UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES IJBltAR ANGELES, CAU THE ROMANS UNDER THE EMPIRE VOL. n. WORKS BY CHARLES MERIVALE, D.D. SOMF.TIMK DEAX OP KI,Y. HISTORY of the ROMANS under the EMPIRE. With Maps. 8 vols. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6rf. each. The FALL of the ROMAN REPUBLIC; a History of the Last Century of the Commonwealth. With Maps. Fcp. 8vo. 7s. 6d. The ROMAN TRIUMVIRATES. With Map. Fcp. 8vo. 2s. 6rf. (Epochs of Ancient History.) GENERAL HISTORY OF ROME from the Founda- dation of the City to the Fall of Augustulus, B.C. 763 A.D. 476. With 5 Maps. Crown 8vo. 7*. 6rf. SCHOOL HISTORY of ROME. Abridged from Dean MERIVALE'S General History of Rome, with the sanction of the Author, by C. PULLER, M.A. With 13 Maps. Fcp. 8vo. 3.. 6d. LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO. 39 Paternoster Row, London, New York, and Bombay. HISTORY ROMANS UNDER THE EMPIRE 11Y TIIK VKKY RKV. CHARLES MERIVALE, D.C.L. LATE DEAN OF ELY IN EIGHT VOLUMES VOL. II. NEW IMPRESSION LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON NEW YORK AND BOMBAY CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME. N$ CHAPTER XI. TABU {State of the Parthian Monarchy Crassus meditates an ex- pedition against the Parthians First Invasion, A.U. 700 Second Invasion, A.U. 701 He is deceived by the Par- thians, and misled by his guides Fatal engagement beyond Carrhae Death of the younger Crassus Crassus enticed into a conference and slain in a fray His remains insulted An Interregnum at Koine Pompeius prevails ft on the Tribunes to allow the election of Consuls Assassi- nation of Clodius Disturbances in the City Pompeius appointed sole Consul for the year 702 Trial of Milo The proceedings of the Forum controlled by an armed force ---------- I *>> CHAPTER XII. ~t> Caesar a seventh campaign in Gaul, A.U. 702, B.C. 52 Ver- cingetorix effects a coalition between the Belgians and Arvernians Caesar takes Genabiun and Avaricum Wise and spirited policy of Vercingetorix Siege of Gergovia Revolt of the JEdui Caesar compelled to raise the siege: he effects a junction with Labienus in Belgium, and retreats towards the province He obtains a victory, and blockades the Gaulish army Great operations before Alesia Triumph of the Romans, and submission of Vercingetorix Caesar's eighth campaign, A.U. 703, B.C. 51 Partial insurrections in the north, west, and centre of Gaul Cap- ture of Uxclloilumim The cont|tiest of Gaul completed - 30 245239 VI CONTENTS OF CHAPTER XIII. PASS Pompeius, as sole consul, undertakes the reform of abuses-. his ill success: he connects himself again with the oligarchy by espousing the daughter of Scipio Csesar intrigues to obtain the consulship before relinquishing his province Cicero accepts the government of Cilicia: his civil and military administration The nobles seek to deprive Caesar of his command M. Marcellus insults him by the harsh punishment of a Transpadane Gaul Pompeius falls sick Rejoicings for his recovery Cassar conciliates the Gauls Strength and composition of his army: his popularity \vith the soldiers Character of the younger Curio ; his devotion to Caesar's interests Caesar received with acclamations in Cisalpine Gaul He fixes his quarters at Ravenna He offers a compromise with the Senate, which it refuses, and requires him to resign his command The tribunes inter- pose, are menaced with violence, and thereupon fly to Cazsar's camp. (A.U. 702 704, B.C. 52 50.' 75 CHAPTER XIV. The consuls prepare to withstand Caesar's claims by force Caesar crosses the Rubicon Consternation of his enemies They abandon Rome, and rally round Pompeius in Cam- pania Caesar advances triumphantly The senate affects to negotiate Pompeius falls back upon Luceria Domitius makes a stand at Corfinium: is betrayed and delivered up by his soldiers: pardoned by Caesar Effect of Caesar's clemency Pompeius is besieged by Caesar in Brundisium Escapes across the sea with his troops, the consuls and the senate Explanation of the apparent pusillanimity of his conduct. (Jan. March A.U. 705, B.C. 49.) - - .23 CHAPTER XV. Caar repairs to Rome and convenes the Senate His mode- ration and clemency He plunders the Temple of Saturn He proceeds to attack the Pompeian armies in Spain Domitius encourages the Massilians to shut their gates against him He leaves a force to besiege their city, and crosses the Pyrenees The Pompeian lieutenants occupy Ilerda Military operations before that place Overflow of the Sicoris and peril of Caesar Brutus gains a naval advantage over the Massiliaus The Pompeians compelled THE SECOND VOLUME. Vll PAG I to eyacnate Ilerda Farther military operations, ending in the capitulation of the Pompeian armies. (A. D. 705, B. c. 49.) 1 i_ , . . , ., [ To be placed at the beginning of the MAP OF PHAKSALJA . . . HISTORY ROMANS UNDEK THE EMPIEE. CHAPTER XI. State of the Parthian Monarchy. Crassus meditates an expedition against the Parthians. First Invasion, A.U. 700. Second Inva- sion, A.D. 701. He is deceived by the Parthians, and misled by his guides. Fatal engagement beyond CarrhsD Death of the younger Crassus. Crassus enticed into a conference and slain in a fray His remains insulted. An Interregnum at Rome. Pompeius prevails on the Tribunes to allow the election of Consuls. Assassination of Clodius. Disturbances in the City. Pompeius appointed sole Consul for the year 702. Trial of Milo. The proceedings of the Forum controlled by an armed force. BEFORE we revert to the contemplation of the pro- tracted death-struggle of Roman indepen- . , r ,, r ,. Rise of the dence, we must turn aside to follow the Parthian Parthian expedition of Crassus, one of the most romantic episodes in the history of the martial republic, conspicuous for the most wanton aggression and the most signal chastisement by which her bloody annals are distinguished. The province of Syria offered brilliant opportunities to the ambition or avarice of a Roman proconsul. Its wealth, compara- tively untouched by earlier conquerors, was the accu- mulation of centuries of commercial splendour. Its frontiers were limited by the dominions of the tribu- tary sovereigns of Cappadocia and Palestine, who flourished under the shadow of Roman protection. Beyond them lay the kingdoms of Armenia, placed VOL. II. B 2 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XT. also in a state of dubious dependence on the republic, and of Egypt, whose freedom at the moment was trembling in the balance. To the east stretched the vast extent of the Parthian empire, with which Rome had never yet measured her strength. The region from which the once mighty name of the Parthians took its rise is an insignificant tract of country watered by the river Ochus, the modern Tedjen, near the south- eastern extremity of the Caspian Sea. On the north a sandy desert separates it from the Oxus and the modern city of Khiva ; on the south it is hemmed in by the great mountain chain which connects the Caucasus of the west with the Hindoo Khoosh, or Caucasus of the east. This district had formed the most northern possession of the Macedonian empire ; but, upon the partition of the various provinces after the death of Alexander, none of his Greek generals aspired to occupy a throne in so remote and barba- rous a region. Parthia fell into the hands of a chief of native extraction, though known by the Greek name of Stasanor : but it continued in a state of pre- carious dependence on the sovereigns of the Mace- donian line, who held their court in Susa. The power of the European dynasties was weakened by their quarrels with one another ; and both the Parthians and the Bactrians shook off the yoke in the third century before our era. Arsaces, the founder of a race of Parthian kings, was a man of obscure origin ; the conquest of Hyrcania extended his possessions to the Caspian ; and when his vigorous chivalry crossed the Caucasus and came in contact with the nations to the south, the successors of Alexander were unable to withstand them, and the whole of the provinces between the Euphrates and the Indus fell in the fourth generation under the sway of the Parthian Mithridates. Thie powerful tyrant was succeeded by a son who, after some brilliant triumphs over the Greeks in Syria, was defeated and slain by a horde of CH. XT. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 3 invading Scythians. The attention of his successors, as far as they could spare it from their intestine divisions and family intrigues, was principally occu- pied with checking the progress of these depredators, and supporting the power of Armenia on their north- western frontier, which formed a bulwark against future invasion from that quarter. ' For his abode the Parthian sovereign selected Seleucia on the Tigris, from among: the , . , f , , , The Parthian royal residences ot the empire he had over- court at thrown. Scarcely emerged from the tent of his fathers, he at once established himself in all the pomp of the ancient dynasties which had successively held the sceptre of Central Asia. He adopted from the Assyrians the slothful luxury of the priest-kings of the line of Bel us ; he surrounded himself with slaves, eunuchs, and concubines ; dressed more like a woman than a man 2 , and revelled in the charms of odours, wine, and music. From the example of the Medes, he assumed the licence of intermarrying with the nearest members of his own family, a barbarous device for limiting the claimants to the succession. Nor was he less easily seduced by the more intellec- tual, but hardly less enervating, refinements which the Greeks had introduced into Asia. An exotic literature and a gaudy theatre flourished at Seleucia under the royal patronage : the ritual ceremonies of the most graceful of superstitions were too closely interwoven with the forms of the Grecian drama not to follow in its train. The court of Seleucia presented a motley combination of the manners of different ages and countries, only to be paralleled, perhaps, in the 1 This history is concisely detailed by Justin, xli. 4, 5. 2 See Plutarch's description of Surenas (c. 24.): Ivrplp/juuii iepov KO! ruv &\\cav T&V ffvtrrpa- Ttvaavrtav ff$i 'E\\Tjvit>v &TTOIKOI iroAAol, /3p.aiovs us Kal To. 10 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XI. portended the vengeance of the gods. 1 He was joined by his son, the gallant lieutenant of Csesar, with a body of one thousand cavalry from Gaul, a present from the one triumvir to the other. The most ex- perienced of his officers was C. Cassius Longinus, a soldier of approved skill and courage. Thus sup- ported, with an army duly disciplined and equipped, he continued to indulge in sanguine confidence re- garding the result of the campaign which he projected for the following year. The character of the Parthian warfare, which became so terrible to the Komans, was as yet little known to them ; but the Persian arrow, they might remember, had been no match for the Macedonian sarissa. They had not yet learned to distinguish the mail-clad horsemen of Parthia from the loose-garbed and effeminate human herds which Xerxes had driven with whips before him, which Agesilaus had scattered with a handful of Spartan infantry, or which Alexander had chased from the Hellespont to the Hyphasis.* 1 Crassus seized without remorse the treasures amassed in the temple of Derceto or Atargatis, in Hierapolis. (Plut. Crass. 27.; Strab. xvi. 1. 4.) He made a journey to Jerusalem on purpose to rifle the temple. Its wealth was computed at ten thousand talents. Eleazar the high-priest tried to save it by the offer of a costly bribe. Crassus took the bribe and the treasure both. Joseph. Antiq. xiv. 7. 1., B. Jud. i. 7. 8. 2 Compare the speech of Lentulus in Lucan's poem (viii. 331. &c.), which seems to express a revival of the contemptuous and unfounded prejudices of the Romans, after the defeat of Crassus had been effaced from their recollection: " Illic et laxas vestes et fluxa virorum Velamcnta vides." .... The bow was stigmatized as a cowardly and effeminate weapon com- pared with the sword: " Ensis habet vires, et gens qusecunque virorum est Bella gerit gladiis." .... One disadvantage it had: " Nam Medos praelia prima Exarmant, vacutcque jubent remeare pharetrae." No Roman would have escaped from the field of Carrhae if the A IT.701-B.C.53. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 11 While Crassus was collecting his forces from their winter quarters, Orodes, the king of the Embassy of Parthians, sent ambassadors to complain of ^f^luS"' the sudden aggression upon his territories, or, * a ";, more properly, upon those of Abgarus, king B- c- 53- of Osrhoene, a dependency of the Seleucian crown. But their commission was not so much to negotiate with the Koman proconsul as to defy him. The Parthians seem to have been informed of the dislike with which the proceedings of Crassus were viewed by the Roman senate. An attempt had lately been made in that assembly to obtain the proconsul's recal from his province, which was foiled by the interference of Pompeius, seconded by a speech from Cicero. 1 The Parthians affected to draw a distinction between the republic herself and the marauder who had insulted them. With the former, they said, they were pre- pared to wage war to extremity, if challenged to the field ; but if the enterprise were merely the personal act of the old man before them, they would not con- descend to harm a hair of his head, but would con- temptuously send him back the garrisons he had left beyond the Euphrates. Crassus retorted with the usual taunt of inexperienced commanders; he would discuss these matters in their capital. Wagises, an aged Parthian, pointed to the smooth palm of his hand, and said that hair should sooner grow there than the Romans ever see Seleucia. 2 The confidence these expressions indicated was not belied by the power and resolution with Adviceof which it was backed. Some of the Roman j$iSi- detachments stationed beyond the Eu- $?, !$?,. phrates were soon compelled to abandon f" n - their posts, and came flying into the camp. They described the vigorous character of the enemy who Parthians could have maintained a close blockade of the exhausted legions. 1 Cic. ad Div. T. 8. * Plut. Crats. 18. 12 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. Xi. had assailed them, the deadliness of his assault, the fruitlessness of pursuing him, the unerring aim of his arrows, the impenetrability of his armour. The Parthians were evidently a people very different in character from the Armenians and Cappadocians, whom Lucullus had so easily routed. These reports caused much uneasiness in the Roman quarters, and Cassius thus early warned his leader of the perils of the enterprise he was about to undertake. But Crassus gave no heed to the warning. Artabazes, the king of Armenia, came into his presence with the offer of all the resources of his country. He promised the assistance of ten thousand cavalry equipped in complete armour, and of thirty thou- sand infantry ; at the same time he strongly urged him to direct his march through his own friendly territories, well supplied with water and provisions, and abounding in hills and streams, which would baffle the dreaded manoeuvres of the Parthian horse- men. 1 By this route he would reach the upper waters of the Tigris, from whence he might descend to Seleucia through a fertile and practicable country. But Crassus, though well pleased with the zeal of his ally, would brook no delay, nor adopt a circuitous line of march : moreover he represented that he had still some troops left in occupation of outposts be- yond the Euphrates, and these he was hastening to support. ' Comp. Lucan, /. c.: " Parthus per Medica rura, Sarmaticos inter campos, effusaque piano Tigridis arva solo, nulli supcrabilis hosti est Libertate fugaa: scd non, ubi terra tumebit, Aspera conscendet mentis juga, nee per opacas Bella geret latebras, incerto debilis arcu: Nee franget narulo violent! vorticis amnem." . . Yet the Parthians came originally from a hilly country, anil the mail-clad cavalry of Armenia, as well as the modern Belooches, were accustomed to mountain warfare. A.D.701-B.C.53. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 13 The writers from whom we derive our accounts of the campaign that followed, lived at least two centuries after the date of the events rouu^opento they relate ; and even if the sources from an e invidTng which they drew their materials were trust- worthy and accurate, they may very probably have confused and disfigured their statements from their own want of critical spirit. Accordingly, their nar- ratives correspond very imperfectly with the geo- graphy of the country through which they profess to guide us. The district of Osrhoene, which compre- hends undoubtedly the whole of the route we wish to trace, was confined on the north by the line of the Mons Masius, or Karahjah Dag, running directly east and west from the Tigris to the Euphrates, in the parallel of Samosata. The latter of these rivers bounds it to the west and south, as far as its conflu- ence with the Chaboras, which may be considered as the eastern limit of the district. The great highway from Asia Minor to the cities of Persia lay through the town of Zeugma, on the Euphrates, which de- rived its name from the bridge by which the opposite banks were there connected, and which, in Rome's most prosperous times, when she granted terms to the prostrate empires of the East, was complimented with the pompous title of the Route of Peace. 1 The modern village of Roum Kale (the Roman castle) still marks its site, but the caravans now cross the river a few miles lower down at Birs. From Zeugma a military way was directed due east to Edessa, the modern Orfa, the Ur of Scripture, where the king of Osrhoene held his court. At a later period this posi- 1 Stat. Sylv. Hi. 2. 137.: " Zeugma Latins Pacis iter." The bridge was originally constructed for the transport of Alexander's aruiy across the Euphrates. Dion, xl. 17.; Kinneir, Geographical Memoir, 316. The Euphrates there is deep and rapid and about 130 yards broad. 14 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XI. tion became, in the hands of the Romans, the key of Parthia and Armenia. From hence the road branched into two lines : the one continued in an easterly di- rection to Nisibis and Nineveh, on the Tigris, and here was the point of departure either for Seleucia or Ecbatana ; the other struck more southward, ran through Carrhae, then turned due south, skirting the little stream Balissus, till it reached the Euphrates at Nicephorium. From this point it was carried on nearly parallel to the banks of that river, and at last terminated at Seleucia, after crossing the narrowest part of the isthmus which separates the Euphrates from the Tigris. These highways were the work of a later age, when the power of Rome was established through the whole of Mesopotamia ; but they were laid out, in all probability, in the line of the much more ancient routes frequented in the time of Crassus. It was along one or other of these lines, therefore, that we should expect to trace the march of the invading army. In later times Trajan entered Parthia by the northern, and Julian by the southern route 1 ; but Crassus, according to our historians, followed neither. We have no choice, but to con- sider the main incidents of their narrative correct, and we must be content with remarking, as we pass, the minor inconsistencies by which it is en- cumbered. The proconsul had collected his troops together, seven legions strong, at Zeugma. Once Diicourage- ,, .... r .-, 11- mentofthe more the superstition ot the soldiers was Roman army. , , . l . . busy in discovering omens ot disaster. Thunders and lightnings, with tempests of wind and 1 Mannert, v. 2. p. 200.; Francke, Gesch. Trojans, p. 277.; Am- mian. xxiii. 3. D'Anville's work on the Euphrates and Tigris is of great service in tracing the ancient geography, hut his map is ex- tremely incorrect as regards the course of the former river. That which is appended to Kinneir's Journey through Anwnia,, fyc., seems much more trustworthy. A.C.701 -B.C.53. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 15 rain, gave a gloomy presage of ill-success. 1 The bridge Lroke under the weight of the army and its baggage, at which the troops were much disheartened. But the actions of their leader and the expressions which fell from him were peculiarly significant and unlucky. Crassus, intending to return from the conquests he anticipated by the route of Armenia, paid no attention to the calamity, and uttered the unconscious prophecy, that none of his soldiers would want that bridge again. So, too, in sacrificing, he let the sacred fragments of the victim fall from his hand. Instead of hastening to recover them, and avert the omen by appropriate formulas, he only smiled, and remarked with levity, See the infirmity of age ! 2 As soon as the Roman army had reached the left bank of the Euphrates, it proceeded, if we ,-. f f , * , ' , Preparation! are correctly informed, not to take the of the Par- road to Edessa, but to skirt the river for some way down. 3 If the object of the general had been to give confidence and support to garrisons stationed along its course, as, for instance, at Barba- lissus and Nicephorium, that object, it would seem, might have been more readily attained by approaching the river at the spot nearest to Antioch, his original point of departure, without making a circuit so in- convenient There could have been no difficulty in throwing a bridge of boats across the stream at either of those places. The counsel of Artabazes having been altogether disregarded, the skill and experience of Cassius now suggested the most feasible alternative, 1 The Euphrates is subject to violent hurricanes. It was in one of these that Captain Chesney's vessel was lost on his expedition to explore the navigation of that river. 2 Plut. Crass. 19. : TOIOVTOV rb yfjpay. * The force which crossed the Euphrates amounted to seven legions with about four thousand cavalry, and as many light-armed troops. Plut. Crass. 20. Appian (B. C. iii. 18.) raises the number to 100,000 men, and Floras to eleven legions (iii. 11.). 16 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XI. the plan of the campaign. Cassius recommended his leader to keep along the bank of the Euphrates, by which means he could ensure a constant supply of provisions from the flotilla which was in readiness to accompany him, and secure himself against being surrounded. At the same time he advised him to move slowly and wit! circumspection, not to trust to the rumours which flowed into the camp of the disappearance and meditated flight of the Parthians, but to keep under the shelter of some of his fortified posts till the plans of the enemy could be fully ascertained. The fact was, as Cassius anticipated, that the Parthians designed to maintain the defensive, and did not choose to meet the invaders in a pitched battle on equal terms. It was their object to lead the Koman army into the sandy plains which Their strata- . J . r -t .-, gem to mislead intervene between the two rivers, and there hang loosely upon their skirts, till heat, fatigue and want should anticipate the work of the sword. They found an instrument for their design in Abgarus 1 , the Osrhoenian, who attended the march of the Roman legions, and wormed himself into their leader's confidence by specious professions of gratitude for the favours he had received from Pompeius. He assured the proconsul that Orodes, despairing of the defence of his country, had left two of his satraps, Stirenas and Sillaces, to make a show ot arthian resistance, while he was himself in full retreat for Scythia or Hyrcania, carrying off with him all the treasures he could hastily remove. Any appearance, he said, of hesitation on the part of the Romans might restore his confidence, but a sudden 1 He is called by Dion ASyapot, i.e. Abgarus; by the Pseudo-Ap- pian, "AicSapos, in which we may, perhaps, recognise the modern Akhbar. This word is said to be a royal title, signifying " great." Several of the name are mentioned in this and the following centuiy as kings of Edessa. Plutarch gives this peisonage the name of Ariamnes; he also uses the form "TpwSrjs for Orodes. i.CJ.70!-B.C.53. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 17 and direct march upon Seleucia would at the moment meet with no effectual opposition. In fact, whether through fear of the Eoraans, or to show his contempt for them in the most striking manner, Orodes had undertaken himself to chastise the insolence of their Armenian ally, leaving the brunt of the invasion to be sustained by his satraps. But this division of his forces was calculated to lull the enemy into security, and entice him to a perilous movement, where the nature of the country and climate would arm the Parthians with irresistible weapons. Surenas ranked next to the king in birth, wealth and distinction. 1 He was the most eminent of his nation for valour and abilities, nor had he an equal in strength and beauty of person. He went forth, whether in peace or war, with an equipage of one thousand camels, and his wives and concubines followed him in a train of two hundred chariots. His body-guard consisted of one thousand horsemen in mail, and a still greater number of light-armed. His rank and relationship to the throne entitled him to place the diadem on the head of the sovereign. It was to him that Orodes owed his restoration to the supreme power, from which he had been formerly expelled by his own subjects. Surenas had reconquered Seleucia by his own personal valour, and though not yet thirty years of age, he added to all these claims to honour the reputation of the highest wisdom in council and craft in the face of the enemy. Abgarus, it seems, found no difficulty in persuad- ing the infatuated Roman to abandon the The Roman line of the Euphrates, and strike into L i8 utch- d the plains which separate it from the er y ofAb ru '- Tigris, in the face of this formidable opponent. The general character of the country from Zeugma to the 1 Pint. Crasx. 21. 24. It seems probable that Surenas, like garus, was a title, and not an appellative. VOL. II. C 18 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XL Chaboras is both level and sandy, but its barrenness is relieved by patches of cultivated and abundantly fertile soil. Nor are there wanting both streams and wells to supply it with water. There seems, therefore, to be no serious impediment to the pro- gress either of a caravan or an army as far as the river Chaboras, beyond which lies the great desert of Sinjar. 1 It is highly improbable that the army of Crassus ever penetrated into this further region, and we cannot resist the suspicion that the common traditions, upon which the historians relied, ascribed to its march far greater difficulties and privations than it really encountered. Soon after leaving the river side, it is said, the country lost every appear- ance of habitation and fertility. Boundless tracts of light moving sand presented themselves to the eye, without shade or water, undulating like the waves of the sea. The heat was intense, and the spirits of the soldiers sank under the daily repetition of fatigue without refreshment. Artabazes, harassed by the attack of Orodes, excused himself from despatching the promised reinforcements, and entreated the Ro- man general to turn his course in the direction of Armenia. Crassus denounced the unfortunate prince as a traitor, and threatened him with the vengeance of the republic as soon as he should have leisure to execute it. His conduct to Cassius was marked with contemptuous disregard, and the officers, who fore- saw the perils into which they were hurrying, had no other resource than to wreak their ill-humour in bitter reproaches against Abgarus, who retorted with the coolest assurance, asking if they had expected to make a holiday excursion among shady groves and fountains, in a country of baths and hostelries, like their own Campania. At last, on pretence of exe- cuting some secret services he quitted the Roman 1 This is the great desert of Mesopotamia, which Strabo describes as lying beyond the Chaboras (xvi. 1.). A.U.701-B.C.53. UNDEll THE EMPIRE. 19 camp, and escaped from the hands of the eiiemj whom he had entrapped into the desert. 1 It is evident from this account of Plutarch that lie considers the expedition to have proceeded Geographical , , , t_f . difficulties re- several days march irom the point where pectm g the it left the beaten route to the next locality "'' march, which he mentions, the passage of the river Balissus. It was here that Crassus was informed by the piquets which he had sent forward that the Parthians were collected in his front in much greater force than he had been led to expect. If this, then, was the ex- treme limit of his onward progress, he had not left the Euphrates above fifty miles in a straight line behind him ; he had not set foot in the sandy desert at all ; nor had he given any indication that he meant to pursue a route through the centre of Mesopota- mia, for at this point he had not abandoned the highway that leads from Edessa to Nicephorium and Seleucia. We must either consent to regard the whole account we have received of Crassus's errors and misconduct as unworthy of credit, and the charges against him unproved, or we must apply a correction to Plutarch's geography, and believe that he should have pointed out, not the Balissus, but one of the branches, probably the more western, of the Chaboras, for the spot where the army prepared for combat. However this may be, we now find Crassus taken by surprise, and his army thrown at once into confusion. Hasty preparations were made to meet the ei emy ; the order of battle was a deep square of four fronts, with twelve cohorts on each side, supported by a body of cavalry not only on the flanks, but also in front and rear. A moment only was allowed for refreshment on the bank of the rivulet, contrary to the advice of the most experi- enced officers, who recommended a halt and an en- 1 Plut. Crass. 2-2. C 2 20 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS Cfl. XI. campinent for the night. The troops pushed on till they came in sight of the advancing columns of the Parthian cavalry. The enemy had adopted measures to conceal their numbers till the Komans had come close upon them. When the whole of their forces were revealed, with their sweeping clouds of cavalry, glittering, man and horse, in brilliant armour, their banners waving with silk and gold, and the loud clang of their kettle-drums uttering discordant music to European ears 1 , the Eomans were appalled at the sudden discovery both of their numbers aiid resolu- tion. Nevertheless, wearied and breathless The Roman , , 1 1 i and Parthian as they were, they were compelled imme- armies engage. . . . J -p r diately to accept the pronered combat. The shower of arrows with which the Parthians began the fray pierced the armour of the legionary through and through. It nailed his buckler to his arm, and his feet to the ground. Thus far, indeed, he suffered DO worse than the ordinary peril to which he was exposed from the first discharge of the skirmishers at the commencement of a battle, except that the Parthian arrow was a missile of unusual strength and sharpness. But the Parthian bowman was mounted, and the Eoman foot-soldier in vain attempted to close with him. He could shoot as well in the retreat as the charge, and the onset of infantry threw him into no confusion, and afforded not an instant's relief. His quiver was no sooner exhausted than he repaired to his camels in the rear, and quickly reappeared with his stock replenished. Crassus perceived the necessity of employing his cavalry to disperse the enemy, but their numbers were inadequate to such a service. He directed his son Publius to charge, and the gallant young soldier obeyed with too eager 1 Compare Flor. iii. 11. 8., and Plut Crass. 24. Milton (Farad, Regained, iii.) has amassed from the historians and grouped with poetic brilliance the charareristics of Parthian warfare: " He look'd and saw what numbers numberless," &c. 4..U.701-B.C.53. UNDER THE EMPIRE- 21 alacrity. The Parthians gave way, and led him on till they had withdrawn him far from the support of the main body, when they wheeled about, sur- rounded and easily overpowered his scanty squadrons. Young Crassus fought with resolution to the last, and when every hope of victory or rescue had vanished, caused himself to be slain by his shield- Death of the bearer. The father had been nattering ^S, r t himself that the field so suddenly cleared ** by his son's impetuous charge was already his own. He was awakened from his dream by the return of the Parthians, shouting aloud in triumphant exultation, and brandishing the head of their victim on a pike. Crassus stifled his grief and horror with an effort of despair. He hurried from cohort to cohort, uttering such customary words of en- couragement as his alarm or sorrow allowed. The death of Publius, he said, was the loss of a son to his father, but only of a citizen to the republic. But spiritless himself, he was incapable of infusing spirit. The Parthians continued throughout the day to harass the Koman army by a repetition of their usual manosuvres. It was not till nightfall that they allowed them any respite. Not being accustomed to construct camps, they never passed the night in the immediate neighbourhood of an enemy, but retired to a distance, leaving the Eomans to make what use they could of the few hours which would intervene before their reappearance. Crassus himself, over- whelmed with grief and mortification, if not with fear, was incapable of suggesting any counsel or adopting any resolution. Cassius and the other offi- cers promptly set him aside, and took upon them- selves to give the necessary orders. They determined to retreat without a moment's delay. Compelled to leave behind them the wounded, these unfortunate victims, hopeless of receiving quarter, uttered such piercing shrieks as to reach the ears of the Parthian 22 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xi. spies, -who guessed the cause and reported it. Im- mediately the horsemen sprang to their saddles, and speedily overtook the retiring legions. But it would seem that their horses, after a long day's service, were unable to keep pace with the headlong rush They take re- f desperate men. News of the disaster fugeincarrh*. wag gp ee( jiiy conveyed to Carrhae, and the Eoman garrison which was there stationed issued forth to succour and rescue the remnant of the flying army, which it conducted to an asylum of rest and safety. The Parthians contented themselves with the plunder of the camp and the slaughter of the wounded, together with all the stragglers they could intercept, to the number of several thousands. 1 A report was spread in the Parthian cantonments that Crassus and the principal leaders had abandoned the routed army and effected their escape. Surenas was especially anxious to seize the person of the pro- consul, for, according to Oriental notions, the death or captivity of the leader was generally considered decisive of the war. Accordingly, he would have pushed forward in pursuit, and left the fugitives behind him in Carrhae, had he not obtained by a stratagem the information he sought. Having ascer- tained that Crassus was within the walls, he collected his forces and determined to beleaguer the place. But the Parthian tactics were not adapted either to the siege or the blockade. The Romans, distrusting their slight fortifications, or unprovided with the means of subsistence, or more than ever anxious to get within their own frontier, escaped from the for- The Roman tress by night. Each officer seems to have So 9 y ca b r?hi, been allowed to make the best of his way ?n MYeVaYSl- with his own division ; no attempt was made to conduct the retreat in concert. Cassius succeeded in crossing the Euphrates with a small 1 Plut. Crest. 27.; Dion, xl. 25.; Flor. iii. 11. 8. A.C.701-B.C.53. UNDER THE EMl'IRE. 23 body of horse ; Octavius, with a larger division, reached the outskirts of the Armenian hills, and was almost beyond pursuit, when the imminent danger to which the proconsul was exposed behind him induced him to quit his vantage-ground, and descend to save or perish with his general. The Parthians had come up with Crassus, and were pressing closely both upon his rear and flanks. Yet a few hours more, and the shades of evening would receive him within the moun- tain fastnesses, among which the cavalry of his pur- suers would cease to be formidable. Surenas beheld his prey on the point of eluding his grasp ; courage and audacity could hardly secure it, cunning and treachery might yet prevail. He allowed some of his prisoners to escape, after duly preparing them for his purpose, by discoursing in their presence of the goodness and placability of Orodes, and assuring them that the Parthians would be satisfied with fair and reasonable terms of accommodation. At the same time he sent messengers to Crassus stratagem of to propose a capitulation. The escaped fngagTcrassu. prisoners repaired to the camp of their in conference - countrymen, and spread among them their own conviction of the good faith and moderation of the enemy. Crassus had the sense to distrust their representations ; but the army became clamorous, and began to threaten violence, shaking their arms in a tumultuary manner. The proconsul believed himself compelled to yield, though not without protesting to his officers that he was coerced by the insubordi- nation of his own soldiers, the greatest disgrace that could befal an imperator. The Parthian chieftain made the fairest professions, and arranged that the meeting between them should take place in the company of a few chosen officers on each side. The Roman imperator approached, attended by his staff, but all, it would appear, disarmed and dismounted. Crassus was received at first with the highest demon- 24 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xi. strations of respect, and Surenas, according to the Parthian custom, ordered a horse with golden housings to be brought forward for his use. The proconsul would have sent for his own charger, but the Parthian offered him one of his own in the name of Orodes the king. The feeble and bewildered old man was lifted abruptly into the saddle, and the Parthian grooms began to goad the steed and urge him towards the enemy. The attendants of Crassus vainly en- deavoured to arrest his doom. Octavius and another officer named Petronius seized the reins, while others attempted to cut them. Confusion ensued, and blows were interchanged. Octavius seized a Parthian's sword, and slew one of the grooms, but was imme- diately cut down by a blow from behind. In the A fray ensue.. ^ ra Crassus himself received a mortal wound from the hand of a Parthian named Pomaxaithras. Such was the most credible account of the matter, but nothing certain was known. Others of the Eomans fell also in the scuffle ; the remainder escaped to the army, and the Parthians now suffered the fugitives to make their way unmo- lested to the hills. Many, indeed, surrendered to Surenas, who assured them that with the death of their general hostilities should cease. We do not hear that they received any ill-treatment ; though, from the temper in which, as we shall see, the remains of Crassus were insulted, we cannot suppose that they met with the respect due to honourable captives. Detained for years among their foreign captors, they ended with adopting their customs and manners, intermarried with the families of the barbarians, and renounced the country of their ancestors. 1 It was 1 Hor. Od. iii. 5. 5. : " Milesnc Crassi conjuge barbara Turpis maritus vixit," &c. And according to Velleius ii. 82. and Floras iv. 10. M. Antonius, in his campaign of A.U. 718, found prisoners from the army of Crassus A.U.701-B.C.58. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 25 calculated that twenty thousand men perished in this calamitous expedition, and that half that number were made prisoners. The victor sent the head and hand of Crassus to Orodes ; but he would have been better The p ftr thjaiu pleased to have conducted his prisoner alive ,T h " c "t8 h with into the royal presence, as he is said to have ot-Vm^k ' 6 promised. He amused his soldiers, and trium P h - gratified his own vanity, by the performance of a ceremony in mockery of a Eoman triumph. The proconsul was represented by one of the captives, who was supposed to bear some personal resemblance to him. The substitute was tawdrily arrayed in female garments, and compelled to answer to the title of Imperator, with which his fellow-prisoners were ordered to address him. The voluptuous and dissi- pated habits attributed to Crassus and his officers were made subjects of scornful ridicule, and the licentious books which were found in the Eoman tents were paraded with a mockery of indignation. 1 It seems that the Parthians were well pleased to offer such a spectacle to their effeminate Greek subjects : but they, on their part, failed to draw the inference which their masters intended, and thought it incon- sistent in Surenas to deride the licentiousness of the Eomans, when he was himself accompanied to the field by his battalion of concubines, and rejoiced in the lewd music and dancing of a train of slaves, and when the throne of the Arsacidae was so often filled by the offspring of strange and disgraceful alliances. They compared, indeed, his array to the figure of a viper, bristling in front with its armed warriors and in the Parthian service. Compare Justin, xlii. 5. ThedayofCrassus's death, vi. Id. Jun. or June 8, is fixed by Ovid, Fast. vi. 465. See Fischer, p 253. 1 It should be observed, however, that Crassus himself was un- stained with the grosser vices of his class: " Vir coetera sanctissimiiR, immunisque volnptatibns." Veil. ii. 46. 26 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XI. horses, but disgusting and squalid behind, with its train of women, with their timbrels, and songs, and bacchanalian orgies. 1 While these events were in progress, Orodes came indignities to terms with the Armenian Artabazes, and mnTfnsof' 16 accepted the hand of his daughter for his c^us. own gon p acorus . This auspicious union received new lustre from the triumph of Surenas. The festivals with which it was celebrated were fashioned upon Grecian models ; so soon had the rude descendants of Arsaces resigned themselves to the fascinating luxuries of their semi-Hellenic capital. Orodes was well skilled in the language and literature of Greece ; Artabazes even composed tragedies after the Grecian model, and wrote historical works in that tongue. When the head of Crassus was brought to the door of the banqueting hall, a Greek actor from Tralles began to recite appropriate verses from the Bacchanals of Euripides; when the bloody trophy was thrown at the feet of the assembled guests, he seized it in his hands, and enacted with it the frenzy of Agave and the mutilation of Pentheus. The story that molten gold was poured into the mouth of the avaricious Roman is not mentioned by Plutarch, from whom we receive such minute details of the insults practised on his remains. But the testimony of an earlier writer shows that it was already currently reported 2 , nor is there any improbability in the cir- cumstance to induce us to disbelieve it. Such was the end of the unfortunate triumvir. It Reflections on was many years since a Roman proconsul the cmlsi.fhe had thus miserably perished at the head of father and son. an armv w hich he had led to destruction. 1 Pint. Crass. 32. 1 Florus, iii. 11. 11., at the end of Trajan's reign, about one hundred and seventy years after the event. The commentators on this passage have collected several analogous stories from Appian, Pliny, Justin, Zosimus, and more modern writers. A.D rOl-B.C.53. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 27 The names of Carrhse and Cannae were coupled together on the bloodiest page of the national annals. The fate of the general was held up by poets and historians as a beacon for the warning of ambitious statesmen, and possibly his errors were magnified to screen the want of conduct and discipline in the licentious armies of the east. Not a single voice has been raised through all ages in lamentation over his untimely death, except in so far as it tended to pre- cipitate the confusion of his country's affairs, and the overthrow of her constitution. But the son deserves at least to be exempted from the pitiless scorn which clings for ever to the name of the father, and to be honoured as the gallant Lausus of Roman history. 1 Enough that his memory has found a shrine in the pages of the philosopher whom he most revered, and of the commander whom he strove to imitate.' 2 At Rome the year 701 had opened with an inter- regnum, which was itself an important step Al. J- j.- 1 l. a.u A f A. U.701, in the direction in which the intrigues ot B.C. 53. -P. . . . _., . Interregnum : rompeius pointed. Ihe mterreges were the tribunes J l -J.J. A- r it. prevent the assigned by a committee consisting of the election of 75 i r AU L 1 r> 1. consul.. patrician members ot the senate/ Each m- terrex in turn held the office for five days only; and the principal object of their appointment was under- stood to be that they might summon and preside over the comitia for the election of consuls. They dis- charged, however, in the meantime, the general func- 1 Virg. Mn. x. 811.: " Quo moriture ruis, mnjoraque viribus audes? Fallit te incautum pictas tua." * Cic. ad Qu. Fr. ii. 9. : " P. Crassus, adolescens nostri studiosis simus." Ad Div. v. 8. : " Hoc magis sum Publio deditus quod me niaxime sicut alterum parentem etobservat et diligit." Ad Div. xiii. 16.: "P. Crassum ex omni nobilitate adolescentem dilexi plurimum." Compare Brut. 81.: "Erat cum institutus optime turn etiam pcrfecte planeque eruditus; ineratque et ingenium satis acre, et orationis non inelegans copia; pnetereaque sine arrogantin gravis esse videbatur ct sine segnitia verecundtis." See also Caes. B.O. i. 52., ii. 34., iii. 7. * Ascon. ary. in Milan, init. 28 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS SB. XL tions of the chief magistrates. But a power so limited in duration was merely nominal. The executive was paralysed, and almost every one was interested in devising means to terminate so disastrous an inter- ruption to the ordinary course of affairs. The cry for a dictatorship rose more and more loud above the murmurs of personal and party interests, for it was only by the creation of a supreme autocrat that the free-state had provided for disentangling the most desperate complications of her affairs. Pompeius affected indifference, and pretended to keep aloof from the confusion, but his creatures were labouring actively in his behalf. The nobles were full of apprehension and anxiety. Cato unravelled and denounced the plot against the liberties of the commonwealth ; Cicero was silent. 1 In the meantime the tribunes, or some at least of their number, continued to play into the hands of the triumvir, by obstinately opposing all at- tempts to assemble the comitia. In former times, the appointment of interreges had been an object of tra- ditional jealousy to the protectors of the plebs, inas- much as the constitution allowed the plebeians no share in their election. 2 But now they not only acquiesced in that temporary arrangement, but seemed resolved to perpetuate it, until the senate should be compelled to resort to the creation of an irresponsible ruler. The nobles, however, held out with more than usual firmness, and even took the vigorous step of im- prisoning one of the tribunes, Q. Pompeius Eufus, a grandson of Sulla, whose hostile proceedings were the most violent. To put this bold stroke in execution, they were enabled to employ the strong arm of the triumvir himself. In the absence of consuls and praetors, the tribunes, who since the abrogation of Sulla's enactmentB, had been constantly encroaching 1 Cic. ad Qu. Fr. iii. 9. " Ego quiesco. " Liv. iv. 43. : " Coire patricios tribuni prohibcbant." A.U.701-B.C.53. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 29 upon the functions of the other magistrates, under- took almost the entire management of the affairs of the city. Even Pompeius was offended at their in- solent usurpations. The absence of his colleagues, and the disruption of the peculiar ties which bound him to Caesar 1 , gave a freer scope to the aristocratic prejudices of his youth. He was already revolving in his mind the expediency of returning to his former alliances, when he consented to become the instru- ment of the senate in thus chastising tribunitian dictation. 2 He waited for the most graceful . ~, . . j . , . , Pompeius at opportunity tor offering his mediation, and ien g ti. inter- interfered at last to bring the matter to a aonMiit decision, by prevailing on his own friends to give way, and consent to the election of consuls. 3 The ostensible causes of its postponement had van- ished, and the ground being cleared, it was only decent in one so studious of appearances to prepare the foundation of a new edifice. The Silent Judgment which the senate had instituted upon the conduct of the several candidates had been put off on various excuses, till the public had ceased to be interested in its pro- secution ; the competitors stood with erect front before the people whose suffrages they demanded ; Cicero himself had defended and obtained the acquittal of 1 Pompeius was the more free to act without deferring to Caesar at this moment because he had just lent him one of his own proconsulai legions. Cses. B.G. vi. 1.; Dion, xl. 65. Plutarch (Cces. 25.) says two, but this is an error. 2 But such a violation of the sacred person of the tribune must have been an act of flagrant illegality, and we look in vain for any further explanation of the circumstances. The story is told by Dion, xl 45. 3 Plut. Pomp. 54. : alSfo-Bfls eVe^A^flTj. Dion, xl. 46. This writer is incorrect in saying that the dictatorship was offered to Pompeius: the offer was proposed by Lucceius Hirrus, one of the tribunes, but the question was never formally entertained. Among other sugges- tions of the tribunes one was to return to the government by military tribunes, a board of several members. Perhaps it was this that in- duced 1'omi tins to take the part of the senate- 30 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XI. Scaurus ; perjury and corruption raised their heads triumphantly ; and it might be expected with reason that no public man would ever be condemned again, except upon a charge of murder. 1 in the seventh _i^ i j.- r 11 r\ f% -i- n 1 month of the The election tell upon Cn. Domitms Cal- vinus and M. Valerius Messala, who at last entered upon their office in the seventh month of the year. 2 Although the- blow had thus been averted for a General moment, yet the opinion was rapidly gain- necelsi" y of h a e m g ground, in the midst of these dissen- sions, that affairs were tending irresistibly to the creation of a dictator. The powers of the state could not long exist by the mere counteraction and collision of one with another. The strength of their materials was too sorely tried. The genuine patriotism and singleness of purpose through which alone, and by no nice adj ustment of its functions and forces, the machine of government had in reality been in ancient times preserved, were found to have given way altogether. The constitution of the com- monwealth stood in need of an organic change ; the exorbitant power of individuals could only be ba- lanced by conferring an adequate share of political importance on the wealth and intelligence of a lower class. Probably the establishment of a permanent military police, such as that which the emperors after- wards maintained in the city, was absolutely neces- sary to secure the freedom of councils and elections ; yet the hand to which this force was intrusted could hardly fail to establish a monarchical domination. What was it then that still retarded a consumma- iti. only re- tion which seemed so imminent ? It would recofiec b tTon hc of appear that Cicero and the more moderate 110^ SUH". politicians whom he represented would have 1 This was Cicero's own remark at the beginning of these proceed- ings (ad Ait. iv. 16."). a Dion, xl. 45 A.U.701-B.C.53. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 31 acquiesced in the temporary appointment of a dic- tator, according to the old traditional policy of the state, as at least a necessary evil, fondly blinding themselves to the risk of its becoming perpetual. The knights and others of the middle class would doubtless expect the vigour of an irresponsible governor to overflow in measures for the elevation of their own order. The multitude, always apt to ap- plaud a striking change, had no longer that appre- hension of a dictator which he was wont to inspire when he was the instrument of the patricians for overruling the insolence of the tribunes. Even the nobles might have remembered that the last dictator- ship had been the creation of their own hands, and all its measures directed to their own aggrandise- ment. Pompeius, however much he had wavered in their cause, was still the pupil, the follower, the admirer of Sulla, the heir to his fame, to his army, to his political career. Besides, the cautious decorum with which he had conducted himself for many years had secured him the reputation, however unmerited, of moderation and humanity, and he might be ex- pected to make a mild, perhaps a bloodless use of absolute authority. Nevertheless, it was from the nobles that the opposition to this appointment princi- pally came. The proscriptions of Sulla and Marius had made an indelible impression on the minds of the generation next succeeding. The dream of blood still flitted before their unclosed eyes ; the name of dictator was indissolubly connected with the idea of unimaginable horrors. 1 The life of a citizen was still sacred in the eyes of the conquerors and butchers of the world. Could a Pompeius bear rule in a state in which a Caesar was a subject? Unless the one were massacred, the other must be overthrown. 1 Dion, xl. 45.: iriibs yap T^V rou StJAAou !UOT>/TO t^'iaovv iravrti 32 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. n. Murder would succeed to murder, revolution would breed revolution. The door to violence being once opened could never be shut against the torrents of blood that would dash through it. The conviction was forced upon them that the question was not that of the appointment of a temporary dictator, but of a succession of tyrants. The weight of these sentiments and reasonings was reinforced by the ponderous mass of selfish Selfishness and , i i -11 L 3 j blindness of voluptuousness, which, with no extended the oligarchy. -PI,- U view ot ulterior consequences, would not consent to relinquish or abridge its gratifications at the bidding of a social reformer. No aristocracy was ever more short-sighted at the crisis of its fate than the once glorious patriciate of Eome. It clung des- perately to its privileges, not from a fond regard to their antiquity, or their connexion with any social or religious prejudices ; disdained to invoke the watch- words of patriotism or utility ; it took up its ground upon the enactments 'which Sulla had made to en- hance its own wealth and power and depress those of its rivals, and contended with its assailants upon purely selfish considerations. Without a policy and without a leader the nobles went staggering onward in their blind conflict with the forces arrayed against them, and Pompeius, not daring to take the single step which still remained between him and the post he coveted, left everything a prey to sus- pense and confusion. At last the force of circum- stances had thrust the prize even to his feet; he gazed at it and sighed over it, but did not stoop to take it up. The appointment of consuls had no effect in re- storing public order. The senate indeed Tranquillity , ., , . , notrcitoredby passed one decree, ostensibly ot consider- meiu'of able importance, which forbade the consuls and praetors to assume the government of a province till the fifth year from the expiration of A.C.701-B.C.53. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 33 their office in the city. 1 It was hoped, perhaps, that this limitation would materially check the eagerness of the candidates. 2 This, however, was the only measure of reform that could be carried. The con- suls and senate clad themselves publicly in ^, v . 702t mourning 3 when they found that, as in pre- B - c - 5i! - vious years, it was impossible to effect the election of the ordinary magistrates. Among the various candi- dates, Milo sued for the consulship and Clodius for the praetorship : the violence of the one and the in- triguing spirit of the other rendered any decision more than ever unattainable. The new year opened, like the preceding, with an interregnum. It was speedily distinguished from its predecessor by a fla- grant crime and its long train of consequences. In the middle of January it happened that Milo was travelling along the Appian Way. He was accom- panied in his carriage by his wife, a large retinue of servants was in attendance upon him, and he was followed, according to his wont, by a troop of gladia- tors. The object of his journey was at least osten- sibly peaceful, since he was on his way to perform certain ceremonies attached to his municipal dicta- torship at Lanuvium. At a few miles' distance from the city he was met by Clodius, who was on horse- back, with a small company of armed attendants. Such modes of travelling were not unusually adopted for the sake of security even in the neighbourhood of Rome; but the lives of men in the position of Milo and Clodius were never safe from sudden vio- lence, and their journeying with military escorts could be no proof that their designs were sinister, or that the meeting was on either side premeditated. Cicero, in his defence of Milo, lays great stress on 1 Dion, xl. 46. * This judicious enactment we shall find revived under ihe imperial system of Aogustus. Dion, liii. 14. 1 Dion, xl. 45. VOL. II. D 34 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CM. XT. * the nature of his retinue, which he adduces in proof that he had no intention of waylaying his enemy, while, on the other hand, he tries to fasten a suspi- cion of the kind on Clodius. However this may be, a quarrel ensued between Affrav the servants on each side ; blows were ex- aodi e n and changed, and Clodius himself, wounded in the scuffle, took refuge in a tavern by the road-side. The fury of Milo was ungovernable. Violence once committed, he resolved to carry it through. He attacked the house, caused Clodius olain : ' , his enemy to be dragged from his conceal- ment, and slain. The corpse lay in the road, till it was picked up by a passing friend, and brought to Rome. The adherents of the murdered man exposed it to the view of the populace, who worked them- selves into frenzy at the sight. A riot Riot and con- , , * , . , nagration in ensued ; benches, books and papers were snatched from the curia in which the senate was wont to assemble, and the tumultuary pyre involved part of the forum in its conflagra- tion. 1 The house of Milo and that of the interrex M. Lepidus were attacked, but the assailants were received with coolness and determination, and re- pulsed with bloodshed. So great was the popular clamour against the murderer, that he dared not at first submit himself to trial. He was preparing to withdraw into voluntary exile ; but his friends rallied about him ; the violence of the Clodians worked some reaction of opinion in his favour 8 , and a majority of 1 Dion, xl. 49. ; App. B. C. ii. 21. ; Ascon. arg. in Milan.: " Quo igne et ipsa quoque curia flagravit, et item Porcia basilica, quao erat ei adjuncta, ambusta est." The burning of the Caria Hostilia and the adjoining buildings cleared the space for the improvements intro- duced afterwards by Caesar. There was another great fire in the year 703. in the western part of the forum, that is, nearly on the same spot. Oros. vi. 13. * Ascon. L c. : "Incendium curiae majorem ali^uanto indignationein civitatis moverat ouam Clodii csedes." A.n.:02-n.c.52. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 35 the tribunes was known to be generally favourable to his party. He was encouraged to remain in the city and try the effect of wholesale bribery, by distri- buting a largess among the poorer citizens. 1 But riot succeeded to riot, and the populace refused even to listen to the excuses which the culprit pleaded in his defence. The senate, crippled in its executive branch, felt its authority defied by both parties, whom it could neither mediate between nor confront before an equitable tribunal. It adopted .. ,. ,, , A commission the expedient ot nominating a commission, appointed fur . .T ~ ,, . . ,? . ., I the trial of consisting ot the interrex, the tribunes and MHO. The Pompeius, to whom it intrusted conjointly tkdietator- , - ... , J J ship thrust the solemn charge ot providing tor the intopompeius- safety of the state. Pompeius was allowed to collect a military force to overawe the turbu- lent multitude. The substance of the dictatorship was thus thrust into his hands ; for what authority could his colleagues exert against the commander of an army at the gates, or even in the forum? Still, however, the title was withheld ; some secret intrigues prevailed to thwart the cherished wish ; still Pompeius hesitated to demand it. Caesar had by this time arrived at Lucca, and was intently watching the crisis. 2 His immediate vicinity gave a new stimulus to the efforts of his partisans, and honours were lavishly decreed him in acknowledg- ment of his late victories. So close at hand, the senate was apprehensive of his not only resenting the elevation of his rival to an avowed dic- tatorship, but claiming a share in the consular dignity for himself. Accordingly, with the sanction of Cato and Bibulus, the nobles invented a middle way to reconcile the conflicting pretensions of the jealous allies, by refusing Pompeius the dictator- 1 Appian, B. C. ii. 22. * Caps, B. G. vi. ult. : " Ibi cognoscit de Clodii csede." u 2 36 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XL ship, but decreeing his appointment as sole consul. 1 He ii declared Pompeius himself was absent from the ?. C.?" 1 ' city 5 but t ne public appearance of the candidate was dispensed with ; the suf- frages of the tribes were not solicited ; it is even doubtful whether any forms of popular election were maintained. The trial of Milo was the principal object for The trial of which these irregularities were committed, dat'ion Irfhu" f r it required extraordinary measures to advocate.. g^ ye e ff ec ^ t o judicial proceedings in such a case. The character of the accused and the in- fluence which he exerted, combined with the osten- tatious lawlessness of his enemies to make a fair decision hopeless. It was the part of a vigorous magistrate at least to repress violence, and for this purpose the consul did not hesitate to fill the avenues to the forum, and even the steps and porticoes of the temples which surrounded it, with files of soldiers', a spectacle never before witnessed by Roman eyes. Cicero, on rising to defend the criminal, was assailed with such cries and menaces from the populace as almost to make him quail from the attempt. The sight of the consul's military dispositions was too 1 Dion, xl. 50. : T$ flofjarrjiifi r^v inraTeiav. Siart ^ SiKrdrtapa avrbv \tx&fjvcu, tol i*6vq> yt, "va ^ 6 Kcuaap avrqj ffwdpfy, $6rrfS. Appian, B. C. ii. 23.; Plut. Pomp. 54.; Liv. Epit. cvii.: " Cnseus Pompeins a senatu consul tertiam factus est, absens et solas, quod nulli alii ntiquam comigit." To crown this series of irregularities it must be remembered that he was at the same time proconsul. On all these accounts Brutus branded this appointment as a dictatorship, the assignment of irresponsible power by an irresponsible authority. Qnintil. Inst. ix. 3. 95. " quale apnd Brutum de dictatura Cn. Pompeii." 2 Pint. Cic. 34.; Schol. Bob. in Milan, p. 276.; Lucan.i. 319.: " Quis castra timenti Nescit mixta foro, gladii cum triste minantes Judicium insolita trepidum cinxere corona, Atque auso medias perrumpere mi lite leges Pompeiana reum clau?erunt signa Milonem ?" A,0.702-b.c.52. UNDEll THE EMPIRE. 37 novel and alarming to reassure Mm. He hurried through his speech, abashed and dispirited : Milo goei into his client lost his cause, and was condemned " c e i'cero^r e o fc to banishment. 1 On returning to his own Milone - house Cicero recovered to a sense of the glorious opportunity he had lost, and sate down to compose the magnificent oration which has descended to posterity as his defence of Milo. 2 The orator had executed a splendid declamation, and his vanity prompted him to send it to his client at Massilia. The exile perused it, and replied that he esteemed himself fortunate that so convincing a speech had not actually been delivered, else, he said, I should not now be enjoying the delicious mullets of this place ; a reply which may perhaps have passed with Cicero as a pleasant jest, but which, as Dion shrewdly remarks, must have been meant as a bitter sarcasm on the timidity of the orator in the forum and his vanity in the closet. 3 1 The judges, according to a new enactment of Pompeius, were selected by lot to the number of eighty-one: this number was re- duced by challenge on either side to fifty-one. On this occasion their votes were given in the following proportions: " Senatores con- demnaverunt xii., absolverunt vi. Equites condemnaverunt xiii., absolverunt iv. Tribuni aerarii condemnaverunt xiii., absolverunt iii." Ascon. p. 53. Immediately after his conviction on the charge de vi, Milo was accused of ambitus, and condemned in his absence. He was again accused de sodalitiis, of conspiracy, and condemned a third time. * Dion, xl. 54. : XP V V iro ^' vwrfpov Kal Kara o\o\)}v ai'adapa-ijcras eypatyf. The writer of the Scholia Bobiensia mentions that in his time the original speech was existing: " Existit alius praeterea liber actorum pro Milone, in quo omnia interrupta et hnpolita et rudia, plena deniquc inaximi terroris agnoscas." This must have been the " report " of the speech inserted perhaps in the Acta Diurna. See Leclerc's dissertation, Journaux Publics rhez IKS Eomainn. * Dion, xl. 54. ' 38 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CHAPTER XII. Ctesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul, A.O. 702, B.C. 52. Vcrcinge- torix effects a coalition between the Belgians and Arvernians. Csesar takes Gcnabnm and Avaricnm. Wise and spirited policy of Vercinjretorix. Siege of Gergovia, Revolt of the jEdui. Caesar compelled to raise the siege : He effects a junction with Labicnus in Belgium and retreats towards the Province. He obtains a victory, and blockades the Gaulish Army. Great operations before Alesia. Triumph o f the Romans, and submission of Vercin Kal pfvudriav irapa- rptiroutvcav a.ffd-x They consent twenty fortresses of the Bituriges were to destroy levelled to the ground, and similar havoc was made throughout the territories of the i allies. But when the fate of Avaricum itself came to be discussed, whether it should be defended or destroyed, the Bituriges could hold out no longer. Their deputies threw themselves at the feet of the assembled Grauls, and interceded with piteous cries for the preservation of their beautiful and, as they deemed, impregnable city. The hearts of the chief- tains were moved to compassion. Vercingetorix at first sternly resisted representations which he knew to be delusive. But when the rest gave way, he at last yielded to the general clamour, and consented that the place should be maintained and an ample force assigned for its defence. The site of Avaricum was admirably calculated for defence. It stood on a hill, and a narrow , . . , Avaricum causeway between a river and a morass captured by afforded the only approach to it. 2 These natural advantages had been improved by art, and the devoted garrison now proceeded to strengthen their defences within the walls. The combined exer- tions of the Roman legions were applied to draw lines of circumvallation around them, while the principal force of the Gaulish league watched these operations at a short distance, and cut off the sup- plies destined by the Boii and JEdm for the hostile camp. While the Bituriges within their city were hard pressed by the machinery which the Roman engineers directed against their walls, the forces of the proconsul, on their side, were harassed by the exchanged for that of the people, i. e. Bituriges, and thence the modern Bourges and the name of the province Berri. 1 Cues. B. G. vii. 20. * Cscs. B. G. vii. 17 : Dion, xl. 34. VOL. II. E 50 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS Ctt. xtl. fatigues of the siege and the scarcity of provisions. Caesar is lavish of praise in speaking of the forti- tude with which his soldiers bore their privations : they refused to allow him to raise the siege; and when he at last led them against the enemy's army, and finding it too strongly posted for an attack, with- drew them again within their lines, they submitted to the disappointment, and betook themselves once more without a murmur to the tedious operations of the blockade. The skill of the assailants at length triumphed over the bravery of the defenders. The walls were approached by towers at various points, and mounds constructed against which the com bustible missiles of the besieged were unavailing. Finally, a desperate sally was repulsed, and then, at last, the constancy of the Bituriges began to fail. Taking advantage of a moment when the watch on the walls had relaxed its vigilance, Caesar marshalled his legions behind his works 1 , and poured them suddenly against the opposing ramparts. They gained the summit of the walls, which the defenders abandoned without a blow, rallying, however, in the middle of the town, in such hasty array as the emergency would allow. A bloody struggle ensued ; both parties were numerous, and, still burning to avenge the massacre of their countrymen at Genabum, the assailants gave no quarter. The Gauls were routed and exterminated, their women and children mercilessly slaughtered, and the great central city of Gaul fell into the hands of the conquerors without affording a single captive for their triumph. 2 The influence of the champion of Gaulish inde- vercingetorix pendence, far from declining, rather gained Sura^e'rfthe strength by this disaster, for he could represent that the defence of Avaricum had thwarted the policy he so warmly recommended, 1 Caes. B. G. vii. 27.: " Legiones intra vineas in occulto expe- dite." 2 Oa>s B. G. vii. 2228. A.U.702-B.C.52. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 51 and to which, in that single instance, the allies had refused to accede. He now instructed his followers, abandoning their regular fortresses, to defend them- selves with temporary works, according to the Koman practice, which the Gauls had never before adopted. Nor were the rest of the tribes discouraged : many reinforcements arrived, notwithstanding the great losses the cause had sustained ; the numbers of the confederates were recruited by new levies, and the Komaus found their enemy no less formidable than before in actual strength, and much more so in ex- perience and confidence. Hitherto the ./Edui had acted with great indecision. They had refused assistance to the Bituriges when that unfortunate people, urged to co^duc^'o^the revolt by the Arvernians, had solicited ,. , T I ,1 . among them . their protection to enable them to remain interference of faithful to Eome. This refusal, veiled by a flimsy pretext, had thrown the Bituriges into the arms of the confederates, and had brought upon them the destruction of their capital. The attack of Vercinge- torix upon the Boii was intended to force the ^Edui to a declaration of their sentiments ; but Caesar's sudden diversion on the north withdrew the enemy, and relieved them from this pressure. On the other hand, the proconsul complained that the provisions and stores he required came slowly and scantily to his camp, until the capture of Avaricum gave him abundant supplies. The counsels of the yEdui vacil- lated through internal divisions. At the commence- ment of the spring they held their annual election of a vergobret, and then these dissensions came to a head. While a faction among the chiefs tried to thrust into the office a noble of the name of Cotus, who, as brother of the late vergobret, was by the law excluded from it, the priests, at the head of the dominant party, selected a youth of birth and distinction, named in the Roman version of his Gaulish appellation E 2 52 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. all. Convictolitans. The rival candidates appealed to Caesar, and consented to abide by his decision. The popular party he probably considered the most favour- able to his own policy, and their appointment he accordingly confirmed. 1 But, having performed this act of friendly interference, he demanded his reward: he required the nation to co-operate vigorously with him, and to furnish him with a contingent of ten thousand men. Having imposed these orders upon his clients, Csesar proceeded to divide his Koman the'coimtry of forces into two armies. He placed four and lays'^ege legions under the command of Labienus, whom he charged to take up his quarters in the country of the Senones, and from thence main- tain the obedience of the central states ; with the re- maining six he crossed from the Loire to the Allier, intending to make his way to Gergovia of the Arverni. His vigilant enemy was not off his guard. Vercinge- torix had broken the bridges, and was guarding the fords of the latter river. If the energy of both com- manders was equal, the skill of the Koman was superior. By a feigned movement he drew off his adversary's attention, and speedily restored the means of crosring. Caesar's camp was always fur- nished with implements and workmen, and he owed much of his success to the skill of his engineers. He transported his army across the Allier with his usual celerity; and Vercingetorix, surprised to find his flank thus suddenly turned, cautiously and firmly declined a general engagement. Caesar held his course along the left bank of the Allier towards Ger- govia, the enemy retreating with no less steadiness 1 There is some obscurity in Ctesar's account of this transaction (vii. 33.): " Intermissis magistratibus " I understand, with Hotoman, to refer to the law that two individuals of the same family should not succeed one another in the supreme magistracy. A.U.702-B.C.52. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 53 before him. 1 He arrived before the ramparts on the fifth day, but was foiled in his turn by finding on inspection that the place was too strong in situation and defences to be captured by assault. It was im- possible to form a regular siege until the necessary provision for the troops had been collected and for- warded to the camp. He contented himself for the moment with a successful attack upon an important position in the neighbourhood, carrying it by a bold and skilful movement in the night. 2 Meanwhile, Convictolitans, the vergobret of the i, had resolved to betray the patron to ThejE( i ui whom he owed his appointment, and to "cre't^Ro- precipitate his country into war with the ^"e'dudld 1 Komans. He took his measures with Lita- and P arUoned - vicus, the commander of the levies which his nation had consented to send to Csesar, and planned a scheme for deceiving the soldiers, and hurrying the people blindly into revolt. In the midst of their march Litavicus suddenly caused his men to halt, and brought forward certain persons whom he had instructed to announce that the proconsul had just put his ^Eduau hostages to the sword, and reserved the same fate for the -very troops who were at that moment marching into his toils. 3 The stratagem succeeded; the JEduans, seized with indignation, slew all the Romans within their reach, and Litavicus transmitted the news to Bibracte, with representa- tions calculated to inflame the passions of the nation, 1 The site of Gergovia of the Arverni is supposed to be a liill near the Allier, four miles south of the modern Clermont Ferraud in Auvergne. The Koniiins seem to have neglected Gergovia, and to have founded the neighbouring city, to which they gave the name Augustouemetuin. The Roman city became known after- wards as Civitas Arveruorum, in the middle ages, Arverna, and then, from the situation of its castle, clarus mons, Clermout. See d'Anville, Notice de la Gaule, in voc. , Mannert, n. i. 131. Comp. Napoleon, Hist, de Ccesar, ii. p. 268. - Cu;s. B. G. vii. 3436. 1 Cses. B. G. vii. 38. : Dion. xl. 37. 54 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS en. xu and strengthen the hands of Convictolitans by com- mitting it irrevocably to the Gaulish cause. A massacre of the Eoman settlers ensued, as "the ordi- nary preliminary of revolt. At this moment, the ^Eduans in the proconsul's camp, the same whom he was represented to have murdered, were contriving a plot for his destruction. The feebleness of one of the conspirators revealed the danger, and Caesar marched forth with his usual decision to meet the troops of Litavicus, while they were still awaiting fresh orders from Bibracte. Instead of attacking and crushing them by force of arms, he showed them the persons of their countrymen, whose supposed assassi- nation had excited them to revolt. Overwhelmed with surprise and terror, Litavicus threw himself on the proconsul's mercy. The soldiers disowned the authority of their general; the general disclaimed the acts of his goverment; every one hastened to plead for himself, and to make the most abject pro- fessions of obedience for the future. 1 With these professions Caesar was forced to be content. The adherence of the ^Edui was of too much importance to allow him to indulge in vengeance, or even in just retribution for the murder of his countrymen. He led back the contingent of Litavicus to his camp before Grergovia, where his presence was required to revive the courage of the division he had left be- hind, which had repelled one attack from Ver- cingetorix, and was in immediate apprehension of another. It seemed, indeed, notwithstanding this success, that heavy clouds were gathering around Engagement ~ , J . . before the Caesar s position. He was aware that the g^i^csesur yEdui still meditated defection, the more so as they could not persuade themselves that he would persist in his clemency when the danger 1 Cses. B. G. vii. 3844. A.P.702-B.C.52. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 55 of the moment was passed. They held the key of the road which led to his legions at Agedincum, and the situation of his forces, thus separated by a wide tract of hostile country, was eminently pre- carious. He pressed forward to Gergovia ; but with no hope of forcing the Gaulish leader to a battle, or making any important impression upon the centre of the confederacy. He was only anxious to perform some creditable feat of arms, and then withdraw his forces northward without the appearance of a check. 1 Vercingetorix had posted his army midway on the declivity, at the summit of which the city stood, and he had imitated so well the science of his enemies in surrounding his position with fortifications that he could not be compelled to fight. He had also taken possession of several elevated spots in the neighbour- hood, from which he commanded the Eoman camp in every direction. Frequent skirmishes took place between the cavalry on both sides ; and CaBsar gained a momentary advantage by deceiving the enemy with a feigned movement, and inveigling him to a dis- tance from his encampment. The bulk of the Koman forces advanced boldly up the hill, penetrated the almost deserted lines, and found themselves, breath- less and astonished at their success, beneath the walls of the town. The Gauls within were struck with panic at this sudden apparition. A cry arose among the unarmed population that the scenes of Avaricum were about to be repeated ; the women threw their ornaments and treasures over the walls ; some even leaped into the arms of the assailants, hoping to earn their mercy by precipitate submission. Meanwhile, Caesar, satisfied with the achievement of the day, gave the signal for retreat. He had no intention of making a serious attack upon Gergovia, which he could not hope to take, still less to keep if taken. 1 Cs- B. G. vii. 44, 66 HISTORY OF THE ROMA.NS CH. XTl. But the ardour of his soldiers had led them too far ; the hasty return of the Gaulish army placed them be- tween two enemies. But for the prodigious exertions of the tenth legion, which, under Caesar's immediate command, hung on the rear and flanks of Vercinge- torix, they would have been crushed between the pressure of stone walls and overwhelming numbers. The struggle was long and dubious ; the several divi- sions of both armies seemed inextricably entangled with one another ; the unequal combat of horse with foot, of the light with the heavy-armed, of one above with another below, of one behind a wall ur a hedge with another exposed and defenceless, all contributed to the uncertainty of the issue and rapid fluctuations of success. The Roman general was at last enabled to draw off his troops with ill-concealed precipita- tion. So great was their loss, so dire their discou- ragement, that it was only to save the appearance of a rout that Caesar postponed his retreat for two days. The Grauls abandoned themselves to the full intoxi- cation of a success beyond their most sanguine hopes. Even the Roman writers enumerated this among the few instances in which their illustrious hero was worsted. 1 Caesar himself passes it lightly over; nor certainly was his defeat of such extent or character as would have done him serious injury under other circumstances than those in which he actually stood. 3 1 Suet. Jul. 25. : " Per tot successus ter nee amplius adversum casum expertus: in Britannia classe vi tempestatis prope absunita ; et in Gallia ad Gergoviam legionc fusa ; et in Germanorum h'nihus Titurio et Aurunculeio legatis per insidias ca;sis." 4 Cses. vii. 52, 53. Dion (xl. 36.) takes the same view. Cresar takes care to mention that he gained the advantage in two cavalry skirmishes before he abandoned his quarters. On the other hand, Orosius says that he lost a large part of his army, which was cer- tainly not the case. Oros. vi. 11. This author, however, is very ill-informed. He confounds Genabum with Avaricum,and Gergovia with Alesia. Florus (iii. 10.) makes the same mistake. A.U.702-B.C.52. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 57 But the delay of only two days threw a serious obstacle in Caesar's way. The ydui, vacil- i . . j , i , CiEsar retreats latmg and inconstant, harassed as they to his quarter* i ,, . , . , i- .... f in Belgium. were by the intrigues and solicitations of Convictolitans and Litavicus, yielded at once to their persuasions, on the news of their allies' disaster. Their previous indecision gave place to the most vehement activity. The enthusiasm of the people knew no bounds ; they exhibited it by the sacrifice, not of such wretched villages or towns as the Bitu- riges had committed to the flames, but of Noviodu- num itself, the second city in their rich and flourish ing country, the mart of commerce, the centre of communications, the magazine and arsenal of the deserted foreigners. 1 Their first act was to slaughter the Roman traders and sqjourners in the city ; they next demolished the bridge over the Loire, for which they knew Caesar would make, and then consum- mated the awful catastrophe of patriotism and devo- tion. Caesar had now broken up from before Grer- govia. He crossed to the right bank of the Allier, entered the country of the Boii, only less exhausted and barren than that of the Bituriges on the left, and traversed the strip of land which separates the parallel channels of the Allier and Loire. He arrived in front of Noviodunum in time to hear the last crash of the sinking bridge, and see the devouring flames rise triumphantly beyond it. His army was exhausted by its rapid march ; it was straitened for supplies ; the waters of the rivers were swollen with the first melting of the snows, and the ordinary fords had become impassable. Before him lay a powerful peo- ple, long ripening, as he knew, for rebellion, the first signal of whose avowed defection he beheld in the flaming masses before him. The alternative of turn- ing southward and retreating into the Province was 1 Noviodunum, the modern Nevers. 58 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xn. opposed by many considerations. The roads were difficult, and the passage of the Cevennes would cost much time ; moreover, besides the disgrace of thus skulking from the enemy, it would leave Labienus in a position of extreme peril. In this emergency he did not hesitate for a moment. To consume a single day in building a bridge would have been a fatal delay. But a spot was discovered where the Loire could be forded by wading to the armpits ; the soldiers could carry their weapons above their heads. The stream was strong and rapid, but the cavalry were ranged above, and broke the current for the infantry below. If the JEdui had made the best of the occasion, they might have defended the bank of the river against the Romans with great ad- vantage. But Caesar carried everything before him by the terror of his name. He now supplied him- self with provisions in the neighbourhood of Novio- dunum, and thence continued his march unmolested until he effected his junction with his lieutenant, who came forth, at his summons, from Agedincum to meet him. 1 This well-combined operation revived the drooping spirits of the Roman legions. The forces Successful "~ , . j , . operations of of Labienus had engaged in a campaign Labienu.. . .. Ul against the Parisu and some neighbouring states, in which their success had at first been dubious. The growing enthusiasm of the Grauls was constantly pouring fresh hosts into the field ; almost every day brought the news of further defections. The issue of the siege of Gergovia was rapidly communicated to the tribes in the north. The revolt of the ^Edui was made known to them at the same moment. It was generally believed that the baffled invader had turned 1 Cses. B. G. vii. 55, 56. Agedincum is generally supposed to be the modern Sens. See d'Anville, Mannert, Walckenaer. An essay in the Mem. Soc. Antiq. de France (ii. 397.) maintains the opinion f the earlier critics in favour of Provins. A.0.702-H.C.5-2. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 59 his back upon Gaul, and was hastening to seek an asylum in the Province. This accumulation of suc- cesses had inspired the opponents of Labienus with overweening presumption. They had no leader of consummate caution and experience, like Vercin- getorix, to head them ; their king Camologenus was unable to control their anxiety for instant battle* Once more engaged man to man in the open field, the Koraans gained a complete victory, and this triumph counterbalanced in their minds all the dis- asters of the campaign hitherto. 1 Labienus could now receive his general with troops elated with victory and flushed with plunder, in quarters abounding with stores and provisions, and in the centre of a tract of country where the hydra of revolt lay stunned and prostrate. Perhaps it was from that moment that the lieutenant began to measure himself with his general, and to murmur secretly at standing second to a leader whose disgrace he boasted of having turned into a triumph. The tranquillity thus temporarily restored in the north afforded indeed a respite of great im- , 1 1 TT u J Great prepara- portance to the proconsuls plans. He had turn, on both assembled all his ten legions, nor had their complements been much diminished by the checks they had hitherto sustained. But his cavalry had suffered very severely, and he was precluded from the possibility of drawing recruits from the Province. He turned his eyes towards Germany, and the pro- mise of pay and booty allured to his standard several bauds of horse, together with the light -armed runners, who were accustomed to combat by their side. But the horses of the Germans were unequal to those of Gaul, and Caesar did not hesitate to dismount himself and his officers to furnish them with chargers of better quality.' 2 Meanwhile, the confederates re- 1 Cses. B. G. vii. 5762. ' Cses. B. G. vii. 66. 60 HISTORY OF TEE ROMANS CH. xu. ceived the ^Eduans into their alliance with open arms. Whatever distrust they might be disposed to entertain towards a people who had betrayed their countrymen in the first instance, and deceived them more than once since, every suspicion must vanish before such devotion to the cause as that which all their public acts now displayed. They had sur- rendered their ancient claim to precedency among the Gaulish states, and relinquished the command of the combined armies to the brave Arvenian. Having seized at Noviodunum the Gaulish hostages whom Caesar kept there in honourable custody, they made use of them to confirm the fidelity of some tribes, and to stimulate the sluggishness of others. So success- fully did they wield this instrument of coercion, that when the general assembly met at Bibracte, there were only three states, it was said, from whom no deputies arrived. These were the Remi, the Lin- geries and the Treviri : the first had been uniformly devoted to Rome ; the second were controlled by the presence or proximity of the Roman armies ; the third had suffered . severely in previous struggles, and as they had been left to defend themselves without as- sistance from the states of Southern Gaul, so they did not now choose to form a combination with them. 1 While Vercingetorix was preparing to march in casar retreats quest of Caesar with an overwhelming force, t f ordft g he m ne did not neglect ulterior measures. He province. gen & division of his troops to organize a diversion against the Romans in the Narbonensis, by a combination of force and intrigue. With tin- Allobroges he adopted a similar course ; though he could not persuade them to unite their arms with his, they took measures to defend the points at which the upper Rhone could be crossed, so as to anticipate any attempt the proconsul might make to regain the 1 Cses. B. G. viL 63, (A. A.C.703-B.C.S2. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 61 Province in that direction. 1 They rightly conjec- tured the plan which Caesar's necessities would cause him to adopt. It was impossible for him to remain in his actual position, having lost all communication with the south : but his united forces were formid- able, from their numbers as well as their valour, and he might presume on cutting his way to the Province through all opposition. What were his ulterior views he gives us no intimation ; but he left no troops in garrison behind him ; nothing but the terror of his name and the deep discouragement inflicted by so many triumphant campaigns. He conducted hia march without hurry or confusion, and seemed to court rather than avoid the attack of the enemy. But he abandoned the direct route through the ter- ritory of the ^Edui, and repaired to the left bank of the Saone, expecting perhaps to experience from the Sequani less organized and effective resistance. Vercingetorix came up with the Eoman army in the high country of the Upper Saone ; but, A great battle adhering still to his old tactics, delayed an Tdl^ engagement. For some days he followed of ClB9ar - its movements at a short distance ; possibly he dis- trusted the power of the Allobroges to check it on the Rhone ; possibly the ardour of the Gallic chief- tains was too impetuous to be withstood. In an evil hour, trembling lest his enemy should at length escape him, he, too, was carried away by the vain confidence of the national character, and gave the signal for battle. 2 Never, indeed, was the chivalrous spirit of a gallant people more thoroughly awakened. The chiefs engaged themselves by mutual oaths not to return from the field till they had twice ridden through the enemy's ranks. Cavalry was the force in which the Romans were most deficient, and in which the Gauls most boasted of their strength ; for 1 Cs. B. G. vii. 65. * Cues. B. G. vii. 67. 62 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xn. their horsemen belonged to the class of the rich and noble, better armed and equipped, and inspired with a more martial spirit than the multitudes which followed them to the field on foot. Caesar, always found at the point where the danger was greatest, was this day engaged with the cavalry, as in his great battle with the Nervians he had done the duty of a legionary. At one moment he was so nearly captured that his sword was wrested from him, and remained in the hands of his enemies. 1 The Arvernians caused it to be suspended in one of their temples, and of all military trophies this assuredly was the noblest. The steady Roman and the impetuous Gaul were The Gauu are we ll matched in the desperate struggle of defeated. t kat day. At length a dexterous move- ment of the German squadrons checked the hot onset of the Gaulish horse, and gave the legionaries room to open their lines and charge in their turn. The unwieldy masses of the barbarian infantry had not yet learnt to face this formidable shock. The men, hastily imagining that they were outflanked, lost their presence of mind, broke their ranks, and fled precipitately. Their careful leader had provided a retreat for them in three camps which he had forti- fied in the rear. The Gauls rallied, but it was only for a moment ; many of their principal chieftains had been slain or taken ; the panic became more than ever irretrievable ; and Vercingetorix was compelled to abandon the defence of his position, and guide the flying multitudes to the neighbouring city of Alesia. Here, besides the enclosure of the place itself, situated on the level summit of a high es- carped hill, a large camp had also been constructed and fortified with every appliance of art for the re- ception of eighty thousand men. 2 1 Plut CCES. 26. 1 Cses. 13. G. vii. 69. Alesia is supposed to be the modern Alise Sainte-Reine, to the west of Dijon. Mannert, n. i. 175. So fciso Napoleon, Hist, de Caesar, ii. p. 299. A.t.702-B.c.52. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 63 Thus failed the rash attempt to bring the retreat- ing lion to bay. But even though the Boidresoiu- battle was lost, the cause might have been !oauack a ti" maintained by recurrence to the harassing ^"ified'camp system in which the Gauls had hitherto, atAle " ia - with one exception, so steadfastly persevered. If their vast forces had been dispersed or drawn out of Caesar's immediate reach, and the country wasted around him, he would not, we may presume, have ven- tured to protract an indecisive warfare under pressure of the circumstances which urged him to seek the Koman frontiers. The victory he had gained would in that case have been destitute of any decisive result. But the fatal mistake of assembling the whole Gaulish army in one spot, and there tying it, as it were, to the stake, offered an opportunity for a daring and decisive exploit. Few strokes in warfare have been more prompt and bold than the last Csesar now made in his retreat, and his turning to attack the enemy and terminate the struggle at a blow. At this moment Caesar risked every thing ; all the plans of conquest which he had established and matured in Gaul ; all the schemes of ulterior aggrandisement over which he had so long brooded ; his life, his repu- tation, all were hazarded at this eventful crisis. For if he now escaped into the Province, he might hope to organise a future invasion ; another series of cam- paigns might restore him to that supremacy which he had just forfeited beyond the Rhone ; or he might leave the unfinished task to a successor, and hasten himself to retrieve his fortunes by some popular act of audacity in Rome. But he saw the whole, flower and strength of Gaul self-cooped in a single encamp- ment, and determined to abide his attack. He had thoroughly calculated his own strength. He was at the head of a larger force than he had ever mustered before ; and he collected his energies for one decisive struggle, with just confidence in a crowning success. 64 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. Xtt The preparations which Caesar made to carry out He form, a his resolve were on a scale proportioned to Ration o?" its grandeur. He formed a line of circum- botharmie*. va ll a tion round the whole of the enemy's works, thus blockading in one sweep both the camp and the city, an army of eighty thousand men, and the population of the place swelled with an innumerable crowd of fugitives. The exultation they had felt at their late triumphs, and their indignation at their recent reverses ; the taste of blood they had obtained in the massacres of Grenabum and Avaricum; their horror at the slaughter of their countrymen at Novio- dunum and Bibracte ; all they had done and all they had suffered, had combined to harden the minds of the legionaries, and divest both men and officers of the common feelings of humanity. The Grauls, too, had had their moments of triumph and exasperation, of vengeance and despair ; the same causes had pro- duced on them no less frightful effects ; the nerves of both parties were strung to the uttermost, and both were equally prepared for every extreme of infliction or endurance. If it was with these feelings that the two armies Ti.eRomani faced each other from behind their breast- cavafry fu ki i r" a works, the events of the siege daily added p 9 h thebi e k- to them fresh bitterness. Vercingetorix, t a ion ! ofthT a " discovering the fault he had committed, made an attempt to break the Eoman lines by means of his cavalry. But here again the Ger- mans turned the fortune of the day, and the Grauls, beaten back with loss into their entrenchments, suffered sore discouragement. Their leader felt increasing alarm. He knew how rapid must be the progress of scarcity in such a host as was cooped up with him, which he dared not again lead forth to combat. He dismissed a great part of his horse, with the commission to scour the country far and near, and summon tribes and cities to his assistance. A.P.702-B.C.52. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 65 But this could not be done effectively in the short period during which he might hope to maintain his post; as the operations of the enemy were pressed more resolutely and decisively, it became necessary to repel the approach of famine by extraordinary measures. The Gaulish chieftains were animated with the most desperate resolution; it was delibe- rately proposed to sanction the killing and eating of human beings. For the present, indeed, this horrible counsel was rejected. But another alter- native, hardly less shocking, was adopted : all the non-military population which had crowded within the lines, the women and children, the sick and the aged, were expelled from the city and the en- trenchments. The Roman general was unrelenting ; he too was steeled in this last struggle against every ordinary feeling of humanity, and he ordered the helpless multitude to be driven back upon their countrymen with showers of stones and darts. Be- tween the trenches of their friends and the bristling ranks of their enemies, the miserable victims perished by wounds or hunger. 1 The Roman general, apprehending the arrival of the enemy's succours, had not only com- pleted a line of circumvallation in front of m*MKy* the Gaulish fortifications, but had strongly a?myin u the entrenched himself in the rear also. The v"* an has left, that if he had completed the work with his own hand, he would have chosen to gratify our curiosity with any general delineation of the state of the province at the conclusion of his eight years' labour. A writer of a much later age has thought Auct. B. G. viii. 23. * Auct B. G. viii. 48. 3 Auct. B. G. L c. 74 HISTORY OP THE ROMANS CH. xn. fit to embellish a feeble narrative with a picture which might have struck our imagination more had the colours been less elaborate. Let the reader conceive, says Orosius 1 , the languid and bloodless figure of Gaul, just escaped from a burning fever and inflammation of her vital parts ; let him re- mark how thin and pale she is, how helpless and nerveless she lies ; how she fears even to move a limb lest she should bring on a worse relapse ; for the Roman army rushed upon her as a plague stronger than the strongest patient, which rages the more, the more resistance it encounters. The thirst that consumed her was her impatience at the de- mand for pledges of her perpetual servitude ; liberty was the sweet cold draught for which she burned ; she raved for the waters ivhich were stolen /ram her. Or let him turn to a passage of a very different character, the cold and dry enumeration of Plutarch, which seems to bear the impress of the very words of Caesar himself 2 : He took more than eight hun- dred cities by storm, worsted three hundred nations, and encountered, at different times, three millions of enemies, of whom he slew one million in action, and made prisoners of an equal number. Which- ever of these two records be thought the most im- pressive, the reader will feel that enough has been said to account for the long prostration of the ener- gies of Gaul from this time forward, and for the almost passive endurance with which it submitted to the establishment and development of the pro- vincial administration. 1 Oros. vi. 12.; comp. Thierry, Gaulois, iii. 206. * Pint. Cas. 15. A.P.702-H.C.5S. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 76 CHAPTER XIII. Pompeius, as sole consul, undertakes the reform of abuses : his ill success : he connects himself again with the oligarchy by espousing the daughter of Scipio. Caesar intrigues to obtain the consulship before relinquishing his province. Cicero accepts the government of Cilicia : his civil and military administration. The nobles seek to deprive Caesar of his command. M. Mar- cellus insults him by the harsh punishment of a transpadane Gaul. Pompeius falls sick. Rejoicings for his recovery. Caesar Conciliates the Gauls. Strength and composition of his army : his popularity with the soldiers. Character of the younger Curio: his devotion to Csesar's interests. Caesar received with accla- mations in Cisalpine Gaul. He n'xes his quarters at Ravenna. He offers a compromise with the senate, which it refuses, and requires him to resign his command. The tribunes interpose, are menaced with violence, and thereupon fly to Caasar's camp. A.U. 702704, B.C. 5250. WHEN Pompeius entered upon his office as sole consul, he submitted his reputation as a , . i rT . . Comparison of statesman to a crowning trial. His posi- pom P m. and tionwasin substance that of a dictator, but A"i7.702. without the odium of the name. But, in return for the, irresponsible power which formed the peculiar feature of this extraordinary charge, no less was expected from him than to direct the stream of public affairs back into the old channels which it had deserted, to repair the youth and vigour of a decaying commonwealth, and to restore the spirit of a constitution which seemed only to survive in forms and traditions. The work of Sulla was the model which the nobles thrust under his eyes, still cherish- ing the vain hope that he possessed the genius no less than the desire to restore an oligarchical supre- macy which the march of events had rendered impossible. But if the champion tJiey had sum- 76 HISTOBY OF THE ROMANS CH. xill. moned to their side was ambitious of wielding the power of his early patron, his motives were merely personal and selfish. The dictator, indeed, had thrown himself in implicit faith upon the principles of his faction. The ascendency of his class was the object to which his career was devoted ; he was no less ready to become the martyr than the champion of his political creed. As the spirit of the two men differed, so did the comprehensiveness of their views, and the vigour of their execution. If Sulla was blinded by his original prejudices to the real evils of his times and their true remedies, he at least felt and acknowledged the responsibility which he assumed. He placed his object steadily before him, and cut out a complete constitution, such as it was, with two or three rough strokes of the chisel. It was the work of a master, complete, consistent, fulfilling its idea. But Pompeius, on the contrary, was satisfied with the tentative palliation of a few prominent abuses ; he probed nothing to the bottom ; he removed some scandals for the moment, but made no attempt to reach the sources of evil. In one respect only the dictator and the sole consul acted alike ; neither the one nor the other submitted to the trammels to which they had subjected their countrymen. Sulla, in his zeal for social reformation, had enacted new and severe laws against violence, immorality, and extravagance ; but in his own person he was noto- rious for the indulgence of prodigal tastes and licen- tious passions. l The correctives which Pompeius applied to social abuses were subtler in their cha- racter; but he, too, scrupulous as he was in all matter* of public decorum, could not restrain him- self from the violation of his own laws for transient political purposes. 8 1 Duruy, Hist, des Rom. ii. 297. 2 Tac. Ann. iii. 28. : " Turn Cn. Pompeius tertium consul, corri- gendis moribus delectus, et gravior remediis quam clelicta eraiit, * U.702-B.C.52. D.NDER THE EMPIRE. 77 The methods which the consul devised to protect the political tribunals from undue influence f . i ,1 rrn 1 Reforms intro- were frivolous m the extreme. The selec- *^ d JJj tion which he is said to have made from the three privileged orders of the persons who might be chosen by lot to exercise the functions of judges may have purified the bench from the neediest and most openly profligate of its members; but the vices of venality and partiality were common to the noblest and the most abject, and it was not by merely removing the scum from the surface that the foun- tains of justice could be really cleansed. The limi- tation of the number of advocates, and the restriction of the speech of the accuser to two and of the defen- dant to three hours, were trifling reforms in pro- cedure ; but the latter at least deserves notice from the importance subsequently attached to it as forming an epoch in the eloquence of the bar 1 ; and it may undoubtedly be regarded as a symptom of the desire of wise and thoughtful men to diminish the undue weight of rhetorical appeals to the passions. It had been moreover a common artifice to overawe the judges by bringing forward the testimonies and protestations of distinguished men in favour of the accused. A letter of Caesar or Pompeius expressing his regard for the culprit, his assurance of his innocence and wishes for his success, might be read in open court with no little effect upon the interested parties in whose hands the decision lay. 2 This was another instrument in suarumque legum auctor idem atque subversor, quae armis tuebatur armis amisit." It is curious to observe the aristocrat of so late an age still clinging to the conviction that the evils of the times were not so great as Pompeius chose to represent them, and that he betrayed his party by the extent to which he carried his reforms. 1 Auctoi de Cans. Corr. Eloq. 38. Cicero himself seems to have thought the restriction reasonable and convenient (Brut. 94.). 2 Asconius in his Commentary on Cicero's pleading for Scaurus (A.U. 700) cites, apparently from the documents of the trial, the names of the personages who used their influence in this way: " Laudaverunt Scaurum consulates novem. L. Piso, L. Volcatius, 78 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xm. the machinery of corruption which the consul con- sidered a fitting object of his specious reforms. But trifling as these matters were in themselves, they combined to assist in breaking down the rude inde- pendence of the judicial system, in which the judges and the advocates had played into each other's hands, in defiance both of the government and of popular clamour. Notwithstanding the partial reforms which had been effected since the time of Sulla, the qucBstiones perpetuce were still the stronghold of aristocratic monopoly. Every attempt, however superficial, to amend them, contributed to reveal the unfairness of their operation. Degraded in the public estimation, they lost their ancient hold on the feel- ings of the citizens, and the intrusion of armed soldiers at Milo's trial, though adapted only to the convenience of the moment, and with no ulterior designs, was in fact a significant intimation that the ascendency of the nobles had fallen for ever under the military domination of generals and dictators. It is not to be supposed that Pompeius was acting: in these proceedings with far-sighted Hit conduct at . r , ... the head of treachery towards the party with whose interests he had connected himself. He considered his own exalted position to rest mainly upon public opinion, and, in the discharge of his Q. Metellus Nepos, M. Perperna, L. Philippus, M. Cicero, Q. Hor- tensius, P. Servilius Isauricus pater, Cn. Pompeius Magnus. Horum magna pars per tabellas laudaverunt qui aberant, inter quos Pom- peius quoque; nam quod crat pro consule, extra urbem morabatur. Unus prseterea adolescens laudavit, frater ejus, Faustus Cornelius, Sullae films. Is in laudatione multa humiliter et cum lacrymis locutus non minus audientes permovit, quam Scaurus ipse permo- verat. Ad genua judicum, cum sententiae ferrentur, bifariam se diviserunt qui pro eo rogabant : ab uno latere Scaurus ipse, et M'. Glabrio, sororis filius, et Paulus, et P. Lcntulus, Lentuli Nigri Flaminis filius, et L. ^Emilius Buca filius et C. Memmius, Fausta natus, supplicaverunt; ex altera parte Sulla Faustus frater Scauri, et T. Annius Milo, et T. Peducseus, et C. Cato, et M. Octavius Lenas Curtianus." A.IT.702-B.C.52. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 79 functions as state reformer, his object was to main- tain the influence of the senate, as the inveterate enemy of his own rival Cassar, just so far as he could do so without sacrificing his own popularity. He would have been content with the praise due to the specious palliatives which he had devised for long-condemned abuses, and neither aspired nor expected to lay the foundations of a new political system. He persuaded his friends that the desertion of Milo, of whose popu- larity with his party and unreserved devotion to them he was jealous, was a necessary sacrifice to appearances. 1 But having made this specious con- cession to the demands of outraged law, the consul was anxious to exhibit the impartiality of his justice, and now encouraged proceedings against the friends of Clodius who were implicated in the disturbance. 2 Even among the nobles indeed Milo had made many enemies ; the historian Sallustius resented a private affront, and had been one of the loudest in clamouring for his condemnation. 3 He had kept clear, however, of any act which could involve him in the guilt of sedition. Sextus Clodius, less prudent or less for- tunate, was accused and condemned for the breach of the public peace ; and as soon as their year of office expired, the tribunes Pompeius Eufus and Munatius Plancus, both highly connected and adherents of the senate, were brought nevertheless to the bar of justice. The reformer took no step to avert the punishment of the first of these ; but for the other he condescended to write a letter to be read before the judges, thus using his influence precisely in the 1 Pompeius pretended to believe that Milo had plotted against his life. Ascon. in Milan. 67.; Veil. ii. 47.: " Milonem renm non magis invidia facti quam Pompeii damnavit voluntas." 2 Dion, xl. 55.: 5ia r^v TOV ftovXfvrripiov inirpriffiv. 1 Ascot, in Milan. Gellius (xvii. 18.), on the authority of Varro, tells the story of Sallust having been discovered by Milo in adultery with his wife, and severely chastised. 80 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xm. way which his own enactments expressly forbade. j This indecorous proceeding gave deep offence. It was a manifest breach of the law as well as a gross act of partiality. Cato denounced it with all the weight of his blameless reputation. 2 The accused thereupon excepted against him as one of his judges; but though his challenge was admitted, he was not- withstanding condemned by a majority of voices. In this suddenly awakened zeal for purity and fair play, the criminals who excepted against Cato were generally condemned, so strong a presumption of guilt did it seem to shrink from the sentence of a judge whose integrity stood so high in public estima- tion. 3 The year of Pompeius's consulship was dis- tinguished by the multitude of cases in which the conduct of men of all shades of political opinion was submitted to judicial scrutiny. He passed a law to compel the prosecution of all the charges of bribery with which the various candidates for office since the year 699 had been menaced. 4 A curious provision was adopted to stimulate the flagging zeal of the accusers. The culprit who was suffering himself under conviction for a similar crime might obtain remission of his own penalty by conducting to a suc- cessful issue a charge against another. 6 1 Dion, xl. 52. 55. ; Plut Pomp. 55. 2 Val. Max. n. 2. 5. : " Huic facto persona admirationem ademit . nam quse in alio audacia videretur in Catone fiducia cognoscitur." Plut. /. f ., Cat. Mm. 48. ; Dion, /. c. 4 Pint Cat. Min. 48. This was the year of Pompeius's second consulship. Appian (B. C. ii. 23.) makes the retrospective operation of this act extend to his first consulship in 684. Caesar's friends are said to have complained of the indignity of bringing their patron's consulship (695) within the period thus stigmatized for its corrup- tion, and possibly the limit was contracted on this account Hoeck, ROmische Geschichte, i. 149. * This privilege continued under the emperors, and tended to mul- tiply the number of delators. Tac. Ann. vi. 7. : ** Sed Minucius et Servseus damr-sti indicibus accessere." 4.TJ.702-B.C.52. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 81 It seems, however, that the alliance of Pompeius with the senate, and the alienation from Caesar which all his proceedings attested, Sti"*" gave new life and strength to the functions $?**" of government. Not only did the consul arm himself to enforce the execution of the laws, but he provided, by a salutary measure, against their violation, in forbidding the citizens to carry weapons within the walls. 1 The riddance which had been made both of Milo and Clodius, together with many of their noisiest adherents, freed the forum from the tumultuary bands by which public business had been so long impeded. The tribunes learned to be more cautious in their opposition, and the people, no longer caressed or menaced by rival demagogues, became good-humoured and manageable. Such was the early promise of the military tyranny which the consul and senate had virtually introduced into the city. The consul's success was obtained by favour perhaps not less than by the display of force. The commission he had received for provisioning the city gave him the opportunity and the means of distri- buting grain to the populace. This usage, which had originated in the legislation of C. Gracchus 2 , had been turned to the maintenance of the senatorial ascendency by the astute policy of Cato. Under his direction it had served to soothe the irritation of the people on the defeat of the Catilinarians. 3 Fatal as it eventually proved to their liberties, and even to their prosperity, it conciliated them at the time to the governments which fed them, and became a shield in the hands of the oligarchy against the 1 Plin. H. N. xxxiv. 39. If the words are to be taken literally, he forbade even the keeping of arms : " Magni Pompeii in tertio consulatu exstat edictum, in tumaltu necis Clodian*e, prohibentis ulluin telum esse in urbe." * Cic. pro Seat. 48 Plut. Cat. Mitt. 26. ; see Hocck, R. G. I 1.12. VOL. II. Gt 82 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xm. attacks of demagogues, which they could not refrain from using, notwithstanding the warnings of Cicero and the more far-sighted of their statesmen. 1 Nevertheless, Pompeius was not unconscious of Pompeiu., di.- the hollow and unsubstantial nature of the reforms he had devised. The permanence of the little good he had effected could oligarchy. OE j v ^ Q assured by the military power on which it was really based. A few months must reveal the imposture, and the termination of his extraordinary office would be hailed as the dethrone- ment of a tyrant. Great as were his abilities in the conduct of affairs, and free as he was from the passions which so frequently cloud the judgment of statesmen, untrammelled by avarice or sensuality, with few personal hatreds or partialities, nevertheless his character exerted no ascendency over others. Always artful, he had no ingenuity in concealing his artifice. He was suspected by all men, and he could impose upon none. His moral nature was as repul- sive to those who came in contact with him as that of his great rival was attractive. He felt that his sole consulship was after all a failure, and he hastened to throw off the responsibility of ineffectual power. Upon the dissolution of his connexion with Caesar by the death of Julia, he had determined to retrace his steps, and ally himself, by another marriage, with the heads of the oligarchy. He offered his neiia, and r hand to Cornelia, the widow of the younger ' Crassus 3 , whose father, Q. Caecilius Metellus ith hinwelf w r\ i~ . i i i r in the consul- fecipio, was one of the leading members ot , J , , the senate, and a sworn enemy of the hip. 1 Cic. /. c., ad Alt. i. 16. : " Ilia coneionalis hirudo zerarii misera ac jejuna plebecula." * Appian, ii. 25.; Dion, xl. 51.; Plut. Pomp. 55., who. gives a pleasing account of her character and accomplishments. The warm praises which Lucan lavishes upon her are a testimony to the tradi- tional prejudices of the nobility in her favour. A.U.702-B.C.52. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 83 Marian faction. He now seized the opportunity of cementing this interested alliance by associating his new father-in-law with himself in the consulship for the latter half of the year. The people, if indeed they were consulted in the matter, made no difficulty in accepting his nomination, and the senate was pleased with an act of condescension to its wishes, though it probably despised the weakness which die- tated it. 1 But in this proceeding, also, Pompeius betrayed the same disregard for the provisions of his H i 8 incon- own general policy which we have before ar'bi*'ary Un- remarked. Scipio was himself one of those f^4. nd un ~ over whom, as a recent candidate for the towardsC(B8ar - consulship, a charge of bribery was impending ; and it required the consul's interference to avert the con- sequences of a prosecution which his own enactment had encouraged. Another instance of the reformer's inconsistency was still more flagrant, and served to crown the impatience of the people, who acknow- ledged in after times that Csesar's subsequent treason was provoked by the lawlessness of his rival. It will be remembered that the consuls of the preceding year had obtained the enactment of a law whereby the curule magistrates were forbidden to take a province till after the lapse of five years from the termination of their office. It does not appear whether the framers of this restriction had any other object in view than to check the inordinate ambition of the aspirants to wealth and power; but when Pompeius, in the exercise of his sovereign authority, renewed and confirmed it a , his purpose was to deter Caesar from suing for the consulship. The position of Caesar's game was so critical, that he was compelled 1 In divesting his sole consulship of its exclusive character at the end of six months, Pompeius seems to have acknowledged that it was a dictatorship in disguise. 2 Dion, xl. 56. a 2 84 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xm to keep his enemies in check at every move ; if he once allowed the lead to be taken from him he was lost. As long as he was at the head of an army in Graul, he could despise the impotent clamour of the oligarchy : if he could obtain the consulship without previously laying down his command, he might then enter the city and return to civil life with security. From the curule chair he might descend once more to the proconsular camp, and place himself again at the head of the armies of his country. But the interval which was now appointed to elapse between the two offices which were essential to his safety seemed to threaten him with certain destruction. Pompeius could not indeed suppose that so bold and skilful a statesman would resign himself without a struggle to the prosecutions with which his enemies threatened him, as soon as they could get him within their toils; but he calculated on his precipitating himself into a revolt against the state, and dash- ing himself with senseless desperation against the senate, the veterans and the conqueror of Mithridates. Thus, presumptuously confident in his superior re- sources, he was unconscious of the moral force with which he furnished his rival, when, in the face of this very enactment, he retained his own proconsular appointment, and even caused it to be prolonged to him for another period of five years. 1 The senate, however, exulted in the advance it had critical poai- made, and believed that its path was now tionofcaar. clear b e f ore ^ an( j that its mortal enemy must soon fall into its hands. Cassar, on his part, in the midst of the overwhelming cares and perils of war, kept his eye intently fixed upon the progress of affairs in the city, and saw that his only hope now lay in the errors of his antagonists. His term of govern- ment was approaching its close, while his opponents 1 Dion, xl. 56. A.U.702-B.C.52. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 85 were eagerly pressing to have it cut short at once. At the moment of its expiration, as soon as he should become once more a private citizen, denuded of troops and employments, a charge of malversation would undoubtedly be preferred against him. The conduct of his proconsular government would be subjected to invidious scrutiny, the daring acts of his consulship would be denounced and punished. 1 He could expect neither justice nor mercy from the powers whose posi- tion in the cityseemed now impregnable. But could he only obtain the consulship, he had yet another stroke to make, in spite of the restriction which his enemies had so craftily devised. He might employ his year of office in reviving the spirits of his own party, in recovering the affections of the people, which had cooled, apparently, during his long absence, in infus- ing fresh vigour into the tribunes, in forming new alliances, and breaking the phalanx of his enemies by the numerous modes of corruption in which he was so well versed. As a last resource, he might flee from the city like Lepidus or Catilina, and raise his voice from the Alps to the veterans of either Gaul. Though better aware of the strength of his resources than his contemptuous enemies, yet it is evident that he felt the extreme rashness of throwing off his allegiance to the state while he had yet no plausible excuse for it, and that he did not decide upon that course till he had no other alternative, nor till his enemies had re- vealed to the world the injustice of their conduct, and to himself the weakness of their counsels. Such then were the prognostications which Caesar drew from the conduct of his adversaries in ,i p i , . He in trip ues to their enjoyment or power ; such were his be permuted resources, and such his hopes. Nor did he tSI cSnsuuhip i , , TT . ,. while still delay to act. Mis nrst counter move was to absent from f i e i , i .the city. employ some of his friends among the tri- 1 Suet. Jul. so. 86 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. X11I bunes to submit a law to the people, authorizing him to sue for the consulship without being present in the city ; that is, without laying down his command pre- viously. From a comparison of the various conflict- ing accounts, the confusion of which throws great uncertainty upon a point of considerable interest, we may conjecture that this authorization was meant to be a special exception in Caesar's case to the general provisions of the existing law, by which the candi- date's presence Was required ; a law which, as we have seen, had frequently been dispensed with in similar instances ; and further, that Pompeius, jealous of the tribunes' interference, took the matter out of their hands, with the promise to settle it by a declaratory enactment, in which the existing law should be con- firmed with some provision for special exemptions. This enactment, it seems, had passed ; it had been engraven in the usual way on a brazen tablet, and actually deposited in the public offices, before Caesar's friends observed that the promised exception in his favour had not been distinctly made. A great clamour was raised, and Pompeius was obliged to come for- ward and acknowledge that an oversight had been committed. The error was relucta-ntly corrected, by the insertion of the name required ; but the transac- tion could only add to the imputations of treachery and inconstancy under which the consul already suffered with either party. 1 1 The authorities are strangely contradictory : 1. Cic. ad Alt. viii. 3. says: "Pompeius contendit.ut decem tribuni plebis ferrent ut absentis ratio haberetur, quod idem ipse sanxit lege qnadam sun." 2. Appian, ii. 25.: rovs 5 &rift.dpxovs tireurev (<5 Karop) flariyi\ffa- ffOcu v6/j.ov . Kal rovff inrorfivovTos en TOW riojMnjiou /cat ovSev avrti- 3. Dion (xl. 56.) speaks of the law as entirely the work of Pom- peius, and says that the provisions for exemption were so large as to render it nugatory. 4. Suet. Jul 28. : " Acciderat ut Pompeius legem de jure magis- tratuum lerens, eo capite quo a petitione honorum absentes submo- A.u.702-n.c.52. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 87 The tenor of Scipio's administration of office was quiet and unobtrusive. The only measure ., , . . . i r j.1 Scipio restore! attributed to him was the repeal ot the the authority popular Clodian enactment which had de- prived the censors of one of their most important functions, the power of degrading unworthy members of the senatorial order. But the temper of the times was unfavourable to such delegation of irresponsible power even to an ancient and venerated magistracy. Private character was no longer confided in as a guarantee for the honourable discharge of a public trust. As long as the censor was prohibited by law from noting the infamy of his fellow citizens, his office might seem indeed shorn of its former lustre ; but he was exempt himself from the jealousies which so invidious a duty must otherwise have heaped upon him. But when the restriction was removed, he had no longer an excuse for inaction; all connivance at vice was construed into fear of offending the powerful ; the reputation of the censor and of his office sank together, and no man with any regard to his character coveted from henceforth a position which had once been the most honourable in the state. 1 The consuls were succeeded in the year 703 by M. Claudius Marcellus and Servius Sulpicius Rufus without disturbance or impediment. thTye703. They both belonged to the party of the Mareeliu, ind 1 j.l_ r i. J u Servius Sul- oligarchy : the former was animated by picms Kufu i 1- v. i'l-i n il defeat of Cato. peculiar hostility to Caesar ; the other was a man of whom the nobles were justly proud, on account of his great reputation as a jurist. 2 Their vebat, ne Csesarem quidem exciperet, per oblivionem ; ac mox lege jam in ses incisa, et in asrarium condita, corrigeret errorem." 1 Dion, xl. 57. 2 Cic./ro Mtiren, 10, 11, 12., Uiut, 41. j GelL vi. 12. &o. ; Quintil. x. 1. 88 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xm. influence with Pompeius was such as to secure their x.u.703, election against Cato, who had declared himself also a candidate, but whose inde- pendence of character was feared by the men in power. The candidates, it is said, abstained from bribery ; authority and intimidation may have served instead. But the successful suitors for the suffrages of the tribes had put on the garb of flattery and con- descension; to which Cato, who maintained all the stiffness of the antique virtue, refused to bend. 1 His impracticable purism sustained a fatal defeat, and he determined from thenceforth to decline all further competition for public honours, by which conduct he inflicted, probably, a serious injury upon his unfortu- nate country, which stood so much in need of honesty among its rulers. The position which Cicero had lost as a political leader might be compensated to the state Cicero's ac- , , . . , . , . . , . tivity in by the activity and success with which he applied himself to the business of a pleader in political causes. For some years there was, per- haps, no cause of importance in which his eloquence was not put in requisition for the accusation or the defence ; and his name grew more and more illustri- ous, both for the brilliancy and the effectiveness of his harangues. On the one hand, he defended and saved Saufeius, a friend and associate of Milo 2 ; on the other, he did not shrink from accusing Munatius Plancus 3 , at the risk of offending Pompeius. Nor did he quail before the threat of a public impeach- ment himself : once released from the persecution of Clodius, who seems to have had a greater mastery over his courage than any other of his enemies, his confidence in his own powers was unabashed, and he defied the malice of the world. Cicero seems indeed 1 Dion, xl. 58. 2 Areon. in Milan, p. 54. 1 Dion, xl. 55.; Cic. ad Div. vii. 2. A.U.703-B.C.51. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 89 to have recovered, in these congenial occupations, some portion of his earlier spirits and n uatta<-M- sanguine temper. Though in his private ^bo^r ' correspondence he still expressed himself in hlm- despair for his country's destinies, yet that lie did in fact retain hopes of better days appears from the in- terest he continued to take in those, among the rising generation, who seemed to give the greatest promise of goodness and wisdom. 1 Such seems to have been his opinion more particularly of the younger Curio, the son of Scribonius, whom the experienced states- man delighted in educating, to fill hereafter, as he fondly imagined, the highest places in the state, to the advantage of the commonwealth. 8 Yet this was the young patrician whom Vettius, as we have seen, had implicated in the alleged conspiracy against the tri- umvirs, and against whom Cicero himself had uttered expressions of no little bitterness : we cannot doubt that his early years were stained by the worst vices of his time, such as, in a more sober period at least, would have left little room for auguring from him a more useful and honourable manhood. But in those times of sudden change, the dissipation of youth might yet give place to better counsels and the grow- ing strength of a manly character : the abilities of Curio were brilliant, and his disposition had some natural bias towards the good; his recent quffistorship of Asia had opened his mind to larger views of in- terest and duty, and his sphere of action was expanded 1 Abeken (Cicero in sein. Brief, p. 186.). It was in this year that he wrote the treatise de Legibus. Fischer, Riim. Zeittafeln, p. 260. 2 The family of Curio was distinguished for its talents. Plin. H. N. vii. 41.: " Una familia Curionum, in qua tres continua serie oratores exstiterunt." Schol. Bob. in Clodian. et Curion. p. 330. ed. Orell. : " Tres illis temporibus Curiones illustri nomine exstiterunt, atque ita in libris adhuc feruntur: Curio avus, qui Servinm Fulvium inccsti ream defendit, et hie, C. Curio pater qui P. Clodio affuit, et tertius ille Curio tribnnitius," &. 90 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xut by the death of his father, a man of considerable in- fluence among his order. Cicero exerted himself to the utmost to develop the latent seeds of good in hia favourite and pupil ; and it would seem that the young man had already made some return for this care, by the zeal with which he had served his monitor in the affair of Clodius. 1 Cicero obtained an honourable reward for the cicero obuin. courage he had recently displayed, in the co!te^'f the acquisition of the place in the College of Augur.. Augurs rendered vacant by the death of Publius Crassus. 3 Hortensius proposed and Pom- peius lent his countenance to this appointment 3 , and the only drawback to the complacency of the success- ful candidate was the obscurity of his competitor Hirrus. The office itself he considered one of the most dignified which a citizen could enjoy 4 ; and his vanity could plume itself on unsubstantial dignities, when real power eluded his grasp. But the law of Pompeius, which restricted the administration of the provinces to such magistrates as had completed their term of office five years previously, left a gap in the ordinary succession to these governments, which could only be filled by invoking the services of the consuls and praetors of past years, who had already served, or, perhaps, had declined to serve at a distance from Rome. Among the number of the latter was Cicero, whom the alluring temptations of the proconsulate had never yet induced to abandon that position in the city which he considered the only proper sphere for Accept, with the exercise of his accomplishments. Nor ro^^entof was be less reluctant now to accept the commission which was thus, in a manner, forced upon him. He saw more clearly, perhaps, than others, though few were altogether blind to it, 1 See Cicero's Letter to Curio, ad Div. ii. 1. Plut. Cic. 36 Cic. Brut. 1. 4 Cic. de Legg. ii. 12, i.tj,?03-fl.c.5l. tNDER THE EMPIRE. 91 the imminence of a decisive struggle between the leaders of party; he was slackening in his atten- tions to Ceesar, and attaching himself more closely to the culminating fortunes of his rival ; and he flattered himself, perhaps, that his own presence might supply the deficiency of public virtue which he still mourn- fully remarked in his patron's counsels. But to obey the call of the commonwealth was the point of honour with the Koman statesman ; and when Syria and Cilicia were assigned to himself and Bibulus, the latter was the province which fell by lot to his hands. 1 The province of Cilicia was of considerable extent, and of no less military importance. It state of comprehended, besides the narrow district CiUcia - between the Taurus and the sea to which the appel- lation more properly belonged, the countries of Pisidia, Pamphylia, Isauria and Lycaonia, together with the three districts of Southern Phrygia, dis- tinguished by the names of their respective capitals, Laodicea, Cibyra and Apamea. 4 To these was added the neighbouring island of Cyprus. From the moment that he reached the frontiers of his government the new proconsul was called upon to exercise the military functions, so foreign to his habits and education, which the republic imposed upon the rulers of her subjects, no less than the administration of her laws. In Lycaonia he met his army, which ought to have con- sisted of two legions, but was reduced in numbers by the absence of some cohorts. 8 It was necessary to advance without an instant's delay to the eastern extremity of the province, in order to check the inso- lence of the Parthians, who were threatening an irruption into the Roman territory, nor less to control the disaffection of the king of Armenia, who, as we have seen, had lately formed a family alliance with 1 Plut. L c. * Cic. ad Div. xiii. 07. * Cic. ad Div. iii. 6. 92 HISTORY 0* THE ROMANS C the victors of Carrhae. Cicero stationed himself at Cibystra at the foot of the Taurus. 1 This place was within the frontiers of the dependent kingdom of Cappadocia, where Ariobarzanes II. occupied the throne upon which his father had been placed by the Romans. A conspiracy against him was on the point of breaking out, and it was only by the presence of the proconsul and his legions that it was repressed ; but the king was with difficulty able to maintain himself against the rebellious spirit of his subjects, fostered, no doubt, by the intrigues of his Parthian neighbours. Cicero could not afford to detach any troops for the defence of his capital or person ; the terror of the Roman name was all the assistance he could lend him ; but this was sufficient to check the apprehended revolt. The smallness of the military force which was assigned for the support of the dependent sovereigns, for repressing the discontent of the provincials themselves, for overawing the predatory tribes of Isauria, for withstanding the en- croachments of the Parthians or Armenians, cannot fail to move our astonishment. It is calculated cer- tainly to impress us with an exalted notion of the moral influence exercised over the provinces by the vigour of the Roman administration, and the more so at a moment when a large army had so recently been lost almost within sight of the frontiers. It must be remembered, however, that Cicero himself complains of the inadequacy of his forces ; and his friend Caelius accuses the uniform misconduct of the senate in leaving its generals in the provinces miser- ably ill-provided for the services they had to perform. 2 Caesar and Pompeius were already draining the ordi- nary resources of the state, and diverting the flower of the Roman youth into their own camps. The pro- J Cic. ad AtL v. 18. * Cic. ad Alt. v 18., and Cselius to Cicero, ad Du\ viii. 5 4.U.70S-B.C.51. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 93 consul was obliged to make a levy of Roman citizens in his province, while he trusted to the goodwill of Deiotarus, the king of Galatia, to double his num- bers with auxiliary troops. But the expedient of enlistment did not answer his wishes ; the number of the Romans in those parts was small, and they were reluctant to quit their lucrative employments for the perils of military service. Bibulus, who made the same complaint in his government of Syria, relin- quished the attempt as wholly unprofitable. 1 The apprehensions of a Parthian invasion which the proconsul of Cilicia entertained, were relieved by the high spirit with which ion^r g th^ n T J C J -i. O -il. P rth ' an Cassius Longmus defied it in Syria with checked by Ctxssius the remnant of the army of Crassus. 2 After his general's fatal discomfiture, Cassius had retired to Antioch, resolving to provide for the safety as well as the internal administration of the province until he should be superseded by the arrival of a new pro- consul. In the preceding year he had repulsed some Parthian squadrons which had ventured to cross the frontiers of the Roman territory. While Cicero was still advancing leisurely from Rome to assume his command in Cilicia, Pacorus, the son of Orodes, appeared again with larger forces, and in a more determined attitude, almost before the walls of the Syrian capital. Cicero claims the merit of having emboldened Cassius by his proximity to bring the enemy to a decisive engagement ; but a comparison of dates clearly shows that the victory which the latter now obtained was some weeks previous to Cicero's arrival at the foot of the Taurus. 3 Nor did Bibulus 1 See Cicero's complaints in an official despatch to the consuls and senate (ad Div. xv. 1.). 2 Liv. Epit. cviii.; Dion, xl. 29, 30.; Veil. ii. 46.; Joseph. Ant. Jud. xiv. 7. 8 Fischer, Rom. Zeittafeln, p. '260.; comp. Cic. ad AU. v. 20. with nd Div. xv. 4 94 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH XIII. appear in time to reap any share in his lieutenant's laurels. The Parthians seem to have been sufficiently discouraged by their successive defeats ; they refrained from any further demonstrations of hostility ; and to pursue them into their own country demanded greater forces, and perhaps bolder leaders, than the Eoman power in the east could at that moment furnish. Ac- cordingly, the new proconsul abstained from the pro- secution of any military enterprise against the enemy ; but he kept a watchful eye upon their affairs, and fomented a family quarrel in the Parthian court, which resulted in the revolt of Pacorus against his father. 1 The citizens of Eome seem to have derived some amusement from contemplating; the novel Military ex- . . ., , . r r , , .? pioitsand situation of their peaceful philosopher, in civil admi- , i i r nistration of the heart of a country swarming with ban- ditti and half-reclaimed pirates, and with clouds of Parthian cavalry rolling in his front. But Cicero was ably supported by his brother and other officers ; and when the more serious danger had passed away, he was far from shrinking from the safer though less glorious warfare which the state of his province demanded. He chastised the marauders of the mountains in more than one expedition 2 ; his soldiers complimented him with the title of Imperator, and the senate rewarded him with the honour of a Supplication. 3 For his own part he was so much dazzled by his own exploits as to fix his heart on the distinction of a triumph. 4 Indeed we may reasonably feel at a loss whether most to admire the ability of the man who could thus acquit himself with credit iu 1 Dion, xl. 30. * See Cicero's official despatch (ad Die. xv. 4.)j comp. Plut. Cic. 36. * Cselius to Cicero (ad Div. viii. 1 1 .). 4 Cic. ad Ait. vi. 6.: " Arnicorum literse me ad triumphum vocant." Comp. ad Ati, vii. 1., ad Div. xv. 6. A.0.703-B.C.51. UNDER TUB EMPIRE. 95 a career so alien from the studies of his life, the ex- cellence of the training which enabled his countrymen ordinarily to exchange without disadvantage the gown for the breastplate, the forum for the camp, or again, the perfection of the military system, which seemed to require no more than good sense and firmness in the general to insure the success of his arms. Nor did the moderation and wisdom of Cicero's civil administration belie the lessons of public virtue of which he had been so conspicuous a teacher. On the one hand, we may be assured that the man who re- sisted the importunities of M. Brutus, seconded by the instances of his own personal friends 1 , would exercise a wholesome severity in checking the ex- tortion of less distinguished and less powerful subor- dinates ; on the other, we learn that the expenses of the government were reduced to a scale of the most scrupulous economy 2 , and that a troop of disappointed parasites groaned over the ample surplus which was poured into the national coffers. 3 Meanwhile, the consulship of Sulpicius and M. Marcellus was attended with continued 11 -j. J.-L -j. mi. 1 i- State of parties tranquillity in the city. The rival parties during the , ,1 i i i_ ii J i consulship of were intently watching each other, and cal- suipicmsand i , i -^i i ii i M - Marcelliu. culating their next moves with breathless A.I-.TOS, anxiety, and it seemed agreed that the game should be played out by an effort of skill and cool- ness. The commencement of Caesar's proconsulate dated from the first of January 696, and the original provisions of the Vatinian law had been extended, by the good offices of Trebonius, to a second term of five years, commencing from the beginning of 701. Accordingly, in the middle of 703 his government had still two years and a half to run. At this mo- 1 Cic. ad Alt. v. 21 , vi. 1 3. See above, Vol. I. p. 333. 1 Cic. ad Ait. v. 16. ; comp. Plat. /. c. 1 Cic. ad Att. vii. 1.: 'Ingemuit nostra cohors crane illud put mis distribui sibi oportere." 96 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. Xllt inent the wars of Gaul, as we have seen, were almost brought to a close ; but the remainder of the term he might still advantageously employ in consolidating his influence both in the province and among the needy politicians of the capital. The senate had just carried the election of two of its partizans, L. JEmilius Paulus and C. Claudius Marcellus, who were to enter upon the consulship at the commencement of the ensuing year. It was for a still distant vacancy that Caesar reserved his pretensions. During the interval he remained entrenched, as it were, behind the provisions of the law which had been extorted from Pompeius, and depended on the exertions of his party to carry his election in the city while he still retained the command of his legions in Gaul. Among the nobles, indeed, there were not a few who felt the obligation to respect so recent and clear an enactment. Others, less scrupulous perhaps on this point, were still unwilling to strip him of his power while his rival, of whom they were hardly less jealous, continued to wield the military government of Spain Cato himself, exasperated at the slight he had sus- tained from the creatures of Pompeius, would will ingly have pulled down both the rivals together from their proud elevation. But M. Marcellus and the more violent section of the party were for pushing their attack upon the popular leader without dis- guise, and disregarded all further considerations. The consul audaciouslv proposed that Cse- Renewed in- , i i j i_ i i triguesfor sar s term should be cut short at once by Cffisar'ofSus the appointment of a successor. Pompeius masked the approaches by which he hoped to storm his rival's position by assurances of his im- plicit deference to the will of the senate, at the same time that he affected moderation, and interrupted its deliberations by absenting himself from the city when it was proposed to bring the matter to a solemn de- bate. At this moment all eyes were turned towards 4..B.703-B.C.M. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 97 the tribunitian bench, where some were known to be devoted to Csesar, and determined to exercise their fatal veto in any case of direct attack upon his rights. A correspondent of Cicero reveals to us the f V -i.i_ !_ i_ j.1 1 j.' The younger feelings with which the election or younsr cuno elected n AU A -u i. j j u tribune - Curio to the tnbuneship was regarded by the nobles. Already it was surmised that one so giddy in temper, and so needy as he was known to be, might easily be corrupted by the arts of the most accomplished of intriguers ; but they trusted in a slight which he was said to have received from Csesar, and still clung to the hope that he would continue faithful to the policy of his family and friends. 1 They declared boldly that if any tribune protested against the removal of the proconsul of Graul, they had par- tisans on the same bench pledged to frustrate the appointment of a successor to any one of the pro- vincial governors, and thus bring matters to a crisis which would demand the intervention of a dictator. 3 At length, on the last day of September, M. Mar- cellus came forward and proposed that, Decree of M on the first of March ensuing, the consuls Magnus who should have then entered upon office alignment of should proceed to the usual assignment of aim^ddTrectiy the provinces of the republic. 3 The first two months of the year were appropriated to the reception of foreign ambassadors and the regulation of external affairs. The first of March was apparently the ordinary day for assigning the provinces, the most important business connected with the internal 1 Caelius to Cicero (ad Div. viii. 4.): " Curio . . . nihil consilio facit, incutit multis magnum metum, sed ut spero et volo et ut se fert ipse, bonos et senatum malet .... quod cum Csesar . . valde contempsit." 2 Cselius to Cicero (ad Div. viii. 5.). ' Ad Div. viii. 9. VOL. II. H 98 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xm. economy of the state. 1 Marcellus had made no express mention of Caesar's province ; but it was well known that he was in reality aimed at, and a second decree was fulminated against any tribune who should venture to impede the proceedings of the senate. It was further provided that the claims of Caesar's veterans should be taken into immediate consider- ation ; and it was evidently hoped that they might thus be seduced from their allegiance to their be- loved commander. Three tribunes protested, not- withstanding, and even Sulpicius expressed disapproved i_- j i r i_ 11 by the mo- his disapproval ot his colleague s proposi- derate party, . . . , j-j but supported tion ; but the majority ot the senate did not hesitate to confirm it, and Pompeius inti- mated with solemnity that obedience to the senate was the first duty of a citizen. Hitherto, he said, he could not have interfered to abridge Caesar's term of govern- ment, but now his scruples vanished. What then would he do, asked Marcellus, if the tribunes should interpose, and forbid the law for assigning his provi/nces to a successor ? It would make no dif- ference, he replied, whether Ccesar refused to obey the senate himself, or prompted his creatures to do so. And what, urged another, if Ccesar should persist in suing for the consulship, and refuse to abdicate his command ? What, he returned, if my son should raise his stick against me! z These words were not regarded as sufficiently explicit. They might, indeed, imply a contempt for the restless intriguer too great to condescend to so monstrous a supposition; but, whatever language Pompeius might hold, his intentions were never free from suspicion ; and on this occasion there were not wanting some 1 Com pare Cic. de Prov. Cons. 15.: " Ex Kal. denique ei Marti is nascetur repente provincia." Perhaps this was a provision of the Sempronian law for the assignment of consular provinces before the consul's election. * Caelius to Cicero, I. c. 4.U.70S-B.C.51. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 99 to surmise that he had still a private understand- ing with the common enemy. Caesar appears to have remonstrated against the injustice Casar offera to of the proceeding, and even, if we may ^ n "^ e believe the testimony of one writer, to and iu y ricnm - have offered to resign the Transalpine and Illyrian provinces, retaining only the Cisalpine. 1 But the senate gave no heed to him. Exasperated to a pitch of unusual warmth, he could no longer refrain from intimating his resolution to preserve himself, if necessary, by an appeal to arms. When the news was conveyed to him of the determination at which the senate had thus arrived to deprive him of his government on the appointed day, he laid his hand on his sword and exclaimed, This, then, shall keep it* It still remained to be seen whether these bold assailants would have the courage to abide M< Marc< .Hu. by this resolution when the time came to by'themfaSt- put them to the proof. It was, perhaps, SSif.^ the object of a section at least of the party Gaul- to anticipate the risk of failure by driving the popular leader at once to violence. Such seems to have been the aim of a brutal insult with which the consul Mar- cellus now provoked him. Caesar had constituted himself the patron of the Transpadane Gauls, and among other acts by which he had confirmed his interests in that country, he had founded a colony at Novum Comum. The Transpadanes had already ob- tained the Latin franchise from the republic through the influence of Pompeius Strabo 3 ; a privilege 1 Appian, B.C. ii. 25. It may be suspected that Appian antici- pates in this place an offer of the kind, which Caesar undoubtedly made at a later period. 2 Appian, B.C. ii. 26. Plutarch, however, attributes this sally to one of his soldiers. 1 Strab. v. 1. 6.: Ascon. in Pisonian. p. 3. ed.Orell. Novum Comum was the name given to Comum, now Como, when Cassar founded a second colony there. Drumann thinks that as the first colony of Pompeiug Rtrabo received the jus Latii, the second had the complete I 100 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. which, as is well known, conferred upon all who had held a provincial magistracy the full rights of Roman citizenship. Scourging was a punishment from which a Roman citizen, in the fullest sense, was legally exempt. This immunity was considered as a distinc- tion, and guarded with jealousy. Marcellus caused a freeman of Novum Comum to be seized, upon some pretence, and beaten with rods. The man, it appears, had not served a magistracy l ; he could not legally claim exemption ; but the act was not the less offen- sive to the patron of his countrymen, who felt that it was intended to disparage his influence. Cicero's good sense and moderation denounced it as an act of wanton hostility towards one who deserved at least h onourable regard from every citizen of the republic. The indignity was redoubled, when the consul bade the man go and show his scars to the patron who was powerless to relieve him. It is not improbable that the precarious position supposed peni i Q which the proconsul was at this time posFtk^n supposed to be, may have inspired his ene- mies with courage to hurl this insult at his head. It was reported at Eome that his cavalry had been destroyed in a disastrous engagement : that the seventh legion had suffered a severe defeat ; that in his Roman franchise. There is no authority for such a supposition, and it can only be adopted with the idea that it is required for the point of the story before us. But the act of Marcellus was sufficiently irri- tating to Caesar, without supposing a direct violation or denial of a citizen's privileges. 1 Such are Cicero's express words : " Marcellus foede de Comensi: etsiille magistratum non gesserat, erat tamen Transpadanus" (ad Alt. v. 11.). Appian (ii. 26.) and also Plutarch (Goes. 29.) assert the contrary, but Cicero's authority is of course to be preferred. He goes on to complain of the act as disrespectful to Pompeius, whose father had given the jus Latii to the Transpadanes. It could hardly be represented as such, if Marcellus had merely denied Csesar's power to confer a higher right than had been conceded to his predecessor. Middleton, 1 observe, makes bad Latin of the passage, reading gesserit fit should be gessis&et) for gesserat, in a futile attempt to reconcile it with Appian and Plutarch. A.TJ.704-B.C.50. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 101 expedition against the Bellovaci he had been cut off with a small detachment from the rest of his forces : whispers as to his fate were circulating in the ranks of the nobility ; Domitius put his finger to his lips with a significant look which our informant declines to interpret. 1 But Pompeius at least had more con- fidence in his rival's ability to extricate himself from his difficulties. When Marcellus proceeded still fur- ther, and proposed to send the proconsul's successors into his provinces, even before the time appointed, he interfered with expressions of moderation and respect for so noble a champion of the common- wealth. 2 At the same time, however, he insisted, without disguise, that the senate should take up the matter in due season, and assume the right of deciding peremptorily upon his claims. The termination of the conquest of Gaul found the work of pacification already far ad- C.-CMI'S mim , _, ! r n 11 and concilia- vanced. 1 he policy ot Caesar was essentially tory treat- ,.. ,, , J c ,. . J mentofthe different trom that or his predecessors in oauis. provincial administration. The provinces on either side of the Alps had been bound to the car of the republic by the iron links of arms and colonies. Large tracts of land had been wrested from the con- quered people, and conferred upon such Roman citizens as would exchange for foreign A . r . 704 . plunder the security of their own homes, Ba5 - and maintain the outposts of the empire in the midst of prostrate enemies. The military spirit which animated these colonists, their discipline, intelligence 1 Cic ad Dlv. viii. 1. Calius writes to Cicero, in Cilicia, on the first of June: " Quod ad Caesarem crebri et non belli de eo rumores sed susurratores duntaxat veniunt: alius equitem perdidisse, quod.opinor, factum est : alius septirnam legionem vapulasse; ipsum apud Bello- vacos circumsederi, interclusum ab reliquo exercitu : neque adhuc certi (juicquam est, neque hac inceita tamen vulgo jactantur : sed inter paucos, quos tu nosti, palam secreto narrantur : at Domitius, quuni mantis ados npposuit " 2 Appian, B.C. ii. 26. 102 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xm. and valour, sufficed to overawe the natives almost without the presence of regular troops. But such a system could not possibly be extended to the vast territories which the state was now suddenly invited to organize. For was it Caesar's wish to bring Rome thus, as it were, into the provinces ; his object was, on the contrary, to approach the Gaulish provincials to Rome, to give them an interest and a pride in the city of their conquerors. The first step towards making citizens of the Gauls was to render the Roman yoke as light as possible. Accordingly Caesar established no colonies throughout the vast region which he added to the empire. The form of a province which he gave to it was little more than nominal. As Cisalpine Gaul was distinguished by the title of Togata, the gowned, to indicate its peaceful character and approximation to the manners of the city, so the Province, otherwise called the Narbonensis, was contrasted with it by the epithet Braccata, or trousered, from the uncouth habiliments of its people. So, also, to the whole of the immense country between the Rhone, the Ocean and the Rhine, the acquisition of Caesar himself, another term of distinction was applied, and it was called Comata, from the long wild hair of its native barba- rians. But, on the other hand, the conqueror allowed the appearance at least of their original freedom to most of the states within these limits. He was not afraid to trust the most spirited of the Gallic tribes with this flattering boon. Not only the Arverni, the ^Edui, the Bituriges, but even the fierce and intrac- table Treviri, were indulged with the name of free states. 1 They had their own magistrates, senates and deliberations, guided no doubt by Roman agents; and, as we hear in later times, that the subjects of discussion were appointed by the government, and 1 Cas. B.C. iii. 59. ; Plin. H.N. iv. 31. S3 1.V.704-B.C.60. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 103 the topics and arguments of the speakers strictly controlled 1 , so it is probable that Caesar did not cease to exercise jealous vigilance over the assemblies he permitted to exist. Other states were taken into the alliance of the victorious republic. 2 The tribute which the provincials paid was softened by the name of military contribution 3 , and that it might not press heavily upon them, the annual sum was definitely fixed at the moderate amount of forty millions of sesterces. 4 Upon both cities and chiefs he showered a profusion of honours and more substantial benefits. 6 But, after all, the manner of the magnanimous Roman won as many hearts as his benefactions. When he saw his own sword suspended, as has been mentioned, in the temple of its Arvernian captors, he refused to reclaim it, saying, with a gracious smile, that the offering was sacred. 6 Caesar, indeed, had another enemy in the southern part of his province, the Pompeian faction, i i j J_T_ 1 1 /~i i ii Heconciliatea whom he ieared more than the (jauls them- the adherents , , . , j .of the senate selves, and it was in order to strengthen m the pro- viuce himself against these that he paid his court to the nations which he had subdued. The strong- hold of this party lay in the Narbonensis, where Pompeius had established the base of his operations against Sertorius, and which he had filled with his legionaries and dependents. Narbo Martins, the principal city in the west of the province, was devoted 1 Tac. Ann. iii. 43.; Ukert, Geog. der Gr. und Rom. iii. 255. " Tac. Germ. 29. Suet. Jul. 25.; Thierry, Gaulms, iii. 211. 4 Computing the sestertius at 2d. and a fraction, this sum will re- present about 350,0007. of our money. 4 Auct. B. G. viii. 49.: " Itaquu honorifice civitates appellando, principes maximis praemiis afficiendo." Dion's account, indeed, is not so favourable: -rovs fj.ev haTTfivwffe, rovs 5e rjnepuxre (xl. 43.). 8 Pint. Cees. 26. : Itpov riyovfj.fvos. The writer evidently attributes this generosity to a feeling of superstition. 104 HISTORY OF THE KOMANS CH. xin. to the interests of the chief of the nobles ; nor was Massilia less attached to the cause of the Roman aristocracy, to which it had looked for alliance and protection during the period of its struggle with the neighbouring tribes. The presence of Marius in those regions for a period of some years, had, indeed, introduced relations with the party of which he was the victorious champion ; and when that party had been trampled down by Sulla in Italy, many of its proscribed adherents had taken refuge in the Gaulish province. It was there that Lepidus had hoped to muster allies for his futile attack upon the Roman oligarchy; it was from thence that Perperna had brought powerful reinforcements to Sertorius in Spain ; but after the triumph of Pompeius the south of Gaul was reorganized as a dependency of the as- cendant class by a system of cruel confiscations and proscriptions. Milo selected Massilia for his place of retreat, as being a stronghold of his order. For the same reason, perhaps, Catilina pretended to go into banishment there, as a pledge to the senate that he had no views opposed to their interests. Pompeius, after his return to Rome, had still continued in fact to govern the Province, through the agency of Fon- teius and other proconsuls, up to the moment of Caesar's arrival. But the new governor was intently occupied in undoing the work of his predecessors. He exerted himself to recover the favour of the Massilians by doubling the benefits his rival had already conferred upon them. He extended the limits of their territory, and increased the tributes they derived from it. 1 The project, at least, of building a city and forming a naval station at Forum Julii may be attributed to Cffisar, though it is un- 1 Cses. B. C. i. 35. : ' Bello victos Salyas attrilmit, vectigaliaque auxit." The Massilians acknowledged that they had rer-eived paria beneficia from Caesar and Pompeius. A.U.704-B.C.50. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 105 certain whether he actually completed it. 1 With the ulterior designs he had in view he could not follow the example of Sulla and Pompeius in disbanding his veterans, and establishing them in colonies throughout the country ; but we heax of the settle- ment of a division of the tenth legion at Narbo, of the sixth at Arelate, of the seventh at Biterrae, of the eighth at Antipolis 2 ; and it is probable that he made at least the commencement of an assignment of lands at those places, which was afterwards completed by Augustus. If the clemency which the Gaulish cities experi- enced at his hands should fail to procure csesarat- ., . . ,1 i ,! laches to him- their acquiescence in the ascendency with self the ,. r n J* military spirit which Home seemed to be content, the pro- om.eGauis. consul adopted other means to deprive them of the power of contesting it. He placed himself at the head of the military spirit of the people, and con- verted the flower of their youth into one great Eoman army. The legions with which he had composition effected the reduction of the country had <* hu Ie8t01 "- been principally of Gaulish blood and language ; the republic had furnished him with no Italian troops. 3 The tenth legion was raised by Pomptinus in the Transalpine province to combat the Allobroges. The seventh, eighth and ninth, which Caesar found in the Cisalpine, were probably the levies of Metellus in that region, when he was commissioned to close the Alps against the retreat of Catilina. 4 The eleventh 1 D'Atmlle, Notice sur hi Gaule, in toe. z Mela, ii. 5.; PI in. H.N, iii. 4. ; Ukert, Geoy. der. Gr. vnd Rom. ; Guiscbard, Mem. Milit. iii. 1 6. 1 Guiscliard, Mem. Milit. iii. 2. 4 Auct. B.C. viii. 8. : " Tres veterrimre Icgiones. " Tin- legions which Pompeius maintained in Spain bore tlie numbers one to six. The numbers were given according to the date of conscription; but even at this early period the armies of the east and west had no reference to each other, and the legions of Syiia were numbered in- dependently of those of Spain and Gaul. Guiscliard, L c. 106 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. Xiu. and twelfth were the proconsul's hasty conscription in his province at the commencement of his first campaign. The thirteenth and fourteenth were raised from the same countries to oppose the great confede- racy of the Belgians. Of these, the latter had been cut to pieces by the Eburones l ; but another four- teenth and a fifteenth also were afterwards levied in the Gaulish provinces. Even the legion which Pom- peius had lent to his rival had been raised by him in the Cisalpine, by the order of the senate. Only a small portion of these soldiers could have been of genuine Roman or Italian extraction, with the full franchise of the city ; they were levied, no doubt, from the native population of the numerous states which had been endowed with the Latin rights. 2 It was contrary to the first rule of military service to admit mere aliens into the ranks of the Roman legion, or to form supplemental legions of the unenfranchised pro- vincials. But each of these divisions was attended by an unlimited number of cohorts 3 , which, under the name of auxilia, were equipped, for the most part, in the same manner as itself, and placed under the same discipline and command. The common dangers and glories of a few campaigns side by side had rendered the Gaulish auxiliary no less efficient than the legionary himself. Caesar surrounded him- self with a large force of this kind, and swept into its ranks a great number of the men of note and in- fluence in their respective cities. 4 One entire legion, indeed, he did not scruple to compose of Gauls alone ; 1 Two legions arc said to have been destroyed on that occasion ; probably there remained enough of them to be drafted into a single legion. 2 Sigon. de Jur. Ant. ItaL iii. 2., de JUT. Prov. i. 6. * The thirty-second cohort of the second legion is mentioned on a medal. Harduin. ad Plin. iii. 4. 4 Cas. B.C. i. 39: " Nominatim ex omnibus ci vital ibus nobilis- simo et fortissimo quoque evocato." A.TJ.704--B.C.50. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 107 and of all his audacious innovations, none, perhaps, jarred more upon the prejudices of his countrymen. But in so doing he was carrying out his policy of amalgamation ; and he acted on the same principle, when, at a later period, he gave to this whole body the Koman franchise. The soldiers who csmr-s composed this legion were distinguished ^ nSnlld by a helmet with the figure of a lark or a Alauda - tuft of its plumage on the crest, from whence it de- rived its name Alauda. 1 The Gauls admired the spirit and vivacity of the bird, and rejoiced in the omen. Fond of the excitement of a military life, vain of the consideration attached to the profession of arms, proud of themselves and of their leaders, they found united in Caesar's service all the charms which most attracted them. No captain ever knew better how to win the personal affection of his soldiers, while he commanded their respect. The general severity of his discipline enhanced the favour of his indulgence. Even the studied appearance of caprice, and the rudeness which he could mingle seasonably with his refined accomplishments, hit the humour of the camp, and delighted the fancy of his followers. 2 Accordingly, he enjoyed popularity among his troops such as seldom fell to the lot of the Koman generals, who maintained discipline by the terror of punishment alone. Throughout his Gaulish campaigns there was no single instance of an open act of insubordination ; even the raw recruits of his earliest campaign quailed at the first words of his rebuke. The self-devotion manifested in moments of peril by men and officers astonished even the ample experience of the Eomans. It was impossible to make his soldiers, when captured, 1 Suet. Jul. 24. ; Plin. H. N. xi. 44. ; Cic. ad Att. xvi. 8. ; cotnp. Druinann, iii. 235 * Suet. Jul. 65. and foil. , where he gives several instances of the kind. 108 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. Mil. turn their arms against him ; and the toils and priva- tions they endured in their marches and sieges more appalled the enemy than even their well-known bravery in the field. 1 This was the secret of their repeated triumphs over numbers and every other advantage ; the renown they hence acquired charmed away the malice or patriotism of the Gauls, and precipitated them once more upon Italy, under the banners of their conqueror. Through the favour of the senate, though not without the misgivings of some at least Character and ., ,, n c. !. /-^ i. j conduct of c. ot the party, C. fecribomus Curio had suc- curio. ceeded in obtaining the tribuneship. He A.u.7rtlve at- ij \. n tempt to ex- would have noted Curio among the un pelCurlofrom , i_ j i i 11 T T>- /- the senate, worthy, had not his colleague L. Fiso, Cae- Marcellusand , ~ J ' . , , ,^ . , . ' . the oligarchs sar s tather-in-law, though timid in opposing "onions tor the party to which he was generally at- support. r J . , , . J tached, resisted this extreme proceeding. Appius contented himself with gravely pronouncing the unworthiness of the tribute in the senate, and the tribune retorted by tearing his robes, in token of the insult done to his sacred office. 1 The consul, C. Marcellus, was not daunted by this demonstration, but put the question of his rejection to the vote of the assembly. Curio defended himself with address, and affected moderation ; the senate faltered, and re- frained from sanctioning his expulsion. Stung with vexation, the nobles clothed themselves in mourning, and made all the parade of a great national calamity. 2 They attended their champion Marcellus to the suburban retreat to which under the plea of his pro- consular command Pompeius had retired. They there thrust upon him the guardianship of the city, and placed at his disposal the two legions at Capua. 3 The cautious statesman required that this charge should be confirmed to him by the sanction of the consuls designated for the ensuing year. These were C. Claudius Marcellus, 4 a brother of M. Marcellus, the consul of the year 703, and L. Cornelius Lentulus vincial government in Africa, and there amassed by extortion the enormous wealth for which he became notorious to posterity. This circumstance may serve to illustrate Horace's address to the historian's grand-nephew : " Latins regnes avidum domando Spiritum, quam si Libyam remotis Gadibus jungas et uterque Poenus Serviat uni." Hor. Od. ii. 2. 9. 1 Dion, xl. 64. 2 Plut. Pomp. 59. 8 Appian, B. C. ii. 31.; Dion, xl. 64. 4 He was cousin to C. Claudius Marcellus, the consul of 704, A.U.704-B.C.50. UNDER TI1E EMPIRE. 113 Crus. They both expressed their full concurrence in the voice of their party 1 , and promised their future support to its chosen protector. It was vainly hoped, from the reports which were said to come from Cae- sar's camp, that the proconsul's army would refuse to fight for him, and even that he might be overpowered and destroyed by the indignation of his own troops. 8 Pompeius was still blindly persuaded that his own position was unassailable, and when pressed to make further levies, contemptuously rejected the advice. / have only to stamp with my foot, he said, when the occasion requires, to raise legions from the soil of Italy. 3 Such is the infatuation which seems generally to attend the counsels of a proud and digni- infatuation fied aristocracy assailed by a revolutionary oligarchs. leader. Wrapped in their own tranquil composure, they fail to take account of the contagiousness of an aggressive and lawless spirit. They make no due allowance for the restlessness of troops who have been debauched by a long career of plunder and power. They calculate on the mere instruments of a selfish leader being at last dissatisfied with their own unequal share in the combination, and on their willingness to secure their gains by turning against him. But the genius of the successful adventurer is chiefly shown in the ascendency he gains over his adherents, filling them with his own hopes, moulding them to his own feelings, and imbuing them with the sense of actually partaking in his triumphs. This transcen- dent operation of mind upon mind can only be fully understood by the same genius which can exert it. At this crisis, while the more wary p omp ei n8 among the nobles might still distrust their Neapolis at ability to resist the enemy whom the A - u - ro4 - more violent were driving to desperation, an incident 1 Dion, xl. 66. * Plut. Ctffi irapjjWire. Appian, B. C. ii. 33.: ticiKtvov rots &,us irdOoitv a.roiruTfpoi'. Liiv. Eplt. civ. : " Urbe pulei." The tribunes quitted Rome on the night of Jan. 6 7. Nov. 1819 of the corrected calendar. A..U.705-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 123 CHAPTEE XIV. The consuls prepare to withstand Caesar's claims by force. Caesar crosses the Rubicon. Consternation of his enemies. They abandon Rome, and rally sound Pompcius in Campania. Caesar advances triumphantly. The senate affects to negotiate. Pom- peius falls back upon Luceria. Domitias makes a stand at Cor- finium: is betrayed and delivered up by his soldiers : pardoned by Caesar. Effect of Caesar's clemency. Pompeius is besieged by Caesar in Brundisium. Escapes across the sea with his troops, the consuls and the senate. Explanation of the apparent pusil- lanimity of his conduct. (Jan. March A.u. 705, B.C. 49.) As long as the claims which Caesar advanced were supported by champions invested with the Suoceg , of the prerogatives of the Tribunitian office, the mfalureiof senate, composed of men of every party l 1 ' 6 ^"^' and various shades of opinion, had acted, B - 49 - as we have seen, with extreme vacillation. Though it had permitted itself to be swayed violently from one extreme decision to another, at the bidding of its most resolute and turbulent members, yet it had shown, at least on many occasions, a disposition to treat both the rival leaders with equal justice. . But the abrupt departure of the tribunes, compelled, as they proclaimed, by the ascendency of the most violent section of the oligarchical faction, changed at once the position of parties, and decided the place of the wavering and neutral. If any voice was now raised for negotiation or even reflection, it was drowned by the din of applause which hailed the indignant reclamations of Scipio, Lentulus and Cato. 1 From this moment the staunchest of the proconsul's > Caes. B. C. i. 3, 4. 124 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS en. xiv. adherents in the senate were reduced to silence. If the sacred office had failed to protect the tribunes, what should divert the violence of the consuls from the head of a private partisan ? The law had de- clared itself against Caesar in the person of its chief organs, the authorities and great council of the state ; and the Marian party, the strength of which certainly did not lie in the eminence of its leaders in the city, had neither the courage nor the power to defy it. At the same time, as might be expected, and as doubtless was calculated, the success of violent mea- sures swept along the more moderate councillors, such as Cicero, in the wake of the triumphant leaders of their common party. Even those who had obsti- nately maintained a neutral position, such as Cato, those who detested and feared both the rival chiefs equally, found themselves reduced to the necessity of embracing the side on which the state had declared itself. In supporting Pompeius at the head of the republic they were compelled to concede to him all his claims, and that entire independence of law and constitutional practice which Csesar had so plausibly contrasted with the severe treatment he had himself received. Accordingly, when the consuls convened the senate The consuls for the day succeeding: the flight of the review their forces, mthe tribunes, they invited Pompeius to attend their deliberations, which were held out- side the walls of the city in the temple of Bellona. 1 Lentulus was roused to action by the pressure of his debts, the prospect of military command, and the lavish bribes administered to him by eastern poten- tates, impatient for the commencement of anarchy. He boasted among his friends that a second Cornelius was destined to resume the pre-eminence of Sulla. Seipio, as the father-in-law of the general, expected 1 C8. B. C. i. 6.; Dion, xli. 8. ; Appian, B. C. il 34. A.P.705-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 125 at least to share his distinctions. Pompeius himself was impelled to the arbitrament of arms by the con- sciousness of his own equivocal position as the pro- consul of a province at the head of an army in Italy. The nobles were charmed at the echo of their bold defiance, and were determined not to relax the vigour of their policy at the moment when it had gained the ascendant. They listened with satisfaction to the sanguine calculations their leader made of the forces at his disposal. Ten legions he had under arms ; seven of these, indeed, were in Spain, where one had been lately levied, in addition to those which the senate had assigned to the proconsul ; one only he had in immediate attendance upon his orders in the neighbourhood of Rome, and two more were stationed at Capua, being the same which the govern- ment had lately extorted from Cffisar at his bidding. But his strength lay not so much, he affirmed, in the magnitude of the preparations he had made, as in the expectations on which he might confidently rely. A vast portion of the soil of Italy had been parcelled out among the veterans of Sulla, and every motive of gratitude and interest would still attach both them and their descendants to the party which inherited the dictator's principles and obligations. It was on the temper of his rival's forces, however, that Pom- peius chiefly relied for the triumphant issue of a struggle he had determined to provoke. The con- querors of Graul, it was said, were wearied with war, satiated with plunder, discontented with their restless general, dismayed at the prospect of raising their hands against their beloved country. 8 It is not im- probable that notions of this kind were disseminated by members of the great families of whom Caesar kept so many about his own person throughout his campaigns. Certain of these might be in corres- 1 Cs. B. C. L 4. * Cajs. B. C. L 6.; Pint. Pomp, 57. 126 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. JCTT, pondence with his enemies, and not disinclined to betray him, at least if his affairs should seem despe- rate. Some doubtless who, up to this time, had been most distinguished in foreign fields, declined to follow his banners in the unnatural contest of civil war. Among his chief lieutenants there was one at least who was on the point of abandoning his camp, and arraying himself in arms on the other side. So strong was the conviction upon this point entertained in the circles of the senatorial party, that few of them believed that Caesar would really venture to throw away the scabbard. But there was no more fatal mistake throughout their proceedings than their confidence in the existence of general disaffection to their leader among the officers and soldiers of the Gallic legions. The senate, though far from expecting the actual collision of arms, decreed its war-measures fhe^pro^clf with ostentatious energy. Orders were of\hVw a na e te s . issued for the immediate levy of fresh troops ; but, at the same time, so secure did it feel of its position and resources that it made no provision for bringing over the large division of its forces quartered in Spain. It was presumed, indeed, that Caesar could not venture to withdraw his army of occupation from the conquered provinces of Gaul, and the Iberian legions might be left to menace the garrisons which, if he invaded Italy, he must leave behind him in the west. 1 In the assign- ment of provinces which was made at the same sitting of the senate, no respect was paid to the regulations which had been so recently sanctioned by its own decree. The enactment which required an interval of five years between the discharge of 1 Cic. ad Div. xvi. 12.: "Putabamus ilium mctuere, si ad urbeni ire coepisset, ne Gallias amitteret, quas ambas habet inimicissimas praeter Transpadanos : ex Ilispaniaque sex Icgioiies ct magna auxilia habet a tergo." A.r.705-B.c.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 12? office in the city and the assumption of a provincial government was utterly disregarded. Scipio, the consul of the year 702, received Syria, the most im- portant military command in the East. L. Domitius Ahenobarbus was selected to be Caesar's successor in the Further Gaul, a province which had heretofore been generally reserved for the most devoted parti- sans of the oligarchy. The Cisalpine Gaul, one of Caesar's principal strongholds, was confided to Con- sidius ; Sicily, Sardinia, and Africa, the three grana- ries of the city, were entrusted to the vigilance of Cato, Cotta, and Tuber o. Cilicia, which secured the alliance of the dependent kings of Asia Minor, was placed under the control of P. Sestius. A trifling and inglorious charge, that of the Campanian coast, satisfied the demands of Cicero. He was extremely unwilling to leave the immediate neighbourhood of Kome, where he conceived that his real sphere of usefulness lay. 1 Cato was no less reluctant to relinquish the contests of the forum, in the danger and excitement of which he delighted, for the grave responsibility of arming in a civil contest. He would have resisted every entreaty or menace of Pompeius, but the voice of the consuls spoke to him with an authority which he could not withstand, and his issuming an active share in the war measures of the senate gave the stamp of justice to its cause in the eyes at least of an admiring posterity. 2 The personages who were selected for these im- portant charges were for the most part dis- Men and tinguished as the boldest and haughtiest E^u* 11 champions of aristocratic ascendency. Mar- "i"""" ""- cius Philippus, a near connexion of Caesar, and M. Marcellus, who had given offence by his prudent 1 Cic. ad Div. xvi. 11, 12., ad Alt. vii. 14. 7 Pint. Cat. Min. 53.; Lucan, i. 128.: " Viotrix causa Deis placuit, sed victa Catoni." 128 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XIV advice not to rush into war, at least until preparation was fully made, were passed over in the distribution of provinces, though both were entitled to them from their consular dignity. 1 The appeal to the people for the Lex Curiata, by which alone the pro- consul received legitimate authority for the levy of troops, was omitted in all these appointments as a superfluous condescension to the privileges of the commonalty. The treasury was freely opened to the requisitions of the generalissimo of the republic, and not in Rome only, but throughout Italy contribu- tions were extorted, and even the temples plundered, to expedite the collection of the materials of war which had been so long neglected. 2 These measures were the vigorous, or rather the feverish work of a single day. It was not hawJgues his by Curio and the fugitive tribunes, who had ciaTSsMs pro ~ left the city the preceding night, that the wrongs. J ri j j t. news of the nobles defiance was brought to Caesar's camp. The couriers who set out from Rome one evening later with the account of the next day's debate seem to have outstripped the progress of the private party; and it was upon the receipt of the intelligence which they brought to Ravenna, if we are to believe Caesar's apologetic statement, that he first determined to draw the sword. 3 He did not fall in with Curio, as we shall see, till some days later, and one stage nearer to Rome. Doubt- 1 Caes. B. C. L 6.: "Philippus et Marcellus private consilio prae- tereuntur." 2 Caes. /. c. : " Tota Italia dilectus habentur, anna imperantur, pecunite a municipiis exiguntur, e fanis tolluntur, omnia divina humanaque jura penniscentur." Comp. Dion, xli. 6. ; Appian, L'. C. ii. 34. 1 Cxs. B. C. i. 7. : " Quibus rebus cognitis," that is, the resolu- tions of the senate for the division of provinces, by which he was himself superseded, Caesar harangued his soldiers : it was not till some days later that he met the tribunes at Ariminum (c. 8.). But I am inclined to think that the notices cf date here are purposely confused. A..U.705-B.C.49. UNDEfi THE EMPIRE. 129 less he had calculated every step beforehand : his arrangements were made, his preparations complete, nor did he at the last moment waver. It was appa- rently on the eleventh of January, as soon as the news reached him, that he assembled and harangued the thirteenth legion, which was all the force he had with him at Ravenna. 1 The statement of his claims and wrongs was received by the soldiers with expres- sions of the warmest indignation ; though he did not even yet indicate publicly the course he had deter- mined to adopt, he felt the pulse of his followers, and satisfied himself once more of their devotion to him. The officers were attached to him from love, hope and gratitude, and the great mass of the common soldiers, of provincial or foreign birth, had no sym- pathy with the country whose name only they bore. He had already doubled their pay 2 while yet in com- parative poverty; what might they not expect from his munificence when the riches of the world should lie at his disposal ? The city of Ravenna, at which Caesar had fixed the quarters of his scanty band, though lying C(E8ar pr e pare , out of the direct line of the ^milian way, iu 1 " 1 " 16 1 Caes. B. C. I 7. Appian (B. C. ii. 32.) says that Curio reached Rome in three days from Ravenna. We must suppose that couriers left Rome with the news of the debate which took place in the senate on the following day, in the evening of the 7tb, and ar- rived at Ravenna within a similar period. Caesar's address to the soldiers could hardly be later than the next day, that is, the llth: yet it does not appear that he crossed the Rubicon before the night of the 15th 16th, if we may depend upon the accuracy of Plutarch's calculation of 60 days from thence to the taking of Brundisium. 2 Suet. Jul. 26. : " Legionibus stipendium in perpetuum dupli- cavit." He does not state the exact time, but mentions this among the various artifices by which Caesar attached different classes of the citizens to his rising fortunes. The legionary's pay in the time of Polybius was two obols, equivalent in round numbers to five ases (Polyb. vL 39.). Tacitus (Ann. i. 17.) mentions ten asea as the ordinary stipendium in his day. See the note on Suet. /. e. ed. Baumgarten-Crusius, from Lipsius and Gronoviua. "VOL. TT. K 130 HISTORY OF THE BOMANS CH. MT. the principal communication between .Italy and Cisalpine Gaul, was the chief military station of that province. It was connected with this main trunk by a secondary route, which branched off from Ari- minum, and skirted the coast of the Adriatic, pass- ing through Ravenna to Aquileia. About ten miles from Ariminum, and twice that distance from Ra- venna, the frontier of Italy and Graul was traced by the stream of the Rubicon. 1 This little river, red with the drainage of the peat mosses from which it descends, 2 is formed by the union of three mountain torrents, and is nearly dry in the summer, like most of the watercourses on the eastern side of the Apen- nines. In the month of November the winter flood might present a barrier more worthy of the important position which it once occupied 3 ; but the northern frontier of Italy had long been secure from invasion, and the channel was spanned by a bridge of no great dimensions. 4 Caesar seems to have made his last arrangements in secret, and concealed his design till the moment he had fixed for its accomplishment. On the morning of the fifteenth he sent forward some cohorts to the river, while he remained himself at Ravenna, and assisted at a public spectacle througn- out the day. He invited company to his table, and entertained them with his usual ease and affability. It was not till sunset that he made an excuse for a brief absence, and then, mounting a car yoked with mules, hired from a mill in the vicinity, hastened with only a few attendants to overtake his soldiers at the appointed spot. In his anxiety to avoid the risk of being encountered and his movements di- 1 Suet. Jul. 31.; Plut. Cox. 20. 4 Lucan, i. 214. : " Puniceus Rubicon." The name of the stream is evidently derived from its colour. 1 The loth of January, A.U. 705, corresponded with Nov. 27. B.C 50; Fischer, R. Z. 4 Suetonius (/.c.) calls it ponticulus. A.U.70.5-B.C.49. DflDEE THE EMPIRE. 131 vulged, he left the high road, and soon lost his way in the bye-paths of the country. One after another the torches of his party became extinguished, and he was left in total darkness. It was only by taking a peasant for a guide and alighting from his vehicle that he at last reached his destination. 1 The ancients amused themselves with picturing the guilty hesitation with which the first me passage of of a line of despots stood, as they imagined, theKubico - on the brink of the fatal river, and paused for an in- stant before he committed the irrevocable act, preg- nant with the destinies of a long futurity. Caesar, indeed, in his Commentaries, makes no allusion to the passage of the Rubicon, and, at the moment of stepping on the bridge, his mind was probably ab- sorbed in the arrangements he had made for the march of his legions, or for their reception by his friends in Ariminum. We may feel an interest, how- ever, in remarking how the incident was coloured by the imaginations of its first narrators; and the old tradition recorded by Suetonius is too picturesque and too characteristic of the Italian cast of legend to be passed by without notice. Even now, Caesar had said, we may return ; if we cross the bridge, arms must decide the contest. At that moment of suspense there appeared suddenly the figure of a youth, re- markable for comeliness and stature, playing on a flute, the pastoral emblem of peace and security. The shepherds about the spot mingled with the soldiers, and straggled towards him, captivated by his simple airs ; when, with a violent movement, he snatched a trumpet from one of the military band, rushed with it to the bank of the river, and blowing a furious blast of martial music, leaped into the water, and disappeared on the opposite side. Let us advance, exclaimed Caesar, where the gods direct, and our 1 Suet. Jul I. c.; Plut. CCES. 32. K 2 132 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xiv. enemies invite us. Be the die cast. The soldiers dashed across the bridge or the ford, and, giving them not an instant for reflection, the bold invader led them straight to Ariminuin, entering its undefended walls with the first break of dawn. 1 It was there that he met Curio and the fugitive tribunes. They had no occasion to disclose their grievances. While they had lingered on their way, inflaming perhaps the in- dignation of their adherents in the towns through which they passed, by the recital of the proceedings in Eome, the champion of the commons had already heard the story of their wrongs, and had taken up arms ostensibly to avenge their violated sanctity. The occupation of Ariminum was an explicit de- conntemation claration of war ; but Caesar was not in a of the city. condition to push forward immediately. It was from thence, he tells us, that he despatched orders for the movement of his troops 2 ; one legion, the twelfth, reached him within a fortnight, and an- other, the eighth, within a month from that time. These, together with the thirteenth legion, which he had with him, were the forces with which he had de- termined to confront the army of the consuls; for Caesar also had made his calculations regarding the disposition of the Italians, and the fidelity of the troops opposed to him, and reckoned upon deriving his most copious resources from the enemy's own camp. Three of his legions were led to the neigh- bourhood of Narbo, under the command of Fabius, in order to check the advance of the Pompeian lieu- 1 Suet. Jul. 32. ; comp. Appian, ii. 35. ; Plut. Cces. 32. Lucan (i. 186.) introduces on this occasion the apparition of the goddess Roma. In his times, it should be remembered, the idea of Rome as a living abstraction began to take the place of the conceptions of the popular mythology. The famous Prosopopoeia of the Genius of the Cape, whom Camoens summons to address the Portuguese navigators, has far less connexion with the ideas of real life. * Cses. B. C. I 8. ; Lucan, i. 396. : " Deseiuere cavo tentoria fixa Lemano," &c. A.U.705-B.C.49. UNDER 1KB EMPIRE. 133 tenants from Spain. The remainder of his forces were withdrawn perhaps gradually from their winter- quarters and concentrated in the south of Gaul, to support either the right or left wing of his position. But for some days the position of the invader, with a mere handful of soldiers about him, was extremely precarious. Had the three legions of Pompeius been arrayed in his front, and led against him by officers in whom they confided, a prompt attack could hardly have failed to destroy him. But these troops were divided and distant ; perhaps their officers knew, what at least was carefully concealed from the public, that they could not be relied on ; and the counsels of the nobles had relapsed once more into feebleness and vacilla- tion. They had indulged in incredulity to the last, and the news that Caesar had actually crossed the frontier came upon them like a clap of thunder. The conqueror of the northern world was marching, as they believed, upon them. He who had climbed the Alps and bridged the Khine and bestridden the ocean 1 , was daily, so the rumour ran, achieving his twenty miles on the broad and solid footing of their own military way. Nor was it only the Caesar of the Curia and the Forum who was rapidly approaching their walls. Bold and reckless as he had shown himself in the civic contests of the gown, he had learnt cruelty by habitual shedding of blood ; he had become, they were assured, in his nine years' intercourse with the barbarians, more ferocious than the Gauls themselves. Even hia legions were not of pure Roman extraction, but filled with the fiercest warriors of the races he had subdued. 2 The name of the half-clad savages of 1 Lucan, i. 369. : " Hsec manus ut victum post tcrga relinqueret orbem Oceani tumidas remo compescuit utidas, Fregit ct Arctoo spumantem vortice Rhenurn." * Lucan, ii. 535. : " Gallicaper gelida* rabies ctTunditur Alpes." 134 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XIV. the north was still a sound of panic dread to the populations of Italy. The Eomans quailed before a second apparition of the bearded and brawny victors of the day of Allia, much as the citizens of London shuddered at the approach of the Highlanders, the shock of whose charge had overthrown horse and man at the rout of Grladsmuir. For such, they believed, were the followers of the patrician renegade, who were even now thundering down the Flaminian Way, bursting through the denies of the Apennines, and choking the valleys of the Tiber and Nar with clouds of barbarian cavalry. 1 At this moment Caesar, as we have seen, was wait- The chiefs of ing with only a few cohorts at Ariminum evirate 6 f r t ne arrival of the succours, without which, bold as he was, even he would have deemed it madness to advance against the city. But the elements of his strength were magnified into colossal proportions by the excited imaginations of the men who, only a week before, had most affected to despise them. They counted his eleven legions, his indefinite resources of Gaulish cavalry, the favour of the Transpadanes, the zeal of the city mob, the fanatic devotion to him of the depraved and ruined of all classes. He had secured the favour of the pub- licani by his successful vindication of their claims ; the money-lenders were dissatisfied with the sump- tuary reforms which Pompeius had encouraged ; and, lastly, the agriculturists of Italy were indifferent to the empty names of freedom and the republic, and would have lent their weight to the maintenance of 1 Lucan i 475 : " Qua Nar Tibcrino illabitur amm Barbaricas saevi discurrereCa;saris alas. Ipsum omnes aquilas collataque signa fercntem Agminc non uno densisque incedere castris. Nee qualeiu meminere vident ; majorque ferusque Mcntibns occurrit, victoque immanior hostc '' A.TT.705 B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 135 a kingly tyranny, if only they could avert the calami- ties of war. In the midst of this general panic, the consuls and the senate, with their friends and ad- herents, turned anxiously for counsel and encourage- ment to Pompeius. But the hero had withdrawn from the neighbourhood of the city immediately on the arrival of the fatal news. He imparted his views and plans to no one. He had an interview with Cicero at Formiae ; but the orator, irresolute and de- sponding himself, could obtain no intimation from his leader of the tactics by which he meant to oppose the invader. The streets of Kome were crowded with an agitated multitude of all ranks and classes. Consulars and patricians descended from the steps of their palaces and led the long procession of fugitives down the Appian Way to Capua and the south. 1 Such was the confusion of the moment that the rulers of the state left the city without removing the public treasure in the coffers of the temple of Saturn. 2 They were not less negligent of their own private possessions, all of which they abandoned to the risk of pillage by the mob, even before the public enemy should arrive to seize them. Many indeed of the nobles still retained their blind confidence in Pom- peius, and calculated on a speedy return, as the result of some deep-laid schemes which they supposed him to have planned in secret. But his flight operated in general to increase the terror, and no sacrifice was thought too great to make for the safety of their bare lives. At the moment when great political principles meet in decisive conflict, it may be observed ., ,, , . ,. f ,, ~ ,, Thecalumnie* that the inclinations ot trie mass oi the against cr honourable and well-intentioned, who con- wen-tote"* . , ,. , , tioned men statute perhaps generally the numerical fromembrmc- _j.u f J C ing his cauae. strength of a party, are swayed in favour 1 Dion, xli. 7,8.; Lucan, i. 486.; comp. Cic. ad Alt. vii. 1012. * Cic. ad Alt. vii. 15 ; Cues. B C. i. 14. 136 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. Xiv. of the side which seems to embrace the men of highest renown for patriotism and probity. It is much easier to distinguish who are the most honest men, than to discover which are the soundest prin- ciples ; and it seems safer to choose the side which boasts of philosophers and patriots in its ranks than that which is branded as the refuge of spendthrifts and apostates. It was with an instinctive sense of this bias of the human mind that the nobles had studied all along to represent the followers of their enemy's fortunes as none other than the needy and rapacious, the scum of all orders of the community. They did not affect to insinuate that their vileness made them less dangerous, but they were such, they maintained, as no man who wished to keep up the appearance of public virtue could decently associate with. We may remember that Csesar, as he appeared to the eyes of the Roman nobility at this period of his career, was an adventurer of dissolute manners and the loosest principles. For many years all his ac- tions had been blackened by the systematic calumnies with which he was assailed, even beyond the common measure which fell to the lot of contemporary states- men. It required more than usual candour, par- ticularly in his avowed enemies, to divest the mind of a peculiar prejudice against him. Nevertheless, his conduct as a statesman and warrior in his foreign governments might have served to disabuse public opinion of its grossest errors in this respect. As- suredly none could fairly deny that he had formed to himself friends and admirers from among men of the best families, and the highest principles. A Cicero, a Crassus, a Brutus, had been his most devoted partisans. The connexions of his own family, the Caesars, the Pisos, the Marcii, held a high place in the estimation of their countrymen. But, in spite of the plainness of this fact, the charge was constantly reiterated ; the men whom the arch-traitor could A.U.705-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 137 attach to himself could be none, it was insisted, but monsters of vice, cruelty and profligacy. The lie prevailed by repetition ; and the waverers, unable to see clearly for themselves through the cloud of in- terested sophistry, were frightened, if not convinced, and learned to shrink with horror from a cause which was thus atrociously misrepresented. Cicero himself, of all men the most easily deceived by the colouring of political partisans, was deluded by this clamour. Much as he hated and feared the nobles, from whose victory he expected nothing but violence and illegal usurpation, he had not the firmness fairly to review the cause and objects for which Csesar was in arms. If the invader's personal aim was self-aggrandizement, the same was at least equally true of his opponent. If Pompeius, on the other hand, had refrained hitherto from acts of violence, every one was ready to acknow- ledge that he was deterred by no principle ; it was only because the necessities of the senate had com- pelled it to throw its powers unreservedly into his hands. The event of the impending contest would undoubtedly place him, if successful, in the position he had long coveted, of a military tyrant. The power of the oligarchy, upon which he leaned, hemmed in on all sides by the encroachment of popular influ- ences, could only be maintained by arms, and arms could not fail to raise their bearer to the despot's throne. But Caesar's success would not be confined to himself personally ; it would be the triumph of the classes from whose fresh blood and simple habits the renovation of the commonwealth might not unreason- ably be expected. The Transpadanes, for instance, claimed the boon of citizenship ; and setting aside blind prejudices, no pretender to a statesman's fore- sight could deny the advantage of thus converting lukewarm allies into zealous members of the com- monwealth. The principle for which their patron contended was ripe for extension to other communi- 138 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XIT. ties similarly circumstanced, aud it was apparent that a vast but bloodless revolution might be effected under the auspices of a Marian dictatorship. The interest which the moneyed classes took in Caesar's suc- cess was another proof that the victory of the oligarchy could only lead to more hopeless embarrassments, while that of the popular faction might establish peace upon a solid foundation. 1 The native races of Italy, notwithstanding all the intrigues and violence of the long ascendant faction, still retained their old sym- pathy for the popular side ; and they too had claims of justice which they had long despaired of urging upon the dominant oligarchy. The soil on which the forces of Pompeius were standing was mined beneath their feet So far from his being able to raise legions by stamping on the ground, the first call of the old general upon his veterans throughout the peninsula was answered, as we shall see, by the open defection of cities and colonies. Surely these were signs of the times upon which the true patriot ought to have meditated, before he enlisted on the side against which was arrayed such a mass of interests and affec- tions. It is not the province of the historian to con- demn or absolve the great names of humau annals. He leaves the philosophic moralist to denounce crimes or errors, upon a full survey of the character and position of the men and their times ; but it is his business to distinguish, in analysing the causes of events, between the personal views of the actors in revolutions and the general interests which their conduct subserved, and to claim for their deeds the sympathy of posterity in proportion as they tended to the benefit of mankind. He may be allowed to 1 Cic. ad. Ait. vii. 7. 5., written xiii. Kal. Jun. A. u. 704. : "An publicanos bonos putas qui nunquam firmi, sed mine Caesari sant amicissimi ? an foeneratores, an agricolas, quibus optatissimum est otium ? Nisi eos timere putas ne sub regno sint, qui id nunquam, dummodo otiosi sint, recusaruut." A.U.705-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 139 lament the pettiness of the statesmen of this epoch, and the narrow idea they formed of public interests in the contest between Caesar and his rival. Above all, he must regret that a man to whom we owe so much affection as Cicero should have been deceived by a selfish and hypocritical outcry ; for Cicero suc- ceeded in persuading himself .that the real patriots were all on the side of the oligarchy, and that it was his duty as a philosopher to follow, not the truth, but the true men, not right judgment, but honourable sentiment. 1 The consuls and senate, as we have seen, had aban- doned the city on the first rumour of Cae- sar's advance to Ariminum. The political mistake of the effects of this rash step seem to have been abandoning little considered by them ; but, in fact, in the view of the great mass of the Eoman people, the abandonment of the city was equivalent to an abdica- tion of all legitimate authority. 2 Once only, in the history of the nation, had a Roman imperator, in the centre of his camp, assumed to represent the majesty of the republic, and refused to obey the convention of a coerced and beleaguered senate. But the example of Camillus was justified by his success ; and it was only in the expectation of a speedy and triumphant return that the magistrates of Rome could hope to retain their authority at a distance from the Forum and the Capitol. Caesar saw how fatal a blunder his opponents had committed. A great change had taken place in the temper of the people since the last civil wars. In the contest of Sulla and Marius the whole population was divided into two hostile camps ; now 1 Cic. adDiv. xiv. 18.: " Illud me movet quod video omnes bonos abesse Roma." Ad Att. vii. 20. : '' Ad fugam hortatur atnicitia Cnasi, causa bonorum, turpitudo conjungendi cum tyranno " (viii. 1.). * Comp. Cic. ad Att. vii. 11.: " Non est inquit (Pompeius) in parietibus respublica: at in aris et focis: fecit idem Themistocles .... at idem Pericles non fecit . . . Nostri olim, urbe reliqua capta, arceia tamen retinuenjnt." 140 HISTORY OF THE EOMANS CH. XTT. the great mass was quiescent ; its predilections were not strong enough to rouse it to vigorous action in behalf of either. Its instinct taught it that another civil war could only present it with a choice of mas- ters. Whichever of the rival chieftains first occupied Rome, he would secure the acquiescence and apparent approbation of the citizens, and obtain the most spe- cious sanction to his usurpation. The consuls retired along the Appian Way instead Pompeiu. f advancing upon the Flaminian. Such c*aVuf oTder was their first false step, and it is possible to gain time. fa^ ft save( j Csesar from immediate destruc- tion. Yet he could not venture to move southward without reinforcements, while to halt at the first moment of invasion might seem a sign of weak- ness and an omen of discomfiture. The second move of his enemies relieved him from this difficulty. Pompeius had the weakness to keep up the farce of negotiations by sending L. Caesar, a young kinsman of the proconsul, to solicit a final declaration of his demands. 1 To complicate the matter still more, and give further pretence for procrastination, the young ambassador was instructed to speak particularly of the good feeling of Pompeius towards his rival, and his personal wish to accommodate matters in a liberal way ; as if a feud so ancient, and lately grown so deadly between the Marian camp and the Sullan, could be resolved into an affair of private and personal jealousy. Pompeius indeed had his own reasons for wishing to gain time to complete the preparations he contemplated in Italy and throughout the provinces ; but he lost by delay far more than he gained, for the activity of his rival could profit more by an hour than his own stately movements by a day. To these overtures, the insincerity of which was too obvious to deceive, Caesar replied with an energetic exposition of the claims he had repeatedly advanced, the sum 1 Ctts. B.C. i. 8. A.U.705-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE 141 of which was his demand that equal measure should be dealt to Pompeius and himself, and the armies of each imperator disbanded simultaneously. Such was the ultimatum with which the envoy was dismissed ; and this was the moment which Labienus seized for the defection which he had been meditating. 1 ^^^ of The desertion of so able an officer at this Labieuu8 - juncture seems to prove how precarious, in a military point of view, the position of his leader must have appeared. But Labienus could only see what was immediately before him ; he could not appreciate the more remote resources on which Caesar calculated, or the signs of distraction and imbecility already half disclosed by his opponents. It was on the twenty- second of January that the fugitive was received by Pompeius in his quarters at Teanum. 2 Caesar con- temptuously sent his baggage after him 3 ; but the nobles stomached this affront, and vied with each other in hailing the accession to their side with raptu- rous anticipations of triumph. Even Cicero, who had been plunged into the most abject despondency, and was only thinking how best to reconcile his posi- tion as a leader of the senatorial party with the means of recovering the favour of the enemy, now broke into exulting vituperation of the new Hannibal, the plunderer of Italy. 4 He was well pleased to think that his commission in Campania gave him the rea- 1 Cic. ad Att. vii. 11.. ad Div.xiv. 14.: " Labienus rem meliorem fecit. Adjuvat etiaru Piso quod ab urbe discedit, et sceleris con- demnat geuerum suuiu." Dion, xli. 4. * Cic. ad Alt. vii. 13. : "Labienus Teanum venit, a.d. ix. Kal. Febr." Jan. 22. A.U. 705 Dec. 4. B.C. 50. All the dates of this year are forty-seven days in advance of the real time. See Fischer, 7?. Z. It must be remembered that December and January, before the Julian correction, had only 29 days each. Drumann, Billerbeck, Arnold and others make this day the 24th. 1 Plut Cces. 34. 4 Cic. ad Att. I. c. : " Utrum de Imperatore populi Romani an de Hanuibale loquituur ? O hominem amentein et miserum qui ne uiu- bram quidem uuquam TOV KO\OV viderit I " 142 HISTORY OF THE JROMANS cB. XIV. diest access to his beloved city ; but Cato murmured loudly against his own destination to Sicily, at a time when all eyes were turned towards Eome, and the first question to be debated in the senate would be the acceptance or rejection of Caesar's submission. 1 But L. Caesar had hardly returned to head-quarters before the news arrived of further aggres- vrn"s a a nci sions on the part of this audacious rebel. takes Iguvium, ~ , , , . Arretium, and Caesar s advance more than counterba- lanced the impression made by his lieu- tenant's defection. Three great roads converged upon Ariminum from the south. One led from Etruria to the confines of the Gallic province, through the passes by which Brennus had penetrated to Clusium ; another, the famous Way of Flaminius, was the direct route from Eome ; a third led from Brundisium and the southern districts of the penin- sula, taking the line of the Adriatic coast from Ancona. Arretium, Iguvium, and Auximum were important fortresses for the defence of these roads respectively against an invader from the north. Their occupation would enable Caesar to advance upon either of the three positions which the enemy might adopt ; for Pompeius might either concen- trate his forces to cover Kome, or withdraw to the right towards Brundisium to keep open his commu- nications with the eastern provinces, or to the left to maintain himself at Centumcella?, while he recalled to his standard the legions in Spain. Caesar's forces were still limited to a single legion. Antonius with five cohorts seized upon Arretium, which was unde- fended. At the same moment Thermus, to whom the senate had mtrusted Iguvium and the country of Umbria which it covered, first abandoned his post, 1 Cic. ad Alt. vii. i5. : " Cato enim ipse jam servire quam pug. nare mavult. Sed tamen ait se in senatu adesse velle quum de conditionibus agatur .... Ita quod maxime opus est in Siciliara ire non curat; qnod metao ne obsit, in senatu esse vult." A.U.705-B.C.40. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 143 rendered untenable by the disaffection of the inha- bitants, and was straightway abandoned by his own soldiers ; Auximum, meanwhile, rose against Varus, and compelled him to a hasty retreat, while it opened its gates to Caesar in person. 1 The senate, though alarmed and irritated at the progress of an enemy who gave his oppo- nents not a moment to breathe, still in- ttcmpuagain dulged the hope that he would suffer ors himself to be persuaded to withdraw from of gladiato the places he had occupied, and come to Rome, after disbanding his forces, there to discuss, as a private citizen, the wrongs of which he com- plained. This was still the only condition upon which the consuls would condescend to treat, and it was with corresponding instructions that L. Caesar was sent a second time to the quarters of the invader. 2 Meanwhile the levy of troops on the part of the senate proceeded slowly and with little success. The reluctance of the Italians to enlist became alarm- ingly apparent. The magistrates of the towns showed the strongest disposition to hail the approach of Caesar's troops as a deliverance from the tyranny of the dominant class. 3 From the moment that the consuls left Rome there was no further prospect of enlisting in the capital for the service of the state. 4 Lentulus would have stooped to a measure which revolted the pride of his associates. He proposed to draft into the legions of the republic the gladiators, some thousands in number, whom Cassar kept in training at Capua. 8 But his followers remonstrated BO warmly against this proposal, which was, indeed, highly impolitic as well as illegal, that he was com- ' OSES. B.C. i. 1113. 2 Cses. B. C. i. 10. 3 Ces. B.C. i. 15. He mentions particularly the case of Cingulum, a town on which Labienus had conferred great benefactions. 4 Gas. B.C. i. 14. : " Dilectus intra urbem mtermittuntnr." 144 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS en. Xtv. pelled to relinquish it. It was a difficult matter, however, to dispose of a large body of swordsmen, skilful and well armed, and accustomed to regard Caesar as their patron ; and the more so as he might have no scruple himself in employing them in his own service. The numerous legionary force which would be requisite for controlling them, while col- lected in one spot, could not possibly be spared, for such a service. After much deliberation it was resolved to distribute them in small parties among the households of the principal nobles, and break their strength and spirit by dispersion. Attius Varus, Thermus, Lentulus Spinther, Faustus Sulla, and Libo, with their soldiers oraban- Pompeius falls , , , , r n bock upon doned by them, were now in lull retreat from Picenum towards Apulia. 1 Pompeius appointed Larinum, on the frontier of the latter province, as the rallying point for one division of his forces, while another under Domitius, was posted in advance at Corfinium, there to collect the new levies from the centre of Italy.* He left Teanum in Cam- pania at the end of January for Larinum, and from thence despatched pressing orders to the consuls to return to Koine, and carry off the public treasure which had been left behind. 3 The want of money was felt not less severely than that of men ; but the consuls did not choose to risk falling into Caesar's hands by a retrograde movement, and refused to obey their general's orders. Pompeius himself, shocked perhaps at the arrival of his lieutenants from Picenum with the account of their disasters in that quarter, 1 Lucan, ii. 461. foil. " Gens Etrusca fuga trepidi nudata Libonis, Jusque sui pulso jam perdidit Umbria Thermo. Nee gerit auspiciis civilia bella paternis Caesaris audito conversus nomine Sulla. Varus utadmotse pulsarunt Auximon alas," &c. Cacs. B.C. i. 15. 'Cic. ad Alt. vii. 21., writing from Cales, a.d. vi. Id. Feb. fob. 8. A..U.705-B.C.49 UNDER THE EMPIRE. 145 fell back upon Luceria; and it was now evident that his eyes were turned towards Brundisium, and that he contemplated the abandonment of Italy altogether rather than oppose the public enemy in the field. 1 The first suspicion of this intention called forth from his partisans a storm of indignant remon- strance. Cowardice or treachery, they conceived, alone could have dictated it, and the bravest of their leaders broke into open disobedience to the com- mands of a champion of whose perfidy they were now convinced. The arrival of the twelfth legion having given Csesnr the means of acting against larger forces, he advanced upon Corfinium early mS^a'stand -n i TT i Ji i it, at Corfinium. in P ebruary. He hardly condescended to notice the terms now brought by his kinsman for the second time, for every succeeding day had disclosed to him the weakness of the enemy and the increasing strength of his own arms. He speedily overran Pice- num, taking the fortresses of Cingulum and Asculum, on his way, without opposition. But before Corfinium the Pompeian forces were assembled in formidable numbers, and were commanded by an officer of tried conduct and firmness. Domitius, whose zeal in the cause was inflamed by his recent appointment as Caesar's successor in the Further Graul, was deter- mined to make a stand for the defence of Italy. 1 He hated the person of his leader, he despised his policy, and his command to retreat he threw to the winds. At the same time he sent pressing messages to the consular camp, urging Pompeius to advance to his assistance, and representing the smallness of the enemy's forces, the number and confidence of his own. At Corfinium and in the neighbourhood 1 Cic. ad Ait. vii. 23., writing from Formise, iv.Id.Feb. = Feb. 10. *Ca:s. B.C. i. 16. foil.; Dion, xli. 10, 11.; Appian, B.C. ii. 38.; Lncan, ii. 478. foil. VOL. II. L 146 HSTORY OF THE EOMANS CH. xiv. he had assembled thirty cohorts: of these many indeed were raw levies, and his oldest veterans had seen perhaps no other service than the beleaguer- ment of the forum during Milo's trial. 1 But Porn- peius, dismayed at the repeated defection of his troops, had no confidence in his lieutenant's assurances. He declared that he could not in prudence advance to his succour ; that in the present temper of the army Italy was untenable, and that to hazard a general engagement with Caesar would be to rush upon certain ruin. Domitius was not to be discouraged even by his leader's desertion ; but the disposition he ic^ucr/cor- made of his troops was unskilful. He isTSkyed weakened his force by trying to extend into his hands. . a , - , . , , protection to oulmo and the neighbouring towns, and lost one division after another, until he found himself blocked up in Corfinium by an enemy whose strength and audacity were increased by these bloodless successes. A third legion, the eighth, now reached Caesar's quarters, attended by twenty-two cohorts of Gaulish auxiliaries, and a detachment of cavalry from Noricum. The siege was vigorously pressed ; for the delay of a few days was galling to him, while Pornpeius, with diminished forces and fast ebbing courage, was evidently preparing to escape from his hands by flight across the sea. But Cor- finium could not be left behind ; and, indeed, it was a prize second only in richness and importance to Luceria or Brundisium. For besides the military stores amassed in it, and the vaunted strength of its numerous garrison, Domitius had received into his citadel many of the knights and most distinguished 1 Lucan I.e. : " Tua classica servat Oppositus quondam pollute tiro Miloni " These recruits were the levies Pompcius had made ostensibly for his service in Spurn. /LU.705-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 147 senators, who sought refuge from the invader under the protection of a favourite leader. Domitius him- self made every exertion to justify their confidence. He conducted the war as an affair of personal in- terest, promising his soldiers large assignments of land from his own private possessions, after the manner of a principal rather than a subordinate lieutenant. 1 But his exhortations to the soldiery were at first coldly received, and soon slighted alto- gether. Disaffection was rife within the walls of Corfinium, as before at Iguvium and Asculum. The heart of the old Italian confederacy throbbed at the presence of Caesar and the banners of Marius. The rumour spread that Pompeius dared not advance, and had abandoned his followers to their fate. Secret intercourse was held with the besieger, and after a few days the conspiracy broke out into open mutiny, the troops proclaiming their determination to surrender the place, with all that it contained, into the enemy's hands. The nobles, alarmed for their lives, could obtain no other indulgence than permission to make terms for themselves by special application to Caesar. Lentulus Spinther, who was one of the number, acted as their spokesman ; and he rightly conceived that to expatiate on the favours he had formerly experienced was the surest means of propitiating a generous conqueror. The time had now come for Caesar to dispel the fears of massacre and proscription which had driven a large proportion of the senatorial party into arms against him. 2 His reply was full of mildness and condescension; he apologized for the necessity in which he was placed of asserting his rights by an act of violence against the state, while he insinuated, emboldened by success, that his opponents were a factious minority, and him- 1 Caes. D. C. i. 17.; Dion, xli. 11. 2 CSES. 3 C. I. 23. L 2 148 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XIT. self the real champion of freedom and the common- wealth. 1 Domitius expected to be himself marked out as the special object of the conqueror's ven- Caaar grants -, J , . ' , , life and liberty geance. Caesar was determined to render toDomitim P. , . .. . . . ._. nd the Pom- him a, signal instance ot his clemency. On the eve of surrender the Pompeian leader applied to his physician for poison, and even, it was said, compelled him with his drawn sword to ad- minister a potion. But the draught had not pro- duced its anticipated effect, when he was informed that the victor was disposed not only to spare the lives of bis prisoners, but to treat them with marked indulgence. He now, in the most abject manner, lamented his precipitation; but the physician had deceived him with a narcotic, and he lived to enjoy, and afterwards abuse, his captor's clemency. 2 Caesar, if we may believe his own direct statement in con- tradiction to an obscure rumour related by Cicero, went so far in his generosity as to restore to Domi- tius the large treasure in his military chest 3 ; an act which is rendered credible by the proconsul's natural wish to show the Roman people that they had no more to fear from his want of money than from his thirst for blood. He then pressed his prisoners to acknowledge his claims and share in the brightening prospects of his enterprise. This offer the men of note steadily declined, but the fresh Italian recruits hailed the summons with enthusiasm, and speedily 1 Caesar was seven days before Corfinium, Feb. 14 - 21. : " Septcm dies ad Corftniura commoratur." Caes. B. C. i. 33. 2 This story is told by Suetonius, Seneca, Pliny and Plutarch- See Drumann, iii. 22. " Caes. B. C. i. 23.; Cic. ad Atl. viii. 14. Appian (B. C. ii. 39.) confirms Caesar's statement. Some of Csesar's adherents seem not to have admired their leader's clemency. See the letter of Cicero's witty correspondent Cselius, ad Div. viii. 15. But Caelius was per- sonally hostile to Domitius : comp. ad Div. viii. 12. A.H.705-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 149 ranged themselves under the banner which they regarded as their own. The effect of this clemency, hitherto unexampled in the civil wars of the Eomans, became immediately apparent. Cicero bears unwil- ***" ling testimony to the consummate adroit- ness of the enemy's proceedings. 1 He had killed nobody, he had taken nothing from anybody; if he proceeded thus he would become the object of universal love and enthusiasm. Such was the feeling springing up among the population of Campania; the people of the country towns discoursed with Cicero on the state of public affairs ; and he saw but too plainly from their conversation that the heart of Italy was estranged from the consuls and senate : peace was the general wish even among those who had no Marian predilections, and the tranquil posses- sion of property outweighed the antiquated names of law and liberty. 2 And then the philosopher sighed to think how much the errors and vices of his party had contributed to bring about this state of political indifference. But, in truth, the conduct of Caesar was set off in brighter colours from its contrast with the It offers a opposite disposition manifested by his op- S^lthe ponents. The senate had proclaimed him t^tTof MS a public enemy, and his adherents and adTm " rie "- followers in arms were naturally included in the same sentence. Nor was this enough. At the mo- ment of leaving Home, it determined, at the instiga- tion of the ferocious Domitius, to drive the neutral and the waverers into the Pompeian camp by terror. It declared that every citizen who remained behind at Eome should be deemed a Caesarean, and thus 1 Cic. ad Alt viii. 13. J Cic. /. c.: " Multum mecum municipales homines loquuntur, mnltnm rusticani. Nihil prorsus aliud curant,nisi agros nisi villulaB nisi uumwulos suos." 150 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XIT. provided itself with a pretext for the extreme mea- sures against the city which it seems to have already contemplated. 1 Not only were the young nobles loud in their denunciations of proscription and mas- sacre; the older and more dignified were already parcelling out among themselves in imagination the spoils of the commonwealth. Pompeius himself had the name of Sulla always in his mouth : Sulla could do this, why should not I do the same?* was his constant argument. To propose the great dictator for his model was to threaten a sanguinary revolu- tion and a thorough reorganization of the state. It was surmised with inexpressible alarm and disgust that Rome had been abandoned when it might have been defended, in order that it might be involved in Caesar's guilt, and, when the day of vengeance should arrive, be subjected to all the horrors of a war of reprisal, to famine and fire, to pillage and massacre. 3 When Domitius refused, or was no longer able, to obey his leader's injunctions, and withdraw n " from Corfinium to the head-quarters at cro, p 8 a over into Luceria, Pompeius saw the ruin his lieu- tenant had drawn upon himself, and felt that his own position in Italy was no longer tenable. But the rashness of the rear-guard saved the main body of the retreating column, for so rapid were Caesar's movements, that but for this seven days' delay, Pompeius would undoubtedly have been over- taken. He now sheltered himself in Brundisium 4 , and charged the consuls and other magistrates to accompany him across the sea. When this command reached Cicero in Campania, the road into Apulia was no longer open. Caesar was eager to recover the time he had lost before Corfinium. But the har- re- 1 Appian, B. C. ii. 37.: a.Trtt\-fitra.s raits 2 Cic. ad Alt. ix. 10.: " Sulla potuit : ego non potero ?" 8 Cic. ad Div. iv. 14., ad Alt. viii. 11., ix. 7. 10, 1 1. See below. Cues. B. C. 5. 24, 25. i. 17.705- B.C.49. DNDER THE EMPIRE. 151 bour of Brundisium was crowded with transports and vessels of every description. The consuls and the greater part of their army, which now amounted to five legions, effected their embarkation, and were already far on their way across the Adriatic ; but Pompeius, with a division of the army, still lingered in the town when Caesar's advanced guard appeared before the walls. Intercepted in his meditated flight by the celerity of these movements, Cicero hesitated to take ship at Naples and encounter before the close of winter the dangers of the straits and the Ionian sea. Filled with dark forebodings as to the designs of his leader, whose abandonment first of Eome and then of Italy he regarded as part of a long matured scheme for the destined subjugation of his country, he was not sorry, perhaps, that circumstances now placed a barrier between them. But he was still indisposed to anticipate Caesar's success, as well as indignant at his rebellion against prescriptive autho- rities. In his sullen retirement at Formiae the orator was plied by solicitations and flatteries on the part of Caesar himself and his friends Balbus and Oppius. The strongest assurances were given him of the con- queror's good intentions and conservative principles ; but these representations failed to assuage his fears or lighten his melancholy, and he continued to pour his griefs and distractions into the ear of his chief adviser Atticus. 1 Caesar arrived before Brundisium on the ninth of March. 2 The forces with which he formed ? ompelm eT ,_ the siege amounted to six complete legions, u a m%nd undi ~ together with their auxiliary Gaulish co- S^^m horts. Of these legions, three consisted of Italy< 1 See particularly Cic. ad Ait. ix. 11 13., and the correspondence of Cicero with Caesar and his partisans therein communicated. Cic. ad Alt. ix. 3.: "Brat hie dies vii. Jd. Mar. quo die suspi- cabamur aut pridie Brundisium venisse Csesarurn." So Caspar, in Cic. ad Alt. ix. 13 A. 152 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XIV. his veterans ; the others were made up partly of new levies and partly of the Pompeians whom he had drafted into his own ranks. But these did not include the battalions he had recently enrolled at Cornnium; for these zealous allies had been de- spatched in all haste to secure the possession of Sicily. It was impossible for Pompeius with the twenty cohorts, which were all he retained, to hold the place against this overwhelming force. But Caesar, on the other hand, was entirely destitute of ships ; the sea was open, and the transports had received orders to return and bear away from Brundisium the remnant of the consular army. The port of the city is approached by a narrow passage leading from an outer into an inner basin ! , and the shore on either side of this passage was occupied by the besiegers. But the outlet could only be obstructed by the erection of immense earthworks, and Pompeius trusted to the depth of the water to frustrate or delay the accom- plishment of so great an undertaking. 2 Full of this confidence, he refused to listen to the proposals of accommodation which Caesar continued to offer. He declared that he was only the lieutenant of the con- suls, and could not act without their concurrence. Caesar sank vessels and drove piles in the channel, while Pompeius exerted himself to impede these operations, and succeeded in keeping it open for the transports, which in due time made their appear- ance. 3 Upon their arrival, the troops were embarked without delay, a few soldiers being left on the walls 1 The localities are carefully described by Kcppel Craven, Tour in the kingdom of Naples, p 149. * Caesar in a letter to Balbus, communicated to Cicero (ad Att. ix. 14.), speaks of his operations before Brundisium: " Pompeius se oppido tenet. Nos ad portas castra habemus. Conamur opus mag- num et multorum dierum propter altitudinem maris. Sed tamen nihil est quod potius faciamus. Ab utroque portus cornu moles jacirnus." 1 Caes. B. C. i. 25. 28. ; Dion, xli. 1|. \.U.705-B.C.-9. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 153 to deceive the enemy with a show of resistance to the last moment. The streets had been carefully barri- caded to obstruct his progress upon first entering the undefended city. But the inhabitants were eager to display their zeal in the cause of a triumphant and perhaps irritated conqueror, and guided his troops with alacrity to the haven. The last of the Pompeians were already safe on board ; the flotilla glided rapidly down the harbour, and broke through every obstruc- tion at the outlet, with the loss of only two vessels, which struck against the head of the embankment. These were immediately grappled to the shore with irons, boarded by the enraged Caesaveans, and theii crews cut to pieces. This was the first blood shed in the civil war. Caesar had made himself master of Italy in sixty days. 1 Never, perhaps, was so great a con- i C j J -Jl J j.l_ f Rapidity of quest enected so rapidly, and in the lace c^nr's suc- of antagonists apparently so formidable. Every step he advanced was a surprise to his enemies ; yet at each step they predicted more con- fidently his approaching discomfiture. But at the first blast of his trumpets every obstacle fell before him, and the march of his legions could hardly keep up with the retreat of his boastful adversaries. The consuls abandoned Eome before he was competent to approach it ; their lieutenants, deserted by their troops, plundered of their treasure, and denuded of 1 Pompeius embarked March 17 = Jan. 25. B.C. 49, and Caesar entered Brundisium the day following. Cic. ad Att. ix. 19. Plutarch says (Cffs. 35.): yeyov&s lv ^uepais el^/corra iramjs a.vaifuaT\ rrjs 'IroAias Kvptos. Assigning twenty-nine days to January, and twenty-eight to February, the sixty days would extend from Jan. 16 March 18, inclusive. If this calculation is to be taken strictly, the passage of the Rubicon would take place on the night of Jan. 15 16.; but I am inclined to place it a few days earlier. The interval between the flight of the tribunes, Jan. 6, and the passage of the Rubicon, Jan. 15 16, seems too long, while more time is required for the events which were crowded into the following days. 154 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xiv the materials of war, found themselves alone and defenceless in their camps before the invader appeared in sight. The interest which Sulla had fostered in his colonies melted away like a dream ; old hopes and hatreds revived in the breasts of the Italians ; the magistrates of every city flung wide their gates, and hailed the Koman traitor as their hero and deliverer. 1 The captain, second only to Pompeius in the camp and councils of the senate, was dragged a prisoner into Caesar's presence; and Pompeius himself retreated from one position to another without a single attempt to rally, and finally crept out of the country like a hunted fox. All this time the nobles indignation of had been growing more and more clamo- th" cond e uct of rous to be led against the invader ; in vain pompeiu.. did they mutter and scowl, and heap re- proaches upon their chosen champion. He was not to be diverted from his plans, whatever they might be, but he would make no disclosure of them ; to their remonstrances he coldly replied by ordering the murmurers to follow him under pain of proscription. To the last they hoped that he would still make a stand on the sacred soil of Italy; when he finally deceived their anticipations and wafted the last band of his military followers from the port of Brundisium, confusion and despair prompted many among them to throw themselves upon the conqueror's generosity. The Appian Way was again crowded with knights and senators ; but this time their faces were turned towards the city. Dragged so long against their will at the wheels of Pompeius' chariot, they vowed from henceforth to renounce the war, and sought the protection of the chief who alone permitted neutrality. 2 Many of these belonged, no doubt, to the class of 1 Cic. ad Alt. ix. 12,: " Municipia vero et rnstici Komani ilium (sc. Pomp. ) metnunt, hunc adhnc dilignnt." * Cio. ad Att. ix. 8. (March 6.): " Urbem quidem jam refertara esse optimatium audio .... Hinc vero vulgo vadaut." A.C.70&-B.C.49 UNDER THE EMPIRE. 155 indolent and selfish voluptuaries, who had been be- guiled into a momentary relinquishment of their pleasures by the assurance that they should be soon reinstated in them more securely and triumphantly. But many also were better citizens, who foreboded some undefined evil to the state from the apparent treachery of Pompeius, and would no longer lend their support to his cause, though they might scruple to turn their arms against the sacred names of consuls and senate. They left it to the needy and reckless, the disappointed adventurers and patrician spend- thrifts, to cling still to Pompeius' fortunes, and gloat over their visions of an abolition of debts, a con- fiscation of properties, and a reconstruction of the government. Whatever stains there might be on the character of many of the most prominent of Caesar's adherents, it was now fully evident that the leader of the oligarchy was surrounded by a crew not less dissolute and unprincipled. The departure of the more moderate and high- minded of his partisans was witnessed, we may presume, by Pompeius with no great o^thewcwt ,. J , r i- mu i, J-i.i.1 -Ui. Policy of Pom- dissatistaction. There can be little doubt pem in aban- , . , , , , doning Italy. as to the game he had all along been playing. It is impossible to suppose that a captain so consummate and a statesman so experienced should have let the cards drop from his hands, as he had done throughout, except with a deliberate policy. Wheth er he admitted the consuls themselves into his confidence may remain uncertain ; but it is clear that he deceived to the last the main body of his adherents, even within the camp, by a pretended defence of Italy, while it had long been his intention to surrender every post successively, and make his exit from the peninsula as fast as, with a decent show of resistance, he could. 1 1 Cic. ad Att. ix 10. : " Hoc turpe (de fuga cogitare) Crocus noster biennio ante cojritavit." 156 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. JHV. The eastern and western portions of the empire stood to each other in peculiar contrast, brt n ronthe and the views which influenced Porapeius w^eTn^r- at this crisis may be traced to the nature of the resources respectively offered by them. The Italian peninsula, stretching far into the midland sea, divided the Roman world into two hemispheres, rivals for the regard of the war- rior and statesman, not less distinct in their social and political character than in their geographical position. The contrast between them was more strongly marked at this period than at any subsequent era. For both the East and the West were still in- stinct with the life peculiar to each, and though both equally within the reach and under the control of the same iron arm, were nevertheless as completely alien from one another in their principles, interests and feelings, as if they bad been two rival empires and not parts and provinces of the same. On the one hand, the great province of Spain was already more thoroughly Romanized compiIteTy than any other part of the dominions of ",y e other the republic. Though some districts were not yet fully subdued, and much law- lessness and disaffection still existed in others, yet the manners of the conquering people had been introduced from an early period, and definitively adopted throughout a large portion of the country. The language of the Italians was achieving rapid conquests in every quarter, and consolidating the municipal institutions which were lavished so freely upon the natives in no other part of the empire. These results had been rendered permanent by the influence of Sertorius, who had taught the Iberians to regard the discipline and habits of their foreign masters as the true secret of their irresistible success. The subjugation of Spain had occupied one hundred and fifty years of almost constant warfare. Step by .I.C.705-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 157 step had Kome made her way into the heart of a country, in which every mountain and desert had been defended with the same inveterate love of free- dom. But she had never been compelled to retreat from an inch of ground once occupied, and the roots of her power struck the deeper into the soil from the tempests which had so long repressed its growth. The condition of the native races had been one of unmitigated barbarism ; the southern and western coasts alone were slightly tinctured with the spirit of Greek and Phoenician culture. But, in the absence of civilization, the Iberians had no social institutions which could retain their vitality under the blight of a foreign conquest. Innumerable strongholds, dig- nified by the Roman writers with the name of cities, had been razed to the ground ; the elder Cato had destroyed, it is said, not less than three hundred. 1 Deprived of every fastness, except those which the nature of the country continued to offer in some isolated districts, the barbarians, once thoroughly subdued, had no retreat in which to cherish the rem- nants of their nationality. The character of the people was, however, essentially warlike, and this temper the crafty conquerors did not suffer to fer- ment in inaction. The Iberian peninsula was the Switzerland of the ancient world. Its hardy clans had for ages supplied the infantry of Carthage ; they had defeated the Eomans themselves at the Trebia and Cannae, and had enlisted under the banners of Antiochus for a second invasion of Italy. Accord- ingly, the rude chieftains whom the arts of peace could not soften, were more easily broken to the yoke of military discipline. It was in Spain that the Romans first adopted from their rivals the practice of enlisting hired bands of their foreign 1 See Plutarch, Polybius and Strabo, referred to by Mannert. L 241. ; Liv. xxviii. l,xxxiv. 17. 158 HISTOKY OF THE ROMANS CH. r subjects. 1 The colonization of the peninsula, especially in the south, by Roman citizens, had been carried on systematically, and the admission of natives to the Roman franchise had been more liberal there than in most of the provinces. The way was already paved for the much larger enfranchisement which followed at a later period. Thus it was that at the opening of the civil wars the spirit of the Iberian provinces was more thoroughly Roman than any other; the political feelings and interests of the people, no less than their social habits, had become nearly identified with those of the dominant race. In no part of the empire beyond Italy itself were the ancient traditions and prejudices of patrician and plebeian held more sacred. Spain was rather a healthy offshoot from the parent state than a conquered dependency. Strong in her indomitable character and her military resources, she was calculated to form the firmest bulwark of the republic and of the party which at this period prevailed in its counsels. The process of civilization in Spain had been commenced by the Scipios and Catos of. R^man 8 nti- earlier generations, and carried on by a Metellus and a Pompeius. The colonists and the natives were attached to the senatorial party by all the ties which the policy of the conquerors could devise. We have seen how in Gaul, on the other hand, the two rival factions had been alter- nately in the ascendant, and that the result had been to leave the old province, for the most part, Pom- peian in feeling, but to create a strong Csesarean interest throughout the later conquests. The genius and activity of Caesar seemed to have effected in nine years in Gaul beyond the Cevennes the moral and social transformation which it had taken a cen- 1 Liv. xxiv. 49. : " Mercenarium militem neminem ante quaui turn Ccltiberos Romani habuerunt." This was in the second Punic war. A.U. 539 A.C.705-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 159 tury and a half to mature in the Iberian peninsula. We have already remarked the extent to which the conqueror had availed himself of the military spirit of the northern nations ; how, by enlisting the chief- tains under his banner, he had so far gained their affections as to be able to leave them most of the forms at least of their ancient freedom. He thus succeeded in inspiring both their warriors and their magistrates with Roman feelings, and the desire to emulate the spirit of southern civilization. The two great nations of the west were thus rendered the allies of the republic, rather than her subjects. Either of them furnished a field on which her quarrels might be fought out, in the midst of a native population hardly less Csesarean or Pompeian in their sympathies than the conquering race itsel But in the eastern half of the Roman empire the ideas of the dominant people had received , , , r j . , The eastern no such development, and no interest provinces in- r li i-u 1 r j-V, 'j. different to the was there telt in the quarrels of the city, principle m- The earlier and finer cultivation of the East civil wn"and still regarded with contemptuous indif- tttpwSwoc r , ir.Li.-r> J the leaders. ference the struggles of the Roman mind to obtain an ascendency over the subject races. The Greek populations were at this period almost exhausted by war, bad government and the decay of their commercial prosperity. They submitted to the conqueror with an apathy from which no- thing could rouse them, and, while they were forced to cast their institutions in Italian moulds, refused to imbibe any portion of their spirit. But beyond the Grecian provinces no attempt was made to infuse the political ideas of the republic into the dependent or tributary kingdoms on the frontier. The races of Asia acquiesced in their own imme- morial despotisms, to which they had been aban- doned by Sulla and Pompeius. To them the names of Liberty and Equality, invoked in turn by each 160 HISTORY OF THE BOMANS CH. xiv. of tbe Roman factions, were unintelligible. They had no conception of the nature of the contests, the rumour of which reached them across so many seas and continents. The sympathies of the Ori- entals centred always in men, and never in govern- ments. A Cyrus, an Alexander, an Arsaces, com- manded all their devotion ; for them the founda- tions of law lay in the bosom of the autocrat. If summoned to take up arms in behalf of either party, it was upon the leader alone that they would fix their eyes, to his triumph the sphere of their in- terests would be limited. The accession of their wealth and numbers would strengthen the hands of the chief even against his own followers ; to the common cause a victory obtained by their aid might be not less dangerous than a defeat. Accordingly, the introduction of such allies into a civil war could only be regarded by the genuine and high- minded among her children, as an insult to the dignity of the republic. 1 The party chief who should divest himself of the support of the national sentiment, and rally around his standards the blind obsequiousness of Egypt and Syria, the rude de- votion of Colchis and Armenia 2 , would forfeit the repect of the true patriot as much as if he had put himself at the head of a foreign invasion. That this, however, was the course Pompeius had Pompeiiw determined to adopt, from the moment atfe s ir h hTld, f tnat ne saw tne contest with his rival counfeV- to inevitable, seems sufficiently proved by aSth"rity h of the whole tenor of his subsequent conduct, the ~n.te. He nated the O iig arcn y of which he was the 1 The true Roman sentiment is expressed by Lucan (vii. 526.) : ..." Civilia bella Non bene barbaricis unquam commissa catervis." * Cic. ad Att. ix. 10 : " Getarum et Armenioram et Colchornm copias ad earn adducere." ix. 11. : " Nuntiant ^Egyptum et Arabian! tvSalnova et yitffo*ora.ij.ia.v cogitare." Dion, xli. 13, A.0.705-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 161 chief. At an earlier period, while placing himself ostensibly at its head, he had laboured to depress and degrade it. Jealous of the rival whom in self- defence it had raised against him in Cicero, he had used Caesar, as he thought, as an instrument to crush this attempt to control him. But the instrument cut the workman's hand. The next turn of the wheel of fortune showed him in close alliance with this same party, to defend themselves against a common ad- versary. Pompeius, however, was well aware that these hollow friends would seize the moment of victory to effect his overthrow. If they worsted Csesar, it would not be to submit once more to him- self. He feared the hostile influence of the consuls and magistrates in a camp of Roman citizens, and felt that, in the event of a struggle with them, his title of Imperator would not weigh against theii superior claims to the soldiers' allegiance. For the armies of which he was now the nominal leader were raised within the bounds of Italy; they were not debauched like the legions of Sulla, of Marius, of Caesar, or those which he had himself led from Asia, by long absence from the city and habits of military licence. In order to strengthen his own exalted position, or even to maintain it after the defeat of the invader, he required a military force of another description. It was necessary that his anticipated victory should be gained, not on the soil of Italy nor by the hands of Lentulus and Domitius, and that his return to Eome should be a triumph over the senate no less than over Caesar. Thus only can we account for Pompeius having made no arrangements for maintaininghim- Wlth thi , view self at Rome, or at least in Italy, while there u7y a a n n d d on d L was yet time to have brought to his succour ***"*' s " a - the legions in Spain ; for his abandoning Domitius with his strong detachment in the face of so inferior an enemy ; and above all, for his carrying the war to VOL. II. M 162 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS en xiv. the East instead of to the West, when compelled to escape from the shores of the Peninsula. 1 It was in Spain that the great strength of his party lay after it was expelled from the hearths of the re- public ; there was no region where the sacred names of Rome and the senate could meet with so favour- able a response in the breasts of the provincials. Twelve legions of Roman soldiers, backed by the resources of so warlike and opulent a country, might be matched with advantage against any force Caesar could bring against them ; and it was more probable that they would have crossed the Pyrenees to engage their antagonists in southern Gaul, than have awaited an assault within their own limits. In the mean- time Scipio would have brought up the resources of the east and all that could be spared from the armies of the Syrian frontier, and the two ponderous masses might have met in Italy, and crushed Caesar between them. But Pompeius had no intention of sharing his He exait,, him- victory on equal terms with the great men Jhiefirfhu he f his party, or reinstating in their ivory fai d w.r chairs the old chiefs of the aristocracy. ai, ia t Rome. There was now no disguise as to his de- signs, no doubt as to the attempt he would make to obliterate every vestige of ancient liberty. Some, indeed, of the nobles might still expect to impose a check upon him by their presence in his camp, but many even of the most distinguished among them were already corrupted by the hope of plunder. War against Italy, war against Rome, was the open cry of the most daring and profligate. We will starve the city into submission, we will leave not a tile on a 1 It was at first expected that Pompeius, if driven from Italy, wonld have retired into Spain. Cic. ad Alt. vii. 18.: "Tempori parcamus, cum Pompeio in Hispaniam eamus." This letter was written Feb. 3. Appian B.C. ii. 38.: teal Tapewncei/ijs dx* v &s 6p^ffuv fan) iror' tu> at Xpf'tcu A.U.705-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 163 house throughout the country, was echoed by Pom- peius himself. 1 Such was the ominous language which resounded in the senatorial camp as soon as it was pitched in Epirus, and the opposite shores assumed the character of a foreign and a hostile strand. The consuls listened to it without a mur- mur, for it was their own chosen champion who avowed it. He left the city, says Cicero, not because he could not defend it, and Italy, not because he was driven out of it ; but this was his design from the beginning, to move every land and sea, to call to arms the kings of the barbarians, to lead savage nations into Italy, not as captives but as con- querors. He is determined to reign like SuUa, as a king over his subjects ; and many there are who applaud this atrocious design? 1 Cic. ad Ait. ix. 7. : " Pritnum consilium cst suffocare urbem et Italiam fame, deinde vastarc agros, urere, pecnniis locupletum non abstinere .... Promitto tibi, si valebit, tegulam ilium in Italia nullam relicturuni." Comp. ad Ait xi. 6., ail Div. iv. 14. 2 Cic. ad Ait. viii. 11.; comp. viii. 16., ix. 9.: " Mirandum in modum Cnaeus noster Sullani regni similitudinem concupivit. Ei'Suij o-oi \rx&!. Nihil ille unquam minus obscure tulit." ix. 10.: " Snlla- turit ejus animus et proscriptnrit diu." 164 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS en. xv. CHAPTER XV. Caesar repairs to Rome and convenes the Senate. His moderation and clemency. He plunders the Temple of Saturn. He proceeds to attack the Pompeian armies in Spain. Domitius encournges the Massilians to shut their gates against him. He leaves a force to besiege their city, and crosses the Pyrenees. The Pompeian Lieutenants occupy Ilerda. Military operations before that place. Overflow of the Sicoris and peril of Caesar. Brutus gains a naval advantage over the Massilians. The Pompeians compelled to evacuate Ilerda. Further military operations, ending in the capitulation of the Pompeian armies. A.U. 705, B.C. 49. now occupied without an antagonist in sight A.u.705. the centre of his enemies' position. Their line of operations was fairly cut in two. and The consuls' .^ . , > . . ' the assailant might determine at his leisure i a f -L. J "I i.' Ce.' rein- Jryrenees, for he was in daily expectation forcemenu - r r f j.i j. -L A resilian9 190 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XV. materials, and less skilfully manoeuvred, might have failed to force them to an engagement; but seek- ing the conflict themselves, and joining beak to beak and side to side, they threw away all their peculiar advantages and reduced the contest to one of valour and discipline only. Here indeed the Albici, a tribe of hardy mountaineers, whose aid they had secured, did them good service ; but these warriors were not a match for the picked men of the Eoman legions, with whom Brutus had manned his vessels. The result was that the Massilian squadron lost nine out of seventeen vessels, and the remainder were driven with shame and disorder into their harbour. These tidings were not confined to Caesar's camp, but spread rapidly among the native tribes men't ofthe in the country around, and combined, with the conspicuous restoration of Caesar's fortunes before Ilerda, to dispose them to enter into friendly relations with him. 1 And at the same time it became evident that the rumour of Pompeius's advance through Mauretania was altogether false. The troops of Afranius and his colleague were dispirited at these successive disappointments ; their cavalry and foraging parties became daily more afraid to venture near the squadrons with which Caesar was now overrunning and occupying the plain ; they kept close under the walls of Ilerda, and contented themselves with brief nocturnal expedi- tions to supply their necessities. Afranius and Petreius seem themselves to have been grievously affected by these disasters, to e e vacu r ate are Despairing of succour from their leader, and alarmed by the defection of the native tribes around them, they already began to look wistfully towards the central districts of Celtiberia, 1 Cs. B.C. i. 60.: " Magna celeriter commutatio rcrum." A..C.705-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 191 which were the most devotedly attached to them, and where they might hope to find freer scope for their movements. They had voluntarily shut them- selves up in their fastness at Ilerda ; hut the enemy was now manoeuvring to cut off their retreat, and but a short interval remained for escaping from their narrow entrenchments without hazarding the general engagement, which they dreaded more than any other alternative. The most direct route to the west or south was guarded by Caesar's camp ; the other road which presented itself lay across the bridge over the Sicoris, reaching the banks of the Ebro at a distance of twenty miles, at a spot to which Csesar gives the name of Octogesa. 1 Caesar . , , , . Cwar' opera- Was anxious to check their movements tionitocrow on this bank ot the river also; but the prevent their bridge, by which alone he could communi- cate with it, lay, as we have seen, about twenty-two miles above Ilerda, and he could not venture to divide his army into two bodies at such a distance from each other. He might have adopted the course of throwing another bridge over the Sicoris at a nearer point, at least he does not in his narrative state any reasons to show that this was impracticable or difficult. But, instead of this, he preferred an operation of a different kind. At a short distance 1 I cannot suppose with Maniurt (i. 417.), that this place is Me- quinenza, though we might naturally expect that so commanding a position would have attracted the attention of the Romans. Octogesa, from Caesar's account, must certainly have been on the left bank of the Sicoris ; possibly at La Granja, as Ukert supposes, following Guischard. I think that it lay a few miles lower down, where the present road from Lerida strikes the Ebro, opposite the town of Flix. This situation agrees with the description which Csesar gives of the country between Ilerda and Octogesa, first several miles of plain, and then a hilly tract. This is the line of the modern road to Tortosa and Valentia, and there is an antecedent probability that it follows an ancient route. I have examined the country carefully in the atlas to Sachet's campaign (1811-12), -irhich is as clear as a model. Napier (Penins. War, iii.) says off-hand that Mequinenza is the Octogesa of Caesar. 192 HISTORY OP THE ROMANS OH. xv. above Ilerda he cut several ditches, each thirty feet in breadth, so as to drain off the waters of the river and throw them behind his position, until the stream was rendered fordable at a convenient point. The waters thus carried off were led apparently into an offset of the Noguera, which runs into the Segre a little below Lerida 1 , and the operation upon which the whole army was employed (the Eoman legion- aries being thoroughly trained to the use of the spade and pickaxe) might have been completed, it is said, in the space of ten days. 2 The labour, therefore, was not greater than that of building a bridge, while it required no materials. As soon as the object of these extraordinary works was dis- covered by the Pompeian generals, they hastened the removal from Ilerda, which they had been already meditating. Orders had been previously given to collect boats for the construction of a bridge over the Ebro at Octogesa, and, in expectation of its speedy completion, two legions were transported across the Sicoris and stationed on the left bank behind strong entrenchments. At this moment, when the bridge of boats was an- The Afra- nounced to be almost ready for the escape thrcniran. of the retreating Pompeians, the ford of !-o e np n iith the Sicoris was declared to be practic- able for the cavalry of their pursuers, who dashed boldly across it. But the water reached to 1 Caesar does not say this, nor does he say, as has been also sup- posed, that he conducted these waters into an immense reservoir excavated for the purpose. It is difficult to understand clearly what the nature of the operation was. It seems that there must hare been a considerable depth of soil to cut through to lead these trenches behind Ilerda into the further branch of the Noguera. Caesar's words are simply these : " Nactus idoneum locum fossas peduna triginta in latitudinem complures facere instituit quibus partem ali- quam Sicoris averteret, vadumque in eo flumine efficeret." (.B.C. i. 61.). 4 Guischard, ii. 67. foil. The length of the cut would be about 4000 toises. A..D.705.B.C.49. UNDER THE EMflRfe. 193 the armpits of the legionaries, and its rapidity was such that it seemed impossible to keep their footing. There was no resource but to send the legions round by the circuitous route above described, and leave it to the cavalry to harass and impede the retreat of the enemy, which it was out of their power to arrest. Afranius left two cohorts in Ilerda, and carried all the rest of his forces across the river, where they joined the two legions already in advance, and thus pro- ceeded on their way to Octogesa. Caesar's cavalry con- tinued to act with great effect on their rear ; its operations were distinctly visible to the troops en- camped on the heights on the other side, who were inflamed with admiration of the conduct of their more fortunate brethren, and stung with despair at seeing the enemy thus escaping out of their hands. The centurions and tribunes rushed tumultuously to their general, and besought him in the name of the legions to allow them to throw themselves into the ford. Caesar himself was carried away by the contagion of their ardour, though not without apprehension for the result ; he contented himself with leaving the weakest of the men behind with a single legion to protect the camp, and gave the rest the signal to ad- vance. The passage was at length effected. The precaution had been taken to place beasts of burden in line, above and below, in the one case to break the force of the current 1 , in the other to rescue such as should be swept away by it ; the cavalry also as- sisted in picking up the stragglers, and not a man 1 Lucan describes this operation at the passage of the Rubicon (i. 220.): "Primus in obliquum sonipes opponitur amnem, Kxeepturus aquas ; niolli turn caetera rumpit Turba vado fracti faciles jam fluminis undas." The line of beasts below would also slacken the stream by acting as a dam to it, but it would increase the depth proportionally. The date of this passage of the Sicoris is assigned by Guischard to x. Kal. Sext.=Jul. 22. (Mem. Mil. iii. 193.), which corresponds with May 31 of the corrected calendar. VOL. II. O 194 HISTOKT OF THE ROMANS CH. xv. was lost The retreating Afranians had left their en- campment in the first dawn of morning; but such was the alacrity and speed of the Caesareans that they came up with them in the afternoon of the same day, though they had a circuit of six miles to make, and so formidable a barrier to surmount. But the retreat of the fugitives bad been checked in some degree by the enemy's horsemen, and, deeming themselves secure from more serious interruption, they had not cared to make any special exertion. Their circum- stances, however, were now altered. Afranius was compelled to halt and draw out his men in battle array, for Caesar was advancing in three lines, as if prepared to demand an engagement. The pursuer now halted in his turn to give his troops rest and refreshment before drawing their swords. Afra- nius again threw his lines into column, and hurried forward, till the enemy, advancing once more, and pressing closely upon him, rendered escape impossible. The Pompeian general however was informed that at a distance of five miles a tract of hilly country com- menced, in which the cavalry of his pursuers would be rendered unavailing. His intention was now to secure the defiles of these hills with forces suffi- cient to arrest the progress of his pursuers, and so effect his retreat with the bulk of his army to the Ebro ; and in this, which was the best course open to him, he might have succeeded had he persisted in continuing his march late into the night, which, con- sidering the few miles he had yet traversed, required no extraordinary effort. But other counsels prevailed ; the troops pleaded the fatigues of a day of marchiug and fighting, and the salvation of the republican cause in Spam was postponed to the morrow. Meanwhile, .Caesar, on his part, was satisfied with the feats his soldiers had performed that day, and he took up his position on the nearest eminence. But he maintained his vigilance through the silent hours of gloom. A.U.705-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 195 About midnight some stragglers from the Pompeian camp were brought to his quarters, and from them he learned that his opponents were preparing to evacuate their entrenchments under cover of the darkness. Im- mediately the Csesarean trumpets sounded to arms, the tents were struck, baggage piled, arms and ac- coutrements buckled on ; and the uproar of a camp of four legions breaking up announced far and wide that their general was on the alert, and ready to fol- low hard upon the track of the fugitives. Afranius feared to risk the result of a night engagement, to which he might be compelled in the narrow passes of the mountains, and countermanded the intended movement. The next day was passed on both sides in examin- ing the nature of the country in the direction in which both armies were equally anxious Ca , 9ar raakes to proceed. The Pompeian generals held mov^'to"*- a council, in which they determined to ?<* u, wait for the morning to continue their enem y- route, that they might at least have the advantage of daylight to repel the attacks of the enemy, whose vigilance they could not even in darkness elude. But Ca3sar turned the information he had acquired to another account. By a rapid though circuitous march he saw that he could throw himself between the retreating army and the mountains. In the early twilight his battalions were observed to issue from their camp, and seemingly to retire in the track upon which they had advanced the day before. The Afranians were convinced that they were in rapid retreat towards Ilerda, overcome by famine, fatigue, or terror ; but when they saw the dense columns wheel suddenly to the right ' and sweep along the 1 Cses. B.C. i. 69. A wheel to the right after issuing from the rear of the camp (contrariam in partem iri videbatur) would lead them to the east of Afranius's camp, which would thus be placed between them and the Sicoris. The loca aspera nnd angustice which o 2 196 HISTORY OF THE BOMA.NS CH. xv. verge of the horizon towards the quarter whither they were themselves bound, the tactics of the sup- posed fugitives and at the same time their own im- minent danger became apparent. The breaking up of their camp, however, caused c^ar brings some little delay. At the same time the to e athk i , an " Caesarean cavalry, hanging upon the flanks suffJhi." ' of the Afranians as they formed and ad- g^T^ith en ~ vanced, impeded their movements ; so that, in the efforts of both armies to gain the hills, the Cassareans had so much the advantage as to be able to range themselves in order of battle at their foot, and effectually block up the road to Octo- gesa. An eminence in the plain afforded the harassed Afranians a position where at least they could recover breath and consider what course to take. 1 They first attempted to create a diversion by sending a body of the light-armed Spanish auxiliaries to occupy a hill on the flank of the Cassareans ; but the terrible Gaulish cavalry were immediately upon them, and cut them off to a man in sight of both armies. It was now evident that the Afranians, dispirited by their re- verses, and inferior in cavalry, would have no chance against their assailants in the open plain. The Caesareans were confident of dislodging them from the slight acclivity on which they had taken refuge ; and, as before, the centurions and tribunes again sur- rounded their general, and urged him with almost threatening importunity to lead them to combat. But Caesar had many reasons for wishing to refrain from an engagement which he believed to be superfluous ; for the enemy, even though unassailed, could not Cffiaar mentions, Guischard supposes to be a defile between the moun- tains and this river. I think it describes the interior of the tract between the Sicoris and the Iberus. 1 The level country at the foot of the hills in which these manoeuvres took place is, I conceive, the tract now called la Gariga, and the spot on which Afranius pitched his camp may be that of the village of Llardecans. A.U.705-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 197 long maintain their position for want of water, but, if driven to despair, might still cause him the loss of many of his bravest troops. Moreover, it accorded with his policy as well as his temper to avoid the effusion of Roman blood, whether on his own side or that of his opponents. And, above all, perhaps his experience in Italy assured him that a large portion of the men now arrayed against him were, in their hearts, well disposed to join his colours. Accordingly, he steadily rejected the demands of his imperious veterans, though in doing so he greatly offended them, and might hear them muttering, with the licence to which they had been long accustomed, that another time fight they would not when Caesar ordered them. 1 The Pompeian generals, meanwhile, were in a state of great perplexity. All hope of crossing c ommunicl . the Ebro was abandoned ; their choice of ^"edV an asylum now lay between Ilerda and UuSn^ntha Tarraco. But their movements were closely "pp 08 " 6 1 " 1 watched, and circumscribed by the squadrons which hovered around them. No handful of forage nor cup of water could they procure except at the sword's point. The parties they sent out for supplies were attacked, and only rescued by the succour of fresh battalions, which, in their turn, required to be sup- ported by others ; so that a large portion of the army was gradually drawn down into the lower ground. The generals ordered a trench and rampart to be constructed from the hill to the watering-place; the distance was great, the work arduous, and, to carry it through, required the presence and encourage- ment of all the superior officers. Meanwhile, the soldiers in their camp were left almost with out super- intendence; the Ca3sareans straggled up to their entrenchments, and opened communications with 1 Gas B.C. i. 72. 198 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. x>. such friends and acquaintances as the fortune of civil war had arrayed in the opposite ranks. By degrees this distant intercourse ripened into familiarity and confidence ; the soldiers of either party mingled freely among one another ; and the enthusiasm with which Caesar's veterans proclaimed the merits of their commander worked surely and speedily upon the indifference of the Afranians. The rival parties soon came to an understanding. The only stipula- tion they made between themselves was, that the lives of the Pompeian generals should be guaranteed them. Even Afranius' own son was forced to be satisfied with this assurance; and, upon its being given, the legions arrayed under his standard declared themselves content to surrender to a merciful and munificent enemy. 1 The report of these important transactions brought both the Pompeian leaders hastily back to the camp. Petreius inter- Afranius easily acquiesced in an arrange- fyTnd'brtak* raent in which his own safety had been clre between carefully provided for; but Petreius, a them. man O f ^erner temper, would abandon neither his reputation nor his duty. It was usual for the general to have a body-guard about his own person, distinct from the maniples of the legions. That of Petreius consisted of a cohort of light native infantry, a small squadron of cavalry, and a number of private friends and attendants, who formed his staff or acted as his aides-de-camp. With these men who remained true to him, he rushed im- petuously to the rampart at which the soldiers of the opposed armies were holding their treasonable con- ferences, and broke up their meeting, slaughtering as many of the Caesareans as he could lay hands upon. The remnant, collecting hastily together, wrapped their cloaks about their left arms, and with drawn 1 CSBS. B.C. I 74. A.U.705 B.c.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 199 swords fought their way through the assailants to their own camp hard by. Petreius re-entered his entrenchments, and the habits of discipline resumed their sway. Petreius now proposed the solemn form of the military oath not to desert nor betray the Fer0 city of army or its generals, nor to hold any Petreiu - private parley with the enemy. He first took the oath himself, then tendered it to his colleagues ; next came the tribunes, and after them the cen- turions, and, finally, the whole body of the legionaries, century by century. Strict orders were immediately issued that every Caesarean who had been entertained by a relative or friend in the camp should be brought forth and slain ; but mercy or shame interfered to frustrate this atrocious command, and most of them were concealed till nightfall, and then sent privily away. Meanwhile, the conduct of Caesar was stu- diously in contrast with this cruelty. 1 He carefully inquired for all the Pompeians who had strayed into his camp, and offered to send them back to their own quarters unharmed. But many of the officers were already so charmed with bis demeanour, that they preferred to remain in his service, in which he gave them their old rank, or even promoted them to a higher. 2 The Afranians were now reduced to great distress for provisions, and at the same time were cut off from water. It was resolved to direct the retreat upon Ilerda, where their magazines were The Afraniam not yet exhausted, rather than larraco, are compelled . . / , ,. . , , to retrace their which lay at a greater distance, and where tp towards i_ 1 1 L j V j Ilerd *- probably no preparation had been made for the maintenance of so large a force. Caesar pressed closely upon them, and gave them no oppor- tunity of supplying themselves. Constant skirmishes 1 Suet. JuL 75.; Appian, B.C. ii. 43. Cs. B.C. i. 76, 77. 200 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XT. took place between the parties detached on each side for procuring provisions or intercepting them. When the Afranians pitched their tents for the night and formed their entrenchments near the river, Caesar determined to confine them to the spot, and prevent them from reaching the water, by drawing a com- plete line of circumvallation around them. He had persevered for two days in this arduous work, which was already nearly completed, when the Pompeian leaders felt the necessity of interrupting it, even at the risk of provoking the enemy to a decisive combat. But Caesar also was anxious on his part to avoid the risk and bloodshed of a general en- gagement with an opponent whom he expected to reduce ultimately upon much easier terms. It The armies was only the mutinous importunity of his drawn up op- ,, positeeach OWU trOOBS, to all appearance, that in- other in battle , 11. . 1 1 .,1 array. duced him to put his men in battle array and confront the beleaguered Afranians in the at- titude of defiance. The mode in which the two armies were drawn up, the main strength of each consisting equally of five Eoman legions, shows how much the Caesarean was superior in efficiency. The five legions of Afranius were ranged in two lines, each numbering twenty-five cohorts, instead of the more usual array of three ; for the cavalry and light- armed auxiliaries were of so little value that the general extended his centre to the utmost, and dis- pensed altogether with wings for the protection of his flanks. A third line was formed of the native auxiliaries, and their leader depended for his reserve upon those very battalions in which he could place least reliance. Caesar, on the other hand, disposed his forces according to the approved system. The legions were arrayed in triple line ; four cohorts of each legion, twenty in all, formed the first, three of each the second, and an equal number the third. The intervals between the cohorts were occupied by A.H.705-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 201 the light troops, the bowmen and slingers, and the flanks were protected by the redoubtable squadrons of Gaulish horse. But the day passed without a blow being struck. The Afranians had not courage to begin Thepompeian the attack, while their opponent checked induced to the ardour of his own forces. The next ca P itulate - morning the retreating army, which had suc- ceeded thus far in keeping Caesar's lines open, made a demonstration upon the side of the river 1 , with the desperate intention of crossing a difficult ford in the face of an active enemy. But the disposi- tions Caesar made for covering the spot with his cavalry soon satisfied Afranius that escape in this direction was impossible. The moment had evidently arrived when the want of provisions for men and cattle, the discouragement of his soldiers, and the inferiority of his strength, demanded the unreserved capitulation which his adversary had so long anti- cipated. The terms required by the conqueror were, that the lieutenants of Pompeius should abandon the province, laying down their military command, and therewith disbanding their forces. At the same time he engaged not to press any of the soldiers into his own service against their inclinations. To those who had families and possessions in the country he gave permission to remain in the country; the rest he promised to escort safely to the frontiers of Italy, and there release them from their military engage- ments. With his accustomed policy he pledged himself also to abstain from any harsh treatment of their officers. Nor did he fail to display his wonted generosity, in satisfying from his own resources the demands for pay, which the soldiers were clamorously 1 Coesar gives no intimation where this ford was: it must have been at some point below Ilerda, and by this time the floods had no doubt entirely subsided. 202 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xv. pressing upon their unfortunate generals. 1 The campaign was thus brought to a termination at the end of forty days 2 , and the brilliant success which Csesar achieved added more lustre to his military reputation than even his great exploits in Gaul. He had fairly out-manoauvred a Roman army, not inferior to his own in strength, not indifferently com- manded, and backed by all the strength and resources of the country in which it was engaged. The im-. pregnable position of Ilerda, and the extraordinary swelling of the Sicoris, had contributed, in no slight degree, to the difficulties with which the assailant had had to contend ; and, whether we look to the splendour of the victory or the importance of the result, the day of Caesar's triumph over Afranius and Petreius deserved equally to be marked in the Imperial calendar, and its memory celebrated, in after ages, by a festive anniversary. 3 1 Caes. B.C. i. 86, 87. 2 See Curio's speech to his soldiers (J5. C. ii. 32.). 3 Orelli (Inscript. ii. 396.) gives fragments of four ancient Kalen- daria which record this circumstance: e. g. " Kal. Capranicorum, iiii. Non. Sext. ferise quod hoc die imp. Caesar Hispaniam citeriorem. vicit." The same day was the anniversary of the subsequent defeat of Pharnaces. " Kal. Amitern. iv. Non. Sext. feriac, quod eo die C. Cses. C.F. in H[ispan. citer. et] quod in Ponto eod. die. r[egem Pharnacejm devicit." The trne date of the event is June 9, B.C. 49. See Fischer. H&mische d.n.705-B.c.4. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 203 CHAPTER XVI. Siege and capture of Massilia. Caesar receives the submission of Varro, and establishes his power throughout the Spanish pro- vinces. Campaign of Curio in Africa: his defeat and death. Disaster to Caesar's forces in Illyricum. Administration of Rome by Lepidus and M. Antonius. Caesar is created Dictator in his absence. He quells a mutiny among his troops at Flacentia, and hastens to Rome. His financial and political measures. He is elected consul, and resigns the Dictatorship. Prepares to follow Pompeius across the sea. Advantages of his position compared with that of his adversaries. A.C. 705, B.C. 49. WHILE these operations were in progress in Spain, the success which D.Brutus had recently obtained A . v . 703< over the Massilian fleet had given the be- sit^on of siegers a superiority at sea, and Trebonius M " ilia - was conducting his operations against the city by land with every resource the military art could supply. Mamurra, the chief of the engineering department, had merited Caesar's unbounded favour by the skill he displayed in his profession. 1 But the defenders of Massilia were provided, on their part, with abundance of military engines, which it had been the policy of the state to provide long before- hand for such an emergency. Accordingly, both the attack and defence of their city exhibited the most consummate application of the principles and re- sources of warfare as then practised. 2 The Massilia 1 Catullus speaks of tru enormous wealth Mamurra had reaped from his services in Gaul, and makes it the ground of a gross charge against him and his commander (Carm. Ivii.). Pliny (H. N. xxxvi. 7.) commemorates his profuse magnificence. 2 The power of the engines used in defence of a city may be esti- mated from Caesar's statement, that the beams of wood, twelve feet in length, pointed with iron, which were hurled from them, pierced through four successive screens of wood-work, behind which the 204 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvi. of antiquity bore out little resemblance, even in its external features, to the city which has inherited its site and name. Caesar describes it as washed by the waters of the sea on three sides ; but the port which then bounded it on the south is now surrounded by streets and houses. The French antiquaries assert moreover that a considerable part of the ancient city in its western quarter has been long since covered by the encroachments of the waves. The site of the temple of Diana, upon which the modern cathedral stands, was originally in the middle of the city, but is now on the margin of the sea. The lazaretto occu- pies the eminence on the north, upon which, accord- ing to Caesar's description, the citadel stood ; and the side on which alone the city was exposed to attack from the land stretched from the base of this rugged elevation to the innermost angle of the port, along the line probably of the Cours St. Louis and the Rue Cannebiere, which are now in their turn the most central regions in the whole assemblage of buildings. While Trebonius was conducting his first opera- Rerait of a tions against "the city, by the construction g^e a ment of an immense rampart, eighty feet in tothe r Ma S - height, over against the wall on the land siiians. g ^ e throughout its whole length, the be- sieged ventured to make another attempt upon the element in which they were wont to confide. 1 L. Nasidius had been sent by Pompeius with a squadron of sixteen vessels to throw succours into the city. He had directed his course from the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, through the straits of Mes- sana, either unobserved by or in defiance of Curio, the Csesarean commander in Sicily. Indeed he had ventured to enter the port of Messana, and cut besiegers sheltered themselves while engaged in filling the ditch before the walls. Cses. B. C. ii. 2. They were obliged to construct these vinece of solid beams a foot in thickness. 1 Cses. B.C ii. 17. A.U.705-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 205 out one vessel from the dockyard. From thence he made sail for the shores of Gaul, sending forward one bark from his squadron to convey to the besieged the news of his arrival, and to exhort them to sally forth with their whole naval force and join him off Tauroentum, a port and fortress at a little distance on the coast. The Massilians, since their recent defeat, had devoted themselves with unwearied energy to repairing their galleys, and arming the merchant vessels and fishing boats with which their harbour swarmed. They were not disposed to shrink from making a second experiment of their prowess, while the acclamations of the unarmed multitude, of their women and old men, encouraged them to strain every nerve in a contest in which their pride was so deeply interested. Nor did the assailants, who had multiplied the numerical strength of their armament since the last engagement, and were prepared to decide the contest on the broad decks of their rude but massive fabrics, decline the proffered meeting. 1 In numbers, however, the fleet of the Massilians still preponderated; the praetorian galley of Decimus 2 was attacked at the same moment from opposite quarters by two powerful triremes, which dashed towards it with all the velocity their oars could im- part. By a skilful turn of the rudder the Csesarean steersman extricated his vessel from both the assail- ants at the instant when they were about to strike her on either side, and the opposing beaks impinged violently against each other. Thus entangled and mutually disabled they were speedily attacked, boarded and destroyed. The Massilians and their allies, the Albici, are admitted to have fought admir- ably ; but Nasidius gave them a very lukewarm 1 Lucan, iii. 512.: " Sed rudis ct qualis procumbit montibus arbor, Conseritur stabilis navalibus area bellis." 1 Lucan, iii. 535. : " Bruti prsetoria puppis." 206 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS. CH. XVL support, As soon as the fortune of the day seemed to incline towards the Caesareans, he quietly withdrew without the loss of a single vessel, while of his allies thus treacherously deserted, five galleys were sunk and four captured. A Eoman officer might naturally be reluctant to exert himself in behalf of Greeks, whom he despised or hated, against the bravest and most illustrious of his own countrymen. Nasidius seems indeed to have had further orders to execute on the coast of Spain, and it is not improbable that Pompeius had strictly charged him not to entangle himself too closely in the defence of a city to which he attached only secondary importance. He sailed for his ultimate destination without bidding adieu to the unfortunate Massilians, who with difficulty and in diminished numbers escaped into their harbour, and betook themselves, not even yet dismayed, to the defence of their walls. The entrance of the port of Massilia is so narrow that a chain drawn across it secured it from the attacks of the victorious squadron. But the operations which Trebonius was sedulously operations directing against the defences of the city MalSila : on the land side were such as no artificial ca'pituuiion means of resistance were capable of effec- er n y d of re the h ~ tually withstanding. 1 Indeed, it may be observed that, in the best times of Roman military science, the means of attack were generally much superior to those of defence. While a fortress such as that of Ilerda, perched on a lofty eminence, with a steep and narrow access, was justly deemed impregnable, no resources or skill could avail to pro- tect a city which stood upon comparatively level ground against the assault of a persevering and enterprising besieger. Such was the site of Mas- silia, which had been chosen rather for the conve- nience of its haven than the natural security of its position. Having effected the complete blockade of 1 Cscs. B.C. ii. 814. A.o 705-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 207 the city by means of the gigantic barricade already described ', Trebonius proceeded to construct a tower at a short distance from the point in the wall which he destined for his attack. This tower was built of solid brickwork, and so covered with skins and mat- tresses that the blows of the enemy's ponderous missiles fell dead upon it, while other contrivances were applied to guard it from being set on fire. When at last this prodigious edifice overtopped the walls, (a work, however, which, in the face of a vigi- lant enemy, must have cost much time and many lives,) the Massilians could no longer maintain them- selves on the summit of their ramparts, commanded as they now were by the assailants from above. The next step on the part of the besiegers was to fill up the fosse under the protection of this tower, and erect close to the walls the musculuis, a ponderous and well-compacted roof of timber, under which men could work without interruption, picking out the stones with crowbars, and undermining with manual labour the bulwarks of the city. The besiegers had thus succeeded in shaking one of the towers of the wall, and the rampart was tottering to its overthrow, when the Massilians hastened to anticipate, by a timely offer of capitulation, the moment which would deliver their hearths and altars to a furious and unbridled soldiery. Trebonius, on his part, had received strict orders to abstain from storming the eity, which Caesar was reluctant to surrender to the horrors of an assault. Accordingly, he was willing to accord honourable terms to the suppliant republic. His soldiers, indeed, murmured bitterly at being dis- appointed of the plunder which was almost in their grasp; it seems doubtful whether they would have 1 Guischard, in his M6m. Militaires, ii., has an elaborate discussion of these operations; but after all the ingenuity he has displayed in the explanation of them, there still remains much to perplex at least the non-professional student. 208 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS cH. XVL continued to observe the armistice until the expected arrival of the Imperator himself. The apprehension of their uncontrollable fury may have driven the Massilians to violate the agreement they had them- selves solicited, and taking advantage of the confi- dence reposed in them, to make a sudden attack upon the Roman works, and give them to the flames. But this conspicuous instance of Grecian perfidy The ege was displayed to no purpose. Trebonius resumed his operations with the same de- termination and on an ampler scale than before. The original barricade had been constructed princi- pally of timber, and the conflagration had reduced it to ruins. He now repaired it with earthworks and solid masonry, and again pushed forward his covered galleries to the foot of the walls. Against these insi- dious enemies the great catapults on the ramparts were of no avail, for they were calculated to hurl their missiles to a distance, and their range could not be adjusted so as to reach an object immediately below them. 1 Once more the Massilians siiians^ffer despaired of defending themselves, and ute a a Ucond ventured to tempt the forbearance of the conqueror by a second offer of capitulation. This time, indeed, it was not Trebonius or Brutus, caaar but Caesar, the politic and the merciful, establishes . . . in .1 .-, his head with whom, as we shall presently see, they cord-ibL* had to treat. The return to the camp before their walls of the great captain who had delivered Italy and pacified Spain, may both have cut off the last hope of escape, and at the same time have held forth an augury of pardon. For, after the 1 Gas. B.C. ii. 16.: " Suorumque tormentorum usum spatio pro- pinquitatis interire." This obscure expression seems to be explained by Lucan (iii. 478.): " Nee Grans Jlecterejactuni, Nee facilis labor est longinqua ad bella parati Tormenti mutare modum, sed pondere solo Contenti nudis evolvunt saxa laccrtis.** A.C.705-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 209 capitulation of the Pompeian lieutenants on the Sicoris, Csesar had hastened to complete the reduc- tion of the three provinces of the peninsula. He had marched directly towards the south, and estab- lished his head-quarters at Corduba, the Iberian capital, whither he had summoned to his presence the representatives of all the states and cities beyond the Pyrenees. Here the favourable sentiments of the Further Province were speedily pronounced, and it was with full anticipation of the general concur- rence of the native and colonial cities that Caesar had postponed his return to finish the siege of Massilia. 1 Nor had he any serious opposition to fear vacillating from M. Varro. That officer being left in v^ro!" command of the two districts into which the south and west were divided, had excused himself from joining the camp of his colleagues, retaining two legions at his side to ensure the submission of the natives and the fidelity of the Roman inhabitants. In the first instance, he had allowed himself to express a favour- able opinion both of the cause and the prospects of the invader. He admitted in his public harangues the inclination of the province towards Csesar ; but, undecided thus far as to his own course, he had faintly pleaded the duty which as a legatus he owed to his imperator Pompeius, and thus allowed himself to reconcile the maintenance of his official command with entire neglect of the active exertions demanded by the emergency. But the news of the vigorous resistance of Massilia, of the junction and subsequent successes of Afranius and Petreius, together with the assurances he received of the firm allegiance of the Hither Province, all these circumstances, coloured and magnified by the sanguine temper of Afranius in his correspondence, shook his resolution of neutrality. He now affected vast eagerness in the cause of the senate, and adopted active measures for recruiting 1 Cs. B.C. ii. 1721. VOL. II. P 210 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvr. his forces, for collecting supplies for Massilia and equipping a naval armament for the conveyance thither of men and stores. He did not scruple to wield, in the interest of his commander, all the terrors of the Roman proconsulate, imposing arbitrary contributions upon the states which he suspected of favouring the enemy, and abusing the forms of law to mulct the Roman citizens whose disaffection was reported to him. He invaded the sanctuaries of the (rods, and rifled the celebrated temple of Hercules at Grades. That important and hostile city he entrusted to C. Grallonius, a tried friend of Domitius, with a garrison of six cohorts. At the same time, the tone which he assumed in speaking of Caesar was arro- gant and violent. He described him as beaten in every engagement, and hourly abandoned by his soldiers ; nor did he omit the solemn ceremony of summoning the Roman citizens throughout the pro- vince to renew the military oath of fidelity to their rightful proconsul. But, notwithstanding all this pretended display of The province zeal, Yarro was still cautious of openly fe*antar taking the field against the general whom dEiedbv ke so insolently disparaged. When the hi>idien, actual result of the contest in the north renders. was disclosed, he proposed to shut himself up with his two legions in the insular fortress of Grades, where, supported by a naval force, and well supplied with stores and provisions, his position, he deemed, would be impregnable till the proconsul should come to his relief. Csesar was already ad- vancing towards Corduba; he had pushed forward Q. Cassius, with two legions, upon Hispalis, while the fame of his victories had gone before him, and penetrated to the remotest quarters of the Pom- peians. His mandate for the assembling at Corduba of the Iberian deputies had been received with re- spect and obeyed with alacrity. The Graditanes, A.U.705-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 211 indignant at the desecration of their temple, had already tampered with the tribunes of the cohorts in garrison among them, and expelled Gallonius from their walls. Varro was on his march from Hispalis, the seat of his government, to the more secure retreat ..of Gades, when the result of this intrigue was an- nounced to him. Immediately one of his legions wheeled about before his face, arid returned to the city from which it had just departed. Without a general, and without quarters or provisions, the sol- diers abstained from any act of violence, and quietly rested in the forum and under the colonnades in the streets, until the inhabitants, admiring their boldness and perhaps sympathizing in their preference for the expected conqueror, received and entertained them in their own houses. Varro now paused and attempted, as a last resource, to gain the walls of Italica ; but this city also had suddenly declared itself against the senate, and refused to admit him. No other course now remained but to acknowledge the ascendancy of the victor of the Sicoris, and proffer a timely sur- render ; the unfortunate general sought to make a merit of his submission, by offering to bring over the legion, which, in fact, he could no longer retain. 1 Caressed and flattered on all sides, Caesar received the submission of his baffled opponent at Corduba. He prescribed complete reparation of the wrongs in- flicted upon his own adherents, remitted Ca ., ar ar _ the contributions which had been levied Sif"of upon the provincials, and commanded at ^{lito* 1 least to be restored the treasure and orna- MmMilia - mente which bad been carried off from the temple at Gades. Nor in the midst of all this liberality did he hesitate to pardon the double-dealing of Varro, and to treat him with the courtesy due to his character as a scholar rather than as a statesman or soldier. The three provinces were combined under the sole go- 1 Cses. B. C. ii. 20. P 2 212 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. JTVI vernment of Q. Cassius, who had formed a thorough acquaintance with them at an earlier period, while serving in the peninsula as quaestor to Pompeius. Four legions were left behind to maintain the autho- rity of the conqueror in the west. The inhabitants of Grades he attached to himself by the stronger tie of gratitude ; for the Eoman franchise, which he now bestowed upon them, more than counterbalanced the pecuniary contributions which, notwithstanding his lavish bounty in restoring his opponents' plunder, he was constrained to demand for the support of his armies. 1 In their noble haven Caesar took possession of the ships his predecessor had summoned thither, and embarked with a portion of his troops for Tar- raco ; from whence he pursued his journey by land through Narbo, and arrived, finally, at Massilia at the moment when that city, as has been seen, was about to fall into his hands. 2 But while the arms of Caesar, wherever he was state of the personally engaged, were crowned with un- proinceof I ^ Africa. alloyed success, the enterprises he was obliged to entrust to his lieutenants were less uni- formly prosperous. The obstinate and perfidious resistance of the Massilians, indeed, had been brought to a close by the perseverance of Brutus and Tre- bonius, and both the islands of Sicily and Sardinia, so important from their proximity to Rome and the resources with which they abounded, had been evacuated by the garrisons of the senate rather than 1 Cues. B. C. ii. 21; Liv. Epit. ex.: Appian, B. C. ii. 43.; Dion, xli. 24., who tells a frivolous storj, which I cannot quote, to account for Caesar's liberality to the Gaditanes. 2 In crossing the Pyrenees, Caesar passed the spot where Pompeius, who had constructed the military road of communication between Gaul and Spain, had erected a trophy to commemorate his achieve- ments in those regions. It need not be said that he abstained from destroying it, as a man of coarser mind would certainly have done: lie contented himself with the indirect satire of placing in its vicinity a much simpler and more modest memorial of himself. Dion, I.e. A.U.706-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 213 conquered by Valerius and Curio. Thus the whole of the western half of the empire had fallen from the hands of the oligarchy, excepting only the pro* vince of Africa, destined to give the first decided check to Caesar's triumphant progress, and to become, at a later period, the last stronghold of the common- wealth and its genuine defenders. This province occupied but a small portion of the coast of the Mediterranean, comprising the region of which Car- thage had formerly been the metropolis. The more distant regions of Mauretania and Numidia, over which the Punic republic had extended its influence rather than its rule, had been acknowledged by the Romans as independent kingdoms; and Juba, the sovereign of the latter country, was attached to the interests of Pompeius, and hostile to those of Caesar, on distinct personal grounds. To the for- no . tility of mer he owed his throne, having received of^imidL, at his hands the succession to his father toCaislir - Hiempsal ; from the latter he had experienced, as we have seen, an egregious insult on presenting him- self as a suitor before the Roman senate. It hap- pened, moreover, that Curio, the appointed bearer of the Caesarean banner to the shore of Africa, had attempted to injure him in proposing, as tribune of the people, to deprive him of his sovereignty and dispose of his possessions by public sale. 1 There could be no doubt, therefore, that the fierce and vindictive Numidian would bum to avenge this ill- treatment by taking part with Pompeius against their common enemy. But it was at least possible that prudence might interpose to check the appetite for revenge ; it might be presumed that, with the faithlessness attributed to his race, he would hesitate to compromise his interests on the score of ancient obligations ; while, at the same time, the unsettled state of his frontiers, harassed as they constantly 1 Dion, xli. 41.; Lucan, iv. 690. 214 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvi were by the marauding tribes of the interior, might paralyse his efforts, or at least retard his advance. Such were probably the anticipations of Curio when he crossed over from Sicily, with only Africa', n a V n a d ei two of the four legions under his orders, to ?uc" n ser[-,.. ., i -, 11 scurrilous was, ne telt, in reality as arbitrary and de- deciamnionj cisive as the formal missives by which the Anwniui. Spartan ephors cashiered their military sovereigns. 1 He revenged himself, in his correspondence with Atticus, by puerile declamations against the prefect's vices. He represented Antonius as making his pro- gresses through Italy with the mime Cytheris at his side, surrounded by his lictors, followed by a train of panders and concubines, nor scrupling to introduce his own wife and mother into the same odious com- 1 Cic. ad Ait. x. 10. : " Habes anvrf}s (\fv6eptov d{tw^a, Kal iruywv m OVK aytw^s, KCU irAoTos fifrdinrov, Kal ypvir6ni]s ^uwrfjpos e'SoKet rols * Comp. Eckhel, Doclr. Numm. vi. 44. This figure appears on a coin supposed to be of the date 715 u. c. It occurs also on one struck by Antonius at Lugdunum in Gaul, a city which was much attached to him. Vaillant supposes that its modern name Lyon is derived from the Antonian symbol 4 Plin. H. N. viii. 21. 4 Cic ad Att. x. 13. : " Tu ieones Antonii ne pertimescas cave." i.\f.705-B.c.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 223 on the point of surrendering, when Caesar's good for- tune brought him in triumph to their gates Final .ub- .P . \_ . i miwion mst in time to receive their submission ofMaiiia. f T TN , i /> Escape of in person. L. Domitius, by whose herce Domiuns. hostility they had been animated throughout their long struggle, contrived by slipping out of the haven to avoid falling a second time into the hands of the conqueror whose clemency he had abused. He will next reappear in the Pompeian camp at Thessa- lonica. The perfidy of the Greeks was prudently forgotten, their submission graciously accepted, and their city saved from pillage, though the appetite of the besiegers was whetted by perils and fatigues, and they had indulged in the fullest anticipation of mili- tary licence. The surrender of all their munitions of war, together with the treasure of the republic, was rigorously enforced : and if the inhabitants were allowed the enjoyment of their own laws and institu- tions, they were effectually deprived of the means of defending them. 1 It was at this moment that Cffisar received intelli- gence that he had been declared dictator '. -n 1.1 - r .LI- f -+ Cxt> " createi1 at Koine by the appointment ot the prefect dictator inhu Lepidus.' 2 The creation of this extraordi- nary magistrate was an expedient recognized, by traditional usage, on occasions of the greatest emer- gency. In the earliest ages of the republic the appointment was exercised by the consuls at the command or with the consent of the senate. 3 The people had no voice in the matter, nor were the peculiar restrictions under which the office was held adopted with any view to their protection. The appointment of a dictator was, in fact, the resource 1 CJES. /?. C. ii. 22.; Dion, xli. 25.; Liv. Epit. ex. 2 Caes. B. C. ii. 21. 3 Arnold, Hist, of Rome, i. 144.: "One of the consuls received the name of the person to be declared dictator from the senate; he then declared him dictator, and he was confirmed and received the iiuperium by a vote of the great council of the curiae." 224 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XVI. which the nobles reserved to themselves whenever the ordinary political forms were insufficient to resist the demands of the commons. But as the commons grew in strength, and asserted equal privileges with the nobles, such an arbitrary power could no longer be safely exercised. The senate resorted to another expedient to protect itself, whenever its privileges seemed threatened with imminent peril. On such occasions it passed a solemn resolution, declaring the state in danger, and investing the consuls with summary powers for maintaining the public safety. Accordingly, with the single exception of Sulla's appointment, which was made in the intoxication of an overwhelming triumph, there had been no crea- tion of a dictator for a hundred and twenty years. Indeed Sulla's revival of this unpopular authority, and his frightful abuse of it, had concentrated upon it the whole force of the national odium. Pompeius had not ventured to claim it ; he had contented him- self with the more irregular but less hateful assump- tion of the sole consulship. It might now be doubted whether the people would endure it, even when exercised by their own champion, and ostensibly for their own interest. The circumstances, however, which compelled Caesar to run the hazard of thus awakening Caesar's object .-, i f , j, in seeking the the lealousv ot his own adherents were appointment %. '_,. , , , , at this time, peculiar. 1 here can be no doubt that consular he had himself suggested to Lepidus to comitiaand 1,1 , i j obtain the make the appointment ; but, in doing so, consulship. , , ' , , \ he had not yielded to the indulgence ol puerile vanity. It was the proper function of the consuls for the current year to convene the people for the election of their successors. The consulship was the dignity for which Ca3sar had long contended. The exalted position he occupied, and the great ser- vices he had rendered the state, gave him an undeni- able claim to the fasces, even for the second time, upon 4.C.705-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 225 the expiration of his provincial government. For this he had quarrelled with the party of the optimates, who had striven by every kind of violence and in- trigue to thwart him. For this he had taken up arms and crossed the Eubicon ; and now, having driven his enemies fairly out of Italy, he was ready, he declared, to present himself to the people for this, and this only. But the consuls were absent from the city ; no election could take place at Eome ; neither, on the other hand, could an election be made under the consular auspices elsewhere than at Eome. Lepidus, indeed, asserted that as praetor he had the right to hold the consular comitia. But an outcry was raised against the legality of this claim ; and Cicero argued that an inferior magistrate could not rightly preside at the election of a superior. 1 Caesar was studious to preserve appearances, and, on this occasion, he forbade his minister to perform an act which could bear even a colour of illegality. It was, however, of great importance to his views that the state should not fall under an interregnum. The office of the interreges was to supply the place of the consuls on the occurrence of an unavoidable vacancy, until such time as a formal election could be held under their sanction. 2 But the law restricted the choice of interreges to the patrician houses, and in that class there was so much jealousy of Caesar that under their authority fresh obstacles, he apprehended, would be thrown in his way. 3 There remained, therefore, only one other feasible course, and this was the appointment of a dictator, in whom the right of holding the consular comitia was undeniably vested. If such a sovereign magistrate was to be 1 Cic. ad Alt. ix. 9.: " Iste omnium turpissimus et sordidissimus (Lepidus) qni consularia comitia a prsetore ait haberi posse." s It was by an interrex that Sulla had been created dictator. Cic. ad Att. ix. 15. ' Drumann, iii. 475.; Cic. ad Att. ix. 9. ; " Permagni cjus interest rem ad interregnum non venire." VOL. II. Q 226 HISTOttr OF THE ROMANS CH. XVL appointed, it was upon Caesar alone, as the fore- most man in the state, that the burden and the dignity could alight. He accepted the office as the only means of arriving at the consulship. Never- theless, it was still a question whether, in the absence of the consuls, the praetor had strictly the right to make this nomination. It may be remembered, in- deed, that the first dictator was appointed at a period when there was no distinction between the functions of these two officers, so that it is not improbable that the archives of the early republic might furnish at least a literal precedent for such a proceeding. There seems, however, to have been a general impression that there was some irregularity in the transaction, though the historians express themselves very dif- ferently upon it. 1 Under such circumstances, it must have been a matter of great satisfaction to Caesar that the intelligence of this appointment reached him at a moment when there was nothing to prevent his setting off immediately for Eome. Delay at such a conjuncture might have been fatal ; but Spain was converted to his side, Gaul vaunted her zeal for his interests, Massilia was pacified and crushed. The broad beaten track of the Aurelian Way lay before him, and the proconsul crossed the Alps with the expedition of a courier. Nevertheless, there remained yet another labour to csar queiu be overcome before he could reach the con- among his summation of his desires. For a moment piacentia. the very foundation of all his power seemed crumbling under his feet. After the disappearance of the senatorial forces from the shores of Italy, Caesar, as we have seen, had stationed a portion of his troops in the southern extremity of Apulia, to 1 Flor. iv. 2. : " consnlem se ipse fecit." Appian, B.C. ii. 47. : Ktu OATTOV 6 Srjfjuts iretptK^s rjpfiro StKrarupa otrre TI TTJS 0ou\rjs \)rrii- (oftfVT]s, uirre irpoxipoToHj. 4 Cic. de Off. iii. 32.; Drumann, iii. 447 A.P.706.-B.C.49. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 235 template for reducing the city by famine had been thwarted for the most part by the energy and success of Caesar's lieutenants in Sar- dinia and Sicily. But Africa withheld her supplies, and the produce of more distant Iiaaricl "- shores might be cut off by the cruisers of a vigilant enemy. The populace of Eome began to suffer from this pressure, and the dictator distributed gratuitously among them all the grain he could collect. 1 He seems to have indemnified himself for these extra- ordinary expenses by levying contributions on the deposits in the temples. 2 The people easily pardoned these depredations. They were now in the highest good humour. Caesar could trust his fortunes confi- dently to their grateful favour. 3 Accordingly he proceeded, without further delay, to convene the as- sembly for the election of consuls, and presented himself as a candidate. He could fairly represent to the people that, in the discharge of the sovereign magistracy he had paid unusual deference to their rights as legislators; in his wish to make his dicta- torship a name rather than a reality, he had abstained from the appointment of a master of the horse. He now encouraged P. Servilius Isauricus to offer him- self for the other chair, and no one ventured to solicit the suffrages in opposition to either. The election of the other magistrates followed, and next in order the distribution of the provincial appointments. Lepidus received the Hither Spain, Q. Cassius retained his government of the Further province, and Decimus Brutus succeeded to that of Gaul beyond the Alps. The last month of the Roman calendar had now arrived. 4 Caesar performed, in his capacity of dictator, 1 Appian, B. C. ii. 48. 2 Dion, xli. 39. * Lucan, v. 384. : M Leetos fecit se consule fastos." 4 The month of December, A. u. 705, answered to October, B. c. 49. Plntarch and Floras forget the error in the current computation of time when they state that Csesar arrived at Brundisium at the winter solstice. See Fischer, R. Z. p. 273. 236 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XVI. the solemn rites of the great Latin festival on He resigns the the Alban mount ; and thus, at the mo- ndiqwin to ment of drawing his sword, he proclaimed Bru"|ishfm, himself in the face of gods and men the B!c.'*8. ' supreme impersonation of the laws. It was by this ceremony that the chief magistrate of the republic was wont to invoke the divine favour before arming to encounter the national foes ; and its celebration now seemed to denounce Pompeius, with his Oriental allies, as a foreign enemy. As soon as the sacrifice was completed the dictator abdicated his extraordinary office, only eleven days after he had entered upon it. 1 He had already summoned his veterans to attend him at Brundisium, and he went forth to the decisive conflict amidst the accla- mations of the people; but their applause was mingled with painful presentiments, and at the last moment they earnestly entreated him to bring the struggle to a peaceful termination. Every eye was bent on the fatal field, where legion should be matched against legion, pile against pile, and eagle against eagle. 2 The antagonists had assumed an attitude of personal defiance ; the names of Senate and People had sunk into ominous oblivion. Caesar and Pompeius were now the exclusive watchwords of the contending parties ; even the children playing in the streets divided themselves into Caesareans and Pompeians. 3 The judgment and ability which Caesar manifested comparison of throughout these proceedings must raise his n^Voccupfed estimation as a statesman to the highest ^ofws" 1 pitch. He who had crossed the Eubicon adversaries. ^ fo e beginning of the year, in defiance of 1 Caes. B.C. iii. 2. ; Appian, B.C. ii. 48. ; Plut. Cas. 37., Zonar. X. 8. 2 Lucan, i. 6. : " Infestisque obvia signis Signa, pares aquilas et pila minantia pilis." * Dion, xli. 39. A.U.706-B.C.48. UNDER THE EMPIIIE. 237 law and authority, and daringly confronted the go- vernment of his country, backed as it was by the general opinion of his order, had now completely turned against his opponents the current of public feel- ing. The moral victory he had gained over them was even more complete than the triumph of his arms. He was now the consul of the republic, legitimately elected and duly invested with full powers. Through- out the empire there were vast numbers of citizens who would bow implicitly to the wielder of this formal authority. There were many cities which would shut their gates against any party which opposed him, without asking a question as to the substantial justice of its cause. 1 On the other hand, the Pompeians acknowledged by their own conduct that they had ceased to retain the government of Kome. In Epirus, though there were two hundred senators in their camp, they dared not enact a law or hold an election, or confer the imperium. They had neither curies nor centuries, nor comitia; and the consuls, praetors, and quaestors, who had sailed from the shores of Italy, sank in the next year into pro- consuls, propraetors and proquaestors. 2 The repre- 1 Caes. B.C. iii. 12.: "Uli se daturos negare, neque portas consuli praeclnsuros, neque sibi judicium sumpturos contra atque omnis Italia populusque Romanus judicavisset." z Dion, xli. 43. This writer gives a confused account of the pro- ceedings of the Pompeians, or rather the proceedings themselves were confused and inconsistent. He says that though, as some affirm, there were 200 senators in the camp, together with the consuls, and though they consecrated a spot of ground for taking the auspices preliminary to an election, though they possessed a legitimate sem- blance of the Roman people, and even of the city itself, yet they did not proceed to make any election of public magistrates, because the consuls had not proposed a lex curiata. The proceedings then above mentioned, if they really took place, were a mere imposition : the Pompeian chieftains preferred the retention of their military com- mands by a mere change of title, to going through even the bare forms of an election. Lucan (v. init.), and Appian (ii. 50.), pre- serve the popular arguments by which it was sought to give a con- stitutional colour to these informal proceedings ; but the alleged precedent of Camillus was far from the purpose. It is probable thtu 238 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvi. sentative of the people had become the guardian of precedent and order ; while the champion of the aristocracy derived his unauthorized prerogatives from the suffrage or the passions of a turbulent camp. The position of the rivals was thus exactly reversed, and with it, in the eyes of a nation of formalists, the right seemed to be reversed also. Caesar's senate was not less numerous than his rival's, notwithstanding the sneer of the poet: " Libyae squalentibus arvis Corio Cwsarei cecidit pars magna Senatns." A.U.706-B.C.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 239 CHAPTER XVII. The senatorial party assemble at Thessalonica. Review of their forces and position. Caesar crosses over to Epirus. Pompeius throws himself before Dyrrhachium. Maritime operations of Bibnlus: his mortification and death. Sedition in Italy, and death of Caelius. Antonius crosses over to Epirus with rein- forcements. Caesar blockades Pompeius within his lines. Operations in Macedonia and Greece. Appius Claudius consults the oradc of Delphi. Caesar is baffled in his attack on Pompeios, and withdraws into Thessaly. Pompeius follows, and effects a junction with Scipio. Gives battle at Pharsalia. Rout of the Senatorial forces. Flight of Pompeius : death of Domitius: surrender of M. Brutus (Jan. Aug. A.U. 706, B. c. 48.) POMPEIUS had no sooner placed the sea between his followers and the cherished soil of Italy, than he began to develop the military plans of*/* , . , i i j i j-I i TT ofPompehu. which he had long meditated in secret. He had no further occasion to practise reserve. The consuls and their party were now really at his mercy ; they could not dispense with his services, for once removed from the centre of government, their autho- rity in the camp was merely nominal. The rulers of the allied and dependent states of the East owed their thrones to the conqueror of Mithridates. While only distant and doubtful rumours had reached them of Caesar's exploits on the shores of the Western Ocean, they had before their eyes sensible proofs that his rival was the greatest captain and most powerful statesman in the world. Gratitude and fear there- fore equally conspired to urge them to obey his summons, when he appointed Thessalonica for the rendezvous of his forces. Deiotarus and Dorilaus, princes of Gralatia, Rhascupolis and Sadala of Thrace, Tarcondimotus of Cilicia, Ariobarzanes of Cappa- docia, Antiochus of Commagene, were among the 240 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS en. rm. most conspicuous of the foreign chieftains who flocked to his standard. 1 Each of them was attended by a select body of horsemen from his own country. Among the Oriental allies, Caesar enumerates only the cavalry, the bowmen and the slingers, who formed the ordinary auxiliary force to the main body of the legionaries. 2 But there can be no doubt that most of the tributary states and sovereigns of the east fur- nished also large contingents of foot-soldiers. These, however, were for the most part ill equipped and worse disciplined, and in the enumeration of com- batants it was not commonly the practice of the Koman military writers to take any special account, of them. 3 The senators and knights served also in large numbers on horseback. A body of five hundred Eoman cavalry, which had been left at Alexandria by Grabinius to maintain or watch the power of Ptolemaeus, was brought by Cn. Pompeius, the tri- umvir's eldest son, who had armed, moreover, eight hundred of his slaves and labourers from the exten- sive estates belonging to his family. But the main strength of the army consisted, of course, in the legionary infantry. Five legions had been carried over from Italy ; a sixth was formed by the \mion of the two incomplete divisions which Cato had com- manded in Sicily ; a seventh was raised from the veterans whom Sulla, Lucullus, and their successors had settled in Macedonia and Crete ; two more had 1 Caes. B.C. iii. 4.; Veil. ii. 51. 2 Caesar computes the cavalry at 7000, the slingers and bowmen at 4000, bearing iu each case an unusually large proportion to the legionary infantry. s Appian, B. C. ii. 70. Lucan (vii. 360.) dwells emphatically on the numbers of these Oriental allies, and compares their variety to the forces of Cyrus, Xerxes, and Agamemnon (iii. 28-4.). Not to in- sist on the testimony of the rhetorical poet, we have similar evidence in Cicero's letters; and Appian says plainly %Qvtffi re iratrt KO\ ffrpa nftois teal Paun\evo-i K ir6\tfwv av^ffxiv (B.C. ii. 38.). Such troops conld not, of course, be opposed to Csesar's veterans in the field, but they might bo serviceable in many operations of war. .U.706-B.C.4S. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 241 been hastily levied by Lentulus among the citizens of the republic in the province of Asia. The strength of these divisions had been considerably increased by the addition of supplemental or auxiliary cohorts of Achaians, Boeotians, Epirotes and Thessa- lians. Scipio, who had gone forth to his appointed province of Syria, was expected to return with the two legions stationed on that frontier. The name of Pompeius might be deemed sufficiently terrible to curb the audacity of the Parthians ; but Orodes had presumed to negotiate for the cession of Syria as the price of his active alliance, and Lucceius Hirrus was despatched on a mission to amuse his vanity while he solicited his favours. 1 To these forces is to be added the detachment of C. Antonius recently cap- tured by Octavius. These armed multitudes, to which Caesar's enume- ration is confined, were quite as large as H i.naTmi could be conveniently supported or ma- armamenu - uoeuvred, according to the principles and habits of ancient warfare. Though composed partly of strange and discordant elements, partly of untrained levies, they might form, in the hands of skilful officers, a military power more formidable than any the world had yet seen. Their numbers may be stated very moderately at eighty or ninety thousand men. 2 Pompeius employed himself in exercising them to- gether with the utmost diligence. He condescended to go through the severe discipline of the legionary in person, hurling the pilum and brandishing the sword, on horseback and on foot, and he displayed, it was said, though fifty-eight years of age, the strength and ardour of a young recruit. 3 At the same time every exertion was made to collect magazines of 1 CJBS. B. C. iii. 82. ; Dion, xli. 55. 2 Eleven legions might amount to 60,000 men. The light troops and cavalry were above 1 1,000. The supplemental cohorts could hardly be less than 20,000 more. Plut. Pomp. 64. VOL. II. K 242 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XVIT. provisions and warlike stores, while a fleet of five hundred vessels of war, and an infinite number of transports, contributed by every naval power in the eastern seas 1 , was placed under the command of Bibulus, and divided into several squadrons to watch every harbour from which the enemy might issue forth, or at which he might attempt to make good his landing. 2 The overwhelming naval force which Pompeius Thenobiei possessed enabled him undoubtedly to Pompeii)*-, throw reinforcements upon any coast where cmp. High - . . f . , . J . estimation his interests were assailed by the enemy. in which T- i 11 11 i i Domitiu. is But he would not detach a single vessel or held among . them. a single cohort to the reliet ot his provinces or his legions. He required all his adherents to seek him in the position in which he had determined to abide the attack, and looked on with apparent apathy while his best generals and his amplest resources were torn from him. Indeed his opponent's libe- rality restored to him the officers whom his own negligence had allowed to fall into their hands. Afranius had followed the example of Domitius and Vibullius, in turning his arms once more against the conqueror to whom he owed his freedom. The menaces of the senate left them, perhaps, no choice but to take a decided part on the one side or the other. But Pompeius was exceedingly jealous of his principal officers, especially of such as had the con- fidence of his party. Though compelled to entrust to them the most important commands in his army, 1 Cic. ad Att. ix. 9.: " Omnis hsec classis Alexandria, Colchis, Tyro, Sidone, Arado, Cypro, Pamphylia, Lycia, Rhodo, Chio, By- zantio, Lesbo, Smyrna, Mileto, Coo, ad intercludendos commeatus Italise et ad oocupandas frumentarias provincias comparator." 2 Cses. B. C. iii. 5. Cic. (ad Att. x. 8.), in one of his fits of confi- dence in Pompeius's preparations: " Cujus omne consilium Themi- stocleum est. Existimat enim qni mare teneat, eum necesse esse rerum potiri. Itaque nunquam id egit, ut Hispanise per se tenerentur: nayalis apparatus ei semper antiquissima cora fait. Navigabit igitnr. quum erit tenipus, maximis clasibti8, et ad Italiam accedet." 4.D.706-B.C.4S. TTXDER THE EMPIRE. 243 he was by no means disposed to listen to their coun- sels. The fortune of war which had dislodged the partisans of the senate from so many of the positions they had undertaken to defend, had now assembled at Thessalonica all the great leaders of the aristo- cratic faction. Various and conflicting as were their opinions on the state of affairs, they all seemed to agree in their dislike and distrust of the champion under whom they were forced to array themselves. It was with great reluctance that Domitius resorted to Thessalonica after his escape from Massilia. His leader's desertion of him at Corfinium still rankled in his bosom ; he felt that it was only by his own gallant self-devotion that the consuls, the senate, and Pom- peius himself, had been enabled to escape from Italy ; this was a service he never permitted his associates to forget, nor was his temper such as to brook an inferior command. But he found himself naturally in his place at the head of the proudest and most exclusive section of the nobles, and in their company he ridiculed the airs of sovereignty assumed by Pom- peius among the petty potentates whom he had sum- moned to his standard. 1 Cicero also had found his way to the head-quar- ters of his friends. How he evaded the vigilance of Antonius does not appear. We His discontent il-J f T^ 1 must suppose that he withdrew from Italy n Kdrcavos (c. 52.). 2 Lucan, ii. 343. : " Liceat tumulo scripsisse Catonis Marcia." * Lucan, ii. 346 : " Non me Isetorum sociam rebusque secundis Accipis; in curas venio partemque laborum. Dii mihi castra sequi." It seems, however, that Cato left Marcia in Italy to superintend his domestic affairs. Plut. Lc. * Lucan, ii. 365.: " Sicut erat, moesti servans lugubria cultug. Quoque modo natos hoc est amplexa maruum: Non soliti luserc sales, nee more Sabino Excepit tristis convicia festa maritus." * Lucan. ii 371.: " Junguntur taciti, contentique auspice Bruto." 248 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvn. complete. The losses of so many campaigns in Gaul and Iberia, and latterly the fatigue of a long and rapid march from the Ebro to the Ionian straits, had thinned the ranks of his veterans, while the troops which had been kept in quarters on the Apulian coast had suffered from its autumnal fevers, and were weak and dispirited through sickness and inaction. 1 All the vessels that could be collected for the transport of these forces would not contain more than fifteen thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry, notwithstanding that the baggage was left behind ; yet this small number comprised the com- plements of seven legions. 4 Before embarking, Cae- sar harangued his soldiers, declaring that he was now demanding of them the last sacrifice he should have to require, and assuring them that the aban- donment of their baggage should be recompensed by rich booty and a munificent largess. They replied with enthusiasm that his orders should be obeyed, be they what they might. On the second day, the fifth of January, the expedition came safely to land, near a place called Palaeste. 3 The pilots had selected a sheltered beach upon which their vessels could be run with safety, though surrounded on all sides by the dangerous promontories of the Ceraunian mountains. They had received orders to avoid the harbours on the coast, which were all understood to be occupied by the enemy: but the construction of the Eoman galleys gave great facili- ties for debarkation, and for this purpose a naval 1 Caes. B.C. iii. 2.: "Multi Gallicis tot bellis defecerant, longum- qne iter ex Hispania magnum numerum diminuerat, et gravis autumnus in Apulia circumque Brundisium omnem exercitum vale- tudine tentaverat." 2 Cajs. B.C. iii. 26. * Caes. B. C. iii. 6. The reading of the codices is Pharsalus or Pharsalia, which is evidently a mistake or corruption. Lucan (iv. 460.) supplies the name adopted in the text: "Paliestinas uncis confixit arenas." 1.U.706-B.C.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 249 armament might avail itself of coves, creeks, and sand-banks, such as in modern times are only accessible to the light craft of the smuggler. It cannot be supposed, however, that Caesar trusted entirely to fortune in thus launch- f j i Tardy activity ing upon an element occupied by an over- <*. Pom- whelming naval force. While completing their military equipments in Macedonia, his ad- versaries pretended to keep him at bay across a channel forty miles in width. But the winter was advancing, Caesar's troops were scattered, he was supposed to be still absent himself in Spain ; for a moment the vigilance of the Pompeian commanders was relaxed, and the gates of the East were left un- guarded. Caesar was, doubtless, aware that Bibulus, with the galleys, an hundred and ten in number, which he retained under his immediate orders, was lying in- active at Corcyra. Nor was he ignorant that another hostile squadron was stationed at Oricum, at no great distance from his destined landing-place. Either of these armaments would have sufficed to destroy his defenceless flotilla ; but the police of the seas was imperfectly kept by the naval science of the ancients ; their vessels were ill-adapted for cruising through variable weather ; and the use of oars acted almost like steam in giving wings to weakness, and baffling the vigilance of a blockade. Bibulus was deeply mortified at an exploit, the success of which was sure to be attributed to his own remissness. He had become apprised of Caesar's sudden arrival at Brundisium : he augured the lightning speed with which he would dash across the straits, and he hastened, though too late, to intercept him. It was not, however, too late to divide the invader's forces, and make it impossible either for a second detach- ment to cross over, or for the first to return. While he rushed himself to sea, he had sent orders to all his officers to issue simultaneously from their stations on 250 ' HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvn. the coast. From Corcyra to Salona the Ionian gulf was swept by their squadrons. Caesar on, the very evening of his landing despatched his lieutenant Fuh'us Calenus with the empty transports to thread the hostile armaments, and bring over his remaining forces from Brundisium. But, neglecting to take advantage of the night breeze, Calenus was descried by the enemy, and thirty of the returning vessels were intercepted and burnt, with their crews on board. Octavius, who commanded a portion of the Pompeian fleet, was less successful in an attack upon Salona, a stronghold of Caesar's in Illyricum, and was compelled to retreat from before it with some loss. Bibulus continued to keep the sea, notwith- standing the approach of the stormy season, and although Caesar's operations shut him out from nearly every port on the coast into which he might have run for shelter. 1 Pompeius was in Macedonia, and had hardly Pompeius received information of his rival's unex- Thlreafontea, pected landing iu Epirus, while Csesar was h"mSfbrfore already reducing his fortresses and dis- Dyrrhachium. p ersm g j^g garrisons. The citizens of Oricum and Apollonia refused to shut their gates against the consul of the republic, and com- pelled the Pompeian lieutenants, Torquatus and Staberius, to withdraw their forces. Several other towns soon followed this example, and, in the course of a few days, the states of Epirus sent a formal deputation to declare their submission to the invader who bore the insignia of the Koman government. 2 Pompeius was now in full march for Dyrrhachium, which he was exceedingly anxious to save from the enemy. The news of his repeated disasters met him at each successive stage of his advance, and such terror did the name of Caesar strike into the minds 1 Ca*. B.C. iii. 79. * Cos. B.C. iii. 12. A.0.706-B.C.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 251 of his soldiers, that they began already to melt away from him, as they had abandoned his lieutenants in Italy the year before. Drooping and straggling, and throwing away their arms, the march of the Pompeian legions began to assume the appearance of a flight. Labienus came forward to check the progress of desertion, by taking the solemn military oath of adherence and obedience to the general. The formula was successively tendered to the princ*- pal officers, to the tribunes, to the centurions, and the legionaries. This appeal to the spirit of disci- pline seems to have revived the courage of the soldiery. Dyrrhachium was effectually covered by the lines behind which the Pompeians now en- trenched themselves on the right bank of the Apsus ; while Caesar, finding his scanty forces insufficient to assail them, took up his position on the left to pro- tect the towns in his rear which had submitted to him, and there resolved to pass the winter under canvas. At this crisis, attempts were still made on each side to delude the other by negotiations. r\ i j ii_ j- . f TT'i i The Pompeian Caesar employed the mediation ot Vibul- adm^u at- lius, the Pompeian officer whom he had present the twice captured, first at Corfinium, and c.ar' lecond again in Spain. The terms which he of- fered were that each chieftain should disband his troops simultaneously, and refer the adjustment of their disputes to the senate and people ; an arrange- ment which had by this time become more than ever impracticable. Caesar's only object in proposing it must have been to gain time for the arrival of rein- forcements. On the other hand, Bibulus and his colleague, being now excluded from almost every point of the coast, and severely harassed by the weather and want of necessaries at sea, were anxious to conclude an armistice for their own immediate con- venience. But Caesar understood their object, and 252 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvn. though Calenus was still prevented from joining him with the expected succours, he refused to listen to their proposals. Meanwhile, the fatigues of his naval campaign, joined to his excessive mortification at Caesar having so narrowly escaped him, had com- pletely broken the health of the Pompeian com- mander. He fell a sacrifice to his anxiety to redeem his character for vigilance or fidelity with the party which had entrusted to him so important a com- mand. 1 He showed, indeed, ferocity enough to satisfy the most blood-thirsty of the faction, but he had no other claim on their approbation. The only service he had performed was to disperse his vessels up and down the coast of Epirus, so as to watch every creek and strand upon which Caesar's second division might seek to effect a landing. Caesar himself complained that Antonius, whom he had appointed to direct the opera- tion, neglected more than one favourable opportunity of making the passage. He might have made a feint to draw off the enemy's attention, and have selected a point for running on shore where the numbers of his opponents would be insufficient to cope with him. Upon the death of Bibulus, the several detachments of the collective fleet seem to have been left at the disposal of their respective commanders. Pompeius was apparently too much disconcerted by the preca- rious position of his affairs to pay due attention to what was after all the point most important for his interests, the prevention of the junction of Caesar's two divisions. L. Scribonius Libo, who had com- manded under Bibulus a detachment of fifty ships, now took upon himself to act with this force inde- pendently. He quitted the coast of Epirus, and, crossing the straits, established a blockade of Brun- disium, taking possession of the island which lay at the entrance of the harbour, and cruising before it 1 Caes. B.C in. 18. A.U.706-B.C.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 253 with a force which alone was more numerous than any Antonius could bring against it. One great difficulty which the ancients experienced in conduct- ing operations of this kind lay in the incapacity of their vessels for sufficient stowage of provisions and water. They were unable to keep the sea with a view to effectual observation. The numerous flotillas which still lingered along the shores of the opposite coast could not have been better employed than in mini- stering to the necessities of the blockading squadron. But Libo's manoeuvre, far bolder and more decisive than any of Bibulus, or even of Pompeius, failed from the want of co-operation. He was deceived indeed with the idea that he could maintain himself by the possession of the little island he had seized, and even assured Pompeius that he might withdraw the rest of his fleet into port, and trust to him alone to frustrate the passage of the Csesareans. Antonius, however, disposed his cavalry skilfully along the coast to prevent any of Libo's foragers landing in quest of water and provisions, and the Pompeian was com- pelled at last to abandon his position, and resort once more to the same feeble and inefficient tactics which had rendered Bibulus contemptible. 1 Some months had been consumed in these desul- tory manoeuvres, and great must have been r\ A- i u L Jf Intrigued of Caesars impatience at being prevented trom M.cuusat acting more boldly by the absence of so large a portion of his forces. While in this state of suspense and comparative inactivity, his anxiety must have sorely increased on hearing of the progress of an attempt at counter-revolution in Rome and Italy. Cicero's correspondence has preserved to us the record of the zeal with which M. Caelius Rufus had advocated Caesar's cause at the period of his invading Italy. He had used his best endeavours to cajole 1 Caes. B.C. iii. 23,24. 254 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvn. Cicero into acquiescence in the proconsul's views, and his old intimacy with his correspondent, and the terms of playful familiarity in which he addressed him, pointed him out as the likeliest person to sway that vacillating politician. 1 Caelius had been only a late convert to Caesar's party. As one of the tribunes in the time of Pompeius's sole consulship, he had exerted himself in defence of Milo, and had asserted on that occasion the principles of the most violent section of the oligarchs. But he seems to have been won over to the popular side by the seductions of Curio, whom he was persuaded to accompany on the famous expedition to Caesar's camp at Ariminum. The proconsul's blandishments may have completed the work of conversion ; and from that period, as we have seen, Caelius devoted his talents, which were con- siderable, to the establishment of the new order of things. Cassar had rewarded him by obtaining for him the election to the praetorship, second in dignity; the chair of the praetor of the city was occupied at the same time by C. Trebonius, whose fidelity had been longer tried, and whose services were un- doubtedly more conspicuous. Caelius, witty, vain, and dissolute, was dissatisfied with this post, and sought to raise himself to higher distinctions by studying the gratification of the popular wishes. 2 He declared with plausible eloquence that Caesar'b enactments had not gone far enough for the relief of the needy citizens. He promised to lend all the sanction of his office to any debtor who should appeal against the decisions of his colleague, according to the tenor of the recent enactments for the adjustment of debts. He even proposed himself a new law for the greater relief of the debtor by the spoliation of his creditor. The multitude were well pleased with these 1 Cic. ad Div. viii. 15 17., comp. ad Dio. ii. Ifi. 1 Cffis. B.C. iii. 20, 21.; Liv. Epit. cxi.; Dion, xlii. 23, 24.; Veil. ii. 68. 4.tr.706-n.c.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 255 revolutionary proceedings, and it became necessary for the consul and higher magistrates at once to resist such democratical encroachments. Cselius was hurried forward on his career by the still increasing demands of the passions he had evoked. Tumults arose in the city ; the consul applied to the senate for unusual powers ; it was decreed that Caelius should be suspended from his functions, and the execution of this decree was enforced with a high hand, which controlled all opposition, and drove the discomfited demagogue from his chair of office. Baffled in his schemes and unprepared with resources, he now pro- fessed his intention of appealing personally to Caesar, and under this pretence he left the city, to repair the web of his intrigues in greater security at a distance. Though the consul had been able to maintain the peace of the city with the opportune neatumputo assistance of a body of soldiers which was recon n aJEa'>nst passing through at the time on its way hTc^n/uncffdn into Gaul, Caelius, it appears, had per- withMll - suaded himself that Caesar's government had already fallen into general odium there, and that, with the exception of a wretched pack of money-lenders, the whole population was prepared to rise against his authority. It was only the dread, he argued, of the vengeance which Pompeius had vowed to wreak upon all who had ever submitted to his rival, that caused any delay in effecting a counter- revolution. New views of ambition began to open upon him. Instead of inviting Pompeius to has- ten across the sea and recover Italy and Eome, while his enemy would be detained by the want of ships from following him, he left him to the chances of an encounter, which, from his knowledge of Caesar's veterans, he believed would be unfavourable, if not fatal to him, while he conceived the design of seizing the prize him- 256 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvn self. 1 Milo, who, as the only political exile ex- cepted from the late amnesty, had obvious grounds of indignation against Caesar, had taken advantage of the disturbed state of affairs to come secretly into Italy, and call to his standard the remnant of the armed bands with which he had been wont to domineer over the factions of the city. Cselius had been allowed to leave Rome unmolested, and was already engaged in secret intrigues with this rash adventurer ; but the consul had directed one of the tribunes to attend upon him and observe his move- ments. His resorting to Campania roused sus- picion, and he was summoned back to the neigh- bourhood of the city; but in deference to his noble birth and the high office which he still claimed, the watch which was kept over him was relaxed, and still more so, perhaps, after the speedy defeat of Milo before Capua. Cselius effected his escape, and followed the traces of his new confede- rate in the Lucanian mountains. Here Milo was striving to kindle heath and forest with the flame of predatory insurrection. At the same time he addressed his solicitations, on the one hand, to the municipal authorities in the neighbouring towns, asserting that he was acting under the direction of Pompeius and Bibulus, while he held out, on the other, to the needy and profligate the usual pro- mises of a revolutionary agitator. But his career was speedily cut short; for in an attempt to seize the town of Cosa he was slain by the blow of a stone hurled from the walls. Soon afterwards Cselius entered Thurii unarmed ; his levity prompted him, alone and defenceless, to make another effort; 1 See a letter from Caelius to Cicero, written apparently at the mo- ment of his leaving Rome. Cic. ad Div. viii. 17.: "Quod si timor vcstra crudelitatis non esset, ejecti jam pridem hinc essemus. Nam hie prater foeneratores paucos, nee homo nee ordo quisquam est, nisi 1'ompeianus .... vestras copias non novi: nostri valde depugnare et facile algere et esurire consnerunt." 1.0.706-8.0.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 257 but when he tried to corrupt the fidelity of some Gaulish and Spanish horse whom Caesar had sta- tioned there, they turned round upon him with indignation and slew him. With the death of the two chieftains the seeds of this paltry insurrection were scattered to the winds. 1 While these ineffectual movements in the interest of the Optimates were in progress in Italy, cr at- ,, . . ,'11 1 i i- temptatocroM their great champion still kept close m his theAdriaticin ._ {_ , . . a violent tem- quarters at Dyrrhachmm, not venturing to pe. trust his half-trained forces in conflict with Caesar's veterans. The withdrawal of Libo's squadron from the coast of Apulia had left open the harbour of Brundisium. Antonius was well aware of his com- mander's impatience to combine all his forces to- gether on the other side of the channel : nor was he or the other officers in command at all deficient in- zeal to perform the duty expected of them. But once baffled in their attempt to effect the passage, and awed perhaps by the savage vengeance which Bibulus had wreaked upon his captives, they let slip more than one opportunity of embarking with a favourable wind. The winter was now nearly over, and with the prevalence of milder weather the Pom- peian squadrons would find it easier to keep an effectual blockade. Accordingly, Caesar sent re- peated messages, urging Antonius to put to sea at all hazards. He represented that the loss of the vessels was of little consequence. If the troops could only be run ashore any where on the beach, it mattered not that the ships were exposed to the beating of the surf, or liable to be seized by the enemy. 2 It is related that in a transport of im- patience, for his situation was now becoming every 1 Cscsar and Dion, It. cc. The story is told with some discrepancy by these two writers. The narrative of the latter has the appear- ance of greater accuracy in detail. 1 Cos. B.C. iii. 25, VOL. II. 8 258 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvn. day more critical, he determined to hazard the passage in person, and that too in the face of a violent tempest. This daring enterprise he was obliged to conceal from his own soldiers, and in a private vessel of only twelve oars he braved the chances of shipwreck or of capture. The sailors, however, could make no way against the fury of the winds and waves, and his life was probably saved by yielding to the storm. The undertaking was bold to the verge of rashness. Caesar himself, it must be observed, does not mention it, and we may suspect that the circumstances have been dis- torted or coloured by successive rhetoricians, with the wish to trace throughout the exploits of the most successful of adventurers that implicit re- liance upon fortune, which is all that ordinary men can discover in the most consummate calcu- lations of the statesman or the warrior. Perhaps the whole story was invented to introduce the brilliant apophthegm which Caesar is said to have addressed to the dismayed sailors : Fear nothing ; you carry Ccesar and his fortunes. 1 At last Antonius embarked his forces, the men Antomus and officers being equally clamorous to be effects the pas- . , mi A. j r r sage with the carried across. They consisted 01 tour legions and eight hundred cavalry. The south wind, with which he sailed, was not favourable for shaping his course for Oricum. As the breeze freshened, his vessels were wafted considerably to the northward, and passed off Apollonia and Dyrrha- chium. 2 They were descried by Coponius, who com- manded a Khodian squadron in the service of Pompeius at the latter port. He immediately gave them chase, 1 Floras is the first to tell the story, and records this celebrated saying (iv. 2.). Appian (ii. 57.), Dion (xli. 46.), Plutarch (CVcs. 38.), repeat all the circumstances with little variation. Lucan (v. 577, &c.) amplifies them wih some of his wildest hyperbole?. * Gas. B. C. iii. 26. foil A.C.706-B.C.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 259 and his swift war-vessels, though only sixteen in number, were more than a match both in speed and strength for the transports in which the Caesarean legions were embarked. The wind, however, now blew so strongly as to enable Antonius to keep his start of the pursuer, and enter the haven of Nyrn- phasum, which lay some hours' sail to the north of Dyrrhachium. The mouth of this harbour directly faced the south, and if it was easy for Antonius to make it, it would not be more difficult for Coponius to follow. But the wind suddenly shifted to the south- west, and drove the Pompeian vessels with violence upon the coast. Here they were all dashed to pieces, their crews falling into the hands of the enemy. Caesar, however, treated them with studied kindness, and he takes care to inform us that he sent them safe home to their native island, from which they had been summoned to maintain a cause in which they took little interest. Very different was the fate of the complement of one of Antonius's vessels. Two ships of the squadron had parted company with the main body in the night, and came to anchor off Lissus, three miles to the south of Nymphaeum. Here Ota- cilius Crassus commanded for Pompeius. He sur- rounded them with a swarm of boats and transports, and invited them to surrender. One of the two, which carried a division of two hundred and twenty men belonging to a newly-raised legion, promptly obeyed, under a promise that the men's lives should be spared. But the Pompeian officer carried out the system of his colleagues without regard to mercy or good faith, and caused them all to be massacred. The complement of the other, which was a battalion of veterans, maintained their courage in the last ex- tremity. Though suffering from fatigue and sea- sickness, and entirely ignorant of the strength of their enemies, they ran their ship on shore, and threw up a hasty entrenchment, behind which they repulsed 8 2 260 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XTU. the attack of the Pompeians, and were enabled even- tually to escape to the camp of the main body. Cras- sus had not the means of offering any resistance to the large force now collected so near him. He re- tired from Lissus, which immediately opened its gates to Antonius. The transports were sent across the gulf once more to bring over a detachment which was still expected, and Caesar was speedily apprised of the place and circumstances of his lieutenant's landing. The course of Antonius's fleet had been observed , by both armies in their quarters on the Manoeuvres of fc _ . ,. L - ,, u.eho.tiie Apsus. Both were equally eager to follow it; the Pompeians with the view of pro- tecting Dyrrhachium, the Csesareans in the hope of at last effecting the long-desired junction of their forces. Pompeius, on the right bank of the river, was able to move without delay, while his enemy, to whom the stream offered a considerable impediment, was obliged to seek a ford higher up. Pompeius hoped to surprise Antonius, and conducted his march with secrecy as well as speed : but his movements were discovered to the new comers by the natives of the country, and they had time to entrench themselves, while they sent messengers to inform their general of their arrival and position. On the second day Caesar made his appearance, and Pompeius, not venturing to expose himself at the same time to an attack both in front and rear, hastily withdrew to a place called As- paragium ', where he found a suitable spot to establish his fortified lines. Even when his forces were so much less numerous, cawar block- Caesar had been eager to press the enemy to wlthinTr 118 a battle. He had now doubled his avail- line, at Petra. ^g num b ergj and had succeeded in dis- lodging Pompeius from the position he had selected to cover Dyrrhachium, so that he had every reason 1 Caes. B.C. iii. 30. The locality of Asparag5um is not accurately known. It was on the left bank of the Genusus, and within one A.T7.706-B.C.48. UNDEn THE EMPIRE. 261 to anticipate compelling him soon to fight at a much greater disadvantage. With this view he followed the steps of the retreating army until he arrived before their new encampment, where he drew out his legions in order of battle, and vainly hoped that his challenge would be accepted. But Pompeius kept close within his lines. Caesar again broke up from his position, and, making a circuit to disguise the object of his movement, threw himself before the walls of Dyrrhachium in such a manner as to cut off all communication between the city and the camp of its defenders. Pompeius had attempted to anticipate this manoeuvre, but his cautious circumspection was baffled by the activity of his adversary's move- ments. Firmly resolved as he was not to commit his half-trained battalions to a premature engagement with their veteran enemy, it was necessary to seize a position in the neighbourhood, lodged securely in which he might watch their operations and profit by circumstances. A cliff, on the sea-coast, distinguished from its bold projection with the appellation of Petra or the Rock 1 , offered a favourable post for the de- velopment of these defensive tactics. It stood at a short distance from Dyrrhachium, which contained the stores and arsenals of the republican army ; it pos- sessed certain natural ad vantages for defence, and the anchorage it commanded was extensive and tolerably sheltered. At this spot his troops might rely upon the supply of all their wants from the sea 2 ; but, secure though he was of this element, Pompeius made himself independent of distant resources by drawing military lines in front of his position, fifteen miles in length, and thus inclosing in a strong entrenchment day's march of Dyrrhachium, as appears from Caesar, B. C. iii. 76. The reading (iii. 41.), "in Macedonian!," must certainly be corrupt 1 Lucan, vi. 16.: " Quemque vocat collem Taulantius incola Petram. * 1 Plut. Pomp. 65 : vdm-a. -xv*iv &vtnot> tlop.in}iU .,., , , . ,. Minor, and m military conduct ; yet his proceedings *Tive. at iai J -. ~ ,, J . in Macedonia. in the command of the eastern provinces were marked by great want of activity. He with- drew every battalion that could be spared from the frontiers of the empire, leaving them almost unde- fended in the presence of the formidable Parthians. He recruited his legions among the provincials of Syria and Asia Minor, and gradually assembled his 1 Cues. B.C. i\i. 34, 35. 65. 270 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvii. whole force at Pergamus, in Pbrygia, where he established his head-quarters for some months. His troops were for the most part fully trained to war, so that the delay in his movements could not be attri- buted to the necessity of devoting time to exercising them. Even had this been the case, he might have led them into Epirus, and thus have united the two great divisions of the Pompeian armies before Cae- sar's arrival on the coast. He may have pleaded, perhaps, in excuse for his neglect, the reluctance of the eastern legions to be led against their own coun- trymen, and their mortification at being required to abandon the interests of the republic in those parts to the mercy of an insolent enemy. It was only by giving up to them, if Caesar may be believed, the plunder of various cities in Asia, that the proconsul first debauched and so bound them to his service. 1 But it is more probable that Scipio was intriguing to secure his influence with this division of the army, to enable him to claim a share in the command of the combined forces. Accordingly, he proceeded to ingratiate himself with his soldiers by severe ex- actions upon the subject provinces. His officers were clamorous ; they declared, not untruly, that in leaving Rome they had abandoned their personal means of subsistence, and they demanded a full compensation for their sacrifices in the spoil of the provinces in which they were quartered. Every personage of rank and influence was propitiated by the lucrative government of some city or district. The maintenance of a large and licentious army in the midst of a wealthy and feeble population may, indeed, suffice to tell its own tale. It requires no statement of the historian to convince us that the proconsul himself, his retinue, his officers and his soldiery, vied with each other in oppressing the un 1 Caes. B.C. iii. 32. A.0.706-B.C.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 271 fortunate provincials. Yet Scipio could not shake off the yoke of military obedience. He had devoted to plunder the temple of Ephesus, a shrine of almost unparalleled wealth, and had assembled the senators and principal officers upon the spot to apportion the treasures among them, when peremptory orders arrived from Pompeius to join him without delay, 1 The despatch contained, perhaps, bitter reflections upon the character of his proceedings, which could not fail to excite displeasure and alarm in the more politic commander. The greedy expectants were dismissed ungratified, and the temple was saved. Scipio now summoned his troops to active service. He crossed the Bosporus, and was pursuing the great road westward, which led through Thessalonica and Pella, when he learned that Calvinus was strongly posted in his front in the valley of Haliacmon, while, at the same time, the more circuitous route through Thessaly was occupied with a smaller detachment by Longmua. His advance thus intercepted, Scipio acted with great vigour and promptitude. He ap- , .... - , . Undecisive proached within twenty miles of his oppo- operations m c -x-L ^i p j^ i / Macedonia. nent, as it with the purpose of fighting, and then, leaving only a handful of men under Favonius to amuse him, turned sharply to the left, crossed the Haliacmon, and pushed on rapidly over the mountain frontier of Thessaly to cut off the division of Longinus before it could receive succour. 2 But Calvinus was quickly apprised of his 1 Cue,. B.C. iii. 33. 2 Col. Lcnke supposes Calvinus to have been posted at the modern Satista on the left bank of the Haliacmon, and Scipio to have crossed that river at Servia (near the ancient JEane in the common maps). In my first edition I had described the opponents as meeting near Pella. I see now, however, the improbability of Calvinus advancing so fur to the east, and I also infer from the expression : " nnllo in loco Macedonia moratus," that Scipio must have nearly traversed that country before he came in front of his adversary. (1852.) 272 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvn. manoeuvre, and, knowing that Favonius was un supported, advanced without a moment's delay to attack him. Cassius had already moved in retreat, and Scipio dared not follow him and leave Favonius in such apparent jeopardy. He retraced his steps with reluctance, and rescued his lieutenant at the moment when the enemy was about to fall upon him. But with all his forces reunited he was still indisposed to meet Domitius in the field. His re- tirement behind entrenchments was hailed by his opponents as nearly equivalent to a defeat, for, in the wavering state of opinion among the provincials, the party which maintained the most confident de- meanour was sure to carry off the palm of popular favour. Some skirmishes ensued, with various suc- cess ; but, on the whole, the two armies continued watching each other, without coming to any decisive action, while the course of events was unfolding far more important results under the immediate eye of the great rivals. 1 While these movements were in progress, how- Appiu. ever, Caesar had detached another small s c u'fts u. u e 8 ora"" division under Fufius Calenus to promote cie of Deipw. j^g interests in Achaia. 2 The senate had entrusted that province to Appius Claudius, whose zeal for the cause of the nobles was by no means equalled either by his judgment or activity. He abandoned the plain duties before him to inquire idly into the secrets of futurity. The champion of antiquated political forms took counsel at the shrine of an effete superstition. The oracle of Delphi had fallen into oblivion or contempt in the general decay of faith, or on the discovery of its profligate cor- ruption. Whatever credit might still attach to their pretensions to divine inspiration, its hierophants were no longer the confederates or the creatures of 1 Cres. B.C. in. 3638. : Cess. B.C. iii. 55. A.U.706-B.C.48. UNDER fHE EMPIRE 273 the statesman. They were roused from the languid enjoyment of ample revenues and traditional dignity by the perilous compliment now paid to their obsolete functions. Alarmed and bewildered, they sought to disclaim the invidious reponsibility : the destinies of Rome, they said, were recorded once for all in the verses of the Sybil : tJie conflagration of their temple by the Gauls had choked the cave with cinders, and stifled the voice of the god : he who spurned from his shrine the profane and unrighteous, found none to address in these degenerate days. But all these evasions were vain. Appius demanded the event of the war, and pertinaciously claimed a reply. The priestess took her seat on the fatal tripod, inhaled the intoxicating vapours, and at last delivered the response which her prompters deemed the most likely to gratify the intruder : Thou, Appius, hast no part in the civil wars : thou shalt possess the hollow of Eub&a. The proconsul was satisfied. He deter- mined to abandon all active measures for the party which had entrusted the province to him, and fondly hoped that, in retiring to the deep recesses H delusion of the Euripus, where the sea rushes anddeath - through the gorge between Aulis and Chalcis, the waves of civil war would pass by him, and leave him in undisturbed possession of his island sove- reignty. But he had scarcely reached the spot when he was seized with fever, and the oracle was trium- phantly fulfilled by his death and burial on the rock- bound shore. 1 From this time the interests of the nobles met with no fostering care through- c 8 aroccu P iei out the province of Achaia; and, on the Achaia - approach of Calenus, the Pompeians found them- selves so weak, that they abandoned all Greece north of the isthmus, and contented themselves with for- tifying the access to the Peloponnesus by land, 1 Val. Max. i. 8. 10. ; Lucan, v. 122. foil. VOL. II. X 274 HISTORY OF tHE ROMANS CH. xvil. tlie coast being secured by the undisputed supremacy of their naval armaments. It would seem that by this time Caesar had established his interests on a solid foundation throughout the provinces from Epirus to Thrace, and from Illyricum to the Gulf of Corinth. He had restored the balance of power between himself and his rival upon the very theatre of war which the latter had chosen, and which he had had a whole year to fortify and secure. The military operations which were conducted operations during this interval before the walls of before Peira. p e t ra were of so complicated a character that, in the absence of local knowledge, and with no other guide than the Commentaries 3 which at this juncture are both obscure and defective, it would answer no purpose to attempt to describe them in detail. Skirmishes were constantly occurring throughout the whole extent of the lines. Caesar enumerates the occurrence of not less than six in a single day ; and in these earlier engagements it would appear that the advantage generally rested with his own side. One circumstance which he mentions in regard to them is curious, nor does there seem any reason to suspect him of misrepresenting it. It was found, he says, after a series of these petty combats, that two thousand of the Pompeians had fallen, while of his own men only twenty had been killed ; on the other hand, of those engaged in a certain position not one escaped without a wound. If any inference can be drawn from so remai'kable a disparity of loss, it would seem to show the great superiority of the Csesareans in the use of their weapons, and is a striking proof of the advantage which the well-trained veteran derived from his superior skill in the warfare of those times But if these repeated engagements gave occasion for the display of more than usual valour and devotion on the part of Csesar's veterans, and one of them could exhibit his shield pierced in one ..TT.706-B.C.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 275 hundred and twenty places 1 , they served, neverthe- less, at the same time to exercise the Pompeian recruits in the use of their arms, and to raise them gradually to a 'level with their presumptuous assail- ants. There was one part of Caesar's works which had not been completed. He was conscious that, with the command of the sea, Pompeius could turn his besieger's flank and attack him in the rear, by landing troops at a point outside his own lines. To provide against such a movement, Cassar drew a second line of entrenchments from the shore parallel to his principal line, leaving a certain interval be- tween them, and of such a length that, in order to double them, the assailant would have to penetrate inland a considerable distance from his ships. 2 But, to carry out this mode of defence, it was necessary to draw a transverse line along the coast to connect the first rampart with the second. This lateral intrench- ment had not been completed, and, accordingly, there remained an open space between the two lines, into which Pompeius was able to throw a body of men from his vessels. This detachment not only made good its landing, but found the Caesareans unprepared, and working at the intrenchments without their arms, It would seem that Caesar's numbers were not ade- quate, especially after their late reductions, to carry out works of such immense magnitude, or to defend them when completed. In this quarter his troops were routed and thrown into confusion. He was compelled to withdraw them from the ground on which they were posted and content himself with the construction of a new encampment to confront the enemy, who had thus established themselves in a 1 Cass. B.C. iii. 53. This was the centurion Scseva, whose prowess, as recorded by Caesar, Suetonius and Appian, to set aside the hyper- boles of Lucan, \vns more like that of a hero of romance than of a military veteran, according to modern ideas. * CJTS- B. C. iii. 63. T 2 276 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvn. position in the rear of his trenches. The besiegers were much disheartened at the unexpected vigour which their opponents had exhibited, and their gene- ral strove in vain to rally their confidence. He was himself aware that his position was lost almost be- yond recovery, for the connexion between the different parts of his immense lines was dislocated, and the ground, intersected by so many walls and trenches, presented serious impediments to the rapid move- ment and concentration of his forces. His eagle eye discerned one Pompeian division separated from the Discomfiture main body and unsupported. He moved with a very superior body against it ; but the difficulties of the ground baffled all his com- binations ; his men, dispirited and out of breath, straggling up to the object of their attack, were repulsed with steady gallantry, and, when a larger force came to the rescue of the Pompeians, were completely discomfited, and driven back in confusion to their lines. 1 The rout and disorder of the vanquished party were so complete, that Pompeius could Triumph of ,. . *. ' , T n- i , Pompeius-. only imagine that their rapid flight was a military ikilL - . > .15 temt to lure him on to incautious pursuit. He abstained from pressing his advantage 2 ; indeed the impediments of the ground would have retarded his advance, while it favoured his opponent's well- known ability in rallying his broken ranks. He had gained, indeed, a complete victory, for it was now impossible for Caesar to hold his position. Pompeius had fully carried out the plans he had in view from the first, for he had steadily refused to be drawn pre- 1 CSKS. B.C. in. 69, 70. ; Frontin. Stratagem, iii. 17. 4. ; Orosius (vi. 15.) here supplies what was required to account for this extra- ordinary rout of the Csesarean veterans. * He is said to have been dissuaded by Labienus: but Csesnr him- ecif was reported to have acknowledged that the war might have been brought to a close that day if the enemy had known how to use his victory. Appian. B.C. ii. 62. A.U.706-B.C.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. '277 maturely into a decisive engagement ; he had trained his men at leisure, and had at last thrown them upon their besiegers with equal confidence and superior numbers. He now broke triumphantly through the toils with which his enemy had surrounded him, and his fortunes seemed to emerge with all their former brilliancy from the cloud which so lately obscured them. When Cato, indeed, beheld the bodies of a thousand citizens extended on the ground he covered his face and wept. 1 But with this single exception, both the general and his officers now abandoned themselves to unbounded exultation. All the nattering XUltatioI1 hopes which had sustained them through ^hi/pini- 6 the winter of soon returning to Eome to zans> satiate their vengeance or their cupidity, damped as they had been by the course events had recently taken, now returned in their original freshness. They made no account of the disadvantages under which Cuesar had fought, and claimed the victory as the reward of their own valour and conduct. Pom- peius alone had any apprehension of the result of a general engagement, to which his adherents now looked forward with impatience. In the midst ot his triumph he exhibited signs of moderation which they ascribed only to pusillanimity. He accepted indeed the title of Imperator with which the vic- torious legions saluted him ; but on this, which was perhaps the first occasion of that honourable distinc- tion being awarded in a civil war, he declined to adopt the usual insignia by which it was accompanied, and wreathed neither his despatches nor his fasces with laurel. But his followers had no such scruples : their leader probably had not the power, if even he had the will, to restrain them in the display of their arrogance and violence. Labienus was particularly anxious to distinguish himself among his new friends. 1 Zonaras, Annul x. 8. 278' HISTORY OP THE ROMANS CH. xvn. He demanded and obtained of Pompeius the un- fortunate men who had been made prisoners in the late engagement. Upbraiding them ironically with cowardice and desertion of their ranks, he ordered them all to be put to the sword in the presence of the applauding Pompeians. 1 But the gain of a victory was not sufficient to counterbalance the loss of time and repu- tation which Pompeius had submitted to undergo. One month earlier the defeat of Caesar would have been his destruction, for he had then secured no friends to favour him in his retreat, and no second field on which to develope the re- sources of his genius. But now looking calmly around him, he saw that it was necessary to withdraw from the seaboard, and remove the war to a wider theatre in Macedonia or Thessaly. There he could unite all his forces and reconstruct the plan of the campaign. With unabated alacrity he prepared to execute this new project. The sick were sent forward, in the first instance, together with the baggage, under the escort of a single legion. The rest of the army left the camp in successive detachments, and Caesar himself, having confronted his victorious enemy to the last, followed his advancing legions with such celerity, as to overtake and combine his march with them. The destination of the army, in the first in- stance, was Apollonia; for it was there that thevar'ioM 168 Caesar had made arrangements for the care memymay of his wounded, and there lay the treasure which was amassed for the pay of the legionaries. From thence he despatched letters of exhortation to his allies, explaining the real state of his affairs, while he advanced detachments to occupy the most important points on the sea-coast. His first 1 Cxs. B.C. iii. 71 : " Interrogans, solerentne veterani milites fu- gere, in omnium conspectu intcrricit." A.U.706-B.C.43. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 279 anxiety was to effect a junction of the main body of his troops with Calvinus. 1 He calculated that if, by such a movement, he could draw Pompeius from bis lines at Petra to protect Scipio from the combined forces of the Caesareans, he should find an oppor- tunity for compelling him to engage. But if Pom- peius should avail himself of the retreat of his anta- gonist to recross the Adriatic 2 , it was then his inten- tion to march through Illyricum with his whole army, and confront the enemy in Cisalpine Graul, if not before Rome itself. If, as a third alternative, Pom- peius should prefer keeping close to his present quarters, and forming successively the sieges of Oricum, Lissus and Apollonia, in order to cut him off from the sea, and deprive him of all succour from Italy, Caesar then contemplated advancing against Scipio in Macedonia, and thus forcing the generalis- simo of the senate to hasten to his colleague's relief. Caesar sent forward despatches to notify his ap- proach to Calvinus, and to convey the . ' ,. , . .% Caesar effects a necessary instructions for his guidance, junction with , y . J ' , . the division of rsut the pompous announcement 01 their caivinuaon i . i .1 i j the fronUen of victory which the conquerors had cir- EPS nd i i j 11 j- j.- T_J j TheMal y- ciliated in all directions, had so imposed upon the inhabitants of the intervening districts, that they considered the baffled cause as lost, and were eager to conciliate the victors by intercept- ing his messengers. Calvinus, meanwhile, after keeping his ground for a considerable time in front of Scipio on the Haliacmon, bad been compelled to withdraw by the want of provisions, and had fallen back upon the road to Dyrrhachium, as far as Hera- clea, a town on the frontiers of Macedonia, at the foot of the Candavian mountains. He supposed that, 1 Caes. B.C. iii. 75. foil. 1 This was the advice of Afranius, but Pompeius did not choose to withdraw so far from his Eastern allies. Appian, B.C. ii. 65. 280 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvn. in making this retrograde movement, he was only approaching nearer to the base of Caesar's operations, and rendering a junction with him more sure, what- ever fortune might befal his general's arms in Epirus. But Caesar, by the circuit he was compelled to make in order to visit Apollonia, had abandoned to his adver- sary the direct route into Macedonia ; and this was the line upon which Pompeius was already advancing, the noise of the breaking up of Caesar's camp having advertised him of his sudden retreat. It was by accident only that Calvinus became apprised of the danger gathering in his rear. Certain Allobrogians, who had recently deserted from Cassar to his opponent at Petra, happened to fall in with the scouts sent out by Calvinus to collect information. Though now arrayed on different sides, yet from old habits of familiarity they did not scruple to enter into con- verse with one another, and the retreat of Caesar in one direction, together with the advance of Pom- peius on the other, were disclosed just in time to allow Calvinus to break up his camp and set out in a southerly direction to meet his general. The Pom- peians arrived at his deserted quarters only four hours after he had quitted them ; but he was already be- yond the reach of pursuit, and the two great divisions of the Caesarean army effected their junction at ^Eginium, on the confines of Epirus and Thessaly. From this point Caesar advanced to Gomphi, a ca^r axes his town which had lately volunteered to place queers mtne itse]f under foe banner of his lieutenants, Thessaiy. ^^ which now, excited by the exaggerated report of his disasters, shut its gates against him, and sent pressing messages both to Scipio and Pompeius to come to its relief. Scipio, however, had withdrawn as far as Larissa, and Pompeius had not yet entered Thessaly. The activity of Caesar's operations was such as to prevent the possibility of aid being ren- dered to the devoted city. Arriving before the walls A.U.706- B.C.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 281 in the morning, he had prepared all the requisite works and machinery for the assault by three o'clock in the afternoon, and carried the place by storm the same evening. To reward the energy of his soldiers, and at the same time to inspire a salutary sense of his undiminished power, he gave up the town to pillage: but this was for a moment only, for he was immediately on his march again, and appeared straightway before Metropolis, which took warning by the fate of its neighbour, and surrendered without a blow. All the towns of Thessaly, except Larissa, followed this example without delay, thus giving Cassar complete possession of the broad champaign country watered by the Peneus and its tributaries. Throughout this fertile region the corn was abun- dant and now nearly ripe. Caesar had no diffi- culty in maintaining his soldiers there, and he now confined his movements to the plain southward of the Enipeus, deliberately awaiting the expected attack. 1 Caesar had directed his advance upon the route which traverses the southern part of Thes- Arrogance O f saly, abandoning any attempt to prevent chfe^VhUi* 1 the junction of the two main divisions of '*" "^ the enemy's forces, which, when thus com- 5 ealousies - bined at Larissa, formed an aggregate of imposing magnitude. Pompeius now condescended or was compelled to share with his father-in-law the honours of the chief command. But the responsibility still attached to him alone, and the impatient senators felt assured that he purposely protracted the war, to enjoy the supremacy in the camp which must be re- linquished in the city. 2 Domitius taunted him with 1 Appian (B- C ii. 67.) supposes that CfEsar was in want of pro- visions, and that Pompeius wished to protract the campaign in order to profit by his necessities: but it appears that the resources of a larire extent of country were now at his command. 3 Pint. Pomp. 67., Cas. 41.; Appian, I.e. 282 HISTORY OF THE KOMAN8. CH. xvn. the name of Agamemnon, king of the kings before Troy; Favonius only exclaimed with a sigh, We shall not eat our Jigs this year either at Tusculum. But the proud array of the combined armies inflamed more than ever the hopes of their order ; their nu- merical superiority to Caesar was greater now than even at Petra, and the impatience to strike the blow which should free them for ever from his harassing persecution became universal and overwhelming. The chiefs contended openly among themselves for the places and dignities which should fall to their lot upon Caesar's destruction. They already assigned the consuls for several years to come ; while among the candidates for the highest offices, Domitius, Scipio and Lentulus Spinther were most clamorous for the supreme pontificate 1 , Fannius coveted the villa of Atticus, and Lentulus Crus laid his finger on the house of Hortensius and the gardens of Caesar. 2 The mutual jealousy of these competitors led to intrigues and recriminations which loosened the bands of authority and discipline. Attius Kufus came forward to accuse Afranius of deliberate treach- ery in the Spanish campaign ; L. Hirrus, a man of some note in the party, having had the honour of competing on one occasion with no less a rival than Cicero, being absent from the camp on a mission to the Parthians, might fear to be thrust altogether aside in the scramble for the anticipated dignities ; and Domitius proposed in council that judgment of death or confiscation should be passed at the close of the war upon every member of the senate con- victed of the crime of having remained at Eome during the struggle, or even who, after joining its 1 Caes. B.C. iii. 83. 2 Cic. ad Att. xi. 6. If this is correct, it would seem that Marcia did not bring the property of Hortensius to Cato as her dowry on their resumption of the nuptial relation, and therefore there was pro- bably no second marriage. A.U.706-B.C.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 283 standard, should have continued a spectator rather than an actor in its ranks. 1 It is possible that this menace pointed among others at Cicero, who may have advanced The irduatu- claims to a larger share in the contem- c* C Mr o""on h - plated distribution of rewards than was duct - deemed proportionate to his actual services. He had been present in the camp at Petra, and had freely expressed his disgust at his leader's policy in allowing himself to be shut up in so dishonourable a position. Cicero, indeed, was one of the few sensible men who had deprecated forcing Pompeius to a pre- mature engagement ; but while he confessed that the troops of the republic were not equal in training to their adversary's veterans, he had persisted in urging the adoption of measures still more certainly ineffi- cient, and had paraded his impracticable notions of the authority and dignity of the senate in a question of mere military means. 2 At last, when Pompeius advanced into Thessaly, he pleaded ill health as an excuse for remaining behind 3 , declining at the same time all public command, and contenting himself with sending his son to follow the fortunes of the com- mon cause. The proposition of Domitius, if carried into effect, would have fallen with its full weight upon one who had thus offended the zealots of his party. At length Pompeius moved to the southward from Larissa upon the road to Pharsalus, which Theo P po.hig c J.-L T f . '* i. i armies take up forms the line of communication between their potjoni Thessaly and Greece. The city of Phar- Ptamffir ' salus occupied a rocky eminence connected with 1 Caes. l.c. This is fully confirmed by Cicero. Even Atticus, he says, was among the proscribed : and further, " Omnes qui in Itulia manserant, hostiunrnumero habebantur." * Cic. ad Div. iv. 7.: - Non iis rebus pugnabamus quibus valere poteramus, consilio, auctoritate, causa, qiue erant in uobis superiora; sed lacertis et viribns, quibus pares non fuimus." He used similar expressions in a letter to Torqnatus (Div. vi. l.). 1 Plut, Cic. 39. ; Cic. ad Att. xi. 4- 284 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvn. the northern spurs of the chain of Othrys, upon the verge of the plain, five or six miles in width, through which the river Enipeus flows in a broad channel. On the southern side of this level expanse, near its eastern extremity, rise some detached hills of moderate elevation, upon one of which Pompeius is supposed to have drawn the lines of his encampment. The fortified post of Pharsalus itself lay at no great distance on the left ; but the inhabitants, who had submitted to Caesar's requisitions in the absence of his adversary, were now glad to shut their gates, and gazed, perhaps with indifference, upon the prepara- tions which were making to decide the war before their eyes. 1 Almost at the same moment Caesar pitched his own camp in the centre of the same plain, a little to the west of Pharsalus, at a distance of thirty stades, or about four Eoman miles from that of his opponent. 2 Assured of the revived confidence of his veterans, he was anxious to draw Pompeius into 1 Two cities rose successively on or near the site of Pharsalus, and it is possible that at the period of the battle the place may have been deserted. If so, this would account for the remarkable fact that Cffisar makes no mention of it, and also for its playing no part in the details of the operations conducted so close to it. See Ersch und Gruber's Encyclopadie, art. " Pharsalische Schlacht," by Eckermann. 8 I have endeavoured to comprise in the text all the marks of lo- cality which Caesar, Appian, and Plutarch furnish for understanding the battle of Pharsalia; what further explanation is required I have derived from Colonel Leake's account in his Travels in Northern Greece (i. 445., iv. 477.), and I have to acknowledge his kindness in elucidating some points on which he has allowed me to refer to him. Dodwell and Clarke traversed the plain, but their observation was extremely cursory, and their statements, in some respects, strangely conflicting. The lively professor, indeed, acknowledges that he trotted across it in a thick fog. The map accompanying my second edition is borrowed from Col. Leake, with a trifling altera- tion regarding the position of Caesar's cavalry. After weighing again the circumstances of the battle, I am inclined to leave my account substantially as before. I ought, however, to add, that the difficulty of the received explanation is increased by the use of the word rivus for the stream on the bank of which the armies were posted. According to Caesar's and all correct usage, this term is ouly applied to a rivulet, and is constantly opposed toJJumen, a river A.U.706-B.C.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 285 a general engagement in the open country between them. He arrayed bis forces at first in front of his own encampment, and gradually pushed his lines still nearer to the enemy's position. But though Pom- peius caused his legions to deploy day by day on the slope beneath his own fortifications, he still kept them on superior ground, and refused to descend into the plain and confront the assailants on equal terms. The result of some cavalry skirmishes was favourable to the Caesareans, and showed that their slender squad- rons, supported by picked men of the infantry, trained to run and fight between their ranks, could stand without flinching the onset of undisciplined numbers. The nobles were irritated at these petty losses, and redoubled their pressing solicitations to be led to battle. Still Pompeius refused to move. Thus baffled, Caesar was preparing to shift his quarters, and entice his adversary to follow him into another part of the country where the supplies were less exhausted, and where his vigilance might seize some opportunity of compelling an engagement. The movement he now threatened upon Scotussa would have ClMar thrown him between the Pompeian army S^S'pL- andthe base of its operations at Larissa, p eius> Sffovs p^v ical irp6r(p6v irort fl'prjKilis rjXr^Kfi airf'/creive. On the other hand, we read in (1.) Caesar himself, i. 98., "Omnes conservavit." (2.) Cic. pro Marcell.3., pro Ligar. 6.: "Quis non earn victoriam probet, in qua Occident nemo nisi arma- tus?" (3.) Vellei, ii. 52.: "Nihil ilia victoria mirabilius .... fnit, quando ncminem nisi acie consumptum patria desideravit." (4.) Sueton. Jul. 75. : " Nee ulli pcrisse nisi in prselio reperiuntur," with three exceptions which occurred at a later time. (5.) Florus, iv. 2. 90., speaking generally, " Reliqua pax incraenta, pensatum cle- mentia bellum," &c. * This was the statement of Asinius Pollio, who was present in the buttle. Others swelled the loss of the Pompeians to 25,000. Appian. B. C. ii. 82. 296 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvn. this return does not include the loss of the auxiliaries, which, at least on the Pompeian side, must have been much greater. It may be added that Caesar's clemency was not dictated merely by policy. He mourned over the destruction of so many brave men, even at the moment which satiated his own thirst for power and glory. They would have it so, he exclaimed, as he traversed the field strewn with the corpses of the honoured dead ; after all my exploits, I should have been condemned to death had I not thrown myself upon the protection of my soldiers. 1 The most DomitiusBiain distinguished of the slain was L. Domi- in the punmit. t i US} a man conspicuous among the basest of his class for treachery, the fiercest for ferocity, and the most rancorous for personal malice. He was cut down in the flight by Caesar's cavalry. 2 In the course of this history, we shall have to brand the name of Domitius through several succeeding genera- tions as the symbol of falsehood, cruelty and vindic- tiveness. We may lament that Lucan condescended to embalm the memory of the victim of Pharsalia in verses of more than usual power and pathos ; perhaps they were meant as a tribute of flattery, however un- availing, to his detestable descendant, the emperor Nero. 3 The conqueror was satisfied with the solid fruits of victory, without claiming the title of impe- M. Brutus sur- L J j j , ,1 renders, and is rator ; he demanded no triumph nor thanks- taken into . . ' - PI- favour by giving irom a senate ot his own parti- zans ; a piece of moderation which, however 1 Suet. Jul. 30. : " Hoc voluerunt : tantis rebus gestis con- demnatus essem, nisi ab exercitu auxilium petissem." So Plut. Cats. 46. * Cicero (Philipp. ii. 29.) seems to insinuate that he was slain in cold blood by Antonius. 1 Lucan, vii. 599. : * Mora tamen eminuit clarorum in strage virorum Pugnacis Domiti . . rictus toties a Csare, salva Libertate perit; tune rnille in vulnera laetus Labitur, et venia gaudet caruisse secunda." A.IT.706-B.C.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 297 trifling it may appear in our eyes, was thought wor- thy of being recorded to his honour by a reluctant panegyrist. 1 He bestowed his pardon and even his favour upon the chiefs of the opposite party who of- fered to lay down their arms. Among these was M. Brutus, who had escaped from the field, and got safely into Larissa ; but, hearing of his leader's flight, and despairing of the cause, he had voluntarily tendered his submission. Assuredly this conclusion of his campaign contrasts mournfully with Lucan's address to the future hero of the republic. Unennobled by honours and offices, he had escaped, in the mass of the combatants, the deadliest aim of the Caesareans. Yet how fatal a weapon did he wield I He is bid to reserve it for a fitter day and a riper victim. The foe has not yet scaled the tyrant's citadel, or merited, at the summit of all human power, to bow to the sacrificial steel. 2 Such is the strain of the poet ; the historian quietly assures us that Caesar learned in con- fidential discourse with his captive the direction of his adversary's flight ; not, perhaps, that Brutus in- tentionally betrayed so important a secret, but his warmth of temperament and want of reserve made him more dangerous as a friend than as an enemy. Ad- mitted to familiarity with his new leader (for he seems to have placed himself at once freely at Caesar's dis- posal) he exerted his influence to conciliate him to- wards Cassius, and, at a later period, moderated his wrath against Deiotarus. Caesar generously indulged this impetuous zeal, and was touched by its openness, however little it was tempered by prudence or reflec- tion. As for this young man, he is said to have observed of him, I know not what he wills, but what- ever he does will, he wills with energy. 3 1 Cic. Philipp. xiv. 8.; Drumann, iii. 516. 2 Lucan, vii. 586. seqq.: " Illic plebeia contectus casside vultus, Ignotusque hosti, quod ferrum. Brute, tencbas ! " Cic. ad Alt. xiv. 1., Plutarch, tirut. 6. 298 HISTORY OP THE EOMANS CHAPTER XVIII. Pompeius seeks refuge in Egypt. Treacherous policy of the ad- visers of King Ptolemaeus. Pompeius is enticed from his vessel and murdered. The fugitives from Pharsalia reassemble at Dyr- rhachium and Corcyra. Cicero withdraws from the contest. Scipio assumes the command. Caesar follows in pursuit of Pom- peius: receives the submission of C. Cassius : reaches Egypt, and undertakes to settle the affairs of that kingdom. Fascinations of Cleopatra. Discontent of the Alexandrians : they rise against Caesar, and blockade him in the palace. The Alexandrian war: intrigues, defeat and death of Ptolemaeus. Caesar places Cleo- patra on his throne. Pharnaces attacks the allies of the Republic, and defeats Calvinus. Csesar marches against him: he is routed at the battle of Zela and slain. Arrogance of the conqueror, A.TT. 706, 707. B.C. 48, 47. THE remnant of the vast Pompeian host was scattered in various directions. No reserve had been e^S'to the provided on the battle field, nor had any ea-eoast: he A , . . , . , . - . i_ > j takes ship, place been assigned in the neighbourhood for rallying in the event of disaster. The fiimiiy'de- fleet was far distant, and dispersed on various uy ion in petty enterprises. Yet the resources which remained to so great a party, even after its signal defeat, were abundant and manifold. 1 But Pompeius himself, mortified and bewildered, aban- doned every thing, and sought only to save his own life. He fled through Larissa, declining the shelter of its walls, and, penetrating the defiles of Tempe, gained the Thessalian shore at the mouth of the Peneus. 2 Here he fell in with a merchant vessel lying off the coast, the master of which recognized 1 Lucan. viii. 27. " Sparsit potius Pharsalia noetras Quam subvertit opes." * Plut. Pontp. 73 ^.0.706-8.0.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 299 and generously offered to take him on board, together with Lentulus Spinther, Lentulus Crus, the consul of the preceding year, Favonius, the Galatian chieftain, Deiotarus, and a few more. Pompeius dismissed the slaves who had hitherto accompanied him, assuring them that they at least had nothing to fear from the conqueror : it was to the loyalty of Favonius that he owed the common offices of menial attendance. The master of the vessel undertook to carry him wherever he should appoint. Pompeius merely cast anchor off Amphipolis, in Macedonia, in order to provide him- self with a sum of money, and then steered for Lesbos, where his wife Cornelia, and his younger son, Sextus, were also received on board. From thence, without a moment's delay, the fugitives proceeded to run along the Asiatic coast, and were joined in their pro- gress by another vessel with a few more adherents of the ill-fated cause. Among these were some person- ages of rank : when at last they landed on the shores of Cilicia, a miniature senate was convened, and a mock deliberation held under the presidency of the late consul, to determine what course should finally be taken. We are assured, strange as it may appear, that the wish of Pompeius himself was to seek an asylum in Parthia, Whether he hoped to lead the murderers of Crassus against his detested rival, or only to watch in security the progress of events, no- thing can show more strongly than such a project the state of abject humiliation to which he was reduced. 1 Orodes had just inflicted another insult upon the majesty of the republic in throwing her ambassador, Hirrus, into chains, because Pompeius had refused to buy his alliance by the surrender of Syria. It was but too evident that his consent to receive Pompeius him- self must be obtained by submitting to still greater sacrifices. But to these affronts Pompeius, it appears, 1 Dion (xlii. 2.) cannot believe it possible that Pompeius contem- plated taking refuge in 1'arthia. 300 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvm. could have submitted ; the arguments which induced him to renounce such a plan were drawn from the danger it seemed to threaten to his own person, or at least to the honour of his handsome wife. 1 The next alternative which suggested itself was to retire into Africa, where the king of Numidia had proved his devotion to the benefactor to whom he owed his sceptre, by his signal service in the destruction of Curio. In Africa two legions awaited their general's arrival, flushed with victory and devoted to his party. The resources of the province were immense : it of- fered its harbours for the reception of his magnificent fleets ; while, separated from Europe by the breadth of the Mediterranean, it might defy Caesar for months even to approach it. The fatuity of Pompeius in deciding against the course which held out so flatter- ing a prospect seems indeed inconceivable. But it would appear that he still looked fondly to the East as the quarter of the world associated with his greatest triumphs, and where the prestige of his name had taken, as he imagined, the deepest root. Perhaps he wished to make himself at all events independent of the succour of his own countrymen. The king whom the Roman government had im- posed upon the Egyptian people had died State of Egypt. * TT \. J Quarrel be- three years previously. He had requited tweenPtole- , J . 11 i 11 , cieoVtr'a favour of the republic by a will 2 in which he had placed his kingdom under the guardianship of Rome, while he nominated his son Dionysius, or, as he was afterwards called, Ptolemasus the Twelfth, and his daughter Cleopatra, both under age, as joint successors to his throne. In accord- ance with the national usages, this joint authority had been consolidated by the marriage of the brother and sister, the former of whom was seventeen years of age, and the latter about two years his senior. 1 Plut. Pomp. 76.; Luoan, viii. 412.; Appian, B. C. ii. 83 2 Oses. B.C. in. 108. A.U.706-B.C.48. UNDER THE Elf PIKE. 301 The senate had appointed Pompeius guardian of the kingdom, and possibly the authority this appointment gave him, and the influence he already exercised through it, assisted in determining his choice of a place of refuge. But, at the moment of his arrival off the shores of Egypt, the existing government was less than ever competent to extend its protection to so dangerous a suppliant. The throne had become an object of contention between the brother and sister. Cleopatra had been driven from Alexandria by a popular insurrection, and the ministers of her youthful consort, who had apparently instigated the tumult, took advantage of its success to exclude her from her share in the sovereignty. The royal child was directed in all his counsels by a junta consisting of Pothinus, a Greek eunuch of the court, Theodotus, a rhetorician, who held the ostensible office of pre- ceptor to the sovereign, and Achillas, an officer of the Egyptian army. 1 These men had acquired a complete ascendency over their tender charge, and they used their influence unscrupulously for the furtherance of their private schemes. They had stationed Ptole- maeus at the head of his troops in the neighbourhood of Pelusium, to await on the frontiers of the king- dom the invasion of Cleopatra, who had found means to raise a military force for the assertion of her rights. 2 The hostile armies were arrayed almost in sight of each other at the foot of the Casian hills, when Pompeius appeared off the coast with a slender flotilla bearing about two thousand soldiers, whom he had collected in his flight. The royal ministers hoped to exclude the republic, in the state of anarchy into which it appeared to have fallen, from the inter- ference it had so long exercised in the affairs of Egypt ; they might also apprehend that the new comer, if admitted within their confines, would rather 1 flat. Pomp. 77. Cuts. B.C. iii. 103 302 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XVITL assist the injured sister than confirm the usurpation of the brother. Pompeius sent a message e " to the young king, requesting the favour of AteTadria, a hospitable reception. His application Crafty polity r . J- /L of the king-, gave rise to anxious discussion m the royal council. If any of the king's ministers was honest and bold enough to insist on the obliga- tions of good faith and gratitude, his counsels were speedily overruled by the arguments of a subtler policy. It was dangerous to expose the kingdom to the wrath of Caesar by receiving his defeated enemy ; it was dangerous to reject the petition of a suppliant whom the fortune of war might yet restore to power. The only remaining course, which seemed to avoid every danger, and combine every advantage, was to invite the unfortunate visitor to the shore and at once make away with him. Such a crime might deserve the gratitude of the conqueror, since it would effec- tually cripple and distract the plans of his adversaries. Accordingly, the treacherous counsel was invTted"o 18 adopted. A small fishing-boat was speedily equipped, and Achillas, with a few attend- ants, among whom, to inspire confidence in the in- tended victim, were Septimius, an old comrade in arms, and another Eoman officer named Salvius, proceeded to invite Pompeius into the royal presence. 1 The meanness of the vessel assigned to convey so noble a passenger was excused by the alleged shal- lowness of the water near the coast ; but it was really so contrived to exclude a retinue sufficient for his protection. The Eoman officers, indeed, who had crowded into the ship from which their chief was about to take his departure, beheld the Egyptian galleys ranged along the shore, and the evident falsehood of the plea awakened their worst appre- hensions. But Pompeius, prepared to dare or to 1 Cses. B.C. iji. 104.; Plat. Pomp. 78, 79. A.U.706-li.C.4. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 303 submit, combated their fears, and repelled their entreaties to remain. He took leave of his friends with a faint smile, repeating the words of the poet : He who repairs to a tyrant becomes his slave, though he set out a freeman. 1 He descended into the fatal bark. The distance to the shore was considerable, and the passage was made in painful and ominous silence. The illustrious fugitive recognized and courteously addressed Septimius, but his salutation was acknowledged only by a bow without a word. The silence continued, and Pompeius took up a roll of parchment on which he had written the speech he proposed to address to the king, and occupied him- self in studying it. Meanwhile, Cornelia and her friends watched from the ship the progress of the boat with the deepest anxiety, and when the king's soldiers and attendants were seen crowding towards the point where Pompeius appeared about to land, they indulged in the hope that he would yet meet with an honourable reception. But at the , -|-v . . i * n| l treacher- moment when Pompeius was taking an at- cudy mur- tendant's hand to help himself to rise, Septimius approached from behind and struck him with his sword. The victim knew his fate, and, with- out attempting to struggle against it, drew his toga over his face with both his hands, and so fell mortally wounded. His head was immediately severed from his body, and carried away as a proof of the accom- plishment of the bloody order. The trunk was thrown out of the boat and abandoned in the breakers. 2 The friends of the murdered man beheld the deed from afar, and, uttering a shriek of horror, hurried away from the Egyptian galleys which were 1 Appian, B.C. ii. 85.; Plut. I.e. ; Dion, xlii. 4. The lines ana from a play of Sophocles: Sffris ykp us Tupavvov efj.TTopevtrau Kfivov ' . i /-* the death of tmguished by the appellation of the Great, Pompeius. J a title which seemed peculiarly appro- priate to one whose rapid conquests in Asia could only be paralleled by those of the Macedonian Alexander. 3 His fate continued to point a moral to the latest period of the Empire, and its consumma- tion deserved to be regarded as the most tragic incident in Eoman history. 4 He had earned greater popularity, and he had perhaps surpassed his rivals more conspicuously, than any Roman before him ; and, in the same proportion, his fall was more disas- 1 Lucan, viii. 709. 720. 2 Lucan, viii. 755. * Pompeins himself affected this comparison from an early period. Comp. Sallust, Fr. Hist. iii. 32.: "Cn. Pompeius a prima adolescentia, sermone fautorum similem fore se credens Alexandra regi, facui consultaque ejus qnidem aemulns erat." * Comp. Veil. ii. 58. i..r.706-B.C.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 305 trous and his end more miserable. Yet no acute observer, we might suppose, could have failed to predict his discomfiture; for every move he had made for many years, whether in politics or latterly in war, had been a manifest blunder. All generals, it has been said, make mistakes, and he is the greatest who makes the fewest ; but the conduct of Pompeius throughout his last campaigns had been a series of mistakes, against which the renown of his genius can scarcely maintain itself. His last im- perfect success in the defence of Petra he owed indeed to his wariness in so long abstaining from offensive operations : but this delay, which he had himself rendered necessary by neglecting to secure the Iberian veterans, was improved by his adversary no less than by himself. No partial victory could compensate for the alienation of friends, the en- couragement of enemies, and the loss of that pres- tige of invincibility which alone had thrown Rome and the provinces at his feet. Pompeius checked Caesar in attempting an impossibility; but the attempt itself, though unsuccessful, was ruinous to his cause, and on this Caesar had calculated. On the whole, we must admit the justice of the general verdict, that the great Pompeius was enervated by his early triumphs and constant prosperity. We have seen that in the outset of his career he pos- sessed, with the fire of youth, all the fiercest and most vindictive passions of his times. But he was not naturally jealous, and when arrived at the serene eminence of power, his vanity easily per- suaded him that he was beyond the reach of com- petition. He treated his associates and colleagues with lofty courtesy ; to his spouses he even displayed a certain feminine fondness; but while his con- temporaries could point to no particular instance of flagrant incivism, in the spoilt child of revolu- tions, it cannot be denied that the general impression VOL. H. x 306 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvin. he left upon them was one of deep distrust and wide-spread dissatisfaction. 1 He was roused from his dream of pre-eminence to repel the aggression of a more ardent rival ; and it was truly said of the two illustrious competitors for power that Pompeius could bear no equal, Caesar no superior. 2 Pompeius fell at the close of his fifty-eighth year, on the anniversary of his triumph over the greatest but Final disposal one ^ n ^ s opponents, the renowned king and U hon"s ns ' OI> Pontus. 3 His ashes, hastily entombed paid to them. on ^e margin, of the waves 4 , were re- moved, it is said, at a later period by the pious 1 It might be expected that the memory of Pompeius would be more partially estimated under the tyranny of the emperors. Yet Lncan paints him with more discrimination than any other of his characters. The panegyric of Velleius is less judicious ; but it is valuable in showing the liberty of speech allowed even by a Tiberius. Lucan, ix. 190. foil. : " Civis obit, multo majoribus impar Nosse modum juris, sed in hoc tamen utilis sevo: Cui non nulla fuit justi reverentia, si!va Libertate potens, et solus plebe parata Privatus servire sibi; rectorque senatus, Sed regnantis erat: nil belli jure poposcit, Quaeque dari voluit, voluit sibi posse negari . . . Olim vera fides, Sulla Marioque receptis. Libertatis obit; Pompeio rebus ademto Nunc et ficta perit: non jam regnare pudebit, Nee color imperil, nee frons erit ulla Senatus. " Velleius, ii. 29. : " Innocentia eximius, sanctitate prsecipuus, elo- quentia medius, potentiae quae honoris causa ad eum deferretur, non ut ab eo occuparetur, cupidissimus ; dux belli peritissimus ; civis in toga, nisi ubi vereretur ne quern haberet parem. modestissimus ; ami- citiarum tenax, in offensis exorabilis, in reconcilianda gratia fidelis- simus, in accipienda satisfactione facillimus; potentia sua nunquam, aut raro, ad impotentiam usns ; paene omnium vitiorum expers, nisi numeraretur inter maxima in civitate libera, dominaque gentium, in- dignari, cum omnes cives jure haberet pares, quemquam sequalem dignitate conspicere." 2 Lucan, i. 1 25. : " Nee quemquam jam ferre potest, Caesarve priorem, Pompeiusve parem." 8 Dion, xlii. 5. 4 Lncan, viii. 797.: " Situs est qua terra cxtrema refuse Pendet in Oceano." A.H.706-B.C.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 307 care of Cornelia, and enjoyed their final rest in the mausoleum of his Alban villa 1 , the ruins of which are pointed out at this day. Such is the statement of his biographer ; but the poet who sings his funeral dirge knows nothing of this honourable interment. Lucan bewails the disgrace of the illus- trious remains, still confined to their wretched hole scratched in the sand 2 , and surmounted by a frag- ment of stone on which the bare name of Magnus had been traced with a burnt brand. 3 The im- perial dynasties which owed their elevation to the victory of Pharsalia had no interest in paying honour to the champion of the commonwealth ; and it was reserved for the most enlightened and the most humane of the emperors, at a distance of a hundred and sixty years, to raise a fitting monu- ment to Pompeius on the spot where his body had been burnt. 4 The nobles betrayed their own cause at Pharsalia by their want of courage and self-devotion. Tx Al. i T J A- 1 It is in vain that Lucan rounds a poetical P period with the names of the Lepidi, the Dyhachm Metelli, the Corvini, and the Torquati, whom he supposes to have fallen in the last agony of the defence 5 : of all the great chiefs with whom 1 Plut. Pomp, in fin. 1 Lucan, viii. 756.: " Exigua trepidus posuit scrobe." 1 Lucan, viii. 793.: " Hie situs est Magnus." 4 Spartianus, Hadrian. 7.; Dion, Ixix. 11.; Appian, ii. 86.: ftfirilfffv Kal (vptv fir' tftav 'Poi/ioiai' &cun\fvs 'ASpiavbs 4trtSrifjuei> t K. T. \. The emperor offered a line for an inscription : T< pools /3pt6ovTt ir6o"i) c-iram lirAero rvfj.ov. Anthol. Gr. ii. 286. * Lucan, vii. 583. : " Csedunt Lepidos, cseduntque Metellos Corvinosque simul, Torquaraque nomina legum." A similar remark has been made on the battle of Waterloo. " Ex- cept Duhesme and Friant, neither of whose names were very much distinguished, we hear of no general officers among the French list of slain." Paul's Letters to his Kinsfolk, p. 191. x '2 Cato lead the 308 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvm. we are familiar as leaders in the Pompeian camp, Domitius alone perished on that day, and even he was killed in the act of flying. 1 The fragments of the mighty ruin were scattered far away from the scene of disaster. Pompeius and a few adherents fled, as we have seen, in one direction to Larissa; a larger num- ber escaped by the road to Illyricum, and met again within the walls of Dyrrhachium. The principal reserve of the Pompeian forces was there commanded by M. Cato, and there also was the common resort of the wavering and dissatisfied, such as Varro and Cicero, who wished to secure their own safety in either event. The fleets of the republic, under Oc- tavius and C. Cassius, still swept the seas trium- phantly ; the latter had recently burnt thirty-five Caesarean vessels in the harbour of Messana. But the naval commanders were well aware that their exploits could have little influence on the event of a contest which was about to be decided by the whole military force of the Eoman world ; and forming their own plans, and acting for the most part indepen- dently, they began more and more to waver in their fidelity to the common cause. As soon as the event of the great battle became known, the squadrons of the allies made the best of their way home, while some, such as the Ehodians, attached themselves to the conqueror. At the same time the turbulence of the soldiers in garrison at Dyrrhachium broke through all restraint. They plundered the maga- zines and burnt the transports on which they were destined to be conveyed to some distant theatre of protracted warfare. The desertion of the allies, the mutinous spirit of the troops, and the report of the numerous adhesions which Caesar was daily receiving from the most conspicuous of the nobles, convinced 1 Cses. B. C. iii. 99. Cicero truculently insinuates that Antonius put him to death in cold blood after he had surrendered. See Philipp. ii. 29. A.D.706-B.C.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 309 Cato that the last hope of keeping the party together, and maintaining the struggle effectually, depended upon the fate of Pompeius himself. In the event of the destruction of the acknowledged chief of the se- nate, he only contemplated restoring to the shores of Italy the troops confided to him, and then betaking himself to retirement from public affairs in some remote province. 1 While the fatal catastrophe was yet unknown he withdrew from Dyrrhachium to Cor- cyra, where the head-quarters of the naval force were established ; and there he offered to surrender his command to Cicero as his superior in rank. But the consular declined the perilous honour, and refused to take any further part in a contest which, from the first, had inspired him with distrust and remorse. The young Cnseus Pompeius had urged the exercise of summary vengeance upon whosoever should threaten defection- at such a crisis, and it was with difficulty he was restrained from using personal violence against Cicero, when he declared his in- tention of embarking at once for Italy. 2 The re- creant consular's life was barely saved by Cato's vigorous interference. At Corcyra many of the fugitives from the field of battle rejoined their confederates. Among them were Scipio and Afra- nius, the former of whom now assumed the com- mand of their combined forces, and it was upon him, as soon as the fact of Pompeius's death was ascertained, that the leadership of the party most naturally devolved. 3 Caesar followed up his success at Pharsalia with unabated activity. He allowed his soldiers C(B8ar follow , at the most only two days' repose on the up hu victory - scene of their triumph, and amidst the spoils they had acquired. 4 His care was divided between im- 1 Plut. Cat. Min. 55. * Flat. Cic. 39. 3 Dion, xlii. 10.; Appian, B.C. ii. 87. 4 Appian, B.C. ii. 88.: avrbs 8' iwl -ry viicy 8t'o /u<" V*'?* 1 * >|r ttt,>fToAo> Sifrpityf diW. Cu'sar Limseii declares that he reached Larissa the day after tlit/ buttle. 310 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS tn. xvni, proving the victory he had gained in the east, and securing his acquisitions in the west. With the latter view he ordered Antcaius to return to Italy with a large part of his forces, and watch over his interests in that quarter, where he apprehended that some of the beaten faction might hazard a descent upon the centre of his resources. He also required his lieutenant Calenus to complete, without delay, the subjugation of southern Greece. Athens had not submission of J e ^> opened her gates to him, but the event the^pe'io^n. of the great battle determined her to obey nerafc his summons. The long resistance this city had made exposed it, by the usages of ancient warfare, to the conqueror's vengeance; but Caesar ordered it to be spared, for the sake, as he said, of its illustrious dead. 1 The Peloponnesus was now speedily evacuated by the forces of the republic, and Calenus occupied the points on the coast where he anticipated the possibility of fresh intrusion. Scipio had landed at Patrae, probably to receive the rem- nant of the Pompeian garrisons in that province, but he presently abandoned it, and stretched his sails for Africa. Caesar devoted himself to the pursuit of Pompeius cier puiue* with the utmost energy and impatience, pompeiu.. De i n g anxious not merely to prevent his assembling a new armament, but if possible to secure his person. He pushed forward with a squadron of cavalry, and was followed by a single legion. 2 He reached Amphipolis just after the fugitive's departure, and, taking the route of Asia by land, crossed the Hellespont with a few small vessels. In the passage he fell in with a squadron of C. Cassius, who had been despatched to the Euxine to stimulate or co- operate with Pharnaces, king of Pontus, whose pro- mised succours were urgently demanded. It was 1 Dion, xlii. 14.; Appian, B.C. ii. 88. * Cs. B.C. iii. 102. 106. 4.D.706-B.C.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 311 remarked as an extraordinary instance of the good fortune ever supposed to wait upon the c.casiu.ur- mighty conqueror, that the mere terror of wm. er ' his name induced Cassius to surrender his galleys to a few fishing boats. 1 There can be little doubt that the republican commander had already made up his mind to change bis side, when accident threw this favourable opportunity in his way. As a man of in- fluence and authority, as well as an able soldier, he was well received by his adopted leader, and the good offices attributed to Brutus could hardly have been required to conciliate to him the favour of Caesar. Having now arrived on the Asiatic coast, Caesar ad- vanced more leisurely. He had received in- ClMar arriTe , formation of Pompeius's flight to Egypt, lnE yp t - and was aware that, if the suppliant were received there, he could not be dislodged except by regular military operations. He was content therefore to await the arrival of ampler succours, and em- ployed himself in the meanwhile with repairing the injuries which Scipio was accused of having inflicted upon the unfortunate provincials. He earned their favourable opinion by the remission of taxes, and by restraining the exactions of the farmers of the reve- nue. 2 He saved a second time from spoliation the treasures of the Ephesian Diana, which Ampius, an ad- herent of the opposite party, had been on the point of seizing. These benefits he accompanied with fur- ther favours and distinctions, and then handed over the government of the province to Calvinus, to whom 1 Suet. Jul. 63.; Appian, B.C. ii. 88.; Dion, xlii. 6.; comp. Cic. ad Div. xv. 15. Suetonias and Dion attribute this adventure to Lu- cius Cassius. The only personage we know of that name was a brother of Caius, one who has already been mentioned as serving in Caesar's army before the battle of Pharsalia. The allusions, how- ever, which Cicero makes to C. Cassius's abandonment of the republi- can cause (comp. ad Alt. xi. 13. 15.) are hardly consistent with his being engaged in this occurrence, and I have great doubts as to the genuineness of the story. * Plut. Cats. 48. 312 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvm. he entrusted three legions, to defend it against Phar- naces and the other Oriental allies of the senate. Cassar retained only two legions about his own person, and those so much reduced in number as to contain much less than half their proper complements. The whole of this force consisted of only three thousand two hundred infantry, and eight hundred cavalry ! , and with these he sailed without hesitation for Egypt. It was only a few days after the death of Pompeius that he appeared thus attended off the port of Alex- andria. No sooner was his arrival known than Theo- dotus hastened to meet him on board his vessel, and brought to him the head and ring of his murdered rival. The latter might be of important service to assure the wavering of the event which had occur- red, and Caesar took and preserved it for that pur- Hi, horror on P ose 2 ? Du ^ from, th e mangled head he turned htacfof'pom- away with horror, and gave orders, with p* 1 " 8 - tears in his eyes, that it should be consumed with the costliest spices. 3 The ashes he caused to be deposited in a shrine which he erected to the avenging Nemesis. 4 The murderers were con- founded and alarmed at the feeling he exhibited, nor were they less astonished, perhaps, at the perfect con- fidence with which he disembarked upon their coast, and claimed with his handful of followers to settle the concerns of a powerful kingdom. It had been Caesar's policy to spare the wealth of char's object the provinces which he wished to attach fa the e lffa!ra g to his side, and his system was directly op- of Egypt. posed to the confiscation of his enemies' estates ; but his want of money was urgent, and it was in arranging the quarrels of a dependent kingdom that the best opportunity might be found for exacting it. This undoubtedly was the strong 1 Gees B.C. Hi. 106. * Dion, xlii. 18. 3 Pint. Pomp. 80. ; Goes. 48.; Lnc. ix. 1091. 5 Val. Max. v. 1. 10. * Appian, B.C. ii. 90. .r.706 B.c.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 313 motive which impelled him to intrude upon the affairs of a jealous people, in which his principal designs were in no way implicated. l When Auletes came to Eome to negotiate his restoration to the throne, he had purchased the support of the leaders of the senate by the most lavish bribes. Caesar him- self had received the promise of seventeen millions and a half of drachmas 2 ; an obligation which had never yet been discharged. He now confined his demand to ten millions, but sternly rejected the re- presentations of Pothinus, who pleaded for a longer time for the payment of so large a sum. But even at the moment of landing Caesar was warned of the difficulties into which he was rushing. His military force was contemptible; it was upon the dignity of his title as consul of the republic that he could alone rely. Accordingly he entered the streets of Alexan- dria with all the insignia of his office, thereby offend- ing the populace, who were easily persuaded that he offered an intentional insult to their independence. 3 A riot ensued, in which many of the Caesarean sol- diers lost their lives. Caesar felt that he had mistaken the character of the nation, and underrated their jealousy of foreigners. But policy would not allow him to give way. He boldly summoned the rival sovereigns before him, and offered to decide their disputes in the name of the republic. Ptolemaeus left his camp at Pelusium, and gave Caesar a meet- ing in the palace of Alexandria, where he soon found himself watched and detained as a hostage. Cleo- patra had already implored the consul's ,. . , J r . , , , HIS am inter- mediation, and now. when her brother or viewwun his ministers obstructed her approach to his presence, she caused herself to be carried by 1 Flor. iv. 2. 53. 2 Plut. Cats. 48. This sum may be computed in round number* at 700.000/. 8 Cscs. B.C. iii. 106.J Lucan, x. 11. 314 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xviu. stratagem into his chamber. 1 The fame of Cleopatra's beauty <1 , which was destined to become second only to Helen's in renown 3 , was already bruited widely abroad. She had been seen by M. Antonius during the brief in- road of Grabinius into Egypt ; and grave legates of the republic had brought back to Kome glowing re- ports of the girlish charms of the Lagide princess. She was indeed, at the time of her introduction to Caesar, little more than twenty years old, and her wit and genius were yet unknown. Caesar forthwith un- dertook the championship of the distressed beauty, for it suited his purpose to play off her claims against the haughty minions of her rival. In devoting him- self to her cause he did not deny himself the reward of his gallantry 4 ; but while he indulged in the luxuries and dissipations of the most sensual of capi- tals 5 , he kept his eye steadily fixed on his main object, and at the same time carefully guarded his own person from the machinations of his unscrupulous enemies. The ministers of the young king were well as- cear' preca- 8ured that the reconciliation of the brother riou. podtioo. and sister wou i(i be the signal for their own disgrace. They employed every artifice to rouse the passions of a jealous populace, and alarmed the 1 Plut. CCES. 49. 1 Dion (xlii. 54.}and Plutarch (Ant. 27.) have particularly described her charms. From the latter we learn that her beauty was not regu- lar or striking at first sight : avrb fitv Kaff avrb ?b KO\\OS ainrjs ou KO.VV SuairapdS^rjTOV, ov5' ofov lKir\TJa.i rovs lS6vras, atpriv 8' ftxfv i) awSiairriffis H^VKTOV. Her talents were fully equal to the fascination of her appearance and manners. 3 Cleopatra was compared with Helen not only for her beauty, but for the consequences it produced. Lucan, x. 60.: " Quantum impulit Argos Iliacasque domos facie Spartana nocenti, Hesperios auxit tantuin Cleopatra furores." 4 Lucan, x. 74.: " Sanguine Thessalicae cladis perfusus adulter Admisit Venerem curis et miscuit armis." 1 Lucan, x. 109. : " Explicuitque suos magno Cleopatra tumultu Nondum translates Romana in soecula luxus," &c. A..0.706 n.c.48. UNDER THE EMPIJIK. 315 fanaticism of priests and people against a foreigner, whom they accused of desecrating their holy places, of eating accursed meats, and violating their most cherished usages. 1 Caesar had despatched an urgent message to Calvinus to hasten to his succour with all the forces he could muster. But while waiting for the arrival of reinforcements, the necessity of which he now keenly felt, he dissembled his apprehensions, and occupied himself in public with the society of Cleopatra, or in conversation with the Egyptian sages, and inquiry into their mysterious lore. 2 His judgment was no more mastered by a woman's charms than by the fascinations of science : but the occupation of Alexandria was essential to his plans, and he assumed the air of curiosity or dissipation to veil his ulterior designs. With this view he visited with affected interest all the vaunted wonders of the city of the Ptolemies 3 , and even proposed, it was said, to relinquish his schemes of ambition to discover the sources of the Nile. 4 At the first outset of his career of glory, his imagination had been fired at Grades by the sight of Alexander's statue 5 ; now that the highest summit of power was within his reach, he descended to the tomb of the illustrious conqueror, and mused perhaps on the vanity of vanities beside his shrouded remains. 6 The young king, though kept in hardly disguised 1 Dion, xlii. 54.; Lucan, x. 158.: " Non mandante fame multas volucresque ferasque ./Egypti posuere Decs." 1 See Lucan's beautiful episode (x. 181.): " Si Cecropiura sua sacra Platonem Majorca docuere tui, quis dignior unquam Hoc fuit auditu, mundique capacior hospcs?" &c. 1 Frontinus (i. 1. 5.) mentions this conduct of Caesar in his collec- tion of notable stratagems. 4 Suet. Jul. 52.: Lucan, x. 191.: " Spes sit mini certa videndi Niliacos fontes, bellum ciTile relinquam." 6 Suet. Jul. 7. * The body of Alexander was embalmed, and the mummy pre- 316 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvnr. captivity within the walls of his palace, had found means to communicate to his adherents the alarm and indignation with which he viewed his sister's apparent influence over the foreign intru- jrians rif e an der. The Macedonian dynasty which had reigned for nearly three centuries in Alex- andria, was not, perhaps, unpopular with its Egyp- tian subjects. Though the descendants of Lagus had degenerated from the genius and virtues of the first sovereigns of their line, their sway had been generally mild and tolerant, and both conquerors and conquered reposed in equal security under the shadow of their paternal throne. Achillas, the commander of the king's armies, had a force of twenty thousand men, consisting principally of the troops which Gabinius had employed in the restoration of Auletes, and which had been left behind for his protection. These men had for the most part formed connexions with the natives, and had imbibed their sentiments at the same time that they adopted their manners. The camp was filled, moreover, with a crowd of deserters and fugitive slaves from all parts of the Roman empire, for Alexandria was the common resort of profligate and desperate men, who pur- chased impunity for their crimes by enlisting in the king's service. 1 These were the men who had placed Auletes on his throne, who had murdered the sons of the Roman legate Gabinius, and expelled Cleopatra from her royal inheritance. They were the reckless agents of the populace of Alexandria in each capri- cious mood of turbulence or loyalty. They were served in a glass case. See Strabo, xvii. 1.; Lucan, x. 20.; Stat. Sylv. in. 3. 117.: " Due ei ad JEmathios manes, ubi belliger urbis Conditor Hyblaeo perfusus nectare durat." The sarcophagus in which the remains were inclosed, if tradition speaks tru.e, is now in the British Museum. 1 Cits. B.C. iii. 110.: " Fugitivisque omnibus nostris certus erat Alexandria} receptus certaque vitae conditio, ut dato nomine nrlituui esscnt uumero." A.TT.706-B.C.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. now prepared to join in the general outcry against the intrusion of the Romans, and encouraged by their leader and Arsinoe, their sovereign's younger sister, they entered the city, and imparted vigour and concen- tration to the hostile ebullitions of the multitude. Caesar awaited anxiously his expected succours ; in the mean time he sought to avert the . ... , Caesar fortifies danger by concession, and while he himMinn proposed that Ptolemaeus and Cleopatra should resume their joint sovereignty, he consented to satisfy the claims of Arsinoe by surrendering to her, together with another younger brother, the province of Cyprus. 1 But before these arrangements were completed, the discontent of the Alexandrians re- vived with more alarming violence. A skirmish which occurred in the streets between the Eoman sol- diers and the Egyptians determined Caesar to throw off all disguise, seize the royal fleet, and give it to the flames. 8 Thus only could he hope to keep the coasts open for the approach of his reinforcements. The city of Alexandria stretched along the sea-shore, and its port was formed by an island named Pharos, which lay over against it, and was connected with the mainland in the middle by a narrow causeway and bridge. This island was occupied by the villas of the wealthy, and the suburbs of the great city. Its position enabled it to command the entrances of the double port, which were apparently much narrower than at the present day. As a military position therefore it was invaluable, and while the tumult was raging in the streets Caesar transported into it a 1 Dion, xlii. 35. * CSBS. B.C. iii. 111. The conflagration reached the shore and consumed a large portion of the celebrated library of the Ptolemies. Seneca asserts that four hundred thousand volumes perished (de Tranquill. 9.). The resignation he expresses under the loss, "multo satius est paucis te auctoribus tradere quam errare per multos." is severely rebuked by a modern devourer of large libraries (see Gib- bon, Decline and Fall, ch. li.) Comp. Dion, xlii. 38. 318 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvm. portion of his troops, and seized the tower or fortress which secured its possession. 1 At the same time he continued to occupy a portion of the palace on the mainland, which commanded the communication with Pharos by the causeway. He strengthened its de- fences with additional works, destroying in every direction the private houses of the citizens, which being built entirely of stone, even to the floors and roofs, furnished him with abundant materials for fresh and massive constructions. The Egyptian troops set to work with no less energy in forming triple barricades of hewn stone at the entrance of every street, and thus entrenching themselves in a fortress in the heart of their city. 2 They looked forward already to the arrival of winter, and were convinced that the enemy must fall eventually into their hands; when he could no longer derive supplies from beyond the sea. But in the meanwhile the shade of Pompeius began to be avenged on his murderers. At the Pothi e n n ns n and commencement of the outbreak Caesar had seized the person of Pothinus, who was in attendance upon the young king, and detecting him in correspondence with Achillas he put him sum- marily to death. Soon after, Arsinoe, who hoped by means of the Egvptian general to elevate Ar$ino8pro- , *-.. r i i_ ciaimi heraeif hersclt into the royal seat, having cause to be dissatisfied with his conduct, induced her confidant Granymedes to assassinate him. The ad- hesion of the army she secured by a munificent largess, appointed (Janymedes her minister and lieu- tenant, and, assuming the diadem of her ancestors, caused herself to be proclaimed sole queen of Egypt. 3 The Alexandrians pressed the blockade with per- csarii tmacity. They could not hope to dislodge A\?xa a n d dr1a in ^ e enemy by force, but they expected to reduce him by cutting off his means of 1 Caes. B.C. Hi. 112. * A net. de Bell. Alexand J, 2. ' Auci. de Bell. Ahx. 4. : Dion, xlii. 39. .U.707-B.C.47. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 319 subsistence. A contemporary writer describes the artificial contrivances by which the population of Alexandria obtained their constant abundance of water. Kain, it is well known, rarely falls in Egypt, nor were there living springs for the supply of foun- tains. The common people, indeed, were content with the water of the Nile in the turbid state in which it flows through their slimy plain ; but the houses of the wealthier classes were supplied by means of subterranean channels, with which the whole city was mined, and through which the stream of the river was carried into reservoirs, where the impure sediment was deposited. Such of these chan- nels as led to the parts of the city occupied by the Romans the Alexandrians obstructed, so as to pre- vent the river from flowing into them ; they then filled them again with sea-water, raised by hydraulic machinery, in the construction of which they were eminently expert. This operation caused at first great consternation among the Romans, and still more among the native population shut up within their defences. But its effect was defeated by Caesar's sagacity. He caused his soldiers to dig pits on the sandy beach, and the brackish water which oozed up in them furnished a sufficient supply, not altogether unfit for drinking. 1 At the same time the arrival of a legion from Asia, with a convoy of provisions and military stores, at a point a little to the west of the city, revived the courage of the besieged, and restored the fortunes of their commander. 1 When the English besieged Alexandria in 1801, they cut the canal which supplied it with water; but the French garrison found a sufficient quantity in the tanks. Water, however, might have been procured by digging, though not in large quantities nor very good Sir R Wilson's Erped. to Egypt, p. 215. Caesar's expedient has been resorted to by exploring parties on the coast ol' Australia. See for instance Eyre's letter to the Colonial Secretary of Swan River in the Journal of the GCOQT. Soc. xiii. 180. Captain Slarryat, in one of his novels, mentions this filtration o<" salt- water by percolation through sand as an authentic, though little known fact 320 HISTORT OF THE ROMANS C The Rhodian vessels which had betaken them- dEsarswimi selves to Caesar's side -were now of great service to him in establishing a commu- nication with these reinforcements. The islanders of Rhodes had succeeded to the nautical skill of Athens and Corinth, and were among the most expert mariners of the time. Combined with the small flotilla which Caesar had brought with him, and the ships which had lately arrived, these new allies presented a formidable force. The Egyptians, however, though the royal fleet had been destroyed, possessed considerable resources for the equipment of a naval armament. They collected from every quar- ter all the vessels they could muster, and hastily constructed others, till they found themselves in a condition to dispute once more the approach to the harbour. Nor were they less vigorous in the attack they made upon the enemy's defences by land. The crisis of danger called forth all Caesar's energies : he never exposed his person more boldly, or encountered more imminent peril. At one moment he was so hard pressed as to be forced to leap from his vessel into the sea, and swim for his life, carrying his most valuable papers in his hand above the water, and leaving his cloak in the possession of the assailants, who retained it as a trophy, as the Arvernians had pre- served his sword. 1 The Egyptians indeed were ultimately worsted in every encounter, but they could still return CSMO.T restores ~ , . . . , , , ptoiemceiuto to the attack with increased numbers, and Caesar's resources were so straitened, that he was not disinclined to listen to terms of accommoda- tion, the insincerity of which was transparent. The Alexandrian populace declared themselves weary of the rule of their young princess, and disgusted with the tyranny of G-anymedes. Their rightful sovereign once restored to them, they would unite heartily with 1 Dion, xlii. 40.; Suet. Jal 64. *.U.707-B.C.47. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 321 the republic, and defy the fury of the upstart and the usurper. It cannot be supposed that the Roman general was deceived by these protestations : the bad faith of the Alexandrians was already proverbial in the West. But he expected perhaps that the rivalry of Ptolemseus and Arsinoe would create dissension in their camps : he may have preferred coping with the young king in open war, to keeping a guard over him, and watching the intrigues with which he beguiled his captivity: possibly the surrender was made in concession to a pressure he could not resist, and was adopted as a means of gaining time. But when Ptolemseus was restored to his subjects, and imme- diately led them to another attack upon Caesar's position, the soldiers are said to have felt no little satisfaction at the reward of what they deemed their general's weak compliance. 1 Cleopatra, whose blandishments were still the so- lace of the Roman general throughout his Battle of th* desperate adventure, rejoiced to see her deltk""? PU>- brother thus treacherously array himself in lemxiu - rash hostility to her protector. The toils were beginning to close around the young king. Mith- ridates of Pergamus, an adherent in whose fidelity and conduct Caesar placed great reliance, was advanc- ing with the reinforcements he had been commis- sioned to collect in Syria and the adjacent provinces. He reduced Pelusium, the key of Egypt by land as Pharos was by sea, and crossed the Nile at the head of the Delta, routing a division of the king's troops which attempted to check his progress. Ptolemaeus led forth his army to confront the new invader, and was immediately followed by Caesar. The Romans came up with the Egyptians, crossed the river in the face of their superior numbers, and attacked them in their entrenchments, which, from their acquaintance 1 Auct. Bell. Alex. 24. VOL. II. Y 322 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvm. with military art, as taught both by the Macedonians and the Romans, were probably not deficient in scientific construction. But the shock of the veterans was irresistible. The Egyptians fled, leaving great numbers slaughtered within the lines, and falling into their own trenches in confused and mangled heaps. The fugitives rushed to the channel of the Nile, where their vessels were stationed, and crowded into them without order or measure. One of them in which Ptolemseus had himself taken refuge was thus overladen and sank. 1 This signal defeat, and still more the death of their unfortunate sovereign, reduced the drun. Submit defenders of the monarchy to despair. The rei,tor^ r 'c7eo- populace of Alexandria issued from their gates to meet the conqueror in the attitude of suppliants, and with the religious ceremonies by which they were wont to deprecate the wrath of their legitimate rulers. He entered the city, and directed his course through the principal streets, where the hostile barricades were levelled at his approach, till he reached the quarters in which his own garrison was stationed. He now reconstituted the government by appointing Cleopatra to the sovereignty, in conjunction with another younger brother, while he despatched Arsinoe under custody to await his future triumph at Rome. The throne of his favourite he pretended to secure by leaving a Roman force in Alexandria. The pride of the republic was gratified by thus advancing another step towards the complete subjugation of a country it had long coveted. Caesar was anxious that so much Roman blood as had been shed in his recent campaigns should not appear to have sunk into the earth, and borne no fruit of glory and advan- tage to the state: he did not deem it expedient, 1 Auct. Bell Alex. 2981. A.U.707-B.C.47. UNDER THE EMPIKE. 323 however, to constitute Egypt a province of the empire, and transfer it from the hands of a woman and a child to some warlike and ambitious pro- consul. 1 The whole of this episode in his eventful history, his arrogant dictation to the rulers of a foreign people, his seizing and keeping in capti- vity the person of the sovereign, his discharging him on purpose that he might compromise himself by engaging in direct hostilities, and his taking advantage of his death to settle the succession and intrude a foreign army upon the new monarch, form altogether a pregnant example of the craft and un- scrupulousness of Roman ambition. 2 But in their deadly contests with their neighbours, the wolves of Italy were not always the assailants. The dependent monarchies on the frontier watched the intrigues of the She curia and the forum, and profited by the disasters of their chiefs and parties. The discom- fiture of the senate let loose upon the republic a new assailant, the son of its most inveterate and dangerous foe. Pharnaces, to whom Pompeius had granted the kingdom of the Bosporus, in reward for his unnatural treachery, had held aloof from the great gathering of the Eastern auxiliaries in the re- publican camp. C. Cassius, as we have seen, had been despatched, before the event of the contest was ascertained, to stimulate his flagging zeal in his patron's cause. But when the event of Pharsalia be- came known to him, he augured that the time was come for resuming the independent attitude of his illustrious father, and wresting the ancient patrimony of his house from a foreign yoke. He first made a descent upon the Lesser Armenia and Cappadocia, 1 Liv. Epit. cxii. : " Regnum JEgypti victor Cleopatra fratrique ejns minor! pennisit, veritus provinciam facere, ne quandoque riolentiorem prassidem nacta, novarum rerum materia esset." 2 Dion, xlii. 44. Y2 324 HISTORZ OF THE ROMANS e where Deiotarus and Ariobarzanes occupied the pre- carious thrones upon which Pompeius had seated them. At the moment when Calvinus received his leader's pressing message to send all his available forces to his aid in Egypt, he was summoned also to defend these petty princes whose dominions were the outworks of the empire itself. Deiotarus had been one of the most devoted of the Pompeian allies ; but he had recently submitted to Caesar, and engaged to furnish a sum of money for the demands of his troops, an obligation which he declared it would be impossible for him to discharge, unless protected him- self from the spoiler. Calvinus, while requiring Pharnaces to desist from insulting the majesty of Rome, protested that he held the honour of the re- public far dearer than gold. He put himself in motion with one legion, having sent two to Caesar, and he was joined by two other detachments which Deiotarus had equipped and trained on the Roman model, and by an equal number from Cappadocia. He had with him also another legion recently levied in Pontus, so that his force was such as might justly inspire him with confidence. Pharnaces retreated from Cappadocia, and attempted to amuse the advan- cing enemy by negotiations, while the fate of Caesar was yet in the balance. But Calvinus pressed upon He defeats him, and demanded a battle. The conflict t^ln'tcau"" resulted in the complete defeat of the Roman army, with the loss of a large num- ber of knights of illustrious family. The worsted general effected an orderly retreat, but he abandoned both Armenia and Cappadocia to the invader, and the province of Pontus fell again for a moment under the sway of the dynasty of Mithridates. 1 Caesar's policy required him to postpone the pur- riie caesareans suit of his own personal enemies to the uffer reveries , **_'_ A*. J e ii. in niyrieum. duty of chastising the invaders of the 1 Auct. Bell. Alex. 3440.; App. B.C. ii. 91.; Dion, xlil 46. A.U.707-B.C.47. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 325 empire. The partisans of the old broken faction which still called itself the senate and people of Rome were gathering head ; and the difficulties which surrounded their adversary in a remote region, together with other misfortunes which befel his cause in various quarters, encouraged many who had thrown away their swords in the flight from Pharsalia to return to the standards of Scipio and Labienus. Caesar, on his part, even in the moment of victory, was well aware that the strength of his opponents would not succumb under a single defeat ; and when he determined himself to follow in the track of Pompeius, he provided against the revival of the beaten party in the countries which had wit- nessed their recent disaster. He had commissioned his lieutenant Cornificius to hold Illyricum with two legions, while an additional force of new recruits was summoned from Italy to support him in that province and secure the possession of Macedonia. These reinforcements were led by Gabinius, the profligate adventurer who had first made himself notorious by his base subserviency to Pompeius, and who now threw himself without a blush into the party of his victorious rival. But his new ser- vice was one of great difficulty. Octavius still rode with a powerful fleet in the Adriatic; and though he had failed in preventing the transit of Gabinius, he cut him off from further communica- tion with Italy, and intercepted his supplies. The country in which the Csesarean forces were moving was so exhausted by the support of immense armies, that they were sorely pressed for sustenance, while, from their want of military stores, they could make no impression upon the strongholds which they invested. The natives, harassed by repeated exac- tions, and emboldened by these favourable circum- stances, rose against them in the neighbourhood of Salona, and inflicted severe loss on their feeble 326 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvm. battalions. It was only with leaving two thousand men and many officers on the field that Gabini early Grabinius could effect his entrance into safe quarters at Salona ; cooped up for months in that fortress, the state of his affairs so depressed his spirits that he sickened and died. This reverse, however, was in a great measure retrieved obtains" a sue- by the exploit of Vatinius, who attacked the fleet of Octavius with an inferior force, and obtained such an advantage over it, as to induce its gallant commander to desist from cruising in the narrow seas, and betake himself first to the coast of Greece, and eventually to Africa. In vain had Caesar affected moderation in his treatment of the provinces ; his lieutenants either did not understand his motives, or felt no interest in them. The common vice of proconsular extor- tion had well-nigh overthrown his party in Spain. 90 Spain, almost immediately after he had Misconduct of _* .- ... j . f\ n T char's lieu- himself quitted it. Q. Cassius Longinus, Q^casfmas already mentioned as one of the pretended patriots who fled to the camp at Eavenna, had been appointed to the government of the Fur- ther Province. This man had formerly served as quaestor in the same country under the procon- sulate of Pompeius, and was already infamous there for his cruelty and rapacity. 1 But Caesar could not refuse to reward the services of an adherent of such high personal distinction. He nearly paid dear for his compliance. Cassius had already irritated his people by his exactions, when directions arrived from his chief to transport a military force into Africa, in order to curb the officious zeal of Juba, who was sending aid to Pompeius in Macedonia. The propraetor was well pleased to have the con- duct of an operation which promised to open a fair 1 Auct. Bell. Alex. 4964.; Dion, xlii. 15. 16. *.tr.707-B.c.47 TINDER THE EMPIRE. 327 field for plunder. He made his preparations on a large scale, and his fresh demands upon the re- sources of the province added, doubtless, to the odium he had previously incurred. Certain citizens of Italica entered into a conspiracy against his per- son. He was severely wounded, and being supposed dead, one of his officers, Laterensis, prepared to assume the command, to the great joy of the soldiers, who detested their general. But Cassius surviving the blows which had been inflicted upon him, such was the discipline of the legions that they immedi- ately returned to their fidelity. The conspirators, and with them Laterensis, who was also implicated in their abortive deed, were delivered up and put to death with torture. The news of the victory of Pharsalia which now arrived, rendered the proposed expedition unnecessary; but Cassius proceeded to indemnify himself for his disappointment by re- doubling his exactions upon the people subjected to his rule. The passions of the provincials became more furiously inflamed than ever. The legions in occupation had been either raised or recruited in the province, and partook fully in the feelings of their countrymen. The authority of the propraetor was at length shaken off, and his quaestor Marcellus invited by acclamation to take the command. Cas- sius, who retained only a small force about his own person, now called to his support both Lepidus, the proconsul of the Hither Province, and Bogudes, king of Mauretania, while he fortified himself on a hill over against the city of Corduba. Marcellus boldly summoned him to surrender. Lepidus on his arrival took the side of the new governor, for he was convinced that it was requisite for Caesar's interests that his lieutenant should atone by dis- grace for his impolitic extortions. This service Caesar at a later period acknowledged with mag- nificent gratitude. He assigned him the distinction 328 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvm. of a triumph, though in fact he had fought no battle. 1 But Cassius had chosen his position well, and might not have been easily dislodged from it : when, however, his successor, Trebonius, arrived in the province at the commencement of the following year, he voluntarily relinquished his hostile atti- tude. Being allowed to retire unmolested with his ill-gotten treasures, he took ship at Malaca for Italy, and was lost in a storm off the mouth of the Iberus. But the guilty legions, which had revolted from their hateful commander, could not easily be persuaded that their offence admitted of pardon. Uneasy and dissatisfied with their own conduct, they began to meditate defection. They deputed envoys to treat secretly with Scipio in Africa. 2 The result of the propraetor's misconduct was yet to be further developed. Caesar' protracted absence from the capital strongly Theie.uuof marked the confidence he felt in the sta- FharslVia" and bilitv of his arrangements there. The the death of - J . r fi- T pompiu. ferocious menaces ot the .rompeians against Rome. all who submitted to his ascendency had tended to attach firmly to him the great mass of the resident citizens. But we may imagine with what anxious suspense the upper classes of Eome awaited the event of the long operations in Illyricum and Thes- saly. Servilius, Caesar's colleague in the consulship, exercised paramount authority in the city. He watched with vigilance every indication of the popular feel- ings, and surrounded every suspected enemy with secret spies. Every courier who arrived with news of Caesar's successes was received with spontaneous or forced acclamations. But there were not wanting sinister rumours of his discomfiture, which many 1 Dion, xliii. 1. 2 Dion, xliii. 29. The soldiers who proved so unfaithful to Caesar were mostly Afranians, who had been drafted into the victorioui ranks. Comp. Dion, xliii, 3<5, A..n.706-B.C.48. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 329 turbulent spirits in the great focus of confusion secretly welcomed and disseminated. The report of the victory of Pharsalia announced a catastrophe too momentous to command immediate belief. The conqueror himself had sent no official notification of the event to the senate; he felt it unbecoming to offer formal congratulations on a triumph over his fellow citi/ens. But as soon as the fact was sufficiently established, the government decreed the removal of the statues of Pompeius and Sulla from the open space which they occupied with kindred effigies in front of the rostra. This was a final declaration of defiance, not towards Pompeius only, but towards his party, the recent rulers of the republic ; and many still feared and hesitated when they surveyed the manifold resources of the great Eoman oligarchy, and mused on the rapid reverses of civil warfare. The disasters of Marius had been even more humiliating; yet Mariiis had returned in triumph to the scene of his former greatness, he had wreaked an awful retri- bution on his enemies, and had died in the enjoy- ment of yet another consulship. The rumours of Pompeius's assassination were obstinately discredited ; but the most incredulous were at last convinced by the fatal token of his ring, transmitted by Caesar to Rome. From this moment the face of things was entirely changed ; the previous hesitation had been J L x- -J-A it, f Thewnute inspired by timidity, not by any remains of and people > jjr -IT h "P honour, love for the murdered hero. From hence- upon ca*or , . , 1 i Oct. A. o. 706. forth every scruple about paying court to the conqueror vanished. His flatterers multiplied in the senate and the forum, and they only vied one with another in suggesting new honours for him. Decrees were issued investing him with unbounded authority over the lives and fortunes of the vanquished. When the news arrived that the standard of the republic was again raisbd in Africa, the power of 330 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xvm. making war and peace was surrendered to his sole deci- sion. A semblance of legal authority was thus hastily impressed beforehand upon acts on which their absent ruler had already resolved. Caesar dictator was next created dictator for the extra- ordinary period of a whole year 1 ; whereupon he appointed Antonius, whom he had sent back to Italy, his master of the horse. Antonius constantly appeared in arms in the city, and caused both offence and alarm by the military state he maintained. But the insecurity of his position demanded these odious intrigue of precautions. A popular sedition was excited r^r^dV by the intrigues of Dolabella, who had tried Antoniu.. fo j n g ra ti a te himself with the people in his office of tribune by reviving the measures of spolia- tion recently projected by Caelius. 2 He found him- self thwarted, as always happened in similar cases, by a rival occupant of the tribunitian bench, equally unprincipled and equally anxious to distinguish himself by rushing to the protection of the menaced interests. Antonius, already incensed against the innovator on personal and domestic grounds, was compelled to interfere with a military force, in de- fiance of the sanctity of the much abused office, and vindicate the supremacy of the dictator and the senate against both the contending parties. He acted with unflinching rigour against the excited populace, and quelled the riot with the slaughter of eight hundred citizens. 3 His armed mediation be- tween the demagogues was maintained, however, with scrupulous moderation. He abstained from putting forth his strength to crush their noisy preten- sions, so that they continued from time to time to disturb the tranquillity of the city, and were only 1 Caesar's second dictatorship dates from October, A.U. 706. See Fischer, Rom.Zeitt. p. 282. * Dion, xlii. 32.; Cic. ad Alt. xi. 12.; Liv. Epit. cxiii. Liv. Lc. A.U.707-B.C.47. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 331 lulled by the periodical rumours of Caesar's approach. As soon as the dictator was known to be still engaged abroad, they constantly broke out afresh ; nor did they finally subside till his actual arrival quelled dis- affection, and awed every passion to obedience. 1 Caesar received information of these disturbances when already on his march from Alexandria D i S a i.ii ment ensues. moved rapidly upon them ; and, in the m which - A, . J ... Cassar is course ot their manceuvres to secure their worsted. communications with the sea, they found them- selves reduced to the necessity of hazarding a general engagement. Caesar had with him at this time thirty cohorts and some hundred cavalry and archers ; the number of the republicans was so enormous that Labienus could boast that even to destroy them un- resisting would weary out the puny band of Cae- sareans. Labienus and Petreius were the principal leaders of the attack, which was confided almost entirely to the Roman and Numidian cavalry. The former of these officers made himself particularly conspicuous, fighting in the thickest of the conflict, and railing in bitter language at the Caesarean le- gionaries, to whom his person was well known. The Roman veteran was proud of his length of service, the experience, valour and fidelity, which it betok- ened. No sarcasm was more biting to him than to be addressed as Tiro, or raw recruit. Who are you ? I never saw you before, was the insulting lan- guage which Labienus addressed to his old com- panions in arms as he thrust his lance in their faces. / am no tiro, replied one of them, but a veteran of the Tenth, hurling his ponderous pilum at his old commander. The skilful horseman covered himself by a rapid movement of his steed, which received the blow in its chest and fell under him. But the valour of the Tenth was unavailing; the pressure of the enemy's massive squadrons drove the men close together, or, in Roman military phrase, within the rails. Hardly able to use their arms in the throng, they gazed anxiously around in search of their commander, while they moved their bodies and inclined their heads to avoid the shower of missiles. By a great effort Caesar threw his lines into a wedge, VOL. II. A A 354 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xix ranging the alternate cohorts back to back and separating the dense array of the enemy in the centre. The combat was divided into two parts on the right and left; but Caesar had pierced an opening for retreat to his camp, and was glad to draw off his men, and abandon the field of battle to the republicans. 1 Caesar now fortified his position on the coast, in Theprovin- connexion with the town and harbour of Mm s ith ld Ruspina, with more than usual care, for ninfmcewnts he felt the extreme precariousness of his position while awaiting the arrival of the expected supplies. At this period, however, events began to tell in his favour, both in the advance of Sitius and the Mauretanians upon the Numidian ca- pital, Cirta, which drew off Juba from Scipio's head- quarters, and also by the growing manifestations of feeling in his favour within the province. Even now, distressed and harassed as he was, many personages of rank and station began to resort to him ; the harshness of the proconsul's administration drove the noble and the wealthy to his camp. 2 Caesar published their complaints in his appeals to the rulers of the neigh- bouring provinces for supplies. He had come to Africa, he declared, to save the natives from spolia- tion, and the allies from utter destruction ; but for his opportune arrival nothing but the bare soil would soon be left them. Four more legions shortly joined him from beyond the sea, and provisions with all kinds of military stores were collected in abun- dance, while Scipio, deprived of the aid of his Numidian allies, was seeking to train a squadron of elephants to war, by a series of mimic com- bats. The arrival of so large a number of Caesar's veterans gave a decisive inclination to the scale of 1 Auct. B. AJT. 1518. * Aucu B. Afr. 2$. A.U.708-B.C.4fi. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 355 fortune. The legionaries of the republican army were personally no match for them, and csar obtaim .7 . , .... i n advantage even its numerical superiority in cavalry overscipio was greatly diminished, while the terror of Caesar's prowess more than counterbalanced any other ad- vantage it might possess. Scipio felt that he was unfit to contend with such an adversary in the field, and avoided a battle; while at the same time he had conceived no other distinct plan of opposition to him. But even this feeble policy was disconcerted by the rapidity of the assailant's movements. A month had scarcely elapsed from his first landing when he found himself in a condition to assume offensive operations. He surprised Scipio's position near Uzita, and forced his troops to an engagement from which they did not escape without considerable loss. The discomfited general could only revenge himself by putting to the sword the complements of two of Caesar's transport vessels, which were cast away at Thapsns, and on the island ^Egimums. 1 During these operations, however, the diversion on the side of Cirta had not proved so inwienceof important as had been anticipated. Juba, i^Hai 116 after making his observations on the c * mp ' strength of the invaders, contented himself with de- puting the defence of his capital to Sabura, while he returned with the larger part of his forces, to share in person the fortunes of his allies. The necessities of the Roman chiefs compelled them to submit to revolting indignities from the pride of their pre- sumptuous colleague. He took upon himself to for- bid Scipio the use of the Imperator's purple cloak, which he declared to be an ensign of the kingly office ; and restricted him to the white colour of the ordinary toga. When the barbarian issued his royal mandates to Roman officers, they were observed to 1 Auct. B. Afr. 46. 4 A 2 356 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xix. be more punctually obeyed than tbe orders of the general himself. 1 But every insult was borne to secure the aid of the Numidian cavalry, which Caesar was compelled to train his soldiers to baffle by a peculiar system of tactics. They were discouraged also by the elephants, which their horses would not encounter. Caesar fetched some animals of the kind from Italy, on purpose to familiarize both men and horses with the sight of the uncouth creatures ; and it was found that, when the first terror of novelty was overcome, the unwieldy monsters did little service in battle. 2 Thus prepared for a decisive struggle, Caesar long The hostile tried in vain to draw his adversary into arrnie meet a g enera ] engagement. At last, on the Thap,u,. fourth of April, 708, he issued from his encampment by night and marched sixteen miles to Thapsus, where Virgilius commanded for Scipio with a considerable force. 3 When his determination to invest this place, important as well from its devo- tion to the republican cause as from the numbers of the garrison it contained, became known, Scipio felt the necessity of making an effort to preserve it. He summoned resolution to follow in the enemy's track, and pitched his camp over against him, at a distance of eight miles from the town. Caesar had profited, in the meanwhile, by the few hours by which he had outstripped his opponents. There was only one route by which they could communicate with the place, which ran along a narrow strip of land, enclosed by the sea on one side, and a salt-water lake on the other. This isthmus Caesar had secured the day be- fore Scipio's arrival, throwing up fortifications, and posting a strong body of troops behind them. Having made these dispositions, he was applying himself to the investment of the city, when Scipio, 1 Auct. B. Afr. 57. - Auct. B. Afr. 72 1 Auct. B. Afr. 79. ; Dion, xliii. 7. A.C.708-B.C.46. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 357 unable to torce an entrance into it, contented himself with taking up a position on the shore, from whence he might observe and impede the works of the be- siegers. While some of his troops were employed in casting up the entrenchments, the main body was drawn up in battle array for their protection. Caesar saw that the moment was arrived ; he immediately led forth his own troops to the encounter, leaving two legions to cover the works already commenced, and, at the same time, gave orders to a portion of his fleet, which was riding off the shore, to divert the attention of the enemy by threatening to land a detachment in their rear. 1 If Caesar felt a momentary distrust of the result of the approaching combat, it was caused by Battle of the consciousness that a large portion of his Ip?^" 8 ' men were fresh recruits, who had never en- ^rib. ! countered an enemy before. To these he * " 46> pointed out the sturdy veterans dispersed through their ranks, and bade them emulate the fame they had acquired,- and merit similar titles and rewards. Some symptoms of vacillation on the part of their opponents gave new force and spirit to his exhorta- tions. Men and officers crowded round their general, imploring him to give the word for the onset. While he still hesitated, or watched his opportunity, check- ing with hand and voice the impatient swaying of the lines, suddenly the blast of a single trumpet burst forth on the right wing. The impetuous ferocity of the Tenth legion could no longer brook restraint; they had raised the signal unbidden, and now the whole army rushed forward in one unbroken body, overpowering the resistance of their officers. Caesar, when he beheld rank after rank pouring by him, without the possibility of recal, gave the word Good luck to his attendants, and spurred his horse to the 1 Auct. B. AJr. 81. 358 HISTORY OJ? THE ROMANS CM. XIX head of his battalions. The combat was speedily ca*ar obtains decided. The elephants, thrown into con- vicwy. et< fusion by the first discharge of stones and arrows, turned upon the ranks they were placed to cover, and broke in pieces their array. The native cavalry were dismayed at losing their accus- tomed support, and were the first to abandon the field. Scipio's legionary force made little further resistance; their camp was close in the rear, and they were con- tent to seek shelter behind the entrenchments. De- serted by their officers, they looked in vain for a leader to direct the defence of the ramparts. No one had been left in command of the camp. The fugitives, seized with panic terror, threw away their arms and betook themselves to the Numidian encamp- ment near at hand. But, on reaching it, they found it already in the hands of the Csesareans. They now withdrew in a body to a neighbouring eminence, and held out their bare arms and empty hands in sign of submission. But the victorious veterans were mad with fury and exultation ; they would give no quarter to the unresisting multitude, and even slew some of their own comrades, men of gentle birth and nature, lately enlisted at Home, and uninitiated in their brutal habits, in resentment at the attempt to curb their ferocity. Caesar beheld the transaction with horror ; but neither entreaties nor commands could prevail on the butchers to desist from their carnage. 1 This sudden and complete victory cost the con- DUpersionpf querors no more than fifty men. Caesar chief.. celebrated it by a grand sacrifice in the presence of the army, after which he addressed his soldiers with encomiums on their valour, and dis- tributed a largess to the whole of his veteran forces, with special rewards to the most deserving. After this, 1 Auct. B. Afr. 85 A.0.7U4-B.C.46. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 359 leaving considerable detachments to conduct the siege of Thapsus and Thysdrus, he followed up the first report of his success by appearing before the walls of Utica. The destruction or rout of the republican army in the late battle had been no less complete than at Pharsalia. And, precisely as on that fatal day, the chiefs of the party had sought each his own safety by escaping unattended from the field. As the fugitives from Pharsalia had made no attempt to rally within the walls of Larissa, so for the most part the remnant of the slaughter of Thapsus left Utica in their rear, nor looked behind them till they had gained the sea or the recesses of Numidia. Scipio, with a few officers of high rank, attempted to make his way into Spain ; but their vessels were driven by stress of weather to the harbour of Hippo, where Sitius, who had routed and slain Sabura, had sta- tioned a flotilla of much greater force. The un- equal combat ended in the destruction of Death of the flying armament; while Scipio, after others. n exhibiting pride and courage worthy of a Roman imperator, thrust his sword into his side, and leaped overboard. 1 A Damasippus and a Torquatus sank ingloriously with the vessels. It was late in the evening of the eighth of April when Cato received information at Utica Cato ailima te, of the result of the battle. The next *$?* ia morning he assembled the Roman senators defence - and knights, together with the three hundred 2 , in the temple of Jupiter. By this time the news of the overwhelming disaster had spread among 1 Auct. B. Afr. 96.; Appian, B. C. ii. 100.; Liv. Epit. civ. "P. Scipio in nave circumventus honesUB morfi vocem quoque adjecit : quaerentibns enim Imperatorem hostibus dixit, Imperator bene se habet." 2 These " three hundred," according to Plutarch, were Roman citizens engaged in commercial and monetary transactions in Africa, of whom Cato formed a council for the government of the city. Plut. Cat. Min. 59. 360 HIStORt OF THE ROMANS CH. xit them. With surprise and admiration they beheld the calmness of their general's demeanour. He began by stating that he had summoned them to deliberate upon affairs of grave importance. 1 Though professing himself still full of hope, and urging every one to nerve his courage for a magnanimous defence, he left the determination of their conduct to their own decision. For himself, he would not exercise his military authority to prevent them either from seeking safety by flight, or even opening the gates to the enemy ; but if they were determined to de- fend the liberty of Rome to the last, he would place himself at their head, and lead them against the enemy, or prolong the struggle in some other quar- ter. He read the list of men, arms and stores which were still at their disposal; and the example of his calm courage was so effectual that they resolved on the spot to prepare for resistance, and began manumitting and arming their slaves. The remnant of the Roman nobility remained firm in their deter- mination ; their blood was more thoroughly inflamed against the enemy, and their hopes of pardon seemed more precarious. But the three hundred, for the most part private speculators, men who had no per- sonal quarrel against Caesar, and had taken no part in the contest until the establishment of the repub- lican head-quarters in the centre of their peaceful town had compelled them to assume the attitude of political partisans, soon relaxed from the high- wrought enthusiasm to which they had for a mo- ment given way. The few days which followed seemed to have been passed in mutual intrigues between these parties and the natives of Utica, each fearful of being betrayed and sacrificed by the other. Cato felt the im- possibility of reducing to harmony such dis- cordant elements. The last duty which remained Auc.t. B. Afr. 88. I.C.708-1I.C.46. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 361 to the patriot general was to save the persons of all Eoman citizens from the treachery of the pro- vincials, as well as from the vengeance of the con- queror. When it was announced that Caesar was advancing at the head of the merciless legions which had given no quarter on the field of Thapsus, Cato closed all the gates except that which led to the sea, and urged the Eoman senators to betake themselves to the ships which lay ready to receive them. He entreated all his personal friends to make their escape in the same manner, but about securing his own safety he said nothing, and seemed to take no thought. No one indeed doubted that he had formed his own resolution to die. Finally, he consulted with L. Caesar on the terms in which he should intercede with his kinsman on behalf of the three hundred, and despatched him to the con- queror's camp. When he had thus dismissed every one, excepting his own son, who would not abandon his father, and one or two friends and attendants, with whom he was wont to take his meals and dis- course or declaim on subjects of sublime specula- tion, he passed the evening in animated conversa- tion on his accustomed themes, and harangued with more than usual fervour on the famous paradox of the Stoics, that the good man alone is free, and all the bad are slaves. His companions could not fail to guess the secret purpose over which he was brooding. They betrayed their anxiety only by silent gestures; but Cato, observing the depression of their spirits, strove to reanimate them and di- vert their thoughts by turning the conversation to topics of present interest. The embarkation was at this moment proceeding, and Cato repeatedly inquired who had Cato commiu already put out to sea, and what were euicide- the prospects of their voyage. Retiring to his chamber he took up the Dialogue on the Soul, in 362 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XIX. which Plato recorded his dying master's last aspi- rations after immortality. The academy might be justly proud of the homage of so noble a disciple of the Porch. But the Stoic could dispense with the consolations of any other school, for he had been taught to believe in a future existence, coeval at least with the frame of a perishable universe. 1 After reading for some time, he looked up and observed that his sword had been removed. In the irritation of the moment he gave way to a burst of violence, such as often characterized the behaviour of the Eoman master to his slaves: calling his attendant to his presence he struck him on the mouth, bruising his own hand with the blow. He then sent for his son and friends, and rebuked them sharply for their unworthy precaution ; as t/, he said, / needed a sword to kill myself, and might not, if I chose, put an end to my existence by dashing my head against the wall, or merely hold- ing my breath. They saw that it was vain to avert the blow which he seemed to meditate, and re- assured, perhaps, for the moment by the calmness with which he conversed, they restored him his weapon, and at his earnest desire once more left him alone. At midnight, still anxious about those who were departing, he sent once again to inquire if the embarkation was completed. The messenger returned with the assurance that the last vessel was now on the point of leaving the quay. Thereupon Cato threw himself on his bed, as if about to take his rest for the night; but when all was quiet, he seized his sword and thrust it into his stomach. The wound was not immediately mortal, and the victim rolled groaning on the floor. The noise at 1 This was the doctrine of Zeno (comp. Diog. Laert. vii. 156, 157. Plutarch, de plac. Philos. iv. 7.); Cicero's raillery is unmerci- ful (Tusc. DL<*p. i. 31.): " Stoici vero usnram nobis largiuntnr, tan- quaiu cornicibus; diu mansuros aiunt aniinos; semper, negant." 4..C.708-B.C.46. UNDER THE EMPIItE. 363 once summoned his anxious attendants. A sur- geon was at hand, and the patient was unconscious while the protruding intestines were replaced, and the gash sewn up. But on coming to himself he repulsed his disconsolate friends, and tearing open the fatal wound, expired with the same dogged resolution which had distinguished every act of his life. 1 Such was the proud though melancholy end of the gravest philosopher Home had yet pro- J il. f 1 T X> V Judgment o( duced: the first ot a long line ot heroes the ancients of the robe, whose dignified submission to an adverse fate will illustrate the pages of our history throughout the gloom of the imperial tyranny. The ancient heathens but faintly ques- tioned the sufferer's right to escape from calamity by a voluntary death. It was reserved for the Chris- tian moralists, in their vindication of nobler princi- ples, to impugn the act which has rendered Cato' fame immortal. 2 The creed of the Stoic taught indeed that the world is governed by a moral Intelligence, and from such premises the obvious inference is, that it is the part of man to conform to its behests, and fulfil his appointed lot whether for good or for evil. But the philosophy which exalted man to a certain participation in the nature of the Deity 3 , seemed to make him in some sort the arbiter of his own actions, and suicide, in Cato's view, might be no other than the accomplishment of a self- appointed destiny. The wisest of the heathens never understood that the true dignity of human nature Plut. Cat. Min. 5870.; Dion, xliii. 10, 11.; Appian, B. C. ii. 98, 99. ; Auct. B. Afr. 88. 2 Cato's suicide is applauded by Cicero, Tusc. i. 30., Off. i. 31., and Seneca, Ep. 24. 67. 7 1. 95. fin., 104. See also de Prov. 2. S. Au- gustine, on the contrary, contrasts it with the genuine heroism of Hegulus (de Civ. Dei, i. 24.). 1 Lucan, ix. 564.: " Ille deo plenus tacita queui mente gerebut." 364 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS ca. xix consists in its submission to a higher Existence; that its only hope for the future is in the conscious- ness of its imperfection and weakness and responsi- bility here. Cato had no cause to despair of retaining life under Deaths of jut> the new tyranny. At an earlier period he nd Petreius: j^ me( jit a ted, in such a contingency, seek- ing refuge in retirement and philosophy. But his views of the highest (rood had deepened and sad- dened with the fall of the men and the things he most admired. He now calmly persuaded himself that with the loss of free action the end of his existence had failed of its accomplishment. He regarded his career as prematurely closed, and assuredly the dignity of his acquiescence demands our respect and compas- sion, if not the principle on which it was based. Far different was the manner in which the rude barbarian Juba and the coarse soldier Petreius rushed forward to meet their ends. They had escaped together from the field of battle, and the Numidian offered to pro- vide shelter for his companion in one of his own strongholds. The Eoman province was so ill-disposed towards the barbarian chief, that he was obliged to hide himself by day in the most secluded villages, and roam the country on his homeward flight during the hours of darkness. In this way he reached Zama, hia> second capital, where his wives and children, together with his most valuable treasures, were deposited. This place he had taken pains to fortify at the commence- ment of the war, with works of great extent and magni- tude. But on his appearance before the walls, the in- habitants deliberately shut their gates against him, and refused to admit the enemy of the victorious Roman. Before setting out on his last expedition, Juba had constructed an immense pyre in the centre of the city, declaring his intention, if fortune went ill with him, of heaping upon it everything he held most dear and pre- cious, together with the murdered bodies of the prin- 4.U.708-B.C.46. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 365 cipal citizens, and then taking his own place on the summit, and consuming the whole in one solemn conflagration. But the Numidians had no sympathy with this demonstration of their sovereign's despair, and resolved not to admit him within their walls. Juba, having tried in vain every kind of menace and entreaty, to which no reply was vouchsafed, at last retired, but only to experience a similar reception in every other quarter to which he resorted. He at least had little to hope from the clemency which the victor had extended to his conquered countrymen. His companion, hard as his own iron corslet, scorned to accept it. The fugitives supped together, and, flushed with the fumes of the banquet, challenged each other to mutual slaughter. They were but un- equally matched : the old veteran was soon despatched by his more active antagonist ; but Juba was constant in his resolution, and only demanded the assistance of an attendant to give himself the last fatal stroke. 1 Nor was the fate of Considius, of Afranius, and Faustus Sulla less disastrous. The first of these had abandoned the defence of Thys- ArraS 1 , 'ami drus at the approach of the forces which Caesar despatched against it, and attempted to make his escape with the treasures he had amassed into the territories, until now friendly, of the Numidian chieftains. He was destroyed, for the sake of his hoarded booty, by the Gaetulians who accompanied him in his flight. The others had re- tained the command of a squadron of Scipio's cavalry, and after burning one town which had shut its gates against them, had made a desperate attack on the military post which Cato maintained outside the walls of Utica, to wreak an unworthy vengeance on the Cae- sarean partisans there kept in custody. Baffled in this object, they had made their way into Utica, while 1 Auct. B. Afr. 91. 94.; Appinn, B.C. ii. 10O.; Dion, xliii. 8.,- Senec. 6Spa o\iyois ruv \TKOV ta&vriav alxuaXuruv vvyyvovs, Sib, rb TOIS irporfpois avrobs p)] ff-Tta(ppovriffOai iro\fnois. His kinsman Octavius with great difficulty extorted from him the pardon of a brother of his friend Agrippa. Fragm. xcix. : trtpl TTJS Kai KdruJt'o iffiafffv Hv (xliii. 13.). 368 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XIX. sulate of Sallustius. 1 The rewarded and the punished acquiesced equally in the conqueror's dispositions ; the submission of Africa to his authority was from thenceforth complete. The Uticans were allowed to commemorate with a funeral and a statue the humane and noble conduct of their late governor. Caesar settled the affairs of Africa with his usual c.esar nui. for despatch, and sailed from Utica on the SSlS'to" 1 " 1 thirteenth of June. 2 On his way to Italy, he stopped at Caralis, in Sardinia. The aid which the island had afforded to his adver- saries furnished him with a decent pretext for extorting from the inhabitants large sums of money. At the end of the same month he again weighed anchor ; but the prevalence of easterly winds drove him repeatedly to shore, and he at last reached Rome on the twenty-eighth day after his departure from the Sardinian capital. 3 The reports he received at this time of the revival of the republican cause in Spain did not give him much uneasiness. Cnseus had been detained by sickness in the Baleares, and the fugitives from the field of Thapsus had been al- most all cut off in their attempts to reach the point to which their last hopes were directed. The legionaries who had mutinied against Quintus Cassius were still either dissatisfied with their treatment under the commander who had superseded him, or fearful of their general's vengeance when a fitting opportunity should arrive. It was from Caesar's own soldiers 1 Auct. B. Afr. 97. Dion, xliii. 9.: r$ SoAotxm'y, \6y(? fj.tv &PXfit>, fpyif 8e Hyetv -re Kal l> 2 404 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XX. well-timed effort for the removal of a gr^at prac- confusion of tical abuse. 1 The Roman year, even before calendar the time of Caesar, ought to have equalled, on the average, three hundred and sixty-five days and six hours ; so near had the astronomers even of the period assigned to the reign ofNuma already arrived to the real length of the earth's revolution round the Eim. This year had been calculated on a basis of three hundred and fifty-four days, with the interca- lation of a month of twenty-two and twenty-three days alternately every second year ; but another day had been added to the three hundred and fifty-four to make an odd or fortunate number, and, to com- pensate for this superfluous day, the number of in- tercalations was proportionally diminished by a very intricate process. 2 The simplicity of the original ar- rangement being thus violated, great carelessness had soon prevailed in making the requisite corrections. In course of time the pontiffs, to whose superior knowledge the guardianship of the national calendar had been entrusted, had shrouded their science in a veil of religious mystery, and began to turn it to political or private purposes. They commanded the intercalation of a month arbitrarily 3 , when it suited them to favour some partisan who desired the exten- sion of his year of office, or the postponement of the day on which his debts should become due. 4 They most noted exploits were of a later date(A.u. 715, in Illyricutn). It seems likely, however, that the statue of Varro would be placed in the library which he had himself arranged ; and I am inclined to follow the account of Suetonius, and to suppose that Pollio only made additions to Caesar's original foundation. It may be remarked that the first Alexandrian library, though open to the public, was the private property of the king. So was Lucullus's a private col- lection. Plut. Lvcull. 42. 1 Ideler, Handb. der Mathem. und Techn. Chronologic, ii. 117. There is some discrepancy in the most modern observations of the precise length of the solar year. 2 Macrob. Sat i. 13. ; Censorin. de Die Natal. 20. * Censorin. /. c. ; Plut. Cats. 59 * Censorin. /. c.\ Macrob. Sat, i. 14.; Ammian, xxvi. 1.; Solin. 1. A.U.709- H.C.45. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 405 abstained from the requisite insertion, at the instance of some provincial governor who was anxious to hasten his return to the enjoyments of the capital. 1 This control over the length of the civil year, as well as the power of proclaiming the days on which business might or might not be transacted, had become an engine of state in the hands of the oligarchical go- vernment with which the sacerdotal functionaries were for the most part politically connected. Caesar indeed had broken down in his own person the barrier which had been systematically raised against the in- trusion of the opposite party into this body. The supreme pontificate which he enjoyed gave him the legitimate means of working this instrument for his own advantage. But he felt the extreme inconvenience which had latterly resulted from its abuse. The griev- ance had indeed become intolerable. In the dis- tracted state of public affairs, and amidst conflicting personal interests, the pontiffs had abstained from making any intercalation since the year of the city 702, and had even then left the civil calendar some weeks in advance of the real time. From that time each year had reckoned only three hundred and fifty- five days, and the civil equinox had got eighty days in advance of the astronomical. The consuls, ac- cordingly, who entered on their office on the 1st of January of the year 708 of the city, really commenced their functions on the 13th October, B. c. 47, that is, eighteen days after the astronomical equinox. The confusion which resulted from such a state of things may be easily imagined. The Roman seasons were marked by appropriate festivals assigned to certain fixed days, and associated with the religious worship of the people. At the period of harvest and vintage, 1 As Cicero, for instance, in his government of Cilicia. He writes to his friends at Rome to entreat them to hinder the pontiffs from intercalating in that year, and so protracting his term of absence (Ad Att. v 9., ad Div. vii. 2., viii. 6.)- 406 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xx. for instance, certain offerings were to be made and certain divinities thereby propitiated. 1 The husband- man was obliged to reject the use of the calendar altogether, and to depend upon his own rude ob- servations of the rising and setting of the con- stellations. Caesar had acquired a competent knowledge of Amount of the science of astronomy, in which the ""mpiution duties of his office as supreme pontiff gave him a particular interest. He com- posed himself a treatise upon the subject, which long retained its value as a technical exposition. 2 The astronomers of Alexandria were considered the most expert of their time, and with them he had made acquaintance during his brief and busy sojourn in the palace of the Ptolemies, But if the Alex- andrians made their year to consist of three hundred and sixty-five days, without any intercalation 3 , their error was out of all proportion greater than that of the original calendar of Numa. It is more probable that Caesar took this latter as the basis of his own calculations. He was not unaware that the period of three hundred and sixty-five days and six hours exceeds, in a slight degree, the true length of the solar year. The astronomer Hipparchus 4 had calcu- lated this excess as constant at four minutes and forty-eight seconds, and Caesar, or his adviser Sosigenes, was no doubt acquainted with this result. But if the excess were really constant and not greater than this, it would make the difference of only one day in three 1 Suet. Jul. 40:"Utnequemessium ferise sestati neque vindemiarum auturano competerent." 2 Macrob. Saturn, i. 16., where the writer asserts also that Caesar derived his knowledge from the Egyptians. 1 Censorin. 18.: " Nam eorum annus civilis solos habet dies CCCLXV sine ullo intercalari." Ideler shows that the Egyptians knew of the increment of six hours, but did not introduce it into their civil year till B.C. 30. Ideler, ii. 118. * B.C 160, or thereabouts. See Ideler, Ijc. i.tl.709-B.C.45. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 407 hundred years, and this amount of error he may have been contented to neglect. In fact, however, the more accurate observations of the moderns have as- certained that the excess of the Julian year over the solar progressively increases; that at the present time, it amounts to as much as ll m 22 s , while at the commencement of the Julian era it was only ll m 12 $ . It appears, then, on taking the average excess between that era and the present time, that the error would really amount to as much as one day in each hundred and thirty years. Csesar, however, was satisfied with assigning to each year the average of three hundred and sixty-five days and a quarter, by the regular intercalation of one day in every fourth year. The consequence was that the sum of the trifling incre- ments of each successive revolution of this period had occasioned a loss of nearly three days at the date of the council of Nice, A. D. 325. Accordingly, in that year, the solar equinox was found to fall not on the 23rd of March, as in 45 B. c., but on the 20th. When the Komish calendar was corrected by Pope Gregory XIII. in A. D. 1582, it had got forward as much as thirteen days. That pontiff proceeded to cut off ten of these superfluous days, and so restored the calendar to its position at the date of the council of Nice. This alteration has since been adopted throughout the Protestant states of Europe, with an adequate provision against the future accumulation of error ; but there still remains a constant difference of about three days between the civil and the astronomical equinox. The basis of Caesar's reform was that the com- mencement of the new era should coincide with the first new moon after the shortest otX r day. In order to make the year of the city 709 thus begin, ninety days required to be added to the current year. In the first place an intercalary month of twenty-three days was inserted in its proper 408 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. rx place between the 23rd and 24th of February 1 , and at the end of November two new months were added, comprehending sixty-seven days, or rather as we may conjecture, the months comprised twenty-nine and thirty-one days respectively, and the seven supple- mental days were counted separately. The shortest day of the year 46 B. c. was the 24th of December, and the first new moon fell on the eighth day suc- ceeding, from which accordingly the new era received The Julian it* date. 2 The period which was marked by !^.7o.' h this series of alterations received vulgarly the appellation of the year of confusion ; the last year of confusion was the term which a writer of a late date more significantly applied to it. 3 In a political as well as a social point of view it must have been hailed by the mass of the people as the commencement of a new era of steady and reasonable government. Even the discontented could not raise the cry so popular in England on the occasion of the reformation of our own calendar in the last century, Give us back our eleven days. Caesar, on the con- trary, had given them ninety. The jests which they did level at this wholesome enactment were miser- ably pointless. When some one observed to Cicero, To-morrow Lyra rises, Yes, he replied, by com- mand. 4 After all, the most salutary of the dictator's re- forms were embittered to the minds of the noblest of the Romans by the compulsion with which they 1 In our ecclesiastical calendar the intercalary day of leap-year is still inserted at this place. 2 Ideler, ii. 122.; Servius on Jn. vii. 720.: "Proprie sol novus est octavo Calend. Januarias." 3 Macrob. Sat. i. 16. 4 Plat. CCEX. 59.: val tic SiaTefy/iaroi. The edict, in fact, reconsti- tuted the civil limits of the seasons according to certain phenomena of the heavens. Thus an ancient calendar remarks on Aug. 11.: " Fidicula occasu suo autumnum inchoat Csesari." We can detect from this the way in which Cicero's jest may possibly have been spoiled by the mistake of the reporter. A.U.709-B.C.45. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 409 were attended. Both Caesar and his familiar friends had been accustomed to express openly The aicutol . their contempt for the republic as a name i^fumV^egai only, and not a reality, a title without form 8tate- or substance. 1 The name of king was alone want- ing to complete the actual tyranny which they saw gradually closing around them. The despot made little show of veiling the arbitrary nature of his pro- ceedings. He caused, indeed, the decrees he issued from the solitude of his own chamber to be sub- scribed with the names of the senators who were supposed to have assisted in his councils 2 ; but so flagrant an imposition only added insult to the injury. Nothing struck the Romans more forcibly with its assumption of regal state than the difficulty of access to the great man. Accustomed as the nobles were to the most perfect external equality, and the easiest intercourse among each other, their indignation rose high when they found their ap- proach to the dictator barred by a crowd of atten- dants, or impeded by ceremonious formalities. 3 In this, however, there may have been no affectation on his part ; he felt the unpopularity of such a position, and lamented the soreness which it engendered towards him. But the enormous pressure of busi- ness, however rapid was his despatch of it, and in this respect he had an extraordinary facility, made it necessary to restrict the times and means of claiming 1 Suet. Jul. 77.; coinp. Cic. ail Alt. x. 4., ad Div. ix. i). 2 Cic. ad Div. ix. 15. He alludes, perhaps, to a single instance of the kind. Dion attests that Caesar generally required the sanction of a council selected from the senate, or of the whole body, to his decrees (xliii. 27.). J Cic. ad Div. vi. 13. : " Magnis occupationibus ejus, a quo omnia petuntur, aditus ad eum difficiliores fuerunt " (comp. vi. 14., iv. 57.). Gesar had expressed his sense of the unpopularity he incurred from the necessary inconvenience he caused his friends : " Ego dubitem quin summo in odio sim quum M. Cicero sedeat, nee suo commodo me convenire possit?" Coinp. ad Att. xiv. 1,2.; Dru- imum, iii. 626. 410 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. x.\. his attention. Thus it was that the first rudiments of an Oriental court began to rise in the centre of the western republics. The colours of this imitation cieopaira f a hateful original were heightened by isiuRome. ^g demeanour of Cleopatra, who followed her lover to Eome at his invitation. 1 She came with the younger Ptolemseus, who now shared her throne, and her ostensible object was to negotiate a treaty between her kingdom and the commonwealth. White the Egyptian nation was formally admitted to the friendship and alliance of Eome, its sovereign was lodged in Caesar's villa on the other side of the Tiber, and the statue of the most fascinating of women was erected in the temple of the Goddess of Love and Beauty. 2 The connexion which subsisted between her and the dictator was unblushingly avowed. The national prejudice against the fo- reigner and the Egyptian was openly outraged and insolently disregarded ; and Cleopatra was encou- raged to proclaim that her child, whom she called Cassation, was actually the son of her Roman ad- mirer. A tribune, named Helvius Cinna, ventured, it is said, to assert among his friends his intention of proposing a law, with the dictator's sanction, to enable him to marry more wives than one, for the sake of progeny, and to disregard in his choice the legitimate qualification of Roman descent. 3 The citizens, however, were spared this last insult to their cherished sentiments. The queen of Egypt felt bitterly the scorn with which she was popularly 1 Dion, xliii. 27. ; Suet Jul. 52. 2 Appian, B.C. ii. 102. 3 Suet. I.e. ; comp. Dion, xliv. 7. But the story is a confused one. The words of Suetonius (" Cinna . . . confessus est, habuisse se legem," &c.) imply that the statement was made after Caesars death, as was the case with regard to many other schemes ascribed to him ; but the same writer also tells us (c. 85.) that Helvius Cinna was murdered in the fury of the mob immediately after the funeral. JLU.709-B.C.45. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 411 regarded as the representative of an effeminate and licentious people. 1 It is not improbable that she employed her fatal influence to withdraw her lover from his jealous capital, and urged him to schemes of Oriental conquest to bring him more completely within her toils. Meanwhile the haughtiness of her demeanour corresponded with the splendid anticipa- tions in which she indulged. 2 She held a court in the suburbs of the city, at which the adherents ot the dictator's policy were not the only attendants. Even his opponents and concealed enemies were glad to bask in the sunshine of her smiles. Cicero himself, the moralist and the patriot, was not the last to submit to the blandishments of the sorceress. He was still unable to shake off his apprehensions of an impending proscription, and with all his pro- fessions of personal purity he was not scrupulous as to the character of those whose favour or resistance he required. He had availed himself of the infi- delity of a Fulvia; he now flattered the vanity of a Cleopatra. The desire to obtain some precious manuscripts and works of art from Alexandria was the excuse he made for presenting himself in her hall of reception. 3 The queen's behaviour to him was exceedingly gracious ; she promised every thing he desired, and charged the grammarian Ammonius, who followed in her suite, to remind her of the engagement. But Cicero did not refrain at the same time from expressing himself with great bitter- ness against her in his private correspondence, in 1 The sensuality of Canopus was proverbial. Comp. Propert. iii. 11. 39.: "Incesti meretrix regina Canopi." Juvenal, vi. 84. : " Prodigia et mores Urbis damn ante Canopo." 1 Cic. ad Alt. xv. 15.: " Superbiam ipsius Reginse, quum esset trans Tiberim in hortis, commemorare sine maximo dolore non pos- sum." 3 Cic. ic. : " Quae omnia erant (piAo^uxyo et dignitatis mew." 412 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xx. which he seems anxious to assure Atticus that her agent Sara was only admitted once into his house. Lt is probable that Cleopatra arrived at Rome before Caesar's expedition into Spain 1 , which interrupted and perhaps frustrated her intrigues. But she con- tinued to reside there till after his death, as will appear in the sequel. The flattery of the nobles was, after all, pronounced Adulation of i Q a louder strain than their discontent, the nobles. Caesar heard himself addressed daily in the senate with language of fulsome adulation. A crowd of parasites of the highest education and the most polished manners imparted grace to homage, and threw a charm over the most abject obsequiousness. Of all the attributes of greatness which were lavishly ascribed to the dictator, none was more celebrated by his courtiers than his clemency. M. Marcel lus had retired from the field of Pharsalia to Mitylene, and dared not even solicit the favour of the conqueror, whom his fatal insolence to the Transpadanes had offended beyond the hope of pardon. But his friends had learned not to despair. They plied Caesar with piteous appeals to his generosity. C. Marcellus, the cousin of the exile, prostrated himself at the dictator's feet, and a crowd of the noblest of the Romans fol- lowed his example. The question of his recal was remitted to the decision of the senate itself. The oration which Cicero delivered was a laboured pane- gyric upon Caesar; the anticipated pardon of Mar- cellus was exalted above the greatest of his actions ; and the usurper was bid to rest secure in the grati- tude of the nobles, and in the firm conviction of the nation that his life was indispensable for the main- tenance of order. 2 Marcellus was accordingly in- 1 According to the order of events as related by Dion, see xliii. 27. 2 The genuineness of the Oratio pro Marcello has been abandoned without due consideration, in my judgment, by many modern critics. The arguments against it seem to mo at least inconclusive, and I 4.D.709-B.C.45. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 413 vited to return to his country ; but on his way he fell under the dagger of an assassin at Athens. The deed was undoubtedly the effect of some private enmity, but it did not fail to be for some time cur- rently ascribed to the instigation of the man who had forgiven him. Cicero made a speech some months afterwards in favour of Ligarius, against whom, on account of the pertinacity of his opposition, the dictator was said to be peculiarly exasperated. In this address, the orator adopted undoubtedly a bolder tone than appears in the oration of Marcellus. But, as Csesar's character became better known, the most timid summoned courage to affect freedom of speech in his presence. The fear of proscription had van- ished, and with it much of the breathless subservience of the proud Roman nobility. Caesar indeed felt the ground firm beneath his feet. He was conscious that the real strength The general c At ! -i-L i_- mi. -LI feeling of the of the nation was with him. Ine nobles nation might intrigue against him, and the mob c**ar' power, of the city might be ready to sell itself to any restless adventurer ; but the good sense of the middle class of Rome, backed by the general sympathy of the Italians and the enthusiastic veneration of the provinces, con- curred to secure the foundations of his power. It was to these classes only that he felt himself respon- sible for the exercise of his delegated authority. Ac- cordingly, he disbanded his veterans, or despatched the legions to distant quarters. He even dismissed a band of Spanish auxiliaries whom he had retained about him for a time as a chosen body-guard. 1 When his personal friends among the senators and knights offered to arm a select corps of their own number, to watch over the safety of his person, he waived the should expect the work of a rhetorician composed after the event which confuted so many of its prognostications, to betray some con- sciousness of the impending catastrophe. 1 Suet. Jul. 86.; Appian, B.C. ii. 109. 414 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xx. honour of their services, in the confident assurance that the state had more need of him than he of the state. 1 And such was the impression of its general beneficence which his administration had created in almost every quarter, that he might fully depend upon it to protect him at least from any public enemy. No precaution he well knew could gua- rantee his life from the insidious attack of the private assassin : but he declared that it was at any time better to die than to live always in fear of dying. 2 1 Plut. Cces. 57. 2 Plut. I.e.; Appian, B. C. ii. 108.: a^>J 8e aur< A , , oi the name of Brutus. Atticus, who, amidst the public commotions, amused himself with genealogical studies, had flattered M. Junius Brutus by tracing his descent from a supposed third son of the founder of the republic, whose elder brothers perished, as was well known, childless, by the axe of the lictor. 2 Servilia, the mother of Brutus, derived her lineage from the renowned Ahala, whose dagger had avenged the ambitious projects of Spurius Maelius. 1 Cic. ad Div. xv. 19. He wrote to Cicero, A.TJ. 709: "Malo ve- terem et clementem dominum (Caesarem) habere quam novum et crudelem (Cn. Pomp.)." 2 Comp. Corn. Nepos, Alt. 18.; Plut. Brut. 1. Cicero maintains this popular derivation of his hero (Tusc. Qu. iv. 1., Phil. i. 1.). But Plutarch allows that its accuracy was disputed. A.C.710-B.C.44. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 449 But so far from inheriting the zeal of his imputed progenitor, the Brutus of the expiring republic had acquiesced in Caesar's usurpation with less apparent reluctance than perhaps any other member of the Pompeian party. Despondent in her hour of distress, he had been the last to join, the earliest to desert, the unfurled banner of the republic. After Pharsalia he was the first to seek refuge in the camp of the victor ; in the city he was the foremost to court the friend- ship and claim the confidence of the dictator ; he was zealous in serving his interests by the discharge of important offices ; nor did he blush to govern Cisalpine Gaul for Caesar while his uncle still held Utica against him. 1 A feeble panegyric of the sturdy sage whom he had abandoned while he affected to adopt his principles and emulate his practice, seemed to Bru- tus a sufficient tribute to his virtues. He disparaged the merits of Cicero, and exalted the services of Cato in the suppression of Catilina; but both his depre- ciation and his praise were blown to the winds by the caustic irony of Caesar's reply. 2 His consort 1 Plutarch assures us that his government of this province was a great blessing to it : eurvx'? Ttvt rrjs &rapx'<" .... ical riav irpStrtifv a.Tvxtifj.dra>i> iroO\o Kol Tro.paij.vQia Bpovros fy. Caesar was exceedingly gratified at witnessing the beneficial results of his administration. Comp. Cic. Orat. 10. 34. 2 Cicero's letters to Atticus, in which this subject is mentioned (aa Ait. xii. 21.), is curious: "Catonem primum sententiam putat (Brutus) de animadversione dixisse; quam omnes ante dixerant, praeter Caesarem : et quum ipsins Csesaris tarn severa fuerit, qui turn praetorio loco dixerit, consularium putat leniores fuisse, Catuli, Servilii, Lucul- lornm, Curionis, Torquati, Lepidi, Gellii, Volcatii, Figuli, Cottae, L.Caesaris, C. Pisonis, etiam M'. Glabrionis, Silani, Murenae, designa- torura consulum." Brutus, it seems, sought to enhance Cato's merit by a deliberate falsification of history. Cicero goes on to explain why the capital sentence was ascribed to Cato's advice, namely, be- cause, though the whole party spoke and voted for it, his arguments were considered the most forcible and effective. Middleton (Life of Cicero) supposes that it was from Brutus's account, rather than Cicero's, that Sallust drew up his own narrative. He was a contem- porary and though not a witness of the scene, be required no written record to remind him of that awful debate. VOL. II. Q G 450 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xxi. Claudia he had divorced to espouse the philosopher's daughter Porcia, a woman of more masculine spirit than his own. But thus doubly connected with strength and virtue, Brutus failed nevertheless to acquire the firmness which nature had denied him. Although in his habits a professed student, he could not resolve to withdraw to the shades of philosophy from the fiery glare of a season of revolution. The thirst of lucre still beset him; the victor caressed and the vanquished courted him ; he was a greater man to-day than yesterday, and the path of official dis- tinction seemed safe and flowery. With Brutus, by circumstances a revolutionary partisan, by temper a sophist, the conspiracy would never have originated ; the admission of his inherent weakness is the fairest extenuation of his crime. But the deaths of all their more distinguished leaders had elevated him to undue importance among the remnant of his party. His uncle's renown seemed to shed its light upon him, and he was supposed to inherit the political spirit of the hero whose disciple he had avowed himself in the tranquil walks of science. The name of Brutus forced its possessor into prominence as soon as royalty began to be discussed. The Koman people were neither moralists nor genealogists, but they had im- bibed from the traditions of four hundred and fifty years an unreflecting horror of the mere title of king, and admiration not less blind for the name of the first of the Consuls. The weakness of Brutus's character may be He H cajoled estimated by the means which were em- irate " ployed to work upon him. A bit of paper affixed to the statue of the ancient hero with the words, Would thou wert alive, billets thrust into hig hand inscribed, Bi^utus, thou sleepest, thou art no Biiitus, shook the soul of the philosopher to its centre. 1 His vanity had already been excited by a 1 Plut. Brut. 9., CCES 62; Dion, xliv. 12 A.U.710-B.C.44. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 451 compliment attributed to Caesar, which was no doubt reported to him, Brutus only waits for this dry skin J ; implying that he of all the Eomans was the most capable of succeeding to pre-eminence. Cassius, who was brother-in-law to Brutus, and admitted to his familiar intimacy, watched . . , ~ , r , , . , and induced narrowly the enect ot these incentives to ^ i ^ Mume his ambition, and led him gradually to the ng point at which he could venture to disclose the deed which was in contemplation. Brutus, adroitly plied, embraced the schemes of the con- spirators, and assumed the place of chief adviser, which was, at least in appearance, tendered to him. The renewed name became at once a charm of magic potency. It raised the sick Ligarius from his bed. 2 A pardoned follower of Pompeius, the clemency of Caesar rankled in his bosom. How sad for Ligarius, said Brutus to him, to be disabled at such a moment. The sick man raised himself on his elbow and re- plied, If thou hast any project worthy of Brutus, behold, I am well again. Ligarius was admitted to the secret, and took an active part in the deed which followed. We learn with pleasure that the con- spirators did not venture even to sound Cicero. 3 Favonius withheld his countenance from them, and declared that it was better to acknowledge a master than to plunge again into the miseries of civil war. 4 The fatal intrigue was now ripening to its execution. As long as Caesar remained at Kome his fearless demeanour exposed him almost undefended to the dag- gers of assassins, for he had dismissed the guard which had at first surrounded him, and he appeared daily in the forum and the curia with no other attendance 1 Hut. Brut. 8., C(S. /. c. * Plut. BruL 11. 1 Plut. Ci'c. 17.: oXA' tSfurav ol HvSpts avrov r^v tpvaiv, is cVSeo r6\fj.-ns. Antonius, indeed, tried to fasten the charge upon him. Cic. lipp, ii. 11. 12., ad Div. xii. 3. 1'lut. Brut. 12. 452 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. xxi than that of friends and casual suitors. If the state- ment is correct that he had assembled as many as sixteen legions in Illyricum, he must have sent almost every disposable soldier out of Italy. 1 But from the moment he should leave the city and assume the com- mand of his armies, his security would be guaranteed by the fidelity of the troops; an attack upon the cherished life of the imperator would be difficult of execution, and sure of prompt punishment. Once intoxicated with the splendour of royalty in the pro- vinces, he would never consent to return a citizen to Eome. He had promised, it was said, to restore the ancient towers of Ilium, the cradle of the people of ^Eneas and Eomulus ; possibly he might transfer thither the throne which the proud nobility forbade him to establish in the Capitol. 2 Or, if the charms of Cleopatra should still retain their power, he might take up his abode in Alexandria, and transfer the seat of empire to the shrine of the Macedonian con- o'ieror. Caesar's preparations for his departure were almost The compira- complete. The senate was convened for the ezecSSir 10 Mes of March, the fifteenth day of the design. month, and at that meeting, it was con- fidently expected, the odious proposition would be openly made for conferring the royal name and power on the dictator in the provinces. The con- spirators determined to make their attack upon him 1 Appian, B.C. ii. 110. The same writer, however, speaks after- wards of e legion quartered at Home in the island of the Tiber (c. 118.). 2 Suet. Jul. 79.: " Valida fama percrebruit. miRraturum Alex- andriam yel Ilium, translatis simul opibus imperil." Lucan, ix. 998. : " Restituam populos, grata vice incenia reddent Ausonidae Phrygibus, Romanaque Pergama surgent." The Ode of Horace (Od. in. 3.), in which he deprecates a transfer of the seat of empire, shows how deep an impression this rumour had made, though I cannot imagine that Augustus could have seriously contemplated it, or that Horace would have so earnestly denounced it, if he had. See the commentators on Horace, I.e. A.U.710-B.C.44. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 453 as soon as he should enter the assembly. Among the floating stories of the day was a prediction that the Ides of March should be fatal to Caesar. He had received, it appears, intimations from more than one quarter of the danger which threatened him ; but he resolutely rejected all advice to guard himself against it 1 , relying, as he declared, implicitly on the good sense or gratitude of the citizens. It had long been the fixed principle of his philosophy that the only way to enjoy life was to banish the fear of death. 2 On the eve of the fatal day he was entertained by Lepidus, and when, in the course of conversation, some one started the question, What kind of death is the best? it was remarked that he cut short the discussion abruptly with the reply, That which is least expected. The constant tradition of antiquity declared that, among many prognostics of an im- pending catastrophe, his wife had revealed to him in the morning an ominoiis dream, and when she pre- vailed upon him to consult the sacrificers, the signs of the victims were fearfully inauspicious. 3 Whether his own superstitious feelings gained the ascendency, or whether he was overcome by the entreaties of Calpurnia, he consented at last to send Antonius to dismiss the senate, or to excuse his absence. At this moment Decimus Brutus came to attend him on his way to the place of meeting. On hearing the dic- tator's reluctant avowal of his scruples, he was struck with consternation at the prospect of the victim's escape ; for the conspirators meanwhile were in mo- mentary apprehension of discovery. Brutus himself, 1 Suet. Ju/. 86. 2 Plut. C(8. 58.; Veil. ii. 57. Certain expressions currently at- tributed to Caesar at this period of his career, ns in Cic. pro Marc. 9., " Satis diu vel naturae vixi vel gloriae," have been supposed to indicate that he was dissatisfied with life, and reckless of the perils of his position. 3 Suetonius (Jut. 81.) relates the occurrence of various prodigies. Oomp. Plutarch, Cees. 63.; Dion, xliv. 17. 454 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS CH. XII, tormented by fear or conscience, had failed to con- ceal his agitation since he had embarked in the enterprise, and his nervous excitement was shamed by the firmness of his wife, who pierced her own thigh and long concealed the wound, to extract his secret from him by this proof of her self-control. 1 With Porcia indeed the secret of the tyrannicides was secure; but not so with many of the wild un- principled men to whom it had been confided ; every moment of delay made the danger of its divulgement more imminent. Under pretence of escorting the son of Cassius, who had just assumed the gown of man- hood, the conspirators assembled early, and proceeded in a body to the portico before the theatre of Pom- peius, the place assigned for the meeting of the senate being a hall immediately adjacent. 2 It had never been the ordinary custom of the Eomans to wear arms in the city, and when the commotions of Milo and Clodius were put down, a special enactment had been introduced to check such a practice, which seemed to be creeping in through the licence and perilousness of the times. But the Koman senator carried his iron stylus in a little case, and in the place of the implement of writing the conspirators had furnished themselves each with a dagger. While awaiting the arrival of the dictator, Brutus and Cassius occupied themselves as praetors with listening to casual appli- cations, and the freedom with which the former ex- pressed himself, rebuking those who boasted that Caesar would reverse his decisions, was especially remarked. But as the morning wore on, the conspi- rators were exposed to redoubled risks. A senator, addressing Casca with a significant smile, said, You have concealed your secret from me, but Brutus has revealed it. In another moment Casca would have 1 Plut. Brut. 13. 2 Suet. Jul. 80. : '" Senatus idibus Martii* in Pompeii curiam edic- tus est." Plut. Brut. U. ; Appian, B.C. ii. 115. A.C.7 0-B.C.44. UNDER THE EMPIRE. 455 pressed his hand and communicated the design, but the other went on to allude to his meditated com- petition for the aedileship, and the conspirator saw that he was undiscovered. Popilius Laenas whispered to Brutus, What you have in hand despatch quickly, and was immediately lost in the crowd. It was never known to what he referred, but the conscious assassins were disconcerted and alarmed. 1 Meanwhile, Decimus Brutus had recovered his presence of mind. He saw that all was lost unless Caesar could be brought to the spot u finite" where the ambush awaited him. He rallied him on the weakness of Calpurnia, hinted some friendly disparagement of the hero's own resolution, and assured him that so favourable a moment might not again arrive for the sanction of his views and wishes by the decree of the subservient senators. Caesar yielded, and quitted his house. Hardly had he turned his back when a slave besought an audience of Calpurnia, declared to her that there was some design in agitation against her husband's life, and desired to be kept in confinement till the event should prove his assertion. 8 As Caesar proceeded along the Forum and Velabrum from the mansion of the chief pontiff to the theatre of Pompeius, more than one person, it seems, pressed towards him to warn him of his doom. But the conspirators to whom that part of the business was assigned crowded closely about him, and the press of his attendants was almost too great to allow of a mere stranger's approach. One man, indeed, succeeded in thrusting a paper into his band, and earnestly exhorted him to read it instantly. It was supposed tc have contained a distinct announcement of the impending danger, but Caesar was accustomed to receive petitions in this way, and paid no immediate attention to it, though 1 Plut. Brut. 14-16. * Pint. Cas. 64. 456 HISTORY OF THE ROMANS en. xxi he had it still rolled up in his hand when he entered the senate house. As he was borne along in his litter (for he affected sickness to countenance the excuse which Calpurnia had persuaded him to send to the senate) he observed complacently to the augur Spu- rinna, who had foreboded evil on that fatal day, The Ides of March are come ; Fes, muttered the sage, but not yet passed. 1 At the moment when Caesar descended from hia Cesar anaaa- litter at the door of the hall, Popilius nated. Laenas, the same who had just before spoken so mysteriously to Brutus, approached him, and was observed to enter into earnest conversation with him. The conspirators regarded one another, and mutually revealed their despair with a glance. Cassius and others were grasping their daggers beneath their robes; their last resource was to despatch them- selves. But Brutus, observing that the manner of Popilius was that of one supplicating rather than warning, restored his companions' confidence with a smile. 2 Caesar entered : his enemies closed in a dense mass around him, and while they led him to his chair kept off all intruders. Trebonius was spe- cially charged to detain Antonius in conversation at the door. Scarcely was the victim seated when Til- lius Cimber approached with a petition for his bro- ther's pardon. The others, as was concerted, joined in the supplication, grasping his hands and embracing his neck. Caesar at first put them gently aside, but, as they became more importunate, repelled them with main force. Tillius seized his toga with both hands, and pulled it violently over his arms. Then P. Casca, who was behind, drew a weapon and grazed his shoulder with an ill-directed stroke. Caesar disen- gaged one hand and snatched at the hilt, shouting, Suet. Jul. 81.; Dion, xliv. 18.; Val. Max. viii. 11. 2. Plut. Brut 16. *.U.710-B.C.44. UNDEK THE EMPIKE. 457 Cursed Casca, what means this ? Help, cried Casca to his brother Lucius, and at the same moment the others aimed each his dagger at the devoted object Caesar for an instant defended himself, and even wounded one of the assailants with his stylus; but when he distinguished Brutus in the press, and saw the steel flashing in his hand also, What ! thou too, Brutus ! he exclaimed 1 , let go his hold of Casca, and drawing his robe over his face made no further resistance. The assassins stabbed him through and through, for they had pledged themselves, one and all, to bathe their daggers in his blood. Brutus himself received a wound in their eagerness and trepidation. The victim reeled a few paces, propped by the blows he received on every side, till he fell dead at the foot of Pompeius' statue. 2 1 Kol av -rtKvov, is the expression given by Dion and Suetonius. Plutarch only says that on seeing Brutus's dagger Caesar resisted no longer. The " Et tu, Brute," with which we are familiar from Shakspeare, has no classical authority. See the commentators on Julius Ccesar. But some such exclamation seems natural; while the allusion to the pretended parentage of the assassin has an air of later invention. * Plut. Caw. 66., Brut. 17.; Suet. JuL 82.; Val. Max. iv. 5. 6.; Dion, xliv. 19. EKD OJT THE SECOND VOLUME. PKI5TKD BY BPOTTISWOODE AXD CO. LTD., NEW STREET SQUARE LONDON UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY This book is DUE on the last date stamped below Form L-9-157n-2,'36 DG 276 Meriva^e - .~54h History of 1865 the under the cop3 empire. Grad. R. R m 1S50 1 H A 000 361 909 s