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CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 READ BEFORE THE COMMANDERY 
 OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS, 
 MILITARY ORDER OF THE LOYAL 
 LEGION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 VOLUME I. 
 
 ^ la ^A. 
 
 BOSTON: 
 
 PRINTED FOR THE COMMANDERY 
 
 MCM 
 
COPYRIGHT, 1900, 
 
 BY COMMANDBRV OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS 
 MILITARY ORDER OF THE LOYAL LEGION 
 
 OF THE 
 
 UNITED STATES. 
 
 F. IT. GILSON COMPANY 
 PRINTERS AND BOOKBINDERS 
 BOSTON, U. S. A. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 THE Massachusetts Commandery of the Military Order of 
 the Loyal Legion on November 2nd, 1892, appointed a Commit 
 tee on History, and since January 1893, papers on the Civil War 
 have been prepared and read by the companions, first at special 
 meetings called for that purpose, subsequently during the hour 
 preceding the regular monthly meeting. 
 
 November 4th, 1896, the Board of Officers voted to call the 
 regular meetings of the Commandery at 5.30 o clock P.M., to 
 listen first to the reading of the papers announced by the Com 
 mittee on History. 
 
 On April 4th, 1900, 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel FRANCIS S. HESSELTINE, Chairman Committee on 
 
 History, 
 
 Captain WILMON W. BLACKMAR, Junior Vice Commander, 
 Major EDWARD T. BOUVE, Member of Council and of Committee on 
 
 History, 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel SAMUEL A. DRAKE, 
 Lieutenant CHARLES H. PORTER, Librarian, 
 
 were appointed a committee to publish a volume of the papers 
 which have been read before the Commandery. A few of the 
 papers had been prepared for and published by the Military 
 Historical Society of Massachusetts, others were reserved by 
 the companions who furnished them. 
 
 From those at their disposal the committee have selected 
 the papers here published, considering solely variety and interest 
 of subjects and the honor of the Commandery of Massachusetts. 
 
 THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLICATION. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 "MY FIRST AND LAST BATTLE" 3 
 
 BY REV. EDWARD EVERETT HALE, D.D., CHAPLAIN OF THE MASSACHUSETTS 
 
 COMMANDERY. 
 
 "THE FIRST CRUISE OF THE KEARSARGE " n 
 
 BY COMPANION WILLIAM H. BADLAM, 2nd ASSISTANT ENGINEER, U.S.N. 
 
 " AMUSING THE ENEMY" 27 
 
 BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL FRANCIS S. HESSELTINE, U.S.V. 
 
 " THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND " 47 
 
 BY LIEUTENANT ROYAL B. PRESCOTT, U.S.V. 
 
 "THE LEFT ATTACK (EWELL S) AT GETTYSBURG " 75 
 
 BY BREVET CAPTAIN EDWARD N. WHITTIER, U.S.V. 
 
 "MY CAPTURE, PRISON LIFE AND ESCAPE" 109 
 
 BY BREVET MAJOR ANDREW M. BENSON, U.S.V. 
 
 "THE OLD ARMY IN KANSAS" 141 
 
 BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL SAMUEL ADAMS DRAKE, U.S.V. 
 
 " FOURTEEN MONTHS SERVICE WITH COLORED TROOPS" 155 
 
 BY BREVET LIEUTENANT COLONEL SOLON A. CARTER, U.S.V. 
 
 "THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK, Oct. 19, 1864" 183 
 
 BY BREVET BRIGADIER GENERAL HAZARD STEVENS, U.S.V. 
 
 " THE CAPTURE OF JACKSON " 249 
 
 BY LIEUTENANT SETH A. RANLETT, U.S.V. 
 "THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER" 271 
 
 BY BREVET MAJOR GENERAL ADELBERT AMES, U.S.V. 
 
 "THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER" 299 
 
 BY BREVET MAJOR GENERAL N. MARTIN CURTIS, U.S.V. 
 
 "SHERMAN S CAMPAIGN IN THE CAROLINAS " 331 
 
 By MAJOR HENRY O. MARCY, SURGEON U.S.C.T. 
 
 " LIFE IN CONFEDERATE PRISONS" 351 
 
 BY LIEUTENANT JOSEPH E. MOODY, U.S.V. 
 
 V 
 
r\ TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PACK 
 
 IN THE WILDERNESS" , ..... 373 
 
 BY BREVET MAJOR Z. BOYLSTON ADAMS, U.S.V. 
 
 THE BATTLE AT HIGH BRIDGE" 403 
 
 BY MAJOR EDWARD T. BOUVE, U.S.V. 
 
 THE MORNING SURPRISE AT CEDAR CREEK" 415 
 
 BY CAPTAIN S. EDWARD HOWARD, U.S.V. 
 
 THE BURN SIDE EXPEDITION " 427 
 
 BY BREVET BRIGADIER GENERAL A. B. R. SPRAGUE, U.S.V. 
 
 SUNSHINE AND SHADOWS OF ARMY LIFE " 447 
 
 By CAPTAIN JOHN G. B. ADAMS, U.S.V. 
 
 THE RE-OCCUPATION OF JACKSONVILLE IN 1863 " 467 
 
 BY COLONEL THOMAS WENTWORTH HIGGINSON, U.S.C.T. 
 
 THE EXPLOSION AT CITY POINT" 477 
 
 BY CAPTAIN MORRIS SCHAFF, U.S.A. 
 
 1 STUART S BRIGADE AT SHILOH " ... 489 
 
 BY LIEUTENANT ELIJAH C. LAWRENCE, U.S.V. 
 
 REMINISCENCES OF A PRISONER OF WAR " 499 
 
 BY BREVET LIEUTENANT COLONEL ISAAC F. GALLOUPK, STRGEON U.S.V. 
 
 AN INVOLUNTARY JOURNEY THROUGH THE CONFEDERACY". . . . 513 
 
 BY CAPTAIN JOSEPH E. FISKE, U.S.V. 
 
 THREE MONTHS SERVICE IN 1861 WITH THE 4TH REGIMENT M.V.M. " 533 
 
 BY BREVET BRIGADIER GENERAL LUTHER STEFHENSON, U.S.V. 
 
 GENERAL JESSE L. RENO AT FREDERICK, BARBARA FRITCIIIE AND 
 
 HER FLAG " 553 
 
 BY COMPANION CONRAD RENO. 
 
MY FIRST AND LAST BATTLE 
 
MY FIRST AND LAST BATTLE 
 
 BY 
 
 REVEREND EDWARD EVERETT HALE, D.D., 
 CHAPLAIN OF THE MASSACHUSETTS COMMANDERY. 
 
 FOR three years of the Civil War I had been connected with 
 the Sanitary Commission of Massachusetts and of the United 
 States. The Commission had it for its duty to keep the people 
 at home in touch with the army. It tried to keep alive the 
 enthusiasm of the people for the soldiers, and it tried to make 
 the soldiers understand that they were not forgotten by the 
 nation. 
 
 In the correspondence and other work connected with the 
 Sanitary, I had occasion to visit Fort Monroe in the spring of 
 1864, and was most cordially and courteously received there by 
 General Butler. I was his guest at his house, and, with regard 
 to some interesting things in the movements of the war, I 
 learned a great deal which was very curious from him. When 
 we parted I said to him : " It will not be long before you will 
 see me again. I shall be drafted some day, and as I present 
 arms to you, as a sentinel, you will remember your old guest." 
 He asked if I could not stay then, and said he would put me to 
 work. But I had home duties in hand. 
 
 I was not surprised, therefore, when, after General Butler, 
 by a well-planned movement, had taken up his position at Ber 
 muda Hundred, where the Appomattox and James Rivers join 
 each other, to receive a telegram from Shaffer, his chief of 
 staff, saying simply : " Come on at once. We are more suc 
 cessful than our best hopes." 
 
4 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 At that time, the beginning of May, 1864, the chances were 
 good for the combined armies going, separately or together, 
 into Richmond. Alas, it was a year before this happened ! 
 But I at once made arrangements to join the headquarters staff, 
 with which I was now intimate, and I went on with a fortnight s 
 leave of absence from my work at home. 
 
 As I passed through Washington, where we were all at 
 home in the war, I went to the War Department, where the 
 adjutant-general, Townsend, was an old schoolmate of mine. I 
 was no stranger there then, and so it happened that he gave 
 me a dispatch for General Butler. This elevated me at cnce 
 in the esteem of all chiefs of transportation, giving me I do 
 not know how much power, but great prestige whenever I 
 needed it. I went down to Fort Monroe at once, where I 
 found only one or two of the gentlemen of the staff, chafing 
 because they were not at the front ; and on the government 
 steamer of the next day I went up to Bermuda Hundred. 
 
 We were rather more than halfway up when we were 
 arrested for a little by the sound of firing on the shore. It 
 proved that this was one of the days when Fitzhugh Lee had 
 attempted to cut off General Butler s river communications. 
 He had attacked the field works which we had on the south 
 side of the river. As it happened, some of these works were 
 held by negroes recruited in Virginia, and this was one of the 
 earlier trials of those troops. After a little delay on this ac 
 count, we pressed on, and just about at nightfall arrived at the 
 crowded water-front of Bermuda Hundred. The whole army of 
 25,000 men had arrived there suddenly a fortnight before, as if 
 it had fallen from the skies. In that time wharves and landing- 
 places had been improvised, with marvelous rapidity ; and 
 although there was endless confusion, still things seemed to 
 go forward with the kind of energy which marks the work of a 
 well-disciplined army. 
 
 For me, I was as ignorant as a freshman is on entering 
 college of what I was to do. I knew that General Butler and 
 
MY FIRST AND LAST BATTLE 5 
 
 his staff were six or seven miles away, I knew that night was 
 falling, and I did not know how I was to go to him. Fortu 
 nately for me, as I thought, there was on the boat a member of 
 his staff with whom I had some acquaintance, and I relied upon 
 him to help me through. When we landed, however, he was 
 out of the way, and I could not find him. I suspected that he 
 did not care to embarrass himself with a civilian, and was inten 
 tionally keeping out of sight. I think so still. 
 
 I therefore did what I always do in life struck as high as 
 I could. I said to the sentinel that I was a bearer of dispatches, 
 and asked him the way to the headquarters of the commander of 
 that post. I wish I remembered this gentleman s name, so well 
 did he illustrate the courtesy and promptness of a man in com 
 mand. He said at once that his own orderly should go with me 
 to General Butler ; that he would lend me his own horse ; and 
 would send my valise on the ambulance the next morning. So 
 the horse was saddled, and about the time when it became quite 
 dark, the soldier and I started on our way. 
 
 He knew no more of the way than I did, and a very bad 
 way it was. I made my first acquaintance with the sacred soil 
 of Virginia then and there. We lost ourselves sometimes, and 
 then we found ourselves, the greater part of the road being the 
 worst possible country road, all cut to pieces by the heavy army 
 work, through woods, not of large trees, which were close enough 
 on both sides to darken the passage. It was nine o clock or 
 later when we saw the welcome sight of the headquarters 
 camp fires. 
 
 We rode up and I jumped from my horse to shake hands 
 with General Butler, Colonel Shaffer, and the other gentlemen. 
 They asked instantly how we had passed the batteries. I told 
 the story, and General Butler, who was always effusively polite, 
 and who to his other gracious ways added exquisite facility in 
 flattery, said to me : " We are greatly obliged to you, Mr. Hale. 
 I have been very anxious for two or three hours. I was afraid 
 my dispatches were cut off." I had already handed to him the 
 
6 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 utterly unimportant letter from the War Department, which 
 had been my talisman thus far. 
 
 Then and there I first heard soldiers talk of what had been 
 done and what had not been done in that day. I knew before 
 hand that, in the push toward Richmond, we had been flung 
 back at Fort Darling. I did not know, till I came there, ex 
 actly how the command was impressed by this delay. But in 
 the headquarters circle I found nothing but confidence, and I 
 very soon saw that I was to understand that we should have 
 taken Richmond, but for the heavy fog of the day of battle and 
 some other infelicities. I think now that this is probably true. 
 
 The fires were kept burning, and we sat and chatted there 
 hour after hour. When we had been there perhaps two hours, 
 up came my dilatory military friend of the general s staff, and 
 with sufficient profanity exorcised the roads over which he had 
 ridden. He had never been there before. General Butler 
 heard him through, and then said : " But here is Mr. Hale, who 
 has been here two hours." The soldier turned on me, a little 
 crestfallen, all the other members of the staff sufficiently amused, 
 and he asked me with another oath, how I found the way. I 
 said, "We followed the telegraph wire ; " and from that day 
 I was rather a favorite with the staff for this civilian snub on a 
 gentleman who was not a favorite. 
 
 Meanwhile, somebody had been ordered to pitch a tent for 
 me, and about eleven o clock, I suppose, I went to bed in my 
 new quarters. I had slept an hour, however, as it proved, when 
 I was awakened by the firing of cannon. I had never heard 
 such firing; as it proved afterward, they were the heaviest 
 guns which I have ever heard in my life. Of course I wanted 
 to jump up, but I said to myself : " It will seem very green if I 
 walk out on the first sound of firing. I suppose this is what 
 I came to the front for. If they want me they will call me, 
 and I shall hear firing enough before I have done." So I 
 turned over and tried to go to sleep did go to sleep and 
 was awakened again by louder and louder firing. All this lasted. 
 
MY FIRST AND LAST BATTLE 7 
 
 I suppose, perhaps an hour, perhaps two. Then all was still, 
 and I went to sleep for the night. 
 
 You are awakened in camp, if you are at a major-general s, 
 by the bugles of his cavalry escort, and the next morning I 
 heard their reveille, also for the first time. I washed myself, was 
 already dressed, of course, and in a little time an orderly told me 
 that breakfast was ready. I met at breakfast Captain Laurie, a 
 fine old officer of the navy, whom I had known slightly in 
 Boston. He said to me, "And how did you like our firing last 
 night, Mr. Hale?" I said, that to me, as a civilian, it seemed 
 very loud, but I supposed that that was what I had come to the 
 war for, and I did not get up from my bed. Laurie answered, 
 as if he would rebuke me for my ignorance : " I have been in 
 the service for thirty-nine years, and I never heard such firing 
 before." I found then, for the first time, that the whole staff 
 had been up and on horseback, had been at the front to try to 
 find out what this firing was, and had returned almost as much 
 perplexed as they went. 
 
 It was thus that it happened to me that I spent my first and 
 last battle in bed. 
 
 I was acting on the principle of doing the duty which came 
 next my hand, and obeying all orders which were given to me. 
 I had not run away ; I was pleased with that. And if I had 
 not personally received the surrender of three or four battle- 
 flags, that was my misfortune. 
 
 I had occasion afterward to hear, not to say report, much of 
 the testimony, and to read all the rest of it, which related to 
 this remarkable battle. If you will read the history of the time, 
 as told in the Richmond newspapers and those of New York 
 City, and will put them together, you will learn that on that 
 night a reconnoissance was sent out from our lines into the 
 tangled shrubbery which separated our newly built works from 
 those of the rebels. You will learn that the rebel guns mowed 
 down these columns as corn is mowed down before a tempest. 
 Or, if you read a Northern newspaper, you will learn that a cer- 
 
8 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 tain column of the rebel troops, who were named, were worse 
 than decimated by similar artillery from our works. 
 
 Every word of this was entirely false. In fact, there was a 
 very heavy cannonading from the newly erected works on both 
 sides. As I have said, it lasted an hour or two. Much of it on 
 our side was from heavy guns, which had been landed from the 
 navy to strengthen the battery which we had near the river. 
 But as the result of it, there was never any evidence that a 
 rabbit was scratched. Certainly no drop of human blood was 
 shed in that encounter of giants. 
 
 How it happened so late in the evening, I do not know. 
 But what happened was this : A party of ladies had been enter 
 tained on board one of our ships of war. As they left, an officer, 
 with the gallantry of his profession, asked one of the ladies if 
 she would like to see how a gun was fired, and to do pleasure to 
 her, he fired one of the guns in the darkness. At that moment 
 everything was on the qui vive ashore, and our land-battery 
 men, eager for something to do, finding that one shot was fired, 
 thought that another had better be fired, and continued the 
 firing. This started the successive artillerists for nearly a mile, 
 as our works ran up into the country toward the Appomattox 
 River, and not to be belated or accused of sleepiness, they began 
 firing in turn. Of course this roused the equally ready artiller 
 ists on the rebel side and they fired, I suppose, at the flashes 
 which they saw a mile or two away. And this was the famous 
 cannonade which made the whole of my first battle. 
 
 The naval officers were dreadfully mortified, our gentlemen 
 at headquarters were indignant beyond account, and the thing 
 almost came to courts martial and courts of inquiry. But it was 
 wisely thought better to leave the record of it to be made at the 
 end of thirty years by the only person who was at all concerned, 
 who spent the hours of the battle in his bed under canvas. 
 
THE FIRST CRUISE OF THE KEARSARGE 
 
THE FIRST CRUISE OF THE KEARSARGE 
 
 BY 
 
 COMPANION WILLIAM H. BADLAM, 
 
 SECOND ASSISTANT ENGINEER, U.S.N. 
 
 ON the 5th day of February, 1862, the Sloop-of-War Kear- 
 sarge, commanded by Captain Charles W. Pickering, sailed from 
 Portsmouth Navy Yard down the Piscataqua river, past the 
 Isles of Shoals, out to sea. 
 
 The course was set to the southward and eastward, and in a 
 short time we ran into the Gulf Stream, and came into rough 
 weather, which lasted for three days, making things wet and 
 uncomfortable. Our hatch combings were low, and the seas 
 that came aboard would strike them and pour down the hatches, 
 until it became necessary to batten down, and put on the storm 
 hoods. The captain s gig was swept out of the davits by a 
 large sea, and lost overboard. 
 
 After this experience we proceeded on our way to Madeira, 
 and had fairly good weather. We lay at anchor, at Funchal, 
 two or three days, and then proceeded to Cadiz, Spain, where, 
 on our arrival, we learned that the Confederate Steamer Sumter 
 was anchored under the guns of Gibraltar, guarded by the 
 United States Steamer Tuscarora, which was lying at anchor in 
 the port of Algesiras, a Spanish town across the bay from 
 Gibraltar. 
 
 We relieved the Tuscarora and kept a sharp lookout on the 
 Sumter for some months, ready to go out in case she made a 
 move. By lying in Spanish waters we were free to go out with 
 out waiting twenty-four hours after the Sumter had departed, 
 which we should have been obliged to do, if we had lain at Gib 
 raltar, in English waters. 
 
12 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 In the latter part of the summer of 1862, we spent con 
 siderable time in the Atlantic waters around the Azores, looking 
 for the Alabama, which had been reported as destroying- 
 American whalers in that vicinity. Not finding the Alabama, 
 we returned to watch the Sumter, until she was finally sold and 
 all hands left her. 
 
 The winter of 18621863 was spent at La Carraca, Spain, 
 at the Spanish Navy Yard, repairing our stern bearing, which 
 had worn down to such an extent that it was not safe to con 
 tinue cruising under steam. It took from the ist of December, 
 1862, until the middle of March, 1863, to have the work finished, 
 a job that ought not to have taken more than three weeks at 
 the longest, had it been done in the United States. 
 
 On April 8th, 1863, Captain Pickering and our Executive 
 Officer were relieved by Captain John A. Winslow, and Lieu 
 tenant Commander James S. Thornton. Soon after this change 
 of officers, and while lying at anchor in the bay of Horta, Fayal, 
 about May ist the plan of protecting the engines and boilers, 
 with the spare cables hung in bights over the sides, as sug 
 gested by Lieutenant Commander Thornton, was decided upon. 
 The engineers department made the iron work, and the ship s 
 carpenter hung the chains. After the chains were hung, the 
 whole surface was covered with inch boards to prevent the sea 
 from washing it adrift, some parts being lashed together only 
 with marline ; the ends and bottom being finished with beveled 
 pieces so as not to reduce our speed. After six days work, we 
 had the job completed, and on painting the new wood covering, 
 the change was scarcely distinguishable at a short distance. 
 
 The Kearsarge was a fast steamer for those days, and had 
 made an average of thirteen and a half knots with moderate 
 head wind and sea. 
 
 On September 7th, 1863, we left Madeira for the English 
 Channel, touching at Lisbon, Portugal, and Ferrol, Spain. 
 Here we heard that the Confederate Steamer Florida was at 
 Brest, France. We immediately proceeded there, looking in at 
 
THE FIRST CRUISE OF THE KEARSARGE 13 
 
 Bordeaux, where two ironclad Rams were being built for the 
 Confederates. We found the Florida at Brest, where we re 
 mained lying off and on for about five months. The Florida 
 was a two funnel steamer, a little smaller than the Alabama, 
 and carried eight rifled guns. 
 
 October 3Oth, we heard that the Georgia was off the coast 
 of Ireland. We proceeded to Oueenstown in a very severe gale, 
 but found that she had gone to Cherbourg. Back again we 
 went to Brest, to continue our watch on the Florida. 
 
 December 5th, we started for Oueenstown again, this time 
 to land some stowaways that had come aboard when there before. 
 These stowaways were the cause of considerable diplomatic 
 correspondence, and we returned them to their native soil as 
 soon as we dared to leave the Florida, touching at Cherbourg 
 and at Plymouth on our return to Brest. 
 
 On January i7th, 1864, being short of coal and stores, we 
 were obliged to go to Cadiz to replenish, and returned on the 
 1 8th of February to find that the Florida had departed during 
 our absence. It was rather a difficult task for one vessel to 
 blockade four or five of the enemy s cruisers, from one to six 
 hundred miles apart. 
 
 In the English Channel we performed considerable police 
 duty, visiting ports in England, Ireland, France, Belgium, and 
 Holland, looking after the Rappahannock, Georgia, and other 
 vessels fitting out for the Confederate Government, as fast as 
 we heard of their whereabouts. 
 
 April i /th, when going into the port of Ostend, Belgium, 
 under charge of a pilot, through his stupidity we were run on 
 the pier, a massive granite structure, where we hung for twelve 
 hours before we could get off. We at first thought it was pre 
 meditated, but finally came to the conclusion that it was through 
 the pilot s ignorance. We came off with only the loss of a few 
 sheets of copper from our bottom. 
 
 That the reader may realize what a scourge the Alabama 
 was to American Commerce, I will proceed to follow her cle- 
 
14 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 structive course from her departure from England. In October 
 1 86 1, the Confederate Agents in England made a contract with 
 the Lairds, of Liverpool, to build a war vessel. In May 1862, 
 the vessel was launched and called the " 290," this being the 
 29<Dth vessel built by that firm. She cost $255,000. On July 
 29th, 1862, the " 290 " was finished, and sailed from Birkenhead, 
 out of the Mersey river, ostensibly for a trial trip, with a large 
 party of ladies and gentlemen aboard, and anchored in Moelfra 
 Bay. Here a tug met her, took off the guests and landed them 
 on shore, when the " 290 " proceeded on her voyage, passing 
 around the north coast of Ireland, then set her course for the 
 Island of Terceira, one of the Azores, where she arrived on 
 the loth of August. In the diary of one of the officers of the 
 Alabama, he says : " No sooner had our departure become known 
 than the United States Steamer Tnscarora received news of it 
 through the American Consul at Liverpool. Every exertion was 
 made by her Commander to seize us, but without avail, for by 
 the time the Tnscarora arrived in Moelfra Bay, we had been 
 gone two days." 
 
 On the 1 8th of August the English barque Agrippina arrived 
 at Terceira, having on board guns, ammunition, coal, stores, etc., 
 for the " 290," which cargo was transferred aboard. On the 
 2Oth, the English steamer Bahama arrived, with Captain Raphael 
 Semmes and other officers of the Confederate Navy as pas 
 sengers. More guns and stores were transferred from her to 
 the "290." On Sunday, August 24th, the "290" was put into 
 commission and named the Alabama by the authority of the 
 Confederate States Government. 
 
 About eighty men were shipped from the three vessels, and 
 formed the nucleus of the crew until others could be found 
 willing to sign the articles. The Alabama was built for great 
 speed, and had a hoisting propeller, so that under sail alone, 
 she could cruise about, thus economizing fuel, which was a very 
 important item with her. 
 
 On September 5th, the eleventh day after going into com. 
 
THE FIRST CRUISE OF THE KEARSARGE 15 
 
 mission, the Alabama captured her first prize, a whaling ship, 
 which was burned. 
 
 After cruising about the Azores for some days, the Ala 
 bama s course was shaped toward New York, capturing on her 
 way twenty vessels. Then steering in a southerly direction 
 toward Martinique, she captured two more vessels previous to 
 her arrival there on the iSth of November. 
 
 She was here blockaded by the United States Steamer San 
 Jacinto, but escaped out of the harbor, at night, on the next 
 day, the iQth. The Alabama went from Martinique to the 
 southward to the Island of Blanquilla, arriving there on the 
 2 ist, where she met her store ship, the Agrippina> from which 
 vessel she took coal and stores. 
 
 After coaling and taking on stores, the Alabama headed 
 northward, going through the Mona Passage, to the north of 
 Hayti, capturing two more vessels ; thence passing through the 
 Windward Passage she captured and ransomed the Pacific mail 
 steamer Ariel, bound from New York to Aspinwall. After 
 lying in the track of the mail steamers for a few days, the Ala 
 bama went to the Areas Rocks, where she took on more coal 
 from the Agrippina, which was there waiting for her. The 
 Confederate cruiser finished taking coal on January 5th, 1863, 
 and hoisted anchor. 
 
 From the mails captured on the Ariel, Semmes obtained the 
 information that an expedition was about to leave New York to 
 make an attack on Galveston, Texas. Semmes had calculated 
 the time for the arrival of the transports at Galveston, and was 
 intending to surprise them at night, while lying at anchor, 
 and then to steam through the fleet, pouring in shot and shell 
 from both batteries as he went. But on Sunday, January nth, 
 when he approached the anchorage, instead of finding the trans 
 ports there, five vessels of war were made out. Soon one of 
 them was reported to be standing out towards the Alabama, and 
 after dark came up with her. Answering her hail, the Alabama 
 replied, "Her Britannic Majesty s Steamer Petrel. What ves- 
 
1 6 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 sel is that ?" and the answer came back "The United States 
 Steamer Hatteras." At the same moment Semmes replied, 
 " This is the Confederate Steamer Alabama," and before the 
 Hatteras had fully heard, a broadside from the Alabama s star 
 board battery was given her at a distance of only fifty or sixty 
 yards. 
 
 After twelve or fifteen minutes of rapid firing from both 
 vessels, the Hatteras was reported to be sinking, and the firing 
 ceased. Semmes lowered his boats, and soon after, the Hatteras 
 went down stern first. The officers and crew were taken aboard 
 the Alabama, and paroled at Port Royal, Jamaica. The Hatte 
 ras, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Blake, was a small 
 iron, side-wheel gunboat, formerly a merchant vessel, and carried 
 a very light battery. 
 
 After repairing and coaling ship at Port Royal, the Alabama 
 proceeded to the eastward, in the track of vessels bound to 
 and from the East Indies, the Pacific and the United States, 
 capturing seven vessels. She then headed in a southerly di 
 rection and along the coast of Brazil, touching at Fernando de 
 Noronha, capturing seven vessels, one of which, the Louisa 
 Hatch, was loaded with one thousand tons of coal. This was 
 a very fortunate capture for the Alabama, as she was short of 
 fuel. 
 
 Semmes had ordered the Agrippina to meet him here, so 
 that he might fill up with coal and stores, but he decided to hold 
 on to the Hatch until he made sure that the Agrippina had 
 arrived. On entering the harbor he did not find the Agrippina 
 there, and had the Hatch brought in, hauled alongside, and filled 
 his bunkers from her. Just after finishing taking coal, two 
 American vessels were sighted in the offing. The Alabama got 
 up steam and went out to them. They proved to be two 
 American whalers, one of which was burned and the other 
 brought in to anchor. 
 
 Semmes waited a few days longer for the Agrippina, but 
 she not arriving, he went out, taking his prizes with him, and 
 
THE FIRST CRUISE OF THE KEARSARGE 17 
 
 burnt them off the island. On the Alabama s way from there 
 to Bahia, she captured four vessels. 
 
 After leaving Bahia, she proceeded in a northeasterly direc 
 tion, then headed south, to a little south of Rio de Janeiro, 
 capturing seven vessels, one of which, the barque Conrad, was 
 commissioned as the Tuscaloosa, and officered as a tender to 
 the Alabama. From here her course was set to the eastward 
 for the Cape of Good Hope, capturing a vessel en route. On 
 July 29th, she anchored in Saldanha Bay. After remaining at 
 this port one week, she put to sea, and captured the bark Sea 
 Bride. She next went to Table Bay, and then to Simons Bay, 
 where she captured, in sight of the town as she went in, a bark 
 named the Martha Wenzell. It was finally decided that this 
 prize was inside the three mile line, and she was released. 
 
 On the 28th of August, the Alabama anchored at Angra 
 Piquina, where the prize, Sea Bride, was sold. It was about 
 September 25th, when the Alabama left the Cape for a cruise 
 still farther to the eastward. After steering south for a short 
 distance her course was set for the Straits of Sunda, by the way 
 of St. Paul s Island. At the entrance of the Straits she cap 
 tured a vessel, and after passing through them she captured two 
 more. The Alabama next sailed as far as the Island of Condor 
 in Siam, arriving at Singapore on December 2ist, 1863. In 
 the Straits of Malacca she captured three vessels, and off the 
 coast of India, another. 
 
 Passing westward, toward the coast of Africa, the Confederate 
 ship passed through the Mozambique Channel, to the Cape of 
 Good Hope, thence up towards St. Helena, west, to the coast 
 of Brazil, then northerly again, capturing the Rockingham April 
 23d, and the Tycoon on April 2/th. She continued her course 
 to the northward, passed the Azores, then stood away to the 
 northeast for the English Channel, and on the nth day of 
 June, 1864, arrived at Cherbourg, France, having cruised less 
 than two years. Of the sixty-six vessels captured by the Ala 
 bama, fifty -two were burned, ten released on bond, the Hatter as 
 
1 8 CIVIL WAR PAPERS. 
 
 sunk in action, the Conrad commissioned as a Confederate 
 tender to the Alabama,, one was sold, and one released- as an 
 unlawful capture. 
 
 The damage inflicted on American shipping by the Confed 
 erate cruisers, which were allowed to be fitted out in England, 
 cost the English government fifteen million, five hundred thou 
 sand dollars ($15,500,000) which sum was paid to the United 
 States in settlement of the so-called Alabama claims. 
 
 ON Sunday afternoon, June 12, 1864, while the Kearsarge 
 was lying at anchor in the Scheldt, off Flushing, Holland, 
 a gun was fired from on board, and the signal was hoisted 
 for everybody ashore belonging to the ship to return, at once ; 
 orders were also given to spread the fires, and to get up steam 
 preparatory to getting under way. The anchor was hoisted 
 and we proceeded to sea, when Captain Winslow called all 
 hands to muster on the quarter deck, and informed them that 
 he had received a telegram from Mr. Dayton, the American 
 Minister at Paris, that the Alabama was in the harbor of Cher 
 bourg, where we were going, and he hoped to have the oppor 
 tunity of meeting her, and of being able to capture or destroy 
 her. 
 
 This information was received with three rousing cheers 
 from the crew, and the men s eyes glistened with excitement 
 and animation, at the prospect of having a chance to show of 
 what they were made. They were all eager for the fray. 
 
 On the way to Cherbourg, the crew w r ere occupied in getting 
 swords and cutlasses sharp, and ready for action ; the grind 
 stones being kept in constant use. On the i4th of June we 
 steamed into the harbor of Cherbourg at the eastern entrance, 
 taking a good look at the Alabama as she lay at anchor. We 
 then proceeded out through the western passage, and without 
 anchoring, stood off and on, outside the breakwater ; keeping a 
 sharp lookout, and waiting for the Confederate to come out. 
 
THE FIRST CRUISE OF THE KEARSARGE 19 
 
 This was kept up for five days ; the crew meantime drilling at 
 the guns, and seeing that everything was in working order. On 
 Sunday, June iQth, at 10.20 A. M., all hands being at muster 
 on the quarter deck, and while the Captain was reading the 
 Church service, the lookout, on the fore-top-sail yard, reported 
 to the officer of the deck that the Alabama was coming out. 
 The Captain took the trumpet, called all hands to quarters, and 
 ordered the ship cleared for action. 
 
 Orders came to the engine room to start all the fires (we 
 had been running under half steam) and to prepare for action. 
 Our bow was turned a\vay from the shore, and we steamed out 
 toward the middle of the English Channel, so that the engage 
 ment should take place outside of the three mile limit, and also 
 that the Alabama might not be able to run inshore in case she 
 attempted to get away. 
 
 The Alabama was convoyed to the distance of three miles 
 from the French coast by the French ironclad frigate, La 
 Couronnc, The Alabama then continued on her course out, 
 while the French frigate returned inshore. 
 
 After Captain Winslow was satisfied that the Alabama was 
 well outside French waters, the Kearsarge was put about, and 
 headed straight for her enemy. At very long range the Ala 
 bama commenced firing, thinking that she might do us some 
 damage by raking shot ; but they mostly fell short, or went 
 clear, some passing over us. 
 
 As we approached her, we -sheered off, giving her a broad 
 side from our starboard battery at a distance of about one thou 
 sand yards, intending to run under her stern and rake her ; but, 
 perceiving our intention, Semmes wisely kept his broadside to 
 us, using his starboard battery. The tide was setting to the 
 westward, and our manoeuvering commenced a little to the east 
 ward of the harbor, on a circle, each vessel being on opposite 
 sides. The engagement took place on a panoramic plan, directly 
 in front of Cherbourg, about six miles distant, in plain view of 
 thousands of people that had come to witness the fight ; it hav- 
 
20 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 ing been reported in Paris Saturday evening that we were to 
 meet on Sunday morning. 
 
 During the early part of the fight, it did not seem to Captain 
 Winslow that our shot or shell were doing much damage, and 
 he decided to fight at closer quarters. We accordingly short 
 ened the distance between us, and could then see, by the 
 confusion on the enemy s deck, that we had not wasted our 
 ammunition. 
 
 After an hour s fighting, the Alabama attempted to set sail 
 and run inshore. The order of four bells ("ahead fast") was 
 given to the engine room ; we forged ahead, and were soon in a 
 position to rake the enemy fore and aft ; but she was too far 
 gone, and had commenced to settle when she hauled down her 
 colors, soon showing a white flag over her stern. Semmes then 
 sent a boat alongside of us to say he had surrendered. She 
 was now about five miles from shore. 
 
 The engagement lasted one hour and two minutes, each ves 
 sel using her starboard battery, and moving in a circle around a 
 common centre. 
 
 When we brought her port side into view, we saw that where 
 our shell had made only small holes in entering, on exploding 
 within, they had opened large gaps in her port side. Then the 
 Alabama sank, going down stern first, with her bow high in the 
 air, leaving the crew struggling in the water. The DeerJwnnd, 
 an English steam yacht, which had been lying at a safe distance 
 inshore, now steamed under our stern, and Captain Winslow 
 requested her commander to assist him in saving the crew, as 
 most of our boats were disabled. (We had only two that would 
 float, and they were sent to pick up the men.) W T hile thus en 
 gaged, it was observed by the officers of our vessel that the 
 Deerhound was steaming towards the English coast, and evi 
 dently going away with our prisoners. Permission was asked 
 by some of our officers to heave her to. Winslow refused, say 
 ing that the commander of an English yacht would not do such 
 a thing as to carry our prisoners away, but was only steaming 
 
THE FIRST CRUISE OF THE KEARSARGE 21 
 
 about, and would return with them to our ship ; but it was not 
 so The Deerhound went off with Semmes and a number of 
 his officers and crew, landing them at Southampton, England. 
 
 I will say that our boats crews were out, and it might have 
 been possible that the rescued men would have overpowered 
 them ; and it would certainly have been a very grave error to 
 have followed the yacht and left the men under such circum 
 stances. 
 
 After we had picked up all the men we could find in the 
 water, and had taken them from one of the French pilot boats 
 that had brought them alongside (making in all seventy men 
 and officers), we steamed into the harbor of Cherbourg and 
 came to anchor. 
 
 Captain Winslow sent an officer ashore to visit the Admiral 
 of the Port, in order to obtain permission to land the prisoners 
 on parole, and also to be permitted to send the wounded of both 
 vessels to the Marine Hospital; which was granted. 
 
 Virtually, the Alabama was an English ship, with English 
 guns, manned by an English crew, sunk in the English channel, 
 and Semmes and other officers were run away with by an Eng 
 lish yacht. 
 
 During the engagement, a iio-lb. rifle shell entered the bul 
 warks and exploded, wounding three of our after pivot-gun s 
 crew ; but everybody was working with such coolness and pre 
 cision that no more notice was taken of the casualty than to 
 have them taken below to the surgeon on the berth-deck, for 
 medical attendance. No other casualties befell our crew during 
 the engagement. 
 
 We never ascertained the losses on the Alabama, but judged 
 them to have been twenty or more. 
 
 We were struck twenty-eight times in hull and rigging, 
 which caused the following damages: A no-lb. rifle shell 
 struck the roof of the engine house, cutting it completely 
 through and across, knocking the splinters and glass in all 
 directions into the engine room below ; and it became neces- 
 
22 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 sary to set the men to sweeping them up to prevent them from 
 getting into the machinery. 
 
 A shell entered the smoke-pipe and exploded inside, tearing 
 out a space on the port side about three feet in diameter, cut 
 ting a boat hanging on the davits, full of small holes with the 
 fragments. 
 
 Another no-lb. shell struck a glancing blow under the 
 counter and deflecting, entered the rudder post and remained 
 there, but did not explode : nor did it jam the rudder so that 
 it could not be used ; situated as this shell was, it would have 
 done us very serious damage had it exploded. 
 
 One shot carried away the starboard life-buoy. 
 
 Three 32-lb. shot went through the port bulwarks forward 
 of the mizzen mast. 
 
 A shell exploded at the after end of after-pivot-gun port. 
 Another shell exploded at the after end of chain plating. Two 
 shot struck below the plank-sheer abreast of the boiler-room 
 hatch, one in the plank-sheer of the forward-pivot-gun port, 
 one forward of the fore rigging, two through the port quarter- 
 boat, and a number in the shrouds and rigging, doing more or 
 less damage. 
 
 To illustrate the effect of discipline aboard a man-of-war, I 
 will relate an incident that occurred during the fight. 
 
 John W. Dempsey, a quarter-gunner who was wounded, 
 received a compound comminuted fracture of his right arm. As 
 he went from the after-pivot-gun to the hospital, forward, with 
 his arm dangling by his side and bleeding freely, he took his cap 
 from his head and held it under his hand to prevent the deck 
 from being stained with his blood. 
 
 Before we went into the fight, an American flag was sent to 
 the main truck in a stop : at the end of the fight, the Alabama s 
 last shot struck the halyards, and breaking the stop, let the flag 
 loose to the breeze. 
 
 The crew of each vessel was as follows : Kcarsarge, one hun 
 dred and sixty-three, all told ; the Alabama, about the same 
 
THE FIRST CRUISE OF THE KEARSARGE 23 
 
 number, as near as could be ascertained at the time, although 
 her crew had numbered as high as one hundred and seventy, a 
 short time before. 
 
 The Alabama had been in Cherbourg a week preparing, and 
 had taken aboard three hundred and fifty tons of coal, which 
 brought her down in the water ; while the Kearsargc had only 
 one hundred and seventy tons aboard, making her very high out 
 of water. 
 
 The size of the two vessels was as follows : 
 
 
 ALABAMA. 
 
 KEARSARGE. 
 
 Length of keel . 
 Beam 
 
 . . . 210 feet 
 
 "J2 " 
 
 199 feet. 
 
 -7, " 
 
 Depth 
 Tonnage 
 
 . . 17 " 
 IO4O 
 
 jj 
 
 17 
 
 IO7I 
 
 Armament : 
 
 
 4 \_/ J A 
 
 Kearsarge, 
 
 4 short 32-pounders 
 
 
 2 ii-in. smooth bores (Dahlgrens) 
 i 30-lb. rifle 
 Total 7 guns. 
 
 Alabama, i 7-in. Blakely rifle, no Ibs. 
 
 i 8-in. smooth bore, 64 Ibs. 
 6 long 32-pounders 
 Total 8" guns. 
 
 The total number of shot and shell fired by the Kearsarge was 
 one hundred and seventy-three, while it was stated that the 
 Alabama fired about three hundred and seventy. 
 
 The repairs were all made by our own men, and we contin 
 ued cruising in the English Channel. 
 
 On August nth, 1864, we left Dover, England, on our way 
 home, stopping at Fayal ; then running due south to the St. Paul 
 Rocks which are situated about one degree north of the Equator 
 and almost in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, without any 
 light or beacon, in fact nothing to mark their location. 
 
 We proceeded to the southward to the Island of Fernando de 
 Noronha, a penal settlement belonging to Brazil, and then to 
 
24 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 off Rocas Islands, northwest to Barbadoes where we arrived 
 October 23d ; thence to St. Thomas, remaining three days. 
 
 While lying here two steamers were sighted in the offing 
 showing the American colors. We proceeded out of the har 
 bor and found the U. S. Steamer WacJiusett on her way to the 
 United States with the Confederate Steamer Florida which she 
 had captured by boarding, and had taken out of the harbor of 
 Bahia, in Brazil. We relieved her of part of the Florida s crew 
 and brought them home with us. 
 
 We arrived at Boston at five minutes after twelve o clock on 
 the morning of Tuesday, November 8th, 1864, having been two 
 years and nine months away from the United States. We were 
 given a reception and banquet by the city government in Fan- 
 euil Hall, it being the second time its doors had been thrown 
 open for a like occasion. The first was in 1812, when Captain 
 Hull, commanding the frigate Constitution, came into Boston 
 Harbor with the crew captured from the English frigate Guer- 
 riere, which she had destroyed in an engagement on the high 
 seas. 
 
 We were also banqueted at the Revere House by the mer 
 chants of Boston, receiving a most enthusiastic welcome from 
 all. On the 28th of November, 1864, the crew were discharged 
 and the officers were detached. Thus ended the first cruise of 
 the Kearsarge, one of the most famous of American naval 
 steamers. 
 
AMUSING THE ENEMY 
 
AMUSING THE ENEMY 
 
 BY 
 
 LIEUT.-COLONEL FRANCIS S. HESSELTINE, U. S. V. 
 
 THIS is a simple story, a brief account of an unimpor 
 tant part of the great contest in suppressing the rebellion. I 
 come not with a recital of heroic deeds, hard fought battles, 
 brilliant victories. The path of duty does not always lead to 
 the grandest heights. Mine is a "plain unvarnished tale" 
 relating to the Texas Coast Expedition in 1863. 
 
 To this expedition history gives a. very small space. The 
 ten-volume life of Abraham Lincoln, by Nicolay and Hay, which 
 contains a full account of all the movements of the armies, de 
 votes hardly a page to this Texas campaign. Grant in his 
 memoirs still more briefly refers to it. Having stated that on 
 August /tb, 1863, ne scnt to General Banks the Thirteenth 
 Army Corps, and that he went to New Orleans to confer, being 
 directed to co-operate with him in movements west of the Miss 
 issippi, he sums up the whole event in a word " All these 
 movements came to naught." 
 
 So little is generally known of this movement to the Rio 
 Grande and up the coast of Texas, that I have thought it not 
 altogether a vain task, though it may fail in interest, to give an 
 account of this expedition, its purpose, course, and accomplish 
 ment. 
 
 After the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson in July 1863, 
 when the great river went again imvexed by rebel guns and bar 
 ricades to the sea, Generals Grant and Banks recommended an 
 immediate movement against Mobile, but General Halleck re 
 fused his consent. August 6th a despatch to Banks informed 
 
 27 
 
28 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 him that there were important reasons why our flag should be 
 established in Texas with the least possible delay. 
 
 President Lincoln wrote a confidential letter to General 
 Grant on August Qth saying of the proposal to capture Mobile, 
 " This would appear tempting to me also were it not that in view 
 of recent events in Mexico I am greatly impressed with the im 
 portance of re-establishing the national authority in western 
 Texas as soon as possible." In the darkest hours of our strug 
 gle to suppress the rebellion and maintain our national existence 
 Napoleon III., assisted for a time by the forces of Spain and 
 England, attempted the conquest of Mexico under the pretence 
 of restoring order there. In May, England and Spain having 
 withdrawn their troops, the French captured the capital and pro 
 ceeded to establish a government in Mexico. Having convened 
 an assembly in July, it declared for an imperial government, 
 and selected as Emperor the Archduke Maximilian of Austria. 
 
 General Banks, in obedience to the directions to occupy 
 Texas, immediately made preparations to do so, and on the 5th 
 of September sent an expedition under General Franklin to land 
 below the Sabine Pass, capture the fort at the head of it, and 
 move rapidly to the occupation of Houston, the capital of the 
 State. General Franklin arranged for the gunboats, recon 
 structed merchant vessels, to enter the Pass and attack the 
 fort. They ran aground, were exposed to fire, and surrendered. 
 General Franklin thereupon abandoned the expedition, returning 
 to New Orleans within six days after he sailed. 
 
 Immediately after this lamentable failure, on September I3th, 
 troops were transferred to Bayou Teche for an overland move 
 ment ; but after planning and beginning this campaign General 
 Banks came to realize that the region through which he was to 
 march was barren, with little water ; that it required a march of 
 three hundred miles with wagon trains, and then at the end, if 
 not sooner, he would have to meet the enemy in full force ; and 
 as he says, the movement was necessarily abandoned in conse- 
 quence. 
 
AMUSING THE ENEMY 29 
 
 Generals Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan did not seek to avoid 
 the enemy, but marched where they were to be found. Then 
 was devised and organized by General Banks this expedition to 
 the Western Coast of Texas, and on the 26th of October, 1863, 
 there sailed under command of Major-General Napoleon J. F. 
 Dana, General Banks accompanying, a force of about four 
 thousand men, being the Second Division of the Thirteenth 
 Army Corps, to which was attached the I3th and I5th Maine 
 Infantry Regiments of the Nineteenth Army Corps, the first of 
 which regiments I had the honor to command. 
 
 This expedition was taken without the knowledge of the 
 authorities at Washington, and General Halleck on learning of 
 it immediately wrote his disapproval to General Banks, who ex 
 cused it on the ground that he was directed to enter Texas at 
 once, and that this was the one safe line of movement. The 
 fleet was scattered by a severe gale in the Gulf, but reassembled 
 at the point of destination, and on November /th we landed with 
 out welcome on the deserted shores of Brazos Santiago, a small 
 force of the enemy retiring. General Dana on board ship, 
 being surprised at sight of a regiment drilling a few hours after 
 a rough sea voyage, sent off to inquire its name, and then with 
 compliments to the commander for its condition, gave the I3th 
 Maine Regiment the honor of the advance. At midnight came 
 an order for this regiment to move at once for the mouth of the 
 Rio Grande, where a small force with difficulty and with some 
 loss had made a landing by boats through the surf. Before day 
 break, without equipage or rations, none having as yet been 
 landed, we marched out, forded the Boca-chica, and after several 
 hours suffering under the hot sun without food or water, we 
 reached the river s mouth and foraged for something to eat. 
 During the day, as no rations had reached us and it was impor 
 tant to move on to Brownsville at once, with one or two men as 
 an escort I crossed the Rio Grande to Bagdad, Mexico. Bagdad 
 was a small city built of shanties occupied by Greasers, Confed 
 erates, blockade runners, and desperadoes. I was warned as I 
 
30 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 landed to be careful or I would be shot down, but I announced 
 that I came only for provisions, and had left orders if fired upon, 
 and I did not return within an hour, for my regiment to cross and 
 destroy the town. Fortunately no such violation of international 
 law took place. 
 
 I found a shrewd trader who was willing to furnish rations 
 for my regiment and deliver them across the river, on my writ 
 ten order on the United States Government, payment to be 
 made in gold ; and I have often wondered if Uncle Sam honored 
 my draft when presented. 
 
 About sundown with haversacks filled, the 1st Missouri 
 Light Artillery being joined to our command, we began a forced 
 march for Brownsville, thirty-five miles distant. The next fore 
 noon, November 5th, we marched into Brownsville, from which a 
 short time before the rebel general H. P. Bee with his troops 
 had retreated without firing a shot, after setting fire to buildings 
 and stores. 
 
 General Jose Maria Cobos, a Spaniard by birth, long a resident 
 of Mexico, from which he had been banished the preceding 
 March, was residing at Brownsville. He organized a force prior 
 to our arrival to overcome a mob of marauders and suppress the 
 conflagration. That evening after our arrival he crossed the 
 river with his men, took possession of Matamoras, issued a grand 
 iloquent proclamation assuming the government and imprisoned 
 Senor Don Manuel Ruiz, military Governor of Tamaulipas, 
 and his officers. That night the I3th Maine Regiment encamped 
 in Fort Brown, famous for its defence against the attacks of the 
 Mexican army during the Mexican war, and named from Major 
 Brown who was killed there. My headquarters \vere a few 
 boards leaning against the parapet, my couch a blanket on the 
 ground. All night the Mexican bands celebrated the revolution 
 of General Cobos. The next morning at eight o clock I heard 
 across the river the volley that shot him ; another successful 
 revolution under General Cortinas having occurred very early, 
 and Cobos after a trial occupying but a few minutes was con- 
 
AMUSING THE ENEMY 31 
 
 demned and executed. The former Governor Ruiz was then 
 released, but fled to Brownsville for our protection. 
 
 On November 1 3th, with a Mexican guide, the 1 3th Maine 
 Regiment marched for Point Isabel, thirty-one miles distant, with 
 orders to report there to General Ransom, who had embarked 
 with troops at that point. We marched as before in light order, 
 our tents and baggage not having reached us. We bivouacked 
 for the night near the famous battle-fields of Resaca de la Palma 
 and Palo Alto, and being misled by our guide, wandered, suffer 
 ing for water over the arid sandy country, reaching Point Isabel 
 about four o clock, where we occupied a church overlooking 
 the sea. Here I first met and came under the command of 
 Brigadier-General T. E. G. Ransom, a most genial, generous and 
 gallant officer. He so distinguished himself by his reckless 
 bravery at Shiloh, exciting the admiration of General Grant, that 
 he won his promotion. He was severely wounded later at 
 Pleasant Hills. Then having been transferred to the northwest 
 he died while in command of the Seventeenth Army Corps on the 
 march to the sea, near Rome, Georgia. General Sherman es 
 teemed him most highly, and gave to the St. Louis Grand Army 
 Post the name of his beloved officer. 
 
 On November i6th, the I3th and I5th Maine Regiments 
 and two companies of the 2Oth Iowa Infantry, with two boat 
 howitzers, in charge of Ensign Henry Grinnell, afterward Lieu 
 tenant United States Navy, and later an officer with the rank of 
 Admiral in the Japanese Navy, now a companion of this com- 
 mandery, the whole force under the command of General Ransom, 
 sailed for Corpus Christi. Being unable to cross the bar into 
 the bay, about sunset we landed at the south end of Mustang 
 Island and made a rapid night march up the beach, the I3th 
 Maine Regiment in advance, with a line of skirmishers in front, 
 to capture the Confederate works at Aransas Pass, one of the 
 inlets to Corpus Christi Bay. 
 
 Never shall I forget the weird beauty of that silent night 
 march along the smooth white sands of the beach, with the con- 
 
32 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 tinual roll and solemn beat of the dark waters of the Gulf against 
 the shore. The waning moon shedding a dim benignant light, 
 the North Star beckoning us to the mysterious uncertainty 
 beyond, a glorious struggle, victory, captivity, or death. 
 
 General Ransom sent an orderly to order a halt but he could 
 not reach us until four o clock in the morning, when having 
 marched eighteen miles, we dropped down on the sand and 
 rested an hour until daybreak, then pushed forward again, driv 
 ing in the enemy s skirmishers. The I3th Maine by its rapid 
 movement marched far in advance of the rest of our forces, fol 
 lowed by the I5th Maine Regiment. The 2Oth Iowa did not 
 get up until after the capture. Deploying, we followed close 
 on their picket lines, fairly surprising the enemy ; and as we 
 rushed over their works, they raised the white flag of surrender. 
 
 General Ransom, in his report of the affair, see page 426, 
 vol. 26, Record War of the Rebellion, says, " I desire par 
 ticularly to make honorable mention of Colonel Isaac Dyer, Com 
 mander of the 1 5th Maine Regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Hesseltine commanding the I3th Maine Infantry, who were 
 untiring in their efforts to encourage their men and urge them 
 forward," and I hope I may be pardoned for repeating these 
 words from General Ransom s report. " Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Hesseltine was the first man to land through the surf and plant 
 his colors on the island." Here I obtained my favorite horse 
 Zip that did good service afterwards in Virginia, and went to my 
 home in Maine after the war. The rebel major s saddle, a huge 
 Texan affair, the star on it denoting his rank, I still preserve as 
 a memento. 
 
 On November 22nd, General Ransom in obedience to the 
 orders of Major-General C. C. Washburn now commanding this 
 division, crossed Aransas Pass and moved eight miles up St. 
 Joseph Island to Cedar Bayou, which separates St. Joseph from 
 Matagorda Island. Here our advance had difficulty with a small 
 force, and Major Charles Hill commanding the Confederate 
 forces was killed. A severe norther delayed our crossing for two 
 
AMUSING THE ENEMY 33 
 
 days, then we were ferried across and moved up the island for 
 the capture of Fort Esperanza, at the north end of the island 
 commanding Pass Cavallo to Matagorda Bay. 
 
 On November 2 7th we drove the enemy into their works, 
 threw up an earthwork, mounted one or two guns, opened fire, 
 and began to dig our way towards the fort preparatory to 
 assault. I received orders to command a night expedition across 
 Espirito Santo Bay, to capture a one gun earthwork on Bayucos 
 Island and prevent the retreat of the Confederates, but another 
 severe norther delayed the movement, and on the night of the 
 28th we were startled by heavy explosions caused by the enemy 
 blowing up some of their magazines before retreating. The 
 fort was a strong work, mounting one 128-pounder Columbiad, 
 and seven 24-pounder siege guns. At this point orders came 
 from General Banks at New Orleans that a further advance of 
 our troops would bring down the concentrated forces of the 
 enemy, and that we must be largely reinforced before such ad 
 vance was made ; "that in the meantime the commanding 
 general desires that you scout actively all the country in your 
 front and press your scouts in the direction of Caney Creek and 
 make demonstration with a view to amuse and confuse the 
 enemy." We had no cavalry force ; on one side was Matagorda 
 Bay, the Gulf of Mexico on the other ; in front a long narrow 
 peninsula extending nearly sixty miles to Caney River. We 
 knew little of the position or strength of the enemy. How was 
 it supposed that we could " scout actively and amuse and confuse 
 the enemy." I will give a brief account of one attempt to do 
 this. On the evening of December 28th, orders came to me from 
 General Ransom to detail one hundred men under the command 
 of a captain to go aboard the gunboat Granite City, which would 
 go up the coast in the night, and at early daylight land the 
 force near the head of Matagorda peninsula with instructions to 
 reconnoitre, ascertain about the Confederate force there, then 
 march down and cut off a company of Confederate cavalry scour 
 ing the peninsula. I immediately went to the General s head- 
 
34 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 quarters to confer about this strange order to land one hundred 
 unmounted men sixty miles from our army near an unknown 
 force of the enemy. General Ransom replied that the order had 
 come from General Washburn, the division commander, and 
 that while he questioned the wisdom of it, the instructions must 
 be carried out. I then claimed the right, if one hundred of my 
 men were to be sent on such a wild expedition, to command them 
 in person. My request was granted, and that night the men were 
 embarked on the Granite City, General Ransom accompanying 
 on the gunboat Sciota, commanded by Lieutenant George H. Per 
 kins, now a resident of Boston, a member of this Commandery. 1 
 About daylight in a foggy mist, the shore hardly discernible, 
 we were landed on the beach. Immediately after a norther, 
 which beats down the sea, one can land on this shore, but very 
 soon after the wind changes, the waves roll in, the surf breaks, 
 and no boat can approach the beach. The last boat reached the 
 shore with difficulty and was nearly swamped. We were now 
 in an unknown place at least fifty miles from our army, with no 
 means of communication with the gunboats ; we were in obedi 
 ence to orders to " amuse" if not to "confuse the enemy." 
 
 The Sciota, with General Ransom on board, went farther up 
 opposite the Brazos River to reconnoitre, and soon we heard her 
 guns firing on the enemy s works. We had landed near the 
 house of an old man who had lost two sons in the rebellion ; we 
 found here, and took possession of several boarding pikes which 
 had floated ashore from the wreck of the U. S. Steamer Hat- 
 teras, sunk in the Gulf by the Alabama. Having sent an 
 officer with a small force farther up the peninsula for informa 
 tion, we ascertained that we had landed within a few miles of 
 the whole Confederate army, who would doubtless soon learn of 
 our position and come down upon us. Deploying my small 
 force across the peninsula we moved down, driving in front of us 
 Captain Henderson s company of Confederate scouts, who lower 
 down abandoned their horses and escaped in boats across the 
 
 1 Since deceased. 
 
AMUSING THE ENEMY 35 
 
 bay. We secured a couple of their horses and I was again a 
 mounted officer. Now and then we saw hovering in our rear 
 and watching us, a small body of cavalry. About i o clock we 
 passed, and halted for an hour near, an old German farmer s 
 house. Both he and his wife were very pressing in their invita 
 tions for me and my officers to come to his house and dine. 
 They seemed too urgent and we declined, but the old lady 
 brought us down an abundant repast, evidently seeking to de 
 tain us with good fare. I afterwards learned that some of the 
 Confederate scouts were concealed in their house and that they 
 sought our delay and capture. 
 
 We had proceeded but a short distance after our halt and 
 meal when the continued whistling of the Granite City that 
 followed us down the coast gave warning of a danger which as 
 yet was not apparent. Soon she opened with her guns, firing 
 at the approaching enemy. After a \vhile with the aid of my 
 glass I could see the advance of a large body of cavalry gallop 
 ing down in pursuit. The sea was too rough for accurate firing 
 from the gunboat, and their shell did not retard the pursuing 
 forces. In a short time they ceased firing altogether. On 
 came the enemy, their long column uncoiling like some huge 
 serpent drawing continually nearer to our small band, ready to 
 spring upon and destroy it. Far back the whole peninsula was 
 alive with mounted men coming at full trot. The rear of the 
 column could not be seen. The force as we afterwards learned, 
 was a brigade of Confederate cavalry, the ist Texas Regiment 
 Mounted Rifles and a Texas Cavalry Regiment, Colonel R. R. 
 Brown, all under the command of Colonel Buchel, a former 
 officer in the Prussian Army. They came on gayly, confident 
 of their prey, a party apparently too small to offer resistance, and 
 too far from its base to hope for aid, out on an open plain with 
 no possible way of escape. I rallied my men and continued the 
 march, allowing the Confederates to approach quite near to my 
 line, when at command the company halted, the rear rank faced 
 about and opened fire. It was a reception they had not antici- 
 
36 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 pated ; one or two dropped from their saddles, others hugged 
 their horses necks, and a large detachment began to move 
 towards the bay on the right out of range, to get below and cut 
 off our line of retreat. I ordered the company forward again. 
 One of my officers remonstrated, declaring that we might as 
 well fight and die there as anywhere. Repeating the command 
 forward, the march w r as resumed. I confess I did not at first 
 know what to do. I wanted time to think. I could see no 
 way of escape. It was hopeless to fight there in the open plain, 
 retreat was impossible, and soon our line of march would be cut 
 off. 
 
 Unwilling to surrender while there was a single chance, I 
 looked and sought to find that chance, and whether there was 
 anything to do but halt and resist the enemy. At one time 
 I did form a square, intending to receive their charge, but as 
 they moved out of range to get below us I ordered the retreat 
 again. There appeared no possible line of escape, but no man 
 should ever despair. One can always find a way or make it. 
 Need I say I looked up for wisdom and guidance, and rode on a 
 little in advance to seek the means of escape for which I prayed ? 
 Soon, glancing ahead, it flashed upon me like an inspiration. A 
 short distance beyond there was a bayou extending into the pen 
 insula from the bay, which formed a wide marsh, reaching quite 
 near to the Gulf side where we were. I noticed that trunks of 
 trees, branches and drift stuff were strewn along the shore. I 
 rode back and instructed the men that when opposite this place 
 they, at command, were to rush on to the beach, drop their guns 
 and pile up a barricade of the trunks and drift stuff on the sand 
 ridge which extended some hundred feet back from the water, 
 and to be ready to seize their guns again at the signal announ 
 cing the approach of the enemy. It was done quickly, every 
 man working with renewed energy and confidence. The Con 
 federates came down with a yell, thinking we were demoralized 
 and had broken ranks. They formed opposite us, as many and 
 as well as the nature of the ground would allow, and began to 
 
AMUSING THE ENEMY 37 
 
 advance for a charge. They caught sight, as they drew near, 
 of our strange rough work looming above the sand ridge, and 
 halted just out of range, evidently surprised at this sudden 
 erection, and sent up a reconnoitering force to inspect the work. 
 At command every man took possession of his rifle, and at the 
 order when within range opened fire upon the party. Some of 
 them rode back to report, and then they began to ford the bayou 
 to get down to the beach below. They reformed on the beach 
 to charge upon our flank, but before they could reach us on that 
 side a barricade from the sand ridge to the water had been piled 
 up as if by magic, every man and officer working with a will, 
 and soon we were enclosed on three sides by a rough work with 
 gnarled roots and branches projecting, forming such an abatis 
 as no horseman would care to charge against. 
 
 Would they dismount and attempt our capture, was the 
 question. They were numerous enough, and if they had the 
 will could do it perhaps. Darkness came on. The Granite 
 City sent a boat in as near as they could to the beach and 
 shouted to ask if they could render assistance, but communica 
 tion was impossible and the boat returned. To encourage the 
 men, and for a challenge to dispirit the enemy, I ordered three 
 rousing cheers, which were given with a will, and which the 
 enemy heard, as we afterwards learned from their report of the 
 affair. After a while we saw the lights of the Sciota returning. 
 The Granite City sent up signal lights and rockets. The Sciota 
 ran down, communicated with the Granite City, and that boat 
 went off down towards the point, sent as we inferred, for relief. 
 The Sciota ran in as near as she could opposite our position and 
 anchored. Through the mist her lights looked a mile away ; 
 she could not communicate with us, but Captain Perkins fired a 
 shot to announce his presence and to assure us that he would 
 stay by us. We built fires on each flank to let him know our 
 position, and without what lines he could aim his guns, if he 
 opened fire. We continued at work strengthening our bar 
 ricade, digging and throwing the sand up into it. 
 
38 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 Every man was assigned to his post, which he was not to 
 quit for the night. Pickets were sent out to watch and give 
 warning of the approach of the enemy, as we did not doubt 
 that they would dismount and make a night attack. We suf 
 fered with thirst and dug in the sand, obtaining a little brackish 
 water ; the soldiers rested their backs against the barricade 
 ready for instant action. The gallant Captain Perkins walked 
 the bridge on his gunboat and kept his men at quarters all 
 night, his ship lying close in, the surf breaking all around her. 
 He lent us the moral force of his presence, though in case of a 
 close fight he could do little to aid us. 
 
 When at one time our fires were suffered to become low, 
 they lost heart on the gunboat, and declared that we must have 
 given up and surrendered. Shortly after midnight our pickets 
 opened fire and ran in announcing the approach of the enemy. 
 A dark column of men on foot appeared moving on our left 
 flank. We opened fire as they approached and instantly the 
 Sciota slipped her anchor and fifty fathoms of chain which she 
 had out, turned broadside to, and fired in the direction in which 
 the flash of our guns indicated that the enemy were approach 
 ing. The attacking force, finding us prepared, broke and re 
 tired, troubling us no more that night ; later the moon broke 
 through the clouds, lending us her uncertain light. The morn 
 ing brought no additional cheer or hope ; a thick fog hid both 
 friend and foe. We could not see a hundred feet away. Pickets 
 sent out reported that appearances indicated that the main force 
 had gone down the peninsula and that only a few scouts were in 
 our immediate front. The enemy doubtless having us cut off 
 had gone below to meet any relieving force, and were waiting 
 for us to come out and surrender. Our rations were exhausted 
 and we were suffering with thirst. There was no cavalry at 
 the point and probably from the report which came by the 
 Granite City of our condition it would be considered useless to 
 attempt our rescue ; no troops could be landed and we would be 
 compelled to surrender long before infantry could reach us. In 
 
AMUSING THE ENEMY 39 
 
 fact the gunboat Granite City reported that the force of the 
 enemy was overwhelming and that we were no doubt captured, 
 and it was so reported to the headquarters at New Orleans. 
 The few horses at the point, some thirty, were mounted and 
 sent up the peninsula but were driven back. About noon the 
 fog lifted, the sun appeared, and we caught glimpses of the old 
 MonongaJiela, Captain Strong, far off from shore, with the gun 
 boat Estrella steaming up from the point. There was no rescue 
 possible, as no boat could approach the beach. Later we dis 
 cerned the Confederate gunboat J. G. Carr\x\ the bay steaming 
 from the direction of Matagorda City. As she approached I 
 could read her name with my glass, and see her decks crowded 
 with soldiers. She had on board an infantry force sent over to 
 aid in our capture. When opposite our position she opened fire 
 with shot and shell ; fortunately only a few of the shell that 
 dropped around and near us exploded, and as we were protected 
 behind our wall no one was injured. About three o clock, as 
 there was no prospect of relief, and no force could be seen in 
 our immediate front, it being useless to remain there longer 
 without rations and no prospect of rescue, I decided that we 
 must go out and try to force our way down the peninsula. 
 This was our only hope of escape. I divided my force into two 
 companies, sending in advance one-half with skirmishers under 
 the command of a brave officer, Captain R. B. Grover, now of 
 Brockton, leaving a few men for a while to build fires and work 
 conspicuously on the fort to deceive the enemy : the remaining 
 force moved out about a mile in rear of the advance. The men 
 went out singly, concealing themselves from the enemy by mov 
 ing low under the cover of the sand ridge. The instructions 
 were if the advance platoon was attacked they were to fall back 
 on us who would throw up a barricade, and if we were attacked 
 we were to join them, who would prepare a like protection. The 
 enemy were deceived and continued firing at the work after our 
 departure. Even on the Sciota they did not divine our purpose 
 to abandon the work, supposing that a force of sharp-shooters 
 
40 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 had been sent out to open fire on the troops aboard the gunboat, 
 and remained at anchor. 
 
 Night came on and some distance ahead we saw a light like a 
 camp fire. We reconnoitered and found the remains of a house 
 set on fire by the enemy in punishment for assistance rendered 
 by the owner to the mounted men sent up from the Point and 
 driven back the day before. Here at the well the boys for the 
 first time were able to fill their canteens. About nine o clock 
 the most terrible norther yet experienced, a perfect blizzard, 
 struck us. Only those who have experienced a norther on the 
 Texas Coast know anything of the fierceness and penetrating 
 power of the freezing wind. It pierces all garments, and out of 
 doors there is no escape from its chilling grasp. Men and 
 cattle exposed perish before its deadly breath. We suffered 
 much in our camps during this campaign. We took the skins 
 of cattle killed for food and stretched them over stakes for 
 shelter ; we dug holes in the sand, building some cover over 
 them ; we had devised every way in vain for protection from 
 this fiend. Now it was our welcome friend, possibly our de 
 liverer. The foe would hide from its fury ; we rugged men from 
 the Pine Tree State would march as long as it was possible. 
 By eleven o clock the exhausted men could go no farther and 
 we hugged the ground as closely as we could under the lea of 
 the sand ridge. After two hours flesh and blood could not en 
 dure the cold ; the water in my canteen was frozen, and I 
 allowed the men to build and hover round fires which, as a 
 caution, I had at first forbidden. Still the men were freezing. 
 By chance we had halted near a house just behind a ridge, 
 which the light of the fire disclosed. Forcing our way with 
 difficulty against the gale we reached the house, aroused its 
 inmates, two young women and two children; they hesitated, 
 and refused us admission until assured that we meant no harm, 
 and that they should be protected. Assigning them a room 
 under a guard, we built a fire in the fire-place and thawed out 
 the men before it. The girls in the morning got the officers a 
 
AMUSING THE ENEMY 41 
 
 good breakfast of corn-cake, meat, eggs, etc., the men baking 
 some sweet potatoes. While at breakfast we were startled by 
 the firing of cannon and immediately formed on the beach. 
 Far up the coast the Estrella, as we afterwards learned, was 
 firing on the Confederate gun-boat in the bay. The Granite 
 City could be seen anchored below us, but she did not know 
 our whereabouts and did not discover our signals to her ; the 
 gale continued but we resumed our march. About 3 o clock P.M., 
 when some twenty miles from Decrow s Point, lookouts on the 
 Sciota which was then steaming down, discovered us, signalled, 
 and sent in to attempt to take us off. The tars pulled in as 
 near as they could, then jumping overboard held the boats till 
 we waded out to them, then pushed off and with great labor got 
 out through the heavy surf, repeating the service until all were 
 taken off. As we approached the Sciota, the tars manned the 
 rigging and gave three cheers, which we heartily returned. 
 General Ransom assisted the men on board and heartily shook 
 every man s hand as he reached the deck ; all the officers gave 
 us a royal welcome, and the tars in like manner the soldiers. 
 Double rations were issued. Another chain and anchor were 
 lost in getting under way. In the heavy sea it was impossible 
 to weigh it. Shortly after the lookout reported a large force 
 of cavalry moving up the beach ; there in plain sight was our 
 late foe returning. The gun-boat had discovered and taken us 
 off none too soon. That night was a bitter cold one, the se 
 verity of the norther increased, water freezing several inches 
 thick, but we were safe, comfortably housed and cared for in 
 the good Sciota. In the cabin that night we had a rejoicing, 
 watching out the old and welcoming in the New Year, 1864. 
 
 The next day we entered the harbor and landed. With a 
 brief intermission the gale continued until January 5th, causing 
 great suffering and the deaths of many horses and mules from 
 exposure and want of forage. I turned my horses loose, either 
 to find food by grazing or to perish. When the storm ceased, 
 we obtained from a Confederate deserter papers containing their 
 
42 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 account of the affair. It appeared that the rebel boat./. G. Carr 
 had on board Captain Rugeley s company from Matagorda City, 
 who landed after dark to capture us, and that many perished, 
 frozen to death. Some years after the war I met in the State 
 of Georgia a Southern lady who at the time lived in Matagorda 
 and learned that Captain Rugeley s command was a company of 
 home guards, composed of the best young men of Matagorda. 
 About thirty were lost. A few who survived came to the fires 
 which we had left when we abandoned the work, to surrender. 
 I give this brief extract from the " Tri-Weekly Telegraph of 
 Houston." 
 
 CAMP WHARTON, Dec. 31, 1863. 
 
 We have had considerable excitement within the past twenty-four hours. 
 The Yankees landed at Caney River on the 2Qth inst. Their force was about 
 three hundred. They marched down the beach to entrap the Houston videttes; 
 they were pursued by Buchel ; then entrenched themselves on the lower side of a 
 marsh behind drift-wood, and cheered lustily. Buchel approached, but deeming 
 it too hazardous to charge them under the circumstances, retreated, after ex 
 changing some shots in which we had five or six wounded, we having had bad 
 luck in this game. VIDETTE 
 
 CAMP WHARTON, Jan. 2, 64. 
 
 Captain Rugeley embarked with some forty or fifty men in their small boats 
 during the night. Shortly after they started, a severe norther sprang up which 
 was so severe as to swamp the frail barks, and the brave men who had thus risked 
 their lives to rescue their comrades were buffeted about the bay all night. Next 
 day some twenty reached the shore in safety, but almost frozen to death, as the 
 day w r as a bitter cold one. The day passed, and the night was freezing cold ; the 
 next morning, New Year s Day, fourteen were found, but Oh, God 1 How ? In 
 the beach, drowned and frozen. How horrible to think that fourteen young and 
 brave men should meet with such a death. 
 
 This is the most horrible calamity that has occurred on the coast of Texas 
 during the w r ar. VIDETTE. 
 
 The following is extracted from Colonel Buchel s report : 
 
 HEADQUARTERS, 2d BRIGADE, 2d DIVISION. 
 
 Dec. 3 ist, 1863. 
 DEAR SIR: 
 
 I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 2Qth inst. I received 
 intelligence of the arrival of two or three gunboats near the works being erected 
 at the mouth of the Caney, and of the landing of a force of men. I immediately 
 
AMUSING THE P:NEMY 43 
 
 started with the two regiments under my command, and proceeded down the 
 peninsula for the purpose of saving Captain Henderson s squad of exempts and 
 my scouts, as I had no doubt that these men had been landed with a view to cut 
 them off and capture them. I proceeded in a trot and gallop until I had over 
 taken the enemy, who had moved down the peninsula from the place of landing 
 about eight miles. The gunboat which accompanied them awaited our approach 
 about two miles below where they had landed, and when within shelling distance 
 she opened on us with shell, rifle shot, and spherical case shot. After overtaking 
 the enemy, it took a position behind the marsh and began to make breastworks of 
 the logs which were profusely strewed along the beach. I thought the risk too 
 great and the enterprise too hazardous to attack them in their breastworks, as 
 their capture would not compensate for the loss of lives w T hich we must necessarily 
 have sustained. Captain Henderson escaped with his men in a boat, but lost his 
 horses. Both officers and men behaved with coolness and bravery. 
 Very respectfully your obedient servant, 
 
 A. BUCHKL, Colonel, Commanding. 
 
 I hold in my hand the report of General Ransom in his own 
 handwriting, handed to me when copied by his Adjutant-General, 
 Dickey, who was killed in the subsequent Red River campaign, 
 when the general was wounded. The general speaks in such 
 flattering terms of the conduct of our little expedition, that it is 
 hardly befitting for me to give his words here. I prize his 
 report more than any memento preserved from the War. Once 
 again before the I3th Maine left I was sent with a small force 
 in boats by night to capture a Confederate gunboat commanding 
 the bay. The pilot, I believe a traitor, failed to guide us 
 through the reef, and daylight found us in easy range of the 
 enemy s guns, but we escaped with small loss. This was the 
 last attempt to " amuse " the enemy. We remained in camp at 
 Decrow s Point until the last of February. No further advance 
 was made, such as at first could have been clone safely, as we 
 outnumbered the enemy, and they had no works at the Brazos 
 River at the head of the peninsula. The troops at Decrow s 
 Point were transported up Atchafalaya Bay to Brashear City, to 
 take part in the disastrous Red River campaign. If the cam 
 paign had been stronger, my story would have been longer. The 
 purpose of this campaign, a notice and warning to France that 
 Texas was one of the United States which the government pro- 
 
44 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 posed to hold and occupy, thus lending our moral support to the 
 adjacent friendly republic of Mexico, was accomplished. Browns 
 ville and points in Western Texas were held. Napoleon did not 
 heed the occupation by General Banks, but when at the close of 
 the Rebellion, General Sheridan with troops went to the Rio 
 Grande, he did take heed, withdrew the French troops, and 
 left the brave Maximilian to his sad and untimely fate. 
 
THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND 
 
THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND 
 
 BY 
 
 LIEUTENANT R. H. PRESCOTT, U.S.V. 
 
 THE Confederate capital, as it appeared before the war, was 
 a fair and pleasant city, occupying a commanding position on 
 the north bank of the James River, at the head of tide water, 
 about one hundred and fifty miles from the sea, and about 
 ninety miles from Washington in a southwesterly direction. 
 Like ancient Rome, it was built on seven hills, surrounded by 
 beautiful scenery, possessing a few fine public buildings, and a 
 beautiful park adorned with statues of men famous in their 
 country s history. It was the capital of the state, and rich in 
 all the natural elements of growth and prosperity. 
 
 During the war it was one of the most strongly fortified 
 cities ever known. Its inner line of defences consisted of seven 
 teen powerful earthworks, forming almost a complete circle 
 about a mile from the city (the interruption being on the south 
 west where the river in itself was considered a sufficient pro 
 tection), mounting more than three hundred guns of the 
 heaviest calibre, and commanding each foot of ground in every 
 direction. 
 
 A second line of continuous earthworks almost surrounded 
 it again, and in places deemed especially weak or exposed, a 
 third line outside of this. Not a hill or knoll for miles around 
 but bristled with cannon. Nature had most admirably adapted 
 it for a defensive position, protecting it on the south and west 
 by the river, and on the north and east by that vast tract known 
 as the swamps of the Chickahominy in which so many thou 
 sands of McClellan s men perished in the spring and summer 
 campaigns of 1862. 
 
 47 
 
48 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 Its naval defences consisted of several powerful gunboats 
 which lay in the river opposite the city, but their range of move 
 ment being limited to the seven miles of river navigation lying 
 between their anchorage and the Dutch Gap Canal, they were 
 of little or no use except as a show of strength. 
 
 Five lines of railroads brought supplies from the outer world, 
 and thus surrounded, defended and supplied, this proud city, 
 secure in its position, confident in the strength of its defences 
 and the inexhaustibleness of its resources, maintained itself 
 through four long years of bloodiest strife, as the seat and 
 stronghold of the Confederate government, its military centre, 
 the very heart of the Confederacy. And so secure did its 
 thirty-eight thousand inhabitants feel against the most strenu 
 ous efforts of the Union armies to capture it, that from May, 
 1 86 1, when it was made the seat of the Confederate government, 
 until June, 1864, it was held by only a few thousand militia, 
 mainly boys and old men unfit for more arduous and active 
 service in the field. Until the last of September, 1864, the 
 exterior line of its triple wall of defence had never been carried. 
 Union troops had on several occasions come within sight of it ; 
 in one or two instances it had been for a moment pierced, but 
 the assaults had always been repulsed, and no Union soldier 
 had ever seen the inner line unless taken through it as a 
 prisoner of war. The city had no appearance of being in a 
 state of siege. The people quietly pursued their various avo 
 cations, and save for the newspaper reports, the tales of soldiers 
 on furlough and those of the sick and wounded in the hos 
 pitals, they had little knowledge of what was transpiring even 
 in their own army. Consequently, when on that beautiful 
 Sabbath in early April, 1865, the President of the Confederacy, 
 while seated quietly in church, was suddenly notified that Gen 
 eral Lee could no longer maintain his lines and that the city 
 must be immediately evacuated, one can easily imagine the 
 scene of consternation and terror that followed. 
 
 On Wednesday, September 28, 1864, General Grant, in order 
 
THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND 49 
 
 to prevent Lee from sending reinforcements to Early, who was 
 being badly punished by Sheridan in the Valley of the Shenan- 
 doah, sent General Ord with a considerable force to make 
 another threatening demonstration against Richmond, and this 
 time from the south, all previous campaigns and attempts hav 
 ing fully demonstrated that the city could be taken only from 
 this direction. 
 
 Orel s troops consisted of Stannard s division of the Eigh 
 teenth Corps, three brigades numbering some twenty-five hun 
 dred men encamped at Bermuda Hundred and General Birney 
 with about eight thousand men of the Tenth Corps, including a 
 division of colored troops from the Petersburg front, who was 
 expected to co-operate at a point considerably further to the 
 right. General Kautz, also, with his cavalry, was to penetrate 
 still further, if possible, and make a demonstration along the 
 Darbytown road, one of the turnpikes leading into Richmond. 
 Two pontoon bridges were thrown across the river late in the 
 afternoon of that clay, one near Aiken s Landing, about ten 
 miles below Richmond (the place, also, where the exchange of 
 prisoners took place), the other at Deep Bottom, some distance 
 below. 
 
 Stannard s division, in which was our regiment, the I3th 
 New Hampshire, crossed at the first named place, Birney and 
 his troops at the second. We left our camp behind the in- 
 trenchments at Bermuda Hundred at eight o clock that morning, 
 September 28, 1864, and spent the day in marching idly about 
 from one position to another. At nine in the evening we started 
 for Aiken s Landing, some three or four miles distant, where 
 the men were massed in the darkness of the woods awaiting 
 the order to cross. The utmost secrecy and silence were ob 
 served. The men were allowed to converse only in low tones, 
 and the exhibition of any light, however small, was strictly for 
 bidden. Meanwhile the pioneers were busy covering the bridge 
 thickly with earth, that the measured tread of the troops in 
 crossing might not be heard by the enemy. About three o clock 
 
50 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 on the morning of the 2Qth all was ready and the movement 
 commenced. 
 
 The first faint flushes of dawn were just appearing in the 
 eastern skies when the entire force found itself safely transferred 
 to the north bank of the river, and without delay was immedi 
 ately ordered forward. Advancing across open fields for about 
 a mile, we entered a travelled road the Varina road which 
 led through a piece of pine forest, and just at this point the 
 enemy s pickets were first encountered. A brisk fire was ex 
 changed with our skirmishers, when the enemy hastily retreated 
 leaving their breakfast untouched, which was without ceremony 
 snatched and eaten by our men as they passed along. On 
 emerging from the woods nearly three miles above, a momentary 
 halt was made to afford a hasty survey of the scene before us. 
 Directly in front and nearly three-quarters of a mile distant, on 
 the summit of a hill, stood a large fort, the Confederate flag 
 waving above it, and the black muzzles of its heavy guns plainly 
 visible. Long lines of rifle pits stretched away on either side 
 to the James River on the left, and until lost to view in the 
 woods on the right. The ground between us and the fort was 
 rough and uneven, the trees having been cut away to afford the 
 enemy an unobstructed view of the road, but leaving the stumps 
 a foot or more in height, and the ground strewn with branches. 
 Two brigades, General Burnham s and General Stevens , were 
 ordered to the left of the road ; the third, General Roberts , to 
 the right, in order to allow our own artillery to come up the 
 road to the front. No use was made of it however; not a can 
 non shot from our side was fired during the day, the battle being 
 fought and won by the infantry alone. 
 
 In another moment a loud roar, a sudden burst of flame and 
 smoke from the fort, announced that the action had begun. 
 The first few shells screamed harmlessly overhead, only cutting 
 off the tops of the trees and bursting far behind us, but the 
 enemy soon obtained our range and more serious results fol 
 lowed. The first to do any harm struck the edge of an artillery 
 
THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND 51 
 
 wheel close to where we stood, straightened its heavy tire and 
 laid it flat as a ribbon along the road, then glancing, cut off the 
 fore-legs of a horse attached to the gun next behind, causing 
 the poor beast to pitch suddenly forward upon his breast. Pass 
 ing on, it killed two more horses, and finally exploded in a group 
 of men, killing three and wounding several others. 
 
 Nothing demoralizes troops more thoroughly than to remain 
 inactive under fire, and it was with a feeling of relief that the 
 order " forward " was received. Steadily, almost as if on parade, 
 in close column by division, with arms at right shoulder, the 
 brigades moved onward, and as the cannon shot from fort and 
 gunboats ploughed great gaps through their ranks, quickly 
 closed up and pressed forward as rapidly as the nature of the 
 ground would permit. It did not take long to traverse that 
 mile of death, and when a point was finally reached where the 
 ground rose so abruptly that the guns of the fort could not be 
 depressed sufficiently to do further harm, a momentary halt 
 was made to enable the men to recover their breath. Then the 
 order to charge was given, and with a yell the men sprang for 
 ward. Leaping into the deep moat which surrounded the fort, 
 they climbed by means of each other s shoulders, and their 
 bayonets driven into the opposite wall of earth, to the slope 
 above, over which they swarmed like bees, under a terrible fire 
 of musketry from every available point. So near were they to 
 the enemy that many were severely burned by the flame from 
 the latter s rifles, and their faces blackened by the unburnt 
 powder. The fire was literally in their very faces. It was but 
 a moment, however, ere the parapet was gained. The colors of 
 half a dozen regiments were quickly planted upon it, and as the 
 enemy turned and fled in haste, loud and repeated cheers an 
 nounced that the dearly bought victory was won. The fort 
 with its sixteen heavy guns and a considerable proportion of its 
 garrison was ours. All this had been accomplished without 
 firing a shot. At the moment of commencing the march across 
 the field the caps were removed from the muskets, bayonets 
 
52 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 were fixed, and until the enemy were met face to face within 
 the fort, not a shot from our side had been fired. When once 
 inside the fort, the bayonet alone completed the work. Later 
 in the day we had the misfortune to see General Birney s troops 
 repeatedly repulsed while charging Fort Gilmer, another large 
 earthwork further in our front. 
 
 That march of a mile, through such a terrible tempest of 
 lead and iron, was, of course, attended with most disastrous 
 results. General Stevens lay severely wounded just without, 
 and General Burnham dead just within the fort. Both were 
 taken away in the same ambulance, under a heavy fire. Of the 
 assaulting column more than one-third lay dead and wounded 
 between the fort and edge of the woods. Looking back from 
 the parapet of the fort the line of march was seen to be covered 
 with prostrate forms, while the groans and shrieks of agony 
 that came to our ears were most appalling. What with the fire 
 from the fort and the redoubts which flanked it on the right and 
 left, the huge shells which came screaming up from the enemy s 
 gunboats on the river, the bullets from the enemy s riflemen 
 posted in treetops, the roofs and chimneys of the scattered 
 farmhouses, and from the lines of rifle-pits, it is a wonder that 
 the column was not completely annihilated. Had there been 
 an abattis in front of the fort, it is certain that it could not have 
 been taken, and why so important a position was unprovided 
 with this invaluable protection is something I have never been 
 able to understand. It is only on the supposition that the posi 
 tion was considered impregnable. 
 
 As the last discharge of the enemy s artillery tore through 
 the broken and shattered ranks, the column wavered and rocked 
 like a tree before a rude blast of wind, and for a moment the 
 task seemed impossible ; but under the shelter of the crest 
 before mentioned there was a momentary respite, and the rush 
 and shout which immediately followed were irresistible. As the 
 first men mounted the parapet and looked down into the faces 
 below them a Confederate officer was discovered just sighting 
 
THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND 53 
 
 one of the huge pivot guns for another shot, when a Union sol 
 dier shouted at the top of his voice, " Don t fire that gun." 
 The Confederate soldier who held the lanyard looked up with a 
 curse upon his lips and defiance in his face, but before he could 
 pull the cord he fell dead, transfixed by the Union bayonet. In 
 another moment a score of ready hands had turned the gun 
 about and its contents of grape and canister were sent crashing 
 through the disorganized ranks of the fleeing enemy. 
 
 The capture of this fort, the most important of all the de 
 fences on the south of Richmond, and the main reliance of that 
 part of the Confederate lines, created the wildest excitement in 
 the rebel capital. Fearing that the fall of the city would imme 
 diately follow, a panic seized upon the citizens, who began pack 
 ing their valuables and preparing for instant flight. With much 
 difficulty their fears were allayed. They were assured that the 
 position would be speedily retaken, and Jefferson Davis, Gen 
 eral Lee and others high in authority came hastily down to Fort 
 Gilmer to study the situation and decide what should be done. 
 From our position we plainly saw the group surveying us 
 through their field-glasses, and from numerous deserters who 
 came into our lines that night we learned that Mr. Davis had 
 declared that the fort must be retaken if it required the entire 
 Confederate army to do it. It would never do to permit the 
 Yankee army to remain permanently within such easy threaten 
 ing distance ; its frequent raids from so secure a position, and 
 the constant bursting of Union shells within the city suburbs 
 would keep the people in constant alarm. So every male be 
 tween the ages of sixteen and sixty \vas hurried at once into the 
 defences. The ironclads were sent down the river, and taking 
 up a position directly opposite the fort, they shelled it furiously 
 all the afternoon. The river banks at this point were fortu 
 nately so high that the necessary elevation of their guns sent 
 their shells high above the fort bursting harmlessly overhead 
 and scattering their fragments in the fields beyond. Only one 
 shell of the hundreds they threw at us that afternoon came 
 
54 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 inside the fort, and that, a huge two hundred pounder, fortu 
 nately did not explode. 
 
 Knowing there would be hot work as soon as the enemy 
 attempted to retake the fort, orders were given to strengthen 
 the position as speedily as possible. It was with very different 
 feelings from those of the clay before that the men set about 
 this task. Now they would be the defenders and the enemy 
 the attacking force. They felt abundantly able to hold it 
 against any force that could be brought against it. So the dead 
 lying too thickly about the place were hastily buried, leaving 
 the more remote untouched ; the enemy s barracks were torn 
 down and the logs piled up into breastworks, covered with 
 bales of hay, and wagons filled with shovels and pickaxes were 
 ordered up from the river bank without delay. This attempt to 
 assist, however, proved utterly useless. The enemy s sharp 
 shooters concealed in the trees and behind the chimneys, shot 
 down the mules as soon as the wagons appeared in sight, and 
 killed the men detailed to go back and fetch the tools in their 
 hands. So every man wrought as best he could with bayonets, 
 sticks, and the tin dipper from which he drank his coffee. Thus 
 digging away as for dear life, by night a low bank of earth ran 
 along the rear of the fort, now changed to a new front facing 
 toward Richmond. All night long we worked, and on the fol 
 lowing morning, much to our disgust, our slender protection was 
 taken from us and given up to fresh troops who had been hastily 
 sent up as reinforcements ; we who had won the position the day 
 before were removed further to the right into open unprotected 
 ground. There was much unavailing grumbling at this seeming 
 injustice, but the men went heartily to work turning up the 
 fresh earth for new protection. All that forenoon the cloud of 
 dust raised by marching rebel troops, and the gleam of their 
 bayonets were plainly visible, skirting the edge of the woods at 
 no great distance, giving token of dreadful work close at hand. 
 About noon, each man had raised for himself a little mound of 
 earth a few inches in height. At that time a sudden furious 
 
THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND 55 
 
 cannonade opened from gunboats, batteries and forts, and soon 
 after the appearance of long lines of Confederate gray, ten of 
 the choicest brigades in the whole Southern army, under Ewell, 
 and later under Lee himself at the edge of the woods an 
 nounced the approaching attack. 
 
 The dense lines of gray, with banners flying and uttering 
 their shrill cries, came sweeping swiftly forward. It was a mo 
 ment of intensest interest. The enemy was but a few yards dis 
 tant ; already their features were plainly visible, when suddenly 
 came the sharp command "Fire." A sheet of flame leaped 
 from the muzzles of two thousand seven hundred rifles, and that 
 line of gray went down as grass falls beneath the mower s scythe. 
 Broken and shattered the survivors made their way back to the 
 shelter of the woods, followed by a continuous fire from breech- 
 loading rifles. 
 
 I well remember the feeling of exultation that found expres 
 sion in our brigade as they recognized in the lines of the ap 
 proaching foe a certain Southern regiment which they had often 
 faced on former battle-fields, and against which a peculiarly 
 bitter animosity existed on account of certain atrocities com 
 mitted on our dead and wounded who had fallen into their 
 hands. So it was with gleeful feelings that this regiment was 
 recognized, and most fearfully were those atrocities avenged. 
 At the roll-call of that Southern regiment at the close of that 
 afternoon s fight, only seven men made answer to their names, 
 while General Clingman s brigade to which it belonged, and 
 upon which our fire was concentrated, was practically annihi 
 lated being either killed, wounded or captured flags and 
 all. 
 
 Meanwhile the enemy reformed his shattered ranks in the 
 woods for a second assault ; but this and a third also met with a 
 like result, being each time effectually repulsed with terrible 
 loss. The Spencer, a breech-loading rifle which could be fired 
 with great rapidity, poured in its constant fire with deadly effect. 
 Some of the Confederate prisoners exhibited great curiosity to 
 
56 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 see what they expressed as " that cl d Yankee gun which 
 could be loaded up on Sunday and fired all the week." 
 
 At last, realizing that our line could not be broken, and mad 
 dened and desperate by failure, they concentrated all their re 
 maining strength and energy for a final assault, and this time 
 directed their attack obliquely upon the division of colored 
 troops at our right. The assault was impetuous in its fury and 
 well-nigh successful. They came to the very foot of the low 
 earthwork, many of them actually clambered over it, and our 
 hearts sank within us when we saw the colored troops give way 
 in terror and confusion. In vain their officers cursed and struck 
 at the men with their swords. A wild panic seemed to have 
 seized them, and the danger of being flanked and taken prisoner 
 seemed imminent to all, when suddenly a color sergeant, a tall, 
 muscular, black fellow, a typical specimen of his race 
 sprang upon the low edge of earth, waved the flag about his 
 head, and calling upon his comrades to follow him, leaped boldly 
 down into the midst of the enemy. It was the work of an in 
 stant. He lived hardly long enough to touch the ground. We 
 found his body after the fight was over, lying at the bottom of 
 a heap of slain, blacks and whites together fairly riddled 
 with bayonet wounds, and the flag all torn and bloody, tightly 
 clenched in his stiffened hands. Poor, despised, unknown 
 image of his Maker ! Who would ever have believed this man 
 capable of such sublime courage and heroism ? But beneath 
 that black skin there beat a heart as loyal to freedom and as 
 determined to win it for himself and his race as any which 
 stands recorded in the world s history. Who shall dare deny to 
 that poor black, in the face of such devotion and sacrifice, the 
 possession of those qualities which in other races call forth our 
 highest praise and admiration ? His example saved the day. 
 His comrades, ashamed of their momentary panic, turned and 
 followed him. With an almost unearthly cry a cry in which 
 all the agony and despair of centuries of bondage and oppression 
 seemed concentrated, they threw themselves with irresistible 
 
THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND 57 
 
 fury upon their foes. No mercy was asked or given on either 
 side, and that evening as I walked over the blood-soaked ground 
 I counted them by the score, black and white, pierced by each 
 other s bayonets. 
 
 During this terrific struggle, the troops previously engaged 
 were compelled to remain passive spectators. They could not 
 turn their arms against this swaying mass without equal danger 
 to friend and foe. But so great was their realization of the 
 danger, so keen the anxiety, so doubtful the issue, that every 
 eye was riveted upon it unmindful of the storm of lead and iron 
 that the Confederate sharpshooters and artillery poured upon 
 us from every available point. It seemed impossible in such a 
 storm for any to escape, but happily in a few moments the Con 
 federates broke in disorder and sought safety under the protect 
 ing guns of Fort Gilmer, while the Union troops shouted 
 themselves hoarse with delight. From the prisoners we learned 
 that General Lee had commanded in person, that he was deeply 
 disappointed and chagrined at his failure to retake this most 
 important position, and counted its loss an irreparable disaster 
 to the Confederate cause. 
 
 The capture of Fort Harrison and the desperate attempt to 
 retake it were among the important battles of the war. As 
 Gettysburg indicates the highest tide-water mark reached by 
 the rebellion, so the capture of Fort Harrison marks the real 
 beginning of the end. This was the first time that the Union 
 army had gained a permanent foothold on the north side of the 
 James River ; the first tightening of that iron grip on the throat 
 of the rebellion which was never to be relaxed until its final 
 death. Henceforth Richmond was in a state of siege ; her 
 steeples almost within sight and her people ever within sound 
 of the Union guns. 
 
 A great change had taken place in the sentiments of the 
 people of Richmond even before the date of the storming of 
 Fort Harrison. Before the battle of Gettysburg in July, 1863, 
 high hopes of ultimate success had animated all classes of 
 
58 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 the Southern people, and no one, however great the doubts he 
 might have felt, dared to give them open expression. But when 
 Lee s shattered and demoralized battalions came pouring back 
 in wild disorder from that bloody field, the hopes of the South 
 sank never again to rise. They realized then, as never before, 
 the tremendous military strength of the Government, and the 
 determination of the North never to abandon the contest until 
 the recreant states had returned to their allegiance. 
 
 The positions of the opposing forces as just described, re 
 mained practically unchanged throughout the winter. As was 
 anticipated, the Union batteries threw hundreds of tons of iron 
 into the suburbs of the city, and were replied to with equal 
 vigor by the Confederate guns. For days at a time the shelling 
 was so furious that there seemed hardly any intermission, day or 
 night. Life was rendered a burden, no less from the incessant 
 din than from the constant vigilance required to escape the 
 flying missiles. On the picket line at night we lay wrapped in 
 our blankets, and, unable to sleep, watched the curving lines of 
 fire with which the air was filled, and calculated from the radius 
 of curvature the nearness of the explosion. 
 
 The vigilance in both armies was unceasing, and so great was 
 the strain that the health of nearly every one became seriously 
 impaired. All winter long a battle was deemed imminent at 
 any hour. Only two, however, occurred. On October 2Oth 
 Mr. Davis and General Lee came down within half a mile of 
 Fort Harrison and for five hours discussed the situation. The 
 result was seen a day or two later in a furious attack upon our 
 right flank, which was unsuccessful. It cost the Union army, 
 however, about fifteen hundred lives and the enemy more than 
 twice that number. On the 27 th the Union army retaliated, 
 and advanced within four miles of Richmond, one mile nearer 
 than McClellan had advanced in 1862. The attack was repulsed 
 and the troops driven back with heavy loss. The retreat of 
 that night forms one of the darkest pictures of the war. All 
 night long the rain poured in torrents. So deep was the mud 
 
THE CAPTURP: OF RICHMOND 59 
 
 that the roads were almost impassable, and so tenacious that 
 boots and shoes were pulled off and left behind at every step. 
 The darkness was intense and we went floundering slowly 
 along, artillery, infantry, cavalry, wagons, ambulances, all mixed 
 together in inextricable confusion. Many dropped out from 
 sheer fatigue, and either perished in the woods or were captured 
 by the pursuing enemy, the flash of whose rifles every few 
 moments lit up for an instant the otherwise impenetrable dark 
 ness. Others were drowned in the swollen streams, or sank 
 helpless in the soft mud which in many places reached nearly 
 to the knees. To add to its misfortunes the column lost its 
 way and came suddenly upon Confederate fortifications, to avoid 
 which it turned aside into the woods and waited for daylight, 
 the wearied men catching a little sleep in a standing position, 
 leaning against the trees. Nothing could be done for the 
 wounded, whose shrieks, as the ambulances went bumping over 
 stumps and stones and sunken logs or were tipped completely 
 over in the mud, were dreadful and heart-rending beyond power 
 to imagine. 
 
 The only advantage gained in this reconnoissance was by the 
 cavalry, which secured an advanced position in the recesses of 
 White Oak Swamp on the Charles City road which they held 
 until the end of the war. The effect of these two engagements 
 was extremely disheartening, and hundreds of men and officers 
 were wholly disabled for further service. So few officers were 
 fit for duty that the detail for picket came almost every night, 
 and was especially severe. No sleep was allowed, nor any fires ; 
 and whether in drenching rain, blinding snow or sleet, or pier 
 cing cold, there was no relief until the twenty-four hours had 
 expired. It seemed cruel to extinguish a trifling fire of dried 
 leaves or twigs that the poor fellows might have kindled behind 
 some sheltering rock, in the small hours after midnight, but the 
 orders were imperative, and it had to be done. It was pitiable 
 to see them rubbing their ears with snow. In many instances 
 they were so benumbed that they could no longer hold the 
 
60 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 musket, and many were sent to the hospital disabled for life. 
 It was an experience akin to that which the Continental army 
 endured in the famous winter at Valley Forge, and I am con 
 vinced that many of the desertions from our army that winter 
 were for only one purpose. The cheerful fires of the Confed 
 erates were too great a temptation, and they went over simply 
 to get warm. 
 
 Another order, the violation of which was punishable with 
 death, was against holding any communication with the enemy 
 on the picket line. But the eagerness to exchange newspapers 
 was so great on both sides that this order was often violated. 
 A stump about midway between the two lines was usually 
 selected, and the picket officer on either side, first attracting the 
 other s attention by waving his paper in the air, advanced, laid it 
 on the stump, and returned to his own lines. The other then 
 advanced, took up the paper and left his own, which was again 
 taken by the first. Of course it was agreed that there should 
 be no firing and no treachery on either side. In this way we re 
 ceived the Richmond papers a few hours after their publication, 
 and the enemy were always delighted to receive ours, especially 
 the New York illustrated papers, for their own carefully sup 
 pressed the truth and fed their readers with the most preposter 
 ous lies. I remember meeting an officer of the i/th Virginia 
 Regiment several times at the stump, and having a little talk 
 with him. He freely acknowledged that the South could hold 
 out but little longer ; that it was daily becoming more and more 
 difficult to maintain discipline in their army, and that all were 
 longing impatiently for the end. Even on the picket line where 
 desultory firing was kept up most of the time, intermissions 
 occurred, usually toward the close of a pleasant Sabbath after 
 noon, when, after dress parade, the bands of both armies ap 
 proached as near the picket lines as permission allowed, and 
 followed by crowds of listeners who seated themselves upon the 
 ground around, proceeded to fill the air with melody. Patriotic 
 airs were first given. " Yankee Doodle " on the Union side 
 
THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND 6l 
 
 was followed with " Maryland, my Maryland " from the Confed 
 erates. The "Star Spangled Banner" alternated with "The 
 Bonnie Blue Flag"; "Hail Columbia" with "Stonewall Jack 
 son s March," each rendering followed by lusty cheers from 
 their respective adherents, and so on, until as darkness ap 
 proached and the silent stars came out one by one, and myriads 
 of twinkling lights appeared in thousands of tiny tents stretch 
 ing away far as the eye could reach, the music took on a differ 
 ent character. The strains of " Annie Laurie " commenced by 
 a band of either side, was quickly taken up by the others, Union 
 and Confederate alike, followed by "The Girl I left behind Me," 
 "Auld Lang Syne," and kindred airs, the impressive silence 
 which pervaded the vast audience showing how deeply these 
 familiar strains had touched all hearts. And when at last the 
 concert closed with " Home, Sweet Home," before the last 
 notes had wholly died away upon the ear, the bugler at some 
 headquarters caught them up and successive bugles sent them 
 on from regiment to regiment, brigade to brigade, division to 
 division, army corps to army corps, until the echoes were lost in 
 the far distance. Then the myriad lights went out, the soldier 
 turned himself anew in his bed of mud, drawing his blanket 
 over his head, perchance to hide the tears that he could not 
 repress, and slept, to dream perhaps of the home and faces he 
 was never to see again. 
 
 Amid such scenes the long and dreary winter passed slowly 
 away. As spring approached most of the troops in this vicinity 
 were withdrawn to the extreme left of the line forty miles away 
 where Grant was persistently pushing Lee. This had the effect 
 of greatly thinning our lines, and at once increasing the vigil 
 ance and rendering more burdensome the duties. The standing 
 order, day and night, was " Be ready to move at any moment." 
 Desertions from the enemy occurred daily by scores and hun 
 dreds, all bringing stories of distress in Richmond. 
 
 One by one the avenues of supply to the Confederate capital 
 and army were cut off, and the pressure of want, even hunger, 
 
62 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 began to be acutely felt. Sheridan had rendered the fertile 
 valley of the Shenandoah a desert waste. Sherman had cut the 
 Confederacy in twain. His victorious legions marching to the 
 sea had left a wide swath of desolation behind them. The 
 Weldon and South Side railroads running south from Petersburg 
 had both been cut, and but one avenue remained open the 
 Richmond and Danville road to feed the almost starving 
 Southern armies. 
 
 Everything throughout the South was in the worst possible 
 condition. As rats are said to desert a sinking ship, so the 
 highest among the Confederate officers, seeing clearly the inevi 
 tably speedy collapse of the Confederacy, were sending off 
 boxes of gold to Europe and following them just as fast as they 
 could get away. The Governors of several of the Southern 
 States were demanding of President Davis the immediate return 
 of their troops, claiming the same right to secede from the Con 
 federacy as from the old Union. Generals Johnston, Beaure- 
 gard, and Bragg were without commands, and the country 
 everywhere was filled with deserters from the ranks. They 
 came into our lines almost every night in considerable numbers. 
 From the Richmond papers they often brought with them we 
 learned much of what was going on within the city. Here are 
 a few of the market prices of provisions : Flour, $i 500 a barrel ; 
 tea, $120 per pound ; coffee, $80 ; butter, $50 ; corn meal, $75 
 a bushel ; cord wood, $5 a stick ; a dress pattern of cheapest 
 calico, $300 ; a pair of coarse shoes, $100 ; and everything else 
 in like proportion. As the people used to say, they carried 
 their money to market in a basket and brought home their pur 
 chases in their pockets. One newspaper article complained of 
 the difficulty of filling the depleted ranks. They even took sick 
 men from their beds, and one case which excited great indigna 
 tion was that of a poor fellow dying of consumption who was 
 taken from bed, a musket put in his hand, and he was forced 
 into the intrenchments, where in a few hours he died. One 
 editor grows almost hysterical in his gratitude for the gift of a 
 
THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND 63 
 
 dozen ruta baga turnips and two quarts of persimmons, and o: 
 eminent gentleman on Christmas Day, 1 864, entered into a com 
 pact with his family that while at dinner no unpleasant word 
 should be spoken and no one should " scramble " for anything 
 on the table. This Christmas dinner consisted of a boiled head 
 of cabbage costing $12, and bacon costing $10 per pound. One 
 gentleman told me that his family had not tasted fresh meat for 
 more than a year. The last that he bought had cost $60 per 
 pound, and even at that price was of very poor quality, while as 
 a substitute for butter they boiled potato skins into a sort of 
 jelly and mixed it with the fat of bacon. 
 
 Such was the condition of affairs in Richmond at this time. 
 Finally the morning of Sunday, April 2d, 1865, dawned beauti 
 fully bright and clear. All nature teemed with signs of the 
 coming spring. The blue sky, the warm, still atmosphere, the 
 budding trees and songs of birds, the freshening green of 
 the hillsides, all told of the awakening season of life and beauty. 
 Far off in the direction of Petersburg, southward the deep 
 booming of heavy cannon came all day to our ears, and we knew 
 that a battle was in progress there. While at breakfast that 
 morning the adjutant said to me, " You will report at brigade 
 headquarters at half-past eight this morning as officer of the 
 picket." Just before starting for the picket line, General Ripley, 
 commanding the brigade, said to me, " You will be especially 
 vigilant to-day, and should you observe anything unusual in the 
 enemy s lines, you will send me word of it immediately." Then 
 I started with the brigade pickets for the outposts. 
 
 Our position was in a thin belt of pines from which we could 
 clearly perceive the enemy s works and all his movements. All 
 seemed as usual. Fort Gilmer with its frowning parapet, its 
 heavy battery, the Confederate flag floating from its staff, and 
 the sentinel with musket on his shoulder, pacing the rampart, 
 presented its usual threatening appearance. Groups of Confed 
 erate soldiers lounged about the picket fires and the camp, and 
 nothing indicated in any way the near approach of startling 
 
64 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 events. About the middle of the afternoon, however, I noticed 
 several army wagons being loaded up and field artillery moving 
 away, and a general air of bustle and activity pervading the 
 enemy s camps. I sent news of this to General Ripley, and 
 received in reply the laconic message "Keep your eyes and ears 
 open." As darkness came on these signs increased. There 
 was a continual rumbling sound as of heavily loaded wagons 
 and artillery ; their bands played louder and later than usual, 
 and their camp-fires seemed to blaze more brightly. There was 
 something ominous in the very air a feeling that a great crisis 
 was at hand, but of what nature it might be, none could surmise. 
 No man slept that night. Each stood ready, musket in hand, 
 for whatever might happen. At length, at half-past four on the 
 morning of the third, there came a sudden blinding glare of 
 light, a concussion that shook the earth and nearly threw us to 
 the ground, and immediately after the division officer of the day, 
 the lieutenant-colonel of the 5th Maryland Regiment, galloped 
 up and ordered me to advance the picket line, adding that the 
 enemy were blowing up their iron-clads in the river, and it was 
 believed that Richmond was being evacuated. It was but the 
 work of a moment for the men to sling their knapsacks, and de 
 ploying them as skirmishers, we cautiously advanced toward the 
 enemy s lines. Their fires were still burning brightly, but not 
 a man was to be seen. Fearing some treachery we approached 
 cautiously, and as we came nearer I perceived small bits of 
 bright-colored cloth attached to slender sticks a few inches above 
 the ground and a few feet apart. These marked the location of 
 buried torpedoes. In their hasty flight they had forgotten to re 
 move these danger signals. Halting the line I called attention 
 to them, bidding the men step carefully a pressure of only 
 five pounds was sufficient to explode them. All passed through 
 in safety. In another moment we had mounted the parapet of 
 Fort Gilmer and were in the enemy s camp. Evidences of hasty 
 departure were everywhere visible. The ground was strewn 
 with clothing, muskets, canteens, blankets, everything which 
 
THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND 65 
 
 could hinder their flight or was not really needed for use. All 
 this was taken in at a glance in passing, and without stopping 
 we pushed rapidly on. From an old negro woman whose cabin 
 stood in the rear of Fort Gilmer, we were directed into the 
 Newmarket turnpike at a short distance on our right, and from 
 this point we inarched by the flank instead of being deployed as 
 skirmishers. 
 
 Soon we began to meet groups of rebel soldiers stragglers 
 from their regiments, who gazed curiously at us, and with our 
 men exchanged much good-natured banter and jokes. So des 
 perately hungry were they that many of them offered to trade 
 their rifles for a handful of coffee and a few hardtack. This 
 offer, however, met with scant favor, though the coffee and 
 hardtack were freely bestowed. All along the road were strewn 
 muskets, canteens, haversacks, blankets, and other equipments, 
 and the desertions from the Confederate ranks that morning 
 must have reached many hundreds. 
 
 Every moment the light we had seen over Richmond on 
 starting became more and more brilliant. Above it hung great 
 clouds of heavy smoke, and as we drew nearer there arose a 
 confused murmur now swelling into a loud roar and then sub 
 siding, and again swelling like a great tumult of excited voices, 
 while at frequent intervals short, sharp explosions \vere heard 
 as of the discharge of field artillery. Weary, breathless, hungry, 
 begrimed with dust and perspiration, but eager and excited, we 
 pushed on, and at half-past six o clock in the morning I stood 
 with about two-thirds of my men on the summit of a hill and 
 looked down upon the grandest and most appalling sight that 
 my eyes ever beheld. Richmond was literally a sea of flame, 
 out of which the church steeples could be seen protruding here 
 and there, while over all hung a canopy of dense black smoke, 
 lighted up now and then by the bursting shells from the numer 
 ous arsenals scattered throughout the city. I waited here until 
 the stragglers of my command had come up, then marched down 
 the hill until we came to a little creek, crossed by a few planks 
 
66 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 which alone separated us from the city. Two mounted cavalry 
 men stood upon this bridge who said that they had been sent 
 there by General Weitzel with orders to allow no one to cross 
 the bridge until he came up. So there was nothing to do but 
 to wait. The men stacked arms and threw themselves upon 
 the ground. While resting, a rebel iron-clad lying in the James 
 River in full sight blew up with a terrific crash, scattering frag 
 ments of iron and timbers all about us, but fortunately no one 
 was hurt. In a few moments more a carriage appeared coming 
 from the city, and stopped directly before us. Beckoning me 
 to approach, the occupant asked if I was in command of the men 
 lying about, and on being answered in the affirmative, he said 
 that he was the mayor of Richmond, and that he wished to 
 make a formal surrender of the city. At the same time he 
 placed in my hands a large package, containing, I presume, 
 official papers, the city seal, keys and other property. I told 
 him that General Weitzel, commanding the department, would 
 be present in a short time and that he would be a proper person 
 to treat with. Even while we were speaking the general and 
 his staff appeared at the top of the hill, and the mayor rode 
 forward to meet him. The whole party shortly returned, and 
 General Weitzel ordered me to follow him into the city. 
 
 This I did, but we had not advanced many rods before the 
 smoke became so thick as to make it impossible to see even a 
 few feet in advance, and for this reason, I suppose, I missed the 
 general, he turning to the right towards the upper part of the 
 city, and I to the left towards the river. We had not gone far 
 before I discovered that I had become separated from him, and 
 was uncertain how to proceed, when on a lamp-post at a corner 
 I read the words, " Main Street." Thinking this would at 
 least conduct us to the central part of the city and assist in find 
 ing the capitol grounds, I turned into it. The scene that met 
 our eyes here almost bafHes description. Pandemonium reigned 
 supreme. Two large iron-clads near by in the river exploded 
 with a deafening crash, the concussion sweeping numbers of 
 
THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND 67 
 
 people off their feet. The street we were in was one compact 
 mass of frenzied people, and it was only with the greatest diffi 
 culty that we were able to force our way along. Had they been 
 hostile our lives would not have been worth a moment s pur 
 chase. But the poor colored people hailed our appearance with 
 the most extravagant expressions of joy. They crowded into 
 the ranks and besought permission to carry the soldiers knap 
 sacks and muskets. They clapped them on the back, hung 
 about their necks, and " God bless you," and " Thank God, the 
 Yankees have come," resounded on every side. Women, 
 emaciated, barefoot, with but one scanty skirt made from old 
 bags, fell on their knees in the street, and with clasped hands 
 and streaming eyes thanked God that their sufferings were 
 ended at last. Others with little children, wretched little skele 
 tons, clinging to their scanty skirts and crying with hunger and 
 fright, pressed into the ranks and begged most piteously for 
 food. One woman, I distinctly remember, with three little pale, 
 starved girls clinging about her, herself barefoot, bareheaded, 
 thinly and miserably clad, seized my arm with a vise-like grip, 
 and begged for the love of God, for just a morsel for her 
 starving children. They had tasted nothing since Sunday morn 
 ing, and then only a spoonful of dry meal. I gave her the 
 contents of my haversack, and one man in the ranks, a great, 
 rough, swearing fellow, poured into her lap his entire three days 
 rations of pork and hard bread, thrust a ten dollar greenback, all 
 the money he possessed, into her hand, swearing like a pirate all 
 the while as a means of relief to his overcharged feelings, their 
 intensity being abundantly evident by the tears which coursed 
 rapidly down his cheeks. I feel sure that the recording angel, 
 as he charged up this man s profanity against him in the 
 book of life, kindly blotted it out with a tear, in consideration of 
 the circumstances which called it forth. 
 
 The gutters literally ran whiskey. The members of the City 
 Council, foreseeing the mischief that would ensue should the 
 liquor shops be sacked, had rolled all the barrels to the curb- 
 
68 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 stone, knocked in their heads, and emptied their contents into 
 the gutters. The poisonous flood rolled like a river of death 
 rapidly on into the sewers, while the atmosphere fairly reeked 
 with its unsavory odor. The rougher element of the population, 
 white and black alike, were dipping up the vile stuff with their 
 hands, and pouring it down their throats. The shrill whistle of 
 locomotives sounded loud and frequent in the near distance, as 
 train after train hurried away bearing frantic citizens with what 
 valuables they had time to secure. Bands of thieves and rascals 
 of every degree, broken loose from the penitentiary, were entering 
 the stores on either side the street and stealing whatever they 
 could lay their hands upon, while the entire black population 
 seemed out of doors and crazy with delight. Tumult, violence, 
 riot, pillage, everywhere prevailed, and as if these were not 
 enough to illustrate the horrors of war, the roar of the flames, 
 the clanging of bells, and general uproar and confusion were 
 sufficient to appall the stoutest heart. Fearing violence from 
 some unexpected source in the midst of such fearful scenes, I 
 looked about for some avenue of escape into a less crowded 
 street, where I could more easily keep the soldiers apart from 
 the populace, but none presented itself. At length the heat be 
 came so great that we could proceed no further. Our hair and 
 beards were scorched, our clothing smoked, the air we breathed 
 was like a furnace blast, and many of the men, weighed down as 
 they were with musket, knapsacks, blanket, ammunition, and other 
 accoutrements, were well-nigh exhausted. Three fire engines 
 were burning in the street immediately before us. On the side 
 walk near by lay the bodies of three young girls burnt to a crisp. 
 People jumped from the windows of burning buildings ; others 
 with wildly waving arms shrieked for help, not daring to take the 
 fatal leap. On a lamp-post just at my right, I read the words 
 " Fourteenth Street," and turning to a citizen who stood in a 
 porch on the corner, I asked him to direct me to the capitol. 
 " Turn right up here," he said, " go straight on for two or three 
 streets, and you will see it just on your left." He also added 
 
THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND 69 
 
 that General Early, at the head of a body of Confederate 
 cavalry, had passed along only a moment before, and with out 
 stretched hand showed us through the smoke the rearmost 
 rank. 
 
 Following his directions we soon arrived at the capitol, where 
 arms were stacked, and the wearied soldiers threw themselves 
 upon the ground to rest. It was not long before an orderly from 
 General Weitzel rode up with orders to report to him at once in 
 the house recently occupied by Jefferson Davis, not far from 
 the capitol. Upon presenting myself, I was ordered to patrol the 
 streets of the city with a sufficient number of men, to order all 
 the colored people to their homes, there to remain until further 
 orders, and to arrest every person in Confederate uniform of 
 whatever rank, and bring them to General Weitzel s head 
 quarters. In this work I was busily engaged for nearly three 
 entire days. General Lee s army, after the surrender, poured 
 into Richmond by thousands. The city swarmed with them. 
 We gathered them in from the streets, the saloons, the 
 houses, wherever the homeless, starving wretches could find 
 warmth and shelter. Several times a day I marched down 
 Broad Street at the head of two or three hundred officers and 
 privates, halting for a moment at General Weitzel s door until 
 they could be counted, then continuing on to Libby Prison and 
 Castle Thunder, where they were locked up until the peace and 
 safety of the city were assured, when they were allowed to de 
 part whithersoever they would. During those three days both 
 those historic buildings were literally packed from cellar to roof 
 with Confederate prisoners, a piece of retributive justice which 
 gave solid comfort and satisfaction to all who witnessed it. 
 
 The same tumultuous scenes just described were visible 
 throughout the city. The spacious capitol grounds afforded the 
 only spot of refuge, and these were crowded with women and 
 children, bearing in their arms and upon their heads their most 
 cherished possessions. Piles of furniture lay scattered in every 
 direction, and about them clustered the hungry and destitute 
 
70 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 family groups, clinging to each other with the energy of despair. 
 One of the most touching sights amid these accumulated 
 horrors, was that of a little girl a toddling infant holding 
 her kitten tightly under her arm, a dilapidated rag doll in one 
 hand and grasping her mother s gown with the other, as they 
 sought shelter from the showers of cinders, under the capitol 
 steps. 
 
 The constant explosion of ammunition in the arsenals 
 seemed almost like a battle. Many citizens were killed by the 
 flying fragments. Many were burned to death. In one house 
 seventeen people perished from the flames. The sick, the aged, 
 helpless and infirm, left to themselves in the general panic, 
 could only pray for deliverance, which came to them when the 
 flames had stifled their prayers in death. 
 
 Seven hundred and fifty thousand loaded shells in the 
 arsenals, exploding from the heat, tore their way through 
 houses, ploughed up the streets and the gardens, and spread 
 death and destruction on every hand. The whole city jarred 
 and vibrated with horrid sounds, while warehouses, stores, 
 mills, bridges, depots, and dwellings went down by scores and 
 hundreds. The streets leading to the railroad stations were 
 filled with a frantic mob, pushing, struggling, cursing, trampling 
 each other without mercy in their efforts to get away with what 
 plunder they could carry. No troops of either army were in 
 sight, only rebel stragglers, whose long familiarity with similar 
 scenes rendered them, no doubt, the only cool-headed and 
 indifferent spectators of these appalling sights. Over and above 
 all the terrible roar of the conflagration as it leaped from 
 building to building, from street to street, filled the whole city 
 with its scorching breath, and lent added horrors to the scene. 
 
 Upon starting out on one of these Confederate-arresting expe 
 ditions that morning a couple of hours or so after first entering 
 the city, we heard the strains of " Yankee Doodle " by a mili 
 tary band, and looking in the direction from which the strains 
 proceeded, we perceived a column of Union troops just appear- 
 
THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND J\ 
 
 ing at the lower end of the city. A few moments more and a 
 whole wall of shining bayonets came into view just over the 
 brow of the hill flashing brightly in the sunshine, and above 
 them the regimental flags waving in the morning breeze. It 
 was the Third Division of the Twenty-Fourth Army Corps. 
 The First Brigade, General Ripley, led the column, and the I3th 
 New Hampshire, the oldest regiment in the brigade, held the 
 post of honor on the right, and was consequently the first regi 
 ment to enter the city. As they came abreast of where we 
 stood I halted my little force and exchanged salutes as they 
 passed. The first duty to which they were assigned was to 
 extinguish the fires which the enemy had kindled, and to aid in 
 restoring order throughout the city. In less than forty-eight 
 hours all this was accomplished. The evil disposed either 
 fled the city or were unearthed from their hiding-places and 
 received swift punishment at the hands of an authority that 
 indulged in no triflings and whose judgments could neither be 
 disregarded nor overruled. Human life and property became in 
 that brief time as safe as in any city in the land, and Richmond 
 enjoyed a safety and repose she had not known for years. 
 Business soon resumed its sway, confidence was restored, and 
 the people exulted openly in their escape from the despotism and 
 outrages which they had experienced from the Confederate 
 authorities. With so much destitution, misery and ruin there 
 was of course great need of immediate relief ; and this was 
 freely given. An endless procession of citizens, rich and poor, 
 black and white alike, presented itself daily at the depots for 
 provisions and supplies, and received food, medicine, clothing, 
 care and protection. A guard was placed over General Lee s 
 house when he returned to it a few days after the surrender, and 
 he and his family were protected against intrusion and annoy 
 ance. All shared freely in the bounty of the government which 
 they had fought desperately for four years to destroy. History 
 may be searched in vain for a similar illustration of obedience to 
 the divine injunction to forgive and feed one s enemies. 
 
72 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 The behavior of the Northern troops was all that could be 
 desired. No brawls, disturbances, or conflicts with the citizens 
 occurred, and ladies walked the streets unattended and in per 
 fect security. The loyal citizens, who all through the war had 
 been suppressed and silent, now uttered their sentiments freely 
 and without fear. The roll of the Northern drum was no 
 sooner heard in the streets than this element broke forth impet 
 uously and greeted it with heartiest cheers ; loyal eyes grew dim 
 at sight of the flag they had so long vainly hungered to behold, 
 and as its protecting folds floated from roof and balcony and 
 window, all rejoiced in its supremacy. Human slavery was for 
 ever ended, and God-given Liberty was henceforth the common 
 heritage of all. 
 
THE LEFT ATTACK (EWELL S) AT 
 GETTYSBURG 
 
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 July2nd.!863. 
 SECOND DAY, 
 
THE LEFT ATTACK (EWELL S) AT GETTYSBURG 
 
 BY 
 
 BREVET-CAPTAIN EDWARD N. WHITTIER, U. S. V. 
 
 THE returns of the First Army Corps for June 30, 1863, 
 give "present for duty equipped" 708 officers and 9,314 en 
 listed men. Of these, there were killed, wounded, or captured, 
 in the first day s fight at Gettysburg, as nearly as can be ascer 
 tained, sixty per cent. 
 
 Barely twenty-four hundred fighting men of the corps found 
 their way up the slopes of Cemetery Hill, and formed lines 
 anew in this position, at the close of that first day s desperate 
 struggle. No sight more welcome ever strengthened the hearts 
 of soldiers, than that which burst upon our longing eyes, when, 
 escaping capture in the streets and lanes of Gettysburg, we 
 gained the plateau of East Cemetery Hill. From this high 
 ground which dominated the town and the fields, in all directions 
 save one, there was an unobstructed view of rolling country 
 open and accessible to the fire of our guns. To the north and 
 northeast the town and the scattered buildings along its edge ; 
 to the right and east, a great expanse of farming country bi 
 sected by Rock Creek, which, flowing in a southeasterly direc 
 tion, ran nearly parallel to that portion of our front ; in the 
 southeast and at a distance of about seven hundred yards, Gulp s 
 Hill, bold, rough and densely wooded, rising from the bed of the 
 stream whose tortuous channel skirted its eastern base for nearly 
 three-quarters of a mile, until its southern slopes merged in the 
 swamp, rocky and almost impassable, separating Gulp s from 
 Wolf s Hill bristling with the welcome bayonets of the Twelfth 
 Corps. Following a course almost southerly, the Baltimore 
 pike reached nearly to the horizon, covered with fugitives, or 
 
 75 
 
76 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 masked by the dust of columns hurrying to the front. To the 
 southwest, the Round Tops, and in the west the splendid spec 
 tacle of Buf ord s cavalry, in lines of battalions in mass, stand 
 ing steady as if on parade, unshaken and undaunted in face of 
 the advancing victorious Confederate infantry. 
 
 But more than this, and of deepest significance to all who 
 saw it, in the center of the plateau was a group of generals with 
 staff officers and orderlies. It was a scene of the utmost ac 
 tivity, yet there was no confusion. The condition was changed 
 from that described by General Buford in the morning, when he 
 informed General Pleasanton of the sad tidings of Reynolds s 
 death, adding, "in my opinion there seems to be no directing 
 person," for, in the center of the group, on horseback, unmoved 
 by all the confusion among the retreating soldiers, sat a man, 
 born to command, competent to evolve order out of the chaos, 
 the master of the first position that day found for successful 
 resistance. I shall never forget (for I reported to him for 
 orders) the inspiration of his commanding, controlling presence, 
 and the fresh courage he imparted. I recall even his linen, clean 
 and white, his collar open at the neck, and his broad wristbands 
 rolled back from his firm, finely moulded hand. This was 
 General Hancock. 
 
 The spirit of victory, high and controlling, pervaded the army 
 of Northern Virginia, the outgrowth of Second Bull Run, 
 Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and even of Antietam ; to 
 which was added the elation arising from the unexpected suc 
 cess of the first day. There was disappointment because of the 
 failure to seize Gulp s and Cemetery Hills when these positions 
 were almost in their grasp on the afternoon of the first day. 
 There remained however the assurance that Longstreet could 
 and would attack and break through our left, that no rein 
 forcements could be taken from our center, so closely watched 
 by Hill, and the hope that Meade would be forced to weaken his 
 right to reinforce his left, and diminish the resistance at that 
 point ; for it is to be constantly borne in mind in the narration of 
 
THP: LEFT ATTACK 77 
 
 the events of the second day, that General Lee had issued orders 
 that our flanks should be attacked simultaneously by Longstreet 
 and by Ewell, while Hill, carefully watching the center, should 
 throw his whole force against that part of our line on the slight 
 est sign of an opportunity, and secure a foothold on the northern 
 slopes of Cemetery Hill. These were the arguments presented 
 to the Confederate leaders, changing the plan adopted at Fred- 
 ericksburg and leading up to the attacks, one of which I have 
 selected for my subject. 
 
 Gulp s Hill, of which Early could have taken possession on 
 the first day without striking a blow, rises strong, bold, and 
 precipitous, out of the bed of Rock Creek, about seven hundred 
 yards southeast from East Cemetery Hill. The highest point, 
 about one hundred and twenty rods from the Baltimore pike, is 
 also the most northern, and the ridge, sloping gradually, follows 
 a southeast course until it merges in the swamp, full of large 
 boulders, separating Gulp s from Wolf s Hill. The greater part 
 of its northern face and the whole of its eastern slope are 
 heavily timbered, difficult of ascent and exceedingly rocky. 
 The hill commands the valley of Rock Creek, faces Benner s 
 Hill, and completely flanks the plateau of East Cemetery Hill. 
 Some of the Confederate reports mention Gulp s Hill as a 
 mountain, and others speak of Rock Creek, or run, as a branch 
 at the foot of the mountain, so high and abrupt did it appear to 
 their officers from the vantage ground of Benner s Hill, and 
 from that which later was known as "Hospital Hill." On the 
 northwestern face of Gulp s Hill, on a small knoll, General 
 Hancock had placed the 5th Maine Battery, six 12-pounders, 
 facing the town and commanding the valley separating Gulp s 
 and Cemetery Hills, and also the steep acclivities of the eastern 
 face of the spur known as Cemetery Ridge. Joining the right 
 of the battery and extending easterly to the highest point of 
 Gulp s Hill, thence southerly along its crest, was Wadsworth s 
 division of the First Corps ; later, and joining the right of this 
 small division, the Second Division of the Twelfth Corps swung 
 
78 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 into line, the brigade of General Greene of glorious memory, on 
 the division left ; the remainder of the Twelfth Corps, increased 
 by Lockwood s Independent Brigade, lay in a southeast direc 
 tion, following the crest and the most defensible positions, until 
 the extreme right rested in the low grounds and woods near 
 McCallister s Mill. Lockwood was on the extreme right and 
 refused, nearly touching the Baltimore pike. 
 
 The woods covering the greater portion of this part of our 
 line afforded excellent material for the construction of rifle pits, 
 and during the night of the first and the early morning of the 
 second day, men accustomed to woodcraft built log breastworks, 
 felling the trees and blocking them up into a close log fence, 
 battening with cord-wood from piles close at hand, and sur 
 mounting the whole with "head-logs," which later proved of 
 inestimable value in the close contact of the contending forces. 
 So formidable were these works in places, that the Confederates 
 reported them to be log forts requiring scaling ladders for their 
 successful assault. Some of our regiments, more fortunate than 
 others, had picks and spades, and strengthened their works ma 
 terially with earth. All along the line, earth, logs, boulders, 
 cord-wood, brush, in fact everything that could be made useful, 
 was taken advantage of to complete the line of defence. 
 
 About ten o clock on the morning of the second the line of 
 defence was in a great measure completed, although the men 
 were busied for the larger part of the day, in strengthening 
 angles, and developing salients wherever the ground admitted, 
 and in Greene s lines, under the personal direction of that gal 
 lant and most accomplished officer, in constructing a traverse 
 from his right along a ridge which, nearly at a right angle to his 
 front, ran back towards the Baltimore pike. The construction 
 of this supplementary line of defence provoked much complaint 
 from the men, already nearly exhausted by the severe labor of 
 the night and early morning, and seemed at the time uncalled 
 for, so strong were our lines at this point, but the men, who, 
 while toiling under the hot sun, cursed their brigade commander, 
 
THE LEFT ATTACK 79 
 
 before night fell blessed the high soldierly instinct and foresight, 
 which gave protection in the evening when Johnson s victorious 
 columns, sweeping before them the thin line left to hold the 
 rifle-pits vacated by the Twelfth Corps (sent across to reinforce 
 our left hard pressed by Longstreet), turned the right of 
 Greene s brigade, and were held in check at this point by a 
 small force behind the traverse. The great importance of this 
 result will appear later on. 
 
 It was after Longstreet s attack had made great headway, 
 that there was presented to our gaze the spectacle of a Confed 
 erate battery thrown into "action front" on the ground sloping 
 towards us, and just to the north of the high ground since 
 known as Benner s Hill. It was the initial movement of An 
 drew s Battalion of Light Artillery of Johnson s division, tak 
 ing position, closely crowded on the slope and crest of this small 
 knoll. A short distance to the north were two guns of large 
 calibre, 3<D-pounders, and still farther north, at longer range, 
 rifled batteries were established, all concentrating their fire on 
 P^ast Cemetery Hill, and enfilading our lines along the Northern 
 slope of Cemetery Ridge beyond the burial ground. Six Con 
 federate batteries in all were engaged in this attack. 
 
 The reply was quick and effective. Weidrich, Ricketts and 
 Reynolds on the plateau and southern slope of the hill, Taft s 
 2O-pounders back in the cemetery, the 5th Maine smooth bores 
 on Gulp s Hill, and two guns of Knapp s Pennsylvania battery 
 on the very crown of Gulp s Hill, opened fire. In less than 
 half an hour four of the Confederate limbers or caissons were 
 exploded, the men driven from the guns and the batteries 
 silenced. 
 
 Nowhere on the field of Gettysburg was such havoc wrought 
 by artillery on artillery, and the wreck of Andrew s Battalion, 
 in dead horses, shattered guns, and ammunition carriages left on 
 the field, was for months a noteworthy feature. The command 
 ing officer, Major Latimer, died of wounds received here. One 
 captain and one lieutenant were severely wounded, one non-com- 
 
80 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 missioned officer and nine enlisted men were killed. Two non 
 commissioned officers and thirty men were wounded, and thirty 
 horses were killed. In Carpenter s battery alone, five men 
 were killed, nineteen badly, and several others slightly wounded. 
 
 Our guns cooled, but hot apprehension seized us, as with 
 our glasses we watched the fearful struggle on the left, our 
 infantry falling back and our lines driven in from the high 
 ground at the Peach Orchard and the Emmetsburg road. 
 About six o clock, and directly in rear of the position I occupied 
 with the 5th Maine Battery, the Twelfth Corps, at a double 
 quick, poured out of its works in the woods on Gulp s Hill, and 
 crossed the Baltimore pike in response to the urgent need and 
 call for reinforcements along the Third and Fifth Corps fronts. 
 Almost at the very hour the Twelfth Corps was vacating the 
 breastworks on Gulp s Hill, General Ewell ordered the advance 
 of Johnson s division. This division, in position on the extreme 
 left of the Confederate army and somewhat refused, had during 
 the day occupied the fields in the Gulp farm beyond the Han 
 over road in a general direction northeast from Gulp s Hill, and 
 at a distance of a little more than a mile. Jones brigade had 
 been thrown forward in support of the artillery on Benner s 
 Hill, and halted under cover of a range of low hills about three 
 hundred yards in rear and to the left of Andrew s Battalion. 
 
 No one of high rank in the Confederate army knew, as 
 Johnson did, the difficulties in the path of an assaulting column, 
 the vital importance of this position to our army, or the near 
 ness of the prize, the Baltimore pike, to gain which he must 
 exert his best endeavor. On the preceding afternoon, his engi 
 neer officer had crossed Rock Creek and with a small force of 
 infantry for protection, scaled the steep acclivities of the eastern 
 face of Gulp s Hill, and from its commanding crest looked down 
 upon the narrow line of fields and the pike almost at his feet. He 
 had secured information of the utmost importance ; for within one 
 hundred and twenty rods was the Baltimore turnpike, our line of 
 retreat. Even at that hour its value in such emergency was being 
 
THE LEFT ATTACK 8 1 
 
 demonstrated, for it was crowded with men and teams, a confused 
 throng, struggling to escape the wreck and havoc wrought by 
 that day of disaster to Federal arms. This officer barely escaped 
 capture. Some of his men were taken prisoners by the skir 
 mishers of the 1 7th Indiana, while extending our line to the 
 right by General Hancock s orders. 
 
 From his position on Benner s Hill, General Johnson had 
 full in his front the wooded outlines of Gulp s Hill. Concealed 
 behind this high ridge, but in close and dangerous proximity to 
 it and commanded by it, lay the Baltimore pike, separating the 
 narrow fields on the western slopes of Gulp s Hill from the 
 ground holding in dense park our reserve ammunition trains. 
 Could he possess himself of this ridge, he might turn our flank 
 and place his command across the line of retreat for more than 
 two thirds of the Potomac Army. 
 
 Through an interval, now closed by trees, in the valley be 
 tween Benner s and Gulp s Hills, our officers on the plateau of 
 East Cemetery Hill had some time before this, caught sight of 
 Johnson s troops passing to our right, and a brisk artillery fire 
 was opened upon them and maintained as long as they were in 
 sight. Crossing Rock Creek by various fords, the enemy 
 reached the base of Gulp s Hill, driving in our skirmishers on 
 Greene s front and making a sharp attack on that brigade, which 
 was attempting to obey General Slocum s order " to occupy the 
 breastworks thrown up by the corps." As nearly as can be 
 ascertained this was about half past seven, and Ireland s regi 
 ment, the 1 37th New York, strung out in a thin line of men 
 quite widely separated, had barely time to gain the protection of 
 the breastworks vacated by Kane s brigade on Greene s right, 
 when the enemy attacked most vigorously the whole front with 
 large force, and for nearly an hour the fight to dislodge Greene 
 by a front attack, and to gain possession of his works, was urged 
 with extreme gallantry. The enemy made four distinct charges 
 between 7.30 and 9 P.M., and was repulsed with great loss. 
 Soon after he appeared in force on the right flank of Ireland s 
 
82 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 regiment, which had been reinforced by a regiment sent from 
 the Eleventh Corps. As the enemy advanced, this regiment 
 broke and fled, placing Greene s right in a most critical position. 
 Colonel Ireland met the flank attack with bravery and soldierly 
 skill, forming his right company at right angles with the breast 
 works and checking by a stubborn resistance the movement on 
 his flank. He held his ground until the heavy loss in killed and 
 wounded by a fire from three sides, forced him back to the 
 works occupied by his brigade. Here he formed line behind 
 the traverse built by General Greene in the early part of the 
 day, which now served its grand purpose, by arresting at once 
 all further movement against this portion of our line. I doubt 
 if in any part of the field to-day, the soldier and the student of 
 the history of this desperate conflict, lingers longer or more 
 fondly than about the fast fading traces of this traverse on the 
 right of General Greene s line, built in the quiet of the morning 
 of the second day, a strong line of defence in the gloom of im 
 pending disaster when night closed on the doubtful issue of the 
 Confederate assaults on the right of our line on Gulp s Hill. 
 
 In the early part of the attack, General Greene had sent 
 urgent requests for help to General Wadsworth, on his imme 
 diate left, and to General Howard on Cemetery Hill. These 
 officers responded promptly, sending six regiments, aggregating 
 seven hundred and fifty-five men all told. Good service was 
 rendered by these most welcome reinforcements, in relieving the 
 regiments whose ammunition had been used up or whose rifles 
 had fouled. Greene s brigade, with unflinching courage, main 
 tained its desperate position during the series of attacks lasting 
 two and one half hours, in the face of vastly superior numbers. 
 The large number of Confederate dead and wounded close up 
 under the works attested their high valor. This determined re 
 sistance compelled the enemy to discontinue the attack about 10 
 P.M., but he remained in occupancy of that part of the ridge and of 
 the works vacated by the First Division, Twelfth Corps, as well as 
 the works built by Candy s and Kane s brigades, Second Division. 
 
THE LEFT ATTACK 83 
 
 General Greene still bravely held his original front, with the 1 37th 
 New York at right angles to the rest of the brigade, behind the 
 traverse. Kane s brigade, returning about 9 P.M., when within 
 two hundred paces of the breastworks, received a sharp fire, 
 which at the time was supposed to come from the First Brigade 
 (Candy s), misled by the darkness. The men were ordered not 
 to reply, and were withdrawn to the turnpike, where a staff officer 
 of General Greene, sent for the purpose, advised Colonel Kane 
 that the intrenchments were in possession of the enemy. About 
 one o clock on the morning of the 3d, Candy s brigade, which 
 had been held in readiness in the fields across the Baltimore 
 pike, crossed that road and took position in a double line along 
 a narrow lane, the right resting in an orchard near the house of 
 Henry Spangler. This position was somewhat screened from 
 the enemy s observation by woods, and the various alignments 
 were made with the utmost quiet within a few rods of the 
 enemy s line. 
 
 During the night prisoners from the forces occupying our 
 breastworks were brought in, they were from Stewart s and 
 Jones brigades ; and our men deployed as skirmishers, carefully 
 feeling their way, and exchanging frequent shots with the 
 enemy, reported that our works to the south of the " Swale" 
 were unoccupied. A few prisoners were taken there also, pre 
 sumably from scouting parties of the enemy, but Co. F, 2d 
 Massachusetts Infantry, skirmishing, developed a large force of 
 Confederates in our works to the north of the " Swale," and 
 having advanced into the woods, where in the darkness it was 
 impossible to tell friend from foe, found itself in the midst of a 
 brigade of the enemy s troops. Here it captured twenty-three 
 prisoners, among them a captain, and brought all in with a loss 
 of only two men. 
 
 Our right flank was once more guarded. The night ad 
 vanced, broken by occasional volleys from Greene s front on the 
 eastern face of Gulp s Hill, and scattering shots from the angle, 
 and along the traverse. Through the woods, among the 
 
84 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 wounded between the lines, brave men crept over the great 
 rocks and fallen trees, bearing grateful sustenance to their suf 
 fering comrades. The clear, cool waters of Spangler s spring 
 reflected in the moonlight, in turn, Confederate and Union 
 soldiers ; for scouting parties from each side between midnight 
 and early dawn, filled their canteens and quenched their thirst 
 where to-day the hands of children welcome veterans revisiting 
 the hard fought field. 
 
 I will go back to the early evening of the second day, and 
 before describing Early s assault on the east face of Cemetery 
 Hill, will give the designation and position of our troops there. 
 
 Slopes of considerable ruggedness, overtopped here and 
 there by steep acclivities, with intervening open fields irregularly 
 broken by stone walls, rendered the position easy to defend 
 against any direct attack from the north, but the decliv 
 ities of the east face of Cemetery Hill were so abrupt, falling 
 sixty-four feet in the first hundred yards and one hundred and 
 forty feet in the first seven hundred, that the guns on the 
 plateau were wholly unprotected in event of assault from the 
 east, unless infantry, placed behind the stone wall at the base of 
 the hill, should possess staying qualities of a high order. 
 Whether they did or did not, let the narrative answer. 
 
 The Count of Paris regards the position of Cemetery Hill as 
 completing the strategic advantages, in a tactical sense, pre 
 sented by Gettysburg, for it commands the town and all the 
 roads adjoining it. 
 
 The disposition of the troops on the evening of the second 
 day was as follows : Beginning with the left of the line, resting 
 on the Baltimore pike, which crosses the highest part of East 
 Cemetery Hill, was Ames s division, the io7th and 2 5th Ohio 
 facing north, and 75th Ohio and I7th Connecticut facing east. 
 These troops were under the immediate command of Colonel 
 Harris of the 75th Ohio. Joining this brigade was the left of 
 Von Gilsa s brigade, the 8th and 54th New York, refused, and 
 facing southeast ; the three remaining regiments were in position 
 
THE LEFT ATTACK 85 
 
 fronting east, and behind a stone wall lower down, and at the 
 base of the hill. On the plateau and high above the infantry 
 were B Battery, 4th Artillery, four guns, straddling the pike 
 near the cemetery gate and looking down into the town, front 
 ing north; Battery I, ist New York Light Artillery, Weidrich ; 
 Batteries F and G (consolidated), ist Pennsylvania Light Artil 
 lery, Ricketts , facing east ; and a short distance down the 
 southern slope and at the head of the valley separating East 
 Cemetery from Gulp s Hill, Battery L, ist New York Artillery, 
 four guns. Back of Weidrich and Ricketts, in the cemetery, 
 were two 2O-pounders, Taft s Independent New York Battery, 
 also facing east. The infantry interval at the base of the hill, 
 from the right of Von Gilsa s, was taken up on the extreme 
 right, just at dusk, by the 33d Massachusetts, Colonel Under 
 wood, the extreme right of his regiment resting at the foot of 
 the knoll occupied by the 5th Maine Battery. Underwood s 
 command faced east northeast. 
 
 The batteries on the plateau facing east were placed a short 
 distance back of the crest behind earthworks, the condition of 
 which to-day bears witness to their thorough construction at 
 Steinwehr s hands. All these guns were long range, having as 
 their objective the high ground occupied by the Confederate 
 infantry and artillery on the other side of Rock Creek, and the 
 rolling fields at a distance of eight hundred to one thousand 
 yards between the Creek and the edge of the town. These bat 
 teries had absolutely no point blank, and were prevented by the 
 sharp descent of the eastern face of the hill, from exerting any 
 control over that portion of his front which an artillerist holds as 
 his dearest possession, leaving in its place a "dead angle," large 
 and of terrible significance, in the place of ground where guns 
 can vex and tear assaulting columns with canister ; but on a 
 small knoll half way along the northern face of Gulp s Hill, which 
 projects at this point like a salient from our lines, and about 
 three hundred and fifty to four hundred yards to the right and 
 somewhat advanced from the plateau of East Cemetery Hill, 
 
86 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 General Hancock had placed a battery of i2-pounders, the 5th 
 Maine, well known at that time as " Leppien s old battery." 
 
 The guns of this battery could reach Benner s Hill and 
 commanded the valley and wooded banks of Rock Creek, and 
 the farm lands of William Gulp between Benner s Hill and the 
 edge of the town, and, by swinging the trails sharp to the right, 
 the steep acclivities of East Cemetery Hill were within canister 
 range. The fields at the foot of the hill, inaccessible to the 
 guns on the crest, could be swept clean of any troops assailing 
 our front at that point by an enfilading fire of double canister. 
 
 On the right of the battery and facing north, Wadsworth s 
 division prolonged the line to the top of Gulp s Hill, where the 
 front again faced the east, and the right of the division joined 
 Greene s brigade, holding the left of the Twelfth Corps line. 
 
 Johnson s attack on the east face of Gulp s Hill was press 
 ing with great force and violence on Greene s front within a few 
 hundred yards of the right of the battery, then under my com 
 mand ; and because it seemed that the enemy would certainly 
 break through our line at this point, the right half battery was 
 changed to fire right oblique, and canister was brought into the 
 works ; for the distance to the woods was too short for easy 
 service of ammunition from the limbers of the pieces. It was 
 close to quarter of eight, the sun had dropped behind the Cum 
 berland mountains, and the dusk of evening was creeping 
 through the valley of Rock Creek, when we made out the 
 enemy deploying into line at a distance of a thousand yards, and 
 forming near the house and farm buildings of William Gulp on 
 the outskirts of the town. This was the assaulting column of 
 Early s division, Hays brigade, " Louisiana Tigers," and Hoke s 
 brigade of North Carolinians, with Gordon s brigade well closed 
 up in reserve. Their right rested on the town and the left on 
 Rock Creek, near the foot of Benner s Hill, their objective 
 point being East Cemetery Hill by a right half wheel pivoting 
 on the town. 
 
 A Erench "ordnance" glass, the nearest approach to a 
 
THE LEFT ATTACK 87 
 
 " range finder " for light artillery at that time known, had, that 
 afternoon, given me the distance of all prominent landmarks in 
 my front, and acting under the permission of the chief of artil 
 lery, kindly granted, I had proved the accuracy of the glass by 
 solid shot. The clump of buildings on the Gulp farm was one 
 of the best defined objects in range, and as quickly as the enemy 
 appeared, even while his lines were forming, the battery opened 
 with spherical case, each one bursting as if on measured ground, 
 at the right time and in the right place in front of their forma 
 tion. This was the first intimation given by artillery of the 
 Confederate advance. General Underwood afterwards kindly 
 wrote me of his feelings on that occasion. " I had just placed 
 my regiment, the 33d Massachusetts, behind the stone wall at 
 the foot of a hill and faced northeast, and had no knowledge 
 that the enemy was advancing, when suddenly, right over my 
 head, it seemed, there was a blaze, a crash, and a roar, as if a 
 a volcano had been let loose." It was six i2-pounders firing by 
 battery almost simultaneously ; in another moment the battery 
 was " firing at will," and Weidrich, Ricketts, and Reynolds on 
 the plateau and slope of East Cemetery Hill, volleyed and 
 thundered. 
 
 This movement of Early s was a noteworthy example of the 
 independent action of division commanders, keeping pace with 
 the departure by the corps commanders from the orders of the 
 General-in-chief that the flank attacks, Longstreet s and Ewell s, 
 should be made simultaneously, and that the three divisions of 
 Rodes, Early and Johnson, should move at once and the same 
 hour, Early and Johnson to the direct assault, Rodes from his 
 position in the town, close up under our guns, to seize upon the 
 opportunity which any change in the Union forces on the 
 northern slopes and ridge of Cemetery Hill might give to effect 
 lodgment there. Waiting until Johnson had gained our works, 
 Early did not move his division until nearly or quite 7.45. 
 Delayed by the twilight obscuring the ground in their front ; 
 by the difficult passage over rolling farm lands and fields shut 
 
88 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 in by stone walls which broke up their alignments ; by loading 
 and firing as they advanced ; delayed perhaps by the fire of 
 sixteen guns directly in their front, on the plateau of East 
 Cemetery Hill, and the fire of the six light twelves on Gulp s 
 Hill on their flank, nearly an hour was consumed in passing 
 over the seven hundred yards between their starting point and 
 the fields within short range of our infantry posted behind the 
 walls at the base of East Cemetery Hill. 
 
 Early s movements, up to within a very short time of his 
 final repulse, were guided by the movements and position of 
 his right flank ; the initial command, " right half wheel guide 
 right," having been, as accurately as could be in the rapidly in 
 creasing darkness, strictly complied with ; but, when Hoke s 
 brigade, having the left of the line and constantly increasing in 
 the tendency to "refuse" as it came more and more under the 
 persuasive influence of the 5th Maine s guns, had reached the 
 low bottom of the valley separating Gulp s from East Cemetery 
 Hill, Colonel Avery, (in command since Hoke s severe wound 
 at Chancellorsville), finding his men too far to the left of the 
 position they had been ordered to assault, ordered a change of 
 front and wheeled his brigade to the right, a movement which 
 none but the steadiest veterans could execute under such cir 
 cumstances. It was in this movement that the enemy swept 
 past the left flank of my guns within short canister range ; shut 
 ting out the right half battery so that these guns could not be 
 brought to bear on those troops which were hastening to gain 
 a new position and to re-form on ground from which they could, 
 with better hope, charge the crest of East Cemetery Hill. The 
 trails of the left half battery were swung sharp and hard to the 
 right, the right half battery was hastily " limbered to the rear," 
 and in the darkness, hurried to a new position on the left of the 
 guns remaining in the works, so that the whole battery was 
 once more effective, and this time, with double canister, pouring 
 a most destructive, enfilading, demoralizing, fire into a confused 
 mass of the enemy, struggling in the uncertain shadows at the 
 
THE LEFT ATTACK 89 
 
 base of the hill ; for Avery s change of front brought his men in 
 a body, tangled and confused, among the men of Hays com 
 mand, with which, up to the time of this to them most unfortu 
 nate change of front, they had maintained some semblance of 
 alignment. General Hays, in his report to General Early, 
 writes, " The enemy s artillery, now within canister range, 
 opened upon us, but owing to the darkness of the evening ver 
 ging into the night, and the deep obscurity afforded by the smoke 
 of the firing, our exact locality could not be discovered by the 
 enemy s gunners, and we thus escaped, what, in the full light of 
 day, could have been nothing else than horrible slaughter." 
 
 Meanwhile our batteries on the crest of East Cemetery Hill 
 were powerless. Break s (Reynolds ) four guns on the southern 
 slope, did not use canister, for fear of our men at that time 
 thought to be behind the walls in his front ; while the " dead 
 angle" made by the abrupt slopes of Cemetery Hill had been 
 changed, by the act of General Hancock, who placed the 5th 
 Maine light twelves on the side of the salient created by the 
 north face of Gulp s Hill, into a most deadly angle ; for the 
 brave men, charging across our front, were forced to yield to 
 the inexorable fate which surely awaited whatever body of 
 troops the enemy chose to hazard within double canister range 
 of the smoking muzzles of a well drilled 12-pounder battery. 
 It was this same battery, the 5th Maine, which was mentioned 
 first in the list of the fourteen batteries selected from all the 
 batteries, volunteer and regular, of the Potomac Army for pro 
 ficiency and promise, in General Orders No. 18, Headquarters 
 Army of Potomac, March 3, 1863. 
 
 It was our turn that night, for on the previous day we had 
 been flanked out of our position on Seminary Ridge at the 
 Seminary buildings, where we had faced three successive 
 charges of Daniels and Scales brigades, each time driving them 
 back with canister, but only after we had each time lost them 
 in the smoke of our guns. 
 
 The 33d Massachusetts at the left of the battery, by an 
 
90 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 oblique fire, and on the right of the guns, the survivors of the 
 first day s fight of the " Iron Brigade," by an enfilading fire, 
 rendered loyal service. This brigade on the first day, lost 64^0 
 per cent, one regiment, the 24th Michigan, 84^ per cent, in 
 killed, wounded, and missing; of these last, but few ever again 
 answered the roll-call, for they also were "dead on the field of 
 honor. These small regiments constituted the only infantry 
 force effective on that part of our lines that night. Von Gilsa s 
 brigade, Eleventh Corps, behind the stone walls at the base of 
 East Cemetery Hill, broke and left its front open. When this 
 was discovered, the i/th Connecticut was ordered to the ground 
 vacated by Von Gilsa. Through the opening in our lines caused 
 by this change of position of the i/th Connecticut the few Con 
 federates who succeeded in reaching the crest found their way, 
 and in the rush for the crest, and the guns there, the enemy 
 struck the right of the 75th Ohio, breaking off two companies 
 and swept them along in their headlong charge. The remainder 
 of the 75th Ohio changed front to rear on the third company, 
 now on the right of the Regiment, and held firm place. Weid- 
 rich s and Ricketts batteries were overrun and the guns seized, 
 the left piece of Ricketts was spiked, but the cannoneers 
 fought the enemy hand to hand with trail handspikes, rammers, 
 and what few pistols they had, and succeeded in checking them 
 for a moment, when Carroll s brigade, sent unasked, by General 
 Hancock s happy inspiration, advancing by front of a single regi 
 ment, charged across the small space, drove the enemy from our 
 guns and down the slopes. The position was saved. 
 
 It was believed at the time, and for several years afterwards, 
 that the enemy were in such force, and had gained such foothold 
 on the crest of East Cemetery Hill, that except for the re 
 inforcement of Carroll and of Carroll s brigade, the position 
 could not have been retaken that night, if at all. That officer, 
 distinguished then and frequently afterwards for acts of great 
 gallantry, should be given full credit for the courage of his con 
 victions at the time he led his small brigade by regimental front, 
 
THE LEFT ATTACK 91 
 
 up the slopes, in the dark, seeking close contact with the enemy s 
 line and driving straight to the mark, shown only by the spiteful 
 spitting of rifles a few paces to his front, for the plateau was 
 only one hundred and ten paces in width at this point. But 
 now, from the reports only recently accessible, we must accept 
 as final the fact, that of all the men in the two brigades 
 leading the Confederate assault only eighty-seven found the 
 way to the top of the crest, and that these few brave men 
 in the darkness, "travelling in the line of least resistance," 
 stumbled upon the gap in our infantry lines made by the 
 moving of the i/th Connecticut to the place where Von 
 Gilsa s brigade had just demonstrated their lack of staying- 
 qualities. This was the place the enemy came through ; it was 
 opposite this point, and a few paces further on, that they 
 struck the left of Weidrich s battery, where I am unable to find 
 that they met with much resistance, or indeed until, sweeping 
 down the line of the guns, they came in contact with the left 
 of Ricketts battery next beyond. Here a first-class fight was 
 served out to them, Ricketts cannoneers contesting every inch, 
 and defending the position with trail-handspikes, spongers and 
 rammers, rock, and whatever else they could find on the ground, 
 so well that only one of Ricketts guns, the left one, was under 
 the absolute control of the enemy. 
 
 It was now sharp nine. Carroll had swept the plateau clean 
 of Confederates, and the enemy retreating down the slopes was 
 picking his way in the darkness as rapidly as he could, over the 
 rough, rocky ground and stone walls separating him from the 
 safe shelter of the wooded banks of Rock Creek, and the fields 
 of the Gulp farm beyond. All firing ceased, but rumor has it 
 that a new fight was on. The fiery spirit of the gallant Carroll 
 "flamed to its height." Bent on maintaining the safety of this 
 key to our position, conquered, as he believed, from a victorious 
 foe by the high valor of the force he had led, he was ready to 
 fight with his three small regiments the whole of Ames division, 
 Eleventh Corps, for possession of the lines it had failed to de- 
 
92 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 fend, and for whose failure his headstrong, indomitable courage 
 knew no excuse. His anger found utterance in words which 
 these pages may not venture to chronicle ; his warlike rage found 
 no vent in the language of the schools, but rather in that of the 
 barracks, and with the memory of Chancellorsville rankling in 
 his breast, he emptied the vials of his wrath on the devoted 
 heads of the Eleventh Corps officers, high in rank, sparing none 
 of those gathered about him. He was with much difficulty per 
 suaded to yield the point he had made, as well as the lines he 
 sincerely believed he had conquered the right and the high privi 
 lege to defend until daylight. Calling off his men, already on 
 the hot scent of a new fight, with curses loud and deep for the 
 part played that evening by the Second Division, Eleventh Corps, 
 he at length returned to his own command, and to the chief whose 
 genius never shone more brightly than it did that night when 
 he sent this fighting brigade to the rescue of East Cemetry Hill. 
 Dear old " Sprig Carroll," bravest of the brave ! the roll of heroes 
 of the Second Corps bears no more gallant name than thine ! 
 
 Paralleling the difficulty in determining the precise strength 
 of Confederate forces at any one time or place, is that of finding 
 out their losses in killed, wounded and captured. The discrep 
 ancies between the reports of subordinates, and that of the medi 
 cal director, are so great as to compel the conclusion that there 
 was a deliberate intention to conceal, and to conceal forever, the 
 losses actually sustained. 
 
 The assaulting column from Early s division, not including 
 Gordon s brigade, though this force was close up to the line of 
 Hays and Avery s (Hoke s old command), was not far from 
 sixteen hundred strong ; braver troops than those of Louisiana 
 and North Carolina never went into position in line of battle, 
 and these stood elbow to elbow in their desperate undertaking. 
 The Medical Director, Army of Northern Virginia, concedes in 
 his final report the loss of six hundred and fifty-eight in these 
 two brigades, almost all killed or wounded, but few missing. 
 Hoke of Chambersburg, whose history of the battle is most 
 
THE LEFT ATTACK 93 
 
 interesting and painstaking, writes me that Hays and A very s 
 brigades sustained but slight loss at any other period than during 
 their charge on East Cemetery Hill. Their loss at this time was 
 upwards of forty per cent. General Doubleday did us the honor 
 of writing, that the enemy was repelled, or rather crushed, in his 
 attempt to make permanent lodgment among the Eleventh Corps 
 on Cemetery Hill, and that the enfilading fire from our battery was 
 so destructive arid well directed, that only a remnant of A very s 
 and Hays brigades returned to their original position in line. 
 
 We now approach the third section of this, the Left Attack 
 at Gettysburg, the part taken by Rodes division of the Second 
 (Confederate) Corps, with the support from Fender s division of 
 the Third Corps (Hill s). 
 
 Rodes division, the largest but one in the Army of Northern 
 Virginia, numbering eight thousand five hundred effectives, oc 
 cupied the town and the Chambersburg pike as far back as Sem 
 inary Ridge. Orders had been received by General Rodes 
 requiring him to co-operate with the forces attacking our right 
 as soon as an opportunity should offer for doing so with good 
 effect. Some stir in our lines opposite Rodes front, late in tho 
 afternoon, causing a diminution of artillery and infantry, led him 
 to seek out General Early with a view to acting in concert with 
 him. These officers agreed as to the fitness of the opportunity 
 for attacking, and each made preparations accordingly. It must 
 be borne in mind that this joint assault was to be made by 
 Rodes and Early, by the latter on the east face, and by the 
 former on the northern slopes of Cemetery Hill, from such 
 directions as to expose our lines to a flank and enfilading, as 
 well as to a direct fire, Early s assault flanking the northern 
 slope and Rodes the eastern face of the hill. It is a curious 
 fact, easily verified, that lines let fall perpendicularly from the 
 center of each attacking division will intersect within two hun 
 dred feet of the highest point of Cemetery Hill. 
 
 But, at the time described by General Rodes in his report, 
 there took place an exhibition of that spirit of independence so 
 
94 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 prevailing and so prominent among the brigadiers of Lee s 
 army. 
 
 Ramseur, holding the right of Rocles division with the un 
 derstanding that the other brigades were to conform to his 
 movements, obeyed the order to advance, until he was within 
 two hundred yards of our lines on the northern slope, when he 
 discovered (so he reports) " batteries so placed as to pour upon 
 his lines, direct, cross and enfilading fires. Two lines of infantry 
 behind stone walls and breastworks were also discovered, sup 
 porting the batteries." He halted his brigade, conferred with 
 the nearest brigadier, General Dole, the whole line governed 
 itself accordingly, the forward movement was arrested, and with 
 it all opportunity of acting in concert with General Early. It 
 was during the time thus wasted, and the critical moment in 
 which the large masses of Fender and Rocles were halting un 
 certainly almost within our lines, that Carroll, moving by his 
 right flank, covered the rear of the position upset by Early on 
 East Cemetery Hill, and threw his brigade on the troops of Hays 
 and Avery (Hoke s old brigade). " The action," writes General 
 Walker, " was short, sharp and decisive. Hays and Avery were 
 thrown out by Carroll s impetuous attack, and Gordon s brigade 
 advancing to their support, met them retreating down the slope. 
 Thus the Eleventh Corps position was restored and its guns re 
 taken. Early s assault on the eastern face of Cemetery Hill 
 having failed, Rodes and Fender s attack was abandoned." 
 
 It is extremely difficult at this late day, for me to dis 
 criminate between facts well known at the time or shortly after 
 the battle, and sustaining important relation to the events of the 
 second and third days, and the knowledge since then acquired 
 from the literature of the theme, but I am assured by friends 
 whose opinion I am bound to respect, that the largest and best 
 result will be attained when the narrative of personal observation 
 and participation is rounded out by a synopsis of clearly ascer 
 tained, and definitely determined, historical facts. 
 
 The literature of the battle divides itself, we may say, into 
 
THE LEFT ATTACK- 95 
 
 three sections, the historical, the oratorical, and that which is 
 synchronal with the event itself ; but the oratorical bears about 
 the same relation to the stubborn facts, that Rothermcl s picture 
 painted for the State of Pennsylvania sustains to the reality of 
 the central feature of the fight, for the painting serves chiefly to 
 bring to the front the part alleged to have been borne by the 
 Corn Exchange Regiment of Philadelphia, on the third day. 
 
 The change in the understanding reached at Falmouth, in 
 the Confederate Council of War, that the campaign if made into 
 Pennsylvania, should be offensive in strategy, and defensive in 
 tactics, was supplemented by Lee s disregard of Longstreet s 
 advice at Gettysburg, that the army should be thrown around 
 our left flank, and interposed between our posit ion and Washing 
 ton. If we take it for granted that no disappointment, not even 
 this two-fold failure to influence his General-in-chief, could have 
 made Lee s greatest Lieutenant lukewarm and sluggish, we can 
 not overlook the fact, the subject of much controversy in Con 
 federate high circles after the battle, that Longstreet began his 
 attack too late in the afternoon of the second day ; and, disre 
 garding this fact, evident at the time, failed to engage the whole 
 of McLaw s division, in time to support that of Hood, barely 
 defending with success the great advantage gained by it, at the 
 Peach Orchard and Devil s Den. Rodes and Early did not 
 move simultaneously against the northern front and easterly face 
 of Cemetery Hill, as had been ordered. Hill s corps, occupying 
 the Confederate center, afforded no material aid to the troops 
 engaged on its right and left. A portion of Edward Johnson s 
 division, forcing back the thin line and small detachments of part 
 of Greene s force, gallantly but ineffectually resisting, gained 
 possession of works on the right of our line, and penetrated be 
 yond to within two hundred yards of the Baltimore pike within 
 easy musket shot of our reserve ammunition train and stopped 
 there, though meeting with no resistance to further progress ; 
 while their division commander, in undisputed possession of a 
 wide path straight into the rear of our center, and within less 
 
96 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 than a mile of Army Headquarters, turned to one side and ex 
 pended the hours of the early part of the night, in fruitless assaults 
 on a position the strength of which had been demonstrated as 
 soon as his brigades had faced the fire of its defenders. Smith s 
 brigade, detached from Early s division to watch a body of our 
 cavalry on the York road, was not within supporting distance of 
 Hoke s and Hays brigades at the time of their grand assault on 
 East Cemetery Hill in the dusk of that memorable evening. 
 The Confederate movements at Gettysburg were broken, dis 
 jointed, and unconnected. In fact, Lee s lieutenants could not, 
 or would not, obey his commands to move simultaneously against 
 our flanks, while Hill was directed at the same time to seize 
 every opportunity to crush our center ; for, writes the Count of 
 Paris, " the extreme independence of the Confederate corps 
 commanders, which division and brigade generals imitated in 
 their turn, rendered the best conceived plans and the most 
 daring efforts fruitless." 
 
 " At eight o clock in the evening," spoke Mr. Everett at 
 Gettysburg, " a desperate attempt was made by the enemy to 
 storm the position of the Eleventh Corps on Cemetery Hill ; 
 here, too, after a terrible conflict, he was repulsed with immense 
 loss. . . . Such was the result of the second act of this event 
 ful drama. A hard day fought, at one moment anxious, crowned 
 with dearly earned but uniform success to our army, auspicious 
 of a glorious termination of the final struggle. On these good 
 omens the night fell." 
 
 These glowing words spoken by Mr. Everett in his Gettys 
 burg oration, at the time of the dedication of the National Ceme 
 tery, November 19, 1863, are highly oratorical, but cannot be 
 regarded as historical, for when the night fell on the second day s 
 fight the omens were not good, they were bad. The First Corps 
 had left sixty per cent, the Eleventh Corps, thirty-three per cent, 
 and the Third Corps, thirty-eight per cent, dead and wounded 
 on the field, or prisoners in the enemy s hands ; throngs of 
 stragglers had not yet fallen into line, while along our right flank, 
 
THE LEFT ATTACK 97 
 
 and a mile in rear of our right center, rebel yells and the rattle 
 of musketry awoke the slumbering echoes of Gulp s and Wolf 
 and Powers Hills ; the night fell on a loss inflicted by the enemy, 
 of more than twenty thousand men, without counting the men 
 dispersed by the contest and not yet able to rejoin their colors. 
 The conviction was strong that the enemy had not yet spoken 
 his last word ; while General Meade was made to fear that 
 another day s fighting, equally murderous, might cause his whole 
 army literally to melt away. 
 
 General Walker will recognize his words expressive of the 
 opinion at that hour prevailing. "The fall of night found the 
 Potomac army in a situation that demanded the most grave and 
 serious consideration. We had repulsed the last assaults, but 
 nearly twelve thousand men had fallen in the desperate battle of 
 the afternoon. Our whole left had been driven back to the 
 position assigned in the morning ; the two corps chiefly en 
 gaged, the Third and the Fifth, had been shockingly depleted, 
 the enemy had taken advantage of the absence of the greater 
 part of the Twelfth Corps, to push around our right and seize a 
 part of our line, holding there an open gateway through which 
 their troops could be advanced to seize the Baltimore pike. It 
 was indeed a gloomy hour when General Meade summoned his 
 corps commanders to consider upon the situation and to form 
 plans for the morrow. For these weighty reasons, as night fell, 
 and before the fight on our right which gave the enemy posses 
 sion of the works at that point had been fully decided, a council 
 of war was called to decide the question of remaining or retreat 
 ing, and if it should be decided to remain, should the army 
 await or should it deliver attack." 
 
 These then were the omens on which that night fell, and 
 the ranks \vere re-formed among the dead and wounded, too 
 numerous to receive attention at the time. Men took position 
 in silence, for the exultation of victory was not felt to cause 
 them to forget fatigue, hunger, suffering comrades, or the chance 
 of death on the coming day. W T ords were never spoken more 
 
98 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 clearly expressing the anguish of brave men s hearts, than those 
 of the gallant Birney, who, while watching the small numbers 
 of determined soldiers gathering about him, in the gloom of the 
 night, whispered to one of his Lieutenants, " I wish I were 
 already dead." The facts are hard, cold and incontestable. 
 The twilight shrouded a field hard fought, dearly won, barely 
 held, drenched with blood ; and upon tokens presaging evil to 
 the Potomac Army. 
 
 The moon, then at her full, lighted the valleys and the fields 
 around Gettysburg, favoring the march of troops of both armies 
 hurrying towards our right. " About half-past one, Daniels and 
 Rodes old brigades began their march of about four miles," so 
 writes General Daniels, " to reinforce Johnson. Smith s bri 
 gade, detached on the previous afternoon to watch our cavalry 
 menacing the enemy s left, was also put in motion for the same 
 point on Johnson s line, while the * Old Stonewall Brigade, drawn 
 in from a position where it had been placed to guard Johnson s 
 left flank, rejoined the command." In all, Johnson had in his 
 command when dawn broke, ten thousand five hundred effec 
 tives, close to our lines, or in full possession of the major part 
 of our works vacated in the afternoon of the second day. On 
 our part, the troops returning during the night had re-occupied 
 the small portion of our intrenchments not held by the enemy. 
 In the woods, on the hill south of the swale, near the extreme 
 right of our line, Colgrove s brigade rested on Rock Creek, with 
 skirmishers in the woods beyond. McDougall s brigade on his 
 left extended as far as the Baltimore pike, facing nearly 
 north. On the other side of the swale, and beginning at the 
 Baltimore pike near Henry Spangler s house, Lockwood s Inde 
 pendent Brigade was on the right of a line which made up of 
 that brigade and Candy s and Kane s, prolonged the line to that 
 of the regiment forced behind the traverse on Greene s right, 
 when it was assaulted by Jones and Stewart s brigades of John 
 son s command in the early part of the previous night ; these 
 regiments faced east of south. On the narrow western slope of 
 
THE LEFT ATTACK 99 
 
 Gulp s Hill, and in the fields near the Baltimore pike, Shaler s 
 brigade of the Sixth, stood in columns of regiments near 
 Greene s right. In the woods and on the hillsides northeast of 
 the meadow and swampy ground, and extending along the whole 
 eastern face of Gulp s Hill, was Johnson s command, in close 
 column, waiting for light to enable them to renew the struggle 
 for the possession of the Baltimore pike. On our side, the 
 night had been spent in well-directed, though hurried efforts, to 
 so strengthen our position that it could resist successfully the 
 assault which was certain to come as soon as dawn should reveal 
 to the enemy how near they were to their goal, the main avenue 
 of retreat for more than two-thirds of the Army of the Potomac. 
 On the western side of the Baltimore pike, beginning with three 
 batteries (Winegar, Knapp and Rigby) on Powers Hill, with 
 K of the 5th Artillery one hundred and twenty rods to the 
 north, and, a little further on, Miihlenberg s F of the 4th Ar 
 tillery, five batteries in all, were in position parallel to the pike 
 and directly opposite the center of the Twelfth Corps line. 
 Their guns controlled the approaches of the enemy through the 
 ravine formed by the curving channel of Rock Creek, and by 
 means of the swale leading from the bed of the stream out on 
 to the open ground close to the pike. 
 
 General Lee, deceived by the result of Longstreet s assault 
 at the Peach Orchard and at the Devil s Den, and particularly 
 by the success attained by the brigades of Anderson near Zeig- 
 ler s grove, and encouraged by the strong foothold secured 
 within our lines by Johnson s division, decided to resume in the 
 early morning of the third clay the movements of the previous 
 afternoon and evening, adhering to the tactics of a double attack 
 with his two wings. Ewell was notified that the battle would 
 be renewed by Longstreet at daybreak, and he was ordered to 
 attack at the same time the positions adjacent to the large part 
 of our intrenchments which his troops already held. 
 
 Because the reinforcements of the night gave Johnson an 
 assaulting column which might, by its sheer weight, crush oppos- 
 
100 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 ing lines, no thought appears to have been given by the general 
 to the necessity of artillery support, other than to trust to the 
 fortunes of war, and to the high hope which gave shape to his 
 plans, that sufficient gain to the Confederate front could be 
 made to enable them to place their guns on the hill southwest 
 and across the Baltimore pike. But the ground in Johnson s 
 front and on his left, over which the artillery must pass in order 
 to keep within call, if his movements should be successful, 
 afforded no passage for guns. It was the same swampy, wooded, 
 boulder covered and boulder broken country extending to the 
 base of Wolf and McAllister s hills which had been carefully 
 examined by General Slocum and General Warren on the 
 morning of the second. They reported it as impassable for artil 
 lery, and unfit for the movement ordered by General Meade, 
 that the Twelfth, Fifth and Sixth Corps should move past 
 our right and attack the Confederate left. If Johnson knew 
 these facts they may not have seemed to him to present material 
 objection to this plan of battle, for he was leading Stonewall 
 Jackson s old corps, men who had been taught by that illustri 
 ous chief that a flank position in their hands outflanked the 
 enemy and gave victory. 
 
 General Lee had ordered the movements for the morning of 
 the third day to be an attack at daylight delivered simultane 
 ously by both wings of his army, and if either of our flanks 
 should be driven in, an assault by the whole of Hill s corps 
 from the rebel center, with Zeigler s grove as its objective 
 point . 
 
 At 4.30 A.M., the artillery of the Twelth Corps opened at a 
 range of six hundred to eight hundred yards. To those of us 
 whom the last hours of the night held in their soft embrace, 
 the awakening was violent and startling, for twenty guns con 
 verged and crossed their fire on the intrenchments seized by the 
 enemy, while the guns on Powers Hill enfiladed the eastern face 
 of Gulp s Hill. Johnson s left was menaced by that portion of 
 the First Division, Twelfth Corps, which was in the woods and 
 
THE LEFT ATTACK IOI 
 
 rough ground south of the swale. Geary s division threatened 
 the enemy s right, but their front was open, and just beyond, 
 almost in their grasp, it might appear, was the pike, covered 
 with wagons and moving troops, apparently pushing to the rear 
 as if already in retreat. It had been planned that our infantry 
 should be moved forward as soon as our guns opened ; but the 
 ground our men would have to pass over was so exposed to the 
 projectiles from our batteries, even then firing over our own 
 troops, that there was some delay, which gave Johnson oppor 
 tunity for the initiative. As soon as it was light enough to 
 maintain alignments, he hurled his battalions, in lines scarcely 
 separated, straight at the works which on Greene s front had 
 resisted his efforts the night before. Stimulated by the knowl 
 edge of the nearness of the Baltimore pike, the Confederates 
 charged with extreme vigor. 
 
 "The shock," writes the Count of Paris, "was terrific. 
 Facing musketry and cannon shot and shell without a single 
 gun with which to reply, the Confederates repeatedly charged 
 an impenetrable front, under a sun, which rising higher and 
 higher, at last became absolutely scorching." 
 
 No considerable development of line by the enemy that 
 would be of advantage to him, could be made in front of the 
 divisions of Ruger or Geary without exposure of a large part 
 of his lines to an enfilading fire of musketry, and to a cross fire 
 from the artillery on the high ground south of the road and 
 from Powers Hill ; these last mentioned batteries fired over 
 the line of the First Division, Twelfth Corps, causing a small 
 but unavoidable loss. 
 
 The morning advanced slowly. The enemy, by repeated 
 assaults struggled fiercely to make headway, but suffered 
 severely without progressing perceptibly, when General Ruger 
 received orders to try the forces in the woods behind the works 
 on the north of the swale or meadow, and if practicable, to 
 drive them out. Orders were sent Colonel Colgrove to advance 
 skirmishers against the enemy at that point, and if not found too 
 
102 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 strong, to advance two regiments and drive them out. "From 
 a mistake of the staff officer, or misunderstanding on the part 
 of Colonel Colgrove," writes General Ruger, "it was attempted 
 to carry the position without first ascertaining the strength of 
 the enemy." 
 
 It was seven o clock. The battle which, begun before it was 
 fully light in the woods and behind the breastworks and large 
 ledges of rocks on the southern slopes and eastern face of Gulp s 
 Mill to the left of the position occupied by Ruger s division, 
 had been extremely severe, was now thought to be receding, and 
 loud cheering was heard along the lines. "It was evident," 
 writes Colonel Colgrove, " that General Geary had dislodged the 
 enemy and had retaken the breastworks of Candy and Kane, 
 vacated the night before." At the same time on Colgrove s 
 front the enemy was discovered by him to have advanced in line 
 to the woods, and forming nearly at right angles with his front. 
 At this juncture Lieutenant Snow of General Ruger s staff 
 delivered the order to Colonel Colgrove, " The General directs 
 that you advance your line immediately." "The position of the 
 ist brigade," writes Colgrove, "was such that it was impossi 
 ble to advance more than two regiments in line." For between 
 the enemy and Colgrove s command was an open meadow, now 
 known as "the swale," about one hundred yards in width at this 
 point. Breastworks and ledges of rocks entirely sheltered the 
 enemy. It was impossible to send forward skirmishers, as the 
 enemy s advantages were such that a line of skirmishers would 
 be cut down before they would fairly gain the open ground that 
 intervened. "The only possible chance I had to advance," 
 writes General Colgrove, "was to carry the enemy s position by 
 storming it." "I selected the 2d Massachusetts and the 2/th 
 Indiana, and ordered the 2cl Massachusetts to charge the works 
 in front of their position, and the 2/th Indiana as soon as they 
 should gain the open ground, to carry the position held in the 
 ledges of rocks." "At the command. Forward, double-quick, 
 our breastworks were cleared, and both regiments, with deafen- 
 
THE LEFT ATTACK 103 
 
 ing cheers sprang forward. They had scarcely gained the open 
 ground when they were met with one of the most destructive 
 fires I have ever witnessed. Up to this time the enemy re 
 mained entirely concealed. It had been impossible to tell any 
 thing about his strength in our immediate front, but it was now 
 clearly ascertained that he had massed a heavy force at that 
 point. It would seem that the two regiments were doomed to 
 destruction." 
 
 In these words which I have quoted, General Colgrove bears 
 witness to the discipline and to the invincible courage of our 
 own Second Regiment Massachusetts Infantry, and we are now 
 for the first time able to trace to its source, the error, and the 
 order which sent this gallant regiment across the narrow swale 
 to its fate. Not pausing to reason why, they rushed into the 
 very teeth of an overwhelming force, concealed by dense woods, 
 protected by breastworks, or shielded by great ledges. No less 
 than three brigades of the enemy are reported to have been on 
 the ground which these two small regiments were ordered to 
 carry, and one was the " Old Stonewall Brigade." The 2d 
 Massachusetts gained the woods ; the 2/th Indiana broke when 
 half way across the meadow. 
 
 Permit me to refer to a paper written by companion Colonel 
 Charles F. Morse of the Second Massachusetts and read at a re 
 union of the survivors of the regimental officers, May 10, 1878. 
 
 " A verbal order was given Colonel Mudge, directing him to 
 charge across the meadow and attempt to drive the enemy out 
 of their works in the woods. Chaplain Quint in his book says, 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Mudge questioned the messenger, Are you 
 sure that is the order? Yes. Well it is murder, but it is 
 the order. Up, men, over the works ; forward, double- 
 quick. 
 
 These words deserve a longer life than those so widely 
 known, " Up guards, and at them." For, up and out from be 
 hind well built life-saving intrenchments the men of the 2d 
 Massachusetts clashed across the swale where even a skirmish 
 
104 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 line could not live, into death-dealing woods. Driven out, 
 fighting their way back through a line of the enemy thrown be 
 hind them to compel their surrender, forming anew under the 
 protection of a low detached piece of stonewall about half way 
 across the meadow, they cleared the ground of the enemy in 
 their new front, then fell back to their new position. Upon 
 calling the roll, not one man was reported as missing. The 
 Second Massachusetts, writes Colonel Morse, went into action 
 with twenty-two officers and two hundred and ninety-four en 
 listed men, and when the roll-call was ended, but one hundred 
 and ninety had answered to their names, and the little knot of 
 officers numbered but twelve. Five times the colors changed 
 hands, and the next day when the regiment took its place in 
 column to march away, as it passed General Slocum s head 
 quarters, he and a large group of general and staff officers 
 uncovered their heads." 
 
 From early dawn until ten o clock, charge followed charge in 
 swift succession assault and counter assault served only to 
 multiply the winrows of the dead and wounded in the Confede 
 rate ranks ; the cross-fire of artillery and musketry barely held 
 in check the savage onslaught of Johnson s men. 
 
 Never before in the history of the Army of the Potomac, and 
 never again until this same Edward Johnson s division had been 
 gathered in, artillery, battle flags, and all, prisoners of war at 
 Spottsylvania, did men so nearly thrust the smoking muzzles 
 of their rifles into each other s faces; nowhere before and not 
 again, until the Brock road had been reached, and the tangled 
 thickets of the Wilderness concealed lines of battle almost in 
 contact, was volleying so heavy and so continuous from so small 
 a front as Greene s on the crest of Culp s Hill during the hard 
 fighting, urged with varying fortune to gain and to maintain 
 possession of the Baltimore pike. 
 
 Directly in my rear, their left resting close to the foot of 
 the knoll I occupied, I counted twelve lines of infantry crouch 
 ing in the grass and behind the rocks and stone walls in the 
 
THE LEFT ATTACK 105 
 
 narrow fields separating Greene s right from the pike ; so great 
 the danger of the enemy s breaking through at this point. 
 
 Nothing that I have ever read describes the situation so well 
 as the poet Stedman s versification of the words of the gallant 
 Kearney at the Seven Pines, 
 
 " Up came the reserves to the melee infernal, 
 Shouting, Where to go in, through opening or pine, 
 Anywheres, forward, tis all the same, Colonel, 
 You ll find lovely fighting along the whole line. " 
 
 Just at this time the enemy showed signs of yielding then 
 came the rush, the grand rush to recapture our breast-works ; 
 then cheers ; for the intrenchments were once more in our pos 
 session, the enemy had been driven out and down the slopes. 
 The right flank was safe. 
 
 General Geary, commanding the Second Division, Twelfth 
 Corps, reports nine hundred buried in his front, and estimates 
 the loss of the enemy at twelve hundred killed, and the wounded 
 at the ratio of four to one killed. 
 
 " The day was a most disastrous one to Ewell s Corps," writes 
 General Geary, " and equally if not more so to the whole rebel 
 army, in consideration of the importance which the turning of our 
 flank would be to them, and which alone could compensate them 
 for the repulse they had already on the previous evening re 
 ceived from these parts of our line in their well-conceived 
 designs upon the key-points to the position of our army; they 
 were not only defeated, but terribly punished." 
 
 No place on the field of Gettysburg presented such terrible 
 effect of battle as the portion of Gulp s Hill in front of Greene s 
 line, and along the works vacated on the evening of the second, 
 by McDougall s brigade of the First Division. From under our 
 works, down the hill to the creek, the open places were cov 
 ered with Confederate dead, every exposed place holding groups, 
 and behind the rocks many wounded had been dragged only to 
 die a lingering death. 
 
 About 1 1 A.M. a considerable number of the enemv in front 
 
106 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 of Greene s intrenchments and close up to our lines, displayed a 
 white flag. Major Leigh, Johnson s chief of staff, galloped into 
 the throng, and endeavored to prevent the surrender, but fell 
 shot to pieces almost, by a volley from our works. I remember 
 well on the morning of the 4th, crossing from my position the 
 short distance to the front of Greene s line, and there seeing 
 Major Leigh pinned to the ground by his horse, shot at the 
 same time with his rider and falling on him. 
 
 Of all those lying there, whose leader he seemed to be, who 
 would watch no more for the coming of Longstreet s mighty 
 hosts ; who would listen no longer for Hill s bugles sounding 
 the charge, or the volleying rifles of Stonewall Jackson s old 
 corps hurrying to their support ; of all the uncounted dead 
 covering the ground; of the dying, tenderly cared for by 
 hands which but the day before had given mortal wounds ; 
 of all the signs of battle, in trees stripped by bullets and torn 
 by shot and shell ; of all these, no memory is so vivid as that 
 of this dead soldier, still astride his horse, borne, as it were, 
 on the crest of the highest wave of the Rebellion up into the 
 flame of our guns, almost seizing our flags swaying in the 
 smoke of that fierce, uncertain struggle. 
 
MY CAPTURE, PRISON LIFE AND ESCAPE 
 
MY CAPTURE. PRISON LIFE AND ESCAPE 
 
 BY 
 
 BREVET-MAJOR ANDREW M. BENSON, U. S. V. 
 
 IN June, 1864, there came together about fourteen thousand 
 of cavalry and six light batteries for the purpose of making a 
 raid around Richmond, the object being to destroy all the rail 
 roads leading into Richmond and Petersburg from the south, 
 including the Petersburg & Weldon, the South Side, and the 
 Richmond & Danville. This force was placed in command of 
 General Wilson. 
 
 On the night of the 25th, we passed around the flanks of 
 both armies and struck the Petersburg & Weldon at a place 
 called Reams Station. There we took and destroyed half a 
 dozen passenger freight trains and captured a few Confederate 
 soldiers. This I think was the only victory gained at any time 
 during the raid. 
 
 Immediately after our men had secured what few soldiers 
 there were, they destroyed the road for a long distance on both 
 sides of the station. As soon as that was accomplished they 
 turned their attention to the South Side, a road that reaches 
 from Reams Station to the Richmond & Danville, a distance of 
 forty-six miles, and joining that road at a place called Black and 
 White. The road we entirely destroyed from that point on the 
 Petersburg & Weldon to the Richmond & Danville. 
 
 After reaching the Richmond & Danville Road the larger 
 portion of that road was torn up, destroying all the public prop 
 erty as far as the Roanoke and I dare say some private 
 property may have suffered a little. 
 
 My squadron was selected for the purpose of wrecking the 
 bridge over the Roanoke. Numbers one, two and three dis- 
 
 109 
 
I 10 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 mounted, while Numbers four took the horses into a secure place. 
 There was a distance to traverse of about a mile and a half. As 
 soon as we had ridden well out on to the plain we came within 
 range of the enemy, who opened on us with shells. We kept 
 on until within close range when they fired shrapnel, case shot 
 and canister. I was so near that I could see the gunner. When 
 he had fixed the lanyard and was about to discharge the piece, 
 I gave the order for my men to lie down. At that time I hap 
 pened to be in front of my little command. I turned around to 
 the left to see that the left was down, and then to the right to 
 see that the right was clown, when I unfortunately went down 
 myself with a canister shot in my side. That was the end of 
 my career for a time. 
 
 We went no further in that direction, having quite a num 
 ber wounded and some killed. Those that were killed were 
 buried, and for the wounded we secured all the means of trans 
 portation we could, top-buggies, wagons, hacks, and every other 
 conceivable thing on wheels that we could get, and in that way 
 started back again to our army. 
 
 Our return march was by nearly the same course that we had 
 been following in the advance. We had almost reached the 
 Petersburg & Weldon railroad when we found in front of us 
 Wade Hampton s and Fitzhugh Lee s brigades of cavalry, and 
 Mahone s division of infantry. Our artillery was parked on the 
 right side of the road while the ambulances were on the left. 
 
 I was aware of a little skirmishing in front, but knew noth 
 ing about the nature of it until I saw our men fire the caissons 
 and cut the wheels of the guns, all of which were destroyed. 
 And I believe that in that raid, of all the artillery and wagons 
 with which we had started, not a single wheel was ever brought 
 back into our lines. 
 
 When the caissons were fired and the shells began to ex 
 plode, I found that my position was not any too comfortable, and 
 so I left the hack I was riding in at what I considered a judi 
 cious time, and went into the woods. I had been among the 
 
MY CAPTURE, PRISON LIFE AND ESCAPE III 
 
 trees but a few seconds when two or three straggling Confeder 
 ates who happened to be in there saw me, and of course I sur 
 rendered to them. 
 
 I was taken out into the road, and after going a little dis 
 tance came upon the right of General Mahone s division, where 
 I was turned over to the provost guard. I was told, in the first 
 place to sit down on the fence so that they might take off my 
 boots. I had on a pair of Burnside cavalry boots, almost new, 
 which attracted the attention of the Confederates, and they were 
 very desirous to obtain them. So they took my boots off I 
 was not in condition to take them off very well myself and 
 half a dozen of them tried them on. At last they passed them 
 back to me with a look of disgust and this remark : " Oh God ! 
 what feet ! " So I put on my boots and wore them out myself. 
 
 After a time General Wilson with his entire command of 
 cavalry retreated. They were followed by Wade Hampton and 
 Fitzhugh Lee, and about five hundred prisoners were captured. 
 In a short time these prisoners were brought to the rear, placed 
 under guard, and marched to Petersburg. We were there put 
 into a tobacco warehouse and kept three days, with nothing to 
 eat but cold water and Indian meal. 
 
 On the 4th of July we were removed to Richmond, and as 
 we were marching through the town we were asked " If this was 
 the advance guard of General Grant s army ? " We told them 
 we thought it was, but we did not think then that the main body 
 would be ten months behind. 
 
 We were taken to Libby Prison, and there shown our quar 
 ters. Mine was beside a post, on the floor, without blankets. 
 Our rations were issued to us. They consisted of about twenty- 
 two ounces of bread and thirty ounces of meat for one week. 
 We had something else that they gave us one week ; I do not 
 know what the name of it was. 
 
 We remained there until the 5th or 6th of August, when we 
 were taken away. We knew that we were going somewhere, 
 but of course did not know where. It proved, however, that we 
 
112 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 were bound for Macon, Ga. We were put into box cars, sixty- 
 five in a car. There were no modern conveniences. No man 
 was allowed to go out. We were confined in the car for two 
 and one-half days, until we reached Macon. 
 
 The majority arrived there all right. Some few jumped off 
 the car and escaped, I hope ; but the greater proportion reached 
 Macon and were put into the stockade. The prisoners there 
 aggregated, after our arrival, sixteen hundred, all officers. After 
 we had been there some time we had very nice quarters in 
 barracks. We also had blankets. Our food was as good as I 
 expected it would be, and a great improvement over that at 
 Petersburg and Richmond, but we clicl not feel inclined to accept 
 and be contented with our position. W T e thought we wouldn t 
 stay there any longer than we could help, and a few of us got 
 together and arranged to dig a tunnel. I was not in condition 
 to dig very much. Still I was in the secret and assisted as well 
 as I could. Those who were more interested than I and had 
 more to do with it, labored night after night diligently, and one 
 morning as we fell in for roll-call, after all the prisoners were in 
 place, the guard marched in to the rear of us and took their 
 places, and some of them went to this very place where the 
 tunnel had commenced, took away the covering, and the whole 
 thing was broken in. There was one of our number, it was said 
 - I hope it was not true but am inclined to think that it was 
 who had told the authorities that such a thing was being done, 
 and an officer of our own army was taken out of the quarters 
 that day and never came back again. 
 
 We remained there some time and then five or six hundred 
 were removed to Charleston ; the rest were taken to Savannah. 
 I happened to be among those who went to Savannah. We 
 were put into what was known as "The Marine Hospital," a 
 delightful place. \Ve had tents, rations were issued to us regu 
 larly, and we enjoyed ourselves as well as we could in a prison. 
 
 After we had been there a short time we conceived the idea 
 of digging another tunnel. Twenty-five of us formed a plan by 
 
MY CAPTURE, PRISON LIFE AND ESCAPE 113 
 
 which we might liberate the whole party if we could carry it 
 through. The hospital vault was on one side of the yard and 
 we thought that if we could get into that vault we should be 
 able to conceal there the earth that we took from the tunnel. 
 
 Now, in regard to our manner of tunnelling. There are 
 some in this Commandery who have tunnelled. To those who 
 have not done any such work I will say that we made an endless 
 rope of blankets and at intervals of every ten feet there would 
 be a little bag holding ten or twelve quarts. The man whose 
 duty it was to take the earth from the pit would take that rope 
 on his arm and crawl into the tunnel and take the first bag he 
 came to and fill it, and two pulls meant to start it out and one 
 to stop. When one bag was filled he had that passed along 
 until the next empty bag came up, then filled that and so on. 
 As soon as the first bag reached the mouth of the tunnel there 
 was another party who took that in a bucket and carried it over 
 the yard, sprinkling it as carefully as he could, and in the morn 
 ing it was the duty of the police to clean the grounds. This 
 earth was piled in little heaps and mule teams took it out in the 
 morning. In this way the enemy promoted our scheme. All 
 that we had to dig with was a strap hinge and a case knife. We 
 used the case knife for cutting through roots and the hinge for 
 digging, and with only these implements we excavated a tunnel 
 about one hundred and twenty feet long. 
 
 It was bright moonlight when we completed the tunnel, and 
 we did not think it advisable to go out then. We therefore 
 waited for a dark night. But cows were grazing over in the lot 
 next to the yard and unfortunately for us they broke into the 
 tunnel. The Confederates investigated and found that it was a 
 tunnel leading from the camp. They placed a guard there and 
 waited for us. 
 
 When the first dark night came Captain McElroy, Captain 
 Grant of the iQth Wisconsin and myself were selected to go out 
 and reconnoitre and find out what was the best thing to do. We 
 had our clothes done up in a little bundle and pushed them in 
 
114 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 front of us and here I will say that those who worked in the 
 tunnel were naked all the time. We pushed our little bundles 
 ahead of us until we came to the end of the tunnel, McElroy 
 ahead, and he took his hinge in order to enlarge the opening a 
 little when somebody from the outside called the corporal of the 
 guard and immediately thrust a bayonet down into the ground 
 at that place, which came near going through the captain s neck. 
 He called out " Get back, we are discovered." Of course we 
 had to back up until we got to the vault, and there we shifted 
 ends and went out the other way. 
 
 When we came out, Colonel Wayne, the commander, was 
 there with his guard, and the pioneers with their spades and 
 picks. After taking our names and telling us what fine speci 
 mens of officers we were, he asked if there were many in the 
 Union army as good and as fine looking as we were. Of course 
 we did not explain how we came to be in such condition. W T e 
 were ordered to our quarters. 
 
 A few nights afterwards, in walking through the yard, we 
 discovered between the camps and the hospital a disused well. 
 We determined to dig into this well, and so started another 
 tunnel. We had been working but a little time when one night 
 I was standing on the edge of the shaft and said to the man 
 who was in the tunnel, or just about going in, "You must 
 make this tunnel larger; the other wasn t quite large enough." 
 Of course I did not imagine that there was any one about 
 who was not in sympathy with us, when a man standing near 
 by said, "Don t you-uns want to buy a shirt?" I looked 
 up, and there was a Confederate directly over my shoulder. I 
 sprang up as quickly as I could, and attempted to catch him, 
 but he reached the gate first, and in a little time it was a very 
 dark, rainy night Colonel Wayne came again with his guard, 
 proceeded immediately to our camp and said, " Take down these 
 tents. I will raze every one of them to the ground, but I will 
 stop these accursed Yankees from digging." We had taken 
 refuge in the first tents we came to. I sprang into a tent near 
 
MY CAPTURE, PRISON LIFE AND ESCAPE 115 
 
 this and the others were further away. There were two officers 
 in this tent who were very ill, and I knew that to expose them to 
 the weather would be very dangerous to them ; so I came out of 
 my hiding-place and went to the colonel, and said, " Colonel, it 
 seems very hard that those officers who are ill should be exposed 
 to this weather." He turned to me and said, " What is it that 
 you know about this ? " I said " I know all about it, as I 
 organized the party that dug it, and I think I can give you as 
 much information as any one. 1 At that time Captain Grant 
 came out and said, " I am Captain Benson s second in command, 
 and if there is any punishment to be inflicted I propose to take 
 my share of it." Colonel Wayne said, "What are your names ? " 
 I said, " My name is Benson." Grant said his name was 
 Grant. Colonel Wayne said, " Oh, yes, I think I have your 
 names." I said, " I think you have you took them, at least. 
 He then told us to go to quarters. 
 
 He then went away. In the morning I went to call on a 
 friend in another part of the yard, and one of the mess came 
 down and said, " The provost guard is at your tent and want 
 you to come up there." I went to the tent and found a corporal 
 and two soldiers with bayonets fixed. The corporal told me that 
 he wanted me to go with them. So I took my boots down from 
 the ridgepole of the tent, put them on, went out, proceeded with 
 the guard, and found that Captain Grant had to go with another 
 squad. I didn t know what they were going to do with us, but 
 we were immediately informed by the colonel, who was outside 
 of the gate. It was Sunday. As we came out, he kindly in 
 formed me that he was very sorry that my propensities for dig 
 ging were so great, as he thought my quarters very much more 
 comfortable than the place he was going to send me to. I 
 thanked him, and told him he couldn t put me in any place where 
 I should ask any odds of him. We w r ere taken to the jail, turned 
 over to the jailer, put down into a dungeon there, and in that 
 place we stayed sixteen days. We did not have a drop of water 
 or a piece of bread during our stay there ; a soup was issued to 
 
Il6 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 us regularly and it was quite nice, too. It was sufficient for us 
 to live on. 
 
 On the sixteenth day, in the morning, there was a change in 
 our affairs. The quartermaster of the post had been in the 
 habit of going through the corridor for the purpose of being 
 with the jailer, to whip a negro who had stolen a tent, trying to 
 get him to tell where it was secreted. For several mornings 
 they had gone around there and I could hear the screams of that 
 poor fellow. Of course I didn t know what it was all about 
 until I met this officer. The name of the officer was Hatch, 
 and as he was going by the cell on the morning of the i6th, I 
 happened to think that I was a Mason, a Knight Templar, but 
 I had been one for so short a time that I really had not thought 
 of it. This time I did, and I gave him a sign which he readily 
 understood. He stopped and wanted to know how long I had 
 been in there. I told him sixteen days, and informed him why 
 I was there, what I had been doing, etc., and he told me that 
 Colonel Wayne who, by the way, was the colonel of the first 
 regular Confederate regiment, and rather a fine officer was 
 the Grand Commander of the Knights Templars for the State 
 of Georgia, "and," he added, "should you make an application 
 to be released, I have no doubt he will send you back to the 
 stockade. If you wish to make such an application, I will go 
 and get some paper, pen, and ink, and I will be very glad indeed 
 to take the application to him myself." I thanked him. He 
 went out, brought paper, pen, and a lighted candle, and I wrote 
 the application. I simply told him that should I remain in his 
 command longer I would not use any more means to escape. 
 
 He took the application out. This was in the morning about 
 10 o clock. In the afternoon Colonel Wayne came down. I 
 heard the door unlocked, and hoped that it was on my account, 
 for I wanted to get away from there. I had countless vermin 
 on me, and could only get sleep by taking off all my clothes, 
 piling them in a corner of the cell, and using my boots for a 
 pillow. They were the only things I had to rest upon except 
 
MY CAPTURE, PRISON LIFE AND ESCAPE I I/ 
 
 the cold flagstones in the cell. Therefore anything would be 
 \velcome. lie came down with the jailer and said to me, " You 
 have sent for me?" I said, "Yes, Colonel, I have. I simply 
 sent an application to you." Well," he said, " I received it 
 and have come here to take you out, but I find that you haven t 
 embodied in that application all that I wish you would." I said, 
 " Very well, Colonel, what else do you want ? " " I want you 
 to tell me now that if you should see any of your comrades 
 attempting to escape during your stay here in Savannah you will 
 take means to let me know." "Well," I said, "Colonel, I am 
 surprised that you should ask such a thing of an old soldier. 
 I am surprised." He laughingly said that he didn t expect that 
 I would consent. " But," he said, "I am going to take you out 
 anyway." 
 
 He then ordered the jailer to unlock the door of the cell, and 
 I stepped out into the corridor. As I did so I said, "Where is 
 Captain Grant ? " The colonel replied, " Over there, I suppose, 
 and he can stay there until he rots for all me." "Well," I said, 
 " Colonel, you know very well when I came to you that night in 
 the storm and told you those officers were ill, the captain came 
 out very quietly and told you he was my second in command, 
 and if there was any punishment to be inflicted he proposed to 
 take his share of it. Now, I shall not go out unless you let 
 Captain Grant out as well. You can take him out, or put me 
 back." He said, "Very well, I will let him go back on one con 
 dition, and that is that you shall be responsible for Captain 
 Grant." I said, " If the captain attempts to escape and I know 
 it, I will catch him if I can, and hold him until you come." 
 
 They went to the captain s cell and took him out. He was a 
 
 man whom I then thought was a very old man he was forty 
 
 and they had to take a stretcher and carry him back to the 
 
 stockade. Of course we had quite an ovation when we got back 
 
 to the stockade that afternoon. 
 
 In a little time after that we were taken over to Charleston 
 and joined our comrades, who had preceded us. On the way 
 
Il8 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 we conceived the idea of capturing the train. Some of the men 
 had been over the road and knew it thoroughly, and we thought 
 with a code of signals that we should be able with some concert 
 of action to capture the train, destroy the bridge over which we 
 were to pass, and make our way to the coast. The plan was 
 given into the hands of an officer who agreed to get into the 
 forward car, if he could, and upon a signal which he was to give 
 before approaching the bridge we were to act. In our car, as in 
 every car, there were four soldiers with their muskets. They 
 generally sat near the door with their muskets crossed over the 
 entrance. We thought we could capture those guards inside 
 very readily, and with four muskets in each party we could 
 spring out, after the train had been brought to a standstill, and 
 overpower the guards who were on the top of the cars. It was 
 a risky undertaking, but still we thought we might possibly 
 accomplish it. We expected that those eight men on the top of 
 the cars would shoot eight of us which eight we did not know 
 exactly, but some one must die if we attempted it. That 
 we fully realized. But the officer, unfortunately or fortu 
 nately for a good many, perhaps never gave the signal, and we 
 went over the bridge all right and into Charleston. 
 
 As we entered, Grant and I were sitting together, looking out 
 o*f the door. We did not see any favorable places to escape, 
 and decided that we would try and behave ourselves after we 
 got into Charleston, and take things as we found them. We 
 arrived in the afternoon of a very hot day, and the men of our 
 party were taken into the jail yard, one of the most filthy places 
 I ever saw. The roll was being called, and my name came 
 near the head of the list. As I was walking along, stepping 
 through a little narrow gate into the yard, the officer there said, 
 " You stand a moment." I stood alongside of him wondering 
 what was going to come next ; then when Grant came along he 
 was also taken out of the line and stood beside me. 
 
 After the entire roll was called we were told to come into 
 the officer s quarters. The officer, who was a Lieutenant 
 
MY CAPTURE, PRISON LIFE AND ESCAPE I 19 
 
 Vcdetto of this same regiment, took a letter from the table, and 
 said, " What were you doing in Savannah ? " I told him, " Noth 
 ing in particular." " You have been doing something. I have 
 a letter in my possession which came from Colonel Wayne, and 
 I would advise you to tell me just what you were doing." I told 
 him we had attempted to escape twice, had been captured, had 
 been taken once and put in a dungeon and kept there sixteen 
 days with very little to eat, with rats in abundance, and cock 
 roaches, weighing anywhere from one to six pounds apiece, 
 falling on us. I said that I didn t think we could be punished 
 any more. He said, " No, I don t think that there is any 
 further punishment that can be inflicted, but here is a letter, 
 and I will read it : 
 
 "Mv DEAR VKDKTTO, You will find in the squad I send you to-day two 
 officers, Captains Benson and Grant, who have caused me a great deal of trouble 
 here in Savannah ; and I would suggest that you offer them a parole. If they 
 will sign it I will vouch for them." 
 
 W T e signed the parole, and were put down into a house on the 
 peninsula between the Cooper and the Ashley Rivers. This 
 house was owned by Dr. Todd, a brother of Mrs. Lincoln. 
 There we had the freedom of the city, that part of it south 
 of King Street. There were only two houses in that part then ; 
 the rest had been burned up. 
 
 Now the reason why we were put down there under fire was 
 simply to protect the city, to stop our people on Morris Island 
 from shelling the town. In retaliation our government built a 
 stockade on Morris Island, and took sixteen hundred prisoners, 
 I believe from Dayton, O., putting them into the stockade. A 
 compromise was made a little while after, and we were taken 
 from Charleston and sent up to Columbia. 
 
 About the second or third day of October we were taken 
 on board the cnrs for Columbia ; and before going to the cars 
 Grant said, " As soon as it gets dark I am going to jump off the 
 car, and I want you to go with me. I will jump off just as 
 soon as we get on to high land, if I can find any." We found 
 
120 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 out that we were going to Columbia, and I told him it would be 
 better to stay on the train until we got nearly there. I much 
 preferred riding to walking, and thought it best to stay where 
 we were and get all the riding we could ; but in the morning 
 Grant was gone. The balance of us were taken across the Con- 
 garee River, and put into a field with a guard, and a dead line 
 established, the sentinels being composed of old men and boys 
 from the college there. The old men could carry a musket on 
 one shoulder, and a cane in the other hand. Of course the 
 boys were strapping fellows ; but it seemed humiliating to be 
 confined there sixteen hundred of us with those boys and 
 very old men, men over sixty-five years of age, and boys less 
 than fifteen. 
 
 After I had been in the camp a little while I saw by the 
 papers that some of the men from my own regiment had been 
 captured, and were in the jail down town. I went to Major Mills, 
 the commander, and got permission to go down to see these men. 
 Several of us went together. He sent a guard of one with us, 
 - one of his officers. We told him we would come back again if 
 he would let us go. So we went down to Columbia. It was 
 quite a warm afternoon. The only thing I had to wear that 
 was decent was an officer s overcoat which I borrowed, and I 
 was nearly roasted. Perhaps that may be why I thought it was 
 so warm. 
 
 We went down, and I found my men. We stayed around 
 town quite a while, and then started across the river again. We 
 came to a place near where the Confederacy had their plant for 
 manufacturing their valuable money. The Confederate officer 
 in charge of us happened to recollect that he had some friends 
 living in that neighborhood, so he wanted us, as there was a big 
 shower coming up, to go in there for protection. We went in, 
 and it was dark before we got away. When we did get away, 
 as this officer had been imbibing quite freely, Captain Roche of 
 the 1 2th New York Heavy Artillery, Lieutenant Swan and 
 myself, were obliged to lead our guard home. We did it safely, 
 
MY CAPTURE, PRISON LIFE AND ESCAPE 121 
 
 and turned him over to the commander. The major said, " Gen 
 tlemen, had I been in your places, I wouldn t have come back." 
 I said, " Yes, but we told you we would come back. We are, 
 however or I for one am going to leave you very soon. I 
 have been out just long enough to think that I can do so." 
 " Well," he said, " let me know a little while before you go and 
 I will try and prevent it." 
 
 We tried to get up a party there to capture the camp. This 
 Congaree River was quite a broad river, with no other crossing 
 save one until the Saluda is reached. The Saluda and French 
 Broad form the Congaree. The river was also quite rapid. 
 We thought that if we could capture the camp, there being five 
 twelve-pounders there and a good supply of ammunition, we 
 would have a safe commanding position. We planned to cap 
 ture the guard when we fell in at the morning roll-call, because 
 when the roll was being called the Confederates were cooking 
 their breakfast, and we were as near as they to the stacked 
 arms. We thought we could capture the guard, and take pos 
 session of the camp, and so we tried to get up a company to do 
 it. Out of the sixteen hundred men we got one hundred and 
 eighty who said they would try. We went to Colonel Thorpe 
 of the 8th Illinois Cavalry and told him what our plan was. He 
 said it was a rash piece of business, and that we ought not to 
 think of attempting it ; that if we did he should inform the 
 authorities and have it stopped right where it was. His advice 
 may have been good, but we thought we knew better. How 
 ever, the plan fell through. 
 
 Our next thought was to run the guard. Colonel Walpole, 
 a captain at that time, Captain Geer, Lieutenant Correll 
 and myself got together one day and decided to run the guard 
 and make our way North. The night that we selected was very 
 dark. It was the first night of November. We were tired of 
 staying out in the field with no covering and very little to eat. 
 We concluded that we could do better by ourselves, and decided 
 to make the attempt anyway. The night that we intended to 
 
122 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 carry it into execution we crawled up as near as we dared to the 
 dead line and waited for the relief to come. The instructions 
 were that if any one attempted to run the guard or if there was 
 anything that caused a sentry to fire, the entire front should 
 concentrate its fire upon that one point. We waited until the 
 sentinel had been released and the guard was in motion. Then 
 all four of us got on to our feet and ran over the line. Of 
 course we made some noise and confusion. The sentry nearest 
 to us fired, but it was so dark that he happened not to hit any 
 of us. Immediately the whole relief faced about and fired. 
 But we got away into the woods and kept on running as long as 
 we could. We ran until it was beginning to show a little day 
 light, when we went into the woods again, found a convenient 
 place and lay down. There we remained all day, not daring to 
 show our heads, because we were near many people. We could 
 hear them talking, could see them all around us, but fortunately 
 they did not see us. We remained there until night and then 
 started out. For seven days we scouted along through the 
 night and in the daytime would sleep under a log or in any con 
 venient hiding-place \ve could find. In rainy and cold weather 
 it was a little uncomfortable. 
 
 On the seventh day, Colonel Walpole, not being accustomed 
 to such usage, became exhausted and wanted us to let him stop 
 and give himself up to the authorities, while w r e went on. We 
 declined to do that. We had been living on nothing but raw 
 corn which we had taken from the fields and carried in our 
 pockets. This we wet when we got such water as we- would 
 find at the side of the road. On the seventh night when we 
 were discussing the situation, we saw a little light in front and 
 determined for the first time to go to a house and see if we 
 couldn t get something to eat. We had usually marched in 
 single file on moonlight nights, forty or fifty yards apart, and 
 when it was dark not a third of that distance. During all the 
 nights while we were on the road there was not a word spoken 
 that could be heard halfway across this room. My business 
 
MY CAPTURE, PRISON LIFE AND ESCAPE 123 
 
 was to go ahead, Geer s was to select a suitable place for camp, 
 Walpole helped bring water for the cook, Correll did the 
 cooking. 
 
 I went to this door and knocked and some one said " Who is 
 there ? " I told him "A friend." They wanted to know who I 
 was. I said " Open the door and let me in, and I will tell you 
 just who I am." After consultation they opened the door and 
 I went in. The one who opened the door was an old colored 
 man and he immediately, upon slipping the bolt, jumped back 
 into bed, and I saw that there was also an old colored woman. 
 The only room in the house was this one, which was occupied 
 by this elderly couple. I walked up to the side of the bed and 
 told them that I wanted something to eat, that I was nearly 
 famished. The old man said " We haven t got anything, Massa, 
 we are very poor." "Haven t you something? Can t you 
 give me a piece of pone or something ? I don t care what it 
 is." " We haven t anything." " Haven t you a piece of bread, 
 apiece of meat, or anything?" "No, we can t give you any 
 thing, we haven t anything." "Then perhaps I will ask you 
 another favor do you suppose you could keep a secret if I 
 told you something ? " He said he didn t know, perhaps he 
 could. I said " I am a Union officer, escaped from prison at 
 Columbia, South Carolina, and we are trying to work our way 
 up into our lines at Knoxville." Well, both of them jumped 
 out of bed then and the woman went to the corner where there 
 was a little box, opened it and took out a wooden tray, got some 
 meal and water and the necessary seasoning. The old man 
 raked open the coals upon the hearth and took out a turkey 
 wing. In a little while a pone was nicely moulded and placed 
 there, and soon I had such a banquet as I never enjoyed before 
 in my life. 
 
 The old man seemed to be very earnest about whatever he 
 attempted to do. He said "Now, you mustn t go any farther 
 to-night. I will take you up into a laurel patch here, where there 
 is a disused still, and to-morrow bring you up something to eat, 
 
124 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 or mother will, and then I will either go with you myself or 
 furnish a younger man to pilot you for a distance." He then 
 dressed himself, took us about two miles into the woods and 
 showed us this old still, and told us we could lie there in perfect 
 safety. There was straw, and three of us lay down while the 
 other one took his place at the entrance to the still and re 
 mained on guard during the daytime. 
 
 In the afternoon, at about two o clock I noticed coming from 
 the other side through a little opening, this colored woman, 
 our hostess of the night before. She came in, taking a cir 
 cuitous way. At every turn she made I saw that she was 
 approaching this point, and as she came to the path I stepped 
 farther back into the woods and let her come in. When I 
 stepped in front of her she said " My, I am so glad to see you. 
 I have brought your dinner." She had brought us a very nice 
 dinner, and seemed to enjoy seeing us eat as much as we 
 enjoyed eating. She told us that her husband would come that 
 night, that by a signal agreed upon he would let us know that 
 it was he and that we were to answer it in the same manner. 
 She also said that they had invited some of their friends down 
 in the country to meet us. 
 
 The old gentleman came along about nine o clock and we 
 started off to join in this reception over in the lot. We found 
 there fifteen or twenty colored people. They had assembled 
 from around the neighborhood, and we were introduced to them, 
 they being told that we were officers of the United States 
 Army. 
 
 We had a very nice time there. They brought some little 
 things for us. Some had socks and others mittens. I was 
 sitting on a stone heap with a buxom colored woman and she 
 wanted to give me something, she didn t know what, but she 
 said the only thing she thought of that would do me any good 
 was a fine-tooth comb. I told her she couldn t have thought 
 of anything that was more useful, and I kept it and used it. 
 
 After the reception was over the old fellow selected a young 
 
MY CAPTURE, PRISON LIFE AND ESCAPE 125 
 
 man, who went with us ten miles that night, and put us in the 
 hands of another colored man. And so it was for quite a long 
 way. Sometimes we were sent to find these people and missed 
 them, and then had to work our way along as best we could. 
 
 There was a man whom we had been told about, Mr. John 
 Logan, whose brother was in the Confederate Congress a 
 man noted for his goodness all over that region. We were as 
 sured that if we could find him we should get assistance. The 
 negroes all knew him, and as this negro who went with us to his 
 house could not be seen with us, he left us to do as best we 
 could. I went to the door and knocked. He had a room in a 
 little post-office, a small building near the road. He owned a 
 beautiful mansion near by, but his wife having died a little while 
 before, he would not stay in it a moment afterwards, but had 
 a room finished off in this little building. When I knocked 
 a young colored man came to the door. I said, " Is Mr. Logan 
 in ?" He said he was, in bed. I walked in. There was a 
 partition between the outside front room and this sleeping room, 
 which did not go more than two-thirds of the way up to the 
 ceiling. I went into the sleeping room, walked up to the bed 
 side, and said "Is this Mr. Logan ? " He said it was. I said 
 " Mr. Logan I am an escaped prisoner, a Union officer from 
 Columbia, and am trying to work my way north to the moun 
 tains, to Knoxville. I have been told that you are a friend of 
 the Yankees, and that if I could find you you would give me 
 some assistance." He sort of turned over in his bed a little and 
 said, " I am not a friend of the Yankees ; I sha n t give you any 
 food or directions, but I will take you and turn you over to the 
 authorities to-morrow morning." At the same time he threw 
 the clothes off and sprang on the floor. When he got out of 
 bed I found that he was a small man, and had a crooked leg 
 and walked on his toes. Now, I never saw a man in my life I 
 was afraid of who walked on his toes. There was a rifle in the 
 corner and I stepped over and seized it. I said, " I came in 
 here, Mr. Logan, expecting to find some one who would assist me. 
 
126 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 I am very much disappointed, I certainly don t want to injure 
 you. I don t want any trouble with you. I simply tell you to 
 go back to bed, because if you don t I shall be inclined to send 
 your soul to God quicker than you ever received it." He went 
 back to bed that instant, and didn t have the politeness to say 
 "Good-night." 
 
 I stood there for a moment, deliberating what was best to do, 
 and decided that I would go out into the darkness, notify my 
 people that I had not met with success, and that we would then 
 go on and try to find somebody else. As soon as I got out of 
 the room Logan called to the colored man and said, " You go out 
 and keep your eye on the Yankee, and in the morning I will get 
 a force out and catch him." I started out and went back again 
 on the same road. Down this road on one side were some very 
 large chestnut trees. This little colored fellow was following 
 me. I got him clown as far as I thought was necessary, and 
 then I stepped behind a tree and let him come up. He 
 came crawling along, and although it was dark I located him 
 all right and sprang on him. I seized him and said " Now, if 
 you make one particle of noise I will kill you. I have killed 
 five niggers to-day, and if you don t look out you will be the 
 sixth. Now I want you to be quiet." As soon as he could 
 he said, "Well, Massa, I know you are a Yankee, and of 
 course we want to help you." He was a very bright young 
 fellow, and he said, " Now I will go back and tell Massa I can t 
 find you ; then he will tell me to go out and stay until I can 
 find you, then I will go and get you something to eat, and then 
 I will go with you a little way, and tell you how to get along." 
 I followed him up to the house again and he told his master 
 that he could not find me, and the master told him to go out and 
 stay until he did find me. Then he went out, went to a little 
 cabin and got something for us to eat. Then that colored man 
 went with us eight miles that night, as far as he could go and 
 get back in season for his day s task. 
 
 And so we went on. We had a great deal of adventure, in 
 
MY CAPTURE, PRISON LIFE AND ESCAPE I2/ 
 
 one way and another, with the home guard. The home guard 
 consisted of old men of sixty to sixty-five years, which was the 
 limit, and the younger boys, formed into what was known as a 
 private guard. Their duties were to patrol all roads for the 
 purpose of catching runaway negroes or escaped prisoners like 
 ourselves. We were continually coming across these people, 
 but always managed in some way to avoid them. 
 
 One night as we were going along we made up our minds 
 that we wanted some green goose, and as we were armed with 
 hickory sticks Correll thought we could kill a goose without 
 making any noise, which w r as something that I never knew to 
 be done. He walked up to a flock of geese and struck into 
 them. Unfortunately there was a man standing in front of his 
 house, who said, " What are you doing ? What is the matter 
 there ? Get out ! " Of course we knew that something would 
 be the matter unless we got out of the way, so we jumped over 
 the fence, flanked the house, and came around on the other 
 side. We started off and had gone perhaps a mile or two when 
 I heard a hound behind us, and knew what it all meant. \Ve 
 knew we were nearing the Broad River, but did not know 
 exactly where it was, although we could tell by the atmosphere 
 that it was not far off. We climbed over a fence, ran across a 
 field, and came upon the river. A fence extended to the 
 water s edge, and as we reached the stream we began taking the 
 rails and putting them into the water, holding them to the shore 
 at one end by a stone. On them we piled crosswise all the 
 rails we could get. When the dogs came very close to us we 
 sprang on to the rails, pushed out into the stream and began 
 paddling for the other shore. The dogs came to the place where 
 we had embarked. We could hear them, and could even hear 
 the men with them talking, but they did not see us. We 
 reached the other side safely, but much chilled, and frolicked 
 around until our blood was in good circulation. 
 
 One Sunday night we were going along very quietly, with 
 the woods on one side and fields on the other, when we heard 
 
128 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 people in front of us. They were singing some old familiar 
 gospel hymn. It struck me very forcibly. That day we had 
 had nothing to eat, and were nearly famished. I said to my 
 companions, " If you will stop right here near enough to sup 
 port me I don t know just what I am going to contend with 
 I will go along and see what is going on. Probably there is 
 a negro there, and if there is I will take him out." So I went 
 along a little way and hid myself behind a small hummock. 
 The very first person that appeared was a small negro. I rose 
 up, caught him in my arms, and threw him fiat on the ground. 
 The whole congregation, consisting of fifteen or twenty persons, 
 passed within fifteen feet of our position, but it was very dark 
 and they could not see us, and that negro never uttered a 
 sound. After they were out of hearing I said to him, " Why 
 didn t you holler ? " He said, " Oh, golly, Massa, I was so 
 scared I couldn t holler." I then told him who we were. He 
 took us to the top of the hill to a white woman there whose 
 husband was in the Union Army. She gave us everything she 
 had in the house to eat. When we went away we wished to 
 give her some souvenir. Geer gave her a silver pencil, and 
 Walpole and Correll each cut a button off his coat. All that I 
 had was a toothbrush which I paid fifteen or sixteen dollars for 
 in Charleston, and I gave her that. 
 
 We came to the French Broad River, through that historical 
 old place, the Cow-pens. One day we had an adventure with 
 another man whom we met, named Goforth. We had been all 
 day on a hill looking at him and his young men who were haul 
 ing corn fodder from the fields and piling it up in the barn. 
 We were between two roads, and did not dare to get up from 
 the logs where we were for fear of being seen. When it came 
 night, just about dusk, we came down the hill, leaving Walpole 
 and Correll on the hill. We went to the house, climbed over 
 a little fence, and went alongside of this man and said, " Good- 
 evening." He seemed to be very courteous, and Geer said 
 " Can you tell me which road we would take to go to Morgan- 
 
MY CAPTURE, PRISON LIFE AND ESCAPE 129 
 
 ton ? " " This one over here," he replied. " How far is it to Mor- 
 ganton ? " " Eight miles." " Are there any hotels between here 
 and Morganton ? " "One they call a hotel three or four miles 
 down the road. It is not very good, but they put people up." 
 Then he said, " Who might you be ? " Geer said, " We might 
 be a great many people, but there are only two of us. We are 
 special officers of the government." He wanted our papers, as 
 it was the custom there with any person out in a strange part of 
 the country to have a pass. Geer said, " We have papers, but 
 we are not under any obligation to show them, as we are special 
 officers, as I have told you, of the government. I certainly 
 decline, and I presume my friend will decline to let you see 
 them." I declined, telling him he couldn t see mine anyway. 
 We kept him there until it was so dark that he couldn t see 
 which way we were going. When we thought it was dark 
 enough we bid him good-night and started along the road to 
 Morganton. We wanted to go to Marion, in an entirely oppo 
 site direction. We went over the hill. As soon as he was fairly 
 out of sight we jumped into the woods and lay down. In a 
 short time those men saddled their mules, mounted, aroused 
 their neighbors, and very soon six men went down the road as 
 fast as they could go in pursuit of us. After they had gone we 
 left our hiding-place, went around on the hill, found our com 
 panions, and hastened out of the district as fast as we could. 
 
 We came a little further up the country to a place called 
 Spruce Pine. We learned that there was a man there named 
 Isaac English who was recruiting for Kirk s Cavalry, and we 
 were advised to go there, as he would assist us. We found 
 Isaac English and learned that it was true, that he was a Union 
 man a loyal, true, staunch Union man. He told us that in 
 the mountains above, where it was very high up, there was a 
 force of about a thousand Confederate deserters, and about half 
 that number of refugees \vho had been obliged to leave their 
 homes and seek safety in the mountains. They were cared for 
 by the people in the valleys below. They had there a loyal 
 
130 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 league, called the " Red and White String," and these people 
 wanted us to go up and be initiated into the order. We told them 
 we would go. We went up and found, as Mr. English had said, 
 a thousand Confederate deserters, and half as many refugees, 
 with their camp-fires burning, arms stacked, and having a good 
 time. We were introduced to the leader, the master of cere 
 monies, and after the social part of it was over we were told to 
 kneel in a circle. They brought out a Bible and a wooden 
 square, told us to place our right hands upon the square, and, 
 with our left hand extended up to heaven, repeat alter the 
 leader a solemn oath which we did. We were given the counter 
 sign and the signal of distress, and then decorated with the 
 emblem of the order, which was a red and white twisted string 
 to be tied in the button-hole or elsewhere. He also told us that 
 in Carter County we would find a great many loyal friends. 
 Now Carter County in East Tennessee was a county distinctly 
 loyal. It is surrounded by Yancy, Mitchell, Elizabeth, Jackson, 
 and Johnson Counties, and nearly every person living in Carter 
 County at the time we were there, was as loyal as ourselves. 
 Those who had been disloyal in Carter County were driven from 
 their homes and sought refuge in other neighboring counties, 
 and all persons who had loyal sentiments were driven from their 
 homes in other counties into Carter County. The result was 
 that Carter County alone was all loyal, while all around them 
 were disloyal. 
 
 A great many of these loyalists never stayed in their houses 
 at night. They were on the alert, bushwhacking and raiding, 
 and I learned in the little time I was there what it cost to be 
 loyal. After we had been in this county a day or two we 
 learned that Breckinridge had reinforced Vaughn, and driven 
 General Gillam out of Bull s Gap, and all the passes by which 
 we could get out had been stopped ; consequently we were 
 obliged to remain there until such time as circumstances 
 would permit of our getting away. 
 
 At that time they were forming a party to go to Johnson 
 
MY CAPTURE, PRISON LIFE AND ESCAPE 131 
 
 County on a raid, and we, not liking to remain behind, decided 
 that we would join them, and go along for a little frolic. There 
 were ninety-three men, indifferently armed, with but little 
 ammunition. A few had rifles, one a flint-lock, another a 
 musket ; one or two had carbines, some had revolvers ; some 
 had ten rounds of cartridges, while others had but three. We 
 started on the raid and went across the mountain to what is 
 known as the Elk River, and tried to make our way up to 
 Johnsonville, which is the shire town of Johnson County. Our 
 scouts came in and reported such a force there that it would not 
 be advisable to make an attack, as we had not ammunition 
 enough or strength enough to cope with them. Then we 
 decided to go over to Roan Mountain and finish up our little 
 affair in that direction. We went over the mountain and came 
 down into the valley, and the first man we saw was walking 
 across the road. I, being a cavalry officer, was in advance with 
 five men. I rode over to this man and told him I wanted him 
 to turn over to us all he had in the way of oxen, horses and 
 other things that we stood in need of. He wanted to know who 
 we were, and I told him we were officers of the Union army. 
 Well, that didn t seem to astonish him very much ; however, we 
 took everything he had in our line. 
 
 I there learned what a raid really meant. I had been on 
 raids before but I never saw anything like this ; cutlery, bed 
 ding, household utensils, everything movable was taken out 
 and tied in a bag, and in that way, taking oxen, sheep, cows, 
 mules, and everything else, we had quite a miscellaneous 
 stock. 
 
 We moved on, and for a long time did not see a man, but we 
 captured everything that we could find, coming at last to a place 
 called Taylor s Gut. It was a place through the mountains 
 where the walls rise abruptly three or four hundred feet. I was 
 riding along at the head of the column when an old lady came 
 out and said, " Who is in command of this army?" I said, 
 "Lieutenant Blackwell," who was in the rear. "Well," she 
 
132 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 said, "you are going to be murdered, every one of you." 
 " Why do you think so ? " " Because there is a powerful heap 
 of men up at yonder knob." " How many do you think there 
 are?" "Oh, a right smart heap a dozen of them." Well, I 
 told her that if there weren t more than a dozen we shouldn t all 
 get murdered. When the lieutenant came up the old lady re 
 peated to him substantially what she had said to me. He called 
 for volunteers to go into the bushes and shake them up, and in a 
 minute they all wanted to go. There were not men enough left 
 to drive the flock along. The volunteers went into the woods and 
 located these men very quickly. Then after a little fusillade we 
 drove through the Gut. 
 
 When we came out we reached a place called Taylor s Open 
 ing. We were riding along, as we thought, comparatively safe. 
 I heard a screeching behind which really seemed as though 
 there were ten thousand men in our rear. In the house of a 
 Mr. Jake Wagner was a young lady who had just returned from 
 boarding-school. She was screaming to prevent the men from 
 going into the house, and at last persuaded them to go away. 
 They left, and then I stole a beautiful Arabian horse. I liked 
 the horse so well that I thought I would ride him off. I left 
 word that I would send him back as soon as I had no further 
 use for him. 
 
 In the meantime the small force we had left behind was 
 coming after us. I turned around and saw a man coming over 
 the hill riding on a white horse, his hair flying and his coat open 
 to the shoulders, and six or eight more coming after him. I 
 saw our men running, some one way and some another, and 
 concluded that there was going to be a stampede, but I saw in 
 a moment that they were simply taking to cover. One got 
 behind an apple tree not over six inches in diameter, another 
 behind a little stone pile, another took the corner of a fence. 
 Lieutenant Blackwell directed them not to fire until he gave the 
 order. As soon as the enemy were near enough he ordered our 
 men to fire, and they did so, shooting four of them dead. The 
 
MY CAPTURE, PRISON LIFE AND ESCAPE 133 
 
 man who was riding this white horse, when he fell from the 
 horse, did not disengage his right foot from the stirrup and was 
 dragged along on the ground for some distance. We then 
 charged them, capturing the other four and took them along. 
 That day we crossed the Elk River again and bivouacked for the 
 night. The prisoners were put under guard, and I supposed 
 something would be done with them, I didn t know what. But 
 we had our camp fires built and passed the night, which was 
 very cold, as comfortably as we could. In the morning, as I 
 was not sleeping very soundly, I thought I would go down and 
 see about those prisoners. I walked down to where they had 
 been, but they were not there. I went to Lieutenant Blackwell 
 and said "Lieutenant, those prisoners have gone." He said 
 " Oh yes." " Did you know it?" " Oh yes, I supposed they 
 would go." " Where have they gone to? What has become 
 of them?" "Oh, don t inquire. They won t trouble you any 
 more." 
 
 After we had eaten our breakfast we started up the moun 
 tain. There we found a courier who came out from Carter 
 County, who said that the Mitchell County people were there 
 raiding ; sure enough, while we were away nearly two hundred 
 men raided Carter County. When we returned there it looked 
 desolate enough. What we took back with us from Johnson 
 County was distributed to those people who had lost by the 
 Mitchell County people. 
 
 About this time the blockade was raised and we decided that 
 we would move on. We started down the valley and came to a 
 place in Bull River Cove. We were then without food for some 
 little time, as we were getting out of the friendly district and 
 among our enemies again. One day looking into the wood I 
 saw a little red house, and while watching it a young lady came 
 to the back door and shook the crumbs from a tablecloth. That 
 made us feel so ravenously hungry that we decided, contrary to 
 our custom, to go to the house and see if we could get some 
 thing to eat. I went around to the back door and the young 
 
134 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 lady came to the door and invited me in. When I got into the 
 house I didn t know just what to say. I looked at her and she 
 at me, and I said to her " Have you seen any of our people go 
 by this morning ? " She said " What people ? " I said " Rebels, 
 of course." She said " You are no rebel. If you had been you 
 would not have said < rebels but Confederates. " I saw that 
 she had me. So I said " I am not a rebel, nor a Confederate, 
 but a Yankee. I came from Maine away up North. I came 
 from Portland." "Why," she said, "I have been in Portland, 
 Maine, myself. We have been to Canada and came through 
 Portland, stopping at the United States Hotel," and she told 
 me that her name was Lizzie M , that her father s name was 
 William M , and she said " You mustn t go further this 
 way. Morgan s raiders have just gone along this morning. They 
 are a desperate set of men and should they see you they will cer 
 tainly kill you." Well, having gone so far I did not wish to be 
 killed just then, so I followed her advice. She called a colored 
 boy who took us to another road, going in another direction, but 
 still having as the objective point Knoxville. 
 
 We had a great many minor adventures of one kind and an 
 other, until finally we reached the Holston River. As we 
 approached Knoxville we began to behave half decently. Pre 
 viously, when we came to ferries with ropes, we had cut 
 them after going across, or if there were boats, we had set them 
 adrift, not asking permission of the ferryman to use the ferry. 
 But this time we thought, as we were near Knoxville, that we 
 would be friendly and awaken the man and get him to set us 
 across. I went to the house and knocked, and some one asked 
 the question from within, " Who are you, and what do you 
 want ? " I said that we wanted to be set across the river, that 
 we were officers of the Confederate Army, travelling on special 
 duty, and that we wanted to get across the river. He said, " I 
 shall not set you across until you tell me who you are." So I 
 said " Come down and I will tell you. So he came down with 
 nothing but his shirt and trousers on, and as soon as he 
 
MY CAPTURE, PRISON LIFE AND ESCAPE 135 
 
 opened the door I took him. All I wanted was the key, 
 and fortunately I had both the man and key in my posses 
 sion. I took him, or rather dragged him, down to where the 
 boat was moored, and told him if he refused to set us across, 
 that possibly he would feel sorry for it, or something to 
 that effect, and he concluded that he would do so. He said, 
 " Get into the boat and I will set you across or drown you." I 
 said, " Go ahead, we will take chances." I really thought the 
 old fellow tried to drown us, but he did not quite succeed. At 
 last we got to the other side of the river, and he cursed us and 
 left us there. 
 
 We started for Knoxville. We went up on high land so that 
 we could see the country around Knoxville, which was very 
 broken. After going up one range of hills we saw what we sup 
 posed were picket fires in front of us. We had been told that 
 we should see them. Then we went down into the valley and 
 up on the next hill, and saw the fires in front of us, but nearer. 
 The third time, going up the last hill, we had gotten well up on 
 the height but could not see any fires in front of us. Walpole 
 said, " Where in the name of Heaven are they ? I can t see 
 them." We happened to look around, and there we were inside 
 of our own lines, having come within the lines without any 
 challenge, and at last we stood under the protection of our dear 
 flag. 
 
 Walpole said " Hello ! " and the men all sprang on their feet. 
 It had been a cold night and I didn t blame them for sitting 
 around the fires. The challenge came, " Halt ! Who comes 
 there ? " Walpole said, " Friends, without the countersign." 
 "Advance one." Walpole went up, and as soon as he got 
 within speaking distance an officer said, " Are you aware that 
 you are going out into the enemy s country ? " Walpole said, 
 " I am only aware that we are on our way to Knoxville, and have 
 just arrived from the enemy s country, and come through your 
 lines." Of course the officer in charge was very much 
 chagrined, and said that he wished we would not say anything 
 
136 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 to General Carter, and if we wouldn t say anything that he would 
 send with us a guide into town, four miles. He furnished us with 
 horses and a man to take care of us. We entered the town and 
 were taken to General Carter, Adjutant-General, who gave us a 
 pass into the hospital. We went there, and tried to make our 
 selves as presentable as we could, considering the vermin on us. 
 We then made requisition for and were given clean clothes, and 
 got into bed for the first time in months, and slept soundly. I 
 never enjoyed rest more. 
 
 As soon as transportation could be obtained we started for 
 Washington, and after arrival there Colonel Baker took me be 
 fore President Lincoln and Mr. Stanton, and I told them sub 
 stantially what I am telling here. Of course there were some 
 things then that I remembered more vividly. Mr. Lincoln told 
 me, after I had been there about twenty-five minutes, " I want 
 to hear more about this, and I wish you would come to-morrow 
 about the time you did this morning." I promised to do so. I 
 spoke of the many deserters I had seen in the mountains, and of 
 the Loyal League. I told him of the extreme loyalty of those 
 people down in Carter County which pleased him very much. 
 
 I obtained leave of absence for three months, and after a time 
 went back to Petersburg. I was married before going back, and 
 I can t help telling this, because it is a big joke on me. I told 
 my young wife that if any letters should come to Portland, she 
 could open them, only sending such to me as were necessary for 
 me to see ; or that she might destroy the letters if she wished. 
 
 When we were in Petersburg we did not have letters for some 
 little time. But they came at last and I found one from my 
 wife. Enclosed in this letter was a red rose pressed carefully, 
 and another letter. My wife said, " I send you a letter to-day 
 from one who says her name is Lizzie M - . I can hardly 
 understand how you could become so well acquainted with any 
 one in your travels in the mountains as to have her write to you 
 such a letter as I now enclose." 
 
 The letter enclosed was something of this nature : 
 
MY CAPTURE, PRISON LIFE AND ESCAPE 137 
 
 " LIMESTONE COVE, CARTER Co., TENN. 
 VERY DKAR FRIEND : 
 
 Many are the thoughts I have of you since you passed 
 
 those few but pleasant moments in our rustic home in the mountains of East 
 Tennessee. I hope ere long that the clouds of war shall have rolled away, and that 
 peace shall be restored to us; but above all things I hope the time will speedily 
 come when you will return to me to fulfil the pledges made so long ago." 
 
 I want to tell one word about my dear old friend Grant. 
 Fifteen years after the war, I was one morning at the Ebbett 
 House, Washington, talking with Whitney, who had been a 
 comrade with us, and was then chief of the bureau of statistics, 
 and he said to me, " Have you seen Grant?" I said, "What 
 Grant do you mean?" "That Grant who was in the dungeon 
 with you." " No, where is he ? " "Why, he lives here." " Does 
 he live here ? Why I have been hunting for him for more than 
 ten or fifteen years." He said, "He lives at 228 A Street, 
 southeast. Take one of these bob cars here, and go along until 
 you come to A Street, then go along a single block and you will 
 find him there." I went down. It was Sunday morning. I took 
 my card from my pocket, thinking I would give it to the servant 
 when he came to the door, but changed my mind. I rang the 
 bell and when the servant came I said, " Does Colonel Grant live 
 here ? " "Yes, sir. Will you come in ? " I walked into the house 
 and sat down. There was a portrait of the captain hanging there 
 that looked to me just as he did at the time I left him, and of 
 course I knew I was at the right place. In a little time the 
 door opened at my rear. I turned around and saw him coming, 
 and walked a few steps to meet him. I said, "Is this Colonel 
 Grant ? " He said, " Yes, sir." I said, " Colonel, I want you to 
 pardon me for calling on you this Sunday morning. I want to 
 assure you that I am not a book agent, but am a committee 
 from the Army and Navy Gazette, which is compiling a work on 
 personal reminiscences of the war. I have been told that you had 
 quite an experience, and I want you to contribute to this work. 
 It will be bound in calf, and will be fifteen dollars a volume. 
 Every one who contributes must send his photograph so that it 
 
138 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 may be inserted." The colonel said, "Well, I did have experi 
 ence in the war, quite a good deal." I said, "Of course you 
 understand that this is to be a personal experience. It is not 
 to relate anything concerning a battle, bivouac, or march, but 
 something that happened to yourself." He said, "Well, I was 
 in eight different rebel prisons. I escaped once, travelled three 
 hundred miles, and was captured and taken back. At another 
 time we attempted to make an escape while we were at Savan 
 nah, and I was captured there and put in a dungeon, and there 
 I should have remained if it hadn t been for a comrade who 
 happened to be a Mason. By reason of that I was released, and 
 if it hadn t been for that I should not be here this morning 
 probably. Unfortunately I do not know his initials. His name 
 was Benson, and he belonged to a New York regiment. Only 
 a little while ago my son, seeing a new name that of Benson 
 - in Ontario County, New York State, wrote to see if that 
 person was with his father in 1864. The reply was that the 
 man referred to was only twenty-five years old, and he said, It 
 is therefore quite impossible for me to have been with your 
 father in 1864. 
 
 I said to him, " I am very sorry indeed, but have only a 
 little time, and I wish you would come down and dine with me 
 at the Ebbett to-morrow, when I will tell you more fully what 
 my plans are." He said, " I cannot, because I have an engage 
 ment in Baltimore, and shall not be home in season, but if you 
 will give me your address I will communicate with you." 
 
 I then took my card from my pocket, and handed it to him. 
 He took it, fixed his glasses, and looked at it, and said, "You 
 are not Benson ? You are not my Benson ? " I said, " My 
 name is Benson, sir, and I was in prison with Captain Grant of 
 the i Qth Wisconsin in Savannah." He threw the glasses and 
 card on the floor, and sprang on my neck, and cried like a child. 
 Then he said, " Sit down. You are just the same as you used 
 to be. The idea of your coming in here to sell me that damned 
 old book ! " 
 
THE OLD ARMY IN KANSAS 
 
THE OLD ARMY IN KANSAS 
 
 BY 
 
 LIEUTENANT COLONEL SAMUEL ADAMS DRAKE, U. S. V. 
 
 IN the early spring of the year 1858 circumstances took me 
 to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. That post and its near neigh, 
 bor, Leavenworth City, were just then assuming new impor 
 tance on account of the forces concentrating there for the 
 purpose of chastising Brigham Young and his terrible Danites, 
 who secure in their mountain fastnesses, had long set the 
 authorities of these United States at defiance. This was the 
 so-called "Mormon War," which began with a tragedy and 
 ended with a farce, as the administration relented as soon as 
 Brigham gave in before the display of an overwhelming force 
 marching to confront him. 
 
 After four years of constant and heated political agitation 
 Kansas was at last cooling off. It was decreed that this remote 
 corner of the Union should be the first battle-ground between 
 North and South. The struggle was long and bitter. You 
 know how it ended. Victory declared for the North, and the 
 South here met her first defeat. As Abraham Lincoln said, in 
 his memorable Cooper Institute speech, " it has been one of the 
 relentless maxims of history that might makes right, but I say 
 unto you that right makes might," and it was so settled in 
 Kansas. 
 
 At the time I am speaking of there were no railroads 
 running west of Jefferson City, the state capital of Missouri. 
 It is instructive to let one s mind dwell a moment on that fact. 
 Another road was being built across the northern counties of 
 
 141 
 
142 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 the state from Hannibal to St. Joseph, but was not yet com 
 pleted. The Missouri River was still the great thoroughfare 
 for travellers going to Kansas, Nebraska or across the great 
 plains ; and great it was in every sense of the word, for in a 
 journey of seven hundred miles we were seldom out of sight 
 of the smoke of some steamboat breasting the turbid current of 
 the "big Muddy." When I first saw it in the pleasant month 
 of May, Kansas looked like some stray corner of Paradise, set 
 apart by a gracious Providence as the abode of peace and plenty 
 rather than as the arena for the strifes and rivalries of warring 
 factions. Indeed, it was a country worth fighting for, so the 
 cause were just, as all who have ever visited it will testify ; and 
 I could not help feeling a little glow of, I trust, pardonable pride, 
 that my people and the principles they stood for, had wrested 
 so fair a heritage from the curse of slavery. My first glimpse 
 of Fort Leavenworth is a charming memory. There was a 
 cluster of white sunlit buildings, perched upon the brow of a 
 high bluff overlooking the turbid Missouri, like some feudal 
 castle of the Rhine without its gloom or terrors. 
 
 General Percifer F. Smith, who was to command the Utah 
 expedition, had just died and was succeeded by Harney, the old 
 Indian fighter. I was frequently at the General s quarters 
 where Alfred Pleasanton, his A. A. G., did the honors most 
 acceptably. Pleasanton was then a natty looking young fellow 
 in a dragoon s jacket. Many things happened between that 
 time and October, 1864, when by one of those queer freaks 
 of fortune the credulous are inclined to call special providences, 
 Pleasanton turned up in Kansas again just in the nick of time 
 to save the state from Price s last and greatest effort of the 
 war in that section. 
 
 Harney himself was a man of imposing physique, over six feet 
 in height, perfectly well made, and though getting along in years, 
 as vigorous and erect as an oak. It was my fancy to picture him 
 as a soldier of the Suwarrow or Bliicher type, to whom the 
 prospect of an active campaign was like the sound of the trum- 
 
THE OLD ARMY IN KANSAS 143 
 
 pet to an old warhorse, after the dull routine of camp and garri 
 son. For those questions requiring delicate handling, constantly 
 arising then and there between the civil and military authorities, 
 no man could have been worse fitted ; and for the whole race 
 of politicians he had the professional soldier s undisguised con 
 tempt. War was his trade : peace his aversion. 
 
 There were giants in those days. What has become of the 
 men of commanding presence for which the old army was so 
 noted and so notable the Scotts, Harneys, Sumners, Morrisons, 
 Mays and many others I could name ? Can it be true, as the 
 wise men tell us, that the race is steadily degenerating, and 
 that it is only a question of some thousands of years when we 
 shall again be going about on all fours, like our ancestors, 
 according to the late Mr. Darwin, or residing in dry-goods boxes 
 like the late Mr. Tom Thumb ? Perish the thought ! 
 
 I saw these troops file off in front of the general s quarters. 
 Among the officers assembled there to see them march was 
 Colonel Joe Johnston-, then Deputy Quartermaster General, and 
 a very soldierly looking man indeed ; with beard then a little 
 grizzled but looking to be in his prime. I knew that Johnston s 
 abilities were held in high esteem in the old army, an estimate 
 fo which he subsequently proved his title only too well. There 
 were also present Colonel Tompkins, nephew of the Vice-Presi- 
 dent of the same name, then in charge of the Commissary 
 Department, a little, short, red-faced man with a very quick 
 temper ; Major David Hunter, and Captain Van Vliet, the Depot 
 Quartermaster. One of the most ludicrous affairs it was ever 
 my fortune to witness was a court of inquiry ordered to investi 
 gate Van Vliet s conduct in refusing to accept certain mules 
 brought in by a Missouri contractor, notwithstanding this con 
 tractor exhibited an order from Floyd, then Secretary of War, 
 directing that the animals should be passed in a lump. 
 
 This precious contractor was no other than Martin Green, 
 who, when the war came on, became the most active and notori 
 ous of all the guerillas in that section, and that is only giving 
 
144 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 him his due. Behind Martin, was his brother, James S. Green, 
 a United States Senator and the right hand man of Mr. 
 Buchanan in carrying his Kansas policy through that august 
 body. Martin Green drove his mules to Leavenworth, they 
 were duly inspected, some accepted, others rejected, according 
 as they were found fit or unfit for service. Green was furious, 
 but Van Vliet was firm. The Secretary of War was appealed 
 to, and it was then that he gave the order which no officer con 
 sistently with honor could obey. Hence the court of inquiry. 
 Major Thomas W. Sherman, an artillery officer, who later lost a 
 leg at Port Hudson, was then in command of the post. He was 
 a veteran of the Mexican War, and as punctilious in upholding 
 his rights as could well be. Sherman was named a member of 
 the court, and, believing himself entitled to sit as its president, 
 resolved to do so. It so fell out, however, that Floyd had sent 
 Major Benny Roberts to Leavenworth for that very purpose, 
 probably at the suggestion of Senator Green, and for reasons 
 entirely satisfactory to themselves. Roberts ranked Sherman 
 only by brevet. When the court met, Sherman attempted to 
 open it, but was at once interrupted by Roberts, who declared 
 himself the only person authorized to act as president, at the 
 same time producing his order. " Sit down, sir ! " commanded 
 Sherman. Roberts then attempted to read his order. " Con 
 sider yourself in arrest ! " roared Sherman. " Sir, I place you 
 in arrest," Roberts angrily retorted. By this time the members 
 of the court, witnesses and lookers on were all on their feet, 
 talking and gesticulating all at once, and the sitting broke up in 
 confusion. The question of precedence was finally settled by 
 reference to some of the older officers, who poured oil on the 
 troubled waters, and the inquiry proceeded with Sherman in 
 the chair. For reasons best known in Washington, the court 
 was dissolved before a finding was reached. Possibly the pro 
 ceedings may be found in some pigeon-hole of the War Depart 
 ment, possibly not. 
 
 As I remember, Senator Green acted as counsel for his 
 
THE OLD ARMY IN KANSAS 145 
 
 brother Martin before the court. His frequent allusions to 
 " my ill-used brother" were exceedingly pathetic, though not 
 more calculated to excite the sympathy of the court, than the 
 positively villanous countenance of his near relative, when 
 giving his testimony about " them thar mules." 
 
 In dismissing the subject I will mention that the same 
 Martin Green became a Confederate brigadier and was killed at 
 Vicksburg. Some time during the war I met the ex-Senator at 
 Quincy, 111. It was impossible not to feel shocked at the evi 
 dences of a strong intellect almost wholly given way under 
 habits of dissipation. 
 
 While strolling through the streets of Leavenworth one day, 
 my eye fell upon a sign-board nailed up at the entrance to a 
 passage-way with an inscription like this : 
 
 SHERMAN, EWING A- McCOOK, 
 ATTORNEYS AT LA\V. 
 
 They will tell you out there that Sherman, whose name 
 appeared as the senior partner, was not considered a bright and 
 shining light of the profession. One of the stock anecdotes of 
 the Kansas bar relates that Sherman lost his first case in a 
 justice s court by resting his plea upon a statute that had been 
 a long time repealed. Report says that Sherman did not bear 
 this defeat with entire equanimity. However, his interpreta 
 tions of martial law, particularly to the Georgia rebels, were 
 considered remarkably sound. Sherman and Ewing, be it said, 
 were doubly brothers-in-law, once by marriage and once by legal 
 copartnership. 
 
 Tom Ewing, as he was familiarly called, was one of the 
 acknowledged leaders of the Free State party in Kansas, which 
 rewarded him with the highest office on the bench of the new 
 state. He resigned to take command of a regiment raised and 
 officered outside of the executive authority of the state by 
 Senator Lane. Similar action, I believe, was taken here in 
 
146 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 Massachusetts. It certainly did not tend to harmony in Kansas. 
 Ewing was presently promoted to brigadier. Quantrell s mur 
 derous raid was made while Ewing commanded on the Missouri 
 border, which had so long been the dark and bloody ground of 
 Kansas history, serving at need either as a hiding place or as a 
 rallying point for the Confederate banditti. E wing s famous 
 order No. 1 1, devastating this section, was one of those vigorous 
 war measures justifiable by stern necessity alone. It was ruth 
 lessly carried out. The act aroused the greatest indignation at 
 the South as was to be expected, and was not forgotten even 
 when the war was over, having recoiled upon its author s head 
 in a somewhat unlooked for manner. For instance, when 
 Ewing, who had been the Republican chief justice of Kansas, 
 turned Democrat after the war, and was expecting the nomina 
 tion for Vice-President on the democratic ticket, a southern 
 delegate, Wade Hampton, I think, got up and read Ewing s 
 Order No. 1 1 to the Convention. The effect upon a body 
 largely composed of ex-Confederates may well be imagined. 
 
 History shows us some strange paradoxes. The regular 
 army was freely used to make Kansas a slave state. This was 
 when the South ruled. Even northern officers like Sumner, 
 Sedgwick, and Sackett could obey the order to disperse a Free 
 State legislature, and to make and hold as prisoners those men 
 whom the people had chosen to lead them out of the wilderness 
 of political anarchy. This generation has not seen what we 
 saw in Kansas, men going up to cast their votes through files 
 of United States regiments with fixed bayonets. One did not 
 hear of northern officers resignations because " my state " was 
 being coerced by the Federal government. These officers acted 
 from a stern sense of duty ; and I do not hesitate also to add 
 from a high sense of honor, even when duty and inclination 
 often pulled in different directions. But when it came to 
 enforcing the national authority in states in actual rebellion, 
 southern states, we have seen what happened. In which school 
 of chivalry will we choose to bring up our children ? 
 
THE OLD ARMY IN KANSAS 147 
 
 Daniel McCook, junior member of the celebrated law-firm, 
 and one of the so-called fighting McCooks, had that strong 
 predilection for a military life which seemed to run in the 
 family. He obtained a captaincy in the First Kansas, a regiment 
 that fought under the lamented Lyon at Wilson s Creek with 
 signal bravery, losing a third of the whole command in killed 
 and wounded. McCook, however, was not in this battle, he 
 having fallen very ill before his regiment marched. At this 
 time a strange presentiment of death had taken strong hold of 
 his mind. Indeed, such was the power of this hallucination 
 that the sick man predicted the very day and hour of his 
 decease. He lived, however, to attain the rank of brigadier 
 and to fall gloriously at Kenesaw Mountain while under the 
 command of his old law partner, Sherman. Upon joining the 
 army McCook dramatically said to a friend that he would either 
 win a colonel s epaulettes or a soldier s grave. Poor, fellow ! he 
 won both. 
 
 As already intimated, when the rebellion broke out, the 
 western posts exhibited a most sickening, a most humiliating 
 lack of fidelity to the flag. The regular troops being all ordered 
 in, most of the Southern officers took French leave as soon as 
 they reached the Missouri River, not even waiting for their 
 resignations to pass through the regular channels or taking the 
 trouble to report to the commanding officers of the posts. One, 
 among the rest, was Pemberton, of Vicksburg fame, a South 
 ern officer born in Philadelphia. Some of them made no secret 
 whatever of their destination, others said that they were going 
 " home ; " and there was much small talk of coercion, and of 
 "my state." 
 
 While the rebel element was very buoyant and defiant, even, 
 I believe, in calling things by their right names, those officers 
 who remained true to their oaths, on the contrary, seemed sunk 
 in despondency, so widespread was the defection around them. 
 It certainly seemed in those dark days as if the veteran officers 
 would draw their swords on the side of the Union with reluctance 
 
148 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 if not with chagrin. In fact one could easily count on the fingers 
 of one hand about all the outspoken anti-slavery men among the 
 superior officers of the army. One of the few whom I recall as 
 faithful among the faithless, for his country, right or wrong, 
 coiite qui cofite, was Jesse Reno, then in command of the 
 Leavenworth Arsenal. There was no half-way, grudging sup 
 port about him. Instead of making an issue of Mr. Lincoln s 
 election, he practically said to his late comrades in the manner 
 of Dr. Franklin s retort : " You and I were long friends. You 
 are now my enemy and I am yours." There were presently at 
 least three Confederate camps forming with their flags floating 
 in full view of the fort ; and as it had been left without a com 
 petent garrison to defend it, it was easily guessed to be the 
 object of these hostile demonstrations. If by a sudden dash, 
 the rebels had possessed themselves of the large military stores 
 there, the result must have been altogether disastrous to the 
 Union cause in that quarter. By his patriotic exertions Reno 
 procured a hundred volunteers from the neighboring city, put 
 arms into their hands, and thus undoubtedly saved this valuable 
 warlike material from falling into rebel hands. A leading spirit 
 in this company of volunteers, the flower of the young men of 
 Leavenworth, was Powell Clayton, afterwards Governor of 
 Arkansas and United States Senator from that state. Reno 
 was killed at South Mountain at the close of the battle, and 
 when he passed away there passed as gallant a spirit as ever 
 animated the breast of a true patriot and tried soldier. 
 
 The one other officer whose loyalty stood the test without 
 flinching was Stewart Van Vliet, later McClellan s chief quarter 
 master in Virginia, where his broad, good-natured Dutch fea 
 tures and bushy white hair were doubtless familiar to many com 
 panions. Van Vliet s chief clerk, Benjamin C. Card, I may 
 mention as having afterward entered the quartermaster s de 
 partment of the regular army. One other officer should be 
 added to this list, although he was not on duty in Kansas at this 
 particular time. This was General Lyon. Lyon had been in 
 
OLD ARMY IN KANSAS 149 
 
 command at Fort Riley, Kansas, where he was known to us as 
 an outspoken Union man. He even wrote a series of letters 
 favoring Lincoln s election in 1860. Soon after, he was put in 
 command of the St. Louis Arsenal, a post of the highest re 
 sponsibility in view of the threatening posture of affairs in Mis 
 souri at this time. Lyon was an inflexible patriot of the old 
 Puritan stamp. He was a grand-nephew of that gallant officer, 
 Colonel Knowlton, who fell so gloriously at Harlem Plains in 
 1776, after defeating the vaunted British Light Infantry. In 
 Francis P. Blair, Lyon found a kindred spirit. These two men, 
 with the aid of Franz Sigel, saved Missouri in the hour of her 
 extremest peril, while Tecumseh Sherman remained a passive 
 spectator as their troops marched out to the capture of Camp 
 Jackson. 
 
 During the period immediately preceding the breaking out of 
 hostilities, the post at Leaven worth was commanded by Major 
 John Bankhead Magruder, and after him by Colonel Dixon S. 
 Miles of the 2d U. S. Infantry. 
 
 Magruder delighted in military display. Every now and 
 then he would have a field day to show off his beloved artillery 
 to some specially invited guests. Magruder was exceedingly 
 vain, was a great ladies man, and, to render the character more 
 perfect still, he had a pronounced lisp. In fact, he was what 
 young fellows would call a " dandy." While he was in command 
 of the post, the old traditions of southern hospitality were kept 
 most thoroughly alive, so much so that Magruder s field days 
 usually ended with what he called a collation, the table being 
 bountifully spread with Old Bourbon and with little else. 
 
 J. E. B. Stuart was another familiar figure to us at this time. 
 The only thing I can now call to mind of him was his having a 
 favorite horse which would follow him about like a dog, when 
 ever he dismounted. Stuart was whiskered to the eyes like a 
 Cossack, and had a great thick head of hair besides, to complete 
 the resemblance. I have since been sorry that he gave no occa 
 sion to observe him more closely. 
 
ISO CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 Colonel Miles was a soldier of the old school, joining by his 
 own life two as widely distant and differing periods as did the 
 old flint-lock and percussion muskets, the smooth-bore and the 
 rifle. He was punctilious, pompous and quick-tempered, blazing 
 up like a straw fire at the smallest provocation. Two of his 
 captains served with some credit. Frederick Steele became a 
 major-general, Alfred Sully, son of the celebrated painter, a 
 brigadier. To see captains who had not been advanced a grade 
 for nearly twenty years looking forward to, yet scarcely daring 
 to hope for, further promotion, was an experience confined to the 
 regular service, I think, as I recall no volunteer captains of that 
 description. No wonder these poor regulars were aghast at see 
 ing the prodigality with which commissions were bestowed at 
 the beginning of the war. But the time soon came when these 
 protectors were ordered to Washington, to their great rejoicing 
 and our greater sorrow, leaving us to sink or swim as best we 
 might. I saw them go down the Missouri in great spirits at the 
 prospect of getting into a fight. It came sooner than they ex 
 pected. At Kansas City, which was then a rabid secession 
 town, their boat made a landing, and while she lay at the levee 
 the regulars became the target for the vilest abuse that the 
 gathering mob could shower upon them. They were hooted at, 
 cursed and finally dared to come on shore. Though boiling 
 over under such provocation, the officers held their men under 
 strict control. Not so the commander. The defiance aroused 
 all his pugnacious spirit in a moment. Forgetting his sixty odd 
 years, the old man strode quickly down the gang plank alone, 
 and shaking his clenched fist in the faces of the surging and 
 yelling mob, around him, dared the best man among them to 
 come out and fight him single-handed. This was the same 
 Colonel Miles who commanded the reserves at Bull Run. It is 
 needless to add that the offer was not accepted. 
 
 The withdrawal of these troops threw Kansas wholly upon 
 her own resources. What these were will perhaps best appear 
 from a rapid resume of the situation at that time. 
 
THE OLD ARMY IN KANSAS 151 
 
 Though there was no longer a valid excuse for it, as Kansas 
 had fulfilled all the legal requirements for admission, she was 
 designedly kept out of the Union until January, 1861, when the 
 cotton states seceded in a body, breathing defiance as they went. 
 Everything thus conspired to make the entrance of this new 
 commonwealth one of the most dramatic in our history. In 
 very truth, the stone that the builders rejected was become the 
 head of the corner. The new state government came into being 
 without money, without credit, and utterly unprovided with mili 
 tary equipments of any sort whatsoever. The new machinery 
 was starting up under the strain of previous weakness and inex 
 perience. The people were poor. Trade had flourished only 
 spasmodically, under the stress of political agitation. And now 
 at the very moment when she had just ridden out one great 
 storm in safety, another still more portentous was heard thunder 
 ing all along the line. 
 
 Still, there was no faltering, although it is true that many 
 weak-kneed settlers left the state at this time. About every 
 able-bodied man in the state responded to the call of the gover 
 nor. From all sides went up not the Macedonian cry of " Come 
 over and help us " but of " Arms ! Arms ! Ye Gods, give us 
 arms ! " Of course every man had his own rifle or his own pis 
 tols, but the state had not yet been furnished with a solitary 
 United States musket, nor could they at once be obtained be 
 cause the Honorable Secretary of War had stripped the north 
 ern arsenals for the benefit of the states in rebellion. The 
 border was all alive with rumors of invasion ; communication 
 with the friendly east cut off. Rebel flags were flaunting in 
 our very faces. And still no arms. What could be done ? 
 
 In this emergency some patriotic citizens were sent through 
 hostile territory to Chicago, where they succeeded in buying up 
 rifles enough for one company, had them packed up in very long 
 boxes, such as are used by nursery-men, and marked " Trees," 
 and thus disguised they safely ran the blockade. Shoots from 
 those trees were not in great demand among the rebels. 
 
152 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 In spite of all sorts of discouragements, met at the very 
 threshold of her career as a sovereign state, two regiments were 
 quickly raised, equipped and hurried off into the field. It is my 
 impression that both fought at Wilson s Creek with the old 
 smooth-bore muskets. These were three-months men. 
 
 In the beginning of our military organization we received 
 material assistance from Major William E. Prince of the ist U. S. 
 Infantry, who succeeded Miles in the command of Fort Leaven- 
 worth. He was I believe, a brother of a former mayor of 
 Boston. Prince was a thorough soldier of unswerving patriot 
 ism, and that nice sense of honor which so distinguished the old 
 army. Senator Lane was different. Unfortunately, the war 
 let loose a horde of greedy and unscrupulous men, bent on get 
 ting control of all government patronage. Fort Leavenworth 
 was looked upon as the natural spoil of the dominant political 
 influences. As Prince could not be used, he was summarily got 
 rid of, denied the promotion to. which his rank and long service 
 should have entitled him, and finally put on the retired list 
 through the efforts of his evil genius, Senator James H. Lane. 
 
 It is hard to realize that the weak little territory, which I 
 first knew in 1858, with its ninety odd thousand people, is a 
 substantial and progressive commonwealth of to-day, with a 
 population larger than that of the three New England states, 
 Maine, New Hampshire and Rhode Island combined. But so it 
 is. Child of New England ideas, strong in her faith, unswerving 
 in her purpose, like another infant Hercules, she strangled the 
 serpent slavery in her cradle and cast it forth, a despised thing, 
 to be a hissing and a by -word for all time. Was not this some 
 thing worth fighting for ? 
 
FOURTEEN MONTHS SERVICE WITH 
 COLORED TROOPS 
 
FOURTEEN MONTHS SERVICE WITH 
 COLORED TROOPS 
 
 BY 
 BREVET-LIEUTENANT COLONEL SOLON A. CARTER, U.S.V. 
 
 THE object of the present paper is to tell in simple language, 
 without exaggeration or embellishment, the story of what the 
 Colored Division of the Eighteenth Corps did, and how they did 
 it, throwing here and there a side light upon previous descrip 
 tions of their deeds of valor and heroism. That the lights are 
 of such exceedingly limited power must be attributed to the 
 fault of the instrument, rather than lack of loyalty to the mem 
 ory of the gallant officers and brave men, living and dead, whose 
 acts are commemorated. 
 
 Late in the month of April, 1864, Brigadier General Edward 
 W. Hincks,at that time in command of the camp for rebel pris 
 oners at Point Lookout, Maryland, was summoned to Fortress 
 Monroe by Major General Benjamin F. Butler, commanding the 
 Department of Virginia and North Carolina, for consultation 
 with reference to the campaign soon to be inaugurated. As the 
 result of this interview, General Hincks returned to Point Look 
 out, and made arrangements for the transfer of his command to 
 other hands. Within forty-eight hours of the receipt of his 
 verbal instructions from General Butler, he established head 
 quarters at Camp Hamilton, near Fortress Monroe, and upon 
 the same day that his formal instructions were received from 
 department head quarters, issued the following order : 
 
 "HEAD QUARTERS OF DIVISION AT CAMP HAMILTON, VA. 
 GENERAL ORDER, No. i. April 22nd, 1864. 
 
 In compliance with Par. X. S. O. No. 1 23, dated Head Quarters Department 
 of Va. and N. C. April 22nd, 1864, the undersigned hereby assumes command of 
 
 155 
 
156 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 all troops at Camp Hamilton, Va. The following Division Staff Officers are 
 announced, and will be obeyed and respected accordingly : 
 
 Capt. Solon A. Carter, I4th N. H. Vols., Act g Ass t Adj t Gen. 
 
 Capt. John E. White, 99 th N. Y. Vols., A. A. D. C. 
 
 Capt. Thos. L. Livermore, 5th N. H. Vols., A. A. D. C. & A. A. Q. M. 
 
 -nd Lieut. Robert N. Verplanck, 6th U. S. Col. Troops, A. A. D. C. 
 
 (signed) EDW. W. HINCKS, 
 Official, Brig. Gen. U. S. Vols. 
 
 (signed) SOLON A. CARTER, 
 
 Capt. and Act g Ass t Adj t Gen l." 
 
 The troops composing the new command consisted of, 
 
 Battery B, 2nd U. S. Colored Light Artillery, Captain F. C. Choate. 
 ist U. S. Colored Cavalry, Colonel Jeptha Garrard. 
 2nd U. S. Colored Cavalry, Colonel George W. Cole. 
 
 The three foregoing organizations had been recruited at 
 Camp Hamilton during the late autumn of 1863, and the winter 
 of 1863-4. 
 
 ist Regiment U. S. Colored Troops, Colonel John H. Holman ; (organized 
 in the District of Columbia.) 
 
 4th Regiment U. S. Colored Troops, Colonel Samuel A. Duncan; (organized 
 at Baltimore.) 
 
 5th Regiment U. S. Colored Troops, Colonel Conine, subsequently Colonel 
 G. W. Shurtleff ; (organized at Camp Delaware, Ohio.) 
 
 6th Regiment U. S. Colored Troops, Colonel John W. Ames; (organized at 
 Camp William Perm, Philadelphia.) 
 
 loth Regiment U. S. Colored Troops, Colonel Stafford, subsequently Colonel 
 Elias Wright ; (organized in Virginia.) 
 
 22nd Regiment U. S. Colored Troops, Colonel Joseph B. Kiddoo ; (organ 
 ized at Philadelphia.) 
 
 37th Regiment U. S. Colored Troops, Lieutenant Colonel A. G. Chamberlain, 
 subsequenly Colonel Nathan Goff ; (organized at Norfolk, Va.) 
 
 The 36th Regiment U. S. Colored Troops, Colonel Alonzo 
 G. Draper, which was organized at Portsmouth, Va., was at that 
 time on duty at Point Lookout, Md., but joined the division 
 during the summer. 
 
 The ist U. S. Colored Cavalry was not recognized as a part 
 of the division after breaking camp at Camp Hamilton, never 
 
SERVICE WITH COLORED TROOPS 157 
 
 thereafter reporting to division head quarters ; but the 2nd U. S. 
 Colored Cavalry was at intervals attached to the division, parti 
 cipating with it in some of its most important engagements, and 
 furnishing a goodly number of capable officers for staff duty, not 
 only to the division to which it was attached, but to other com 
 mands. 
 
 The organization of the division was further perfected by 
 the formation of two brigades, the ist, loth, 2 2nd and 37th 
 Regiments constituting the First Brigade, under the command 
 of Brigadier General E. A. Wild. The Second Brigade con 
 sisted of the 4th, 5th and 6th Regiments, under the command 
 of Colonel Samuel A. Duncan. 
 
 The short time intervening between the organization of the 
 command and its departure from Camp Hamilton to become a 
 part of the Army of the James, was spent in drill, in which 
 most of the regiments were exceptionally proficient ; and in sup 
 plying it with the necessary clothing, ammunition and equip 
 ment for active service in the field. 
 
 A feature of the formation of one of the regiments of the 
 command (the 4th, Colonel Duncan), is perhaps worthy of men 
 tion, not in disparagement of any other, but because it was 
 unique and had several advantages to recommend it. The usual 
 formation of an infantry regiment was by placing the tallest man 
 in each company on the right, giving the regiment, when in line, 
 a somewhat jagged appearance. Colonel Duncan being given a 
 thousand men, placed the tallest in the color company, tapering 
 gradually to the wings. By this arrangement, his command 
 when in line, especially when viewed from the front, gave the 
 spectator the impression that the men were above the average 
 height. 
 
 This formation greatly simplified the work of the captains in 
 making requisitions for clothing. 
 
158 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 ASCENT OF THE JAMES. 
 
 The hour was at hand for the general forward movement of 
 all the armies of the Union, in accordance with a comprehensive 
 plan. 
 
 The grand old battle-scarred Army of the Potomac was soon 
 to grapple again with its old-time antagonist, and once more the 
 battle should be joined, was never to loose its grip until victory, 
 complete and decisive, should crown its efforts. 
 
 The Army of the James, consisting of the Eighteenth and 
 Tenth Army Corps, under the command of Generals William 
 F. Smith and Quincy A. Gillmore, had been concentrated at 
 Yorktown, Gloucester Point, and Norfolk (with the exception of 
 the Third Division of the Eighteenth Corps, which was at Camp 
 Hamilton) ready to embark on transports when the movement 
 of the Army of the Potomac should be announced. The Rapi- 
 dan was crossed May 4th, and on the evening of that day the 
 Army of the James embarked upon transports and dropped an 
 chor in Hampton Roads. 
 
 At the dawn of the 5th of May, a motley fleet of upwards 
 of one hundred and fifty vessels of all classes, but of sufficient 
 capacity to transport an army of more than thirty thousand 
 men, with their ammunition, camp equipage, commissary stores, 
 artillery and horses, at a given signal weighed anchor, and con 
 voyed by the naval fleet, bore away for the mouth of the James. 
 
 The little fleet of the Naval Brigade of the Army of the 
 James, under command of Brigadier-General Charles K. Graham, 
 had preceded the movement, destroying the enemy s signal 
 stations. 
 
 The transport fleet as far as practicable was grouped in bri 
 gade and division formation, but such formation was not wholly 
 .maintained, owing to the varying speed of the vessels. 
 
 It was an inspiring sight, and never to be forgotten by one 
 who was privileged to witness it, and consider himself a unit 
 in the magnificent pageant. 
 
SERVICE WITH COLORED TROOPS 159 
 
 The sky was clear, the air balmy, and the banks of the 
 stream were clothed with the luxuriant verdure of the rapidly 
 advancing season. As each bend in the river disclosed a new 
 vista, surpassing the former in beauty, the beholders forgot for 
 the moment the scenes of carnage to which they were surely 
 moving forward. 
 
 It was surprising that the onward movement of the fleet was 
 not obstructed, as there were several points upon the river banks 
 where artillery would have seriously delayed its progress. 
 
 Evidently the enemy had been taken by surprise ; the auda 
 city of the movement was our greatest security. 
 
 What of the Third Division ? They occupied a peculiar 
 position. For the first time, in Virginia at least, they were to be 
 put to the supreme test. At Port Hudson and Wagner, indeed, 
 they had given proof of their capacity, and their deeds had been 
 published to the country, but there was an unmistakable feeling of 
 distrust in the minds of many, soldiers and civilians as well, and 
 a fear amounting to conviction, that they would flinch in an 
 emergency. 
 
 These sentiments were not shared by the officers in immedi 
 ate command of the colored troops, and they waited with im 
 patience for an opportunity of demonstrating their steadiness 
 and courage. 
 
 Forty miles above the mouth of the river, and nearly twenty 
 miles below City Point, at Wilson s Wharf, afterwards known 
 as Fort Pocahontas, the first detachment was landed, consisting 
 of the ist, 22nd, and 3/th Regiments, U. S. Colored Troops, 
 and Captain Choate s battery. General Wild was in command. 
 Intrenchments were thrown up, and preparations made for a 
 vigorous defence of the position, which commanded the river 
 at that point. 
 
 Seven miles above, at Fort Powhattan, the remaining regi 
 ment of General Wild s brigade (the loth) was landed, and a 
 few days later, as the importance of the position became 
 apparent, the 22nd Regiment was transferred from Wilson s 
 
l6o CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 Wharf to Powhattan, Colonel Kiddoo assuming command of the 
 post. 
 
 At four o clock in the afternoon, on May 5th, the little 
 steamer upon which were General Hincks and staff and a 
 small provost guard, made fast to the partially destroyed wharf 
 at City Point, encountering no opposition from a detachment of 
 the 8th North Carolina Confederate regiment stationed there. 
 
 Head quarters were quickly transferred from the steamer to 
 to Dr. Eppes cottage, on the bluff (subsequently occupied by 
 General Grant as army head quarters from the middle of June 
 until the surrender of Lee s army). 
 
 Colonel Duncan s brigade was quickly landed, and dis 
 positions made to intrench and hold the position so easily 
 acquired. 
 
 A few days later the 4th and 6th Regiments of Duncan s 
 brigade moved out six or seven miles towards Petersburg, and 
 constructed a strong redoubt at Spring Hill, on the right bank 
 of the Appomattox, a position which, if controlled by the enemy, 
 would have commanded the left of the line on the Bermuda 
 front. The 5th Massachusetts Cavalry (colored), Colonel 
 H. S. Russell, and a battalion of the 4th Massachusetts Cavalry, 
 Colonel Arnold A. Rand, relieved Colonel Duncan s brigade in 
 the intrenchments at City Point. 
 
 This post, in the spring of 1 864, was the point at which the 
 exchange of prisoners of war was effected ; Major Mulford and 
 Robert Ould being the Federal and Confederate commissioners, 
 respectively. 
 
 The Colored Division was in the enemy s country, but scat 
 tered from Spring Hill, on the Appomattox, to Wilson s Wharf, 
 on the James, a distance of twenty-five miles. 
 
 The enemy made an occasional reconnoissance from Peters 
 burg toward the work at Spring Hill and also towards our 
 position at City Point ; but no formidable demonstration was 
 attempted upon either. 
 
 The position of General Wild s brigade was an important 
 
SERVICE WITH COLORED TROOPS 161 
 
 one, commanding the river for a considerable distance, and was 
 coveted by the Confederates. 
 
 On the 24th of May, General Fitz Hugh Lee, with a con 
 siderable force of cavalry, appeared before the works, and after 
 a sharp skirmish drove our pickets inside the intrenchments. 
 
 He then sent to General Wild a formal summons to sur 
 render, promising that both officers and men should be treated as 
 prisoners of war, adding that in the event of a failure to comply 
 with his demand, he would immediately assault, in which event 
 he would not be responsible for the consequences. The inter 
 pretation of this threat was that colored soldiers taken as 
 prisoners should be returned to their former masters, and their 
 officers be delivered to the state authorities to be dealt with for 
 inciting insurrection. 
 
 General Wild s reply to Lee s demand was that he was ready 
 to try conclusions with him. 
 
 Lee dismounted his troopers, and at half past twelve o clock 
 made a furious attack upon the works. The colored soldiers 
 withheld their fire until the assailants were entangled in the 
 abattis, when it was delivered with murderous effect. The 
 enemy recoiled and sought shelter ; a second and third time 
 they renewed the attack, and were as often repulsed. After five 
 hours of fruitless effort, they withdrew, chagrined and disgusted, 
 leaving their dead upon the field. 
 
 General Wild reported twenty-four of the enemy killed, in 
 cluding one major and a captain, and ten prisoners ; also 
 that the enemy had opportunity to remove their dead and 
 wounded from all parts of the field, except the abattis. His 
 own losses were two killed, nineteen wounded, and one missing. 
 
 The results of this first encounter were highly gratifying, 
 demonstrating that the colored troops possessed nerve and cour 
 age. Their critics were compelled to admit they had shown 
 good qualities behind breastworks, but were still sceptical as to 
 their ability to assault them. 
 
 Preparations were completed for an advance in force upon 
 
162 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 Petersburg on the 2Oth of May, but the movement was aban 
 doned, owing to the withdrawal of sixteen thousand troops from 
 the Bermuda front under General W. F. Smith, to reinforce the 
 Army of the Potomac at Cold Harbor. 
 
 It was believed by General Butler that the defences of 
 Petersburg had been weakened by the withdrawal of troops to 
 send to the Army of Northern Virginia, and he planned to send 
 General Hincks to attempt the capture of the city, with reason 
 able expectations of success. 
 
 General Gillmore, learning of the contemplated movement, 
 expressed a desire to command it, and his request was acceded 
 to. 
 
 On the ninth of June the demonstration was made with a 
 column of sixty-five hundred infantry and artillery under the 
 command of General Gillmore, besides a body of cavalry, number 
 ing thirteen hundred, under the command of General A. V. 
 Kautz. Of the infantry comprising General Gillmore s force 
 the Third Division contributed three regiments, about nineteen 
 hundred men, with General Hincks in command. 
 
 The troops from the Bermuda front had crossed the pontoon 
 bridge at Broadway landing, by half past three o clock in the 
 morning, where they were joined by General Hincks. At five 
 o clock the column was in motion, the cavalry in advance, closely 
 followed by the colored troops. 
 
 The route of the cavalry was southerly, crossing the City 
 Point, Jordan s Point, Prince George and Norfolk and Peters 
 burg roads (a detour of nearly twenty miles), to the Jerusalem 
 plank road, striking the latter at a point about four miles from 
 the enemy s intrenched line. 
 
 At seven o clock the colored troops encountered the Confed 
 erate pickets at Bailey s Creek, on the Jordan s Point road, and 
 drove them within their works on that front. 
 
 General Hincks took a position near the Ruffin house, with 
 skirmishers advanced to the crest from which could be obtained 
 a view of the enemy s line of works. 
 
SERVICE WITH COLORED TROOPS 163 
 
 It was now ten o clock. Two hours later the three regi 
 ments of colored troops were withdrawn a short distance, and at 
 one o clock by order of General Gillmore fell back to Bryant s 
 house and by a subsequent order, at two P.M. General Hincks 
 command rejoined General Gillmore s column at Baylor s farm. 
 
 Meanwhile General Kautz had moved up the Jerusalem plank 
 road, gone within the enemy s works, destroyed their camps, 
 and captured forty-two prisoners ; but hearing nothing from the 
 infantry, had withdrawn by the same route by which he had 
 advanced, without encountering opposition. 
 
 Nightfall found all the troops participating in this reconnois- 
 sance back in their camps, wondering what the day s work had 
 amounted to. 
 
 The movements of the Colored Division on the fifteenth of 
 June were in some respects a repetition of those of the Qth, 
 but executed under changed conditions, and with better, if not 
 entirely satisfactory results. 
 
 The strength of the division was increased, the ist Regi 
 ment having joined from Wilson s Wharf, constituting with the 
 5th Massachusetts Cavalry dismounted, a brigade under com 
 mand of Colonel Holman, and the 22nd Regiment had been 
 brought up from Powhattan and assigned to Colonel Duncan s 
 brigade. 
 
 It was understood that this time there would be no turning 
 back ; accordingly the comfortable head quarters which we had 
 occupied since the fifth of May were abandoned, and all neces 
 sary preparations made to take the field and fulfil our part in 
 the general plan of the campaign. 
 
 Our route brought the division substantially to the point 
 reached on the ninth. General Smith returned on the evening 
 of the fourteenth with the column he had commanded at Cold 
 Harbor, disembarking from transports near Broadway landing, 
 but on the Bermuda side. 
 
 At an early hour on the fifteenth, his two divisions, com 
 manded by Generals Brooks and Martindale, crossed on the 
 
1 64 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 pontoon bridge, and preceded by General Kautz s cavalry and the 
 Colored Division (the latter being now a part of General Smith s 
 command) moved in the direction of the Petersburg intrench- 
 ments. The cavalry encountered the pickets of the enemy on 
 the City Point road, and soon discovered a considerable force 
 with two pieces of artillery in position, protected by an earth 
 work which had been erected since our former visit, contesting 
 its advance. 
 
 General Kautz moved to the left without engaging this force, 
 leaving the 3rd (of the Colored Division) to dislodge them. 
 The field work referred to was on Baylor s farm, in an open field, 
 and commanded the City Point road. It was hidden from view 
 by a strip of timber perhaps one hundred and fifty yards in 
 width, with a dense undergrowth which separated the open 
 ground in which it stood from another open field, over which the 
 Colored Division must advance. The City Point road led 
 through this timber. 
 
 Dispositions were quickly made for the attack, Duncan s 
 brigade being formed in two lines, the 4th and 6th Regiments on 
 the right of the road, and the 22nd and 5th on the left, the 4th 
 and 22nd Regiments being in the front line. Holman s brigade 
 was still further to the left. 
 
 Skirmishers were thrown forward and the line of battle ad 
 vanced across the open field in splendid style, though the enemy s 
 artillery had perfect range and their practice was good. 
 
 There was no giving way on any part of the line, although 
 progress through the wood was slow, owing to the tangled 
 undergrowth through which they were obliged to force their 
 way. 
 
 Emerging from the timber, the line charged with a rush, the 
 enemy retreating before the furious onset, leaving one of their 
 guns in possession of the 22nd Regiment. 
 
 General Hincks and staff closely followed the line of battle 
 moving on the road, and upon reaching the work just captured^ 
 found a group of colored soldiers indulging in extravagant 
 
SERVICE WITH COLORED TROOPS 165 
 
 demonstrations of delight at their victory, one sable son of 
 Mars being astride the captured gun as if it were a hobby horse, 
 and disclosing a wide expanse of ivory. 
 
 Addressing him the general inquired, " What has become of 
 the Johnnies ? " 
 
 "Well, sah, dey jes done lit out ; didn t car to make close 
 quaintance. Reckon dey must ha smelled us." 
 
 The column was quickly reformed and moving to the left, 
 soon reached the Jordan s Point road, on which the division 
 advanced. 
 
 General Brooks and Martindale moved on the City Point and 
 river roads, later going into position in front of the works on the 
 enemy s left. It was now nine o clock. Reaching the Jordan s 
 Point road at a point nearly two miles from the intrenchments, a 
 company of colored cavalry, from Colonel Coles regiment, com 
 manded by Captain Robert Dollard, accompanied by Captain 
 Livermore of the division staff, was placed in advance, and 
 forced back the enemy s skirmishers. At a favorable point this 
 company dashed up the road, through the enemy s skirmish line, 
 and deploying to the right and left, cut out from under their 
 guns and brought to the rear a number of prisoners, about equal 
 in number to their own strength. 
 
 The division was in position in front of the enemy s works 
 on that part of the line soon after one o clock P. M., with 
 skirmishers advanced beyond the crest overlooking the enemy s 
 position, the line of battle slightly in the rear of the highest 
 point intervening, and but slightly protected by it, from the fire 
 of the batteries in our front and flanks. 
 
 Generals Martindale and Brooks had meanwhile taken their 
 positions so that the line was in the following order : General 
 Martindale on the right, General Brooks in the centre, and Gen 
 eral Hincks on the left ; General Kautz operating independently 
 still farther to the left. 
 
 The Petersburg defences consisted of a line encircling the 
 city and a distance about two miles from it, of strong redans or 
 
l66 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 batteries connected by infantry parapets with high profiles, and 
 all with ditches. The line commencing at the Appomattox 
 river on the north of the city, extended nearly a mile in an 
 easterly direction, thence southerly, considerably beyond the 
 position of the Colored Division, and thence around to the 
 river, on the other side of the city. The length of the entire 
 line was upwards of seven miles. The redans were numbered 
 from our right consecutively, battery five forming the salient, 
 and commanded the approaches on both northern and eastern 
 fronts. 
 
 The right of the line of the Colored Division was nearly 
 opposite battery six, and connected with the I3th New Hamp 
 shire which formed the left of General Brooks division, and 
 overlapped battery five. 
 
 The connection with General Brooks division was not abso 
 lutely perfect, a swamp intervening, but the gap was inconsider 
 able. 
 
 For five hours the command remained in this exposed posi 
 tion, swept by, at least, four of the enemy s batteries, momenta 
 rily expecting the signal to attack, and under orders to be ready 
 for instant response. 
 
 There they remained throughout the afternoon, hostile shot 
 and shell doing their deadly work until the list of casualties was 
 formidable, the oppressive heat adding to their discomfort, and 
 they were unable to strike a blow in return. It was indeed a 
 severe test for inexperienced troops. 
 
 At half-past six the long expected summons came, the skir 
 mish line, which had previously been doubled, was ordered to 
 assault along the whole front. The line moved forward promptly 
 and steadily across the intervening space, in the face of a galling 
 artillery and musketry fire from the parapets ; up the slope 
 which was surmounted by the enemy s fortifications, over the 
 parapet, inside the works, capturing all the guns in position and 
 many prisoners, although many of the Confederates retreated in 
 confusion toward what they must have considered the doomed 
 
SERVICE WITH COLORED TROOPS 167 
 
 city. The main line then advanced and occupied the captured 
 line of works. 
 
 The charge was simultaneous on the part of the Colored 
 Division and the division under command of General Brooks, 
 and resulted in the capture of the entire line as far to the left 
 as battery number ten, which was situated at the point where 
 the Jordan s Point road entered the line. There was at that 
 time no obstruction between us and Petersburg. 
 
 The Third Division claimed for its share, the line from bat 
 tery number seven to battery number ten, both inclusive, and 
 immediately after the occupation of the line, a regiment moved 
 to the left inside the Confederate line, and occupied battery 
 eleven also, which was near the Dunn house. 
 
 The claim has been advanced by at least two eminent 
 authorities, General Grant, in his memoirs, and General Butler, 
 that it was the colored troops that captured the entire line. 
 The claim is not justified by the facts. The left of General 
 Brooks division, or the 1 3th New Hampshire, captured battery 
 five and the line to and including battery six ; and those works 
 were the spoils of General Brooks division. 
 
 The casualties of the Colored Division, including the affair 
 of the morning, at Baylor s farm, were five hundred and seven 
 killed and wounded, among the latter being Colonel Russell of 
 the 5th Massachusetts Cavalry (temporarily attached to the 
 division) and Lieut. Colonel Goff of the 22nd U. S. Colored 
 Troops. (Colonel Goff returned to duty in November as colonel 
 of the s/th U. S. C. T.) 
 
 No attempt was made to press the advantage secured that 
 night, and the colored troops which had sustained themselves 
 so well throughout the day (receiving commendation for their 
 gallantry, in general orders from General Smith), were not 
 allowed to occupy the line they had won, but were withdrawn, 
 being relieved by the Second Corps which had come up late in 
 the afternoon or early evening. 
 
 It was a victory for which the active participants and the 
 
168 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 country were grateful ; but in view of the conditions then exist 
 ing, the numbers and character of the forces opposing, the 
 absence of Lee s Army, and the proximity of the veterans of 
 the Army of the Potomac, it is a pertinent question whether it 
 might not have been still more decisive and far reaching in its 
 results. 
 
 Let the question be answered in the Yankee fashion, by 
 asking others, ist. Would the defence of the Confederates 
 have been more stubborn at two o clock than at half past six, 
 when they must have been emboldened by the apparent timidity 
 of their assailants during the the whole afternoon ? 2nd. Would 
 the assault have been less vigorous and determined at two 
 o clock, when the colored troops, at least, were elated at their 
 success of the morning, than at sunset, after having been sub 
 jected to the demoralizing influences of the afternoon s exposure ? 
 
 Candid answers to these questions will suggest the answer 
 to the former, and compel the admission that the same qualities 
 of leadership which were displayed in such a marked degree in 
 the campaign resulting in the surrender of Lee s Army at Ap- 
 pomattox, if exercised on that day, would have given the Army 
 of the James possession of Petersburg, and greatly simplified 
 subsequent operations. 
 
 The Army alas, possessed but one Phil Sheridan ! 
 
 The division was assigned a place on the right of the line 
 during the earlier stages of the siege and division head quarters 
 were established on the right, near the City Point road. 
 
 A battalion of sharp-shooters was organized by a detail of 
 two hundred picked men from the command, suitably officered, 
 which furnished a provost and head quarters guard. 
 
 While occupying this position an order was promulgated, 
 requiring public religious services at division head quarters on 
 Sundays. Pursuant to the order, a colored chaplain was de 
 tailed to conduct the service the following Sunday, and as the 
 fact became known there was a large congregation, including 
 many representatives from neighboring head quarters. 
 
SERVICE WITH COLORED TROOPS 169 
 
 The vService was unique ; the singing by the congregation 
 hearty, as usual ; the officiating clergyman read the Scripture 
 lesson appreciatively, and prayed with fervor ; but he was visibly 
 embarrassed by the large audience, and his extemporaneous dis 
 course was a decided failure, closing as follows : " Ma deah 
 fren s, I hopes you will all scuse dis er er somewhat in-co-he- 
 rent discose. To tell de tru hones truf, de peculiar circum 
 stances ob de occasion have made it jes impossible for me to 
 ventilate myself as I could wish." 
 
 About the first of July, General Hincks, still suffering from 
 wounds received at Antietam, intensified by a fall from his 
 horse during the engagement of June 1 5th, was advised by com 
 petent medical authority that it would be unwise for him to 
 endure the exposure incident to active service in the field. 
 
 He reluctantly relinquished his command, greatly to the 
 regret of his superior, as well as his subordinate officers. 
 
 July 3Oth, upon the occasion of firing the mine on General 
 Burnside s front, the division, being temporarily under the com 
 mand of General James B. Carr, was assigned and occupied a 
 position on the Ninth Corps front, but was not actively engaged. 
 
 In August, Brigadier General Charles J. Paine was assigned 
 to the command ; the detachments from Wilson s Wharf and 
 Fort Powhattan were brought to the front, and the 36th Regi 
 ment joined the division from Point Lookout. 
 
 Under General Paine s watchful eye and careful attention to 
 all the little details, especially to the personel of the division, 
 and the capacity of his brigade and regimental commanders, the 
 command attained a high degree of efficiency. 
 
 In September the division left the Petersburg front for 
 Deep Bottom, from which point it moved September 2Qth to 
 the assault of the enemy s position at Newmarket Heights, 
 simultaneously with the movement of General Ord upon Fort 
 Harrison, and that of the Tenth Corps under General Birney 
 from Deep Bottom, to which Corps the Third Division was tem 
 porarily attached. 
 
I/O CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 This engagement was the severest test of the fighting quali 
 ties of colored troops to which the Third Division was sub 
 jected, and it is believed to be within the bounds of truth to 
 say that no other command of colored troops ever experienced a 
 more trying ordeal. 
 
 The fortification to be attacked was on the Newmarket road, 
 and was practically to the left of the Confederate line. It was 
 defended by about one thousand Confederate veterans, with 
 artillery in position to command the narrow neck over which 
 the assaulting column must advance. It occupied a consider 
 able elevation and was protected by two lines of abattis ; 
 one about fifty yards from the parapet, and the other a very 
 strong line about one hundred yards further down the slope ; 
 the position was further protected by a marshy swamp or morass 
 which was imperfectly drained by a sluggish creek through 
 which the assailants must force their way. 
 
 The effective strength of the command was not far from 
 three thousand, organized in two brigades, commanded that day 
 by Colonels Draper and Duncan. 
 
 The troops were in position at an early hour on the morn 
 ing of September 2Qth on open ground descending towards the 
 James, screened from the view of the enemy by the intervening 
 crest ; and officers and men were impressed with the idea that 
 the charge must be vigorous and sustained, and that they were 
 expected to capture the work at whatever sacrifice. 
 
 Muskets were loaded, but not capped, bayonets fixed, and 
 everything made ready for the dash. At half past four o clock, 
 in the gray of dawn, the order to advance was given, and the 
 line moved forward. But few moments were required to gain 
 the crest, from which a view of the enemy s position could be 
 obtained. 
 
 The ground descended gradually to the marshy bottom and 
 stream before described, and was exposed for the entire dis 
 tance to the fire of the guns on the height beyond, which 
 opened as soon as the column advanced beyond the crest, but 
 with little effect at first. 
 
SERVICE WITH COLORED TROOPS I/I 
 
 The lines moved forward with steadiness and without any 
 perceptible hesitancy until the marsh and stream were reached. 
 At this point there was a little confusion, the left of the line 
 finding the swamp impassable. This compelled a contraction of 
 the front. 
 
 The column pressed forward across the stream and up the 
 slope beyond, encountering the concentrated artillery and 
 musketry fire of the enemy, which was terribly effective. 
 
 The first line of abattis was reached without any apparent 
 check, and pioneers with axes commenced the work of remov 
 ing it. Many were killed while so employed, but others seized 
 the axes and the obstruction disappeared as if by magic. 
 
 It was still a hundred yards to the inner, and less formida 
 ble line of abattis, but the distance was soon traversed, and 
 the demolition of the second line was commenced. 
 
 Here the head of the column seemed literally to melt away 
 under the destructive fire to which it was subjected. It was an 
 anxious moment. Could the men endure the frightful strain ? 
 
 The obstruction delaying their progress rapidly disappeared 
 under the almost superhuman efforts of the axemen ; the 
 officers gallantly rallied and encouraged their commands ; the 
 gaps in the ranks were filled and the onward movement was 
 resumed with irresistible force and energy. 
 
 The last line of abattis once passed, the enemy did not 
 wait for a bayonet charge, but fled in confusion along the New 
 market road towards the inner defences of Richmond. 
 
 With exultant cheers the column swept forward over the 
 parapet, and occupied the coveted prize. 
 
 The casualties resulting from this brief engagement (it could 
 not have much exceeded thirty minutes) were appalling. 
 
 General Butler, who was present, says, " As I rode across 
 the brook and up towards the fort along this line of charge, 
 some eighty feet wide and three or four hundred yards long, 
 there lay in my path five hundred and forty-three dead and 
 wounded of my colored comrades." 
 
172 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 The Official Army Register of the Volunteer Force of the 
 United States Army, states that the casualties of the several 
 regiments composing the assaulting column were five hundred 
 and eighty-seven, as follows : 
 
 ist Regiment 18 
 
 4th 162 
 
 5th 6 1 (including 3 officers killed 
 
 6th 203 and 1 1 wounded) 
 
 22nd 15 
 
 l6th " 128 
 
 Total 587 
 
 From this statement it appears that the 36th Regiment of 
 Colonel Draper s brigade, and the 4th and 6th of Colonel Dun 
 can s brigade bore the brunt of the engagement. 
 
 Many of the companies lost all their officers, and left the 
 field under the command of non-commissioned officers. 
 
 Christian A. Fleetwood, late Sergeant Major 4th U. S. 
 Colored Troops, in a paper entitled "The Negro as a Soldier" 
 written for the Negro Congress at the Atlanta Exposition in 
 1895, compares the work of Duncan s brigade on September 
 29th with the Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava, as 
 follows : " Sometimes a comparison will illustrate better than 
 figures alone. I give a single instance : Every one has heard 
 of the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava. I will put be 
 side it a Black Brigade of about the same number of men. 
 Here they are : 
 
 HAD LOST PER CENT 
 
 Duncan s Brigade, comprising the Fourth and Sixth 
 
 Regiments at New Market, Heights, .... 683 365 53.7 
 
 Light Brigade, Balaklava, 673 247 36.7 
 
 Excess in Duncan s Brigade, 10 118 17. 
 
 The Tenth Corps moved up the Newmarket road, and in 
 the afternoon unsuccessfully assaulted Fort Gilmer ; in which 
 assault a portion of the Third Division participated. 
 
 Meanwhile the white troops of the Eighteenth Corps had 
 
SERVICE WITH COLORED TROOPS 173 
 
 captured Fort Harrison with its connecting works at Chapin s 
 farm, from which line the Army of the James advanced to oc 
 cupy the Confederate Capital, the following April. 
 
 The Third Division was moved to the left during the even 
 ing of the 29th, head quarters being established for the night 
 within Fort Harrison, and the troops were employed in revers 
 ing the captured works. 
 
 On the morning of the 3Oth our wagon was brought up and 
 preparations made for serving our mess with coffee. A con 
 venient spot was selected on the plateau over which the 
 Eighteenth Corps had charged the previous day ; and soon 
 the aroma of the refreshing beverage caused a little group to 
 gather, with pleasant anticipations of a treat. 
 
 Meanwhile Confederate gun-boats in the river were getting 
 the range and occasionally dropping a shell in the neighborhood. 
 
 During the night of the 29th and morning of the 3Oth the 
 captured line was placed in a tolerable condition for defence ; 
 and none too soon ; for during the afternoon of the 3Oth three 
 determined attempts were made by the enemy to retake it, but 
 without success. 
 
 During the attack, the left of the division rested on Fort 
 Harrison, extending thence toward the Newmarket road, where 
 the command did effective work in repulsing the repeated 
 assaults of General Hoke s Confederate division. 
 
 The command later occupied a position on the left of the 
 line of the Eighteenth Corps. 
 
 On the 27th of October, the ist, 22nd and 37th Regiments 
 formed a part of the force under General Weitzel, which moved 
 to the right as far as the Seven Pines battle field of 1 862, thence 
 up the Williamsburg road to the enemy s line. The Colored 
 Brigade, under the command of Colonel Holman, was on the ex 
 treme right, beyond the railroad at Fair Oaks Station. 
 
 The ist and 22nd Regiments assaulted at a point between 
 the Williamsburg and Nine Mile roads, carrying the work in 
 their front ; dismounted two guns and threw them outside the 
 Confederate work. 
 
174 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 They were the only troops that succeeded in breaking the 
 enemy s line that day, but they were soon withdrawn by order 
 of General Weitzel. 
 
 Colonel Ilolman and Colonel Kiddoo were both severely 
 wounded while gallantly leading the charge ; the total casualties 
 in both regiments amounting to one hundred and five killed and 
 wounded. 
 
 The brigade left the field under the command of Lieut. 
 Colonel Chamberlain of the 37th Regiment, retreating about ten 
 miles in a pouring rain, over the route by which they had ad 
 vanced, and bivouacked about midnight. 
 
 An incident illustrating the tenacity with which colored 
 soldiers clung to their weapons occurred during this movement. 
 
 The surgeon-in-chief and assistant adjutant general of the 
 division who had accompanied the command, were steaming 
 under the same blanket when they were awakened at daybreak 
 by some one inquiring for "de doctah." 
 
 The caller was a colored soldier who had been shot through 
 the right lung the previous afternoon, the bullet passing through 
 his body. This man had followed the retreating column 
 through mud and rain for ten miles, bringing his gun and equip 
 ments with him. 
 
 Surgeon Barnes dressed the wound and placed him in charge 
 of the ambulance corps. Asked why he had brought his gun, 
 the brave fellow replied that he " Didn t car to be in dose parts 
 widout sumpin to protect hisself." 
 
 By direction of the President and an order from the War 
 Department dated December 3, 1864, the Tenth and Eigh 
 teenth Army Corps were discontinued and the Twenty-fourth 
 and Twenty-fifth Corps were constituted, the white infantry 
 troops of the Army of the James constituting the former ; and 
 the colored troops of the Department of Virginia and North 
 Carolina, the latter. 
 
 By this arrangement, the Third (Colored) Division of the 
 Eighteenth Corps became the First Division of the Twenty- 
 
SERVICE WITH COLORED TROOPS 175 
 
 fifth Corps, with Brigadier General Charles J. Paine as its com 
 mander. 
 
 In the reorganization, the division gained four righting 
 regiments which had seen service with the Ninth Corps, 
 
 The 27th, Colonel A. M. Blackman ; 
 The soth, Colonel Delavan C. Bates ; 
 The 39th, Colonel O. P. Stearns ; 
 The io7th, Colonel Revere, 
 
 and lost the ist, loth and 36th Regiments, which were at 
 tached to another division. 
 
 The First Division, Twenty-fifth Corps, saw little or no ser 
 vice in Virginia after its organization, December 6th, but it 
 accompanied both expeditions to Fort Fisher. 
 
 The division was on ship-board continuously for nearly three 
 weeks in December, no portion of the command disembarking 
 on the occasion of our first visit to Federal Point. 
 
 On the return of the first expedition, we occupied our 
 former camp on Chapin s farm, discontinued the practice of desig 
 nating orders and correspondence, " Head Quarters off Cape 
 Hatteras," and adopted the more familiar form, " Head Quarters 
 before Richmond." 
 
 In drilling an awkward squad when raw recruits failed to 
 master some detail of the manual and the instructor wished to 
 retrace a step, the command (not recognized in Casey s tactics, 
 to be sure) " As you were," was frequently used. General 
 Grant practically adopted the phrase, and issued orders for the 
 return of the troops comprising the first expedition with one ad 
 ditional brigade from the Twenty-fourth Corps ; the second 
 expedition being under the command of General A. H. Terry. 
 
 To the Colored Division was assigned the duty of construct 
 ing and holding a line across the peninsula facing Wilmington, 
 and preventing General Hoke s Confederate division from inter 
 fering with General Ames operations ; and this was effectually 
 accomplished. 
 
176 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 The Confederate commander evidently had a wholesome fear 
 of encountering the Colored Division for the third time. He 
 possibly entertained the opinion expressed by one of the dis 
 gusted captives of the division on the i$th of June before 
 Petersburg, who was credited with the remark, " D d if 
 Southern gentlemen would fight with niggers, and the govern 
 ment ought not expect them to do it." 
 
 For this or some other reason, General Hoke attempted no 
 serious interference ; no attack was made upon our defensive 
 line. 
 
 The day following the capture of Fort Fisher, a flag of truce 
 appeared upon our front, and the assistant adjutant general was 
 directed to detain the party, which consisted of the wife of 
 Colonel Lamb, the commander of the garrison, who was severely 
 wounded the previous day, with an escort. 
 
 We went to Federal Point in light marching order. There 
 was not a horse in the entire division when we landed. A sorry 
 apology for one had been captured, and equipped with a primi 
 tive outfit, consisting of an antique saddle, a saddle cloth of 
 gunny bags, so adjusted as to prevent the frame of the horse from 
 injuring the saddle, and a bridle of ropes and strings. The 
 whole thing was worthy a conspicuous place in an antique 
 and horrible parade. 
 
 With this mount the officer rode out to meet the flag of 
 truce. In the Confederate party was the assistant adjutant 
 general of General Hoke s division. We had plenty of topics of 
 conversation, as we had been opposed to each other in several 
 engagements. He had a splendid mount, with a complete set 
 of Federal equipments, and was inconsiderate enough to make 
 disparaging remarks in regard to the appearance of the Union 
 livery. 
 
 He was reminded that we had visited the country for the first 
 time, contemplating living off it, without an accurate knowledge 
 of its resources, that the specimen under consideration was the 
 best the country afforded : and that evidently our affairs had 
 
SERVICE WITH COLORED TROOPS 177 
 
 become somewhat confused and that our mounts had been ex 
 changed, that the proper thing to do was to trade again. He 
 was in no mood for a horse trade, and the proposition was re 
 jected. 
 
 On the 22nd of February, General Terry occupied Wilming 
 ton, General Ames and General Paine s divisions passing 
 through the city and encamping at North East Station, on the 
 north east branch of the Cape Fear river about ten miles north 
 of the town, being but feebly opposed by General Hoke s 
 command. 
 
 From this camp the command moved March i6th to effect a 
 junction with the column of General Sherman, moving from 
 Fayetteville, and that of General Schofield moving from New- 
 berne. 
 
 General Terry was assigned to the command of the new 
 Tenth Corps, which was composed largely of the two divisions 
 under his command at Fort Fisher, the First Division of the 
 Twenty-fifth Corps becoming the Third Division, Tenth Corps. 
 
 An incident, well illustrating the cheerfulness with which the 
 colored soldiers obeyed orders, occurred on our march through 
 North Carolina. 
 
 At the time of our visit the appropriations for highways and 
 bridges were evidently exhausted. Bridges over the smaller 
 creeks and streams were unknown on the country roads ; pedes 
 trians picked their way over trunks of fallen trees or a single 
 plank, while equestrians were obliged to ford. Reaching one of 
 these streams upon one occasion, preceded by white troops, the 
 column was greatly delayed by reason of their efforts to cross 
 dry shod. The delay threatened a late supper for the colored 
 troops as we had several miles to cover. 
 
 General Paine sent a staff officer to Colonel Duncan, com 
 manding the leading brigade of his division, with orders that he 
 permit no straggling at the ford, which was fifty feet or more in 
 width and waist deep. 
 
 Colonel Duncan formed his brigade in close column, the men 
 
1 78 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 removed their waist belts, cartridge boxes, shoes and stockings, 
 trousers and drawers, and making a compact bundle of the whole 
 outfit secured it to their bayonets or ramrods. A band was sta 
 tioned at the ford and to the lively strains of " The Girl I Left 
 Behind Me" they took to the water, with arms and bundles at 
 right shoulder, with touch of elbow and fours well aligned. 
 There seemed to be a rivalry between the regiments and the 
 different companies of the same regiment as to which should 
 flinch the least. 
 
 On the march from Goldsboro the division was halted for a 
 midday rest near a little hamlet consisting of a few scattered 
 houses. General Paine and staff rode into an enclosure, and 
 dismounting proceeded to partake of their frugal lunch. 
 
 The owner of the premises appeared, and in the course of 
 conversation inquired if any of the colored troops composing the 
 command were at Fort Wagner ? He volunteered the informa 
 tion that a gentleman living in the neighborhood, near whose 
 house we should pass, was at Wagner at the time of the assault 
 by Colonel Robert G. Shaw s 54th Massachusetts Regiment 
 and had that officer s sword in his possession. 
 
 General Paine took the man s name and the location of his 
 premises, and directed one of the staff to take a small escort, 
 visit the house, and if possible obtain the weapon. The house 
 was found without difficulty but it was without an occupant. 
 Upon searching the premises, a sword was found, and delivered 
 to General Paine. 
 
 In July, upon leaving the service, the late Assistant Adjutant 
 General was charged by General Paine with the duty of restoring 
 the sword to Colonel Shaw s father, and upon arrival at his home, 
 opened a correspondence with Mr. Francis George Shaw inform 
 ing him of its recovery. 
 
 The sword in question proved to be the one carried by the 
 gallant colonel and was identified by the initials R. G. S. deli 
 cately etched upon the blade. In a postscript to one of his 
 letters Mr. Shaw wrote, " The sword was a present to my son 
 
SERVICE WITH COLORED TROOPS 179 
 
 from his uncle, Mr. George R. Russell, who purchased it in 
 England and caused the etchings to be made there." 
 
 In a subsequent letter acknowledging its receipt he says " I 
 thank you most heartily for all the care and trouble you have 
 taken. So far as such words may be applied to an inanimate 
 thing it is the weapon which has done most for our colored 
 people in this war, and it is to me likewise as well as to you a 
 source of great satisfaction that it was recovered and restored 
 by officers of colored troops." 
 
 Time and space will not allow of a minute description of the 
 subsequent movements of the Colored Division ; of the junction 
 with Sherman s victorious army near the battle field of Benton- 
 ville ; the occupation of Raleigh ; the surrender of Johnston ; the 
 review of the combined armies by General Sherman, and the 
 closing scenes connected with the homeward march. 
 
 There are many interesting incidents, ranging from the ludi 
 crous to the pathetic, but the limits of this paper will not permit 
 reference to them. 
 
 The story of the part taken by the colored soldier in the war 
 which resulted in establishing the freedom of his race will at the 
 hands of some future historian form a romantic chapter in the 
 history of the progress of the Republic. 
 
 As in the grand transformation scene in some spectacular 
 play, he sprung, at a single bound, from the darkness of servitude 
 to the light of freedom ; from a chattel to a man ; from a serf to 
 a citizen ; from wearing the clanking chains of bondage to wield 
 ing clashing arms in defence of the government which had pro 
 claimed, and which shall henceforth maintain his liberty. 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 
 
 OCTOBER 19, 1864 
 
"" / 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 
 
 OCTOBER 19, 1864 
 
 BY 
 
 BREVET BRIGADIER GENERAL HAZARD STEVENS, U.S.V. 
 
 THE victories of Winchester and Fisher s Hill, September 
 1 9th and 22d, sent Early and his army "whirling up the valley." 
 Sheridan pursued as far as Harrisonburg and Mt. Crawford with 
 his infantry, and Staunton with his cavalry. Thence retiring at 
 his leisure, he swept the valley bare with a cordon of cavalry, 
 stretching clear across it from the Blue Ridge to the North 
 Mountain, burning all the mills and barns, driving off all the 
 horses and cattle and sheep, and leaving so little subsistence 
 that it was said that a crow, seeking to fly down the valley, would 
 have to take his rations with him. 
 
 He took position on the north bank of Cedar Creek, fifteen 
 miles from Winchester, astride the valley pike, sending on the 
 Sixth Corps to Front Royal, a day s march on the road to Wash 
 ington, in expectation of returning it to Grant at Petersburg. 
 
 Early, reinforced by Kershaw s Division of infantry, and 
 Cutshaw s Battalion of artillery, followed at a respectful dis 
 tance, throwing forward his cavalry under Rosser, who had just 
 joined him with a fresh brigade of horse. But the high hopes 
 of this self-styled Saviour of the Valley received a crushing blow 
 at the fight of Tom s Brook, October Qth, six miles south of 
 Cedar Creek, where Sheridan launched Merritt s and Custer s 
 divisions of cavalry under Torbert upon him, with the emphatic 
 order to " whip or get whipped," utterly routed him, chased him 
 at full speed twenty miles, and captured all his guns but one 
 sixteen taken all his ambulances and wagons, everything on 
 wheels, in fact. 
 
184 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 Notwithstanding these Woodstock races, as the Union 
 troopers called the rout of his cavalry, Early advanced his whole 
 force, and after making a bold reconnoissance right up to Cedar 
 Creek, fell back four miles and took post on Fisher s Hill on the 
 1 3th. The village of Strasburg lay between. 
 
 The Shenandoah Valley is by no means a level plain, but 
 presents a rolling surface breaking frequently into decided ridges 
 and even hills. Although the greater portion consists of open 
 ground, cultivated fields and pastures, there are many tracts and 
 groves of woods, chiefly black walnut and other deciduous 
 trees, but the timber is quite open and free from underbrush, 
 affording little obstacle to the movements of troops. 
 
 Opposite the mouth of Cedar Creek, the Massanuttan Moun 
 tain, a steep, lofty and rugged, though isolated range, rises in 
 the midst of the valley, and extending twenty miles southward, 
 divides it into two portions. That on the east is known as the 
 Luray Valley, the other retaining the name of Shenandoah. 
 The North Fork of the Shenandoah River washes the western 
 foot of the range, bending around the northern end, and flowing 
 easterly to meet the South Fork, which drains the Luray 
 Valley. 
 
 On the top of the mountain, at the northern end, the enemy 
 had a signal station which commanded and searched the whole 
 region for miles around so perfectly that the valley of Cedar 
 Creek and the adjacent country appeared spread out like a map, 
 and every object, roads, buildings, camps, intrenchments, and 
 bodies of troops could be exactly located. 
 
 Cedar Creek flows diagonally across the valley, from north 
 west to south-east, and empties into the North Fork a mile and 
 a half below the bridge, where the creek is crossed by the valley 
 pike. It was fordable almost anywhere at this season, but above 
 the bridge the banks are generally steep and rugged. 
 
 Hupp s Hill is a broad, high elevation, just south of the 
 creek, over which the pike leads to Strasburg on the other side 
 of the hill, a distance of two and a half miles. The little hamlet 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 185 
 
 of Middletown is situated on the pike about two miles north of 
 the bridge across Cedar Creek. A high, open plain extends 
 from the village to the stream, traversed by the high road. The 
 ground is higher on the left of the road, extending back a mile 
 or more in a broad, level plateau. It slopes down on the right 
 to Meadow Brook, which rises north of Middletown, and flowing 
 just west of the village and nearly parallel to the pike, empties 
 into the creek nearly a mile above the bridge. The pike 
 descends to the stream by a ravine. On the right, the high, 
 bare ground fronts upon the creek in a bold curved ridge, one 
 hundred and thirty feet above its bed, as far as the mouth of 
 Meadow Brook. On the left across the ravine, the ground rises 
 even higher by forty feet, in a bold headland, and beyond this, 
 still farther down the stream, was another headland separated 
 from the first by a marked ravine. 
 
 Just across Meadow Brook, west of Middletown, the ground 
 rises in a high, steep ridge, which curves around to the right 
 and extends north-westerly. It was partially wooded, and 
 just beyond the bend there was quite a tract of woods. The 
 cemetery is situated in this ridge, opposite the village. A wide, 
 open plain extends from the base of the ridge to Cedar Creek, 
 while to the rear, or north, the ground stretches away in gentle 
 undulations of about the same elevation as the ridge. 
 
 The Nineteenth Corps took position on the right of the 
 pike in two lines occupying the high ground overlooking the 
 creek between the road and Meadow Brook, and fortified it with 
 a line of breastworks, the First Division on the right, the Second 
 Division on the left. Crook s corps went into camp on the 
 ground on the left of the pike, the Second Division in rear of the 
 first headland on the left, and the First Division taking position 
 on the second headland, which was nearly a mile farther down 
 the creek, and stood out like a bastion. Along the crest of the 
 ridge they threw up a line of works fronting the stream. Near 
 the extreme left of this line a return or flanking breastwork was 
 started, and extended at right angles to the rear by Crook s 
 Second Division. 
 
186 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 A division of cavalry was disposed upon each flank ; Custer 
 on the right, Merritt on the left ; and Powell s division was sent 
 to Front Royal to watch the Luray Valley and operate across 
 the Blue Ridge. 
 
 Sheridan established his headquarters at the Bell Grove 
 House, a capacious mansion in the midst of the plain on the 
 right of the pike. 
 
 The Army of the Shenandoah at this time comprised the 
 Sixth Corps in three divisions, Major General Horatio G. 
 Wright, of the Army of the Potomac ; the Nineteenth Corps in 
 two divisions, Brevet Major General William H. Emory, recently 
 from Louisiana ; and the Army of West Virginia, or Eighth 
 Corps, in two divisions, under Brigadier General George Crook. 
 With the latter may be included the 6th New York Heavy 
 Artillery and a small detachment of other troops, forming a 
 provisional division, so-called, commanded by Colonel J. Howard 
 Kitching. All these were infantry. There were three divisions 
 of cavalry : the First and Third of the Cavalry Corps of the 
 Army of the Potomac, commanded respectively by Brigadier 
 Generals Wesley Merritt and George A. Custer, and the 
 Second Cavalry Division of the Department of West Virginia, 
 Colonel William H. Powell, Second West Virginia Cavalry, 
 commanding, all under Brigadier General A. T. A. Torbert 
 as chief of cavalry. Each command was supplied with its due 
 quota of field artillery. 
 
 Three brigades of infantry, one from each corps, garrisoned 
 Winchester and guarded trains in the rear, besides which, one 
 regiment of Crook s corps, the gist Ohio, the Second Brigade, 
 Second Division, was guard to the ammunition train, and the 
 26th Massachusetts Battalion of the First Brigade, Second Divi 
 sion, Nineteenth Corps, was provost guard at army headquar 
 ters. Deducting these detachments, amounting to eighteen 
 regiments, the effective strength on the day of battle, Oct. 
 1 864, was as follows : 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 187 
 
 6th Corps 8506 Infantry 600 Artillery 24 guns 
 
 1 9th " 8748 " 414 " 20 " 
 
 8th " 4000 " 200 " 1 6 " 
 Kitching s command 1000 
 
 Totals 22,254 1214 60 
 
 Cavalry 7>5 with 642 artillery and 30 guns 
 
 29,754 1856 90 
 
 1,856 artillery, with 90 guns. 
 
 Total force 31,610 men and 90 guns. 
 
 The strength of Early s army is more difficult to approxi 
 mate. 
 
 His infantry consisted of five divisions, known after the 
 names of their commanders : Ramseur, Pegram, Gordon, Ker- 
 shaw and Wharton. 
 
 The first three comprised the Second Corps of Lee s Army 
 of Northern Virginia, Jackson s old command. 
 
 The field inspection reports of October 3ist, Army of the 
 Valley District, General Early commanding, give the number 
 present, effective for the field, as follows : 
 
 Ramseur 2442 
 
 Pegram 2013 
 
 Gordon 2227 
 
 Kershaw 3071 
 
 Wharton 1421 
 
 Total 11,174 
 
 Add losses in the battle of Cedar Creek 35 
 
 Infantry 14,674 
 
 Artillery, noi, 35 guns, as appears by inspector s report of 
 September 3Oth ; but General Early himself says he went into the 
 fight with a little over forty pieces of artillery. His cavalry was 
 in two divisions, under Brigadier Generals Lundsford L. Lomax, 
 3121, and Thomas L. Rosser, 2206, and numbered 5327. 
 
 Cavalry 5327 
 
 Artillery noi 
 
 Infantry 14674 
 
 Total force 21.102 men and 40 guns. 
 
188 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 This does not include his horse artillery, which so soon 
 after Tom s Brook was probably scanty, although Rosser 
 certainly had four guns. 
 
 Kershaw s Division, which had left Early before the battle of 
 Winchester, rejoined his army after Fisher s Hill, thus escaping 
 the losses and demoralization of these defeats ; and he was also 
 reinforced by Cutshaw s Battalion of artillery, and a considerable 
 accession of cavalry, which about made good his losses, as he 
 admits himself. 
 
 In his brief and brilliant campaign, Sheridan had apparently 
 shattered the rebel army, and completely cleared out the valley. 
 
 There remained two ways, and but two, in which his army 
 could be brought to bear upon the enemy. One was to rein 
 force Grant at Petersburg with the bulk of his forces, retaining 
 in the valley only enough to protect the line of the Potomac 
 River and Baltimore and Ohio Railroad ; the other was to move 
 south in force upon the Virginia Central Railroad, the enemy s 
 great line of communication between east and west. By this 
 move the enemy s force in that quarter could be held from rein 
 forcing Lee, a vital line of supply to Richmond and Petersburg 
 cut off, and probably Lee himself be compelled to detach from 
 his own army, and thereby the strain on Grant be lessened. 
 
 Grant favored this offensive movement. But Sheridan was 
 opposed to it on account of the difficulty of supplying his own 
 army, and advised sending a large part of his force to Grant. 
 As such a step involved breaking up his victorious army, and 
 reducing him to a purely defensive and subordinate role, the 
 unselfish sincerity and patriotism of his views are apparent. 
 
 On the other hand nothing can be more admirable than the 
 free hand the great commander gave his dashing subordinate, 
 trusting in his judgment. Advance on the enemy s great rail 
 road line, or else reinforce the army at Petersburg. Do one 
 or the other, and use your own judgment as to choice the 
 time and the execution of the movement, such was the gist 
 of Grant s orders. 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 189 
 
 But Halleck, Chief of Staff of the Armies of the United 
 States and military adviser to the President and the Secretary of 
 War, had his own views, likewise, which he was not slow to 
 communicate, not as orders, for he held no command, but 
 as expert opinions from an acknowledged master of the Art 
 of War. 
 
 All summer he had been striving to rebuild and open the 
 Orange and Alexandria and Manassas Gap Railroads from Alex 
 andria to Front Royal in the valley, using for this purpose a large 
 part of the forces defending Washington, which, although within 
 Sheridan s command, he seems to have managed at his own will. 
 Notwithstanding many breaks by Mosby s guerrillas, he had 
 succeeded in opening the road to Rectortown, at the eastern 
 base of the Blue Ridge. His plan was to fortify and hold this 
 line of railroad from Alexandria to Front Royal permanently. 
 From its western end as a secure base, an advance could be 
 made up the Shenandoah Valley, or, from its centre the 
 advance might go forward by the line of the Orange Court 
 House and Alexandria Railroad, which could be rebuilt as the 
 army advanced. And in case it were decided to send troops 
 back to Grant, the newly opened road would offer the most 
 direct route. 
 
 But Sheridan was opposed to the whole scheme. He be 
 lieved it would take so many troops to hold the railroad that he 
 would have none left to strike with. Even when he started the 
 Sixth Corps to Washington he disdained to use the railroad, 
 although opened within a few miles, but ordered the troops to 
 march via Ashby s Gap, telegraphing to Halleck : "To trans 
 port the corps by railroad would break up its organization, and 
 the shipment of artillery, horses, trains and officers traps will 
 involve so much trouble and delay that no time will be gained." 
 
 The difference between the two in their military ideas and 
 methods was evident. 
 
 Halleck would establish his base, secure his communications, 
 occupy a large tract of the enemy s territory, and then advance, 
 
190 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 building his railroad as he moved forward. Sheridan would 
 keep his army together and in hand, constantly manoeuvre to 
 head off or threaten the enemy, and then strike him with all his 
 force at the first opportunity. Halleck would wage a war of 
 positions, Sheridan a war of blows. 
 
 On the 1 2th, Sheridan started the Sixth Corps for Alexan 
 dria en route to Petersburg. Grant at Petersburg telegraphed 
 Halleck on the nth: " After sending the Sixth Corps and 
 one division of cavalry here, I think Sheridan should keep up as 
 advanced a position as possible towards the Virginia Central 
 Railroad, and be prepared with supplies to advance on that road 
 at Gordonsville and Chariot tesville at any time the enemy 
 weakens himself sufficiently to admit of it. The cutting of that 
 road and the canal would be of vast importance to us." 
 
 The next day, the 1 2th, Grant again telegraphed Halleck : 
 " Send my despatch of yesterday, in relation to what Sheridan 
 should do, to him," and Halleck replied that "the substance 
 of your dispatch of nth was immediately sent to General 
 Sheridan." 
 
 What he did send on the 1 2th was as follows : - 
 
 " General Grant wishes a position taken far enough south to 
 serve as a base for future operation upon Gordonsville and Char- 
 lottesville. It must be strongly fortified and provisioned. Some 
 point in the vicinity of Manassas Gap would seem best suited 
 for all purposes. Colonel Alexander of the Engineers will be 
 sent to consult with you as soon as you connect with General 
 Augur." 
 
 Grant evidently intended a raid on the railroad and canal by 
 a strong movable column, giving Sheridan a free hand, but his 
 clear and simple instructions were so modified by Halleck as to 
 convey an order to Sheridan to take up and fortify a permanent 
 base for future campaigns, and even the point was indicated, 
 the vicinity of Manassas Gap, and a colonel of engineers was 
 sent to assist him in carrying out the order, and he was to con 
 nect with General Augur, who was then building the railroad to 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 191 
 
 Front Royal. In fine, Halleck simply reverted to his own pet 
 scheme, of a fixed base and permanent advance, and undertook 
 to carry it out in Grant s name. 
 
 This perversion of Grant s orders at once frustrated his 
 plans for strengthening the army at Petersburg, and might have 
 led to serious results to the Chief of Staff and Master of the 
 Art of War himself, had not fortune bent all these events for 
 the best. 
 
 Sheridan, on receipt of Halleck s dispatch, on the I3th, at 
 once recalled the Sixth Corps, which had already reached 
 Berry s Ford over the Shenandoah, and was about crossing the 
 river, and telegraphed Halleck : "If any advance is to be 
 made on Gordonsville and Charlottesville, it is not best to send 
 troops away from my command, and I have therefore counter 
 manded the order directing the Sixth Corps to march to 
 Alexandria." 
 
 On the 1 3th, in the afternoon, Early suddenly and unex 
 pectedly appeared in heavy force on Hupp s Hill, first making 
 known his presence by vigorously shelling the camps of the 
 First Division of Crook s corps, which occupied the salient 
 headland on the left. The two brigades of this division present 
 with the army, the First and Third, were thrown across the 
 stream to develop the enemy s force, but after a sharp affair 
 were driven back with a loss of two hundred and nine killed 
 and wounded, including Colonel George D. Wells, 34th Massa 
 chusetts, commanding the First Brigade, who was mortally 
 wounded. Having administered this rebuff, Early at once with 
 drew to Fisher s Hill, not waiting to be attacked in force. 
 
 Simultaneously with the demonstration on the pike, Rosser 
 appeared in force on the right, opposite Cluster s cavalry, drove 
 his pickets across Cedar Creek and advanced about a mile, but 
 was forced back or retired, and in consequence of this demon 
 stration, Merritt s division was moved to the right also, taking 
 position on Custer s left and between him and the right of the 
 infantry, so that all the cavalry was disposed on the right, and 
 covered the open country there for five or six miles. 
 
192 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 On the 1 4th, the Sixth Corps rejoined the army and went 
 into camp on the right on the open plain beyond Meadow 
 Brook, the Third Division on the left, next the Nineteenth 
 Corps, the First Division in the centre ; the Second Division on 
 the right, and somewhat refused. 
 
 On the night of the i6th, Rosser with two brigades of 
 cavalry and Grimes Brigade of infantry, of Ramseur s Division, 
 the foot-soldiers mounted behind the horsemen, marched thirty- 
 two miles around the right flank of the Union cavalry in an 
 attempt to surprise and capture an advanced brigade. But he 
 found, on reaching the desired position, that the brigade had 
 been drawn in, and had to content himself with the capture of a 
 small outpost. On the morning of the i /th Early advanced his 
 whole army some distance in order to cover and sustain 
 Rosser s movement, and all marched back on the failure of that 
 officer. 
 
 On the 1 7th Sheridan proceeded in person to Front Royal 
 with Merritt s and Custer s divisions of cavalry under Torbert, 
 intending to push them through Chester Gap to the Virginia 
 Central Railroad, while he himself went on to Washington by 
 way of Manassas Gap and Halleck s railroad, in response to the 
 persistent despatches of that officer, for consultation with the 
 authorities there. General Horatio G. Wright of the Sixth 
 Corps was left in command of the army during Sheridan s 
 absence. 
 
 On reaching Front Royal he received a message forwarded 
 by Wright which had just been taken or read off the enemy s 
 signal flag on Three Top Mountain (Massanuttan), as follows : 
 
 LIEUT. GENL. EARLY : 
 
 Be ready to move at once, as my forces join you, and we will crush 
 Sheridan. LONGSTREET. 
 
 At first Sheridan considered this message a ruse, but on 
 reflection he gave up the raid, ordered all the cavalry back to 
 Wright, and sent him the following message by way of 
 caution : 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 193 
 
 HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION. 
 
 Front Royal, Oct. 16, 1864. 
 MAJOR GENERAL H. G. WRIGHT, Commanding Sixth Corps : 
 
 GENERAL : The cavalry is all ordered back to you ; make your position 
 strong. If Longstreet s despatch is true, he is under the impression that we have 
 largely detached. I will go over to Augur and may get additional news. Close 
 in Colonel Powell, who will be at this point. If the enemy should make an ad 
 vance I know you will defeat him. Look well to your ground and be well pre 
 pared. Get up everything that can be spared. I will bring up all I can and will 
 be up on Tuesday, if not sooner. P. H. SHERIDAN, 
 
 Major General. 
 
 Then he continued through Manassas Gap to the end of the 
 newly opened railroad at Piedmont, and thence by rail to Wash 
 ington, where he arrived the next morning. 
 
 His consultation with the authorities must have been brief, 
 for at noon the same day he left Washington by special train 
 for Martinsburg, accompanied by two colonels of the engineer 
 corps sent by Halleck, who was evidently bent on demonstrat 
 ing the superior wisdom of his own ideas. 
 
 General Early, in a letter dated November 6th, 1890, to 
 General Irwin, author of the " History of the Nineteenth Corps," 
 has stated that the signal message was altogether fictitious ; 
 that he wrote it himself and caused it to be signalled from 
 Round Top, a hill back of Fisher s Hill where he had his head 
 quarters, in full view of the Federal signal men, in order to in 
 duce Sheridan to move back his troops. On the failure of this 
 ruse he determined to make his attack. 
 
 Thus Halleck s intermeddling caused the Sixth Corps to 
 rejoin the army, and Early s ill-advised ruse brought back the 
 cavalry. These two blunders caused the whole strength of the 
 army to be concentrated at the very time when it was to be 
 most needed. There are few instances that more clearly illus 
 trate the part that fortune plays in war. 
 
 General Wright, fearing a movement by the enemy on his 
 right through the open country, placed both divisions of 
 cavalry, Merritt s and Custer s, on that flank. Moore s brigade, 
 of Powell s division, was posted at Buckton Ford on the left, 
 
194 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 two miles below the mouth of Cedar Creek, with pickets con 
 necting with those of Crook. Powell remained to guard the 
 Luray Valley and confront Lomax, who occupied it with his 
 division. 
 
 On the 1 8th Colonel Thomas M. Harris, 3Oth West Vir 
 ginia, commanding Third Brigade, First Division, Crook s 
 corps, was sent out on a reconnoissance to ascertain the 
 enemy s position. On his return he reported that he had 
 advanced as far as the enemy s old camps and found him gone. 
 Every one supposed, or assumed, that Harris had gone as far 
 as Fisher s Hill at least, and that this position was meant by 
 the enemy s old camps, and the feeling of security and careless 
 ness caused by his report, especially in Crook s corps, contri 
 buted not a little to the disaster of the next morning. For 
 Early s army was all at Fisher s Hill that day, and Harris 
 must have turned back before he reached that point. General 
 Wright, however, was not satisfied with the report, and ordered 
 General Emory to make a reconnoissance in force up the pike 
 with a brigade or more of infantry, and Torbert to advance a 
 brigade of cavalry by the back road, both to start at daylight 
 the next morning and push forward until they found the 
 enemy. 
 
 Now became apparent the fruits of Sheridan s rigorous 
 devastation of the valley. The granary of Virginia lay in 
 ashes. No more could the rebel armies draw ample supplies 
 of bread and beef from its broad fertile fields and whirling 
 flour mills. No longer could their forces sweep down the 
 valley pike with loaded trains and bursting haversacks to the 
 very banks of the Potomac. Early, obliged to haul up his 
 supplies by wagon, eighty miles from Stanton, was unable to 
 feed his army for any length of time, and was forced either to 
 retreat or attack. Early was desperate and his officers were of 
 like mind. They felt that their previous defeats and the wan 
 ing fortune of their cause demanded extraordinary exertion. 
 They felt ready to take desperate chances, to do desperate 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 195 
 
 deeds. Their troops, despite severe losses and repeated de 
 feats, had rallied magnificently and were still game. After 
 reconnoitring upon both flanks, a plan of attack was at length 
 decided upon. It was the result of a reconnoissance made on 
 the 1 7th, from the top of Massanuttan Mountain by Major Jed. 
 Hotchkiss, Early s Chief of Engineers, and General Gordon. 
 Hotchkiss, in his journal of these operations relates that 
 Gordon and himself fixed upon the plan of attack to suggest 
 to General Early. Early adopted it. " Soon," continued 
 Hotchkiss under date of the i8th, "all the division com 
 manders, Generals Gordon, Pegram, Ramseur, Wharton, 
 Rosser and Kershaw, and Colonels Carter of the artillery 
 and Payne of the cavalry came, and there was a conference 
 at headquarters at Round Hill. General Early decided to go 
 by the route recommended by General Gordon and myself, and 
 decided on a plan of attack to which we all agreed. General 
 Gordon, in command of the Second Corps (Gordon s, Ram- 
 seur s and Pegram s Divisions), was to cross the river at 
 Fisher s Hill and go round the end of the mountain and cross 
 again at Bowman s Ford, turn the enemy s left and press on to 
 the pike to his rear. Kershaw was to go through Strasburg, 
 go to Bowman s Mill, near the mouth of Cedar Creek, and cross 
 or advance over the enemy s line or front of breastworks. 
 Wharton, followed by the artillery, was to go along the turn 
 pike to Hupp s Hill and cross after the others and press up the 
 pike ; Rosser was to cross Cedar Creek at Mohamy s Mill and 
 engage the Yankee cavalry ; Payne was to precede Gordon and 
 try to capture Sheridan at Belle Grove. This plan having been 
 decided on, Generals Gordon, Ramseur and myself went to 
 examine the route around the mountain ; General Pegram 
 went to the top of the mountain." 
 
 On his return that afternoon, Hotchkiss took the pioneers 
 of Ramseur s Division, went over the route, made bridges, cut 
 out trees, etc., and a temporary bridge was thrown across the 
 river opposite Fisher s Hill. 
 
196 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 The troops had sixty rounds of ammunition, and were 
 cautioned to leave behind their canteens and everything that 
 could rattle. 
 
 At eight o clock in the evening, as Gordon s long column 
 was starting, General Pegram reported to Early that from the 
 top of the mountain he had just discovered some fresh earth 
 works on the left of the Union Army, doubtless the return or 
 flanking line which Crook s Second Division was at work upon, 
 and expressed some doubt or objection to the undertaking. 
 But Early stood firm and the column marched on. Early 
 states that the plan at first was for Kershaw as well as 
 Wharton and the artillery to advance on the pike, ready to 
 cross the creek and attack as soon as Gordon struck the left- 
 rear of the Union army, but on Pegram s report, fearing that 
 Gordon might meet more resistance than was expected, he 
 decided that Kershaw should ford the creek lower down and 
 directly attack the left of the Union works. 
 
 Gordon s three divisions crossed the river and made their 
 way by the narrow and rugged path winding along by the foot 
 of the mountains, now in single file, now hurrying forward, and 
 now halting for the rear to close up. Kershaw and Wharton 
 moved at midnight down the pike, through Strasburg, where 
 the former filed off to the right on the direct road leading to 
 the lower ford of Cedar Creek, while the latter continued his 
 march over Hupp s Hill to his station. Thus, during the long 
 hours of that cold, crisp, autumn night, the Confederate 
 columns were silently and steadily creeping upon their foe 
 as he lay wrapped in slumber in the fancied security of his 
 camp, and at the appointed hour, five o clock, before day-break, 
 were at their posts. On the right of the sleeping army 
 Rosser s squadrons mounted and formed, waited in the gray 
 gloom for the moment when they should pounce upon the 
 Union pickets and cavalry, their onslaught to be the signal to 
 the other columns to attack. 
 
 On the pike, Wharton s infantry deployed in line, and 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 197 
 
 silently moved down the slope of the hill to the very edge of 
 Emory s picket line. Thirteen batteries of artillery, forty guns, 
 stood harnessed on the pike at the foot of Fisher s Hill, impa 
 tiently waiting the opening of the fight, to rush to the front 
 at a gallop and join in the battle with Wharton. Gordon s 
 column was closed up on the river, ready to wade the stream 
 breast deep at the two fords (Bowman s and Mclnturfs). 
 Kershaw s troops, accompanied by Early in person, were led 
 close down to Cedar Creek the camps of Crook s corps in 
 plain sight on the height beyond and shown exactly where to 
 cross the creek, where to deploy and where to storm the works 
 in column of brigade. 
 
 The morning was exceedingly damp and chilly. A dense fog 
 settled down upon the ground as the dawn slowly lightened. 
 
 Across the creek the bulk of the Union army lay in 
 slumber. After their arduous campaign the men keenly 
 enjoyed the unwonted rest, none so apprehensive as to 
 dream that the twice beaten foe would dare assail that large 
 and victorious army in its chosen and fortified position. Far 
 away on the right Lowell s cavalry, the reserve brigade of 
 Merritt s division, was making ready to go forth on the ordered 
 reconnoissance. The Second Division of the Nineteenth 
 Corps was also up, preparing for the reconnoissance ordered 
 up the pike, and the First Maine battery was hitched up ; - 
 for the First, Second, and Third brigades and the battery were 
 to go forth, while the Fourth brigade which was in second line, 
 was to occupy their places in the works during their absence. 
 
 All unsuspecting danger, little dreaming that the enemy 
 whose whereabouts, supposed to be miles distant, was at that 
 very moment crouching just across the creek, ready like 
 leashed hounds to spring at their throats ; the troops were 
 making their last little preparations for their march, some 
 hastily swallowing their coffee, others buckling on and adjust 
 ing their accoutrements. Thus the whole army, \vhether asleep 
 or awake, was buried in the deepest sense of safety. 
 
198 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 And now Early and his staff astride their horses behind 
 Kershaw s column, anxiously waiting and listening, heard the 
 scattered firing caused by Rosser s advance, the signal for the 
 deadly ball to open. This was followed almost immediately by 
 dropping musket shots, where Gordon, Payne s cavalry in ad 
 vance, was brushing away the weak picket line on the river. 
 Already Kershaw s troops were fording the creek, Simm s 
 Brigade in advance and forming line. Receiving the pickets 
 fire without returning a shot, Simm s troops advanced straight 
 upon the breastworks so swiftly and so resolutely that they 
 captured the force on picket almost entire, and stormed the 
 works in a single rush, driving in confusion Thoburn s First 
 Division of Crook s corps, and capturing the six guns of 
 Battery D, ist Pennsylvania Artillery, Lieutenant William 
 Munks, posted on the left of the line. The cannoneers were 
 bayoneted, clubbed and driven from the guns, which were at 
 once turned on Emory s line. The blow was so sudden that 
 the surprise was complete. The pickets, badly posted and 
 negligent, had given no sufficient notice. The 5th New York 
 Heavy Artillery (infantry), which picketed this part of the 
 line, lost four officers and three hundred and five men taken, 
 only forty escaping. 
 
 Kershaw s three other brigades swept forward as fast as 
 they could deploy and advance, hard on the heels of Simms, 
 and joined him on the captured heights ; Conner on his left, 
 Humphrey and Wofford on his right. 
 
 Battery B, 5th U. S. Artillery, Lieutenant Henry F. Brewer- 
 ton, was posted on the right of the intrenchment. His cais 
 sons and horses, as also those of Munks battery, were kept at 
 the bottom of the ravine which extended behind the headland 
 upon which the works stood, and separated it from the headland 
 where Crook s Second Division was camped. As the attacking 
 force swept up the height, Brewerton delivered a round of can 
 ister into them from his centre pieces, and then ran his guns back 
 by hand into the ravine, and while the swarming rebels paused a 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 199 
 
 moment upon the works to reform and pour a furious fire 
 over his head, managed in the smoke and fog to bring off all his 
 pieces save one, moving down the ravine and along the foot of 
 the other headland to the pike, but with severe loss in men and 
 horses, and was himself captured bringing up his rear. Lieuten 
 ant Samuel D. Southworth, 2nd U. S. Artillery, the only other 
 officer, was killed. In like manner were saved the caissons of 
 Munks battery. The remaining battery of Crook s corps, L, 
 ist Ohio, Captain F. C. Gibbs, occupied an epaulement on the 
 next headland, near and overlooking the pike and bridge. He, 
 too, after firing a few rounds at Wharton s infantry and guns now 
 coming in sight just beyond the creek, was forced to gallop down 
 the pike to escape capture by Kershaw s men, already again 
 swiftly rushing on. 
 
 Thus was broken and swept away like chaff, in an instant, 
 as it were, the First Division, the half of Crook s corps, with a 
 loss of seven guns ; and Colonel Joseph Thoburn, ist West Vir 
 ginia, commanding, was killed, striving in vain to rally his troops. 
 
 Meanwhile the Nineteenth Corps, partially roused by the 
 picket firing on the left, were suddenly startled and astonished 
 as they heard the yells of Kershaw s infantry storming the height, 
 their rapid and heavy musketry, and the roar of Brewerton s 
 guns. The troops hastily resumed their places in the works. 
 The Third Brigade, Second Division, occupied the left, next the 
 pike, with two regiments, the I56th and i76th New York, swung 
 back on the left along the road. The Fourth Brigade extended 
 the line still farther back, along the pike, crossing it diagonally, 
 facing to the left, to confront the new danger. The First and 
 Second brigades continued the line in the works on the right of 
 the Third and then came the First Division. Battery D, ist 
 Rhode Island Artillery, Lieutenant Frederick Chase, was on the 
 left near the pike, and in rear of the works. Battery A, of the 
 ist Maine Artillery, Lieutenant Eben D. Haley, was in the works 
 between the Third and First Brigades, Second Division. The 
 5th New York Light Battery, Captain Elijah D. Taft, was in 
 
200 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 the works farther to the right with the First Division ; and the 
 i /th Indiana Light Battery, Lieutenant Hezekiah Hinkson, was 
 posted in rear. Now the fugitives came swarming across the 
 hills and rushing in wild disorder to and down the pike. Now 
 beyond the creek appeared Wharton s skirmishers driving in 
 the Union pickets, and firing across the creek, and a battery 
 opened a brisk fire of shells upon the works. 
 
 Roused by the furious outburst of Kershaw s attack, Crook 
 was forming his Second Division, Colonel R. B. Hayes, after 
 wards President, on the left of the pike, and about one hundred 
 yards from and parallel to it, fronting to the left with the 
 small brigade of Kitching on his left. Emory hurried over from 
 his right the Second Brigade of his First Division under Colonel 
 Stephen Thomas of the 8th Vermont, who had just escaped cap 
 ture on the picket line, for he was corps officer of the day, and 
 threw it across the pike on Crook s right. General Wright, gal 
 loping to the fight, aided personally these dispositions, while he 
 sent in hot haste for two divisions of the Sixth Corps, thinking 
 that the troops just formed could hold the enemy at bay until 
 the veterans could come to their support. 
 
 But Gordon s three divisions having crossed the river, filed 
 up through the woods for a mile, and formed on the open plain, 
 directly on the left and rear of Crook and Emory, all unknown to 
 the Union troops. Ramseur on right, Gordon on left, Pegram in 
 second line, were now sweeping forward in battle order. They 
 struck the hastily improvised line, and at its weakest point, its 
 left, where stood Kitching s raw men with their left in air. They 
 broke and fled with scarcely a show of resistance, Colonel Kitch 
 ing fell mortally wounded, and Hayes division, bewildered in the 
 fog, smoke and din, shaken by the rush of fugitives through and 
 past them, with the serried rebel lines smashing their left and ad 
 vancing towards their rear, gave way, and in a manner that has 
 called forth the apology of the three commanders who witnessed 
 it, Wright, Crook and Hayes. But in truth they broke none too 
 soon. Gordon s Division smiting them on their defenceless left 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 2OI 
 
 must have swept them away, while Kershaw was already assail 
 ing their right, and a more stubborn resistance would only have 
 made their losses greater and the disaster worse. 
 
 Brave officers and men in every regiment there were, who, 
 amid the universal break and confusion, fronted the enemy, stood 
 their ground to the last moment, and checked his advance long 
 enough to enable many of the wagons and ambulances to hitch 
 up and escape to the right. But Crook s corps was irreparably 
 shattered, and it may fairly be said, took no further part in the 
 battle. 
 
 Even while this struggle was in progress, Thomas brigade 
 was furiously assailed by Kershaw s and Gordon s troops in front 
 and flank at once, and made a brave and stubborn resistance. 
 The colors of the 8th Vermont were actually fought over ; three 
 color-bearers went down in succession, but brave men at once 
 took their places and the flags were saved. A monument now 
 erected on the ground records that the regiment lost one hun 
 dred and ten killed and wounded out of one hundred and sixty- 
 four engaged. About half the regiment were across the 
 creek on picket, and cut off by Wharton s advance, were un 
 able to join their command until the afternoon. The other 
 regiments of the brigade were the I2th Connecticut and the 
 i6oth New York; there were only three, and although the 
 scanty band was soon forced back with a loss of more than a 
 third of its number, it had momentarily checked the enemy and 
 gained a little priceless time. 
 
 The victorious rebel infantry, charging, firing, yelling, now 
 fell upon Emory s Second Division. The I56th and i/6th 
 New York saved their colors only by tearing them from the 
 staves, as they report. The Fourth Brigade was swept back, 
 and one gun of Chase s Rhode Island Battery D was lost. The 
 other brigades in the works, seeing the refused flank broken, 
 and the enemy amid the fog pushing along their rear, leaped 
 over the breastwork and stood on the outside facing the rear, to 
 meet the attack. General McMillan, commanding the First 
 
202 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 Division, leaving two regiments, the I i6th and 15 3d New York, 
 to hold the right of the works, which here crowned a pronounced 
 hill, threw the other two regiments of the First Brigade, the 
 3Oth Massachusetts and the ii4th New York, on the plain to 
 the rear of the works and in line facing to the left, and some 
 four hundred yards from the struggling troops on the pike. As 
 these now came breaking to the right and rear, this little force 
 made a gallant stand and suffered terribly, the i I4th New York 
 losing one hundred and fifteen out of two hundred and fifty 
 engaged. 
 
 But all in vain. Nothing could stem the skilfully planned 
 attacks of the two Confederate columns and the fiery onset of the 
 Southern soldiers, now wreaking a long-deferred vengeance upon 
 their hated foe. While Kershaw drove all before him along the 
 works, from ( left to right, capturing three guns of Haley s ist 
 Maine Battery A, three guns of Taft s 5th New York Light 
 Battery, and prisoners by hundreds, Gordon swept a wide 
 swath across the plain, far in rear of the works, constantly out 
 flanking and driving the scattered commands that yet strove to 
 rally and hold their ground, and forcing the broken fragments 
 and fugitives of the corps back upon the creek, leaving them no 
 escape save by the extreme right. Three guns of the i/th Indi 
 ana Battery and one of Chase s Rhode Island Battery D were 
 lost in crossing Meadow Brook, making eleven taken from the 
 Nineteenth Corps. 
 
 And all this time the dense fog, now heavy with smoke, 
 shrouded the plain, hiding the enemy s movements and greatly 
 increasing the feelings of uncertainty and dismay among the 
 Union troops. 
 
 The rapid advance of Gordon s troops, covering and searching 
 the entire plain with continuous and heavy fire, left Payne no 
 opportunity to charge upon Belle Grove and capture the Union 
 commander, the part especially committed to him. His efforts 
 were restricted to picking up wagons and fugitives on the skirts 
 of Middletown, and he claimed that he captured three hundred 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 203 
 
 and ninety-nine men with a force of only three hundred and 
 twenty-six. lie was checked by some men of the Qist Ohio, 
 Crook s cattle guard and others, and never got beyond the 
 village. 
 
 Gordon s advance also cut off Moore s cavalry brigade at 
 Buckton Ford from the army, but that officer, moving rapidly 
 across country, threw his force across the pike just north of 
 Middletown and held it. 
 
 The Sixth Corps had thrown up no works, being regarded as 
 a reserve or movable force. With pickets well out across Cedar 
 Creek, connecting with those of the Nineteenth Corps on the 
 left and the cavalry on the right, they lay in camp since their 
 return on the i.ith, enjoying the unusual and welcome rest, as 
 oblivious of all danger as the other troops, but with even a 
 greater feeling of safety, as they had the greater pride and confi 
 dence in their corps. 
 
 As the gray dawn began to lighten the damp and heavy 
 air, a scattering musketry fire far off on the right startled, yet 
 scarcely aroused, the sleeping camps of that corps. " Sho ! that s 
 nothing but picket firing," exclaimed a drowsy soldier to his 
 mate, as he turned in his blanket. It was Rosser s advance. 
 
 The firing on the right died away, but then dropping mus 
 ketry shots on the extreme left were heard, soon followed by the 
 ripping volley of a line of battle, and then the musketry rattled 
 and crackled louder and louder, and shouts and cheers resounded 
 in the fog, and above all, the shrill rebel yells. There was 
 scrambling out of blankets and into clothes, and buckling on of 
 belts in hot haste. The dense sea of fog completely shrouded 
 and hid everything. Nothing could be seen, nothing could be 
 fixed, except the pandemonium on the left. And soon crowds of 
 scattered men came issuing out of that dense veil of fog, some 
 running, most walking fast, but all intent on putting ground be 
 tween themselves and the fight. And now wagon after wagon, 
 with here and there an ambulance, came bumping over the fields, 
 the drivers urging their teams and casting scared looks behind, 
 
204 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 The troops made haste to pack up their knapsacks, blankets 
 and shelter tents and get under arms. The corps artillery, 
 which was camped together in close order on the right bank of 
 Meadow Brook in rear of the infantry, hitched up. On the first 
 burst of the storm Wright had ordered up two divisions to sup 
 port the line that himself, Crook and Emory were forming be 
 yond the pike. Twenty minutes would suffice for the veterans to 
 march the intervening mile, and he looked forward with confidence 
 to the repulse of the enemy on that line. But now the line was 
 shattered, the enemy advancing, and he was forced to send word 
 to General Ricketts commanding the corps, to move back and 
 take up a defensible position. 
 
 In compliance with the first order, the First and Third Di 
 visions moved to the left, and the leading brigade of each was 
 already across the brook before they received the countermand, 
 the Third Division crossing below the artillery camp, the First 
 Division passing its rear and left and crossing above it. The 
 Second Brigade of the Third Division deployed and advanced up 
 the slope nearly to the Belle Grove House and became engaged 
 with the enemy, but was struck, overborne and broken in two 
 by the retreating masses of the Nineteenth Corps, and moved 
 back across the creek under a heavy fire and in some confusion. 
 The First Brigade of the First Division also re-crossed the brook. 
 Fugitives, wagons and ambulances were rushing past or breaking 
 through the ranks of the Sixth Corps in ever increasing num 
 bers. The dense fog and smoke rendered it impossible to dis 
 tinguish friend from foe at any distance. 
 
 Unable to see the ground for over a hundred yards, unable 
 to fix the position of other troops, each command was in a meas 
 ure isolated, while the heavy and continuous firing, the rebel 
 yells, the swarms of fugitives, the whizzing musket balls, the 
 roar of the enemy s guns, which, having crossed the creek after 
 Wharton, were now opening along the pike, and the shriek and 
 burst of their shells, told only of disaster. 
 
 Amid this scene of dismay the artillery went into action in a 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 205 
 
 huddle, almost as they stood in camp, and as fast as the fugi 
 tives and wagons cleared their front, opened vigorously, firing 
 into the fog and at the noise. The Third Division formed on 
 the right and partly in support of the artillery, with its right 
 near its camp. The First Division, only two small brigades, 
 First and Second, eight regiments in all, took post on the left 
 of the artillery, the whole line being nearly parallel to and a 
 little back from the brook, facing to the left or eastward, 
 towards the pike. The fragments of the Nineteenth Corps 
 were falling back past or through the right of the Third Divis 
 ion, and it was extremely difficult to distinguish the last of the 
 fugitives from the first of the enemy, or to tell when to open 
 lire without slaughtering our own men. 
 
 Thus they were ill prepared to sustain the enemy s attacks, 
 following hard upon the fugitives. General James B. Ricketts 
 was severely wounded and disabled ; General Wright was 
 slightly wounded in the face. lie had just ridden back from 
 the rout on the pike, determined to make a stand with his own 
 corps, and, as the First Division was forming, .sat on his horse 
 near by, bareheaded, with the blood trickling down his beard. 
 
 The Third Division, assailed by Gordon in front and Kershaw 
 on the right, gave way, and instantly the swarming rebel infantry 
 was among the guns and captured three of Captain James 
 McKnight s, Battery M, 5th U. S. Artillery. But the next bat 
 tery belched canister, the loth Vermont of the Second Brigade 
 and the 6th Maryland of the First Brigade vigorously counter 
 charged ; the enemy was driven back and the guns brought off 
 by hand. 
 
 For this gallant act a medal of honor was conferred upon 
 Colonel W. W. Henry, commanding the loth Vermont. His 
 color-bearer, Sergeant William Mahoney, was the first man to 
 reach the guns, and mounted one of them, waving his colors. 
 This brave soldier was killed in the afternoon. Captain Clinton 
 K. Prentiss led the Marylanders. 
 
 But the check was brief. Kershaw s troops, pushing 
 
206 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 through the camps of the division, flanked and enfiladed its 
 right, while Gordon s men furiously attacked its front and left. 
 In vain General Wright ordered an advance. The division was 
 forced back to the right and rear, resisting stubbornly. 
 
 Ramseur at the same time, with the three brigades of battle, 
 Cook and Cox, and part of Gordon s, was assailing the First 
 Division of the Sixth Corps ; and that, too, outflanked and out 
 numbered, was forced back, after a brief but bloody resistance. 
 
 Yet these were staunch troops, and there were no braver 
 nor more skilful officers than General Frank Wheaton, who 
 commanded the Division, or the five gallant men who there fell 
 in succession, commanding the brigades. Commanding the 
 First Brigade, Colonel William H. Penrose and Lieut. Colonel 
 Edward H. Campbell, I5th New Jersey, were wounded, and 
 Major Lembert Bowman, loth New Jersey, was killed. The 
 command devolved upon a Captain, Baldwin Hufty, 4th New 
 Jersey. Commanding the Second Brigade, Colonel Joseph F. 
 Hamblin, 65th New York, and Colonel Ronald S. McKenzie, 
 2nd Connecticut Heavy Artillery (infantry), were wounded. In 
 less than thirty minutes the division lost nearly half its officers, 
 and nearly one-third of its men. 
 
 Only by great bravery and steadiness was any of the artillery 
 saved. While Me Knight s and the next battery, G, ist Rhode 
 Island Artillery, Captain George W. Adams, were pouring can 
 ister into the advancing gray lines, Colonel Charles H. Tomp- 
 kins, ist Rhode Island Artillery, Chief of Artillery, threw Bat 
 tery C, ist Rhode Island, Lieutenant Jacob H. Lamb, to the 
 left, and drew back to new position the two remaining batteries, 
 5th Maine Light Battery E, Captain Greenleaf T. Stevens, and 
 ist New York Light Battery, Lieutenant Orsamus R. Van 
 Etten. The scene is graphically described by a participant, 
 Captain John K. Bucklyn, ist Rhode Island Artillery, in the 
 Rhode Island Historical Society s papers. " Scarcely were bat 
 teries put in position than they were flanked and compelled to 
 retire to escape capture. The enemy pushed so furiously that 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 2O/ 
 
 he seemed to arrive first at every place we wished to occupy. 
 Captain Jacob H. Lamb, with Battery C, scarcely commenced 
 work in a position assigned him by General Tompkins when the 
 enemy struck his flank, and with difficulty he retired, saving 
 one-half his command. Out from the fog and smoke in front 
 came a hostile line, and immediately the first battery was lost, 
 and a rebel flag waved over one of the guns. Two batteries a 
 little to the rear sent canister among them, and the flag went 
 down. We drew back the guns by hand, but soon lost them 
 again. 
 
 " Positions changed so rapidly that staff officers could not re 
 port and commanders could not wait. Every man seemed to 
 be doing his best, and more daring acts of courage and des 
 peration have seldom been seen. Guns were limbered up 
 and brought away when the enemy was already within the 
 battery." 
 
 In this melee an hundred horses were killed, six guns were 
 lost, and one hundred and seven officers and men, about one- 
 quarter of the artillery brigade, were killed and wounded, with 
 only four men captured. 
 
 Thus driven in considerable disorder, though stubbornly 
 resisting, both divisions gained the high ground to the right 
 and rear the extension of the ridge opposite Middletown, 
 where, out of range of fire, they reformed their lines and rallied 
 the broken men. Gordon s and Kershaw s troops were too 
 spent and scattered by their long charge to press on farther, in 
 face of the cavalry deployed and showing a formidable front 
 across the open country still more to the right, and the masses 
 of Emory s infantry reforming behind them. Ramseur s atten 
 tion was turned to another quarter, as will presently be shown. 
 
 While the Sixth Corps was thus struggling to withstand the 
 enemy, the Nineteenth Corps, after passing through the former 
 and nearly a mile beyond Meadow Brook, were reforming across 
 the plain, beyond the camps of that corps. Here they stood at 
 bay for some time, although assailed by some of Kershaw s troops 
 
208 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 that had passed the right of the Sixth Corps, and by the fire of 
 the enemy s artillery. Then ordered to withdraw by General 
 Wright, the corps fell back to a high, commanding, open ridge, 
 over a half mile to the right and rear of the Sixth Corps divis 
 ions. This withdrawal took place about the same time with or 
 possibly a little after that of the latter, but instead of uniting 
 with or falling back upon the other troops, the Nineteenth Corps 
 retreated in an eccentric course that brought it still farther 
 apart from them. The fog may in part account for this eccen 
 tric movement, but in truth the corps was terribly shaken by 
 the severe and unexpected blows it had undergone ; eleven out 
 of twenty guns were lost ; two thousand men were killed, wounded 
 or captured out of nine thousand effective ; thousands of soldiers 
 had left their colors, and it was necessary to gain a position far 
 enough back to give a brief respite and chance to reform. The 
 First and Third Divisions of the Sixth Corps were in little better 
 plight except for stragglers. Yet in neither corps did the troops 
 feel whipped. They were indignant that they had been taken 
 at disadvantage, and hustled off the field without a fair chance 
 to defend themselves, but not disheartened. The very com 
 mands that had been forced to break, hung together as best 
 they could through all the confusion of the fight and retreat, 
 and instantly assembled and reformed as soon as the pressure 
 relaxed. Not a single regiment in the Sixth or Nineteenth 
 Corps lost its organization except temporarily, or failed to take 
 part in the subsequent movements of the battle. The troops 
 took up their new positions and adjusted their lines in as per 
 fect order and steadiness as though they had just marched out 
 of camp. 
 
 All this while a fierce contest was raging on the ridge near 
 Middletown between the victorious enemy and the remaining 
 division of the Sixth Corps, the Second, commanded by Briga 
 dier General George W. Getty. But before describing this fight 
 it seems best to sketch the part taken by the cavalry thus far, for 
 the pen is forced to recount in succession the various parts and 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 209 
 
 incidents of the battle, although they actually occur simultaneously 
 in great measure. 
 
 Rosser drove in the Union pickets by his first dash, and cap 
 tured an entire company of infantry two officers and sixty men 
 of the 2nd Connecticut Heavy Artillery, at Mohamy s Ford 
 on Cedar Creek. But he was speedily encountered by Custer s 
 picket reserves and by the reserve brigade of Merritt s division, 
 under Colonel Charles Russell Lowell, 2nd Massachusetts Cavalry, 
 which was already under arms and about to set forth on the 
 reconnaissance as directed by General Wright, and driven back 
 across the stream. Warned soon afterwards by the sounds of 
 battle on the left, and the portentous sight of swarms of infan 
 try fugitives breaking out of the fog from that quarter and 
 hastening across country to the right and rear, Torbert, holding 
 Rosser in check with a portion of Custer s command, deployed 
 the bulk of his cavalry across the plain considerably to the right 
 and right rear of the Sixth Corps camps, facing to his left-front 
 and presenting a formidable line to confront the furious and 
 fast-approaching attack, and the horse batteries opened upon 
 the enemy as soon as his position could be discerned. 
 
 This bold and aggressive stand checked the ardor of the 
 rapid though now disordered onslaught of the enemy, for it could 
 not be pushed farther without reforming his troops ; and aided 
 materially in rallying stragglers and encouraging the disordered 
 Union infantry to reform. At about eight o clock Torbert sent 
 Devin s brigade of Merritt s division to the left towards the pike, 
 to assist in rallying the stragglers and in holding that all-impor 
 tant avenue of communication. 
 
 Torbert s own escort, ist Rhode Island Cavalry, under Major 
 William H. Turner, was deployed across the fields, and strove 
 hard to stop the fugitives, but with indifferent success. The 
 reports of the cavalry commanders drew a graphic picture of the 
 number of fugitives and the condition of the broken and driven 
 infantry. Says Dcvin : " I found large numbers of the infantry 
 retiring by regiments, companies, squads and stragglers. With 
 
210 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 some difficulty I checked the rout at this point, it being neces 
 sary in several instances to fire on the crowds retiring, and to 
 use the sabre frequently." 
 
 Merritt speaks of the immense number of infantry stragglers 
 making across the country to the Back road from our left. The 
 5th U. S. Cavalry (his escort) was immediately deployed across 
 the fields, and together with the officers and orderlies of the di 
 vision staff, did much toward preventing the infantry from going 
 to the rear, and forced every one to stop and form line. Other 
 officers repeat the story. 
 
 War presents no picture of hopeless demoralization like the 
 sight of swarms of broken and scattered men escaping from the 
 battlefield, nor one that produces a more exaggerated effect upon 
 the mind of the beholder. At the very time that so many strag 
 glers were going to the rear, the bulk of the Sixth and Nine 
 teenth Corps was manfully fighting under every disadvantage, 
 and when overpowered and forced back, still stuck to their colors, 
 perfectly ready to renew the fight and needing nothing but a 
 leader. And many of the stragglers who coolly disregarded the 
 exhortations of the officers of another arm, were ready to rally 
 or intended to rally at the call of their own officers, cr when 
 they reached a good place, and this is shown by the fact that so 
 many of them voluntarily returned to the ranks later in the day. 
 
 Now will be related how Early s victorious advance, sweeping 
 all before it, was hurled back from the ridge near Middletown 
 by a handful of staunch troops, well commanded, and how the 
 aggressive audacity of the Confederates was turned to ill-timed 
 prudence. 
 
 Getty s division, Second of the Sixth Corps, was camped on 
 the extreme right of the Union infantry. Satisfied from the 
 heavy firing on the left that the enemy was attacking in force in 
 that quarter, General Getty lost no time in getting his troops 
 under arms, and without waiting for orders, marched them by 
 the left flank across the plain past the rear of the corps artillery 
 camp, to the sound of the firing towards the pike in front of 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 211 
 
 Middletown. Neither the artillery camp, scarce two hundred 
 yards distant, nor the other divisions, could be discerned through 
 the fog. Already the plain was covered with fugitives, wagons 
 and ambulances intermixed, hurrying away so eagerly and re 
 gardless of the columns marching athwart their course that many 
 of the soldiers fixed their bayonets and, as they marched, threat 
 ened the stragglers with the points to keep them from breaking 
 through the column. Already the whiz and ping of bullets 
 were singing past, and the terrific noises of battle waxed louder 
 every minute on the left. The division was formed in two lines 
 along Meadow Brook, near the foot of the ridge, facing towards 
 the pike ; the Vermont or Second Brigade, Brigadier General L. 
 A. Grant, in the centre ; the Third Brigade, Brigadier General 
 Daniel D. Bidwell, on the left ; the First Brigade, Colonel James 
 M. Warner, on the right. As the lines were forming, a strong 
 force of skirmishers, consisting of the 5th and 6th regiments and 
 a battalion of the I ith Vermont under Major Johnson of the 2nd 
 Vermont, dashed across the brook, drove back the enemy s skir 
 mishers through the open woods there with a rough hand, and 
 captured several prisoners. On Getty s right, its flank within 
 thirty yards, a well-dressed line of other Union troops extended 
 to the right into the fog. These were of the First Division, 
 Sixth Corps. 
 
 As soon as his lines were formed, Getty advanced across 
 Meadow Brook and swung forward his left considerably, reach 
 ing towards the pike, and again straightened and adjusted his 
 lines preparatory to advancing into the fight. At this moment, 
 save an annoying skirmish fire, no attack was making on Getty, 
 but sweeping across the fog and smoke laden plain in front, from 
 left to right, resounded the unmistakable and awful noises of a 
 fierce and heavy fight. The crash and crackle of musketry, the 
 boom of guns and burst of shells, mingled with yells and cheers. 
 Far to the right, in the fog were heard the echoing roar of the 
 corps artillery, and the rolling musketry of the infantry. Now 
 at last the rebel onslaught could be repulsed and hurled back, 
 and the course of disaster stopped if not retrieved. 
 
212 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 Thus confident that the enemy could never break through 
 the other divisions, Getty resolved to move forward, wheeling to 
 the right, and smite the charging Confederates in flank with the 
 whole weight of his division. Orders were given the brigade 
 commanders to this effect, the right brigade to commence the 
 movement, the second and third immediately to take it up. 
 
 Getty bestrode his horse just in front of the right of his 
 line ; his staff officers galloped back to him and reported that 
 the brigade commanders were all ready to advance, and he 
 turned to give the final order, when the troops on his right were 
 seen to break and fly in the utmost confusion. As far do\vn the 
 line as could be seen in the fog, the men were breaking succes 
 sively, file after file, like a row of toppling bricks set up in play 
 by some sportive urchin. We could see the break run along 
 the line until it came to the last man next to the division, and 
 he, too, sprang from his place and ran back after the others, 
 and in a few minutes not a vestige remained of that well-ordered 
 and apparently firm and steadfast line. Whatever may have 
 occurred w r ithin that pall of smoke and fog, it is certain that 
 there was no pressure to excuse the giving way of that line, as 
 far as one could see. 
 
 Thus in the very act of delivering his well-timed, if desperate 
 blow, Getty beheld his point d appid give way, leaving his right 
 without support, so now both flanks were in air, and the whole 
 infantry of the army broken and driven in confusion, save only 
 his own scanty division, while on his right front, amidst the fog 
 and smoke appeared the enemy s battle line. In this emergency 
 - without supports, without orders, in the open indefen 
 sible plain where a few moments would bring the victorious 
 Confederates charging upon his defenceless flanks, and not one 
 ray shone amid the universal wreck and ruin, Getty, with 
 prompt and cool decision, moved his troops in line facing by the 
 rear rank, back across the brook to the foot of the ridge. Then, 
 moving up its slope he posted them in a single line extending 
 right and left as far as possible. His right, Warner s First 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 213 
 
 Brigade, rested upon a heavy patch of woods and extended into 
 it by the front of two regiments. The Vermonters held and 
 extended around the curve of the ridge, and the Third Brigade 
 was pushed along and back on the ridge to the left and rear, 
 until opposite the village, where its flanking regiment connected 
 by a strong skirmish line with the cavalry skirmishers of 
 Moore s brigade of the Second Cavalry Division, which had just 
 come up from Buckton Ford and was boldly thrown across the 
 pike in rear of the hamlet. 
 
 One regiment of Warner s brigade, the I39th Pennsylvania, 
 remained on the plain at the foot of the ridge to support Lamb s 
 Battery C, ist Rhode Island Artillery, which had just been 
 placed in battery here by Colonel Tompkins, as already stated, 
 and was soon forced to fall back with the battery to the right 
 along the foot cf the riclge where it met the First Division, and 
 remained with these troops until afternoon, when it rejoined its 
 brigade. With this exception the division was intact throughout 
 the entire day. 
 
 The withdrawal to the ridge was made with coolness and 
 deliberation. The brigade and regimental commanders posted 
 and adjusted their lines along the crest so as best to meet the 
 impending attack which they coolly awaited with well-founded 
 confidence. The skirmishers were drawn in to the foot of the 
 ridge. 
 
 The provost guard was posted in a line of sentinels across 
 the rear, to arrest stragglers as usual. Colonel B. W. Crownin- 
 shield, in his interesting paper on Cedar Creek, states that he 
 assisted in posting these guards, and speaks of the good order 
 and steadiness with which Getty s fine division took up its 
 position. 
 
 Nor had they long to wait. The gray lines of Pegram s 
 division soon came advancing swiftly up the steep slope, and 
 struck the troops awaiting them on the crest. The heaviest of 
 the attack fell upon Warner s brigade. Getty s veterans coolly 
 held their fire until the enemy was close upon them, then deliv- 
 
214 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 ered it in their very faces, and tumbled the shattered ranks 
 down the hill, pursued to the foot by Warner s two right 
 regiments. 
 
 In their rapid advance, Grimes Brigade, the rear or left 
 brigade of Ramseur s Division, became separated from the other 
 three brigades. After taking part in driving the Union troops 
 across the pike, Grimes advanced along the highway towards 
 Middletown while the others were so vigorously assailing the 
 First Division and artillery of the Sixth Corps, thus opening 
 an interval or gap between himself and them. Pegram s Divi 
 sion, which was the reserve or second line of Gordon s attacking 
 column, was placed in this gap, and he it was that attacked 
 Getty. 
 
 The enemy s shells now began to burst over and upon the 
 ridge, coming mostly from the high ground along the pike. The 
 troops lay flat on the ground just behind the crest, and suffered 
 but little, most of the shells passing over and exploding in rear 
 of the line. It was not long before the skirmishers in front of 
 the Vermonters and Third Brigade came running breathlessly 
 in, and reported that the enemy was again advancing to the 
 attack. The troops sprang to their feet, dressed their lines, 
 fixed bayonets, moved forward a few paces to and over the crest, 
 and met the enemy at thirty yards as he struggled, well winded 
 and tired, up the ascent, with so well-aimed a volley, so thunder 
 ing a cheer, and so sudden and spontaneous a rush forward that 
 he fell back in great confusion to and beyond the foot of the 
 ridge, sharply pursued by the victors half way down the slope, 
 and a number of prisoners were taken. The troops were imme 
 diately recalled and posted again behind the crest. 
 
 This attack was made by Grimes Brigade of Ramseur s 
 Division in two lines, and, judging from the extent of its front, 
 by a part of Pegram s Division. In his report General Grimes 
 claims that his troops advanced as far as the cemetery in their 
 charge, and admits their repulse. 
 
 Early reached the skirts of Middletown just as these broken 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 215 
 
 troops came tumbling back, and there met Ramseur and Pegram, 
 who told him that the Sixth Corps was making a stand on the 
 ridge, and urged him to throw Wharton s Division into the fight. 
 This division having crossed Cedar Creek by the bridge with 
 the artillery as soon as the way was cleared, and advanced along 
 the pike, was close at hand and had not been engaged. Accord 
 ingly Early at once ordered Wharton to attack, directing the 
 other two division commanders to show him where to go in. 
 
 This attack fell more to the left than the preceding, more 
 on the Third Brigade and partly on the Vermonters. Again 
 the skirmishers ran in and gave timely warning. Again the 
 troops rose to their feet, dressed their ranks, and gripped their 
 muskets, with bayonets fixed ; and again, at the critical moment, 
 just as the charging line, straining up the hill, gained the sum 
 mit, the steady veterans countered upon it with a terrific three 
 fold blow, a sudden deadly volley, a fierce charge, and a mighty 
 shout, and dashed it in pieces clown the ridge. In their eager 
 ness many of the men chased the broken troops to the foot, but 
 the enemy s batteries in the edge of the village raked them well, 
 inflicting some loss, and soon all were brought back to the shel 
 ter of the crest, and the line was reestablished. In these 
 attacks the enemy s losses must have been heavy, for at one 
 place alone near the bend of the ridge, thirty-four of his dead 
 were found lying on the slope the next day. 
 
 Wharton reported to Early not only that his division was 
 repulsed, but that the Sixth Corps was advancing, and the Con 
 federate commanders, impressed by this fierce rebuff, felt them 
 selves thrown upon the defensive. Wofford s Brigade of 
 Kershaw s Division was close at hand the only troops not yet 
 engaged, and was hurriedly posted on Grimes right, fronting 
 the ridge, in order to withstand the apprehended Union advance, 
 while Wharton s men were rallied and reformed. This brigade, 
 it appears, after taking part in driving Crook s First Division 
 from their intrenchments, became separated from the rest of 
 Kershaw s Division, and did not join in their charge clown the 
 
2l6 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 Union works. But Early had no stomach to renew his attacks. 
 The repulse of three divisions, and the formidable strength of 
 the position, quelled even his audacity. He supposed, as he well 
 might, that he was confronted by the entire Sixth Corps, and 
 not merely by one weak division without a single piece of artil 
 lery. He sent orders to Gordon and Kershaw to advance and 
 attack the right flank of the force which had brought him to a 
 standstill, while Colonel Carter, his chief of artillery, posted 
 battery after battery on the high ground along the pike, in and 
 near Middletown, until two score guns were hurling shell and 
 shrapnel over and upon the thin line crouching behind the crest. 
 But this storm, which would have been destructive and unbear 
 able in a level or open position, while inflicting some loss, only 
 made the troops hug the ground the closer, without shaking 
 their confidence a whit. 
 
 At this juncture Early, with half his army, was, if not on the 
 defensive, at least brought to a halt in front of Getty s one small 
 division of infantry, which he was furiously bombarding with 
 most of his artillery ; while the other half of his army, under 
 Gordon and Kershaw, had driven all the rest of the Union 
 infantry, six divisions, from their positions, and had put them 
 hors de combat for the moment. 
 
 Getty s troops sustained this iron tempest unflinchingly for 
 half an hour. During this time a staff officer notified him that 
 General Ricketts had been severely wounded, and that the 
 command of the Sixth Corps had devolved upon him. Thus 
 far he had manoeuvred and fought his troops unaided and 
 without orders, nor was it possible that he could receive any, 
 for General Ricketts was disabled early in the battle, and 
 General Wright, after riding back from the rout on the pike 
 and rejoining the First and Third Divisions of his corps, was 
 forced to retreat with them and the Nineteenth Corps to the 
 right and rear. 
 
 Determined to hold his position to the last, and impressed 
 with the importance of holding the enemy in check r..s long as 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 217 
 
 possible, Getty remained with his own division, placing General 
 L. A. Grant in immediate command of it and sent orders to 
 the other divisions to conform to the movements of the Second. 
 The enemy, making no more infantry attacks, kept up his 
 artillery fire for half an hour, when some scattering musketry 
 was heard on the right flank, and Colonel Warner reported that 
 the Confederates were driving back his skirmishers on that 
 flank and pushing a column past it. Getty had not a man 
 in reserve. He had not a gun. His entire force in one thin 
 line barely sufficed to fill the position, with his right resting on 
 nothing but a piece of woods, good only as a screen, but a 
 source of weakness instead of strength as soon as the enemy 
 found out the situation. Nothing remained but to get out, and 
 that quickly. Accordingly Getty ordered the troops to move 
 to the rear in line. Fortunately the artillery fire had slackened 
 somewhat, and the movement was executed by Grant without 
 haste or difficulty. Facing by the rear rank, each brigade 
 marched across the open fields for half a mile to a cross-road 
 known as the Old Furnace Road, which intersected the pike 
 just north of Middletown and extended across country. 
 Here they halted and faced about ; the lines were readjusted, 
 skirmishers thrown out and the cartridge boxes refilled. The 
 enemy, unconscious of the movement, was still shelling the 
 abandoned crest. By this time the fog had all disappeared and 
 given way to a bright sunny day. 
 
 One loss, but that a severe one, marked this retrograde 
 movement. Just as it began, General D. D. Bidwell, command 
 ing the Third Brigade, was mortally wounded by a shell. As 
 colonel of the 49th New York he rose to the command of the 
 brigade by faithful and gallant service. Of stalwart presence, 
 with a countenance marked by firmness, good sense and kindly 
 feeling, always careful of his men, and cool, steadfast and brave 
 in action, he had won the love of his command and the esteem 
 and confidence of all. The whole corps mourned his death. 
 
 Early, it will be recollected, when repulsed by Getty s 
 
218 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 stand, called upon Gordon and Kershaw for aid to drive the 
 obstacle from his path. He did not realize the full measure of 
 their astonishing success. Oblivious or regardless of the fact 
 that no troops could make such a long and heroic charge and 
 overcome such determined resistance without suffering heavy 
 losses and becoming more or less disordered, he expected them 
 instantly to make a new attack, and begrudged them the time 
 necessary to reform, and, more discreditable yet, he ever after 
 wards persisted in reproaching these brave soldiers with ill 
 founded charges of disorder and delay. 
 
 In fact, they reformed and advanced in surprisingly short 
 time, and it was their movement which flanked Getty s position, 
 and compelled him to withdraw. 
 
 While Getty was thus successfully maintaining an unequal 
 contest on the ridge, the other divisions of the Sixth Corps and 
 the Nineteenth Corps were halted and reforming in separate 
 bodies far to his right and rear, as already narrated. General 
 Wright ordered these troops to move to the rear and left in 
 order to unite them, and take up some suitable position to 
 secure the valley pike, that vital communication. This move 
 ment was made just before Getty withdrew from the ridge, and 
 just as Gordon and Kershaw began their second advance. 
 
 Colonel Crowninshield says that after seeing Getty s di 
 vision take position on the ridge, he rode across country to 
 the right, found the Nineteenth Corps there on a hill, reformed 
 and making breastworks, while General Emory declared that he 
 would retreat no farther ; that he remained there until the 
 corps fell back under orders from General Wright ; he saw the 
 First Division, Sixth Corps, moving back also, and witnessed 
 the advance of Gordon s and Kershaw s Divisions, "who were 
 slowly and in fine order coming up the slope, their guns throw 
 ing solid shot up the hill at Emory s corps." 
 
 General Wright at 9 A.M. ordered Torbert to throw all the 
 cavalry to the left to hold the pike. 
 
 Finding himself still isolated and unsupported at the cross- 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 219 
 
 road, the country all open and the pike a quarter of a mile 
 distant, after a rest of half an hour Getty moved his division 
 by the flank to the left and rear, soon reached the highway and 
 took up another position three quarters of a mile north of 
 Middletown, the left, the Third Brigade, resting on the pike, 
 the line extending at right angles thereto to the right, across 
 the low valley of Meadow Brook, up the farther slope, and some 
 distance into a tract of open woods, the Vermonters in the 
 centre, Warner s First Brigade on the right. Skirmishers 
 were thrown out well to the front. The troops set to work 
 piling up rude breastworks of rails, rocks and earth, and although 
 expecting an attack at any moment, all drew a long sigh of 
 relief, feeling that now the pike was secured, the worst was 
 over. One gun of Lamb s battery took position behind the 
 line and began replying to the enemy s batteries in Middletown. 
 
 This was a very weak and exposed position ; the left and 
 centre on low ground dominated by that in front and on the 
 left, and the right simply screened by the woods, but a small 
 force of cavalry on the left of the pike was gallantly breasting 
 the village, and Getty took up the most advanced position 
 possible to support them. This was Devin with the Third 
 Brigade of the First Division of cavalry, which had already 
 joined Moore s brigade, and was soon after reinforced by 
 Colonel Charles Russell Lowell with the reserve brigade. 
 Their dismounted troops lined the stone walls in the outskirts 
 of the village, while the mounted squadrons and horse artillery 
 boldly took position in the open fields on the left, as though 
 about to attack, and so completely did the aggressive attitude 
 of these brilliant officers impose upon Early that instead of 
 pushing forward his available and ample force of infantry down 
 the pike, he posted them to resist an attack and secure his right 
 flank. 
 
 Soon after Getty took up his last position, Kidd s brigade, the 
 First of Merritt s First Division of cavalry, arrived and took post 
 on Devin s and Lowell s left, and Custer, leaving Colonel Wil- 
 
220 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 liam Wells of the ist Vermont Cavalry with three regiments 
 to hold Rosser in check, moved over his division and extended 
 the cavalry line still farther on that flank. Moore s brigade 
 was shifted to the extreme left. Thus one division of infantry 
 Getty, held the right of the pike, and two divisions of 
 cavalry, Merritt and Custer, with Moore s brigade of Powell s 
 division, the left. 
 
 The rest of the infantry meantime, by their retrograde move 
 ment, had placed themselves as follows : The First and Third 
 Divisions of the Sixth Corps a mile in rear of Getty, and next 
 the pike ; the Nineteenth Corps somewhat farther to the rear 
 and right, massed and awaiting orders. 
 
 Soon afterwards the Second Brigade of the Third Division, 
 Sixth Corps, moved up and extended Getty s line to the right. 
 Colonel R. B. Hayes with about sixty men of his division of 
 Crook s corps, whom he had kept together all through the 
 varying fortunes of the morning, also reported to Getty, and was 
 placed on the line on the right of Warner s brigade, between the 
 Second and Third Divisions. After the rout of his corps, Hayes 
 and his handful of brave men were forced over to the right, 
 there joined the Third Division when it fell back, and remained 
 with it until he found a place in the front line. 
 
 The other brigade of this division, the First, Colonel William 
 Emerson of the 1 5 ist New York commanding, in the withdrawal, 
 in passing through some woods, lost sight of the Second Brigade 
 which was nearest the pike and became separated from it, and 
 with the First Division reached the pike a mile in rear of Getty s 
 position, as already stated, while the Second Brigade struck the 
 highway not quite as far back, and were the first to respond to 
 Getty s order to conform to the movements of the Second 
 Division. 
 
 It was not long after Getty withdrew from the ridge he had 
 so well defended, when Ramseur and Pegram cautiously moved 
 forward, found it evacuated, and occupied it. Gordon and Ker- 
 shaw came up abreast with them. Early, unduly apprehensive 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 221 
 
 as to his right, shifted a large part of his troops to that flank and 
 moved forward and took up the line of the Old Furnace Road. 
 Wofford s Brigade and Wharton s Division with Payne s cavalry 
 on the extreme right, held the line on his right of the pike, 
 across his right and front of the village ; then came Pegram 
 across the pike and the valley of Meadow Brook, then Ramseur, 
 then Kershaw, and Gordon held his left. 
 
 The enemy s skirmishers soon closed up with Getty s, and 
 from time to time a brisk firing would break out. His batteries 
 from high ground on both sides of the pike and in Middletown 
 kept up a persistent, well-aimed and very uncomfortable shelling, 
 which greatly overmatched the horse-batteries with the cavalry, 
 and compelled them to change positions several times. Lamb s 
 solitary gun behind the infantry kept up a show of answering, 
 more for its moral effect than for any real good. 
 
 About 10 A.M. General Wright rode up to Getty s position. 
 He had been wounded in the face early in the day, and the lower 
 part of it was swollen and bloody. He made no change in the 
 disposition of the troops. 
 
 This lull in the battle broken by artillery firing and desultory 
 skirmishing had lasted about two hours, when, at half past eleven, 
 happening to be looking down the pike, I beheld a horseman on 
 a powerful black charger come tearing at full gallop over the roll 
 of ground and up the road, towards the front. Behind him raced 
 a handful of riders strung out in single file, according to the 
 speed of their steeds. As he drew near, leaving the highway, 
 he dashed across the open ground to the little group consisting 
 of Getty and his staff, reined up his panting, smoking steed, and 
 hastily demanded to know the state of things. In a few words 
 Getty gave him the salient facts. Without further pause, 
 Sheridan, for it was he, rode down to the line of battle a 
 hundred yards in front, and in a ringing voice surcharged with 
 passion and confidence cried out : " Men, by God, we ll whip 
 them yet ! We ll sleep in our old camps to-night ! " The men 
 sprang to their feet and cheered as only men under such circum- 
 
222 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 stances can. Instantly a mighty revulsion of feeling took place. 
 Hope and confidence returned at a bound. No longer did we 
 merely hope that the worst was over, that we could hold our 
 ground until night, or at worst make an orderly retreat to Win 
 chester. Now we all burned to attack the enemy, to drive him 
 back, to retrieve our honor, and sleep in our own camps that 
 night. And every man knew that Sheridan would do it. 
 
 Sheridan, as already stated, left Washington at noon on the 
 1 7th by special train for Martinsburg, and the next day reached 
 Winchester, where he spent the night, and received despatches 
 from Wright that all was quiet at the front. Artillery firing in 
 the direction of Cedar Creek was reported in the morning, but 
 this was attributed to the reconnoissance sent out by Wright 
 finding the enemy. After breakfast, with his staff and escort, 
 and accompanied by Colonels B. S. Alexander and George Thorn 
 of the Engineer Corps, he started to ride up the pike to rejoin 
 his army at Cedar Creek. Scarcely had the cavalcade cleared 
 the skirts of Winchester, when, on surmounting a rise of ground, 
 there burst upon them the appalling sight of crowds of wounded 
 men and fugitives, of wagons and ambulances thronging the road 
 and spread widely over the fields, all hurrying to the rear, the first 
 wave of wreckage from the defeated army. Colonel Wood, the 
 Chief Commissary, rode up just from the front and reported to 
 Sheridan that everything was gone, his headquarters captured 
 and the troops dispersed. For a little way Sheridan walked his 
 horse, considering whether he should rally his troops on Win 
 chester as they came falling back, and attempt to make a stand 
 there, but the heroic resolution flamed up in his heart to go to 
 the front, try to restore the broken ranks of his troops, or, fail 
 ing in that, to share their fate. Directing Colonels Alexander 
 and Thorn and Colonel James W. Forsyth of his staff, with the 
 bulk of the escort, to remain and do what they could to stop the 
 fugitives, with two of his aids, Major George A. Forsyth and 
 Captain Joseph O Keeffe, and twenty of the escort he started 
 for the front at a gallop. As he dashed on, now up the high- 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 223 
 
 road and now over the fields alongside, when the way was blocked 
 by wounded and fugitives, the cry rose among the retreating 
 crowds that Sheridan was back. Mounted officers galloped out on 
 either side of the pike and rallied the men with the inspiring 
 news. Hundreds at once turned back, with enthusiasm and 
 cheers, and started for the front, and a tide of these men flowed 
 up the pike after Sheridan, towards the foe. As he clashed past 
 the crowds Sheridan at times took off his hat and exclaimed : 
 " If I had been with you this morning this disaster would not 
 have happened. We must face the other way, we must go 
 back and recover our camps!" 
 
 This remark seems unjust to Wright and his army. Sheri 
 dan if present might have prevented the surprise by greater 
 vigilance and better picketing on the left, but after Early had 
 been suffered to place his columns in position and surprise the 
 Union army, Achilles himself could not have withstood the 
 terrific force and fury of his well-planned attacks until they had 
 in part spent their force, until Getty s stand had checked their 
 victorious course and made it possible to get the Union army in 
 hand. 
 
 Sheridan reached the field at 11.30 A.M., but it was 4 P.M. 
 before he took the aggressive. No one, impressed with the 
 popular, dramatic legend of Sheridan s exploit at Cedar Creek 
 would imagine that over four long hours were consumed before 
 he brought up the scattered battalions to the battle-line, made 
 his dispositions and was ready to strike. Yet such is the fact, 
 a fact not less creditable to the sagacious and skilful general 
 than the popular story, while the moral effect upon the army 
 of his inspiring presence has never been, and cannot be 
 exaggerated. 
 
 Let us for a moment review the situation on the field when 
 Sheridan arrived. The enemy had driven the whole Union 
 infantry from its fortified positions and camps, with the loss of 
 twenty-four guns and fifteen hundred prisoners, had dispersed 
 Crook s corps completely, and severely disordered and punished 
 
224 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 the Sixth and Nineteenth, had met with scarcely a check except 
 the repulse of his attacks on Getty s division, and advancing in 
 force had taken up a new and strong position north of Middle- 
 town. His infantry, strongly posted behind stone walls, ex 
 tended across the front and considerably to his right of the 
 village, and his lines stretched away to his left across and far 
 beyond Meadow Brook until lost in the woods. Wharton s 
 Division, with Wofford s Brigade of Kershaw s Division, held the 
 right ; next stood Pegram s Division across the pike and reaching 
 beyond Meadow Brook ; then came Ramseur s Division ; then 
 Kershaw s and Gordon s held his left, extending to Marsh Run. 
 
 He displayed forty guns planted in strong and commanding 
 positions along this line ; Payne s scanty brigade of horse cov 
 ered his extreme right. All that part of the line in front of 
 Middletown and as far as the woods beyond Meadow Brook was 
 made immensely strong by the heavy stone walls which lined 
 the Old Furnace Road and bordered the fields, and by a stone 
 mill at the crossing of the road and brook. Open ground, which 
 must be crossed by an attacking force without cover, extended in 
 front. 
 
 There was every reason to expect, and Sheridan did expect, 
 that Early with his victorious troops rested and reformed and 
 deployed and united in one strong battalion, would move onward 
 to the attack at any moment. That he failed to do so was the 
 colossal blunder of the day, which gave his more skilful and 
 vigorous antagonist the opportunity of wresting victory from 
 the jaws of defeat. 
 
 Confronting this formidable and threatening array, Sheridan 
 found nothing but Getty s division of infantry with the Second 
 Brigade of the Third Division and the handful of men that Hayes 
 had kept together, on the right of the pike, extending in a single 
 thin line across the brook and its sunken valley, and into the 
 open woods on the right a short distance, and Merritt s and 
 Custer s divisions of cavalry on the left of the pike. 
 
 There were only two guns, a section of Lamb s 10 Ib 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 225 
 
 Parrotls in rear of the infantry, which coolly fired from time to 
 time in order to impress the enemy with the show of strength. 
 The horse batteries on the left manfully bore the brunt of the 
 enemy s superior artillery, and although several times forced to 
 change position, vigorously kept up their fire. 
 
 " I found," says Sheridan in his report, " on arriving at the 
 front, Merritt s and Ouster s divisions of cavalry and General 
 Getty s division of the Sixth Corps opposing the enemy. I sug 
 gested to General Wright that we should fight on Getty s line 
 and to transfer Custer to the right at once . . . that the re 
 maining two divisions of the Sixth Corps which were to the 
 right and rear of Getty about two miles should be ordered up, 
 and also that the Nineteenth Corps which was to the right and 
 rear of these two divisions should be hastened up before the 
 enemy attacked Getty. I then started out all my staff officers 
 to bring these troops back, and was so convinced that we should 
 soon be attacked that I went back myself to urge them on." 
 
 Under his vigorous hand the troops rapidly moved up and 
 prolonged Getty s line to the right, in the following order : 
 Third and First Divisions, Sixth Corps ; Second and First Divis 
 ions, Nineteenth Corps. All were formed in one line except 
 the First Division, Sixth Corps, and a portion of the Second 
 Division, Nineteenth Corps, which were in two lines, but before 
 the advance the Nineteenth Corps was all extended in one line. 
 Breastworks of rocks, rails, and logs were hastily thrown up. 
 Owing to the losses of the morning the artillery was greatly 
 reduced. Only some twenty guns could be mustered with the 
 infantry. 
 
 Far back on the left of the pike and in the rear of the 
 cavalry, Crook s troops were being placed in line as fast as they 
 could be assembled, but they bore no part in the shock of arms 
 about to open, except part of his artillery. 
 
 Leaving Merritt to confront alone the enemy s infantry on 
 the left of the pike, Custer moved his division to the extreme 
 right. Colonel Wells was still holding Rosser in check. Him 
 
226 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 Custer now forced back by a sharp dash, and then took position 
 on Emory s right. 
 
 The opposing line extended about two miles across a rolling 
 country, much of it wooded, with open fields interspersed, and 
 intersected by stone walls. 
 
 The enemy was superior in artillery, his infantry lines over 
 lapped Sheridan s on both flanks, and he skilfully strengthened 
 his position by taking advantage of the walls and by breastworks. 
 
 Fearful as to his right, Early had placed a division and a 
 brigade of infantry wholly on his right of the pike, where they 
 were confronted only by Union cavalry, so that he had four 
 divisions left to oppose the five divisions of the Sixth and Nine 
 teenth Corps. Yet considering the severe losses in casualties 
 and stragglers on the part of these corps, and the extent of the 
 opposing lines, it was evident that the Union infantry was not 
 more than equal to the Confederate, even on the right of the 
 pike, while the advantage of position was altogether with the 
 latter. Sheridan s infantry, when he attacked, did not exceed 
 eight thousand or eight thousand five hundred. Early mustered 
 one thousand more. 
 
 At the suggestion of Major George A. Forsyth of his staff, 
 Sheridan now rode his new formed line of battle from flank to 
 flank, and, by his inspiring words and presence, imbued his 
 troops with his own enthusiasm and confidence. 
 
 These dispositions were scarcely completed when an attack 
 in some force was made on the left of the Nineteenth Corps, but 
 was repulsed. Sheridan, from high ground on the left, observ 
 ing the movement, sent word to that portion of his line to be 
 ready to meet it ; and to make all safe the Vermont Brigade 
 was withdrawn from Getty s line, moved over to the right, and 
 posted in rear of the threatened point, while two regiments of 
 Getty s Third Brigade, the 43rd and 49th New York, tempora 
 rily filled the gap left by the transfer. The attack was made 
 about one P.M., and on its repulse the Vermonters returned to 
 their former position, not having been called upon. 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 227 
 
 This attack was not pressed home. General Early intrusted 
 it to Gordon with discretionary authority ; and that officer, on 
 driving in the opposing skirmishers, found himself confronted 
 by a well-formed and continuous line, strengthened by breast 
 works to some extent, and wisely gave up the attempt. And 
 thereupon Early abandoned all idea of following up his success 
 further, and ordered the captured artillery and trains sent back. 
 The prisoners taken in the morning had already been hurried 
 to the rear. 
 
 Sheridan was now ready to attack, but stayed his hand in 
 consequence of a report that the enemy was advancing a heavy 
 column of infantry on the Front Royal Road towards Winches 
 ter. Altogether incredulous as to this alarming report, yet 
 mindful of the threatening message taken from the rebel signal 
 flags, " Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, and 
 we will crush Sheridan, James Longstreet, Lieut. Gen l," 
 Sheridan deemed it best to ascertain its truth or falsity before 
 launching his army into the vortex of another great fight. 
 
 Powell, it will be recollected, was posted before the battle 
 on the Front Royal and Winchester Road, with his Second Bri 
 gade holding Lomax in check, and guarding the mouth of the 
 Luray Valley, while Colonel Moore with the First Brigade was 
 posted on his right at Buckton Ford. Warned of the enemy s 
 morning attack by the heavy firing on his right, he held his 
 command in hand awaiting developments. At eight A.M. he re 
 ceived notice from Colonel Moore that he was obliged to fall 
 back to Middletown. At nine A.M., under orders from Torbert 
 to fall back, he slowly retired on the Winchester and Front 
 Royal Road, some five miles to the cross-roads between White 
 Post and Newtown, followed by Lomax at a respectful distance. 
 Thence, by Torbert s orders, he moved across country three 
 miles to Newtown, but was immediately sent back to the cross 
 roads by that officer on learning of Lomax s appearance. This 
 rebel cavalry leader had been fully acquainted with Early s bold 
 and promising plan of attack, and ordered to throw his force 
 
228 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 upon the valley pike in rear of the Union army, and spread 
 havoc and terror there. Although at the head of twenty-five 
 hundred troopers, opposed only by one brigade of horse, and 
 with so much at stake, Lomax spent the entire day in feebly 
 feeling towards Kernstown and Newtown, until at last, satisfied 
 that his side was getting the worst of it, he retreated across 
 Buckton Ford and thence to Front Royal, having inflicted upon 
 his antagonist a loss of one man killed, one wounded, and one 
 taken, total, three. 
 
 Nothing was lost by the delay, for many of Crook s men 
 were collected and joined to their command ; and the strength 
 of the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps was augmented by the return 
 of men who had gone to the rear early in the day. Several 
 hundred of the pickets also, who had been cut off by the morn 
 ing attack, now rejoined their commands. Just before the 
 advance, Colonel Hayes with his little force moved back and 
 across the road, and took post with the rest of Crook s men. 
 
 Assured at last that nothing need be apprehended on his left 
 rear, Sheridan, at four P.M., gave the order to attack. He in 
 tended a general attack by the whole line, combined with a 
 wheeling and turning movement to the left. The orders, as 
 transmitted to Getty, and doubtless to the other commanders, 
 gave clearly the plan, and directed the advance to commence on 
 the left, Getty s division, which was made the pivot and the 
 directing flank, and to be successively taken up by the com 
 mands from left to right. Beginning the attack on the left was 
 clearly a tactical mistake. If the movement had begun on the 
 right the defeat of the enemy would have been even more com 
 plete, and without the severe loss on the Union side caused by 
 attacking the strongest part of the enemy s position first, and 
 before the flanking movement could produce its effect. 
 
 The Union troops now advanced, and a severe and well 
 contested battle ragecl between the opposing lines, along the 
 two miles of rolling and partially wooded country covered by 
 them, with varying fortunes at different points, for over an hour, 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 229 
 
 with the result that the enemy s troops were finally forced back 
 in several places, then broken, and at last gave way and fled in 
 the utmost disorder across the plain to Cedar Creek, pursued by 
 the triumphant Union infantry, shouting and firing in scarce less 
 confusion. So rapidly did they flee that the powerful cavalry 
 on each flank had not time to intercept their flight, and made 
 no captures this side of the creek. 
 
 It is impossible to narrate all that occurred on so extended, 
 and in places hidden, a battlefield. Only a succinct account of 
 the part borne by each command in the fight can here be at 
 tempted, bearing in mind that the events here related in succes 
 sion took place simultaneously. 
 
 Getty s division, having to begin the attack, sprang to their 
 feet from behind their rude breastworks, dressed their ranks, 
 and moved steadily forward in one thin blue line. They were 
 instantly greeted with a severe fire of shell from the enemy s 
 guns, soon followed by the opening crash of his musketry, but 
 without answering a shot the veterans swept resolutely on. 
 The cavalry on the left of the road also advanced, but \vere un 
 able to make any impression on the enemy ; and it \vas here 
 that Colonel Charles Russell Lowell met his second and fatal 
 wound. 
 
 The Third Brigade on the left, advancing rapidly past the 
 cavalry on its left, came under a terrific flanking fire of artillery 
 on its exposed flank, together with a deadly musketry and artil 
 lery in front ; the men fell in heaps, and the brigade broke and 
 fell back to the starting point. Simultaneously the Third Di 
 vision of the Sixth Corps, next on Getty s right, having become 
 somewhat confused in advancing and guiding on the left, and 
 unable to sustain the destructive fire of the enemy secure be 
 hind stone walls, also broke and gave back. The 93rd Regi 
 ment Pennsylvania Volunteers, right regiment of Warner s 
 First Brigade of Getty s division, also fell back in confusion 
 with them. But the centre of the division, the staunch Ver 
 mont Brigade, and the remainder of Warner s brigade, although 
 
230 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 brought to a halt, stood firm, and with the utmost coolness 
 opened so well sustained and effective a hail of musketry 
 upon the gray forms crouching behind the stone walls in front, 
 that their fire visibly slackened. Thus the veterans stubbornly 
 held their ground until the troops on right and left rallied, re 
 formed and advanced again abreast, when the whole division 
 pressed forward, and after a severe struggle drove the enemy 
 from his position in great confusion and pursued him without a 
 pause through Middletown. The Third Brigade gave way be 
 cause they came within a vortex of fire too deadly for any troops 
 to bear, but the readiness with which they made haste to rally 
 and advance again, spurred on by the generous rivalry which 
 had always existed between them and the Vermont Brigade, 
 proved them no wise inferior to their gallant comrades. As 
 they again rushed forward, the enemy s battery, which had 
 shattered their left, and its infantry support, were seen not over 
 fifty yards from the pike. Portions of the 1st Veteran Maine, 
 and the 43rd New York poured a hot volley upon the battery 
 and the flank of the supports, and they hastily fell back. 
 
 The Third Division reformed promptly and advanced a sec 
 ond time, and a severe musketry fight ensued between them 
 and the enemy for three quarters of an hour, while the First Di 
 vision was holding its ground in advance on their right. At length 
 General Wright in person peremptorily ordered the division to 
 charge. Under cover of a stone wall which extended between 
 and at right angles to the opposing lines, a small force led by 
 Captain H. W. Day of the io6th New York, brigade inspect 
 or of the First Brigade, and Lieutenant Colonel M. M. Granger, 
 1 22nd Ohio, was thrown on the left of the opposing line, so as 
 to gain a partially enfilade fire, while the division charged, driv 
 ing the enemy and taking two battle-flags and a considerable 
 number of prisoners. 
 
 When the First Division, Sixth Corps, advanced, it was in 
 two lines. The first line was brought to a halt by a stubborn 
 resistance, but at length both lines charged together and forced 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 231 
 
 the enemy back some distance. Here the First Division was 
 forced to halt in consequence of the repulse of the Third Divi 
 sion, and with its left exposed sustained a severe fire of musket 
 ry and artillery for some time, but when the Third Division ad 
 vanced, they too attacked, and drove the enemy in their front. 
 
 During the advance, Colonel Tompkins placed Stevens 5th 
 Maine Battery of light twelves and Lamb s section of ten-pound 
 er Parrotts in position in rear of Getty s division, and Van 
 Etten s ist New York Light Battery, and Adams G Battery, 
 ist Rhode Island, farther to the right, and all maintained a 
 rapid and effective fire until the enemy gave way. 
 
 It does not appear that the Nineteenth Corps artillery par 
 ticipated in the attack, although a section of the i7th Indiana 
 Light Battery and what was left (three guns without caissons) 
 of the ist Maine Light Battery, were in support. 
 
 The Nineteenth Corps, on advancing, met with the same 
 stubborn resistance as the Sixth. The enemy s line overlapped 
 Emory s right, which at the time was not supported by the 
 cavalry, Custer having broken his connection with the infantry 
 and drawn off to the right to attack Rosser. As the Nineteenth 
 Corps pressed forward, the enemy poured a severe fire into the 
 right and rear of the flanking brigade, the Second of the First 
 Division. Colonel McMillan, its commander, promptly wheeled 
 his brigade to the right and above the flanking force. Evans 
 Brigade of Gordon s Division, which fell back across Cedar Run, 
 then moving to the left he regained his place in line. After a 
 severe struggle the corps drove the enemy from his strong posi 
 tions and through the woods, and its right emerged upon the 
 high open ground, overlooking the valley of Cedar Creek, 
 and came under the fire of the Sixth Corps artillery for a brief 
 time, until it could be stopped. Sheridan himself cheered on 
 this attack. 
 
 The enemy s troops were now everywhere breaking and seek 
 ing safety in flight. On pushing through the village of Middle- 
 town, the fugitives were seen half way across the plain in con- 
 
232 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 fused masses, many running, some turning an instant to fire back 
 and then resuming their flight, but nowhere the semblance of a 
 line or organized body. The Union infantry pursued without 
 waiting to reform, men of different commands all intermixed, 
 shouting and firing, wild with the exhilaration of victory, as far 
 as Cedar Creek and the old camps. 
 
 As the troops were driving the enemy in such disorder 
 through Middletown, a prodigious shouting and cheering was 
 heard far to the rear, and a long line of Crook s men could be 
 seen on the left of the pike, advancing over the plain towards 
 the village. 
 
 An affecting incident occurred when Getty s divisions were 
 pushing through Middletown. A woman came out of one of the 
 houses fast holding by the arm a tall young Vermont soldier 
 fully equipped, who seemed overjoyed to see his comrades, yet 
 somewhat shamefaced withal. " Here is my guard," cried she, 
 weeping and laughing by turns, in a high state of excitement. 
 "This is my house-guard, I have saved my house-guard, I 
 wouldn t let them take my house-guard. See, here he is all 
 safe, musket and all." This was the fact. The man had been 
 posted at her house as a guard before the battle, and was caught 
 there when the enemy occupied the village. When they were 
 about to march him off as a prisoner, the woman protested, and 
 made such an outcry that they desisted and left him unmolested, 
 not even disarming him. It was the practice of the Sixth Corps 
 to place guards at the houses along the line of march and in the 
 vicinity of the camps, usually one man at each house, in order 
 to protect the inhabitants from marauders and stragglers, and 
 these guards were respected not only by them, but by the rebel 
 guerrillas and scouting parties also. Indeed, it was understood 
 that Lee, recognizing the benefits of this practice to his people, 
 had forbidden any one to molest them. 
 
 Crook s Artillery, Batteries B, 5th Massachusetts, and L, ist 
 Ohio, under the able direction of Captain H. A. Dupont, Chief 
 of Artillery, taking position on the left of the pike, engaged the 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 233 
 
 enemy at close quarters until he fell back, and then followed him 
 so closely through Middletown that they were the first guns to 
 reach the creek, and were planted on the height on the right of 
 the road overlooking the stream and the pike winding up Hupp s 
 Hill, now crowded with the retreating columns. From this 
 point they opened an effective and demoralizing fire upon the 
 crowded masses. For a time a Confederate battery manfully 
 replied, firing with great precision and inflicting some casualties. 
 Among others Captain Frank C. Gibbs of the Ohio battery was 
 severely wounded, but the cavalry now charging across the bridge 
 and adjacent fords rapidly dispersed or captured everything in 
 sight. 
 
 Merritt s cavalry division advanced on the left of the pike, 
 Lowell s reserve brigade on the right, next the road, Devin s Sec 
 ond Brigade in the centre, and Kidd s First Brigade, in column of 
 regiments, on the left, but were unable to force the enemy from 
 his strong positions behind the walls and inclosures of Middletown. 
 Lowell charged, but was repulsed with considerable loss, and here 
 received his death-wound. Twice the ist and 6th New York of 
 Devin s brigade, says that officer, charged the town, and each 
 time were compelled to retire under the terrible fire. At length 
 Kidd s brigade forced back the line and a battery in its front, al 
 though receiving a deadly fire from infantry in the woods on its left. 
 Passing around the left of the village, the cavalry moved forward 
 to the creek. Detachments of Kidd s and Lowell s brigades 
 pursued those portions of the enemy which fled by the fords be 
 low, capturing a battle flag and a number of prisoners. Devin 
 first reached the creek at the bridge. The fugitives were already 
 all across, so hastily they fled, and were forming an infantry line 
 athwart the road on the other side, while Dupont s batteries 
 were vigorously shelling the retreating columns. The 6th New 
 York, gallantly led by Lieutenant Blunt of his staff, dashed 
 across the bridge and charged the half formed line, which fired 
 one volley and broke for the woods on the left. Other regiments 
 crossed at the ford below the bridge, and all pushed up the pike 
 
234 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 in pursuit as the shadows of falling night rapidly dropped upon 
 the scene. 
 
 On receiving orders that the general advance was about to 
 commence and to be in readiness to participate in it, Custer, who 
 with his division well extended was on Emory s right, closed his 
 lines to the left and began massing his troops on the level plain in 
 rear of the ridge which overlooks Cupp s Ford. At this juncture 
 the mounted skirmishers of the ever-present Rosser were seen 
 advancing over the ridge. Custer promptly drove them back 
 and discovered Rosser in force on the plain next the creek, one 
 and a half miles from Emory s right. Breaking his connection 
 with the Nineteenth Corps, Custer assailed this force with 
 Pierce s battery and three regiments under Colonel Alexander 
 C. F. Pennington, and forced it back upon the stream, where it 
 was supported by the fire of a battery of four guns. " From the 
 ridge where Pierce s battery was posted," says Custer in his re 
 port, " I could witness the engagement between our and the 
 enemy s line of battle. It was apparent that the wavering in the 
 ranks of the enemy betokened a retreat, and that this retreat 
 might be converted into a rout. For a moment I was unde 
 cided. Upon the right I was confident of my ability to drive 
 the enemy s cavalry, with which I was then engaged, across the 
 creek ; upon my left the chances of success were not so sure, but 
 the advantages to be gained, if successful, overwhelmingly greater. 
 I chose the latter. With the exception of three regiments this 
 entire division was wheeled into column and moved to the left at 
 a gallop, Pierce s battery following at a brisk trot. . . .The 
 design was to gain possession of the pike in rear of the enemy, 
 and by holding the bridge and adjacent fords, cut off his retreat." 
 
 But the enemy s lines, already broken, were falling back to 
 wards the bridge so rapidly that Custer, having the longer dis 
 tance to traverse, was unable to intercept their flight. Crossing 
 the creek at a ford half a mile above the bridge, he dashed up 
 the hill towards the pike with his two leading regiments, ist 
 Vermont and 5th New York, charged and scattered an infantry 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 235 
 
 line which the enemy was striving to form, and without a pause 
 sent the two regiments under Colonel William Wells charging 
 up the pike. At this moment Devin and his men came up from 
 their dashing charge at the bridge and joined in the pursuit at 
 a gallop. 
 
 It was now quite dark. The valley pike between the creek 
 and Strasburg, over Hupp s Hill, a distance of two and a half 
 miles, was thronged with the fugitives and the retreating artil 
 lery and ambulances hastening away from the disastrous field. 
 The broad, macadamized limestone highway, compacted like a 
 solid rock, resounded and re-echoed under the iron-shod hoofs 
 of the galloping squadrons in the ears of the beaten and flying 
 rebels as though ten thousand Yankee troopers, sword in hand, 
 were thundering down upon their defenceless heads. Dropping 
 their muskets by thousands, abandoning their guns and teams 
 in the road, the terrified fugitives scattered right and left, seek 
 ing refuge in the fields and woods, as the charging column with 
 ringing hoof -beats and clashing scabbards, and shout and cheer 
 and carbine shot went thundering past. 
 
 "The darkness of the night," says Custer, " was intense, 
 and was only relieved here and there by the light of a burning 
 wagon or ambulance to which the affrighted enemy in his de 
 spair had applied the torch. This fact alone, while it dis 
 heartened the enemy, increased the ardor and zeal of our troops, 
 who, encouraged by the unparalleled success of their efforts, 
 continued to urge forward their horses at the top of their speed, 
 capturing colors, guns, caissons, wagons, ambulances, and im 
 mense numbers of prisoners." 
 
 The pursuit never slackened until Fisher s Hill was reached, 
 where a piece of artillery, the last one captured, was secured. 
 Forty-five pieces of artillery, including the twenty-four taken by 
 Early in the morning, hundreds of wagons and ambulances and 
 hundreds of prisoners were the fruits reaped by this dashing 
 and vigorous pursuit. 
 
 Yet while giving credit to the brave cavalrymen, one cannot 
 
236 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 refrain from admitting the part taken by a slight accident, with 
 out which the greater part of Early s artillery and trains would 
 probably have escaped. 
 
 Half a mile beyond Strasburg the pike crosses a small creek 
 by a wooden bridge only thirty feet long. The left hand or 
 lower side of this bridge was broken down, but over half of it 
 remained intact and afforded ample and safe room for anything 
 on wheels. Some frightened teamster in his haste had driven 
 too near the broken side of the bridge, running the wheels on 
 that side off the sound part, and had left the wagon half upset, 
 hanging on the edge, the lower wheels dangling over the broken 
 planks and the stream. A single, sturdy shove would have 
 thrown it over and cleared the way. But this trifling obstruc 
 tion, which any man who kept his head could have cleared away 
 in a few minutes, blocked the whole retreating column of guns 
 and trains behind it, by which the road was jammed full for 
 some distance in an almost solid mass. 
 
 The First Division, and the Fourth Brigade, Second Divis 
 ion of the Nineteenth Corps, after two hours rest, were sent 
 forward to Strasburg to aid in securing the immense captures. 
 The other troops returned to their old camps and sought needed 
 rest and food. What alternations of fear and hope, of flight 
 and pursuit, of defeat and victory, had they not felt in the space 
 of a single day ! How they talked over the varied scenes and 
 emotions that they had passed through, lamented the loss of 
 comrades tried and true, and exulted over their success. Well 
 had Sheridan fulfilled his confident words: "Men, we ll whip 
 them yet ; we ll sleep in our old camps to-night." 
 
 But, during the long hours of that damp, chilly autumn night, 
 Early s beaten and scattered soldiers, exhausted by twenty-four 
 hours of incessant marching and fighting, half famished, with 
 hopes and spirits crushed by their overwhelming defeat, were 
 wandering singly or in squads, seeking safety by flight, in the 
 darkness, through woods and fields. Many crossing the river 
 took to the mountains ; many avoiding the pike, fled up the 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 237 
 
 valley, picking their way across country, and many sank ex 
 hausted and despairing on the ground, gladly surrendering to the 
 Union pickets on the morrow when daylight revealed their lurking 
 places. The next morning the roadsides from Cedar Creek to 
 Strasburg were simply lined with muskets flung away by the 
 flying troops. The beaten enemy continued his flight, without 
 semblance of order or formation, twenty-five miles to New 
 market, where, as Major Jed. Hotchkiss says, the men in some 
 degree "sorted themselves." A small cavalry force remained 
 over night at Fisher s Hill, but fell back on the approach of 
 Merritt s division the next morning. 
 
 Early s loss was, killed and wounded (about) 2250 
 
 Prisoners 1250 
 
 3500 
 
 Twenty-four guns, fourteen battle-flags, fifty-six ambulances, 
 were captured, and many wagons and ambulances were destroyed 
 by the cavalry. 
 
 General Ramseur was mortally wounded and captured, and 
 died the next morning, and General Culler A. Battle was wounded. 
 The Union loss all told amounted to 
 
 Killed 644 
 
 Wounded 343 
 
 Captured 1591 
 
 5661 
 
 Of the Sixth Corps, General D. D. Bidwell was killed ; 
 Generals Wright and Ricketts and Colonels Penrose, Hamblin, 
 and R. S. McKenzie, commanding brigades, were wounded. 
 Colonel Thoburn commanding First Division, Crook s corps, 
 was killed ; and Colonel Kitching was mortally wounded. Col 
 onel Charles Russell Lowell was mortally wounded. General 
 Cuvier Grover, commanding Second Division, Nineteenth Corps, 
 was wounded. 
 
 The table oi; casualties in this battle, as in all others, throws 
 much light upon the part borne by the several commands. 
 
 As was to be expected from the surprise of the attack, 
 Crook s corps, including Kitching s force, lost mostly in pris- 
 
238 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 oners, having five hundred and fifty-eight officers and men taken, 
 four hundred and two killed or wounded ; total, nine hundred 
 and sixty. 
 
 Three-fifths of the prisoners were captured on the picket- 
 line largely in consequence of their own lack of vigilance. 
 
 The Nineteenth Corps lost even more prisoners, seven hun 
 dred and ninety, while the killed and wounded amounted to 
 sixteen hundred and ninety-three ; total loss, twenty-three hun 
 dred and eighty-three. The losses in killed and wounded were 
 heaviest in the First Division, although only half as large as 
 the second in numbers ; but the latter lost twice as many pris 
 oners as the former. The Second Division, it will be remem 
 bered, held the left of the Nineteenth Corps position on the 
 pike, and were assailed by Kershaw in flank, Wharton in front 
 and Gordon in rear, almost simultaneously. 
 
 The Sixth Corps lost only two hundred prisoners, half of 
 whom were taken on picket, an entire company of the 2d Con 
 necticut Heavy Artillery being surrounded and captured by 
 Rosser without fault of its commander. It lost in killed and 
 wounded, nineteen hundred and twenty-aix. Getty s division 
 suffered the heaviest, six hundred and seventy-seven ; the First 
 Divison, four hundred and seventy ; the Third, six hundred and 
 sixty. Getty s division met with its greatest loss in carrying 
 the enemy s strong position at Middletown in the afternoon. 
 But taking the fighting of the entire day, it undoubtedly in 
 flicted a heavier loss upon the enemy than it suffered. The 
 next day, according to the report of the division ordnance com 
 mander, Captain Gifford, nine hundred and one muskets were 
 gathered up from the ground fought over by the division, of 
 which four hundred and sixty-one were Enfield muskets, an 
 arm peculiar to the Confederate infantry. 
 
 Considering the really important part borne by the cavalry 
 in this battle, and the claims often advanced that the cavalry 
 saved the army and the day, one is astonished to learn that the 
 entire loss of the three divisions aggregated only one hundred 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 239 
 
 and ninety-six, of which twenty-nine were killed, one hundred 
 and twenty-four wounded and forty-three captured. Getty s 
 single division suffered about four times the loss of the entire 
 cavalry. 
 
 Even Custer himself, after confronting the rebel infantry all 
 the morning, first on the right and then on the left, after in the 
 afternoon twice attacking and then driving back Rosser after 
 his dashing and successful charge and pursuit on the pike, 
 which resulted in such enormous captures, lost just two men 
 killed, one officer and twenty-three men wounded, and eight 
 men captured ; total thirty-four ; while Powell s Second Division 
 lost only ten men all told, seven of whom belonged to Moore s 
 brigade, which first held the pike in rear of Middletown. 
 
 The hardest fighting by the cavalry was done by Merritt s 
 First Division, in rear of Middletown, on Getty s left. Here 
 Lowell, nobly aided by Devin, held the rebel infantry at bay 
 for hours, lining the stone walls with his dismounted troopers, 
 and repeatedly though fruitlessly charging the enemy at the 
 head of his mounted squadrons, until he was twice wounded 
 and died gloriously pro patria, the most distinguished and the 
 most lamented of all the brave men who fell on that field. 
 Merritt s loss was one hundred and forty-nine, of which Kidd s 
 First Brigade lost eighty-eight, Devin, Second Brigade, twenty- 
 four, and Lowell, Reserve Brigade, thirty-seven. 
 
 With this exception it may be said that Cedar Creek was a 
 great infantry fight at which the cavalry assisted by their 
 presence. 
 
 Few battles afford a more striking instance of the great 
 moral effect that can be produced by a powerful cavalry when 
 skilfully manoeuvred without being heavily engaged, and that 
 the cavalry was handled with great judgment and skill on this 
 occasion is undeniable. 
 
 When Gordon swept everything before him from flank to 
 flank of the Union positions, and stood triumphant on the right, 
 it was the sight of the cavalry forming across the country on 
 
240 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 his left front, with the infantry rallying behind their lines, that 
 deterred him from instantly following up his success and made 
 him delay further advance until he could reform his troops, dis 
 ordered by their long and successful charge. What timely and 
 effective aid the cavalry rendered in encouraging the broken 
 infantry to reform, and in actually stopping hundreds of 
 fugitives and driving them back to their colors ! To have 
 hurled the cavalry directly upon Early s veteran and victorious 
 infantry would have been simply folly. General Wright 
 evinced sound judgment in throwing all the cavalry on the 
 left to secure the pike, for that was a vital point, and the most 
 exposed. And what could be finer than the way Lowell and 
 Devin held the highway at Middletown on Getty s left ! Un 
 doubtedly it was their resolute and aggressive attitude and the 
 sight of Getty s infantry and their Sixth Corps crosses which 
 had just repulsed three of his divisions so roughly that de 
 terred Early from boldly advancing down the pike. He had 
 ample forces in hand, the three divisions of Pegram, Ramseur 
 and Wharton, and a brigade of Kershaw. The cavalry could 
 not have withstood their onset, and then Getty, flanked on his 
 left, would have been forced back and his fine division probably 
 badly crippled. All the Union forces would have gone tum 
 bling back to Winchester, and Early would have reaped all the 
 spoils and prestige of a great victory. 
 
 For several hours fortune thus tempted Early, but he failed 
 to seize the opportunity, and with Sheridan s arrival it 
 vanished. 
 
 Dread of the Union cavalry paralyzed both Rosser and 
 Lomax. Colonel Wells, with three regiments, held the former 
 at bay all the morning, and the latter did not even make an 
 effort worthy of the name. The enemy s cavalry was so com 
 pletely cowed by their whipping at Tom s Brook that it has 
 been well said that the fruits of that brilliant fight were reaped 
 at Cedar Creek. 
 
 The disposition of a division of horse on each flank for the 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 241 
 
 final attack, showed Sheridan s accustomed skill, and it was 
 not their fault that when the enemy gave way he fled so rapidly 
 that they could not flesh their sabres nor intercept his flight. 
 Yet it should be remarked that Merritt could make no im 
 pression on the enemy until the universal rout occurred, and 
 that Custer, drawing off to the right to fight Rosser, left 
 Emory s right unsupported and outflanked by the enemy s 
 infantry lines, and only the prompt change of front by his 
 right brigade and its vigorous attack on the enemy s flanking 
 force prevented disaster at that point. 
 
 The plain fact is that the enemy s infantry in a hard, stand- 
 up fight of an hour, in which they had the advantage of num 
 bers, superior artillery and position, were beaten by the Sixth 
 and Nineteenth Corps and driven in confusion which rapidly 
 degenerated into rout. The knowledge that the powerful 
 Union cavalry might cut them off, and perhaps the sight by 
 some of the broken line on the left, of Glister s column gal 
 loping swiftly across their left rear, undoubtedly hastened their 
 flight. 
 
 If the general fight had commenced from the right, in 
 stead of the left, it is hard to see how the bulk of Early s army 
 could have escaped capture. Yet the fact that Sheridan ordered 
 it the other way is enough to make one consider well before he 
 ventures the criticism. Doubtless he designed to fully engage 
 and occupy the enemy all along his line, in order that the 
 turning movement might be the more unexpected, irremediable 
 and decisive. If the rebel infantry had clung to their position 
 only twenty minutes longer, they must nearly all have been 
 captured. 
 
 The astonishing success of Pearly s morning attack was 
 fairly earned by the boldness of the plan and the remarkable 
 skill, precision and vigor with which his brave troops executed 
 it. It was a fine illustration of the maxim that in war the 
 boldest often succeeds the best. Yet it could not have suc 
 ceeded had not the way been opened by the inexcusable care- 
 
242 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 lessness and mistakes of his opponents. And first, Crook s 
 picket line, instead of being pushed out in front of Cedar 
 Creek a mile at least from his camps, was posted along the 
 stream less than half that distance in front of them. Second, 
 the fact that the greater portion of the pickets was captured in 
 the first rush of Kershaw s Division, proves that they were 
 unprepared even to retreat, far less to resist. The day after 
 the battle, Getty s division occupied an advanced post at Stras- 
 burg, and many fugitives were picked up as his pickets were 
 thrown out. Some of these belonged to Kershaw s Division, 
 and stated that when they advanced in the morning attack they 
 found the picket reserves fast asleep in rail pens, and captured 
 them all without firing a shot. They probably supposed, from 
 the report brought in by the reconnoissance the day before the 
 battle, that the enemy was miles away retreating up the valley, 
 and this, while it cannot excuse such negligence, helps to account 
 for it. On the other hand, officers of Crook s command claim 
 that the alarm was given by the pickets a good half hour before 
 the attack. It is probable enough that some of the outposts 
 in a long extended picket line observed and reported the 
 presence of the enemy, but if so the reports not being verified 
 by the picket reserves were treated as mere alarms. Certainly, 
 had the pickets been properly posted and duly vigilant, Ker- 
 shaw could not have formed his lines close to the creek, with 
 out their knowledge, nor crossed the stream without such 
 resistance offered by the reserve lining the banks as would 
 have loudly notified all of the attack in ample time to prepare 
 to meet it. 
 
 Third, the fords across the North Fork on the left, just 
 be ow the mouth of Cedar Creek, should have been strongly 
 held by the cavalry, and an advance post or picket thrown out 
 to occupy the roads and railroad on the opposite bank, between 
 the river and the mountain, which gave direct communication 
 between Strasburg and Front Royal. Instead of which, Moore s 
 cavalry brigade was posted two miles below at Buckton Ford, 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 243 
 
 and only a few viclettes watched the fords above and connected 
 with the infantry pickets. In fact, Wright was unduly appre 
 hensive as to his right, and regarding the river and mountain as 
 a protection on his left, never thought that they might be a 
 cover to the enemy s attack. Early s plan was hardly appre 
 hensible. Wright, an able and approved soldier, showed more 
 than usual vigilance in ordering the reconnoissance at daylight 
 on both flanks. 
 
 There was no circumstance to which Early was more in 
 debted for the overwhelming success of his attacks than the 
 early morning fog, which, overspreading the entire field, ren 
 dered it impossible for the Union troops to discern the attacking 
 columns until they were directly upon them, or to distinguish 
 friend from foe at any distance, to know the positions or fate of 
 the next commands, or even to see to guard their flanks until 
 too late. In a word, it made confusion worse confounded, while 
 the enemy, knowing thoroughly the ground and the Union posi 
 tions, carrying out a well-studied plan, and taking the aggres 
 sive, were free from such perplexities. Had the morning been 
 clear, in all probability the Sixth Corps would have repelled the 
 attack at Meadow Run and enabled the Nineteenth Corps to 
 reform there, and then the two corps would have advanced, and 
 in a fair, stand-up fight on the open plain along the pike, would 
 have driven the enemy across Cedar Creek, fortunate indeed if 
 the powerful Union horse had not cut off his retreat to Stras- 
 burg, and forced him, with the loss of all his artillery and ambu 
 lances, to take refuge in the Massanuttan Range. This would 
 have surely been the result if the left had not been so com 
 pletely and culpably surprised, and by this fact the real temerity 
 of Early s move can be seen. It was, in fact, one of those 
 desperate attempts, which nothing but dire necessity can justify, 
 and nothing but success can prevent from being condemned. 
 Yet Early s situation fully justified the attempt. The morning s 
 battle was a most remarkable and glorious achievement, and 
 would have caused him and his army to live long in story and 
 
244 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 in song, had it not been overshadowed by the afternoon s reverse. 
 How he failed to perfect and secure his victory by resolutely 
 advancing down the pike beyond Middletown, has already been 
 described. Well for him had he pressed his attack with the 
 same audacity with which he commenced it. Early s critics, 
 friend and foe alike, loudly condemn his inaction at this critical 
 point, now that they all see the situation clearly enough. 
 But things appeared very differently to the Confederate com 
 mander in the skirts of Middletown, as amidst the fog and 
 smoke he saw his reserve division driven back, and received the 
 report of Wharton, its commander, that his troops were repulsed 
 and the Sixth Corps advancing. Early supposed that the whole 
 Sixth Corps, and not merely a single division, confronted him 
 on the ridge. He did not know the full success of his flanking 
 columns, that not only the Eighth and Nineteenth Corps, but 
 two divisions of the Sixth, were driven far to the right and rear, 
 and put hors dn combat for the time. Under these circum 
 stances, with such light as he had, Early acted the part of a 
 prudent and skilful general ; acted as nine good generals out of 
 ten, standing in his shoes, would have done. He only lacked 
 the intuitive judgment or inspiration of genius. And next to 
 his own failure to advance, his greatest misfortune was the 
 arrival of Sheridan on the battle-field, but for which he would 
 have saved all that he had gained, at least. 
 
 Sheridan it was, and Sheridan alone, who restored the con 
 fidence and morale of his army at a bound, ranged the dis 
 jointed commands in united battle order, inspired them with the 
 determination to win and confidence of success, and hurled them 
 on the foe with such vigor and skill, that the more he resisted, 
 the worse was bound to be his defeat. 
 
 And it was Getty, whose prompt, sound judgment in seizing 
 the ridge, and steadfast courage and tenacity in holding it, 
 arrested the enemy s victorious onslaught and paralyzed the 
 judgment and energy of the Confederate commander. It was 
 Getty who, for hours unsupported save by the cavalry on his 
 
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK 245 
 
 left, unflinchingly maintained the lino which alone made it pos 
 sible for Sheridan to retrieve the day. 
 
 One of Sheridan s first despatches to Grant after the battle 
 contained the following request : " General, I want Getty of the 
 Sixth Corps, and the brave boys, Merritt and Custer, promoted 
 by brevet ; " and in his report and memoirs he has always ac 
 knowledged Getty s services on that day. 
 
 Early has endeavored to cast the blame for his own failure 
 upon his troops, alleging that they stopped and scattered to 
 plunder the Union camps ; and his aspersions have been re 
 peated in most accounts of the battle. This charge can only 
 apply to Kershaw s and Gordon s Divisions, for Ramseur and 
 Pegram struck far in rear of the camps, and there encountered 
 Wheaton s division, First of Sixth Corps, which they drove 
 back, and Getty s division, by which they were in turn repulsed ; 
 and Wharton s Division, after crossing the creek, moved directly 
 by the pike to Middletown and attacked Getty on the ridge, 
 and was also thrown off. These troops, and Wofford s Brigade 
 of Kershaw s Division besides, which had become separated and 
 did not join his other brigades in sweeping down Emory s works, 
 had not suffered much, and were in good order and perfectly 
 available for any movement. And although Gordon s and Ker 
 shaw s troops were necessarily exhausted and scattered after 
 charging the entire length of the Union camps, a good two 
 miles, and overcoming no little resistance, it took that officer 
 only an hour to collect and reform his men, advance again, and 
 flank Getty out of his position on the ridge. General B. W. 
 Crowninshield, 2d Massachusetts Cavalry, Sheridan s provost 
 marshal, witnessed this advance, and speaks with praise of the 
 admirable order and steadiness of the enemy s troops. It is evi 
 dent that there was no serious delay, straggling, nor demoraliza 
 tion among them, even admitting that they picked up the shelter- 
 tents, blankets, and clothing abandoned by Crook s and Emory s 
 men, and stripped the dead. None of the other Confederate 
 officers make the same accusation, and several indignantly deny 
 
246 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 it. Wherefore it may be dismissed as grossly exaggerated, 
 equally unjust to those brave and tried soldiers, and discredit 
 able to the beaten general who uttered it to excuse himself. 
 Somewhat to the surprise of most of his officers, Sheridan took 
 no steps to fix upon any one the blame of the reverse of the 
 morning. He was satisfied with the result, and remarked that 
 " the accident of the morning turned to our advantage as much 
 as though the whole movement had been planned." 
 
 "This battle," he said in his report, "practically ended the 
 campaign in the Shenandoah Valley. When it opened it found 
 our enemy boastful and confident, unwilling to acknowledge 
 that the soldiers of the Union were his equals in courage and 
 manliness ; when it closed with Cedar Creek, this impression 
 had been removed from his mind, and gave place to good sense 
 and a strong desire to quit fighting. The very best troops of 
 the Confederacy had not only been defeated, but had been 
 routed in successive engagements until their spirit and esprit 
 were destroyed." 
 
THE CAPTURE OF JACKSON 
 
THE CAPTURE OF JACKSON 
 
 BY 
 
 LIEUTENANT SETII A. RANLETT, U.S.V. 
 
 THE movement upon Jackson may be said to have begun 
 simultaneously with the surrender of Vicksburg. During the 
 investment and siege of this stronghold, a large force of Con 
 federates under General Joseph E. Johnston, who was one of 
 their ablest generals, was threatening to fall upon the besieging 
 army, and, assisted by a vigorous sortie of General Pemberton s 
 forces, unite their commands and rescue the latter. 
 
 Such a movement was, in fact, planned for the seventh of 
 July, and by scouts word was sent to General Pemberton on the 
 night of the 3d, to co-operate with Johnston s attack, but too 
 late, for negotiations were then in progress for the surrender, 
 and on the 5th, upon hearing of the surrender, instead of cross 
 ing the Big Black River to attack us, Johnston issued his orders 
 to retreat upon Jackson, and made his dispositions to defend the 
 Capital. 
 
 General Grant, with his customary foresight, had, some days 
 prior to the surrender, matured his plans to turn upon Johnston 
 and drive him from the State. 
 
 For this purpose, he had appointed General Sherman to lead 
 the expeditionary force, which was to consist of his own corps, 
 the Fifteenth, General Ord s Thirteenth Corps and the Ninth 
 Corps under General Parke, to which was temporarily assigned 
 General Smith s division of the Sixteenth Corps. In General 
 Grant s Official Report of the Vicksburg Campaign he says : 
 
 " Johnston, however, not attacking, I determined to attack him the moment 
 Vicksburg was in our possession, and accordingly notified Sherman that I should 
 
 249 
 
250 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 again make an assault upon Vicksburg at daylight on the 6th, and for him to 
 have np supplies of all descriptions ready to move upon receipt of orders, if the 
 assault should prove a success. His preparations were immediately made, and 
 when the place surrendered on the 4th, two days earlier than I had fixed for the 
 attack, Sherman was ready and moved at once," etc. 
 
 After the battle of Fredericksburg, when General Burnside 
 resigned command of the Army of the Potomac and took com 
 mand of the Department of the Ohio, he asked permission to 
 take his own corps, the Ninth, with him. 
 
 Two divisions of the corps, the First and Second, went 
 west, the Third remaining in Virginia. Four Massachusetts 
 Regiments, the 2ist, 29th, 35th and 36th went with the corps 
 to Kentucky, but only the three latter to Vicksburg, the 2ist 
 remaining in Kentucky during that summer, so fateful to the 
 corps. And thus our two divisions, largely composed of East 
 ern and New England men, found themselves a part of the 
 Army of the Tennessee, men who were known to fame as 
 the veterans of Shiloh, Donelson and other western battles. 
 They were disposed to look upon us with somewhat of con 
 tempt, and there was little cordiality of feeling for us at first ; 
 under their high slouch hats they laughed at our jaunty 
 McClellan caps. In set-up and soldierly appearance our men 
 were greatly their superiors, and to us there was little dif 
 ference in their looks, save in the color of the dress, from the 
 Confederates. They felt annoyed, too, to think that we 
 had been summoned from the east to help them out of 
 what looked like a bad scrape. Many of our regiments had 
 been in the war from the very first and bore on their flags the 
 names of most of the eastern battles from Bull Run to Fred 
 ericksburg, and they were not men to put up with any patron 
 izing. But these strained relations all disappeared after the 
 Jackson affair, and we returned north with their good opinion 
 and soldierly friendship and the highest encomiums of their 
 officers. 
 
 About 10 A.M. of the 4th of July, while we were rejoicing 
 over the surrender of the great stronghold, with its thirty thou- 
 
THE CAPTURE OF JACKSON 251 
 
 sand prisoners, orders came for us to move at once in light march 
 ing order, without tents or baggage, on the road to the Big 
 Black River. The "general" call was sounded and I rode out 
 and called in a picket of our regiment, which was picketing a 
 road leading eastward through the woods ; a very uncanny place 
 it was, too, in the night. The remainder of our brigade, which 
 had been stationed at Oak Ridge, marched without waiting 
 for us, and so rapidly that we could not overtake them until the 
 next day. Ours was the First Brigade, First Division, consist 
 ing of the /th and 2/th Michigan, 45th Pennsylvania and 
 36th Massachusetts. It was commanded by Colonel Henry 
 Bowman of the 36th and his assistant adjutant general 
 was Major William H. Hodgkins. Major E. T. Raymond was 
 his inspector general. The 36th was under the command of 
 Lieutenant Colonel John B. Norton of Charlestown, who had 
 been a captain in the 5th Massachusetts at Bull Run, a brave 
 and popular officer. The division was commanded by Brigadier 
 General Thomas Welsh, a former colonel of the 45th Penn 
 sylvania. He died at Cincinnati just after our Mississippi 
 campaign of disease contracted therein. 
 
 There were few, if any, better regiments in the service than 
 the 45th Pennsylvania, and between it and ours there always 
 existed the warmest regard and even affection, as peril after 
 peril shared together produced such a bond as only soldiers 
 know. We were brigaded together from the beginning to 
 the end of our service. They welcomed us as comrades in the 
 mountains of Maryland in September, 62 veterans then them 
 selves of long service, and escorted the regiment to the boat in 
 Alexandria in June, 65 when it left for home, their term as re- 
 enlisted veterans still incomplete. These few words may per 
 haps appear hardly germane to the subject, but they may make 
 matters to be spoken of later, better understood. 
 
 The movement upon Jackson was, therefore, soon in full 
 progress. Three full army corps, with plenty of artillery, some 
 cavalry, and with General Sherman in command had taken 
 
252 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 the field, unencumbered with any baggage, in the hottest month 
 of the year, and the hottest rebel state. 
 
 The army moved in three columns directly east to the 
 Big Black River, the Ninth Corps taking the roads north of the 
 railroad, the Fifteenth Corps, the centre, by the nearest roads 
 to Messenger s Ford, and the Thirteenth along the line of the 
 railroad, all within supporting distance. 
 
 The country over which our column marched was not ill- 
 adapted to military movements, being comparatively level and 
 not swampy except near the river. We passed over some very 
 large and thrifty-looking plantations, through corn-fields of vast 
 extent and most luxuriant growth. Standing in my stirrups 
 and reaching up with my sword I could not touch the tops of 
 the stalks. This afforded us plenty of fodder for our animals, 
 and for lack of other food, we found it meant roast-corn for our 
 own breakfast, dinner and supper. It was an agreeable change 
 from a hard-tack diet. All suffered much for water; the intense 
 heat and dust naturally created an intolerable thirst, and the 
 only way to allay it was to chew the leaves of the trees. 
 As the Confederates retreated they polluted the water, leaving 
 dead animals in the creeks and ponds and even throwing kero 
 sene and filth into wells and cisterns. Only those whose lips 
 have cracked and tongues swollen with thirst know what it 
 means to suffer for water. 
 
 Upon reaching the Big Black River at Birdsong s Ferry on 
 the 6th, our brigade was detailed to build a bridge. At this 
 point the river was not very wide or deep, but the steep banks 
 made it difficult to approach. Parties scattered in all directions 
 and returned with timber and boards from farm buildings and 
 fence rails. These were floated out and bound together with 
 withes in such a way that a floating bridge was constructed 
 strong enough to bear men and horses passing a few at a time. 
 We worked all day and night of the 6th and until noon of the 
 7th on this bridge. The First Division had passed over it 
 safely, and two brigades of the Second Division, when, as 
 
THE CAPTURE OF JACKSON 253 
 
 Durrell s Battery was crossing, the bridge suddenly broke and 
 was swept away, cutting off Colonel Griffin s brigade, General 
 Smith s division and most of the artillery. This was sent round 
 to Messenger s Crossing and by means of rafts and a ferry-boat 
 found sunk in the river and raised, the infantry was ferried over 
 during the afternoon and night of the 7th. This accident 
 greatly delayed the movement of the corps, which was forced 
 to halt till the afternoon of the 8th for the delayed troops and 
 artillery. The day we crossed the river the heat was some 
 thing fearful and many of the men were overcome by it. Late 
 in the afternoon there came up one of those thunder showers 
 for which the Black River valley is famous. The lightning was 
 appalling ; the rain fell in torrents and the roads soon became 
 little better than a quagmire. No orders came to halt and the 
 troops plodded on as best they could. Some of the artillery 
 became mired and badly hindered the movement of the infantry. 
 Darkness came on and the storm continued, showing no signs 
 of holding up. Finally, Colonel Norton s horse and my own 
 became terrified and unmanageable, and we were forced to dis 
 mount and lead them, their plunging making it dangerous for 
 the men around us. It was at this time that Quartermaster 
 Hawes of the 35th Massachusetts was killed by a falling 
 limb, and about nine o clock in the evening Major Robert 
 Parrett of the zooth Indiana in General Smith s division was 
 also killed by a falling tree. It was a fearful night, and though 
 our corps in its campaigning over six states saw some pretty 
 tough times, no one has ever questioned the fact that that 
 night " took the cake." At length the order came to go into 
 bivouac, and our brigade marched into an old cotton-field, ankle- 
 deep in mud, and stacked arms. 
 
 After much hard work some fires were started, and then fol 
 lowed a dipper of hot coffee, a good soldierly growl, a pipe, 
 and sleep. Many graphic incidents of this march upon 
 Jackson are and will ever be in my memory, and alone would 
 make a lengthy story, but I must pass them over and come to 
 the event to which they all led. 
 
254 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, is situated on the west 
 or right bank of the Pearl River, forty miles east of Vicksburg : 
 an important junction of railroads from north to south and 
 east to west. It is pleasantly situated in an undulating coun 
 try, a commanding site, overlooking the adjacent territory. In 
 addition to the State House there were the Insane Asylum, 
 Deaf and Dumb Asylum, City Hall, and many fine private 
 residences. It was not only a commercial, but a manufacturing 
 centre, with car-shops, cotton warehouses and factories. Its 
 loss would mean the loss of Mississippi to the Confederates, to 
 say nothing of the moral effect, and it was expected that it 
 would be desperately defended. During the siege of Vicksburg, 
 and in anticipation of its fall, the capital had been fortified by 
 a line of rifle-pits and forts on the three sides, north, west and 
 south, the Pearl River covering the east side. This fortified 
 line extended around the city about a mile distant from it, not 
 far enough out really as a protection against artillery. At 
 several points of the line forts had been constructed by skilful 
 engineers and embrasured for many guns, and these were 
 manned with heavy artillery, some pieces as large as 64 pound 
 rifled siege-guns. I bear in memory one of these guns that 
 gave us no rest : even when in reserve its missiles found us, and 
 it required constant watching. Their rifle-pits were so planned 
 as to take advantage of every slight elevation, zig-zagged so as to 
 command every approach, and trees and bushes had been cut 
 away in front and slashed, making a natural and almost impen 
 etrable abatis. 
 
 Within these defences were four strong divisions of infan 
 try, cavalry and artillery, all veterans, under Generals Loring, 
 French, Walker, and Breckenridge, numbering, according to an 
 official report of June 25th, 31,226 officers and men; with 
 ample field and siege artillery. Included in this number was 
 the cavalry division of thirty-six hundred under General Jackson, 
 operating in the field outside the city. It largely outnumbered 
 the cavalry with General Sherman, and compelled him to 
 
THE CAPTURE OF JACKSON 255 
 
 detach infantry to meet threatened attacks upon trains coming 
 from the rear with ammunition and supplies. Our entire force, 
 according to an official report of June 3Oth, numbered 48,935 
 officers and men : not much superior to Johnston s, considering 
 that his forces fought behind powerful intrenchments. 
 
 Our cavalry numbered only twenty-six hundred and was 
 under command of Colonel Cyrus Bussey of the 30! Iowa 
 Cavalry. 
 
 For six days the army pushed steadily forward, necessarily 
 with caution, and ready at any moment to form line of battle ; hav 
 ing an enemy in front who might be heavily re-enforced by troops 
 from General Lee or Bragg; an enemy, too, of veterans led by an 
 able general, who would gladly lead us into a trap if possible. 
 
 We were short, also, of ammunition, the trains being far 
 behind and a battle and check might have been serious. But 
 we all had great faith in Uncle Billy, or " Old Tecump " as some 
 of the Western men called him. On we tramped, over the 
 burning roads and in the intolerable dust, or perhaps through 
 shady bottom lands among great trees hung with Spanish moss, 
 and then across cotton or corn fields, an object of never ending 
 interest to the plantation blacks who thronged the road-side and 
 knew that liberty followed our flags ; greeting Massa Linkum s 
 sogers with " hallelujahs " and antics of joy, both ludicrous and 
 pathetic at the same time. 
 
 It was about three o clock in the afternoon of July roth when 
 the Ninth Corps, the First Brigade, First Division leading, 
 debouched from the woods into the open country in sight of the 
 Capital. In all my experience I cannot recall a more glorious 
 sight than we looked upon then and there. An open valley 
 stretched away to our front, through which from north to 
 south ran the Jackson and Northern Railroad. Far away 
 beyond the distant slopes, covered with suburban residences, 
 clumps of woods, corn-fields and gardens, we saw the city of 
 Jackson. Down the valley to our right, their muskets flash 
 ing in the light of the westering sun, and colors waving in 
 
256 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 the breeze, our comrades of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Corps 
 were deploying into line of battle, while in our and their front, 
 the active forms of the skirmishers, covering the entire battle 
 line, were pushing ahead and feeling for the enemy. Our line 
 was quickly formed and advanced, the First Brigade on the 
 right of the division, the 45th Pennsylvania skirmishing on our 
 front, the 36th Massachusetts holding the extreme right of the 
 division. 
 
 Continuing our line to the left was the Third Brigade, the 
 2d, 8th and 2oth Michigan, 79th New York and looth Penn 
 sylvania. The First, Second and Third Brigades of the Second 
 Division, commanded respectively by Colonel Simon G. Griffin, 
 Brigadier General Edward Ferrero, and Colonel B. C. Christ, 
 followed in our support. 
 
 As we moved forward we established connection with Colonel 
 Hick s brigade of General Smith s division, the 46th Ohio 
 being on our immediate right, and along the front of this division 
 was the 6th Iowa, Colonel John M. Corse s regiment, deployed 
 as skirmishers, and commanded by Colonel Corse in person. 
 
 As our line advanced down the slope and cleared the way, 
 the artillery came out of the woods and went into battery on 
 the crest of the ridge in our rear. Directly in rear of the First 
 Brigade we could see Lieutenant Benjamin executing the move 
 ment of " action front " with his big 20 pounder rifled Parrotts, 
 those pets of the corps, Battery E of the 2d U. S. Artillery, 
 whose guns had thundered at Antietam and many other eastern 
 fields. All at once as we continued our advance and reached 
 the railroad the great guns opened, and over our heads the 
 shells went screaming into and beyond the wooded crest upon 
 which we were moving and from which we expected to receive 
 a heavy fire. But much to our surprise, General Johnston had 
 chosen not to risk a battle in the open, and was falling back into 
 his intrenchments. The skirmishers were sufficient for the 
 work and drove back the Confederates so fast that the main line 
 could hardly keep up with them. The centre was held back and 
 
THE CAPTURE OF JACKSON 257 
 
 the two wings advanced, the line becoming a semi-circle, so as 
 to rest upon the river above and below the city and completely 
 invest its northern, western and southern sides : this, however, 
 was not fully accomplished until the I3th. 
 
 As we steadily advanced, crossing the railroad and the two 
 county roads called the Livingston and Canton Roads, our regi 
 ment came up squarely against the State Lunatic Asylum, a 
 large white marble building. The keepers had fled at our ap 
 proach, needlessly, locking the wretched inmates in their cells. 
 The firing of the skirmishers under their very windows, the 
 booming of cannon, and unwonted spectacle of war, had wrought 
 the poor wretches up to a pitiable state of excitement. As we 
 passed under the windows, the screams and curses were horrible 
 to listen to, and added a new terror to the day. Guards were at 
 once placed upon the building to keep out all intruders, and dur 
 ing the battle which raged for a week in sight of the Asylum, 
 no harm came to the patients. 
 
 It was growing late and the lines, somewhat broken by our 
 rapid advance, were halted, supports closed up, alignments 
 rectified, a strong picket and reserve thrown out and operations 
 ended for the day. 
 
 Coffee was brought up by the company cooks and the men 
 were soon lying down in line of battle with loaded muskets by 
 their sides, ready to fall in at any moment to the long roll 
 of the drums, and sleeping to the music of the sharp and con 
 stant firing of the pickets. 
 
 At the first sign of daylight on the iith the men were 
 aroused and the advance movement continued. 
 
 General Parke was ordered to move up as close as possible 
 to the enemy, without assaulting their works or bringing on a 
 general engagement, which it seemed General Sherman did not 
 desire. This was very quickly done. In very little more time 
 than it takes to write it, our division, in the same order as the 
 day before, with General Smith s division on the right, without 
 firing a shot except from our skirmishers, advanced directly to 
 
258 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 the front, driving a strong line of Confederates behind their 
 earthworks, and halted on a wooded ridge about two hundred 
 yards from their line. Here we received a heavy fire from 
 their artillery and sharpshooters, but lying low their fire mostly 
 passed over and did us little damage. Here we continued 
 to lie through this entire day. Some of our men are lying 
 there still, where we buried them that night. 
 
 In General Sherman s Official Report he says, " It was no 
 part of the plan to assault the enemy s works, so that the main 
 bodies of infantry were kept well in reserve under cover, whilst 
 the skirmishers were pushed forward as close as possible, lead 
 ing to many brisk skirmishes, which usually resulted in the 
 enemy taking refuge within his works." 
 
 I think there was no other engagement during the war of 
 the length of duration and forces engaged, so well entitled as 
 this one to be called: "The Battle of the Skirmishers." 
 
 Being wholly ignorant as we were of the general s plans and 
 supposing the object of our movement was to capture or defeat 
 Johnston s command, having our enemy on the run and the 
 esprit-dit-corps of the army being at its very best, it was matter 
 of wonder to us why we were held back just as we had brought 
 our foe to a stand. There was some pretty emphatic talk 
 among us as we lay there idle through that trying day, a passive 
 target for their artillery and marksmen. It was hinted that 
 General Sherman, sharing the prejudice of the western troops, 
 did not dare or care to trust our corps to attack in earnest, 
 even fearing our possible success. 
 
 The ease with which we had forced them back into their 
 works led us to believe that a vigorous assault, well supported, 
 would have carried them and so saved us a week of severe fight 
 ing, constructing of field works, rifle-pits and approaches to 
 their line. Probably we were wrong in our suspicions, as it 
 appeared later that General Sherman hoped to hold Johnston 
 there until he had destroyed the railroads north and south, then 
 gradually to work around his flank and rear, and so force a 
 surrender. 
 
THE CAPTURE OF JACKSON 259 
 
 These very tactics he used the next year in the Atlanta 
 campaign, against General Johnston. The enemy s superiority 
 in cavalry would have made it very difficult, if not impossible, 
 to cross the Pearl River, and so extend our lines, which were 
 none too strong as it was. On the contrary, there were some 
 pretty weak points in it and General Sherman, soon realizing 
 this fact, sent back for more troops. General McArthur s 
 division of McPherson s corps came forward, two brigades 
 arriving at Jackson the I4th, and one brigade halting at Cham 
 pion s Hill, ready to come if needed. The line we were holding 
 could not have been less than five miles long, and it is my candid 
 opinion that it was very fortunate for General Sherman s fame 
 that there was no Stonewall Jackson with his old division in 
 our front. 
 
 About 10 o clock A.M. it was found necessary to re-enforce our 
 skirmish line, the 45th Pennsylvania having been on duty 
 many hours and hard pushed. Companies A and F of the 36th 
 under command of Captain William F. Draper of Company 
 F, were ordered out. Captain Draper was informed that the line 
 with which he was to connect was about one hundred yards in 
 advance. He deployed his men and advanced rapidly in the 
 face of a severe fire, until he found himself confronting the 
 main line of the enemy. There were no signs of our skir 
 mishers to right or left, and satisfied that there must be some 
 misunderstanding of the enemy s position he withdrew his men 
 to a point midway between the hostile lines, but not until he 
 had suffered a loss of two killed and seven wounded (one 
 mortally) of his own company. 
 
 It must be remembered that at this time the enemy s line 
 was but partly developed, the ground was very uneven, cut up 
 by ravines, dense undergrowth, here and there an opening, but 
 very blind country : much worse in our front than to the west 
 or south. Both the adjutants of the /Qth New York and /th 
 Rhode Island went through the lines by mistake and were 
 captured. 
 
260 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 At the same time that Captain Draper advanced, Colonel 
 Norton, finding that we were without any troops on our right 
 flank, sent me to see if I could find any, as the firing in that 
 direction seemed heavy. 
 
 The ground just here was very much broken, a ravine run 
 ning off to the right and a tangled undergrowth masking every 
 thing in that direction. I had gone but a short distance when 
 I struck the skirmishers of Colonel Hicks brigade almost parallel 
 with our main line, and this was the line which Captain Draper 
 had gone out far in advance to find. They were in a growth of 
 young scrub oak about breast high and had evidently attracted 
 the especial attention of the enemy, for the firing on both sides 
 was red hot. I found an officer in command and told him our 
 skirmishers had just gone out far to the front, expecting to con 
 nect with him. He said he could not advance another foot : 
 two of his men had just fallen (I saw them lying there), the 
 fire being from the enemy s sharpshooters and very close and 
 deadly. 
 
 I returned to our line and shortly afterwards our own skir 
 mishers were forced to fall back, as above stated. I have some 
 times thought that those jack-oak bushes in that intensely hot 
 July sun, with the whistling bullets and roar of battle on all 
 sides, was about as near an approach to a material hell as I ever 
 care to get. 
 
 Sometime during the morning, Lieutenant Benjamin came 
 up and studied the ground where we lay to see if there was any 
 room to place his guns. For a short distance in our front there 
 was a little clearing, but it was commanded and swept by a most 
 deadly fire of sharpshooters posted in trees in the enemy s line. 
 It would have been death to every horse in his battery to have 
 attempted to haul his guns out there, and a useless sacrifice. 
 He finally placed them on a ridge about one hundred yards 
 directly in rear of us and opened fire over our line, the big 
 shells tearing through the trees, lopping off limbs that fell 
 among us and made things very uncomfortable. Some of his 
 
THE CAPTURE OF JACKSON 261 
 
 shot were so low that we began to question which of our fronts 
 was most dangerous, and finally Colonel Norton sent me with 
 his compliments to the lieutenant, and "would he be kind 
 enough to elevate his guns a little?" " He would with pleas 
 ure" - but as by that time he had shot away the tops of most 
 of the trees, he had cleared a path for his shells and they gave 
 us little more trouble. 
 
 So the day wore on and about 4 o clock in the afternoon 
 Captain Draper was relieved by the i/th Michigan Regiment. 
 They had hardly taken their position than they were hand 
 somely charged by the Confederates. Companies E and K 
 of the 36th under Captain Warriner re-enforced the i^th 
 and the enemy was repulsed. Just before dark a heavy 
 thunder shower came up. As if in fear that we might improve 
 the opportunity of the rain to make a general assault, the 
 enemy opened with all their artillery, to which ours promptly 
 replied. The roar of heaven s artillery, the torrents of rain, 
 the crash of grape through the trees and the bursting shells 
 combined with the sharp rattle of musketry to make such a 
 scene as even a battle rarely presents. About 9 o clock that 
 evening, Captain Warriner sent back for ammunition. The 
 lines were very close together and the firing was constant. I 
 took a box half full, about five hundred rounds, which was as 
 much as I could carry, and started out for the picket line. It 
 was intensely dark, the trees and bushes dripping wet, and the 
 only way to find the line was to watch for the flash of the rifles. 
 Floundering around with my load of nearly fifty pounds, stopping 
 from time to time to rest and take my bearings, by good luck I 
 at length came right upon the reserve of the picket. There 
 were some negro cabins about midway between the hostile lines 
 and both sides were disputing their possession. The " John 
 nies " would make a rush and hold them a while and then our 
 boys would rally and clean them out. From the noise made 
 that night it would not surprise me at any time to hear that a 
 placer lead mine had been discovered in that region. As the 
 
262 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 place was not especially conducive to health and long life I did 
 not remain a great while to see the fun, but groped my way 
 back to the main line. 
 
 During this clay there was some very sharp fighting on our 
 left by the Third Brigade of our division, commanded by 
 Colonel Daniel Leasure of the looth Pennsylvania. 
 
 As their line advanced with ours in the morning the 2d 
 Michigan was deployed as skirmishers and flankers to the front 
 and left. The brigade advanced until with us, it drew the fire 
 of the enemy s artillery and then halted, as ordered. But the 
 brave men from Michigan did not halt, but dashed forward, 
 drove the enemy into their rifle-pits, out of them, and back into 
 their main line, which also fell back into their works. They 
 then looked around for their supports and found they had none. 
 The fighting had been most desperate, hand to hand, and some 
 of the men had fallen close up to the enemy s works. There 
 was nothing to do but get out of the scrape, and they did so 
 under a terrible fire, with the loss of fifty-nine killed, wounded 
 and missing out of less than two hundred engaged. 
 
 Colonel Leasure says in his official Report : " At the very 
 moment when the gallant 2d Michigan Regiment was enter 
 ing the enemy s lines, I received an order to halt where I 
 was, as General Sherman said we had already advanced farther 
 than he intended we should at that time as the right of the 
 investing army had not yet got sufficiently forward. I had 
 no doubt then, nor have I now, that if that order had not 
 arrived at that moment, in twenty minutes the First Division 
 would have been in the city, or at least held the heights that 
 command it." 
 
 It would be interesting to quote Colonel Corse s official 
 account of the movements on the nth, of General Smith s 
 division, at our right, as well as of his later account of the 
 1 6th, when, being in command of the entire skirmish line of 
 the division, with his own regiment and the 97th Indiana 
 (of Colonel Cockerill s brigade) supported by the 48th Illinois 
 
THE CAPTURE OF JACKSON 263 
 
 and 4<Dth and 46th Ohio, he made a most gallant and suc 
 cessful reconnoissance, pushing up very close to the enemy s 
 line and obtaining valuable information. He handled his com 
 mand with such skill that, although exposed from 1 1 A.M. 
 till late in the afternoon to a close fire of artillery and 
 musketry, his loss was only one hundred killed, wounded 
 and missing. From a special order of General Smith to 
 Colonel Corse I make this extract : "I cannot too highly com 
 mend the gallantry you have displayed in two successful charges 
 you have made. The true heart swells with emotions of pride 
 in contemplating the heroism of those who, in their country s 
 cause, charge forward under the iron hail of half-a-dozen rebel 
 batteries and, exposed to a murderous fire of musketry from 
 behind strong intrenchments, capture prisoners under their very 
 guns." In this action our lamented companion and past com 
 mander displayed that same fertility of resource, coolness of 
 thought and action, and dauntless heart, that within a year later 
 at Allatoona, "held the fort " and gave him a national renown. 
 
 Time will not permit me to relate many instances of brave 
 fighting and gallant charges during the seven days we confronted 
 the enemy, gradually advancing our lines and ready at any mo 
 ment for the general assault which we knew was to come. I will 
 only speak of the sad and unsuccessful affair on the extreme 
 right of General Ord s corps. This was one of those lamentable 
 occurrences of which there were too many during the war where 
 " somebody blundered." It took place about 9 A.M. of the I2th, 
 and seems to have been due to ignorance of the enemy s position, 
 no proper reconnoissance having been made. The line of invest 
 ment on the right was not yet extended to the river. Briefly 
 the situation was this : The Confederate defences, after crossing 
 the railroad a mile below the city at an angle from north-west 
 to south-east, instead of turning directly east to the river, as 
 was supposed, continued in a south-easterly direction for a half 
 mile and then turned sharply north-east to the river. 
 
 Colonel Isaac C. Ptigh s brigade, consisting of the 3d Iowa, 
 
264 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 28th, 4 1st and 53d Illinois and 5th Ohio Battery, of General 
 J. G. Lauman s division, Thirteenth Corps, crossed the New 
 Orleans and Jackson Railroad about two miles south of Jack 
 son and was ordered to advance and connect with the right 
 of General Hovey s division, west of the road, a half mile to 
 the north, and presumably a half mile from the enemy s main 
 line. With the left of this brigade on the railroad and skir 
 mishers thrown out, he advanced a half mile through timber 
 and dense undergrowth without opposition and without finding 
 General Hovey s right. Suspicious that all was not right, 
 Colonel Pugh halted his command at the edge of an open field 
 and awaited supports and orders. General Lauman came up 
 and ordered him forward. When crossing the open field the 
 enemy s pickets were met and driven back, and presently a 
 murderous fire from twelve guns, Cobb s and Slocum s Batteries 
 at three hundred yards, open upon the devoted brigade. At 
 the same time a deadly flank fire came from the iQth Louisiana, 
 320! Alabama, 1st and 3d Florida and 4/th Georgia of Adams 
 and Stovall s Brigades of General Breckenridge s Division. In 
 face of this whirlwind of lead and iron the brigade charged up 
 to within seventy-five yards of the works, when it neither could 
 advance or would retreat. For twenty awful minutes it lay 
 there, melting away, and then the survivors fell back, the 3d 
 Iowa alone saving their colors, but losing one hundred and four 
 teen out of two hundred and forty-one who went into the action, 
 while the loss in the other regiments was in the same propor 
 tion. Colonel Pugh reported officially a loss of four hundred 
 and sixty-five out of eight hundred and eighty officers and men 
 engaged or 53% of his command. Of the 53d Illinois of 
 two hundred men who went into action only sixty-six came 
 out. Colonel Earle was killed and the lieutenant-colonel severe 
 ly wounded. The 4ist Illinois had forty killed, one hundred and 
 twenty-two wounded, and Major Long killed. The 28th Illinois, 
 of eight companies present, one hundred and twenty-eight men, 
 had seventy-three killed and wounded and sixteen missing. 
 
THE CAPTURE OF JACKSON 265 
 
 Many wounded who might have been saved, lay in the hot 
 sun all the i2th and I3th and until noon of the I4th, and died 
 without attention, the ground being unapproachable from either 
 side and swept by both the Union and Confederate fire. 
 
 Who was to blame for this sad affair we never knew. General 
 Lauman received the blame at the time and was ordered home. 
 General Sherman said it " resulted from misunderstanding or 
 misinterpretation of General Ord s minute instructions on the 
 part of General Lauman." My remembrance is that the opinion 
 in the army there was that General Ord was responsible and 
 that Lauman was the scapegoat. About noon of the I4th Gen 
 eral Johnston sent out a flag of truce, asking a suspension of 
 hostilities for three hours in order to bury the Union soldiers 
 killed in that fatal charge. The rapid decomposition of so 
 many bodies in a hot July sun had infected the air for a long 
 distance, annoying the living equally on both sides. The truce 
 was granted and until 4 P.M. all firing ceased along the lines and 
 the hostile pickets met and exchanged compliments and badinage, 
 and some of the Confederates improved the opportunity to ask 
 our men to take letters and mail them to northern relatives. 
 
 In the Confederate correspondence a letter of July I2th from 
 General Johnston to General Breckenridge contains these words : 
 " Do me the kindness, also, to express to the ist, 3d and 4th Flor 
 ida and 4/th Georgia Regiments the pride and pleasure with which 
 I have accepted the splendid trophies they have presented me." 
 
 Not long ago I read in the papers of the return by the Con 
 federate captors of the flag of the 53d Illinois to its survivors. 
 Would that the brave fellows who went into that fatal trap and 
 saw their flags go down in blood, could also have been returned 
 safe and sound. 
 
 Our division was relieved on the morning of the I2th by the 
 Second Division, and during that day and the 1 3th lay in reserve 
 not far in the rear, within easy range of their artillery that occa 
 sionally sent shells and solid shot over to us. The days were 
 intensely hot and all suffered much, water being very scarce and 
 
266 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 what there was being muddy and lukewarm. The Pearl River 
 was too far away to be of any service to us. Operations had 
 now settled down into the nature of a siege and when we relieved 
 the Second Division on the I4th, it was in rifle-pits. Meantime, 
 night and day, our artillery was busy. Every battery in position 
 was ordered to fire one shot every five minutes, and some days 
 as many as three thousand rounds were fired into Jackson and 
 the Confederate lines. 
 
 The effect of this tremendous cannonade for a week can be 
 no better expressed than in General Sherman s own words : 
 "The city is one mass of charred ruins." 
 
 It will be understood, without going into details of the many 
 bold advances of our skirmishers, that many available positions 
 were secured to plant our artillery, and not only in our lines 
 of the Ninth Corps, but along the front of the Fifteenth and 
 Thirteenth Corps, our batteries had been advanced to within four 
 hundred yards of the enemy s intrenched line, and were enabled 
 to enfilade many parts of their line and keep down their fire. 
 
 The guns of General Ord s corps and Steele s division of 
 tne Fifteenth Corps, took Walker s and Loring s line in reverse, 
 and those of General Blair s division as well as Smith s did as 
 much for General French. The guns of General Osterhaus 
 division directed to the right, enfiladed the entire line of Breck- 
 enridge s Division, and the persistent, never-ending fire from our 
 guns was a very severe strain upon the morale of the Confeder 
 ate forces. 
 
 Every sortie they made was bloodily repulsed, for our infan 
 try was closed up and ready at a moment s warning to engage 
 the enemy. No part of the city or of the enemy s line was 
 beyond the reach of our guns, and for not one moment, night 
 or day, was a man safe except in a bomb-proof, from bursting 
 shell or shot. 
 
 There is no question but their losses were very much greater 
 than their official figures admitted. 
 
 I have said little of the operations in front of the Fifteenth 
 
THE CAPTURE OF JACKSON 267 
 
 and Thirteenth Corps, as it would be simply a repetition of the 
 skirmishing tactics pursued in our corps. The losses in the 
 Fifteenth Corps were so slight as to prove that the troops kept 
 well under cover, the loss being only eighty all told, or only 
 one-fourteenth of our entire loss. 
 
 The ammunition train arrived late in the night of the i6th, 
 and preparations were made for a grand attack the next day ; 
 but when morning dawned, white flags waving from the enemy s 
 earthworks told the story ; during the night the Confederates 
 had retreated across the Pearl River and destroyed the bridges. 
 
 Our Second Division was in front and quickly entered Jack 
 son, the flag of the 35th Massachusetts being the first to be 
 placed on the Capitol. One hundred and thirty-seven Confed 
 erates who had not made the best use of their time were taken 
 prisoners. 
 
 Our work was done, and while we felt chagrined at the es 
 cape of the enemy, we were glad to have been spared the fur 
 ther heavy loss of life which must have resulted from an assault, 
 even if successful. And what was that work ? The railroad 
 had been broken up for forty miles north and sixty miles south of 
 Jackson ; the fine bridge above Canton destroyed, as well as all 
 the machine shops and rolling stock of Canton ; in fact every 
 thing that could be of value to the enemy. In Jackson, hardly 
 a building of any value except the State House, remained. Our 
 losses in killed, wounded and missing were eleven hundred and 
 twenty-two officers and men, and those of the Confederates, as 
 nearly as can be ascertained, five hundred and seventy-five 
 killed and wounded by Johnston s own report, and Sherman 
 reported over one thousand prisoners taken. 
 
 Of our loss, two hundred and ninety-one was in the Ninth 
 Corps and seven hundred and fifty-one in the Thirteenth. In 
 closing let me quote from General Sherman s official Report 
 dated July 28th, 63. After giving a detailed history of the 
 expedition from beginning to end, he says : 
 
 " In reviewing the events thus feebly described, it may seem 
 
268 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 superfluous to call attention to the fact that the great mass of 
 troops thus called for action were on the 4th day of July in the 
 trenches before Vicksburg, where for near two months they had 
 been toiling in the hot sun in close and stifling rifle-pits, and 
 without stopping to indulge for a moment in the natural joy at 
 the great success which had crowned their labors they were 
 required again to march in the heat and dust for fifty miles, with 
 little or no water save in muddy creeks, in cisterns already ex 
 hausted and in the surface ponds which the enemy in his retreat 
 had tainted with dead cattle and hogs ; that we crossed Black 
 River by bridges of our own construction, and then had to deal 
 with an army which had, under a leader of great renown, been 
 formed specially to raise the siege of Vicksburg ; far superior to 
 us in cavalry, and but little inferior in either infantry or artil 
 lery ; that we drove him fifty miles and left him in full retreat ; 
 that we have destroyed those great arteries of travel in the 
 state which alone could enable him to assemble troops and mo 
 lest our possession of the Mississippi River, and that we have so 
 exhausted the land that no army can exist during this season 
 without hauling in wagons all its supplies." 
 
 In the shadow of three such glorious events as Gettysburg, 
 Vicksburg and Port Hudson, the capture of Jackson attracted 
 little attention at the north. At any other time it would have 
 been hailed with joy as a grand triumph of the northern arms. 
 
 We who had gone from the Army of the Potomac and so 
 missed the glory of Gettysburg, feel that we only lost one 
 glory to gain two others. No monument erected by our 
 state marks any spot where Massachusetts men did her full 
 honor in that Mississippi Campaign ; but later on in defending 
 Knoxville, and again in Virginia from the Wilderness to Peters 
 burg, no Massachusetts regiments could show on their battle- 
 flags two words more significant of sacrifice and victory than 
 those gilded upon our tattered banners by General Grant s 
 command : 
 
 " VICKSBURG & JACKSON." 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 BY 
 
 BREVET MAJOR GENERAL ADELBERT AMES, U.S.V. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 ABOUT the first of December, 1864, when in command of 
 the Third Division, Twenty-fourth Corps, of the Army of the 
 James, then before Richmond, Va., I was notified I had been 
 selected to lead my division in a movement, by sea, against 
 some point of the Confederacy on the Atlantic coast. 
 
 At that time Wilmington, N.C., was the port through 
 which the Confederacy received a large part of its munitions of 
 war, and w r hence was shipped to England, in payment therefor, 
 much of its cotton and tobacco. Wilmington was situated on. 
 the east bank of the Cape Fear River, thirty miles from its 
 mouth, which was guarded by Fort Fisher. 
 
 Our Navy was untiring in its efforts to blockade that port, 
 but was not successful. 
 
 The order from General Butler to General Weitzel relative 
 to the expedition December 6th, 1864, was: "The Major 
 General commanding has entrusted you with the command of 
 the expedition about to embark for the North Carolina coast. 
 It will consist of sixty-five hundred infantry, two batteries and 
 fifty cavalry. The effective men of General Ames s division of 
 the Twenty-fourth Corps will furnish the infantry force. 
 General Paine is under your orders and General Ames will be 
 ordered to report to you in person immediately." 
 
 My division, of three brigades, was composed of New Hamp 
 shire, New York, Pennsylvania, and Indiana troops, about thirty- 
 three hundred in number. General Paine had a division of 
 colored troops. 
 
 271 
 
272 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 We embarked at Bermuda Hundreds, Va., December 8th, 
 and our transports reached the place of rendezvous off New 
 Inlet, N.C., Thursday, the I5th. Friday, Saturday, and Sun 
 day, we awaited the coming of the Navy. 
 
 Admiral Porter, commanding our fleet, arrived Sunday 
 evening, the iSth. The next day the water was too rough to 
 make a landing on the ocean beach. Towards evening a north 
 east gale coming up, the transports were sent to Beaufort for 
 coal and water, as the ten days supply had run short, where 
 they were delayed by the weather and the difficulty of getting 
 coal, until Saturday, the 24th. 
 
 I did not go to Beaufort, as my ship, on which was one of 
 my brigades, was well prepared for such an emergency. 
 
 General Butler, followed by his fleet of transports, returned 
 to New Inlet on Saturday, the 24th of December, between four 
 and five o clock in the afternoon. 
 
 The powder boat, which played such a notorious part in this 
 expedition, had been exploded at about two o clock on the morn 
 ing of the same clay. 
 
 The idea of the powder boat was General Butler s, but it was 
 approved of and adopted by the Navy, which furnished the vessel 
 and its share of the two hundred and fifteen tons of gun-powder 
 used. The Navy held control of this experiment from first to last. 
 
 The explosion was untimely, and a failure. Commodore 
 Jeffers of the Navy reports : "A part of the programme re 
 quired that the vessel should be grounded, which appears not to 
 have been the case." 
 
 Commander Rhincl writes : " That, owing to the want of 
 confinement and insufficient fusing of the mass, much of the 
 powder was blown away before ignition and its effect lost." 
 
 Admiral Porter reports : " That the powder was finally 
 exploded from the effects of a fire kindled in the forecastle. 
 No results of value were to be expected from this mode. It was 
 proposed only as a final resort, in order to prevent the vessel, 
 in any contingency, from falling into the hands of the enemy." 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 273 
 
 Commander James Parker, U. S. Navy, stated to the New 
 York Loyal Legion, October 5, 1892 : " We all believed in it (the 
 powder boat) from the Admiral down, but when it proved so 
 laughable a failure we, of the Navy, laid its paternity upon 
 General Butler." 
 
 Colonel Lamb, in command, describes Fort Fisher as fol 
 lows : " At the land-face of Fort Fisher the peninsula was about 
 half a mile wide, Cape Fear River being on one side and the 
 Atlantic Ocean on the other. This face commenced about a 
 hundred feet from the river with a half bastion, and extended 
 with a heavy curtain to a full bastion on the ocean side, where 
 it joined the sea-face. The work was built to withstand the 
 heaviest artillery fire. The outer slope was twenty feet high 
 from the berm to the top of the parapet, at an angle of forty- 
 five degrees, and was sodded with marsh grass, which grew 
 luxuriantly. The parapet was not less than twenty-five feet 
 thick, with an inclination of only one foot. The revetment was 
 five feet nine inches high, from the floor of the gun chambers, 
 and these were some twelve feet or more from the interior 
 plane. The guns were all mounted in barbette, Columbiad car 
 riages ; there was not a single casemated gun in the fort. Be 
 tween the gun chambers, containing one or two guns each 
 (there were twenty heavy guns on the land-face), there were " 
 (some eighteen) " heavy traverses, exceeding in size any known 
 to engineers, to protect from an enfilading fire. They extended 
 out some twelve feet on the parapet, running back thirty feet 
 or more. The gun chambers were reached from the rear by 
 steps. In each traverse was an alternate magazine or bomb 
 proof, the latter ventilated by an air-chamber. Passageways 
 penetrated the traverses in the interior of the work, forming 
 additional bomb-proofs for the reliefs of the guns. 
 
 "The sea-face was a mile long, and for a hundred yards 
 from the northeast bastion was of the same massive character as 
 the land-face. 
 
 " As a defence against infantry there was a system of sub- 
 
2/4 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 terre torpedoes extending across the peninsula, five to six hun 
 dred feet from the land-face, and so disconnected that an 
 explosion of one would not affect the others ; inside the torpe 
 does, about fifty feet from the berm of the work, extending 
 from the river bank to the seashore, was a heavy palisade of 
 sharpened logs nine feet high, pierced for musketry, and so laid 
 out as to have an enfilading fire on the centre, where there was 
 a redoubt guarding a sally-port from which two Napoleons were 
 run out as occasion required. At the river end of the palisade 
 was a deep and muddy slough, across which was a bridge, the 
 entrance on the river road into the fort ; commanding this 
 bridge was a Napoleon gun. There were three mortars in rear 
 of the land-face." 
 
 This strong work had, at the time of our first expedition, a 
 garrison of fourteen hundred men, nine hundred of whom were 
 veterans. 
 
 Colonel Lamb had been incited to the utmost by General 
 Lee, who had sent him word that he "must hold the fort or he 
 could not subsist his army." 
 
 On the morning of the 24th the fleet of Admiral Porter 
 moved in towards New Inlet and opened fire on the fort. The 
 character of this, bombardment and the demands made by the 
 Admiral on his ships and sailors I will let him tell. 
 
 In his letter to the Secretary of the Navy of the 24th of 
 December, 1864, he says: "I have the honor to inform you 
 that I attacked the forts at the mouth of the Cape Fear River 
 to-day at 12.30. . . . After getting the ships in position we 
 silenced it in about an hour and a half, there being no troops 
 here to take possession. I am merely firing now to keep up 
 practice. The forts are nearly demolished, and as soon as 
 troops come we can take possession. We have set them on fire, 
 blown some of them up, and all that is wanted now is troops to 
 land and go into them." The Admiral failed to mention, in his 
 letter, the fact that I had offered one thousand men and co 
 operation, although, in his testimony before the Committee on 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 275 
 
 the Conduct of the War, he said : " General Ames had a thou 
 sand men there, and he sent on board and told me he was ready 
 to land." 
 
 In his letter of the 26th he says, referring to the bombard 
 ment of the 24th : " In an hour and fifteen minutes after the 
 first shot was fired not a shot came from the fort. Finding that 
 the batteries were silenced completely I directed the ships to 
 keep up a moderate fire in hopes of attracting the attention of 
 the transports and bringing them in." In this same letter of 
 December 26th Admiral Porter says, speaking of the bombard 
 ment of the forts on December 25th : " The firing this day was 
 slow, only sufficient to amuse the enemy while the army landed. 
 In the bombardment of the 25th the men were engaged firing 
 slowly for seven hours. . . . Everything was coolly done 
 throughout the day, and I witnessed some beautiful practice." 
 
 In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, December 29, 
 after the fleet had left and the transports had gone back to 
 Hampton Roads, he writes : "At no time did I permit the ves 
 sels to open on them with all their batteries, limiting some of 
 them to about two shots a minute, and permitting the large 
 vessels to fight only one division of guns at a time ; and the 
 bombardment cost only a certain amount of shells, which I 
 would expend in a month s target practice anyhow." Such are 
 the salient features of the reports of Admiral Porter. 
 
 General Whiting, who was in the fort, and who commanded 
 that military district, says the slight damage done by this 
 cannonading was repaired at night, and that "the garrison 
 was in no instance driven from its guns, the palisade was in 
 perfect order, and the mines the same, the wires not having 
 been cut." 
 
 General Weitzel testified before the Committee on the Con 
 duct of the War : " I made a reconnoissance of the fort and saw 
 that the work, as a defensive work, was not injured at all, except 
 that one gun about midway of the land face was dismounted. 
 I did not see a single opening in the row of palisades that was 
 
2/6 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 in front of the ditch ; it seemed to be perfectly intact." All in 
 the fort agree that Admiral Porter was mistaken as to the effects 
 of the cannonading. 
 
 So much as to the condition of the fort. 
 
 On the morning of the 25th all our transports anchored 
 near the shore some two or three miles north of the fort, and 
 the troops immediately began to land. 
 
 I had been selected to storm the fort with my division. 
 
 My report on December 28th is as follows: "Brevet Brigadier 
 General Curtis and five hundred of his brigade were the first to 
 land, and were taken towards the fort by General Weitzel for a 
 reconnoissance. ... It was dusk when I reached the front. 
 I then heard that the First Brigade was to remain where it was 
 until further orders, and that if any attack was made the respon 
 sibility would rest with the officer in immediate command. At 
 this time I did not know that it had been decided not to attack 
 the fort. Upon the report of Curtis that he could take the 
 fort I sent his brigade forward to make the attempt." In his 
 report Curtis says : " On my arrival at this point I received 
 orders from General Ames to return and re-establish my lines as 
 they were, and, if possible, to occupy the fort, and I at once 
 ordered my skirmishers forward, etc. . . . The enemy, having 
 cover of the darkness, opened on the skirmishers as they ad 
 vanced with musketry and canister, but did not prevent their 
 establishing the line in its former position, with the reserves in 
 close proximity." Curtis made no further effort to take the 
 fort, as I had ordered him to do, but sent word to me that 
 he was "occupying his former position." Why he failed to 
 assault the fort after I assumed the responsibility and gave 
 the order I have never known. At this time an order reached 
 me to return to our ships, which we did, and the first expedition 
 ended. 
 
 An incident occurred which had much to do in giving an 
 erroneous idea of the condition of the fort and garrison. 
 
 One of our lieutenants approached the fort and captured its 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 277 
 
 flag, which had been shot away by the Navy, and which had 
 fallen with the flag staff on the outer slope of the parapet to the 
 ditch. 
 
 On this point General Weitzel testifies : " I sent for Lieu 
 tenant Walling and questioned him about it, and he told me that 
 a shell had knocked the flagstaff outside and on top of the 
 parapet, and the flag hung over into or outside of the ditch. 
 Thinking that probably the rebels had not observed it, he crept 
 up on his hands and knees to the palisading, found a hole in it 
 that one of the shells had made, crept through the hole and 
 up to the flag, and got it and got away with it without being 
 observed." 
 
 Let us see why our expedition terminated thus abruptly. 
 
 Weitzel had been ordered by Butler to land and make a 
 reconnoissance. In his testimony before the Committee on the 
 Conduct of the War he gave his experience during the war in 
 charging and defending field works, and continuing, said : 
 " After that experience, with the information I had obtained 
 from reading and study for before this war I was an instructor 
 at the Military Academy for three years under Professor Mahan, 
 on those very subjects remembering well the remarks of the 
 Lieutenant General commanding, that it was his intention I 
 should command that expedition, because another officer selected 
 by the war department had once shown timidity, and in face of 
 the fact that I had been appointed a major general only twenty 
 days before, and needed confirmation ; notwithstanding all this, I 
 went back to General Butler, and told him I considered it would 
 be murder to order an attack on that work with that force." 
 
 Colonel Lamb says, in reference to the loss of his flag : " I 
 had no fear of an assault, and because, during a bombardment 
 which rendered an assault impossible, I covered my men, and 
 a few straggling skirmishers, too few to attract attention, got 
 near the fort, and some gallant officers thought they could have 
 carried the work, it does not follow that they would not have 
 paid dearly for their temerity if they had made the attempt." 
 
278 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 General Whiting speaks to the same effect. 
 
 Now, who is to say that Weitzel, Whiting and Lamb were 
 mistaken as to the situation that day ? Is it the brave soldier, 
 who crept unseen through a hole in the palisade to the parapet 
 and took a flag from a staff which had been shot away ? 
 
 Is it Admiral Porter, who wrote to the Secretary of the 
 Navy January I7th, 1865: "I have since visited Fort Fisher 
 and the adjoining works, and find their strength greatly beyond 
 what I had conceived. An engineer might be excusable in 
 saying they could not be captured except by regular siege. I 
 wonder, even now, how it was done. The work, as I said 
 before, is really stronger than the Malakoff tower, which defied 
 so long the combined power of France and England." In a 
 letter of the i6th of January to the Secretary of the Navy, he 
 says : " I was in Fort Malakoff a few days after it surrendered 
 to the French and English ; the combined armies of the two 
 nations were many months capturing that stronghold, and it 
 won t compare, either in size or strength, to Fort Fisher." 
 
 I have no hesitancy in saying that they were not mistaken, 
 though it is true that without personal knowledge of the charac 
 ter of the fort, and, for the time, believing Curtis, I ordered 
 him to take it on his assertion that he could do so. 
 
 What was not possible December 25th, was made possible 
 January I5th, through an efficient bombardment on the part of 
 the navy and the co-operation of two thousand sailors and 
 marines and an additional force of one thousand four hundred 
 infantry. 
 
 January 1st, 1865, Grant wrote to Secretary Stanton : "The 
 fact is, there are but two ways of taking Fort Fisher, operating 
 from the water ; one is to surprise them whilst there is but a 
 small garrison defending the place ; the other is for the navy to 
 send a portion of their fleet into Cape Fear River. ..." He 
 continues : " In the three days of good weather which elapsed 
 after the army had reached the scene of action, before the navy 
 appeared, our troops had the chance of capturing Fort Fisher 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 279 
 
 whilst it had an insufficient garrison to hold it. The delay gave 
 the enemy time to accumulate a force. . . . The failure before 
 was the result of delays by the navy." 
 
 So, of Grant s two ways of taking the fort, one by surprise 
 failed, as he said, because of the delay of the navy, and as to the 
 other, Colonel Comstock reports to Grant, January gth : " There 
 is no hope, at least at present, of the admiral s trying to run by 
 Fort Fisher." 
 
 Grant ordered and intended that Weitzel should have com 
 mand of the expedition. North Carolina was in Butler s military 
 department. His order retained Weitzel as his subordinate. 
 
 Though Grant may have intended and ordered certain action 
 on the part of our expedition in December, 1865, on the first of 
 January, 1865, he wrote the Secretary of War, as just quoted, 
 that there were but two ways to take the fort by surprise or 
 by the occupancy of the river by the navy. There was no sur 
 prise, the navy was not in the river, the bombardment of the 
 fort was ineffectual, Weitzel decided against an assault, Butler 
 acquiesced and ordered the expedition back to Virginia, saying 
 to Weitzel at the same time that he, Butler, would assume all 
 responsibility, as he could stand the blame better than could 
 Weitzel, the professional soldier. 
 
 The Committee on the Conduct of the War was composed of 
 the leading men in Congress at that time. Much experience 
 in the investigation of military affairs had made them, to say the 
 least, fairly capable judges. They could command any witness, 
 they were critical and severe in their examinations, and their 
 conclusions were reached without fear or favor. Honest Ben 
 Wade was their chairman. This is their decision : 
 
 " In conclusion, your Committee would say, from all the testi 
 mony before them, that the determination of General Butler not 
 to assault the fort seems to have been fully justified by all facts 
 and circumstances then known or afterwards ascertained." 
 
 Few can comprehend the penalty General Butler had to pay 
 for his action on this occasion. The war was within a few 
 
280 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 months of its end, and he had hoped for a share of the honors 
 conferred on those who served faithfully and well, but he was 
 sent home, and the whole nation condemned him for the failure. 
 General Weitzel, one of the best of men, and one of our ablest 
 generals, was humbled in spirit before the storm of censure 
 and ridicule. But all that came after the capture of the fort on 
 our second expedition. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 The second expedition was started without delay. January 
 2nd, 1865, General A. H. Terry was put in command. On the 
 3rd we left camp, began re-embarkation on the 4th, and com 
 pleted it on the 5th. 
 
 I had thirty-three hundred picked men in my division. Gen 
 eral Paine had the same number in his. There were added a 
 brigade of fourteen hundred men under Colonel J. G. Abbott 
 and two batteries of light artillery of three and six guns each. 
 Colonel Comstock, who represented Grant on our first expedi 
 tion, returned with us on the second. 
 
 The transports put to sea on the morning of the 6th. 
 A severe storm drove them into Beaufort. 
 
 The troops were landed on the 1 3th, some two miles north 
 of the fort. 
 
 Upon landing the first work on hand was to establish a line 
 of breastworks from the ocean beach to the river to keep the 
 enemy in the direction of Wilmington from interfering with our 
 operations. 
 
 A reconnoissance was made. Terry reports : " As a result 
 of this reconnoissance, and in view of the extreme difficulty which 
 might be expected in landing supplies and the materials for a 
 siege on the often tempestuous beach, it was decided to attempt 
 an assault the next day, provided that, in the mean time, the fire 
 of the navy should so far destroy the palisades as to make one 
 practicable. This decision was communicated to Admiral Porter, 
 who at once placed a division of his vessels in a position to 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 281 
 
 accomplish this last-named object. It was arranged, in consul 
 tation with him, that a heavy bombardment from all the vessels 
 should commence early in the morning and continue up to the 
 moment of the assault, and that even then it should not cease, 
 but should be diverted from the points of attack to the other 
 parts of the work. It was decided that the assault should be 
 made at 3 P.M., that the army should attack on the western half 
 of the land-face, and that a column of sailors and marines should 
 assault the northeast bastion. The fire of the navy continued 
 during the night. At 8 A.M. of the I3th all of the vessels, 
 except a division left to aid in the defence of our northern line, 
 moved into position, and a fire, magnificent alike for its power 
 and accuracy, was opened," and continued all day Saturday, 
 Saturday night and Sunday, till 3.30 P.M. "Ames s division had 
 been selected for the assault. . . . At 3.25 P.M. all the prep 
 arations were completed, the order to move forward was given to 
 Ames, and a concerted signal was made to Admiral Porter to 
 change the direction of his fire." 
 
 The situation at this time was as follows : Some two miles 
 north of the fort General Paine had established a line of breast 
 works, from ocean to river, facing north, with his own division 
 on the left and Colonel Abbott s brigade on the right. On the 
 sea-beach, about half a mile from the fort, were two thousand 
 sailors and marines under command of Fleet Captain K. R. 
 Breese. On the east were sixty-four ships of war, under Admiral 
 Porter, cannonading the fort. My three brigades were in line, 
 one behind the other, ranging from three to five hundred yards 
 from the fort ; the left of each line nearly opposite the middle 
 of the land-face of the fort, the right near the river. A body of 
 sharpshooters were pushed forward, and the whole division was 
 covered from the fire of the enemy, as far as possible, by the 
 inequalities of the ground and slight pits formed by throwing up 
 the sand. 
 
 Terry, Comstock and I were in a small advanced outwork 
 about half a mile from the fort. My able and gallant Adjutant 
 
282 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 General, General Charles A. Carleton, has made the following 
 record : " General Terry turned to General Ames and said : 
 General Ames, the signal agreed upon for the assault has been 
 given. General Ames asked : Have you any special orders to 
 give ? General Terry replied : No, you understand the situa 
 tion and what is desired to be accomplished. I leave everything 
 to your discretion. Thus was given me the unrestricted 
 command of the fighting forces. 
 
 At once I directed Captain Lawrence of my staff to order 
 Curtis, commanding the First Brigade, to charge, striking the 
 parapet at the end nearest the river. The palisade had been 
 sufficiently broken and shot away by the fire of the navy to 
 permit the passage of the troops. As I approached the fort I 
 watched with anxious eyes the charge of the First Brigade. 
 
 Captain Lawrence heroically led the charge of that part of 
 the brigade which advanced at this time. He was the first 
 through the palisade, and while reaching for a guidon to plant 
 on the first traverse, his hand was shot away and he was danger 
 ously wounded in the neck, but with this lodgement on the first 
 traverse, the force of the charge was spent. I quickly ordered 
 Colonel Pennypacker s brigade, which was close at hand, to 
 charge and sweep down the parapet to the ocean. 
 
 I will not attempt a description of the battle. It was a 
 charge of my brigades, one after the other, followed by desperate 
 fighting at close quarters over the parapet and traverses and in 
 and through the covered ways. All the time we were exposed 
 to the musketry and artillery of the enemy, while our own Navy 
 was thundering away, occasionally making us the victims of its 
 fire. 
 
 The official reports of my officers gave no adequate idea of 
 their gallant deeds, but they must supply the form and coloring 
 of the warlike scenes of that eventful Sunday. 
 
 Colonel Daggett, in command of the First Brigade, January 
 1 7th, reports : "At about 3 P.M., General Curtis having received 
 orders to that effect from General Ames, through Captain Law- 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 283 
 
 rence, the brigade advanced to the charge, so as to strike the 
 sally-port, that having been deemed the only vulnerable point of 
 the work, and, after a desperate struggle, the advance of the 
 brigade reached the parapet of the fort and scaled it to the first 
 traverse, where the guidon of the 1 1 7th New York was planted 
 the first colors on the fort." 
 
 Major O. P. Harding, who came out of the fight in command 
 of the Second Brigade, reports : " The brigade was ordered to 
 assault the fort, which was done in a gallant manner and under 
 a heavy fire of grape and musketry, and entered the fort through 
 a sally-port near the river. The 203 rd Pennsylvania, com 
 manded by Colonel J. W. Moore, was the first to enter the fort, 
 closely followed by the 97th Pennsylvania, commanded by First 
 Lieutenant John Wainwright. The colors of each of those regi 
 ments reached the parapet about the same time, those of the 
 97th borne by Colonel Pennypacker, and of the 2031x1 by Colonel 
 Moore. Colonel Pennypacker was seriously wounded while 
 planting his colors on the third traverse, and Colonel Moore fell 
 dead while passing the second traverse, waving his colors and 
 commanding his men to follow. After entering the fort the 
 brigade became somewhat broken up ; nevertheless, both officers 
 and men behaved gallantly until its capture." 
 
 " After the fall of Lieutenant Colonel Lyman, 2O3rd Penn 
 sylvania, who fell on the sixth traverse, I commanded the regi 
 ment until about 5 P.M., when ordered by General Ames to 
 take command of the brigade, which I immediately organized." 
 
 Captain II. B. Essington, commanding 203 rd Pennsylvania, 
 reports : " The regiment charged on the right of the Second 
 Brigade, and was the first regiment of the brigade to enter the 
 fort, going in with the First (Curtis s) Brigade. After having 
 assisted in capturing the first two mounds, a portion of the regi 
 ment went to the right and stationed themselves behind a bank 
 in the open field south of the fort. The latter portion then 
 charged across the plain, by order of the commanding general 
 (General Ames), until opposite the seventh or eighth traverse, 
 
284 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 where they threw up an embankment with their tin plates and 
 shovels, which they held until the fort surrendered, keeping up 
 a steady fire on the enemy." 
 
 Let me say, in passing, that Colonel Pennypacker s conduct 
 in leading his brigade with the colors of his own regiment, 
 placed him second to none for gallantry that day. It would be 
 difficult to overestimate the value of his example to his brigade. 
 
 Entering the fort and passing to the rear of the parapet at 
 the west end, I made an examination of it from that position, 
 and decided to use my third brigade, Colonel Bell s, with its 
 left by the parapet, right extended south and west inside the 
 fort, and charge into the angle formed by the land and sea faces. 
 I ordered Bell forward with his brigade to report to me. Lieu 
 tenant Colonel Johnson, commanding the Third Brigade, Jan 
 uary i Qth, reports : " Colonel Bell was ordered by General Ames 
 to remain near him for the purpose of receiving orders." Un 
 fortunately Colonel Bell was killed in the advance, gallantly 
 leading his brigade. The part of his brigade which reached me 
 was in a somewhat disorganized condition. I formed it as best 
 I could for the charge. Owing to the obstructions of the de 
 molished quarters of the garrison and the fire of the enemy from 
 the front (the angle had been partially filled in and was pro 
 tected by a curtain), and from the right, as well as the fire of 
 our Navy, the advance was checked. The men were in a very 
 exposed position, and as no advantage could be gained there I 
 ordered them to join the other troops in pushing seaward on the 
 land-face of the fort. Lieutenant Colonel Johnson further re 
 ports : "The brigade entered the fort conjointly with a portion 
 of the First (Curtis s) Brigade, at the left bastion, a portion 
 moving along the ter re-plain and a portion on the ramparts, 
 parapets and slopes, some of the officers and men in the advance 
 with officers and men of other brigades, all vying with each 
 other." 
 
 Owing to the contracted space in which the fighting was 
 done, brigade and regimental formations were impossible. What 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 285 
 
 was accomplished was through the heroic efforts of small bodies 
 of officers and men. 
 
 From time to time I sent to Terry, who was in the earthwork 
 half a mile away, reports of the progress I was making. 
 
 I had previously learned that the sailors and marines who 
 had made an attack on the sea angle had been quickly repulsed. 
 
 As the sun sank to the horizon, the ardor of the assault 
 abated. Our advance was but slow. Ten of my officers had 
 been killed, forty-seven wounded, and about five hundred men 
 were killed and wounded. Among the killed was one brigade 
 commander, the other two were wounded and disabled. I now 
 requested Terry to join me in the fort. It was dark before he 
 and Com stock arrived. I explained the situation. 
 
 Colonel Abbott s brigade, which had been relieved from its 
 position in the line facing Wilmington, by the defeated sailors 
 and marines, had been ordered to report to me. 
 
 I decided to make my chief effort with the reinforcements 
 by moving the troops by the flank between the palisade and the 
 foot of the fort until the head of the column should reach the 
 northeast angle by the ocean, then face to the right and rush 
 the men up and over the parapet ; and at the same time continue 
 the struggle for the traverses. Colonel J. C. Abbott, command 
 ing Second Brigade, First Division, in his report of January 
 1 5th, says: "Reaching the fort about dark I reported to 
 General Ames. By order of General Ames I first threw the 
 3rd New Hampshire Volunteers, Captain Trie key commanding, 
 along the portion of the north face of the work already occupied 
 by his troops and relieved them ; also by General Ames s order, 
 I threw out the /th Connecticut Volunteers, Captain Marble 
 commanding, as a picket in rear of the work, the right of the 
 line resting on Cape Fear River. During this time the enemy 
 occupied all the eastern and about one-third the northern face 
 of the work. At about 9 o clock, by order of General Ames, 
 I then proceeded to dislodge the enemy from the remainder of 
 the fort. I then advanced the /th New Hampshire, Lieutenant 
 
286 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 Colonel Rollins commanding. They at once and gallantly 
 charged up the slope enveloping the sea angle of the work, 
 meeting a sharp fire from the enemy, who were stationed behind 
 the parapets, and in rear of the main work." 
 
 Captain William H. Trickey, commanding 3rd New Hamp 
 shire Regiment, reports January iSth: "I was directed by 
 Colonel Abbott, commanding brigade, to move my regiment to 
 the extreme advance held by the Second Division and open fire 
 upon the enemy ; was thus engaged for nearly an hour, having, 
 to a great extent, silenced the enemy s fire ; was then directed 
 by Colonel Abbott to take and hold, with twenty men, the next 
 traverse in front, the remainder of my command being left in 
 several traverses to keep up the fire upon the enemy. We 
 took the traverse, as directed, driving the enemy out. Think 
 ing we could go farther, we charged and took the next two, 
 with a like result. After taking the third traverse, having met 
 with considerable resistance, I did not deem it prudent to go 
 farther with so few men, and opened a vigorous fire upon the 
 enemy, who was rallying for the recapture of the traverses ; we 
 held the enemy in check until the arrival of the /th New Hamp 
 shire and 6th Connecticut, who charged and took the remainder 
 of the work." 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel Rollins reports: "At 10 p. M. moved 
 my regiment inside the fort, and was ordered by General Ames 
 to take two traverses, and three, if possible, the number not 
 then taken. I moved over the third traverse of the fort, and 
 advanced rapidly inside the stockade until I reached the battery 
 on the northeast angle of the fort, where I formed the right 
 wing of the regiment, leaving the left in support. I then 
 ordered a charge and captured the three remaining traverses 
 and batteries, then pushed on by the right flank, and by so 
 doing cut off the angle of the fort, moved to the right, and by a 
 rapid and determined advance, captured the remaining traverses 
 and batteries of the fort proper." 
 
 Thus, after some seven hours fighting, more than five of 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 287 
 
 which were after dark, the land-face of the fort was occupied 
 and all resistance ceased. The enemy fled to the shelter of 
 Battery Buchanan, at the end of the point, two miles away. 
 Terry took Abbott and a part of his brigade and marched to 
 Battery Buchanan. Abbott reports : " I was met by the 
 Adjutant General of the General commanding the enemy s 
 forces, who tendered the surrender of the battery, upon which. 
 I referred to General Terry, who would soon arrive. . . . 
 General Terry having arrived, received the surrender of the 
 work and the force." 
 
 Colonel Abbott was mistaken. Terry was too late. Captain 
 Lockwood of my staff had already received the surrender. 
 
 It was after ten o clock. The task set for us at half-past 
 three was finished. Our work was done. 
 
 The statement of their achievement is the highest eulogy 
 that can be passed upon our soldiers. 
 
 A grievous accident occurred early the next morning, which 
 killed and wounded one hundred and thirty of our gallant heroes. 
 It was the explosion of the magazine of the fort. A board of 
 enquiry was organized and found, "that the following are the 
 main facts, viz. : i, immediately after the capture of the fort, 
 General Ames gave orders to Lieutenant Colonel Samuel M. 
 Zent to place guards on all the magazines and bomb-proofs. 
 2, Lieutenant Colonel Zent commenced on the northwest corner 
 of the fort, next the river, following the traverses round, and 
 placed guards on thirty-one entrances under the traverses. The 
 main magazines, which afterwards exploded, being in the rear of 
 the traverses, escaped his notice, and, consequently, had no 
 guards from his regiment or any other." 
 
 General Bragg reports that the defenders of the fort num 
 bered, all told, about one hundred and ten commissioned officers 
 and twenty-five hundred men their casualties being over four 
 hundred. A few escaped across the river, in boats, under cover 
 of the darkness ; the rest became our prisoners. 
 
 Mr. Stanton, the Secretary of War, had been visiting Sher- 
 
288 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 man at Savannah after his march through Georgia, and on his 
 way north called at Fort Fisher, where he had an interview with 
 Terry. 
 
 Upon Stanton s arrival at Fortress Monroe, Va., he sent a 
 despatch to President Lincoln marked "official," dated Tuesday, 
 10 A.M., January 17, 1865. In this despatch Stanton mentions 
 Terry, my brigade commanders and some regimental com 
 manders, but omits my name altogether. Among other things 
 he says : " The assault on the other and most difficult side of 
 the fort was made by a column of three thousand troops of the 
 old Tenth Corps, led by Colonel Curtis, under the immediate 
 supervision of General Terry." 
 
 This is not true, as the official reports show, in any other 
 sense than that Curtis s brigade first reached the fort under 
 my immediate orders with Terry half a mile away. An earlier 
 attempt to make public these facts has been impracticable, as 
 the volume of the war records covering this event was not 
 published till 1894. 
 
 With this as a preface I will add to the extracts of the 
 reports of some of my subordinate officers already given, the 
 report of General Terry, who was my only superior officer. He 
 says : " Of General Ames I have already spoken in a letter 
 recommending his promotion. He commanded all the troops 
 engaged and was constantly under fire. His great coolness, 
 good judgment and skill were never more conspicuous than in 
 this assault." 
 
 These official reports show, as Terry says, that I " com 
 manded all the troops engaged " from the first act, when my 
 aide, Captain A. G. Lawrence, led the first brigade into the fort, 
 to the last act, when the garrison surrendered to my aide, 
 Captain H. C. Lockwood. 
 
 The sailors and marines who assaulted in column the north 
 east angle of the fort along the sea beach, were a body of two 
 thousand men, made up of detachments from different ships. 
 Naturally enough, Captain Breese found it, as has been stated, 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 289 
 
 an unwieldy mass. The sixteen hundred sailors were armed 
 only with pistols and cutlasses. They were quickly repulsed. 
 Few reached the parapet. Once checked, they turned and fled, 
 losing three hundred in killed and wounded. Admiral Porter 
 testified : " I suppose the whole thing was over in fifteen minutes, 
 as far as the sailors were concerned, for they were cut down like 
 sheep." 
 
 Later, this force was sent to the line of intrenchments facing 
 Wilmington, relieving Colonel Abbott s brigade, which reported 
 to me. Of course Admiral Porter expected his sailors to carry 
 the fort, but, alas ! he had been deceived as to its defensive 
 capabilities, which deception resulted in the apparently needless 
 sacrifice of his gallant sailors. 
 
 Our Navy, in its ships and armament, was the most powerful 
 that ever existed up to that time. In officers and men it never 
 had its equal, and never will till an equally enlightened, powerful 
 and liberty-loving people again rise, in their might, in a struggle 
 for self-preservation. 
 
 As to the effect on the fort of the second bombardment, 
 Colonel Lamb writes : " The land armament, with palisades and 
 torpedoes, had been destroyed. For the first time in the his 
 tory of sieges the land defences of the works were destroyed, 
 not by the act of the besieging army, but by the concentrated 
 fire, direct and enfilading, of an immense fleet, poured upon 
 them without intermission, until torpedo wires were cut, palisades 
 breached so that they actually afforded cover for assailants, and 
 the slopes of the work were rendered practicable for assault." 
 
 Why the first expedition was a failure and the second a 
 success has never been rightly understood. The military situa 
 tions have been obscured by the contention between General 
 Butler and Admiral Porter, though the most amicable relations 
 existed between the army and navy. 
 
 It has been believed that the fort was in the same condition 
 on both occasions, and that it was but poorly garrisoned on the 
 first. Those who so held were in error in both particulars. 
 
290 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 According to Badeau, Grant s historian : " Curtis declared 
 that the fort could have been carried on the first expedition, and 
 that at the moment when they were recalled they virtually had 
 possession." This declaration has been accepted as the truth. 
 
 We can examine the facts, now that the official reports have 
 been published, and form our own opinions on this point, which 
 has been the pivot of the whole controversy. 
 
 It appears from Curtis s report that he had " pushed the 
 right of his skirmishers to within seventy-five paces of the fort 
 and had sent back to his reserves for two hundred men with 
 which to possess the fort, but his messenger was there informed 
 that orders from the department commander bade him retire," 
 which he did. 
 
 Let us see what these two hundred men would have had to 
 do to make what Curtis calls a "virtual," an actual possession of 
 the fort. 
 
 Colonel Lamb had a force of fourteen hundred men, nine 
 hundred of whom were veterans. Whiting, Lamb and other 
 officers commend the discipline, skill and gallantry of the gar 
 rison. I will not take time to quote from their reports. They 
 all show that the officers of the fort were keenly alive to our 
 movements. Colonel Lamb states that he intentionally kept 
 his men hidden from view. He was perfectly familiar with the 
 surroundings, both within and without the fort. 
 
 Now, the one question to decide is, could those two hundred 
 men, sent for by Curtis, have taken possession of that palisaded 
 Malakoff fortress, with its garrison of fourteen hundred men ? 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel Barney, who commanded our forces 
 behind the picket line, nowhere intimates that we had any kind 
 of possession of the fort. 
 
 Even Curtis reports, officially, that his skirmishers were met 
 with musketry and canister, and that he retired under a heavy 
 fire. 
 
 In making a decision, Lamb s report must not be overlooked. 
 He reports : "That it was dark at 5.30, when the fleet ceased 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 291 
 
 firing. No assault could be made while the fleet was firing. 
 When the firing ceased the parapets (which were twenty feet 
 high) were at once manned and half of the garrison (seven hun 
 dred men) were stationed outside the work behind the palisade, 
 which was nine feet high and pierced for musketry." What 
 soldier will say we had " virtual " possession of the fort under 
 such circumstances ? 
 
 The second expedition took this question from the realm of 
 speculation. 
 
 Three weeks after the first attempt we were back again 
 before the fort, which, because of the efficient bombardment of 
 the Navy, was far less capable of resistance. A column of two 
 thousand sailors and marines were to make a gallant assault on 
 the sea angle simultaneously with ours, thereby to create a 
 diversion, greatly to our advantage. 
 
 Curtis had in his brigade, now forming the first line, more 
 than twice as many men as he had before the fort on the first 
 expedition. Again I gave him the order to take the fort. Did 
 he take it ? No. His brigade, led by Captain Lawrence, made 
 a lodgment on one corner of it a lodgment so uncertain that 
 I immediately ordered up Colonel Pennypacker s brigade, which, 
 inspired and led by him and Colonel Moore, reached the third 
 traverse and made our foothold secure. Such are the official 
 records of the battle. 
 
 I wish to touch one other point. Badeau writes in this same 
 history : " The fighting was continued from traverse to traverse, 
 until at 9 o clock the troops had nearly reached the bastion. 
 Bell had been killed and Pennypacker wounded, and Curtis now 
 sent back for reinforcements. The advance party was in 
 imminent peril, for the guns from both bastions and the mound 
 batteries were turned upon them. At this crisis a staff officer 
 brought orders from Terry to stop fighting and begin intrench 
 ing. Curtis was inflamed with the magnificent rage of battle, 
 and fairly roared at this command, Then we shall lose whatever 
 we have gained. The enemy will drive us from here in the 
 
292 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 morning. While he spoke he was struck by a shell, and fell 
 senseless to the earth. The hero of Fort Fisher had fallen, and 
 the fort was not yet carried. Ames, who was near him, sent an 
 officer to Terry to report that Curtis was killed, and that his 
 dying request was that the fighting might go on. It was also 
 Ames s opinion that the battle should proceed. Terry caught 
 the contagion, and determined to continue the assault, even if it 
 became necessary to abandon the line of defence towards Wil 
 mington. Abbott s reinforcements were at once ordered for 
 ward, and as they entered the fort the rebels on the bastion gave 
 way and Fort Fisher was carried." It is due to Badeau to state 
 that he says in a note that he "obtained the account of this 
 assault from a paper written by an aide-de-camp to General 
 Curtis." 
 
 This remarkable statement deserves a moment s considera 
 tion. If it be true, then all the chief honors must fall on one 
 head. But it is not true. If Terry gave orders to stop fight 
 ing and begin intrenching, who can believe that it was through 
 the " contagion caught " by him from Curtis that the fight 
 continued, or that he would "abandon the line towards Wil 
 mington " to try uncertainties at the fort ? 
 
 Terry reports : " When Bell s brigade was ordered into 
 action I foresaw that more troops would probably be needed, 
 and sent an order for Abbott s brigade to move down from the 
 north line, at the same time requesting Captain Breese to 
 replace them with his sailors and marines. I also directed 
 General Paine to send me one of the strongest regiments of 
 his own division ; these troops arrived at dusk and reported to 
 General Ames." 
 
 This treatment of Terry and the ignoring of division, 
 brigade and regimental commanders find no justification in the 
 facts. Terry is entitled to every honor due his position. 
 Pennypacker and Bell cannot be swept aside so lightly, nor 
 the regimental commanders, whose names I need not give 
 here. 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 293 
 
 I would say specifically to that reference to myself, that I 
 did not send any request, " dying " or other, from Curtis to 
 Terry that the fighting might go on. 
 
 If Terry intended my division to stop fighting and begin 
 intrenching he did not send the order to Curtis, one of my 
 brigade commanders, nor would Terry send reinforcements to 
 Curtis over my head. 
 
 According to this aide, Curtis was wounded at 9 o clock 
 while criticising Terry s order to stop fighting and begin 
 intrenching. I say in my report that Curtis was wounded "a 
 short time before dark " on that brief winter s day. 
 
 I saw him in and emerge from a covered way at the west 
 end of the parapet. He approached me and began to speak ; 
 almost at the same time a shot struck him down. Colonel 
 Daggett, who succeeded to the command of Curtis s brigade, 
 reports two days after : Curtis was seriously wounded about 
 4.30. General Carleton, who was with me at the time, and 
 picked up his sword as he fell, says Curtis was shot at about 
 4.30. 
 
 And yet Badeau would have us believe that Curtis was 
 wounded while criticising Terry s order to stop fighting and 
 begin intrenching, at 9 o clock, some four hours after Curtis fell 
 senseless at my feet. 
 
 In fact, he was wounded before dark, about an hour and a 
 half after the battle began, and some four hours before the fort 
 was taken. The exact minute is of no importance. Partici 
 pants in a battle are poor judges of passing time. 
 
 In this instance it is fixed accurately enough in the official 
 reports of Daggett, Abbott and myself, as well as Carleton s 
 statement of his recollections. 
 
 General Terry says in his official report of the battle : 
 " Brigadier General Curtis and Colonels Pennypacker, Bell and 
 Abbott, the brigade commanders, led them with the utmost 
 gallantry. Curtis was wounded after fighting in the front rank, 
 rifle in hand ; Pennypacker while carrying the standard of one 
 
294 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 of his regiments, the first man in a charge over a traverse ; Bell 
 was mortally wounded near the palisade." 
 
 This is all, literally all, Terry says of exceptional services by 
 Curtis. "Fighting in the front rank, rifle in hand" is most 
 commendable under the circumstances, but it does not in itself 
 justify claims for exceptional honors. 
 
 My report says : " The conduct of the officers and men of 
 this division was most gallant. . . . Where the name of every 
 officer and man engaged in this desperate conflict should be 
 submitted, I shall at present only be able to give a few of those 
 most conspicuous. It is hoped all may be properly rewarded. 
 
 "Brevet Brig. General N. M. Curtis, commanding First 
 Brigade, was prominent throughout the day for his bravery, cool 
 ness and judgment. His services cannot be overestimated. He 
 fell a short time before dark, seriously wounded in the head by 
 a canister shot. 
 
 " Colonel Pennypacker, commanding the Second Brigade, 
 was seriously wounded while planting his colors on the third 
 traverse of the work. This officer was surpassed by none, and 
 his absence during the day was most deeply felt and seriously 
 regretted. 
 
 " Colonel L. Bell, commanding Third Brigade, was mortally 
 wounded while crossing the bridge in advance of the palisading. 
 He was an able and efficient officer ; one not easily replaced. 
 
 " Colonel J. W. Moore, 2O3rd Pennsylvania Volunteers, be 
 haved with the most distinguished gallantry. He was killed 
 while passing the second traverse of the fort, in advance of his 
 regiment, waving his colors. Few equalled, none surpassed 
 this brave officer." 
 
 My report on Curtis is not less generous than Terry s ; but 
 it was not intended to, and I doubt if it does, sustain his pre 
 tensions of this day. 
 
 The official records, written thirty-two years ago, must be 
 the foundation for all claims of honor and distinction. Nothing 
 can now be added to them or taken from them. By them we 
 all must be judged. 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 295 
 
 Misrepresentations greatly injured General Butler, and deeply 
 humiliated General Weitzel. Truth has been outraged truth 
 overslow in the pursuit of falsehood, not always the most agree 
 able company. 
 
 In this paper I have attempted to right a wrong. I have 
 given few opinions of my own. I have called up the actors 
 themselves, and have let them speak in their own words some 
 times under oath always under a sense of grave responsibility. 
 
 [The writer wishes to state to those who heard the paper read before the 
 Commanderies of the Loyal Legion of the States of Massachusetts, November 4th, 
 1896, and New York, February 3rd, 1897, that, in the accompanying pamphlet, in 
 which it is reproduced, he has omitted reference to the time when a flag was cap 
 tured and the time and place a Lieutenant was made a prisoner, and also as to 
 having heard of and from General Curtis. 
 
 This has been done because the accuracy of these statements has been ques 
 tioned, and also because, accurate or inaccurate, they are immaterial to the issues 
 involved. 
 
 He prefers to stand on the official records made at the time and not on recol 
 lections after a period of thirty-two years. 
 
 If, however, any of his hearers offers the slightest objection to this action, 
 whatever the motive, the writer is quite willing to be held to the text as read.] 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 liV 
 
 BREVET MAJOR GENERAL N. MARTIN CURTIS, U.S.V. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT, in the iQth Chapter of the 2cl Volume of 
 his Personal Memoirs, refers to Fort Fisher in the following 
 words : 
 
 " Up to January, 1865, the enemy occupied Fort Fisher, at the mouth of 
 Cape Fear River and below the City of Wilmington. This port was of immense 
 importance to the Confederates, because it formed their principal inlet for block 
 ade-runners, by means of which they brought in from abroad such supplies and 
 munitions of war as they could not procure at home. It was equally important 
 to us to get possession of it, not only because it was desirable to cut off their 
 supplies so as to ensure a speedy termination of the war, but also because foreign 
 governments, particularly the British government, were constantly threatening 
 that unless ours could maintain the blockade off that coast they should cease to 
 recognize any blockade. For these reasons I determined, with the concurrence 
 of the Navy Department, in December, to send an expedition against Fort Fisher 
 for the purpose of capturing it." 
 
 Thomas E. Taylor, an English merchant, one of the most 
 active and successful blockade-runners during the war, says in 
 his book, " Running the Blockade," page 139 : 
 
 " That morning (in Richmond, Va., December, 1864) I had an appointment 
 with the Commissary General, who divulged to me under promise of secrecy that 
 Lee s army was in terrible straits, and had in fact rations for only thirty days. 
 He asked me if I could help him. I said I would do my best, and after some 
 negotiations he undertook to pay me a profit of 350 per cent upon any provisions 
 and meat I could bring in within the next three weeks. . . . Although it w r as a 
 hard trip it paid well, as we had on board coming out a most magnificent cargo, 
 a great deal of sea island cotton, the profits upon which and the provisions I had 
 taken in amounted to over eighty-five thousand pounds not bad w r ork for about 
 twenty days." 
 
 January I5th, 1865, the day of the capture of Fort Fisher, 
 he wrote from Nassau to his chiefs in Liverpool, England : 
 (p. 136, same vol.) : 
 
 299 
 
300 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 "Altogether I think the Confederate government is going to the bad, and if 
 they don t take care the Confederacy will go too. I never saw things look so 
 gloomy, and I think spring will finish them unless they make a change for the 
 better. Georgia is gone, and they say Sherman is going to seize Branchville ; if 
 he does Charleston and Wilmington will be done and if Wilmington goes Lee 
 has to evacuate Richmond and retire into Tennessee. He told me the other day 
 that if they did not keep Wilmington they could not save Richmond. They nearly 
 had Fort Fisher they were within sixty yards of it and had they pushed on 
 as they ought to have done could have taken it. It was a terrific bombardment ; 
 they estimate that about 40,000 shells were sent into it. Colonel Lamb behaved 
 like a brick splendidly. I got the last of the Whitworths in, and they are now 
 at the fort. They are very hard up for food in the field, but the Banshee has this 
 time 600 barrels of pork and 1 500 boxes of meat enough to feed Lee s army 
 for a month." 
 
 When Colonel Lamb took command of the fort, July 4th, 
 1 862, he found it a quadrilateral work with six guns, flanked 
 north and south by five detached batteries carrying eleven guns, 
 four of which were casemated. Only one of the seventeen 
 guns was of modern ordnance. He stated that the frigate 
 Minnesota could have destroyed the works and driven them out 
 in a few hours. During his occupation of the fort he made it 
 the largest and best equipped fortification constructed by the 
 Confederates, as shown in his description of it as it stood before 
 the attack. 
 
 At the land-face of Fort Fisher, five miles from the in 
 trenched camp at Sugar Loaf, the peninsula was about half a 
 mile wide. This face commenced about a hundred feet from 
 the river with a half bastion, and extended with a heavy curtain 
 to a full bastion on the ocean side, where it joined the sea-face, 
 without moat, scarp and counterscarp. The outer slope was 
 twenty feet high from the berm to the top of the parapet, at 
 an angle of 45, and was sodded with marsh grass, which grew 
 luxuriantly. The parapet was not less than twenty-five feet 
 thick, with an inclination of only one foot. The revetment was 
 five feet nine inches high from the floor of the gun-chambers, 
 and these were some twelve feet or more from the interior 
 plane. The guns were all mounted in barbette, on Columbiad 
 carriages ; there was not a single casemated gun in the fort. 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 301 
 
 Between the gun-chambers, containing one or two guns each 
 (there were twenty heavy guns on the land-face) there were 
 heavy traverses, exceeding in size any known to engineers, to 
 protect from an enfilading fire. They extended out some 
 twelve feet on the parapet and were twelve feet or more in 
 height above the parapet running back thirty feet or more. 
 The gun-chambers were reached from the rear by steps. In 
 each traverse was an alternate magazine or bomb-proof, the 
 latter ventilated by an air-chamber. Passageways penetrated 
 the traverses in the interior of the work, forming additional 
 bomb-proofs for the reliefs for the guns. 
 
 The sea-face for a hundred yards from the northeast bastion 
 was of the same massive character as the land-face. A crescent 
 battery intended for four guns adjoined this. A series of batter 
 ies extended for three-quarters of a mile along the sea, connected 
 by an infantry curtain. These batteries had heavy traverses ten 
 or twelve feet high above the top of the parapets. On this line 
 was a bomb-proof electric battery connected with a system of sub 
 marine torpedoes. Farther along a mound battery sixty feet high 
 was erected, with two heavy guns, which had a plunging fire on the 
 channel ; this was connected with the battery north of it by a 
 light curtain. Following the line of the works it was one mile 
 from the angle of the sea and land faces to the mound, and upon 
 this line twenty-four heavy guns were mounted. From the 
 mound for nearly a mile to the end of the point was a level sand 
 plain scarcely three feet above high tide, and much of it was sub 
 merged during gales. At this point was Battery Buchanan, of 
 four guns, in the shape of an ellipse, commanding the inlet, its 
 two 1 1 -inch guns covering the approach by land. An advanced 
 redoubt with a 24-pounder was added after the first expedition. 
 A wharf for large steamers was in close proximity to these works. 
 As a defence against infantry there was a system of sub- 
 terra torpedoes extending across the peninsula, five to six hun 
 dred feet from the land-face, and so disconnected that the explo 
 sion of one would not affect the others ; inside the torpedoes, 
 
302 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 about fifty feet from the bcrm of the work, extending from 
 river bank to sea-shore, was a heavy palisade of sharpened 
 logs nine feet high, pierced for musketry. There was a redoubt 
 guarding the sally-port, from which two Napoleons were run out, 
 as occasion required. At the river end of the palisade was a 
 deep and muddy slough, across which was a bridge, over which 
 the river road entered the fort. Commanding this bridge was a 
 Napoleon gun. There were three mortars in rear of the land- 
 face. 
 
 Colonel Lamb says : 
 
 " Fort Fisher commanded the last gateway between the Confederate States and 
 the outside world. Its capture with the resulting loss of all the Cape Fear River 
 defences, and of Wilmington, the great importing depot of the South, effectually 
 ended all blockade running. Lee sent me word that Fort Fisher must be held or 
 he could not subsist his army." 
 
 General Butler reported at 8 P.M., December 27th, to General 
 Grant, his return to Fortress Monroe, briefly stating the oper 
 ations of the men under his command, and his reasons for with 
 drawing his forces. He stated that all but about three hundred 
 were re-embarked before he left the North Carolina coast, and that 
 he had no doubt they were all safely off by that time. He also 
 said that he would go up to see General Grant the next morning. 
 
 The transports returning with the troops (excepting one on 
 which was about one-quarter of Curtis s brigade, which did not 
 return until after the second expedition sailed) passed the capes 
 and anchored in Hampton Roads early in the morning of De 
 cember 29th, and returned to their camps near the New Mar 
 ket Road on the 3<Dth of December. 
 
 In the interval between the return of the first expedition 
 and the departure of the second, General Grant was in corre 
 spondence with the President, the Secretary of War, the Secre 
 tary of the Navy and Admiral Porter, in reference to the failure 
 of the first expedition, and the preparation going forward to re 
 new the attack upon Fort Fisher. 
 
 On January 2nd General Grant requested General Butler to 
 send Major General Terry to him at City Point, and the same 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 305 
 
 day issued Special Orders No. 2, Headquarters Armies of the 
 United States, directing eight thousand infantry, two batteries 
 of artillery without horses, with four days cooked rations in hav 
 ersacks, to be got in immediate readiness to embark on trans 
 ports, with orders to report to Major General W. T. Sherman, 
 at Savannah, Ga. ; that the troops and artillery of the late ex 
 pedition against Wilmington, being experienced in embarking 
 and debarking, should be selected, and to make up the balance 
 of the eight thousand, good and tried soldiers of the Second 
 Brigade, First Division, Twenty-fourth Army Corps, should be 
 taken. Brevet Major General A. H. Terry, U. S. Vols., was 
 assigned to the command of these forces, and directed that every 
 practicable precaution should be observed to prevent information 
 of any movement of troops getting to the enemy. 
 
 On January 2nd General Grant gave General Terry written 
 instructions to renew the attack on Fort Fisher, with details for 
 his co-operation with Admiral Porter. 
 
 On January 4th Lieutenant Colonel C. B. Comstock, Aide- 
 de-camp, \vas directed to report to General Terry, and accom 
 pany him as chief engineer of the expedition under his command. 
 
 January 4th, en receipt of a letter from Admiral Porter, 
 General Grant gave General Terry additional instructions gov 
 erning his action after joining Admiral Porter s fleet. When the 
 troops went down the James River, General Grant accompanied 
 General Terry to Fortress Monroe, and gave such verbal in 
 structions as he deemed necessary. 
 
 January 4th, 1865, five days after returning from the first 
 expedition, the First Brigade broke camp, marched in a heavy 
 snow-storm to Bermuda Landing, and bivouacked for the night. 
 
 The next morning, General Adelbert Ames, commanding 
 Second Division, Twenty-fourth Army Corps, directed me to 
 embark my brigade on two river steamers, proceed to Hampton 
 Roads, transfer my command to the steamship Atlantic and 
 to reserve rooms on board the ship for himself and staff ; and 
 he especially directed that neither myself nor any member of 
 
304 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 my command should leave the ship after boarding it. The trip 
 down the James River, and the transfer of the troops to the 
 Atlantic were made before sundown. Before dark all the division 
 officers, except General Ames and his aide, Captain Henry C. 
 Lockwood, came on board, and reported that General Ames and 
 Captain Lockwood would soon join us. Two rooms had been 
 reserved for General Ames, and one for each of his staff. 
 
 About nine o clock in the evening information reached us 
 that Ames s division, Twenty-fourth Army Corps, Paine s 
 division, Twenty-fifth Corps (Colored), J. C. Abbott s Second 
 Brigade, First Division, Tw r enty-fourth Army Corps, and two 
 batteries of artillery were on transports in Hampton Roads. 
 
 At five minutes after twelve o clock that night Captain Alger 
 non E. Smith, 1 1 /th New York, aide to General A. H. Terry, 
 brought to my state-room a sealed envelope addressed " To the 
 Senior Officer on Board the Atlantic" and asked me to take and 
 receipt for it. This I declined to do, informing him that General 
 Ames was the senior officer on board, and the proper person to 
 receive it. He left, but soon returned with one of the division 
 staff, who reported that General Ames was not at that time on 
 board. I then receipted for the despatch, and after reading it to 
 the division staff officer, requested him to acquaint General 
 Ames with its contents as soon as he could do so. The orders 
 addressed "To the Senior Officer on Board the Atlantic" and 
 the sealed orders addressed "To be opened off Cape Henry," 
 read as follows : 
 
 HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, 
 
 GENERAL ORDERS, ) Januarv 5, 1865. 
 
 No. 2. \ 
 
 The vessels containing the troops of this expedition will leave Hampton Roads 
 precisely at 4 A.M. to-morrow. As far as possible the vessels containing the troops 
 of each division will keep together, and the whole fleet will follow the flagship, 
 which will carry red, white, and green lights at the masthead. They will pass out 
 between the capes, and when off Cape Henry the sealed orders which are furnished 
 to the commanding officer on each transport will be opened. The speed of the 
 transports will be as nearly as possible eight knots per hour. 
 
 By order of Bvt. Maj. Gen. A. H. TERRY: 
 A. TERRY, Captain, and Assistant Adjutant General." 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 305 
 
 HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, 
 
 January 5, s86j. 
 SEALED ORDERS, 
 
 COMMANDING OFFICER OF TROOPS, 
 
 On Board of U. S. Transport Atlantic : 
 SIR: 
 
 The transport fleet will rendezvous twenty-five miles off Beaufort, N.C. 
 You will immediately proceed to that point and report to the senior officer of the 
 expedition present at the time of your arrival. 
 You will then await further orders. 
 
 By order of Bvt. Maj. Gen. A. IT. TERRY : 
 
 A. TERRY, Captain, and Assistant Adjutant General. 
 
 I sent word to Captain Gray, commanding the ship to weigh 
 anchor and be ready to sail at four o clock in the morning. I 
 went on deck at 3 A.M., and found the men weighing anchor ; 
 but the ship waited for its position in the line until after day 
 light, and then passed out between the capes. While sailing out 
 breakfast was served to the officers in the cabin. Before taking 
 seats at the table I requested Captain Charles A. Carleton, acting 
 assistant adjutant general on division staff, to invite General Ames 
 to join us. He replied, "General Ames did not come on board 
 until late, and will not breakfast for several hours." Before the 
 officers left the table Captain Gray was called on deck. He soon 
 returned and reported that the ship was off Cape Henry, and 
 asked for further orders. I handed to Captain Carleton the 
 sailing orders, as well as the sealed orders, " To be opened 
 when off Cape Henry," and requested him to give them to 
 General Ames. At first Captain Carleton declined to do so, 
 saying he did not wish to disturb General Ames, and said that I 
 should open the envelope and attend to all matters of detail 
 while on shipboard, as Colonel Bell had done on the first ex 
 pedition. I replied that I should not assume any of the duties 
 of the division commander until directed by him to do so, and 
 that if he declined to take the orders to General Ames I would 
 send one of my own staff. Thereupon Captain Carleton took the 
 orders to the state-room in which General Ames s baggage had 
 been placed, but soon returned to the cabin and reported that 
 General Ames was not on board the ship. 
 
306 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 During the second day after the arrival of the division at the 
 rendezvous off Beaufort, N. C., General Ames and his personal 
 aide, Captain Lockwood, came on board the Atlantic from a 
 hospital ship which had sailed from Fortress Monroe the clay 
 following the departure of the expedition. General Ames then 
 charged General Curtis with " sailing with his division for the 
 purpose of commanding it," and used offensive words, which 
 were promptly resented and their retraction demanded. Follow 
 ing this unhappy and uncalled for incident the intercourse 
 between these officers was limited to the strictest requirements 
 of official duty. 
 
 After the sailing of the troops above mentioned, Brevet 
 Brigadier General H. L. Abbott sailed from Fortress Monroe, 
 on the /th of January, with a siege train of twenty 3O-pounder 
 and four loo-pounder Parrott guns, twenty Coehorn mortars, 
 three companies of the 1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery, and 
 two companies of the 1 5th New York Engineers. This addi 
 tional force joined us at the rendezvous one day before the 
 landing. 
 
 Early on the morning of Friday, January I3th, the vessels 
 of Admiral Porter s squadron moved into position before Fort 
 Fisher and opened a vigorous bombardment of the fort, which con 
 tinued without cessation until its capture. About eight o clock 
 A.M. a division of light draught naval vessels was detached from 
 the squadron to cover the landing of the troops, which was com 
 pleted at three o clock in the afternoon, together with extra 
 rations, ammunition and intrenching tools. The landing was 
 made through a heavy surf in which officers, men, provisions in 
 haversacks, and ammunition in boxes were thoroughly soaked. 
 
 A line established across the peninsula in the early morning 
 was soon abandoned for a second line, a mile farther south, on 
 which breastworks extending from the beach to the Cape Fear 
 River were thrown up during the night and completed at eight 
 o clock the next morning, when the troops of General Ames s 
 division were withdrawn from the line. General Paine s divis- 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 307 
 
 ion and Abbott s brigade (under command of General Paine) 
 were left to defend it if attacked by the enemy, then in large 
 force at Sugar Loaf, two and a half miles north. The maintain 
 ing of this line was of vital importance a failure to do so 
 would have caused the withdrawal of troops from before the 
 fort, to reinforce the line. General Terry was justified, in view 
 of the past services of the troops under Generals Paine and 
 Abbott, in leaving it in their charge. The regiments of 
 Abbott s brigade were first organized under General Terry, and 
 he always fondly referred to it as " his old brigade." They were 
 prepared to make a stubborn defence, but the mildness of 
 General Bragg s demonstrations did not rise to the dignity of an 
 attack at any time. Not only did he not, throughout the 
 day, force back the line ; his fire did not wound a single Union 
 soldier. 
 
 For the third time since he rejoined the expedition, General 
 Ames now requested General Terry to promise that he would 
 not designate General Curtis for any special duty, and, failing 
 to obtain assurance that his request would be complied with, 
 stated to General Terry that he would not be responsible for 
 the success of any movement with which General Curtis was 
 charged. Thereupon General Terry answered : " I have known 
 General Curtis for nearly two years, and have perfect confidence 
 in his ability and fidelity. I will relieve him from your com 
 mand, and direct him to report to me for orders." Immediately 
 after this General Terry informed me that from that time I 
 should receive all orders from him direct. A brief statement 
 of this incident is made to give a better understanding of 
 subsequent events. 
 
 Soon after being relieved from General Ames s command my 
 brigade accompanied General Terry and Colonel Comstock, 
 Aide to General Grant, to Battery Holland, below Craig s Land 
 ing, where a small steamer, loaded with forage and ammunition, 
 was captured. While marching down a shell from the rebel 
 gunboat Chickamauga, lying in the Cape Fear River, ex- 
 
308 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 ploded near the head of the column, seriously wounding Captain 
 J. H. Reeve, commanding the 3rd New York, and three men 
 of the brigade. 
 
 A skirmish line was sent forward from Battery Holland, 
 under cover of which General Terry, Colonel Comstock and 
 myself went along the sand dunes near the river to within six 
 hundred yards of the fort. After completing his observations 
 General Terry asked, "Do you think the fort can be successfully 
 assaulted with the force I can spare from the line established 
 last night, the holding of which is of the first importance ? " I 
 replied that I believed the three brigades already withdrawn 
 from the line could carry the fort by an assault if the disposi 
 tions were properly made, and if the Navy should support the 
 troops from start to finish. He said, " It has been definitely 
 determined that in case an assault is made you will make it. 
 I will see Admiral Porter this evening, and we will then decide 
 what course to pursue." 
 
 General Terry directed me to remain near the fort if I could 
 do so safely, or to retire to the reserves near the breastworks 
 thrown up the night before, where he could be found to receive 
 reports of any incidents which I might think it important for 
 him to know. He then returned, with Colonel Comstock, to 
 the reserves. 
 
 From a sand dune on the right of my skirmish line I took a 
 survey of the ground in front of the parapet, and determined to 
 throw up breastworks to protect the assaulting party. On 
 account of the conformation I decided to construct these lines 
 at an angle to the curtain, the left flanks to be fifty yards nearer 
 the fort than the right flanks. There was marshy ground in 
 front of the west half of the parapet, but I preferred to march 
 through it rather than go to the eastward over dry ground, 
 although the west end of the parapet was higher than the east 
 end, as the low ground in front made it easier to get under the 
 plane of fire than at the east end, \vhere the surface was higher, 
 and served as a natural glacis. Because of this, when the 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 309 
 
 assault finally came to be made, the naval column was kept 
 under fire longer than were the troops assaulting on the left 
 end of the parapet. 
 
 As soon as it was dark a skirmish line was deployed at five 
 paces, the front rank carrying muskets, the rear shovels, and 
 advanced to the place selected for the first line. Here the men 
 in the rear line proceeded to throw up enough sand to protect a 
 man lying on his face, while the line with muskets advanced 
 twenty paces beyond the men with shovels. In the drift sand 
 the work was quickly done. Then the man with the shovel 
 went forward and gave it to the picket, from whom he took his 
 musket and marched forward twenty paces, while the former 
 picket threw up the sand where he stood ; and so the lines 
 went forward, each man exchanging gun for shovel. In this 
 manner four lines of breastworks were laid out, the last being 
 under the plane of fire. Details were made to connect these 
 " Gopher Holes," as the men called them, thus making con 
 tinuous lines. About one hundred and seventy-five yards from 
 the parapet a higher and heavier breastwork was thrown up to 
 protect a party of sharpshooters ; and forty men, selected on 
 account of their skill as marksmen, were immediately sent to 
 occupy it. They had orders to remain until the next night, or 
 until an assault should be made, in which case they were 
 instructed to join the first line and go to the fort. In the 
 meantime they were to prevent the loading of the Columbiads 
 on the parapet. The work was completed before dawn, and 
 the tired troops of the First Brigade turned in for a well-earned 
 rest. Many of those who slept on the sands of Federal Point 
 the night preceding the battle of January I5th, friends and 
 foes alike, will, from causes incident to the service, remember 
 that night, with all its disagreeable features, as one which 
 afforded them sweeter and more restful slumber than they have 
 since obtained on the softest couch. 
 
 On the morning of the I5th General Terry, with Colonel 
 Comstock, came to Battery Holland, and informed me that it 
 
310 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 had been agreed between Admiral Porter and himself that the 
 three brigades of the Second Division should attack the west 
 end of the parapet, while sixteen hundred sailors and four 
 hundred marines would attack the east end at three o clock in 
 the afternoon. He then asked, " What have you done or dis 
 covered during the night ? " He was told about the rifle pits 
 and their use when advancing on the fort, and the stationing of 
 men under the plane of fire to keep the cannoneers from loading 
 the Columbiads when the assaulting forces should take position 
 preliminary to the final rush. He approved the work, and later 
 sent forward sixty men of the I3th Indiana (Third Brigade) 
 with repeating rifles, to join the sharpshooters. They went 
 under command of Lieutenant Colonel Samuel M. Zent, and 
 they performed most valuable service. 
 
 General Terry said to me, " You stated yesterday that an 
 assault would be successful if the dispositions were properly 
 made. Your brigade is to lead, and I should like to know 
 your views as to the formation." I replied that I wished to 
 charge in line, brigade front, make successive advances from one 
 rifle pit to the next, the final rush not to be made until we were 
 as near the fort as we could get without drawing the infantry 
 fire, and that our movements in this particular would be gov 
 erned by the action of the enemy in coming to the parapet ; that 
 when his infantry came up we would wait behind our newly made 
 rifle pits until the Navy pounded them down ; when they were 
 down we would go forward to the next line ; when they came to 
 the parapet again we would again lie down until they were 
 driven back ; and when they should refuse to leave the parapet 
 we would make the final rush and get under the plane of fire 
 before the enemy could deliver a second volley. 
 
 General Terry said, " Don t you want to strike them in 
 column with a hammer-head ?" I replied, "After I get under 
 the plane of fire I will ; but before that the thinner the line 
 the better. The troops will be in column when they get to the 
 parapet. The right regiment will go straight to the right of the 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 311 
 
 left salient, the three other regiments will oblique -to the right 
 and strike the fort at the same place, and so reduce the front to 
 one-third of what it will be at the start. We will pass the 
 stockade and mount the parapet, and if we cannot get in, send 
 a brigade to push us in." The subject was fully discussed, and 
 after Colonel Comstock had given the plan his approval General 
 Terry accepted it. He thus became responsible for the plan, 
 and ordered its execution. 
 
 I said, " General Terry, the final rush will be made when 
 you see me rise in the middle of the line and hear me call aloud. 
 Soon after you will see the First Brigade go through the stock 
 ade and up the parapet ; then send Pennypacker s brigade." He 
 replied, " With the men of your brigade on the parapet I shall 
 feel certain of success. A lodgment there assures victory." 
 
 About noon General Ames came to the front with Bell s 
 and Pennypacker s brigades, and halted them in rear of my 
 brigade. 
 
 A little time before advancing to the line from which the 
 start was to be made, a naval officer, Lieutenant Porter, I 
 think, came to me and said, " General Terry informs me that 
 your brigade is to lead in the assault, and I desire to be informed 
 of your plans, so that the sailors and marines on the beach may 
 move at the same time you do." I told him of the plans for a 
 gradual approach, and that the final rush would be made when 
 the garrison remained on the parapet, at which time the column 
 on the beach should also start ; that I did not approve of the 
 formation the Navy seemed inclined to make, and feared the 
 result would not be satisfactory. He replied, " I am sorry 
 Army officers find so much fault with the Navy. We are try 
 ing to help them on their own ground, and they ought to be 
 satisfied." I answered, " You misunderstand me. We want 
 you very much, both your guns on the ships and your men on 
 the shore. I speak as a landsman about operations on land 
 I would not criticise nautical matters. Your men are too com 
 pactly formed your front is too narrow for the depth of your 
 
312 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 column. To go into action as your men are now formed places 
 you under a great disadvantage. You should hold back your 
 main body until your advanced line gets a foothold on the fort. 
 If you go forward as you are you will be fearfully punished, and 
 the only good your column will do us will be to receive the fire 
 which otherwise would come to our lines. I fully understand 
 the great advantage the troops will derive from this movement 
 of the Navy, but hesitate to commend it when I think of the 
 heavy loss they must sustain in making it in the formation you 
 have adopted." The officer left, assuring me that the Navy 
 would do its part and merit approval whether the Army gave it 
 or not. 
 
 Two thousand men from the Navy, from sixty ships, unac 
 quainted one with another or with the service they were to 
 undertake, were brought together on the beach to perform a 
 most hazardous work. The number of officers was small 
 entirely too few for the number of men engaged. As before 
 stated, the force was too compact. The first line should have 
 been longer and thinner, and the main body kept out of the fire 
 until the first line had reached the fort. Such a plan requires 
 good men veterans ; it is, however, the way to assault fortifi 
 cations with the least loss of life, almost the only plan by which 
 to achieve success. 
 
 Before advancing to the first line every officer and man had 
 been instructed as to his movements and the order in which 
 they would take place, and that the point of attack would be 
 between the first and second traverses. 
 
 Just before the preliminary movements were begun Captain 
 A. G. Lawrence, of General Ames s staff, came to me and asked 
 if he could go with my brigade. I replied that he could if he 
 would not interfere with its movements, and sent him to Lieu 
 tenant Colonel F. X. Meyer, commanding the n;th New York, 
 at the right of the line. Captain Lawrence understood that I 
 was not under the command of his chief, and that he could not 
 accompany my brigade without my permission. He did not go 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 313 
 
 as the representative of another, nor did he make the slightest 
 attempt to direct the movements of the men. He fell at the 
 stockade, seriously wounded, the victim of a valor which he con 
 spicuously exhibited in every battle in which he participated. 
 
 The preliminary advances were made in a succession of thin 
 lines, number one of the first line going forward to a rifle pit, 
 followed by number two ; the rear rank advancing in the same 
 manner. By this method only one-fourth of the line was ex 
 posed to the enemy s fire. 
 
 After the first advance Captain Keeler, of the division staff, 
 who was near the right of my line, called out, " General Ames 
 says the time for the assault has come." I replied, " I shall 
 obey the orders of General Terry, who understands that the 
 advance depends upon the fire of the Navy and its effect upon 
 the garrison." 
 
 Three short advances were made. During each the garrison 
 came to the parapet ; when the line halted it returned to the 
 bomb-proofs, each time remaining longer on the parapet and 
 suffering greater damage from the naval fire. When the enemy 
 seemed determined to remain on the parapet the final rush 
 was made. I arose from the middle of the line and called 
 out "Forward," advancing as I arose from the ground. Each 
 officer and man had been instructed to advance as he got up, 
 and to go forward in silence. Cheering was positively for 
 bidden, the object being to keep the men from expending their 
 wind needlessly, as it was all important to save it for the final 
 rush up the parapet. We were fifteen paces to the front before 
 we reached the usual height of a running man, which is about 
 one-third less than the height when standing. The result of 
 this movement was to cause the first volley to pass over our 
 heads, doing but little damage. Had the order been given, 
 "Attention, first battalion, guide right, second, third and fourth 
 battalions oblique to the right," many in the line would have 
 been shot down before a start was made. 
 
 The naval fire had made many openings in the stockade, but 
 
314 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 not enough to allow speedy passage through it. One hundred 
 axes which had been distributed in the brigade were vigorously 
 used, under a galling fire, in making openings for the men. 
 The first forty or fifty through the stockade climbed up the 
 parapet and met the enemy between the first and second trav 
 erses. In this space there were two Columbiads, one disabled, 
 the enemy loading the other. The charge had been sent home, 
 but the ramrod not withdrawn, when we overpowered the gun 
 ners. The man at the breech put out his hand with a primer 
 to discharge the piece, after his surrender had been demanded. 
 A sharp blow from a sabre on his outstretched hand quickly dis 
 suaded him, and the charge remained until the captors had 
 leisure to withdraw it. 
 
 The first battle-flag to come up was a marker of the H7th 
 New York, which was promptly placed on the second traverse. 
 Its right to remain there was tested in a hand to hand contest 
 with swords and bayonets, in which the Yankees won. 
 
 We then went down to the floor of the fort and secured the 
 men serving a Napoleon gun at the gate, and a number of in 
 fantry posted at the stockade west of the gate. These men 
 were sent to the rear without escort. Their capture removed 
 the chief obstacle to an approach by the road. At this time 
 the Second Brigade entered the fort, some through the gate, 
 and others over the parapet. Just before returning to the para 
 pet I saw General Ames advancing from the gate, through which 
 he had apparently entered the fort. He requested Adjutant 
 Roys, 1 1 /th New York, to take a number of prisoners then 
 coming out of the left bomb-proof, to General Terry, with his 
 compliments. I directed Adjutant Roys to return to the para 
 pet, where he could be better employed than in escorting pris 
 oners to the rear. He obeyed my order, and rendered most 
 efficient service in the front line throughout the day. Upon 
 reaching the parapet I found that a large number of my brigade 
 had succeeded in getting through the stockade, and were advan 
 cing to the place first gotten possession of, where they were 
 being rapidly joined by men of the Second Brigade. 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 315 
 
 At the time we made the grand rush for the left of the para 
 pet, the naval column moved in mass upon the sea bastion. 
 The enemy, believing this to be the main attack, turned upon 
 them all the guns which could sweep the beach, and massed 
 more than half of his infantry behind the right of the parapet 
 to repel the attack. Colonel Lamb conducted this defence of 
 the sea bastion in person. The enemy s fire upon the naval 
 column was terribly effective, spreading death and disorder. 
 Except a few, who reached the stockade, those not disabled soon 
 retired. 
 
 General Whiting at this time occupied a position on the 
 parapet midway between the sea bastion and the sally-port. 
 The repulse of the naval column caused the troops under 
 Colonel Lamb and General Whiting to cheer vigorously, the 
 cheers being heard above the roar of the cannon ; but their 
 exultation was short, for, upon looking to the west, they saw 
 two U. S. flags on the left of the parapet, their comrades 
 unable to remove them. General Whiting hurried with the 
 troops near him to the left of the line, and joined in the contest 
 which we made for the third traverse. While in this hand to 
 hand conflict he received a mortal wound, and was carried to a 
 bomb-proof, whence he encouraged his men to continue the de 
 fence. Colonel Pennypacker, commanding the Second Brigade, 
 was severely wounded while placing the colors of his regiment 
 on this traverse, and Colonel Moore, 2O3rcl Pennsylvania, was 
 killed while advancing with the colors of his regiment to the 
 same position. Lieut. Colonel Burney and Major Jones, I42nd 
 New York, were wounded here, but soon after re-entered the 
 contest. Here Captain Thomas, n/th New York, was killed. 
 Lieut. Colonel Meyer and Major Bagg, 1 1 ^th New York, al 
 though each wounded, and many officers of the Second Brigade 
 whose names I cannot give, came to the front and joined in the 
 contest until our possession of the traverse was undisputed. 
 Our killed and wounded on the parapet impeded our advance to 
 the fourth traverse so that we were scarcely able to go forward 
 
3l6 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 without treading upon them. Colonel Lamb came forward with 
 troops to meet us at the fourth traverse, bringing into action a 
 larger number than we had met at the third. Our numbers 
 were also increased by those who joined us as rapidly as they 
 came into the fort. The struggle for this traverse was the 
 hottest and most prolonged single contest of the day. The loss 
 of life was great on both sides. The killed and wounded were 
 set aside to make room for comrades who came impetuously for 
 ward to support their respective sides. In this contest Colonel 
 Lamb was seriously wounded, and taken to the same bomb-proof 
 occupied by General Whiting, from which place he directed his 
 subordinates to make every resistance to our advance ; but our 
 success in this fearful struggle had turned the tide, their 
 defence became less spirited and effective, and each succeeding 
 traverse was taken with less difficulty. 
 
 The naval fire throughout the day had been delivered with 
 singular accuracy, at the rate of two or three shells per second, 
 in front of the assaulting forces ; but at the fifth traverse a shot 
 went wide of its mark and killed or disabled all but four men in 
 our front line. Fearing that a slackening of our fire would in 
 vite a countercharge, I myself discharged the guns of the killed 
 and disabled men until reinforcements were brought forward. 
 A sudden emergency compelled this action. It was not done to 
 encourage the soldiers no theatrical efforts were needed to 
 quicken their zeal. Men unable to stand and fire their pieces 
 handed up the guns of their dead and helpless comrades, and 
 when given back reloaded them again and again, exhibiting a 
 frenzied zeal and unselfish devotion, that, seemingly, nothing but 
 death could chill. 
 
 While we were capturing the traverses, others on the floor 
 of the fort fought the enemy in bomb-proofs and behind obstruc 
 tions near the parapet, keeping pace with us. Lieut. Colonel 
 Lyman, 2O3rd Pennsylvania, was killed while actively urging this 
 line forward. Several company officers were in this detachment, 
 and vigorously conducted these operations after his death, among 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 317 
 
 them Captain William H. Walling, I42nd New York Volunteers, 
 who, on the first expedition, had captured the garrison flag of 
 Fort Fisher. Captain R. D. Morehouse, I42nd New York 
 Volunteers, in charge of a party, captured a large number of 
 Confederates in the sally-port, from which they had energetically 
 opposed the advance of our forces on the floor of the fort ; but 
 our progress on the parapet rendered their position untenable, 
 and, by a skilful movement, he captured them before they could 
 retire to other defences. His skill and bravery were as con 
 spicuous then as his modest dignity is noticeable among his com 
 panions of the Legion. This capture was considered by the 
 Confederates a dishonorable surrender. They did not know 
 then that these men had been compelled to surrender, and had 
 only put up a white flag when retreat was impossible. Major 
 William J. Sanders reports this incident in the following language: 
 " General Whiting, although wounded, was still directing, as far 
 as possible, the movements of his small force, when Major Riley 
 rushed in and reported the astonishing fact that an officer, hav 
 ing put his handkerchief on a ramrod whilst he was temporarily 
 in another portion of his command, had surrendered three 
 hundred of his men and admitted a regiment into the galleries 
 of the sally-port on the land-face." 
 
 Progress was more easily and steadily made until we gained 
 possession of the seventh traverse at 4.45 P.M., where it was 
 found that our best marksmen could drive the gunners from 
 the Columbiad on the sea bastion, with which gun the enemy 
 had enfiladed the ditch and given the assailants more trouble 
 than with any other piece in the fort. When it was discovered 
 that this gun could be silenced, the project of marching up the 
 ditch and capturing the sea bastion was decided upon, and men 
 at the west end of the fort were summoned to undertake it. I 
 sent Corporal Jones, of the color guard of the I i/th New York, 
 to the west end of the fort to bring men forward. He came 
 back, and stated that General Ames directed him to return and 
 say that men could not be sent, but spades to fortify would be 
 
3l8 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 furnished. My orderly, A. D. Knight, was next sent to obtain 
 men, and directed to state the object of the movement to be 
 made. He soon returned, and stated that General Ames had 
 ordered him to say that the men were exhausted, and no further 
 advance would be attempted until reinforcements arrived in 
 the morning ; that we should hold the ground occupied, if 
 possible, and that intrenching" tools would be sent to us. I 
 directed Orderly Knight to go back and request officers under 
 my rank to collect men and bring them forward, so that the 
 attack could be made before dark ; to say that the resistance of 
 the enemy was less than at the beginning of the battle, and that 
 the capture of the bastion would compel an early surrender. 
 Knight soon returned with an armful of spades which General 
 Ames had ordered him to carry to me that I might fortify and 
 hold our position until fresh troops came into the fort. I threw 
 the spades over the traverse to the Confederates. Being con 
 vinced that General Ames intended to suspend operations until 
 reinforcements came in, I directed Silas W. Kempt on, Mate 
 U. S. Navy, who reported to me early in the engagement and 
 volunteered to serve in whatever capacity he might be useful, 
 to go, for the second time, to General Terry, to urge him to 
 have the troops then engaged in throwing up fortifications in 
 rear of the left end of the parapet to join in a general advance, 
 and take possession of the fort before reinforcements could be 
 sent in to the enemy. I instructed him to state that the enemy 
 were offering slight resistance, and that a bold push would 
 secure a victory already substantially won. This young sailor 
 had been previously sent to General Terry, after we had won 
 possession of the fourth traverse, to ask him to have the naval 
 fire in front of our advancing lines increased, if possible, and to 
 have the fuses cut shorter, so as to cause the explosion of 
 the shells nearer the parapet. Many passed beyond the fort, 
 and were lost by exploding in the marsh and river. The zeal 
 and intelligence of Mr. Kempton commanded my warmest 
 admiration. 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 319 
 
 I then directed Captain David B. Magill, ii/th New York, 
 to take the next traverse with the first men who should come 
 up, and went to the west end of the parapet and to the floor of 
 the fort in rear of it, to obtain men to march up the ditch to 
 the sea bastion. While collecting them on the floor of the fort 
 in rear of the first and second traverses, General Ames addressed 
 me, for the first time since the movement on the fort had 
 begun, and said, " I have two or three times sent you word to 
 fortify your position and hold it until reinforcements can be 
 sent to aid us ; the men are exhausted, and I will not order 
 them to go forward." I directed his attention to two steam 
 boats in the Cape Fear River, loaded with Confederate troops, 
 waiting for darkness to enable them to land, which they could 
 not do while it was light, because of the naval fire, and said, 
 " Should they succeed in landing they may be able to drive us 
 out ; therefore, the fort should be captured before fresh troops 
 come to the enemy." I informed him that the garrison was 
 resisting with less spirit than earlier in the day, and asserted 
 that complete victory was within our grasp if we aroused our 
 selves and pushed the advantage we surely had, and that I 
 intended to conduct the movement up the ditch to the sea 
 bastion if I could get but fifty men. Several said, " We will 
 go." At this time the sun was just disappearing, at 5.15-^ P.M., 
 as stated by the Navy Department, two hours and five 
 minutes from the opening of the battle. 
 
 While the volunteers were assembling I went further into 
 the fort and had ascended a magazine or sand dune for the 
 purpose of looking into the angle of the bastion I intended to 
 attack, when I was struck and disabled by two fragments of a 
 shell, one destroying the left eye, and the other carrying away 
 a portion of the bone at the base of the brain. I was uncon 
 scious for several hours. 
 
 From official and other trustworthy sources it is shown that 
 after sundown no special efforts were made to advance our 
 lines, except the capture of an additional traverse by the troops 
 
320 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 left under command of Captain Magill when I started out to 
 collect men to go up the ditch. About 8 o clock a regiment 
 of colored troops from General Paine s line was sent to General 
 Ames to assist in taking possession of the fort. He directed 
 them to stack arms outside the fort and join the men in the 
 rear of the left end of the parapet in throwing up breastworks 
 to protect the assailants from a counter-charge by the garrison. 
 Late in the afternoon the sailors and marines were withdrawn 
 from the beach and sent to relieve Abbott s brigade, which was 
 immediately sent down to the fort. The 3rd New Hampshire 
 was placed on the right of Abbott s brigade, and when Captain 
 Trickey, in command of it, was directed by General Abbott to 
 take the traverse on that part of the parapet where the greatest 
 resistance was expected to be made, the captain called his 
 attention to the fact that he had less than eighty men in his 
 command, and that a greater number might be needed to carry 
 the traverses. General Abbott informed him he would be 
 supported, and that his regiment was specially named to him by 
 General Terry for that duty. The fact that the regiment was 
 armed with repeating rifles may have influenced General Terry 
 in making the selection. The order for the placing of the 
 3rd New Hampshire in Abbott s brigade, as stated to me by its 
 commander, shows that General Terry kept in close touch with 
 the several brigades, and gave personal attention to their move 
 ments throughout the battle. When Abbott s brigade reached 
 the unoccupied portion of the parapet the enemy received it 
 with a volley, but not heavy enough to check its progress. It 
 marched over the parapet, across the floor of the fort, parallel 
 to the sea-face, and southward to Battery Buchanan, where the 
 garrison of Fort Fisher was found, unarmed and demoralized. 
 These operations of Abbott s brigade were successfully carried 
 out with the loss of four men killed and twenty-three wounded. 
 As soon as it was dark General Whiting and Colonel Lamb 
 had been carried to Battery Buchanan, the former mortally and 
 the latter seriously wounded. It was proposed to send them 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 321 
 
 across the river in small boats, as many had been, but they de 
 termined to remain and share the fate of the garrison. 
 
 The troops entered the fort without hesitation, and vied one 
 with another, officers and men alike, for possession of the work. 
 The loss in the early part of the engagement of Colonel Bell, 
 commanding Third Brigade, and Colonel Smith, 1 1 2th New 
 York, both mortally wounded before reaching the work, and of 
 Colonel Moore, killed soon after mounting the parapet, was 
 sorely felt throughout the day. They were soldiers of marked 
 ability, veterans who had won distinction in every campaign in 
 which the army to which they belonged had been engaged. 
 Colonel Pennypacker, commanding Second Brigade, was seri 
 ously wounded while placing the colors of his regiment on the 
 third traverse. This distinguished officer had put his brigade 
 into position and given it an impulse which continued through 
 out the day. The loss of no officer could have been greater. 
 At the end of the first hour few officers could have been found 
 not disabled or bearing wounds that would have justified their 
 retirement from an ordinary engagement, and a suspension of 
 hostilities would have followed had not the troops been of the 
 highest grade. Nine-tenths of them were veterans who had 
 served in the campaigns in Virginia and the Carolinas, and had 
 fought in every battle from Cold Harbor to the last battle in the 
 campaign before Petersburg and Richmond. There was not an 
 officer or man in the division who did not merit the highest 
 commendation for unyielding persistency, courage, and devotion. 
 
 While the First and Second Brigades were the first to enter 
 the fort, and contended together without distinction for posses 
 sion of the parapet, it is not the intention to claim that one 
 brigade was superior. Circumstances to a large degree, no 
 doubt, influenced the selection as to the order in which the 
 troops attacked the fort. The First Brigade had been near it 
 on the first expedition, had taken its flag and a battalion of 
 prisoners, and thoroughly believed that it could have been 
 captured then. The knowledge of this fact undoubtedly had 
 
322 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 much weight in influencing the commanding general to select 
 that brigade to lead the assaulting forces. Each brigade took 
 the position assigned to it, and performed its duties in a most 
 courageous and efficient manner. 
 
 The crisis was passed soon after four o clock, and success 
 assured when the First and Second Brigades had mounted the 
 parapet and demonstrated their ability not only to hold their 
 ground, but to make steady progress from traverse to traverse. 
 Had Ames and Curtis both been killed or disabled at the time 
 Pennypacker was wounded, the battle would have proceeded 
 successfully under the command of field and company officers. 
 When the battle was well begun skill and generalship consisted in 
 physical blows, and to every one who struck them honor is due. 
 
 Admiral Porter wanted success no less than General Terry, 
 and was ready to take any steps in the line of his profession to 
 win it. He knew, as all did, that a naval column would divert 
 the garrison, and asked the navy to furnish men to form it. 
 In pursuit of victory desperate chances are often taken. Never 
 did men undertake a more difficult or hazardous task, and never 
 did men offer themselves in their country s service with more 
 zeal, courage or unselfish devotion than did the officers and men 
 of the Navy, and the Marines, on the beach at Fort Fisher. 
 Their action contributed to the progress of the army whether 
 the gain justified the losses we shall never know. The naval 
 column was important as a diversion, but its value was slight in 
 comparison with the fire of the six hundred guns trained on the 
 fort. The fleet maintained an uninterrupted fire for two days, 
 exceeding in effectiveness any bombardment recorded in the 
 annals of war. To Admiral Porter s fleet the army was in 
 debted for an uncontested landing, for an uninterrupted approach 
 to within charging distance of the fort, and to its well directed 
 fire in front of the assaulting forces, for a success which, with 
 out the Navy s aid, would have been impossible. 
 
 It will not be out of place to refer to the enemy and their 
 defence of the fort. 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 323 
 
 The constant fire of the Navy for two days deprived the 
 garrison of opportunity to rest or prepare food. While they 
 suffered but little from this fire until brought out of their bomb- 
 proofs to contest the advance of the assaulting forces, they then 
 came under the hottest fire men ever encountered. Colonel 
 Lamb skillfully conducted the defence, aided by General Whit 
 ing, who had volunteered his services on entering the fort. 
 They protected their men until the decisive moment, and then 
 led them with conspicuous gallantry. 
 
 The left of the parapet was in charge of a junior officer 
 whose mistake, that of a moment only, was in failing to mount 
 the parapet and contest our advance from the ditch. The men 
 serving the piece of artillery covering the road, west of the para 
 pet, were so intent in performing their duty that they were un 
 conscious of our approach until ordered to surrender by men of 
 the 1 1 /th New York, who went down from the parapet after 
 capturing the second traverse. 
 
 General Bragg, in his report on the capture of the fort, says 
 of our assaulting line : 
 
 " His army column, preceded by a single regiment, ap 
 proached along the river and entered the work on that flank 
 almost unopposed." 
 
 This does a great injustice to the men guarding the road. 
 In fact they made it fatal to approach by the road ; and not 
 until their capture, in active defence of the work, was the road 
 made a safer line of approach than over the parapet. The Con 
 federate garrison of Fort Fisher might well resent this asper 
 sion on their most stubborn defence, and justly complain of the 
 indifference of General Bragg, who had six thousand men within 
 striking distance of our defensive line more than twice the 
 number of men holding the line in not vigorously attacking 
 it. General Bragg reported to General Lee "That at 4 P.M., 
 when the enemy s infantry advanced to the assault, our troops 
 were making a heavy demonstration against the enemy s rear." 
 Although he expended a large amount of ammunition in making 
 
324 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 this so-called " heavy demonstration," nevertheless General 
 Paine s line was maintained without the loss or injury of a single 
 Union soldier. 
 
 I have said that the enemy plainly showed signs of weaken 
 ing before 5 P.M., and that full possession of the fort only 
 awaited the advance of the Federal troops. This statement is 
 supported by the reports of Confederate officers. 
 
 In his report General Whiting says : 
 
 " The fall both of the general and the colonel commanding 
 the fort, one about 4 and the other about 4.30 P.M., had a per 
 ceptible effect upon the men, and no doubt hastened greatly the 
 result ; but we were overpowered, and no skill or gallantry could 
 have saved the place, after he effected a lodgment, except attack 
 in the rear." 
 
 General Colquitt, who had been ordered, late in the after 
 noon, to take command of the fort, reported to General Bragg 
 the condition of affairs he found on landing on Federal Point 
 between 9 and 10 P.M. 
 
 " We landed, therefore, four hundred or five hundred yards 
 from Battery Buchanan, between the Battery and Fort Fisher. 
 I was not hailed, and did not see a sentinel or picket. A short 
 distance from the point of landing I saw a shanty with several 
 negroes and one or two white men in it. They reported that 
 Fisher was taken, which, as I distrusted, I required one of them 
 to come out and go with me as guide. I was about starting 
 when an officer, representing himself as Captain Munn, with a 
 dozen or fifteen men, without arms, came up. These I took for 
 a fatigue detail, until the captain informed me the fort was 
 evacuated ; that he had just come from it, and that General 
 Whiting and Colonel Lamb were already at Battery Buchanan. 
 . . . Meeting an officer, he said he would carry me to Colonel 
 Lamb, who was wounded. I found the colonel prostrate with 
 a wound, which he thought, however, was not severe. In an 
 swer to my inquiry whether anything more could be done, he 
 replied that a fresh brigade might then retake the fort. I told 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 325 
 
 him there was no brigade with me, and wished to know of him 
 the condition of the men who had escaped. He said that when 
 \ie was wounded everything broke up in consternation and was 
 utterly disorganized, and that no further efforts could effect 
 anything with the resources available." 
 
 Lieutenant Hugh H. Colquitt, who accompanied General 
 Colquitt to Battery Buchanan, in his report says : 
 
 " I asked an officer, the coolest man I saw, at what hour the 
 enemy got into the fort. He replied, about two hours by the 
 sun. What in the world have you been doing since ? This 
 he answered by stating that he had been fighting in the fort 
 ever since, until dark, when the garrison commenced leaving, 
 and he presumed all had left by that time. . . . All our men 
 were in a state of panic and demoralization ; no organization, 
 no guns, nothing but confusion and dismay." 
 
 " The Abstract From Return of the Expeditionary Forces, 
 Bvet. Maj. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, U. S. Army, commanding, 
 for January 10, 1865," gives the aggregate of the four brigades 
 engaged in reducing the fort, five days before the assault, 
 to have been two hundred and fifty-seven officers and five thou 
 sand one hundred and seventy-two men. Of this number prob 
 ably thirty-seven hundred took part in the assault, and at 9 
 o clock P.M. thirteen hundred men under Abbott and three 
 hundred colored troops entered the fort substantially unopposed, 
 to secure a victory actually won four hours before. There arc 
 no records in the War Department giving the number of officers 
 and men in the brigades commanded respectively by Curtis, 
 Pennypacker and Bell, or the number of men taken into action. 
 It is estimated that the First (Curtis ) Brigade numbered nine 
 hundred officers and men ; the Second (Pennypacker s), seven 
 teen hundred officers and men ; the Third (Bell s), eleven hun 
 dred officers and men ; Abbott s Second Brigade, thirteen 
 hundred officers and men. 
 
 The return of the casualties indicates the actual resistance 
 met by the several brigades, which I give in the order they re- 
 
326 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 spectively entered the fort. Curtis brigade, two officers and 
 thirty-seven men killed ; eighteen officers and one hundred and 
 sixty-six men wounded; five missing. 25.33 per cent. Penny- 
 packer s brigade, six officers and forty-five men killed ; six offi 
 cers and two hundred and eleven men wounded ; two missing. 
 16.47 P er cent. Bell s brigade, two officers and fourteen men 
 killed ; six officers and ninety-one men wounded ; two missing. 
 10.04 P er cent. Abbott s brigade, four men killed ; two officers 
 and twenty-one men wounded ; four missing. 2.33 per cent. 
 The missing includes those injured beyond recognition, and 
 those buried in the sand by the explosion of a magazine after 
 the capture. 
 
 In bestowing honors for the victory at Fort Fisher we 
 should prominently mention the Secretary of the Navy, and the 
 officers and men of the North Atlantic blockading squadron, 
 who, for three years, had continually urged the sending of an 
 army force to join the navy in an expedition to reduce the de 
 fences at the mouth of the Cape Fear River. Nor should we 
 neglect prominently to associate General Grant with its capture. 
 He organized the military force, and in spite of the first failure 
 adhered to his purpose with unyielding persistency until the 
 end was accomplished. The skill and labors of Admiral Porter 
 and General Terry were fully acknowledged by the Administra 
 tion and Congress, which all serving under them heartily approve. 
 
 Whatever may be the opinion of military men as to the 
 wisdom of employing troops in throwing up breastworks in 
 side the fort a greater number of men than were engaged 
 with the enemy in close action on the parapet and the floor of 
 the fort near the parapet instead of sending them across the 
 floor of the fort to the sea-face, which movement would have 
 ended the contest an hour before sunset, certain it is all will 
 acknowledge that General Ames, under whose directions these 
 engineering operations were carried on, bore himself with cool 
 ness and courage, as he did in his first battle, when he won a 
 Congressional Medal of Honor for personal bravery. 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 327 
 
 The services of the gentlemen who went on both expeditions 
 in an advisory capacity, although on the first the most impor 
 tant action the withdrawal of the troops from the beach 
 was determined upon without his opinion being asked, were 
 briefly stated by General Terry : 
 
 " To Bvt. Brig. Gen. C. B. Comstock, Aide-de-Camp on the staff of the 
 Lieutenant General, I am under the deepest obligations. At every step of our 
 progress I received from him the most valuable assistance. For the final success 
 of our part of the operations the country is more indebted to him than to me." 
 
 It would be unjust, as it would be ungenerous, to withhold 
 from the field and company officers the warmest praise for their 
 watchfulness in detecting every advantage afforded by the 
 enemy, for their irresistible impetuosity and valor, which over 
 came obstacles as great as human skill and stubborn devotion 
 could create, or to fail to gratefully acknowledge the services of 
 the men in the ranks. Their steadiness, fortitude and bravery 
 were surpassed by no one exercising command over them. 
 Certainly our great commander did not neglect to commend 
 every member of the military force composing the expedition, 
 irrespective of rank or grade, in one of the most extraordinary 
 documents ever filed with the archives of the War Department, 
 wherein he recommended their commander for a high position 
 in the regular army, based solely on their services, and inde 
 pendent of the promotions given to Terry, Ames, Pennypacker 
 and Curtis in acknowledgment of their personal services. 
 
 CITY POINT, V A., January 17, 1865. 
 HON. E. M. STANTON, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 As a substantial recognition of the bravery of both officers and men in the 
 capture of Fort Fisher, and the important service thereby rendered to their 
 country, I do most respectfully recommend Bvt. Maj. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, U. S. 
 Volunteers, their commanding officer, for appointment as Brigadier General in the 
 Regular Army. 
 
 U. S. GRANT, 
 
 Lieutenant General. 
 
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