UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY 
 
 
 

 
 THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES
 
 *.., 
 
 
 H^'
 
 AN 
 
 A P PEAL 
 
 TO THE 
 
 P E O P L E: 
 
 CONTAINING, 
 
 The Genuine and Entire Letter of 
 Admiral Byng to the Seer, of the Ad y : 
 
 OBSERVATIONS on thofe Parts of it 
 which were omitted by the Writers of the Gazette : 
 
 AND 
 
 What might be the R E A S O N S for fuch 
 
 Omissions. 
 
 •Nee lex eft aequior ulla 
 
 Quam necis artifices arte perire fua. 
 
 Ovid. 
 
 PART the Firft. 
 
 LONDON: 
 Printed for J. Morgan, in Pater-Nojler-Row. 
 
 J 7J6. 
 
 i

 
 9 7. 
 
 ,» . ' .. . i 
 
 A N 
 
 APPEAL 
 
 T O T H E 
 
 PEOPLE, &c. 
 
 IN all States of whatever Plan the Conftitu- 
 tion may be formed, general Prejudices are 
 extremely apt to take coo Prong PolTeflion 
 of the Hearts of Men, but in none are the Peo- 
 ple fo open to the Influence of that Impulfe as 
 in Governments, where, fiom the Nature of 
 the Eftablifhment, they make a Part of the le^ 
 giflative Power. 
 
 FroxM this Caufeat prefent in this Kingdom, 
 conflituted on a Plan of Liberty, it is probable, 
 that as well as anciently in Athens and Rome, 
 popular Condemnation and Applaufe are more 
 particularly vinble in the A&ions of all Ranks 
 of Men, than in monarchic or defpotic Spaces : 
 Hence it is, that thofe who become the favou- 
 rite Obje&s of this People, are for the moft 
 
 B Part 
 
 477536
 
 [ *3 
 
 Part preferved inviolate from the Malevolence 
 of the M rs, and thofe who become Ob- 
 jects of their Reientment or Contempt, are 
 
 abandoned to the full Force of m 1 Attacks. 
 
 No Man can be fafely punifhed, or fafely per- 
 mitted to eicape Punifhment, when the Nation 
 h in great Ferment, contrary to the gene- 
 ral Opinion of his Deferts, however well in- 
 clined the M— rs may be to fave or deftroy. 
 
 This Confent or Difapprobation of the Pub- 
 lic, frequently proves to be the juft Counter- 
 poise which weighs again ft the minifterial In- 
 clinations, when unreafonably intended to re- 
 ward or puniih thofe who become the Objects 
 of the national Coniideracion, and a neceffary 
 Sand ion to all their Proceedings of a public 
 Nature ; for thefe Reafons, whenever, by 
 
 m 1 Meafures long mifconducted, fome 
 
 iinifter Event becomes the Confequence of their 
 Adminiii ration -, thofe in the Cabinet who have 
 little Hoeefty and lefs Underftanding to direct a 
 Nation either in Peace or War, to appoint pro- 
 per Means for attacking their Enemies, and 
 protecting their own Country by Land or Sea ; 
 in fhorr, thofe who are unequal to every Duty 
 
 of a M r, are ftill cunning enough to 
 
 think it indifpenfibly necelTary, to throw the 
 whole Blame and Difgrace of the ill Succefs, on 
 the vifible Object who prefided in the Scene of 
 Action, to fafcinate the Underftandings of the 
 Multitude by delufive and partial Repreienta- 
 
 tions,
 
 C3] 
 
 tions, and fculk from their Indignation behind 
 the Refentment, which their Adherents and 
 Abettors have craftily raifed againft the Com- 
 mander in the Day of Battle. 
 
 To quote Inftances of this Kind, would be 
 to mention almoft all the pad Fads in Hiflxry, 
 in which Military Affairs have proved infuc- 
 cefsful, from the Iniquity, Negligence, or In- 
 capacity, of the M— < — rs, and the Chief in 
 Command has been called to public Juttitka- 
 
 tion : and indeed as the Dependants of M s 
 
 mufl be more numerous than thofe of a im- 
 peded Commander, and as the Love of Money 
 and their own Intereft is more particularly pre- 
 valent, in fuch Men, than the Love pf Honefty 
 of Truth, and of their Country, k has too ge- 
 nerally happened, that by means of m 1 
 
 Faction, the innocent Commanders have been 
 condemned by the People, and the guilty Ad- 
 miniftration not attended to or acquitted. It 
 has been remarked, that the Tribunal of the 
 People has generally pronounced righteous Sen- 
 tences, when all the Circumftances of rhe Af- 
 fair have been brought before it ; and even 
 where the Decisions have been either defective or 
 unjuft, that it has been chiefly owing to partial 
 and unfair Repreientations of the Subject ; for 
 thefe Reafons, it neceffarily becomes the Inie- 
 reft of all Minifters, who intend to transfer the 
 Guilt of an Action from memielves to the Com- 
 manders in any unfortunate undertaking, to 
 B 2 conceal
 
 conceal and mifreprefent every Circumftance, 
 which can poffibly offer any favourable Idea, for 
 the Juftification and Defence of thofe who have 
 unhappily mifcarried in their Endeavours, under 
 tricir wrong Directions and ill-concerted Mea- 
 fures, and to deftine them the public Sacri- 
 fice and Atonement for their Inability or Ini- 
 quity. 
 
 To effect this, and their own Prefer vation, 
 Ten Thoufand idle and groundlefs Reports, 
 which may tend to countenance and fupport that 
 Part of the Affair only which they think necef- 
 fary to be offered to the Public, are daily 
 fpsead by their Emiffaries ; hence it arifes, 
 that fiom partial Views of the whole Cir- 
 cumMances, from limited Confiderations of 
 the Subject, Things appear to be juft, which are 
 the rankefi. Injuitjce, the Guihlefs die, and the 
 Guilty cicape from condign Punifhment. 
 
 This has frequently been the Consequence 
 
 of Ctaft in M rs, and many an innocent 
 
 Man has fuffered from this cruel Cunning of Men 
 in Power -, bv thefe Arts the Pactions of the 
 People, greatly incenfed and knavifhly feduced, 
 have been mifled to condemn Men as Deft oyer s 
 of the Crown and Nation's Honour, who are only 
 made to appear in that Light, by the Wickednels 
 
 and Wiles of thofe very M s who ruined 
 
 the public Welfare, and betrayed the Glory of 
 £he Sovereign | it is during thjs Tumult in the 
 
 Minds
 
 [5] 
 
 Minds of Men, too turbulent at firft to be ap* 
 pealed by, or Hften to, the Voice of Reaion, 
 
 that M rs have taken Occafion to facriflce 
 
 a Commander in Chief, to appeafe the Wrath 
 of the People and lave themfelves. 
 
 This having been already the Event in 
 numberlefs Inftances, muft naturally prevail a- 
 gain, and be attempted, whenever an iniquitous, 
 
 weak, or inattentive M r entertains the De- 
 
 fign of fcreening himfelf from Punimment, 
 by the Death of another Man lefs criminal ; 
 without this Precaution, the hi ft Impetuofity in 
 the Multitude fubfiding, and more Truth being 
 let in upon the Subject and their Minds, that 
 which was condemned under a partial View, 
 becomes approved of under a general one, the 
 M r receives that Fate which he had allot- 
 ted for the Commander, and Juftice takes Place 
 where Heaven always defigned it fhould, on the 
 nefarious. 
 
 It may perhaps by this Time be fufpectcd, 
 that all this Preface is advanced to prepare a 
 Judication of the late Behaviour of Admiral 
 £ — g t and that I, his Advocate, am endeavour- 
 ing to fcreen him from the public Refentment. 
 Nothing is lefs true ; my Intent is only to lay 
 the whole Affair candidly before you, affuring 
 you at the fame Time, that no Man can be 
 more irritated againft his Conduct than I was in 
 the beginning, till what I am going to offer to 
 
 your
 
 [«] 
 
 your Opinions became the prevailing Power over 
 mine. 
 
 I AM fully convinced that the People of this 
 Country have the Love of Juftice fo ftrongly im- 
 planted in their Bofoms, that nothing can efface 
 or over-rule it by dired: and open Foice ; but I 
 know alfo, that by Concealment of Truth and 
 Mifreprefentation of Circumftances, the Minds 
 of Multitudes, as well as of the wifeft Individu- 
 als, may be warped from Equity, and induced 
 to determine diametrically oppofite to right Rea- 
 ion, however ardently they ieek the Truth. 
 
 Indeed, I freely own my Sentiments are 
 much altered, by being indulged with authentic 
 Evidence of Admiral B — g's Behaviour in the 
 Mediterranean ; and appealing to you as Judges 
 of his Guilt or Innocence, I dare believe, when 
 what I have to fay is laid before you, even in 
 granting the moft unfavourable Opinions you 
 can entertain of him to be juft, you will allow 
 that he has been moft unjuftifiably dealt with 
 by thofe who lent him on the Expedition. 
 
 Between perfecllnnocence and perfed Guilt 
 there are innumerable Degrees in the Scale of 
 Offence; and as no Man can fay he is without 
 Fault, fo none can be pronounced all Guiltinefs ; 
 the Nature of Crimes differs as much in Degrees 
 as thofe who commit them ; and the Nature of 
 Jfbflice is fuch, that unlefs it be truly adapted to 
 
 the
 
 C7] 
 
 the Degree of Offence, it becomes Injuftice ; and 
 that which is the due Punifhment for one Crime 
 is converted to Guel'v, when inflicted for the 
 Commiflion of a lefs ; though it be jtift to 
 condemn the Murderer to Death, is it not too 
 fevere to deprive thofe of Life, who fteal Bread 
 to iatisfy the Calls of Nature in the Moment of 
 perifhing by Hunger ? 
 
 In Cafes of Dhloyalty, the Officers who are 
 mod active in recruiting Troops againft their 
 King, and braved: in the Day of Battle, are al- 
 ways confidered as lefs culpable in the Breach of 
 their Allegiance and Duty, than the Creators 
 of the Rebellion, though they never appear in 
 Arms ; the mod obvious Objects of Reientment 
 are frequently the leaffc guilty of all who are 
 concerned. 
 
 In like Manner, when M rs have here- 
 tofore been determined to fell the Intereft of 
 their K — g and Country, thofe whom they em- 
 ployed to execute their Purpofes, however guil- 
 ty, have been confidered as lefs criminal, whilit 
 their Leaders, like Satan, firtl tempred to fin, 
 continue tempting others to their own and the 
 Nation's Ruin ; not that I fay this to intimate 
 that f his Kingdom has been fold on a late Occa- 
 fion, much lefs that Mr B — g is confeious 
 of the Sale. I know he is not; but to flxnv 
 only that in fuch aggravating Infrances even, 
 there muft be Men more notorioufly guilty than 
 
 the
 
 [8] 
 
 the mod obvious Offender, and that it therefore 
 becomes neceffary to p;)int out who they are, 
 that the foremoft in Offence may be firft in Pu- 
 nishment, and nor by removing the fubordinate, 
 preferve the chief Contrivers, to perpetrate more 
 Mifchief to their Country's Ruin. 
 
 To fix the Degree of every Crime in the 
 Scale of Offence, becomes then as much an Act 
 ofjuftice, as to protect the Innocent or con- 
 demn the Guilty - y and to lay the Cafe of Mr 
 jB — g fairly before you, mult appear a laudable 
 Attempt in the Eyes of all humane and juft Men, 
 becaufe every Englijhman has a Right to a fair 
 Plea and candid Judgment ; and without being 
 acquainted with ail the Circumftances, no De- 
 cifion can be made but what muft be partial 
 and defective. If it fhall appear then, at the 
 End of this Enquiry, that Mifreprefentation, 
 Calumny, Concealment of Truth, and Tales of 
 Falfhood, propagated and committed by thofe 
 wh@ purfue Mr B — g y and their Confederates, 
 have induced you to pronounce thofe fevere 
 Cenfures which have been paffed againft him, 
 .when Things come to be placed in their true 
 Light, and the Milt of Craft removed from 
 your Eyes j when, if it be apparent that your 
 Judgment has been milled by erroneous and 
 partial Reprefentations, fhall not then the Love, 
 of Juftice move ye to reverfe thofe Decr&s 
 which ye have already made, and the Love of 
 Truth prompt you to renounce the Errors of 
 
 your
 
 [9] 
 
 your former Decifion, with the fame Zeal with 
 which you embraced it, you will then think it 
 as much the Duty of an Englifh Subject, and of 
 a Man, to remit your Refentment againft Mr 
 B — g y as it will be to direct it on the great Pro- 
 moters of your Ruin and Difgrace. 
 
 Without manifesting this Candour, Men 
 obflinately confefs, that they prefer following an 
 Error once adopted, to renouncing it for a Truth 
 which may have been long hidden from their 
 Perceptions, by the moil malignant Artifices of 
 the moll pernicious Men : This Reflection, I 
 hope, fhall never be imputed to the Behaviour 
 of Engliflmeji. 
 
 In this View and to this Intent I ftand forth, 
 not as the Friend or Advocate of Mr JS — g, but 
 as the Friend and Advocate of Juftice, my 
 King, and Country -, to make apparent to all 
 Eyes, how the firft has been violated, and the 
 latter abufed and ruined ; to explain how it be- 
 comes your Duty, though the Crime of Mr 
 B — g be ever fo enormous, to provide that it 
 be fairly examined, and the Ad 1 impartial- 
 ly treated ; to fhow you in what Manner thofe 
 Evidences, which favour the Juftification of 
 him, have been cruelly with- held from the 
 public Eye, bafely mi (rep re fen ted, and others 
 added to infinuate their coming from his Hands ; 
 and in his Place permit me to fpeak to the 
 Hearts and Underftandings of all Engl!fimc?i y 
 
 C uncorrupted
 
 C i° ] 
 
 uncQrrupted and uninfluenced by m 1 Bribes, 
 
 Places, and Penfions. Let me fuppofe that any 
 one indifferent Man amongft you had been em- 
 ployed in a military Action of Confequence, and 
 had written to either of the others an Account 
 of his Behaviour, and of the Tran fact ion on 
 which not only his Honour but his very Life 
 depended, is there a Man amongft you who 
 would have concealed or mifreprefented any 
 Part of this Account, with Defign to accomplilh 
 the Writer's Undoing? I am convinced you 
 would not have committed fuch Bafenefs. What 
 then is the juft Due of fuch Men, if fuch there 
 are, who have dared to commit an Action of 
 that Nature, not improbably, duping their R — 1 
 Matter to this iniquitous Intent, without his 
 Knowledge of the real Circumftances, and ma- 
 king you, the honeft Subjects of this Realm, 
 Abettors of all this horrid injuftice ? What then 
 mutt be the State of that Man's Bofom, who 
 may have ken his own Letter (tripped of every 
 Part which can make moil effectually in his 
 Favour, imperfectly given to the public Exami- 
 nation, and the People enraged againft his Con- 
 duct by this partial Reprefentation of his own 
 Account, concealing the mod material Circum- 
 ftances which determined him to behave as he 
 did. 
 
 What profligate and abandoned Hearts 
 mutt fuch Men poffeis, who, by Omiffions of 
 whole Paragraphs of a Ccaucjinder's own Let- 
 ter,
 
 [ » ] 
 
 ter, and Additions of others, can leflen the 
 Force of his Justification in an Affair of Life 
 and Death, change the Account of his Proceed- 
 ings, and almoft efface the whole Meaning of 
 the Letter, to make his own Words condemn 
 him to the Multitude, by fpeaking half what 
 they exprefs, and extorting, by this new Way of 
 putting Letters to the Torture, fo contradictory 
 to the Spirit of the Englijh Laws, a fVleaning 
 fo different from what they truly import, a 
 Confeflion of Guilt which is not to be found in 
 the whole uncaffrated Original. If this appear 
 to be a true Reprefentation, you will not with- 
 hold a juft Refentment on this Occaficn ; and 
 that it is, I dare to make appear from fuch 
 Proofs, that even the greatefr Enemy again ft 
 Mr B — g mall be obliged to confefs his Convic- 
 tion of the Truth of what /hall be faid ; and 
 that, however guilty he may appear to be, in 
 Companion with his Gppreffors, he is as inno- 
 cent as the Perfon who treads on a Worm com- 
 pared with Cain who flew his Brother, or he 
 who burns his own Hovel, to him that fet Fire 
 to the mattered Ruins of Lijbon amidft the Ca- 
 lamities of the Earthquake. 
 
 In Truth, and before the Eyes of Heaven, 
 if what I (hall offer to your Confideration ap- 
 pears to be Fadt, How are fuch barbarous Pro- 
 ceedings reconcilable with Humanity, or effen- 
 tially different from a Forgery ? to add what can 
 undo a Man, or erafe what can preferve him, 
 
 C 2 how
 
 how do they vary in the Nature and Confe- 
 quence of the Defign ? And to aggravate the 
 Heinoufnefs of the Offence, it is not like the 
 defpicable Intent of defrauding a Man of his 
 Money, but like that of depriving him of his 
 Life -, it cannot be an Attempt to rob, though it 
 may be to murder. 
 
 Is it not a Crime equal to that of Forgery, 
 when men, by leaving out the moil: material 
 Circumftances of a Man's Defence, leffen the 
 Force, or change the Import of the whole, ren- 
 dering him to the People the deteiled Object of 
 their Indignation and Defire of Punifhment ? 
 Is it not by fuch cruel Means that he may be- 
 come uniuflly condemned ? Added to this, if it 
 ihall appear that this Iniquity is purpofely com- 
 mitted to fcreen themfelves from their juft Re- 
 wards, what is it but an execrable Endeavour 
 to take away the Life of a lefs guilty, perhaps 
 Innocent, Man, to fave their own deftrudive 
 Heads from condign Punifhment. 
 
 Any Attempt of this Nature appears the 
 moil: inhuman of all Kinds of corrupted Evi- 
 dence I have hitherto known, omitting the Parts 
 which juftify, and retaining thofe which feem 
 to condemn. Is it not a Subornation of Wit- 
 nefs ? Is it not obliging the very perfon to give 
 Tefiimony contrary to the Truth of the Fad, 
 and repugnant to his own Prefervation ? 
 
 J?
 
 C HI 
 
 If this fhould appear to be the Cafe with 
 Rcfpedt to the Man whofe Conduct I am going 
 
 to lay before you \ if M rs thall be found 
 
 to have dealt with him in this inhuman Man- 
 ner, I doubt not but the Tide of Refentment, 
 which has fo long and fo violently ran againft 
 him, will be turned in His Favour, and fet as 
 flrongly againft thofe that may be difcovered to 
 have thus cruelly meditated his Ruin to preferve 
 themfelves. 
 
 This Attempt of faithfully placing before 
 your Eyes the real State of an injured Fellow- 
 Subjeci, will I hope be forgiven ; injured he 
 muft appear to be, however Guilty, becaufe no 
 Man's Guilt can juftify the concealing or alter- 
 ing the Nature of his Evidence, or reprefenting 
 him to his Countrymen more criminal than he 
 is, with Defign to fee him over- borne by the 
 Torrent of Popular Prejudice. 
 
 I n my Endeavours to do this, I (hall only 
 lay before you the genuine Letter which was 
 
 fent to the S y of the A y by Admiral 
 
 B—g, dated on board the Ramillies off Minor- 
 ca y May the 25th, 1756, in it's intire State, 
 unmangled by the Writers of the Gazette 3 en- 
 deavour to inveftigate the true Motives which 
 induced the publishing of it in this imperfect 
 State, on June the 26th, and impartially ex- 
 plain
 
 [ 14 ] 
 
 plain the Mifchief it was probably defigned to 
 do Mr B— g. 
 
 This I prefume is justifiable in the Eyes of 
 Heaven and Earth, to devellope and characte- 
 rise the Defigns of Men in fuch Proceedings 
 
 againft. the A 1, and to examine if Self- 
 
 Prefervation, attempted by Cruelty and In- 
 juflice, might not have been the chief Motives 
 to this inhuman Conduct. 
 
 All I requefl:, is a calm and difpafiionate 
 Examination of the whole Affair, and what 
 there is to be faid upon it ; and then, though 
 Prejudices of all Kinds are difficultly erafed, 
 more efpecially thofe which are received againft 
 the imagined Enemies of their Country. I 
 entertain not the lead: Sufpicion, but to prove 
 the Perfon againft whom this Temped of In- 
 juries has bsen let loofe, who has been drawn, 
 hanged, and burnt in every Part of the Town, 
 is the leaft Guilty of all concerned in the Con- 
 duct of the Affair in the Mediterranean, the 
 lead meriting fuch opprobrious Treatment, and 
 the moft worthy your Protection ; and that all 
 thofe injurious Proceedings will be found to 
 have taken Birth from confeious Guilt, the 
 Fear of your Refentment, and public Juftice, 
 and to with-hold your Eyes from difcerning the 
 jufl Objects of your Indignation : By this, I 
 mean not to foothe your Hearts to difpropor- 
 tioned Mercy 5 all I defire is, that you may be 
 
 alike
 
 [•5] 
 
 alike juft in your Decifions to every Mart 
 proved a Delinquent -, let not the great, when 
 proved Offenders, fcreen themfelves by the Sa- 
 crifice of the lefs criminal ; diftinguifh their 
 Offences and the Degrees of them, deliver your 
 Opinions freely of the Punifhment which is 
 due to each, for without your Approbation, 
 they will not prefume to condemn him un- 
 meriting it ; and if yoa are ftiil deluded to 
 believe amifs by partial and unjuft Reprefenta- 
 tions, will they not fcreen themfelves and com- 
 plete his Deftruffion however Innocent? 
 
 A l l I mean by what has been already urged, 
 is to appeal to your Tribunal, in Juftice to you 
 who have been fo flagrantly abufed by deceitful 
 Reprefentations, and made Accomplices in 
 Abetting the wicked Purpofes of bad Men, in 
 Juftice to my own Convidtions, and the Stn- 
 fations of a humane Heart, which has been 
 deeply touched with Refentment of this 
 Barbarity towards Mr Byng ; in Juftice to, 
 and Companion for one, who by injurious and 
 unmerited Ill-Ufage from their Hands, has 
 been rendered fo obnoxious to the Public, 
 that fcarce a Man dares openly appear to be 
 his Friend. 
 
 Permit me now, to lay the true Copy of 
 the Letter as it left the Hands of Admiral Byng 9 
 before you, uncurtailed or altered. 
 
 A Ge-
 
 C *6] 
 
 A Genuine Copy of Admiral Byvg's 
 Letter to the Secretary of the Ad- 
 miralty. 
 
 The Parts printed in Italics and Comma's, mark 
 the Parts omitted in the GAZETTE. 
 
 Ramillier, off Minorca, 
 25 May, 1756. 
 
 SIR, 
 
 IH A V E the Pleafure to delire you will ac- 
 quaint their Lordfhips, that having failed 
 from Gibraltar the 8th, I got off Mahon the 
 19th, having been joined by His Majefty's Ship 
 Phoenix, off Majorca, two Days before, ,, by 
 , whom I had confirmed the Intelligence I re- 
 , ceived at Gibraltar, of the Strength of the 
 , French Fleet, and of their being off Mahon. 
 , His Majefty's Colours were fill flying at the. 
 y Cajlle of St Philip's, and I could perceive 
 , fever al Bomb Batteries playing upon it from 
 , different Parts ; French Colours we faw fly- 
 , ing on the Weft Part of St Philip's. I dif- 
 , patched the Phcenix, Chefterficld, and Dolphin 
 , a Head, to reconnoitre the Harbour s Mouth % 
 , and Captain Hervey, to ejideavour to land a 
 , Letter for General Blakeny, to let him know 
 , the Fleet was here to his Affiftance, though 
 , every one was of Opinion, we could be of no 
 , life to him, as by all Accounts , no Place was 
 
 „ fecured
 
 [ *7 ) 
 
 , fecured for covering a Landings could we havb 
 , /pared any People. "The Phoenix was alfo to 
 , make the private Signal between Captain 
 , Harvey and Captain Scrop'e, as this latter 
 , would undoubtedly come off, if it were prac- 
 , table, having kept the Dolphin's Barge with 
 , him ; but the Enemy s Fleet appearing to the 
 , South- Ea/l, and the Wind at the fame Time 
 , coming flrong off the Land, obliged me to call 
 , thofe Ships in, before they could get quite fo 
 , near the Entrance of the Harbour, as to make 
 , fure what Batteries or Guns might be placed 
 , to prevent our having any Communication with 
 , the Cajlie" Falling little Wind, it was Five 
 before I could form my Line, or diftinguifh any 
 of the Enemy's Motions, and not at all to judge 
 of their Force more than by their Numbers, 
 which were Seventeen, and Thirteen appeared 
 large. They at firft flood towards us in a re- 
 gular Line, and tacked about Seven, which I 
 judged was to endeavour to gain the Wind of 
 us in the Night 3 fo that being late, I tacked* 
 in order to keep the Weather- Gage of them, as 
 well as to make fure of the Land Wind, in the 
 Morning, being very hazy and not above five 
 Leagues off Cape Mola. We tacked off towards 
 the Enemy at Eleven ; and at Day-light had no 
 fight of them. But two Tartans with the 
 French private Signal being clofe in with the 
 Rear of our Fleet, I fent the Princefs Louifa to 
 chafe one, and made the Signal for the Rear- 
 Ad miral, who was neareft the other, to fend 
 
 D Ships
 
 [ 18 :] 
 
 Ships to chacc her ; the Princefs Louifa, Defiance, 
 and Captain, became at a great Diftance, but the 
 Defiance took her's, which had two Captains, two 
 Lieutenants, and One Hundred and Two pri- 
 vate Soldiers, who were fent out the Day be- 
 fore with Six Hundred Men on board Tartans 
 to reinforce the French Fleet, on our then ap- 
 pearing off the Place. The Phoenix, on Cap- 
 tain Hervey's offer, prepared to ferve as a Fire- 
 Ship, but without damaging her as a Frigate, 
 'till the Signal was made to prime, when fhe was 
 then to fcuttle her Decks, every thing elfe being 
 prepared, as the Time and Place allowed of. 
 The Enemy now began to appear from the 
 Maft-head ; I called in the Cruifers, and when 
 they had joined me, I tacked towards the Ene- 
 my, and formed the Line a-head. I found the 
 French were preparing theirs to Leeward, hav- 
 ing unfuccefsfully endeavoured to weather me : 
 They were Twelve large Ships of the Line, and 
 five Frigates. As foon as I judged the Rear of 
 pur Fleet to be the Length of their Van, we 
 tacked ail together, and immediately made the 
 Signal for the Ships that led, to lead large, and 
 for the Deptford to quit the Line, that ours 
 might become equal in Number with theirg. 
 At Two I made the Signal to engage, as T 
 found it was the fureft Method of ordering 
 every Ship to clofe down on the one that fell to 
 their Lot, And here I muff exprefs my great 
 Satisfaction at the very gallant Manner in which 
 *he Rear- Admiral fet the Van the Example, by 
 
 inftantly
 
 [ *9 J 
 
 inftantly bearing down on the Ships he was to 
 engage with his fecond, and who occafioned 
 one of the French Ships to begin the Engage- 
 ment, which they did, by raking ours as they 
 went down ; I bore down on the Ship that lay 
 oppofite me, and began to engage him, after 
 having received the Fire for fome Time in going 
 down. The Intrepid, ,, unfortunately" (in the 
 very beginning had his Fore-top- maft (hot 
 away, and as that hung on his Fore-fail and 
 backed it, he had no Command of his Ship, 
 his Fore-tack and all his Braces being cut at the 
 fame Time, fo that he drove on the next Ship 
 to him, and obliged that, and the Ships a-head 
 of me to throw all aback ; this obliged me to 
 do fo alfo for fome Minutes to avoid their fal- 
 ling on board me, though not before we had 
 drove our Adverfary out of the Line, who put 
 before the Wind, and had feveral Shot fired at 
 him from his own Admiral. This not only 
 caufed the Enemy's Center to be unattacked, 
 but left the Rear-Admiral's Divifion rather un- 
 covered for fome little Time. I fent and called 
 to the Ships a-head of me to make Sail on, and 
 go down on the Enemy, and ordered the Che- 
 flerfield to lay by the Intrepid, and the Dept- 
 ford to fupply the Intrepid's Place. I found the 
 Enemy edged away conftantly, and as they 
 went three Feet to our one, they would never 
 permit our clofing with them, bu»: took the Ad- 
 vantage of deftroying our Rigging ; for though 
 I cldfed the Rear-Admiral fad, I found I could 
 D 2 not
 
 [ 20] 
 
 not agaia clofe the Enemy, whofe Van were 
 fairly drove from their Line ; bat their Admi- 
 ral was joining them by bearing away. By this 
 Time 'twas part Six, and the Enemies Van and 
 ours were at too great a Diftance to engage ; I 
 perceived fome of their Ships ftretching to the 
 Northward, and I imagined they were going to 
 form a new Line ; I made the Signal for the 
 headmoft Ships to tack, and thofe that led be- 
 fore v ith Larboard Tacks, to lead with the 
 Starboard, that I might by the jirft, keep (if 
 p Tible) the Wind of the Enemy, and by the 
 i jond, be between the Rear- Admiral's Divi- 
 iion and the Enemy, as his had furTered moil, 
 as alio to cover the Intrepid, which I perceived 
 to be in a very bad Condition, and whofe lofs 
 would very greatly give the Ballance againft us, 
 if they had attacked us the next Morning as I 
 expe&ed. I brought to about Eight that 
 Night to join the Intrepid, and to refit our Ships 
 as faft as poffible, and continued fo all Night. 
 The next Morning we faw nothing of the Ene- 
 my, though we were frill lying to ; Mahon 
 was N. N. W. about ten or eleven Leagues. 
 I fent Cruifers out to look for the Intrepid and 
 Chefterfield, who joined me the next Day ; 
 and having, from a State and Condition of the 
 Squadron brought me in, found that the Cap- 
 tain, Intrepid, and Defiance, (which latter has 
 loft her Captain) were much damaged in their 
 iyiafts, „ fo that they were endangered gJ not 
 „ Iking able to Jecure their Majis property at 
 
 ,, Sea 5
 
 3»5 
 
 ti 
 
 [ 21 ] 
 
 Sea ; and alfo, that the Squadron in general 
 were very fickly, many killed and wounded^ 
 and no where to put a Third of their Num- 
 ber, if 1 made an Hofpital even of the Forty 
 Gun Ship, which was not eafy at Sea J* I 
 thought it proper in this Situation, to call a 
 Council of War before I went again to look for 
 the Enemy. I defired the Attendance of Gene- 
 ral Stuart, Lord Effingham, and Lord Robert 
 Bertie, and Colonel Cornwallis, that I might 
 colled: thejr Opinions upon the prefent Situa- 
 tion ,, of Minorca and Gibraltar, and make 
 „ Jure of protecling the latter, Jince it was found 
 y , impracticable to either fuccour or relieve the 
 „ former with the Force we had-, for though we 
 ,, may juflly claim the Victory, yet we are mndh 
 ,, inferior to the Weight of their Ships, though 
 ,, the Numbers are equal, and they have the 
 „ Advantage of fending to Minorca their 
 ,, wounded, and getting Reinforcements of Sea- 
 ,, men jrom their Tranf ports, a?id Soldiers from 
 „ their Camp -, all which, undoubtedly has been 
 ,, done in this Time that we have been laying 
 „ to to refit, qnd often in Sight of Minorca $ 
 ,, and their Ships have more than once appeared 
 ,, in a Line from our Majl- heads. I jend their 
 3 , Lord/hips the Refolution of the Council of 
 ,, War," in which there was not the leaft Con- 
 tention or Doubt arofe. ,, / hope indeed we 
 ; , f ball find Stores to reft us at Gibraltar, and 
 ,, if I have any Reinforcement, will not lofe a 
 1} Moment's Time to feek the Enemy again, and 
 
 ,, once
 
 )> 
 
 [ 22 ] 
 
 more give them Battle, though they have a 
 „ great Advantage in being clean Ships, that 
 ,, go three Feet to our me, and therefore 
 y , have the Choice how they will engage us, 
 f, or if they will at all, and will never let 
 y, us clofe them, as their fole View is the dif 
 „ ailing our Ships, in which they have but 
 ,, too well fucceeded, though we obliged them to 
 ,, bear up." I do not fend their Lordmips the 
 Particulars of oar Lofles and Damages by this, 
 as it would take me much Time, and that I am 
 willing none mould be loft in letting them know 
 an Event of fuch Confequence. ,, 1 cannot help 
 „ urging their Lord/loips for a Reinforcement, 
 5, if none are yet failed, on their Knowledge of 
 „ the Enemy's Strength in thefe Seas, and which, 
 ,, by very good Intelligence, will in a few Days 
 3 , be ftrengthened by four more large Ships from 
 y , Toulon, almofl ready to fail, if not now Jailed 
 ,, to join thefe." I difpatch this to Sir Benjamin 
 Keene by way of Barcelona, and am making 
 the beft of my way to „ cover (< Gibraltar ; 
 from which Place I propofe fending their Lord- 
 ihips a more particular Account. 
 
 I am, 
 
 S I R, 
 
 Your moil humble Servant, 
 
 Hon. John Cleveland, Efq; T g. 
 
 P.S. Imuft
 
 [ *3 3 
 
 P. S. I muft defire you will acquaint their 
 Lordfhips, that I have appointed Captain Her- 
 vey to the Command of the Defiance, in the 
 room of Captain Andrews flain in the Action. 
 
 I have juft fent the Defeats of the Ships, as 
 I have got it made out, whilft I was clofing 
 my Letter.'' 
 
 Before I proceed to examine what may 
 have been the probable Reafons for omitting the 
 above Paragraphs printed in Italics and Com- 
 ma's, permit me to lay before you, authentic 
 Lifts of the Fleets which engaged in the Medi- 
 terranean under the Commands of Admiral 
 Byng and Monfieur La Gal/iJ/bnniere, as they 
 were in Number of Ships, Number of Men, 
 Number of Cannon, and Weight of Metal ; 
 and from a fair Comparifon in thefe Particu- 
 lars, mow you on which Side, and to what 
 Degree the Advantage lay. 
 
 Ths
 
 [ 24] 
 
 The Honourable Admiral Byng's Squadron, 
 when he engaged Monfieur De La Gallijfon- 
 mere's off Cape Mola, 20 May, J 756. 
 
 Ships Names. 
 
 Guns 
 
 Weight 
 
 of Meta 
 
 [ on the 
 
 Men. 
 
 Lower 
 
 Middle 
 
 Upper 
 
 
 
 Deck. 
 
 Deck. 
 
 Deck. 
 
 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 Ramillies - - 
 
 go 
 
 32 
 
 18 
 
 12 
 
 780 
 
 Culloden - 
 
 74 
 
 32 
 
 
 18 
 
 600 
 
 Buckingham 
 
 68 
 
 32 
 
 
 18 
 
 535 
 
 Lancafter 
 
 66 
 
 32 
 
 
 18 
 
 520 
 
 Trident 
 
 64 
 
 24 
 
 
 12 
 
 500 
 
 Intrepid 
 
 64 
 
 32 
 
 
 18 
 
 480 
 
 Captain 
 
 64 
 
 24 
 
 
 12 
 
 480 
 
 Revenge - - 
 
 64 
 
 24 
 
 
 12 
 
 480 
 
 Kingfton - 
 
 60 
 
 2 4 
 
 
 9 
 
 400 
 
 Defiance - - 
 
 60 
 
 24 
 
 
 12 
 
 400 
 
 Princefs Louifa - 
 
 <i 
 
 24 
 
 
 12 
 
 400 
 
 Portland - - 
 
 48 
 
 778 
 
 24 
 
 
 12 
 
 300 
 
 
 
 
 5375 
 
 Frigates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Deptford - - 
 
 48 
 
 
 
 
 280 . 
 
 Cheiterfield 
 
 40 
 
 
 
 
 250 
 
 Phcenix 
 
 22 
 
 
 
 
 160 
 
 Dolphin 
 
 22 
 
 
 
 
 160 
 
 Experiment 
 Total - - - 
 
 22 
 
 932 
 
 
 — 
 
 
 160 
 
 
 
 6885 
 
 MoNSIEU R
 
 [ *5 ] 
 
 Monsieur De La Gallijfonnieres Squadron, 
 when he landed the Troops at Minorca 
 1 8 April, and at the Engagement with Ad- 
 miral By rig's Squadron off Cape Mola, 20 
 May, 1756. 
 
 
 
 Weight 
 
 of Me- 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 
 
 tal on the 
 
 Num 
 
 serof 
 
 Men on 
 
 Ships Names. 
 
 Guns 
 
 
 
 
 
 board 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Lower 
 
 Upper 
 
 Sea- 
 
 Soldi- 
 
 each 
 
 
 
 Deck. 
 
 Deck. 
 
 men. 
 
 ers. 
 
 Ship. 
 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 
 
 Foudroyant 
 
 84 
 
 5 2 
 
 2d 
 
 700 
 
 250 
 
 o>° 
 
 La Couronne - 
 
 74 
 
 42 
 
 24 
 
 650 
 
 150 
 
 • 800 
 
 Le Guerrier - 
 
 74 
 
 42 
 
 2 4 
 
 650 
 
 150 
 
 800 
 
 Le Temeraire 
 
 74 
 
 42 
 
 24 
 
 650 
 
 150 
 
 8oo 
 
 Le Redoutable 
 
 74 
 
 42 
 
 2 4 
 
 650 
 
 150 
 
 800 
 
 L'Hipopothame 
 
 64 
 
 36 
 
 24 
 
 500 
 
 100 
 
 600 
 
 Le Fier - - 
 
 64 
 
 16 
 
 2 4 
 
 500 
 
 100 
 
 600 
 
 Le Triton 
 
 64 
 
 *6 
 
 24 
 
 500 
 
 100 
 
 600 
 
 Le Lion - - 
 
 64 
 
 ,6 
 
 24 
 
 500 
 
 ICO 
 
 600 
 
 Le Contant - 
 
 64 
 
 ^ 
 
 2 4 
 
 500 
 
 IOO 
 
 600 
 
 Le Sage - - 
 
 64 
 
 tf 
 
 24 
 
 500 
 
 1 00 
 
 600 
 
 L'Orphee - - 
 
 64 
 
 828 
 
 36 
 
 2 4 
 
 500 
 
 IOO 
 
 600 
 
 
 
 6800 
 
 1550 
 
 8350 
 
 Frigates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 La Juno - - 
 
 46 
 
 
 
 300 
 
 
 300 
 
 La Roze - - 
 
 30 
 
 
 
 2,-0 
 
 
 250 
 
 La Gracieufe - 
 
 JO 
 
 
 
 250 
 
 
 2,-0 
 
 La Topaze 
 
 2 4 
 
 
 
 250 
 
 
 250 
 
 La Nymphe - 
 Total 
 
 24 
 982 
 
 
 
 200 
 
 
 200 
 \ 
 
 
 
 8050 
 
 1550 
 
 9600 
 
 In
 
 [ 26 ] 
 
 In the firft Place, the Number of Ships was 
 equal on each Side ; from this then no Advan- 
 tage was to be drawn by one Party above ano- 
 ther. As the Frigates on either Side did not 
 engage, notwithstanding the French exceeded 
 the Englijh greatly in Number of Men and 
 Weight of Metal, I (hall not attempt to de- 
 rive from that Circurnftance any Argument of 
 the Superiority of the French Fleet to that of 
 the Engli/Jj, but confider thofe Ships which 
 were drawn up in Line of Battle, only remark- 
 ing the Weaknefs of that Objection to the Con- 
 dud of the Admiral, in leaving the Deptford 
 out of the Line ; when the fame Thing was 
 done by Monfieur La G alii ffbnni ere in not taking 
 the Junon into his Line ; the firft being of For- 
 ty-eight Guns, and the latter of Forty-fix. 
 
 The Number of Ships being equal, the next 
 Confideration is the Number of Guns ; and in 
 this Article, according to this Lift, which was 
 received from a Perfon the bed: enablsd to give 
 a juft Account, and the leaft to be fufpe&ed of 
 doing the contrary, the French Fleet exceeded 
 the Englijh by Fifty Cannon, the Number of 
 the firft being Eight Hundred Twenty-eight, 
 and of ihe fecond Seven Hundred Seventy-eight, 
 which gives a Majority of Fifty on the Side of 
 the French ; but as it may be objected, that, 
 according to other Lifts printed by Authority, 
 the Hipopothame and Fier are given as Fifty Gun 
 
 Ships
 
 [ 27 ] 
 
 Ships only, we will fuppofe that to be the right, 
 and then the Number of French Cannon ex- 
 ceeds the Englijh by Twenty-two Guns only. 
 
 The next Article which comes under Confe- 
 deration is the Weight of Metal; and in this 
 Place it feems neceffary to remark, that it is the 
 ufual Cuflom to denominate the Weight of 
 Metal by the Guns which are on the whole 
 Decks only ; hence it happens, tho' three Sizes 
 are only mentioned in the Lift of the RamiUies, 
 and two in that of the Foudroyant, that there 
 were ten of the Number on board the Rami Hies 
 on the Quarter Deck and Forecaftle, which 
 carried fix Pounds only, and on board the Fou- 
 droyant Twenty-four, which placed in the fame 
 Parts mentioned in the Rami Hies, carrried only 
 Shot of Twelve Pounds. 
 
 Th e Foudroyant and Ramillies then may be 
 thus confidered with Refpecl: to the Cannon 
 which each carried. 
 
 
 Foudroyant. 
 
 
 
 
 Ramillies 
 
 Guns 
 
 :. Weight of Shot. 
 
 
 
 Guns 
 
 Weight of Shot. 
 
 3° 
 
 of 5 2 Pounds. 
 
 
 
 26 
 
 of 32 Pounds. 
 
 3° 
 
 24 
 
 
 
 26 
 
 18 
 
 24 
 
 12 
 
 
 
 26 
 
 12 
 
 — 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 6 
 
 84 
 
 2268 lb. each Char 
 
 S e - 
 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 "" = ** 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 9 Q 
 
 1696 lb. each Charge. 
 
 
 
 E 
 
 2 
 
 
 Deducting
 
 [ 28 ] 
 
 Deducting then the lefler from the grea- 
 ter Number, the Weight of the Shot fired by 
 the Foudroyant in a Di (charge of all the Can- 
 non, exceeds that of the Rami Hies by Five Hun- 
 dred Seventy-two Pounds, almoft a third of the 
 whole Quantity. The Number of Men on 
 board the Englifi Ship, was Seven Hundred and 
 Thirty : on board the French, Nine Hundred 
 and Fifty : which gives a Majority of Two 
 Hundred and Twenty Men to the French Ship. 
 Now, on a Medium, we may allow Eight Men 
 to a Gun on board the Foudroyant, as her Me- 
 tal is heavier, and Six to a Gun on board the 
 Ramillies; this will make Six Hundred Seventy- 
 two at the great Guns, and Two Hundred and 
 Seventy-eight at the fmall Arms, on board the 
 French Ship ; and Five Hundred and Forty at 
 the great Guns, and One Hundred and Ninety 
 at the fmall Arm?, on board the Ramillies y 
 which gives a Majority of Eighty-eight fmall 
 Arms Men to the Foudroyant, almoit a third 
 iuperior to the Rami Hies. In this Account we 
 have computed, the Officers and others em- 
 ployed in various. Duties, amongft the fmall 
 Arms ; and as each Ship has probably an 
 equal Number engaged in thefe Services, what- 
 ever is allowed, being allowed alike on 
 board each Ship, it leaves the fame Proportion 
 an;ongii the fmall Arms Men ; this then effects 
 BQthing on the Validity of the Reafoning. 
 
 Let
 
 [ 29] 
 
 Let me then imagine them all engaged on 
 board each Ship, the Foudroyant discharging 
 from the imall Arms, two hundred and feven- 
 ty-eight Bails, and the Ramillies one hundred 
 and ninety, the French Ship's Fire in this Re- 
 fpe<fr exceeds the Englijh by eighty-eight Ball in 
 each generally Volley ; let me luppofealfo, that 
 a Number of Cannon-equal to the whole Sum 
 in each Ship, be difcharged in a Minute, which 
 feems no improbable Suppofition, fince Cannon 
 are fired twelve Times in a Minute in Land- 
 Service ; the Excefs of Weight of Metal in the 
 Foudroyant , compared with that fired by the 
 Ramillies in one Hour, will be thirty-four thou- 
 fand three hundred and twenty Pounds, a moil 
 amazing Superiority. If we allow at the fame 
 Time, four Difcharges of the Small- Arms in 
 each Minute, then the Number of fmall Shot fired 
 from the Foudroyant \ more than from the Ra- 
 millies in one Hour, will be twenty-one Thou- 
 fand one Hundred and Twenty, which increa- 
 fes the Chance of the Men being killed on the 
 upper Decks on board the Engli/Jj Ship equal to 
 that Number. The Advantage drawn from 
 the fmall Arms, is then exactly in Proportion to 
 the Number in which one Ship exceeds another, 
 and the Advantage of the heavier Shot dif- 
 charged from the Cannon, is as the Diameter of 
 each exceeds the other ; let me fuppofe a thirty- 
 two Pound Ball to be ten Inches in Diame- 
 ter^ fuch a Shot can pafs between two Objects 
 
 eleven
 
 [ 3o] 
 
 eleven Inches diftant from each other, and 
 touch neither of them ; whereas, allowing a 
 Ball of fifty-two Pounds, to be twelve Inches 
 diameter, and to pafs in the fame Direction with 
 the former, this lafl Ball may deftroy, but mufi 
 inevitably wound both Objects : Again, if you 
 fuppofe a Ball of ten Inches diameter, to pafs 
 within half an Inch of any fingle Object, that 
 of twelve paffing in the fame Line by the in- 
 creafed Diameter, muft deftroy or injure it: In 
 like Manner as the Diameter in Shot increafes, 
 the Holes which are made in the Sides will be 
 increafed alfo ; thus two Men may be killed by 
 the biggeft Ball, and not touched by the leffer ; 
 two Ropes cut by the biggeft, and not touched 
 by the leffer $ and Mafts and Yards carried 
 away by the increafed Diameter of the heavy Ball, 
 which will be untouched or lefs affected by the 
 lighter 5 belides this, Holes between Wind and 
 Water, which are made by heavy Balls, being 
 proportioned to the Diameter alfo, the Danger of 
 finking is increafed, as the Water which flows 
 through the great Aperture, is more than that 
 through the leffer ; every Broad fide then fired 
 from the Foudroya?it y carries a Probability of 
 doing more Mifchief than that from the Ra- 
 mil/ies, as the Diameters of all the Balls taken 
 together, fired from the French Ship, exceeds 
 that of the Englifo ; and for this Reafon it is in 
 a great Meafure, that the Mafts, Yards, and Rjg- 
 ging, are more damaged on board Engtifo Ships 
 in Battle than on board French. 
 
 Hence
 
 [ 3* ] 
 
 Hence in every View, except Number of 
 Cannon, which are only fix fmall Guns of fix 
 Pounds, the Foudroyant is fuperior to the Ra- 
 mi Hies, almoft as three to two j in this Manner 
 of computing the Superiority, which appears to 
 me to be juft, if for three to two in Force, we 
 put three to two in Ships, which amounts to 
 the fame Thing, on which Side ought a 
 prudent Man to expedt the Vidtory. 
 
 I do not by this Manner of computing each 
 Force, propofe to reduce the different Degrees 
 in Strength of each Ship to a Mathematical and 
 demonstrative Exa&nefs, but only to <ihow 
 nearly, how much the Superiority of the French 
 Ship was greater than that of the Englifo 5 as to 
 the Size of the Ships, the Foudroyant is the 
 largeft. 
 
 It may be objeded, probably, that the 
 Charge and Difcharge of a Cannon, inftead of 
 taking up one Minute, may take up five or 
 perhaps ten, and each Man at the fmall Arms 
 employ a like Time to charge and fire his Fufee; 
 even then this will create no Difference, the 
 fame Time being allowed alike to each Ship, 
 the Superiority of Powers on board the Foudro- 
 yant 10 thofe on board the Ramillies will be 
 ftill preferved the fame ; and the fole Alteration 
 arifing from this is, that by lefs firings, the Su- 
 periority
 
 C 32 ] 
 
 perlority is not fo often exerted, and the Pro* 
 portion of four to three {till remain. 
 
 In this Manner of comparing the different 
 Strengths of the two Fleet?, I have pitched upon 
 the two Ships which were the neareft a Match 
 for each other, and here the odds were as four 
 to three. Between the Ccuronne and Cidloden^ it 
 is ftill greater, and when you defcend lower, 
 and compare the feventy-four and fixty-four 
 Gun French Ships, againft the fixty-eight, fixty- 
 fix, fixty-four, and fixty Gun Ships of England^ 
 it is three to two ; fo that the Proportion of 
 four to three, is a very inferior Allowance for 
 the Superiority of the French Fleet over the 
 Englijlo as they met in the Mediterranean. 
 
 Hence it evidently appears, that if this third 
 Part of Superiority was taken from the twelve 
 French Ships, leaving each an equal to the En- 
 glijh, there would remain a fufficient Force to 
 equip four Ships more, then the Number 
 would be fixteen French Ships to twelve En- 
 glijh 9 a Superiority not to be attacked by a 
 prudent Man, fcarce at any Time, and in this 
 particularly wrong, as we (hall (how in the fol- 
 lowing Pages. 
 
 The inexpreffible Ignorance of thofe who 
 appointed and prepared this Fleet for this Ex- 
 pedition, if the fuccouring Minorca was the 
 Defign of it, muft appear abfurd beyond all 
 
 ExprefTion,
 
 C 33] 
 
 Expreffion, not to give it a worfe Appella- 
 tion. 
 
 Having in this Manner endeavoured to 
 afcertain the Superiority of the French to the 
 EngliJJj Squadron, let me now affign the Rea- 
 fons for the French Cannon being fo much 
 heavier than the Englijh. Firft, the Pounds of 
 France being heavier than thofe of England \ a 
 Shot which they call a thirty-fix Pounder, is 
 almoft equal to a forty -two Pound Shot Englijh -> 
 and in the above Lifts, the Weights are re- 
 duced to the Englijh Standard ; another Rea- 
 fon was, that to increafe the Force on board 
 each Ship at Toulon, Cannon were put much 
 heavier than ufual on board Ships of fuch Rates, 
 to make them as much fuperior as pofiible to the 
 Englijh in the Day of Battle, apprehending no 
 Digger from this increased Weight, as the Na- 
 vigation wa: fhort, in Summer Sea?, and fmooth 
 Water. And that it may not appear extraor- 
 dinary, that Ships mould carry Cannon of 
 twenty-four Pounds on the Upper-Deck ; the 
 Invincible in our Service, taken from the French^ 
 carries fuch Guns at prefent. 
 
 The Lifts of each Fleet were placed in the 
 Beginning, to gjye a juft Idea of the Strength 
 of them, and to place the whole in a clearer 
 View, which may be (aid in the follow- 
 ing Sheets, where we (hall mention that 
 given , to the Public in the Gazette^ with 
 
 F Mr
 
 [ 34 ] 
 
 Mr Byug's Letter, to fnow how fallacioufly it 
 was inferted to infmuate it's coming from his 
 Hands. 
 
 Having tranfcribed the Letter, given the 
 Lifts of the Fleet and their different Force, 
 let me now enquire what may be the Nature 
 of the Paragraphs omitted in the Gazette, and 
 from thence attempt, if it is not poffible to de- 
 duce the true Reafons for the Omillions of 
 them. 
 
 The firft Article omitted, refers to a Letter 
 fent from Gibraltar by the Admiial, on his Ar- 
 rival at that Place in his Voyage to Minorca, 
 and addrefled to the Secretary of the Admiralty. 
 This Letter contains an Account of the Num- 
 ber of the French Fleet which eicorted the 
 Embarkation from Toulon ; the landing of fif- 
 teen thoufand Men at Minorca, from about a 
 hundred and fixty or two hundred Trafnport?, a 
 concern for the Admiral's not being fen r time e- 
 nough to prevent this Deicent, which he imagines 
 he could have effected, had he been fent fooner 5 
 Reafons for the Difficulty of relieving the Place 
 unlefs a fufricient Number of Soldiers could be 
 fent to diilodge the French, confidering the im- 
 menfe Quantity of Stores, Ammunition, and 
 Provifions of all Kinds which they brought with 
 them, adding, immediately " I am determin- 
 u ed to fail up to Minorca with the Squadron, 
 c< where I {hall be a better Judge of the Situa- 
 
 I! lion,
 
 f 35 ] 
 
 M tion of Affairs there, and will give General 
 " Blakeney all the Affiftance he (hall require." 
 He then expreffes his Opinion, that of the 
 Chief Engineers at Gibraltar , who had ferved 
 at St Philips, and of the other Officers of the 
 Artillery, who were acquainted with the Situa- 
 tion of the Harbour, of what might be the Suc- 
 cefs of his going to it's Relief, and his and their 
 Reafons for thofe Opinions. He then mentions 
 an enclofed Lift of the Strength of the French 
 Ships at Toulon, and a Copy of a Letter of In- 
 telligence to General Blakeney, giving an Ac- 
 count of the Equipment on that Occaiion ; and 
 thence infers an Apprehenfion of the French at- 
 tacking Gibraltar, adding, that if Maboh could 
 not be relieved, that ne fhould look upon fecur- 
 ing Gibraltar as his next Objedt. 
 
 H e then goes on to exprefs his great Con- 
 cern, in finding at Gibraltar, few or no Stores in 
 the Magazines ro fupply the Squadron ; and that 
 the careening Whart, Sore-houfes, Pits, &c. 
 were entirely decayed ; with the great difficulty 
 of getting them repaired, as no Artificers were at 
 that Place, and no Carpenters could be fpared 
 from the Fleet which was proceeding to Mi- 
 norca ; he then mentions his having appointed 
 a proper Perfon to tranfacl every Thing towards 
 preparing what was neceffary, with all poffible 
 Speed, adding fomething relating to the Coun- 
 cil of War held by General Fowke, and the 
 Refult of it. 
 
 F 2 This
 
 [ 3 6 1 
 
 This Letter was never given to trie Public, 
 for Reafons too evident to be named ; yet this 
 is the Letter from which thofe wife Heads in- 
 ferred that the Admiral would not Fight ; 
 which in the Opinion of every honed: Man, 
 will convey Ideas very different from founding 
 the Preemption of branding him with Cowar- 
 dice ; and which, though without Defign, af- 
 fords very juft Reafons to blame the Conduct 
 of the great Head of the A y. 
 
 This Letter, if the Publick have any defire 
 to fee, accompan ; cd with fome others, may 
 probably be laid before them. 
 
 Is not then the emitting the firfl: Article of 
 the Letter in the Gazette^ defigncd to prevent 
 all Knowledge or Enquiry about the different 
 Force of the two Fleets, to keep your belief of 
 Superiority on the Englifo fide, and delude you 
 to conclude from the Equality of the Number, 
 that Mr Byng was extremely delinquent in not 
 yanquifhing the French Squadron. 
 
 The next Article feems omitted with intent 
 to fuggeft, that the Admiral's Squadron was 
 never in Sight of Port-Mahon^ and that he 
 avoided meeting the French Fleet, or proceed- 
 ing directly to Mr Blakenefs Affiftance j where- 
 as by the Objects which he faw, and indeed 
 it will be proved by undeniable Evidence, that 
 
 after
 
 [37]' 
 
 after getting round the fmall Ifland, called the 
 Lain of Mahon, at Ten in the Morning he 
 was within a League of the Port ; but on feeing 
 the Enemy 's Fleet, be thought it more imme- 
 diately his Duty to bear away at Eleven, to 
 meet them. This obliged him to recall, with 
 Reafon, the three Frigates which he had fent 
 a-head of the Fleet to reconnoitre the Harbour's 
 Mouth, to land a Letter for the Commander of 
 the Garrifon, to acquaint him the Fleet was 
 arrived to his Affiftance, and to know in what 
 Manner it could be of the mod efieclual Ser- 
 vice. 
 
 This Behaviour will now I imagine, appear 
 to be fuggefied by the utmofr. Prudence, all 
 that could have been attempted in the Space of 
 an Hour, and the moft advantageous Step 
 which could have been taken on that Occaiion : 
 It proves that the Admiral depended not on the 
 hear- fay Evidence which he had received, even 
 from the bed: Authorities at Gibraltar > nor on 
 the united Opinion of every Officer at that Place : 
 But that he was determined o be certified of 
 the true State of the Harbour and Cicadel from 
 General Blakeney him 'elf, as he knew that Cap- 
 tain Scrope, who, together with A\ the Soldiers 
 and Marines of Mr Edgecomb's Ships, and one 
 hundred Seamen, had been left to reinforce the 
 Garrifon, would come off in his Ba r ge, and 
 bring him a jufl: Relation of every Circumdance 
 neceffary to be known $ and though he adds the 
 
 Opinions
 
 [ 3§] 
 
 Opinion of all the Sea and Land Officers, that 
 
 * they could render no Service to the Garrifon, 
 
 * as no Place was covered for the landing of any 
 c Men, could they have /pared any.' In this he 
 only gave his Opinion, agreeable to that of all the 
 other Officers. This Opinion had no Influence 
 on his Conduct, and was only meant to fignify 
 what might have been the Event, fuppofing 
 the French Fleet had not appeared at that Time. 
 
 So far theft neither Knowledge of his Profef- 
 fion, Prudence in conducting the Expedition, 
 or Duty to his King and Country, appear to be 
 deficient in him. 
 
 His Letter to Mr Blakeney, fent by Mr Her- 
 vey t though never delivered, for Reafons imme- 
 diately to follow, will evince this Truth, and 
 the Public may be fatisfied by feeing it alfo if 
 they pleafe. 
 
 The firft Care of the Admiral, after coming 
 in Sight of the Port, was to know the true State 
 of the Harbour and Garrifon, to encourage the 
 General and the Soldiers, by acquainting him 
 that he was arrived to his Succour, and defiring 
 to know how ft might moil; effectually be put 
 in Execution. 
 
 Are not now the Reafons which induced 
 the publifhing this Letter, mangled in that 
 Manner, fufficiently convincing? Was it not 
 
 from
 
 [ 39] 
 
 from a Perfwafion, that thofe PafTages would 
 convey to your Underitandings the moft unde- 
 niable Proofs of Knowledge, Prudence, Con- 
 duel:, and Duty, in the Commander of the 
 Fleet, the Man whom they feem too determi- 
 ned to deftroy ? Did not they know that thofe 
 Words would c r cate a Sufpicion, that an Ad- 
 miral, fo provident in every other Refped", 
 could not be guilty of what they chufe to lay to 
 his Charge ? And the laft Words, Could we have 
 fyared any People -, Do not theie plainly pro- 
 nounce Negligence, Ignorance, Inability, or 
 fomerhing worfe, in Men whole Duty it is to 
 pretide and direcl in the equipping a Fleet? 
 Docs it not naturally create this Queftion, Why 
 a Fleet, fent with Intent to relieve St Pbiltp*s f 
 and affift the Garriion againft a Siege from a 
 very powerful Enemy, was unfupplied with 
 Troops for that Purpoie? This would probably 
 have condemned the Equippers of the Fleer, 
 and exculpaced the Admiral. This was a too 
 dangerous Hint to be trufted with the Public ; 
 they felt in their own Hearts that this Negled: 
 or Defign coiild not be imputed to him as a 
 Crime; he neither fitted out the Fleet or plan- 
 ned the Expedition -, they alio knew that it 
 mud: fall on them in your Opinion, and there- 
 fore it was neceflary to be concealed from your 
 View. 
 
 Let thefc Men, whofe Duty it was to pre- 
 pare this Fleet, and plan the Expedition, an- 
 
 fwer
 
 I 40 ] 
 fwer me, when I afk them in the Name of you, 
 the People of England \ who have a juft Right 
 to know, by what Means and from what Man- 
 ner of Reafoning it came to pafs, that a Fleet 
 fo unequal to the Enemy's as this has been 
 proved to have been, and without Troops, 
 -was fent to relieve St Philip's ? Nay, even 
 •fuppofing a Falfhood, that the Force of the 
 Two Fleets had been equal, and even that 
 the Engl/J/j had carried Troops with that 
 Intent, Why was the Succefs, of fuch Confe- 
 quence to the Nation, left to the precarious 
 Event of an Equality in Strength, which might 
 have been eafily prevented by lending more 
 Si: ps, ufeleffly riding at Spithead ? No Man, 
 however prejudiced, will prefume to utter, that 
 either of theft Neglects or Overfights, to fay 
 no worfe, are to be imputed as Crimes to Ad- 
 miral Byng. Nay, permit me to alTert, if the 
 Admiral had not been induced to be'ieve that 
 xhtFrencb Fleet could confift only of Seven Ships, 
 and this from Men who ought to have known 
 the contrary, he never would have undertaken 
 the Command without a proper Force 5 his prin- 
 cipal Fault was believing them to fpeak Truth, 
 and his Force of Co'urfe fufficient. 
 
 And though it has been affiduoufly reported 
 by the Malevolence of evil-minded Men, that 
 he requefted the Command, they will not open- 
 ly aflirr, he fought it any otherwife, than by the 
 general Offer of his Service t$ his King and 
 
 Country,
 
 
 Or ] 
 
 Country, which becomes the Duty of every 
 Man of his Rank and Station in Times of War, 
 
 Thus then all Things appear to be well 
 conduded to the Time of the French Fleet's 
 appearing in View j when on feeing the Ene- 
 my, Confiderations of another Nature took 
 Place, and it became neceffary to defer the Ex- 
 ecution of all Refolutions which he had taken 
 fince he faw Mahon, and to recal the Men of 
 War which he had difpatched to reconnoitre the 
 Harbour, and procure Intelligence from Gene- 
 ral Blakeney. It was now to no Purpofe to 
 know the State of the Citadel and Harbour be- 
 fore he had engaged the French Fleet ; he had 
 no Soldiers to land but what made Part of the 
 Complements of his Ships, and ferved as Ma- 
 rines j and if he had been provided with them, 
 it would have been abfolutely imprudent to have 
 landed them before the Engagement with his 
 Enemy, and thereby render that Force lefs, 
 which was already too little for the Intent it 
 ought to have been fent upon. Landing the 
 Troops would have rendered the Fleet unlit for 
 Adtion, and obliged it to flee before the Ene- 
 my. Had the Admiral behaved in that Man- 
 ner, fuch a prepofterous Adl could not have 
 failed rendering him juftly delinquent, and une- 
 qual to the Command he preiided in. 
 
 H e knew that if Succefs was the Confequence 
 of engaging the French, that he mould have it 
 
 G mors
 
 [42] 
 
 more in his Power to relieve the Citadel, as far 
 as landing the Troops, which ferved as Marines, 
 could effect it. Bat hefufpedted alfo, and with 
 Reafon, that he might probably be rendered 
 unable to keep the Seas, though he obtained the 
 Vi&ory, and therefore prevented from effectual- 
 ly fuccouring the Citadel. 
 
 So far all appears to have been conducted 
 with the greatest Knowledge and Prudence, and 
 the mod partial Advocate for his Opponents 
 can draw no reasonable Objections to his Pro- 
 ceedings. 
 
 This Paflage of his Letter, omitted in the 
 Gazette, cannot well proceed from Clemency 
 to the Admiral, nor from Tendernefs of not irri- 
 tating the Multitude more vehemently, by giv- 
 ing them all the Letter, as it hath been reported 
 with fuch Diligence. 
 
 . I presume it will rather appear this Tender- 
 nefs began from other Motives, and nearer 
 Home ; fince it feems too evidently to prove, 
 that thole who planned the Expedition, prepa- 
 red and appointed the Fleet, were beyond all 
 Meafare either ignorant or wicked. 
 
 Their. Precifenefs in omitting an individual 
 Word is no fmall Argument of their Attention 
 and Care ; the miferable Epithet unfortunately , 
 in defcribing the Lofs of the Intrepid'% Fore- 
 
 Top-Mail,
 
 [43] 
 
 Top-Mail:, was omitted, left fuch a palliating 
 Expreflion, imputing it to Chance, might alle- 
 viate the Odium, which feems by all poffible 
 Means defigned to be thrown on the Admiral. 
 
 The next Omiffion is yet a greater Manife- 
 fiation of the true Defign of thole Gentlemen, 
 who like Deer, beat him from the Herd which 
 the Hounds begin to purfue. For after having 
 caftrated all that could prove his Prudence, and 
 vindicate his Conduct before the Engagement, 
 they now conceal what can moft effectually ju- 
 flify his not engaging a fecond Time, and not 
 attempting to land a Reinforcement after the 
 Battle. 
 
 With this View was not all that Part omit- 
 ted, which mentions the Ships that were wound- 
 ed in their Marts, and endangered of not being 
 fecured at Sea, the great Sicklinefs of the 
 Squadron, the Numbers killed and wounded, 
 no Hofpital-Ships fent out to receive thefe un- 
 happy brave Men, that a Forty Gun Ship con- 
 verted to that Purpofe would be unequal to the 
 receiving one third of the Number, and which 
 could not be well done at Sea -> Circumstances 
 which entirely change the Face and Reafon of 
 Things, and throw the Blame which they in- 
 tend for the Admiral, on the Planners of the 
 Expedition and Appointers of the Fleet. 
 
 G 2 Now
 
 [44] 
 
 Now let the mod ftrenuous Advocate for the 
 Ad — — ty, the mod prejudiced Purfuer of Mr 
 Byngy tell you why this Paragraph was omitted, 
 without confeffing that this Omiffion could not 
 be made in his Favour. Will he fay that Ten- 
 dernefs and Humanity diftinguifh this Action ? 
 Or will he not rather declare that the contrary is 
 manifefted beyond all Power of Denial. 
 
 I T is evident from the Dates of the Time of 
 Engagement, and of that of writing the Letter, 
 that Four Days had palled in refitting the difa- 
 bled Ships, and yet that the Mails of Three of 
 them could not be fecured fit for a fecond En- 
 gagement ; that if this could have been obtained, 
 that the Ships Crews were too fickly to under- 
 take the Fatigue of a fecond Combat, with not 
 a Ship to put the lick and wounded on board 
 during an Action, which being left on board, 
 muft have disheartened and interrupted thofe 
 who were able to perform their Duty. 
 
 The Neglect of not providing Ho fpital- Ships, 
 as well as Fire-Ships, Store-Ships, and Tenders, 
 could not proceed from any Fault, Inability, or 
 Inattention in the Admiral. And if the Con- 
 tempt of Money in the Perfon who muft be 
 imagined to have appointed this Fleet, was not 
 fo diftinguifhed, and did not forbid entertaining 
 fuch a Thought, would you not be inclined to 
 think, that fome finifter Intent had determined
 
 [45 ] 
 
 him to prevent Succefs in this Undertaking ? Or 
 that he defigned the Fleet fhould come too 
 late to fave Minorca and not engage ; and there- 
 fore the Idea of providing Holpiial-Ships, Fire- 
 Ships, Store-Ships, and Tenders, Vcffels never 
 omitted 'till now on fuch Expeditions, never 
 entered into his Imagination ; for though I am 
 willing to indulge this great Man, to prevent all 
 Imputation of greater Crimes, with being the 
 moft. ignorant of all Men who have ever fat at 
 that Board ; yet I am afraid the Indulgence of 
 the moft consummate Ignorance, will fcarce pre- 
 ferve him from the Taxation of fomething more 
 criminal, though not more fatal to your, your 
 Sovereign's, and the Nation's Welfare. 
 
 Before what Tribunal can Admiral Byng 
 be juftly condemned, for not feeking the Ene- 
 my in this difabled Condition ; not before that 
 of the People of England, who, Lovers of ftridt 
 Juftice in all Things, never decide contrary to 
 her Dictates, when the whole of any Affair is 
 impartially laid before them, nothing concealed, 
 nor any Thing added, to difguile the Truth. 
 
 Let me afk his Accufers, To what Purpofe 
 would this fecond Engagement have been at- 
 tempted, with a Fleet originally fo greatly infe- 
 rior to the French, and now rendered much 
 more fo by the Damages received in the late 
 Battle? A total Defeat, in all Probability, is 
 the Anftver of Reafon; and if Moniieur La 
 
 GalliJJonniere
 
 ( 46) 
 
 Gallijfonnierc had fought it, which providen- 
 tially he did not, it is a reafonable Prefumption 
 that the whole Englijh Squadron would have 
 perifhed, or fallen a Prey to the French, fince 
 there was no Port to fhelter them. Whereas, 
 had Mr Byng been in the Mediterranean before 
 the Arrival of the French at Minorca, a Defeat 
 on his Side even might have faved the Ifland ; he 
 could have then faved his mattered Remains in 
 Mabon, and though conquered at Sea, by 
 Means of the Sailors and Soldiers have preferved 
 St Philip's, and probably the Ifland. Thus a 
 Defeat of our Fleet, had it been timely fent out, 
 would have done more Service than a Viclory 
 after St Philip's was in veiled. 
 
 Those who reafon otherwife than in this 
 Manner, exclude human Prudence from amongft 
 the Qualifications of a commanding Officer, a 
 Talent of much more Ufe in the Day of Battle 
 than tilting againft Stone Walls, or engaging 
 Yard- Arm and Yard- Arm again ft a fuperior 
 Force ; and indeed I am more afraid that Mr 
 Byng, after every Thing has been fairly urged 
 in his Vindication, and maturely cofidered, will 
 be found rather culpable in feeking the Enemy 
 at firft, than not feeking them after the Engage- 
 ment. 
 
 I t has been the fettled Rule of all great Ge- 
 nerals, and of thofe who have written beft on 
 the Subject of Armies, and the Manner of a 
 
 General's
 
 (47 ) 
 
 General's conducting them, as may be feen in 
 moft ancient Authors, and thofe of more mo- 
 dern Date, particularly the Marquis De Feu- 
 quiere, and the Marquis De Santa Cruz, whofe 
 Words I (hall quote, to confider what Advan- 
 tage can refult from the A&ion before an En- 
 gagement be refolved upon. 
 
 First then let me quote the Spaniard on this 
 Subjedt, which permit me to tranflate. 
 
 <c If nothing is more uncertain than the Suc- 
 
 cc cefs of a Eattle, as I have jail eftablifhed it to 
 
 " be, this Confequence is fairly drawn from it, 
 
 " That no Commander mould ever rifque an En- 
 
 <c gagement, but when there is greater Expec- 
 
 " tations to gain by a Vidtory, than to lofe by a 
 
 " Defeat." 
 
 And Feuquiere on the fame Subjedl, lays it 
 down in this Manner as a Maxim not to be 
 deviated from. 
 
 cc 
 
 " I have already laid in my Maxims on the 
 Subject of Battles, that a General never ought 
 " to attack an Enemy, or to fubjedl himfelf to 
 <c receive one from them, but when there is a 
 <c greater Advantage to be drawn to his Prince 
 iC by a Victory, than Difad vantage to be feared 
 «' from a Defeat." 
 
 According
 
 ( 48 ) 
 
 According to thefe Maxims of the moft 
 approved Writers on Military Affairs, Mr Byng 
 ieems not a little culpable, in firft feeking the 
 French, and juftifiable only in declining the fe- 
 cond Engagement ; that the Circumftances in 
 which he was placed before the Battle, corref- 
 pond exa&ly with the Dire&ions and Maxims jufl 
 laid down, is utterly undeniable ; Firft, becaufe 
 it was romantic to exped: that he could defeat 
 the French Fleet again ft fuch Superiority as has 
 been already proved, it had over him ; next, 
 there was much to apprehend from a Defeat, 
 and nothing to expedt from a Victory, St Phi- 
 lip's being already inverted and irretrievably 
 gone, with Refped: to what Mr Byng could 
 have affifted in the Defence of it, when fo great 
 a Number of French Troops, with Artillery, 
 Ammunition, Provifions, and every Thing ne- 
 ceffary were landed. 
 
 When then, from the Inferiority of the En* 
 glijh y nothing could be reafonably expedted but 
 Misfortune and Difgrace ; or if by the greateft 
 Efforts of good Fortune, Vi&ory fhould declare 
 for our Fleet, that no Advantage could be 
 drawn from it ; when the Rifque of lofing the 
 whole Fleet was the Refult of an unanimous 
 Council of War ; and the Nation, considering the 
 real State of the Englijh and French Navies, fo 
 little able to fuftain a Lofs of that Kind ; 
 when Gibraltar would have been left defence- 
 
 lefs,
 
 ( 49 ) 
 
 lefs, and fallen of Courfe to the Enemy. Could 
 the feeking the French Admiral, by a Comman- 
 der who forefaw thefe probable Confequences* 
 with not only an inferior, but a (battered Fleet, 
 and no other Ships in the Mediterranean to re- 
 inforce him, have been juflifted in the Judg- 
 ment of Men who have fludied the Nature of 
 Military Atchievements, or according to the 
 Rules and Obfervations of ancient and modern 
 Writers on this Head ? 
 
 The utmoft Advantage could have been but 
 a Prolongation of the Siege, without the lead 
 Probability of railing it ; becaufe the Fleet un- 
 able to keep the Seas mud: have retreated to 
 Gibraltar^ the Port of Mahon being Hill com- 
 manded by the Enemies Batteries; from this 
 View of Things it feems apparent, that the 
 only wrong Step was leaving Gibraltar to give 
 Battle to the French, and his Retreat to that 
 Place the difcreeteft Acl: of Prudence and of a 
 General, and in this Opinion the whole Council 
 of War was unanimous : They did not imagine 
 that a Commander in Chief with an inadequate 
 Force was to engage at all Adventures, like 
 Moor of Moor-Hall, who, with nothing at all; 
 flew the Dragon of Wantky * indeed the Admi- 
 ral was not a little furprized when he arrived at 
 Gibraltar in going up to Minorca, and knew 
 the Force of the Enemy, that Difpatches had 
 not come over-land to flop him 'till he received 
 farther Reinforcement 5 Men of Senfe and Pru- 
 II dencCj
 
 ( 50 ) 
 
 dence, who intended the Nation's Honour and 
 Advantage, could not have omitted fo neceffary 
 a Step ; for though it is barely poffible that they 
 knew not the Strength of the French Fleet be- 
 fore it left Toulon, and the Admiral left En- 
 gland ; they knew it well before he arrived at 
 Gibraltar, and had fufficient Time to have ac- 
 quainted him of it, to (lop his Proceeding 
 to Minorca,, to have reinforced the Fleet, 
 and to have defeated the French before the 
 Place was taken ; this he thought neceffary, 
 and though his Orders would not permit him to 
 tarry at Gibraltar , he could not avoid requeft- 
 ing a Reinforcement with all Speed to protect 
 that Place, as he forefaw, that upon any Mif- 
 fortune of great Confequence to the Fleet which 
 be commanded, this Fortrefs would be open to 
 hourly Invaftons. 
 
 Had the Prudence of thofe who deftine and 
 prepare Fleets been equal to that of this Comman- 
 der whom they feek to condemn, Minorca had 
 been fafe, the Honour of the Crown, and the 
 Commerce of the Nation preferved, and this 
 Gentleman the Darling, whom they wifh to be 
 the Deteftation of the People. 
 
 Let thofe who omitted this Precaution an- 
 fwer you, why it was thus ignorantly or iniqui- 
 toufly omitted ?can that be the Fault of Mr Byng; 
 and when he expreffes his Apprehenfions of be- 
 ing inferior to the Fleet under La GalliJJbn-
 
 ( sO 
 
 niere y from the Intelligence he had received? 
 what does it arife from, but a thorough Ac- 
 quaintance with the Nature of his Profeffion, 
 rendering Juftice to the Arms of one Nation as 
 well as another, from a confcious Deficiency in 
 many Particulars, as well as in that of Weight 
 of Metal, Number of Cannon and of Men, 
 from a Sufpicion perhaps of fome delufive Pro- 
 ceedings in thofe who had feduced him to 
 Command fo inferior a Fleet, by pofitively af- 
 ferting, that the French could not coniift of more 
 than Seven Ships, and would probably be but Five, 
 as well as from fome beginning Convictions, 
 that it was not impoffible, but that he, his 
 brave Companions, the Honour and Intereft of 
 the King and Country, might be doomed a Sa- 
 crifice to fate the Appetite of fome fmifter rul- 
 ing Pafiion. 
 
 To me it appears inexplicable, as I doubt 
 not it will to you, whence it can arife that a 
 good Retreat of an inferior Force from before a 
 iuperior at Land, fhould be confidered as one 
 of the mod diftinguifhing, difficult, and meri- 
 torious Exploits of a General ; and yet, that a 
 Retreat equally well conducted at Sea under the 
 fame Circumitances, fhould be deemed a dis- 
 graceful Action and worthy Punifhment, more 
 efpecially as the whole Council of War, Land 
 and Sea Officers, who mud from their Situation 
 and Profeffions, naturally be the propereft Judges 
 of what was beft to he done on fuch Occafions, 
 . H 2 were
 
 (52 ) 
 
 were unanimous, and thought Gibraltar m 
 Danger. 
 
 Are Commanders then at all Events to 
 fhqw no other Token cf Gcneralfhip, but what 
 is to be learned from Brutes ? An Excefs of 
 Courage only ? And are all who ufe the fuperior 
 Attributes of the human Underftanding, to be 
 coniidered as Delinquents in their Duty to their 
 King and Country ? What Commander of com- 
 mon Senfe will ferve his Country under fuch 
 difcouraging Conditions; where, unlefs he fights 
 againft ail Kinds of Difadvantage, he is to be 
 ftigmatifed with the eternal Infamy of Cowar- 
 dice ; and if he does engage his Enemy, and 
 does not fucceed againft this great Superiority of 
 Force, he is to be deemed a Coward alfo, and 
 given up to the Rage of the Multitude ; his 
 Letters publifhed, and deprived of all that 
 can vindicate him, with Additions intended 
 to depreciate his prudent Endeavours, efpecially 
 when it is known, that all private Letters which 
 can juflify the Admiral have been fupprefied, 
 or made to fpeak a different Senfe, by interlin- 
 ing, before they were produced ; and all thofe 
 which revile and rail at his Behaviour, however 
 ^bfurd, have been given to the Public. 
 
 Can the Defign of omitting the Paragraph 
 which I have been juft examining, take it's 
 Origin from Tendernefs in expofing the Ad- 
 miral to the People's Contempt ; whoever can
 
 ( 53 ) 
 
 give Credit to fuch AfTerticns, can never be 
 deemed an Infidel. 
 
 Does not this Behaviour proceed from a very 
 contrary Motive ; what is it but depriving him 
 of his juft Defence, and giving him to an en- 
 raged People, by injurious Mifreprefentations, 
 Falmoods, and Concealments ; is it not like 
 lopping off a Man's Hands, and then bidding 
 him to defend himfelf againfi: his Adverfary ? Is 
 it not like cutting out a Man's Tongue, and 
 then ordering him to plead in his own Defence ? 
 Is it not even inhuman r And fince, to fink the 
 Truth, or to add a Falfhood, are equally con- 
 fidered as Perjury in the Law ; why mould it. 
 be conceived otherwife in this Inftance, and in 
 thofe Men, if this mall be proved to be the real 
 State of the Cafe, efpecially as the Event may 
 prove equally fatal to the Perfon againft whom 
 thefe Things may be attempted. 
 
 The next Omiffion begins with the Word?, 
 of Minorca and Gibraltar \ which you will cb- 
 ferve immediately follow the Word Situation \ 
 this Omifiion determines the Reader to fix the 
 Situation of the Fleet, as the Objecl on which 
 the Admiral had gathered the Opinions of all the 
 Officers ; which real Condition of the Ships 
 being concealed alfo, this Confederation of it's 
 Situation, made the Sentence ridiculous, as it too 
 evidently feems defigned it mould be : Whereas 
 the Situations of Minorca and Gibraltar became 
 
 reafonabie
 
 ( 54- ) 
 
 realonable Objects of their Confederation ; it ap- 
 peared impracticable to relieve Mahon, and pro- 
 bable that Gibraltar would be attacked, and 
 therefore the Determination of proceeding thi- 
 ther, was become the moft prudent Deciiion 
 which could have been made, the moft likely to 
 conduce to the Nation's Service, and a juft Re- 
 folution of the Council of War. 
 
 As to the Victory, it fignifies not much who 
 claims it, but it was a Matter of Confequence 
 to confider, that though two Fleets may be of 
 equal Number, they may yet be of unequal 
 Force, as we have already proved it happened in 
 this Initance : and a fickly Squadron, with- 
 out Means of providing for the difeafed and 
 wounded, or recruiting their Seamen and Sol- 
 diers, of which, more than a Thoufand Sick, 
 which at their return to Gibraltar, were fent 
 to the Hofpital, was a Confideration that ought 
 greatly to influence at that Moment, efpecially 
 when it was evident beyond all Contradiction, 
 that the Enemy poffeffed every Advantage which 
 the Englifh Admiral was in want of, having a 
 Power of procuring Recruits of Seamen from 
 the Two Hundred Tranfports, and Soldiers 
 from the Camp of the Befiegers, and which 
 every prudent Commander muft have done, and 
 was therefore highly realonable to be concluded, 
 would be done, by the Admiral, Council of 
 War, and by all who underftand the Profeffion 
 of Arms. 
 
 PURING
 
 ( 55 ) 
 
 During the four Days which Mr Byng's 
 Fleet was obliged to lye to to refit, La Gallif- 
 fonniere's Fleet was feveral Times feen from their 
 Mad-head, as undoubtedly was that of Mr 
 Byng by the French Admiral, a Circumftance 
 as well worth omitting, perhaps, as any of the 
 whole, becaufe it is a dangerous Thing to per- 
 mit a Queftion, (o liable to Conftru&ion againft 
 any Mens Advantage, to come before the Peo- 
 ple of England, who, in fearch of Truth, might 
 not unlikely demand, why La Galijfonm 'ere with 
 fuch apparent Superiority did not attack the £tz- 
 glifo Fleet once more, and then perhaps a fatisfac- 
 tory Anfwer might have been difficultly returned 
 by thofe who chufe to conceal that Circumftance : 
 indeed this fingle Circumftance, in all Men 
 who may be unacquainted with the upright In- 
 tentions 6f thofe who planned the Expedition, 
 may probably create a Sufpicion, that the 
 French Admiral could not have conducted Mat- 
 ters in this abfurd Manner from Ignorance alone : 
 nor the Planners of the Expedition have prepar- 
 ed a Fleet fo unequal to what it ought to have 
 been from that Caufe : in what Manner, on 
 the Principles of Reafon and Knowledge in his 
 Profeffion, which he is allowed to poffefs, can 
 it be accounted for, that La Gallijfbnniere de- 
 fifted from purfuing an Advantage which he had 
 fo apparently obtained, by difabiing five Ships of 
 our Fleet, three of which could not be got fit 
 for Service again without going into feme Port. 
 
 The
 
 ( 56 ) 
 The next Day, and the three following, though 
 he faw our Fleet, and might know it's Con- 
 dition by a Cruiier fent for that Purpofe, and 
 probably did know it ? why was the French 
 Admiral fo deficient in Duty to his King and 
 Country, not to attempt deftroying the Engliflj 
 Fleet, by renewing the Combat on fuch advan- 
 tageous Terms, and complete the Victory which 
 he had partly atchieved -, was La Gallijfonniere 
 a Coward too r Many are the Suggeftions 
 which are and may be formed on this Occa- 
 iion ; I infinuate none, but leave all Men to 
 decide, for what Reafon the French Admiral 
 could be fo complaifant t) the Englifi, unlefs 
 it was by Way of Return to thofe of the 
 
 Ad y, who fent out a Fleet fo unable to 
 
 difturb him in covering the Siege of St Philips. 
 One Thing I will aflert, and produce my Rea- 
 fons for faying it if required, that Admiral Byng 
 was intirely ignorant of any Confideration which 
 could have created this mutual Politenefs, in the 
 Englifh Planners of the Expedition, of not di- 
 ilurbing the Siege of St Philips ; and of not de- 
 ftroying the Englijh Squadron in thofe of the 
 French. 
 
 Things and Appearances being in this Situa- 
 tion, what could the mod prudent and rnoft cou- 
 ragious Man have done more than he performed? 
 he relied on no Man's Word ; Mr Byng proceed- 
 ed immediately from Gibraltar to difcover the 
 Truth of Things 5 and having fuffered from 
 
 La
 
 ( 57 ) 
 
 La GalliJJbnniere's Squadron was difabled from 
 putting in Execution what he had intended be- 
 fore the Enemy's Fleet appeared in View. 
 
 After this laft Omiffion, a few Words of 
 the Letter being left to remain, the Admiral 
 proceeds with expreffing his Hopes that he fhould 
 find Stores to refit the Fleet at Gibraltar, and a 
 Refolution of not lofing a Minute in feeking the 
 Enemy again, if he had any Reinforcement^ and 
 once more giving them Battle. 
 
 You will eafily difcern the Reafon of ex- 
 preffing himfelf by Hopes of finding Stores, if 
 you recall, that in going up to Minorca, in his 
 Letter from Gibraltar, he tells the Secretary of 
 
 the Ad- y, that there were neither Stores 
 
 nor Places in repair for refitting the Fleet. This 
 Word was only ufed as a gentle Rebuke for this 
 NeglecT, and the moil polne Hint, that if he 
 fhould tarry at Gibraltar longer than you, the 
 People of England, unacquainted with the 
 Caufe, mould think requiiite, that fome palli- 
 ating Report for this Delay might be fpread, 
 to prevent Murmurs againit him, who was on- 
 ly delinquent in Appearance, owing to the Ne- 
 glecl of thofe whole Dutv it is to provide Stores, 
 and to keep careening ; Wharfs, Store-Houfes, 
 and Pits, in due repair. How undeservedly 
 then was he calumniated? How induftrioufly 
 was the Slander of Delay Ipread by thole Men 
 who were only culpable hi this Part, from an 
 
 I Expreffiorx
 
 [ 58 ] 
 
 Expreffion in his fecond Letter from Gibraltar % 
 publifhed in the Gazette, " That watering was 
 " tedious at that Place," omitting in this alio 
 the mod favourable Circumftances, as they did 
 in the former. 
 
 At the fame Time, his Refolution of return- 
 ing to give the Enemy Battle, could be no Ar- 
 gument of his Timidity ; and when he adds, 
 that the French had a great Advantage in being 
 clean Ships, and going three Feet to one with 
 his 3 What was there in this Expreffion, fo much 
 carped at and ridiculed, but a Phrafe of all Sea- 
 men, who, to exprefs one Ship's failing much 
 fafcer than another, almoft conftamly ufe it ? 
 Was not the Reafdn for mentioning their 
 failing fader, then, prudent in all Refpecls ? 
 It was to guard againft any unwarrantable 
 Expectations, which Men, unacquainted with 
 naval Affaiis, might entertain from a Rein- 
 forcement ; becaufe, though one Fleet is vaft- 
 ly fuperior to another, yet the inferior Fleet 
 being better Patters, may eaiily efcape by running 
 before the Wind, if the fuperior Squadron has 
 the Wind of them • and by turning to Wind- 
 ward, if they have the Wind of the fuperior 
 Force. And though the Admiral affigns no o- 
 ther Reafon for this failing better than the En- 
 gli/b, but their being clean Ships, he might have 
 juftly added their being better Ships alio ; which 
 refle'&s not a little on the Supervifors of naval 
 Affairs, who have been inattentive to Improve- 
 ments
 
 f 59 J 
 merits at hoffie, and or-ly ilowly copied the 
 French in then Manner of building. 
 
 Besides this, Mr Byng concluded, from the 
 Behaviour of Mpnfieui La Gallijjbnniere, that he 
 would negledt no Way of conducting his Fleet 
 v h Judgment, and confequently chufe, from 
 this Advantage of better failing, in what Man- 
 ner the Con > bat mould be carried on ; and 
 which, by preventing the coming to a clofe 
 Engagement, wi h a View of disabling the 
 Englijh Ships, he had already too fuccefsfully 
 piu in Execution. 
 
 This Part then b?came abfolutely necelTary 
 to be omiued, again ft a Man determined to be 
 overwhelmed, becaufe it rakes die Fault of tar- 
 rying at Gibraltar from him, and places it on 
 their Neglecl or that Place. It mows, by his 
 Refolution of engaging again, that he could not 
 be juftly taxed with Cowardice ; it proves his 
 Knowledge of what is to be expe&ed from a Su- 
 perior Fleet, which is out-failed by an inferior j 
 i and his Polhenefs, in not mentioning with 
 Acrimony the Negledt of fending a Reinforce- 
 ment fooner, and of keeping Gibraltar in Repair : 
 Examine one Minute in how different a Man- 
 ner his and vour Enemies have obferved a reci- 
 procal Behaviour towards him and you. 
 
 As to the Three Feet to One, it meant no 
 more than that the French failed fafter thyi the 
 
 I 2 Englijh',
 
 [ 6o ] 
 
 EngHJJj ; which, if they had failed only as Thir- 
 teen to Twelve, would as effectually have an- 
 fwered all their Purpofes, and all that the Ad- 
 miral intended to be conveyed by the Expref- 
 fion, failing f after than bis Fleet. 
 
 What Truth is there then in the prevailing 
 Report given out by his Accufers, that Tender- 
 neis for his Character, and not defigning to ag- 
 gravate his Faults, were the true Caufe of omit- 
 ting thefe Parages in the Gazette. 
 
 Are not thefe Particulars fo many Juftifica- 
 tions of Mr Byng's not renewing the Engage- 
 ment againft a Fleet, which had already difabled 
 him, and which had the Power of chufing their 
 Manner of fighting? Ought not thefe Confide- 
 rations alone, without inferring the Confequence 
 of ill Succefs, to have determined him againft 
 engaging the Enemy once more, and rifquing a 
 total Defeat. 
 
 The next Paragraph which is omitted, is the 
 
 urging the Ad y to a fpeedy Reinforcement, 
 
 if none was already icnt y a Requeft which he 
 had before made ; at the fame Time acquainting 
 them with the increafing Strength of the Enemy 
 at Toulon, by four large Ships; which Circum- 
 flance, though it tends not to juflify the Admi- 
 ral's Behaviour, gives a favourable Idea of his 
 Zeal for Succefs, and a contemptible one of 
 thofe, who, prefiding at the Head of Affairs, 
 
 had
 
 [ 6r ] 
 
 had been totally ignorant of what was preparing 
 at Toulon, and negligent at be/l of what happened 
 to Minorca : unlefs you may poffibly by this 
 Time be appreheniive, that fome other Motives 
 conduced to this Behaviour in them. 
 
 The laft Paragraph has but one Word omit- 
 ted, which, inftead of " making the beft of my 
 t£ Way to Gibraltar" is to cover Gibraltar ; a 
 very material Alteration ; the going to cover a 
 Place being very different from going to a Place, 
 the one fignifying an Act of Prudence, and of a 
 Soldier ; the other, in fuch Inftances, of Flight, 
 and of a Fugitive. Was not this Monofyllable 
 premeditately left out, to prevent you from afk- 
 ing what Danger Gibraltar was in, and to what 
 Part of the Letter this referred ? Does it not 
 feem to be the prefent Employment of the Ga- 
 zette to mifreprefent, and of the Writers or Di- 
 rectors of it, to keep the People of England as 
 ignorant as poffible of the real Situation of any 
 Place, which may be deiigned to be given up to 
 your declared Enemies, by thofe who are your 
 concealed, if Men can be denominated conceal- 
 ed, who are thus open in purfuing a Nation's 
 Ruin ? 
 
 Every Man amongft you, who can diftin- 
 guifli Right from Wrong, will, I doubt not, 
 behold this perfidious A&ion of omitting the 
 Parts of a Letter, which can mod: effectually 
 plead the Juftification of the Writer, with all 
 
 due
 
 [ 62 ] 
 
 due Abhorrence ; notwithftanding which cri- 
 minal Proceeding, permit me to fay, there re- 
 mains fomething which is yet a ftronger Indi- 
 cation of more blameable Defign in thofe who 
 have been guilty of the former Mifbehaviour ; 
 to omit with Defign to injure, is furely a cri- 
 minal Proceeding ; and to add, with Defign to 
 create a farther Accufation of Offence, muff be 
 yet a more heinous Crime in the Eyes of all 
 Men of Probity. 
 
 In Continuation of this Intent to accumulate 
 the Guilt of Mr Byng, is it not extremely proba- 
 ble, that the Lifts of the Two Fleets were 
 primed at the End of his Letter in the Gazette, 
 taking perhaps the Hint of that Defign, from 
 Part of the Poftfcript, in which he lays, " I 
 " have juft fent the Defects of the Ships, as I 
 " have got it made out wbilft I was clofing my 
 " Letter. " Then adding what the Admiral 
 never fent, and concealing what he did. The 
 Defects of the Ships are very confiderable, as 
 hath been already laid, five of them receiving 
 much Damage ; three of which could not, in 
 the Opinion of the bed Judges, be repaired at 
 Sea for a fecond Action ; the Lift of this Da- 
 mage may be hereafter printed. At the fame 
 Time, under Favour of the above Sentence, 
 Occafion was taken to add the Lifts of the Ships, 
 a fpurious one, even with Refpecl to our Fleet; 
 which methinks thofe who inferted it ought to 
 be better acquainted with, whatever it might 
 
 be
 
 [ 63 ] 
 
 be their Duty to know of the French ; leav- 
 ing out the Weight of Metal and Number of 
 Hands on board, and putting in the Number of 
 killed and wounded, that is, preferving all, in 
 which a feeming, Equality confifted, and ca- 
 ftrating all, in which the French were eminently 
 fuperior. Nor was this the only Variation from 
 Truth, for fome confiderable Addition was 
 made to the Number of the Englijh Cannon, 
 and a Dimunition of the French \ with a 
 View probably to bring the two Numbers near- 
 er each other, and to creatte the Idea of Equality 
 in the two Squadrons. I hope it is no uncha- 
 ritable Suggeftion to fay, That this fpurious and 
 partial Lift of each Fleet, was inferred to aggra- 
 vate your Refentment againft the Admiral, and 
 to gain a Belief, that the Defedts of the Ships 
 which accompanied this Letter, was no more 
 than a Lift: of the killed and wounded, an Ar- 
 tifice favouring of much defpicable Cunning, 
 feen through by every Man who had Senfe 
 enough to reflect, that though Mr Byng had 
 fent the Number of hie own killed and wound- 
 ed, he could not well come at that of Monfieur 
 La Gallijjonniere. Can thefe Lifts have been 
 added with an honeft Intent ? Was it notdeilgned 
 to create tho Idea of his being a Coward ? And 
 to ftrengthen, by this Addition, what they had 
 begun to infinuate by the former Omiffions. 
 
 Let me now appeal to the Hearts of Men 
 confpicuous for the Love of Juftice and Huma- 
 nity
 
 [ 64 ] 
 
 nity amongft all Nations ; is it not perfidious 
 Treatment, not only to cut out the genuine Ju- 
 stification of a Man's own Words, but as it 
 were to fuborn falfe Evidence, and add it to 
 the Account which was tranfmitted by the Ad- 
 miral, with a View of depreciating him in the 
 Eyes of his Fellow- Subjeds, and letting loofe 
 ihe popular Clamour againft him. 
 
 Indeed when we review thefe Artifices, 
 and reconfider the Reports which were fpread 
 among the People during the Preparations at 
 Toulon, after their arriving at Minorca, whilft our 
 Fleet was preparing, and after it's Departure, 
 will there not arife certain Sufpicions which Pru- 
 dence would rather conceal than hint at, in any 
 Cafe but that of preferving one's Country from 
 future Misfortunes of a fimilar Nature, and pre- 
 ferving the Life of a Fellow-Subjedt ? We (hall 
 endeavour to recoiled: fome of them, and let 
 thofe who chufe to examine them, draw that 
 Conclufion which feems the rnoft probable. 
 
 First, then, how came the French to form 
 the Idea of taking St Philips, when the Fleet 
 of England, known to be fo fuperior, might 
 have prevented the Embarkation; if not that, 
 their Defcent on Minorca ; if that could not 
 have been done, reinforced St Philips, beat 
 the French Fleet, and taken the whole Em- 
 barkation Prisoners. Is the Duke of Richlieu fa 
 Military mad, that he would have undertaken 
 
 to
 
 ( 6 5 ) 
 
 to command in an Expedition which had been 
 preparing for five Months, known to all Europe, 
 and open to be difconcerted in all the above dif- 
 ferent Manners ? Would not this have rather 
 proved him fitter for Bedlam, than a Com- 
 mand in Chief? Is not this repugnant to what 
 Feuquiere and Santa Cruz have pofitively en- 
 joined ? And if the Duke w T ould have been hardy 
 enough to undertake it, would the French Mi- 
 ni/try have permitted him ? Would the Direc- 
 tors of our Marine Preparations, had they been 
 in earned to prefer ve St Philips , have fent out 
 an inferior Squadron? Delayed it at Spithead 
 during fo many Months? And given the Admiral 
 abfolute Orders to expedite other Services, by 
 not taking Men from particular Ships, nor 
 from any Ship fit for Service, to man his own 
 Squadron, but to wait the coming of Tenders 
 with prefled Men from Liverpoie and other 
 Ports ? And before the Arrival of more than 
 two, he was obliged to fail. 
 
 Had the Planners of the Expedition been 
 truly animated with the Intcreft of their Country, 
 why, during this Preparation at Toulon, wheri 
 all England, and all Europe, Wa« exclaiming a- 
 gainlt their Delay, did they continually give out 
 to you, that there was no Fleet preparing at 
 Toulon? That the French had no Sailors nor mili- 
 tary Stores ; was not this to be the palliating 
 Speech to the People to countenance their Pio- 
 ceedings? Was it not to give the Air of rcliev- 
 
 K ing
 
 (66 ) 
 
 St Philips only that the Engli/h Fleet fet fail 
 a few Days before the French, and before a 
 certain Intelligence of it was given to the 
 Public ? Though the Day for leaving Toulon by 
 the latter muft, beyond all Doubt, be known 
 by thofe who prevented it's Relief, in fending a 
 Fleet from hence fo inferior to the Under- 
 taking. 
 
 When the popular Clamour now began to be 
 very loud againft this fhameful Behaviour, were 
 not ten thoufand Stories invented to draw off the 
 public Attention from the Planners of the Expe- 
 dition, and to throw it on him who command- 
 ed, and who they concluded would mifcarry ? 
 Was it not owing to a Defign of ill Succefs in 
 them that the Fleet was lent out fo fmall, and 
 that he was allured the French Armament could 
 not pofiibly exceed feven Ship?, and probably 
 would not be more than five ? Was it not con- 
 stantly affer ted, that no Fleet was ever fo well man- 
 ed, equipped, and powerful, for the Number, as 
 this Eng/iJhFkct ? And that the French confided 
 of old Ships not fit for Service, ill-manned, and 
 worfe provided^ whereas one Moment's Thought 
 would have told them, that a Fleet, however 
 ill-furnifhed with Men, when it left Toulon, 
 muft be abundantly provided with Hands from 
 Two Hundred Tranfports, which after land- 
 ing the Troops and Ammunition, and at Anchor, 
 could very well fpare two thirds of their Crews j 
 as to the Ships being feeble or ill- fitted out, the 
 
 Faljthood
 
 ( 67 ) 
 
 Falfhood of that AiTertion is now perfectly well 
 known, Was not this Story, of great Deficiency 
 in the French Fleet, propagated to create a 
 Belief in you, that La G alii [jonni ere was in- 
 ferior to Mr Byng-, as the extolling the Strength 
 of our Fleet, was to make the latter appear fupe- 
 rior? To thofe fpurious Accounts of the different 
 Strength of the two Fleets, was it not conftantly 
 added, that Mr Byng could blow the French out 
 of the Water ? With what Intent could this be 
 propagated, but to aggravate the Mifcarriage of 
 the Admiral, by creating an Opinion of his fu- 
 perior Force, and to animate your Expectations 
 with Views of Succefs, the more effectually to 
 inflame your Refentment againft him, when the 
 the ill News of his not prevailing mould arrive, 
 and which they mud forefee? 
 
 The Citadel of Mahon being attacked, it now 
 became the common Converfation amongft the 
 Planners of the Voyage, that the Fortification 
 could not hold out a Week, with a Defign to 
 leffen the Surprize of it's being taken ; or if it 
 was defended any confiderable Time, to give 
 an Idea of it's being well provided ; does it not 
 therefore feem evident, from the Fleet of En- 
 gland being appointed fo inferior, (o long de- 
 layed after it was ready, fent fo late, without a 
 Soldier but thofe who acted as Marines, with- 
 out an Hofpital-Ship, Firefhip, Tranfports, or 
 Tenders -, that no Battle was intended to be 
 fought, nor St Philips relieved ? But by this 
 K 2 delay,
 
 (68 ) 
 
 delay, to give Time to Marfhal Richlieu to take 
 the Fortification, return with his Fleet, and 
 leave Mr By?ig to cruife ineffectually round Mi- 
 norca; indeed the brave Jrijhmen difap pointed 
 the Expectations of thofe who had thus defigned 
 the whole Tranfa&ion, by defending the Place 
 becoming the Duty of BritiJJo Subjects, and 
 not according to finjfter Intention. 
 
 By this contemptible Cunning, a Quality 
 often connected with Ignorance in little Minds, 
 it feems contrived, that if General Blakeney gave 
 up the Citadel before Mr Byng's Arrival, then 
 he vyas to be exclaimed againft, and charged 
 with Cowardice ; and if he held out, as the 
 Admiral was inefficient, then that Imputation 
 was to fall on the latter. 
 
 Was it not therefore owing to the daily Dis- 
 appointment of hearing that the Citadel had fur- 
 rendered, that no Fleet was fent to reinforce 
 Mr Byng ; apprehending, that with a Rein- 
 forcement he would raife the Siege, which 
 feems fo contrary to the Intent of fending 
 him ? Was it not on this Account that they did 
 not flop him by Exprefs at Gibraltar, to wait 
 for more Ships of War ? And at la ft, was not 
 the Reinforcement fent when it could not pof- 
 iibly arrive 'till after the Admiral had fucceed- 
 e4 or miscarried, 
 
 At
 
 ( 69 ) 
 
 At length comes a Letter from Monfieur 
 La Galli jfonni ere, of the EngliJJj Fleet having; 
 retired before the French, when immediately a 
 Report prevailed, that from a Letter fent by 
 Admiral Byng from Gibraltar, it was forefeen 
 that he would not fight; with what Intent 
 was this added, but to confirm your Sentiments 
 in his being a Coward, according to the Refo- 
 lution which had been taken of throwing the 
 whole Blame of the Mifcafriage on him, be- 
 fore his own Account could come to fet Mat- 
 ters right in the People's Opinion. After fomc 
 Time a Letter from Admiral Byng arrives, print- 
 ed in the Gazette, where the moil material Paf- 
 fages in Vindication of his Conduct are cut out ; 
 why were thefe omitted, but to preferve the for- 
 mer Imprefiions of his having behaved like a 
 Coward, at the fame Time condemning the Re- 
 flations of the whole Council of War unheard, 
 a mod flagrant Affront on Men of fuperior 
 Birth, by one who has undefervedly flarted into 
 Nobility. 
 
 It was now necefTary to continue inventing 
 more Tales to fupport your Refentment again it 
 Mr Byng ; one Day it was given out, that he had 
 fold out of the Stocks, forty-four thoufand Pounds 
 before he failed, which was to infinuate, that 
 he left England with a Defign never to return : 
 The Falfhood of this Report may be feen in the 
 Stock Books, Then it was reported, that this 
 
 was
 
 ( 7°) 
 
 was the Man who cruifed before Genoa laft 
 War, and took Money to let Veffe.Is with Pro- 
 visions and Men pafs to the Relief of the 
 Town ; a known Falfhood, and were not the 
 Afhes of the Dead facred, I would tell you his 
 Name : Was not this to hint the Idea of Venality ? 
 
 Then it feems it was difcovered, that a Ship 
 with Provifions had gotten into Mahon the 
 very Day before the Adtion, which Ship ar- 
 rived at the Port a Month before the invert- 
 ing the Citadel ; was not this to infinuate that 
 he might have landed his Soldiers alfo ? 
 
 These Rumours being grown a little coo!, 
 Ballads were made to keep up your Refentment, 
 and the Admiral hanged and burnt in Effigy at 
 the national Expence, by the Clerks and Of- 
 ficers of Public Offices, amongft whom one 
 Mr G lever , belonging to the Victualling-Office^ 
 burning him in White-Chapel Road, was re- 
 warded with a broken Leg by the Barking 
 Stage-Coach. 
 
 It was now thought neceffary to aflert, that 
 Mr Byng was attempting to efcape in Women's 
 Cloaths, to impart the Idea of confeious Guilci- 
 nefs, which is likewife an Invention of FaKhood ; 
 and yet this Idea was to be continued by fixing 
 Iron Bars to the Windows, to prevent a Man from 
 efcaping, whom they with to be well rid of, 
 
 and
 
 ( 7* ) 
 
 and who would not leave the Place if they 
 would permit him. 
 
 At one Time he is reprefented as mad, and 
 then as killing himfelf with drinking : then, that 
 it is to be feared he may attempt Suicide. Be- 
 lieve me, he has not loft his Senfes, as his Ac- 
 cufers will find, nor will he deftroy himfelf with 
 his own Hands ; and it is your Duty to preferve 
 his Life, for the Sake of more perfectly know- 
 ing what influenced his Purfuers to contrive and 
 conduct the Expedition in fo prepoilerous a 
 Manner. Then the Author of the Evening 
 Advertifer is engaged to keep alive the Idea of 
 Mr Byng's being a Coward ; a proper Employ- 
 ment for a Man who has rifen to Dignities by 
 the infamous Pradtice of an Informer. 
 
 And laftly, thefe contemptible Artifices are 
 followed by a Letter to Ad 1 B — g, pub- 
 lished at the Expence of his and your Enemies, 
 and hawked through the Streets for the Sake of 
 univerfal Publication. This fingle Circumftance, 
 in the Minds of all Men of Senfe, fo inhumanly 
 contrived to keep up the popular Prejudice a- 
 gainjl the Admiral zn&from themfelves, amounts 
 to an Acknowledgment of their Guilt and of his 
 Innocence -, otherwife, fome one Proof of what 
 is there charged would certainly have been 
 brought againft him. But the whole is an en- 
 tire Declamation, intended to inflame your 
 Minds, founded on no one Argument, and con- 
 cludes
 
 (j* ) 
 
 eludes with, a Confejjion^ which his Adverfaries 
 would do extremely well to learn by Heart, 
 again ft that Day when public Jujiice will de- 
 mand, them to their Try ah. 
 
 Does not this Uniformity of Behaviour, in 
 planning the whole Affair, prove, that Mr Byng 
 was not the great culpable Perfon ? There mult 
 be fome other Source of his and your Misfor- 
 tunes ; otherwife the French muft have been 
 Madmen or Fools to have attacked Minorca in 
 that Manner, and fome of this Nation Madmen 
 or Fools to attempt preferving it with fo unequal 
 a Force. 
 
 After all, Are not fuch defpicable Proceed- 
 ings in Men of Rank, below the Behaviour of 
 the meanert Beggar? What an Infult on your 
 Understandings, to conceive the abfurd Idea of 
 fcreening themfelves from your Enquiry, and 
 feeking Prefervation, by drawing, hanging, and 
 burning, a Man in Effigy, who, however culpable 
 in this Action, muft be white as Snow com- 
 pared with them, whofe Sins are red as Scarlet. 
 
 From what Origin can fuch Proceedings 
 fpring, but from confeicus Delinquency and Ap- • 
 prehenfion of Danger ?' had they believed them- 
 felves innocent, why did they conceal thofe ma- 
 terial Paffages in his Letter, and add a fpurious 
 and malicious Lift of the Two Fleets ? Was it 
 not with Defign to depreciate the Commander's 
 
 Plea,
 
 ( 73 ) 
 
 Plea, as much as poffible, before his Fellow- 
 Subjecls? Had they been confcious of perform- 
 ing their Duty, why was he not left to the true 
 Recital of his Conducl ? His Miibchaviour could 
 not have affected them ; the World would have 
 been fatisfied with a true Narration qf the Cir- 
 cumftances ; they had been cleared, and Mr 
 Byng Jlood unprejudiced, by injurious Calumnies 
 in your Opinion ; juftly condemned if delinquent, 
 or juftly difcharged if innocent. Was it noc 
 their internal Guilt which prohibited them from 
 behaving with Integrity, and I pre fume by this 
 Time, as in Cafes of Murder, too great Defirc 
 to conceal the Crime, has {hewn you who were 
 the Capital Offenders. 
 
 I t becomes now the effential Duty of every 
 Engli[kman, to divert himfelf of all thofe Preju- 
 dices which have been fo artfully propagated 
 againft xMr Byng, to refent, with becoming Spi- 
 rit, the inful ing Defign of duping you, by Mif- 
 reprefentation of the Truth, to become Accom- 
 plices in purfuing, even to Death, a Man who 
 muft be unjuftly treated, becaufe hitherto his 
 Story has never been known, and his Judica- 
 tion concealed. 
 
 Heaven forbid that the Integrity of Eng lift- 
 men fhould be deceived by the Wiles of Men, 
 who do not poffefs one Praife- worthy Qualifica- 
 tion ; or their Judgments perverted by crafty 
 Reprefentations, to become Auxiliaries in com- 
 
 L pitting
 
 ( 7+) 
 
 pleting the Ruin of him they intend to de- 
 ftroy. I know you have hitherto determined 
 equitably according to what has been laid before 
 you ; I blame not the Decifion, becaufe it flows 
 from the Love of Juftice and your Country. 
 All I requeft is, that you would now confider 
 the Cafe of Mr Byng with the fame Zeal which 
 his Adverfai ies are purfuing him ; receive the 
 Truth as you did the Delufion; refent the Im- 
 pofition, and fee Juftice done to him whom 
 they wifh to ruin. Without your Approbation 
 they will not dare to make him fuffer unjuftly, 
 and with it I tremble for him, however inno- 
 cent he may be. Confider the Situation of that 
 Man, whofe Death may be necelTary to prefer ve 
 the Lives of others. Confider what the Difpofi- 
 tions of Men, who have almoft undone the Na- 
 tion, muft be againft: a Feliow- Subject, whom 
 it may be convenient to deftroy. If he fuffer, 
 you will repent too late the not having liftened 
 to the Admonitions of thefe Sheets. Let your 
 Prejudices be abated, for the Sake of Equity to 
 him and to yourfelves ; it is become an indif- 
 penfible A<ft of Juftice to fupport him, who 
 has been injured, againft Men who by every 
 Art have infinuated his being guilty. By his 
 Death you may fave the Deftroyers of your 
 Country. Urge then that the greateft Criminals 
 be firft brought to Juftice, and that fuch exift, 
 can need no farther or more convincing Proof, 
 than the Infufficiency of the Englijh Fleet, the 
 long Delay in fending it, the Want of Stores 
 
 and
 
 ( 75 ) 
 
 and Artificers at Gibraltar, the ordering the 
 Marines out of Mr Byng's Squadron at Portf- 
 moutb, fending no Troops to Mahon, no Hof- 
 pital-Ships, Fire-Ships, or Tenders, the fend- 
 ing him with foul and crazy Ships, ill manned 
 and old, the Concealment of his Vindication, 
 and adding to his Deflrudtion by Ten Thoufand 
 calumniating Inventions. 
 
 Are not thefe the (Irongeft Proofs of Delin- 
 quency ? Do they not amount to almoft a De- 
 monftration, that the Blame lies not greatly a- 
 gainfl: Mr Byng t and that what has happened, 
 has not been repugnant to the Inclinations of 
 his Purfuers ? Did they ever defign that Minorca 
 fhould find Relief from the Fleets and Armies of 
 Great-Britain ? 
 
 No twit h standi kg this favourable Ap- 
 pearance on his Side, and criminal on theirs, 
 I ail: not Mercy, but J u ft ice to Mr Byng, 
 his Purfuers, and your Country ; all I requeil is 
 a candid Tribunal, an impartial Enquiry, and 
 an unprejudiced People, which I wifh alfo to 
 thofe who have thus inhumanly treated him. 
 If they have all erred alike, give them up to the 
 fame condign PunitLment. If their Guilt is un- 
 equal, you will not add Cruelty to Injuftice, but 
 let cheir Punifhments be proportioned to it. If 
 he is proved guiltlefs, you will preferve him. But 
 a' all Events remember, that thofe, in whofe 
 Hearts the horrid Compound of Cunning and 
 
 Iniquity
 
 ( 76 ) 
 
 Iniquity refide, who have brought this once 
 flourifhing Country to fo ruinous a State, efcape 
 not, by the Sufferings of Mr Byng, the Rewards 
 which are due to them. To you I appeal ; be 
 Engliff:men y and I fear no Injuftice to him who 
 is thus unjuftTSably purfued -> him whom you 
 have already been deceived to condemn, you 
 will now be reiblved to fee treated according 
 to the Laws, Rights, and Privileges, of a Fel- 
 low-Subjedt and free Briton. 
 
 F IN I S. 
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 Page i. line i. for ofx. on. 
 P. 9. 1. 29. for his r. this. 
 P. 14. I. 15. for their r. our. 
 P. 32. 1. 2. for remain r. renhtim 
 P, 51. 1. 32. for he r. be. 
 
 t. c
 
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