IFtEIPOIRT OIF 
 
 Colonel ALVAN C. GILLEM, ist Cavalry. 
 
 M O D O C W A K , 1873. 
 
 BEXICIA BAKKACKS, CAT.., 
 
 Juno 1, 1874. 
 To the 
 
 Assistant Adjutant General, 
 
 Headquarters Department of the Columbia, 
 
 (Thro 1 Headquarters Military Division of the Pacific.) 
 SIR: 
 
 I Lave the honor to submit the following imperfect report of the 
 operations of the troops in the Modoc Country whilst under my 
 command; having no access to the records of the command, it can 
 but be very incomplete. 
 
 On the 23d of January, 1873, I received a telegraphic order from 
 the Headquarter** of the Military Division of the Pacific, informing 
 me that I had been "assigned to the command of the troops in the 
 Modoc Country, and directing me to proceed without delay to the 
 Headquarters of those troops." Delaying only to get the necessary 
 information concerning the position of the troops in, and en route 
 to the seat of war, I left Benicia Barracks, Cal., January 26th, and 
 arrived at Yreka the 28th. On my arrival at the latter place, I 
 received a telegraphic dispatch from G-eneral Canby, giving me the 
 stations and numbers of troops, with other important information. 
 Later the same day, I received another dispatch from G-eneral Can- 
 by, informing me that a Commission to negotiate with the Indians 
 had been, or would be appointed, and directing me to suspend all 
 active operations, and so post the troops as to protect the settlers 
 I asked to be informed whether I was to .give this information to 
 Captain Jack, and was authorized to use my discretion. 
 
 On the 30th I left Yreka and joined the Battalion of the 4th Ar 
 tillery, under Captain Throckmorton, at 12 M., same day, at tin- 
 foot of the Cascade Mountains. The snow on the mountain being 
 quite deep arid roads bad, we did not reach Van Bremer's until 
 February 4. Leaving the three companies at that place, I went on 
 to Fairchild's, and thence to Dorris', hoping to find some place with 
 wood and water within convenient proximity, but could not find 
 
 87 
 
them nearer than t\vo miles from each other. On the 7th of Feb 
 ruary I arrived at the Camp on Lost River, and on tho 8th assumed 
 command of the Modoc Expedition, including 1 the District of the 
 Lakes. In compliance with the request of Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Wheaton private affairs requiring his presence he was permitted 
 to return to his post at Camp "Warner, Oregon. At the same time 
 lie requested me to inform him, should hostilities be resumed, to 
 enable him to share in them. Unfortunately, the resumption of 
 hostilities was so sudden, that he did not join until the fighting had 
 ceased. 
 
 On the 9th of February I made a detailed report to Headquar 
 ters Department of the Columbia, of the condition and position of 
 the troops, and the various routes of supply. I learned that the 
 cost of transportation from Roseburg to Lost River was from 30 to 
 82 cents per pound, and from Redding to the stations of the troops 
 16 cents per pound; and therefoi'e recommended that supplies be 
 furnished from San Francisco, via Redding and Yreka, which was 
 done. 
 
 On the 15th of February I started to return to Dorris' Ranch, but 
 was met by a courier with a letter from General Canby, informing 
 me that he would be in Linkville that day, arid requesting to see me 
 as early as convenient. I met him that evening at Linkville, and 
 from that time until the llth of April, all movements of the troops 
 were made with the. knowledg-e and approbation of the General. 
 There being but two of the Peace Commissioners (Applegate and 
 Case N present, the meeting was merely informal. On the following 
 day, February 16, General Canby and the Commissioners accompa 
 nied me to Dorris' Ranch, that place being nearer the Indian posi 
 tion and more convenient for communication. About the 18th of 
 February, Mr. Meachem arrived, and on the 20th three squaws 
 went into the Indian Camp to arrange for a "talk;" these squaws 
 were instructed by the Commission to say, that the great Mili 
 tary Tyhee, (General Canby) and a man who came from far off, (Mr. 
 Case), desired to see them the names of Applegate and Meachern 
 were not to be mentioned. This I regard as being a very grave 
 error; it was inevitable that the Indians would soon know who the 
 Commissioners were. On the 24th of February Mr. Fairchild, 
 accompanied by a white man and squaw, went into the Lava Bed, 
 and on the 25th returned, bringing with them a deputation of war- 
 iors to "talk," but none of the principal chiefs came, nor was there 
 anything satisfactory accomplished. The Indians upon their ar 
 rival inquired for Judge Rosborough and E. Steele, Esq., the 
 
former of wjiom had, upon the request of General Canby, been 
 added to the Commission. I had earnestly recommended this ap 
 pointment to General Canby, after ascertaining the high esteem in 
 which the Judge was held by both whites and Indians. 
 
 Judge Rosborough and Mr. Steele arrived on February 27, (the 
 latter at the request of General Canby), and that evening there was, 
 at my headquarters, the first full meeting of the Peace Commission. 
 After a great deal of talk, General C;tnby proposed that Judge 
 Steele should go to the Indian Camp with these terms: "to surren 
 der as prisoners of war, to be sent to a southern reservation, and 
 to be fed or supported until they could support themselves." 
 
 On the 28th Judge Steele arid party went to the Lava Bed, and 
 on the night of March 1 I received a note from Lieutenant An 
 derson, Aid-de-Camp to General Ganby, announcing that the "In 
 dians had accepted the proposed terms." Eight warriors and Mary 
 (Jack's sister) returned with Judge Steele, as they said, to arrange 
 for the tribe to come in, Jack being, as he claimed, too sick to travel. 
 The same terms were repeated and accepted so far as the Indians 
 present were empowered to act. The proposition to protect them 
 was to include those charged with murdering the "settlers." On 
 the 2d of March Judge Steele returned to the Lava Beds to make 
 arrangements for the removal of the Indians. On the night of the 
 4th of March I received a note from General Canby informing me 
 of the return of Judge Steele, and that such was the information 
 brought by him as "to render it probable that the Modocs would at 
 once resume hostilities." 
 
 Couriers were at once sent to the different camps to put their 
 commanders on the alert. 
 
 On the 5th of March I attended a meeting of the Peace Commis 
 sion which was convened to receive Jack's message, which was 
 simply that the Indians refused the terms offered them and would 
 not corne out. After considerable discussion by the Peace Com 
 mission, General Canby spoke he said "Tell Captain Jack our 
 men have been to see him have trusted him ; that he had refused 
 to come out or treat; that if no message was received from him by 
 to-morrow night it would be considered that they desired war, and 
 we would act accordingly," adding "I have no more to say." 
 
 The Indians appeared much impressed by this message and soon 
 left for the Lava Beds. 
 
 After the departure of the Indians I learned, upon what I con 
 sidered good authority, that a white man from Linkville, (Sam. 
 Blair), who had been loafing about Fairchild's Ranch and com- 
 
inuiiicatiug with the Modocs, had informed them that he had an 
 order in his pocket from the G-overaor of Oregon (we were in Cali 
 fornia) to hang the nine Indians engaged in killing- the citizens, so 
 soon as they came in. Of course this was false, but as some of the 
 most influential men and best warriors were engaged in these mur 
 ders, it probably had some influence on the after conduct of the 
 Indians. 
 
 Late in the evening of the 6th I was informed by General Can by 
 that Mary with some warriors had come in and requesting my 
 presence. On my arrival the Commission met, and Mary delivered 
 the message of her brother: whether her own or Jack's, it was the 
 best Indian speech I ever heard requiring an hour for its delivery. 
 It was to the effect that Jack submitted, would come out and go 
 anywhere that he was wanted to, all his people to go with him; he 
 had thrown away his gun and given up his country, but that he 
 had no horse to come in on. He was again informed that if "he or 
 some of his principal men were not in by the evening of the 8th of 
 March, it would be taken for granted he wanted war," and a horse 
 was sent for Jack. On the evening of the 8th two Indians came 
 with a message from Jack stating that the entire tribe would come 
 in on the 10th; that there were several sick and unable to travel, 
 and asking that three wagons be sent to meet them about half way 
 for the women, children and sick. 
 
 The wagons were sent as requested, and remained at the appointed 
 place until nearly sun-down, and returned without having heard 
 anything of a sing-le Indian. All was again uncertainty, and it was 
 determined to try a little pressure by way of convincing the In 
 dians that we were in earnest. Accordingly Major Mason, 21st 
 Infantry, was directed to make a reconnaissance down the east 
 side of Tule Lake, and select a position for a new camp as nearly 
 east of the Indian position as practicable. Captain Biddle, com 
 manding Company U K," 1st Cavalry, was -directed to leave all his 
 baggage at Clear Lake, and make a reconnaissance to the south of 
 the Lava Bed, and come to the camp at Van Bremer's Ranch ; he 
 made the march as directed by the Ticknor's road or trail, which 
 was almost impassable for horses. 
 
 About five miles south of the Indian position he came upon a 
 party of squaws herding ponies, and captured thirty-three ponies. 
 The squaws and children were not fired upon. Captain Biddle's 
 company arrived at Van Bremer's Ranch, March 13. On the 14th 
 some squaws came to Headquarters complaining bitterly of the 
 capture of their ponies and three of their children. Biddle's de- 
 
iiijil of capturing the children availed nothing. The children how- 
 over returned to the Indian camp, having been hiding in the rocks, 
 and tn.us hostilities were again deferred. In the meantime Judge 
 Rosborough having business of importance to attend to and per 
 haps despairing <>f a favorable issue of the negotiations, and Messrs. 
 Applegate and Case, resigned. 
 
 But one Commissioner being left all negotiations were suspen 
 ded, no Indians coining to or communicating with our camps. 
 
 On the 21st of March General Can by and myself made a recon 
 naissance in the direction of the Lava Bed, but without expecta 
 tion of seeing the Indians. About 1 P. M. we arrived at the summit 
 of the bluff overlooking the Lr.iva Beds. 
 
 Considerable confusion appeared to exist in the vicinity of Jack's 
 caves, about two and a half miles distant. Very soon we were 
 hailed by two Indians wanting to know what we came for, and say 
 ing they did not want to fight, and that they wanted to "talk." 
 
 Dr. Cabaniss, Acting Assistant Surgeon, and well known to the 
 Indians volunteered to meet them and learn their wants. He found 
 several Indians, among them Captain Jack, who proposed, he, 
 Schonchin and Scar-faced Charley, should meet General Canby and 
 myself all to be unarmed. We accepted the offer, and descended 
 the bluff to that interview, which General Canby in his dispatch to 
 the Headquarters of the Army, March 22, terms, "unsatisfactory." 
 (The language was not too strong). Instead of Schonchin came the 
 "Curly Headed Doctor," the leader of the party who murdered the 
 settlers ; instead of three warriors six came four armed with re 
 volvers : such was the roughness of the place that we did not de 
 tect the treachery until it was too late to avoid the meeting. Gen 
 eral Canby asked Jack to talk. Jack said he "was a good man," 
 had "a good heart," wanted "all the soldiers taken away," "wanted 
 to go where he pleased," that "the soldiers had hunted him like a 
 wolf." The General told him that "if he came out with his people 
 he should be fed and clothed; to which Jack replied, that he "wanted 
 to go nowhere" and asked "if he had anything for him, why he 
 did not bring it to him" "When the interview terminated I was 
 convinced Jack had determined not to leave the Lava Beds until 
 forced. 
 
 On the 23d Major Mason moved from Lost River, and on the 
 24th encamped near the east side of the Lava Bed, about six miles 
 east of Jack's position. On the 26th I made a reconnaissance for 
 the purpose of finding a shorter and more practicable route from 
 Van Bremer's to the Lava Beds. 
 
6 
 
 The Rev. Mr. Thomas, one of the newly appointed Commission 
 ers, accompanied me. I found the trail, which had been reported 
 good for wagons, almost impassable for horses. Coming- to the sum 
 mit overlooking the Lava Beds two Indians were discovered, who, 
 upon being called, came up. They informed me that Jack desired 
 peace, but would not come out of the Lava Beds. 
 
 I had made all necessary arrangements to move to the foot of the 
 bluff (the edge of the Lava Bed) on the 20th, but a party of Indians 
 came into camp on the 28th and arrangements were made by the 
 Peace Commission to meet all the Indian Chiefs the 1st of April, 
 which, of course, prevented my moving. On the evening of the 
 29th a messenger from Jack informed the Peace Commissioners that 
 Captain Jack would not leave his position to "talk," but that he 
 would be glad to see the Peaoe Commission, General Canby and 
 myself; that we must not bring more than ten soldiers. A message 
 was sent to Jack that we would meet him at the Lava Bed, April 
 1, but with more than ten men. On the 31st of March all the 
 troops of the Expedition (except a guard for public property at 
 Van Bremer's) on the west side of Tule Lake moved out of camp, 
 and on the 1st of April encamped at the foot of the bluff, on the 
 edge of the Lava Bed. and immediately 011 the border of Tule Lake. 
 "We had scarcely reached our camp when two Indians came in and 
 appeared much surprised and dejected at the number of men. 
 
 I asked them if Jack would be in that evening and received a 
 decided negative reply. Later the same evening a message was re 
 ceived from Jack to the effect that he would meet the Commission 
 on the next day, April 2. 
 
 About 10 P. M. of the 1st of April, I was awakened by one of the 
 Peace Commissioners with information to the effect that our camp 
 was to be attacked before day, and that the line of tents occupied 
 by the Peace Commission, General Canby and myself, was to be the 
 object of their attack. I endeavored to quiet his apprehensions, 
 though not very successfully. The next morning the man given 
 as authority denied all knowledge of the affair. This was not the 
 only occurrence of the kind, and is merely mentioned as an act of 
 justice to that great aud good man who has been charged with 
 rashness for not giving credit to a similar report. On the morning 
 of April 2 a message was received from Jack that he and some of 
 his warriors were on their way to meet the Peace Commissioners 
 and General Canby. The General and the Peace Commissioners 
 went out and met the Indians. After a conference of four hours 
 nothing definite being arrived at the sitting was adjourned to meet 
 
the next day at the name pla.ce ; but nothing more was heard from 
 the Indians until the 5th, when a message was received from Jack 
 saying he would "talk," but "had made up his mind not to leave 
 the Lava Beds." 
 
 On the 6th the troops on the east side of Rhett or Tule Lake 
 advanced to within one and a half miles of the Indian stronghold 
 and in full view of it; no resistance was made. 
 
 Nothing further was done in the way of negotiations until April 
 9, when a message was received stating that Jack "would not come 
 out," that "he was afraid to come out," but "if the troops would go 
 away, he would come out;" but on the next morning a message 
 was received from Jack saying he would "talk" with the Commis 
 sioners. In order to be certain however about the disposition of 
 the Indians* the interpreter, Frank Riddle, and his wife, (a squaw), 
 went to Jack's camp and soon returned with information that Jack 
 would not "talk," nor meet the Commission, nor leave his strong 
 hold until the troops were removed. On the morning of the llth 
 one. of the Indians who had come in the previous evening with the 
 interpreter asserted that Riddle had not told "all," and that Jack 
 did desire to "talk." Boston Charley and Bogus Charley (the lat 
 ter had remained in my camp all night) were sent to the Indians 
 to ascertain Jack's intentions; they soon came back saying, Jack 
 "would meet General Canby, myself and the three Commissioners 
 at the Council Tent" about three quarters of a mile in front of 
 my camp. After duly considering the subject it was determined 
 to accept the proposition. I was too ill to accompany the party, 
 and before leaving the interpreter brought the Commissioners to 
 my bedside; General Canby was already in the tent. The interpreter 
 asked me to bear witness that he had warned them that there was 
 danger in going out. At six minutes after eleven o'clock, A. M., 
 April 11, the party left camp. The signal officer was directed to 
 keep a strict watch on the Council Tent, and to inform me of every 
 thing that occurred. 
 
 After the Indians, who went out with the Commission, were 
 beyond view, the troops were quietly warned to be near their tents. 
 At half past one o'clock, P. M., April 11, the signal officer brought 
 me information that Major Mason's camp, on the eastern side of 
 the Lake, had been attacked, and two officers probably captured. 
 This afterwards proved to be incorrect; two Indians had appeared 
 in front of Major Mason's camp with a white flag. Lieutenant Wil 
 liam L. Sherwood, 21st Infantry, Officer of the Day, accompanied 
 by Lieutenant "W. H. Boyle of the same regiment, went out to re- 
 
ceive it. Shots were heard, and upon advancing the troops found 
 the officers several hundred yards in front of the pickets. Lieuten 
 ant Sherwood was mortally wounded, and died on the 14th. 
 Knowing now that treachery was intended I sent for Acting As 
 sistant Surgeon Cabaniss who volunteered to take a note to General 
 Canby. (I c:mld not send a verbal message as the Modocs could 
 understand English). I had written but a few words when shots 
 were heard. The men at once seized their arms and advanced, 
 Major Biddle having in the meantime joined me from the signal 
 station with information of the death of General Canby and the 
 Commissioners. The troops moved as rapidly as the nature of the 
 lava permitted. I found the bodies of General Canby and the Rev. 
 Dr. Thomas, about seventy yards from the tent; Mr. Meachom was 
 near by, severely wounded: these three were stripped of their 
 clothing. Mr. Dyar, one of the Commissioners, escaped unhurt; 
 neither Riddle, interpreter, nor his wife, (a squaw), who was also 
 an interpreter, were attacked. The troops moved about half a mile 
 in advance of the C >uncil Tent but saw no Indians. The officer 
 at the signal station informed me that they disappeared among the 
 rocks as .soon as they had finished their murderous treachery. 
 
 It was now three o'clock, r. M., and to have followed the Indians 
 into the Lava Beds would have been folly. The troops returned to 
 camp and vigorously set about preparations for the attack which 
 would have been made on the 13th, but for the non-arrival of the 
 Warm Spring Indians under Donald McKay, and who had a high 
 reputation as fighters and scouts. 
 
 They arrived on the night of the 13th sixty strong and re 
 ported to Major Mason, 21st Infantiy, commanding on the east 
 side of the Lake. On the 14th of April Major Mason was ordered 
 to advance that night under cover of the darkness, as near to the 
 Indian position as he could do, without bringing on an engagement. 
 His command consisted of Companies "B" and "G," 1st Cavalry: 
 commanded, Company "G," by Captain Bernard, (until reported 
 sick, April 16), and afterwards by 2d Lieutenant J. G. Kyle ; 
 Company "B" was commanded by its Captain James Jackson. 
 The Infantry Companies were "C," "I" and "B," 21st Infantry, 
 commanded by Captain Burton, and 1st Lieutenants E. R. Theller 
 and J. M. Ross. A detachment of Company "A," 4th Artillery, 
 under command of 2d Lieutenant E. S. Chapin, 4th Artillery, man 
 ning a section of mountain howitzers ; and the "Warm Spring In 
 dians under Donald McKay. The command on the west side of 
 the Lava Beds, under Major Green, 1st Cavalry, were Companies 
 
*'F'' and "K," 1st Cavalry, (dismounted), commanded by Captain 
 D;ivid Perry, 1st Cavalry. Companies "E," "K" and "M," 4th Ar 
 tillery, comin:inded, in the order ab:>vc named, by 3d Lieutenants 
 Peter Leary, Jr. and George M. Harris, and Captain C. B. Throck- 
 morton. Companies "G" and "E," 12th Infantry; the former com 
 manded by 1st Lieutenant C. P. Eagan, the latter by 1st Liexiten- 
 ant Thomas F. Wright. This Battalion was commanded by Cap 
 tain M. P. Miller, 4th Artillery. To Company "A," 4th Artillery, 
 Captain Evan Thomas, was assigned the duty of taking charge of 
 the four Coehorn mortars. At 2 o'clock, A. M., April 15, Captain 
 David Perry's command of dismounted cavalry advanced under 
 cover of the darkness about one and a half mile. At 8 o'clock, A. M., 
 Major Green moved with the remainder of his command, except a 
 detachment of "H" Company, 1st Cavalry, under command of Cap 
 tain Trimble, left to guard the camp, and Thomas' Company, 4tli 
 Artillery, in. charge of the Coehorn mortars, which were packed 
 and ready to advance so soon as a proper position should be secured 
 for them. Though the distance was short, the lava was so difficult 
 to get over that at least an hour and a half was required to march 
 that distance. 
 
 At the point at which Captain Perry had taken his position a 
 peninsula makes out about a mile northward into Tule Lake; its 
 base line running east and joining the lake about three-fourths of 
 a mile distant from the point occupied by Perry's command. The 
 right of the Indian stronghold on the west side joined the lake at 
 the east end of this base line. The peninsula was comparatively 
 level, but being north of the line mentioned was not in the field of 
 operations. When it joined the command of Captain Perry the Bat 
 talion under Captain Miller was deployed as skirmishers, and Per 
 ry's held in reserve. The ground over which his command advanced 
 is very correctly described by Captain Miller in his report ; he says 
 "The surface of the ground along the first quarter of a mile being 
 rough, the remainder being partly rough to within about the third 
 of a mile of the stronghold that a low smooth sage brush valley 
 which narrowed rapidly in the direction from the lake, south into 
 the Lava Beds, and ending among high and rou'h lava hills." It 
 was while forming the skirmish line that the Indians first fired on 
 the troops, the shots coming from some lava cliffs on the extreme 
 right, which was constantly exposed to this fire from about eight 
 Indians behind the rocks at safe distance. The line was formed 
 and moved forward. The lava was so cut up by chasms running 
 in every direction that it was very difficult for an officer to make 
 
10 
 
 himself heard by his men, A slow but steady advance was kepi* 
 np a part of the men remaining- concealed and firing to protect 
 those advancing until late in the evening,, when the exterior 
 heights of tire stronghold were occupied, 
 
 In the meautime (at 4 p, M.) Captain Miller's command having 
 in its advance inclined slightly to the south east, there was space- 
 sufficient on his- left for G.iptain Perry's dismounted cavalry, which 
 moved forward in a most gallant manner, captured and held a po 
 sition in the rocky edges of the Indian stronghold: the right join 
 ing Captain Miller's Battalion r the left res-ting 01* the Lake, thus 
 securing water for the entire line, and also a position for the Coe- 
 horn mortars that had in the mean time arrived. Fire was at once 
 opened from them, and I believe with good effect ; after dark a shell 
 was thrown into the Indian cliffs at intervals of fifteen minutes. 
 The troops on the west side of the Lava Beds now held a line in the 
 edge of the Indian stronghold from the Lake south. They had 
 fought for every foot of ground gained, over the roughest field I 
 ever have seen ; the chasms running in every direction ; the lava 
 cutting like glass, and exposed at every step to the fire of the con 
 cealed foe. The line was closed and the troops bivouacked on the 
 ground they had so gallantly won ; their success had cost some 
 brave men, the loss being three enlisted men killed, 1st Lieutenant 
 Charles P. Eagan, 12th Infantry, wounded, gallantly leading his 
 Company, and nine enlisted men wounded. 
 
 There was considerable firing along the line by the Indians dur 
 ing the night, especially on the extreme right. Such were the 
 operations of the troops on the west side of the Lava Beds, April 15. 
 
 The following is an extract from the report of Major E. C, Mason, 
 commanding the troops on the east side of the Lava Beds during 
 the attack on the Indians, April 15, 1G and 17; it is dated June 10, 
 1873, twenty days after I had been relieved from the command of 
 the Modoc Expedition. As heretofore stated in this report, Major 
 Mason was ordered on the 14th of April to advance the night of 
 that day as near as practicable, without bringing on an engagement. 
 In this report he says: "The movement commenced at midnight, 
 and before daylight the troops were all in position on the east side of 
 the Modoc stronghold, the right resting on the Lake and within four 
 hundred yards of the ridge on which the Modocs had their position ; 
 the left of the line was in the air (rear) ? about half a mile from 
 the Lake. Before daylight (April 15) the men had so covered them 
 selves by building breastworks that it was impossible for the ene 
 my to discover our exact Locality. Soon after daylight Lieutenant 
 
11 
 
 Chapin placed the section of howitzers in position and opened fire 
 with shells and spherical cases. During the day the enemy aban 
 doned their outer line of defenses. I did not however follow them, 
 ns it was not part of my plan to expose my men unnecessarily.*" 
 'Such were the services of Major Mason's command of three com 
 panies of Infantry, two of dismounted Cavalry and sixty Warm 
 Spring Indians, making a total of six companies, after more than 
 once being ordered to attack the Indians; nor did I have any idea 
 that the orders had not been obeyed, until it was too late to reme 
 dy the neglect. The Major states in the extract above quoted that 
 his command on the morning of April 15 was within 400 yards of 
 the ridge upon which the Modocs had their position. 
 
 I have examined the ground occupied and am convinced that the 
 distance was nearer seven hundred than four hundred yards, and I 
 believe that if the howitzers had opened on the Indian position 
 from that distance that the Modocs would have soon discovered 
 their "exact locality" and probably have fired upon them instead of 
 "abandoning their outer line of defenses," as stated in Major Mason's 
 report. I however attribute this falling back of the Indians to the 
 vigorous attack from the troops on the west side, 'under Major 
 Green, and believe that if my orders had been executed by Major 
 Mason the Indian position wonld have been surrounded, the women 
 and children and perhaps some of the men captured. But he ad 
 hered to his plan and remained in the "position where it was im 
 possible for the enemy to discover our (his command) exact locality.' 1 
 I know the troops who served under Mason too well to doubt for a 
 moment they would have gallantly advanced and attacked the In 
 dians, had they been ordered to do so by their immediate comman 
 der; this would have prevented the concentration against Major 
 Green's command. That he had the order cannot be doubted ; he 
 gives a telegram from me of which the following are extracts 1 "Post 
 McKay's company on your left with orders to work in towards our 
 right ; caution the Indians to wear their uniforms to avoid mistakes; 
 hold every inch of ground you gain." (Dated April 14, 1873, 
 (signed) Alvan C. Gillem.) Major Mason also says: "At midnight 
 on the 15th of April the troops advanced to take up their second 
 position. Captain Burton advanced the Infantry about three hun 
 dred yards ;" this, as they were but four hundred yards the day 
 before, would have brought them within one hundred yards of the 
 Indian stronghold, and nearer than I found them the following 
 morning, April 17. 
 
 Major Mason says "his troops on the morning of the 16th were 
 
12 
 
 in possession of the Mesa which coin man dec! the 'Medicine Rock ? 
 and the whole eastern and sorHh-cdx'ern side of the Modoc strong 
 hold." If this statement is correct it is impossible to account for the 
 escape of the Modocs: the line of attack being the two sides of a tri 
 angle with the apex at the north, mid I know from personal observa 
 tion that the line of Colonel Green's troops held the west side of this 
 triangle, with his right at least as far south as Major Mason's left. 
 
 On the morning of the 16th all the troops on both the east and 
 west sides of the Indian position were ordered forward. 
 
 Major Green's command moved slowly, but in good order, the 
 march being over ground more favorable than that passed over the 
 previous day, the large blocks of lava affording some cover to the 
 advancing' line. When this command had gained a position nearly 
 opposite Jack's strongest point, I ordered Major Green to move for 
 ward and connect his right with Major Mason's left; at the same 
 time I ordered Major Mason to attack the Indians, using the follow 
 ing language in my dispatch, which is an extract from his report: 
 "To Major Mason : We Avill endeavor to end the Modoc war to-day. 
 Try and join Major Green's right. Push the Indians when Green 
 attacks. (Signed) Alvan C. Gillem." Sometime after sending this 
 dispatch and when the troops on the west side of the lava were ad 
 vancing, and I supposed those on the east were doing the same, I 
 received the following message from Major Mason: ''To General 
 Gillem: The Indians are on our right and rear. (Major Mason's 
 report says 'on our left mid rear.'' I have the original dispatch; it 
 reads on our right and rear.} We have to fight them but will 
 do all we can to help Green. (Signed) Major Mason." To execute 
 this (the junction with Major Mason's command) Captain Miller, 
 commanding the right of Major Green's troops, says in his report : 
 "I received orders from Major Green to move my command to the 
 right a little, then wheel to the left and try to connect my right 
 with the Warm Spring Indians on the left of Colonel Mason's com 
 mand operating on the opposite side of the stronghold. To execute 
 this, owing to the impassible ground, I had to separate Battery "E" 
 to the right from the rest for an interval, and having given direc 
 tions to the other troops to move by the flank to the right and close 
 the interval after the obstacles were passed by Battery "E" * * * 
 I heard the firing of the Warm Spring Indians and endeavored to 
 unite by the shortest line." But owing to the roughness of the 
 ground the troops on the left of Miller's command did not close to 
 the right as rapidly as he expected, and he ordered his own Battery 
 ("E") to close to the left and make a left wheel, but owing to the 
 
13 
 
 nature of tlie ground or rather rocks and lack of officers, the com 
 pany became separated and the Captain went with the extreme 
 right. About the time he joined this detached body (17 men) they 
 were fired into from the rear by the Modocs and by the Warm 
 Springs on the left of Major Mason's command. Captain Miller 
 says that he "soon from the reports of the muskets learned that the 
 Warm Spring Indians had been driven b.u.>k." He then closed his 
 line to the left. It was during these operations that, not being- 
 satisfied with the action of the troops ou the eastern side of the 
 Modocs, Colonel Green visited Major Mason at my request to ex 
 plain what I desired, viz: a change of his left to join Green's right. 
 Colonel Green agreed with me on the practicability of the move 
 ment. Shortly after Colonel Green's departure I received the fol 
 lowing dispatch from Major Mason, not given in his report: 
 
 "To General Gillem : It is absolutely impossible to connect our 
 left with Green's right; we are separated by a deep chasm held by 
 the Modocs; we cannot cross it without great loss of life. If we 
 join our right with your left and move directly south we can find 
 whether or not the Modocs have fled. Colonel Green is here and 
 sanctions this plan." From this dispatch it appears that, although 
 the Modocs held a deep chasm, there was a doubt as to "whether 
 or not they had fled." I at once replied : "I sanction the move 
 ment suggested by Colonel Green and yourself; execute it at once." 
 I ordered this movement in the hope that the troops once engaged 
 would drive the Modocs south where they would come on Captain 
 Miller's c mim md, but it resulted in no material advantage, merely 
 shutting off the Indians from the water. 
 
 The troops on the west of the Modoc position having been en 
 gaged all day, and gained a position in the immediate vicinity of 
 the Modocs, bivouacked for the night. Those on the east side oc 
 cupied about the same position as the night previous, the right 
 having joined Major Green's left without opposition. On the re 
 turn of Major Green I asked him if he did not still believe the 
 movement to join his right to Major Mason's left was practicable if 
 Major Mason would make a vigorous attack; he answered in the 
 affirmative, but stated the attack was so strenuously opposed by 
 Major Mason and Captain Bernard, 1st Cavalry, (the two senior 
 officers on that side), that he thought it advisable under the circum 
 stances to agree to their plan. jThave no doubt on the subject, and 
 the attack would have been made, but it was now too late. Major 
 Mason says in his report "on the 17th the troops were gradually 
 pushed forward and the line closed in on the right. About 12 
 
14 
 
 o ; clock this movement developed the fact that the Indians were 
 evacuating the stronghold. A general advance of the line was 
 ordered by General Gillem, the two lines meeting and following 
 for some distance the retreating enemy. Lieutenant Chapin ad 
 vanced his howitzers with the line and kept up a rapid fire not only 
 on the parties who were seen retreating but also on those who held 
 positions in the rocks." The statement that the two lines (Major Ma 
 son's right and Major Green's left) joined, is incorrect. I ordered tin- 
 movement; stationed myself on Major Green's extreme left in order 
 to conduct it. Green's troops moved promptly. Seeing nothing of 
 Major Mason's command I got upon the highest rock available, and 
 ordered repeatedly "Forward !" "Forward !" I saw a few men rise 
 from behind the rock but they did not advance. Lieutenant James 
 Rockwell, 1st Cavalry, my Adjutant, and whom I had sent to urge 
 forward this command, informed me that he heard my order for a 
 "forward;" he was in rear of Major Mason's line. I continued the 
 march with Major Green's left, and the first troops who joined me 
 was Company "G," 1st Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant J. G. 
 Kyle, and which was the fourth company from Major Mason's right. 
 The line advanced as rapidly as the nature of the rocks would 
 admit; it was during this advance that the Indians opened a sharp 
 fire on us, wounding (not seriously) Private Nolan, Company *'G," 
 1st Cavalry, which was the only casualty in Major Mason's com 
 mand during the three days fighting, except Warm Spring "Bob" 
 slightly wounded in the leg. On the 16th, in Colonel Green's 
 command, there were six killed and twelve wounded. Colonel 
 Green's right advancing rapidly, the Indians no doubt fearing to be 
 surrounded fled. Major Mason states that Lieutenant Chapin ad 
 vanced his howitzers with the line. I advanced "with the line" but 
 saw nothing of the howitzers, and any who did "advance with the 
 line" knows that it would have been impossible for the Artillery to 
 have moved as rapidly over the rocks and chasms as the line moved. 
 If any Indians were seen retreating / did not see them and I was 
 in as good position to do so, I think, as Major Mason. I have a let 
 ter from the officer who commanded the advance company, who 
 says he "did not see any retreating Indians; do not believe any 
 person else did" April 20. The firing had scarcely ceased when the 
 Cavalry and Warm Spring Indians were ordered to make the cir 
 cuit of the Lava Beds and ascertain whether the Indians had gone 
 to the mountains. Two companies marched from each camp those 
 under Captain Perry made the entire circuit of the Lava Bed, re 
 turning to the camp on the west side of the lava on the 22d, by the 
 
15 
 
 margin of Rhett Luke. In the mean time the Indians had been 
 discovered in the southern part of the Lava Bed, and on the 21st 
 fired into an escort of fifty men, killing one enlisted man and 
 wounding another. I was at the signal station closely observing 
 the affair, and I am convinced the Indians did not exceed five or 
 six, though it has been asserted there were many more; they were 
 no doubt after water, and could be distinctly seen filling their ves 
 sels after the escort had left. On the 22d the Cavalry returned to 
 camp, having failed to find any trail of the Indians. On the 2od 
 a party of "Warm Spring Indians were sent to find the position of 
 the Modocs; they i - eturned on the night of the 24th and reported 
 having found them in the southern part of the Lava Bed and 
 thought there wei'e about forty of them; no doubt a very correct 
 estimate. On the 25th Major John Green, commanding camp 
 south of Tule Lake, was directed to send out a party to reconnoitre, 
 and if possible ascertain the position of the Indians and whether 
 a pack train could cross that portion of the lava. I regret that in 
 the report to the Acting Assistant Adjutant General, District of 
 the Lakes, dated June 22, Major Green has felt it necessary to state 
 (apparently for his vindication) that this scout was sent out after 
 "consultation with Colonel Alvan C. Gillem, commanding the Mo- 
 doc Expedition, and with his full approval." I did fully approve 
 of the scout ; no detachment would have been sent into the lava 
 without my "approval." Major Green, an officer of experience in 
 Indian fighting, and who was in the immediate command of the 
 camp, of course had charge of the details and gave instructions to 
 Captain Thomas, commander of the detachment. This party con 
 sisted of Companies "A" and "K," 4th Artillery, and Company "E," 
 12th Infantry. The officers were Captain Evan Thomas, command 
 ing, 1st Lieutenants A. Howe and A. Cranston, and 2d Lieutenant 
 Harris of the 4th Artillery, and 1st Lieutenant T. F. Wright, 12th 
 Infantry. "About seventy" (meaning enlisted men) Major Green 
 says in his report; from the best information I could obtain I think 
 there were sixty-eight soldiers. I ordered Donald McKay to go 
 himself with fourteen Warm Spring Indians; he took but twelve, 
 making' with himself and the soldiers eighty-one (81) fighting men. 
 Captain Thomas was directed to move cautiously, not to bring on an 
 engagement, but if compelled to fight to do so only on the defensive. 
 The command left camp at 7 A. M. in excellent spirits. The point 
 to which Captain Thomas was ordered to proceed was in full view 
 of the camp, though the intervening lava obscured the detachment 
 before it was a hundred yards beyond the pickets ; several signals 
 
were received that no Indians had been found. About 1 o'clock a 
 message was received from Captain Thomas (by signal) "We have 
 found" the Indians they are behind the bluff," (to which he had 
 been ordered to go.) I went to the signal station; nothing could 
 be seen; an occasional shot was- heard. I was anxious of course- 
 concerning the result of the firing, but Lieutenant Adams, the sig 
 nal officer, informed me that all was right; that he had counted fif 
 teen (15) men passing a fissure in the rocks, and he thought the entire 
 command on its way returning. About 2 P. M. several stragglers 
 came in to camp and stated Captain Thomas had had a severe fight 
 and they had been cut off from the command. No two gave the same 
 account of the fig^ht; in fact they were too much frightened to give 
 any information. Notwithstanding that I was convinced that Cap 
 tain Thomas' command outnumbered the Modoc Warriors almost 
 two tt, one, I at once directed Major Green, 1st Cavalry, to take 
 "all the available men in camp and proceed to the assistance of 
 Captain Thomas." At the same time the companies under Captain 
 Miller, 4th Artillery, were ordered from the camp in the Lava Bed 
 to join Major Green. I was astonished to learn that Major Mason 
 had sent his command as it were into battle without a medical offi 
 cer, though there were three (Sterling, Cabaniss and Skinner) at 
 tached to his command; he was telegraphed to send one, but it was 
 too late. During the afternoon and night stragglers continued to 
 come in, generally unarmed: all had been "cut off" during the 
 fight and all had different stories. As will be seen by the report 
 of Major Green, his command was joined by that from Major Ma 
 son's camp "about dark." He continued his march until darkness 
 and the lava compelled him to halt. At midnight five men came 
 into his camp; two of these men being unhurt he tried to use them 
 as guides, but as might have been surmised by those acquainted 
 with the locality, they became confused and of "no use." The com 
 mand halted until daylight. Acting Assistant Surgeon B. Semig 
 informs me that during the night the noise of "piling rocks" was 
 heard, and that he and those with him thought it was the Indians 
 preparing for the next morning that he did not think soldiers 
 could work so silently ; but his suspense was ended at daylight by 
 the appearance of a sergeant of the 1st Cavalry. Major Green re 
 mained on the battle ground during the day, caring for the woun 
 ded, collecting the dead and preparing for his return on which he 
 set out about dark, and arrived at camp at 7 A. M. on the 28th. 
 about 14 hours to go over not to exceed 4 miles probably not more 
 than three miles. Major Green informed me that but for the light at 
 
the signal station in camp it would have been impossible for the 
 party to have moved. Of the details of this fight it is difficult to 
 learn anything definite. It is only known that the gallant Thomas 
 and the officers with him died :is brave men and true soldiers. 
 Many of the enlisted men remained with their officers and shared 
 their fate; but justice to these gallant officers and men compels me 
 to say, that had all the enlisted men done their duty and obeyed 
 their commanders no disaster could have occurred. Dr. B. Semig, 
 Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. Army, who accompanied the party. 
 in a very intelligent and concise account of the affair, says when he 
 "joined the command about half a mile from the camp they were 
 marching as follows: Company "E," 12th Infantry, deployed as 
 skirmishers, but extending over a comparatively small amount of 
 ground ; following close to the skirmish line and in column of twos- 
 Companies ''K" and "A," 4th Artillery, followed by a rear guard of 
 a non-commissioned officer and three men. Major Thomas, Lieu 
 tenant Wright, and Ticknor (guide) marched in rear of the skir 
 mish line, and' Lieutenants Harris and Howe at the right (head, as 
 they were marching in column of twos) of their companies, and 
 Lieutenant Cranston and myself (Dr. Semig) in rear of the column." 
 He says that he "noticed the skirmish line did not extend so as to 
 cover the most prominent ridges on our right arid left and that the 
 main column was getting closer and closer on to the skirmish line, 
 until the space between the two was hardly perceptible; the whole 
 command marching more in the shape of a ' than a skirmish 
 lino and main column." The Doctor says ^ffe he "called Lieu 
 tenant Cranston's attention to the fact that there were no flank 
 ers out, and that the Lieutenant detailed parties for each flank, but 
 that these parties passed at the foot of the ridges nearest the column 
 and kept drawing away from the ridges and nearer the column this 
 after they had been repeatedly ordered by Lieutenant Cranston to 
 go on the ridges, until 1st Sergeant Rohmer, Company "A," 4th 
 Artillery, went out on the right flank and did certainly, all by him 
 self, perform the duties of flanker much more thoroughly than the 
 men detailed for the purpose." About 12 M. the command reached 
 the foot of the sand hill, the terminus of the march : here the com 
 mand halted and took luncheon; Captain Thomas, Lieutenant Har 
 ris and two signal men prepared to ascend the. hill. Lieutenant 
 "Wright ordered two men from the left of the skirmish line to ad 
 vance towards some high lava rocks rising to the east of the sand 
 hill. These two men had gone about half the distance to the r-ocks 
 when two shots came from the very rooks the men were ti-ying to 
 
18 
 
 gain ; this was the first indication that Indians were near. The 
 firing" now commenced from all the lava ridges around the com 
 mand and from 400 to 1000 yards distant; the troops being on low 
 and comparatively open ground. At this time the greater portion 
 of the command became panic stricken and all organization ceased. 
 Dr. Semig says "the excitement was intense; numbers of soldiers 
 ran in every direction for shelter shouting ' we are entirely sur 
 rounded,' and not paying the least attention to the commands of 
 their officers." All the officers and a great portion of the men 
 pressed forward toward the sand hill where Captain Thomas was. 
 Captain Thomas then ordered Lieutenant Wright with Company 
 "E," 12th Infantry, to advance with his company and take a ridge 
 which was to the left of the sand hill and "commanded the sur 
 roundings" and was about 000 to 800 yards distant. Lieutenant 
 Cranston, 4th Artillery, then volunteered to take some men and 
 dislodge the Indians from the rocks north of the sand hill and so 
 protect the left. I learned at the time, from those who saw him 
 start, that he took five men with him; that these men behaved like 
 soldiers and died like heroes, the position of their bodies, as after 
 wards found, surrounding that of the gallant Cranston, clearly 
 proves. Captain Thomas with Lieutenants Howe and Harris, Dr. 
 Semig, and the guide with the main column, which had melted 
 down to twenty five or thirty men. followed the direction taken by 
 Lieutenant Wright with his company. Meeting two slightly 
 wounded men the Doctor stopped to dress their wounds. Mr. 
 Ticknor, the guide, separated from the column and went north to 
 wards camp. The Dr. then followed the command until lie over 
 took them "halted in a hollow" with some small rocks and sage 
 brushes, not over fifty yards from the ridge which Wrights com 
 mand had been ordered to take. Major Thomas supposing the 
 ridge to be held by his troops "shouted -out for Colonel Wright and 
 as a reply received several shots." At this time there seems to have 
 been a proposition made to charge the ridge but it was disapproved 
 and the command "sheltered themselves as best they could behind 
 rocks, sage brushes, little rises in the ground, etc." It was here 
 the brave Thomas with all the officers who remained with him were 
 killed or mortally wounded. The little band of enlisted men, "at 
 least twenty." (says Dr. Semig) who had followed their commanders 
 to this point stood by them to the last, being almost without excep 
 tion either killed or severely wounded. After leaving Dr. Semig, 
 Mr. Ticknor, the guide, did go north or toward the camp and came 
 upon the command of Lieutenant Wright, but that command be- 
 
19 
 
 coining 1 disorganized and scattered Ticknor started for camp, but 
 soon came on the Warm Spring Indians who were endeavoring to 
 join Captain Thomas' command and had arrived about the time the 
 firinii 1 began, but had been unable to join as they were fired at by 
 the troops the moment they showed themselves. Donald McKay 
 who had charge of them stated to me that he used every devise to 
 make himself and men known shouting to them, and by raising 
 their U. S. military hats with all their dressing, bugles, feathers. 
 etc. Finally a bugler of one of the Artillery companies came upon 
 them and McKay captured him and made him, as he expressed it, 
 blow all the calls from reveille to tattoo; next a sergeant was "cap 
 tured," and McKay endeavored to use him to communicate with the 
 command, but nothing could induce him to return, and both the 
 sergeant and bugler "g - ot away;" they arrived safely in camp. 
 The sergeant gave such a very definite account of what had oc 
 curred to Captain Thomas' command that I ordered him to return 
 as gtiide with the troops going to the relief of Thomas, but he 
 showed such utter demoralization that I feared to trust him. The 
 Warm Spring Indians did not succeed in joining the troops until 
 the arrival of Major Green. Under fire from both sides these thir 
 teen Warm Spring Indians held their ground during the day with 
 out the loss or even wounding of a man. I have been thus particu 
 lar in giving the details furnished by Dr. Semig, McKay and others, 
 as they confirm the impression I entertained and reported at the 
 time to the Commanding General, Military Division of the Pacific, 
 that "soon after firing began a large part of the command became 
 panic struck and soon all organization ceased." At the time Cap 
 tain Thomas took his position in the hollow, and before anv of the 
 officers with him had been wounded, his command had melted 
 away to twenty men, and up to that time but few men had been 
 wounded. These brave men shared the fate of their officers the 
 majority of them being killed; the remainder almost to a m:in 
 wounded. Those who accompanied Cranston shared his fate. Of 
 Company "E," 12th Infantry, I have been able to learn nothing re 
 liable after it was detached as above stated: frmrteen of the enlisted 
 men were killed or wotmded, several of them around their com 
 mander, proving they had died nobly, doing their whole duty; but 
 justice to the other companies requires it to be stated that the com 
 pany was well represented among the first stragglers arriving in 
 camp. From this statement of what, after the most careful inqui 
 ries, I believe to be as correct a statement of this affair as it is possi 
 ble to obtain, I think it apparent that soon after the firing the 
 
20 
 
 greater portion of the command became panic stricken ''running in 
 every direction and not paying the slightest attention to the com 
 mands of their officers ;" that all organization ceased and many men 
 fled from the field. That no disaster could have occurred had disci 
 pline and order been observed I have no doubt. The force with Cap 
 tain Thomas including Warm Spring Indians was about eighty men, 
 and probably twice the number that Jack could bring against them. 
 The loss of Captain Thomas' command was four officers Captain 
 Evan Thomas, 4th Artillery, commanding the reconnaissance, 1st 
 Lieutenant A. P. Howe, 4th Artillery, 1st Lieutenant Arthur 
 Cranston, 4th Artillery, and 1st Lieutenant T. F. Wright, 12th 
 Infantry, and eighteen enlisted men hilled. Wounded: 3d Lieu 
 tenant G. M. Harris, 4th Artillery, (mortally), Acting Assistant 
 Surgeon B. Semig (severely), and seventeen enlisted men ; making a 
 total of forty-one killed and wounded. Of the personal action of 
 the officers it is of course impossible for me to speak ; it is only 
 known they died nobly, doing their duty executing the orders of 
 their gallant commander. Had all the enlisted men been true to 
 their colors all would have been well. Two men seem to require 
 special mention ; their conduct was the subject of commendation by 
 those who fled from the fight as well as those who remained true 
 to their duty. These gallant men were 1 st Sergeant Robert Rorner, 
 Company "A," 4th Artillery, and 1st Sergeant Malachi Clinton, 
 Company - 4 E," 12th Infantry; they not only did their duty as brave 
 soldiers, but endeavored to force others to do likewise. The former 
 was killed with his commander, Captain Thomas; the latter mor 
 tally wounded with Lieutenant Wright. After a day's rest Donald 
 McKay with his friendly Indians made a reconnaissance, returning 
 to camp on (I think) the 3d of May and reporting that the Modocs 
 had abandoned the Lava Beds. About the date (I cannot specify 
 the day) the Commander of the Department of the Columbia arrived 
 in camp, and though I was not relieved from the command of the 
 "Modoc Expedition," the actual command was exercised by the De 
 partment Commander's orders ; verbal or written orders were usu 
 ally given or sent direct to those for whom they were intended, as 
 will be seen in the report of Captain Hasbrouck, 4th Artillery. His 
 expedition consisting of his own Battery ("B," 4th Artillery) and 
 Companies "B" and "G," 1st Cavalry, and the Warm Spring Indians 
 under Donald McKay, left Peninsular Camp under verbal orders 
 of the Department Commander, May 9, 1873 ; encamped that night 
 at Sorass Lake, but found it dry. On the succeeding morning the 
 camp occupied by "B" and "G" Companies, 1st Cavalry, and the 
 
21 
 
 Warm Spring Indians, was attacked about daylight by the Modocs. 
 In this affair the troops lost twelve killed and wounded including 
 one Warm Spring Indian killed and two wounded; the loss of the 
 Indians (Modocs) was one killed. I mention this fact to illustrate 
 the disadvantage at which the troops invariably frnight. The In 
 dians secreted in the crevices and chasms of the lava always ob 
 tained the first shot at the exposed advancing soldiers. I know it 
 has been suggested that "the soldier had the same shelter that pro 
 tected the Indian;" so he had, but if he had availed himself of it 
 and remained concealed in the rocks, the Modoc War would have 
 never ended. The soldier had to advance and in doing so expose him 
 self to the view and fire of the hidden savage ; the disadvantage under 
 which he labored is easily seen. Captain Hasbrouck was compelled 
 to return to Tule Lake for water the day of his fight, but, having 
 turned in his horses, this energetic officer marched on the 12th (May) 
 to the large sand butte and found the Modocs in position just to the 
 west of it; the 18th and 14th were spent reconnoitering and ar 
 ranging with Major Mason for an attack on the 15th, but on the 
 afternoon of the 14th a scout brought information that the In 
 dians had fled. On May 16 the horses of Captain Hasbrouck's 
 command reached him, and on the 17th he followed the trail which 
 took a westerly course on what is known as Ticknor's road and that 
 night encamped at Van Bremer's Ranch. On the 18th Captain 
 Hasbrouck's command was to inarch to the ford of Butte Creek, but 
 while on the march an Indian trail WHS discovered leading up to 
 the hills towards Fairchild's Ranch ; Captain Jackson with Com 
 pany "G," 1st Cavalry (commanded by Lieutenant Kyle) was sent 
 in pursuit: firing being heard, "B" Company, 1st Cavalry, and the 
 "Warm Spring Indians were ordered forward to re-enforce Jackson. 
 The Indians were pursued to near Fairchild's, where they scattered 
 and sought shelter among the rocks and brushes. Captain Has 
 brouck reports two warriors and three squaws killed. A number 
 of squaws were captured; they asserted that the Modocs were on 
 their way to Fairchild's Ranch to surrender ; that they were tired 
 of fighting. This, I believe, was true; as the Indians were the Hot 
 Creek band, and the fight occurred within sight of their old home. 
 On the 19th of May I received instructions from the Department 
 Commander to make certain changes in the organization and posi 
 tion of the troops serving in the Modoc Expedition. Among other 
 things I was to select a camp near Van Bremer's station for the In 
 fantry. On the 20th, after having given the necessary orders and 
 instructions for the movements of the troops, I marched to, and en- 
 
22 
 
 camped in the vicinity of, Fairchild's Ranch ; the same evening, at 
 the request of the Department Commander, I was present at the in 
 terview when he gave the squaws the messages to be delivered to 
 the Indians desiring to come in and surrender. On the 21st of May 
 I proceeded to examine the country in the vicinity of Van BremerV 
 Ranch with a view to establishing the camp under my instructions 
 of May 10. Having selected a position I was about returning to 
 camp when an orderly handed me the communication of which the 
 following is a copy : 
 
 ''HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE COLUMBIA, 
 
 IN TIIK FIELD, Mai/ 21, 1873. 
 Colonel A. 0. Gillem, 1st Cavalry, 
 
 Commanding Modoc Expedition. 
 COI.ONKT,: 
 
 The Department Commander directs that you issue the necessary 
 orders to give effect to the following : 
 
 The Modocs having been during the recent operations beaten and 
 driven from their strongholds and having dispersed into small scat 
 tered bands, the pursuit and capture of the fugitives is now to be 
 the immediate work of the troops. This duty will especially de 
 volve upon the mounted troops who will be called 011 to operate in 
 small detachments, moving rapidly, vigorously, and frequently in 
 dependently of each other. The operations of the foot troops must 
 be made to conform to the new condition of things. The conduct 
 of affairs therefore can more conveniently be carried on under the 
 immediate orders of the Department Commander, while on the spot, 
 than under those of a special commander of the Expedition. Colonel 
 Alvan C. Gillem, 1st Cavalry, is therefoi'e 1'elieved from duty with 
 this command and will proceed to the Headquarters of his Regi 
 ment at Benicia Barracks, California, with a view to his assuming 
 command of, and preparing for the field, the five Troops of the 1st 
 Cavalry, now en-route from Arizona. 
 I am, Colonel, 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 E. V. SUMNER, 
 
 Captain 1st Cavalry " 
 
 The provisions of this communication seemed somewhat contra 
 dictory the first sentence directing me to give certain orders and 
 the closing sentence relieving me from duty with the "Modoc Ex 
 pedition" and ordering me to duty in another Department. I left 
 
23 
 
 the command May 22 ; returned to Benicia Barracks and resumed 
 command of my Regiment and Post. I WHS in command of the 
 Modoc Expedition about four months. 
 
 Until the murder of General Can by, April 11, there were no ac 
 tive military operations; after hostilities actually began, the fight 
 ing-, skirmishing and reconnoitering, was almost constant until I 
 was relieved from command. When officers and men generally per 
 formed their duties so gallantly and cheerfully it might seem invi 
 dious to specially mention any; but I think it will be conceded by 
 all who witnessed the conduct of Major John Green, 1st Cavalry, in 
 the actions of the 15th, 16th and 17th of April, that he was dis 
 tinguished for his cool judgment combined with gallantry border 
 ing- on rashness. First Lieutenant Charles P. Eagan, 12th Infan 
 try, was severely wounded on the 15th of April, bravely leading 
 a charge of his company. Captain David Perry, commanding the 
 1st Cavalry Battalion, (dismounted) on the left of Major Green's 
 right, and Captain M. P. Miller, commanding the Battalion of the 
 4th Artillery and 12th Infantry, both served under my personal 
 observation and deserve special commendation. The latter com 
 manded the extreme right of the line advancing eastward, the most 
 important part of the attack, and handled his men with skill, ener 
 gy and gallantry. Assistant Surgeon Henry McElderry, chief 
 medical officer of the Expedition, after the death of the lamented 
 McMillan, performed all the duties devolving upon him in the most 
 satisfactory manner. In. the actions of the loth, 16th and 17th 
 April he was on the field giving his personal care to the wounded, 
 under fire. Two gentlemen, though not commissioned in the Army, 
 deserve particular mention; I allude to Acting Assistant Surgeons 
 T. Cabaniss and B. Sernig. The conduct of the former excited uni 
 versal comment among those who witnessed his conduct prior to 
 the fatal morning on which General Caiiby was murdered; he never 
 hesitated to meet the Modocs or enter their stronghold. On that 
 morning he volunteered to carry a message to General Canby in 
 forming him of the treacherous shooting of Lieutenant Sherwood on 
 the east of the Modoc position, but the General's party was attacked 
 before the services of the Doctor could be of any avail. In the bat 
 tle of the 15th, 16th and 17th the Doctor's services were conspic- 
 UOTIS; he advanced with the line and took charge of the wounded as 
 they fell. The incident mentioned by Captain Miller of the Doc 
 tor taking the letter himself after its bearers had refused to follow 
 him, and thus shaming them into a performance of their duty, was 
 an act characteristic of the man. 
 
24 
 
 Acting Assistant Surgeon B. Semig accompanied the command of 
 Captain Thomas ; remained with him to the last and was found near 
 the Captain's body. Dr. Semig in this fight lost a foot, and was se 
 riously wounded in the right shoulder, producing partial paralysis ; 
 he is a young man of ability and stands high in his profession, from 
 the practice of which he will be in the future to a great extent inca 
 pacitated by wounds received in battle. I earnestly invite the at 
 tention of the proper authorities to his services, disability, and, 
 what I think are his just claims, to provisions for his support. 
 Lieutenant James Rockwell, Adjutant 1st Cavalry, acted as Assis 
 tant Adjutant General of the Modoc Expedition during mv com 
 mand ; he performed his administrative duties with care and ac 
 curacy ; in action he conveyed my orders with promptness and 
 gallantry, and in my opinion deserves that his services be recog 
 nized by the War Department. 
 
 Since the termination of the Modoc War I wrote to Dr. McElderry 
 to learn the number of Modoc warriors engaged during that war and 
 how many of them were killed ; to which he replied as follows, viz : 
 "Your note of inquiry in regard to the number of Indians killed 
 from the llth of April to the end of the Modoc War is at hand. 
 The Modocs themselves while at this post (Fort Klamath) said that 
 they had only lost five warriors during that time, viz : three killed 
 during the three days fight (2 by the explosion of a shell and 1 by 
 a rifle, ball), one killed at Sorass Lake, and one at the time of 
 the ThQrtww Massaci'e. They stated that several old squaws were 
 killed during the three days fight. There were forty warriors at 
 this post belonging to the tribe. This corresponds to the count of 
 Dorris and Fairchild, both of whom you remember always conten 
 ded that this was the actual number of fighting warriors belonging 
 to the Modoc tribe." 
 
 ; Mully corroborated the .statement of Dorris and Fairchild as to 
 -*-tli(MKimber of Modoc warriors engaged during the war. 
 
 ' This report has been delayed by the great difficulty in procuring 
 the data necessary for its accuracy and also by my ill health. 
 I am, Sir, 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 ALVAN C. GILLEM, 
 
 Colonel 1st Cavalry, 
 Commander of the late Modoc Expedition, including District of the Lakes.