UC-NRLF 
 
GIFT OF 
 
< ^ . *f*t*- f 
 
 STATEMENT 
 
 OF 
 
 A PROPER MILITARY POLICY 
 
 FOR THE 
 
 UNITED STATES 
 
 PREPARED BY THE WAR COLLEGE DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF 'cOrfPS 
 
 IN COMPLIANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS OF THE pECRETARY OF WAR 
 
 MARCH, 1915 
 
 W. C. D. 9053-90 
 
 ARMY WAR COLLEGE 
 
 SEPTEMBER 
 
 1915 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
 1916 
 
Al 
 
 #, 
 
WAR DEPARTMENT, 
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, 
 
 WAR COLLEGE DIVISION, 
 Washington, September 11, 1915. 
 Memorandum for the Chief of Staff: 
 Subject: Military policy. 
 
 1. Memorandums from your office, dated March 11 and March 17, 
 1915, directed the War College Division to make a complete and ex- 
 haustive study of a proper military policy for the U.QKed States, aiid^ 
 to prepare a clearly and succinctly expressed statement of the policy, 
 basing it, in a general way, upon the " Keport on tfie Organization o?> 
 the Land Forces of the United States, 1912," "eliminating every- 
 thing that is not necessary for the easy and quick comprehension of 
 the military policy, and adding anything which may be necessary to 
 afford such comprehension." 
 
 2. The following extract from the memorandum of March 17, 1915, 
 gives the subjects which the " statement " was to cover, viz : 
 
 The substance of this policy will, therefore, be a clearly and succinctly ex- 
 pressed statement, with the reasons therefor, of the recommended strength and 
 organization of- 
 
 I. (a) The Regular Army; 
 (&) The Organized Militia. 
 
 This should be followed by 
 
 II. A careful study of the question of a reserve for both the Regular Army 
 and the Organized Militia and, if possible to agree upon it, a plan for the forma- 
 tion of such reserves. 
 
 III. The Volunteers: Their organization and relation to the Regular Army 
 and the Organized Militia. 
 
 IV. Reserve material and supplies which should be available and which can 
 not be promptly obtained if delayed till the outbreak of war. 
 
 The Secretary of War is of the opinion that a statement which shall contain 
 everything that is pertinent to the foregoing subjects will inform Congress of 
 all the essential things that the best judgment of the War Department thinks it 
 is justified in asking Congress to provide in peace and to be prepared to provide 
 in war. These things, being such as commend themselves to the general mili- 
 tary intelligence (if they do not so commend themselves there can be no policy 
 such as is now aimed at), may be assumed to be those that will be asked for by 
 succeeding administrations of the War Department at least, they will indicate 
 the general line of development to be pursued. Such a statement will constitute 
 what he has in mind as a comprehensive military policy. 
 
 There are many other things that will from time to time be asked of Congress 
 or, when authority exists for it, that will be done without asking legislation. 
 Such things may be requests for appropriations to build new posts in view of 
 the abandoning of others ; the concentration of the Army in a smaller number 
 of posts in definite areas of the country ; projects for promotion, retirement, etc. ; 
 plans for training the Army and the militia, etc. 
 
 Such things have no part in the statement of a general military policy which 
 the Secretary of War now desires to have prepared, and in order to save time 
 
 m 
 
 6673-J7 
 
IV A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 and labor and to concentrate attention upon that which is essential, he desires 
 any such extraneous matter to be eliminated from the study which he has 
 directed. 
 
 3. Following these lines the accompanying " Statement of a Proper 
 Military Policy for the United States " was prepared. 
 
 4. It is proposed to supplement this statement later with brochures 
 on such subjects as require more detailed discussion than would be 
 appropriate herein. 
 
 M. M. MACOMB, 
 Brigadier General, Chief of War College Division. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Page. 
 
 MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF in 
 
 INTRODUCTION , . 1 
 
 THE MILITARY PROBLEM CONFRONTING THE UNITED STATES 1 
 
 The evolution of national military policies 1 
 
 Our abiding national policies 2 
 
 Coordinate relationship of Army and Navy 2 
 
 Coordinate relationship of statesman and soldier 3 
 
 Preparedness of the world powers for oversea expeditions 3 
 
 Statement of the military problem 5 
 
 I. THE REGULAR ARMY 5 
 
 GENERAL FUNCTIONS OF THE REGULAR ARMY 5 
 
 MOBILE AND COAST ARTILLERY TROOPS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS... 6 
 
 RELATION BETWEEN HOME AND, OVERSEA GARRISONS 7 
 
 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF OVERSEA SERVICE 7 
 
 The Philippines. 7 
 
 Oahu, Hawaiian Islands 8 
 
 The Panama Canal 8 
 
 Guantariamo 9 
 
 Alaska 9 
 
 Porto Rico 9 
 
 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF HOME SERVICE 9 
 
 General distribution of Coast Artillery troops in fortified areas. . . 9 
 
 General distribution of mobile troops in strategic areas 9 
 
 Puget Sound area 10 
 
 California area '. 10 
 
 Atlantic area 10 
 
 Middle West area 11 
 
 NECESSARY STRENGTH OF MOBILE TROOPS FOR OVERSEA SERVICE. 11 
 
 The Philippines 11 
 
 Oahu 11 
 
 Panama 11 
 
 Guantanamo 11 
 
 Alaska 12 
 
 Porto Rico 12 
 
 Tabular statement 12 
 
 NECESSARY STRENGTH OF MOBILE TROOPS FOR HOME SERVICE 12 
 
 Tabular statement showing distribution of administrative units 
 
 of mobile troops m strategic areas 12 
 
 Formation of higher tactical units and their distribution in stra- 
 tegic areas 13 
 
 NECESSARY STRENGTH OF COAST ARTILLERY TROOPS REQUIRED FOR 
 
 SERVICE OVERSEAS AND AT HOME 13 
 
 TOTAL STRENGTH OF THE REGULAR TROOPS REQUIRED FOR ALL 
 
 SERVICES 13 
 
 Organization 14 
 
 II. THE ORGANIZED MILITIA 15 
 
 Constitutional functions 15 
 
 Some uses a? a Federal force 15 
 
 Limitations 15 
 
 Recommendations 16 
 
 III. RESERVES 16 
 
 The Regular Reserve 16 
 
 Citizen soldiers 17 
 
 Reserve officers 17 
 
 IV. THE VOLUNTEERS 17 
 
 V. RESERVE MATERIEL AND SUPPLIES 18 
 
 List of Brochures . . 22 
 

A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED 
 
 STATES. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. ./, ; - - > V i^ i , J 
 
 THE MILITARY PROBLEM CONFRONTING THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 1. The evolution of national military policies. National policies 
 are evolved and are expanded as the Nation grows. They reflect the 
 national sense of responsibility and also the national ambitions. 
 They constitute the doctrine underlying acts of statesmanship and 
 diplomacy. A nation's military policy is the national doctrine of 
 self-preservation. The world is never without virile, capable, and 
 progressive nations, the circumstances of whose development have 
 imbued them with the belief that their vital interests demand an 
 active aggressive policy. They are forced to resort to universal 
 service in the effort to fulfill, at any cost, what they conceive to be 
 their destiny. In the United States the development of the Nation 
 has proceeded under an environment so favorable that there is no 
 well-defined public opinion in regard to what constitutes an ade- 
 quate military policy. Heretofore isolation, combined with the neces- 
 sity of preserving the balance of power, has been a sufficient guaranty 
 against strong hostile expeditions from Europe or Asia. The safe- 
 guard of isolation no longer exists. The oceans, once barriers, are 
 now easy avenues of approach by reason of the number, speed, and 
 carrying capacity of ocean-going vessels. The increasing radii of 
 action of the submarine, the aeroplane, and wireless telegraphy all 
 supplement ocean transport in placing both our Atlantic and Pacific 
 coasts within the sphere of hostile activities of oversea nations. 
 
 The great mass of the public does not yet realize the effect of these 
 changed conditions upon pur scheme of defense. 
 
 Another thing that militates against the evolution of a sound 
 military policy for our country is the erroneous conclusion drawn by 
 the people from our past experiences in war. In developing such a 
 policy victory is often a less trustworthy guide than defeat. We 
 have been plunged into many wars and have ultimately emerged 
 successfully from each of them. The general public points to these 
 experiences as an indication that our military policy has been and 
 still continues to be sound. That this is not really the belief of those 
 in authority is shown by the fact that each war of importance has 
 been followed by an official investigation of our military system and 
 the policy under which it operated. The reports of these investiga- 
 tions give a startling picture of faulty leadership, needless waste of 
 lives and property, costly overhead charges augumented by payment 
 
2 A PBOPEB MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 of bounties to keep up voluntary enlistments, undue prolongations of 
 all these wars, and finally reckless expenditure of public funds for 
 continuing pensions. These documents supply convincing proofs 
 that all such shortcomings have been due entirely to a lack of ade- 
 quate preparation for war in time of peace. But we have not yet 
 learned our lesson. It has never been driven home by the bitterness 
 of defeat. TVe have never known a Jena or a Sedan. At no stage 
 of our national life have we been brought face to face with the armed 
 strength of a great world power free to land sufficient forces to gain 
 a foothold at any, desired portion of our coasts. That we have to 
 -seiite extVTittfeii;tliis danger is evidenced by our efforts to provide a 
 naVy as' a 1 first Tine of, defense and to supplement it with the necessary 
 :harbar;!rpttfficatipns;:but we have not yet realized that^our ultimate 
 ^safeguard 4s 4 till "adequate and well-organized mobile* land force. 
 Experience in war has shown the need of these three elements but 
 the public has not yet demanded that they be perfected, coordinated, 
 and combined in one harmonious system of national defence. Not 
 until this has been accomplished will a proper military policy for the 
 United States be adopted. 
 
 2. Our abiding national policies. The majority of our people have 
 always believed in asserting their own rights and in respecting those 
 of others. They desire that the cause of right should prevail and that 
 lawlessness should be crushed out. To live up to these high ideals 
 imposes upon us new duties as a world power; duties that require 
 something more positive than a policy of mere passive defense. In 
 addition, there are two underlying and abiding national policies 
 whose maintenance we must consider as necessary to our national life. 
 These are the " Monroe doctrine " and the policy of avoiding " entan- 
 gling alliances." They are distinctive and affect our international 
 relations in a definite manner. In addition, policies may develop in 
 the future as a result of international relations with respect to trade 
 conditions. 
 
 A general consideration of our responsibilities as a nation and of 
 our geographical position indicates that the maintenance of our 
 abiding policies and interests at home and abroad involves problems 
 of defense measures both on land and on sea. The solution of the 
 general problem of national defense must be sought in the provision 
 of adequate land and sea forces and a consideration of their co- 
 ordinate relationship. 
 
 3. Coordinate relationship of Army and Nary. Upon the Navy 
 devolves the solution of the problem of securing and maintaining 
 control of the sea. To accomplish this it must be free to take the 
 offensive promptly that is. to seek out and defeat the enemy fleet. 
 The use of any part of the high-sea fleet for local defense defeats the 
 chief object of the Xavy and is a misuse of naval power. A fleet de- 
 feated at sea and undefended by an adequate army is powerless 
 either to prevent invasion or even its own ultimate destruction by 
 combined hostile land and naval forces. In illustration compare the 
 cases of the Spanish fleet at Santiago and the Russian fleet at Port 
 Arthur with the present example of the German. Austrian, and 
 Turkish fleets under the protection of land forces. 
 
 Upon the Army devolves the task of gaining and maintaining on 
 shore the ascendency over hostile land and naval operations. To 
 
A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 3 
 
 accomplish this it must be able to seek out promptly and to defeat, 
 capture, or destroy the invader wherever he may attempt either to 
 secure a footing upon our territory or to enter the waters of our har- 
 bors with the object of threatening the destruction of the seaport 
 or of a fleet driven to seek refuge or repair therein. 
 
 The problems involved in operations against hostile land forces 
 are complex and include only as an incident the protection of harbor 
 defenses on the land side. The problems of harbor defense against 
 attack from the sea are simple and passive in their nature. 
 
 4. Coordinate relationship of statesman and soldier. In our coun- 
 try public opinion estimates the situation, statecraft shapes the 
 policy, while the duty of executing it devolves upon the military 
 and naval departments. 
 
 Such a doctrine is sound in direct proportion to its success in pro- 
 ducing a military system capable of developing fighting power suffi- 
 cient to meet any given national emergency, at the proper time, sup- 
 ported by all the resources, technical and economic, of the country, 
 in a word preparedness. All the other world powers of to-day have 
 realized the necessity of maintaining highly trained and organized 
 military and naval forces in time of peace, and all, or nearly all, are 
 allied in powerful coalitions. 
 
 Without superiority on the sea or an adequate land force there is 
 nothing to prevent any hostile power or coalition of powers from 
 landing on our shores such part of its trained and disciplined troops 
 as its available transports can carry. The time required is limited 
 only by the average speed of its vessels and the delay necessarily 
 consumed in embarking and disembarking. 
 
 In order that the American people can intelligently decide on a 
 doctrine of preparedness which shall constitute the military policy 
 of the United States, and that Congress and the Executive may be 
 able to carry out their decision, information concerning the military 
 strength of other great nations and shipping available for transport 
 purposes must be clearly set forth. 
 
 The work of the statesman and of the soldier and sailor are there- 
 fore coordinate; where the first leaves off the others take hold. 
 
 5. Preparedness of the world powers for oversea expeditions. 
 Control of the sea having been once gained by our adversary or 
 adversaries, there is nothing to prevent them from dispatching an 
 oversea expedition against us. In order to form an idea of the 
 mobile force we should have ready to resist it an estimate must first 
 be made of the approximate number of troops that other nations 
 might reasonably be expected to transport and of the time required 
 to land them on our coasts. 
 
 The number of thoroughly trained and organized troops an enemy 
 can bring in the first and succeeding expeditions under such an 
 assumption is a function of 
 
 (a) The size of the enemy's army, and 
 
 ( ~b ) The number, size, and speed of the vessels of the enemy's mer- 
 chant marine that can be used as transports. 
 
 Should our enemy be a nation in arms that is, one in which all or 
 nearly all of the male inhabitants of suitable physique are given a 
 minimum of two years' training with the colors in time of peace (and 
 this is true of all world powers except ourselves and England), it is 
 
 3608516 2 
 
4 A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 evident that the size of the first expedition and succeeding expeditions 
 would be limited only by the number of vessels in the transport fleets. 
 It also follows that as the capacity and number of steamers in the 
 merchant marine of any nation or group of nations increase in the 
 future, the number of trained soldiers which such nation could send 
 in such expedition will also increase, and our trained forces should 
 be correspondingly augmented. 
 
 What the conditions were in August, 1914, is shown in the follow- 
 ing table, which may be regarded as a reasonable estimate: 
 
 Preparedness of the great powers for over-sea expeditions. 
 
 Nation. 
 
 Strength 
 of army. 
 
 3 Tonnage available of ships 
 with capacity over 
 
 First expe- 
 dition using 
 50 per cent 
 of tonnage 
 given. 
 
 Second expe- 
 dition using 
 75 per cent 
 of tonnage 
 given. 
 
 Time 
 needed to 
 
 Load 
 and 
 cross 
 ocean 
 with 
 first 
 expe- 
 di- 
 tion. 
 
 Re- 
 turn, 
 load, 
 and 
 re- 
 cross 
 with 
 sec- 
 ond 
 
 T- 
 
 tion. 
 
 ! ' 
 
 3,000 2,000 
 tons, i tons. 
 
 1,000 
 tons. 
 
 Men. 
 
 An- 
 imals. 
 
 Men. 
 
 An- 
 imals. 
 
 Austria-Hungary . . 
 France 
 
 4,320,000 
 5,000,000 
 5,000,000 
 1695.000 
 2,600,000 
 2,212,000 
 5,000,000 
 
 762,756 
 1,705,931 
 3,569,9624,018,185 
 13, 000, 000 i 
 
 
 72,000 
 160,931 
 4 387,000 
 170,000 
 91,000 
 95, 745 
 37, 630 
 
 14,000 
 32, 186 
 81, 270 
 90,000 
 13, 650 
 24, 416 
 7,940 
 
 108,000 
 243,295 
 440,000 
 
 21,600 
 48,279 
 ^94,600 
 
 Days. 
 20.7 
 15.8 
 15.8 
 14.0 
 18.3 
 22.5 
 20.5 
 
 Days. 
 40.4 
 30.0 
 30.8 
 27.0 
 35.0 
 41.0 
 40.0 
 
 Germany 
 
 Great Britain 
 Italy 
 
 
 1,065,321 
 
 
 136,000 
 142,622 
 66, 444 
 
 20,475 
 36,623 
 11,918 
 
 
 
 21,013,985 
 
 Russia 
 
 428 019 
 
 
 I 
 
 
 i 240,500 territorials. 
 
 * Japanese field regulations indicate the intention to use steamers of 1 ,000 tons; for this reason and because 
 of the large amount of steamers between 10 and 12 knots speed, all Japanese steamers over 10 knots speed 
 and a thousand tons gross have been considered. 
 
 s Fifty per cent has been assumed as the figure representing the amount of shipping in or within call of 
 home ports at outbreak of war. 
 
 Using no ships less than 3,000 tons. 
 
 NOTE. The allowance prescribed in our Field Service Regulations of 3 tons per man and 8 tons per 
 animal for ships over 5,000 tons and 4 tons per man and 10 tons per animal for vessels under 5,000 tons has 
 been used in estimating the capacity of ships, except where the regulations of any country prescribe a 
 different allowance. These allowances include rations, water, forage, etc., for the voyage and a margin 
 (or three months' reserve supplies. The tonnage allowance covers men, animals, and" all accessories and 
 is sufficient to provide for vehicles (including guns). 
 
 Fighting power is the result of organization, training, and equipment backed by the resources of the 
 country. Available shipping is a matter of commercial statistics. 
 
 The quality, organization, and efficiency of these troops, except 
 those of Japan, which demonstrated their excellence in the Russo- 
 Japanese War, are now undergoing a supreme test of military 
 strength on land and sea. This test by the ordeal of battle is visibly 
 demonstrating their organization, their fighting power, and the rate 
 at which each is capable of developing and maintaining its military 
 strength. In addition, where certain nations have transported troops 
 by sea their capabilities in this respect have to some extent been 
 shown. 
 
 This evidence, produced under conditions of actual warfare, pre- 
 sents an example of the resultant efficiency of any nation that has de- 
 veloped a sound military policy ; the soundest policy being the one 
 which insures a successful termination of the war in the shortest time. 
 
A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 5 
 
 6. Statement of the military problem. From what has been stated, 
 we are forced to the conclusion that we must be prepared to resist a 
 combined land and sea operation of formidable strength. Our prin- 
 cipal coast cities and important harbors have already been protected 
 by harbor defenses which, by passive method alone, can deny to an 
 enemy the use of these localities as. bases for such expeditions. 
 
 The enemy being unable to gain a foothold in any of these fortified 
 areas by direct naval attack will therefore be forced to find some suit- 
 able place on the coast from which land operations can be conducted 
 both against the important coast cities and the rich commercial cen- 
 ters in the interior. Long stretches of coast line between the fortified 
 places lie open to the enemy. The only reasonable way in which these 
 localities can be defended is by providing a mobile land force of suffi- 
 cient strength, so located that it may be thrown in at threatened 
 points at the proper time. 
 
 It has just been shown what the strength of these expeditions might 
 be, as well as the time required for any one of them to develop its 
 whole effective force. Hence it can be seen, when we take into con- 
 sideration the possible two months' delay provided by the Navy, that 
 our system should be able to furnish 500,000 trained and organized 
 mobile troops at the outbreak of the war and to have at least 500,000 
 more available within 90 days thereafter. Here, however, it must be 
 pointed out that two expeditions alone will provide a force large 
 enough to cope with our 1,000,000 mobile troops, and consequently we 
 must at the outbreak of hostilities provide the system to raise and 
 train, in addition, at least 500,000 troops to replace the losses and 
 wastage in personnel incident to war. To provide this organized land 
 force is the military problem before us for solution. 
 
 I. THE BEGULAB ARMY. 
 GENERAL FUNCTIONS OF THE REGULAR ARMY. 
 
 7. In the endeavor to reach a just conclusion as to the strength 
 and organization of a Kegular Army, adequate to play its part in 
 our national defense, it must not be forgotten that this defense is a 
 joint problem requiring for its correct solution the united efforts of 
 both Army and Navy, and that the ultimate strength of the greater 
 war army is dependent to a considerable extent upon the part to be 
 played by the fleet. It is therefore assumed in this discussion that 
 the Navy is preparing to place and maintain in the Pacific, when the 
 occasion requires, a force superior to that of any oriental nation, and, 
 in the Atlantic, one second only to that of the greatest European 
 naval power. 
 
 The Regular Army is the peace nucleus of the greater war army of 
 the Nation. Its strength and organization should be determined not 
 only by its relation to the larger force but by its own peace and war 
 functions. It must be prepared at all times to meet sudden and 
 special emergencies, which can not be met by the army of citizen 
 soldiers. Its units must be the models for the organization and train- 
 ing of those of the great war army. 
 
 Some of the functions of the Regular Army are : 
 
 (a) To furnish the entire strength of our garrisons outside of the 
 United States proper both in peace and war. 
 
6 A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 (b) To garrison our harbor defenses within the United States 
 proper in time of peace. 
 
 (<?) To furnish detachments of mobile forces in time of peace suffi- 
 cent for the protection of these harbor defenses and naval bases 
 against naval raids which, under modern conditions, may precede a 
 declaration of war. 
 
 (d) To furnish sufficient mobile forces to protect our principal 
 cities by preventing the landing of hostile expeditions for their cap- 
 ture in the intervals between our fortified harbors or near such cities. 
 
 (e) To supply a mobile reserve to reenforce our garrisons outside 
 of the United States proper during periods of insurrection and 
 disorder. 
 
 (/) To furnish expeditionary forces for minor wars resulting from 
 the occupation of foreign territory where treaty rights or funda- 
 mental national policies may have been threatened. 
 
 (g) To prepare ill advance its existing administrative and supply 
 departments for the equipment, transportation, and supply of the 
 great w r ar army of the Nation. 
 
 (A) To assist in the training of organizations of citizen soldiers. 
 
 8. Concerning the strength and organization of the Regular Army, 
 the following points are to be considered : 
 
 (a) At the outbreak of war the Regular Army at home should be 
 strong enough, with the addition of organized and trained citizen 
 soldiers, to form the first line of defense in order to give sufficient 
 time to permit the mobilization and concentration of our greater war 
 army, and to seize opportunities for such immediate initial operations 
 as may be undertaken before the mobilization of the army of citizen 
 soldiers can be completed. 
 
 (b) It should be so organized and located that it can be economi- 
 cally and efficiently trained, quickly and easily mobilized and concen- 
 trated, and readily used as a model in the education and training of 
 the citizen forces. 
 
 MOBILE AND COAST ARTILLERY TROOPS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS. 
 
 9. Experience has shown that our regular land forces and others 
 modeled upon them must consist of two distinct classes, i. e. : 
 
 (a) Mobile troops. 
 
 (b) Coast Artillery troops. 
 
 These two groups have their own special functions for which they 
 are trained and equipped and from which they should not be diverted 
 except in some emergency. 
 
 The function of the Coast Artillery is to man our harbor defenses 
 designed to protect important seaports from direct naval attacks and 
 raids from the sea. The armament and accessories of these forts are 
 intended to be so complete and powerful as not only to prevent 
 hostile landings at all places within range of the guns, but also to 
 cover all navigable waters in the vicinity of great seacoast cities so 
 thoroughly as to leave no dead spaces from which enemy ships, either 
 at anchor or during a run-by, could bring them under bombardment. 
 While these harbor forts are important elements in our scheme of 
 defense, they are. nevertheless, powerless to prevent invasion at 
 points outside the range of their guns. The total length of our coast 
 
A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 7 
 
 line is enormous, and the stretches covered by harbor defenses are 
 and must remain very small compared with the unprotected inter- 
 vals that lie between them. If we should lose command of the sea 
 an invader would simply land in one of these intervals. It there- 
 fore follows that the ultimate defense of our coasts depends upon 
 defeating a mobile army of invasion, and this can be done only by 
 having mobile forces prepared to operate in any possible theater of 
 war. At this stage of hostilities the problem becomes one of cooper- 
 ation between Coast Artillery and mobile troops, but there can be no 
 fixed relation in the strength of these two classes of land forces. 
 The necessary strength of Coast Artillery troops depends upon the 
 number and character of harbor defenses established ; that of mobile 
 troops upon the nature and extent of the defensive and offensive 
 operations for which the Nation decides to be prepared. 
 
 RELATION BETWEEN HOME AND OVERSEA GARRISONS. 
 
 10. The most rational method of determining the proper strength 
 and organization of the Regular Army is based upon the fact that 
 this force is and must be divided into two distinct parts one for 
 oversea service, the other for home service. Each of these parts 
 must have its proper quota, both of mobile and Coast Artillery 
 troops. 
 
 The troops on oversea service consist of the detachments required 
 to meet the special military problems of the Philippines, Oahu, 
 Panama, Alaska, Guantanamo, and Porto Rico. Each of these de- 
 tachments has a distinct tactical and strategic mission, and is to 
 operate wdthin a restricted terrain. All of them are limited to over- 
 sea communication with the home country, and all of them may 
 therefore be isolated for considerable periods, especially in the criti- 
 cal first stages of war. It is obvious that under these circumstances 
 these detachments should be prepared to meet all military emergen- 
 cies until reenforcements from the United States can reasonably be 
 expected. They must, therefore, be maintained at all times at full 
 statutory strength, and must, in addition, be organized with the view 
 to being self-supporting, preferably during the continuance of war, 
 or at least until the Navy has accomplished its primary mission of 
 securing the command of the sea. 
 
 The force at home is on an entirely different basis. It may or may 
 not be given an adequate number of units in time of peace, but it is 
 supported by all of the resources of the Nation. It may be increased 
 at the pleasure of Congress, and it may be reenf orced by considerable 
 forces of citizen soldiery. It follows from these considerations that ' 
 the military establishment of the United States in time of peace 
 should first provide effective and sufficient garrisons for the political 
 and strategic outposts of the United States, and that the residue at 
 home should be organized with the view to ultimate expansion into 
 such war forces as national interests may require. The possibility 
 of a satisfactory mobilization of this home force is dependent upon 
 keeping the units of the regular contingent at full statutory strength. 
 
 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF OVERSEA SERVICE. 
 
 11. The Philippines. A decision to defend the Philippines against 
 a foreign enemy is a matter of national and not of military policy. 
 
8 A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 But in studying the military requirements of such defense it must be 
 remembered that, under conditions of modern warfare, unless our 
 Navy has undisputed control of the sea, we can not reenforce the 
 peace garrison after a declaration of war or while war is imminent. 
 
 12. Oahu. The maintenance of the naval base at Pearl Harbor, 
 Oahu, is an essential factor in the military problem of holding the 
 Hawaiian Islands. These islands constitute a vital element in the 
 defense of the Pacific coast and in securing to ourselves the full value 
 of the Panama Canal as a strategic highway between the two oceans. 
 
 The problem of holding the Hawaiian Islands can be solved by 
 making Oahu, and therefore Pearl Harbor, secure against all comers. 
 A satisfactory solution requires the joint action of the Army and 
 Navy. Pearl Harbor and Honolulu are already protected from 
 direct naval attack by fortifications now nearing completion. These, 
 while deemed adequate to meet the conditions existing when they 
 were designed, must now be strengthened to meet the recent increase 
 in power of guns afloat; but no matter how complete these harbor 
 fortifications on the southern coast of Oahu may be, they are unable 
 to prevent attacks either on the remaining hundred miles of coast 
 lying beyond the range of their guns or on the other islands of the 
 group. Consequently there should be in addition a force of modern 
 submarines and destroyers forming part of the permanent naval 
 equipment of Pearl Harbor with sufficient radius of action to keep 
 the Hawaiian waters thoroughly patrolled throughout their whole 
 extent and to make them dangerous for enemy vessels. Should this 
 force be worsted in combat and withdraAvn before the arrival of our 
 high-sea fleet, the complete control of the local waters might pass 
 temporarily to the enemy, so that the ultimate security of both Hono- 
 lulu, the naval base at Pearl Harbor, and indeed of the whole group, 
 depends upon including in the Oahu garrison enough mobile troops 
 to defeat any enemy that may land anywhere on the island. It is 
 clear that perfect coordination between the Army and Navy at this 
 station is absolutely essential to success in holding this key to the 
 Pacific. Unless we provide such dual defense of the Hawaiian Islands 
 we can not be sure of retaining control even of that part of the Pacific 
 lying within the sphere of defense of our western coast. By making 
 such provision the high-sea fleet is left free to seek out the enemy fleet 
 in Pacific waters. 
 
 13. Panama. The Panama Canal is a very important strategic 
 position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this highway 
 between the two oceans the effectiveness of our fleet and our general 
 military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that 
 the unquestioned security of the canal is for us a vital military need. 
 The permanent garrison should be strong enough to guard the locks, 
 spillways, and other important works and to prevent a naval attack 
 which, under modern conditions, may even precede a declaration of 
 war. We should therefore be able, even in peace, to man the sea- 
 coast guns and mine defense that cover the approach to the canal, 
 and we must have enough mobile troops to defeat raids. A modern 
 fleet might land a small raiding party of several thousand bluejackets 
 at any one or more of a number of places, and such a force landing 
 out of range of the seacoast guns could, if unopposed, penetrate to 
 some vunerable part of the canal within a few hours. The permanent 
 garrison should therefore include a mobile force strong enough to 
 
A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 9 
 
 anticipate and defeat naval raids at the beginning of hostilities and 
 to protect the canal against more serious land operations liable to be 
 undertaken later. If the enemy is operating on one ocean only, it 
 might be possible to send reenf orcements from the United States, but 
 to count on such relief would be running too great chances. By au- 
 thority of the Republic of Panama, this garrison is given facilities 
 in time of peace to operate beyond the Canal Zone in order that the 
 troops may be properly trained for their special mission and made 
 familiar with the terrain over which they may be called upon to 
 operate in defending the canal. 
 
 14. Guantanamo. The policy of the United States contemplates 
 the establishment of a naval base at Guantanamo. Garrisons of coast 
 artillery and mobile troops are necessary for its defense and should 
 be assigned to station there at the proper time. 
 
 15. Alaska. The garrison of Alaska should be large enough to 
 support the authority of the United States, and, in time of war, to 
 maintain our sovereignty over a small selected area of the Territory. 
 As work on the Alaskan Railroad progresses, the military needs of 
 Alaska will increase. 
 
 16. Porto Rico is to be classified with the Philipines and Guam. 
 Unlike Alaska and Hawaii, these island possessions have not been 
 organized as Territories; nevertheless, they all belong to the United 
 States and must be protected. 
 
 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF HOME SERVICE. 
 
 IT. General distribution of Coast Artillery troops in fortified 
 areas. It has already been shown where we should have garrisons 
 for oversea service and why. It now remains to show how we should 
 distribute our regular troops for service at home. Coast Artillery 
 stations should correspond to the fortified areas on the seacoast, and 
 these are indicated by the position of the harbor defenses, which are 
 at present located as follows : 
 
 Portland, Me. The Potomac. New Orleans. 
 
 Portsmouth, N. H. Chesapeake Bay. Galveston. 
 
 Boston. Cape Fear. San Diego. 
 
 New Bedford. Charleston. Los Angeles. 
 
 Narragansett Bay. Savannah. San Francisco. 
 
 Long Island Sound. Tampa. Puget Sound. 
 
 New York. Key West. The Columbia. 
 
 The Delaware. Pensacola. 
 
 Baltimore. Mobile. 
 
 18. General distribution of mobile troops in strategic areas. As 
 previously explained, the influence of harbor defenses is limited to 
 the areas within the range of their guns. To provide harbor defenses 
 without mobile forces necessary to cover the unprotected intervals that 
 lie between them would be comparable with attempting to make a 
 house burglar proof by barring the doors and leaving the windows 
 open. There is not a case in history where seacoast fortifications, 
 efficiently manned, have been captured by direct attack from the sea. 
 In all cases of capture mobile land forces have been employed for the 
 purpose, and an enemy that hopes for success must undertake landing 
 operations against us. We must therefore decide upon a rational 
 distribution of our mobile forces to meet this contingency. 
 
10 A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 19. Puget Sound area, Western Washington is bordered on the 
 east by the steep and rugged Cascade Mountains, on the south by 
 the Columbia River, and on the north by Juan de Fuca Strait and 
 Canada. This corner of the United States is completely cut off from 
 the rest of the country by great natural obstacles and presents an 
 extensive front for attack by sea. While the maps show some twenty 
 passes across the Cascade Mountains, communication with the east 
 is almost entirely by three railroads, all crossing at points less than 
 50 miles apart and having tunnels or other vulnerable structures. 
 The only practicable wagon road is effectually closed to traffic for 
 between four and five months each year by heavy snows. Communi- 
 cation with the south is by one line of railroad, crossing the Columbia 
 River by bridge at Vancouver. Communication between this sec- 
 tion and the east and south is thus largely dependent upon a number 
 of structures readily destroyed by high explosives, and impossible of 
 restoration to traffic within a definite time. The two railroads along 
 the Columbia River, at the point where it breaks through the moun- 
 tains, could be easily wrecked so as to -require considerable time to 
 repair, and the gorge could be held by a small force against a large 
 one coming from the east. If an enemy succeeds in entering western 
 Washington and in seizing and destroying the important bridges and 
 tunnels, he would be so securely established as to render it extremely 
 difficult to dislodge him. In this rich region an invader could main- 
 tain himself indefinitely. The harbor defenses maintained in this 
 region are reasonably strong. Ordinary precaution demands that a 
 mobile force of reasonable strength be also maintained in this region. 
 
 20. California area. There are five transcontinental lines of rail- 
 way entering California. The Western Pacific and Southern Pacific 
 by the passes through the Sierras northeast of Sacramento; the 
 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe, and the San Pedro, Los Angeles & 
 Salt Lake via Daggetts Pass northeast of Los Angeles; and the 
 Southern Pacific via the Salton Sea and Gorgonia Pass southeast of 
 Los Angeles. There are no other passes through the Sierras that 
 have been considered practicable. There is no railroad running south 
 into Lower California. Only one railroad, the Southern Pacific, 
 runs north into Oregon. As in the Puget Sound region, communica- 
 tion with the east is largely dependent upon structures readily de- 
 stroyed by explosives and impossible of restoration to traffic within a 
 definite time; California and the greater centers of population are 
 separated by wide expanses of sparsely settled country. To trans- 
 port promptly large bodies of troops into California would be difficult 
 if not impossible in face of opposition at the passes. The invader 
 would have a most fertile region at his back, while the reverse would 
 be the situation with us. 
 
 The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably 
 strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably 
 strong mobile force maintained in this region. 
 
 To rely, for defense, during the first stages of a war upon a mobile 
 force shipped in from the east is to invite disaster. 
 
 21. Atlantic area. In case of war with a first-class power on the 
 Atlantic, that portion of our country lying between and including 
 Maine and Virginia would undoubtedly be the primary object of an 
 invader. While all other points along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts 
 
A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 11 
 
 and all points on our land frontiers would undoubtedly be in danger, 
 the danger would be secondary to that of the North Atlantic States 
 above named. Here, also, the harbor defenses are reasonably strong, 
 and here also, a mobile force should be kept sufficient in size to hold 
 important points until the citizen soldiery can be mobilized. 
 
 While many other regions are important, the three regions de- 
 scribed Puget Sound, California, and the North Atlantic States 
 contain the critical areas. 
 
 22. Middle West area. The center of population of the United 
 States is in the middle west, and here should be located a mobile 
 force for use in case of need, on either the Pacific or Atlantic coast, 
 the northern or southern border. 
 
 NECESSARY STRENGTH OF MOBILE TROOPS FOR OVERSEA SERVICE. 
 
 23. Constant study of the problem which confronts each of our 
 oversea garrisons in connection with the advance made in arms, trans- 
 portation, tactics, lines of information, methods of communications, 
 undersea craft, and aerial operations, has led to the conclusions that 
 the strength of the oversea garrisons, herein given is the minimum 
 below which they should not be allowed to fall at any time. 
 
 The general requirements of oversea service have already been 
 stated for each of the several localities concerned. It now remains 
 to determine the necessary strength to meet these requirements, 
 taking up each case in turn. 
 
 24. The Philippines. If in accordance with national policy it is 
 decided to keep the American flag flying in the Philippines in war 
 as in peace it becomes essential to hold Manila Bay. 
 
 25. Oahu. Having in mind the principles governing the relations 
 between home and oversea garrisons, the force maintained at all 
 times in Oahu should include : 
 
 9 regiments of Infantry (3 brigades). 
 
 1 regiment of Cavalry. 
 
 2 regiments of Field Artillery. 
 
 2 battalions Engineers; 1 field battalion of Signal troops; 1 aero squad- 
 ron ; 1 telegraph company. 
 2 ambulance companies. 
 14 companies Coast Artillery. 
 
 This force will total about 25,000 combatant officers and men. 
 
 26. Panama. The force maintained at all times in the Canal Zone 
 should include : 
 
 9 regiments of Infantry (3 brigades). 
 1 regiment of Cavalry. 
 
 1 regiment of Field Artillery. 
 
 2 battalions of Engineers ; 1 field battalion Signal troops ; 1 aero squad- 
 
 ron ; 1 telegraph company. 
 1 ambulance company ; 1 evacuation hospital. 
 21 companies Coast Artillery Corps. 
 
 This force will total about 24,000 combatant officers and men. 
 
 27. Guantanamo. The policy of the United States contemplates 
 the establishment of a naval base at Guantanamo. Garrisons of 
 Coast Artillery and mobile troops are necessary for its defense and 
 should be assigned to station there at the proper time. 
 
12 
 
 A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 28. Alaska. The garrison of Alaska should be large enough to 
 support the authority of the United States and, in time of war, to 
 maintain our sovereignty over a small selected area of the Terri- 
 tory. As work on the Alaskan Railroad progresses the military 
 needs of Alaska will increase. 
 
 In time of peace it is believed that the Alaskan garrison should be 
 one regiment of Infantry (1,915 officers and men), to be increased 
 later as circumstances may demand. 
 
 29. Porto Rico. The present garrison, reorganized into a full 
 regiment of three battalions, etc., is sufficient (1,915 officers and men). 
 
 30. The following table gives a summary of the minimum garrison 
 to be maintained on over-sea service : 
 
 Table of garrisons for over-sea stations. 
 
 Localities. 
 
 Regi- 
 ments of 
 Infantry. 
 
 Regi- 
 ments of 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Batteries 
 of Field 
 Artillery. 
 
 Battal- 
 ions of 
 Engi- 
 neers. 
 
 Battal- 
 ions, 
 Signal 
 Corps. 1 
 
 Aero 
 squad- 
 rons. 
 
 Compa- 
 nies of 
 Coast 
 Artillery 
 Corps. 
 
 Philippines 
 
 9 
 
 3 
 
 18 
 
 11 
 
 1 
 
 j 
 
 26 
 
 Oahu 
 
 9 
 
 1 
 
 12 
 
 2 
 
 !i 
 
 1 
 
 14 
 
 Panama . 
 
 9 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 2 
 
 lj 
 
 1 
 
 21 
 
 Alaska 
 
 | 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Porto Rico 
 
 31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 29 
 
 5 
 
 36 
 
 5| 
 
 4} 
 
 3 
 
 61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 Includes 1 telegraph company in each garrison. 
 2 1 company mounted for Cavalry brigade. 
 3 Native. 
 Combatants 
 
 Mobile 
 
 Coast Artillery Corps 
 
 Officers and men. 
 
 74,500 
 
 7,500 
 
 Total... 82,000 
 
 NECESSARY STRENGTH OF MOBILE TROOPS FOR HOME SERVICE. 
 
 31. Careful studies made at the War College, extending over a 
 period of years, lead to the conclusion that the strength of the 
 Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Engineers, and signal troops of 
 the Regular Army maintained at home in time of peace, and the dis- 
 tribution of administrative units of these arms in the principal 
 strategic areas, should be as given in the following table : 
 
 Combatant troops. 
 
 Localities. 
 
 Infantry 
 regiment. 
 
 Cavalry 
 regiment. 
 
 Field 
 Artiller: 
 regimen 
 
 7 
 
 Engi- 
 neer 
 bat- 
 talions 
 
 
 Bat- 
 talions 
 Signal 
 Corps. 
 
 Aero 
 squad- 
 rons. 
 
 Puget Sound area 
 
 9 
 
 3 
 
 13 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 1 li 
 
 1 
 
 California 
 
 9 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 U 
 
 1 
 
 North Atlantic States 
 
 9 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 H 
 
 1 
 
 Middle West 
 
 9 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 li 
 
 1 
 
 Mexican border 
 
 
 6 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 Total 
 
 36 
 
 20 
 
 15 
 
 
 10 
 
 
 7 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 Each Cavalry brigade to have 1 battalion horse artillery; 1 company mounted Engineers; 1 company 
 Signal Corps. 
 
 Approximate total, 121,000 officers and men. 
 
A PROPER MILITAEY POLICY FOE THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 13 
 
 These troops should be organized in higher tactical units and dis- 
 tributed in strategic areas substantially as follows : 
 
 Puget Sound area One division (less divisional Cavalry) and one Cavalry 
 
 brigade (of 3 regiments) . 
 
 California One division and one Cavalry brigade. 
 
 North Atlantic States One division and one Cavalry brigade. 
 
 Middle West One division (less divisional Cavalry) and one Cavalry 
 
 brigade. 
 Mexican border 
 
 West of El Paso One Cavalry brigade. 
 
 East of El Paso One Cavalry brigade. 
 
 NECESSARY STRENGTH OF COAST ARTILLERY TROOPS REQUIRED FOR SERVICE 
 OVERSEAS AND AT HOME. 
 
 32. The strength of the Coast Artillery depends upon the number 
 of guns and mine fields installed and projected and upon the assist- 
 ance to be received from Organized Militia units. An estimate pre- 
 pared in the Office of the Chief of Coast Artillery 1 gives the follow- 
 ing strength, in companies, required under the supposition that all 
 mine fields and all oversea guns and one-half the guns at home are 
 manned from the Regular Army : 
 
 Companies, 
 
 Philippines 26 
 
 Oahu 14 
 
 Panama 21 
 
 United States- 228 
 
 Total 
 
 Total companies (gun and mine) 
 
 289 
 289 
 
 Officers and men 34,413 
 
 TOTAL STRENGTH OF THE REGULAR TROOPS REQUIRED FOR ALL SERVICES. 
 
 33. Combining all previous estimates of Coast Artillery and mobile 
 troops required for service in oversea garrisons and at home, the fol- 
 lowing tabular statement of the required strength of the Regular 
 Army in units appropriate to each arm, results, viz : 
 
 
 
 Localities. 
 
 Infantry 
 regi- 
 ments. 
 
 Cavalry 
 regi- 
 ments. 
 
 Field 
 Artillery 
 regi- 
 ments. 
 
 Coast 
 Artillery 
 com- 
 panies. 
 
 Engi- 
 neer 
 bat- 
 talions. 
 
 Signal Corps, 
 
 Battal- 
 ions. 
 
 Aero 
 squads. 
 
 Philippines 2 
 
 9 
 9 
 9 
 1 
 1 
 9 
 9 
 9 
 9 
 
 3 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 3 
 2 
 1 
 
 26 
 14 
 21 
 
 ? 
 
 2 
 
 li 
 l| 
 
 1* 
 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 
 Oahu 
 
 Canal Zone 
 
 Alaska 
 
 Porto Rico 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Puget Sound area 
 
 3 
 4 
 4 
 3 
 6 
 
 1 
 
 
 1 
 
 li 
 l| 
 If 
 
 P 
 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 
 California 
 
 
 North Atlantic States . . 
 
 
 Middle West 
 
 
 Mexican border.. 
 
 
 United States 
 
 
 228 
 
 Total required 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 65 
 
 25 
 
 21 
 
 289 
 
 15J 
 
 Hi 
 
 8 
 
 
 1 This estimate can only be verified by an inspection of all the harbors in question, for which inspection 
 there has not been sufficient time since this estimate was received. 
 
 3 Nine regiments Infantry, 2 regiments Field Artillery, 2 battalions Engineers. Filipinos to be added, 
 21,000 officers and men. 
 
14 A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 These figures may be summarized as follows : 
 
 Oversea : 
 
 Mobile (combatant) 74, 500 
 
 Coast Artillery Corps 7, 500 
 
 82,000 
 In United States: 
 
 Mobile (combatant) 121,000 
 
 Coast Artillery Corps 27, 000 
 
 - 148, 000 
 Total : 
 
 Mobile (combatant) 195, 500 
 
 Coast Artillery Corps__l 34, 500 
 
 230, 000 
 
 To this total should be added officers and men for the Sanitary, 
 Quartermaster, Ordnance Department, etc., appropriate to a force of 
 this strength, amounting approximately to 30,000 officers and men. 
 Including Philippine Scouts, 21,000, the grand total becomes 281,000. 
 
 34. Organization. The Tables of Organization, approved and 
 published on February 25. 1914, for the information and government 
 of the Regular Army and Organized Militia of the United States 
 have been taken as the guide in estimating the numerical strength of 
 the personnel of the various tactical and administrative units men- 
 tioned in this report. This was done as a matter of convenience and 
 because the service generally is familiar with these tables, which are 
 the latest official publication of the War Department on this subject. 
 They conform to the Field Service Regulations and are the best that 
 can be devised under the limitation of the present laws governing the 
 Army, but it can not be too emphatically stated that they are for 
 emergency use only and contain certain undesirable and unscientific 
 features which should be corrected as soon as the necessary legisla- 
 tion can be obtained. For example, the war organization shown in 
 the tables is provisional only, while the peace strength is arranged 
 so as not to exceed the total enlisted strength of about 93,000 men 
 now permitted by existing appropriations. 
 
 This limitation falls heaviest upon the Infantry, whose organiza- 
 tions on home service are maintained at only 43 per cent of full statu- 
 tory strength, while the Cavalry organizations are maintained at 75 
 per cent and those of Field Artillery at 77 per cent of such strength. 
 It is generally conceded that our Infantry companies should each 
 have the full statutory strength of 150 men in order to permit proper 
 training of the officers in time of peace and supply efficient fighting 
 strength in time of war. 
 
 In consequence of the greatly reduced strength of these Infantry 
 organizations, their efficiency is unduly decreased and overhead 
 charges correspondingly increased. 
 
 The requirements of modern war demand that a machine-gun unit, 
 a supply unit, and certain mounted men be attached to each regiment, 
 and that units of various strengths be assigned to brigade and divi- 
 sion headquarters. None of these units is authorized by law, vet all 
 are essential. Tables of Organization, 1914, represent an effort to 
 adapt an archaic statutory organization to modern requirements by 
 organizing the necessary 'additional units, provisionally. This has 
 been done by detaching from statutory organizations the personnel 
 required. An examination of the tables will show that more than 
 5 per cent of the Infantry personnel authorized by Congress have 
 
A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 15 
 
 been diverted from their legitimate duty as members of statutory 
 organizations and have been assigned to provisional units which, 
 while necessary and essential, have only the sanction of departmental 
 authority, and lack the efficiency which can only be given by statute. 
 In the Cavalry more than 9 per cent are similarly diverted. 
 
 Kecognizing these facts, the War College Division of the General 
 Staff has prepared a plan for organizing on modern lines an army 
 of the strength just shown to be necessary for the national needs. 
 Should this plan be approved, the organization of the Regular 
 Army, the militia, and whatever reserves are formed would proceed 
 along the new lines. 
 
 II. THE ORGANIZED MILITIA. 
 
 35. The act of Congress approved April 25, 1914, commonly known 
 as the volunteer law, defines the land forces of the United States as 
 " the Regular Army, the organized land militia while in the service 
 of the United States, and such volunteer forces as Congress may 
 authorize." 
 
 The Organized Militia, in addition to its use as a State force, is 
 available for use by the Federal Government, as provided in the 
 Constitution. 
 
 36. Constitutional functions of the Organized Militia. Its consti- 
 tutional functions are the following: 
 
 (a) A State force to preserve order within the State limits, in 
 order to avoid calling upon the Regular Army or the Organized 
 Militia of other States to discharge such function. 
 
 (b) A Federal force when called forth by the President, and duly 
 mustered as prescribed by Congress, for any of the three purposes 
 authorized by the Constitution. 
 
 37. Some uses of the Organized Militia as a Federal force. Hav- 
 ing been called forth as militia, they may be used as follows: 
 
 (a) As Coast Artillery supports and reserves. 
 
 (b) To guard and protect certain bridges, canal locks, arsenals, 
 depots of supplies, docks, navy yards, and other vulnerable points in 
 the home territory. 
 
 (c) To guard lines of communication within the limits of the 
 United States. 
 
 38. Limitations. It is stated later in this report that 12 months 
 at 150 hours per month, " is considered the minimum length of time 
 of actual training considered necessary to prepare troops for war 
 service." Due to constitutional limitations, Congress has not the 
 power to fix and require such an amount of training for the Organ- 
 ized Militia. No force can be considered a portion of our first line 
 whose control and training is so little subject to Federal authority 
 in peace. No force should be considered a portion of our first line in 
 war unless it be maintained fully organized and equipped in peace at 
 practically war strength. This would exclude the Organized Militia 
 from consideration for service in the first line mainly because of the 
 impossibility of giving it in peace the training required for such 
 function. It may be necessary to continue Federal support of the 
 Organized Militia in order that some organized force may be imme- 
 diately available for the purposes set forth in paragraphs 36 and 37, 
 
16 A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 39. Recommendations. In the preparation of plans for the na- 
 tional defense and for the preservation of the honor and dignity of 
 the United States, the number of troops that are deemed necessary are 
 largely in excess of the total Eegular and Militia forces available in 
 the United States. 
 
 It is only during the existence of war, or when war is imminent, 
 that any other forces may be raised under existing law. When Con- 
 gress so authorizes the President, he may call forth volunteers. 
 
 Section 3 of the volunteer law provides that under certain con- 
 ditions organizations of the Organized Militia may be received into 
 the Volunteer Service in advance of any other organizations of the 
 same arm or class from the same State, Territory, or District; and 
 section 4 of the act of May 27, 1908, amending the militia law, pro- 
 vides that the Militia shall be called into the service in advance of any 
 volunteer force that may be raised. 
 
 It is evident that it can not be known prior to the existence of the 
 imminence of war what organizations, if any, of the Organized 
 Militia will enter the volunteer service, and that no definite plans can 
 be prepared providing for the use of such organizations, either as 
 militia or as volunteers, until war is actually upon us. 
 
 No legislation affecting the Organized Militia is recommended 
 beyond the repeal of all provisions of laws now in effect whereby 
 militia or militia organizations may or must be received into the 
 Federal service in advance of any other forces. 
 
 This recommendation is not to be construed as advocating express 
 repeal of certain sections of existing laws relating to the Organized 
 Militia, but as suggesting that any legislation hereafter proposed 
 for the organization of a Federal reserve force shall contain the 
 usual concluding section repealing all laws and parts of laws incon- 
 sistent therewith, and that such legislation be so framed as to render 
 inconsistent with it the provisions of law just referred to. 
 
 III. RESERVES. 
 
 40. Reserves include: (a) Well-instructed soldiers of the Regular 
 Army furloughed to what is herein termed the regular reserve, (b) 
 citizen soldiers, (c) reserve officers. 
 
 41. The regular reserve. As the United States should have a 
 mobile force of 500,000 soldiers available at home at the outbreak of 
 war, the Army, with the regular reserve, should amount to this 
 strength. In order to develop the necessary regular reserve with the 
 Army at the strength advocated in this policy, enlistments would 
 trave to be for about eight years two with the colors and six in 
 reserve. That would, in eight years, result in approximately the 
 following mobile forces at home available at the outbreak of war: 
 
 (1) Mobile regular troops (combatant) with the colors 121,000 
 
 (2) The regular reserve 379,000 
 
 Total _ 500,000 
 
 During the first weeks of war in this country the military situation 
 will probably be critical. At that time every fully trained soldier 
 should be put in the field. To do that with the small military estab- 
 lishment herein advocated it is necessary that during peace the Army 
 
A PROPER MIL1TARI POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 17 
 
 be kept at war strength, and that the regular reserve be organized 
 and not kept back to replace losses expected during war. Such losses 
 should be replaced from depot units. 
 
 42. Citizen soldiers. In addition to the 500,000 fully trained 
 mobile troops mentioned above, at least 500,000 more a total of 
 1,000,000 men should be prepared to take the field immediately on 
 the outbreak of war and should have had sufficient previous military 
 training to enable them to meet a trained enemy within three months. 
 Twelve months' intensive training is the minimum that will prepare 
 troops for war service. Therefore the 500,000 partly trained troops 
 above referred to require nine months' military training before war 
 begins. Military efficiency of reserves requires that Regular Army 
 officers be assigned thereto for training purposes at least one to 
 every 400 men and that organizations and specially designated non- 
 commissioned officers of the Army be utilized in instructing reserves 
 as far as practicable. 
 
 Based upon experience with Tables of Organization, 1914, the 
 War College Division has recently prepared a new plan of organiza- 
 tion for the Army. The Regular Army and the reserves should be 
 organized according to this plan. Organizations should be formed 
 of men from the districts to which their respective organizations are 
 assigned for recruiting. For this purpose, each organization should 
 be assigned to a district from which recruits most suitable for the 
 service required of the organization may be obtained mounted units 
 to horse-raising districts, technical troops to manufacturing districts, 
 etc. As a rule the size of districts should be about in proportion to 
 population of the qualifications age, etc. required. Organizations 
 in war should be kept at full strength from the depot units which 
 they should have in their respective recruiting districts. 
 
 43. Reserve officers. Officers for staff and organizations of re- 
 serves, and officers for temporary appointment in the Regular Army 
 as provided for in section 8 of the volunteer law (act of Congress 
 approved Apr. 25, 1914), should be selected and trained in time of 
 peace. The President should be authorized to issue, by and with 
 the advice and consent of the Senate, commissions as reserve officers 
 to citizens of the United States who, upon examination prescribed by 
 the Secretary of War, demonstrate their physical, mental, moral, 
 and professional fitness therefor, and who duly obligate themselves 
 to render military service to the United States while their commis- 
 sions are valid. Such commissions should be valid five years, and 
 renewable under such regulations regarding examinations and quali- 
 fications as the Secretary of War may from time to time prescribe. 
 
 IV. VOLUNTEERS. 
 
 44. In addition to any forces that may be maintained and trained 
 in time of peace, provision must be made for vastly increasing such 
 forces in time of war. These must come from the untrained body of 
 citizens and provisions for raising them is contained in the act of 
 Congress approved April 25, 1914. 
 
 45. This act meets the military needs for raising volunteer troops 
 as far as concerns the enlisted personnel, except in two particulars, 
 which are : First, that under the existing laws certain organizations 
 
18 A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 of the militia, with numbers far below the full strength, can enter the 
 volunteer force in advance of other similar volunteer organizations 
 from the same State ; and second, no volunteers of any arm or branch 
 can be raised until all the militia of that particular arm or branch 
 have been called into the service of the United States. The changes 
 necessary to remedy these defects have been set forth in paragraph 39 
 under the subject of the Organized Militia. 
 
 V. RESERVE MATERIEL. 
 
 46. Of all the features disclosed by the war in Europe none stands 
 more clearly revealed than the power to be derived from national 
 economic organization behind the armed forces of a nation. 
 
 47. In a war of gigantic proportions the chances of success are 
 immeasurably lessened by wastage, abuse, and confusion. Steps 
 should be taken looking toward a national organization of our eco- 
 nomic and industrial resources as well as our resources in fighting 
 men. 
 
 48. In its report the commission appointed by the President to 
 investigate the conduct of the War Department in the War with 
 Spain used the following language : 
 
 One of the lessons taught by the war is that the country should hereafter be 
 in a better state of preparation for war. Testimony has been taken on this sub- 
 ject and suggestions have been made that large supplies of all the materiel not 
 liable to deterioration should be kept on hand, to be continuously issued and 
 renewed, so that in any emergency they might be available. Especially should 
 this be the case \vith such supplies, equipment, and ordnance stores as are not 
 in general use in the United States and which can not be rapidly obtained in 
 open market. 
 
 49. The lack of such articles as shoes, wagons, harness, rifles, 
 saddles, medical chests, and so on, will render ineffective an army 
 just as certainly as will the lack of ammunition. 
 
 50. For the purposes of storage military supplies may be divided 
 into four classes : 
 
 (a) Supplies that can be obtained in great quantities in the open 
 market at any time. 
 
 (b) Those that can be obtained in sufficient quantities on 15 days' 
 notice. 
 
 ((?) Those that can be obtained on three months' notice. 
 (d) Those that can not be obtained within three months. 
 
 51. The War College Division of the General Staff is of the opin- 
 ion that for purposes of defense we should maintain the troops enu- 
 merated in Parts I and III of this report. 
 
 52. A fully trained force, to be effective during the critical period 
 when war is imminent and during the first few weeks of a war, must 
 not be hampered by lack of necessary supplies and equipment. For 
 this reason, supplies of all kinds which can not be obtained in the 
 open market at any time must be kept on hand, in use and in store, 
 at home and oversea, sufficient to equip without delay all troops whose 
 training warrants sending them promptly into the field. 
 
 53. It is probable that as soon as war becomes imminent, the Conti- 
 nental Army 500,000 mobile troops will also be called out. As 
 this partially trained force can not be expected to take the field within 
 three months' time, it is practicable to refrain, after the third year, 
 from keeping on hand or 'n store for it any articles of equipment 
 
A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 19 
 
 except those necessary to complete its training and those which can 
 not be procured within three months. 
 
 54. The total number of harbor defense troops necessary is about 
 50.000. Due to conditions of service, it is believed that ultimately 
 supplies of all kinds for 60,000 should be kept on hand. 
 
 55. In any great war, volunteers must be called out in addition to 
 the troops above enumerated. 
 
 56. It would be unwise to have on hand at the beginning of a war 
 merely the supplies sufficient to place in the field our first contingent 
 of troops and to complete the training of the Continental Army, and 
 to be unprepared to supply to even a limited extent the Volunteer 
 Army we should have to raise, not to mention replacements of arms, 
 ammunition, clothing and equipment of all kinds for those already 
 in the field ; but on account of the great sum of money which will be 
 necessary in entering upon a program for collecting and storing mili- 
 tary supplies it is believed that the subject of equipment for a Volun- 
 teer Army and replacements for the Regular and Continental Armies 
 should be provided for by obtaining options with domestic manufac- 
 turers to furnish the required supplies, all of domestic manufacture, 
 in accordance with tentative contracts to be made by the supply de- 
 partments with such manufacturers in time of peace. By so doing we 
 will be taking the initial steps toward organizing the industrial and 
 economic resources of the country as well as its resources in fighting 
 men. 
 
 ."7. Referring to Part III, approximately the following troops will 
 be available at the close of the successive years : 
 
 
 Fully- 
 trained 
 mobile 
 troops. 
 
 Partially- 
 trained 
 Conti- 
 nental 
 Army. 
 
 Harbor- 
 defense 
 troops. 
 
 Total. 
 
 First year 
 
 160 000 
 
 185 000 
 
 30 000 
 
 375 000 
 
 Second year 
 
 219.000 
 
 351 000 
 
 40'000 
 
 610,000 
 
 Third year 
 
 320 000 
 
 500 000 
 
 50 000 
 
 870 000 
 
 Fourth year 
 
 383,000 
 
 500 000 
 
 52 000 
 
 935 000 
 
 Fifth year 
 
 439 000 
 
 500 000 
 
 54 000 
 
 993 000 
 
 Sixth year . . ... 
 
 489.000 
 
 500 000 
 
 56 000 
 
 1 045 000 
 
 Seventh year , 
 
 534.000 
 
 500,000 
 
 58,000 
 
 1,092,000 
 
 E ighth year 
 
 574,000 
 
 500 000 
 
 60 000 
 
 1 134 000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A study of these figures and of the difficulties we have experienced 
 in the past in the matter of supplies lead to the conclusion that the 
 program adopted for procuring reserve supplies should be such that 
 at the close of each year we should have in use and in store, at home 
 and oversea, supplies of all kinds necessary to equip : 
 
 
 Infantry 
 divisions. 
 
 Cavalry 
 divisions 
 of 9 regi- 
 ments. 
 
 Harbor- 
 defense 
 troops. 
 
 First year 
 
 13 
 
 3 
 
 30 000 
 
 Second year 
 
 22 
 
 5 
 
 40'000 
 
 Third year 
 
 32 
 
 g 
 
 50 000 
 
 Fourth year 
 
 34 
 
 
 52 000 
 
 Fifth year 
 
 36 
 
 g 
 
 54 000 
 
 Sixth year 
 
 37 
 
 9 
 
 56.000 
 
 Seventh year 
 
 38 
 
 10 
 
 58 000 
 
 Eighth year 
 
 40 
 
 10 
 
 60 000 
 
 
 
 
 
20 A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 The supplies acquired during the first three years should include 
 all articles which can not be obtained in sufficient quantities on 15 
 days' notice, those acquired during the last five years to include only 
 those articles which can not be obtained on three months' notice. 
 After the eighth year the program should be extended to provide for 
 the storing of such additional machine guns, rifles, field guns, ammu- 
 nition, etc., as may be considered advisable. 
 
 58. In order that vast supplies pertaining to one supply bureau 
 should not be secured and relatively nothing be done by other supply 
 bureaus, supplies should be obtained progressively in complete divi- 
 sion units. 
 
 59. In order that the efforts of the various supply bureaus may be 
 properly coordinated by the Chief of Staff, reserve supplies should 
 be collected in general supply depots located in accordance with the 
 general principle below enumerated. Each general supply depot 
 should be considered a place of issue in time of peace for all articles 
 of field equipment, so that the stock on hand will be continually 
 turned over and the machinery for the issuing and forwarding of 
 supplies will be in operation at the outbreak of war. The com- 
 mander of each general supply depot should be either a line or a 
 staff officer specially selected by and reporting direct to the Chief 
 of Staff or to the department commander and independent of the 
 control of any one particular staff department but keeping in touch 
 with all. The commander of each general supply depot should be 
 assisted by the necessary commissioned, enlisted, and civilian person- 
 nel. Supplies for not more than three division units should be stored 
 at any one locality. Each place selected for a reserve storehouse 
 should be one that will be at all times under adequate military pro- 
 tection, . where ground is available and where abundant railroad 
 facilities exist. 
 
 60. As a general military principle, no supply depot, arsenal, nor 
 manufacturing plant of any considerable size, supported by War 
 Department appropriations for military purposes, should be estab- 
 lished or maintained east of the Appalachian Mountains, west of the. 
 Cascade or Sierra Nevada Mountains, nor within 200 miles of our 
 Canadian or Mexican borders, and steps should be taken gradually 
 to cause to be moved depots and manufacturing plants already estab- 
 lished in violation of this military principle. 
 
 61. The estimated cost of the field equipment of one Infantry divi- 
 sion, Tables of Organization 1914, is as follows : 
 
 Kind of supplies. 
 
 Can be ob- 
 tained in the 
 open market 
 in great 
 quantities at 
 any time. 
 
 Can be ob- 
 tained on 15 
 days' notice. 
 
 Can be ob- 
 tained on 
 3 months' 
 notice. 
 
 Can not be 
 obtained on 
 3 months' 
 notice. 
 
 Signal supplies 
 
 $722. 12 
 51,983.35 
 1,835.26 
 5,779.67 
 10,997.95 
 
 $1,688.51 
 54,054.45 
 471. 59 
 7, 730. 96 
 10,189.63 
 
 $6,030.46 
 3,177,083.47 
 7, 703. 97 
 257, 489. 89 
 88, 861. 51 
 
 $385,310.26 
 
 Quartermaster supplies 
 
 Engineer supplies 
 
 8, 428. 95 
 4, 164, 770. 6S 
 
 Ordnance supplies 
 
 Medical supplies 
 
 
 
A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 21 
 
 And the estimated cost of the field equipment of one Cavalry 
 division of nine regiments is approximately as follows : 
 
 Kind of supplies. 
 
 Can be ob- 
 tained in the 
 open market 
 in great 
 quantities at 
 any time. 
 
 Can be ob- 
 tained on 15 
 days' notice. 
 
 Can be ob- 
 tained on 
 3 months' 
 notice. 
 
 Can not be 
 obtained on 
 3 months' 
 notice. 
 
 Signal supplies ... 
 
 $370.80 
 
 $1 638. 53 
 
 $4 290 61 
 
 $277 156 43 
 
 Quartermaster supplies 
 
 55 102 48 
 
 76 143 40 
 
 4 584 628 93 
 
 
 Engineer supplies . ......... 
 
 1, 769. 59 
 
 416. 53 
 
 10 885 20 
 
 3 999 45 
 
 Ordnance supplies 
 
 31 862 02 
 
 18 630 56 
 
 311 056 68 
 
 3 541 004 68 
 
 Medical supplies 
 
 13, 454. 99 
 
 13, 060. 57 
 
 108 630. 36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 62. While the amount of money involved is large, practically all of 
 it will remain at home, especially if every effort be made by the sup- 
 ply bureaus to eliminate from supply tables all articles not of domes- 
 tic manufacture. It must also be kept in mind that it is cheaper to 
 buy war supplies in time of peace than in time of war. 
 
List of Brochures Prepared by the War College Division, General Staff Corps, as 
 Supplements to the Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United 
 
 States. 
 
 NOVEMBER, 1915. 
 Doc. 
 
 No. 
 
 506. Changes iu organization found necessary during progress of the European 
 
 War. WCD 4886-23. 
 
 507. Comparison of cost of our military establishment with those of other 
 
 countries. WCD 9053-120. 
 
 508. Coordination of the mobile and coast artillery units of the army in the 
 
 national defense. WCD 8911-9. 
 
 509. Development of large caliber mobile artillery and machine guns in the 
 
 present European War. WCD 9239-1. 
 
 510. Educational institutions giving military training as a source for a supply 
 
 of reserve officers for a national army. WCD 9053-121. 
 
 511. Elimination of unnecessary expense from army administration. WCD 
 
 9053-113. 
 - 512. Finances and costs of the present European War. WCD 9287-1. 
 
 513. Fortifications. WCD 4896-4. 
 
 514. General Staffs of certain belligerent powers. WCD 9286-2. 
 
 515. Military aviation. WCD 9311-1. 
 
 516. Militia as organized under the Constitution and its value to the Nation 
 
 as a military asset. WCD 7835-9. 
 
 517. Mobilization of industries and utilization of the commercial and industrial 
 
 resources of the country for war purposes in emergency. WCD 8121-45. 
 
 518. Modern organization for the Regular Army and its use as a model in 
 
 organizing other forces. WCD 9302-1. 
 
 519. Motor transport in campaign. WCD 9318-1. 
 
 520. Organization and administration of the War Department adapted to a 
 
 change from peace conditions to a state of war. WCD 9262-14. 
 
 521. 1. Organization, training, and mobilization of a force of citizen soldiery. 
 
 2. Method of training a citizen army on the outbreak of war to insure 
 its preparedness for field service. WCD 7541-12. 
 
 522. Organization, training, and mobilization of a reserve for the Regular 
 
 Army. WCD 8106-15. 
 
 523. Organization, training, and mobilization of volunteers under the act of 
 
 April 25, 1914. WCD 8160-25. 
 
 524. Outline of plan for military training in public schools of the United 
 
 States. WCD 9064-16. 
 
 525. Pension roll as affected by the war with Spain in 1898. WCD 9290-3. 
 
 526. Personnel versus materiel in plans for national defense. WCD 9314-1. 
 
 527. Places of origin and ability to procure supplies needed in vast quantities 
 
 in time of war. WCD 8121-39. 
 
 528. Proper relationship between the army and the press in war. WCD 8976-6. 
 
 529. Recruitment of officers in time of peace in the principal armies of Europe. 
 
 WCD 9278-1. 
 
 530. Standardization of methods of military instruction at schools and colleges 
 
 in the United States, with draft of a bill to establish a Reserve Officers' 
 Training Corps. WCD 9089-8. 
 
 531. Statistical comparison of universal and voluntary service. WCD 4886-25. 
 
 532. Strategic location of military depots, arsenals, and manufacturing plants 
 
 in the United States. WCD 8121-42. 
 
 533. Sanitary troops in foreign armies. WCD 9319-1. 
 
 534. Training of forces of belligerent nations of Europe. WCD 9289-1. 
 
 535. Utilization of our resources in various means of transportation and of 
 
 the services of trained specialists. WCD 9053-111. 
 
 22 
 
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