Ex Libris C. K. OGDEN THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES iji-^'JU) /rmn tli/i f^ajjj/jjiq l-if c^ii- 5KuL'crC con Sfdj-Lcmcr ui I'Jie ^\cUicnaA jinrtnu t yalLery THE LIFE OF SPENCER COMPTON EIGHTH DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE BY BERNARD HOLLAND, C.B. IN TWO VOLUMES VOL. II WITH PORTRAITS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO. 39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON NEW YORK, BOMBAY, AND CALCUTTA I9II All rights reserved CONTENTS CHAP. PAGB XIX. The Nile War i XX. The Franchise and Redistribution Bills and Irish Policy 49 XXI. Lord Salisbury's First Administration, June 1885 to January 1886 64 XXII. Mr. Gladstone's Administration, January to July 1886 131 XXIII. Lord Salisbury's Second Administration, 1886 to 1892 ........ 166 XXIV. Some Characteristics . . . . .222 XXV. Governments of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Rosebery, 1892-1895 ..... 242 XXVI. Lord Salisbury's Third Administration, 1895 to 1902 ........ 261 XXVII. Mr. Balfour's Government XXVIII. Latest Years Appendix Index 281 372 425 431 109.1359 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS The Duke of Devonshire in the Year 1892 Photogravure) ...... Froufi£cem/>£r i8, 1S85. ' Many thanks for your letter of the 17th, and for the permission to put questions if it seems ambiguous. ' My chief difficulty is this : how to reconcile the advice which you give that we should not commit our- selves with the position which has been created by the rumours of which you complain, which, though perhaps inaccurate, appear not to be very far from the truth. 'When you say that you are determined to have no intentions at present, I understand that you do not desire to take or to prepare any action before the Government have had an opportunity of acting. But the fact that you have formed the opinion that an effort should be made by the Government to meet the Irish demand, and that this opinion has been allowed to be made known and cannot be contradicted, amounts in my view to action of enormous importance. It has brought the question into the front rank ; nothing else will be dis- cussed till Parliament meets, and it will be discussed with the knowledge that in your judgment the time for action has arrived, and that action is practicable. ' I cannot conceive action of a more practical or more important character, and it is very difficult for those who, like myself, are unable to share your opinions to refrain from committing ourselves while this most vital question is being discussed with the knowledge, not indeed of the details of the Home Rule scheme which you think should be given, but that a scheme of Home Rule should be proposed by this or by some other Government. * I am going to-morrow to London to see Goschen, who is as much alarmed as I am at the position which I02 SALISBURY'S ADMINISTRATION Ch. xxi. has been created. I do not suppose that it will be pos- sible for us to take any action ; but as I believe our opinions on the subject agree very closely, I acceded at once to his suggestion that we should meet. ' I may perhaps avail myself of your kind offer of personal communication in the week after next ; but I am afraid that matters have now gone so far and that our views are so widely separated that there would be little advantage in such communications.' Lord Hartington to Loi'd Granville. 'Devonshire House, ' December 19, 1885. ' I enclose Mr. Gladstone's letter. Please return it to me at Kimbolton, where I go to-morrow or Monday. I have told him in reply that my difficulty is to re- concile the advice which he gives us, to abstain from committing ourselves, with the position which has been created. He appears to desire to take no action until the Government have had their opportunity; but he has allowed it to be known publicly, not that he has settled the details of a Home Rule plan, but that he is of opinion that the time has come when the demand for Home Rule must within certain limits be conceded. This cannot be contradicted, and in my opinion con- stitutes action of the most important and decisive character. It is difficult for those who do not agree with him to remain perfectly quiet while the question is being discussed, with this knowledge of his opinions which constitutes a most important element in the discussion. I do not know whether I can or ought to do anything ; but I cannot admit that he has, as he seems to imagine, done nothing. . . .' Mr. Gladstone to Lord Hartington, December 20, 1885. * I kept mine of yesterday back as there was no post. 'On Tuesday I had a conversation with Balfour at 1885 A CORRESPONDENCE 103 Eaton which, in conformity with my public statements, I think conveyed informally a hope that they would act. As the matter is so serious, and as its becoming a party question would be a great national calamity, I have written to him to say, without committing others, that, if they can make a proposal for the purpose of settling definitively the question of Irish Government, I shall wish, with proper reserves, to treat it in the spirit in which I have treated Afghanistan and the Balkan Peninsula. ' I think the situation has been made for us by the election of 85 Irish members. Next to this, by the un- contradicted statements as to the opinions of several, and those most important members of the Cabinet. ' If Parnell gets a negative from them, and thereupon splits, the question of confidence appears to rise, 'We ought soon to be informed on what day they mean to proceed to business.' Lord Hartington to Mr. Gladstone. ' Devonshire House, • December 21, 1885. * I have received this morning your letters of the 19th and 20th. *I cannot expect that you will approve of my letter which has been published this morning. But as to the contradiction of the reports which have been circulated, I believe that it is strictly accurate and does not go beyond Chamberlain's statement in his speech of last week. 'There may be doubts as to the necessity for re- affirming my declarations and expression of opinion in recent speeches ; but it appeared to me that the an- nouncements of last week had created a new position, and that there was sufilicient cause for me to let it be known by those who attach any importance to my opinion that my own views remain unchanged.' I04 SALISBURY'S ADMINISTRATION ch. xxi. Mr. Gladstone to Lord Hartington, December 23, 1885. ' I think I had better pass by your published letter. In this big business, which is likely to dwarf every other, my duty and desire are to look for points of agreement, actual or possible, and not of difference. 'As to these, notwithstanding all that has occurred, I by no means despair. ' If the Government refuse to act, and split off from their Nationalist supporters, that will bring a grave re- sponsibility upon the Liberals, anterior to and apart from the Irish question. ' You will probably have seen R. Grosvenor, and both he, and Granville at Chatsworth, will probably have spoken to you on this matter.' Lord Hartington to Lord Granville. 'KiMBOLTON CASTI.E, St. NeOT's, ^December 25, 1885. ' I think that perhaps you had better see the enclosed letters from Harcourt ; because if any one should under- take to press upon Mr. Gladstone a meeting of the ex- Cabinet, I think that it should be you. I don't feel in a position to make any such request to him. I have told him that I altogether differ from him in his opinions on the Home Rule question, and (this was before the publication of my letter) that I was going to see Goschen and to con- sider whether there was anything which those who differed from him could do in the circumstances which had arisen. ' I cannot understand your argument on this point. Mr. Gladstone may say as much as he likes about our not committing ourselves ; but he has committed himself up to his chin. He may not have formed a complete scheme ; but he has allowed it to be known that in his opinion Home Rule, including an Irish Parliament, must be granted 1885 A CORRESPONDENCE 105 either by this, or by some other Government. This has not been denied and cannot be denied. Is it possible to conceive anything more absurd than that he should allow these opinions of his to be made known, constituting as they do a most important element in the discussion, and then ask us not to be in haste as to any decision ? * I do not see how it is possible that Mr. Gladstone and I should agree at any meeting which might be held, and I think I should hardly like to address to him the request which Harcourt suggests, ' I have had a strong letter from Derby against the Gladstonian policy.' Lord Hartington to Lord Granville. 'Devonshire House, 'December 28, 1885. ' I have seen Harcourt to-day, who has had several letters from Chamberlain. The latter has proposed that he, Har- court, Dilke, and I should meet and see whether we can agree and can resolve on some way of bringing Mr. Glad- stone to book. I saw no reason to decline this, and have suggested Friday or Saturday or both, I should think that if the meeting comes off you had better join us ; if you see no objection. Chamberlain, who has written very defi- nitely to Mr. Gladstone, can get no answer from him, and, as you know, he has not told me much. It will not do for us to be taken entirely unprepared when Parliament meets, ' I will write or telegraph to you when our meeting is fixed. I think I may very likely go to see Spencer on Wednesday, but I will keep you informed as to my move- ments. ' I should think this preliminary meeting had better not be too large ; but you are the only person who has any influence with Mr. Gladstone ; and if anything is to be done I think your presence would be necessary.' io6 SALISBURY'S ADMINISTRATION ch. xxi. Lord Hartingt07i to Lord Granville. ' Devonshire House, ^December 29, 1885. * Chamberlain is coming up on Friday, and will be here at 4 o'clock. I have seen Goschen to-day, who quite con- curs in the necessity of trying to obtain from Mr. Gladstone some further explanation of his intentions. ' So far as we can gather from his letter and from what Grosvenor has told me, he wishes, if the Government, as is now certain, make no Home Rule proposals, and break with the Parnellites, to move a vote of want of confidence on the ground of the unconstitutional nature of an attempt to govern the country by a party in a minority of only 250. ' But none of us as at present advised are disposed to join him in such a course without knowing what is to follow.' Lord Hartington to Mr. Gladstone. ' Devonshire House, * January I, 1885. ' Harcourt, Chamberlain, Dilke, and I met this afternoon and had a good deal of discussion on the Irish question. ' I think that the only definite conclusion at which we arrived was that it is of great importance that as early an opportunity as possible should be given, in the first place to the leaders, and subsequently to the party itself, of hearing what are your views and intentions on this subject, and what course is to be taken on the meeting of Parlia- ment. I had heard from Granville that you did not propose to come up before the 12th, and that you thought that the interval between the election of the Speaker and the commencement of business would probably be sufficient for the necessary consultations. It was pointed out, however, that the Government are about to meet Parlia- ment in a small minority ; that, either by their own act or by ours, in a combination with the Parnellites which it may be impossible for us to prevent, they may at any moment i88s A CORRESPONDENCE 107 be defeated and may resign office ; and that you would then be called on to form a Government. The possibility of your doing this would depend mainly on Irish policy. If, instead of being a possible, you were the actual Prime Minister, and had this great difficulty to deal with, your main proposals would have been placed before your colleagues in November. At all events, they would not have been called on to decide upon them in a week, or in the hurried interval which would elapse between the resignation of the present Government and your own acceptance or refusal of office. 'Without attaching any special importance to the re- ports which have appeared in the newspapers as to your opinions, the difficulties of any mode of dealing with the Irish question are so great, and so little is yet known of the opinions of the leaders of the party as to its treatment, that it seems very necessary that more rather than less time than usual should be given for the purpose of ascertaining if possible what those opinions are, and whether differences are capable of being reconciled. 'These considerations seem to have some weight if the precarious position of the Government is alone taken into account. But, in addition to this, we are aware that you have thought that it may be necessary to raise the question of confidence, in the event of the Government making no proposals on Ireland, or breaking with their Irish sup- porters. (This contingency may now, according to all that we hear, be regarded as certain.) The responsibility which would be incurred by a decision to eject the Government on the earliest occasion without some knowledge of what would follow seems to strengthen the necessity for the fullest previous consultation that the circumstances admit of. ' So far, I believe, I have expressed the unanimous opinion of those I have named. We had, naturally, a good deal of discussion on the merits of the various Irish policies which have lately come under discussion. I could not attempt to describe the opinions of any one except io8 SALISBURY'S ADMINISTRATION Ch. xxi. myself ; but while I concur in all that was urged in favour of exhausting all means of arriving at an agreement, and also as to the necessity for giving as much time as possible for this purpose, I should not wish you to suppose that my own opinions have changed, or that I see any way in which I could be a party to a policy involving the creation of an Irish Legislative body. That, however, is a matter which chiefly concerns myself, and does not, I think, at all weaken the sense which I share with others as to the extreme importance of ascertaining and discussing as soon as possible the opinions — first and principally of yourself, but also of others, on this most important subject.' Air. Gladstone to Lord Hartington, Januaiy 2, 1886. * Unfortunately the subject of your letter makes it im- possible to reply by telegram, and I receive it on the evening when there is no post to London. 'I. On the 17th of December I communicated to you all the opinions I had formed on the Irish question ; but on the 2ist you published in the Times a reaffirmation of the opposite opinions. 'On the Irish question I have not a word to add to that letter ; I am indeed doing what little the pressure of correspondence permits to prepare myself by study and reflection. My object was to facilitate study by you and others — I cannot say it was wholly gained. But I have done nothing and shall do nothing to convert those opinions into intentions, for I have not the material before me. I do not know whether my " postulate " is satisfied. Nor do I know whether you are right in supposing there is a breach, by which I mean a breach to become public on the Address, between Tories and Nationalists. The im- perfect information which I possess rather looks towards the opposite conclusion. ' So that I am totally unable to submit any proposal for consideration ; and desirous of gaining whatever lights intervening time may possibly afford. 1885 A CORRESPONDENCE 109 ' I admit that the incessant and incurable leakages of the late Cabinet supply me with an additional reason for circumspection. *But I have taken care by my letter of the 17th that you should know my opinions en bloc. You are quite welcome to show it if you think fit to those with whom you meet. But H. has, I believe, seen it, and the others, if I mistake not, know the substance. MI. But besides the question of legislation for Ireland, there is the question of parliamentary procedure. For considering this the time in London will, I think, be ample. I have, through R. Grosvenor, put you in possession of my ideas ; but they are floating ideas only. In mine of the 23rd I stated my view, which you wrote down accurately in your letter but have made inaccurate by a correction. There is no doubt that a very grave situation is before us, a little sooner or a little later. All my desire and thought are how to render it less grave ; for next to the demands of a question far larger than all or any party interests is my duty to labour for the consolidation of the party. * Should I see cause to anticipate the breach you expect (of course this might happen), I will at once let you know. * What, I find, Granville has written you may be found to be of weight. ' Pray show this letter if you think fit to those on whose behalf you write. * I propose to be available in London about 4 p.m. on the nth for any who wish to see me. 'As to my "postulate" {q.v\ I have doubts whether it can be dealt with by an Opposition. A meeting of the party is a serious matter, but may be found requisite.' Lord Hartington to Lord Granville. 'Devonshire Hovse, /amtafj 2, 1SS6. 'The communication decided on was a rather urgent appeal that Mr. Gladstone would give the earliest oppor- tunity of consultation in the first instance with the leaders, no SALISBURY'S ADMINISTRATION ch. xxi. and subsequently with the party itself, especially if any question of a motion of want of confidence were likely to arise. ' It was suggested that the 12th would be very late for any such consultation. I added on my own part only a reservation as to the improbability of my being able to assent to any policy in the Home Rule direction. 'Considering the nature of the communication, and that its essence was to clear ourselves from responsibility for delay, I did not think there could be any reason for waiting and sent it as soon as I could write my letter, by late post last night. I am rather glad that I did so, because, if it had been sent after the receipt of your letter, it would have looked more like a remonstrance against his decision. 'The letter to you has partly been produced, I think, by an intimation which he has had from E. Hamilton that some of us are perfectly aware, and think we have reason to complain, of H. Gladstone's proceedings with the Press. It is useless to expect him to be intelligible ; but to whom do you understand him to refer as " those of whom he speaks " who " not only ought but in principle would assent to and even desire" — "what he will do of himself"? ' I don't suppose our communication will produce any acceleration of his movements, but we have to some extent liberated our minds. I do not think there was any general agreement among us on the merits, but we were very amicable. Chamberlain and Harcourt are as much opposed to Home Rule as I am. The former thinks Gladstone's scheme (for there is practically a scheme) quite impossible and prefers another. But both of them are more impressed than I am with the hopelessness of resistance, in present circumstances, or of governing Ireland by repression. ' Of course Mr. Gladstone's announcements are an important factor in the case, and their effect can never be done away with. * Did any leader ever treat a party in such a way as he has done ' ? I88S A CORRESPONDENCE iii Lord Hartington to Lord Granville. ' Hardwick Hall, Chesterfield, ^Jamiary lo, 1886. ' I have got some people here and shall not come up till Tuesday evening. Grosvenor told me that Mr. Glad- stone wished to see me on Tuesday at ii, but I have asked him to arrange for the afternoon instead. I suppose you will see him to-morrow. Harcourt is asked to see him to-morrow afternoon and Chamberlain on Tuesday morn- ing. I do not think that any of us like much these separate interviews. We cannot very well decline to see him separ- ately, but I expect that he will find us all rather reticent. I hope you will try to induce him not to allow these interviews to exclude a more general collective consultation. * If the Times account of the Parnellite policy is correct, it seems as if there might be no immediate breach between the Government and Parnell ; and in that case I suppose the question of a vote of want of confidence would not arise.' Lord Hartington to Mr. Gladstone. ' Devonshire Rouse, /amiary 15, 1886. ' I am afraid that, if I gave you reason to think that I attached importance to the National Press statement on account of any idea that I had that it was an accurate statement of your opinions, I failed to express my meaning. 'The importance which belongs to it seems to be due to the fact that it was written after an interview between the manager of the National Press agency at his office with your son. This, I believe, is true. Further the manager of the agency asserts, in a letter which I have seen and which probably others have seen, that he and the editor-in-chief, who was present at the interview, " considered that they were giving expression to Mr. Herbert Gladstone's personal opinion of his father's views." 112 SALISBURY'S ADMINISTRATION ch. xxi. * However inaccurate this impression may have been, it seems to me impossible to treat the statement, as I under- stood you to intend to treat the Press statements generally, as unauthorised attempts to extract from you your opinions on a question on which you had declined to make any addition to your public utterances. Grosvenor will have told you that I had reason to believe that an amendment will be moved to the Address censuring the Government for having failed to maintain the authority of the law. I had heard this from two sources which I thought likely to be well informed. On the other hand, Goschen, whom I have seen since and would be likely to know, has heard nothing of it. * But I can scarcely doubt that in some form or other an Irish debate will arise on the Address, which will make it impossible for those who are in favour of maintaining the legislative union as it exists to abstain from reasserting their opinions. ' The question of Home Rule may not be in a parlia- mentary sense before the House. But it is now in the most distinct manner before the country, and I fail to see how any political party can avoid expressing its opinions upon it.' Mr. Gladstone to Lord Granville, January i8, 1886. < Hartington writes to me a letter indicating the possi- bility that on Thursday, while I announce with reasons a policy of silence and reserve, he may feel it his duty to declare his determination " to maintain the legislative union," that is to proclaim a policy (so I understand the phrase) of absolute resistance without examination to the demand made by Ireland through five-sixths of her mem- bers. This is to play the Tory game with a vengeance. They are now, most rashly, not to say more, working the Irish question to split the Liberal party. ' It seems to me that if a gratuitous declaration of this kind is made, it must produce an explosion ; and that in 1885 A CORRESPONDENCE 113 a week's time Hartington will have to consider whether he will lead the Liberal party himself or leave it to chaos. He will make my position impossible. When, in conformity with the wishes expressed to me, I changed my plans and became a candidate at the General Election, my motives were two. The firsts a hope that I might be able to contribute towards some pacific settlement of the Irish question. The second^ a desire to prevent the splitting of the party, of which there appeared to be an immediate danger. The second object has thus far been attained. But it may at any moment be lost, and the most disastrous mode of losing it perhaps would be that now brought into view. It would be certainly opposed to my convictions and determination to attempt to lead anything like a Home Rule Opposition, and to make this subject — the strife of nations — the dividing line between parties. This being so, I do not see how I could as leader survive a gratuitous declaration of opposition to me such as Hartington appears to meditate. If he still meditates it, ought not the party to be previously informed ? ' Pray consider whether you can bring this subject before him less invidiously than I. I have explained to you and, I believe, to him, and I believe you approve, my general idea, that we ought not to join issue with the Government on what is called Home Rule (which indeed the social state of Ireland may effectually thrust aside for the time) ; and that still less ought we to join issue among ourselves, if we have a choice, unless and until we are called upon to consider whether or not to take the Govern- ment. I for one will have nothing to do with ruining the party if I can avoid it.' Ill Times have changed, and we with them. No man below the mid-line of life can well remember 1886. It is difficult, even for those old enough to remember, to recall in all its vividness the state of feeling when Glad- VOL. II. H 114 SALISBURY'S ADMINISTRATION Ch. xxi. stone plunged into his last great adventure. Then, not four years had passed since the release of Parnell from Kilmainham coincided with a terrible event. Agrarian terror, murders in every part of Ireland, hangings, stern repression — all this was fresh in memory. Legislative and executive power were now, it appeared, to be transferred to the men who had instigated, or acquiesced in, a blood- stained peasant revolt, and had urged the Irish people to claim national independence limited, at most, by the slender link of the Crown. Few of Mr. Gladstone's followers had imagined that he would go so far. Liberals had for years denounced the rule of men of one race or religion over those of another in Greece, Poland, Italy, Hungary, Turkey, with- out admitting that these principles could be used against the government of Catholic Irish by Protestant Anglo- Saxons. Had the comparison been suggested they would have said, ' But our rule is quite a different thing ; besides the Irish are represented in Parliament.' But whether alien rule is good or bad, and whether or not the ruled can make themselves heard, as a minority, in a common Legislature, the will of a distinct race to live its own life may remain unsatisfied. On the immense assumption that these Liberal principles are true, semper et ubique, the logical argument from the Irish elections of 1885 was one of tremendous force. According to these principles that which the majority of a national electorate desire ought to be done. If Ireland could, by a second assump- tion, be taken as a distinct nation, then, on these principles, the vote of 1885 was decisive. Gladstone, born and bred a Tory, an intellectual or sentimental convert to Liberalism, accepted and applied, as converts often do, the fundamental principle more logically and boldly than did men born in Liberal families. I8S5 LIBERAL PRINCIPLES 115 He was, compared to the Whigs, that which his former friend Manning became to the born EngHsh CathoHcs. Throughout his life, before and after he definitely belonged to the Liberal party, the freedom of nations had been his inspiring passion. He had in his earlier day belonged to the Canning school of Tories, and the foreign policy of this school was Liberal and anti-imperial, opposed, that is, to the extension or maintenance of non- English empires. His political character was moulded, not during the era of conscious formation of empires, but during that of unification and emancipation of races, which may be a step, in the order of Providence, towards the forma- tion of greater and nobler unities. In the British Empire the stream of tendency during the best part of Gladstone's life set towards full self-government in colonies in- habited by men of European race. Not till this move- ment was nearly completed did the tide towards imperial co-operation and common organisation set in. Mr. Gladstone applied Liberal principles honestly, sincerely, and, above all, logically, to the case of Ireland, but, after his wont, allowed too little weight to actual facts, or, rather, looked at facts from a point of view determined by his will to believe.^ Ireland was not one in race or religion. The dead wills of the Tudors, of Oliver Cromwell, of William III., thwarted the living will of Gladstone. Arguments used against the government of Ireland from London could also be used against the government of Ulster from Dublin, and with more deadly * Pascal says, with his incomparable terseness and lucidity, ' La volonte est un des principaux organes de la creance ; non qu'elle forme la creance, mais parce que les chases sent vraies ou fausses, selon la face par ou on les regarde. La volonte, qui se plait a I'une plus qu'a I'autre, detourne I'esprit de considerer les qualities de celles qu'elle n'aime pas a voir ; et ainsi I'esprit, marchant d'une piece avec la volonte, s'arrete a regarder la face qu'il aime, et ainsi il en juge par ce qu'il y voit.' ii6 SALISBURY'S ADMINISTRATION Ch. xxi. effect. For armed revolt of the Catholic and Celtic Irish against English rule had been proved by long experience to be impracticable, but nothing was, or is, to this day, more probable than armed resistance by the Protestant Saxons of Ulster to an Irish Catholic Government. This difficulty was lightly passed over by Mr. Gladstone, as it is by his succes- sors. A similar division existed throughout the three other provinces between the territorial aristocracy and the people. This last difficulty Mr. Gladstone did not ignore. He proposed to meet it by a scheme of land purchase to operate on a large scale and rapidly ; but this was a difficult undertaking. Gladstone carried with him the larger part of the Liberal party in Parliament by the entraining fascination of his per- sonality, and by strength of party feelings and organisation. This achievement was due also to special circumstances of the time. More than half the Liberal members had virtually been returned in 1885 by the newly enfranchised two million of electors, in whose eyes, as a Yorkshire correspondent wrote to Lord Hartington, 'Whatever Mr. Gladstone proposes must be right and to differ from him (even in company with Bright) is deadly sin.' A Norfolk gentleman wrote, ' The electors in the east of England care very little about Home Rule one way or the other, but the new elector believes intensely in Mr. Gladstone.' Also the English rural labourer voted in mere opposition to squire, farmer, and parson. Little he cared, as yet, for imperial questions, and he wished to prove his new-won power. After the December revelation the leading men of the party were torn by inner conflict, until, by acceptance or refusal of office at the beginning of February, the final choice had been made. On one side stood the old insistent Gladstone, a strange heroic-seeming figure, armed with the 1885 THE CHOICE 117 weight of age, with the fascination of genius, with subtle skill, with appeals to Liberal first principles, and with temptations of office ; on the other, the unyielduig Hart- ington, armed with the sword of consistency and the shield of prudence, and standing for the power of England and the real unity of the United Kingdom. Between these strong opposites were hesitations and movements to and fro. Mr. Chamberlain said, in a speech at Birmingham on December 17th, that he did not doubt that, if Mr. Gladstone were able to propose some arrangement, he should be able to give it his support. ' But,' he added, ' it is right, it is due to the Irish people, to say that all sections of the Liberal party, Radicals as much as Whigs, are determined that the integrity of the Empire shall be a reality and not an empty phrase.' Sir William Harcourt, a man built mentally, as well as physically, on the large scale, was a most reluctant convert to Mr. Gladstone's policy. Early in December, in a speech made at Lowestoft, he had denounced the supposed continued alliance between the Tories and the Irish Nationalists, and used one strong and disagreeably picturesque phrase long remembered and cited against him. His letters to Lord Hartington, after the Hawarden manifestations of mid-December, show that he still saw with all the lucidity of his powerful intellect the reasons against any scheme of Home Rule. On the other hand, he represented the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of resistance, and that of carrying on government in Ireland on the existing basis, now that Mr. Gladstone had thrown his immense influence over the Liberal party into the Home Rule scale. The time allowed for choice was short, and many Liberals acted under the influence of a kind of panic, or ii8 SALISBURY'S ADMINISTRATION Ch. xxi. depression of spirit, confidence, and hope. These conver- sions recall Shakespeare's heart-piercing lines : — * Mistrust of good success hath done this deed — Oh, hateful Error, Melancholy's Child : Why dost thou show to the apt thoughts of men The things that are not ? ' Another old and distinguished friend and colleague, who knew Ireland well, and yet eventually followed Mr. Glad- stone, wrote to Lord Hartington : — 'You say that we ought to fight until we are beaten into a cocked hat, I think we are that already — I do not see a chance of our holding our own. If one feels that, the sooner one takes the horrible plunge the better. . . . But I get at times sick of the idea of giving up to such men with such a history belonging to them.' Lord Granville wrote that — ' Whatever is decided upon by the Government, or the Opposition, whether coercion, concession, or leaving things alone, may probably lead to a great catastrophe. . . . To me the two great difficulties are how the rights of minorities and of landlords are to be sav^ed. The great bribe to me and, I suppose, to England and Scotland, would be to get rid of the Irish M.P.'s here, who are introducing the dry rot into our institutions.' ^ Lord Hartington was not moved by these counsels of despair. He had the coolness of brain in a crisis which aided Wellington on the field, and enabled him to confront serenely even the terrors of Napoleon in person. The witch. Imagination, had no power over him, nor did 1 In a letter to Mr. Gladstone, of December 28, 1885, Lord Granville said that ' at present the current of feeling is very strong, not only Chamberlain and Har- tington, but Harcourt and other colleagues,' and adds, ' my own opinion is that the safeguard for the minority must be very efficient, and that the bribe necessary to satisfy Great Britain, whether logical or not, would be to get rid of the Irish members ; the dry rot of the House of Commons.' — Life of Lord Granville, vol, ii. p. 423- 1885 LORD HARTINGTON 119 Ambition secretly sway his judgment. He had always said that the difficulty of governing Ireland in opposition to the apparent, or even to the real, wishes of the majority of its inhabitants, was exaggerated, nor did he see much objection in principle to doing so, as long as Irish facts remained what they were. He was not influenced by abstract theories, nor was he in the least degree moved, like Mr. Gladstone, by the unquestionable fact that the methods by which Pitt and Castlereagh carried the Act of Union through the Irish Parliament nearly resembled those of strong-handed annexation. ^ The difficulties in the House of Commons seemed to him to be vexatious, but by no means insuperable, provided that the two British parties showed some sense of unity in enforcing fundamental obligations. In a letter of 29th November 1885, one of his colleagues, who a month later had accepted the Gladstone policy, had said that the two parties should combine * to settle a policy for Ireland, and present a united front against the Parnellites. If that could be done, and I don't see why it should not be done, the Irish would worry and tease, but would have no effective power.' Lord Hartington was of the same opinion. No doubt, and he fully recognised the fact, Mr. Gladstone's mani- festation destroyed the effective co-operation of the two parties, as two wholes, and the Tory leaders by their previous action and non-action had also, by provoking a manifestation, done their part in destroying this prospect. But, if the Legislative Union and British Government in Ireland could not be maintained by the co-operation of the Conservative and Liberal parties, it might still be * One reply to this argument from history might be that ' Grattan's Parliament ' achieved its independence by something like armed rebellion. The biographer of Parnell relates that his hero remained entirely unmoved and indifferent upon an occasion, at a private dinner-party, when Mr. Gladstone was violently declaim- ing to the table about Irish history. 120 SALISBURY'S ADMINISTRATION ch. xxi. maintained by the action of a part of the Liberal party co-operating with the Conservatives. The mist hanging over the Tory camp rose, and their Hne of battle became clear, after the Hawarden revelation ; they declared for unyielding resistance. It also became clear that the Liberal party was divided ; and that the Unionist section would be a minority was soon apparent. Would it be a minority large enough to give a Unionist majority in the House of Commons ? This was the uncertain and exciting question which convulsed the political world during the first half of the year 1886. Lord Hartington's attitude was at this moment of supreme importance. Lord Derby wrote to him, on ist January 1886, 'very much depends on you. Your abstention will make the adoption of a dangerous policy impossible. Your acquiescence would make resistance useless, though, for myself, I don't think any consideration would make me swallow the dose.' Lord Hartington and those who went with him took the right line. Few now would say that Mr. Gladstone steered on the true course, though many may deem him right in thinking that some modification of the constitution of the United Kingdom was necessary. The day had not come for even a far more moderate form of provincial self-government than that which he proposed. The storms of passion had not sufficiently subsided ; the agrarian question was still too little settled. Most of those who followed him knew this well in their inner mind. But to break with an old, renowned, and mag- netic leader is the most difficult thing in the world ; it is in itself almost a heroic deed ; and it is rash and uncharitable to blame those who are not able to cross this terrible pass. It must be remembered, too, that most of the Liberal candidates for Parliament had committed 1886 OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT 121 themselves to vague declarations in favour of some kind of representative local government in Ireland. Thence to acceptance of the still abstract propositions of December was one step, to the overthrow of the Conservative Government in February was a second, to the acceptance of the Bill proposed in March, subject to possible modifi- cations in Committee, was a third. Facilis descensus Averni. Moreover, the still real existence of the House of Lords made it certain that the measure, even if it went through the Commons, would not become law until, at any rate, it had been submitted to the country at a General Election. The process was gradual, and the intellect could furnish fairly good reasons to the will in those who desired to adhere to the party and its leader. In Lord Hartington, in consequence of his character, position, and previous relations to the party and chief, this desire was not so strong as to seduce his judgment. Parliament heard, in the Speech from the Throne on 2ist January 1886, a strong and defiant Tory declaration in favour of maintenance of the Legislative Union, and an intimation that a new Act giving special powers for en- forcing the law in Ireland would probably be necessary. On the 26th, the Government asked leave to introduce a 'Coercion Bill.' It was for this manifestation that Mr. Gladstone was waiting. On the 27th, he overthrew the Government, with Irish aid, on an amendment to the address by Mr. Jesse Collings, which had nothing to do with Ireland. Debaters talked of small holdings for rural labourers, but this, they all knew, was not the real question. In the division, Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Chamberlain, and the mass of British Liberals voted against the Government, while Lord Hartington and a few other Liberals went into the opposite lobby. The amendment was carried against the Government by 122 SALISBURY'S ADMINISTRATION ch. xxi. seventy -nine votes.i On the 29th, Lord Salisbury's Government resigned. On the 30th, Mr. Gladstone wrote to Lord Hartington, ' Please to come to me as soon as you can. The Queen has sent me her commission.' He enclosed this memorandum : — ' I propose to examine whether it is or is not practi- cable to comply with the desire widely prevalent in Ireland, and testified by the return of eighty-five out of one hundred and three representatives, for the establishment by statute of a legislative body, to sit in Dublin, and to deal with Irish as distinguished from Imperial affairs ; in such a manner as would be just to each of the three kingdoms, equitable with reference to every class of the people of Ireland, conducive to the social order and harmony of that country, and calculated to support and consolidate the unity of the Empire on the combined basis of Imperial authority and mutual attachment.' Lord Hartington's interview was short and decisive. He wrote to his father that Mr. Gladstone — ' sent for me this morning and I have declined. . . . He was very civil, and we parted apparently very good friends. He asked me to write him a letter to show to the Queen, which I have done. I hope that I have not made it too civil. I have not promised him any support, but I think that now that the thing has gone so far, he ought to have a fair trial and let the country see what he has really got to propose.' The following is the letter intended for the Queen's information : — Devonshire House, January 30, 1886. My dear Mr. Gladstone, — I will endeavour to state in as few words as I am able the main reasons which make ^ 257 Liberals and 74 Irish Nationalists composed the majority ; 234 Con- servatives and 18 Liberals the minority. 76 Liberals were absent. 1886 REFUSAL OF OFFICE 123 it impossible in my judgment for me to accept the office which you were so good as to make to me this morning in such friendly terms. You stated that, in the policy of a new Government, the measures to be adopted in regard to Ireland must be the dominant and paramount consideration ; and in this I think that all will agree with you. I understand your opinion to be that the time has arrived for an examination of the Irish demand for increased powers of self-govern- ment, with the view, if certain preliminary conditions can be satisfied, of creating by statute a legislative body for the management of local Irish, as distinct from Imperial, affairs. I am unable to attach great importance to a distinction between examination and the actual conception and announcement of a plan. The hopes which will be raised in Ireland by the consent to examine the demand on this basis will be such as to make it almost impossible for any Government to take the responsibility of disappointing them, by an admission that the examination has led to no practical result. Parliament or the country may reject a plan ; but the Government which has undertaken to enter into such an examination can scarcely stop short of ipro- posing a policy founded upon it. In the discussion which has recently been carried on I have seen nothing to weaken the objections to the establishment of an Irish Legislature, whether independent or subordinate, which have up to this time been deemed insuperable by every English statesman who has examined the question, when the demand has been put forward by Irish parties of less advanced views, and less animated by hostility to this country, than the party now led by Mr. Parnell. But without further discussing the possibilty or ex- pediency of such a concession as is the ultimate object of this examination, I feel that every public utterance which I have ever made in or out of Parliament has pledged me too deeply against it to enable me, without a loss of honour, and therefore of all possibility of any 124 SALISBURY'S ADMINISTRATION ch. xxi. future influence for good in public affairs, to take a part in a policy directed to this object. I could not, even if I desired it, bring to the support of your Govern- ment that section of the Liberal party with which I have been mainly connected. My departure from my previous declarations would be too great ; the confidence of my friends, already weakened by the impression which justly or unjustly prevails that I have already too frequently surrendered my own judgment for the maintenance of unity in the party, would be entirely destroyed, and those who, like myself, wish to maintain the legislative union with Ireland would, under some other leadership, assume a more hostile position towards your Government than may perhaps be the case if I remain in an independent position. For greatly as I regret much that has occurred, the declarations which have already been made, and the further encouragement now to be given to the Irish National party by the undertaking to examine their demand, I am now of opinion that, these declarations having been made, it is necessary that they should assume a practical shape. The country must now understand what con- cession of legislative independence is considered safe and practicable by any responsible party, and it must now be proved whether it is, or is not, possible to re- concile the demands of the Irish Home Rule party with the deliberate opinion of the majority of Englishmen and Scotchmen. While, therefore, I reserve full liberty to form the best judgment I can on your proposals when they may assume a definite shape, and can in no way commit myself to their support, I hope and believe that it may be possible for me, as a private member, to do something to prevent obstacles being placed in the way of a fair trial being given to the policy of the new Government. I am fully convinced that the alternative policy of governing Ireland without large concessions to the national sentiment, presents difficulties of a tremendous 1886 AN EXPLANATION 125 character which, in my opinion, could now only be faced by the support of a nation united by the con- sciousness that the fullest opportunity had been given for the production and consideration of a conciliatory policy. — I remain, yours sincerely, Hartington. Lord Hartington heard, a few days later, from a moderate Liberal that ' the Gladstone party have put it about that you agree with him generally upon his Irish policy, and that you are prevented joining him sinjply because you have committed yourself to your constituents. In point of fact they say that you do not intend to oppose the Government even on Home Rule.' This, and other communications, made Lord Hartington write the follow- ing letter : — Devonshire House, Piccadilly, W., February 5, 1886. My dear Mr. Gladstone, — I have heard within the last day or two from several sources that some use has been made (I do not think by yourself) of my letter to you of the 30th January in the communications which have been going on for the formation of your Govern- ment. I have been told that I have been represented as having been in general agreement with you on your Irish policy, and having been prevented joining your Government solely by the declarations which I had made to my constituents ; and as not intending to oppose the Government even on Home Rule. On looking over my letter I think that the general intention is sufficiently clear, but there is perhaps part of one sentence which, taken by itself, might be under- stood as committing me beyond what I intended or wished. The words I refer to are those in which I say that it may be possible for me as a private member to prevent obstacles being placed in the way of a fair 126 SALISBURY'S ADMINISTRATION Ch. xxi. trial being givtn to the policy of the new Government. But I think that the commencement of the sentence in which those words occur sufficiently reserves my liberty ; and that the whole letter shows that what I desire is that the somewhat undefined declarations which have hitherto been made should now assume a practical shape ; and that it should be ascertained, on the one hand, whether Mr. Parnell will accept anything which any English party can offer him ; and, on the other, whether the English and Scotch people will concede what is necessary to satisfy his demands. I do not ask for any reply to this letter which I have only thought it necessary to write to prevent any misconception as to my position. — I remain, yours sincerely, Hartington. As an offset to these troubles and misunderstandings, it is pleasant to be able to give a second and more private letter, which Lord Hartington sent to his old chief on 30th January : — ' I feel that I ought to have tried, both in my interview with you this morning and in my letter, to have thanked you for the extreme kindness of your manner towards me, and for the way in which you have received my reasons for declining to offer to you again the slight assistance which I may have been able to give you on former occasions. 'Although I cannot truly say that exclusion from office is unpleasant to me, I can assure you that I feel most deeply how great a burden of responsibility is about to be cast upon you, and that it would have been a duty, if I could have felt it in any way compatible with honour and consistency, to have attempted to do anything in my power to relieve you of any share of it.' Lord Hartington wrote on 17th February to his faithful friend, Mr. John Fell of Ulverstone : — 1886 THE GREAT SCHISM 127 ' It has, as you may imagine, been a very anxious time for me, and I have felt much regret at having had to separate myself for a time from Mr. Gladstone and many of my friends. I cannot, however, feel any confidence, judging from the tone of his recent speeches, in the policy which he seems likely to adopt towards Ireland. It would, perhaps, have been better, as matters have turned out, if I had spoken out at once on the Irish question, as the great bulk of the party seem now likely to drift into acquiescence with anything which Mr. Gladstone may propose. But the responsibility of provoking an open split in the party, so long as there seemed any chance of averting it, was too great ; and, on the whole, matters have gone so far that it is perhaps best that Mr. Gladstone should have full oppor- tunity of disclosing his policy.' Now was consummated the great schism in the Liberal party. Mr. Gladstone was followed, with reluctant fidelity, by Lord Granville, Lord Spencer, Lord Kimberley, and Lord Rosebery. Sir William Harcourt became Chancellor of the Exchequer, with almost certain succession to the leadership. Lord Herschell became Lord Chancellor, after that high post had virtually been declined by Sir Henry James, who thought that he could not, in honour, go back upon declarations made to his constituents. Mr. Chamber- lain and Mr. Trevelyan joined the Cabinet conditionally, and upon the basis of the suggested 'inquiry'; Mr. Childers and Mr. Campbell-Bannerman accepted ofBce with conviction. The Irish Secretary was Mr. John Morley, an influential political writer, who now held office and sat in the Cabinet for the first time. Lord Hartington was followed by Lord Derby, Lord Northbrook, Lord Selborne, and Lord Carlingford, members of the late Cabinet. Sir Henry James was his faithful and useful adherent. John Bright declared aganist Home Rule. Mr. Goschen was a strong Unionist, and so was the 128 SALISBURY'S ADMINISTRATION ch. xxi. Duke of Argyll. Minor characters in the play went this way and that, as fears or hopes prompted them, while Reason, limping behind, discovered to each the arguments for his choice. One gentleman, who had written a few weeks previously to Lord Hartington urging undying resistance to the Irish Nationalists, succumbed to the magic influence of the Prime Minister and accepted an Under-Secretaryship. Another acceptant of office, stung by remorse, wrote to say that he had thrown it up, and would henceforth be a faithful Unionist. The fight for the capture or possession of the rank and file of the Liberal party in Parliament went on down to the very eve of the rejection of the Home Rule Bill. Gladstone avoided party meetings and saw individuals separately. In the magical art of persuasion by will-power Lord Harting- ton was, of course, quite outmatched by his old chief. De Segur, in a chapter worthy of Thucydides, narrates the arguments used by himself and others in the winter of 1811-12 to dissuade Napoleon from the Russian War, and Napoleon's replies. He then says : — 'Ainsi Napoleon r^pondait a tout; son habile main savait saisir et maniera propos tous les esprits ; et, en effet, des qu'il voulait seduire il y avait dans son entretien une espece d'enchantement dont il etait impossible de se de- fendre ; on se sentait moins fort que lui, et comme contraint de se soumettre a son influence. C'^tait une espece de puissance magnetique, car son g6nie ardent et mobile est tout entier dans chacun de ses desirs, le moindre comme le plus important. II veut ; et toutes ses forces, toutes ses facult^s se reunissent pour accomplir ; elles accourent, se pr^cipitent, et dociles, elles prennent a I'instant meme les formes qui lui plaisent. . . . Dans cette occasion, il n'y eut pas de teintes si varidies dont sa vive et fertile imagination ne colorat son projet, pour convaincre et entrainer. Le meme texte lui fournissait mille arguments 1886 THE GREAT SCHISM 129 divers : c'est le caract^re et la position de chacun de ses interlocuteurs qui I'inspire ; il I'entraine dans son entre- prise, en la liii faisant envisager sous la forme, avec la couleur, et du c6t6, qui doit lui plaire.' Men differ much in regard to susceptibility to magnetic power, and it was along the lines of this natural division of character that the division between the Gladstonian Liberals and the Liberal Unionists developed. The less susceptible, as a rule, followed Hartington. The rest, in- cluding most of those who had, even though unsusceptible by nature, gradually become magnetised by long ofBcial contact, followed Gladstone. Lord Hartington, some thought, treated with too visible a want of sympathy, not being an adept at disguising his feelings, those of his colleagues who had forsworn their former opinion and gone down the main stream. He had, indeed, every reason to suppose, almost to the last moment, that the Whig leaders, Lord Granville, Lord Spencer, Lord Kimberley, and Sir William Harcourt would have followed him, and not have gone with Mr. Gladstone. Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice, in his Life of Lord Granville, says that that nobleman, ' like Perithous in the Athenian legend, plunged after his king into the gulf.' It was, perhaps, to the good of the commonwealth that some men of this kind should have followed Gladstone (who would probably have formed a Government whether they followed him or not), so that the greater offices might still be ad- ministered by men of rank and experience. But most Whigs not of official rank followed Lord Hartington. It was the end of the Whig party. Until this moment the word 'Whig' was still in common use to denote a con- nection loosely bound together, the moderate Liberals, led by the chiefs of certain families of long standing. Since 1886, the word has been used in a purely historical sense, VOL. II. I 130 SALISBURY'S ADMINISTRATION Ch. xxi. while ' Tory ' has still a living meaning. The Whig party as a concrete reality, had a history of as nearly as possible 200 years. Time, with its changes, softens the sense of grievance, and, when it is proved that a separation is final and com- plete and irrevocable, those who are separated can regard each other more serenely. In a speech made in November 1890, Lord Hartington referred with kindness and regret to these events, and Lord Rosebery wrote to him : — ' I read your words about the separations caused by politics with great pleasure ; they were both kind and true. For myself I can sincerely say that the greatest sorrow I have ever known in public life was the severance from you and the manner of it.' 1 886 CHAPTER XXII MR. GLADSTONE'S ADMINISTRATION, JANUARY TO JULY 1886 Mr. Gladstone formed his Cabinet upon a basis of inquiry, but inquiry developed at express speed into a legislative measure. The Irish Government Bill and the Land Bill were ready in about two months' time. Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Trevelyan disagreed with the definite proposals, and resigned on the 26th March. Lord Morley, who was present at the decisive Cabinet Council, intimates that the Prime Minister made no attempt to conciliate or to retain the two Ministers.^ Provisions were, at a later date, inserted in the Bill which went some way towards meeting Mr. Chamberlain's objections, but if these would ever have availed to keep him, it was now too late. Mr. Gladstone's art. Lord Granville's tact, had hardly kept in the same Cabinet from 1880 to 1885 those incom- patibles. Lord Hartington and Mr. Chamberlain. Now, by a strange and unexpected turn of events, they had been driven into common opposition. The absence of both lieutenants was no doubt a relief to their aged and obsti- nate chief ; at any rate he was now at the head of a Cabinet in which his authority was supreme. Mr. Cham- berlain's defection, however, vastly increased the chances ^ Life of Gladstone, vol. iii. p, 303. This means probably that his action was like that of Mr. Balfour at the Cabinet crisis of 14th September 1903 towards his dissentient Ministers, to the effect ' I see that you don't agree, and, therefore, we cannot continue to£rether,' 131 132 GLADSTONE'S ADMINISTRATION Ch. xxii. of defeat in Parliament, and, still more, in the country. That Mr. Gladstone so nearly won this fight in the House of Commons — with the leader of the Whigs and the leader (till then) of the Radicals in revolt, with the whole tradition of English policy against him, opposed by almost all the wealthy, the experienced, and the wise — certainly shows his marvellous influence over generous instincts, weak wills, and impressionable minds. A hostile writer once said that Mr. Gladstone's influence reminded him of the influence of the Moon described in Butler's invocation to that deity in Hudibras : — ' Queen of the night, whose vast command Rules all the sea, and half the land, And over weak and watery brains At high spring tides, at midnight reigns.' Better, perhaps, it might be said that his power was the Daemon within him, in the nobler Greek, and not in the lower Christian, sense of that word. Goethe, in his Dichtung und Wahrheit, says : — ' The most fearful manifestation of the daemonic is when it is seen predominating in some individual character. During my life I have observed several instances of this, either more closely or remotely. Such persons are not always the most eminent men, either morally or intellectually, . . . but a tremendous energy seems to be seated in them, and they exercise a wonderful power over all creatures. All the moral powers combined are of no avail against them ; in vain does the more enlightened portion of mankind attempt to throw suspicion upon them as deceived, if not deceivers — the mass is still drawn on by them. Seldom, if ever, do the great men of an age find their equals among their contemporaries, and they are to be overcome by nothing but the Universe itself ; and it is from observation of this fact that the strange, but most striking, proverb must have arisen, Nemo contra Dcuvi nisi Deus ipse' 1886 MR. GLADSTONE'S INFLUENCE 133 An agent of Napoleon I. in Germany said that he felt so uneasily conscious of his distant master that he could realise the doctrine of the ' Real Presence.' Gladstone had this power of making his personality invade the imagination of men. It is a power which moves the world, and seems, at times, to make events deviate from their ordained course. So a great storm may make a river overflow, and, for a while, cause channels and landmarks to disappear. The strange thing was that, in 1886, Gladstone's full mental and physical strength no longer existed. It was the impression which he had made in the ' seventies ' which still worked on the people. The best defence of his action is that, by the test of political and economic results, the English rule of Ireland had, so far, been miserably unsuccessful, that the question of Irish Government was, after the recent elections, a very real one, that, as Bacon has said, ' Where a great question exists it will not fail to be agitated,' and that it could best be discussed upon the basis of a definite legislative pro- posal. The debates, in and out of Parliament, were educa- tional and cleared the air. The question is not yet settled. It may be that the future historian who sees unravelled the whole story to its last page, may judge that, although Glad- stone made an impossible proposal at an impossible time, there was in his crusade a certain consonance with main results achieved through and after the events of many years. Things anticipated are apt to come to pass, but in a form different from that dimly and erroneously seen by the earliest pioneers. The road of change is paved with the errors of its builders. The real opposing force centres in this battle were not, however, so much Hartington and Gladstone, as Harting- ton and Charles Stewart Parnell. These two men, so opposed in policy, resembled each other in temperament 134 GLADSTONE'S ADMINISTRATION ch. xxii. far more than either resembled Gladstone, and indeed more than either resembled some other leading men in the House of Commons. Both Hartington and Parnell were of the positive, or realist, character ; neither the one nor the other was influenced by abstract ideas, or by books, or by phrases of any kind. Neither man was in the least degree a Radical, a Sentimentalist, or an * Intellectual.' Neither was swayed in his course by philosophic theory or by definite religion. Each was cool, aloof, by nature indolent, inclined to silence and averse to rhetoric, country-bred, independent, unim- pressionable, self-contained, indifferent in the main to the opinion of men at large, doggedly tenacious of his own view and purpose. Both had that which Harcourt (or was it Lowe ?) used to call * Hartington's you-be-damned- ness,' the characteristic so striking in that mighty Anglo- Irishman, the first Duke of Wellington. This quality was brought to a lofty point by the Irish squire who led, and despised, the Nationalists. Hartington and Parnell were, in fact, both of them, extremely Anglo-Saxon by nature and temperament, as they mainly were by descent.^ Hartington himself, through the Butlers and the Boyles, may have inherited some of the Anglo-Irish temperament, which is that acquired by men of a conquering race living among the conquered. Lord Hartington was guided by his conception of the public interest, touched with some special feeling, no doubt, natural to the representative of a family having large terri- torial possessions in Ireland. How far Parnell was guided by public spirit, or how far by a cold and personal hatred of the English who, so he thought, had treated him — an Anglo-Irish aristocrat — with some condescension or con- ^ Parnell in 1886 consulted the London physician, Sir Henry Thompson, who did not at first know who he was. Sir Henry said afterwards, ' I should have taken him, and did take him, for a quiet, modest, dignified, EngHsh country gentleman.' — Life of Parnell, vol. ii. p. 161. 1886 HARTINGTON AND PARNELL 135 tempt as a mere Irishman, will always be a matter for conjecture.^ Probably there was a certain commixture of patriotism with personal vindictiveness, as in the case of Dean Swift. And his biographer supplies reason for think- ing that, blended curiously with cool reason and common sense, he had a touch of that insanity which hangs about Ireland like an unwholesome mist. But Lord Hartington was sanity itself, and, having good reason to be satisfied with life, was singularly free from any domination by ambition, vanity, or jealousy. Lord Hartington, true to the intention stated in his letter to Mr. Gladstone, said at an ' Eighty Club ' dinner on the 5th March : — 'The people of this country must know what the scheme is. They must be able to bring their judgment to bear on the question whether it presents dangers and risks which they cannot bring themselves to face, or whether it presents so little hope that they are unwilling to face those risks. They must know whether the scheme is one which will, or can, be accepted by Mr. Parnell. They must know whether there is any scheme which can be proposed by any responsible English Government which it will be in the power of Mr. Parnell, in the name of the people of Ireland, to accept. When they know these things, when they have had the policy of the Govern- ment clearly and fully placed before them, and not before, they will be in a position to make up their minds and come to a final judgment upon this great issue ; and when they are so informed, so instructed, and so prepared, I do not doubt their ability to form a sound judgment upon it. For these reasons, although I have not been able to be a party ^ See in Barry O'Brien's vivid Life of Parnell ^^ci^ tale of what Parnell said to his brother after a visit to the Governor of an American state ; and see also O'Donnell's History of the Irish Parliamentary Party. This writer thinks that Parnell was ' a bit of a Cataline,' a discontented aristocrat, and speaks of his early ' vague sympathy with Ireland as a fellow-sufferer with the Parnells.' — Vol. i. p. 255, 136 GLADSTONE'S ADMINISTRATION Ch. xxii to this policy of examination and inquiry, I have done nothing to put any obstacles in the way. I will not be a party to any attempts to prejudge the policy of the Government by agitation of a political or sectarian character. ... I will do all I can to enable the Govern- ment to have a fair field for a policy of peace to Ireland, and no one would be more rejoiced than myself if it should succeed.' On the afternoon of the 8th April 1886 Mr. Gladstone issued from his recaptured house in Downing Street and, as convinced as Don Quixote of the rightness of his cause, went gallantly down through a deeply interested crowd of friends and foes to introduce the Bill for giving autonomy to Ireland. The measure had undergone trans- formations in drafting, and did not represent Mr. Glad- stone's original ideas. He had at first wished to place Ireland upon the basis of a self-governing dominion, with full power over all internal affairs, raising and spending all her own revenue. This was, of course, the position which Parnell and his friends would have desired. It was also a proposition more logical, intelligible, and consistent than was the hybrid measure which, to persuade his English and Scottish adherents, he was obliged to introduce. Apart from other and more serious objections, it was urged that, if Ireland were placed in the position of New Zealand or Cape Colony, her Government and Legislature could, and probably would, refuse to make any contribution towards Imperial expenditure, the Army and Navy, and so forth, and would almost certainly raise part of their revenue for fiscal and protective purposes by taxing English imports. It was also thought that an Irish Government could not be trusted with certain subjects of internal legislation, especially where religion was con- cerned, or with so dangerous a plaything as a local 1886 THE HOME-RULE BILL 137 military force, or even an armed constabulary. The measure, therefore, contained provisions reserving to the Imperial Parliament certain subjects of Irish legislation and administration, forbidding the Irish Government to maintain any local forces, or to impose customs duties or co-related excise duties, and arranging that Ireland should make a contribution towards ' Imperial ' expen- diture. The ingenious proposal was that the customs and excise duties, which formed three-fourths of the total revenue collected in Ireland, should be levied under the Imperial authority, paid into the Imperial treasury, and appropriated so far as necessary towards paying the fixed Irish contribution to Imperial expenditure, including that of the Irish police force, the balance to be paid over to the Irish Government. This arrangement certainly killed two birds with one stone, saved free trade and secured the contribution. But, since Irish members were not to sit at Westminster, the proposal involved 'taxation without representation.' Ireland would be placed in a worse position than that against which the American colonies revolted. Moreover, it would be difficult for the British Parliament either to raise or to lower in future the existing duties. If they raised the duties, they would impose further taxation upon the unrepresented Irish. If they lowered them, they would diminish the balance to be paid over to Irish revenue. But if, on the other hand, the Irish Legislature were allowed to levy their own customs and excise duties the plan would be open to the equally terrible charge, from the English point of view, of abandonment of free trade principles, leading probably to exclusion of many English goods, and ' dis- solution of fiscal unity.' Such a surrender would, no doubt, arouse the keen hostility of the English and Scottish commercial and industrial classes. In this 138 GLADSTONE'S ADMINISTRATION Ch. xxii. dilemma, Mr. Gladstone preferred to accept the horn of 'taxation without representation.' He met the difficulty, characteristically, in his first speech, by saying that, as the Irish leaders had consented to the arrangement, Ireland might be taken to have consented to such taxation. He said, also, in this speech that it was ' perfectly clear that, if Ireland is to have a domestic legislature, Irish Peers and Irish representatives cannot come here and control English and Scottish affairs.' This argument was insuperable, but so also was the argument that, in this case, the Irish Legis- lature should, like a free colony, have full control over all the legislation and taxation affecting their own island. Gladstone, in fact, would have liked to give the full colonial status to Ireland, but the concessions with which he had to buy English support reduced his measure to an illogical and impossible scheme. Between grant of full colonial status and maintenance of the legislative union there is, in the case of Great Britain and Ireland, one via media, and one only, and that would involve a great constitutional change. It was the solution suggested, but not worked out, in these debates by Mr. Chamberlain, viz., to divide the whole of the United Kingdom into provinces, corresponding or not with the separate king- doms from which it was constructed — and, while main- taining the Imperial Parliament, to allocate to the provincial Legislatures and Governments such subjects of legislation and departments of administration as might be prudent and advisable ; in a word, to adapt to our own circumstances the scheme of the Canadian Constitution of 1867, with its distribution of power between the Dominion and the Provincial authorities. This, also, was the kind of system which Mr. Isaac Butt, supported by many moderate men in Ireland, had advocated, before he was so rudely set aside by Parnell and the extremists. i886 MR. GLADSTONE'S ARGUMENT 139 The reasoning by which Mr. Gladstone supported his proposals on April 8th was to the following effect. Coercion in Ireland had become habitual instead of ex- ceptional. The agrarian crime in Ireland and the neces- sity of constant resort to special measures for enforcing law showed that the law was discredited in Ireland. Why discredited ? Because it came ' to the people of that country with a foreign aspect and in a foreign garb.' Continuous and resolute coercion might, he said, be successful, but this could not be maintained except under an autocratic government, and with the condition of secrecy in public transactions. It could not be carried on against Ireland by England and Scotland, the two nations on earth 'most fondly attached to the essential principles of liberty.' In this connection he attached great importance to the decision of Lord Salisbury's Government not to renew the Coercion Act in 1885. The solution of the problem was to strip law of its foreign garb, and to ' invest it with a domestic character.' England, he said, makes her own laws as freely as if she were not connected with the smaller countries. Scotland was allowed, virtually, to do the same, but not Ireland. ' It is a problem not unknown in the history of the world . . . how to reconcile Imperial unity with diversity of legislation.' He quoted Grattan's fine sentence, ' I demand the continued severance of the Parliaments, with a view to the continued and everlasting unity of the Empire.' The orator then referred to the union under one monarchy of Norway and Sweden with abso- lutely independent legislatures. 'The Norwegians and Swedes are every year more and more feeling themselves to be children of a common country united by a tie which never is to be broken.' Not, as later events have shown, a very happy illustration. He also referred to 140 GLADSTONE'S ADMINISTRATION Ch. xxii. the success of the confederation between Austria and Hungary. Our own Act of Union, he said, had replaced two independent legislatures by one supreme authority. That supremacy was not now to be impaired. Men spoke of a reform of the administrative system of Ireland, but the fault of the system was simply that its spring of action was English not Irish. Unless there were an Irish Parliament by what miracle could the administration be made Irish and not English ? No scheme for creating a central elective body to control specific branches of administration could have finality, for the Irish did not want this. < I cannot,' he said, ' conceal the conviction that the voice of Ireland, as a whole, is at this moment clearly and constitutionall}^ spoken. I cannot say it is otherwise, when five-sixths of its lawfully chosen repre- sentatives are of one mind in this matter.' Mr. Gladstone said in this speech that the Act of Union had established a ' supreme statutory authority ' over the whole United Kingdom. 'That supreme statutory authority it is not asked, so far as I am aware, and cer- tainly it is not intended in the slightest degree to impair.' This was to repeat that dictum contained in one of his speeches before the elections when he said to the electors of Midlothian, 'We are, every man, woman, and child among us, convinced that it is the wall of Providence that these islands should be bound together in a United Kingdom, and, from one end of Great Britain to the other, I trust there will not be a single representative returned to Parliament who for one moment would listen to any proposition tending to impair, visibly and sensibly to impair, the unity of the Empire.' ^ 1 By the more old-fashioned speakers of ihat time ' United Kingdom ' and ' Empire ' were often used as interchangeable terms in certain connections in a way they would not be now. If in the last line of this quotation Mr. Gladstone 1886 LORD HARTINGTON'S ARGUMENT 141 What meant these phrases ? Lord Hartington sus- pected that they meant nothing at all, and were mere words corresponding with no realities in heaven above, or in the earth beneath. He spoke on the following day, April 9th. He described the position in which the Liberal party had stood before the elections, opposing the Irish demands, and defending the administration of the law in Ireland as it had been carried on by Lord Spencer. Thereby they had drawn upon themselves the bitter hostility of the Irish party, who had assisted to defeat them in the House of Commons, and had opposed them with all its might at the elections. He quoted Mr. Gladstone's utterances before the elections to show that they had given no notice of the policy now pro- posed. These dark and vague sayings had not prevented the Irish party from strenuously opposing the Liberals, nor had they created alarm or excitement, or even much interest in Great Britain. Gladstone had said that ' Providence ' had bound these islands together as a United Kingdom. But what, asked Hartington, with his damaging matter-of-factness, is the United Kingdom ? It is, he replied, 'the creation of a particular Act, the Act of Union.' The country, therefore, had, before the elections, no idea of the vast proposal which was to be set before it if the Liberals came into power. He said : — ' Although no principle of a " mandate " may exist, there are certain limits which Parliament is morally bound to observe, and beyond which Parliament has, morally, not the right to go in its relations with the constituents. The constituencies of Great Britain are the source of the power really meant the Empire, Ireland might, of course, have been given the inde- pendence of New Zealand without impairing that degree of unity. But the sense is, or should be, governed by the preceding use of the ' United Kingdom.' 142 GLADSTONE'S ADMINISTRATION ch. xxii. at all events of this branch of Parliament, and I maintain that, in the presence of an emergency which could not be foreseen, the House of Commons has no right to initiate legislation, especially immediately upon its first meeting, of which the constituencies were not informed, and of which the constituencies might have been informed, and of which if they had been so informed, there is, at all events, the very greatest doubt as to what their decision might be.' This, he pointed out, was not ' mere theory,' it had a very practical bearing. In many cases Liberals had won seats by narrow majorities, and the total majority, in- cluding the Irish, was not large. If the scheme of a new Irish Parliament and Government had been announced before the elections, the result would probably have been reversed. He referred to Gladstone's pre-election declara- tion that the work of dealing with the Irish question by any Government depending upon the Irish party would be extremely difficult. This consideration had not pre- vented Mr. Gladstone from displacing the Conservative Government and placing himself in that very position. The Government, he said, had taken upon themselves a * tremendous responsibility.' Whatever might be the fate of this measure, its introduction would add vastly to the future difficulties of Irish administration. Grattan's Parliament, Lord Hartington reminded the House, was a Protestant and Landlord Parliament. Was it not probable, had it continued to exist, that it would have resisted all those reforms which the Imperial Parlia- ment had effected in Ireland ? On the other hand, could any Irish Parliament have averted the economic evils which have befallen Ireland since then ? 'We are a great deal too apt to attribute omnipotence to Parliaments and to Governments. In the presence of physical and economic causes and changes, I believe that 1886 LORD HARTINGTON'S ARGUMENT 143 it is much nearer the truth to say that Parliaments and Governments, whatever they may be, are almost powerless.' But these very reforms effected by the Imperial Parlia- ment materially affected the situation. ' It may be, and I believe it was, substantially just that these changes should have been made . . . but at the same time it is not less just that the minority which has been deprived by our action, and not by the action of the people of Ireland, of almost all the rights and privileges and power which they possessed at the time of the union, should not be handed over, without due and adequate protection, at the hands of that Power by whose influence these vast and far-reaching changes have been effected.' The time might come, he said, when not merely County Boards or Municipal Councils, but — ' some larger provincial, and perhaps even national or- ganisation and co-ordination of local authorities may be required in England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales. When that time comes, let Ireland share in whatever is granted to England, Scotland, or to Wales, but, when it comes, it will, in my opinion, be the outgrowth of institutions which have not yet been created.^ The superstructure will be raised on foundations which have not yet been laid, and it would be unwise and impolitic ... to attempt to begin at the top.' Mr. Gladstone, however, he said, had discovered that it was not local institutions at all that the Irish party wanted, but — 'a practical separation from this country, national in- dependence, the power to make their own laws, and to shape their own institutions, without any reference what- ^ It must be remembered that at this date there were no elective County Councils in any part of the United Kingdom, 144 GLADSTONE'S ADMINISTRATION ch. xxil ever to the opinion that may be held here in respect to the wisdom, the justice, the equity of those laws, or to the fitness or the wisdom of those institutions.' Lord Hartington pointed out the distinctions between the case of the United Kingdom and that of the self- governing colonies. The colonies were, at the nearest, 3000 miles away. The connection between them and our- selves was voluntary and not one which, if a colony mani- fested unmistakably its desire to terminate it altogether, we should maintain by force. He showed, at length, the essential impossibilities of the actual scheme resulting from the fact that, on the one hand, the Imperial Parlia- ment, without Irish representatives in it, would have the power of levying certain taxation, and other important powers in Ireland, and, on the other hand, that Ireland would contribute a large sum to Imperial expenditure while ceasing to have any voice or vote in the Imperial Parliament which controlled both that expenditure and the policy to w^hich it was due. He replied also to the nebulous contention of Mr. Gladstone that supreme authority over the whole United Kingdom would remain, as before, vested in the Imperial Government and Parlia- ment. 'We shall be under one Sovereign, but the question is — Shall we be under one sovereign power ? The sovereign power is the power of the Imperial Parliament. Will the power of the Imperial Parliament remain sovereign in Ireland ? Nominally it will remain ; will it be real ? ' How, he asked, was it to be enforced in Ireland ? By military force ? ' It is impossible to administer the affairs of a country by means of an army.' The difficulty of maintaining order in Ireland had, he 1886 LORD HARTINGTON'S ARGUMENT 145 thought, been exaggerated. In so far as administration had failed in Ireland it was due to the fact that — ' Irish questions and the government of Ireland have too long and too habitually been made the battle-ground of political parties. Questions of Irish order have been too often subordinated to what, I have no doubt, have been honestly thought at the time to be interests of a superior or more pressing character.^ But, Sir, I do not admit that, because this has been so, it need always be so. If, indeed, this be a necessity, then I am afraid no alter- native lies before us but either resort to civil war or abandonment of our duties, our privileges, and our responsibilities. But, Sir, I refuse to believe it. I believe, at all events, that now, if ever, now that the people of this country have been brought face to face with the alternative of the disruption of the Empire on the one hand, or all the evils and calamities which, I admit, will follow on the rejection of this unfortunate measure, I believe that now, at all events, the people of this country will require that their representatives shall, in relation to Irish affairs, agree to sink all minor differences, and to unite as one man for the maintenance of this great o Empire, to hand it down to our successors compact as we have received it from our forefathers, and at the same time to maintain throughout its length and breadth the undisputed supremacy of the law.' This was the peroration of a speech which, as Lord Randolph Churchill said, when he followed it, profoundly impressed the House of Commons. Mr. Chamberlain wrote to express his ' unfeigned admiration,' and said, ' It was the finest you have ever made and was sustained throughout on the highest level.' An old social and racing friend, himself a Tory orator of no mean level, Mr. Henry Chaplin, wrote to congratulate * on the best speech I have ^ He evidently had in mind the perpetual Radical attempt to give precedence to remedial legislation over measures intended to reinforce the law. VOL. II. K 146 GLADSTONE'S ADMINISTRATION ch. xxii. ever heard you make by ten to one, and the most states- manlike I have ever heard made by any one in Parliament. It may be a drawback in your eyes that, if it has half the effect in the country that it has had here, it will make you Prime Minister for certain.' Lord Salisbury wrote to say that the 'very powerful speech of last night . . . will make a great difference in the political situation.' A fine orator of the older and grander school, the Duke of Argyll, wrote saying that he agreed with every word, and that the speech was the weightiest that Hartington had ever made, or that had been made by any one in these debates. Among the letters of congratulation on this occasion was one from Mr. Auberon Herbert. He did not agree with the view of Irish policy taken by Lord Hartington, but had 'gratefully watched your courageous stand on your own opinions and your refusal to go simply with party in the matter.' He added, with splendid truth : — ' I think we may go right or wrong about Ireland or almost any great matter, and, if wrong, recover from our mistake ; but the one thing from which I think there is no salvation is when men begin to have no confidence in themselves and their own opinion, and to become the mere instruments of party. I have long hoped to see you break with what I have believed to be a false position, and I think your having done so will give a new sense of duty and a new power of action to hundreds of men throughout the country. Every man who consents to action of which he is believed to disapprove helps to lower the sense of individual responsibility in all others whom he influences, and the moment he refuses to do so any longer he wakes others from a mental and moral sleep.' Throughout these debates Lord Hartington took what, in the history of mediseval philosophy, is called the * realist ' view ; Mr. Gladstone took the ' nominahst.' Men 1886 'SUPREME AUTHORITY' 147 are born, or bred, with this diversity of brain. Gladstone, son of the Oxford school, believed in what he called the ' union of hearts,' the higher or more spiritual unity of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and thought that the concrete, or visible, unity of government, so far from being necessary, stood in the way.^ Hartington by his whole temperament, descent, education, pursuits, and pleasures in life, was a realist ; he could not have ac- cepted words in place of things, the invisible without the visible, spirit without body. He did not understand how the * supreme authority ' of the Imperial Parliament could at once persist and disappear. Sir Louis Mallet sent to him about this time a quotation from Mountstuart Elphin- stone : ' Most mistakes in policy arise from ignorance of the plain maxim that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,' and applied it to the desire of people at once to have Home Rule and not to have it. No one was less capable of this error than Lord Hartington. To him a thing either was or it was not. It had slowly become clear to him, at last, that, as he said, he and Mr. Gladstone ' did not mean the same thing ' by the ' supremacy ' of Parliament. Because Lord Hartington looked at facts as they were, or at least tried to do so, and not as interest or love of the more facile course might make him wish them to be, he rendered good service to the country, and attained to the influence which he had. II The introduction of the Irish Bill was followed by a pause in the progress of the measure. The second reading was not taken until the loth May. The interval ^ The minutely self-described history of John Henry Newman was that of a realist spirit slowly working its way out of a nominalist cocoon into full realism. Mr. Gladstone's course in politics was somewhat the reverse. 148 GLADSTONE'S ADMINISTRATION ch. xxii. was filled by an oratorical war throughout the country. There was a remarkable meeting on 14th April at Her Majesty's Theatre in the Haymarket. Both Lord Salis- bury and Lord Hartington spoke from the stage, and other leading Liberals and Conservatives. It was the first manifestation of the coalition which was to hold the State firm on its course for the next twenty years. The audience was mainly composed of Tories, and was in a state of strong emotion. Lord Hartington was received with a storm of cheering. When he first had occasion to mention the name of the Prime Minister there were groans and hisses. The speaker paused, and then said, in a moved tone which silenced the demonstration, ' Gentle- men ! I hope that I may appeal to you not to make my task more difficult than it is by any manifestation of want of respect to one whom I shall always admire and revere as the leader of a great party, who, in my opinion, has conferred great advantages on this country, and who, at this moment, in my judgment, although I am bound to differ from him, is actuated by feelings as noble and honest as any that have ever inspired the conduct of an English statesman.' Lord Randolph Churchill, speaking elsewhere in London, said that the Prime Minister had appealed to the cowardice of the people, their dread of what, in Ire- land, might follow a refusal. Lord Hartington, at the Opera House, said that this assuredly was not the motive of the Prime Minister, but that it was the sole motive of many who had followed him, in opposition to their own reason and conscience. He spoke on this memor- able occasion with great feeling, force, and concentration. He also spoke in Lancashire, where he met with a mixed reception from his own constituents ; then, at the end of April at Edinburgh, and in May in Yorkshire. A veteran and distinguished Whig, Mr. Pleydell Bouverie, of 1886 SECOND READING DEBATE 149 Wiltshire, wrote to congratulate him on a speech at Bradford. He said : — * Its substance and its form are equally admirable, and it is an unanswerable argument of the most complete and statesmanlike character against this fatal Bill. I really do not think it omits anything which ought to be said, or says anything which ought to be omitted, and the whole case against the scheme may be safely rested on what you have thus said in the best possible spirit and way. You may have forgotten that, when you were a parliamentary youngster, I endeavoured to stir your ambition by point- ing to the position you might, with your abilities and advantages, fairly aspire to reach. My forecast has been more than confirmed now by the event, and, as I am old, on the shelf, and want nothing, you will forgive my intrusion.' On the 14th April, Lord Randolph Churchill urged upon Lord Hartington, ' the enormous desirability of your giving notice to-morrow of your intention to move the rejection of the Bill.' Any delay in giving notice would, bethought, be open to misinterpretation. 'There are many waverers. The only way, to my mind, of leading such persons is by resolute, prompt, and decided action.' Lord Hartington was wiUing to take the lead in the second reading debate, but doubted whether it would be better to move, in the usual form, the rejection of the Bill, or to defeat it with what is known as a ' reasoned amend- ment.' He consulted Mr. Chamberlain upon this point. The reply shows how things stood at the moment. Mr. Chamberlain said that a 'reasoned amendme.it,' would be fatal. He had a list of Liberal members who had promised to vote against the Bill, more than sufficient in number to destroy it in its present form. But the pressure from the constituencies was great. ' If you alter the motion of ISO GLADSTONE'S ADMINISTRATION ch. xxii. rejection and give any excuse to waverers you will lose fifty votes at least.' Mr. Chamberlain had heard on good authority that, to win the battle, Mr. Gladstone might allow the retention of the Irish members in the Imperial Parliament. ' If it is true, I must vote for the second reading, and I estimate that from fifty to fifty-five will go with me.' But, in that case, Mr. Chamberlain believed that the Bill would perish by certain large amendments, which would be pressed in Committee, amendments intended to give a purely provincial instead of a national character to the Irish institutions. Mr. Gladstone moved the second reading on the loth May in a speech which was certainly feebler than either his first or his final speech in these debates, especially than the last, which was a fine oratorical effort. His main argument was still the will of the Irish people manifested in the late elections. He said : — ' I live in a country of representative institutions ; I have faith in representative institutions, and I will follow them out to their legitimate consequences ; and I believe it to be dangerous to the Constitution of this country, and to the unity of the Empire, to show the smallest hesitation about the adoption of that principle.' To the argument that Home Rule was incompatible with unity he opposed a singular and illuminating defence, which showed how his genius transmuted words into things. This question, he said, was settled in his mind on the first night of the session, when Parnell had declared that what he sought was ' autonomy ' for Ireland. * Auto- nomy,' said Mr. Gladstone, * is a name well known to European law and practice as importing, under a historical signification sufficiently definite for every practical purpose, the management and control of the territory to which the 1886 MR. GLADSTONE'S SPEECH 151 word is applied, and as being perfectly compatible with the full maintenance of imperial unity.' To the charge of ' taxation without representation ' Mr. Gladstone replied that * nothing but the consent of Ireland could have in- duced Her Majesty's Government to contemplate such a thing for a single moment,' as if the unwilling assent of Parnell, given for tactical purposes, could have bound the future Irish Parliament. As to Ireland ceasnig to have any share in the control of imperial affairs, he replied (i) that oversea affairs did not affect Ireland so much as they did England and Scotland ; (2) that there was now a provision in the Bill which would enable Ireland to vote a contribution in case of a great war. He hinted, however, that some modification of the principle of 'exclusion' might be introduced into the Bill in Committee. When, for instance, it was proposed to alter the Excise and Customs duties, Irish representatives might be allowed to attend the Imperial Parliament 'to take a share in the transaction of that business.' As to foreign affairs, treaties of commerce and so forth, there might be some system of a Joint Commission to consider those matters. These suggestions were aimed at the hearts of Liberal waverers, who might be induced to vote for a second reading. Lord Hartington then rose to move the rejection of the Bill, and made the most powerful debating speech, pro- bably, of his life. As to Gladstone's singular argument about * autonomy,' he said : — ' Is this great question, which has long been per- plexing the mind of my right honourable friend, to be solved by a single sentence spoken in debate, for a manifest and obvious purpose, by the leader of the Irish National party, when that sentence is in direct con- tradiction to almost everything which he and his friends have hitherto said, and to the repeated assurances which 152 GLADSTONE'S ADMINISTRATION ch. xxii. they have given us that they were working and would work for, and would be satisfied with nothing but, com- plete separation. Did the hon. member for Cork ever use the words " severance of the last link," or " complete independence," or did he ever say that no bounds were to be set to the independence of the Irish nation ? ' Mr. Gladstone had said that Government were charged with experimenting on this question, and he had defined experimenting as * treating grave questions without grave causes.' ' I do not deny,' said Lord Hartington, ' that there may be grave causes, and that this is a grave question, but I should rather be inclined to define experimenting in politics as treating grave questions for grave causes, but without grave and mature consideration. Whatever may be the consideration which my right hon. friend may have himself given to this policy and this measure, it is cer- tain that the country and its representatives have had no sufficient opportunity of forming their judgment or giving their decision upon it. And it is, also, equally notorious that, with very few exceptions, the colleagues of the right honourable gentleman, up to the moment of their joining the present Government, had formed opinions, and ex- pressed opinions upon the question of Ireland, I will not say diametrically opposed to, but certainly very little in harmony with, the policy of the Prime Minister.' Mr. Gladstone's scheme was not only an experiment, but a * novel experiment, for never, I believe, in the history of the world, has the attempt been made to carry on the government of a country upon any such system as that which is now proposed for Ireland.' Mr. Gladstone had said that previous Governments had carried on Irish administration by a ' judicious mixture ' of measures of conciliation and measures of coercion. Lord Hartington replied that no Minister had ever admitted that these 1886 LORD HARTINGTON'S SPEECH 153 measures were introduced upon any such principle. Each measure had been proposed because the Government thought it a measure of justice or a measure of necessity. He challenged Mr. Gladstone's review of history. Grattan's Parliament could not have endured. That experiment must have ended either in complete separation or in a legislative union sooner or later. Mr. Gladstone had said that Lord Hartington had taken a great responsibility on himself in his opposition to this measure. Lord Hartington replied that he and his friends were so acting because they knew that the Bill could not be defeated by the Conservatives alone. He added : — ' We believe this Bill is a mischievous measure. We believe it is not one which will heal the feud, the long- standing feud, between Great Britain and Ireland. We believe it does not satisfy any of the essential conditions which have been laid down by my right honourable friend himself. We believe it is not a final settlement of the question. We believe there is nothing in this measure which conclusively commends it, or ought to commend it, to those who profess Liberal principles ; and, holding these opinions, we who have the misfortune to differ from my right hon. friend and from the bulk of the party which he leads, have thought it necessary not to conceal our opinions, not to take a passive or a neutral part, but to take that part which alone could give effect to the opinions we entertain, and which alone, in our opinion, can result in the defeat of this measure, which we believe to be injurious to the best interests of the nation.' Lord Hartington, then, in reply to Mr. Gladstone's question, said that he was not bound in opposing a measure to state an alternative policy, but that he saw no reason why there should not be an attempt to confer upon Ireland local institutions of a kind which were also applicable 154 GLADSTONE'S ADMINISTRATION Ch. xxii to other parts of the United Kingdom. This he believed to be 'a. more statesmanlike method of proceeding than to attempt to confer on Ireland a cut-and-dry constitution, separating and cutting off Ireland completely from all political connection with the United Kingdom of England and Scotland.' He objected to Mr. Gladstone's treatment of the ex- clusion of Irish representatives from the Imperial Par- liament, or their inclusion for some ill-defined purposes, as a detail which could be settled in Committee. This was, he said, on the contrary, of the essence of the matter. He pointed out what immense changes the Bill would effect. It did not merely grant local self-government to Ireland ; it broke up the political unity of the kingdom ; it placed restrictions upon the power and the policy of the Imperial Parliament. The Bill would destroy the very essence of political unity. Lord Hartington said: — ' We may have not only different laws in Ireland from those which prevail in England and Scotland, but laws founded on entirely different principles and administered in a totally different spirit. And I say that is no ex- travagant supposition. If the principles recently preached by the Irish Land League and the Irish National League be translated into legislation by the Irish Parliament, and if laws founded on these principles be administered by those who have had control over the National League, then we shall find in Ireland a state of law relating to property, liberty, and security of life which will be of an altogether different character to that prevailing in this country. Can it be said that the unity of the Empire is maintained when an Englishman going from England to Ireland, or an Irishman remaining in Ireland, finds him- self subject to a code of laws administered in a totally different spirit from that which prevails in the rest of the Empire ? ' 1886 LORD HARTINGTON'S SPEECH 155 He then discussed the position of the minority in Ireland under the proposed system. Certain provisions intended for their protection had indeed been inserted in the Bill, but would it be possible to tie down the Irish Government by these restrictions ? ' I may be included,' said Lord Hartington, ' among those representatives of class whose evidence is discredited evidence, whose opinion upon this subject is not worth having ; but I shall not be debarred, nevertheless, from expressing my opinion of the character, the political ante- cedents, and the political record of the men whom we are now told are the representatives of the vast majority of the people of Ireland, and to whose hands will be en- trusted, if this Bill should pass, the future destinies of Ireland. I shall call as a witness no discredited representa- tive of class, but I shall call my right honourable friend himself.' He quoted the famous denunciation of Parnell made by Mr. Gladstone in that speech at Leeds in 1881, which formed the prelude to the arrest of the Irish leader, and said that the doctrines of violence and rapine then de- nounced had never yet been repudiated by the Irish leaders. Mr. Gladstone at Leeds had upheld the policy of strongly maintaining order. ' If,' said Lord Hartington, * this war — this final conflict between law on the one side and sheer lawlessness on the other — is to continue, that is the policy which I venture to recommend still, but for recommending which I and my friends are called the representatives of class.' The circumstances of 1881 were not 'materially altered,' neither, therefore, should the policy be substantially altered. * I see no reason, simply because the party professing those principles has acquired greater strength and possibly 156 GLADSTONE'S ADMINISTRATION ch. xxii. a greater claim to represent a large number of the people of Ireland — I see no reason why we are to retire from that which has been called by my right hon. friend a conflict between law on the one side and sheer lawlessness on the other ; and why we are to sacrifice, without any further struggle, the principles upon which, in the opinion of my right hon. friend at that time, the structure and basis of society reposed.' The Government delayed rather than pressed the conclusion of the debate, and the division was not taken until the 8th June. The result was uncertain to the last. Mr. Gladstone had told his party on the 27th May that he would consider any plan for the retention of the Irish members, provided that it did not interfere with the liberty of the Irish legislature, or make the working of the Imperial Parliament impossible. The Bill, if read a second time, would be recast, and not taken in Committee until the autumn. Would these last concessions sap the opposition of the Radicals who went with Mr. Chamberlain, and were, with him, deeply committed to approval of some kind of Irish self-government ? Would the continuous pressure from the constituencies have been too much for Liberal Unionist consciences to withstand ? Attempts were made to discover some formula which would enable, or, rather, compel, Mr. Chamberlain and his group to vote for the second reading. A memorandum by Lord Hartington written at this time shows that, in his opinion, there would be no reality in any form of words devised to cover irreconcilable divergencies of intention. Mr. Gladstone's concessions to meet English opinion had already put a strain upon the rope which bound him to the Irish Nationalists as great as it would bear. The Irish parliamentarians were themselves straining to the utmost their own connection with Irish extremists. It was not 1886 DISSOLUTION 157 possible, in this tug of war, to draw Mr. Gladstone over a certain line. The division was taken amid intense excitement before sunrise on the 8th June. Government were defeated by thirty votes, 343 against 313. Ninety-three Liberals had voted against the Bill. Never since then has an English Government been defeated in a critical division in con- sequence of a great revolt in its own camp, and this was twenty-five years ago. Will it ever happen again, or are party chains now too strong ? On the following day, 9th June, the Prime Minister, after a Cabinet Council, advised the Queen that Parliament should be dissolved, and that the opinion of the country should! be taken. He flung himself into the struggle with vigour amazing in a man now in his seventy-eighth year, appealing freely to the wisdom of the ' masses ' against the ' classes,' who, he alleged, had been politically in the wrong, always and upon every question. An arrangement was rapidly made between the Conservatives and the Liberal Unionists to the effect that, where a Liberal Unionist already held a seat, the Conservatives should not oppose him, but support him against any Gladstonian candidate. But in the Liberal Unionist party itself there was a certain division of opinion as to Irish policy. Lord Hartington wrote in reply, on May 24th, to questions put to him by a follower important in matters of organisation in the north : — ' I do not think that the time has come when Liberal Unionists can with advantage commit themselves to any definite Irish policy ; but I see no reason why they should limit themselves to opposition to Mr. Gladstone's Bills, or refuse to indicate their willingness to support safe and well-considered measures for the satisfaction of what is reasonable in the Irish demand. All Liberals have, I think, pledged themselves to support an extension of local self- 158 GLADSTONE'S ADMINISTRATION ch. xxii. government in Ireland on lines similar to those which may be adopted for the rest of the United Kingdom. Others are quite willing to consider favourably a larger measure for Ireland than has yet been proposed for England and Scotland, provided that it is founded on principles which would be applicable in case of necessity to the remainder of the United Kingdom, and that the real unity of the Government of the United Kingdom, and the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, and the protection of all classes from injustice or oppression are fully secured. I do not see any reason why a candidate holding opinions within these limits should not be supported by the moderate Liberal party. It is certainly undesirable that a policy of coercion alone should be attributed to us ; though personally I should always be prepared to maintain that the law must be enforced, and that the measures necessary to secure its enforcement should be adopted, by whatever name they may be called. ' I do not think that it is necessary to take up a position of antagonism to Mr. Chamberlain and the section of the party which he leads. I believe that our objects are the same, the difference between us being simply that he sees less difficulty than I do in framing a measure which would give satisfaction to reasonable Irish aspirations and at the same time maintain the substantial authority of the Imperial Government and Parliament.' The address which Lord Hartington issued to his con- stituents on 15th June was an extremely well-reasoned statement of policy, and, as the question is still with us, it is of living interest even now, twenty-five years later. The whole question, he said, was not one of justice, or right, but of expediency. To what extent could concession be safely made to the desire for self-government undoubtedly existing among a majority of the Irish population ? * The measure introduced by Government reserved to a Parliament of Great Britain, in which the Irish people would not have been represented at all, the control over 1886 LORD HARTINGTON'S ADDRESS 159 vital matters in which they are as much interested as EngHshmen or Scotchmen — such as the conduct of foreign and colonial aflfairs, the regulation of trade, and the im- position of duties of Customs and Excise. At the same time it entrusted to an Irish Legislature, and to a Govern- ment responsible only to that Legislature, a control prac- tically exclusive, not only over affairs of a local character, but also over legislation and administration of laws affect- ing the relations of property, the prevention and punish- ment of crime, and the civil and religious rights and liberties of the whole community. ' To say that these are exclusively Irish affairs, and may therefore be safely entrusted to the management of the Irish, is misleading. To recognise this fact is not to import into the controversy the elements of religious bigotry. Not only the Protestants of Ulster, and those who are scattered over the whole country, but many Roman Catholics also, regard this measure with real alarm, as fatal to their prosperity and their liberties. To ignore this fact is to trifle with the question, and is mi attempt to escape by specious phrases from the realities of the position.' ^ Lord Hartington pointed out that Mr. Gladstone con- tinued to pass over these difficulties sub silentio. He was therefore compelled to conclude that < within the lines of the plan of the Government it is impossible to devise any adequate protection for those who are admitted to need it. That plan surrenders powers which the Imperial Government and the Imperial Parliament must retain, if the first duties of government are to be discharged.' ' It is easy,' the address continued, ' to dismiss with contempt the alternative plans which have been suggested by those who decline to accept the Separatist scheme, but are yet willing to concede that which they deem reason- able in the Irish demand. The difficulties are great, and I 1 Italics are not in the original, but so true and characteristic a sentence deserves them. i6o GLADSTONE'S ADMINISTRATION cn. xxii. am certainly not prepared to commit myself to the details of any of the plans which have been proposed ; but, in my opinion, there are certain conditions which may be clearly stated, which are essential to any plan which can be accepted by the country. ' Parliament ought to continue to represent the whole, and not merely a part, of the United Kingdom. The powers which may be conferred on subordinate local bodies should be delegated, not surrendered, by Parlia- ment. The subjects to be delegated should be clearly defined, and the right of Parliament to control and revise the action of subordinate legislative or administrative authorities should be equally clearly reserved. And, lastly, the administration of justice ought to remain in the hands of an authority which is responsible to Parliament. ' It is asserted that no measure thus limited will satisfy the demands of the Irish people. No doubt the repre- sentatives of the Nationalist party in Parliament will declare themselves dissatisfied with any concession which falls short of the demands that they have been encouraged to make. But, if the great majority of the people of the United Kingdom now distinctly and firmly declare that they can give no assent to measures which will loosen the bonds of union between the^two countries, and that they are ready, at the same time, to give to Ireland as large a measure of self- government as is consistent with that union, it remains to be proved whether the Irish people will be persuaded to maintain a hopeless and unnecessary contest.' It had been alleged. Lord Hartington added, that, in face of a determined opposition by ninety Irish members, supported by an English and Scotch minority, it would prove impossible to carry on a parliamentary government. He did not believe it, and intimated that, if this should prove to be necessary in defence of the existence of parliamentary institutions, it would be a duty to adopt a policy with regard to Irish representation which might be 1886 ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN i6i considered to be analogous to defensive war. He concluded his address by saying : — ' In advocating the policy, which I have attempted to define, I deny that I have seceded from the principles or traditions of the Liberal party. I contend, on the con- trary, that I am maintaining them, and, with them, the best security for freedom and justice in every part of the United Kingdom.' The Irish people still maintain that which Lord Hart- ington called ' a hopeless and unnecessary contest,' but, on the other hand, it may perhaps be contended that they have not yet received 'as large a measure of self-govern- ment as is consistent with ' the union of the two countries, so that the conditions of the test as posited by Lord Hartington have not yet been fulfilled. The more moderate Home Rule Bill of 1893 did not comply any more than that of 1886 with Lord Hartington's condi- tion that subjects to be delegated to the local legislature should be specified and clearly defined, as they are in the Canadian Constitution. In the 1893 debates his nephew, Mr. Victor Cavendish, the present Duke of Devonshire, proposed such definition and specification as an amend- ment to the Bill, but Mr. Gladstone adhered to the method of leaving to the proposed Irish legislature all power in Irish affairs from which it was not expressly debarred. It makes all the difference in the world which of these methods is adopted, the Canadian precedent or that of the United States. The electoral campaign was now opened, and there were the usual 'alarums and excursions,' Mr. Gladstone took the field with hardly any abatement of his old energy and valour. Lord Hartington fought the most strenuous cam- paign of his life. He spoke at Rossendale, Manchester, Glasgow, Paisley, Cardiff, Bristol, Plymouth, Chesterfield, VOL. II. L 1 62 GLADSTONE'S ADMINISTRATION ch. xxii. Rossendale again, and at Derby, the capital of the county where his family had played so large a part. The Glad- stonian standing for Derby was Sir William Harcourt. Two rather touching letters show that he felt keenly his late colleague's acceptance of the invitation from Derby to speak there. Harcourt's political career was certainly open to criticism, but he was a good friend and a man of large and generous character. Sir IVt'/h'am Harcourt to Lord Hartington, I'jth June 1886. 'What you said to me about the possibility of your coming to try to defeat me at Derby took me so by surprise that I was hardly able to realise the thing at the moment. On reflection I feel bound to say before it is too late what a bitter thing it would be to me to find myself placed in personal hostility to you after the long and close relation in which we have stood. ' I judge the case by the impossibility I should have felt myself in taking any action individually against yourself, but I do not, of course, consider that you are at all bound by the same considerations. ' If there is to be war between us it will be to me the saddest thing which has befallen me in public life, but I shall have the satisfaction of feeling it was not of my seeking, and that I have done all in my power to avoid it.' Sir William Harcourt to Lord Hartington, 2^th June 1886. ' Your kind letter of this morning was an immense relief to me. Anything which brought me into personal collision with you would be to me the most painful thing in the world, as the recollection of our intimate relations for so many years is to me a deeply cherished feeling which no political difference can change. * I can quite understand the pressure to which you were subjected by those who agree with your views in Derby- shire. At the same time I hope you will not in the future 1886 UNIONIST VICTORY 163 regret that you did not find yourself obliged to emphasise and widen the breach between the two sections of the Liberal party here as elsewhere which we must all desire to heal. ' I do not know whether it is by accident or instinct that we have hitherto been all of us able to avoid placing our- selves in individual conflict with our former colleagues of a recent date, and I am sure you would not willingly find yourself unnecessarily an exception to that happy rule.' Lord Hartington was supported in Lancashire by his old ' fair trade ' opponent, Mr. Farrer Ecroyd, but was bitterly opposed by the Gladstonians. ' They have begun the contest in earnest,' wrote (2nd July) to him Mr. Thomas Brooks of Crawshaw Hall, 'on the other side ; in fact, they seem to have gone mad. Mr. Gladstone has not said those words in vain, " the masses against the classes." ' Lord Hartington wrote to his father on 9th July : — 'A great many of my old supporters seem to be very angry, and are working as hard as they can against me. Both the Manchester Liberal papers are strong against me, and we are certainly on the unpopular side with the mob this time. I have only had one very noisy meeting, but the others were decidedly cold.' Rossendale was, however, carried, with the Tory assistance, on 15th July. Some other leading Liberal Unionists were less successful, and Mr. Goschen and Mr. Trevelyan were defeated in Scotland. But the Gladstonians were beaten. The Tories came back 316 strong instead of 251 ; and the Liberal Unionists were slightly diminished, yet were 74 in number. Thus the Unionist alliance were 390 in the new Parliament, the allied sections led by Gladstone and Parnell amounted to 280, and there was a majority of no against the Home Rule policy. This result placed the Liberal Unionists in a commanding 164 GLADSTONE'S ADMINISTRATION ch. xxii. position, although, if on any occasion they merely abstained from voting, the Tories could still defeat the Gladstone- Parnell combination. The electoral defeat of that com- bination had not been very decisive, especially if votes were counted instead of seats.^ There can be no doubt that the failure of the Home Rule proposal was due to the action of Lord Hartington, Mr. Chamberlain, and Mr. Bright. Not so important was the defeat in Parliament as the defeat in the following elections, because, even if the Bill of 1886 had passed the House of Commons, it would certainly have been rejected by the House of Lords. If Gladstone had returned with a majority, it wou'ld not have been easy for the House of Lords to ofifer resistance. These results were prevented by the influence of Lord Hartington over moderate Liberals, of Mr. Chamberlain over a section of Radicals, and the weight carried by the name of John Bright. But all these forces, combined with the regular army of Conservatism, did but narrowly defeat the host of believers in Gladstone in England, Scotland, and Wales. Mr. Gladstone resigned office at the end of July. Now began the long Unionist tenure of power which, with one interval of three years, lasted from July 1886 to December 1905. Lord Randolph Churchill said, at the opening of the new Parliament in August 1886: — * The great sign-posts of our policy are equality, simi- larity, and simultaneity, as far as possible, in the develop- ment of a genuinely popular system of local government in the four countries which form the United Kingdom.' This marked the Unionist policy of the future tending towards, firstly, county, and then, perhaps, provincial * In Great Britain the votes cast were : Gladstonians, 1,344,000 ; Liberal- Unionists, 397,000; Conservatives, 1,041,000; so that the Unionist majority was only 76,000 excluding the vote in Ireland. Including actual and potential electors in Ireland the Unionists were probably in a minority. 1886 AN IRISH TESTIMONY 165 institutions for the whole United Kingdom, and, although Lord Hartington would not have been inclined to move so fast as the Tory Democrat, this was, as his addresses and speeches show, at the foundation of his own ideas. His speeches throughout this great campaign in Parlia- ment and on the platform impressed his opponents as well as his allies. Mr. F. CDonnell, an Irish Home Ruler, who long sat with him in the House of Commons, has written ; — 'The Marquis of Hartington appeared to me to be the only statesman who, if he had dealt with the subject, could have reconciled Nationalism and Imperialism in Ireland. His subsequent objections to Mr. Gladstone's scheme of Home Rule were all unanswerable, and I, a thorough maintainer of Irish legislative independence, acknowledge that they were so. Except, perhaps, on financial subjects, there was more relevant matter and more broad thought in one of Lord Hartington's speeches than in a round dozen of the great Parliamentarian's utterances.' ^ The contrast between Gladstone and Hartington was that between those eternal opponents, the sea and the rock. The imaginative and sentimental waves broke vainly against and around the opposing strength of character. ^ And, elsewhere, the same candid writer says : — ' Lord Hartington always impressed me with the conviction that he was the English statesman above all others who could introduce the proposal which would solve the difficulty between England and Ireland, provided only he was convinced of the rectitude and expediency of the step,' — History of the Irish Parliamentary Party (Longmans, 19 lo). Ch. XXIII CHAPTER XXIII LORD SALISBURY'S SECOND ADMINISTRATION, i8S6 TO 1892 Lord Salisbury's first idea was that the new Govern- ment should be formed by Lord Hartington. He had himself been Prime Minister for a short period ; he was philosophical, magnanimous, and superior to personal ambitions, and he would have been contented to carry on that which chiefly interested him, the work of the Foreign Offtce. If, moreover, Lord Hartington were Prime Minister, he would also, of course, be leader in the House of Commons, and this would solve a domestic question then vexing the Tory party. Their Hector in recent warfare had been the still youthful Lord Randolph Churchill. He had won the heart of the Tory part of the democracy by his hard hitting, and by the cavalier insolence of his assaults upon Mr. Gladstone. He was an iconoclast, and dared to assail with impious ridicule that venerable image of the Prime Minister which had formed itself in the public mind. He had risen as much through revolt against the constituted authorities of his own party as through warfare against their opponents, and stood out in the popular imagination with infinitely more distinctness than any other Tory leader. He had the restless and ambitious spirit of the young Buonaparte, and could not rest until he was First Consul. When the Conservatives came into power in June 1885, he refused to accept office unless Sir Stafford Northcote were re- i66 1886 LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL 167 moved from the leadership in the House of Commons ; and he was successful. Sir Michael Hicks Beach occupied the vacant place during the short Administration. Sir Michael, a proud and self-respecting country gentleman, was unwilling, in July 1886, to retain the lead with a second in command more popular and powerful in the party at large than himself. Evidently the leadership in the House of Commons must pass to Lord Randolph, unless Lord Hartington would accept it. Hartington's social and political position was superior to that of the cadet of the House of Churchill, and he was regarded with more general and real esteem. Lord Randolph had always treated him with ceremonious respect. When, on one occasion, this failed, Lord Randolph wrote a kindly- received apology. He stood, it seemed, in some awe of a man who was not only a leading statesman but also a great figure in the social world, whose word and opinion carried weight in aristocratic circles and clubs. Early in 1887, Lord Randolph told a Liberal Unionist friend that he felt that Lord Hartington hated him politically and ignored him socially. He recognised later that this was not a well-founded suspicion ; he was a guest at Chatsworth ; and they were on friendly terms enough. But he had, perhaps, rather the feeling of the Duke in Disraeli's Lothair : 'St. Aldegonde was the only one of his sons-in-law whom the Duke really considered and a little feared. When St. Aldegonde was serious, his in- fluence over men was powerful.'^ Lord Randolph had indeed some reason, based on bygone encounters, for his views as to Lord Hartington's feelings. The acute observer who wrote * Essence of Parliament ' in Punch ^ It was thought by some that Disraeli drew the character of St. Aldegonde from Lord Hartington. Whether this was so or not, it might stand very well as a clever sketch from this model. i68 SECOND ADMINISTRATION ch. xxni. for the benefit of future generations, describing one such encounter, in the year 1881, says : — ' Randolph could not have been very happy after Lord Hartington had finished with him. Hartington not often roused from his chronic condition of passionless in- difference. Randolph, among other charming qualities, possesses the secret of moving the Marquis to astonishing exhibitions of sledge-hammer contempt.' The view, at this conjuncture, of another important leader must be given. Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Hai'tington. ' HlGHBURY,y«/(/ 16, 1886. ' I am enjoying myself very much here, and am revelling in the delights of Capua, that is to say, I am playing lawn tennis and reading French novels — the while accompanied by unlimited tobacco. You will easily understand that I have no intention of giving up this blissful existence to come to London unless it is absolutely necessary. ' As to the situation : of course I could not join any Coalition ; it would be absurd in me, and I need not argue it. 'With you it is somewhat different. You might join and be perfectly consistent. ' But if you do you must make up your mind to cease to be or call yourself a Liberal. ' The force of circumstances will be irresistible, and you will be absorbed in the great Constitutional party. The fate of the Peelites will be the fate of the Hartingtonians — they will be probably swallowed up and digested by the party to which they adhere. * I do not suppose that you desire this, and I have there- fore always assumed that you would refuse to head or to join a Coalition Government. In that case we must all give a loyal support to the Conservatives provided that 1886 REFUSAL OF OFFICE 169 they do not play the fool either in foreign policy or in reactionary measures at home. They might count on some years of power — after which, if Mr. Gladstone is out of the way, the Liberal party will probably pick itself together again, and I hope may be strong enough to turn them out. ' I do not see how we can find them an Irish Secretary, but I think we might suggest a policy which would last a year or two, and that is as much as can be expected at this time.' Lord Salisbury met Lord Hartington on the morning of the 24th July. The latter, in a letter on the following day to Mr. Chamberlain, said that — ' Salisbury told me that he wished to advise the Queen to send for me to form a Government. I told him that I thought it was impossible, and, after consulting H. James and others, I wrote to him to Osborne finally declining. I gather from him that he will not make any difficulty about undertaking it himself, and I do not think there will be any further offer of coalition, though he admits and deplores his weakness as to men in the House of Commons.' The following is the letter which Lord Hartington wrote to Lord Salisbury on this evening of decision : — Devonshire House, 2A,th July 1886. My dear Lord Salisbury, — I have considered as well as I have been able what you said to m.e this morning. I have also seen Sir Henry James, Lord Northbrook, and Lord Derby. I have come to the conclusion that the difficulties in the way of my forming a Government are so insuperable that it would be useless for me to attempt it. I have had some means of ascertaining the opinions of the unofficial, as well as of the ex-official members of the Liberal Unionist party, and I am convinced that I could not obtain the support of the whole or nearly the whole of them for a Government the main strength of which I70 SECOND ADMINISTRATION ch. xxiii. must be Conservative. They have represented themselves to their constituencies as Liberals, and nothing will in- duce many of them to act with Conservatives in general opposition to Liberals. It is scarcely worth while to discuss whether this attitude is reasonable and logical or not. The important fact is that the Liberal opposition to Home Rule would be broken up, and the fraction of the party which declined to follow me would inevitably gravitate towards the Home Rule portion of the party led by Mr. Gladstone. I have to look at the question from two points of view, (i) that of the future of the Liberal party, and (2) that of the immediate future and the best means of maintaining the Union. The first has, perhaps, more interest for me than for you ; but national as well as party interests are concerned in a step which, so far as it might succeed at all, would have the effect of withdrawing from the Liberal party all its most modern elements, and leaving it a purely Radical and Democratic party. But I do not believe that compensation for this evil, as I should esteem it, would be obtained by securing any better stability for the Union. If Home Rule is to be resisted it must be, not by the Conservatives alone, but by the assistance of a party which not only is, but is acknowledged to be. Liberal. There is no name which could be invented which would prevent an Administration resting mainly on the support of 320 Conservatives being, in the public estimation, a Conservative Administration. The Liberal resistance to Home Rule would devolve on Mr. Chamberlain and his friends, whose position would shortly become untenable, and the Liberal party as a whole would soon become identified with Home Rule. I believe, therefore, that, as I endeavoured to state to you this morning, the most useful part which I can now take is to afford to you an independent but friendly support. In this course I think that I can rely on the assistance of Mr. Chamberlain, though I have had but little conversation with him since the elections. At all events I am sure that it is in this position alone that his active co-operation with 1886 REASONS FOR REFUSAL 171 me will be possible, and that it is of the greatest importance to secure it. — I remain, yours sincerely, Hartington. On the same day Lord Hartington, in a letter to Mr. Goschen, said : — * Lord Salisbury came to me this morning to tell me that he wished to tell the Queen that he thought I ought to form a Government. He admitted that he was not certain that his friends would agree to support such an Administration, but he would be willing to serve in it himself, and he thought that he could obtain their con- currence. I told him that though this solution had been suggested to me as a possibility, I had not thought so much of it as of the probability of his asking me to join him. I pointed out the objections which I saw to it, but told him that I should like before giving him an answer to consult those whom I could see to-day. In the course of conversa- tion he excluded Chamberlain, and said he thought it would be too sharp a curve for both him and Chamberlain to sit in the same Cabinet. This, I think, was really conclu- sive. Although Chamberlain would not have joined, the fact of my not being able to ask him would remove any possibility of the Government's being in public estimation anything but a Conservative one. I have seen Northbrook, Derby, Stalbridge, and H. James, and have written to him that I consider the difficulties insuperable. I think he is quite ready to accept, though he would have preferred the other solution. It is possible that there may be a further offer to some of us to join him, but I do not much expect it. My answer is really a refusal to both proposals. He said that if I declined he hoped I would let him talk over policy with him. I mentioned your name, but I could not gather whether he was likely to ask you separately or not. He said there would be difficult personal questions involved. He has gone to Osborne, and remains there till Monday.' ^ ^ This letter \vas published in the Life of Lord Goschen, by Mr. Arthur Elliott (Longmans, 191 1). 172 SECOND ADMINISTRATION ch. xxiii. Lord Hartington thus for the second time refused to be Prime Minister. Two or three days later Sir Henry James, writing to him the news of the town, said : ' It is true that Lord Randolph is to be Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader in the Commons. I gather that he would take nothing else. He would not have served under you.' In a letter on the following day Sir Henry James said : — * I saw Randolph Churchill yesterday evening. He is anxious, I can see, to keep on very good terms with us, and I think he also fully approves of the course which you have taken. He is nervous about leading the House, and is naturally desirous of as much aid from you as possible.' Certainly the antithesis of the Cavendish to the Churchill was complete. One refused to accept, the other tried to seize the ' Crown ' ; and, in the end, fell by the qualities through which he had risen. He was also, perhaps, already suffering from the approach of the malady which, in a few years, was to prove fatal to a brilliant existence. The new Administration was formed, and Lord Harting- ton received from the Queen this letter : — 'Osborne, August 6, 1886. ' The Queen has hesitated till now to write to Lord Hartington. She would have liked, as he knows, that he and others should have joined in a Coalition Government, which she believes was the general wish of the country. But she saw Lord Hartington's reasons against this course in his letter to Lord Salisbury. She will not; dispute his reasons, much as she regrets them ; but, this being the case, she thinks it imperative on him and his followers to support Lord Salisbury's Government on all important questions, on which she feels sure Lord Salisbury will gladly consult with him ; for if, as he has declared, Lord Hartington 1886 REPLY TO THE QUEEN 173 cannot form a Government himself, he is, she considers, bound to support Lord Salisbury, so that the country may not be perpetually exposed to changes of Government, which upset everything and give a painful uncertainty at home and abroad.' Lord Hartington replied thus: — Lord Hartington to the Queen, August 6, 1886. ' Lord Hartington with his humble duty begs to thank your Majesty for the gracious letter which he received last night. * Lord Hartington can well understand the desire, which is shared by many of your Majesty's subjects, that an open and recognised coalition should take place between men of different political parties, who are nevertheless at the pre- sent time in general agreement on the most important question of the day. But Lord Hartington is still of opinion that, whatever might be the case with a few leading statesmen and members of both Houses, there remains on the part of the large majority of the constituencies so strong an attachment to party organisations and associa- tions that no real fusion of parties could at present take place ; and that all that would really be accomplished would be a reconstruction which would no doubt consider- ably strengthen the Conservative party, but would at the same time deprive the Liberal party of all its most promi- nent and moderate elements. Lord Hartington humbly agrees with your Majesty that it will be the duty of the Liberal Unionist party to give to the present Government all the support in its power which may be necessary to retain it in office until the Liberal party can be reorganised on principles which they can approve, and he trusts that the policy of your Majesty's present advisers will be such as to make this no very difficult task. It will probably not be for the advantage of the Government itself that such support should be given ostentatiously or indiscriminately; but Lord Hartington will gladlyavail himself of any oppor- 174 SECOND ADMINISTRATION Ch. xxiii. tunities which may present themselves of confidential consultation between himself and his friends and Lord Salisbury and his colleagues. ' Lord Hartington again ventures to tender to your Majesty his most sincere thanks for the expressions of approval of his conduct which your Majesty has been graciously pleased to convey to him.' On August 5th a meeting of Liberal Unionists was held at Devonshire House, and Lord Hartington explained his reasons for not accepting office. He would, he said, have been nothing more than the Liberal leader of a Conserva- tive Government. He still hoped, he said, for the reunion of the Liberal party. But this, he added, could only be if the Gladstonians again became Unionists ; not a very hopeful prospect. The question, of some real importance, arose as to where the Liberal Unionists should sit in the House of Commons, which does not in its physical construction make provision for a ' Centre ' party. Should they sit on the Government side, or on that occupied by the Gladstonian Liberals and the Irish ? If the latter, should members of the late Administration sit on the front bench or below the gang- way ? Some, Lord Salisbury, for instance, thought that they should sit on the Government side. Lord Hartington was at first inclined to think that, while the party should sit on the Opposit on side, the leaders should sit not on the ex-ministerial bench but below the gangway. Mr. Chamberlain and others held that, in order to assert the claim to be the true Church of Liberalism, the Liberal Unionists of ministerial rank should take their places upon the front bench, and that the rest of the party should sit as near to them as possible. Lord Hartington thought it well to consult Mr. Gladstone on this delicate subject, and the two following letters passed : — 1886 WHERE TO SIT 175 Devonshire House, August 3, 1886. My dear Mr. Gladstone, — We shall have to decide before next Thursday on a point of detail, but which is still of some importance, viz., where we (the Privy Councillors who were not members of the late Government) are to sit in the House of Commons. It mi^ht for some reasons be more convenient for us as well as for you that we should endeavour to find seats in some other part of the House than on the front Opposition Bench. But the arrangements of the House are so incon- venient, and there has on former occasions been so little disposition on the part of some members of the House to assist in mitigating this inconvenience, that it is difficult to decide in what other part of the House we can sit. I believe that, according to the practice of the House, we are entitled to our seats on the front Bench, but before deciding to take them, I should be glad to know whether you see any objection or could suggest any other arrangement. There have been some foolish paragraphs in the news papers on one side and the other, for which neither I nor, I feel sure, any of my friends are responsible. Some poli- tical considerations may, of course, be involved in the decision ; but I think that it may be settled, for the present at all events, without reference to them, and solely on grounds of convenience and necessity. — I remain, yours sincerely, Hartington. Mr. Gladstone replied : — ' I fully appreciate the feeling which has prompted your letter, and I admit the reality of the difficulties you de- scribe. It is also clear, I think, that, so far as title to places in the front Opposition Bench is concerned, your right to them is identical with ours. Nor can I for a moment regard some insignificant newspaper statements or sugges- tions as fit to be taken into the account by either of us in dealing with this far from easy matter. 176 SECOND ADMINISTRATION ch. xxm. 'I am afraid, however, that I cannot materially contribute to relieve you from embarrassment. The choice of a seat is more or less the choice of a symbol ; and I have no such acquaintance with your political views and intentions, as could alone enable me to judge what materials I have before me for making an answer to your inquiry. ' For my own part, I earnestly desire, subject to the paramount exigencies of the Irish question, to promote in every way the reunion of the Liberal party : a desire in which I earnestly trust that you participate. And I certainly could not directly or indirectly dissuade you from any step which you may be inclined to take, and which may appear to you to have a tendency in any measure to promote that end. Beyond this general but decided declaration my state of information does not at this moment enable me to go.' The question was settled in the way advocated by Mr. Chamberlain, and for the next six years the Liberal Unionist and the Gladstonian leaders sat uncomfortably upon the same bench. This unpleasant arrangement came, of course, to an end when Mr. Gladstone formed his last administration in 1892. Parliament sat in August and September to dispose of some pressing business. The following letter shows Lord Hartington's attitude towards a Bill introduced by the Irish leader to deal with evictions for non-payment of rent. Devonshire House, lotk September 1886. My dear Lord Salisbury, — I see that Parnell's Bill is to be introduced to-day, and I understand that you have another Cabinet to-morrow, at which I suppose you will finally decide on the course to be taken on it. I saw Sir Michael Hicks Beach yesterday, and gathered from him that he would be very glad if he could see his way to putting some check on evictions in the worst dis- tricts. I see much objection to any concession to Parnell 1886 PARNELL'S BILL 177 which he could use as a proof of his power of coercing ParHaraent. On the other hand, it is clear that the Nationalist agita- tion is to be carried on during the winter by resistance to payment of rent, and that numerous evictions are probably desired by Parnell and his friends. The Bill will probably, in view of its rejection, be drawn in as moderate a form as possible. I do not believe that it will be in his power to draw the eviction-suspending clause in such a form as will not encourage and protect tenants in a fraudulent refusal to pay rents which they are able to pay. But if it should be such as, in the opinion of the Irish Government, ought with any modifications to be accepted, I hope that there is nothing which I have said which would indispose the Government to consider it fairly. If, as is probable, you decide to oppose the second reading, I shall certainly come up to vote against it. I have no reason to think that any Liberal Unionists will support it, but the number who will vote at all will be small. — I remain, yours sincerely, Hartington. In the House of Commons debate Lord Hartington described the Parnell Bill as a measure for stopping for a time the collection of rents all over Ireland. He said : — ' Individuals of all classes, whether they be landlords or whether they be others, have their rights, and have a right to appeal to law, and it is not in the power of this Govern- ment, or any Government, to raise itself as a dispensing power superior to law.' The Whigs of the Revolution had resisted the * dispens- ing' power claimed in certain matters by the Crown, the power, in that case, of dispensing with the enforcement of provisions of statutory law. Their successor now pro- tested against the proposal, too common in these days, to dispense by statute with the elementary principles of the Common Law. VOL. II. M 1 78 SECOND ADMINISTRATION ch. xxiii. Lord Hartington, upon whom the strain of political and administrative work had been incessant since he assumed the leadership of the Liberal Opposition at the beginning of 1875, thought of taking holiday by way of a visit to India, where Lord Dufferin was now Viceroy.^ He was debarred from this relaxation by a letter from the Queen : — ' Balmoral Castle, October i<)tk, 1886. ' When the Queen saw Lord Hartington here about four weeks ago, he spoke of the possibility of his going to India — at the same time saying he felt doubtful whether he ought to do so. She then strongly urged him against it, but she still sees mention of his journey thither in the papers. The Queen writes to ask him in the strongest terms not to do so. Lord Hartington's position at the present time is one of the greatest importance ; we do not know at the present time whether the state of affairs at home and abroad (which last are very serious) may not necessitate an earlier calling together of Parliament, and even without that, it is of the utmost importance for his party that he should be here. ' Lord Hartington has shown so much sense of duty and such true patriotism and loyalty during the first trying six months of this year that she feels persuaded that he will again listen to appeals for the same great object. ' Lord Salisbury feels very strongly on the subject.' The Cabinet crisis which ended in the resignation of Lord Randolph Churchill occurred in the last days of the eventful year 1886, and Lord Hartington now, for the third time, received and refused the offer of the position of Prime Minister. At the time of the crisis he was at Rome. He wrote to his father on his return to Devonshire House on the 29th December : — * He had been in office, or a leader in Opposition, since i86 i, but the first six years of the whole period were ' easier going.' 1886 LORD SALISBURY'S PROPOSAL 179 * I got back this evening. I had a telegram from Lord Salisbury at Rome, asking me when I should be back, and at Monte Carlo I found a letter from him renewing his offer of last July that I should either form a Coalition Government, or join the Government as leader of the House of Commons. I have not sent him any answer except that I was coming back at once, and I suppose I shall see him to-morrow. I am also to see Goschen and Chamberlain and lots of other people ; but, so far as I can see, my answer is likely to be the same as before. I should think from the little that I have heard that there would be a good deal of difference of opinion among the Conserva- tives as to following me, even if I was inclined to attempt it, and I should think that Lord Salisbury may have found this out by now.' The desire of the Queen again coincided with that of Lord Salisbury. She wrote to Lord Hartington from Windsor on Christmas Day, 1886, to express her earnest desire that he should accept the proposal. Lord Hartington stated his reasons for declining in the following letter, dated 31st December 1886 : — 'Lord Hartington presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and begs to thank your Majesty for the letter which he received on his way home from Italy. ' Lord Hartington has, since his return on Wednesday night, been in consultation with as many of his friends and others likely to be able to give him information as to the position of parties, as he has been able ; and to-day, as your Majesty will have heard, he has seen Lord Salis- bury. Lord Hartington has found among his friends a perfectly unanimous opinion, in which he completely acquiesces, that the accession of himself and a few of his friends to the Conservative Government, while it would not give any numerical strength to the Government on a division, would inevitably bring about the dissolution of the 1 80 SECOND ADMINISTRATION ch. xxiii. Liberal Unionist party, the whole of which would not follow him, while the remainder would be compelled to gradually join the Home Rule section of the party. Lord Hartington is still of opinion that the best defence of the Union is to be found in the alliance of the Conservative party with a considerable portion of the Liberal party ; and that it would only be in the last extremity, which in his judgment has not yet arrived, that the two ought to combine in a party united for all political purposes. The question whether Lord Hartington and his friends should have acceded to Lord Salisbury's most patriotic and disinterested suggestion that Lord Hartington should himself be called on to form a Government would have been a very difficult one, even if it had appeared that the whole of the Conser- vative party were prepared cordially to concur in Lord Salisbury's proposal. Many of the same objections as would have existed to the other course would have still remained ; but undoubtedly as Prime Minister Lord Har- tington would have been in a position to claim, and might have retained, some of the influence on the Liberal party as a whole which he would certainly have lost by entering as a subordinate member into a Conservative Cabinet. But it would at the same time have been a somewhat anomalous position that the leader of a small section in the House of Commons should receive the constant and steady support of the much larger Conservative majority whose opinions on all subjects he did not profess to share. 'This view has, it appears, very naturally presented itself to many members of the Conservative party, and it is admitted that strong remonstrances against the suggested arrangement have been received. ' Lord Hartington has no doubt that he would have received the loyal and hearty support of Lord Salisbury and of his colleagues, and that their influence would have suppressed any open indication of dissatisfaction. But in the very difficult circumstances in which Lord Hartington would have been placed, he feels that nothing but the 1886 MR. GOSCHEN i8i general and spontaneous conviction of the whole Conserva- tive party that the arrangement was a right and necessary one could have given him the strength necessary to carry on your Majesty's Government.' The Cabinet rearrangements involved the transfer of Mr. Smith from the War Office to the leadership, as First Lord of the Treasury, of the House of Commons, and that of Mr. Edward Stanhope from the Colonial Office to the War Office. Consequently two posts were vacant, that of Chancellor of the Exchequer and that of Colonial Secretary. Lord Salisbury wished to strengthen his Government by taking in two Liberal Unionists. Mr. Goschen's financial skill made him an obvious choice for the Exchequer, and, as he had not been a member of the 1880 to 1885 Adminis- tration, by reason of his views on the franchise, he was less bound to Liberalism than the rest. The two following letters from Lord Hartington to Lord Salisbury show the part which the former took in securing this valuable recruit for the Government. The first, written from Brooks' Club on the 31st December, runs: — * I have had a long talk with Goschen, and have urged all the considerations I could think of. He is thinking it over, but I do not think that he will be able to give you an answer to-day. I suppose that you can give him till to-morrow morning. ' He feels that he will find himself isolated in a Conser- vative Cabinet, and also that there is no such strong desire on the part of the Conservative party generally for his assistance as would make it worth while for him to separate himself from me and his other Liberal Unionist friends. He also appears to dislike extremely having to retire from the struggle for the Union which he has fought side by side with me. He would distinctly prefer the Chancellorship of the Exchequer without the leadership, if he accepts at 1 82 SECOND ADMINISTRATION ch. xxiii. all. I am afraid, however, that I cannot hold out to you any sanguine prospect that he will be induced to accept.' The second letter to Lord Salisbury is dated ist January 1887:— ' I have seen Goschen again to-day, who is, I think, disposed to accept your offer if he can, after personal communication with you, be satisfied on certain points. He would desire to be at liberty to state that in joining your Government, with or without one or two Liberal colleagues in the House of Lords, he had taken this step, not as having become a Conservative or ceasing to hold any of his Liberal opinions, but as a Unionist joining a Government which relies on the support of Unionists of all shades of political opinion. If you think that such an interpretation of his action given by him would be resented by your party he would prefer to remain outside. ' Next, he would wish to have a full consultation with you as to general policy, foreign, domestic, legislative, and financial, and satisfy himself that he would be able to act with you on all these questions, as he feels that any subsequent disagreement on them, leading to a pos- sible separation, would materially aggravate the present difficulties.' * I am not surprised,' Lord Hartington wrote to Mr. John Fell of Ulverston on 13th January — ' that some should see inconsistency in my advising Goschen to join the Government when I decline to join myself ; but I think that a sufficient reason is that I can undoubtedly continue to exercise a good deal of influence over a large section of Liberals in the country so long as I remain in name as well as in reality a Liberal and abstain from actual official coalition with the Conservatives, but that Goschen's previous difference of opinion with his 1886 REASONS FOR REFUSAL 183 party deprives him of much of the influence which he ought to have possessed, and that he would be more useful in strengthening the Government than in supporting it from outside.' Another detached Liberal Unionist, Lord Lansdowne, then Governor-General of Canada, was invited to accept the Colonial OfHce. ' The temptation,' he wrote to Lord Hartington, ' was great,' but he did not wish to give up his work in Canada so soon, nor did he like the idea of sitting among the Conservative peers, so strong still was the old Whig family feeling. Lord Northbrook was also sounded, but he did not desire to re-enter any Cabinet. Eventually the Colonial Office was given to a Conservative, Sir Henry Holland, afterwards Lord Knutsford, Lord Hartington's friends approved of the course which he had taken. Lord Northbrook wrote that ' You would have weakened the Unionist cause if you had either taken Salisbury's place or joined his Government under existing circumstances,' and Lord Derby was of the same opinion. His old adviser, Lord Granville, wrote on ist January : ' I presume it is certain that you have declined to join the Government. You will not, under present circumstances, attach weight to my opinion, but I cannot resist telling you how glad I am for various reasons. Among these, however, is not that of your refusal strengthening our Home Rule policy. But the coalition would have weakened you and your position.' What did Lord Hartington himself feel as to his decision ? Doubt and some regret. He replied to Lord Granville : — ' I wish I could feel as convinced as you are that I have done right. There seems to me to be a good many reasons why the chance of forming a tolerably strong Government 1 84 SECOND ADMINISTRATION ch. xxiii. by those who agree on most of the immediate and practical questions should not be sacrificed to the very doubtful prospect of my recovering any influence with the Liberal party as a whole. However, most of my friends seem to think otherwise.' ^ Events proved that his friends were wrong, and nothing, perhaps, was gained by this final refusal. He was not again member of a Cabinet for more than eight years ; he was then over sixty years of age, and his physical powers were declining. But has any other Englishman refused three times to be First Minister of the Crown, or is this a ' record ' ? II An apology may be due for the length at which three or four years have been treated in this Memoir, but a biographer's aim should be to make character stand out ; character most appears in times of greatest stress, and the years 1884, 1885, and 1886 were the critical period of Lord Hartington's political career. He now passed into smoother waters, and, except for the year 1903, the remaining story of his life can be narrated in more sum- mary fashion. It is necessary, however, to dwell in some detail upon the year 1887, which was occupied by the sequences of the Irish storm and the Unionist victory. During the first three months of this year took place an attempt to find a basis of Irish policy upon which it might be possible to re-unite the shattered Liberal party. Formal sittings of a ' Conference ' were held, known as ^ Lord Morley says in the Life of Gladstone (vol. iii. p. 364) with regard to this event : " Lord Harlington was too experienced in affairs not to know that to be head of a group that held the balance was ... far the niore substantial and commanding position of the two," i.e. than being Prime Minister under the circumstances. This seems to attribute to Lord Hartington a motive which certainly did not inspire him. 1887 ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE 185 the ' Round Table Conference.' Those who took part in it were Sir William Harcourt, Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Herschell, Sir George Trevelyan, and Mr. John Morley. Lord Morley has given an account of what happened at the Conference in his Life of Gladstone.'^ Mr. Chamber- lain wrote to Lord Hartington on the 4th January 1887 with reference to the proposed Conference : — ' Nothing/ he said, ' will induce me to consent to a Parliament in Dublin with an Executive dependent on it. On the other hand, Mr. Gladstone can hardly be ex- pected to proclaim that he had entirely abandoned what he has declared to be a cardinal principle. The Con- ference would show,' he added, ' whether (i) we can agree on other branches of the Irish question, viz., the land and local government ; (2) whether there is any ter- tmni quid — any alternative to an Irish Parliament on which we can also agree as good in itself, without re- quiring from either side any formal repudiation of pre- viously expressed opinions.' If Lord Hartington decided to take no part in the Conference, would he at least announce that he was cognisant of and approved the negotiations and < heartily desired reunion, provided that it could be brought about without danger to the principles that ' — he had advocated as to Irish Government ? Lord Hartington took great pains in drafting a letter in accordance with this request, but the result was a document so distrustful, and so carefully guarded, that Mr. Chamberlain, when he had studied it, said that he would not be responsible for its publication. ' It may appear' (ran one passage), 'at least to some, that the most probable result of the Conference would be to bring about some partial reconciliation in the Liberal ^ Vol. iii. p. 367. 1 86 SECOND ADMINISTRATION ch. xxiii. party, while the great differences which have divided us still remain. All that I have said at, and since, the General Election, and the course which I have taken in the last few days, precludes me from promoting such a reunion of the Liberal party as would weaken or destroy the existing securities for the Union, until we can feel a greater confidence in the future policy of the party on what we hold to be essential points.' Mr. Chamberlain followed in the Conference his idea that two Provincial Legislatures might be established in Ireland, with strictly limited powers, having to the Im- perial Parliament the same relation as those of Quebec or Ontario have to the Dominion Parliament and Govern- ment in Canada. He made it clear that, in this scheme, the separate treatment of Ulster was absolutely essential to agreement. Lord Hartington's opinion appears in a letter of 6th March 1887. Lord Hartington to Mr. Chamberlain. 'March 6, 1887. ' I understand that you think that the time has arrived when you are entitled to have some expression of my views on the negotiations between yourself and Trevelyan and some of Mr. Gladstone's late colleagues as to the progress of which you have informed me from time to time. I must point out in the first place that, up to the present time, proposals have not yet been made, much less accepted, on any of the points under discussion which would make it possible for me to say that they are or are not in my judgment admissible. All that has hitherto taken place, so far as I understand, has been an exchange of views on certain points of agreement and of difference, and all that I can do under the circum- stances is to try to give you some indications of my 1887 ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE 187 opinions on them as communicated to me by you.* ... As to Local Government, I understand your position to be that while you have not undertaken, as on the Land question, to submit proposals, you have expressed your willingness to discuss proposals, provided that the measure of last year is definitely withdrawn ; and subject to the conditions which you have stated in your speeches. Further, you have insisted, not as new conditions, but as consequences of those which you have previously con- tended for, that Ulster or a part of Ulster should be represented by a separate council, that Judges should be appointed by the Imperial Government, and that the Irish constabulary should be maintained and controlled by the same authority. I believe that these conditions do not differ in principle from those which I attempted to formulate last year in my address to my constituents. I do not consider that they were complete or exhaustive, but I have no desire to make them more stringent. All that I wish to add, with immediate reference to the present proceedings, is that it is necessary that any scheme which professes to comply with them should offer a reasonable probability of being a practicable one having regard to the circumstances of Ireland and the temper of the leaders of the Irish people. It would not be very difficult to devise several schemes for the extension of local self-government in Scotland which might be tried without much risk, because the demand in Scotland, such as it is, is on the part of the vast majority really limited to local self-government. But in Ireland the demand is, on the part of a large section at all events of the people and their leaders, a demand for national recognition ; and it is certain that unless the provisions for the maintenance of the authority of the Imperial Parliament and Govern- ment are made strong, simple, and effective, the con- cession which may be made will be used for extorting complete separation and independence. ^ Some observations on a Land Purchase scheme, which was discussed at the Conference, are omitted, not being of much existing interest. i88 SECOND ADMINISTRATION ch. xxiii. ' For this reason I doubt the appHcability of the pre- cedent of the constitution of the Dominion of Canada. I think that this constitution provides no sufficient guarantees for the maintenance of the power of the Dominion over the Provincial Governments except the desire of the Provinces for Union which prompted the Federation. I do not refer to the absence of a powerful Dominion force, or to the weakness of the Imperial forces, in which respect Great Britain would have some advantages in the case of Ireland which the Dominion Government lacks in the case of the Provinces. I refer to the possibilities under the Canadian constitution of legal constitutional Parliamentary resistance to the superior authority, which it seems to me to be fatal if made use of as they probably would in Ireland. ' For this reason it has occurred to me that it might possibly be safer to look for a solution in the direction not of subordinate Parliamentary institutions or subordinately responsible Governments such as have been adopted in the Colonies, but of such extended municipal institutions and powers as have been conferred on our large cities, and as are proposed to be conferred upon counties. No doubt the power conferred upon such councils would be rather administrative and executive than legislative ; but certain legislative power would not necessarily be excluded ; and it seems to me that the Irish demand, so far as it is a reasonable one, is rather for administrative and executive than for legislative control over local affairs. I am very far from saying that I have a clear idea of the extent to which this principle might be applied to solve the Irish question. Neither do I say that the difficulties of the sub- ordinate responsible Government system are insuperable. But I feel strongly the necessity of looking at any scheme from the point of view of distrust as well as of confidence, and to bear in mind the danger of assuming that a system which might work admirably in the case of a people which desired union would be prudent in the opposite case of a people who had been brought to desire the largest possible measure of separation.' 1887 PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 189 A few days later this Conference came to an end, but the idea of settling the question upon the lines of the relations between the Canadian Dominion Government and Parliament and the Canadian Provincial Legislatures, was discussed among leading Liberal Unionists for some time longer. A letter of August 1887 to Mr. Goschen shows that Lord Hartington feared that, if the Liberal Unionists adopted a scheme of this kind, and if Mr. Gladstone wholly or partly accepted it, and the Conservatives rejected it, then the Liberal Unionists ' would be almost compelled to help to bring Mr. Gladstone back, and, with the large majority which he would have under such circumstances at an election, the influence which we could exercise over the future policy would be very small.' Mr. Arthur Balfour now succeeded to Sir Michael Hicks Beach as Chief Secretary in Ireland, and the Government entered upon a policy of resolute repression of the forces of disorder. A new Crimes Bill was introduced differing from its predecessors in that it was not made to last for a short definite period. Thus the question of renewal which had caused so much trouble on previous occasions would in the future be avoided. One justification for this measure was the ' Plan of Campaign ' which some of the Irish agrarian leaders had launched after the rejection of Mr. Parnell's Bill in the autumn of 1886. Parnell himself, two years later, said in a speech made in London that he was not the author of the ' Plan,' and was not prepared to vindicate it.^ The ' Plan ' was this. Rents on estates were assessed by the managers of the agitation at a figure lower, if they thought good, than the judicially fixed rents. If the pay- ment was refused by the landowner, the money was handed ^ Speech at the Eighty CUil). His hearers were taken aback, because many of them had, like Mr. Gladstone, been engaged in semi-vindications of the Plan. 190 SECOND ADMINISTRATION ch. xxiii. to a kind of trust to be used for the purposes of the struggle. Mr. Gladstone, now more Parnellite than Parnell, admitted that the 'Plan' was 'one of those devices that cannot be reconciled with the principles of law and order in a civilised country,' but he more than balanced this admission by adding that 'such devices are the certain result of misgovernment.' Lord Hartington, speaking in Parliament on the loth February 1887, justified the action of Government in striking at the ' Plan of Campaign.' But he doubted, he said, whether the relations between land- lord and tenant in Ireland could be satisfactory ' so long as the dual ownership created by the Land Act exists.' By some process the occupiers in Ireland must be made pro- prietors of the soil. Industrial resources must be developed, and some scheme of emigration might be useful. ' If there are any other remedies I confess I do not know what they are.' A resolution in the Home Rule sense had been moved by the Gladstonians. Lord Hartington said — * I decline to vote for a resolution which holds out as the sole object to be borne in mind by the House of Commons that of satisfying the wants and securing the confidence of the Irish people, and fails at the same time by a single word to recognise that there are securities and conditions which are equally required, and equally justly required by the people of Great Britain, and which must be secured before they can assent to any such legislation as is contemplated by some of my right honourable friends near me.' On the 18th April he spoke in support of the Crimes Bill.i The Gladstonians, he said, had — ^ This Bill was carried in June, against violent resistance, by application of the then novel * guillotine ' mode of closure. 1887 HARTINGTON'S SPEECH 191 'discovered that the true method to govern Ireland is not to arm the law, or to arm the Judges, with powers for contending against the intimidation practised by the National League, but to make such changes in the Govern- ment of Ireland as will place the Judges and the law practically in the hands and under the control of the National League. Having been converted to those doctrines it is perfectly reasonable that my honourable friends should now be opposed to anything in the shape of exceptional and repressive legislation. That is sufficient excuse for them, but it is not a sufficient reason for us, who have not been converted.' Sir William Harcourt had mentioned in defence of the •' Plan of Campaign ' some consecrated Whig precedents, such as the refusal of Hampden to pay ship-money ; the illegal and rebellious proceedings in support of the invasion of England by William of Orange ; the riotous throwing of tea cargoes by the American malcontents into Boston harbour. Lord Hartington coldly said : — ' It is extremely difficult to argue with opponents who avow there is a moral justification for defiance of the law. I believe we are here in this House to amend the law, if necessary ; but to support the Government in the enforce- ment of the law. We are not here for the preaching or condoning resistance to the law, either passive or overt." The land-law in Ireland had been settled by the Act of 1881. * It was passed by the greatest statesman of this age ; it was passed with his assurance that " walking in the light of justice we could not err." . . . The wicked Conservative Government, supported by the still more wicked Liberal Unionists, refuse to disturb or alter summarily this benefi- cent settlement of five years ago, and immediately, accord- ing to the case of my right honourable friend, a case has 192 SECOND ADMINISTRATION ch. xxiii. arisen not only for the alteration of the law, but for rebellion, for armed resistance and defiance of the law.' Lord Hartington had a disconcertingly plain way of stripping facts from sentimental trappings. Mr. Gladstone, who possessed the opposite power of veiling facts in clouds of sentiment, showed a sympathy both with dis- orderly resistance to business in the House of Commons and with disorderly resistance to the Executive Govern- ment in Ireland which widened the breach between him and Lord Hartington. In July 1887 he said, with virtuous sadness, to an American * deputation' : — * We have been tampering with trial by jury ; we have given the right of imprisonment to the Lord Lieutenant. These things are very mournful.' Had ' the Grand Old Man ' forgotten his own Coercion Acts, certainly not less drastic, of 1870, 1881, and 1882? Or would he have said that all reasons for enforcing law had been removed by his defeated Home Rule Bill of 1886 ? Mr, Balfour, regardless of these vain lamentations, used his power in Ireland with vigour and success. In August 1887 the National League was proclaimed. This step almost led to a schism in the Liberal Unionist party. Mr. Chamberlain, remembering the recent days when he had fought in the Cabinet against Coercion unaccompanied by Local Government, had been extremely uneasy with regard to the policy of his Tory allies, and disapproved of the attempt to suppress the National League. He was still anxious that the Liberal Unionists should not oppose a mere negative to Gladstonian Home Rule, but should adopt and advocate a scheme based upon the Canadian lines, upon the relation that is, not between Canada and England, but between the Dominion and Provincial Governments. The 1887 LORD RANDOLPH'S VIEWS 193 following letters show how matters now stood between the Liberal Unionist leaders : — Devonshire House, August 15, 1887. My dear Chamberlain, — I met R. Churchill in the country yesterday, and had a talk with him. I found that you had mentioned to him your opinion that the time had come for a new departure, and for the production of a modified scheme of Home Rule, and I had therefore no difficulty in discussing the question with him. I gather that he thinks that the Conservative party would not entertain any plan going beyond a large exten- sion of Local Government for the three kingdoms. The only form in which they could be brought to consider Home Rule would be that of a development from a measure of Local Government on the lines indicated in my speech in Belfast in 1885, when I advocated the building up from the foundation of Local Self-Government, instead of the attempt to create a new cut and dry constitution. R. Churchill thinks, therefore, that our adoption of a modified Home Rule scheme founded on the Canadian constitution will probably break up the alliance between the Conservatives and the Liberal Unionists, and will be fatal to the prospects of a coalition or of a national party, to which he still looks forward, though he sees greater difficulties than he did in the way of any combina- tion which would not include Lord Salisbury. I conceive that on Irish as well as on other political questions, R. Churchill is at least as advanced as any of the Con- servatives ; and I conclude, therefore, that the prospect of any national settlement on the lines of your plan must be a very remote one, even if Mr. Gladstone were to take a favourable view of it. The probable result, then, of your now bringing for- ward your plans will be to break up the alliance with the Conservatives, and to make a reconstruction of the Govern- ment impossible. We shall either have to join Mr. Glad- stone or to remain in a position where we shall have the VOL. u. N 194 SECOND ADMINISTRATION Ch. xxiii. support of neither the Liberals nor the Conservatives, which of course means our disappearance. I hope, therefore, that you will still very seriously con- sider the expediency of taking a step so exceptional in its character as the production of a policy by a party in our position. It is probable that we may continue to suffer some losses, and it may not be easy to carry on the cam- paign ; but surely it is still possible for us to criticise and examine Mr. Gladstone's supposed concessions, to ask for explanations as to what they amount to, and to draw him into more explicit declarations before we commit ourselves further. If you still decide on treating Mr. Gladstone's conces- sions as substantial and as providing a basis for an under- standing, I fear that it may be, as you have suggested, the commencement of a separation in our lines of action. But I do not know that the risk of this is greater than it was at the time of the round table, and I doubt whether anything which I could honestly say at this time would certainly avert it. If I could promise a favourable consideration to some plan which should be intended to satisfy my condi- tions, it would not carry us much further, for I should do so with the knowledge that the plan when produced would not differ very much from the one which I have seen, to which I do not think that I could agree, and for which I could not take any responsibility ; and we should before long find ourselves drifting apart. If this should come to pass under any circumstances I shall deeply regret it, but the difference of our positions from the outset would make such a separation perfectly intelligible on both sides. — I remain, yours sincerely, Hartington. Hardwick Hall, Sept. 21, '87. My dear Chamberlain, — C. Sellar asked some of our people to let him have their opinion in writing on what ought to be the policy of the Unionist party, and especi- ally on the question of our proposing a scheme of Home 1887 MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S VIEWS 195 Rule or extensive Local Government. He has sent me some idea of what he has already received, which I think you may like to see, although one of them at least was evidently not written for your inspection. He expects further memoranda from .^ The opinions which he has got are all against any form of Irish Parliament, or very large scheme of Local Govern- ment. I feel more and more convinced that the production of any alternative plan will break up the Liberal Unionist party, or what remains of it, immediately. There are, no doubt, a certain number whose objections were to the details of the Gladstonian scheme. Mr. Gladstone has probably indicated sufficient openness of mind to con- ciliate them, and they would prefer such a modification of his plan as he would himself propose, to anything which we could offer as an alternative. But the principle of the large majority of Liberal Unionists is, I think, opposition to an Irish Parliament in any shape, and them we shall lose by any approach to Mr. Gladstone. I think you may like to see other opinions before you speak either in Ireland or England. I saw an Irish Catholic Liberal Unionist the other day, who speaks in the same sense, and asserts that this is the opinion of Irish Unionists, Catholic and Protestant. Yours very truly, Hartington. Highbury, Moor Green, Birmingham, Sept. 22nd, '87. My dear Hartington,^ — Thanks for your letter and its enclosures. I cannot say that I think much of the authority of the various writers consulted by Craig-Sellar. With the exception of and they are all bad advisers for a popular party, and even the two Ulstermen regard the question from an Irish standpoint and without references to the English electorate. Besides, I feel that in an inquiry of this kind every- ^ The names of six leading Liberal Unionists are here mentioned. 196 SECOND ADMINISTRATION ch. xxiii. thing depends on how the question is put and who puts it. If we had a meeting of Unionist Liberals and a discussion of the whole situation, it is possible that some at least of Craig-Sellar's correspondents would have taken a different view. However, I do not want to press this now. I decided after my last conversation with you not to put any alter- native scheme forward at the present time in opposition to your wish, and I certainly shall not say anything in my coming speeches more definite than the general allusions I have previous!}^ made. At the same time it is right that I should privately record my dissent from the policy which you have finally adopted. It is a negative policy, and, while it may do very well for the Conservatives, it will not retain any consider- able number of Liberal or Radical Unionists in the country. Unless something unexpected turns up we are certain to be extinguished at the next election, and it is impos- sible to say how soon that election may come. If you are ready to support the Government through thick and thin, and whether they accept your advice or not, they may retain office for a few years, but the smash will be all the worse when it does come. Believe me, yours very truly, J. Chamberlain. On the other side. Lord Derby wrote, a few days later : — * I hold, and have held all along, that there is no middle course possible. If Ireland and England are not to be one, Ireland must be treated like Canada or Australia. All between is delusion or fraud.' At the end of August Mr. Gladstone moved a resolution condemning the proclamation of the National League, of which the leaders were now his allies. Mr. Balfour replied in a powerful speech, showing, by many an instance, how the branches of this League had usurped the power of trying and punishing men who were acting, in taking or holding 1887 THE NATIONAL LEAGUE 197 land, within their legal rights. Lord Hartington spoke on the 26th August. The Government had been charged with violating fundamental British principles by suppressing a political association. He replied to this : — 'So far as the objects and action of any association are political, and only political, their action ought not to be interfered with. But if the action of any association, whether political or otherwise, becomes destructive of the liberty and freedom of the people of any country, if it becomes subversive of the principles of order and good government, then it seems to me that it does not matter whether the professed objects of that association are political or private, or are of whatever character you choose, so that the operations or actions of that association are hostile to the peace and good order of the country.' He argued that the Crimes Act was now part of the law, that the Executive Government were proceeding under their powers, and that the question was now, simply, whether Parliament was to place a veto upon the action of the Executive Government. He said that he had pointed out to members of the Government some political and parliamentary difficulties, and had indicated a preference for procedure under other sections of the Act if, in the judgment of Government, such proceeding would be adequate. He had always, however, considered that the Government alone were responsible, and were bound to act on their own judgment, and that it would be 'in the highest degree inexpedient and un- wise' of the House to damage in advance the authority of Government, and to deprive them of the executive dis- cretion which had been given to them by Parliament. He believed the objects of the National League to be 'spoliation and injustice,' and their methods to be 'intimi- dation, defiance of the law, and the oppression of every 198 SECOND ADMINISTRATION Ch. xxiii. one who disagrees with them.' He had doubts as to the procedure adopted by the Government, but heartily and en- tirely sympathised with the end which they had in view. 'There is not room in Ireland for these two govern- ments. If we think that the government of the National League is a better or more just, and a more expedient government for Ireland than the government by law established, let us put this government in power, and confer upon it the responsibility that ought to go with power.' But the majority had not arrived at that conclusion. They must therefore support the legal Government. ' Let us not permit any body or association, however organised, however designated, whatever its objects may be, to usurp any of the functions which ought only to belong to the Government that is established by law.' Mr. Gladstone's Resolution was defeated by 272 votes to 195, but Mr. Chamberlain and some of his friends voted in the minority. ^ The reaction from 1886 had already set in, and bye- elections showed that a tide of feeling had begun to flow against Government. Mr. W. H. Smith, the excellent and virtuous Conservative leader in the House, wrote on 27th August to Lord Hartington : — 'Don't suppose that I think we must be beaten on the Irish question. We must sooner or later go out of office, but as nothing but the unexpected happens in politics, it is quite possible that the issue on which the next election may be fought may not be the Irish one, but Protection in some shape, or a peace or a war policy in a great European struggle. For the present, and among my friends, I should hold the most confident language, whg,tever may be the result of bye-elections.' 1887 LONDON AND CAMBRIDGE 199 Notwithstanding the * Radical ' reaction in remoter and less civilised provinces, the great centres of life and in- telligence remained firm. In December 1887 Lord Har- tington received the honour of its Freedom from the City of London, now and henceforth the great citadel of imperial and patriotic thought and feeling, as it once had been of Liberal ideas when these were in accordance with the best interests of the English nation. The resolution of the City Council spoke of the 'wise and patriotic spirit evinced by Lord Hartington during his parliamentary career, and more especially in connection with the events of recent times affecting the welfare of the United Kingdom.' In the isummer of 1887 he had received addresses signed by the Liberal Unionist residents both at Oxford and Cambridge, a body comprising most of the distinguished men at both Universities. The Cambridge address said, among other things, 'We consider that you, and the other eminent Liberals who have acted with you, have rendered an inestimable public service both by opposing Mr. Gladstone's Bills and by the manner, at once firm and moderate, in which your opposition has been conducted.' With rare exceptions all the best thought in England was opposed to the disuniting policy of Mr. Gladstone and his political followers or allies. It was a pity that Mr. Gladstone did not fulfil his long-delayed intention to retire, now that he was seventy-seven, after the elections of 1886, for the following years added nothing to his reputation. John Bright, now within a few months from his death, wrote sadly to Lord Hartington in the autumn of 1887: ' Times are changed, and our old friend Mr. Gladstone has done much to make them incurably worse.' But the antique leader of Opposition was not so wholly swallowed up by the Irish question as utterly to forget the 200 SECOND ADMINISTRATION Ch. xxiii. financial ardours of his glorious prime. In April 1887 he wrote to Lord Hartington to ask him whether he could not bring 'friendly pressure' to bear upon the Government ' with a view of suppressing the deplorable proposal for invasion of the Fund dedicated to the redemption of Debt. I feel that you are the man who can make an appeal, and can make it effectively.' He himself would do anything, either by speech or by silence, as might be best, to support him. Lord Hartington replied that, ' I have, as you know, given very little attention to the subject of finance. You will remember that in the Cabinet I used to place my financial conscience in your keeping, and I always sup- posed it was almost equally safe in Goschen's hands.' He feared, therefore, that his intervention would not carry much weight, or be justified. Ill During the remainder of Lord Salisbury's second administration Lord Hartington steadily supported the Government, but seldom spoke in the House of Commons. The chief event of 1888, or at least that which most excited the political world, was the embroilment caused by the attack made by the Times newspaper upon the actions and character of the Irish leaders. In order to assist the passing of the Crimes Bill in 1887, and for general reasons, this newspaper had published a series of articles intended to connect these leaders with criminal associations. The most sensational point of these articles was the print of a facsimile letter purporting to be dictated and signed by Mr. Parnell. The letter was supposed to be written after the Phoenix Park murders. It faintly regretted that of Lord Frederick Cavendish, and approved that of Mr. Burke. Mr. Parnell denied that he had written the 1888 THE PARNELL COMMISSION 201 letter. Lord Hartington in the House of Commons alluded to these charges, and, in his plainest language, said that in his opinion men so accused ought to vindicate their character by proceedings taken in the Courts of Law. His speech met with fierce Irish clamour and interruption at every sen- tence. In the summer of the following year, 1888, the men impugned having taken no action, the Government intro- duced a Bill instituting a special Judicial Commission to inquire into charges so much affecting the reputation of members of Parliament. It was a kind of State trial. Sir William Harcourt said in the debate on this step of the Government that Lord Hartington had more than any one else ' vouched for the TimeSy adding, ' vouched is perhaps too strong a word to use, but he has said that these were charges that men were bound to meet.' Lord Hartington resented this language. He said that, although he had referred a year ago to the charges which had been brought against the Irish members, and had suggested that they ought to vindicate their innocence, he had ' never referred for a single moment to the letter which has been mentioned, and I have never referred to it since.' 'Why?' interrupted an Irish member. Lord Harting- ton paused, and then, in a tone and with a gesture im- pressive to those remembering who it was that spoke, and what was the subject of the letter, said : — ' Why ? I do not know that it is necessary on this occasion that I should go into my reasons for not referring to it. I want to know for what reason, for what purpose, and with what justification my right honourable friend thinks it necessary to drag my name into this discussion in respect of letters to which I never so far in these discussions referred.' When the Commission sat the authenticity of the letter in question was disproved, and it was held that the Times 202 SECOND ADMINISTRATION Ch. xxiii. had been deceived by a forgery. The findings on the rest of the questions referred to were unfavourable to the Par- nellite leaders from the point of view of ordinary morality. Acquitted of some of the graver accusations, the Irish leaders were merely found guilty of inviting the assistance of the Physical Force party in America, and of abstaining, in order to obtain that assistance, from repudiating and condemning the action of that party — of accepting sub- scriptions from Patrick Ford, a ' known advocate of crime and the use of dynamite ' — of making payments to persons injured in the commission of crime — of not denouncing the system of intimidation which led to crime and outrage, but persisting in it with knowledge of its effect — of dissemina- ting the /risk World and other newspapers which tended to incite to sedition and the commission of crime, of intending (some of them) to ' bring about the absolute independence of Ireland as a separate nation,' and of certain other speci- fied offences. On these charges, especially the last, men would certainly have imperilled their heads two centuries earlier ; in our mild times — mild, perhaps, in consequence of the immense strength of the modern State relatively to that of any group of rebels — the result was deemed rather a triumph for the accused Nationalists, all public attention having been concentrated on the single sensational incident of the forged letter. Parnell was hailed as an injured hero by sentimental English Radicals, whom he thoroughlydespised. All this pointed to a certain degradation in political tone, and there was some justification for Lord Salisbury's pessimistic view when he wrote : — ' We are in a state of bloodless civil war. No common principles, no respect for common institutions or traditions unite the various groups of politicians who are struggling LAND PURCHASE 203 for power. To loot somebody or something is the common object under a thick varnish of pious phrases.' ^ Lord Hartington wrote to Lord Wolmer - from Cairo, where he was preparing for an expedition up the Nile with Lord and Lady Gosford, on 22nd February 1890: — ' I am very well satisfied with the Commission's report, which I find most interesting as far as I have read it in the Times. Of course it does not confirm all the Times' charges, which I have always thought (apart from the letter) to be pitched too high and exaggerated, but it more than con- firms everything that I have ever said about the Parnellites and the character of the movement with which the Glad- stonians have associated themselves.' Lord Hartington strongly supported the real cure, or basis for the cure, of Irish troubles, viz. the policy of assisting the transfer upon fair terms of the freehold of rural holdings from landlord to tenant, and the termination thereby of the ' dual ownership ' created by the Act of 1881. A sum of ;^5,ooo,ooo had been devoted to this purpose by Lord Salisbury's Government in 1885. In the autumn of 1888 a further Bill was introduced authorising the application of a second five millions. Lord Hartington supported it. ' Has this policy,' he asked, ' proved a failure ? On the contrary, it is the only successful experi- ment which has been tried in the direction of a peasant proprietary in Ireland.' Parliament, he said, 'could be guilty of no more wanton or mischievous act than to abandon, in pursuit of some other aim, a policy which, so far as it has gone, has been attended by unlimited suc- cess.' In the year 1890 Mr. Balfour, pursuing his policy of promoting the economic recovery of Ireland while sternly ^ Letter to Mr. W. H.Smith of 5 th February 1889, quoted in Sir H. Maxwell's Life of IV. H. Smith, vol. ii. p. 241, '^ The present Lord Selborne. 204 SECOND ADMINISTRATION ch. xxiii. maintaining order, introduced a still larger measure. The great sum of thirty-three millions was added to the ten millions already advanced under the Acts of 1885 ^^^ 1888. This measure was opposed by the Gladstonians and the Nationalists, and was supported by Lord Hartington. He said that the difficulty in instituting any * reasonable ' local self-government in Ireland had lain in the unsatisfactory relations between landlord and tenant. He had always regarded the creation of a large number of occupying holders as a necessary preliminary to any large measure of local government. He was not surprised that this policy was opposed by the Irish National party. 'They have in view, they do not disguise it, the establish- ment of Irish National independence ; and one of the strongest weapons on which they rely for the attainment of that object is the unsettled state of the relation between landlord and tenant, and the discontent, unrest, and dis- turbance caused by those unsettled relations.' As their opposition, he said, was dictated by these superior motives and was not based solely upon the merits of the measure, it was not possible to be guided by their views, as Parliament would, no doubt, have been guided in the case of a like measure for Scotland, by the views of Scottish representatives. On the 29th March 1889, Lord Hartington added his tribute to those which the leaders of parties dedicated to the memory of John Bright. Some words of this speech are worthy of remembrance. He said that the cause of the esteem in which Mr. Bright was held was to be found in — 'the transparent simplicity of his character, and the high standard of political conduct which he set before his fellows. Mr. Bright did not profess to be — perhaps he was not — a ,% r, 1/ The Sevi.nth Duke of Devonshire in the Year 1891 [Ffoni a picture by the Ladv ABl•;KCKOMH^■) iS9i SUCCESSION TO DUKEDOM 205 statesman versed in all the arts of government, a statesman capable of conducting all the complicated affairs of a great nation ; but upon certain subjects he had thought deeply and felt strongly, and had formed convictions which, to his mind, carried all the weight of absolute and indisputable truth. It was this absolute conviction which gave to the eloquence of Mr. Bright extraordinary and unrivalled power and force. ' ... In forming his political opinions, in shaping his political conduct, he consistently and resolutely deter- mined, as perhaps few men have ever been equally able to determine, that the standard which should guide his political conduct should be precisely the same rule as that which the strictest principles of morality imposed upon the private life and character of a man. ' These are the things which have combined to make Mr. Bright, if not one of the foremost statesmen, one of the noblest figures, we have ever known in Parliament.' Since Lord Hartington always endeavoured to make his words correspond exactly with his thought, his testi- mony is of high value. IV The last words which Lord Hartington spoke in the House of Commons were on June i, 1891, in answer to some dull question asked as to the procedure of the Labour Commission. Thus tamely do long stories of lives of men in arenas of labour often end. He was now to leave the assembly in which he had sat, with only one three months' break, since 1857. He entered it in his twenty-fifth year, and left it in his fifty-ninth. His father, the seventh duke, arrived at the conclusion of his long, quiet, and dignified life on December 21, 1891, and Lord Hartington succeeded to the title and estates as eighth Duke of Devonshire. He soon became to his fellow- 2o6 SECOND ADMINISTRATION ch. xxiii. countrymen the duke, in a sense in which no duke had been since the death of the first Duke of Wellington. The last few months of the life of the seventh duke had, unhappily, been saddened by the death, in May 1891, of his youngest son, Lord Edward Cavendish, a most truly amiable and beloved member of the family. Lord Edward began life in the army, sat for some years in the House of Commons, and spent much of his life in public, local, and family business in the North. Lord and Lady Edward Cavendish had always, when in London, lived at Devon- shire House, and had thus incidentally given to Lord Hartington a domestic circle. Lady Edward came of the Lascelles family. Their eldest son is the present Duke of Devonshire ; and their second son is Lord Richard Cavendish, to whom Holker Hall in Lancashire now belongs. A third son is Lord John Cavendish, now of the ist Life Guards. Mr. Gladstone wrote to the new Duke of Devonshire a letter of condolence upon the death of his father. The Duke replied : — Chatsworth, December 2%, 1891. My dear Mr. Gladstone, — Your kind letter has given me great pleasure. I am sure that you know that, although my father's opinions on certain matters were very strong, no political differences could affect the great admiration and esteem which he had for you ; and I hope that you will believe that this is also true of myself. Nothing could have been more peaceful than the closing days of his life, and there was no sign either of bodily pain or mental disquiet. I am happy to say that my sister seems to have quite recovered from the effects of her long and anxious watch- ing. — I remain, yours very truly, Devonshire. Mr. Gladstone did not for a moment allow private friendship to interfere with political warfare. It is the I89I A CONFLICT 207 modern English way, and the non-politician is tempted to think that either the warfare or the friendship must be unreal. Mr. Gladstone never lost an opportunity of de- nouncing by speech or letter Mr. Balfour's firm administra- tion of the law in Ireland. Lord Hartington at Edinburgh, on October 31, 1890, had pointed out that the coercive system in Ireland now denounced by Mr. Gladstone was substantially the same as that which a few years before had been established and administered under Mr. Glad- stone's Government ; that Mr. Gladstone had now ' gone very near the length of exciting, and the whole length of excusing, breaches of the law ' ; and that such vehement denunciation was not the duty of a statesman unless he first took the trouble to acquaint himself with the case of his opponents, the state of the country, and the circum- stances which had made exceptional legislation necessary. He said that he did not apologise for the Crimes Act, on the contrary was proud of it, for it had ' done more to restore freedom and the most elementary rights of liberty in Ireland than if twenty new political franchises had been given to the Irish people, or if the widest system of self- government ever devised had been bestowed on them.' Lord Hartington evidently held to the old Whig view that liberty consisted in the safeguarding of personal rights, and was not, as the French Jacobins held, a kind of goddess. Mr. Gladstone must have thirsted to have his revenge for this dreadfully heretical doctrine, delivered within the hearing of his own constituents. The new Duke of Devon- shire, a year later, increased the offence by his farewell address to the electors of Rossendale, when he said, with the most wounding veracity, that the ' anticipation of danger and difficulty which exercised for a time so large an influence on the minds of the timid and irresolute had not been realised, and the Government of every part of the 2o8 SECOND ADMINISTRATION ch. xxiii. United Kingdom by a single Parliament had been found practicable and effective.' The vacant seat, Rossendale, was contested between a Liberal Unionist and a Gladstonian. Mr. Gladstone came to the support of his follower by a letter in which he alleged that, in 1886, Lord Hartington had — 'promised a large introduction into the Irish Govern- ment of the representative principle, and a fundamental reform in the system of administration known and hated in Ireland under the name of Dublin Castle. Nearly six years have elapsed, but not a single step has been taken towards the redemption of either of these pledges, but instead of such fulfilment, Ireland has for the first time been placed under a law of perpetual coercion, and the credit of the Exchequer has been pledged . . . for the purchase of Irish estates. This is the system which is now, it seems, to recommend your opponent to the suffrages of Rossendale — that is to say, a constituency, historically Liberal, is invited to the systematic support of a Tory Government, which founds its chief claim to favour on its having done more than any Tory Govern- ment to alienate the Irish from the British people, and to dishonour the names of law and order by making them a pretext for trampling on liberty, for promoting the interest of the landed class, and for undermining the Union while professing to maintain it.' This astoundingly reckless assault upon those who maintained social order in a still restless Ireland, while they promoted the true remedy for agrarian discontent, elicited a reply from the Duke, in which he did not attempt to conceal his resentment : — ' Mr. Gladstone says that I owed my majority in 1886 to my promises of a large introduction into Irish local government of the representative principle, and a funda- mental reform in the system of administration " known and 1892 A CONFLICT 209 hated in Ireland under the name of Dublin Castle." My promises and pledges, to which he now attaches so much importance, were contained in my address to my con- stituents, and were at the time abundantly commented on, disparaged, and sneered at by Mr. Gladstone himself. I was not in 1886, and have never since been, in a position to promise fundamental reforms on any subject, and I made no such promises. All I did was to admit the existence in Ireland of a desire, recognised by the Liberal party as reasonable within certain limits, for a larger share of control by the Irish people over their own affairs ; and while I expressly declined to commit myself to any of the plans which had been proposed, I endeavoured to state in more intelligible terms than Mr. Gladstone had used some of the conditions which, in my opinion, were essential in any measure which could be adopted by Parliament. There was not a word in my address, nor, so far as I can recollect, in my speeches, about the representative principle, or about Dublin Castle. 'There were, therefore, no pledges of mine to be redeemed ; but a considerable step will be taken, or attempted, in the next session, if Mr. Gladstone and his followers do not prevent it, in the direction of satisfying the reasonable desires of the Irish in the matter of local self-government, to which I referred, and it is more than probable that these steps would have been taken long ago, but for the determined and mischievous agitation which was kept up in Ireland by his allies, as long as they were able, and was tolerated and encouraged by Mr. Gladstone himself, for the purpose of proving that the government of Ireland under the Union was impossible.' ^ Mr. Gladstone had the delightful satisfaction of seeing the capture of the seat which his great adversary had held. The Liberal Unionist was defeated by 1225 votes, 1 Lord Salisbury's Government introduced a Bill for Irish County Councils in iSoa, but its progress was arrested by the Dissolution. The English and Scot- tish County Councils had been established in 1888. The Irish County Councils were established by Lord Salisbury's third Government in 1896. VOL. II. O 2IO SECOND ADMINISTRATION ch. xxiii. a slightly smaller majority than Lord Hartington had obtained in 1886. Since the schism of 1886, Lord Derby had led the Liberal Unionist section of the House of Lords. He now very willingly resigned this function to the Duke of Devonshire as the recognised chief of the whole Liberal Unionist party. Mr. Chamberlain succeeded, almost as a matter of course, to the command of the Liberal Unionists in the House of Commons. The only possible alternative would have been the choice of Sir Henry James, and he entirely agreed with the course taken. The Duke continued to be chairman of the Liberal Unionist Associa- tion. Other honours, or duties, followed. Lord Salisbury wrote that he was ' afraid ' that he must ask the Duke's leave to submit his name to the Queen for appointment as Lord-Lieutenant of Derbyshire. The Duke replied that he ' could not even go through the form of objecting to the submission.' . . . ' My father told me that he believed the office had been held by one of our family for over 200 years, and I know that he hoped that I might succeed him.' In July 1892 the Prime Minister wrote that he had submitted the Duke's name to the Queen for the 'Garter' vacant by the death of the Duke of Cleveland, and that the ' submission was received with very hearty approval.' ' It is a liability,' Lord Salisbury added, * which you inherit, like the Lord-Lieutenancy. At all events it may serve as a very slight expression of the debt which the existing but moribund Government owes to you.' The Prince of Wales wrote on this occasion : — CowES, July 2'jik, 1892. My dear Hartington, — As your name appears in to-day's newspaper as a Knight of the Garter, I must write these few lines to offer you my sincere congratu- 1892 THE PRINCE OF WALES 211 lations on the honour the Queen has conferred upon you. I am sure no one deserves it more for your devotion to your country — my only regret is that you have not received it long ago. Let me also congratulate you on winning the ' Stewards' Cup ' for the second time. . . . Ever yours very sincerely, Albert Edward. Throughout life this kind and [genial Prince counted Lord Hartington, or, as he became, the Duke of Devon- shire, among his most intimate friends, and they met very frequently in the more easy and less formal society which, both as Prince of Wales and as King, he had the rather rare gift of enjoying and making enjoyable for others, without any sacrifice of his own dignity, or of the respect due to his position. He had a high opinion of the Duke's sound judgment and good sense, and, when occasion arose, consulted him both in matters of a more public character and in private affairs relating to the social world.^ One little scene, from a cheerful dinner table at the Baths of Homburg, is rescued from oblivion by Mr. George Smalley, in his book entitled Anglo- A^nerican Memories: — ' The late Duke of Devonshire, at that time the Marquis of Hartington, was sitting nearly opposite the Prince, but at some little distance, and this colloquy took place : '•' Hartington, you ought not to be drinking all that champagne." ''No, sir, I know I oughtn't." "Then, why do you do it ? " " Well, sir, I have made up my mind that I'd rather be ill now and again than always taking care of myself," " Oh, you think that now, but when the gout comes what do you think then ? " " Sir, if you will ask me then I will tell you. I do not anticipate." The Prince laughed and everybody laughed, and Lord ^ The writer has submitted these observations to the best authority, Lord KnoUys, who confirms them. The Duke was often called upon to arbitrate in private social matters. He once said, 'I don't know why it is, but whenever a man is caught cheating at cards the case is referred to me.' 212 SECOND ADMINISTRATION Ch. xxiii. Hartington, for all his gout, lived to be seventy-four — one of the truest Englishmen of his time, or of any time.' Another hereditary succession (by way of election this time) was that to the office of Chancellor of Cambridge University, vacant through the death of the late Duke. It was fitting. The Duke was not, like his father, a man of academic distinction. But in other respects his position was a great one, and there was much in his cool and unbiassed way of regarding things akin to the genius of the University of Cambridge. Lady Louisa Egerton, speaking to Professor Liveing, of Cambridge, soon after the death of the seventh Duke, and the accession of his son to the office of Chancellor, said, ' You will find that my brother has the same strong sense of duty which characterised my father.' ' This,' says the Professor, ' I found to be quite correct.' The Duke did his best to raise a sum for the much-needed better endowment of the University, and himself gave ;^io,ooo towards this object. The donations exceeded ^^100,000, but the Duke was disappointed by the results, since half a million was required to meet urgent needs. Professor Liveing says that the Duke — < found that there was a widespread belief among men who had amassed large fortunes that the education given at Cambridge was not the best preparation for the practical business of life, and especially that time was wasted in the study of classical languages, without, in most cases, any adequate result, and he did not fail to press this on the attention of the leading members of the University. When the Liberal party came into power in 1905, he sympathised with the proposal, which arose within the University, to endeavour to get an Act of Parliament to modify its constitution so as to give those actually doing the work of the University fuller control of the courses of study, 1892 MARRIAGE 213 and was disappointed that it went forward so slowly. He took a particular interest in the development at Cambridge of a school of scientific agriculture. Before he became Chancellor he was a member of a University syndicate to consider the promotion of education in that subject, and later, it was through his influence that the Drapers' Com- pany provided a liberal endowment for the professorship of agriculture. When the school had taken root, he again came to the front, in the endeavour to obtain subscrip- tions for suitable buildings and further equipment for it. He was again disappointed in the result. The amount subscribed, though a substantial help to the University, was inadequate, and he remarked, "We must hope that the fruit of our labour will come in legacies." ' ^ The Duke, quite at the end of his life, was also elected to be Chancellor of the modern Victorian University at Manchester. He was also for some time President of the National Association for the Promotion of Technical and Secondary Education. Another non-political office which he held for fifty years was that of the Provincial Grand Master of the Freemasons of Derbyshire. In the summer of 1892 the Duke was married in the most private way possible, at the church in Down Street off Piccadilly, to his most intimate friend of nearly thirty years, Louise, daughter of Count von Alten of Hanover. Her first husband, the seventh Duke of Manchester, had recently died. Her daughters by that marriage were the Duchess of Hamilton, the Countess of Gosford, and Lady Alice Stanley, now Countess of Derby, and her sons were the eighth Duke of Manchester and Lord Charles Montagu. There had been no reigning Duchess of Devonshire since 1811. The Duke informed Queen Victoria of his intended marriage, and received a kind ^ This quotation is made from an obituary notice of the Duke by Professor G. D. Liveing, published in the Proceedings of the Royal Society. 214 SECOND ADMINISTRATION ch. xxm. letter of approval and congratulation. In it the Queen said in her noble style : — 'The Queen cannot conclude this letter without ex- pressing to the Duke her high sense of the great services he has rendered to the country and herself during the last few years — and how much she relies on him to assist in maintaining the safety and honour of her vast Empire. All must join in this great and necessary work.' The new Duchess was of a vigorous character and an extremely social and hospitable disposition. Devonshire House, Chatsworth, and other abodes were henceforth centres of active life, the resort of beautiful and shining women, and of men distinguished in the social and political world. The society was not, like that of some great Tory or Whig houses of former days, of a distinctively political and party character. The Duchess was the centre of a world whose interests were rather social than political, and although, among politicians, guests of Unionist opinion were naturally the more numerous, those from the opposite camp were also to be found. At a great evening party at Devonshire House the leading statesmen of both sides were to be seen, a Harcourt as well as a Balfour, and that house and Chatsworth did something to soften the edge of political conflict. This was one effect of the transfer to alliance with the Conservatives of a great Whig family not oblivious of the past, and faithful in friendship. The Duke troubled himself not at all about the social part of his establishment. People came and went, and he himself, not usually knowing who was coming or going, and not always who all his guests were, was, as a kins- woman observed, like the most popular and permanent guest in his own house.i It was the work of the Duchess ^ The writer remembers the Duke saying to him when a house party were assembled before dinner in the hbrary at Chatsworth: 'This is all very well, but I should like to know who all my guests are. Do you know the name of that red-faced man over there ? ' 1892 ELECTIONS 2 1 5 to maintain his social relations, and this she did most effectively. No doubt also there is ground for the common belief that, in earlier times, it was due, in some measure, to her energy and decision, as a friend, that he did not abandon a political life which was so often extremely distasteful to him. Those who knew them best can and do testify to the tender and faithful affection which united the Duke and the Duchess of Devonshire.^ Meanwhile the days of Lord Salisbury's Administration came to an end. It was six years since the last General Election, and it was necessary to take new powers from the nation. Parliament was dissolved and the electoral battle was fought in July 1892. The result was the return of 274 Gladstonian Liberals and 81 Irish Nationalists on the one side, and 269 Conservatives and 46 Liberal Unionists on the other. Thus the former alliance had a majority of 40.^ The bye-elections, especially between 1887 and 1890, had run so strongly against the Govern- ment that this victory was, to the Gladstonians, a dis- appointingly small one. In all probability it would have been far greater, but for the charms and unruly affections of one woman. The action for divorce from his wife, on the ground of her long-standing and fairly well-known liaison with Charles Parnell, brought by the political intriguer O'Shea, in 1890, had unchained a pack of angry forces against the Irish chief. The bishops and priests had never gladly followed one who was a Protestant or a Free- thinker ; many of his parliamentary followers cherished old resentments against his system of despotism, his assertion of social superiority, and his personal neglect ; ^ The Duchess died at the end of July 191 1. - The Unionist majority, reduced by bye-elections, had stood at 66 before the elections. 2i6 SECOND ADMINISTRATION ch. xxiii. he had bitterly offended some of them by insisting upon the election of O'Shea for Gahvay in 1886 ; and now he was found guilty of the sin which to the conscience of England and Scotland is, if made public, almost the darkest. The coup de grdce was given by Mr. Gladstone, who was a strong moralist and was, no doubt, pressed by countless invocations, and well informed of the Non- conformist feeling. He publicly declared that * notwith- standing the splendid services rendered by Mr. Parnell to his country, his continuation, at the present moment, in the leadership would be productive of consequences disastrous in the highest degree to the cause of Ireland.' The meaning of this oracle was, he gave it to be under- stood, that, unless Parnell retired, he himself could no longer assist the Irish cause. The majority of the Irish M.P.s who, after the divorce verdict but before Gladstone's declaration, had publicly committed themselves to the continued support of Parnell, then forsook him. The ruined leader sustained a hopeless fight in England and Ireland against all these foes with darkly splendid heroism resembling that of Satan in Milton's epic. He was defeated and killed in this battle. He was driven from political life, and, virtually, from life itself, for an offence not altogether unpardonable, by those who understand, in strong men who attract, and are attracted by, beautiful and ambitious women ; an offence, more- over, which has been condoned by the English in some of their most illustrious kings, statesmen, soldiers, and sailors, Parnell disclosed, with scornful comment, conversations which he had had with Mr. Glad- stone and Mr. Morley, and explained to his fellow- Irishmen the attempts made, he averred, by these leaders to water down the Home Rule claim to a drink more acceptable to the English Liberal 1892 FALL OF PARNELL 217 palate.^ This he did, he told his countrymen, in order to 'enable you to understand the loss with which you are threatened, unless you consent to throw me to the English wolves now howling for my destruction.' A leading Tory Minister wrote to Lord Hartington : ' Our business is to sit still while Parnell is being devoured by the wolves.' He was soon devoured, and the Irish party, torn in two, lost all vigour and power. John Redmond said, with truth, in the debates in Committee Room No. 15, that — 'in selling our leader to preserve the Liberal alliance we are selling the independence of the Irish party. This party has been powerful only because it has been in- dependent ; every Irish party that ever existed in this House fell in the same way ; if we sacrifice Parnell to preserve this alliance the days in our generation of the independence of the Irish party are at an end. Mr. Gladstone would be absolutely unfettered, and he would have the Irish party in the hollow of his hand, and it would be a discredited and powerless tool of the Liberal party.' The younger Redmond brother wrote fiercely in United Ireland, after Parnell's death : — 'The greatest friend of Irish liberty, the greatest enemy of British tyranny, the one man hated and feared before all other men by the oppressors of Ireland, is hunted to death, that the virtue of Ireland might be vindicated to the satisfaction of the Pharisees and hypocrites of holy England. The Nonconformist conscience is now at ease, &c." This affair just made the difference in the elections of 1892. It headed back many Nonconformists and others * The Irish members opposing Parnell sought in vain to obtain a specific re-assurance as to his intentions from Mr. Gladstone, though he is said to have remarked after a deputation from Committee Room No. 15 : 'My heart bleeds for the poor fellows.' 21 8 SECOND ADMINISTRATION Ch. xxiii. who had been driven into the Unionist camp in 1886 by fear of the Church of Rome, and had, since then, been reverting towards the main Liberal body, carried by inveterate bias and ancient jealousy of the Church of England.! The policy of handing over Irish government to Irish political leaders seemed, to men of the world, more questionable than ever now that the one strong man, Parnell, was dead. The Irish party was divided into a Parnellite group and an anti-Parnellite majority. They were shattered like the aggregation of Highland clans after the fall of the 'glorious Dundee.' The larger group lost spirit and fighting power, and were led by individuals of the forcible-feeble order, who, delivered from the stern control of Parnell, could not stand alone, and fell miserably under the magic spell of Mr. Gladstone.^ The leader of the smaller group of those faithful to Parnell, although his following was still further reduced at the next elections, was in the end more successful, and, ten years later, reunited the party under his able chieftainship. Mr. Redmond well deserved this success because he was loyal and consistent. V Lord Hartington had undertaken twice during Lord Salisbury's second Government to discharge the duty, im- portant, though tedious and without glory, of chairman of a Royal Commission. The first was that appointed in the summer of 1888 to inquire into a matter of much practical importance, ' the civil and professional administration of ^ Mr. Chamberlain, writing to Lord Hartington in October 1889, said: 'The bye-elections are most discouraging. I am afraid the Liberal cry is too strong for us, and that it is true, as Harcourt says, that the Liberal Unionists of 1886 have largely become Gladstonian since then.' " Parnell was aware of this peril to his party, and on one occasion, after the breach, compared Mr. Gladstone to a ' spider. ' 1888-94 ROYAL COMMISSIONS 219 the naval and military departments and their relations to each other and to the Treasury.' The Commission reported in 1890. Their chief conclusions were that the office of Commander-in-Chief (still held by the Duke of Cambridge) should be abolished, and that a naval and military Council should be created. This Council was to comprise the principal professional advisers of the Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty. The reason for creating such a Council was to remedy the want of co-operation between the Departments. The mischief was not so much that the Departments quarrelled, as that by avoiding dis- cussion with each other they also avoided the solution of problems, though the absence of such solution might lead to disaster. The reasons for abolishing the office of Commander-in-Chief, given fully in the Report, are well summed up in a speech made by Lord Hartington on July 4, 1890. He said : — 'We have felt that, under our Constitution, it is impos- sible to place any direct control over the army, over army organisation, in the hands of any man except one who shall be directly responsible to the House of Commons. That being so, the question is narrowed to this : whether it is desirable to place between the parliamentary Chief and the heads of the various Departments into which the office must be divided, one great military officer, to whom all other departmental officers shall be subordinate, and in whom all the lines of administration shall centre. In my opinion that is not a desirable link in the chain of War Office administration. I think that the existence of such an officer tends to weaken the sense of responsibility of each of the officers at the heads of the Departments. It also tends to diminish the efficiency of the War Office Council. I do not think it possible, if you have an officer of the weight and influence of the Commander-in-Chief, however 220 SECOND ADMINISTRATION ch. xxiii. much you may modify his functions, that you will have that freedom of discussion in the War Office Council which will alone enable a civilian Minister adequately to decide, rightly and justly, the question of War Office administration.' The Government did not take the main steps advised by this Report. The Duke of Cambridge continued to be Commander-in-Chief until the autumn of 1895, and was then succeeded by Lord Wolseley. The post was not abolished until after the conclusion of the South African War, and the Report of Lord Elgin's Commission. It was, however, intended that the Commander-in-Chief should hereafter discharge duties akin to those of Chief of the Staff, and direct access to the Secretary of State was given to the heads of the other great Departments. Nor was the joint naval and military Council created. Instead, the Govern- ment adopted a different plan, that of a Cabinet Committee for naval and military defence which professional advisers in both services could be invited to attend. This was the Committee over which the Duke of Devonshire presided under Lord Salisbury's third Administration, and it was a step in the process of evolution which led to the existing Imperial Defence Committee, an institution very much the creation of Mr. Balfour, which should have still larger destinies. The other Royal Commission, due to an outbreak of labour troubles and wars, was that appointed in 1891 to inquire into 'questions affecting the relations between employer and employed, the combinations of employers and employed, and the conditions of labour, which have been raised during the recent trade disputes in the United Kingdom.' This inquiry covered a vast field. Nearly 600 witnesses were examined, and masses of written information were collected and arranged by the energetic Secretary to 1891-94 LABOUR COMMISSION 221 the Commission, Mr. Geojffrey Drage. The inquiry was useful in the way of ventilating grievances, and making employers and employed appreciate more truly each other's points of view, but the subject proved to be in- capable of definite recommendations except upon matters of detail. The Report was not presented till June 1894. The Duke of Devonshire (as he had now become), in a supplementary report signed by himself and several other Commissioners, suggested that a fuller legal personality should be given to trade unions, so that they could enter into legally recognised contracts with employers. Ch. XXIV. CHAPTER XXIV SOME CHARACTERISTICS The writer of the present Memoir worked, in connec- tion with the Labour Commission, upon the personal secretarial staff of the Duke of Devonshire, from January 1892 to June 1894, and saw him constantly. He was an excellent chief to serve. He was sensitive to the feelings of those who worked under him, and, when he had chosen them, he trusted them, and did not commit the error, fatal to good administration, of worrying himself over details.^ To do this is to diminish the responsibility of subordinates, and to lessen their zeal. He was absolutely unassuming, but every one in his presence was aware of a largeness and dignity of nature which filled much 'moral space.' In business he spoke little, hardly using a superfluous word, listened to others, when possible with the aid of a cigarette, without much appearance of interest or attention, and at the right moment indicated, with an instinctive sagacity, the best and most practical line to follow. A decision, once taken, was adhered to ; he did not look back or retrace his steps. His work was done with a weary, or bored, thoroughness, the resultant apparently of a conflict 1 Mr. Robert Hobart, now Sir Robert Hobart, K.C.V.O., C.B., was the official private secretary to Lord Hartington 1863-66, 1868-74, and 1880-85. Mr. Reginald Brett, now Viscount Esher, was private secretary 1 875-80, and non-officially till 1882. After 1885, at various times, Colonel Henry Lascelles and Mr. John Dunville and Mr. Charles Hamilton acted on his personal staff, and after 1895 Mr. (now Sir) Almeric Fitzroy and then Mr. Riversdale Walrond were successively official private secretaries. 322 ESTATE BUSINESS 223 between a strong sense of duty on the one side, and, on the other, hatred of writing and speaking, and inborn indolence. Once he said to one who was speaking of the indolence of another man, ' I know some one more indolent,' meaning himself. Throughout life he had to spend most of his hours in uncongenial tasks, because, when his political functions had declined in severity, his accession to the dukedom and the control of great landed estates exposed him to new obligations of duty, and to fresh assaults by that ' Fiend, Occupation,' as Charles Lamb calls it. His semi-public and private busi- ness was capably managed by those who served under him, but inevitably the time of a large landowner of high rank is devoured by estate business, local functions, and so forth, affairs even more tedious than those connected with the public work of the State. Mr. Charles Hamilton, who worked on the Duke's staff from 1894 onwards, has been so good as to contribute the following remarks : — ' The Duke had large estates in Derbyshire, Yorkshire, Lancashire, Cumberland, Lincolnshire, Somerset, Sussex, Middlesex, and Ireland. He was absolute owner of all these estates. He was also the patron of a number of livings, and was largely interested in several commercial enterprises such as the Furness Railway, the Barrow Hematite Steel Company, the Eastbourne Waterworks Company, the Naval Construction Company, and the Waterford, Dungarvan, and Lismore Railway. The two last concerns were sold during the Duke's life, the former to Vickers, Maxim & Co., the latter to the Great Southern of Ireland Railway. 'The Duke took a keen interest in all that concerned his estates. His agents referred or reported all matters to him directly. He required full information before coming to a decision, and important questions were personally discussed by him with his agents. The estate accounts 224 SOME CHARACTERISTICS Ch. xxiv. were all kept in a very elaborate manner, and at the end of each year an exhaustive report was made on them, pointing out and explaining in what respect the figures varied from those of the preceding year, and these reports he carefully studied. Requests for pecuniary assistance for persons or objects connected with his estates were very numerous, and the Duke always met generously any demand which had a reasonable claim on him. He realised fully that his great possessions entailed great obligations on him, and his own personal interests were the last things he considered in his dealings with his tenants on his estates. ' His duties as chairman of companies in which he was by far the largest shareholder were rather irksome to him. He distrusted his knowledge of business matters, conse- quently he did not, as a rule, attempt to force his views, as chairman, on his colleagues, and, besides, he felt unwilling to urge strongly his particular view lest his colleagues should, having regard to his preponderating interest in the concern, feel bound to give way to his wishes. I have known instances where, had the Duke insisted on his own view, it would have been far better for the particular Company. His business mind worked slowly, but once he got a grip of a subject he kept it, and then no one was better able to confute a false argument or to see what the real point was. He grudged no time in trying to master a difficult question. I have heard him say, " It may be all right and clear, but I don't understand it the least " ; and the whole matter would then again be thrashed out. ' As patron of a number of livings, he had frequently to appoint clergymen to vacant livings. This was a duty he particularly disliked. He would carefully consider the names of all candidates who had applied personally or been recommended, but he did not approve of personal application. If any candidate seemed suitable he caused further inquiries to be made and generally had a personal interview. If not satisfied he would consult some one who might be able to recommend a good man, sometimes the bishop of the diocese, frequently his sister, Lady Louisa ESTATE BUSINESS 225 Egerton, in whose judgment he had the greatest confidence. As a rule he did not appoint clergymen holding extreme views. ' He was a most loyal member of Cambridge University. When he became the Chancellor he never grudged time, trouble, or financial assistance on their behalf. The Senate could at all times rely on the Duke to do his utmost to forward their interests. ' Perhaps the pursuit in which the Duke took the keenest interest was his breeding and racing stud. He never seemed happier than when he was looking at his mares and yearlings at his Polegate Stud Farm. While he was the owner of some good horses, he never was success- ful in any of the classic races for colts. He said to me once, " Sometimes I dream that I am leading in the winner of the Derby, but I am afraid it will never be anything but a dream." I often thought that he would almost as soon have won the Derby with a good horse as have been Prime Minister. 'As I was associated with him for more than twelve years, I should like to say that no secretary ever had a more considerate chief or one more delightful to work with. When he gave his trust, he gave it absolutely. His custom was to open and read all letters himself, and then to give instructions how they were to be dealt with. Though by nature he was indolent (he said once to me, " I think my motto should be, ' Never do to-day what you can put oft till to-morrow,' and then very often it need not be done "), he was always most accessible and willing to deal with estate or business questions, and the fact was, that he was really a very hard-worked man, who against his inclination forced himself to consider and deal with the numerous questions, political and private, that cropped up every day. ' No one could realise the great simplicity of the man and the charm of his nature who had not seen him living quietly at one of his country homes. It used to be said at the Turf Club that, if all the members had to be VOL. II. p 226 SOME CHARACTERISTICS ch. xxiv. re-elected, the only one certain of re-election was the Duke of Devonshire.' Any one who worked with the Duke of Devonshire must have felt how impossible it was to express in his presence any false sentiment or exaggerated view. Dis- taste for all superfluous or hyperbolic expression was one of his most marked characteristics. Some orator in the House of Lords said on one occasion, 'This is the proudest moment in my life.' The Duke murmured to his neighbour, ' The proudest moment in my life was when my pig won the first prize at Skipton Fair.' ^ In his conversation there was much of the humorous, nothing of the brilliant. Devonshire House, in his day, was a social and political centre, but not a mart and exchange of ideas on all subjects, like some of the older Whig houses — Bowood or Holland House. Unlike his father, who had throughout life been a great reader of books on science and history, the eighth duke was no reader. In his earlier days he would sometimes be seen absorbed in a book, probably a political memoir, during a purely domestic evening atChatsworth or Devonshire House. Later, like most men of action as they advance in life, he read little save newspapers, or novels which did not involve any strain on the mind (he consumed many of these), and in leisure hours preferred cards to any book-reading. It was said at one time, 'Gladstone reads every new book that comes out, Hartington none of them.' Probably he quoted poets or other authors less than any political leader of his time, except Parnell.^ His natural inclination was, like that of Parnell, rather towards applied science, and ^ This glorious incident probably took place when he was a boy at Holker Hall, * Parnell is said only to have quoted poetry once in a speech, viz., Moore's line about Ireland, ' First flower of the earth and first gem of the sea,' and then excruciatingly wrong, saying 'jewel ' instead of 'gem.' He once asked a poetic Irish patriot, ' What is the good of poetry ? ' BOOKS AND ART 227 he always showed interest in the mechanism of a great factory or a workshop. A Chatsworth story relates that Lord Salisbury, being on a visit there, and alone in the great library, discovered, by some chance, the non-apparent way up to the gallery which runs round it, but could not re-discover the door, veiled by sham books, leading to the spiral staircase when he wished to descend. Lord Hartington, returning from shooting, strolled through the room. Lord Salisbury, from above, asked for guidance, and his host, equally ignorant, had to summon expert assistance. But, like many Englishmen of his class, the Duke of Devonshire had more real, and happily unsophisticated, appreciation of literature and art than he cared to express or, perhaps, admit even to himself. Men cannot be brought up and live in houses full of the best things in these kinds without being, perhaps unconsciously, affected by them. What unconscious in- fluence may not the chivalrous portraits of Van Dyck, hanging in many a great, boy-breeding, country house, have had upon the actual political history of England ! Mrs. Strong, who was for a time, after her husband's death, librarian and custodian of works of art to the Duke, gives an interesting aspect of his character in this con- nection. She writes : — 'In all that concerned the management of his library and art collections the Duke showed in the highest degree the same wise liberality which I always understood he brought to the administration of his vast estates. I have studied for over twenty years in private collections both in England and abroad, but I have never met with another owner who understood so fully as the Duke the privileges and responsibilities of possession. He was too liberal and generous — too conscious also in a simple way of a certain mal-adjustment of this world's goods — not to wish others 228 SOME CHARACTERISTICS Ch. xxiv. to come in for their share of enjoyment of his splendid treasures. Chatsworth and Hardwick, with all they con- tained, he seemed to consider himself as holding in trust for the benefit primarily of the county and then of the larger public from wheresoever they might come. Year in and year out thousands tramped through the magni- ficent State Rooms at Chatsworth and the Picture and Sculpture Galleries.^ The privilege was certainly im- memorial, dating back to the eighteenth century ; but with the increased facilities of travelling and the institution of cheap railway excursions it threatened to become a serious nuisance. When it was pointed out to the Duke that this continuous stream of '' trippers " involved tremendous wear and tear to the works of art and was bad for the actual structure of the house, he would answer, " I daresay they w411 bring down the floors some day, but I don't see how we can keep them out." He would sometimes waylay these parties with the evident intention of watching their deportment. Probably none of his contemporaries had been more often portrayed and caricatured or was a more familiar figure. But he would stand there amusingly unconscious of recognition, wondering why the housemaid who acted as guide and the whole party had suddenly stood still and were staring at him. ' But there was another and more important side to his liberality as owner of a great collection, and that was the constant and unfailing welcome which was extended at Chatsworth to scholars and to students of every degree. No praise bestowed upon his memory on this score could be excessive, as savants, scientists, art critics, curators of museums, learned men of every sort or description all over the world can testify. If abroad Chatsworth has become a name to conjure with, if it stands for the very type of a princely collection conducted on princely lines, this is due in great measure to the reception that the Duke not only allowed, but wished, his representatives to accord to 1 It was stated in a newspaper that in the year 1910 no less than 80,000 people visited Chatsworth. BOOKS AND ART 229 savants. Many have carried back to France, to Germany, to Italy, to distant universities in Poland, in Russia, in Greece, and in America, grateful recollections of long, un- disturbed days of study in the stately library and of the quiet, refreshing walk home in the evening light across the great park to the little inn outside the gates ; unforgettable days "au pays des grands arbres," as a Frenchman once wrote to one of the Duke's librarians. In a sense the Duke reaped his reward — not only by the prestige that came to attach to Chatsworth as a great house where learning and research were encouraged — but also because well-nigh all these scholars left some trace of their passage through Chatsworth in contributions of some kind. ' In acting thus the Duke was, of course, continuing the enlightened tradition of his family — showing himself the worthy descendant of those seventeenth-century Earls of Devonshire who had been by turn the pupils, the friends, and the patrons of Hobbes. Moreover the Duke, following again in this in the footsteps of his ancestors, understood the necessity of placing the library and collections in the charge of scholars of experience and reputation. His father, the "Scholar Duke," without appointing a resident librarian, had received friendly assistance in the care of the library and the making of the catalogue from the late Sir James Lacaita. In 1893 the late Duke appointed as librarian, Arthur Strong, a young Cam- bridge man of thirty, a favourite pupil of Renan, who had been librarian to Max Miiller and had already made his mark both in England and on the Continent as an Orientalist and art critic. Strong, who died only ten years later after a rapid and brilliant career during which he held simultaneously the appointments of librarian to the Dukes of Devonshire and of Portland, of librarian to the House of Lords, and of Professor of Arabic in the University of London, brought to his work at Chatsworth a devotion and enthusiasm combined with a wealth of learning which will probably leave their mark on the great collection as long as it exists. 230 SOME CHARACTERISTICS ch. xxiv. 'The art treasures of Chatsworth were freely drawn upon by outsiders, few applications to study or to photo- graph or to publish being refused, provided the Duke could be satisfied that they came from an honest and competent source, and that no one's claims to priority were interfered with. One of the undertakings planned by Strong was the publication for the Roxburghe Club of the famous Benedictional of St. ^thelwold — one of Chatsworth's greatest treasures. The Duke showed his usual munificent spirit when the scheme was submitted to him, and wished the publication to be worthy of the splendid manuscript — a masterpiece of Anglo-Saxon minia- turists. But he also was to die before its completion, and the work was brought out only a few months ago under the auspices of the present Duke, who adds the touching inscription to his uncle's memory. ' Moreover, the Duke, contrary to what is generally supposed, was a liberal purchaser. There are several cases full of books at Chatsworth, bought for the Duke by Strong, which form an interesting record of what was done for the library under his reign. Unlike so many other great libraries, which seem to have been frozen or petrified at a certain date with the cessation of new acquisitions, the Chatsworth Library was kept alive by this continuity of purchase, and in touch with modern thought and requirements. ' Alongside this work for the library, the Duke en- couraged Strong's desire to see the works of art put into good order. The systematic cleaning of the pictures — most of which were darkened by the varnish dear to mid-Victorian connoisseurs — was taken in hand, and the more valuable drawings were mounted and cleaned, all of which led to many important results — to the detection of artists' signatures, the discovery of unique prints, or the identification of forgotten drawings. A notable achieve- ment was the restoration of the now famous Hardwick " hunting Tapestries " — once in Elizabethan days a glory of Chatsworth, then relegated to a Chatsworth lumber- BOOKS AND ART 231 room — finally cut up into strips to cover the walls of the Hardwick Gallery, where the single figures and scenes had long been known and admired, but without any under- standing of the conformation as a whole. It was Strong who made out, with the assistance of the late Sir P. Clarke, the sequence of the scenes. The Duke had the whole repaired. The four panels, reconstituted, almost in their first freshness, are now on loan at the Victoria and Albert Museum, where they afford a practically unique example of a fourteenth-century tapestry sequence on this scale. ' These tapestries, however, remind me that if the Duke was mostly silent on art matters, he would on occasion give his opinion in a most direct and unmistakable manner. When the two first panels had been completed they were brought to Chatsworth, where they proved something of white elephants. No wall could be found large enough to hang them upon save those of the Sculpture Gallery, which, as is well known, is full of works of the period of Canova and Thorwaldsen. When, however, the Duke came to see the effect, he sharply and rightly disapproved. " I can only say," he remarked, " that to hang Gothic tapestries behind statues in the classic style is simply ridiculous, and nothing will induce me to think otherwise " — and upon that he walked out. ' In the latter years of the Duke's life, under Mr. Strong's successor, the rearrangement, or rather the reinstatement of certain sections of the library and collections was under- taken. For instance, the curious and interesting collection of mathematical and scientific tracts, left with his fortune and his collections to Chatsworth by Henry Cavendish the physicist, were restored to the great library, whence they had been displaced, at some date unknown, in favour of full-dress " library editions of a thousand authors " dear to mid-Victorian taste. Again, the famous Kemble-Devon- shire collection of English plays, purchased from John Philip Kemble by the sixth duke and greatly enlarged by him, had failed to find suitable house-room after its removal from Devonshire House to Chatsworth, but had 232 SOME CHARACTERISTICS ch. xxiv. been lodged in a gallery. In 1905, however, it was first adequately displayed in a room near to the Duke's own study. He took perhaps more interest in this portion of his library than in any other. 'The fears which I at first not unnaturally felt when summoned to the Duke's room for library business soon turned to pleasurable anticipation, owing to his genuine kindliness and also because of the touches of humour which would relieve these interviews. He hated adulation and flattery of any kind — to him mere " humbug." One day when reading a long-winded begging letter he came to the sentence, " I had the honour of presenting a copy to your Gracious Consort." *' I don't know who he means," said the Duke rather irritably ; and as I suggested that the reference might be to the Duchess, "Then why can't the man say so ? " growled the Duke. Or he would meet me in the passage and, holding out a letter, say, " Here's a man writes to inform me I am a passionate admirer of the pictures of Claude Lorraine. You had better come to my room after breakfast and tell me what he wants." However tedious it might be he took infinite pains over correspondence of this kind. The applications for loans of pictures or other objects were interminable, but too often, as those who had the care of his collections thought, they had to be answered in the affirmative. He was one of the most liberal of lenders ; since exhibitions came into being, there were few, if any, of importance held in England which did not contain one or more examples from the Duke's collections. He even lent liberally to the Continent. The Chatsworth Memlinc went to Bruges ; the finest Van Dycks to Antwerp ; the famous Sir Joshua, of the Duchess and the child, to Berlin. It might all be a bore and a nuisance, but it was rather to the Duke like the question of admittif^g trippers to view Chatsworth — a duty to be put up with — incumbent upon him as a great owner. ' It would, of course, be absurd to claim for the Duke that he had any serious knowledge or understanding of BOOKS AND ART 233 art, but he had decided tastes, and a certain natural instinct which often led him to what was best in his collections. When the first batches of drawings came back from being mounted at the British Museum, the Duke took a singular pleasure in looking over the drawings by older German masters such as Matthaicus Griinewald, Altdorfer, or Diirer. He liked their strong, rugged lines. At last one day the Duchess asked me to put out on an easel in the library a splendid battle-scene by Altdorfer because, she said, "the Duke enjoys looking at it so very much." 'Nor could it be said that he knew the collections in detail, but he knew certain things about them well. He rarely took any of his guests over Chatsworth, but I remember, among other instances, his showing the house to the late Lord Goschen, and hearing him myself describe pictures and other objects which we were apt to suppose he had never so much as looked at. His reputation for apathy in these matters arose in great measure from his fear of boredom and of having to exert himself in the way of small talk. The unwary guest who thought to please the Duke by ecstasies over the beauties of Chatsworth and its art treasures was often disconcerted by some answer such as that which he was reputed to have given to an enthusiastic American lady, " It's a rummy old place." People would go away under the impression that the Duke was indifferent to his artistic treasures. But this was false ; for as he had an evident deep pride of race, so he had in equal measure a legitimate pride of possession, mitigated by his strong sense of responsibility. ' My last recollection of the Duke at Chatsworth is of him in the library on the occasion of what was to be his last visit to his great Derbyshire estate. He came in while I was arranging one of the cases that contained the rarer books, and asked me to show him some of the more precious among these. I took out the first edition of Paradise Lost, which he seemed not to know. The Duke sat down with the book and, to my astonishment, began to read the poem aloud from the first line. He read on 2 34 SOME CHARACTERISTICS ch. xxiv. for quite a time, stopping once to say, " How fine this is ! I had forgotten how fine it was ; " when the Duchess came in and, poking her parasol into the Duke, whimsically re- marked, "If he begins to read poetry he will never come out for his walk." That afternoon they returned to London, and I only saw the Duke once again in the following autumn on his return from Eastbourne, during the period of apparent convalescence that followed the first attack of illness.' In matters of dress (to descend to a lower plane) the Duke was famously careless and conservative and averse to new apparel. He wore a certain round hat so disgracefully long at race-meetings and elsewhere that four-and-twenty ladies, it is said, conspired each to send him a new hat of that species on the same day. Once, at luncheon at Devonshire House in 1893, after attending a levee, he asked, ' How many years is it since 1866, when this uniform was new ? ' This showed that his figure had not materially altered in the critical years of the life of man. The highly correct Conservative leader, Mr. W. H, Smith, once noticed with surprise the attire of his Liberal Unionist ally. He writes from Aix-les-Bains in August 1888 : 'Yesterday Lord Hartington came to see me, dressed as a seedy, shady sailor, but he sat down and talked politics for half-an-hour, and he said it was pleasant in a place like this to have some work to do.' Note that unconscious ' but.' Like St. Aldegonde, in Disraeli's Lothair, he had a preference for plain and substantial viands. The following anecdote supplied by the well-known author, Mr. Wilfred Ward, illustrates his tastes both in diet and conversation : — ' I only met the late Duke of Devonshire twice. But the two meetings left a vivid impression on my mind, and had in them enough character to be perhaps worth re- FOOD AND CONVERSATION 235 cording. The first occasion was in 1885 at a small dinner party in London. Mr. Gladstone, I remember, was there, and the late Lady Londonderry ; also Bishop (afterwards Cardinal) Vaughan and Mr. R. H. Hutton of the Spectator. The Duke, then Lord Hartington, arrived after a long day of committees, both tired and hungry. And he was obviously dissatisfied with the unusually unsubstantial character of the excellently cooked French dishes which formed the first courses at dinner. His remarks were for a time few and brief. I was sitting nearly opposite to him, and a little later my attention was aroused by hearing him suddenly exclaim in deep tones, " Hurrah ! something to eat at last" — as some solid roast beef made its appearance. He spoke freely after this, but as I was talking to others I did not get the benefit of his conversation until after the ladies had left the dining-room. Then an extremely in- teresting political discussion ensued. I remember that while Mr. Gladstone talked very much and with great animation, Lord Hartington spoke briefly and seemed not much inclined to make the necessary effort. But I thought that in every case when the two men differed Lord Hartington put his finger on the weak point in the logic which Mr. Gladstone's rhetoric had tended to obscure, and that he had much the best of the argument, though he did not seem to care to press his advantage. When, a little later, Mr. Gladstone led the conversation to theo- logical topics, Lord Hartington appeared as little inclined to talk as he had been at the beginning of dinner. Another member of the company also held aloof rather ostentatiously from Mr. Gladstone's theological discussion. This was Dr. Vaughan, who evidently did not care to discuss theology with a " heretic." Matters ended by the future Duke and the future Cardinal removing themselves to the other end of the table and carrying on a rival conversation on country pursuits and sport. They became friends then and there (they had never met before, I think), and I believe that the Cardinal used occasionally to go to Devonshire House in later years. 236 SOME CHARACTERISTICS Ch. xxiv. 'The evening long dwelt in my mind as an exception- ally interesting one, in which I had had an opportunity of getting a very distinct impression of two great statesmen — for Mr. Gladstone showed quite as much character as Lord Hartington. ' Some eighteen years later I was dining at the British Embassy in Rome with Sir Frank Bertie, and the Duke and Duchess of Devonshire were staying in the house as his guests. After dinner I was presented to the Duke, who talked politics very pleasantly for some minutes. I then ventured to remind him that we had once met before, and he looked somewhat blankly at me until I mentioned the place of our meeting. Then he exclaimed with strong feeling, "Of course I remember. We had nothing to eat." The inadequate French dishes had dwelt in his mind for nearly twenty years.' The Duke played cards habitually, and in earlier times had the reputation of a specially good whist-player, but was not so brilliant in the later days when bridge super- seded whist. He enjoyed easy and casual society, and the coming and going of acquaintance, if it were un- accompanied by trouble to himself, and throughout life he was glad to be provided with the company of beautiful and lively women. He liked children. Lady Granville's daughters can remember him stretched on the floor, and unsuccessfully endeavouring to defeat them in the ancient game of ' knuckle bones,' which for a year or two, in the later seventies, while he led the Liberal Opposition, had a passing revival. In his earlier days his passion had been hunting ; he was a bold rider, and his figure was especially well known at the meets in the country near Kimbolton Castle. He liked shooting well enough, and was deemed rather a dangerous shot by (and to) his friends and relatives. Shooting in the Highlands stimulated his nerves, and o i o > V. 3 ? a THE TURF 237 he is said to have suffered at critical moments of the sport from the excitement known as ' stag fever.' But his chief pastime and delight was horse-breeding and racing. As the horses in a good race neared the stand he would show almost tremulous excitement. He built himself a house at Newmarket, where his horses were in training, and was never more happy than on that airy heath. Once he said, after he was Duke, ' I have six houses, and the only one I really enjoy is the house at Newmarket.' He was a Steward of the Jockey Club. His success on the turf was by no means in proportion to the money spent. He never won the Derby, though one year, 1898, a horse of his, Dieudonne, was a good deal fancied for that triumph. The most ' classic ' of his vic- tories was at a much earlier date, when he won the One Thousand Guineas, and ^£4750 therewith, in the year 1877, after a thrilling race, by a neck, with his fair and rare Belphoebe, a filly whom Vaga bore to a noble sire, Toxophilite. In the Oaks the same bay lady all but defeated the brilliant Placida, and for a triumphant season or two she won, or nearly won, many other races. 'Shall I call my daughter Belphoebe ? ' wrote to Lord Hartington a friend new-blessed with an infant. Indeed 'tis a charm- ing name, and fit for the proudest beauty. The Stewards' Cup three times fell to his colours ; Monaco was his horse, and Marvel, both of some repute in their day. In 1902 one of his horses won the Eclipse Stakes at Sandown, very unexpectedly. Some think that the best horse he ever owned was Morion, son of Barcal- dine, who captured the Gold Cup at Ascot in 1891. This was a popular victory, and, as a racing correspondent wrote, ' Morion was much cheered as he passed the post, the cheering being meant quite as much for his noble owner as for himself.' One can imagine all the pleasant 238 SOME CHARACTERISTICS ch. xxiv. friendly scene on the loveliest of English race-courses. His horses were, during most of his racing life, trained at Newmarket by Mr. Marsh, and then by Mr. Goodwin, but in his last years the Duke sent them to be trained by Mr. Sam Darling in Wiltshire. Mr. Darling has kindly supplied the following reminiscences : — ' It is with much pleasure that I send you a few remarks about the late Duke of Devonshire during the time I trained his Grace's horses. ' The first race I won for him was the Queen's prize of ;^iooo at Kempton in 1906, and I never saw him more pleased in my life. It was so long since he had won a race. The Sporting and Dramatic portraits him patting the horse and smiling at the weighing-room door after the victory. The following week he was in a ^^looo race at Newmarket, and, during the transit from Kempton to Newmarket (Burgundy was the horse's name) hurt himself in the box, and was so lame the following morning I found he could not run. So, after breakfast, I went to Beaufort House, which was the Duke's Newmarket residence, and told him what had taken place, with much regret and disappointment from me, as he would have won. His Grace turned quietly round and said, " Well, Mr. DarHng, we had a good time at Kempton." That is what I call a true and noble sportsman, for his Grace had not won many races for some time before this.^ ' I won the Newmarket Stakes, High Weight Plate, and other races with Acclaim, and several more with Cheshire Cat, when his Grace said, " Well, you are winning me a lot of races ! " Fugleman won at Ascot and Doncaster and would have won the Cesarewitch, had I been able to train him on ; his leg was a little sore, and though I thought of winning Ascot Cup with him the last year I did not risk it. His Grace's Black Spot was also a winner from here. ' I cannot speak too highly of the late Duke of Devon- ^ Quite, on a small scale, like Louis XIV. and Marshal Tallard afier Blenheim. SOCIAL TRAITS 239 shire. He, as all knew, raced on the very highest lines, and I'm sure no man ever took defeat better than his Grace, or enjoyed victory more ; and I've always been proud and felt honoured to have had the Duke as one of my patrons, and I am also proud of the present Duke as a patron. I paid my last respects to his Grace by attending his funeral at Chatsworth.' The Turf Club was, perhaps, the Duke's favourite resort in London, though he also frequented ' Brooks' ' and the ' Travellers'.' Racing, unless carried on with decided success, is, like war, an expensive amusement, and at one time Lord Hartington accumulated a certain though not very serious load of debt, which was paid off in 1880. An old estate steward once said to the fifth Duke of Devonshire with regard to a former Marquis of Hartington : ' My Lord Duke, I am very sorry to have to inform your Grace that Lord Hartington appears disposed to spend a great deal of money.' The Duke replied : ' So much the better, Mr. Heaton — so much the better ; Lord Hartington will have a great deal of money to spend.' Objects and ways of expenditure may certainly be open to the censure of the moralist and the criticism of the economist, but something can be said for the view that he to whom much is given ought much to spend, and not to accumulate. Lord Hartington was sensitive to the feelings of others in matters of larger import, but he successfully established early in life the principle that little was to be expected from him in details of polite etiquette. Like in this to the poet Wordsworth, according to De Quincey, he would never have volunteered to carry a handbag for a lady. He was not at all conventional. Those who take these things very seriously thought him ' rude ' or ' spoiled ' as a young man. He was sadly 240 SOME CHARACTERISTICS Ch. xxiv. deficient in social punctuality ; he might arrive very late to dinner, or possibly not at all. A hostess of those days said that when she had asked Lord Hartington to dinner she always asked one man to spare, upon the principle of the twelfth man in a cricket team. Life is certainly rather spoiling in these minor respects to a young man of great position who is aware that he will be sought after whatever almost he may do, and is sought after so much that it bores him. He has in this line nothing to achieve, and this is the secret of ennui. He was not of an impressionable nature. It is said that upon one occasion King Edward told him that he proposed to dine quietly at Devonshire House on a certain day. The Duke forgot this arrangement, and when the King unexpectedly arrived, had to be hurriedly retrieved from the Turf Club. This recalls a certainly true tale of Queen Victoria. The Queen had told the Duke of Devonshire of her idea — at that time a new and striking one — of revisiting Ireland after the lapse of man}'' troubled years. She asked him to mention it to Lord Salisbury, then Prime Minister, so that she might talk to him also about it when he had had time to think it over. When the Queen next saw Lord Salisbury she said, ' And what do you think of my Irish plan ? ' but found the Prime Minister blankly ignorant of her meaning. 'The fact was I clean forgot about it,' said the Duke. Perhaps no other man in England would have been capable of these wonders of forgetfulness, certainly no politician. Both defects and merits of the original character tell more decidedly towards the end of a man's career, like the bias in a bowl, as the dynamic force decreases. In his later years, although on occasions, such as that of an important speech, the Duke's mental strength was as good as ever, his innate slowness, or lethargic habit, of mind INTELLECTUAL PACE 241 made it increasingly difficult for him to keep in touch with the movements of other minds. His own mind worked slowly, and for that reason the more surely, because, when he arrived at last, his view was sound, and really his own in all its parts. Expression could not, in him, outrun thought. But it was no doubt a difficulty for him in Cabinet Council that a decision was usually arrived at by swifter intellects before he had been able to formulate, even to himself, his own position. It was impossible for him to keep in pace with minds so swift as those of Mr. Gladstone or Mr. Balfour, or to arrive at one practical conclusion in the time during which Mr. Chamberlain could have reached ten. Throughout his political career his attitude was that of a man refusing to be hurried. VOL. II. Q Ch. XXV. CHAPTER XXV THE GOVERNMENTS OF MR. GLADSTONE AND OF LORD ROSEBERY, 1892-1895 Lord Salisbury's Government did not resign at once, after the defeat of the Unionists at the elections of July 1892, but met the new House of Commons in August. A motion of ' No confidence ' was moved by Mr. Asquith on behalf of the Opposition. Mr. Gladstone in this debate said that his own principles of Home Rule were well known. They were ' limited, on the one hand, by the full and effectual maintenance of the imperial supremacy -which pervades the whole of the Empire, and, on the other, by the equally full and effectual transference to Ireland of the management of her local concerns.' Ireland, in other words, should in his view have self-government limited only by the recognition of the imperial supremacy in the same way as the self-government of (say) New Zealand was so limited. This was his own principle, and if he consented, as he did, to make modifications, it was only in order to assuage the terrors of the men who formed the main body of his host, the English and Welsh Nonconformists, Scottish Presbyterians, and Freethinkers, who shivered at the idea of assisting to set up a Roman Catholic Government in Ireland with full power to deal with all Irish affairs. Lord Salisbury, defeated on the motion of ' No confid- ence,' resigned office, and Mr. Gladstone, in his eighty- 242 1893 NEW HOME-RULE BILL 243 fourth year, heroically formed a Liberal Government for his fourth and last time. The Queen's Speech at the begin- ning of the session of 1893 promised, with true English avoidance of the expression of realities, a measure 'to amend the provision for the government of Ireland.' The Duke, in the debate on the Address, summed up the facts with which Parliament would have to deal. He compared declarations made by leading Gladstonians as to the narrow limits which they proposed to set to Irish autonomy, with the wholly incompatible declarations made by Irish Nationalists. He said : — 'There is a fear that the English people, trusting to the validity of such declarations as I have quoted, and finding in this proposed measure some recognition of the principle of the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, may be lulled into a sense of security, while the Irish members, with better reason, trust to the assurance, or to the conviction, that this nominal supremacy, although it may exist, will never be enforced, and can never be enforced.' Mr. Gladstone introduced his new Home Rule Bill into the House of Commons, and the second reading was carried on the 2ist April 1893, by a majority of 43 votes. The Bill of 1886 had provided for the exclusion of all Irish representation from the Parliament at Westminster, not- withstanding that Ireland was to make considerable contribution to the imperial expenditure. The measure of 1893, on the contrary, proposed that, while Ireland was to have a legislature for Irish affairs, Irish repre- sentatives, eighty of them, were to continue to sit in the Parliament at Westminster. As the Bill stood until after the second reading, these members were not to have the power of voting upon any legislation or taxation which was limited to England or Scotland, and not expressly 244 GOVERNMENTS OF 1 892-1 895 ch. xxv. extended to Ireland. By way of diminishing the Protestant objection it was provided that the Irish were not to legislate in their own Parliament on matters touching religion or education. The power of legislation on Irish matters, over-riding local Irish legislation, was reserved to the Imperial Parliament ; the Irish Parliament was pro- hibited from repealing or amending any laws so made, and its own Bills were to be subject to a veto by the Lord-Lieutenant exercised upon the instructions of the Imperial Government. It was pointed out that this ' in and out ' method, by which Irish members at Westminster were to vote on some subjects but not on others, was incompatible with the system of party government. A Government which, like Mr. Gladstone's at that moment, depended for its majority on the Irish vote, would be defeated on purely English or Scottish measures, while the Opposition side could not hold office because they, in turn, might be defeated on matters of imperial concern. It was said that thus there would be two centres of political gravity in the same Parliament. Sir Michael Hicks Beach truly said, ' This Bill is not a Union, it is not a Federation, it is not a Colonial Self-Government. It is a bastard combination of all three.' These objections prevailed, and Mr. Gladstone, who had carefully left open the door for the alternative of ' oinnes omnia,' adopted it in Committee. He defended the change on the ground that the debate had shown (i) that the Liberal party preferred it; (2) that it 'passed the wit of man to draw an exact line of severance between subjects which concerned Ireland and those which did not.' The Bill, as it left the Commons, allowed Irish mem- bers to vote in the House of Commons on all measures, whether of imperial concern or limited to England or Scotland. But now it encountered the no less fatal 1893 NEW HOME-RULE BILL 245 objection that Irish members would take part in legisla- ting for purely English or Scottish affairs, while English or Scottish members would have no power of legislation in Irish matters, except by way of legislation ignoring or over-riding that of the Dublin Parliament, a power which Irish national spirit would probably make difficult or impossible in practice. Mr. Gladstone himself would always have preferred his original plan of placing Ireland upon a footing as nearly as possible corresponding to that of a fully self-governing colony. He had said at Manchester on 25th June 1886 : ' I will not be a party to a legislative body to manage Irish concerns, and at the same time to having Irish members in London acting and voting on English and Scottish ques- tions.' In 1893 he had to do that which he said in 1886 he would not do. The fact is that, between the giving to Ireland of full colonial status and the existing legislative union, there is, as John Redmond said in Parliament on 13th July 1893, 'only one logical way of solving the problem, and that is by establishing a system of Federalism which would enable various local Parliaments for the different parts of the United Kingdom to legislate locally for those parts, leaving to the Imperial Parliament the function of managing imperial affairs.' ^ In other words, if we depart from full legislative union for all purposes, and?/" we are not willing to place Ireland in the position of New Zealand or Newfoundland, the only possible course is, as Mr. Chamberlain held in 1886, some adaptation of the Canadian Dominion and Province system to the circumstances of the whole United Kingdom. Most of the attack led by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Chamber- lain was founded on the contention that the securities 1 Mr. Redmond added, it is true, that the process by which this complete result must be arrived at must be carried out step by step, beginning with Irish Home Rule. 246 GOVERNMENTS OF 1 892-1 895 ch. xxv. which the Bill contained for the supremacy of the Imperial Government and Parliament, well as they might look on paper, would prove worthless in practice. This * supremacy ' question has been the issue all through. What is supremacy ? A real thing ? Or is it nothing but the hardly even nominal supremacy of the Imperial Parlia- ment over self-governing Dominions ? On the base of the monument now (1911) being erected to Parnell near the Rotunda at Dublin are engraved his words, ' No man has the right to set a boundary to the march of a nation,' followed by an assertion of eternal adher- ence to this dogma on the part of those who erect the monument. It is this everlasting claim of the Irish to the full recognition of a national status which has made the English unwilling to give them even a mild form of local self-government. It is feared that, if any form be given, the national spirit will enter into that body, and soon transform it into something very different. ' Nothing,' said Mr. Red- mond in these debates, ' so long as the Union remains unrepealed, can deprive you of the right to control the Irish Parliament as you can control the Australian and Canadian Parliaments, and to check the growth of oppression and injustice.' It was pointed out again and again, in reply to this argument, and by none more frequently and lucidly than by the Duke of Devonshire, that this control is not real and cannot be exercised. Even if a fully free Dominion wished to leave the Empire, and its inhabitants were fairly unanimous in the desire, we should probably, he said, not try to prevent this except by argument. The advocates of Home Rule, trying to satisfy at the same time advanced Irish Nationalists and English and Scotch Protestants, hovered uncertainly both in 1886 and in 1893, as they still hover in 191 1, between the proposition that the relation of Ireland to Great Britain was 1893 SUPREME AUTHORITY 247 to be that of Canada to England, and that it was to be that of Quebec Province to Canada, two wholly different things. It is one thing if a provincial government is created which has no general power of taxation, and perhaps no power to raise loans without sanction of the Imperial Parliament, which has a right of legislation strictly limited to special and defined subjects, which cannot raise any military or semi-military force, or appoint high judicial officers. It is another thing to say, as Mr. Redmond and others have said, following the Gladstonian principle, that the Imperial Parliament will retain 'an over-ruling supreme authority over the new Irish Legislature such as it possesses to-day over the various Legislatures in Canada, Australia, South Africa, and other self-governing Dominions.' ^ Such * supreme authority,' in the case of these Dominions, does not exist. It is a purely theoretic idea, or, at best, the ghost of ancient authority which lived long ago, when the self-governing Dominions were still Crown Colonies. No real power is exercised over these Governments either by the Imperial Parliament or by the Imperial Executive. In practice the relation of the United Kingdom to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or South Africa is the relation between States allied for all purposes. The Governors are our Ambassadors, and the Colonial Office does, on this side of its activity, the same kind of work as that done by the Foreign OfBce with regard to other external Governments. There is all the difference in the world between these cases and those in which, by hold over finance or in other ways, the Imperial Parlia- ment and Executive does exercise real control, as, for instance, over the London County Council, or, in of course a very different way, over India, hitherto, or any Crown * The words are quoted from a speech by Mr. Redmond in 1910. Quotations to the same effect might be made from Mr. Asquith, Mr. Churchill, &c. 248 GOVERNMENTS OF 1 892-1 895 ch. xxv. Colony. But part of the lower art of politics consists in confounding things which ought to be distinguished. A few years ago, it may be remarked, a slight inter- ference by the Imperial Government with an executive detail, involving, however, the life of several persons and allegations of injustice and oppression in a self-governing Colony, was immediately followed by the resignation, as a protest, of the Ministry in that Colony. If the Secretary of State for the Colonies had persisted, no other Colonial Ministry could have been formed, and the only possible method would have been the abolition or modification of the Colonial Constitution by Act of the Imperial Parlia- ment. Of course the Colonial Office gave way at once. A little later the Government of another self-governing Dominion threatened to adopt the same course upon a far smaller interference, and was met by a prompt apology and withdrawal. This shows how little the Imperial Supremacy amounts to, in practice, as a check on Colonial action. Mr. Gladstone, in the debate of 1893, spoke of this Supremacy as a 'hallowed thing,' Mr. Balfour, in reply, said, very truly, that Mr. Gladstone adored a 'hallowed Nothing.' This 'supremacy' is one of those magical phrases which have the terrible power, when used by the clever, to ' call fools into a circle.' It is worth while to dwell upon this point a little because the confusion of thought, against which Lord Hartington so often protested, is to this very day sedulously maintained, and is apt to cheat the ignorant. Side by side with this talk about Canada and Australia, and South Africa, and Imperial Supremacy, were, and still are, placed definite proposals as to an Irish Constitution wholly different from, and inferior in nature to, the Con- stitution of these Dominions. This was done in 1886 and in 1893, 3.nd is done to this day. It is a kind of intellectual 1893 ULSTER 249 jugglery, a sleight-of-hand. Perhaps it was, and is, thought that the Irish are more easily held with words than are the English, and that by phrases, which make it seem that Ireland is to be placed upon the footing of a self-governing Colony, the Nationalists will ' save face ' and be brought to accept a merely provincial Constitution. Honestly, one can concede to Ireland either the position of a self- governing Dominion or that of a Canadian Province. It is not honest to pretend that one is doing the first while one is really doing the second of these things. II More than enough excitement alleviated the tedious progress of this measure through the House of Commons. There were speeches in the country and demonstrations in Ulster. The Duke of Devonshire, on April 15th, addressed a meeting of the Prime Minister's Scottish constituents in that same Corn Market at Dalkeith which has been the scene of several famous orations. He set forth lucidly the main objections to the Home Rule Bill, and his words on the deepest objection of all may here be quoted : — ' The people of Ulster tell you that they will not willingly submit to the form of government which it is proposed to impose upon them. I have never attempted to say whether you are to believe that the people of Ulster say what they mean or not, but I will say that it is a very ill-advised action, at all events, on the part of the sup- porters of the Bill, to treat the manifestations of Ulster as mere bluster.' He referred to the resistance in arms made to James II. by those ancestors whose memory ' we are accustomed to venerate.' Then he said : ' The people of Ulster are a 250 GOVERNMENTS OF 1892-1895 ch. xxv. strong and masterful race. They have been for a long time accustomed to rule. . . . We expect that the inhabit- ants of Ulster will obey the law, but no subject is bound to obey a law which does not give him at least equal protec- tion with that which is offered to every other class of his fellow-subjects. . . . ' But,' he added— ' the people of Ulster believe, rightly or wrongly, that under a Government responsible to an Imperial Parliament they possess at present the fullest security which they can possess of their personal freedom, their liberties, and their right to transact their own business in their own way. You have no right to offer them any inferior security to that ; and if, after weighing the character of the Government which it is sought to impose on them, they resolve that they are no longer bound to obey a law which does not give them equal and just protection with their fellow- subjects, who can say — how, at all events, can the de- scendants of those who resisted King James II. say — that they have not a right, if they think fit, to resist, if they think they have the power, the imposition of a Government put upon them by force ? ' Mr. John Morley, the Irish Chief Secretary, quoting these words a few days later in the House of Commons, said that they showed * the high-water mark of the frenzy to which Unionist fanaticism and superstition can bring men of intelligence.' Mr. Morley himself admitted the danger of an armed Protestant rising in Ulster, and the ' frenzied fanaticism and superstition ' of the Duke of Devonshire consisted apparently in his statement that, if such a rising took place, no Whig, on his own historic principles, could condemn it. But was not this true ? The Revolution of 1688 was, essentially, an armed rising, with foreign aid, of English Protestants who desired, for reasons 1893 BILL PASSES THE COMMONS 251 of a general kind, not to allow executive power to be in the hands of a virtually Roman Catholic Government.^ There was bitterness enough, yet the whole affair of 1893 was but a pale repetition of that of 1886. It was felt to be not an attempted and menacing Revolution, but an ordinary piece of party campaigning. In 1886 there was real danger. Early in that year, in view of the new and untried electorate, it could not be predicted with certainty how, on appeal to the people, the final verdict would go. But in 1893 the judgment of the larger island was obviously against Home Rule. Mr. Gladstone, if the representatives returned by England and Scotland were alone counted, was in a decided minority ; he was only maintained in office by the combined support, for a limited purpose, of the two Nationalist factions, then bitterly hostile to each other, sent to Parliament by the over-represented Irish electorate. No one felt the smallest doubt that the Bill, if it reached the House of Lords, would there be slain with the approbation of England. Had it not been for this certainty the Bill would not, it was thought, have got through the House of Commons. The Unionist party, however, fought the measure line by line ; it was forced through at last by free use of the closure, and arrived in the House of Lords at the end of August with the greater number of its clauses undiscussed. The Duke of Devonshire, on the 5th September, moved the rejection of this Bill in the House of Lords, as he had moved the rejection of the Bill of 1886 in the House of Commons. His speech touched upon some political prin- ciples of general importance. He wished, he said, to call 1 The not very convincing specific grievances of 1688 were, mainly, the appointment of a few Catholics to places of trust or profit ; the refusal of the Executive to enforce laws against Catholics or other dissenters, and the punish- ment of a dynastic rebellion with the same kind of seventy as that used in 1746 in the Highlands after CuUoden. 252 GOVERNMENTS OF 1892-1895 ch. xxv. the attention of the House to the decision which they had to give : — * It is an important one, but it does not appear to me to be a decision which involves your Lordships in any heavy responsibility. Such cases have occurred before, and will doubtless occur again. The question has had to be solved whether your Lordships should make use of the Constitutional powers which you possess to reject measures which did not commend themselves to your judgment, but which you had reason to believe were approved by the majority of the House of Commons and of the country. ... I think that your Lordships know well the limits of your power. You know that, not being a representative Assembly, and not backed by the strength that a repre- sentative character gives to a legislative body, and not sharing altogether the democratic principles which are making progress in this as in other countries, it would be unwise, impolitic, and unpatriotic to insist upon your personal convictions in opposition to the decided view of the country.' Such, he said, was the aspect of matters in the case of the Reform Bill of 1832, the repeal of the Corn Laws, and the Irish Church Act. ' Such cases may recur, and it is not for me to say what it may be the duty of this House to do when a similar case recurs again. It may be that a measure may be, in your Lordship's opinion, so impolitic, so unjust, and so mis- chievous that it may be your duty to resist it to the last at any risk, even at that of the loss of your own political privileges.' The present, he maintained, was not a case in which the will of the country was known and declared. ' On a question of such magnitude, so closely touching the fundamental institutions of our State, if there is any 1893 THE DUKE'S ARGUMENT 253 object in the existence of a second Chamber, it is, at all events, to prevent changes of that character being made without the absolute certainty that they are in accordance with the will of the majority of the people. Now of that certainty we have no knowledge, and we can have none.' To prove this point he traced the history of the measure. It had not been, like the Reform Bill of 1832, or the repeal of the Corn Laws, preceded by a long popular agitation, nor had it been, like the Irish Church Act, the sole measure submitted to the country at a General Election. 'In 1885 not only was no political party committed to this policy, but I venture to say that not one elector in ten thousand was favourable to the policy of Home Rule. This is a policy which emanates from the brain and will of a single man. It is not a policy which has proceeded from a political party ; it is not a policy advocated by a political party and then adopted by its leaders. It is a policy which has been imposed upon his followers by the single will of one man.' The policy had been rejected by the House of Commons in 1886, the rejection had been, immediately afterwards, confirmed by the voice of the country, attempts to revive interest in the subject had been unsuccessful, and — ' in the electoral campaign carried on from 1886 to 1892 the Home Rule policy was more and more withdrawn from the notice of the constituencies, and other measures which, it was found, commanded a larger measure of popular sympathy and support were put forward in its place. That policy was so successful that no human being can tell on what question the majority which put the present Government in office was returned.' Supposing, for argument's sake, that the present Bill were passed. It was quite possible that there might be, at the next elections, a strong Unionist and anti-Irish 254 GOVERNMENTS OF 1 892-1 895 ch. xxv. majority. The new Irish Government and ParHament might find themselves confronted by a hostile English Government and Parliament. ' Consider what, in that case, would be the responsibility of your Lordships' House. You would be told that you had had the power to prevent these evils, that you had had the power to impose an interval during which the true will and desire of the people might be ascertained, but that you had failed to use this opportunity. In vain you would plead that you had acted as we are told we ought to act ; in vain you would plead that you had acted on the assumption that the vote of the House of Commons was conclusive. Those who now denounce you for attempt- ing to withstand the judgment of the popular Assembly would then be the first to denounce, with more justice, this Assembly as an utterly useless and inefficient body, incapable of averting even the consequences of a mis- taken estimate of the opinion of the country.' In a case so serious, he contended not only the prin- ciple but the form of the measure should be before the country. In this matter the form was 'only less essential than the principle itself.' * I shall be told that the House of Commons approved of this Bill, and that the General Election gave to the House of Commons the necessary mandate and authority to work out the organic details of the measure. I traverse that argument at every step. For reasons which I have stated I deny that the House of Commons received any mandate upon Home Rule at all at the last election ; and I say further that, if there were a mandate, it was a conditional mandate, and that the conditions were not within the knowledge of the country. Before this measure is passed into law, we have a right to demand that the judgment of the country shall be given, not upon a cry, not upon an aspiration, not upon an impatient impulse, but upon a completed work ; and that this measure, the result of the 1893 THE DUKE'S ARGUMENT 255 collective wisdom of the Government and Parliament, shall be submitted to the country for its approval, aye or no.' He denied that the measure even represented the real views of the existing majority in the House of Commons. Every one had known that the measure could not be passed into law. ' Members have debated and voted on this question knowing well that it was not a question of practical policy.' Knowing that their action could lead to no practical consequences, they had voted with their party. Three-fourths of the Bill had been put to the vote without debate in the House of Commons. Turning to the merits of the Bill itself, he pointed out that its authors appeared to recognise no distinction between the Government of the British Empire and the Government of the United Kingdom. He compared the real supremacy of the Parliament at Westminster in the United Kmgdom — ' the direct government of these islands by ParHament through a Committee ' — with its merely nominal supremacy in the British Empire. 'As regards the affairs of our self-governing Colonies, the supremacy of Parliament, and the direct control of Parliament, has become nothing but a name.' Which of these two systems, he asked, was intended by the proposed measure ? ' When the Government speak of this measure sometimes as one preserving the unity of the United Kingdom, and sometimes the unity of the British Empire, are we to read those terms in the sense in which they are now applied to the United Kingdom, or only as they are now applied to the British Empire ? ' This was Lord Hartington's old point of 1886. It was the point which Gladstone, the great Nominalist, to whom words were as things, could never see, or would never meet. This part of the Duke's argument is too long to be 256 GOVERNMENTS OF 1892-1895 ch. xxv. summarised here, but it is worth the most careful attention of those who wish to make up their minds on this question of organic policy. The Duke repeated also his old objec- tions to the establishment of an Irish Government and Parliament, that there would be no guarantee to the minority of protection against oppression and injustice, and his view that the true path of advance was the extension of local, as opposed to national, elective government : — 'All our institutions have been gradual in their growth, and never has there been wholly absent from them, even in Ireland, the germ of local self-government. In very recent times we have seen an enormous development of the principles of local self-government. In our County Councils we have seen great and powerful bodies created, possessing now very considerable executive and adminis- trative powers. No one can say how far this principle may yet be capable of extension ; but to whatever extent it may grow, in the course of its growth it destroys nothing, it takes no power away from our central Government, or from our Imperial Parliament. It grows side by side with our parliamentary institutions. . . . ' It is like the action of a father who, as his sons grow up, and show more and more capacity for business, entrusts a larger and larger share of the management of his affairs to them, or like the case of an employer who, as his busi- ness increases, and he feels less inclined to devote himself to details, delegates to managers and subordinates a larger amount of power and responsibility. But the course you prefer resembles that of a father who is compelled by his son to sign during his lifetime a bond assigning a con- siderable proportion of his income and an appreciable amount of control in the management of his affairs, or like the conduct of subordinate managers of a firm who insist on their employer converting his business into a limited liability company, and appointing all of them co- directors with equal power and authority to himself. 1893 A PERORATION 257 'The reason for this course of conduct on the part of Government is not far to seek. No proposal to extend local self-government in Ireland would have purchased votes. In an evil and unhappy day the Irish party accepted at the hands of Mr. Parnell the principle of Irish nationality ; and, in a still more evil day, without consulting his followers, the leader of the Liberal party committed the great bulk of his own party to the same principle.' The speech ended in a solidly eloquent peroration : — *We have been accused of indulging in prophecy. I do not know which of us has claimed that gift, but no doubt statesmanship does consist in the gift of foreseeing, so far as our imperfect faculties will admit, the conse- quences of certain acts and certain policies. Principles may be important, details may be essential ; but what the statesman has to look at are the probable results. We have, as the Prime Minister thinks, a distorted vision of the measure. You also have your visions. We think we see not only the evils and horrors which will result from this Bill, but we have a vision of a happier Ireland under other conditions. Our vision, I admit, is not clothed in any radiant colours, but we see the prospect of a continu- ous growth in the material prosperity of Ireland which has marked the history of the country in recent years. We believe that contentment and order will in the end follow in the steps of material prosperity. If we have the dis- torted vision of the facts of your policy which the Prime Minister describes, we are entitled to think that your Utopia is still more wild and improbable than ours. . . . We believe that the picture we draw is drawn on truer lines, and in more faithful colours, than their picture, which is so much the work of the imagination. They must acknowledge, at all events, that their remedy is a critical and a capital one. If it does not succeed one of the patients surely dies, while the other must be left sorely afflicted almost unto death. Believing that it is better to VOL. II. R 258 GOVERNMENTS OF 1892-1895 Ch. xxv. endure the ills we have than to fly to others that we know not of, we elect, and we hope that the people will support us in electing — to abide by the Union of the United Kingdom, which we believe was decreed by Nature, and to which laws and treaties have only given a written sanction.' Oliver Cromwell once said that when he forcibly dis- solved the Long Parliament * not a dog barked.' So it was when the House of Lords threw out the Home Rule Bill of 1893. The only sign of popular feeling was a small crowd singing 'Rule Britannia' and cheering the Lords as they came down into Palace Yard near midnight. Not a meeting of protest was held. The Government did not dare, or care, to go to the country, as in 1886, and their Irish allies, although they had the power, had no longer spirit or independence enough to compel them. The House of Lords, in 1893, thus stopped with ease the last attempt made by an old political hero — inspired as he believed by high motives — to impose upon the English nation, by means of a small, hybrid, and almost weightless majority, his own inveterate and impatient will. If, in some future dream of delusion or lassitude, we succumb to the empire of new magicians, or, what is worse and far more probable, to the cold mechanic sway of intellectual schemers, then some even of those who did the deed may have bitter cause to repent of the revolution completed on the night of loth August 191 1, which violently broke and almost destroyed the liberty-guarding power of that free and famous Council. In the following February (1894) Mr. Gladstone, tired out at last, resigned, and was succeeded by Lord Rosebery, a faithful personal friend of the Duke, as Prime Minister. It was the end of Gladstone's long and strange romance, and to him this political story may now bid farewell. 1893 MR. GLADSTONE 259 He lived thenceforth in retirement, and died in a religiously noble manner in May 1898, almost ninety years after he was born. The Duke of Devonshire, in the House of Lords, then spoke in these words of the man whose character and actions had so much affected his own Hfe :— * But for the events of 1886 it would have been un- necessary on my part to add anything to that which has been said as to the great qualities of Mr. Gladstone or any of the incidents of his great career. As to those events I only desire to say this — to be placed in acute opposition to one with whom as a trusted leader we had been in relations of intimate confidence and warm personal friendship must necessarily have been, and was, to us, a most painful posi- tion. But, although it was not in the character of Mr. Gladstone to shrink from letting his opponents feel the full weight of his blame or censure, when he considered that blame or censure was deserved, I can truly say that I can recall no word of his which added unnecessary bitterness to that position. My Lords, deeply as we regret the difference of opinion which caused the separation between Mr. Gladstone and so many of those who had been his most devoted adherents, we never doubted, and we do not doubt now, that in that, as in every other matter with which, during his long public life he had to deal, his action was guided by no other consideration than that of a sense of public duty, and by his conception of that which was in the highest and truest interests of his country.' Lord Salisbury on the same occasion said that Mr. Gladstone had been ' a great Christian man.' It was then felt, even by the strongest of his old opponents, that his errors had been the fruit of honest convictions and high aims and standards, and had been expiated by his defeats, his virtues, his sufferings, and by the burden of his years. 26o GOVERNMENTS OF 1892-1895 Ch. xxv. Popular homage was his guerdon to the last. Beaconsfield was quietly buried near Hughenden Manor, Salisbury at Hatfield, and Devonshire at Edensor, when their labours were ended, but the mortal part of Gladstone lay in state in Westminster Hall, visited by thousands, and was in- terred in the most frequented part of Westminster Abbey, where unnumbered feet pass above his grave. Lord Rosebery's Government lost some of their narrow majority at bye-elections, were defeated in a division in the House of Commons on the 21st June 1895, and re- signed. Lord Salisbury accepted office, formed his third Administration, and advised the Queen to dissolve Parlia- ment, The elections took place in July, and proved to be the worst disaster that had ever befallen the modern Liberal party. The action of the House of Lords was completely approved by the country. Conservatives were returned 340 in number, and 71 Liberal Unionists. A transfer of 221,059 votes in Great Britain had changed Mr. Gladstone's last majority of 40 into a Unionist majority of 152. Now from the most sanguine breast had wholly vanished that hope of a complete reunion of the Liberal party which had inspired most of the Liberal Unionists in 1886 and 1887, and had prevented Lord Hartington from inscrib- ing his name upon the roll of English Prime Ministers. He accepted office as Lord President of the Council, Mr. Chamberlain as Colonial Secretary. Sir Henry James was also a member of the new Cabinet, and some of the minor posts were held by Liberal Unionists. The seven following years were the calmest in the Duke's political life, and they can be dealt with very shortly. 1 895 CHAPTER XXVI LORD SALISBURY'S GOVERNMENT, 1895-1902 Lord Salisbury's third Administration, the last in Queen Victoria's reign, enduring from June 1895 until July 1902, was by far the best and strongest and most successful English Government of modern times.^ The conduct of affairs was immensely strengthened by the conversion of the alliance with the Liberal Unionist leaders into the closer relation which exists between men actively working in, as well as for, the same Ministry. In that Cabinet were combined the wise and far-seeing mind of Lord Salisbury, incapable of illusion or self-deception, with the weight of character and common sense of the Duke of Devonshire, the business capacity of Lord Goschen, the coolness and lucidity of Lord Lansdowne, the strength and courage of Sir Michael Hicks Beach, the swift intellect of Mr. Balfour leading the House of Commons, and the temperament of Mr. Chamberlain, open to ideas, in natural touch with the average Englishman, a dynamic force, and a power in the country. Mr. Chamberlain wrote to the Duke on the 23rd July 1895 :— ' We have a chance now of doing something which will make this Government memorable. Do not be alarmed ! I do not mean sensational legislation, but we can settle some questions in a way which cannot be touched when ^ Technically, this period covered two Salisbury Administrations by reason of the accession of a new Sovereign at the beginning of 1901. 261 262 SALISBURY'S GOVERNMENT Ch. xxvi. the inevitable reaction takes place. National Defence, for instance, besides some pending English and Irish questions.' The expectation was largely justified. In the field of domestic legislation Lord Salisbury's Government passed useful though not sensational measures, such as the Friendly Societies Act, 1896, the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, the Act of 1898 establishing County Councils in Ireland, and the Act of 1899 establishing the Irish Depart- ment and representative Council for Agriculture and Tech- nical Instruction, the Act of 1899 establishing the London Borough Councils, and the Factory and Workshop Act of 1901. Through the sea of foreign and imperial affairs Lord Salisbury's Government held the ship on a steady and forward course. In these years great things were done. Strong soldiers and civilians abroad were supported by strong statesmen in Whitehall. The boundaries of Empire were driven outward in Western and Northern and Southern Africa, advancing as, in the days of Chatham, they advanced in America and Asia. Sir George Goldie's brilliant victory in 1897 at Bida, the Plassey of Western Africa, and the subsequent transfer of Northern Nigeria from the Com- pany to the Crown, converted nominal influence into actual sway over a vast territory with a boundless future.^ Lord Kitchener, by his Nile campaigns, and his crushing defeat and slaughter of the Dervish host at Omdurman, and Lord Cromer by his civil skill and patience, repaired the disasters of 1884 and 1885, and, fulfilling the idea of Gordon, gave to the desolated Soudan a happier future under British ' This somewhat unknown but most eventful victory was won by about 30 British officers leading 600 native troops, with a few machine guns, against a host reckoned at over 20,000 men, a large proportion of whom were cavalry of the dominant Arab (Fulani) race. i897 THE DIAMOND JUBILEE 263 control. Khartoum began to arise from ruin like Jerusalem after the return from exile. In South Africa, Lord Salisbury's Government bore the burden of a long series of errors com- mitted by previous Governments, both Conservative and Liberal. Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Alfred Milner, Cecil Rhodes and the Dutch Presidents Kruger and Steyn, brought, between them, the old question to its final issue. A wearisome and costly war, fought with heroic obstinacy by the Boers, and carried through with resolution and superior force by the English, ended, before Lord Salisbury resigned, in a peace which laid the foundation of a free and united new Dominion beneath the Imperial Crown. This war, and the Colonial military co-operation, swelled the tide of feeling which set towards greater imperial unity. Strong impulses were also given by the celebration of the Queen's Jubilee of 1897, the Colonial Conferences of 1897 and 1902, the death of Queen Victoria, the accession and coronation of King Edward VII. The sense of family unity throughout the Empire was quickened by these events. The year 1897, combining, as it did, the Jubilee celebra- tion of the sixtieth year of the longest reign in our history with the first formal Conference between the Governments allied beneath the British Crown,^ seemed to some, more especially on that perfect day of June, when they watched the noble procession move through the radiant and exulting streets of London, to be a culminating point in the wonder- ful story of England. In that glorious and happy summer serious and world-embracing business, pregnant with future consequences, was combined with feasting and revelry. Devonshire House has always played a leading part both in the sphere of politics and in that of social magnificence. By far the most splendid private entertainment of the * Dia- ^ The preceding; Conference of 1887, under Sir Henry Holland's presidency, was a very informal proceeding, though the seed of much to come. 264 SALISBURY'S GOVERNMENT Ch. xxvi. mond Jubilee ' was the Devonshire House Ball on the 2nd July, where the elect of the British aristocracy appeared in the Court costumes of all times and countries. They were received at the head of the fair and curving marble stair- case by the Duchess, gloriously apparelled as Zenobia, Queen of Palmyra, and by the Duke as the Emperor Charles V., adorned with the collar and the badge of the Golden Fleece.^ Two English kings, to be, were present. The Prince of Wales appeared as Grand Master of the Knights of Malta, the Duke of York as Clifford, Earl of Cumberland in Elizabethan days. The Duchess of York came as the renowned Marguerite de Valois. Princess Henry of Pless shone as a beautiful Queen of Sheba, her train borne by four negro boys. Sir William Harcourt assumed the weighty shape of his ancestor. Lord Chan- cellor Harcourt ; ^ Lord Rosebery donned the lighter mien of Horace Walpole. Mr. Chamberlain appeared in the cos- tume worn by courtiers at Versailles shortly before the French Revolution, and by the younger Pitt at Windsor ; Mr. Balfour was habited like a distinguished gentleman of Holland at the period of the English Restoration, but Mr. Asquith, faithful to life-long convictions, was attired in the riding dress of a Puritan or Roundhead. Modestly, he did not in terms assert himself to be the reincarnation of Oliver Cromwell. As Lord President of the Council the Duke of Devon- shire had a leading part to enact in the annual openings of Parliament from 1896 to 1903, at the accession and at ^ The Times correspondent remarked that this was suitable since the Caven- dishes and the Hapsburgs are ' curiously alike in feature.' The Golden Fleece was lent to the Duke by the Prince of Wales for the occasion. ^ The Harcourt temp. Anne and George I., to whom Swift addressed his beau- tiful allocution : — 'Come, trimming Harcourt, quit your place, And to another yield your mace ! ' 1897 BRITISH EMPIRE LEAGUE 265 the coronation of King Edward VII., and in other great ceremonials. His stately figure, with something recaUing the idea of an old Teutonic prince, well became these high rituals of the Crown of England. The English Court shone with renewed splendour during the too brief reign of Edward VII., and on more than one occasion the Duke and Duchess received the King and the Queen with feudal magnificence at their palatial house of Chatsworth. All this, however, is somewhat in anticipation of the course of this political story. During this great period the Duke was the President of the British Empire League, comprising distinguished men of both parties, and founded to promote the consideration and evolution of Imperial ideas. The Duke, on the 6th July 1897, addressed a meeting of the British Empire League, at which the Colonial Premiers then in England were present. He spoke of the growth of the self-governing Colonies, and of the common sentiment which united ourselves and them, and said that — ' we should fall short of our opportunities and our capa- bilities if these nations should in future grow^ up as separate or independent nations, and not rather as integral parts of a still greater nation — the British Empire — which shall be connected by ties which may be more or less close, more or less definite, but still shall be substantial ties connecting us together in everything which connects our government, our general policy, our commercial re- lations, and our general defence.' In a speech to this same League on the 24th July 1900, he spoke of the approaching establishment of the Australian Commonwealth, and said that these great measures of Colonial Federation strengthened, in his opinion, 'that cause of Imperial Federation which shall spread over the whole world.' Lord Morley says that ' in 266 SALISBURY'S GOVERNMENT Ch. xxvl their views of Colonial policy Mr. Gladstone was in sub- stantial accord with Radicals of the school of Cobden, Hume, and Molesworth ' ; ^ and it is not necessary to quote well-known passages to show that those men thought and taught that all political connection between the Colonies and the United Kingdom would and should come to an end. It is to be hoped and believed that modern Liberals have abandoned these false and depressing doctrines, and hold, like their rivals, a nobler faith, taught by experience and by wisdom. II Strong as the Conservative and Liberal Unionist coali- tion was from the point of view of Imperial policy, it was not free from internal weaknesses and seeds of disintegra- tion. The very fact of the administrative fusion involved a tendency towards a redivision of parties upon the old Conservative and Liberal lines. Mr. Gladstone's final withdrawal from the political arena had removed the purely personal and Gladstonian aspect of his party ; the second crushing defeat of Home Rule had removed the menaced danger to Irish Protestantism which had made so many Nonconformists, like Bright and Spurgeon, become Liberal Unionists. The fusion of Liberal Unionists in Government and Parliament with a Tory party heredi- tarily sympathising with the wishes and interests of the Church of England was likely to drive these Noncon- formist Unionists back towards the main Liberal body. It was difBcult also to arrange the distribution of seats between Conservatives and Liberal Unionists. The general basis of division had been that of beati possidejites. Conser- vative was to succeed to Conservative and Liberal Unionist ^ Life of Gladstone, pp. 361, 362, 1895 MR. CHAMBERLAIN 267 to Liberal Unionist, as candidates. But what if Conserva- tive electors, as happened in 1895 at a bye-election at Warwick, wished a Conservative to succeed to a Liberal Unionist, and declined to obey the commands of head- quarters ? Before the change of Government, in the spring of 1885, some of the Tory papers were assailing Mr. Chamberlain. Sir Henry James wrote to the Duke of Devonshire: 'This policy among the Tories is founded partly on the Leamington row, and partly on the vote on the Welsh Church. ^ Chamberlain is so furious that he talks of ceasing any political action and going to Australia until after the General Election is over.' In the eyes of many Tories who were behind their time and rooted in their ideas, Mr. Chamberlain remained for years the typical Radical and Dissenter of an earlier period. The following letter shows the position : — Mr. CJianiberlain to the Duke of Devonshire. April 19, 1895. ' I am much obliged to you for your very kind letter, and I hasten to assure you that although I have been led very seriously to consider my position during the last few weeks, I have never thought of taking any irrevocable step without consulting you and asking your advice. ' The difficulty has arisen unexpectedly — almost from a clear sky. ' It does not consist in any single incident, but in a sort of cumulative demonstrations from different quarters directed against the principles of the Unionist alliance, and chiefly against myself as their personal representative. 'As far as I am concerned the question is a simple one. I have nothing to gain by remaining in public life — I would not give a brass button to fill any office that is likely to be within my reach — and therefore, unless I ' Mr. Chamberlain had voted for the second reading of the Liberal Govern- ment's Bill dealing with the Church in Wales. 268 SALISBURY'S GOVERNMENT Ch. xxvi. can see a clear public duty or a great public object — I am ready and even desirous to be relieved of further responsibility. 'As to the longer consideration, and the possibility of further usefulness, I feel that this can only exist under certain conditions which the recent demonstration tends to make impossible. ' My role in the Home Rule controversy has been to keep a number of strong Liberals and Radicals staunch to the Union. To do this, I have had to give evidence that I remain a Liberal at heart although I am loyally working with the Tories. I can sacrifice a great deal in the way of opinions, but I cannot sacrifice everything without losing all the influence I now possess. 'If any considerable number of Conservatives believe that they are strong enough to stand alone and can do without the Liberal Unionist " crutch," as poor Randolph phrased it, I am ready to be thrown aside and to let them try the experiment. ■'On the other hand, if they still want our assistance, they must pay the price they have hitherto willingly paid. There is no room for further concession, and they will find it bad economy to haggle over the terms of the bargain. ' I believe that Lord Salisbury, Balfour, and the great bulk of the party are loyally anxious to carry out the agreement ; but they will have to find some way of preventing their more undisciplined troops from firing into the backs of their allies. ' If we are to help the Unionist party in the future we must have a certain latitude of interpretation, and in carrying out our combined strategic movement we are entitled to the same confidence as is accorded to the Conservative members. The recent controversy has had for its main object to establish a difference between us, and while the Conservative leaders are to be trusted, we are to be used. 'Once grant this, and our influence will be destroyed with both sections of the party. I895-I902 EDUCATION 269 * I hope that good may come out of evil and that the air may be cleared after the recent thunderstorm, but if we are to avoid the most serious complications in the near future it seems to mc that we must take up a firm stand now.' In the autumn of the same year, 29th November 1895, Mr. Chamberlain, in a letter to the Duke, expressed his opinion that some authoritative statement must be made as to the necessity for maintaining the Liberal Unionist organisations throughout the country. If nothing were done, he believed that in many places the organisation would be broken up and the Liberal Unionists divided, half joining the Conservatives and the remainder returning to the Radicals. Ill The Duke of Devonshire, as Lord President of the Council, took charge from 1895 to 1902 of the Education Department. Sir John Gorst, rather a malcontent Tory, was Vice-President, and answered for education to the House of Commons. Now education was precisely the weakest link in the relations between Conservatives and Liberal Unionists. Fortune compelled Lord Salisbury's Government to begin, and Mr. Balfour's to continue, educational legislation upon a large scale, although, for political reasons, they would rather have avoided this horrid question. These events touch, both directly and indirectly, the life of the Duke of Devonshire. Like most things English, national education had grown in its own way without forethought taken or general design. Rate-supported School Boards, created at first to supplement the numerous gaps left by the voluntary, religion-prompted system, had become, by 27© SALISBURY'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvi. dint of growing, powerful and jealous rivals of the older elementary schools. Secondary or higher education was carried on partly by endowed schools, partly by municipal authorities, exercising powers to promote technical educa- tion, partly, in large towns, by School Boards illegally, as it afterwards appeared, instituting ' continuation ' classes. There was, in 1895, no real Minister or Board of Education. The Committee of Council on Education had been created in 1839. The Lord President of the Council had many other functions, and the Vice-President was not a Cabinet Minister. One department dealt with elementary education, and another, that of ' Science and Art,' distinct and independent, dealt with technical instruc- tion. The Charity Commissioners exercised a limited and ineffective control over endowed schools. A Royal Commission had recommended, in 1895, the establishment of a real central authority, and of local authorities, for secondary education. The denominational elementary schools, then supported partly by Treasury grants and partly by voluntary sub- scriptions, were in distress. The requirements of the Education Department led to ever-increasing expendi- ture, while subscriptions showed no power of expansion. Especially was this the case in rural districts where squire, parson, farmer, and tradesman had been hard hit by the decline of rents, tithes, profits, and local business. The ratepayers also, where School Boards existed, limited to narrow and poor areas, were oppressed by the increasing load of taxation. An attempt was first made to smooth out the adminis- trative entanglement, central and local. Bills with this end in view were introduced, but for various reasons not pro- ceeded with in 1896 and 1898. Bills were, however, passed in 1897 of a financial modus vivendi kind — measures intended, I895-I902 EDUCATION 271 as the Duke said, ' to relieve the voluntary schools from intolerable strain of poverty, and to relieve the oppressive burdens of rates in some of the poorer districts.' Even these transient expedients — so far as assistance to voluntary schools was concerned — revealed the rift which menaced the integrity of the Unionist party. The Duke wrote on 24th March 1897 to Lord Salisbury, who went abroad for his health : — ' I look forward with a good deal of anxiety to what may occur here. I think it has required all your influence in the Cabinet to keep us together, and I do not feel sure that those who have joined us unwillingly in the present policy will be equally amenable if further developments should arise. On the other hand, you have made con- siderable concessions to opinions expressed in the Cabinet, and I do not very well see how this process is going to be continued.' The House of Cecil were, and are, firm defenders of all the rights, or claims, of the Church of England. Lord Salisbury wrote to the Duke on the 21st January 1900: — ' I am afraid I shall have trouble with you about this denominational question. I cannot accept any measure which aids undenominational religion out of the public funds and refuses the same aid to denominational religion. If you choose to give aid to specified secular teaching with- out touching the religious question, of course I have no objection.' The Duke himself, like nine Englishmen out of ten, would have been perfectly content, and indeed better pleased, with the simplest and most undenominational teaching. He had a correspondence at the same date with Lord Cranborne, the eldest son of Lord Salisbury, who 272 SALISBURY'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvi. quite unsuccessfully endeavoured to explain to him the Church view. The Duke said in one of these letters : — 'I am afraid that there is some defect in my intelli- gence which renders me incapable even of understanding the apprehensions of the advocates of denominational education. If I could only understand them, I might try to do something to remove their objections.' His position in these years was not an easy one so far as concerned education. Tory Churchmen on one side and Unionist Nonconformists on the other were alike malcontent, while the state of the case forbade the policy of leaving things as they were. In 1899 a Bill was passed enabling the constitution of a Board of Education, which should unite the two existing departments under a President and a Parliamentary Secretary, on the lines of the Board of Trade. In 1900, and again in 1901, Bills were introduced, but not passed, with the object of making each County or County Borough Council the local authority for all secondary education.^ Early in 1901 came a bolt from the calm Olympus where sit the highest Judges of Appeal, the famous decision re Cockerton, which accel- erated the pace and enlarged the intent of legislation. The supreme tribunal held it to be illegal on the part of School Boards to use rates for any purpose beyond that of elementary education strictly so-called. This decision threatened immediate destruction to the weapons by which the greater School Boards, in rivalry with, and overlapping the action of, municipal authorities, had been invading the sphere of secondary education, not ^ I have heard on good authority that when the Cabinet decided not to proceed with one of these Bills the Duke undertook to break the news to the Vice- President, who had produced it and was attached to it, and that he went to Sir John's room, and after standing some time with his back to the fire, said, 'Well, Gorst, your damned Bill's dead." 1895 EDUCATION 273 without the approval of the Education Department. Flourishing evening continuation schools were in danger of losing their means of subsistence. A financial jnodus Vivendi was hastily arranged, but Government were now forced to deal with the question as a whole. The con- fusion between the powers of School Boards and of County Councils, the Cockerton judgment, the cry of the distressed ratepayer in the poor districts, the failure of ruined voluntary schools to meet the rise in ideals of the Education Depart- ment and of sanitary experts — all these things clamoured for that which newspapers call a ' bold and comprehensive reform.' Sir Almeric FitzRoy, who was official private secretary to the Duke from 1895 to 1898, and afterwards Clerk of the Privy Council, has supplied the following note as to his chief during this period : — 'When we first met he told me it was intended to associate Sir John Gorst with him as Vice-President of the Committee of Council on Education in the belief that his ingenuity might assist the Government to square the educational circle, but the uses of political ingenuity were not perhaps fully realised. As a matter of fact the Duke stood to a large extent between Sir John and the resent- ments he incurred, defending him on one occasion in the House of Lords with great vigour and success : he was indeed tolerant of the liberties of expression which Sir John allowed himself, and inclined to attribute his idiosyn- crasies to friskiness rather than disloyalty. 'The relations in those days between a Lord President who was expected to exercise some real control of educa- tional policy and a self-willed Vice-President with ideas of his own and a contempt for mandarins, were likely to prove uncomfortable, but from the first the Duke con- quered both the esteem and respect of his critical subordinate. His own view was that the questions VOL. II. S 274 SALISBURY'S GOVERNMENT Ch. xxvi. agitating controversialists were given a prominence out of all proportion to the interests involved, and he was therefore impatient of the violent and uncompromising passions which retarded a lasting settlement. ' It must be admitted that the details of educational administration, however interesting to the enthusiast, were frankly distasteful to the Duke's temperament, and on one occasion when he found them particularly tedious, he threw himself back in his chair, put his hands through his hair and groaned, " I can't understand how it is I ever got the reputation of an educational expert." It was of course in connection with higher and especially technical education that any such reputation was gained. As Presi- dent of the National Association for the Promotion of Technical Instruction he was not merely a figurehead ; but further, he more than once vindicated his title to the possession of large views on national education as a whole, and never more effectively than in the speech of August I, 1898, when presenting two Bills on the subject to the House of Lords : a speech which, at the suggestion of no less an expert than Mr. Lyulph Stanley, now Lord Sheffield, was printed and circulated to the members of both branches of the legislature. ' In this connection there should not be overlooked his contribution to the settlement of the University problem in the North of England, when as President of the Committee of the Privy Council (Lords Rosebery, Balfour of Burleigh, and James of Hereford, and Sir Edward Fry being the other members), which dealt with the petitions of Man- chester and Liverpool for separate incorporation, he guided its deliberations to the conclusion which has borne fruit in the creation of four vigorous Universities of a new and progressive type in Lancashire and Yorkshire.' ' His pecuhar bent of mind fitted him to deal with controversies over which other and smaller men got angry. He was never angry, though often bored. He did much of his work at Devonshire House, but he was I895-I902 EDUCATION 275 frequently at the Office, and showed himself capable of any effort, if moved thereto by the obligation of duty. No man arrived at the substance of papers submitted to him more thoroughly — indeed, his capacity to extract the essence of a Blue Book was phenomenal. He had, moreover, a most effective manner of dealing with a deputation : to the onlooker it might seem as if he was prejudiced against the view they sought to present, so resolute was he in raising objections which he thought it their business to remove, before he could be persuaded to give an encouraging reply. He never put a question which was not pregnant with meaning, nor made a comment which was not instinct with sense. He was not so conspicuously successful in conducting Bills through the House of Lords ; he was neither very ready in handling small points nor supple enough always to accommodate himself to the parliamentary view of the situation, and it was distasteful to his candour to make formal concessions merely to buy off the pertinacity of a troublesome or presumptuous opponent. Thus his charge of the London Government Bill in 1899 ii"icurred some criticism. In subsequent years, while the new local authorities were being brought into being by a Statutory Commission, responsible to a Committee of the Privy Council for the arrangement of their boundaries and the settlement of their liabilities, he took an important part in the labours of the Committee, and once or twice sat judicially on appeals against the decisions of the Commission, when the power of his mind to disentangle leading ideas from subsidiary issues received striking illustration. ' In his last weeks as a Minister, amid the agitations of fiscal controversy, he took considerable interest in the appointment of the Departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration ; on the very day his office was transferred to another, he declared to me his conviction that the matter was of far more importance than Tariff Reform. He did not fail to follow the course of the inquiry with 276 SALISBURY'S GOVERNMENT Ch. xxvi. attention, and subsequent to the issue of the Committee's Report raised a valuable discussion in the House of Lords upon certain of its aspects.' IV In addition to his supervision of the education depart- ments, the Duke of Devonshire had been asked by Lord Salisbury to preside over the ' Defence Committee of the Cabinet.' It has sometimes been said that this Committee was to blame because it did not foresee, and take steps to meet, all the contingencies of the South African War. But the scope of this Committee was ill-defined and uncertain. The War Office and Admiralty, and other Departments, were inclined to refer questions to it as little as possible. It did not, like its successor, the Imperial Defence Committee, profess as its main business the devising of strategical schemes for the defence of the Empire. It did not often meet, had no permanent secretariat, and kept no records. Its functions chiefly consisted in settling, now and then, controversies between the War Office, the Admiralty, and the Treasury, which would formerly have led to intermin- able correspondence, or would have been brought before the Cabinet as a whole.^ Even if the Defence Committee had devised the most beautiful defensive-offensive scheme of operations in South Africa the theory would probably have been upset by unexpected events, as much as were the plans and ideas of the most competent soldiers. The Duke approved of the final despatch ^ to the Trans- vaal Republic which was in draft, at the close of a long diplomatic correspondence, at the beginning of October 1 See Report of Koyal Commission on the War in South Africa, 1903, p. 135. ^ This was the final despatch predicted in the last preceding despatch of 22nd September 1899, sent after the Transvaal had declined the terms offered in our despatch of 8th September (see C. 9251 of 1S99 and C. 9530). I899-I900 SOUTH AFRICAN WAR 277 1899, and would have been launched had not the Repub- lican Government sent on the 9th October their own terse, summary, and decisive ultimatum, or rather, declara- tion of war. Three days later the mounted Boer riflemen rode across the historic Pass of Laing's Nek, and made their fateful descent from the high plateau of the Transvaal into the valleys of Natal. The Cavendish kinship, like so many in all ranks, contributed to the sad and glorious roll of men who died for their country. On a day of dire disaster, when two battalions were lost and Sir George White's force was driven back into Lady- smith, the Duke's nephew Frederick, the son of Admiral and Lady Louisa Egerton, a most promising naval officer, who had assisted Hedworth Lambton in bringing the big ship guns from Durban to Ladysmith just in time to cover the retreat, was fatally wounded by a Boer shell. In a speech made in September 1900, the Duke said that the war was * undertaken in the defence of imperial interests in South Africa,' and that the British demands on the Transvaal Republican Government which had let to it were 'not only just, but imperatively necessary in imperial interests, not only in South Africa, but in the interests of our authority in every part of the world.' ^ The vast expenditure upon this war, the assistance given by the Colonies, and the stimulus to imperial feelings, were the main causes of the next great development in English politics. The Queen dissolved Parliament, upon Lord Salisbury's advice, in September 1900, immediately after the formal annexation of the Transvaal had taken place, and the elec- tions were fought in October. Liberal orators complained that the Government were making use of a moment of national victory to snatch a party triumph. The Duke, in 1 Speech al Bradford, 24th September 1900. 278 SALISBURY'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvi. a speech in Yorkshire, said that the act of annexation was one worthy to be referred to the electors for approval. He also said, with his usual frankness, using a simile which must have appealed to a Yorkshire audience — ' We all know very well that the captain of a cricketing eleven, when he wins the toss, puts his own side in, or his adversaries, as he thinks most favourable to his prospects of winning ; and if there is not supposed to be anything unfair about that, then I think the English people would think it very odd indeed if the Prime Minister and leader of a great political party were not to put an electoral ques- tion to the country at a moment which he thinks will be not unfavourable to his own side.' The moment was, in fact, very good, because the main part of the war was over, and the wearisome guerilla resistance of the tenacious Boers had only just begun. The tide of patriotic feeling still ran in favour of the Government, the Liberal party were weak and divided, the usual reaction, which had begun before the war, was stayed, and the result of the elections corresponded very nearly to that of the elections in 1895. ^ ^^^^' changes in the personnel of the Administration were carried out with the usual diffi- culty. ' It is extraordinary,' wrote the Duke to Lord Salisbury, ' what an attraction office seems to have for some people.' Mr. Balfour wrote to the Duke, ' I wonder, if I live till seventy-two, whether I shall still wish to be a Cabinet Minister. I like it so very little at fifty-two that I can hardly believe it.' The Duke offered to place his own office at the disposal of the Prime Minister, but he was desired to remain as Lord President of the Council, and until the summer of 1902 the educational control continued to be part of his functions. His old anti-Radical ally. Lord Goschen, at this time retired from office. These elections were the last in Victoria's glorious reign. I902 SALISBURY'S FAREWELL 279 That great Queen died at Osborne on the 22nd January 1901, and on the following day the Duke presided over the meeting of the Privy Council at which King Edward VII. entered upon the royal duties. Lord Salisbury's vital force was now rapidly failing. He had lightened his task in 1900 by the transfer of the Foreign Office to Lord Lansdowne, but his physical strength was now insufficient to allow him to be Prime Minister. The following letters are of interest : — Downing STREET,y«/y lo, 1902. My dear Devonshire, — After some communications with the King, I have arranged to wait upon him to- morrow and give him my seals. As my strength has considerably diminished of late I had contemplated this step for some time, but as long as the war lasted I was apprehensive that it might be mis- construed to indicate some division in the Cabinet, and therefore might have a prejudicial effect. In taking my official leave of you, I desire to thank you most warmly for your kindness and forbearance which during the last seven years have enabled us to carry through a difficult experiment with very fair success. — Ever yours truly, SALISBURY. Devonshire House, y«/j/ 11, 1902. My dear Salisbury, — I am very sorry to hear of the resolution which you have come to, and especially of the cause which has induced you to take it. I am very grateful to you for the terms in which you write of our official relations during the last seven years, and feel that it is rather for us, who entered your Govern- ment under conditions which might have made our position difficult, to thank you for the forbearance and consideration which you have always shown to us. — Yours very sincerely, Devonshire. 28o SALISBURY'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvi. Mr. Balfour was First Lord of the Treasury, and had been since the year 1891 the brilliant Tory leader in the House of Commons. He had a first claim to the succes- sion to his uncle as Prime Minister, and the King acted upon his own judgment in the matter. It would, however, possibly have been better if Lord Salisbury h2.d, pi^o formd, consulted the Duke of Devonshire before he resigned. The Devonshire papers show that there was for the moment a slight feeling of this kind in the inner circle of the Liberal Unionists. Mr. Balfour's accession to the ofBce of Prime Minister was accompanied by certain ministerial changes. Sir Michael Hicks Beach resigned, and was succeeded as Chancellor of the Exchequer by Mr. Ritchie, a change which soon had important and unforeseen results. Lord James of Hereford also retired. Lord Cadogan resigned the Viceroyalty of Ireland. ' Of course,' he wrote to the Duke, * it is with a sad heart that I thus terminate my political and public life, but I am only following the splendid example which you have given us of self-denying devotion to duty, and that is always a consolation.' The Duke himself surrendered with much pleasure his functions in respect of education to Lord Londonderry, who became first distinct President of the Board of Educa- tion, but he continued to be Lord President of the Council until the catastrophe of 1903. At the request of Mr. Balfour he also undertook the leadership of the whole Unionist party in the House of Lords, rendered vacant by the retreat of Lord Salisbury from all political life. I902 CHAPTER XXVII MR. BALB'OUR'S GOVERNMENT The first important measure passed by Mr. Balfour's Government was the Education Act of 1902. The main features of this reform were (i) the transfer of the powers and functions of School Boards to the Town and County Councils with the object (a) of terminating the over-lapping and conflict of jurisdiction between the School Boards and these bodies in the matter of advanced education, and (d) of spreading the education rate over wider areas ; and (2) the placing of the voluntary or denominational schools upon the rates, this step being accompanied by an in- creased control by the public over the secular education. The fight raged bitterly over the proposal to give to denominational schools a share in the rates without at the same time transferring their complete control to elected Authorities. That schools teaching Anglican or Roman Catholic doctrines should be supported by local as well as by national taxation was a thing intolerable to Nonconformists, who had hoped to see the extension to all schools of teaching religious indeed, but colourless. The Duke of Devonshire, although no longer in control of the Education Department, undertook the chief share in carrying this measure through the House of Lords, partly because Lord Londonderry was new to the work, partly because it was thought that any suspicion of lack of sympathy would thus be avoided. He moved the second reading at the end of an Autumn Session in December 282 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. 1902. He was aware, he said, when he reached the con- troversial hne, that — ' to many conscientious and religious men a denomina- tional school, especially if it is supported out of public funds, whether those funds be derived from the taxes or the rates, is an abomination. Certainly this is not the opinion of His Majesty's Government, and we do not believe that it is the opinion of the majority of the country. We have, therefore, deliberately adopted the principle that, subject to conditions which we believe to be adequate to secure their efficiency, and to all necessary public control of these schools, they shall remain a part of the educational provision of the country, and shall not be compelled to sacrifice their definite religious character.' He admitted the right of the Opposition to criticise the adequacy of the provisions for securing public control, and said : — ' I think we have a right to know from what point of view these provisions are criticised, whether they are critics who accept, perhaps unwillingly but in good faith, the denominational schools as part of our educational system, or whether they are critics who are openly op- posed to their retention in any form or shape. That is the main issue. All the rest of the discussion is, in my opinion, mere detail, 'This Bill does not strengthen "clerical" control in the slightest degree ; on the contrary it diminishes it : this Bill does not weaken public control over any school ; on the contrary it strengthens it. It brings it to bear in schools where it had not previously existed at all. This Bill contains nothing that aggravates a Nonconformist grievance ; the real grievance is that it does not extinguish Church Schools. They hoped, many of them, either to have those destroyed by legislation or starved out of existence. My Lords, that is a grievance which we can- not undertake to remedy.' 1902 EDUCATION ACT 283 The Duke then discussed the alternative courses which the Government might have adopted. They might simply have legalised the action of School Boards invali- dated by the Cockerton judgment. In that case they would have perpetuated the evil of the over-lapping jurisdiction of different Authorities. There were, he said, two insuperable objections : — 'The first was our educational conscience, which told us that any such course would be fundamentally unsound, and would, in the long run, tend rather to aggravate than to remove or diminish the existing evils ; and the second was the conviction that we entertained of the fixed resolu- tion of a very large number of our own supporters that no final settlement, or even temporary settlement, of the education question would be acceptable to them which did not do something to increase the efficiency and secure the permanent existence of that class of elementary schools in which they were deeply interested. In these circumstances we resolved on what is admitted to be a bold and compre- hensive measure.' This Act relieved Churchmen, but had disastrous effects for the Liberal Unionist party. Numbers of their adherents reverted to the host now led by Sir Henry Campbell- Bannerman ; the line dividing parties became more nearly than it had been since 1886 the old line demarcating Conservatives from Liberals ; and these events had their share in bringing about the Unionist disruption. Sir Henry James wrote to the Duke on the 6th August enclosing *a wail from Jesse Collings.' He added: — ' I am afraid that he is quite right as to the smashing blow inflicted on the Liberal Unionist party by the Education Bill. Our reports to Great George Street are black as night, and Powell Williams is more despondent than Jesse. What can be done now to make Arthur Balfour understand 284 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT Ch. xxvii. the position ? If he makes no concession to the anti- clericalists, I am quite sure that, apart from the difficulty of carrying the Bill, there will be an opposition to the Act being worked which will produce chaos.' Mr. Chamberlain had taken no part in the debates in the House of Commons. On the 22nd September he wrote to the Duke : — 'The political future 'seems to me — an optimist by profession — most gloomy. I told you that your Educa- tion Bill would destroy your own party. It has done so. Our best friends are leaving us by scores and hundreds, and they will not come back. I do not think that the Tories like the situation, but I suppose they will follow the Flag. The Liberal Unionists will not. 'We are so deep in the mire that I do not see how we can get out. If w^e give way now, those who have sacrificed much to be loyal will be furious, while our enemies will not be appeased. ' If we go on, we shall only carry the Bill with great difficulty, and, when it is carried, we shall have sown the seeds of an agitation which will undoubtedly be successful in the long run. 'After all we have done some good work in the last seven years, and ought to be satisfied. I wonder how much mischief the Opposition will be able to do when they at last seize the opportunity which we have so generously presented to them.' Mr. Chamberlain departed to South Africa in November and did not return until the early spring of the fatal year 1903. It was clear that the fighting force, so closely attached to him personally, and centred at Birmingham, was deeply offended. Only by avoiding certain questions, and by finding common interests, could Tory Churchmen and Radical Nonconformists work together. But these questions had insisted upon a solution ; the very success I902 MR. CHAMBERLAIN 285 of the Unionist party had weakened the original common interest ; the African War, which had been a new binding influence, was over. Before the autumn of 1902 the tide of reaction was already running against the Government, and at every bye-election they were losing votes or seats. II There may have been in the mind of Mr. Chamberlain some subconscious desire to find a new motive of political action. But, what is more important, his work at the Colonial Office during an important period had detached his mind from that preoccupation with parliamentary tactics which is apt to disturb the sense of relative values in statesmen ; and his special duties there had brought some questions before him far more vividly than they could present themselves to colleagues, each absorbed by the work of his department. In the minds of some of those who opposed his policy during the following years there certainly was an antagonism not dating from the initiation of the fiscal question. Successors of the Gladstonians regarded Mr. Chamberlain as an apostate ; they had more or less openly fought against his South African policy, and were ready to disagree rashly, violently, and without reflec- tion, with anything which he proposed, not merely on its merits, but because he proposed it. Nor was he beloved by the High Church Tories, who had not forgotten his vote for Welsh Disestablishment and his attitude on the Education question. When, in 1904, a leader of this group in the House of Commons called Mr. Chamber- lain an ' undesirable alien in the ranks of the Tory Party,' it was not a figure of speech, nor could the bitter word refer merely to the new fiscal policy. For this fiscal policy, in reality, was the revival, with modern 2 86 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvit. impiovements, of an article of the old national creed, never altogether disowned by Lord Beaconsfield, nor by Lord Salisbury, nor by Mr. Balfour. The doctrines of national, as distinguished from abstract or universal, economy had smouldered like a low fire covered with grey ashes during the predominance of Liberal ideas in philosophy and Liberal power in politics. One might compare the thing to the smouldering of High Church ideas during the long Low Church period. The * national ' doctrine had been expounded scientifically by German writers, and practised by the greatest of German statesmen. Lord Hartington had come across these inclinations in his Lancashire campaign of 1885, and had found them to be stronger than he had imagined. Since then, resolutions in the sense of Fair Trade had been passed almost annually at the Synod of the Conservative Associations, and frequently also, since 1887, resolutions in favour of renewed preferential relations with the Colonies. ^ Englishmen were aware of their own prosperity, but were impressed by the rapid in- crease in the wealth, power, population and industry of Ger- many and the United States under increasingly protective systems. There was natural irritation among men in many trades when they beheld goods freely entering our ports from countries which hindered or prevented the import of similar goods from England. Nor was there doubt that Free Trade, when the development of transport re- moved the natural protection long afforded by distance, had ruined the old agricultural system both in Great Britain and in Ireland. There was, therefore, in 1903, material for a new political conflagration. It must be remembered also that the tide of Imperial feeling had been flowing strongly since 1886, and had reached its height about the ^ Previously to the repeal of the Corn Laws a tariff preference had been given in the United Kingdom to Colonial corn, &c. 1902 MARCH OF EVENTS 287 middle of the South African War. In 1902 it had, per- haps, just begun to ebb, but the part taken by the Colonies in the war had begotten a strong feeling in favour of something being done to promote more real Imperial union. Some, like Brutus in the play, replying to Cassius, who wished to defer the decisive battle, felt that — ' Our legions are brim-full, our cause is ripe : The enemy increases every day ; We, at the height, are ready to decline. There is a tide in the affairs of men Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune ; Omitted, all the voyage of their life Is bound in shallows and in miseries. On such a full sea are we now afloat, And we must take the current when it serves, Or lose our ventures.' The decision of Brutus, it is true, led the Roman constitu- tionalists swiftly to Philippi, but the hesitation of Cassius would have led them less gloriously to the same end. When Mr. Chamberlain made his famous declaration of 1903 he was accused of a sudden change of policy. This was no less unjust than the like accusation brought against Mr. Gladstone as to Home Rule at the end of 1885. Both statesmen, years earlier, had indicated clearly enough the tendencies existing in their own minds, but the public, in each case, had not understood their meaning, or had for- gotten what they said. The march of world-wide events had called the atten- tion of men occupied in foreign and Imperial affairs to the need of Imperial consolidation. During the last decade of the century Russian aggression in Asia was still feared, and more than once we had been near a collision with the French Republic. Other events, the message of the German Emperor to President Kruger at the time of the * Jameson Raid,' and the despatch of President Cleveland 2 88 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT Ch. xxvii. in the affair of Venezuela, had indicated new dangers. On Lady-day 1896, Mr. Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary of State, made a striking speech at a Canada Club dinner. He referred to these events, and he said : — 'We may endeavour to establish common interests and common obligations. When we have done that, it will be natural that some sort of representative authority should grow up to deal with the interests and obligations which we have created. What is the greatest of our common obligations ? It is Imperial defence. What is the greatest of our common interests ? It is Imperial trade. Imperial defence is largely a matter of ways and means, and de- pendent upon fiscal and other arrangements which you may make, and therefore the conclusion at which I arrive is this, that if the people of this country and the people of the Colonies mean what they have been saying, and if they tend to approach the question of Imperial unity in a prac- tical spirit, they must approach it on its commercial side.' He then referred to the history of the Zollverein, or Customs Union, one of the foundation stones of the strong and successful German Empire, and, next, to the resolution passed at the Colonial Conference held at Ottawa in 1894, viz. : — 'That this Conference records its belief in the advisa- bility of a Customs arrangement between Great Britain and her Colonies, by which trade within the Empire may be placed upon a more favourable footing than that which is carried on with foreign countries.' Mr. Chamberlain said : — *At any rate a proposition of this kind is entitled to respectful consideration, and if we object to it we ought to propose an alternative, or else to say at once that all that we have said, all that we have done, all that we have I902 THE HOFMEYR SUGGESTION 289 thought about Imperial unity has been thrown away, and that that idea must be abandoned as an empty dream.' Very fully, fairly, and clearly he stated the great ob- jection that Imperial preference would, in this country, involve taxes on foreign food and, perhaps, raw material, which might increase the cost of living and the cost of production. This difficulty could only be faced if the advantages offered by the Colonies in return were of a real kind. He discussed the suggestion, first made at the Colonial Conference of 1887, by the South African statesman, Hofmeyr, that each state in the Empire should impose a common revenue duty upon goods when imported from non-Imperial countries, in addition to any existing duties, and that the revenue thus obtained should be devoted to purposes of common defence. This sug- gestion, stating the difficulties, he left for consideration. He spoke much to the same effect to the Conference of Chambers of Commerce of the Empire held in London in June 1896, and said that it might become desirable to impose duties on foreign corn, meat, and wool, while admitting these products from the Empire duty free. In the following year, 1897, there was a Colonial Con- ference in London on the occasion of the ' Diamond Jubilee.' The Colonial Governments again, as in 1887, and as at the Ottawa Conference in 1894, made clear their desire for special and preferential relations with the United King- dom. Canada in this same year gave a large preference, afterwards increased, to certain produce of the United Kingdom, and, to facilitate her action, Lord Salisbury, meeting the desire expressed by the Conference, denounced treaties with Germany and Belgium which stood in the way. This led to a tariff war between Germany and Canada. On the 3rd November 1897 the Colonial Secre- VOL. II. T 290 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. tary, in an address on ' Patriotism ' which he deUvered as Lord Rector of Glasgow University, significantly quoted a passage from Bolingbroke's ' Patriot King,' where it is said : — ' To give ease and encouragement to manufactory at home, to assist and protect trade abroad, to improve and keep in heart the national colonies, will be the principal and constant parts of the attention of a patriot prince.' Mr. Chamberlain added, in his own trenchant style : — ' I have faith in our race and our nation. I believe that with all the force and enthusiasm of which democracy alone is capable, they will complete and maintain that splendid edifice which, commenced under aristocratic auspices, has received in these later times its greatest extension, and that the fixity of purpose and strength of will which are necessary to this end will be supplied by that national patriotism which sustains the most strenuous efforts, and makes possible the greatest sacrifices.' Ill The South African War and consequent financial neces- sities brought this question to an issue. The shilling duty on imported grain and flour endured long into the period of Free Trade finance. It survived, as a useful branch of revenue, many a year of Mr. Gladstone's administration of national finance, and was not removed until 1869. It was re-imposed in 1902 when Lord Salisbury was still Prime Minister, and Sir Michael Hicks Beach was Chancellor of the Exchequer. In proposing the tax Sir Michael said : — " Looking to the ever-increasing demands made upon the Exchequer flowing from our modern civilisation we must expect some increase in our expenditure in years to come. I am, therefore, endeavouring now, as I endeavoured I902 THE CORN DUTY 291 last year, when I asked the Committee to raise additional taxation in order to meet the charges of the war, so to frame that taxation that, when peace returns, and it is possible also to return to ordinary expenditure, we may have no difficulty in settling our financial system on a basis which would be equitable to all payers of taxation in the country. Therefore, in seeking for new indirect taxation, what I desire to find, as I desired to find last year, is an article of practically universal consumption, from which, therefore, a large revenue can be produced to the Exchequer without any injurious or oppressive burden on any individual or on any class. My primary duty is to look for revenue, and my ideal of a tax is that which will yield the most revenue with the least injury and inconvenience to the community.' The Liberals at once assumed an attitude of strong opposition to this tax, and their suspicions were increased by the events which next happened. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the Canadian Prime Minister, speaking early in May at Ottawa to the Canadian House of Commons, welcomed the English corn duty as a mild measure of 'protection' in which he rejoiced, for now, said he, ' the field is clear for arranging a system of larger trade between all parts of the British Empire.' The duty, he said, ' placed Canada in a position to make offers which she could not make in 1897. A step has been taken which would make it possible to obtain preference for Canadian goods.' In the second reading debate on the Finance Bill, which began on the 12th May, the Eng- lish Liberals made the most of this cabled Canadian declaration, and Mr. Balfour said, on the following day in meeting their attack, ' Sir Wilfred Laurier's mission to this country 1 has absolutely nothing, direct or indirect, to do 1 I.e., Sir Wilfrid's visit for the Coronation and Conference. This was to have been in June, but because of the King's sudden illness it had to be deferred until August. 292 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. with this tax. This tax was put on for fiscal reasons.' Three days later, on the i6th May, Mr. Chamberlain ad- dressed the Liberal Unionist Association of Birmingham and the Midlands, in a powerful and stirring speech, in which he reviewed the whole political battlefield. Towards the close he denounced the attacks made by the Liberals upon Sir Wilfrid Laurier's utterance, and pointed out the dangers menacing English trade from hostile tariffs of foreign States, and from offensive warfare waged by enor- mous Trusts. He added, amid the loud cheers of his faithful and delighted Midlanders : — ' It is quite impossible that these new methods of com- petition can be met by adherence to old and antiquated methods. At the present moment the Empire is being attacked on all sides, and in our isolation we must look to ourselves. We must draw closer our internal relations, the ties of sentiment, the ties of sympathy, yes, and the ties of interest. If by adher ice to economic pedantry, to old shibboleths, we are to lose opportunities of closer union which are now offered to us by our Colonies ; if we are to put aside occasions now within our grasp ; if we do not take every chance in our power to keep British trade in British hands, I am certain that we shall deserve the disasters which will infallibly come upon us.' All the policy which the Colonial Secretary declared more at large in May 1903 was contained in this speech of May 1902 ; he had set up his standard, and his colleagues and the world had received fair warning. The Liberal Opposition were now more hostile than ever ; they maintained that, along the road of the revenue corn duty, the Government were moving towards an end disastrous to mid-Victorian ideals, and on the 9th June 1902 they moved in Committee an amendment to limit the operation of the Corn Duty Bill to the space I902 THE COLONIAL CONFERENCE 293 of one year. The amendment was avowedly based upon the supposed leanings of the Government towards a preferential system. Sir Michael Hicks Beach, in reply, again said that the tax was imposed simply for the purpose of raising revenue, and of more equitably adjust- ing the burden of taxation. But he added, ' If we could have Free Trade with our Colonies, I do not see why that should necessarily involve increased duties on our part against foreign nations, but, if we could have Free Trade with our Colonies, even some sacrifice in that direc- tion might be made.' He said also that, although he had proposed this duty as a revenue duty, he had proposed it * absolutely without prejudice to any discussions which may take place between us and the Colonial representa- tives (at the approaching Conference) on the question of commercial relations.' There was fierce debating. The Colonial Secretary was prudently or scornfully absent, but his son, Austen Chamberlain, then Financial Secre- tary to the Treasury, defended the Birmingham speech. His father, he said, had not argued in favour of pre- ferential relations, but had refused * to be deterred from proposing a tax, which he believed to be good on its merits, merely because it might be used, if the people of this country so willed, to draw closer the ties between the Mother Country and the Colonies.' It was the summer of the Coronation of King Edward VII., and the Prime Ministers of the self-governing Colonies came to London to assist at it, and also to take part in a Conference which was of a character more formal than those of 1887 and 1897, although, since the Australian Commonwealth Government was not established until 1903, and South Africa was still in the making, the constitution of the Conference was not yet quite satisfactory. The eventful resolutions relating to trade unanimously adopted 294 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT Ch. xxvii. at the Conference of 1902, on nth August, were as follows : — ' I. That this Conference recognises that the principle of preferential trade between the United Kingdom and his Majesty's Dominions beyond the Seas would stimulate and facilitate mutual commercial intercourse, and would, by promoting the development of the resources and indus- tries of the several parts, strengthen the Empire. ' 2. That this Conference recognises that, in the pre- sent circumstances of the Colonies, it is not practicable to adopt a general system of Free Trade as between the Mother Country and the British Dominions beyond the Seas. '3. That with a view, however, to promoting the in- crease of trade within the Empire, it is desirable that those Colonies which have not already adopted such a policy should, so far as their circumstances permit, give substantial preference treatment to the products and manufactures of the United Kingdom. '4. That the Prime Ministers of the Colonies respect- fully urge on his Majesty's Government the expediency of granting in the United Kingdom preferential treatment to the products and manufactures of the Colonies, either by exemption from or reduction of duties now or hereafter imposed. 'That the Prime Ministers present at the Conference undertake to submit to their respective Governments at the earliest opportunity the principle of the Resolution, and to request them to take such measures as may be necessary to give effect to it.' Mr. Chamberlain said at the Conference that the change desired by Canada, i.e. an abatement of the new corn duty in favour of corn grown within the Empire, would involve a departure from the established fiscal policy of the United Kingdom, and that, assuming that the proposals could be entertained at all, it would be necessary for Canada to I902 IMPERIAL PREFERENCE 295 offer some material tariff preference beyond that which she had already given. The Canadian Ministers, in reply, stated that * if they could be assured that the Imperial Government would accept the principle of preferential trade generally, and particularly, grant to the food pro- ducts of Canada in the United Kingdom exemption from duties now levied, or hereafter imposed, they, the Canadian Ministers, would be prepared to go further into the sub- ject, and endeavour to give to the British manufacturer some increased advantage over his foreign competitors in the markets of Canada.' ^ The importance of this Con- ference was obscured by the fact that the chiefs of the allied Imperial states had crossed the seas partly in order to assist at the Coronation, and sufficient attention was not given in this country to these supremely important proposals. Between the Conference of 1902 and that of 1907 the Dominions south of the Equator gave some tariff preference to the produce of the United Kingdom in accordance with the third Resolution, and, at the Con- ference of 1907, the request that a reciprocal preference should be given by the Government of the United King- dom was once more strongly and unanimously pressed by his Majesty's other Governments, reaffirming in un- changed terms the Resolutions of 1902. It was as de- liberately refused ; and the present Ministerial party in this kingdom still hold to the refusal. Mr. Asquith, in a speech made on 9th February 191 1, said that 'what used to be called Imperial Preference ' was ' one of the greatest and most disastrous political impostures of modern times.' These are not words, certainly, which the Duke of Devonshire would ever have used, although he could not ^ Memorandum by Canadian Ministers. Miscellaneous. No. 144. Colonial Office, October 1902. 296 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT Ch. xxvii. bring himself to think that the balance of considerations was in favour of the policy.^ In the debates of June 1903, Sir Michael Hicks Beach, now no longer a Member of the Cabinet, gave the following account of what had happened in 1902 : — * What is the history of this small duty on grain and on flour ? When I proposed it as Chancellor of the Exche- quer to my colleagues in the Cabinet of last year the South African War was still at a stage of which no one could foresee the end. I proposed it as it was necessary, in my opinion, to raise more money for the purposes of that war by indirect taxation, and because I believed that in this revival of this duty I had a source of revenue which would yield largely to the Exchequer, while doing the minimum of injury possible to the trade, commerce, and industry of this country. When I brought it before my colleagues in the Cabinet it was my duty to state to them that I foresaw the objections with which it would be assailed. I knew that it would be challenged as a viola- tion in theory, though I believe not in practice, of the principles of Free Trade. I was well aware of the use which would be made of it in reviving the cry of the big loaf and the little loaf in Parliamentary elections. But, after careful consideration of the objections to the pro- posal, my colleagues in the Cabinet cordially accepted what I suggested. And when the war ended in South Africa, as we had to reconsider the finance of the year, of course, as it was my duty, I placed the matter before them, not merely as a tax necessary for the war, but as a permanent addition to our sources of revenue. They unanimously accepted the proposal which I made to them to persist in the tax. I proposed it, and my colleagues accepted it, as a purely fiscal measure which, in the enormous annual growth of the ordinary expenditure of the country, I be- ^ The agreement of Mr. Asquith's Government at the Imperial Conference of 191 1 to the constitution of a joint commission to inquire into all the facts, shows, perhaps, that the door is not quite closed after all. I902 MR. RITCHIE 297 lieved, and they believed, to be a necessary addition to our sources of taxation.' Sir Michael Hicks Beach, therefore, stating with force the reasons in favour of this tax, had made it clear to the Cabi- net and the House of Commons that it was proposed as a permanent addition to the sources of revenue. No objection was made by any member of the Unionist party, and such men as Mr. Arthur Elliot, Lord Hugh Cecil, and Mr. Win- ston Churchill, strong Unionist Free Traders, voted and spoke in its favour.^ Why, then, did the Cabinet decide a year later to remove this duty ? It was certain, and it had been foreseen, that the Opposition would make the most of this tax. Sir William Harcourt called it ' infamous.' But, as Sir Michael Hicks Beach said, 9th June 1903, ' No Government which is afraid to face temporary unpopu- larity in the interests of sound finance deserves to sit on that Bench.' Had he continued to be Chancellor of the Exchequer this tax would probably have been retained on its own merits. To retain it did not of necessity involve its use for any other purpose than that of raising revenue. But he retired, with Lord Salisbury, in July 1902, and his successor, Mr. Ritchie, was a Minister of a different dis- position. He was alarmed by Mr. Chamberlain's proposal, now made definitely to the Cabinet, to give a tariff preference to corn grown within the Empire over foreign corn. He may have been influenced also by certain abstract doctrines, or hard and fast rules, then dominant among high Treasury officials. His desire to repeal the duty was strengthened by defeats at some by-elections, and by the representations of scared party officials, who never look more than a mile ahead, or Members of Parliament. It was, above all, this terror which enabled him to carry his view in a Cabinet * Mr. Churchill even showed some leaning towards a preferential system in the debate of 1902. 298 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT Ch. xxvii. which was certainly not then awake to the full importance of the issue. The subject was discussed at a Cabinet held in Novem- ber 1902, a few days before Mr. Chamberlain departed to South Africa. Mr. Chamberlain contended that the duty should be retained in order to meet the fourth resolution passed at the recent Colonial Conference and to give a preference to Colonial corn. Mr. Ritchie protested against the continuance of the tax with this non-revenue object, and put in a written Memorandum. He did not, in this paper, ask his colleagues to come to an immediate decision, but he stated very strongly the objections both on political and general grounds to the adoption of the policy. Mr. Chamberlain left for Africa under the impression that the Cabinet, or at any rate the great majority of the Cabinet, agreed with his view ; but the Duke, writing to him in July 1903, said — ' I have myself no clear recollection of what took place upon it, but I do not think it possible that Ritchie's protest against a pledge for the retention of the tax with a view to giving a preference to Canada was in any way over- ruled. Certainly no communication was made to Canada, and I was under the impression that the whole question must have been postponed till the Budget, when we should all be free as to the retention of the tax, or as to any new departure in the way of preferential treatment of the Colonies.' There are some disadvantages, now that Cabinet Councils are so large, in the practice of having no Secretary and no minutes of proceedings. Mr. Balfour, in a letter to the Duke in August 1903, said that Mr. Chamberlain on his return found ' that his scheme for employing the shilling duty on corn as a means of obtain- ing preferential treatment for Canada was rendered im- I903 REPEAL OF CORN DUTY 299 possible by the Chancellor of the Exchequer's unexpected refusal to embody it in his Budget, and this after he had just reason to suppose that in November the Cabinet as a whole were in its favour.' The Duke and some others would not have admitted that the words 'unexpected' or 'just' were correctly used. In any case no final decision was made until the eve of the declaration of the Budget of 1903. Mr. Cham- berlain had, by then, returned to England and was present at a Cabinet held before the Budget speech, and again contended that the tax on imported corn should be continued in order to carry out the preferential policy. On the other hand, Mr. Ritchie quoted a Memorandum from the Chief Whip urging, on behalf of many Members of Parliament, the repeal of a tax which was unpopular. His Budget speech, on 23rd April 1903, announced the repeal of the corn duty. He was reducing the income tax, and it was a question how corresponding relief to indirect taxation should be given. He gave reasons for leaving as they were the export duty on coal and the import duty on sugar. Should, then, the duty be taken off corn, or should that on tea be reduced ? He said, following the most commonplace style of Chancellors : — 'Tea has many attractions, it is the easiest and least contentious subject of taxation, but it cannot be said to be dear. Nor do I think that a duty of sixpence on tea is very excessive or hard to bear. Corn is a necessary of life in a greater degree than any other article. It is a raw material, it is the food of our people, the food of our horses and of our cattle ; and, moreover, the duty has a certain disadvantage inasmuch as it is inelastic, and, what is much worse, it lends itself very readily to mis- representation. I do not think it can remain permanently an integral portion of our fiscal system, unless there is 300 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT Ch. xxvii. some radical change in our economic circumstances, or it is connected with some boon much desired by the working classes. ... In my opinion, being, as it is, a tax on a prime necessity of life, it has the first claim to be associated with the large remission of income tax of which I have spoken.' It may be asked why, when Mr. Chamberlain upon his return from South Africa found that, so far from using the corn tax to give a preference wnthin the Empire, the Cabinet proposed to repeal it, did he not then resign as a protest ? His answer is — * Why should I have resigned ? The majority of my colleagues agreed with me. The difficulty of carrying out my policy arose only from the fact that the Chancellor of the Exchequer was opposed to it, and that there was no time to fight the question out then and there before the Budget had to be introduced. Accordingly the Cabinet, while allowing Mr. Ritchie to have his way with the Budget, decided to use the summer in further investiga- tions of the questions which had been raised. No decision adverse to them was taken, and there was no occasion for me to resign.' When he did resign, in September, the position had altered, he says, because the ' Liberal party had used every endeavour to excite prejudice and influence passion on the subject of food taxes.' The two preceding quotations are from a letter from Mr. Chamberlain to the writer in reply to a question. Mr. Chamberlain said in the House of Commons, on i8th May 1904, that when he spoke at Birmingham, 15th May 1903, he had ' no idea that so great a storm would be raised, because my view was that I was raising an important question which deserved the fullest consideration, and which could not at the moment be decided. When I I903 THE BIRMINGHAM SPEECH 301 raised it I said that I asked for no immediate decision, and that it might be an issue at the General Election.' If this be so, it illustrates Cromwell's saying that ' no man goes so far as a man who does not know how far he is going.' Thus, for reasons not at the time clearly understood, was repealed in April 1903 the corn duty to which, as a permanent revenue tax, the whole Unionist party, in the Cabinet and in the House of Commons, including all the subsequent < Free-Trade Unionists,' stood strongly com- mitted by their vote in May 1902. A Chancellor of the Exchequer who would probably have resigned sooner than assent to a continuance of a tax on the ' food of the people/ carried, of course, great weight in a Cabinet which had no very firm or definite views on the question, and had already begun to feel the effects of the reaction following upon war. IV The announcement that the corn duty was to be repealed was swiftly followed by Mr. Chamberlain's famous speech at Birmingham on the 15th May 1903. He reminded his hearers that Canada had given first a 25 per cent, preference, then a 33 per cent., to British goods, and had intimated that she would go further if some preference were given in return to her corn. ' I must say,' he continued, ' that, if I could treat matters of this kind solely in regard to my position as Secretary of State for the Colonies, I should have said, "That is a fair offer, that is a generous offer from your point of view, and it is an offer which I might ask our people to accept ; but, speaking for the Govern- ment as a whole, not in the interests of the Colonies, I am obliged to say that it is contrary to the established fiscal policy of this country." ' 302 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. Then he went on to say : — 'The people of this Empire have two alternatives before them. They may maintain if they like in all its severity the interpretation — in my mind an entirely artificial and wrong interpretation which has been placed on the doctrines of Free Trade by a small remnant of little Englanders of the Manchester school. . . . They may maintain that doctrine in all its severity, though it is repudiated by every other nation and by all your Colonies. In that case they will be absolutely pre- cluded either from giving any kind of preference or favour to any of their Colonies abroad. . . . That is the first alternative. The second alternative is that we should insist that we will not be bound by any purely technical definition of Free Trade ; that, whilst we seek as one chief object free interchange of trade between ourselves and all nations of the world, we will, nevertheless, recover our freedom, and resume that power of negotia- tion, and, if necessary, retaliation, whenever our own interests or our own relations between our Colonies and ourselves are threatened by other people.' ^ The speaker left no doubt which alternative he himself would take. ' For my own part,' he said, ' I believe in a British Empire, an Empire which, though it should be its first duty to cultivate friendship with all the nations of the world, should yet, even if alone, be self-sustaining and self-sufficient, able to maintain itself against the com- petition of all its rivals.' On the same day the Prime Minister was replying to a deputation which came to protest against the repeal of the corn duty. He said, among other things, that, in certain 1 The reference was to the quarrel between the German and Canadian Governments. The Germans had taken steps to retaliate on Canada for the preference given by Canada to English over German manufactures. We could not assist Canada by retaliating against Germany by reason of our fiscal principles of Free Trade. I903 MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S ARGUMENT 303 events, there might be a small corn duty in connection with a general preferential system. But such a movement must proceed from the conscience and intellect of the great mass of the people. Until such a general agreement were reached it was useless to maintain a tax which would be the shuttlecock of opposing parties. Mr. Chamberlain maintained and defined his view in a speech made in the House of Commons on the 28th May. His policy, he said, had he the choice, would be first to obtain a ' mandate ' from the nation at the next General Election ; next, to summon a special Colonial Conference in order to negotiate the terms of preference with the Colonial Governments. Any effective preference on our side could only, he said, be given upon raw materials, upon food, or upon both. It would be inexpedient that it should fall upon raw materials, therefore it must fall upon food. He was ready to argue with any British workman that the result would be to his benefit. Any revenue collected by means of new taxes imposed upon food for the sake of preference should, he said, go directly for the benefit of the poorer classes, as, for instance, in old age pensions. The duty upon foreign corn might give some encouragement to British farmers ; but this, so far from being a national calamity, would, he actually dared to say, be a good thing. He also defended protective measures, such as a duty upon foreign manufactured goods, as they might be applied both in order to obtain reduction of foreign tariffs and as a defence against the offensive operations of such powerful organisations as the American Steel and Iron Corporation. Mr. Chamberlain was clear and definite, and, when he spoke outside the House of Commons, he appealed to sentiment as well as to reason. He held that if we established neither closer political nor closer commercial relationship with the Colonies, the tide 304 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. would set in the opposite direction, and the maintenance of a united Empire would become difficult or impossible. The seed fell upon rich soil and increased a hundred- fold. Advocated by some able writers in the Press, the new doctrine grew and developed with amazing speed in all its branches — imperial preference, protection to home industry, retaliation against the alien. On the other side the Liberals saw their chance, and appealed to the old deep-lying feeling against the taxation of wheat. For mild Conservatives who had long professed an academic scepti- cism as to the blessings of Free Trade it was an embarrassing situation. They were in the position of English Jacobites when the Pretender crossed the border, or of men who had talked vaguely in favour of Home Rule when Mr. Glad- stone, who also could take a great decision, proposed the real thing. The Midland leader was of those who rapidly translate ideas into action. His was that quality which now and then enables a hero successfully or not to march upon some city consecrated by time, veneration, ancient authority, and general acceptance. Did Caesar do well, morally, to cross the Rubicon, or no ? The world has never been able to decide. But he crossed the stream because he was Caesar, and so could do no otherwise.^ The Duke was informed at the end of May that the Birmingham speech had been issued by Mr. Powell Williams, from the London Office, on behalf of the Liberal Unionist Association to all the local Associations, and would thus receive the appearance of an officially recom- mended policy. He wrote on 29th May to Mr. Chamber- ^ Plutarch affirms, perhaps poetically, that Coesar hesitated for some time on the north bank of the Rubicon. ' At last, under some sudden impulse, bidding adieu to his reasonings, and plunging into the abyss of futurity, in the words of those who embark in doubtful and arduous enterprises, he exclaimed, "The die is cast," and immediately crossed the river.' Garibaldi marched upon Rome, without the same immediate success, some 1900 years later, I903 THE BIRMINGHAM ASSOCIATION 305 lain to say that this step had called forth inquiries whether the speech was to be considered as embodying the views of the Government and ' of myself as President of the Association.' He did not think that ' anything which has taken place in the Cabinet has committed any one of us to a definite approval of the policy, and I am myself extremely doubtful whether I can be a party to it when it takes a more definite shape. At all events I feel that the Liberal Unionist Association cannot be employed in the active support of the policy without serious risk, if not the certainty of breaking it up.' He suggested that the Association should take up a perfectly neutral'position, although ' the Birmingham Association has always been so directly under your control that I think its position is a different one, and no one could object to your using it in the active support of your policy.' Mr. Chamberlain replied : — 40 Prince's Gardens, S.W., z^th May, '03. My dear Devonshire, — Powell Williams told me on Wednesday that some objection had been taken to the distribution of my speech by the London Liberal Unionist Office, and I at once said that this ought not to be done without your full approval, and that, if you objected, I should deprecate proceeding any further in the matter. I have therefore anticipated your letter, and I am quite of your opinion that, in view of some division in the party, the London Office had better confine itself to the work on which we are all agreed. The Birmingham Asso- ciation is in a different position, and I shall have to consider whether it may not be necessary to extend its operations, which hitherto, as you are aware, have been confined exclusively to the Midland District ; but this is a matter which I can leave for future settlement. Meanwhile, it is hardly necessary for me to assure you that, although I had no idea that the Cabinet as VOL. II. U 3o6 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. a whole, or indeed any individual members of it, was pledged to a definite line of policy, I did assume that, with the possible exception of Ritchie, they were all in favour of raising the question as a matter of dis- cussion. My own desire would be that it should be treated as an open question, and that no effort should at present be made to commit any member, either of the Govern- ment or of the party in the House of Commons, to a final decision. Discussion must go on, and I shall do my best to direct it ; but as a general election may very well be postponed for two years, or even more, there is no necessity to attempt a purely party agitation. If we had all felt exactly the same on the subject, our united influence would no doubt have secured a practical unanimity in the party. As it is, each member of the party must go his own way, and the constituencies in the long run must decide. It is not like the Home Rule business, where we ran our own candidates to support our views. In this case each member must take his own line, which I suppose he will do in most cases according to his judgment of the feeling in his own constituency. As a matter of prudence, I should advise my friends who are hesitating not to commit themselves finally. I think the working-classes may be ripe for change ; but whether this be so or not, I am myself so convinced of the importance of the matter and the necessity of dealing with it, if any progress is to be made in regard to \ Imperial union, that I am ready to stake my fortunes upon it. If I succeed I shall consider the result worth all the pains I have taken to secure it. — Believe me, yours very truly, J. Chamberlain. The question of the action of the Liberal Unionist organisation was thus, for the time, adjourned, but the schism which was to break up that party within a few months was made manifest. The position of the Prime 1903 THE PRIME MINISTER 307 Minister, after Mr. Chamberlain's pronouncement, is de- fined in the following letter : — Littlestone-on-Sea, /;<«<; 6,th, 1903. My dear Devonshire, — It must be admitted that Chamberlain's speech of last Thursday has not made either the Parliamentary or the Cabinet situation easier than it was left by the utterances he delivered on the two Fridays which preceded it. I have not therefore been greatly surprised at receiving letters from yourself, Ritchie, G. Wyndham, Balfour of Burleigh, and George Hamilton, all, in various degrees, expressing disquiet and anxiety. Yet surely nothing has occurred which ought to make it difficult for us all — whatever shade of opinion we may entertain on the subject of Colonial Preference — to act cordially together during the natural term (not of course necessarily or probably the legal term) of the present Parliament. Chamberlain's views, both in their general outline and their particular details, commit no one but himself. They certainly do not commit me ; although I am probably more in sympathy with him than either you or Ritchie. Ritchie, I gather, dislikes Colonial Pre- ference simpliciter. If a good fairy offered it to him to-morrow as a fait accompli, he would reject it. I do not, as at present advised, share this view. If I could have it on my own terms I am disposed to think I should take it — though even then I should like to have more time for analysing its economic consequences before expressing a final decision. My hesitation, however, chiefly arises from doubts as to its practicability rather than its ex- pediency. I question whether the people of this country will be sufficiently tolerant of the protective side of the scheme, or the people of the Colonies sufficiently tolerant of its Free Trade side, to permit them to accept the com- promise in which it essentially consists. But whatever be the merits of the question, whether looked at from the strictly economic or the political side, why should the fact that some of us differ and many of us 3o8 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. hesitate about it, break up or tend to break up the present Cabinet ? Of course I admit that, if Chamberlain is to be at hberty to express his views on one side of the question, a Hke Hberty must necessarily be extended to his colleagues to express their views on the other. I also admit that, if we are to be perpetually debating it in public, this constant collision of opposing opinions will give the impression of general disunion, and may even produce it. I further admit that such a state of things might make it useless for us to remain longer in office. But I do not think we should anticipate such a misfortune — and certainly not act as if it had already befallen us. I call it a misfortune, because our resignation must produce an immediate dissolution, and this is not a felicitous moment for putting the party fortunes to the hazard. It is of course true that our greatest offence — that of having been too long in office — is one that time cannot diminish. But the Education Bill fever will be allayed in twelve months, and Ritchie will, I hope, next year get another penny off the income tax. There is yet another reason against causing or precipitating a minis- terial crisis, and that is that it would destroy the chances of the Land Bill.^ Chamberlain, I am aware, does not like that measure, and I am not sure that it moves your enthusiasm. Yet it seems to me to give us a unique chance — I do not put it higher — of really settling the Irish Land controversy ; and I should regard it as the greatest of national misfortunes if that chance was thrown away over differences which do not, as yet, relate to any question of practical politics. I think in this connection we ought to bear in mind that through many Parliaments Catholic Emancipation was an open question in the Tory party ; and (a genera- tion later) the same thing was true of Free Trade. I suppose that Disestablishment occupies at the present moment a similar position among the Radicals. I cannot conceive why we are not to allow to ourselves a liberty of * First Land Purchase Bill. 1903 THE PRIME MINISTER 309 difference which we allow to our opponents ; and which is in strict conformity with constitutional tradition. I am the more moved to take this view when I reflect that if we dissolved ^low^ I, and I suspect many other of our colleagues, would be in the embarrassing and indeed somewhat ludi- crous position of having to say that on the point which divided us we had not made up our ow7i minds, and could not therefore pretend to give a decided lead to any one else. My hope, therefore, is that for the present it shall be agreed among us — {a) That the question is an open one ; and that no one stands committed by any statement but their own. {b) That we should be allowed officially to collect information upon the effects of the proposed policy. [c] That, at all events for the session, we should dis- courage further explicit statements of individual opinion. {d) That if it be necessary for Ritchie on the Budget or you in the House of Lords to say anything, you should not go beyond t-he statement that the question was one of extreme difficulty — that you had not come to a final decision upon it, although as at present advised you were disposed to doubt the practicability of any scheme of pre- ferential tariffs. Whether this particular formula satisfies you and Ritchie or not, I hope at least that no more defi- nite or vigorous expressions of opinion will be used by any of us than are absolutely required to prevent us being committed either way to opinions from which we dissent. This, however, is only a counsel of expediency : and I admit the right of each member of the Cabinet to express on this subject his own opinions in his own way. If Ritchie is with you will you show him this letter ? If he is not, would you mind telegraphing to me and I will send him a copy. — Yours, Arthur James Balfour. The difficulty of the situation at this moment was shown by a letter addressed by one of the younger Unionists in 3IO MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. the House of Commons, Mr. Winston Churchill, to the Duke (8th June). He said — ' It is quite impossible that the question of Mr. Chamberlain's proposals can remain open and academic. Those of us who are Free Traders will not accept them under any circumstances, popular or unpopular howso- ever. If, therefore, he proposes to carry on an active propaganda in favour of Protection and Preferential Tariffs, we shall be bound in self-preservation to band ourselves together under such leaders as we can find, and organise and agitate in our turn. You will easily see that this must end in an utter split, and that the Tory dissen- tients will be driven to make the same sort of arrange- ments as the Liberal Unionists in 1886. You will be able to judge much better than I whether this is worth considering. ' But if you should be able to persuade Mr. Balfour to refuse the new proposals, then I am quite sure the Govern- ment would find a loyal and faithful support in quarters where lately perhaps there has been enough criticism. I do not think Mr. Balfour realises quite how determined people are against a reversion to Protection.' The Duke wrote, on 9th June 1903, to Sir Edward Hamilton of the Treasury : — ' I believe that my position is almost exactly the same as what I understand Goschen's to be. I am not so con- fident as Ritchie that the principles of Free Trade, or rather of Free Imports, are unassailable, and I do not object to a fresh inquiry into their effects. On the other hand, I entirely disagree with Chamberlain in thinking that it is already proved that they are unsuited to our existing conditions, Imperial or industrial. And I believe that I differ from Arthur Balfour in attaching more importance than he does to the economical side of the question. I gather that, if Chamberlain can persuade the Chambers of Commerce and the constituencies to try the experi- THE INQUIRY 311 ment, he would let him negotiate with the Colonies in this direction. I say, on the other hand, and I understand Goschen to say, that he would be no party to the experi- ment at all, unless he were satisfied as to its probable result on the condition of the people and the prosperity of industry and commerce generally. Do you think that any inquiry on these lines could be indicated ? ' For the time being the difficulty within the Cabinet was held at bay by the expedient of instituting an inquiry into the subject. But no Royal Commission was created for this object, as it might advisably have been, and the inquiry was ill-defined. It consisted in the hurried ac- cumulation and printing of a vast store of statistics by the Board of Trade, which could not, as any one who knows anything of the work of Cabinets and Cabinet Ministers will understand, be studied by men each overwhelmed by the work of his own department. The Minister best informed was, no doubt, Mr. Gerald Balfour, who, after his excellent work as Irish Chief Secretary, was now Pre- sident of the Board of Trade. It was also agreed that, except under necessity of parliamentary exigencies, no member of the Cabinet should deal publicly with the subject during the rest of the session. A group of Conservatives opposed the removal of the corn duty, and the question was debated in the House of Commons on the 9th and loth June 1903. Sir Michael Hicks Beach said in this debate that he had much re- gretted the action of his successor in proposing to repeal the duty, but, now that the question appeared to lie between removing the duty and retaining it with a view to Prefer- ence, he preferred the former course as the least of two evils. 312 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. Mr. Ritchie said : — * I avow myself a convinced Free Trader, and I do not share the views of those who think that any practical means can be devised for overcoming the difficulties which present themselves to me in connection with their pro- posals, and, as at present advised, I cannot be a party to a policy which, in my opinion, would be detrimental both to the country and to the Colonies.' Mr. Balfour stated his own position with candour and lucidity. He quoted Mr. Gladstone's canon that a Prime Minister was responsible for the common action of his Cabinet, but not for the expression of individual opinion. He advocated a policy of wise hesitation and inquiry. What, he asked, were a Prime Minister, or Ministry, to do when circumstances indicated that some existing policy must be reviewed and some change contemplated ? One course was that of open discussion. Another was to ' mature in silence and in private his, or their opinions, and to act in public as if the old system were absolutely impeccable in all its parts. That system . . . was tried by Sir Robert Peel in 1845. ^^ was tried by Mr. Gladstone in 1886. ... In each case the result was disruption.' After referring to all the difficulties and complexities of the question, the Prime Minister said that he would be ill- performing his duty to the House and to the country if he were to ' profess a settled conviction where no settled conviction exists.' ' It would,' he added, 'be folly and rashness to inter- fere with a great system which has been in operation all these years, without a most careful examination of every side of the problem, and with all due regard to the history and traditions of the past ; or to ignore new problems which the ever-changing phases of industrial life present I903 THE DUKE'S DEFENCE 313 for the decision and action of statesmen." In the House of Lords the Free Trade attack fell upon the Duke of Devonshire as leader for the Government. With regard to the proposed inquiry he said, 15th June 1903 : — ' I cannot see how any man, any convinced and rational Free Trader, can take exception either to inquiry or dis- cussion on this subject. In the first place there is no Free Trader who can feel, or profess to feel, satisfied with the present position of the question. What the Free Trader advocates is free interchange of all commodities between all nations. What we have got is something very different from that. We have got free imports on one side and exports burdened by every barrier fiscal ingenuity can devise. And I cannot see how any convinced Free Trader can object to an inquiry after the lapse of a period of fifty years into the reasons which have prevented the realisation of the hopes which were entertained by the founders of this policy, and an inquiry whether it may not be possible that anything should be done to secure the more ample and full realisation of that policy which was undoubtedly in the minds of the founders of Free Trade policy — Sir Robert Peel, Mr. Cobden, and Mr. Bright. 'The name of Free Traders cannot with strict accu- racy be applied to the supporters of our present fiscal system. We are not Free Traders, because we have not got Free Trade. It is more accurate to say that we are free importers. I acknowledge that I have been a free importer during the whole of my political life, and I am now. I was in favour of that policy for the first twenty-five years of my career in the House of Commons, for the simple reason that, so far as I knew, no one was anything else. Then came a period of commercial depression, and the agitation in those days went by the name of Fair Trade. * It happened that my opponent in a division of Lanca- shire was the President of the Fair Trade League. I think it is also perfectly accurate to state that with the help of my friends, including, I think, the valuable assistance of 314 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. the present Colonial Secretary, I absolutely annihilated and demolished my opponent and his doctrines.' He had opposed that movement, he added, partly because it was not ' supported by any strong or sound economic opinion,' and partly because he was convinced that on the facts brought forward the fair traders had failed to establish their case. But much had happened since then. So far from other countries having lowered their barriers against our imports they had raised and strengthened them. Also during this same period our manufacturing supremacy in iron and steel, textiles, and other manufactures had been seriously challenged. He said : — ' Undoubtedly it was the opinion and contention of the founders of our present fiscal system that our industrial supremacy would be secured by the adoption of those principles in the face of the refusal of other nations to adopt them. Certainly any anticipations of that descrip- tion which they may have held have fallen very far short of the reality.' He referred also to the great industrial Trusts which had arisen in other countries, and to the growth in importance of the Colonies. * With that growth in importance, prosperity, and strength, these Colonies have manifested a desire to enter into closer political relations with each other and with the Mother Country. One manifestation of that desire has been in the direction of increased fiscal unity with the United Kingdom.' All these things, he said, could ' not be put aside as if they were not ; there is no sense or reason in ignoring these facts and in refusing to enter into some inquiry as to their effect. And all those who profess principles of real Free Trade, the men who believe that those principles are 1903 THE DUKE'S DEFENCE 315 founded not only on the dictates of absolute reason, but are proved by the teaching of experience, those are the very last who ought to refuse to enter into the fullest and most searching inquiry and discussion as to the effect not only of those principles, but of the effectual results which have been achieved under the present system.' The Duke then indicated the lines upon which in his opinion the inquiry ought to proceed, such as the condition of the home trade as well as the foreign, and the effect of any raising of the price of food upon the purchasing power of the people. He pointed out that the system of free im- ports of cheap food had brought into existence additional millions of people between whom and famine the margin was slender, and added : — ' I can conceive that under a different system, though we might not have been so rich or so prosperous, a con- dition of things might have existed in which the problems with which we are now confronted might have been less great, less momentous than they are now. We have to deal not, perhaps, with the best possible organisation of society in our country ; we have to deal with it under conditions which have been brought about by our present fiscal system, and we must be very careful indeed before we alter those conditions in a manner which may possibly reduce the margin which now exists between those people and absolute want. Under these circumstances I should hesitate very long before I could bring myself to assent to changes the effect of which, so far as I know, or have the means of knowing, might be to improve the conditions of certain of the higher classes of labour, but might also have the effect, so far as I know or have the means at present of knowing, of breaking down that barrier which still exists between those millions and absolute starvation. These are questions, I think, which every one who professes to be a statesman will admit cannot be solved simply by counting votes at a general election.' 3i6 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT Ch. xxvii. If he knew that every working-man with a vote was in favour of trying the experiment, and that every Colony would meet us as fully as we could desire, yet, he said, he would not be a party to its trial, ' unless I were con- vinced in my heart and conscience that that experiment was justified on sound economic grounds, and that there was reason to believe that it would tend to the benefit of the great masses of the people, as well as to that of some of the more favoured sections of the working classes.' There were, he said, undoubtedly political advantages in the proposed change — in connection with the Colonies — but if these could 'only be purchased at the expense of privation, hardship, and discontent on the part of our own people, then I can conceive of no policy which would more certainly or more swiftly tend to the dissolution and disintegration of our Empire.' He drew a distinction in point of importance between the 'preferential policy and the policy known as ' retaliation,' and said : — 'The policy of preferential treatment of our Colonies, founded on the taxation of food, would be a policy which would be either irrevocable, or, if reversed, the reversal must be attended with the most serious and grave con- sequences. On the other hand, I can conceive that an experiment in the way of retaliation might be tried, and, if found not to succeed, that it might be reversed without any serious injury to any great national interests.' The Duke then discussed the question whether men could have open and declared convictions of an opposite kind on a serious question, and yet remain in the same Cabinet. He quoted a passage from a speech of Lord Macaulay to show that both Tory and Whig Govern- ments, especially that of the second Pitt, had allowed questions not pressing for immediate decision to remain open in this way. He admitted that the present position 1903 THE DUKE'S DEFENCE 317 of the Government was difficult, but it was not impossible. Ought, he asked, the Prime Minister to have resigned because Mr. Chamberlain had set forth a policy as to which the Prime Minister had not yet formed fixed opinions. 'The position of the Prime Minister, if he had resigned as soon as that speech was made, and on further reflection found that he agreed with it, would have been a most absurd one.' Then, again, w^hy should Mr. Chamberlain resign ' when he found that his colleagues, though they frankly avowed their present frame of mind, were willing to give an opportunity for opening a dis- cussion on the question he raised.' And why should members of the Cabinet who entertained grave doubts as to this policy resign? 'They were asked to take no immediate action except to vote for a Budget which was entirely consonant with the most pronounced Free Trade principles.' Noble Lords opposite, he concluded, thought that both the principles and results of the present system were so obviously satisfactory that no inquiry was needed, or even permissible. ' I believe that they will find that the people of this country are not so deeply impressed with the absolute perfection of our present fiscal and commercial policy that they will view with much favour the action of those who refuse even to inquire whether it has been, as they believe, a success, or whether, as is held in other quarters, it has been but an incomplete success, and is tending towards failure. I believe the best friends of Free Trade will be found to be those who are willing to enter into a full and fair inquiry, not as to its principles, which, perhaps, w^e may take for granted, but as to its consequences and results. And I believe for myself that the result of any such inquiry will be to establish more firmly the essential principles which underlie our policy, although it may be found, possibly, that some modifica- 31 8 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. tion and alteration of our arrangements may tend to strengthen and consolidate, and make more unassailable and permanent, a system founded essentially upon the principle of Free Trade.' The question was raised again in the House of Lords on the 29th June and the 2nd July. The Duke remained intrenched within the lines of the Inquiry. Why was this position not tenable beyond September ? Mr. Balfour and the Duke had quoted instances earlier than the Reform Bill of 1832 of important questions on which members of the same Cabinet had long professed dif- ferent opinions. Some questions, much more recently, have long remained " open," such as women's suffrage. But, in the earlier days, the political machine had been little developed. Statesmen were not expected to make numerous speeches throughout the country ; there were no local associations clamouring for a lead, no central federations expecting, or pressing, a policy. Mr. Chamber- lain was not only an individual Minister, he was at the head of eager legions which he had himself organised for other purposes. On a question of this kind he could hardly, perhaps, even had he wished it, have prevented them from going into action, after his first speeches, any more than the Transvaal Republic could have prevented war after their burghers had been encamped for some weeks on the border of Natal. As a matter of fact, the propagation of the new faith and policy, from the Midland centre, was continued with the utmost energy during the period of truce and inquiry by every means possible other than speeches of Mr. Chamberlain. The doctrine met the wishes of hundreds of thousands of Englishmen, and in that respect differed materially from the Home Rule move- ment of 1886, which the Liberal party accepted for no other reason than allegiance to a much-adored old chieftain. I903 MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL 319 The Free -Trade Unionists in Parliament, whose posi- tion was being undermined in the constituencies while they were precluded from defending their views in the House of Commons, resented the one-sided truce from the first. A letter written a little later by Mr. Winston Churchill, then Conservative member for Oldham, to the Duke shows how impossible the neutral attitude had become. DuNROBiN, Sept. I, 1903. My dear Duke, — An agreement has been come to in my constituency between the Free Trade majority on the Executive Committee and the small but very aggressive Fair Trade minority, that, during what is called the ' truce,' no literature is to be circulated by the Association on the Fiscal Question. We have made this concession to the minority in the hopes of delaying as long as possible what I fear is the inevitable split. We could at any moment by a large majority carry a resolution authoris- ing the Hon. Sec. to distribute Free Trade literature and no other literature, but, till Mr. Balfour has definitely pro- nounced, I think it better to defer a step which will cause a secession of the Protectionists and Fair Traders, and probably lead us into negotiations with the Liberal party in the borough. But I now receive complaints from my chairman and other Free Traders on the Com- mittee that the Birmingham Tariff Committee has been in communication not only with the central party organisa- tion in Oldham, and the recognised leaders and ofticials of the Association, but with the separate ward committees and the officials of the various clubs underneath the central organisation, that literature has been pressed upon them, and that they have been invited to distribute it. In some cases they have been induced to do this, largely because they believe that it is, in fact if not in name, the orthodox literature of the Unionist party sent out by the Unionist party leaders. If it were not for Mr. Chamberlain's ministerial position, his close association 320 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. with the Birmingham Tariff Committee would not matter, and the operations of that Committee would not embarrass me. But the fact that the circulation of this literature is regarded as an act of party loyalty by some of my con- stituents does undoubtedly make the position difficult, and I think we have some reason to complain that a Minister should countenance the tampering with subordi- nate members of a party organisation which gives him general support, and should encourage them to circulate propagandist leaflets, against the wishes of the members and of the majority of the Association, upon a question of policy not agreed upon by the Cabinet and not accepted by the party. I don't set much store myself by leaflets either way, and I do not myself propose to do anything until the middle of October ; but I write to you to point out that by then we must know where we stand. We must know who are our friends and enemies, and make arrangements accord- ingly. It is perfectly impossible for the ordinary routine of party work to be carried out in the borough while these highly irregular methods are being employed. I have no doubt that my case is the case of other con- stituencies, and I submit to you that no compromise on which the Cabinet may decide will be of the slightest use in keeping local organisations together, unless it in- cludes an absolute, honest, and immediate cessation of these tactics on the part of a Minister. I have written all this formally, because I think you ought to be in pos- session of the facts. If it were not for you, I do not think it would be worth while for Free Traders to worry on in the party. On my last visit to Oldham two working men at different clubs informed me that they would wait to see what you decided, and I believe your influence is much greater than perhaps you think. We are on the eve of a gigantic political landslide. I don't think Balfour and those about him realise at all how far the degenera- tion of the forces of Unionism has proceeded, and how tremendous the countercurrent is going to be. I903 MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S FOUR FACTS 321 Don't bother to answer this. I know you must have a good deal on your hands. — Yours very sincerely, Winston S. Churchill. During July letters passed between the Duke of Devon- shire and Mr. Chamberlain upon the more abstract merits of the question ; but as, in this field, the views and reason- ing of eminent statesmen are not of more value than those of other thinkers, this correspondence need not be given. Mr. Chamberlain closed it by saying (July 25, 1903) : — ' All economic arguments are speculative, and, in my opinion, as apparently in yours, they are inconclusive. I prefer a little common sense and business experience. Both tell me that there is ample room for the investment of un- told millions in this country, and, if we gave manufacturers here some security, there would be an enormous develop- ment both by British and foreign capital. There will also be a sufficiency of labour, though its cost per man may increase. There are always millions of unemployed in this country, or with only partial employment, and besides this there is a large continuous emigration. ' Ireland might have had nine millions of people but for the Corn Law repeal ; whether that would be a blessing or not, I leave to others to decide, * In any case we have four facts to go upon, viz. : — * I. British exports have been stagnant for ten years. ' 2. They would have shown an immense decrease but for the increase of Colonial trade, and the larger export of coal. * 3. British industries will be in the most serious danger when Germany and America have a large over-production. '4. Tariffs and Preference, which might remedy the above evils, are consistent with a growth and progress in protected nations enormously greater than our own.' By the end of the summer the controversy in the country had grown to such a height that, with a view to VOL. II. X 322 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT Ch. xxvii. autumnal speeches, and especially the address by the Prime Minister to the meeting at Sheffield on October ist of Conservative Associations, who were thirsting for a bold and strong lead, the Cabinet had to try to arrive at some common line of statement. The question was discussed at a Cabinet held on the 13th August 1903. In anticipation of this meeting the Prime Minister cir- culated to his colleagues his paper, afterwards published, on * Insular Free Trade,' together with a paper suggesting certain propositions for adoption. He proposed that the Cabinet should take up the position that, while no fiscal change should be rejected merely because, like the corn tax of 1902, some flavour of protection could be imputed to it, they intended to propose * no tax simply for pro- tective purposes,' and that 'any readjustment of taxation, required either for the purpose of furthering Free Trade with the Colonies, or for the purpose of preventing 'dump- ing,' should be framed so as to avoid any material increase in the budget of the working-men, whether artisans or agricultural labourers.' This attitude assumed that, subject to satisfaction of certain conditions, the road was open to a reform of the fiscal system with a view to preferential relations with the Colonies and to defence against foreign economic aggression. No decision was reached at this Cabinet, and the discussion was adjourned to a meeting to be held on the 14th September. Mr. Chamberlain wrote on the 25th August 1903 to the Duke that — ' If, as I originally hoped, the proposal that I made for discussion had been accepted on both sides, and had not been made a party question, we might have stood to what was undoubtedly my original idea, and have treated the small taxation that will be necessary to give a preference to the Colonies as a revenue tax, and have used the profits for the promotion of those social reforms which are certain I903 MR. RITCHIE'S POSITION 323 to come in the future, and which ou^ht in my opinion to be provided for by indirect, and not by an increase in direct taxation.^ But the Opposition thouf^ht the chance too good to be lost. They have raised the Free Food cry, and we must meet them on their own grounds. I am therefore prepared to accept the responsibihty of treating the change, so far as preferential rates are concerned, as a redistribution of taxation and not as an imposition of increased burdens. Accordingly any tax on one kind of food must be met by a reduction of an equal amount on other articles of food which are now being taxed.' After discussing this matter at length he concluded — ' In face of such facts as these, it seems to me that one may fairly put aside the dogmatic assertions of the fanatical Free Traders as to the consequences of a change in our system. All prophecies are made on insufficient founda- tion, while the facts show a greater proportionate increase in prosperity in every country in which a scientific fiscal system has been adopted, in place of the haphazard free import policy to which we alone have hitherto adhered." In the interval between the Cabinets of 13th August and 14th September the Duke also received the following letter : — Mr. Ritdiie to the Duke of Devonshire Welders, Gerhard's Cross, R.S.O., Bucks, 20th August 1903. My dear Duke, — Those of us who appreciate the serious character of the results which are likely to follow from the success of Chamberlain's policy should do our utmost to prevent his obtaining that success. It would be infinitely more agreeable for me to resign, as the position ^ In his speeches Mr. Chamberlain had connected in this way a tax to give Colonial Preference with the proposal of Old Age Pensions. There can be little doubt that, from a political point of view, nothing has injured the Unionists so much as leaving Old Age Pensions to be given by the Liberals. 324 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. is gradually becoming almost intolerable, but it is clear that those of us in the Cabinet who oppose this policy should act together if we are to produce any effect. I am there- fore quite prepared to continue in office, if you consider it advisable to do so, but it seems to me that, if this course is adopted, we must have some clear understanding that Balfour in his speech is not to covnnit the Cabinet as a whole to any portion of Chamberlain s policy, and that Chamber- lain is not to be at liberty to carry the fiery cross into all the constituencies during the autumn.^ I do not mean that he should be dissuaded from making speeches, but that they should, if made, be confined to a moderate exposition of his own views, which we, on our part, should be at liberty, also in a moderate way, to challenge. In this con- nection I think it most essential that you should take part in the public discussion. It is, I know, a great bore, but I think it will be necessary. No one's views are likely to carry nearly as much weight. An essential condition of this arrangement is, of course, that we are not asked at our next meeting to come to a definite decision on Balfour's paper. This is what will be insisted on by Chamberlain, but I hope you will strongly oppose it. We cannot assent to the prin- ciples embodied in his paper until we have an opportunity of considering his plan in detail. In connection with this I enclose you the first portion of a paper I am writing for the Cabinet. I have written it very hurriedly, and it will require correction, and is not of course completed. I quite agree to your proposal about resolutions, if we can agree upon thtm, which, however, I very much doubt. I am going yachting on the West Coast to-morrow, joining the Irene on Saturday at Oban, and will not be back here for ten days or more. A letter to me at Oban will reach me. — Yours very truly, C. Ritchie. The Duke also received a letter from Lord Balfour of 1 The italics are as in original letter. I903 THE DUKE'S POSITION 325 Burleigh stating his reasons for disliking the new policy, the method in which it had been launched, and the argu- ments used by its supporters, and his distaste, also, for the prospect that the Government would go to the country with no specific scheme of policy by which it was prepared to stand or fall. On the 23rd August the Duke of Devon- shire wrote to the Prime Minister from Bolton Abbey : — The Duke of Devonshire to Mr. Balfour. ' I am afraid that there is no immediate prospect of your being able to leave London or Hatfield, and therefore make no excuses for writing to you about my position and that of some other members of the Cabinet in regard to the fiscal question. 'Without going so far as Mr. Ritchie in asking that a complete scheme should be submitted to us, I think that it is most desirable that, before our next meeting, we should have something more definite before us than anything which we have at present got. We know that Mr. Cham- berlain, who has advocated something which it is not easy to distinguish from Protection, finds the Prime Minister's paper and memorandum sufficient authority to enter upon his autumn campaign, while I and others might find in the reservations contained in it securities and safeguards which might satisfy me. Would it not be possible for you, before we meet again, to draw up some propositions, affirmative and negative, which would enable us to see how far it is possible to agree, or within what limits we can, as a Cabinet, agree to differ ? ' I am willing to admit that it may be right to make some attempt to establish closer trade relations with the Colonies, but do not admit that we ought to make sacrifices for this object, because I do not believe that the country will or ought to consent to make what can properly be called sacrifices, which would probably rather impair than strengthen its relations with the Colonies, and I doubt very much whether it is possible to establish very 326 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT Cn. xxvii. close trade relations between a country whose fiscal policy is mainly Free Trade, and other countries whose policy is mainly Protective. But I do not absolutely reject the attempt. ' Again, I could admit that the restriction of exports to foreign countries, which is due not to natural but to artificial causes, may be, and probably is, an evil, and I do not refuse to consider measures intended to cure it. But I have the most profound doubt whether it is possible to secure either of these objects without resorting to measures which would do more harm to ourselves than good to our colonial relations or our improved treatment by foreign rivals, and therefore I should like to see the new departure tried, if at all, in the most restricted and guarded manner. ' But this is not what, under existing conditions, is in the least likely to be the issue placed before the country. From the manner in which the new policy has been initiated, and also opposed, it seems to be inevitable that, unless some very stringent limitations are imposed on and accepted by its advocates, the issue will become still more what it really already is, viz., a controversy between Free Trade and Protection, If a General Election were to take place now this would be the issue, and I cannot conceive a more unsatisfactory position than that in which Cham- berlain and his supporters would be able to go as far as they liked in bidding for Protectionist support, while we, who are convinced, but not bigoted, Free Traders, would be reduced to attempt to restrain the application of Protectionist principles. ' For these reasons I should like, if possible, to have something in the nature of definite propositions placed before the Cabinet before the autumn agitation begins, and to see whether it is possible for us, even for a time, to continue as a united Cabinet. ' But there is a further suggestion which I should like to make. I do not know whether it has yet been considered how the present Parliament is to be treated in relation to this question. Probably, if Chamberlain thinks that he I903 THE DUKE'S POSITION 327 has obtained a sufficient success in the autumn, he will want a dissolution before another session. I should think it a great misfortune that a dissolution should take place either on the issue of Protection v. Free Trade, or on the perfectly vague and indefinite issues which are now being discussed all over the country. While I admit that the present Parliament cannot sanction any important new departure in present policy, I think that the existing Parliament is the proper place in which such a new departure ought in the first instance to be discussed. I suggest, therefore, that we should decide and announce that, when the inquiry which we have undertaken to make is completed, we shall submit its results to Parliament in the form of Resolutions. There are probably no exact pre- cedents for such a procedure, but I think that the Resolutions on which the Government of India Bill was founded, and Mr. Gladstone's Resolutions on the Irish Church, are something in the nature of precedents, and there may be others and better ones. ' But, precedent or no precedent, I think there would be some serious advantages in that procedure. If we are to meet Parliament again, it is impossible to exclude the House of Commons any longer from taking part in the dis- cussion which is going on everywhere else, and it seems to me that definite Resolutions would be a better basis for discussion than an amendment on the Address, or a Vote of Censure, or repeated motions for the adjournment. In the next place a full and formal discussion in the House of Commons might really be of some use in helping the country to make up its mind on a question on which it is almost hopelessly perplexed. ' It would, I think, have a very wholesome effect on the autumn oratory if it were known that the platform speeches and disquisitions had to be reduced to the form of concrete resolutions. And, finally, it would have the more doubtful advantage of enabling us, if we can arrive at some provi- sional agreement, such as I have suggested, at our next meeting to postpone the moment at which, if our differ- 328 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT Ch. xxvii. ences should prove to be irreconcilable, the Cabinet must break up, till near the time of the meeting of Parliament.' Mr. Balfour wrote a long and lucid letter on the 27th August to the Duke, in which he gave his view of the whole history, general and personal, of the fiscal question. In the latter part of it he stated his own existing posi- tion, and this statement must be given, as it is essential to the matter in hand. Mr. Balfour to the Duke of Devonshire. 'All this you will say is mere history ; so it is. But it is history which must be kept in mind if we are to be just to the various actors in this rather complicated drama. ' I will, however, now come to the immediate issue. ' I should much have preferred that the controversy which, as I have said, I believe in any case to have been inevitable, should have been allowed to develop itself in a more peaceful and regular manner. Through no fault of mine this proved impossible, and my efforts have been devoted to lessening, so far as I can, evils which 1 fear cannot be wholly avoided. But inasmuch as the question, for good or for evil, has been raised in a form which makes it necessary for every man in practical politics to make some declaration of opinion, I cannot, as an honest man, do otherwise than range myself among those who are of opinion that our present fiscal system is not wholly suited to our present needs. < I have troubled you already at great length with the economic reasons which have brought me to this view ; and I have also made some practical suggestions for the consideration of the Cabinet. ' I do not propose to repeat here anything that I have said in either of the two Papers which you have before you. But I hope you will allow me to remove one mis- conception to which the blue Cabinet paper appears to have given rise. I had not the smallest intention of using 1903 MR. BALFOUR'S POSITION 329 in that Paper anything in the nature of an argumcntum ad homineni. I sincerely thought that the Cabinet, Hke my- self, had long abandoned the narrow limits of what some persons regard as financial orthodoxy, and, in reminding them of the facts on which this view was based, I meant to do no more than point out that it was hardly open to us to declare that this or that proposal was outside discussion, merely because it did not square with the formulas of the Cobden Club. I never meant to suggest to any one that, because he was prepared to advise the use of our fiscal system {e.g., under the Sugar Convention) for purposes other than mere revenue, he was therefore bound to go the " whole Protectionist hog," or, indeed, to go an inch further away from Cobdenite Free Trade than, on its merits, he thought proper. ' My own view, perhaps, can be put most clearly by drawing a comparison between my theories upon fiscal questions and my theories upon social questions. The old Free Traders were consistent advocates of the laisses /aire principle in both departments of policy. Their advocacy of Free Trade and their objection to factory legislation largely sprang from the same root principle — the principle of laisses f aire and individualism. The move- ment of thought and the pressure of events have com- pelled us (in my opinion rightly compelled us) to abandon these principles in their extreme form. But this does not mean that either you or I are Socialists. It does mean that we now feel bound to consider many proposals on their merits which the Manchester School of sixty years since would summarily have dismissed on (what they called) " principle." * My attitude upon fiscal questions is precisely the same. I do not believe — indeed, I never have believed — that the old dogmas are theoretically sound. I do believe that they have served a very useful practical purpose at a certain stage of our political development. But they are in many respects unsuited to our present industrial and national position. I think we must be prepared to modify 330 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. them. Just as I am not a Socialist, so I am not a Protec- tionist ; and as in the case of social reform, so in the case of fiscal reform, I think that the mere fact of our increas- ing largely the number of ''open" questions, makes it more than ever necessary to approach their consideration in a spirit of cautious moderation. * Now, if this is so, it would surely be a matter of pro- found regret if the conduct of this question were to be left wholly, or principally, to those who, by temperament or by opinion, were disposed to extreme courses. I noticed at the last Cabinet before we separated that many of those who were, so far as I could judge, in complete agreement with myself were, nevertheless, disturbed by the reflection that they might be dragged along the new path much further than they desired to go. Chamberlain's extra- ordinary vigour and controversial skill thoroughly alarmed them. They feared that if they give an inch, an ell will be taken, and though they had no belief in the old dogmas, they liked them because they were definite and precise, and because they knew not whither the current of events would sweep them if they once abandoned the familiar anchorage. ' For my own part, I do not the least desire to ignore the danger which they feared. The danger is real ; and it exists with regard to fiscal just as it does with regard to social reform. If any political prophet were to assure me that we were either going to slip into some extreme form of Protection, or into some dangerous experiments in Socialism, I could not conscientiously say that I regard such a fate as impossible. What I could conscientiously say is that the path of safety is not to be found in the adherence to discredited dogmas, but in the cultivation of a sober public opinion, and in the steadfast co-operation of men who are neither blind to new necessities, nor too easily carried away by new enthusiasms. ' If, as now seems likely, these fiscal questions are going to remain in the forefront of practical politics, I should despise myself if I pressed any man to remain in the ,903 MR. BALFOUR'S POSITION 331 Government who was, on principle, opposed to the views I have expressed in this letter, or elsewhere. But, on the other hand, I should boldly appeal, on grounds of public duty, to ask those who do not dissent on principle to con- tinue their co-operation. And I make this appeal for two reasons — a narrower one and a broader one. The narrower reason is the one which I have just explained. The proper course for those who are afraid that a sound policy may be pressed too far, is to insist on having a share in deter- mining the method of its application. The broader reason is that a great many all-important interests, besides those immediately affected by our fiscal policy, are entrusted to the Unionist party ; and if that party be broken up, or seriously weakened, by internal divisions, these interests must assuredly suffer. That the party is threatened with serious disruption upon the fiscal question may be due to Chamberlain's fault, or it may be due to deeper causes ; and Chamberlain's action may have only hastened, and, it may be, somewhat aggravated, difficulties which were inevitable. It matters little which. Our business is to prevent our divisions reaching a point which may convert them into a national disaster, and may deprive the greatest interests of the country of the guardianship by which since 1886 they have been protected. ' Much as you dislike office, and justly as you may feel that you are entitled to some rest from public labours, these are considerations to which you are so certain to attach their full value that I will not dwell upon them. 'This letter has, indeed, already reached an inordinate length, and if I did not feel it absolutely necessary that before the decisive Cabinet of the 14th, you should have before you the whole case as it presents itself to my mind, I would not have troubled you with it. The subject on which I have dwelt least is the Imperial, as distinguished from the economic, side of preferential treatment. I do not feel that on this I have any new or valuable observa- tions to offer. But if, as seems certain, Canada and other Colonies are prepared to employ their tariffs in order to 332 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. further an Imperial ideal, and if, as seems probable, the rejection of their overtures will lead to their withdrawal, and we become worse off as an Empire than if those overtures had never been made, I should be sorry to think that I belonged to a Government or a party which hastily rejected them. Let that responsibility, if it has to be incurred, be incurred by others.' In another letter two days later, 29th August, Mr. Balfour said that there would be no difficulty in preparing the definite propositions suggested by the Duke in his letter of 29th August. He said also that he had been a little disturbed by the Duke's description of himself ' as under some special obligation to consult the views of Ritchie, G. Hamilton, and Balfour of Burleigh. I quite understand that each and all of us are under obligations of this kind to the Cabinet as a ivhole, but surely not to any fraction of it. This is having a Cabinet within a Cabinet with a vengeance.' * Mr. Balfour wrote again to the Duke on the 6th September. He said — ' I quite understand your anxiety not to take any step which may ultimately involve you in a policy which you dislike, and your consequent hesitation in becoming re- sponsible for a change which, while it may be confined within limits of which you approve, may also not be so confined. I cannot help thinking, however, that these dangers can be avoided. It may, of course, happen that the injury done at some future time to enormous home industries by foreign competition will so arouse public ^ In his speech of 7th March 1904, Mr. Balfour said : ' It appears . . . that there had been formed within the Cabinet a sort of second Cabinet pledged to each other by bonds of mutual confidence in connection with this subject of fiscal reform,' and he referred to rumours of the time as to his own resignation and new ministerial combinations. It is quite possible, or probable, that some of those politically connected with the Duke may have talked of these things in the clubs, but nothing, one need not say, could have been more remote from the Duke's own mind. I903 GERALD BALFOUR'S FORMULAS 333 feeling that another President of the Council and another First Lord of the Treasury may be compelled to adopt Protection. I do not venture to prophesy, but I am confident that the best way of avoiding such a contingency is to do what we can now to mitigate illegitimate competi- tion. If, like the Cobden Club, we preach a doctrine of Free Trade which takes account of nothincr but the immediate interests of the consumer, and which welcomes every form of competition which appears to minister to these ; if, in other words, legitimate and illegitimate foreign competition receive from us an equal benediction, depend upon it Free Trade, thus made unnecessarily repulsive, will be repudiated by the nation, in the first great commercial stress which occurs. ' It is unfortunate, but certainly true, that it is not possible for any of us, at the present juncture, to adopt a quiescent or waiting policy. An answer, and a definite answer, must be given to the questions which the public are asking. There is the answer which Chamberlain, if he had no one but himself to consider, would probably like to give ; an answer which goes perilously near to general protection. There is the answer / want to give — which is embodied in the documents you already possess, and is summarised in the accompanying formulas drawn up by Gerald. It is based on Free Trade and offers, I believe, the best hope of maintaining or extending Free Trade, There is, lastly, the answer which, I gather, Balfour of Burleigh is resolved to give ; which is a mere nonpossumus. This which, in point of form, seems the most negative of the three, is really the one which will most quickly produce the most serious consequences. For it will not merely break up the Unionist party ; it will shatter each separate wing of the Unionist party, dividing Tory from Tory, and Liberal from Liberal. This is dynamite with a vengeance ! I still hope better things.' The formulas, prepared by Mr. Gerald Balfour, which accompanied the letter were as follows : — 334 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. Draft Resolutions for Stibmission to the Cabinet {and possibly later on to the House of Commons). ' I. That an increasing tendency is manifest on the part of communities outside the United Kingdom towards a highly protective policy. '2. That such policy is calculated to injure the trade and commerce of this country by diminishing the demand for British and Irish produce, and also in certain cases by directly or indirectly favouring the export of foreign pro- duce at artificially low prices, and thus giving it an unfair advantage in competition with British manufactures in our home and in neutral markets. '3. That it is expedient alike on commercial and on political grounds to establish trade relations between the United Kingdom and other parts of the Empire, so far as may be found practicable, on a basis of mutual preference. '4. That for the purpose of securing freer trade within the Empire, and freer and fairer trade with foreign countries, the time has come when the Executive should be placed in a stronger position or more adequately equipped with powers for the conduct of commercial negotiations with other Governments, and for the defence of our commercial interests when threatened by the fiscal policy of foreign countries. ' 5. That the importance of securing the above objects justifies such departure from the general rule that taxes should only be imposed for revenue purposes as the circumstances in each case may appear to demand. 'Provided that this resolution shall not extend to approval of any tax on raw material which is not food, or of any tax on food or food-stuffs exceeding ^ per cent, ad valorem, or of any tax the sole primary object of which is to protect British and Irish industry against the competition of foreign producers unaided by State agency. ' Left blank in the orisjinal document. I903 MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S LETTER 335 ' Provided further that any readjustment of taxation required for the purposes contemplated in this rcsohition shall be framed so as to avoid any (material) increase in the general cost of living of working men, whether artisans or agricultural labourers.' The Duke wrote on the loth September to Lord James of Hereford : — ' I do not think that I can agree to any modus vivendi that can be proposed, and resignation appears to be the only alternative. But I am very low about it. You say that assent to a modus vivendi will be destruction to us as a party. What do you think is to become of the party if we break up ? I cannot see how the Liberal Unionist Association is to be maintained. * I suppose the critical decision will have to be taken on Monday, and the Prime Minister's compromise seems to me the most impossible course of all. I am completely puzzled and distracted by all the arguments pro and con Free Trade and Protection ; but, whichever of them is right, I cannot think that something which is neither, but a little of both, can be right.' On the 9th September Mr. Chamberlain wrote to the Prime Minister the letter, afterwards published, in which he said, that by reason of the * unscrupulous use ' which had been made of *■ the old cry of the dear loaf,' and the prejudice thus created, he felt that *as an immediate and practical policy, the question of preference to the Colonies cannot be pressed with any success at the present time, although there is a very strong feeling in favour of the other branch of fiscal reform, which would give a fuller discretion to the Government in negotiating with foreign countries for freer exchange of commodities, and would enable our representatives to retaliate if no concession were made to our just claims for greater reciprocity. If, 336 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT Ch. xxvii. as I believe, you share these views, it seems to me that you will be absolutely justified in adopting them as the policy of your Government, although it will necessarily involve some changes in its constitution.' ^ As Colonial Secretary, he said, he stood in a position different from any of his colleagues, and would justly be blamed if he remained in office and ' thus formally accepted the ex- clusion from my political programme of so important a part of it.' He thought that he could best promote the cause from outside. He suggested, therefore, that ' You should limit the present policy of the Government to the assertion of our freedom in the case of all commercial relations \vith foreign countries, and that you should agree to my tendering my resignation of my present office to his Majesty, and devoting myself to the work of explaining and popularising those principles of Im- perial union which my experience has convinced me are essential to our future welfare and prosperity.* This letter, of the 9th, was not mentioned at the Cabinet meeting of the 14th, although Mr. Chamberlain did then say that, if Preference were dropped, he thought that he would have to resign, and carry on the movement in an independent capacity. On the i6th September Mr. Balfour replied to the Colonial Secretary. He began by saying that he did not answer the letter of the 9th, ' which I received shortly before my departure from Scotland for the Cabinet meeting, as I knew that we should within a few hours have an opportunity of talking over the important issues with which it deals. The reply, therefore, which I am now writing rather embodies the results of our con- versations than adds to them anything which is new.' Mr. Balfour then expressed his general sympathy with ^ ' Some changes ' seems to refer to the retirement of the decided Free Trade Ministers, as well as his own. I903 A RESIGNATION AND ACCEPTANCE 337 Mr. Chamberlain's views as to Colonial Preference, and his agreement with the view that, if taxation on food-stuffs were necessary for that purpose, public opinion was 'not yet ripe for such an arrangement ' by reason of ' past political battles and present political misrepresentations.' He acquiesced, in terms of reluctance, in Mr. Chamberlain's proposal, and said : — ' If you think that you can best serve the interests of Imperial unity for which you have done so much by press- ing your views on Colonial Preference with the freedom which is possible in an independent position, how can I criticise your determination. The loss to the Government is great indeed ; but the gain to the cause you have at heart may be greater still. If so what can I do but acquiesce ? ' On 8th September Mr. Gerald Balfour sent to the Duke a scheme for giving to the Colonies a preference by placing a duty on meat, fruit, and dairy produce, but excepting the sacred corn, reducing at the same time, as a set off, the taxes on tea, coffee, cocoa, and sugar. In this letter he referred to the draft resolutions sent two days earlier by the Prime Minister to the Duke as ' expressing the policy he and I approve.' It appears, therefore, that on the 8th September the Prime Minister was in favour of the adop- tion by the Cabinet in principle^ and as the objective of future action, of that policy which in his letter of the 9th Mr. Chamberlain described as ' a preferential agreement with our Colonies involving any new duty, however small, on articles of food hitherto untaxed,' which was, he said, ' even if accompanied by a reduction of taxation on other articles of food of equally universal consumption, unaccept- able to the majority in the constituencies,' at present. The letters which passed between the Prime Minister and Mr. Chamberlain, of the 9th and i6th September, VOL. II. Y 338 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. showed that they were, for the time at least, in what may perhaps be called an incomplete agreement. Both Ministers believed, although with different degrees of fervour in faith, that the preferential policy was an ideal to be aimed at ; both of them held, although with different degrees of decision, that the time was not yet ripe for the proposal of taxation of food products. The policy was not to be abandoned, but to be adjourned for such time as might be necessary to affect a change in public opinion. Both Mr. Balfour and Mr. Chamberlain thought that public opinion was ripe, or nearly so, for the policy of arming our diplomacy with some means of enforcing our claim to fair treatment by other nations in matters of trade. It would surely have been better if the Prime Minister had informed his colleagues at the Cabinet of 14th September of Mr. Chamberlain's letter and his own reply, or intended reply, but the disclosure could not have made any difference to men like Mr. Ritchie, who were opposed not ojtly to any immediate steps in pursuance of the policy, but also to the adoption of the principle as part of the Unionist creed.^ At the end of his letter to Mr. Chamberlain of i6th September Mr. Balfour referred to the readiness of Mr. Austen Chamberlain to remain in the Cabinet and said, 'There could be no more conclusive evidence that, in your judgment, as in mine, the exclusion of taxation on food from the party programme is, in existing circumstances, the course best fitted practically to further the cause of fiscal reform.' This, and the whole tenor of the letter, made it clear that no one could honestly remain a member of Mr. Balfour's Government unless he were, in general terms, a fiscal reformer, in favour, that is, of a free hand to treat other nations as they treated us, and in favour also, ulti- mately, when the people of this country could be converted, * Mr. Ritchie himself admitted this in a later letter to the Duke. I903 DIVISION IN CABINET 339 of the imposition of such duties as were necessary to enable us to treat the Colonies on a different basis from our treat- ment of countries outside the Empire. Now Mr. Ritchie and, probably, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, sympathised, if not on the first, yet certainly on the second, of these points with the view taken from the first moment by the Liberal Opposition. The Duke of Devonshire still re- mained in the position of an inquirer without much hope of conviction. Mr. Balfour had, however, some reason to think that, regard being had to his speech in the House of Lords and to his letter of 23rd August, the Duke might accept the ' opportunist ' position of the Chamberlain correspondence. The question raised was new to busy men of the day, and full of difficulty. Few of Mr. Balfour's colleagues were ready or willing to go beyond the most general declarations in favour of fiscal reform, none, per- haps, except Mr. Chamberlain and his son. Two of them, namely, Mr. Ritchie and Lord Balfour of Burleigh, were strong and decided adherents of the doctrine of free im- ports, without preference, at any rate in the case of all food products, although admitting the legitimacy of a small duty for purely revenue purposes. With these colleagues the Duke of Devonshire and Lord George Hamilton (who as Indian Secretary had committed himself to a defence upon Free Trade principles of the fiscal policy imposed, to satisfy Lancashire, upon a reluctant India in the matter of cotton duties) were, although less antagonistic to all change, in decided sympathy. When papers containing definite proposals are circu- lated to the members of a Cabinet before a meeting by the Prime Minister, or another, it is the practice that any other Ministers who desire to do so can also circu- late printed remarks on the subject. The only Ministers who sent in memorandums with regard to Mr. Balfour's 340 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. papers on this occasion were Mr. Ritchie and Lord Balfour of Burleigh, both of them stating strongly and fairly their reasoned objections to the via media proposed by the Prime Minister and their inability to accept his conclusions as to policy. When the Cabinet met, it was at once made clear to the two Ministers that, with the opinions which they held, they could not remain. In a letter at the time the Duke, who always put things into plain language, wrote : ' I never heard anything more summary and decisive than the dismissal of the two Ministers.' It was a 'dismissal' in the same sense, appar- ently, as Mr. Gladstone's dealing with Mr. Chamberlain and Sir G. Trevelyan in 1886, a prompt assertion, that is, ' If such is your view, you cannot continue to be members of this Government.' This opening appears to have been followed by a general and not very clear discussion. Mr. Chamberlain said that, if preferential proposals were dropped, he would have to resign. He also asked whether, if they were dropped, the Cabinet would hold to the re- taliatory part of the programme. The Prime Minister tried to fix attention on the main issue of principle, * Are we a Cabinet of Fiscal Reform, or no ? ' There was to be a second Cabinet on the following morning, Tuesday 15th, to deal exclusively with foreign affairs. Lord George Hamilton, in a speech which he made to his constituents on 22nd October, gave the following account of what happened up to the evening of the 14th September : — 'On the last day of the Session (13th August) the Cabinet met, and we had before us two documents, a pamphlet entitled Insular Free Trade and another docu- ment containing the proposals which the Prime Minister wished officially to put forward in the name of the Govern- ment. Preferential tariffs and taxation of food were in- I903 LORD GEORGE HAMILTON 341 eluded in that programme. We agreed to the pubUcation of the first document ; we differed as to the acceptance of the proposals in the second. The discussion was adjourned, and on the 14th September was resumed. Both Mr. Ritchie and I understood that these proposals were still before us, though we were perplexed and mystified by the turn the discussion sometimes took. Again we w^ere unable to agree. When the Cabinet was over, the Duke of Devonshire, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, Mr. Ritchie and I met in my room. We fully discussed the position, as we understood it, and we were unanimously of opinion that we had no option but to resign, and the Duke undertook personally to inform Mr. Balfour of the determination we had arrived at. One and all of us were then ignorant of Mr. Chamberlain's resignation, and we knew that as long as he was one of the Cabinet pre- ferential tariffs could not be altogether dropped.' There were, as must always happen, some differences in recollection as to what passed in conversation. In a letter of 24th October to Lord George Hamilton, the Duke said : — * I certainly had not made up my mind to resign when we met in your room, as I had promised, and stated that I had promised, to see Balfour again. Neither did I under- take the commission on the part of us all to communicate the resignations to the Prime Minister. What I distinctly recollect that I undertook to do was to ask the Prime Minister whether those Ministers who, as it were, had notice to quit, were expected to attend the Cabinet next day.' Lord George Hamilton continued his narration thus: — 'There was another Cabinet the next day dealing with other matters. We four met again after the Cabinet and, as I was informed there was no change in the situation, I formally sent in my resignation, which was written in words 342 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvil making it clear that I understood that Mr. Chamberlain was remaining a member of the Government, and that, in one shape or another, preferential tariffs were to be advocated. I received the following day (i6th) a friendly acknowledgment of my letter from the Prime Minister.' The Duke, according to a memorandum preserved among the Devonshire papers, saw Mr. Balfour after the Cabinet of Monday the 14th. ' He hinted that Chamber- lain might resign.' On September 15th, it is noted, the Duke met the other three Ministers, and it was understood that they would all send in their resignations in the course of the afternoon, with a proviso, in the Duke's case, that he was to have an interview with Mr. Balfour in the even- ing, and that it was ' possible but not probable ' that he (Mr. Balfour) might cause him to reconsider his position. The Duke wrote his letter of resignation but suspended sending it until after the interview. Earlier on the same day (Tuesday 15th) the Duke had written to the Prime Minister : — < Before sending you my final decision I should like to know, if possible, what it is you propose to say about pre- ferential treatment of the Colonies involving taxation of food. Though I understand you to doubt its practicability at the present time, I do not understand that you will say anything that will prevent Chamberlain from continuing his advocacy of it. We are all, I believe, agreed that the time has come when the Cabinet must cease to speak with two voices, and therefore I do not think that any reserva- tions on your part short of rejection of this part of the policy would make much difference on the situation, though I have reason to believe that a distinct repudiation of it would affect the views of other members of the Government, perhaps more than my own.' When the Duke saw the Prime Minister at 7 p.m. that Tuesday evening the strong probability of Mr. Chamber- I903 THE DUKE'S FIRST RESIGNATION 343 Iain's ceasing to remain in the Cabinet was mentioned, but not, as the Duke stated in his later explanation in the House of Lords, in such a manner as to lead him to believe "that a definite tender of resignation had been made, still less that it was likely to be accepted." Mr. Balfour, according to the Duke's memorandum, asked him not to mention this probability to any one. He also told him that Lord Balfour of Burleigh and Mr. Ritchie were not compelled to resign " on account of the Memoranda which they had circulated, but on account of the attitude which they had assumed towards the fiscal question throughout all its stages." The Duke, on his return to Devonshire House, decided to send the letter of resigna- tion, which was already written, to the Prime Minister, with the following covering letter : — ' In thinking over the very difBcult position in which I find myself, the only course which suggests itself to me is to send you the letter which I had written before I saw you this afternoon. It was only the accident of my having asked for a supplementary explanation on a certain point that caused its delivery to be delayed. It represents accurately the opinion which I had formed on the dis- cussion in the Cabinet, and in my subsequent conversation with you,i and if you consider that it is based in any degree on a misapprehension of the circumstances it must be for you to take such action upon it as you think fit. I need, perhaps, only add that if I am acting under any mis- apprehension it was shared by others, who after consul- tation with me have taken more prompt action than I did, and that I could not honourably reconsider my position in any way without further communication with them.' The letter of resignation of 15th September sent with the covering note was as follows : — ^ i.e., at Downing Street, immediately after the Cabinet on the 14th September. 344 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. TJie Duke of Devonshire to Mr. Balfour. it^th September 1903. My dear Balfour, — I need not tell you that I have given the most anxious thought to the discussion in yester- day's Cabinet, and to the conversation which I had with you afterwards. Nor is it necessary for me to say with what deep regret I find that I cannot come to any other conclusion than that which I have indicated in two or three recent letters to you as the probable one. My conviction that I cannot with satisfaction to myself, or with any advantage to the Government, remain a mem- ber of it, after the declaration of policy which you intend to make at Sheffield, is strengthened by what took place at the Cabinet yesterday. Two members of the Cabinet only had written and circulated Minutes on the question under discussion. I have referred again to these Minutes, and I find that they consist mainly of criticisms on the procedure that has been adopted, of the expression of doubt as to the necessity of any new departure at all in our fiscal policy, and of objections to any plan of fiscal reform which, in the absence of any definite plan proposed by the reformers, it seemed possible to construct from the speeches of Mr. Chamberlain. I do not find in these Minutes a single criticism from which I dissent, or any argument with which, in the absence of reply or refutation, I disagree. But without any attempt to reply to these criticisms or objections, without any statement whatever on the part of the principal authors of the new departure, it was assumed that the writers had shown themselves to be irreconcilable, and that their resignation had become inevitable. I do not question the opinion expressed on all sides yesterday that this policy can only be successful if supported by men who thoroughly believe in it, and I ask myself, how is it possible that I, who so largely share the views of these Ministers who are deemed to be irreconcilable, can under any con- ceivable circumstances be of any use to, or add to the strength of, the Government ? I903 THE DUKE'S FIRST RESIGNATION 345 But I only refer to this point as having strengthened the convictions which I think I must in any case have formed, and I do not wish you to suppose that any dif- ferent procedure at, or previous to, yesterday's Cabinet would have materially altered my decision. Without going into the merits of the questions which are being discussed, and those which will be discussed after your declaration, I hold that the raising of the issue at all was unnecessary and premature, and that it has been raised in the wrong way. Neither you nor I are responsible for this, and you know that a crisis similar to this one was imminent in the summer, and was only averted by the invention of the formula of the Enquiry. I have done my best to persuade myself, and to persuade others, that a real enquiry was being carried on, that Free Trade was on its trial, and that by the results of the enquiry it would be judged. But I cannot admit that the collection of a mass of statistics without any attempt to enlighten ourselves or the country as to what they prove, or an abstract essay such as you intend to publish, constitute the kind of enquiry which I, at least, have been promising. I object, therefore, to the declaration which you propose to make at Sheffield that the time has arrived when it is necessary that a change, which I understand you will indicate as a considerable change, must be made in the fiscal policy of the country. How far you intend, or will be able to indicate the nature and the extent of that change, I confess that I am still quite unable to grasp, but I apprehend that your declaration must involve some attack on the principle of free imports, which will give great hope and encourage- ment to every Protectionist, and will, in the first instance at least, alienate from you every Free Trader until you have been able to persuade them — if you can persuade them — that you are working in the interests of real Free Trade. As a consequence of what has already taken place, the issue of Free Trade v. Protection has been raised, and I 346 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. cannot distinguish the policy which Chamberlain has initi- ated, and which is being advocated by an organisation directly under his control, from a policy of Protection. Chamberlain has said nothing to lead me to believe that he is going to abandon or modify his course of action, and thus, in the coming months, a great deal must be said, if not by you, by the next most important members of the Cabinet, with which I shall be wholly unable to agree. I shall either have to be silent, or to dissent. The first course would be intolerable for me, and the second would be a prolongation of a state of things which we are all agreed cannot go on any longer with credit to the Govern- ment or with advantage to the country. It has long been a matter of doubt how far such a question as this could properly be regarded as an open one. With the departure, recognised as necessary and inevitable, of the Free Trade members of the Government it ceases to be an open one, and those who, like myself, hold that no sufficient case has been made out for disturb- ing the foundations on which the fiscal and commercial policy of the country rest, must definitely declare them- selves on one side or the other. It might be possible for one who is more conversant with the abstract doctrines of political economy than I am, or who possesses more dialectical skill than I can pretend to, to support the position which you are going to take up, while dissociating myself from the more advanced policy which is going to be advocated by Chamberlain, but when I look forward to the controversies which will be raised by your declaration followed by Chamberlain's speeches, and to the part which I should be called upon to take in them in the country and in the House of Lords, I feel the most profound conviction that I should find my own position an impossible one, and one which could only bring discredit on your Government. I believe that there is no other important subject on which we differ, and it has been a pleasure to me to give you what little help I could as a member of your Govern- 1903 LETTER TO MR. RITCHIE 347 ment. I am not insensible to the effect which this sever- ance may produce on the maintenance of the Unionist party, but I am certain that my continuance in office under the conditions which I have endeavoured to de- scribe would deprive us of any power to be of real service to that party or the country. I have therefore, with feel- ings of the deepest regret, no alternative but to ask you to place my resignation in the hands of his Majesty. — I remain, yours sincerely, Devonshire. On the afternoon of the following day, Wednesday the i6th, Mr. Balfour called upon the Duke and read to him Mr. Chamberlain's letter of the 9th and his reply of the 1 6th September. The Duke said that he thought that the same information should be given, and an opportunity of reconsidering their resignations should be allowed to the other three Ministers concerned, but Mr. Balfour did not agree to this, giving as his reason that they were irrecon- cilable, and that, if they remained, the Cabinet would break up. At the end of this conversation the Duke con- sented to continue in the Government. He wrote that same evening the following letter to Mr. Ritchie : — September 1 6, 1903. My dear Ritchie, — I received your message through E. Hamilton asking me whether the situation is altered since my interview with Balfour last night. I was unable at the time to answer the question, but I have since seen Balfour, and am able now to tell you of what I think you will agree with me is a fundamental alteration. He assured me in the first place that the promptitude with which he had acquiesced in the necessity for your and Balfour of Burleigh's resignation was not due, or mainly due, as I had assumed, to anything contained in your Minutes recently circulated, but to your general attitude towards the question throughout its stages which he con- sidered had been very different from my own. But this is 348 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT Ch. xxvii. not the material point. To my astonishment he informed me last night of the probability, and has to-day assured me of the certainty of Chamberlain's resignation. I told him at once that, though this would have materially altered my own view of the situation, I was still in a very embarrass- ing position. You, Balfour of Burleigh, and G. Hamilton had consulted me, and it was, if not on my advice, with my acquiescence, that you had sent in your resignations, and that I had led you to expect that I should take the same course. I also told him that I thought that the knowledge of Chamberlain's resignation might, though I did not know whether it would, have altered your decisions, and that, if I was asked to reconsider my position on this ground, the natural course would be that you should also have the opportunity of reconsidering yours. This he considers impossible on the ground I have already indicated, and indeed he is of opinion that he would not keep the re- mainder of the Cabinet together under such conditions. I need not enter into the reasons why, for myself, this wholly unexpected result of these discussions has led me to reconsider the decision which I had formed. What I have, however, to consider is whether, after what has passed between us, I shall be guilty of any breach of faith towards you and the other seceders if I consent to remain in the Cabinet. On the best consideration which I can give to the question, I have come to the conclusion that I shall not. After the Prime Minister's opening statements on Monday, I do not think that you and Balfour of Bur- leigh could have taken any other course than that which you have taken, or that any different advice which I could have given you would have led to any different result. Although therefore you may blame me for inconsistency I cannot feel that any responsibility towards you or Balfour of Burleigh rests upon me which precludes the necessity of forming my own judgment as to my own conduct in the new situation. While I was writing this your note has arrived, and though I can assure you that the turn which events have 1903 LETTER TO LORD GEORGE 349 taken has given me very great anxiety, and even pain, I shall be very glad to see you to-morrow morning, and to give you any further explanation you may desire. — Yours, Devonshire. The Duke, on the 17th September, sent copies of this letter to Lord George Hamilton, and to Lord Balfour of Burleigh. His covering letter to Lord George was as follows : — ' I enclose a copy of a letter which I wrote to Ritchie last night, which I hope may explain to you my position in this wholly unexpected turn of events. < I have felt this position to be a very difficult and even painful one, but what has given me most anxiety has been the apprehension that, in having led some of my colleagues to expect that I should, under entirely different circum- stances, take a different course from that which I am now taking, I may be open to some imputation of want •of loyalty or good faith towards them. I have seen Ritchie this morning, who, though he considers that he has been badly treated in this matter, I hope entirely acquits me of any such charge of a personal character, and I trust that you may take the same view. ' I feel, perhaps, a greater responsibility towards you than any other of the Ministers concerned, for while Ritchie and Balfour of Burleigh received, at the opening of the Cabinet discussion, distinct notice to quit, you were not so singled out, and possibly, but for my advice, and if you had known of Chamberlain's impending resignation, you might not have thought it necessary to join the others in resigning. ' I think that what I said to the Prime Minister would justify you in re-opening the question with him, if you thought fit ; but I should tell you that, for some reason which I do not know, he appears to class you among those who have been irreconcilable throughout.' 350 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. Lord George Hamilton said, in replying, on the i8th: — ' I do not see what else you could have done. If you had refused to stay on the Unionist party would have been scattered to the four winds. It is quite true that, if you had not agreed to my sending in my resignation, and if I had not thought that you were sure to do the same, I should have hesitated in taking the step I did. No one could foresee the extraordinary change that has occurred, and as the whole condition of things had changed you could but adapt your position to the facts put before you. Therefore dismiss me from your mind ; you have treated me, as you do everybody else, with absolute good faith.' The Duke also sent a copy of his letter to Mr. Ritchie to Lord Balfour of Burleigh, who answered laconically, ' You will never hear any complaint from me about your action.' Lord George Hamilton, in the speech of 22nd October, portions of which have already been quoted, pointed out that when on the 17th September the newspapers published the correspondence between Mr. Balfour and Mr. Chamber- lain, and the resignations of the Free Trade Ministers were at the same time gazetted, their letters of resignation were not also sent for publication. He said : — ' I am quite sure that this was a pure oversight, but the result was that the public believed that the whole Cabinet were aware of the change in the situation, and that with that knowledge before us the Duke of Devonshire and we differed. I make no complaint whatever on being out of office. In my own judgment I had been long enough in office, and I had felt that, for some time past, as I was tired and jaded, a change at the India Office might be desirable. There were plenty of able young men coming on, and it was only fair that they should have their chance before they were too old, and I was ready at any time, upon a hint from the Prime Minister, to resign my office. A I903 LETTER TO LORD JAMES 351 Prime Minister has, moreover, an undoubted right to request any of his colleagues, whose presence in his Cabinet is, in his opinion or judgment, prejudicial to the efficiency or policy of the Government, to resign his office. On the other hand, a Cabinet Minister has an unquestioned right to expect that, if he is summoned to decide upon a momentous issue, and one which may affect his whole future official and political life, he should be fully informed of the latest phase of the situation. Mr. Balfour, holding the opinions he does, was perfectly right in wishing to reconstitute his Cabinet, but I think it was a pity that more care was not taken so to conduct the procedure of resignation as to prevent all cause for subsequent mis- understanding.' VI The Duke's decision not to resign left him in a torment- ing state of mind. He felt that the Ministers who had resigned must think that he had not stood by them. His explanations did not satisfy his own keen sense of honour and loyalty. His uneasiness was increased when he had carefully studied the letters of the 9th and i6th September exchanged between the Prime Minister and Mr. Chamber- lain and now published in the newspapers, and saw, or thought that he saw, meanings in them not apparent when he had heard them read to him on the i6th. On the 17th September he wrote to Lord James of Hereford, who was a very strong Free Trade Liberal Unionist : — ' I suppose you will d — n me and say that I have accepted an impossible modus vivendi. I had fully intended to resign until I heard that Chamberlain's resignation was definitely decided, which was not till Tuesday evening. This removed my chief difficulty, which was freedom to Chamberlain, as a member of the Government, to carry on his Protectionist agitation. ' And the position seemed to me to be absurd that both 352 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. Chamberlain and I, who had been opposing him, should both leave Balfour. I believe that Finlay, who was, I think, the only man to foresee a possible solution of this kind, and whom I saw on Sunday, will think that I have done right, and will have no difhculty in remaining. Ritchie and Balfour of Burleigh did not really resign, but were told that they must go. ' I shall be curious to have your opinion, however condemnatory." Lord James replied, with most effective gloom — ' Pray let me assure you that under no circumstances could I ever ejaculate the words you suggest in relation to any course you may pursue, and never in public will you find me uttering one word in condemnation of your political action. But to you I must say that your agree- ment to become a supporter of Balfour's Protectionist views has caused me as much sadness as surprise. In your last letter to me your condemnation and repudiation of his arguments were complete. Chamberlain's resigna- tion does not alter the soundness of a policy.' i Mr. Balfour, on the 22nd September, sent the following Memorandum to the Duke and to his other colleagues : — ' There appears to be some misapprehension among some of my colleagues as to what occurred in and out of Cabinet in the early part of last week in connection with fiscal reform. ' It has been implied, for instance, in some statements that I have seen, that I came to Monday's Cabinet knowing that Mr. Chamberlain was determined to resign, but re- solved to keep the circumstance from the knowledge of my colleagues. The true facts are as follows : — < I received Mr. Chamberlain's letter of the 9th by the last post on Thursday the loth. I made no reply to it, hoping to have an interview with him on Sunday. ' He did not, however, leave Birmingham till Monday ^ 19th September 1903. I903 MR. BALFOUR'S EXPLANATION 353 morning ; and I did not see him till an hour before Cabinet on that day (the 14th). ' We talked over his letter, he reiterated his view, after- wards expressed to the Cabinet, that, if preferential duties were dropped, there were reasons, personal to himself, which made it impossible for him to stay ; and I said to him, what I said to the Cabinet within the last hour, that I was becoming more and more convinced that pubhc opinion was not ripe for a tax on food, and that any attempt at the present time to impose one would endanger that portion of fiscal reform against which there was no such widespread prejudice. ' Whether, however, a duty on food-stuffs should be attempted or not seemed to be then — and seems to be still" — a subsidiary point, important indeed, but in no way fundamental. ' I was not, therefore, of opinion that either Mr. Cham- berlain's attitude or mine towards a food tax was relevant to the question of principle ; nor could I suppose that any discussion of it would affect the opinion of those members of the Cabinet who were not prepared heartily to accept a change of fiscal policy at all. ' Over and over again, in the early part of Monday's Cabinet, I therefore called the debate back from all minor issues to this, which I conceive to be the main point ; and I never doubted then, and I do not gather that there is any reason for doubting now, that, on this point, Mr. Ritchie, Lord George Hamilton, and Lord Balfour of Burleigh took, and take, a different view from myself and the majority of the Cabinet. ' The fiscal discussion has now been going on in an acute form since the middle of May. Never once, so far as I am aware, did any hesitating member of the Cabinet suggest to me that his objection to tariff reform would be completely met if no attempt were made to put a tax on food.' The following correspondence took place between the Duke and Mr. Chamberlain : — VOL. II, Z 354 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. The Duke of Devonshire to Mr. Chamberlain. igih September 1903. ' I am sure you must be overwhelmed with corres- pondence, and I will not add more than I can help to its volume. But I should like to assure you that, though I was as far from anticipating it as any one else, I am now convinced that from your point of view the course which you have taken was right, and I only wish that my own had been as clear to me as yours has seemed to you. 'After Monday's Cabinet I had quite resolved to send in my resignation with those of Ritchie and the others, and I know that you will not misunderstand me when I say that though I had, and still have, difficulty in accepting the policy which Balfour will announce at Sheffield, my main reason was that I did not see how you, holding what I understood to be frankly Protectionist views, and myself, could remain in the Cabinet together. I might, no doubt, have known that, if you had remained in the Government, you would have loyally accepted any limitations which the Prime Minister might have imposed, but I think you will agree with me that his statements are not as clear as they might have been, and that he expressed so much sympathy with your opinions that these limitations were not very accurately defined. ' I could, therefore, only look forward, so far as I was concerned, to a continuance of the unsatisfactory division of opinion in the Cabinet which has already lasted too long. 'This part of my difficulty is removed by the decision on your part which I perhaps ought to have anticipated, and, now that you have taken it, see to be the right and perhaps even inevitable one. I need not trouble you with the reasons which make me regret that our positions were reversed, but I do not imagine that it will be very long before we all find ourselves in the cold shade,' 1903 CHAMBERLAIN'S REMONSTRANCE 355 Highbury, Moor Green, Birmingham, 21 si Septetnber 1903- My dear Devonshire, — I am very much obliged to you for your letter and glad to receive it. I confess that I have been puzzled by your recent attitude, and even now I do not altogether understand it. You seem to have accepted Balfour's whole paper — which leads to retaliation and therefore, incidentally, to the Protection of which you are so much afraid. But you refused to look at my proposals for Preference, which are put forward solely with the object of ensuring Imperial Unity, and which, under no possible circumstances, would lead to any substantial, or indeed perceptible, protection of a Home industry. It is ridiculous to suppose that two shillings a quarter on corn would restore prosperity to agriculture, although the farmers might possibly support it as drowning men will catch at a straw. For my own part I care only for the great question of Imperial Unity. Everything else is secondary or conse- quential. But for this — to quote a celebrated phrase — I would not have taken my coat off. I should not be frank with you if- I did not say that, after eighteen years of loyal co-operation, I have been bitterly hurt by the fact that you have thought well to confer as to your course of action with Ritchie and Balfour of Burleigh, who are not members of your party. Meanwhile, I have never been called to your counsels, and have had to seek even such slight opportunity as you have given me to explain my views. If you had thought me worthy of your confidence, you would have known from the first that I was perfectly ready to put aside any personal claims and to resign office rather than be a cause of discord. If the Cabinet and the Party had been united we might have faced the General Election with confidence that even if we were defeated — as I believe we should have been on Education and War Office Reforms — we should have had ZS^ MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. a policy for the future which time and discussion would have made victorious. Education and our War Office policy — on both of which I warned the Cabinet and yourself especially that you were destroying your party — gave us Greenwich and Rye and Kent — all before the fiscal question was mentioned. Where have you had such a turnover of votes since ? I, who for the sake of the party swallowed these camels, now find that you and others strain at my gnat ! What did I ask of you before I went to South Africa ? That you should retain the shilling corn duty and give a drawback to Canada. I thought you had all, except Ritchie, accepted this policy. While I was slaving my life out you threw it over as of no importance, and it is to this indifference to a great policy, which you had your- selves accepted, that you owe the present situation. I have written more of my mind than I had intended. I do not think that I should have served you as you have served me, but in spite of all I am glad that you have remained in the Government — I hope that your presence will add strength to it — and I sincerely intend to give to you and Balfour all the support, in Parliament and elsewhere, which it is in my power to afford. Liberavi aniuiuin meum. — Yours very truly, J. Chamberlain. The Duke replied :- Devonshire House, T.'jth September 1903. My dear Chamberlain, — I have been moving about and have had no time to reply to your letter of the 21st inst. until my return here to-day. I do not know that there would be much use in my attempting to explain my position in this question, but when I have been able to refer to some correspondence and other papers I may endeavour to do so. But I wish to assure you without further delay that I deeply regret that my conduct in regard to it should have caused you any pain or annoyance. I think that you are mistaken when you say that I I903 THE DUKE'S REPLY 357 have conferred with Ritchie and Balfour of Burleigh as to my course of action in preference to yourself. After your Birmingham and other speeches I wrote (I think in the Whitsuntide holidays) to the Prime Minister, Lans- downe, and Ritchie asking what view they took of them, but so far as I remember these letters they contained little beyond this inquiry, and suggested no course of action. I saw Ritchie in the morning before he made his speech in the House of Commons, but I was certainly not re- sponsible for his declaration or the form of it. I had no consultation with Ritchie, Balfour of Burleigh, or any member of the Government before the speeches which I had to make in the House of Lords in which I endeavoured to the best of my ability to defend the course of the Prime Minister and yourself, although I could not profess to be entirely in sympathy with it. I had no consultation on the subject with the Free-Trade members of the Govern- ment until after the circulation of the Prime Minister's papers. They may have probably discussed these with me in conversation, but no consultation as to the course which any of us should take was ever held. Since the Cabinet of August 13th I have, no doubt, had some letters from them to which I have replied, but I have never asked their advice as to my own course, and the Prime Minister knows that about that time, in my anxiety to avoid dis- ruption, I made some suggestions to him entirely on my own account, which, however, on further reflection, I did not consider practical, and withdrew. As to any failure on my part to discuss the question with you, I think that we must go back to the Cabinets immediately before and after your visit to South Africa, the proceedings at which are still extremely obscure to me. As you know, I am rather deaf, and I am afraid sometimes inattentive. I certainly altogether failed to understand that at the first of these a decision was even provisionally taken of such import- ance as that to which you refer, and it must have been taken after very little discussion. Nothing so far as I know was decided about the Budget before you came 358 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT Ch. xxvii. back, and though I recollect that you were annoyed by Ritchie's proposals, and made some protests against them, you did not oppose them in such a manner as to lead me to suppose that you took so strong a view of their effect as it now appears was the case. In fact, whether through my own fault or not, your Birmingham speech, and still more the subsequent speeches in the House of Commons, took me completely by surprise. You appeared to have, without any personal communication whatever with me, adopted an entirely new departure in policy, and though I did not, and do not now complain of this, I confess that it did not occur to me that there would be any special advantage in discussing with you a question on which you apparently had made up your mind, and on which I thought it very unlikely that I should change mine. In such conversations as we had, I thought that your object was rather to convert me to your opinions than, as now appears, to discuss the course which, with our conflicting views, we should each take in the best interests of the party. There has in fact been some misunder- standing between us, for which I do not think I can hold myself entirely responsible, but whatever mistakes you may think I have made in judgment, I sincerely trust that you will not attribute them to any want of respect to yourself or to any doubt as to the loyalty of your action towards the Unionist party or myself. — Yours truly, Devonshire. Highbury, Moor Green, Birmingham, I'&th September 1903. My dear Devonshire, — I am very much obliged to you for your letter, and so far as any personal question is concerned, I am quite satisfied, and shall forget altogether the feeling which I undoubtedly entertained at one time that you had withdrawn all confidence in me. During the long period of our political co-operation I have contracted so strong a feeling of personal respect 1903 CABINET REFORMATION 359 and regard that it hurt me to think that it was not reciprocated. That is all over, and I do not wish to trouble you any more about the past, except to apprise you once more that I thought you were with me in principle when I raised this question, and had I known that you were so little prepared for it, I should certainly have dela^^ed, and perhaps even abandoned, its advocacy. I do not know what the future has in store, but every day convinces me more and more that before long the country will insist on some protection against what they consider unfair foreign competition. All the indications point to a period of bad trade before long, and when numbers of respectable work-people are thrown out of employment, the feeling in favour of a change will be irresistible. This may not be strong enough to carry even a small tax on food, but I confess I do not see what answer can be made to the agricultural interest if you take special pains to exclude them from any retaliatory arrangements. Do not trouble to give me any further reply. I wish you and the Government well through all your difficulties, of which I still think the War Office and Educa- tion the greatest. If — in concert with the Archbishop and others — you could devise any compromise which would satisfy even a portion of the Nonconformists, you might win the next election even now. If this is impossible you must be defeated. — Believe me, yours very truly, J. Chamberlain. During the next fortnight Mr. Balfour filled up the vacancies in the Cabinet. He recruited mainly from the Liberal Unionist wing of the party. Lord Milner having declined to accept the Colonial Office because he wished to carry further his work in South Africa, the post was accepted by Mr. Alfred Lyttelton. Mr. Arnold Forster re- ceived the War Office, after Lord Esher had declined it. Mr. 360 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT Ch. xxvii. Austen Chamberlain replaced Mr. Ritchie as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and some other consequential appointments were made. As Lord Lansdowne remained at the Foreign Office and Lord Selborne at the Admiralty, the Liberal Unionists were now more numerously than before repre- sented in the Cabinet. The reconstruction of the Ministry reflected Mr. Bal- four's idea that the Government should adopt the general principle of " fiscal reform," without committing itself, as yet, to any definite proposals or practical steps. The Prime Minister believed that, above all things, it was to be desired that the Unionist party should not be broken in two. Sir Robert Peel in 1845, and Mr. Glad- stone in 1886, by sudden and definite proposals, reversing a previous settled policy, had each shattered a mighty party, and had given years of power to their opponents. It was evident that by far the largest part of the Unionists were, more or less, in favour of fiscal reform, and Mr. Balfour was himself in favour of a moderate change in that direction, but the more rapid the pace of the movement, the greater was the danger of schism upon a considerable scale. The strongest tariff reformer and his most uncom- promising adversaries having left the Government, Mr. Balfour was now able, although with great difficulty, to hold his course on the via media until November 1905, when he resigned in despair, and the Liberals came into power, and those General Elections followed which both reduced the Unionists to a small minority in the House of Commons, and almost eliminated from their benches the Free Traders pure and simple. VII The immediate cause of the schism of September had been the question what the Prime Minister should say to I903 THE SHEFFIELD SPEECH 361 the meeting of Conservative Associations to be held at Sheffield on the ist October. The Duke did not yet know what would be said. In his uncertainty of mind he arrived at the decision that his continuance in office should depend upon Mr. Balfour's statement upon this occasion. He had decided not to resign on what he called the ' personal grounds/ that is, on account of his relation to the ex-Ministers, but there is no doubt that these personal grounds affected his mind strongly, and that he was vastly relieved that the strength of some expressions used by the Prime Minister in his Sheffield speech, and indicated in the next following letter, enabled or compelled him to resign on the ' public ' grounds. The Sheffield speech gave rise to the following correspondence : — The Duke of Devonshh^e to Mr. Balfour. 2nd October 1903, My dear Balfour, — I have, since we last met, felt an increasing doubt whether I had been well advised in con- senting to separate myself from those of our colleagues whose resignations were tendered and accepted last month. But until some new developments of the situation should have taken place, I have not thought it necessary to trouble you with these doubts. The speech, however, which you delivered last night makes it necessary for me finally and definitely to decide whether I am so far in agreement with yourself on the question of Fiscal Policy as to make it possible for me, with satisfaction to myself or advantage to the country, to remain a member of your Government. I must, especially as the representative of the Government in one of the Houses of Parliament, in forming this deci- sion, have regard not only to the definite statements of policy contained in your speech, but also to its general tone and tendency. As to the former it was possible to arrive at a clear understanding by previous discussion, but 362 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. as to the latter, no judgment could be formed until the declaration had been actually made. I was prepared by our discussions for your statement that you desired to obtain the sanction of the constituen- cies for a reversal of the doctrine that taxation should never be imposed except for purposes of revenue, and this is no doubt the principal and most definite statement in your speech. But you may remember that I told you that I thought it would be very difBcult to make this statement the foundation of a great announcement of policy, inas- much as I was not aware of any law or constitutional prin- ciple in which this doctrine was embodied. I admit that you have succeeded in making this declaration the basis of a great political announcement, but in my opinion that announcement has been extended very far beyond the necessities of the case. It was unnecessary, in my opinion, for the purpose of the statement to which I had assented, to assert that the controversy of 1846, which you describe as the great lawsuit between Free Trade and Protection, is of no interest whatever to us except from an historical point of view. Nor can I think that it was necessary to assert that you desired to 'reverse the fiscal tradition, to alter fundamentally the fiscal tradition, which has prevailed during the last two generations.' I had hoped to have found in your speech a definite statement of adherence to the principles of Free Trade as the ordinary basis of our fiscal and commercial system, and an equally definite repudiation of the principle of Pro- tection in the interest of our national industries, but, in their absence, I cannot help thinking that such declara- tions as those which I have quoted cannot fail to have the effect of materially encouraging the advocates of direct Protection in the controversy which has been raised throughout the country, and of discouraging those who, like me and, I had hoped, yourself, believe that our present system of free imports, and especially of food imports is, on the whole, the most advantageous to the country, although we do not contend that the principle on which I903 THE DUKE'S RESIGNATION 363 it rests forms any such authority or sanctity as to forbid any departure from it, for sufficient cause. I have only ventured to make these criticisms as illustra- tions of the different points of view from which we regard the whole question, and I am very far from wishing to enter into any personal controversy with you. You have, in your second speech, said that this subject could no longer be left an open question among members of the Government, and I think I have said enough to prove to you that there is no such agreement between us on the general question, as to make it possible for me to be a satisfactory exponent of your views, or those of the Govern- ment, in the debates which must inevitably take place in the next Session of Parliament. I cannot adequately express the deep regret which I feel in separating myself from a Government with which I believe myself to be in sympathy on all other matters of public policy, or the anxiety with which I anticipate the wide division which I fear must result from the unexpected scope and strength of your declarations of yesterday, in the ranks of the Unionist party, but holding the opinions which I have endeavoured to express, no other course is open to me but to ask you to place my resignation in the hands of his Majesty. — I remain, yours sincerely, Devonshire. Mr. Balfour to the Duke of Devonshire. Whittinghame, Prestonkirk, •yd October 1903. My dear Duke, — I received this afternoon two tele- grams, forwarded in quick succession by my private secretary in London, the first from you, asking how soon your resignation might be announced, the second giving a full summary of the reasons which moved you to resign. I am not sure which of these unexpected communications surprised me most. On the whole, perhaps the second. The first, however, was sufficiently strange. Remember 364 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. the circumstances. It was on Wednesday, the i6th Sep- tember, that you informed me of your resolve to remain in the Government. This decision was preceded by much confidential correspondence, much intimate conversation. There was no phase of policy which I was not prepared to discuss, which I did not in fact discuss, with perfect frank- ness ; men and measures were alike surveyed from every point of view which had a bearing on the present course or future fortunes of the party. A decision arrived at after these preliminaries I had a right to consider final ; and final I certainly considered it. Accordingly I consulted you, as far as circumstances of time and place permitted, on the best mode of filling up the vacancies in the Govern- ment of which you were the most distinguished member ; you were good enough to express some weighty judgments on the delicate matters submitted to you ; you even initiated proposals of your own, which I gladly accepted. Our last communication on these subjects was in a letter I dictated during my journey to Sheffield on Thursday after- noon. In less than forty-eight hours I received in Edinburgh the telegrams which first announced both your intention to resign, and your desire to see the process of resignation consummated without delay or discussion. The principal occasion of this singular transformation was (you tell me) my Sheffield speech. This is strange indeed. In intention (at least) there was no doctrine con- tained in that speech which was not equally contained in my Notes on Insular Free Trade, and my published letter to Chamberlain. The first of these documents you had in your possession (before the generality of the Cabinet) at the end of July. The second you saw in manuscript before it appeared in the newspapers. With both, therefore, you were intimately acquainted during the whole fortnight in which you lent your countenance to the Government after the recent resignations. I must suppose therefore that it is some unintentional discrepancy between the written and the spoken word that now drives you to desert the Administra- I903 MR. BALFOUR'S REMONSTRANCE 2^S tion you have so long adorned. Such unintentional dis- crepancies are no doubt hard to avoid. Not every one, certainly not I, can always be sure of finding, on the spur of the moment, before an eager audience of five thousand people, the precise phrase which shall so dexterously express the exact opinion of the speaker on a difficult and abstract subject, as to foil the opponents who would wrest it either to the right hand or the left. But till one o'clock this afternoon I had, I confess, counted you not as an opponent, but as a colleague — a colleague in spirit as well as in name. To such an one it would have seemed natural (so, at least, I should have thought) to take, in cases of apparent discrepancy, the written rather than the spoken word as expressing the true meaning of the author: or (if this be asking too much) at least to make inquiries before arriving at a final and a hostile conclusion. But, after all, what, and where, is this discrepancy which has forced you in so unexpected a fashion to reverse a considered policy ? I do not believe it exists : and if any other man in the world but yourself had expended so much inquisitorial subtlety in detecting imaginary heresies, I should have surmised that he was more anxious to pick a quarrel than particular as to the sufficiency of its occasion. To you fortunately no such suspicion can attach. Yet am I unreasonable in thinking that your resignation gives me some just occasion of complaint, and perhaps some occasion of special regret to yourself ? Am I, for example, not right in complaining of your procedure in reference to the Sheffield speech ? You fear that it will aggravate party division. If there is anything certain, it is that the declaration of policy then made pro- duced, and is destined still to produce, a greater harmony of opinion than has prevailed in the party since the Fiscal Question came to the front six months ago. Had you resigned on the 15th, or had you not resigned at all, this healing effect would have suffered no interruption. To resign now, and to resign on the speech, is to take the 366 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvti. course most calculated to make yet harder the hard task of the peacemaker. Again, do you not feel some special regret at having at this particular juncture to sever your connection with a Unionist Administration ? Doubtless there is no imaginable occasion on which you could have left one without inflict- ing on it serious loss. At the moment of its most buoyant prosperity, your absence from its councils would have been sensibly felt. But you have, in fact, left it when (in the opinion at least of our opponents) its fortunes are at their lowest, and its perplexities at their greatest. It may be, however, that you are spared this aggravation of the inevitable pains of separation by holding, as I hold, that our opponents are in this mistaken. I firmly believe they are. I see no difficulty in successfully carrying out the policy which — for a fortnight — you were ready to accept, by the help of the Administration which — for a fortnight — you aided me to construct. On this point I feel no disquiet. I cannot pretend to feel with a like equanimity the loss of a colleague whose services to the Unionist party no changes and chances of political fortune can tempt any Unionist to forget. — Yours sincerely, Arthur James Balfour. These two letters were sent to the newspapers. The following letter replies to an explanation from the Duke which it is not necessary to give. lo Downing Street, Whitehall, S.W., 9M October 1903. My dear Duke, — Pray do not think that any apology or explanation is needed in respect of the form in which the announcement of your resignation reached me. The announcement itself could not but give me pain — it would be but a poor compliment to you to pretend that it did not — but its mode,. as distinguished from its substance, neither is, nor was, of the smallest importance. I903 MR. BALFOUR'S DIFFICULTIES 367 I hope you will not mind my adding that if there was anything in the letter which I sent in reply which was too plainly expressed, I regret it. In any case nothing has or can interfere with my strong feeling of personal regard. — Pray believe me, yours very sincerely, Arthur James Balfour. The Duke's resignation was a joy to the foe, and a blow to the Government. The Cabinet now seemed to have lost all fire and zeal with Mr. Chamberlain and, with the Duke and Lord Balfour of Burleigh, all solid weight remaining since the retirement of Lord Salisbury and Sir Michael Hicks Beach, and to be existing grace only to the skilled rapier play of its chief. If Mr. Balfour's published reply to the Duke was too hastily expressed, this was due to the disappointment and irritation of the moment. He may possibly have thought that had the Duke persisted in his first resignation he himself would have resigned, or obtained a dissolution, and not have continued upon the weary and difficult course of office to which, by the reformation of the shattered Administration, he was now committed for, at any rate, a decent space of time. In a speech made in the House of Commons on 7th March 1904, Mr. Balfour said that he had nothing of which to complain in the Duke's conduct in this affair. ' Even the manner of his resignation and the time of it I have long forgotten. The character of the Duke of Devon- shire is one of the assets of public life in this country. It is beyond attack and beyond criticism ; and, if we have unfortunately differed on this question, if the amount and the extent of our differences came to me with a suddenness of surprise, betraying me into unduly heated language, I should never forget the service he has rendered to English public life, or how he came forward in a great crisis of our 368 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT Ch. xxvii. national history to play a part which will have a permanent effect on the fortunes of this country.' On October 6th the Duke wrote to Lord James of Hereford : — * I have made a mess of this business and have come out with severe damage, but I suppose you are glad that I have got out at any price. 'The fact is that the strain of the continuous discussions and interviews of Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday com- pletely tired and wore me out, and when I had my final interview with Balfour on the Wednesday afternoon my mind was more occupied with the great change in the situation caused by Chamberlain's resignation and with personal relations towards Ritchie, Balfour of Burleigh, and George Hamilton than with anything else. When, therefore, Balfour read me his correspondence with Chamberlain or part of it, I altogether failed to grasp its full effect. 'When I had read and considered it more carefully I became extremely uneasy, but I had made up my mind to stick to the ship, and should have done so, but for the, to me, quite unexpected declarations in the Sheffield speech. ' It is, however, a great relief to me that the final declarations in the speech were so clear and decided (in my opinion) on the side of Protection that I had no alternative. ' I suppose that now I shall be readmitted into the fold of Free Traders.' Thus ended the Duke of Devonshire's ' official ' career. He was now seventy years old. He had spent forty-six years in Parliament, in one House or the other. During about twenty-three of these years he had held public office. The Duke, at a later date, with a view to his own explanation in the House of Lords, asked Mr. Balfour 1903 MR. BALFOUR'S POSITION 369 whether he had any objection to his referring 'to the conversations which took place between yourself and me on the Monday and Tuesday evenings after the Cabinets, and on the following day, and especially to the requests which you made to me that I should say nothing about Chamberlain's intended resignation.' Mr. Balfour replied on this point (30th January 1904) : — ' As regards my request that you should say nothing about Chamberlain's intention to resign if Preference were omitted from the Government programme, you must bear in mind that rightly or wrongly (as it turns out, I am afraid, wrongly) I always in my own mind drew a sharp distinc- tion between your position on the one side and Ritchie and Hamilton's position on the other. I was convinced that they were "root and branch" opponents of fiscal reform, and that they were resolved to leave the Govern- ment unless the fiscal reformers surrendered at discretion. I thought, on the other hand, that your attitude was one of not unfavourable suspense. ' In my view, therefore, the first thing to be decided was whether we were, or were not, a Cabinet of fiscal reformers ; and to this question, whenever the discussion strayed from it, I always endeavoured to bring it back. Whether a fiscal reform Cabinet should make Preference part of its programme appeared to me a question which, however important, was quite secondary to the primary issue, and could only be profitably discussed in a Cabinet already at one on the broad principle of reform. If they had said, "We are prepared to go in heartily for fiscal reform, but we cannot accept any tax on food," the situation would, of course, have been different. But they neither said this, nor thought it, and it was not for their benefit, therefore, that, in the Cabinet of the 14th, I gave it as my opinion that a tax on food in the then state of public sentiment was impracticable ; a statement imme- diately followed by one from Chamberlain to the effect that if Preference was not included in the programme, he VOL. II, 2 A 370 MR. BALFOUR'S GOVERNMENT ch. xxvii. proposed to leave the Government and urge his view in an independent position. ' In our long conversation after the Cabinet, I was still influenced by the idea (which, indeed, I retained up to your final resignation) that your position was essentially different to that of Ritchie and George Hamilton. I regarded, and rightly regarded, them as having practically severed their connection with the Fiscal Reform Cabinet. I regarded you as still potentially a member of it, and I was quite prepared to discuss with you what I should certainly have never discussed with them, namely, the extent to which fiscal reform as a practical policy was ripe for inclusion in an official programme, and the effect which any limitation of the plan originally contained in the " blue paper " would have upon the reforming portion of the Cabinet, and especially upon Chamberlain. Hence my request for discretion.' Mr. Balfour had lost in a fortnight five of his previous Cabinet colleagues, and Mr. Arthur Elliot, Financial Secre- tary to the Treasury, a strong Free Trader, had also re- signed. His object apparently had been to impress upon his Government the general character of a Government of Fiscal Reform, but not, by taking immediate steps in practice, to break up the Unionist party. But on the one side Mr. Chamberlain was committed to immediate action ; on the other, certain members of the Government were committed to resistance on the very principle of Fiscal Reform. In order to obtain the equipoise desired by the Prime Minister it was necessary that not one only of these extreme opposites should be withdrawn from the Govern- ment. If Mr. Chamberlain alone withdrew the Government would wear a dominantly anti-reform complexion. Mr. Balfour strongly desired to keep the Duke, whose attitude was, he honestly believed, that of the equipoise. The Duke, on his side, had acted, as ever, with honour, I903 CHARACTER OF THE BREACH 371 and in good faith. He made a mistake, on September i6th, in not asking for a few hours for consideration, and for leave to read (as well as hear read) the Balfour- Chamberlain letters. Had he done so, he would probably have maintained his first resignation, and would not have had to endure two of the most painful weeks in a much- troubled political existence. This schism was in some ways more trying for him than was that of 1886. The7i he was separating himself, not without a sense of emancipation, from a Prime Minister from whom he had long been alienated, upon an issue as to which he felt the most profound conviction. Now, he was breaking with a Prime Minister, with whom he had no other difference, upon an issue which he felt to be one of great importance, but not one as to which he had arrived at absolutely firm and settled conclusions of his own. He could not, however, have acted otherwise. Public declarations, such as those contained in the Prime Minister's published letter to Mr. Chamberlain and in his Sheffield speech, must be the ruling consideration in matters of this kind. After these declarations Mr. Balfour could not rightly be re- garded otherwise than as a prudent and cautious ally of the new Reformers, as in fact he was, and those who acted with him would be in the same position. The Duke, on the contrary, was not prepared to depart from the fiscal principles in which he had been educated, which he had publicly defended in 1885, and had, like most men of his time, taken for granted. He desired to have a real and full inquiry made into the question, but did not expect the result to shake Free Trade. Without such inquiry he certainly would not move at all. Ch. XXVIII. CHAPTER XXVIII LATEST YEARS The Duke of Devonshire was now seventy years of age, and tired of most things. Long it was since young Lord Cavendish had entered ParHament in the cheerful and buoyant days of the consulship of Palmerston. His life deserved a more leisurely old age. But he became the target of advice from all sides. He received, and had to answer, in a handwriting which had, since 1886, lost its old plain firmness, and was becoming more and more tremulous and indistinct, endless letters from men of variously shaded views. The free-trade Unionists were in a state of utter disunion. The ambiguity in the policy of the Prime Minister served to keep them disunited. Some were complete free-traders, others made an excep- tion in favour of ' retaliation.' Some were for, and some against, the formation of a distinct party co-operating, more or less, with the Liberals. Some Liberal Unionists had yearnings for reunion, as allies, with those whose name they partly bore, and with some of whose opinions they agreed, but Conservatives would not consent to this who had fought for years under the glorious banners of Beaconsfield and Salisbury against Radicals, Nationalists, and Gladstonians. Lord George Hamilton thought that free-trade Unionists might be advised not to support, and sometimes even to vote against, the followers of Mr. Chamberlain. * But,' he wrote, ' I am not prepared to go further and politically associate myself with the Radicals 372 1903 FREE-TRADE UNIONISTS 373 even for temporary purposes. ... I have fought too long and consistently against Radical doctrine to be able now to alter my attitude towards my old opponents.' Another leading Tory, the chief of an old west country family, wrote that he believed in Free Trade, but that if, for its sweet sake, he gave general support to Radicals it would be enough to 'make his father turn in his grave.' 'As to the future,' a Tory ex-Minister wrote to the Duke — ' I fear that it is very possible that you may be right, and that the General Election may see the Unionist party com.mitted to Preference and Protection. ... I am utterly disgusted with the prospect, and shall simply stand aside for a while in such a case. I should disagree with my party on the great issue of Protection. I remain in agree- ment with them on other questions, and could not bring myself to join the Opposition, a position which, to me who have stuck to my party for forty years, would be simply intolerable.' Of the younger men, Lord Hugh Cecil, a frequent cor- respondent at this time, was in the same position. His family traditions, his intense antagonism to the highest Nonconformist ideals, would not permit him even to dream of crossing the floor of the House of Commons. Nor did he think possible even co-operation of free-trade Unionists with the Radical party. He wrote on the 29th June to the Duke : — 'A large number of Unionist free-traders could not in honesty and patriotism permanently co-operate with the Liberal party as now constituted. If, indeed, the dominant force in that party were Lord Rosebery and the Liberal Imperialists, the case might be different. But . . . the main stream of Liberalism does not run in that direction. That stream is Gladstonian in foreign, colonial, and Irish questions, it is Nonconformist in ecclesiastical and educa- 374 LATEST YEARS Ch. xxviii. tional questions, it is Radical in questions affecting property, it is Trade Unionist in questions affecting labour and capital. For those of the Free Food League who are Imperialists and Unionists and Churchmen and Conser- vatives, a permanent co-operation with such a party could not be otherwise than immoral.' He thought it possible, however, to make a temporary and strictly ad hoc electoral and parliamentary arrange- ment on the part of the free-trade Unionists limited to opposition to Mr. Chamberlain's movement, and solely for that purpose. The Duke doubted the feasibility of this course. He wrote to Lord Hugh on December 4, 1903 : — ' Is it at all likely that the Opposition would be willing to give any such assurances as those you wish to obtain ? It seems to me that they are much more likely to use the question as the means of breaking up the Unionist party, and will hope to secure for themselves a large number of the seats held by Unionist free-traders.' In fact, the Conservative-Liberal Unionist Coalition of 1886 and onwards had only succeeded because the mass of moderate Liberals agreed more with the Conservatives than with the Gladstonians upon other questions as well as that of the Legislative Union. It is very difficult for two groups of men to combine for any length of time upon one question, and one only, and to differ on all the rest. Lord Randolph's son was naturally more hostile than the son of Lord Salisbury to the present Tory leader, and was more detached from the Tory creed. Mr. Winston Churchill wrote to the Duke on the 6th October 1903 : — "Let me offer you my most sincere congratulations and thanks for the course you have taken. There can only be two sides in these great struggles, and I believe that your decision will secure the victory of Free Trade. As long as you remained with Mr. Balfour the issue was I903 MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL 375 obscured, and yet it was certain that we were drifting, and that it was his intention that we should drift into a regular Protectionist system. On even larger grounds the recon- stitution of the Liberal party in its old power and integrity was greatly to be desired. I implore you not to leave that work uncompleted ; and I venture with great respect to offer such faithful service as is in my power.' Mr. Churchill had some hopes that the free-trade Unionist section might be organised as a group, and might enter into an arrangement with the Liberal party, corresponding to the old alliance for certain purposes between the Liberal Unionists and the Conservatives. ' It is idle,' he wrote on 6th January 1904, 'for free-traders to expect to be returned by Protectionist organisations, and if we negotiate singly we shall be swallowed whole by the Liberal party.' But only a few of the free-trade Unionists in Parliament were willing to co-operate in any general way with the Liberals. Nor were the Liberals anxious to assist the free-trade Unionists. Their own success at by-elections was continuous from 1902 to 1905 ; their spirits had risen from the depths of 1900, and they were by no means inclined to waive their own claims in order to support Unionists, however orthodox in fiscal creed. Attempts at co-operative arrangements soon vanished in a mist of words, and Mr. Churchill crossed the floor of the House and entered upon a new and brilliant career. After this step he wrote to the Duke (25th August 1904) : — '. . . In 1886 the Liberal Unionists, or a good many of them, wanted to fight with the Conservatives. Nearly all your people — Free Trade apart — would like to see the Liberals get a good beating. There is the difficulty of an arrangement. I only wish I had a little more influence, so as to be able to help. If the whole position to-day is better, we owe it mainly to you, and though I have moved, as I 376 LATEST YEARS ch. xxviii. always intended, into the Liberal ranks, I hope I am not ungrateful for all you have done.' Mr. Churchill was, perhaps, Radical by nature and Tory by accident. At any rate he was wise in his generation. Other frequent correspondents of the Duke, men like Mr. Arthur Elliot and Lord Hugh Cecil, who tried to combine Unionism with Free Trade and yet to retain seats in Par- liament, found their political careers ruined or damaged. From the beginning of this schism the free-trade Unionists were divided in opinion and policy. Some held that Mr. Balfour must be regarded and treated as a Protectionist who was luring others into the net by a specious appearance of moderation and of adhesion to the general principles of Free Trade. Other men, few in number certainly, thought that Mr. Balfour should be regarded and treated as a real Free Trader, obliged to bend a little to the Protectionist storm. Both groups pressed their views in numerous letters upon the Duke, whose own feelings in the autumn of 1903 are best shown in the following letter to his old ally, Lord Goschen, on October loth : — * I find myself, as usual, in a very difficult position. In the first place, I am very unwilling to put myself at the head of a new political movement at all. I am getting old, and I am rather tired of, and disgusted with, politics. The question itself is difficult and complicated, and I have never given any special study to it. I never read a speech or an article upon it on either side to which I see clearly the answer, and I shrink from going through all the labour of getting up what is to me almost a new subject. In the next place, I am not sure whether you and the other Free Fooders do not wish to take up a more hostile attitude towards the Government than I, who have only left it after much doubt and hesitation, wish to do, or I903 FREE-TRADE UNIONISTS 377 could decently do. I told Beach yesterday that nothing would induce me to take up such an attitude, and that all I could do would be to use any influence I might have in preventing them from being led or forced by their followers to go beyond the limits of their definite declarations. . . .' In this letter, also, the Duke referred to the difficulty concerning the Liberal Unionist Association. If, he said, he were to take the lead in opposing Mr. Chamberlain he would inevitably break up the Association. He added — ' I do not know that its continued existence is of much value to anybody under existing conditions, but I shall no doubt be open to a good deal of criticism for having joined Chamberlain in destroying one of the defences against Home Rule, which it has been the chief political work of my life to create.' Lord Goschen, in reply, urged, as he had already urged, that the Duke should give a strong lead, and said, ' The fate of the free-trade Unionists, the degree to which they may hope to have any influence on the public mind, depends on your decision.' This wearisome business of the Liberal Unionist Associa- tion gave birth to a copious correspondence until the matter was settled by Mr. Chamberlain's conquest and annexation of all that was left of it. The organisation had been constructed in 1886, and the Duke had, since then, been nominally in chief command of it, as 'president.' It consisted of the Liberal Unionist Association and the Liberal Unionist Council. It was supported partly by subscriptions, mainly provided by a few of the wealthier members before each General Election ; partly from an invested fund which had been raised by the Duke, who was thereof trustee and sole disposer. The 'Association' was a nominal body. It never met, and its existence was 378 LATEST YEARS ch. xxviii. represented only by a little office controlled by the Liberal Unionist Whips, and by a small nominated committee. The Liberal Unionist Council was a consultative body of leading men of the party, and did meet from time to time, but the life of the system lay in the local Liberal Unionist Associations, and in the Whips and their committee. After the check given to the first pro-Tariff Reform out- burst on the part of the London Office, a rather absurd compromise had been arranged on the lines of the general ' inquiry ' — namely, that the Association should publish leaflets and literature on both sides of the fiscal question. In the autumn of 1903 Mr. Chamberlain began his mission- ary tour of the great cities, and this modus vivendi ceased to be possible. Lord Barnard, a leading nobleman of County Durham, presided in October over the North of England Liberal Unionist Conference, held at Newcastle in con- nection with Mr. Chamberlain's visit. The Conference resolved: 'That the time has now come when the fiscal policy of the country should be reconsidered with a view to promoting a closer union of the Empire, and of securing a modification in the hostile tariffs of other countries.' This resolution was followed by the with- drawal of Arthur Elliot and some other north country free-trade Unionists from the Conference. The Duke of Devonshire, on the 23rd of October, wrote to Mr. Cham- berlain a letter in which, referring to this event, he said that ' It is almost impossible with any advantage to maintain, under present circumstances, the existence of the Liberal Unionist Association.' He pointed out that it was not possible to withdraw grants in aid from local Associations which took a line on the fiscal question, that without such grants from the central invested fund the local expenditure would exceed revenue, and that he himself was personally responsible for the application of this fund. 1903 LIBERAL UNIONIST ASSOCIATION 379 Mr. Chamberlain's long reply was couched in a fighting tone. He said : ' I should not myself be willing to break up the Association. ... It is my conviction that a vast majority of the rank and file of the Liberal Unionists are with me, and, therefore, against you, on the question I have raised.' He suggested that this opinion should be tested by the holding of a meeting in the spring of delegates from the Liberal Unionist local Associations. Later in the autumn the Duke allowed a letter to be published, in which he advised Liberal Unionist electors at by-elections to refuse to support any candidate, although a Unionist, who held the Protectionist view. Mr. Chamberlain made a strong fighting point of this action, and insisted that it could only be regularised by a vote approving it, passed either by the Council, or by a meeting of delegates. He said, in a subsequent letter, that, if the Duke took no action, he should himself summon a meeting of delegates. The Duke, in the course of his reply, wrote : — *You state truly that the main object for which the Association was formed was to prevent the return of a Home Rule Government, but I cannot agree with you that in that respect matters are unchanged. ' Your agitation has made it certain that the issue before the country at the next election will not be Home Rule, but Protection against Free Trade, and many of us are not prepared to surrender the principle of Free Trade because at some future time the Home Rule policy, to which we are as strongly opposed as ever, may be revived. The differences between us are certainly not less vital or urgent, as questions of practical policy, than those which separated us from Mr. Gladstone in 1886. 98, 102, 104, 105, 109, III, 112, 117, 118 ; follows Gladstone (1886), 127, 129; letter to Hart- ington (1887), 183 Granville, Countess, ii. 27, 236 Grattan, Henry, ii. 139 Green Price, Mr., i. 74 Greville, Charles Fulke, i. 26, 57 Grey, Earl, i. 229 Rt. Hon. Sir Edward, i. 202 Griffin, Sir Lepel, i. 298, 301 Grosvenor, Lord R., i. 356 Haldane, Rt. Hon. R., ii. 409, 412 Halsbury, Earl, ii. 411 Hamilton, Duchess of, ii. 213 Mr. Charles, ii. 222, 223 Sir Edward, ii. 95, 310, 347 Lord George, i. 319 ; ii. 307, 332, 339, 340, 341, 348, 349, 350, 353, 369, 370, 372_, 388, 423. Haines, General Sir Frederick, i. 305 Hanna, Colonel, i. 302 Harcourt, Rt. Hon. Sir William Vernon, on Irish University Bill, i. 114; enters administration, 128; Public Worship Bill, 134; attitude as to Liberal leadership (1875), 140; campaign of 1879- 80, 255 ; attitude as to Liberal leadership (1880), 271 ; Home Office, 280 ; leadership question, 379 ; Soudan policy, 464 ; ii. 26 ; Irish question (1885-86), 96, 98, 103, 105, 106, no, 118; follows Gladstone (1886), 127 ; corres- pondence, 162 ; Crimes Bill (1887), 191 ; Parnell Commission, 201 ; at a ball, 264 ; on the corn duty, 297 Hardwicke, Elizabeth of, i. 2 Hartington, Marquis of (Sth Duke of Devonshire), birth, i. 10; boy- hood, 1 1 ; at Axminster, 12; at Cambridge, 13-17 ; visits Paris and Germany, 17 ; in Chats- worth Rifles, 18 ; visits Ireland, 18; Russia, 19; enters House of Commons, 20 ; becomes Marquis of Hartington, 30 ; speech in 1859, 31 ; speech on paper duty, 36 ; visits the United States, 39 ; is appointed Under Secre- tary, War Office (1863), 55; introduces Volunteer Bill, 58 ; appointed Secretary of State for War (1866), 62 ; speaks on Reform Bill (1866), 65 ; visits Berlin and Vienna, 67 ; speaks on Irish Church resolutions (1868), 70; loses his seat, 71 ; appointed Postmaster-General (1869), 74; elected for Radnor Boroughs, 74 ; takes charge of the Ballot Bill, 74 ; supports Irish Land Bill (1870), 77; is appointed Irish Chief Secretary (1870), 80; Westmeath Act, 84; Phoenix Park riots, 89 ; speech on Home Rule (1872), 94 ; Irish railways, 98 ; Irish University Bill, 104 ; retires from office with Mr. Gladstone's Government (1874), 130; speaks on Home Rule, 136 ; is elected to be leader 436 INDEX of Liberal Opposition (1875), 147 ; takes part in debates on Peace Preservation Bill, 153; on Franchise Bill, 154 ; on Suez Canal, 161 ; on imperial title, 163 ; visits Vienna and Con- stantinople, 179; views on Eastern question, 168, 182-94, 203 ; attitude on Mr. Gladstone's resolutions, 195 ; views as to Afghan War, 225 ; as to Trans- vaal War, 237 ; as to Zulu War, 239 ; on Irish Local Government, 243 ; as to the Birmingham scheme, 245 ; on Tory doctrines, 250 ; on the Liberal leadership, 256 ; on Lord Beaconsfield, 267 ; is asked by the Queen to form Government, 272 ; accepts India Office, 280 ; contrast with Glad- stone, 282-94 ; Afghan affairs, 296-327; Irish affairs, coercion, Land Bill, threatened resigna- tion, Kilmainham treaty, 328-59 ; Irish affairs, 352-9 ; Egyptian affairs, 360-8 ; views as to pro- cedure in House of Commons, 370-76 ; as to Liberal leadership, 377 ; Irish Local Government (1883), 382-91 ; franchise and redistribution, 392-406; Secretary of State for War, 407 ; Soudan rebellion, 408 ; mission of Gordon, 414 ; correspondence as to Sou- dan, 425-94 ; Egyptian control, ii. I ; threatens resignation, 5 ; fall of Khartoum, letters, 1 1 ; speeches, 23 ; views as to Don- gola, 34-39 ; correspondence with Queen, 40 ; with Wolseley, 46 : views and action as to Franchise and Redistribution Bills, 49-59 ; Irish policy, 60-62 ; resignation of Government, 63; Irish policy and elections (1885), 65-76 ; cor- respondence on Irish question, 77-113; refuses office under Gladstone (1886), 122; corres- pondence, 122-27 ; Irish debates (1886), 136-55; defeat of Home Rule Bill, 156; election cam- paign, 157 ; is asked by Lord Salisbury to form Government (1886), 166; reasons for declin- ing, 169-74; on Rent Bill, 177 ; again asked to form Government (1887), 179; letters as to Mr. Goschen, 181 ; round table con- ference, 185 ; a plan of cam- paign, 190 ; Irish policy, 193 ; addresses from London and Universities, 199 ; on Parnell Commission, 200 ; on land pur- chase, 203 ; on Mr. Bright, 204 ; succeeds to dukedom, 205 ; con- troversy with Gladstone, 207 ; relations with Prince of Wales, 211; Chancellor of Cambridge University, 212 ; marriage, 213 ; Royal Commissions, 218 ; estate business, 223 ; art collections and books, 227 ; dress, diet and con- versation, 234; sport and racing, 237 ; social traits, 238 ; speeches on Home Rule Bill of 1893, 249- 58; on Mr. Gladstone, 250; joins Lord Salisbury's third Government, 260 ; ball at Devon- shire House, 264; British Empire League, 265 ; work as Presi- dent of the Council and as head of Education Department, 269- 76 ; on South African War, 277 ; general elections, 1900, 278 ; gives up Education Department, 278 ; farewell letter to Lord Salisbury, 279 ; takes lead in House of Lords, 280 ; speech on Education Bill, 1902, 282 ; cor- respondence with Mr. Chamber- lain and Mr. Balfour on fiscal question, 305-10 ; speech on fiscal question (15th June 1903), 313 ; further correspondence on the question, 319-35 ; Cabinet of 14th September 1903, 340 ; sub- sequent correspondence, 341-59 ; Duke finally resigns, 361 ; sub- sequent correspondence, 361- 70 ; correspondence with Lord Hugh Cecil and Mr. Churchill, 373~77 ; meeting of the Liberal Unionist Association and Duke's retirement, 377-83 ; speeches on fiscal question, 384-88 ; elections of 1906, 392 ; the Duke at Lans- INDEX 437 downe House, 394 ; an Education Bill, 1906, 402 ; on position and function of House of Lords, 405 ; ball at Devonshire House, 408 ; speech at Cambridge, 409 ; ill- ness, 410; death of his sister, 411 ; goes to Egypt, 413 ; death, 413; funeral, 414; speeches about him in the two Houses, 414-18 ; appreciation by Sir Almeric Fitzroy,4i9 ; conclusion, 422 ; appendix Hassein Khalifa, i. 443 Hastings, Miss, i. 1 1 Hay, Admiral Lord John, i. 465 Hay ward, Mr. Abraham, i. 209 Helps, Sir Arthur, i. 129 Herbert, Mr. Auberon, i. 279 ; ii. 146 Rt. Hon. Sydney, i. 24, 26 Herkomer, Sir Hubert, R.A., por- trait by, ii. 243 Herschell, Lord Chancellor, ii. 127 Hicks, General, i. 408-10 Hicks Beach, Sir AIichael(Viscount St. Aldwyn), praises Irish ad- ministration of Hartington, i. 153; speech on Soudan, 454; negotiations on Franchise Bill, ii. 54; Irish policy, 176, 244; character, 261 ; resignation, 280 ; fiscal policy, 290, 293, 296, 297 Hobart, Sir Robert, ii. 222 Hobbes, Thomas, i. 3 Horsman, Rt. Hon., i. 115 Houghton, Lord, i. 295 Huguessen, Rt. Hon. E. Knatch- bull, i. 176 Hutton, Mr. R. H., ii. 235 ISM.AIL, Khedive of Egypt, i. 158, 360 James, Sir Walter, i. 256 Lord, of Hereford, ii. 127, 169, 171, 172, 260, 267, 274, 283, 351, 352,412, 413 Jefferson-Davis, President, i. 52 Johnson, Dr. Samuel, i. 6, 8, 289 General Sir E., i. 305 Kauffman, General, i. 218 Kenmare, Earl of, i. 91 Keogli, Judge, i. 92 Kiibracken, Lord, i. 382 Kimberley, Earl of, i. 280, 380 ; ii. 30, 127 Kitchener, Field-Marshal (Vis- count), i. 459 ; ii. 10, 44, 262 Knollys, Viscount, ii. 211 Knutsford, Viscount, ii. 183, 263 Kruger, President, i. 177 ; ii. 263, 287 Lacaita, Sir James, ii. 229 Lambton, Admiral Sir H., ii. 277 Lansdowne, Marquis of, ii. 183, 261, 360, 388, 399.415. 419 Lascelles, Colonel H., ii. 222 Laurier, Rt. Hon. Sir Wilfrid, ii. 291, 292 Lawrence, Lord, i. 229, 235 Lawson, Sir Wilfrid, i. 207 Lecky, Rt. Hon. E., i. 283, 286 Leopold, King of the Belgians, i. 414, 445 Liddell, Mr. A., i. 283 Liddon, Canon, i. 185, 193 Lincoln, President A., U.S.A., i. 40, 42 Liveing, T'rofessor G., ii. 212 Londonderry, Marquis of, ii. 280 Lowe, Rt. Hon. R., i. 66 Lowell, Mr. A. T., i. 249 Lyall, Rt. Hon. Sir Alfred, i. 225, 306, 309, 312, 322; ii. 29 Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. Alfred, ii. 359, 412 Lytton, Sir Edward Bulwer, ii. ^^ Earl of, i. 2 1 5, 220-36, 297, 3 1 3 Macgregor, Sir Charles, i. 297, 301 McNeill, General Sir F"., i. 473; ii. 27 McClellan, General, i. 39, 46 Mahdi, the, i. 40S, &c. ; ii. 32, &c. Maine, Sir Henry, i. 252 Malet, Sir E., i. 362, 409 Mallet, Sir Louis, i. 380 ; ii. 147 Mr. Bernard, i. 448 ; ii. 4 Manchester, Dukes of, ii. 213 Duchess of. See Devonshire Manners, Lord John, ii. 49 Manning, Cardinal, i. 135 Martin, Sir Theodore, i. 252 Mary, H.M. Queen, ii. 264, 408 438 INDEX Maxwell, Sir Herbert, i. 178 Mayo, Earl of, i. 215 Midhat Pasha, i. 180 Milner, Viscount, i. 201 ; ii. 263, 359; 409 Molesvvorth, Sir William, i. 239 ; ii. 266 Mommsen, i. 252 Montagu, Lord Charles, ii. 213 Montaigne, Michel de, i. 293 Montesquieu, ii. 58 Morley, Viscount, i. 195, 258, 263 ; on Soudan policy, 463; ii. 19; Irish pohcy, 59, 61 ; joins Cabinet (1886), 127, 131 ; on Hartington's position, 184 ; round table conference, 185 ; on Ulster question, 250 Mundella, Rt. Hon. A., i. 263 Myers, Mrs. Frederic, i. 283 Napier of Magdala, Lord, i. 305 Napoleon L, i. 158, 185, 292; ii. 128, 133 — in., i. 17,58 Newman, Cardinal, ii. 147 Newton, Lord, ii. 404 Nolan, Captain, i. 92 Northbrook, Earl, Afghan policy, i. 216, 226 ; Admiralty, 280, 294 ; opinion of Hartington, 295 ; on party, 353 ; on Egyptian and Soudan policy, 364, 417, 447, 449, 464, 466, 488, 492 ; mission to Egypt, ii. I ; threatens to resign, 5 ; opinion of Gladstone, 45 ; follows Hartington in 1886, 127 ; coalition question, 183 Northcote, Rt. Hon. Sir Stafford, i. 196; ii. 55 Nubar Pasha, i. 360, 413, 416 Nur Mahomed Shah, i. 216, 218, O'Brien, Mr. Barry, i. 359; ii. 135 O'Donnell, Mr. F., i. 347, 356, 359 ; ii. 165 Odyngseles, John de, i. i O'Keefe, Father, i. 97 O'Shea, Captain, i. 347 ; ii. 215 Mrs., i. 347, 356, 358; ii. 215 Osman Digna, i. 425, 429, 467 ; ii. 27 Palmerston, Viscount, i. 21, 22, 23, 24-30, 35, 36-37, 55, 57, 61 Parnell, Charles Stewart, enters Parliament, i. 241, 249; speech, 265 ; speech, 341 ; imprisoned, 342 ; released, 349 ; relations with Gladstone, 356; speech at Cork, ii. 59 ; at Dublin, 67, 68 ; compared with Hartington, 134; Rent Bill, 176 ; plan of campaign, 189; Parnell Commission, 200; divorce case, defeat and death, 215 ; words on his monument, 59, 246 Pascal, 1. 293, 394 Peel, Sir Robert, i. 24, 98, 104, 244, 287 General, i. 61, 66 Pelly, Sir Lewis, i. 220 Playfair, Dr. Lyon, i. 128, 143 Pless, Princess Henry of, ii. 264 Plunkett, Rt. Hon. Sir Horace, ii. 389 Plutarch, ii. 304 Ponsonby, Sir Henry, i. 299, 305 ; ii- 53-55, 65 Powell-Williams, Mr., ii. 283, 304 Power, Mr. F., i. 410, 489 Powerscourt, Lord, ii. 94 Redmond, Mr. John, ii. 217, 218, 245, 246, 247 Mr. William, ii. 217 Rhodes, Rt. Hon. Cecil, i. 163 ; ii. 263 Ripon, Marquis of, Secretary of State for War, i. 55 ; for India, 62 ; retires from Government, 128 ; views on Afghanistan, 226; Viceroy of India, 298 ; Afghan policy, 296, &c. ; opinion as to Persia, 322 ; as to Indian troops and Egypt, 324 ; on Duke of Devonshire, ii. 414 Ritchie, Rt. Hon. Mr., ii. 280, 297, 298, 299, 306, 308, 309, 310, 323, 338-50, 353. 423 Roberts, Field-Marshal Lord, i. 217, 235, 296, 302, 314 Rose, Sir John, i. 43, 279 Rosebery, Earl of, i. 280; ii. 127, 130,258, 274,404,413,416 INDEX 439 Russell, Lord John, i. 21, 24, 35, 62,66, 132, 157, 392 Lord Arthur, i. 133 Odo (Lord Ampthill), i. 135, 213 Lady John, i. 270 Mr. Harold, i. 133 Mr. George, i. 12, 213 Sir WiHiam, i. 68 Said Pasha, i. 181 St. John, Colonel, i. 298 Salisbury, Marquis of, article in Quarterly^ i. 64 ; views as to Church, 132-33; at Constanti- nople, 172 ; at Berlin, 210 ; at India Office, 218 ; Afghan policy, 218-20; on Lord Beaconsfield, 318 ; speech, 384 ; article, 405 ; Soudan policy, ii. 19, 32 ; fran- chise and redistribution, 58 ; becomes Prime Minister (1885), 63 ; Newport speech, 64 ; resigns, 122 ; Irish debates (1886), 146, 148 ; asks Hartington to form Government (1886), 166, but becomes himself Prime Minister ; again asks Hartington to form a joint Government (1887), 179; letters as to Mr. Goschen, 181 ; offers honours to Duke of Devon- shire, 210 ; end of his second administration, 215, 242; at Chatsworth, 227 ; forms his third administration (1895), 260; char- acter and achievements of this Government, 261 ; views on Mr. Gladstone, 259 ; on education question, 271 ; retires from office and public life, 278-80 Sandeman, Sir Robert, i. 312 Schnadhorst, Mr., ii. 95 Seeley, Sir John, i. 252 Segur, Comte de, ii. 128 Selborne, ist Earl of, i. 208, 280, 285, 475 ; ii. 127 2nd Earl of, i. 289; ii. 203, 360 Seneca, i. 287 Seward, Mr., Secretary of State, U.S.A., i. 42 Shaw, Mr., ii. 79 Sheffield, Lord, ii. 274 ' Shepstone, Sir Theophilus, i. 236 Sher Ali, Amir of Afghanistan, i. 215-25 Wali of Kandahar, i. 298, 303 Sherbrooke, Lord. See Lowe Shuttleworth, Lord, i. 71, 266 Skobeleff, General, i. 321 Smalley, Mr. George, ii. 211 Smith, the Rt. Hon. W. H., ii. 177, 181, 198,203,234 Smyth, Mr., M.P., i. 89 Somerset, Duke of, i. 58 Spencer, Earl, at Cambridge, i. 15 ; Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, "j}^ ; letters, 78 ; Phoenix Park riots, 89; Irish University Bill, iio- 22; a misunderstanding, 123; on Mr. Gladstone, 190; Cabinet (1880), 280; Lord- Lieutenant (1882), 352; Irish feeling, 385; follows Gladstone (1886), 127 Countess, i. 126; ii. 94 Spring Rice, Sir Cecil, i. 201 Spurgeon, Rev. Mr., i. 184 ; ii. 266 Stael, Madame de, i. 174, 210 Stanhope, Rt. Hon. E., ii. 181 Stephen, Sir J. Fitzjames, i. 288 Stephenson, General SirF., Egypt and Soudan, i. 407, 450, 459, 483, 485, 486-88 Stewart, General Sir Donald, Afghanistan, i. 224, 296, 301, 305 Colonel, i. 409, 433> 4^9 General Sir Herbert, ii. 8 Steyn, President, ii. 263 Stoletoff, General, i. 223 -Strathnairn, General Lord, i. 69 Straw, Jack, i. i Strong, Mr. Arthur, ii. 229 Mrs. Arthur, ii. 227, 412 Stuart-Wortley, Colonel, i. 459 Suffi)lk, Earl of, i. 279 j Temple, Archbishop, i. 133 ! Tennyson, Alfred, Lord, i. 66, 290 Tewfik, Khedive of Egypt, i. 361, 420 Thompson, Sir Henry, ii. 134 Sir Ralph, i. 407 Trench, Captain, i. 92 i Trevelyan, Rt. Hon. Sir George, 440 INDEX i- 154, 355. 356, 386; ii. 27, 127, 131, 163 Tyler, Wat, i. i Vaughan, Cardinal, ii. 235 Victoria, H.M. Queen, letter from, offering Government, i. 272 ; Lord Hartington's interviews with (1880), 273 ; correspondence with, as to Afghanistan, 299, 302, 305> 309 ; remonstrance as to Soudan policy, ii. 39 ; asks Mr. Gladstone to form Government (1886), 122 ; correspondence with Lord Hartington(i886), 172, 179 ; congratulations on his marriage, 214, 224 ; Diamond Jubilee (1897), 263 ; dissolves Parlia- ment (1900), 277 ; her death, 279 Walpole, Horace, i. 3, 7 Walrond, Mr. Riversdale, ii. 222 Ward, Mr. Wilfred, ii. 234 Washington, President, i. 263, 292 Welby, Lord, i. 14 Wellington, ist Duke of, i. 292, 341 West, Sir Algernon, i. 12, 278, 353 Westminster, Duke of, i. 183 Whately, Archbishop, i. 284 Whitbread, Mr., i. 55 White, General Sir George, ii. 277 Wilhelm IL, German Emperor, ii. 287 Wilson, General Sir C., i. 439, 460 ; "• ^5 Sir Rivers, i. 360 Wingate, Sir Reginald, i. 411, 455, 462 ; ii. 9 Wolseley, Field-Marshal Lord, Egypt and the Soudan, i. 367, 407, 415-20, 425-29, 441-46, 453, 458, 463, 468, 473, 483-87 ; ii- 6, 7, 11-17, 33,47 Wolverton, Lord, i. 271 Wood, General Sir Evelyn, i. 407, 459 Wyndham, Rt. Hon. George, ii. 307 Yakub, Amir of Afghanistan, i. 217, 222, 225, 298 ZOBEIR Pasha, i. 430-33, 438, 489 THE END Printed by Ballantyne, Hanson &• Co. Edinburgh 6* London UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Los Angeles This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. mp ^ 5 *^¥ le^^^ ^W if^^? P «^( pK^ Uji^^t liO>i i^Witf «li^ AliG^<%j, UM. ' c^ D LD- J o REC'D LD-URt mi 16t969 9IS 1^1^ ^ 2 1 ]f^ ID-W^ .9 ^ ^"' ft 2 8 W*^ DEC t2lW8 orm L9-116m-8,'62(D1237s8)444 3 1158 00953 0998 III mill 5^5 D5HT V.2 «.'