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LIEUTENANT-GENERAL 
 
 SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY, K.R 
 
EDINBURGH: PHTNTEU BY THOMAS CONSTABLE. 
 
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 EDMONSTON AND DOUGLAS. 
 
 LONDON . . . HAMILTON, ADAMS, & CO^ 
 
 DUBLIN . . . W. ROBERTSON. 
 
 GLASGOW . . JAMES MACLEHOSE. 
 
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LIEUTENANT-GENERAL 
 
 SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY K.B. 
 
 1793-1801 
 
 A MEMOIR BY HIS SON 
 
 JAMES LORD DUNFERMLINE 
 
 " He. was illustrious for his virtues, wliich were unsullied by any vice. He ruled 
 his conilurt by the motto of his family — ' Vive ut Vivas ;' — his rleath was glorious, 
 iinil he (lied in the arms of vietorv."- general f. maitland. 
 
 EDINBURGH 
 
 EDMONSTON AND DOUGLAS 
 
 1861. 
 

 HENRY MORSE STEPMS»<i 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The following Memoir of Lieutenant-Geiieral 
 Sir Ralph Abercromby, was written by my Father 
 during his residence at Colinton, after he had re- 
 tired from official life. 
 
 His reasons for undertaking this work, and the 
 objects which he had in view in writing it, are 
 so fully developed by himself in the Introductory 
 Chapter, that all further explanations by me on 
 these points would l^e superfluous. 
 
 It may be right to observe, that although my 
 Father, throughout this Narrative, has invariably 
 given to my Grandfather the title of " Sir Ralph," 
 liy which he was most generally known, it was only 
 on the 15th of July 1795, that the Order of the 
 Bath, from which he derived it, was conferred upon 
 him in acknowledo;ment of his services. 
 
 
VI PREFACE. 
 
 It only remains for me to add, that this Memoir 
 is now printed from the original MS. of my Father, 
 precisely as he left it. 
 
 DUNFEEMLINE. 
 
 CoMNTON House, August 1861. 
 
 I 
 
CONTEJSTTS. 
 
 I'AOE 
 
 Intkoduction, ...... 1 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 Family and Eakly Life, ..... 13 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 Campaign in Flandkks, ..... 39 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 Command in the \Ve.st Indies, .... 54 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 Command in Ireland, ..... 61 
 
 CHAPTER Y. 
 Expedition to Holland, . . . . .139 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 Expedition against Cadiz, . . . . 219 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 Expedition to Egypt, ..... 240 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 Conclusion, ....... 303 
 
 Appendix, ....... 309 
 
 Index, ....... 323 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 So many lives of those officers who distinguished 
 themselves in the Army and Navy during the pro- 
 tracted war with France have been written, that it 
 has repeatedly been remarked as an omission that 
 no authoritative account of the character and ser- 
 vices of Sir Ralph Abercromby had ever been given 
 to the public. The obligation to secure the per- 
 formance of this duty to the memory of Sir Ralph 
 was pressed upon me by some who had formed 
 their opinions from personal intercourse and obser- 
 vation, and by others, who, judging from his public 
 acts, had a high estimate of his character, his 
 ability, and his services. It was especially and 
 strongly urged by one who, from his public situa- 
 tion, had become familiar with the history and 
 details of the service, and with military opinions, 
 that the army owed more to the services of Sir 
 Ralph than to those of any other of our generals 
 between the Duke of Marlborough and the Duke 
 
 A 
 
 /-i 
 
2 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 of Wellington, and that it was due to his memory 
 that his personal character and his public conduct 
 should be so developed as to preserve the remem- 
 brance of the zeal, abihty, and devotion which he 
 displayed in improving the discipHne, elevating the 
 character, and maintaining the renown of the Eng- 
 lish army in the arduous struggle in which the 
 country had been engaged. 
 
 Such an appeal could only be met in a cordial 
 spirit, and could not be dismissed without that 
 deliberate consideration to which it was so justly 
 entitled. Conscious of the difficulty of the task 
 which I have undertaken, I have gladly sheltered 
 myself under the sanction of an authority which I 
 highly respect. 
 
 The difficulties which presented themselves, in 
 making an effi^rt to comply with this appeal, were 
 most discouraging, and they will account not only 
 for the delay in performing a duty, but also in 
 some degree for the imperfection of this Memoir, 
 and for the many deficiencies that cannot fail to 
 be remarked. The delay is no doubt much to be 
 regretted, for the interest that had been excited 
 by the events in which Sir Ralph had borne a 
 prominent part, has passed away ; but it was un- 
 avoidable ; because justice could not have been done 
 
INTRODUCTION. 3 
 
 without revealing transactions that could not have 
 been sooner disclosed without a violation of those 
 rules which are prescribed by respect for the feel- 
 ings of individuals, and for the public interest. 
 
 The defeats and disasters which attended the first 
 part of the French war, contrast so strikingly with 
 the brilliant success of the Spanish campaigns and 
 the glory of Waterloo, that it seems to be a hope- 
 less efibrt to excite an interest in the life of a 
 military officer who did not live to see the Peace 
 of Amiens, the attainment of which was the object 
 of the service in which he fell. 
 
 The brief military career of Sir Kalph can have 
 little attraction for those who regard success as the 
 only test of merit ; but it may have a deep interest 
 for those who can appreciate the virtue of an officer 
 advanced in life who devotes himself to the service 
 of his country from the day that war is declared to 
 the day of his death, who is discouraged by no dis- 
 appointment or defeat, who shrinks from no climate, 
 who surrenders at a critical moment a high and 
 honourable position, because he would not consent 
 to oppress the people by violating the principles of 
 law and of the Constitution, and who closed his life 
 in the last, the most difficult, and the most arduous 
 service of that war in which he had throughout 
 
4 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 borne so distinguished a part, — it may enable those 
 who wish to trace the progress of the EngHsh army 
 from the state of disorganization into which it had 
 fallen at the commencement of the French war, to 
 the discipline and skill which it subsequently ac- 
 quired and displayed, to appreciate the efforts which 
 were made by Sir Ealph to infuse an improved spirit 
 into all the departments of the service. 
 
 The active military life of Sir Ealph, with the 
 exception of having served as a subaltern officer 
 in Germany, under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, 
 from the close of the year 1758 to the end of that 
 war, is limited to the period between the Declara- 
 tion of War by France, in the year 1793, and the 
 year 1801, when he fell in Egypt. During his 
 foreign service in Europe, he never held the chief 
 command, except in 1799, when the Helder and 
 the Dutch fleet were taken, and he was then super- 
 seded by the Duke of York, and afterwards during 
 portions of the years 1800 and 1801, when he 
 served in the Mediterranean. Sir Ealph twice held 
 the chief command in the West Indies, but such 
 colonial service, however important it may be to 
 the interests of the country, or however it may 
 be attended with complicated difficiUties, is not 
 so well calculated to excite general interest, or to 
 
INTRODUCTION. 5 
 
 display tlie resources and genius which are charac- 
 teristic of a distinguished commander, as the more 
 varied and continuous operations of a continental 
 campaign. As Sir Kalph did not court active ser- 
 vice in the struggle for American independence, his 
 military career did not begin until he was advanced 
 in life, and was necessarily limited to the first por- 
 tion of the war with France. It is unfortunate 
 that Sir Kalph kept no journal of his proceedings, 
 and maintained no regular private correspondence, 
 in which his views and opinions might have been 
 preserved. His correspondence, official or private, 
 with thpc Ministers of the Crown, and which has been 
 preserved, is, in consequence of his holding subor- 
 dinate situations, limited to the early portion of the 
 expedition to Holland, to his commands in Ireland 
 and in the Mediterranean. This apparent indiffer- 
 ence to the means by which his conduct, if necessary, 
 might be explained or vindicated, and his reputation 
 preserved, seems to be inconsistent with that ardent 
 and honourable ambition which he always cherished 
 and anxiously desired to gratify. It did not pro- 
 ceed from negligence or indolence, faults from which 
 he was entirely exempt, but from his characteristic 
 self-reliance, and from the high standard by which 
 alone he thought that true fame ought to be tested. 
 
6 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 He loved real fame, Lut lie always considered that 
 it never could be honourably earned and deserved 
 except by those who, having been placed in a posi 
 tion which enabled them to perform critical or im- 
 portant service, and who, relying on the conscious- 
 ness of their own purity and devotion, could rest theii" 
 fame on the simple and unaided narrative of the 
 events which had occurred. From a sense of the 
 duty which as a soldier he owed to his Sovereign 
 and to the country, he wdUingly gave his zealous ser- 
 vice to the public ; but wdth little hope that he 
 should ever be able to realize fame that would bear 
 the test of his own standard. This lofty ambition, 
 so characteristic of generous and noble aspirations, 
 led Sir Ralph to disregard all secondary means by 
 which his fame could be extended or preserved. 
 He neither courted popular favour nor the rewards 
 of his Sovereign. He did not value such distinc- 
 tions unless they were spontaneously conferred, and 
 unless he felt conscious that they had been duly and 
 justly earned by useful and solid service rendered 
 to his country. The sincerity with which he enter- 
 tained these opinions ^Yi\l be illustrated and con- 
 firmed by some striking passages in his life. It 
 may be said that this is a strained and not very 
 practical \T.ew of the subject, because it can only 
 
INTRODUCTION. 7 
 
 apply to those who have been highly gifted, and 
 who have had an opportunity of displaying their 
 powers. I do not deny that there is truth in this 
 objection, but I can truly say that such were the 
 opinions ever entertained by Sir Ralph ; and I 
 must admit that the influence of the most pure 
 and virtuous conduct is often less useful, beneficial, 
 and extended, when it has not been preceded by 
 a discreet cultivation of those secondary means by 
 which popular fame is conciliated and acquired. 
 How numerous are the instances in which a false 
 estimate is made of those who obtrude all their small 
 services on the public notice, and of those who 
 modestly, perseveringiy, and honourably pursue the 
 path of duty, and rest their hopes of fame on the 
 judgment of the discerning few. 
 
 It was also unfortunate for Sir Ralph, that when 
 he began his military career, the inefliciency and 
 disorganization of the English army were such 
 that they were wholly unprepared for the service 
 on which they were employed. A distinguished 
 Avriter and a most excellent judge has stated, " that 
 the English army that was disposable for foreign 
 service at the commencement of the war with 
 France, was deplorable. The officers were without 
 instruction ; the improvement was gradual ; and 
 
8 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 its regeneration can only be dated from the war 
 in Egypt." ^ The same writer truly adds that the 
 Enghsh soldier is distinguished by his docility 
 and obedience, and that resignation and discip- 
 line, united with coolness and courage, are qualities 
 to be preferred to more brilliant but less per- 
 severing valour. It is obvious, that even with 
 such admirable materials, no energy and no skill 
 on the part of a commander could promptly cor- 
 rect or remedy the evils arising from the deficient 
 experience and instruction of the ofiicers. Time, 
 perseverance, judgment, and, above all, the example 
 of the commander, were required to train the ofii- 
 cers to a knowledge of their various duties, to the 
 exact observance of discipline, and to a watchful 
 and unceasing care for the wants and health of the 
 soldiers. That Sir Ealph laboured with untiring 
 zeal to inspu'e the ofiicers under his command with 
 an ardent desire to learn and to perform their 
 duties, has been acknowledged by those who ob- 
 served his career, and have so highly appreciated 
 the services which he rendered to the English army, 
 and which has been recorded in the published 
 opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, who held him 
 forth as an example, not only for his heroism in the 
 
 ' General Jomini. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 9 
 
 field, but for the not less valuable qualities of an 
 exact observance of discipline, and for bis ever- 
 watchful attention to the health and wants of his 
 troops. 
 
 The success of his efforts is attested by the fact, 
 that the regeneration of an army, which he found 
 in so deplorable a condition, can only be dated from 
 the war in Egypt, and that he left to his successor 
 the organized means of reaping that harvest of 
 glory which has been gathered in the Peninsula and 
 on the plains of Waterloo. Sir Ealph did not achieve 
 this success by any theoretical rules or code which 
 he promulgated, but by the steadiness and justice 
 with which he enforced exact discipline, by never 
 withholding censure when it was merited, by freely 
 bestowing praise when it had been honourably 
 earned, and by the example which he constantly 
 gave of the exactness and spirit in which he ex- 
 pected that those under his command should per- 
 form all their duties. 
 
 It is comparatively an easy task to write the life 
 of a commander whose career has been marked by 
 general and brilliant success. It is difiicult, though 
 perhaps not less important or useful, to do justice 
 to a commander who, in despite of the many and 
 great disadvantages under which his course was 
 
10 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 run, and in despite of the signal failure wliicli 
 attended all our continental ejQTorts durinsf the first 
 portion of the French war, has left a name which is 
 stni revered by the army, and has been honoured 
 by the cordial approval of his country, of the Par- 
 liament, and of his Sovereign. 
 
 My means are most scanty, for the only very 
 material assistance on which I have rehed, is a 
 faithful and accurate journal, which was kept, un- 
 known to Sir Ealph, by his son, Lieutenant-General 
 Sir John Abercromby, who acted, during the sendee 
 in the Mediterranean, as Deputy Adjutant-General 
 under Lord Hopetoun. My consolation is, that it 
 will be admitted that there must have been \TTtu- 
 ous qualities in the character, and real merit in the 
 services of Sir Ealph, which enabled him, under 
 adverse circumstances, to vnn the entire confidence 
 of the Government, the respect of his brethren in 
 arms, and to make an enduring impression on the 
 judgment of the pubhc. My hope is, that mth the 
 knowledge I possess, greater perhaps than that of 
 any person now hving, of the thoughts and opinions 
 of Sir Ealph on important subjects, and ^dth the 
 aid of such particulars and anecdotes as I have pro- 
 cured, I shall be enabled to develop his real charac- 
 ter, and to elucidate the motives and principles 
 
INTRODUCTION. 1 1 
 
 which influenced the whole tenor of his life, I 
 sincerely regret, for various reasons, that the task 
 has devolved upon me ; and I have only under- 
 taken it, because I failed in my efibrts to make a 
 satisfactory arrangement for its execution, and be- 
 cause I thought that it was a duty from which I 
 ought not to slu'ink. I am so well aware of my 
 inability to impart novelty and interest to the 
 military services in which Sir Ealph was engaged, 
 that I have not made the attempt. They have 
 akeady been recorded with abundant fulness in the 
 history of the times. My object has been to give 
 prominence to such occurrences and events as were 
 illustrative of his character and of his merits as a 
 commander, and were calculated to display the 
 manly and generous devotion to the service of his 
 country, which animated Ms conduct throughout 
 every portion of his pul)lic and private life. I have 
 always felt that it was an objection to my engaging 
 in this eff'ort that I could not be relieved from the 
 suspicion of not being an impartial judge in such a 
 case, but I have obeyed what would have been the 
 wish of Sir Ralph, who would have scornfully re- 
 jected those strained efforts which are often made 
 to give importance to a biographical narrative ; and 
 he would have insisted that his conduct and charac ■ 
 
1 2 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 ter should be judged by a simple and scrupulous 
 exposition of the services which he had performed, 
 and of the accordance of his conduct with the prin- 
 ciples wliich he uniformly professed. The facts 
 which I have collected and recorded, cannot fail to 
 be interesting to the descendants of Sir Kalph ; and 
 if those into whose hands this Narrative will fall 
 shall decide that it is fit to be given to the public, 
 they may with confidence rely on the accuracy and 
 truth of the statements which it contains. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 
 
 In several imperfect and inaccurate notices of 
 the life of Sir Ralph which have been published, 
 the circumstances of his family have been mis- 
 represented, and therefore it is necessary that they 
 should now be correctly stated. 
 
 Mr. George Abercromby of Skeith, who was a 
 distant relation of Sir James Abercromby, Baronet, 
 of Birkenbog in Banffshire, soon after the Restora- 
 tion, purchased the estate of Tullibody in the county 
 of Clackmannan, from a family of the name of 
 Meldrum. Mr. George Abercromby adopted as his 
 heir Alexander, one of the younger sons of Sir 
 James Abercromby. On the marriage of Alexander 
 with Miss Duff, the daughter of Mr. Duff of Braco, 
 Mr. George Abercromby made a settlement on his 
 adopted son, and bequeathed to him the estate of 
 TuUibody, which is now in the family of his de- 
 scendants. After Alexander came into possession 
 
14 FAMILY AND EAELY LIFE. 
 
 of the estate of Tullibody, he represented the county 
 of Clackmannan in the Union Parliament. He was 
 a bitter foe to the exiled family of Stuart, and a 
 warm supporter of the Protestant succession. In 
 religion he was a decided Presbyterian, and, from 
 his dread of Episcopacy, he preferred a Federal to 
 an Incorporatmg Union. In the year 1754, Alex- 
 ander died at the advanced age of eighty-four, and 
 was succeeded by his eldest son George, the father 
 of Sir Ralph. George had been called to the bar, 
 but he never prosecuted his profession, although he 
 was considered to have acquired such a competent 
 knowledge of law, that he was requested by Mr. 
 Dundas, the Professor of Civil Law in the Univer- 
 sity of Edinburgh, to supply his place during a 
 session when he was unavoidably absent. During 
 several sessions JMr. Abercromby gave lectures in 
 the University on the Law of Nature and Nations, 
 having purchased that professorsliip, which, in ac- 
 cordance with the prevailing practice of the time, 
 was treated as a subject of sale. Mr. Abercromby 
 was distinguished for his industry, his love of know- 
 ledge, and his vigorous and comprehensive under- 
 standing. Sir Ralph often expressed his regret that 
 his father had never been called into active life, in 
 Avhich he could scarcelv have failed to have become 
 
FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 15 
 
 useful and eminent. Mr. Abercromby, who was 
 born in the year 1705, died in the month of May 
 1800, when he was within a few weeks of com- 
 pleting his ninety-fifth year. It is worthy of notice 
 that both the grandfather and father of Sii' Ealph 
 lived to become by seniority the oldest members 
 of the Scotch bar. The mother of Sir Ealph was 
 a daughter of Mr, Dundas of Manor, and, according 
 to all tradition, she was not less remarkable for her 
 vivacity, the warmth of her affections, and the 
 solidity of her understanding, than for her beauty. 
 She commanded and retained the steady attachment 
 of all her sons, three of whom rose to rank and 
 eminence in their professions. 
 
 Sir Ralph was born in the month of October 1734 
 at Menstry, an adjoining property which had been 
 adeied, by purchase, to the estate of Tullibody, and 
 where his parents then resided. The first part of 
 his education was judiciously directed by the Rev. 
 Mr. Syme, who acted as his private tutor, and he 
 was afterwards removed to the school of Mr. Moir 
 at Alloa. That school was then highly esteemed by 
 the Jacobite gentry of Scotland, but his father dis- 
 regarded that circumstance, as he was of opinion 
 that the school was in all other respects correctly 
 and skilfully conducted. If Mr. Moir attempted to 
 
16 FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 
 
 infuse liis owii peculiar views and principles into 
 the minds of his pupils, he was signally unsuccess- 
 ful in making any impression on Sir Ralph. After 
 passing some tune at the school at Alloa, Sir Ralph 
 was sent to Rugby, where he remained until he was 
 eighteen years of age. During the years 1752-53 
 he was a student in the University of Edinburgh, 
 where he attended the moral and natural philosophy 
 and civd law classes. A most intelligent contem- 
 porary and relative of Sir Ralph, who Hved in the 
 same house with him while he was a student in the 
 University of Edinburgh, has thus recorded his im- 
 pression of his conduct and character at this period 
 of his life :— " Sir Ralph on leaving Rugby was 
 manly and sensible beyond his years, of prepossess- 
 ing appearance, and w^th pohshed manners. If not 
 a hard student while attending the University of 
 Edinburgh, he punctually performed the tasks that 
 were required of him, and he gave much satisfaction 
 to the professors, who regarded him as a youth of 
 sound rather than of brilliant parts, and who bid 
 fair to obtain distinction in the pursuits of active 
 hfe. He was much respected and beloved by his 
 companions and coevals, who admired the sound- 
 ness and comprehensiveness of his intellect, accom- 
 panied by the urbanity and sweetness of his dispo- 
 
FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 17 
 
 sitioii." The wiiter of these remarks survived Sir 
 Kalph, and saw the fulfilment of his prediction. 
 
 In the autumn of 1754, Sir Ralph was sent to 
 Leipsic to prosecute the study of the civil law. He 
 went to Holland in company with Lord Elgin, who 
 had been his school-fellow at Alloa, and who was 
 going to a French academy. At the HagTie they 
 were presented to Sir Joseph Yorke, then the British 
 Minister in Holland, who disclosed the vigilance 
 with which the Government watched the education 
 of the youth of rank or fortune in Scotland, by 
 twitting them with having been at a Jacobite school 
 at Alloa. 
 
 On his return from Leipsic, Sir Ralph announced 
 to his father that he had a very strong dislike to the 
 study of the law, and that he had an ardent desire 
 to devote himself to the military profession. This 
 was a severe disappointment to his father, whose 
 penetration had enabled him to discern the promis- 
 ing abilities of his son, which he thought were 
 most likely to be successfully excited and displayed 
 in the legal profession. Wlien he found that the 
 opinion of Sir Ralph was firm, and had been dehber- 
 ately formed, his good sense led him to see that 
 nothing was more calculated to defeat the expecta- 
 tions which he had cherished than perseverance in 
 
 B 
 
18 FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 
 
 a pursuit which was uncongenial to the taste and 
 inclination of his son, and he therefore yielded and 
 determined to promote with cordiaHty his desire to 
 devote himself to a mihtary life. In accordance 
 with this change of profession, a cornetcy was, in 
 March 1756, purchased in the Third Dragoon 
 Guards, in which regiment Sir Ralph served, in 
 country quarters, until it was sent to Germany in 
 the year 1758. When Sir Ralph received his first 
 commission he possessed the advantage of a useful 
 and liberal education, but it had in no respects been 
 directed with reference to the profession in which 
 he had embarked. Whatever knowledge he subse- 
 quently acquired that could be useful to a com- 
 mander, was the result of private study and of his 
 own practical observation and experience. From 
 the first he was remarked for a zealous performance of 
 his duties, and his attention was especially directed 
 to the means of combining exact discipline wdth a 
 judicious and considerate attention to the wants and 
 health of the soldiers. His reason taught him that 
 these were most useful and important elements in 
 the formation of an efficient army, and he cultivated 
 them assiduously throughout his life. 
 
 In Germany, his steady attention to his duty, 
 aided by the advantage of possessing more instruc- 
 
FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. " 19 
 
 tion, and a more lil3eral education, than most of his 
 brother officers, recommended him to the notice of 
 General Sir William Pitt, to whom he was otherwise 
 unknown, who selected him to be one of his aides- 
 de-camp. In Fel3ruary 1760, Sir Ralph became a 
 lieutenant in the Third Dragoon Guards, and in 
 1762, a troop was purchased for him ; in 1 770, he 
 became major, and, in 1773, lieutenant-colonel of 
 the regiment ; and, during all that time, he served 
 with it in Ireland. In 1780, Sir Ealph obtained the 
 brevet rank of colonel, and, in 1781, he became 
 colonel of the 103d or King's Irish Infantry. The 
 103d regiment was disbanded in 1783, when Sir 
 Ralph retired on half-pay. 
 
 The military life of Sir Ralph has now been traced 
 to the close of the struggle for American indepen- 
 dence. The question may reasonably be asked, 
 How did it happen that Sir Ralph, who had ex- 
 pressed so ardent a desire to devote liimself to a 
 mihtary life, and who, at an advanced age, was 
 eager to embark in the war with France with all 
 the zeal and energy of youth, had never courted or 
 obtained active employment during the war with 
 America ? The true answer is, that Sir Ralph was 
 a sincere and honest friend of rational liberty ; he 
 sympathized with the Americans in their struggle 
 
20 FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 
 
 for independence ; and he ever held the moderation, 
 the sound judgment, and the disinterested patriot- 
 ism of General Washington in the highest venera- 
 tion. The subsequent events of the life of Sir 
 Ralph leave no doubt that it must have been a 
 severe mortification to him, that the country was 
 eno'aged in a war in Avhich he could not make an 
 effort to gratify his ardent love of distinction with- 
 out a sacrifice of his feelings and his principles ; 
 but he was fortunately able to avoid a conflict 
 between his duty as a soldier and the principles 
 which he had adopted as a citizen, having been, 
 during the whole course of the American War, em- 
 ployed in Ireland, in the discharge of regimental 
 or staff duties. 
 
 It may, perhaps, be urged by those who think 
 the war with France originated in a desire on the 
 part of the sovereigns to crush the liberties of the 
 people, and to control their right to choose their own 
 government, that it was, therefore, similar in prin- 
 ciple to the war with America, and consequently, 
 that the conduct of Sir Ralph, in serving against 
 France, is open to the charge of inconsistency. If 
 such a^ charge should be made, it might be met by 
 the fact that France declared war against England, 
 and l)y reference to what passed in a debate in the 
 
FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE, 21 
 
 House of Commons, when the conduct and duties 
 of officers in such cases were canvassed. Lord 
 Howe said that, if left to his own free choice, he 
 would have declined to serve agamst the Americans. 
 Other officers shared the opinion of Lord Howe, 
 but acted with more decision. Admii'al Keppel had 
 said that, although professional employment was the 
 dearest object of his life, he covdd not accept it in 
 the line of America. Lord Effingham, on his regi- 
 ment being ordered to America, wrote to the Se- 
 cretary at War, — " I cannot, without reproach from 
 my own conscience, consent to bear arms against 
 my fellow-subjects in America, in what, to my dis- 
 cernment, is not a clear cause ;" and resigned his 
 commission. General Conway, recognising the cor- 
 rectness of these opinions, urged that there was a 
 material distinction between a foreign war, where 
 the whole community was involved, and a domestic 
 war on points of civil contention, where the com- 
 munity was divided against itself. Li the first 
 case, no officer ought to call in question the justice 
 of his country. In the latter case, before he drew 
 his sword against his fellow-subjects, he ought to 
 examine his conscience whether the cause was just. 
 
 Sir Ealph had no doubt as to the decision which 
 he ought to make with respect to the American 
 
22 FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 
 
 struggle ; but when France declared war against 
 England, he obeyed, as a soldier, the call of liis 
 country, and although, from the close of the first 
 campaign, he strenuously advised that no favour- 
 able opening for negotiation should be lost, yet 
 he steadily maintained that war, judiciously and 
 successfully conducted, was the surest way to ob- 
 tain a safe and honourable peace. 
 
 It would be an entire misconception of the cha- 
 racter of Sir Ralph, to conclude, from his having 
 avoided active service in the American War, that he 
 was biassed either by political or party feelings or 
 attachments, or by heated or exaggerated opinions. 
 Notliing could be further from the truth than such 
 a sujDposition. He wished to lead the life of a 
 soldier, and to place his services, on all fitting occa- 
 sions, at the command of his country. He rarely 
 mingled in the society, and never participated in 
 the warfare of politicians, and liis real sentiments 
 were scarcely known beyond the circle of his family 
 and a few chosen friends. This reserve did not 
 proceed from selfish caution ; but, as he reflected 
 earnestly, deeply, and wisely on the passing events 
 of his time, he was well aware that the opinions he 
 had formed would either not have been acceptable 
 to, or would not have been understood in the mill- 
 
FAMILY AND EAELY LIFE. 23 
 
 tary circle in which he lived. He had no reserve 
 in his intercourse with his private friends, and with 
 those who, from their knowledge or abilities, com- 
 manded his respect and confidence ; and subse- 
 quently, when he was employed during the war 
 with France, he expressed his opinions to the Mini- 
 sters of the Crown with the utmost freedom, and to 
 an extent that was not always palatable to those to 
 whom they were addressed. 
 
 Before entering on the private life of Sir Ralph, 
 during the interval of peace between the close of 
 the American and the commencement of the French 
 War, it is necessary to state that in the year 1773 
 he Avas chosen to represent the county of Clack- 
 mannan in ParHament. The contest was severe, 
 and was conducted by Colonel Erskine, the brother 
 of the restored Earl of Mar, with unusual violence. 
 Colonel Erskine published a pamplilet in which he 
 reflected on the conduct of Lord Kennet, who was 
 one of the Judges of the Court of Session, in terms 
 which Sii' Ralph thought ought to be resented ; and 
 as Lord Kennet could not as a Judge vindicate his 
 own character, Sir Ralph decided that under the 
 circumstances it became him, on behalf of Lord 
 Kennet, who was his supporter and near relation, to 
 assume that duty. A hostile meeting ensued, shots 
 
24 FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 
 
 were exchanged, when the seconds interfered ; but 
 Sir Kalph considered that the provocation given by 
 Colonel Erskine was so unjustifiable, that he declined 
 to be reconciled to his opponent. Sir Laurence 
 Dundas, who was at that time desirous of acquiring 
 political power in Scotland, decided the contest by 
 exercising his influence in favour of Sir Ealph, under 
 the expectation that by so doing he became entitled 
 to control the votes in Parliament of the candidate 
 whom he supported. There was not the very 
 sHghtest foundation for this expectation on the part 
 of Sir Laurence ; and, accordingly, Sir Ralph re- 
 sented his interference, and a breach between them 
 ensued. Although Sir Ralph resisted the assumed 
 right of control, he did not forget the obligation 
 which he owed to Sir Laurence for his support. He 
 repaid it, by uniformly voting for the son of Su' 
 Laurence m his repeated and severe contests for the 
 county of Stirling, which were so close as to make 
 a single vote of real value, and that at a time when 
 there was no agreement in their political opinions, 
 and when Sir Ralj^h was strongly urged by per- 
 sonal friends to take a diflerent part. It may seem 
 strange to attach any importance to a single vote 
 in a county election, but those who know what 
 the state of the representation of Scotland was 
 
FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 25 
 
 before the passing of the Reform Bill, will be 
 competent to appreciate the value of one vote in 
 a keenly contested county, and in a narrow locality, 
 in which the political conduct of every individual 
 is known and canvassed. 
 
 A parliamentary life had no attractions for Sir 
 Ralph, who was not prepared to surrender his judg- 
 ment to the guidance of a party leader, and who 
 thought that his services as a soldier belonged exclu- 
 sively to his country. He speedily resolved never 
 to be re-elected, and he was only restrained from 
 resigning his seat by the feehng that doing so would 
 have been ungracious and ungenerous towards those 
 friends who had made great efforts and sacrifices 
 to secure his return. Sir Ralph might have been 
 re-elected in 1788, but he declined in favour of one 
 of his brothers. In 1797, he was actually re-elected 
 without his concurrence, and during his absence 
 from the country, but immediately on his return he 
 vacated in favour of his brother. General Sir Robert 
 Abercromby. 
 
 A knowledge of the private habits and pursuits 
 of any individual who has become eminent by his 
 abilities or services, is a natural and reasonable 
 object of desire. Details of private life ought, how- 
 ever, to be selected with discretion, and so limited 
 
26 FAMILY AND EAELY LIFE. 
 
 as to be sufficient to convey a general and just im- 
 pression of the character of the individual, and of 
 his resources when in retirement. The mother of 
 Sir Ealph died in the year 1767, and in the autumn 
 of that year he married Miss Menzies, second 
 daughter of Mr. Menzies of Fernton, in the county 
 of Perth. After his marriage the whole scheme of 
 his private life was regulated by devotion to the 
 comfort of his father, who resided constantly in the 
 family of his son until his death in the year 1800. 
 " I have often reflected," says an accurate observer, 
 " on the unmeasured and never-faihng devotion of 
 Sir Ealph and Lady Abercromby to the comfort and 
 happiness of a parent whose life was so unusually pro- 
 longed, as an admirable and beautiful trait in then- 
 character. Such conduct is the more worthy of 
 commendation when it is recollected that devotion 
 to the comfort of an aged parent not only regulated 
 but necessarily imposed many restraints on their own 
 inclinations and course of life." According to this 
 arrangement, Sii' Kalph's residence with his family 
 during; the continuance of the American War was 
 limited to such periods of time when he could be 
 spared from liis military duties in Ireland. The 
 only occasion on which Lady Abercromby accom- 
 panied Sir Ralph to L-eland was during the short 
 
FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 27 
 
 time he held the chief command in that country in 
 1798. Wlien peace with America was concluded, 
 and Sir Ealph had no longer any military duties 
 to perform, he retired into a life of strict privacy, 
 and during the interval between the close of the 
 American War and the commencement of the war 
 with France, he passed his time at first entirely in 
 the country, and subsequently it was divided be- 
 tween the country and Edinburgh. 
 
 In the country his habits were retired and simple ; 
 he found active occupation in the management of a 
 small farm ; he acquired an interest in the different 
 schemes of agricultural improvement which then 
 engaged the attention of the public ; he read the 
 remarkable publications of the day, and he possessed 
 an inexhaustible resource in his own reflections, as 
 he was at all times rather a profound tliinker than 
 an extensive reader. His society was limited to a 
 small circle of relations and friends, and to the 
 neighbouring gentry and clergy, with whom he at 
 all times associated on courteous and friendly terms. 
 In his intercourse with his neighbours he always 
 endeavoured to lead the conversation so as to induce 
 his guests to express their opinions on those subjects 
 on which they were likely to be best informed, and 
 this they were the more readily induced to do from 
 
28 FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 
 
 tlie singular affability aud modesty of his own man- 
 ner. His guests retired not only pleased with the 
 hospitality and kindness with which they had been 
 received, but the skill with which he had elicited 
 whatever information each could contribute, had 
 placed them on such good terms with themselves, 
 that few reflected or were conscious that they had 
 been engaged in conversation with one who was so 
 much their superior in the extent of his views and 
 the vigour of his understanding. 
 
 The impression made by the conduct of Sir Ralph 
 in his retirement attracted the notice of a traveller 
 in Scotland, to whom he was unknown. "As a 
 country gentleman," says the writer, " Sii' Ralph was 
 ever attentive to all within the circle of his move- 
 ment ; he stands high in the estimation of his neigh- 
 bours and dependants, and when his military glory 
 shall have fallen into oblivion, it will be gratefully 
 remembered that he was the friend of the destitute 
 poor, the patron of useful knowledge, and the pro- 
 moter of education among the meanest of his 
 cottagers ; and as a circumstance it may be men- 
 tioned that, in the village of Tullibody, on his 
 paternal estate, a reading school, under his inspec- 
 tion, was established many years back." 
 
 Gratitude and aff'ection may, perhaps, justify an 
 
FAMILY AND EAELY LIFE. 29 
 
 allusion to another of Sir Ralph's pursuits during 
 his retirement in the country. For a considerable 
 period of time he regularly devoted a portion of 
 each day to the instruction of his son, the writer of 
 this Memoir. Sir Ralph had not kept up the know- 
 ledge of Greek which he had acquired at school, 
 but Cicero, Horace, Csesar, Tacitus, and Livy, were 
 authors with whom he was familiar, whose merits 
 he tasted, and always read with real pleasure. His 
 efforts as a teacher were mainly directed to the per- 
 usal and study of these Latin authors whom he so 
 much admired, and to the formation of a simple, clear, 
 and nervous style in English composition. The 
 most vivid and enduring impression that survives, 
 is the remembrance of the wise, elevated, and noble 
 principles wliich he uniformly and earnestly incul- 
 cated, and now, at the close of a long life, a 
 comparison of the lessons which he taught, with 
 the results of personal experience, derived from 
 intercourse with public men and the world, renders 
 it impossible not to be filled with increased vene- 
 ration for the penetration, sagacity, rectitude, and 
 generous principles of the instructor, and with a 
 painful consciousness of the manifold deficiencies 
 of the pupil. 
 
 When Sir Ralph went to Edinburgh, his principal 
 
30 FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 
 
 object was the education of his family. He lived 
 in a small and select society, and found occupation 
 for his mind in the study of such subjects as inter- 
 ested him. During one winter he attended the 
 Lectures on Church History, which were delivered 
 by Dr. Hardy, who, at that time, enjoyed great re- 
 putation as one of the Professors in the Uni- 
 versity. 
 
 In his retirement Sir Ralph relied mainly on his 
 own resolution and resources. He allowed no in- 
 dulgence, and no habits of indolence to impair the 
 energy and activity of his mind ; he cherished and 
 retained in all the freshness of youth, the ambition, 
 and devotion to the service of his country, wliich 
 had been so long kept in abeyance, but were so 
 promptly displayed when they could, consistently 
 with his principles, be called into action. 
 
 The French Revolution was an event wliich sub- 
 jected the pohtical principles, the sagacity, and the 
 grasp of mind, of all who were capable of reflecting 
 and reasoning on such a striking occurrence, to a 
 severe and searching test. Some hailed it with un- 
 hesitating joy, as the assured triumph of principles 
 which were to place the freedom and happiness of 
 the French people on the firmest basis. Others, 
 being attached to ancient institutions, were dis- 
 
FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 31 
 
 mayed by the fierce inroad of Democracy, which 
 they regarded as subversive of law, order, rebgion, 
 and regulated freedom, and they became its uncom- 
 promising foes. There was a third party, who, cor- 
 dially sympathizing with the French people in their 
 desire to emancipate themselves from the abuses 
 and vices of the old government of France, regarded 
 this sudden and ^dolent change with trembling 
 anxiety, from the fear that those who had so long 
 groaned under the iron hand of despotism, must be 
 ill qualified to reconstruct their government with 
 prudence and wisdom. As Sir Ealph, according to 
 an admission of Lord Camden (which will be after- 
 wards cited), was a jDerson who thought " deeply 
 and wisely" on all subjects that came under his ob- 
 servation, it is desirable to show what were the feel- 
 ings, hopes, and fears with which he regarded the 
 first movement of this great and startling event. 
 Sir Ralph had anxiously watched the progress, and 
 carefully studied the causes and results of the 
 American revolution ; he admired the conduct and 
 character of General Washington as a noble example 
 of moderation and patriotism, and he rejoiced in the 
 development of the great principles of religious and 
 civil freedom, which he always expected would exer- 
 cise a powerful and favourable influence in Europe. 
 
32 FAMILY AND EAELY LIFE. 
 
 With such opinions, he could not f^iil to be warmly 
 interested and strongly excited by the striking- 
 events of the French Revolution. From the first 
 he made a just estimate of the importance and mag- 
 nitude of the crisis that had arisen. His ardent love 
 of Kberty was tempered by a calm and sound judg- 
 ment ; he never was seduced by theories, however 
 plausible ; his views were practical, and he knew that 
 freedom could not be suddenly and safely conceded 
 to people who had been long oppressed, and that 
 they could only he trained to the use and enjoyment 
 of it by experience, and under the influence and 
 control of energetic and wise leaders. He never 
 was for a moment dazzled or misled by the pro- 
 fessions of the leaders of the French Revolution, 
 whose conduct he condemned as rash and dangerous 
 in conceding to the people liberties which they were 
 unprepared to understand or to use with discretion. 
 His hopes for the estabhshment of freedom in 
 France were always damped Ijy the fear that liberty 
 would be abused, and that from aiming at too much 
 they would fail in obtaining those real benefits which 
 were practical, and adapted to the cncumstances of 
 their situation, and which might be secured under 
 firmer and wiser guidance. When the French Re- 
 volution was discussed in his presence, he gave 
 
FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 33 
 
 expression to these sentiments, by remarking, that 
 the French people were not sufficiently instructed 
 to submit to the sober guidance of a Washington, 
 and that they required to be controlled by a firm 
 and energetic hand, such as that of Frederick of 
 Prussia, until they could be gradually trained to the 
 exercise of freedom ; since, if they were not so re- 
 strained, the result might be perilous to them- 
 selves, might obstruct the progress of freedom, and 
 involve the rest of Europe in serious embarrass- 
 ments. 
 
 The early impressions of Sir Ralph with respect 
 to the French Revolution are material, as they may 
 be compared with, and may illustrate the opinions 
 which he subsequently expressed during the pro- 
 gress of the War, when he was unremittingly en- 
 gaged in the service of his country. The popular 
 feeling which had been evoked tln-oughout the 
 country, by the writings of Paine, by the capti- 
 vating professions of popular leaders, and the efforts 
 of the indiscreet friends and admirers of the French 
 Revolution, afforded to Sir Ralph, before he went 
 on active service, an opportunity of expressing his 
 opinion as to the spirit in which it ought to l3e met 
 by a just and wise government. He held it to be 
 an established truth that opinions, however delusive 
 
34 FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 
 
 or erroneous, could not be controlled or put down 
 by legislative or physical force, but that they might 
 be successfully met and counteracted by diffusing 
 instruction and wholesome principles among the 
 people, in a form likely to be effective, if skil- 
 fully regulated by the standard of their knowledge 
 and understanding. So long as he beheved that the 
 arm of force would not be extended in any dii-ec- 
 tion, in the vain attempt to crush opinions, he 
 confidently cherished the hope that good would 
 follow from the political discussions that had 
 arisen. He believed that a more familiar and 
 instructed acquaintance mth the merits of our in- 
 stitutions, and with the principles on which they 
 were founded, would give them a stronger hold 
 on the attachment of the people, that many of 
 those who had been seduced by popular fallacies 
 would be restrained, and that if some were still 
 incorrigible, and might be led to commit acts of 
 violence, they would easily be repressed by the 
 ordinary laws, and with the general approbation 
 of all classes. 
 
 With this view, he departed from his uniform 
 practice of abstaining from all participation in poli- 
 tical affairs, and became an active member of an 
 association that was formed in Edinburgh for the 
 
FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 35 
 
 purpose of diffusing useful information among the 
 people. He was so satisfied with the benefits that 
 resulted from this measure, that when he was Com- 
 mander-in-Chief in Ireland in 1798, he earnestly, 
 but in vain, recommended that a similar plan should 
 be adopted by the Irish Governnient. This calm 
 and temperate view of the crisis mortified and 
 ofiended those, who, under the influence of unrea- 
 sonable alarm, were urging on a mischievous policy, 
 founded on intolerance and violence, which has 
 left painful recollections, and fixed an indelible 
 stain on the social and judicial history of Scot- 
 land. Sir Ralph was well aware that his opinions, 
 however guardedly expressed, were exaggerated and 
 misrepresented by the heated and exclusive alarm- 
 ists, but he was convinced of the soundness of his 
 views, and pursued his course with unshaken con- 
 stancy. He carefully abstained from whatever was 
 calculated to justify off'ence, but he never failed 
 to mark, on fit occasions, his decided disapprobation 
 of the intolerant and exclusive policy which was so 
 generally recommended and adopted. An instance 
 or two, though trifling in themselves, will illus- 
 trate the character of the times, and the temper 
 and spirit which animated the conduct of Sir 
 Ralph. 
 
36 FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 
 
 An able and distinguished Scotch nol)leman, who 
 had taken a warm and prominent part in defence of 
 the French Revolution, happened to come to Edin- 
 burgh, where he was deserted and avoided by most 
 of his former acquaintances and friends. Sir Ralph, 
 thinking that such intolerance was calculated to be 
 very mischievous in its consequences, and that ex- 
 clusion from society was not justified by differences 
 of opinion on political subjects, marked his disap- 
 proval of this conduct by doing an act of courtesy 
 to a nobleman with whom he had no pre\dous ac- 
 quaintance, and the object of which could not be 
 mistaken under the circumstances in which it was 
 tendered. The compliment was strongly felt, and 
 always kindly remembered, by the individual to 
 whom it was paid. 
 
 Among those who had espoused the cause of 
 popular reform was a young nobleman, Basil Lord 
 Daer, who was distinguished, not only from his rank 
 and fortune, but by the abilities and the integrity 
 of his character, which was above all reproach, and 
 who left a name which was long revered l)y the 
 people of Scotland, w^ho justly appreciated his sym- 
 pathy mth their feelings and interests, and his 
 sincere desire to promote their comfort and to raise 
 and improve their condition. Sir Ralph, believing 
 
FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 37 
 
 that Lord Daer acted under the influence of pure 
 and honourable principles, was anxious to ascer- 
 tain the extent and the character of the views and 
 opinions wliich he had adopted. 
 
 An arrangement was made by which they met at 
 dinner at the house of a distant relative of Sir Ralph. 
 The only persons present were Lord Daer, Sir Ralph, 
 our host, and myself, then in my sixteenth year. 
 The conversation was protracted, was conducted 
 with calmness, and with that mutual respect which 
 resulted from the conviction that both were un- 
 influenced by personal objects, and were actuated 
 only by benevolent and patriotic motives. Lord 
 Daer made a very favourable impression as to the 
 sincerity and purity of his character, and Sir Ralph 
 readily overlooked the exaggeration of some of 
 his views and opinions, which he attributed to the 
 ardour and generosity of youth, and which would 
 be corrected by experience. Sir Ralph was always 
 pleased when he heard young men expressing senti- 
 ments favourable to freedom, and he used to say 
 that unless the opinions of a young man of twenty 
 had a tinge of republicanism, he would be sure 
 to be a corrupt man at forty. Lord Daer did 
 not long survive, having died at an early age. 
 
38 FAMILY AND EAELY LIFE. 
 
 Sir Ralph was soon called away from these calm 
 and contemplative pursuits to engage in a succes- 
 sion of military employments, to which, with brief 
 intervals of repose, the remainder of his life was 
 devoted. 
 
CHAPTER IL 
 
 CAMPAIGN IN FLANDERS. 
 1793 TO 1794. 
 
 The National Convention of France declared war 
 against England and Holland on the 1st of February 
 1793. Whatever differences of opinion may have 
 existed among statesmen or the public as to the 
 policy or justice of the attack on France by the 
 continental sovereigns, or as to the sincerity and 
 skill with which the Ensrlish Ministers had endea- 
 voured to avert the calamity of war, there was no 
 doubt that after the French declaration, it was the 
 duty of every loyal subject to support the interest 
 and honour of his country. Sir Ralph accordingly 
 felt that the time had at length arrived when 
 he could heartily embark in the active duties of 
 his profession. Although then about to enter the 
 sixtieth year of his age, he did not hesitate to 
 recommence his active professional life, which had 
 been so long suspended. He embraced the oppor- 
 tunity with ardour, and was animated by the hope 
 
40 CAMPAIGN IN FLANDERS. 1793. 
 
 that he might still achieve distinction by liis mili- 
 tary skill, and by his zealous devotion to the service 
 of his country. 
 
 At this time Sii^ Ralph had seen no service in the 
 field, except during his early years, when he was a 
 subaltern officer, and afterwards when he acted as 
 aide-de-camp to Sir W. Pitt, who held a command 
 in the English force that was sent to Germany, and 
 was placed under the command of Prince Ferdinand 
 of Brunsmck. The events of the War of 1756 
 could not fail to arrest the attention of every mili- 
 tary student, and the frequency with wliich Sir 
 Kalph recurred in conversation to the character and 
 conduct of Frederick of Prussia, showed how closely 
 he had observed the career of that distinguished 
 sovereign. Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick was an 
 able and esteemed commander, and has been espe- 
 cially commended for his minute and watchful at- 
 tention to the comforts and health of his soldiers, 
 an example which was rigidly followed by Sir 
 Kalph. The rank which Sir Ralph held at the 
 commencement of the War of 1793, was that of 
 major-general, and the only command to which he 
 could aspire was that of a brigadier, in the event of 
 an English force being sent to serve on the Con- 
 tinent. However highly the abilities of Sir Ralph 
 
1793. CAMPAIGN IN FLANDERS. 41 
 
 may have been respected and esteemed by those 
 with whom he had lived in habits of intimacy, and 
 with whom he had been associated on home service, 
 yet from the circumstance of his having taken no 
 part in the American War, and from his having 
 latterly passed so many years in privacy, he was 
 unknown to the public, and he had still to lay the 
 foundation of his fame as a commander in the field. 
 The Ministers having determined to send an auxi- 
 liary force to co-operate with the Allies in the Low 
 Countries, the command of the British troops was 
 confided to the Duke of York, and Sir Ralph was 
 appointed to the command of a brigade to be em- 
 ployed in the same service. 
 
 It is not now proposed to investigate the causes 
 which dashed the hopes that were inspired by these 
 events, or to criticise the conduct of commanders 
 and cabinets. All that is necessary for the present 
 object is a brief reference to those occasions on 
 which the British Army was brought into action 
 during this campaign, and in which Sir Ralph bore a 
 part. The opportunities for exertion which were 
 ofi'ered to Sir Ralph were few, and the last, which 
 was the most important, and the best calculated to 
 display his energy, and his fortitude, under circum- 
 stances the most mortifying and painful, was his 
 
42 CAMPAIGN IN FLANDERS. 1793. 
 
 conduct during the retreat from Holland in the 
 winter of 1 7 9 4-9 5. On the 2 5th of February 1793, 
 the Duke of York embarked, with three battalions 
 of the Guards, for Holland, with the intention to 
 relieve Williamstadt, which was then besieged by 
 the French. The brigade to the command of which 
 Sir Ealph was appointed, was composed of the 14th, 
 37th, and 53d regiments, and with them he em- 
 barked at Leith on the 21st of March ; and thus it 
 happened that the 21st of March was the day on 
 which he entered on a new course of military ser- 
 vice, and was also the day on which it was closed 
 by the mortal wound which he received in the 
 Battle of Alexandria in 1801. 
 
 The first account of the state of liis brigade is to 
 be found in the letters of Sir Henry Calvert, aide- 
 de-camp to the Duke of York, which have been 
 published. Writing on the 9th of April 1 7 9 3, he says, 
 that the Guards anchored off Antwerp, and that a 
 brigade, consisting of the 14th, 37th, and 53d, under 
 Major-General Abercromby, disembarked from their 
 transports at the ferry opposite Antwerp, and he 
 adds, " On the junction of the Brigade of the Line, 
 we remarked with concern that the recruits they had 
 lately raised were, in general, totally unfit for ser- 
 vice, and inadequate to the fatigues of a campaign. 
 
1793. CAMPAIGN IN FLANDERS. 43 
 
 being mostly either old men or quite boys, extremely 
 weak and short." In a letter dated on the 26th 
 April, Sir H. Calvert again refers to the brigade in 
 these terms : — " I am sorry to say that our small 
 force is much diminished by two of the regiments 
 in the Second Brigade being totally unfit for service, 
 so much so, that the Duke of York has left the 3 7th 
 and 53d at Bruges and Ostend. The recruits that 
 were sent to complete them immediately before 
 their embarkation are worse than any I ever saw, 
 even at the close of the American War, and I sin- 
 cerely hope the representation of the Duke of York 
 may awaken the resentment of the King against 
 whatever person or persons the fault lies with. In 
 the meantime, it is a most cruel circumstance for 
 the officers who command these regiments, and for 
 Major-General Abercromby, whose brigade is for the 
 present placed quite liois de combat." In a subse- 
 quent letter, Sir Hemy says, "The recruits for 
 Major-General Abercromby 's brigade arrived a few 
 days ago ; they much resemble Falstaff''s men, and 
 were as lightly clad as any Carmagnol battalion." 
 This description of the brigade, to the command of 
 which Sir Ralph was appointed, amply supports the 
 statement of General Jomini, who says that the 
 state of the EnglLsh Army at the commencement of 
 
44 CAMPAIGN IN FLANDERS. 1793. 
 
 the War was deplorable, and that its regeneration 
 was only to Ije dated from the War in Egypt. 
 
 It would be irksome and unprofitable to trace 
 the progress of the English army froni the landing 
 in Holland in 1793, to the period of their final re- 
 treat from the Continent in the early part of 1795. 
 During the whole of these campaigns Sir Ralph 
 zealously discharged his duty, and gradually and 
 steadily acquired the respect and confidence of his 
 commander, and of the Army. His conduct was 
 peculiarly distinguished in the attack on the Camp 
 of Furnes, in the month of May 1793. In the 
 Gazette, in wliich an account of the action is given, 
 it is stated : — " The troops of the difi'erent nations 
 displayed the utmost firmness and intrepidity 
 in this arduous undertaking. The British troops 
 who had the opportunity of distinguishing them- 
 selves were the Brigade of the Line, namely, the 
 14th and 53d regiments, with the BattaHon 
 formed from three light infantry and grenadier 
 companies, commanded by Major-General Aber- 
 cromby." Sir Ralph commanded the British troops 
 who were employed in storming Valenciennes ; 
 after the surrender of which place, the Allies, in- 
 stead of following up this advantage, and pressing 
 on the French army, which was composed of raw 
 
1793. CAMPAIGN IN FLANDERS. 45 
 
 and undisciplined recruits, determined to divide their 
 forces, and to pursue their own separate objects. 
 
 The Duke of York received instructions from 
 Enoiand, directino; him to undertake the siege of 
 Dunkirk. With whom this unhappy project ori- 
 ginated, seems never to have been ascertained, and 
 it was never either encouraged or approved by the 
 Duke of York, or those in whom he confided. The 
 author of the Victoires et Gonquetes does not hesi- 
 tate to say, that France owed its safety, at that 
 critical moment, to the decision wliich led to the 
 separation of the Allied forces. The plan of the 
 English Cabinet was bad, and the means that ought 
 to have been provided by the Minister for its 
 execution were criminally defective. "That this 
 undertaking," says Sir H. Calvert, " received no 
 countenance nor moral co-operation appeared very 
 extraordinary. This remissness on the part of 
 Government excited much indignation in the Army, 
 and no small astonishment among our Allies." In 
 France, the defeat of the attack on Dunkirk dif- 
 fused universal joy, restored confidence, and aroused 
 throughout the nation a determined spirit of resis- 
 tance to the interference and dictation of foreign- 
 ers, which was honourable to the French people 
 and formidable to their enemies. 
 
46- CAMPAIGN IN FLANDERS. 1793. 
 
 In the varied, and not very important events 
 that occurred during the remainder of the cam- 
 paign, the conduct of the Duke of York and of the 
 British Ai'my was irreproachable and creditable. 
 
 It was at the close of this campaign that Sir 
 Ralph, in writing to j\Ir. Secretary Dundas, stated 
 it to be his opinion, that a spuit was abroad which 
 would certainly spread, and which could not be put 
 down by force, and that it would be sound wis- 
 dom on our part to seize the earliest opportunity 
 of withdrawing from the War. His opinion was, 
 that the old monarchies were worn out, and that 
 a new order of things was approaching, which 
 would be felt throughout Europe. This, like many 
 other predictions, was sound, but it was announced 
 too soon. After the lapse of sixty eventful years, 
 the struggle which Sir Ralph anticipated is still in 
 progress and undecided. 
 
 The sovereigns triumphed in the War ; they made 
 a settlement of Europe which is crumbling ; they 
 violated their pledges to the people ; and they 
 only sustain themselves by mutual co-operation, 
 by restraining the hberty of the press, by a 
 detestable police, and large armies. In spite of 
 all this force, opinion is making its way ; some 
 countries have gained solid advantages, others are 
 
1794. CAMPAIGN IN FLANDERS. 47 
 
 struggling for freedom, and the ultimate result can- 
 not be doubtful. 
 
 At the opening of the campaign, the Emperor of 
 Grermany took the command in person, and reviewed 
 the Allied army, then in West Flanders, on the heights 
 above Cateau. On the morning of the l7th April, 
 the Allied army advanced in eight columns. The 
 fourth and fifth columns were placed under the 
 command of the Duke of York : the former he kept 
 under his own direction, and the latter he confided 
 to Sir William Erskine. The object of the Duke 
 was to attack with the column under his immediate 
 command the redoubts and village of Vaux and 
 also the Bois de Bohain, which the enemy had 
 strongly entrenched. 
 
 After the necessary arrangements had been made, 
 the attack was commenced by the advanced guard 
 under the command of Sir Ralph, in which, 
 although the enemy's fire was very severe, he 
 completely succeeded. The whole of a very com- 
 plicated movement having proved successful, the 
 Duke of York expressed his approbation to the army 
 for its conduct in a general order, in which.he thanks 
 Sir Ralph " for the zeal, activity, and spirit with 
 which he led the advanced guard of his column ;" 
 and, in his despatch, which was published in the 
 
48 CAMPAIGN IN FLANDERS. 1794. 
 
 Gazette, His Royal Highness repeats his obhgations 
 to Sir Ralph for his conduct on that day. On the 
 14th of May, the French made an attack, which 
 they supported with desperate valour, on General 
 Kaunitz, but they were repulsed with a most severe 
 loss both of officers and men, and were obliged to 
 recross the Sambre. Encouraged by this success, 
 the Austrians determined to make an effort to expel 
 the French from those parts of the Austrian terri- 
 tories of which they had taken possession. "When 
 the Austrians had formed their plan, it was unfor- 
 tunately betrayed to the enemy, and the failure 
 which ensued was by them attributed to that cii'cum- 
 stance, though it appears that there were other causes 
 sufficient to account for the unsuccessful result of 
 the attack. 
 
 The Austrians approached towards the enemy on 
 the night of the 16 th of May, with the intention 
 of attacking them at daybreak. The army was 
 divided into five columns. Two of these divisions 
 were directed to force a passage across the river 
 Marque, which, indeed, they effected, but in so 
 tired and exhausted a state that they were unable 
 to execute the remaining portion of their orders. 
 A third division advanced as ordered, but found the 
 enemy in such force that they retired to their former 
 
179i. CAMPAIGN IN FLANDERS. 49 
 
 position. The two divisions under General Otto 
 and the Duke of York were more successful, and 
 drove the French from several of their posts. In 
 the last of these which was taken by the Duke's 
 division, the enemy were strongly entrenched and 
 made a formidable resistance, " but by the judicious 
 conduct of General Abercromby, and the valour of 
 the troops under his command, the entrenchment 
 was forced and the enemy totally routed." On the 
 morning of the 18th, the French made an attack 
 on the column of the Duke of York, which had been 
 weakened by a detachment sent to make a diversion 
 in favour of those who were most severely pressed 
 by the enemy. The French were greatly superior 
 in numl3ers, and the Duke of York found himself so 
 surrounded that he was unable to join those portions 
 of his own troops, which were under the command 
 of Sir Ralph and General Fox ; it was with great 
 difficulty that he escaped falling into the hands of 
 the enemy, and succeeded in making his way to 
 General Otto. 
 
 Sir Ealph and General Fox effected the retreat of 
 their respective corps in a manner which is uni- 
 formly mentioned with the greatest praise in every 
 account that has been published of the proceedings 
 of that day. One account says : — " It was with 
 
 D 
 
50 CAMPAIGN IN FLANDEKS. 1794. 
 
 prodigious efforts that Generals Abercrumby and 
 Fox found means to restore sufficient order among 
 the troops to save them from utter destruction and 
 effect a retreat. But even this was attended with 
 almost insurmountable difficulty, the enemy pressing 
 upon them with incessant fury, and giving them no 
 time to recover from theii' forlorn situation, into 
 which they had been thrown by the unexpected 
 immensity of the numbers with which they had to 
 contend on this unfortunate day."' Another account 
 mentions that the Duke of York dii-ected General 
 Abercromby to retire from Mouveau to the heights 
 behind Robaix, where it was his intention to have 
 assembled his troops. In consequence of these 
 directions General Abercromby began liis retreat, 
 but on his arrival on the heights of Eobaix, he found 
 liimself surrounded on all sides, so that the re- 
 assembling of the Army on that position was im- 
 possible ; he therefore continued his march toLannoy, 
 which he effected amidst the repeated attacks of the 
 enemy who poured upon liim from all cparters, and 
 at every avenue or pass had guns ready to flank 
 him and cavalry to attack him whenever the ground 
 would admit. On his arrival at Lannoy he found 
 it also in possession of the enemy, and was obliged 
 to avoid the town, and march round it under a 
 
1794. CAMPAIGN IN FLANDERS. 51 
 
 very heavy fire, and with much difficulty reached 
 Templeuve. 
 
 As the object of this brief Memoir is strictly con- 
 fined to the detail of such incidents as tend to 
 illustrate the personal character and conduct of Sir 
 Ralph, it would be superfluous to enlarge on the 
 events of the disastrous campaign of 1794. It is 
 only necessary to say that so long as the Army was 
 under the command of His Royal Higlmess the 
 Duke of York, there never was the slightest ground 
 for imj)uting any of those disasters to the want 
 of energetic co-operation, or to any deficiency in 
 military conduct on the part of the Duke of York 
 and of the British Army. On every occasion the 
 English soldiers maintained their character for 
 ardour, perseverance, and indomitable courage, and 
 only retired when they were overcome by the over- 
 whelming amount of the French force. The defeats 
 of the Austrians, who were compelled to re-cross 
 the Rhine, and tlie fall of all the fortresses in rapid 
 succession, compelled the Duke of York to abandon 
 Flanders, and to retire into Holland. 
 
 The defence of Holland became impracticable from 
 the severity of the season ; and that of Walcheren, 
 which was intrusted to Sir Ralph, was rendered 
 equally hopeless by the early setting in of a winter 
 
52 CAMPAIGN IN FLANDERS. 1704. 
 
 of most unusual severity, which enabled rivers to 
 be easily crossed on the ice. Deprived by this cir- 
 cumstance of the expected means of defending 
 themselves, nothing remained for our army but to 
 evacuate Holland. On the return of the Duke of 
 York to England, the chief command of the British 
 force was placed in the hands of General Harcourt, 
 who appears to have been unequal to such a crisis. 
 The privations and sufferings of the Army were 
 dreadfully aggravated by the unusual and extreme 
 inclemency of the weather, and by the constant 
 pressure of a victorious and superior enemy. 
 
 Under these circumstances, the duty of protecting 
 the Army during its retreat through Holland de- 
 volved on Sir Ralph, and he was so commonly re- 
 garded as the chief commander, that some of his 
 friends in England, not foreseeing that in the midst 
 of these disasters, he was earning an European re- 
 putation, remonstrated with the Government for 
 allowing him to be considered as exercising a res- 
 ponsibility which in fact belonged to another. The 
 hideous details of this disastrous retreat have been 
 so often given to the public, that it would be pain- 
 ful and superfluous to repeat them, and the more so 
 as nothing new can be added. 
 
 The judgment with which the retreat was effected, 
 
1794. CAMPAIGN IN FLANDERS. 53 
 
 attracted general attention, and commanded respect 
 for the constancy and ability which were displayed 
 by those who conducted it. Infinitely the largest 
 share of tliis pubhc approbation was by common 
 consent assigned to Sir Ralph, and his character as 
 a commander was established. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 COMMAND IN THE WEST INDIES. 
 
 1795 TO 1797. 
 
 The Government in England having decided to 
 attack the French and Dutch possessions in the 
 West Indies, a large armament, amounting at least 
 to 15,000 men, was prepared in the autumn of 
 1795 for that service, and was placed under the 
 command of Sir Ralph Abercromby. The fleet was 
 under the orders of Admiral Christian. The convoy 
 sailed on the 28th of November. This expedition 
 was destined to encounter a storm of unusual length 
 and severity. The fleet was entirely dispersed, 
 some ships making their way to the West Indies, 
 and the remainder scattered in all directions. 
 
 The "Glory," in which Sir Ralph sailed with 
 Admiral Clmstian, kept at sea as long as possible, 
 but was ultimately obhged, after a vain struggle of 
 seven weeks, and after having been exposed to the 
 very greatest danger, to return to port. This was 
 of course most disappointing and disheartening to 
 
1795. COMMAND IN THE WEST INDIES. 55 
 
 Sir Ralph, but Admiral Christian in writing to a 
 friend remarks, " that his demeanour on this occa- 
 sion was so calm and composed, that it was an 
 example to be admired and followed by all who 
 witnessed it." The following anecdote is of no im- 
 portance, but as it has been preserved by others as 
 characteristic, I have inserted it. At a moment 
 when the " Glory" was known to be in the most 
 imminent danger, the confidential servant of Sir 
 Ralph rushed into the cabin where he was with 
 Admh'al Christian, and addressing him said, "We 
 are going to be drowned." " Very well," replied Sir 
 Ralph, " you go to bed." 
 
 After the return of the "Glory" to port. Sir 
 Ralph again sailed for his destination in the " Are- 
 thusa" frigate, commanded by Captain Wooley. 
 On his arrival in the West Indies, Sir Ralph com- 
 menced the campaign by an attack on St. Lucie, in 
 which he succeeded. He sent a force to take Deme- 
 rara and Berbice, which the Dutch not unwillingly 
 surrendered, and he also took the necessary measures 
 for relieving St. Vincent's, and laying the foundation 
 for the restoration of order in that Island and in 
 Grenada. 
 
 Thus ended the first campaign in the West In- 
 dies, all having lieen accomplished that was possible 
 
56 COMMAND IN THE WEST INDIES. 179«. 
 
 after the serious difficulties and disasters whicli the 
 fleet had encountered at its commencement. 
 
 On the conclusion of this first campaign, Sir 
 Ralph returned to Europe in the " Arethusa," in 
 which frigate he again sailed for the West Indies at 
 the end of the year 1796. War with Spain having 
 in the interval been declared, Sir Ralph' was directed 
 to attack the Spanish possessions of Trinidad and 
 Porto Rico. The attack on Trinidad, which eventu- 
 ally proved successful, appears to have been con- 
 sidered by the King's Ministers especially desirable, 
 because it was a place of refuge for democratic 
 agitators, chiefly French, who instigated disturbances 
 in our West Indian possessions. Sir Ralph was in- 
 structed, if he should find that he could not aff'ord 
 to leave a sufficient force for the protection of 
 Trinidad without endangering the security of our 
 islands, to destroy as far as possible everything that 
 could be useful. He himself certainly took a wdder 
 view of the real importance of Trinidad, as afibrding 
 facilities for any enterprise in which we might en- 
 gage for the liberation of Spanish America. 
 
 In a letter from Trinidad, dated 28th Februar}^ 
 1797, he says, "In my official letter I had the 
 honour of giving you the detail of our opera- 
 tions against this island. Every part of the con- 
 
1797. COMMAND IN THE WEST INDIE.S. 57 
 
 duct of the Spanish troops, both by sea and 
 land, seems to indicate a decayed nation, and to 
 point out the possibihty of further conquests, if 
 we were in a condition to keep what we might 
 acquire, with a small additional force. It appears 
 necessary to keep possession of 'Trinidad as an im- 
 portant post should the war continue, for which 
 purpose I shall leave a garrison that will be suffi- 
 cient for its defence. The inhabitants are a mix- 
 ture of Spanish, English, and French. I shall 
 endeavour as much as possible to gain them by 
 a mild and equal government." 
 
 The independence of South America was at all 
 times a favourite project of Sir Ralph, and the 
 further conquests to which he alludes as to be 
 made from Trinidad, have, no doubt, reference 
 to the continent of America, and the means b}^ 
 which he proposed to retain them with an in- 
 considerable force, were a declaration of indepen- 
 dence, and the establishment of "a mild and equal 
 government."^ 
 
 After the surrender of Trinidad, which he placed 
 under the care of Colonel, afterwards Sir Thomas 
 Picton, whom he selected as the person best quali- 
 fied to understand and appreciate his future views, 
 
 1 Vide Appendix for Minute on tins suhject. 
 
58 COMMAND IN THE WEST INDIES. 1797. 
 
 he proceeded to Porto Eico, the possession of which 
 had been considered by the King's Ministers to be 
 important, as it might afford the means of provid- 
 ing for those persons in St. Domingo wlio were 
 living under the protection of the English Govern- 
 ment. It seems to have been a project, which 
 would have been difficult of execution, even if the 
 place had been taken. The attack on Porto Pico, 
 however, was unsuccessful. Sir Palph, in a private 
 letter, explains very simply and clearly the cause of 
 his failure. He says, " Perhaps the expedition has 
 been undertaken too lightly. We had not sufficient 
 information, and to say the truth, it is not easily 
 obtained. Mariners, smugglers, and merchants, 
 generally know little but their own affairs ; it is 
 only from military men, or men of great observa- 
 tion, that proper information can be got. Abbe 
 Kaynal passes for a writer of little credit, but in 
 this instance he has been correct. At all events, 
 after the reduction of Trinidad, the Admiral agreed 
 with me, that something further was to be done, 
 and as both he and I had received re-inforcements, 
 and had been instructed to attempt Porto Eico, we 
 determined to try our fortune, trusting a little to 
 the weakness of the enemy. We found them well 
 prepared, with a garrison more numerous than us, 
 
1797. COMMAND IN THE WEST INDIES. 59 
 
 and with a powerful artillery. The troops, indeed, 
 were of the worst composition, but Ijehind walls, 
 they could not fail to do their duty."' 
 
 The conduct of Sir Kalph at Porto Rico was 
 most cordially approved by the Ministers, and there 
 is no indication that his failure ever gave him 
 any uneasiness ; he considered the case to be so 
 clear, that there was no room for difference of 
 opinion. 
 
 Sir Ralph very much disliked the command in 
 the West Indies, as it involved a responsibility, 
 especially as to public expenditure, which was very 
 irksome to him, and on the 28th of February 1797, 
 he wrote as follows to Mr. Secretary Dundas : — 
 
 "With every wish to do my duty to the public, 
 and to show my gratitude for the favours I have 
 received, I hope that it will not be considered as a 
 deviation from that principle, to ask permission 
 to return to Europe after the campaign. I do 
 not complain of want of health, but I find the 
 complex nature of the civil and military duties 
 of a commander too much for me, and I cannot 
 discharge l^oth completely to my satisfaction. The 
 control of the Army accounts, and the disagreeable 
 task of keeping within due bounds the difterent 
 departments, occupy much of my time, and give 
 
60 COMMAND IN THE WEST INDIES. 1797. 
 
 me much uneasiness. When I have a little leisure 
 I hope to simplify this business, and make matters 
 less a load on my successor." 
 
 Sir Ralph's request was complied with, and 
 General Cuyler was sent out to succeed him, and 
 he returned to Ens^land. 
 
CHAPTEK IV. 
 
 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 
 
 1797 TO 1798. 
 
 When Sir Ealpli returned from the West Indies 
 in 1797, the condition of Ireland was engaging the 
 most serious attention of the Grovermnent. The ap- 
 pointment of Lord FitzwiUiam, in December 1794, 
 to the situation of Lord Lieutenant, had raised the 
 hopes of the Roman CathoHcs, which were defeated 
 by his recall in 1795. The disappointment of theii' 
 hopes had produced discontent, and, as was alleged, 
 the severity of the Government, and the license of 
 the Army, had led to disaffection, to a desire for 
 separation from England, and to a traitorous corre- 
 spondence with Frauce. 
 
 It is not necessary to investigate minutely the 
 truth of these allegations, but it may be remarked 
 that when Doctor M'Nevin was examined before 
 the Secret Committee of the House of Commons, in 
 the year 1798, he was asked by Lord Castlereagh 
 whether the measures of the Government complained 
 
62 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1797. 
 
 of were not subsequent to various proceedings of the 
 United Irishmen ; he replied, that if his Lordship 
 desired it, he was prepared to prove, by a compari- 
 son of dates, that the Government had throughout 
 been the aggressors. It is to be lamented that Lord 
 Castlereagh did not accept a challenge which might 
 have estabHshed the truth by so simple a process as 
 a comparison of dates. It must be admitted, on 
 the one hand, that disaffection did exist, and, on the 
 other, it cannot be denied that undue severity on 
 the part of the Government, and uncontrolled license 
 on the part of the Army, had a du'ect tendency to 
 stimulate the exertions and to strengthen the hands 
 of the disaffected. The feuds between the Pro- 
 , testants and Roman Catholics had assumed a very 
 / serious character. A battle had been fought at a 
 viUage in the county of Armagh, called the " Dia- 
 mond," in which the Catholics had been defeated. 
 Orange lodges had been established, and persecution 
 had been carried so far, that, in the month of De- 
 cember 1795, Lord Gosford, the Governor of the 
 county of Armagh, had found it necessary to con- 
 vene a meeting of the magistrates, to whom he 
 stated, " That a persecution so ferocious was raging, 
 that neither age nor sex, nor even acknowledged in- 
 nocence were sufficient to excite mercy, much less 
 
1797. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 63 
 
 to afford protection, and that the only crime with 
 which the persecuted were charged, was simply a 
 profession of the Roman Catholic faith." The de- 
 fenders of this system, who included in their ranks 
 the discontented and the disaffected, were not idle. 
 In the autumn and winter of 1795, they appeared 
 in arms, attacked houses and plundered them of 
 arms, fired at magistrates, and assassinated wit- 
 nesses, so that the country was exposed to the evils 
 of civil war. Lord Carhampton was sent to the 
 West to suppress the rioters, and he preceded the 
 judges with his troops, opening the gaols as he went, 
 and, without any form of trial, or any other autho- 
 rity than his own order, he sent the prisoners on 
 board a tender, which sailed along the coast to re- 
 ceive them, and they were transferred to the service 
 of the Navy. Such a precedent for superseding the 
 authority of the Law, was promptly followed by 
 magistrates and others, the Army was misled and 
 disorganized, and misrule prevailed. Parliament 
 was compelled to interfere, first to arrest the pro- 
 gress of actions which had been brought in the civil 
 courts against those who had acted without autho- 
 rity fromx the Law, and ultimately it became neces- 
 sary to pass a bill of indemnity. 
 
 The Irish Parliament met early in the month of 
 
64 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1:97. 
 
 Jaiiuary 1796. A bill was passed enabling magis 
 trates to declare any county in a state of insurrec- 
 tion, to break open houses at any hour, to search 
 for arms, to arrest and send on board the fleet any 
 one whom they suspected, and to imprison any man 
 whom they found out of his house between sunset 
 and sunrise. This was a very dangerous delegation 
 of powers to magistrates, who iiad so abused their 
 authority that it had been found necessary to pro- 
 tect them by a bill of indemnity. However much 
 it may be lamented and justly condemned, it can 
 not be surprising, that in a countiy distracted by 
 religious persecution, l^y the suspension of the 
 authority of the law, by the exercise of power in- 
 trusted to incapable and unworthy hands, and by 
 the pressure of a licentious army, some were at 
 last found who were disposed to look to foreign aid 
 as the only escape from this disastrous misnde, and 
 that the French Government were prompt to avail 
 themselves of the domestic weakness of a formidable 
 enemy. Mr. Wolfe Tone, who had fled from Ireland 
 to America, went to France early in the year 1796. 
 He was not, and he did not pretend to be, the autho- 
 rized representative of any portion of his countr}' 
 men ; but the French Government, influenced by 
 his reports and opinions, were induced to fit out an 
 
1797. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 65 
 
 armament, which sailed from Brest on the 15th of 
 
 December of that year. The fleet consisted of 
 
 seventeen sail of the line, thirteen frigates, having 
 
 on board fifteen thousand troops, and a large supply 
 
 of arms and other muniments of war. It reached 
 
 Bantry in safety, but it was dispersed by boisterous 
 
 and adverse winds, and compelled to return to Brest. 
 
 Lord Camden in his despatch to the Government, 
 
 detaihng the arrival and dispersion of the French 
 
 fleet, praises the excellent spirit shown by the 
 
 regular and militia forces, the zeal displayed by all 
 
 classes, and dwells especially on the cordiality and 
 
 kindness with which the troops were received and 
 
 their movements facilitated by the poorest of the 
 
 people, and concludes by saying,—" In short, the 
 
 general good disposition throughout the south and 
 
 the west was so prevalent, that, had the enemy 
 
 landed, their hope of assistance from the inhabitants 
 
 would have been disappointed." In the report of a 
 
 secret committee presented to the House of Lords, 
 
 there is a statement connected with this event which 
 
 deserves attention. It is there declared that, in the 
 
 month of November 1796, the Irish Directoiy were 
 
 informed of the armament preparing at Brest, but 
 
 they subsequently received a letter to which they 
 
 attached credit, and on which they acted, stating 
 
 E 
 
66 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1797. 
 
 that the projected expedition was postponed for 
 some months, and, consequently, no steps were 
 taken to prepare the people for the arrival of the 
 French ; and to that circumstance one of the Irish 
 Directory ascribed the loyalty of the inhaljitants 
 when the French fleet arrived off" Bantry, and he 
 confessed that the people were loyal because they 
 were left to themselves. Such a statement, con- 
 firmed by the active display of the loyalty of the 
 inliabitants on a most trying occasion, gives great 
 weight to the assertion of Dr. M'Nevin that the 
 Government had been the aggressors. The people, 
 when left to tliemselves, were patient and su]3mis- 
 sive, and if they had been considerately, humanely, 
 and justly treated, their attachment and fidelity 
 might have been secm'ed, but the ii-ritation produced 
 by religious persecution and arbitrary laws harshly 
 enforced, enabled the leaders of the disaff'ected to 
 seduce the people, and to involve the country in the 
 most disastrous calamities. 
 
 When the Irish Parliament met in 1797, an effort 
 was made to induce the Government to reward the 
 loyalty displayed by the people when the French 
 appeared off the coast, by adopting a firm, but 
 lenient and just policy, and a motion was made in the 
 House of Commons to that eftect, but was negatived 
 
mr. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 67 
 
 by a majority of ninety to seven. This result was so 
 discouraging that Mr. G rattan and his friends would 
 probably have abstained from making any farther 
 effort, if they had not felt that they might be con- 
 sidered as having deserted their duty to the country 
 if they did not bring under the consideration of 
 Parliament an overture for peace, which had been 
 submitted to the Lord-Lieutenant. In the preced- 
 ing month of December a meeting had been held at 
 Belfast, at which Arthur O'Connor and others were 
 appointed to prepare resolutions to be laid before 
 the Lord-Lieutenant, which stated in substance that 
 the public mind would be restored to tranquillity, 
 and impending danger averted by such a reform as 
 would secure to population and property their due 
 weight without distinction on account of religious 
 opinions. These resolutions were laid before the 
 Lord-Lieutenant, but were followed hj no result. 
 There were not only plausible, l^ut even strong 
 reasons for believing that the authors of these re- 
 solutions would, at that time, have been glad to be 
 extricated from the difficulties and dangers with 
 which they were environed, if the Government could 
 have been prevailed upon to accept their substance 
 in a sincere spirit. This opinion was most distinctly 
 avowed in a memorial delivered to Government by 
 
68 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1797. 
 
 Arthur O'Connor, Emmett, and Dr. M'Nevin ; and 
 Emmett subsequently, when under examination, 
 stated that if reform had at that time been con- 
 ceded, the Irish Directory were prepared to have 
 sent a message to France, stating " that the differ- 
 ences between the Government and the people had 
 been adjusted, and dissuading tliem from attempt- 
 ing a second invasion of Ireland." Mr. Grattan and 
 his friends declined to have any meeting, or to act 
 in concert with the authors of the resolutions, but 
 Mr. Ponsonby, with a view to the restoration of 
 tranquillity, order, and legal government, proposed 
 in Parliament such a plan of reform as he thought 
 might have been safely adopted. The motion was 
 rejected by 117 to 30. It is impossible to read the 
 speeches of Mr. Grattan, on occasions so deeply 
 affecting the fate of his country, without the greatest 
 admiration of the calmness, the patriotism, and the 
 wisdom with wliich they were inspired, and which 
 were so characteristic of that virtuous and eminent 
 statesman. Lord Castlereagh, indeed, commended 
 the tone and temper with which Mr. Grattan had 
 conducted these discussions, but he rejected his 
 advice, and adopted a still more severe and irritat- 
 ing policy. 
 
 The first prominent act of the Government that 
 
1797. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 69 
 
 followed tliis discussion was a proclamation issued 
 by General Lake, who commanded in the north, in 
 which he stated " that it had become necessary to 
 interpose with the King's troops, and that he had 
 received authority and directions to act in such 
 manner as the pubHc safety required." The Law 
 and the Constitution being thus superseded, Mr. 
 Grattan lost no time in asking Mr. Pelham, the 
 Secretary, whether the proclamation had been issaed 
 by his authority. Mr. Pelham declined to avow 
 the proclamation, on which Mr. Grattan gave notice 
 that he should move for it on the following day, 
 but was prevented from doing so by the absence of 
 the Ministers. The Lord-Lieutenant was, in the 
 meanwhile, induced to send a message to Parlia- 
 ment acknowledging that the proclamation had 
 been issued by his authority. This transaction is 
 characteristic of the feebleness of the moderate, and 
 of the ascendency of the violent party, which 
 marked the whole com'se of Lord Camden's ad- 
 ministration in Ireland. 
 
 The proclamation was admitted to have been 
 illegal, but was justified on the ground of necessity. 
 The inevitable consequence of such a defence was 
 that the civil power was superseded by military 
 authority, which was not only enforced, but very 
 
70 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1797. 
 
 speedily abused. Acts of injustice and cruelty were 
 daily perpetrated, the soldiers were debauched, and 
 military discipline was injuriously relaxed. Ad- 
 dresses were presented to the King from the city of 
 Dublin, and the counties of Antrim and Armagh, 
 describing, in the strongest language, the sufferings 
 of the people from the enforcement of mihtary law, 
 and from religious persecution. Such addresses 
 were displeasing to the Government, and a procla- 
 mation was issued prohibiting all persons from 
 meeting in unusual numbers, and Mr. Pelham m- 
 timated to the Hic^h Sheriffs of Kildare and the 
 King's County, that a meeting of the inhabitants 
 would not be permitted, and that the Lord-Lieuten- 
 ant would direct the troops to prevent such assem- 
 blages. The counties that had intended to meet for 
 the purpose of laying before the King the wrongs 
 and mjuries of which they complained, abandoned 
 their purpose. In the month of April the Govern- 
 ment received private information, which enabled 
 them to arrest the persons and seize the papers of 
 two committees of the Society of United Irishmen. 
 These papers disclosed the origin, progress, and pre- 
 sent means of that Society, and they also proved that 
 it had been first estabhshed in 1791, by persons who 
 were in no resjDect distinguished for education, abilitv^, 
 
1797. COMMAND IN IRELAND. ' 71 
 
 or influence, but who liad made converts and gained 
 strength under the pressure of coercive laws. None 
 of those who were arrested, in consequence of the 
 discovery of these papers, were Koman CathoHcs. 
 
 In the month of November 1797, Lord Carhamp-!' 
 ton had resigned the command of the Army in 
 Ireland. This event, which was unexpected by the 
 pubHc, gave occasion for many conjectures. When 
 it was known that Sir Kalph Abercromby had been 
 selected to succeed to the command, those who be- 
 lieved that he would not tolerate the licentious pro- 
 ceedings of the Army, regarded his appointment as 
 a proof that the English Government had begun to 
 distrust the Irish policy, under which, disaffection, 
 so far from having been suppressed, had increased 
 and extended. Others supposed that the expecta- 
 tion of another attempt by the French to invade 
 Ireland had suggested the necessity of placing the 
 Army under the command of an officer of experi- 
 ence and ability. Probably both these reasons had 
 some influence on the decision of the EngUsli 
 Government. 
 
 These preliminary remarks on the state of Ireland 
 under the administration of Lord Camden, were in- 
 dispensable to show the difficulties with which Sir 
 Ralph had to contend when he assumed the com- 
 
72 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1797. 
 
 mand of the Army in that country. It would have 
 been easy to have proved the sufferings of the people 
 and the disorganization of the Army, by extracts from 
 an overwhelming mass of evidence ; but enough has 
 been said to indicate with clearness the naturally 
 patient and submissive character of the people, the 
 progress and causes of disaffection, the subversion of 
 the civil authority, the abuse of military power, and 
 the consequent disorganization of the Army. The 
 difficulties inseparable from the command of the 
 Army in a country so distracted and misgoverned, 
 were greatly increased by the urgent necessity for 
 promptly restoring discipline and efficiency to troops 
 that might suddenly be called upon to meet an 
 enemy in the field. 
 
 Sir Ralph had passed much time in Ireland, and 
 he was too close an observer not to have studied the 
 character and investigated the social and political 
 condition of the people. He took great interest in 
 the fortunes and fate of Ireland, and he exj^ressed 
 his opinions without reserve. His estimate of the 
 people led him to appreciate justly the liveliness of 
 their parts, and the levity which exposed them to 
 the danger of being misguided by able and artful 
 demagogues ; but, while he knew their vices, and 
 the origin of them, he knew that there was in their 
 
1797. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 73 
 
 character mucli of generosity and warmth of feehng, 
 which made them acutely sensitive when they were 
 treated considerately and kindly. He. said they were 
 what the Government chose to make them, and to 
 this opinion he adhered after the close of his com- 
 mand in Ireland. He knew from experience that 
 the Irish made excellent soldiers when they were 
 well commanded, and it had been remarked that he 
 had very frequently intrusted the execution of criti- 
 cal service to regiments composed of Irishmen. His 
 judgment of the upper classes of society, and of the 
 purity and wisdom of the Government, was less 
 favourable. He saw that the gentry were imper- 
 fectly educated ; that they were devoted to the pur- 
 suits of pleasure and of political intrigue ; and that 
 they were ignorant or neglectful of the duties im- 
 posed on them as landlords, and as the friends and 
 protectors of those who depended on them for their 
 existence. He saw that the acts of the Government 
 and of the Legislature were not regulated by respect 
 for principle, which was the more to be lamented, 
 as they were not controlled by the influence of an 
 intelligent public opinion. Such were the opinions 
 which Sir Ralph had formed during his preceding 
 residence in Ireland, but he was quite prepared for 
 the change which had l^ecn cflectcd by the violence 
 
74 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1797. 
 
 of the Government, the license of the Aimy, the 
 seduction of the demagogues, and by the iiiitation 
 arising from the sufferings of the people. So much 
 was Sir Ralph under the influence of these conside- 
 rations, and of the difticulties which miijht arise 
 from a conflict between his own principles and those 
 on wliich the Government acted, that after his ap- 
 pointment, but before he left Loudon, he intimated 
 to Mr. Pitt through Mr. Dundas, that if his measures 
 were not approved he would willingly resign ; and 
 that if it sli(udd then be considered desirable to 
 unite the oftices of Lord-Lieutenant and Commander 
 of the Forces in the person of Lord Cornwallis, he 
 would he ready to serve under him. This was a 
 very sincere offer on the part of Sir Ral[>h, as he 
 had the highest esteem for Lord Cornwallis, with 
 whom he lived on ultimate terms, and he thought 
 that their united and cordial eflbrts might be the 
 means of restoring peace to Ireland. 
 
 In accepting the command in Ireland, under cir- 
 cumstances of so much difficulty, Sir Ralph felt 
 that his first and most pressing duty was to exer- 
 cise such control over the Army as would enable 
 him to restore discipline, and to prepare for a 
 struggle with the French if they should attempt 
 another invasion. A very short residence in Dub- 
 
1797. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 75 
 
 lin sufficed to convince him that an effort to re 
 store discipline and to correct abuses in the Army, 
 would be entirely thwarted by the powerful influ- 
 ence of the magistracy and gentry, and would be 
 feebly, if at all, supported by the Government. 
 
 Sir Ralph arrived in Dublin on one of the early 
 days of December 1797, and immediately proceeded 
 to make such arrangements as appeared to him to 
 be necessary for the defence of the country against 
 the attack of a foreign enemy, and to restore the 
 discipline of the Army. Efforts were very early 
 made to induce the Government to counteract or 
 resist the measures proposed by Sir Ralph for the 
 safety of the country, but by his firmness he over- 
 came them. The real struggle was with respect to 
 the control, the distribution, and the emplopnent 
 of the Army. Sii* Ralph wished and intended to 
 concentrate the troops in large bodies, so that dis- 
 cipline might be enforced, and that they might be 
 made fit to cope with the enemy in the field, and 
 that on those occasions when their aid was required 
 for the maintenance of domestic tranc[uillity they 
 should act as the supporters and under the autho- 
 rity of the civil power. On the other hand, the 
 magistrates and resident proprietors, who shrunk 
 from the performance of their own duty, were un- 
 
76 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1797. 
 
 ceasingly urging that the troops should at their 
 call be dispersed and scattered through the country 
 in small parties, under the pretence of securing 
 their personal safety, but really for the purpose of 
 enabling them to harass and oppress the people. 
 They were strenuously supported by the principal 
 advisers of the Lord-Lieutenant, which led to a 
 singular struggle, in which a military commander 
 wished to restrain the license of the troops, to pro- 
 tect the people, and to place the Army in subjection 
 to the constitutional control of the civil power ; 
 while the Government and the magistrates en- 
 couraged and promoted the licentiousness of the 
 troops, disregarded the authority of the law, and 
 licensed the oppression of the people. The views 
 and principles of the commander, who was the ad- 
 vocate of order, of justice, and of law, were enforced 
 by him as affording the best chance of avoiding a 
 rebelhon, which was the inevitable consequence of 
 the policy which finally prevailed. 
 
 The instructions which Sir Ealph issued very 
 shortly after his arrival in Dublin, to the general 
 officers under his command, place in the clearest 
 light the principles on which he was resolved to act. 
 These instructions state—" It is unnecessary to 
 point out to the general officers the urgent necessity 
 
1797. 
 
 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 77 
 
 of preparing for any emergency that may arise in 
 this country ; their own observations must have 
 convinced them that we may be called into the 
 field without any previous notice." 
 
 Detailed and important instructions are then 
 given for the improvement of discipline, the train- 
 ing and practice of the troops, and for the conduct 
 of the generals. " In this country," it is stated, " it 
 too frequently happens that the troops are called 
 upon in aid of the civil magistrates, to support the 
 peace of the country. Although on all occasions 
 they ought to behave with firmness, yet they must 
 not forget that they are only called upon to support 
 the laws of the land, and not to step beyond the 
 bounds of them. Any outrage or excess, therefore, 
 on their part is highly culpable, and they are strictly 
 enjoined to observe the greatest moderation and 
 the strictest discipline when they are called upon to 
 execute this part of their duty. Even in time of 
 actual war, amongst all civilized nations, it is con- 
 sidered as disgraceful and subversive of all disci- 
 pline, if soldiers are allowed to be licentious." 
 
 On the important point of internal defence, the 
 instructions are to this effect : — " The internal de- 
 fence of the country in its present circumstances, 
 will require the attention of the general officers. It 
 
78 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1797. 
 
 \vill be impossible to leave the well-disposed inhabi- 
 tants totally unprotected in case the troops are 
 withdrawn. They "svill therefore turn this matter 
 seriously in their minds, and make such arrange- 
 ments as this object may require. It is recom- 
 mended to the general officers, to have a confiden- 
 tial correspondence with the heads of the Yeomanry 
 corps in their dijQferent districts, on whom the inter- 
 nal tranquillity of the countiy must in a great mea- 
 sure depend. The general officers will give these 
 gentlemen such advice, instructions, and support as 
 the local situation of the country may require, to 
 enable them to preserve tranquillity, and to prevent 
 insurrections, or the excesses of the banditti which 
 may show themselves in any part of the country, 
 and which must happen, unless they will exert with 
 vigour and energy the means they have in their 
 power to prevent it. Should any insurrection arise 
 in the country requiring the interposition of the 
 troops, they are to be ordered to march in such 
 force as will be sufficient to quell it instantly, as it 
 is always attended with bad consequences, where 
 troops receive any check in the first instance." 
 
 These instructions indicate with distinctness the 
 view which Su- Ralph took of the trust which had 
 been confided to him, and the means l)y which he 
 
1797. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 79 
 
 proposed to perform it. From these principles lie 
 never swerved, and he preferred the resignation of 
 his important command to any concession which he 
 would have deemed inconsistent with his duty to 
 the public. While Sir Ralph had firmly resolved on 
 the course of conduct which it was his duty to fol- 
 low, he acted in a temperate and conciliatory spirit, 
 wisliing to carry with him the opinion and judg- 
 ment of those who were bound to yield obedience 
 to his authority. Writing on the 13 th of December 
 1797 to General Lake, who commanded in the 
 north, and who, as has been stated, had issued a 
 proclamation imder the authority of the Lord-Lieu- 
 tenant, superseding the Law and the Constitution, Sir 
 Ralph says, " The very dispersed state of the troops 
 in the northern district naturally attracted my atten- 
 tion. I know how difficult it is for the Govern- 
 ment of this country to resist the applications of 
 individuals for protection, and perhaps in some cases 
 they ought not to be resisted. I am convinced, how- 
 ever, of the absolute necessity of contra(iting to a 
 ceHain degree, the quarters of the troops under 
 your command. In their present state they are ex- 
 posed to be corrupted, to be disarmed and made 
 prisoners. AVhen wanted they cannot be easily f 
 assembled, and if called away suddenly, a general 
 
80 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1707. 
 
 dismay would take place in the country. You will 
 therefore take such measures for bringing the troops 
 more together, as you shall judge expedient." 
 
 When General Lake read this letter, he must have 
 seen that the system was changed, but he could not 
 fail to feel, that it had been aimounced to him witli 
 delicacy, and with due respect for the peculiar posi- 
 tion in which he was placed. 
 
 However highly Sir Ealj)h had estimated before- 
 hand the difficulties with which he should have to 
 contend in his command in Ireland, he speedily 
 found that they were more serious than he had an- 
 ticipated. When he arrived in Dubhn he naturally 
 fell into the society of the higher classes, and of 
 those who were closely connected with the Govern- 
 ment by official and other ties. Their conversation 
 betrayed such unrelenting hostility to the people, 
 f such an ardent desire for the most severe measures, 
 unrestrained by law and the authority of the civil 
 power, that Sir Ealpli was compelled to abandon all 
 mixed society, and to devote himself to the fu-m and 
 calm maintenance of that poUcy which his duty to 
 his country prescribed. It would be a mistake to 
 undervalue the importance of such conversation, for 
 it had been the great misfortune of Ireland, that it 
 had never l^een under the control of an intelligent 
 
1797. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 81 
 
 public opinion ; and the consequence had been, that 
 the tone of the higher classes of society in Dublin 
 had not only indicated the tendency, but had exer- 
 cised the most powerful influence over the policy 
 of the Government. 
 
 After a lapse of more than a quarter of the present 
 century, it happened that the writer of this Memoir 
 was asked by one of the most observing and sensible 
 statesmen who has filled the office of Chief Secretary 
 in Ireland, to give him the character of a lawyer, who 
 had been selected to occupy the high station of Lord 
 Chancellor. The request was complied with, and 
 afterwards he was told by the Secretary, that the 
 character given was in all respects just, except that 
 it omitted one of the greatest merits of the new Chan- 
 cellor, that he was proof against the flattery and se- 
 ductions of the aristocratic society, which misled 
 and corrupted all the Englishmen who were sent to 
 govern Ireland. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
 the views and opinions of Sir Ralph were as dis- 
 pleasing to the Government as to the aristocratic 
 class of society. 
 
 The interference of the Government, and the diffi- 
 culties thrown in his way, compeUed Sir Ralph to 
 address the following letter to Mr, Elliot, dated on 
 the 25th December, the month in which he arrived 
 in Dublin : — 
 
 F 
 
82 COMMAND TN IRELAND. 1797. 
 
 *' Mr. Pelham, before he went to England, desired 
 me to communicate with you in the same manner 
 as if he were present, and, from the confidential 
 situation in which you are placed, I naturally ad 
 dress myself to you on any occasion of moment. 
 When I was asked to take the command of the 
 Army in Ireland, I then stated the objections which 
 the nature of the Government of this country sug- 
 gested to my mind, and I then felt the dehcacy of 
 my situation. I was then assured by those with 
 whom I communicated, that I should labour under 
 no difficulty or restraint in my command, and, from 
 the conversations I held with those well acquainted 
 with, the government of Ireland, I had reason to 
 expect that in time of war the Army would be 
 totally under my command, the patronage of it ex- 
 cepted ; and I was taught to believe that my recom- 
 mendation of deserving officers would be sufficient 
 to entitle them to promotion. From the experience 
 I have had since my arrival in this country, and 
 from looking forward to future consequences, I find 
 it indispensable for the good of the King's service, 
 and to prevent any future embarrassments, that 
 there should be a free and explicit explanation on 
 this subject. A di Added command in the direction 
 of an Ai'my is perfectly incompatil>le with those 
 
1797. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 83 
 
 principles by which military affairs are guided. It 
 is, therefore, necessary that the Lord -Lieutenant 
 should take the sole command, and the senior officer 
 in Ireland act as his Lieutenant-General ; or that he 
 should delegate it to the Commander-in-Chief ap- 
 pointed by his Majesty. I can see no other alterna- 
 tive. If this line is not drawn, delays must for ever 
 arise from a divided command ; from a diffidence 
 proceeding from an undefined situation ; from the 
 interference of office, and the appeal of Boards from 
 the Commander-in-Chief to the Lord-Lieutenant. 
 In times such as the present, such obstructions to 
 the public service cannot be permitted to arise. 
 With the highest respect for the situation and char- 
 acter of his Excellency the Lord-Lieutenant, I re- 
 quest a clear decision on this point. I came here 
 from no motive of emolument, and I may say of 
 ambition, except that of being useful, as far as my 
 abilities went ; and it is my earnest wish not to quit 
 a station in which I have been placed. I trust to 
 receive through you such an explanation as will 
 settle this point." 
 
 This plain and explicit letter was met Ijy verljal 
 and unsatisfactory assurances, so that there was no 
 alternative but to persevere, and to wait until some 
 tangible and decisive event should arise. 
 
84 COMMAND IN TKELAND. 1797. 
 
 The Duke of York, the Commander-in-Chief of 
 the Army, who was warmly and most faithfully at- 
 tached to Sir Ralph, desired that he would commu- 
 nicate to him the opinion he formed of the condition 
 of the country and the Army, and would keep him 
 informed of all his material proceedings in Ireland. 
 In compliance with the Avish of the Duke of York, 
 Sir Ralph, on the 28 th December, addi^essed a, letter 
 to his Royal Highness, from which the following 
 and only material extracts are made : — 
 
 " The disturbances which have arisen in the south 
 are exactly similar to those which have always pre- 
 vailed in that part of the country, and they hold out 
 the old grievances of tithes and oppressive rents. 
 The country gentlemen and magistrates do not do 
 their duty ; they are timid and distrustful, and ruin 
 the troops by calhng on them upon every occasion 
 to execute the law, and to afford them personal 
 protection." 
 
 After giving details with respect to the com- 
 position and discipHne of the Army, Sir Ralph goes 
 on to state : — 
 
 "With an army composed of so various a de- 
 scription of troops, and in a country so unprepared 
 for war, it requii-es all the authority that the Lord- 
 Lieutenant can give me, to enable me to carry on 
 
1798. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 85 
 
 the King's service. I have no reason to say that 
 Lord Camden has refused me his support, hut the 
 difficulties and delays I experience will render my 
 situation irksome and my labour unavailing. I 
 have the honour to enclose a copy of a letter which 
 I have written on this subject, to which I have 
 only received general and verbal answers. I am 
 determined, however, to act with, firmness and 
 prudence, and to exercise that command over the 
 Army which the situation of this country and the 
 public welfare require." 
 
 In the month of January, vSir Ealph visited the 
 south of Ireland, and, on the 23 d, he \\Totc to Lord 
 Camden from Cork :— - 
 
 " I have the satisfaction to assure your Excellency 
 that, as far as my information goes, the country 
 through which I have passed is in a state of tran- 
 quillity. Of this I have had the fullest assurance 
 from every gentleman with whom I have conversed. 
 It would now ]^e very desirable if the troops could, 
 without alarming the gentlemen, be collected, and 
 their discipline restored, which suffers exceedingly 
 from their dispersed state. I am morally certain 
 that many of the regiments could not, at present, 
 take the field from their various wants, which 
 cannot be known or .sup[)lied till more Inxjught 
 
86 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 179S. 
 
 together. The yeomanry appear to advantage ; 
 they are well clothed and mounted, and express 
 great willingness and zeal. I am, however, nearly 
 convinced that to bring them together, and to 
 appoint officers to command them, must not be 
 attempted. They must be left at home, and ap- 
 pointed for the defence of the interior." 
 
 On the same day Sir Ralph wrote to Mr. 
 Pelliam : — 
 
 " The dispersed state of the troops is really 
 ruinous to the service. The best regiments in 
 Europe could not long stand such usage. The real 
 state of the country can alone determine the ne- 
 cessity for it. If I could be informed what number 
 of regiments in aid of the yeomamy would be 
 wanted in each pro\Tnce for the preservation of 
 the peace of the country, I would willingly abandon 
 a certain proportion for that peculiar purpose, pro- 
 vided the remainder were to be kept together, and 
 in a situation to move if a foreign enemy should 
 appear. I have found the cavalry, in general, unfit 
 for service, and more than one-half of the infantry 
 dispersed over the face of the country, in general 
 imdcr ofticers very little able to command them. 
 At Fermoy more than thi'ce-fom-ths of the light 
 infantry are ' on command.' " 
 
1798. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 87 
 
 During his visit to the south, Sir Ralph did not 
 fail to examine with care all the points at wliicli 
 the landing of the French might be expected, and 
 such preparations for defence as had been made 
 were found to be in a most defective condition. 
 The tranquillity of the south, as described by Sir 
 Ralph, in the first month of the year in which the 
 Rebellion broke out, is a striking fact. The temper 
 and earnestness with which he enforces the necessity 
 of concentrating the troops, in order that discipliiie 
 may be restored and an army formed, capable of 
 opposing a foreign foe, who might at any moment 
 appear, ought to have engaged the serious atten- 
 tion and to have secured the cordial support of 
 Government. 
 
 It is to be observed that Sir Ralph, in his com- 
 munications with Government, speaks in general 
 terms of the relaxed discipline of the Army, and 
 abstains from all allusion to the excesses committed 
 by the troops, when they were called out, to calm 
 the , fears, or gratify the resentment of a timid and 
 jealous magistracy. Assuredly this did not proceed 
 from indifference to the cruelty and injurious con 
 sequences of such conduct, but from his honest 
 desire to counteract the evil, by leadmg the Govern- 
 ment to consent to the concentration of the troops, 
 
88 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1798. 
 
 and to the use of the civil power, aided, when 
 necessary, by the yeomanry, as the means of pre- 
 serving internal peace. The exclusive object of Sir 
 Ealph was to obtain such control over the Army 
 as would enable him to make it efficient for the 
 defence of the country, and he therefore carefully 
 abstained, as far as ]3ossible, from criticism on the 
 past, and shunned whatever could give countenance 
 to the suspicion that he was acting from party or 
 political bias. 
 
 When the principles on which he was acting 
 came to be understood, he received overtures of 
 support from persons of influence and character, 
 who approved of his course ; but he courteously 
 rejected them, as inconsistent with the position 
 which he had taken, and with his resolution to rest 
 his character on the purity of his purpose and the 
 soundness of his views. The principles on which 
 Sir Ralph was resolved to act in the performance of 
 his duty to the public, in a season of difficulty and 
 danger, having been, distinctly and unreservedly 
 communicated to the Government, he was fully 
 justified in expecting either to have received cordial 
 sup23ort, or to have been frankly told that his views 
 were inconsistent with those of the advisers of the 
 Lord-Lie uk'iiant, and that they could not be sane- 
 
1798. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 89 
 
 tionecl. So for from this being the case, the course 
 pursued by Lord Camden was as embarrassing to 
 Sir Ralph as it was unfortunate for his own char- 
 acter, and the welfare of the country which he 
 governed. In their personal intercourse. Lord Cam- 
 den was not only courteous but kind, and when Sir 
 Ralph reasoned with him, his judgment seemed to 
 be convinced, and at the close of then* conversations 
 he repeatedly said, " Now I must go to my friends 
 and hear very diiferent op>inions." Lord Camden 
 was, in truth, the victim of the passions and vio- 
 lence of his advisers ; he had good intentions, but 
 was of infirm purpose, and did not possess the cour- 
 age to assert or even to assist what he felt to he, 
 right. Sir Ralph was touched by his amiable cjuaH- 
 ties, and by liis personal kindness, but he could not 
 respect Lord Camden as a public man ; he felt for 
 him, as holding a position to which he was unequal, 
 and re2;arded his errors and faults rather with com- 
 passion than with resentment. From the aristo- 
 cratic and Protestant ohgarchy, who were the real 
 rulers of the country, Sir Ralph met with no mercy. 
 All his acts were grossly misrepresented, the most 
 Ijitter abuse was heaped upon him, and his conduct 
 was attributed to the falsest motives. The patriotic 
 Lord C'harlemont, writing to his friend Dr. Haliday, 
 
90 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1 798. 
 
 in the month of February, warmly commends the 
 conduct of Sir Ralph, who, he says, " has acted with 
 the strictest propriety in his most difficult situation, 
 and has the happiness of being cordially disliked 
 and abused." 
 
 Such a state of affairs was not calculated for long 
 endurance. It would be tedious and useless to give 
 the details of the many instances in which the 
 measures of Sir Ralph were interfered with or 
 thwarted. One or two cases may be selected to 
 show the steadiness with which he endeavoured to 
 restore the ascendency of the civil authority, and to 
 restrain the excesses of the Army. In ^vriting to 
 Mr, Secretary Pelliam, on the case of a serjeant of 
 a Fencible regiment who had been mmxlered by 
 the people, a crime wliich was followed by great 
 excesses on the part of the troops, Sir Ralph says — 
 " It is much to be regretted that the civil magis- 
 trate has not hitherto discovered the murderer of 
 the Serjeant, and I still more lament that no evi- 
 dence has been brought forward sufficient to con- 
 vict the authors of the notorious acts of violence 
 which have been, in some measure, the consequence 
 of the murder. It is to he hoped, Sir, that the 
 magistrates of the county of Kildare will be in- 
 structed to prosecute still farther the investigation 
 
1798. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 91 
 
 of this business. Although they may not discover 
 the murderer of the serjeant, they cannot fail to 
 discover the soldiers who first set fire to the houses, 
 and committed several acts of violence at noonday, 
 and in face of all the inhabitants of Newbridge. 
 The soldiers are all at Kildare, and every assistance 
 shall be afforded in the farther prosecution of the 
 inquiry. The future discipline of the Army may 
 depend on the conduct observed in tliis affair. If 
 the civil power should decHne taking any farther 
 steps, it must be taken up in a different point of 
 view." This letter supplies the strongest practical 
 proof of the soundness and sufficiency of the means 
 by which Sii' Ralph proposed to restore the disci- 
 pline of the Army, to re-estabhsh the ascendency of 
 the civil power, and to protect the people from the 
 licentious excesses of the troops. 
 
 In writing to General Jolmstone, who commanded 
 at Fermoy, Sir Ralph says :-— " I regret the death of 
 Mr. St. George and Mr. Uniacke ; your exertions in 
 assisting the civil magistrate in apprehendmg the 
 perpetrators of a horrid murder are highly com 
 mendable, and promise to be the means of eventu- 
 ally bringing them to public justice. I have always 
 wished that the law should he supported liy the 
 troops when called on pioperly, Ijut I have as strongly 
 
 \ r-' 
 
92 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1798. 
 
 wished that they should not take any part that was 
 not strictly legal, because when we once depart from 
 that rule we subject ourselves to much inconveni- 
 ence. I hope the magistrates have not put their 
 intention of burning houses in force. I hope the 
 soldiers have taken no part in it." 
 
 Sir Ealpli again develops his views in a letter 
 which he addi'essed to the Duke of York on the 1 7th 
 February, after his tour in the south : — " I can say 
 with satisfaction that in the country through which 
 I passed, I found the people quiet. That dissatis- 
 faction and disaffection prevail cannot be doubted or 
 denied ; it requires a watchful eye to preserve the in- 
 ternal tranquillity of this country. It is very unfor- 
 tunate that the upper orders of men have fallen, in 
 general,, into a state of despondency, and seem to 
 have given up the cause. To rouse them, and to 
 call forth their exertions, ought to be the great ob- 
 ject of the Government. On tliis principle, I have 
 endeavoured as far as possible to resist the interfer- 
 ence of the troops in all matters where the civil 
 magistrate ought alone to have interfered. I clearly 
 saw that the discipline of the troops would be com- 
 pletely ruined, and that they would be led into a 
 thousand irregularities contrary to law, which would 
 bring disgrace upon themselves, and in which they 
 
1798. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 93 
 
 ought not to be supported by the Government of 
 the country. I flatter myself that the efiect of this 
 will be to force the gentlemen to exert themselves, 
 and to trust to the yeomanry, on whom they must 
 ultimately rely for their internal security in case 
 the troops should be called to act against a foreign 
 enemy. On no occasion, however, which has been 
 really urgent, have I objected to the troops being 
 employed, guarding them at the same time against 
 any excess in the execution of their duty," 
 
 These extracts, which might be greatly multiplied, 
 sufficiently confirm the assertion by which they have 
 been preceded, that throughout the struggle between 
 Lord Camden's advisers and Sir Ealph, the com- 
 mander of the Army was the steady and consistent 
 vindicator of the authority of the civil power, and 
 the protector of the people, while the Government 
 were the zealous and successful advocates of mili- 
 tary rule, and of the uncontrolled license of the 
 troops. 
 
 On the 26 th of February, Sir Ealph issued the fol- 
 lowing celebrated order : — " The very disgraceful fre- 
 quency of courts-martial, and the many complaints 
 of irregularities in the conduct of the troops in this 
 kingdom, having too unfortunately proved the Army 
 to be in a state of licentiousness which must render 
 
94 COMMAND IN IRELAND, 1798. 
 
 ^ it formidable to every one but the enemy, the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief thinks it necessary to demand from 
 all Generals commanding districts and brigades, as 
 well as commanding officers of regiments, that they 
 exert for themselves, and compel from all officers 
 under their command, the strictest and most unre- 
 mitting attention to the discipline, good order, and 
 conduct of their men, such as may restore the high 
 and distinguished reputation which the British 
 troops have been accustomed to enjoy in every part 
 of the world. It becomes necessary to recur, and 
 most pointedly to attend to the standing orders of 
 the kingdom, which, at the same time that they 
 direct military assistance to be given at the requi- 
 sition of the ci^dl magistrate, positively forljid the 
 troops to act (but in case of attack) without his 
 presence and authority, and the most clear and 
 positive orders are to be given to the officers com- 
 manding the party for this purpose." 
 
 That Sir Ralph was fully justified in believing 
 himself authorized to announce the principles on 
 which he was resolved to control and regulate the 
 conduct of the Army, is apparent from a letter 
 which Lord Camden addressed to the Duke of 
 Portland, two days before the order was issued. 
 After some remarks on Sir Ralph's report as to 
 
1798, COMMAND IN IRELAND. 95 
 
 the military defence of the south, the Lord-Lieu- 
 tenant proceeds > — 
 
 " But your Grace is not to imagine, that Sir 
 Kalph Abercromby has failed to turn his mind to 
 the internal defence of the country. He has con- 
 sidered it, as he does every subject which occurs to 
 him, gravely and deeply, and I have had frequent 
 conversations with him upon it. He is impressed, 
 as every man who resides in this country must he, 
 with the extent and danger of that conspiracy which 
 exists, and of the necessity of watching and attend- 
 ing to it most closely. He is, at the same time, 
 much impressed with the necessity of drawing the 
 Army into larger bodies, with a view^ to resist in- 
 vasion ; and he is of opinion that steps should be 
 taken for that purpose, and to give opportunity to 
 the gentlemen of the country to feel their own 
 strength, to ascertain the capacity of their own 
 exertions, and the credit w^hich ought to be given 
 to the services of the Yeomanry corps. I so j9e7'- 
 fectly agree with Sir Kalph in the propriety of this 
 measure, that I lost no time in communicating with 
 several gentlemen connected with various parts of 
 the country, who feel the justice of his remarks, 
 and are so much inclined to adopt some of the sug- 
 gestions he has made, that I propose very speedily 
 
96 COMMAND IN IRELAND, 179a 
 
 to make some arrangements which will disengage 
 the army from part of the duty that is now imposed 
 upon them in various parts of the kingdom. I am 
 desirous to take this opportunity of expressing the 
 very high satisfaction I have received from his 
 Majesty's gracious compliance vnth. my representa- 
 tions in appointing a Commander-in-Chief of Sir 
 Ralph Abercromby's experience, and I am convinced 
 the selection of this very able officer will be of the 
 most essential advantage to his Majesty's service, as 
 in his instance, the greatest military experience is 
 combined with remarkably good sense and know- 
 ledge of the world." 
 
 This letter proves how clearly Lord Camden un- 
 derstood the principles on which Sir Ealph was re- 
 solved to act, and how perfectly he agreed in their 
 propriety and wisdom. There cannot be a doubt, 
 that if Lord Camden had adhered to the opinions 
 expressed in this letter, he would have been cordially 
 supported by the Enghsh Government. Unfortu- 
 nately for his own fame and the peace of L'eland, 
 he displayed neither the courage nor the virtue to 
 act on the principles in which he agreed, or to resist 
 the importunity and violence of liis intemperate and 
 reckless advisers. All discussion of Irish policy has 
 here been avoided, except in so far as it was neces- 
 
1798. COMMAND IN lEELAND. 97 
 
 sary to illustrate the personal conduct of Sir Ralph, 
 but it is impossible not to feel, that if Lord Camden 
 had steadily adhered to, and acted upon the view 
 which he had imbibed from the Commander-in-Chief, 
 there was still a reasonable chance that the rebellion 
 might have been prevented. 
 
 After issuing the order of the 26th February, Sir 
 Ralph went to inspect the Army in the north. The 
 advisers of Lord Camden were alarmed and exas- 
 perated by the firm and judicious conduct of Sir 
 Ralph, which they felt was beginning to make a 
 serious impression, and they availed themselves of 
 his absence to weaken his influence with the Lord- 
 Lieutenant, and to instn into the minds of the 
 militia officers, that the statements contained in the 
 order were an insult to the character of their corps. 
 It also happened, that at this time. Lord Moira 
 took his seat in the Lisli House of Lords, and made 
 a motion, in which he described the distracted state 
 of the country, and in which, as of necessity, he 
 dwelt on the excesses committed by the troops. 
 The enemies of Sir Ralph seized upon this event, 
 and as unscrupulously as falsely, asserted that his 
 conduct was prompted by a desire to promote a 
 political intrigue, and that he was acting in concert 
 mth Lord Moira. On his return from the north 
 
98 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1798. 
 
 Sir Ralph found the stonii thus raised violently 
 raging, and he wrote to Coh^nel Brownrigg, then 
 Secretary to the Duke of York, that the Lord-Lieu- 
 tenant had candidly imparted to him, that his order 
 of the 26 th February had been taken up as a poli- 
 tical manoeuvi-e in conjunction with Lord Moira, 
 and he then adds : " Lord Moira is but little known 
 to me, his politics have certainly never allured me, 
 and the profession of a politician I have never fol- 
 lowed. Independence has always had too powerful 
 an attraction to allow me to engage with any set of 
 men. I came here determined not to regard trifling 
 inconveniences, and to struggle with more serious 
 difficulties, but if I am to have a poweiful host to 
 contend with, I do not see how I am to keep my 
 ground." 
 
 Ha^dng thus prepared the Duke of York for the 
 resignation of his command. Sir Ralph waited on 
 the Lord-Lieutenant, and presented to him the fol- 
 lowing letter : " Understanding from your Excel- 
 lency's communication yesterday that the orders 
 issued on the 26th of February last had been con- 
 strued as a political manoeuvre, permit me to lay 
 before your Excellency, with candour and truth, 
 what has passed in my mind and influenced my 
 conduct since I took the command of his Majesty's 
 
1798. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 99 
 
 troops in this kingdom. I have lamented the gene- 
 ral alienation of the minds of the people from the 
 Government. I have regretted the supineness and 
 the despondency of individuals, and I have seen, with 
 anxious concern, the loose texture of the Irish army, 
 and their relaxed discipline. Under these circum- 
 stances, it did not become me to remain neuter or 
 inactive. It has been my study to acquire some 
 knowledge of the country. Several important mili- 
 tary arrangements have been recommended and 
 carried into execution. I have personally, as well 
 as by orders which I have issued, endeavoured to 
 correct abuses, and to support a stricter discipline ; 
 and I have, as far as became me, stimulated the 
 exertions of the country, by pointing out the neces- 
 sity of calling out part of the Yeomanry in case the 
 troops should be called away to face a foreign 
 enemy ; and I have procured arms to be sent to 
 the different parts of the kingdom, to be put into 
 the hands of the well-affected in case of necessity. 
 The orders of the 26 th February were issued ex- 
 pressly for this purpose, and the whole spirit and 
 tenor of them tend to that end. I acknowledge 
 that I did not consider the proclamation of the 1 8 th 
 May last as then in force ; at the same time, I am 
 clearly of opinion that the interpretation and execu- 
 
100 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1798. 
 
 tion of it could not have been left to officers of all 
 descriptions without great inconvenience, and even 
 danger. 
 
 " I beg leave to assure your Excellency that I 
 never was a political man ; that I have no political 
 connexion with the noble Lord who was lately in 
 this kingdom, and but a very slight personal one. 
 Previously to my coming to Ireland, I had no com- 
 munication mth any of his Majesty's Ministers on 
 the state of the country. After my appointment, I 
 communicated to Mr. Pitt, through Mr. Dundas, 
 that if I did not meet the public mind, I should 
 most ^\illingly resign, or serve under a superior 
 officer Avith whom I knew that I could act. I now 
 renew to your Excellency what I then expressed, 
 being perfectly convinced of the necessity of it, be- 
 cause, if I do not possess the confidence of those 
 with whom your Excellency advises, I must impede 
 the operations of your Government." 
 
 Lord Camden was thus driven to make his elec- 
 tion between the firm, humane, and constitutional 
 policy of Sir Ealph, in which he had expressed his 
 agreement in his letter to the Duke of Portland, and 
 the advice of those who did not scruple to avow 
 their anxious wish that the people should be forced 
 into a rebellion, from the suppression of which they 
 
1798. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 101 
 
 anticipated a gratifying triumph. Lord Camden 
 took the course which was consistent with the in- 
 firmity of his character ; he wished to retain Sir 
 Ralph, but he had not the manliness to give him 
 that support which was essential to the maintenance 
 of his authority and his system. 
 
 After the delay of a week, Lord Camden replied 
 to Sir Ralph's letter. The Lord-Lieutenant cordially 
 absolved Sir Ralph from the imputation of having 
 participated in a political manoeuvre, and expressed 
 his agreement with most of the important parts of 
 Sir Ralph's letter, but he adds : " At the same time, 
 you have had the candour to acknowledge that you 
 did not consider the proclamation of the 18th May 
 as then in force. There is no doubt that until such 
 a proclamation is recalled, or until the state of the 
 country is so altered that it is a dead letter, the 
 proclamation exists. Under that proclamation, the 
 military received orders to act without waiting for 
 the civil magistrate. A responsibility is thrown 
 upon the Army, which is unpleasant to him who 
 commands it, and upon the officer who may be 
 caUed upon to exert himself individually ; and al- 
 though I may lament the necessity, that necessity 
 exists, and since it does exist, it appears to me that 
 the proclamation must be acted upon. I therefore 
 
102 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1798. 
 
 look with confidence to some explanation of that 
 part of your orders which you issued under the im- 
 pression that the proclamation was not in force, to 
 determine whether it will be most agreeable to you 
 to make such alteration yourself, or whether you 
 would be desirous to receive an intimation to that 
 effect from me." 
 
 Lord Camden then assures Sir Ealph that he 
 does possess the confidence of those with whom he 
 advises, and also of the English Government, who 
 are impressed with the incalculable evils, both in a 
 mihtary and a political view, which would follow 
 from his resignation. The delay which took place 
 in replying to Sir Ralph's letter, in which he had 
 intimated the necessity of his resigning his situation, 
 is easdy accounted for by the straggle which must 
 have arisen in the mind of Lord Camden in deciding 
 between the approval of the policy of Sir Ralph, 
 which he had expressed to the Duke of Portland, 
 and the advice of those with whom he consulted. 
 
 The advisers of Lord Camden had prevailed, and 
 the difference between him and Sir Ralph had now 
 assumed a distinct and decisive shape. Lord Cam- 
 den insisted that the troops should be authorized to 
 act without the intervention of the civil power, and 
 that the proclamation of the 18th May, authorizing 
 
1798. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 103 
 
 them so to act, should be enforced. Sir Ralph, on 
 the contrary, contended that the interpretation of 
 the proclamation could not be left to officers with- 
 out great inconvenience and danger, without ruin- 
 ing the discipline of the Army, and without leading 
 to excesses oppressive to the people. 
 
 Sir Ralph did not hesitate for a moment as to 
 the course which it was his duty to pursue. On 
 the same day on which Lord Camden's reply reached 
 him, he wrote to Mr, Secretary Dundas, to acquaint 
 him, that the breach l^etween him and the advisers 
 of the Lord-Lieutenant made it impossible that he 
 should retain his command ; and he expresses an 
 earnest wish that his removal might be so ordered 
 as to give the least possible interruption to the mili- 
 tary business in so distracted a country, and the 
 least handle for speculation. Sir Ralph, justly ap- 
 preciating the influence which had directed the con- 
 duct of the Lord -Lieutenant, thus expresses himself 
 in his reply to Lord Camden — " I am sensible, my 
 Lord, that there never was a time when private 
 concerns or private opinions ought less to influence 
 all who are in the service of the pubHc ; yet, my 
 Lord, there is one point on which no man who is 
 fit for public employment can be indiflerent. No 
 man can be indiflerent to his own character. He 
 
104 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1798. 
 
 cannot trust it in the hands of those who have en- 
 deavoured to deprive him of it. Were I to remain 
 under your Excellency's orders, I should feel diffi- 
 dence and distrust from the experience which I 
 have had of the past conduct of those with whom 
 your Excellency advises, which would render me 
 very unfit for the command in such a time as the 
 present. I, therefore, entreat you will be pleased to 
 move his Majesty graciously to permit me to resign 
 my situation, in which I cannot be continued with 
 advantage to his service," 
 
 Lord Camden made another effort to retain Sir 
 Ealph, and offered to act as a mediator, and to re- 
 move the impressions which his conduct had made 
 on others. To this offer Sir Ealph replied on the 
 2 7th March : — " I cannot admit that any part of 
 my conduct requires any interposition to give a 
 favourable construction to it, or to remove any im- 
 pressions which that conduct has occasioned. While 
 your goodness in these, particulars is an additional 
 motive for gratitude, it is likewise a proof that it 
 would be improper in me to remain in a situation 
 in which my conduct could only be supported by 
 your personal authority, and not by the opinion of 
 those around you." 
 
 In the meanwhile, the English Government were 
 
1798. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 105 
 
 not inactive. Mr. Dundas, in his own name, and in 
 that of his colleagues, urged Sir Ralph to make every 
 possible concession, so that he might retain a com- 
 mand in which his services were so lughly valued by 
 them. Mr. Dundas also transmitted to Sir Ralph 
 copies of the correspondence between Lord Camden 
 and the Duke of Portland, in wliich Lord Camden 
 expressed, in the warmest manner, his confidence in 
 Sir Ralph ; and the Duke of Portland stated, that 
 there had never existed in England the remotest 
 suspicion that Sir Ralph's conduct had been in- 
 fluenced by political motives ; that all his colleagues, 
 as well as the kingdom at large, did justice to the 
 correctness of his manner of tliinking, and to the 
 uprightness of his conduct ; and therefore he ex- 
 pressed an anxious hope that his discernment and 
 his devotion to the pubHc service, for which he had 
 always been so eminently conspicuous, would induce 
 him to continue in a situation which it was so ne- 
 cessary that he should retain. The only objection 
 that ever was made in England to Sir Ralph's order 
 was one which was not unnatural in those who 
 were engaged in political warfare. They felt that 
 the authoritative admission of the bad discipline and 
 excesses of the Army gave an advantage to their 
 opponents, and they felt this the more because they 
 
106 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1798. 
 
 were convinced that it was true. If Sir Ralph had 
 been supported, the scale would have been turned in 
 favour of the Government, for the evil which was 
 justly complained of would have been effectually 
 redressed. 
 
 Sir Ralph w^as too well acquainted with the tem- 
 per, the character, and the conduct of Lord Camden's 
 ad^dsers, to be moved by the flattering soKcitations 
 of the Duke of Portland and his colleagues. 
 
 Sir Ralph's final resolution was intimated in the 
 following letter which he \\Tote to Mr. Dundas on 
 the 24th of March :— 
 
 " I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of 
 your letters of the 18th and 20th March, with theii- 
 enclosures. I trust that my letter of the 2 2d, which 
 I WTote previous to the receipt of either of yours, 
 will carry so much weight with it that you "uill be- 
 lieve that I am not actuated either by resentment or 
 by caprice. I feel the most perfect conviction that 
 the principal members of Lord Camden's cabinet 
 have lost their confidence, if they ever had any, in 
 me ; that they did, during my absence, attempt my 
 ruin by their machinations here and in England, is 
 a matter beyond all doubt. It is perfectly impos- 
 sible for me to act with them in future but with 
 the greatest distrust, which, in these difficult times, 
 
1798. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 107 
 
 must cramp every endeavour of mine to render any- 
 essential service, were I to remain here. I think 
 you, who have long known me, will believe me 
 when I assure you that I am no politician ; and as 
 to the particular construction put on my order, it 
 was so unfounded, that when I gave that order I 
 never had read either Lord Moira's speech or that 
 of the Lord Chancellor ; that I mentioned to Lord 
 Camden my disapprobation of the mode of employ- 
 ing soldiers in this country, that I have told Mr. 
 Pelham that the best troops in Europe would not 
 stand such usage, are undoubted facts. The abuses 
 and the insubordination of the Irish army called for 
 the most strenuous exertions on my part, and the 
 most positive orders. If I were to enter into any 
 detail upon this subject, I think I could convince 
 you, or any candid person, of the necessity of the 
 steps I have taken, since I came to this country, to 
 reform the Army, on which the salvation of this 
 country must principally depend. I have nothing 
 to charge my conscience with, and whatever is the 
 consequence I cannot abate one single fact or senti- 
 ment I have now the honour of expressing to you." 
 
 The motives which governed the conduct of Sir 
 Ralph on this important occasion, are very fully 
 stated in the following letter which he addressed to 
 
108 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1798. 
 
 his eldest son, for the information of his father, then 
 in the ninety-fourth year of his age : — 
 
 " It is natural to suppose that my father should 
 be anxious to know the true reason of my resigna- 
 tion. Be so good as to tell him in a few words, that 
 the struggle has been, in the first place, whether I 
 was to have the command of the Army really or 
 nominally, and then whether the character and dis- 
 cipline of it were to be degraded and mined in the 
 mode of using it, either from the facility of one man, 
 or from the violence and oppression of a set of men, 
 who have for more than twelve months employed it 
 in measures which they durst not avow or sanction. 
 Lord Camden, in weakly yielding these points, has 
 betrayed the situation of the Commander-in-Chief ; 
 has thrown the Army into the hands of a faction ; 
 has made it a tool under their direction ; and has, 
 I think, overset himself; for, although the British 
 Government has prejudged me, they cannot but see 
 the weakness and folly of all that has been done 
 here. Within these twelve months, every crime, 
 every cruelty that could be committed by Cossacks i 
 
 or Calmucks, has been transacted here. 
 
 "The words of the order of the 26th Februaiy 
 were strong, the cu'cumstances required it ; it has 
 not abated the commission of enormities, and I will 
 
1798, COMMAND IN IRELAND. 109 
 
 venture to predict that when the moment for call- 
 ing forth the Irish Army arrives, one-half of it will 
 dissolve in a month. The proclamation, in the face 
 of wliich the order alluded to was said to be, is 
 given up both here and in England, and it is un- 
 necessary to say anything on the subject. Within 
 less than two months since the issuing of my orders, 
 a private man has thrown a chair at the colonel of 
 his regunent, when sent for to be reprimanded. 
 Houses have been burned, men murdered, others 
 half hanged ; a young lady has been carried off by 
 a detachment of dragoons, and in the room where 
 she was an officer was shot through the thigh, and 
 a blunderbuss snapped at another gentleman's head. 
 These are but a few of the enormities which have 
 disgraced us of late ; were the whole to be collected, 
 what a picture would it present ! 
 
 "Such a degree of insubordination has been 
 allowed, that the general officers write directly to 
 the Castle, overlooking every decency and order. 
 Almost all of those who were here before me have a 
 plot or a conspiracy which they cherish, and which 
 is the subject of their correspondence and conse- 
 quence ; and instead of attending to their duty, 
 and to the discipline of their troops, they are either 
 acting as politicians, or as justices of the peace, a 
 
110 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1798. 
 
 situation which most of them have soHcited. In 
 short, I feel the greatest satisfaction in quitting a 
 country where I have been betrayed. Of this I am 
 certain, that there must be some change, otherwise 
 the country will be lost. The late ridiculous farce 
 acted by Lord Camden and liis cabinet must strike 
 every one. They have declared the kingdom in 
 rebeUion, when the orders of his Excellency might 
 be carried over the whole kingdom by an orderly 
 dragoon, or a writ executed without any difficulty, 
 a few places in the mountains excepted. Lord 
 Camden is a most virtuous man, and as far as per- 
 sonal civility goes, I am much indelrted to him. 
 
 " Dublin Castle, April 23, 1798." 
 
 The reference in Sir Ralph's letters to the efforts 
 that had been made to ruin his character in Ire- 
 land and England is illustrated by the foUow- 
 insf facts : — The advisers of Lord Camden took 
 advantage of Sir Ralph's absence from Dublin to 
 hold a meeting in the Speaker's room, at which 
 they dehberately discussed and considered whether, 
 with the greatest prospect of success, they could 
 induce the House of Commons to pass a resolution 
 that Sir Ralph had, by liis conduct, proved himself 
 to be an enemy to his country, or whether they 
 should proceed at once by impeachment. The 
 
1798. COMMAND IN IRELAND. Ill 
 
 decision was in favour of the former course of pro- 
 ceeding. 
 
 A gentleman of family and fortune, who had 
 formerly served in the same regiment with Sir 
 Ealph, became acquainted mth what was passing, 
 and he forced himself into the room of Mr. Pelham, 
 who was sick in bed, and communicated the fact to 
 him. Mr. Pelham at once took such measures as 
 effectually crushed the plot. The same advisers of 
 the Lord-Lieutenant also induced a nobleman of 
 high rank and great influence, to go to England for 
 the purpose of impressing all those to whom he had 
 access with the impolitic and dangerous course 
 which Sir Kalph was pursuing. These facts, which 
 were certain, were sufficient to justify the strong 
 expressions of Sir Ealph, but they did not stand 
 alone. 
 
 It is proper to insert the letter which Sir Ralph 
 addressed to the Duke of York on liis resignation, 
 as it shows how carefully he abstained from saying 
 anything that could create a prejudice against in- 
 dividuals, and how anxiously he limited his obser- 
 vations to the vindication of his own personal 
 conduct. On the 27th of March, Sir Ralph writes 
 to the Duke of York : — " Finding that my remain- 
 ing in the command in this country can no longer 
 
112 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1798. 
 
 be of any advantage to his Majesty's service, I 
 have applied to the Lord-Lieutenant to move his 
 Majesty that I may be permitted to resign my pre- 
 sent situation. I feel the fullest conviction that 
 every act of mine since I came to Ireland has pro- 
 ceeded from the most earnest regard for the good of 
 his Majesty's service, that my whole attention has 
 been directed to the care of the Army, and that I 
 have not only avoided all personal connexion with 
 political men, but every interference \vith their 
 politics. I shall hope for an opportunity of con- 
 vincing your Royal Highness and his Majesty that 
 the construction put on my conduct is most unjust." 
 
 The follo^^ing letter from Sir Ralph to the Avriter 
 of this Memoir, and dated March 23, gives a more 
 detailed account of the movement against him, 
 which was conducted by the Speaker, Mr. Foster. 
 
 " You know the reluctance I had in accepting 
 the command in this country ; it was in obedience 
 to the King's pleasure ; and having accepted it, 
 neither inconvenience nor serious difficulties would 
 have induced me to quit it at this time. Since my 
 arrival I have been under the necessity of support- 
 ing myself by great exertions and strong representa- 
 tions, otherwise I should have been a mere cipher, 
 or what is worse, a tool in the hands of a party who 
 
1798. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 113 
 
 govern this country. Their dislike to me has of 
 course been visible, and in my absence they took 
 the opportunity of attempting to crush me. The 
 Speaker at the head of a junto met in his chamber, 
 canvassed and censured my order, and, interfering 
 in a matter which did not belong to them, sent a 
 deputation to Mr. Pelham to convey to him their 
 opinion, and their determination to bring it before 
 Parliament. This was only part of their plan ; they 
 wrote the most furious representations against me 
 to the Duke of Portland, and to others of high rank 
 in England. 
 
 " This mode of proceeding was so precipitate and 
 so hostile, that there can be no doubt of their inten- 
 tion to ruin me. After this there can be no mutual 
 confidence. In times so difficult, it is next to im- 
 possible to separate the civil and military business 
 of the country, and with all the wisdom, all the 
 vigour that can be shown, it is impossible for any 
 General to answer for success. Should, therefore, 
 any one thing go wrong, I could expect nothing 
 but the fullest effects of their resentment. I am 
 not easily alarmed, but I cannot help feeling my 
 situation, which, however, would not alone deter- 
 mine me, if I did not see that my remaining here 
 would impede the King's service. 
 
 H 
 
114 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 179S. 
 
 " Thus the matter stands. Now for the order. 
 
 " The abuses of all kinds I found here can scarcely 
 be believed or enumerated. I tried various means 
 with Httle success ; it was necessary to speak out ; 
 the order is strong, but be assured it was necessaiy. 
 The way in which the troops have been employed, 
 would ruin the best in Europe. Here are 35,000 
 Yeomanry, raised for the express purpose of protect- 
 ing the countiy. To them I have urged the neces- 
 sity of applying for assistance, but in vain. I there- 
 fore restricted the troops to the standing orders of 
 the kingdom, that their discipHne might be pm^sued 
 if possible, and that the gentlemen might be obliged 
 to trust to the Yeomaniy, on whom they must ulti- 
 mately depend, in case the troops should be called 
 away to oppose a foreign enemy." 
 
 From this time. Sir Ealph considered himself as 
 only holding his command until the arrival of his 
 successor, and as being absolved from all serious re- 
 sponsibility, by acting only under the orders of the 
 Lord-Lieutenant. To remove all doubt as to the 
 exact position in which he stood, and to \dndicate 
 his o^Aii consistency and character. Sir Ralph ad- 
 dressed the following note to all the general officers 
 commanding districts in Ireland : " I think it is an 
 attention due to myself to inform you, that I expect 
 
 I 
 
]793. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 115 
 
 soon to be relieved in the command of his Majesty's 
 troops in this kingdom." 
 
 The impression made by the conduct of Sir 
 Ealph was such, that his enemies were restrained 
 from exulting in their victory, by the consciousness 
 that his resignation would be regarded by very 
 many as a public misfortune. Notwithstanding 
 the unjust treatment which Sir Ralph had experi- 
 enced from the advisers of Lord Camden, he neither 
 yielded to resentment, nor relaxed in such efforts as, 
 under his circumstances, he could properly make, 
 for the maintenance of discipline in the Army, or 
 for the safety of the country. In his communica- 
 tions with the general officers, he did not fail to ad- 
 monish them most earnestly to exercise the great 
 powers which were intrusted to them by the Lord- 
 Lieutenant's proclamation now to be enforced, with 
 the greatest lenity, and to be cautious in exceeding 
 the limits of the law. Deeply impressed with the 
 inefficiency and disorganization of the Irish Army, 
 and with the imminent probability of foreign inva- 
 sion. Sir Ralph urgently pressed Lord Camden to 
 apply for an additional force of disciplined troops, 
 which must be drawn from England, as any attempt 
 to raise them in Ireland would only be adding to 
 the danger. 
 
116 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 179S. 
 
 The unabated kindness, and the amiable qualities 
 displayed by Lord Camden throughout these trans- 
 actions, induced Sir Ralj)h to make a great sacrifice 
 to aid him in the perplexities in which he was in- 
 volved by the weakness of his character. In a letter 
 to Mr. Dundas, Sir Ralph says, " If the virtuous 
 character of any man could interest me, as I am 
 now situated, it is that of Lord Camden ; and I hope 
 you will think so when I tell you, that to ease his 
 government I have consented that I should contra- 
 dict my own order, and I should go into the South 
 to compose the disturbances that now prevail in 
 certain districts in the provinces of Leinster and 
 Munster. Before I yielded these points, I informed 
 my brother ofiicers that I expected soon to be re- 
 lieved. This I considered as an attention due to 
 myself, and I hope my letter is conceived in such 
 terms as to preclude any misconstruction, or even 
 the most distant idea of my endeavouring to create 
 in the minds of others any improper sentiment or 
 sensation. It must, however, be considered as a 
 pledge that I shaU not on any account remain in the 
 chief command in this country. Although I have 
 consented to the revocation of my own order, I 
 cannot consent to my remaining a degraded man. 
 As to the propriety of the order, I trust that I 
 
 I 
 
1798. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1 1 'Z 
 
 shall hereafter be found to stand on the firmest 
 ground." 
 
 The temper and moderation with which Sir Ealph 
 acted on this occasion must be strongly felt, when 
 it is recollected that the proclamation of the 18th 
 May had been practically abandoned in Ireland 
 and disapproved in England, but had not been 
 recalled by proclamation, in order to spare the 
 Government the pain of publicly condemning their 
 own act. Lord Camden, at the instigation of his 
 advisers, condescended to revise and to rest on that 
 order only as the means of placing Sir Ralph m an 
 embarrassing position. Sir Ralph was touched by 
 the pitiable condition of Lord Camden, whose in- 
 tentions were good, but who was irresolute, and 
 suffered himself to be driven into courses which 
 he did not in his heart approve. 
 
 Sir Ralph also clearly saw that some great change 
 in the condition of Ireland must speedily arise, and 
 he was unwilling that his measures, which were in- 
 tended to arrest, should be falsely represented as 
 being the cause of the impending crisis. While, in 
 compliance ^vith the earnest solicitation of Lord 
 Camden, he recalled the order, he protected himself 
 and prevented any misapprehension as to the real 
 source of the recal, by at the same time announcing 
 
118 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1798. 
 
 to the Army that he was speedily to retire from his 
 command. 
 
 The spuit in which Sir Ealph endeavoured to 
 compose the disturbances in the South, is clearly 
 sho\vn in the instructions given to the general offi- 
 cers, in which they are told " that a public notice 
 has been issued by the Commander-in-Chief, calling 
 upon the people to dehver up the arms which have 
 been taken from the Yeomanry and the well-affected ; 
 that the general officers are to communicate to the 
 people through the priests, and by one or two men 
 selected from each townland ; that if the order is 
 compHed with, it will be a sign of their repentance, 
 and that not only forgiveness but protection will 
 follow ; that they must be sensible that it is in- 
 finitely better for them to remain quietly at home 
 minding their own affairs, than to be committing 
 acts which would ruin them and their families ; that 
 as it would be impossible to prevent the innocent 
 from sufiPering in some degree with the giiilty, the 
 innocent have the means of redress by informing 
 against those who have engaged in unlawful associa- 
 tions, and in robbing houses of arms and money. 
 
 " The people must be very ignorant not to know, 
 that notwithstanding the fair promises of the French, 
 they have first deceived and then plundered every 
 
17ns. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 119 
 
 country into which they have come ; and they are 
 forewarned, that in case of invasion, and if they 
 should attempt to join the enemy, or communicate 
 with him, or join in any insurrection, they will be 
 immediately put to death, and their houses and 
 properties destroyed. 
 
 "The people ought to know that they cannot 
 expect any redress of matters which they think they 
 have to complain of, while they continue turbulent 
 and giving offence to Government, by joining in 
 acts which disturb the public peace and threaten 
 the lives and properties of loyal subjects. 
 
 "The general officers will endeavour to get at 
 the bottom and meaning of the real designs of the 
 instigators of disaffection, to know who they are, 
 and to what length they have proceeded, whether 
 they are banditti taking advantage of the times to 
 rob their neighbours, or whether they proceed from 
 the association called 'United Irishmen,' and are 
 directed by them, or are ebullitions caused by the 
 ferment which has been made, but which has broken 
 out contrary to their present intention. 
 
 " In general, to give confidence and courage to 
 the well-afiected by promising assistance and pro- 
 tection, and raising the spirits of the magistracy 
 and gentry, pointing out that unless they exert 
 
120 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 179S. 
 
 themselves tlie troops can only be a temporary 
 security to tliem, and that nothing can really 
 re-establish the government of this country, but 
 enforcing a due execution of tlie law." 
 
 After some observations on the cautious use of 
 secret service-money, and the maintenance of the 
 discipline of the troops, it is added, — " The follow- 
 ing questions may be pertinently put. AMiy should 
 the people be less attached to their Government 
 than they were twelve months ago, when they 
 showed so much loyalty in assisting his Majesty's 
 troops to oppose the French ? Is it not because 
 they have been seduced by wicked men ? and why 
 should they think themselves bound by oaths into 
 which they have been seduced or terrified ?" 
 
 Such was the sphit in which Sir Ralph endea- 
 voured to compose the disturbances in the south, 
 which, especially in the county of Tij)perary, had 
 assumed a serious character. These disturbances 
 he attributed to the influence of demagogues 
 and of a hostile press acting on the people, who 
 were depressed by the low price of grain, to the 
 severity with which the middlemen exacted their 
 rents, to the abandonment of their duty by the 
 gentry, who quitted their dwellings and retired 
 into towns, and to the violences of religious diflfer- 
 
1793. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 121 
 
 ences. He particularly called the attention of 
 Government to the fact that in the district to the 
 north of Fethard, the gentry had done their duty, 
 and, with the aid of the Yeomanry, had effectually 
 succeeded in preserving the peace of the country, 
 and on the whole he was of opinion that, by a 
 judicious distribution and employment of the 
 military force, order might speedily be re-estab- 
 lished for the time. 
 
 That such a spirit was cordially disapproved Ijy 
 the advisers of Lord Camden need hardly be stated, 
 and Sir Ealph's conduct was severely censured by 
 them. Sir Ralph always maintained that military 
 law ought to be confined to those districts which 
 were refractory, and which could not be controlled 
 by the power of the civil authority. All his orders 
 were based on this distinction, and the officers were 
 enjoined to enforce them with the utmost leniency. 
 This was not the opinion of Lord Castlereagh, who 
 had succeeded Mr. Pelham as Chief-Secretary, and 
 to whom Sir Ralph expressed his desire that the 
 proclamation should be enforced in the county of 
 Kilkenny in the most restricted sense, and in the most 
 lenient manner. Lord Castlereagh said that such was 
 not his view, and that coercive measures ought to be 
 left to take their course as the countrv desired it. 
 
122 COMMAND IN lEELAND. 1798. 
 
 On the 2 5 til April, General Lake was appointed 
 Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, and the conse- 
 quences of the change are most significantly ex- 
 pressed in the following order, which was issued by 
 General Sir James Stuart at Cork on the 7th of 
 May. " Whereas, it has been reported to General 
 Sir James Stuart, that in some parts of the county 
 where it has been necessary to place troops at free- 
 quarters for the restoration of tranquilHty, that 
 general subscriptions have been entered into by the 
 inliabitants to purchase provisions for the troops, by 
 which means the end proposed of making the bur- 
 then fall as much as possible on the guilty, is en- 
 tirely defeated by making it fail in a light propor- 
 tion on the whole, and thereby easing and protecting 
 the guilty : It has been thought proper to direct 
 that whenever the practice has been adopted or 
 shall be attempted, the general officers commanding 
 divisions in the southern district shall immediately 
 double, triple, and quadruple the number of soldiers 
 so stationed, and shall send out foraging parties 
 to pro\dde provisions for the troops in the quantities 
 mentioned in the former notice, bearing date the 
 27th day of April, and that they shall move them 
 from station to station through the district or 
 barony imtil all arms are surrendered and tran- 
 
1798. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 123 
 
 quillity be perfectly restored, and until it is re- 
 ported to the general officers by the gentlemen 
 HOLDING LANDED PROPERTY, and those who are 
 employed in collecting the public revenue and 
 tithes that all rents, taxes, and tithes are com- 
 pletely PAID UP." 
 
 A historian of these times has remarked that, 
 after dihgent search, he has been unable to find in 
 the proceedings of the French, either under the 
 Repubhc or under Napoleon, any parallel to the 
 severity and injustice of this order. It can excite 
 no surprise, that the same people who, in the pre- 
 ceding year, had displayed so much loyalty in re- 
 sisting the French, were, within three weeks from 
 the date of this order, driven into rebellion. 
 
 In the month of April, Sir Ralph returned to 
 England, and was instantly appointed to the com- 
 mand of the forces in Scotland. While this ap- 
 pointment was a decided and just tribute to the 
 ability and uprightness of Sir Ralph, and was a 
 proof of the great confidence which the King 
 and liis Ministers reposed in him, they did not 
 foresee that when he left Ireland, the last hope of 
 peace was extinguished, and that the l)urst of 
 military violence which followed his resignation 
 was so soon to involve the country in the horrons 
 
124 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1798. 
 
 of civil war. The remark of Mr. Grattan, " that 
 the policy of Sir Ralph was sound and wise, but 
 that he came a little too late," might have accounted 
 for the failure of that policy, if it had ever been 
 fiiirly tested. But that remark could not justify 
 the relaxation of discipline, the subversion of the 
 law, and the neglect of the means by which a 
 deluded and oppressed people might have been 
 reclaimed and saved, and still less could it be urged 
 as an apology for the cruelty and tyranny practised 
 by a \4ndictive Government and a licentious army. 
 The result was, that the English Government de- 
 cided and acted when it really and certainly was 
 too late. Lord Camden was recalled, and replaced 
 by Lord Comwallis. 
 
 The first act of Lord Cornwallis, on receiving his 
 appointment, was to write to Sir Ralph, and request 
 that he would leave any person who had been on 
 his staff, and in whom he had confidence, who could 
 fully explain the views and policy on which he had 
 acted while he held the command in Ireland. Ac- 
 cordingly, Colonel Hay, who was afterwards killed 
 at the Helder, was left, and remained for some 
 months on the staff of Lord Cornwallis. 
 
 When Sir Ralph returned to London, he naturally 
 presented himself on the first occasion at the King's 
 
1798. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 125 
 
 levee. The attendance at levees was then so hmited, 
 that the King walked about, and spoke to those who 
 were present in such order as he chose. Several 
 times the King came very close to Sir Kalph, and 
 always turned aside, so that Sir Ralph began to 
 think that the King did not intend to notice liim. 
 At last, however, the King came and addressed 
 these words to him : — " They have used you very 
 ill in Ireland, and you are now going to Scotland, 
 where they will know how to respect you, and to 
 treat you better." When the King retired into his 
 closet, he said to one of his Ministers, " I watched 
 my opportunity, when certain Irish politicians were 
 witliin hearing, and I took good care that they 
 should be in no doubt as to my opinion of Sir 
 Ralph and his conduct." 
 
 The following letters from Sir Ralph may properly 
 be annexed to this brief account of his conduct in 
 Ireland, as they illustrate the view which he took of 
 his own position, and of the future prospects of a 
 country in whose welfare he was so warmly inter- 
 ested. The two first letters are addressed to his 
 eldest son, and the tliird to a military friend. 
 
 On the 1st April 1798, Sir Ralph thus writes 
 from* Dublin : — " In a letter to my brother, I in- 
 formed him that I had desired to be recalled from 
 
126 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1798. 
 
 my present command. This step is no doubt unfor- 
 tunate at tliis moment, Ijut it is much better for the 
 King's service and for Lord Camden's Government 
 that a successor should be sent over, than that there 
 should exist an open war between my Lord Lieu- 
 tenant's cabinet and myself. The breach is too wide 
 to be closed, and they and I must be always at 
 variance. They will never forgive me, because they 
 know that they have not only injured me, but have 
 used every means in their power to ruin me, and it 
 is impossible that I can ever have any confidence in 
 men who have endeavoured to deprive me of my 
 good name. I shall not enter at present into any 
 detail on my o^vn conduct since I came to Ireland. 
 I trust that it is irreproachable, and that I have rea- 
 son on my side. It is some satisfaction to have the 
 opinion of the reasonable men, both civil and mili- 
 tary, with me, and that the man,i not the last in 
 this kingdom, is among the number. 
 
 " The hue and ciy has been raised in London by 
 letters from hence, and has been carried on, as I 
 hear, principally by that immaculate character. Lord 
 Auckland. I shall keej) my temper, and patiently 
 wait for the moment when I can be heard. My 
 Lord Camden has begged of me to go to the South, 
 
 1 Jjord C.anifleii. 
 
1798. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 127 
 
 to endeavour to compose the disturbances that pre- 
 vail in that part of the country. I could not refuse 
 his Lordship, although I know the drift of it, and 
 that he has been advised to put this service on me. 
 
 " This is a most wretched country. The upper 
 orders have fallen into a lethargy, and are only oc- 
 cupied in eating and drinking, or in uttering their 
 unmanly fears. They know that they have been the 
 oppressors of the poor, and that the moment of 
 vengeance is at hand. The lower orders rejoice that 
 in their opinion the moment is at hand when they 
 can glut their revenge, and hope for a more equal 
 share of the good things in this life." 
 
 On the 20th April 1798, Sir Kalph writes from 
 Dublin : — '' I returned last nio;ht from the South. I 
 had reason, from the proclamation and instructions 
 I received, to believe that an insurrection had taken 
 place in the province of Munster. I have been 
 through all the disaffected districts, and found no- 
 thing but tranquilhty, the people employed in culti- 
 vating their lands and following their usual avoca- 
 tions. They were civil and submissive, and although 
 I never took any escort or anything more than one 
 servant, I was under no apprehension, even the most 
 distant, of any danger. Several robberies have been 
 committed, as has been at all times the custom in this 
 
128 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1798. 
 
 country ; some private quarrels have been avenged, 
 and arms have been taken from the Protestants. The 
 people, however, are induced to give them up, partly 
 through fear, partly tlu'ough persuasion. I do not, 
 however, doubt, that if an enemy should land, the 
 Roman CathoHcs will rise and cut the throats of the 
 Protestants. 
 
 " I really think Lord Camden is ill-ad^dsed to 
 declare the kingdom in rebellion, and to establish 
 something more than martial law over the whole 
 kingdom. It was perhaps right to do something 
 in that way in some particular districts where the 
 greatest outrages had been committed, and where 
 the magistrates had fled from their duty. I am now 
 convinced that a writ may be executed in any part 
 of Ireland. Do not, therefore, be under any im- 
 mediate apprehension about this countr}\ My re- 
 signation being accepted, and having refused any 
 compromise, which could not have produced any 
 confidence, I shaU leave this country as soon as 
 General Lake reheves me. I once more beg aU my 
 friends will be easy on my account." 
 
 The following letter expresses the opinion of Sir 
 Ralph at so late a period as the 28th January 
 1799. 
 
 "I am not afraid of being charged with prejudices. 
 
1798. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 129 
 
 If I have any, they are in favour of a country in 
 which I have lived long, in which I formed many 
 valuable friendships, some of which are still fresh in 
 my mind. There cannot be a subject more inter- 
 esting than that of your letter. Long observation 
 has convinced me, that all your misfortunes, that 
 all the evils with which you are threatened, proceed 
 from the illiberal, the unjust, and the unwise con- 
 duct of England. Your Legislature and your Exe- 
 cutive Government partake of course, of the vices 
 flowing from the wretched system of English domi- 
 nation. The vices of the Government infect the man- 
 ners of the people. If I find a peasantry cunning, 
 deceitful, lazy, and vindictive, I cannot attribute it, 
 without impiety, to the hand of God. It must come 
 from the iron hand of man. Although the French 
 Revolution and Jacobin principles may be the im- 
 mediate cause of the events which have lately taken 
 place in Ireland, yet the remote and ultimate cause 
 must be derived from its true origin, the oppression 
 of centuries. Do not imagine that I am weak 
 enough to believe that a few effusions of lenity or 
 benevolence are to soften or subdue the minds of a 
 people hardened by oppression. It will require the 
 wisest system you can devise, and length of time, to 
 effect it. In the meantime, you must trust to the 
 
 1 
 
130 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1798. 
 
 due execution of the Law, and to a powerful and 
 well disciplined Army for your protection. The 
 Irish people are not a thinking people, they have 
 strong prejudices. However, people wiU think for 
 them. Till a new system has begun to take effect, 
 they will remain the tools of a foreign enemy, or of 
 domestic agitators and demagogues. God grant 
 that the measures on the affairs of Ireland, which, 
 they say, are now under consideration, may be 
 well weighed, and that the spirit of party may give 
 way to true wisdom." 
 
 Sir Ealph's o'wti letters explain his conduct and 
 unfold his views with so much clearness and simpli- 
 city, that it is unnecessary, and perhaps scarcely 
 justifiable, to make any addition to them. Sir 
 Kalph held the cliief command in Ireland from the 
 beginning of December 1797, to the month of April 
 following. The times were difiicult and critical, 
 especially for the officer to whom the command of the 
 Army was intrusted. The objects to w^hich his at- 
 tention was necessarily directed, were the restoration 
 of the discipline of the Army, so that it might be in 
 a condition to contend with the enemy in the event 
 of an invasion by the French, the maintenance of 
 public tranquillity, and the efiicient protection of 
 fife and property. The peculiarity of the case was 
 
179S. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 131 
 
 that the first and indispensable means to be taken 
 for the restoration of discipline, was to abandon the 
 vicious practice of scattering the troops in small 
 parties over the whole face of the country, for the 
 protection of those who were unwilling to make any 
 effort for their own security. • The Commander-in- 
 Chief was forced to call the immediate attention of 
 the Lord-Lieutenant, and of his Government, to the 
 necessity of drawing the troops together in larger 
 numbers, in order that discipHne might be restored 
 and enforced, and he advised that the preservation 
 of domestic tranquillity should be left to the large 
 body of Yeomanry, which had been raised for that 
 especial purpose, and that the aid of the Army 
 should only be required in urgent cases, and on the 
 demand of the civil power. 
 
 It is obvious that in such a state of affairs, the 
 civil and military poHcy of the country were so in- 
 timately blended, that separation was impossible. 
 It is also obvious that the discussion of such ques- 
 tions could not be conducted without more or less 
 involving the fundamental policy of the Govern- 
 ment. Sir Ralph was responsible for the discipline 
 of an Army which might at any moment be called 
 upon to act against the enemy, and he would have 
 ill discharged his duty to his country, if he had 
 
132 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1798. 
 
 tamely acquiesced in a system wliicli was destruc- 
 tive of all hope of improvement, and had relied for 
 the defence of his inaction, on the ground that it 
 was not his duty, as a soldier, to interfere with the 
 domestic policy of the Government, who were en- 
 titled to require the service of the Army in whatever 
 way appeared to them to be most expedient for the 
 pubhc advantage. 
 
 No man, as has been shown, was more earnestly 
 desu'ous to restore and maintain the proper and 
 constitutional relations between the civil and mih- 
 tary power than Sir Ealph, and his interference 
 with the civil policy of the country was forced 
 upon him by an imperative sense of duty, and by 
 the danger to the public safety in the event of the 
 expected invasion being realized. That Sir Ralph 
 conducted his communications with the Lord- 
 Lieutenant on these delicate and important ques- 
 tions, with, temper, firmness, and good sense, is 
 clearly established by the letters of Lord Camden 
 to the Duke of Portland. It is fortunate for the 
 fame of Sir Ralph, that in the midst of such diffi- 
 culties, he was enabled, even during the short 
 period of his command, to develop liis humanity, 
 his love of justice, and his respect for the law ; to 
 display the sagacity of a wise statesman in discern- 
 
1798. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 133 
 
 ing the policy that was best calculated to extricate 
 Ireland from the serious and urgent difficulties in 
 which it was involved. Having matured his opinion 
 he took his part with decision, and maintained it 
 with unflinching consistency and resolution. As 
 Commander of the Forces, he struggled to protect 
 the people by restraining the licentiousness of the 
 troops, he made the most strenuous efforts to restore 
 the discipline and efficiency of the Army, and to re- 
 establish those relations between the civil and mili- 
 tary power which are prescribed by the Law and 
 the Constitution. The mihtary Commander had 
 to contend with the mveterate vices of the system 
 that prevailed, with the inffi-m and u-resolute mind 
 of the Lord-Lieutenant, and with the unscrupulous 
 and vindictive characters of his advisers ; and hav- 
 ing no support but that which he might conciliate by 
 the justice and wisdom of his measures, it is plain 
 that nothing but the most entire devotion to his duty, 
 and to the interests of his country, would have in- 
 duced one so calm and circumspect as Sir Ealph, to 
 engage in a contest with such a host of formidable 
 opponents. He courted no party, he sought no 
 allies ; he was f^icile on small, and uncompromising 
 on great points ; he stood alone, trusting to the 
 justice of his Sovereign, and to the dispassionate 
 
134 COMMAND IN IKELAND. 1798. 
 
 judgment of his country. His reliance was not 
 misplaced ; for although the influence of a most 
 powerful Irish party, acting on the ignorance of the 
 English public, succeeded in raising a fearful storm 
 against him, he remained unmoved, and did not seek 
 the honour of martyrdom, but waited patiently for 
 the development of those events which he felt con- 
 vinced would justify the course he had taken, and 
 he was sustained by recei\^g the prompt and cor- 
 dial approval of his Sovereign. 
 
 On resigning the command in Ireland, Sir Ralph 
 was appointed Commander of the Forces in Scot- 
 land, and in a letter dated the 14th May 1798, he 
 thus expresses himself : — " It seems determined 
 that I must accept of the command in Scotland ; it 
 is by no means with my good-will, as it will expose 
 me to more company and expense than I could wish, 
 and can add neither to my fortune nor my fame. 
 Were I to choose, I should have said, allow me to 
 be quiet tiU there is occasion for me. But the King 
 is determined to give me the highest mark in his 
 power, on account of the injury done to the service, 
 not in removing me, but in remo\dng his Com- 
 mander-in-Chief by a political blast." 
 
 While Sir Ralph was residing in Scotland, as 
 Commander of the Forces, he received a letter from 
 
1798. COMMAND IN IRELAND. 135 
 
 his valued and attached friend, General (afterwards 
 Lord) Hutchinson, who was then at Dundalk. The 
 letter was dated from Dundalk on the 12 th June 
 
 1799, and as it not only contains the opinions of the 
 General with respect to the state of Ireland, but 
 refers also to the expediency of making a diversion 
 in favour of the Allies by a descent on Holland, it 
 forms an appropriate conclusion to the account of 
 Sir Ralph's service in Ireland, and an introduction 
 to the Dutch expedition, which is the next impor- 
 tant event in the career of Sir Ralph, and therefore 
 it is here inserted. " I was sent dowD. here to com- 
 mand a brigade of English militia a few days after 
 the French left Brest. Two of my regiments have 
 returned to England. One of them, the Warwick, 
 would stay no longer. The King of England has a 
 great number of armed men in his service, but where 
 his army is, I am at a great loss to find. 
 
 " In my opinion, the Rebellion in this country- 
 is entirely put down. The rebels seem to be sick 
 of their own machinations, by which they have been 
 themselves the chief sufferers. I suppose you know 
 that I support the Union. After all my patriotism, 
 1 have been obliged to vote for the annihilation 
 of the Irish Legislature, but such are the hopes of 
 man, and such the termination of his most proud 
 
13() COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1798. 
 
 designs. And yet I never was so convinced of 
 anything in politics, as of the necessity of this 
 measure. If ever there was a country unfit to 
 govern itself, it is Ireland : a corrupt aristocracy, 
 a ferocious commonalty, a distracted government, 
 a divided people. I solemnly believe that the 
 great mass of every rehgious persuasion in this 
 country have no wish so near their hearts, as to 
 enjoy the power of persecuting each other. The 
 CathoHc would miu-der the Protestant in the name 
 of God ; the Protestant would murder the Catholic 
 in the name of law. Both sects seem to consider 
 their common country only as an extended field 
 of battle, where each are at full liberty to display 
 their sanguinary dexterity. The bulk of the j)eople, 
 in my opinion, are by no means averse to the Union. 
 The south is certainly for it ; the north silent ; 
 DubHn clamorous ; the lawyers outrageous ; the 
 chief opposition A\dll, therefore, be in Parhament, 
 where money and influence can do everything. 
 But Lord Castlereagh will be deceived, if he thinks 
 that he can pay the needy members of Parliament 
 in sentences and not in cash. The fact is, people 
 are so used to be bribed in this country, that they 
 will not even do what is right, or their own busi- 
 ness, unless they are paid for it. 
 
1798. 
 
 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 
 
 137 
 
 " The success of the Allies on the Continent has 
 been greater than could have been reasonably ex- 
 pected. The Archduke will soon again act offen- 
 sively on the Upper Ehine. The French cannot 
 be enabled to leave many troops in Holland. Now 
 would be the moment (and moments are everything 
 in war), to make a diversion, and put the project 
 of the summer of 1795 in execution. Certainly 
 it ought to be easy now to assemble from fifteen 
 to twenty thousand men. It would surely not be 
 difficult to get volunteers from the militia, both 
 English and Irish." After enlarging on the advan- 
 tages which might result from such an employment 
 of the military force of England, and expressing 
 his apprehensions as to the course hkely to be pur- 
 sued by the King of Prussia, who, he thinks, must 
 see the aggrandizement of Austria and the destruc- 
 tion of French power with an evil eye, as it was 
 only the predominant genius of Frederick that ever 
 could have made the house of Brandenburgh a 
 match for the House of Austria, he thus concludes, 
 " Since I have written what precedes, I find from 
 Mr. Dundas' motion in the House of Commons 
 for an act of Parliament to allow twenty thousand 
 of the militia to enlist in the regular forces, that 
 some project of an extended kind is in contempla- 
 
138 COMMAND IN IRELAND. 1798. 
 
 tion. In that event, if they are wise, they will give 
 you the command. You have local knowledge, and 
 experience of the modern manner of warfare, which 
 the grandees of our army want. I need not again 
 repeat to you that I shall be ready to attend you 
 in any capacity, even that of a friend. My passion 
 for fighting rather increases than diminishes ; be- 
 sides, I have a great idea that the French are just 
 as easily beaten as other people. I think in our 
 time we did not find them much greater heroes 
 than om^selves. We lost more ground by our own 
 weakness than by their prowess." 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 
 
 1799. 
 
 The success of the allied armies against the 
 French in Southern Germany and in Northern Italy 
 in the year 1799, together with the willingness of 
 the Emperor Paul to send his Russians to act against 
 the French wherever their services were to be paid 
 for, suggested to the EngHsh Ministers the expedi- 
 ency of making a diversion in favour of the Allies, 
 and of attempting to restore the independence of 
 Holland. 
 
 As a preliminary step for this object a treaty was 
 concluded in the month of June 1799 between the 
 English Government and the Emperor of Russia, 
 by which these powers became bound to furnish a 
 force to the amount, and on the conditions therein 
 specified. It was stipulated that the united force 
 should be placed under the command of the Duke 
 of York, and should, in the first instance, be em- 
 ployed in expelling the French from the United 
 
140 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 Provinces, and that, if successful, their operations 
 should not be confined to Holland. 
 
 If a really powerful diversion could have been 
 made by England and Russia in Holland at a proper 
 moment, it might have been attended with very 
 beneficial results to the cause of the Allies. The 
 expulsion of the French, and the restoration of the 
 Prince of Orange as Stadtholder, and the re-estab- 
 lishment of the independence of Holland — in whose 
 fate, as well as that of the Low Countries, England 
 had the deepest interest — were objects, if attainable, 
 of sufficient importance to have amply justified the 
 prudence of the treaty concluded with Russia. In 
 addition to these considerations, a very strong be- 
 lief prevailed that the Dutch were so discontented 
 and so hostile to the French that they would in- 
 stantly rally round the standard of the Prince of 
 Orange, as soon as it was raised mth any prospect 
 of support and success. 
 
 Such being the views of the projectors of the 
 expedition, it is ob\ious that obtaining possession of 
 the Dutch fleet, on which so much stress was ulti- 
 mately laid, entered very little, if at all, into the 
 contemplation of the projectors of the expedition. 
 When, in addition to the considerations already 
 stated, the serious consequences which must result 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 141 
 
 from the great struggle in which Europe was then, 
 and for so many succeeding years, involved, were 
 deliberately weighed, it is not surprising that the 
 English Ministers were tempted by the prosperous 
 efforts of the Allies, to make as powerful a diversion 
 as they could in their favour in the hope of termi- 
 nating a war in which the treasure and blood of 
 England were so freely lavished. 
 
 Even now, when the wisdom of having engaged 
 in the expedition to Holland has been tested by 
 the event, it must be admitted that the opportunity 
 was most inviting, for we were committed in a great 
 contest, and the professed objects, if attained, would 
 have been an ample compensation for the expense 
 to be incurred and the risk to be run ; but it was a 
 fatal fault that the Ministers were too sanguine, 
 and were misled by their zeal in the cause; they 
 resolved to act and were pledged to the enterprise 
 before they had obeyed the dictates of prudence, 
 by maturely weighing the difficulties that were to 
 be overcome, and carefully considering how their 
 means could be most usefully employed, and how 
 far they were sufficient for the attainment of the 
 objects which they had in view. 
 
 The most superficial glance at the perils which 
 are inseparable from maritime expeditions must 
 
142 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 3799. 
 
 increase regret that the fame of the EngHsh Army 
 and the honour of the country were hastily com- 
 mitted to so hazardous an enterprise. 
 
 The assembling of men, ships of war, and trans- 
 ports, the time necessary for the embarkation of 
 infantry, cavalry, artillery, ammunition and stores, 
 can scarcely fail to enable the enemy to penetrate 
 the objects of such preparations and to take the 
 necessary measures to resist and defeat them. The 
 wind and weather exercise a great and controlling 
 influence on the movements of a fleet, with respect 
 to the moment of departure, during the voyage, at the 
 time of landing on the coast of the enemy, and in 
 supplying the troops with all necessary requisites, 
 until they have gained as much ground in the 
 country invaded as will enable them to maintain 
 themselves. Such dangers are beyond control, and 
 no human skill or foresight can avert them. It vnl\ 
 be seen that the expedition to Holland did not 
 escape these perils, which had not been overlooked 
 by Sir Ralph when he was required to pronounce an 
 opinion on the prudence of the enterprise, and on 
 the plans that were submitted to him. The un- 
 favom-able state of the wind and weather after the 
 fleet left the English shore, fully justified the wis- 
 dom of dul}" calculating on such incidents, and 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 143 
 
 caused delays which very materially increased the 
 difficulties and the hazard of the enterprise. The 
 Russian troops also in their voyage from the North 
 were exposed to similar perils from adverse wind 
 and weather. 
 
 Having concluded the Treaty with Russia, the 
 Ministers then began to collect and form the Eng- 
 lish army, and vessels for their transport, and to 
 deliberate on and decide the plan of operations. 
 
 While these proceedings were in progress. Sir 
 Ralph was employed in the command of the forces 
 in Scotland, and it was not until after the Treaty 
 with Russia had been concluded, and progress had 
 been made in collecting the troops, that he was 
 summoned to London, and made acquainted with 
 the views and intentions of the Ministers. As Sir 
 Ralph was subsequently intrusted with the com- 
 mand of the first division of the English army, and 
 took so very prominent a part throughout the ex- 
 pedition, it is desirable to trace, with as much 
 accuracy as is now practicable, the extent of the 
 responsibility which he incurred, and the opinions 
 which he formed and submitted to the Ministers 
 on the expediency and wisdom of this great enter- 
 prise. 
 
 The first communication made to Sir Ralph was 
 
144 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 in a letter received by him in Edinburgh, from Mr. 
 Dundas, dated on the 8th June 1799.^ 
 
 Mr. Dundas, in the letter to which reference has 
 been made, stated " That although there is never 
 dependence to be placed on the disposition of 
 Prussia, governed as she is, by a corrupted and 
 weak administration, still she must be ready, if 
 actuated either by her fears or her interest she shall 
 be induced to come forward. By our most recent 
 intelligence it is not impossible that at any hour 
 she may call upon France to evacuate Holland, with 
 a menace of marching a Prussian army into it, if 
 she does not. If she takes this step, she will at the 
 same time call upon us to co-operate "w-ith our fleet, 
 and to seize on the island of Walcheren. We must 
 be ready if such an event takes place, and I have 
 this morninor arranged with the Duke of York to 
 carry the accompanying disposition of troops into 
 execution. I have not time to enter into farther 
 
 ' It may not be without interest to mention a characteristic incident which 
 has been preserved by a friend who had been much associated with Sir Ralph 
 in early life. " I breakfasted," says this friend, " with Sir Ralph the day 
 before he left Edinburgh to take the command of the expedition to Holland 
 in 1799. I found him in great spirits, and, what I less expected, Lady Aber- 
 cromby was perfectly calm and tranquil. On remarking this to Sir Ralph, 
 he replieil, I have an excellent wife, who, without a murmur, allows me to 
 go where I please." This incident marks the promptitude with which Sir 
 Ralph sacrificed the ease of domestic life to every opportunity of serving his 
 country. It shows how completely a knowledge of the ruling passion of her 
 husband had taught a devoted wife to control and keep in subjection her 
 wannest affections, under most trying circumstances. 
 
17W. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 145 
 
 details, but if you wish to commaud the expedition, 
 you must come away as soon as you can after the 
 receipt of this letter." On the same day that Sir 
 Ralph received this letter from Mr. Dundas, he also 
 received a letter from Colonel Brownrigg, written 
 by command of the Duke of York, asking what 
 general officers and staff he would wish to accom- 
 pany him on the expedition which it was proposed 
 to place under his command. It will be observed 
 that the expedition of which Sir Ralph is invited by 
 Mr. Dundas to take the command, is far different 
 from that which was eventually carried into execu- 
 tion. An attack on the island of Walcheren, with 
 a view of assisting the expected invasion of Holland 
 by a Prussian army, is the object proposed to Sir 
 Ralph. There is no mention of the treaty with 
 Russia which was then on the eve of l^eing signed, 
 and there is no allusion to an invasion of Holland 
 by an allied force under the command of the Duke 
 of York. 
 
 At what precise time the hopes of an invasion of 
 Holland by the Prussians were abandoned does not 
 appear, but they seem to have been cherished so 
 late as the 20th of July, when Sir Ralph was in- 
 structed to prepare a short statement of the effect 
 that might be anticipated from an attack by the 
 
 K 
 
146 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 Meuse on the province of Holland, and of the facili- 
 ties that it would give to an enemy intending to 
 act in the direction in which it was supposed that 
 the Prussians would move. The statement was in- 
 tended to enable Mr. Grenville, then at Berlin, to 
 show that the plan of attacking HoUand by the 
 Meuse would render the movement of the Prussians 
 safe and easy ; but the opinion of Mr. Dundas that 
 no reliance could be placed on the steadiness of 
 Prussian policy, seems to have Ijeen completely 
 verified. Early in August the English Government 
 were in possession of the fact that the French 
 Directory had intimated to the King of Prussia 
 that they were prepared to sacrifice the Batavian 
 Eepublic, and to co-operate with him in restoring 
 the Stadtholder, on the condition of his remaining 
 neuter. On the 7th of August, Lord Grenville 
 wrote to Mr. Dundas, suggesting that Sir Kalph 
 should send an ofiicer with, a flag of truce, in the 
 first instance to the Governor of the BriUe, with a 
 summons for the surrender of that place, but 
 charged mth a demand for a passport to the 
 Hague, to carry there a proposal for the peaceful 
 re -establishment of the ancient government ; and 
 the officer might be directed to declare in conversa- 
 tion to all whom he should see, that the French 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 147 
 
 Directory had offered to sacrifice the Batavian 
 Eepublic and to restore the Stadtholder, provided 
 they would remain neuter. The suggestion of Lord 
 Grenville proceeds on the assumption that the pro- 
 posal of the French Directory would be rejected by 
 the King of Prussia. It" occurred, on the other 
 hand, to Sir Ralph that it was possible that the 
 proposal might be accepted, and he asked how he 
 was to conduct himself if, in consequence of a 
 treaty between France and Prussia, any of the 
 troops of the latter power should have entered 
 Holland. The only reply was, that in such event 
 he must act according to circumstances, and to the 
 dictates of his own discretion. Sir* Ralph, seeing 
 the doubt and irresolution of the Ministers with 
 regard to the issue of the proposal made by France 
 to Prussia, was much embarrassed and dissatisfied 
 with the vagueness of a reply, which, instead of 
 giving him instructions for the regulation of his 
 conduct, was calculated to tlu'ow upon him a re- 
 sponsibility properly belonging to the advisers of 
 the Crown. 
 
 When the hopes of an invasion of Holland by 
 the Prussians died away, then the necessity for 
 finding employment for the English and Russian 
 force, according to the terms of the Treaty, became 
 
148 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 pressing and urgent. The invasion of Holland was 
 the professed object, but how, or in what direction 
 it should be attempted, was a question towards 
 the solution of which no real progress had been 
 made. 
 
 On Sir Ralph arriving in London, he was placed 
 in command of the forces that were assembling on 
 the coast of Kent, and Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas 
 took up their residence at Walmer Castle, that they 
 might have frequent and easy communication with 
 him, as soon as the expected reports of Johnstone, a 
 well-known smuggler, who was employed by the 
 Government to collect information as to what was 
 passing on the coast of Holland, had been received. 
 Many plans were proposed, much discussion ensued, 
 and in fact no positive and final decision had been 
 reached when the expedition was on the eve of 
 sailing. It will appear from the letters which will 
 be hereafter inserted, that Sir Ralph from the first 
 was strongly impressed with the diSiculties that 
 were to be encountered, and he was of opinion that 
 the risk which must be run, and the perils to wliich 
 the Army must be exposed were so great, that they 
 could not be justified by the importance of the ob- 
 jects to which our efibrts were to be directed. He 
 stated his views to the Ministers most frankly and 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 149 
 
 unreservedly, so much so, indeed, that Mr. Pitt, 
 who was unacquainted with the details of military- 
 operations, and with the means that were required 
 to afford a reasonable chance of success, could not 
 always repress his impatience, and on one occasion 
 remarked, very pointedly, " There are some persons 
 who have a pleasure in opposing whatever is pro- 
 posed." Sir Kalph was not moved by this hint, and 
 he persevered in expressing his opinions with calm- 
 ness and firmness. 
 
 It would now be superfluous to discuss the merits 
 of the many projects that were suggested and con- 
 sidered, as the opinion of Sir Ralph was alike unfa- 
 vom-able to all, and his responsibihty was ultimately 
 limited to the adoption of the plan for landing at 
 the Helder, ^^dth a view to the capture of the Dutch 
 fleet, which he throughout regarded as the most pro- 
 mising object that had been proposed. The views 
 of the Ministers, and the grounds on which the 
 country was committed to this great enterprise, can- 
 not be more accurately represented than by a faith- 
 ful abstract of the instructions given to Sir Kalph 
 previously to the sailing of the first division of the 
 English Army, which took place on the 13tli of 
 August. 
 
 The first instruction is dated on the 3d of Auo-ust, 
 
150 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 and states that the ol)ject of the treaty with the 
 Emperor of Russia was to rescue Holland from the 
 tyranny of the French, and to restore its indepen- 
 dence ; that the forces to he employed on this ser- 
 vice were to proceed in different divisions, and that 
 the first division was placed under the command of 
 Sir Ralph, and was directed to proceed to the en- 
 trance of the Meuse, and to obtain possession of 
 Goree, Over Flacken, the small island of Romburg, 
 and that of Voorne. It assumed that the three first 
 islands might easily be taken, but Voorne, possessing 
 two towns regularly fortified, might require more 
 serious mihtary operations ; and it specified that a 
 most confident expectation was entertained that 
 these islands might be secured. The object of the 
 campaign, after the arrival of reinforcements, was, 
 the instruction continued, if possible to obtain pos- 
 session of the provinces north of the Waal before 
 the bad weather set in, and therefore it became de- 
 sirable to seize upon some point on the mainland 
 where the troops could be at once disembarked 
 as they successively arrived. The selection of the 
 position on the mainland was left to the discretion 
 of the commander, but Maasland, Sluys, Schiedam, 
 Rotterdam, and Dort, are designated as the points 
 most desirable with reference to the object in view. 
 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 151 
 
 This instruction indicates clearly that the first 
 plan was to attack Voorne, to gain, if possible, a 
 footing on the mainland ; and that the ultimate 
 object of the campaign was to obtain possession of 
 the Provinces of the Union, north of the Waal. 
 
 In a second instruction, dated on the 4th of 
 August, and supplementary to that of the 3d of 
 August, Mr. Dundas states that he feels it to be due 
 to the public service and to Sir Ralph to state the 
 grounds on which the instructions had been framed, 
 and the pecuHar motives which had led to the deci- 
 sion that the expedition should proceed without de- 
 lay to the place of destination. JNIr. Dundas admits 
 that the returns and reports which he had received 
 from Sir Ralph, since he took the command at 
 Barham camp, had made such an impression on his 
 mind as might have induced him humbly to advise 
 liis Majesty to suspend any attempt against Holland 
 until the first division of the Russian army should 
 arrive at Yarmouth, or a considerable addition could 
 be made to the British troops by the reinforcements 
 now collectino- from the militia of the kino'dom. 
 Mr. Dundas proceeds to remark, that had he felt it 
 to have been his duty to submit that advice to his 
 Majesty, it would not have been founded so much 
 upon any apprehension that with the present num- 
 
152 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 bers the danger of the enterprise would be of such 
 a magnitude that in prudence it ought not to be 
 undertaken, or that the object was not of sufficient 
 importance to warrant that reasonable degree of risk 
 to which every great military operation is liable, as 
 upon the opinion he had fonned that the present 
 force, should it have been found adequate to the 
 reduction of the islands in the mouth of the Meuse, 
 would not, however, have been able to follow up 
 that success immediately, and to improve it by such 
 further operations, as in every military view" of the 
 question it would be highly desirable that Sir Ralph 
 should have the means of proceeding upon with- 
 out any interruption or delay, of which the enemy, 
 if not prevented by the want of resources, or the 
 favourable disposition of the country, might have 
 availed themselves to throw many obstacles in the 
 way of future operations. Mr. Dundas, in the same 
 instruction, goes on to observe, that having thought 
 it right so far to state the leading motives which 
 would have induced him to concur in recommending 
 that the departure of the expedition should be de- 
 ferred until it could be reinforced, had he been called 
 upon to decide on military considerations only ; he 
 adds, that he would have been the more inclined to 
 admit of delay, from a wish to remove entirely the 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 153 
 
 chance of a failure at the outset, which, however 
 improbable with the present force, had not been 
 perhaps so completely guarded against as might 
 have been the case, had he been at liberty to waive 
 other essential considerations consequent upon a full 
 review of the political relations of Great Britain with 
 other powers as connected with this expedition, the 
 general state of Europe, and other motives arising 
 out of internal arrangements too urgent to allow of 
 the expedition being retarded until it could be fur- 
 ther reinforced. 
 
 Mr. Dundas, in the same communication, states 
 the great importance he attaches to Sir Ralph being 
 in a position to follow up his first operations with 
 as little delay as possible, and he assures him that 
 he has felt it to be his duty to require from every 
 department of Government the utmost exertions for 
 bringing forward every further means the country 
 could afford, to be ready to support Sir Ralph with 
 in the least possible time after his departure. The 
 instruction concludes with details relative to the 
 amount of reinforcements proposed to be sent, and 
 with the expression of a confident hope that no dis- 
 appointment would arise on that point. The whole 
 spirit of this instruction is a frank and candid re- 
 cognition of the weight ^\liich was felt to be due to 
 
154 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 objections that had been pressed l)y Sir Ralph, and 
 Mr. Dundas, with his characteristic boldness, at once 
 assumes the whole responsibility as resting on him- 
 self and his colleagues. 
 
 There is a third instruction, dated on the 5 th of 
 August, of which the object is to point out the poli- 
 tical conduct to be observed when the troops shall 
 have made good their landing in the United Pro- 
 vinces. A proclamation, setting forth that the ob- 
 ject of the Allies was the expulsion of the French, 
 the restoration of the independence of Holland, and 
 of the former Government, under the chief direction 
 of the Stadtholder, and an address from the Prince 
 of Orange was also to be disseminated as widely as 
 possible. The only paragraph in the proclamation 
 to which it is requisite to make special reference, is 
 that in w^hich it is stated that it is " not his Majesty's 
 intention by the proclamation, or by any other de- 
 claration to be made in his Majesty's name, to pre- 
 clude himself from supporting, or even recommend- 
 ing, such alterations in the Dutch constitution, as, 
 being conformable to the ancient principles of that 
 Government, may l)e necessary for gi\ing it more 
 vigour and energy." No opportunity was ever 
 offered for testing the object or spirit in which this 
 part of the instruction was framed. 
 
mu. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 155 
 
 The preceding instructions were followed by an- 
 other, which is dated on the 10 th of August, This 
 latter instruction, it is stated, is founded on intel- 
 ligence collected respecting the approach to Hel- 
 voetsluys, and that on a comparison of the objec- 
 tions arising out of that intelligence with the plan 
 pointed out in the instruction No. 1, the conduct of 
 the commander is to be governed by the following 
 considerations, namely, — that according to advices 
 recently received from the Continent, the immediate 
 sailing of the expedition is a matter of most urgent 
 necessity, and that, as there appears to be very little 
 doubt of being able to take possession of Goree, it is 
 in any case to be considered as the first object. 
 Goree being secured, it is then left to the judgment 
 of the General and Admiral to determine whether 
 the facility it will afford is sufficient to warrant the 
 attempt against Voorne. In the event of the decision 
 being that the attack on Voorne is impracticable, or 
 that the hazard is greater than it would be reason- 
 able to incur, then the next object of immediate 
 importance is to attempt to get possession of the 
 Helder and the Texel Island, with the probability 
 of obtaining the disposal of the Dutch navy. The 
 mode of making the attack, as well as the expe- 
 diencv of its being; undertaken, is left to the discre- 
 
156 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 tion of Sir Ealph, after receiving the report of the 
 ofUcer who had been sent to Lord Duncan to obtain 
 information, and such suggestions as he might offer. 
 Should the attack both on Voorne and the Helder 
 be relinquished, it is stated that there appears to be 
 little doubt of the facility with which troops might 
 enter the Ems, to be landed in the neighbourhood 
 of Delfzyl, and thence to push their operations in 
 such a manner as might be best adapted to reduce 
 the provinces of Groningen and Friesland, and the 
 generality of Drenthe. The instruction adds, " de- 
 tails have been avoided, wishing to leave entirely to 
 the judgment of Sir Ealph the direction of the 
 movements of his army according to the intelligence 
 he may procure on the spot, of the strength of the 
 enemy, the disposition of the inhabitants, and other 
 circumstances, which must direct him in the execu- 
 tion of a plan of this nature. Should he," the in- 
 struction continues, " be compelled to make the con- 
 quest of Groningen the principal object of his attack, 
 provision shall be made for supplpng him imme- 
 diately with a reinforcement of cavalry." Sii' Ealph 
 was not restricted from proceeding with his whole 
 force to the Helder, if that should be the selected 
 point of attack, l)ut it was recommended that, if 
 practicable, he should send a detachment to Goree, 
 
1799. 'expedition TO HOLLAND. 157 
 
 sufficient to hold it for a few clays, until it could be 
 reinforced from England, on the ground that the 
 friends of the Prince of Orange might have made 
 their arrangements in the belief that that island 
 would be at once occupied by an English force. 
 The instruction concludes by stating that the exer- 
 cise of Sir Kalph's own discretion, in concert with 
 the Admiral, is not excluded from modifying each 
 or either of these plans, or from adopting any other, 
 the Government being satisfied that their efforts 
 will be directed to whatever object may appear 
 most to correspond with the advantage of the 
 King's service, and the spirit of the instructions. 
 
 These instructions show that the Ministers had 
 matured no plan on which they could confidently 
 rely, and by which they were prepared to abide ; 
 but the attack on the islands of Goree and of 
 Voorne had been so definitively fixed, that it had 
 been announced to those in Holland with whom 
 they had been in correspondence, and they, it was 
 reasonable to conclude, must have made their ar- 
 rangements under the belief that these islands, or 
 Goree at least, would be occupied by an English 
 force. The Ministers must, therefore, naturally 
 have been reluctant to abandon that portion of a 
 plan to which they were committed, and thus to 
 
158 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 disappoint the hopes and defeat the arrangements 
 of their friends, and to betray a vacillation Avhich 
 could not fail to abate the confidence of those who 
 might be disposed to co-operate with the English 
 in restoring the independence of their country. 
 
 Recent information as to the difficulty of approach 
 to Helvoetsluys, is assigned as the reason for this 
 change of plan, and yet it could scarcely be the real 
 one, as it was a port that had been so constantly 
 and so frequently resorted to by English vessels, 
 that accurate information as to the approach to the 
 town must have been easily obtained. Be that as it 
 may, the attack on the Helder is for the first time 
 brought prominently forward in the instruction of 
 the 10th of August, and, failing that, it is sug- 
 gested, that a landing might be made in the mouth 
 of the Ems, with a view of conquering the pro- 
 vinces of Groniugen and Friesland. But so much 
 uncertainty seems to have been felt as to the prac- 
 ticabiUty of executing any of these projects, that 
 Sir Ralph, in conjunction with the Admiral, was 
 authorized " to modify each or either of these plans, 
 or to adopt any other which in their judgment 
 should correspond wdth the advantage of the King's 
 service, and the spirit of their instructions." The 
 only point on which the instructions were uniform 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 159 
 
 and imperative was, that something must be done, 
 and that the departure of the first division of the 
 Army must be immediate. The necessity which 
 prompted this imperative instruction, was the ob- 
 Hgation which Enghmd had contracted with her 
 Allies. It was that obligation which decided Mr. 
 Dundas to insist on the departure of the expedition, 
 while he felt and acknowledged the force of the 
 objections which had been urged by Sir Ralph, and 
 which finally sent the first division of the Army to 
 sea without any definite object or plan having been 
 adopted. 
 
 The wish to make a powerful diversion in favour 
 of our Allies, to expel the French, and to restore 
 the independence of Holland, were in themselves 
 most laudable and honourable objects, but it must 
 be deeply lamented that a heavy expenditure, and 
 the unfortunate conclusion of a great enterprise, 
 were the results of an engagement which had 
 been entered into without a due appreciation 
 of all the difficulties to be encountered, and 
 without mature consideration how far the means 
 were sufficient to secure the attainment of the pro- 
 posed ends. These misfortunes might probably 
 have been avoided, if reference had been timeously 
 made to the advice of military men of experience 
 
160 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 and ability, for it does not appear that, with the 
 exception of unfavourable weather, of which the 
 most was made, any ditiiculties occurred wliich 
 could not have been foreseen by commanders of 
 capacity and real knowledge of what was necessary 
 to warrant a probability of ultimate success. 
 
 How far the great change of plan between the 
 3d and 10th of August may have been influenced 
 by the representations of Sir Ralph, cannot now he 
 ascertained by direct evidence. There is, however, 
 abundant proof that tlu"oughout he was unfavour- 
 able to the enterprise, and that among the difi'erent 
 projects which were entertained, he always preferred 
 the attack on the Helder and the capture of the 
 Dutch fleet, as being the most practicable, and the 
 most likely, if successful, to sustain the spirit of the 
 English people in a struggle from which there was 
 no present prospect of escape. No correct judg- 
 ment can be formed of the opinions which were 
 entertained and expressed by Sir Ralph on this 
 occasion, without adverting to the view which he 
 took of the character and spirit of the War in which 
 the country was embarked. He adhered to the 
 opinion which he had formed at the conclusion of 
 the campaign of 1793, that a great revolution had 
 begun which would not stop until it had shaken 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 16'1 
 
 and changed the condition of all the nations of 
 Europe. He saw that it was, in spirit, a war 
 against opinion ; and recognising the principle that 
 it could not be put down by force, he anxiously 
 longed for the opportunity of retiring from the 
 struggle by making as reasonable and honourable a 
 peace as could be secured. If peace could not be 
 obtained, he was deeply impressed with the import- 
 ance of preventing the spirit of the country from 
 being broken by repeated defeats which might 
 lead them to make dangerous and dishonourable 
 concessions. 
 
 "When he was required to form a judgment as to 
 the practicability and wisdom of the enterprise in 
 which he was about to take a part, his views were 
 governed by the opinions which he had so firmly 
 and steadily maintained, and so often expressed. 
 The two points which engaged his attention were 
 the importance of avoiding a disheartening defeat, 
 and of endeavouring so to direct our efforts as to 
 achieve a success that would sustain and animate 
 the spirit of the country. Accordingly, it will be 
 seen that he was never shaken in his opinion that 
 the projected invasion of Holland was an effort be- 
 yond our strength and our means, and most likely 
 to end in disappointment or disaster, and that of 
 
 L 
 
162 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 all the plans suggested the attack on the Helder 
 and the capture of the Dutch fleet was the only 
 one that he was disposed to countenance, as being 
 calculated to support the spirit of the country. 
 Major Kempt, afterwards General Sir James Kempt, 
 who subsequently was appointed to be the Secre- 
 tary to Sir Ralph, was at that time his first aide-de- 
 camp. The private correspondence did not pass 
 through liis hands, but with such great access to 
 know the opinions of Sir Ralph, he entirely confirms 
 the statement now made. When the expedition 
 was on the eve of saihng, Major Kempt was sent 
 by Sir Ralph with a despatch to Mr. Dundas at Sir 
 C. Middleton's, where the Ministers were assembled 
 to attend the King on the occasion of his in- 
 specting the volunteers of the county of Kent, 
 and was directed to return with the utmost speed. 
 The despatch contained a short letter from Sir 
 Ralph to Mr. Dundas, stating that he enclosed a 
 paper which had been drawn up by Sir John Hope 
 under his direction. Mr. Pitt read the paper in the 
 presence of Major Kempt, and he repeatedly ex- 
 pressed his approval of it in the warmest terms. 
 The troops began to embark immediately on the re- 
 turn of Major Kempt. On the evening of the day 
 on which the troops were put on board, Major 
 
 I 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 163 
 
 Kempt was sent to Ramsgate, to bring General 
 Coote to head-quarters at Deal, to receive further 
 instructions. General Coote's brigade was actually 
 embarked, and he said that he had received his in- 
 structions, but they were partially countermanded, 
 and he was directed to make a demonstration on 
 the coast of Holland, remote from the Helder, to 
 distract the attention of the enemy, and he was 
 afterwards to join the main body of the forces. 
 
 The order given to General Coote leaves no 
 doubt that Sir Ralph had resolved to exercise the 
 discretion intrusted to him by the instruction of the 
 10th of August, by directing the attack against the 
 Helder, unless subsequent information should be re- 
 ceived from the officer who had been sent to Lord 
 Duncan, and whom he was to meet at sea, or unless 
 he should find that the Admiral entertained a dif- 
 ferent opinion. Neither of these events, as will 
 appear, happened. The expedition sailed on the 
 13 th of August, and on the 14 th, Sir Ralph com- 
 municated to Mr. Dundas, that the intelligence 
 brought by the officer who had been sent to Lord 
 Duncan to bring the latest tidings from the coast of 
 Holland, had not shaken his purpose, and that he 
 intended to proceed to the Helder. Admiral Mit- 
 chell and Mr. Dundas both expressed their cordial 
 
164 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 approval of this decision. There are letters written 
 by Sir Ralph to his family during, and after the 
 conclusion of the expedition, in which he expresses 
 his opinion as to the impolicy of the enterprise. It 
 is sufficient for the present purpose to refer to one 
 letter which is addressed to Mr. Huskisson, the 
 Under Secretary of State, who was most intimately 
 acquainted with all the facts, as he enjoyed the un- 
 reserved confidence both of Mr. Dundas and of Sir 
 Ralph. In a letter dated on the 10th of October, 
 which will be hereafter more fully noticed, Sir Ralph 
 says, " I am unwilling to write to Mr. Dundas on 
 the subject. My mind always went in opposition to 
 this undertaking, and I spoke my sentiments on it so 
 fully before I left England, that it is decent to be 
 silent in my correspondence with him, on the con- 
 sequences likely to result from it." It was due to 
 truth and to the judgment to be formed of the mili- 
 tary reputation of Sir Ralph to disclose his real 
 opinions, and to show that in his intercourse with 
 the Ministers he had avowed, and expressed his 
 views of the expedition with the frankness and de- 
 cision which became an independent man, and 
 which was so consistent with his conduct on all 
 occasions. 
 
 There has been no desire to cast blame on the 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 165 
 
 authors of the expedition, for justice and candour 
 exact the unqualified admission, that the importance 
 of the objects they had in view, the urgent pressure 
 of their AlHes, and the peculiar character of the con- 
 test in which the country wiis involved, were motives 
 calculated to exercise a most powerful influence over 
 the decisions of capable and honest statesmen. The 
 fault was, that they were too sanguine, that they 
 were not sufliciently impressed or acquainted with 
 the difficulties with which they would have to con- 
 tend, and that they did not avail themselves of the 
 advice of capable and experienced military men be- 
 fore they were committed to this hazardous under- 
 taking. The opinions of the Ministers and of Sir 
 Ralph, were no doubt materially, and perhaps un- 
 consciously, influenced by the difierent points of 
 view from which they looked on the spirit of the 
 contest and on the events that were passing. The 
 Ministers were conducting the War under the im- 
 pression that they could confine France within her 
 former limits, put down the revolutionary spiiit and 
 reckless ambition of the French people, and restore 
 the ancient sway of the Bourbons. Sir Ralph did 
 not participate in these sanguine views. He enter- 
 tained faint hopes of efi'ecting these oljjects, he was 
 opposed to wasting our resources and risking the 
 
166 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 fame of the English Army on unprofitable and im- 
 practicable objects, and, above all, he feared a repe- 
 tition of defeat, which he thought would either pro- 
 long the War, or lead to an unsatisfactory and 
 insecure peace. Such, no doubt, were the grounds 
 of difference in the views of Sir Ralph, and of those 
 Ministers who had imbibed the spirit of Mr. Burke. 
 It would be unjust to the memory of Mr. Dundas, 
 who took so prominent a part in the conduct of the 
 War, to withhold the impression that has been made 
 by a careful perusal of his correspondence with Sir 
 Ralph. It is plain that thi'oughout his views were 
 of a more sober and practical nature than those of 
 his more sanguine colleagues. It has been shown 
 how correctly he appreciated the weakness and bad 
 faith of the Prussian Government ; and it will ap- 
 pear that he subsequently expressed at least an equal 
 distrust of the policy and power of Austria. The 
 project of a treaty with Russia was conceived and 
 executed under the excitement awakened by the 
 temporary success of the Allies on the Continent. 
 The Emperor of Russia appeared to be, for the time, 
 a sincere aUy, and other concomitant circumstances 
 being favourable, Mr. Dundas was induced to con- 
 cur with liis colleagues in concluding the treaty 
 with Russia. Being so committed, with his char- 
 
-%Mtf^ 
 
 1799. EXPEDTTION TO HOLLAND. 167 
 
 acteristic manliness he boldly and steadily defended 
 the policy that had been adopted ; but as he gra- 
 dually came to see more clearly the serious difficul- 
 ties and obstacles which must be encountered, and, 
 if possible, overcome, in an extended scale of opera- 
 tionSj he attached more value to an attack on the 
 Helder and the capture of the Dutch fleet ; and in 
 his future conduct, as a War Minister, the instruc- 
 tion and experience which he then acquired pro- 
 duced a happy and beneficial influence on his policy. 
 The views and projects of the Ministers with respect 
 to the invasion of Holland by the combined forces 
 of England and Russia, as well as the opinions of 
 Sir Ralph, have now been unfolded as far and as 
 accurately as the materials which were accessible 
 permitted. 
 
 There is little to be told that can revive interest 
 in the details of the short campaign in Holland. 
 The ability and spirit with which the landing at the 
 Helder was effected, and the uniform bravery dis- 
 played by the troops, are facts which have been 
 universally recognised as honourable to the skdl of 
 the commander, and to the energy and dauntless 
 courage of the English army. It is equally true 
 that the rare quality of moral courage was never 
 called into action under more painful circumstances 
 
168 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 than at the close of this campaign, when officers, 
 who were ambitious of military fame, and who com- 
 manded a defeated but not dispirited army, found 
 themselves compelled, by a strong and iiTcsistible 
 sense of public duty, to assent to a convention which 
 they were well aware would wound the pride and 
 damp the spirit of the country which they served. 
 
 The leading events of the campaign shall now be 
 traced, not with the hope of throwing any new light 
 on the military talents of Sir Ealph, but with the 
 view of introducing such incidents as are illustrative 
 of the motives which governed some important de- 
 cisions, and are characteristic of Sir Ralph and of 
 those with whom he had intimate relations. 
 
 The arrangements having been completed, 10,000 
 troops were embarked, and the fleet sailed with a 
 fair wind on the 13 th of August, under the com- 
 mand of Admiral Mitchell. 
 
 On the 14th, as has been already stated. Sir 
 Ealph communicated to Admiral Mitchell his inten- 
 tion to make an attack on the Helder, and he 
 instantly replied that he cordially approved of the 
 decision, and that he would zealously co-operate 
 with the army in the undertaking. On the follow- 
 ing day, Sir Ralph having had an interview with 
 the officer who had been sent to Lord Duncan, 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 169 
 
 communicated to Mr. Dundas that nothing had 
 occurred to alter his determination to proceed to 
 the Helder — a decision of which Mr. Dundas ex- 
 pressed his most entire approval in a letter ad- 
 dressed to Sir Ealpli on the 16th August. During 
 the 13 th and 14 th, the wind continued to be 
 favourable, but it was followed by most boisterous 
 weather (very unusual at that season of the year). 
 It was not until the 21st that the weather became 
 propitious, and every preparation was then made for 
 landing on the 22d ; but again the weather became 
 boisterous, and the fleet was obliged to put to sea- 
 It was not until the evening of the 25 th that the 
 weather cleared up, and, on the 26tli of August, the 
 fleet came to anchor under the shore of the Helder, 
 and the troops began to disembark at dayhght on 
 the 27th. During the delay occasioned by the 
 adverse winds, the commanders adhered so steadily 
 to their purpose, that they resolved not to abandon 
 their intention of attacking the Helder, unless they 
 should be compelled to do so by the want of water 
 and provisions. On the 2 2d, General Brune, who 
 commanded the united force of the French and 
 Dutch Republics, was apprised of the real destination 
 of the armament, and he instantly gave directions 
 to General Daendels to proceed to North Holland 
 
170 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 and assemble his division, which consisted of 4300 
 men, with six pieces of artillery, and which were 
 already cantoned at Schlagenburg under General 
 Van Guericke. On the 25 th, General Daendels had 
 collected a force between the Helder and Haarlem 
 consisting of 10,300 men. From Huisduinen, near 
 the Helder to the mouth of the Meuse, the coast of 
 North Holland is bounded by a chain of sand-hills 
 of various heights, and interrupted at intervals by 
 openings towards the land. Between Huisduinen 
 and Calandzoog the sand-hills rest on the basis of 
 an ancient dyke, called Sand Dyke, at the foot of 
 which the sands have gradually accumulated, and 
 the shore between the hills and the sea is not 
 more, in some places, than 1000 paces broad, and 
 in others not more than 200. At three o'clock 
 in the morning of the 27th, the boats, with the 
 troops on board, were assembled, and began to 
 move towards the shore. Some small armed vessels 
 opened a brisk fire to clear the coast, under cover 
 of which the troops, commanded by Sir James Pul- 
 teney, amounting to between 2000 and 2500 men, 
 efi^ected a landing. "Although," says Sir Kalph 
 in his ojficial despatch, " the enemy did not oppose 
 our landing, yet the first division had scarcely begun 
 to move forward before they got into action, ^^'hich 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. I7l 
 
 continued from five o'clock in the morning till 
 three o'clock in the afternoon. The enemy had 
 assembled a very considerable body of infantry, 
 cavalry, and artillery, near Calandzoog, and made 
 repeated attacks on our right with fresh troops. 
 Our position was on a ridge of sand-hills stretching 
 along the coast from north to south. Our right 
 flank was unavoidably exposed to the whole fire of 
 the enemy. We had nowhere sufiicient ground on 
 our right to form more than a battalion in line, yet, 
 on the whole, the position, though singular, was not 
 in our situation disadvantageous, having neither 
 cavalry nor artillery. By the courage and per- 
 severance of the troops, the enemy were fairly worn 
 out, and obliged to retire in the evening to a position 
 two leagues in their rear. The contest was arduous, 
 and the loss has been considerable." Arrangements 
 had been made for attacking the Helder, which 
 contained a garrison of 2000 men, at daybreak of 
 the morning of the 28th, "but about eight o'clock 
 in the evening of the 27th, the Dutch fleet in the 
 Nieuve Diep got under way, and the troops were 
 withdrawn. About nine o'clock at night. General 
 Moore took possession of that important post, in 
 which he found a numerous artillery of the best 
 kind, both of heavy and field train." 
 
172 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 The numerical loss of the English in this action 
 was 5 7 killed, of whom three were officers ; 371 were 
 wounded, of whom eighteen were officers ; and 2 6 
 rank and file were missing. The loss of the enemy 
 was greater than had been expected. General Daen- 
 dels, in his official report, states that the action began 
 early in the morning, and lasted till evening, having 
 cost the loss in killed, wounded, and missing, of 
 1400 men, of whom fifty-seven were officers. It is 
 possible, however, that in this statement. General 
 Daendels may have included those who deserted. 
 The efiect of these operations was decisive as to the 
 fate of the Dutch fleet, which was reduced to the 
 alternative of surrendering to the Stadtholder or to 
 the English, They chose the former alternative, 
 and, on the 3 0th of August, they smTcndered to the 
 Stadtholder. 
 
 The complete success of these first operations, 
 which secm'ed the possession of the fort of the 
 Helder and the Dutch fleet, did not alter the 
 opinion which Sir Ealph had formed and ex- 
 pressed as to the ultimate result of the expedition 
 in which he was embarked. He persevered zeal- 
 ously in the performance of his military duty, and 
 lie was supported by the consciousness that he had 
 fulfilled his obligations to his countr}^ by having 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 173 
 
 most unreservedly communicated his opinions to 
 tlie Ministers. In writing to Mr. Dundas on 28th 
 of August, the day after their first success, he says, 
 " We have succeeded in our enterprise, which, as far 
 as I can be allowed to judge, was most precarious, 
 and which, if I am to give an opinion, ought not to 
 have been risked. It is impossible as yet to form 
 any opinion as to the disposition of the country. 
 We shaU observe strict order, and give every kind 
 of protection to persons of aU descriptions. We are 
 now to make the most of our success, and as soon as 
 we shall be enabled to procure horses and waggons, 
 we shaU endeavour to push on to Alkmaar, where 
 the country becomes more cultivated and produc- 
 tive. As we have now a secure port, I hope there 
 will be no delay in sending us three or four regi- 
 ments of Light Dragoons, as the want of cavalry is 
 sorely felt. The force that opposed us yesterday 
 was about 7000 men, well clothed, well armed, and 
 weU disciplined. They may be said to have behaved 
 better than we expected. They certainly at times 
 pushed our people with spirit and perseverance, as 
 they returned several times to the attack. I could 
 not yesterday sufficiently admire the spirit of the 
 British soldier. Without any sort of discipline, they 
 did in their- own way as much as could have been 
 
174 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 expected from veteran troops. Sir James Pulteney 
 really surprised me. He showed ardour and intelli- 
 gence, and did himself honour. I have reason to be 
 satisfied with all the general officers, although they 
 did not all show the same intelligence. Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Hay, whom I highly valued, was killed by 
 my side. He has left a widow and six daughters 
 without a shiUing. I trust that you will recommend 
 Colonel Hay's family to the King's goodness. If I 
 have endeavoured to render any ser\dce to the public 
 on this occasion, the only reward that I ask is, that 
 tliis poor family may not be left destitute.'^ 
 
 On the same day on which Sir Ralph wrote to 
 Mr. Dundas, he wrote a short letter to one of his 
 own family, in which he says, — " This expedition 
 has hung heavy on my mind ever since it was 
 thought of. The risk was far too great, and now 
 all is not dayhght." 
 
 The success at the Helder was acliieved under 
 circumstances which added very materially to the 
 perilous character of the undertaking. Many of the 
 troops were raw, and, as Sir Kalph says, without 
 discipline, and from the delay caused by adverse 
 winds, a knowledge of the destination of the arma- 
 ment was acquired by the enemy in such time as 
 enabled them to make preparations to meet the 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 175 
 
 landing on the coast. If the weather had been such 
 as was to be expected in the month of August, the 
 landing might have been effected on the 19th, and 
 before the point selected for attack was known to 
 the enemy. Even if it had been effected on the 
 2 2d, as was at one time hoped would have been the 
 case, the force assembled by the enemy would only 
 have been 4300 instead of 7000, with which the 
 British troops had to contend on the 27th; but 
 although the delay caused by unfavourable weather 
 was no doubt a serious disadvantage, the defenders 
 of the expedition exaggerated its consequences when 
 they represented it as the real source of the failure 
 of the enterprise. The native valour of the EngHsh 
 troops, the completeness and success of the arrange- 
 ments made for their landing, and the confidence re- 
 posed both by oflficers and men in the experience and 
 abihty of the commander, overcame all difficulties. 
 
 In the letter which Sir Ealph wrote to Mr. 
 Dundas, he did not mean to undervalue the im- 
 portance of the success which had been achieved. 
 The capture of the Dutch fleet, which he regarded 
 as certain, was calculated to sustain the spirit of 
 the English public, and if the expedition had then 
 terminated, the disheartening failure which he an- 
 ticipated from engaging in more extended opera- 
 
176 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 tions would have been avoided. His object was to 
 show that his own opinion remained unshaken, and 
 he wished to repress those sanguine and, as he 
 thought, unfounded hopes wliich would be raised 
 by a first success. It was, perhaps, too much to 
 expect that Ministers who were so deeply committed 
 should consent to review their position after the 
 surrender of the Dutch fleet ; but if they had been 
 wise enough then to pause, the lives of many brave 
 men would have been saved, and an English army 
 would not have been indebted for its safety to a 
 humiliating convention. 
 
 On the evening of the 28th, a reinforcement 
 under General Don, wliich had left England many 
 days after the fleet, arrived at the Helder. 
 
 As soon as the English became masters of the Zuy- 
 der Zee, by the surrender of the Dutch ships of war. 
 Sir Ralph determined to advance, but he was unable 
 to do so until the 1st of September, from the diffi- 
 culty of finding a sufficient number of horses to 
 transport the subsistence of the troops which it was 
 necessary to bring from the Helder. On that day 
 Sir Ralph advanced with 12,000 men, leaving some 
 troops in the Helder to protect and escort the stores 
 and supplies, and took up a strong position at 
 Potten, on the German Ocean, with his left at Ouder- 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 177 
 
 sluys on the Zuyder Zee. This position was well 
 chosen and strong, for enabling Sir Ralph to hold 
 his ground securely until the Duke of York with 
 the reinforcement from England, and the Russians, 
 who were on the sea, should arrive. The strength 
 of this position has been minutely described by an 
 officer who served in Holland, and who has pub- 
 lished an account of the campaign. His view was 
 that the English object of the expedition having 
 been accomplished by the surrender of the Dutch 
 fleet, the position ought to have been fortified and 
 left under the protection of a small force, while the 
 rest of the English army crossed the Zuyder Zee, 
 " instead of setting the English army, as the Mini- 
 sters or Generals did, to fight their way to Amster- 
 dam through the long defile of North Holland." 
 This remark is only another proof of how rashly the 
 expedition had been framed from its outset, for 
 there is no doubt that the plan of operations on the 
 Yssel had been maturely considered and rejected by 
 the Ministers in England, because it would have 
 been, in fact, the renewal of a Continental War, by 
 sieges and battles, which was never contemplated 
 by the projectors of the enterprise, who proposed, 
 as is stated in the treaty with Russia, that an eflbrt 
 should be made to liberate Holland by a sudden 
 
 M 
 
178 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 attack, aided by the Dutch people, whom they sup- 
 posed to be desirous to shake off the French yoke. 
 At all events, it is plain that Sir Ealph was not one 
 of the Generals who set the Army the hard task of 
 forcing their way to Amsterdam through North 
 Holland, as he thought the whole plan impracticable, 
 although as a soldier he exerted all his energies to 
 insm^e success and to maintain the honom' of the 
 English arms. 
 
 In pursuance of his instructions. Sir Ralph in- 
 trusted to General Don, a letter addressed to the 
 Batavian Republic, and directed him to proceed to 
 the head-quarters of General Daendels, and to apply 
 for passports to enable him to execute his commis- 
 sion. General Daendels declined to decide the 
 point, and referred it to General Brune, who refused 
 to grant the passports, and General Don was obhged 
 to return without having been able to execute his 
 instructions. The enemy were aware that Sir 
 Ralph was only holding his position until he re- 
 ceived large reinforcements, and Sir Ralph, on his 
 part, was fully prepared to expect that the enemy 
 would be anxious to make an impression before the 
 whole of the allied English and Russian forces were 
 united. Accordingly, he had been vigilant and 
 active in strengthening his position. The right was 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1V9 
 
 protected by an entrencliment, and by gunboats, 
 stationed close to the shore. The left was the ob- 
 ject of similar attention, as all the provisions from 
 the Helder were landed there, and it was accordingly 
 fortified with care. The intermediate points were 
 judiciously strengthened, and every precaution had 
 been adopted to insure success in repelling the an- 
 ticipated attack. At daybreak, on the morning of 
 the 10 th of September, the enemy commenced an 
 attack which was more particularly directed against 
 the centre and right of the English force. The 
 right column of the enemy, under General Daendels, 
 attacked the village of St. Martin's, but not with 
 much spirit. The main attacks were made by the 
 Dutch troops, wliich composed the centre column of 
 the enemy, and which marched on Krabbendam and 
 De Zype, and by the left column, composed of 
 French troops, which attacked the position of 
 General Burrard, who commanded the second bri- 
 gade of Guards. The enemy displayed great bra- 
 very and perseverance, but they were everywhere 
 foiled by the strength of the position and the deter- 
 mined courage of the English troops. About ten 
 o'clock the enemy retreated towards Alkmaar, leav- 
 ing behind them many dead, some wounded, a piece 
 of cannon, a number of waggons, pontoons, and por- 
 
180 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 table bridges. The loss of the English was, thii'ty- 
 seven rank and file killed, eleven ofiicers, three Ser- 
 jeants, 131 rank and file wounded. The loss of the 
 enemy in the two columns which were principally 
 engaged was estimated at 1000 in killed and 
 wounded. 
 
 The time was now come when Sir Ralph was to 
 surrender the command to the Duke of York. He 
 had executed with success the portion of the service 
 that had been intrusted to him. The landing at 
 the Helder, and the capture of that fort had been 
 efiected, a safe place of disembarkation had been 
 secured for the English and Eussian troops as they 
 successively arrived, and he had occupied a strong 
 position which he had been able to maintain against 
 the assault of the enemy. 
 
 These successes caused general rejoicing in Eng- 
 land. Mr. Dundas's own appreciation of the import- 
 ance of the service rendered by Sir Ralph, and his 
 recognition of the serious observations he had made 
 before the expedition sailed, with regard to the diffi- 
 culties to be encountered, are shown by the follow- 
 ing extract from a private letter addressed to Sir 
 Ralph, dated "Walmer Castle, 3d September 1799 : — 
 
 " Yom* despatches reached me on Barham Do\vns 
 this morning at ten o'clock. You will not expect "^ 
 
1799. . EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 181 
 
 me to detail to you my feelings of satisfaction on 
 the present occasion ; the service was the most im- 
 portant that could be performed, and it has been 
 not only well, but completely done ; there cannot 
 be two opinions on that subject. Notwithstanding 
 your opinion as to the danger of the attempt, you 
 cannot expect me to say that I am sorry I preferred 
 my own to your better judgment. Admiral Mitchell 
 has completely kept his word with me. Your letters 
 and his do honour to yourselves and to each other." 
 
 In another private letter from Mr. Dundas to Sir 
 Ralph's eldest son, dated also from Walmer Castle, 
 but written on the 6th of September 1799, he thus 
 expresses himself : — 
 
 "You win naturally suppose how happy I am, 
 both on public and private grounds, at the success 
 which has attended this most important enterprise. 
 Gratified as the country now is by the complete 
 success, neither the Minister who planned, nor the 
 General who executed, the enterprise, would have 
 escaped censure if it had failed. In so far as I 
 could, I took the responsibility on my shoulders. 
 From what Sii' Ealph stated to me, I was aware that 
 risks were to be run, not justifiable by the rules of 
 military prudence, and therefore, when I gave my 
 last instructions, I expressly took the responsibility 
 
182 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 on myself. Thanks however to Heaven and to Sir 
 Ralph, we stand on a pinnacle of glory and of fame. 
 I cannot better convey to you what is felt on the 
 subject than by transmitting to you a copy of my 
 letter of thanks, dated 4th September 1799, which 
 I have given to the Duke of York to deliver to Sir 
 Ralph." 
 
 The public letter of thanks alluded to above by 
 Mr. Dundas, as having been sent to Sir Ralph, con- 
 tains the foUomng expressions : — 
 
 " The anxiety in which His Majesty and the 
 public had remained respecting the situation of the 
 expedition under your command, was fortunately 
 and most pleasingly reheved by the arrival of Major, 
 now Lieutenant-Colonel Kempt, with your despatch 
 of the 28th ultimo, which was immediately laid be- 
 fore the King. It is impossible for me to convey 
 to you, in adequate terms, the sense His Majesty 
 entertains of the steady and enterprising bravery of 
 the army under your command in the arduous and 
 ever-memorable action of the 27th ultimo. High 
 as the character of the British Army stood before 
 this event, it is impossible that the landing at the 
 Helder point, preceded and attended by so many 
 untoward difficulties, and the battle by which it 
 was immediately followed, should not attract the 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 183 
 
 admiration of Europe, and raise that character still 
 higher in every part of the world, as it has done 
 already in the eyes of their Sovereign and their 
 countrymen at home. 
 
 " The cool judgment, military ardour, and supe- 
 rior abilities you have displayed on the occasion has 
 justly drawn from His Majesty the warmest com- 
 mendations. It is to these great qualities directing 
 the enterprising courage of the troops, and to the 
 able assistance of Lieutenant-General Sir James 
 Pulteney, and the other general and staff officers 
 engaged on the occasion, that His Majesty ascribes, 
 under Providence, this brilliant opening of the cam- 
 paign, and the important events by which it has 
 been so rapidly improved." 
 
 On the same occasion the Corporation of the City 
 of London conferred upon Sir Ralph their public 
 thanks, together with the freedom of the city, and 
 voted him a sword of the value of one hundred 
 guineas. 
 
 Sir Ealph was naturally desirous that the com- 
 mand of an expedition, of which he thought un- 
 favourably, should be, as speedily as possible, placed 
 under the guidance of the commander to whom it 
 was to be intrusted. But while he urged that the 
 Duke of York should promptly assume the com- 
 
184 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 mand, he gave the assurance that he would serve 
 under His Eoyal Highness with as much constancy 
 and zeal as if acting for himself, — a pledge which he 
 most gallantly and honourably redeemed. It only 
 remains to pass in review the fruitless display of 
 valour, and the sacrifice of valuable lives which pre- 
 ceded the humihating catastrophe of this ill-advised 
 expedition. 
 
 The Duke of York landed at the Helder on 
 the evening of the 13th of September, where he 
 found that the first division of the Kussians, 
 under General Hermann, had akeady arrived, and 
 they were followed in a few days by the second 
 division. Wlien the command of the united forces 
 of England and Eussia was intrusted to the Duke 
 of York, it was arranged that on all important occa- 
 sions reference should be made to the opinions of a 
 council of war, to be composed of Sir David Dundas, 
 Sir Ralph Abercromby, Sir James Pulteney, the 
 Russian commander, and Lord Chatham. The force 
 now placed under the command of the Duke of 
 York amounted to thirty-tln^ee thousand men. The 
 artillery were supplied with horses sent from Eng- 
 land, but the commissariat and baggage were in- 
 sufficiently provided with the means of rapid or 
 continued movement. The Allies had, at first, a 
 
 i 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 185 
 
 decided superiority in numbers, but that was the 
 only advantage they possessed, as the enemy were 
 daily increasing and concentrating their force, and 
 were skilfully availing themselves of the means of 
 defence which the country presented, and of the 
 facilities which water carriage afforded for estabHsh- 
 ing magazines of military stores and provisions. 
 
 If there ever existed any real desire on the part 
 of the Dutch people to co-operate with the Allies in 
 an effort to re establish the independence of their 
 country, it was repressed by the balanced state of 
 the war, and they invariably watched the course of 
 events with sullen indifference. The Dutch troops 
 had fought with bravery, and there had been few 
 desertions. The people were sufficiently disposed 
 to sell their produce for profit, but, in all other 
 respects, they appeared to be listless spectators of 
 the scene. The hereditary Prince of Orange had 
 joined the army, where he was met by no indica- 
 tions of any support of an encouraging nature from 
 the inhabitants, who, it is true, did not appear to be 
 disposed, on the other hand, to assist the French, 
 although they were daily increasing in number, 
 and strengthening themselves in their position, and 
 the season was advancing, which was favourable to 
 them. On the whole, it must be admitted that the 
 
186 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 Duke of York assumed the command under circum- 
 stances not merely unpromising, but which presented 
 the most formidable difficulties. 
 
 The plan of the campaign, and the consequent ope- 
 rations, were regulated and directed by the Council 
 of War. AYhat part Sir Ealph took in the delibera- 
 tions of the Council, and how far their decisions were 
 sanctioned by his opinion, cannot now be known, 
 as he always obsei'ved the strictest silence on that 
 subject. It woidd perhaps not be uncandid to infer 
 that he did not invariably concur in the decisions of 
 the Council, as the only occasion on which he freely 
 and voluntarily broke silence was with respect to 
 the Convention, of which, however unpopular, he 
 always took a large share of the responsibility. The 
 Duke of York and his Council appear to have been 
 of opinion, that as the season was far advanced, and 
 the enemy were daily becoming stronger by the ac- 
 cessions to their number, and the increased strength 
 of then' positions, it was necessary that whatever 
 was to be attempted should be done quickly. It 
 was decided that a vigorous effort should be made 
 in the hope that a brilliant success might open the 
 way to Amsterdam. On the 19th of September an 
 attack was made, and the army advanced in four 
 columns. The left column under Sir Ralph marched 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 187 
 
 on the evening of the 18th towards Hoorn, the 
 object of this movement being to make a decisive 
 impression in the event of the other columns being 
 successful on the right of the enemy, which had 
 been left somewhat exposed. The main attack was 
 to be made by the Russians, who were to drive the 
 enemy from the heights of Camperduyn, and finally 
 to take possession of Bergen. The two centre co- 
 lumns were destined to co-operate with and to assist 
 the main attack that was to be made by the Rus- 
 sians. It had been ordered that the attack should 
 commence at daybreak, but two hours before that 
 time a portion of the Russians advanced, and General 
 Hermann, either because he felt that it was neces- 
 sary to support those who had already marched for- 
 ward, or being himself impatient to begin the action, 
 caused a canal to be passed an hour before dayHght, 
 and commenced the attack on the entrenchments of 
 the enemy. The Russians pressed forward with an 
 energy and ardour that was irresistible, and they 
 obtained a brief possession of Bergen, which was the 
 object of the battle ; but in acliieving that success, 
 all order and discipline were overthrown, and the 
 French, profiting from the disorder of the assailants, 
 rallied and repulsed them, taking General Hermann 
 prisoner. The centre colunms, which had obeyed 
 
188 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 orders, began the attack at the appointed time, and 
 were in the course of effecting the duties assigned to 
 them, but the defeat of the Russians rendered their 
 efforts unavailing, and, after having given all the 
 assistance in their power to their impetuous allies, 
 they retired in good order. 
 
 Sir Ralph had taken possession of Hoorn, which 
 he had been unable to reach until some hours after 
 the appointed time, owing to the badness of the 
 roads ; and, after resting his troops, he was on the 
 point of proceeding to execute the portion of the 
 plan which had been intrusted to him, when he was 
 informed of what had occurred on the right, and he 
 was personally ordered to retire, as his advice was 
 required without delay. The division returned with- 
 out having been impeded by the enemy. 
 
 If tliis battle had been gained by the Allies, it 
 may reasonably be doubted whether it would have 
 been so decisive as to have realized the important 
 results that were anticipated. It is very probable 
 that, but for the impetuosity of the Russians, the 
 event of the battle might have been different. They 
 did succeed in obtaining a temporary possession of 
 Bergen, but that success was achieved by a disobe- 
 dience of orders in commencing the attack before 
 the appointed time, at the risk of preventing the 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 189 
 
 other columns from being ready at the proper mo- 
 ment to follow it up ; and the want of discipline on 
 the part of the Eussians converted what had been a 
 momentary success into a defeat. The loss of the 
 Enghsh in this action was. fifty officers and 1200 
 men, and that of the Eussians at least 2000. The 
 loss of the enemy must have been considerably less 
 than that of the Alhes. The capture of General 
 Hermann, who was made prisoner, was severely felt. 
 He was a brave and zealous, though perhaps not an 
 experienced or skilful officer, and he was beloved 
 by his troops. One inevitable consequence of this 
 unfortunate battle was, that the Eussians naturally 
 endeavoured to excuse their own rashness, impetu- 
 osity, and disobedience of orders, by throwing the 
 blame on their Allies for not supporting them. It 
 is plain that there was not the slightest foundation 
 for that charge, but the dislike and jealousy which, 
 from that day, existed between the Eussians and the 
 English, added one more to the many difficulties to 
 be encountered in this hopeless undertaking. 
 
 After the action of the 19 th, the armies maintained 
 the ground which they had respectively occupied, 
 and General Brune having discovered the danger 
 to which he had been exposed, of having his right 
 turned by the Eussians, and his rear attacked by the 
 
190 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 division under Sir Ralph, determined to strengthen 
 liis position. For this purpose he laid a portion 
 of the country under water, and, by so doing, he 
 was relieved from the necessity of defending, except 
 by small detachments, the country between the 
 Zuyder Zee and Alkmaar, and forced the Duke of 
 York to make his attack in front. None of the 
 difficulties wliich were to be encountered by the 
 Allies had been overcome, but were, on the contrary, 
 increased. The season had advanced, the enemy 
 were strengthened, and all hopes of support or sym- 
 pathy on the part of the Dutch people had vanished. 
 The position of the Duke of York had become 
 perilous in the extreme. It was, however, deter- 
 mined to make one more effort, and the remain- 
 der of the month of September was employed by 
 both armies in preparations for the coming con- 
 ffict. It was not until the 2d of October that the 
 Duke of York was enabled to make his great 
 attack. On that day the army was divided into 
 four columns, and to Sir Ealph the execution of 
 the main attack was intrusted. The column 
 under his command was directed to march along 
 the shore, to turn the left flank of the enemy 
 and to fall on their rear in case they persevered in 
 attempting to maintain themselves in Bergen. 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 191 
 
 Another column, composed of Russians, under 
 General Essen, wlio had succeeded General Hermann 
 in the command, were to attack Bergen in front, 
 while it was to be taken in reverse by Sir Ralph. 
 A portion of the third column was to support 
 General Essen, and the remainder to attack and 
 carry Schoreldam. The fourth column, commanded 
 by Sir James Pulteney, was to threaten the enemy's 
 right, and to be kept in reserve to take advantage 
 of such favourable opportunities as might occur. 
 By this arrangement the two wings were composed 
 of English, and the two centre columns of Russian 
 and English troops. After very considerable efforts 
 the enemy were driven from the sandhills on the 
 coast, and if General Essen could have been pre- 
 vailed upon to have advanced on Bergen, the French 
 column, which was retuing and almost turned, 
 might have been cut off. The column under Sir 
 David Dundas was too weak to attack Bergen alone, 
 having been unable to bring the artillery over the 
 sandhills, and was therefore obliged to be satisfied 
 with maintaining the ground that had been gained. 
 If the success of the column under Sir Ralph had 
 been seconded by cordial co-operation on the part 
 of General Essen, and by an effective execution of 
 the duty intrusted to him, the results of the action 
 
192 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 would have been more important, as will appear 
 from tlie public despatch of the Duke of York, who 
 thus describes the progress of the column com- 
 manded by Sir Ralph : — " The main body of Sir 
 Ralph Abercromby's column had proceeded without 
 meeting much resistance in the early part of the 
 day, but was, nevertheless, much inconvenienced, 
 and his troops harassed by the necessity of de- 
 taching continually into the sandhills to his left to 
 cover that flank against the troops whom the enemy 
 had placed on them. The admirable disposition, 
 however, which he made of his troops, and their 
 determined spirit and gallantry, enabled him to 
 arrive within a mile of Egmont. Here he was 
 seriously opposed by a considerable corps of French 
 infantry which occupied Egmont-op-Zee, and the 
 high sandhills in its front, and who had formed a 
 very strong corps of cavahy and artillery on the 
 beach. The engagement was maintained during 
 several hours with the greatest obstinacy, and in no 
 instance were the abilities of a commander, or the 
 heroic perseverance of troops more highly con- 
 spicuous. Animated by the example of Sir Ralph 
 Abercromby, and the general and other officers 
 under him, the troops sustained every effort made 
 upon them by an enemy their superior in numbers 
 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 193 
 
 and mucli favoured hj the strength of their posi- 
 tion." On this occasion Sir Ralph had two horses 
 shot under him. 
 
 The Duke of York in this despatch veiy correctly 
 described the feeling of the Army with respect to 
 the ability of the commander and the bravery of 
 the troops, displayed in the battle at Egmont, 
 which was generally regarded as not only the 
 most distinguished, but as the redeeming event in 
 the campaign in Holland. An intercepted letter, 
 written during the action by General Borstel to 
 General Vandamme, who did not join the army till 
 near the close of the action, tln^ows light on the 
 events of the day, and on the motive which urged 
 the French to make so persevering a resistance at 
 Egmont. General Borstel expresses the greatest 
 alarm for the fate of the French column which was 
 in imminent danger of being either cut off or wholly 
 routed if General Essen had advanced on Bergen, as 
 he was pressed to have done. The object, therefore, 
 of making such an obstinate resistance at Egmont, 
 was to give time to the French column to retreat. 
 The result of the action was that the Allies remained 
 in possession of the field of l^attle, and the enemy 
 abandoned the positions they had occupied as well 
 as an extent of country which, under ordinary cir- 
 
 N 
 
194 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND, 1799. 
 
 cumstances, might have been regarded as an ade- 
 quate reward of victory ; but although the enemy 
 retired it was only to occupy positions still stronger 
 than those wliich they had abandoned, and to re- 
 ceive large reinforcements which were hastening to 
 join them. The force of the Allies had sustained 
 an additional loss of 2000 men in killed and 
 wounded, and the liberation of Holland was as 
 distant and hopeless as ever. At each succeeding 
 stage in the progress of the expedition the same 
 difficulty presented itself — How to persevere with 
 any reasonable hope of success, or how to retire 
 mthout discredit. It is not surprising that a 
 young Prince placed at the head of the AlUed force, 
 should be desirous to persevere as long as there 
 existed even a ray of- hope. It is not surprising 
 that the Council which had been appointed to assist 
 the Duke of York in carrying into execution a 
 plan wliich had been adopted by England and by 
 Eussia, should be slow to incur the responsibility 
 of abandoning the expedition at the moment when 
 the enemy appeared to have sustained a defeat. The 
 consequence was, that it was determined that an- 
 other effort should be made. 
 
 On the 6th of October, the Duke of York 
 pushed forward the advanced posts of liis right 
 
170!). EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 195 
 
 and centre, with a view of securing for the dif- 
 ferent cohimns points of departure more free and 
 nearer to the enemy, when he should make the 
 general attack for which he was then prepar- 
 ing. At first this movement was made without 
 difficulty, and without threatening to involve any 
 other consequences than those which had been anti- 
 cipated. The Russians wishing to strengthen their 
 position pushed on beyond the limits that had been 
 prescribed, and the enemy, not doubting that a 
 general attack was intended on their position, re- 
 inforced their advanced guard, and gradually a 
 general action ensued, contrary to the intention of 
 both parties. At nightfall the French retired, and 
 left the Allies in possession of the post for which 
 they had been contending. The details of such a 
 conflict would be devoid of all interest, although it 
 was very bloody, and its consequences decided the 
 fate of the expedition. The loss of the Allies in 
 this action was not less than two thousand five 
 hundred men, of whom about seven hundred were 
 prisoners. 
 
 This unexpected action extinguished all hope 
 of being able to make such an impression on 
 the enemy as would justify farther perseverance in 
 the enterprise. Under this impression Sir Ralph 
 
1 9 n EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 Abercromby, Sir David Dundas, and Sir James 
 Pulteney, signed a paper, which they delivered to 
 the Duke of York, and in which they assigned their 
 reasons for recommending His Royal Highness to 
 retreat to the position of the Zype, and there to wait 
 for instructions from England. The Generals re- 
 presented to His Royal Highness that in the five 
 actions in which the Army had been engaged, their 
 loss, on the whole, amounted to between nine and 
 ten thousand men, which could not be easily re- 
 placed, while the enemy, whose loss had not been 
 less considerable, had received and were receiving 
 large reinforcements ; they enumerated the various 
 difficulties which had impeded the transport of pro- 
 visions and supplies, and they stated that the posi- 
 tion which the Army occupied afforded no natural 
 advantages, and could not be improved by art, and 
 that even if they gained the position of Beverwyk, 
 they could not maintain it, as they possessed no 
 certam means for the conveyance of provisions, and 
 that they would have the formidable French Ai-my 
 in their front, and the greatest part of the Dutch 
 troops on the left flank and in the rear. Finally, 
 they submitted to His Royal Highness that the 
 expedition had been undertaken in the hope that 
 the Dutch people would join heartily in an effort 
 
 il 
 
1799. , EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 197 
 
 for their own liberation, and that the French being 
 pressed on the most vulnerable points of their fron- 
 tiers would be unable to defend those that were 
 more distant and less important, but that both these 
 expectations had been signally disappointed, as there 
 had been no movement on the part of the Dutch, 
 and the French had been able to reinforce their 
 army in Holland to an extent that rendered the 
 prosecution of the enterprise hopeless. This reason- 
 ing was conclusive, and amply justified the opinions 
 of those who predicted failure in a protracted effort 
 for the expulsion of the French, and the restora- 
 tion of the independence of Holland. 
 
 In compliance with the advice of the three Gene- 
 rals, the Duke of York, on the morning of the 7th of 
 October, began to draw off his army, with the view 
 of re-occupying their former position of the Zype. 
 This object was accomplished without loss, as the 
 roads had been so much cut up and damaged, that 
 the enemy were unable to harass them in their re- 
 treat. 
 
 On the 9th of October, the Duke of York in- 
 formed the Ministers of his return to the position 
 of the Zype, and applied for further instructions. 
 Sir Ralph, at the same time, addressed the following- 
 letter to Mr. Huskisson :— " Schagenhurg, October 
 
198 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 10, 1799. — Colonel Brownrigg, who goes to Eng- 
 land with the Duke's despatches, will fully explain 
 to you our situation, and will show to Mr. Dundas 
 a paper signed by myself, Sir David Dundas, and 
 Sir James Pulteney, in which we give some of the 
 principal reasons why we thought it advisable to 
 resume the position of the Zype. It is impossible 
 to conceal from the most short-sighted the situation 
 in which we are placed. I need not, therefore, point 
 it out to you. What depends on us shall be done ; 
 the position is good, the army still numerous, and 
 the troops not defeated. It is impossible, however, 
 that we can remain here long ; the means of sub- 
 sistence must fni], and our wants must increase. 
 Should the enemy press on us, we must once more 
 attack him, Imt to advance into the country is im- 
 practical)le. 
 
 " From the moment of our arrival, orders were 
 given to fortify the Helder, but the means of execu- 
 tion have been few, and no great progress has been 
 made, and it will now be expedient to forward, with 
 every possible exertion, the fortifications. But, 
 above all, you must seriously consider what you are 
 to do with an army of 24,000 men, cooped up in a 
 corner of an impracticable country. I am unwilling 
 to write to Mr. Dundas on the subject ; my mind 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND, 199 
 
 always went in opposition to the undertaking, and I 
 spoke my sentiments on it so fully before I left 
 England, tliat it is decent to be silent in my corre- 
 spondence with him, or the consequences likely to 
 result from it. We are certainly unfortunate in our 
 Eussian Allies. The less, however, that is said on 
 that head the better ; we must endeavour to keep 
 them in good humour, and there are no such means 
 as giving them meat and drink. It has been recom- 
 mended to the Duke to give them something in lieu 
 of bat and forage money, an allowance for horses, 
 and a proportion of meat to the men. 
 
 " I much doubt if any attempt on Friesland or 
 Groningen is either practicable or expedient. As 
 yet, the Army is not sickly, Init sickness must neces- 
 sarily come. As to myself, I do not sleep on a bed 
 of roses. I feel deeply interested for the young 
 Prince who commands, and it is my anxious wish 
 to be useful to him in any shape. I should not be 
 pardonable if I omitted mentioning, in the fullest 
 manner, the abilities and heroism of General Moore. 
 I have seen so much of his conduct, that I can 
 speak confidently. To him you may safely look as 
 a most promising ofiicer ; he goes to England, 
 covered with honourable scars, and were I King of 
 England I should administer a salve." 
 
200 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 Before Colonel Brownrigg could have returned from 
 England, and before any fresh instructions coidd have 
 been received by the Duke of York, a negotiation 
 had been opened mth General Brune. A few brief 
 passages in the letters written by Sir Ralph at this 
 time to one of his oami family throw light on the 
 negotiation, and on liis opinions and conduct at this 
 important crisis. On the 20th of October, he writes : 
 " We have entered into an agreement to withdraw 
 the Allied Army from Holland on or before the 3 Otli 
 of November, and to restore to France and Holland 
 8000 prisoners. An armistice has taken place. 
 AVhat do you think of this ? I have given my con- 
 sent, but I do not consider that this convention 
 gives us any security. The contracting parties are 
 the Duke of York, Admmal Mitchell, and General 
 Brune." On the 31st of October, Sii' Ralph again 
 writes : " I wrote to you on the signing of the Con- 
 vention. "What could tempt the French to agree to 
 it, I cannot conceive. One-half of this Army must 
 have fallen into theii- hands, with all our artillery, 
 stores, etc. It would have overset the Ministry, so 
 great would have been the indignation of the nation, 
 however ill directed. I am sure they ought to thank 
 the Duke of York for listening to the advice which 
 he got on this occasion. Wliether our conduct in 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 201 
 
 approved or not, is to me a matter of indifference, 
 being conscious that we were in the right. The 
 first hint came from the French Army, which was 
 taken up hy the Duke's Etat-Major ; when proposed 
 by them to me, I desired them to put it down in 
 writing. I heartily concurred with them, and de- 
 sired them to carry it to Lord Chatham, which was 
 done. As to the number of prisoners to be returned, 
 whether 5000 or 8000, it appeared to be of no great 
 importance. The chief objects were not to commit, 
 by any act of ours, the Ministry, and not a word to 
 be allowed to be said about the Fleet. All inferior 
 articles were left to be adjusted by General Brune 
 and General Knox. The agreement has been rati- 
 fied, hostages have mutually been given, and more 
 than two-thirds of the Anglo-Russian Army are 
 embarked. It would not now be worth while to 
 break from the Armistice for so small an ol)ject. 
 
 " A great change has taken place in the manners 
 of the French since 1794. They are more perfectly 
 civilized ; they have not exactly the tone of the old 
 system, but more frankness and apparent candour. 
 Nothing can exceed the humanity that has been 
 practised betAveen the rival nations." 
 
 In writing to Mr. Dundas, on the 26 th of Octo- 
 ber, Sir Ralph thus expresses himself : — 
 
202 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 " It has apparently suited tlie convenience of the 
 French Directory to sanction the Armistice. We 
 shall get off with some difficulty, and not without 
 risk, from the badness of the port of the Helder, 
 and the inclemency of the weather. With a superior 
 army in our rear, it is difficult to see how the Army 
 would have got off, especially as the works ordered 
 at the Helder, on my arrival, had been long neglect- 
 ed, and are in a very imperfect state. Whatever 
 may be the opinion of others, I shall l^oldly set my 
 face to the Convention signed by the Duke, and 
 when the welfare of an army is at stake, one cannot 
 allow feehngs and such unmeaning words to have 
 any weight. If an army were so situated as to be 
 able to open a way with their swords, any agree- 
 ment might have been a disgrace, but that was not 
 the case. The army you sent to Holland will return 
 with the real loss of three or four thousand British. 
 Many of the w^ounded and sick will rejoin their 
 regiments. In the spring you will have a fine 
 army if the brigades are put under major-generals 
 who are capalDle of instructmg young officers and 
 training soldiers. They must rfemain stationary, 
 and not be allowed to dance aU over Great Britain. 
 I have been cautious in blaming the Russians. I 
 must, however, acknoAvledge that I have seen no- 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 203 
 
 thing to admire. I am sensible of the great exer- 
 tions made to send a considerable force to Holland. 
 So much is wanting to enable an army to act, that 
 unless we could have kept our ground during the 
 winter, we could not have hoped to be in an active 
 state till spring. From apathy this country seems 
 contented under its present governors. I have not 
 seen anything like opposition, and there have been 
 no acts of cruelty as far as I have heard. The 
 hereditary Prince of Orange is the most ungracious, 
 weak prince in Europe. Except one man from 
 Hoorn, no person has come near him, or had any 
 communication with him. He knows as little of 
 the country as if he had been born in Sweden. He 
 is not a man whom you can support from any 
 motive of personal character. My further ser- 
 vices are not worth offering. I am not, however, 
 discouraged ; and I have but one wish in tliis world, 
 — the honour and welfare of the country." 
 
 A disastrous conclusion to the enterprise had 
 been clearly foreseen by Sir Ealph, who, in a private 
 letter dated on the 30th of September, had endea- 
 voured to prepare the public for such a result. He 
 then wrote : — 
 
 " Our situation does not improve ; the weather is 
 bad, the enemy gain strength from inundations, and 
 
204 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 17t)9. 
 
 they fortify every other pomt. The Russians, entre 
 nous, seem to he a strange kind of people. There 
 may be bravery, but there is no discipHne. The 
 general may cane an officer, but he does not prevent 
 plunder and robbery. Our people have behaved 
 uncommonly well in that respect. We must expect 
 sickness from the climate and the weather, and I 
 wish the nation may prepare itself for a disappoint- 
 ment. If the expedition had ended with the sur- 
 render of the Dutch fleet, everybody would have 
 been satisfied. In short, my reason does not tell 
 me that we are to have any success. Perhaps those 
 who are better informed have a right to see thing's 
 in a different point of \T[ew." 
 
 In reply to the letter of Sii' Ralph, sent by Colonel 
 Brownrigg, Mr. Huskisson wrote what follows, which 
 is important, as containing his views of the campaign 
 in Holland : — 
 
 " I cannot allow Colonel Bro\\Tirio;g to return to 
 
 CO 
 
 head-quarters A\athout thanking you for your letter 
 of the 10th, and expressing how much, on every 
 ground, public and private, I feel gratified at your 
 having, without accident, borne so principal and 
 distinguished a share in the gallant but bloody con- 
 flicts our Army has so honourably sustained in Hol- 
 land. Being at present very much taken up in 
 
irno. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 205 
 
 preparing the despatches to be forwarded by Brown- 
 rigg to his Royal Highness, I cannot enter into a 
 view of your situation. I own, considering the 
 season, the importance of not totally ruining our 
 Army, the apathy of the Dutch, and the efforts of 
 the French, I have wished, since the attack of the 
 19 th, that the campaign had ended with the brilliant 
 coup-de-main that gave us the fleet. That battle 
 opened my eyes on several points, and I believe 
 others saw things as I did, but they are naturally 
 over sanguine. Perhaps in the Army itself this was 
 too much the case, and, if so, their confidence, and, 
 above all, their extreme good conduct, justified the 
 l)rilliant expectations of those who were anxiously 
 watching the course of events at home. I really 
 believe it was a gratifying circumstance to Mr. 
 Dundas to be enabled, with the concurrence of the 
 Duke of York, to recommend to the King to desist 
 from the prosecution of the campaign, and to bring 
 back the troops to this country. He feels, as you 
 do, most anxious for the glory and the safety of his 
 Royal Highness, and, if possible, his conduct during 
 this short campaign has rendered his character more 
 dear to him than it was before he left England. 
 
 " When I venture to mention a military subject, 
 T have no excuse but anxiety for a successful issue 
 
206 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 to your arrangements for the embarkation of the 
 army. In the presence of an enemy flushed with 
 success in every quarter, and receiving daily re- 
 inforcements, it must be a most arduous and com- 
 phcated operation. I tnist there is no reason to 
 apprehend a disaster, Ijut I shall certauily be upon 
 thorns until it has taken place. 
 
 " The maimer in wliich you mention General 
 Moore, whom you have taught me to admire, 
 induced me, among other reasons, wliich you mil 
 collect from this letter, to communicate yours to 
 ]Mr. Dundas."' 
 
 This calm, candid, and able letter of ]\Ir. Huskis- 
 son, shows how sanguine had been the hopes of the 
 projectors of the expedition, how long they were 
 cherished, and how unpalatable the objections, dic- 
 tated by experience and knowledge, must have been. 
 Mr. Huskisson acknoAvledges that the results of the 
 action of the 19th opened his eyes to the reality of 
 the case, and that even Mr. Dundas was secretly 
 rejoiced that the means, however painful, of with- 
 drawing the Army had been found. 
 
 The letter which Mr. Dundas wrote to Sir Ealph 
 on the same occasion, is characteristic of his courage 
 and fortitude under the pressure of the most dis- 
 couraging circumstances. He writes, " I have re- 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 207 
 
 ceived your letter by the messenger Scott, and Hus- 
 kisson has communicated to me your letter to him. 
 I hope it will not be long before I see you, to enter 
 into all the ideas contained in your letter. If I had 
 foreseen, that in the month of August you were to 
 have had a hurricane, and in the months of Septem- 
 ber and October a deluge, I probably should not 
 have ordered the armament to sail at the time I did. 
 I give, however, a cordial approbation to the con- 
 duct of the Duke of York in retreating the Army to 
 the strong position they had before the 2d, and I 
 have as little doubt in advising his Majesty, in the 
 letter I have this moment written to him, to give 
 immediate directions for bringing the troops from 
 Holland. But I wish you not to understand from 
 this, that, upon a full review of all that has hap- 
 pened, I in any respect repent of anything that has 
 been ordered by me. If the thing was to do again, 
 and I was certain, that with all the loss we have 
 suffered, the result was to be the capture of the 
 Dutch Fleet, I would order the armament to sail. 
 I say so, taking into calculation all the hurricanes 
 and all the deluges that have obstructed us. But 
 surely, taking the subject in that point of view, I at 
 least argue the point fairly with those who differ 
 from me, for they are not at liberty to employ 
 
208 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1790. 
 
 arguments founded on hurricanes in August, and 
 deluges in September and October, upon neither of 
 which is anybody entitled to count. 
 
 " I therefore desire, that none of you will return 
 with heads hanging do^^al in despair, or as if you 
 were returning as condemned criminals. I hold you 
 up in a veiy different tone, and I have the satisfac- 
 tion to feel the country does the same. In short. 
 Colonel Brownrigg will tell you all I have said to 
 him, and probably the Duke of York will show you 
 the letter I wrote to him. Bring me back as many 
 good troops as you can, and before next spring I 
 will show you an Army the country never saw 
 before. How to dispose of them must depend on 
 circumstances at the moment." 
 
 The circumstances which have now been detailed, 
 have clearly established the fact, that Sir Ralph 
 never encouraged the effort that was made for the 
 liberation of Holland, and that he firmly and perse- 
 veringly protested against it. It is true that the 
 object professed by the framers of the treaty mth 
 Russia, was, that Holland was to be liberated by a 
 sudden attack, aided by the efforts of the Dutch 
 people. Sir Ralph was well aware that a sudden 
 attack was impossible, on account of the time that 
 was required to make the necessary preparations, 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 209 
 
 and on account of the difficulties inseparable from 
 the perils of a maritime expedition on a great scale. 
 He foresaw, that if the attempt was made, it must 
 end in a protracted campaign, for which our means 
 were insufficient. He saw that the note of prepara- 
 tion had raised the hopes of the nation, which it 
 would have been unwise to have wholly disappointed. 
 He therefore fixed on the attack on the Helder as 
 the only practicable way of avoiding disappointment, 
 and sustaining the spiiit of the people, and the in- 
 structions given to him show that the more the 
 object of the expedition was considered, the more 
 the difficulties of conducting extended operations 
 were felt, and the more the advantage of directing 
 our efforts, at least in the first instance, to the 
 accomplishment of a success that would be gratify- 
 ing to the English people, was appreciated. When 
 the Helder and the Dutch fleet had been captured. 
 Sir Ralph cautioned the Ministers not to be carried 
 away by this first success, and he made them aware 
 that it had in no degree shaken the opinions which 
 he had expressed. 
 
 Throughout the campaign, he was under tlie im- 
 pression that the result would be unfavourable, if 
 not disastrous, but that feeling did not weaken or 
 impair the zeal with which he exerted himself in a 
 
 
 
210 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 hopeless service, and when the final catastrophe 
 came, he devoted himself with, if possible, increased 
 ardour in his efforts to save the Army, and he freely 
 and unreservedly took on himself a very large share of 
 the responsibility for the Convention that was made. 
 
 The French Directory having ratified the Con- 
 vention, no time was lost in re-ernbarking the troops 
 and retirinsj from Holland. 
 
 Sir Ralph, attended l^y liis personal stafi", em- 
 barked and landed at Shields, and went direct to 
 Scotland, to resume the command of the forces, 
 which had been held during his absence by General 
 de Burgh, the general officer next in rank. The 
 opinion prevailed very generally among the public, 
 that Sir Ealph had disapproved of the expedition 
 to Holland, and the circumstance of his returning 
 to Scotland without havino; communicated mth the 
 Ministers on events in wliich he had acted so pro- 
 minent a part, was regarded as a confirmation of 
 it. The Ministers were disappointed that Sir Ralph 
 did not go to London ; l)ut, as he could not de- 
 fend an undertaking of which he had disapproved, 
 and did not wish to give j)ublic expression to his 
 real opinions, he very naturally at once resumed 
 liis command and rejoined his family. 
 
 The humiliating result of this expedition neces- 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 211 
 
 sarily gave rise to debates in Parliament, in which 
 the opponents of Ministers assumed as a fact, though 
 without any proof which they could produce, that 
 Sir Ealph had throughout disapproved of the enter- 
 prise. The Ministers did not venture to assert that 
 he had approved of the expedition, but they fixed 
 on a detached sentence in one of his letters, which, 
 taken by itself, seemed to hold out a prospect of 
 success ; while, from the context, it was plain that 
 it was thrown out as the only possible event that 
 could afford the slightest encouragement to the 
 Duke of York, to sustain him in the arduous and 
 perilous command which he was about to assume. 
 When Sir Ralph complained that a partial quotation 
 of a single passage in one of his letters, had given 
 an unfounded and unwarrantable impression of his 
 opinions, the most conciliatory and apologetic ex- 
 planations were liberally offered. In truth, Mr. 
 Dundas, to whom the letter was addressed, from 
 wliich the quotation was made, was perfectly aware 
 that the event to which Sir Ralph had referred as 
 possible, was only pointed out to prevent the Duke 
 of York from being depressed and discouraged in 
 the execution of the service, to the performance of 
 which he was irretrievably committed. 
 
 Although the Ministers may at times have Ijeen 
 
212 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 vexed and even offended by the freedom with which 
 Sir Ralph criticised their projects when they were 
 submitted to liis consideration, and by the unre- 
 served expression of his opinions, they Avere never- 
 theless just towards him, and highly appreciated his 
 services, as will appear from the following corre- 
 spondence relative to the offer of a peerage wliich 
 was made to him, and which he declined. On the 
 1 0th of October, Mr. Dundas wrote to the Duke of 
 York, that " At the time the news arrived of the 
 success of the Army at the Helder, and the subse- 
 quent capture of the Dutch fleet, Mr. Pitt observed 
 to me, that no such brilliant service had been per- 
 formed during the war, or perhaps any war, without 
 receiving a distinguished mark of His Majesty's 
 approbation, and he mentioned his wish of carrying 
 to His Majesty his opinion that a peerage should be 
 conferred on Sir Ralph Abercromby, which he con- 
 sidered to be the more necessary as so many dis- 
 tinctions of that nature had been conferred on naval 
 services, but none in the course of the war upon 
 services by His Majesty's land forces. I, however, 
 thought it right, after what Mr. Pitt had said, to 
 report the conversation to Sir Ralph, wliich I did 
 by a letter a few days after, and I enclose an extract 
 from his answer." The enclosed extract was : " I 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 213 
 
 must deprecate a title either for myself or any of 
 my family. Allow us to go on in the paths of in- 
 dustry in our different pursuits." In the mean- 
 while, the Duke of York had anticipated the letter 
 from Mr. Dundas, to whom he had, on the 4th of 
 October, addressed the following letter, after the 
 action in wliicli Sir Ralph distinguished himself at 
 Egmont : — " What I have much at heart is, that 
 this opportunity should be taken of showing some 
 mark of His Majesty's approbation to Sir Ralph 
 Abercromby. I know his delicacy about accepting 
 a peerage. It is for you to consider how far his 
 own feehngs ought to be consulted, when certainly 
 it would be a compHment to the Army. The action 
 was fought between Bergen and Egmont. Sir Ralph 
 Abercromby was engaged at Egmont ; that, there- 
 fore, would certainly be the title most complimen- 
 tary to himself. Should, however, any difficulties 
 arise on account of the Egmont family, may I say, 
 that I should consider it as a favour done to me if 
 he was to receive the title of Bergen." Mr. Dundas 
 forwarded the preceding correspondence to the 
 King, accompanied with the following note : — " Mr. 
 Dundas humbly transmits to your Majesty the 
 accompanying correspondence with his Royal High- 
 ness the Duke of York for your Majesty's perusal 
 
214 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 and consideration. Independently of his general 
 feeling of duty as an officer and a good subject, Mr. 
 Dundas has personally reason to know that no re- 
 ward he could ever receive, no distinction that could 
 be conferred on him, would give Sir Ralph Aber- 
 cromby half the satisfaction he derives from every 
 opportunity afforded to him of proving the high 
 sense of gratitude he feels from the generous sup- 
 port your Majesty and the Duke of York adminis- 
 tered to liim on his last return from Ireland, a time 
 when every support was necessary to protect him 
 from the unprincipled faction that was then com- 
 bined against him. Mr. Pitt has never said so to 
 Mr. Dundas, but he cannot help thinking that part 
 of Mr. Pitt's anxiety to mark Sir Ralph on this 
 occasion, may arise from his recollection of some 
 circumstances that occurred at that time." Even- 
 tually his Majesty acquiesced in the refusal of the 
 peerage by Sir Ralph, but suggested that as he had 
 served in the West Indies, it would be a reason for 
 giving him a grant of Carib lands, and he added, 
 " I am not sui-prised Mr. Pitt feels that Sir Ralph 
 was not justly treated in Ireland. I know he has a 
 heart, when he has had time for reflection, that ever 
 inclines him to judge equitably." 
 
 A rumour having reached Sir Ralph that there 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 215 
 
 was an intention to act on the suggestion of the 
 King, with respect to a grant of Caribbean lands, 
 he, on the 30th of November 1799, addressed the 
 following letter to Mr. Dundas : — " It has been 
 hinted to me that in consideration of the services I 
 may have done in the way of my profession I am 
 to receive a grant of Caribbean lands, or a sum of 
 money arising from them. If it is thought that I 
 am deserving of any mark of public favour, it is 
 from the public alone that I can receive it. I am 
 not a beggar or a covetous person to ask private 
 honours or private grants. Good God, sir, what 
 opinion should I have of myself were I to profit 
 from the crimes and forfeitures of such a set of mis- 
 creants as the Caribs ! I hope I shall trouble you 
 no more on my services or then- rewards. As long 
 as my mind and body remain entire, I am bound to 
 the service of my country." 
 
 Some weeks after the preceding letter had been 
 written, Mr. Dundas happened to be in Scotland, 
 and he placed the correspondence relative to the 
 peerage in the hands of Sir Ealph, who returned it 
 with the following note : — - 
 
 " Edixbukgh, January 30, 1800. 
 
 " I beg leave to return you many thanks for the 
 communication of the enclosures, and for the con- 
 
216 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 versation you allowed me an opportunity to hold 
 with you yesterday. I should be happy if I could 
 persuade myself that Mr. Pitt now tliinks more 
 favourably of my conduct in Ireland. If I ever 
 thought well of myself, if I ever thought that I had 
 deserved well of the public, it was during my short 
 command in that country. Lord Camden, thinking 
 in private as I did, had not the courage to act as 
 he ought ; he had not the generosity to do me 
 justice ; he had the weakness to injure me with 
 Mr. Pitt." 
 
 There is no doubt whatever, as was well known 
 to those who possessed his confidence, that in declin- 
 ing a peerage Sir Ralph was governed by the high 
 standard by which he estimated fame. He was 
 unwilling that his name should be permanently 
 associated with a service of which the result had 
 been so humiliating to the country. Mr. Pitt pro- 
 posed that the peerage should be conferred in con- 
 sideration of the brilliant attack on the Helder, and 
 the capture of the Dutch fleet, and if it had then 
 been promptly offered, it is possible that it might 
 not have been refused, as Sir Ralph felt that the 
 service then rendered had been both useful and 
 honourable to the country. The prominent 2:)art 
 which Mr. Pitt took with respect to the peerage is 
 
1799. EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 217 
 
 honourable to him, as he overcame the unfavour- 
 able impression that had been made with respect to 
 the conduct of Sir Ealph in Ireland. 
 
 It may be remarked that Sir Ealph, in writing to 
 Mr. Dundas, on the 30th of January 1800, expresses 
 himself in more unfavourable terms with respect to 
 the personal conduct of Lord Camden, than he had 
 done in the letters written while he was in Ireland. 
 It was not until Sir Ealph returned from Ireland to 
 London that he was fuUy aware of the impression 
 that had been made by Lord Camden on the mind 
 of Mr. Pitt, which sufficiently accounts for the 
 resentment which he felt against the uncandid and 
 unjust conduct of the Lord-Lieutenant, 
 
 Sir Ealph was gratified by finding that Mr. Pitt 
 had been led by reflection, and by more correct 
 information, to do him justice. He always rated 
 highly the abilities of Mr. Pitt, of whom his judg- 
 ment is expressed in a letter which he wrote to his 
 eldest son, who had met Mr. Pitt for the first time. 
 Sir Ealph says, — " In Mr. Pitt you gained an agree- 
 able companion at table, and you saw in him very 
 nearly a great man in the Cabinet. If his mind 
 was equal to his abilities and talents, he would de- 
 serve the name of a first-rate statesman. Be that 
 as it may, we are obliged to him, as we may doubt 
 
218 EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. 1799. 
 
 whether there is any one better fitted for his 
 station." 
 
 Sir Ralph remained in Scotland until he was 
 called upon to engage in the service in which he 
 closed his life. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 EXPEDITION AGAIN.ST CADIZ. 
 
 1800. 
 
 On the 2 2d of April 1800, Sir Ralph Abercromby, 
 who was then in Edinburgh, received a summons 
 from Mr. Dundas, Secretary of State for the War 
 Department, requiring his immediate presence in 
 London. On the following day. Sir Ralph took 
 leave of his family, and left Scotland, never to 
 return. 
 
 On arri^dng in London Sir Ralph was informed 
 that a plan for co-operation with the Austrians in 
 Italy had been submitted to the Government by 
 General Sir Charles Stuart, to whom the conduct 
 of the intended enterprise had been intrusted. The 
 object of the plan was to take possession of the 
 Maritime Alps, with the view of cutting off the 
 communication between France and Italy. This 
 plan was then abandoned in consequence of an alarm 
 that a Spanish army, supported by the French, was 
 
220 EXPEDITION TO CADIZ. 1800. 
 
 about to invade Portugal, and accordingly fresh in- 
 structions were sent to Sir Charles Stuart, who, 
 either from disapproving the change of plan, or 
 from some other cause, suddenly resigned the com- 
 mand. 
 
 The Portuguese had, in the meanwhile, applied to 
 England for aid, and had asked that Sir Ealph should 
 be sent to take the command of their army. This 
 proposal was submitted by Mr. Dundas to Sir Ealph, 
 who said, that as he had expressed his willingness to 
 serve so long as he could be useful, he should not 
 object to go to Portugal to report on the state of the 
 Portuguese army, and the means which the country 
 possessed to resist the attack ^vith. which it was 
 threatened, but beyond that he could not promise 
 to go. 
 
 Ml-. Dundas, taking a sanguine view of Sir Ralph's 
 reply, assured his colleagues that he would accept 
 the command of the Portuguese army ; but when 
 the subject was again discussed, Sir Ralph stated 
 that he never intended to consent to transfer his 
 services to another sovereign, and never would do 
 so, but that, m the event of war, and of English 
 co-operation being afforded to Portugal on an 
 adequate scale, he would be ^^'ilhng to command 
 both armies. The threatened invasion of Portugal 
 
1800. EXPEDITION TO CADIZ. 221 
 
 proved, however, to be a false alarm, and the sub- 
 ject dropped. 
 
 Sir RaljDh had at various times represented 
 to Mr. Dundas, that he was now advanced in 
 years, and that it was important for the public 
 interests that younger offic'ers should be brought 
 forward, and he had pointed out Su' Charles 
 Stuart as one who, from his rank and abilities, was 
 well qualified to take a prominent place in the 
 military service of the country. This suggestion 
 had been acted upon, but on General Sir Charles 
 Stuart's voluntary resignation. Sir Ralph, although 
 in the sixty-sixth year of his age, did not hesitate to 
 accept the command in the Mediterranean, which 
 was represented as likely to become both urgent and 
 important. 
 
 The necessary arrangements having been com- 
 pleted with all possible despatch. Sir Ralph, on the 
 12th May 1800, repaired to Portsmouth, and on the 
 13th embarked on board the " Sea-horse" frigate, and 
 after various delays from adverse winds, arrived in 
 Gibraltar Bay on the 6 th of June. After a short 
 stay at Gibraltar, Sir Ralph proceeded to Minorca, 
 to assume the command to which he had been 
 appointed. 
 
 Previous to the opening of the campaign of this 
 
222 EXPEDITION TO CADIZ. 1800. 
 
 year, a plan of operations had been agreed upon be- 
 tween the EngHsh and Austrian Cabinets, by which 
 it was provided that 10,000 British troops should 
 be sent to co-operate with the Austrians in Italy. 
 Early in March, a portion of the force destined for 
 this service, had been sent to the Mediterranean, 
 and Sir Charles Stuart, as has already been stated, 
 had been appointed to the command ; the resigna- 
 tion of that officer, and the false alarm as to the 
 invasion of Portugal by the Spaniards, led to the 
 decision, that the troops which had not yet been 
 embarked for the Mediterranean should be counter- 
 manded. Under these altered circumstances, the 
 instructions given to Sir Ralph were, to effect land- 
 ings at different points on the coast of Italy, in 
 order to draw off the attention of the French from 
 the Austrian army under the command of General 
 Melas, and to use aU means that could be devised 
 to accelerate the surrender of Malta, which was 
 closely blockaded. 
 
 Sir Ealph found at Minorca a disposable force of 
 6000 men, and, having received an application 
 from General Melas to send a reinforcement to 
 strengthen Genoa, which had surrendered to the 
 Austrians, he immediately sailed for that place, 
 leaving orders for 4000 men to be sent after him 
 
1800. EXPEDITION TO CADIZ. 223 
 
 with the greatest possible expedition. A few hours 
 after Sir Ealph had sailed from Minorca, a despatch 
 was received from Lord Keith, announcing that 
 Bonaparte had crossed the Alps, broken into the 
 Milanese, and gained the signal and decisive battle 
 of Marengo. 
 
 General Fox, who commanded at Minorca, think- 
 ing that he had no authority to detain the troops, 
 allowed the embarkation to proceed as directed. 
 In the meanwhile, Sir Ralph having been apprised 
 of the event which had occurred, altered his course, 
 and he, with these troops, joined the English fleet 
 then at Leghorn, where both Lord Keith and Lord 
 Nelson had their flags flying. Sir Ralph went on 
 board Lord Keith's sliip, where he was made ac- 
 quainted with the details of the battle of Marengo 
 and its consequences. General Melas, who had re- 
 treated behind the Mincio, there to await orders 
 from his Court, represented that he was still in a 
 condition to renew hostilities, and in this opinion 
 he was supported by Lord Wilham Bentinck, who 
 was attached to the Austrian army. 
 
 For the present nothing was to be done, but Sir 
 Ralph subsequently despatched General Hope, and 
 Colonel Lindenthal, an Austrian by birth, who was 
 on Sir Ralph's personal staft', to General Melas, not 
 
224 EXPEDITION TO CADIZ. 1800. 
 
 only to ascertain the real state of tlie Austrian 
 army, but with power to agree with hini upon any 
 reasonable plan of co-operation on the part of the 
 British. The report made by these officers showed 
 that no such plan could be formed, and, therefore, 
 that the first part of Sir Ealph's instructions to 
 co-operate A\ath the Austrian s, had clearly become 
 impracticable. 
 
 The Queen of Naples, who had fled on the ap- 
 proach of the French, was also at this time at 
 Leghorn. Her Majesty pressed Sir Ralph to under- 
 take the defence of Naples, but he, well knowing 
 the insufficiency of his own means, and aware that 
 no reliance could be placed on the Neapolitan army, 
 decHned the proposal. Her Majesty urged her re- 
 quest with the impetuosity and intemperance wliich 
 so strongly marked her character, but Sir Ralph 
 was firm, and he finally said, " that, without positive 
 orders from his own Court, compliance on his part 
 was impossible." Sir Ralph ordered the troops 
 which had reached Leghorn, to return to Minorca, 
 and he sailed for Malta, with the intention of 
 carrying into effect the second part of his instruc- 
 tions, which required him to use all such means as 
 he could devise to facilitate the surrender of that 
 island, and, this object having been accomplished, 
 
1800. EXPEDITION TO CADIZ. 225 
 
 Sir Ealph returned to Minorca, where lie arrived 
 on the 2d of August. 
 
 The disposable troops under the command of Sir 
 Ralph were kept quite distinct from the garrison 
 of Minorca, under the command of General Fox; 
 and, on the morning of the 10th of August, Sir 
 Ralph began a minute inspection of them, and, on 
 finishing it on the 15th, expressed his entii-e appro- 
 bation of their general appearance, and remarked 
 that he observed among them many young soldiers 
 well worthy of every care and attention, and par- 
 ticularly recommended those of that class to the 
 generals and other officers, adding that the time 
 might come when their own honour and the glory 
 of their countiy might depend upon theii- exer- 
 tions. 
 
 Such details are minute, but they mark the un- 
 remitting zeal of a commander who omitted no 
 opportunity to enforce on the generals and other 
 officers the most careful and exact performance of 
 their duty towards those over whom they were 
 placed, and to inspire aU with a spirit which sub- 
 sequently enabled them to display at the landing 
 in Egypt, and on its sandy shores, a union of 
 bravery, discipline, and ardour, which realized the 
 prophetic words of Sir Ealph, " that the time might 
 
226 EXPEDITION TO CADIZ. 1800. 
 
 come when their own honour, the glory of their 
 country," and, it might have been added, the peace 
 of Europe, " would depend on their exertions." 
 
 On the 24 th of August, Sir Kalj^h received in- 
 structions to effect a landing at Cadiz, to seize on 
 the arsenals of the Caraccas, to destroy the docks, 
 naval stores, and as many of the ships as possible ; 
 but the same instmction proceeded to state, that as 
 it was not ^vished that much risk should be run, he 
 was pointedly ordered not to land, unless he was 
 confident that he should l^e able to re-embark and 
 bring off the troops. 
 
 Orders were immediately issued for the embarka- 
 tion of the troops, and on the 31st of August the 
 fleet sailed from JMinorca for Gibraltar, where, after 
 much stormy weather, they arrived on the 13th 
 September, and were joined on the 19th by the 
 troops under the command of Sir James Pulteney. 
 
 At this season of the year, Gibraltar could not 
 furnish a sufficient supply of water for so large a 
 fleet, and the anchorage bemg deemed unsafe, the 
 greater number of the ships were sent to Tetuan. 
 Sir Ealph and Sir James Pulteney remained at Gib- 
 raltar to make the necessary arrangements for the 
 services with the conduct of which they were re- 
 spectively intrusted. The whole force embarked 
 
1800. EXPEDITION TO CADIZ. 227 
 
 consisted of 20,000 infantry, 772 artilleiy, and 200 
 cavalry, making a total of 20,972 men. The Ai*my 
 was divided into two wings, the right being under 
 the command of General Hutchinson, and the left 
 under that of Sir James Pulteney. 
 
 Before entering on the detail of the unfortunate 
 failure of the expedition to Cadiz, it is necessary to 
 revert to the tenor of the instructions received by 
 Sir Ralph, with regard to the precautions to be 
 observed in the event of an attempt to land being 
 decided on. The certainty required by these in- 
 structions could only be obtained in the event of 
 there being such safe anchorage for the Fleet as 
 would insure constant communication, a regular 
 supply of stores and j)i'Ovisions, and the means of 
 bringing off the troops. These were naval questions, 
 which it was necessary to submit to the decision of 
 the Admiral. If it was clear that the certainty 
 required by the instructions could not be obtained, 
 the enterprise ought not to be attempted. Accord- 
 ingly, Sir Ealph prepared his plan, and sul^mitted it 
 to Lord Keith before the Fleet left Gibraltar. The 
 General proposed to land the troops at Rota, about 
 six leagues to the northward ol Cadiz, and that his 
 first object should be to seize Santa Catalina, under 
 the impression that between these two points, which 
 
228 EXPEDITION TO CADIZ. 1800. 
 
 form part of the Bay, the Fleet could lie at anchor 
 ill tolerable safety ; and to this plan Lord Keith 
 assented. 
 
 The Fleet sailed from Gibraltar upon this under- 
 standing between the naval and mihtary com- 
 manders. On the 2d of October, the Fleet passed 
 through the Straits, arriving off Cadiz on the even- 
 ing of the 3d. On the 4th, the beach at Eota was 
 examined, and Avas reported by the Engineers to be 
 favourable for the disembarkation of the troops, and 
 preparations w^ere accordingly made for landing the 
 Army on the following day, 5th of October. In the 
 course of the 5th of October, however, a conference 
 took place, at which the Admiral, the General, Sir 
 R. Bickerton, Captains Elphinstone and Morris of 
 the Na\y, and Colonels John Abercromby and 
 Anstruther, were present. The Admiral pointed 
 out to Sir R. Bickerton and the two naval captains 
 the position in which he proposed to station the 
 Fleet during the time that the Army should remain 
 OD shore. The above-named naval officers gave it 
 as their opinion that they considered the proposed 
 anchorage to be unsafe at that season of the year. 
 Lord Keith then, adopting the opinion of his officers, 
 stated to the General that he could not insure him 
 either a communication with the Fleet while the 
 
1800. EXPEDITION TO CADIZ. 229 
 
 Army was on shore, or a retreat to the ships in case 
 a re-embarkation should become necessary. 
 
 Sir Ealph, although disappointed and staggered 
 by the difficulties thus unexpectedly brought for- 
 ward in the then advanced position of the enter- 
 prise, nevertheless desired to proceed, and during 
 the discussions that ensued, he observed to the 
 Admiral, that in most undertakings of the nature 
 of that on which they were engaged, some hazards 
 must be run ; he stated that fourteen days would 
 be required fully to carry out the spirit of his in- 
 structions, during which time communication with 
 the Fleet was indispensable, but he offered to the 
 Admiral, at the same time, to take the whole re- 
 sponsibility of the land service upon himself, and 
 to share with him that which was attached to the 
 Navy, adding, however, that if the Admiral would 
 state it to be his opinion that the Ai'my should not 
 land, and that he could not insure uninterrupted 
 communication with the Fleet for fourteen consecu- 
 tive days, he would relinquish the project. Lord 
 Keith wavered, and declined to say anytliing de- 
 cisive. In this state of uncertainty, matters re- 
 mained during the day of the 5th of October, but 
 in the course of that evening Sir Ealph told the 
 Admiral that before morning it would be necessary 
 
230 EXPEDITION TO CADIZ. 1800. 
 
 for him to come to a final determination. At two 
 o'clock on the morning of the 6th of October, Sir 
 Ralph left his bed, and went to the cot of Lord 
 Keith, requesting to know from his Lordship what 
 his decision on this important point was. 
 
 Lord Keith being either still undecided, or un- 
 wiUing to give a direct opinion. Sir Ralph stated, 
 that unless he would positively say to him that he 
 ought not to land, he must desire that the troops 
 should be disembarked in the morning, to which 
 Lord Keith made no reply. 
 
 The order for the disembarkation of the troops 
 on the 6th of Octol)er was however issued, but it 
 was not till one o'clock in the afternoon of that 
 day, that 3000 instead of 5000 men could be placed 
 in the boats preparatoiy to landing. The ineffec- 
 tive arrangements made for the disembarkation and 
 landing of the troops can be best explained by the 
 following passages from a letter written by General 
 Moore who commanded the Reserve, and who had 
 been charged with the duty of conducting the land- 
 ing :— 
 
 " Lord Keith was frightened at the opinion of 
 his officers, and somewhat ashamed of what he had 
 before asserted. He could not be got to adopt the 
 opinion of his officers, nor totally to give up his 
 
1800. EXPEDITION TO CADIZ. 231 
 
 own, though in my presence he was pushed by Sir 
 Ralph to do so, who wished for a decided opinion 
 from him, one way or another, that we might either 
 immediately land, or return to Gibraltar. 
 
 " When the signal was made for landing, the Fleet 
 was then under v/ay, at Ifeast ten miles from the 
 shore. The flat-bottomed boats, agreeably to the 
 signal, began to assemble round the sliips which 
 contained the troops destined for that service. It 
 is not to be described the bad arransjements and 
 confusion which attended the assembling of the 
 boats ; it was increased by the sliips being under 
 sail. About one o'clock p.m., there were only 3000 
 instead of 5000 men in boats, and no more boats 
 could be got, and this from want of arrangement. 
 We were seven miles from the shore, and before it 
 would have been possible to land us and return for 
 more troops, it must have been dark. It was evi- 
 dent, therefore, that the landing was to be effected 
 with 3000 instead of 5000 men, and these, instead 
 of being immediately supported by a second division 
 of 5000 men, must trust to themselves for the night 
 in an unknown country. Under these circum- 
 stances. Sir Ralph wisely determined to postpone 
 the landing." 
 
 On Sir Ralph's return on board the "Foudroyant" 
 
232 EXPEDITION TO CADIZ. 1800. 
 
 from the Pli?eton frigate iii which he had been close 
 in shore for the purpose of reconnoitring, and of 
 being present in the event of the troops being able 
 to land/ " Colonel Anstruther represented to liim 
 the necessity of having something in writing from 
 Lord Keith, as he, Sir Ralph, was taking the whole 
 responsibility on himself, and this became the more 
 necessary, as it was obvious that all the naval officers 
 were against the attempt, and as his Lordship himself 
 had said after we had left his ship to land, that Sir 
 Ralph was going to do a very rash act. In the 
 evening of the 6th of October, Sir Ralph wrote to 
 Lord Keith, stating that this was a conjoint expedi- 
 tion ; and that, as by his instructions he was directed 
 not to attack Cadiz, unless he saw a good prospect 
 of being able to re-embark his army, he must require 
 from him, as Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, a 
 positive answer whether or not he could promise 
 him that ; and, at the same time, he said, his Lord- 
 ship's reply must decide his conduct. Lord Keith 
 in his answer said, that at this season of the year, 
 he could not promise him a safe retreat to his ships, 
 or a communication while on shore ; that, if he 
 anchored his Fleet between Rota and Santa Catalina, 
 in the event of a gale of wind, many of his ships 
 
 > Letter of Colonel John Abercromby, 12th October 1800. 
 
1800. EXPEDITION TO CADIZ. 233 
 
 must be lost ; that, if he anchored farther out, and 
 was, from stress of weather, obHged to put to sea, 
 it might be weeks before he could return. He 
 further said, that, as Sir Ralph had asked his 
 opinion, he would advise him l3y no means to land, 
 and concluded by saying that, if he did, he con- 
 ceived that he would be acting contrary to the 
 spirit of his instructions. Upon this Sir Ralph 
 agreed not to persevere, as he could not venture to 
 take so much responsibility on himself." 
 
 The circumstances which occurred previously to 
 the enterprise being undertaken, and the course 
 pursued by Lord Keith, are fully developed in the 
 following minute dictated by Sir Ralph, of what 
 had passed between himself and the Admiral : — 
 
 " His Majesty's Ministers having been pleased to 
 order Sir Ralph Abercromby and Lord Keith to 
 make a joint attack on the bay and city of Cadiz, it 
 became the General's duty to weigh seriously in his 
 mind the object in view, and the mode of accom- 
 plishing it. After carefully surveying Tofino's 
 chart of the Bay of Cadiz, and after examining at 
 Gibraltar those persons who were most likely to 
 give information, it appeared to him that notliing 
 could be effected by surprise or a coup-de-main, 
 because the enemy could not have remained igno- 
 
234 EXPEDITION TO CADIZ. 1800. 
 
 rant of our intention, and must necessarily have 
 made such preparations as they had in their power 
 to resist the impending attack. It appeared to him 
 practicable to carry his orders into execution, pro- 
 vided a safe anchoras^e could be obtamed for the 
 Fleet, which would have enabled him when on shore 
 to have kejDt up a communication with it, and to 
 have re-embarked the troops in case of emergency. 
 If liis instmctions had not positively enjoined him 
 not to land the troops unless he was convinced in 
 his own mind of the practicability of re-embark- 
 ing them, he should equally have thought himself 
 bound not to do it, because he always considered it 
 as a fixed principle that no conjoint expedition of 
 any magnitude should be undertaken unless the Fleet 
 could be placed in a safe port. Reasoning on this 
 principle, he thought that the anchorage from Rota 
 to Santa CataHna would afford that security to the 
 Fleet which was required, and would give to the 
 Army those advantages which it was necessary they 
 should possess. As the town of Rota is fortified 
 towards the sea, and as there are several batteries 
 between that place and Santa Catalina, which is a 
 fort of considerable strength, it might have proved 
 difiicult for the ships of war to have silenced their 
 batteries, and to have enabled the troops to land 
 
1800. EXPEDITION TO CADIZ. 235 
 
 under them. To obviate these difficulties, it was 
 found that there is a sandy beach to the northward 
 of Eota where the troops might be landed ; and it 
 was proposed by the General, that as soon as they 
 were disembarked they should make themselves 
 masters of Rota, and the batteries between that and 
 Santa Catalina. It was likewise intended (as soon 
 as some pieces of artillery could be got on shore) to 
 attack vigorously that fort. This plan was submit- 
 ted to Lord Keith, and the principal pilot was exa- 
 mined on the sufficiency of the anchorage, who gave 
 it as his opinion that in most winds it was safe. 
 The Admiral, after examining the plan, acquiesced 
 in the practicability of it, reserving, however, his 
 final determination till such time as he should have 
 seen Sir Richard Bickerton, who commanded the 
 squadron cruising off Cadiz, and from whom he 
 might receive information with which he was un- 
 acquainted. The General does not know that Sir R. 
 Bickerton did communicate any intelligence of any 
 moment which could particularly induce a change of 
 opinion as to the anchorage in question. Sir R. Bick- 
 erton, and several other naval officers of character, 
 seemed, however, to be of opinion that the anchor- 
 age between Rota and Santa Catalina was hazard- 
 ous. Lord Keith hesitated a little. The General 
 
236 EXPEDITION TO CADIZ. 1800. 
 
 told him that he would take the whole responsi- 
 bility of the land service upon himself, and that he 
 would share with him, as a man of honour, in every- 
 thing relative to the naval risk ; at the same time he 
 expressed a desire that his Lordship would declare 
 his sentiments clearly on a subject of so much im- 
 portance. Not having been able to obtain from his 
 Lordship any explicit declaration, the General told 
 his Lordshi]) that he would take the whole responsi- 
 bility upon himself, and that the landing must take 
 place unless his Lordship should absolutely say that 
 it should not. The orders were accordingly given, 
 l)ut from causes which the General is unable to 
 explain, the troops did not get into the flat boats 
 until late in the day, and even then not above one- 
 half of the number ordered according to the arrange- 
 ment which had been made with his Lordship. As 
 the boats had more than four miles to row to the 
 shore, it was e\T.dent that a sufficient number of 
 troops could not be landed that evening, so as to 
 have enabled them to maintain themselves on shore 
 with any degree of security. This was apparent to 
 the General and to Sir John Moore, who was to 
 command the first body of troops that were to dis- 
 embark ; and they were therefore ordered to return 
 to their respective shijDs. The General, who had 
 
1800. EXPEDITION TO CADIZ. 237 
 
 been on board the ' Pliseton' close in shore, did not 
 observe any appearance which indicated a design on 
 the part of the enemy to have seriously opposed the 
 landing on that part of the coast, and he is fully 
 persuaded, that if the frigates to cover the landing 
 had been placed over night,' and if the ships with 
 the troops had gone early in the morning into nine- 
 fathom water, that the whole, or the greater part of 
 the troops, might have been disembarked in the 
 course of that day. When the General returned from 
 the ' Phseton' to the flag-sliip, he found that the 
 Admiral had expressed himself explicitly on the rash- 
 ness of the undertaking, which led to a further con- 
 versation on the subject, and induced the General 
 to ask his Lordship to express his opinion either 
 affirmatively or negatively as to the possil^ility of 
 re-embarking the troops in case of emergency. His 
 Lordship then, in answer to this question, gave it as 
 his opinion that he could not, and advised the Ge- 
 neral by no means to land the troops. The General 
 did not, under these cii'cumstances, think that he 
 could disembark the troops and proceed in this ope- 
 ration, because his instructions did not permit him 
 to land them unless he was convinced that they 
 could be re-embarked with safety." 
 
 The expedition then returned to Gibraltar. 
 
238 EXPEDITION TO CADIZ. 1800. 
 
 Sir Ralph was much distressed by the thought 
 of the impression which could not fail to be made 
 by this useless display of force at Cadiz, which 
 would be aggravated by the previous failure at 
 Ferrol ; but he endeavoured to mitigate the disap- 
 pointment which would be felt, and the censure 
 which might be pronounced, by making the most of 
 such reasons as could be urged to justify the aban- 
 donment of the enterprise. 
 
 Sir Henry Bunbuiy states, and apparently on 
 good authority, that when at Gibraltar, Sir Ralph 
 had received intelligence that the yellow fever, in 
 its most fatal form, was raging in and about Cadiz. 
 In consequence it had occurred to Su' Ralph, that it 
 would be prudent to suspend operations against a 
 town suffering under such a calamity, and he had 
 proposed to the Admii"al that they shoidd repair to 
 the Tagus, there to await fresh instructions from 
 England. To this Lord Keith had decidedly ob- 
 jected, urging that the instmctions were peremp- 
 tory, especially as regarded the attack on the 
 arsenals of the Caraccas, and Sii* Ralph had acqui- 
 esced, though reluctantly, in the prosecution of the 
 enterprise. The instructions were, probably, per- 
 emptory, but the question was, whether humanity 
 might not have induced the Government to change 
 
1800. EXPEDITION TO CADIZ. 239 
 
 their views, if they were made aware of the dis- 
 astrous calamity under which Cadiz was suffering. 
 
 From the foregoing narrative of this expedition, 
 it cannot be doubted that the conduct of tlie 
 Admiral must have created embarrassments and 
 difficulties for the General ; and justice to Sir 
 Ralph, and to the Army he commanded, would not 
 have been done had it been passed over in silence. 
 
M 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 
 
 1800-1801. 
 
 The Fleet returned to Gibraltar, where it suffered 
 mucli inconvenience from the prevalence of boister- 
 ous weather, and was dispersed, but happily no 
 shij)s were lost. 
 
 The scurvy also broke out in several regiments, 
 and rapidly extended, as the necessary means for 
 arresting its progress could not be procured. This 
 distressing position of the Fleet and of the Army 
 was terminated by the arrival of the brig " Lavinia" 
 on the 24th of October, \vith despatches for Sir 
 Ralph and for Lord Keith. 
 
 These despatches informed Sir Ralph that the 
 Government in England had decided upon sending 
 an expedition to Egypt, with the view of expelling 
 the French from that country, and they contained 
 instructions directing him, if possible, to effect that 
 object. 
 
1800. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 241 
 
 Such an expedition was in accordance with the 
 views of Sir Ealph, as calculated to give security to 
 important English interests, and to facihtate negoti- 
 ations for peace. 
 
 At the close of the campaign in 1V93, he had 
 formed the opinion that a spirit was abroad which 
 could not be put down by the force of arms, that, 
 like the Reformation, it would not stop until it had 
 travelled throughout Europe, and had either sub- 
 verted or radically reformed the worn-out monarchies 
 of the Continent. This opinion he communicated 
 at the time to one of his Majesty's Ministers, and 
 strongly advised that the first opportunity for mak- 
 ing peace should be cordially and promptly seized. 
 So long as the prosecution of the War was inevitable, 
 he wished that it should be conducted by wisely 
 directed efibrts so that the spirit of the country and 
 the honour of English arms should be sustained, as 
 the sound means of securing peace, and, especially, 
 that no favourable or legitimate opportunity to 
 advance English interests should be lost, as the only 
 compensation that could be obtained for the enor- 
 mous expense incurred. 
 
 General Moore, on this occasion, writing from 
 Malta on the 18th of December, says : — " The Army, 
 I think, rather likes the service on which we are 
 
 Q 
 
242 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1800. 
 
 about to be employed ; I, in particular, prefer it to 
 anything that has yet offered. I am persuaded of 
 the necessity of driving the French from Eg3rpt be- 
 fore we can make peace. Sir Ealph is quite keen 
 about it, and is ten years younger since he left 
 England.'' 
 
 The ardour ^^^th wliich General Moore describes 
 that Sir Ralph engaged in this service, wliich, from 
 his advanced years, and from the progress of a pain- 
 ful complaint to which he was subject, would pro- 
 bably have been his last active employment, even if 
 he had not fallen in the performance of it, can be 
 easily understood by those who were familiar with 
 his character. 
 
 Although in every service in which Sir Ealph had 
 been engaged during the War, his conduct had been 
 such as to have increased his reputation, and the 
 confidence of the public and of the Army in his 
 abihty as a commander ; he was disappointed and 
 depressed by reflecting that with the exception of 
 the conquest of French and Spanish islands in the 
 West Indies, and the surrender of the Dutch fleet at 
 the Helder, they had not been crowned with ulti- 
 mate success nor rewarded by any sohd advance- 
 ment of Enghsh interests. He had sufi'ered most 
 acutely from the unfortunate conclusion of the 
 
1800. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 243 
 
 expedition to Holland in 1793, and from the recent 
 failure at Cadiz. With such feelings, it is not sur- 
 prising that he embraced with ardour the opportunity 
 now offered of engaging in an enterprise which 
 gratified the honourable ambition by which all his 
 exertions were animated, and enabled him to make 
 a last effort to associate his name with a service 
 which promised to be successful, to raise the char- 
 acter of the British Army, to strengthen the sub- 
 stantial interests of his country, and eventually to 
 restore peace to Europe. 
 
 Before entering on the details of the military 
 operations which finally led to the expulsion of the 
 French from Egypt, it is just to Mr. Dundas, who 
 was the sole author of the measure, to unfold the 
 motives which influenced him in deciding to under- 
 take that great and urgent enterprise. 
 
 The battle of Marengo, and the disastrous defeats 
 sustained by the Austrian army, had rendered all 
 hope of useful or efficient co-operation with them 
 in Italy utterly desperate. The party in England 
 who had so long and confidently cherished the hope 
 that a counter-revolution might be effected in France 
 by the exertions of French royalists, had at last be- 
 come sensible that prudence would not sanction the 
 encouragement and support of such visionary pro- 
 
244 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1800. 
 
 jects. The sagacity of Mr. Dundas enabled him to 
 discern, and the manliness of his character led him 
 to acknowledge the errors that had been com- 
 mitted in the conduct of the War. He saw that 
 an enormous expenditure of money had been in- 
 curred, that a large militaiy force had either been 
 kept inactive or misdirected, and that much valu- 
 able time had been sacrificed. Under these cir- 
 cumstances, it appeared to Mr. Dundas, that it was 
 his duty to his country to assert his opinion, as the 
 Minister intrusted with the conduct of the AVar, and 
 to make a vigorous effort to repair past errors, and 
 to arrest the progress of the public disappointment 
 and despondency produced by the uniformity of 
 failure and defeat wliich had attended our Allies, 
 and which had so strongly characterized the last 
 campaign. Mr. Dundas was therefore anxious to 
 revive the drooping spirits, and to retrieve the 
 military character of the country, by directing our 
 efforts to the attainment of objects calculated to 
 promote English interests. He first turned his 
 thoughts to the ports of Spain, and projected the 
 expeditions to Ferrol and Cadiz. Foiled in these 
 objects, he next directed his attention to the expul- 
 sion of the French from Egypt. Mr. Dundas having 
 with great difficulty obtained the concurrence of the 
 
1800. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 245 
 
 King and of the Cabinet, it was finally decided, that 
 the expedition to Egypt should be undertaken, and 
 he immediately wrote to Sir Ralph a very full and 
 unreserved detail of all that had passed in conse- 
 quence of the proposal which had been made by 
 France, to conclude a naval armistice, and of the 
 counter proposition by England to negotiate in con- 
 junction with Austria, for a general peace. 
 
 Mr. Dundas proceeded thus : — " Instead of enter- 
 ing into a general comparison between the advantages 
 (if any still exist), of our sending a Minister to a 
 Congress, or negotiating separately with France, I 
 shall confine myself to giving you, as my opinion, 
 that we ought to shun the former, and take the first 
 opportunity of entering seriously upon the latter. 
 Other persons may have different sentiments, but 
 the necessary course of events, seems to counteract 
 their views, as much as they accord with mine upon 
 this momentous subject, which are, that a negotiation 
 without a naval armistice, is the best line we can 
 follow for bringing the War to a safe and not dis- 
 graceful conclusion, and Providence seems to inter- 
 fere to prevent om- adopting any other. Entertain- 
 ing this opinion, I have no uneasiuess with respect 
 to the footing on which we shall meet the enemy, 
 except what arises from his being in possession of 
 
246 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. J800. 
 
 Egypt. Frttm the moment of the unfortunate rup- 
 ture of the Convention of El Arisch, I have watched 
 with unceasino; concern the unavailinsj efforts made 
 by the Turks to drive him from that province, and 
 coupling the weakness of that ally, with the disas- 
 ters of our other Allies on the Continent, and the 
 direction of British pohtics during this campaign, 
 I own I have seen with great alann the necessary 
 moment of negotiation draw near, without perceiv- 
 ing any certainty that either by any mihtary effort, 
 pending that negotiation, or by any compensation 
 it might afford us an opportunity of offering to 
 the enemy, it would be in our power to compel or 
 entice the French to withdraw from Eg}"pt. My 
 apprehension respecting the views or feeUngs of the 
 present French Government upon this subject, were 
 fully confirmed, both by the verbal and written dis- 
 cussions we had with Monsieur Otto, their agent 
 here, respecting the armistice. The main difficulties 
 of it have all turned upon the demand (still unre- 
 linquished) of permission to send arms, mihtary 
 stores, and reinforcements to Eg}^t ; and the ex- 
 planations entered into by Monsieur Otto leave very 
 Httle doubt, that a ^\^sh to establish their power in 
 that country is the leading principle of their con- 
 duct in this instance, as it probably would be in any 
 
1800. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 247 
 
 future negotiation. I enclose for your perusal, a 
 paper wliich I lately circulated among his Majesty's 
 Ministers, by which you will be made acquainted 
 with my general opinions on this subject, and the 
 little chance we have of frustrating the views of 
 Bonaparte, unless adequate measures are imme- 
 diately taken for this purpose. The idea I had 
 formed when I wrote that paper of the difficulty to 
 which we should be reduced, if nothing could be 
 undertaken against Egypt, before or pending a ne- 
 gotiation is this : That we might go to the utmost 
 possible extent of our offers of compensation from 
 the conquests we have made ; France would say 
 in reply, If you think this is an equivalent for 
 Egypt, we do not, and we cannot therefore agree to 
 the exchange, as we are willing you should keep tliis 
 equivalent, and we will keep Egypt. What answer 
 can we make ? We must either admit the reason- 
 ing, and subscribe to the premises, or break off the 
 negotiation. In fact, we should have no choice, for 
 we should not feel ourselves at liberty to adopt the 
 other alternative. All that I have seen or heard 
 confirms to me, that upon the question of Egypt, 
 more or less modified, will turn the whole of our 
 negotiation, and it is in order to take away from the 
 enemy all the advantages they expect from it, or, if 
 
248 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1800. 
 
 they cannot be taken away entirely, to divide, or (if 
 I may use the expression) to neutralize them, that 
 we now send you up the Mediterranean." 
 
 Mr. Dundas then proceeds to explain what he 
 means by neutralizing the advantages which the 
 enemy derive from the possession of Egypt. He 
 says : — 
 
 " From the moment that we hear of your arrival 
 at the proposed rendezvous (whether Rhodes, Cyprus, 
 Candia, or the coast of Spia), we shall have a right, 
 if then in negotiation mth France, to consider our- 
 selves as in a situation to dispute with them the 
 possession of Egypt, even if the state of the weather 
 and the season of the year should not admit of your 
 making an immediate landing on the coast. If it 
 should, or at any rate as soon as possible, you will 
 proceed against Alexandiia and the other ports, to 
 endeavour to make yourself master of the whole 
 extent of coast. My opinion is, that from the 
 moment Alexandria falls, and the enemy find them- 
 selves pressed by the Turks on the side of Syria, 
 you will be able to command the evacuation on 
 granting moderate terms ; but if I am mistaken in 
 this expectation, still, by having the whole extent of 
 coast in our hands, and by the measures taken to 
 secure the ports on the Red Sea, we shall have a 
 
1800. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 249 
 
 clear right to consider Egypt as at least a divided 
 possession, for tlie evacuation of the interior of 
 which France will be able to claim no other return 
 than our retiring from the coast. By this arrange- 
 ment, every other advantage of the negotiation, as 
 far as relates to sacrifices and restitutions, will be 
 on our side, and upon this one point, instead of it 
 being in their power to set it off against or to hold 
 it higher than any other, we shall be upon a footing 
 of equality, which is the least benefit we have 
 reason to expect from the expedition on which you 
 are now to proceed." 
 
 These sound and enlightened views of Mr. 
 Dundas afford full evidence of the earnestness with 
 which he laboured to conclude a separate peace, on 
 safe and not dishonourable terms, and his conviction 
 that the attainment of this great object depended 
 entirely on the success of the expedition to Egypt. 
 His able and convincing reasoning encountered 
 much opposition from his colleagues, and, on a 
 separate ground, from the King. In writing to Sir 
 Ralph, Mr. Dundas said : — " The deep impression I 
 have of the French being disappointed in their views 
 upon Egypt, has made me uncommonly urgent in 
 pressing these opinions on his Majesty's confidential 
 servants. Indeed, it would be unfair and uncandid 
 
250 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1800. 
 
 in me not to acknowledge that if the country meets 
 with any serious disappointment in the event or 
 consequences of this enterprise, the responsibility 
 does and ought to rest upon me, as many doubts 
 and objections have been stated against it by per- 
 sons of great respectability." 
 
 The objection of the King was founded on an 
 opinion which had been infused into his mind, that 
 the climate of Egypt would prove more fatal to the 
 troops than the yellow fever had ever been in the 
 most unhealthy of the West India islands. It is a 
 proper tribute to the candour of the King, to state 
 that after the accounts of the first successes in 
 Egypt had been received, he took an occasion to 
 state, in the presence of many persons, his respect 
 for the IVIinister who had the courage and the virtue 
 to persevere in the promotion of this great enter- 
 prise, in opposition to his opinion, and to that of" 
 many members of the Government. 
 
 Having shown how courageously Mr. Dundas had 
 assumed the whole responsibility of suggesting and 
 of planning the enterprise, and how deeply his char- 
 acter and fame as a Minister were involved in the 
 result, it only remains to point out with what con- 
 fidence he refied on the commander to whom the 
 conduct of the expedition had been intrusted. 
 
1800. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 251 
 
 After putting Sir Ralph in possession of tlie facts 
 on which his own opinion had been formed, Mr. 
 Dundas says, " I do not mean to exclude your fur- 
 ther inquiry, or even an exercise of your judgment, 
 if the result of further inquiry should lead you to 
 form a decided opinion contrary to the instructions 
 you have received. From the naval advice you have 
 with you, and the various channels of information 
 which the Mediterranean affords, it is not impos- 
 sible you may receive such information and intel- 
 ligence, either with respect to the navigation to 
 Egypt, or with regard to the circumstances in which 
 that country now is, as may induce you either in 
 whole or in part to postpone the execution of the 
 service committed to your charge, and I shall not 
 repine at whatever the exercise of that discretion 
 may be. In your hands I feel the interests of the 
 country safe in this respect. I do not mean these 
 as common expressions of complimentary address, 
 because I know that as on the one hand no false 
 point of honour or feehng will induce you to at- 
 tempt what is too hazardous to be attempted, so, 
 on the other hand, I am satisfied by experience, that 
 when great objects are at stake, and great services 
 are in contemplation, you are not to be .startled by 
 those difficulties to which characters of less energy 
 
252 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1800. 
 
 or less standing than your own may allow them- 
 selves to yield." 
 
 The clear and candid revelation of his views 
 contained in the letters of Mr. Diindas, from which 
 only partial extracts can with propriety be given, 
 must have been very acceptable to Sir Ealph, as 
 indicating a striking coincidence of opinion as to 
 the desirableness of concluding a separate peace, 
 and as to the objects to which the disposable force 
 of England ought in the meanwhile to be directed. 
 
 The expulsion of the French from Egypt, and the 
 emancipation of South America, were two objects to 
 which Sir Ralph had drawn the attention of the Go- 
 vernment in a Memorial,-^ which he had at a former 
 time submitted for theii* consideration. However he 
 might have wished that a preference had been given 
 at an earher j)eriod to the latter object, he now felt 
 that the turn of affairs on the Continent, the prospect 
 of an early negotiation for peace, and the circum- 
 stances in which the disposable force of the country 
 was then placed, all combined to decide the ques- 
 tion in favour of an effort to expel the French from 
 Egypt. This opinion was expressed in a letter to 
 Mr. Huskisson, then Under-Secretary to Mr. Dundas, 
 and of whose abilities Sir Ralph entertained a very 
 
 ' Vide Appendix A. 
 
1800. EXPEDITION TO ECxYPT. 253 
 
 liigli opinion, in which he says, " I ardently wish 
 that pubHc affairs may go well, and they cannot go 
 better than in obtaining, what I have always longed 
 for, a reasonable peace. I think you are now begin- 
 ning to be sensible. I wish you had laid aside your 
 buckram opinions a little sooner." 
 
 This letter to Mr, Huskisson was written before 
 Sir Ralph was aware that the expedition to Egypt 
 had been finally decided on ; and its contents must 
 have assured Mr, Dundas, that his opinions and in- 
 structions on the subject would be favourably and 
 cordially received by the General he had appointed 
 to command the enterprise. Sir Ealph, on his part, 
 must have felt that the confidence thus j^laced in 
 him, and the discretion with which he was invested, 
 carried with them a responsibility which required 
 that all the energies of liis mind should be devoted 
 to the undertaking in which he was about to 
 engage. The watchful care, the zeal, and the un- 
 daunted resolution with which he exercised his 
 discretionary powers under circumstances often 
 embarrassing and discouraging, will be seen by 
 tracing the outhne of the military operations from 
 their commencement to the close of the decisive 
 battle on the 21st March 1801. 
 
 Immediately after the arrival at Gibraltar of the 
 
254 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1800. 
 
 brig "Lavinia," on the 24th October 1800, A\'ith 
 despatches for Sir Ealph, an order was issued, an- 
 nouncing that a separation of the Army was to 
 take place. Major-Generals Hutchinson, Coote, 
 Cradock, Ludlow, Moore, Lord Cavan, and Bri- 
 gadier-Generals Stuart, Hope, Doyle, and Oakes, 
 were attached to the di\dsion of the Army destined 
 to serve under Sir Ralph. Brigadier-General Hope 
 and Colonel Austruther were appointed Adjutant 
 and Quartermaster Generals. The total effective 
 strength of the regiments of infantry amounted to 
 13,488. The total of cavalry was only 200. The 
 artillery, under Brigadier-General Lawson, amounted 
 to 614 men ; and the engineers, under Major 
 M'Kerras, consisted only of a few artificers. The 
 selection of general officers chosen for this service 
 was, on the whole, judicious and satisfactory ; and 
 the infantry regiments were, A\T.th the exception of 
 three battalions lately completed from the Irish 
 militia, old soldiers who had not been much em- 
 ployed on home service, were in good order, and for 
 the most part well commanded. The composition 
 of this Army was equal, or perhaps superior, to any 
 that had been assembled by England during the 
 war. It was impossible to conceal the destination 
 of the armament. It was necessarilv known that 
 
1800. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 255 
 
 the troops were to be employed in the Mediterra- 
 nean ; and as no regiments were selected but those 
 in wliich the men had been enlisted for general ser- 
 vice, the conclusion was obvious that Egypt must 
 be the object of the enterprise. 
 
 The original intention was that all the fleet 
 should touch at Minorca, and with that view the 
 first division, consisting of about twenty ships, 
 sailed on the 27th of October for that island. At 
 the same time Colonel Anstruther, the Quarter- 
 master-General, and Lieutenant -Colonel Murray, 
 sailed for Ehodes with instructions to communicate 
 with the Turkish army in Syria, and to make all 
 necessary preparations to facilitate the future pro- 
 gress of the enterprise. 
 
 In order to avoid delay, it was subsequently de- 
 cided that only such ships should touch at Minorca 
 as required repairs that could not be made at Malta, 
 to which place all the rest of the fleet were to pro- 
 ceed direct. 
 
 It is to be regretted that there were causes which 
 diminished the effective strength of the Army, even 
 before it left Gibraltar, The troop-ships, with very 
 rare exceptions, were in a most wretched condition, 
 deficient in anchors and stores of every kind ; the 
 decks so leaky that when it rained the men were 
 
256 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1800. 
 
 constantly wet ; they were too much crowded, and 
 the soldiers, with no other bedding than blankets, 
 were obliged to lie on the deck. The sick, amount- 
 ing to between four and five hundred, were left in 
 the general hospital at Gibraltar ; and the second 
 battalion of the 27th Regiment of Infantry, in 
 which a bad fever had l^roken out, were in conse- 
 quence sent to Lisbon in the ships in which 
 they had been embarked to sail up the Mediter- 
 ranean. 
 
 On the 5th of November 1800 all the ships in 
 Gibraltar Bay, belonging to the expedition, got 
 under way and sailed for Tetuan. After a quick 
 passage, Sir Ralph, who sailed in the "Diadem" of 74 
 guns, reached Malta in the afternoon of the 19th of 
 November. The weather had been boisterous, and 
 the ships had been dispersed, so that some time 
 elapsed before the whole fleet re-assembled. As cir- 
 cumstances rendered some delay at Malta indis- 
 pensable. Sir Ralph landed on the 20 th, and he 
 anxiously wished that, if possible, the troops should 
 be disembarked. ; but this most desirable object 
 could not be effected, in consequence of the impossi- 
 bility of finding quarters for them. Every pre- 
 caution was adopted to remedy this inconvenience. 
 The men of some of the regiments that were most 
 
1800. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 257 
 
 sickly were accommodated in tolerable barracks in 
 the town and in the adjoining villages. The troops 
 were directed to be landed as frequently as possible 
 for the benefit of exercise, and to give time for 
 cleaning the ships thoroughly ; they were invariably 
 supplied with fresh l^eef, and with an abundance of 
 vegetables. 
 
 Sir Ealph had, while at Minorca, made a tour of 
 that island, and examined carefully the means of 
 defence, the advantages which it offered, and all 
 other circumstances which could affect its value 
 in the event of its becoming a possession of Great 
 Britain. At Malta he followed the same course, 
 and knowing from his instructions that an early 
 negotiation for peace w^as probable, he transmitted 
 to Mr. Dundas, before proceeding on the expedition, 
 the opinion which he had formed of the compara- 
 tive value of Minorca and Malta, and also of the 
 preliminary steps which ought to be taken, with a 
 view to the estal)lishment of a regular government, 
 in the event of Malta (to which he gave the prefer- 
 ence) becoming a permanent possession of England.^ 
 
 The information which the Government had col- 
 lected for the guidance of Sir Ealph, in the conduct 
 of the expedition, was most meagre. In fact, it 
 
 ' Vide Appendix B. 
 R 
 
258 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1800. 
 
 consisted ouly of a very bad map of Egypt, and of 
 copies of a work which had been published under 
 the title of " Intercepted Correspondence," on which 
 no rehancc could safely be placed. Sir Ralph was 
 therefore anxiously engaged while at Malta in en- 
 deavouring to obtain information respecting the 
 strength, state, and condition of the French army 
 in Egypt, the geography of the country, and the 
 nature of the works recently constructed for the 
 defence of Alexandria. Except with respect to 
 the weather wliich generally prevails on the coast 
 of Eg}^3t, and to the facilities for disembarkation 
 afforded by the Bay of Aboukir, the information 
 was most contradictory and unsatisfactory. 
 
 The impression left on Sir Ralph's mind may be 
 estimated l^v the foUowino^ extract from a letter 
 which he wrote to Mr. Dundas before leaving Malta : 
 " During my stay here, I have procured a little in- 
 formation resjDecting Egypt, and have been able to 
 form some notion on the operations of the campaign, 
 with which I shall not trouble you at present, but I 
 think it necessary to apprise you that the service on 
 which we are going will not probably be so soon 
 performed as you may expect.^' 
 
 It was the \\dsh and intention of the Government 
 that the expedition should have sailed direct from 
 
1801- EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 259 
 
 Malta to Egypt. It was, however, necessary to pro- 
 ceed to a third rendezvous, for the purpose of taking 
 in a full supply of water, receiving a great quantity 
 of small craft, horses, and refreshments for the 
 troops, and also to- leave the sick. All necessary- 
 arrangements having been completed, the Fleet was 
 ready to have sailed from Malta on the 13 th of 
 December 1800, but the wind being adverse, it was 
 not until the morning of the 20 th that the first 
 division of the Fleet was enabled to weigh anchor. 
 On the morning of the 27 th, the " Kent," in which 
 Sir Ealpli sailed, and the first division of the Fleet, 
 being off Ehodes, they fell in with the "Peterel," 
 sloop, which Sir Sidney Smith had left to conduct 
 them into the Bay of Marmorice, where they an- 
 chored in the afternoon. On the 2d January 1801, 
 the second division of the Fleet arrived in Marmo- 
 rice Bay.^ The interval between the arrival of the 
 Army at Marmorice, and the final departure for 
 Egypt on the 2 2d of February, was employed by 
 Sir Ealph in watchful and zealous attention to the 
 health and discipline of the troops. The experience 
 of the defective arrangements that had been made 
 when a landing at Cadiz was attempted, showed the 
 necessity for guarding against the recurrence of 
 
 ' Vide Appendix C- 
 
260 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1801. 
 
 similar evils. The troops were constantly practised 
 in embarking and disembarking, until both services 
 became expert in the performance of that duty. 
 
 As the expulsion of the French from Egypt, and 
 the restitution of that province to the Porte, was the 
 ultimate object of the expedition, it was reasonalile 
 to expect the most zealous and cordial support from 
 the Turkish Government. To ascertain how far re- 
 liance could be placed on this expected co-operation, 
 was one of the first sul)jects that engaged the atten- 
 tion of Sir Ralph. Before the fleet sailed from Gib- 
 raltar, Colonel Anstruther, Quartermaster-General, 
 was sent to Rhodes to make the necessary arrange- 
 ments for the contemplated service, and Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Murray was directed to proceed to the camp 
 of the Grand Vizir at Jaffa. The first reports re- 
 ceived from Colonel Anstruther were very encourag- 
 ing, but unhappily they were founded on warm 
 professions of friendship, and promises of cordial 
 assistance and co-operation which proved eventually 
 to be quite illusory. Lieutenant-Colonel Murray 
 had arrived from the camp of the Vizir before Sir 
 Ralph reached Marmorice, and his report of the 
 Turkish Army was so discouraging as to preclude 
 all hope of useful or efficient co-operation. Sir 
 Ralph still deemed it advisable to send an officer of 
 
1801. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 261 
 
 rank to announce to the Grand Vizir the arrival of 
 tlie EngHsh force at Marmorice, to explain the ope- 
 rations tliat might be undertaken, and to encourage 
 him to put his army in a condition fit for active 
 service. General Moore was selected for that mis- 
 sion, and his report entirely, confirmed that which 
 had been previously made by Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Murray, and, he added, that it was his decided opi- 
 nion that the plan of operations ought not in any 
 degree to be influenced by the hope of assistance 
 from the Turks, wliich could not at present be ex- 
 pected. 
 
 This report did not make any alteration in Sir 
 Ralph's views, for very soon after liis arrival at Mar- 
 morice, he had become convinced that the Turks 
 regarded the armament with a jealous eye, and did 
 nothing to assist, and much to thwart and obstruct 
 the preparations for the enterprise. This system was 
 so constantly pursued by the Turks, that the Fleet 
 finally sailed from Marmorice without any ofiicial 
 authority from them to countenance the expedition, 
 and unaccorapanied by a single Turkish soldier or 
 ship. It may be that the Turks were alarmed at 
 the magnitude of the armament, and may have sus- 
 pected that the expulsion of the French was not the 
 only object in view. All possible pains were used, 
 
262 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. ISOl. 
 
 but without apparent success, to remove this sus- 
 picion. It may be that the Emperor Paul, who was 
 then on the eve of declaring war against England, 
 and of forming an alliance with France, may have 
 been induced by the French Government to threaten 
 an immediate invasion of the Turkish dominions, 
 unless all assistance to the English expedition were 
 withheld, and the Turks may have preferred the 
 sacrifice of Egypt to the danger of an incursion which 
 they may have felt that they were unable to resist. 
 Whatever the motive may have been which influ- 
 enced the conduct of the Turkish Government at 
 that time, it added greatly to the difficulties of the 
 Commander, and left him no resource but in his 
 o\Aai energy, and in the bravery of his troops. It 
 was now placed beyond all doubt that no present 
 assistance would be afforded by the Turks, and that 
 future co-operation could only be expected in the 
 event of such a footing being gained by the Army 
 in Egypt as would justify a reasonable hope of ulti- 
 mate success. In that case it was probable that 
 both the inhabitants of the countrv, and the Turkish 
 Government, would be disposed to assist in the ex- 
 pulsion of the French. Under these circumstances 
 it became necessary to weigh carefully the scanty 
 and inconclusive information ^^dliell had Ijeen col- 
 
1801. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 263 
 
 lectecl, and to decide upon a plan of operations 
 commensurate with the means and strength of the 
 Enghsh Army, which was now to act independently 
 and unsupported by the Turks. The instructions 
 given to Sir Ralph simply suggested the expediency 
 of landing at the nearest practicable point to Alex- 
 andria, but he was authorized to exercise his own 
 discretion, and to substitute any other plan which 
 he might deem more advisable. 
 
 The gravity and responsibility of the decision 
 then to be made, must not be judged by the events 
 which followed, but must be tested by reference to 
 the imperfect information which had been with 
 difficulty and exertion obtained, and in the accuracy 
 of which, on material points, no confident reliance 
 could be placed. The anchorage in the Bay of 
 Aboukir was known to be good, and it was beUeved 
 that constant communication with the Fleet could 
 be maintained, so that, if circumstances should 
 render re-embarkation necessary, it could most pro- 
 bably be effected with little loss. Abouku-, on these 
 grounds, offered advantages as the place of dis- 
 embarkation ; but, as the disposition and amount 
 of the French force were entu-ely unknown, it was 
 not impossible that the enemy, suspecting or know- 
 ing that we should land there, might have assembled 
 
264 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1801. 
 
 such a force as would have rendered the attempt 
 impracticable. This was the more to be appre- 
 hended, as there was every reason to believe that 
 the ground between the Castle of Aboukir and Lake 
 Maadieh did not exceed a league. The landing- 
 being successfully effected, the next object would 
 necessarily be to obtain possession of Alexandria, 
 by which a safe harbour would be secured for the 
 Fleet, and a position for the Ai-my, from which ar- 
 rangements might be made for moving against the 
 enemy wherever their force might be concentrated, 
 and which, even under adverse circumstances, might 
 be maintained, until reinforcements could be re- 
 ceived. It was believed that the French had so 
 strengthened Alexandria, that it could not be taken 
 by a coup-de-main, and, therefore, that the use of 
 artillery must be the resource. There were neither 
 horses nor mules to draw the artillery, and no 
 prospect of obtaining a sufficient number of either 
 for that purpose, so that this laborious ser\dce must 
 ]je devolved on the troops. Mr. Baldwin, who had 
 been nearly tliirty years consul at Cairo and at 
 Alexandria, who being at Naples when the Fleet 
 was at Malta, had handsomely volunteered his ser- 
 vices, and now accompanied the expedition, gave it 
 as his decided opinion, that no fresh water would 
 
1801. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 265 
 
 be found on the peninsula between Aboukir and 
 Alexandria. 
 
 This opinion of Mr. Baldwin was confirmed not 
 only by travellers, but by every individual who had 
 been examined on this point. 
 
 All authorities concurred in stating that the 
 coast between Aboukir and Alexandria was so 
 rocky, and the surf so high, that no boats could, 
 approach the shore, except in one small creek about 
 four miles from Alexandria, and then only in favour- 
 able weather. The direction of Lake Maadieh could 
 not be determined with certainty, but Mr. Baldwin 
 and others who were examined, agreed in stating 
 that the nearest portion of it was distant four or 
 five miles from Alexandria. It did not, therefore, 
 appear that much assistance could be derived from 
 the lake in conducting operations against Alexandria, 
 and it was probable that it might become necessary 
 to tnist to the Fleet to supply the Army with 
 water, wood, provisions, and stores of every kind. 
 This supply must, in bad weather, have been drawn 
 from Aboukir, a distance of ten miles, or, in favour- 
 able weather, from the Creek, a distance of five 
 miles by land, and five miles l)y water, as all the 
 ships must have permanently remained at Aboukir. 
 This was a demand on the Navy, which even the 
 
266 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1801. 
 
 greatest activity and energy on their part might 
 have been unequal to meet. The French, after 
 throwing a sufficient garrison into Alexandria, might 
 have a disposable force, capable of obstructing the ope- 
 rations of a siege, and the strong body of cavalry 
 which they were known to possess would materially 
 assist in impeding the progress of the service. 
 
 In addition to these anticipated difficulties, the 
 progress of the equipment at Marmorice was retarded 
 by events wliich were not under the control of the 
 Commander, and the means of the Army were 
 crippled by the failure of arrangements which the 
 Government at home had directed to be made at 
 Constantinople and at Smyrna. Horse-ships and 
 small craft wliich had been taken up at Smyrna two 
 months previously, did not, from some unexplained 
 mismanagement, arrive at Marmorice until the 1 7 th 
 of February, although the distance is only two days' 
 sail. 
 
 Five hundred mules had l)een purchased at 
 Smyrna, and the " Greyhound" frigate, which had 
 long before been sent to convoy them, joined the 
 Fleet after it had sailed from Marmorice, with the 
 intelligence that the vessels in which the mules had 
 been embarked had been dispersed in a gale, and 
 had taken refuge in different ports. The horses 
 
1801. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 267 
 
 which Lord Elgiii^ had been directed to purchase 
 at Constantinople, only arrived on the 17 th of 
 February, and were found to be in such miserable 
 condition, that very few of them were fit for the 
 purpose for which they had been intended. 
 
 In a letter from Sir Ealph to Colonel Brownrigg, 
 from Marmorice Bay, dated IGth February 1801, he 
 thus describes his view of the prospects of the ex- 
 pedition : — 
 
 " It is impossible for me to say how much we 
 have been disappointed in our expectations of assist- 
 ance from the Turkish Government. I firmly be- 
 lieve, that both the Quartermaster-General and 
 Lord Elgin did use, before our arrival here, every 
 exertion to procure us those articles of which we 
 stood most in need, and I know, from my own ex- 
 perience, the impossibility of rousing the Turks to 
 any efiectual aid or co-operation. We are now on 
 the point of sailing for the coast of Egypt, with very 
 slender means for executing the orders we have re- 
 ceived. I never went on any service entertaining 
 greater doubts of success, at the same time with 
 more determination to encounter difficulties. Our 
 own character, and the honour of the profession to 
 which we belong, urge us all to use every effort in 
 
 1 TLeu British Ambassador at Constantiuoiile. 
 
268 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1801. 
 
 the discharge of our duty. The Dutch expedition 
 was walking on velvet in comparison with this. 
 Do not think that tliis is a gloomy letter, I only 
 wish that you should know the truth." 
 
 In a letter to Mr. Huskisson of the same date, 
 and on the same subject, Sir Ralph thus expresses 
 himself : — 
 
 " The Turkish Government has been lavish of 
 promises, but in no one circumstance have they been 
 fulfilled, and we now go to fight their battles with- 
 out their assistance or co-operation in any one 
 article. I am not willing to state difficulties, but 
 I should deceive you if I did not speak truth. You 
 may rest assured that everything shall be done that 
 it is possible to accomplish, but I cannot, and will 
 not, promise success." 
 
 Before saihng from Gibraltar, the difficulty of 
 finding specie in the Mediterranean had been ur- 
 gently pressed on the consideration of the Govern- 
 ment. Unhappily the admonition was not attended 
 to, and the consequence was, that the pay of the 
 troops was three months in arrear, and the military 
 chest was nearly exhausted. One hundred horses 
 for the cavalry had l^een purchased at Marmorice 
 with the aid of the dollars which were contributed 
 by the stafl-officers out of their o\mi resources. 
 
1801. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 269 
 
 It was calculated that eight or ten Turkish gun- 
 boats, which had been procured at Ehodes, together 
 with two or three English gunboats which had been 
 fitted up, would, with the assistance of the brigs and 
 cutters, be found sufficient to cover the landing. The 
 engineers had been employed in making facines and 
 gabions, as Egypt furnishes no wood for such pur- 
 poses, and every exertion was made to provide the 
 Army with all that was necessary for the arduous 
 service on which they were about to be employed. 
 A few days before leaving Marmorice, a French cor- 
 vette was brought in, which had been taken by one 
 of Lord Keith's cruisers. This corvette had sailed 
 from Toulon in company with two French frigates, 
 which had succeeded in getting into Alexandria with 
 800 soldiers and military stores. It appeared from 
 the contents of letters which were found on board 
 the corvette, that there were several other frigates 
 ready to sail from Toulon, and that it was the deter- 
 mination of Bonaparte to make every possible exer- 
 tion, and at every hazard, to send supplies and 
 reinforcements to Egypt. 
 
 Such were the difficulties to be overcome in the 
 event of a landing being effected at Aboukir, and 
 such were the means that had been provided for the 
 conduct of the enterprise. It had been considered 
 
270 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 
 
 1801. 
 
 whether it would not be preferable to land at 
 Damietta, and thence to proceed to Cairo, wdiich the 
 French had made their Capital. When the details 
 of that operation were examined, however, so many 
 serious objections to it presented themselves, that 
 the Damietta plan was rejected, and the preference 
 was given to Abonkir. 
 
 Although the armament had been some w^eks at 
 IMarmorice, and every effort had been made to for- 
 ward the equipment of the Army, the result had 
 not corresponded with the exertions or expectations 
 of the Commander. 
 
 The time for action had arrived, and a decision 
 was to be formed under difficult and anxious cir- 
 cumstances. 
 
 Mr. Dundas had stated in his instructions that, 
 when the armament had reached the place of ren- 
 dezvous in the Mediterranean, he should consider 
 that on our side the negotiators for peace would, 
 from that moment, be entitled to maintain that the 
 possession of Egypt was in dispute, and dependent 
 on the result of an undecided contest, and their ar- 
 gument would be powerfully strengthened if a foot- 
 ing could be made in Eg}'pt. If, on the other 
 hand, the French, conjectm'ing that a landing would 
 be attempted at Aboukii', should have assembled 
 
IBOI. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 27l 
 
 such a force as would, with the advantages of 
 ground and position, have rendered the disembark- 
 ation impracticable ; or if, after having effected a 
 landing, the deficiency of our means, or the supe- 
 riority of the enemy in number or resources, should 
 make retreat necessary, then the whole object of 
 the expedition would be at once and irretrievably 
 defeated, and all the advantages in a negotia- 
 tion for peace would be thrown into the scale of 
 France. 
 
 On mature reflection. Sir Ralph determined, if 
 possible, to effect a landing at Aboukir, and to 
 follow it up as far as prudence and the means at 
 his command would allow. 
 
 Having made np his mind, he announced his 
 resolution to the general officers, and proceeded to 
 carry it into effect ; and from that moment to the 
 hour of his death he proceeded with unfaltering 
 and dauntless energy, tempered only by that cau- 
 tion which was imposed on him in acting on un- 
 known ground, in conflict with an enemy with the 
 amount of whose force he was unacquainted, and 
 who commanded the resources of the country. The 
 responsibility of the decision was increased by the 
 instructions from England, which thus disclosed the 
 material influence which the expedition might have, 
 
2*72 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1801. 
 
 not only Ijy its ultimate success, but by being 
 protracted so long as negotiations for peace were 
 pending. 
 
 Although the equipment of the Army was less 
 satisfactory and complete than had been expected, 
 yet, as the enemy Avere no doubt daily profiting 
 from delay, Sir Ralph decided that the time had 
 come when it was necessary to leave the Bay of 
 Marmorice. Accordingly, orders were issued for 
 the embarkation of the troops, and of tlie few 
 horses which had l)een purchased. The order in 
 which the troops were to disembark, and an excel- 
 lent code of instructions for the conduct of the 
 Army during the campaign, were also issued. All 
 the ships were directed to have as large a supply of 
 wood and water as they could possil)ly carry, and 
 several ships were besides specially allotted for that 
 purpose. The sick unfit for service were sent to an 
 hospital which had been provided at Rhodes. The 
 general officers were furnished with the best maps 
 of Egypt that could be procured, and their instruc- 
 tions were full and distinct. The nature of the dif- 
 ficulties that were to be encountered were fully ex- 
 plained. The importance and necessity of main- 
 taining the strictest discij^line, and of paying the 
 greatest attention to precision and regularity in the 
 
1801. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 273 
 
 movement of tlie troops, were strongly impressed by 
 the Commander, who concluded by assuring them 
 that if they were so fortunate as to find water, 
 there was every reason to flatter themselves with 
 the hope of at least partial success. 
 
 The exact amount of the eflJective infantry was 
 14,144 ; but from that was to be deducted 750, 
 who were not expected to be able to land with 
 their regiments. The total of cavalry was 1063 
 men, and 454 horses. There were 630 artillery- 
 men, with 173 horses. Lord Keith promised the 
 aid of a Battalion of Marines consisting of 5 men, 
 making a total of 16,337 men, and 627 horses. 
 
 These arrangements having been completed, the 
 signal for the Fleet to sail was made at seven in the 
 morning of the 2 2d February 1801, and before dusk 
 the whole were clear of the harbour. Colonel 
 Abercromby, in his journal, says : — " It was impos- 
 sible not to contemplate with an awful but inter- 
 esting sensation the noble sight of this grand fleet 
 issuing from under the stupendous mountains of 
 Asia Minor. Never was there an expedition at- 
 tended with more important and extraordinary cir- 
 cumstances. Never was the honour of the British 
 Army more at stake, or its animated exertions more 
 required : and never was the interest of the country 
 
 s 
 
274 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1801. 
 
 more deeply involved than in its ultimate success. 
 Our difficulties, as far as we are now enabled to 
 view tliem, are great indeed ; but I can venture to 
 assert that an equal number of Britons were never 
 assembled who were more determined to uphold 
 their own and their country's honour." 
 
 The weather proved to be variable and hazy, and 
 on the 27th, the Fleet was dispersed by a very fresh 
 gale, but re-assembled on the 28 th, with the excep- 
 tion of some ships that were missing. On the 1st 
 of March, the look-out frigates made the signal of 
 seeing land, and the Fleet was ordered to bring -to. 
 In the course of the evening, Captain Louis of the 
 "Minotaur," who had been cruising off the coast, came 
 onboard the "Kent" to inform Sir Ralph that Major 
 M'Kerras, the chief engineer, and Captain Fletcher 
 of the same corps, who had been despatched from 
 Marmorice to reconnoitre the coast, had unfortu- 
 nately been surprised in a small boat, and had been 
 made prisoners. A more untoward accident could 
 not have occurred, as the services of the Chief 
 Engineer were lost, and from the fact of his having 
 been found in the Bay of Aboukir, the enemy could 
 no longer be in doubt as to the place where the 
 landing would be attempted. On the 3d of March, 
 a flag of truce from Alexandria brought intelligence 
 
1801. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 275 
 
 tliat Major M'Kerras had been killed by an acci- 
 dental shot, the boat in which he was having made 
 some resistance, the enemy had found it necessary 
 to fire. 
 
 On the 2d of March, the greater part of the Fleet 
 anchored in Aboukh' Bay, and the signal to prepare 
 to land was made, but the roughness of the sea, and 
 the violence of the surf, rendered it impossible to 
 do so. Sir Kalph, however, went close in shore, in 
 a small vessel to reconnoitre, and the place of land- 
 ing was chosen and fixed. 
 
 The north-west winds continuing to blow with 
 unabated fury, the immediate landing of the troops 
 was impracticable. On the 6th of March, Sir Sidney 
 Smith was sent to destroy a gun-boat stationed at 
 the entrance of Lake Maadieh, and to cut the rope 
 which formed a pontoon bridge, by means of which 
 the communication between Rosetta and Aboukir 
 was kept up. A prisoner who was taken, gave 
 information that 2000 men had been sent from 
 Alexandria, together with a small body of cavalry 
 and fifteen pieces of artillery, under General Friant, 
 to oppose the landing. He also stated that a French 
 frigate from Rochefort, with several hundred soldiers 
 on board, had arrived at Alexandria the day after 
 the English Fleet anchored in Aboukir Bay. This 
 
27(3 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1801. 
 
 would not have happened if the cruisers off Alex- 
 andria had not unfortunately been recalled by Lord 
 Keith. 
 
 At length the wind became moderate, and on the 
 8 th of March the preparations for landing com- 
 menced. All the orders for the disembarkation of 
 the Army had been made public before the departure 
 from Marmorice. It was so arranged that each 
 vessel knew to which particular ship the boats were 
 to proceed on the signal being made for the First 
 Division to prepare to land. In order to guard as 
 far as possible against the chance of any mistake 
 being made, the First Division was repeatedly 
 landed in its resailar order before lea^inor Mar- 
 morice. Two field-pieces, ^^^th the artillerymen 
 attached to them, were put on board each of the 
 line-of-battle ships, and the launches were so fitted 
 up, that they could receive the guns, mounted on 
 their carriages, by which means they would be 
 landed, and ready to fire, nearly at the moment 
 that the troops got on shore. 
 
 At two in the morning, on the 8 th of March, a 
 rocket w^as fired from Lord Keith's ship, which was 
 the signal for preparing to land, and by three o'clock 
 the troops of the first di\dsion began to get into the 
 boats. Owing to the distance at which the ships lay 
 
1801. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 277 
 
 from tlie shore, it was near eight o'clock before they 
 reached the small vessels stationed to cover the land- 
 ing, and round which they were directed to assemble. 
 The troops were alive to the difficulty and danger of 
 the service in which they were engaged, and, while 
 they rowed to the rendezvous; the most profound 
 silence was preserved, and not a sound was heard 
 save the splashing of the oars in the sea. About fifty 
 men sat in each of the boats with their muskets un- 
 loaded, and there were in all about 5000. On reaching 
 the rendezvous, a little time was required to arrange 
 the boats in their proper order. At nine o'clock, 
 Captain Cochrane of the Navy, who superintended 
 the arrangements for landing with great judgment 
 and ability, made the signal to pull to shore. The 
 troops, fixed to then- seats, without the power of 
 resistance or defence, exposed to the fire of fifteen 
 pieces of artillery, throwing round grape shot, and 
 shells, and to the musketry of 2000 infantry, re- 
 mained undismayed, answering only with hurrahs, 
 in anticipation of the victory which they so gloriously 
 achieved. It has seldom, or perhaps never before 
 happened, that a more concentrated fire was brought 
 to bear upon a single and defenceless point. When 
 the troops reached the shore, they had to contend 
 with a force which was most advantageously posted. 
 
278 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1801. 
 
 The enemy had Lake Maadieh on their right, and a 
 long commanding sand-hill on their left. The sand- 
 hill had a very steep front towards the sea, and came 
 down close to the edge of the water. The interme- 
 diate ground between this sand-hill and the right 
 of the enemy was covered with a number of small 
 and irregular sand-hills, on which artillery were 
 placed, and behind them were the infantry and 
 cavalry. The whole extent of ground between Lake 
 Maadieh and the sea did not exceed a mile and 
 half, and was entirely occupied by the enemy, ex- 
 cept that portion of it which was within the range 
 of the fire from the castle of Aboukir. General 
 Moore, ^\ith the flank companies of the 40th, 23d, 
 and 28th regiments, landed under the sand-hill, 
 which was nearly perpendicular, and the troops sunk 
 up to the knees in loose sand. General Moore, in a 
 spirited and masterly manner, gained the sand-hill, 
 thus turning the left of the enemy, who retired 
 across a plain keeping up a distant and not well 
 directed fire from their artillery. General Moore 
 stopped the pursuit, as he heard a heavy firing on 
 his left, which he knew must proceed from the re- 
 mainder of the reserve which General Oakes was 
 bringing up. 
 
 The 4 2d and 58th regiments, under General 
 
1801. 
 
 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 279 
 
 Oakes, tlie brigade of Guards under General Lud- 
 low, and a part of General Coote's brigade, landed 
 opposite to tlie enemy's right and centre, where the 
 resistance was very obstinate. On that point the 
 contest was maintained for an hour, Ijut the enemy, 
 after the most strenuous eftbrts of their infantry, 
 cavalry, and artillery, were forced to retire, leaving 
 seven field-pieces, some ammunition-waggons, a few 
 horses, and many of their wounded. 
 
 The plan of putting two field-pieces into the 
 launches of the line-of-battle ships fully answered 
 the expectations which had been formed, for they 
 were landed and in action as soon as the troops. 
 The enemy behaved with great courage ; they sus- 
 tained a severe loss of men, and General Martinet 
 was killed. Nothing could resist the intrepidity of 
 the Enghsh troops, which, as Sir Ralph expressed 
 in his public despatch, could scarcely be paralleled. 
 The apprehension that the French might have 
 assembled a sufticient force to prevent the landing 
 was removed, and a footing in Egypt had been 
 gained. Before General Moore landed. Sir Ralph, 
 who was in the nearest bomb-vessel, sent General 
 Hope to say, " that if he (Sir Ralph) saw that the 
 fire from the enemy was so great that the men could 
 not bear it, he would make the signal to retire, and 
 
280 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1801. 
 
 desired that lie and Captain Cochrane should look 
 occasionally to the ship in which he was ;" thus evin- 
 cing that humanity and feeling for the troops were 
 the only limits to the exertions which he was prepared 
 to make. From the vessel in which Sir Ralph was 
 he had a full view of the preparations made by the 
 enemy, and, after surveying them, he turned to 
 General Hope and smiling, said. This is really 
 taking the bull by the horns. General Hope, 
 Colonel Abercromby, and some of those who were 
 nearest to Sii* Ralph, were well aware how difficult 
 it would be to restrain him from landing with the 
 first of the troops, and therefore they arranged with 
 Lieutenant Richardson, who was to command the 
 boat from which Sir Ralph was to land, that he 
 should not push off from the bomb- vessel until he 
 saw that the landing was securely effected. General 
 Hope left the vessel in wliich Sir Ralph was, un- 
 observed, as he believed, but he had scarcely gone 
 before Sir Ralph called for his boat and was im- 
 mediately put on shore, accompanied by his son 
 Colonel Abercromby, and by Colonel Kempt, his 
 military secretary, in full time to direct and to 
 enjoy the conduct of the troops.^ 
 
 1 When Sir Ralph was at Malta, he inspected the 23d regiment, Welsh 
 Fnsileers, wliich had formerly served under him with distinction, and he was 
 mortified to find that tlie corps was in the worst order and condition. A 
 
1801. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 281 
 
 Sir Ralph passed the night of the 8 th of March, 
 which was very cold, under a small hut formed from 
 branches of the date-tree, which was constructed 
 for him by the soldiers, who vied with each other 
 in their efforts to mark their gratitude by providing 
 shelter for a Commander who was the ever- watch- 
 ful guardian of their health and comfort ; a trifling 
 incident, in itself unimportant, but which, being 
 authentic, is strongly illustrative of the estimation 
 in which the character of Sir Ralph as a Commander 
 was held by those who served under him. 
 
 He was a just and severe disciplinarian, but 
 prompt and frank in his approval of those who 
 profited from his instruction. 
 
 On the 9 th of March, the reserve advanced about 
 two miles, and took up a position at Mandora, 
 which is the narrowest part of the peninsula, the 
 distance between the lake and the sea scarcely ex- 
 ceeding a mile. On this and the following day 
 water of a tolerably good quality was found, thus 
 disproving the testimony which had been given 
 without a dissenting voice on this most important 
 
 general order was published strongly censuring the inefficiency of the regiment, 
 and Brigadier-General Oakes was directed to assume, in person, the command 
 of the regiment until he should be enabled to report that it was restored to 
 efficiency. Soon after landing at Aboukir, Sir Ralph, having witnessed the 
 gallantry of the flank companies of the 23d on the assault of the sand-hills, 
 saw Lieutenant-Colonel Hall, who had resumed the command of that 
 regiment, and going up to him, shook him cordially by the hand and said,— 
 " My friend Hall, I am glad to see you ; I shall never abuse you again." 
 
282 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1801. 
 
 point. On the 11th of March, some Arabs came in. 
 Tliis was a fortunate circumstance. In the instruc- 
 tions issued by Sir Ralph at Marmorice for the 
 guidance of the officers and men under the various 
 circumstances that might arise, "the utmost for- 
 bearance, and the most humane treatment of the 
 inhabitants, the most scrupulous and honourable 
 conduct in all their dealings, prompt payment for 
 all supplies purchased, the greatest deference for 
 their habits and religious tenets," were enjoined in 
 forcible terms. The Arabs were encom-aged to 
 
 o 
 
 bring in supplies, and they were so well satisfied 
 with their treatment, that within a few days after 
 the Army had landed on the sandy and barren 
 shore of Egy]^)t, a market, under the direction of 
 Mr, Baldwin, was estabHshed, which was well 
 supplied by the inhabitants, in despite of an order 
 issued by the French, annexing the penalty of death 
 to those who were detected in conveying provisions 
 to the camp of the invaders. So faithfuUy and 
 exactly were Sii' Ralph's orders observed, that from 
 the day of his landing to the hour of his death he 
 was never called upon to take cognizance of a single 
 case of outrage or even ordinary misconduct on the 
 part of either officer or soldier. 
 
 Provisions, stores, and other requisites having 
 been landed bv the unremittino^ exertions of tlie 
 
1801. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 283 
 
 Navy, the Army advanced five miles on the 12 th of 
 March, having been retarded and harassed by the 
 Tirailleurs, and a considerable body of French 
 cavalry, who were favoured by the ground, which 
 was much broken by sand-hills, and woods of date- 
 trees. Before our troops reached the ground on 
 which it was intended to halt, a large body of the 
 enemy's infantry was observed on an eminence, 
 which extended nearly across the peninsula, and it 
 appeared from their manoeuvres as if they intended 
 to descend to make an attack. A line was instantly 
 formed, and the Army advanced in the best possible 
 order for nearly half a mile, and halted on gaining 
 a favourable piece of ground. The two armies were 
 now separated by a plain not exceeding two miles 
 in extent, and the enemy were posted on an advan- 
 tageous ridge with the right to the canal of Alex- 
 andria, and the left towards the sea. The enemy 
 showed no inchnation to quit his favourable posi- 
 tion, and the day being too far advanced to begin 
 an attack, the troops were ordered to pile their 
 arms, and to lie by them during the night. The 
 position of the enemy having been reconnoitred. 
 Sir Kalph determined to make an attack on the fol- 
 lowing morning, with a view to turn their right 
 flank. Accordingly, the Army marched on the 
 
284 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1801. 
 
 morning of the 13tli of March in two columns, 
 Major-General Cradock having the right, and Major- 
 General Lord Cavan the left. The 90 th regiment 
 formed the advanced guard of the former, and the 
 9 2d regiment that of the latter. The artillery, 
 though, from the want of horses to transport it, 
 rather an encumbrance than an assistance, was 
 disposed of to the best advantage in different 
 parts of the Hne. Soon after our Army began to 
 move, the enemy quitted his position, and com- 
 menced the attack. The brigade of Major- General 
 Cradock was the first against which the enemy 
 directed his efforts. The French cavalry made a 
 bold and spirited attack on the 90th regiment, who, 
 unbroken and undismayed, received them on the 
 points of their bayonets. The cavahy retreated, 
 and many of them fell under an effective volley of 
 musketry, which was poured upon them as they 
 wheeled. The brigade of Lord Cavan was nearly 
 at the same time very sharply engaged, and the 
 troops were ordered to deploy, which was effected 
 with the greatest quickness and precision. After a 
 warm contest, in which the fire on both sides was 
 uncommonly severe, the French retreated in every 
 direction in toleral)le order, under the protection of 
 their artillery, which was remarkably well seiwed, 
 
1801. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 285 
 
 and was very galling. The enemy did not halt on 
 the position which he had occupied in the morning, 
 but retreated across a plain of a mile in extent, and 
 retired to a strong ridge of sand-hills which appeared 
 to be within the range of fire from Alexandria. It 
 was the intention of Sir Ealph .to have followed up 
 his success by attacking the last position taken up 
 by the enemy, and driving them within the walls 
 of Alexandria, and he had made the necessary ar- 
 rangements for carrying his purpose into execution. 
 It had been decided that General Hutchinson 
 should attack the right, and that the reserve, under 
 General Moore, supported by the Guards, should 
 attack the left of the enemy near the sea. As Gene- 
 ral Hutcliinson had a considerable circuit to make, 
 the one attack was to be regulated by the other. 
 When General Hutchinson reached the ground, he 
 saw that the enemy's position was very strong, de- 
 fended by a numerous artillery, and commanded by 
 fortified hills near Alexandria. General Hutchinson 
 halted, and sent to inform Sir Ralph that the heights 
 could not be carried without considerable loss, and 
 that if carried they would be exposed to the fire 
 from the fortified hills, and could not be maintained 
 without entrenchments, for which they had not the 
 means. Beyond the hiUs on which the enemy were 
 
286 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1801. 
 
 posted, nothing had hitherto been seen, and the in- 
 formation which had been received was doubtful and 
 conflicting. Mr. Baldwin, the consul, stated that 
 these hills were close to, and if possessed, would 
 command the town of Alexandria. The Arabs, on 
 the contrary, said that the hills were a considerable 
 distance from Alexandria ; that there was a plain of 
 some extent between them, and a strong fortified 
 position in front of the town. Sir Ealph went in 
 person to examine the ground, and came to the con- 
 clusion that the Arabs were most probably correct 
 in what they had stated, and however unwilling he 
 might be to abandon the object which he had in- 
 tended to efi"ect, and to disappoint the hopes of the 
 Army, who were flushed by their first success, pru- 
 dence required that they should not persevere, and 
 that the Army should be withdrawn and placed in a 
 safe position. The event amply justified the wdsdom 
 of this decision, for the information of the Arabs 
 proved to be perfectly correct. If the French had 
 been driven back, they had Alexandria and a strong 
 fortified position in front of it on which to retire, 
 and which could not have been taken without heavy 
 artillery and considerable delay. During the pro- 
 gress of this operation, the Army would have been 
 exposed to a fire in front from Alexandria, and the 
 
1801. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 287 
 
 fortified position, and to the danger of being at- 
 tacked on the flank or rear by the troops which 
 were expected from Cairo, and from the various 
 detachments whicli had been called in. 
 
 The loss of officers and men in the engagement of 
 the 13th of March was severe on both sides. The 
 British had nearly 1100 rank and file killed or 
 wounded. 
 
 So far the expedition had been successful. The 
 landing, which the enemy confidently believed that 
 they could resist, had been efiected, water had been 
 found, and Lake Maadieh, contrary to all the in- 
 formation that had been collected, was navigable 
 for boats up to the canal of Alexandria. This last 
 fact was the more important, as the weather had 
 been so boisterous that there was scarcely a day on 
 which stores could have been landed at Aboukir. 
 The troops had displayed the strictest observance of 
 discipline, the greatest quickness and precision in 
 their movements, and the most undaunted bravery, 
 for which they received the warm thanks of the 
 commander in an order whicli he issued after the 
 action of the 13th of March. The position occupied 
 by the English Army was about four miles from 
 Alexandria, and nine from Aboukir. The right was 
 on the sea, and the left on the canal of Alexandria 
 
288 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1801 
 
 and the Lake, occupying a front of about a mile and 
 a half. The ground on the rig-ht and centre was an 
 irregular ridge of sand-hills, which gradually sloped 
 into a plain in front of about a mile or three quar- 
 ters in extent, which divided the two armies. 
 
 The Army was encamped in two Hues, with the 
 cavalry between them. The ground on Avhich the 
 reserve was posted was the most projecting part of 
 the line, and between that corps and the brigade of 
 Guards the ground fell into a hollow, through which 
 the road from Alexandria to Aboukir passed. Be- 
 liind the reserve were the remains of a large scjuare 
 building, of which the walls in many places were of 
 considerable height, and in others afibrded an excel- 
 lent parapet. 
 
 The position of the enemy was also on a ridge of 
 sand-hills, with, the left to the sea, and the right 
 towards a large tract of marshy ground, which, 
 when ovei-flowed by the Nile, is known as the Lake 
 Mareotis. 
 
 As it was impossible to advance until the heavy 
 artillery, and the requisites for conducting the siege 
 of Alexandria had been brought up, orders were 
 issued for strengthening the position of the Army. 
 Two redoubts were begun on the canal of Alexan- 
 dria, and a considerable fleche was thrown up in 
 
1801. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 289 
 
 front of tlie reserve. The camp equipage was 
 ordered to be landed, for hitlierto there had not 
 been a tent even for the commander. On the 1 7th 
 of March, reports were received from several Arab 
 chiefs that General Menou had left Cairo, with 
 nearly the whole of the French force in Egypt, and 
 had announced his intention of attacking the Eng- 
 lish as soon as he should reach Alexandria. It had 
 been necessary to erect a breaching-battery against 
 the castle of Aboukn, and after a resistance of two 
 days, the defences were destroyed, and the garri- 
 son surrendered, and were immediately eml^arked 
 for France. Early in the afternoon of the 18th 
 of March, a strong patrol of the enemy's cavalry 
 showed itself on the canal, and approached very 
 near to the left. The cavalry pickets were ordered 
 out, and were supported by a very considerable part 
 of the brigade of cavalry. The officer in command, 
 without reconnoitring what was in his front, gave 
 the order to charge, and with horses so weak that 
 they staggered under their riders, attacked the 
 French dragoons, who, seeing that cavalry were 
 their only assailants, prudently retired, posting a 
 detachment behind a bank to arrest the progress of 
 the English, who, both in advancing and retiring, 
 suffered severely from its fire. 
 
 T 
 
290 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1801. 
 
 This check, though small to an army hitherto 
 victorious, was very mortifying to Sir Ralph, who 
 issued an order, strongly censuring the conduct of 
 the cavalry, in which they were reminded, " that by 
 thus undertaking enterprises without ol:)ject and 
 without use, they risked the lives of valuable men, 
 and exposed themselves to failure." 
 
 On the 19th of March, the heavy ordnance, am- 
 munition, and stores began to arrive, and the reports 
 of General Menou's approach to Alexandria gained 
 ground. The troops were ordered to be under arms 
 every morning an hour before daybreak. On the 
 20 th of March, Sir Ealph, in a conversation with 
 General Moore, pointed out the difficulties which 
 they had to encounter, and said, that as soon as the 
 heavy guns were got up, and the entrenching tools 
 were forwarded, it was his fixed purpose to make a 
 great effort. His plan was to push forward the 
 artillery in the night, and to form the troops under 
 such cover as he could find, and at day -break to 
 advance to the attack of both the enemy's flanks. 
 
 He said that in the event of failure, they could 
 fall back on their present position, and maintain it 
 until another could be prepared in the rear to favour 
 their retreat, and, finally, their re-embarkation. 
 
 Although it had been reported that General Menou 
 
1801. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 291 
 
 was coming from Cairo with all the force he could 
 collect, no authentic intelligence of his having 
 reached Alexandria had been received. During the 
 20th of March nothing had been observed which 
 indicated any stir or movement in the French camp. 
 In the early part of the night a few rockets had 
 been seen, but that was so common an occurrence, 
 that it attracted no particular observation. General 
 Moore, who had been the officer of the day on the 
 20 th, remained with the picket of the reserve until 
 four in the morning of the 21st March, and, as 
 everything had been quiet during the night, he left 
 orders with the field officer to retire his posts at 
 daybreak. No immediate attack of the French was 
 therefore expected on that morning, and no other 
 precaution had been adopted than that enjoined by 
 the general order issued on the 19 th, by which the 
 troops had been dh-ected to be under arms every 
 morning an hour before daylight. It was in conse- 
 quence of this judicious arrangement that the troops 
 had fortunately fallen in before the early attack of 
 the French, on the morning of the 21st of March, 
 commenced.^ 
 
 1 A copy of General Menou's orders was found in the pocket of General 
 Loize, who was killed in the action of the 21st of March, from which it 
 appeared that the plan of the French general was to make a false attack on 
 the British left, while the real attack was to be directed against the right and 
 centre, with the intention of driving the English into Lake Aboiikir. 
 
292 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1801. 
 
 The action of the 21st of March began by a false 
 attack on the part of the French on the British left, 
 in which the enemy had a momentary and partial 
 success, which was, however, promptly repaired, and 
 they were repulsed with loss. The real attack, 
 which was directed against the right and centre, 
 speedily followed. The greatest efforts of the 
 French w^ere directed against the reserve, and it is 
 therefore desirable to describe the exact position of 
 that corps. The alarm posts of the 28th and 40th 
 flank companies were in a redoubt which was open 
 in the rear, and in which were placed two 24- 
 pounders and several field-j)ieces. Two or three 
 hundred yards l^ehind the redoubt, but more to the 
 right, and nearer to the sea, stood the old ruined 
 Ijuilding before mentioned, one side of which looked 
 directly to the front, and commanded in a great 
 degree the ground between the alarm posts of the 
 28th regiment and the sea. Here the 58th regi- 
 ment was posted, and was covered against cannon 
 shot. The 23d regiment occupied the front of the 
 building on the left of the 58th, and looked to the 
 rear of the 28th regiment, so as to keep in check 
 any corps that might pass between the brigade of 
 Guards and the left of the 28th regiment. The 
 4 2d regiment was encamped considerably in the 
 
 I 
 
1801. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 293 
 
 rear, but had orders from General Moore to move 
 up on the first alarm, and to form on the left of the 
 28th, placing its right to the ditch of the wall 
 within which that regiment was placed. 
 
 The French drove in the pickets with great spirit 
 and impetuosity, and a large 'column of infantry- 
 pressed forward close to the ditch of the redoubt, 
 where, finding themselves vigorously opposed, they 
 inclined to their right, passed round the left of the 
 28th regiment, and advanced towards that front of 
 the old building where the 23d regiment was posted. 
 The 42d regiment, which had not moved from its 
 encampment until the firing had commenced, did 
 not reach its post until the column of the French 
 had penetrated thus far. By this means the enemy 
 were placed between the 4 2d regiment and the old 
 builclino;. The 4 2d reoiment was ordered to attack 
 the enemy in the rear, and in the course of a very 
 short time the French column was completely 
 routed, and not a man escaped being killed, 
 wounded, or taken prisoner. 
 
 The enemy made an attack on the centre, nearly 
 at the same time with that which they had directed 
 against the right of the English Army, hut were 
 repulsed with vigour and success. During the 
 continuance of these struggles with the British right 
 
294 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1801. 
 
 and centre, the fire of musketry and cannon was in- 
 cessant and tremendous. 
 
 As the day began to dawn the enemy became 
 sensil)le that they could not make any serious im- 
 pression with their infantry, and they therefore 
 decided to bring forward their cavalry. A column 
 of at least 1000 cavalry advanced at full speed to- 
 wards the left of the redoubt, where the 4 2d and 
 General Stuart's regiment, which had been ordered 
 from the second line to support the reserve, were 
 drawn up in good order, and were at the time en- 
 gaged with the infantry of the enemy. Although 
 unable to check the velocity of this column of 
 cavalry, the infantry were not dismayed but gave 
 their fire, and allowed them to pass without quitting 
 an inch of their ground. The 28 th regiment faced 
 its rear^ rank to the rigTit about, and threw in a 
 destructive volley on the French cavalry, and the 
 23d regiment were so well posted behind the ruin 
 of the old building, that without any risk they were 
 enabled to check the progress of the enemy's squad- 
 rons, who, finding themselves attacked on all sides 
 and without any hope of making a real impression, 
 were glad to retreat, lea^dng a large numbei* of their 
 
 ' For this manceuvre the 28th regiment were authorized to bear the number 
 of the regiment on the hack, as well as on the front of their caps. 
 
1801. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 295 
 
 horses and men \vithin the English Hne. Early in 
 the action the regiments of Dillon and De EoUe had 
 been ordered to occupy the vacant ground between 
 the left of the reserve and the Guards in the centre, 
 and by being so placed they were enabled to add 
 greatly to the difficulties of the French cavalry in 
 effecting their retreat. After this the enemy showed 
 signs of being in much disorder, but they still kept 
 up a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, and 
 General Menou, unwilling to yield, resolved to make 
 a last and desperate effort to repair the defeat he 
 had sustained. For tliis purpose a considerable 
 column of infantry was directed to attack the bri- 
 gade of Guards, and at the same time the cavalry 
 made a second charge on the reserve. The Guards 
 reserved theii' fire until the enemy came close to 
 their front, and then poured in such heavy dis- 
 charges of musketry as speedily compelled them to 
 retreat in the utmost disorder. The cavahy attacked 
 nearly at the same place as on the former occasion, 
 and they forced their way, as is not surprising, 
 through the 4 2d and Stuart's regiments, which had 
 been for a long time warmly engaged, and had lost 
 a very great number both of officers and men. The 
 troops in the ruin checked the progress of the 
 cavalry, and the Minorca regiment, having been 
 ordered out to support the 4 2d, General Roize made 
 
296 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1801. 
 
 a desperate charge against it. This regiment allowed 
 the French cavalry to pass, and then facing about 
 poured such volleys upon them as brought many of 
 the men. and horses to the ground. The cavalry 
 then endeavoured to force their way back, but were 
 unable to do so. It is understood that General Roize 
 had vainly attempted to dissuade General Menou 
 from making this last effort, seeing that it could not 
 possibly succeed, but his advice having been rejected, 
 he executed his orders with the greatest spirit and 
 courage, and fell in the struggle. 
 
 The enemy then began to collect their troops, and 
 to draw them off by degrees, under the fire of their 
 artillery.^ 
 
 The object of General Menou had been to cut off 
 the reserve which was a little advanced from the 
 rest of the line ; and if he had succeeded, the right 
 of the English would have been turned, and their 
 retreat in the face of a formidable cavalry, and of 
 the commanding position he would have then occu- 
 pied, w^ould have been difficult and disastrous. But 
 this object he was fortunately unable to effect, owing 
 to the judicious disposition of the British troops, 
 and of their undaunted bravery. 
 
 The safety of the English Army, the fate of 
 Egypt, and the hopes of an honourable peace, were 
 
 ' Vide Apfiendix D. 
 
1801. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 297 
 
 all involved in tlie result of this clay's battle. These 
 grave consequences must have been vividly present 
 to the mind of the commander, who was devoting 
 the last moments of his life with youthful ardour 
 and zeal to the pubhc service ; whose thoughts 
 were intently fixed on the security of an army, the 
 discipline of wliich he had brought nearly to perfec- 
 tion, and who had long cherished an anxious desire 
 for peace, as the greatest boon that could be con- 
 ferred on his country, a glorious object, in the ac- 
 complishment of which, his own life was now about 
 to be worthily closed. 
 
 The following remarks of General Moore furnish 
 some details with regard to the personal conduct 
 of Sir Ealph during this important battle : — " Sir 
 Ralph had always been accused of exposing his 
 person too much ; I never knew him carry this so 
 far as in this action. When it was so dark that I 
 could scarcely distinguish, I saw him close to the 
 rear of the 4 2d, without any of his family. He was 
 afterwards joined by General Hojje. When the 
 French cavahy charged us for a second time, and 
 our men were disordered, I called and waved with 
 my hand to him to retire, but he was instantly sur- 
 rounded by the hussars. He received a cut from a 
 sabre on the breast which passed through his clothes. 
 
298 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1801. 
 
 but only grazed the flesh. He must have been 
 taken or killed, if a soldier had not shot the hussar." 
 
 It has never been ascertained at what precise 
 time Sir Ralph received the wound which proved 
 to be mortal. Colonel Abercromby states that his 
 tent being at some distance from that of Sir Ealph, 
 he did not see him when the first alarm of the 
 French attack was given, and did not afterwards 
 meet him until about break of day, in the rear of 
 the reserve, when the principal attack had been 
 made, and he then gave him orders relative to the 
 movements of the troops. Colonel Abercromby did 
 not afterwards see Sir Ralph until near the close of 
 the action, when he found him in a small work 
 about the centre of the line, where there were some 
 guns firing on the enemy. Colonel Abercromby 
 observed that the clothes of Sir Ralph were cut, and 
 that there were marks of blood on them. He asked 
 if he was wounded, and he answered, " Yes, by a 
 spent ball, but it gives me no uneasiness,'' but he 
 added that he felt considerable pain in his breast 
 and side from a blow he had received from a French 
 dragoon who rode against him, when the cavalry 
 broke in on the right. 
 
 General Ludlow and Colonel Abercromby urged 
 in the strongest manner that his wound should be 
 
1801. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 299 
 
 examined, but he persevered in refusing, assigning 
 as his reason, that there were many poor fellows 
 worse wounded than he was, and that the surgeons 
 were more usefully employed in attending to them. 
 Sir Ealph dismounted, and walked about with ap- 
 parent ease, watching earnestly the manoeuvres of 
 the enemy. After an interval of half an hour, he 
 complained of being very faint, and sat down on the 
 ground, with his back to the parapet of the redoubt. 
 General Ludlow then sent for one of the surgeons 
 of the Guards, who were nearest at hand, but only 
 a mate could be found. The mate looked at the 
 wound, and found that the ball had entered the 
 thigh, and Sir Ralph was again pressed to leave the 
 field, but he would not do so until the firing had 
 ceased, and the enemy had completely retired. As 
 soon as the firing ceased. Sir Ralph was removed to the 
 tent of Colonel Abercromby, where the wound was 
 again examined hj a skilful surgeon of the Guards, 
 who, not finding the ball where he expected, advised 
 that Sir Ralph should be carried on board a ship, to 
 which he at once assented, and he was conveyed on 
 board the " Foudroyant," Lord Keith's flag-ship. Sir 
 Ralph was placed on a bier, and an officer who was 
 present took a soldier's blanket, and was adjusting it 
 under his head as a pillow, when Sir Ralph asked, 
 
300 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 1801. 
 
 " Wliat is tliat you are placing under my head ?" The 
 officer^ replied that it was only a soldier's blanket, on 
 which Sir Ralph said, "Only a soldier's blanket! a sol- 
 dier's blanket is of great consequence, and you must 
 send me the name of the soldier to whom it belongs, 
 that it may be returned to him." This was accord- 
 ingly done, and the blanket was duly restored, Sir 
 Ralph himself having given directions to that effect. 
 
 Sir Ralph would not allow his son to accompany 
 him to the beach, but frequently desired him to go 
 to General Hutchinson, and to attend to his duty. 
 Although the ball could not be extracted, sanguine 
 hopes of recovery were entertained. On the 26th 
 of March, the symptoms caused anxiety, but Sir 
 RaljDli ralhed, and during the 2 7th he conversed 
 with his son on various points connected wdth the 
 pubHc service with much composure, but in that 
 night he became feverish, and at eleven o'clock on 
 the night of the 28th of ]\Iarch he expired without 
 pain or suff"ering. 
 
 The baU had taken a direction upwards, and 
 had lodged iu the thigh-bone, from whence it never 
 could have been extracted. The body of Sir Ralph 
 was sent to Malta, where it was interred, and a 
 simple monument was erected over his grave. 
 
 ^ General Sir John Macdonalil. late Adjutant-General of tlie Arniv. 
 
1801. EXPEDLTION TO EGYPT. 301 
 
 It lias been remarked, and no doubt with truth, 
 by those who best knew Sir Ealph, that the circum- 
 stances attending liis death were nearly such as he 
 would have chosen for himself. The same senti- 
 ment has been thus beautifully expressed by one 
 who did not personally know him : " Over Sir Kalph 
 Abercromby I do not much lament ; full of years 
 and full of honour, he seems, with his own hands, to 
 have erected a monument of glory, and then calmly 
 entered it. When death must come, it never comes 
 better than disguised as glory. Such ashes should 
 rather be revered than deplored." 
 
 Sir Ralph, who always regarded unhesitating de- 
 votion to the public service as the first duty of a 
 soldier, could not review his own career during 
 the war, without a conscious feeling that neither 
 unlookecl for disappointment nor ultimate failure, 
 which might have weighed with less elevated minds, 
 had relaxed his untiring zeal and ardour in the 
 cause of his country. He must have felt that he 
 possessed in full measure the respect, the confidence, 
 and the warmest attachment of the officers and 
 soldiers under liis command. He must have dwelt 
 with unmingled satisfaction on the promptitude, 
 precision, and good order with which all the move- 
 ments of the troops had been conducted hy the 
 
302 EXPEDITION TO EGYPT, 1801. 
 
 officers and men ; the legitimate result of the just 
 and rigid discipline which he had constantly en- 
 forced. Anticipated difficulties and serious defi- 
 ciencies had been overcome, and the character of the 
 British Army for discipline and valour had been 
 raised and confii-med by three actions, which had 
 been fought and won against a brave enemy, greatly 
 superior in cavalry and artillery, and animated by 
 the recollection of the splendid victories in which 
 they had shared. Such are some of the reflections 
 which must have soothed and cheered the dying 
 moments of the veteran commander. 
 
 Sir Ralph died too soon to know the fidl extent 
 of the service he had rendered to his country. He 
 did not live to know that the battle of the 21st 
 March virtually decided the fate of Egypt, and 
 facilitated the conclusion of peace, for which he so 
 ardently wished. The importance of this service 
 is now understood, and is appreciated by the rapid 
 communication through Egypt which is maintained 
 between England and her possessions in the East ; 
 and, if the day should ever arrive, as arrive it may, 
 when Egjrpt shall again become the battle-field, 
 there is no reason to doubt that the interest and 
 honour of the country will be maintained with equal 
 skill and valour, and crowned with equal success. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 The preceding narrative has been conducted 
 with an anxious desire to adhere to unexaggerated 
 simplicity, and with a scrupulous respect for truth, 
 in the belief that the facts disclosed would afford 
 the surest means of estimating the private virtues 
 and the public services of Sir Ralph. I dare not 
 venture to give expression to my own view of his 
 character ; I cannot be a competent judge of his 
 military skill and science, and my unabated remem- 
 brance of his kindness and affection as a parent, 
 disqualify me from being an impartial judge of 
 the other qualities which marked his pure, saga- 
 cious, and elevated character. I must therefore, 
 as I have before done, appeal to the authority and 
 opinions of others, and to a reference to some of 
 the prominent acts of his life. 
 
 A distinguished general officer, who, from his 
 laborious studv of the art of war as a science, was 
 
304 CONCLUSION. 
 
 more capable than most men of his time to appre- 
 ciate the merits of a commander, who thorouglily 
 knew Sir Ralph, was intimately acquainted with 
 his opinions, and had the closest opportunity of 
 seeing his conduct on service, has ascribed to him 
 " the most perfect knowledge of his profession in 
 all its branches, from the highest parts of the art 
 of war to the details of a garrison, or camp, or 
 regimental duty, wliich he had acquired by careful 
 and diligent study of the duties of a soldier ; a 
 perfectly clear and combining head, great firmness 
 of purpose, and extraordinary sagacity in happily 
 conjecturing the designs of an adversary from slight 
 indications." His valour, of course, he placed among 
 the inferior qualities of the captain, and he added 
 that, while Sir Ralph felt this, and always in con- 
 versation maintamed that the commander's duty 
 was to keep liimself out of fire, he owned that he 
 never could prevail upon himself to obey his own 
 rule. When the fight began he seemed to be uneasy 
 and impatient until he reached the point where the 
 struggle raged most fiercely, and then he was at 
 ease, and he became more collected, clear, and 
 decisive in giving his orders as the perils around 
 him increased. Sir Ralph was very short-sighted, 
 and this he considered to be the only deficiency in 
 
CONCLUSION. 305 
 
 his military capacity, and to this he attributed, in 
 part, his so constantly exposing his own person. 
 It was the unhesitating opinion of this general 
 officer that, if Sir Ralph had been supported and 
 placed in circumstances at all similar to those of 
 other most distinguished commanders, he must have 
 acquired the greatest military renown. He enlarged 
 on the extraordinary skill and foresight which were 
 displayed in the arrangements for landing in Egypt, 
 which was a combined naval and military operation, 
 a service of unusual difficulty, calling forth all the 
 talents and resolution of a general. He had the 
 highest opinion of Sir Ralph's political wisdom, 
 founded on an intimate knowledge of his opinions, 
 and he fondly dwelt on the perfect and exemplary 
 independence of his conduct towards the Govern- 
 ment which he served, as illustrated by various 
 instances, which proved how plainly, at all periods 
 of his life, he spoke truth, however unpleasant to 
 those who employed him. He regarded the pri- 
 vate worth of Sir Ralph as something so pure, that 
 it almost defied panegyric.^ 
 
 It will remain for those who have followed the 
 course of Sir Ralph, to judge how far this view 
 
 1 For these recollections of Sir Ralph T am indebted to the kindness of a 
 friend, who embodied them as the siibstance of repeated conversations with 
 the general officer whose opinion and judgment they express. 
 
 U 
 
306 CONCLUSION. 
 
 of his conduct, capacity, and character, has been 
 justified and confinned by his acts, and by the 
 whole tenor of his life. 
 
 His military merits secured for him in the highest 
 measure the respect and attachment of the Army, 
 and the enthe confidence of his Government. His 
 pohtical wisdom was proved by his early apprecia- 
 tion of the true nature of the principles of that 
 conflict which was convulsing Europe ; and his love 
 of order and respect for the law, combined with 
 kindness and justice to the people, were evinced by 
 liis conduct in Ireland. His indignant rejection of 
 pecuniary rewards, which he deemed to be undig- 
 nified, and his refusal of high rank, because it had 
 not been earned in a service which had ended in 
 the advantage and glory of his country, prove the 
 purity of his character, and show that his love 
 of distinction and of fame was regulated by the 
 noblest standard. His exercise of power was con- 
 siderate and just, and untainted by caprice, temper, 
 or partiahty ; and he performed all the duties of 
 domestic life with the same constancy, kindness, 
 and simpHcity which characterized his public career. 
 The singular modesty of his nature restrained him 
 from making any allusion to his o\\ti services, even 
 in the most select circles, and the proud reliance 
 
CONCLUSION. 30*7 
 
 with which he reposed on the consciousness of the 
 zeal, disinterestedness, and purity wliich governed 
 his actions, have led to his character being hitherto 
 less understood, and his merits less appreciated than 
 they deserved to be. 
 
 An attempt has now been made to supply, how- 
 ever inadequately, this defect, and if it is in any 
 degree successful in illustrating and developing the 
 real character of Sir Kalph, it will be the best justi- 
 fication of an effort which has been prompted by 
 the warmest and deepest feelings of affection, grati- 
 tude, and veneration. 
 
 The notice of the life of Sir Ralph Abercromby 
 cannot be more aptly concluded than by these words 
 from the general order issued by the Duke of York, 
 on the occasion of the victory of the 21st March 
 1801 :— 
 
 "The illustrious example of their commander 
 cannot fail to have made an indelible impression 
 on the gallant troops at whose head, crowned with 
 victory and glory, he terminated his honourable 
 career ; and his Majesty trusts that a due contem- 
 plation of the talents and virtues which he uniformly 
 displayed in the course of his valuable life, will for 
 ever endear the memory of Sir Ralph Abercromby 
 to the British Army. ... 
 
308 CONCLUSION. 
 
 "His steady observance of discipline, his ever- 
 watchful attention to the health and wants of his 
 troops, the persevering and unconquerable spirit 
 which marked his military career, the splendour 
 of his actions in the field, and the heroism of his 
 death, are worthy the imitation of all who desire, 
 like him, a life of honour and a death of glory." 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 Appendix A.- -Pp. 57, 252. 
 
 Memorial communicated by Lieutenant- General Sir 
 Ealph Abercromby to the English Government, 
 ON THE Liberation of the Spanish Provinces in 
 South America. 
 
 The people of Great Britain in general take little con- 
 cern in the affairs of foreign nations. The balance of 
 Europe is a subject they do not understand ; and they are 
 little interested in anything that does not tend to the 
 security and extension of commerce, and to the dominion 
 of the sea. 
 
 To keep up the spirits of the nation, and to engage it 
 heartily in the further prosecution of the war, it seems 
 necessary that every military enterprise we shall under- 
 take, shall be directed to such objects as shall tend to 
 secure to us, or to enlarge, the sources of our commerce 
 and wealth. 
 
 With this view, it has occurred that the removal of the 
 French from Egypt should be effected before a negotiation 
 for peace should take place. To allow it to remain in 
 their possession would threaten the security of our domi- 
 nions in the East ; at any rate, were the cession of it to 
 become an object of discussion at the peace, a considerable 
 
312 APPENDIX. 
 
 degree of weight would be given to it in the general scale, 
 and concessions would be demanded of more consequence 
 than we would be inclined to grant. 
 
 But of all the objects which ought to claim our atten- 
 tion, the liberation of South America from the dominion 
 of Spain seems to stand first. It can only be effected 
 whilst we are still at war with Spain, and if it should be 
 happily accomplished, it would be beyond the reach of 
 negotiation at a peace. 
 
 It should be undertaken without any view to conquest, 
 to exclusive commerce, or to plunder. Every port in South 
 America, and the whole trade of that extensive continent 
 should be declared free ; every country would feel inter- 
 ested in it (Spain and Portugal excepted). 
 
 Great Britain, however, from her entei-prise, from her 
 capital, and from her industry, would in reality possess 
 nme parts in ten of this great commerce. A market woidd 
 be equally opened for British and for East India commo- 
 dities. In a short time the Brazils (which would foUow 
 the fate of the Spanish settlements in South America), and 
 the other countries now under the dominion of Spain, 
 would produce more sugar, cotton, and indigo, than all of 
 our West India islands, and at a cheaper rate. By degrees 
 we should be enabled to drop our sugar islands, which we 
 retain at a great expense, and which are frequently the 
 source of wars. 
 
 Should Great Britain decline at this time to undertake 
 this great enterprise, some other nation will attempt it on 
 principles less liberal, and less advantageous to the happi 
 ness of South America, and to the world at large. 
 
 The present state of that country gives us reason to be- 
 lieve that it would not be difficult to accomplish this object. 
 
APPENDIX. 313 
 
 The Creole Spaniards and Indians are oppressed beyond 
 measure. No office can be held in that part of the world 
 but by a native of old Spain, and the restrictions on trade 
 are severe in the extreme. Justice is venal, and extor- 
 tion commonly practised by all in power. The clergy, 
 who have great influence over an ignorant and supersti- 
 tious people, are in general natives of New Spain, and 
 consequently would favour a revolution. It seems only 
 necessary that we should remove the Spanish forces ; de- 
 clare to the people what our intentions are, and the Spanish 
 government would fall to the ground. 
 
 Two expeditions should be fitted out, — one to proceed 
 to the Cape of Good Hope, and from thence to the river 
 Plate ; the other should rendezvous at Barbadoes, on the 
 Gulf of Paria, and should act on the provinces of Cumana, 
 the Caraccas, and Venezuela. 
 
 Monte Video is the principal port and rendezvous for 
 shipping in the river Plate. It is situated on the left 
 bank of that great river ; Buenos Ayres, the capital of the 
 country, is situated on the right. One or two line-of- 
 battle ships, and as many frigates, are commonly stationed 
 at Monte Video, and two battalions of Spanish infantry at 
 Buenos Ayres, for the defence of that country. Of the 
 force at Monte Video little is known. 
 
 The approach to Buenos Ayres by water, can only be 
 made in vessels of a small draught, on account of the 
 shoals. The climate is good, and the country abounds in 
 provisions. Eoads have been opened across the country 
 to Chili and Peru, and European commodities are carried 
 over land into those provinces, which are paid for in specie, 
 and brought from Buenos Ayres to Europe. 
 
 The expedition against the Terra Firma should act in 
 
314 APPENDIX. 
 
 the rivers Orinoco and Guarapichi, and against La Guayra, 
 and Porto Cabello ; the above-mentioned rivers give an 
 opening into the province of Ciimana. 
 
 La Guayra is the port of St. Juan de Leon of the Carac- 
 cas, it covers the approach to that great capital, and is 
 strongly fortified to the sea. A landing, however, may be 
 effected to the right or left of La Guayra, particularly at 
 the small river Tuy, and if the batteries to the sea 
 can be turned (which they probably may) this fortress 
 would soon fall, and consequently the capital of the pro- 
 vince. 
 
 Porto Cabello is said to be a place of considerable 
 strength, but probably like La Guayra it is not equally 
 strong on the land side as on the water. 
 
 It may admit of a doubt whether in carrying on these 
 operations, we should do more than blockade those for- 
 tresses, taking it for granted, that as soon as the revolution 
 had taken effect they would surrender ; but it is to be 
 apprehended, that a people who possess so little energy as 
 the Creole Spaniards would not venture to adopt so decided 
 a measure as throwing off the Spanish yoke until they saw 
 their enemies removed, and British garrisons in La Guayra 
 and Porto Cabello. 
 
 If a revolution could be set fairly on foot in the prin- 
 cipal settlements on the coast, it would spread with rapidity 
 into the interior of the country. Emissaries would be sent 
 to propagate the joyful event, and to assure them that the 
 British troops should not quit tlie country till relieved 
 from the Spanish yoke, and until a new Government of 
 their own should be established. All that would be re- 
 quired on the part of Great Britain in the first instance 
 would be, to furnish them with arms and ammunition. 
 
APPENDIX. 315 
 
 and to assist them in framing a form of Government best 
 suited to the genius and temper of tlie people. 
 
 Much information and many details will be necessary 
 before these undertakings can be set on foot. Captain 
 M'Dowall of the Ganges (who was an Admiral in the Por- 
 tuguese service when Portugal endeavoured to establish a 
 colony at St. Sacrement) certainly . knows the navigation 
 of the river Plate ; and amongst the Spanish prisoners 
 now in England, with a little address, some of them may 
 be found who can give pretty accurate knowledge of the 
 river Plate and of the coasts of Terra Firma, and General 
 Miranda is still in London. 
 
 Lieutenant- Colonel Pictou, the Commandant of Trini- 
 dad, was instructed, in 1797, to procure every possible 
 information relative to the neighbouring provinces of 
 Cumana, the Caraccas, and Venezuela, and Colonel Mait- 
 land might be directed to go to Trinidad to arrange with 
 Colonel Picton the phxn of operations. 
 
 The province of Guyana is already nearly in our pos- 
 session ; there remains, however, in tlie possession of the 
 French the small island of Cayenne, and some inconsider- 
 able plantations on the mainland ; it may be necessary to 
 root out the French by removing the garrison, and the 
 French settlers in this island, and by a total destruction 
 of the fort, and adjacent town. 
 
 To insure the success of this great enterprise a very 
 considerable force (probably not less than 12,000 men) 
 would be required. Were it to fail, the unfortunate 
 natives would be left to the merciless revenge of their 
 cruel masters, and many of them would end their days on 
 the scaffold, or in the mines. 
 
 The difficulty seems to be to find a sufficient dispos- 
 
316 APPENDIX. 
 
 able force ; this, however, may be procured, provided the 
 general principles in which this enterprise is founded shall 
 be approved of. 
 
 Nothing has been said of Mexico. Unless the Ameri- 
 cans were to co-operate we have not a sufficient force to 
 favour a revolution in that part of the Spanish settlements ; 
 the probability however is, that the same spirit would pre- 
 vail through that great continent. 
 
 Appendix B. — P. 257. 
 
 Despatch fkom LieutenajST- General Sir Kalpii Aber- 
 CROMBY TO Eight Honourable Mr. Dundas. 
 
 La Yalette, Malta, December 9, 1800. 
 
 Sir, — Were I to enter fully into a statement of the 
 military and civil establishment of Malta, and so detail 
 circumstantially the prodigious works with which the 
 town and harbour of La Valette are surrounded, I should 
 exceed the bounds of a letter. I have directed the en- 
 gineers to make out a report on the fortifications, which, 
 as soon as completed, shall be transmitted to England 
 with an accompanying plan. Captain Ball, of the Navy, 
 who has acted here as Civil Governor, has desired that I 
 would permit him to transmit such papers as will explain 
 the nature of the Civil Government and the Eevenue of 
 the Island. 
 
 As a military station, it may be pronounced to be the 
 most complete in His Majesty's possession, and the har- 
 bour, which is capacious and perfectly safe, is perhaps the 
 best port in the Mediterranean ; the works are so con- 
 trived as to cover the harbour, so that it scarcely can be 
 
APPENDIX. 317 
 
 subject to any attack, and must remain a safe arsenal and 
 a complete dockyard for the Navy, imtil the place itself 
 shall be forced to surrender, which can only be effected 
 after a long and laborious siege. 
 
 Although the works are in themselves very extensive, 
 yet it does not appear that a very numerous garrison is 
 required, and were any of the outwprks to be abandoned, 
 or to fall into the hand of the enemy, yet the body of the 
 place might be long defended. An invadmg enemy can 
 only approach the island on two points, in the Bay of St. 
 Paul's and its neighbourhood, and in the Bay of Marsa, 
 Sirocco. Whilst the existing batteries are kept in repair, 
 it will be next to impossible for any ship to come to an 
 anchor in either of those bays, but the great strength of the 
 island must be considered to consist in the attachment of 
 the inhabitants, and the difficulty of the country, every field 
 of two or three acres being enclosed with high stone walls. 
 
 The inhabitants are a brave, active, hardy race, and if 
 they can once be firmly attached to the Government under 
 which they live, it will be extremely difficult to wrest 
 Malta out of its possession. I am sorry to say, that 
 hitherto they appear to have been very ill governed. The 
 Knights were bad masters. Justice was perverted wdien- 
 ever they found it convenient. The income of the Judges 
 arose principally from fees, and the Grand-Master had made 
 a monopoly of corn, and of all the mills of the country. 
 No person was permitted to import a sack of grain except 
 a corporation consisting of four persons named by the 
 Grand-Master and acting under him. All the corn was 
 lodged in the town of La Valette, and every individual was 
 obliged to purchase it there, and to grind it at the Grand - 
 ' Master's mills. 
 
318 APPENDIX. 
 
 The corn was retailed at one-third more tlian it cost, 
 except in years of scarcity, when it was sold at tlie usual 
 price, but as this happens seldom, from the vicinity to the 
 fruitful island of Sicily, the Grand- Master drew a revenue 
 to himself of between twenty and thirty thousand pounds 
 a year, one year with another, independent of the regular 
 revenue of the island, amounting to about thirty-six thou- 
 sand pounds per annum, arising from landed property in 
 the island belonging to the order ; from the rent of wind- 
 mills, houses, and warehouses in town ; from customs and 
 a tax on wine ; from a tax of three and a half per cent, on 
 the sale of property, and from the Mont-de-Piete, or pawn- 
 broker's shop. All this is at present imder the adminis- 
 tration of Captain Ball, who is an exceedingly honourable 
 man ; but as he is in the hands of a few people m the 
 island, who certainly may take an advantage if they please, 
 it appears necessary that some steps should be taken to 
 establish a British system of administration, without alter- 
 ing, perhaps, for the present the usual forms of administer- 
 ing justice, or of receiving the revenue. 
 
 If the island should remain with Great Britain, such 
 alteration may take place as may relieve the inhabitants 
 from an oppressive monopoly, and from the perversion of 
 justice. Hitherto no merchant has been ever able to esta- 
 blish himself in Malta, and whoever shall be appointed 
 Governor of the island for the time being, must continue 
 to import grain for the sustenance of the inhabitants till 
 such time as a free importation can be established ; and 
 at all times it will be necessary to have a stock of provi- 
 sions for the garrison for at least eight months. 
 
 I should apprehend that if an intelligent and honest 
 British commissary and English secretary for the island 
 
APPENDIX. 819 
 
 were sent out, the Governor, whoever he may be, with the 
 assistance of some person or persons of respectability in 
 the island, would be able to carry on the affairs of the 
 government, leaving the courts of justice in their present 
 form, keeping a strict eye over them, and as all decisions 
 and appeals must naturally come before him, he will soon 
 perceive how justice is administered. It certainly might 
 be right to give the judges fixed salaries out of the revenues 
 of the island, and to take away all perquisites. 
 
 It is necessary to explain the situation in which Cap- 
 tain Ball at present stands. On the revolt of the island, 
 in September 1798, he was sent by Lord Nelson and the 
 Court of Naples to attend to the interest of his Sicilian 
 Majesty ; and until the surrender of the town of La Valette, 
 every public act was in the name of the King of the Two 
 Sicilies, the Sicilian colours were everywhere hoisted, and 
 at this moment they are flying in most parts of the island. 
 If Captain Ball has received any salary, it has been from 
 his Sicilian Majesty. His table has been kept at the ex- 
 pense of the island. Having, in obedience to Lord Nel- 
 son's orders, given up his professional pursuits, he has 
 reaped no benefit from prize-money, and has only received 
 bare pay as Captain of the "Alexander;" his situation 
 seems now incompatible with that of Major- General Pigot's, 
 and I hope that some decision will take place. I feel 
 great delicacy in removing Captain Ball ; at the same 
 time, I am obliged to place all authority in the hands of 
 Major- General Pigot, and to direct him to employ Captain 
 Ball in the administration of the civil affairs of the island 
 until his Majesty's pleasure is known. 
 
 I trust that the honourable conduct of Captain Ball 
 (who from every account has given general satisfaction to 
 
320 APPENDIX. 
 
 the inhabitants) will recommend him for some considera- 
 tion for his services, and that any irregularity which may 
 have taken place in his acting in the name of his Sicilian 
 Majesty, may not be imputed to him. 
 
 It may be expected from my situation that I should say 
 a few words on the importance of this island to Great 
 Britain, and of the relative advantages of Malta and 
 Minorca in a military point of view. During the summer, 
 I seriously considered the situation of IMinorca, and the 
 only conclusion that I could draw was, that, although 
 the harbour must be acknowledged to be excellent, and 
 its situation convenient to control the naval power of 
 France and Spain, and so prevent them from passing 
 the Straits of Gibraltar without our knowledge, yet it 
 appeared to me that no skill of the ablest engineer could 
 protect it and the dockyard, and that in the commence- 
 ment of a war, it is always in the power of France and 
 Spain to invade that island, and either to take it from us 
 or to destroy the dockyard ; to this may be added, that the 
 fortifications of Fort St. Philip's are a heap of ruins, that 
 the present temporary works can only serve as retreat for 
 the troops to entitle them to a capitulation, and that if we 
 shall keep the island, all the fortifications must be re- 
 constructed. 
 
 Malta, in point of situation, does not possess the advan- 
 tages of Minorca, and is not so convenient a station for a 
 fleet in time of war, yet possessing so many other advan- 
 tages, it may almost, on a comparison, be equal, if not 
 superior ; and if it were to fall into the hands of a power- 
 ful enemy, we should severely feel the consequences of it. 
 To France, it would afford an opportunity of again at- 
 tempting an establishment in Egyiit ; and to Eussia, it 
 
APPENDIX. 321 
 
 would become a depot of naval stores for the powers in 
 the Mediterranean who are hostile to us, and might give 
 to either of these powers a preponderance in the Mediter- 
 ranean, and the means of weakening the Turkish empire. 
 Whether Malta, in a commercial light, would be consi- 
 dered of consequence to Great Britain, is very uncertain. 
 The inhabitants carry on a manufacture in cotton to a 
 considerable extent, which interferes with ours. It is not 
 probable that it would become a great depot for British 
 goods. British commodities would be carried directly to 
 Genoa, Leghorn, Naples, Messina, Smyrna, and Constan- 
 tinople. It is possible, indeed, that the Barbary States 
 might take from Malta such goods as they might want, 
 and that a few Jews from Tunis and Tripoli, and a few 
 Greeks from the Archipelago, might establish themselves 
 at Malta, and carry on a small commerce. 
 
 Tlie revenue of Malta, it must be allowed, would go a 
 considerable way to defray the expense of the establish- 
 ment, and in course of time, we might draw from it 
 recruits for our Army and Navy, as the island is very 
 populous, and probably would become more so under our 
 Government. 
 
 I beg pardon for taking up so much of your time in a 
 long letter, which might have been more distinct and 
 concise if I had not been otherwise much employed. — I 
 have the honour to be, etc., E. A. 
 
 The Right Hokourable Henry Dunuas, etc. 
 
 Appendix C. - P. 259. 
 
 The Bay of Llarmorice, on the coast of Caramania, was 
 judiciously selected as the third rendezvous for the Fleet. 
 
 X 
 
322 APPENDIX. 
 
 The entrance to the Bay is not many hundred yards in 
 breadth, but witliin, its circumference is twenty miles. 
 The depth of water is everywhere sufficient for ships of 
 the largest size, and it is surrounded by high mountains 
 covered to the summit with the finest wood ; and many 
 small rivers discharge themselves into the Bay. The safety 
 of the Fleet was secured. There was abundance of wood 
 and water, and within a few days' sail of Egypt. 
 
 Appendix D.— P. 296. 
 
 The enemy had assembled the whole of his force with 
 the exception of one demi-brigade and one regiment of 
 cavalry, expecting, perhaps not unreasonably, that by a 
 great effort he might put an end to the contest. According 
 to the best accovmts, the enemy brought into the field at 
 least 12,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry. Their artillery 
 was numerous and well served. The force of the English 
 army did not exceed 10,000 infantry and 300 cavalry. 
 The artillery was not nmneruus, and from defective means 
 of transport the guns were for some time witliout ammu- 
 nition. The loss of the English was 1-lG-l killed, wounded, 
 and missing. Generals Hope, INIoore, Oakes, and Colonel 
 Paget were wounded. The French lost at least 3000 men, 
 probably more. Generals Lanusse, Ptoize, and Baudot were 
 killed ; Generals Destaing, Silly, Eppler, and others were 
 wounded. 
 
INDEX. 
 
i 
 
INDEX. 
 
 ABERCROMBy, famil}', sketch of, 13-15. 
 
 Abercromby, General Sir Robert, 25. 
 
 Abercromby, Lieut.-General Sir John, 
 use made of his journal, lU, 273 ; 
 remarks on the attempted hmding 
 at Cadiz, 232. 
 
 Aboukir, advantages of, for disem- 
 barkation, 263. 
 
 Alloa school, 15, 17. 
 
 America, South, independence of, a 
 favourite project, 57, 252, 311-31(3. 
 
 American Independence, War of, 5, 
 19-23. 
 
 Amiens, Peace of, 3. 
 
 Anstruther, Colonel, 260. 
 
 Arabs, friendly services of the, to the 
 English camp in Egypt, 282, 286. 
 
 Anny, inefficiency and disorganization 
 of, in early part of the war, 4, 7 ; 
 efforts for its regeneration success- 
 ful, 8, 9. 
 
 Austrians, the, in Flanders, 48, 49. 
 
 Baldwin, Mr., British consul at Cairo 
 and Alexandria, 264, 282, 286. 
 
 Bar, Scotch, father and grandfather 
 members of, 15. 
 
 Battle of the "Diamond," 62. 
 
 Berbice, surrender of, 55. 
 
 Bergen, attack on, 187. 
 
 Bois de Bohain, attack on the, 47. 
 
 Borstel, General, 193. 
 
 Brownrigg, Colonel, 145. 
 
 Brune, General, 169, 189. 
 
 Cadiz, expedition against, 219-239 
 embarkation at Portsmouth, 221 
 subsequent movements, 222-226 
 
 sailing of the Fleet from Minorca 
 under Lord Keith, 226; difficulties 
 in carrying out their instructions, 
 227-23(3 ; ineffective arrangements 
 made for landing, 230, 231 ; aban- 
 donment of the enterprise, 233-237. 
 
 Calvert, Sir Henry, 42, 43, 45. 
 
 Camden, Lord, Lord-Lieutenant in 
 Ireland, 31 ; state of tlie country 
 under his administration, 61, 71. 
 See Ireland. 
 
 Capture of a French corvette in the 
 Mediterranean, 269. 
 
 Carhampton, Lord, 63, 71. 
 
 Castlereagh, Lord, 61, 136. 
 
 Cavati; Lord, 284. 
 
 Chrisiian, Admiral, 54. 
 
 Clackmannan, became M.P. for county 
 of, 23. 
 
 Classics (Latin), familiarity with, 29. 
 
 Cochrane, Captain, 277, 280. 
 
 College, student at, 16. 
 
 Colonelcy in King's Irish Infantry, or 
 103d Regiment, 19. 
 
 Commander, Sir Ralph's skill as a, 
 303-306. 
 
 Conway, General, 21. 
 
 Coote, General, 279. 
 
 Cornetcy, purchase of, in Third Dra- 
 goon Guards, 18. 
 
 Cornwallis, Lord, 124. 
 
 Correspondence with Ministers of 
 Crown, 5. 
 
 Council of war. in campaign in Hol- 
 land, 184. 
 
 Cradock, Major-General, 284. 
 
 Cuyler, General, 60. 
 
 Daendals, General, 169, 178. 
 Daer, Basil Lord, 36, 37. 
 
326 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Death of Sir Ralph, 300. 
 
 Declaration of war against England 
 and Holland by Franco, 3i). 
 
 Demerara, surrender of, 55. 
 
 Discipline, Army, 7-9, 43, 44. 
 
 Don, General, 176. 
 
 DnfF, Mr., of Brace, 13. 
 
 Duke of York, 4 ; see York. 
 
 Duncan, Lord, 156, 1G8. 
 
 Dundas, Sir., Secret ary-at-^Var, cor- 
 respondence with, on the campaign 
 in Flanders, 46 ; on command in 
 West Indies, 59 ; on the command 
 in Ireland, 106, 107, 114 ; as to the 
 expedition to Holland, 144, 148- 
 157, 162, 173, 174, 180, et sej ; on 
 the expedition to Cadiz, 219; his 
 views regarding the possession of 
 Egypt, 243-249';' 251, et seq. 
 
 Dundas, Mr., of Manor, maternal 
 grandfather, 15. 
 
 Dundas, Professor, 14. 
 
 Dundas, Sir David, 184, 191, 198. 
 
 Dundas, Sir Laurence, 24. 
 
 Dunkirk, defeat of the attack on, 45. 
 
 Dutch Fleet, surrender of the, 172. 
 
 Edinburgh, life at, 29, 30. 
 
 Education and early life, 15, 17. 
 
 Effingham, Lord, 21. 
 
 Egmont, battle at, 190-194. 
 
 Egypt, expedition to, 240-302 ; mo- 
 tives to this enterprise, 243-249 ; 
 effective strength of the Army for 
 this service, 254 ; sailing of the 
 Fleet from Gibraltar, 256; Malta 
 and Marmorice Bay, 256-260 ; state 
 of the Turkish army, 260-263 ; pau- 
 city of information as to Egypt, 257, 
 263-267 ; Sir Ralph's views of the 
 prospects of the expedition, 267, 
 268 ; departure of the Fleet from 
 Marmorice Bay, 273 ; arrival in 
 Aboukir Bay, 275 ; difBculties ex- 
 perienced in landing, 275-278 ; de- 
 tails of the subsequent struggle, 
 278-291 ; force of the respective 
 armies, 322 ; narrative of the deci- 
 sive action on 21st March, 292-296; 
 Sir Ralph's conduct during this 
 battle, 297, 298; his fatal wound, 
 and death on the 28th, 298-300. 
 
 Elgin, Lord, 17. 
 
 Elgin, Lord, ambassador at Constanti- 
 nople, 267. 
 
 Embarkation for Holland, 42. 
 Erskine, Colonel, contest with, as to 
 
 Clackmannanshire election, 23, 24. 
 Erskine, Sir William, 47. 
 Essen, General, 191, 193. 
 European War, views regarding it, 4(5, 
 
 160, 161. 
 Evacuation of Holland, 52. 
 Expedition to the West Indies, 54-60. 
 
 Fame, views of, 5, 6. 
 
 Family and early life, 13-38. 
 
 Ferdinand, Prince, of Brunswick, ser- 
 vice under, 4, 40. 
 
 First night of Sir Ralph in Egypt, 
 281. 
 
 Fitzwilliain, Lord, 61. 
 
 Flanders, campaign in, 39 53 ; ap- 
 jwinted to command a brigade, 41 ; 
 miserable inefficiency of the men de- 
 scribed, 42, 43 ; advance of the Al- 
 lies, 47-50 ; close of the campaign, 
 50-53. 
 
 Fletcher, Captain, 274. 
 
 Fox, General, 49, 223. 
 
 Frederick of Prussia, 33, 40. 
 
 French Fleet sent to Ireland, 64 ; dis- 
 persion of, 65. 
 
 French Revolution, views of, 30-34, 46. 
 
 Friant, General, 275. 
 
 Fumes, attack on the camp of, 44. 
 
 GERMAxy, went to, with Third Dra- 
 goon Guards, 18, 19. 
 "Glory," the, voyage of, 55. 
 Gosford, Lord, G2. 
 Grattan, Mr., 67. 
 
 Hall, Lieutenant-Colonel, 281. 
 
 Hardy, Professor, 30. 
 
 Holder, attack on the, 171. 
 
 Hermann, General, 184, 187; captured 
 in the attack on Bergen, 187, 189. 
 
 Holland, expedition to, 139-218 ; views 
 of its projectors, 139, 140 ; hazards 
 of the enterprise, 141-143 ; propo- 
 sals of Ministers, 145-147 ; views of 
 Sir Ralph, 147-149, 161-164; con- 
 flicting instructions as to the cam- 
 paign, 149-157 ; impracticability of 
 the plans of attack proposed, 157- 
 160; sailing of the expedition, 103, 
 168 ; attack on the Holder, and cap- 
 
INDEX. 
 
 327 
 
 tare of the Dutch Fleet, 169-172 ; 
 subsequent difficulties, 175 ; arrival 
 of reinforcements, 176 ; apathy of 
 the Dutch, 178, 185, 190 ; engage- 
 ment at Potten, 179 ; command sur- 
 rendered to the Duke of York, 180, 
 184 ; arrival of the Russian forces, 
 184; attack on Bergen, 187 ; loss in 
 this action, 189; battle at Egmont, 
 190-194; review of the expedition 
 at this stage, 194 ; last action in 
 this enterprise, 195 ; abandonment 
 of the expedition, 196 ; re-occupa- 
 tion of the Zype, 197 ; correspon- 
 dence on closing the campaign, and 
 returning to Britain, 198-208; Sir 
 Ralph rejoins his family in Scotland, 
 210. 
 
 Ilopetoun, Lord, 8. 
 
 Howe, Lord, 21. 
 
 Hutchinson, Lord, letter from, 135- 
 138. 
 
 Ireland, serves there with Third Dra- 
 goon Guards, 19 ; state of the coun- 
 try under Lord Camden's adminis- 
 tration, 61-71 ; disorganization of 
 the Army, 71 ; Sir Ralph succeeds 
 Lord Carhampton in the command, 
 71 ; difficulties with which he had 
 to contend, 72-75 ; instructions is- 
 sued to officers, 76-80 ; his policy 
 distasteful to Camden and his ad- 
 visers, 75, 76, 80, 85, 88, 89, 110, 
 121 ; letters to Mr. Elliot and the 
 Duke of York on the subject, 82- 
 85 ; visit to the south, and the re- 
 sult of his observations, 85-87, 92 ; 
 the celebrated order of 26th Febru- 
 ary 1798; 93, 94 ; Camden's vacil- 
 lating policy, 94-96 ; inspection of 
 the Army in the north, 97 ; alarm 
 and opposition consequent ou this, 
 98-106; Sir Ralph's resolution to 
 resign, 106, 107 ; correspondence 
 on the subject, 107-115; General 
 Lake's appointment to the com- 
 mand, 122 ; Sir Ralph's conduct 
 throughout approved by the King 
 and his Ministers, 123-125. 
 
 Irish Parliament of 1797, 66-68. 
 
 JoMiNi, General, quoted on state of the 
 Army, 7, 8, 43. 
 
 Kaimitz, General, 48. 
 
 Keith, Lord, 229 ; difficulties between 
 him and Sir Ralph as to landing at 
 Cadiz, 229-237. 
 
 Kempt, General Sir James, 162, 182. 
 
 Kennet, Lord, Judge of Court of Ses- 
 sion, 23. 
 
 Keppel, Admiral, 21. 
 
 Kiug, anecdote of the, 125. 
 
 Landing of the troops at Aboukir, 276, 
 
 277. - 
 Law, dislike to the study of, 17. 
 Leipsic, study of civil law at, 17. 
 London, fr-eedom of the city bestowed 
 
 on Sir Ralph, 183. 
 
 Macdonald, General Sir John, 300. 
 
 M'Kerras, Major, 274. 
 
 M'Nevin, Dr., 61, 66, 68. 
 
 Mar, Earl of, 23. 
 
 Malta, blockade of, 222 ; surrender, 
 224. See Minorca. 
 
 Marengo, battle of, 223. 
 
 Marniorice Bay, 259, 321. 
 
 Marriage, 26. 
 
 Martinet, General, 279. 
 
 Mediterranean, command in the, ac- 
 cepted, 221. 
 
 Melas, General, 222. 
 
 Menou, General, advance of, 289, 295, 
 296. 
 
 Menzies, Mr., of Ferton, 26. 
 
 Military life, active, summarized, 4 ; 
 entrance on, 18 ; sketch of, down to 
 1783, 19. 
 
 Minorca and Malta, their comparative 
 value to England, 257, 316-321. 
 
 Mitchell, Adniiral, 168, 181. 
 
 Moir, Mr., teacher at Alloa, 15. 
 
 Moira, Lord, 97, 98. 
 
 Moore, General, 171 ; his account ol 
 the attempted landing at Cadiz, 
 231 ; his views on the expedition to 
 Egypt, 241, 242. 
 
 Murray, Licut.-Col., 260. 
 
 Napi.e!?, application by the Queen to 
 Sir Ralph to undertake its defence, 
 224. 
 
 Oakes, General, 278. 
 
328 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 " Only a soldier's blanket !" 300. 
 Otto, Geueral, 49. 
 
 Parliamentary life, views of, 25. 
 
 Parliament, debates in, as to the ex- 
 pedition to Holland, 211. 
 
 Peerage offered to Sir Ivalph, but de- 
 clined, 212-21fi. 
 
 Pelbam, Mr., 111-113, 121. 
 
 Picton, Sir Thomas, .57. 
 
 Pitt, General Sir William, 19, 40. 
 
 Pitt, Mr,, 212, 214, 217. 
 
 Political differences, 36, 37. 
 
 Popular favour, not conrted, 6. 
 
 Portland, Duke of, 100, 105, 113, 132. 
 
 Porto Rico, attack on, 56, 58. 
 
 Portugal, threatened invasion of, by 
 Spain, 220. 
 
 Potten, importance of the position, 
 177. 
 
 Private habits and pursuits, 26-30. 
 
 Prussia, policy of, in regard to the ex- 
 pedition to Holland, 145-147. 166. 
 
 Pulteney, General Sir James, 170, 174, 
 183, 226. 
 
 Richardson, Lieutenant, 280. 
 
 Rugby, pupil at, 16. 
 
 Roize, General, 291, 205, 296. 
 
 Russia, treaty of, with England, 139. 
 166; arrival of the Russian forces 
 in Holland, 184 ; repulse of the at- 
 tack on Bergen, 187. 
 
 Scotland, appointment as Commander 
 
 of the Forces in, 134. 
 Smith,^ Sir Sidney, 275. 
 St. Lucie, attack on, 55. 
 St. Vincent's, 55. 
 Stuart, General Sir Charles, 219. 
 Summary of military service, 4. 
 Syme, Rev. Mr., 15. 
 
 TriLK, proposal to bestow, on Sir 
 Ralph, 212 ; his refusal, 213. 
 
 Tone, Mr. Wolfe, 64. 
 
 Treaty between Russia and England, 
 139 ; its object, 208. 
 
 Trinidad, successful attack on, 56. 
 
 Tullibody, estate of, 13, 14 ; village, 
 28. 
 
 Turkish army incapable of co-operat- 
 ing with the English in Egypt, 260. 
 
 University of Edinburgh, attendance 
 at, 16. 
 
 Valenciennes, storming of, 44. 
 Vandamme, General, 193. 
 ^'aux, the Allies' attack on, 47. 
 
 War with America and that with 
 France contrasted, 19-23. 
 
 Washington, General, 20, 31. 
 
 West Indies, command in the, 4, 51- 
 60 ; diflSculties and disasters attend- 
 ing the first campaign, 55 ; success 
 of the second expedition, with a view 
 to attack the Spanish possessions, 
 56, 57 ; failure at Porto Rico, 58- 
 60. 
 
 York, Duke of, 4 ; his command of the 
 campaign in Flanders, 41 ; opposed 
 to besieging l)unkirk, 45 ; letter to, 
 on resigning the command in Ire- 
 land, 111 ; command of the expedi- 
 tion to Holland, 139, 145, 180, 183; 
 his encomium on Sir Ralph, 307, 
 308. 
 
 Yorke, Sir Joseph, 17. 
 
 ZuYDER Zee, 176. 
 
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