=^ I: The Rights of Englishmen William Young UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES THE RIGHTS OF ENGLISHMEN; BRITISH CONSTITUTION GOVERNMENT, COMPARED WITH THAT OF A DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. BY THE AUTHOR OF THE HISTORT of the REPUBLIC of ATHENS. Cunftas nationcs aut Reges, aut Primores, aut Populi rexerunt, deledu ex his et confociatu Reipublica; forma laudari facilivu ^uum evenire poteft. . TAG. ANN. i. LONDON: PRINTED FOR JOHN STOCKDALI, PICCADILLY, '793- [Price One Shilling and Six-Pence.] JM *\4- H33 tHE RIGHTS OF ENGLISHMEN, &e. c^ TN the prefent crifis of affairs, no fubjcl 22 can be more interefting to Englimmen, =5 than an inquiry into the real principles and g; practice of Republican Governments, for which they are recommended (by no very friendly advifers) to change their old Britifh Conflitution. In comparing the one form of government with the other, I (hall not avoid any part of 'j the fubjecl: ; I mall require and look for all g the advantages which a people can poffefs un- = der any government : I mall confider the A 2 peace .'507078 [ 4 ] peace and happinefs of mankind as effential ; but I (hall not confider thefe as all, or com- plete : I (hall require the fulled pra&ical en- joyment of liberty, equality, and the rights of men in civil fociety. I mall advance no fme-fpun theories, no fanciful fchemes of perfection. I (hall take men and things as they are, and allow for faults in government, becaufe I muit allow for frailties in men. In truth, a neglect of this plain way of dealing, and the publimirig abftract notions of perfection which never did or can exift, is the method employed to daz- zle and lead us Englishmen aftray, and put us on the hazarding our real advantages in focie- ty for what is imaginary and impracticable. I would as a fubject enjoy all that can be en- joyed as fubject to any government of any form on earth. Building caitles in the air hath been ever the proverb for extreme folly and abfurd fchemes. The governments of our modern legiflators feem framed efpecially for thofe cajlles in the air. Why will the politicians of the day confi- der themfelves exempt from the common fenft t 5 ] fenfe in practice required of ordinary men on every occafion in life ? When a mechanical artift propofes to frame a machine, he duly confiders the nature of the materials with which it is intended to frame his machine: he confiders well too the nature of the materials which his machine when finimed is intended to work upon. It were not amifs if our political artifts of the prelent day were to take example from the mechanic, and in their theories of govern- ment, admit fome confideration of the quali- ties of thofe who are to govern, and of thole who are to be governed. D The governor and the governed, % whatever be the form of government propofed, are men partaking of the interefls and paffions of men. Let us then take the feelings of pri- vate intereft, and the paffions of men into our eftimate of what government is beft for them ; and let us too coniider thofe interefts and paf- fions as exiftent under the a&ual circum- ftances of the times. We [ 6 } We muft take men as they are. We muir not take them as the poets defcribe mepherds of Arcadia, and thofe of the Golden Age. We muff, take men who follow trade and commerce, becaufe trade and commerce bring money ; and who feek money, becaufe money gratifies their lufts and appetites. We muft take men who feek power, be- caufe power not only may reach wealth by fhorter {hides, but moreover gratify vanity and other paffions extraneous to thofe merely fenfual. We muil: take men, who, in all clafles of life, reach as high towards the enjoyments which power or wealth may give, as their means will afford ; and who, if too low to reach at all, in their envy and difcon tent give proof of what they feek, and what they would do if they could. In fliort, we muft take men for the moft part, and in their general community, who abufe, or are ready to abufe, both power and wealth. If fociety appears too vicious in this reprefentation, {hike off as much as pleafes ; 3 7 el [ 7 1 yet more than enough of the love of power and of wealth will remain, to require their en- tering into the confideration of what govern- ment is beft for mankind. The queftion then is, not what govern- ment is beil for men in a ftate of great purity of manners, fimplicity of knowledge, general competency to all, without riches to any, and contentment in private life, keeping down ge- nerally the ambition of public life. I leave to any fanciful writer, any form of government he pleafes for fuch a community. He may take a republic, and of republics, he may take a pure democracy. But fhortly fuperior abilities and fuperior induftry will make fuperior acquifitions ; and inequalities in fociety will arife. He who ac- quires beyond his competency, will have to beftow ; and he who beftows will command, and power once tailed begets the love of pow- er. He who acquires beyond his competency and doth not be (low, will referve to enjoy ; and then the fenfe of enjoyment re-operates, and [ 8 ] and gives new value to the means ; and io. \ve have the growing love of wealth. The love of power and of wealth are of ib quick growth, and are fo fatal to any inftitu- tion of government which is not framed un- der coniideration of their influence that no democracy, or republic leaning to a demo- cracy, ever lafted an entire century. It be- came an ariftocracy, or it fubmitted to the usurpation of an individual ; and in its latter years of duration as a republic was convulfed 2nd diftra&ed by thefe jarring influences, and at all times was a fcene of difquiet in itfelf, of unhappinefs to mankind. Generally a democratic people on their outlet of republican eftablimment have been ruinous to the quiet and happinefs of all peo- ple near them ; and afterwards have felt as great unhappinefs from commotions among themfelves, as heretofore they brought on others by their wars and difpofhion to con- teft, priftina mala foflquamforis deer ant, domi qutrrere, is by Livy applied to Rome, it be- longed to Athens, or to Carthage equally as lo Rome. In a democracy competition is. not [ 9 ] hot merely open to all, (as under t/je Bniijb conftltutlon) but all are invited, all are im- prefled, as it were, into a competition, none muft be neutral : and we know that the heat and animofity of thofe who follow^ are often greater than of thofe who lead in ftate-parties. Thus the fpirit of conteft becomes the foul of action throughout the ftate. Individuals and parties of the people conteft with each other ; and the people at large conteft with other na- tions. A republic has ever a difpofition to conteft. When a people of this ftamp declare, " they will have no wars, and difclaim all conquefts," ihe declaration may do for the eulogy of a fchool exercife, but wife men of neighbour- ing nations will be on their guard. They know that a people in the aggregate have a character as marked, as that of any individual authority ; and that in this aggre- gate capacity, a democracy is ever more re- ientful, and often more imperious, than an in- dividual in his monarchic capacity. B They [ 1 ] They know too that private difputes and encroachments in commerce, colonization, at fea, or on land, are not fo eafily made up with a democratic government, which is ever ready to court the people by a difplay of paf- fionate regard for the interefts of every con- ftituent, right or wrong. They know too that the leading men in fuch democratic ftate have ever a private inte- reft in fomenting war and troubles, which may make their own abilities ufeful and ne- ceflary to the people. They know too that thefe demagogues at the head of affairs mufl often embroil the people in wars on various other accounts. They muft conciliate fome general who is popular and wifhes to be em- ployed, or they may have to draw the atten- tion of the people from inquiry into their jpaft conduct in adminiflration. The follow- ing detail of hiftory to this efFecl: is curious : " Pericles, the minifler of the democratic re- public of Athens, one day walking with Al- cibiades, looked very thoughtful ; ' What * makes you fo ferious ?' faid his friend. ' I * am thinking,' replied Pericles, ' how I (hall * make up my accounts for the people/ - Poh/ ' Poh,' returned Alcibiades, * rather think * how you fliall avoid the neceffity of making * up any accounts at all.' -Andfo Pericles immediately involved Athens in a war with all Greece" So much for a quiet neighbourhood to a democratic republic ! fo much for the profef- fions of peace and good- will to all nations of a democratic republic ! Now to consider the interefts and paffions of men as operating in the democratic go- vernment and their tendency. The tendency of the paffions and interefts of men in fuch government ever takes its direclion to the attainment or fupport of the executive depart- ment. It is the ftruggle for executive pow- er on which the whole turns. The moft pleafmg and flattering view which the piclure of a democracy prefents us with, is the fud- den rife of genius and ability which competi- tion gives birth to in partial inftances, and in the earlier period of its eftablimment. The elevation of fuch genius and ability cannot long, however, depend on pure and virtuous reafons of preference : nor does ability imply B 2 virtue virtue in the candidate. As the people, and as the favourites of the people, become in pro- cefs of time enlightened and matured to the bufinefs and concerns of life, they become in plainer terms more knowing in regard to pri- vate advantages, and in the means to attain their purpofe. Ingenious and able men will then foon hit on the various paths to autho- rity which the temper of fociety opens to them : they will feed the ambition of one with promifes, the vanity of another with praife, the avarice of a third with gifts. But even in the fimplefl flate of manners, it is not pure virtue that commands, for pure virtue is then no diftinftion ; it is ability that com- mands. The ftronger minors of the few muft ever command the weaker minds of the gene- rality. The ftronger mind feels a right as it were to command the weaker ; and what it feels a right to, it will affume if it can, and by what means it can. For this command there will be a certain rivalfhip of pretenfions, and in the ilruggle of individuals the commonwealth mull: break into parties ; and if the territory is very ex- tenfivo, [ '3 3 tenfive, and people numerous, muft break into new and diftind commonwealths. The favourite general, or favourite minif- ter, or favourite judge of the north, will make a party of the north to fupport his pretenfiens Bgainft the candidate of the fouth ; a imall majority of voices will not for any length of time decide fuch contefts : a fchifm of office will begin, and the diftincl: army, executive government, and court of juftice in the north, will in procefs form a new and independent republic. Confider this in another point of view. If one diftrift, if one great town is the fole feat of republican ambition and executive authority, the extenfive territory, the nu- merous people, will be quickly made to feel that they are no part of the republic, but in provincial fubje&ion to that diftricl or town, which muft be the republic defaEto : the re- public at large and de jure will, as it finds and feels the grievance, tend to felf-relief in a di- vifion of power as of interefts, and fplit into, feveral republics de fafto as de jure ; herein appear ftrong preemptions of the fate of an unweildy democratic republic. What fcenes of t 14 3 of private mifery open in thefe public contefts ! leading men quarrel, and the people bleed. The operation of ftruggles for the execu- tive power in fmaller commonwealths, and republics in general, is equally deftructive to domeftic happinefs, and to the political inlti- tution. The afcendancy of a {ingle character hath of- ten, in the early periods of a republic, mount- ed to power on patriotic fervices ; but this cannot be always the cafe, and to lay down and refign power, is an effect of moderation rarely to be expected ; and certainly in an enlightened and vicious age is not to be ex- pected, whilft any means to retain it can be devifed. Thefe means have been fo common place, fo fyftematic in all popular republics, and fo fucceisful too, that he muft be a bung- ling ftatefman indeed who at the head of a fu- ture democracy mall omit to profit of the left on. This policy of great and leading men is on record in every hiftory of popular govern- ments. It t '5 ] It is to bribe the people at large, by exac- tions on the few. It is to pay from the pub- lic purfe for individual votes under the plea of remunerating public duties. It is to requite the gift of more power from the people by gi- ving more liberty (as it is called) to the people. It is to repay the grant of new authorities with the grant of further licencioufnefs. It is, in other words, at the fame time to ftrengthen the force of one man, and to wea- ken the eftablimment of the whole : it is a bargain of a demagogue on one part, and of the people on the other -for rights to da wrong. The above obfervations go fpecially to any, and every fingle character rifing unrivalled on the ihoulders of the people to command over them. In making them the inftrument of tfieir tyranny over the objects of popular envy, namely, the rich and the good ; they will in the end confirm a defpot over all. But let us fuppofe a competition of afcen- dant characters. There ever have been, for the moft part, and always will be, able and enterprifing men flruggling together for af- 2 cendancy. t '6 ] cendancy. Thefe bufy and ambitious men are feldom fo virtuous as to be nice about the means, fo that they attain their ends. Hu- man ingenuity will foon be exercifed and well practifed in all the arts to gain or to cheat the people, to feduce, to corrupt, or to deceive ; whilfl the animoiity of contending parties, permits not either to fee that in the end the people are merely cavilling for who mall efta- blim defpotifm in the perfon of their own chufing ; or perhaps two or three parties find it neceflary to join their forces ; and the re- fult is the word of all governments an hate- ful ariftocracy. During thefe ftruggles no end of good go- vernment is anfwered. There is no peace, there is no private happinefs, no fecurity of perfon, no fecurity of property ; there is lit- tle too of liberty as applied to the individual {ration. The majority in a democratic aflem- bly ever have tyrannized over the minority ; the general picture of a democracy is of a party conquering, and of a party fubdued ; of a party oppreffing, and a party fuffering; an alternate abufe of power, and viciffitude of murders, exile, and confifcations. Thus Thus all democratic republics have fallen, and will fall, and be of ihort duration, from the impracticability of fo ordaining the exe- tive power, as not to be the object of undue practices, and not to be the means of undue influence ; the one tending to corrupt, and the other to overturn the political inftitu- tion. Looking to the peace* and happinefs, and liberties of mankind, and anxioufly wiming to difcover what may give and what may fe- cure and perpetuate thefe bleflings, it is a moft important queftion whether and how the evils above-mentioned may be obviated. It is a queftion truly of great concern, whe- ther executive authority in government can be fo placed and guarded as to be without, and beyond, the reach of thofe paffions and influ- ences which tend to corrupt the people and deftroy the ftate, and yet be within the reach of controul, and retrained from all exertion to prejudice of the liberties and rights of the people ? I think the evils above ftated cannot be ob- viated in a democratic republic. C I think t 18 ] I think they have been obviaied for a time, and may fo for a yet longer time, in particu- lar inilitutions of a mixed republic. I think they have been, and are moft hap- pily provided againft in one great exifting re- public ; for fuch I do not helitate to term the Britijh conjlitut'wn of government. The one vefted with the executive power in this great republic is called king. The word king in Great Britain means not the fame thing as king elfewhere ; as for- merly in France, or as actually in Pruflia, Hungary, or Spain. It means a perfon in- vefted with the executive power, as to the people individually to adminifter the laws, but under the controul of the laws ; and as to the people as a nation, to adminifter the government, but under the controul of the nation. As to the perfon s and property of individuals, the king has no power or autho- rity, but what the people by their reprefen- tatives have veiled in him by laws made for the public peace and advantage of all. As [ '9 ] As to the government of the nation, the king hath no means of power, and no agents of power, but what the people by their repre- fentatives have allowed, and do allow to him. They allow to him a idiftribution of the funds of ad minift ration, and they allow to him a direction of the force of government ; but they allow to him one and the other under flrong controuls and for mort periods : refer- ving thus the means to check and prevent the poflible abufes of power in either cafe of mo- ney or arms. The fupplies of money are voted annually. The mutiny act, by which the army exifts, is voted annually. In this fenfe the king can do no wrong as king. Yet fuch wrong he may attempt. But in the conftitution of the Britim government, the king can do no wrong, as a man, or in any acceptation of the terms. This axiom is not merely abftract ; it is juft and important in its principle, and is a fecurity, which I will explain, of the firft moment of the Bri- C 2 tifh tim conftitution. Without this principle the executive power of the king would depend on him as man, would fhift to the flrongeft fide with the popular favour of the day, and be open to all the mifchiefs and intrigues/or his place belonging to the executive power in ancient and modern democratic republics. The nonfenfe of a late declaration, * that Great Britain hath no conftltution? fhould be fwept and cleared away. It is fo done at once by a definition of the word conftitution. It is an inftitution and arrangement of le- giflative and executive powers ; it is a fettle- ment and declaration of who are to make the laws, and in what manner they are to be made ; and of who are to execute the laws, and in what manner they are to be executed. It is a fettlement and declaration of the ends, and of the means of the government of a people. Great Britain hath all this, and this is a conftitution of government. What are the ends and what the means of government, ;' > lo ( ftiaiqx fcom- comprize the farther premifes of difcuffion, whether a conftitution is good or bad. To fay that Great Britain hath no confti- tution, is to fay, that it hath no government, and is nonfenfe : the only queftion is, whe- ther it is good or bad ? I have ihewn the mifchiefs which the ftruggles for executive power occafion in a republican government, and remarked the fucceffive factions and difturbances, deftroy- ing all domeftic fecurity of individuals, and all peace and happinefs in the community. I have fhewn that thefe ftruggles in the end go to deftroy the republic itfelf, and confirm one man, or one fet of men, in power and tyranny. I will now explain how this is avoided in the Britim conftitution of government ; and with refpedl: to the governed, I will clearly fliew that under that conftitution liberty^ equality, and the rights of men in civil fociety are dealt out to all, and fecured to all, better and more fully than they ever have been, or are [ " J are ever likely to be under any other form of government whatever. Firft, in regard to the extenfive power of the king: whilft every proper controul is laid on his official conduct, and the means of extending or abuiing that power (namely, arms and money) are checked by confiding them only from year to year ; the nation hath all the advantages and fecurity which can be- long to any executive power, under name of executive council, or other name whatever, which is annually appointed in a democratic republic. It is true, that for any length of time to en- tirely withhold the means of executive pow- er, and deny any army or any money, is to deftroy that power : or, in other words, to dethrone the king and diffolve the govern- ment. But the referve on the part of the people, and by their reprefentatives, to leflen or increafe the fupplies of force or moneys, and to ap- portion and fuit the means to the ends which themfelves have in view, commands, 3 in in faft, the choice of thofe ends ; commands the choice of national expenditures in peace, and the choice of peace or war in regard to foreign nations. This choice of ends, by referve of power over the means, is all that a people in the moft democratic government can retain to them- felves. A total rejelion of the means of govern- ment, would in either cafe diflblve the go- vernment, Britim or democratic. If it is faid, that fuch laft refort to a revo- lution is avoided under the democratic infti- tution, by an exercife of the power which the people retain of removing and degrading thofe who abufe that power ; and that thus the people in fuch ftate have a farther advan- tage of controul and prevention of abufe : I deny that the republic of Great Britain hath not this advantage, and in as full a degree as can be of fervice, and in a much fafer degree refpecting the peace of the nation, and the quiet of individuals. Every C *4 ] Every hiilory of every republican people fhevvs the danger at times of one party at- tempting to remove the confui or tribune whom another party have voted into office, and who even will, to a certain degree, fupport him even in the abufe of power as a faction, whom they have raifed to power as a party. The .conftant civil commotions or wars of Greece, and of Rome, and of every petty re-* public to the prefent day, are in proof of this portion. This mifchief is avoided in the government of Great Britain by the perfon of the king being rendered inviolable, his authority per- manent, and the fucceffion hereditary : for hence there is none to contejl his place. He who, in the eye of the law, can do no wrong* is kept by the conftitution as an inftrument to prevent the doing wrong by others, and to punifli if fo doing, The king is the instrument of the peo- ple's will and pleafure in the railing from their public good opinion, or in degrading from their public diffatisfaftion, the actual agents of ex- ecutive power and authority. The C *5 ] The referve of moneys and arms, of wealth and force, is withheld by the people in condi- tion to this effeth The comforts, the ftate^ the aggrandize^ ment of the king, his powers to pardon, his powers to difpenfe favour, his powers to do all good, and to do no harm ; all thefe great and high diftinctions render him only a more valuable hojtage to this effeft* The king muft on thefe very confiderations of fliperior condition and character in the irate, which weak and bad men affect to de- ride or to explode, put not fuch pre-emi- nence at hazard, but enfure ultimate concef- fion to the general intereft and wifhes of the people. We have in the late inilahce of the India Bill feen, that a king can only refift the voice of the reprefentatives of the people, by ap- pealing to the voice of the people at large. If the people return the fame reprefentatives to give the fame voice, the king cannot but concede. The alternative is not of a nature to fuppofe : for befides, that a king of Great D Britaift [ ,6 ] Britain hath no means of conteft with his peo- ple ; a king of Great Britain cannot act without his council or advifers. Now thefe advifers are none inviolate ; they are refponii- ble in the higheft degree. The known law of the land and principles of the conftitution hang paramount over their lives and fortunes ; and no power can fave him from juft fentence and execution who is found guilty on im- peachment in the name of the Commons of Great Britain. Thus the conftitution of Great Britain hath every, and more, fecurity againft the abufe of executive power than a republic of any other form. The counfellors or minifters of execu- tive government refponfible to definite max- ims, and to fixed laws which admit of no va- riation, diftinction, prejudice, or favour, will be ever more cautious than thofe acting at the head of a democratic government, where con- ciliatory acts, and even frefli crimes, may work out a favourable decree from the affem- bly ; where the high court of juftice refembles. the huttings of an election ; and he is voted moft innocent, who is guilty of bribing the moil votes. A Britim fentence of judgement, founded founded on known principles and laws, can- not vary or bend to thefe or other influences. None would advife, none would be minif- ters of the king's executive power under cir- cumftances of this refponfibility, and its con- fequences, were not advantages of power, as in a democratic republic, attached to their fituation and office. Thefe advantages, this power, will be fought as in a democratic republic, and ftrug-^ gles will be made for official place : but the high and permanent office of king (as I be- fore obferved) operates as a curb on private ambition. // is the inftrument of the nation and of the conftitution of government to in- terpofe and prevent the dangers and mifchiefs ariting from fuch ftruggle for power. The king is called to raife ; the king is called to difmifs. The Commons addrefs tp remove a judge, to remove a general, 10 re- move thofe in truft of every department. The majority in Parliament, and of the voices of the people too, as far as their numbers can fce afcertained, lofethe diftindtions of majori- Pa ty ty and minority as they reach the throne. It- is the vote of entire Parliament ; it is the voice of the whole people that calls on the king. By this operation in our conftitution of government, the king is relieved from the imputations of partialities, and his appoint- ments are never the appointments of a part, but of the whole. Parties yet do, and muft, and mould exifr, ; under thefe checks they cannot be mifchie- vous ; and, indeed, are moft ufeful. That fome men of leading ability and genius mould ever be on the watch to acquire fair populari- ty, and convert their minority of fupport into a voice of the people in their favour, is an ambition of high advantage to the country. That in this courfe they mould watch each occafion to difcover, and mow to the people inftances of mal-adminiftration in their rivals when in executive authority, muft check and keep thofe rivals to their duty : and is of firft intereft and moment to the public at large. Men will become good to become great, whilft to ftand well with the people at large is the only way to gain or to regain the feat of exe- cutive authority. A king A king of Great Britain muft have private predile&ions, becaufe a king is a man; but the king can difpenfe only fubordinate pow- ers (and not always thefe) to the obje&s of his predilections. The man, the minifter to whom is efpecially confided the care of the interefts of the people, muft be the man of the people's choice and confidence, or he can- not long be minifter of the king. Thus in the Britim conflitution of govern- ment, the executive power, when trufted and placed, is placed with as full refponfibility, and even more certain refponfibility than in a democratic republic ; where the appeal for applaufe or favour, or indemnification or par- don, is made to a plebicitum or decree of an aflembly (taken, perhaps, at an unguarded moment) or taken under circumftances of par- tiality or prejudice : and not as in Great Bri- tain, where the plea muft be to ' the law of the land;' and to judges out of the power or influence of the crown or of the people. Thus, too, in the Britim conftitution of go- vernment there is left room for competition of men of the firft genius and beft knowledge to [ 3 ] to flruggle for the executive departments of government, without danger refulting from their fuccefs, their defeat, their exaltation, or their difmiffion. Thus, too, afpiring characters neither in their elevation, or in their fall from power, difturb the national profperity or peace. They are enforced to a middle place, and to mode- ration, checked by and kept between the two conftitutional powers of the King and the Commons. And thus, looking to the true and only ends of all government, the component parts of civil fociety, individuals, families, municipa- lities, are engaged as they may prefer, in their private purfuits, and yet watchfully may be looking to the conduct and characters of the conftituted authority, without fuffering as constituents, all thofe feuds and animofities ; and without fufFering in the private line all that lofs of peace, happinefs, and domeftic fecurity, which are the individual materials and form the only well laid foundation of na- tional wealth, force, and general profperity, [ 3' 1 111 con fide ration of executive government, the fecurity of property with the liberty of the perfon are the great eflentials required ; and the expences of government being paid from the pockets of the governed, thole ex- pences fhould in fairnefs be taken into the efti- mate, of what form of admmifbration of exe- cutive power is the beft for the people. I venture to aflert, that the charges of go- vernment are cheaper to the people, and muft in their very nature be cheaper under the Bri- tifli conftitution, than under a form of repub- lic, in which the executive power fpreads more at large, and is fo frequently fliifting from one fet of men to another. The civil lift in Great Britain hath been, perhaps, rather wickedly than ignorantly mif- ftated, and the annual expenditure of a million with purpofed falfehood called, c The ex- pence of having a king? But our free and enlightened countrymen can only feel difguftat fo mean an attempt to breed difaffection to their happy eftablifhment of limited monarchy. They know that the ci- [ 3* 1 vil lift is, in fmall part only, paid to fupport the honours and parade of official authority in the perfon of him who has the truft and ex- ecution of it, their dear and rejpecled King, beloved and refpecled equally in his private and his public character. They know that the judges of the land, the foreign minifters, or perfon s fent to take care of the national inte- refts abroad, the fecretaries of ftate, the ma- nagers of their finance, the governors of their colonies, the confuls for the care of Bri- tim trade, and numerous other departments of public ufe, are all paid from the civil lift. If in the expenditures of the civil lift there is ought extravagant or overburthenfome, and even a fmall faving can be made to relieve the people, it ought to be done, and the Britim conftitution provides that relief. Parliament holds the purfe, and a Committee of Grie- vances is one of our oldeft conftitutional re- fources in the records of the country. This is another advantage of our admirable conftitu- tion of government : it finds remedy to its own diforders ; it corrects its own abufes ; and has that principle of lelf- renovation which Machiavel, in his difcourfes on the Roman Hif- [ 33 ] Hiftory, ftates as the perfection of human wifdom in political inftitutions. Reverting to that part of my fubjeft, which takes in the comparative expences under the Britifh conftitution, and under a democratic ftate, I muft obferve, that all accounts of fums of expenditure more or lefs, mufl be irrelevant to a juft decifion ; as all details re- lative to the departments of juftice, trade, and ordinary adminiftrations of government, muft be inconclufive, whilft diftinftions arife from extent and from diftance of territory, and from numbers and diverfity of people, and from various other circumftances. I muft deal then in general portions, and fuch as are applicable to human nature under juft confideration of what belongs to the in- dividual man, and what arifes from his con- nections in fociety, and under political infti- tutions, whatever they may be. Man will under each look for wealth, and for power. In a democratic republic, then, all who can be paid, will be paid : we have a late example in a neighbouring country of the National Convention afluming for each member i E livres [ 34 ] livres or 15 {hillings of our money daily r amounting for the year to about 250,0007. Then in a democratic republic the obliga- tions of men raifed to authority, to thofe who have raifed them, is fuch, as to make the fe- cret fervice-money enormous ; fo enormous, that it would not be borne with under the Britifh government a moment. I .;;;; ? *>be*J ^ifttff'i^ ^imir^b CKJ o-v;j. r Then as under the Britim government all offices throughout the various departments are to be fatisfied, and the fatisfaction may not be fo eafy to the public purfe, whilft every writing-clerk is not only to be paid as a clerk, but, perhaps, to be conciliated as a confHtuent citizen, who has his vote and his connections. Then national parade, not lefs coftly than kingly parade, (and kingly parade is national parade) is to bring in its items of gewgaws, its triumphal arches, and its federal feafts. Then as to penfions ; in Great Britain by law the king cannot grant them beyond a very moderate fum, and that fubmitted to the infpection of Parliament. I know of no pof- [ 35 ] pofllble limitation in a democratic republic, where thofe who are chofen to office muft bribe thofe who have chofen them, and where the account made out of the public money diffipated, is made to the very perfons who are bribed with it. This part of the fubject needs no long dif- cuffioru It is obvious that twenty perfons in power, that is, twenty kings, muft diflipate in every way more of the people's money than one perfon, that is, one king, and controuled too and reftricted as under the Britim confti- tution of Parliament, Clofing the comparative ftatement of exe- cutive power in a democratic government, and under the Britim conftitution of govern- ment, I think the premifes fully warrant me to affert, that under no other conftitution of government hath an executive power ever ex- ifted fo beneficial, fo fafe, and fo little bur- thenfome to the fubject as that of king under the Britim conftitution. But this is not all : the Britim conftitu- ' tion of overnment not only difpenfes thefe bleffings, but fecures thefe bleffings : it pro- E 2, vicles vides for duration ; and, as far as human af- fairs can be of a permanent nature, it pro- vides for permanency of its own excellent and beneficial eftablimment. A constitution merely of monarchy and democracy, of King and of Commons, could fcarcely do this ; its duration could not be of any length of time. The aflembly of the Commons, with furfe and armies at their difpofal, in the natural courfe of human ambition, and of great men afpiring to be greater, would trench on the power of the king, and progreffively affume to themfelves a fhare of executive authority, till in the end they got the whole ; and if ever our Britifh conftitution is deftroyed, I always have believed, and mujl ever believe , that this ambition in the Houfe of Commons is andmujl be the natural caufe and courfe of its decline and dejlruttion. A too great influence of the crown will be kept down (as it ought to be kept down) by the Houfe of Commons : but what mail oppofe the Commons themfelves, if inclined to trefpafs beyond their province, under influence of fome afpiring and able man, whofe ambition, too, may be abetted by the prejudices of the people, and the cir- cumftances of the times ? J [ 37 ] Let us attend to and keep by us the an- tidote to this poifon. To obviate the evil, the Britifli conftitution hath found a preven- tative in furniming an ariftocratic order, with- out one evil incident to ariftocracy attending it, and with every benefit. An ariftocracy, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, is the moft hateful of all govern- ments. It is a government of privileges and of exemptions. It is a confpiracy of a cer- tain number of individuals to burthen the people, and not to be burthened themfelves ; and to make and enforce laws againft others, which themfelves are not fubjeft to ; it is a government which adds infolence to wrongs, and wounds the fpirit, whofe body and fub- fiance it deftroys. In Great Britain none of thefe deteftable charafteriftics apply to the eftablimment of the Houfe of Lords. It is not an ariftocracy of individuals, but an ariftocracy fr the {late : it is not an ariftocracy of privileges and exemptions for the individual fervice, but for the public benefit. Th* 3O7078 [ 38 ] The privilege of hereditary place in the legiflature, and in judicial refort, and the ex- emption from arreft for civil procefs, (the chief diftinctions) are not given in boon to this ariftocraey as men, but as truftees of their country. They are called for the general good to a fhare in legiflation and judicial de- terminations ; they cannot be ar reded for a private debt to one, becaufe in their public functions they owe a debt to all. Where crime is in queftion, they areas common men, equally amenable to the laws with the pooreft of the people. They have no exemptions ; no exemption from public taxes, and no pri- vilege tp do private wrong : they have no ad- vantages, no distinctions but what the people require for the people's fake ; they poflefs none for their own fake. They are Lords in Parliament, not in private life t If they are Lords in private life (I allude not to the name, but to the refpect paid ; not to words, but to things,) they have their diiHncYion from mere cour,teiy and civility ; and that courtefy and civility (hould be paid to t 39 ] to men in office, legiflators, or judges, if worthy ; if not worthy, it will not be paid to any effect ; and is not paid, but by thofe who feed vanity to gain profit, or who in- terchange the ceremonious courtefies of va- nity for vanity, with great pains giviixg and receiving nothing. Thus ftating the ariftocracy of the Lords in Parliament of Great Britain to be no ways dangerous, let us confider, on the other hand, its actual ufe. It interpofes between king and people, and mediates thofe contefts which in default of this intervention might overturn the flate. It is a great body of landed intereft, and whilft the country throws new weight daily into the commercial fcale, it weighs in the fcale of landed interefr, with all the yeomen, and farmers, and thofe dependent on agricul- ture ; the moft virtuous of our citizens, and the moft neceflary to, and the beft delerving of their country. It is connected in near relation both to the King and to the Commons. Raifed by, and connected [ 40 ] conne&ed with the king, and like him holding hereditary honours and office, fubjeft to, and deriving rights from the laws, as commoners ; they are engaged to the interefts of the go- vernment and the governed more efpecially than other fubjefts. With the juft prerogatives of the king, they would lofe their own honours and dif- tinctions. With the jufl rights of the people, they would lofe their own fecurity of property and perfon. The Lords in Parliament have much to de- fend for the king and for themfelves : out of Parliament, have more to defend for the peo- ple and for themfelves. They thus as a body give fecurity to the eftablifhment of the whole, and are the fpecial barrier to prevent the fhocks of the monarchic and democratic powers. I have already called to recollection that the Lords are fubjecls of the laws on equal footing with the pooreft cottager ; and it is an abufe of language to name them as any ways I 4. ] ways partaking of what was called nobility in France or Brabant, or is yet fo called in many countries throughout Europe. The nobility in thofe countries were an ariftocracy in its worft fenfe, an ariftocracy of privileges and exemptions, of haughty abufe of power, and odious immunity of wealth from the taxes of the ftate, which poverty paid and funk un- der, opprefled by authority and manner of collection, and opprefled, too, by exactions of more than due from the little a{l of the cottage. I mean not an inquiry at hrge into the de- tails of the Britim conftitution ; I mean only to trace the great outlines of that conftitu- tion, and place them in a comparative point of view with thofe of a govern meat purely republican. I have fufficien-tly for this purpofe obferved on th.e executive power in the governments under my confideration ; I fhall yet more briefly touch on the legiflative powers. I mail then clofe this eflay with a few remarks on. the relative lituation of the governed, and difplay ill genuine colours the liberty., equality, F and. [ 4* ] and rights of men as actually exiftent in Great Britain, and poffefled by every Englifh- man. Laws are made, or mould be made, more efpecially with the view to a fecurity of per- fon and property ; of man, and of what man by his own induftry, or that of his. forefa- thers, hath acquired. To preyent or punifh afTaults from the flighted blow to favage murder, and to pre- vent or punifh trefpafles from encroachment on an outyard to the moft outrageous robbe- ry, is the rfr, and great object of laws : for it is the firft object of the laws to promote the peace and happinefs of a community, and this can only be done by enfuring the quiet and enjoyments of every individual of which it is compofed, and protecting each in that {huation and courfe of induftry which co- operates to the wealth, force, and profperity of the whole. But at the fame time it is the province of the laws to guard againfr. a more oppreffive aflault, a greater outrage, namely, that of falfe [ 43 j falfe accufatioii) and undue fufFering of the innocent. ( . ,f None mould be permitted to do mifchief to another ; but again, none mould be treat- ed as having done mifchief or wrong to ano- ther, unlefs it is proved that the mifchief or wrong has been done, and that the perfons accufed have done it. Hence the queftion, whether the mifchief or wrong hath been done, and by whom done, mould not be deferred ? The public hath a claim to fpeedy fentence if guilty : the ac- cufed hath a claim to the fpeedieft acquittal if innocent. Again, the guilt or innocence of the ac- cufed mould be afcertained by a tribunal not only competent to a juft decifion, but inte- refted in a juft decifion ; by a jury deeply concerned in the acquittal of innocence as in the condemnation of guilt ; by thole who are in a fituation to feel, that on other occafions themfelves may be offended a gain ft, or ac- accufed of offending others. F 2, Above C 44 ] Above all, laws being made for the fecu- rity of mankind, it is indifpen fable that their object mould be fixed and known the crimes be declared, the penalties afcertained. To know what a man may do, and what he may not do, is neceflary not only to the fafety, but to the peace of mind and happi- nefs of every one. For this reafon laws fhould be certain and definite ; they mould not make the fault but correcV it; they mould never be enacted to convert an old deed into a new crime ; they mould not ope- rate ex pojlfafto, for in other words this is to place all under incertitude of right and wrong, and hold out impunity to betray to punifhment. It is to place every action of life under doubts and fears ; the characteriftic of defpotifm and the defpot a Caligula. For the fame reafon laws mould not deal in general and fweeping terms of offence, any more than in general denunciations of puniih- rnent ; for who, then, is fafe ? Republics have ever admitted accufations of incivifm, r loofe opinion of forne one's diflike to their goveru- 2 C 45 ] government, without any precife allegation or fpecific charge, as grounds of judicial pro- cedure. Thus the Athenians banifhed by their oftracifm thofe whom public opinion declared guilty of inchifm. But the climax of tyranny remained for a modern republic, where thoufands have been imprifoned on the loofe charge of incivifm ; have then been maf- facred in their goals : and without inquiry for the murderers, thoufands again have crouded thofe goals ftained with blood. Could fuch ge- neral accufation without fpecific charge be ad- mitted even a moment in this free country, enlightened by the true principles of liberty, law, and juflice ! do we not reject the prin- ciple of procedure with difdain, as we re- gard the confequences with horror ! For the &me reafoii laws mould be free topics of diicuffion that all may learn and uu- derftand their meaning and effect. For yet greater reafon mould thofe who make the laws, or who execute the laws, their views, their wifdom, their integrity, their charac- ters, both as to purpofe and means of legifla- tion, be made the free topics of the people's conventions and writings. Was t 46 T Was there ever a popular republic exifting in ancient days, or does there exift one now in the whole world ; wherein fuch difcuffion to prejudice, perhaps of the ruling power, has the freedom of words and thoughts, as in Great Britain ? Can any man in any other country fpeak and write with the freedom of fentiment and opinion as in Great Britain, without perfonal danger ? Whatever under the con flit ution of Great Britain checks the progrefs of calumny and mifreprefentation in refpect to the hurt of a man's circumftances in bufinefs, or peace of his family ; or checks the language of trea- fbn, or incitement to infurre&ion againft the peace and property of all ; yet fo defines each offence, and ib narrows it to fomething like an overt act, that he who fo offends as to be amenable tojuftice, muft offend wickedly and malevolently, and with direct purpofe of pri- vate, or of public breach of the peace : and fuch rnuft be checked or controuled ; or neither the individual is fafe in his reputation, or the whole people fafe from deftruclion to their free and happy flate. Was [ 47 J Was ever the freedom of public opinion, the freedom of the prefs fo great, fo little checked, and only duly checked, under any republican government whatever, ancient or modern ? I will, laftly, mention the genuine principle of juftice ; that its decifions ihould bear on all alike, deal out protection to the poor, and fentence on the rich, without favour, without partialities to any clafs or condition of life,-^ ihould acknowledge no diftin&ions but of in- ppcence and of guilt. I bring forward thefe few mjlances of the fpirit of the laws m Great Britain, merely as a fample to allure the confideration of my Countrymen to all they poflefs in fecurity o perfon, property, and freedom of mind as of body above other nations, and above thele boafted republics in particular. The excellence of our laws is in fome mea- fure, a refult of the excellence of our infli- tution of the legiflative department, The [ 48 3 The legiflature is fo framed and conftruc- ted, and is conduced on fuch principles, and on fuch deliberation, that if wife and good laws are not in every care the refult, it is ow- ing to the imperfections of human nature in the adminiflration of an inftitution of govern- ment, and not be placed to account of the in- flituticsn itfelf. The principle and practice of Britim Par- liament are, and have been, to colled all the legiflative wifdom of the prefent age, and to graft it on the wifdom of pafled ages ; and further to avail itfelf and make ufe of the ex- perience and fpeculations for the public good, which the fenfe of the beft and wifeft men of all times can fupply. To thus religioufly preferve, and revert to precedents and ufages, and to ancient char- ters and laws ; but without blind fubmiffion and fuperfHtious adherence to thofe ats of our forefathers, if a change of cuftoms, man- ners, or circumftances require alteration ; or if more enlightened experience can fuggeft improvement, or if late abufes require new regulations. [ 49 ] To reverence the authorities of ancient wifdom or policy, fo far, and fo far only, as not to change the minuteft form, and much lefs to change the fubftance of what hath been heretofore done, but on urgent occa- fion, after provident difcuflion, and on moii weighty and impreflive argument for the alteration propofed. The conftru*flion and ufages of the legifla- tive body conform to, and tally with, thefe principles, and operate as a check on wanton innovation, and work with energy to juft amendment. Each of the two Houfes of Parliament, as it originates, or as it receives from the other, a new proportion for law, muff., from its own confKtution, proceed with the provi- fionary delays of firit, fecond, and third readings, on different days : and many other ftoppages for deliberation in courfe, are pre- clufive of mifchievous and rafh refolves, and the fenfe of the people hath time to collect ; and the interefls of every body of men, and the rights of every individual citizen, have time to come forward, and claim their juft G con- [ 5 ] consideration. After all thefe precautions, fhould a bill, or proportion for law, to the detriment of national interefts, or private fran- chifes, pafs the Houfe of Commons from po- pular heat or prejudice ; or pafs the Houfe of Lords from too courtly attachment to the monarchic branch of the conftitution, or too partial views to their own order in the ftate, yet the one houfe muft aft as a corrective on the other. From the diftindt characters and temper of each houfe, the public hath a fe- curity, not only that bad or unjuft propofitions for law, mail never become '* Law of the Land:" but further, that no one of the {rates of the conftitution mail encroach on the other, whilft each hath a felf-defence in the being a neceflary party to the act and pro- cedure which might operate to its detriment ; and the buckler of the peers covers too, and guards the juft perogative of the crown. Thus the balance of our mixed government is poized and fixed to the level, and thus we have a certain and known fyftem of laws, that befl fecurity of the liberties and proper- ties of men. No word, no action, is deemed an offence and punimable, but under known laws. t 5' ] laws. Every citizen is aware whether he goes right or wrong, for he has a line to walk by ; and he thus walks cheerfully and fafely. No Britifli law can convert right into wrong, and punifh as a crime what was no crime when committed. In this principle of immutable juftice, and in the fpirit of our laws born of that princi- ple, and partaking throughout of its nature, permanency, and firmnefs, the great advan- tage of all is, that national morality is fxed. What a man ought to do, and what he may do, varies not to fluctuating decrees, and a rule of life is laid down. Citizens, in habit of obedience to laws for their conduct and good order, remaining the fame in their old age as in their youth, fix their minds to a principle, as well as fyflem of demeanour ; and gain the habits of thinking rightly, with thofe of acting honeftly. Integrity and virtue thus become features of national character, under a firm, permanent, and fyftematic pro- cedure in legiflation. Individual happinefs, peace and fafety , are decided too, as it were, for life. The progrefs and fuccefs of men in all trades and vocations of arts, and of learning, G 2 arc [ 5* ] are fettled. The apprenticefhip of the mecha- nic fecures his livery in his town. The prof- peels of laborious application and improved talents may be viewed in the very fchool of the firft rudiments of literature. Men be- come enlightened, happy, and rich, fmgly, and in the aggregate, whilft each is affured that the end, the home of his labours and application will not be pulled down ere he reaches it ; but the rights he fet out with, remain with him to the end of his courfe. Turn from this fyflem of eftablimment and fecurity, and view the popular repub- lics of ancient and modern times ; you will defcry a fluctuating and dangerous procedure in legiflation, \vhilft therein fcarcely a citi- zen knows in what he is fafe, or in what he hath to truft to. Juftice and liberty are the watchwords of republican governments ; too often ufed for readier paffports to oppreffion and tyranny. The popular clamour for juftice mutt ever indicate that there mall be no juftice: as the cry of liberty on one fide is ever a fummons to tyrannize over the other. Even legiflation. is [ 53 ] is made the direct and avowed inftrument of wrong. The people are angry with ibme minifter or general, and a hafty decree converts all he has done into fo many crimes, and the decree follows to adjudgebaniihrnent or death. The people become quickly hardened to thefe ple- bifcita or decrees ; and the majority in the aflembly vote laws, in effecT: a dreadful pro- fcription to perfon and property, againft all who do not vote with them : fcarcely a, citi- zen knows by what tenour he holds his eftate or his life, in the exceptions which contending factions arrogate to themfelves a power of declaring, to the prejudice of their opponents, and of thofe too who may be neutral. If any think that I deal too hardly with the chara&er of popular republics in this little (ketch of comparative ftatement, I refer to hiftory at large, to the republics of Sicily, from Drepanon to Syracufe, and to thofe of the South of Italy, from Crotone to Meta- pontum, and thence throughout to Apulia ; to thofe of Greece throughout; and above all I 54 ] all, to the democracy of Athens. If modern examples are required, I refer to the hiitories of Machiavel, and all the factious intrigues and maffacres of his petty Italian common- wealths. France, in its wretched anarchy, hath yet enough of democratic temper, if not of repub- lican arrangement, to fill up the meafure of example, and afford another inflance for my purpofe. Let no one call another an enemy to liberty becaufe he profefles a love of order. Jt is becaufe I am the warmeft advocate for true liberty, that I am the moil decided adverfary to democratic republics. I have been In the habits of attention to hiftory from my earlieft youth ; and my views have been directed to inquire under what political inftitutions of government, throughout all ages, and in all countries, might be found the moft freedom^ the moft virtue, and the mofl bappincfs. All that I have read or heard, all that my mind can furnilh from the materials it hath collected, or from the combination of thole 3 ma- [ 55 ] materials, lead me to declare, that the repub- lic of the Britim conftitution of King, Lords, and Commons, is the beft fuked for all the ends of government, for the liberty, peace, and happinefs of mankind. Says Tacitus, in the fentence prefixed to the title-page of this effay. " All nations have been governed " by kings, or by a certain number of chief- *' tains, or lords, or by an affembly of the " people themfeives : a republic framed ouc ** of thefe, by affociating the three original " powers into one conftitution of govern- ** ment, is much eafier to make the fubje& s. per Hundred ; or 1000 for Two Guineas. 2. ONE PENNYWORTH of TRUTH, from THO- MAS BULL to his Brother JOHN. is. per Dozen ; 55;. per Hundred; -or ICOO. for Two Guineas, <. A ' 'CURATE'S ADDRESS to the MANUFACTU- RERS of BIRMINGHAM, -&c.. is. per Dozen; s>. per Hundred ; or IOOO for Two Guineas. 4. TRUE PATRIOTS put to the Teft ; or An Infalli- ble RECEIPT for knowing an HONEST MAN from :i ROGUE, is. per Dozen; 55. per Hundred; or icoo for Two Guineas. 5. A BIRD in the HAN]-) i? worth TWO in the BUSH, is. per Dozen; 55. per Hundred; or 1000 for Two Guineas. 6. A WORD in SEASON to the Traders and Manufac- turers of .Great Britain. . Price u. -or Two Guineas per Hundred. 7. INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCES of REFORM in PARLIAMENT. By William Pluyfuir. Price is. or Two Goine:is per Hundred. 8. The LIFE 01 THOMAS PAINE. By Francis Oldys, A. M. Sixth Edition. Price is. -or Two Guineas per Hundred. 9. An ACCOUNT of the MANNER in which the Per- ions confined in the PRISONS of PARIS were TRIED and PL T to DEATH, on the ad and 3d of September laft. Bv an Eve-Witnefs. Price is. ---or Two Guineas per Hisndred. 10. ADVICE to the JACOBIN NEWS- WAITERS, and thofe v\hu p role them. Recommended to the Dif- fsrent Affuciatiims to ft op the Piogiels of Rebellion. By Df. Jonathan Slow. Pi ice 6d. or One Guinea per Hundred. 11. The genuine SPEECH of the Right Hon. CHARLES JAMES 1 OX, at the Meeting of the Whig Club, at the London Tavern, December, 1792. With a Poetical Paraphrase. Pi ice 6d. One Guinea per Hundred ; or Five GuiiKMS per Thouiand. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY This book is DUE on the last date stamped below \S59 ID-URL JAN 2 INTERLIBRARY OCT1 Out Two Wieks From Date of Receipt RECT) LD-ORC FEB261985 SEP 1 5 1969 THREE WEEKS FROM DATE f NON-RENEWABLE RC '0 LOANS 1984 rr OF AT UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY F A 000 000 085 1 I