — stimulated this process and brought the royalty greater power. AVar was always imminent and a strong central authority became a con- tinuous necessity. It was Louis XIV who crowned the work of French unity. At his accession France divided its legal juris- diction between a written law and local custom. A majority of Frenchmen w'ere ignorant of the national language. France was simply a federation of provinces, each of which used its own laws. The Chancellor used two seals, one for Dauphine, the other for the rest of the kingdom. Cities were independent citadels. Re- gional States-Generals, established by financial neces- sity, cried for independence. But through the inten- dants, the predecessors of the modern prefects, the king overcame local independence and centralized adminis- 384 REGIONALISM tration ; armies, cities, provinces, judges, came under his direct control. Louis XIV traced the outlines which Napoleon was to fill. The weakness of succeeding sovereigns postponed the completion of the work Louis had started. The Revolu- tion found France still a divided and morcellated coun- try. Lorraine was regarded as a foreign province ; Beam demanded a distinct sovereignty; Dauphine pre- tended to be at the same time in and out of the king- dom; Boulogne and Navarre started separatist move- ments, declaring null the royal edicts joining them to France. The situation confronting the Revolution was a serious one and led to the appeal for unity without which the Revolution could not succeed. The Con- stituent Assembly of 1789 ^^ relied upon a common devo- tion of the communes of France to the fatherland to en- force this unity. The institutions of local government which it established were marked, consequently, by local independence. The Assembly divided France into about eighty-five departments, which in turn were formed into districts. The intendant, a regalian office, was sup- pressed and elective officials held the executive control of the departments. The central power had no repre- sentatives in local assemblies. The communes or parois- ses, of which there w^re about 44,000, were uniformly organized as self-governing units with a mayor and council elected by nearly universal suffrage. They also were practically independent of the central authority. The Revolution thus achieved a democratic and a de- centralized system of self-government ; but French unity had not become firmly enough established to prevent the " A brief history of French administrative organization and decentralization since 1789 will be found in G. Jeze, Elements du Droit Public et Administratif, 134-137, 385 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS abuses of such extensive liberty. Consequently in 1795, because of the excesses of the Reign of Terror which arose under local governing bodies uncontrolled by the central authorities, a reorganization became nec- essary. The Directory immediately upon coming into power suppressed the communes as a self-governing unit and substituted for them the canton, whose ad- ministration was placed in the hands of a directory of five to nine members popularly elected. As many small communes were grouped into a single canton, much of the local and unrestrained independence was destroyed. Although this cantonal system led to a more effective control of the country, it could not become the satis- factory basis of local government because the canton was an artificial division. The commune, by tradition and by natural boundaries, has been and always will be the natural unit of local administration. Napoleon may have recognized this fact, for in Feb- ruary, 1800 (twenty-eight pluviSse, Year VIII), upon his advent to power, he reestablished the commune as the governmental unit. Completely out of sympathy with popular demands for freedom in government, he did away with the election of officials. Henceforth mayors, adjoints and couneilmen were to be appointed by the central regime. The department was retained, but at its head was placed an appointive prefect; the arrondissoments appeared in place of the old districts, and were presided over by the sub-prefect, also ap- pointed. These features the Third Republic still main- tains. With the growth of the Empire, France little by little lost its local and regional liberties. To these centralizing tendencies, men like Villele and Corbiere were not slow in ol)jecting. But no funda- mental change in the Napoleonic administration was 386 REGIONALISM made even after the Restoration in 1815. Numerous projects appeared urging the extension of local self- government. In 1829 the Martignac project was intro- duced, substituting the election of the general and arrondissement councilors for their appointment by the central power; but it failed of passage and caused the fall of the cabinet. It was only after the Revolution of 1830, bringing Louis Philippe into power, that this movement bore fruit. By the laws of 1831 and 1837 municipal governments were reorganized so that coun- cilors could be elected indirectly by a suffrage based on property and educational qualifications. The mayors and adjoints still were appointed, but were now to be taken from members of the council ; the municipal coun- cils were granted limited power in certain matters of local administration. In 1833 slight changes were also made in departmental organization. The Revolution of 1848 gave a new impulse to the movement for decentralization. A project with that purpose was submitted to the Council of State, which provided for the substitution of commissions of the arrondissements, formed of the general councilors of each arrondissement, for the old arrondissement and canton councils. But the National Assembly did not approve the measure. How^ever, municipal councils in communes of not more than 6,000 inhabitants were per- mitted to select their own mayors. But the larger cities continued under the old jurisdiction. The Second Em- pire in 1852 took away this privilege from the com- munes, and the Government also abolished the practice of choosing mayors from members of the municipal council. The entire spirit prevalent in the Government of Napoleon III was in complete agreement with that of 387 CONTE]\IPORAItY FRENCH POLITICS Napoleon Bonaparte.^^ The prefects exercised complete power not only over the departments but over com- munes. In 1866 and 1867 laws were passed somewhat enlarging the attributes of the general and municipal councils, but they were already so effectively controlled by the central authority that municipal life remained practically extinct. This repressive policy naturally met with opposition. Demands for reform culminated in the program of Nancy in 1865, to which representatives of nearly every political faith adhered — Berryer, de Broglie, Casimir- Perier, d 'Haussonville, J. Simon and Jules Favre.^" This conference proved a landmark in the movement for self-government. It officially gave birth to the regional idea — the creation of a region of considerable powers, supplanting and greater than the department — although several writers had previously made the sug- gestion. Auguste Comte in 185-4 urged the grouping of departments into seventeen regions; while Le Play, in his Reforme Sociale en France in 1864, urged the group- ing of the departments into thirteen "provinces." The Assembly of 1871, after bringing the war to a close, partly occupied itself Avith the administrative re- organization of France, As a temporary measure it de- cided, except for a few alterations, to return to the sys- tem used in 1848. One of these changes was that in all cities, except those having over 20,000 inhabitants, the mayors might be chosen by the municipal councils. The Assembly having retained the general features of the centralized government laid down by Napoleon I, op- "Sec De la Gorcc, Histoire du Second Empire, ii, 48 et seq. for Napoleon III and decentralization. ^'' For the Nancy projjram, as advocated before the National Assembly, see G. Hanotaux, op. cit., i, 234, 235. 388 REGIONALISM I)()siti()n in favor of incroasocl local freedom arose in the Third Republic. In an effort to silence it by oppres- sion, and to make its own position permanent, the ]\Iac- Mahon Government secured the passage of a law in 1874 which suppressed the right of communes to choose their own mayors. This law was repealed upon the accession of a new government in 1876; and in 1882 every com- mune, regardless of its size, was allowed to choose its own administrative officials. On April 5, 1884, a munic- ipal code ^^ was promulgated combining and organizing the many different laws upon municipal government which previous regimes had framed. "With the excep- tion of a few amendments, it provides the present basis of municipal organization in France, which has been outlined at the beginning of the chapter. Ill Throughout the history of this development two cur- rents of reform may be discerned. The first limited itself to the extension of the powers of local assemblies and units at present in existence. Such a movement was successful enough to extend the financial powers of the general councils by a law passed in July, 1898, and also those of the municipal councils, in a law passed on April 7, 1902. ]\rore recent attempts for increasing the powers of local assemblies are too numerous to re- count. Three propositions upon communal organiza- tion were introduced in Parliament about 1900; since then, at least thirteen propositions upon cantonal or- ganization and eleven bills, upon departmental organiza- "For the Law of Municipal Organization of April 5, 1884, sec Codes et Lois, ii, 9.55-967. 389 CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS tion, including the suppression or the reduction of the uiidcr-prefect, have also been introduced. The re- forms advocated place much of the present initiative of the prefect upon the general council, and free hira from the constant interference of Paris authorities. A few even advocate the election of the prefect or of the under-pref ect ; many advocate the total suppression of the arrondissement. The extension of the powers of the commune receives the strongest supporters because it is the natural and traditional unit of government in France.^^ The increasing responsibilities of niunicipal- " The most extensive effort toward decentralization in France was that attempted by the Paris Commune of 1871. According to the Official Journal of the Commune (April 20, 1871)," it de- manded: "The absolute independence of the Commune and its extension to every locality in France; the assurance by this means to each person of his rights in their integrity. . . . The independence of the Commune will have but one limit — the equal right of indepen- dence to be en.ioyed by the other Communes who shall adhere to the contract. It is the association of these Communes that must secure the unity of France. * ' The inherent rights of the Commune are these : the right of voting the Communal budget of receipts and expenditure, of regulating and reforming the system of taxation, and of directing local services; the right to organize its own magistracy, the inter- nal police and public education ; to administer the property be- longing to the Commune ; the right of choosing by election or com- petition, with responsibility and a permanent right of control and revocation, tlie communal magistrates and officials of all sorts. . . . ' ' Paris desires no more than this, with the condition, of course, that she shall find in the Grand Central Administration, com- posed of delegates from the Federal Communes, the practical recognition and realization of the same principles. . . . The unity which has hitlierto been imposed u])on us by the Empire, the Monarchy, and the Parliamentary Government is nothing but a centralization, despotic, unintelligent, arbitrary, and burdensome. Political unity as arty), 34-35 Minister of State, 58 Minister without portfolio, 57 Ministerial instability, 56 ; num- ber of changes under Third Republic, 59 ; compared with England, 59 ; causes lack of Cabinet leadership, 60; leads to dominance of Parliament over Ministers, 64; group sys- tem, a cause for, 54-56; ex- aggeration of the defects aris- ing from, 61-64 ; overcome by permanent functionaries, 62; and by public opinion, 76-78 Ministerial ' ' participation, ' ' Socialist opposition to, 37, 123, 258; changed attitude during war, 94-96, 104 Ministerial responsibility, 60, 220-222, 223, 224, 226, 230, 342, 358, 374 Ministry, dependence of, on Parliament, 60 ; reconstruc- tion of, 62 ; members not ne- cessarily members of Parlia- ment, 202, 222 ; composition of, during the war, 57, 94, 96, 104 ; power of, over adminis- tration, 340-342; over local government, 374; Millerand (1920), 202 Ministry of the Interior, 59, 272, 374, 379, 393, 398 Minorilaires (see also Socialist party) ; 98-106, 285, 299 Mirabeau, cited, 158 Mistral, Prederic, 394, 395 Mistral, M., 41, 98 Monarchists. See Orleanist party. Legitimists, and Bona- partists Monattc, Pierre, 240 Monis Government, 86, 160 Monoj)olies, State. See State Socialism, Nationalization Monroe Doctrine, Prench inter- pretation of, 483-485 Montesquieu, 214, 227, 372 Morality. See Alcoholism, Pros- titution, Bribery Muel, Leon, cited, 59 Multiple voting. Sec Family vote, ' ' Father 's vote ' ' Mun, M., 6, 18 Murat, Prince, 197 Nancy program, regionalist (1865), 388, 394; Radical (1907), 29 Napoleon I, 9, 19, 232, 373, 385, 388, 407, 415, 416, 417, 430, 458 Napoleon III. 5, 10, 155, 216, 233, 387 Napoleon, Prince, 10 Napoleon, Victor (sec also Bo- napartists), 9 National Assembly (1871-1875), 3S8, 497; parties in, 5, 55; monarchical majority in, 215; effect of, on constitution, 216 National Assembly, to elect the President of the Republic, 200, 219; to amend the Con- titution, 227 National Association for the Organization of Democracy, 44, 223, 228, 371 National Association of Econ- omic Expansion, 333 517 INDEX National Federation of Func- tionaries, 61, 352 National Socialists. See Ee- publican Socialists Nationalists, 9 Nationalization (see al^o Rail- roads, Socialism, Syndical- ism), 115, 120, 138, 183, 225, 242, 338, 370, 499 New Democracy, party of. See Beinocratie Nouvelle New York Herald, 297 Newspapers. See Press and Journalism Notre Voix, 288-289 Nusellard, Major, 296, 297 Octroi, 243, 349 (Euvre, 188, 283, 310, 335, 482 Ogg, F. A., cited, 226 ' ' Old Diplomacy, ' ' principles of, 405, 406, 425, 431, 435, 446, 450, 454, 465 "Opportunists," 27, 79 Ordre Public, 11, 28 Organization, law of (1884), 350, 352, 353 ; industrial, nec- essary to professional repre- sentation, 360, 364, 368; ex- tent of, 364-368 Orleanist party (see also Phi- lippe VIII, Action Fran- ^aisc), 9, 11, 234; in Assem- bly, 1871-1875, 5; demands an absolute monarchy, 12-13; so- cial and religious program of, 6, 14, 361-362, 399; organiza- tion of, 15; strength of, 15- 16, future of, 132 Ostrogorski, M., 139 "Pacification," policy of, 79, 80 Painlcve, Paul, 42, 63, 104, 189, 197, 203 Pams, Jules, 63, 87, 88, 162, 164, 258, 259 Paris, Count of. See Count of Paris Parliament (see also Chamber of Deputies, Senate groups. Political parties) ; dominance of, over Ministry, 64-69 ; per- manent commissions of, 53, 71-73; sessions of, 69, 161, 181, 199; during the war, 69-76; never dissolved since 1877, 70, 222; political groups in, 48, 204 Parliamentary form of govern- ment (see also Ministerial in- stability), as distinct from the congressional form, 46, 214, 224, 230; parties neces- sary to, 47, 139; difference between French and English system, 53, 57, 60, 70; de- fects in French system, 56, 213, 228; unfair criticisms of, 61-64; changes in, during the war, 69-76 Parti Socialiste de France, 35 Parti Socialiste Frangais, 35 Parties. See Political parties Pau, Eadical Congress (1913), 50, 89, 134, 206 Pays, 283, 482 Peace Conference (see Treaty of Versailles, Indemnity, In- ternational military force), 122, 276, 286, 299, 404, 415, 423, 434, 468 Peace Treaty. See Bonds, In- demnity, International mili- tary force, Saar, League of Nations, Treaty of Versailles Peasants, growth in number of, 38; attitude of, toward So- cialism, 37-40; attempted or- ganization of, 366, 367 Perot, Eaoul, 199 Personality in politics, 76-78 Pertinax. Sec Echo de Paris Petit Journal, 276 Petit Parisien, 276, 316, 438- 439, 476 Phedon. See Populaire Philippe VIII (see also Orlean- ist party), 11-12, 14, 132, 278 518 INDEX Pichon, Stephen, 63, 133, 207 Piou, M., IS, 132 Plebiscitdircs, 9 Poincure, Raymond, 27 ; Minis- try of, 63, 84, 87, 160; Presi- dent of the Republic (1913- 1920), 58, 88, 93, 221; elected to Senate (1920), 198; quot- ed, 404-405; cited, 222 Political parties {see also Bona- partists, Liberal Action party. New Democracy party, Or- leanist party, Progressists, Democratic Republican Alli- ance, Republican Socialists, Socialist party) ; multiplicity of, 1-8, 370; philosophies of, i; organization of, 15ff; their relation to Parliament, 48-56; their combinations: Bloc, 80- 87, Sacred Union, 93, future realignments, 131-140; effect of electorial reform on, 169- 173 Pope (see also Leo XIII), 19, 22, 189, 203, 207 Populaire, 105, 274, 275, 286- 287 Possibilists, 33 Post-Office, French, 305 Prefect (sec also Department), 259, 293, 298, 383, 384, 386, 388, 390, 396, 403; powers of, 374, 379 Prefectoral Council, 375 President of the Republic, 227, 374, 375, 380; election of, 200, 219; term of, 219; a "parliamentary clerk," 218, 220-222; movement to in- crease powers of, 19, 201, 223- 224 ; obstacles to such an in- crease, 232-235; election of M. Deschanel 1920, 200-202 Press (see also Journalism, Cen- sorship), ix; individualism of, 271; charges against, 272- 275 ; does not reflect opinion accurately, 271, 289 ; Royalist press, 276-278; Conservative press, 278-281 ; Liberal press, 282-284; Socialist press, 284- 289; legal restrictions on, 290-299 Prcssc do Paris, 183 Pressemanne, M. (Socialist), 98, 100 Prime Minister, difficulty of se- lecting, 57 Prince Imperial, 5 Private enterprises, obstacles to (see also State Socialism), 312-313, 321, 337 Professional representation, 24, 43, 358; advocated by: Lysis, 361, Benoist, 362, Duguit, 362, Liberal Action party, 19, 362, Orleanists, 13, 361- 362; principle of, 362; syndi- cal organization necessary, for, 360, 364, 368; defects in, 368-372 Programs, political. See Poli- tical Parties Prog res Civique, 335 Progressism, 81 Progressist party (see also Re- publican Federation), 22, 179, 204 ; formation of, 23 ; con- servative program of, 23, 228 ; opposed by Bloc of Left, 81, 178, 180; organization of, 24; strength of, 23; future of, 133; gains in 1919 elec- tion, 193, 196 Proportional division of school funds. See Schools Proportional representation (see also Electoral law of July, 1919), 134; agitation for, 19, 22, 24, 83, 11.5, 156; parliamentary attempts to en- act, 158-161; principle of, 166-168, 194; effect of, on political parties, 169-171 Prostitution, 145, 473 Proudhon, cited, 267 Public opinion, 231; control of, over deputies, 78 ; supreme under parliamentary form of 519 INDEX government, 47, 231; hin- drances to exercise of, in France, 70; in United States, 231, 492 Question, the parliamentary, 65 Questor, 199 Radical and Radical Socialist party, 9, 50, 60, 119, 162, 175, 179, 184, 187, 200, 203, 204, 205, 235, 333, 339, 443; his- tory of, 8, 27, 28; Anticler- ical and collectivist program of, 29-32, 138; organization of, 32; Congresses of: Tours, 87, 88, Dijon, 30, 85, Nancy, 85, Pau, 50, 89, 134, Nimes, 86, Toulouse, 87, September, 1919, 178; relation to Bloo of Left, 84-87; opposes Pro- gressists, 89 ; relation to Bloc National Eeimblicain (1919), 180, 188; demands abolition of three-year military law, 32, 58, 89, 134; lack of leaders in, 136 ; divisions of, 136 ; fu- ture of, 134-137, 206; defeat of, in 1919 elections, 193, 195; newspapers of, 282 Raffin-Dugens, 100, 195, 300 Railroads, 376; State v. pri- vate, 303-305 Bailies, 6, 133 Referendum, 19, 22 Reform, organizations of, 44 Reformism, doctrine of, 7, 81, 119 Regional Councils. See Coun- cils, regional Regionalism, xii, 13, 383, 388; economic, 345 ; principles of, 391-394; proposed bill for, 396-399; obstacles to, 399 Reign of Terror, 386 Reinach, Joseph, 145, 280 Rcnaudel, Pierre, 97, 98, 106, 107, 121, 177, 210, 274, 285 Renoult, Rene, 32, 197 Reparations. See Indemnity Representation. See Profes- sional representation ; Pro- portional representation, Elections Republic. See Third Republic, Parliamentary form of gov- ernment Republican Democratic Alliance. See Democratic Republican Alliance Republican Democratic Entente, group of (1920), 204 Republican Democratic Left, group of (1920), 204, 205 Republican Federation, 8, 9, 49, 133, 138, 178, 179, 180 Republican Socialist party, 9, 51, 138, 178, 186, 189, 196, 203, 204, 205; history of, 8, 41-42 ; difference between, and Radicals and Radical-So- cialists, 42-43 ; prominent members of, 42; strength of, 43; future of, 137; relation of, to the Bloc of the Left, 87 Republicans of the Left (see also Democratic Republican Alliance), 193, 196, 200, 204, 205 Bepublique Susse, 295 Revanche, 16, 233, 411, 472 Revisionism. See Reformism Revolution, French, 12, 27, 113, 360, 377, 412, 413, 498; effect of, on administrative system, 385; of 1848, 27, 141, 154, 387 Revolution, Social {see also Socialism, Syndicalism, Lo- riot faction), demanded, 113, 118, 127, 128, 182, 241, 287, 288; attitude of France to- ward, 130, 183, 290, 366 Rhenish Republic, history of former, 412-415; creation of, advocated, 412, 415, 425 Rhine. See Left Bank of the Rhine Ribot, Alexandre, 22, 24, 57, 520 INDEX 58, 59, 63, 92, 95, 96, 104, 395; advocates division of war debts, 439 Ricard, 27, 153 "Right" of Chamber, 9, 178 Eire de Paris, 474 Roanne Arsenal Scandal, 307 Rochctte Case, 71, 90, 135 Rolland, Remain, 366, 469 Rouher, 5 Rouvicr Cabinet, 80, 81, 83, 225 Royalists. See Bonapartists, Orleanist party, Legitimists Russia. See Bolshevism Saar, annexation demanded, 416, 425, 429, 454, 488; his- tory of, 416; population of, 421; coal in, 294, 417, 419; Treaty terms concerning, 456- 459 Saarbruck, 412, 416, 417 Sabatier, Paul, cited, 7 Sacred Union, 94, 169, 185, 190 Sadoul, Jacques, 177, 195 Saigon bamboo case, 309 Sailliens, E., cit«d, 142 Sarrail, General, 189, 197 Sarrien, M., 28, 63, 81 Saumonneau, Mme., 120 SccHp, Georges, 484 Schools, 24, division of funds for, advocated, 20, 189; lay, advocated by Radicals, 89 Scrutin d'arrondifisement (see aho Electoral law of July, 1919) ; as an election district, 152; "gerrymandering" features of, 155 ; defects in, 153 ; abolition of, 165 Scrutin de listr, 24, 29 ; trial of, in 1885, 153; advantages of, 156; legislative efforts to enact, 158-161; adoption of, 1919, 162-169 Secret Committee. Sec Commit- tee, Secret Secret press funds, 272 Sembat, Marcel, 34, 41, 94, 98, 173, 469 Senate (sec also United States Senate), 362; method of elec- tion, 198, 218; as a High Court of Justice, 136, 225, 234; control of, over Minis- try, 225; attitude of, toward electoral reform, 160, 164- 165; conservatism of, 224; movement to strengthen in- fluence, 224 ; existence of, in- consistent with parliamentary government, 225; election of, 1920, 198 Separation of Powers, govern- ment based on, 180; differ- ence between, and parliamen- tary government, 214-215, 218, 219; advocated in France, 223-229; defects of, 231-232, 235 Siegfried, M., 145 Sillon, 7, 8, 21-22, 108 Socialism (see also Socialist party, Class Struggle, State Socialism, Republic Socialist party), 7, 208; history of, in France, 33ff. ; doctrines of, 37, 112-119, 121-125, 236 Socialist party (Unified), (see Pact of Amsterdam, Jean .Taures, Dissident Socialists, Ministerial "participa- tion"), 9, 51-52, 138, 176, 177, 178, 184, 186, 191, 192, 204, 205, 300, 333, 335, 339, 357, 371, 433, 470; formation of, 8, 33-36; growth of, 40; seeks peasant support, 37-40 ; relation of, to Bloc of Left, 36; organiza- tion of, 40; strength of, 36; antimilitarism of, 92-93 ; fu- ture of, 137, 206; adheres to the Sacred Union, 94-95; the first break in the Sacred Un- ion, 97, 98 ; origin of the Kien- thalians, 99-100; of the mino- ritaires, 98 ; of the majori- taires, 98; of the Centrists, 98 ; struggles between these 521 INDEX factions, 98-107; victory of the mmoritaires, 106-107; at- titude toward Villain trial, 110; 1919 program, a com- promise between imnoritaires and mnjoritaires, 112-119, 243; distinction between rev- olution and violence, 113; political and economic re- forms demanded, 115-118; Easter Congress, 1919, 120- 129, 176, 209, 211, 274, 275, 285, 487; motions on general policy, 121-125; on electoral discipline, 124; victory for radicals, 125; adherence to Second Internationale, 128 ; Socialists withdrawal from the Chamber, 257-258; oppo- sition of, to Peace Treaty, 172-173, 175; formation of Bloc against, 131-132, 137, 179-181; defeat in 1919 elec- tions, 193, 196; causes of, 194-195; Strassburg congress, February, 1920, 208-211; qualified adherence to the Third Internationale, 209 ; character of leaders of, 41, 184; newspapers of, 284-289 Sorel, Albert, cited, 413 Sorel, Georges, 236, 365; theory of strikes, 237, 267 Sous-prefet, 154, 278, 386, 390 State of Siege, law of, 69, 75, 94, 251, 259, 292, 298, 299 State Socialism {see also ' ' Con- sortiums, " Bureaucracy), 23, 43, 115, 138, 186, 187, 196, 281, 359, 372; extent of, in France, 306, 338; agitation against, 206, 333-338 Steeg, M., 87 Stern, Jacques, 440 Stockhold question, 103, 126 Strassburg, Socialist congress at (1920), 208-211 Strikes (see also General strike), 354, 355; causes of, 246, 260; postal (1909), 82; railway (1910), 82; news- paper (1919) 182; political, 260-263; failure of, 263-269 Suffrage. See Woman suffrage. Multiple voting, Electoral re- form Supreme Court, with power to declare laws unconstitutional, advocated, 19, 24, 226-228; inconsistency of, with parlia- mentary form of government, 229 . Syndicalism, (see also Confede- ration Generale du Travail, Sorel, Georges), theory of, 236, 261, 267; difference be- tween, and Socialism, 236- 237 Syndicates, 238; Christian, 20, 365 Tannery, M., 305, 306 Tardieu, Andrg, 173, 179, 205, 281 Taxation, Appendix B. ; former system of, 31, 501; change of basis during war, 502; failure of, to provide revenue, 503- 504 Taxes (see also Income tax), 375, 378; excess profit, 115, 502-503 ; international advo- cated to pay for war debt, 442 Telegraph and telephone ser- vice, 305-306 Temps, 162, 185, 186, 272, 280, 294, 296, 331, 406, 469, 489, 494 Tery, Gustave, 188, 283, 296 Thierry, 88 Thiers, Adolphe, 10, 27, 64, 201, 216, 404 Third Republic, criticisms of, 212ff. ; compromised basis of, 217ff. ; attempts to over- throw, 233-234 Thomas, Albert, 41, 96, 98, 102, 104, 107, 137, 172, 175, 240, 248, 307, 308, 339 522 INDEX Three-year military service law, 32, 58, 83, 89, 134 Tirard Cabinet, 225 Tocquovillo, do, 3 Treason trials, 273-274 Treaty of Frankfort, 403-404 Treaty of Versailles (sec also Left Bank of Rhine, Bonds, International military force), 176, 177, 1<)7, 263, 295, 296, 432, 436, 444, 494, 495; com- promises in, 454-463 ; ratifica- tion of, by Parliament, 54, 172-175; rejection of, by United States, 231-232, 491- 494 Treitschke, cited, 430 Unified Radicals (sec also Eadical and Radical-Socialist party), 51 Unified Socialists. See Socialist party Union of Commerce and Indus- try, 44 Union of Economic Interests, 44, 334, 367-368, 371; mem- bership of, 337; anti-statist program of, 337-338 United States, 294, 435, 445; part of, in war, 474-475; ideals of, charged with im- practicability, 480-482, with insincerity, 482-489 ; responsi- bility of, for a weak League of "Nations, 454, 465-466; failure of, to assume interna- tional obligations, 207, 491- 494 United States Senate, rejection of Treaty by, 231 ; attitude of France toward, 484, 491-492, 494; reasons for rejection, 492 Uzfes, Duchesso d ', 234 Vague, 252, 287-288, 289, 290, 486 Valois, Georges, 12 Vandervelde, Emile, cited, 339 Varenne, Alexandre, 98, 107, 158, 175 Vaugcois, Henri, 13, 277 Verfeuil, M., 120, 121 Veritc, 110 Victoire, 95, 272, 273, 283, 482 I'ictoire Integrale, 425 Victor Emmanuel II, 10 Vie Ouvrirre, 240 VieiUe-France, 278-280, 475, 476, 478, 479 Vilgrain, M., 245, 315, 344 Villain, Raoul, assassinates Jau- res, 108; acquittal of, 109, 285; aids Socialist cause. 111 Villele, 386 Villey, Edouard, cited, 59, 302, 362 Viviani, Rcn6, 12, 34, 36, 63, 95, 96, 104, 108, 137, 148, 172; Republican Socialist, 42; Ministry of (1914), 57, 58, 59, 94 Vizetelly, E. A., cited, 10 Voix du Peuple, 239, 251, 252 Vote of confidence, 66 Waldeck-Rousseau, 23, 27, 34, 81, 225 War, declaration of (1914), 69, 93, 161; Socialist attitude to- ward, 94, 122; women and, 143 War debt. See Cost of War War of 1870, 403, 411 Weill, Georges, cited, 44 Weiller, Lazarc, 305 Wellington, Duke of, 403 Worth, Leon, 17 Wilson, President, 240, 295, 447, 453, 483, 485, 488, 489, 490; reception of, in Paris, 468- 471; changed attitude to- ward, 472, 481 ; personal at- tacks against, 475-479 ; suc- cess and failure at Paris, 466 Woman suffrage, y; demanded as reward for women 's war work, 143; also to aid solu- tion of moral problems, 144; 523 INDEX arguments against, 146; leg- islative activities for, 147- 149; riandin bill, 148 Women, French attitude to- ward. 142; war work of, 143 Zimmerwald, Socialist confer- ence at, 99 Zevaes, Alexandre, cited, 35, 85 Zevort, E., cited, 7, 16 UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY AA 001 139 414 5 CENTRAL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY University of California. Saji Diego DATE DUE J UN 1 6 1979 JUN 1 9 1979 CI 39 UCSD Libr. ''^m