'""* A 000611 006 8 SPEECH Hon. HOKIE- SMITH, AT JEFFERSON, GA., TUESDAY, AUGUST 6, 1895. Mr. I'lt'iii-iiKiit nitd Fellow Citizens: Three years ago, just after the democratic national convention was held at Chicago, I had the pleasure of addressing you. I then gave especial attention to the importance of reducing the tariff taxes. I undertook to show that a high tariff placed unjust burdens upon the agricultural classes, and that the greatest benefit which could come to you from legislation would be the reduc- tion of the tariff. If you were taxed on all the costs of production, so that you could make no profit from working your farms, you would be without money, no matter how great the volume in the country might be. Since that time a reduction of the tariff has been made by democratic efforts. The reduction was less than we hoped, but while a few democrats in the senate failed to support the bill prepared by the democrats in the house, you must not lose sight of the fact that none of the Populists in the senate stood squarely by tariff reform. x Local interests seemed to have checked their ardor. This was to be expected, for the Populist party has its chief following from a section filled with local schemes, none of them calculated to benefit the people of this state. They have great silver mines. It is, perhaps, natural that they should feel more interest in helping silver bullion than in preserving sound currency. I shall not, to-day, discuss generally the platform of the Populists. I wish to give attention especially to the money question, and to the effort now being made to commit the democrats of Georgia to the support of the free, unlimited and independent coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1. A silver dollar, as now coined, has 371J grains of pure silver in it. A gold dollar, as now coined, has 23 22-100 grains of pure gold in it. The silver dollar contains sixteen times as many grains of silver as the gold dollar does of gold ; 23 22-100 grains of pure gold, uncoined, are worth 100 cents; 37l grains of pure silver, uncoined, are worth 51 cents. The word "free," as applied to the coinage of silver, means, literally, without any charge against the bullion holder, but in general acceptation, it ins, also, unlimited, independent coinage at 16 to 1. " Unlimited " means the Government shall coin all the silver bullion that is offered for coinage, ependent " means without reference to the action of foreign countries ithoiit reference to the value the world over of silver bullion, have the proposition made that the Government of the United States >in all the silver bullion offered at the mints, putting only 371 J grains lollar, although that many grains are worth much less than a dollar, and h it requires 100 cents worth of gold for tho coinage of a gold doi 1 The 16 to 1 plan of the extreme silver men, therefore, requires the silver dollar to contain only sixteen times as many grains of silver as a gold dollar contains of gold, while a grain of gold is worth about thirty-two times as much as a grain of silver, and it proposes to allow both silver and gold to be coined in unlimited quantities at this ratio. ELAN PROPOSED WOULD CAUSE SILVER MONOMETALLISM HE FAVORS GOLD AND SILVER, BOTH. I am in favor of the use of both gold and silver as money, and my opposition to the unlimited, independent coinage of silver at 16 to 1 is not due to any hos- tility to silver, but to the firm conviction that the plan proposed will change our currency system from one which furnishes both . gold and silver to one which will furnish nothing but silver. We now have a system of limited bimet- allism. Under the plan of the extreme silver men we would have silver mono- metallism. While you should favor all the gold and silver as money which can be kept sound and eqnal in purchasing power, I urge you to oppose the free silver 16 to 1 plan, because it would not give bimetallism, but would bring the United States to the Asiatic basis of silver money only. I deny that it is possible with free, unlimited and independent coinage to keep in circulation two different metals, coined into money, where the plan of coinage does not recognize the commercial value of the bullion of each metal put into a dollar. If the proportion is so adjusted as to make the bullion of one of the metals put into a dollar of less value than the bullion of the other metal put into a dollar, and the opportunity for the coinage of both metals is unlim- ited, then the necessary result will be the coinage and use of the cheaper metal only, and the loss as money of the more valuable metal. f THE GRESHAM LAW. This is the principle frequently referred to as the Gresham law, named from Sir Thomas Gresham, who wrote on the subject of finance during the reign of Queen Elizabeth of England. He thus expresses the principle as applicable to money and business : "If debased coin is attempted to be circulated with full- valued coin, all of the latter will disappear from circulation and the over-valued and debased coin will alone remain to the ruin of our commerce and business." I shall show that unlimited coinage at 16 to 1 means the unlimited coinage of 51 cents worth of silver into dollars, which would result in a debased cur- rency, causing gold to disappear from circulation, leaving nothing but silver in use " to the ruin of our commerce and business." HISTORY OF COINAGE FROM 1792 TO 1860. For the purpose of investigating the proposition which I have just sic ask your attention first to the history of the coinage of gold and silver United States, that the practical experience of the past may show what expected in the future. In 1792 a bimetallic system of coining gold ar was adopted. It was planned by Thomas Jefferson and Alexander I Though belonging to different political parties, they agreed entirely business principles involved in the use of gold and silver as money. r-*-- UCSB LIBRARY HAMILTON'S POSITION. Mr. Hamilton, in his report as secretary of the treasury, May 5, 1791, said : "As long as gold, either from its intrinsic superiority as a metal, from its rarity, or from the prejtidice of mankind, retains such a prominence and value over silver as it hitherto has, a natural consequence of this seems to be that its condition will be more stationary. The revolutions, therefore, which may take place in the comparative value of gold and silver will be changed in the state of the latter rather than that of the former. * * * That species of coin, i. e., Spanish silver dollars, has never had any settled or standard value, according to weight or fineness, but has been permitted to circulate by tale without regard to their advantage as a mere money of convenience, while gold has had a fixed price by weight and with an eye to its fineness. The greater stability of value of the gold coin is an argument of force for regarding the money unit as having been hitherto virtually attached to gold rather than to silver. * * * 24| grains of fine gold have corresponded with the nominal value of the silver dol- lar, without regard to the successive diminutions of its intrinsic worth." JEFFERSON'S VIEW. Mr. Jefferson said ' " The proportion between the values of gold and silver is a mercantile problem altogether. * * * Just principles will lead us to 'disregard proportions altogether ; to inquire into the market price of gold in the several countries with which we shall principally be connected in commerce and to take an average from them. Perhaps we might, with safety, lean to a proportion somewhat above par for gold, considering our neighborhood and commerce with the sources of the coin. * * * It is not impossible that 15 to 1 may be found an eligible proportion. * * * The present market price of gold and silver in England is 15.5 for one ; in Russia, 15 ; in Holland, 14.75 ; Savoy, 14.6; France, 14.42; Spain, 14.03; Germany, 14.55; the average of which is 14. 673. I would be inclined to give a little more than market price for gold, because of its superior convenience of transportation. " These two great statesmen, after a careful study of the commercial value of silver and gold bullion, determined that gold was worth a little less than fifteen times as much as silver, and as they considered silver the less stable of the two metals, they intended to put a full quota of silver in a dollar to keep it even with the gold dollar. They took as a standard 24J grains of gold and multiplied it by 15, giving 371 i grains, which number they determined upon as the silver grains to be put into a dollar. They did not, for one moment, pretend .that a plan of free and unlimited coinage by the United States would increase the value of silver or gold bullion, and they recognized the Gresham law that bi-metallism could not exist unless the uncoined silver put into a dollar was of equal value with the uncoined gold put into a dollar. At that time international transpor- tation and communication were limited. For a while both gold and silver were used ; but in 1806, by the direction of Mr. Jefferson, who was then president, the coinage of silver dollars was suspended, under the following order, issued by the then secretary of state : DEPARTMENT or STATE, May 6, 1806. BOBERT PATTERSON, Esq., Director of the Mint : SIR In consequence of a representation from the director of the bank of the United States that considerable purchases have been made of dollars coined at the mint for the purpose of exporting them, and as it is probable that further purchases and exportation will be made, the president directs that the silver coined at the mint shall be of smaller denominations, so that the value of the largest piece shall not exceed a half a dollar. I am, etc., (Signed) JAMES MADISON. Thus it was, as far back as 1806, that Mr. Jefferson, while believing in a bi- metallic currency, recognized the principle that it may at times be necessary to throw restrictions around the coinage of a metal to accomplish the ultimate purpose of the use of both metals. And from 1806, for thirty years, no silver dollars were coined. William H. Crawford, Georgia's most distinguished son, in 1820, when secre- tary of the treasury, discussed the same principle which Mr. Jefferson pre- sented, and held that bi-metallism was impossible unless the proportion of gold and silver put into a coined dollar was fixed by the commercial value of the bullion of each metal before coinage. That is to say, the silver put into a dollar must be worth a hundred cents before it is coined, and the gold put into a dollar must be worth a hundred cents before it is coined. 15 TO 1 FIKST RATIO CAUSED SILVER STANDARD. As before stated, the plan of coinage adopted first was 15 to 1 ; that is to say, fifteen times as many grains of silver as of gold were put into a dollar. But Jefferson and Hamilton were mistaken as to the commercial value of silver, or else its value decreased, for after a few years from the time when the law was passed, in 1792, fifteen grains of silver had ceased to be worth as much as one grain of gold. The result was, gold went out of circulation. It was coined only in limited quantities, and that for shipment. The United States went to the silver standard. Silver was practically the otly money in circulation, and although the difference between the value of the silver bullion put into a dollar and the value of the gold bullion put into a dollar was less than 5 per cent., unlimited coinage of silver failed to raise the value of silver bullion this small amount. JACKSON APPROVED CHANGE OF RATIO. In 1834 Andrew Jackson was president. Thomas H. Benton was the great democratic leader in the senate. He declared, in the senate, that bimetallism was impossible at the ratio of 15 to 1, and called attention to the fact that the United States was on the single silver standard. Recognizing the necessity of bringing the coinage ratio to the commercial ratio of the two metals, and seeing that it 'was impossible for unlimited coinage to substantially affect the value of either metal, President Jackson approved an act of congress changing the ratio from 15 to 1 to 16 to 1. To accomplish this he reduced the number of grains of gold put into a dollar to 23 22-100. He took this course to avoid a change of the existing standard. As transactions were then measured by the commercial value of 371 J grains of silver, he reduced the gold put into a dollar so that the grains of gold which made a dollar should have the commercial value of the existing measure of values, the grains of silver put into a dollar. President Jackson therefore went upon record in favor of the following propositions : First, that unlimited coinage of silver and gold would not increase the value of silver bullion 5 per cent. ; second, that with the silver bullion put into a dollar commercially worth 5 per cent, less than the gold bullion put into a dollar, bimetallism could not exist, but silver monometallism would exist ; third, that it was advisable, under such condition of affairs, not to continue unlimited coinage of both metals at a ratio which did not recognize the commercial value of the bullion put into a dollar, but that it was necessary to change the ratio, putting in more grains of silver in proportion to the grains of gold used prior to that date. 16 TO 1 SECOND RATIO CAUSED THE GOLD STANDARD. In a short time it was found that 16 to 1 was not a correct ratio between the value of silver and gold, but that 16 grains of silver were worth more than 1 grain of gold. The Gresham law, the principle for which I am contending, at once came into play and silver went out of circulation. We went to the gold standard, and silver, if coined at all, was coined for exportation, the object being simply to designate by the stamp of the Government the fact that a piece of silver bullion marked a dollar had 371 J grains of silver in it. A silver dollar could be melted down and sold, when melted, for about three cents more than its value as coined money. This fact caused great scarcity in small change, because even the half dollars and the quarters were worth more for bar silver than for money at their coined value. In 1853 it became, therefore, necessary to lessen the amount of silver put into halves and quarters so that they would not be melted into bar silver. This was done, and all silver of denominations less than a dollar after 1853 were made subsidiary silver. That is to say, they were good for the payment of debts only to a limited amount, namely, five dollars. No man could compel another to accept eleven silver half dollars in payment of five dollars and a half of debts or in payment of any sum above five dollars. In 1876 subsidiary silver was made legal tender to the amount of $10. CHANGES OF 1853 AND 1857. The reports of the Treasury Department show that practically none of the silver coined in the United States prior to 1853 was left in circulation, but that whether it consisted of pieces of the denominations of one dollar, or fifty cents , or less, it had been melted down into bar silver, being more valuable for com- mercial purposes than for money when coined. During this time, however, more or less of foreign silver remained in circulation. The highest volume of this silver, at any one time, has been estimated by the treasury department officers, and is fixed at $50,000,000. In 1857 the foreign silver was demonetized and the coin currency of the United States was left to consist of gold and of subsidiary silver. In addition to the coin, bank notes were used as money. During the war, large quantities of treasury notes promises by the Govern- ment to pay on demand were issued. They were generally known as green- backs. Gold remained the standard, but greenbacks constituted the circulating medium. In 1873 all provision for the coinage of legal tender silver dollars was omitted from the act revising and amending the laws relative to mints and coin- age in the United States. This act, however, continued the coinage of sub- sidiary silver, and subsidiary silver has been coined as freely since 1873 and con- tinues to be coined as freely now as it ever has been since the act of 1853. THE ACT OF 1873. There are many important and valuable provisions applicable to the mints and to coinage in the act of 1873. It is no doubt true that there were congress- men who did not know all of its provisions. I do not care to discuss the cir- 6 cumstances under -which the act became a law. The debate upon its passage was elaborate ; but even if the provisions of the act were misunderstood by some, there is no reason why we should now adopt the system which existed prior to that time unless it can be shown that by adopting it benefits will accrue to the public. Certainly this is no reason if by its adoption injury would come to the public. PRESENT CONDITION OF OTJR SILVER COIN. By the act of 1874 silver was demonetized, but in 1878 the act of 1874 was repealed, silver was remonetized, and under the terms of the Bland- Allison act we began the coinage of $2,000,000 of silver each month, every dollar of which is full legal tender. This was kept up until 1890, when the Sherman purchasing act was passed as a substitute for the Bland-Allison act. By the Sherman pur- chasing act the United States bought 4,500,000 ounces of silver bullion each month. The silver purchased under this last act was not all coined, but treasury notes were issued against it. Under these two laws we have coined, since 1878, 423,289,000 standard silver dollars, which are full legal tender, good for the payment of every debt. We have issued 146,088,000 United States treasury notes, based upon silver bullion now in the treasury, that furnished an additional currency based upon siver. This bullion when coined will furnish about $50,000,000 additional silver, besides being sufficient to redeem the United States treasury notes based upon it. About $12,000,000 of the treasury notes based upon this silver bullion, have been taken up and canceled by the present secretary of the treasury and silver dollars issued in their stead. When we began the coinage of silver dollars under the act of 1878, 37l grains of silver were worth almost 100 cents and it was confidently believed that a large use of silver by the United States would carry the value of 371 J grains of silver up to a dollar. This hope was not realized, and even with the enormous increase of purchase of silver by the Sherman act of 1890, silver fell from 1890 to the present time about 40 per cent. , until the silver contained in a dollar is now worth only half a dollar. By the credit of the Government the silver dollars are maintained equal to the gold dollars. The strain upon the treasury in part from this burden became so great that general distrust was caused, and in 1893 it was necessary to suspend the further accumulation of silver bullion in the treasury, and the purchasing clause of the Sherman law was repealed. SILVER MONET IN 1873, AND SILVER MONET NOW. In 1873, when the act so much denounced was passed, there was no silver in circulation in the United States, and the only silver coin in the United States consisted of subsidiary silver, amounting to $17,000,000. There is now $76,772,000 of subsidiary silver coin. The coinage of subsidiary silver has never been suspended and the mints are increasing the volume of subsidiary coin more rapidly at the present time than at almost any other period of our history, so that in considering the effect of the legislation of 1873, we can eliminate the question of subsidiary coin, because we have more of it to-day, by far, than ever before in the history of our country, and it will continue to in- crease in volume just as fast as it is needed or called for at the treasury. There were no silver dollars in circulation in 1873. They had formed no part of our currency since 1834. Only 8,031,000 silver dollars had been coined from 1792 to 1873 ; $76,734,964 of fractional silver had been coined prior to 1853, when fractional silver was made subsidiary ; but, as before stated, the cause of the legislation in 1853, which made fractional silver subsidiary and reduced the amount of silver bullion put into fractional silver, was the fact that the fractional silver already coined contained silver bullion worth more than the face of the coin, and it was melted down into bar silver or shipped out of the country, so that it formed no part of the actual money used in the United States. What, then, has been the change, so far as silver is concerned, since 1873 ? From 1834= to 1873 we had no silver actually in circulation except $50,000,000 of foreign coin, which was demonetized in 1857, and the subsidiary fractional currency coined after the act of 1853. In the last twenty years we have in- creased the subsidiary silver to four times as much as we had then, and we have coined 423,289,000 standard silver dollars of full legal tender. Of these stand- ard silver dollars 397,000,000 are in circulation among the people. Either the silver dollars themselves are circulating, or else silver certificates are circulating in place of the dollars, the silver certificates being simply receipts for the silver dollars, payable at the treasury with silver dollars only, and issued on account of the fact that they can be handled with much more ease than actual silver, especially when amounts are large. So it will be seen that under the legislation which has followed the act of '73, the people have been given an opportunity to use infinitely more silver than was ever in circulation in the United States prior to 1873. I repeat that the standard silver dollars are still full legal-tender dollars, and the subsidiary silver is still being coined just as rapidly as at any time since 1853 The coined gold in the United States now in the treasury and in circulation amounts to $678,569,000. The gold and silver of full legal tender amounts to $1,110,848,000. There was no silver of full legal tender in 1873, and the gold coin at that time amounted to only 8135,000,000. It is thus seen that the money of ultimate payment in the United States at the present time is eight times as much as it was in 1873. The paper money, including bank notes, in '73, was about equal to the amount now in use. No one can claim that the volume of business in this country has increased since 1873 as rapidly as the volume of money has increased. If we make the per capita comparison, in 1873 it was between $18 and $19. Now it is $24. Or, going back to 1860, it was $14 ; in 1850, $12. The per capita of silver is now $9.08. It was never so much before in the history of the United States. Nor has any country -which allows free and unlimited coinage of both gold and silver so much silver per capita as the United States. Mexico has only $4.13 ; Japan, $2.14. NO CONTRACTION OF CURRENCY. The facts that I have given show that there has been no contraction of the money of final payment in the United States since 1873, but that both the vol- ume in proportion to the business and the per capita is larger and has been larger for the past few years than at any time during our prior history. If financial troubles have come upon the country it will not do to accept the first suggestion as their cause, or the first remedy proposed as their cure. A patient may be sick ; proof that lie is sick does not show conclusively that the first medicine suggested by a quack doctor will certainly give a cure. The currency of the United States has been contracted during the past few years; but to understand this contraction, it is necessary to bear in mind that 95 per cent, of business transactions are conducted by the use of checks and drafts, of bills of exchange and bills of credit. Only about five per cent, use actual money for the purpose of making exchanges. Confidence is the basis of credit. Destroy it, and contraction and panic must necessarily follow. With the cessation of credit as the basis of exchange, follows also a timidity about the use of actual money. Investment ceases and money becomes in- active. Inflation is the quack remedy for inactivity on the part of money; if accepted by the patient it would increase his fever and probably kill him. The restoration of confidence is the medicine which the trained physician will give, and if the patient takes it he must only wait a reasonable time for his gradual and certain recovery. MONEY AND ITS USE. It is well to keep in mind the fact that the only object of money is to enable the man who has something he does not care to keep to swap it off and get something that he would rather have. You swap your cotton for money that you may swap that money for something you need at home, for better agricul- tural implements, or, perhaps, for more land. The money which you take, when you give up that which you do not desire to keep, should be of such fixed value that it will be worth just as much when you wish to swap it off and get something you intend to keep, as when you received it. It also should be in such shape as to make it easy for transporta- tion and convenient to handle. It must have a fixed value, a recognized value, so that the men with whom you desire to exchange the money will recognize it just as you recognized it when you took it in exchange for the thing you sold. A great many different kinds of moneys have been used shells, skins, tobacco. At one time cows were used as money because they could be shipped and had a recognized value. A man would buy a piece of land for so many cows, payable in the fall. Shrewd men sought to relieve themselves somewhat of the burden of promises to pay, and got into the habit, after making contracts for the purchase of something which was to be paid for in the future by so many cows, of stopping the feed of the cows. They paid the cows as promised but allowed their value to decrease. This was carried to such an extent that a law was passed forbidding men to pay their debts in "lean kine." The early settlers of Virginia bought their cattle, and sometimes, it is even claimed, their wives, with tobacco, at so much a pound. The tobacco was used as money because it had a recognized value. A pound of tobacco was worth a fixed sum, and this recognized value made it useful as money as a medium of exchange. The stamp does not make the value of the money. Suppose some bright trader had marked two pounds on one pound of tobacco ? Do you suppose that the mark would have given to the pound of tobacco any more exchange- able power ? Suppose when skins were used as money some one had marked "t\vo skins "on one skin, do you suppose the two-skin stamp would have added to the exchangeable quality or the purchasing power of the single skin ? Yet the extreme silver people wish silver in unlimited quantities stamped one hundred cents -when only worth 50 cents. They wish to remove the credit of the Government from the silver dollar to let it rest simply u pon its bullion value, and stamp upon a piece of silver bullion twice its actual value. The stamp would increase the value of the bullion, under such circumstances, about as much as the stamp of "two skins " on the single skin would have increased the purchasing power of the one skin when skins were used fcr money. Another illustration, familiar to all of you, is found in the history of the money issued by the Confederate States. At first all notes or paper money were good for their face value, as perfect confidence in the ability of the Con- federate States to pay their promises existed. But as the war went on, and as it became impossible for the treasury of the Confederate States to give some- thing of actual value for these paper promises to pay when they were presented at the treasury, they became depreciated and fell, first a small per cent., then a larger and a larger per cent. , until finally men paid five hundred dollars for a saucer of ice-cream or for a cigar. Now the notes are utterly worthless. They were valuable at first because the Government was supposed to be able to give something of actual value in settlement of its promises. They became less and less valuable as this prospect grew less and less, and finally became of no value when the prospect was gone. While the failing credit of the confederacy left its paper money worthless, a German, living nearDahlonega, coined on his own account gold, and his stamp upon five dollars of gold gave it circulation through north Georgia. Although he is dead, the coins are still worth their face, for the gold is in them. UNITED STATES MONET. Our money consists of gold, silver and paper. The paper is the promise of the Government to pay in coin, or else receipts for the deposit of gold or silver, together with bank notes. The paper money, no matter of what denomination, is a promise to give something of actual value, and so long as the holders of this paper money know that on demand they can get the something of actual value by calling for it, the paper money is as good as the coined money the thing of actual value and is not presented for redemption. The gold coin is simply the stamp of the Government upon so many grains of gold. The grains unstamped are worth as much as they are stamped. You can take a ten-dollar gold coin and melt it down and get ten dollars for it after it is melted. It is good the world over for ten dollars because the stamp tells the truth it says that the Government has coined ten dollars' worth of gold, and as it really has coined ten dollars' worth of gold, the credit of the Government is not needed to keep the coin good. The thing has its actual value, uncoined, and, therefore, has the same value after it is coined. This is the kind of money which Jefferson and Jackson, Crawford, Benton, Cobb and Hill advocated. Our silver money rests in part upon the credit of the Government. It is not an ideal money. Every silver dollar ought to have one hundred cents' worth of silver bullion in it, but in 1834 we adopted the ratio of 16 to 1. In 1878 it was believed that the volume we proposed to coin would carry 371 1-4 grains of silver up to par ; we coined nearly $400,000,000 under the act of 1878. Silver did not go to par, and we more than doubled the amount we were using by the provisions of the act of '90 for the purchase of 4,500,000 ounces of silver a month. We continued the ratio of 16 to 1, hoping by this large increase of 10 demand for silver to carry it to par. This experiment also failed, and the failure, as before Stated, began to fill the country with distrust of the power of the Government to keep the silver dollar, intrinsically worth less than a dollar, from dropping below its coinage face value to its intrinsical bullion value. HOW THE GOVERNMENT SUSTAINS THE SILVER DOLLAR WITH THE GOLD DOLLAR. I have stated that we have, in round numbers, 400,000,000 of silver dollars, of full legal tender, in actual circulation among the people, besides the subsidiary silver. The Government collects each year about 8500,000,000 of revenue. It says to the people, you can pay to the Government anything you owe in silver dollars at their coinage value. The Government stamped them and allowed them put among the people as good. The Government is ready to take them at the value which it fixed upon them when they were coined. On the other hand, when the Government owes money, it has pursued the practice since 1878 of saying to those it owes, that the silver dollar and the gold dollar have each received the stamp of the Government, declaring their value, and the Govern- ment declines to discriminate between them. It will not say to you, you must take one or the other. As the Government maintains them equally good, it lets you have, when it owes you, whichever you prefer. Thus the credit of the Gov- ernment has been placed behind the silver dollar to keep it as good as its face value. To preserve the ability of the Government to sustain the credit of the silver dollars which it coins, it has been necessary for the Government to buy the bullion at the market price, and to take the difference between the amount act- ually put into a dollar, 374 grains of silver, and the amount of silver which is bought with a dollar. It was necessary to limit the quantity of these dollars which the Government put out, or else the volume would become so great that the financial resources of the Government could not carry the burden of sus- taining the dollars at their face value. The repeal of the purchasing clause of the Sherman law was necessary, be- cause the quantity of these dollars was becoming so large, increasing each month at the rate of 4,500,000 ounces of silver, that confidence in the strength of the Government to sustain these dollars was beginning to be shaken, and with that fact came a distrust of our entire currency system. Congress, therefore, repea ed the purchasing clause of the Sherman law, and for a time the purchase of silver bullion, except for subsidiary silver coin- age, has been suspended. The treasury is coining the silver bullion now in the treasury, bought under the act of '90, as fast as the coined dollars are absorbed in business, and the United States treasury notes are being redeemed with this silver. The process will continue as rapidly as practicable until the entire amount of silver bullion now in the treasury is coined and the United States treasury notes have all been redeemed. The seigniorage which will result from this coinage will, together with the dollars used for the redemp- tion of the treasury notes, carry our actual silver circulation up to over $600,- 000,000. But the silver dollar has been kept good, as heretofore explained, by the credit of the Government, and the credit of the Government has been able to sustain the silver dollars, because the quantity coined was limited. The proposition of the extreme silver people is to take down the limit, to open the mints to the unlimited coinage of silver dollars with 371J grains of silver in each dollar, although the bullion is worth only fifty cents. They propose to withdraw from the support of our silver dollars the very thing which has kept them good. 11 It is this proposition which I am opposing, not for the purpose of striking down silver, but for the purpose of preventing the extreme silver men from striking down our silver dollars. ALLEGED APPKECIATION OF GOLD FALL IN SILVER HAS NOT REDUCED VALUE OF COMMODITIES. The extreme silver advocates contend that gold has appreciated in value, and that the unlimited coinage of silver is necessary to overcome the depre- ciation in the value of products by reason of the appreciation of gold. I have already shown that the sale of property for money is a mere exchange of a thing of value for something else of value. If gold has appreciated, then when I exchange a thing which has not changed in value, for gold, I would expect to receive less gold than prior to the time when gold appreciated. If 23.22 grains of gold are worth more to-day than they were twenty years ago, then I would not expect to receive as many grains of gold for my labor as I received at that time unless my labor had itself appreciated in value also. But if we compare the prices of labor at the present time with those of twenty years ago, we find that an advance of 12 per cent, has been made under the gold standard in the average wages of employees. While commodities have averaged a fall of 20 per cent. , the heav- iest declines have been in those lines which the masses of the people buy, and these reductions can be attributed to a lessened cost of production and to the recent panic. While commodities have fallen 20 per cent., silver has fallen 50 per cent. In 1873 corn sold for 41 cents a bushel ; silver was worth $1.31 an ounce. In 1895 corn sold for 52 cents and silver is worth 66 cents an ounce. Silver has fallen 50 per cent, and corn has risen 25 per cent. In 1873 wheat was worth 1.17 a bushel and silver $1.31 an ounce. In 1878 wheat was worth 31.34 a bushel, silver 81.15 an ounce. In 1889, wheat, 90 cents, silver, $1.04; 1895, wheat, 85 cents and silver 66 cents. COTTON AS INFLUENCED BY SILVEB. Cotton is the product in which you are directly interested. The claim that the value of cotton has been depreciated by the rise in gold or the fall of silver has been shown this year to be without foundation. Cotton in the last four months has risen 30 per cent. ; silver, only 5 per cent. Prior to 1873 the price of cotton varied from 4 to 40 cents per pound. Silver never fell below 1.29 an ounce. In 1845 cotton sold for 4 cents and silver was then worth $1.30 an ounce. QUANTITY OF GOLD. There has been an enormous increase in the production of gold during the last four years. Last year the world's product of gold amounted to 181, 500, 000. This was the largest quantity of gold ever mined in any one year in the world's history. Keports already received for the present year indicate that the output of gold will amount to 200,000,000 this year. The discovery of large gold deposits and new machinery recently invented for the purpose of mining gold will have the tendency to lessen very much the cost of producing it, to increase the volume of the product, and to prevent the possibility of its becoming too scarce to perform its part as money for the world. Besides, it must be borne in mind that even in those countries thai? adhere to the gold standard a large 12 amount of silver is being used, sustained in part by the credit of the Govern- ments, but which nevertheless lessens the demand upon gold as money of final payment. The world's coinage in gold for 1893 rose to $232,785,000 and that of silver to $135,389,000, making the largest yearly original coinage in the world's history. The world's stock in full legal-tender gold and silver to-day is by the latest statistics $3,965,900,000 of gold and $3,435,800,000 of silver. DOUBTFUL EXPERIMENTS NOT JUSTIFIED. I present these facts to show that there is no pressing necessity caused by contraction of money of final payment which' can justify an experiment in silver coinage both reckless and dangerous. I know that by extreme silver men the volume of debts in this country is compared with the volume of money, and they practically claim that the volume of money should equal them. This con- tention is so foolish that it scarcely deserves notice. Everyone must know that a dollar is not consumed by its use in paying a debt. The same dollar is capable of making innumerable transactions. A pays it to B, B to C, C to D, and so on to Z. Z may pay it to A. It would serve twenty-four times to pay debts and return again to A just as ready for use as ever. Besides, 95 per cent, of transac- tions are paid by checks without actual money being used at all. WILL SILVEK BULLION KISE OE SILVEE DOLLAES FALL ? But the extreme free silver advocates contend that the unlimited coinage of silver will enhance the value of silver bullion put into a dollar aud make it worth a dollar. They say that, so soon as you give the unlimited right to every 371i grains of silver to be coined without charge into a dollar, 371 grains of silver will be interchangeable with a coined silver dollar, and that therefore silver will appreciate in value at once to its coinage ratio. I admit that, when 371i grains of silver is allowed to be coined in unlimited quantities and free of charge into dollars, then 371 J- grains of silver will be worth uncoined as much as the silver dollar coined from them, but the dollar would be worth only 37l grains of silver. My contention from the very first has been, not that the silver put into a dollar, under free, unlimited coinage, would be worth less than the dollar, but that the dollar would become worth no more than the bullion. At the present time one of our silver dollars will buy two Mexican silver dollars. Five of our silver dollars can be exchanged for a five-dollar gold piece. At pre- sent the credit of the Government keeps the silver dollar up to twice the value of the bullion put into it. When this credit is- withdrawn, when the limit now put upon the amount coined is also removed, will the silver dollar drop to its bullion value and be worth no more than the Mexican dollar, and will it take then ten silver dollars to buy one five-dollar gold piece ? Of course, the silver dollar and the bullion put into it, with free, unlimited coinage, will have the same value ; but will the bullion rise or the dollar fall ? The grains now proposed to be put into a dollar are 371i. If you reduce the number to a hundred grains, if you reduce the number to ten grains yes, if you reduce the number to one grain, and give free, unlimited coinage, the one grain uncoined would be worth an American dollar, but the American dollar would be worth no more than the one grain. If you adopt chips and allow any one with a chip one-eighth of an inch thick and an inch in diameter to have it coined or stamped one dollar, without charge and in unlimited quantities, the chip uncoined or unstamped would be worth as much as the dollar after it 13 is stamped, but the dollar after it is stamped -would be worth no more than the chip. This argument by the free silver people throws a just insight into their cause and shows how fallacious is their entire position. The question really is, what effect would unlimited coinage, by the United States alone, have upon the value of silver bullion ? It, of course, would leave the bullion worth as much as our silver dollars, but unless it raised the value of silver bullion throughout the world, it would depreciate the value of our new dollars. THE RE-ENACTMENT OF THE LAW PEIOB TO 1873 WOULD NOT EESTOBE SILVER. It is claimed that silver was struck down by the act of 1873, and we are urged to remove the blow and to restore silver. If our action was the sole cause of the depreciation of silver, and if the restoration of the legislation which existed in the United States prior to 1873 would put silver bullion back to its former value, no one would urge more earnestly than myself the legislation sought. But we must understand the history of the fall in silver before we embark in so wild an enterprise. ACTION OF OTHER COUNTRIES. Between 1871 and 1872, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Germany passed legislation which went into effect in 1873 and 1874, by which silver was practi- cally demonetized in those countries. Subsequently Holland, Russia, Austria, Hungary, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Italy, Greece, India, Argentine Republic, Brazil and Chili demonetized or suspended the unlimited coinage of silver. If the fall of silver has been due to the adverse action of countries which have demonetized or suspended the coinage of silver, then it has been the result of the action of seventeen countries and not of one. The reversal of such action by the United States, or restoration by the United States of the law in force prior to 1873, would remove the cause of that fall so far as the United States pro- duced that fall, but it would not remove the effect of the action of the balance of the countries. If all of these causes produced the fall, it would be utterly illogical to claim that the removal of one would remove the effect of all. The mere examination of the number of countries which have acted adversely to silver since 1873, shows that the action of the United States could have been but a small part of the cause of the fall of silver, and therefore the reversal of such action could but in small part restore the value of silver bullion. INCREASED PRODUCT OF SILVER. But the great cause of the fall of silver is probably due, not to the action of nations, but to the increase of the amount mined. The entire quantity of sil- ver mined during the year 1873 was $81,000,000. The amount mined in 1894 was $214,000,000. The price of silver had fallen 50 per cent., but so great had been the reduction of the cost of mining silver, by the use of new mechanical contrivances, and so much had the cost of transporting silver to market been lessened by the construction of new railroads in the United States and in Mex- ico and other countries, that although silver fell one-half in its market price, the men engaged in silver mining found it sufficiently profitable to justify them in increasing the amount produced to three times as much as it was when the price was twice as large. The effort to raise the value of silver involves an effort to raise the value of all that may be mined. If silver can be mined at a profit at sixty-six cents an 14 ounce, how tremendous will be the quantity mined when you raise the value of silver to one hundred and twenty-nine cents an ounce, which is the increase necessary to make 371 i grains of silver worth a dollar. If it were possible to put a profit on silver mining largely over 100 per cent, by this increase in the value of silver bullion, it would pay the money and energy of the world to turn its attention from everything else to silver mining, and the output would sim- ply be beyond human estimate. BTTLLJON ALKEADY COINED. Again, the coined silver now in the world amounts to $4,000,000,000. About one-half of it is sustained artificially by the governments coining it, at its coinage value, just as the United States sustains the $400,000,000 in circulation here. But one-half of it is down to its bullion value. Take the silver of Mexico, Japan, China and the little South American states their silver dol- lars have dropped from coinage value to bullion value. It requires 740 grains of Mexican coined silver to buy one dollar of silver coined by the United States. When we raise the value of our silver, the silver of the world must increase to the same price which silver brings in the United States, less the cost of trans- portation. When, therefore, we undertake by unlimited coinage to lift the value of the silver bullion to put into our dollar, by merely opening our mints to its free coinage, to twice the present value of silver bullion, we will undertake at once, to lift the value of $4,000,000,000 of silver bullion already coined throughout the world to twice its present value, as well as to lift the bullion dug each year out of the mines, no matter how great it may be in volume. To state this proposition shows how ridiculous is the contention of the extreme silver men. THE "TBY IT" ABGUMENT. But it is urged that we should try it and see. A man who did not know how to swim would "be foolish to jump into deep water and try to see how it would affect him. But we have tried it. We tried it from 1792 to 1834, and failed to raise the price of silver three per cent, to make it even with gold at the ratio of 15 to 1. We tried it from 1834 to 1860, and failed to raise the price of gold bullion between 3 and 5 per cent, to make it equal with silver at the ratio of 16 to 1. In 1873 the Latin Union, composed of France, Belgium, Italy, Switzer- land and Greece, wedded to the free and unlimited coinage of silver, found, when Germany threw $300,000,000 of silver bullion upon the market, that free and unlimited coinage of silver by their mints failed to keep up the value of silver with gold at the ratio at which they were coining silver, and they were com- pelled, nmch against their wishes, to suspend the unlimited coinage of silver year by year for four years, until finally they indefinitely suspended it in 1878. We tried it and failed. They tried it and failed, and were compelled to quit it. Mexico, Japan, and the other countries that are allowing free and unlimited coinage, to-day, are trying it. What is the result ? Their dollars are down to the bullion value of silver one-half the value of our dollars. History and reason both demonstrate the fact that while unlimited coinage of silver by the United States alone might increase somewhat the value of silver bullion, it would be entirely impossible to lift it to twice its present value, and-that our new dollar would, therefore, fall to about one-half its present value, and be 15 depreciated to the commercial value of the silver put into it to the standard of the Mexican dollar. THE UNITED STATES COULD ACT ALONE. We are told the United States is a great country ; that we ought not to be governed, or dictated to, by Europe, by England ; that we should establish our own system, and are big enough to do it. This is a species of demagoguism which enjoys my unlimited contempt. Of course we could establish our own system independent of anybody else. We could adopt iron as money if we wanted to, but it would be a very foolish thing to do. We could go back to cows, skins and tobacco this, indeed, would be the money of our forefathers ; but the United States can no more fix absolutely the price of gold and silver, independent of the balance of the countries of the world, than she can fix the price of wool, or cotton, or machinery, or ship transportation. She can adopt any system she pleases, but she can't make 16 ounces of silver worth 1 ounce of gold. We can use silver alone, or anything else which is cheap, as money. We can tax our foreign trade by a high tariff or in any other way we wish. We can adopt free, unlimited, independent coinage of silver at 16 to 1, but by doing so we should expect the logical result of such a course. We would use nothing but silver, give up all gold and depreciate our currency one-half. DIFFICULTIES WHICH SURROUND THE DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION. When Mr. Cleveland retired as president, on March 4, 1889, he left the treas- ury full of money, a large surplus having been caused by an economic admin- istration of public affairs during his four years of service. When he returned to office, four years later, he found the surplus practically squandered, the tariff taxation increased by the passage of the McKinley bill, and appropriations made for the ensuing year amounting to $90,000,000 in excess of the revenue which could be raised by the existing legislation. Gold had been leaving the United States in great quantities ; the large increase of silver had created a distrust lest the credit of the Government would not be strong enough to keep a dollar con- taining fifty cents' worth of bullion in circulation at double its bullion value. Twelve millions of dollars ($12,000,000) had left the United States per month during the last three months of the Harrison administration, and already the republican administration, recognizing the condition of the treasury, had pre- pared for the issue of bonds to sustain it against their own mismanagement. All over the country people were out of employment, manufactories were closing and prices were becoming depressed. No democrat will charge these condi- tions upon a democratic administration. They were burdens it was compelled to carry for which it was not responsible. THE PANIC OF 1893. The panic of 1893 came upon us, as panics have come periodically, about every twenty years, and as they will continue to come in the future ; but it was made more severe, on account of the fact that we were living under a system of high-tariff taxation, which absorbed the money that should have been dis- tributed among the masses for their labor, and put it in the pockets of a few protected classes. It was made worse on account of the fact that the enormous volume of silver which had been put in circulation, coupled with the weakened 16 condition of the national treasury, created great doubt lest the credit of the Government would not be strong enough to keep silver in circulation at its face value. At the instance of a democratic administration the purchasing clause of the Sherman law was repealed and the burden of keeping additional silver at twice its actual value in circulation was removed from the Government. The McKinley law has been repealed, and a new tariff bill, though not satis- factory, infinitely better than those of previous years, has become a law. Busi- ness, in the mean time, however, had become thoroughly prostrate, thousands of men had been thrown out of employment and want and suffering spread over the land. But with the removal of two great causes, business began somewhat to revive. It was checked for a while by the unwise effort to pass through congress legislation in favor of the unlimited coinage of silver. Limited coin- age of silver had helped to prostrate the business of the country ; unlimited coinage would have destroyed it. The democratic administration, in the mean time, was called upon to meet demand notes, known as greenbacks. The gen- eral distrust had caused the holders of these paper promises 'to pay of the Government to call for something of actual value in their place. The administration has been criticised for issuing bonds in time of peace. The bonds were issued to meet demand notes issued in time of war. But even had it been otherwise it would have been better, if the expenses of the Gov- ernment were temporarily greater than the receipts, to have borrowed money at a low rate of interest to have met those expenses, rather than to have levied additional taxes upon the people when money could only have been obtained by the public at great expense. The adjournment of Congress relieved the public mind from fear of further silver legislation. The courageous action of the democratic president and secretary of the treasury in issuing bonds to pre- serve the credit of the Government, restored confidence to a great extent, and business at once revived. Manufactories all over the country have again opened ; thousands of men who have been idle are at work ; the wages of more than a million of laboring men have been voluntarily increased, the two great causes which intensified the panic of 1893 have been removed, and there is every reason to believe that we have entered upon the onward march toward a degree of prosperity never before known in this country. It is true that agricultural products have not been returned to the full prices which they brought a few years back, but there is a tendency to improve all along the line, and as the immediate responsibilities incurred by reason of months of idleness have been met, the masses will be able to wear more and bet- ter clothes, to eat more and better food, and all the products of our country will feel the effects of prosperous times. I do not mean that I am opposed to further legislation in the direction of improving the financial system of the United States. I am in favor of it. The secretary of the treasury sent to congress a plan which would have furnished an elastic currency. It embraced the repeal of the ten per cent, tax on state banks. The president indorsed the plan. It was prevented from reaching a vote by free-silver democrats and populists. I still believe that legislation upon the line indicated should be enacted. But the wail which goes up from the populists and misguided democrats upon the subject of a contracted currency and which urges bad money as a remedy, instead of being one which would be beneficial to the people, would prove their greatest injury. 17 There is a growing sentiment among the great nations of the world to en- large the use of silver. The course of the United States during the last two years has strengthened this sentiment. The way for us to help those engaged abroad in this work is to let it be seen that we can command what gold we need, and that other countries are as much interested in the movement as we. I think legislation immediately retiring all money below ten dollars except silver, which was partially urged by Hon. B. H. Hill in 1878, would be wise and helpful . THE EXAMPLE OF FRANCE. The condition of France is often referred to. France has more money per capita than any other country in the world. But the paper and silver money of France combined (those being the moneys which need the support of the Government to sustain them) are not as much per capita as the paper and silver in the United States. Where France has her advantage of us is in her very large per capita of gold. France has $21.54 per capita of gold. And this gold has poured into France since 1874, when she suspended the unlimited coinage of silver and adopted limited bimetallism. I mention this, not for the purpose of urging that this country shall not change from the present plan of limited coinage of silver, but to show that the alleged injury from the present plan if France is taken as an illustration might prove not an injury but a benefit. OPINION OF GREAT BIMETALLISTS. The greatest advocates of bimetallism oppose unlimited, independent coin- age. The fact should not be lost sight of that the greatest students of finance, who advocate a bimetallic currency oppose unlimited, independent coinage at 16 to 1. Perhaps the ablest writer and thinker upon this subject in the United States is Dr. Andrews, who represented this country at the last international monetary conference. In his work, "As HONEST DOLLAR," although he urges many arguments in favor of a bimetallic currency, he declares : "Neither the United States nor any other nation would be wise in undertaking, alone, to rein- state silver. The result of such an effort, I think, would be that the nation making it would simply bid farewell to the gold-using section of mankind, and go over to the users of silver. "Were we, in our present condition, to institute the free coinage of silver, the first consequence would be the hegira of gold, leading to dreadful strin- gency, and a much greater fall in prices than we have thus far seen. This agony being over, as the mints began to turn out great piles of silver dollars, to circu- ' late either directly or by proxy, prices would slowly rise to the Mexican, level. We would have left Europe in order to join Mexico, Central and South America, Japan and China. I can see how high protectionists might earnestly desire such a result, for the wall which the change would erect between Europe and America would be more impassable than any that McKinley tariffs could create." At the recent German bimetallic conference it was expressly declared that there was no purpose to embark Germany in the unlimited coinage of silver independent of the action of other countries. At one time Mr. Henry Hucks Gibbs, president of the bimetallic league of England, was understood to favor independent action. And he is so quoted by Dr. Andrews. But in a speech delivered last year, referring to the ratio which must be fixed for the coinage of gold and silver, he declared that " the terms of the treaty that shall bring this 18 about, the details of the measure, and the means by which it is carried out and the safeguards which will have to be applied are a matter of international concern." Mr. Balf our, so much quoted . by the extreme silver men, in his celebrated address delivered two years ago, expressed himself in favor of " a more effective international system under which every great commercial community' shall con- tribute its share to maintain the stability and value of silver." A recent conference of bimetallists in France, as far as I have seen by a translation of their proceedings, showed no member who believed it possible for a single country to sustain a bimetallic currency with unlimited independent coinage at existing ratios. The extreme silver men in the United States to-day are not in touch with the world's great advocates of bimetallism, but are press- ing forward upon a line recognized to be destructive of the possibility of bi- metallism and productive only of silver monometallism. EFFECT OF FEEE, UNLIMITED AND INDEPENDENT COINAGE OF SILVER AT 16 TO 1. "What would be the effect of free, unlimited, independent coinage of silver at 16 to 1 ? I have shown that it would be impossible by such legislation to substantially change the value of silver. I have shown that, as a necessary re- sult, our silver dollar would drop in its value to the commercial value of the bullion put into it ; that is to say, that it would drop about one-half in value. Gold, then, measured by our silver, would be worth two for one. No man would allow gold to circulate as money when he could buy with the gold twice as many dollars in silver that could do the same work, perform the same duty. No man would coin gold into dollars when he could exchange the gold required for the coinage of five dollars for silver bullion which could be coined into ten dollars. According to the Gresham law, by all the tests of logic, and all his- tory, the gold would at once go out of circulation and the paper promises of the United States would go out of circulation also ; their holders would keep them, waiting until the time when wiser legislation would do away with the Asiatic silver standard. Our currency, our money proper, would at once be contracted one-half. Our currency, before described, consisting of checks, bills of ex- change, bills of credit, making 95 per cent, of our entire circulating medium, based, as it is, upon credit and confidence, would at once cease to be used. We had an illustration of this during the summer of 1893, when, with simply the threat of depreciated silver, it was impossible to do any business by modes of credit, by checks, or bills of exchange. The new president, if elected on a free silver ticket, would be elected in November, and could not be inaugurated for six months. If he called Congress together at once upon his inauguration, it would be several months before any legislation could be passed. In the mean time, from the very hour it was ap- parent that legislation would be passed bringing this country to the standard of a dollar worth only half as much as the present dollar, every man who had a debt due him, unless the obligation upon its face was payable in gold, would commence an effort to collect it. He would justly feel that he had done work or loaned money upon a standard of a dollar worth a hundred cents, a dollar worth two Mexican dollars, and that it would be foolish to take in settlement of his debts dollars worth only half as much as those due to him or loaned out by him. 19 Debtors who owed money not payable in gold would never see the day come when this new legislation, this unlimited silver legislation, this depreciated money legislation, would enable them to pay off their debts at fifty cents on the dollar. They would be forced to pay at once, or else the sheriff would be sell- ing their property, and the result would be to force every debtor to settle up or else renew in gold. Debtors who owed obligations payable in gold would find it necessary to buy gold as a commodity. Under such a condition of excite- ment interest would rise, and those who secured renewals would be compelled to do so at largely increased rates. Banks would be raided. The money in sav- ings institutions would be withdrawn. Merchants would be forced to settle their debts, and would therefore collect from those who owed them. Business would stop, because in such a condition of uncertainty no one would feel justified either in buying or selling. Manufactories would be closed for the loss of that part of our currency which consists of credit would prevent them from being able to do business. Men would be thrown out of employment all over the land. The prices of farm products would drop, and misery and distress would cover the land. / ITS FINAL EFFECT. After the immediate incidents of contraction and paralysis of trade which wonld be produced pending the passage of a bill for the unlimited, independent coinage of silver at 16 to 1, there would then follow a period of continued busi- ness prostration, less aggravated, no doubt, than that of the first twelve months. All business would gradually seek to adjust itself to the new standard. Until this process could be completed the ultimate effect of the silver standard would not be reached. Finally, when it was reached and business became completely adjusted to it, then what benefits could be expected ? I am able to see none. We would do business upon a standard not recognized by the great countries from which we chiefly buy and to which we chiefly sell. Exchanges would all be against us. We, being in the minority, so far as standard of measurement was concerned, would find that when we bought we would have to pay a price based upon the lowest fluctuation of silver, and when we sold we would receive a price based upon the highest fluctuation of silver. Its changeable status in the market during the past two years would show how greatly such a condition would burden trade and hinder commerce. Not only would this be its effect upon international transactions, but the uncertainty of the standard would dis- courage domestic credits, domestic business, domestic enterprise. EFFECT ON WAGE EAJRNERS. After all, however, the men who would suffer most would be those who work for wages or salaries. They would find their dollars, while the same in number, but half the value of those formerly paid them. What guarantee would they have of an immediate increase ? Gradually, in the course of time, no doubt, their wages and salaries would move up to double the number of dollars now paid them, so as to be equal in value to the sums they now receive ; but history has shown that the advance of pay to those people who work for wages or salaries has always been the. last to change incident to a depreciated currency. And there is every reason to know that past experience would be repeated in the future, if the misfortune should ever come to our country of adopting the views of the extreme silver men. 20 This is a just picture of the consequences to be brought upon our people by the success of those who advocate the free, unlimited, independent coinage of silver at 16 to 1. CALAMITY HOWLEBS. But I am told through the columns of one of the advocates of this scheme that I have become a calamity howler. This is not true. A calamity howler is a man who complains of the present, who complains of things which exist. To show the evils incident to the unwise schemes of the extreme silver advocates, were they to succeed, is to warn the public against danger, that danger may be averted. In doing so it gives me pleasure to answer those who misrepresent the present, who fill the columns of papers with complaints about our own state. To carry out their political schemes they have been willing to actually advertise the state as being almost in a bankrupt condition. They have paraded the lessened amount of tax returns. I deny that this is any evidence of the lessened amount of real values in the state. It has been explained by the fact that the grand jury of Fulton county recommended returns at less rates in Fulton, and a great many people of other counties concluded to follow their advice. It is a natural condition incident to the panic that we have been through that men should contract their tax returns ; but I have investigated the actual values of property at various points in Georgia, I have inquired for the price at which it can be bought, and I deny that purchases can be made in 1895 as low as they could have been made in 1894 or 1893. This is the true test of returning pros- perity, and I repudiate the slander placed upon this rich and fertile land of ours which would check investors and drive away home-seekers. MY FOKMEB POSITION. But you have been told that in 1890 I was in favor of the! free coinage of silver, and a letter which I wrote in the fall of that year to Mr. Peek has fur- nished printers a chance for occupation to a considerable extent during the past few days. It disturbs the extreme silver men a great deal more than it does me. If you will read the letter carefully you will see that it committed nie to no proposition contained in it. But I would not be candid if I did not say that frequently in 1890 I expressed myself in favor of free coinage of silver. I do not know that I ever expressed myself in favor of free, unlimited, independent coinage of silver at 16 to 1. I am not sure that I had ever investigated the meaning of the term at that time. I do not think I had. But when I used the term "free coinage of silver,"! used it in its general sense, which means unlimited coinage at the existing ratio of 16 to 1. I simply desire to say that with only a limited investigation of the subject, I entertained the opinion then expressed. Since that time the further effort to bolster silver through the Sher- man act, which increased enormously our purchases of silver, failed, and silver dropped about thirty per cent, on the dollar. These two things combined the fall of silver since that time and the further investigation of the question have satisfied me beyond a doubt that the scheme is dangerous and that its results would be disastrous. I would be less than a man if I did not have the courage to combat a threatened evil because at one time I did not know its injurious effects. THE DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM. I cannot see how any democrat who studies the platforms of his party can be willing to support this policy. 21 A careful examination shows that whenever the democratic party, in national convention, has spoken upon the subject of currency, it has declared emphati- cally for sound money. The platform of 1876 uses the following language : "We denoiince the failure, for all these eleven years of peace, to make good the promise of the legal-tender notes, which are a changing standard of value in the hands of the people, and the non-payment of which is a disregard of the plighted faith of the nation. ********** "We denounce the financial imbecility and immorality of that party, which during eleven years of peace has made no advance toward resumption, but in- stead has obstructed resumption by wasting our resources and exhausting all our surplus income. ********** " We demand a judicious system of preparation by public economies, by official retrenchments, and by wise finance, which shall enable the nation soon to assure the whole world of its perfect ability and its perfect readiness to meet any of its promises at the call of the creditor entitled to payment. ********** "We believe such a system, well devised, and, above all, intrusted to com- petent hands for execution, creating at no time an artificial scarcity of currency, and at no time alarming the public mind into a withdrawal of that vaster machinery of credit by which 95 per cent, of all business transactions are performed a system open, public and inspiring general confidence, would from the day of its adoption bring healing on its wings to all our harassed industries, set in motion the wheels of commerce, manufactures, and the mechanical arts, restore employment to labor, and renew in all its natural sources the prosperity of the people. " The principles announced by the party, above quoted, are those for which I contend to-day. In no platform of the party can be found anything which would recognize the unlimited coinage of a metal while putting into a dollar less than one hundred cents' worth of the metal. The democratic national platform of 1892 is the last official declaration of the party. Upon the subject under consideration it reads as follows : " Sec. 7. We denounce the republican legislation known as the Sherman act of 1890 as a cowardly makeshift, fraught with possibilities of danger in the future which should make all of its supporters, as well as its author, anxious for its speedy repeal. We hold to the use of both gold and silver as the standard money of the country, and to the coinage of both gold and silver without discrimin- ating against either metal or charge for mintage ; but the dollar unit of coinage of both metals must be of equal intrinsic and exchangeable value or be adjusted through international agreement or by such safeguards of legislation as shall insure the maintenance of the parity of the two metals and the equal power of every dollar at all times in the markets and in the payment of debts ; and we demand that all paper currency shall be kept at par with and redeem- able in such coin. We insist upon this policy as especially necessary for the protection of farmers and the laboring classes, the first and most defenceless victims of unstable money and fluctuating currency. " Sec. 8. We recommend that the prohibitory 10 per cent, tax on state bank issues be repealed." Let us analyze section 7. First It demands the repeal of the Sherman act of 1890. UCSB LIBRARY Second It expresses a desire for the use of both gold and silver as stand- ard money, and for the coinage of both without discrimination or charge for mintage. Unlimited coinage of silver and gold at the ratio of 16 to 1 would be a discrimination requiring only fifty cents' worth of silver while requiring a hundred cents worth of gold put into a dollar. Third It requires the dollar unit of coinage of both metals to be of equal exchangeable and intrinsic value. Unlimited coinage of silver at 16 to 1 would entirely disregard this provision. It would make the dollar unit of silver intrin- sically worth but half as much as the dollar unit of gold, and instead of being exchangeable it would take twice as much as the silver bullion put into a dollar to be of an equal exchangeable value with the gold bullion put into a dollar. Fourth The next clause is, " 00 -CZ 1-1 SJ 0* -l-J 2^ rjsji-iodininoscO'HSiT-icot- IHMW* . -o ri in -o tn ~ : : "" I. 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