MIVERSITY OF CA RIYERSII 3 1210 01927 1780 mm mi ■'Mm AMERICA AFTER JHEWAR ByJfn 'AMERICAN JURIST UBmy UNIVERSITY Of mpomiA Rimsm :iui AMERICA AFTER THE WAR AMERICA AFTER THE WAR BY AN AMERICAN JURIST NEW YORK THE CENTURY CO. 1918 Copyright, 1918, by The Century Co. Copyright, 1918, by The New York Times Company Published, March, 1918 The general interest aroused by the communications of An American Jurist while the series was in the course of pub- lication in the New York Times during the month of January is the warrant for their reproduction in book form. It should be said here that the title, "An American Jurist," was not of the author's choosing. As the communica- tions were published anonymously, it was necessary to indicate in some man- ner the quality and the authority of the writer and they were described in the Times as coming from the pen of An American Jurist, an ascription of au- thority which, while appropriate and ac- curate, the author's modesty might have disclaimed. March, 1918. CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I America and the War ... 8 II Belgium and Luxemburg . . 22 III The Balkans 43 IV The Sequel of the War . . 54 V Mexico 64 VI Canada 80 VII The West Indies 99 VIII Asia and the Pacific . . . .112 IX America after the War . . .123 X Democracy 134 XI An American Merchant Marine 171 XII Preparedness 186 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR AMERICA AFTER THE WAR CHAPTER I AMEBICA AND THE WAR When the national authorities acted, and America became a belligerent in one of the most stupendous wars in history, the duty of Americans to their country was clear : they were bound to sustain the successful prosecution of the war by every legitimate means in their power. Nevertheless, without impropriety they may continue to differ concerning the ends and the ultimate effects of the war on the future of the nation and on civi- lization in general. The right to free- dom of opinion does not, however, abro- 3 4 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR gate the duty of an American not to em- barrass his Government by useless dis- cussion. No further debate, for exam- ple, concerning the propriety of a war is admissible in any orderly state after war is once duly declared. The laws which underlie national existence do not permit individual or domestic opposition to the national authority in time of war ; but the liberty postulated of a republic does permit a reasonable discussion, in the abstract, of the future national prob- lems affected by the war. All modern wars between nations are in the last analysis founded on national interest and national honor, which are al- most identical terms. Other causes may be assigned by political parties, and in popular governments other causes are often necessarily assigned when the cit- izenship is indifferent to the national honor or oblivious of the urgency of AMERICA AND THE WAR 5 the paramount national interest. The United States had an ample casus belli on which to found a declaration of war against Germany. The conduct of Ger- many prior to 1917 had violated the prin- cipal laws of war {jura belli), to the great injury of the American nation. The wonder is that American politicians and even the national authorities so long absolutely ignored or tolerated what was generally apparent. But underneath all the causes avowed for America's en- tering the war lay that mainspring of na- tional action — the national safety and the national interest. Prior to 1914 it had long been foreseen by thoughtful men that America would sooner or later be obliged to enter into a war with Ger- many. The present time was certainly an opportune time for America to begin hostilities that were inevitable. Long anterior to the present war Germany was 6 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR known to regard with invidious eyes this hemisphere, its institutions, its preten- sions, and its peculiar and phenomenal development. It should be confessed that America in the past has not been most favorably regarded by European governments. Between the political thought of Europe and the political thought of America lies a great abyss far deeper than the separating seas. Only time can satisfactorily bridge this chasm. Between Germany and America in particular there has long been a latent misunderstanding. Since 1870, given an opportune moment, American inter- ests would have been unhesitatingly as- sailed by Germany with all the force and power it could command. For this reason, if for no other, it was the interest of the American Government to meet the inevitable issue with Germany at least as AMERICA AND THE WAR 7 soon as it did, and it is its duty to wage the war with all the power and force it can command. Some of the provocative causes ably stated by President Wilson in his ad- dress to Congress, April 2, 1917, and as- signed as reasons for the entrance of America into a foreign war, have not become of less moment now that America is at war. Their indirect purpose was the conviction of those Americans who think little concerning the laws which control the struggles for human and na- tional existence. That America was jus- tified in her declaration of war for many reasons not stated by the President the world in the end will concede. Her imperiled national interests alone af- forded ample justification for such a declaration. But in pragmatic England and in practical America political and national movements are singularly pro- 8 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR moted by sentimental considerations, sometimes pertinent, at others irrele- vant, but always skilfully manipulated by those more discerning public men who have closer at heart the national interests and well-being, and who them- selves need no other incentive besides the national interests for even such an extreme action as public war. For the honor of humanity it is sad to have to admit that sentiment of itself is never a valid reason of state for extreme national measures. In the minds of statesmen of any country sentiment is not the real reason for war, though it is often made use of by public men in order to influence some desired public action. Patriotism is not a sentiment. It is to belittle the nobility of mankind to affirm that the love of God, of family, of coun- try, of liberty, and of justice is a senti- ment. This natural affection is a priori AMEEICA AND THE WAR 9 and inborn ; it is dictated by the sense of self-preservation; it is an elementary principle of being. For country, family, and liberty men will fight until the end of time. In well-constructed human beings sentiment plays a minor part. At so grave a time as this Americans need no such artificial stimulus as sentiment to induce them to support their Govern- ment in an international issue involving the safety of their country, their fami- lies, and their liberty. As is the case with most abstractions, sentiment would not at any time be a safe criterion for public measures. It is as often ill founded as well founded, and conse- quently it is never a prudent or a de- liberate reason for the great finality of a nation. It is the national interest and honor alone which in the end control the external actions of a state. In any dis- cussion of the problems involved in 10 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR this war, therefore, sentiment should be allowed to play only a minor part. Al- liances between nations are not deter- mined by considerations of sentiment. Common interests and advantages for the time being afford the sufficient in- ducement for either defensive or offen- sive alliances of nations. Since the ascent of Prussia to the hegemony and direction of Germany, English public men have been with rea- son profoundly disturbed. They have seen with disquietude the long commer- cial supremacy of England challenged with effect by Germany ; they have seen the colonial policy of England and the integrity of its widely extended empire frequently menaced by unmistakable overtures. Indeed, for tlie last fifty years thinking men in England and else- where have foreseen that a straggle be- tween the English and the German em- AMERICA AND THE WAR 11 pires was inevitable. Men in both na- tions have long been shouting, "Delenda est Carthago!" to the increasing discom- fiture of the rest of the world. Both Germany and England have in their own way silently prepared for the struggle, indirectly by alliances and international conversations, and directly by increased armaments either on the land or on the sea. It would have been far better for the Entente Allies if England had not confined her preliminary preparations so largely to the seas. Her allies have been forced to bear the brunt of her over- sight. Indeed, it would have been far less costly to the British Empire itself had England's preparations on land kept better step with the pace of the Ger- man Empire. Mr. Lloyd George has lately admitted that England somewhat neglected the obvious duty to arm on land, and that the neglect would not 12 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR occur again. England 's excuse for neg- lect is no mystery. She used her na- tional resources the better to extend for the time being her challenged commercial supremacy. In so far as America was concerned, England's increased armament was never disquieting. All the other ex- ternal actions of England were not, how- ever, so reassuring to America. Ante- rior to the War of 1914 many English statesmen endeavored to come to an un- derstanding with Germany. In such a possible understanding lurked the great- est peril to this country. As existing national alliances and ententes are very temporary, it is thought by some public men, even in England's own empire, that this country has not yet escaped all ulti- mate danger of such an association. Regardless of that now remote possibil- ity, the interest of America in the pres- AMERICA AND THE WAR 13 ent conflict unquestionably lies with England and her allies. To aid France Cardinal Richelieu did not hesitate to promote Protestantism. He was a statesman of the first order. Any mina- tory combinations of the great powers which the future may unfold are too re- mote to furnish ground for any hesitancy on the part of America to cooperate heartily with England and her allies throughout the present war. Neverthe- less, the American aims in the final is- sues of the war are not and cannot be identical with the ends of England. In Asia their separate interests have of late widely diverged. It is reasonably clear that the pronounced aims of Mr. Lloyd George are not even now the aims of most of the other leading public men of England. It is therefore safe to predict that the program of Mr. Lloyd George will not be prominent in the final adjust- 14 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR ments of the pending war by the powers. As to the respective merits of the two leading belligerents, England and Ger- many, in the War of 1914, America has not hesitated to form an opinion. Eng- land is a free and great country. Her public men are far more astute in the business of government than the German public men or any other public men. Even the English colonial empire, the duration of which is much involved in this war, has, since the independence of America, been admirably administered in the main, and the high commercial principles applied in colonial adminis- tration have produced good results. If we except the loss of liberty and inde- pendence of some of the subject popula- tions of England, there has been little to condemn in the English colonial system. In all her colonies England has had since 1783 more regard for justice and human AMERICA AND THE WAR 15 rights than has ever been displayed by any other colonial system. It is this fact which has made the dependent status tolerable in the English colonies and dependencies, and in several in- stances even desirable for them. It is the general opinion in America that the colonial system of England has for a century been more nearly perfect than any other colonial system known to his- tory. There is not, however, a general consensus in America that the English colonial system either in India or Egypt is abstractly justifiable. But taking the English colonial system as it is, this country, as a whole, has not viewed with favor the desires of Germany to disrupt or partition it. It is not extreme to affirm that the am- bition of Germany to enter the ranks of the great colonial powers has been con- templated with disfavor not only in 16 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR America, but by the entire non-Germanie world. America in the main distrusts, with or without sound reason, all colo- nial systems whatever, but particularly the German. Of those existing it un- doubtedly favors the British. American sympathies with the colonial system of England have in the pending conflict been much promoted by the conviction that since 1914 the Germans have delib- erately violated the laws of war, labori- ously built up since the time of Grotius. The early attempt of England to starve by a new system of blockade the civilian population of Germany did not meet with prompt condemnation in America because of the coarse German methods of warfare and the instinctive conviction of Americans that Germany was as hos- tile to America as to England. It was foreseen from the outset that the War of 1914, beyond all other modern wars, was AMERICA AND THE WAR 17 bound to be a war a out ranee, and that American interests were likely to be gravely imperiled by the leading bellig- erents. The President and the present Government were evidently from the be- ginning deeply concerned, and they acted with caution and uniform discretion. As the sequel showed, their concern was well founded. Americans are not a thoughtless peo- ple, and they are now beginning to think of the future, after the present war shall end. That the past alliances between nations have not been of long duration history demonstrates to them. At pres- ent America finds herself engaged on the side of four or five powers of the first rank; some of them have long been friendly to America, others not uni- formly so. The alliance, or, if pre- ferred, the present coordination, of America with the Entente powers, is en- 18 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR tirely fortuitous; it is pursuant to no treaty, or even international conversa- tion. It is dictated, as aU other inter- national arrangements and alliances have, in fact, been dictated, solely by the best interests for the time being and the supposed safety of the allied countries. All such alliances are at best but tem- porary. In the past England and France have more often been enemies than allies. In the more general con- flicts of the world America and England have heretofore been uniformly enemies. France and Russia have in turn been enemies and allies. Prussia and Eng- land have been both allies and enemies. France and Prussia have been allied against England, while Austria, France, and Russia have been allies against Eng- land and Prussia combined. The past combinations, indeed, have been very curious and inconsistent. In each in- AMERICA AND THE WAR 19 stance the supposed interest of the allies alone governed. The course of history never stops. What has been will be again.^ 1 The inconsistent alliances between European coim- tries are enumerated by a recent French writer as follows : The alliances of Burgundy and England against Franc«, then of Burgundy and France against Eng- land; of France, Venice, and Turkey against Austria and Spain; of France, Saxony, and the Palatinate against Austria; of France, Sweden, and the Nether- lands against Spain and Austria; of France and Prussia against Austria and England, then of Aus- tria, France, Sweden, and Russia against Prussia and England ; of France, Spain, and the United States against England; of all the nations of Europe against France; of France, England, and Piedmont against Russia; of France and Italy against Austria; the moral or immoral entente of Prussia, England, and France against Austria; alliance of Prussia and the North German States, morally aided by England, against France; of France and Russia against Ger- many, Austria, and Italy, with England in the back- ground; of Japan and England against Russia; in order to bring about the present combination, in which fabricators of empty phrases see the supreme struggle between "civilization" and "barbarism," but in which well-informed minds see only a new and intense form of a conflict of interests dividing Eu- rope and the world. [Translated from "Hier, Au- jourd'hui, Demain," p. 155, Bourassa.] 20 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR That the policy of America in the present war should be formulated by its statesmen, and not by its politicians, is evident. Statesmen govern a country with an eye to the future good of the na- tion. Politicians are mere opportunists. The difference between them is marked. Taking into consideration the brevity of all international alliances, the impera- tive duty of American statesmen is to make sure that in the course of a tem- porary alliance with European powers the best interests of the American na- tion are not imperiled. There are with the allies of America outstanding prob- lems of grave importance. Any error in regard to them will inflict untold mis- eries upon posterity. Most interna- tional alliances, while necessary, are full of ultimate dangers. For this reason European alliances have not been here- tofore favored in America. That they AMERICA AND THE WAR 21 have now become necessary and must long continue is generally admitted, al- though it is a departure from an ancient tradition. Unintentionally, America has against her will at last been forced to enter a new and difficult foreign arena. The great question is. Will it adequately prepare for the new responsibilities which the entrance entails'? If it does not, the future of America will be un- necessarily jeoparded, and the natural course of American history will be much influenced. To the world in general the ''United States" par excellence is known as ''America." In the course of these pa- pers America has therefore been ac- cepted as the more familiar title of the United States. Only in some instances, where greater particularity was essen- tial to clarity, has the official designation been employed. CHAPTER II BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG To enforce Belgian neutrality is not the primary reason why America en- gaged in the war against Germany, nor is the violation of the spirit of Ameri- can democracy the real reason. The great injuries suffered by the Belgians in the present war have been deplored by Americans, who have done much to alleviate the plight of Belgium. Throughout their entire national exist- ence Americans have evinced a marked sense of public justice; they have showed themselves to be in the main a just and kindly people. But as Amer- ica was not a party to the neutraliza- 22 BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG 23 tion of Belgium, it is doubtful whether an infraction of Belgian neutrality by any of the parties to the Neutrality Treaty of November 15, 1831, could by the law of nations be vindicated by America. This was obviously the con- clusion at first reached at Washington. Americans could and did protest against the violation ; but officially America had no standing to protest or to vindicate a treaty of neutralization to which Amer- ica was not a party. It is unfortunate that the state of po- litical parties and the conditions of her parliamentary government did not per- mit England to act with more efficiency in the first days of the War of 1914. That the safety of Belgium was in the first instance adequately protected by any of the guarantors of her neutrality is not clear. The preliminary pourpar- lers in 1914 between England and Ger- 24 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR many, when examined carefully, leave the impression that the English minis- ters did not insist firmly enough on the right of Belgium to immunity from inva- sion in the event of war. Up to July 31, 1914, Sir Edward Grey said to the French representative, "The pres- ervation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor in determining our attitude." (British White Book of 1914, No. 119.) Would Sir Edward not have been justified in making his declar- ation stronger! Belgium, in the eyes of America, pre- sents one of the most melancholy as well as one of the most heroic spectacles in modern history. Her sad plight has ex- cited their profound sympathy. That Belgium will emerge intact and resume her national existence, Americans hope and expect. What the ultimate destiny BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG 25 of Belgium may be in the centuries to come is another matter which no states- man of Europe would venture to pre- dict. But one thing may be affirmed: Belgium in the future is not going to repeat her present experience if it can be helped. It is an error to assume that Belgium is the cause of the war of 1914 or even the cause of England's belligerency. Belgium is only one incident of the great war, not its causa causans. Many peo- ple in this country have lost sight of the fact that this war is in its origin a war for supremacy in the Balkans, which in- cidentally set on fire the long-conflicting pretensions of Germany and England. To the people of the Orient the present war is one for the control of the Eu- ropean approaches to the far East. To the average American the war is one for the principle of democracy. But what- 26 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR ever the object of the war, Americans in or out of public life, with ample jus- tification, have come to believe that the triumphant success of Germany in Eu- rope would be disastrous to America. It is not compatible with the safety of America that there should be only one great power in Europe and that power unfriendly to America. The arroga- tions of such a power would soon extend to this hemisphere; they would menace its integrity, and possibly destroy for centuries the national policies and the proper development of America. This is a correct, if instinctive, conclusion for Americans. That the status of Belgium was not the primary cause of the war, history dem- onstrates. Belgium never has been, ac- cording to the publicists' definition, a completely sovereign state. Belgium as a state was the product of the fears of BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG 27 Europe. Torn away from Holland only in 1830, Belgium, by the concerted action of England and France, was erected into an independent, but neutralized, state by the convention of the five great powers convened in London in the year 1830. In the erection of a single state com- posed of the Flemish and the Walloon provinces, formerly a part of the United Netherlands, the racial diversities of the Flemings and the Walloons were not much considered. Consequently, the new state was from its inception left to wrestle with the always deplorable bilin- gual problems. The choice of a reigning house for the new kingdom was not even left to Belgium, but was dictated by the great powers. The choice of the English queen's uncle as the first sovereign was agreeable to England, and the arrange- ment for his speedy marriage to the daughter of Louis Philippe, then King 28 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR of France, was most pleasing to France, as the future dynasty was not likely to be hostile to French susceptibilities. It will thus be perceived that Belgium was allowed to enter the family of na- tions only provisionally and because the great powers deemed it the best solution of a very dangerous territorial problem. From the days of CaBsar to those of Na- poleon, the valley of the Meuse has been the pathway and the battle-field of all the armies of Europe. In 1830 neither France nor England was willing that either separately should have para- mountcy in the territory since known as Belgium. In 1830 an English foothold in the Low Countries would have met the opposition of all the other great powers. At that time Prussia was not in a posi- tion to enforce its own views in regard to the territory now called Belgium. It very reluctantly consented to the propo- ! BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG 29 sals of England and France to sever it from Holland, as did Austria and Rus- sia; but all the powers recognized that England's interest in the Belgian littoral was greatest. Indeed, her interest was vital. England has long feared that the littoral of the Low Countries might pass into powerful and unfriendly hands, and the supreme effort of her statesmen has been directed to frustrating this eventu- ality. That her apprehension is both legitimate and natural cannot be denied. Her bitter enemy, Napoleon the Great, discerned that "Antwerp was a pistol turned against the heart of England." What he neglected to add was that Bel- gian territory is a highway which leads with equal directness to either Paris or Berlin. The terrain of both Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg is very un- fortunately situated as regards three of 30 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR the great powers of Europe. The pres- ent German invasion of these territories is by no means the first instance of a vio- lation by the powers; it is computed by competent authority to be the one hun- dred and nineteenth invasion. For this reason Belgium has been called the "Cockpit of Europe." Every military scientist in Europe has long formulated possible plans for military movements on Belgian territory, as the military ar- chives of all the great powers might dis- close. The international situation of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and of Bel- gium is almost identical. If anything, Luxemburg was more effectually neu- tralized than Belgium. A public man is in no position to form a correct opinion upon the international status of Belgium and the obligations of the guarantors of its neutralization if he is not entirely BELGIUM AND LUXEMBUEG 31 familiar with the Luxemburg neutraliza- tion treaties of 1839 and 1867, their con- struction by the great powers, and the subsequent attitude of the signatories to such treaties. The international status of Belgium was fixed by Articles VII and XXV of the treaties of November 15, 1831, and by Articles I and II of the treaty of April 19, 1839. The neutrali- zation of Luxemburg was finally effected by the treaty of London, signed May 11, 1867, on the part of Great Britain, France, Italy, Eussia, and Prussia. By Article II of that treaty the ''high con- tracting parties engaged to respect the principle of neutrality stipulated by the present Article." By the prior treaty of 1839 the powers collectively guar- anteed the peaceful possession of Lux- emburg to the King of Holland in the fullest, most absolute, and most unquali- fied manner. The object of the Luxem- 32 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR burg treaty was to prevent the possibil- ity of Luxemburg passing under the control of any of the great powers. The effect of the treaty of 1839 was to make Luxemburg inalienable. The Eng- lish construction of her obligations un- der the treaty of 1839 concerning the practical neutralization of Luxemburg was not, however, fortunate for Belgium in 1914. On the threshold of the exist- ing hostilities, as appears from that most important document, the ''British White Book," published in England by authority in the first days of the pres- ent war, M. Cambon, the French am- bassador, asked the English foreign minister. Sir Edward Grey, ''what the British Government thinks of the viola- tion of Luxemburg by the Germans." Sir Edward Grey referred him "to the views expressed in 1867 by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon." (White Book, BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG 33 No. 148). Sir Edward's answer in- volves a historical retrospect. In 1867 France, prior to the final treaty of that year, was negotiating for the acquisi- tion of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. This expressely violated the treaty of 1839, on which Prussia relied. In Par- liament Sir Robert Peel strongly pro- tested against the purchase of Luxem- burg by France, following closely the annexation of Savoy and Nice, ''be- cause the holding of Luxemburg is a mat- ter of first importance for France, for defensive or offensive operations against Germany." The question in substance in 1867, when France was in treaty for Luxemburg, really was. What obliga- tions the collective guarantee of the in- tegrity of the territory of Luxemburg entailed on the signatory powers, and whether, if one power disregarded or re- tired from the treaty, the others were 34 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR obligated either individually or jointly to enforce by arms the obligations of the treaty ? Prussia insisted on the binding nature of the obligation, as it was clearly her interest to do then. Count Bis- marck was firm on this point. On June 14, 1867, according to Hansard (p. 1910, seq.), Mr. Labouchere, M. P., in the course of Parliamentary debate on the treaty of 1839 said: . . . The guarantees entered into by this country for the independence of Belgium and of Turkey stood on very different ground from that given recently with respect to Luxemburg. Nobody could contend that the possession of Luxemburg, either by Prance or Germany, would menace or disturb our interests. At the time when a war with America seemed likely, we might have felt grateful to the Emperor of the French for stepping for- ward with a guarantee affecting Montreal BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG 35 and the Canadian lakes; but would his own subjects have been pleased? According to M. Moustier, the Foreign Minister of France, the ''neutrality" of Lux- emburg might not be inconsistent with the passage of troops through the Duchy. The noble Lord appeared to have admitted that a violation of the treaty would be constituted if an army marched through the territory, but a glance at the map would show that it was almost impossible that war could be waged between France and Germany with- out an army passing through the Luxemburg territory. If, therefore, we were to take Count Bismarck's view of our obligations, we should be bound to go to war. Nothing had done so miicJi harm to the English name as a certain recklessness in undertaking ohliga- tions and a great discretion in fulfilling them. . . . . . . Even supposing that England might be brought to raise armies and find treasure for a war to prevent a Dutch province from becoming German or French, was it likely that our colonies would incur the risks of war for such an object? 36 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR The nature of the obligation of the powers under the Luxemburg guarantee of 1839 was in 1869 a subject of deep con- cern both in England and on the Conti- nent. Prussia was particularly appre- hensive. Nevertheless, Lord Stanley, then English foreign secretary, in- formed Prussia: *'No interest of ours was either directly or indirectly involved and we stood absolutely free and un- fettered. The security of Belgium is an entirely different matter." (Han- sard, Vol. CLXXXVL, p. 1253, seq.) Now, Great Britain was a party to the neutralization of Luxemburg. Lord John Russell, not then in power, alone protested against any such narrow con- struction of the obligation of England under the treaty of 1839, and he bravely stated that the position of the English Government had created a very un- pleasant feeling on the Continent. BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG 37 (Hansard, Vol. CLXXXVIIL, p. 975.) The relation of Saguntum to the Car- thaginians was singularly like Belgium's to Germany. The Roman contentions concerning Hannibal's violation of the treaty relative to Saguntum probably offer the nearest parallel to England's present contentions concerning the Ger- man invasion of Belgium in derogation of the Belgian treaty of 1831. In the negotiations for peace the Roman argu- ment is not likely to be overlooked by those trained in the art of diplomacy. The attitude of the powers to the Lux- emburg treaties leaves the impression that the right of a signatory to contra- vene or to withdraw from its conven- tional guaranty is not clearly denied in public law. The alleged right of a signa- tory to violate the pact is a grave mat- ter, and it certainly shocks the moral sense of private people when a party to 38 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR a neutralization treaty withdraws and then violates it. But the nature and ex- tent of the obligation of a guarantor of neutrality is, in international law, not so clearly laid down as it should be. The English position that there was no obli- gation of the parties to the Luxemburg treaty to enforce it by a resort to arms, unless their own interests were also vio- lated, leaves a very unpleasant impres- sion when applied to Belgium. That a treaty of neutralization was violated with impunity in the instance of Luxem- burg must be conceded, and this is the unhappy lesson of Luxemburg. The un- certainty of the attitude of the great powers in regard to neutralization trea- ties long stared Belgium in the face, and consequently its apprehensions were first directed to one great power and then to another. The annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, with the consent of the BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG 39 powers, after Japan had guaranteed the independence of Korea in 1904, was om- inous for Belgium. If the often-avowed projects for the neutralization of either Mexico or Can- ada by the great powers ever come to maturity, America will then be con- fronted by a set of problems concerning neutralized countries of the gravest im- portance to her own internal safety and security. It is highly desirable, there- fore, that the status of neutralized coun- tries and the nature of the obligations of the guarantors of neutrality should receive a closer consideration than they yet have received in the law of nations. A neutralized state may, in some of its aspects, yet prove embarrassing for America. In late public utterances of many leading Americans regarding neu- tralized countries there seem to be cer- tain assumptions quite inadmissible in 40 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR respect to a Canada or a Mexico neutral- ized by the powers. Had the former Republic of Texas been neutralized, as once proposed, or had California been ceded to Great Britain by Mexico, as once attempted, the intricacy of the law of neutralization would now be more apparent to Americans. If the United States had joined in the proposed neu- tralization of the former Republic of Texas by England and France, would it then have been at liberty to recede from the treaty when Texas itself desired to be annexed to the United States? If the United States first had denounced such a treaty and declined to engage in it further, would France and England then have been obligated to enforce the neutralization of the Republic of Texas by a recourse to arms? Such are the serious questions which a treaty of neu- tralization presents. BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG 41 According to the British ''White Book," on the first signs of the great conflict of 1914 Sir Edward Grey offi- cially inquired in Paris and Berlin whether the French and German gov- ernments are ''prepared to engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as no other power violates it." (114.) The German chancellor replied that Ger- many would like to know what France is prepared to do. (122).) The reply from Paris was "that the French Gov- ernment are resolved to respect the neu- trality of Belgium, unless some other power violated it." (125.) On August 1, 1914, the German ambassador at Lon- don asked Sir Edward Grey whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, England would en- gage to remain neutral. Sir Edward Grey did not think "we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition 42 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR alone." (123.) The German ambas- sador then suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed by Germany. No definite reply was vouchsafed. England simply refused to be bound. Evidently the great war of the empires, long predicted, was at hand, if all the conditions favored it. In that event Belgium was left in a very perilous position, for every military expert in Europe had announced that its territory would inevitably be a battle- field of the warring powers. CHAPTER in THE BAL.KANS That the War of 1914 could be con- fined to the Balkans no profound Eng- lish statesman could have believed; yet the early efforts of both England and Germany in 1914 were apparently di- rected to that end alone. Had the war been so confined, it would have been sat- isfactory only to Austria-Hungary. It must have been known in England from the first menace of hostilities against Serbia by Austria-Hungary that in any such conflict Serbia would not be aban- doned by Russia. The Balkan history of the last half of the century preceding demonstrated that Russia could not 43 44 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR abandon the Slavs to Austrian domina- tion. That Germany would stand by Austria-Hungary as against Russia was equally clear. The French ambassadors in London and St. Petersburg most frankly stated ''that France would ad- here to Russia at every step." (White Book, No. 6.) The only possibility of preventing the extension of the Balkan war to all Europe was that England should promptly declare its intention to stand with France and Russia in the event of a European war. If England so declared, she was advised by Russia, France, and Italy that a general Eu- ropean war involving all the great pow- ers could be avoided. This is proved by the official documents contained in the British White Book of 1914. The Rus- sian foreign minister, M. Sazonoff, in July, 1914, stated to the English rep- resentative in St. Petersburg that if THE BALKANS 45 England ''took her stand with France and Russia, there would be no war," but that if England ''failed them now, rivers of blood would flow," and Eng- land "would in the end be dragged in." (No. 17.) On July 27 the Russian ambassador in London deplored the ef- fect of the impression that England would stand aside. (No. 47.) M. Pale- ologue, the French ambassador at St. Petersburg, urged England to the same effect. On July 29 the Marquis of San Giuliano gave to the British ambassador Italy's opinion, "If Germany believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, it would have a great ef- fect." (No. 80.) President Poincare in behalf of France, on July 30, 1914, stated to the British ambassador at Paris, "if his Majesty's Government an- nounced that England would come to the aid of France in the result of a conflict 46 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR . . . there would be no war." (No. 99.) President Poincare reiterated this in his letter to King George V of England, dated July 31, 1914. But England did not, or could not for some reason, act. It seems now as if a titanic struggle in Europe was fated by errors of policy from the beginning, and that it was be- yond the powers of the statesmen of any single country to prevent the dire calam- ity. The apprehensions, the fears, and the rival ambitions of the nations of Eu- rope all tended to make a general war inevitable when the Balkan fires were relighted in 1914. The preliminary transactions between the powers in July and August, 1914, when the war between Austria and Ser- bia loomed up, are contained in the Brit- ish White Book. On July 24, 1914, the French ambassador at St. Petersburg gave the British ambassador to under- THE BALKANS 47 stand ' ' that France would fulfill all their obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides sup- porting Russia strongly in any diplo- matic negotiations. ' ' ( No. 6. ) On July 29, 1914, Sir Edward Grey communicated to Sir Francis Bertie in Paris that the Balkan war '* would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav — a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans ; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question." (No. 87.) The British am- bassador at St. Petersburg had previ- ously stated to the French ambassador that '* direct British interests in Serbia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion." (No. 6.) That the British interests in the Bal- kans were not **nil," England knew, and it is now apparent to the world that Eng- 48 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR lish interests in Serbia are not nil. Had Russia been triumphant and Austria- Hungary effaced, a great Slav power un- der the hegemony of Russia would have been erected in the Balkans. This would have been most disturbing to Eng- lish susceptibilities, and to Great Brit- ain's interests in Asia and Africa. Since the war began it has been correctly stated in England by an English subject, who has devoted much critical attention to the "Eastern questions," that in the event of Russia 's triumph in the Balkans English imperialists would have been obliged to promote the military strength of the German Empire as a counterpoise to the dreaded Russian ascendency. Now that the Central powers are for the moment in practical control of the Bal- kans, the danger of the Balkans to Eng- lish interests is no longer concealed in England. The Balkan question is, in THE BALKANS 49 fact, an ominous spectre in all intelli- gent governmental circles in England, for in it are involved many future perils to the different powers, but most directly of all to the extended English Empire. The Austria-Hungary war of 1914 against Serbia was *'the postponed se- quel of the war of 1912." That Ger- many would aid Austria against Eussia was certain. Ever since the days of Frederick II of Prussia the inhabitants of Germany have been in fear of Rus- sian invasion. It was to prevent the overweening growth of Russia that oc- casioned the first partition of Poland. It was a national fear of Russia in Ger- many which in the end mobilized even the Social Democrats behind German diplo- macy in the present Great War, (Eng- lish '* Contemporary Review" for Sep- tember, 1914). The Balkan question is not compli- 50 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR cated. When the Ottoman Empire had been virtually destroyed in Europe, the Balkan question became primarily an issue between Austria and Russia for the hegemony of the small States through which led most directly the land passages from Europe to Asia, Africa, and the seas adjacent. For a time Russia and Austria worked in close association in the Balkans. Austria was allowed pre- dominance in Serbia and Russia in Bul- garia. It was when Russian diplomacy became most influential in Serbia also that the general European peace was first threatened. At this fateful epoch in the world's history the most immediate of all the problems of the moment is, What will be- come of Russia, Turkey, and the Bal- kans? The interest of America in this question is not direct. That the Balkan questions should be intruded at all into THE BALKANS 51 American policies is highly undesirable. There are indications that there is al- ready a rift in the entente between Amer- ica and England on this point. Mr. Bal- four significantly announced to Parlia- ment, July 29 of last year, ''America had [has] no interest on the Continent" of Europe. This announcement is appa- rently not in accord with late official dec- larations at Washington, nor is it con- sistent with all the causes officially as- signed for Americans entrance into the European War. With proper regard to the future safety of the United States, it cannot be conceded that it is the policy of the United States to promote the proposed neutralization of any of the Balkan States, under some guaranty by the great powers, to be contained in the final treaty of peace which will terminate the present general war. The United States 52 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR has no national interest in the Balkans. Even if the Balkan States should urge the United States to become a party to their neutralization, it is to be hoped that it will decline. The proximity of a feeble power to a great one makes neutralization guaran- ties highly coveted in the weaker state. For this reason it has been suggested that Canada and Mexico should ulti- mately be neutralized by international guaranties of the great powers. That any such neutralization of Canada or Mexico would be inimical to the interests of America in any future war between the United States and a great European or a great Asiatic power, military men will concede. In any such war it would be indispensable to the security of Amer- ica that its military forces should imme- diately bar any approach to this conti- nent through the open doors of either THE BALKANS 53 Canada or Mexico. While Americans prize liberty in the abstract, the first care of their Government should be the lib- erty of Americans, and not that of some remote people alien to them in blood and institutions. It was some such reason in all probability which induced the as- tute English statesmen to refrain from taking a final position in regard to the true construction of the Luxemburg treaties already mentioned. CHAPTER IV THE SEQUEL OF THE WAB When the present Great War shall have subsided, how will Araerica stand in relation to the rest of the world? In what way will her peculiar interests be affected by the possible international ar- rangements which will in the usual course conclude the war? These are now questions of more than ordinary moment to the future peace and pros- perity of America. No doubt the ques- tions themselves are receiving the anx- ious consideration of the present Gov- ernment. The interests of America most con- cerned in the final treaties which will THE SEQUEL OF THE WAR 55 embody the consummation of this great- est of modern wars may be classified as (1) Mexican, (2) Canadian, (3) West Indian, (4) Asiatic, and Pacific. Cur- sory suggestions in regard to each of these interests are contained in these ar- ticles. It is not pretended that they are other than tentative; but it is thought that at this important moment the sug- gestions, such as they are, may serve to stimulate their better discussion. To some extent the interests indicated must be affected by the outcome of the present World War. That at the end of the war the alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Em- pire will not be disrupted is most prob- able. It is a natural alliance dictated by the interests of the German Empire, Austria, and Turkey. The alliance ought not to be regarded as offensive to America. Nor is its continuation hostile 56 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR to the best interests of America, for in that event France, England, Italy, and Japan of the great powers will necessar- ily be interested to remain in very close and friendly association with America. An alliance of the Central powers will make the continuation of the ''Entente" highly desirable for England, France, Italy, Japan, and America. There will thus be a new and more effective ''bal- ance ' ' of the great powers. Such an as- sociation of the great powers must tend to the advantage of America, for it con- duces to a more satisfactory solution of the pressing Mexican and Japanese problems in particular. At the moment it looks as if Russia would usurp the place of the Balkans in the chancelleries of Europe. If Russia remains intact, and a stable government of all the Russias comes soon, that Rus- sia will for the time being adhere most THE SEQUEL OF THE WAR 57 closely to France and America seems probable. But the Russian situation is not reassuring. That a permanent form of government is likely to arise in Russia within a decade is not probable unless the monarchy is meanwhile restored. What, then, is to become of the vast Russian domain in the event of more se- rious internal commotions is with rea- son troubling every statesman in every state in Europe. For a long time to come the final destiny of Russia and her Asiatic provinces must necessarily con- tinue to usurp the most important place in the diplomacy of Europe. If Russia should by any means drift back to her former dynasty, it will apparently be un- der a modified and more liberal consti- tution. That disorder and insecurity of property will be allowed to continue in Russia is most improbable. In time the property classes and the intelligent no- 58 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR bility of Russia will doubtless make som© overt effort looking to a reaction and the restoration of the ancient and his- toric monarchy. Should the monarchy be restored with the consent of the Rus- sians, America will have little to appre- hend. The ancient dynasty of Russia has exhibited the greatest friendliness to America and in the most critical mo- ments of American history. It is to this friendship that America owes the princely domain of Alaska and its de- pendencies. It was not advantageous to Canada or the English interests that Alaska should pass to America, but the Russian dynasty ignored their opposi- tion and ceded Alaska to America. Such friendly generosity on the part of the late dynasty and its conduct in the civil war of 1861-65 Americans are not likely to forget when the American prob- lems to the north of the 49th degree of THE SEQUEL OF THE WAR 59 north latitude become more critical, as they necessarily will with time. America is not interested in imposing any particular form of government on Russia. With the internal government of any country in Europe America has no concern so long as American institu- tions are not menaced by that country. America has no interest in the forms of government adopted by European coun- tries. Lloyd George, who stands pre- eminently for the democracy of England, has very recently stated that such was the English position concerning the do- mestic institutions of all foreign coun- tries. Mr. Balfour, who is personally a representative of a very different class of Englishmen, the professional govern- ing aristocracy of England, in July of last year officially stated that "no one was foolish enough to suppose that it would be possible to impose" on a for- 60 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR eign country '*a constitution made out- side of that country." He very prop- erly added that "nations must make their scheme of liberty for themselves according to their own ideas and based on their history, character, and hopes." This statement has much commended itself to the intelligence of most thought- ful Americans. America has now noth- ing to fear from Germany so long as England, France, Italy, and Japan are not estranged. The present entente between France and England is likely to be durable. As the French ambassador, M. Cambon, said in London to Sir Edward Grey, in July, 1914: ''It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. Great Britain would then be in a very diminished position with re- gard to Germany. In 1870 Great Brit- ain had made a great mistake in allow- THE SEQUEL OF THE WAR 61 ing an enormous increase of German strength. ..." (119.) That France should continue an independent and un- diminished state has now become impor- tant to English security. The safety of both powers is seen to depend in the fu- ture upon their entente. Had Russia, by means of this war, assumed the hege- mony of Europe, and had France contin- ued in close alliance with her on all Eastern questions, the English under- standing with France might speedily have been jeoparded; but no such con- dition is now likely to ensue within any reasonable space of time. There- fore the continued entente between France and England is measurably sure to endure for a considerable space after this present war is terminated. The future position of Russia is ad- mitted in Europe to be uncertain. That Russia will be reconstructed ultimately 62 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR on the ancient plan and in conformity with the principles of the governments most nearly adjacent to her is generally regarded in Europe as the most natural solution. In Asia the future of Russia excites apprehension. Japan would have ground for alarm if the naturally strong, disciplined, and effectual Ger- man system were by any chance extended to the Pacific. Japan is therefore di- rectly interested at present in preserving a good understanding with all the En- tente powers, including America. That this entente cordiale will conduce to the interests of America is apparent. It can be destroyed only by the improbable dis- ruption of the alliance between the Cen- tral powers of Europe. The problems of America after the war will not be confined to foreign af- fairs. The inevitable increase in taxa- tion by the Federal Government, the THE SEQUEL OF THE WAR G3 probable rapid diminution in the remu- neration of labor, and the increased cost of living due to the war will doubtless create popular unrest such as has never before been known in America. That the Government will prove equal to the maintenance of order there is no reason from its past history to doubt. The at- tachment of Americans to their familiar institutions is so great that mere adver- sity or misfortune alone will not cause them to change their institutions. The perpetuation of the republic in America is for a long period as certain as any human institution of government can be, but the need for fostering the interests already indicated will be made apparent to the Government when the period of unrest becomes acute. CHAPTER V MEXICO Afteb the general peace ending the present Great War the American Gov- ernment will be compelled to pay closer attention to the disturbed state of Mex- ico. The great increase of America's national debt, her increased taxation, and the artificial limitations placed on her ability to cope with either England or Germany in world commerce will com- pel America to promote better condi- tions of trade and intercourse on her own continent. To this end Mexico must be pacified and the Government made more stable. Stability and security are press- ing needs not only of the property 64 MEXICO 65 classes in Mexico, but of the Mexican la- borers as well. Without prosperity in Mexico, humanitarians should clearly understand, the condition of its lower classes cannot be ameliorated. More- over, the safety and the freedom of Americans' trade is directly involved in the Mexican problem. After the gen- eral peace the American Government will not long be suffered to continue a policy of inaction and indifference to the internal conditions of Mexico. Other and more peremptory motives will ultimately lead America to a re- vision of its policy of inaction. No scheme of defensive warfare which omits a reference to Mexico can be com- plete for the United States of America. The northern boundary of Mexico, as fixed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hi- dalgo in 1848 and the Gadsden Treaty of 1853, extends along the southern fron- 66 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR tier of the United States for nearly 2000 miles. The occupation of Mexico by a European or Asiatic power of the first rank at war with the United States doubtless would and should be pre- vented. At the first sign of such a pos- sibility the seaports of Mexico would be a subject of serious consideration by the military authorities of the United States. That Mexican ports should not offer a harbor for the enemy would be a mat- ter of as much concern in Washington as that the harbors of the Chesapeake or of San Diego and San Francisco Bay should not offer them a safe landing. If Mexico were then neutralized, the neutrality of Mexico would inevitably be subordinated to considerations in- volving the safety and the integrity of a great and populous nation. America has a high and commendable moral con- ception of the effect of a country's neu- MEXICO 67 tralization, but in the last resort it can- not deliberately permit itself to be de- stroyed. The world would not expect that America would allow itself to be overrun from Mexico. It is not only the military significance of Mexico which makes it of serious im- portance to the United States, but its trade, and the unlimited possibilities of its greater development under a stable Government. Properly governed, Mexi- can commerce with its nearest neighbor, the United States, would be of incalcu- lable value not only to the Mexicans themselves, but to America. The fertile areas, the valuable mines, and the un- limited resources of Mexico would, if properly developed under a competent and orderly Government, add prodi- giously to the riches and the foreign trade of the United States. The config- uration of Mexico in reference to the 68 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR United States makes it certain that Mex- ico and the United States are destined to some closer commercial association and some defensive alliance. Had the momi- tain chains of North America run east and west instead of north and south, the future history of the countries, now un- der separate and distinct governments, would be very different from what it is destined to be. The configuration of the territory of a nation with reference to that of bordering nations is a most im- portant factor in both its economic and its political development. We have only to glance at the histories of Greece and Italy to be convinced of the truth of this statement. The history of Mexico since its escape from Spanish domination in 1821 shows a lamentable defect in the capacity of Mexicans for self-government. Since its virtual independence of Spain, with the MEXICO 69 exception of the regime of Porfirio Diaz from 1884 to 1911, the history of Mexico is a tale of almost continuous warfare, in which Maximilian's empire is a mere episode. During all this long period life and property have been insecure, and the misgovernment such as no neighboring power of the first rank other than the United States would have suffered to endure so long in any country contigu- ous to it. Instead of receiving commen- dation for its toleration of Mexico 's mis- government, the Government of the United States has been censured by all the older political communities of Eu- rope. That the Washington Govern- ment is largely responsible for the dis- order of Mexico is believed in Europe. The Monroe Doctrine prevents any for- eign nation taking the place of Spain in Mexico, and it morally obligates the United States to do that which it will 70 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR not permit any foreign Government to do. Unless something is soon done by America to set the Mexican house in or- der, it is reasonably sure that some sort of foreign intervention will be suggested at no distant time after the general peace. European activities in this hem- isphere will not subside with the general peace. They can be regulated only by the prompt action of America in the in- terest of tranquillity in Mexico. It is within the power of the Washing- ton Government to bring about a better state of things in Mexico. Nor need the exercise of this power imperil the inde- pendence of Mexico. This would be de- plored in America. The hegemony of the United States in North America can, if desired, be asserted as effectually in Mexico as in Cuba, and with as favorable results. It is the conviction of any real necessity for action which has been lack- MEXICO 71 ing at Washington, and it is the want of conviction which is receiving the censure of the rest of the world. The Govern- ment at Washington is constituted for the purpose of promoting the safety and the highest development of the United States. The Government cannot always wait for popular mandates concerning every detail of its foreign policies. The people expect their Government to gov- ern and they have a right to expect that it will govern well. As yet the great mass of Americans have not seen fit to intrude their opinions on the Mexican question; but this state of things is un- likely to last. Ignoring the defects of the Spanish administration of three centuries, it must be conceded that the great and in- teresting cities of Mexico were founded under Spanish rule. The admirable ar- chitecture of Mexico, which bids fair to 72 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR be influential in the future of Califor- nia from San Diego to San Francisco, is also due to Spain. Any permanent ex- cellence in the laws of Mexico is derived from Spain. It has been lately remarked in an in- fluential American journal that the population of Mexico, like that of other countries, is composed of three classes, ''upper, middle, and low" (''Tragic Story of Martyred Mexico"). Under Spain the upper class of Mexicans was perhaps more highly refined than that of any other part of North America. He who would have a correct idea of high society in Mexico a century since must turn to the pages of Mme. Calderon de la Barca, the wife of the first Spanish minister accredited to Mexico after its independence ("Life in Mexico"). It is a document of no little value, published at the instance of the historian Prescott. MEXICO 73 At the present day the general refine- ment of the upper class of Mexico re- mains quite equal to that of the more in- telligent classes of the United States. This fact Americans are apt to ignore. Few Americans who adventure into Mex- ico come to know the inner life of the Mexicans. It is the orderly upper class of Mexico who would most welcome the security which the United States is alone able to afford to Mexico. That the life of the lower classes of Mexicans, the Indians and the mestizos, could be ameliorated by the friendly and proper intervention of the United States there can be no question. That the present state of things in Mexico will be allowed by America to continue indefinitely it is counter to the course of history to sup- pose. It is the duty of the Government of the United States to undertake the 74 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR pacification and reorganization of Mex- ico very soon after the general peace, and to see to it that there is set up in that unfortunate and superlatively beautiful country, close to the United States, a Government worthy of its potentialities. It is only in this way that the United States can fulfil on this continent its natural responsibilities and its high des- tiny. When it is the national will that peace and security shall be brought about in Mexico by Washington, it can be ac- complished with no impairment of Mexi- can independence. This the history of American intervention in Cuba dem- onstrates. That intelligent Americans would deplore the loss of independence by Mexico is certain. Only a few Amer- ican adventurers desire its annexation by the United States. The intelligent classes of America recognize clearly the natural limitations imposed by their MEXICO 75 form of government, and it is the intel- ligent classes of all countries who in the end frame its policies. The continua- tion of an independent, but a more or- derly and safer, Mexico is the only wish of the people of the United States at the present time. Under the auspices of a patriotic and eminent American, Archbishop Ireland of St. Paul, a brief, but powerful, picture of the degraded political conditions long prevailing in Mexico has very lately been given to the world. The sketch of the revolutionary governments since the expulsion of Spain is concise and ac- curate. The rapine, the murderous con- duct, and the general disorder and insecurity of the Mexico of a century past are there given with substantial ac- curacy and without exaggeration. It makes a sorry picture. Constant revolutions in Mexico mean 76 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR that there can be no stability either in public or private affairs. The insecu- rity of the property of American nation- als in Mexico the American Government has the power to ignore; but no great Government can persistently neglect such interests without condemnation in the end. Action will follow the more spirited condemnation that must soon exhibit itself after the general peace. In view of the established foreign policy of America, formulated in the Monroe Doctrine, it is not safe for America to continue to ignore the Mexican depreda- tions committed against foreign subjects and citizens. America must either act in Mexico or allow other nations to in- tervene. There is no third choice left to her. That America will patiently suffer foreign intervention in Mexico would be counter to her history. Therefore it is reasonably certain that the Mexican MEXICO 77 problem will be taken up by Washing- ton soon after the next general peace. The inconvenience suffered by Amer- ican citizens, the perils of their com- mercial intercourse, the jeopardy of American and foreign capital invested in Mexico, make it unwise and impolitic for the Washington Government to con- tinue a policy of inaction and indiffer- ence to Mexico. It would seem almost unbelievable that for years past no re- turn transportation can be purchased between the commercial capitals of America and Mexico. There is at a time of peace between the United States and Mexico no certainty that an American landed at Vera Cruz or Laredo will be allowed to reach Mexico City or to return from there. What other Government besides the American would so patiently endure such a condition of things for so long a period? 78 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR Now that ententes between America and other powers are in order, it would seem that a better entente between Mex- ico and the United States, the most de- sirable of all ententes for America, will not be much longer delayed. The con- struction of the Panama Canal makes it expedient and even imperative for the safety of the rapidly increasing popula- tion and wealth of the United States that the future joint foreign policy of the United States and Mexico should be defi- nitive and uniform. The protection of the Panama Canal against foreign ag- gression makes it equally imperative that America should come to a speedy understanding whereby American troops and munitions may be forwarded by land routes to Panama. Only in this way can ''American liberty" be effectually safe- guarded against the inevitable foreign aggressions which time in the ordinary MEXICO 79 course of events will surely develop. After the episode of Maximilian, Ameri- cans have no further justification for believing that never again will Mexico be the subject of foreign attempts at her regeneration or even her domination. All history is one long record of more repetitions whenever similar conditions again develop. CHAPTER VI CANADA From President Washington's first administration until a comparatively re- cent period American public men have not been unmindful that permanent Eu- ropean domination of Canada was un- desirable for the United States. In the last century startling events have brought home to thoughtful Americans the apprehension that the territory to the north of them might be susceptible of developments which would prove hostile to their security and safety. The ap- prehension was made particularly great by events leading to the Mexican War, and again during the American Civil 80 CANADA 81 War of 1861-65. The peace of America doubtless may be endangered by events in a Canada not independent. In pos- sible foreign complications in which America may be involved, unless some closer coalition meanwhile take place, Canada will be a point of danger for America. Happily, any disturbance due to such possible conditions seems at the moment postponed. Nevertheless, there are latent forces at work in the great Canadian problems which forbid Ameri- cans to remain indifferent to the fate of their Northern neighbor. Closely allied in origin, condition, and disposition, native Americans and the native British Canadians present char- acteristics which are markedly similar. A common language, as Bismarck said, the greatest possible bond between sepa- rated peoples living under different governments, a common jurisprudence, 82 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR political and educational institutions not dissimilar except in the single Province of Quebec, but above all a close and al- most interdependent agriculture and commerce, all tend irresistibly to draw Canada and the United States together. With no safe winter ports of her own in the Atlantic basin, the economic inter- ests of Canada and the United States are in all essentials the same. But Canada has been far-distanced in national wealth and population by the United States. Canada remains rela- tively a poor state at the present time. The notable over-exploitation of her re- sources has caused the internal and the economic problems of Canada to come to be such as to compel a large and intelli- gent portion of her population to recog- nize that Canada cannot much longer re- main as she is. Canada must draw closer either to England or to the United CANADA 83 States. Tradition would reconcile the British part of her population to the pro- pose scheme of "imperialistic federa- tion with England and her dependen- cies." But their personal interests dic- tate that Canada should draw closer to the United States. The prolific de- scendants of old French Canada would no longer offer a substantial resistance to some union with the United States. They perceive that their coreligionists have been safe under the Government of the United States and that their church is protected there, while in western Can- ada it meets with a marked hostility. The serious problem of the future of Canada is never very far from the thought of intelligent Canadians of all antecedents and all schools of political opinion. No American who has made a close study of the political literature and the state of the politics of Canada can 84 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR fail to recognize that some speedy politi- cal change is now in order in Canada. This change will doubtless be much facil- itated by the present Great War. Mr. Bonar Law prophetically said in Decem- ber, 1915, '* After this war the relations between the Dominions and the Mother Country can never be the same again." This is generally recognized by Cana- dians. There have been times in the last cen- tury when Canada could have come closer to the United States with little op- position from England or from Cana- dians, but no cordial response to the proposal was made in America. The close and changing majorities of politi- cal parties in the United States have dis- inclined the average American politician to view with favor any near political union between the United States and Canada. If Canada were to be incor- CANADA 85 porated in the United States, and the different Canadian Provinces were to become States, what would their politics be? This question has not been lost sight of by American politicians. If the Canadian States should all incline to one great political party in the United States, the balance of parties would be disturbed, and one or other great politi- cal party might lose power at Washing- ton for a very long period. This has been the real reason of the indifference of American politicians to any closer po- litical union between Canada and the United States. Forty years ago it was the recognition of this attitude of Ameri- can politicians that disinclined many public men in Canada to favor openly any movement looking to a closer politi- cal union between Canada and the United States. The average Canadian politi- cian was not then willing to risk his po- 86 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR litical future in view of the cold reserve of the American fraternity. Yet this was the period in which the merger of Canada and the United States could have been most easily effected. But, while long quiescent, such ques- tions will not down in Canada. Even at the present moment they are being dis- cussed, particularly in the Province of Quebec, with much interest and ability. "Independence" or ''Imperial Partner- ship," together with the tertium gaud- ens, ''Union with the United States," are favorite topics with a large and im- portant class of polemical Canadian writers. In England the same topics are being much discussed by such writers as Mr. Lionel Curtis ("The Problem of the Commonwealth," The Macmil- lan Company). Singularly enough, in America these same subjects are re- ceiving scant attention in any quarter. CANADA 87 The reasons for the more marked Cana- dian interest in these questions so im- portant to her future are not far to seek. The internal polities of Canada are, if anything, now in a less elevated and sat- isfactory state than internal politics in the United States. What Sir Charles Dilke said in 1890, ' ' that the tone of pol- itics is, on the whole, higher in Canada than in the United States, " is no longer true. The efficiency of the governments of the large cities in Canada is also more unsatisfactory than it is in the large cities of the United States, where the municipal resources are greater. But above all other reasons for a certain manifest inquietude in Canada is the ap- prehension occasioned by the exploita- tion of the natural resources of the coun- try with the public funds. After the confederation of the Canadian Provinces and their quasi-independence, all the ad- 88 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR venturers of Lombard Street seem to have taken up their abode in the Domin- ion of Canada. The expense of the pres- ent war to Canada bids fair to bring the results of this excessive exploitation to a speedy and accurate reckoning. The financial condition of Canada is, in fact, such that it can be saved only by the speedy intervention of England or the United States after this war shall end. That the financial rehabilitation of Can- ada should be undertaken by the United States alone would be more consistent with the policy of *' America for the Americans." It would amply repay either America or England to assist the development of Canada, for in the end it is destined to be a prosperous coun- try. That the projected imperial federa- tion, by which all the countries having close political relations with England CANADA 89 shall be federated into one great impe- rial state, with England at the head, will be in the interest of the United States ought not for a moment to be admit- ted by Americans. Imperial federation would, if anything, be even less desirable for the United States than would be the independence of Canada under some neu- tralization guaranteed by the great Eu- ropean powers. It ought to be of pro- found interest to the people of the United States that either the independence of Canada or its absorption in some great scheme of British imperial federation is destined to come about very speedily af- ter the present war. That it is so des- tined is now generally admitted both in Canada and in England. If the present war produces no other changes in the British Empire, it is at least certain to produce some change in the international status of Canada, 90 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR If Canada should become actually sov- ereign and independent, — and this is a consummation not only in the interest of the Canadians themselves, but the best solution for the United States, — any guaranty of the neutralization of the new power by European powers would be most undesirable for the United States. With an absolutely independ- ent Canada commercial treaties and some definitive offensive and defensive alliance could be made by the United States. It would be highly necessary for the United States that the arrange- ments be made speedily. They would not at first be rejected by an independ- ent Canada, for her foreign relations would be on the same plane as those of the United States, while the United States would furnish to Canada her nat- ural or primary markets. The ''Imperial Federation League," CANADA 91 the program of which imports the po- litical, military, and economic reorgani- zation of the entire British Empire, was founded in the year 1884. Ever since, with varying fortunes and support, the project has continued to grow. "With the close of the present war the nego- tiations for federation will be ripe for consummation. In any such reorganiza- tion of the British Empire, Canada, from its geographical position, will necessarily have a leading place. Canada is much nearer to both Europe and Asia than is the United States. As early as 1764 it was suggested by Thomas Pownall, one of the very few able administrators up to that time sent by England to the North American colonies, that the seat of Government of the British Empire should be transferred to America. This premature suggestion long afterward attracted the attention of Mr. Gladstone, 92 AMERICA AFTER TIJE WAR who considered it highly interesting. Portugal acted on Pownall's suggestion and transferred its dynasty to its Bra- zilian Empire. With the inevitable al- terations in the diffusion and extent of the population of the British Empire, it is not impossible that the project of Pownall may some day be revived. But whether revived or dismissed, imperial federation will necessarily alter essen- tially the entire military program of the British Empire. Imperial arsenals, dockyards, and fortifications in Canada would become inevitable. That they would excite the lively apprehensions of Americans there can be no justifica- tion for doubting. Imperial federation would, indeed, be little less menacing to the permanent peace of America than the independence and neutralization of Canada under some guaranty of the great European powers. Imperial fed- CANADA 93 eration would permanently intrude Eu- ropean questions into the foreign poli- cies of America. Canada would then necessarily become a participant in every European, Asiatic, and African problem of the federated empire. That a speedy change of some kind in the political status of Canada is under way is apparent not only from the pub- lic utterances of Mr. Bonar Law and the imperialists in Canada and England, but from the Canadian evolutions of the last fifty years. The official construc- tion of the Canadian militia laws in 1855, 1862, 1868, 1883, 1899, and 1904; the English colonial conferences of 1887, 1902, and 1907 ; the Canadian naval pro- gram of 1910 in aid of Great Britain — none of all these things has received the attention in the United States which its importance to them deserves. Proud of its inherent strength, America has re- 94 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR mained strangely indifferent to a pro- gram which some day is destined to move it profoundly. There is in Canada an important part of the population who favor absolute in- dependence of Great Britain. These ** nationalists," as they term themselves, think that a self-governing state ought not to be dependent or subordinate in any respect. It should be free to control its own destiny. The nationalists argue that it is to the interest of Canada to control its own policies and foreign re- lations, and that Canada can fulfil its high destiny only by entering the family of nations as a completely sovereign state. If the absolute independence of Canada should ever be realized, it prob- ably would be the best solution of the Canadian problem for the United States. The territory now embraced in the United States is already so extended that CANADA 95 its proper and efficient government is not free from difficulties. To enlarge the number of States of the Union any- further would not diminish its problems or promote the more efficient govern- ment of the United States, while it might menace the permanency of the Union. With an independent republic of Can- ada relations could easily be established which would increase the safety and the prosperity of both Canada and the United States. Canada, from its extent and the character of its population, is naturally a democracy and likely to remain such. The United States, if well governed, is likely to continue indefi- nitely a republic. Monarchical institu- tions do not and cannot flourish in such countries as Canada and the United States unless artificially fostered. On the other hand, some kind of union of Canada and the United States would 96 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR mucli simplify the collection of revenue under the protective system, as well as the plans for the defensive warfare of both countries. Closely allied, the two countries would be in an insular posi- tion, separated from the rest of the world by vast seas. With a great navy and a moderate standing army, the two countries combined could resist the ag- gression of the entire world. Probably the desirable results indicated could be attained without political union if Can- ada were an independent state and in a position to enter a league of the repub- lics of North America. The British scheme of imperial federation would frustrate any such desirable league. That between Canadians and Ameri- cans there is at present the most friendly feeling is a fact the value of which can- not be overestimated. That a period of general good feeling should be availed CANADA 97 of to place both nations in a position reciprocally advantageous is evident. The common problems for the two coun- tries are of more importance to them than any other, and their proper solu- tion will call for a high order of states- manship in both Canada and the United States. With Europe both Canada and the United States have minor interests, but with each other their interests are reciprocal and of paramount impor- tance. After the present World War is at an end the problem of adequate labor for Canada is likely to become acute. There is at all times insufficient labor in Can- ada. Ever since the day of Sir Alexan- der Gait, an able Canadian, schemes for the increase of labor have formed a part of Canadian policy. One of the most powerful Canadian arguments against conscription at the present time 98 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR is that it will stifle European emigration to Canada. Deprived of immigration for a long period, suggestions of Indian and coolie labor will fall no longer on unwilling ears in Canada. Under im- perial federation the hitherto insoluble problem for the British Government con- cerning the disposition of the surplus labor of India would tend to make its in- troduction into Canada reasonable cer- tain. That such a policy would be ac- tively resented in the United States is not doubtful. The Asiatic problem is in the United States fundamentally and primarily a labor problem. If Asiatic laborers should swarm in either Canada or Mexico, they could not long be kept out of the United States. This is only one additional reason why the problems of Canada should continue to interest the people of the United States. CHAPTER VII THE WEST INDIES The group of islands between Florida and South America are collectively des- ignated, in common parlance, the West Indies. These islands are all directly within the proper sphere of American influence and not within the proper sphere of influence of Europe. In all these islands America has a most direct interest that they shall not be utilized as the future bases of hostilities directed against either North or South America. As the islands lie directly in the trade routes of the American hemisphere, it cannot be claimed with justice that either Europe or Asia has an equal com- 99 100 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR mercial interest in them. American in- terests of all kinds in the West Indies are plainly paramount to the interests of all other powers. Consequently most of the larger islands in the West Indies have already passed under the control of America, and the rest in course of due time bid fair to follow. Any examination of the personal in- terests of the West Indian Islands will disclose that economic influences prompt them to seek incorporation with Amer- ica. In those of the islands which have already come under American domina- tion the agricultural and other island resources quickly revived, whereas un- der European domination they lan- guished or disappeared. In the process of extinguishing the proprietorship of Europe in the West Indies all the eco- nomic conditions are aiding America. The islands of the Atlantic stand in a THE WEST INDIES 101 peculiarly close relation to America. America lias no colonial possessions on the mainland of Europe, Africa, and Asia, and it would be highly impolitic for her to accept any colonial juris- diction in any part of Europe, Africa, or on the mainland of Asia. If terri- tories in those quarters of the world were presented to her, it would be the act of the enemies rather than the act of the friends of America. In all the Ameri- cas and their adjacent seas lie all the best interests of America. The West Indies are directly within the American sphere of interest. The islands of the Pacific other than those belonging to the great powers, in- cluding Japan, do not occupy the same relation to America as the Asiatic main- land. America has already acquired large and important island possessions in the Pacific, and her tenure of these is 102 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR morally superior to that of any of the other great powers exclusive of China and Japan. As one of the leading coun- tries bordering on the Pacific Ocean, America has the most direct concern in the islands of the Pacific. The economic interests of the rapidly developing por- tion of the United States lying west of the Rocky Mountains in the trade of the Pacific are already so extensive that the general Government cannot ignore them. The Pacific States of America would not long tolerate governmental indifference to their paramount interests. The trade and commerce of the Pacific are most important for the long future of the Western United States. The proxim- ity of the cities of San Diego, Los An- geles, San Francisco, Portland, Tacoma, and Seattle to the Pacific Ocean tends to develop certain characteristics peculiar to all the Pacific. The trade intercourse THE WEST INDIES 103 between the Atlantic States of America and the West Indies creates a very close bond. The facilities of intercourse between countries bordering on the same seas always create common interests in all the peoples of the seaboard districts. Their daily intercourse tends to produce a certain uniformity of temperament, manners, and culture in the populations of coast to^Tis lying on the same seas without much regard to their respective nationalities. All the peoples living on the Mediterranean show marked similar- ities, and to acute observers they are dis- tinguishable from their countrymen liv- ing remote from the Mediterranean. So the peoples living on the sea coast of the North Atlantic basin are much in- fluenced by certain common forces not felt by their countrymen of the interior. The inhabitants of New York and Boston 104 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR are, for instance, in closer touch with the thought and interests of London and Bordeaux than are the inhabitants of the cities in the middle States of Amer- ica. It is obvious that the thought of London, New York, and Boston is greatly affected by common interests and by the facility of their intercourse by sea. Daily and hourly the ships come and go between them with peculiar mes- sages for themselves only. In the great towns of middle America the thought of London or Bordeaux has little or no di- rect influence. The immense mass and weight of America are already exercising an irre- sistible force in attracting the West In- dies to it. As President John Adams said, ** There are laws of political as well as of physical gravitation." This force is now almost irresistible in the West In- dies. It has been sought in vain to coun- THE WEST INDIES 105 teract it by subsidies to the islands from European governments or by the spe- cial privileges called reciprocities. Not- withstanding these encouragements, the trade of the West Indies continues to seek its natural American channels. This invariable tendency of trade is ob- servable even in the distant North At- lantic island of Bermuda, where the flag alone continues British, and this only be- cause the flagstaff is of good English oak. Except as coaling ports and dockyards the West Indies are now of very little importance to the European powers. From the economic point of view the West Indian Islands still retained by Europe are positively disadvantageous to Europeans, and their longer reten- tion is prompted only by motives of am- bition or sentiment. That the European powers could continue to hold their West 106 AMEEICA AFTER THE WAE Indian possessions during a war with America is unlikely. It would be an indication of friendliness on the part of Europe to follow the example of Den- mark and cede all the West Indies to America. Their usefulness to Europe as coaling stations will cease with scien- tific changes in the nature of the meth- ods of propulsion, and as dockyards their importance will decrease with the in- creasing radius of commercial vessels. Any necessary European user of the islands could be better provided for by stipulation in the acts of cession to the United States. Owing to its fertility, its temperate climate, and the abundance of its food supply, the population of America is bound to increase with leaps and bounds after the war. The United States is more than half as large as China and Europe combined, and yet its continental THE WEST INDIES 107 population is only about a hundred mil- lions at present. It will in time readily support and maintain more than seven hundred millions. That it is destined to be densely populated and highly devel- oped is certain. When America is in the condition of Europe as regards density of population and internal development, the West Indies will belong exclusively to America. The Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico will be what they now are, the American Mediterranean, but with this difference : they will be, as they should be, exclusively under American domination. In the general peace to follow the pres- ent World War the Entente statesmen could do much toward the better defini- tion and limitation of the American spheres of influence in the West Indies. That they will not neglect this Ameri- cans feel confident, despite unofficial dis- 108 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR claimers that no advantage whatever for America is sought by the war. It would be detrimental to Americans if the pub- lic authorities should neglect the real in- terests of America at a time when the foreign powers are in the mood to make concessions of things of no value to them from any point of view. If the Euro- pean powers attached any real value to their empty titles of sovereignty in the "West Indies, the case would be differ- ent. The continuation of Europe in the West Indies can have no adequate moral foundation, while it is, and ought to be, displeasing to America. By reason of the mere cooperation of America with England in the present Great War England's precarious tenure of her widely extended empire has al- ready been assured for an indefinite pe- riod beyond her reasonable hopes. If England does not recognize this fact, her THE WEST INDIES 109 statesmen do, and it is her statesmen who control the immediate future of the British West Indies. That the peace negotiations could be made the means of transferring Jamaica and Nassau, for example, from England to America is not doubtful if English statesmen are willing to consent. They certainly will not consent if they are not asked by America to make the cession. When America is as densely popu- lated as its resources and situation prom- ise, the now potential resources of the West Indies will not fail to be utilized on the mainland. With la petite culture, or intensive cultivation by small proprie- tors, the production of food in the West Indies may be made almost unlimited. Charles Kingsley, in his charming sketch of the West Indies, fifty years ago, pointed out that the same space of ground in the West Indies is capable of no AMERICA AFTER THE WAR producing 133 times the amount of food producible in the wheat-growing areas of America. The food supply of a na- tion in the last analysis is the funda- mental purpose of government. With- out an abundance of food the progress of a nation is seriously hampered. Its limit of development is determined only by the limitation of its own natural food- giving areas. A nation dependent on another nation for food is at all times in a more or less dangerous position. That the United States will not in the end be indifferent to the food areas of the West Indies is certain. The completion of the Panama Canal by the United States and the importance to America of keeping it open at all times for the coastwise commerce of the United States give a new strategic importance to the possession of the West Indies by the United States. In the possession of THE WEST INDIES 111 a European power the West Indian Is- lands are a menace to the peace of Amer- ica. They can be retained by Europe only with some latent design hostile to America. In a war exclusively between European or Asiatic powers their cus- tody has only some remote significance. The retention of the West Indies by Eu- rope because it promotes its world com- merce would justify its possession of the shores of all parts of the world. It is an argument the validity of which can- not be admitted in America. World conomerce in the end must be regulated by a superior and binding law of na- tions and not by hostile and armed cita- dels seated in foreign countries or at points immediately adjacent to them. CHAPTER VIII ASIA AND THE PACIFIC That the present Great War and its solutions will have a lasting effect on the future of Asia and the Pacific Ocean as an international highway is clearly dis- cerned by the leading eastern Asiatic powers. Both have therefore prepared for representation in the final peace council. The late action of China is peculiarly significant. It nominally en- tered the war in order to safeguard its national future. China was unwilling that its interests in the peace conference should be abandoned to the great Eu- ropean powers. China is a belligerent because it does not intend that the final 112 ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 113 decisions of the peace conference in re- gard to the future of the Orient shall go by default. In this action Chinese statesmen have acted astutely. The time has doubtless come for China to cry halt to European aggressions. These aggressions have gone further than is consistent with the interests of America. America has a supreme interest in East- ern Asia, the ''open door." The suc- cess of the ''open-door" policy demands that eastern Asia, in common with the rest of the world, shall be left to govern itself consistently with the general law of nations. The abstract right of the Chinese to govern themselves can no longer be ignored. As an American doc- trine it is rapidly coming to the fore. The right of the Chinese to govern them- selves is as well founded as the right of Americans to govern themselves, and by Americans it cannot be safely chal- 114 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR lenged. The American Government at Washington has been theoretically con- sistent in upholding the plea of "Asia for the Asiatics"; but it has lacked the power and will to enforce either the in- tegrity of China or the ''open-door" policy. The "open-door" policy was first pro- nounced by the American secretary of state, John Hay, in 1899. The "open door' graphically prefigures little more than equal commercial opportunities for all foreigners, including Americans, in China and its dependencies or provinces. The doctrine of the "open door" is un- fortunately much complicated by rail- way and other concessions granted by China to Europe. These cessions have diminished the sovereignty of China throughout extensive provinces of its empire. But the most formidable ob- stacles to the "open door" are the ex- ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 115 elusive territorial ambitions of both Kus- sia and Japan, not opposed by England or France. The Russians and the Japa- nese have virtually closed the ''open door" in Mongolia and Manchuria. Their action is regarded in the Orient as fatal to the American plan of the ''open door." Wherever Japan or Russia has encroached on Chinese ter- ritory the door is no longer left wide open. The particular pretensions in China of Japan and Russia have hitherto been consistently supported by England and France of the present Entente powers without great regard for the American "open-door" policy. The history of Manchuria and the Chinchow-Aigun railway project would alone demonstrate the accuracy of this statement. It therefore becomes a serious problem for America, where, if anywhere, she is to 116 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR look for an ally if she ever concludes to enforce her ** open-door" policy in the Orient. If America concludes that she must enforce the ''open door" by her- self, and the time is fast approaching when the great States lying west of the Rocky Mountains will insist on some sort of Federal action about the "open door," it is evident that the military strength of America after the present war must be maintained even when it shall be placed on a peace footing. Otherwise America will be in a very ex- posed situation. Japan has promised to return to China after the war the territory of Kiao-chau, leased to Ger- many by China and now held by Japan. If the German protectorate is not so re- turned after the war, what is to be the sequence and significance of the refusal? Kiao-chau is a minor matter. Amer- ica is one of the great powers having di- ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 117 rect interests in the Pacific Ocean. With the exception of China and Japan, no other power has such extensive interests in the highways of the Pacific as Amer- ica. The Pacific furnishes the western boundary of the United States, and the greater trade of the vast region of America lying west of the Rocky Moun- tains will sooner or later be over the Pacific with the Orient. The territorial interests of England and France in China are not comparable with those of America. The real interests of England and France are in southern Asia and in the southern Pacific. How America is to safeguard effectually its particular interests in China and the Pacific is des- tined to be one of the greatest problems for American statesmen. It is obvious that the proper foreign policy of America turns upon two great principles, the Monroe Doctrine and the 118 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR ' * open door. ' ' The practical application of the Monroe Doctrine is confined to the Western Hemisphere; the "open door" to the Eastern. Unless America is pre- pared to enforce both, it would have been more conducive to the peace of America had they never been formulated. The safety and the prosperity of America are, however, so intimately concerned with both policies that they cannot be abandoned. Therefore America must be prepared to enforce them whenever they are flagrantly assailed, or America will lose its rightful place as a great power. America has become a great nation by reason of its natural resources, its con- stantly augmenting population, and its ever-growing commerce. The natural resources will cease to be developed, the population and the commerce of the ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 119 country will cease to grow, if neglected by the Government at Washington ; they require an intelligent and an energetic national policy for their proper conser- vation. American merchants are free to seek the protection of any more power- ful government, and if America neglects its own merchants, they will seek a more splendid flag. American commerce will inevitably follow her merchants. It is essential, therefore, that the foreign policy of the United States shall be made to measure up to its responsibilities if the country is to continue permanently successful and powerful. Unless a na- tion cooperates closely with its mer- chants and fosters their foreign com- merce by every legitimate means in its power, national prosperity will surely cease, and political decadence follow. There can be no successful domestic com- 120 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR merce in a country where the foreign commerce is not intelligently promoted by the Government. The acquisition of the islands of the Pacific now under American dominion was pursuant to the best national policy. Hawaii, Samoa, Guam, and the Philip- pines are not only important points of call, but important protected refuges for American shipping in the Pacific. The retention by America of these islands does not violate the principle of **Asia for the Asiatics." None of them was acquired from an Asiatic power. America is a co-owner of the shores of the Pacific, and one of the largest. In the distant future its commerce on the Pacific will far surpass in importance to America that of the Atlantic side. The future of American commerce for- bids America to neglect or to abandon its rightfully acquired island possessions in ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 121 the Pacific. No European power, indeed no Asiatic power, questions the right of America to the Pacific islands which have passed under its flag. It holds them by a completely valid title, and it must not part with them, or it will be false to its trust and to the future good of the American nation. America, unlike England, has never sought territorial possessions remote from its proper shores. Every acquisi- tion of outlying lands has had direct ref- erence to the proper sphere of Ameri- can influence and to the immediate in- terests of its domestic territories. Had the Philippines been owned by China or Japan, America would not have acquired them. They were ceded to America by a European power in deference to the superior interests of America in the trade of the Pacific. America, unlike the European powers, has never sought 122 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR any territory or ''sphere of influence" on the Asiatic mainland. The Ameri- can title to the Philippines is not deroga- tory to any Asiatic power. The islands are rightfully American and they are a tremendous and natural auxiliary to the long future of the rich trade between Asia and America. If the Philippines are abandoned by America, the descent of America into the ranks of the de- cadent and nerveless powers will be rapid and certain. Asia is not im- pressed by a foreign power which ex- hibits neither strength nor consistency, for Asiatics are quick to realize that without these qualities no nation can be either successful or permanent. CHAPTER IX AMERICA AFTER THE WAR After the present war the conditions of the world will be greatly changed, and America can never again be quite the same. The isolation of America will have ended ; its relations to foreign pow- ers will be reversed. But the value of its alliance with France, England, Italy, and Japan and ** preparedness" will for a long period be worth to America all they have cost, and the cost has been al- ready prodigious. The internal prob- lems of America after the war will not be diminished. Only a few of the prob- lems, foreign and domestic, have been noticed in the preceding pages. There 123 124 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR are many others. By means of the war it will have become evident to Americans that a very prosperous nation, with an extended and exposed territory, cannot safely be left longer undefended, and that the future measures for the defense of the country must be more commensu- rate with its dangers and the national potentiality. Americans will not here- after rely on the isolated position of America, nor will they easily resume their former policy of trusting the de- fense of the country wholly to chance. If they do, they will in the end suffer un- told miseries, and the prosperity of America will vanish as quickly as it ap- peared. Not only must the American be made a more efficient government from every point of view, but it must be kept effi- cient. America can never again, after this war, safely return to its indiffer- AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 125 ence to the military situation of the country. It has chosen to assert itself as a great power in the world, and it must recognize the responsibilities and the risks which the assertion involved, or it will fall as other weak countries have always fallen. There is now no inter- mediate choice for Americans. They must be up and onward or fall to pieces. In the future America must be made able to stand by itself ; it can safely trust to the permanency of no alliance ; it must be prepared at all cost to resist aggres- sion from any and every quarter. To do this it must be kept a strong as well as a rich nation. The enmities and the jealousies created by the present war will not subside for a century. If they should, a rich nation, helpless and unpre- pared to defend itself, is certain, when a good opportunity offers, to be attacked. A nation with the sharp enmities ere- 126 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR ated by American policies is in a par- ticularly dangerous situation. Only by remaining prepared can America hope to escape unscathed. The methods thus far characteristic of American democracy are not condu- cive to the permanent peace of America. The constant rotation in office, which is a principle of democracy, often brings into power men not trained in either state- craft or diplomacy. Many of the suc- cessful lawyers and the prominent poli- ticians promoted to high office at Wash- ington are not profoundly trained in the art of government. Some of them have little familiarity with even the foreign relations of America, while only a few of them are deeply versed in the finer art of diplomacy. Such things are not easily acquired by men not in public life ; they require a lifelong training. The rest of the world asserts that the AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 127 foreign policy of America has been char- acterized by a certain abrupt directness which is inconsistent with the usages of diplomacy and is unnecessarily disturb- ing to the peace of the world. The di- rectness of American diplomacy is too often mistaken by foreign states for either menace or a sign of unfriendli- ness. When it is mistaken for menace, America is left in a very unsafe position unless prepared for sudden attack. It does not diminish the danger to plead that the ''directness" of America in dip- lomatic negotiations is not intended to be minatory or unfriendly, or that American diplomacy is only one phase of a government in which the people rule. The necessity that American diplomats shall not disregard ''popular opinion" doubtless too often obligates them to a sort of spectacular diplomacy which is certainly not consistent with diplomatic? 128 AMEEICA AFTER THE WAR usage as hitherto understood. The ex- igencies of politics in America often re- quire an administration to submit its foreign policies at every stage to the people, although the electors themselves have no settled foreign policy upon which the administration and its diplo- matic corps can rely. Perhaps the greatest disadvantage of democracy as a principle of government is observable in the history of American foreign rela- tions. There is in America no such thing as a settled foreign policy binding on successive administrations. This is not so in France or England. The de- fect can be corrected only by greater loy- alty of Americans to constituted au- thority and by a deeper popular convic- tion, gleaned from hard experience, that matters of foreign policy should proceed on a settled and permanent principle which must be determined by competent AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 129 governmental agents trained in the art of diplomacy. The accusation of the world that American diplomacy too frequently ex- hibits an unfriendly attitude which is not sufficiently conciliatory is in part due to the unusual frankness characteristic of American diplomacy. To be effectual, diplomacy must be reticent. Much of the information imputed to diplomats should, if repeated, be confined to the archives of the State Department. The English foreign minister, Mr. Balfour, in August, 1917, lucidly and satisfac- torily explained to Parliament the real reasons for diplomatic reticence. His explanation must have been very dis- quieting to some diplomats in America. Not only should diplomacy be reticent, but it should be stately. European di- plomacy has been built up on a policy of compromise, facilitated by a distin- 130 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR guished conciliation and marked official politeness. The diction of diplomatic intercourse should at all times be one of extreme civility. The use of the term "demand" in international negotiations is, for example, equivalent in European diplomacy to hostilities. In American diplomacy the term ** demand" has not had the same significance. It has been used on several occasions with very awk- ward results. Doubtless America has occasionally had diplomats of excep- tional ability, but it has had more of in- adequate attainment. If America is to continue to pursue its past diplomatic methods, it should have a greater force always behind it. The Japanese states- man Count Okuma is reported to have said in 1915, ''Diplomacy, to be really effective and successful, must be backed up by sufficient national strength." The directness and the exigencies of AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 131 American diplomacy make it particu- larly necessary that America should be prepared for hostile eventualities. The proper conservation of all the ele- ments of a nation's strength is a prime duty of a great government. When a nation's territory is so situated that it has an extensive coast bordering on the open seas and a large population dwell- ing on the seaboard, and yet the nation has no commercial marine and no seafar- ing men, there is evidently something awry in the governmental policies or some omission on the part of the govern- ment. After the present war America will in all probability be reinstated in the leading position which it once held on the high seas. It is now becoming apparent in America that it is not good policy to abandon transportation of American commerce to foreigners. Americans at last begin to see, also, that 132 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR a commercial marine is an important auxiliary in waging successful warfare, defensive or offensive. Had America in 1914 possessed a great mercantile ma- rine and an adequate armed force, the entire course of the general war in Eu- rope would have been different. That America should in the future maintain a mercantile marine has already become a common conviction in the American coast towns. It is to be hoped that this conviction will become general. The building up of a commercial ma- rine will be one of the after-war prob- lems; but the greatest of all such prob- lems will be '* preparedness." In a de- mocracy preparedness meets with an opposition not tolerated in states exist- ing under more centralized forms of gov- ernment. Before discussing the prob- lems of the American commercial marine and ** preparedness," it will be best to AMERICA AFTER THE WAR 133 consider the characteristics of American democracy, for they affect both prepar- edness and the commercial marine of America. CHAPTER X DEMOCKACY In the course of the polemics of the pending war, Democracy has been much emphasized by the politicians. Democ- racy, as a principle of government, has the defects of its virtues. In ancient times it was thought to be fatal to free- dom. In modern times it is generally believed to promote freedom and liberty, but to fail in efficiency. That it is nec- essarily inefficient old-fashioned native Americans deny. It is by no means cer- tain that a democratic republic cannot be made equal to all the exigencies of na- tional life. It is, however, the fact that to Americans of the old school democ- 134 DEMOCRACY 135 racy means something quite different from the rampant kinds of democracy which many politicians of the present day applaud. At the foundation of the general Gov- ernment of the United States ''democ- racy" stood for a popular government of an ordered and highly conservative kind. To Americans of the old school, democracy, in a glorified sense, conse- quently became almost the equivalent of civil liberty. Such Americans are confi- dent that popular judgment in the end will sustain civil liberty and order and refrain from excesses. This is the prob- lem. Will it? Unfortunately, there is a new theory of democracy coming up in America, a theory which some modern politicians would carry to extremes. If this new school were to triumph, we should have a weak and spasmodic form of democracy, with a government badly 136 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR adapted to times of stress and confusion. Thus far in its history the United States has proved to the world that a demo- cratic republic may be highly efficient and powerful even in times of war. The new school of democracy deprecates any efficiency for war, and in this respect their departure from a historic creed separates them from the American dem- ocrats of the old school. President Wil- son has recently showed that he has no lasting sympathy with the new school and that he favors a militant democracy of the historic type. It is to be hoped that his present conviction will not again change after peace ensues. Let us inquire what modern Ameri- cans really mean by democracy. De- mocracy has been defined by Mr. Bal- four as a government in which the ulti- mate control lies with the people. It is obvious that Mr. Balfour's definition is> DEMOCRACY 137 wide enough to embrace a great many forms of government other than repub- lics. In political theory the ultimate control lies with the people in many European kingdoms; but in England above its democracy, is a great political aristocracy which, disguise it as we may, arrogates to itself in some way the su- preme and perpetual direction of the Government. To some modern Ameri- cans the Government of England is therefore not a pure democracy. What most Americans mean by democracy is a government where there are no class distinctions and where the people rule not ultimately, but primarily and all the time. Such was the Jeffersonian con- ception of American democracy. With a simple and homogeneous people such as Americans were at the inception of the republic, that form of democracy worked admirably. As the nation has 138 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR grown more complex, the art of govern- ment on the principles of democracy has become difficult, and it is less certain that a government in which the people rule all the time is efficient enough to weather the perils which beset nations. What many Americans prize most in their democracy is not, however, the effi- ciency it produces, but the kind of care- less and unrestrained liberty which they associate with their own form of democ- racy. Of the inestimable value of per- fect, ordered liberty there can be no question. The trouble is that perfect, ordered liberty cannot always be pro- tected or even maintained without an efficient government. Thus the pro- found problem for American democracy is, Can democracy organize and main- tain a government sufficiently efficient to assure and protect ordered liberty per- manently? Old-fashioned conservative DEMOCRACY 139 Americans believe that in time democ- racy can do this. They, however, rarely philosophize about their democracy; they accept it as a perfectly natural and stable institution for a great state. This is a favorable sign, for to be great, a state must be strong and well ordered. To the more than fifty millions of na- tive Americans whose progenitors vol- untarily severed their connections with Europe nearly three centuries ago de- mocracy is not so much a political creed as a mental habit. They were born dem- ocrats and know nothing else. As Henry Clay said, "Monarchy in the American Colonies before the Revolu- tion was only a theory." America was of necessity essentially a democracy from the very beginning. Of aristo- cratic or monarchical institutions co- lonial Americans had no actual experi- ence. With privilege and recognized 140 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR distinctions of rank they were totally un- familiar. It is significant that present- day Americans remain indifferent to all titles except the military. In America even the signs of authority are rarely visible. With the machinery of their own form of government most Ameri- cans rarely come into contact. They vote at stated times, and they take a more or less active or passive interest in the preliminaries which lead to popular elections for public office; but never through their entire life do most of them come in contact with the high officials of their general Government. In large portions of America even the police, in other countries the most familiar agents of governmental authority, are un- known. Yet all Americans are dimly aware that a great governmental struc- ture exists at Washington, and that at times it exerts a tremendous power, DEMOCRACY 141 which on the whole they believe is work- ing for the good of the country at large. Only in some vague way do they associ- ate their prosperity and the actual free- dom they enjoy with democracy. Up to this point of their history it has not been indispensable for Ameri- cans to inquire whether or not democ- racy is the best principle for their coun- try. Let the Government alter ma- terially its relations to the governed, let the nation be utterly vanquished by a foreign enemy, or let a long period of re- tarded development intervene, and the spirit of inquiry concerning the merits of democracy would be easily aroused in America. That the examination would be thorough there is good reason to be- lieve, for the general intelligence of the people of the country is singularly alert when interest and necessity demand final and serious public action. 142 AMEEICA AFTER THE WAR With all its advantages democracy, like all other human institutions, is not without its peculiar defects. It is con- ceded to be inefficient in particulars where more centralized governments are efficient. As Mr. Balfour has lately re- marked, democracies require a very high order of statesmanship to guide them successfully. The main defect of democracies is that they are apt to give rise to a large political class. Democ- racies generally are a paradise for petty politicians. In modern . America the professional politicians stand almost apart from the excellent and industrious citizens of the country. It is generally admitted that as a rule they do not as a body now compare favorably with Americans in other vocations. Of course there are exceptions to this rule. A politician is not necessarily a dema- gogue or a corrupt man; but with a DEMOCRACY 143 formidable part of the American poli- ticians politics is a sort of science of de- mocracy which they pervert for their own purposes. A breach of a private trust is always deplorable and it is gen- erally condemned. When politicians do not consider the welfare of the state or of the country, but the advantage of pub- lic measures to themselves or their party, it is a breach of a public trust. A breach of a public trust is the most serious offense which can be committed against human society. Yet among pol- iticians this offense is not uncommon, and by the public it is often too freely condoned. It is fortunate that the most eminent public men of America are not its pro- fessional politicians. They are those whose mastery of the science of govern- ment segregates them from the regular politicians of the country. By sheer 144 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR force of intellectual eminence a few pub- lic men have won in America a recog- nized place in the national councils. Without such men the condition of pub- lic affairs would be hopeless indeed. Fortunately, Americans do not ignore the distinction between their politicians and their statesmen. They honor their statesmen and distrust their politicians. The term '^ democracy" seems lately to have become in the public discourse of the politicians the equivalent of the term ''republic," and yet the terms are far from being equivalents. A republic may exist without democracy, and de- mocracy without a republic. To a re- publican form of government Americans, from the first settlements of North America, are so committed that no other form of government is now either pos- sible or consistent with the national habits and the historical development of DEMOCRACY 145 the country. A republic flourishes in America because it is the form of gov- ernment best suited to the national hab- its and temper. In America a republic is as much the product of the natural and original conditions of the country as are its fauna and flora. A democratic republic is, in fact, the normal govern- ment of Americans. There is probably not a single American living who does not hope for the perpetuation of the es- tablished government. That no other form of government could at present flourish here is manifest. The prob- lem is, Will the conditions which have long favored democracy continue? Of all the dangers which beset a democratic republic, the greatest is the multitude of demagogues and petty politicians whom popular governments foster. If a radical change shall ever come about in American political institutions, — and 146 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR history proves that no one form of gov- ernment is perpetual, — it will doubtless be largely due to the abandoned charac- ter and the insincerity of the profes- sional political class. The experience of mankind teaches that under all forms of government the mass of the people is powerless to react against the general perversion of the political class of the country except by a revolution. A long period of suffering from cor- ruption and inefficiency of the estab- lished republican government in Amer- ica might bring about a change. If through deplorable necessity a change in the constitution of government shall ever become imperative in the long fu- ture of the American nation, it will doubtless be due to the incurable public corruption of the politicians and to the consequent breaking down of the execu- tive, legislative, and judicial institutions DEMOCRACY 147 established by the Constitution. Their demonstrated incapacity to perform well the true functions of government might suddenly bring about a revolution and change. That there is at present any serious degeneration in American po- litical institutions impartial observers do not detect. The executive continues to be highly intelligent, disinterested, and efficient; the legislative bodies, while not free from all reproach, are in the main fairly representative and seldom corrupt. The Federal judiciary re- mains above all just criticism or re- proach. That the various legislative bodies, the weak spots of the Govern- ment, will in course of time become even more truly representative of the more elevated thought and desires of good and conscientious Americans most of them continue to hope and trust. That there is a modern tendency to 148 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR chicanery and what the French call chantage savant in American poli- tics some, perhaps not many, elevated Americans are at times forced to sus- pect. If this suspicion should ever ripen into a general conviction, it would be a sign of danger for democracy. The de- fects referred to are not, however, yet sufficiently grave to constitute a menace to existing institutions, but that they are sufficient to constitute a possible danger ahead is not to be ignored. That the problems of the American form of government are sufficiently grave to demand greater attention from the men in public life all Americans out of pub- lic life believe. Before the defects of democracy are entirely eradicated, any attempt to impose American democracy as a system on foreign states may be pre- mature. A recent issue of an American journal, DEMOCRACY 149 the organ of a religious faith embracing many millions of American citizens, contains a serious and a significant ref- erence to the democracy of the American politicians. This journal pertinently asks ** whether the object of democratic governments is the happiness, welfare and progress of a nation, or the mere perpetuation of democratic institutions which systematically neglect any or all of these objects of government." It then proceeds to point out that democ- racy has been tried only by highly civil- ized and enlightened peoples with some measure of success. It admits that de- mocracy has proved up to the present to be the government best suited for Amer- ica, where, although lacking in efficiency, it has justified itself in results. The journal adds in substance: ''Democ- racy has not yet been able to impose it- self on the world as a principle, for it is 150 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR in the experimental stage. It has never yet succeeded with others than enlight- ened and fully civilized peoples." Without the obligation of accepting or denying the truth of this particular con- clusion of the journal in question, a re- flecting reader will at once admit to him- self that it is true that democracy is still on trial as a principle, and he will naturally conclude that any effort on the part of Americans of the present century to impose their own system, however ad- mirable for themselves, on other coun- tries is both premature and in direct con- flict with the leading principle of democ- racy itself. A consistent democracy leaves to the people of every country the right to form their own government, as the English foreign minister, Mr. Bal- four, very lately said, ** according to their own ideas, and based on their own history, character, and hopes." DEMOCRACY 151 The world has a very long history, and that American democracy is even yet in the experimental stage must be admitted by every reflecting man. Until recently American democracy has been conserva- tive and just. The older democracies were not exempt from serious defects. They were not fair to property, and therefore perished. Certain recent dem- ocratic theories of taxation, very much favored by the modern school of demo- crats, have not yet been worked out in America in detail. On the practical re- sults of the application of these theories the ultimate fate of democracy in Amer- ica much depends. If it shall be proved that the new theories stifle individual in- itiative, destroy property and energy, and are subversive of all the arts and the sciences peculiar to high civilization, it will be safe to affirm that either these unjust theories must be quickly aban- 152 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR doned or else that democracy will not establish itself as a recognized principle for the world. If such fallacious the- ories of taxation are persisted in after being demonstrated unsound, it is safe to affirm that then it will be democracy which will be forced to give way to some other system of government productive of better results to mankind. A system of taxation is dangerous to the stability of government in exact proportion to its injustice. It must be remembered that liberty, freedom, and justice are not in- consistent with forms of government other than democracies. There have been democracies in the past which have subverted both liberty and justice. The great constitutional lawyer, Mr. Justice Story, thought that democracies could maintain themselves only where the people were superior and highly enlight- ened. His conclusion is entitled to some DEMOCRACY 153 consideration by thoughtful men even in democracies, for he contributed much to- ward the success of the republic insti- tuted by the established democracy of America. Doubtless Americans are justified thus far in regarding their own political in- stitutions as the best for themselves, for no other form of government has ever produced for so long a period so much happiness among so many people in so great an extent of country. Neverthe- less, it is highly inexpedient for Ameri- can democracy to endeavor to force de- mocracy as a principle at this time on the other nations of the world. No mon- archical nation would be willing to ac- cept its political institutions from a for- eign power. Nor can a foreign country be forced even by a successful war to act against the national predilections, cus- toms, and traditions. Nothing so cer- 154 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR tainly tends to the perpetuation of mon- archy in Europe at the present time as the proclamation of a democratic power that a particular monarchical country must accept democracy as a principle. It is to be feared that the American proclamation of democracy as a uni- versal principle of government is dis- quieting to those of our own allies whose regime is aristocratical, if not abso- lutely monarchical. It takes no note of the real strength of European aristocra- cies at the present time. Lord North- cliffe has evidently detected this danger, for he has announced that America is not now fighting for democracy (''Cur- rent Opinion Magazine" for October, 1917). In Europe the aristocracies, while having undergone a great inherent change, still possess a commanding in- fluence in all European states. Some years since a distinguished French DEMOCRACY 155 writer, Count Melchior de Vogiie, well pointed out the radical changes which had taken place in the modem constitu- tions of European aristocracies. Although aristocracies of any kind may be distasteful to Americans, they ought not to shut their eyes to the fact that the aristocratic classes are in Eu- rope still strongly intrenched and greatly respected by most Europeans. The aristocracies of Europe, however now constituted, are seriously attached to monarchical institutions, which they naturally associate with the ideals that they most cherish in life. In order to abolish monarchy in Europe it will be necessary to uproot the whole social or- der of all European states except Swit- zerland. An American propaganda for democracy outside of America is there- fore inexpedient, as it tends to shock and alienate the aristocratic classes in the 156 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR various countries of the European allies of America. In Europe the aristocracy as a body is evidently beginning to won- der where the entente with America is leading them, and, if the truth were known, the American proclamation of democracy as a universal principle is be- coming a powerful influence in Europe for a speedy peace. Many Europeans, quite outside of Germany and Austria, begin to see that if the Hapsburgs and the HohenzoUerns are to be forcibly ejected from their hereditary kingdoms, the royal houses of Windsor, Savoy, Spain, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden will soon be expelled. Now, the govern- ing aristocracies of all these countries are by no means ready to abdicate, nor are their kings, whatever Mr. Lloyd George and his followers may have in contemplation for England's particular royalties. It is a formidable undertak- DEMOCRACY 157 ing for America to attempt to establish a universal democracy on the debris of the last of the thrones of Europe. Nor can Americans afford to disre- gard the fact that even in republican France there still exists a powerful aris- tocratic class who, while ever loyal to France, never allow themselves in times of peace to come into personal contact with the officialdom of the republic. The old French aristocracy still believe, as Bismarck believed, that a republic is not the most formidable government in a military sense for France, They are convinced that republican politics lead to corruption and tend to weaken France. The old French aristocracy, in other words, do not believe in the principle of democracy. Americans should bear in mind that it is not abso- lutely impossible that in some circum- stances France may yet become a mon- 158 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR arcliy and join some future league of the kings. It is quite significant that even the most advanced republican officials in France have had the moderation to rec- ognize that, so long as the existing dem- ocratic institutions of France are not threatened directly from without, the po- litical principles of foreign states should not be provoked by France even in time of war. Concerning the revolution in Russia, official France has been notably reticent. The action of America has been otherwise, and not in accordance with American precedent. A revolution in Russia is not necessarily a democratic manifestation. After the revolt of the Spanish prov- inces from Spain, the United States thought it decorous to wait five years before any formal recognition of their independence. Whether the future Gov- ernment of Russia, as it shall be ulti- DEMOCRACY 159 mately reorganized, raay not take excep- tion and umbrage to the speedy recogni- tion by America of the Revolution re- mains to be seen. The pendency of the Great War is the justification, doubtless, for the prompt American action toward the Russian Revolution. It would seem unfortunate that it was not possible for America to cooperate with the Russian military authorities in their offensive against Germany without the necessity of a recognition of the Revolution before some form of government that showed greater indications of permanency had been erected in Russia. It is apparent that the Republic of France has been more cautious in its attitude toward the Revolution in Russian, while the democ- racy of England has spoken with hesita- tion. The long holding back in London of the first American despatches from "Washington to Russia would seem to in- 160 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR dicate some doubt on the part of the English authorities about the wisdom of the speedy American indorsement of the Russian Revolution. So long as the principle of democracy in America is not questioned by Euro- peans, it is impolitic for America to chal- lenge the principle of monarchy in Eu- rope. If Europe becomes restless or re- sentful of American influence, monarchy as a principle will quickly reincorpo- rate itself with the aid of the powerful European aristocracy. It may then con- clude that its own favorite institutions cannot survive if menaced overtly by the American democracy. It is not impos- sible that in that event America will be plagued by a powerful European coali- tion endeavoring to undermine it in all directions. America has no proper con- cern with democracy as a principle of government except in so far as it relates DEMOCRACY 161 to America. In America democracy has the right and the duty to maintain itself by every means in its power, but it is im- politic for America to project itself un- necessarily against the monarchical pre- dilections and traditions of Europeans. America cannot afford to occupy the po- sition of provocateur of European revo- lutions. It is a maxim that ''revolu- tions often react and devour their nurses.*^ The freedom and security of Americans are too important to be jeop- arded by hostile and intrusive asser- tions of Americans that democracy is the only proper governmental principle. Wise Americans do not forget that democracy has ndt yet solved in America some of the peculiar problems of popu- lar government which require a longer period of time for their proper solution. The efficient government of great cities on the principle of democracy is only one 162 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR of the many existing problems of de- mocracy. The comparatively new civic communities in America have not had time to create a civic spirit. It is thought that it takes 500 years to con- solidate and train any civic community. But, whatever the reason may be, thus far democracy has not solved in America the problem of the orderly and the eco- nomic government of great cities. Un- der no other form of government is the administration of great municipalities so bad and so extravagant as it is in America. Unjust and excessive munici- pal assessments and taxation, the ex- ploitation of the municipal resources by designing demagogues, a general waste- ful extravagance, and an ineffective po- lice are familiar spectacles in the larger American cities. These things threaten property and menace the prosperity of the whole country. Peaceable, old-fash- DEMOCRACY 163 ioned citizens of districts adjacent to large cities in America have been ac- tually ruined by the unjust exploitations of the municipal authorities. Their out- lying lands have been taken from them through unjust assessments fomented by civic political exploiters, and no ade- quate redress has as yet been discovered for this form of municipal injustice. Of all governments the municipal is that which touches most closely the wel- fare of the people, and it is most impor- tant to them that it should be good and efficient. Until the democratic municipal gov- ernments of America are made far bet- ter, as they doubtless will be and must be in the course of time, American democracy has no complete title to jus- tify itself as a general principle for the world. It is generally admitted that de- mocracy will be able to solve its munici- 164 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR pal problems only after a much longer period of time. Meanwhile democracy in America will have problems enough of its own without undertaking to spread democracy as a principle throughout Europe. The inefficiency of democracy as a principle of government was lately em- phasized by the disclosure of the de- plorable situation of the shipping of the United States. At the outbreak of the present war in 1914 America, with a coast-line far greater than that of any country in Europe and with a large mari- time population once training and send- ing to sea the most skilful sailors in the world, had virtually no merchant ship- ping. Her coast people, who naturally follow the sea, had deserted it. Why this was puzzled thoughtful Americans. It has been suggested that there has long been a great shipping trust, representing DEMOCRACY 165 all the large European companies, Eng- lish, French, and German alike. It is said that the shipping laws of America have been made in the interest of the for- eign shipping trusts and not in the inter- est of the American nation. It is evi- dent that this explanation ought not to be accepted without proof, for it may be an unjust reflection on Congress. That the destruction of American shipping is due to other causes than corruption in Congress is the better and more conserv- ative opinion. Unfortunately, that ex- planation reflects on the capacity for government of democracy. With all its defects, educated and in- fluential Americans of the best tradi- tional type believe that democracy is a necessary principle of free government in America. They continue to hope and believe that the manifest defects in the operation of the democratic political in- 166 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR stitutions of America can and will be obviated in time. But the wisest of them are convinced that the principle of ' * America for the Americans ' ' is endan- gered by any premature attempt of Americans to impose the principle of democracy at this time on the govern- ments of Europe as a world principle. America is making war against Ger- many not to extend democracy or the peculiar institutions of America, but, as Lord Northcliffe has rightly conjectured, in order to defend American nationality and American freedom against the as- saults of a formidable and unscrupulous foreign enemy. That America will and must succeed in the war admits of no doubt ; but in order to succeed it is quite unnecessary for Americans to obscure the plain issue with Germany by the dis- cussion of a political philosophy not yet complete. DEMOCRACY 167 The time is doubtless coming in the world when the security of a personal liberty will be a first principle of all governments, no matter what form they may assume. Tyrannies everjnvhere will pass away forever. Monarchies will be as liberal and as free as republics. A more intelligent and trained public will no longer in any country be deluded by mere oratorical phrases. Govern- ments of all kinds will be recognized as an intricate business, and they will be given over to the most capable, the most efficient, and the best trained. The United States will then form no excep- tion to a universal principle. It will be- come more practical and less idealistic. The demagogues and the visionaries in America will then be required by an in- telligent public to yield their influence to more capable men. Then only will liberty be well ordered and permanent 168 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR in the world, and democracy triumph as a universal principle. When this comes about there will be no need of an Ameri- can crusade to impose the principles of democracy on the world. The world will then be safe for democracy and de- mocracy safe for the world. Since America has declared war against Germany the conduct of its de- mocracy has justilBied the expectations of the most ardent Americans. Democracy in the United States has thus far dis- played a loyalty and a quiet dignity ri- valing France. It has submitted to un- precedented and drastic military meas- ures of the Government without a mur- mur and with a readiness and loyalty not exceeded in the German Empire. With such a citizenship any Government may be well satisfied. This conduct of the American people points to a long reign of order under the republic. But the DEMOCRACY 169 real test of democracy and republican institutions will come after the war, when the politicians begin again their mischievous appeals for total disarma- ment and for the neglect of our war de- fensive with the hope of capturing a dis- contented and impoverished people. If democracy passes through the ordeal safely, proves conservative, and con- tinues to exhibit an intelligent and ele- vated political outlook, discarding the coming socialistic program of the ex- treme political demagogues, the republic will be safe for a long, a conservative, and an interesting future. It will, how- ever, be compelled to correct that fatal defect of democracies — excessive gov- ernmental extravagance in the wrong di- rection. "While America has been able to stand up in the past despite the gross extravagance of its governmental ma- chine, the time is coming when a non- 170 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR productive extravagance in the wrong directions will have to cease if democ- racy is to prove permanent. If the at- titude of the American democracy proves as correct toward the notorious improvidence of the politicians at Wash- ington as it has thus far proved toward the pending war, democracy will have vindicated itself completely, and the re- public will be safe for a long time to come. CHAPTER XI AN AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE There can be no more imperative duty than that immediately after the pres- ent war the American Government shall, cost what it may, speedily revive its merchant marine. Once the acknowl- edged mistress of the seas, America is now bound hand and foot by the great foreign ship-owning powers of the world. It is thus rendered helpless in war, and placed in times of peace at unnecessary disadvantage. Even the Government mails and the private despatches are wholly at the mercy of foreigners, as America has no fast mail-ships of its 171 172 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR own. Almost every ton of freight pro- duced in America pays rich tolls to aliens and is covered in transit by strange flags. American merchants are thus placed by a government policy, as wrong as impol- itic, at the mercy of foreign ship-owners, while Americans citizens are humiliated by being forced to seek passage on for- eign vessels even when approaching or quitting their own shores. And yet America claims to be one of the richest and most advanced countries of the world. Why is it that its sea-borne com- merce is deliberately handed over to for- eigners, its defensive warfare allowed to be paralyzed, and its citizens driven from the gainful occupation of the seas? A government policy which suffers these things is as incompetent as it is unwise. Until this particular wrong to American citizens is remedied, America cannot be reckoned among the great and formid- A MERCHANT MARINE 173 able powers of the world. Any of the great foreign governments may at will interdict or impede American trade. This the American Government can pre- vent only by the reestablishment of its once prosperous merchant marine. In the early days of the republic the merchant marine and the foreign com- merce of America were sedulously and intelligently protected and fostered by the American Government. The deep- sea fisheries, those nurseries of the navy, were until 1866 encouraged by special bounties. The result of this pro- tection was that America gained the War of 1812 on the seas, although the victory was waived by the Treaty of Ghent, which in effect repealed the laws favor- able to the American merchant marine. Had it not been for the Federal statute of 1817, still in force, which closed coast- wise conamerce to foreigners, America 174 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR to-day would have barely a ship left on the high seas. Between the years 1830 and 1838 the American merchant marine somewhat flourished because American wooden ships could be built more cheaply and American mariners were acknowl- edged to be the most skilful afloat. But with the coming of steam power and iron and steel ships all this natural advantage was lost. In 1858, when it was proposed to remedy the condition, the Southern slave-owners began openly to play into the hands of the foreign shipmasters and to oppose any governmental encourage- ment necessary to enable American ship- masters to compete with the cheaper- manned and -built foreign ships. This Southern opposition is now thought by well-informed men to have been the first move of the Secessionist party in the United States. In President Cleveland's administra- A MERCHANT MARINE 175 tion, to which the modern American Navy owes so much, it was made evident that something must be done to restore the American merchant marine. Ac- cordingly the act of 1845, authorizing the Federal Government to contract for car- rying the mails on American ships, was substantially reenacted in 1891 ; but unfortunately the act of 1891 did not offer sufficient encouragement to Ameri- can shipmasters. In 1912, foreign-built ships at last became entitled, after a long opposition, to American registry, but the higher American operating scale frus- trated also this law. The tariff biU of 1913 was on sound principles. It gave a five per cent, discount of duties on mer- chandise imported in American bottoms ; but the act was rendered futile by the favored-nation clauses in all American treaties. It is intimated that Congress realized this when the law was enacted 176 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR and that it was intended to be inopera- tive. When the present war broke out in 1914 the shocking condition of the Amer- ican merchant marine was brought f orci- oly home to Americans. All the foreign commerce immediately retired from America, and America had virtually no ships of its own. It was then proposed by patriotic Americans to buy all the foreign ships in sight, but this '* dollar project" was immediately frustrated by foreign nations as well as by princi- ples of the international laws of war. Withal, the war would have quickly re- vived shipbuilding and American ship- ping had it not been for the enactment of the **La Follette- Alexander Bill," one of the worst pieces of demagogic class legis- lation the world has ever beheld. This measure enabled American sailors to de- sert at will, while it prevented replacing A MERCHANT MARINE 177 them with such sailors as are freely em- ployed by both English and French ship- masters. By the enactment of useless and unwise details the bill made the op- erating cost of American ships so ex- cessively dear that no freights whatever could be earned by American-owned ves- sels. The La Follette-Alexander Bill should have been entitled **a bill for driving American ships off the high seas." Passed on November 4, 1914, this iniquitous law has rapidly driven the remnant of American commerce off the seas. It handed over the Pacific commerce to Japan. A more wicked and a more unpatriotic measure than the La Follette-Alexander Bill has never been enacted by Congress. It is obvious that, unless this sort of legislation is soon put a stop to. Congress ought to give place to a more efficient kind of legislature. The Americans are a patient people, but 178 AMEEICA AFTER THE WAR they are impatient in the end when re- form is necessary. If necessary, they will reform Congress or any other gov- ernmental organ which stands persist- ently in the way of national progress. Possibly it cannot be said with accuracy that the neglect of the American mer- chant marine is the result of deliber- ate treachery to American institutions. That it is a manifestation of a certain sort of inept demagogy which often pro- duces in popular governments very bad results for the time being is, however, evident. To employ a euphemism, the worst has not been said concerning this ''mistaken policy" of the American Congress. In time of war a great merchant marine is indispensable to many successful mili- tary operations. Without the aid of merchant shipping battles may be lost A MERCHANT MARINE 179 and the country subjugated by a foreign power. The rapid transport of troops by sea is a military necessity. It can be accom- plished rapidly only by the employment of the national mercantile marine. To operate as an efficient auxiliary to the defense of the nation the merchant ma- rine must be kept always in a state of the highest efficiency; the gross tonnage must be large, and the individual ships speedy and roomy. Three gross tons is reckoned the minimum for the transpor- tation of a soldier and ten gross tons the minimum for a horse. In 1914—15 Ger- many had 5,090,331 gross tons of steel merchant shipping capable of landing at least 1,000,000 soldiers with adequate supplies on any enemy coast within a brief time. England was far better sup- plied with transport facilities, having 180 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR nearly 21,000,000 gross tons. The con- dition of the United States was negligi- ble. It was not adequate to convey rap- idly by sea even the small army neces- sary for the defense of the Panama Canal or Cuba. A hostile occupation of Cuba by an enemy force might prove fa- tal to the United States, and, what is more, easy of accomplishment by a great European power at war with America. A merchant marine in time of war is essential for the collection of war ma- terial. America procures from Chile most of the sodium nitrate from which is made nitric acid, essential to the manu- facture of guncotton and smokeless pow- der. Perhaps a hundred highly desir- able articles for war material, not all of them indispensable, are derived from foreign countries, and can be conveyed in times of war only in domestic bottoms properly convoyed. In a hundred ways A MERCHANT MARINE 181 a nation deprived of a mercantile marine by bad laws is placed at a great disad- vantage in times of war as in times of peace. In 1865 American deep-water tonnage carried seventy per cent, of its exports and sixty-five per cent, of its imports. But in 1914 almost all the exports and imports of America were carried by foreigners, who thrived with the profits paid to them by the American producers. Thus the millions of freight moneys which should have found their way into American banks were deposited in Lon- don and Berlin. After the war, if America would re- main at a high stage of national effi- ciency, the present laws affecting its mer- chant marine must be speedily altered. There is doubtless in America a popular disapproval of bounties and subsidies to American shipmasters. This spirit, 182 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR correct in the abstract, is much per- verted and encouraged by demagogic pol- iticians, who prefer to waste the public moneys in grossly extravagant expendi- tures more directly profitable to them- selves or their constituents. A well-di- rected campaign of education may be necessary to prove to the people of the interior of America that a great mer- chant marine is essential to their protec- tion and to the prosperity of the whole nation. Americans learn quickly, and they can be made to unlearn as quickly, if desired. When they come to perceive that the nation can be neither strong nor highly prosperous without a merchant marine, they will readily consent to all measures necessary for the upbuilding and the maintenance of American ship- ping. The merchant marines of all the great powers have been built and maintained A MERCHANT MARINE 183 by bounties, favorable discounts, or sub- sides. The greater European govern- ments are most liberal to their ship-own- ers and to the national shipping inter- ests generally. This policy is not ani- mated by a desire to favor ship-owners, qua ship-owners, but to strengthen and fortify the whole nation. England has led the way in the development of Eng- lish shipping by liberal subventions or bounties to English ships built on certain lines and convertible into armed cruisers. The English Government has not hesi- tated to make large advances of the pub- lic funds to English companies engaged in the business of overseas transporta- tion. English postal subsidies to the fast English steamship lines are most liberal. In fact, the whole scheme of the law of England is designed to foster for- eign commerce in English-built ships. Germany, France, and Japan all subsi- 184 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR dize in one way and another the ships un- der their flags. They recognize by their laws the fundamental importance of sea- borne commerce under the national flag. The time has come when America must do the same or grow weaker and weaker as a power. If American ship-builders are at a nat- ural disadvantage, it must be overcome by necessary legislation. If the cost of maintenance of American ships is greater by reason of the greater cost of labor, or because of the unjust demands of labor-unions, then the American Gov- ernment which tolerates such things must foot the bill in the interest of the whole nation and a determined national policy. Nothing will pay the nation bet- ter than large and liberal encouragement to American ship-builders and American ship-owners. Such a policy will in all probability result in the ultimate inde- A MERCHANT MARINE 185 pendence of the ship industries of the country. In the end they will be made self-supporting, for shipmasters always fear to rely on the Government's con- tinuing liberality. They naturally seek to become independent and self-support- ing. Cost the nation what it may, there can be no better investment of the public funds than in the support and mainte- nance of the American mercantile ma- rine. When stately American ships cover every sea, when ocean greyhounds, American bred, carry Americans more swiftly and safely than the mail-boats of other nations; when the American flag floats proudly in every foreign port, then, and not until then, will America be a supremely great power. May that day speedily come! CHAPTER XII PREPABEDNESS The worst foes of a long era of peace for the world are the idealists known as extreme pacifists and the socialistic dreamers. These fantastic thinkers for- get that man is a dominating and a fight- ing being. In peace man struggles for mastery and success in human society; his victories in peace are the results of the lesser forces skilfully employed in a warfare of a social variety. Collec- tively, men love warfare more than peace. The will to dominate, which can- not be eradicated from human nature, impels men, combined in nations, to the use of the major forces whenever they 186 PREPAREDNESS 187 are necessary to attain national domina- tion. The weapons employed in national force are called ''armaments." If na- tions were to disarm by agreement, they would soon improvise the more primi- tive weapons necessary to enable them to carry out their new schemes of national domination. Battles might for a time be less scientific, but human ingenuity would make them hardly less sanguinary or less savage. It is idle to think that wars would be avoided because of na- tional disarmaments. New and cheaper arms hastily improvised would be sub- stituted for the abandoned armaments, but wars would not cease, and will never cease, while mankind remain masterful and contending beings. If nations were disarmed, the numerically weak nation would be placed at a greater disadvan- tage. The nations of millions would soon overcome and depress the nations 188 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR of thousands by the very force of num- bers. Disarmament, to be effectual, would require the redistribution of coun- tries into districts of equal content. The men termed ' ' pacifists ' ' are of two varieties: those who would promote peace by sensible endeavor, and those who believe that wars may be eradicated by some scheme of universal disarma- ment or the total neglect of military ed- ucation. The second kind of pacifists are called "extreme pacifists" because they believe that every warlike prepara- tion is a moral offense. Extreme paci- fists, in the very face of danger to their country, would consent to render it an easy prey for the enemy. Of all dan- gers to the state the extreme pacifists are the greatest. Every cultivated or thoughtful man is in some degree a paci- fist. He loves peace and he believes in the substitution of arbitration for force PREPAREDNESS 189 in the greatest possible number of inter- national differences. But he recognizes that some national differences can be solved in only one way, and that way is by the employment of the national force in war. There have been wars from the very morning of history, and there will be wars until the night sets in for all mankind. There is not in Europe or in Asia a single eminent statesman who be- lieves for one instant that warfare will ever be a thing of the past. Preparedness has to do with the na- tional necessity called war. If a nation is right-minded, and there are nations which are not so, the extremity of war will be avoided whenever possible. But whenever a war is inevitable, a right- minded nation will be prepared to meet it, and that kind of nation will survive in the struggle for human existence. If a nation neglects preparation for war, and 190 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR leaves itself exposed to every hostile ag- gression, that nation will be extermi- nated pursuant to the law which dooms all weaker beings in the struggle for ex- istence. A nation which neglects pre- paredness is a weak or a decadent na- tion; it is a nation which lacks sense of proportion, one where the pursuit of wrong ideals has dulled the national in- telligence. It is a nation which has de- cided to neglect its progeny and its fu- ture. Deliberately such a nation has chosen to be trampled on in the end by the more aggressive and the more endur- ing types of men and nations. America is not such a nation. It will end in being prepared for all eventualities. That is preparedness. The first requisite for national pre- paredness, in view of the complicated, costly, and scientific military apparatus now employed in warfare, is a highly ef- \ PKEPAREDNESS 191 ficient civil government. The main effi- cient in modern warfare is a treasury balance on the right side, a prosperous national agriculture, and a rich and prof- itable national commerce. In a strong government all the national industries and organizations are sustained and made successful by judicious and highly scientific measures. Nothing good in the state is allowed to fall down. The education, the morale, the health, and the prosperity of the people of the na- tion are at all times maintained by gov- ernmental regulations at the highest stages of national efficiency. This de- sirable condition can be brought about only by a government conducted on the highest possible plane. Good govern- ment is essential to a strong and power- ful nation and to preparedness. Preparedness for America takes into consideration the extent of the territory 192 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR to be defended. America has four mili- tary fronts open to enemy attack. The Pacific coast-line is exposed to attack by any great Asiatic power. The Atlan- tic coast is exposed to the hostile actions of any European power at war with the United States. Mexico and Canada, both weak countries, are not able to de- fend their neutrality, and the territories of either or both may be readily used as a base by any great power or combination of powers at war with the United States. Future wars will probably be conducted by groups of powers allied for the time being. An attack on America may be simultaneously made on all its fronts. Preparedness for America, therefore, presents the problem how best to defend the country against hostile attacks from any or all directions. Preparedness in America is not an aggressive, but a de- fensive, policy for a naturally peaceful I PREPAEEDNESS 193 and rich country living under a lax and decentralized government in times of peace. In times of war American Gov- ernment, like the Roman, becomes more highly centralized, indeed a virtual dic- tatorship of an extremely powerful kind. The difficulty in America is that the con- version from one form of government adapted to peace to the other form more adapted for war takes time. In modem warfare there is little time given for preparedness. Consequently, if Amer- ica wishes to continue as it is, it must live under a regime of preparedness. Most sensible men who love peace and security support a national scheme for minimum preparedness. If Canada and Mexico were by proper and friendly treaties committed to some general alliance by which the whole of North America was obligated to resist hostile aggressions from across the seas, 194 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR the problem of preparedness would for the United States be much simplified. America would then be virtually an in- sular country. The first line of defense would be exclusively on the high seas, and this line could be held for a long time by a powerful and efificient navy. For the purposes of the exterior line of de- fense America should possess in the Pacific a modern fleet equal to that of the greatest Asiatic power. In the Atlan- tic, America should maintain a fleet equal to that of the greatest European power. With a coast-line of 6000 miles to guard, a little navy is of no use to the country. It would be better for Amer- ica to abolish the naval service alto- gether than to trust its defense to a small navy. A navy of the size here suggested would be an adequate protection for a great and a rich country and enable it to PREPAREDNESS 195 meet the attacks which are sure to come in the future of the nation. The second line of defense for the proper security of America consists of the modem fortifications and military- protective works necessary to guard the harbors and landing-places available for an enemy. To guard the second line the strongest possible modem fortresses should exist not at some points of the coast, but at all necessary points. Kept fully equipped with ordnance of the greatest power and range and with all the most advanced auxiliaries of modern defense, the second line of defense would be a protection to the country of the most efficient kind which it is overt treason in the military and the congressional au- thorities to neglect. The supplements to this second line of defense, the routes of quick communications, have not yet re- 196 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR ceived all the attention their great im- portance demands of the authorities. There is now no system of strategical railways in America. But this defect can be readily overcome. The third line of defense is the army. The character and quality of this branch of the national defense is the supreme military problem. The United States will soon have to protect over two hundred millions of prosperous and peaceful citizens. It is thought by the best military authority that a standing army, for the effective defensive purposes of such a vast popu- lation, should consist of at least half a million men. This would be only one fourth of one per cent, of the population. Two hundred thousand soldiers would be required in the West and as many more in the East. One hundred thou- sand would be held in a central position, where they could easily be mobilized i PREPAREDNESS 197 either on the Southern or the Northern borders as the need developed. Such a regular army, if highly trained and disci- plined in the most modern and scientific methods, would be the nucleus of the greater army of national defense. Un- der-disciplined, carelessly trained, or ob- soletely armed and equipped, a regular army of even 500,000 would be worse than useless to the nation. An eflScient modern army requires not only the most modern equipment, but an abundance of trained officers possessed of the best at- tainable military education. The Mili- tary Academy and the war colleges in America must therefore be kept superior to the best foreign standards. That they are so now many traveled Ameri- cans very much doubt; there are too many signs to the contrary. It is generally assumed that a standing army has not been popular in America. 198 AMEEICA AFTER THE WAR Certainly many American politicians of the easy-going, every-day variety have been opposed to a standing army, and the demagogues among them have long proclaimed that a standing army is a menace to liberty. But all Americans are not of the politician kind. Some of them are beginning to be convinced that in such a vast country, so rich and so largely populated, a regular army has become necessary for defense. A regu- lar American Army, as most intelligent men believe, would have little power to harm liberty. Many civilians are now convinced that the power for good of a regular army would more than compen- sate for any risk it entails. A regular army would not bring about a perpetual dictatorship a day sooner. America will not submit to a dictatorship until the country has become so fallen and so utterly wretched as to be able to be saved PREPAREDNESS 199 from disorder in no other way. When America has fallen into that degraded condition, no regular army will be nec- essary to bring about a dictatorship. When the time is ripe, a dictatorship will come about in America by acclamation, just as it came about in ancient Rome. In all probability the American Republic will not for centuries fall through the rise of a dictator or through the machin- ations of ambitious men. If it falls, it will be through a conquest by stronger powers. It is thought by skilled military men to be possible for a combination of pow- ers at war with America to land in North America in a comparatively brief space of time a million trained soldiers, prop- erly equipped. There are now at least eight of the great powers each of which has an army of far more than two and a half million men. To cope with half 200 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR this number speedily, a regular army of 500,000 men, scattered throughout the United States, is conceded by experts to be wholly inadequate. A large part of the regulars would be required at the principal military stations throughout so vast a country. The regular army in America must therefore be largely sup- plemented by a national army quickly mobilized for the purpose of defense. A national army should be composed in the last extremity of all the men of military age. Probably there would never be an occasion when all would be called into the field. The old militia system is obsolete and useless for defense. The testimony of the leading military authorities in Amer- ica, from Washington down, is, in sub- stance, that a militia is not an effective military arm of the nation. Since Washington complained of the militia it I PREPAREDNESS 201 has become, under modern conditions, even less effective. However well dis- posed and patriotic the militia may be, it requires immediate reorganization in every war. It is always reorganized as a national army. Consequently, it has become the general opinion in the coun- try that the old militia system is obso- lete and that it must give way to univer- sal military service, preferably on the Swiss plan. The Swiss or the Austra- lian plan seems to be the most demo- cratic and the least expensive plan for the national army of a republic. The time it requires for training is short ; it interferes little with the ordinary pur- suits of the young men of the nation, while its cost to the republic is compara- tively small. The Swiss system gives to every male under age, as a part of his general edu- cation, a compulsory military training of 202 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR about one year. Thereafter the only ad- ditional military training necessary is about sixty-five days for the infantry, seventy-five for field artillery, and ninety days for the cavalry. The subsequent trainings, known as ''repetition courses," are confined to eleven days annually. After their twenty-third year the young men are placed in the reserve. The reserve is called upon only in cases of dire necessity. The Swiss system, if adopted in the United States as in Aus- tralia, would have the merit of not seri- ously interfering with the civil life and industries of the country, while it would create a national army of millions of men, trained, disciplined, and effective for all purposes of defense. Together with the regular army and navy, this sys- tem would render the country invulner- able to attack, and thus tend to make it immune from hostile aggression. PREPAREDNESS 203 The unfortunate tendency in America has been toward a general indisposition to undergo military hardships of any kind. The inclination of the young men in particular is to seek the softer, the slouching, and the indifferent phases of life. This tendency would be overcome if the Swiss system were adopted. In- tensive military training promotes the general health, discipline, and order in ways most valuable for the country at large. A hardy body of young men, drilled, disciplined, and obedient to au- thority, would invigorate the whole coun- try and stimulate the desired public or- der in all directions. Besides, universal military training would create a patri- otic spirit and a love of country, without which no country can be in a healthy or a sound condition. Unless in such a con- dition, a nation is not prepared to meet all the vicissitudes of national existence, 204 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR and it ultimately would fall down before stronger and better-prepared nations. If the United States were to adopt the Swiss system, a great national auxiliary army of the highest efficiency for all pur- poses would at once spring into being. Universal military service is thoroughly democratic and consistent with modern pressure. Modern military movements are so speedy that there is now no time given to create an army. An army must in modern times be in existence and able to be mobilized, thoroughly armed and equipped within a few days. Every man enrolled in the general army should al- ways know his station in the event that the general army is quickly mobilized. Mobilization requires that the arms and equipment of the army shall always be ready. The greatest test of the military efficiency of a nation is the speed with which mobilization may be effected. PREPAREDNESS 205 In order to mobilize speedily," every- thing must be ready. Modem guns and military material have become so elabo- rate and scientific that they cannot be improvised within a moderate space of time. They must be always on hand. Nothing can now be left to the future or chance. The general staff should there- fore always know that all the necessary military equipment and appliances for the army and navy are ready to meet an attack from any quarter. The expense to the nation of being ready is small compared with the cost to a rich nation caught unprepared. Improvidence and lack of military preparation have cost the United States far more in the ag- gregate than the largest standing army has cost the most warlike nation in Europe. The cost of maintaining a proper and eJBficient military establishment in the 206 AMERICA AFTER THE WAR United States in time of peace would be far less than the cost of a hurried and nervous preparation on the eve of a great war. Statistics show that the cost of the past wars conducted by the United States under the old plan of voluntary enlistment and improvised preparation for war has been the greatest of all mod- ern wars. Indeed, the expenditures for military purposes in the United States have in recent years been almost as great as those of the most efficient military powers in Europe. In the United States only has the vast expenditure for mili- tary purposes been wasted and useless. From the present outlook it would ap- pear that Americans have now deter- mined to substitute an intelligent scheme of defense for the past wasteful extrava- gance amounting to national debauch. How best to accomplish it is the problem of preparedness. PREPAREDNESS 207 All the former national wars of Amer- ica have been conducted in circum- stances more favorable than will occur again. The adversaries have been either weak nations or the terrain has been of America's own choice. Conditions have greatly changed. In the employ- ment of the old rifle or musket American farmers and frontiersmen of the last century needed little training to make them eflBcient; they were accustomed to the use of these arms. With the disap- pearance of large game and the old fron- tier life, all this former advantage has been lost. In the use of modern weap- ons of defense no other nation is now more unskilled than the American. In modern warfare neither arms nor their proper employment can be suddenly im- provised. Their production and their skilful use require a long period of preparation in times of peace. 208 AMEEICA AFTER THE WAR Unless America arouses itself to the necessity of preparedness as a policy, it is doomed sooner or later to destruc- tion as a great power. There are ele- ments of dissolution within every organ- ism ; there are also foes external as well as foes internal. Preparedness would postpone the natural operation of these forces for centuries, perhaps. Of all the enemies of a great nation the worst are the dreamers who see ahead an era of universal and perpetual peace. As man is constituted, perpetual peace is impossible. The life of nations, like the life of man, is one long struggle. Only that nation will survive which is strong in all directions. THE END UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY AA 001327 362