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CLAVIS 
 UNIVERSALIS, 
 
CLAVIS 
 
 UNIVERSALIS, 
 
 OR A NEW ENQUIRY 
 
 AFTER TRUTH. 
 
 BY ARTHUR COLLIER. 
 
 REPRINTED AT EDINBURGH, 
 M.DCCC.XXXVL 
 
^TO ^'^ 
 
 c^^f^/ 
 
 vvV 
 
NOTICE. 
 
 RTHUR Collier, author of 
 the very remarkable Me- 
 taphysical Piece, entitled 
 Clavis Universalis, was de- 
 scended of a respectable family, originally 
 from Bristol, which settled in Wiltshire 
 early in the seventeenth century. An 
 autobiographical sketch of the earlier 
 part of his life,^ has been preserved, from 
 which it appears that his education com- 
 menced at the schools of Chitterne and 
 Salisbury, and was completed at the 
 University of Oxford. From his youth 
 
 * See P. xxiii. inf. 
 
VI 
 
 upwards, although of a very deUcate con- 
 stitution, he was an industrious and 
 successful student in Metaphysics and 
 Theology — his great object being, as he 
 has himself expressed it, " so to read as 
 to fit him for Holy Orders/' He was 
 ordained by the Bishop of Salisbury in 
 1705, and immediatelv entered to the 
 cure of Langford Magna, a parish of 
 which the Advowson had belonged to his 
 family for a century, and of which his 
 immediate ancestors had been rectors for 
 several generations. For the first five 
 years of his ministry Collier also served 
 the cures of Broad Chalk and Bower 
 Chalk; upon resigning which, in 1711, 
 he undertook the cure of Bishop's Cleer 
 during 1712 and 1713. In 1714 he was 
 appointed to Baverstock, and in 1721 to 
 Compton Chamberlain ; and he continued 
 in the pastoral superintendence of these 
 two parishes, in conjunction with that 
 of Langford Magna, till his death. 
 
VII 
 
 Collier appears to have commenced his 
 clerical career, with very exalted notions 
 of the importance of the duties he was 
 about to undertake. The following striking 
 estimate of the functions of a clergyman, 
 is extracted from one of his note books: — 
 " He is dedicated to the service of God 
 and the Church. He wears the habit of 
 a mourner and an intercessor. He must 
 be separated from the concerns and cares 
 of this world. He must be dedicated to 
 the study and meditation of divine mat- 
 ters. His conversation must be a pattern 
 and a sermon to others. He offers up 
 prayers to God as the mouth of the 
 people. He must pray and intercede 
 for them in private as in public. He 
 must distribute to them the bread of Hfe, 
 and the word, and sacraments. He must 
 attend upon them not only in public, 
 but from house to house. He is to 
 watch for their souls, to keep them from 
 sin and error. He must visit the sick. 
 
VIII 
 
 and prepare them for the life to come 
 He must endeavour to raise his own re- 
 putation and that of his function. He 
 must convince his people that he has a 
 true design to save their souls. His 
 course of life must combine public func- 
 tion and secret labours. He will for 
 these be more severely accounted with 
 than any others. He must not only ab- 
 stain from evils, but from the appearance 
 of them. His friend and his garden 
 ought to be his chief diversion — his study 
 and his parish his chief employments. 
 He must employ great part of his time 
 in sin-searching and error. He must 
 have a lively sense and impression of 
 divine matters. He takes upon him a 
 trust for which an account must be given. 
 He must endeavour to act above man, 
 more Uke the angels. He is a fellow- 
 w^orker with God, an ambassador of 
 Christ. He is a savour of life unto life, 
 of death unto death." 
 
IX 
 
 The period of Collier's marriage is un- 
 known. His wife was Margaret, daughter 
 of Nicholas Johnson, Esq., and niece of 
 Sir Stephen Fox, paymaster of the army. 
 By this lady he had a family, the expense 
 of which, combined probably with w^ant 
 of due attention to worldly affairs, ulti- 
 mately involved him in pecuniary embar- 
 rassments. In 1716, we find him applying 
 to the Bishop of Salisbury for permission 
 to leave his parsonage at Langford, which 
 he describes as " too handsome and conve- 
 nient for his income," and to reside for a 
 few years in Sarum. " I speak, my Lord," 
 he says in a very affecting letter to the 
 Bishop, " with confusion of face, and with 
 great reluctance, that this is the only 
 feasible method which occurs to me of 
 extricating myself from the difficulties I 
 am in at present." Collier has left evi- 
 dence, in a letter to Lady Fox, that his 
 request was complied with; but his change 
 of residence does not seem to have had 
 
X 
 
 the desired effect of relieving his embar- 
 rassments. On the contrary, he was at 
 last driven to dispose of the Advowson of 
 Langford Magna, to which he had suc- 
 ceeded as an estate of inheritance, for the 
 inadequate price of sixteen hundred 
 guineas ; a sum scarcely sufficient to pay 
 his debts at the time of the sale. 
 
 Collier died in 1732 at the age of 
 fifty, and was buried in his own parish 
 church of Langford Magna. No account 
 remains of his last moments, or of the 
 disease to which he fell a sacrifice. He 
 was survived by his wife, two sons, and 
 two daughters. " His eldest son Arthur, 
 who is described, in Coote's Lives of the 
 Civilians^ as an ingenious, but unsteady 
 and eccentric man, practised as an Advo- 
 cate at the Commons, where he died in 
 1777. The other entered the army, and 
 rose to the rank of a Colonel. Of the 
 daughters, one was the authoress of a 
 clever work called the Art of Ingeni- 
 
XI 
 
 ously Tormenting, and the remaining 
 child derives some little celebrity from 
 having accompanied Fielding in his in- 
 teresting Voyage to Lisbon,''^ 
 
 These slight notices have been gleaned 
 from an unpublished Memoir of the Life 
 and Writings of ColUer, by Mr Benson, 
 the learned Eecorder of Salisbury, which, 
 with distinguished liberality, he trans- 
 mitted to a friend in Edinburgh, author- 
 izing: him to communicate it to the 
 Editor, for the use of the present publi- 
 cation. This Memoir has been compiled 
 from the most authentic sources, and 
 contains some valuable information re- 
 garding the merits of Collier as a Theo- 
 logian and Metaphysician ; with ample 
 details of the various controversies in 
 which he distinguished himself in these 
 characters. It was intended to accom- 
 pany a new edition of Collier's Philoso- 
 phical Writings ; and although the pub- 
 
 ' Mr Benson's MS. 
 
XII 
 
 lication has been for the present delayed, 
 it is to be hoped that it may one day be 
 given to the world. 
 
 Collier left a large collection of Ma- 
 nuscripts, the remains of which are now 
 in the possession of Mr Benson. They 
 were found in the garret of an ancient 
 residence in the Close of Salisbury, to 
 which Mr Benson's father, the Keverend 
 Edmund Benson, succeeded in 1796, 
 under the settlements of William Ben- 
 son Earle, Esq., a direct descendant, 
 by the mother's side, of a sister of Col- 
 lier, who married a clergyman of the 
 name of Sympson. The authenticity of 
 the Manuscripts is undoubted ; and it is 
 only to be regretted, as Mr Benson re- 
 marks, " that but a small portion of what 
 once existed remains. Indeed, for many 
 years prior to 1806, they were so conve- 
 niently placed for the housemaid, who 
 lighted an adjoining bedroom fire, that 
 it is not easy to estimate how many of 
 them have been consumed. The au- 
 
XIII 
 
 thor's Commentary on the Greek Bible 
 seems to have been her favourite, for of 
 that only a few sheets have been spared." 
 Mr Benson gives a catalogue of the 
 existing Manuscripts, extending, accord- 
 ing to their dates, from 1703, nearly to 
 the period of Collier's death. They are, 
 with few exceptions, on Metaphysical 
 and Theological subjects, and consist, 
 chiefly, of extracts from, or notes on, the 
 different works which formed the subject 
 of his studies. There are, however, a few 
 essays of a didactic character, indicating 
 great vigour of intellect ; and a collection 
 of controversial letters, of which a small 
 selection, comprehending those relating 
 to the Clavis Universalis, will be found 
 ' in the Appendix. 
 
 The Autobiographical Sketch already 
 referred to, which, from its title — eis ayton 
 KAi HEPi ATTOY — ucvcr was intended for publi- 
 cation, has been subjoined to this Notice; 
 and though but the brief chronicle of the 
 early life of a recluse student, it will not 
 
XIV 
 
 be read without interest. There are 
 some Memoranda of the latter period 
 of Collier's life, amongst the manuscripts, 
 which Mr Benson does not consider 
 sufficiently important to be printed. 
 They consist only of short notices of the 
 churches he served — the clerical duties 
 he performed — and the visits he paid and 
 received ; whilst the days he spent stu- 
 diously are merely marked with the 
 word " study." 
 
 Besides the Clavis Universalis, the 
 following works are known to have been 
 published by Collier : 
 
 1. Christian Principles of Obedience. 
 
 A Sermon on Komans xiii. 1. 
 1713. 8vo. 
 
 2. Sermon on Komans i. 17. 1716. 8vo. 
 
 3. A Specimen of True Philosophy, in 
 
 a Discourse on Genesis, the first 
 
XV 
 
 chapter, and the first verse. Sa- 
 rum. 1730. 12mo. 
 
 4. Logology, or a Treatise on the 
 Logos or Word of God, in seven 
 Sermons on John i. 1, 2, 3, 14 ; to 
 which is added, an Appendix on 
 the subject. Lond. 173^. 12mo. 
 
 It would exceed the limits, and be 
 foreign to the purpose of this Notice, to 
 attempt any account of Collier's Theolo- 
 gical writings and opinions. The late 
 Dr Parr, shortly before his death, ap- 
 pears to have prepared for publication a 
 volume of Metaphysical Tracts, contain- 
 ing the Clavis Universalis, and the Sped- 
 men of True Philosophy, with observations 
 on Collier's peculiar reUgious opinions. 
 Dr Parr did not Uve to carry his design 
 fully into execution ; but his own copy, 
 as prepared for the press, was purchased 
 at the sale of his library by Mr Swanston, 
 by whom it was communicated to Mr 
 
XVI 
 
 Benson, whose Memoir contains the ob- 
 servations of that very learned divine on 
 CoUier's Theology. 
 
 The general course of Collier's reading, 
 as indicated by his manuscripts, shows a 
 very early turn for Metaphysical studies. 
 Des Cartes, Malebranche, and Norris 
 were his favourite authors ; and Mr Ben- 
 son conjectures, with great probability, 
 that his intimacy with the latter, who 
 was rector of the neighbouring parish of 
 Bemerton, contributed to foster his natu- 
 ral taste for abstract speculation. It was 
 about the year 17(33, when he had little 
 more than attained to manhood, that he 
 appears to have adopted the celebrated 
 doctrine as to the non-existence of the 
 Material World. His earUest written 
 speculations on this subject are extant 
 in three manuscript tracts, the first of 
 which is dated as far back as 1708, and 
 bears this title : " Sketch of a Metaphy- 
 sical Essay on the Subject of the Visible 
 World being without us or not'' The 
 
XVII 
 
 others are dated in 1712; the one en- 
 titled — " Notes of a Treatise 07i Sub- 
 stance and Accident ; or Frinciples of 
 Philosophy, being a Treatise on Substance 
 and Accideiit : " the other — " Clavis Phi- 
 losophica ; being a Metaphysical Essay 
 against the being or possibility of an 
 Eocternal Worlds These were the first 
 sketches of the work which, in a more 
 matured form, he gave to the world in 
 1713, under the title of Clavis Univer- 
 salis, or a New Inquiry after Truth ; — 
 a work which, whatever may be thought 
 of its conclusions, ever must be regarded 
 as a remarkable specimen of metaphy- 
 sical acuteness, and of logical reasoning. 
 A few copies of this very rare Tract are 
 now reprinted for the gratification of the 
 curious in Metaphysical Science. It is 
 favourably, but shortly noticed by Dr 
 Eeid ; and more largely, and with higher 
 commendation, by Mr Dugald Stewart, 
 who does not hesitate to class it with the 
 celebrated treatise of Berkeley on the 
 
 h 
 
XVIII 
 
 same subject. " The Clavis Universalis,'' 
 says he, " when compared with the writ- 
 ings of Berkeley himself, yields to them 
 less in force of argument, than in compo- 
 sition and variety of illustration."^ 
 
 It is somewhat remarkable that Collier 
 should not mention Berkeley's Theory of 
 Vision or \h^ Principles of Human Know^ 
 ledge — the former pubUshed in 1709, and 
 the latter in 1710. That he was not unac- 
 quainted with these works is evident from 
 his letters to Mr Low* in March, 1714, 
 and to Dr Clarke in February, 1715/ 
 But in making this observation, it is 
 fair to state, that his manuscript sketches, 
 above mentioned, make it certain that he 
 had arrived at his conclusions on the sub- 
 ject of the Material World prior to the 
 publications of Berkeley, and consequent- 
 ly without borrowing from them. Collier 
 
 • Disseriaiion on Hie History of Metaphysical Science, p. 168, 
 
 • A grammarian and critic now little known, except as the 
 author of a System of Mnemonics. 
 
 • Appendix, Nos, I., III. 
 
XIX 
 
 announces on his titlepage, in the lan- 
 guage of Malebranche, the principle with 
 which he starts as dm Enquirer after Truth 
 . — Vulgi assensus et approbatio, circa mate- 
 riant difficilem, est certum argumentum 
 falsitatis istius opinionis cui assentitur. 
 His pubhcation, he tells us, was the 
 result of " a ten years' pause and deli- 
 beration ; " and was presented to the 
 public, as he farther observes, with no- 
 thing more to recommend it than " dry 
 reason and metaphysical demonstration." 
 Its merits have long been acknowledged 
 on the Continent, in consequence of the 
 German translation of Professor Eschen- 
 bach, published at Eostock in 1756 ; and 
 although but little known in his own 
 country, it may safely be represented, 
 after the commendations of Keid and 
 Stewart, as well entitling its author to a 
 distinguished place amongst her Meta- 
 physical Philosophers. 
 
O'- 
 
 EI5; ATTON 
 KAI HEPI ATTOT. 
 
;N the 19th day of August, a.d. 
 1682, 1 was born in the Parson-^ 
 age house at Steeple Langford, 
 of pious and honest parents ; my father, 
 Mr Arthur Collier, the third successive 
 Eector of that parish in the same family ; 
 my mother, Mrs Ann Collier, the daugh- 
 ter of Thomas and Joan Currey, Gents, 
 in the county of Somerset. I was born 
 in great weakness, and my mother, with- 
 out providing any other, undertook to 
 nurse me herself, I being the fifth child 
 she had, all at that time alive. On the 
 8th of September following, I was bap- 
 tized in the same parish church, Mr Pen- 
 ruddock of Compton, and Mr William 
 Ellesdon, my grandfather, being my God- 
 
XXIV 
 
 fathers, my Lady Hyde my Godmother ; 
 by whom, after they had performed the 
 usual duties for me, I was again commit- 
 ted to the care of my parents, my mother 
 taking to breed me up herself. I remain- 
 ed in the same house till I was seven years 
 old and a half, at which time I was sent 
 out to board at school with Mr Delacourt 
 of Chitterne. My mother had before 
 taught me to read very well, and a little 
 Latin, but by Mr Delacourt I was farther 
 instructed in it, so far as Ovid De T7ns- 
 tibus. 
 
 Then at the end of two years and a 
 quarter, I was removed to Salisbury School, 
 under the care of Mr E. Hardwick as to 
 my education, and of Mrs G. St Earb as to 
 my board. Then I was entered in the 
 lowest form in Corderius' Colloquies. 
 After I was got one form higher, there 
 were four of the same form removed into 
 that immediately above, and it was a 
 great trouble to me that I was not one of 
 
XXV 
 
 them. In this school I remained, and 
 went through several of the Classic Au- 
 thors ; but when I was at the higher end 
 of the third form, and lately begun to 
 learn Greek, I was, with four more, remo- 
 ved into the second form, being that next 
 above us, which was no small joy to me. 
 There I lived with as much satisfaction 
 and content as any body, sometimes cor- 
 rected for idleness and negligence rather 
 than immorality, till, at the end of six 
 years and a quarter, Mrs St Barb giving 
 down housekeeping, I, with Mr E. S., my 
 kinsman, who (of six or seven were now 
 the only two boarders remaining with our 
 former mistress) were removed to the 
 boarding school near the Close Gate, 
 which was then kept by Mr G. M. Thi- 
 ther we came at St Michael's day, 1697. 
 I passed the winter very pleasantly, till 
 at the Christmas following my father died 
 of a diabetes in the fifty-fifth year of his 
 age. I had just before dreamed I was 
 married, and my kinsman, who lay with 
 
XXVI 
 
 me on that very night before I was sent 
 for home to see mv father before he died, 
 dreamed that I had drunk a large dose of 
 some corrupted blood which had the day 
 before been taken from one of the house ; 
 and indeed so it came to pass, for this 
 matter was the occasion of giving me very 
 deep draughts of sorrow, and the effects 
 of it I shall feel I believe as long as I live. 
 My father being dead (he died on the 
 10th day of December) and buried, I left 
 a very mournful family, and returned to 
 school. The trouble which my mother 
 met with in settling the Parsonage to 
 be secure, occasioned by the Bishop of 
 Sarum's severity in rejecting Mr Hard- 
 wick and Mr Stephens, though both pre- 
 sented lawfully to it by my mother, is such 
 as we shall never forget, and I doubt not 
 the loss of it so great we shall not reco- 
 ver. But at last, about the Whitsuntide 
 following, the Parsonage was settled, with 
 good^security, upon Mr F. Eyre, second 
 son to Judge Samuel Eyre. The Michael- 
 
XXVII 
 
 mas following, I left the school, said my 
 valedictum, and came home, where I staid 
 till the 28th of October, at which time I 
 set forth with my brother for Oxford. He 
 hadbefore been one yearand three months 
 at Pembroke College, but then (being in 
 the country) he was, at the instance of 
 Mr E. Strong and Mr Hardwick, to leave 
 that College, arid both of us to be entered 
 at BalUoll College ; and entered we were 
 on the 22d day of October, 1698, under 
 the tutorage of Mr E. Strong. Here I 
 continued till the Easter following, and 
 then we were both sent for into the coun- 
 try. Accordingly we went. While we 
 were there, I began to learn to play upon 
 the vioUn of Mr Hall of Sarum, till about 
 the middle of June I went again to Ox- 
 ford to leave BaUioU College and go to 
 Wadham College, in order to stand for 
 a Scholarship there. 
 
 1699. Accordingly, I removed from 
 BallioU College in June, and entered at 
 
XXVIII 
 
 Wadham College, where, on the 29th day 
 of that month (being St Peter's day), I 
 stood the election for scholars, more out 
 of form than any hope of succeeding, it 
 being usual in that college for none 
 (hardly) to be chosen the first time of 
 their standing. Here I continued pretty 
 constant at prayers, and the exercises of 
 the College all that winter, and till the 
 next election, which was on the same day 
 twelvemonth. 
 
 1700. At which time I stood again, 
 but there being but one place void for 
 about nine candidates, my endeavour 
 proved without success, and so forthwith 
 I went into the country, where I re- 
 mained till November 5, of the same 
 year. I returned to Oxford, and passed 
 that winter there. 
 
 1701. In the Whitsuntide week I took 
 a jaunt into Buckinghamshire with Mr 
 J. B., a fellow Collegiate. We resided at 
 
XXIX 
 
 Marsh, which was then the Warden of 
 Wadham's Parsonage, and where my 
 companion's father had an estate ; from 
 whence we went about the country to 
 Bicester, &c., and at length returned to 
 Oxford. The election drawing on, I 
 (upon some consideration) resolved not 
 to stand ; and, while I was thus think- 
 ing, I received a little letter from my 
 mother, wherein she gave me orders to 
 the same effect, and, withall, to come 
 into the country as soon as possible. Ac- 
 cordingly, when I had stayed to keep the 
 term, I went down, and then I stayed a 
 whole year, till the act-term following. 
 That winter I idled away for the most 
 part in following my gun ; but towards 
 spring I laid it aside, and began to 
 study, 
 
 1702. Till at the act-term I returned 
 to Oxford and kept the term, but omit- 
 ted to do juraments, then in expectation 
 of returning the March following ; but 
 
XXX 
 
 then going down again into the country, 
 I found it impracticable for me to come 
 up at March, so I set to my study that 
 winter, and, about Christmas, prepared 
 my lectures for my Batch elor's degree. 
 On the 13th January, I returned to Ox- 
 ford, read my lectures, took my Batche- 
 lor's degree, determined publicly, and, 
 having gone through all the orders and 
 expense of it, stayed there till April, 
 and some part in Easter term, 
 
 1703. And went down for good into 
 the country, having no expectation to 
 return to reside in Oxford. From that 
 time I applied myself with industry to 
 my study, aiming still so to read as to 
 fit myself for holy orders, which I then 
 fully intended, by God's assistance, to 
 undertake. That summer we continued 
 in my mother's house, at which time Mr 
 Eyre, having the presentation of Tred- 
 dington in Worcestershire, was obliged 
 to quit Langford, and then the presen- 
 
XXXI 
 
 tation of it was given to Mr E, Hard- 
 wick, which was not granted him by the 
 Bishop before that winter passed ; and, 
 in the spring, Mr Eyre went from the 
 Parsonage- house, whither he removed 
 the 20th of March, 
 
 1704. And being settled there, I con- 
 tinued at my study. On the 11th day 
 of April, about midnight, I was seized 
 violently ill, till, in two or three days, by 
 my mother's care, I pretty well recover- 
 ed (D. G.) ; and also, on the 11th day of 
 November (on the 20th W. S. H. was taken 
 ill, and died 2d of December), having 
 a great cold, with a violent cough, I was 
 taken, immediately after dinner, with 
 coughing, which forced up what I had 
 eat, and the cough continuing, stoped 
 my breath, and had hke to have choaked 
 me ; but, by the providence of God, I 
 escaped (D. G.). That winter passed ; 
 
 1705. And after having made some 
 sermons, preparatory for orders, I went 
 
XXXII 
 
 to Sarum, 30th of May, and applied my- 
 self to the Bishop for ordination, which, 
 after examination, he conferred on me 
 the Sunday following, with three others, 
 and one priest. Being thus admitted 
 Deacon, I preached the next Sunday in 
 the parish church of Langford, and so 
 continued in making sermons and preach- 
 ing, with other studies, till August 5, 
 when I preached for Mr G. P., who had 
 then the curacy of Broad Chalk. He 
 removing from thence, I was appointed 
 by the Bishop to supply that place till 
 
 March, at which time Mr A n, the 
 
 Vicar of it, was to reside on, or resign it. 
 Then I went to board with Mr Shaw of 
 Fivefield while I served the three Chur- 
 ches of Broad Chalk, Bower Chalk, and 
 Alvidiston for the space of seven weeks ; 
 and March then coming on, 1 expected 
 to return home ; but so it pleased God 
 that the people, being content with my 
 ministry, agreed to go to the Bishop and 
 request him that I might be continued 
 among them, which they accordingly did 
 
XXXIII 
 
 (the persons that went were Mr E. 
 Good, Mr Ch. Good, Mr J. Combe for 
 me, and Farmer Penny of Fivefield for 
 Mr Shaw) ; and the Bishop declaring 
 that his only aim was to please the people, 
 granted their request. 
 
 1706. From thenceforth I applied my- 
 self to the discharge of my duty in the 
 Cure of those two parishes. Broad Chalk 
 and Bower Chalk, and having only these 
 two to care for, my business was the 
 easier. I still continued with Mr Shaw, 
 only advancing his pay from twelve to 
 fifteen pounds per annum. There I 
 continued till May, when he and I hap- 
 pening unaccountably to disagree, he 
 gave me warning to leave his house in a 
 week or a month ; and, for some reasons, 
 I thought not fit to go till my year was 
 up, which it was at Michaelmas. 
 
 And then I removed to Mr E. Good's 
 house at Bower Chalk, Mr Shaw having 
 
XXXIV 
 
 made me an offer to stay with him till 
 Ladyday, or to come back to him if 
 things were not agreeable ; but I chose 
 to go thither, and being settled, I passed 
 that winter not uncomfortably, only till 
 March, when Mr G.'s youngest son, R., 
 having been bit once by a mad dog, and 
 after by a mad cat, died about five weeks 
 after he was last bitten, and was buried 
 March 24 ; but there I continued till 
 the end of the month. 
 
 1707. And, on the 1st of April, I re- 
 moved to my own Vic. -house at Broad 
 Chalk, where, taking a man-servant, I 
 began to keep my own house, and live 
 a little more at my liberty. In May fol- 
 lowing, I went with my brother to Mis- 
 terton to see my mother, whither she 
 and four daughters removed from Lang- 
 ford in November before. 
 
 Having returned, I followed the busi- 
 ness of my parish, and had at this time 
 a dispute with Mr E. Good about paying 
 
XXXV 
 
 three rates towards the discharge of his 
 law with Mr . I considering that 
 
 he had done all that an honest man 
 could do in the matter of the law (not of 
 the seizure, though I was not persuaded 
 that the right was on his side), yet chose 
 rather to pay than contend. 
 
 October 17th. I bought a horse of J. 
 S. of Bower, and find it much more con- 
 venient than to hire* 
 
 January 1st. Mr Sympson was married 
 to my sister Mary, at Misterton. She 
 much desired to be married by me ; but 
 Mrs Good's illness, and the badness of 
 the weather, hindered, that I could not 
 go. At this time Mr W. dying, my 
 brother, that same day, wrote to the 
 Bishop in my behalf, to confer the Presen- 
 tation of it upon me ; but, though many 
 sued for it, yet my Lord Bishop thought 
 fit to confer it upon Mr Fox, a man 
 eminent for piety. 
 
Clavis Universalis: 
 
 OR, A 
 
 New Inquiry after Truth, 
 
 BEING A 
 
 DEMONSTRATION 
 
 OF THE 
 
 Non-Existence, 
 
 OR 
 
 3fm{)tiC(tiJilitj'. 
 
 OF AN 
 
 External World. 
 
 By Arth, Collier, Rector oi Lang- 
 ford Magna^ near Sarum. 
 
 Vulgi Affenfus et Approhatio, circa Materiam Diffici- 
 lem, ejl certum Argumentum Faljitatis ijiius Opirdo- 
 nis, cut Affentitur. Mr. Malebr. De Inquir. Verit. 
 Lib. 3. Pag. 194. 
 
 L OND ON: 
 
 Printed for Robert Go/ling, at the Mitre and 
 Crown againft St. Dunjians Church in 
 Fleetjireet, 1713. 
 
THE 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 The Introduction. 
 
 Herein the Quejlion in General 
 is explained and Jlated^ and 
 the Whole Suhjedt divided into Two 
 Particular Heads, Page i 
 
 Part I. 
 
 w 
 
 Chap. T. Wherein the Firjl Quejlion 
 is conjiderd^ viz. Whether the Vijible 
 World is External or not. 1 1 
 
 Se6t. I. That the feeming Externeity of 
 a Vifihle ObjeSl^ is no Argument of 
 its Real Externeity, 14 
 
 Sedt. II. That a Vifihle ObjeB^ as 
 fuch, is not External, 29 
 
 Chap. II. Obje&ions Anfwered, 45 
 
 Part II. 
 
 That there is no External World ^ and 
 that an External World is a Being 
 utterly TmpoJJible, Page 59 
 
 C hap. 
 
The Contents. 
 
 Chap. I. Argument I. ibid. 
 
 Chap. 11. Argument II. 64 
 
 Chap. III. Argument III. 68 
 
 Chap. IV. Argument IV. 74 
 Chap. V. Argument V. »,«««^.^vgg 
 
 Chap. VI. Argument VI. 91 
 
 Chap. VII. Argument VII. 96 
 
 Chap. VIII. Argument VIII. 104 
 
 Chap, IX. Argument IX. 106 
 
 Chap. Obje&ions Anfwered, 112 
 
 The Conclufion of the Whole. 
 
 Of the Vfe and Confequences of the 
 
 foregoing Treatife, 132 
 
 THE 
 
[ I ] 
 
 INTRODUCTION, 
 
 Wherein the Queftion in General is 
 Explained and Stated^ and the 
 whole Subject Divided into Two 
 Particular Heads. 
 
 THO' I am verily perfuaded, that in the 
 whole Courfe of the following Trea- 
 tife, \Jhall or can have no other Adverfary 
 but Prejudice ; yet, having by me no Me- 
 chanical Engine proper to remove it ; nor 
 being able to invent any other Method of 
 attacking it, befides that of fair Reafon and 
 Argument; rather than the World fhould 
 finifh its Courfe without once offering to 
 enquire in what manner it Exifts, (and 
 for One Reafon more, which I need not 
 name, unlefs the End defired were more 
 hopeful) ; I am at laft, after a Ten Years 
 Paufe and Deliberation, content to put my- 
 felf upon the Trial of the Common Reader, 
 without pretending to any better Art of 
 
 B gaining 
 
■ [ 2 ] 
 
 gaining him on my Side, than that of Dry 
 Reafon, and Metaphyfical Demonftration. 
 
 The Quejiion I am concerned about is in 
 general this, whether there be any fuch 
 Thing as An External World. And my 
 Title will fuffice to inform my Reader, that 
 the Negative of this Queftion is the Point 
 I am to demonftrate. 
 
 In order to which, let us Jirjl Explain 
 the Terms, Accordingly, by Worlds I mean 
 whatfoever is ufually underftood by the 
 Terms, Body^ ^Extenjion^ Space ^ Matter^ 
 Quantity J S^c, if there be any other Word 
 in our Englijh Tongue which is Synony- 
 mous with all or any of thefe Terms. And 
 now nothing remains but the Explication 
 of the Word External. 
 
 By this, in General^ I underftand the 
 fame as is ufually underftood by the Words, 
 Ahfolute^ Self-exijlent^ Independent^ &c. 
 and this is what I deny of all Matter^ Body^ 
 Extenjion^ &c. 
 
 If this, you'll fay, be all that I mean by 
 
 the Word External^ I am like to meet with 
 
 no Adverfary at all, for who has ever af- 
 
 firmed^ that Matter is Self-exiftent, Abfolute, 
 
 or Independent ? 
 
 To this I Anfwer, what others hold, or 
 have held in Times paft, I fhall not here 
 inquire. On the contrary, I fhou'd be glad 
 to find by the Event, that all Mankind were 
 
 agreed 
 
[ 3 ] 
 
 agreed ia that which I contend for as the 
 Truth, viz, that Matter is not^ cannot he 
 Independent ^ Ahfolute^ or Self-exijient, In 
 the mean Time, whether they are fo or no, 
 will be tried by this. 
 
 Secondly^ and more particularly^ That by 
 not Independent^ not Ahfoliitely Exijient^ not 
 External^ I mean and contend for nothing 
 lefs, than that all Matter^ Body^ Extenjion^ 
 Sfc, exifts ///, or in Dependance on Mind^ 
 Thought^ or Perception^ and that it is not 
 capable of an Exiftence, which is not thus 
 Dependant. 
 
 This perhaps may awaken another to 
 demand of me, how ? To which I as readily 
 Anfwer, juft how my Reader pleafes, pro- 
 vided it be fomehoiv. As for Injlance^ we 
 ufually fay. An Accident Exifts in, or in 
 Dependance on its proper Subject ; and that 
 its very Eflence, or Reality of its Exiftence, 
 is fo to Exijl, Will this pafs for an Expli- 
 cation of my Aflertion ? If fo, I am content 
 to ftand by it, in this Senfe of the Words. 
 Again^ We ufually fay, (and Fancy too 
 we know what we mean in faying,) that a 
 Body Exifts in, and alfo in Dependance on 
 its proper Place^ fo as to Exift neceffarily in 
 fome Place or other. Will this Defcrip- 
 tion of Dependance pleafe my inquifitive 
 Reader ? If fo, I am content to join Iffue 
 with him, and contend that all Matter Exifts 
 B 2 ///, 
 
[ 4 ] 
 
 in^ or as much Dependantly on^ Mind, 
 Thought, or Perception, to the full, as any 
 Body Exifls in Place. Nay, I hold the 
 Defcription to be fo . Juft and Appofite, as 
 if a Man fhould fay, A Thing is like itfelf: 
 For I fuppofe I need not tell my Reader, 
 that when I affirm that All Matter Exifts in 
 Mind^ after the fame Manner as Body Exifts 
 in Place^ I mean the very fame as if I had 
 faid, that Mind itfelf is the Place of Body^ 
 and fo its Place, as that it is not capable of 
 Exifting in any other Place^ or in Place after 
 any other Manner, Again Lafly^ It is a 
 common Saying, that an Object of Perception 
 Exifts in, or in Dependance on its refpediive 
 Faculty, xAnd of thefe Objects there are 
 many who will reckon with me, Lights 
 Sounds^ Colours^ and even fome material 
 Things^ fuch as Trees ^ Houfes^ Sfc, which 
 are feen, as we fay, in a Looking-Glafs, 
 but which are, or ought to be owned to 
 have no Exiftence but //?, or refpedlively on^ 
 the Minds or Faculties of thofe who per- 
 ceive them. But to pleafe all Parties at 
 once, I affirm that I know of no manner^ in 
 which an Object of Perception exifts /*//, or 
 on its refpedtive Faculty, which I will not 
 admit in this Place, to be a juft Defcription 
 of that Manner of In-exiflence^ after which 
 All Matter that Exifts, is affirmed by me to 
 Exifi in Mind. Neverthelefs, were I to 
 
 fpcak 
 
[ 5 ] 
 
 fpeak my Mind freely, I lliou'd chufe to 
 compare it to the In-exiftence oi fome^ ra- 
 ther than fome other Objedls of Perception, 
 particularly fuch as are Objects of the Senfe 
 of Vifion ; and of thefe, thofe more efpec'i- 
 ally^ which are . allowed by others to Exift 
 wholly in the Mind or Vifive Faculty ; 
 such as Objefbs feen in a Looking-Glafs ^ by 
 Men Dijiemper d^ Light-headed^ Ecjiatic^ 
 &c. where not only Colours^ but intire Bo- 
 dies^ are perceived or feen. For thefe Ca- 
 fes are exadly parallel with that Exi- 
 ftence which I affirm of all Matter, Body, 
 or Extenfion whatfoever. 
 
 Having endeavoured, in as diftind: Terms 
 as I can, to give my Reader Notice of what 
 I mean by the Proportion I have underta- 
 ken the Defence of, it will be requifite in 
 the next Place^ to declare in as plain Terms, 
 what I do not mean by it. 
 
 Accordingly, I declare in the Firji Place, 
 That in affirming that there is no External 
 World, I make no doubt or Queftion of 
 the Exijience of Bodies, or whether the 
 Bodies which are feen Exiji or not. It is 
 with me a firft Principle, that whatfoever is 
 feen^ Is. To Deny or Doubt of this, is 
 errant Scepttcifm^ and at once unqualifies a 
 Man for any Part or Office of a Difputant, 
 or Philofopher ; fo that it will be remem- 
 bred from this Time, that my Enquiry is 
 
 B 3 not 
 
[ 6 ] 
 
 not concerning the Exijtence^ but altogether 
 of the Extra-exijlence of certain Things or 
 Objects ; or, in other Words, what I af- 
 firm and contend for, is not that Bodies do 
 not Exiji^ or that the External World 
 does not Exift, but that such and such Bo- 
 dies, which are fuppofed to Exiji^ do not 
 Exift Externally; or in univerfal Terms, 
 that there is no fuch Thing as an External 
 World. 
 
 Secondly^ I profefs and declare, that not- 
 withftanding this my Aflertion, I am per- 
 fwaded that I fee all Bodies juft as other 
 Folks do ; that is, the vifible World is feen 
 by me, or, which is the fame, feems to me 
 to be as much External or Independent, as 
 to its Exiftence, on my Mind, Self, or 
 Vifive Faculty, as any Vifible Objed: does, 
 or can be pretended to do or be, to any 
 other Perfon. I have neither, as I know 
 of, another Nature, nor another Knack of 
 feeing Obje6ts, different from other Perfons, 
 fuitable to the Hypothefis of their Exiftence 
 which I here contend for. So far from 
 this, that I believe, and am very fure, that 
 xKisfeeming^ or (as I fhall defire Leave to 
 call it) Quaji Externeity of Vifible Objefts, 
 is not only the Effeft of the Will of God, 
 (as it is his Will that Light and Colours 
 fhou'd feem to be without the Soul, that 
 Heat fhou'd feem to be in the Fire^ Pain 
 
 in 
 
[ 7 ] 
 
 in the Hand^ <!^r.) but alfo that it is a na- 
 tural and necefTary Condition of their Vifibi- 
 lity : I wou d fay, that tho' God fhou'd be 
 fuppofed to make a World, or any one Vi- 
 fibleObjed:, which is granted X.o be not Ex- 
 ternal, yet by the Condition of its being 
 feen, it wou'd, and muft be Quafi External 
 to the Perceptive Faculty, as much fo to the 
 full, as is any material Object ufually feen in 
 this Vifible World. 
 
 Moreover, Thirdly^ When I affirm that 
 all Matter Exifts Dependantly on M'tnd^ I am 
 fure my Reader will allow me to fay, I do 
 not mean by this, that Matter or Bodies 
 Exift in Bodies, As for Inftance, when I 
 affirm or fay, that the World, which I fee, 
 Exifts in my Mind, I cannot be fuppofed to 
 mean, that one Body Exifts in another, or 
 that all the Bodies which I fee Exift in that^ 
 which common Ufe has taught me to call 
 my Body, I muft needs defire to have this 
 remembred, becaufe Experience has taught 
 me how apt Perfons are, or will be, to mi- 
 ftake me in this Particular. 
 
 Fourthly^ When I affirm that this or that 
 Vifible Objedl Exifts in, or Dependantly on 
 my Mind^ ox perceptive Faculty, I muft de- 
 fire to be underftood to mean no more than 
 I fay, by the Words Mind and Perceptive 
 Faculty, In like Manner I wou'd be under- 
 ftood, when I affirm in General, that all 
 
 B4 Mat- 
 
[ 8 ] 
 
 Matter or Body Exifts in, or Dependantly 
 on, Mindy I fay this to acquit myfelf from 
 the Imputation of holding, that the Mind 
 caufes its own Ideas, or Objefts of Percep- 
 tion ; or, left any one by a Miftake fhou'd 
 Fancy that I affirm, that Matter depends 
 for its Exiftence on the Will of Man, or any 
 Creature whatfoever. But now, if any fuch 
 Miftake ftiou'd arife in another's Mind, he 
 has wherewith to re6lifie it ; in as much as 
 I aflure him, that by Mind^ I mean that 
 Part or Adl, or Faculty of the Soul, which 
 is diftinguiftied by the Name IntelleBive^ 
 or Perceptive^ as in Exclufion of that other 
 Part, which is diftinguiftied by the Term 
 Will. 
 
 Fifthly^ When I affirm that all Matter 
 Exifts in Mind, or that no Matter is Exter- 
 nal, I do not mean that the World, or any 
 vifible Objecft of it, which I (for Inftance) 
 fee, is Dependant on the Mind of any other 
 Perfon befides myfelf; or that the World, 
 or Matter, which any other Perfon fees, is 
 Dependant on mine, or any other Perfon's 
 Mind, or Faculty of Perception. On the 
 contrary, I contend as well as grants that 
 the World which John fees is External to 
 Peter^ and the World which Peter fees is 
 External to John. That is, I hold the 
 Thing to be the fame in this, as in any 
 other Cafe of Senfation ; for Inftance, that 
 
 of 
 
f ^ 0^ THE ^h\ 
 
 UNIVERSITY n 
 [ 9 ] \iglUFORNiA:, 
 
 of Soufid, Here Two or more Perfons, 
 who are prefent at a Concert of Mufic, may 
 indeed in fome Senfe be faid to hear the 
 fame Notes or Melody ; but yet the Truth 
 is, that the Sound which one hears, is not 
 the very fame with the Sound which another 
 hears, becaufe the Souls or Perfons are fup- 
 pofed to be different ; and therefore, the 
 Sound which Peter hears, is External to, 
 or Independent on the Soul of John^ and 
 that which John hears, is External to the 
 Soul or Perfon of Peter, 
 
 Lafily^ When I affirm that no Matter is 
 altogether External, but neceffarily Exifts in 
 fome Mind or other, exemplified and di- 
 ftinguifhed by the proper Names of John^ 
 Peter^ ^c, I have no Defign to affirm, 
 that every Part or Particle of Matter, which 
 does or can Exift, muft needs Exift in fome 
 Created Mind or other. On the contrary, 
 I believe that infinite Worlds might Exift, 
 tho' not one fmgle Created, (or rather 
 merely Created,) Mind were ever in Being. 
 And as in fadt there are Thoufands and 
 Ten Thoufands, I believe, and even con- 
 tend, that there is an Univerfe, or Mate- 
 rial World in Being, which is, at leaft nu- 
 merically different from every material 
 World perceived by meer Creatures. By 
 this, I mean the great Mundane Idea of 
 Created (or rather Twice Created) Mat- 
 ter, 
 
[ lo ] 
 
 ter, by which all Things are produced ; or 
 rather, (as my prefent Subjefb leads me to 
 fpeak,) by which the Great God gives Sen- 
 fations to all his thinking Creatures, and by 
 which Things that are not, are prefer ved, 
 and order d in the fame Manner as if they 
 were. 
 
 And now I prefume and hope, that my 
 Meaning is fufficiently underftood, when I 
 affirm, that all Matter which Exifts, Exifts 
 in, or Dependantly on. Mind; or, that 
 there is no fuch Thing as an External 
 World. 
 
 Neverthelefs, after all the Simplicity to 
 which this Queftion feems already to be 
 reduced, I find myfelf neceffitated to di- 
 vide it into Two. For, in order to prove 
 that there is no External World, it muft 
 needs be one Article to fhew that the Viftble 
 World is not external, and when this is 
 done, tho' in this all be indeed done, which 
 relates to any Opinion yet maintained by 
 Men, yet fomething ftill is wanting to- 
 wards a full Demonftration of the Point at 
 Large^ and to come up to the Univerfal 
 Terms, in which the Queftion is ex- 
 preffed. 
 
 Accordingly, I fhall proceed in this 
 Order. Firji to fhew, that the Vifible 
 World is not External. Secondly^ to de- 
 monftrate more at large, or fimply, that 
 
 • an 
 
[ II ] 
 
 an External World is a Being utterly im- 
 poflible. Which Two fhall be the Sub- 
 jedls of Two diftindt Parts or Books. 
 
 PART I. 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Wheiein the Firft Qiteflion is con- 
 fidered, viz. Whethei^ the Vifible 
 World is External or not. 
 
 X^IrJi then I affirm that the Vifible 
 -*- World is not External. By the Vi- 
 Jible World, I mean every material Object, 
 which /V, or has heen^ or can he feen. I fay 
 can he feen, (which is the Import of the 
 Word Vifihle^ in order to comprehend 
 whatever Worlds there are, or may be 
 conceived to be, (befides that which we fee 
 who live on this Earth,) whether Plane- 
 tary^ Celejiial^ or Supercelejttal Worlds. 
 Be they what, or how many they will, 
 fuppofmg they are Vifible, that is, actually 
 feen by fome particular Souls or other, 
 they are all underftood and comprehended 
 within the Notion of the Vifible World: 
 For my Subjedl leads me to affirm, that a 
 
 Vifible 
 
• [ 12 ] 
 
 Vijible World, as Vifible^ is not External. 
 Some perhaps will be apt to prevent my 
 Inquiry, by urging that it is not capable of 
 being a Queftion, whether the Vifible 
 World be External or not ; it being felf- 
 evident^ that a Vifible Objedt, as Vifible or 
 Seen, is and muft be External ; that an 
 Obje6t's being feen as External, is a fimple 
 and diredt Proof of its being really External, 
 and confequently that there is no Founda- 
 tion for the Diftin6lion between the Qiiafi 
 and Real Externeity of a Vifible Objed:, 
 which I laid down in my Introduction. 
 
 I Anfwer, Then indeed I am blown up 
 at once, if there be any Truth or Gonfe- 
 quence in this Objedlion. But the beft of 
 it is, that I had never any Defign to Palm 
 this Diftinction upon my Reader gratis^ 
 forefeeing it might ftick with him. Ne- 
 verthelefs, he muft allow me the common 
 Benefit of Words^ whereby to explain my 
 Meaning ; and this was all the Liberty I 
 prefumed upon, in premifing that Diftin- 
 dlion. Whether the Seeming Externeity of 
 a Vifible Object, be indeed an Argument of 
 its Real Externeity, I leave to be proved by 
 all thofe who will affirm it. However, it 
 cannot be denied, but that it is capable of 
 being a Quejlion. For tho' the Truth be 
 againft me, yet Vifible Objects feem to be 
 External; and herein we all agree; fo that 
 
 one 
 
[ '3 ] 
 
 one Member of the Diftindlion is allowed 
 by all to be Good. If fo, what fhou*d hin- 
 der it from being a fair Queftion, whe- 
 ther this Seeming be an Argument of its 
 Real Externeity ? For my own Part, I am 
 far from taking it for granted, that this 
 Diftin<ftion is Good, or built upon real 
 Fa6ls, (tho' every one muft allow the Di- 
 ftinftion to be good in General between 
 Real and Apparent^ for this wou'd be to 
 take a main Part of the lajl Quejlion for 
 granted. But then on the other Hand, it 
 cannot be expefted that I fhou'd admit an 
 Adverfary to take it for granted that this 
 Diftindtion (with regard to Vifible Ob- 
 jedls) is not good ; in other Words, that 
 there is no Difference in the Things between 
 Seeming and Real Externeity^ or between 
 Vifible and External, For this wou'd be to 
 grant away at once the whole Matter I am 
 concerned for. If therefore another wou'd 
 have me grant or allow this, let him fairly 
 fet himfelf to fhew, wherein lyes the Con- 
 nexion between thefe Two different Terms, 
 ox prove what is affirmed in the Objection, 
 namely, that a Vifible Objedl, as Vifible 
 or Seen, is and muft be External. Here 
 the leaft Thing to be expedted is, that he 
 point or fingle out one Vifible Objedl, which 
 is allowed^ or may be plainly proved to be 
 External. In the mean Time, or till some- 
 thing 
 
[ H ] 
 
 thing of this Kind be attempted by another, 
 all muft allow me the Liberty of Doubting^ 
 whether there be any fuch Connexion or 
 not; at leaft bear with me, whilft I am 
 content to prove that there is no fuch Con- 
 nexion. 
 
 Let this then be the Firji Step by which 
 I rife to my laft Conclufion ; namely, to 
 fhew, that the Seeming Externeity of a Vifi- 
 ble Objedl, is no Argument of its Real Ex- 
 terneity. Or, in other Words, that a Vi- 
 fible Object may Exift in, or Dependantly on, 
 the Mind of him that feeth it, notwith- 
 ftanding that it is feen^ and is allowed to 
 feem to be External to, or Independent on 
 it. 
 
 SEC T. I. 
 
 «. 
 
 Ihat the Jeeming Externeity of a 
 Vifible Object^ is no Aigument 
 of its Real Externeity . 
 
 TO fhew this, I think the beft Way 
 will be by Injiances^ or an InduBion 
 of particular Objedts, which, tho' they 
 feem as much to be External, as any Ob- 
 jedls whatfoever ; yet are, or mutt needs be 
 
 granted 
 
[ 15 ] 
 
 granted, to be not External Thefe, to 
 fpeak as orderly as I can, fhall be divided 
 into Two Sorts, PoJJibles and ASiuals, 
 
 By ABuals are meant certain Inftances of 
 Perception, which are Ordinary and Ufual^ 
 or which, at leaft, have been in Fafb. And 
 by PoJJibles are meant certain Inftances of 
 Perception, which have never indeed been 
 Fadl, but which need nothing but an In- 
 creafe of Power ^ to make them fo at any 
 Time. And, 
 
 Firjl^ for the Laji of thefe, vi%, of Pof- 
 ftble Inftances of Perception; where the 
 Objeft perceived is allowed to be not Ex- 
 ternal^ tho' it appears to be as much fo as 
 any Objefts whatfoever. Of this Sort I ftiall 
 mention Two^ and that according to their 
 Degrees of Actuality. And, 
 
 Firjl^ For that which is the leajl ABual 
 of the Two, which fhall be an Inftance of a 
 Man's perceiving a Creature, which has not 
 fo much as in its Kind, Exifted Externally ; 
 (fuppofmg here for the prefent that fome 
 Things have fo Exifted ;) I mean, one of 
 thofe they ufually call Chimceras, Of thefe 
 there are Diftin6lions and Names, of which 
 one is a Centaur, 
 
 A Centaur, is an Ens or Beings partly 
 Horfe, and partly Man : A mere Fiction of 
 Poets or Painters ; that is, a Creature which 
 has never Exifted, or been Seen, any other- 
 wife 
 
[ i6 ] 
 
 wife than in Imagination, But in Imagina- 
 tion it has, or is fuppofed to have been Seen, 
 and as fuch it has Exijied^ and does or may 
 continually Exift. 
 
 Well now, let fome particular Perfon 
 be fuppofed, in whofe Mind or Imaginati- 
 on a Centaur does, this Inftant, Exift, and 
 let his name be called Apelles, Apelles 
 then perceives a Centaur, and that vividly 
 or dijiindlly enough to draw the Picture of 
 it, or defcribe its fhape and proportions 
 with his Pencil. 
 
 Thefe Things fuppofed, I demand how 
 does this Centaur feem to Apelles P Either 
 as within or without him, whilft he fixes 
 the Eye of his Mind upon it, fo as to de- 
 fcribe it ? For an Anfwer to this Queftion, 
 I appeal to every Perfon Living, whether 
 an Objeft of Imagination does not. feem or 
 appear to be as much External to the Mind 
 which fees it, as any Objeft whatfoever ; 
 that is as any of thofe which are called 
 Objedls of Vijion, If fo, I might here ob- 
 ferve, that we have already one Inftance of 
 an Objeft perceived, which, as perceived, 
 is feen as without, yet is indeed not fo, but 
 altogether Exiftent in, or Dependant on, the 
 Mind that perceives it. But I am content 
 to fuppofe that it will be urged to me, that 
 this is not an Inftance to the intended Pur- 
 pofe, which was not concerning Imagination^ 
 
 but 
 
[ '7 ] 
 
 but Se7ife^ and particularly that of Vifion. 
 Well, I fubmit to the Charge of Fadl, left 
 I Ihould feem too rigorous, and fo over- 
 ftrain my Point : But then my Reader will 
 agree with me in the Conclufion I contend 
 for, if from this very Inftance I fhew him a 
 like pojjible Cafe of Vifion^ wherein the Ob- 
 jedt perceived is not ExternaL 
 
 In fpeaking of FoJJibles allowed to be fuch, 
 I have all Power at my Command, or the 
 Liberty of fuppofmg the Power of God him" 
 felf to produce Effects for me. Suppofe 
 then an Almighty Power ready at hand 
 to produce this Imagined Centaur into an 
 Objedt of Vifon ; What is to be done in this 
 Cafe, or to this End? Muft an External 
 Centaur be Created that Apelles may fee it ? 
 Perhaps fo. But is there no eafier oxfhorter 
 Way than this for Apelles to fee a Centaur ? 
 Nay, but he isfuppofed already to fee a Cen- 
 taur, only that we do not ufe to call Vi feeing^ 
 but imaginings becaufe of the Faint and Lan- 
 guid Manner after which he feeth it. But 
 if this be all the Difference between what 
 we ufe to cd\\ feeing and imaginings they may 
 eafily coincide, without any coniiderable 
 Difference in the Objeft perceiv'd, or in 
 any Thing elfe with which we are at prefent 
 concern'd. For what is that which is per- 
 ceiv'd or feen, when an Objedl Vifible is be- 
 fore our Eyes? Why nothing that I can 
 
 C think 
 
[ i8 ] 
 
 think of but Figure and Colour. Well, A- 
 pelles imagines or perceives a Centaur; he 
 perceives then a certain Figure which v^e 
 call a Centaur ; he perceives it indeed in a 
 certain Languid Manner, or notfo vividly as 
 fome ObjecSls are perceived, v^^hich greater 
 Vividnefs we ufe to call Colour^ but ftill he 
 \%fuppofed to perceive a Centaur. If fo, add 
 Colour to this Perception, and the Centaur 
 which was before only imagined^ is now be- 
 come a Seen or Viftble Obje6l, and yet ftill, 
 as being the fame Figure or Extenfion, is as 
 much in his Mind, or as little External^ as 
 it was before. 
 
 Perhaps my Reader will not be content 
 to grant me, that the Difference between 
 Imagination and Vifion is only that of more 
 and lefsy or that an objeft in One is per- 
 ceived with or with fuch a Degree of Co- 
 lour, and in the Other^ either with Figure 
 only, or with a much lefs Degree of Colour, 
 Perhaps fo, but he will doubtlefs grant thisy 
 that whilft Apelles imagines a Centaur, God 
 may fo a6t upon his Mind, as that by De- 
 grees he (hall perceive it more and more di- 
 ftindlly or vividly, till he comes to perceive 
 it to the full as vividly as any Objedl is, or 
 can be perceived or feen. If fo, I leave it 
 with tbem to diflinguifh Imagination from Vi- 
 fion any otherwife than I have done, who 
 allow not my Manner of doing it ; and in 
 
 the 
 
C >9 ] 
 
 the mean Time muft demand of them One 
 Mark or Sign whereby to diftinguifh the 
 Centaur thm vividly perceived^ or fuppofed 
 to be perceived, from an Objedt which they 
 would call Truly Vifible^ or Seen. 
 
 The Other Inftance which I promis'd to 
 give is indeed much like the former, only 
 that the Objedl perceiv'd, (or one like it,) 
 is here fuppos'd to Kxijl among/l the ordinary 
 Obje&s of the Vifihle World; and it is this. 
 
 When a Man with his Eyes Jhut^ or at 
 Noon-day^ has a mind to think on the Moon 
 at Full^ it is certain he may think on it. 
 This Moon, as being Truly perceived^ 
 Truly Exijis : It Exifts alfo in the mind of 
 him that feeth it, and that fo really and 
 entirely, that tho' every External Objedt 
 were fuppos'd to be annihilated, or not One 
 belides myfelf had ever been Created, yet 
 ftill I might fee or imagine a. Moon. 
 
 Well now, fuppofe as before, that whilft 
 I thus imagine a Moon, God fhould so aft 
 upon my Mind by infenfible Degrees, or 
 otherwife, as to make this imagined Moon 
 appear Brighter and Brighter to me, till it 
 comes to be to the full as Vivid as the Moon 
 fuppos'd to be in the Heavens, or as any 
 Moon whatfoever. In this Cafe, I fay, we 
 have an Inflance of a Vifible or Seen Objeft, 
 which, to Appearance^ is as much External 
 as any ObjecSt whatfoever, but is not indeed 
 
 C 2 External; 
 
[ 20 ] 
 
 External : Which therefore is a Demonftra- 
 tion that the Viftble Externeity of an Objeft 
 is no Argument for any Real Externeity of 
 it. 
 
 II. And now from Pojfihle I come to A- 
 6lual CafeSy or Inftances of the fame Thing. 
 And here, 
 
 I. The Firjl fhall be of certain Other 
 Senfations or Modes of Senfible Percep- 
 tion, wherein the Objefts perceiv'd Exift 
 only in the Mind, tho' they feem to Exift 
 Externally to^ or Independent on it ; fuch as 
 Sounds^ Smells^ Tajles^ Heat^ Fain^ Plea- 
 fure^ &c. 
 
 If any one doubts whether thefe Things 
 be within or without the Souls or perceptive 
 Faculties of thofe who fenfe them, they 
 muft excufe me if I am unwilling to digrefs 
 fo far as to undertake the Proof of what I 
 here fuppofe; and that partly on the Ac- 
 count of its Evidence ; but I am content 
 to fay chiejly^ becaufe the Thing has been al- 
 ready done often to my Hands, particularly 
 hy Mr. Des Cartes ^Mr. Malehranche^ and Mr. 
 Norris^ in feveral Parts of their much Cele- 
 brated Writings, whither I chufe to refer my 
 Inquifitive Reader. 
 
 Suppofmg then that thefe Objects of 
 Senfe Exift truly and really in their refpe- 
 6live Faculties, I am fure no one will doubt 
 whether they do not feem to Exift altoge- 
 ther 
 
[ 21 ] 
 
 ther without them. For this I appeal to 
 every one's Experience, and to the Difficulty 
 which fo many find in believing, that they 
 do not indeed Exift vsrithout them. If fo, 
 we have then feveral Injlances together of 
 certain Objects of Senfe^ which notwith- 
 ftanding that they feem as much External 
 as any Objedls whatfoever, yet really and 
 truly are not External. 
 
 "Moreover, there is of this Sort a 
 ' Particular Inftance often mentioned by 
 ' Philofophers, which is very home to this 
 ' Purpofe ; and that is, of a Man's feeling 
 ' Pain in a Member which he has loji, 
 ' This is ufually faid to depend on cer- 
 ' tain Motions made by certain Humours 
 ' or Animal Spirits on the Nerves or Fi- 
 ' bres of the remaining Part ; but of this I 
 ' make no other Ufe or Account at pre- 
 ' fent, than only to collect from hence, 
 ' that the EfFedl would ftill be the fame 
 ' tho' the Abfent Member were as well 
 ' annihilated as loji. If fo, I alk, where is 
 this Member which the Man is fenfible 
 of? Where, I fay, is, or can it be, but 
 in the Mind or Soul of him that feels it ? " 
 2. ThQ next Inftance fhall be of Light and 
 Colours^ which are allowed to be Objedls pro- 
 perly Vijible, Thefe appear or feem as much 
 at a Diftance or External as any Objects what- 
 foever, yet fcarce any Thing is more evi- 
 dent than that they are not fo. In 
 
 C3 
 
[ " ] 
 
 In this I fpeak more particularly to Carte- 
 ftans ; and on this Occafion I defire to afk 
 them, how has it come to pafs, that they^ 
 who all agree that Light and Colours are 
 not External, fhould yet happen to over- 
 look the fame Conclufion, with relation 
 to the Bodies^ SubjcBs^ or Extenjions^ which 
 fuftain thefe Accidents ? For can any 
 Thing be more true or proper than to fay, 
 fuch a body is Luminous^ or, of this or that 
 Colour ? Or more evident than that Light 
 and Colour Exijl in^ or are Accidents of 
 Matter ? And fhall we fay that the Sub- 
 je&s Exift without^ and the Accidents ivithin 
 the Soul ; Even thofe very Accidents whofe 
 totum Effe is Inejfe in their particular or re- 
 fpedlive Subjecfls ? But to return : As for 
 thofe who are not yet content fo much as 
 to grant that Light and Colours Exift in the 
 Soul, I muft refer them, as before^ for their 
 Satisfadlion in this Point. In the mean 
 Time this will doubtiefs be admitted by all 
 Sides or Parties, that if Light and Colours 
 are not External^ I have given them an 
 Inftance of fome Viftble Objedls, which are 
 very apparently, but yet are not really Ex- 
 ternal, which is all the Labour I fhall be at 
 in this Particular. 
 
 3. My next Inftance fhall be of thofe who 
 on fome Occafions fee many Objefts which no 
 other Perfons fee, and are unanimoufly granted 
 
 to 
 
[ 23 ] 
 
 to have no Exiftence, but in the Minds or Fa- 
 culties of thofe who fee them. Such are thofe 
 who fee Men walking the Streets with Halters 
 about their Necks, or with Knives flick- 
 ing in their Bodies. Such are thofe who 
 fee themfelves or others in the Figures of 
 Cocks, Bulls, or Wolves, or with the Equi- 
 page of Sovereign Princes. And fuch^ Laft- 
 ly, are thofe who fee and converfe with 
 feveral Perfons, fee Houfes, Trees, 8fc, 
 which no other Perfon feeth, or perhaps 
 hath ever feen. 
 
 Thefe, you will fay, are Mad or Light- 
 headed, Be it fo, that they are Mad, or 
 Drunk, or whatfoever elfe you will, yet 
 unlefs we will be like them we muft needs 
 grant the Fa6t, v'i%, that they really fee 
 the Things or Objedls they pretend to fee. 
 They fee them alfo as External or without 
 them; and yet we all grant, and even con-, 
 tend, that they are not without them, which 
 is as much as I am here concerned for. 
 
 4. Another Inftance of Vijion^ which in- 
 ferrs the fame Conclufion, is of Perfons 
 whofe Minds or Perceptive Faculties are 
 a6led in an Extraordinary Manner by the 
 Spirit of God : Such was Ezekiel^ fuch was 
 St, John^ the Author, to us, of the Apoca- 
 lypfcy and fuch have been many others : 
 Thefe were neither Mad nor Light-headed^ 
 and yet they tell us of ftrange Things which 
 
 C 4 they ' 
 
[ H ] 
 
 they have feen as Evidently, .and as Exter- 
 nally to Appearance, as any Objects what- 
 foever; hut yet fuch Things as never re- 
 ally Exifted without the Minds, or percep- 
 tive Faculties of thofe who are fuppofed to 
 have feen them. 
 
 5. Another Inftance of Vifion which in- 
 ferrs the fame Conclufion, fhall be one of 
 which every Per/on may have the Expe- 
 rience. Let a Man, whilft he looks upon 
 any Object, as fuppofe the Moon, Prefs or 
 Dijiort one of his Eyes with his Finger; 
 this done, he will perceive or fee Two Moons, 
 at fome Diftance from each other ; one, as it 
 were, proceeding oxjiiding off from the other. 
 
 Now both thefe Moons are equally Ex- 
 ternal, or feen by us as External ; and yet 
 one at leaft of thefe is not External, there 
 being but one Moon fuppofed to be in the 
 Heavens, or without us. Therefore an 
 Objedt is feen by us as External, which is 
 not indeed External, which is again the 
 Thing to be fhewn. 
 
 6. The laft Inftance which I fhall men- 
 tion to this Purpofe, fhall be one likewife of 
 which we have every Day's Experience, but 
 yet is little obferved ; and that is, the ufu- 
 al Aft of feeing Objedls in a Looking-glafs. 
 
 Here I fee Sun, Moon, and Stars, even 
 a whole expanded World, as Diftindtly, as 
 Externally, as any material Objedls are 
 capable of being feen. Now, 
 
[ 25 ] 
 
 Now, the Quejiion (if it can be any 
 Queftion) is, where are thefe Things? 
 Do they Exift within or without my Soul, 
 or perceptive Faculty? If it is faid that 
 they Exift without, I muft ftill alk Where ? 
 Are they numerically the fame with that 
 Sun, 3^c, which I fee without a Glafs, 
 and are here, for a Time, fuppofed to be 
 External ? This cannot be, for feveral Rea- 
 fons: As Jirjiy I fee them both together; 
 that is, I as evi4ently fee Two dijiindl Ob- 
 jedls, (fuppofe Suns,) as ever I faw Two 
 Houfes, Trees, 8^c, that is, I have the 
 fame ftmple Evidence of Senfe for their being 
 Two diftinft Suns, as I have, or can have, 
 that One Obje6t is not Two^ or Two One, or 
 that One is not Ten Thoufand. Secondly^ 
 I can, and have often feen one of thefe Suns, 
 vi%, either of them fuigly, without feeing 
 the other. Again Thirdly y inftead of Two, 
 I have fometimes feen at leaft Twenty or 
 Thirty Suns, all equally feen, equally feen 
 as External. Moreover Fourthly ^ we often 
 fee the Object in the Glafs very different 
 from that which is like it, and goes by the 
 fame Name, without the Glafs. As for In- 
 ftance, one fliall be in Motion^ whilft the 
 other is at Refi ; one fhall be of one Colour ^ 
 nay, alfo. Figure and Magnitude^ and the 
 other fhall be of another ; to which may be 
 added many other particular Differences 
 
 of 
 
[ 26 ] 
 
 of which every one s Experience will prove 
 a fufEcient Teftimony. 
 
 If then an Objedl feen as in a Glafs, be 
 not the fame with any feen without a Glafs ; 
 and if it be ftill affirmed that it Exifts 
 without the Soul which perceives it, I ftill 
 proceed to demand, Where does it Exift ? 
 Shall we fay that it Exifts in the Glafs ? 
 Perhaps fo, but this muft be made at leaft 
 Intelligible, before another can Aflent to 
 it. What, a whole expanded World in a 
 piece of Glafs ? Well, let thofe who think 
 fo enjoy their own Opinion. For my Part, 
 I freely own I am not a Match for fuch 
 Reafoners ; and fo I grant, as to a Superior 
 Genius, whatfoever they ftiall be pleafed to 
 require of me. As likewife to thofe who 
 ihall ferioufly contend, that the Objedls feen 
 as in the Glafs, are not indeed in the Glafs ^ 
 but in the Eye of him that feeth them ; not 
 thinking it poffible to urge any Thing to 
 the contrary, which will be of the leaft 
 Weight or Moment to alter their Opi- 
 nion. 
 
 Neverthelefs, I expe6t to find fome, ei- 
 ther of the learned or unlearned Part of the 
 World, who, upon the firft Suggeftion, 
 will very readily agree with me, that the 
 Objedts feen as in the Glafs, are not exter- 
 nal to the Mind which fees them; and 
 indeed this is to me fo fimply evident, that 
 
 I 
 
[ 27 ] 
 
 I cannot induce my Mind to fet formally 
 about the Proof of it, and do almoft repent 
 me that I have faid fo much already on 
 this Head, or that I did not at once lay it 
 down as a Thing univerfally taken for 
 granted, at leaft which wou'd be granted 
 upon the firft Suggeftion. However, 'till 
 fuch time as I am apprized of an Adverfary, 
 I will now conclude that the Objedls feen as 
 in a Glafs, are not External to the Soul, 
 or Vifive Faculty of him that feeth them ; 
 and confequently, that I have here again 
 given an Inftance of a Vifible Objedt, as 
 much External to Appearance^ as any 
 Objedl whatfoever, but which is not indeed 
 External. 
 
 Now from all and every of thefe Inftan- 
 ces it follows, that the Vifihle or Apparent 
 Externeity of an Objedl, is no Argument 
 of its real Externeity ; and confequently 
 (if it be not the fame Thing again in other 
 Words) that there is a true and real DiiBTe- 
 rence between the Quafi and any R.eal 
 Externeity of an Objedt ; which juftifies 
 the Diftinction laid down in my Intro- 
 dudlion. 
 
 This Conclufion follows, with the fame 
 
 Force or Evidence, from the Fojfible as 
 
 from the ABual Inftances ; and as much 
 
 from One of either Sort, as from Ten Thou- 
 
 fand. For if but One, and that a poffible 
 
 Inftance, 
 
[ 28 ] 
 
 Inftance, be given and allowed of, wherein 
 an Objed: may be feen, with all the v'lfihle 
 Marks of being External, which attend 
 any Vifible or feen Objeft whatfoever, 
 but which yet is not indeed External; this 
 one intirely deftroys all Connexion between 
 Apparent and Real Externeity ; and fo the 
 Confequence will be, that an Objedl's Ap- 
 pearing to be External, is no manner of Ar- 
 gument that it is really fo. 
 
 Yet I have inftanced in many Things, 
 for my Reader s Sake, as well as my oiion. 
 For my own indeed, in the firft Place, in 
 as much as by this Means I have many 
 Strings to my Bow, which muft every one 
 be broken before the Bow itself can be 
 bent the other Way. But yet not forget- 
 ting my Reader s Benefit, (if he will allow 
 it to be any,) inafmuch as, amongft fo many 
 Inftances, he may meet with one at leaft 
 which will hit in with his Way of Reafon- 
 ing, and fo difpofe him to read what fol- 
 lows with the more Pleafure. 
 
 SECT. 
 
[ ^9 ] 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 That a Vifible Object^ as such^ is 
 Not External. 
 
 TJTAving ftiewn that there is no Confe- 
 •^^ quence from the Viftble or Quoji Ex- 
 terneity of an Objedl to any Real Externeity 
 of it, I come in the next Place to fhew, 
 that a Vifible World is not, cannot be 
 ExternaL 
 
 But before I enter upon this Tafk, what 
 Ihou'd hinder me from aiferting my Privi- 
 lege of {landing ftill in this Place, and 
 demanding to have fome other Argument 
 produced for the Externeity of the Vifible 
 World, bejides that of its feeming Externei- 
 ty ? This is that which convinces People of 
 every Age, and Sex, and Degree, that the 
 Objedls they behold are really External ; 
 and this I am fure, with far the greater 
 Part, is the only Reafon which induces this 
 Perfuafion. With fuch, and even with All, 
 'till fome other Argument be produced, I 
 may be allowed to argue, as if this were 
 the only Argument; That is, to conclude 
 outright, that no Vifible Objedt is indeed 
 External. For to remove all the Pillars 
 on which a Building Hands, is ufually 
 
 thought 
 
[ 30 ] 
 
 thought to be as efFeilual a Way to demo- 
 lifh it, as any diredl Force or Violence. 
 
 But not to infift on every Point of Pro- 
 perty, when fo large a Field is before me, 
 I will here immediately enter upon the 
 Work of proving it to my Reader, according 
 to my Promife. And here, 
 
 I. Firji of all. Let him try once more 
 the Experiment already mentioned, of 
 prefling or diftorting his Eye with his Fin- 
 ger. In this Cafe I obferved before, (with 
 an Appeal for the Truth of it, to common 
 Experience,) that Two like Objects appear^ 
 or are feen. Hence I concluded, that only 
 one of thefe can be External; that is, that 
 one of them is not fo. But here I argue 
 from the fame Faft, that neither of them is 
 External. 
 
 Let an Inftance be put, as fuppofe the 
 Object which we call the Moon^ by pref- 
 fing my Eye I fee Tnsoo Moons, equally 
 Vivid, equally External; if fo, they are 
 both External, or neither. But we are 
 agreed already that they are not both fo^ 
 therefore neither of them is External. 
 
 If any one will affirm, that only one of 
 thefe Moons is External, I mull defire 
 him to give me one Mark or Sign of the 
 Externeity of one, which is not in the other. 
 In the mean Time let him try this Expe- 
 riment with himfelf. 
 
 In 
 
[ 31] 
 
 In the A6t of feeing Two Moons, let 
 him call one of them the true External 
 Moon, and the other only an appearing or 
 falfe, or by any other Name which he fhall 
 pleaie to give it : This done, let him (with 
 his Eyes or Mind Hill intent upon thefe 
 Objects) remove his Finger, and prefs the 
 other Eye in like Manner ; or Jhut either 
 one of his Eyes, ftill keeping the other 
 intent on the fame Objed:, and he will 
 fin4 by manifeft Experience, that the Moon, 
 which he calls the true will prove to be the 
 falfe, and that which he calls the falfe, will 
 prove to be the true. This, I think, is plain 
 and pal{)able Demonftration, that they are 
 both Equally true^ or (as we here underftand 
 the Word) both equally External, Since 
 therefore no more than one can be pretended 
 to be External, to fay that they are both 
 equally fo^ is the fame as to fay that they 
 are neither of them fo. 
 
 Note I. That the fame Argument here 
 proceeding on the Inftance of the Moon, 
 is the very fame with relation to any other 
 Vifible Objedl. So that the Conclufion 
 comprehends the whole Vifible World at 
 once ; or, in other Words, every Vifble 
 ObjeB^ confidered as Vifible or Seen. 
 
 Note 2. The fame Conclufion likewife 
 follows from every one of the Inftances 
 mentioned in the former Section. Since, 
 as on one Hand it appears that there is no 
 
 Confe- 
 
[ 32 ] 
 
 Confequence from the Apparent to any Re- 
 al Externeity of an Obje6l ; fo in the very 
 A61 of fuppofing certain Objedls, which are- 
 as much apparently External as any Objects 
 whatfoever, but which indeed are not Ex- 
 ternal, we muft of Courfe fuppofe them to 
 be as much indeed External as any Obje6ls 
 whatfoever. Since therefore yo;;^^ are not Ex- 
 ternal, we muft conclude that none are fo. 
 And this Conclufion will and muft hold 
 good till fome Mark or Sign be given of 
 the Externeity of One Objeft which is not 
 alfo in the other ; the very Attempt of 
 which is contrary to the Suppofition. But 
 to proceed. 
 
 II. 'Tis a Maxim in Philofophy that 
 Like is not the fame^ and therefore much 
 more one would think ftiould it be allow'd 
 that Things vajily different are not the fame » 
 As for Inftance, that Light is not Darknefs^ 
 nor Darknefs Light ; that Greater is not 
 Lefs^ nor Lefs Greater^ &c. And yet on 
 fuch plain and fimple Principles as thefe it 
 follows that the Viftble World is not Ex- 
 ternal. 
 
 Here then let us again fmgle out an Ob- 
 je6l which will anfwer for the whole Vifi- 
 ble World, and let it be the fame as before, 
 vi^, the Moon. The Queflion is. Whether 
 the Moon ivhich I fee is External or not f 
 In this Queftion there is not a Word but 
 
 what 
 
[ 33 ] 
 
 what is plain and fimple, or which has 
 been explained already : Let us then proceed 
 to the Trial of it by the plain Rule before- 
 mentioned, viz. That Things different are 
 not the fame^ which indeed is the fame 
 Thing in other Words with the Firft Prin- 
 ciple of Science, vi%, Impojfibile eji idem ejje 
 et non eJJe, 
 
 I. Firft then I am content for a while to 
 grant that there is an External World, and 
 in this World an External Moon in a Place 
 far diftant from us, which we call the 
 Heavens. Still the Queftion returns, whe- 
 ther the Moon which I fee be that External 
 Moon here fuppos'd to be in the Heavens. 
 Well now, the Moon which I fee is a Lu- 
 minous or Bright Objedl. But is the Moon 
 fuppofed to be in the Heavens a. Luminous 
 Thing or Body ? No ; but a Dark or Opa- 
 cous Body, if there is any Truth in the 
 unanimous AfTent of all Philofophers. A- 
 gain^ the Moon which I fee is a plain Sur- 
 face ; but is the Moon in the Heavens a 
 plain Surface ? No ; all the World agree 
 that the Moon in the Heavens is Rotund 
 or Spherical, Again ^ the JMoon which I 
 fee is Semicircular or Cornuted ; but is this 
 the Figure of the Moon fuppofed to be in 
 the Heavens ? No ; we all affirm that the 
 Moon in the Heavens is Round or Circular. 
 Again Laflly, The Moon which I fee is a 
 
 D little 
 
[ 34 ] 
 
 little Figure of Light, no bigger than a 
 Trencher, nay Jo little^ as to be intirely 
 coverable by a Shilling. But is this a juft 
 Defcription of the ]\Joon fuppofed to be in 
 the Heavens? No; the Moon in the Hea- 
 vens is by all allowed to be a Body of a 
 prodigious Size^ of fome Thoufands of Miles 
 in its Diameter. Well then, v^hat follows 
 from all this, but that the Moon in the 
 Heavens is not the Moon which I fee ; or, 
 that the Moon which I fee is not in the 
 Heavens, or External to my Perceptive or 
 Vifive Faculty ? 
 
 2. Secondly^ As we have seen that the 
 Moon which I fee, is not the fame with any 
 Moon fuppofed to be in the Heavens, and 
 confequently, that the Moon which I fee 
 is not External, by a Comparifon of the 
 Vifible or Seen Moon, with that which is 
 fuppofed to he External; fo, the fame 
 Thing will appear by a Comparifon of Vi- 
 fible Things with Vifible^ or, of the fame 
 Thing, (as I mull here fpeak, for want of 
 more proper Words,) with itfelf. But to 
 explain. 
 
 At this Injiant I fee a Little Strip of Light, 
 which common Ufe has taught me to call 
 the Moon, Now again I fee a Larger^ 
 which is ftill called by the fame Name. At 
 this InJlant I fee a Semicircle ; a while after 
 I fee a Circle of Light, and both thefe are 
 called the Moon. Again, now I fee a Circle of 
 
 Light 
 
[ 3S ] 
 
 Light difuch ov fuck a Magnitude; a while 
 after I fee a Circle of Light of a much Greater 
 Alagnitude ; and both thefe, as before, I am 
 taught to call the Moon. But really and truly, 
 inftead of one^ I fee many Moons, unlefs 
 Things different are the fame. How then 
 can I believe that the Moons which I fee 
 are either one or all of them External? 
 That they are All fo cannot be pretended, 
 for no one ever dreamt of more than one 
 External Moon ; and I am as confident on 
 the other Hand, that no one will pretend 
 that either One of them is External, as in 
 Exclufion of the reft. I conclude then that 
 they are all alike External, that is, that 
 neither of them is fo ; and confequently, 
 (there being nothing in this but what is 
 equally true of every other Objecft of the 
 Vifible World,) that no Vifible Object is, 
 or can be. External. 
 
 III. But why fuch long Fetches to prove 
 a simple Truth ? 'Tis no Wonder that my 
 Reader (who perhaps has never thought of 
 this fubjecSt before) fhould overlook the ex- 
 a(5t Point of the Queftion, when I myfelf 
 can fcarce keep it in View. I wou'd beg 
 Leave therefore to remind myfelf and him, 
 that the Queftion in Hand does not any 
 way proceed, or fo much as need the Men- 
 tion of any bodies fuppofed to be External, 
 and unknown to us; but the Queftion is, 
 
 D 2 whe- 
 
[ 36 ] 
 
 whether the Extenjions^ Figures^ Bodies^ 
 (or whatever elfe you'll call them,) which 
 I fee quafi without me, be indeed without 
 me or not. 
 
 But can the Refolution of any Cafe be 
 more Plain and Simple than of this ? For 
 is there any other poffible Way oi feeing a 
 Thing than by having fuch or fuch a Thing 
 prefent to our Minds ? And can an Obje6t 
 be prefent to the Mind, or Vifive Faculty, 
 which is affirmed to be External to it ? 
 Then may we think, without thinking on 
 any Thing ; or perceive, without having 
 any Thing in our Mind. If then the Pre- 
 fentialnefs of the Obje(?t be neceffary to the 
 A6t of Vifion, the Objedl perceived cannot 
 poffibly be External to, at a Dijiance from, 
 or Independeftt on, us : And confequently, 
 the only Senfe in which an Object can be 
 faid to Exift without us, is its being not Seen 
 or perceived. But the Objefts we fpeak of 
 are fuppofed to be Seen, and therefore are 
 not External to us, which is the Point to 
 be demonftrated. 
 
 [To this I might add another, which (if 
 poflible) is a yet more fimple Manner of 
 proceeding to the fame Conclufion. And it 
 is this. The objedts we fpeak about are 
 fuppofed to be Vifible ; and that they are 
 Vifible or Seen, is fuppofed to be yill that 
 we know of them, or their Exiftence. If 
 
 fo, 
 
[ 37 ] - 
 
 fo, they Exift as Vilible, or in other 
 Words, their Vifibility is their Exiftence. 
 This therefore deftroys all, or any Diftin- 
 dlion between their Beings and their being 
 Seen^ by making them both the fame Thing ; 
 and this evidently at the fame Time de- 
 ftroys the Externeity of them. But this 
 Argument has the Misfortune of being too 
 fimple and evident, for the Generality of 
 Readers, who are apt to fancy that Light 
 itfelf is not feen, but by the help of Dark- 
 nefs ; and fo, without infifting any farther 
 on this Head, I proceed to fome other 
 Points which may feem to be more Intelli- 
 gible.] 
 
 IV. Surely, cou'd the moft extravagant 
 Imagination of Man have conceived a Way, 
 how an Object fuppofed to be External^ 
 cou'd ever pofTibly become Vifible^ Philo- 
 fophers wou'd never have been at fo great 
 an Expence of Fruitlefs Meditation, as to 
 forge the ftrange Do6trine of the A5live and 
 Paffive Intelle6t, hnprejfed and Exprejfed 
 Species, '^c, whereby to account for our 
 Manner of feeing Objedls. This Dodlrine, 
 as I remember, is as followeth. 
 
 It is fuppofed, that when a Man ftands 
 oppofite to an Objeft, there are certain 
 Scales or Images^ (which proceed from this 
 Obje6l reprefenting it,) which fly in at the 
 Eye, where they meet with a certain Be- 
 
 D 3 ing, 
 
[ 38 ] 
 
 ing^ Faculty^ or Power^ called the Adlive 
 IntelleB^ which, in an Inftant, Spirituali- 
 zes them into Ideas^ and thence delivers 
 them to the inmojl Recefs of the Soul, called 
 the PaJJive Intelledl^ which perceives or fees 
 them. 
 
 Now far be it from me to move the leaft 
 Objection againft this Account of Vifion. 
 They are doubtlefs all plain and fimple Ideas, 
 or elfe Arijlotle had not chofen, neither had 
 the Tribe of Philosophers fmce patronized, 
 them. 
 
 I only obferve Firjl^ that this Antient, 
 and almoft Univerfal, Account of Vifion, 
 fuppofes that the ObjeSi feen is this fuppofed 
 Scale or Effluvium, And confequently, Se- 
 condli^^ that in order to the A51 of Vifion, 
 there is, and muft be, an Intimate Union 
 between Faculti/ and Objedt. 
 
 For if the Soul can fee an Objed: which 
 is not prefent with it, there had been no 
 need of Images of the Object to become 
 prefent to the Soul, by pafling thro' the 
 Eye, Esff. However, they need not be 
 Images^ but any other Fajhioned Particles 
 would have done as well, if the Objedts feen 
 were not thofe very Images thus Spirituali- 
 zed in the Adtive, and thence pafTing on to 
 the Paflive, Intellecft. 
 
 Why then fhou'd not I conclude, even 
 with Univerfal Confent, that the Objects 
 
 feen 
 
[ 39 ] 
 
 feen are not External, but intimately Prefent 
 with, or Exiftent in, the Soul ? 
 
 Thofe who Patronize this Hypothefis of 
 Vifion, will, doubtlefs, tell me, that it is 
 the leaft of their Thoughts thereby to af- 
 firm and conclude, that the Vifible World 
 is not External. On the contrary, that 
 the Hypothefis itfelf fuppofes an External 
 World, or Outward Obiecfts, from whence 
 thefe Images or Effluviums proceed. 
 
 I Anfwer, it does fo ; but it does not fay 
 or fuppofe, that thefe External Objects are 
 Vifible or Seen.^ but only that they Are or 
 Exiji Externally. On the contrary, the 
 Obje6ls feen are fuppofed to be thefe Ima~ 
 gesy which, in order to be feen, muft firft 
 £eafe to be External ; that is, muft pafs into 
 the Soul, and become Ideally prefent with 
 it. So that this Account of Vifion suppo- 
 fes the Vifible World, as fuch, to be not 
 External. 
 
 If, together with this. Men will yet 
 hold or affirm that the Vifible World is Ex- 
 ternal, I can only fhew them that their own 
 Account fuppofes the diredl contrary. But 
 it is neither in mine, nor any other Per- 
 fon's Power to hinder another from holding 
 Contradiftions. 
 
 V. From the Old^ I proceed to the Hypo- 
 thefis of Vifion which is a Part of the New 
 Philofophy. Every one, I fuppofe, has 
 
 D 4 heard 
 
[ 4° ] 
 
 heard of the Dodtrine oi feeing the Divine 
 Ideas^ or (as Mr. Malehranche exprefles it) 
 feeing all Things in God, By this every mode 
 of Pure or Intellective Perception is account- 
 ed for ; but 1 am here concerned only with 
 that which is dillinguifhed by the Name of 
 Vifion, With Regard to this the Hi/pothe- 
 fis is as followeth. 
 
 In every Aft of Vifion they diftinguilh 
 Two Things, vi'z, Senfation and Idea^ in 
 other Words Colour and Figure, Colour^ 
 they fay, is nothing different from the Soul 
 which feeth it, it being only a Modification 
 of Thought or Mind. And as for Figure^ 
 viz. this or that particular Figure which is 
 feen, they call it part of that Intelligible 
 Extenfion which God includes, or contem- 
 plates, thus and thus exhibited to our 
 Minds. 
 
 Now I fay, nothing is more evident than 
 that this Account of Vifion fuppofes Exter- 
 nal Matter is not Vifible^ and confequently, 
 that Vifible Matter is not External; So 
 evident, that I depend even on my Arifio- 
 telian Reader, (who neither approves, nor 
 fo much as underftands, what thefe new 
 Philofophers mean,) that he will perceive 
 at firft Sight that this muft needs be meant 
 by it. 
 
 However, when I am apprized of any 
 one who doubts of it, I fhall not only be 
 
 ready 
 
[ 41 ] 
 
 ready to argue this Matter fairly with him, 
 but will alfo undertake to produce feveral 
 exprefs Paflages from the Writers of this 
 Sort, which directly affirm and contend, 
 that External Matter is not, cannot become 
 Vifible. 
 
 Neverthelefs, I am fenfible of the Oppo- 
 fition which may be made to this AfTertion, 
 from feveral other PafTages taken from the 
 fame Writers. But I cannot help it if 
 Men will fpeak inconlistently with them- 
 felves; or explain their Meaning fo by 
 Halves, as that the fame Thing fhall appear 
 to be both affirmed and denied by them. 
 
 But the Truth is, I fear but little Oppo- 
 fition as to this Point ; Since no one will 
 have Zeal enough to undertake it, but 
 thofe who profefledly Patronize this new 
 Philofophy : And I have fo good an Opini- 
 on of thefe, as to believe that they will 
 rather take the Hint, and agree with me, 
 upon due refleftion, than fet themfelves to 
 oppofe, from any partial Regard to their 
 own preconceived Opinions. 
 
 VI. I fhall therefore ofice more indeavour 
 to perfuade my Arijlotelian Reader, that it 
 is according to the Principles of his oison 
 Philofophy to AfTert, that Vifible Matter 
 is not External. 
 
 For this I wou'd refer him to what he 
 v\dll find in the firft Book of Philofophy he 
 
 fhall 
 
[ 42 ] 
 
 fhall happen to Light on which has any 
 Thing on the General Subjeft of Mat- 
 ter. For Inftance, let him confult Suare%^ 
 Schelhler^ or Baronius^ on this fubjeft, 
 which will be found in their Books of Me- 
 taphyficks ; which Authors I mention more 
 particularly, becaufe with thefe I myfelf 
 have been moil acquainted ; not but that I 
 dare appeal to the firft Philofopher on this 
 Subjedl which my Reader fhall happen to 
 lay his Hands on : But to the Point. 
 
 I do not here affirm, that any one Philo- 
 fopher of this Sort has ever once aiTerted, 
 that Vifible Matter is not External, or fo 
 much as ever moved the Queftion, whether 
 it be fo or not : On the contrary, I verily 
 believe, that if the Queftion had been put 
 to every Individual of them, they wou'd 
 unanimoufly have affirmed that it is cer- 
 tainly External. Neverthelefs I ftill ap- 
 peal to my Impartial Reader, whether the 
 Quejiions which they move, and the Refo- 
 lutions which they agree in, concerning the 
 Thing which they call Matter^ do not 
 plainly fuppofe that they are fpeaking of an 
 Objedl which they do not See^ and which is 
 utterly Invifible ? 
 
 As for Injlance^ 'Tis ufual for them to 
 enquire whether Matter Exijls or not; 
 Whether it has an A6lus Etttitativus ; or 
 
 whc' 
 
[ 43 ] 
 
 whether it be only Piira Potentia ; How it 
 is capable of being Knoiion^ l^c. 
 
 As to the Firji of thefe Queftions they 
 ufe to refolve it thus : That M atter muft 
 needs Exift, becaufe it is fuppofed to be 
 Created, and alfo becaufe it is fuppofed to 
 be Part of a Compqfitum, And here again 
 they will tell you, that if it were altoge- 
 ther nothing, it coud do nothing in Na- 
 ture ; it cou'd not be the Subje6l of Gene- 
 ration and Corruption ; it cou'd not be true, 
 that all Things in their Corruption are re- 
 duced to Matter; and befides, if Matter 
 was nothing, there wou'd be a continual 
 Creation and Annihilation, which is ab- 
 furd, ^r. 
 
 As to the Second Queftion, vt%, whether 
 it be Pura Potentia^ or not, they diftinguifh 
 of a Twofold ABus ; Adtus Phi^ficus^ and 
 A6lus NLetaphyficus* Secundum a£ium Phy- 
 
 ficum^ they fay. Matter is allowed to be Pura 
 Potentia^ but notfecundum A&um Metaphi/^ 
 
 Jicum^ ^c. 
 
 And then Lajlly^ as to the other Que- 
 
 Jiion^ viz. quomodo Materia pojfit Cognofci^ 
 they refolve it thus : That God and Angels 
 are fuppofed to know it per propriam Spe- 
 ciem ; but we are fuppofed to know it only 
 by Confequence^ or, as they fay, per pro- 
 portionem feu Analogtam ad mater'iam rerum 
 Artificialium^ '^c. whence Plato is quoted 
 
 • . by 
 
[ 44 ] 
 
 by them, as faying, that Matter is knovv- 
 able only AdulterinaCognltione, -^ 
 
 Now I idcj^for what are all thefe, and 
 feveral other fuch like Fetches which I 
 cou'd name, if the Matter they inquire 
 about be that which is Vifihle or Seen f Can 
 it be doubted whether that Exifts or not 
 which is fuppofed to be Seen f Whether 
 fuch an Objefl: as this be ABus Entttativusy 
 or Pura Potentia ? And whether we know 
 any Thing of the Exijience of an Objedl 
 w^hich we 2lXq fuppofed to fee f 
 
 If Vifihle Matter were the Matter they 
 are debating about, can it poffibly be ac- 
 counted for, that not the leaft Mention is 
 ever made of our feeing it ? Or, that for its 
 Extfience, ^c, they fhou'd never think of 
 referring us to our Senfes ? And yet I de- 
 fire another to fhew me but one Word of 
 this Sort in any Philofophic Difputation 
 on this Subjedl. 
 
 Nay, they plainly tell us, that the Mat- 
 ter they speak about is not by us feen, but 
 is diredtly knowable only by God and An- 
 gels, 
 
 If then the Inquiry they make about Mat- 
 ter be not about any Matter fuppofed to 
 he feen by us, yet nothing is more evident, 
 than that the Matter they speak about is 
 fuppofed to be External, So that what 
 fhou'd hinder us from concluding, that it is 
 
 the 
 
[ 45 ] 
 
 the unanimous Opinion of thefe Philofo- 
 phers, (tho' indeed they have never in ex- 
 prefs Words affirmed it,) that External 
 Matter is, at leaft to us^ Invijible ; and 
 confequently, that Vifible or Seen Matter is 
 not. External? which is all that I am here 
 concerned for, leaving others to explain for 
 them what they mean when they affirm, 
 that External Matter is Vifible to God and 
 Angels, 
 
 CHAR 11. 
 
 Objections Answer d. 
 
 TIAving prov'd my Point after my own 
 ■^^ Manner, it may be expedled that I 
 now attend to what another may offer on 
 the contrary Part. This, I confefs, is a 
 piece of Juftice which I owe a fair Adver- 
 fary, and accordingly I here profefs I will 
 be ready at any Time, either to anfwer his 
 Objedlions, or fubmit to the Force of them. 
 But how can it be expected that I myfelf 
 fhould oppofe any Thing to the Point I 
 have been contending for ? For my Reader 
 may remember, that I have already declar'd, 
 that I know of no one Reafon or Argument, 
 
 either 
 
[ 46 ] 
 
 either in myfelf formerly, or from others, 
 for the Externeity of the Vifible World, be- 
 fides its feeming Externeity. But if I have 
 not already fhewn the Inconfequence of this 
 Argument, I confefs I have been very idly 
 employ'd ; and if I have, I have at once an- 
 fwer'd every Objection that can reafonably 
 be expe(5led from me, to be urg'd againft 
 the Point I am concern'd for. 
 
 There may be Cavils indeed enough, and 
 of thefe I expedl my Share from a certain 
 Quarter, for having endeavour'd, with a 
 ferious Air, to demonftrate a Propofition 
 which is so contrary to common Prejudice, 
 and which fome perhaps will be refolv'd not 
 to admit ; nay, I myfelf am not fo ab- 
 ftradled from my former felf, as not to be 
 able very eafily to invent a Set of Argu- 
 ments of this Sort. But what can in Rea- 
 fon be expedled that I fliould do with an 
 Adverfary of this Sort? Shall I ftudy a 
 Means to convert thofe whom confefTedly 
 it is not in my Power to convince ? But I 
 have faid already that I know of no Mecha- 
 nical Engine proper to remove Prejudices; 
 and I muft ftill profefs the fame, till this 
 awaken'd Age fhall blefs the World with the 
 Difcovery. Shall I then altogether preter- 
 mit the Mention of fuch Objections, af- 
 fedling to defpise them, as not worth the 
 Labour of anfwering them ? This indeed I 
 
 would 
 
[ 47 ] 
 
 would do if I wrote on the Tide of a pre- 
 vailing Party; but a whole World againft 
 one is too confiderable an Adverfary to be 
 defpis'd, tho' they were not only in the 
 Wrong, but were little better than Idiots. 
 But I have Reafon to expedt, that not only 
 fuch, but even the Wife and learned, at 
 leaft by far the greater part, will be my 
 Adverfaries in this Point, after all the En- 
 deavour which I have us'd to juftifie it ; and 
 therefore, till I am appirz'd of fome other, 
 I muft fuppofe them to be fo, in Virtue of 
 fuch Objedlions as I can think of at prefent, 
 or have by Accident heard from others in 
 Converfation, which are thefe that fol- 
 low. 
 
 • ObjeBion I. 
 
 Firft, I expedl to be told, that in argu- 
 ing againft the Extra-exiftence of the Vifi- 
 ble World, I oppofe a known Evidence of 
 Truth, viz, the univerfal Confent of Man- 
 kind, that it is External. 
 
 Anfwer, 
 
 This now is one of the Things which I 
 juft now call'd Cavils, which I think is the 
 beft Name that an Argument deferves, 
 which is nothing at all to the Purpofe in 
 that wherein it is true ; at leaft fuch a one 
 as is falfe, both in Principle and Confe- 
 
 r quence. 
 
[ 48 ] 
 
 quence, which will, I fuppofe, appear to be 
 the Cafe of the prefent Objeftion. For, 
 
 Firft, as to the Fa6t or Minor Part of the 
 Argument, what fhould hinder me from 
 denying it ? For, Firjl^ who can aflure me 
 that fmce the World began, not One or Two, 
 or Two Hundred Perfons, have not been of 
 that Opinion which I am here concern'd 
 for ? How many may have written on this 
 Subjeft in former times, and we not hear 
 of it in the Prefent ? And how many more 
 may have liv'd and died of this Opinion, 
 and yet have never written on it ? But, Se- 
 condli/^ what if we allow that not one has 
 ever written on this fubjeft before ? This 
 will but turn to the disadvantage of the 
 Objedlion. For where then is the univer- 
 fal Confent before fpoken of? Do we mean 
 the fame by it as univerfal Silence f Si- 
 lence in this Cafe will amount to but a 
 very flender Argument of Confent ; and in- 
 deed fo flender, that the bare Opinio?i or 
 Affirmation of any one Perfon to the contra- 
 ry, who has profefl^edly coniider d and in- 
 quired about the Matter, will outweigh a 
 Silence ever fo univerfal, and may even 
 juftly challenge the Evidence of Confent, 
 be it more or lefs, on his fide of the Que- 
 flion. 
 
 If therefore the Quefl:ion about the Ex- 
 tern eity of the Vifible World, has never, be- 
 fore 
 
[ 49 ] 
 
 fore this Time, been profefledly ccnlider'd, 
 I may fairly plead univerfal Confent for that 
 Part which I defend ; fmce the Confent of 
 all that have ever confider'd it, mull needs 
 be all that is meant by Univerfal Gonfept. 
 If therefore there be found on the contrary 
 Part, any Thing in Mankind which is like 
 Confent, it muft lofe its Name, and be 
 called Prejudice or Inclination ; which is an 
 Adverfary (as I have obferved before) I 
 have no Arms to contend with. But Lajl- 
 tt/, methinks it fhou'd weigh fomething to- 
 wards Confent on my Side, that I have 
 fhewn already that it is confident with, 
 and even neceffary to the Principles of Phi- 
 lofophers of all Sides, to hold that which I 
 contend for. And if this be true, the ut- 
 moft that can be faid in anfwer to it will 
 be this only, that they have contradidled 
 them/elves^ which I am as ready to admit 
 of, as any one can be to urge, fmce this will 
 make the Authority/ of Ten Thoufand of no 
 Value againft the Point / am concerned for. 
 But, 
 
 Secondly^ What if it were true, or ad- 
 mitted, that Univerfal Confent lay oppofite 
 to my Conclufion ? Muft it therefore be 
 condemned without Trial, or hearing o\ 
 any Thing in its Defence \ If not, then it 
 is allowed to be poflible, that a Propofitioiv* 
 may be true, tho' it happen to crofs the 
 
 E Confent 
 
 \ 
 
[ so ] 
 
 Confent of all Mankind. And if fo, how 
 can the contrary be true too, namely, that 
 a Propofition is therefore falfe, becaufe con- 
 trary to Confent? But now, if a Propofi- 
 tion may be true, which is againft Univer- 
 fai Confent, I immediately affirm that this 
 is- the Cafe of the Propofition I am contend- 
 ing for. Well, and how fhall this be 
 tried ? How, I fay, but by Reafoti and Dif- 
 putation f So that unlefs Univerfal Confent 
 be held to be an Argument Ufiiverfallj/ con- 
 clufive, it concludes nothing at all, (there 
 being a contradi&ori/ Dijiance between thefe 
 Two Proportions, vi%» a Thing may be true 
 which is contrary to Confent^ and a Thifig 
 may not be true njohich is contrary to Con- 
 fent,^ And therefore the Mention of Con- 
 fent is here altogether needlefs, at leaft, its 
 Introdudlion ferves only to convince us, that 
 it is much better it had not been introduced. 
 But 
 
 Some perhaps will hold this Argument 
 to be Univerfally Conclufive, vi%, A Propo- 
 Jition may not be true 'which is contrary to 
 Univerfal Confent ; and this, I fuppofe, muft 
 be the Meaning of thofe who will pretend 
 to mean any Thing by the Words of the 
 ObjeSlion, But is there a Man upon Earth 
 who will join Iffiie with me on this Foot ? 
 Perhaps fo, but he muft excufe me if I de- 
 clare beforehand that I will not do fo with 
 
 him 
 
C 51 ] 
 
 him whilft he continues to be of this Opi- 
 nion. And I am Fool enough to fay this, 
 becaufe I think I have Reafon for it. But 
 this alone unqualifies me to hold Difcourfe 
 with one who will contend, that Univer- 
 fal Confent is a fimple Evidence of Truth. 
 Whereas if this be true, then Univerfal Con- 
 fent is Truths and Reafon^ or the common 
 Standard of every particular Truth. Con- 
 fequently, by this Rule, a Propofition may 
 become true which is fimply falfe^ or falfe 
 which is fimply true; that is, all that which 
 I have been ufed to call Truth and Reafon 
 is deftroyed at once. But now, whatfoever 
 Propofition I defend or deny, I muft take it 
 for granted that there is fuch a Thing as 
 Truth^ Independent and Immutable^ and that 
 Reafon is Reafon^ tho' ever fo many People 
 diifent from me, or deny it ; that is, I muft 
 take the Quefiion between us for granted, 
 as my firft Step towards the Difputation of 
 it. And therefore, as on one Hand I can 
 do no otherwife than thus, and on the 
 other I am fure no Adverfary will allow me 
 to take this Method with him, we muft 
 e'en part fairly, as being unqualified for 
 each other's Converfation. And this is 
 my hef Anfwer to the Firfl ObjeBion. 
 
 E 2 Obje- 
 
[ 52 ] 
 
 Objedlion 11. 
 
 Does not the Senfe of Feeling afTure us 
 of the Extra-exiftence of the Vifible 
 World? To this I 
 
 Anfwer, 
 
 Firji^ If for Infl:ru6lion's Sake only you 
 propofe this Queftion, you are doubtlefs 
 difpos'd to take my Word for an Anfwer ; 
 accordingly I anfwer. No ; the Senfe of 
 Feeling does not afTure us of the Extra- 
 exiftence of the Vifible World. If this 
 does not fatisfie, you are defired, inftead of 
 Quejlions^ to give me an Argument y where- 
 by it may appear that the Senfe of Feeling 
 does aflure us of the Extra-exiftence of 
 the Vifible World. What makes this the 
 more neceflary is, becaufe I have proved 
 already in great Variety that the Vifible 
 World is not External ; and amongft the 
 reft, that the Senfe of Vifion gives us Evi- 
 dent Afliirance, that a Vifible Objedl, as 
 fuch, is not, cannot be. External. And me- 
 thinks, if this is not falfe, it fhould be true ; 
 or if falfe, yet fhould not be fo called^ till 
 either the Arguments are anfwered by 
 which it is defended, or fome other Ar- 
 gument be produced, which concludes a- 
 
 gainjl 
 
[ 53 ] 
 
 gainjl the Truth of it : For till one of thefe 
 Things be done I have but the Obje6lor's 
 bare AJfertion againft me, whereas he has 
 mine, and I think fomething elfe on the o- 
 ther Side. But, 
 
 Secondly^ I am content to go on with 
 the Labouring Oar in my Hand, and fhew 
 the contrary to that which is affirmed in 
 the Objeilion. Accordingly I affirm, 
 
 Firjl^ That be the 0bje6l of the Senfe 
 of Feeling \Ahat it will, or leaving the 
 Decifion of this Matter at large. Feeling is 
 no Argument of the Fxtra-exijlence of 
 this ObjecSt. For the Truth of this I will 
 only refer my Reader back to what has been 
 already obferved on this Subject ; or rather 
 I prefume that he remembers both that^ 
 and how I have prevented the Force of this 
 Part of the Objedlion ; fo that till I hear 
 farther on this Point' I may fave myfelf 
 the Pains of adding any Thing in this Place. 
 But I affirm alfo. 
 
 Secondly^ That the Senfe of Feeling is 
 fo far from afi'uring us of the Fxtra-exijl- 
 ence of the Vifible World, that it does not 
 fo much as fay any Thing of its Exijlence 
 Jimple, I fay not here with a certain * Au- 
 thor, that we cannot feel Fxijlence^ it be- 
 ing the fame Thing to do fo as to feel a 
 
 E 3 Propo- 
 
 * Mr. Norris's Theory of Ideal World, Vol i.p. 198. § 13. 
 
[ 54 ] 
 
 Propofitio7u This may be good Argument 
 for ought I know, but I profefs it is too 
 high or too low for me, for I do not un- 
 derftand it. But what I affirm is this, 
 that whatever be the Obje6t of the Senfe 
 of Feelings and even admitting that it af- 
 fures us of the Exiftence of its proper Ob- 
 jedt. Things Vifible are not the Objedt of 
 this Senfe ; and confequently we can have 
 no AfTurance this Wai/ of fo much as the 
 ExiJIence Jimple of fuch Objefts. I know 
 not hew it may found to another, but to 
 me to fay, / can feel a Vifible Objedt^ is 
 juft fuch another Piece of Senfe as to fay, 
 I can fee the Sound of a Trumpet^ or hear 
 the Colours of the Rainbow. One would 
 think it fhould be granted me that a Vifible 
 Objeft is Vfihle^ and that a Tangible Objedl 
 is Tangible^ and that Seeing and Feeling are 
 Two different Things or Senfations ; but 
 'tis the fame Thing to me tho' they were 
 one and the fame ; for if fo, then as Vifion is 
 Feeling, fo Feeling is Vifion ; and then I have 
 proved already that a Vifible Objedl, as fuch, 
 is not External, whereas if they are diffe- 
 rent they muft have different Objects, be 
 the Names of them what they will; and 
 then a Vifible Objedt will be one Thing, 
 and a Tangible Objeft another : And there- 
 fore how the Exiflence of a Tangible Ob- 
 jedl fhould become an Argument for the 
 
 Exiflence 
 
[ 55 ] 
 
 Exiftence (much more the Extra-exiftence) 
 of a Viftble Objed:, is indeed paft my Skill 
 to underftand, any farther than this, that 
 if I underftand any Thing at all, I under- ' 
 ftand, and I think have fhewn, this to be ^ 
 plain and glaring Contradiction, And fo 
 I proceed to /< r.e . > M ^ 
 
 0' T-f 
 
 Obiemon 111, U 
 
 ^ ^ C4L1F 
 
 Which is Mr, Des Cartes* s ; and that 
 according to the beft of my Remembrance 
 is this : He concludes the Being of an Ex- 
 ternal World from the Truth and Goodnefs 
 of God^ who is not to be fuppofed to deceive 
 us in our Involuntary Judgments or Incli- 
 nations. (This, I fay, I take to be his Mean- 
 ing, tho' my Manner of exprefling it be 
 very different from that of his Two great 
 Followers* Mr, Malehranche andf Mr. 
 Norris^ for which I refer my Reader to the 
 Places cited at the Bottom. Whether I have 
 done him Juftice, or not, I leave to be di- 
 fputed by thofe who think I have not. In 
 the mean time, the Reafon which I give for 
 differing from thefe Great Perfons is, be- 
 caufe as they have reprefented his Argu- 
 .ment, it feems to be inconfiftent with 
 
 E 4 itfelf, 
 
 * Search Illustrations, pag. 112. "j" Theory of the* Id. 
 World. Vol. I. p. 208. 
 
[ 56 ] 
 
 itfelf, and has not fo much as the Appear- 
 ance of being an Objeftion ; whereas, as I 
 have here given it, it feems to have fome 
 Appearance, tho' how far it is from being a 
 r^al Argument againft any Thing I am 
 concerned for, will appear by this that 
 folio weth.) 
 
 Anfi 
 
 iver. 
 
 1. If by the Being of an External World, 
 be meant the Being of a World, which, as 
 External, is fuppos'd to be invilible, this 
 is nothing to my prefent Purpofe, but belongs 
 wholly to my Second Part ; wherein I fhall 
 attempt to fhew that an External World is 
 fimply an Impoffibility, which External 
 World will be alfo there fuppofed to be In- 
 vifible. But if by the Being of an External 
 World be meant the fame as the External 
 Beings or (as I have hitherto called it) the 
 Extra-exiftence or Externeity of the Vifible 
 or Senjible World, it is then indeed an 
 Objed:ion againft the Point I am now upon. 
 Accordingly, 
 
 2. I fay, that in my Opinion it is no 
 Imputation on the Truth and Goodnefs 
 of God to affirm, much lefs to attempt to 
 prove, that the Vifible World is not Ex- 
 ternal. 'Tis no Bufmefs of mine to piove 
 this Negative, tho' it be the eafieft Thing 
 
 in 
 
[ SI ] 
 
 in the World fo to do. Let them prove 
 the contrary who build their whole Caufe 
 of an External World upon the Force of it. 
 It is enough for me that I have fhewn by- 
 many Arguments that the Vifible World -is 
 not External. Thefe Arguments either 
 conclude, or they do not ; if not, let this 
 be made appear by a Juft and Diftindl An- 
 fwer to them ; but if they do, the Point 
 is gain'd, and they muft be Perfons ftrange- 
 ly difpofed, who after this will expedt I 
 fhould take their Word, . when they fay, 
 that the Truth or Goodnefs of God is con- 
 cerned, that that fhould be Falfe^ which is 
 and muft be fuppofed to be True. But 
 to be fomething more particular, I anfwer, 
 
 Firji^ That I deny the Suppojition of the 
 Involuntarinefs of our Judgments for the 
 Externeity of the Vifible World. For this 
 it is enough that I myfelf am One, who 
 am fo far from being Involuntarily deter- 
 mined to this AiTent, that I can, and have 
 already demonftrated that it is not Ex- 
 ternal. 
 
 Secondly^ We fhould come to a fine Pafs 
 of Reafoning indeed, if this Manner of 
 Proceeding were allowed to be good, vi%, 
 J am inclined to judge fuch or fuch a Thing 
 to befo or fo ; ergo. It is as /would have it^ 
 hecauje God will not deceive me. It is in 
 vain in this Cafe to appeal to Reafon and 
 • Argument 
 
[ 58 ] 
 
 Argument; nay, tho' God himfelf fhould 
 fupply us with Reafon againft bur Inclina- 
 tion, nay, and give us his Word that our 
 Inclination is Erroneous, yet ftill we are 
 bound to ftand by it, and even plead the 
 Authority of God againft himfelf. But 
 Lajllij^ Do I hear this from a Cartefian^ 
 even from Des Cartes himfelf, who is for 
 nothing more known in the World than 
 for giving us many Inftances wherein a 
 Common Inclination may be, and is Erro- 
 neous ; as in judging Light to be in the 
 Sun^ Heat in the Fire^ or in the Hand^ Co- 
 lours on Exterf^al ObjeSls^ &c. In all thefe 
 Cafes we are as much inclified as in judg- 
 ing the Vifible World to be External; 
 and yet it is enough with him and his Fol- 
 lowers for the Confutation of thefe Inch- 
 nations, that they have good Reafon to the 
 contrary : And this methinks j(hould be e- 
 nough in any Cafe, and with any Perfons, 
 unlefs we are refolved to be unreafonable, 
 and even profefs ourfelves Sceptics^ and if 
 fo, I confefs I am filenced. 
 
 PART 
 
[ 59 ] 
 
 PART II. 
 
 That there is no External Woild^ 
 and^ That an External World 
 is a Being utterly hnpofflble. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 HAving fhewn in my former Part that the 
 Vifihle World is not External, I come 
 now to the other Thing propofed in the Be- 
 ginning, namely to demonftrate more at 
 large, or fimply, that an External World 
 is a Being utterly impoflible, or that there 
 is no fuch World. Now to this, as before, 
 I fhall proceed by Steps. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 ARGUMENT I. 
 
 AND here I affirm in the F'lrft Place, 
 •^^ that (abftradling from any Argument 
 diredlly proving this Point) we are bound 
 already fo far to conclude that there is no 
 External World^ as that it is againft all the 
 Laws of fair Reafon and Argument to fup- 
 pofe or make mention of any fuch World. 
 
 For 
 
[ 6o ] 
 
 For if a Vifible World, as fuch, is not Ex- 
 ternal, an External World, as fuch, muft 
 be utterly Invifible, and if Invifible, Unknow- 
 able, unlefs by Revelation. 
 
 For, Firjl^ an External World (if there 
 be any fuch Thing) is, I fuppofe, allowed 
 by all to be a Creature; but the Being of 
 a Creature is not to be prov'd by Reafon^ 
 for Reafon converfes only in Things Necef- 
 fary or Eternal^ whereas a Creature as 
 fuch is Contingent^ and Temporary ; fo that 
 in vain fhall we feek to Reafon to aifure us 
 of the Exiftence of an External World. 
 
 Then, Secondly^ 'tis here fuppofed that 
 we fhould feek to as litde Purpofe to the 
 Teftimony of Senfe^ fince an External 
 World, as fuch, is here fuppofed to be ab- 
 folutely Invifible. Whether we have any 
 Notice from Revelation of the Being of 
 any fuch World fhall be confidered in its 
 proper Place. In the mean Time I here 
 fuppofe alfo. Thirdly^ that we have no 
 fuch Notice, fo that, as the Cafe ftands at 
 prefent, an External World is a Being 
 utterly Unknown, 
 
 But now I have always received it as a 
 Law, that we ought never to reafon but 
 upon Known Ideas ; and if this be Juft and 
 Reafonable, an External World, as being 
 Unknown^ ought to have as little Place in 
 
 our 
 
[ 6i ] 
 
 our Reafonings as if we knew for certain 
 that there was no fuch World. 
 
 Nay, on the Suppofition of its being 
 unknown, we are not only bound to ofntt 
 the Mention of it, but alfo warranted to 
 conclude that there is no fuch World. This, 
 I fay, muft be an allowed Confequence, 
 till fuch Time as fome other pretends the 
 contrary ; and he mull: prove too as well as 
 pretend, elfe the Confequence Hands good 
 againft him. 
 
 Here then is my Advantage ; we all 
 know and are agreed that there is fuch a 
 Thing as a Vifihle World, and that a Vifible 
 Obje6l, as fuch, is not External : On the 
 other Hand, we are as much agreed, at 
 leaft 'tis here fuppofed that we are agreed, 
 that we know nothing at all of an External 
 World, fuppofed, as fuch, to be Invifible : 
 But it is a Maxim in Science, that Eadem 
 ejl Ratio non Entis Sif ?ion Apparentis, I 
 conclude therefore outright that there is 
 no fuch World. 
 
 'Tis for this Reafon that we think it our 
 Duty to Reafon only on the Suppofition of 
 Body and Spirit^ thinking and eictended Be- 
 ings^ vi%, becaufe we have no knowledge of 
 the Exiftence of any Creature, which is 
 neither of thefe. Hence we think it a very 
 good and fafe Way of arguing, to make the 
 Exclufion of the one, the Confequence of 
 
 the 
 
[ 62 ] 
 
 the Polltion of the other, and fo Vice Verfd, 
 Thus Philofophers ufe to prove that Colour^ 
 Lights Heat^ Sounds ^c, belong to, or are 
 Affedtions of Spirits, becaufe they are not 
 included in the Idea which we have of Bodi/. 
 The Principle or Major Propofition of 
 which Argument is plainly this. There 
 are but Two Sorts of Beings in the World, 
 viz. Spirit and Matter; then the Minor is 
 this, viz. Light, ^c. do not belong to 
 Matter, ergo, they belong to Spirit. Now 
 if this Way of arguing is good, it is fo by 
 Virtue of that Principle, that we ought to 
 reafon onlv on known Ideas, and that 
 Things which appear not, are but equal to 
 Things which are not; and 'tis in Vertue 
 of the fame that I here plead a Right to 
 conclude that there is no fuch Thing as an 
 External World. 
 
 I pretend not this to be Demonftration 
 of the Point fimply, as if I fhould fay that 
 a Things being unknown were a dire6t Ar- 
 gument of its not being at all ; but yet this 
 is fomething fo near of Kin to a Demonftra- 
 tion, and fo every way ferving all the Ends 
 and Purpafes of a Demonftration, that 
 whoever has the Advantage of it on his 
 Side, has as litde to fear from an Adver- 
 fary, as he that can produce Ten Thoufand 
 Demon ftrations. For this is an evident 
 Principle or Rule of Reafoning, that a Thing 
 
 unknown 
 
[ 63 ] 
 
 unknown ought never to be fuppos'd, and 
 therefore till it be fuppos'd 'tis the very- 
 fame Thing as to us as if there were no 
 fuch Thing at all. To fuppofe the Being 
 of a Thing granted to be unknown, with 
 him who affirms that it is nothing at all, is 
 to beg the Queftion ; whereas, to fuppofe 
 it to be nothing at all upon the fame Con- 
 ceffion, is not to beg the Queftion ; I mean 
 any fair or legal one, becaufe on one Hand, 
 no one has any Right to make that a Que- 
 ftion which he profeffes that he knows no- 
 thing of; and on the other ^ every one has 
 a Right not only to Queftion the Exiftence, 
 but alfo to fuppofe the Non-Exiftence of 
 what is granted to be unknown. So that 
 whilft this is granted, in the Cafe before us, 
 I have the fame Advantage againft any one 
 who ftiall fuppofe an External World, [yi%. 
 either in ABu formally as in Oppofition to 
 what I here contend for, or in A5lu exercito^ 
 in the Refolution of any Philofophical or 
 General Queftion, which depends on the 
 Tea or iVjy of this Point,) as if I were girt 
 about with ever fo many Demonftra- 
 tions. 
 
 I might therefore fairly reft here, and 
 fave myfelf the Labour of producing any 
 direB or ojlenjive Arguments againft the 
 Being or Poffibility of an External World : 
 But to give my Reader the heft Satisfaction 
 
 .1 
 
[ 64 ] 
 
 I can, and alfo to eftablilli my Gonclufion 
 in fome Meafure anfwerably to the good 
 Ufe and Moment of it, I am content to 
 propofe the following Demonftrations. 
 
 CHAR II. 
 
 ARGUMENT II. 
 
 A N External World is here fuppofed to 
 •^^ be Invifible^ even utterly or abfolutely 
 fo, abfolutely incapable of being an Objedt 
 of Vifion or Perception ; infomuch, that 
 tho' it were here fuppofed that an External 
 World were capable of Exifting, or that 
 any Power vj&ce fufficient to produce fuch a 
 Thing or Being, yet no Power can be fup- 
 pofed to be fufficient to make it Vifible or 
 Seen, For a Vifible World, as fuch, is not 
 External, as has been fhew'd already : So 
 that to fay, that an External World may 
 (by any Caufe) become Vifible, is a Con- 
 tradidtion in Terms. 
 
 Well now, an External World is fuppofed 
 to be, or to imply. Creature; fo that if 
 there be any fuch Thing in Being, it is 
 fo becaufe God has Willed, Made, or Crea- 
 ted it. 
 
 But 
 
[ ^5 ] 
 
 But for what End^ or U/ky or Purpofe^ 
 can we fuppofe that God fhou'd create an 
 Invifible World ; A World, which, as In- 
 vifible, is incapable of being inhabited, inca- 
 pable of being known ? For my Part I can 
 think of no Ufe which fuch a World can be 
 of. And confidering that fuch a World is 
 here granted to be unknown, it is not in- 
 cumbent on me to fhew that it can be of 
 no Ufe, but on them to fhew the contrary, 
 who are concerned for the Being of it. So 
 that till this be done I have a Right to fup- 
 pofe that it is of no Ufe at all, and conse- 
 quently to affirm that there is no fuch 
 World. 
 
 For tho' the Principle muft take its 
 Chance to be either admitted or denied, as 
 Men fhall pleafe to judge, (only that, as I 
 obferved jufl now, he muft prove his Point, 
 who will venture on the Denial of it,) ftill 
 the Confequence is good, and muft pafs with 
 all for Demonftration, vi%» that a Creature 
 which is not, cannot be of any Ufe, is at 
 beft but a Poffibility, but fuch a PofTibility 
 as neither will nor can be produced into 
 Aft. 
 
 This, with certain Wits, may appear to 
 be a Contradidlion ; and perhaps I ftiou'd 
 mend the Matter but little by the Anfwer 
 I am moft inclined to make them, namely^ 
 that tho' it be fo, yet it is neverthelefs true ; 
 
 F nay 
 
[ 66 ] 
 
 nay, that I cou'd eafily Ihew them a Hun- 
 dred fuch Contradictions, whichl yet they 
 themfelves will acknowledge to be true. 
 But I am content fo far to favour the Ini- 
 quity of Words, as to explain by a Dijiin- 
 h'lon this appearing Difficulty. 
 
 I fay then, that Things are poflible or 
 impoflible, after a Twofold Manner. One is, 
 when in the Idea or Conception of the 
 Thing there is, or is not, any Repugnancy 
 or Contradidiion. 
 
 This is what may be called an Internal or 
 Intrinjic PofTibility, or Impoffibility ; PoJJi^ 
 hility where there is not, Impojfihiliti/ when 
 there is, this fuppofed Repugnancy. 
 
 The other is, when the Repugnancy or 
 Impediment is, or is not, (not in the Thing 
 itfelf, but) in the Caufe^ or Time^ or fome 
 other Circumftance or AfFecftion of the 
 Thing. But in this Place I am concerned 
 only with the firft of thefe, vi%. the Caufe. 
 
 A Thing is pojfible in its Caufe^ when 
 there is, in the Idea of its Caufe, no Impe- 
 diment to be found, forbidding its Exi- 
 ftence, or which is the fame, withholding 
 the Efficient from producing it into Aft ; 
 and when the contrary to this happens, 
 then the Thing is impoffible. For fmce 
 every Thing Exifts by its Caufe, it will as 
 certainly not Exift if the Caufe does not 
 produce it, as if in its own Idea it implied 
 
[ 67 ] 
 
 a Contradidlion. And if the fuppos'd Im- 
 pediment in the Caufe be invincible^ the 
 Exiftence of the Thing fuppos'd becomes 
 properly impojjible. This I would therefore 
 call an External or Extrinjick Poflibility or 
 Impoflibility. A Thing then may be both 
 poffible and impoffible in thefe different Re- 
 fpedls; that is, intrinfically poffible, but 
 extrinfically impoffible; and therefore of 
 fuch a Thing it may be faid without any 
 Contradidlion, that tho' it be admitted to 
 be poffible, [viz, intrinfically,) yet it is 
 fuch a Poffibility, as neither will, nor can^ 
 be produced into Acft, {vi^. by Reafon of 
 an Impediment found in its Caufe, which 
 tho' an Extrinjicky is yet a Real Impoffibility 
 againft the Being of it.) 
 
 Eut now this is the Cafe before us, viz. 
 of an External or Invifible World. Ad- 
 mitting it to be poffible with Regard to the 
 Thing itfelf, that fuch a World fhould Ex- 
 ift ; yet a ufelefs Creature cannot poffibly be 
 made, when we regard its Caufe, vi%» God, 
 who can do nothing to no Purpofe, by 
 reafon of his Wifdom, Here then lyes the 
 Impediment fpoken of in the Caufe^ which 
 makes it extrinfically, but yet really im- 
 poffible, that there fhould be any fuch 
 World. I fay really fo, becaufe the Wif- 
 dom by which God adts is neceffary and 
 immutable; and therefore if it be fimply 
 
 F 2 againft 
 
[ 68 ] 
 
 againft the Order of Wifdom to do an ufe- 
 lefs Aft, the Impediment againft the doing 
 of it is to the full as invincible, as if a Re- 
 pugnancy were found in the Idea or Con- 
 ception of the Thing itfelf, here fuppos'd 
 to be done, or not done ; and confequently 
 an ufelefs EfFe6t is a real Impoffibility. 
 
 But I have often found upon Examina- 
 tion, that where an extrinfick Impoffibility 
 lyes againft any Point, we need but fearch 
 to the bottom of it, and we ftiall find an 
 intrinfick Repugnancy in the Thing itfelf. 
 And this I think I have feen to be the Cafe 
 of an External World, as I fuppofe will 
 appear from fome of the following Chap- 
 ters. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 ARGUMENT III. 
 
 A S for Inftance. An External World, 
 -^^ whofe Extenfion is abfolute, that is, 
 not relatively depending on any Faculty of 
 Perception, has (in my Opinion) fuch a 
 Repugnancy in its Hxtenfton^ as adlually de- 
 ftroys the Being of the Subjed World. 
 
 The 
 
[ 69 ■] 
 
 The Repugnancy is this, that it is, or muft 
 be, both Finite and Infinite. 
 
 Accordingly then I argue thus. That 
 which is both Finite and Infinite in Extent, 
 is abfolutely Non-exiftent, or there is, or can 
 be, no fuch World. Or thus, an Extent or 
 Expanfion, which is both Finite and Infinite, 
 is neither Finite nor Infinite, that is," is no 
 Expanfion at all. But this is the Cafe of an 
 External Expanfion, ergo^ there is, or can 
 be, no fuch Expanfion. 
 
 I know not what will pafs with fome Men 
 for Argument, if both the Matter and Man- 
 lier of this be not approv'd of. Yox jirjl^ 
 what can well be more evident than both 
 the Premifes ? That a Thing, in the fame 
 Refpeft, cannot be both Finite and Infinite ; 
 or that a Thing which in the Idea of it im- 
 plies both Finite and Infinite, is in AB nei- 
 ther Finite nor Infinite ; and that what is 
 neither Finite nor Infinite, is not at all, are 
 (with me, and I fuppofe with all Preten- 
 ders to Reafon,) fuch prime Principles of 
 Science, that I muft needs depend that 
 thefe will never be call'd in Queftion by any 
 but profeft Sceptics. Then as to the Minor, 
 its Evidence is to me fo glaring, and (in the 
 little Converfation I have had in the learned 
 World) fo univerfally afTented to, that I 
 am rather inclin'd here alfo to make my 
 Appeal for, than endeavour to fhew the 
 
 F 3 Truth 
 
[ 70 ] 
 
 Truth of it. This of the Extent of an 
 External World, is that which is call'd 
 Opprobrium Philofophorum^ being a Point 
 own'd by all to have an invincible Demon- 
 llration, both for and againft it. Some 
 indeed, by Way of Hypothecs, have held 
 it to hQ Jinitelt/^ and fome to be injiniteli/i 
 extended, according as either of thefe has 
 beft ferved the Ends of fome other Points 
 they have been concerned for. But I have 
 never yet met with any one fo hardy, as, 
 in Defence of one^ to have indeavoured to 
 Dijfolve or Anfwer the Arguments lying on 
 the other Side of the Contradidlion. For 
 this Reafon I need not here name either 
 the one fort or the other, but conclude 
 outright, even with Univerfal Confent, 
 that an Expanfion External is both (that 
 is neither) Finite and Infinite. Then, 
 
 Secondly^ As to the Form or Manner of 
 this Argument; it has Firji evidently this 
 to plead for itfelf, that there is nothing in 
 its Conclufion but what is in the Premifes ; 
 which fhews it to be no Fallacy, but a Le- 
 gal and Juft Argument. And alfo this, 
 Secondlt/y that it is exaftly parallel with 
 feveral Arguments which I cou'd name, al- 
 lowed by all to be good, and even perfeftly 
 demonftrative. 
 
 As 
 
^^l}t '^^ 
 
 0^ jHe 
 
 [ 71 ] r^"fHSITT 
 
 As for Inftance, Suppofe a Man 
 advance the Notion of a Triangular Square; 
 Or fuppofe, Two Perfons contending about 
 the Attributes of this ftrange Idea; One 
 arguing from the Idea of Triangle^ that it 
 has but Three Angles, and the other con- 
 tending that it muft have Four^ from the 
 Idea of a Square; what cou'd any reafon- 
 able Stander-by conclude from this, but 
 that the Thing they are difputing about is 
 nothing at all, even an Impoffibility or 
 Contradidlion ? Nay, the Difputants them- 
 felves muft needs clofe in with this Manner 
 of arguing ; and that on Two Accounts. 
 
 Firji^ In that this Manner of arguing 
 accommodates the Difference between them, 
 and falves the Honour of both. For by 
 this both appear to be in the Right in the 
 precife Points they are contending for; 
 and Wrong only in fomething which they 
 are both equally concerned for, viz, the 
 Suppofition of the Being of a Triangular 
 Square, which is the Thing fuppofed by 
 Confent between them. But chiefly, 
 
 Secondly y In that the Perfon who argues 
 in this Manner muft be allowed to have 
 the Law of Reafon on his Side, and may 
 compel them, on their own Principles, to 
 aflent to his Conclufion. This is done by 
 granting to each Party his Point, namely^ 
 that a Triangular Square is both Trian- 
 
 r 4 gular 
 
[ 72 ] 
 
 gular and Square, or Quadrangular, This 
 done, they have nothing to do but to An- 
 fwer each other's Arguments, which 'tis 
 here fuppofed they cannot do. By this 
 therefore each grants the other to be in the 
 Right. So that for a Stander-by to grant 
 both to be in the Right, is, in this Cafe, a 
 Demonftration that they are both in the 
 Wrong; or, in other Words, that the 
 Thing they are difputing about is Nothing 
 at all. 
 
 I have mentioned this Poffibk^ rather 
 than any ASlual^ Inftance of this Kind, be- 
 caufe I wou'd give an Inftance wherein I 
 may be fure to have every one of my Side. 
 For certainly no one can doubt whether 
 this be good Argument or not. 
 
 A Figure which is both Triangular and 
 Quadrangular, is not at all. 
 
 But this is the Cafe of a Triangular 
 Square. 
 
 Ergo^ there is no fuch Figure. 
 
 The Force of this Argument has never 
 been difputed, and I dare fay never will; 
 Whereas to have put a Cafe, which has 
 been adlually a Matter of Difpute, (of 
 which Sort I believe fome might be named,) 
 tho' equally conchifive^ had yet been lefs 
 plain and evident^ becaufe what has been, 
 may be again ; and fo to fome I had feemed 
 to prove a Notum by an Ignotum. - 
 
 But 
 
[ 73 ] 
 
 But now, in the prefent Cafe, which is 
 granted to be clear, I have nothing to do 
 but to fhew it to be parallel with that 
 which I before mentioned. And this is an 
 eaiie Work. For, (as in this pojfihle one 
 about the Attributes of a Triangular Square 
 there may be, fo) there has a£tuall7^ been 
 a Difpute between Philofo pliers concerning 
 one Attribute, v'i%, the Extent of an Exter- 
 nal World. One Side, from the Idea of 
 its being External^ has proved it to be 
 Infinite ; the other ^ from the Idea of its being 
 Created, '<^c, has proved it to be Finite. 
 Both fuppofe it to be External, both to be 
 Created. At the fame Time neither of 
 them fo much as pretends to A?tfwer the 
 Arguments on the Side oppoiite to his own ; 
 but only to juftifie his own Point diredlly. 
 And yet both will grant, that if an Exter- 
 nal World be both Finite and Infinite, it is 
 the fame Thing as to fay there is no fuch 
 World. 
 
 Well then, here I interpofe, as before, 
 and fay, 
 
 A World which is both Finite and Infinite, 
 is not at all. 
 
 But this is the Cafe of an External 
 World. 
 
 Ergo^ there is no fuch World. 
 
 Here the Honour of both is falved ; here 
 both the Major and Minor are their own ; 
 
 here 
 
 I 
 
[ 74 ] 
 
 here a Stander-by has the fame Advantage 
 as before; fo that what fhou'd hinder an 
 eafie, and even univerfal, AfTent to the Con- 
 dufion ? 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 ARGUMENT IV. 
 
 FROM the Maximum^ I come next to 
 the Minimum Naturale ; or to the 
 Queftion about the Divifibility of Matter, 
 Quantity, or Extenfion. 
 
 And here I affirm in like Manner as be- 
 fore, that External Matter is both finitely 
 and infinitely Divifible; and confequently, 
 that there is no fuch Thing as External 
 Matter. 
 
 The Argument in Form ftands thus. 
 
 Matter which is both Finitely and Infi- 
 nitely Divifible, is not at all. 
 
 But this is the Cafe of External Mat- 
 ter. 
 
 Ergo^ There is no fuch Thing as Exter- 
 nal Matter. 
 
 The Major of this Argument is the firft 
 Principle of Science, it being the fame in 
 other Words, as to fay, that what is, /V, or 
 
 that 
 
[ 75 ] 
 
 that it is impoffible for a Thing to be, and 
 not be. For Finite and Infinite are juft fo 
 to each other, as Being and not Being. 
 Finite is to be limited. Infinite to be not 
 limited. Or rather thus. Infinite is to be 
 Abfolute, Finite to be not Abfolute. So 
 that it is as plainly impoffible for the 
 fame Thing to be both, as both to be, and 
 not be, at the fame Time, or in the 
 fame Refpedt, ^<:. For both the RefpeEi^ 
 and Time^ and every Thing elfe, which is 
 or can be made the Condition of the Truth 
 of this Principle, is alfo found in the 
 Major of the prefent Argument ; and con- 
 fequently nothing can be more evident, 
 than that what is, or in its Idea implies 
 both Finite and Infinite, is not at all. 
 
 But now this I fay is the Cafe or Implica- 
 tion of External Matter, which is the Minor 
 or Aflumption of the fame Argument. 
 
 External Matter, as a Creature, is evident- 
 ly Finite, and yet as External is as evi- 
 dently Infinite, in the Number of its Parts 
 or Divifibility of its Subftance ; and yet no- 
 thing can be more abfurd than fuch an Infi- 
 nite Divifibility. 
 
 But I need not deduce thefe Things to 
 any farther Length, fmce no Philofopher 
 that I have ever met with has ever doubted 
 of this Matter, it being univerfally agreed 
 
 that 
 
[ 76 ] 
 
 that there is an Invincible Demonftration 
 on both Sides of this Queftion of the Di- 
 vifibility of Matter, fo that I have nothing 
 to do but to conclude that the Thing or 
 Matter of w^hich this Queftion proceeds is a 
 mere Nothing, or Contradidlion ; yet I ex- 
 pert to be told, that it has been the leaft 
 of the Thoughts of thefe Philofophers to 
 conclude as I here do, fince not one has 
 ever doubted of the Exiftence of External 
 Matter. To this I anfwer, 
 
 Firjl^ Perhaps fo ; but who can help this ? 
 Is it not enough for this Conclufion, that 
 we are all agreed in the Premifes, and that 
 there is nothing in the Conclufion but what 
 is in the Premifes ? If in this Cafe Men will 
 hold the Premifes, but deny the Conclu- 
 fion, this, at bejiy can be no better than Inad- 
 vertence ; but to do this, after the Conclufi- 
 on is formally deduced, or the whole Syl- 
 logifm is laid before them, is no better than 
 errant Scepticifm, And I muft be ex- 
 cufed if I contend not with an Adverfary 
 of this Sort. But, Secondly, One would 
 think by the Defcriptions which they them- 
 felves are ufed to give of External Mat- 
 ter, that all Philofophers fhould be very 
 ready to fubfcribe to this Conclufion for 
 its own Sake, as I have partly fhewn al- 
 ready, and fhall make appear more fully be- 
 fore I finifb this Work. 
 
 Again, 
 
[ 77 ] 
 
 Again, I expeft to be told that the Mat- 
 ter which I here fpeak of is conceived to 
 be very different from that concerning 
 v^hich Philofophers have difputed, in the 
 Queftion about the Divifibility of Extenfion, 
 and alfo in that about the Extent of the 
 World, (whether Infinite or Finite;) par- 
 ticularly, that the Matter or Extenfion 
 which they fpeak of is fuppofed to be Vtjible^ 
 whereas that which I am fpeaking of is 
 fuppofed to be Invifihle. I anfwer. 
 
 Perhaps fo ; I admit that the Matter ufu- 
 ally fpoken of by Philofophers is fup- 
 pofed by them to be Vifible, and that the 
 Matter which I am here fpeaking of is 
 fuppos'd, and alfo prov'd to be Invifible, 
 neverthelefs it muft needs be granted that 
 the Matter fpoken of by Philofophers is 
 fuppofed by them to be External; if not, 
 it mufl be becaufe they hold that Vifible 
 Matter is not External, or, that there is 
 no fuch Thing as External Matter; nei- 
 ther of which will I believe be eafily grant- 
 ed^ much lefs (which is neceffary in this 
 Place) contended for againft me. If then 
 the Matter they fpeak about is fuppofed by 
 them to be External, this is all that I am con- 
 cerned for at prefent ; the Queftion between 
 us being only this fimply, Whether Ex- 
 ternal Matter Exifts, or not? Or as ufu- 
 ally exprefs'd in Latin, An Detur Materia 
 
 Externa f 
 
[ 78 ] 
 
 Externa? No, fay I; for it implies fuch 
 and fuch Contradi6tions, which deftroy 
 the Being of it, or render its Exiftence 
 impoffible. Well; and what will an Ad- 
 verfary fay to this ? Will he deny that it 
 implies thefe fuppofed Contradictions ? No ; 
 'tis here fuppofed that all Philofophers agree 
 in affirming this Point. Will he then de- 
 ny the Conclufion whilft he affirms the 
 Premifes ; No certainly ; for this is for- 
 mal Scepticifm, or no other than a Denial 
 of all Truth, and Reafon, and Confequence, 
 at once. What remains then, but that we 
 all conclude that External Matter is a Thing 
 abfolutely Impoffible. 
 
 But you'll fay, to conclude this with 
 Confenty is to conclude the Non-exiftence of 
 Vijtble Matter, fmce Philofophers pretend 
 to fpeak of no Matter but what they fup- 
 pofed to be Vifible. I anfwer, 
 
 Firji^ Why then I muft conclude the 
 fame without Confent ; the Dammage one 
 would think fhould not be great, provided 
 it be allowed that my Conclufion is true; 
 and for this I appeal to. the Arguments by 
 which I prove it, and which I fuppofe may 
 be good, tho' they fhould happen to want 
 Confent. But, Secondli/^ I deny that the 
 Matter of which the Queftion concerning 
 its Divifibility ufually proceeds, is fuppofed 
 by Philofophers to be Vifible Matter. This 
 
 is 
 
[ 79 ] 
 
 is evident from this, that the Matter of 
 which they fpeak, is, and mull be fup- 
 pofed to Exift after ever fo many Divifi- 
 ens of it, even when it is become Invifible, 
 by the frequency of its being divided. 
 
 It is not therefore Vifihle^ but External^ 
 Matter, confiderd as External, of which 
 Philofophers have difputed ; and of which 
 they fay that it is both infinitely and finitely 
 • divifible and extended. And this Idea of its 
 being External, or Independent (as to its 
 Exiftence fimple) on any Mind or percep- 
 tive Faculty, is fo abfolutely neceflary to 
 both thefe Queflions, that neither of them 
 have any Appearance of being a Queftion, 
 upon the Removal of this Idea, and placing 
 Vifthle in its ftead. For a Vifible World, or 
 Vifible Matter, confider'd as not External^ 
 Exifts plainly as Vifible, and confequent- 
 ly, as fuch is extended, as fuck is Divi- 
 fible. So that after this it carries a Con- 
 tradidlion with it, fo much as to enquire 
 whether it be Extended farther than it is 
 feen to be Extended, or Divifible farther 
 than it is fee?i to Exift. So that however 
 by Accident Philofophers may have jum-' 
 bled together the Two Ideas of Vifible and 
 External^ External is the Idea only they 
 are concerned with, and therefore it is 
 External Matter alone whofe Exiftence is 
 encumbered with the forementioned Contra- 
 dictions ; 
 
[ 8o ] 
 
 didlions ; and fo encumbered, I fay, as to 
 make it neceffary for us to conclude that 
 it is abfolutely Impoffible there fhould be 
 any fuch Thing, But yet fo partial have 
 I found fome towards an External World, 
 that when nothing has been found, which 
 could with any Appearance be objedted 
 againft the Evidence of this and the fore- 
 going Argument, they have even drefl up 
 Formal Nothing into the Shape of an Ob- 
 jedlion: For I have been fometimes told, 
 (and that with an Air of unufual Gravity, 
 as if the Being of a Real Univerfe depen- 
 ded on their Concern for it ; nay, as if 
 Religion itfelf muft fail if there be no Ex- 
 ternal World,) that a Thing may be, and 
 muft fometimes be, judged by us to be true, 
 whofe Manner of Exiftence we cannot 
 comprehend. That of this Sort are feve- 
 ral Articles of our Chriflian Faith ; as for 
 Inftance, the Trinity in Unity^ the Incar- 
 nation of the Son of God, ^r. which we 
 believe to be true, tho' we acknowledge 
 them to be Myfteries, nay, and are content 
 to own, that with Regard to our fhallow 
 Reafonings, they are attended alfo with 
 Contradidtions. Why then muft we con- 
 clude that there is no External World, 
 becaufe of the Contradi6tions which feem 
 to attend the Pofition of it? And to this 
 Purpofe I find it faid by a very Judici- 
 ous 
 
[ 8' ] 
 
 ous * Author, that it is good to tire and 
 fatigue the Mind with fuch Kind of Difficul- 
 ties [as the Divifibiliti/ of Matter^ &c.) 
 in order to tame its Prefumption^ and to 
 make it lefs daring ever to opp'ofe its feeble 
 Light to the Truths propofed to it in the 
 Gofpel, &c. I anfwer, 
 
 1. 'Tis a Sign indeed that our Under- 
 ftandings are very iveak and ihallow, when 
 fuch Stuff as this fhall not only pafs for 
 common Senfe, but even look like Argu- 
 ment ; and herein I confefs my own as well 
 as my Neighbour's Weaknefs. However, 
 
 2. If we will reafon at all, we cannot 
 well have a more Evident Principle to go 
 upon than this, that Being is not^ Not Being; 
 that what is, is ; or that it is Impofhble for 
 the fame Thing both to be and not be. 
 If fo, we mull either fay that Humili- 
 ty of Judgment is no Vertue, or that there 
 is ftill Room enough left for the Exercifes 
 of it, whilft we hold this Principle without 
 the leaft Doubt or Wavering. Nay, 
 
 3. It feems to me, that if we will rea- 
 fon at all, we fhould freely judge of what- 
 foever we perceive, fo as firft of all to agree 
 in this, that whatfoever ive perceive to be^ 
 Is : For tho' it w^ere true indeed that there 
 is no fuch Thing as Truth, or tho' the 
 
 G Light 
 
 * Art of Thinking. 
 
[ 82 ] 
 
 Light of our Underllandings were ever fo 
 weak and feeble, yet till we have difcpvered 
 this to be the Cafe, and whilfl w^e all agree 
 to Reafon one with another. That muft 
 pafs for the Truth which we perceive, and 
 That muft pafs for perceiving which at pre- 
 fent we are capable of, be it what it will 
 in the Eye of a Superior Judgment or Un- 
 derftanding. To boggle therefore at this^ 
 is not Reafoning, but refufing to Reafon at 
 all ; Is not Humility of Judgment, but open 
 and avowed Scepticifm ; Is not an Acknow- 
 ledgment of the Infinity of Truth, but an 
 Evil, and Profane, and Atheiftical Denial 
 of it : And yet, 
 
 4. Nothing more than this is requifite in 
 the Cafe before us : Nothing, I fay, but to 
 affirm that Being Is^ and not to deny our 
 oijon Evident Perceptions, The Firfl of 
 thefe is the Refolution of the Major^ and 
 the other of the Minor^ of both the fore- 
 going Arguments, whereby I demonftrate 
 the Impoffibility of an External World: 
 For can any Thing be more Evident than 
 that Finite and hifinite are Exclufive of 
 each other ; and that an Idea which im- 
 plies ^o/y^ is an Impoffibility in Fa6t ? And 
 can we pretend to perceive any Thing at all 
 when we pretend to doubt whether this is 
 not the Fact or Implication of External 
 Matter ? Should we doubt in this Man- 
 ner 
 
[ 83 ] 
 
 ner if the Subjed: fpoken of were a Circu- 
 lar Square^ or Triangular Parallellogram f 
 If not, I would fain know where our 
 Ignorance lyes which is the Foundation of 
 the Objedlion ? We are ignorant indeed 
 that there is any fuch Thing as External 
 Matter, (and one would think for this 
 Reafon we fhould be fo far from having 
 any Partiality towards the Being of it, that 
 we fhould conclude of Courfe that there 
 is no fuch Thing in Being,) but on the 
 other- Hand we cannot fo much as pretend Ig- 
 norance of the Premifes by which this Conclu- 
 fion is enforced. They are as evident as the 
 Light, and alfo (a^ far as ever I could inform 
 myfelf) univerfally acknowledged. Where 
 then is the Dijjiculty^ fuppofed by the fore- 
 mentioned Author, in the Queftion about 
 the Divifibility of Matter, ^<:. wherewith it 
 is fo good to fatigue our Prefumptuous Minds ? 
 Why, nowhere that I can think but here, 
 i>i%, to conceive how it is poilible that fuch 
 a Thing can Exift, whofe Idea implies fo 
 manifeft a Contradidlion : And if this be 
 all the Difficulty, it immediately vanifhes, 
 or lofes its Name, as foon as we fuppofe 
 that there is no fuch Thing or Matter, 
 or make this the Queftion, Whether 
 there be any fuch Thing, or not ? For 
 then, inftead of Difficulty^ it becomes Light 
 
 G 2 and 
 
[ 84 ] 
 
 and Argument^ and is no other than a De- 
 monftration of the Impoflibility of its Ex- 
 iftence. But now, 
 
 5. This does not in the leaft afFe6l fo 
 as to become a Parallel Cafe with the Do- 
 ctrine of the Trinity, 'Kffc. and that for fe- 
 veraLReafons. As, 
 
 Firji^ In that all who believe this Do- 
 ftrine are very ready to acknowledge (and 
 that with Reafon too) that there is fome- 
 thing Incomprehenfible in it ; whereas in 
 the Demonftrations by which External 
 Matter is proved to be both Finite and In- 
 finite, {vi%, in Extent and Divifibility,) I 
 have fhewed already, no Ignorance can be 
 fo much as pretended. Then again, 
 
 Secondly^ The Articles of our Faith 
 concerning the Trinity^ &c. are, by Con- 
 fent, allowed to be Exempt or Particular 
 Cafes, fuch as are not to be made Prece- 
 dents for our Believing any other Points, 
 notwithftanding the Difficulties which are 
 feen to attend them. And this, 
 
 Thirdli/, For a very good Reafon ; name- 
 ly, becaufe as to the Truth or FaB of thefe 
 Doctrines we have an Evidence Irrefraga- 
 ble from another Quarter, (which is at 
 leaft equal to the Evidence of Reafon,) 
 vi%, the Word of God^ which alTures us of 
 thefe Things, whereas we are, or are fup- 
 pofed to be, wholly Ignorant of the Being 
 
 or 
 
f 85 ] 
 
 or Exiftence of an External World. And 
 after all, 
 
 Laftly^ I utterly deny that there is any 
 Contradiftion in the Dodtrines of the Tri- 
 nity, ^^. even rationally confidered, which 
 makes this and the Cafe of an External 
 World to the laft Degree unparallel: But 
 now, it is the ParalleUifm of thefe Points 
 which is the Thing contended for in the 
 Objeftion; and if fo, where is the Man 
 that with a ferious Face will argue this 
 Matter with me ? Who will fay, I will 
 not give up my Judgment for an External^ 
 Invijible, Unknown World, notwithftanding 
 the manifeft Contradidlions which attend 
 the Mention of it, on any other Terms 
 but that of affirming or granting that there 
 is a Contradidlion in the Dodlrine of the E- 
 ver-blefTed Trinity ? A Socinian or Art an 
 wrll not fay this, it being evident that the 
 Obje6lion is very Nonfenfe in their Mouths; 
 and fure I am that an Orthodox Perfon 
 would be afliamed to fay fo : And yet if 
 it be not granted immediately that there is 
 (as far as our Underftandings can dive or 
 penetrate) a Contradiction in the fuppofed 
 Articles of the Trinity, Effc. the Objedti- 
 on (even on this Account alone) is with- 
 out all Foundation, and is no other than an 
 Ignoratio Klenchi^ in other Words, talking of 
 Chalk with thofe that talk of Gheefa 
 
 G 3 C li A P. 
 
[ 86 ] 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 ARGUMENT V. 
 
 A Nother Argument, whereby it is to be 
 -*^ demonftrated that there is 7io Exter- 
 nal Worlds is, That in fuch a World it is 
 impoffible there fhould be any fuch Thing 
 as Motion; or rather (left this fhould not 
 feem Abfurdity enough to ftop Men's Judg- 
 ments in Favour of fuch a World) it may 
 be proved from the moft fimple and evi- 
 dent Ideas, both that there mai/^ and alfo 
 that there cannot be any Motion in it. 
 
 That there mai/ be Motion in an Exter- 
 nal World is fufficiently evident from this, 
 that it is fuppofed to be a Creature : If fo, 
 I have an Almighty Power on my Side to 
 help forward the Conclufion, namely, that 
 it is Moveable. And the Argument in 
 Form will ftand thus : 
 
 The Power of God is fufficient to move 
 Created Matter; 
 
 But External Matter is fuppos'd to. be 
 Created ; 
 
 Ergo^ The Power of God is fufficient 
 to move it. 
 
 On 
 
. [ 87- ] 
 
 On the other Hand, Nothing is more 
 evident than the Impojfihility of Motion in 
 an External World, confidered as Exter- 
 nal. And that, Firjl^ In the Whole ; Secondly ^ 
 As to the feveral Parts of it. 
 
 I. As to the Whole I argue thus ; 
 
 An Infinite Body or Expanfion is not ca- 
 pable of being moved by any Powder what- 
 foever ; 
 
 But an External World is Infinite in Ex- 
 panfion ; 
 
 Ergo^ An External World is abfolutely 
 Immoveable, or incapable of being moved by 
 any Power whatfoever. 
 
 That an Infinite Expanfion is abfolutely 
 Immoveable is too evident to be proved, 
 unlefs this will be admitted as fomething 
 more fo ; namely, that Motion fuppofes a 
 Place pojfejfed^ and afterwards quitted for 
 another, which yet is Impoffible and Con- 
 tradidlory, when affirmed of an Expanfion 
 or Body actually Infinite, which, as fuch, 
 implies the Pofifeffion of All Place already ; 
 which therefore makes the Motion of fuch 
 a Body or World a Fa(?t abfolutely Impoffi- 
 ble. And then. 
 
 Secondly^ That an External World, as 
 fuch, is Infinite in Expanfion ; I appeal to 
 thofe Arguments whereby this Propofition 
 is ufually proved by Philofophers, and which 
 are allowed by .all to be Demonftrative. 
 
 G4 I 
 
t 88 ] 
 
 I fhall not here fill my Paper with the 
 Mention of any one, becaufe I fuppofe my 
 Reader does not need my Information, and 
 alfo becaufe it will be Time enough to do 
 this when I am advertized of an Adver- 
 fary. I fhall only obferve this, (as believ- 
 ing it may be of fome Ufe to thofe who 
 fhall be at the Pains of confidering this 
 Matter,) namely^ that whatever Arguments 
 have been ufed to prove the World to he 
 Infinite in Extent, will be found to have 
 proceeded on the Formal Notion of its being 
 External ; whereas thofe which have been 
 produced on the Contradidiory Part have 
 been altogether filent as to this Idea^ and 
 have proceeded either on the Idea of its 
 being Created^ or on the Ahfurdities attend- 
 ing the Suppofition of Infinite ; by which 
 Proceeding it has flill been granted, that 
 notwithflanding thefe Arguments and Ah- 
 furdities, an External World, as fuch^ muft 
 needs be Infinite. Since therefore an Infi- 
 nite World or Expanfion is not capable of 
 being moved, ^ I conclude that an External 
 World, confidered in the Whole ^ is a Being 
 abfolutely Immoveable. 
 
 II. In like Manner it feems to be Impoffi- 
 ble that there fhould be any fuch Thing as 
 Motion in an External World, confide/ed 
 in the feveral Farts of it. 
 
 For 
 
[ 89 ] 
 
 For motion is fuppofed to be a Tran- 
 Jlation of a Body from o?ie Point or Place 
 to another. Now in fuch a Tranflation 
 the Space or Line thro' which the Body 
 moved is fuppofed to pafs muft be adlually 
 divided into all its Parts. This is fuppofed 
 in the very Idea of Motion : But this All 
 is Infinite^ and this Infinite is Abfurd^ and 
 confequently it is equallyyo, that there fhould 
 be any Motion in an External World. 
 
 That an External Line or Space is com- 
 pounded of Infinite Parts or Points, is evi- 
 dent by the fame Argument by which any 
 Body or Part of Matter (fuppofed to be 
 External) is proved, and alfo allowed to be 
 fo ; namely, from the Idea of its being 
 Qiiantitz/y Body^ or Extenjion, and confe- 
 quently Divifible, and not Annihilable by 
 Divifion, which laft is fuppos'd in the I- 
 dea of its being External. But then on 
 the other Hand, to affirm that a Line by 
 Motion or otherwife is divided into Infinite 
 Parts, is in my Opinion to fay all the Ab- 
 furdities in the World at once. For, 
 
 Firjl^ This fuppofes a Nufnber adlually 
 Infinite, that is, a Number to which no 
 Unite can be added, which is a Number 
 of which there is no Sum Total^ that 
 is, no Number at all ; confequently, 
 
 Secondly^ 
 
[ 90 ] 
 
 Secondly^ By this Means the fhortell 
 Motion becomes equal to the longef!", fince 
 a Motion to which nothing can be added 
 muft needs be as long as poffible. This 
 alfo, 
 
 Thirdly^ Will make all Motions e- 
 qual in Swiftnefs, it being Impoffible for 
 the fwiftefi: in any ftated Time to do more 
 than pafs thro' Infinite Points, which yet 
 the fhorteft is fuppofed to do. To w^hich 
 may be added, 
 
 Lajtly^ That fuch Motion as this, how- 
 ever fhort in Duration, muft yet be fup- 
 pofed to be a Motion of All or Infinite Ages, 
 fmce to every Point of Space or Line thro' 
 which any Body is fuppofed to pafs, there 
 muft be a point of Time correfpondent : 
 But Infinite Points of Time make an Infinite 
 Time or Duration, 'x^c, 
 
 Thefe are fome of the Abfurdities which 
 attend the Suppofal of Motion in an Exter- 
 nal World; whence I might argue fimply, 
 that fuch a World is Impoffible: But left, 
 as I faid before, this fhould not be thought 
 Abfurdity enough, that is, left any one 
 fhould admit fuch a World, notwithftanding 
 the ImpofTibility of Motion in it, I rather 
 chufe to defend and urge both Parts of the 
 Contradidlion, and conclude the Impoflibility 
 of the Being of fuch a World, from both 
 the Pojfibility and Impojfibility of Motion 
 
 in 
 
[ 91 ] . 
 
 in it. The Argument in Form Hands 
 thus : 
 
 A World, in which it is both poflible 
 and impoffible that there fhould be any fuch 
 Thing as Motion, is not at all ; 
 
 But this is the Cafe of an External 
 World; 
 
 Ergo^ There is no fuch World. 
 
 I fuppofe I need not here remind my 
 Reader that I have proved already, and 
 that it is here fuppofed, that a Vifible 
 or Senfible World is not External ; neither 
 if he has at all gone along with me in this 
 Difcourfe, need I undertake to fhew that 
 thefe Abfurdities about Motion do not in the 
 leaft affeft a Senfible or Vifible World, but 
 only an External World. Neverthelefs, if 
 upon a due Perufal of what I have here 
 written, this feems yet to be wanting, I 
 fhall be ready, as foon as called upon, to give 
 my Reader the bell Satisfadtion I am capable 
 of as to this Matter. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 ARGUMENT VI. 
 
 AG A I N^ It is with me an Argument 
 againft the Being of an External 
 World, that there is no Hypothefts of Vifon^ 
 
 that 
 
. [ 9^ ] • 
 
 that I can imagine, or ever heard of, on the 
 Suppofition of fuch a World, but what in 
 the FaB or A6f of it implies an Impoflibi- 
 lity. 
 
 I pretend not to have converfed with the 
 Writings of Philofophers, however I am 
 fure not enough with their Perfons, to know 
 all the Opinions there are or may have been 
 about the M ethod of Vifion ; and fo muft 
 content myfelf with thofe that I have met 
 with, which are only thefe Two that at 
 this Time I can remember, or think worth 
 the Repeating. 
 
 One is the Arijiotelian^ or Old Account, 
 which fuppofes certain Images to scale off 
 from External Objects, and fly in at the 
 Eye, ^c. And the Other is the Carte/tan^ 
 or New Hypothefis, which, inftead of Ima- 
 ges or Refemblances of Objefts, fcaling off 
 from the Objects themfelves, accounts for 
 Vifion from the Refledtion of Subde Matter, 
 {vi%, that which proceeds in a direft Line 
 from the Sun) from the Objed: to thfe 
 Eye, ^r. 
 
 I ftand not here to enquire which of 
 thefe is true, or the moil probable Ac- 
 count of Vifion, on the Suppofition of an 
 External World, being here concerned not 
 in Fhi^icks^ but Metaphyftcks^ or an Enqui- 
 ry into Simple^ not Hypothetical^ Truth. 
 Neither am I concerned to confider thefe 
 
 Two 
 
[ 93 ] 
 
 Two Hypothefes apart, tho' they are fo 
 vaftly different ; for as different as they are 
 upon the Whole, they agree in all that 
 which I am concerned to take Notice of, 
 namely^ that the KQl of Vilion is the Ef- 
 fect of certain Parts of Matter, (whether 
 Images, or not,) which proceeding from 
 ^ the Objefts, refpedlively afFe(5t or act upon 
 the Optick Nerve, '^^c. 
 
 This is that which I take to be an Im- 
 poffibility, or fo attended with Difficulties 
 in the Adiu Exercito of it, as to be the near- 
 eft to an Impoffibility of any Thing that we 
 know of. For, 
 
 Firji^ Thefe Parts^ as being IMaterial or 
 Extended, muft needs be Impenetrable^ that 
 is, they muft each poffefs a Space by itfelf, 
 and cannot (two or more, much more an In- 
 finite Number of them) be crouded into 
 one Point, or the Place of one. Neverthe- 
 lefs it is poffible for a Man's Eye in one and 
 the fame Point to fee a Vaft and almoft In- 
 finite Number of ObjecSls which are in Hea- 
 ven and on Earth. There is then a Ne- 
 ceffity that from each of thefe Bodies there 
 fhould be communicated or fent a Line or 
 Train of fubtle Parts or Images upon the 
 one Point of the Eye, which, how it is pof- 
 fible to be in Fadfy I leave to be confidered 
 by all thofe Vv^ho profefs to know what they 
 mean when they fay, Bodies are Impenetrable, 
 
 Secondly^ 
 
[ 94 ] 
 
 Secondly^ There is not any one Point 
 in the Univerfe, wherein the Eye fuppofed 
 or fixed, cannot perceive an innumerable 
 Company of Objecfts. There is not then 
 any one Point in the Univerfe, wherein 
 Lines of fubtle Matter, or Images, from all 
 thefe fuppofed innumerable Objects, do not 
 aBually concentre. If this is thought poffible by 
 any, I muft be content to leave it with them, 
 fmce nothing is more evident with me, than 
 that the Fadt of this is utterly Impoffihle, 
 
 From thefe and fuch like Abfurdities, 
 which attend every Hypothefis of Vifion 
 in an External World, I think I am bound 
 to conclude that there is no fuch World. 
 For it feems to me at prefent, that if there 
 is an External World, one or other of thefe 
 Accounts of Vifion muft needs be the true^ 
 that is Fa5l, But as thefe appear to be 
 impojjible in Fa&^ they feem to derive their 
 Impoifibility upon the World which they 
 belong to, or which fuppofes them. 
 
 This, I fay, will follow, till fome other 
 Account of Vifion, in an External World, 
 be produced or named, which is not liable 
 to thefe, or any like Abfurdities ; or 
 which, even on the ConceJJton of an Exter- 
 nal World, may not plainly be demonftrated 
 to be falfe. 
 
 In the mean Time nothing of all this 
 affefts a Senftble or Viftble World, fuppofed 
 
 and 
 
[ 95 ] 
 
 and granted to be not External. For then 
 any Hypothefis of Vifion, which has no 
 other Faljhood in it, but what is derived 
 upon it from the Non-exiftence or Impof- 
 fibility of an External World, will be the 
 true Hypothefis^ or Account of Vifion. 
 For, by Truth in this Cafe, will then be 
 meant no other than the Will of God^ the 
 great Author of Nature who giveth us fuch 
 2i\\Afuch S^nfations^ by fuch and fuch Laivs. 
 And in this Senfe, a Law or Rule of Vifion, 
 may hePofible and even Truem its Caufe^xho 
 it has no Truth in its Self or is Impoffible in 
 Fa&, And fo, with this Explanation, I am 
 very ready to fay, that the Second, or Carte- 
 fan Account, is the true Hypothefis of Vifion. 
 For tho' there be indeed no External World, 
 yet fuch a World Exifts as far as it is pofji- 
 ble ; and it has been granted in the Begin- 
 ning, that it is according to the Will of 
 God, that the Vifible World fhould carry 
 in it every Charafter of being External, ex- 
 cept the Truth of Faft, which is abfolutely 
 impoffible. But the Difcovery of this laft 
 is within the Province of Metaphyfcks^ 
 which has to do only with fimple Being or 
 Exiftence ; whereas this about the Method 
 of Vifion is a Queftion of a groffer Size, 
 and a much lower Degree of Abftradlion ; 
 and its Refolution is to be fought for only in 
 the Will of God, by which he willed his 
 
 Creatures, 
 
[ 96 ] 
 
 Creatures, viz. Material Creatures. But in 
 tAis Will we fee an External World, even 
 an External Vifible World, as I obferved 
 juft now. So that this being the firft Will, 
 muft be Jirjl fuppofed^ or taken for granted 
 by Confent. And then, I believe, it will 
 be found that this Account of Vifion (as 
 well as feveral Parts of the fame Philofophy 
 which have been objected againft) will 
 have loft all its Difficulty, and muft pafs 
 for true. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 ARGUMENT VII. 
 
 A Gain^ as by an External World w^e are 
 -^-^ fuppofed to mean certain Obje(?l:s 
 which do not Exift in, or in Dependance on, 
 any Mind or Faculty of Perception, at leaft 
 of any Creature ; fo when I contemplate the 
 Idea of fuch a Self-fubjijiing Beings I profefs 
 I am put hard to it to reconcile it v/ith the 
 Charafter of a Creature^ or to difcover how 
 it can be underftood to fubfift at all on the 
 Mind, or Will, or Power of God, who is 
 fuppofed to be the Creator of it. For, 
 
 Firjl as to its Being fimplt/^ it is paft my 
 Skill to diftinguifh it from being Simple^ 
 Ahfolute^ or Univerfal, We are taught in- 
 deed 
 
[ 97 ] 
 
 deed to fay, that every Creature of God 
 needs the fame Power to preferve, which 
 was neceffary to the Creation of it ; and 
 Chriftian Philofophers are generally agreed, 
 that this Power of God is fo neceffary 
 to the Prefervation, or continued Being, 
 of every Creature as fuch, that it mufl 
 return to its Primitive Nothing, merely 
 from the AhJlraSiion or Withdrawing of this 
 Power. 
 
 But do we underfland what we fay when 
 we apply this Dodtrine to an External 
 World, either in the whole, or in the fe- 
 veral Parts of it ? We fee it indeed in the 
 Idea which we have of Creature, and in the 
 Abfurdities which attend an abfolute Exi- 
 flence applied to any Thing but God alone ; 
 but do we fee any fuch Dependance as to 
 Being or Exiflence, in the Idea which we 
 conceive of an External World ? Confider 
 but this Houfe^ this Tree^ this any Thing 
 amongfl the Objects of an External World, 
 or of the Vifible World, fuppos'd (as ufual) 
 to be External, is there any Sign of Weak- 
 nefs or Dependance in any of thefe Things 
 confider'd by us in this View ? Will not an 
 External Houfe fland or he, unlefs a Foreign 
 Power continue to fupport it ? Or does it 
 feem to us to be any Thing like thofe 
 Things of which we fpeak, when we fpeak 
 
 H of 
 
[ 98 ] 
 
 of certain Beings which have no Subfiftence 
 of their own, no Truth of Being but in 
 Relation or Refemblance^ and which would 
 ceafe to be, barely by an Abftra6lion of a " 
 fupporting Power, which is different from 
 the Things themfelves ? A Houfe indeed 
 may be a good, or ufeful, or convenient 
 Houfe, only as it Hands related to an Idea 
 in the Mind, or IntellecSl of its Maker, and 
 may be faid to Hand in its prefent Form^ 
 only as fupported by certain Foreign Caufes ; 
 but we are fpeaking here, not of the Exter- 
 nal Form, but of the fimple Truth or Being 
 of Things ; and even in this Refpeft we fay 
 that Things Subfift altogether by a Relati- 
 on to the Intellecfb, or in Dependance on 
 the Will of God. But I fay, does this 
 feem to be the Cafe of ag External Piece of 
 Matter ? Do we conceive this as having no 
 abfolute Being, or Subftance of its own ; as 
 a mere Nothing, but by Refemblance, and 
 what would ceafe to be on the Inftant of 
 the Ceifation of God's Will to preferve it ? 
 I know what another may Anfwer to all 
 thefe Queftions, and I cannot help it, let 
 Men Anfwer what they will; but flill I 
 muft infift and fay, that if another will af- 
 firm, that he thus conceives of External 
 Matter, he muft teach me to do the fame 
 from fome other Idea befides that of Crea- 
 ture, 
 
[ 99 ] 
 
 ture, namely^ from the Confideration of the 
 Thing itfelf ; or elfe I muft conclude that 
 he affirms this, not becaufe he underftands 
 any Thing of the Matter fpoken of, but 
 becaufe the Truth in general forces him 
 to fay this. But this is the chief Thing 
 which makes againft his Point. For to fay 
 that External Matter Exifts wholly on the 
 Will of God, becaufe this is the Condition 
 of a Creaturely Exiftence, is only to fay in 
 general, that the Exiftence of a Creature 
 is neceifarily thus dependant. But this is 
 what I affirm ; and hence arifes the Difficul- 
 ty, vi^, how we can conceive External 
 Matter to Exift by this Rule, or how to 
 reconcile the abfolute and ftable Exiftence 
 of Matter fuppos*d to be External, with 
 this neceflary and indifpenfable Character of 
 a Creature's Being. My Bufmefs is to deny 
 that there is any fuch Creature for this 
 Reafon, becaufe it carries in the Idea of it 
 an abfolute kind of Exiftence, which no 
 Creature is capable of; and for this I appeal 
 to the Judgment of all others ; fo that if 
 another will yet contend that there is any 
 fuch Creature, he muft not argue with me 
 that it does and muft fo Exift becaufe it is 
 a Creature, for this is plainly begging the 
 Queftion ; but muft make Anfwer on the 
 other Hand, how a Creature, which is and 
 muft be underftood to have a Self-fubfi- 
 
 H 2 ftence. 
 
[ lOO ] 
 
 Hence, or a proper Subftance of its own, 
 can be laid to Exift, whilft it is acknow- 
 ledged, as before, tbat every Creature, as 
 fuch, Exifts altogether in Dependance on 
 the Power or Will of God. This is the 
 Difficulty which attends an External World, 
 confider'd in its feveral Parts, And 
 this. 
 
 Secondly^ Is rather increafed, if we con- 
 fider it in the whole ; for then nothing 
 but its Expanjion comes under Confidera- 
 tion. And this is plainly Infinite. And if 
 not Infinite Nothings mufl be Infinite Some- 
 things that is. Being or Subftance. But is 
 there any Thing in this Idea which fquares 
 with the indifpenfable Charafter of a Crea- 
 ture ? For this I appeal to every one's Idea 
 of an Expanded Univerfe, particularly to 
 theirs, who (if I may guefs,) are not a 
 few, who from the Confideration of the 
 Firm and Subftantial Exiftence of the Vi- 
 fible World, fuppofed by them to be Ex- 
 ternal, think themfelves compelled to be- 
 lieve, that fimple Space or Extenfion is 
 the very Subftance of God himfelf ; and 
 therefore how to conceive it poffible that 
 fuch a Thing fhou'd Exift, which on one 
 Hand we are compelled to call a Creature^ 
 and on the other cannot forbear to under- 
 ftand as God^ I leave to be explained by 
 thofe who yet retain any Fondnefs for 
 
 fuch 
 
[ loi ] 
 
 fach a Thing. Thus much of the Exi- 
 ftence fimple of an External World ; I 
 come next to confider the Unity which it 
 implies. 
 
 Here then I obferve, that an External 
 World implies in it all the Unity, which 
 any Being whatfoever, which Univerfal 
 Being, which God himfelf, is capable of. 
 
 Confider it in its whole^ and it has the 
 Unity of Infinity. It is one alone^ and is 
 abfolutely incapable of being multiplied by 
 any Power whatfoever ; which is as much 
 as can be faid of God, and even more than 
 they have a Right to fay, who confider 
 him, not as Univerfal, but fome Particular 
 Being. Confider it in its feveral Parts^ or 
 Bodies included in it, and each Particle of 
 Matter has fuch a Unity in, or Identity 
 with itfelf, as I think fhou'd not be afcribed 
 to any Thing but God, who alone is the 
 fame Tejierdat/^ to Da^^ and for Ever, Again^ 
 I confider. That an External World is In- 
 dependent on the Will of God, confider'd 
 in its Expanfion, which will and mud be 
 Infinite^ whether God pleafes to Make, or 
 Will it to be fo or not, fuppofing only that 
 he Wills to produce or Make any the leaft 
 Extent, or that any the leaft Part or Extent 
 is Made, or in Being. 
 
 As for Inftance, Let God be fuppofed to 
 Will the Being of a certain Cubical Part of 
 
 H 3 Mat- 
 
[ 102 ] 
 
 Matter or Extenfion, about the Bignefs of 
 a common Die. This, I fay, is impoflible 
 in Fa6t, and this draws another Impoflibi- 
 lity after it, which is, that by this the Will 
 of God is over-ruled or fruftrated by the 
 Work of his own Hands. For what fhou'd 
 bound this Cubical Extent ? It muft be 
 Something or Nothing. If Nothing, it is 
 plainly Infinite; if fomething, it muft be 
 Matter or Extenfion ; and then the fame 
 Queftion returns, and will infinitely return, 
 or be never fatisfied under an Extent aftually 
 infinite. But this is an Independency of 
 Being, which I think can belong to no Crea- 
 ture, it being the fame with that which 
 we ufe to call necejfary Kxijlence, I con- 
 clude therefore that there is no fuch Crea- 
 ture as an External World. 
 
 Lajily^ Much the fame Sort of Difficulty 
 occurs if we confider it in Not Beings 
 after it has been fuppofed to Exift. That 
 God can Annihilate every Creature which 
 he has made, is, I think, a Maxim undif- 
 puted by any ; if fo, I think it plainly fol- 
 lows, that that which in its Idea implies an 
 utter Impoffibility of being Annihilated, is 
 a Thing in Facft impoffible. But this, I 
 fay, is the Cafe or Implication of an Ex- 
 ternal World. This is evident from the 
 foregoing Article, which fhews the abfo- 
 lute Neceffity of its being Infinite, on the 
 
 Suppo- 
 
[ 103 ] 
 
 Suppofition of the being of but the leaft Part 
 or Particle of it : For certainly if nothing 
 lefs than Infinite can Exift, or be Made, no 
 Part of this Infinite can be Unmade, or 
 Annihilated. And therefore tho' in Words 
 we may fay that God can Annihilate any 
 Part of it, yet we utter that in Words, of 
 which we can have no Conception, but ra- 
 ther the contrary to it. For Annihilate it 
 in Suppofition as often as you will, yet ftill 
 it returns upon you ; and whilft you wou'd 
 conceive it as Nothings it becomes Something 
 to you againft your Will ; and it is impof- 
 fible to think otherwife, whatever we may 
 
 I believe I fhou d lofe my Time and 
 Pains if I fhou'd attempt in this Place to 
 fhew, that the Suppofition of a Vijible^ 
 which is not an External World, is attend- 
 ed with none of thefe Difficulties. This 
 wou'd be a thanklefs Office with all thofe 
 who are not yet convinced, but that an 
 External World may yet ftand, notwith- 
 ftanding thefe pretended Difficulties ; and 
 it wou'd be an Injury to thofe that are^ as 
 preventing them in certain pleafant and 
 very eafie Confiderations. And fo I leave 
 it to take its Chance with all my Readers in 
 common. 
 
 H 4 CHAP. 
 
I 104 1 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 ARGUMENT VIII. 
 
 A Not her Difficulty which ftill attends 
 -^-^ the Notion of an External World, is, 
 that if any fuch World Exifts, there feems 
 to be no Poffibility of Conceiving, but that 
 God himfelf muft be Extended with it. 
 
 This I take to be Abfurdity enough in 
 Reafon, to hinder us from fuppofing any 
 fuch World. But fo unfortunate are the 
 Stars of this Idol of our Imagination, that 
 it is as much impoffible, on another Ac- 
 count, that it fhou'd Exift, tho' this were 
 no Abfurdity, or though it were fuppofed 
 and allowed that God himfelf were Ex- 
 tended. 
 
 I fuppofe then in the Firji Place, that 
 God is not Extended. If fo, I fay there 
 can be no External World. For if there 
 be an External World, and if it be a Crea- 
 ture, we muft fuppofe that God is every 
 where prefent i«, and with it; for he is 
 fuppofed to preferve and do every Thing 
 that is done in it. To deny this, is to fhut 
 him out of the Univerfe, even altogether 
 to deny his Being. On the contrary, to 
 affirm that he is thus Prefent with every 
 
 Part 
 
[ I05 ] >^^;Sg^^gP^ 
 
 Part and Particle of it, is to make him Co- 
 extended^ which is contrary to the Suppo- 
 fition. 
 
 Yes, it may be faid, God is Extended, 
 and confequently there may be an Exter- 
 nal World, notwithftanding this Dilemma. 
 I Anfwer, 
 
 Secondly^ Be it fo, that he is Extended, 
 (to humour a corrupt and abfurd Itch of 
 Argumentation,) yet this Nothing avails 
 towards the Being of an External World, 
 but diredtly towards the Non-exiftence of 
 it. For ii God be Extended, and as we 
 muft alfo fay, infinitely extended, where 
 {hall we find Room for an External World ? 
 Can Two Extenfions, infinite Extenfions, 
 Coexift ? This is evidently impoffible. So 
 that all the Choice we are left to is to ac- 
 knowledge God or an External World ; 
 which, I think, is a Choice we need not 
 long be deliberating upon. I conclude 
 therefore, that if God is, there is no Ex- 
 ternal World. 
 
 I know but one Way of anfwering this 
 Argument, and that is, to affirm that an 
 External World is God himfelf, and not a 
 Creature of God. But 'till fome one fhall 
 be fo hardy as to appear publickly in De- 
 fence of this, I fhall think it but a Lofs of 
 Time and Pains to confider of or debate 
 it. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ io6 ] 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 ARGUMENT IX. 
 
 IPromifed in fome Part of Argument IV. 
 that I wou'd confider farther of what 
 Philofophers fay of External Matter; and 
 here I intend to be as good as my Word. 
 
 I have fhewn in my (^) former Part of 
 this Treatife, that the Matter fo much dif- 
 puted of by Philofophers is not under- 
 ftood by them to be Vifible. This of itfelf 
 is an Argument that they had, or cou'd 
 pretend to have, but a very faint and im- 
 perfect Idea of the Thing they were fpeak- 
 ing of. Accordingly I fhall here proceed to 
 fhew, that they neither did, nor cou'd pre- 
 tend to mean any Thing at all by it. 
 And, 
 
 F'trji^ for the Definitions which they 
 have deliver'd to us of Matter, Arifiotle 
 defines it thus. *H uX?? Skinov g| » ymran rt. 
 Materia efi ex qua Res^ vel aliquod efi. 
 This, by no inconfiderable f Philofopher, 
 is called optima Definitio Materia, And the 
 fame is by Baronius [Metaph, Pag. 172.) 
 defin'd thus : Materia Subftantialis efi Sub- 
 
 fiantia 
 
 * Chap. I. Sect. 11. Argument V. f Scheib. Met. Cap. 22, 
 158. 
 
£. I07 ] 
 
 Jlantia incompleta in qua Forma aliqua fub- 
 Jiantialh exijiit. And fometimes again 
 thus, Subjiantia incompleta capax formce, 
 
 Thefe are all the Definitions that I fhall 
 mention, and thefe I fuppofe are fuflScient 
 to convince us that they meant nothing at 
 all by the Matter which they here fpeak of. 
 For what is there in either of thefe Defini- 
 tions befides the indeterminate Notion of 
 Being in General^ that is. Something, but 
 Nobody knows what, or whether it be any 
 Thing at all or no. This I fay is all that I 
 can make or underftand by it; and this 
 amounts to the fame, as if they had told us 
 in plain Words, that they mean nothing at 
 all. But this, 
 
 Secondli/^ they tell us yet more expresfly 
 in the Defcriptions and Gharadlers which 
 they give of Matter. 
 
 As for Inftance* Baronius delivers it as 
 the common Senfe of all Philofophers, that 
 Materia non ejl in pradicamento^ and that 
 non habet proprie di&um Genus, This is the 
 fame as if he had told us in exprefs Words, 
 that the moll they mean by it, is being in- 
 definite, or fomething, but they know not 
 what. For that which is not in the Predi- 
 caments, is allow'd to be neither Subftance 
 nor Accident^ (unlefs it be God, or Uni- 
 verfal Being,) and what is neither of thefe 
 is confeffedly nothing at all. Again, 
 
 * Met. p. 189 
 
[ 108] 
 
 Again, St. Aujlin is always quoted by 
 Philofophers for his Defcription of Matter, 
 as an Explanation of the common Meaning, 
 and it is thus * expreft. Materia eft tnHma 
 omnium rerum^ ^ prope nihil. 
 
 Much after the fame Manner it is de- 
 fcrib'd by Porphyry, Materia prima ex fe 
 eji incorporea^ neq ; intelledlus, neq ; anima, 
 neq; aliudfecundumfe vivens, informis^ immu- 
 tabilis^ injinita^ impotens ^quapropter neque ens^ 
 fed verum non-ens. But this is a little more 
 than prope nihil^ and I fuppofe may be faid 
 to amount fully to the Senfe of the Englijh 
 Word, Nothing, 
 
 In like Manner Arijlotle himfelf, who 
 has given almoft all other Philofophers 
 their Cue, is for nothing better known 
 than for his moft Intelligible Defcription of 
 Subftantial Matter. He calls it, Nee Quid^ 
 nee Quale^ nee Quantum ; to which I think 
 I may fairly add, Nee AUquid^ as the pro- 
 per Senfe and Confequence of this Defcrip- 
 tion. Nay, to confirm this as the true 
 Interpretation and Defign of his Words, I 
 have many times feen him quoted by his 
 Followers, for faying pofitively that Materia 
 ejl non Ens ; one Inftance of which I parti- 
 cularly remember, vi%, Scheibl. Metaph, 
 Cap, 2 2. 167. 
 
 Perhaps 
 
 ♦ L. 12. Confofs. Cap. 7. t ^»^- de Occafionih, c. 21. 
 
[109] 
 
 Perhaps fo, you will fay, but yet all 
 Philofophers are agreed in the Being of it, 
 and all argue it to Be, or to have a Real 
 Exiftence. I Anfwer, 
 
 Ftrjl^ If they will contradict their own 
 Pofitions, as it is not in my Power to help, 
 fo it is hard that I fhould fufFer for it. 
 But Secondly^ how is it that they argue the 
 Exiftence of Matter ? Do they argue it 
 with a fuppofed Adverfary^ or only with 
 them/elves f If with them/elves only, this is 
 nothing at all ; for in this Cafe they may 
 have the Queftion for afking ; and fo this 
 kind of arguing is only Grimace and Ban- 
 ter. But if they argue it with an Adverfa- 
 ry, who is fuppofed to doubt it, I am this 
 Adverfary, and let their Reafons be pro- 
 duced. 
 
 In the mean Time I affirm that they 
 argue only with them/elves ; that is, they 
 grant themfelves the Queftion, upon all 
 Occafions, and whenfoever they pleafe. 
 
 Their Arguments are fuch as thefe, fome 
 of which I have mentioned * already. 
 
 Matter Is, or Exifts, fay they, becaufe it 
 Is, or is fuppofed to be Created. Here the 
 Adverfary, if any, is fuppofed to grant 
 that it is Createdy but yet to doubt whether 
 it Is, or Exifts, or not. That is, he is 
 
 fup- 
 
 * Part I. Chap. I. Sect. II. Arg. VI. 
 
[ "o ] 
 
 fuppofed to be a drivelling Fool, or no 
 Adverfary at all, which is plainly the 
 Cafe. 
 
 Again^ Matter Is, or Exifts, becaufe it 
 is fuppofed to be Part of a real Compojitum, 
 This is the very fame Cafe as before. 
 
 For furely whoever can be brought to 
 grant that it is a real Part of ,a Compojitum^ 
 cannot be fuppofed to doubt whether it Exifts 
 or not 
 
 Again, if Matter were Nothing, it cou'd 
 do nothing, it cou'd not be the Subjedl of 
 Generation and Corruption; but this laft 
 is fuppofed (Thanks to the kind Oppo- 
 nent!) Ergo^ Matter is not Nothing. 
 
 Again y (faith Chrijiopher Scheibler^ Cap, 
 15, 45.) Materia hahet EJfentiam^ quia 
 Ens eji. And with the fame eafe you are 
 told by all Philofophers together, that Ens 
 ejl quod hahet EJJentiam, This is round 
 about our Coal-fire, in other Words, ar- 
 guing in a Circle^ or no arguing at all. 
 
 Again^ [Cap, 22, 167.) he puts the 
 Queftion fimply. An materia Jit Ens f And 
 this is the Refolution of it. If Matter were 
 not Ens^ it wou'd be the fame Thing to fay, 
 that any Thing^/ ex nihilo^ as Ex Materia, 
 And again^ it mujl be Somethifig^ becaufe 
 Something is conftituted of it. 
 
 Thefe and fuch like (for I am tired with 
 repeating them) are the mighty Arguments 
 
 by 
 
[ III ] 
 
 by which Philofophers demonftrate the 
 Being of External Matter, If you will take 
 their Words you may ; For I think nothing 
 is more evident than that this is all you 
 have to do in the Cafe; unlefs (which I 
 think much more advifeable) you will 
 chufe to believe with me, that they never 
 defigned any other than to amufe the Igno- 
 rant^ but yet to give every Intelligent Rea- 
 der an Item^ by this Procedure, that the 
 Matter they are fpeaking about is nothing at 
 all. 
 
 If fo, I have a vaft Authority on my Side ; 
 Which^ if not fufficient to inforce the Con- 
 clufion fimply with all Readers, becaufe fome 
 there may be who have but little Opinion 
 of this kind of Authority, yet with all muft 
 have this EfFe6l, to remove the Prejudice 
 which may lye on their Minds againil this 
 my Conclufion, on the Account of its ap- 
 pearing Strangenefs and Novelty, And tho' 
 fome Authors on certain Subjects may 
 have good Reafon rather to cherijh than 
 lejfen the Opinion of their Novelty^ yet 
 confidering all Things, if I were certain to 
 have removed what thefe are fuppofed to 
 defire by any Thing I have faid in the pre- 
 fent Chapter, I am perfwaded it would avail 
 me more in the Event, than Ten Thoufand 
 the moft evident Demonftrations without 
 it. And indeed it was the Profped: of this 
 
 EfFea 
 
[ I'2 ] 
 
 EfFedt alone, which induced me to Number 
 this Chapter amongft my Arguments againft 
 the Being of an External World. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 Obje&ions Anfwerd, 
 
 BU T now it is Time to attend to what 
 may be urged on the other Side, vi%, 
 in Favour of an External World. 
 
 But what Favour can belong, or be due, 
 to that which is, or can be of no Ufe, if 
 it were in Being, ivhich is all over Gon- 
 tradidlion, which is contrary to the Truth 
 and Being of God, and after all is fuppofed 
 to be utterly unknown ? Who wou'd ever 
 attempt to form an Argument for the Be- 
 ing of fach a Thing as this ? For as un- 
 known^ it muft be fuppofed to be Nothings 
 even by thofe who are preparing themfelves 
 to prove that it is Something. So that well 
 may all particular Objections be faid to be 
 falfe or infufficient, when it is againft the 
 Suppofition of the Queftion to fuppofe any 
 Objedlions at all, or but the FoJfih'iUty of an 
 Objedlion. 
 
 Never- 
 
[ "3 ] 
 
 Neverthelefs, where Men are thoroughly 
 inclined to hold fall their Point, notwith- 
 ftanding all the Evidence in the World to 
 the contrary, there is a poflible Room for 
 Two or Three Things, which, for ought 
 I know, fome Perfons may call Ohjedlions, 
 And they are thefe that follow. 
 
 Obje&ion I. 
 
 Does not the Scripture aflure us of the 
 Exiflence of an External World ? 
 
 Anfwer, 
 
 1. Not as I know of. If it does you 
 wou'd do well to name to me that Text 
 wherein this is revealed to us; otherwife 
 I have no Way to Anfwer this Objeftion 
 but that of taking into Confideration every 
 Sentence in the whole Bible, which I am 
 fure you vnll believe is more than I need 
 do. But, 
 
 2. To do this Objeftion all the Right I 
 can, I will fuppofe a PafTage or Two in the 
 Word of God ; and I fhould think, if fuch 
 a one is anywhere to be found, it will be 
 in the Firjl Chapter of Genejis^ where 
 Mofes fpeaks of the Creation of the Ma- 
 terial World. Here it is faid, that In the 
 Beginning God created the Heaven and the 
 
 I Earthy 
 
[ 114 ] 
 
 Earthy and alfo that all Material Things 
 were made fome Days before the firft Man, 
 and fo cannot be faid to Exift only relatively 
 on the Mind of Man. To this 1 An- 
 fwer, 
 
 I. This Obje6lion from Scripture is ta- 
 ken from Mr. * Malebranche^ and is his 
 laft Refort on which to found the Being of 
 an External World. But then the Exter- 
 nal World, which he contends for, is prov'd 
 by him before, and here fuppos'd to be no 
 Objedt of Senfe, and confequently Invifible. 
 And it was for this Reafon (it being an 
 Objection peculiar to this Author) that I 
 deferr'd the Mention of it to this Place, 
 where alfo an External World is fuppofed 
 to be Invifible. Here then my Anfwer to 
 the Author is this, that the Tendency of 
 this Paflage of Scripture is not to prove the 
 Being of an External (fuppos'd to be an) 
 Invifible World, but the External Being or 
 Exiftence of the Vifible World ; For it is 
 here fuppos'd that the Vifible World Exifted 
 before the firft Man faw it. But this is as 
 much againft himfelf as me, and there- 
 fore is no Objection, as coming from that 
 Quarter. But another may think that 
 there is an Anfwer due, not only to the 
 Author^ but to the ObjeElion itfelf ; be it fo. 
 I Anfwer, 2. That 
 
 * Search. lUuftr. Tom. 1 1. Pag. 114. Taylor's Tranfla- 
 tion. Ed. 2. 
 
[ "5 ] 
 
 2. That it feems to me there is nothing 
 in this PaiTage which affirms the Vifible 
 World to be External, And my reafon for 
 this is, becaufe there is nothing in it but 
 what is very confiftent with believing that 
 the Vifible World is not External. 
 
 For Firji^ Is it faid that God created 
 the Heaven and Earth ; Meaning b y it, 
 that all thofe Things which either we or 
 any other intelligent Creatures behold, are 
 not their own Caufes of Exiftence, or of 
 an Exiftence necejfari/^ but receive and de- 
 rive their whole Being from another Caufe, 
 viz, God ? Is any Thing of this denied in 
 Confequence of affirming, that a Vifible Ob- 
 jedl, as fuch, is not External ? Or, does this 
 make it to be of neceflary Exiftence, or to 
 be its own Caufe, or to be the Effedt of any 
 Thing but the Will of God, who after 
 the Counfel of his own Will gives or 
 caufes fuch and fuch Senfations in us ? Or 
 Secondly^ is there (as fome learned Inter- 
 preters have thought) a particular fenfe 
 and meaning in the Words, In Principio^ 
 E'v oi,pyij or JT'ti^J^'il as if one Defign of the 
 Text was to tell us, that God the Father 
 made all Things by, and thro', and in^ his 
 Son,^ who is frequently in Scripture Cha- 
 radterized by this as by a proper Name ? If 
 fo, is it inconfiftent with this Do6lrine to 
 hold that a Vifible Objeft, as fuch, is not 
 " I 2 External 
 
[ "6 ] 
 
 External to the Mind or Faculty which per- 
 ceives it ? So far from this, that this Do- 
 (5lrine feems to be intelligible only on this 
 Hypothecs; and I think I have fhewn al- 
 ready, that an External World, as fuch, 
 (whether Vifible or Invifible) is of too ab- 
 folute an Exiftence to Exift only in the 
 Mind or Will of God, or the Son of God, 
 as every Creature is faid to do in this Text. 
 So that if this Text, thus interpreted, 
 proves any Thing to the prefent Purpofe, 
 it proves the contrary to that which it is 
 alleg'd for. Or Thirdly^ Is it faid, that 
 the Vifible World Exifted, or had its Being, 
 before the firft Man Adam was created? 
 And did it not thus Exift when K^xn be- 
 held it, when it had paft the Wifdom^ and 
 was come into the Will of God ? Or might 
 not the Angels fee and live in it, (who 
 knows how long ?) before the Man whom 
 we call Adam was produced into Being ? 
 Or Lajllyy muft all this go for Nothing be- 
 caufe of the little Syallable The^ which is 
 prefixt in the Text to the Words Heaven 
 and Earth f As if by this we were oblig'd to 
 underftand an abfolute and ftrift Identity 
 between the Vifible World, confider'd in 
 the Will of God, or in the Minds of the 
 Angels, and that which was afterwards 
 perceiv'd by Adam ? This is a flender 
 Thread indeed, whereon to hang the whole 
 
 Weight 
 
f "7 ] 
 
 Weight of an Univerfe. But muft I my- 
 felf be forbid the Ufe of this important 
 Word The^ becaufe I hold that a Vifible 
 Objed: is not External ; and becaufe in 
 Confequence of this Pofition there will be 
 found only an Identity of Similitude between 
 the Vifible World which God made in the 
 Beginning, and that which Adam had a 
 Senfation of; and confequently between 
 that which Peter and that which John fees, 
 at the fame or different Times? Muft I 
 never fay that I have feen the Sun, becaufe 
 on my Hypothefis the Sun which I am 
 fuppos'd to fee, is not the fame Jiridili/ with 
 that which God feeth, or which is feen by 
 another Perfon ? And muft I for this Rea- 
 fon never ufe the Expreflion of the Vifible 
 World, the Heaven and Earth, Eff^:. f But 
 then, will that be denied to God, which is 
 and muft be allowed to me ? Where then 
 is there fo much as an Appearance of an 
 Objedlion in the Text before us ? For my 
 Part, I can fee none, either in this, or any 
 other that I know of, in the Word of God, 
 but what is fully anfwerd in what I have 
 replied to this ; and therefore cannot but 
 believe that it would be Time ill-fpent to 
 fuppofe or name any other. Yet Thirdli^y 
 Others I might very eafily name, fuch as 
 thofe which fpeak of the Apparition of An- 
 gels, of feveral Miracles, (particularly that 
 
 I 3 of 
 
[ "8 ] 
 
 of coming into a Room whilft the Doors 
 were fhut, ^r.) which fuppofe the Vifi- 
 ble World to be not External, which would 
 be turning the Objector's Cannon againft 
 himfelf. But I fhall fpare my Reader, the 
 Objedlor, and myfelf, and fo add no more 
 Particulars to my Anfwer in this Place. 
 
 Ohjedl'ion II. 
 
 Is there no Allowance due or to be made 
 to that ftrong and natural Inclination which 
 all Men have to believe an External 
 World? 
 
 Anfwer I. 
 
 You may remember the Mention of this 
 Objedlion* before, where I told you it is 
 the Argument by which Mr. Des Cartes 
 fatisfied himfelf of the Exiftence of an 
 External World. 
 
 In my Anfwer to it I fuppos'd Two Things, 
 either that by an External World was 
 meant the Being of a World, which, as Ex- 
 ternal, is fuppos'd to be Invifihle^ or the 
 External Being of the Vifihle World. To 
 the lajl of thefe Meanings I have given in 
 my Anfwer, which my Reader either does 
 
 or 
 
 • Part I. Chap. II. Objection III. 
 
[ "9 ] 
 
 or may recolledl at Pleafure. I am now 
 (according to my Promife, in that Place) 
 to make Anfwer to this Objedlion in the 
 Firfl of the foremention'd Meanings. 
 
 This, in all Right and Reafon, fhould 
 be the true Intent and Meaning of this great 
 Philofopher. For my own Part I think I 
 could very eafily fhew, that either he muft 
 mean this, or be inconfiftent with himfelf, 
 which is to mean nothing at all ; and if 
 fb, the Objediion is anfwer 'd before any 
 Part of it is confider'd. But I need not be 
 at the Trouble of entering into this Inquiry, 
 it being fufficient in this Place to fhew, that 
 in the Senfe fuppos'd it has not the Rea- 
 lity, or fo much as the Pretence, of being an 
 Argument. And that is done in a Word, 
 by denying the Suppofition of it, which is, 
 that we have any the lead Inclination to be- 
 lieve the Exiftence of an External World, 
 fuppos'd to be Invifible. This is evident at 
 firft Sight, and yet this alone deftroys the 
 whole Force of the ObjecSlion. " Strange ! 
 " That a Perfon of Mr. Des Cartes' s Saga- 
 " city fhould be found in fo plain and 
 " palpable an Overfight ; and that the late 
 " Ingenious Mr. Norris fhould be found 
 " treading in the fame Track, and that 
 " too upon a Solemn and Particular Difqui- 
 " fition of this Matter. That whilfl on 
 " one Hand they contend againft the com- 
 
 I 4 " mon 
 
[ 120 1 
 
 " mon Inclination or Prejudice of Mankind, 
 " that the Vifible World is not External, 
 " they fhould yet appeal to this fame com- 
 " mon Inclination for the Truth or Being 
 "of an External World, which on their 
 '' own Principles muft be faid to be Invi- 
 *' fible, and for which therefore (they 
 " muft needs have known if they had con- 
 " fider'd it) there neither is, nor can be, 
 " any kind of Inclination, 
 
 Well, you'll fay, but is there no Allow- 
 ance due to the natural Inclination, which 
 we all have to believe that the Vifible 
 World is External, and confequently this 
 Way, that there is an External World ? 
 
 Anfwer II. 
 
 Yes certainly, provided you believe the 
 Truth, vi%, that there neither is, nor can 
 be, any fuch Thing as an External World, 
 you may freely make Ufe of the common 
 Language, (which is a Creature of God, 
 and which by his MeiTengers, and even in 
 his own Perfon, he has fandtified to us the 
 Ufe of, if we believe the Truth,) notwith- 
 ftanding that there is fcarce a Word in it 
 but what fuppofes the Being of an External 
 World, or that the Vifible World is Exter- 
 nal. It is the Truth which makes us Free, 
 and they only are in Bondage who are ig- 
 norant 
 
[ 121 ] 
 
 norant of the Truth, or refufe to admit it* 
 If therefore it be true, that there is no 
 External World, common Language is in- 
 deed extremely corrupt; but they only are 
 involvM in this Corruption who know not 
 this Truth, or deny the Evidence of it. 
 And the fame Arguments by which it is 
 demonftrated to be a Truth, prove the Ufe 
 of all Language unclean to fuch as thefe. 
 For fuch are Servants to the Power of a 
 corrupt Language, and know not their 
 Right of Freedom from it ; and this makes 
 them guilty of all the Errors which it fup- 
 pofes. Whereas thofe who know and 
 believe this Truth, are free to ufe any 
 Language or Way of Speaking, wherein 
 this Truth is not formality or diredlly con- 
 tradidled, without being accountable for 
 the Corruption of Human Language. Thus 
 we believe the Circumvolution of the Earth, 
 and the Central Reft of the Sun, according 
 to the Copernican Syftem ; but yet fo much 
 is due to the Natural Inclination which we 
 all find in ourfelves to believe the contrary, 
 as to excufe and juftifie us in the Ufe of a 
 Language altogether Ptolemaic, Thus we 
 know and can demonftrate, that the Light 
 which we behold is not any Property or 
 Affedlion of the Sun, fuppos'd to be in the 
 Heavens ; but an Affe6tion in, or belonging 
 to, ourfelves; yet we are altogether free 
 
 from 
 
[ 122 ] 
 
 from the Error of fuppofing the contrary, 
 tho' we often fay that the Sun is luminous, 
 or Words to that EfFe6l. Thus again^ when 
 the Sun fhines full in our Face, tho' we 
 know for certain that the Pain we feel 
 is not in our Eye, but only in our Souls, yet 
 fo much is due to the Natural Inclination, 
 whereby we judge that all Senfations are in 
 our Bodies, that we are free on a Thoufand 
 Occafions to fuppofe the contrary in Words, 
 as we always do when we fay, that the 
 Light of the Sun affl'iBs our Eyes, or makes 
 them fore, that our Head or Tooth akes^ 
 or other Words to this Purpofe. Thus 
 lq/ili/, (to go but one Step higher, even 
 that one which mounts us into that Re- 
 gion of Truth or Abftradtion which the 
 prefent Theory fuppofes us to be in,) tho' 
 we know (as by this Time I hope we know) 
 that an External World is a Being abfolutely 
 impofTible ; i/et^ or rather becaufe we know 
 this, we are, on infinite Occafions, free 
 from the Error on the contrary Side, tho' 
 we ufe a Language which continually fup- 
 pofes the Vifible World to be External. 
 This I fay is the Liberty of believing the 
 Truth, and this Truth thus believ'd does 
 fo fully fanctifie even a corrupt and errone- 
 ous Language to our Ufe, as to make it our 
 Duty, as well as Liberty ^ (even a Debt we 
 owe to the great Author of Nature and of 
 
 Language,) 
 
[ 123 ] 
 
 Language,) to exprefs our Minds to each 
 other in a Way fuitable to our prefent State, 
 tho' both our Nature and our Language 
 fuggeft and fuppofe the contrary to this 
 Truth. And now I hope this Objedlion is 
 fully anfwer'd. But I expert another in its 
 Place, (which is near about the fame as to 
 Force and Confequence,) and that is to 
 be told. 
 
 Ohjediion IIL 
 
 That the late judicious Mr. Norrisy who 
 (in his Ideal World, Vol L Chap, IV.) 
 purpofely confider'd this Queftion of an 
 External World, was yet fo far from con- 
 cluding as I have here done, that he de- 
 clares it to be no other than errant Scepti- 
 cifrn to make a ferious Doubt or Queftion of 
 its Exiftence. 
 
 Anfwer, 
 
 I have chofen to place this in the Form 
 of an Objedtion, that I may feem rather to de- 
 fend myfelf, than voluntarily oppofe this 
 Author, for whofe Writings and Memory I 
 have a great Efteem. But what fhall I fay in 
 this Cafe ? Muft I give up all the Arguments 
 by which I have fhewn that there is no Ex- 
 ternal World, in Complaifance to this Cen- 
 
 furct 
 
[ 124 ] 
 
 fure^ becaufe it is the Great and Excellent 
 Mr. Norris\ \ But has he fupported this 
 Saying by any Arguments in favour of 
 that which he calls it Sceptictfm to doubt 
 of? Has he proved an External World to 
 be of the Number of thofe evident Truths 
 which are of no reafonable Doubt, nor to be 
 ferioufly queftioned by any fober Under- 
 ftanding ? Or fo much as pretended to An- 
 fwer any Argument alledged for its Non- 
 Exiftence ? No, not a Word of this is to be 
 found in the whole Chapter, unlefs the Ar- 
 gument from Inclination^ which is the Sub- 
 je6t of the former Obje6tion, will be here 
 named againft me. Well then, and muft 
 this too pafs for an Argument, notwith- 
 ftanding that I have fhewn the Weaknefs of 
 it? And fo, muft all that I have hitherto 
 contended for, fubmit to the Power of this 
 great Authority^ on Peril of my being thought 
 a Sceptic? 
 
 But is not this the Way to be betray'd 
 into the very Dregs of Scepticifm^ to make 
 a Doubt of one's own moft evident Percep- 
 tions for fear of this Imputation ? Or can 
 a Man give better Proof that this does not 
 belong to him, than by putting (as I have 
 all along done) his Caufe or Aflertion on 
 the IfTue of a fair Debate on plain Reafon 
 and Argument f And can any Thing be a 
 plainer Mark of Scepticifm than to refufe 
 
 to 
 
[ '25 ] 
 
 to ftand, or be concluded by this IfTue, ap- 
 pealing from thence to Judgment or Autho- 
 rity f This is what I faid from the begin- 
 ning, and I have fhew'd it, I think, in every 
 Inftance of an Objeftion fmce, that my Ad- 
 verfary all along is no other than Prejudice^ 
 which Informal Scepticifm ; and yet nothing 
 has been fo conftantly charged againft my- 
 felf as this very Imputation. And it is this 
 alone which has made it fo confiderable with 
 me, as to fet formally about an Anfwer 
 to it. 
 
 But to fpeak particularly to the Author's 
 Cenfure, with which we are at prefent 
 concerned. 
 
 Is it fo much as true in Fa5l that he 
 has faid any fuch Thing as is affirmed in the 
 Objection ? This perhaps even a Sceptic will 
 contend fairly with me; for Fa6ls are the 
 Things they are obferved to be moft fond of. 
 Well, let this be tried (as it ought to be) 
 by his own Words. 
 
 There are Two, and as I remember but 
 Two, Paflages in this Chapter which fpeak 
 at all to this Purpofe. One is Page i88, the 
 other 205. In the Firfi of thefe I imme- 
 diately find thefe ^\ ords. Much lefs *wou^d 
 I he fufpeBed of indulging a Sceptical Hu- 
 mour^ under Colour of Philofophical Doubt- 
 ing^ to fuch an Extravagance as to make 
 any ferious Quejiion of that General and Col- 
 
 ledlive 
 
[ 126 ] 
 
 leElive ObjeB of Senfe a Natural World: 
 The other is this ; But as to the Exijlence of 
 Bodies^ thd" it be a Thing of no reafonahle 
 Doubt ^ nor to be ferioufly quef toned bi/ any 
 fober Underjlanding^ &c. 
 
 Here the Thing that is not to be doubted 
 of, (at the Hazard of the Sobriety of our 
 Underftanding, and upon Peril of Scepti- 
 cifm,) is the Exijlence of Bodies, the Exi- 
 fence of a Natural World, which isfuppofed 
 to be the Objeft of Senfe, Well, and what 
 is this to me ? Have I been doubting of the 
 Exifence of Bodies f Or of the Natural or 
 Senfible World ? Let the meaneft of my 
 Readers be my Witnefs, that I have been fo 
 far from doubting of any Thing of this, 
 that I have even contended on all Occafions 
 that nothing is or can be more evident than 
 the Exifence of Bodies^ or of a Senfble 
 World. Have I repeated the fame Thing 
 fome Hundreds of Times, and yet ftill is 
 there Need to have it obferved, that an Ex- 
 ternal World is the moot Point between us ? 
 That, not the Exifence^ but the Extra- exi- 
 fence of the Senfible World, is the Point I 
 have been arguing againft ? And that not a 
 Natural, fuppofed to be a Senfible^ World, 
 but an External World, asfuch^ is impoffible? 
 But there is not a Word of an External 
 World in the Two Sentences before-men- 
 tioned; and therefore nothing in the leaft 
 
 againft 
 
[ 1^7 ] 
 
 againft the Concluiion which I am concerned 
 for. 
 
 True, you'll fay, but this was only a Mi- 
 ftake in the Manner of exprefling it ; for 
 that the whole Drift and Argument of this 
 Chapter fuppofes the Subjedl to be an Ex- 
 ternal World. I anfwer. 
 
 Right; that is the Thing I have been 
 all this while expecSting, viz, a litde of his 
 Argument in the Place of his Authority ; 
 and you fee this we muft come to before 
 there can be any Decifion. 
 
 But alas ! to what Purpofe ? For I find thefe 
 Words in the very Title of his Chapter, vi^i. 
 That the Exijience of the Intelligible is more 
 certain than that of the Natural and Senfble 
 World, This deftroys, and doubly deftroys, all 
 again. For, Firji^ Here he fpeaks not of an 
 External but Senftble W orld ; and of this, 
 not of its External Exiftence, which is the 
 Point I have been arguing againft ; but fim- 
 ply of its Exiftence, which is the Point I 
 have been arguing for. And yet, 
 
 Secondli/^ His End propofed is not to Ag- 
 gravate, but Leflen, its Certainty : And 
 this is the Drift and Argument of the whole 
 Chapter, at leaft of about Thirty Pages of it; 
 the reft being employed in a Digreflion 
 concerning the Comparative Certainty of 
 Faith and Reafon. 
 
 But 
 
[ 128 ] 
 
 But is this the main Defign and Purpofe 
 of this Chapter to lejfen the Evidence of 
 an External World \ To fhew, (as he plain- 
 ly does, and for which I refer my Reader to 
 fhew, I fay,) that neither Reafon^ nor Senfcy 
 nor Revelation^ are fufficient to afTure us of 
 the Exiftence of any fuch Thing ? Nay, 
 that the Argument ufed by Des Cartes^ 
 before-mentioned, in which he places his 
 laft Refort, falls fhort, and is deficient, for 
 which we have his own exprefs Words in 
 the 20 8th Page. And can that fame Author 
 fay, in the midft of all this, that the Exi- 
 ftence of an External World is a Thing of 
 no Reafonahle Doubt ^ nor to he ferioujly que- 
 Jlioned by any fober Under/landings &c. 
 Surely it could be no Miftake that he omit- 
 ted the Word External, unlefs he defigned 
 to queftion his own Underftanding, and 
 formally pronounce himfelf a Sceptick. 
 
 Well, you'll fay, but it is Matter of Fa(5t 
 that he has argued Sigdim^ fomething, I an- 
 fwer, he has fo, for it is evident to Demon- 
 ftration that he has argued againft himfelf; 
 and not only fo, but alfo as fceptically as is 
 poflible. 
 
 For after all nothing is more evident, than 
 that his Cenfure and Arguments proceed upon 
 the very fame Subject ; and that is, not the 
 External Exiftence, but the Exiftence y/;////<e 
 of the Natural World. This Natural World 
 
 is 
 
[ 129 ] 
 
 is fometimes by him called Bodies^ fome- 
 times the Vifible or Senfible World : Being 
 about to aggrandize the Evidence, or ob- 
 jective Certainty, as to us of his Intelligible 
 or Ideal World, he endeavours to fhew, 
 that it is much more certain to us than the 
 Ex'iflence of the Natural, or Senfible^ World ; 
 and that becaufe we have, 
 
 1. More^ 
 
 2. Better^ Reafons to ajfiire us of its 
 Exijience, 
 
 Thefe are his very Words, as may be 
 feen in the i88th Page, even in that very 
 Page in which the Genfure is found on all 
 thofe who fo much as offer to queftion the 
 Exiftence of the Natural World. But now 
 the Fadt is, that he does queftion its Exi- 
 ftence both here, and throughout the 
 whole Courfe of this Chapter. What can 
 be more evidently inco7iJiJlent^ more evi- 
 dently fceptical^ than this Manner of Pro- 
 ceeding ? What ! Doubt of the Exiftence 
 of Bodies^ Senfible Bodies ? Well may this 
 be called Indulging a Sceptical Humour under 
 the Colour of Philofophical Doubting, And 
 is this fo called too by the very Perfon who 
 does it ? This is not only to be guilty of 
 Scepticifm himfelf, but alfo to be Self-con- 
 demned. 
 
 K The 
 
[ I30 ] 
 
 ft 
 
 The Sum of this whole Matter is this: 
 If, by the Exiftence of the Senfible World, 
 Mr. Norris^ in this Cenfure, is faid to mean 
 not the Exiftence Simple but the Extra- 
 exiftence of it, his Arguments diredtly contra- 
 dift his Cenfure^ which is a full Anfwer to his 
 Authoritt/m this Matter. If on the other Hand 
 he be faid to mean as he himfelf fpeaks, this is, 
 Firji of all, nothing at all to me, who 
 doubt not of the Exiftence^ but only of the 
 Extra-exijience^ of the Senfible World. Then, 
 Secondli/^ he is in this as much contrary to 
 himfelf, as on the other Suppoiition in that 
 he formally doubts of, and even argues 
 agalnft, that which he calls it Scepticifm to 
 doubt of. And, Thirdly^ which is as bad 
 as any of the reft, he doubts formally of a 
 Point which is not capable of being doubt- 
 ed of, vi%, Thefimple Exiftence of the Vifthle 
 World, To all which, Laftly^ I may, and 
 alfo muft, add this, that this fecond Suppo- 
 fition is fomething more than an If it being 
 evidendy the Cafe in Fa6l, that his whole 
 Difcourfe in this Place is only of the Exi- 
 ftence fimple of the Senfible or Vifible 
 World ; and not a Word of its Extra-exi- 
 Jlence^ on the Concejfion of its Exiftence Jim- 
 pie^ is fo much as mentioned or implied. 
 
 I doubt not but on Sight of the Title 
 Page many of my Readers will judge, and 
 be ready to fay, furely the whole World 
 
 is 
 
[ 131 ] 
 
 is full of Arguments againft fo ftrange an 
 Aflertion, as that there is no External World. 
 And perhaps, in this Place, fome may wonder 
 that I end here with the Mention of fo few 
 Objections; But let fuch as thefe try to add to 
 their Number, they may poffibly find it 
 more difficult than they imagine. 
 
 In the mean Time I expedt to be under- 
 ftood by fome, when I afl^ their Pardon for 
 the Trouble I have given them, in thus feri- 
 oufly confideringy© mafiy trifling Objections; 
 Objections which for the moft Part have 
 been lame on both their Legs, the Language 
 of Prejudice only, and having fcarce fo much 
 as an Appearance to introduce them. But 
 indeed 1 thought I could do no lefs, confi- 
 dering the Difpofitions of far the greateft 
 Part of thofe whom I have converfed with ; 
 who will be fo far from blaming me on this 
 Account, that they will be ready, even at 
 this Time, to take Part with thefe Obje- 
 (flions ; even fuch as thefe I would pleafe^ 
 if poffible ; but being too fure of .the Event, 
 I have nothing left to do, but to acquit my- 
 felf, by cutting off all Occafion of Offence 
 which might be taken at my leaving un- 
 mentioned, or unanfwered, any ObjeClion 
 which I have heard, or found, or which 
 may reafonably be judged I ought to have 
 found : And in this Refpedt I profefs I 
 have done my beft, which, I think, is all 
 that can be expeCled of me. The 
 
 K 2 
 
[ 132 ] 
 
 The Conclufion of tlie Whole. 
 
 Of the Vfe and Confequences of the 
 foregoing Treat fe, 
 
 HAving demonftrated, as I think, my 
 Point prefixed in the Title Page, vi%, 
 the utter Impoffibility of an External 
 World ; and fuppofing alfo that this is here 
 granted me by my Reader, he has a Right 
 to demand, of what Ufe and Confeqiience 
 is all this to Men^ or to the Moral World? 
 
 Now in order to return as plain and 
 diftinft an Anfwer as I can, and can well be 
 expefted from me in this Place, to this 
 Queftion, I wou'd chufe to fplit it into Two^ 
 making the Words Ufe and Confequence to 
 ftand for Two different Things : And I 
 {hall begin with the Laft, vi^, the Confe- 
 quences of this Pofition, no External World; 
 To the Queftion concerning which I have 
 thefe Two Things to anfwer. 
 
 Firfiy I know not why my Reader fliou'd 
 not take my Word, (I mean 'till he himfelf 
 has made Inquiry,) when I aflure him that 
 the Confequences of this Pofition are exceed- 
 ing many in Number: If this will pafs, I 
 
 again 
 
[ ^33 ] 
 
 again aflure him, that I have found by more 
 than a Ten Years' Experience, or Applica- 
 tion of it to diverfe Purpofes, that this is 
 one of the moil fruitful Principles that I 
 have ever met with, even of General and 
 Univerfal Influence in the Field of Know-* 
 ledge : So that, if it be True, as is here 
 fuppofed, it will open the Way to Ten 
 Thoufand other Truths, and alfo difcover as 
 many Things to be Errors, which have hi- 
 therto pafled for true. But this. 
 
 Secondly, May in fome Meafure appear to 
 my Attentive Reader, even before he has 
 made Inquiry, and tho' he makes fome Scru- 
 ple of believing me on my Word : For he 
 cannot but have taken Notice, that all Lan- 
 guage not only fuppofes, but is almoft whol- 
 'ly built on the Suppofition of, an External 
 World : With this is leaven'd all our Com- 
 mon Difcourfe, and almoft every Thing that 
 is found in the Writings of Philofophers : 
 So that with half an Eye it muft needs be 
 feen, that were a Man to call all his former 
 Thoughts and Opinions, all he has read in 
 Books, or heard in Converfation, to an 
 Examination or Review, in the Light of 
 this Pofition, he u ould find a mighty Work 
 upon his Hands, in corredling only former 
 Errors, fetting afide the pofitive Part of de- 
 ducing Truths in their Room. 
 
 K 3 This, 
 
[ 134 ] 
 
 This, 1 think, is all that can be faid in 
 General^ in Anfwer to the Queftion con- 
 cerning the Gonfequences of this Pofition : 
 And I believe my Reafons will be judg'd to 
 be fufficient for not entering into the parti- 
 cular DeduBion of thefe Gonfequences : As 
 Firji^ that this would be all over Digreflion 
 in this Place: And Secondly^ fuch a Di- 
 greflion as would fwell the Volume to more 
 than Ten Times its prefent Size : But 
 chiefly Thirdly^ for that I know myfelf to be 
 unqualified for fo great a Work, which is 
 no lefs than the compiling a New Syftem, at 
 leaft of general Knowledge. Perhaps the little 
 which I have here fupplied may move fome 
 more comprehenfive Genius to begin where 
 I conclude, and build fomething very con- 
 fiderable on the Foundation which is here 
 laid ; but I muft be allow'd to be a proper 
 Judge even in my own Gafe, when I profefs 
 that I am far from being equal to fo vaft an 
 Undertaking. However, Secondly^ I will 
 add a Word or Two concerning the Ufe of 
 the foregoing Treatife: By this, as diftinft 
 from the former Head, I would be under- 
 ftood to mean, 
 
 1. The Subject Matters with regard 
 to which it may be of Ufe. 
 
 2. Its particular Ufefulnefs with re- 
 gard to Religion. 
 
 3- The 
 
[ ^3S ] 
 
 3. The Proper Manner after which it 
 
 fhould be us'd. 
 4th and Laftly, The particular Ufe 
 
 and Advantage which I myfelf pro- 
 
 pofe by it. 
 
 Firfi^ As to the Subjedl Matter, it may 
 poflibly be afk'd, whether every Thing 
 muft pafs for Falfe which does not fquare 
 with this Hypothefis^ fuppofing it to be 
 True ? Or, whether becaufe it is True that 
 there is no External World, we muft there- 
 fore ufe this Language in Difcourfe, or 
 Writing on every Kind of Subject ? To this 
 I anfwer, 
 
 I. That I have in good Meafure preven- 
 ted this Inquiry in my Second Anfwer to 
 the Second Obj'eftion, Part II. where I 
 have fhewn that we are at Liberty, and al- 
 fo in fome Meafure, oblig'd to ufe the Com- 
 mon Language of the World, notwithftand- 
 ing that it proceeds almoft wholly on the 
 Suppofition of an External World : For 
 F'trji^ Language is a Creature of God, and 
 therefore Good, v'l'z, for Ufe^ notwithftand- 
 ing this Effential Vanity which belongs to 
 it ; by this God fpake the World into Being 
 when he faid. Let there he Lighty let there he 
 a Firmament^ a Sun^ Moon^ and Stars ^ &c. 
 and they were : All thefe Things were made 
 in the Beginnings even in the Word^ and 
 
 K 4 Wif- 
 
Wifdom,and /^^i// of God; and xhQXQ^oxQ in him 
 they are 7r//^, even ^^v/^r//^//^ True, according 
 to the Language by which they were will'd 
 into Being, tho' in thewfelves they carry an 
 Impojfihility of fo Exifting. But this does 
 not juftifie the Goodnefs of this Language 
 with regard to us ; or rather juftifie us Sin- 
 ners in the Ufe of this Language, without 
 refledling. Secondly^ that we are Redeem'd 
 or Recreated by the fame Word of God, 
 who has taken upon himfelf the IniquttT/ of 
 all Things ; who, as one of us, has us d 
 this Common Language, and even bore it 
 with him on his Crofs ; who, by his Spirit 
 in his Apoftles, has fpoken all the Lan- 
 guages of the World, making thereby every 
 Tongue his own, and who, Lajllt/^ in a 
 Word, has pronounc'd every Thing to be 
 clean to thofe who believe. I anfwer there- 
 fore, 
 
 2. That there are certain Subjects which 
 require the Ufe of this Common Language ; 
 and on which, to fpeak in the Language of 
 this Hypothefis^ would be both Ridiculous and 
 Unjujl ; Unjujl to the Will, and to the 
 Word, of God, who has made and fandlified 
 Common Language to our Ufe, and confe- 
 quendy to the Obligation of our Chriftian 
 Liberty; and Ridiculous^ in that on feveral 
 Subjefts of Difcourfe the Ufe of any other 
 than the Common Ways of Expreffion 
 
 wou'd 
 
[ ^37 ] 
 
 wou*d be altogether Vain, Nonfenfical and 
 Abfurd. I might eafily give a Thoufand 
 Inftances of the Truth of this ; but it were 
 Pity to prevent the many Witlings of the 
 prefent Age, w^ho by this wou'd lofe their 
 whole Field of Knowledge, with relation 
 to this fubjedl, and would have nothing 
 left: whereby to ridicule what they are inca- 
 pable of Underftanding. I leave it there- 
 fore to Pamphleteers, Doggrel Rhimers, and 
 Comedians, to expofe the Language of 
 this Treatife, by applying it to improper 
 Subjects : For fince the only End of this 
 Kind of Wit is not fo much as pretended to 
 be Truth, but only Laughter and Diverfion, 
 I am content to be the Subject, and alfo to 
 laugh for Company, as having no Pretence 
 to the moving of one Smile by any Thing I 
 have here faid. Allowing therefore all due 
 Advantage to little Wits of all Sorts and 
 Sizes, I anfwer, 
 
 3. Thirdly^ That whenever we are, or 
 pretend lo be, ferious, 1 wou'd recommend 
 the Language of this Difcourfe to be ufed 
 only on Subjefts the moil General^ Simple^ 
 or Univerfal^ I don't fay, in Philofophy only 
 in General^ or in this or that Particular 
 Branch of it ; for I profefs to underftand 
 but very little of either^ as Words and Ideas 
 have been ufually linked together. I fay^ 
 therefore only, as before, the moft Simple^ 
 
 General^ 
 
[ 138 ] 
 
 General^ or JJniverfal Subjects; Subje&s 
 wherein the Queftion is ftridlly about 
 Truth, particularly fuch wherein the 
 Queftion fuppofed receives any Alteration 
 from the Suppofition or Denial of an Exter- 
 nal World. 
 
 Well, you will fay, but then it feems it 
 has but litde to do with Religion, which is 
 a Subje6l beft underftood or treated of in the 
 Common Ways of fpeaking : By this I am 
 led in the 
 
 Second Place to confider the particular 
 Ufefulnefs of this Pofition or Hypothefis 
 with regard to Religion. Accordingly I 
 make Anfwer ; 
 
 Firji, It has been often my Fortune, and 
 may be again, to have this Queftion put to 
 me by fuch as have not been able to com- 
 prehend the Reafons by which I juftifie my 
 Point of no External World ; which, by 
 a very Natural Progrefs, has given them a 
 mighty Zeal againft the Conclufion. In 
 this Cafe, their only Refuge to avoid an 
 utter Silence, has been to urge this Que- 
 ftion about its Ufefulnefs as to Religion. 
 The Pretence of this is, that Religion is 
 their only Care, or the End of all their In- 
 quiries; fo that if it does not immediately 
 appear that this Hypothefis tends to the Pro- 
 jnotion of Religion, they are fairly excufed 
 from believing, or fo much as attending 
 to it. But 
 
[ 139 ] 
 
 But now to fuch as thefe, furely nothing 
 can be eafier than to return a fufficient 
 Anfwer. But I think the heft, in this Cafe, 
 is to make none at all. For Jirjt^ it is evi- 
 dent that the End or Drift of this Queftion 
 is not to urge any Thing againft the Truth 
 of my Conclufion, but only to excufe its 
 Authors from fo much as inquiring into 
 it. But this certainly is a Point I can 
 never be fuppofed to contend againft 
 whilft I am fuffer'd to live out of Red- 
 lam, And therefore fmce this is all that 
 is demanded by this Queftion, it muft 
 needs be very impertinent to go about to 
 Anfwer it any otherwife than by faying, 
 iS'/V, you have free Leave to think of vohat 
 Subjedls you pleafe ; efpecialli/ having chofen 
 the better Part already ^ viz. Religion and 
 nothing elfe^ to imploy your Meditations on^ 
 l^c. But, Secondly^ it happens well enough 
 for the Ends of my Difcourfe at prefent, 
 that my Reader is here fuppofed to 
 have inquired already into the Truth of my 
 Conclufion, and alfo to have difcoverd it 
 to be true. 
 
 And this gives the Queftion concerning 
 its Ufefulnefs as to Religion a very diffe- 
 rent Turn and Senfe from w^hat it had 
 before. For now tho' it may be the Effe6l 
 of Curiofity only, yet it very probably may 
 be the Effeft of a ferious Defire of farther 
 
 Know- 
 
[ HO ] 
 
 Knowledge, and of a true Regard for Re- 
 ligion, and therefore ought to be fo repu- 
 ted. Whereas the fame, as before pro- 
 ceeding, is even defigned as a Bar to Know- 
 ledge, and is plainly no other than a Reli- 
 gious Difguife. But whatever be the 
 true Caufe or Principle of this laft, I muft 
 needs acknowledge its Right to an Anfwer. 
 Accordingly I affirm, 
 
 Secondli/^ That I confider the prefent 
 Treatife, as a Matter of no little Ufe, or 
 good Confequence, with regard to Reli^ 
 g'lon. That I have found the Truth of 
 this by a long or very confiderable Ex- 
 perience. And in a Word, that (be it ta- 
 ken how it will by certain vain Pretenders) 
 I will be bold to pretend, even in my own 
 Behalf, fuch a real, and even exclufive. Re- 
 gard for Religion, that I would never have 
 troubled an unwilling World with this Dif- 
 courfe, (notwithftanding the infinite Ufe 
 which I conceive it to be of with refpeft 
 to Simple or Univerfal Truth,) had it not 
 been for its particular Ufefulnefs with re- 
 fpedt to Religion ; and confequently for 
 the Benefit of thofe few who I expeft will 
 find the Truth of what I here affirm. 
 
 I am fenfible this will pafs for very flen- 
 der Authority with fome^ and perhaps too 
 for an Obje&ion with others ; unlefs for their 
 Satisfadlion I produce the Points concern- 
 ing 
 
[ H' ] 
 
 ing which I affirm this Difcourfe to be of 
 Ufe. But I have proved my Point already, 
 viz, all that is in my Title Page, and I fhall 
 prove no more, 'till I am aware of the Sue- 
 cefs of this, or hear from my Reader him- 
 felf, what farther Demands he may have 
 upon me. Neverthelefs, that I may avoid 
 the Imputation of having pafled over but 
 the Name of an Obje&ion^ without an An- 
 fwer, I will go out of the Track of my in- 
 tended Method fo far, as to charge myfelf 
 with the Debt of one Inftance of this Sort ; 
 and that is, the Point of the Real Pre- 
 fence of Chrift's Body in the Euchariji^ on 
 which the Papifts have grafted the Do6lrine 
 of Tranfuhjlantiation. 
 
 Now nothing, I think, can be more evi- 
 dent, than that both the Sound and Kxpli- 
 cation of this important Do6lrine are 
 founded altogether on the Suppofition of 
 External Matter. So that if this be re- 
 moved, there is not any Thing left, where- 
 on to build fo much as the Appearance of a 
 Queftion. 
 
 For if after this it be inquired whether 
 the Subjiance of the Bread in this Sacra- 
 ment be not changed into the Subjiance of 
 the Body of Chrift, the Accidents or Senfible 
 Appearances remaining as before ; or fup- 
 pofe this fhou'd be affirm'd to be the Fa6t, or 
 at leaft Poffible, it may indeed be fhewn to 
 
 be 
 
[ 142 ] 
 
 be untrue or impoflible, on the Suppofition 
 of an External World, from certain confe- 
 quential Abfurdities which attend it; but 
 to remove an External World^ is to prick it 
 in its punEium fallens^ or quench its very 
 vital Flame. For if there is no Exter?ial 
 Matter^ the very Diflindlion is loft between 
 the Subjiance and Accidents^ or fenfible Spe- 
 cies of Bodies, and thefe lajl vsrill become 
 xh^fole EJJence of material Objefts. So that 
 if thefe are fuppofed to remain as before, 
 there is no pofTible room for the Suppofal 
 of any Change^ in that the Thing fuppofed to 
 be changed is here fhewn to be nothing at all. 
 I have chofen to Inftance in this, rather 
 than any other Point of Divinity or Religion^ 
 becaufe this of Tranfubjlantiation is one of 
 the moft important Doctrines of the Roman 
 Church ; which Church at the fame time 
 happens to hold the Infufficiency of the 
 Scriptures. Now as thefe Two Opinions 
 happen to concur in the fame Perfons, it 
 may pofTibly prove an Umbrage to certain 
 weak and tender Spirits, as if my affirming 
 only without Proof, that the prefent Trea- 
 tife is of fu^h mighty Ufe, with regard to 
 Religion, were an Intrenchment on the Suf- 
 ficiency of the Gofpel Revelation, and con- 
 fequently an Approach towards the Error 
 of Popery. This is the OhjeElion hinted at 
 before, vi'z. the Great and Mighty Objefti- 
 
 on 
 
[ H3 ] 
 
 on, for the fake of which I have departed 
 from my Method, and broken my Refolu- 
 tion. But 'tis high Time however noiv 
 to return and proceed. 
 
 The Third Thing which I propofed to 
 fpeak to, is the proper Maimer after which 
 I would defire this Treatife to be made Ufe 
 of. And here 
 
 Let the Firjl Thing be, to read it tho- 
 rowly and attentively. It is not fo long 
 but it may be read more than once without 
 any very confiderable Expence of Time. 
 However, let it fo be read as to be perfedt- 
 ly underftood to be either true or falfe, 
 l^falfey I wou'd defire my Reader to give me 
 Notice of the Difcovery, that I may dif- 
 charge myfelf of the Guilt of having pub- 
 lifhed a Falfhood in fo confident a Manner ; 
 and alfo fuch a Falfhood as bids open Defiance 
 to fo confiderable a Part of whatfoever Men 
 have hitherto pretended to know. This I 
 think is a fair Requeft. But my Reader is 
 here fuppofed to underftand it in another 
 Light, or to look upon it to be true. 
 
 If fo, I muft neverthelefs defire him to 
 imploy all his Skill or Attention for fome 
 Time to make it as familiar as poffible to 
 his Underftanding. If he fails in this he 
 will find his Affent flide from him he 
 knows not how ; and he will come in a little 
 Time to an effedtual Disbelief of it, whilfl 
 
 he 
 
[ 144 ] 
 
 he continues to believe it. This is the 
 manner of Men with Refpeft to Truths, 
 either very Simple^ or pecuHarly Religious ; 
 there lying an equal Prejudice or Oppofi- 
 tion of Senfe againft both thefe kinds of 
 Truths. This, by the Way, is fome fort 
 of Argument that there is a nearer Affinity 
 between thefe Two kinds of Truth than is 
 commonly imagined ; but I am content in 
 this Place to fuppofe them very different; 
 And be they as different as they will, yet 
 fure I am, that the Subjeft of this Treatife 
 is of the Number of thofe which make the 
 leaft Impreffion, even after they are affented 
 to ; or againft which the ftrongeft Prejudi- 
 ces are found to lye. For nothing can be 
 more evident to the Firfi or Natural Appre- 
 henfions of Men, than that even the Senfible 
 or Vifible World is External. And I be- 
 lieve I fhall find enough of this from my 
 Experience with other Perfons, to make it 
 needlefs to attefl the Truth of it upon my 
 own. If fo, and if it be true notwithftand- 
 ing that there is no External World, I 
 mufl again defire my Reader to ufe his ut- 
 mofl Diligence and Attention to render 
 this Truth as fenfihle to himfelf as poffible ; 
 which he will find to be done only by a 
 very frequent Meditation on, or Exercife of 
 himfelf in it. And here, (if I may for Decen- 
 cy Sake be allowed to prefs this Matter any 
 farther,) I wou'd advife him, ^'C^> 
 
[ 145 ] 
 
 Firft^ To exercife himfelf for a little Time 
 in Writing o;/, or rather againjl^ it. Let 
 him try to add to the Objedlions which I 
 have already confider'd, or refpond afrefh 
 to the Anfwers which I have given to 
 them ; and perhaps his Surprize to find 
 the little Effeft of this Experiment, may 
 add fome Grains to the Firmnefs of his 
 AfTent. 
 
 After this it wou'd confirm him not a 
 little to make the fame Experiment in Dif- 
 courfe with others, whether Learned or 
 Unlearned matters not much, if I have 
 rightly obferved ; unlefs it be that the 
 Learned in this Cafe, ufually make the leafl 
 pertinent Obje(5lions. This Method will in 
 fome Meafure engage even Self-love on the 
 Side of Truth, which will mightily help to 
 overbear the Force of common Prejudice a- 
 gainft it. 
 
 But Laflly, if after all this Endeavour 
 he yet find it difficult (as I believe he cer- 
 tainly will) to keep the Edge of his Atten- 
 tion fixed, fo as not to think it flill more 
 evident that the Vifible World is, than 
 that it is not External, let him prailife 
 with himfelf an eafie, but a very ufefiil. Art, 
 which is to ufe himfelf to meditate on this 
 Subjed: with either his Eye or Imagination 
 fixed on a Looking-glafs. This, he may 
 
 L remem- 
 
[ h6 ] 
 
 remember was one of the Injiances given 
 [Part I. Chap, i. Sedi, i.) to fhew, that 
 the feeming Externeity of a Vifible Obje6t 
 is no Argument of its real Externeity : And 
 it has fmce appear d that all Vifible Objedls 
 are equally External ; or that that which is 
 ufually called the Vifible World, is indeed 
 no more External than what is ufually 
 called the Rejiediicn or Image of it in a 
 Looking-glass, Neverthelefs it is much 
 eafier to apprehend or believe this, with Re- 
 fpe6t to Objects feen in a Glafs, than to 
 fuch as are feen out of a Glafs; and it is 
 only my Reader's Eafe that I am at this 
 Time confulting. 
 
 Now by thefe and fuch like Means, I 
 fuppofe, even my Arijlotelian Reader (who 
 by his Studies has been long unqualified to 
 receive or apprehend pure unbodied Truths) 
 will become Mafher of this Subjedt, as fim- 
 ple as fit is, or underftand it with the fame, 
 or fome Degree of the fame, Kafe or Feelings 
 wherewith he ufually underftands Ideas that 
 are more Complex. And if fo, he is pre- 
 pared for all the Ends and Ufes of it. The 
 chief of which is this ; 
 
 Secondly^ To carry it about wath him, 
 and ufe it as one wou'd do a Key^ or Mir- 
 ror^ or almoll any other kind of Mechani- 
 cal or Ufeful Inftrument. To carry, I fay, 
 
 not 
 
[ H7 ] 
 
 not the Body of the prefent Treatife, or fo 
 much as one x^rgument of it, in his Me- 
 mory, but only the Conclufion^ viz. no Ex- 
 ternal World^ which is juft what is in the 
 Infcription or Title Page. 
 
 With this, as with a Kei/^ he will find 
 an eafie Solution of almoft all the general 
 Queflions which he has been ufed to ac- 
 count very difficult, or perhaps indiflb- 
 luble. 
 
 And as a Mirror^ held as it were, in his 
 Hand before the Writings of others, it will 
 difcover to him many Errors, where before 
 he little expecfted to find them ; befides that, 
 it will open to him a new Scene of Truths, 
 which have not hitherto been fo much as 
 inquired after. 
 
 In a Word, let him read and think with 
 this one Propofition always prefent in his 
 Mind, and I am perfwaded he will need 
 no affiflance of mine to make it appear 
 to him, that it is of the greateft Ufe and 
 Confequence in the Inquiry after Truth. 
 
 And now I have nothing to add, but a 
 Word or Two concerning the particular 
 Ufe or Advantage^ which I myfelf propofe 
 from having written this Difcourfe. And 
 that is, 
 
 Ftrji^ The Probability, by this Means, 
 of having the Truth of it thorowly examin- 
 ed ; Which is rarely done to any Purpofe in 
 
 Dif- 
 
[ H8 ] 
 
 Dtfcourfe^ and indeed in any private Way ; 
 beiides that, I wou'd confult the common 
 Benefit as well as my own. 
 
 Secondly^ and Lajlly^ that by this Means 
 I have freed myfelf from many Diffictdties^ 
 in Cafe I fhould live to appear in Public on 
 any Subje6t, which is either a Confequence 
 of this, or any Way depends on, or inter- 
 feres with it. I fpeak this from an Experi- 
 ence very often repeated. And this, at laft, 
 has reduced me to this Neceffity, either 
 never to attempt to write on any but the 
 moft ordinary and popular Subjefts, (which 
 is a Work I have too good Reafon to leave to 
 others,) or refolve in the firft Place to fet 
 heartily about this, and eftablifh it once for 
 all ; as I hope I have here done. 
 
 If fo, I have no more to do for the Time 
 to come, but only to refer to what I have 
 here written and publifhed ; Which is a Li- 
 berty I may poffibly reap the Advantage of 
 in Difcourfe on fome other Subjedt ; but 
 which I fhall be fure to ufe, and make the 
 moft of, in Cafe this fhou'd be replied to by 
 any Partial, Unfair, or ScoiBng Adver- 
 fary. 
 
 FINIS. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 OF 
 
 ORIGINAL LETTERS. 
 
I. 
 
 TO SOLOMON LOW. 
 
 March S, 1714. 
 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 Saturday laft I received yours, 
 and I am obliged to you for the pains you 
 have been at to tranfmit to me fo long a Let- 
 ter. I alfo thank the Gentleman, whofoever 
 he be, for his labour of compofmg it. And 
 now if Mr Balch will pardon me for not 
 diredling to him, and my friend Solomon 
 will excufe me for giving him the trouble of 
 it, I will now (on your requeft) fit down to 
 anfwer this Doughty Difputant. 
 
 I ft. He grants (if I read right, for the 
 wafer covers fome part of this fentence) that 
 the Seeming Externeity of an object, is not 
 a fufficient argument for its Real Externeity. 
 I thought by this conceffion he either defign- 
 ed to be of my fide, or to prove the Real 
 Externeity of all, or any Vifible or feen 
 obje6ls, from fome other arguments befides 
 the Seeming Externeity of them. But I find 
 hot a word of either of thefe. He is againft 
 
 M 2 me. 
 
[ '52 ] 
 
 me, and for this very reafon which here he fo' 
 freely gives up or acknowledges to be no 
 reafon, for his only argument for the Exter- 
 neity of the Vifible World is from the Senfes, 
 whereas this is all that I meant, and I think 
 he can mean too, by the Seeming Externeity 
 of it It is only by our Senfe of Seeing that 
 we know any thing of the Exiftence of the 
 Vifible World, and therefore certainly it mull 
 be by this only that we infer the Extra-exift- 
 ence of it. Its Seeming Externeity is there- 
 fore the fame as its being ieen as External ; 
 either this is a good argument that it is indeed 
 External, or it is not ; if no, why does he 
 build altogether upon it; if yes, why does 
 he fay that the Seeming Externeity of an 
 objedt is no fufEcient argument of any Real 
 Externeity of it ? 
 
 2nd. No, he will fay, he builds on the 
 united teftimony of the Senfes ; very good, 
 that is, he concludes the Exiftence and even 
 Extra-exiftence of a Vifible objeft, from the 
 fenfe of Feeling, Hearing, Tailing, &c. joined 
 to the Senfe of Seeing, 
 
 I have confidered this objedlion diftindlly, 
 page 52. But I will here add a word or two 
 to refrefh his Memory. The Extra-exiftence 
 of an objefl: is fomething more than its Exift- 
 ence, and the Extra-exiftence of a Vifible 
 objedl is fomething more than its Vifible Ex- 
 iftence. He grants me this, in that he fays 
 
 that 
 
[ 153 ] 
 
 that the Vifible or Seeming Exiftence of an 
 objeft is not a fufficient argument of its Real 
 Exiftence ; well now, and how would he 
 prove fo much as the Exiftence Simple of a 
 Vifible objeft ? Why, he tells me, from the 
 united teftimony of all the Senfes. But is not 
 a Vifible objed: the objedl of vifion only ? 
 Can he Feel, or Hear, or Smell a Vifible object? 
 May not he as well See a Sound, or Feel or 
 Hear a Colour ? Firft, therefore, let him fhew 
 mehow any other Senfe, but that of Seeing gives 
 us any, the leaft aflurance or intimation of the 
 Exiftence Simple of a Vifible objedt, and then, 
 and not till then, he can fo much as fairly 
 attempt to prove that any other of the re- 
 maining four, or all put together, are any argu- 
 ment of its Extra-exiftence. 
 
 3d. But is there not a real difference 
 between Senfe and Imagination ? Yes, that 
 which he mentions, viz. the livelinefs of the 
 Impreflion or Senfation. By this, and this 
 only, I call one moon which I perceive ima- 
 gined^ another Jeen ; viz. becaufe in the one 
 cafe I perceive a moon, viz. the fame, or a like 
 intelligible figure, more vividly, or with greater 
 colour, than in the other ; and on this dif- 
 ference I diftinguiih between an imagined and 
 fenjible fire. But what is this to the Externeity 
 either of the moon or the fire ? May not an 
 objedt be perceived, and very vividly per- 
 ceived, without being External? Yes, he 
 M 3 grants 
 
C 154 ] 
 
 grants me this, as I have fhewn in the begin- 
 ning, I would gladly, therefore, know what 
 he means by this Argument. 
 
 4th. But I will make bold before hand to 
 guefs for him what he means, and I think the 
 matter is too plain to be called a conjecture. 
 He fancies that I affirm, that dWfenftble objefts 
 are no more than imaginary; meaning by this 
 word fomething oppofed to real. On this 
 fuppofition he fets himfelf to prove there is a 
 great deal of difference between fenfihle and 
 imagined objects, and proceeds hence to heap 
 on me many abfurdities, both in Reafon and 
 Religion, to convince me that the objects of 
 fenfe are real; that is, truly exiJienU But if 
 he has read my book, I would be bold to afk 
 him who it is that denies the reality of the 
 Exiftence of the Vifible World, or of any Sen- 
 fible objed: ; for furely he can have no room, 
 or fo much as pretence, to fay that this is 
 chargeable on me. He knows that in my 
 firft conceffion, page 5, 1 grant, and even con- 
 tend, for the Exiftence of Bodies; and that 
 both there, and almoft every where befides, I 
 declare, in the moft exprefs terms I can think 
 of, that it is not the Exiftence, but only the 
 Extra-exiftence of objedts I contend againft. 
 I am fo far, I think, from falling fhort of him, 
 or any of the reft of mankind, in affirming 
 and contending that the objects feen are real, or 
 for the reality of the Material World, that I de- 
 clare 
 
i ^55 -] 
 
 clare for the Exiftence of every imagined obj eft, 
 as he may fee, page i6, in my inftance of a 
 Centaur. Nay I will proceed fo far with him, 
 if he ftill perfifts to charge me with the want 
 of this, as to uphold againft him that he him- 
 felf is the man who is guilty of the Scepticifm, 
 of denying the Exiftence of allVifible obj efts; 
 nay that he cannot fhew another in the world, 
 befides Mr Berkeley and myfelf, who hold the 
 teftimony of fenfe to be infallible as to this 
 point. But it is enough at prefent that I do 
 not in faft deny the Reality of the Mate- 
 rial or Senfible World, but only the Extra- ex- 
 iftence of it, which at once is an anfwer to 
 much the greateft part of his letter, proving 
 him to have done no more than fight with 
 his own ftiadow. 
 
 Here then I will make a full ftop for the 
 prefent, for I am fure we can difpute but 
 to very little purpofe, till we are firft agreed 
 as to what we difpute about. If the Gen- 
 tleman pleafes to lay afide for a time his 
 rhetorical talent and every ornament of fpeech, 
 and let me know, in the moft naked terms, 
 what it is he believes I hold or deny, and what 
 it is which he would maintain againft me, 
 binding himfelf to turn whatever he calls 
 Argument (as I have done for the moft part, 
 and am ready to do always), into the form of 
 a legal Syllogifm, he will wonder perhaps to 
 find — but I will fay no more ; for between 
 
 M 4 you 
 
C 156 ] 
 
 you and me, Friend Solomon, I know (with- 
 out the Spirit of Prophecy) that I make this 
 requeft to him altogether in vain. I may 
 indeed by this increafe his former contempt 
 of me ; and if the ftars I have confulted are 
 not much miftaken, he will diredlly call me 
 names to him that fhall happen to inform him 
 of this requeft. But the Sun will fooner 
 change its courfe than the Author of that Let- 
 ter will ever reafon by rule, or depart from 
 the method by which he has acquired his 
 whole ftock of reputation with regard to 
 Philofophy. 
 
 As he has Charity (as he fays) for me, fo I 
 declare I have fo much for him, that I do not 
 even defire he would put himfelf but to half 
 the pain and torture which it would coft him 
 only to underftand what is meant and not 
 meant in the little Book he oppofes. This I 
 am confident, that all thofe that know it, will 
 fay the words are plain and diftindt as words 
 can well be. However I will infift on this 
 (from a little Charity to myfelf), that who- 
 ever cannot make it plainly appear that he 
 under ftands what I have written, fhall never 
 be underftood by me to oppofe any thing but 
 my Perfon, and in this cafe I think I may 
 plead a liberty to be filent. 
 I am. Sir, 
 Your moft Obliged and Obedient 
 Humble Servant, 
 
 Arthur Collier. 
 IL 
 
[^57] 
 11. 
 
 TO SOLOMON LOW. 
 
 December 19, 1714. 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 I RECEIVED both yours, as well 
 as your News Letter, fome months fince, as 
 your laft but yefterday, without a date. I 
 thank you heartily for both, and fhould have 
 acknowledged your firft much fooner, but 
 that I have of late been more idly-bufy than 
 ever I have been before ; but your laft muft 
 not be fo ufed. 
 
 The title of my firft feftion is indeed as 
 you reprefent it ; viz. That the Seeming Ex- 
 terneity of a Vifible obje6t is no argument of 
 its Real Extemeity. I prove this by inftances of 
 certain Vifible or Seen objedls which, though 
 granted to be not External, yet appear, or 
 feem to be as much fo as any objefts what- 
 foever. The Argument in form ftands thus : 
 
 If a Vifible objedt feen as External is yet 
 not External, then the Seeming Externeity of 
 an objedt is no Argument of its Real Exter- 
 neity : 
 
 But this and that Vifible objedt is feen as 
 External, yet is not External ; 
 
 Ergo, 
 
[ 158 ] 
 
 Ergo, the Seeming Externeity of an objed: 
 is no argument of its Real Externeity. 
 
 To this you anfwer, that you have the 
 fame reafon to fuppofe thofe Seeming External 
 objedts (granted to be not External) to be in- 
 deed External; or thofe objedls which, for 
 argument's fake, I allow to be external. 
 
 I anfwer, very well. This is what I con- 
 tend for finally ; viz. that the objedts which, 
 for argument's fake, in that place I allow to be 
 External, are indeed no more fo than thofe 
 others which are granted, or plainly proved 
 to be External ; confequently, that a Vifible 
 objedl, as fuch, is not External. 
 
 This, I fay, is my final Conclufion in the 
 firft part of my Book ; but perhaps I ftiould 
 do well to put you in mind that this is not 
 my Conclufion in this place. My Conclufion 
 here is the very words of the title of the fec- 
 tion fet down before ; and my Argument 
 here is not defigned to prove the point, con- 
 tended for in the firft part, laid down in the 
 latter end of the Introduftion (much lefs of 
 the whole point expreffed in the title-page), 
 but only an introduction to it, as in anfwer 
 to an aifertion fet down, page 1 2, viz. that 
 an objedl being feen as External, is a fimple 
 and diredl proof of its being Really External. 
 Having removed this by feveral inftances, 
 Seft. I., I proceed, in Sedt. IL, to prove 
 direftly that a Vifible objedt, as fuch, is not 
 External. But 
 
[ 159 ] 
 
 But how do I remove this aflertion ? Why, 
 by giving inftances of certain objedls w^hich 
 are feen as External, which yet are, or ought 
 to be, granted to be not External. Hence it 
 immediately follows, that an objedl being 
 feen as External, is no proof of its being Ex- 
 ternal, which are the words of the afTertion. 
 But let us furvey the three inftances you have 
 pitched upon. 
 
 I. An objedl feen in, or as in a looking-glafs-, 
 or objecft which we call a looking-glass, is as 
 Seemingly External as the looking-glafs itfelf, 
 or any obje6l whatfoever ; but is proved, and 
 fhould be granted to be not External : Ergo, 
 the Seeming Externeity of an objedl is no 
 argument of its Real Externeity, ftill the title 
 of the Seftion. 
 
 In anfwer to this you tell me of Rays Rever- 
 berated, Optic Organs, and fuch like Terms of 
 Art, which receive all their propriety from the 
 fuppofal of an External World. What is all 
 that to me who make this fuppofition the 
 queftion* and fuppofe no more in this or any 
 place, unlefs for argument's fake, than that I 
 fee, and that what I fee exifts ; which no one 
 can deny me, unlefs much at their peril, even 
 to a contradi6tion of themfelves. 
 
 But you'll fay I grant here, for argument's 
 fake, that fome objedts are External. 
 
 I do fo in Sedl. I. I grant that fome 
 
 Vifible 
 
[ i6o ] 
 
 Vifible objefts are External ; for here I am 
 only concerned to prove, that an objedt's 
 being feen as External is no Argument of its 
 being really fo. So, that though fome Vifible " 
 objefts are External, yet we mull prove them 
 fo by fome other medium, and not that of 
 their being feen as fuch. 
 
 Again, Sedl. 11. , I refume this grant, be- 
 caufe in this place it is the queftion (as may 
 be feen in the title of it), and grant only this, 
 fimply that there are fuch things as External 
 (but not Vifible) objefts. For here I am only 
 concerned to prove, that all Vifible objects, as 
 fuch, are not External, or that no Vifible 
 objedl, as fuch, can be External. Now, thefe 
 conceflions are made chiefly to free myfelf 
 from an incumbrance of words which would 
 neceflarily work confufion if I had not ufed 
 that manner. But then, laftly, in my fecond 
 part, I refume this concefliion alfo for the 
 fame reafon as before, viz. becaufe it now 
 becomes the queftion, and fet myfelf to prove 
 fimply that External Matter, as fuch, implies 
 feveral contradiftions, and confequendy is a 
 thing impoffible ; and here, and not before, I 
 come up to the terms of the queftion laid 
 down in the titlepage. 
 
 II. Your words are thefe : " I fee two 
 " Moons when I prefs one eye, becaufe my 
 ** two eyes receive the rays." Anfwer i. 
 
 Here 
 
[ i6i ] 
 
 Here again I except againft the Terms of Art 
 which fuppofe an External World; which 
 amount to begging the queftion. 
 
 2. What if my eyes do both receive rays 
 from the fame objedl, is this any thing to the 
 point I am concerned for ? My Argument 
 ftands thus : 
 
 At this inftant I fee two (objedts allowed 
 to be called) Moons ; both equally feen as 
 External. But one of them is not fo ; that is, 
 but one is fuppofed or contended for to be fo : 
 Ergo, a thing's being feen as External is no 
 Argument of its being really fo. In the hypo- 
 thecs of this Argument, I am fo far from being 
 concerned to take notice of the word Ray 
 (which cannot be ufed againft me without 
 taking the queftion in the titlepage for grant- 
 ed), that I know nothing of the words eye, 
 or preflure, or finger ; there being nothing 
 fuppofed in this Argument but that I fee, and 
 that what I fee exifts. 
 
 Indeed, I ufe the words eye and finger, 
 and am content to grant in this place that the 
 finger which I fee, and the eye which I prefs, 
 are both of them External, and not only fo, 
 but alfo that one of the Moons which I fee is 
 fo, chufe whether of the two you will ; but I 
 ufe thefe words, and make thefe conceflions, 
 only becaufe I muft fubmit to the neceflity 
 which is impofed on me by the words of this 
 
 World, 
 
[ i62 ] 
 
 World, and becaufe in this place my queftion 
 remains entire, notwithftanding thefe concef- 
 fions. 
 
 III. You fay thus : " If imagining be only 
 " recollecting what I have feen," &c. 
 
 Anfwer : Who can tell what is meant by the 
 hard word Recolle6ling ? Is it not enough 
 that we all know what is meant by the word 
 Imagining as well as by the word Seeing ? 
 Or rather is it not evident, at firfl fight, that 
 to imagine an objeft, is to perceive an objedt 
 either more or lefs vividly ? For my part, I 
 can no more underftand how we can create 
 the objedls we imagine than the objedts we 
 are faid iofee, and yet this feems to be inti- 
 mated by the word Recollefting, God cer- 
 tainly is the true caufe of both, though the 
 adt of perceiving be in great meafure, that is 
 on certain conditions, fufpended on our Wills. 
 In like manner I explain the Art which we 
 call Memory. This confifts of two parts, viz. 
 fimple, imaginative Perception of an objedt, 
 and a certain connotative fenfible fomething fu- 
 peradded (both by the ordinary will of God), 
 aiTuring us at the inftant of imaginings that 
 the thing feen has been feen by us before. 
 Well, then, I imagine a full Moon at noon- 
 day ; but I do not create this imagined Moon. 
 'Tis God that does this ; I only perceive it, 
 only that its being perceived is on fome con- 
 ditions 
 
ditions fufpended on the occafion of my Will. 
 One of thefe conditions is the Act of my having 
 yee?2 or imagined the fame, that is the like 
 before. In either of thefe cafes I am faid to 
 remember and not fimply to imagine ; that is, 
 if at the inftant of my imagining I feel 
 within myfelf that Senfe or Affedtion where- 
 by I am afTured, or ftrongly inclined to judge, 
 that I have before now feen or imagined 
 the fame or like objeft, all this, whether 
 true or falfe, fuppofes nothing but that I fee or 
 perceive, and that the object feen Exifts ; and 
 on this only foundation I ereft my Argument 
 on the inftance of a Centaur, which I fuppofe 
 was in your eye at the time of writing this 
 paragraph. And it ftands thus : 
 
 I (or Appelles) imagine a certain objeft, 
 fo and fo fhaped and proportioned, which / 
 call a Centaur. This, as truly perceived (fmce 
 to imagine is to perceive)^ truly exifts. But 
 where does it exift ? Anfwer : 'Tis fuppofed 
 to exift only in the mind or foul which per- 
 ceives it. 
 
 But how does it exift either as within or 
 without ? Anfwer : As much, to all appear- 
 ance, without or External to the mind which 
 fees it as any of thofe objeds which are ufu- 
 ally called Vifible. 
 
 True, but not fo vividly. Anfwer : Right ; 
 it does not happen to be fo : and this is that 
 whereby I diftinguifti this Adt which we call 
 
 Imagination^ 
 
• [ i64 ] 
 
 Imagination ^ixova the A(5l which we call Vifion, 
 But why is this, but becaufe the common 
 caufe of both, viz. God, does not in the 
 former Adt imprefs or aft fo ftrongly upon my 
 mind as in the latter. If he did, both A(5ts 
 would become one, or require the fame name ; 
 and there would be no difference between 
 Seeing and Imagining, But is this a poffible 
 if, or is it not \ Yes, certainly, it is poffible 
 that in the a6l of my Imagining a Moon at 
 full at noon-day, God may, if he pleafes, 
 make me perceive it more and more vividly 
 (or with colours), till I perceive it to the full 
 as vividly as I did laft, or any other night. 
 Well, fuppofe this done. Is the moon, which 
 I now perceive (call it Seeing or Imagining or 
 both), is it External, or is it not ? Anfwer : 
 Plainly not External by the fuppofition of the 
 queftion. This, Sir, is fome part of what the 
 ingenious Solomon Low may at any time 
 command from his 
 
 Friend and Humble Servant, 
 Arthur Collier. 
 
 III. 
 
[ i65 ] 
 
 III. 
 
 TO DR SAMUEL CLARKE, 
 
 HECTOB OF ST JAMEs's, LONDON. 
 
 Langford, February 14, 1765. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 I HAVE been told by thofe that 
 know you that you are Affable and Courteous, 
 apt to Propofe, and apt to Teach, and this 
 encourages me (tho' unknown) to trouble you 
 with the two following Queries. 
 
 I remember, about two years ago, when 
 an honeft neighbour of mine, Mr Fox of 
 Pottern, put into your hands, at my requeft, 
 a little Book of mine, entitled Clavis Univer- 
 falis : At his return, he told me that you 
 received it fmiling, ufmg to him thefe, or 
 fuch like words : " Poor Gentleman, I pity 
 " him. He would be a Philofopher, but he 
 " has chofen a ftrange talk ; for he can nei- 
 " ther prove his point himfelf, nor can the 
 " contrary be proved againft him." This 
 was related to me with a very friendly con- 
 tempt— fuch probably as it was firft fpoken 
 with — and he was very willing to interpret it 
 
 O in 
 
C i66 ] 
 
 in my favour, as if it was a good ftep to- 
 wards the certainty of my point to have the 
 learned Dr. Clarke pronounce that it cannot 
 be difproved, and I confefs it makes me chear- 
 ful to this day to remember with what an in- 
 dolent ferenity I received this cenfure. It 
 neither pleafed nor troubled me, when I 
 reflefted that you had then read no more 
 than the Title-page of my Book ; and as for 
 Mr Fox, I was content to improve the good 
 opinion of it which he had conceived from 
 this your favourable faying, not believing it 
 would turn to any great account to prefs my 
 thoughts upon him who has converfed, I 
 find, but little in ftudies of that kind. But I 
 muft needs fay, that I had a fecret thought 
 and hope, that after you had perufed it, you 
 would have found fome reafon to alter your 
 opinion ; and I thought it not impofTible but 
 I fhould fome way hear of it, as I have done 
 from feveral others. But now believing, with 
 fome concern for fo ufeful and even neceffary 
 a point, that you are ftill of the fame opinion ; 
 and being greatly defirous of feeing it im- 
 proved by fome abler hand, (for of hundreds 
 of Objedlions which I have had repeated to 
 me, I have not hitherto met with one which 
 has in the leaft fhaken my affent to it) I have 
 made bold by this to afk you, what it is you 
 would have another mean or underftand by 
 that Cenfure ? My reafon for this Queftion 
 
 is 
 
C 167 ] 
 
 is, becaufe there are three diftindt Senfes in 
 which a man may be fuppofed to fay that 
 there is or is not an External World. I think 
 in my Introduftion, I have taken fufficient 
 notice of thefe Differences, in order to guard 
 my meaning from being mifunderftood ; and 
 I have often repeated the fame in other parts 
 of the Book. But what I am now about to 
 fay may yet feem to be new to you. I af- 
 firm, in general, that there is no External 
 World. Mjjirji Senfe of thefe words is, 
 That the Vifible World is not External, but 
 exifts dependantly, as in its proper fubjeft, on 
 Mind or Soul. 
 
 In this Propofition I am content to grant 
 that there may be fuch a thing as External 
 Matter ; but only I contend that Vifible 
 Matter, as fuch, is not, cannot be External. 
 The next is a refumption of this grant, as 
 having proved my firft point; and here I 
 drop the word Vifible, infifting only on the 
 predicate External ; this, I fay, deftroys its 
 fubjedt when applied to Matter; that is, I 
 affirm fimply (upon the confideration of thefe 
 two terms only) that there is no fuch thing 
 in Being as External Matter. Thence I con- 
 clude, upon the whole matter, that there is no 
 External World, Vifible or Invifible. 
 
 The third Senfe of this fame common Pro- 
 pofition of no External World, may be ex- 
 preffed in this manner, that the External 
 
 O 2 World 
 
[ i68 ] 
 
 World does not Exift. This Propofition is 
 very different from the two former; and I 
 have often feen it managed w^ith very great 
 fuccefs by fome who, I am certain, have never 
 thought of either of them. 
 
 Now, Sir, give me leave to repeat my 
 Queftion. In which of thefe three Senfes is 
 it you would be underftood, when you affirm 
 of this Propofition, that it can be neither 
 proved nor difproved ? 
 
 If you fay, in xhe Jirji or fecond^ I may 
 fay, perhaps, that I have proved them in my 
 Book ; but fo confident am I that you cannot 
 indeed mean what, for argument's fake, I 
 fuppofe you here to fay, that I could almoft 
 dare to put the whole Queftion upon this 
 tryal, whether you, or any man elfe, ever fo 
 much as heard of either of them before ; I 
 mean, before Mr Berkeley's book on the fame 
 fubjeft, which was publifhed a fmall time 
 before mine. If fo, the cenfure is gone over 
 my head ; you neither meant me, nor am I 
 capable of being wounded by it, for I declare 
 with my whole heart, that only thefe two firft 
 Propofitions are the fubject of my Book. As 
 for the thirdy I am fo far from patronizing, 
 that I renounce and abhor it, as a fceptical, 
 falfe, and felf-contradictive Propofition. 
 
 But now, how fhall I behave myfelf whilft 
 I am about to fuggeft to you, whether this 
 may not be the Propofition which you meant 
 
 in 
 
■ [ i6g ] 
 
 in your cenfure. I am confident, Sir, you 
 will find this to be the point doubted of by 
 Des Cartes, purllied by Malebranche, and my 
 late ingenious neighbour, Mr Norris, and 
 now of late taken up afrefh, and determined 
 manfully by Mr Green of Cambridge. The 
 Queftion with thefe was not fmgly concern- 
 ing the Exiftence of External Matter, from 
 any difficulty they perceived from the con- 
 nexion of thefe two Ideas ; neither did they 
 ever put the Queftion to themfelves, whether 
 Vifible Matter, or the Vifible World, was Ex- 
 ternal or not, but only, whether the External, 
 meaning by it the Vifible World, does Exift 
 or no. For the truth of this I appeal to your- 
 felf, and leave it with you to produce at plea- 
 fure (on peril of my covfufion) any other 
 author fmce Adam, who has managed this 
 queftion in any other cafe than I here fay. 
 
 But now. Sir, what a ftrange Propofition 
 is this to be admitted into debate by fuch in- 
 genious Authors as the forementioned ; and 
 that the learned and penetrating Dr Clarke 
 fhould pronounce fo favourably of it as to fay, 
 that it can be neither proved nor difproved. 
 Well indeed might you fay, that it cannot be 
 proved, that the Vifible World does not Ex- 
 ift; but it is wonderful, on the other hand, 
 that the Teftimony of Senfe fhould not be ad- 
 mitted as Demonftration that it does Exift. 
 For can any Propofition be more fimple and 
 
 O 3 evident 
 
[ 170 ] 
 
 evident than that which I fee Exifts, or that 
 fuch or fuch a thing is feen, ergo it Exifts ; 
 and is not this what we mean by the Vifible 
 World, namely, fuch and fuch Material Ob- 
 jecSls which are fuppofed to be feen ? And 
 can we doubt of their Exiftence, on the con- 
 ceflion of their being feen? This is Scepti- 
 cifm with a witnefs, and perhaps a higher 
 degree of it than has ever been avowed on 
 any other fubjedl, as carrying with it a mani- 
 feft Contradi6lion in Terms. For what can I 
 be fuppofed to mean by the External, Natural, 
 or Vifible World (all which terms have been 
 hitherto confounded or made fynonymous), 
 but the World which I See, and which is 
 fuppofed by all to Exift ; and can I after this 
 make a doubt, whether it be Real or not, 
 that is, Exifts or not? This may be the 
 fubjedl of a Metaphyfical flourifh, a kind of 
 Legerdemain Art, to fhew the vulgar how far 
 the moft evident truths may be puzzled and 
 obfcured by a confufion of terms, but muft 
 needs be a point unworthy of any ferious 
 debate. 
 
 Hence, Sir, I prefume you will acquit me 
 of any Sceptical defign or leaven, it being fo 
 plainly on my fide to turn the tables, and re- 
 tort this charge on all others ; for the evidence 
 of all Perception, whether Intelledlual Ima- 
 gination, or Senfible, for the Exiftence of its 
 proper objedt, is with me fo unconteftable a 
 
 principle. 
 
 Ik- 
 
[ 17' ] 
 
 principle, fo every where juftified, fo abfolute- 
 ly neceflary to the Conclufion which I drive 
 at, that I dare challenge him as my Convert 
 who is able to fland by it. 
 
 My other Query is concerning that point 
 of Doctrine, for the opinion about which you 
 have of late been much fpoken of. I am not 
 out of hope but that a fmall matter may be 
 fuggefted, which may ferve to reconcile your 
 opinion with that of the moft reafonable ad- 
 verfaries on terms honourable to you both. 
 But the meafure of my paper makes me now 
 wifh, but in vain, that I had begun with this, 
 having only room to afk your pardon for 
 this trouble, and to aflure you that I am. 
 Your very Faithful Humble Servant, 
 Arthur CoiiLiER. 
 
 04 
 
IV. 
 
 June 23, 1720. 
 MR MIST, 
 
 Amongst the many good offices 
 you have done the World fince the fetting up 
 your Weekly Paper, it is none of the leaft, that 
 you have been willing to lend your helping 
 hand to the introducing fuch Perfons into the 
 Public, who, though defirous to fee fomething 
 of their own in Print, have not Stock, or 
 fomething elfe, enough to launch out in their 
 own Strength. Accordingly, this comes to 
 defire leave, by your means, to acquaint the 
 moft ingenious and learned Dr Waterland, 
 whom all the Chriftian World knows, or 
 fhould know, that having read to page 90th 
 of his Volume of Sermons, I could proceed no 
 farther till I had advertifed him, that his In- 
 ftance there does not fpeak him to be fo ac- 
 curate in his Philofophical Studies, as he is in 
 his Theological. 
 
 His affertion is, that there are many things 
 not capable of ftrift Demonftration, and yet 
 fo evident and undoubted, that a man would 
 forfeit the very character of Sobriety and Com- 
 mon 
 
mon Senfe, that fhould ferioufly make the 
 leaft Queftion of them, and his Inftance is 
 the Exiftence of the World about us, which, 
 though (in his own, and the opinion of other 
 good philofophers) not capable of a ftrift 
 Demonftration, is yet fo evident on the whole 
 matter from the teftimony of Senfe (meaning 
 from that very topic, which is granted to be 
 not fufEcient to Demonftrate it) that a man 
 would hardly be fuppofed well in his wits, 
 who fhould ferioufly entertain any the leaft 
 doubt or fufpicion concerning it. As to his 
 afl^ertion, I have nothing to fay againft it ; 
 and I make no doubt but there are infinite 
 inftances in the World to confirm the truth 
 of it. But as to the Inftance he has been 
 pleafed to pitch upon, I cannot help thinking 
 myfelf qualified to inform him, 
 
 I. Firft ; That the Exiftence of the World 
 about us, meaning, as I fuppofe he means, 
 the Vifible or Seen World, is capable of the 
 moft ftrift and evident Demonftration ; nay, 
 that nothing but our own Exiftence (unlefs 
 we add that of the Great God) can be fup- 
 pofed to be more fimply and direftly evident. 
 If the Doctor thinks otherwife, I would only 
 defire him to refleft with himfelf (for I pre- 
 fume not to defire his anfwer) whether he 
 can recolledt or invent, I don't fay an Argu- 
 ment or Demonftration, but fo much as any 
 
 P the 
 
[ 174 ] 
 
 the leaft appearance whereon to found any 
 doubt or fufpicion of it. If not (for I am 
 fure he cannot) he will immediately perceive 
 that he has miftaken his Inftance; and that 
 inftead of a point which is not capable of a 
 ftri6l Demonftration, he has pitched upon a 
 moft evident truth, which is not fo much as 
 capable of a Philofophical Doubt. Here, 
 then, I am very ready to grant with him, 
 that a man would hardly be fuppofed to be 
 well in his wits, who fhould either ferioufly 
 or otherwife, entertain any the leaft doubt or 
 fufpicion concerning the' Exiftence of the 
 World about us. And, confequently, if he 
 has not a mind hereby to condemn himfelf 
 amongft thofe whom he refledls on, he has 
 nothing left to do but to retradl his Inftance, 
 and acknowledge with his fober neighbours, 
 that the Exiftence of the World about us is 
 too evident to be doubted of, and fo cannot 
 fall under the head of things which are not 
 capable of a ftrift Demonftration. But how- 
 ever he may be difpofed or able to provide 
 for his own fecurity in this cafe, I may with 
 greater aflurance inform him, 
 
 II. Secondly; That he has alfo miftaken 
 his men, for that the Philofophers wrhom he 
 fo freely reflects on, at leaft thofe who have 
 written moft diredlly and at all confiftently 
 on this fubjedl, are entirely free from fo much 
 
 as 
 
[ '75 ] 
 
 as the Wind of his Blow. Their bufineft or 
 defign has not been to prove, that the Exift- 
 ence of the World is not capable of a ftridt 
 Demonftration, or (to fpeak more according 
 to fa6l) that it does not or cannot Exift ; but 
 on the contrary, they affirm and contend, that 
 it does and muft Exift, fuppofmg it to be 
 Seen, and, in a word, that what we fee Exijis^ 
 is a Propofition of the moft infallible and in- 
 dubitable verity. There have been fome in- 
 deed, who have endeavoured ferioufly to de- 
 monflrate, that becaufe a thing is feen it does 
 not follow that it is External^ viz. to the Soul, 
 or Vifive Faculty, which perceives it : And 
 even farther than this of late, viz. that a Vi- 
 lible or Seen objeft, is not, cannot poffibly 
 be External. But this I think is very far 
 from faying, that the Vifible World (or as the 
 Doctor is pleafed to exprefs it — the World 
 about us) does not Exift at all ; at leaft I leave 
 it with the Learned Doctor to make it out, 
 that Being, and Being External, is one and the 
 fame thing ; or in other words, that a Vifi- 
 ble Objeft which is not External, is therefore 
 nothing at all. If he thinks he can prove 
 this, he will foon be convinced where the 
 Scepticifm of the Matter lies ; for he cannot 
 want inftances (at leaft if he has ever feen a 
 looking-glafs) of Vifible Objedls which are 
 plainly not External; and, confequently, he 
 will find, that it is not the Philofophers he 
 
 P 2 fpeaks 
 
[ 176 ] 
 
 fpeaks of, but fomebody elfe who makes a 
 ferious doubt of the Exiftence of Vifible Ob- 
 je6ts, or would break the Connexion between 
 the Principle and the Confequence in this 
 fliort Enthymene — Quod video Exiflit. But 
 if he would rather grant this Connexion 
 than break his Faculties by denying it, I 
 muft needs defire him to Acquit thofe whom 
 he has Condemned of Madnefs, for Denying 
 the Exiftence of the World about us. In a 
 word (I fpeak it for his Information, as Sup- 
 pofing that he has never Read, or but very 
 flightly Confidered what has been Written lately 
 on this Subjeft) it is not the Exi/ience fimple, 
 but the Extra-Exijlence of the Vifible World 
 which is Denyed by thofe whom the Doctor 
 has Refledled on — not the Exiftence of the 
 External World (the very Expreflion of 
 which is all over Nonfenfe and Contradifton 
 in terms) but the External Exiftence of the 
 World about us. Once more, it is not faid, 
 that the External World does not Exift, which 
 is neither True nor Falfe, but all over Con- 
 tradicftion as before, but that the World which 
 is Seen, and confequently does Exift, is not 
 External. Let but the Doctor find time and 
 Abftraftion of Mind fufficient to confider this 
 (which yet is no other than a Matter of Fadt 
 to the full, as fubjeft to his Senfes, as the 
 Point he is fo very fure of, if he will be at 
 the pains of Seeing with his own Eyes what 
 
 has 
 
[ ^11 ] 
 
 has been Written on this Subjedl) and I need 
 not prefs him with the Confequence of ,Re- 
 trailing his Cenfure of Diftraction, &c., on 
 poor harmlefs Perfons who have never Said 
 or Thought the kaft of, but, indeed, juft the 
 Contrary to what he Charges them with. 
 
 But perhaps after all, the Do6lor will 
 chufe to acknowledge a light Miftake (as he 
 may think) in Words, in Reprefenting the 
 Senfe of thofe whom he Refledls upon, but 
 may ftill be of opinion, that they are very 
 little fhort of being Befide their Senfes, who 
 ferioufly contend, that the Vifihle World is not 
 External. If fo, let him Firft Remember to 
 do Juftice to the Public in Acknowledging 
 this Miftake; and after that, it may not be 
 improper at his Leifure, to Remember his 
 poor Brethren who lie under his Cenfure, 
 either by Anfwering the Arguments by which 
 they Maintain their Point, or Honeftly Ac- 
 knowledging that they are not fo Mad as he 
 has haftily given them out to be. 
 
 Yours, 
 
 Arthur Collier. 
 
 P3 V. 
 
[ 178 ] 
 V. 
 
 TO THE REV. MR SHEPHERD, 
 
 FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, OXFORD. 
 
 July 2%, 1722. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Supposing that by this time you 
 have read my Little Book, if fuch a trifle 
 may be had in your Renowned Univerfity, 
 I cannot chufe but hope, that your Six Ob- 
 jedlions are either Anfwered or Prevented. 
 But becaiife of the Refpect I bear you for 
 your Candor, and other good Qualities which 
 in the little time of our Converfation, I was 
 glad to difcern in you, and alfo for my word's 
 fake, I am now fat down with an Intent to 
 give you the beft Satisfaction I am able, with 
 regard to your Paper now lying before me. 
 
 And, Firft, for your State or Reprefenta- 
 tion of the Queftion, your words are thefe ; 
 " It feems that the Non-Exiftence of an Ex- 
 " ternal World is not True." This, Sir, if I 
 may be allowed to know and exprefs my own 
 Meaning, is not exactly Right. I Affirm, 
 indeed, in my Title, that an External World 
 
 does 
 
[ ^79 ] 
 
 does not Exift — that the Non-Exiftence of 
 an External World is not True — ^that it is an 
 ImpofTibility, becaufe I was not willing, as 
 the manner of fome is, to put my whole 
 Book or Subjeft in the Title-page ; but you 
 will find in the Introdudlion, that I have Di- 
 vided this General Propofition into Two, 
 and have accordingly made Two Diflindt 
 Books of it ; — one is, that the Vifible or Seen 
 World, /. e, Vifible or Seen Matter, Body, or 
 Extenfion, as Vifible or Seen, is not Exter- 
 nal. The other is, that External Matter as 
 fuch, is not, cannot be, as implying feveral 
 contradidlions in the whole Idea of it. Both 
 thefe, indeed, come under the General Propo- 
 fition or Negation, that External Matter, or 
 an External World, does not Exift ; but as I 
 found it neceflary to divide it into Two, in 
 order to the Demonflration of it, fo I prefume 
 upon fecond confideration, you will find the 
 fame, in order to an Anfwer to, or Confuta- 
 tion of it. This would make any Controver- 
 {\Q between us on this Subjeft much more 
 Eafie, Simple, and Intelligible, and would ferve 
 your own fincere defire after Truth, as well 
 as my eafe in Anfwering you, much better 
 than the Method you have taken. But as I 
 am fat down to Anfwer you in your own 
 prefent way, I will endeavour to tell you in as 
 few words as I can, what my Principles direft 
 me to Refpond to your Objections. 
 
 P 4 Obj. 
 
[ i8o ] 
 
 Obj. I. If External Matter or World does 
 not Exift, then Body Exifts in Spirit : Then 
 Extended Being Exifts in Unextended Being: 
 But this is abfurd : Ergo^ External Matter 
 does Exift. 
 
 Anfw, I. Inftead of faying that External 
 Matter does Exift, or does not Exift, if you 
 would fpeak my Language, which here you 
 are concerned to do, you fhould fay one of 
 thefe Two things — either that Vifible Matter 
 is or is not External, or that the Complex 
 Idea called External Matter, does not imply 
 fuch or fuch contradidlions. 
 
 Anfw, 2, Granted to be True, that on my 
 Principles, Body, that is, Vifible or Seen 
 Body, does Exift in Mind or Spirit; where is 
 the Abfurdity of this? You fay, that it is 
 Abfurd to fay, that Extended Being can Exift 
 in Unextended Being. How do you know 
 this ? But do not you know the Contrary ? 
 For are not the Objects Seen in (as we fay) 
 a looking-glafs Extended ; that is, Vifibly 
 Extended ? And do not thefe Exift in Mind, 
 viz. the Mind which Sees them ? And have 
 not you yourfelf granted me, that the Vifible 
 or Seen World, i, e. every Vifible Obj eft, as 
 fuch, is no more than an Image, viz. of ano- 
 ther World which is External, and confe- 
 quently as fuch Invifible ; and on this foun- 
 dation 
 
[ i8i ] 
 
 dation have alfo granted, that External Mat- 
 ter, or an External World, is a thing not to 
 be Demonflrated. For furely if the very 
 World which we fee were External, /. e, if 
 we actually faw an External World, you 
 would not have fo little regard to the Tefti- 
 mony of Senfe, as to fay, that Vifion alone is 
 not a fufficient Demonftration of its Being. 
 If, therefore, it cannot be Demonftrated, it 
 cannot be Seen; and if it cannot be Seen,- 
 that cannot be External which is Seen ; and 
 if that which is Seen is not External, /'. e, to 
 the Mind or Faculty which Seeth it, does it 
 not plainly follow, that it Exifts in the Mind 
 or Faculty which Perceiveth it ; and will you 
 after this fay, that it is abfurd for an Extend- 
 ed Vifible Being to Exift in an Unextend- 
 ed Being ? 
 
 Ohj, 2. My Body Exifts in my Soul — 
 Equally Abfurd, and alfo contrary to Scrip- , 
 ture. 
 
 Anfw, If by any Body you mean any 
 mere Vifible Objedt, this Objedlion is the 
 very fame with the former. But if you take 
 it in its whole Complex Idea of being the 
 Objed: of Several Senfes or Modes of Percep- 
 tion, fuch as Seeing, Hearing, Feeling, &c,, 
 as an Argument from pure Reafon or Reflec- 
 tion, it is not capable of being Anfwered in 
 
 Q the 
 
[ l82 ] 
 
 the Lump, but muft be Divided into as many 
 Propofitions, as the thing fpoken of, is Ob- 
 ject of Senfations or Perceptions, which is a 
 Work too long at prefent. But as an Argu- 
 ment founded on Authority, viz. the Manner 
 of Speaking ufed by St Paul, &c., I can fay no 
 more at prefent (and need fay nothing at all 
 when you have thoroughly underftood my 
 Meaning) than that the Scripture Expreflions 
 which you allege, are fuch as I would ufe 
 myfelf, and do frequently ufe, when it is not 
 the very point in Queftion, whether the Pro- 
 poiition which I advanced in my Little 
 Book be True or not, which I am fure was 
 not the cafe of St Paul. 
 
 Obj. 3. If no External World, the Hea- 
 vens, &c. could not be Created before Man : 
 But the Heavens were Created before Man : 
 Ergo, 
 
 Anfw, Negatur minor. The Heavens 
 which I now fee were not Created before me, 
 neither was the Tree which I now fee Creat- 
 ed before me ; becaufe both as Seen Exift in 
 me. But there were Men Created before 
 me, in whofe mind or Soul a Tree Exifted, 
 but not the fame Tree which I See ; and be- 
 fore the Firft Man there were Created Minds, 
 and before thefe Created Minds, tliere is or 
 was an Uncreated Mind, in which a whole 
 
 Heaven 
 
[ i83 ] 
 
 Heaven and Earth Exifted and does Exift, 
 and therefore Negatur Major alfo. 
 
 I thought when I began, to have gone 
 through your Objections ; but when I reflect 
 again, that they are every one Anfwered in 
 the Book itfelf except the Laft, which I take 
 rather as a Teft of your Pleafantry than Phi- 
 lofophy, I muft beg leave to Conclude here, 
 at prefent, affuring you, that if after you have 
 Read the Book, any one ObjecStion remains 
 with you, you may at any time Command, 
 - Sir, 
 
 Your very Faithful Humble Servant, 
 
 Arthur Collier. 
 
 P. S. — I fhould think I need not tell you, 
 that the way to Anfwer a Book, is not firft to 
 form Arguments againft the Conclufion, or 
 deduce abfurd Inferences from it, but to An- 
 fwer or ftiew the Invalidity of the Argu- 
 ments whereby the faid Conclufion is at- 
 tempted to be Demonftrated. I wifh you 
 would be pleafed to confine yourfelf to this 
 Method, and I am fure you would find the 
 benefit of it. 
 
 A.C. 
 
EDINBURGH: M. DCCC. XXX VI. 
 
 PRINTED BY BALtANTYNE AND COMPANY. 
 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY 
 BERKELEY 
 
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