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REVIEW 
 
 i\ 
 
 OF 
 
 . EMMONS'S 
 
 x.^* ' * 
 
 ^^^*^jL . " / 
 
 OF - -_^' 
 
 GOD'S AGENCY ON MANKIND; 
 
 ADDRESSED TO TVC 
 CO^OBEOATIO.NAL CLKRfiT OF HEW ENGLAND. 
 
 AISO, 
 
 OF 
 
 THE VIEWS 
 
 1 THEORY. 
 KSFECTIitO 
 
 OF 
 
 THE MORAL EVIL EXISTING IN THE UNIVERSE 
 TO A DISPLAY OF THE PIV1NE GLORY. 
 
 NEW-YORK : 
 PUBLISHED BT JOHN SAYRE, 146 BROADWAY. 
 
 1821. 
 
Southern District qf New-York, ss. 
 
 BT REMEMBERED, That on the twenty-sfxlh day of Septem- 
 ber, in the forty-sixth year of the Independence of the Unit* <! States 
 of America, JOHN SATRE, of the said District, bath deposited in this ofllce 
 the title of a book, the right whereof he claims as proprietor, in the words 
 follow ing, to wit: 
 
 " A Review of Doct. Emmons's Theory of God's Agency on Mankind; 
 A<i('re<.e<! to the Congregational Clergy of Ne\\ -England. Also, a Refu- 
 tation of the Views entertained by Advocates of that Theory, respecting 
 the Necessity of the Moral Evil existing in the Universe to a display of 
 the Divine Glory." 
 
 In conformity to the Act of the Congress of the United States, en- 
 titled " An Actforthe encouragement ol Learning, by securing the Co- 
 pies of Maps, Charts, and Books, to the authors and proprietors of such 
 , 'luring the time therein mentioned " And also to an Act, en- 
 titled "an Act, supplementary to an Act, entitled an Act forthe encou- 
 ragement of Learning, by securing the copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, 
 to tin: auMiors and proprietors of Midi copies, during the times therein 
 mention d, and extending the hem-Its thereof to the arts of designing 1 , 
 engraving, aod etching historical and other prints." 
 
 JAMKS DILL, 
 Clerk of the Southern Distric, q/'Xen-York 
 
INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS 
 
 TO THE 
 
 -, oi 1 M:\V-L::: 
 
 F.NDS, 
 
 . of tli,- Mmi-trrs of the (io^pel i^ 
 
 not confiii n-hes : they 
 
 11. >i men-ly to prea- 11 <'hri-t to the 
 
 people in- > "set for 
 
 Thry, Bfl in- 
 
 dividuals, iiiv liaoi "1 i 
 
 f.ttlh, as well as Pastors of the pji -ti:.ular churches 
 \\ hirh th I. It 
 
 devol^ \> M v\alk uhout Zion,to tell the 
 
 . K \\i-ll her bulwark-, ;iml con- 
 
 to extcMid ;t eve over 
 
 her gciir-ral in- to detect ami in- 
 
 tni-i.Mis of error, guard her purity, and defen 
 liberties. 
 
 ed especially on the Congre- 
 gational Clergy in t! 
 
 6 not, like the Presbyterian and ; 
 !, adopted a common Confess n . t I aith, as a 
 
 /orthodoxy; nor e-tahh-hed aeon 
 .hniicatni-y, to \vh i the 
 
 faith once delivered to the ,.rc amenable. 
 
 A lar^e proportion of their churches are entirely 
 independent of the others, and at liberty to em- 
 brao t m whatever of doctrine, and adopt 
 
 any peculiarity of rites, without subjecting them- 
 interference of any judicatory, or the 
 sacrifice of any immunity. Their representative 
 assemblies have no power to enact authoritative 
 laws respecting the faith, rites, and government of 
 their churches; nor to pronounce authoritative 
 decrees of excommunication, or disfranchisement. 
 
IV 
 
 They are not invested with executive power. 
 Their voice is only advisory and monitory ; and 
 their decisions must be ratified by individual 
 churches, in order to become law. 
 
 Thence, the task of correcting abuses and re- 
 pressing error devolves on the clergy individually, 
 in their private capacity ; and the press is the chief 
 medium of accomplishing it. Nor is this the least 
 important duty which their office assigns them. 
 The dignity and influence of religion depend on 
 her purity. Error in doctrine is the worst species 
 of irreligion ; for it attacks religion herself, and 
 endeavours to conquer her dominions by annihilat- 
 ing her truth. The multitude embrace the views 
 of Christianity which are inculcated by their teach- 
 ers ; arid if those views are fraught with error, it 
 soon develops itself in practice. The consciences 
 of men are not often more, they are ordinarily less, 
 rigorous than their creeds. 
 
 Erroneous exhibitions of Christianity do more 
 than any thing else to create and strengthen her ene- 
 mies. Explore the origin of the rancour with 
 which her modern opposers have persecuted her ; 
 you will perceive it was excited, in no small degree, 
 by the ridiculous rites, the absurd doctrines, and 
 the intolerance and tyranny with which the folly and 
 impiety of men had disfigured her. Search for the 
 cause of the disrespect and prejudice with which 
 she is viewed by many of the intelligent and influ- 
 ential in our country ; you will discover that they 
 have been awakened extensively by the distorted 
 views of her which those individuals have been 
 called to contemplate. Robbed of rur dignity and 
 consistency by the admixture of what is contradic- 
 tory, ridiculous, intolerant, and weak, they have 
 not been inspired with that reverence toward her, 
 her native majesty is adapted to awaken ; nor 
 yielded her the confidence her unsullied truth is 
 fitted to command. 
 
Erroneous exhibitions of the Gospel encourage 
 its enemies in their opposition. Its enemies iden- 
 tity the true Gospel with those pretended exhibi- 
 tions of it. They regard th^ir whole aversion to it 
 as just, because they are justified in rejecting the 
 errors appended to it ; and when they triumph 
 those errors, flatter theu;rl\ <- th.it thej have 
 d a victory over the Gospel itself. Had the 
 
 itfl purity, we per- 
 
 ourselves, th.it ChnMend.un h.d never been 
 'one of perser' e primitive ages of 
 
 the church : the world had nev> i 
 !* ns').i-ni inlidel-u ; nr I .i'lt-d 
 
 le of *o large a portion of 
 ' are first in mteli n and in- 
 
 fluence, standing in the : , the 
 
 unb'-l: ,,-teri 
 
 of the cross, theref 
 
 sacred and momentous duties, when, in the kl in 
 
 ness of wisdom," they expose and arrest the. drvia- 
 
 from truth, to which ovory age gives birth : 
 
 and they rn.ike their happi- adorn the 
 
 of Zion with ia|i with 
 
 LOtfl th 4k unity 
 of the 1'iith, and of the knowledge of the Son of 
 
 1 the clergy or tve not, ordi- 
 
 narily, been negligent t Pge thi- <iuty. Her 
 
 churches hav< re intelligent, 
 
 more pioufl ind vigilant, and exerting a more pow- 
 erful and .'ifluence, than tho^e, during the 
 
 : ;d, of any other section, not only ol 
 own country, but of the world. Her first ministers 
 possessed more of the apostolic character than mo- 
 dern ages have ofttn seen. The venerable Ed- 
 wardses Del! -my. Smaliey, Lathrop, the illustrious 
 ig, and several others, would have 
 added strength to any church, and honour to any na- 
 
VI 
 
 tion. Her clergy have done more than all Christen- 
 dom beside, to advance our knowledge of those sub- 
 ject? in theology to which they have devoted their 
 peculiar attention. Edwards instructed the divines 
 and philosophers of Europe on the subject of the 
 freedom of the will ; and many treatises have been 
 presented by them to the world, which, for philoso- 
 phical accuracy, force of argumentation, and ar- 
 dour of piety, are not surpassed by the publications 
 sent forth during the snme period by any division 
 of the Church. And no inconsiderable part of their 
 works has been polemical, and specifically design- 
 ed to counteract the errors with which the church- 
 es around them were infested. Such were some of 
 President Edwards's, most of Bellamy's, Dr. Ed- 
 ward's, part of Smalley's, I)wght\s, and those of 
 others ; and more recently, the Unitarian contro- 
 versy has called forth several publications from the 
 orthodox, honourable to their authors, and worthy 
 of the churches which they represent. 
 
 The intelligence, the vigilance, the promptitude, 
 to meet and check the encroachments of error, for 
 which the clergy of New-England have been distin- 
 guished, have excited the hope and expectation 
 that the subject of this Review would, ere this, 
 have aroused to attention, and called forth to con- 
 troversy, some one of their number, more compe- 
 tent to its refutation, and, from a proximity to the 
 scene of its publication, more immediately interest- 
 ed in it than ourselves We know not whither to 
 look for the cause, that so novel, and, in our ap- 
 prehension, so heterodox and pernicious a doctrine, 
 should have so long been permitted to be taught 
 and diffused, almost without an effort to develop 
 to the churches its character, arid arrest its pro- 
 gress. Whether the individuals, on whom the task 
 of opposing it would properly have devolved, have 
 
Til 
 
 been diverted from it by other controversies, of 
 
 which tii.it section of N l.md has been the 
 
 scene , <>r h ive h; ;'rom it by respect 
 
 for the talents nn I ricty of -r ; whether 
 
 n (k'U'rr- i by the hope that 
 
 tiH-'lnith-i which \n* LntermiDgled, and taught in 
 
 , with it, would iiii<Tcr|it itl l:i'^.'rous 
 
 ncy ; by the apprehension, th ; -niity 
 
 -tacle to i i"nce 
 
 or whrthcrother c PI-'^. in con- 
 
 ^ anted its be- 
 
 ', n _r BQ of puMic controversy, 
 
 illy the lot of i mnova- 
 
 it a lo-- to drcidr Th;it it has not 
 
 MI tin- p.'j.iil lio tficory we are 
 
 tin. ^'. cannot but re^r't. th it some on 
 
 not ap(M-;nt I to controv.-rt it, ln>th tint wo might 
 
 have been released from the t.-U, and that the 
 
 churchet might bare cnji>\. Iier and more 
 
 able \ ludi. ition of the truth. 
 
 We have deomrd it our duty, however, to 
 pre-ent to the public our views of its erroneous- 
 nut to ^olicit to them the serious attention, 
 especially of you, Reverend I the Con- 
 
 gregational Clergy of N -nd, who arc - 
 
 guard the faith of the chnr 1 to whom we 
 
 must look for co-operation, in endeavouring to give 
 supremacy to the truth as it is in Jesus. 
 
 We cannot but regard it as claiming your most 
 solemn consideration. Is it safe for the church to 
 slumber, while even the most harmless errors are 
 diffusing their influence? And allow us to a*k, 
 whether this theory, if our views of its erroneous- 
 ness are correct, is not fraught with an alarming 
 share of danger to the cause of the Redeemer? 
 How had it been viewed had it come from the hands 
 of Antinomians, Unitarians, or Infidels ? Would it 
 
Vlll 
 
 not have been regarded as wearing a threatening as- 
 pect, and have awakened apprehension ? May not 
 many of its principles be employed, by the ene- 
 mies of religion, most naturally and successfully, 
 to perplex and subvert the faith of men in the 
 truth of the Gospel ? Or at least, ifnot thus danger- 
 ous in its tendency, is it not untrue, and to be de- 
 nied a place among the acknowledged doctrines of 
 revealed religion ? 
 
 We entreat you deliberately to weigh our rea- 
 sonings ; and examine whether the dictates of com- 
 mon sense, of reason, of revelation, do not concur 
 in forcing us to the conclusions to which we have 
 advanced. If we have established our views, we 
 conjure you by the responsibilities of your office, 
 to unite with us in suppressing the error, and call- 
 ing back the churches to soundness in the faith. 
 
 We have not deemed it necessary to trace the his- 
 tory of this theory, nor to allude to any of the pub- 
 lications in whose pages, to a greater or less ex- 
 tent, its principles may have obtained a place, be- 
 sides those of Dr. Emmons ; nor considered it im- 
 portant to designate the points in which it resem- 
 bles other errors in theology and philosophy, 
 which have obtained a currency in the world. 
 
 We have not been prompted to this work by 
 sectional feeling, nor the love of controversy ; 
 but by a conviction of the truth of our views, and a 
 solicitude for the welftre of the church. We trust, 
 that those who shall patiently examine our pages, 
 and comprehend the import of our reasonings, will 
 discern that we have not adopted those views with- 
 out consideration, nor reposed them on a founda- 
 tion which shall be easily shaken. 
 
REVIEW, 
 
 OK. KMMOX- has- presented to the world, 
 
 in two volui: ^ermons. the lirst pub- 
 
 <1 in \\\<\(\. :iiid the -econd in \\\\'l. a 
 
 oryof (jod's AL n Mankind, by 
 
 AN hi eh 1 i<- gi?C exi N nee to their agency, 
 
 and control- all its c\rnts. 
 
 It is no\cl and prc.ul: is a theory 
 
 of the MODK of the divine a^(-ncy. 
 
 Tht ^es of Oalvini^tic theologians 
 
 on tin- sidjcct. afl tar as \ve possess an 
 acquaintance with them, merely rc-pect 
 the existence, the c.rtnn\ and the r//rcte of 
 God's a^enrv: le;n iu^; the mode, at most 
 excepting the question whether, in certain 
 cases, it be direct or indirect, untouched. 
 The Doctors is a theory of the mode, and 
 seems, from his use of it, to have been 
 constructed for the purpose of solving 
 those difficult cases in metaphysics; the 
 consistency of a divine influence on men, 
 with their moral agency; the fall of 
 Adam; the depravity of his posterity; 
 2 
 
14 
 
 the renovation of the heart; and the 
 mixed character of the saints in this life; 
 which other theories leave unexplained : 
 and did it furnish a solution of those diffi- 
 culties, and come sustained by competent 
 evidence, it would undoubtedly constitute 
 an important accession to our knowledge, 
 and entitle him to the respect and grati- 
 tude of the world. 
 
 Whether such is its character or not, is 
 worthy the consideration of all. In our 
 judgment he has ventured into 
 
 -"A dark, 
 
 Illimitable ocean; without bound, 
 
 Without dimension; where length, breadth, and height, 
 
 And time and place are lost : 7) 
 
 where he, 
 
 " Meeting 
 
 A vast vacuity : all unawares 
 
 Fluttering his pinions vain, plumb down has dropt 
 
 Ten thousand fathom deep." 
 
 He has presented to us a.fiction of fancy, 
 instead of a doctrine of revelation ; asser- 
 tions and unsound reasonings, in place of 
 indubitable deductions from known 
 truths; and added darkness to the sub- 
 ject, instead of pouring on it the light of 
 intelligibility and consistency. 
 
 To evince this, we will present a state- 
 ment of his theory, and the reasonings on 
 w r hich it rests; exhibit some considera- 
 tions, showing those reasonings to be er- 
 
roneous, and the theory to be false; and 
 point out some of the consequences, which 
 
 iiiii-t IT suit from its bring taught as a part 
 of revealed theolo 
 
 The theory and the reasonings on which it 
 rests. 
 
 The theory is briefly expressed in the 
 following proposition : 
 
 GOD CFIEATKS ALL THE ACTS OF .VI v. 
 
 The mode of His n^rnrt i- iliat ofcrart- 
 :ui(l it exte: // their actions. 
 
 The manner in which the Doctor con* 
 templates its mode aiu! extent, the u 
 motives, and the activity and moral free- 
 dom of men, shall be exhibited by quota- 
 tions.* 
 
 From the following passages it will be 
 : that Ii is the mode of God's 
 
 as that < 
 
 " Since all men are dependent agent:. 
 all their motions, exe.rrises, or actions 
 mu-it originate from a divine efficiency, 
 We can no more act, than we can exist, 
 without the constant aid and influence of 
 the Deiu." Vol. ii. p. 31. 
 
 " The heart may be created, as well as 
 
 * T)> \-oluinec are nor numb- 
 
 we shall di-M^u . that published in l:>00 as Vol. I. and that 
 nublishcd in 1812 as Vol. II. 
 
16 
 
 the understanding ; or moral exercises, as 
 well as natural faculties. It appears from 
 what has been said, that the hearts of 
 saints are created; or that their free and 
 voluntary exercises are the production of 
 divine power." Vol. i. p. 231. 
 
 46 It is agreeable to the nature of virtue 
 or true holiness to be created" p. 279. 
 
 " Holiness, is something which has a 
 real and positive existence, and which 
 not only may, but must be created" p. 280. 
 
 "He," God, "has the power of pro- 
 duction. He can create, or bring out of 
 nothing into existence, whatever he 
 pleases. As he can create a body, and 
 create a soul, which are lower kinds of 
 existence ; so he can create virtue or true 
 holiness, which is the highest and noblest 
 kind of existence." p. 281. 
 
 "It is sometimes proper to ascribe 
 men's good actions wholly to God, and 
 sometimes equally proper to ascribe their 
 bad actions wholly to him. We may 
 justly conclude, that the divine agency is 
 as much concerned in their bad, as in 
 their good actions." Vol. ii. p. 39. 
 
 " If saints can work out their own sal- 
 vation, under a positive influence of the 
 Deity; then sinners can work out their 
 
17 
 
 own destruction, under his positive in- 
 fluence." p. 228. 
 
 " They never do act of themselves. 
 They live and move and have their being 
 in Cod, who constantly works in them, 
 both to will and to do, in every instance 
 of their condurt." p. 210. 
 
 Men are no more capable of acting 
 independently of (!od in one instance 
 than another. If they need any kind or 
 decree of disi. ncy in doing good, 
 
 they need precisely the same kind and 
 < < of divine agency in doing evil. 
 Tiii- is the dictate of reason, and the 
 Scripture says the >ame. It is God who 
 workcth in men, both to will and to do, in 
 all cases without exception. He wrought 
 equally in the minds of those who sold, 
 and in the minds of those who bought, 
 Joseph. He wrought as effectually in the 
 minds of Joseph's brethren, when they 
 sold him, as when they repented and be- 
 sought his mercy. He not only prepared 
 these persons to act, but made them act. 
 He not only exhibited motives of action 
 before theirminds, butdisposed their minds 
 to comply with the motives exhibited. 
 But there was no possible way, in which 
 he could dispose them to act right or 
 wrong, but only by producing right or 
 2* 
 
18 
 
 wrong volitions in their hearts. And if 
 he produced their bad as well as good 
 volitions, then his agency was concerned 
 in precisely the same manner, in their wrong 
 as in their right actions.'' Vol. ii. p. 40. 
 
 " If God can work in moral agents both 
 to w r ill and to do of his good pleasure, 
 then we may easily account for the moral 
 depravity of infants." Vol. i. p. 235. 
 
 44 He works in them, as he does in other 
 men, both to will and to do of his good 
 pleasure; or produces those moral exer- 
 cises in their hearts, in which moral de- 
 pravity properly and essentially consists." 
 p. 238. 
 
 44 Their" [sinners'] "activity in all cases 
 is owing to a divine operation upon their 
 minds : they are not sufficient of them- 
 selves to think any thing of themselves." 
 Vol. ii. p. 179. 
 
 44 If they" [men] 44 do any thing what- 
 ever, it may be truly said, it was done by 
 the finger of God." p. 32. 
 
 Many other passages of similar import 
 might be added from the Doctor's vo- 
 lumes ; but from these it is seen with suffi- 
 cient clearness, that he regards the mode 
 of the divine agency as that of creating. 
 In the passages from vol. i. pp 231, 279, 
 280, and 281, he represents the agency 
 
19 
 
 . >i ( .o(L in regard to the holy acts of n 
 
 rrtutinir a^enry : and in the pa-- 
 
 from vol. ii. p. -11), ho represents preci 
 
 tli-" same kind and degree of divine aj 
 
 i in do: I, ;i- 
 
 in doing good ; and God's agency as con- 
 cernod in />// /\Y/// the. .- in their 
 
 igaa in their right act ions ; ofco:. 
 ii i- -ncy. From \\\^ \\ 
 
 the noun produriion." in -everul ol'thoM- 
 
 j \\ith -crea- 
 tion ;" and in many nthrr - the 
 pro !y with 
 " cri'atr." it \^ apparrnt that hr rmj> 
 lh(Mii in tho^r plaros to denote tlie bame 
 kilid of agency. 
 
 And \ve mi;-t inter, that he intends like- 
 by 
 
 the term-, -divine efficir -divine 
 
 operation," "divine agency," u positive 
 inlliu-ncr :" and the phrases, " to work in 
 men to will and to do" "modetbevfr act" 
 "disposed their minds/' and others of 
 himilar import, if he wishes by them to 
 denote any mode of God's agency. As 
 this phraseology itself, if you except the 
 iirst term, does not determine what mode 
 of agency it is employed to designate ; it 
 must be interpreted in accordance with 
 those passages, in which the Doctor exhi- 
 
20 
 
 bits the mode of divine agency, as that of 
 creating. 
 
 He cannot consistently employ it to 
 denote any other mode, nor mean by it 
 any thing few, than that God creates the 
 acts of men. 
 
 He cannot mean by it, that God merely 
 brings men into a state, in which they are 
 disposed to act, or to act in a given way ; 
 leaving them to exert their volitions by 
 their own power, instead of His creating 
 those volitions; for he denies that any 
 disposition can exist in the mind, which is 
 distinct from and the cause of volition. 
 
 u Some," says he, " suppose that a good 
 heart essentially consists in a good princi- 
 ple, taste, or relish, which is totally inde- 
 pendent of the will. But this sentiment 
 is totally repugnant to the law of iove. 
 This law requires no dormant, inactive, 
 torpid disposition, inclination, or taste. 
 There can be no such thing as an holy 
 principle, disposition, or inclination, which 
 is distinct from true love." " Some sup* 
 pose that a bad heart consists in a bad 
 principle, disposition, or inclination, 
 which is entirely distinct from sinful, vo- 
 luntary exercises. But it appears that all 
 sinfulness consists in the various exercises 
 
21 
 
 and modifications of self-love/' 
 pp. 265, :;d 2b7. 
 
 " Moral exercises llow from 
 opei ,pon the m\\A of a moral 
 
 natural faculty, princi- 
 or taste, enabling him to origiirite his 
 o\vn internal exercises, or external ac- 
 tio: Vol. ii. p. 1 
 
 " ! no possible way in 
 
 which he could dispose them to act right 
 or wrong, but only by producing right or 
 Wrong volitions in their hearts." p. 10. 
 
 As the Doctor thus denies that a dispo- 
 sition, distinct from volition, and antece- 
 dent to it, enabling a moral agent to origi- 
 nate his own internal exercises, orexternal 
 actions, ever exists; and denies also, that 
 God can possibly dispose a moral agent 
 to act rii;I:t or wron:;\ in any other \\ ay 
 than b\ Jit or wrong voli- 
 
 tion-; themselves in his heart; he cannot 
 of course mean by those phrases to desig- 
 nate an agency which produces such a 
 disposition. Besides, under such a mode 
 of agency, men, according to the Doctor, 
 id be passive. "We know that love is 
 a free, voluntary exercise, and not any 
 . habit, or principle, which is totally 
 inactive and involuntary. It is absurd to 
 suppose, that God should require any 
 
22 
 
 thing of us in which we are altogether 
 passive." Vol. ii p. 173, 174. 
 
 Bui the Doctor denies that men ever 
 are passive under the divine influence. 
 " Men act while they are acted upon by 
 a divine operation." Vol. i. p. 223. 
 
 " As saints can act while they are acted 
 upon, so sinners can act while they are 
 acted upon." p. 228. 
 
 " If the making a new heart consists in 
 the exercising of holy, instead of unholy 
 affections, then sinners are not passive, 
 but active, in regeneration." p. 178. 
 
 If that be true, and if " the good and 
 evil heart are both made up of exercises,' 1 
 with no other difference than that " their 
 exercises are diametrically opposite in 
 their moral quality," p. 191, then the con- 
 verse of the preceding proposition is 
 equally true, viz. that, as the making a 
 bad heart consists in the exercising of 
 unholy instead of holy affections, sinners 
 are not passive but active under the divine 
 influence, in all their sinful agency. 
 
 From the first and last of these quota- 
 tions, as well as from many other passages 
 in the Doctor's volumes, it is seen that 
 he holds, that a taste, habit, principle, or 
 disposition, is perfectly inactive and invo- 
 luntary : and that if God exerted an agen- 
 
cy on men, producing such a taste or dis- 
 position, they would be perfectly pa 
 under that agency. He infers from the 
 fact, that love is a free, voluntary exer- 
 cise, and not a taste or disposition; and 
 that the making a new heart consists in 
 the exercising of holy aflections, and not 
 in the production of a disposition; that 
 men are not passive, but active under the 
 divine agency. If thus hrlmlds. that men 
 are wtin under that ai;enr>. In eau-e vo- 
 luntary exercises, ami not a disposition, 
 are produced hv it : then he of course 
 holds, that if a disposition u ere produced 
 by it, they would \>c passive under it, and 
 not active. 
 
 As then he holds, as stated in the quo- 
 tation-, that men are ne\ er pussirr under 
 the divine agency, lie cannot mean to de- 
 note by those phrases any agency under 
 which, according to his own views, men 
 would be p< He means an agency 
 
 that produces the acts themselves of men. not 
 that merely brings them into a state in 
 which they are disposed to act, or that 
 produces a disposition which is antecedent 
 to their acts, and which leads to those 
 acts; and an agency that produces the 
 acts themselves must be a creating agency. 
 
 Nor can he mean by that phraseology 
 
24 
 
 to denote an agency by which God mere- 
 Jy excites men to act, or to exert a power 
 of acting, belonging to themselves; leav- 
 ing their exercises to be the effects of 
 /heir power, and only the indirect conse- 
 quence, not immediate production of His 
 power; for that would be producing no- 
 thing more nor less than a disposition to 
 act. But the Doctor affirms, that " there 
 is no possible way in which God can dis- 
 pose men to act, but by producing volitions 
 in their hearts." 
 
 Besides, he denies that the acts of men 
 ever are the effects of their own power, 
 and only the remote effects of God's ope- 
 ration; and alsothatmen have any power 
 to originate and exert acts of themselves, 
 in such a way as that supposed. u Our 
 moral exercises are the productions of the 
 divine power." Vol. i. p. 224. 
 
 " There is no occasion for a distinct fa- 
 culty of will, in order to put forth external 
 actions, or internal exercises. It is God 
 who worketh in men both to will and to 
 do. Moral exercises flow from a divine 
 operation upon the mind of a moral agent, 
 and not from any natural faculty, princi- 
 ple, or taste, enabling him to originate his 
 own internal exercises, or external ac- 
 tions." Vol. ii. p. 195. 
 
. then, the Doctor hold-, that the ad 
 of men never nre the ellecls of their o\vu 
 ver, as they would he under such a 
 merely exciting BgenCJ : ftnd that men 
 have no power to put forth or originate 
 their own acts, as they would possess un- 
 der such an agencv : he of coiir-e cannot 
 i (o de - hy that 
 
 i-eoloiry. Nor can he. for the -ame 
 in an agency by which ( in I 
 iner tO men the pm,- ' :m K' 
 
 which they tin exerl in origi 
 
 and putting forth acts: for if men do 
 not / |)ower if originating and 
 
 c\eriin^ acts ot' tliem^clve- ; and if, con- 
 '.enlly, none of their actfl are the 
 ellects ot' their own power, then no such 
 power is communicated, and therefore no 
 
 Biichag that bj which God would 
 
 merely impart the power of acting, i- 
 eric 1 on them. 
 
 This is obvious too, from the Doctor's 
 argument derived from the dependence 
 of men in support of the position, that God 
 produces all their actions by a direct in- 
 fluence. He assumes it as an indubitable 
 dictate of reason, that a creature cannot 
 possess the power of acting. The power 
 of exerting internal exercises and exter- 
 nal actions does not arid cannot belong to 
 3 
 
his constitution. Power is an incommuni- 
 cable attribute, and exists no where in the 
 universe, but in God. These views are 
 exhibited in the following quotations: 
 
 " It is the dictate of right reason, that 
 no created being is capable of acting in- 
 dependently." He does not here mean, 
 acting with an absolute exemption from 
 all influence whatever, or control; but 
 acting with one's own power, in distinction 
 from another's, as appears from his infer- 
 ring, from the dependence of creatures, 
 that their actions must be i\\e production of 
 a Divine efficiency. Since, if their depen- 
 dence does not consist in an absolute des- 
 titution of power, he cannot infer from it 
 that all their actions are produced by 
 God's power. If they possess power, it is 
 to be inferred, that their actions are pro- 
 duced by that power, instead of God's. 
 
 " Universal and absolute dependence goes 
 into the very idea of a creature; became in- 
 dependence is an attribute of the Divine na- 
 ture, which even Omnipotence cannot 
 communicate." Vol. i. p. 203. " And 
 since all men are dependent agents, all their 
 motions, exercises, or actions, must originate 
 From a Divine efficiency. We can no more 
 act than we can exist, without the constant 
 aid and influence of the Deity" Vol. ii. p. 3 1 . 
 

 A thing "originates from a Divine effi- 
 
 ieney." \\iicn the power which u'ives it 
 
 tence 1- dod"- : I'm " el " is the 
 
 eHic. '--\ertion of po\\ er. If men can 
 
 no more wt than itho'it the con- 
 
 stant aid and inlliunee of the Deity ; then, 
 as thev do not pos-e<s within themselves 
 the : -I all of e\i.-!ing, or arc not at 
 
 all ieU-< re kept in e 
 
 entirely by Di\ so they do not 
 
 :it all the po\\ 
 
 /, hut all t! d h}' 
 
 ])i\ ine ; 1. that ;dl their 
 
 I'nun a Divine* cfli- 
 i their bcini K!V 
 
 Mute of pov 
 
 Sine(\ then, the Doctor i\ i!te ah- 
 
 sohi 
 
 i a'-.lute destitution of pov.er. and 
 inf r- from it th :l:ty nf their e\- 
 
 j; of th \\ hich are lh.- 
 
 i'theii- potter, he e:uii: 
 raean by the phraseology in <pie*lion, to 
 designate an agency by which the power 
 of acting is tammttnicatoL For if he i^rant 
 tliat the power of acting is communicated 
 at all, he must, to be consistent, give up 
 his views of the dependence of creatures 
 and abandon his argument erected on it. 
 to prove that all the acts of men are the 
 
28 
 
 production of Divine power; for it makes 
 no difference in the nature of their de- 
 pendence, nor in the fact that their ac- 
 tions are the effect of their own power, 
 and not God's, whether the power of ex- 
 erting them is communicated at the time 
 it 'is exerted, or at the commencement of 
 their existence. If they actually possess 
 power, they are not absolutely destitute of 
 it, as the Doctor teaches; and if they 
 possess the power by which their actions 
 are exerted, then their actions are the 
 productions of their own, and not of God^s 
 power. 
 
 Since, then, the Doctor could not have 
 used the phraseology under considera- 
 tion, to designate an agency by which the 
 power of acting is communicated, without 
 contradicting his views and reasonings 
 respecting the dependence of men, it is 
 apparent that he cannot have employed 
 it to denote such an agency. Nor can he 
 mean to designate by those phrases, an 
 agency by which God merely governs men 
 in the exercise of their power; since 
 merely to govern men, or exert on them 
 an agency which simply determines the 
 mode in which they act or exert their 
 power, is nothing more nor less than to 
 bring them into a state in which they are 
 
20 
 
 disposed or choose to act in a given man- 
 ner. But the Doctor denies that God can 
 dispose men to act in any other way than 
 by producing, that is, creating their voli- 
 tions; and of course denies that jle can 
 ' nt them, or determine the mode of 
 their acting, in any other way than by 
 ,tin^ their actions. And moreover, 
 he denies that men possess the power by 
 which their action- a; ted. Their 
 
 action- are. according to his representa- 
 tion, entirely the elll-cls of (iod's power. 
 Ol' course he cannot mean to denote by 
 the lan^uaire referred to. an a^encv em- 
 ployed in LCovernin:: them in the exercise 
 of power belonging to themselves. .\ or 
 can he. for the >ame reason, he supposed 
 to use those phrases to designate an 
 a^enc-v consisting of part, or all of the 
 kinds oi \ \\hich have been men- 
 
 tioned, united. 
 
 If, therefore, as thus appears, he nei- 
 ther employed it to denote an agency 
 which merely produces in men a disposi- 
 tion to act, or exert their own power, or 
 excites men to act, or exert their own 
 power; nor an agency which imparts the 
 power of acting; nor an agency consist- 
 ing of part, or all of those kinds of agen- 
 cy ; then, if he intended to denote by it 
 3* 
 
30 
 
 any kind of agency, he must have employ- 
 ed it to designate a creating agency. For 
 there are no other conceivable modes of 
 agency by which God could, by a direct 
 influence, call the volitions of men into ex- 
 istence, than either that by which he 
 would merely produce in them a disposi- 
 tion to act, or excite them to act or exert 
 their own power in a ojiven way; in which 
 case their actions would be the produc- 
 tion or effect of their own power, and his 
 agency only the cause or occasion of 
 their exerting their power in such a man- 
 ner ; or, that by which he would commu- 
 nicate the power of acting; in which case 
 their volitions would also be the effect of 
 their own power, and his agency only the 
 cause of their possessing that power; or, 
 an agency both imparting power arid pro- 
 ducing a disposition to act, or governing 
 the exercise of that power ; or else a cre- 
 ating agency; an agency which is neither 
 employed in producing a disposition, nor 
 in governing men in the exercise of their 
 own power, nor in imparting to them the 
 power of acting, but which, without the 
 intervention of any such steps, calls their 
 volitions immediately into existence. And 
 as he cannot, a -\ we have shown, have de- 
 signed to designate by the language in 
 
31 
 
 question, either of the former kinds of 
 < \. lie mu-t. if he intended to desig- 
 iiv kind of agency by it, have em- 
 ployed it to denote the last a creating 
 agencs. And moreover, whether he in- 
 tendrd hv the phr i < >lo^y under consi- 
 deration, to de a particular in. 
 of Divine agency, or not, it is perfectly 
 apparent, from the Considerations addu- 
 ced, to show that if he intruded to de-i^- 
 an\ mode, it muM he that of creating; 
 tint tluit is the nuide of a^enc\ \vhic! 
 
 :-tU and mean- h\ hi- theory to exhi- 
 
 liit (iod as exercising, For he denies, as 
 shown, that (iod exerts any other con- 
 reivahle mode of agency on mankind, be- 
 side that of creating: and therefore must 
 trd and mean to exhihit (iod as exert- 
 that, and only that mode. 
 Such, then, are the Doctors views of 
 the Divine agency on men. He considers 
 ita mode as that of creating. He repre- 
 sents God as calling the acts of men into 
 existence, as He called the material world 
 into existence at its creation. God then 
 said. Let there be li<jht, and there iras li^/tf. 
 According to the Doctor, He now says, 
 Let the acts of men exist, and the acts of men 
 are. 
 
32 
 
 The Doctor represents this agency as 
 extending to all the acts of men, both in- 
 ternal and external. This the reader 
 must have already discovered. It will be 
 seen more clearly from the following quo- 
 tations : 
 
 " Mind cannot act, any more than mat- 
 ter can move, without a Divine agency. 
 There must be the exercise of Divine 
 agency in every human action; without 
 which, it is impossible to conceive that 
 God should govern moral agents, and 
 make mankind act in perfect conformity 
 to his own designs. This is the only 
 scriptural representation of Divine Pro- 
 vidence ; and, according to this represen- 
 tation, it is easy to see that all actions, as 
 well as all events, may be traced up to 
 the over-ruling hand of God. It is a gross 
 absurdity to suppose, that the providence 
 of God is more extensive than his agency, 
 or that he ever governs men without ex- 
 erting a positive influence over them. It 
 is God who worketh in men to will and to 
 do in all cases, without exception." Vol. 
 ii. p. 40,41, 42. 
 
 From this language, the Doctor obvi- 
 ously considers the Divine agency as ex- 
 tending to all the events that ever take 
 place in the minds of men ; not only to 
 
33 
 
 those acts of which, according to hi- 
 
 ! COnsista, " r.lli'ctions. de- 
 -. and volitions ;" hut 
 t' percept!- . . me- 
 
 v. iarjjiii.if ion, const ;tii<l all 
 
 is of operation of which the 
 sect. He rcpn Di- 
 
 ding to > all ac- 
 Miil declar- 
 
 'a gross ahsurdity to suppose, that the 
 . (iod is mc ilian His 
 
 rents mm with- 
 out c\frtifiL: a jK^f 1 r them.'' 
 If, then, (iod IB all actions and 
 events. He governs all tho.-e of which men 
 are the subjects: and if He never . >verns 
 men without a positive intluenee over 
 them, then He governs all the actions and 
 events which take place in their mind* hv 
 a positive influence ; that is, according to 
 the Doctor's theory, creates them. 
 
 The Doctor no where does, nor could 
 with propriety, separate the exercises of 
 the heart, affections, desires, intentions, 
 and volitions," and 4i the external actions,'' 
 from the other operations of the mind, in 
 such a manner as to denominate the for- 
 mer, the actions, and the only actions of 
 men, in distinction from the latter. The 
 mind acts as much in perceiving, judging. 
 
34 
 
 recollecting, imagining, and other similar 
 operations, as in loving or hating, desir- 
 ing or intending. The difference in the 
 state of the mind, when those two classes 
 of operation occur, is, that the mode of its 
 operation is different not that it is active 
 when the former, and inactive when the 
 latter class takes place. 
 
 Arjd had he made such a distinction 
 between those two classes of acts, his 
 views of the dependence of men must 
 havr; led him to regard the latter, as pro- 
 duced by the same kind of agency, as the 
 former. 
 
 His views of mankind, as absolutely 
 destitute of power, presented in his argu- 
 ment on that subject, just quoted, employ- 
 ed to prove the necessity of a direct agen- 
 cy ; his use of the scriptural passages, " In 
 him we live and move and have our being" 
 " we are not sufficient of ourselves to think 
 any thing of ourselves, but our sufficiency 
 is of God," to prove the same necessity; 
 and his unequivocal and unlimited de- 
 clarations in the preceding quotations 
 show, that he considers God's agency as 
 extending in the same manner to " all the 
 actions and events," both internal and ex- 
 ternal, of which men are the subjects. 
 
35 
 
 The Doctor's theory therefore is com- 
 pactly embodied in the proposition 
 
 COD < i \LL TIII: ACTS OF MEN; or 
 
 all the intirnnl and (stmml actions and events, 
 whidi iiwy be predicated oj than. 
 
 According to this th< rod en-ales 
 
 nol only all the internal exercises and ex- 
 ternal action- ihem-elvrsof men. hut also 
 oi' course t! m of those exen ud 
 
 actions the nature of all their percep- 
 tions, that is, that they are perception- of 
 such ohjecN a- the\ are. and not of others; 
 and such kinds of perceptions of those 
 objects, and not dillerent ones; and per- 
 ception- of Hieh dr^rre^ of strength and 
 clearness, and not of other decrees: and 
 so also the nature o;' all their acts of judg- 
 ment, memory, imagination, conscience, 
 be.; and like\\i-e the nature of all the ex- 
 ercises of their IK arts, allections, 
 intentions, and volitions that i?. 
 thoy are virtuous and not vicious, or \ 
 cious and not virtuous; and so also the 
 nature of their external actions. For as 
 the agency of God is Ihe sole cause lhat 
 Ihose exercises and actions possess ex- 
 istence, it must of course be Ihe sole cause 
 lhat they possess such an existence as they 
 
36 
 
 do. To suppose, that while they owe 
 their existence solely to God's agency, they 
 owe their nature to some other agency, is 
 to suppose that some other agency than 
 God's is concerned in giving them exist- 
 ence; since that, in its nalure, which dis- 
 tinguishes each one of those acts from all 
 others of the same kind, is a part of that 
 act, as much as that in its nature, which 
 distinguishes one class of those acts from 
 (fnol/ur, is a part of that class : and it is 
 also to suppose, that God's agency, that 
 is, the exercise of His omnipotence, is 
 controlled or modified by some other 
 agency; both of which suppositions are 
 absurd. 
 
 As, therefore, according to this theory, 
 God creates all the acts of men and their 
 nature, the sole reasc-i, that some of those 
 acts differ from others is, that the exercise of 
 God's poii r in creating them is different ; 
 or rather, that God's volitions, by which 
 He exerc-s His power, are different. 
 His omnipotent volitions, being the sole 
 cause of their nature, a difference in His 
 volitions must be the sole cause of the dif- 
 ference in their nature. 
 
 The volitions of men are, according to 
 the theory, always produced in the view 
 of motives. " Choice always implies mo- 
 
In 
 
 37 
 
 Vv > 
 
 live. It is out of the power of the 
 to oblige men to act, without making them 
 willing to act in the view of motives. Ac- 
 cordingly, when He works in us both to 
 will and to do, he first exhibits motives be- 
 fore our minds, and then excites us to act 
 voluntarily in view of the motives exhi- 
 bited." Vol. i. 2ti. 
 
 Motive is< of bodily sensations, 
 
 appetites, mental affections, perceptions 
 of truths and of external objects, concep- 
 tions of things, past volitions, and external 
 actions recollected, and perhaps some 
 other mental operations. All these mo- 
 tives of course, according to Doctor E., 
 are created : a< in hi- view all the actions 
 and events, both internal and external, of 
 which men are the subjects, are the pro- 
 ductions of Divine power. 
 
 By his language, therefore, " when he 
 work? in us both to will and to do, he first 
 exhibits motives before our minds, and 
 then excites us to act voluntarily in view 
 of the motives exhibited;" he means 
 that God always creates motives in the 
 mind immediately antecedent to his cre- 
 ating volitions there ; or, that the order 
 of time in which God creates motives arid 
 volitions, is, that volitions always imme- 
 diately succeed motives. 
 4 
 
38 
 
 But motives, according to the Doctor^ 
 representation, have no influence in excit- 
 ing the mind to volition. Such is neces- 
 sarily the fact, if, agreeably to his view, 
 all volitions are the immediate produc- 
 tions of Divine power. Whatever God 
 creates, must owe its existence solely to 
 His agency , and not at all to any other agen- 
 cy. And if "mind cannot act, any more 
 than matter can move without a Divine 
 agency" then it cannot be excited to action 
 by mere motives. This view the Doctor 
 exhibits in the following passages: "The 
 bare perception of motive is incapable of 
 producing volition. He not only ad- 
 dresses their eyes and ears by external 
 objects, and their understandings and 
 consciences by moral motives ; but he ac- 
 tually operates upon their hearts, and 
 there produces new feelings or affections 
 by the same almighty power which he ex- 
 erted in creating the world." Vol. i. 226. 
 361. 
 
 The connexion, therefore, of motives 
 with volitions, is not that of a cause with 
 an effect, but simply of an antecedent with 
 a consequent. 
 
 It seems too, that in the Doctor's view, 
 motives do not determine the mode of vo- 
 litions ; that is, that they are a choice of 
 
such things as they are, and a refusal of 
 such things as they are, and not a choice 
 of those things of whvoli they are a refu- 
 sal, and a refusal of those things of which 
 they are a choice : or. in other word.-, that 
 in the case of any given volition, it is not 
 the nature of, nor any thing pertaining to, 
 that motive then before the mind, which 
 is to the mind the greatest apparent good, 
 that is the reason that tin; mind view* it 
 as ti. test good, and yields to its in- 
 
 fluence. Nor is it the nature of, nor any 
 thing pertaining to, that moiix I the 
 
 mind, which is to the mind the least ap- 
 parent good, that is the reason that the 
 mind regards it as the least <ood, and re- 
 il \ influence: hut the sole reason that 
 the one im>ti\ e appear- the neatest and 
 
 least good, and the other app- 
 the least and not the greatest gnud. is the 
 
 Divi 
 
 \Ve are presented with this \ir\v in the 
 following passage: "Suppose a ma 
 leisure desires to read, and some person 
 pre-ents him a hible and a Novel. 
 Though he knows the contents of each 
 ,cse books, yet it depends upon a Di- 
 vine operation on his mind which of them 
 he shall choose to read : for the bare per- 
 ception of motive is incapable of pro- 
 
40 
 
 ducing volition. If God works in him to 
 will to read the Bible," &c. Vol. i. 226. 
 
 Here the two motives are, the Bible 
 and the Novel, of the contents of each of 
 which the man possesses a perfect know- 
 ledge ; and it depends entirely, according 
 *o the Doctor, upon the Divine operation, 
 and not at all upon the nature of, or any 
 thing pertaining to the motives, which of 
 them he shall choose, and which refuse; 
 that is, which he shall view as the great- 
 est good, and which as the least; and 
 which, therefore, he shall yield to, and 
 which resist. 
 
 The same view is^exhibited in the fol- 
 lowing passage: "There was a neces- 
 sary and infallible connexion between 
 Saul's actions, and the motives from which 
 he acted ; and this certain connexion 
 could be owing to no other cause than a 
 secret Divine influence on his will, which 
 gave energy and success to the motives 
 which induced him to execute the designs 
 of Providence." Page 227. 
 
 Here the Divine influence is affirmed to 
 have given energy and success to those 
 motives from which he acted^ and not to the 
 others before his mind; and that influ- 
 ence is declared to have been the sole 
 cause of the infallible connexion between 
 
41 
 
 his actions and those motives. It was not 
 the nature of those motives, nor any tiling 
 pertaining to them, therefore, that was the 
 on that Saul regarded them as the 
 greatest good, and yielded to their influ- 
 ence ; hut it was solely the </<>r//n/ of God. 
 
 Motives, then, in the Doctor's view, are 
 not necessary, and are not employed to 
 determine the* mode of volition-, as ex- 
 plained ahove. They do not hold the 
 relation to volitions of a cause of their 
 mode, any more than of their existence. 
 They are nere.-sary, merely a* an < rnisiou 
 to the existence and the mode of volitions. 
 Volitions cannot be created in the mind 
 unless motives are before the mind; and 
 volitions of a particular kind cannot be 
 created, unless motives respecting the ac- 
 tions, which are the objects of the voli- 
 tion-, are present to the mind, when the 
 volitions are produced. A volition about 
 an apple, for instance, cannot be created, 
 unless an apple is present to the mind as 
 a motive to that volition. 
 
 Thus, according to the Doctor, "choice 
 always implies motive. It is out of the 
 power of the Deity to oblige men to act, 
 without making them willing to act in the 
 view of motives." Vol. i. p. 226. And, 
 14 It ought to be considered, that a gene- 
 
 4. 
 
42 
 
 ral propensity to sin will not lead any per- 
 son to any particular sin, without a par- 
 ticular motive or temptation to that sin. 
 There must always be some objective 
 motive presented to the view of the mind, 
 in order to excite or draw forth the na- 
 tive depravity of the heart." Vol. ii. p. 73. 
 That is, to illustrate the Doctor's view by 
 an example, all that is necessary, in order 
 that a man may have a given volition 
 about an apple and an orange, say a 
 choice of the apple and a refusal of the 
 orange, is, that the apple and orange be 
 both present to his mind as motives. His 
 having such a volition as he has, that is, 
 his choice of the apple, does not depend 
 at all on any thing distinguishing it from 
 other apples, as its differing in shape, 
 size, colour, and taste, from the orange, 
 in a manner unlike any other apple; 
 or, that it is a good apple instead of 
 a bad one, or a bad one instead of a good 
 one. Nor does his refusal of the orange 
 depend at all on any thing distinguishing 
 it from other oranges. The apple would 
 be chosen were it any other apple, and 
 the orange rejected were it any other 
 orange. That the particular volition in 
 questionfshould take place, nothing is ne- 
 cessary in regard to motives, but that the 
 
43 
 
 apple and orange should be before (he 
 mind ; and nothing but that would be ne- 
 cessary, in order that any other given \o- 
 lition respecting them should be pro* 
 duced. as, the choice of the orange, and 
 -;il of the apple. The ureat<M pO9* 
 sible variation in the m<>'l< of \oli;i<>n re- 
 specting them might take- place. \\ hile the 
 moth efl remained the .-ainc. 
 
 And such, according to the Doci 
 theory, mu-l net-charily be the fact. For 
 
 reeably to hi- \ ie\v. ^ -h<\\ n a! 
 motives do not have any inilueiic" in ex- 
 r the mind to exert volitions, they 
 cannot have any influence on the ?/Wc of 
 its volitions, or in determining \vhich mo- 
 rn e before the mind shall be regard e 
 
 good, and chosen: and \\liieh 
 as the least good, and rejected. They 
 are oidy n< ry that volitions may 
 
 8MjJ ; and do nothing more than rem. 
 possible that they should be produced. 
 
 The Doctor, notwithstanding these 
 vieus. holds, that men are moral agents 
 under this agency ; and we deem it due to 
 him to exhibit this, as well as the other 
 part of his scheme, that however incon- 
 sistent it may be with that, it may be 
 seen, that he does not admit, nor perceive 
 its inconsistency, nor therefore admit any 
 
44 
 
 of the inferences to be drawn from its in- 
 consistency. 
 
 They are active under the divine in- 
 fluence. " Saints act and are acted upon 
 by a divine operation in all their holy 
 and virtuous exercises. As saints can act 
 while they are acted upon, so sinners can 
 act while they are acted upon." Vol. i. 
 pp. 203, 228. 
 
 " Sinners are not passive, but active in 
 regeneration." " Men are regenerated, 
 converted, and sanctified by the special 
 operation of the divine spirit, and are al- 
 ways equally active under his gracious 
 influence For it is impossible that he 
 should produce love or faith or repen- 
 tance, or any other gracious desire, affec- 
 tion, or volition, without their being ac- 
 tive." Vol. ii. pp. 178, 165. 
 
 The Doctor holds it to be equally im- 
 possible that any sinful volition should be 
 produced without men's being equally ac- 
 tive. " It is absolutely impossible for any 
 to prove, that human dependence and ac- 
 tivity are inconsistent with each other. 
 Vol. i. p. 218. 
 
 They act freely: "Men always act 
 freely while God works in them, both to 
 will and to do of his good pleasure. As 
 saints can act freely under a divine in- 
 
45 
 
 fluence, so sinners can act freely under a 
 divine iulluence." Vol. i. p. 2i . 
 
 Their agency and actions are their own. 
 16 They are. real and proper agents in all 
 their voluntary exercises and exertions, 
 Their actions are all their own, and as 
 much their own, as if they acted without 
 any dependence upon God, or any other 
 being in the universe." Vol. i. p. 33. 
 
 *-lf it be true that mm act, while they 
 are acted upon by a divine operation, 
 tlien their actions are their own, and 
 the actions of God. The divine agency 
 is not human agency, nor human agency 
 the divine agei p. 2:11. 
 
 They are under moral obligation to 
 obey all the commands of God, and wor- 
 thy of praise or blame for all their ac- 
 tions. " The bare light of nature tear 
 that every person ought to exercise uni- 
 versal benevolence. Every intelligent 
 creature is capable of knowing the differ- 
 ence between moral good and moral evil; 
 and this knowledge lays him under moral 
 obligation to exercise true benevolence 
 toward all proper objects of it." Vol. ii. 
 p. 176. 
 
 " If sinners are able to act freely while 
 they are acted upon by the Deity, then 
 
46 
 
 they have no manner of excuse, for neg- 
 lecting to obey any of his commands." 
 Vol. i. p. 246. 
 
 " Their actions are all their own, and 
 constitute them either holy or unholy, vir- 
 tuous or vicious, and worthy of praise or 
 blame, reward or punishment." Vol. ii. 
 p. 33. 
 
 They have natural power to do other- 
 wise than they do. " Those events which 
 God has decreed to bring about by the 
 instrumentality of men, they have natural 
 power to prevent As it is always true 
 that men have natural power to fulfil any 
 decree, which they are appointed to fulfil, 
 so it is equally true that they always have 
 the same natural power to prevent the ful- 
 filment of it." Vol. ii. pp. 53, 56. 
 
 " There is nothing, in the whole circle 
 of created objects, which affords any ar- 
 gument to prove, that man's dependence 
 destroys his moral agency." Vol. ii. p. 
 217. 
 
 Thus the Doctor, as well as other theo- 
 logians, regards men as moral agents. It 
 would seem, however, that their moral 
 agency, according to his theory, is a very 
 different thing from what it is, according 
 to the views commonly entertained. 
 Since, by the Doctor's account, men are 
 
47 
 
 entirely destitute of power, their agency 
 does not consist at all in the exercise of 
 power belonging to themselves; all their 
 actions arc fronted by divine power, and 
 cannot therefore, did thc\ possess ever so 
 inurli, involve any exercise of power be- 
 longing to them>el\< T \ "hey are not 
 agents aa far as it n the exercise of 
 <T belonging to them-elves, any more 
 than Adam wa- an a^ent in God's tak- 
 ing the rib from his *idc. Their actions, 
 like (hat effect in Adam, nre the cHects 
 of divine power solely. Their agency, 
 therefore, consists solely in their being 
 the subjects, in which those effects are 
 created. Peter was the agent in the act 
 brist, -imply because that act 
 -I in bis mind; and was not the 
 it ol ' bd, ' -imply because 
 lhat act was not created in his mind, but 
 in another's. And their agency is moral, 
 simply because those effects, called voli- 
 tions, are created in the view of motives. 
 
 According to the views commonly en- 
 terlained, men are agents, because they 
 exercise power belonging to themselves in 
 all their actions; and they are moral 
 agents, because they exercise their power 
 voluntarily in the view of motives. Adam 
 was an agent in eating the forbidden fruit, 
 
48 
 
 because he did it in the voluntary exer- 
 cise of his own power. He was not an 
 agent in having the rib taken from his 
 side, because that was not done by his 
 power, but was done wholly by God's 
 power. 
 
 Power, according to the views com- 
 monly entertained, is that by which a 
 being exerts acts, or produces effects ; and 
 in nature, though not in degree, is the same 
 in all active beings. According to the 
 Doctor's theory, however, it would seem, 
 that the power of God is entirely different 
 in its nature from the power of dependent 
 beings. 
 
 The power of God is that just describ- 
 ed, by which He produces effects; but 
 the power of creatures is simply a capacity 
 to have effects produced in them by God^j 
 power. 
 
 When therefore the Doctor, after giv- 
 ing us his theory of the mode in which the 
 actions of men are produced by divine 
 power, tells us, that men are agents, and 
 act under the divine operation, he must 
 be interpreted as merely meaning by that 
 language, in order to render it consistent 
 with his theory, that men are the subjects 
 of those created effects, called actions, 
 and predicated of them ; for that, if those 
 
49 
 
 effects are created, as his theory repre- 
 sents, is the only possible sense in which 
 they can be agents. When he says they 
 are moral agents, he must be regarded as 
 merely meaning, that they are the sub- 
 jects of a class of created effects, called 
 rulitions, which are created in the vh 
 motirc*. When he affirms that men havr 
 <r to act* he must be considered as 
 meaning nothing more than that men an* 
 capable of having those effect 7 iu 
 
 thrm: and when he adds, that mm havr 
 ])0icer to do < > than thrv </<-. he must 
 
 !<> understood as only meaning, that mm 
 sess such a nature that God might create 
 otkcr effects in them than He docs create ; 
 as that is the only possible meaning his 
 language can possess, consistently with 
 his theory, 4 that all their actions are cre- 
 ated by divine power/ 
 
 It would seem too, that the Doctor does, 
 or should, in accordance with his theory, 
 regard the mind as a torpid, inactive thing 
 in its nature, as much as matter is; as in- 
 capable of acting, as matter is of moving; 
 and as indisposed to action, as matter is 
 to motion. " Mind cannot act any more 
 than matter can move without a divine 
 agency." Vol. ii. p. 41. 
 
 The difference between the natures of 
 5 
 
50 
 
 mind and matter, therefore, in his view, 
 consists in this, that the nature of mind is 
 such, that it is capable of having those 
 effects, called acts of perception, reason, 
 conscience, volition, and other mental 
 operations created in it; and the nature 
 of matter is such, that is capable of having 
 those effects, called motions, created in it. 
 Each is adapted to be the subject of that 
 class of effects which is created in it. 
 
 Such is the Doctor's theory of the divine 
 agency on mankind. 
 
 God, by his immediate efficience, creates 
 all the acts of men. 
 
 Those acts, called volitions. He always 
 creates in the view of motives. 
 
 Men are agents under His influence, in- 
 asmuch as they are the subjects of the 
 acts created in them. 
 
 They are moral agents, inasmuch as 
 they are subjects of that class of acts 
 called volitions. 
 
 They are worthy of praise or blame for 
 all their actions, inasmuch as they are 
 moral agents. 
 
 The great point in which his theory 
 differs from the doctrines of the Calvinis- 
 tic Divines, on the subject of the Divine 
 agency, and the point from which the 
 other differences result, is, its exhibition 
 
51 
 
 of the mode of God's agency. All Calvin- 
 istic Divines agree with the Doctor in the 
 belief, that (Jod's agency extends to all the 
 actions of mm. It is an article in all their 
 ereeds. that Cod'- providence is, "His 
 i holy. wise, and powerful preserving 
 and governing ail hi- creatures and all 
 their actions." Hut their drlrine i- con- 
 fined to the 'hat Clod j)/'i?cn-<-s man- 
 kiml, and g all (heir acrionx the 
 /'<tct. that 1 i; :iinent ifl \\ \(\\ 
 their moral and th ihat the 
 Holy Spirit y on 
 the Mihjecls of sanclilication. They do 
 not pretend to teach or know the MODK of 
 His agency. 
 
 Doctor K/- is a theory of the mode of 
 His. agency on mankind, or the maimer i;i 
 \\liich lie hring^ all the actions - 
 kind into existence ; which he exhihii 
 
 that of creating. 
 
 From this \iew of the mode of God's 
 agency, the oilier parts of his theory, dif- 
 fering from the views commonly entertain- 
 ed, seem to result, viz. That men are en- 
 tirely destitute of power. (We ought not, 
 perhaps, to suppose, that this view is a 
 consequence of the former; as the Doc- 
 tor, in more than one place, infers the 
 former from this:) That God's agency is 
 
52 
 
 concerned in precisely the same manner 
 in all the actions of men, whether holy or 
 sinful : That the nature of motives does 
 not determine what kind of volitions re- 
 specting them take place : His views re- 
 specting the nature of moral agency ; of 
 power; of mind, &c. &c. 
 
 We are aware that the pretence is 
 made, that the Doctor's theory, though it 
 exhibits the mode of God's agency as that 
 of creating, yet is not a theory of the mode 
 of His agency. But nothing can be more 
 futile than this pretence. For whether it 
 was the intention of the Doctor or not, in 
 constructing his theory, to give a theory 
 of the mode of Divine agency, it is certain 
 that he has done so. There is no mode 
 of Divine agency, of which our concep- 
 tions are so simple and well defined, as 
 that of creating in which the Most High, 
 by His simple volition, calls things into 
 existence, without the co-operation or se- 
 condary agency of any thing else what- 
 ever. And the Doctor, in exhibiting God 
 as creating all the acts of men, and events 
 of which they are the subjects, has given 
 as specific and well defined a theory of 
 the mode of His agency, as our language 
 can express, or our minds conceive : and 
 hi his various reasonings to sustain his 
 
53 
 
 theory, as we have shown in the state- 
 ment of it, he has clone all which lie coulci, 
 to the same purpose, had it been his spe- 
 cific ohject to give a theory of the mode, 
 by denying that God exerts on mankind 
 any other conceivable mode of agency 
 than that of creating. 
 
 \Ve are also awar'\ that in reply to 
 the-e remark^, the pretence will he made, 
 that though the theory exhibit- the fluency 
 of God as a cr< -CIK \. \el it exhi- 
 
 bits Hi- a^enev a- udmittin^ the interven- 
 tion of means, and that it dne- nut pre- 
 tend to teach the mode of His agency 
 through them, but simply that lie acts 
 through them. But this pretence is 
 equally futile. For if the agency of God 
 is universallv a creating agency, its mode 
 is the same, whether it excludes or ad- 
 mits the intervention of means. To pre- 
 tend, while teaching, that God creates nil 
 the effects which take place in the mind 
 that it is unknown how He produces 
 those effects which take place through 
 the intervention of means, is to pretend, 
 that it is unknown that He creates those 
 effects. 
 
 Besides, what, according to this theory, 
 are means? Are they any thing besides 
 motives ? And what are motives ? Are 
 
54 
 
 they any thing but perceptions, sensa- 
 tions, recollections, or other operations of 
 the mind, created by God immediately 
 antecedent to His creating volitions? 
 According to this theory, means are 
 nothing more than acts or effects in the 
 mind, created by God immediately ante- 
 cedent to His creating volitions ; and they 
 have no efficiency or influence whatever 
 in producing volitions; nor do they con- 
 stitute any ground of certainty that voli- 
 tions shall be created : they serve only to 
 make the state of the mind such, that vo- 
 litions may be created. The mind, when 
 motives are created in it, is in the cir- 
 cumstances necessary, in order that voli- 
 tions may be created. The acts of cre- 
 ating motives and volitions are totally dis- 
 tinct from each other; and God, in cre- 
 ating volitions, does not act through means 
 at all, but only after He has created mo- 
 tives. Because God creates volitions im- 
 mediftely after He creates motives, and, 
 while motives exist before the mind, it no 
 more follows, that in creating volitions He 
 acts through means, than because He cre- 
 ated Adam after He had created the 
 earth on which he was to exist, it follows, 
 that in creating him, He acted through 
 means. The acts are totally independent 
 
55 
 
 of each other ; and the act of creating 
 volitions is totally independent of the mo- 
 tives, as far as it respects any influence 
 exerted by the motives on the mode of 
 that act. Motives do nothing but prepare 
 the mind to have volitions created in it. 
 
 Thus, according to the theory, God 
 never acts THROIC.H means. Means arc 
 nothing more than a particular set of 
 effects which lie creates in the mind; and 
 all that pertains to them that constitutes 
 them mean^, is, that they are the imme- 
 diate antecedents of another class of 
 effects which He creates, and serve to lit 
 the mind to have this other class of effects 
 created in it. The mode of His agency 
 is the same in each case. He acts directly 
 on the mind in both cases, and not through 
 the medium of any secondary causes. 
 The intervention of means, according to 
 the theory, in the Divine agency, is no- 
 thing more than God's uniformly creating 
 one set of effects immediately antecedent 
 to His creating another. Motives are an- 
 tecedents to volitions. Because, there- 
 fore, God creates those effects in that or- 
 der, and, in that sense, admits the inter- 
 vention of means, to pretend that this the- 
 ory, in exhibiting the mode of the Divine 
 agency in producing all the acts of men, 
 
56 
 
 as that of creating, does not decide what 
 the mode of that agency through means is. 
 is supremely futile and ridiculous. 
 
 What now is the basis on which the 
 Doctor has erected this theory ? Neither 
 all the foundation, nor all the superstruc- 
 ture, is found united in any single dis- 
 course; but the parts, of which they con- 
 sist, are scattered through the pages of 
 the several sermons already quoted, and 
 others, and left to be gradually collected 
 by the reader, and united into a whole. 
 
 His first step toward establishing the 
 theory is, to prove that God exerts a. po- 
 sitive, direct influence ofi the minds of men 
 in all their holy actions. Then, from some 
 of the same and other arguments, he ad- 
 vances to the inference, that God exerts 
 V similar influence on men in all their 
 sinful and other actions. 
 
 His .second step is, to prove that the 
 mode of the influence which God exerts on 
 men in their holy actions, is that of creat- 
 ing those actions. ; Then, from some of 
 the same and other arguments, he ad- 
 vances to the conclusion, that the mode of 
 the influence which God exerts on men in 
 their sinful arid other actions, is that of cre- 
 ating those actions. To sustain the posi- 
 tion, that God exerts a direct, positive influ* 
 
57 
 
 ence on the minds of saints in all their holy 
 actions, he alleges five arguments: one 
 derived from reason, thiee from the 
 Scriptures, and one from the prayers of 
 good men. 
 
 His first argument, denominated a dic- 
 tate of reason, is founded on the depen- 
 dence of creature 
 
 His position is, that creatures are " ab- 
 solutely drpmrlrnt :" ili;il is. in his view, 
 destitute of the power of acting. Ilr 
 thence infers the necessity of a Divine. 
 operation on them to make them act ; and 
 from that necessity deduces the conclu- 
 sion, that God actually exerts on them, in 
 all their holy actions^ such a direct influ- 
 ence. See vol. i. p. 203. 
 
 The three next, his scriptural argu- 
 ments, though not thus formally divided, 
 are derived from the three following 
 sources : 
 
 His second argument is founded on pas- 
 sages asserting God's government of men: 
 and he presents the fact, that He governs 
 them, as a ground for the inference that 
 He acts on them, in all their holy actions, 
 by a Divine operation on their minds. 
 See p. 203, 204. 
 
 His third argument is founded on pas- 
 sages of Scripture, teaching the dependence 
 
58 
 
 of men on God. He presents the fact, that 
 they are dependent, as a ground for the 
 same inference. See p. 203. 
 
 His fourth argument is derived from pas- 
 sages teaching that men are renewed and 
 sanctified by the Holy Spirit : and from 
 that fact he draws the conclusion, that in 
 all their holy actions God exerts on them 
 a positive influence. See p. 204. 
 
 His fifth argument is derived from the 
 prayers of good men. His position is, that 
 the prayers of good men for Divine assist- 
 ance, presuppose the necessity of a Divine 
 operation on their hearts, in all their holy 
 actions: and he thence deduces the con- 
 clusion, that in all their holy actions they 
 are acted upon by such an operation. 
 See p. 210. 
 
 He employs five arguments also to sus- 
 tain the position, that God acts on men, 
 in all their sinful actions, and all (he other 
 events of which they are the subjects, by the 
 same kind of agency. 
 
 His first argument is founded on the de- 
 pendence of men ; and is like the other on 
 that subject. See vol. ii. p. 39, 40, 41. 
 
 His second is derived from passages of 
 Scripture, teaching that God governs men in 
 their sinful conduct. He infers from the 
 fact that He governs, that He governs by 
 a direct influence. See vol. ii. p. 29. 
 
59 
 
 His third argument is derived from pas- 
 sages teaching f he dependence oi'men; and 
 is like the other from Hint source. See 
 vol. ii p. H. 
 
 His fourth argument is derived from the 
 possibility of God's producing th"ir actions 
 ly Mich an agency. See vol. i. p. 223. 
 
 His fifth argument i> founded on the as- 
 
 pltoft, that h\ such an B we may 
 
 account for the fall of Adam. See vol. i. 
 p. -j:n. 237, -Jm 
 
 He advances to the conclusion, that 
 the mode of C v in acting on 
 
 men, in their holy actions, bv a Divine 
 operation, is that of creating, in the follow- 
 
 ing manner: 
 
 tirst lakes it as granted, or self-evi- 
 dent, that if in those actions men are act- 
 ed upon by a Divine ojurution, those ac- 
 tions are created : or ihat proof , that those 
 actions come into existence under such 
 an operation, is proof that they are cre- 
 ated, as appears from the following pas- 
 sage : 
 
 " It appears, from what has been said," 
 that is, from his proofs that God acts 
 on men, in all their holy actions, by a Di- 
 vine operation on their minds ; for that 
 i- all lie had said from which he could 
 draw the conclusion, and all he had at- 
 tempted to prove, "that the hearts of saints 
 
60 
 
 are created; or that their free and vo- 
 luntary exercises are the production of Di- 
 vine power" Vol. i. p. 231. See also p. 
 280, 281. 
 
 In the next place, he assumes the posi- 
 tion, that it is agreeable to the nature of 
 holiness to be created; and employ sfour 
 arguments to prove it: First, That it is 
 possible that it should be created. The 
 argument is this: volitions are virtuous or 
 vicious in their own natures, \vithout any 
 respect to their cause. Then assuming the 
 position, that the first volition of a created 
 agent must have an involuntary cause, arid 
 supposing that volition to be holy, he con- 
 cludes that its cause may be a creating 
 cause, and the holy volition created. Se- 
 condly, He infers, from the dependence of 
 creatures, that their holiness must be cre- 
 ated. Thirdly, He infers it from the con- 
 sideration that God is able to create it. 
 Fourthly, He deduces it from passages of 
 Scripture, ascribing the renovation and 
 sanctification of the heart to God. Vol. i. 
 pp. 279, 280, 281, 282. 
 
 His argument to prove, that the mode 
 of God's agency is the same in acting on 
 men in their sinful actions, is founded on 
 their dependence. From their "absolute 
 dependence" on God he infers, that they 
 need the same kind and degree of divine 
 
1)1 
 
 if 111 doing evil as in doing good. Ami 
 again assuming, that the only possible way 
 in which God can dispose men to act right 
 or wrong is, by producing, that is, creating 
 right or wrong volitions in their hear;-, 
 he infers, that His agency is concerned in 
 vrccischj the same manner in their a 
 their right actions. Vol. ii. p. -SO. 
 
 From thi^ statement of the Doclt 
 iirgumenK lie appears obviously to ' 
 chosen a much more n;( nitons method 
 of estahlUhinif his theory, than wa- i,< 
 cessary. Since he h;; <ieh i- their 
 
 nature, he might have, in consistency 
 with himself, employed all the arguments 
 to prove the single proposition God acts 
 on men in all their actions. In a 
 
 >cy, including the two propositions, 1st. 
 He acts on them in all their W?y ad 
 by such an agency : and, 2d. He ac: 
 them in all their sinful and other actions, by 
 such an agency which he has employed 
 to establish either of these propositions 
 separately; for his first, second, and third 
 arguments, to support each are the same. 
 
 His fourth argument, to prove the first 
 proposition, he might also, consistently 
 with himself, have employed to prove the 
 second proposition; for if his assumption 
 be correct, that such is the nature of hu- 
 6 
 
62 
 
 man dependence, that men need the game 
 kind and degree of divine agency in doing 
 evil as in doing good; and that there can 
 be but one mode of agency, by which God 
 can bring their volitions into existence ; 
 then the texts, alleged to prove, that the 
 Holy Spirit exerts a direct influence on the 
 minds of men, whenever they exert one 
 class of volitions, may also be used to 
 prove, that a similar agency is exerted on 
 them whenever they exert the other class 
 of volitions : since, if there be but one 
 mode, in which God can exertan influence 
 on men to bring their volitions into ex- 
 istence ; those passages, proving that He 
 exerts a direct influence on the minds of 
 men, when they exercise a given kind of 
 volitions, prove that He exerts on them 
 the same kind of influence, when they 
 exert any other kind of volitions. 
 
 His fifth argument, to sustain the first, 
 might have been used to prove the second 
 proposition; for if the prayers of good 
 men, presupposing their need of a divine 
 operation on their hearts in all their holy 
 actions, prove that in all their holy ac- 
 tions men are acted upon by such an 
 operation; and if there be but one mode 
 of influence which God exerts on men, 
 then those prayers prove, that men are 
 
63 
 
 acted upon in all their actions by ihesanu 
 mode of operation. 
 
 ! ! is fourth argument, to prove the second. 
 
 :ily an inference or assumption from 
 his proof of the first proposition. He as- 
 sumes the possibility of Cod's acting on 
 men in all their sinful actions, by a direct 
 influence, from his being able, then- e.on- 
 
 i-ed as proved, (third inference, vol. i. 
 p. _i!8) to act on men in their holy aci ' 
 by such an influence ; and from that 
 ihility infers, that He does cxerl such ;MI 
 influence on men in all their sinful 
 agency. 
 
 From this assumption it would seem, 
 that the Doctor considers the arguments, 
 alleged to prove the first proposition, as 
 iliriii < qual proof of the second; for 
 
 if arguments proving, that God exerts a 
 
 live influence on men in all their holy 
 actions, prove the possibility of His exert- 
 
 such an influence on them in all their 
 sinful actions; and if that possibility 
 proves, as the Doctor means to teach in 
 that inference, that He actually does 
 exert on them such an influence in all 
 their sinful actions; then those argu- 
 ments, in proving that possibility, prove 
 Ihcfact, that God exerts such an influence 
 
64 
 
 on them in all their sinful actions, arid 
 may be alleged directly in proof of it. 
 
 His fifth argument, to sustain the se- 
 cond proposition, may be employed to 
 prove any proposition about the origin of 
 things, and will yield as much support to 
 one as another. In like manner, all his 
 arguments to prove separately the two 
 propositions, 1st, The mode of God's agen- 
 cy on men, in their holy actiojis, is that of 
 creating ; and 2d. The mode of his agency 
 on them, in all their other actions, is the 
 same ; he might have employed to prove 
 the single proposition including those two, 
 viz. that the mode of God's agency on man- 
 kind, in all their actions, is that of creating. 
 For his first step. viz. the assumption that 
 proof, that God, in all the holy actions of 
 men, exerts a direct influence on their 
 minds, is proof, that the mode of that in- 
 fluence is that of creating, may be takeft 
 in respect to the second proposition as well 
 as the first : proof that, in all their holy 
 actions He exerts on them a direct in- 
 fluence, is no better proof that He creates 
 those actions, than proof, that in all their 
 other actions He exerts on them a direct 
 influence, is proof that He creates those 
 actions. 
 
 His second argument to prove ihe first* 
 
and his argument to prove the secomt, 
 
 proposition, are the same ; for the position 
 
 of that second argument, to prove the first 
 
 proposition, is, that it is agreeable to the 
 
 nature of holiness to be created. But that 
 
 position is involved in the position in the 
 
 part of his argument, to prove the *c- 
 
 ' proposition, and is expressed in the 
 
 part of that argument; for if, as ho 
 
 Mies in the first part, the same kind 
 
 and decree of divine agency must necessarily 
 
 be exerted on men in their sinful as jn 
 
 their Imhj actions: the '' of that ne- 
 
 cessity must he, that it is agreeable to the 
 
 nature of sinful* as it is of holy actions, to 
 
 be created; and that is plainly expressed 
 
 in the assumption in the last part of the 
 
 argument, vix. that t lie only possible way 
 
 in which fiod can dispose men to act right 
 
 or wrong is, by />/W//r///^ right or wrong 
 volitions in their hearts; and in the infer- 
 ence from it, that therefore His agency is 
 concerned in precisely the same manner in 
 the production of sinful and holy actions. 
 If the only possible way, in which God 
 can bring sinful and holy actions into ex- 
 istence is, by producing them in the heart, 
 it must be agreeable and equally so, to 
 the nature of sinful and holy actions to be 
 produced in that manner; and all the 
 6* 
 
66 
 
 reasonings employed to prove that it is 
 agreeable to the nature of holiness to be 
 -Y/, may be used with equal conclu* 
 si veness to prove, that it is agreeable to the 
 nature of sin to be created. 
 
 Thus, his first reason, that it is possible 
 that holy actions should be created, may 
 be employed with equal propriety, as he 
 does indeed use it in the inference, vol. i. 
 p. 228, to prove, that all others are creat- 
 ed. 
 
 His second, from the dependence of 
 creatures, is precisely the argument he 
 employs to prove, that all sinful actions 
 are created. 
 
 His third, that God is able to create ho- 
 liness, is equally applicable to prove, that 
 He creates sin. He holds, vol, i. p. 228, 
 that God is able to create sin ; and if His 
 ability to create holiness may be employ- 
 ed to prove, that it is agreeable to the 
 nature of holiness to be created His abi- 
 lity to create sin may be also alleged to 
 prove, that it is agreeable to the nature 
 of sin to be created. 
 
 His fourth argument, likewise, he might, 
 consistenly with his views, have used to 
 show, that it is agreeable to the nature of 
 sin to be created; for if a passage teach- 
 ing, that God exerts an influence on men 
 
67 
 
 in their holy actions, may be alleged to 
 prove, that it is agreeable to the nature of 
 holiness to be created ; then, since the 
 Doctor holds, that the same kind and de- 
 gree of divine agency is necessary to the 
 production of sinful as lio/i/ actions, the 
 age may he alleged to prove, that it 
 it is agreeable to the nature of sin to be 
 created. 
 
 His arguments to prove, that <7//the ac- 
 tions, holy and sinful, of men, lake place 
 under a ilirim operation on their minds, 
 are likewise the same with those (or such 
 is their nature, that he might, consistently 
 with himself, have employed them to 
 prove one of the positions, as well as the 
 other,) which he alleges to prove, that the 
 mode of God's agency on them, in all their 
 actions, is that ot creating. 
 
 Thus, in his first step to the conclusion, 
 that all their actions are created, he as- 
 sumes it as a tiling of course, that proof, 
 that actions are exerted under a dlcinc 
 operation on the mind, is proof, that they 
 are created. And in his second step ho 
 assumes the position, that it is agreeable 
 to the nature of all actions to be created, and 
 alleges that position as proof, that all ac- 
 tions are created. But the reasons he em- 
 ploys to prove, that it is agreeable to the 
 
68 
 
 re of all actions to be created, viz. the 
 possibility of their being created ; the ne- 
 cessity from human dependence of their 
 being created; the ability of God to create 
 them; and passages showing, that He 
 exerts an agency on men in their actions, 
 are precisely the reasons he alleges, or 
 such is their nature, he might with equal 
 propriety allege them to prove, that all ac- 
 tions are exerted under a divine operation 
 on the mind. If then those reasons, proving 
 that all actions are exerted under a di- 
 vine operation on the mind, prove that it 
 is agreeable to the nature of all actions to 
 be created; and if its being agreeable 
 to the nature of all actions to be created 
 is proof, that they are created, then those 
 reasons, proving that all actions are ex- 
 erted under a divine operation of the mind, 
 prove that all actions are created. 
 
 Thus it appears, that the Doctor em- 
 ploys, or such is their nature, that he 
 might with equal propriety employ, pre- 
 cisely the same arguments to prove the 
 several propositions, as they are found 
 scattered in his volumes God acts on 
 men in all their holy actions by a direct 
 operation on their minds God acts on 
 men in all their other actions by a direct 
 operation on their minds precisely the 
 
69 
 
 in X'/W and degree God creates all 
 the holy actions of men and God creates 
 all the of/ifr actions of men. 
 
 Had he chosen therefore the most di- 
 rect method of establishing his theory, he 
 would have emhodied it in the single 
 proposition, including those four God 
 -ril(s <ill (lu actions f mm and advanced 
 his arguments to prove his whole theory 
 at once, by establishing that proposition; 
 instead of repeating them to prove its se- 
 veral parts, as separated in those propo 
 -it ions. 
 
 His proposition and proofs would then 
 have assumed the following arrangement: 
 
 The proposition expressing the theory: 
 God creates all the act inns of n > 
 
 The reasonings in proof of the propo- 
 sition : 
 
 Firs^ The argument from the depen- 
 dence of creatures. 
 
 Secondly, The argument from passages 
 of Scripture, asserting God's government 
 
 of men. 
 
 Thirdly, The argument from passages 
 respecting the dependence of men. 
 Fourthly, The argument from passages 
 
70 
 
 teaching that men are renewed and sanc- 
 tified by the Holy Spirit. 
 
 Fifthly, The argument from the pray- 
 ers of good men. 
 
 Sixthly^ The argument from the possi- 
 bility of God's creating all the actions of 
 men. 
 
 Seventhly, The argument from the adap- 
 tation of the theory to account for the fall 
 of Adam. 
 
 These are all the arguments the Doc- 
 tor employs to support the whole, or any 
 part of his theory ; and he might, in entire 
 consistency with himself, as shown above, 
 have employed them all to sustain the 
 four propositions separately, of which his 
 theory is made up ; or to sustain the sin- 
 gle proposition in which the whole is em- 
 bodied. 
 
 It is not necessary, therefore, in order 
 to the refutation of his whole theory, to 
 refute his arguments in every instance in 
 which he employs them. A refutation of 
 them in regard to the one proposition ex- 
 pressing the whole theory, will be a refu- 
 tation of them in regard to every purpose 
 for which he employs them : For, in the 
 first place, he employs the propositions, 
 " God exerts, in all the holy actions of men, 
 a direct operation on their minds;" and 
 
71 
 
 BS all the holy actions of men," 
 as perfectly syn. r, as appears from 
 
 his use of the words production and cre- 
 ation synonymously, and produce and cre- 
 ate also; from his taking it for granted, 
 that proof of the. first proposition is proof 
 of ihe second; and from the consideration 
 that, as shown in ihe statement of his the- 
 ory, he cannot use the terms production, 
 produce, divine operation, agency, &c. to 
 ^nate any mode of agency l>ut that of 
 creating. But ;e proposition* Me 
 
 synonymous, all the arguments he em- 
 ploys to prove fithcr oi' the propositi- 
 may be alleged, with precisely the s 
 conclusiveness, to prove the other. If, 
 then, all his to prove cither of 
 
 them arc considered in relation to one, as 
 the psoposition, "(I\M! creates all the 
 holy actions of men," a refutation of them, 
 in relation to that proposition, will he a 
 refutation of them in regard to both those 
 purposes for which he uses them. 
 
 In the second place As he uses the pro- 
 positions, as appears from the reasons just 
 stated, "God exerts, in all the other actions 
 of men, a direct operation on their minds ;" 
 and, " God creates all the other actions of 
 men," as perfectly synonymous: and as 
 thence all the arguments he employs, to 
 
72 
 
 provfe either of the propositions, may be 
 alleged, with precisely the same conclu- 
 siveness, to prove the other, a refutation 
 of all his arguments to prove either of 
 them, considered in relation to one, as the 
 proposition, " God creates all the other ac- 
 tions of men," will be a refutation of them 
 in regard to both of those purposes for 
 which he employs them. 
 
 But in the third place, he does not, 
 as already remarked, employ any ar- 
 guments to prove the proposition, " God 
 creates all the other actions of men,' 7 
 which he either does not, or might not, 
 with equal conclusiveness, use to prove 
 the proposition, "God creates all the 
 holy actions of men." For the only con- 
 sideration employed exclusively to prove 
 the former, is the adaptation of the the- 
 ory to account for the fall of Adam ; and 
 if that adaptation of the theory prove 
 the truth of that proposition, its equal 
 adaptation to account for the renovation 
 and sanctification of saints, may be alleg- 
 ed, with equal conclusiveness, to prove 
 the truth of the other proposition. Nor 
 does he, as already observed, employ any 
 arguments to prove the proposition, "God 
 creates all the holy actions of men," which 
 he either does not, or might not, with 
 equal conclusivenees, use to prove the 
 
73 
 
 proposition, "God creates all the other 
 ac.ions of men." For the three first and 
 the sixth arguments viz. that from the de- 
 pendence of men; that from passages as- 
 verting Ciod"s i;oveniment of men; that 
 from passages teaching th^ir dependence; 
 and that from the possibility of God's cre- 
 ating holy aelio!.-. are all employed to 
 prove both propositions, and with equal 
 conclusiveness; as they rest on ground 
 which is common to both kinds of actions, 
 and if demonstrative of one of the propo- 
 sitions, must be so of the other. 
 
 The seventh is employed exclusively 
 to sustain the proposition, k4 God creates 
 all the other actions of men "' The fourth 
 and fifth are the only arguments employ- 
 ed exclusively to prove that God creates 
 all the holy actions of men. And the Doc- 
 tor might have used them with equal con- 
 clusiveness to prove the other proposi- 
 tion. For in his fourth argument, from 
 Eissages of Scripture, teaching that the 
 oly Spirit renews and sanctifies the 
 hearts of men, the manner in which he 
 obtains the inference, that God creates all 
 their holy actions, is, by the assumption, 
 that the only way in which He can bring 
 the holy actions of men into existence, is 
 that of creating them. His argument de- 
 
74 
 
 pends entirely on that assumption. Since 
 if there be any other way in which God 
 may bring their holy actions into exist- 
 ence, passages merely proving that He 
 brings them into existence, will not prove 
 that the mode of His bringing them into 
 existence is that of creation. 
 
 But that assumption rests on the posi- 
 tion in his argument from the dependence 
 of creatures, that the onl) way in which 
 anij of their actions can come into exist- 
 ence, is that of being created by God. 
 There is no other possible way in which 
 lie can obtain the inference from those 
 passages. His argument, then, from those 
 passages, to prove that all the holy actions 
 of men are created, is an inference from 
 the position that all the actions of men are 
 created ; or he infers, that God creates 
 the holy actions of men, because He cre- 
 ates all their actions. It takes the thing 
 as granted which it is employed to prove, 
 and is, therefore, without force, and can- 
 not be employed with any more concln- 
 siveness to prove that, than to prove the 
 proposition, that all the other actions of 
 men are created. 
 
 The same is true of the fifth argument, 
 from the prayers of good men. For if their 
 prayers for divine assistance presuppose 
 
iheir need of having their holy actions cre- 
 ated, it mu^t be, as before, on the ground 
 that the o///// //</;/ in which God can bring 
 their holy actions into existence, is by 
 
 >n<r them : and that position also rests 
 on the ground, that the anty inuj in which 
 ant/ of the actions of men can come into 
 existence, is that of beinir r/v//W by God. 
 Hi- argument, then, to prove that all the 
 hnlji actions of men are created, is an in- 
 ference from the position, that nil the ac- 
 tions of men are created : and as it takes 
 the thing to be proved for granted, is 
 without i'orce, and cannot be employed 
 with any more propriety to prove that* than 
 lite proposition, that all the other actions of 
 men are created. Thus the inference in 
 each case presupposes the truth of the 
 second proposition. It is entirely imma- 
 
 d, as it respects the force and propri- 
 ety of these two arguments, whether the 
 position from which they are drawn, that 
 there is no other way in which the actions 
 of men can come into existence than that 
 of their being created, is true or not. For 
 if it be true, no arguments derived from 
 its truth to prove its truth, or any part of 
 it, can have any force or propriety. If it 
 be not true, no arguments to prove it to 
 be true, or any part of it to be true, found- 
 
76 
 
 ed on the assumption that it is true, can 
 have any force or propriety. 
 
 Whatever then gnes propriety or con- 
 clusiveness to any of the arguments the 
 Doctor uses to sustain either of the pro- 
 positions, "God creates all the holy ac- 
 tions of men," and u God creates all the 
 other actions of men," gives them equal 
 propriety and conclusiveness to sustain 
 the other proposition. 
 
 But if they are as entirely proper and 
 conclusive to sustain one of those propo- 
 sitions as the other, then they are as en- 
 tirely proper and conclusive to sustain 
 the one proposition including those two 
 propositions, "God creates //the actions 
 of men," as they are to sustain cither of 
 those two propositions. For the two pro- 
 positions, " God creates all the holy" and 
 "God creates all the other actions of 
 men," are precisely equal to the single 
 proposition, "God creates all the actions 
 of men." And thence, if all the Doctor's 
 arguments are precisely as well adapted 
 to prove one of those two propositions as 
 they are the other, they are as well 
 adapted to prove the single proposition 
 uniting the two, as they are to prove 
 either of the two. In metaphysics, as in 
 mathematics, things equal to the same 
 thing are equal to one another. 
 
7? 
 
 As all the Doctor's arguments hold, in 
 respect to propriety and conclusivencss, 
 precisely the same relation to any one 
 part of the proposition, "God creates all 
 the actions of men," as they do to any 
 other part; they must hold the same re- 
 lation, in respect to propriety and conclu- 
 siveness, to the whole of it, as they do to 
 any of its parts. 
 
 Thus the two propositions respecting 
 the ions of men, "God exerts, in 
 
 all the holy actions of men, a direct opera- 
 tion on their minds," and "God o<<//rs nil 
 the holy actions of men," being synony- 
 mous, are reduced to the proposition, 
 " God create* all the holy actions of men :" 
 and the two propositions respecting the 
 other actions of men, "God exerts,*' &c. 
 and "God creates," &c. heing synony) 
 are reduced to the proposition, "God cre- 
 ates all the other actions of men."' The 
 whole theory is thus reduced to the two 
 propositions, "God creates all the holy 
 actions of men," and " God creates all 
 the other actions of men ;" and those two 
 propositions, and thence the whole theo- 
 ry, are embraced in the single one, 
 
 God creates all the actions of men. 
 7* 
 
78 
 
 Now, therefore, in respect to these, as 
 to the synonymous propositions, since all 
 the arguments, alleged to prove either of 
 the two propositions, of which the theory 
 is made up, are equally applicable and 
 conclusive to prove the single proposi- 
 tion God creates all the actions of men in 
 which the two former propositions and 
 the whole theory are embodied ; it is not 
 necessary, in order to a refutation of the 
 whole theory, to refute them in the several 
 instances, in which he employs them to 
 sustain those two propositions separately : 
 a refutation of them once, considered as 
 employed to sustain the whole theory 
 embodied in the proposition God creates 
 all the actions of men will be a refutation of 
 them in all the instances in which he em- 
 ploys them to support his theory. We 
 shall consider them as alleged to sustain 
 that proposition, and regard a refutation 
 of them, in respect to that, as a refutation 
 of them in all the instances in which he 
 uses them, to prove the truth of any part 
 of his theory. 
 
 We proceed therefore to show, that the 
 Doctor's reasonings in support of that 
 proposition are erroneous. 
 
 Hie labor, hoc opus ist, 
 
79 
 
 The Doctors first argument to support 
 his theory is founded on the dependence of 
 creatures 
 
 It is presented in the following manner: 
 "It is the dictate of right reason, that no 
 created being is capable of acting inde- 
 pendently. Universal and absolute de- 
 pendence goes into the very idea of a 
 creature, because independence is \\\\ at- 
 tribute of the divine nature, which e\ -L 
 Omnipotence cannot communicate. And 
 since saints are creature-, and creatures 
 too of an inferior order, they can never 
 act othervsUr than under the powerful 
 and unremitting energy of the Supreme 
 Being. 1 ' Vol. i. p. 203. 
 
 44 Mankind are creatures, and by the 
 Jaw oi nature absolutely dependent upon 
 God. We cannot conceive that even 
 Omnipotence is able to form independent 
 agents, because this would be to endow 
 them with divinity. And since all men 
 are dependent agents, all their motions, 
 exercises, or actions must originate from 
 a divine efficiency. We can no more act, 
 than we can exist, without the constant 
 aid and influence of the Deity. This is 
 the dictate of reason." Vol. ii p. 31. 
 
 Hence the inference obviously drawn 
 from these premises : " Men are no more 
 
80 
 
 capable of acting independently of God 
 in one instance than another. If they 
 need any kind or degree of divine agency 
 in doing good, they need precisely the 
 same kind and degree of divine agency 
 in doing evil. This is the dictate of rea- 
 son " And in reference to a particular 
 case : " If he produced their bad as well 
 as good volitions, then his agency was 
 concerned in precisely the same manner in 
 their wrong as in their right actions." * ; It 
 is upon this ground, and only upon this 
 ground, that all the actions of men, whe- 
 ther good or evil, may properly be ascrib- 
 ed to God." Vol. ii. p. 46. 
 
 " Since mind cannot act, any more than 
 matter can move, without a divine agency, 
 it is absurd to suppase that men can be 
 left to the freedom of their own will, to 
 act or riot to act, independently of divine 
 influence. There must be, therefore, the 
 exercise of divine agency in every human 
 action, without which it is impossible to 
 conceive, that God should govern moral 
 agents, and make mankind act in perfect 
 conformity to his own designs." p. 41. 
 
 By " universal and absolute depen- 
 dence," the Doctor means u universal and 
 absolute" destitution of power. This is seen 
 from his inferences from that " absolute 
 
81 
 
 dependence," that mind can no more act. 
 than matter can wiorr, without a divine 
 agency, to produce its actions; that all 
 the motions, exercises, or actions of men 
 must oriffint'le from a divine etliciei-cy; 
 and that the constant aid and ii.fluene- 
 the [)eit\ arc as neee>sary to enable men 
 to act, as to enahlc them to e\i>t. For 
 if he does not mean hy 4i absolute and 
 universal dependence" an * ah-olut^ arid 
 universal" destitution ol /;O?/Y/. he cannot 
 infer from that dependence thai depen- 
 dent beings cannot act without a divine 
 efficiency to originate or create their ac- 
 tions: since if they possess any degree of 
 power, they pose-s the power of acting 
 without a divine efficiency to produce 
 their actions; for power is that by which 
 a being acts or produces effects; and, 
 therefore, the being \vho possesses any, 
 even the least degree of power, can act to 
 that degree without a divine efficiency to 
 produce his actions. And if he does not 
 mean by that dependence an absolute 
 destitution of power, he cannot infer from 
 it, that " all the motions, exercises, or ac- 
 tions of men do necessarily originate 
 from a divine efficiency" For since, if mo- 
 ral agents possess any degree of power, they 
 possess the power of acting to some de- 
 
82 
 
 gree; some of their motions, exercises, or 
 actions may " originate" from that power 
 of acting, and not " from a divine effi- 
 ciency." 
 
 If by " universal and absolute depen- 
 dence," the Doctor does not mean a total 
 destitution of power, he must mean merely 
 a total inability to act independently of 
 the divine control. But he cannot mean a 
 simple inability of acting independently 
 of a divine control; because he cannot 
 infer, from such a dependence, that all 
 the actions of men must " originate from 
 a divine efficiency;" since their taking 
 place under the divine control does not 
 involve their being originated by a " di- 
 vine efficiency" but simply their being go- 
 verned by a divine agency. Nor can he 
 infer, that men need precisely the same 
 kind and degree of divine agency in doing 
 evil as in doing good ; for if all the agency 
 necessary is merely a controlling agency, 
 the kind and degree necessary in the one 
 case may be very different from those ne- 
 cessary in the other. 
 
 Norcan heinfer,thattheconstant aid and 
 influence of the Deity are as necessary to 
 enable men to act, as they are to continue 
 them in existence : for it is the power of 
 the Deity only that continues them in ex- 
 
83 
 
 istence, and if His aid and influence are 
 as necessary to their acting as to their 
 existing, His power only must produce 
 their actions. But if He exerts over them 
 only a controlling agency in their actions, 
 it is not His power, but the-rs. which pro- 
 duces their actions; and therefore His 
 aid and influence are not as necessary to 
 their acting, as to their existing. 
 
 By u universal and absolute depen- 
 dence," therefore, he cannot mean a mere 
 inability to act with an entire exemption 
 from a divine control, but a total destitu- 
 tion of all power whatever to act. From 
 such a dependence he may justly draw 
 the conclusion, that all the actions of men 
 must originate from a divine efficiency; 
 and that the same kind of agency is ne- 
 cessary in all cases. 
 
 The position, then, from which he ar- 
 gues is, that creatures are universally and 
 absolutely destitute of power. Men then, 
 he infers, cannot act without a divine in- 
 fluence to create their actions. All their 
 motions, exercises, or actions, therefore, 
 must originate from a divine efficiency, 
 or, in the language of the proposition, are 
 created by God. 
 
 The validity of his argument depends 
 on the validity of his position. If his po- 
 
84 
 
 sition is proved to be true, his conclusion 
 is irrefragable, and his theory is esta- 
 blished. If his position is not proved to 
 be true, and can be proved to be false, his 
 conclusion is " lame and impotent;" and 
 his theory, with its seven pillars, for the 
 other six, like an inverted cone, rest en- 
 tirely on this, is subverted. 
 
 What then is the proof alleged by the 
 Doctor of the truth of that position ? It is 
 presented in the following quotations. 
 
 "Universal and absolute dependence 
 goes into the very idea of a creature, be- 
 cause independence is an attribute of the 
 divine nature, which even Omnipotence 
 cannot communicate. Vol. i. p. 203. 
 
 " We cannot conceive that even Omni- 
 potence is able to form independent 
 agents, because this would be to endow 
 them with divinity." Vol. ii. p. 31. 
 
 "It is absurd to suppose, that men can 
 be left to the freedom of their own will to 
 act, or not to act, independently of a di- 
 vine influence. There must be the exer- 
 cise of divine agency in every human 
 action, without which it is impossible to 
 conceive, that God should govern moral 
 agents, and make mankind act in perfect 
 conformity to his own designs." p. 41. 
 
 By " independence" the Doctor, as ap- 
 
pears above, does not mean, the power of 
 acting without absolute exemption from 
 all control by God, but the power of act- 
 ing of one's self, without another's power 
 creating the action, not having any consi- 
 deration whether or not that power of 
 acting is controlled by God. By being 
 " independent/' is meant the pos-e ion 
 within 01 ver to act; and by 
 
 "acting independently." i- meant. e\erting 
 actions by pouer belonging to one's selK 
 ad of liaving those a< created 
 
 by the power of some other being. 
 
 Tlii- i- manifest, from his I:M> of the lan- 
 guage, ^absolute dependei > denote, 
 Bfl BOOWn above, an absolute destitution of 
 power to (id : and from the consideration, 
 that the object of the argument is to 
 prove, that men do not possess the jiower of 
 (irtinir, without a divine influence to create 
 their actions. If, by independence, he 
 means any thing else than the power of 
 acting of one's self, without another's 
 power to create the action, it is not at all 
 pertinent to the thing in question. In 
 saying, that "independence is an attri- 
 bute of the divine nature, which even Om- 
 nipotence cannot communicate;" and that, 
 44 to form independent agents, would be 
 to endow them with divinity," he mani- 
 8 
 
86 
 
 festly means, that to communicate inde* 
 penderice, that is, the power of acting of 
 one's self, without another's power to cre- 
 ate the action, is to communicate omnipo- 
 tence; for he calls it "an attribute of the 
 divine nature," and "divinity." But there 
 is no degree of power but omnipotence, 
 that is an attribute of the divine nature, 
 and is divinity. And he says, on the sup- 
 position that men were made capable of 
 acting without a divine influence to cre- 
 ate their actions, it is impossible to con- 
 ceive that God should govern them, and 
 make them act in perfect conformity to his 
 designs. But if, in being made capable 
 of acting without a divine influence to cre- 
 ate the action, only a limited degree of 
 power were communicated, it is not im- 
 possible to conceive, that God, who is 
 omnipotent, should govern men, and make 
 them act in perfect conformity to His de- 
 signs. But, on the other hand, it is impos- 
 sible to conceive that omnipotence should 
 not, if disposed, govern a limited degree 
 of power in perfect conformity to its de- 
 signs. 
 
 That this exhibition of the Doctor's 
 views, respecting dependence and inde- 
 pendence, is correct, is apparent from a 
 variety of other considerations. The 
 
87 
 
 whole object of his argume.it is, to prove 
 a necessity of a divine influence to create 
 all the actions of men. ?>ow the perti- 
 nency ol hi- reasoning to prove it from the 
 nature of dependence and indepeiuh 
 depends entirely on his possessing tl 
 views of them \\ hich we l:,i\ e :isc:-ihcd to 
 him. For if those are not his views if 
 he r. endence of man n< an 
 
 agent, as c- i his heinj^ 
 
 controlled by God in all i, 
 argunu-nt is inconelu -ive. For it does 
 
 ,'ullow from thai dependence, that (Jod 
 must create all hi us. The argu- 
 
 t then is, God governs man in all his 
 agency ; therefore He creates all his ac- 
 tiun>. But this is assuming the thing to 
 
 demonstrated. Proof that God go- 
 ia no more proof that God creates 
 the actions of man, than it is that He does 
 not create them. The inference, that He 
 creates his actions, cannot be drawn from 
 the fact that He governs them, till it he 
 proved that he cannot, or does not, go- 
 vern them in any other way. But if the 
 Doctor regarded dependence as consist- 
 ing in a destitution of power, then his in- 
 ference follows from his premise: if man 
 is absolutely destitute of power to act, 
 there is a necessity that God should cre- 
 ate his actions. 
 
88 
 
 Again : no dependence but that which 
 consists in an absolute destitution of 
 power, can constitute a necessity of a di- 
 vine influence to create the actions of man. 
 If he possesses power to exert his actions, 
 there is no need of a divine power to exert 
 them ; no divine agency is then neces- 
 sary, except to control him in the exertion 
 of his power. 
 
 Again ; the Doctor regards the depen- 
 dence of the mind as such, that it cannot 
 act any more than matter can move with- 
 out a divine agency. But matter is uni- 
 versally and absolutely destitute of the 
 power of moving itself. If, therefore, 
 mind is dependent for its actions in the 
 same manner as matter is for its motions, 
 then its dependence consists in an " uni- 
 versal and absolute" destitution of power 
 to act. If the Doctor considers the de- 
 pendence of mind and matter as consist- 
 ing simply in their being controlled by a 
 divine agency in the exercise of power 
 belonging to themselves, then his conclu- 
 sion from that dependence, that God must 
 create all the actions of the mind, is, as 
 in the former cases, entirely without force. 
 
 If the Doctor meant, by " acting inde- 
 pendently," acting by one's own power, we 
 can see how he was led to remark, that 
 
89 
 
 he was unable to conceive that God could 
 govern moral agents : but if, by " acting 
 independently," he meant acting exempt 
 from all control, we should hardly expect 
 him to inform his readers, that it was im- 
 possible to conceive that God should 
 vein moral agents. \Vho needs to be told, 
 that he cannot conceive of a being as. at. 
 the same lime, acting independently of all 
 control, and not acting independently of 
 all control? 
 
 His exhibition of the divine agency as 
 necessary to aid, orl^lnntc. and the 
 
 actions of men, has no pertinency to the 
 argument, if he regards human depen- 
 dence as consisting simply in a subjection 
 to the government of God : but it has per- 
 tinency, if lie regards dependence as con- 
 sisting in an entire destitution of power to 
 act. 
 
 That we have here interpreted his lan- 
 guage correctly, is moreover manifest from 
 the fact, that he exhibits precisely the 
 same views of man, and of the origin of 
 his actions, in many other passages. Such 
 are the following: " There is no occa- 
 sion for a distinct faculty of will, in order 
 to put forth external actions or internal 
 exercises." What is the faculty of will, 
 but the faculty of voluntarily exercising 
 8* 
 
90 
 
 power ? " It is God who worketh in men 
 both to will and to do. Moral exercises 
 flow from a divine operation upon the 
 mind of a moral agent, and not from any 
 natural faculty, principle, or taste, enabling 
 him to originate his own internal exer- 
 cises and external actions." Vol.ii. p. 195. 
 What is power but " a natural faculty, 
 enabling" a being " to originate" and ex- 
 ert " his own internal exercises and exter- 
 nal actions ?" And if man is not abso- 
 lutely destitute of power, why do all his 
 actions " originate from a divine opera- 
 tion on his mind ?" " Our moral exer- 
 cises are the production of the divine 
 power." Vol. i. p. 224. 
 
 And furthermore, it is apparent that his 
 views of " independence" are those which 
 we have ascribed to him, because, that 
 which is peculiar to independent action, 
 is exactly the reverse of that which is pe- 
 culiar to dependent action. As thence 
 dependence, as an agent, according to the 
 Doctor, consists in a total destitution of 
 power to act, independence, as an agent, 
 being the reverse of that, must consist in 
 possessing the power of acting. To make 
 it consist in any thing beside that, is to 
 make it something which is not opposed 
 to dependence, and which, therefore, is 
 not independence. 
 
91 
 
 And thence as, according to the Doc- 
 tor, independence, as an agent, consists 
 in possessing the power of acting; if in- 
 dependence, that is, the power of acting, 
 is a divine attribute, and divinity, it must 
 be Almighty power; since the attribute 
 of power in God is omnipotence. 
 
 Such, then, being the Doctor's meaning 
 in those passages, the reason he assigns to 
 prove the truth of his position, " that crea- 
 tures are universally and absolutely 
 titute of the power of acting," is, that to 
 communicate to beings the power of art- 
 ing of themselves, without divine power to 
 create their actions, would be to commu- 
 nicate omnipotence. 
 
 The validity of his position depends on 
 the validity of the reason he assigns to sus- 
 tain it. If the reason is shown to be false, 
 the position will be left without proof, and 
 the conclusion drawn from it, in support 
 of the theory, subverted. 
 
 Power is that by which a being acts, 
 and produces effects. A being, then, who 
 possesses any power at all, possesses 
 power to act so far without his actions be- 
 ing created by another's power. The 
 Doctor, then, in holding that God cannot 
 communicate to a being the power of act- 
 ing of himself, unless He communicates 
 omnipotence, holds, that God cannot com- 
 
92 
 
 municate any power at all, without commu- 
 nicating omnipotence. For if he cannot 
 communicate any power at all to a being, 
 without communicating to that being 
 power to act of himself; and if He can- 
 not communicate power to act of him- 
 self, without communicating omnipotence, 
 then He cannot communicate any power 
 at all without communicating omnipo- 
 tence. 
 
 His proof, therefore, of the position 
 Creatures are universally and absolute- 
 ly destitute of power, resolves itself into 
 the proposition God cannot communi- 
 cate any power at all without communi- 
 cating omnipotence. 
 
 In refutation of this proposition, I allege 
 the consideration 
 
 In \hefirst place That it is a gratuitous 
 assumption. 
 
 It is not a self-evident proposition. It 
 cannot be self-evident, unless the word 
 power be used synonymously with om- 
 nipotence. The proposition then would be 
 God cannot communicate omnipotence 
 without communicating omnipotence. But 
 the word power is not used synonymously 
 with omnipotence ; for the thing in ques- 
 tion is, whether God may not communi- 
 
93 
 
 cate power, which is not omnipotence; 
 that is, whether power may not be some- 
 thing which is not omnipotence. The 
 proposition, therefore, is not a self-evident 
 one, and cannot be made a self-evident 
 one by even omnipotence itself; since it 
 involves a contradiction to suppose, that 
 words used in a different signification in a 
 given case, should not be used in a differ- 
 ent but similar signification in that case. 
 And since the proposition is not self-evi- 
 dent, if it be sustained, it must be by evi- 
 dence external to itself. The Doctor, 
 however, has not alleged any evidence of 
 its truth. He has only presented his na- 
 ked declaration, and left us to believe it 
 simply on his authority. Hut ho makes 
 rather too large a demand on our credu- 
 lity, in calling us to believe, merely on his 
 authority, a proposition so contradictory 
 to our ordinary and natural conceptions, 
 and one upon which the validity of his 
 argument entirely depends, and the va- 
 lidity also of all his other arguments to 
 support the theory, (for, as will hereafter 
 be shown, their validity depends on the 
 validity of his first argument); and thence 
 the truth of hio theory iteelf. 
 
 In the second place There is no me- 
 dium by which it is possible to prove that 
 the proposition is true. This, indeed. 
 
94 
 
 might be inferred from the Doctor's not 
 attempting its proof; since, had its proof 
 been practicable, it is not to be conjectur- 
 ed that he would have left it unattempted, 
 and thereby exposed himself to the 
 charge oi incapacity to discover it; or of 
 presumption, in resting his whole theory 
 on the basis of his own authority, in pre- 
 ference to that of indubitable proof. It is 
 not a dictate of reason, that God cannot 
 communicate any power at all, without 
 communicating omnipotence. If it were, 
 it must be on the ground of the nature of 
 power: but if there be any thing in the 
 nature of power, which renders it impos- 
 sible that it should be communicated 
 without communicating omnipotence, it 
 must be, that power is, in its nature, om- 
 nipotence ; or, that from its nature, there 
 cannot be any degree in it but omnipo- 
 tence. But it is not a dictate of reason, 
 that power is in its nature omnipotence, 
 any more than it is a dictate of reason, 
 that reason is infinite reason, affection in- 
 finite affection, existence infinite existence : 
 and therefore it is not more a dictate of 
 reason, that God cannot communicate 
 power without communicating omnipo- 
 tence, than it is, that He cannot commu- 
 nicate reason, without communicating in- 
 finite reason that He cannot communi- 
 
95 
 
 cate afleetion, without communicating in- 
 finite : ili'iiion *it'it He cannot commu- 
 nicate p\isiepre, without communicating 
 infinite existence. 
 
 \\ ( defy t!io ! Motor, and all the meta- 
 physici me on earth, to that rca-ni- 
 
 t!i<'lat"S. (hilt there; may not be </ 
 pou-f !! as in UBden flec- 
 
 tion, and existence. As far as 
 teaches, any thini; respecting the nature 
 of power, undi atlection, 
 
 aches, that there may be 
 decrees in one of them as well as another. 
 
 On the other hand, it dictates at least 
 a probability, that there may be degrees 
 in power: for as it does not furnish anj 
 ground to conclude, that there may not be 
 er, as well as ofexi-tence, 
 understanding, and i.lleetion : Mnce there 
 are degrees of exi understanding, 
 
 and affection, there is at least a proba- 
 bility that there may be also of power. 
 
 If, then, it is not a dictate of reason that 
 there cannot be degrees in power, it is 
 not a dictate of reason that God cannot 
 communicate power without communicat- 
 ing omnipotence. 
 
 It is not a dictate of common sense, that 
 God cannot communicate any power at 
 all, without communicating omnipotence. 
 If it be a dictate of common sense in dis- 
 
96 
 
 tinction from reason, it must be so on the 
 ground that the existence of power that 
 is not omnipotent, is inconsistent with 
 something of which we are conscious, or 
 which we experience or observe. But 
 there is nothing of which we are conscious^ 
 that dictates the conclusion, that no power 
 but omnipotence can exist. For we are 
 conscious of nothing but the sensations, 
 affections, and actions of our bodies and 
 minds; and they do not dictate, that no 
 power but omnipotence can exist, any 
 more than they dictate, that no existence 
 but that which is infinite can exist. 
 
 Nor is it dictated by any thing which 
 we experience or observe. Were it dictated 
 by experience or observation, it must be 
 on the ground, that we do not experience 
 or observe any exertions of power which 
 are not omnipotent. But that is not the 
 fact. We do experience exertions of pow- 
 er which is limited. The power which 
 is only adequate to w 7 5eld a quill, is not 
 adequate to raise the Andes to the moon. 
 It is limited to the production of only 
 small effects. In like manner, we ob- 
 serve that the power of others, by which 
 they produce effects, is limited to the pro- 
 duction only of effects of the same kind 
 as those we are able to produce. We 
 
'97 
 
 never see the power of creatures surpass 
 very narrow limits. Common sense, there- 
 fore, does not dictate, that no power can 
 exist but what is omnipotence : but it 
 dict-iies, that power does exist, which is 
 limited in degree. 
 
 Nor can it be proved by testimony, that 
 God cannot communicate any power at 
 all. without communicating omnipotence. 
 
 We have indeed the testimony of the 
 Doctor in support (if the position: but he 
 will please to forgive our fastidiousness, 
 if we demur in regard to I :iiony, so 
 
 far ns to con-ider the proposition not 
 provc'l* till either angels or (Jod are found 
 to yield him assistance. 
 
 Since neither reason nor common sense 
 furnish any evidence in favour of the pro- 
 po-ition, men are incompetent to furnish 
 testimony in support of it. 
 
 What the testimony of the angels, holy 
 and unholy, on that subject would be f 
 could it be obtained, it is needless to sup- 
 pose. How much soever they may, with 
 each other, have 
 
 -" reasoned high 
 
 Of providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate 
 Fixt fate, freewill, foreknowledge absolute," 
 
 or on this subject, they have never ex- 
 pressed their views respecting it to men. 
 9 
 
98 
 
 And, finally, God has never testified 
 that He cannot communicate any power 
 at all, without communicating omnipor 
 tence. No such testimony, either direct 
 or implied, is contained in the sacred vo- 
 lume. If it exists there, the Doctor has 
 been guilty of a great oversight, in not 
 detecting it, or else of great presumption, 
 in preferring his own testimony to support 
 the proposition. On the other hand, God 
 treats men in all the requisitions, rewards, 
 arid punishments of His moral govern- 
 ment, as though they possessed only limited 
 power, or as though the power, by which 
 they produced effects, was limited: and 
 also in His providence, by constituting a 
 necessity of only limited power to accom- 
 plish the effects men are designed to ac- 
 complish. And all the language of the 
 Scriptures concurs with experience and 
 observation in producing the conviction, 
 that the power by which men produce ef- 
 fects is limited in degree. The testimony 
 of God, therefore, on the subject, is 
 against the proposition, not in its favour. 
 " And let God be true, and every man a 
 liar." 
 
 But if it is neither self-evident, nor a 
 Dictate of reason, nor of common sense, 
 
99 
 
 nor is proved by testimony, that God can- 
 riot communicate any power at all, with- 
 out communicating omnipotence, then the 
 proposition cannot be proved to be true; 
 for there is no other medium by which it 
 can be proved to be true, than either that 
 of self-evidence, of reason, of common 
 sense, or testimony. 
 
 And if, as has been shown, it is the dic- 
 tate of reason and common sense, and is 
 the testimony of God, that He can and 
 does communicate power, without com- 
 municating omnipotence, then the propo- 
 sition is proved to be false. 
 
 Thus the proposition, alleged by the 
 Doctor to sustain the position, that crea- 
 tures are universally and absolutely des- 
 titute of power, is not only a gratuitous 
 assumption, and incapable of being prov- 
 ed to be true, but is proved to be untrue. 
 It does not yield any support therefore to 
 the position it is employed to sustain. 
 That position, thus left unsupported, be- 
 comes a gratuitous assumption ; and the 
 conclusion drawn from it, viz. that God 
 creates all the actions of men, is equally 
 unsustained. The process, by which the 
 Doctor arrived at that conclusion, seems 
 to have been this: Power is in its nature 
 
100 
 
 omnipotence ; God therefore cannot com- 
 municate any power at all, without com- 
 municating omnipotence. Creatures then, 
 not being omnipotent, do not possess any 
 power at all: God therefore creates all 
 the actions of men. 
 
 The second and third steps are, as we 
 have shown, contained in his argument. 
 The second must be, as before remarked, 
 if it be an inference from any thing, an 
 inference from the first. 
 
 Now since it has been shown, that the 
 first step is not only a gratuitous assump- 
 tion, and incapable of proof, but is false; 
 and likewise, that the second step is not 
 only a gratuitous assumption, and incapa- 
 ble of proof, but is also false ; therefore 
 the conclusion drawn from it, viz. that 
 creatures are universally and absolutely 
 destitute of power, is shown to be erro- 
 neous ; and thence also the inference 
 from that conclusion, that God creates all 
 the actions of men. 
 
 No farther refutation of the Doctor's 
 position^ therefore, unsupported as he 
 has left it, is necessary in order to invali- 
 date his conclusion from it in support of 
 his theory; for since the position is left 
 utterly destitute of proof, the conclusion 
 from that position is also left equally des- 
 
101 
 
 titute of proof, and no ground is presented 
 for the inference of the theory from that 
 conclusion. However, though " we can- 
 not conceive that even Omnipotence is 
 al>le v to make the Doctor's argument, un- 
 supported as he has left it, a good one; 
 yet it may be worth consideration, whe- 
 ther or not any valid arguments, unal- 
 leged by the Doctor, can be advanced to 
 su-hiin hi- position, that creatures are 
 universally and absolutely destitute of 
 power, from which be deduces his theory. 
 This proposition is essentially different 
 from the other, from which he inferred it. 
 Tknt proposition simply denied God's 
 ability to communicate a limited degree of 
 power; this merely denies that He has 
 communicated <///// /><n/'fr to men. Though 
 that proposition i- entirely false, yet this 
 may^notwithsanding, although the Doctor 
 has neglected to prove it, be true. 
 
 In proof then, that the proposition 
 man is universally and absolutely desti- 
 tute of power is incapable of being de- 
 monstrated to be true by'any argumenta- 
 tion whatever, w r e allege, in the first 
 place, the consideration, that reason does 
 not yield it any support, but furnishes 
 proofs of its falsehood. 
 9* 
 
102 
 
 If reason could furnish a demonstration 
 of its truth, it would be either by deduc- 
 ing it directly from some other known, 
 indubitable truth, or bj proving its con- 
 verse to be inconsistent with some known, 
 indubitable truth. If there is any truth 
 within the compass of our knowledge, 
 from which the proposition can be de- 
 monstratively deduced as a conclusion* 
 it must be one which respects either God, 
 or man, or both. But there is no such 
 known truth respecting either. It is a 
 known truth, that man is " absolutely de- 
 pendent" on God. But it cannot be de- 
 monstrated from that, that man is abso- 
 lutely and universally destitute of power, 
 unless it be proved, that he must be 
 universally and absolutely destitute of 
 power, in order to be dependent. 
 
 To determine whether or riot men 
 must be absolutely destitute of power, in 
 order to be dependent, let us ascertain 
 what dependence is. 
 
 A being is " absolutely dependent" on 
 God, who is entirely dependent on Him 
 for existence, and the mode of exercising 
 his power; or whose existence, and the 
 mode in which he exercises his power, 
 are entirely the consequence of God's 
 power, and not his own. 
 
103 
 
 As an existence simply, he is " abso- 
 lutely dependent" on God, if it is entirely 
 by th*; power of God* and not by his own, 
 that he exists. It bcin^ entirely by the 
 power of God that he began -and conti- 
 nues to exist, all his powers and qualities, 
 n existence, are entirely the effects 
 of God's power. His dependence, there- 
 fore, as an existence, on God, is as abso- * 
 lute as it can be. 
 
 And a- an a^ent. he is "absolutely de- 
 pendent" on God, if he is absolutely de- 
 pendent on Him for the modes in which 
 he exercise- hi- power. 
 
 If it is entirely the effect of God's ex- 
 erting on him such an agency as he does, 
 that he rxerci-e^ his pourr in the mode 
 he does: then he i- as dependent as he 
 can be in that r< -pert. I'ui these are the 
 only respects in which a being can be de- 
 pendent. For his existence, and the 
 powers and qualities belonging to him as 
 an existence, and his exercises of those 
 powers, are all you can predicate of him: 
 and if he is entirely dependent on God 
 for all you can predicate of him, he is as 
 " absolutely dependent" as he can be. 
 
 Let us then see whether a being, thus 
 dependent, must be universally and abso- 
 lutely destitute of power. 
 
104 
 
 In the first place, it does not follow 
 from his absolute dependence, as an ex- 
 istence, that he is universally and abso- 
 lutely destitute of power. His power is 
 a part of that, which belongs to his con- 
 stitution as an existence, as much as any 
 other property, and as much as existence 
 itself. It no more follows, from his de- 
 pendence on God as an existence, that 
 he is absolutely destitute of power, than 
 it does, that he is absolutely destitute of 
 existence itself. It follows, that he is ab- 
 solutely destitute of the power of self- 
 existence^ but not, that he is desti4ute ol all 
 power. If it does, it must be on the ground, 
 that God cannot preserve pow r er in exist- 
 ence. But it has been shown, that there 
 is no proof that God cannot communicate 
 power to a being, but proof that He can: 
 but if God can communicate power to a 
 being, he can also preserve that power in 
 existence. As no reason can be shown 
 why He cannot communicate power, as 
 well as existence, understanding, affection, 
 or any thing else ; so no reason can be 
 shown why He cannot preserve power in 
 existence, as well as existence, under- 
 standing, affection, or any thing else. It 
 follows from his dependence, as an exist- 
 ence, for all that pertains, to his constitu- 
 
105 
 
 tion as an existence, that he is " abso- 
 lutely dependent" for his power, just as 
 he is for every thing else, not that he is 
 absolutely destitute of power. 
 
 In the next place, it does not follow 
 from his absolute dependence as an agent, 
 that he is absolutely destitute oi' poner. 
 For his dependence as an ayent, is not a 
 dependence lor the f.<istcnce of any thing, 
 which makes up his constitution, as an 
 tence, but only for the vnodf, in which 
 he exercises his power; that is, that he 
 exercises it in exerting one train of ac- 
 tions, and not any another. Because it is 
 the consequence of God's agency, that 
 he exercises his power in exerting a given 
 scries of actions, and not any other, it no 
 more follows that he is absolutely desti- 
 tute of power, than because it i^ the con- 
 sequence of God's power, that he exists 
 in th mo<lo hp does, and not in any other 
 mode, it follows that he is absolutely des- 
 titute of existence. 
 
 It does not follow then, that a being 
 thus dependent must be absolutely des- 
 titute of power. 
 
 % But is it possible that a being should 
 be dependent in this manner D 
 
106 
 
 In the first place, as an existence he may 
 and must be dependent in this mariner. 
 He must either be thus dependent for 
 existence, or else be self-existent ; but he 
 is not self-existent: since that which is 
 self-existent does not owe its existence to 
 any being external to itself; but the being 
 in question owes his existence to God. 
 and a self-existent being can never cease 
 to exist, as the cause of his existence 
 cannot possibly be destroyed; but the 
 being in question can be annihilated ; for 
 God's omnipotence can annihilate any 
 thing which it creates. As an existence, 
 therefore, he may and must be "abso- 
 lutely dependent" on God for his exist- 
 ence, and his nature as an existence. 
 
 In the next place, he may also, as an 
 agent* be dependent on God for the mode 
 in which he exercises his power. To 
 
 this, three things nnly aro requisite, 1st. 
 
 That his constitution be such, that the 
 exercise of his power shall take place 
 only under the influence of motives; 2d. 
 That it be such, that God can determine 
 what degree of influence any object, if 
 presented to his mind as a motive, shall 
 exert ; and 3d. That it be such, that God 
 can determine what objects shall be pre- 
 
107 
 
 sented to his mind as motives. For if his 
 constitution be such, that he cannot exert 
 his power, except under the influence of 
 motives, then the foundation is laid, by 
 that constitution, of a certainty that he 
 will never exercise his power, except 
 when motives are presented to his mind ; 
 and if his constitution be such, that God 
 can determine what degree of influence 
 any object, if presented as a motive, shall 
 exert, then lie will be dependent on God 
 for the mfluenee which motives exert: 
 arid if his constitution be such, that God 
 can determine what motives shall be pre- 
 sented to his mind, then he will be depen- 
 dent on God for the mode in which he 
 exercises his power. Since, if the mode 
 of his exercising his power depend on the 
 influence of the motives presented to him, 
 and God determine what motives are pre- 
 sented to him, and their influence, then the 
 mode, in which he exercises his power, 
 will be entirely determined by God. 
 
 Can God then form a being with such 
 a constitution ? 
 
 In the first place, He can form a being 
 with such a constitution, that the exercise 
 of his power shall always take place un- 
 der the influence of motives ; for man in 
 
108 
 
 such a being. He never exercises his 
 power in mental operations, or in exter- 
 nal actions, but under the influence of 
 motives. If any effects take place in his 
 mind or body, which do not take place 
 under the influence of motives before his 
 mind, they are not the effects of the exer- 
 cise of his power, but of some other being's. 
 Since then man is such a being, God can 
 form a being with such a constitution, that 
 the exercise of his power shall always 
 take place under the influence of motives. 
 
 In the next place God can form a be- 
 ing of such a constitution, that He can 
 determine what degree of influence any 
 object, if presented as a motive to the be- 
 ing, shall exert ; for man is such a being. 
 
 It is a fact, that every motive under 
 whose influence he acts, exerts on him a 
 specific degree of influence ; and there is a 
 cause that it possesses that precise degree 
 of influence. 
 
 It is owing to the nature of his consti- 
 tution that he is susceptible of influence 
 from motives. It is owing to the nature 
 of his constitution that he is capable of 
 pleasure and pain ; and that is tho ground 
 of his being susceptible of influence from 
 motives. Were his constitution like that 
 of matter, he -would be no more suscepti- 
 
109 
 
 ble of influence from motives, than a mir- 
 ror is from the image formed in it. 
 
 It is owing to the nature of his constitu- 
 tion likewise, that he is capable of the 
 kinds of pleasure and pain of which he is 
 susceptible; and thence, that thu 
 of things are motives, which arc capable 
 of affording him those kinds of pleasure 
 and pain. 
 
 But the nature of his constitution, by 
 wl.ich he i< capable of plea-ure and pain, 
 and thence sii-ccptihlr of influence limn 
 motives, and by uliieh hr i- capable of 
 those kinds and modes of pleasut*e and 
 pain, as those of the appetiies. alli'ctions, 
 and passions of which he i- capable, and 
 thence is susceptible of influence from 
 tho-e kind- of things \\hich ;ire capable 
 of affording those kinds of pleasure and 
 pain, is not the cause that every parti- 
 cular motive under whose influence he 
 acts, possesses that specific degree of in- 
 fluence over him which it does possess. 
 
 It is his knmrldire or estimation of the 
 capacity of an object, which is a motive, to 
 afford pleasure or pain, that is the cause that 
 that motive possesses that precise degree 
 of influence which it does possess. The 
 degree of influence a motive possesses, 
 depends on the degree of pleasure or 
 10 
 
110 
 
 pain it is regarded as capable of affording. 
 That motive possesses the greatest influ- 
 ence, which is esteemed capable of afford- 
 ing the greatest quantity of pleasure or 
 pain ; that motive possesses a less influ- 
 ence, which is considered as capable of 
 affording only a less quantity; and that 
 motive possesses the least, which is re- 
 garded as capable of affording only the 
 least quantity. 
 
 It is the nature of an object, or its ca- 
 pacity to afford pleasure or pain, that 
 constitutes it a good or evil ; and it is his 
 knowledge or estimation of that capacity, 
 that is the cause of its possessing the in- 
 fluence it does possess over him. If the 
 capacity of an object be known, it is his 
 knowledge of that capacity ; if its capa- 
 city be not known, it is Ins judgment respect- 
 ing its capacity, that gives it that specific 
 degree of influence it possesses. The 
 truth of these remarks every mind will 
 recognise. 
 
 What all the causes are of his forming 
 that judgment which he does, respecting 
 the capacity of an object whose capacity 
 is not known, we may be unable to enu- 
 merate. They may be the resemblance 
 or dissimilarity of that object to some 
 other object whose capacity is known. 
 
in 
 
 the testimony of others, and, for aught 
 we know, the influence of the Holy Spi- 
 rit, or of the advc 
 
 No ifi knowledge or estimation 
 
 of the capacity of : ocU which i- a 
 
 motive, to afford j; or pain, is the 
 
 cau-o that that motive pOSBe&es that pre- 
 
 of influence over him it does 
 
 , il is apparent that (Joel may dc- 
 
 \N hat (! T inlluenre any ob- 
 
 eiited In his mind a< ; 
 ; hi- jii<i ve-pcct- 
 
 inic the* object is an fj- 
 
 and that eilect, 1: ry other, mu-t 
 
 have had a cause : and that 
 have eon-titnled. previously to the e 
 cncc of tho effect, a ground of cerl< 
 that the eli \ist at tlie 
 
 and in the circumstances in which it does 
 ist as any other cause constitutes 
 a ground of certainty, previously to its 
 lucing its ciJI'cl, that its effect shall 
 f. at the time and in the circumstances 
 in which it does exist 
 Now the cause* of that judgment, and 
 
 * Cause here does not mean the efficient cause the cause 
 whose power excr . judgment i< tlit- 
 
 act of the b .t C aut.e of the act ; it is his 
 
 power by which the act is exerted : but the " cause' 1 in ques- 
 tion is the occasional idgmpnt; that i?, thr 
 cause which leads the being voluntarily to exert the juo. 
 by his own po-.ver. 
 
112 
 
 ground of previous certainty that it should 
 exist, may and must be constituted by 
 God. For the immediate cause of that 
 judgment must be, either the being's con- 
 stitution, his previous acts, the agency of 
 some other being on him, or part or all 
 of those combined together. 
 
 If his constitution were the cause of 
 that judgment, then as God formed that 
 constitution, He formed the cause of that 
 judgment, and the ground of certainty 
 previously to its production, that that 
 judgment should, as an effect, be pro- 
 duced by that cause. If the cause were 
 the agency of God himself, then He was 
 of course the cause of that judgment 
 
 If the cause were the agency of any 
 other being, as the adversary; then, as 
 his agency is controlled by God, God 
 must have constituted his agency that 
 cause, and made it a ground of certainty 
 previously to its producing its effect, that 
 it should produce that judgment as its 
 effect. 
 
 If the cause were his own previous acts 
 then, as those acts also were effects, they 
 must have had a cause, and a ground of 
 certainty, previously to their existence, 
 that they should exit, and be the cause of 
 that judgment and the cause of those 
 
 
113 
 
 previous acts must have been either his 
 constitution, the agency of some other 
 being, his own previous acts, or some or 
 all of them combined. 
 
 If his own previous acts were the cause 
 in question, then those acts also being 
 effects, must have likewise hail a cause, 
 and ground of pfevious certainty that 
 thev should exUt, and ho the cause of 
 those art- whirh arc the cause in <|ues- 
 tion : and so of every step in the 
 Causes of the Cause of that judgment, till 
 you 10 i he first act, which was a 
 
 i the series. 'Thai act h< 
 an effect, must ha\e had a cau-e; and 
 that cause must have been cither his con- 
 stitution, or the ugj'ncv of some other he- 
 ing, or both combined. If his con>tiluiiou 
 were the sole cause, then, as before, (i I 
 the former of that constitution, formed 
 that cause; and likewise if the agency of 
 God were the cause of that act. If the 
 agency of the adversary were the cause 
 of that act, then God, as before shown, 
 must have constituted that agency the 
 cause of that act. And if, whether his 
 constitution, the agency of God himself, 
 or the agenry of the adversary, were the 
 cause of that act, God must have consti- 
 tuted that cause; then, if either of those 
 10* 
 
114 
 
 two, or if the three united, were the cause 
 of that act, God must also have constitut- 
 ed that cause, and made it a ground of 
 certainty, previously to the existence of 
 its effect, that that act should exist as its 
 effect. 
 
 Now, since the first cause in the series 
 was a ground of infallible certainty that 
 the second should exist ; and the second 
 was a ground of infallible certainty that 
 the third should exist ; and so of every 
 cause in the series till you descend to the 
 last, which was the cause of the judg- 
 ment; God, in constituting the first cause, 
 viz. the cause of the first act that was a 
 cause, constituted the cause of the last 
 cause in the series, viz. that which produc- 
 ed the judgment, and made it a ground of 
 certainty that that last cause should exist 
 at the time and in the circumstances in 
 which it does exist. Arid if, whether his 
 constitution, the agency of some other be- 
 1112:. or his own previous acts, were the 
 cause of that judgment, Got/, as shown, 
 must have constituted that cause ; then, if 
 any number, or all of these united, were 
 the cause of that judgment, God must also 
 have constituted that cause. 
 
 Since, then, it is thus demonstrable that 
 God may and must constitute the cause 
 
115 
 
 of that judgment, it i demonstrable, 
 He may and must determine what degree 
 of influence the object which the judg- 
 ment respects, shall as a motive possess. 
 For since the degree of influence possess- 
 ed by the object as a motive, is determined 
 entirely by the judgment respecting the 
 capacity of that object to afford pleasure 
 or pain: and -hire that judgment is de- 
 termined entirely by its cause ; therefore 
 the degree of influence p< 1 by the 
 
 motive is determined entirely by the 
 e of that judgment. But >ince the 
 e\i-ter,ee and nature of the cause of that 
 judgment, as has been demonstrated, may 
 and must be determined entirely by God, 
 therefore the ilr^nr oj 
 by the moti\e. m iy and must be deter 
 mined entirely by God. 
 
 God. then, can form a being of such a 
 -titution, that He can determine what 
 degree of influence an object, if present- 
 ed as a motive, shall possess; for man is 
 such a being. And if He can determine 
 what degree of influence one object shall 
 po ess. then He can determine what de- 
 gree of influence any object, if presented 
 as a motive, shall possess. 
 
 And in the last place God is able to 
 
116 
 
 determine what motives shall 1>e present- 
 ed to his mind : for He does determine 
 what motives are presented to the mind 
 of man. This the Doctor holds ; this all 
 Calviriists hold ; and all others who be- 
 lieve with the Psalmist, that " He does 
 whatever he pleases in heaven, and in 
 earth, and in the seas, and in all deep 
 places;" and with Nebuchadnezzar, that 
 " He doth according to his will, in the 
 army of heaven, and among the inhabi- 
 tants of the earth ;" and that " none can 
 stay his hand, or say unto him, what doest 
 thou ?" If God's providence is " His most 
 holy, wise, and powerful preserving and 
 governing all his creatures, and all their 
 actions," then He must and does deter- 
 mine what motives are or shall be pre- 
 sented to the mind of man. 
 
 The existence of the first motives be- 
 fore his mind, concerning which he exert- 
 ed a volition, is an effect, and, like all 
 other effects, had a specific cause. That 
 cause, since he hod not exerted any pre- 
 vious act, must have been, either his con- 
 stitution, or the agency of some other be- 
 ing. If it were his constitution, then God, 
 in creating that constitution such, that it 
 should be a cause of that effect, formed a 
 ground of infallible certainty that that 
 
117 
 
 effect should exist that is, determined 
 the existence of that motive before his 
 mind, at the time and in the circumstan- 
 ces in which it did exist. If God's direct 
 agency were the cause of its exigence, 
 then God determined its existence at the 
 time and in the circumstances in which it 
 did exist; and if the agency of any other 
 being wa^tlie eau-e of iN existence, then, 
 since Goers agency, either directly or in- 
 directly, as before remarked, constituted 
 a ground of certainty that that being 
 should exert that agency, He determin- 
 ed indirectly the existence of the motive 
 as its effect, at the time and in the circum- 
 stances in which it did exist. God. then, 
 Me to determine what motives shall be 
 presented to a being posse ini: such a 
 constitution as the one in question: for 
 man i- Mich a being; and God does de- 
 termine what motives are ^resented to his 
 mind. 
 
 Now these three things, viz. that a be- 
 ing's constitution be such, that the exer- 
 C'IH'- of his power shall take place only 
 under the influence of motives; that his 
 constitution be also such, that God can 
 determine what degree < f influence any 
 object presented as a motive shall pos- 
 sess; and, that his constitution be more- 
 
118 
 
 over such, that God can determine what 
 motives shall be presented to his mind; 
 these three things are all that are requisite, 
 in order that that being may, as an agent, 
 be "absolutely dependent" on God for 
 the mode in which he exercises his power. 
 
 For, in the first place, his constitution 
 being such, that the exercise of his power 
 can take place only under thf influence 
 of motives, he will be entirely dependent 
 on the influence of motives for the exer- 
 cise of his power at all in any mode what- 
 ever. 
 
 In the second place, his constitution be- 
 ing such, that God is able to determine 
 what degree of influence any object pre- 
 sented as a motive shall possess, he will 
 be entirely dependent on God for the de- 
 gree of influence exerted on him by every 
 motive presented to his mind. 
 
 And, in the third place, his constitution 
 being such, that God can determine what 
 motives shall be presented to his mind, 
 ho will be dependent on God for the mode 
 in which he exercises his power. 
 
 The mode in which he exerts his power, 
 depends on the relative degree of the influ- 
 ence exerted on him by the several mo- 
 tives under whose influence he exercises 
 his power. He will exercise his power in 
 
119 
 
 ihat mode to which he is influenced, by 
 those motives which exert on him the 
 greatest degree of influence. His con- 
 stitution, then, berni;- Mich, that God can 
 determine, in any g; hat motives 
 
 shall be presented to his mind, God, by 
 presenting those motives, can determine 
 uliat degree of influence shall be exerted 
 on him to rxerci-e hi- |*n\ 
 
 tiiode of 
 
 power he shall be excited 
 by the xlro^fst influcnc*-. 
 
 But, since he will exercise his power in 
 that mode to whirh he is excited by the 
 strongest influence; if it be d ined 
 
 by God to what mode of ex< his 
 
 power he shall he excited by the strongest 
 iniluenee. (hen he \\i\\ be entirely de| 
 dent on God for the mode in which he ex- 
 erci-es hi- pov, 
 
 Th of the effects produced 
 
 by his power, will depend on the f/n(t)>li/y 
 of power with which he is endowed. God, 
 therefore, in endowing him with that 
 quantity of power which he possesses, 
 will determine the magnitude of the effects 
 produced by the exertions of his power. 
 
 God, then, is able to form a being of 
 such a constitution, that the exercise of 
 his power shall take place only under the 
 
120 
 
 influence of motives : that He can deter- 
 mine what degree of influence every mo- 
 tive shall possess ; and that He can de- 
 termine what motives shall be presented 
 to his mind : for man is such a being. 
 
 And, since a being, possessing such a 
 constitution, will be entirely dependent 
 on God for the mode in which he exer- 
 cises his power, God can form a being of 
 such a constitution, that he shall be en- 
 tirely dependent on Him for the mode in 
 which he exercises his power. 
 
 God, then, as has been shown, can form 
 a being of such a constitution, that as an 
 existence, he shall be " absolutely depen- 
 dent" on God for his existence, and all 
 the powers and qualities that make up his 
 existence ; and that as an agent, he shall 
 be u absolutely dependent" on God for 
 the mode in which he exercises his power. 
 
 It has been also shown, that it does not 
 follow, that a being thus depende-nt on 
 God as an existence and an agent, is ab- 
 solutely destitute of power. Therefore it 
 has been showi?, that it does not follow, 
 from man's being " absolutely depen- 
 dent" on God, that he is universally and 
 absolutely destitute of power. 
 
 From the known truth then, man is 
 * absolutely dependent" on God, it can- 
 
not be demonstrated that he is univer- 
 sally and absolutely destitute of power. 
 
 Again; it is a known truth, that the in- 
 finitely wise God has formed and governs 
 man in the manner that yields Him the 
 largest tribute of glory; but it cannot be 
 demonstrated from that, that man is uni- 
 illy and absolutely destitute of power. 
 
 God is glorified by the display of his at- 
 tributes. If, then, it follows from the fact, 
 that God has formed and governs man in 
 the manner that yields Him the largest 
 tribute of glory, that man is destitute of 
 power, it must be on the ground that his 
 creation and government, if absolutely 
 destitute of power, would involve a larger 
 exhibition of the divine attributes than 
 his creation and L;O\ eminent, if endowed 
 with power. Hut his creation and go- 
 vernment, if destitute of power, would not 
 involve so large a display of the divine 
 attributes, as his creation arid govern- 
 ment, if endowed with power. 
 
 In the first place, his creation, if endow- 
 ed with power, would involve a larger ex- 
 hibition of the divine attributes than if 
 absolutely destitute of power. 
 
 For since, if endowed with power, all 
 that belonged to his constitution, apart 
 11 
 
122 
 
 from his power, would exactly resemble 
 his whole constitution, if absolutely des- 
 titute of power; as large a display of the 
 divine attributes would be made in creat- 
 ing what belonged to his constitution, 
 apart from his power, as in creating the 
 whole, if destitute of power. A larger dis- 
 play of them, therefore, would be made in 
 creating his whole constitution, if endow- 
 ed with power, than in creating the whole, 
 if destitute of power. For the creation 
 of his power would manifest the divine at- 
 tributes, as far as we can judge, at least 
 as much as the creation of his understand- 
 ing, affections, or any other part of his 
 constitution. The power of God would, 
 as far as we can see, be as luminously 
 displayed ; and the wisdom of God, in 
 adapting the degree of power, and the 
 mode of its exertion, to the other parts 
 of the constitution, would be as conspicu- 
 ouslv exhibited, as in adapting the under- 
 standing or affections to the other parts of 
 the constitution. 
 
 In the next place, his government would 
 involve a larger exhibition of the divine 
 attributes, if endowed with power, than 
 if absolutely destitute of power. 
 
 The power of God would, in our ap- 
 prehension, be more illustriously display- 
 
123 
 
 ed in directing the vast and complicated 
 means of a providential government, so as 
 to control the power of man in all its ex- 
 ertions and bring all his actions into ex- 
 istence, conformably to His own design, 
 than in simply creating all those acti 
 And the contrivance and direction of the 
 s\-iem of means such a providential go- 
 vernment would involve, would present a 
 bonndl* re fur d 'manifc.-ta- 
 
 tioii> of (u><|V \\ i-dom. 1 di-phv 
 
 would be reMricted to comparatively nar- 
 row limit-, were all the art'mns of men 
 brought into existence by God'- creative 
 power; as that would involve only an in- 
 finite repetition of the same exhibition of 
 His wisdom. 
 
 Since, then, the creation and govern- 
 ment of man. if absolutely destitute 
 Id invol ^p'ay of 
 
 divine attributes than if endowed with 
 power; the fact, that God has formed and 
 governs man in the manner that yields 
 Him the largest tribute of glory, does not 
 present any ground for the inference that 
 he is absolutely destitute of power; but. 
 on the contrary, conducts us to the con- 
 conclusion, that he is endowed with 
 power. 
 
J24 
 
 From neither of these known truths 
 then, respecting God and man, can it be 
 inferred, that man is universally and ab- 
 solutely destitute of power. But there is 
 no other known truth respecting either 
 God or man, from which such a conclusion 
 can be obtained. If it is neither neces- 
 sary, that he should be universally and 
 absolutely destitute of power, that he may 
 be " absolutely dependent" on God, nor 
 that God may be glorified to the highest 
 decree by his creation and government; 
 then it cannot be necessary on any 
 ground. 
 
 Reason^ therefore, does not yield any 
 support to the proposition, man is uni- 
 versally and absolutely destitute of power, 
 but furnishes proof of its falsehood. 
 
 In proof that that proposition is incapa- 
 ble of being demonstrated to be true by 
 any argumentation whatever, we allege, 
 in the next place, the consideration, 
 that common tense does not furnish it any 
 support, but concurs with reason in prov- 
 ing its falsehood. Were any evidence 
 afforded by common sense that the pro- 
 position is true, it must be something of 
 M'hioh we are conscious, or which we 
 experience, or observe. 
 
125 
 
 13 ut our consciousness does not afford any 
 evidence of its truth. We are not indeed 
 conseious of possessing power; but it 
 dors, not thence follow tint we are abso- 
 lutely destitute of it, any more than that, 
 because^ we are not conscious of our ex- 
 istence it follows that we are absolutely 
 de-titute of exi-tence. \\e are conscious 
 of nothing hut the sensations, allertions, 
 and actions of our bod ie8 and mind-. Our 
 not brina; conscious of possessing pouer. 
 no more |,r<>\ e< (i- de-tit ute of it. than our 
 not beinu consciou> of e\ proves 
 
 us de-tiitile of that : or our not being con- 
 scious of the growth of our bodies, and 
 the circulation of our Mood pro\es. that 
 neither of these effects takes place in our 
 bodies. 
 
 Nor does our experience or observation 
 afford any evidence that \\ e are absolute- 
 ly destitute of power. \Ve surely never 
 experience an absolute destitution of it. 
 We find by experience that we are d<--ii- 
 tute of power to subvert the hills, calm 
 the tempest, and trample on empires ; but 
 not that we are destitute of power to 
 think, to converse, and to move. \Y e ex- 
 perience only a limitation of our power, 
 not a total destitution of it. In like man- 
 ner we observe, that others are incapable 
 
 n* 
 
126 
 
 only of producing those stupendous ef- 
 fects which surpass our own power, not 
 that they are totally destitute of power. 
 
 No evidence therefore is furnished by 
 common sense, that man is universally 
 and absolutely destitute of power 
 
 But on the other hand it furnishes proof 
 that he is possessed of power. 
 
 It is the natural and universal convic- 
 tion of mankind, that the power by which 
 their actions are exerted, is their own 
 power, and belongs to their constitution, 
 as much as their actions and their exist- 
 ence are their own. This conviction is 
 as natural and as strong as their convic- 
 tion is, from the fact, that they act, that 
 they exist; or from the fact, that they 
 perceive external objects, that external 
 objects exist: and no man can escape 
 this conviction, any sooner than he can 
 the conviction, that he exists, and that 
 external objects exist. If any ever arrive 
 at the conclusion that they are absolutely 
 destitute of power, and that their actions 
 are entirely the effects of God's power, 
 it is by a course of reasoning against their 
 natural belief, just as those, who deny 
 their own existence, and that of external, 
 objects, advance to those conclusions, by 
 arguing against their natural convictions. 
 
127 
 
 Mankind display this conviction in all 
 their views of their agency. 
 
 They exhibit it in all their endeavours 
 to act. A man. who attempts to lift a 
 weight, does it because he believes him- 
 self possessed of power to lift it. Take 
 an ay the belief that he lias power, and 
 he will not attempt to raise it. 
 
 They display it in all their purposes 
 and promise- to ;tct. No man forms the 
 purpose of walking, if convinced that he 
 doo. not possess pouerto walk. No man 
 designs to ily. No man promises to be 
 in two places at the same time* to raise 
 the dead to detain the sun over Mount 
 (jihcou, or the moon over the vale of 
 Ajalon. They purpose and promise to 
 do those things only, which they belie\e 
 thry possess power to do. Every purpose 
 and promise rests on the conviction, that 
 thry can execute what they \\ill to exe- 
 cute. 
 
 They manifest this conviction in their 
 reliance on the purposes and promises of 
 each other. Take-away the conviction, 
 that tin i/ have power to act, and you will 
 destroy all confidence in them, that what 
 they purpose and promise will ever exist. 
 Men never will confide in each other to ac- 
 complish any thing, if they do not believe 
 
128 
 
 that the power, by which the thing is to 
 be accomplished belongs to themselves* but 
 put their confidence entirely in God, to 
 whom the power does belong. They will 
 never confide in themselves to effect any 
 thirg, if they do not believe it is to be ac- 
 complished by their own, and not by 
 God's power, but will confide entirely in 
 God to accomplish it. 
 
 They display this conviction in their 
 views of obligation. It is held as a first 
 principle in morals, that a being must 
 possess natural powers to do an act, in 
 order to be under obligation to do it; 
 that a being is under no obligation to 
 obey a law, requiring a service entirely 
 above his natural power. Take away 
 natural power to love, to believe, to pray, 
 and praise, and men will not regard them- 
 selves under any more obligation to do 
 those acts, than those who were miracu- 
 lously healed of diseases, regarded them- 
 selves under obligations to heal them- 
 selves in the manner they were healed. 
 The man who loses the power of seeing, 
 feels no obligation to read the Word of 
 God : the man who has become deaf, feels 
 no obligation to hear it : the man who has 
 lost the power of going to the sanctuary, 
 feels no compunction for not entering its 
 
129 
 
 gates. Convince men that the power, by 
 which (heir actions are produced, is 
 lodged entirely in the hands of God, and 
 not in their own, and you disarm their 
 consciences of power to approve or con- 
 demn. They never praise or blame 
 themselves for effects produced in them 
 by another's power. 
 
 They exhibit this conviction in all their 
 language respecting the power by which 
 their actions are produced. They ascribe 
 power to themM'Iw- and other-. They 
 OtEtinguieb between etleeU produced in 
 themselves, by their own power, and by 
 the power of God and other beings. They 
 distinguish the different degrees of power, 
 pn-scsscd by different individuals, and 
 by themselves at different period.?, as 
 much as they di-tm^ui-h the differences 
 in (heir form and mental qualities Were 
 it not for the conviction, that the power 
 which exerts their actions is their own, 
 and not any other being's, they would no 
 more predicate the power by which their 
 actions are exerted, of themselves, than 
 they predicate the power by which a ma- 
 chine is moved, of the machine itself; or 
 the power by which a thing is created, of 
 the thing itself. 
 
 Now this universal and irresistible con- 
 
130 
 
 viction of mankind, that the power, by 
 which their actions are exerted, is their 
 own power, and not God's, as much as 
 their actions and existence are their own, 
 and not God's, must have some cause, 
 and that cause can be no other than their 
 constitution. Now their constitution in 
 giving its testimony, that their power is 
 actually their own as they believe, testi- 
 fies either in accordance with fact, or else 
 in contradiction to fact. But their consti- 
 tution cannot give a testimony contradict- 
 ing the truth. If it does, they are totally 
 deceived on a subject of more importance 
 than any other, and since God made their 
 constitution, they are deceived by Him. 
 
 But God cannot be believed to have 
 thus deceived mankind. No reason can 
 be assigned for His deceiving them at all, 
 and especially on a subject of such bound- 
 less consequence to themselves. If they 
 are totally destitute of power, no injury 
 can be conceived to result from their 
 knowing it. It could not affect their re- 
 sponsibility or the mode of their conduct : 
 for their moral obligation, assuredly, can- 
 not he constituted by their ignorance of 
 themselves; and if their actions are cre- 
 ated by God. their knowledge of the fact 
 could Dot prevent His continuing to cre- 
 ate them. 
 
131 
 
 And how could God thus deceive men, 
 consistently with His rectitude? Would 
 it be consistent with His truth to work a 
 miracle, to lead men to believe a false- 
 hood ? But what would that be doin^, but 
 merely placing ihrm in circum<tanees. in 
 which their constitution force 1 d them to 
 believe a falsehood ? Is it any more con- 
 sistent with His truth, to place them in 
 cirrumsi-Mices in which \\iilumt a mira- 
 cle, their constitution forces them to be- 
 lieve what is total!} false, than it is to em- 
 ploy a miracle to brini; them into such 
 circumstances? Qan it be >ipposed to 
 be more justifiable in God, to employ the 
 arts of deception to accomplish liise: 
 than it is in men to attain theirs? . 
 
 How is it consistent with His wisdom? 
 Can it be supposed that His infinite un- 
 derstanding i> incompetent to <!< 
 means to attain His ends, without deceiv- 
 ing men in what is most momentous to 
 their well being? 
 
 But God cannot have thus deceived 
 men; since it would lay a foundation for 
 an entire distrust of all His declarations. 
 If it can be shown, that the universal and 
 irresistible conviction of all mankind, that 
 the power which exerts their actions, is 
 their own, and not any other being's, is 
 
132 
 
 entirely owing to an illusion imposed by 
 their constitution, and not to the fact, 
 that that power is their own; then it 
 cannot be shown, that their belief of any 
 thing else respecting themselves, or God, 
 is not entirely owing to an illusion arising 
 from their constitution. And if it can be 
 proved, that God has deceived them in 
 regard to one point of such consequence, 
 it cannot be shown, that He has not de- 
 ceived them in regard to every other 
 point. 
 
 When therefore we are conducted to 
 the conclusion, that our belief, that the 
 power which exerts our actions is our 
 own. is entirely owing to an illusion; we 
 consign our Bible to the flames heaven 
 and hell vanish from our eye we anni- 
 hilate the substance of things hoped for, 
 and the evidence of things not seen. We 
 cannot trust the testimony of our senses 
 that we witness a miracle; nor the testi- 
 mony of our constitution that we exist, 
 and that our actions are our own; unless 
 we can also trust the testimony of our 
 constitution, that the power which exerts 
 our actions is also our own power, and 
 not the power of some other being. 
 
 Common sense, then, instead of yielding 
 any support to the proposition, that man 
 
133 
 
 is universally and absolutely destitute of 
 power, presents her indubitable testimo- 
 ny, that the power by which man acts, ie 
 his own ; in the same manner that his un- 
 derstanding, affections, and existence an- 
 his own. We cannot discredit her i 
 mony to this any more than to any ol 
 fact. If her testimony, that the |>o\v< 
 which man acts i- lii- <>un, i- net i 
 tru-ted. her testimony, that man i 
 his agency, that exlenal o!>jee; 
 that he himself exist-. i> not to be credit- 
 ed ; we are plunged amid the -dark il- 
 limitable ocean*' of skepticism. 
 
 In the third place, God, in the I 
 lume of His revelation, has given His 
 testimony, in concurrence with tint of 
 reason and common sense, that man 
 possesses the power which i- exerted 
 in his actions. He n.-> where repre- 
 sents men as universally and absolute- 
 ly destitute of power. But He treats 
 them as possessing the power of acting, 
 by requiring them to act; by prescribing 
 a mode of action, and prohibiting their 
 acting in any other mode ; and by 
 His promising to rew r ard obedience, and 
 threatening to punish disobedience. Were 
 they actually possessed of all the power 
 12 
 
134 
 
 by which their actions are produced, we 
 should expect Him to treat them thus. But 
 were they entirely destitute of it, we should 
 no more expect it than we should expect 
 to behold Him imposing moral laws on 
 brutes, and machines, and unorganized 
 matter : for we cannot discern the pro- 
 priety of His requiring a being absolutely 
 destitute of power, to produce an effect, 
 which cannot be produced except by 
 His own power. If God produces all the 
 effects that are produced in the universe, 
 and must produce them, why does He 
 call on other beings to produce them? 
 Why reward some as though for doing, 
 and punish some as though for not doing, 
 if it is impossible for any of them to obey 
 of themselves ? 
 
 In God's administration as a moral 
 Governor, in which He thus treats men, 
 ns possessing the power by which their 
 actions are exerted, we have therefore 
 His testimony to the fact, that they are 
 not universally and absolutely destitute 
 of power, but possess the power by which 
 they act, distinctly from God's power, in 
 the same manner, as they possess exis- 
 tence distinctly from God's existence, and 
 act distinctly from God's acting. 
 
 But if neither reason, common sense, 
 
zior Revelation, furnish any support to the 
 proposition, that man i- universally and 
 absolutely destitute of pouer; but all 
 unite in proving it to be false; then it 
 cannot be proved to br (rue. by any ar- 
 -gumentation whatever; lor there is no 
 other source from which proof of its truth 
 ran be derived. 
 
 \Ve have, indeed, ih itv of the 
 
 Doctor, against ihat trf reason and e<>m- 
 mon sense; but wlio will hesitate, that 
 the testimony of common sense and rea- 
 son is more worthy of credence. \Ve 
 have the authority of the Doctor, as we 
 apprehend it, against the testimony of 
 God; but the "testimony of God is the 
 .ter. v Since then, as has been shown. 
 neither the reasons alleged by the Doc- 
 tor, nor any other reasons that can be 
 alleged, prove that man is universally find 
 absolutely destitute of power; and since, 
 as has also been shown, reason, co*nmon 
 sense, and revelation, unite* their testi- 
 mony in proving, that man is not univer- 
 sally and absolutely destitute of power; 
 but actually possesses the power by which 
 he acts ; therefore, the position of the Doc- 
 tor, that man is universally and absolutely 
 destitute of power, is proved to be wholly 
 gratuitous and without foundation; and 
 
136 
 
 hence his inference from it, that men can- 
 not act without a divine agency, to pro- 
 duce their actions, is proved to be totally 
 fallacious and unsound ; and therefore 
 his conclusion from that inference, that God 
 creates all the actions of men, is proved 
 to be a false conclusion. 
 
 So much for the Doctor's^r^?/ argument, 
 founded on the dependence of creatures. 
 If our reasonings in refutation of it are 
 conclusive, our work is chiefly accom-, 
 plished; since, as already remarked, the 
 Doctor in all his subsequent arguments 
 assumes the position, that man is univer- 
 sally and absolutely destitute of power, 
 as true; and their validity depends en- 
 tirely on the validity of that assumption. 
 Our task therefore is henceforth circum- 
 scribed chiefly to -the narrow limit of 
 showing, that that assumption being gra- 
 tuitous and false, his reasonings depend- 
 ing on it, are inconclusive. 
 
 His scriptural arguments, as before ob- 
 served, are not numerically divided ; the 
 passages, however, which he employs, 
 present ground for such a division as has 
 been made, and may be most advan- 
 tageously considered in such an arrange- 
 ment. 
 
 He presents then, as the ground of his 
 
] 3? 
 
 second argument to sustain the proposi- 
 tion, God creates all the actions of men, 
 passages of Scripture asserting, that God 
 governs mankind. 
 
 They are the following : " The pre- 
 parations of the heart, and the answer of 
 the tongue, is from the Lord," Vol. i. pu 
 203. "The king's heart is if) the hand 
 of the Lord ; as the rivers of water, he 
 turneth it whithersoever he will/ 3 P. 380. 
 To these may be added, the passages in 
 which God is said to have >enl Joseph 
 into Egypt; to have hardened the hearts 
 of Pharaoh and the Egyptians; to have 
 sent Saul to Samuel : to have command- 
 ed SLimei to cui^e David ; to have taken 
 away from Job that of which he was 
 stripped by the Chaldeans and Sabeans; 
 to have sent the king of ASSA : .inst 
 
 the nation of Israel; to have hardened 
 the hearts and blinded the eyes of the 
 Israelites; to have bruised the Redeem- 
 er, and put him to grief. Vol. ii. p. 29., 
 30, 31, and vol. i. p. 229, 230. To these 
 the Doctor might with equal propriety 
 have added innumerable others, teaching 
 us, that God " doth according to his will 
 in the army of heaven, and among the in- 
 habitants of the earth ;" that He " governs 
 nations upon the earth," &c, 
 12* 
 
138 
 
 Now, what are these and similar passa- 
 ges more than mere declarations, that God 
 governs mankind in all their agency ? What 
 other truth is conveyed to us by the first 
 passage, than that " the preparation of the 
 heart, and the answer of the tongue is 
 from the Lord ;" that is, that God governs 
 all the exercises of the heart, and all the 
 language of the tongue ? What other 
 truth is conveyed to us by the second, 
 than that, " the king's heart is in the hand 
 of the Lord, and he turneth it whither- 
 soever he will," that is, that the king's 
 heart is under His control, and He governs 
 all its exercises according to His plea- 
 sure? What other truth is presented to 
 us by the declaration that He sent Joseph 
 into Egypt; than that He governed Joseph 
 and his brethren, and the Ishmaelites in 
 such a manner that Joseph was conveyed 
 into Egypt in the way in which he was? 
 What other truth are we taught, respect- 
 ing God's agency, in the passages declar- 
 ing, that God hardened the hearts of Pha- 
 raoh, the Egyptians, and the Israelites, 
 than that God governed them in such a 
 manner, that their hearts were hard ? 
 and so of the others. Do these passages 
 present us with any intelligence respect- 
 
 
139 
 
 ing GoiTs agency on mankind, except the 
 mere fad, that lie f*otxf?w them ? Do they 
 utter a whisper respecting the mode of His 
 We defy the Doctor and all his 
 disciples to advance a single reason to 
 prove, that they teach us any thing res- 
 pecting the mode of God' that 
 shall not disgrace the merest sciolist in 
 Biblical criticism, or in reasoning. They 
 simply exhibit Cod to us as governing all 
 the of men; they convey us no 
 information whatever of the mode of His 
 agency. 
 
 The Doctor's inference from these pas- 
 sages is therefore a mere petitio prin- 
 cipii. 
 
 The proposition these passages are em- 
 ploy ed to sustain is, God all the 
 actions of men: but the truth proved by 
 the passages is merely, that ( 
 all the actions of men. The inference of 
 the mode in which He governs, from the 
 fact that He governs, is obtained In 
 suming the position, that the mode in 
 which He governs all their actions, must 
 be that of creating all of them; which is 
 taking the thing to be proved as granted. 
 The Doctor seems to have advanced to 
 this conclusion, as in the former argu- 
 ment, by assuming the position, that man 
 
140 
 
 i-s universally and absolutely destitute of 
 power, and thence inferring, that as he 
 cannot act of himself, God must create all 
 his actions. The Doctor would have 
 been more obliging to his readers, had 
 he not ventured to take it for granted 
 that they were so destitute of considera- 
 tion as not to detect the fallacy of such 
 reasoning. 
 
 It no more follows from the fact, that 
 God governs all the actions of men, that 
 He creates all their actions; than it fol- 
 lows from the fact, that He sent Joseph 
 into Egypt, that He sent him in the same 
 manner that David slang the pebbles, or 
 that Saul threw the javelin, or that Jona- 
 than shot his arrows ; or than it follows 
 from the fact, that Solomon built the tem- 
 ple, that he built it entirely with his own 
 hands, and by his own power. Let us 
 exemplify the absurdity of this method of 
 reasoning; The Doctor infers from the 
 mere existence of a fact, the mode in which 
 that fact carne into existence. How will 
 it appear applied to some other class of 
 facts ? Let us apply it to that class called 
 motions. Assume the position, then, that 
 he mode in which all beings move, is that 
 ^f flying, and allege in proof of it the fact 
 ihal they move. Thus, Jacob went t& 
 
141 
 
 Padanaram, therefore he Jhw to Padan- 
 aram. Joseph's brethren cast him into 
 the pit; therefore he flew into the pit. 
 His brethren drew him out of the pit; 
 therefore he flew out. God sent Jonah 
 to Nineveh ; therefore Jonah flew to Ni- 
 neveh, the incidents of his voyage in the 
 Mediterranean notwithstanding. Paul, 
 having appealed to Caesar, went from Je- 
 rusalem to Rome; therefore he flew to 
 Rome with all the ship's company. Is it 
 any better reasoning to say. ( 
 mankind in all their actions; therefore 
 He crcafcs all their actions? 
 
 The inference that God governs by creat- 
 ing all their actions, cannot be obtained 
 from the mere f.n-t that He governs* until it 
 is proved, from other sources^ that the only 
 mode in which He does or can govern, is 
 that of creating. But the Doctor has not 
 attempted that, except in hi- first argu- 
 ment; and, as has been shown, did no- 
 thing more then, than to beg the position 
 to be proved. He never can prove it, till 
 he is endowed with omniscience. He 
 cannot prove, that the only mode in 
 which God can govern mankind, is that 
 of creating all their actions, till he has 
 discovered all the modes in which God 
 can influence men: and he cannot di 
 
M2 
 
 cover that, till he has found out the Al- 
 mighty unto perfection. Until he has 
 proved that there is no other mode in 
 which God may govern, than that of 
 creating, he cannot infer that God cre- 
 ates all the actions of men, from the mere 
 fact that He governs all their actions, with 
 any more conclusiveness, than he can in- 
 fer any other proposition the English lan- 
 guage can express. His premise and his 
 conclusion lie further apart than " thrice 
 from the centre to the utmost pole." 
 
 He presents, as the basis of his third 
 argument, passages of Scripture respect- 
 ing ihe dependence of men upon God. 
 
 They are the following: " In God we 
 live, and move, and have our being." 
 46 We are not sufficient of ourselves to 
 think any thing as of ourselves ; but our 
 sufficiency is of God." "I can do all things 
 through Christ, which strengthened! me." 
 44 The way of man is not in himself; it is 
 not in man that walketh to direct his 
 Bteps." Vol. i. p. 203, 204. Vol. ii. p. 
 165. 
 
 These passages are advanced as ground 
 for the inference, that God creates all the 
 actions of men. But how does the Doc- 
 tor extort from them that inference ? Ca 
 
143 
 
 the shrewdest sophist make out that they 
 teach any thing more than the fact, that 
 men are dependent on God ? Nothing but 
 that fact is taught us in the first passage, 
 obviously from the language itself, and 
 the design of the Apostle in using it. 
 Look at the language in connexion with 
 which it occurs. "God that made the 
 world, and all things therein, seeing that 
 he is Lord of heaven and rarth, dwelleth 
 not in temples made with hands, neither 
 is worshipped with men's hands, as though 
 he needed any thing, seeing he giveth to 
 all life, and breath, and all things, and 
 hath made of one blood all nations of 
 men for to dwell on all the face of the 
 earth, and hath determined the times be- 
 fore appointed, and the bounds of their 
 habitation, that they should seek the 
 Lord, if haply they might feel after him, 
 and find him, though he be not far from 
 every one of us : For in him we live, and 
 move, and have our being." 
 
 Now was it the Apostle's design in thifl 
 language, to teach the Athenians any 
 thing more than the fact, that God is not, 
 according to their absurd views, depen- 
 dent on men ; but that men are " abso- 
 lutely dependent" on Him, as their Crea- 
 tor, Preserver, and Governor; and that 
 
144 
 
 He is a present God, not a god like those 
 they worshiped far off? Was it his in- 
 tention to instruct them at all about the 
 mode of their dependence ? Has he pre- 
 sented any thing from which it can be in- 
 ferred, that the mode of their dependence 
 is that the Doctor employs the passage to 
 teach, any more than any other mode? 
 If the Doctor can discern any thing of that 
 kind, his eyes are endowed with a much 
 keener perspicacity than ours. He must 
 handle his metaphysical retort with magi- 
 cal dexterity, to transmute the declara- 
 tion " in Him we live, and move, and have 
 our being," (employed by the Apostle to 
 show that God is not far from every one 
 of us,) into the proposition, God creates all 
 the actions of men; or to extort from it 
 any testimony respecting the mode in 
 which He brings their actions into exist- 
 ence. 
 
 Nothing is taught us in the second pas- 
 sage, taking it even in its widest applica- 
 tion, besides the simple fact, that we are 
 46 absolutely dependent" on God. But 
 the declaration was made by the Apostle 
 merely in regard to himself, and the other 
 Ministers of the Gospel, who were instru- 
 ments of converting the Corinthians ; and 
 was merely an acknowledgment that their 
 
success in converting the Corinth*, 
 was owing, not to their own competency to 
 accomplish such a work, but to the snfli- 
 ciency of God. Tin- is manifest from the 
 connexion. In the 17th verse <>f the se- 
 cond chapter of :M Corinthian erl 3 
 the sincerity and faithfuls of Inm-eli 
 and the other Mil of the (i<pel: 
 We are n my, which corrupt the 
 word of (iod ; hut a> o; .1 v . bul 
 (iod. in the sight of 
 ChrM." lit 6r$t 
 
 sks, !)> ire I* to com 
 
 mend ourselve- is BOffiC 
 
 others* epi-tlc- oi'cornmendation tn jroil, '>i 
 v of commendation from you? Y'c 
 are our c| in our IKV 
 
 \ n and read of a 1 ! men ; manil< 
 declared to be the* epistle of Chri-t, mi- 
 red by u- : \\ ritien not with ink. bin 
 with the Spirit of the living (iod: not in 
 tables of stone, but in llc^hy tables of the; 
 heart.** That is, you who were converted 
 to Christ under our ministry, are prooi 
 that we are faithful and sincere ministers;. 
 He then adds -And such trust have we 
 through Christ to God-ward: riot that we 
 are sufficient of ourselves to think any 
 thing as of ourselves; but our sufficiency 
 is of God , who hath made us able minis- 
 13 
 
146 
 
 ters." That is, we arc thus confident that 
 your conversion under our ministry, is a 
 proof of our sincerity and faithfulness as 
 ministers; not because \ve regard our- 
 selves as competent to accomplish your 
 conversion of ourselves alone, but we ac- 
 knowledge that our sufficiency is of God. 
 It is He who made us able ministers of the 
 INevv Testament, not of the letter, but of 
 the Spirit. 
 
 The import of the Apostle's declaration 
 i.s. we are entirely dependent on God for 
 the success of our ministry. The Doc- 
 tor's inference from it is, God creates all 
 the actions of men. By what route he 
 ed to his conclusion, it is difficult to 
 determine. We presume his position, 
 J\lcu are universally and absolutely destitute of 
 pou-cr, was the vehicle of his conveyance. 
 His course, then, must have been like the 
 following: The Apostle, and others of 
 whom he speaks, were entirely depen- 
 dent on God for their success as minis- 
 ters. But since they were universally 
 and absolutely destitute of power, they 
 must have been equally dependent in all 
 their other agency. All other men must, 
 lor the same reason, be dependent in the 
 same manner. But if all men are abso- 
 lutely destitute of power, they cannot act 
 
 
117 
 
 ofthomsr!\' >d. therefore, in'ist cre- 
 
 ate all their . \\ 'In -re-fore God cre- 
 
 ates all the action- of men. 
 What U allirmril in the fliir-i 
 ml the i / that Chri-t Bl : 
 
 i the Aposjle '? ]-, any tl ; 
 
 ? And what more i t US 
 
 in the hi-l. than that man i< depei, 
 
 ! for tin in which h< 
 
 The-e. pa- land in preei-'-ly the 
 
 predieanimt. in i pro- 
 
 position they are presented to | 
 did those of the for 'i'hev 
 
 prove a truth, and an important one but 
 one whi.-h has no connexion \vith the : 
 position, more than any oilier trui! 
 the imi\ To make them hear at all 
 
 on t!ie propo-ilion. it mn-t he : 
 otluM- source-, that the 
 arc dependent on (Jo-l. i- that which the 
 Doctors theory teacher. Hut lie 
 
 nor can, as hefore shown, prove that 
 men are dependent in that mode. These 
 nply teach the fact, that men 
 arc dependent; they convey us no infor- 
 mation resp< the mode of their de- 
 pendence. In alleging them, therefore, 
 as a proof that God creates all the actions 
 of men, he begs the thing to be proved, 
 as in the preceding cases, ft no more 
 
148 
 
 follows from the fact, that men are depen- 
 dent on God that He creates all their 
 actions, than it follows, that He does not 
 create all their actions. 
 
 It has been shown in the argument on 
 that subject, that man may be " abso- 
 lutely dependent" on God, without being 
 absolutely destitute of power, and there- 
 fore, without having his actions created. 
 
 The Doctor's third argument then be- 
 ing a mere assumption, is, like the first 
 and second, 
 
 Vox, et pretcrca nihil. 
 
 We pass, therefore, to the considera- 
 tion of the next. 
 
 His fourth argument is founded on pas- 
 sages teaching that men are renewed and 
 sanctified by the Holy Spirit. 
 
 \Ye will present the reader with his 
 most important quotations: "A new 
 heart will I also give you, and a new spi- 
 rit will I put within you: and I will take 
 away the stony heart out of your flesh, and 
 I will give you an heart of flesh. And I 
 will put my Spirit within you, and cause 
 you to walk in my statutes." " You hnth 
 he quickened who were dead in tres- 
 passes and sins." " We are his workman- 
 ship, created in Christ Jrsus unto good 
 
149 
 
 W0 rks." ; -The love of God is shed 
 abroad in our heart- by the Holy (ihosl. 
 which is given unto n->." " Him hatli (iod 
 exalted to give repentance." M By uraro 
 are ye saved through faith, and liiai not 
 of yourselves: it i . in of (iod." 
 
 -The fruit of the Spirit i- l<>\ e. joy. |M 
 lorio'-snileni -. faith, 
 
 ." It i- (iod 
 
 which worketh in you holli to will and to 
 do of his nood pl< Vol. i. pp. *2()1, 
 
 200. 206^207, i!o;;. 2D!>. 
 
 44 Now he that wrought us for the 
 same tiling, i- (ioil."' "Now the tioil of 
 peace make you pcrl'ret to do hU \\ill; 
 M'orkini( in yon that which is well pic;; 
 in hi pp. 160. 
 
 Th 1C other 
 
 milar import, teacliin^ us that (iod rrn 
 and sanetiiies the I. i'mni. the Doc- 
 
 tor presents as a ground for the ioferei 
 that He create^ .dl the actions of meir. 
 l>ut they teach us nothing i the 
 
 bare fact, that God renews and sanctifies 
 men. They impart no knowledge of the 
 mode of Mis agency in accomplishing that 
 work. Let the reader review them, and 
 detect, if possible, the slightest allusion 
 to the mode of God's agency. What do 
 they assert, except that God gives a new 
 
heart, and causes men to yield obedience 
 10 His statutes quickens them creates 
 them in Christ Jesus gives repentance, 
 faith, love; and works in them to will and 
 to do of his good pleasure? That is, re- 
 news and sanctifies them. The passages 
 are employed wholly about the effects pro- 
 duced by God's agency: they have no 
 concern whatever with the mode in which 
 Ifc produces those effects. 
 
 In regard to these, therefore, as to the 
 preceding passages, the Doctor proves 
 one thing and infers another. The thing 
 to be proved is, that God creates all the 
 actions of men. But the Doctor only 
 proves, that He renews and sanctifies 
 men ; and infers from that, that He creates 
 all the actions of men. His inference is no 
 more involved in his proof, than any other 
 inference which he could have chosen to 
 append to it. It is, like the others, a mere 
 assumption. 
 
 The exhibition of this fallacy shows the 
 Doctor's argument to be wholly inconclu- 
 sive, and might excuse us from any fur- 
 ther refutation of it; but as he obviously 
 relies on it, as a main pillar of his theory, 
 we deem it appropriate to present the 
 reader with a fuller demonstration of its 
 incorrectness. 
 
151 
 
 The ground of the Doctors argument 
 ia, the fact taught in those passages, that 
 ' tiflt.s men. lie bring- 
 that (act in support of hi- propo.-n 
 that God creates all the action- of men. h\ 
 gratuitously .ing. (hat the modi. 
 
 which lie renews and >;mrli!ies, i- that 
 of creating their holy exerciM -. To the 
 refutation of hi- argument then, it i- only 
 IT that it be dcmon-irated. that 
 the position he MBUHI6fl Ml entirely gra- 
 tuitous, and incapable of bring pro\edto 
 rue. This we will endea\onr to do. 
 
 We assume the position then 
 
 That \c( itoou nothing of the mode of tin 
 .crating and sanctify- 
 ing /' 
 
 "Uy thi- \\e mean, that we know notb; 
 how the Holy S[)irit acts on the mind to 
 turn it from sin to holiness. Our ki 
 ledge respecting Hi- agency is confined 
 to the mere/art, that he renews and sanc- 
 tifies it. Of the mode in which He acts 
 to produce these effects we are totally ig- 
 norant. 
 
 In support of this position, we allege, 
 in the first place, the fact, that we do not 
 possess any knowledge of the nature of 
 spirits^ by which we can determine what 
 the mode of the Holy Spirit's agency must 
 
152 
 
 be in regenerating and sanctifying the 
 mind. 
 
 The mind is a spirit. " That which is 
 born of the Spirit is spirit." Now we 
 have no such knowledge of the nature of 
 spirits, that we can decide how one spirit 
 must act on another, in order to produce 
 effects on it. Much more emphatically 
 true is it, that we have no such knowledge 
 of the infinite Spirit, that we can deter- 
 mine how He must act on the human 
 mind, in order to turn it from sin to holi- 
 ness. But we must know the nature both 
 of the Holy Spirit and of the human mind, 
 and all the possible modes in which He 
 can act on the human mind, and all the 
 effects which would be produced by those 
 modes of action, before we can determine, 
 from the nature of spirits, what the mode 
 of the Holy Spirit's agency must be, in 
 regenerating and sanctifying the mind. 
 That is, we must by searching find out 
 God ; we must find out the Almighty unto 
 perfection. The Doctor, in assuming in 
 his first and subsequent arguments, that 
 the nature of the mind, as a dependent 
 existence, is such, that even Omnipotence 
 is not able to make it an agent, except 
 by creating all its motions, exercises, or 
 actions has virtually assumed, that he 
 has attained to that knowledge. 
 
Again we know not what it is peculiar 
 pertaining to the unregcnerate mind, that 
 is the cause of its sinning uniformly; nor 
 what it is peculiar pertaining to the regene- 
 rate mind, that i> li icling in 
 a holy manner; and therefore cannot in- 
 fer, from any thing we know of the nature 
 of the unre :ul the 
 mind, the mode in which ihe Holy Spirit 
 renews the one and sanctifies the other. 
 
 There must be something peculiar ? 
 taming to the nun t mind, th 
 
 the cause of its sinning uniformly; and 
 something peculiar pertaining to the re- 
 generate mind, that is the cause of its 
 acting in a holy manner; but of what 
 those causes are we are universally and 
 absolutely ignorant. 
 
 We know nothing of the unregenerate 
 mind, distinguishing it from the regene- 
 rate, eveept that in all its moral agency 
 it sins. What the peculiar thing is per- 
 taining to it, which is the cause of its sin- 
 ning uniformly, and which is a ground of 
 certainty, that until the Spirit interposes 
 to renew it, it will continue to sin uni- 
 formly, we know not; nor do we know 
 what it is peculiar pertaining to the re* 
 generate mind, that is the cause that it 
 acts in a holy manner. 
 
154 
 
 Their faculties as moral agents are, as 
 far as we can discern, precisely the same. 
 Those faculties, therefore, will account 
 only for their acting, and not for their act- 
 ing in those different modes. 
 
 We may suppose, and it will be a mere 
 supposition, for it is incapable of being 
 proved to be a fact, that that which is pe- 
 culiar to them, and the cause of their 
 acting in those peculiar modes is a moral 
 taste, the train of motives under whose 
 influence they act, or the agency of God, 
 or a part or all of them united. But still, 
 were our supposition even admitted to be 
 correct, we should not possess any know- 
 ledge by which we could decide what 
 must be the mode of the Spirit's agency 
 in the work of renovation and sanctifica- 
 tion. 
 
 Were we to assume, with some, that 
 that which is peculiar to the unregenerate 
 mind, and the cause of its sinning uni- 
 formly is a depraved taste ; and that that, 
 which is peculiar to the regenerate mind, 
 and the cause of its acting in a holy man- 
 ner, is a holy taste; we could not thence 
 determine what the mode of the Spirit's 
 agency must be, in removing that deprav- 
 ed taste, and implanting the holy one; 
 for we are utterly ignorant of the meta- 
 
J JJ 
 
 physical nature of those tastes. Those 
 terms do not present any description of 
 tlu 1 natun of the things they represent. 
 They denote nothing more than a state of 
 the inin<I : in the one case such, that it 
 uniformly BIDS, in the other such, that it 
 sometimes acts in a holy manner. They 
 do not convey any de-eriplion, nor any 
 approximation to a description, of irhn! 
 \\hieh constitutes those states of mind. 
 The terms di-po-ition. lia-~. pnpr!.-ily, 
 reli-h. if used in an\ definable H^niliea- 
 
 tion. mean nothing more. To say, that 
 
 the unn generate mind ha.- a d. 
 
 rcli-h. propen-ily. or di-[ 
 lion. \\hich is the r inning uni- 
 
 formly, is only ' talc, 
 
 that uniformly. To >\\\. that the 
 
 mind has a holy ta-le. I 
 reli-h, pro; . or di-j.n-ition. \\lsieli 
 
 is tlu^ cause of its acting in a hol> manner, 
 nly to say, it i- in >ueli that 
 
 it acts in a holy manner. That laninia^e 
 conveys no intelligence \vhatcvrr of what 
 it is that cnns/tlutcs those states, or of the 
 
 il nature of that \vhich distin- 
 guishes thc^ unregenerate and regenerate 
 mind, and is th . that the one acts 
 
 in the one mode, and the other in the 
 other; and therefore does not enable us, 
 
156 
 
 in the least, to determine, if the supposition 
 of their existence is correct, what the 
 mode of the Spirit's agency must be, in 
 removing the depraved, and implanting 
 the holy, taste. 
 
 Were we, with those who use this lan- 
 guage, to say, The Spirit, in regenerating 
 the mind, removes the depraved taste and 
 implants a holy one we should say no- 
 thing more than that He causes the state 
 of the mind to be &M<?A, that it acts in a 
 holy manner, instead of being, as before, 
 such, that it acts uniformly in a sinful 
 manner, without exhibiting any descrip- 
 tion of the metaphysical nature of the effect 
 produced by His agency; and therefore, 
 without presenting any ground, from 
 which we could infer the mode of His 
 agency, in producing that effect. 
 
 Were we ^to assume, with others, that 
 the train of motives presented to the unre- 
 grnorate mind, is all that is peculiar to it, 
 and the sole cause of its acting uniformly 
 in a sinful manner; and that the train of 
 motives presented to the regenerate mind, 
 is all that is peculiar to it, and the sole 
 cause that it acts in a holy manner; still 
 we should not be enabled by that assump- 
 tion, admitting it to be correct, to decide 
 what the mode of the Spirit's agency 
 
 
157 
 
 must be, in the work of renovation and 
 sanctification. For in onler to determine 
 that, we must possess a knowledge of all 
 the possible modes in which the Holy 
 Spirit can present motives to the mind. 
 And that knowledge would involve ;i per- 
 fect knowledge of the nature both of the 
 Holy Spirit and of the human mind, and 
 that would involve omni^ 
 
 \\e not only do not know nil the modes 
 in which the Holy Spirit can promt mo- 
 tives (n the mind, but we do not k 
 any of (hem; and therefore cannot infer 
 umption. that the train of mo- 
 ii>o presented to it is the cause of its 
 acting as it doe-, \\iiat the mode of the. 
 Spirit's agency mu-t he. in pre-enti.m 
 >ueh a train of mniiv* -hall turn it 
 
 from sin to holiness. 
 
 Were we with others, that 
 
 the absence of the agency of the Holy Spirit 
 is all that is peculiar to the unregenerate 
 mind, and the sole cause of its sinning 
 uniformly; and that the agency of the 
 Spirit is all that is peculiar to the rege- 
 nerate mind, and the sole cause of its act- 
 ing in a holy manner we should be 
 equally incapable of deciding, from that 
 assumption, what the mode of the Spirit's 
 agency must be in the work of renovating 
 14 
 
and sanctifying the mind : since, in order 
 to determine that it would, as in the for- 
 mer case, be necessary to know all the 
 possible modes in which the Holy Spirit 
 can exert a direct agency on the mind. 
 
 Were we, with others, to assume, that 
 men always act under the direct agency of 
 God ; and that a peculiarity in the mode of 
 God's agency on it, is all that is peculiar 
 to the unregenerate mind, and the sole 
 cause of its acting uniformly in a sinful 
 manner; and that all that is peculiar to 
 the regenerate mind, and the sole cause 
 of its acting in a holy manner, is a peculi- 
 arity in the mode of God's agency on it; 
 we should still be equally incompetent 
 to pronounce what the mode of His agen- 
 cy must be, in renewing and sanctifying 
 the mind ; since, as bofore, without omni- 
 science, we are incompetent to pronounce 
 what the mode of His agency must be, in 
 producing any effect. 
 
 Or were we to assume, that part, or all 
 of these things, of the one class, which can 
 be united* were that which is peculiar to 
 the unregenerate mind ; and part or all 
 of these things, of the other class, which 
 can be united* were that which is peculiar 
 to the regenerate mind, and respectively 
 Che causes of their acting in their respec- 
 
139 
 
 live modes: we should still be equally 
 unable to decide what the mode of the 
 Spirit's agency must be in the work of 
 renovation and sanctification ; since a 
 knowledge of what must be the mode of 
 his agency, in all the preced ises, 
 
 would 1 -ary in order to determine 
 
 what it must bo in ////*, in which part or 
 all of those would bo unitod. 
 
 Since then, if wr .ihor of 
 
 the 1 siippnM-d camefl wo havo enumerated 
 
 is the rail cau-o that tho unrogonorato 
 and regenerate mind act in tL pec- 
 
 five modes, we are still incompetent to 
 determine what the mode of the Spirit's 
 icy must be, in renewing an-l <;.ncti- 
 g tho mind: and singe wo do not knmc 
 either what it is, peculiar to tho un rege- 
 nerate mind, that is the cause of its uni- 
 formly sinning : nor what it is, peculiar to 
 tho Degenerate mind, that is the cause of 
 cling 1 in a holy manner; therefore, we 
 cannot infer, from any thing we know re- 
 specting the nature of the unregonorate 
 and rate mind, what tho mode of 
 
 iho S<,i; v i-. in renewing the 
 
 one, and sanctih ing tho other. For in 
 order to determine haw the Spirit acts on 
 the mind to regenerate and sanctify it. wo 
 must know what He does to regenerate 
 
160 
 
 and sanctify it. We cannot determine 
 ihe mode of His agency till we learn the 
 exact nature of the effect. But the effect 
 of His agency is the removal of the cause 
 of the mind's acting in a sinful manner, 
 and producing the cause of its acting in a 
 holy manner. Being then universally and 
 absolutely ignorant of the nature of those 
 causes, we are incompetent to decide on 
 i he mode in wljich the one is removed 
 :\nd the other produced. 
 
 In proof of our position w r e allege, se- 
 rondly, That nothing is known of the 
 mode of the Spirit's agency from feeling 
 or observation. Those, who are regene- 
 rated and sanctified, have no knowledge 
 from consciousness of the mode in which 
 the Spirit acts on them, in producing 
 those effects. They are not conscious of 
 His agency at all, and therefore not con- 
 scious of the mode of His agency. They 
 are only conscious of their holy exercises, 
 the consequences of His agency. They 
 do not learn the fact, that He regenerates 
 and sanctifies them from consciousness, 
 but from revelation; and were not the 
 doctrine taught in the Scriptures, would 
 have no evidence, nor ground to conjec- 
 ture, that it is the Holy Spirit, that renews 
 and sanctifies them. They would sup- 
 
 
161 
 
 pose they renewed and sanctified them- 
 selves This the* Doctor admits. " It is as 
 impossible that we should fed the opera- 
 tion of God upon our hearts, while he 
 works in us both to will and to do, as it 
 that Adam should have/}.// the form- 
 ing hand of God in his creation. " Vol. i. 
 p IT). 
 
 As then they do not learn the / >/. that 
 th" */>irit renews and -met ilies, from feel- 
 
 they of cour.-e do not Irani thr 
 
 of !Iis airencv, in rene\\in^ and sanctily- 
 
 inir. from that h'mg 
 
 nt on the subject tr..m ul.-rrvation. 
 
 The eye is unable to discern cither the 
 
 human mind, or the divine* Spirit, and 
 
 mnot observe any tiling of the 
 
 mode in which thr I !r. Spirit ftCtfl Oil 
 
 the mind, in the work of renovation and 
 
 ratification. 
 
 To Mi-tai-i our po-iion u~e all* 
 thirdly, That Revelation dors not pr< 
 us with any knowledge rrsprriiiiLT the 
 mode in which the Spirit r. and 
 
 sanctifies the mind. 
 
 The Scriptures merely reveal the / 
 that the Holy Spirit renews and sanctifies 
 the mind. They convev to 11- no know- 
 ledge whatever of the mode of His agency. 
 in producing those effects. 
 14* 
 
Thus, none of the passages ascribing 
 regeneration and sanctification to His 
 agency, teach any thing more than the 
 fact, that He regenerates and sanctifies. 
 Examine the following: "Except a man 
 be born of water and of the Spirit, he 
 cannot enter into the kingdom of God."' 
 " He saved us by the washing of regene- 
 ration and renewing of the Holy Ghost." 
 44 Ye are washed, ye are sanctified, by 
 the Spirit of our God." "The love of 
 God is shed abroad in our hearts by the 
 Holy Ghost." Do these passages inform 
 us of any thing respecting the Spirit's 
 agency, except the simple fact, that He 
 renews and sanctifies? Can you, by any 
 process whatever, obtain from them any 
 testimony respecting the mode of His 
 agency ? Look over all the other passa- 
 ges in the Sacred Volume, and you will 
 find, that none of them convey us any 
 more intelligence than these. 
 
 No inference whatever can be drawn 
 from the language employed to designate 
 regeneration and sanctification, in regard 
 to the mode of the Spirit's agency in pro- 
 ducing those effects. The language is 
 figurative, and very dissimilar. The most 
 common forms of expression employed to 
 denote them ? are, to be born again; to 
 
163 
 
 be renewed in the spirit of the mind ; to 
 be transformed by the renewing of the 
 mind ; to be quickened ; to be created 
 anew in righteousness and holiness; to 
 put off the old and put on the now man; 
 to give a new heart and new spirit: to 
 shed abroad love in the heart. :m<i to 
 work in us to will and to do. TflRe 
 forms of expression are derived from the 
 modes in which effects are produced in 
 the material world; and designate modes 
 of operation universally and absolutely 
 diilrrent from each other. To be l< 
 is a totally different operation from that of 
 being renewed ; and to be renewed is a to- 
 tally different operation from that of be- 
 ing transformed ; and to be transformed 
 i operation totally different from that 
 
 of being quickened; to be quickened is 
 
 totally different from beinir created; to 
 be created is totally different from put- 
 ting off and putting on ; to put off and 
 put on are totally different from giv- 
 ing; to give is totally different from 
 shedding abroad; and shedding abroad 
 is totally different from working in. 
 These forms of expression designate 
 modes of producing effects utterly unlike 
 each other; and therefore no conclusion 
 can be drawn from any one or all of them, 
 respecting the mode of the Spirit's agency 
 
164 
 
 in accomplishing the renovation and 
 sanctification of the mind. For no rea- 
 son can be assigned for regarding one as 
 exhibiting a literal description of the 
 mode of the Spirit's agency, which will 
 not apply with equal force to prove, that 
 anjiother presents a literal description 
 of tne mode. There is as much evidence 
 that the word "born" is used literally, as 
 there is that the word "renewed" is so 
 u>ed; and as much, that the word "re- 
 newed" is employed literally, as there is 
 that the word " transformed," "quicken- 
 ed," "created," or any other is. That 
 is, there is no evidence at all that either 
 is used literally; hut evidence from this 
 variety and dissimilarity of the language, 
 which must satisfy every one in the least 
 acquainted with the laws of interpreta- 
 tion, that none of it is employed literally 
 to denote the mode of the Spirit's agen- 
 cy. The language is figurative, and em- 
 ployed to convey to us nothing beyond 
 the fact) that the Holy Spirit renews and 
 sanctifies the mind. 
 
 But our Lord has entirely debarred the 
 hope of learning any thin<r on this subject 
 from Revelation, and rebuked the pre- 
 sumption, which attempts to explore it, 
 by expressly declaring, in reply to the 
 
165 
 
 inquiry of Nicodemus respecting the 
 mode of regeneration, that it is entirely 
 unknown to those who experience it. 
 "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and 
 thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst 
 not tell whence it cometh and whither it 
 goeth." 
 
 This declaration was ail dressed to Ni- 
 codemus, in reply to his inquiry respect- 
 ing the mode in \\hich regeneration is 
 effected. Our Lord had remarked to 
 him. -except a man be born again, he 
 cannot see the kingdom of O< Nico- 
 
 demus inferred from the language, that 
 the body was the subject of the change 
 indicated ; and asked, "How can a man 
 be born when he is old ; can he enter the 
 second time into his mother's womb, and 
 be born ?" Our Lord, in return, correct- 
 ed in the first place his misapprehension, 
 by declaring the Holy Spirit to be the Au- 
 thor of the change, and not the natural pa- 
 rent, and the soul to be the subject of the 
 change, not the body. u Except a man 
 be born of water and of the Spirit, he 
 cannot enter into the kingdom of God. 
 That which is born of the flesh, is flesh;'* 
 that is, it is the body which is the subject 
 of the natural birth; "and that which is 
 born of the Spirit is spirit;" that is, it is 
 
166 
 
 the soul, which is the subject of renova- 
 tion by the Spirit. 
 
 He then replied to his inquiry respect- 
 ing the mode in which it is effected ; by 
 declaring that the mode in which the 
 Spirit accomplishes it, is as entirely un- 
 known to its subjects, as the mode in 
 which the air moves is unknown to those 
 who feel its effects. " The wind bloweth 
 where it listeth" the air moves by laws 
 adapted to its own nature " and thou 
 hearest the sound thereof" and you feel 
 its effects " but canst not tell whence it 
 cometh, and whither it goeth" but you 
 are ignorant of the mode in which it 
 moves. " So is every one that is born 
 of the Spirit" so the subjects of the 
 Spirit's influence only feel its effrcts; 
 they know nothing of the mode in which 
 He produces those effects. We have 
 then the testimony of the Omniscient Re- 
 deemer, that we know nothing of the mode 
 of the Spirit's ageMicy. 
 
 It had been happy for the cause of 
 truth, had Doctor E. and other theolo- 
 gians and philosophers been satisfied 
 with this- explicit decision of the Son of 
 God, arid not. like Nicodernus, permitted 
 a r^stlrss curiosity to ask again, " How 
 can -these things be?" and suffered a pre- 
 
167 
 
 sumptuous fancy to fabricate and pro- 
 mulgate theories of the mode of the Spi- 
 rit's agency, which contradict the truth 
 and perplex the faith and peace of the 
 Church. 
 
 These several considerations then, de- 
 monstrate the truth of our position, tint 
 we know nothing of the mode of the Spi- 
 rit's agency in regenerating and sanctify- 
 ing the mind. 
 
 The only sources from which we < 
 
 in a IvMoulrdi^ of the mode, 
 are tln-e we ha\e enumerated ; that of 
 deducing it from our kno\\ led^e of the 
 nature of the mind and the Holy Spirit; 
 that of learning it from feeling or obser- 
 vation; or lint nf learning it from te-ti- 
 rtiony. If there i- no known truth 
 peeling the Holy Spirit and the mind, 
 from \\hii-h we can infer it. we \\\\\>\ I 
 it, if at all. from some of the oilier sources. 
 It we are not taught it hy feeling or ob- 
 servation, we must resort to testimony, 
 and to the testimony of God only ; for 
 men, unless they learn it from one of the 
 preceding sources, are incompetent to 
 te-tity respecting it. And if God gives 
 us no knowledge on the subject, and 
 moreover declares us utterly ignorant 
 respecting it, then we have the most per- 
 
168 
 
 feet demonstration, that we are univer- 
 sally and absolutely ignorant respecting 
 it. 
 
 Even the Doctor has, it would seem, in 
 a moment of forgetfulness, given his testi- 
 mony to the truth of our position, and the 
 declaration of the Redeemer: "Our de- 
 pendence on the Deity to work in us both 
 to will and to do, is demonstrable; but 
 God operates on our minds in our 
 free and voluntary exercises, we are un- 
 able to comprehend." Vol i. p. 212. 
 
 What, then, becomes of the truth of his 
 theory respecting the mode of God's 
 agency on mankind? Whose fire lighted 
 the torch with which he penetrated this 
 incomprehensibility ? Whose authority 
 encouraged him to announce to the world, 
 with so bold a voice, that " the heart may 
 be created as well as the understanding, or 
 moral exercises as well as natural facul- 
 culties? that the hearts of saints are cre- 
 ated ; or th;it their free and voluntary ex- 
 ercises are the production of divine pow- 
 er?" and, " that the divine agency is as 
 much concerned in the bad as in the ^ood ac- 
 tions" of men, and " in precisely the same 
 manner?" That is, that God creates all the 
 actions of men? 
 
 The Doctor's common sense, it seems 
 
1159 
 
 from the above confession, for once, eveu 
 in respect to this subject, triumphed over 
 his love of theorizing ; and we cannot but 
 et that it had not maintained its su- 
 premacy. 
 
 Since, then, it is demonstrated, that we 
 know nothing of the mode in which the 
 Holy Spirit renews and sanctifies the 
 mind, it is demonstrated, that the Doctor's 
 assumption, from the passages teaching 
 that the Holy Spirit renews and sanctilio 
 HUM t. that the mode in which he accom- 
 plishes that work, is that of cmiting all 
 their holy exercises, is entirely gratuitous, 
 and incapable of being proved to be true : 
 and therefore his conclusion from those 
 passages, that God creates all the actions 
 of men, i- a mere assumption, and inca- 
 pable of being proved from those pas- 
 sages to be true. 
 
 Let us now turn our eye to \\\sfifth ar- 
 gument, founded on the prayers of good 
 men. It is contained in the following quo- 
 tation : " The prayers of all good men 
 suppose, that they must be acted upon by 
 a divine operation in all their v irtuous ex- 
 ercises and actions. For when they pray 
 for themselves, that God would give them 
 joy, peace, love, faith, submission, or 
 strengthen and increase these and all 
 15 
 
170 
 
 other Christian graces, their prayers pre- 
 suppose the necessity of a divine opera- 
 tion upon their hearts, in all their gra- 
 cious exercises and exertions. And when 
 they pray for the world in general, that 
 God would suppress vice and irreligion 
 every where, convince and convert sin- 
 ners, comfort and edify saints, and spread 
 the Redeemer's kingdom through the 
 earth, their prayers are founded in the 
 belief, that God must work in men both 
 to will and to do of his good pleasure." 
 Vol. i. p. 209, 210. 
 
 His argument, viewed in relation to 
 the proposition expressing his theory, is 
 briefly this : The prayers of good men, 
 for the influence of the Spirit on them- 
 selves and others, presuppose a necessity of 
 a divine operation on them in all their ac- 
 tions ; therefore God creates all their ac- 
 tions "A short cut to infallibility." 
 Where is your proof that the prayers of 
 good men, for the Spirit to influence them- 
 selves and others to holiness, presupposes 
 the necessity of a divine operation on 
 themselves and others in all their sinful 
 agency ? Where is your proof, granting 
 that such a necessity exists, that the mode 
 of that agency must be such as you re- 
 present it ? 
 
171 
 
 The fifth argument, like all its prede- 
 cessors, is an unfledged petitio principii. 
 It does not follow from the fact, that good 
 men pray for the influences of the Holy 
 Spirit to renew and sanctify themselves 
 and others, that there is a natural neces- 
 sity for His inlluf nee on them in all their 
 holy exercises ; it may be only a moral ne- 
 < v. li'therc is a natural necessity for 
 Hi- influence* in all (heir holy action-. i. 
 does not thence follow that there i- a si- 
 milar necessity fora divine operation upon 
 their hearts in all their other actions: and if 
 there be such a necessity,!! doesnotthence 
 follow, that the mode of the agency i> such 
 as the Doctor represents it. He has not 
 presented the slightest ground for his con- 
 rhiMon, that God cr II the actions of 
 
 men. There is not a step from his pre- 
 mrn /tray, to his conclusion, 
 God creates, that is not universal and ab- 
 solute" beggary. His argument had heen 
 infinitely more correct and convincing 
 had he reasoned thus: The prayers of 
 ! men presuppose a necessity of the 
 influence of the Spirit in their holy ac- 
 tions; and therefore they do not presup- 
 pose a necessity of a " divine operation* 1 
 in thoir other actions ; and therefore God 
 does not create all the actions of men. 
 
172 
 
 The prayers of good men, in accord- 
 ance with the commands of the Gospel, for 
 the renewing and sanctifying influences of 
 the Holy Spirit on themselves and others, 
 prove the fact simply that they need those 
 influences ; they prove nothing respect- 
 ing the nature of that necessity, nor of the 
 mode of the Spirit's agency. The fact, that 
 they need a divine influence in all their 
 other agency, and that the mode of that 
 agency must be such as the Doctor exhi- 
 bits it, must be proved from other sources, 
 before the conclusion can be drawn from 
 those prayers, that God creates all the ac- 
 tions of men. But the Doctor neither has, 
 nor can prove that. His fifth argument 
 therefore yields no support to his theory. 
 It " presupposes" a great dearth of mate- 
 rials to sustain his theory, and exemplifies 
 the miserable shifts to which a system 
 builder will resort to rear his edifice, arid 
 ^ive it 
 
 u The grace and gayety of nature.' 7 
 
 The Doctor's sixth argument is founded 
 on the possibility of God's creating all the 
 actions of men. It is sufficiently exhibit- 
 ed in the following passages selected from 
 it. In endeavouring to prove that Adam 
 was created upright in heart, he assumes 
 
173 
 
 the position, " that it is agreeable to the na* 
 turc of virtue or true holiness to be cre- 
 ated." In proof of this he alleges, that 
 " the first volition of every created ngent 
 must have a cause altogether involuntary; 
 and if it proceed from an iuwluntanj can-o, 
 it matters not whether that cause 
 within or without himself." He thence 
 inters, - it might hare been created, or pro- 
 duced by the Deity." Then, after a short 
 argument from the dependence of Adam, 
 (who, he asserts, "could no more produce 
 >\vn volitions than his own existence,") 
 to prove 4 - that holiness not only inai/^ but 
 must be created-" he prom <ls to observe* 
 that God is able to create holiness. His 
 proof of it is, that Hi 4 can create, or 
 bring out of nothing into existence, \\hat- 
 cver He pleases. As He can create a 
 body, and create a soul, which arc lower 
 kinds of existence ; so He can create vir- 
 tue or true holiness, which is the highest 
 and noblest kind of existence." Vol. i. 
 p. 279, 280, 281. And in his third infer- 
 ence, vol. i. p. 228, he presents the possi- 
 bility, there considered as proved, that 
 God can produce the holy actions of men, 
 as proof that He can produce their sinful 
 actions also; and thence infers, that He 
 does produce them ; and alleges, to sup- 
 15* 
 
174 
 
 port the inference, passages of Scripture, 
 in which God is said to have hardened 
 the hearts of Pharaoh and the Israelites. 
 His language is "If saints can work out 
 their own salvation under a positive influ- 
 ence of the Deity, then sinners can work 
 out their own destruction under his posi- 
 tive influence. As saints can act while 
 they are acted upon, so sinners can act 
 while they are acted upon. Hence it is 
 just as easy to see that sinners can \vork 
 out their own destruction, as that saints 
 can work out their own salvation, under 
 the operation of the Deity." He then, 
 after quoting the passages referred to, in- 
 ters that they do so. " These different 
 applications of the same text can be re- 
 conciled only on the supposition, that the 
 Prophet, that Christ, and the Apostles," 
 who used it, "meant to convey the idea, 
 that sinners work out their own destruc- 
 tion, under the positive influence of the 
 Deity." 
 
 This argument, then, is briefly this: 
 God can create all the actions of men ; 
 therefore God does create all the actions 
 of men. This is an expeditious method 
 of proving propositions. A proposition 
 may be true, therefore it is true. We have 
 often heard that whatever is, is j but never 
 
173 
 
 before, that whatever may be, is. Let us 
 apply this convenient method of demon- 
 stration to our author himself. The Doc- 
 tor may have reasoned falsely ; therefore 
 he has reasoned falsely. His whole the- 
 ory may be a figment of " science falsely 
 so called ;" therefore such a figment it is. 
 lie may have his choice, whether to give 
 up the argument by abandoning the prin- 
 ciple on which it depends | or to retain 
 the argument, and permit its principle to 
 subvert his theory. 
 
 His theory is thus, if we mistake not, 
 left standing on one pillar only. Let us 
 t-x| lore the foundation on which that 
 rest-. 
 
 His seventh argument is founded on the 
 uda/j/titiifn of his theory to account for the 
 fall of Adam. "Since God can work in 
 men both to will and to do of his good 
 pleasure, it is as easy to account for the 
 first offence of Adam as for any other sin." 
 " As these and all other methods to ac- 
 count for the fall of Adam, by the instru- 
 mentality of second causes* are insufficient to 
 remove the difficulty, it seems necessary 
 to have recourse to the divine agency, 
 and to suppose that God wrought in Adam 
 both to will and to do in his first trans- 
 gression." That is, we must believe that 
 
176 
 
 God created his transgression, because 
 we cannot satisfactorily account for its 
 existence in any other way. The Doctor 
 adds, as though his theory were irrefraga- 
 bly proved to be true, by its adaptation 
 to account for that transgression ' His 
 first sin was a free, voluntary exercise, pro- 
 duced by a divine operation" Vol. i. p. 232. 
 234. 
 
 If this reasoning is good, the Doctor de- 
 serves the humble and hearty thanks of 
 all infidels and theorizing philosophers 
 for its discovery. It will make the foolish- 
 ness of men wiser than God, and the 
 weakness of men stronger than God. Let 
 us apply the principle on which it de- 
 pends, viz. that a theory which will ac- 
 count for a fact, is correct because it will 
 account for that fact. 
 
 Spinoza's Theory of the World will ac- 
 count for its existence ; therefore his the- 
 ory is true. Hume's Theory of Impres- 
 sions and Ideas will account for impres- 
 sions and ideas ; therefore it is true. Des 
 Carte's Theory of Vortices will account 
 for the revolutions of the planets; there- 
 fore it is true. The theories of infidels 
 respecting the forgery of the Scriptures, 
 will account for their existence ; there- 
 fore those theories are true. 
 
177 
 
 This principle will "prove all things." 
 but not "hold fast that which is good," 
 with any firmer grasp than its opposite. 
 It is a fit instrument to give authority to 
 "old wives' fables," "endless genealo- 
 gies/* and the "doctrines of devil-" 
 
 The Doctor must first prove that his 
 theory will account for the fall of Adam, 
 consistently with his moral agency, before 
 he can employ its adaptation to account 
 for that fall to prove his theory ; and must 
 also prove the principle ot his argument 
 to be correc (, hHore he can employ it to 
 prove, from that adaptation of his theory f 
 that his theory is true. 
 
 If we are not deceived, the Doctor's se- 
 ven arguments are shown to be univer- 
 sally and absolutely erroneous, and his 
 lofty edifice reared on them subverted. 
 
 The reader may well be astonished 
 that this theory, so novel, so contradic- 
 tory to the common views of mankind, is 
 published with such dauntless dogmatism; 
 and that having enjoyed so wide a cur- 
 rency, and gained so many advocates, it 
 should be found to rest on no other foun- 
 dation than the Doctor's ipse ducit. 
 
 He valiantly begs the whole theory 
 from the beginning; to the end. He com- 
 
178 
 
 mences the goodly work, by assuming in 
 his first argument, without offering a par- 
 ticle of proof but his own authority, that 
 God cannot communicate power to a be- 
 ing without communicating omnipotence. 
 Man, therefore, not being omnipotent, he 
 concludes is universally and absolutely 
 destitute of power. But, his next step is, 
 if thus destitute of power, man " can no 
 more act than he can exist without a di- 
 vine efficiency." Therefore, the mighty 
 conclusion is, God creates all his actions. 
 This position, that the dependence of men 
 is such, that God must create all their ac- 
 tions, he employs to bring all his subse- 
 quent arguments to bear upon his theory. 
 None of them have a shadow of conclu- 
 siveness, unless the truth of that position 
 is granted. 
 
 It does not follow from the fact, that 
 God governs all the actions of men, that 
 He creates all their actions; unless it is 
 true that He must create them all in order 
 to govern them. He begs that position 
 therefore in his second argument. 
 
 It does not follow from the fact, that 
 men are "absolutely dependent" on God, 
 that he creates all their actions, unless it 
 is true that there cannot be an " universal 
 and absolute dependence," without an 
 
179 
 
 absolute destitution of power to act. He 
 therefore begs that position in his third 
 argument. 
 
 It does not follow from the fact, that 
 the Holy Spirit renews and sanctifies n 
 that God creates all their holy actions, 
 unless it is true, that He cannot bring 
 their holy actions into existence, by any 
 other kind of ag<. ui that which 
 
 creates. 
 
 Nor does it follow from the faet, grant- 
 ing it to be one, th;it G< ites the 
 holy of men, that He also creates 
 all their actions: unlcs* il is true, that 
 He cannot briiig their other actions into 
 :rn('p liy any other kind of agency, 
 th:n that uhieh creates. He begs that 
 position therefore in his fdirlh argument. 
 
 It does not follow from their ;/ L f 
 suj/j*'>sr<l in //// /trat/ff ior them- 
 
 selves and others, of the inlluenccs of the 
 Spirit, that God create - ;ill their actions; 
 unless it is true, that He cannot r ring any 
 of their actions into existence, except by 
 creating them. He begs tfcit position, 
 therefore, in his fifth argument 
 
 It does not follow from the possibility of 
 God's creating al the actions of men. that 
 He does create them ; unless it is true, that 
 He cannot bring them into existence in 
 
180 
 
 an j other way than that of creating them, 
 He therefore begs that position in his 
 sixth argument. 
 
 It does not follow from the fact, grant- 
 ing it to be a fact, that the Doctor's theo- 
 ry is adapted to account for the fall of Mam ; 
 that God creates all the actions of men ; 
 unless it is true, that He cannot bring 
 their actions into existence in any other 
 way. He begs that position in his se- 
 venth argument therefore. 
 
 His six last arguments, like a hexa- 
 gonal tub-pulpit on its pillar, rest entire- 
 ly on the first. If that is erroneous they 
 are without force ; and if that holds, they 
 are utterly useless. For as they possess 
 no force, but what they borrow from the 
 first argument, they can yield no support to 
 the theory, which that argument does not 
 afford. 
 
 His first argument rests entirely on the 
 broad circumference of his own dogmati- 
 cal declaration. Those, if there be such, 
 who regard the Doctor as gifted with 
 omniscience-and infallibility, will believe 
 his theory; and none others : 
 
 -Credat Judaus Appella ; 
 
 Non ego 
 
 To this refutation of the Doctor's ar- 
 
181 
 
 guments, we subjoin several other consi- 
 derations, evincing his theory to be er- 
 roneous. 
 
 In the first place we allege, as aground 
 of jtrobnljlUhj that his theory is entirely 
 erroneous, the consideration, that the 
 Doctor is unable to discover any 
 its truth. None of the arguments adv, 
 
 rd by him to support it. arc valid. lie 
 scarclied thr Scripture- : lie has re- 
 sorted to the dictates of r< id com- 
 mon sense; he has laid heaven, earth, 
 and "the dark world beneath." under 
 contribution, for testimony, without suc- 
 
 1 lis theorv. after all. is left to 
 solely on his own authority. 
 
 Now it is in our apprehension an oini- 
 DOUfl circum-lanrr. that nothing belter 
 than gratuitous a66UID| contradict- 
 
 ing the uimci>al judgincnt of mankind, 
 hold assertions, and the illusions of so- 
 phistry, can be obtained alter so much 
 labour, to yield their support to his theo- 
 ry. Did the Scriptures furnish any proof 
 of its truth, the eager eye of the Doctor 
 would surely have detected it. Were it 
 demonstrable from the dictates of reason 
 and common sense, we have too high an 
 opinion of his sagacity to believe it could 
 have escaped him. Had any evidence 
 16 
 
182 
 
 of its truth existed, he or his disciples 
 would have discovered it, and given it to 
 the world. This " universal and abso- 
 lute" dearth of evidence, that his theory 
 is true, presents a sturdy probability, that it 
 is entirely erroneous. It makes shipwreck 
 of our faith in it. We cannot credit such 
 a theory without evidence. 
 
 Secondly. We present in proof, that the 
 Doctor's theory is groundless, the consi- 
 deration, that it contradicts the decisions 
 of common sense. We have before dwelt 
 on this topic, but hope the repetition will 
 not be thought wholly superfluous. 
 
 It is the natural and universal convic- 
 tion of mankind, that the power by which 
 thrir actions are exerted, is their own; 
 and belongs to their constitution, as much 
 ate do their understanding, affections, and 
 existence itself. This conviction, as was 
 remarked in the answer to the Doctor's 
 first argument, to which the reader is re- 
 quested to refer, is as natural and invin- 
 cible, as is their conviction from the fact 
 that they act, that they exist ; or from the 
 fact that they perceive external objects, 
 that those objects exist; and no one can 
 devest himself of it any more than he can 
 persuade himself that neither he nor ex- 
 ternal objects exist. This conviction dis- 
 
183 
 
 itself in all their conduct, and e\- 
 tend- o'rr them us wide and important 
 an inline any con\iclion \\iiatever; 
 
 it is a first principle. Tli<-v evMbit it in 
 all their ex' to produce eilects in 
 
 themselves, and other in their 
 
 pm-j. -eting futurity; in their re- 
 
 :i the purposes of one anot! 
 in their view-, of obligation ; and in their 
 
 gc. 
 
 '(eiHon of . we 
 
 innsi admit to he according to trntli; or 
 plur ;ell C8 ml-) the ahyss of uni- 
 
 rersal -!,fptirisin. For this conviction 
 is a i ry ell'ect of our constitution; 
 
 and it' we cannot trust the testimony of 
 our constitution in one case, we cannot 
 trust it in another. No reason can be 
 -hould trust the testimony 
 of our constitution, that external objects 
 . which will not oblige us to trust its 
 testii.. .!.\ in i; p. None can be 
 
 given, that we should confide in it> te-li- 
 mony to our existence, which will not 
 to credit its testimony to this 
 Our existence is no more a subject 
 of consciousness, than power is; nor is 
 the existence of external objects. What- 
 ever our constitution obliges us to be- 
 lieve, we must believe to be true. I< 
 
184 
 
 then we would not doubt of our own ex- 
 istence, the existence of external object?, 
 or any other truths, whose evidence is 
 furnished by common sense, we must re- 
 gard her testimony as indubitably true, 
 that the power by which we act is our 
 own, in distinction from God's power, as 
 our existence is our own, in distinction 
 from His. 
 
 Besides, if we admit that our constitu- 
 tion deceives us in this case, since God 
 made our constitution, we must regard Him 
 as deceiving us. But if He has deceived 
 us on a subject of such pre-eminent impor- 
 tance, by our constitution, we cannot 
 prove, nor present any probable reason, 
 that He has not deceived us on every 
 other subject. We must therefore aban- 
 don all our confidence in Him. 
 
 But God is true. He has not deceived 
 us. Our constitution gives a testimony 
 in accordance with fact, The power by 
 which we act is our own, and not God's, 
 in the same manner that our existence is 
 our own, and not His. God then does 
 not create all our actions. The Doctor's 
 theory therefore is untrue. 
 
 Thirdly. The Doctor's theory is con- 
 tradictory to the representation of the 
 Scriptures, that the Spirit of God influen* 
 
 
185 
 
 ces men only in the work of conviction, 
 regeneration, and sanctification ; or that 
 the influence of the Spirit on men is a 
 peculiarity of the work of redemption; 
 and is therefore untrue. 
 
 Every reader of the Scriptures gains 
 from them the impression, that mankind 
 are subjects of the influences of the Holy 
 Spirit in conviction, regeneration, and 
 Rectification only; and in all their other 
 ' v ;u*t without If is influence. This 
 impression i> produced by the influence 
 of the Holy Spirit being promised as an 
 extraordinary and peculiar influence. 
 Thus it was promised to the ancient 
 church, "I will put my Spirit within you, 
 and cause you to walk in my statutes. In 
 th< hM da\-. -nith (Hod. I \\ill pour out 
 of my Spirit upon all flesh/' And Christ 
 promised the di-riplr>. If I depart, I 
 will send him," the Comforter, " unto you ; 
 and when he is come, he will reprove the 
 world of sin, and of righteousness, and of 
 judgment." Now these promises, if they 
 tees anv significance, imply, that the 
 influence promised, was extraordinary; 
 that mankind do not all enjoy it; nor do 
 its subject at all times. If they were 
 always equally the subjects of the Spirit's 
 influence, these promises would have no 
 16* 
 
186 
 
 more significance, than would a promise 
 of future activity, or sensibility, or any 
 thing else, which is involved in existence. 
 
 This impression is produced 'by the 
 prayers of prophets and apostles for the 
 influences of the Spirit. The prayer of 
 the Psalmist is " Take riot thy Holy 
 Spirit from me; uphold me with thy free 
 Spirit." In like manner, the Apostle 
 prays that the Corinthian Church may 
 enjoy " the communion of the Holy 
 Ghost;" and that God may make the He- 
 brews " perfect in every good work, 
 working in them that which is well 
 pleasing in his sight." Arid with these 
 accord all the prayers contained in the 
 sacred volume, for a divine influence. 
 They all proceed on the ground, that 
 such an influence is not enjoyed by all, 
 nor by any at all times. 
 
 This impression is produced by the re- 
 presentation, that the children of God 
 alone enjoy the sanctifying influences of 
 the Holy Spirit. " As many as are led 
 by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of 
 God" " If any man have not the Spirrt 
 of Christ, he is none of his." The saints, 
 individually, are represented as temples, 
 and the Church, collectively, as an habi- 
 tation, in which the Spirit of God dwells. 
 
187 
 
 The reason and propriety of this repre- 
 sentation cannot be seen, if the Spirit in- 
 fluences others as much as the children 
 of God, and dwells in them equally. 
 
 This impression is produced by the 
 ascription of all the holiness of men to the 
 influence of the Holy Spirit: and all the 
 wickedness of men to then and the 
 
 agency of the devil. They are washed 
 and sanctified by the Spirit." Their va- 
 rious holy affection- are the -fruits'' of 
 Hi- inllurnees. Hut the* \\ieked -walk 
 after the ilesh. and mind the things of the 
 fle>li." * They walk according to the 
 course of this world, according to the 
 prince of the power of the air. the spirit, 
 that now workcth in the children of diso- 
 bediem 
 
 Tin- I e is utterly inexplicable, 
 
 unless the iniluence of the Spirit on men 
 is extraordinary and peculiar, and confin- 
 ed to the work of convicting, renewing, 
 and sanctifying them. 
 
 Thus all the language of the Scrip- 
 tures, on this subject, conveys the impres- 
 sion, that the influence of the Holy Spirit 
 on men is extraordinary, and employed 
 'entirely in the great work of convicting 
 them of sin, and turning them from it to 
 : holiness. Strike out the passages relating 
 
188 
 
 to this influence from the Scriptures, and 
 no one would obtain the impression, that 
 men were subject to "a divine influence,'' 
 essentially like that exerted by the Holy 
 Spirit. 
 
 Now the Doctor's theory is entirely 
 contradictory to this representation of the 
 Scriptures, so palpable to the eye of every 
 reader. According to his representation, 
 men need precisely the same kind and 
 degree of divine agency in doing evil, as 
 in doing good; and the agency of God is 
 concerned in precisely the same manner 
 in their wrong, as in their right actions. 
 Vol. ii. p. 40. Now both of these repre- 
 sentations cannot be correct. If God pro- 
 mises His Spirit, as a peculiar gift, to 
 some, and not to others; if He gives Him 
 to some, and not to others; if His Spirit 
 influences men to holiness only, and not 
 to sin ; if all who are not Christ's, have 
 not the Holy Spirit; then men do not 
 need the same kind and degree of divine 
 agency in doing evil as in doing good ; 
 and the agency of God is not concerned 
 in precisely the same manner in their 
 wrong as in their right actions. 
 
 The Doctor may perhaps attempt to 
 escape from this argument against his 
 theory, by the pretence, that his repre- 
 
189 
 
 ; , without a personal desig- 
 nation, as creating all the sinful actions of 
 men. is consistent with the doctrine of the 
 Scripture -. and his admission of it, for he 
 admit- it, that the agency of the Holy 
 Spirit on mankind is a peculiarity of the 
 work of redemption. But by resortiii 
 that pretence. li< 1 will only embarra his 
 theory by another equal inconsistency 
 with the sacred volume. 
 
 For in the lir-l place, if H a mere 
 sumption, and equally contr y to 
 
 the doctrine in qi:; that (*'! < 
 
 exefta such an agency on man, as the 
 Doctor designates by the terms "div i 
 " direct," " positive indue; |)t it 
 
 be by the llolv Spirit in comic -tins:, re- 
 newing and -anctiiying them. We chal- 
 lenge th^ Doctor to produce a passage 
 from the sacred volume in which it U 
 asserted, or ii(H:e^arily implied, that God 
 exerts on men such an influence in their 
 wicked actions. He will undoubtedly 
 turn his eye to those passages in which 
 God is said to have In the hearts of 
 
 Pharaoh, the IVLO ptians. and the Israel- 
 ites. God is in-. 1 . id to have harden- 
 ed their hearts: but He is not said to 
 have done it in a "divine,"' ; ' direct," or 
 " .positive influence ;" that is, an influence 
 
190 
 
 essentially like that exerted by the Holy 
 Spirit. 
 
 The mode in which he accomplishes it 
 is not declared. 
 
 It is not necessary, in order to account 
 for their being hardened, to suppose He 
 exerted such an influence. It was not 
 necessary, (and the Doctor, in deciding 
 this question, cannot assume it as neces- 
 sary, unless he chooses to be as faulty as 
 he has been in begging the thing to be 
 proved in all his other arguments,) that 
 God should have exerted a "divine in- 
 fluence" on them, in order that they should 
 wt ; for we have shown, (hat men are 
 possessed of power to act, and are, as 
 agents, dependent on God only for the 
 mode in which they act. Nor can it be 
 proved, nor is it needful to suppose, that 
 it was necessary that He should have ex- 
 erted on them a u divine influence," to 
 have produced that effect in their hearts, 
 which is denoted when they are said to 
 have been hardened. What is a hard 
 heart ? Is it any thing more than a heart, 
 that resists strong motives presented to 
 induce it to obey the divine will ? A per- 
 verse, rebellious, incorrigible heart? 
 Conceive of the hearts of Pharaoh, the 
 Egyptians, and the Israelites, when bar- 
 
191 
 
 dened, and will you conceive of any thing 
 more than this ? What then is it to harden 
 a heart ? Is it any thing more than to 
 bring it into a slate, in which it shall resist 
 strong motives to obedience; be per- 
 verse, incorrigible, and rebellious ? What 
 then is necessary to harden a heart? Is it 
 any thing more than to bring it into ci'r- 
 i \\hicli the motives to >/// pre- 
 sented to it are stronger than those to ho- 
 : thai is. in \\hich of the obi- 
 iituting the t\v<> classes of motives 
 pn-MMited to the mind, //lo.sr. which 
 motives to >///. are such as arc regarded 
 by the mind as ha\ in^ a gTMI/er capacity to 
 ailbrd pleasure, than ik-mc \\hich are mo- 
 tives to Im/iiKM'* .NothhiL: mure than \\\\< 
 is necessary, if, as ha- been -hown, man 
 has j)ower to act, and the m mlr in wliicli 
 he acts may be determined by ihemo f 
 presented to his mind. Invest Pharaoh 
 with power to act, and present such a 
 train of considerations to his mind, a- 
 should lead him to feel that it would con- 
 tribute more to his good, to detain the 
 Israelites than to let them go, and you 
 harden his heart as much as God did. Is 
 it asked, Could such a series of consider- 
 ations be presented to his mind ? We 
 answer, yes ; for there was. He actually 
 
192 
 
 viewed the disadvantages of letting the 
 Israelites go, as greater than the disad- 
 vantages of retaining them ; and therefore 
 would not let Israel go. His pride, his ab- 
 solute authority, the considerations aris- 
 ing from the long slavery of Israel, and 
 the advantages accruing from it to the 
 Egyptians ; the provocations ari&ing from 
 the injuries he had suffered in conse- 
 quence of his former refusal to let them 
 go; the influence of priests, anxious lest 
 the triumph of Moses should destroy their 
 reputation: these and other circumstan- 
 ces of his condition furnished abundant 
 materials for motives to secure his choice 
 to detain the Israelites. 
 
 But can a heart be brought into cir- 
 cumstances, in which the motives to sin 
 are stronger than to holiness ; or can such 
 a series of motives be presented to the 
 mind, without a "divine influence" is ex- 
 erted on it? We answer it is impossible 
 to prove, or render it probable, that it 
 cannot. And if a heart can ever, without 
 a " divine operation," be brought into 
 circumstances, in which the motives to 
 sin presented to it are stronger than those 
 to holiness, no reason can be given why it 
 might not in the case in question. And 
 to assume that it could not in that case, 
 
193 
 
 is to assume, that it cannot in any; and is 
 therefore to assume the thing in question, 
 and to be proved. 
 
 Did not the daughters of Moab, by 
 bringing the Isiaclites into circum- 
 stances, in which the motive to sin 
 were stronger than those to holiness, iu 
 the same manner harden the hearts of the 
 In the same manner did not 
 and Princes harden the 
 heart of Darius, to cast Daniel into the 
 den <>f lions? And did not the n-wiirds 
 olli-red to the Prophet by Naaman, harden 
 the heart of Gehazi to ask of the Assyrian 
 two talents of silver, and two changes of 
 garments? 
 
 It is not therefore necessary, n<r at all 
 proper, to -uppo-e. that (-ml e\< rtrd on 
 Pharaoh, the Kgyptians, ai:<I tiie Israel 
 Ues, a direct." -divine," or -positive 
 influence," inorder to hardentheir IK 
 for the supposition must he made without 
 any reason to support it. We can as ea- 
 sily conceive of His hardening their 
 hearts without, as with, such an agency. 
 
 Since, then, there is reithcr proof nor 
 probability that God ever exerts a "di- 
 vine influence'' on men, except by the 
 Holy Spirit, in the work of redemption, 
 the Doctor, were he to teach that God. 
 17 
 
194 
 
 without any personal designation, cre- 
 ates all their sinful actions, would con- 
 tradict the doctrine of the Scriptures, 
 as universally as though he had represent- 
 ed the Holy Spirit as the agent who cre- 
 ates all their sinful actions. The doctrine 
 oi'the Scriptures is, that God never exerts 
 a " divine influence" on mankind, except 
 by the Holy Spirit. 
 
 The representation of the Doctor, if he 
 assumes the ground we have supposed 
 him to assume, is, that He does exert on 
 them a divine influence in all their agen- 
 cy, besides that in which they are influ- 
 enced by the Spirit. The doctrine of the 
 Scriptures is, that God exerts on them no 
 " divine influence," except that by which 
 they are convicted, renewed, and sancti- 
 fied. The Doctor, by making that as- 
 sumption, would represent His agency to 
 be as much concerned in their bad as in 
 their good actions, and in precisely the 
 same manner. 
 
 In the second place, the Doctor, in as- 
 suming that ground, will greatly endanger 
 his own craft. He represents men as 
 needing the same kind and degree of di- 
 vine agency in doing evil as in doing good: 
 and thence infers, that the agency of God 
 is concerned in precisely th-c same manner in 
 
19 j 
 
 their wrong as in their right actions. But 
 if the Spirit is the sole agent in creating 
 their holy actions, and is not the agent, 
 or not the sole agent, in creating th'/ir sin- 
 ful actions, then the agency of God is not 
 concerned in precisely the same manner 
 in their \\rong as in their right actions, 
 and therefore they do not need t! 
 kind of agency in duinpj evil as in d 
 good. 
 
 ain: the Doctor, in his fourth and 
 fifth argtttni tltS, from the f:ict that the //<>/// 
 S/,ii-.- tfl a -divine iniluence" on men 
 
 in the work of conriction and sanctificoti<M % 
 infers, that (*'<td exert- a divine inllu- 
 enee*' on men in all their It 
 Put if he admits that the iiifluenee <>f the 
 holy Spirit is a peeuliarity of the work of 
 redemption, and owe- it 
 tirelv to that, he r.Minot inter from that 
 peculiarity, that (iod exertfl an influence, 
 the same m kind and degree, on all n 
 kind in all their sinful conduct. No infer- 
 ence whatever can he, with any propriety, 
 drawn from what is peculiar to one part 
 of liis administration, in respect to an- 
 other part of it. The impropriety of that 
 mode of inference will be seen by an ex- 
 emplification. It is a peculiarity of the 
 work of redemption, that the Word was 
 
196 
 
 made flesh and dwelt among us; there- 
 fore, in all His other administration, God 
 is made flesh, and dwells among us. It is 
 a peculiarity of the work of redemption, 
 that Jesus Christ is Mediator between God 
 and man ; therefore God, in all His other 
 administration, is Mediator between God 
 and man. Is it any better reasoning to 
 say, it is a peculiarity of the work of re- 
 demption, that the Holy Spirit exerts a 
 " divine influence*' on mankind in convict- 
 ing and sanctifying them ; therefore God 
 rxrrts a " divine influence" on them in all 
 their sinful agency? If the Doctor, then, 
 avails himself of the pretence we have 
 supposed him to make, he must abandon 
 his fourth and fifth arguments, as far as he 
 employs them to prove that God creates 
 the sinful actions of men. 
 
 In the third place, if God exerts a " di- 
 vine influence" on men in all their sinful 
 agency, precisely the same in kind and 
 degree as the Holy Spirit exerts on men 
 in their holy agency, why are we not 
 taught it in the Scriptures as explicitly? 
 Why are we not told, that God works in the 
 wicked both to will and to do, in all their 
 sinful agency, by a " divine influence," as 
 we are, that He works in the saints " both 
 to will and to do of his good pleasure?" 
 
197 
 
 Why are we not told, that the wicked are 
 His workmanship, created not after Christ 
 Jesus by a "divine influence;'' that He 
 creates them not after God in unrighteous- 
 ness and true sinfulness by the same influ- 
 ence ? Why are we not told, that they 
 are unwashed and unsanctiiied, and con- 
 demned by the -direct influence" ofCiod ? 
 And that haired, sorrow, enmity, impa- 
 t idicr, severity, male\ olence, unbelief, 
 pride, and h. temperance. ;tre fruits of that 
 influence, afl f ftFC that the opposite vir- 
 tues are the fruits of the Spirit * Why do 
 we not hear the P.-almi-t deprecating 
 Create not in me a polluted heart, and 
 renew not in me a wrong spirit: do not 
 btain me thoroughly with iniquity, and 
 pollute me not \\ith.sin. by a -direct in- 
 fluence.*" This language would be per- 
 fectly natural, were the Doctor's repre- 
 sentation correct. We should as much 
 expect the doctrine of God's " divine in- 
 fluence" to be explicitly taught, as the 
 doctrine of the Spirit's influence. It is as 
 important a doctrine. The Doctor holds 
 it to be of the first consequence that it be 
 known. " He is really concerned in all 
 their actions; and it is as important that 
 his agency should be brought into view, 
 as that theirs should. For his character 
 
198 
 
 can no more be known without ascribing 
 his agency to himself, than their charao 
 ters can be known without ascribing their 
 agency to themselves." Vol. ii. p. 35. 
 
 If it is thus necessary that His agency 
 should be known, in order that His cha- 
 racter may be known, it obviously is 
 equally necessary that the exact nature of 
 His agency should be known, in order 
 that His real character may be seen. If 
 (iod exerts any agency on men, it must 
 be " true and righteous altogether," and 
 adapted, if known, to promote His glory. 
 Why, then, is not this doctrine, if true, 
 revealed to us ? why, at least, are there 
 not some hints of it? Were prophets and 
 apostles ignorant of it ? Was it left " hid 
 from the foundation of the world" till this 
 late age, for our author to discover? 
 
 But how unlike the Doctor's represen- 
 tation, are the views of the divine agency 
 exhibited in the sacred volume! How 
 entirely would the aspect of the divine 
 government and character be changed, i 
 were that doctrine inserted in its holy 
 pages? What could the hand of infidel- 
 ity inscribe there,which should more " ab- 
 solutely" " change the truth of God into 
 a lie," and " the glory of the incorrupti- 
 ble God into an image, made like to cor- 
 ruptible man ?" 
 
199 
 
 The Doctor, then, if he avails hiraseli 
 of the pretence to which we have suppos- 
 ed him to resort, to reconcile his theory 
 with the doctrine that the agency of the 
 I l<-ly Spirit is extraordinary and peculiar, 
 must encounter diiliculties as great as 
 though he left the contradiction without 
 attempting to obviate it. 
 
 Since, therefore 1 . his theory i- thus en- 
 tirely contradictory to the 
 of the Scripture - respecting the? agency 
 of the Spirit, his theory is untiii: . 
 
 Fourthly. The Doctor's theory is con- 
 tradictory to the doctrine of the Scrip- 
 tures, that the devil exerts an agency on 
 mankind. 
 
 The Scriptures represent the devil as 
 an imi-ihlr and powerful agent, employ- 
 ed continually in intluencing men to MM. 
 The Apostle declares, " Your adversary, 
 the devil, as a roaring lion, walketh about 
 king whom he may devour/' He is 
 exhibited as blinding the minds of men ; 
 working in the children of disobedience, 
 and taking men captive at his will; as 
 employing snares, and wiles, and devices, 
 to seduce and destroy them. Thus, ac- 
 cording to our author himself, "The 
 Scripture represents this enemy of all 
 righteousness as having access to the 
 
200 
 
 minds of men, and possessing a power of 
 tempting their hearts, and leading them 
 into all manner of moral evil." Vol. ii. 
 p. 67. " He is constantly endeavouring 
 to blind their minds, harden their hearts, 
 and stupify their consciences." p. 81. 
 He represents him as capable of suggest- 
 ing motives, temptations, thoughts, doubt?, 
 and arguments to the mind. " Why is the 
 chain of our thoughts so suddenly broken? 
 Why do new, unconnected, and unexpect- 
 ed thoughts so frequently rush into our 
 minds? Why do thoughts which the 
 mind abhors, and endeavours to banish 
 for ever, so repeatedly and repeatedly 
 recur? Those tilings favour the account 
 which the Scripture gives of Satan's 
 tempting power over us." p. 71. " He 
 is capable of suggesting the most sophis- 
 tical arguments against divine revelation. 
 How often does he suggest doubts to the 
 minds of both saints and pinners, respect- 
 ing the inspiration of the Scriptures? How 
 often does he help the promoters of infi- 
 delity to the most plausible and delusive 
 arguments, to pervert the doctrines and 
 subvert the first principles of Christiani- 
 ty ? His agency is often very visible in 
 the writings and reasonings of infidels/' 
 p. 76. 
 

 201 
 
 Now, with this representation of the 
 Scriptures, as presented by the Doctor 
 himself, his theory is entirely at variance. 
 His theory teaches, that " mind cannot 
 act, any more than matter can move, with- 
 out a divine agency :" that " all their mo- 
 tions, exercises, or actions, must originate 
 from a t/n-uic rHicirnry :"" that k there 
 must be the cxcrci-c oi divine a^rnry in 
 C\<T\ human action, without v\ Inch ii ifl 
 impossible to conceive that God should 
 rn inoi'. .1 agetltft, and make* mankind 
 BCl in perl. >rmily to his dr-i^ns;" 
 
 th.'t " tlii^ |g thr oiilv M-riptural rrpn^rn- 
 tation of divine proridcnrc C that ^ his 
 h uid is to be seen and acknowledged in 
 v event, without a single exception ;" 
 and, that k ' it is across ahsurdilv to sup- 
 that tht 1 / re of Ciod i- i 
 
 c than hi- i Ic ever 
 
 governs men without exerting H jtoxitiuc in- 
 fluence over them." 
 
 His theory thus represents God as 
 creating all the actions and events that 
 tako place in the minds of men, or of 
 which they are the subjects; and dei 
 that any of their motions, exercises, or 
 actions can exist unless He creates them. 
 It denies that God could govern men, un- 
 less He created all their actions: denies 
 
202 
 
 that the Scriptures, which exhibit His 
 providence as extending to all events, 
 give any representation of it but that; 
 and declares it to be absurd to suppose, 
 that God should govern men, unless He 
 governed them in that way. 
 
 Now if the Doctor's theory is true, the 
 Scriptural representation of the agency 
 of the devil on mankind cannot be true. 
 If the providence of God extends to all 
 the actions and events of which men are 
 the subjects ; and if He neither does, nor 
 can exercise a providence over them, in 
 any other way, than that of creating all 
 the actions nnd events of which they are 
 the subjects; then it is not true, accord- 
 ing to the Scriptural account, that some 
 of the actions and events of which they are 
 the subjects, as " temptations," " thoughts," 
 " doubts," " sophistical, plausible, and de- 
 lusive arguments," should be produced 
 by the agency of the devil. The Doc- 
 tor's theory cuts the devil oflTfrom access 
 to the minds and bodies of men, and 
 "quenches all his fiery darts." It is 
 God alone, who suggests " temptations," 
 " thoughts," " doubts," " sophistical, plau- 
 sible, and delusive arguments" to men. 
 It is " His agency," which "is aften very 
 visible in the writings and reasonings of 
 
203 
 
 mlidels There is not a being in the 
 universe more harmless to men, than the 
 dev-. "That wicked one" has never 
 touched them. How muc h soever he 
 
 >v, as a roaring lion, have walked 
 about seeking whom he might devour, he 
 has only beat the air. Men ncvor live 
 been the subjects of an event whidi the 
 dev.l a agency produced. 
 
 But if the Scriptard .-rprr<r,,tation of 
 
 teagencjoflhe devil is tree, the Doc- 
 
 <'Vh, JI7l snotM>: '"'' "'"* ,tra,lic-t 
 each other.'! here is ,,o a/enae of es- 
 cape from tbifl conclusion. U , cannot 
 c-oiu-cive ol My sophistical, ,lau-ible, 
 r delqsive arguinctHs," by hJd, to rcs .' 
 
 CUP it. 
 
 bai| (, much rnMcnre ,,f l( . 
 of th, devil on mankind, to dis- 
 
 it. uhaU-v,-r I, ;H . O 
 
 rv we oppose. II, ot 
 
 t 
 
 8, n wc"ti8 
 
 common enemy of mankind is n,on 
 
 quentlj mentioned than any other parti- 
 cular person or agent, except the man 
 
 /esus; , s more than fifty ,j. 
 called the do ii : more than f or( y times 
 Oatanj and very often ted IM 
 
 yeral other names;" i,, u| ll( . fl hi< histor? 
 is completely interwoven with the hi^torv 
 
204 
 
 of the Saviour, of " our first parents," 
 "Job," " David," "Judas," and " Anna- 
 nias," (Vol. ii. Sermon 4.) and in which 
 the doctrine of his agency is taught in a 
 great variety of declarations, exhorta- 
 tions, and warnings ; but strong proofs of 
 its truth may be seen in other quarters. 
 We think u his agency" is often very visi- 
 ble in the writings and reasonings of pre- 
 sumptuous theorisers. And " as he is an 
 acute and subtle reasoner," we are not 
 slow to believe that the credit is due to 
 him, " of helping to the most sophistical" 
 and " most plausible and delusive argu- 
 ments," employed in aid of false assump- 
 tions and monstrous hypotheses. 
 
 Fifthly. The Doctor's theory entirely 
 devests the actions of men of moral cha- 
 racter, and releases mankind from all 
 moral obligation. 
 
 It is a first principle in morals, that a 
 being is responsible only for those effects, 
 which are produced by his own power. 
 If any " motions, exercises, or actions," 
 take place in his mind or body, which are 
 produced not by his own, but by the 
 power of some other being, he is not re- 
 sponsible for them; nor is he responsible 
 for any events, of which other beings are 
 the subjects, if those events are not the 
 
205 
 
 production of his, but some other beingV- 
 power. This truth even the Doctor ad- 
 mits. " No man feels that any motion of 
 body or mind is his action, unless his heart 
 is concerned in it. If his eye, or head, 
 or hand, or foot, should move without the 
 concurrence of his heart, he would not 
 call that motion ///,v avtinn* nor led in the 
 JeaM decree accountable for it. Or if his 
 intellectual p(*v\rrs \vere put in motion, 
 without the choice of his heart, he uould 
 not call those mental motion- /Wx act 
 nor feel either praise or Name worthy 
 for them." - The /</// ronsUts in volun- 
 tary exercises." and volitions arc* impe- 
 rative acts of the will, and products 
 external actio Vol. i. | 
 
 \n imperati pFOOUH live ol' ex- 
 
 ternal action-/" c n he QpthlOg e!-e ; 
 an act involving ai on of po\\i'i\ If 
 
 that act is an act of the will or he irt, 
 then the power exerted in it mu>t be me 
 power of the will or heart, which exerts 
 it. A man, then, according to the Doc- 
 tor's own a<lmi>-ioii. dues not call any 
 bodily or "menial motion- ; <>ns, nor 
 
 feel either praise or bhme worthy for 
 them," unless they are the production of 
 his own power. lie is utterly exerrtpt 
 from responsibility for any effects which 
 18 
 
206 
 
 are produced by the power of other be- 
 ings. 
 
 This representation is undoubtedly ac- 
 cording to truth. Men universally dis- 
 tinguish between those effects which they 
 produce by their own power, and those 
 of which they are only the passive sub- 
 jects; and regard themselves as worthy 
 of praise or blame only for the former. 
 No man feels to blame for the effect 
 which thunder produces on his ear, and 
 lightning on his eye; no man feels wor- 
 thy of praise for being warm in summer 
 and cold in winter. If a man's eyes are 
 forced open, and objects presented to 
 them, he does not feel responsible for his 
 perceptions. It is the dictate of com- 
 mon sense, that a man is not, and of rea- 
 son that he cannot be, worthy of praise 
 or blame for any effect which is not pro- 
 duced by his own, but the power of an- 
 other being; and for the obvious reason, 
 that he is not the agent in producing such 
 an effect, nor in any sense the cause of its 
 existence. Let the effect be a perception 
 or sensation; that effect, if it is not pro- 
 duced by his own power, does not owe 
 its existence at all to the man himself, 
 who is the subject of it, any more than a 
 similar effect, of which some one else is 
 
207 
 
 tic subject. It is not the consequence, 
 .n any sense, of his understanding, or 
 will, or any thing that pertains to him. 
 It came into existence entirely by the 
 
 icy of another being, and belongs to 
 him. who is the subject of it, in no other 
 
 -". than that he is the being in whom 
 it was produced. lie is not the agent, 
 -my more, than Adam v ;.t. \\hen 
 
 ,t rib v. n from his Bide by divine 
 
 power: or than Paul v. ,i. \\hen 
 
 forty stripes, -aye one, were thrice inflict- 
 ed on him. The bring, who produces the 
 llrct. is the agent. It is his pou er whieh 
 produces the effect, and it is he who e\- 
 erta the power. This is the distinction 
 which common sense and reason establish 
 betv \ being 
 
 et'ne, when lie produces effects in 
 
 -elf b\ \\\< own pn\\er; he is passive 
 M fie are pro 'need on him by the 
 
 power of another being. Nnee ilien the 
 man is not the n^ent of the effect in ques- 
 tion, but only ihc pas-ive subject of that 
 
 (. which is prodneed by another's 
 ot be worthy of praise or 
 blame for it. The effect does not owe its 
 ' \istence nor its nature to him? and the 
 praise or blame of it therefore cannot be 
 predicated of him, any more than though 
 
208 
 
 he had not been the subject of it. The 
 praise or blame of it can be predicated of 
 the agent only. We trust the common 
 sense and reason of every reader will re- 
 cognise this, as the true distinction be- 
 tween activity and passivity, and the true 
 line between responsibility and irrespon- 
 sibility. 
 
 The Doctor's theory, therefore, devests 
 the actions of men of moral character en- 
 tirely, and releases mankind from all re- 
 sponsibility. For it teaches, that God 
 creates all the actions of men. Men are en- 
 tirely destitute of power. None of their 
 actions can come into existence by power 
 belonging to them. They are not in any 
 sense the cause of their actions, and 
 therefore are not agents, nor worthy of 
 praise or blame on account of them. 
 They are nothing more than passive, ir- 
 responsible subjects, in whom those ef- 
 fects are produced by divine power. 
 
 The Doctor will, peradventure, deny 
 this conclusion, on the ground, that those 
 effects, which God creates in men, are 
 " voluntary actions," acts of choice, or 
 acts of will. But that does not, in the 
 least, intercept that conclusion. The na- 
 lure of the effects produced in men by the 
 power of God, is not at all concerned in 
 
209 
 
 the question, whether men are active 01 
 passive, as it regards the existence oi' those 
 effects. If an effect, which \ve denomi- 
 nate a voluntary action, be produced in 
 a man solely by divine power, that man 
 is as universally and absolutely passive, 
 as it respects that effect, as he is or can 
 be, in respect to any effect, which divine 
 power can create in him. For he is not 
 in any sense the cause of that action. It 
 .e into e e entirely without his 
 
 scy. will, or purpose, lie is not in 
 any sense the cause of its nature. It is 
 solely the consequence of divine pen 
 that it is a voluntary action, and no! 
 o|M ration of a dillerent kind. It is solely 
 the < 'iriice of divine power, that it 
 
 : act of love or of hatred, a elmier nf 
 T that. There U nothing 
 pertaining to it. of \\liieh (iod i- 
 sole author. iV Q |, f 
 
 assigned, that t: -hould be regard- 
 
 ed the agent of this * voluntary action," 
 any more than of any involuntary Hfeet 
 which might have been produced in him. 
 No reason can be assigned, uhy fje 
 should be responsible \ more 
 
 than for any involuntary Hlect which 
 might have been produced in him. The 
 action having been produced entirely by 
 18* 
 
210 
 
 divine power, its being of a particular 
 kind, does not constitute the man the 
 agent of it, or render him worthy of praise 
 or blame on account of it. We challenge 
 the Doctor, and the whole host of meta- 
 physicians, with all the " sophistical, 
 plausible, and delusive arguments" in the 
 world, to allege a reason to prove, that a 
 man is the agent of an action, and respon- 
 sible for it, which is produced solely by 
 divine power, whether that action be de- 
 nominated a " voluntary action," or not, 
 that will not prove him to be the agent of 
 any other action or effect, which Omni- 
 potence can produce .in him, and equally 
 responsible for it. All effects produced 
 in that manner, whether they are called 
 acts of perception, will, affections, sensa- 
 tions, motions, or any thing else, stand, 
 and must stand, on precisely the same 
 ground. No action can have more than 
 one agent. The action is his, who pro- 
 duces the effect. And all the responsibi- 
 lity, connected with the effect, belongs to 
 him. 
 
 The truth is, God cannot create a " vo- 
 luntary action" in a being. It is the most 
 " absolute" impossibility. It would be 
 making passivity, activity; and that which 
 '^involuntary, voluntary; whichever) Dm- 
 
211 
 
 iipotence cannot accomplish. A volun- 
 tary action is that of which the being, who 
 is the subject of it. is the agent; and a 
 being is the agent of an action, which he 
 produces, or exerts entirely by his own 
 power. An effect is not voluntary, if the 
 subject of it is not the agent ; and the sub- 
 ject of it is not the agent, if he does not 
 produce it wholly by his own power. God 
 therefore cannot create a voluntary action 
 in a being ; since in order to be voluntary, 
 it must be exerted solely by the power of 
 the being who is the : of it. 
 
 These views of voluntary actions, both 
 Arminians and Calvinists, in all their elis- 
 ions on moral agency, have, in our 
 apprcheu-inn. entertained. We I; 
 never regarded it a-i an agitated 
 
 \een them, whether the //<>//.'/. by 
 which the voluntary actions of r: 
 
 ;>ower, or God's. T \ 
 
 have alike contemplated man as eiulou ed 
 with power to act voluntarily, or exert 
 volition-; and considered his voluntary 
 actions as solely the exertion of his own 
 power, and not of God's. The question 
 disputed by them is. whether his exercise 
 of that power is controlled by any cause. 
 It was not the subject of President Ed- 
 wards' consideration in the section on 
 
212 
 
 causes, in his Inquiry respecting the Free- 
 dom of the Will, whether or not the voli- 
 tions of men have an efficient cause ; and 
 whether the power of men, or the power 
 of Gorf, is that cause. He concurred en- 
 tirely with Arminians in the unquestion- 
 able position, that their volitions have an 
 efficient cause, and that their power is that 
 cause. The subject disputed between 
 him and Arminians is, whether men are 
 controlled in the exercise of their power by 
 any cause. President Edwards took the 
 position, that they are. He proved by 
 infrustrable argumentation, that there 
 must be a cause, that men exert their 
 power in the mode they do, and not in 
 any other mode; that their agency is made 
 up of a given train of volitions, and not 
 of any other train; as much as there is a 
 cause that any thing else, which begins to 
 exist, exists as it does, arid not in some 
 other way. What that cause was he did 
 not undertake to determine.* 
 
 * We have shown, fn the remarks respecting the_ nature of 
 dependence, that the immediate cause^ that the mind exerts such 
 a Volition as it does, in any given case, is its judgment of the 
 ity of the objects, which are motives to the volitions, to 
 afford pleasure or pain ; and that God is the cause, more or 
 ;notely, of the existence of that judgment. Motives them 
 undoubtedly the cause or occasion that the mind 
 exerts volition?, or exercises its power. Man then, is the effi- 
 cient cause of his volitions, or voluntary exercises; that is, it i<- 
 
21S 
 
 In proving that there must be a cause, 
 that men exercise their power in the mode 
 they do ; or that they exert that series of 
 voluntary actions, which make up their 
 ;cy, and not some other series, lie 
 proved, that a ground of certainty exists, 
 previously to their volitions, that their vo- 
 litions will exist at the time, and in the 
 manner in which they actually do: and 
 thence subverted the reasonings of the 
 Arminians the Calvini-tic doc- 
 
 trines, which involve the existence of such 
 a certaii 
 
 The Arminians. on the other hand, held 
 that men are not controlled in the exor- 
 cise of their power hy any cause; that 
 they possess a self-determining power: 
 is, the po\\ \crtin^ their power 
 
 of acting, in any mode whatever, inde- 
 pendently of a control In xtenial 
 rjin^r. They ilen: ee n! n 
 certainty or necessity of their acting in a 
 given mode, or exerting a given train of 
 volitions. 
 
 hi* po, 
 
 ' 
 
 tion ; that i . mcnt of the capa- 
 
 city of the ol 
 
 exerting such volitions as he docs; 
 that is. 
 
 the cause, t , it is w hat God does 
 
 that is the occasion that he forms those judgments resp 
 the capacities of objects. 
 
214 
 
 The whole course of their controversy 
 demands this construction. The whole 
 subject of difference was the certainty 
 or necessity of men's acting or exercising 
 their power :a the mode they do, pre- 
 viously to their acting. They agreed, in 
 regarding men as exerting their actions 
 entirely by their own power; and used 
 the term agent, to denote a being who 
 acts by his own power; and volition, or 
 voluntary action, to denote a being's vo- 
 luntary exertion of his power, or an act 
 w ? hich a being voluntarily exerts by his 
 own power. When therefore President 
 Edwards assumed, that a volition is vir- 
 tuous or vicious in its own nature, and not 
 in its cause, he contemplated a volition as 
 exerted by the power of the being w r ho is 
 the subject of the volition ; and not by the 
 power of some other being; and thence, 
 regarding the subject of the volition as the 
 efficient cause of it, he intended by the cause 
 which did not constitute the virtue or vice 
 of the volition, that cause which constituted 
 the ground of certainty that it would exist, 
 that is, the cause, which governed the being*s 
 exercise of his power, or led him to exert 
 that volition. They have thus, in the most 
 explicit manner defined 'he subject of 
 their controversy ; and their views of map 
 
as an agent, and of his voluntary actions 
 as the productions of his own power. 
 Whoever lias not entertained these views 
 when reading their volumes, has never 
 comprehended the design of President 
 Edwards, nor known the nature of the 
 Arminian controversy. 
 
 The Doctor therefore cannot assume, 
 as he does in his argument, to prove, that 
 it i- agreeable to the nature of hold 
 to be created ; that a volition is virtuous 
 or vicious in its own rutfur*, without any 
 consideration whether 
 the being who is the subject of the voli- 
 tion, or another 1) nice there nei- 
 ther is, nor can be a volition, of which 
 the being in whom it takes place is not 
 the ellicicnt cause, it constitutes a par! 
 of the nutur' lition, that it- cllicicnt 
 cause is the bein^ who i- the suhj< * 
 the volition. And he cannot, in order to 
 escape the conclusion, that his theory 
 strips the actions of men of their moral 
 character, and releases mankind from all 
 moral obligation, make the assumption 
 we have supposed him to make, that the 
 actions of men are not devested of their 
 moral character, nor men of their respon- 
 sibility, because the effects produced in 
 them by divine power, are " voluntary 
 
216 
 
 actions ;" since, as has been shown, if a 
 voluntary action were produced in that 
 way, it would be a mere mechanical ef- 
 fect. Thus from the acknowledged prin- 
 ciple, that a being is responsible only for 
 those effects which are produced by his 
 own power, or of which he is the efficient 
 cause, it is seen, that the Doctor's theory 
 subverts the whole foundation of moral 
 obligation. 
 
 Again: it is a first principle in morals, 
 that a being, in order to be responsible 
 for his actions, must possess natural pow- 
 er to act otherwise than he do^s. i hat 
 is, that he must act from a moral xud not 
 from a natural necessity. A being who 
 should act only from a natural or physi- 
 cal necessity, would be a mere machine. 
 The Doctor holds, that men must, in or- 
 der to be agents, and that they do pos- 
 sess natural power to act otherwise than 
 they do act. fc< Two tilings are absolutely 
 necessary in order to men's acting: one 
 is to be able the other is to be willing. 
 By being able is meant a natural power 
 to act, and by being willing, a moral 
 power to act." "When men have natu- 
 ral power to do any thing, they always 
 have natural power to neglect it." "God 
 knows that men have natural power to 
 
217 
 
 act contrary to his designs." Vol. ii. p. 
 5/>. 57. And the ground of this reason is 
 obvious. A being who has not natural 
 power to act otherwise than he does, 
 must act from a physical necessity. 
 There must be a physical necessity 
 against his acting differently from the 
 mode in which he does act; and there- 
 fore a physical necessity of his acting: as 
 he does act. And if he acts from a phy- 
 sical necessity, he is a mere machine, and 
 not a voluntary agent ; since a voluntary 
 agent acts from a moral necessity only, 
 or from mere choice. 
 
 The Doctor's theory, therefore, dc\ < 
 the actions of men of their moral nature, 
 and exempts them from all moral ol 
 tion. For it rcj,n -cuts men as nil, 
 destitute of power; as utterly inrapablc 
 of acting, except by a divine inilucncc 
 creating all their actions. Bm if they are 
 universally and absolutely destitute o( , 
 cr^ they plainly have no natural power \ 
 otherwise than they do act ; and ii' they are 
 utterly i/icttjmftlc of acting but by a divine 
 influence, they certainly hav< lured 
 
 ' than t!ie\ aft influenc- 
 ed to act. Natural power to act other- 
 wise than they do act, and than they are 
 influenced, would be natural power to act 
 19 
 
218 
 
 without, and in opposition to a divine in- 
 fluence. His theory, therefore, in repre- 
 senting men as destitute of natural power 
 to act otherwise than they do; and as 
 destitute of all power, represents them as 
 mere machines ; makes their actions 
 merely mechanical effects, and releases 
 them from all moral obligation. 
 
 This is true by his own confession in 
 regard to Adam. " If by being left to the 
 freedom of his own will be meant, that 
 God withdrew some aid or support which 
 he had given him before, and which was 
 necessary in order to resist temptation ; 
 then such a suspension of divine aid or 
 support must have excused him for eat- 
 ing the forbidden fruit; since there could 
 have been no criminality in his not re- 
 sisting temptation, which was above his 
 natural power to resist. Vol. i. p. 233. 
 Here the Doctor .declares that Adam 
 could not have been criminal in yielding 
 to the temptation, unless he had natural 
 power to resist it. And if it be true in 
 his case, it must be so in all others. He 
 also declares, that if God withdrew any 
 aid or support from him, which he had 
 given him before, and which was neces- 
 sary in order to resist temptation ; then 
 such a suspension of divine aid or support 
 
219 
 
 must have excused him for eating the for- 
 bidden fruit. But the Doctor's theory 
 represents the agency of God as the We 
 cause of Adam's not resisting the tempta- 
 tion, and of his eating the forbidden fruit. 
 For he represents His agency as the sole 
 cause of all the actions of men, and of the 
 nature of their actions; and thence re- 
 gards it as such in the case of Adam. 
 And he expressly declares, that "all me- 
 thods to account for the fall of Adam 
 the instrumcntnlihi of second eotfjetj are in- 
 suliicicnt to remove the difficulty ;" and 
 that therefore, "it seems necessary to have 
 recourse to the divine agency, and to 
 suppose that Got I wrought in Adam both 
 to \\ill and to do, in his first Uransg 
 sion. 1 ' "Hi- lirM -in \vas a free volunta- 
 
 \ exerei e produced by a divine op: 
 lion." Vol. i. p. 234. 
 
 But if God wrought in Adam in his first 
 transgression, and His agency was the 
 sole cause of his eating the forbidden 
 fruit; and if His agency was also the sole 
 cause of all his previous actions, then in 
 his !ran.^ression God must have with- 
 drawn from Adam some aid or support 
 given him before, and necessary to resist 
 the temptation. For as the agency of God 
 the sole cause of his actions, the na- 
 
220 
 
 lure of the divine agency must have been 
 the sole cause of the nature of his actions ; 
 and thence a difference in the divine agen- 
 cy must have been the cause of the differ- 
 ence in his actions; and God, therefore, 
 in exerting on him that different agency, 
 which produced transgression, withdrciv 
 from, him some aid and support which He 
 had previously given him, and which was 
 necessary to resist temptation. 
 
 And since, then, according to the Doc- 
 tor, " such a suspension" or withdrawment, 
 fc - of divine aid or support, must have ex- 
 tuscdlmu for eating of the forbidden fruit," 
 the Doctor's theory, in teaching that God 
 did withdraw from him His aid or support 
 in that manner, entirely releases Adam 
 from moral obligation, and devests his 
 transgression of all moral character. And 
 if this be true of Adam in that case, it is 
 equally true of him and all mankind, in 
 respect to every one of their actions. 
 
 But men are not thus mere machines. 
 We have the testimony of the Doctor, 
 that " it is undoubtedly true, that we are 
 all conscious of activity ; arid intuiiively 
 know, that we are free moral agents." 
 Vol. i. p. 215. The Doctor's theory, 
 therefore, which represents men as mere 
 machines, is altogether erroneous. 
 
221 
 
 Sixthly. According to the Doctors the- 
 ory, God is the only agent of the actions 
 of men, and their praise and blame be- 
 longs to Him only. His theory is there- 
 fore incorrect. 
 
 It is a first principle, that the efficient 
 cause or agent of an action is alone re- 
 sponsible for it. He alone gives it exist- 
 ence ; he alone gives it its nature. If its 
 nature is such that it is vicious, he is the 
 sole cause of its viriousness, and its vice 
 belongs to him. If its nature is such 
 that it is virtuous, he is the sole cause of 
 its virtue, and its virtue belongs to him. 
 Its virtue or vice can no more be predi- 
 cated of any other being, than the agency 
 can which produced it. For to predicate 
 virtue or vice, praise or blnme, of a being, 
 is nothing else than to predicate the 
 tion which involves the virtue or virr, 
 praise or blame, of him as the a^ent. No 
 being can be conceived to be worthy of 
 praise or blame for an action, unless he is 
 the agent of that action. To deny that a 
 being is the agent of an action, the praise 
 or blame of which is predicated of him, is 
 to deny that the praise or blame belongs 
 to him; and to deny that the praise or 
 blame of an action belongs to the being 
 19* 
 
222 
 
 who is the agent of that action, is to deny 
 that he is the agent of that action. 
 
 That being is the agent of an action, 
 who is the efficient cause of that action; 
 that is, owns and exerts the power which 
 produces the action, or of which the ac- 
 tion is an exertion. The agent is the be- 
 ing who acts; and the being who acts, is 
 he who exerts the power which is exert- 
 ed in acting. We have the Doctor's tes- 
 timony to this effect: "Two things are 
 absolutely necessary in order to men's 
 acting; one is, to be able. By being 
 able, is meant a natural power to act." 
 That is, a man cannot act unless he has 
 power to act. But there is no need of his 
 possessing power, unless that power is 
 exerted in acting. A man cannot act then, 
 unless he possesses power, and exerts it 
 in acting ; and " no man is capable of do- 
 ing that which he has not natural power 
 to do." That is, a man is not capable of 
 acting in a given way, unless he has 
 power to act in that way; that is, unless 
 he possess power, and exert it in acting. 
 
 According to the Doctor's theory, there- 
 fore, God is the only agent of the actions 
 of men, and their praise and blame be- 
 longs to Him alone. For his theory re- 
 presents God alone as possessing power. 
 
223 
 
 Power, according to his theory, is omnipo- 
 tence, and an incommunicable attribute 
 of the Deity. Men neither do, nor can 
 possess it, and therefore neither are nor 
 can be agents. It is divine pmrer which 
 produces all their actions. God exerts 
 that power alone; and is therefore the 
 agent and only agent of their actions. 
 And as He is the only agent, He is the 
 only moral agent ; and nil the praise and 
 blame of their actions belong solely to 
 Him. Men are therefore universally and 
 absolutely p-i ive in all their aetions, 
 and universally and absolutely exempt 
 from praise and blame. 
 
 Surh is the frightful conclusion to which 
 tliH theory conducts us. God is the only 
 it in the world. Men are mere ma- 
 chines, destitute of power and destitute 
 of rcs|)<)ii-il>ili!\ . ( -od is not only the 
 Author of all the holiness in the world, 
 but all the holiness in the world is His. 
 He is the only holy being. And He is 
 not only the Author of all the sin in the 
 world, but it is all His likewise. He is 
 the only sinful being. Men are totally 
 deceived in the belief that they are 
 agents, and that they are holy and sin- 
 ful, worthy of praise and blame. If this 
 theory be true, God's government is de- 
 
224 
 
 ceitful and unjust. He reaps where He 
 has not sown, and gathers where He has 
 not strawed. All the happiness He be- 
 stows, as the reward of holiness, is no 
 more merited by those who receive it, than 
 it is by others, and no more appropriate- 
 ly bestowed on them than it would be on 
 others. The misery he inflicts as the re- 
 ward of sin is utterly unmerited, and 
 might with equal justice and propriety 
 be inflicted on any other beings! We 
 have sat down to many metaphysical 
 dishes prepared by theorising philoso- 
 phers and theologians, but never before 
 to one w r hich meditated such horrible re- 
 sults as these. 
 
 We might add other proofs that this 
 theory is devoid of truth. We might di- 
 rect the eye of the reader to the nume- 
 rous contradictions which it involves 
 such as, that men have power, and have 
 no power; are agents, and are not agents; 
 are free, and are not free in their agency; 
 are worthy, and are not worthy of praise 
 and blame; and also the contradictions 
 to other parts of the Doctors volumes, 
 which it involves; such as, that the devil 
 exerts, and does not exert an influence 
 on men; that the agency of the Holy 
 Spirit on men is a peculiar agency, and 
 
223 
 
 is not so; &c. &c. But it is unnecessary. 
 What further need have we of witnesses? 
 We apprehend that we have both refuted 
 the arguments employed hy the Doctor 
 to support his theory, and demonstrated 
 the theory to be groundless. 
 
 Let us now turn to some of the baleful 
 consequences which must result from this 
 theory bring publicly taught, by the 
 ministers of the gospel, as a part of re- 
 vealed theology. 
 
 I. It will render their discourses con- 
 tradictory, and thence tend to destroy 
 the confidence of their hearers in their 
 instructions. 
 
 No man can preach this theory, and 
 preach the go.-pel of the grace of God 
 too, without entangling himself in the 
 mo-t i^ross and appalling contradictions, 
 The theory is palpably selt-contradicto- 
 ry; and it breathes out threatening^ and 
 slaughter against every part of the gos- 
 pel. Does its teacher preach that God 
 creates all the actions of men? He de- 
 that,when he preaches that men are 
 agents, and their actions their own. Does 
 he teach, that men are absolutely desti- 
 tute of power, and incapable of acting 
 but by a divine efficiency? He contra- 
 
226 
 
 diets that, when he asserts that men have 
 power to act, and must have power in 
 order to act. Does he announce to his 
 hearers, that men can no more act than 
 matter can move, without a divine effi- 
 ciency ? He retracts that, or addresses 
 to them the grossest insult, when he calls 
 on them to repent, believe, love, and 
 obey ; and presents the promise of hea- 
 ven to allure, and the threatening of per- 
 dition to constrain. Does he hold, that 
 men have natural power to act otherwise 
 than they do act ? He falsifies that, when 
 he teaches that they cannot act except 
 by ni divine efficiency. Is it a part of his 
 creed, that the agency of the Spirit on 
 men is a peculiarity of the work of re- 
 ption? He abandons that position 
 when he assumes that the agency of God 
 is concerned in precisely the same man- 
 ner in the wrong as in the right actions of 
 men. Is it a part of his faith, that " the 
 devil, as a roaring lion, walketh about 
 seeking whom he may devour;" has "ac- 
 cess to the minds of men," is "capable of 
 leading them into all manner of moral evil," 
 and is employed in suggesting to them 
 " temptations," " motives," u thoughts," 
 -' doubts," and in " helping" them to " the 
 most sophistical" and " most plausible 
 
227 
 
 and delusive arguments ?" He excul- 
 pates the devil from all this, when he 
 teaches that God, who creates all the 
 actions of men, is the only agent by whom 
 men are influenced. Does he hold that 
 men are responsible for their conduct, 
 and that the praise and blame of their 
 actions belongs entirely to them? His 
 theory contradicts that, and transfers all 
 their virtue and vice to God. These 
 contradictions and others, to which the 
 theory leads, are obvious and palpable*. 
 They are so flagrant that a hearer must be 
 exceedingly stupid, not to perceive them : 
 for these dogmas of the theory contradict 
 the dictates of common sense, the deci- 
 sions of reason, and the doctrines of re- 
 velation. 
 
 Now to publish such contradictions 
 from the desk, must tend entirely to dis- 
 possess the hearer of confidence in his 
 teacher. It will force him either to re- 
 gard his instructer as incompetent to un- 
 oerstefftd religion, or as dishonest, or to 
 consider the Gospel as made up of" things 
 hard to be understood." No man can be 
 believed to comprehend a subject which 
 he cannot teach with consistency. 
 
 Not a few of mankind are disposed to 
 charge the inconsistencies of the teachers 
 
228 
 
 of religion to religion itself; and to shel- 
 ter themselves under that persuasion 
 from all rebukes of conscience for their 
 neglect to understand its doctrines, and 
 their disregard of its known truths. 
 
 This course of preaching naturally 
 makes shipwreck of the hearer's confi- 
 dence in the teacher. The hearer sees, 
 that he is not fairly treated ; that he is 
 perpetually plunged into artificial per- 
 plexities; that what is simple, is con- 
 founded ; and what is true, is involved in 
 doubt. He becomes averse to the man ; 
 a film of prejudice spreads itself over his 
 eye, discolouring even the truths which 
 are taught, and depriving them of power 
 to delight or persuade. The preacher's 
 influence dies"away. He robs the Gospel 
 of its consistency and dignity, and him- 
 self of the respect arid trust which his 
 oOice properly procures him. He is view- 
 ed with the irreverence and distrust 
 which other men incur, who are inconsis- 
 tent in their principles, and erroneous in 
 their reasonings; and his ministry,* not 
 "commending itself to every man's con- 
 science in the sight of God," is unfruitful. 
 
 Nor will he have much occasion to as- 
 sume to himself the credit of it, if some of 
 his hearers are not driven by his ministry 
 
229 
 
 into the regions of infidelity. There are 
 minds which are more easily plunged into 
 the gulf of skepticism by what in their 
 apprehension is contradictory or incom- 
 prehensible in religion, than by any thing 
 else ; and a ministry, in which this theory 
 is taught, would, in our judgment, furnish 
 " the devil" with ample materials from 
 which he could ^help" such minds " to 
 the most sophistical, plausible, and delu- 
 sive arguments to pervert the doctrines. 
 and ^uhxert the firsUprinciples of Chris- 
 tianity." 
 
 The preaching of this theory will not 
 produce these ellects in every individual; 
 but the laws of human nature assure us it 
 will in some. Were we able to cast our 
 eye over the congregations, in which it 
 has been taught, and trace it- influence, 
 we doubt not, that we should detect many 
 minds, whose history we have delineated. 
 
 II. The preaching of this theory must 
 tend to produce a contentious disposition 
 in the community, and to propagate dis- 
 sensions arid sectarianism in the Church. 
 No man can teach it in such a manner as 
 to command the faith of all. There are, in 
 every congregation, some whose common 
 sense is toodisceming,not to reject its con- 
 tradictory dogmas : and whose understand- 
 20 
 
230 
 
 iiig is too sound, not to detect the fallacy 
 of the reasonings, by which it is attempted 
 to be sustained. However it may be with 
 the multitude, there are many, who will 
 not decide without investigation, nor be- 
 lieve without evidence ; and neither those 
 who reject, rior those who embrace the 
 theory, will regard their decision as of 
 slight consequence. It is a question of 
 pre-eminent consequence, and fitted more 
 than almost any other, to arouse the sen- 
 sibilities. Who can be indifferent, when 
 gravely called by a teacher of religion to 
 decide whether he is a moral agent, or a 
 machine; and whether justice or injustice 
 is the habitation of God's throne ? 
 
 Those who, departing from the com- 
 mon paths of speculation, descry, as 
 they imagine, some truth, " which in 
 other ages was riot made known unto 
 the sons of men," and broach new 
 doctrines, are prone to regard their pe- 
 culiar views as the most important por- 
 tion of the Gospel, and to contend for 
 them more "earnestly" than "for the 
 faith once delivered to the saints." 
 Teachers, who " have sought out such in- 
 ventions," feel constrained by the up- 
 braidings of conscience, and the yearn- 
 ings of philanthropy, to address them- 
 pcjves immediately to the " wood, hay, 
 
231 
 
 and stubble'' of their systems, and ;i omii 
 the weightier matters of the law, judg- 
 ment, mercy, faith," " and the love of 
 God/' The very quintessence of religion 
 is in their apprehension, embodied in 
 their peculiar dogmas; and the ark is in 
 jeopardy till they are embraced with "all 
 lowliness and meekness." They there- 
 fore perpetually drag them before the 
 public rye, and M niggle to beat down 
 other systems, and uivr support to theii 
 own. The natural influence of such a 
 course of preaching is to * gender strifes" 
 ' about words to no profit, but to the sub- 
 verting of the hearers." They are brought 
 to "dote about questions, and strifes of 
 words, whereof cometh envy, railings, evil 
 surmisings, perverse disputings." A pug- 
 nacious, sectarian spirit : tted. One 
 <>f Paul, one of A polios, and another of 
 Cephas, till Christ is Irit alone." The 
 cry is raised, " Who is on the Lord's side? 
 Put every man his sword by his side, and 
 slay every man his brother, and every 
 man his companion, and every man his 
 neighbour." The advocates of the theo- 
 ry " breathe out threatening and slaugh- 
 ter" against their adversaries, as " un- 
 orthodox," mere " heretics," " sons of Be- 
 lial," " men who hold the truth in un- 
 
232 
 
 righteousness." In the mean time, the 
 meekness and gentleness of Christ are 
 extinguished. Severity, dogmatism, a 
 spirit of unsparing condemnation become 
 prominent features of the character. Re- 
 ligion is transformed into "vain bab- 
 blings," " foolish and unlearned ques- 
 tions," " contentions and strivings about 
 the law," and " giving heed to Jewish fa- 
 bles, and commandments of men that turn 
 from the truth." The theory is made the 
 standard of orthodoxy. Every man is 
 stretched upon that bed ; and if " found 
 wanting" in exact coincidence with it, is 
 rejected as an heretic. Faith in it, is 
 made the test of piety ; and on the pre- 
 sumption, that without that faith it is im- 
 possible to please God, all who do not 
 possess it, are cast "without" among 
 " dogs and sorcerers." None but " the 
 thorough going," to use their own lan- 
 guage, are " sound in the faith." 
 
 On the other hand, those who re- 
 ject the theory, are aroused to more 
 warmth and severity in defending their 
 opinions; and are fortunate if they do 
 not, in the contention, revert into the op- 
 posite error. Hot disputation always 
 produces extremes. Some, who would 
 otherwise have "held fast the form of 
 
233 
 
 sound words," retreat into low Calvinism. 
 Multitudes people the regions of Armin- 
 ianism. Uriitarianism here and there culls 
 a disciple. And many, disgusted with re- 
 ligious contentions, resolve to "live with- 
 out God and without hope in the world." 
 
 It needs not the eye of prophecy to dis- 
 cover that these must be the consequen- 
 ces of such a course of preaching. Any 
 one, who has read a single chapter of hu- 
 man nature, may ^oe that they are inevi- 
 table. We appeal to the ministers who 
 have taught this theory; we appeal to 
 the congregations who have heard it, whe- 
 ther we have not accurately depicted the 
 history of their experience. If we wi-!i- 
 cd to discover the most deperate vota- 
 ries of error, Arminians. Unitarians. Uni- 
 vcrsalists, Swedenborgians, Nothingari- 
 an-, we would search lor them in the re- 
 gion where this theory has prevalence. 
 It' we wished to find a region, where piety 
 is chilled and stinted by contention, and 
 religion is resolved into abstract specula- 
 tion, we should turn our eye to that. 
 
 The advocates of this theory are a sect, 
 and as distinctly defined, and as tena- 
 cious of their peculiarities as any sect 
 whatever. It is thence natural to expect 
 that they will avail themselves of all prac- 
 20* 
 
234 
 
 ticable means to give currency to their 
 views and supremacy to their party; that 
 their ministers will associate with each 
 other more intimately than with those 
 who dissent from their creed ; and that 
 their members in vacant congregations 
 will demand that their sentiments should 
 prevail, and make a difference between 
 their own and the opinions of candidates 
 for settlement, a ground of rejecting 
 them. 
 
 The question of their settlement, it may 
 be expected, will in many places come 
 to depend on their views of this theory, 
 and the gates of the sanctuary be barred 
 against those who cannot embrace and 
 teach its revolting dogmas. We appeal 
 to the common sense of all whether these 
 consequences are not to be apprehended. 
 We appeal to those whose condition has 
 allowed them to notice the influence of 
 this theory, whether facts of this kind 
 have not often passed under iheir eye. 
 
 Are not these things to be deprecated ? 
 Is it a matter of small consequence, that 
 the Church is rent with divisions; that 
 44 the meekness and gentleness of Christ" 
 are supplanted by the bitterness of con- 
 tention and the zeal of party; that secta- 
 rianism and error are propagated ; and 
 
235 
 
 that faith in this theory is made a test of 
 qualification for the ministry, and the 
 ground of the decision whether or not 
 men shall be admitted to its labours? 
 
 III. The prevalence of this theory must 
 prepare the way for the reception of other 
 human doctrines. It rests entirely, as we 
 have seen, on the authority of the Doc- 
 tor. He has not obtained the aid of 
 either common sense, reason, or revela- 
 tion to support it; but all these unite 
 their testimony against it. Now the suc- 
 cess of one innovation of the truth pre- 
 pares the way for the success of others. 
 Those who yield their faith to the mere 
 authority of men in one instance, do not 
 surprise? us when tin \ vield it in others. 
 If their common sen^e i- not sniliciently 
 
 rigorous to preserve them \\itliin the ii- 
 
 ii;il belief; if thev fail to dis- 
 tinguish those subjects, of which a know- 
 ledge mav le obtained from human t( -ti 
 mony, from those of VN hich our knowledge 
 mu>t be derived entirely from God; if 
 they overlook the distinction betu 
 ertioris and proofs, " the most sophistical 
 arguments," and the most fair, we an* pre- 
 d to see them "make shipwreck con- 
 cerning the faith," and > blown about,' 1 
 the mere disciples of men, " by every 
 
236 
 
 wind of doctrine." Whatever is present- 
 ed to them with a show of proof, recom- 
 mended by novelty arid enforced with a 
 dogmatical, authoritative air, is a fair 
 candidate for their unwavering faith. 
 
 Now we cannot but regard the disci- 
 ples of this theory as exposed to this 
 danger. They have called a man their 
 Father upon the earth. They have made 
 him their oracle. They have reposed 
 the same confidence in his testimony as 
 in the testimony of God sustained by mi- 
 racles and prophecies. They have on 
 his authority believed dogmas, which all 
 the miracles and prophecies of revelation 
 could never prove to be true, while such 
 things as impossibilities have no exist- 
 ence. What then shall prevent them 
 from yielding their faith to other human 
 doctrines, which chance may bring with- 
 in their knowledge? We cannot con- 
 ceive that either human sagacity or ob- 
 tuseness can devise a scheme, that shall 
 involve grosser contradictions to itself, 
 and to the truth, than are embodied in 
 this theory. We cannot conceive that 
 sophistry itself can furnish a selection of 
 more " sophistical arguments" to sustain 
 any doctrine, than those are on which 
 this theory leans for support. No doc- 
 
trine can be offered to their considera- 
 tion, which for abundance of contradic- 
 tion and dearth of proof, can present more 
 formidable obstacles to their credence, 
 than this theory presented. 
 
 We cannot feel surprised, therefore, 
 should we behold the votaries of this 
 theory exchanging it for some other com- 
 mandment of men, commended by its no- 
 velty, abstr -, dogmatism, or so- 
 phistry. We shall not be surprised, 
 should we see some giving their creduli- 
 ty to the winds. aiul retreating into tlio 
 region of universal skepticism ; and others 
 beguiled by the craft of Unitarian philo- 
 sophy : some, abandoning a creed of 
 tenor and denunciation for the elysian 
 d minis of Universalism; and others plung- 
 ing into the gulf of S\\ ;^i;in mysti- 
 fi-m and lk< s. Not brrausp we 
 regard this theory as at all resembling 
 those errors in its principle- : nor because 
 we suspect the teachers and advocates 
 of it as at all friendly to those errors: 
 but simply l>ee,ni-e they are the disciples 
 of a man. and have given him "dominion 
 over their faith/- We doubt not that 
 many, who teach and who embrace 
 this theory, are men of eminent piety, 
 sense, and learning; but we cannot per* 
 
suadc ourselves, that either their lean, 
 r, or piety, contributed much to 
 thrir 1'aith in this theory; and they will 
 |lr; < to exeuse us, it', when we behold 
 them embarked on the tide of error, we 
 eannol refrain from indul;in<; the apprc- 
 hrnsion, that they may not prove invin- 
 cible by the influence of its ebbs and 
 eoiinter currents. 
 
 IV. The publication of this theory is 
 obviously calculated to lead men to adopt 
 ir\\-. nu)st injurious toliod, aiul dan^er- 
 OUS to themselves. 
 
 f riiere are many persons, especially 
 amon; the \onni;, who, from early eduea- 
 tion, from their confidence in the public 
 teacher ; of religion, and tlie faith of tho> .r 
 around them, will be led to a loose pcr- 
 SUasion that the theory is true, and >et 
 will be forced by their common sense and 
 reason to thr conclusion, that it blots out 
 the morality of thru artion-, and annihi- 
 I ilr-. thrir responsibility, \\iiat views 
 then will they naturally form of (Jod and 
 themselves ? Will they, after heinj; con- 
 viiu-ed that (u)d creates all their a<'tions, 
 be prrparrd to brlirx* that they act vo 
 luntanl\, and arc not machines ? \\\\\ 
 they, after beini; taujjht that they can no 
 more act than matter can move without. 
 
239 
 
 * divine * fheieru \, he jrepaml to Ii 
 (.. ihe twice "i the divine hnv, rr 
 
 them I" I l< <>hr> \\illmnl :in\ -ill 
 
 of ili. nreessary inlltK \\ ill I!K >, 
 
 ' 
 
 afler hrm^ .i-^nrrd thai the ;i^eiie> oi' 
 
 (;<>d is ,,ni 111 , \ ihr lama 
 
 inannrr in ilirir \\ i';ii; M in llirir i 
 iCtlOJ lr ;\s i * - thai tlir 
 
 <!] ctl "1 ll' : '' ;;: IN \ INT n\ nch n na 
 lurr, lhal the 
 
 i- \\!i.i are I'M u h. 
 
 >;il hlr ; and il. , rla , i |.iTri|i 
 
 \\ hu:n i |>ri.di,i ,-d, 
 
 inh) ihr ^iih <>r eternal d< , v\ ill 
 
 (hr\ - i.\ Ii i\ illg ''cm inducl d i i ihr 
 
 liC 'IN , IM- filled 
 !,MIht, lh:it ( Md i OOU ill 
 
 all Hi id h..| N in all I Ii 
 
 m hi ii ten to IH 
 
 and hi dr >ci I ' \\ ||| i-nt ihr CODCll 
 
 i; i ;, M God i 
 
 not 
 
 P6 I !<' li:i I u.,!. 
 ihr \ I. 
 
 rrsal di In . 1 l!i;it ihr l>l 
 
 ' < l<)O JpVBIMAM" . 
 
 h.p' I en too d;u L 10 
 
 l>r .d Ihrni 
 
 Of the palhulion d' Ihcir |;nill, I'm 
 
240 
 
 wished by the doctrine of the theory that 
 they are powerless" machines, as an ex- 
 cuse for abandoning the purpose of refor- 
 mation? Will they not be led to con- 
 ceive of God as an almighty and inflexi- 
 ble enemy, whose love they have no as- 
 surance they can conciliate, and whose 
 wrath they have no certainty they can 
 avoid ; and give themselves up, therefore, 
 to the licentious, unprincipled rein of fa- 
 talism? If this theory is not admirably 
 adapted to release a certain class of man- 
 kind from the restraints of religion, to dis- 
 arm their consciences, and give them li- 
 cense and appetite to " commit iniquity 
 with greediness," we have totally mis- 
 read the volume of human nature; and 
 when it shall be proved, will confess our- 
 selves to have been " in great fear, where 
 no fear was." Men who wish an excuse 
 for sin, may certainly find it in this theo- 
 ry; and we have never yet discovered, 
 that " the bands of the wicked" were slow 
 to discern, or negligent to embrace, any 
 " plausible and delusive" means of silen- 
 cing the monitions of conscience, and 
 casting the veil of justification over guilt. 
 We are not apprehensive that these 
 unhappy consequences will result to eve- 
 rv individuaj, or extensively to every con- 
 * 
 
ill 
 
 gregation, on whom the theory is success- 
 fully inculcated. We are aware that the 
 truths of the Gospel intermingled with it, 
 arid taught in connexion with it, and the 
 influence of common sense, w ill, to a great 
 extent, intercept its deleterious influence. 
 Such is the fact with all errors. Their 
 influence is repressed and modified hy 
 opposing influences. A small share of 
 truth often does much to neutrali/o a 
 large mass of error. Vrt after all. error 
 lias a proportion of influence. We see 
 in every seel, triits of character corres- 
 ponding to the peculiarities of their cived ; 
 and shall not fear that we risk our credit 
 for discernment in exprcs-inir the appre- 
 hension, that this theory will, more or 
 abundantly, j ihr-e conse- 
 
 tjuenccs ftfl it- natural fruits. We appeal 
 to those who have witnessed it- m!lu< 
 whether e\[>rr.' is not alread v c\ in- 
 
 ced the propriety of our apprehension-. 
 
 The Doctor has probably been betray- 
 ed into the invention, as far as he is the 
 author of it, and the publication of this 
 theory as a part of revealed theology, as 
 with most errorist-. l>\ forget- 
 ting the duty of confining his public in- 
 structions, in respect to facts, to the facts 
 which the Scriptures reveal, and not ven- 
 21 
 
242 
 
 turing to inculcate, nor attempting to con- 
 struct, theories of the mode in which those 
 facts exist. The sacred volume presents 
 us with nothing, in respect to facts, but a 
 simple statement that certain facts exist. 
 It conveys to us no intelligence whatever 
 respecting the modus operandi of God, of 
 men, or of other causes, by which those 
 facts come into existence. And it is the 
 business of the minister of religion to 
 teach those truths, and those alone, which 
 he is taught by the volume of Revelation. 
 The Gospel of the grace of God comprises 
 the whole of his commission as an ambas- 
 sador for Christ. The question about the 
 modus existentiae et operandi, is a mere 
 question of philosophy. The mode of 
 God's agency on mankind, in either their 
 holy or sinful conduct, has no more con- 
 nexion with revealed theology, than the 
 mode of His agency on matter. The mi- 
 nister who ventures to construct and in- 
 culcate a theory respecting it, is charge- 
 able with mistaking the business of his 
 office, and assuming that of the mere phi- 
 losopher, as much as though he gave a 
 theory of electricity, or craniology. It 
 was not the purpose of God, that men 
 should learn the modus existentise et ope- 
 randi from Revelation. He has confined 
 
243 
 
 His revelation to those truths, a know- 
 ledge of which is necessary or useful to 
 them, as the subjects of His government. 
 He has revealed those facts respecting 
 His being, character, purposes, will, and 
 agency, and those only, which need to be 
 known, in order to obedience and salva- 
 tion. 
 
 The insatiable curiosity of men asks, 
 How there exists a threefold distinction in 
 the divine nature which constitutes a pro- 
 per foundation for the personal title-, 
 ther, Word, and Spirit, and for their seve- 
 ral agencies, \\hiir yet they are but one 
 Cod, and one Being ? Hut God, in place 
 of gratifying that curiosity, merely reveals 
 'he /'i/rt that such a distinction cxi-ts, and 
 
 tturc unknown. 
 
 An .hie and irreverent curiosity 
 
 . How the Word was united to the 
 man Jesus, so as to lay a proper founda- 
 tion for the personal titles and agency 
 ascribed to the complex nature. But 
 God, revealing only the fact that such n 
 union existed, leaves the mode unknown. 
 
 \ re.tle-s curiosity asks, How does 
 God govern the universe, so as, in respect 
 to all events, to execute His purposes, 
 and yet leave intelligent beings to act as 
 moral agents ? But God only reveals the 
 
244 
 
 fact that He exercises such a government^ 
 and leaves the mode unknown. 
 
 A presumptuous curiosity asks, How 
 are the dead raised, and with what bodies 
 do they come? But God only reveals 
 the fact that they are to be raised, and 
 leaves the mode unknown. 
 
 And a presumptuous curiosity asks, 
 How does the Holy Spirit act on the 
 mind in turning it from sin to holiness? 
 But God only reveals the fact, that the 
 Holy Spirit influences the mind in the 
 work of renovation and sanctification, and 
 leaves the mode unknown. 
 
 A knowledge of the modes of these se- 
 veral facts, if indeed they are such that 
 we are capable of knowing them, could 
 be of no utility to us as subjects of God's 
 government. It could neither alter oui 4 
 views of His character, nor furnish any 
 new motives to love and obey him. And 
 God, therefore, has not made any provi- 
 sion, by revealing it, for the gratification 
 of a vain desire to comprehend what can 
 make us neither better nor happier. 
 
 Since, then, God has confined His re- 
 velation to a simple statement of facts, the 
 ministers of that revelation are bound to 
 confine their instructions to those facts. 
 " Secret things belong unto God." The 
 
ihmgs which " are revealed" are all that 
 belong " to us and to our children." If 
 any, persuading themselves that infinite 
 wisdom in giving a revelation has over- 
 looked things essential to its perfection, 
 attempt to complete the work, by adding 
 their own " psalm,'' or - ; doctrine," or 
 44 revelation," or " interpretation," they 
 -intrude into things which they have not 
 seen," and fall into " the Miare of the de- 
 vil/* What are all the theories of men 
 respecting the of revealed i 
 
 worth ; They do not yield us any know- 
 ledge of God, or His agency. They are 
 the fictions of the imagination, not indu- 
 bitable deductions from known truth. 
 They do not break off the fetters of our 
 nor aid our ascent to heaven. 
 Insi< Qlightening, they obscure; in 
 
 plae(! of aiding piety, they obstruct it by 
 giving perplexity, or endanger it by in- 
 spiring presumption. What are all the 
 -heories of men respecting the mode of 
 jlod's agency on mankind worth ? Have 
 thev imparted any knowledge on the sub- 
 ject? Have any of them been sustained 
 by any evidence? Have any had the 
 praise of not contradicting many impor- 
 tant truths? Have not some virtually 
 21* 
 
246 
 
 denied the agency of God, and some the 
 agency of men ? Have not some cast a 
 cloud of discouragement over piety, and 
 some given the rein to licentiousness ; 
 and have not all tended to embarrass and 
 confound ? What better effects have re- 
 sulted from the Doctor's theory? Are he 
 and his hearers, and his disciples, any 
 wiser on the subject than others ? 
 
 These theories of the modus existentice et 
 operandi, are the field where, in every age, 
 fancy has revelled and dogmatism rav- 
 ed ; but over which religion has wept, as 
 the stumbling place of many of her chil- 
 dren, and the grave of many of their joys 
 and hopes. They have produced incal- 
 culable mischief to the Church in every 
 period of her existence. They began in 
 the days of the apostles, in the inquiry, 
 " How are the dead raised, and with what 
 bodies do they come?" And what of 
 consequence were the heresies of the 
 Gnostics and preceding sects, but theo- 
 ries respecting the modes of things, design- 
 ed to accommodate the doctrines of the 
 Gospel to those of the philosophy and 
 mythology of the heathen ? To what did 
 the contention respecting the Son's eter- 
 nal generation relate, but the mode of the 
 
217 
 
 divine existence ? And on what rock but 
 that is it, that the Arian and Socinian 
 make shipwreck of the faith ? On what 
 have all the objections to the doctrine of 
 God's agency on mankind by His Spirit, 
 or of His providential government, rested, 
 but on theories of the ?nodc of His agency, 
 exhibiting it as subversive of the moral 
 freedom of man ? And to what el>e have 
 tlio error< and contentions of P< 
 and Arminian- related ? 
 
 Mm have not hren -alisfied with u the 
 wisdom which i- from above." It has not 
 -atiah-d the thirst of curiosity, nor allord- 
 ed -nflicient scope for the revels of fancy. 
 They have chosen to -draw water out 
 of their own eiMem," and have done it at 
 the e\|>< -he Chinch in a 
 
 of broil- and persecutions >\ ho can 
 appreciate the injuries which have rcMih- 
 ed from their theories to th -c? of 
 
 Christ? And who. let u- a-k. ran esti- 
 mate the injury which may result to the 
 cause of Christ, from the inculcation of 
 a theory like that we have been consider- 
 \Vho can estimate the injury to the 
 Church which may arise from teaching, 
 as a part of revealed theology, a mere 
 fiction of the imagination ? Jesus Christ 
 
248 
 
 reprobated the Jewish teachers for incul- 
 cating the traditions of the elders. We 
 reproach the Roman Catholic for incul- 
 cating the "doctrine of devils," of purga- 
 tory, arid transubstantiation. We are 
 shocked at the impiety of Swedenborg, in 
 publishing his dreams, as the visions of 
 inspiration. May it not be equally inju- 
 rious to the Church, to exhibit the Gospel 
 as teaching a religion of paradoxes and 
 contradictions, and subverting all the 
 foundations of belief, by devesting the 
 dictates of consciousness, of common 
 sense, and reason, of their authority ? 
 May not more than an ordinary injury 
 arise from teaching a system of religion, 
 professedly derived from the Scriptures, 
 which represents men to be mere ma- 
 chines, and God as pretending to exer- 
 cise over them, as machines, a moral go- 
 vernment; as infinitely loving some of 
 their actions, which He creates, and infi- 
 nitely haling others; as giving His Son, 
 in the exercise of boundless grace, to re- 
 deem them from that guilt which He cre- 
 ated in them, and His Spirit to transform 
 them from that character in which He 
 created them ; and as assigning to some, 
 on account of their characters, the re- 
 
249 
 
 ward of eternal life, and to others the re- 
 tribution of eternal death; a scheme 
 which exhibits God as the only agent in 
 the universe, and the author of all the ho- 
 liness and sin \vhich are predicated of 
 creatures ? May it not involve more than 
 a common injury to the cause of Christ 
 to teach, as a part of the Gospel, n 
 scheme which thus jp.-tilies the guilt of 
 men, and encourages their depravity? 
 And may it not inllict on it more than 
 a rdight injury too, to induce other 
 embrace and inculcate such a scheme. 
 and to involve the children of God. 
 this theory may, in error darken their 
 views of God perpU \ their hope-, and 
 obstruct them with thr temptations of 
 doubt, disputation, and -triie : 
 
 If the Mim-ter.- of the ( io-pcl 
 sponsible for the e\ il conse<|iiehci B to ihc 
 cause of Christ, which result from their 
 dereliction of dul\ ma\ it not become 
 the Doctor to t, whether weighty 
 
 responsibilities may not be devolved on 
 him by the publication of this theory? 
 Let us not be understood as impeaching 
 his motives. We have neither reason 
 nor inclination to do that. We only wish 
 his caution had equalled his zeal; and 
 that we had as satisfactory evidence of his 
 
250 
 
 wisdom, as we have of his conscientious- 
 ness. In attempting to explore this sub- 
 ject, he has ventured beyond the legiti- 
 mate bounds of human investigation. 
 Without the light of Revelation, it is in- 
 scrutable to us ; and God, by not granting 
 us any revelation respecting it, has suffi- 
 ciently indicated that he neither requires 
 nor wishes us to attempt its comprehen- 
 sion. " We cannot by searching find out 
 God. We cannot find out the Almighty 
 unto perfection." " His ways are not as 
 our ways, nor his thoughts as ourthoughts; 
 for as the heavens are higher than the 
 earth, so are his ways higher than our 
 ways, and his thoughts than our thoughts." 
 
 Should the Doctor deem our remarks 
 worthy of a public notice, we hope, that 
 from regard to his reputation, and a de- 
 sire to give the victory to truth, he will 
 present us with something possessing 
 more of sound argumentation than that 
 which we hove been called to consider. 
 We assure him we hold a mere assertion 
 "a vain thing for safety;" that a petitio 
 principii will never convince us; and 
 that the < 4 illusions of sophistry will, in our 
 eye, only render a desperate cause more 
 desperate. If he will vindicate his theo* 
 
251 
 
 ry, he shall receive our loudest applause. 
 If he will show, that we have committed 
 any essential error in the statement of his 
 theory, or that the arguments, by which 
 we have oppose*! it, are u sophistical/ 7 
 merely " plausible and delusive." he shall 
 receive our unfeigned thank-. We have 
 endeavoured on all occasions to discrimi- 
 nate between those consequences which 
 he deduces from the theory, and tl 
 which \s e believe legitimately follow from 
 it; and we doubt not that lie. \\ere, he 
 convinced that these consequence's are 
 fairly deduced, would reject it with as 
 much abhorrence as we do. 
 
 We have not been prompted to this 
 work by -the apprehension, that his theory 
 likely, unless formally refilled, to en- 
 joy a very wide or permanent currency. 
 \\ e have e\er regarded it as destined to 
 only a brief existence. It rests on too 
 slight a foundation, and is fraught with 
 too gross absurdity, and too deleterious a 
 tendency, to triumph long over the s< 
 and piety of the Church. We have ima- 
 gined we long since beheld symptoms of 
 its decline*; in the desertion of some, who 
 were once its warm advocates, and the 
 fluctuation of others 
 
 If by these pages we shall call to it the 
 
252 
 
 attention of those, who are the guardians 
 of the public faith, and arouse their exer- 
 tions to suppress it; if we shall reveal its 
 character to some, who had not detected 
 its erroneousness, nor suspected its inju- 
 rious influence ; if we shall convince 
 some, who have embraced it, that they 
 have departed from " the faith once de- 
 livered to the saints ;" and shall thereby 
 contribute to its earlier extinction ; espe- 
 cially should we be so happy as to per- 
 suade the Doctor himself, that in his 
 views of human dependence, he has mis- 
 taken the suggestions of fancy for the dic- 
 tates of reason, and thence been betrayed 
 into erroneous views of the language of 
 Revelation, and incorrect argumentation 
 from it; we shall regard ourselves as hav- 
 ing performed a work not unuseful to the 
 Church, nor unfriendly to him. We con- 
 fess ourselves to have been often both 
 much instructed and delighted with many 
 portions of his discourses, and deem them 
 worthy a frequent perusal ; and persuade 
 ourselves we cannot make him a more 
 benevolent return, than to assist him to 
 abandon what is incorrect, and expunge 
 what is injurious. 
 
A 
 
 REFUTATION 
 
 ENTERTAINED BT 
 
 ADVOCATES OF DR. KMMONS'S THEORY 
 
 RESPECTING 
 
 or THE 
 
 MORAL KVIL KXI-TlN'i IN III! ^E, 
 
 TO A 
 
 DISPLAY OF THE DIVINE GJ.ORY. 
 
 22 
 
REFUTATION, &c. 
 
 M ANV. and perhaps all the advocates of 
 the theory which has passed under oili- 
 ng iew. hold, a- an obvious iniei -ence from 
 the view- il rxhibii- of the agency of (iod 
 
 in gi to -MI. tint tht* moral 
 
 evil whieh exists i:i the U i- ne- 
 
 ir\ to the ylory oi' God by a natural 
 necessity. 
 
 We are taught by the voice both of 
 
 on and revelation, that Ili> own ijory 
 
 is the end pursued hy il"' Most Hi-h in 
 
 all lli-\vork<; and His attrib 1 i-iite 
 
 ^ent 
 
 to us ,i peri i:ity that He p'.:; all 
 
 His n^eiiev -i r ;,.,] i,, a | )(M 
 
 manner to secure tl. u end. His know- 
 ledge being perfect. He discerns; His 
 goodness beinjr boundless, he must 
 choose ; and His power oeiiM- unlimited, 
 He is able to eveute that scheme of 
 agency which shall give existence to a 
 perfect system of materials, consisting of 
 inanimate objects, animals, intelligent be- 
 ings, and events, for the promotion of His 
 
256 
 
 glory. The whole scheme of His agency 
 in calling into existence and controlling 
 His works; and the whole series of events, 
 natural and moral, of which, under His 
 providential and moral government His 
 works are the subjects, constitute a sys- 
 tem of materials perfectly adapted to 
 glorify Him ; and the result is as large a 
 sum of glory as could arise from any sys- 
 tem of agency Hf could pursue. 
 
 From these premises, and from the pe- 
 culiar views exhibited by Doctor Em- 
 mons's theory of the mode of God's agen- 
 cy on mankind, the inference is drawn by 
 advocates of that theory, that the moral 
 evil existing in the universe is necessary 
 to the glory of God, by a natural necessi- 
 ty; that in a system of materials perfect- 
 ly adapted to glorify God, moral evil must 
 be a constituent, and to precisely the 
 extent to which it actually exists, and 
 shall exist in the universe; that from its 
 nature it is the best material to occupy 
 such a portion of the system; and that 
 neither moral good, nor any thing else, 
 could be stfbstituted in its place, without 
 deteriorating the system, and preventing 
 a perfect display of the divine glory. 
 
 To sustain this position, they advance 
 an argument like the following : 
 
257 
 
 The Most High has chosen a plan of 
 procedure which will glorify Him in a 
 perfect manner. But He has chosen a 
 plan which involves the existence of such 
 a sum of moral evil. He must therefore 
 have chosen that plan, because such a 
 sum of moral evil is necessarily a con- 
 stituent in a system of means to glorify 
 Him in a perfect manner. And since 
 God creates all the actions holy and sin- 
 ful of mankind, that sum of moral evil 
 must be nece.-sury by a natural nere<>ity 
 or a necessity arising from its nature, 
 arid not merely lv a moral necessity. For 
 if it were necessary only by a moral ne- 
 ri'-^ity, that is, if its necessity did not 
 arise from its nature, and it were, in that 
 ect, no better adapt* d to glorify 
 God than moral good, but its necessity 
 arose entirely from the di-pn-itinn of men 
 to exercise MM in-trad of holiness: then 
 AN hat reason could be assigned for God's 
 creating that disposition? It is He who 
 creates the disposition and constitutes 
 the moral necessity. We must look, 
 therefore, for the reason of His constitut- 
 ing that moral necessity, not in the moral 
 necessity itself, but in something antece- 
 dent to it; and that can be nothing else 
 than the nature of moral evil. If moral 
 22* 
 
258 
 
 evil is in its nature no better a material 
 than moral good for occupying that por- 
 tion of the system of means for promoting 
 His glory, no reason can be discerned 
 for His creating it as a part of the system, 
 instead of moral good. If moral evil had 
 not been a better means than moral good 
 to attain the end, then as moral evil is the 
 object of His hatred and moral good the 
 object of His love, He must have chosen 
 to employ moral good instead of evil. 
 But He has created moral evil instead 
 of good. He must have done it there- 
 fore, because from its nature it is a bet- 
 ter means than moral good to occupy such 
 a portion of the general system; because 
 it is an indispensable constituent in a per- 
 fect system : that is, because it is neces- 
 sary by a natural necessity. 
 
 And from these views of the necessity 
 of moral evil, as a means of displaying the 
 divine glory, some important conclusions 
 are drawn respecting the feelings with 
 which moral evil is to be contemplated. 
 Thus it is inferred, that as moral evil is a 
 good to the Most High, and not an evil, 
 a benefit to His kingdom and not an in- 
 jury; it is a subject of joy and not of re- 
 gret that it exists. It is argued that it is 
 supremely desirable, that a perfect dis- 
 play should be made of the divine glory; 
 
269 
 
 and a subject of the highest joy, that God 
 is display ing it by a system of means, 
 which is perfectly adapted to display it 
 in such a manner. And as moral evil 
 constitutes of necessity a part of that sys- 
 tem, it is a subject of joy that it exists. 
 Since God has chosen to create and em- 
 ploy it as a means of display inir Hi* i^lory, 
 we should rejoice that He rrratr- and 
 employs it for that purpose. A- we r-hould 
 rejoice in the exi-tence of the end, ue 
 should equally rejoiee in the cxi-tenee 
 of the means of attaining that end. All 
 mankind, therefore, contemplating moral 
 evil as an instrument of displaying the 
 divine glory, are bound noi I . but 
 
 to rejoice at it- exigence. Each indivi- 
 dual is bound to rejoice that he is him- 
 self the subject of that exact -urn of mo- 
 ral evil of which he is the subject: and 
 that he shall hereafter be the -ubject of 
 precisely that additional sum of it of \\hich 
 he shall be the subject; and is bound 
 also to rejoice, that all other sinful be- 
 ings are the subjects of precisely that 
 aiiioiint of moral evil of which they are 
 the subject 
 
 And since the existence of moral evil 
 is thus a subject of joy, evangelical re- 
 pentance or godly sorrow for sin cannot 
 consist, to any extent, in sorrow for the 
 
260 
 
 existence of sin. The godly sorrow of a 
 person for his sins cannot at all involve 
 any sorrow that he committed those sins ; 
 but is perfectly consistent with joy, that 
 they came into existence, and that he 
 committed them. 
 
 That these conclusions follow irresis- 
 tibly from the position, that moral evil is 
 necessary to the divine glory by a natu- 
 ral necessity, none can be at a loss to de- 
 cide; nor, it would seem to us, can any 
 who contemplate them with an unpreju- 
 diced eye, be at a loss to decide, that 
 they and the position from which they 
 are deduced, are essentially erroneous; 
 at variance with the dictates of reason ; 
 inconsistent with the actual views and 
 feelings of the children of God when ex- 
 ercising godly sorrow for sin: and licen- 
 tious in their tendency. 
 
 If such be in fact their nature, should 
 we succeed in an attempt to subvert that 
 position, and intercept these conclusions 
 from it, we shall perform a task, we trust, 
 not unwelcome to such who have adopt- 
 ed these sentiments; arid should we be 
 successful in endeavouring to collect 
 additional light on a subject hitherto less 
 perfectly understood than many other 
 parts of theology, the task, we hope, will 
 
261 
 
 not be uninteresting nor unprofitable to 
 the Church. And sueh will be the result 
 of our attempt, if we are able to establish 
 the following proposition : 
 
 Did mankind, in the circumstances in which 
 they arc placed, yield a perfect obedience to the 
 divine government, their obedience would con- 
 stitute as good materials as their disobedience 
 docs for a perfect di*i>laij of tht divine glory ; 
 and the same sum of glory would result in the 
 Most Hi^/i from tin fy whith 
 
 would then exist, as /v to Him from 
 
 the system of ( rails which now r.rists. 
 
 The proposition is restricted to man- 
 kind, for the convenience of confining our 
 reasonings to them. It' it br established 
 in regard to them, it is equally applicable 
 to all other sinful beings. 
 
 It is proper to remark, in order that 
 the proposition may not be misappre- 
 hended, that we do not mean by it, that 
 any obedience whatever from mankind 
 would constitute as good materials for 
 displaying the divine glory, as their pre- 
 sent disobedience does; but we mean a 
 perfect obedience, yielded in precisely 
 the circumstances in which they stand in 
 yielding their disobedience. An obe- 
 dience rendered in other circumstances, 
 as in circumstances of much less tempta- 
 
262 
 
 tion, or of entire exemption from tempta- 
 tion, would be of much less value, than 
 an obedience in those circumstances in 
 which they are now placed. In order to 
 be of the value required by the proposi- 
 tion, their obedience must be rendered 
 in the precise circumstances in which 
 mankind are now placed. 
 
 By yielding an obedience in the cir- 
 cumstances in which they are placed, is 
 meant, 
 
 First. Their yielding an obedience 
 with only that quantity of means or of in- 
 fluence, which is now employed by the 
 Most High to excite them to obedience : 
 that is, with precisely that quantity of 
 knowledge of the Divine Being, of His 
 will, of their obligations, and of the con- 
 sequences of their conduct; and with 
 precisely that quantity of means to en- 
 force on them that knowledge, and 
 prompt them to comply with their obli- 
 gations, which is now employed to ex- 
 cite them to obedience. Were they in 
 this respect placed in circumstances dif- 
 ferent from those in which they are now 
 placed, namely, circumstances in which a 
 h more powerful influence should be 
 ; oyM to excite tbern to obedience; as 
 their circumstances would be essentially 
 
263 
 
 changed, the value of their obedience 
 would be changed also, arid the proposi- 
 tion would then be inapplicable to them. 
 
 Secondly. By their yielding obedience 
 in the circumstances in which they are 
 placed, is also meant, their yielding obe- 
 dience while subjected to preci-ely that 
 amount of difficulties, or of inil'ience ope- 
 rating to deter them from obedience, to 
 which they are now subjected ; namely, 
 that precise (jiiantity of temptation or 
 citement to sin, arising from ignorance, 
 ion, the examples and pe;- is of 
 
 men, the adver-arv. and oilier . to 
 
 which they are now subjected. \\ ere 
 they, in this respect, placed in circum- 
 -tanees of less difficulty than those in 
 which they are now placed, that i-, in 
 which they \\onld I,*' -uhjrcied to a much 
 (piantily of excitriiH'F.T to sin : their 
 obedience would be of much le-s value, 
 than an obedience* in the circumstai 
 in which they are now placed; and the 
 proposition would then be inapplicable 
 to them. 
 
 Their circumstances, therefore, include 
 every tiling which has any iniluence on 
 their conduct, whether it be an excite- 
 ment to obedience, or a temptation to 
 disobedience; and yielding obedience in 
 
264 
 
 the circumstances in which they are 
 placed, would be yielding obedience 
 while subjected to all the influences of 
 every kind to which they are now sub- 
 jected. 
 
 The proposition respects all mankind. 
 It respects Adam when he committed the 
 first and all his other transgressions ; and 
 it respects all his posterity, whether Jews, 
 Heathens, or Christians, at the time of 
 committing all their transgressions. 
 
 In support of the proposition, we allege, 
 in the first place, 
 
 The nature of the divine law. 
 
 The divine law requires from mankind 
 a course of conduct adapted to glorify the 
 Most High in a perfect manner. This is 
 seen, first, from the Character of the Most 
 High. He possesses infinite perfection ; 
 and He not only has the attributes, which 
 constitute infinite perfection, but they are 
 of course exercised and displayed in all 
 His works. All His works are consistent 
 with, and expressive of His character. 
 Now from His infinite perfection it is ap- 
 parent, that His law requires a service 
 adapted to glorify Him in a perfect man- 
 ner; for it would be inconsistent with 
 that perfection to impose on mankind a 
 
265 
 
 law requiring a service, that was not 
 adapted to glorify Him in a perfect man- 
 ner. A law, requiring a service that is 
 not adapted to glorify Him in a perfect 
 manner, requires a service that is adapted 
 to dishonour Him to that extent to which 
 it fails of glorifying Him perfectly. And it 
 surely is not consistent with the perfec- 
 tion of God to impose a law, requiring a 
 service that will dishonour him. No law 
 can be worthy of Him, which does not 
 require a service perfectly glorious to 
 Him. To impose a law, requiring a ser- 
 vice which dishonours Him, must arise 
 from a want either of disposition, or capa- 
 city to impose a law, requiring a service 
 that should he perfectly glorious to Him. 
 Hut the want of a <li-pn ition to impo 
 law, demanding a service that should glo- 
 rify Him perfectly, would he inconsistent 
 with His infinite wisdom, which would 
 lead Him to impose a law requiring a 
 service adapted to glorify Him in a per- 
 fect manner; and the want of capacity 
 to impose such a law, would be inconsist- 
 ent with His infinite understanding If 
 the nature of mankind is such, that a law 
 might be devised demanding a service 
 adapted to glorify Him in a perfect man- 
 ner, then not to be able to devise suchalaw 
 23 
 
266 
 
 must arise from a want of understanding, 
 If the nature of mankind is such, that in- 
 finite understanding cannot devise such a 
 law, then God must have created them 
 with such a nature, either from a w r ant of 
 capacity or disposition to create them 
 with a nature such, that a law might be 
 imposed requiring a service which would 
 be adapted to glorify Him in a perfect 
 manner. If His creating them with such 
 anature,thatnosuchlaw could be devised, 
 arose from a want of capacity, it must be 
 a want of understanding to contrive, or of 
 power to create a nature, by which it 
 would be possible to impose on them 
 such a law. To be unable to contrive 
 such a nature would be inconsistent with 
 His infinite understanding; to be unable to 
 create it, would be inconsistent with His 
 infinite power. If His creating them with 
 such a nature, that no such law can be 
 devised by an infinite understanding, 
 arose from a want of a disposition to cre- 
 ate thorn with such a nature, the want of 
 vhat disposition is inconsistent with His 
 infinite wisdom; for it surely is inconsist- 
 ent with infinite wisdom to create an or- 
 der of beings whose nature would be 
 such, that if they were disposed to glorify 
 Him perfectly, they could not from such, 
 
267 
 
 a disposition pursue a course of conduct 
 which should glorify Him perfectly. 
 
 Since then it would be thus inconsistent 
 with the divine perfections to impose on 
 mankind a law, requiring from them a 
 
 ice which would not glorify the V 
 High in a perfect manner, it is manifest 
 from His perfections, th:it the sen ire re- 
 quired by the law. which lie ha*- imposed 
 on them, is adapted to glorify Him in a 
 perfect manner. 
 
 Secondly. This i- apparent al-o from 
 the consideration that the divine law re- 
 quires of mankind all the service \\hich 
 C<od can of ri^ht require of them. For it 
 requires them to lu\e Him with all their 
 heart, and soul, and -tren^th. and mind. 
 It requires them to >iel<l Him the m 
 intense love which their facilities enable 
 them to exerci-e, and to yield it at all 
 times, and it in all their : ft 
 
 And it requires them, \\hether they eat 
 or drink, or whatever thej do, to do all 
 to I!:- ^lory. It thci. la of 
 
 them all the service which < !i of 
 
 rij^ht demand el' them: for He cannot, 
 :itly with rectitude, demand oi 
 them a servi ' than their iiicul- 
 
 lies enable them to \iel-l. 
 
 Now, from the fact that the divine law 
 
268 
 
 thus requires of mankind all the service 
 which God can of right demand of them, 
 it is apparent that the service it requires 
 of them, is adapted to glorify Him in a 
 perfect manner. For God surely has a 
 right to require of them a service that is 
 perfectly glorious to himself. If not, then 
 He has no right to require of them a ser- 
 vice which is not dishonourable to Him- 
 self; for a service that is not perfectly 
 glorious to Him, as far as it fails of being 
 perfectly glorious, is dishonourable to 
 Him. But God surely is not destitute of 
 a right of requiring of them a service 
 which is not dishonourable to Himself; for 
 it is inconsistent with His perfections to 
 create an order of beings, of whom He 
 shall not have the right of requiring a 
 service that is not dishonourable to Him- 
 self. 
 
 And moreover, if God has no right to 
 require of mankind any service but what 
 is dishonourable to Himself, then mankind 
 have the right or privilege of pursuing, 
 with perfect innocence, a course of con- 
 duct which is dishonourable to Him. But 
 mankind - *"Hy cannot, with innocence, 
 pursue any such course of conduct, for 
 they are bound to do whatever they do 
 to His glory. 
 
269 
 
 Since, then, God has the right of de- 
 manding of mankind a service which is 
 perfectly glorious to Himself; and since, 
 by His law, He has demanded all the ser- 
 vice which He can of right require, it is 
 manifest that the service required by His 
 law, is adapted to glorify Him in a per- 
 fect manner. 
 
 Tkirtllif. It is apparent, likewise, fn>m 
 
 the consideration that the divine l:iw re- 
 quires mankind to be actuated, in all their 
 conduct, bv perfect benevolence towards 
 Cod. They are commanded to love Him 
 with all their heart, and soul, and strength, 
 and mind, and to do whatever they do to 
 His olorv. That i-. ihev are required to 
 exercise towards Him, at all limes, the 
 most inlen-e bene\olmce \\bich their iii- 
 
 calties will enable them to exercise; to 
 
 e all the value on His infinite inter- 
 . and cherish all the respect for His 
 rights, and all the delight in His well-be- 
 ing, and to make all the eJlorts to pro- 
 mote His glory of which they are ca- 
 pable. 
 
 Now, from the fact that the divine Liw 
 thus requires mankind, at all times, to ex- 
 ercise perfect benevolence towards God, 
 and to pursue a course of conduct which 
 shall be a proper expression of that be- 
 
270 
 
 I 
 
 nevolence, it is obvious that the service it 
 requires is adapted to glorify God in a 
 perfect manner. For to be actuated to- 
 wards God by perfect benevolence, is as- 
 suredly adapted to glorify Him in a per- 
 fect manner. To place all the value on 
 His interests, and cherish and express all 
 the regard for His rights, and all the de- 
 light in His well-being, and to make all 
 the efforts to promote His glory which are 
 possible, is to conduct towards Him ac- 
 cording to His character, and to regard 
 Him as He ought to be regarded ; and 
 that must certainly be perfectly glorious 
 to Him. Perfect benevolence towards 
 Him can never do any thing which is not 
 perfectly glorious to Him. Nothing but 
 malevolence can violate His rights and 
 dishonour Him. Perfect benevolence to- 
 wards Him will pursue a course of con- 
 duct which is perfectly benevolent to- 
 wards Him ; but nothing can be perfectly 
 benevolent towards Him, which is not 
 perfectly glorious to Him. Perfect be- 
 nevolence, therefore, will pursue a course 
 of conduct which is perfectly glorious to 
 Him. 
 
 Since, then, the divine law requires 
 mankind to exercise perfect benevolence 
 towards Him, at all times, it is plain that 
 
271 
 
 the service it requires is adapted to glo- 
 rify Him in a perfect manner. 
 
 Fourthly. Is it not preposterous to sup- 
 pose, that the service demanded by the 
 divine law is not adapted to glorify the 
 Most High in a perfect manner? and to 
 suppose, that were mankind, in the cir- 
 cumstances in which they exist, to yield a 
 perfect obedience to His law, would not 
 be perfectly glorious to Him? That if 
 they yielded Him the highest tribute of 
 glory their endowments enabled them to 
 yield, it would not be a perfect tribute? 
 Is it not preposterous to suppose, that it 
 would be a real injury to the Most High 
 for them to do their duty? that it would 
 cast a veil over the lustre of His attri- 
 butes, and be prejudicial to the gent-mi 
 good? \Vr have never imagined, thai 
 holiness has or can do any misc hirt in the 
 divine kingdom; but on the contrary, 
 have regarded it as a perfect good ; per- 
 fect, considered abstractly from its influ- 
 ence; and perfect in its influence on the 
 interests of the universe. We have always 
 conceived, that all the natural ev il which 
 exists, or can exist, must have its origin 
 from sin. Can it be, that were all man- 
 kind to yield a perfect obedience to the 
 divine law, it would rend away the robef 
 
272 
 
 of glory which invest the Holy One of Is- 
 rael, and quench the effulgence of His 
 throne ? 
 
 Fifthly. We add once more, that these 
 views of the divine law are correct, is ob- 
 vious from the fact, that that law consults 
 the interests of mankind in a perfect man- 
 ner. It is perfectly glorious to them. It 
 secures their well-being in a perfect man- 
 ner. The service it requires is such, that 
 if yielded, it will exalt them to absolute 
 perfection of character and absolute hap- 
 piness. In rendering an entire obedience, 
 they will ascend to a state of the highest 
 glory and blessedness of which their na- 
 ture is capable. 
 
 Now. from the fact that the divine law, 
 if obeyed, is thus glorious to them, arid 
 consults their honour and happiness in a 
 perfect manner, it is manifest, that the 
 service it requires is adapted to be per- 
 fectly glorious to the Most High; that it 
 secures His glory and blessedness in a 
 perfect manner. For if not, if while 
 that law makes a perfect provision for the 
 good of mankind, it does not make a per- 
 fect provision for His good; then, in im- 
 posing it, He has consulted the good of 
 mankind more than He has His own good. 
 He has placed a higher value on their in- 
 
273 
 
 terests than on His own ; He has made a 
 better provision for their honour and hap- 
 piness than lor His. But it cannot he 
 that the Most High, in imposing that law, 
 exalted the finite interests of mankind 
 above His infinite interests, and consulted 
 their honour and happiness more thai- I! is 
 own. It is inconsistent with His im 
 perfections to act as though He were not 
 an infinite Being, by placing a higher va- 
 lue on them than on Himself! It is incon- 
 sistent with His making Hi lory the 
 great end of all His \\orks. to consu^, in 
 any instance, the good of His creatures 
 more than His own glory. 
 
 From these several considerations then, 
 it is apparent, that the law of God requires 
 of mankind a service adapted to glorify 
 Him in a perfect manner. And from that 
 fact it is manifest, that if mankind yielded 
 a perfect obedience to that law, that obe- 
 dience would glorify Him in a perfect 
 manner. Therefore it is manifest, that if 
 mankind yielded a perfect obedience to 
 that law, their obedience would be as 
 good materials as their disobedience is, 
 for a perfect display of His glory; and 
 that the same sum of glory would result 
 to Him from the system of events which 
 would then exist, as redounds to Him from 
 
274 
 
 the system of events which now exists. 
 For their disobedience neither is nor can 
 be good materials for any thing more than 
 a perfect display of His glory; and their 
 obedience would be good materials for 
 that. And the sum of glory which results 
 to the Most High, from the system of 
 events now existing, is only a perfect sum; 
 and the sum which would redound to Him 
 from the system of events which would 
 exist, if they yielded that obedience, 
 would also be a perfect sum. 
 
 H 
 
 In the Second place 
 
 The Proposition is seen to be true, 
 from the fact that God desires all man- 
 kind, in the circumstances in which 
 they exist, to yield a perfect obedi> ce 
 to His law. He really and perfectly 
 desires all mankind, in the circumstan- 
 ces in which they arc placed, to yicIil 
 Him a perfect obedience. He as really 
 desires them all to yield Him, in the cir- 
 cumstances in which they exist, a perfect 
 obedience in all those instances in which 
 they disobey Him, as He does His chil- 
 dren, in the circumstances in which they 
 exist, to yield Him such an obedience in 
 all those cases in which they do yield it. 
 
 This is seen from the fact, that He has 
 most clearly and strongly expressed such 
 
275 
 
 a desire. Thus He has expressed that 
 desire, by requiring them to yield Him a 
 perfect obedience. His law is not a mere 
 statement to them of what their duty is; 
 but it is an authoritative requisition. He 
 commands mankind to yield a perfect obe- 
 dience to His law. But why does He so- 
 lemnly require them to obey, if He has no 
 desire that they should obey ? Why a-k 
 that which 1 le does not wish to receive ? 
 
 He ha- expressed that de-ire, by em- 
 ploying a vast system of inr.ans to induct: 
 them to render a perfect obedience. Why 
 does ll<' enforce the requisition of Hi< 
 law by infinite sanctions, if He has no de- 
 sire that all should yield such an obcdi- 
 6? Why docs He ur^e them by the 
 1110*4 p. e\po-tula- 
 
 tions, and entn Hi- word? Why 
 
 iccession of messengers to per- 
 suade them? Why adapt the di-p< 
 
 tionsofllis providence to that end? Why 
 send down His Holy Spirit to strive with 
 them, by an influence adapted to excite 
 them to obedience ? Would 1 le add 
 to them, as moral a the mighty in- 
 
 fluence of i\}\< .-y^tem of mean-, if 1 1 } n<! 
 no desire that they should yield to their 
 influence, and obey His will; but on the 
 contrary, desired that they should no( 
 render him a perfect obedience? 
 
276 
 
 He has expressed that desire in expli- 
 cit declarations. "As I live, saith the 
 Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death 
 of the wicked, but that the wicked turn 
 and live." If God has wo pleasure in the 
 death of the wicked, He cannot have any 
 pleasure in their sinning, which is the 
 cause of their death. For He cannot de- 
 sire their sinning for any other reason, 
 than that it may furnish an occasion for 
 that display of His attributes which is 
 made in their death. But if His pleasure 
 is, that they turn and live, then He desires 
 them to yield Him a perfect obedience. 
 And if His desire respecting all the wick- 
 ed is, that they turn and live, then He 
 does not desire any of them to continue 
 to sin, that He may make that display of 
 His attributes which would be involved in 
 His turning them, that they may live. 
 Why did Christ, weeping over Jerusalem, 
 utter so pathetic a lamentation, if He had 
 no desire that its inhabitants should yield 
 a perfect obedience to the divine law? 
 " If thou hadst known, even thou, at least 
 in this thy day, the things which belong 
 unto thy peace ! but now they are hid from 
 thine eyes." And why did the Most High 
 express a similar lamentation over the re- 
 bellious antedeluvians and the Israelites ? 
 
277 
 
 And why did the Holy Spirit declare by 
 Paul, u that God will have all men to be 
 saved, and to come unto the knowledge 
 of the truth?" 
 
 In regard to those measures of His ad- 
 ministration, God has certainly acted pre- 
 cisely as though He had the most earnest 
 desire that all mankind should yield Him 
 a perfect obedience: and has therefore 
 virtually dcrlarfd by tho-e measures, that 
 i is Hi> de-ire; and the passages of 
 Scripture <|uoted and referred to. an 
 plicit declarations to that effect. 
 
 God has then, in the imM clear and 
 strong manner, exp desire that all 
 
 mankind should yield Him a perfect obe- 
 dience. 
 
 Now. from hi- ha\ ;hat de- 
 
 sire, it is manifest that He really j 
 it. For if He does not reallx and per- 
 fectly desire them to>ield Him -uch an 
 obedience, He cannot be sincere in r.r- 
 j)rcssin*r such a desire. But God cannot 
 be insincere in making that expression of 
 a desire, that they should yield Him such 
 an obedience. Need we adduce reasons 
 proving it ? 
 
 /-V/'.sY. That such insincerity i- not con 
 sistent with ill- infinite pcrfeciions. It is 
 inconsistent with His veracity to declare, 
 21 
 
278 
 
 that He really and perfectly desires a 
 thing to exist, when he does not desire it 
 to exist, l>ut really and perfectly desires 
 that it should not exist. But in command- 
 ing mankind to yield Him such an obedi- 
 ence, in employing such a system of 
 means to excite them to yield it, and in 
 expressing such a displeasure with them 
 for not yielding it, He has acted certainly 
 as though He really and perfectly desir- 
 ed them to render such an obedience; 
 and has therefore virtually declared, that 
 He does really desire them to render it; 
 and He has also made the same declara- 
 tion in explicit language. In making such 
 a declaration, therefore, if He does not 
 really desire it, He has made a declara- 
 tion which does not mean what it says. 
 
 And by those measures of His adminis- 
 tration and declarations in his word, he 
 has led mankind to regard Him as declar- 
 ing, that He really desired them to yield 
 Him a perfect obedience. When He im- 
 posed His law on our first parents, they 
 undoubtedly interpreted Him as declar- 
 ing, that He had such a desire. So did 
 the Israelites at Mount Sinai ; for they 
 entered into a solemn covenant with Him, 
 promising to do all which Fie command- 
 ed them. And such unquestionably have 
 
279 
 
 been the views of all in every age who 
 have received the ;. s of Prophets, 
 
 of the Messiah, and of Apostles, as mes- 
 sages from God. And such are the views 
 of all who now receive the sacred vo- 
 lume as a revelation of the divine will. 
 How could the children of God yield 
 obedience to ilis law in am in-l 
 whatever, if they did not lee I the must 
 ab-oliite assurance ilia lie realiy and 
 perf'ctlv dSin a to \ield Him a 
 
 ? I low could they sor- 
 row with a irodly sorrow, thai the\ 
 not render Mich an obedience? How- 
 could they employ means to induct* all 
 mankind to render Him such an - 
 dience? How could the\ expresti io Him 
 in prayer the desire that all mankind 
 should, if they did not feel the ^am< 
 surance. that He desirefi them all in yield 
 Him a perfect obedi They act 
 
 most inconsistently in the-e respects, it 
 thev do not feel the most absolute assur- 
 ance, that God really desires all man- 
 kind to yield Him a perfect obedience. 
 Hut that they are led by the < 
 His admini i and declarations of 
 
 His word to feel such an assurance, there 
 can be no doubt: nor can there be any, 
 but that assurance is perfectly authoriz- 
 
280 
 
 ed by those measures and declarations. 
 For if it is natural and rational to inter- 
 pret Him as declaring by those measures 
 of His administration and declarations of 
 His word, that He has such a desire, then 
 those measures and declarations in fact 
 devolve on mankind an obligation to re- 
 gard Him as possessing that desire; for 
 mankind are under obligation to re- 
 gard Him as possessing the desire in re- 
 gard to them, which he really expresses 
 in His conduct. 
 
 As then God has devolved on them an 
 obligation to regard Him as really desir- 
 ing that all mankind should yield Him a 
 (>( iicct obedience; if He does not de- 
 sire it, He has totally deceived them: He 
 has devolved on them an obligation to be- 
 lieve what is not true, and to entertain 
 views of Him which are entirely errone- 
 ous. But that is inconsistent with His 
 veracity and all His other moral perfec- 
 tions. 
 
 And moreover in these measures of His 
 administration, He has acted in respect 
 to a perfect obedience from all mankind, 
 as though He placed on it all the value 
 which He would if He really desired 
 them to yield Him such an obedience ; 
 and therefore has virtually declared by 
 
281 
 
 those measures that He does place on it 
 all the value which He would if He per- 
 fectly desired it. And He has made the 
 same declaration in those passages refer- 
 red to of His word. If then He does not 
 really desire it, He has declared that He 
 places on it a value ahove that, which 
 lie really does place on it: and has, 
 therefore, made a declaration which is 
 not true. 
 
 Secondly. It is apparent that God is per- 
 fectly sincere in rxproHn^ that de>ire. 
 that mankind should render a perfect 
 obedience to His law, fiom the fart that 
 He requires them to >ield Him such an 
 obedience, for precisely the reason for 
 which He would de-ire and require them 
 to yield it it' He had such a desire. 
 
 Thus the reason which he a>si{ri< for 
 requiring them to render Him a perfect 
 obedience is, that He is (iod, their crea- 
 tor, preserver, and benefactor, and has 
 thence the right of establishing over them 
 a government; and that His government 
 i.- holy, just, and good ; the service u tiich 
 it requires being a service of which He 
 is supremelv worthy, and which they are 
 able and under obligation to yield. 
 
 And the fact, that the service He re- 
 quires is precisely the service which He 
 24* 
 
282 
 
 is worthy to receive; and precisely that 
 which they are bound to render; is the 
 reason precisely which, if He really de- 
 sired them to render that service, would 
 constitute the proper ground of His de- 
 siring it, and the proper ground to be as- 
 signed for His requiring it. And from the 
 fact that the reason He assigns for re- 
 quiring it is the reason for which, if He 
 really desired them to yield that obe- 
 dience, He would desire it, and the rea- 
 son which He would assign for requring 
 it, it is apparent that He does really 
 and perfectly desire them to yield that 
 obedience. For if He does not really de- 
 sire that obedience, why does He act as 
 though He desired it by assigning that 
 reason for requiring it? And why does 
 He thereby entirely deceive mankind in 
 regard to His desire? It is entirely na- 
 tural and rational for them to infer from 
 His assigning that reason, that He really 
 desires their obedience; and the obliga- 
 tion therefore rests on them to regard 
 Him as really desiring it. If then He 
 does not desire it, He has devolved on 
 them an obligation to believe what is not 
 true, and to entertain an erroneous view 
 respecting Him. But He surely cannot 
 have imposed on them such an obligation. 
 
283 
 
 Thirdly. We are bound to draw the 
 conclusion, that He is perfectly sincere 
 in expressing that desire, from the mode 
 in which He has expressed it. For the 
 mode in which He has expressed it hears 
 every mark of perfect sincerity, and is 
 eminently adapted to make on mankind a 
 deep impression that He is perfectly bin- 
 cere. 
 
 Thus He has expressed the desire in 
 the most clntr manner. His law is not a 
 simple declaration that the course which 
 it delineate- is the course which it 
 would he well for mankind, as rational 
 beings, to pursue, without any command* 
 that they should pursue it, and leaving 
 them in uncertainty whether or not it is 
 lli> will that they should pursue it : hut it 
 i> an authoritative requisition, an e\f 
 demand of them of the -ervice it pre- 
 scribes; and no one ever h< -ilaled at all 
 whether it is an expression of His will; 
 or only mere advice, or a mere statement 
 of what it would be well for them to do, 
 without any expression of His wilt in re- 
 gard to it. 
 
 He has expressed the desire in a man- 
 ner peculiarly solemn and impressive. Thus 
 He seems to have revealed Himself to 
 our first parents, and to some of the patri- 
 archs and prophets, in a visible form, and 
 
284 
 
 audibly addressed to them His law. And 
 on Mount Sinai He manifested himself to 
 the whole nation of Israel, by the most 
 awful displays of power and majesty, and 
 proclaimed to them His law by His own 
 almighty voice. He has inspired a mul- 
 titude of prophets and apostles to be the 
 messengers of His will. He sent down 
 His Son to announce the glad tidings of 
 the Gospel. He has wrought innumera- 
 ble miracles to convince mankind that 
 the prophets, that Christ, and the apos-* 
 ties, were His messengers, and to excite 
 attention and respect to their messa- rs. 
 He has committed all His requisitions to 
 writing, that they may be transmitted to 
 every generation, and known to every in- 
 dividual; and He has employed, in every 
 age, an order of men to teach and enforce 
 thorn, and consecrated one day in seven 
 to be at least partly employed in that 
 work. 
 
 He has also strongly expressed that de- 
 sire, by enforcing all His requisitions by 
 the most weighty motives, the rewards of 
 heaven and hell ; and employing a vari- 
 ety of powerful instruments to give influ- 
 ence to those motives, as the most allur- 
 ing invitations, the most cogent reason- 
 ings, expostulations, warnings, rebukes, 
 
285 
 
 and the smiles and frowns of His provi- 
 dence. 
 
 He has strongly expressed it by incur- 
 rinXi if the language may be used, a vast 
 f.t/Hnse in expressing it. How many mira- 
 cles has He wrought ! How many pro- 
 phets and apostles has He inspired ! How 
 many other messengers has He employ- 
 ed ! What an act was it to employ His 
 Son as a messenger of His truth and grace ! 
 How many other stupendous acts of con- 
 descension, power, wisdom, and grace, 
 has this work involved ! At what infi- 
 nite pains, in these various respects, has 
 He been to express the desire ! 
 
 He has expressed that desire very 
 strongly also, by {he frequency of His urg- 
 ing on mankind the requisitions of His 
 la\v. 
 
 Thus, in all respects, the mode in which 
 He has expressed the desire, that man- 
 kind should yield a perfect obedience to 
 His law, bears every mark of perfect sin- 
 cerity ; and is eminently adapted to make 
 on mankind the impression that He does, 
 with perfect sincerity, desire them to ren- 
 der Him such an obedience. 
 
 If He were perfectly desirous that they 
 should render Him that obedience, He 
 could not have displayed more earnest- 
 
286 
 
 ness in requiring and urging them to yield 
 it, than He actually has. As then He has, 
 in this respect, acted precisely as though 
 He was perfectly sincere, we are bound 
 to regard Him as perfectly sincere. In 
 these considerations then, we have so 
 many proofs that God is perfectly sin- 
 cere in expressing a desire, that all man- 
 kind should yield Him a perfect obedi- 
 ence. And if He has sincerely express- 
 ed such a desire, then He of course has 
 a real and perfect desire that they should 
 yield Him such an obedience. 
 
 Jlgain. It is obvious that God really 
 and perfectly desires all mankind to yield 
 Him a perfect obedience, from the fact, 
 that His law is an expression of His will 
 respecting their conduct. Our Lord, in 
 the form of prayer which He taught His 
 disciples, and in many other passages, 
 designates the divine Jaw as the will of 
 God. 
 
 Now if the divine law is an expression 
 of the will of God respecting the conduct 
 of mankind, then it is clear that He de- 
 sires them to yield it a perfect obedience; 
 for the will of a being is His choice. No 
 being can will a thing which he does not 
 choose ; and no being can choose a thing, 
 unless for some reason or other he desires 
 
287 
 
 it. If the law of God then expresses His 
 will respecting the conduct of mankind, it 
 expresses His choice, and therefore His 
 desire, in regard to their conduct. If in 
 that law He expresses a will, that all man- 
 kind should perform all the service which 
 it requires, then He expresses a desire 
 that they should perform all that service. 
 If it is His will that they should yield it a 
 perfect obedience, it i- His dosiie that 
 they should. Can we conceive of Hi^ 
 having a will that they should yield that 
 obedience, without having a desire that 
 they should ? 
 
 Let the reader revolve this argument. 
 He will find there is no method of escape 
 from its conclusion, irile it he cither by 
 denying that thr> law of Ciod i> 1 1\< /////, 
 (in which rase he will contradict the Son 
 of God,) or by <Ii*n\ing that what God 
 wills He desires, (in which case He will 
 contradict the plainest dictates of con- 
 sciousness and reason.) If a being de- 
 sires what He wills, then it is as really 
 and perfectly the desire as it is the will 
 of the Most High, that all mankind should 
 yield Him a perfect obedience. It is as 
 really and perfectly His desire, that all 
 mankind should yield Him a perfect obe- 
 dience in all those instances in which they 
 
288 
 
 disobey Him, as it is that His children 
 should yield Him a perfect obedience in 
 those instances in which they do yield 
 Him such an obedience. 
 
 We are aware, that the advocates of 
 the sentiment we are opposing will object 
 to the whole of this argumentation; that 
 we have disregarded in it a distinction 
 which they and many others make, and 
 hold as exceedingly important, between 
 God's desiring a thing, in itself consider- 
 ed, and desiring it, all things considered. 
 We have indeed disregarded that distinc- 
 tion, and for reasons which, we hope, will 
 induce our readers henceforth to disre- 
 gard and banish it for ever from their 
 reasonings on theological subjects. 
 
 First. It is a distinction without a dif- 
 ference. 'There is no difference between 
 a thing, in itself considered, and all things 
 considered. 
 
 A thing, in itself ronsidered, is the 
 whole of that thing. It is that thing con- 
 templated in respect to all which pertains 
 to it, and constitutes its nature. And a 
 thing, all things considered, is also the 
 whole of that thing. It is that thing con- 
 templated in all its relations to other 
 things; exerting all the influence it does 
 and will exert, and is capable of exerting, 
 
on all other tilings ; and receiving all the 
 influence of which it is and will be, and is 
 capable of being, the subject from all 
 other things. 
 
 Now \ve affirm, that there is no differ- 
 ence between contemplating a thing in 
 respect to all which pertains to it, and 
 constitutes its nature, and contemplating 
 it in respect to all its relations to all other 
 things, and in respect to all the influence 
 which it exerts, and is capable of exert- 
 ing, and of which it is and is capable of 
 l)ein<r the suhject. For it is its nature 
 which constitutes its relations to all other 
 tilings: and we cannot contemplate the 
 whole of its nature, without contemplat- 
 ing all its relations of which that nature 
 if! ihe ground, or contemplating its nature 
 as sustaining those relations ; nor can \ve 
 contemplate the whole of its relat: 
 without contemplating the whole of its 
 nature, which is the ground of those rela- 
 tions. We cannot contemplate the whole 
 of its nature, without contemplating the 
 whole of the influence which it exerts, and 
 is capable of exerting, by its nature ; and 
 the whole of the influence of which, in 
 consequence of its nature, it is and is ca- 
 pable of being the subject. Nor can we 
 contemplate the whole of the influence 
 
 
290 
 
 which it exerts, and is capable of exert- 
 ing, and of which it is and is capable of 
 being the subject, without contemplating 
 the whole of its nature by which it exerts, 
 and is capable of exerting, and is the sub- 
 ject, and is capable of being the subject, 
 of that influence. 
 
 Thus, in respect to the case in ques- 
 tion, there is no difference whatever be- 
 tween God's desiring all mankind to yield 
 Him a perfect obedience, in itself consi- 
 dered, and His desiring them to yield Him 
 such an obedience, all things consider- 
 ed. For in desiring it, in itself consider- 
 ed, He would desire it as being precisely 
 such a thing as it would be ; as having 
 precisely such a nature as it would have, 
 that is, as being precisely such a service 
 as He requires of them, and is worthy to 
 receive from them, and they are under 
 obligations to render to Him; and as ca- 
 pable of exerting precisely all the influ- 
 ence which it would be capable of exert- 
 ing; and of being employed to produce 
 all the effects which it might be employ- 
 ed to produce; and in desiring it, all 
 things considered, He would desire it in 
 precisely the same manner. For He 
 would then desire it as being precisely 
 such a thing as it would be ; as having 
 
291 
 
 precisely the nature which it would have ; 
 and as thence capable of being employed 
 to produce all the effects which it might 
 be employed to produce. We challenge 
 all the advocates of the supposed distinc- 
 tipn in question, to point out a shadow of 
 difference between God's desiring from 
 all mankind a perfect obedience, in itself 
 considered, and His desiring it, all tin 
 considered. 
 
 The advocates of this supposed distinc- 
 tion, without, it would seem, being auar< 
 of it, use the phrase " a thing in itself consi- 
 dered," to denote only a part of a thing, 
 or a thing considered in respect to only 
 a part of its nature ; and employ the other 
 phrase to denote the whole of a thing, or 
 a thing considered in respect to the whole 
 of its nature ; and have imposed on them- 
 selves in that way. This is appatrn; 
 from the whole of their reasonings and 
 illustrations respecting it. 
 
 They endeavour, for instance, to ill 
 trafe and prove the distinction in the fol- 
 lowing manner: A sick man learns that 
 a certain medicine will restore him to 
 health ; but, that being odious to the taste, 
 and painful in its operation, it will, in 
 curing him, subject him to a given quan- 
 tity of pain. Now, contemplating it. in 
 
292 
 
 itself considered, as odious to the taste, 
 and painful in its operation, he does not 
 desire it; but contemplating it, all things 
 considered, as being, besides the cause of 
 such a quantity of pain, a certain remedy 
 for his disease, he does desire it. 
 
 Now it is plain, in this case, that the 
 man, in contemplating the medicine sim- 
 ply as the cause of so much suffering, 
 contemplates only a part of its nature ; 
 namely, only that part, which is the cause 
 of that suffering; and it is not till he con- 
 templates it as the cause of health, as well 
 as of that suffering, that he contemplates 
 its whole nature. To desire a thing there- 
 fore, in itself considered, according to 
 their use of the language, is only to desire 
 a part of that thing, namely, that part of 
 it by which it produces part of the effects 
 which it produces; and to desire a thing, 
 all things considered, is to desire the 
 whole of that thing; that is, to desire it, 
 considering its whole nature, by which it 
 produces all its effects. And there is un- 
 doubtedly a vast difference between a 
 part of a thing and the whole of it, and 
 between desiring a part of a thing and 
 desiring the whole of it: but it is su- 
 premely preposterous to talk of God's de- 
 siring a thing, in itself considered; mean 
 
293 
 
 ing, by " itself considered," only apart of 
 that thing; since the thing, that is, the 
 whole of it, is very different from that part 
 of it which is denoted by "in itself consi- 
 dered;" and desiring only that part, is 
 not desiring the thing as a whole. If we 
 can say, He desires a thing, by desiring 
 only a given part of it, we may also say, 
 He desires that thing by not desiring the 
 other part of it; and if we can say either, 
 we may say. that any part of a thing is 
 the whole of that thing. 
 
 Since then there is no difference 
 between desiring a thing, in itself consi- 
 dered, and desiring it, all things consi- 
 dered, it is to the last degree contradic- 
 tory to hold, that (iod desires from all 
 mankind a perfect obedience, in itself 
 considered, but does not de-ire it, all 
 things con-idered; for desiring it, in it- 
 self considered, is desiring it, all things 
 considered. If God desires from all man- 
 kind a perfect obedience, in itself consi- 
 dered, He desires the whole of that obe- 
 dience. He desires it as precisely such 
 a thing as it is, as having precisely the 
 nature which it has, and as capable from 
 that nature of being employed to produce 
 all the effects which it is capable of being 
 employed to produce. And to hold, that 
 25* 
 
294 
 
 while he thus desires it, in itself consider- 
 ed, He does not desire it, all things con- 
 sidered, is to hold, that he does not desire 
 the whole of that obedience, and as having 
 precisely such a nature as it has, and as 
 capable from that nature of precisely that 
 of which it is capable ; that is, it is to de- 
 ny that he desires it, in itself considered. 
 If He desires from all mankind a perfect 
 obedience at all, He desires it as such a 
 thing as it is, taking into view all which 
 pertains to it, and constitutes its nature; 
 for it is being such a thing as it is, and hav- 
 ing its nature consist of precisely all that 
 of which it does consist, that constitutes 
 it a perfect obedience. 
 
 Secondly. Another reason for which 
 we disregarded that supposed distinction 
 is, that even if it were admitted, that it 
 exists in regard to other things, yet it is 
 demonstrable that it has no existence in 
 respect to the subject under considera- 
 tion. God not only desires from all man- 
 kind a perfect obedience, in itself consi- 
 dered, but He also desires it, all things 
 considered. This is apparent from the 
 fact, that He requires them to yield Him 
 that obedience, all tilings considered. 
 
 What things are to be considered in 
 requiring of all mankind a perfect obe- 
 dience, in order that that obedience may 
 
295 
 
 be required, nil things considered ? \Vhat ? 
 besides Jehovah, but mankind, their obe- 
 dience and disobedience, and the conse- 
 quences of their yielding and not yielding 
 a perfect obedience ? But God consider- 
 ed all these things in requiring of man- 
 kind a perfect obedience. He considered 
 himself perfectly. In requiring that obe- 
 dience. He contemplated himself as pre- 
 cisely such a bring as I i 
 the character which He ]><> r-ses, the 
 - in i < -peel to mankind and all other 
 beings, which He has; and the capacity 
 of employing the obedience and cli-obe- 
 dience of mankind to promote His glory, 
 which He has; and a^> having precisely 
 the end in view, in all Hi- v. which 
 
 He lias. He considered mankind also 
 perfectly. He contemplated them as ex- 
 actly such beings as 1 1 ; as having 
 just the capacity which they actually 
 possess ; sustaining toward Him and all 
 other beings all the relations they do sus- 
 tain; (Acting in exactly the circumstances 
 in which they do exist, and as under all 
 the obligations which actually rest on 
 them. 
 
 He likewise considered their obedience 
 and disobedience, and the consequences 
 of their obedience and disobedience per- 
 
296 
 
 fectly. He contemplated the precise na- 
 ture of their obedience and disobedience, 
 and all the effects which He could and 
 should employ them to produce. This 
 is seen from the fact, that He promised a 
 reward to obedience, which is an appro- 
 priate reward of it throughout eternity; 
 and threatened a punishment to disobe- 
 dience, which is an appropriate punish- 
 ment of it throughout eternity. And in 
 thus considering Himself, all mankind, 
 and the nature and the consequences of 
 their obedience and disobedience, He 
 considered all things. 
 
 That He must thus have considered all 
 things, is manifest from the consideration, 
 that it would have been inconsistent with 
 His infinite perfection to have imposed 
 on mankind a law, without considering 
 all things with which it had any con- 
 nexion; since without such a considera- 
 tion of all things, He could not have had 
 the assurance the law was a wise one. 
 Since then, all things considered, He re- 
 quired of all mankind a perfect obedience, 
 it is plain that, all things considered, He 
 desired all mankind to yield Him a perfect 
 obedience; for the requisition of that 
 obedience is, the expression of His will 
 And since, as before shown, it is His witt. 
 
297 
 
 all things considered, that all mankind 
 should yield that obedience, it is His de- 
 sire* all things considered, that they 
 should; because whatever it is His will 
 mankind should do, it is His desire they 
 should do. 
 
 And moreover having, by requiring 
 that obedience, all thing* considered, 
 acted precisely as though He desired it, 
 all things considered, Ifr has virtually 
 declared that he does dosire it, all things 
 considered. He must therefore so desire it, 
 for otherwise He must have made a decla- 
 ration that is not true, which He cannot 
 have done. If He had only desired it. in 
 itself considered, and not .-ill things con- 
 sidered, supposing the di>tinriion to c\i-t, 
 which that Ian: <-m|>l<>\ < d to de- 
 
 note, He would onlv have required it. in 
 itself considered ; and thrrcb\ declared, 
 that He desired it onlv in h-Hf consider- 
 ed ; since if he only dr-ircd it, in it-elf 
 considered, no possibl* i could ex- 
 
 ist for His requiring it in any older re- 
 spect thon in itstlf considered. For why 
 should He require more than He d - 
 We challenge all the advocates of this 
 iod distinction to furnish us .1 single 
 -on, proving that it is po-^ible that 
 God could require from all mankind a 
 
298 
 
 perfect obedience, all things considered, 
 for any other reason, than that he desired 
 it, all things considered. 
 
 And furthermore, in requiring it, all 
 things considered, He has virtually de- 
 clared, that it is its being such a thing as 
 it is, all things considered, that is the rea- 
 son of His requiring it; and has therefore 
 declared, that it is its being such a thing 
 as it is, all things considered, that is the 
 reason that he desires it. If then, he does 
 not desire it, all things considered, He 
 has made a declaration that is not true, 
 which he cannot have done. If God in re- 
 quiring it looked at it in all respects, who 
 has authority to say, that in desiring it, 
 He did not also look at it in all respects? 
 
 Whether then, any such distinction as 
 that in question exists, or not, it is certain 
 that God, all things considered, desires all 
 mankind to yield Him a perfect obe- 
 dience. 
 
 We are also aware, that to these views 
 the objection will be made by those whom 
 we oppose, that if God as really and per- 
 fectly desired all mankind, in the circum- 
 stances in which they exist, to yield Him 
 a perfect obedience, as He does His 
 children, in the circumstances in which 
 they exist, to yield Him obedience in all 
 
299 
 
 the instances in which they obey Him, 
 then, since that which He really and per- 
 fectly desires should take place, does riot 
 take place, He must be unhappy. 
 
 To this objection we reply, First, That 
 God is not disappointed at all by the dis- 
 obedience of mankind, and is not there- 
 fore made unhappy by that means. For 
 though He desires them to yield Him a 
 perfect obedience, yet He does not expect 
 that they will. He knows perfectly that 
 in the circumstances in which they arc 
 placed, they will not yield Him obedi- 
 ence, but will disobey ; and is therefore 
 no more disappointed by their disobedi- 
 ence than He would be if He had no de- 
 sire that they should obey. 
 
 Secondly. The objection may be m; 
 with as much propriety to the view of 
 GodV de-ire entertained by the objec- 
 tors, as to the view which we have exhi- 
 bited. For if, as they hold. God really 
 and perfectly desires all mankind to yield 
 Him a perfect obedience, in itself consi- 
 dered; then it must be as true, that he- 
 cause that which, in itself considered, He 
 really and perfectly desires should take 
 place, does not, in itself considered, take 
 place, He is made unhappy by it ; as it 
 can be that because that which, all thing? 
 
/ 300 
 
 considered, He really and perfectly de- 
 sires should take place, does not, all 
 things considered, take place, He must 
 be made unhappy by its not taking place. 
 Let the objectors then remove the ob- 
 jection from their own views before they 
 urge it against ours. 
 
 Thirdly. But the objection has no force 
 against either of those view r s. It no more 
 follows that God is unhappy because 
 mankind do not render Him the perfect 
 obedience He desires them to render, 
 than it follows from the fact that He loves 
 holiness really and perfectly, that there- 
 fore He is unhappy because it does not 
 exist in every instance in which it might, 
 and from the fact, that He hates sin really 
 and perfectly, that He is unhappy because 
 it exists as it does. 
 
 jQgain. Those whom we oppose will 
 probably ask by way of objection to the 
 views we have presented, why, if God 
 thus really and perfectly desires all man- 
 kind to yield Him a perfect obedience, 
 does He not make them yield such an 
 obedience ? And remark, that He is able 
 to make them yield a perfect obedience; 
 and if He desired they should, it is to be 
 presumed He would cause them to ren- 
 der it. 
 
301 
 
 To this we reply, that our proposition 
 is, that God desires mankind in the circum- 
 stances in which they arc now placed, to yield 
 Him a perfect obedience ; that is, in cir- 
 cumstances in which He employs only 
 that specific quantity of means to induce 
 them to yield such an obedience which 
 He does employ, and which obedience 
 i- attended with all the difficulties with 
 which it is attended. Our proposition 
 does not affirm that He desires them to 
 yield Him a perfect obedience, without 
 any consideration whether or not He 
 must place them in different circumstan- 
 ces from those in which they nuw exist, 
 in order to lead them to yield that obe- 
 dience; that is, whether or not He inu^; 
 use a much greater quantity of means 
 than He now employs to induce them to 
 yield that obedience. He rannol U86 
 any more means than He now rmplo\> 
 to induce them to yield a perfect obedi- 
 ence, without placing them in different 
 circumstances from those in \\hich they 
 now exist. And since, if they are not 
 disposed to yield Him obedience under 
 the influence of that quantity of means 
 He now employs, He cannot lead them 
 to yield Him obedience without employ- 
 ing a larger quantity of means ; He can- 
 26 
 
302 
 
 not lead them to yield Him obedience 
 without placing them in new circumstan- 
 ces. The reason, therefore, that God r 
 although He desires them to yield Him a 
 perfect obedience in the circumstances 
 in which they exist, does not actually lead 
 them to render a perfect obedience, is 
 that He cannot lead them to yield a per- 
 fect obedience, without placing ihem in 
 different circumstances. The obedience 
 which He desires is an obedience in the 
 circumstances in which they now exist; 
 an obedience therefore, rendered in any 
 other circumstances, were He supposed 
 to lead them to render it r would not be 
 the obedience which He desires. 
 
 The proposition then is, we trust, esta- 
 blished, that God desires all mankind, in 
 the circumstances in which they are pla- 
 ced, to yield Him a perfect obedience. 
 And the truth of that proposition involves 
 the truth of the general proposition we 
 have alleged it to sustain ; that if man- 
 kind were in the circumstances in which 
 they exist, to yield a perfect obedience 
 to the divine law, that obedience would 
 be as good materials as their disobedience 
 is, for a perfect display of the divine glo- 
 ry; and that the same sum of glory would 
 result to the Most High from the system 
 
303 
 
 \)i events which would then exist, as re- 
 dounds to Him from the system of events 
 which now exists ; since He could not 
 really and perfectly desire them to yield 
 that obedience unless it would be as good 
 materials as their disobedience is, for a 
 perfect display of His glory; and unless 
 the same sum of glory would redound to 
 Him from the system of event- which 
 would then e\i-t. n re-uks to Him from 
 the <vsteiu of events which now e\Ut-. 
 For n perfec.t display of His .glory, is the 
 object of I in supreme desire, and the 
 end pursued by Him supremely in ail Mis 
 i^riiey: and, ilier.>f)re, as, if their obe- 
 dience would not be as good materials 
 as their di>ob* ilience is fora perfect dis- 
 play of I Ii- i^ory, their yielding that obe- 
 dience would be iiieon uith a per- 
 fect display of Hi- ir'ory, He coulil not 
 desire them to yield it. But since a per- 
 fect display of His glory is the object of 
 His supremo desire; and since, at the 
 same time, He really and perfectly de- 
 sires all mankind, in the circumstance- in 
 which tliev exist, to yield Him a perfect 
 obedience, it is certain that it would be 
 entirely consistent with a perfect display 
 of His glory for them to yield that obe- 
 dience ; and, therefore, it is certain that 
 
304 
 
 were they to yield that obedience, it would 
 be as good materials as their disobedi- 
 ence is, for a perfect display of His glory ; 
 and that thence the same sum of glory 
 would result to Him from the system of 
 events which would then exist, as re- 
 dounds to Him from the system of events 
 which now exists. 
 
 In the third place 
 
 The proposition derives support from 
 the consideration that a perfect obedi- 
 ence from mankind, in the circumstances 
 in which they exist, would be peculiarly 
 glorious to God. 
 
 The greater the difficulties are which 
 are overcome in rendering an obedience, 
 the more glorious will that obedience be 
 to God; for the greater the difficulties 
 are which are overcome in rendering an 
 obedience, the stronger is the expression 
 of love to God, which is made in that 
 obedience. A being who performs an 
 act of obedience against the influence 
 of powerful temptation, makes a much 
 stronger expression of love to God in that 
 act, than is made in performing an act of 
 obedience when entirely exempt from 
 temptation, or under the influence of only 
 a light temptation. And a being who 
 
305 
 
 performs a long series of acts of obe- 
 dience against the influence of powerful 
 temptation, makes a much stronger ex- 
 pression of his love and devotedness, 
 than would be made by the same number 
 of acts, when entirely free from tempta- 
 tion, or when subjected to only a small 
 influence from it. Thus Abram, in offer- 
 ing up Isaac, gave a much stronger proof 
 ot his confidence in God than he would 
 have made in an act of obedience to any 
 requisition which was not like that, ap- 
 ntly inconsistent with a divine pro- 
 ini-e; and Job di played submission to 
 the divine will ranch more strongly in 
 enduring with patience the -evcre alflic- 
 with whieli IK led, than he 
 
 could have .c season of his 
 
 prosperity, \\h-n a .iled by 
 
 the violence of temptation, struggles 
 through the -tr)rtn with a heart unyield- 
 ing in its attachment to God, with a holj 
 fearfolnese spurning all the alluring joys 
 of sin, cleaving lo Cod as the only object 
 worthy of his love, and preferring His 
 service, amid all the bulletin^ of trial, to 
 the promised pleasures of rebellion, all 
 his holy affe< lion- rise to a more vigor- 
 ous and lofty exercise than when he is in 
 a state of interior temptation, or of entire 
 26* 
 
306 
 
 freedom from it. They show more indu- 
 bitably the reality and strength of his de- 
 votion to God; and form a much more 
 visible and striking expression of it. His 
 obedience in those circumstances, there- 
 fore, is much more glorious to God. It 
 is a muchmore strong and impressive tes- 
 timony to His worthiness of a perfect 
 obedience from His creatures. It pro- 
 claims much more loudly how infinitely 
 lovely He is above all things else ; and 
 how sacred are all His rights, and how 
 just and holy are all His commands; and 
 how unspeakably the pleasures of His 
 service surpass all others; and how rich 
 a privilege it is to serve Him even when 
 amid the most trying scenes those plea- 
 sures are the least. And it is of much 
 more worth to other beings as an exam- 
 ple, adapted to inspire those who are as- 
 sailed with similar temptations with equal 
 resolution, to encourage their hopes and 
 prompt them to suppress the thought of 
 turning from the service of God ; and 
 fitted to quicken those who are exempted 
 from trial in their attachment to the Most 
 High, and exciting them to greater zeal 
 in expressing their love. 
 
 Thus an act of obedience is glorious 
 .to God in proportion to the degree of love 
 
307 
 
 to Him which is exercised in it; and the 
 degree of love involved in an act of obe- 
 dience, is proportioned to the difficulties 
 which oppose the exercise of that act. 
 
 From these Considerations it is appa- 
 rent that a perfect obedience from all 
 mankind in the circumstances in which 
 they are placed, would be peculiarly 
 glorious to God. For it would be per- 
 formed against the opposing influence ol 
 powrrful temptation, and therefore in- 
 volve an exalted exercise and expression 
 of love to Him. How glorious to the Most 
 fli<;h would it, for example, have been, had 
 our first parents, when assailed by all the 
 tempting influence from their own senses, 
 and the subtle and powerful adversary, 
 to which they were subjected, risen in all 
 th'Mr native purity superior to those 
 temptations, and maintained an unbroken 
 and an invincible attachment to God? 
 What a tribute of glory would have been 
 presented to Him by an obedience, per- 
 formed as that would have been, while 
 the voice by which He spake them into 
 being had scarcely died away in the vales 
 of Eden; and declaring, as that would have 
 declared, that though emerged but a mo- 
 ment, as it were, from the abyss of non- 
 existence, the visions of His presence they 
 
308 
 
 had beheld, had chained to Him for ever 
 all the energies of their affection ; that 
 they had seen so much of His infinite 
 excellence, that all things else had no 
 power to attract their love; that they had 
 been touched with such reverence of His 
 majesty, that nothing could tempt them 
 to forget His rights, or disrespect His will; 
 that they had been so ravished with the 
 joys of His presence and service, that all 
 other joys were unable to allure their 
 hearts, or turn away their eye from His 
 glory ? 
 
 Arid with what emotions of admiration 
 and joy would they have been beheld by 
 the habitants of other worlds? How, while 
 their eye watched the new created pair, 
 buffeting their way through the tempestu- 
 ous scenes of their trial, resisting, with 
 the shield of faith, all the fiery darts of 
 their mighty tempter, and turning away, 
 ^vith a holy self-denial, from all the attrac- 
 tions of the forbidden tree, would the uni- 
 verse of holy beings have felt a more ar- 
 dent flame of love to the Most High, kind- 
 ling their own hearts, and a more pro- 
 found reverence of His will, and a deeper 
 sense of the guilt of rebellion against Him, 
 and firmer purposes of eternal fidelity 
 taking possession of their minds ? 
 
309 
 
 And how glorious to the Most High had 
 Jt been, had all the descendants of the 
 first pair, amid all the scenes of their trial, 
 yielded Him a perfect obedience ! How 
 glorious, had they never listened to the 
 solicitations of the adversary, nor indulg- 
 ed the calls of inordinate passion, nor 
 stooped to forbidden joys; had they ne- 
 ver swerved from the service of God, but. 
 amid all the opposing influences which 
 have been exerted on them, ^iven their 
 whole heart to Him, clio-en Him as their 
 only portion, and proved that no storms 
 of temptation could quench the ardour of 
 their love, nor shake their purpose of 
 constant obedience to His will! How 
 glorious to Him would it bave hren. if all 
 the heathens \\liom He l.:i- <jivrn to be- 
 hold only faint visions of Hi- c\c< 11< 
 and to hear the sound only of Hi- distant 
 footstep, had still been wholly attached to 
 Him, and rendered Him the full oblation 
 of their hearts! How glorious to Him would 
 it have been, had the Israelites, to whom 
 He more clearly revealed His perii < i i 
 and proclaimed His will, ever render^ 1 
 Him the hi^h homage of love and faith 
 which lie required ! How glorious to 
 Him, when the Saviour, having finished 
 His mighty work, published the call .of 
 
310 
 
 mercy, had all the tribes of men render- 
 ed Him thenceforth the tribute of a joy- 
 ous and undeviating obedience ! 
 
 How glorious to Him would it be, should 
 all the millions who are now descending 
 the ways of death, turn at His call, and 
 surrender themselves to His will and ser- 
 vice ! And how happy an influence would 
 it spread over other worlds ! 
 
 Thus a perfect obedience from all man- 
 kind, in the circumstances in which they 
 are placed, would be peculiarly glorious 
 to God ; and in that fact we are present- 
 ed with ground for the inference, that did 
 they yield that obedience, it would be as 
 good materials as their disobedience is 
 for a perfect display of His glory ; and 
 ihat the same sum of glory would redound 
 to Him from the system of events which 
 would then exist, as results to Him from 
 the system of events which now exists. 
 
 In the fourth place 
 
 The proposition is corroborated by the 
 consideration, that did mankind yield a 
 perfect obedience to the divine law, none 
 of the misery to which they are now sub- 
 jected in punishment of their rebellion 
 would exist. The sum of glory which re* 
 suits to God from the system of events 
 
31 1 
 
 that now exists, depends on the sum of 
 happiness arising from it; and the sum of 
 glory which would redound to Him from 
 the system of events that w r ould then ex- 
 ist, would depend also on the sum of hap- 
 piness which should result from it. God 
 is glorified by doing good, and happiness 
 only is an absolute good ; other things 
 are good only as means of happiness. 
 God, therefore, is glorified by a'ninjj ex- 
 istence to happiness : and the sum of glo- 
 ry resulting to Him from a system of 
 events, must depend on the sum of happi- 
 arising from that system; and He 
 will be glorified by one system of events 
 as much as by any other, if the sum of 
 happiness arising froin.it will be the ^ame. 
 Such at least are our viev\s. If. a- others 
 hold, the sum of glory redounding to God 
 from a system of evenN. doe- not depend 
 on the sum of happinc.-s M>!< >ly. but on 
 the sum of moral excellence* and happi- 
 ness jointly which that system involves, 
 (he principle on which we should reason, 
 were that our view of the subject, and the 
 conclusion to which we should advance, 
 would be the same as now. 
 
 We are presented then, by these con- 
 siderations, with ground for the inference, 
 that did mankind render a perfect obedi- 
 
312 
 
 ence to the law of God, as great a sum oi 
 happiness would result from the system 
 of events which would then exist, as re- 
 sults from the present system. 
 
 To ascertain the net sum, if we may 
 use the language, of happiness under the 
 present system, we must subtract from the 
 whole sum of happiness existing under it, 
 all the misery which it includes : arid how 
 vastly does that reduce the net amount 
 of happiness below the whole sum of hap- 
 ness! For how immense is the sum of 
 misery in the present system ! How num- 
 berless the beings who suffer how great 
 their capacity how deep their miseries ! 
 Count up the woes of which our world is 
 now the scene unfold the doors of hell, 
 and sum up the miseries of that world! 
 Turn the eye back through every hour 
 since the fall look down through the 
 scenes of eternity and add up the awful 
 sum of suffering which results, and will 
 result, from sin. Subtract, then, an equal 
 sum of happiness from the whole which 
 exists, and how diminished, comparative- 
 ly, is the balance ! 
 
 And, to ascertain the sum of happiness 
 which would exist were mankind obedi- 
 ent to God, we must conceive of them as 
 exempted from all the misery to which 
 
313 
 
 they are subjected under the present sys- 
 tem, and as crowned with all the happi- 
 ness which would be the reward of obe- 
 dience. The results of these two systems 
 of events must be viewed also in respect 
 to their influence on all other created 
 beings. 
 
 And who, contemplating them thus, 
 does not rind the impres-ion -tealing over 
 him, that did mankind yield the Most 
 High a perfect obedience, the sum of hap- 
 piness resulting from it must be as great 
 as that which now exists? Pluck away 
 from mankind, by the hand of perfect obe- 
 dience, those chains of misery which op- 
 press our world extinguish those tires of 
 hell annihilate that deathless worm 
 arrest those atonic- ofdespair e\< h 
 all the suffering of eternal death for life 
 and happiness everlasting. and who 
 shall grieve that misery has /. /, or 
 
 who shall imagine that the sum of happi- 
 ness must be less than now exists? These 
 views apply equally to any portion of 
 mankind who should yield a complete 
 obedience to the divine law. 
 
 These riewfl then corroborate our pro- 
 position. For if, under the system of 
 events which would exist were man- 
 kind entirely obedient, the sum of happi- 
 27 
 
314 
 
 ness would be as great as under the pre- 
 sent system of events ; then as great a 
 sum oi' glory would redound to the Most 
 High from that system of events as results 
 from this. 
 
 In the fifth place 
 
 The proposition is corroborated by the 
 consideration, that no greater good will 
 result to the universe from those sins of 
 mankind for which they w ill be punished, 
 than would have resulted from a perfect 
 obedience, rendered in the circumstances 
 in which those sins are committed. 
 
 This is demonstrable from the justice 
 of God. The good which will result from 
 those sins will arise entirely from their 
 punishment, by the manifestation thereby 
 made of the evil of sin, and the divine ab- 
 horrence of it. And that good will result 
 to God and to His holy subjects, by the 
 vindication of His rights, and the display 
 of 1 1 is attributes, involved in the infliction 
 of that punishment. 
 
 The sum of evil which will be inflicted 
 in punishment of those sins will corres- 
 pond to the sum of their guilt; and the 
 sum of their guilt will depend on the sum 
 of evil to the universe which they are na- 
 turally adapted to occasion, and which 
 
315 
 
 would arise from them were they never 
 visited with punishment. 
 
 \\ ere they left unpunished, they wouM 
 
 be to the universe the n of natural 
 
 evil, consisting in a di of happi- 
 
 , or in positive misery, or in both. 
 
 Sin consists in the e 
 
 in preferring private or individual happi- 
 ness above the ' 
 and pui'Miin^ a COU1 
 
 that pri\ ate happii v, ith 
 
 tho happiness of the \\hote. It i- adapt- 
 ed, therefore, to produce natural e\ il. It 
 it also prove the :i of moral 
 
 evil. The degnr of if- wickedness de- 
 pends on the diirrec of its ir 
 witi'i tlie good of the whole; or on tho 
 cpiajitiiy cf natural and moral c\ il it i ^ 
 adapted to pmduoc. 
 
 As then the iruilt of those Bind will cor- 
 respond to the sum of injury they are na- 
 turallv adapted to occasion to the uni- 
 ver-f. and which would result from them 
 were the; left unpunished ; and a> the 
 sum of evil \\hich \\ill he inilictrd in pu- 
 nishment of them will correspond to their 
 guilt, it is apparent that the sum of evil 
 which will be indicted in punishment of 
 them, will he precisely such, and only 
 such, as shall prevent every injury to the 
 universe which would result from them 
 
316 
 
 were they left unpunished. For it is ma- 
 nifest, from the justice of the Most High, 
 that He will not punish mankind beyond 
 their desert of punishment on account of 
 those sins : and as their desert of punish- 
 ment corresponds to the injury to the uni- 
 verse, which would result from those sins 
 if left unpunished to exert their natural 
 influence, it is manifest that He will not 
 inflict any punishment beyond what is ne- 
 cessary to prevent that injury. He can- 
 not, in the exercise of justice, inflict any 
 greater punishment than that, unless He 
 can, consistently with justice, punish 
 mankind beyond their guilt; or unless 
 the guilt of their sins exceeds the injury 
 they are adapted to occasion. But He 
 cannot justly punish mankind beyond 
 their guilt. For that would involve 
 the right of punishing them for some- 
 thing besides their guilt, as for holi- 
 ness, or something independent of their 
 moral conduct, or for nothing at all. But 
 it cannot be consistent with justice to pu- 
 nish them for what does not involve any 
 guilt. It would be unjust to inflict evil 
 which is not merited. Nor does the guilt 
 of sin exceed the injury it is adapted to 
 occasion to the universe. To affirm that 
 it does, is to charge with guilt that which 
 is granted to be harmless, which is nb- 
 
317 
 
 surd. And were such a species of harm- 
 less guilt admitted to exist, it would not 
 be consistent with the justice of God to 
 punish it, for it is inconsistent with justice 
 to punish what is harmless. If sin were 
 not a violation of the rights, and conse- 
 quently, if left to produce its natural ef- 
 fects, inconsistent with the happiness of 
 the universe, it cannot be possible that it 
 should involve any iiilt. And therefore 
 the sins of mankind do not involve any 
 guilt beyond the injury which they arc 
 adapted to occasion to the nniveive. As 
 then the guilt of sin con-i-u entirely in its 
 injuriousness to the universe, and >' 
 cannot, consistently with justice, puni>h 
 it beyond its <niilt. it i- apparent that lie 
 will not punish mankind on account of 
 their sins, beyond what ia required to pre- 
 vent their BlOfl doin^ any injury to Him 
 and His kingdom. To punish them more 
 than that, would be to punish them be- 
 yond their injuriousness, and therefore 
 beyond their guilt. 
 
 The design of God in punishing man- 
 kind is by an exhibition of the evi 1 of 
 tht-'.i :;i iii- : -if them, to pre- 
 
 vent the injury to the universe which 
 would result from them were they permit- 
 ted to go unpn^i >h i d. The evil of their 
 27* 
 
318 
 
 sins, and thence God's hatred of them, 
 correspond to the injury they are adapted 
 to occasion. He cannot, therefore, con- 
 sistently with justice, punish mankind to 
 any greater extent, than to prevent their 
 sins doing Him and His kingdom any in- 
 jury. For to punish them beyond that, 
 would be to exhibit those sins as more 
 evil than they actually are, and to ex- 
 press a greater degree of hatred of them 
 than they actually deserve. 
 
 And as it is inconsistent with the justice 
 of God, so it is with the good of the uni- 
 verse, for Him to inflict upon mankind 
 any more punishment than is necessary to 
 prevent the injury which their sins are 
 adapted to occasion. He can have no 
 pleasure in the punishment of sin, on any 
 other ground than its promoting the good 
 of the universe ; and but for that effect, 
 would never punish it. But it cannot pro- 
 mote the good of the universe to punish 
 men to a greater degree than would cor- 
 respond with the evil which their sins 
 were adapted to produce ; nor to express 
 a greater abhorrence of their guilt than 
 it merits, for that would be unjust in God, 
 and therefore inconsistent with His glory 
 and the good of His kingdom. 
 
 God will therefore inflict on mankind 
 only so much punishment as shall prevent 
 
319 
 
 their sins occasioning any injury to the 
 universe. The universe will only be pla- 
 ced, by that punishment, in as favourable 
 circumstances as those in which it would 
 have been had mankind never committed 
 the sins for which the punishment will be 
 inflicted. And, as all the good which will 
 result to the universe from the existence 
 of those sins will arise from their punish- 
 ment: and as only the same sum of good 
 will result from their punishment \\hich 
 would have existed had they never been 
 committed; it is apparent that the* sum 
 of good which will arise from the exist- 
 ence of those sins, will not exceed, but 
 will exactly equal, the sum which would 
 have existed had mankind yielded a per- 
 olx'diene.e in the circumstances in 
 which those sins are committed. And 
 this fact corroborates the position, that no 
 greater good will result from any of the 
 sins of mankind, than would have existed 
 had they yielded a perfect obedience in- 
 stead of committing those sins. If any 
 greater good will result from the exist- 
 ence of any of their sins, it must result 
 from those which shall be forgiven. But 
 whence can it be proved, or rendered pro- 
 bable, that they are better materials for 
 a display of the divine glory, than a per- 
 
 
320 
 
 feet obedience rendered in their place 
 would have been ? 
 
 Whence can it be shown, that the ex- 
 ercise of 'His grace in pardoning them, 
 will be more glorious to God than the ex- 
 ercise of His justice in punishing the 
 others ? There is no ground from which 
 to infer the conclusion, that those sins 
 which shall be forgiven, constitute better 
 materials for manifesting the divine glory, 
 than those which shall be punished; and 
 in the fact, therefore, that those which 
 are to be punished, are no better materi- 
 als for the display of the divine glory, 
 than a perfect obedience, rendered in 
 their place, would have been, we are 
 furnished with at least probable ground 
 for the inference, that those also which 
 are to be forgiven are no better materi- 
 als for the same end, than a perfect obe- 
 dience in their place would have been. 
 
 In the sixth place 
 
 The proposition is demonstrated to be 
 true by the fact, that unless it be true, no 
 godly sorrow can be exercised for sin. 
 
 If it be not true, that were mankind 
 to yield in the circumstances in which 
 they exist, a perfect obedience to the di- 
 vine law r , their obedience would be as 
 good materials as their disobedience is, 
 
321 
 
 (or a perfect display of the divine glory; 
 and if thence it be not true, that the same 
 sum of glory would redound to God from 
 the system of events which would then 
 exist, as results to Him from the system 
 which now exists; then it follows, that all 
 their sin must be necessary to the glory of 
 God by a natural necessity. A necessity 
 must arise from its nature of admitting it 
 to precisely such an extent into a 
 that shall secure a perfect display of His 
 glory. The substitution of holiness in its 
 place would injure the system, and pre- 
 vent a perfect display of His glory. And 
 it would therefore be a real and an un- 
 speakable disadvantage to the Most High 
 and to the universe, were mankind to 
 yield Him a perfect obedience: for if it 
 be the nature of sin, and not the mere 
 fact, that mankind, in the rireum>tances 
 in which they arc placed, elmi.M to exer- 
 cise it instead of holiness, that makes it 
 necessary to a perfect display of the di- 
 vine glory; then it is necessary to the 
 divine glory by a natural necessity, a ne- 
 cessity which it is impossible to obviate. 
 And if mankind, by yielding a perfect 
 obedience to the divine law, would pre- 
 vent a perfect display of the glory of God, 
 then, were they to render that obedience, 
 it would be an unspeak^' - -^sadvanta<re 
 
322 
 
 to Him and to the universe. And if a per- 
 fect obedience from mankind would be 
 such an unspeakable disadvantage to the 
 Most High and to the universe, then it is 
 an unspeakable advantage to the Most 
 High and to the universe, that they do 
 not yield that obedience, but disobey 
 Him precisely as they do. And if it be 
 such an unspeakable advantage to the 
 Most High and to the universe, that man- 
 kind disobey Him precisely as they do; 
 because their disobedience enables Him 
 to make a perfect display of His glory, 
 which without that disobedience Pie 
 could not make; then it is a subject of 
 unspeakable joy, that mankind disobey 
 Him precisely as they do; and it should 
 iill r'very heart that is friendly to Him with 
 exultation ; and the thought, that they 
 will continue to rebel against Him pre- 
 cisely as they will, should fill every such 
 heart with the most exalted satisfaction. 
 And had any of mankind refused to dis- 
 obey Him precisely as they have, it 
 should be to all His friends a subject of 
 deep and everlasting regret; and the 
 thought, that any of them should not 
 hereafter disobey Him precisely as they 
 will, should be unspeakably painful. For 
 since all mankind are under obligation to 
 
323 
 
 desire supremely a perfect display of the 
 divine glory, they are also under obliga- 
 tion to rejoice supremely in the exig- 
 ence of precisely that sum of moral evil 
 which is necessary by a natural necessity 
 to such a display of that glory, and bound 
 supremely to shrink from the de-'ne. that 
 precisely such a sum of sin should not 
 exist, And each individual is bound to 
 
 ice in the existence <f all the sins 
 which he commits as well as in the exist- 
 ence of all tlie sin< the re-t of mankind 
 eoiiimii: and to rejoice that all the -ins 
 shall exist which he -hall hereafter com- 
 mit, as \\ell as that all those. \\ hich others 
 ^hall commit, shall e\ 
 
 Now if Midi are the obligations of m;m- 
 
 '. it is ohviouslv impn-sihie that any 
 aodlv MMTOW for -in should be exerei 
 
 \\hat then can godly sorrow for Sin 
 I- it sorrow for the exi-t( nee of sin 
 
 eneral? Or i- it Borrow for the exist- 
 
 of one's own -ins? Or is it sorrow 
 
 Ihut the overt acts of sin are committed 
 
 > <uch motives? Or i> it sorrow for 
 
 1 red ? ( )r is it hatred 
 
 part or all of these united? 
 
 \\ e do not mention each of thr-c. because 
 
 we regard tin in as so man . ditlerent 
 
 kinds of sorrow, but merely because those 
 
324 
 
 whom we oppose are accustomed to 
 speak of them as such. 
 
 If men are under obligation to rejoice 
 supremely, that mankind commit precise- 
 ly that quantity of sin which they do 
 commit, then, 
 
 First. Godly sorrow for sin cannot 
 consist in sorrow for the existence of sin 
 in general. 
 
 Godly sorrow for sin is a holy sorrow 
 for it; a sorrow involving right views and 
 feelings respecting it, and exercised in 
 compliance with an obligation; and sor- 
 row for sin in general, is sorrow for all the 
 sin of mankind, contemplated as a whole. 
 If then men are under obligation to re- 
 joice in the existence of sin in general, 
 godly sorrow for sin cannot consist in sor- 
 row for the existence of sin in general. 
 First, because it is impossible that the 
 same identical thing should be to them, 
 at the same time, an object both of su- 
 preme joy and sorrow. It is absurd to 
 suppose, that precisely the same thing, 
 which is a ground of joy, should, at the 
 same time, be a ground of sorrow. Next, 
 because, if they are under obligation to 
 rejoice in the existence of sin in general, 
 they canirjt be under obligation to exer- 
 cise sorrow for the existence of sin in ge- 
 
 
325 
 
 neral; for in order that that might be the 
 case, precisely the same thing, which was 
 the ground of the one obligation, must be 
 the ground of the other. But it is absurd 
 to suppose the same identical thing to be 
 the ground of two opposite obligations; 
 since that in it, which would make it 
 the ground of one of the obligations, 
 would prevent ii> bt-in^the ground of the 
 other. And it is absurd too, to supj 
 they could obey two such opposing obli- 
 gations: since, as both ohliiMiions would 
 
 on them at all times, it would be im- 
 possible to comply with one without \io- 
 lating the other. Thirdly, l>eeause if 
 right views re-perting sin would lead 
 
 !i to rejoice in it- existence, ri^ht 
 views respecting it could not lead t* 
 to sorrow on ruv-H" existence. As 
 
 then, from tlir nature of the ihing.^ it is 
 impossible that men should, at the same 
 time, both rejoice in the < i >\\\ 
 
 in general, and exercise sorrow f r it : and 
 impossible also, that they should he un- 
 der obligation, at the same time, both to 
 rejoice in its existence, and e\erci>e sor- 
 row for it : it is manifest that, if men are 
 under obligation to rejoice in the cxi.-l- 
 ence of sin in general, godly sorrow 7 for 
 28 
 
326 
 
 sin cannot consist in sorrow for the exist- 
 ence of sin in general. 
 
 Secondly. Nor for the same reasons can 
 it consist in sorrow for the existence of 
 their own sins. It is undoubtedly a fact, 
 that when men exercise godly sorrow for 
 sin, their sorrow respects their own sins, 
 and not the sins of others; yet if they are 
 under obligation to rejoice at the exist- 
 ence of all the sin which exists, their sor- 
 row cannot consist in sorrow for the exist- 
 ence of their own sins; for they are un- 
 der as high obligation to rejoice at the 
 existence of all the sins, which they have 
 committed, as they are to rejoice at the 
 existence of any of the sins which others 
 have committed. Their sins are as ne- 
 cessary to the glory of God, as the sins of 
 others; and whatever exists in respect 
 to the sins of others, to constitute a reason 
 for rejoicing at their existence, exists 
 equally in regard to their own, to consti- 
 tute a reason for rejoicing at their exist- 
 ence. And it is equally as irnposs-ble 
 for them, at the same time, to rejoice in 
 the existence of their own sins, and exer- 
 cise sorrow for their existence, as it is to 
 rejoice at the existence of the sins of 
 other-,, and exercise sorrow for their 
 existence. 
 
3:17 
 
 And if ;odly sorrow do^s not consist in 
 sorrow for the existence of their own sins, 
 it dors nut of coin--<> c.o,-.>i-t in sorrow, 
 that they committed those sins; for sor- 
 row, tint thrij committed tho>e sin-;, 
 \N o Id he .-orrow, that th< 
 since the existence of tho-e sins depended 
 on their committing them. Those iden- 
 tical sins could never exist, Unless they 
 \vere the acts of the identical |" : 
 who committed them. And if it would he 
 int'oiiM-lent \\ iih t!, < f ( iod. for an y 
 
 of mankind not to di^-hey i!i^ l.i\\. in all 
 tho-e instances in whieh they do disohey 
 it : thc'n as it would he ineon-i-'enl \\ith 
 \\\^ ^lory lor any imt I. :it the iden- 
 
 tic: 1 1 -in- \\ hieh tliey do commit, the\ 
 honnd to rejoice, ih.H //,, v <| coiiunit 
 6 identic 1 . d -ins \\ Inc 
 
 mit 
 
 !)< lo sorr<>w ! 
 
 \\ere committed h\ lead i>f 
 
 hf ino committc'd by others of mankind, 
 
 -on-.e, 1 . trom ))nre 
 
 T!ie\ could not de-ire that - - 
 
 >!,ou!d hai ' heen committed h\ oti, 
 
 hemselvea, for <er rea- 
 
 BOfl than th tt the e\ iK r : " ; a 
 
 t fall on others, in.-ti ad of falling on 
 
 themselves; and sorrow arising from such 
 
328 
 
 a source, must surely be the sorrow that 
 worketh death, and not godly sorrow. 
 
 Thirdly. Nor can it be sorrow that the 
 overt acts of sin were committed from 
 such motives. First, because probably 
 only a small proportion of the sins of 
 men involve any overt acts. They are 
 simple exercises of the heart unaccom- 
 panied by any external act. Thus the 
 simple exercise of hatred to God, and 
 malevolence to men, does not involve 
 any overt act. And since therefore men 
 are under obligation to exercise godly 
 sorrow for all their sins, whether they in- 
 clude overt acts or not, it is absurd to 
 suppose that godly sorrow consists sim- 
 ply in sorrow, that the overt acts of sin 
 were committed from wrong motives. 
 Next, because it is absurd to suppose, 
 that many of the overt acts of sin should 
 not be performed from* wrong motives. 
 Can the overt act of worshipping an idol 
 be performed from any other than wrong 
 motive*? And thirdly, because sorrow 
 that the overt acts of sin were committed 
 from wrong motives, would be sorrow 
 that those acts were sinful; since it is 
 their being performed from wrong mo- 
 tives that constitutes their sinfulness. To 
 exerei-e sorrow that those sins were corn- 
 
 
329 
 
 mitted from wrong motives, would there- 
 fore be to exercise sorrow that those sins 
 exist: since some of the overt acts, such 
 as those of idolatry, could not, from their 
 nature, be committed except from wrong 
 motives; and the others could not be 
 sinful acts, unless performed from wrong 
 motives. But sorrow that those sins ex- 
 ist would not be godly sorrow. because 
 ii would be inconsistent with the exercise 
 of joy on account of their existence* If 
 men are bound to rejoice that they com- 
 mitted tho-c identical sinful overt acN; 
 and if those identical o\ert acts could 
 not have been committed except from 
 wrong motives: then tln-y are bound to 
 rejoice that they committed them from 
 u: motive-, and hound therefore not 
 to exercise MHTOW that they committed 
 them from tho-e motives. 
 
 /'<>;trthh/. Nor can it be sorrow for sin 
 in itself considered Sin, in itself con-i- 
 dered, is, as we have already shown, sin 
 idered in respect to its whole nature, 
 as being in all that pertains to it and con- 
 stitutes it precisely such a thing as it is. 
 Thus any particular sinful act in itself 
 considered, is that act considered in re- 
 spect to all which pertains to it, and con- 
 stitutes its nature ; that is, its being the 
 28* 
 
330 
 
 act of the person who exercises it, and 
 being pei formed at the time and in the cir- 
 cumstances, in respect to knowledge, mo- 
 tives, and every thing else, in which it 
 took place ; and its being the violation 
 of that particular command, of which it 
 is a violation, and precisely such a viola- 
 tion of that command as it is ; and its be- 
 ing of a nature adapted to produce, or 
 to be employed to produce, precisely the 
 effects which it is adapted to produce,* 
 as exciting the divine displeasure, occa- 
 sioning God to display His justice, or 
 grace, or other attributes ; and the cause 
 of punishment, or of penitence, or of other 
 effects to the person who performed it, 
 and of good or of evil to other beings; 
 and so its being in all respects precisely 
 the thing which it is. It is having all that 
 belong to its nature, which really belongs 
 to it, that constitutes it the identical 
 thing which it is; and to consider it in 
 itcHf as the very identical thing which it 
 is, is to consider it as having all that be- 
 long to its nature which really does be- 
 long to it. And the same is true of all 
 the sins which mankind commit. 
 
 Now from this it is manifest, that if 
 mankind are under obligation to rejoice, 
 that all the sins which they have com- 
 
331 
 
 inittcd c\i-t. ijoilly sorrow for sin cannot 
 consist in Borrow for sin, in itself consi- 
 dered. For sorrow for those sins, in 
 themselves considered, would be sorrow, 
 that those sins exist. 
 
 Sorrow for those sins, in themsehes 
 considered, must be sorrow, either that 
 those sins possess such a nature as (hey 
 do: or sorrow that they were committed 
 by themselves, and not by others <^f man- 
 kind ; or else sorrow that they uere com- 
 mitted at all. 
 
 If it be sorrow, that those sin* 
 such fi nature as they do, then it i- 
 row that thosr r\M. Fr ; 
 
 identical sins could nol e\i>t. m,!< - i .< v 
 <1 th<. nature which they do: it 
 is Irixini: preeisely all tlio.-e tlji.'L-,- be- 
 long to their nature, which do h< 
 it. that constitutes them the idenl: 
 which they are. Were their nature dif- 
 nt to any, even the least dr^ree. lioni 
 what it now is, they would not be the 
 identical sins thoy now are, but dillerent 
 ^ins. Sorrow then, tint they pQBMSfl the 
 id-'ijtieal nature they do possess is sor- 
 row tli ;t they do not | a dillerent 
 nature; and tl: -w that they are 
 dentical sirs l 1 . and not diiler- 
 ent sins. But sorrow that they are the 
 
332 
 
 identical sins, which they are, and not 
 different sins, is sorrow that those iden- 
 tical sins exist that do exist. 
 
 Such also is the fact, if sorrow for 
 those sins, in themselves considered, 
 be sorrow that they were committed by 
 themselves, instead of others of mankind. 
 For it constitutes a part of the nature of 
 those sins, that they were committed by 
 the identical persons by whom they were 
 cotirnitted, and those identical sins would 
 not exist, except as the acts of the iden- 
 tical persons, whose acts they are. Were 
 they thtt acts of other persons, they would 
 not be the same, but different sins. Sor- 
 row, therefore, that they are the acts of 
 the identical persons, whose acts they 
 are, is sorrow that those identical sins 
 exist. 
 
 And such of course is the fact, if sor- 
 row for those sins be sorrow that they 
 were committed at all. Since, then, sor- 
 row for the sins mankind have commit- 
 ted, in themselves considered, would be 
 sorrow that those sins exist ; it is mani- 
 fest, that if mankind are bound to rejoice 
 that all the sins exist, which they have 
 committed, godly sorrow for those sins 
 cannot be sorrow for them, in themselves 
 considered. If joy that they exist, is 
 
333 
 
 godly joy ; sorrow that they exist, cannot 
 be godly sorrow. 
 
 Fifthly. Neither can godly sorrow for 
 sin be the hatred of sin. First, because 
 the hatred of a thing is not sorrow for it. 
 Hatred and sorrow aro exercises essen- 
 tially diilt'rent. Hatred of a thing is no 
 more sorrow for it. than the love of it, or 
 fear of it, is. And a person may hate 
 many things, without having any sorrow 
 that those things exist. We may, for in- 
 stance, hnte particular kinds of food, 
 without feeling any sorrow that they 
 exist. Since, then, hatred is not sorrow, 
 the hatred of sin cannot be godly sorrow 
 for MIL Secondly, because, if the hat ml 
 of sin were sorrow for it, still if mankind 
 are under ol to t*> uince that all 
 
 the sins cxi-t, \v!,irh they commit, the 
 hatred of lh' k ir nnot be trmlly sor- 
 
 ro\\ for them: for if their hatred of them 
 is sorrou for them, it must, as in some of 
 the preceding cases, either he sorrow for 
 the existence of sin in general : or sorrow 
 for the exigence of their own sins; or 
 sorrow, that the overt acts of their sins 
 were committed from wrong motives; or 
 else sorrow far sin, in itself considered. 
 But sorrow for their si,;s. in either of 
 those respects, would, as already shown. 
 
334 
 
 be sorrow for the existence of their sins, 
 which is inconsistent with joy for their 
 existence. 
 
 Sixthly. Nor, therefore, is godly sorrow 
 for sin. sorrow for it in part or all of those 
 respects united. For if sorrow for sin in 
 each of those respects involves, as has 
 been shown, sorrow that sin exists, and 
 is therefore inconsistent with rejoicing in 
 its existence; then sorrow for it in any 
 two or more of th^se respects united, 
 must also be sorrow for its existence, and 
 therefore be inconsistent with rejoicing 
 in its existence. 
 
 If then mankind are under obligation 
 to rejoice in the existence of all the sins 
 they commit, it is apparent, that they can- 
 not exercise any godly sorrow for them. 
 
 Now this consideration demonstrates 
 the truth of our proposition, that did 
 mankind, in the circumstances in which 
 they are placed, yield a perfect obedi- 
 ence to God, it would be as good mate- 
 rials as their disobedience is, for a dis- 
 play of His glory. For mankind are un- 
 der obligation to exercise godly sorrow 
 for their sins: since it is that sorrow 
 which vvorketh repentance unto salva- 
 tion. But if they are under obligation to 
 exercise godly sorrow for their sins; then 
 
335 
 
 they are not under obligation to rejoice 
 in the existence of their sins; since joy 
 in the existence of their sins is, as has 
 
 ;j shown, inconsistent with godly sor- 
 row for them. But if they are not under 
 obligation to rejoice in the existence of 
 thoir sins, then their sins cannot be ne- 
 cessary to the glory of God by a natural 
 necessity: For if their sins were ne< <-- 
 Kiry to the glory of God by a natural ne- 
 
 il\. they would, as ha- hern -ho\\ Q, 
 be under obligation to rejoice in their 
 existence. I'.eing under obligation to re- 
 j ice in the perfect dis|)lay of the divine 
 glory. they are. it' their sin.- arc neC4 -sary 
 to the divine glory, by a natural nece--i- 
 ty, under e<|iial obligation to rejoice in 
 the exigence of their sins, by w hieh alone 
 a perfect di-play of llie di\ine i^lory can 
 be made. lint if their sins are not IK - 
 ee^ary to the gl>ry ol'Ciod. l>\ a natural 
 necessity, then, did mankind yield a per- 
 fect obedience in their p!aee, the glory 
 of God would he displayed to the same 
 perfection as it now is. For if their 
 are not necessary to the glory of God by 
 a natural neces-ity. then the necessity of 
 their existence doe- not arise from any 
 thing peculiar to their nature; but sim- 
 ply from the circumstance, that men 
 
336 
 
 choose to commit those sins, instead of 
 performing acts of obedience. But if all 
 that renders their sins necessary to a 
 perfect display of the divine glory is, 
 that mankind choose to commit those 
 sins, instead of performing acts of obedi- 
 ence, then demonstratively, if mankind 
 were to yield a perfect obedience to God, 
 their sins would not be necessary to a 
 perfect display of the divine glory. And 
 if by their yielding a perfect obedience, 
 their sins would not be necessary to a 
 perfect display of the divine glory, then 
 their obedience would be as good mate- 
 rials as their disobedience is, for a per- 
 fect display of the divine glory; and, 
 thence, the same sum of glory would re- 
 sult to God, from the system of events, 
 which would then exist, as redounds to 
 Him from the system of events which now 
 exists. 
 
 In the seventh place 
 
 Our proposition is demonstrated to be 
 true by the consideration, that unless it 
 be true, men cannot perform any act from 
 benevolence either towards God or other 
 beings. 
 
 If the proposition be not true, then the 
 converse of it is true, that all the sins 
 
337 
 
 which mankind do and shall commit, are 
 necessary to the glory of God by a natu- 
 ral necessity. But if all the sins which 
 mankind do and shall commit, are neces- 
 sary to the glory of God hy such a neces- 
 sity, then mankind can never, in any case, 
 possess any certainty, previous to their 
 acting, whether an act of obedience or 
 of disobedience is necr^ary to the glory 
 of God in ti ive no rule 
 
 of determining, pre\ i<>n>lv to their noting, 
 what is necessary to the glory of God. 
 The divine law is not sued a rule. It 
 does not show what, in an;. ces- 
 
 sary to the glory of God. nor what lie do- 
 
 B them to do; for His requiring obe- 
 dience to Hi- l.tw. is no proof that it is 
 necessary to His glory, or consistent uith 
 it; neither i- iva-on nor COHSC ueh 
 
 a rule. Mankind are left in the most ab- 
 solute uncertainty, until their action- have 
 come into existence, what are nec< >*ary 
 to the divine glory, and what are incon- 
 sistent with it. In any given case, ante- 
 
 'ntly to their acting, there is, as far as 
 are able to decide, at least as great 
 a probability (and perhaps a much great- 
 er, for undoubtedly much the largest por- 
 tion of the actions of mankind are sinful) 
 that the glory of God demands a sinful 
 29 
 
338 
 
 action, as that it demands an act of obe- 
 dience. 
 
 But mankind being, antecedently to 
 their acting, in total uncertainty whether 
 the glory of God requires them to act in a 
 sinful or obedient manner, demonstrative- 
 ly, can never act from benevolence towards 
 God or other beings. For to act from be- 
 nevolence to a being, is to act from good 
 will towards him with a desire to pro- 
 mote his well-being. But if mankind, in 
 every case antecedently to their acting, 
 are in total uncertainty how they must act 
 in order to promote the glory of God, they 
 cannot act from benevolence to Him. If 
 they yield an act of apparent obedience 
 to His law, they cannot do it from bene- 
 volence to Him, for they must do it in 
 perfect uncertainty whether it is not utter- 
 ly inconsistent with His glory. And they 
 cannot be actuated by benevolence to 
 Him, in performing an act w r hich they 
 have no assurance is not totally inconsist- 
 ent with His glory. If they commit an 
 overt transgression of His law, they can- 
 not do it from benevolence to Him ; since, 
 as in the other case, they must commit it 
 in absolute uncertainty whether it is not 
 incompatible with His glory; and bene- 
 volence could never lead theni to perfornj 
 
an act respecting which they were uncer- 
 tain, whether it was not totally incompati- 
 ble with His glory. 
 
 In like manner, they can never perform 
 an act from benevolence to other beings. 
 For as that course of conduct is best for 
 the universe which promotes the glory of 
 : in bring uncertain how they must 
 act to promote the glory of God, they are 
 uncertain how they must act to promote 
 the good of other bei;. 
 
 >r can they, from benevolence to God 
 or other beings, pause, and suspend act- 
 ing till they c:\n ascertain in what manner 
 they must act, in order to promote the 
 glory of God and the good of His king- 
 dom; both br< ey must be in total 
 uncertainty, but that to Mi-pend actii 
 entirely incompatible with the di\ 
 
 u! the good of His kingdom : and be- 
 cause, if they suspended acting fo: the 
 purpose, they could never ascertain, pre- 
 viously to their acting, in what manner 
 they should act, in order to glorify God, 
 and promote the well-being of His king- 
 dom. 
 
 And brinK thus totally unrtMe to do anv 
 thing from lene\ olence to God or other 
 briiigs, or to do any tiling for (he purpose 
 of promoting the glorv of God and the 
 
340 
 
 good of His kingdom, all motives to ae- 
 tion derived from the glory of God and 
 the good of His kingdom, are entirely ex- 
 cluded from access to their minds. They 
 are forced to act in all cases from pure 
 selfishness. The only motive to action 
 that can have access to their minds, is 
 the desire of their own happiness; and 
 the only rule of determining, in every 
 ease, whether it is best to perform any 
 given act or not, is the dictate of selfish- 
 ness. God and His government are ab- 
 solutely annihilated as it respects any mo- 
 ral influence on mankind; .and they are 
 under a natural necessity of acting on the 
 principles of Atheism. And being under 
 a natural necessity of acting, in all their 
 conduct, from perfect selfishness, they are 
 of course perfectly justifiable for all their 
 selfish conduct. None of their violations 
 of the divine law, arising from selfishness^ 
 involve any guilt. If they possess any 
 moral character, it is virtuous.* 
 
 Since, then, if all the sins which man- 
 
 * How frequently do men of learning hold principles entirely 
 subversive of each other* Those whom we oppose, are noted 
 as the warmest holders and defenders of the position, in our 
 judgment manifestly true, that all sin consists in the exercise of 
 selfishness. Yet in holding the position, that all the sins man- 
 kind do and shall commit, are necessary to the glory of God, 
 itui-al necessity, they hold, as we have shown, that al* 
 
341 
 
 fcind do and shall commit, are necessary 
 to the glory of God by a natural necessi- 
 ty, it is, as we have shown, absolutely im- 
 possible that they should perform any act 
 from benevolence towards God, or other 
 beings; and absolutely impossible, by a 
 natural necessity, that they should not. in 
 all their conduct, act from entire selfish- 
 ness ; it is demonstrable, that the 
 which mankind do and shall commit, an* 
 not neee^ary to the ^Inry of God by a 
 natural ncce-<ity. For if it is absolutely 
 impo>sih!e. by a natural n<-< that 
 
 mankind, in any of their conduct, should 
 act from benevolence towards God or 
 other beings, then they plainly cannot he 
 under any ohli^ufinn, in anv of their eon- 
 duct, to act from benevolence. But man- 
 kind are under perfect obligation, in all 
 their conduct, to act from he,ir\ol< 
 towards God and other bein^. For God 
 requires them, in all their conduct, to act 
 from benevolence towards Himself and 
 other beings. His law is, " Thou shalt 
 love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, 
 
 r*ankind are under a perfect iiatur . in all 
 
 from mere - ;ind therefore h<ld virtually, that 
 
 all hoi, 
 
 ness ; or else, that mankind never exercise any holiness : and 
 hold also virtually, that men aie perfectly excusable ami 
 fiable in acting from pure selfishness. 
 
 29* 
 
342 
 
 and with all thy soul, and with all thy 
 strength, and with all thy mind ; and thy 
 neighbour as thyself." And an apostle 
 assures us, that " love is the fulfilling of 
 the law." That this love is benevolence, 
 arid not the love of character, is apparent 
 from our being required to exercise it to- 
 wards all mankind, without respect to 
 their character. As the character of most 
 of them is entirely sinful, God cannot have 
 required us to love their character. The 
 love He requires must be good will; or 
 love to them as beings simply, consider- 
 ed abstractly from their character. That 
 tin* Ime to God is benevolence, is seen 
 too from our being directed, whether we 
 eat, or drink> or whatever we do, to do 
 all to His glory. 
 
 But if mankind are under perfect obli- 
 gation to be actuated in all their conduct 
 by benevolence towards God and other 
 beings, then there can be no natural im- 
 possibility that they should act from be- 
 nevolence, and no natural necessity of 
 their acting in all their conduct from pure 
 selfishness; since such a necessity woukl 
 be inconsistent with that obligation. And 
 if there is no natural impossibility of their 
 acting from benevolence tow r ards God 
 and^other beings, in any case, then there 
 
can be no natural necessity that mankind 
 should commit all the sins which they do f 
 and shall commit, in order to a perfect 
 display of the divine glory; since, as we 
 have shown, were there such a necessity t 
 that mankind should commit all those 
 sins, it would render it impossible, by a 
 natural necessity, that they should in any 
 case act from benevolence towards God. 
 or other beings. But il there is no natural 
 necessity that mankind should commit all 
 the sins they do and shall commit, in or- 
 der to a perfect display of the divine 
 glory; then the ne< -rs>ity of their sins 
 does not arise from any thing peculiar to 
 their nature, but solely from the consider- 
 ation, that mankind, in the circumstances 
 in which they are placed, rhoo-e to com- 
 mit them, in-lead oi ' \ieldi:g obedience 
 to the divine law. Hut it' all that render* 
 their Blflfl m cessary to a perfect di-play 
 of the divine glory is. that mankind choose 
 to commit ttu m, instead of yielding obe- 
 dience to the divine law. then it follows, 
 that were mankind to yield a perfect obe- 
 dience to the divine law, their sins would 
 not be necessary to the di\ ine glory ; and 
 if, by their yielding a perfect obedience, 
 th^ir sins would not be necessary to a 
 perfect display of the divine glory, then 
 
344 
 
 their obedience would be as good mate- 
 rials as their disobedience is, for a perfect 
 display of the divine glory ; and thence 
 the same sum of glory would redound to 
 God from the system of events which 
 would then exist, as results to Him from 
 the system of events that now exists. 
 
 The question may perhaps be asked in 
 regard to the whole of our reasoningin sup- 
 port of this proposition If a perfect obe- 
 dience from mankind would constitute as 
 good materials as their disobedience does, 
 for a perfect display of the divine glory; 
 and if the same sum of glory would re- 
 dound to God from the system of events, 
 which would then exist, as does from the 
 present system why does not God cause 
 them to yield Him a perfect obedience? 
 Why does he suffer them to rebel, and all 
 that evil to exist, which is the conse- 
 quence of their rebellion ? If no more 
 good now exists than would exist, if man- 
 kind yielded a perfect obedience to His 
 law, would it not be much better to make 
 them yield such an obedience, and not 
 permit any moral or natural evil to exist 
 in our world ? 
 
 To this we reply, that our proposition 
 is, that were mankind, in the circumstances 
 
345 
 
 in which they are actually placed, to yield a 
 perfect obedience, then their obedience 
 would be as good materials as their dis- 
 obedience is, for a perfect display of the 
 divine glory; that is, if they would yield 
 that obedience, while He employs only 
 that specific quantity of means which He 
 now employ?, to induce them to \ ieKI such 
 an obedience; and while an obedience 
 is attended with all ihr difficulties with 
 which it is now attended. Our proposi- 
 tion dues not affirm, that any suppbsa- 
 ble obedience whatever from mankind 
 would be as good nriteri U us their dis- 
 obedience is for a perfect display of the 
 glory of God, without any consideration, 
 whether or not lie must place them in 
 different cirriimstunres from -those in 
 which they now exist, in order to lead 
 them to that obedience ; that i-. whether 
 or not He must use a much greater quan- 
 tity of means, than He now employs, to 
 lead them to yield that obedience. I If 
 r iiinot use any more means than He now 
 employs to induce them to yield Him a 
 perfect obedience, without placing them 
 in circumstances different from those in 
 which they now exist. And since, if they 
 are not disposed, under the influence of 
 that quantity of means He now employs 
 
346 
 
 to yield Him obedience, He cannot lead 
 them to yield Him obedience without ern- , 
 ploying a larger quantity of means He 
 cannot lead them to yield Him obedience 
 without placing them in new circumstan- 
 ces. 
 
 The reason, therefore, that although 
 were they to yield Him, in the circum- 
 stances in which they are now placed, a 
 perfect obedience, it would be as good 
 materials as their disobedience is for a 
 perfect display of His glory, still God 
 does not cause them to yield a perfect 
 obedience, is, that He cannot cause them 
 to yield such an obedience without plac- 
 ing them in circumstances different from 
 those in which they now exist. The obe- 
 dience, which would be as good mate- 
 rials for a perfect display of His glory, as 
 their disobedience is, is an obedience 
 rendered in the precise circumstances in 
 which they now exist; that is, an obe- 
 dience rendered while they are subjected 
 to the precise quantity of influence of 
 every kind to which they are now sub- 
 jected. An obedience, therefore, render- 
 ed in any other circumstances, were He 
 supposed to lead them to render it, would 
 not he the obedience which, according 
 to the proposition, would be as good ma- 
 
847 
 
 terials for a perfect display of His ^l 
 as their disobedience is. 
 
 Is the question asked, Granting that 
 God in order to lead mankind to yield a 
 perfect obedience, must use a greater 
 quantity of means to lead them to yield 
 it, than He now employs; and that by 
 using a greater quantity of means, lie 
 Would place ihrm in circumstances dif- 
 ferent from those in \\lii, h they now ex- 
 ist; still if, were th"y to yield a periect 
 obedience, in t!ie cin ? ?efl in wfiich 
 
 they no\v <-\i-t. it uo'iM he as ^ood ma- 
 ils as their di-ohrdirnre i^, for ;i per- 
 fect display of Jlis glory, why would not 
 an obedience al>o. vieltled in those cir- 
 cumstances in which Me niu^t place mnn- 
 kinil, in order that the) may be induced 
 to yield that obedienc 
 
 To this we reply, that the value of an 
 obedience from mankind, as a means of 
 diftplayiag the divine glory, depends on 
 the degree of love to God which is in- 
 volved and expressed in that obedience. 
 An obedience expressing or involving the 
 exercise of an hundred cl of love 
 
 to God, is worth an hundred times more 
 than an obedience involving the exercise 
 of only one degree of love to Him. Thus 
 the obedience of Abram, in offering his 
 
348 
 
 son Isaac, because it involved and ex- 
 pressed a high degree of love to God, 
 was of much greater value than a com- 
 mon act of obedience. But the degree 
 of love involved and expressed in an act 
 of obedience depends on the quantity of 
 means, or of influence, which is employ- 
 ed to br\>i% that act into existence. An 
 act performed under only one degree of 
 influence to excite to its performance, is 
 worth an hundred times as much as a 
 similar act performed under an hundred 
 degrees of influence to excite to its per- 
 formance. Thus a given overt act of per- 
 fect obedience to God from a h'eathen, 
 would involve a much higher degree of 
 love to God, than a similar overt act 
 from one enjoying the knowledge of the 
 gospel. A heathen seeing only a dim 
 vision of the divine Being, must love what 
 lie sa\v, in order to yield Him a perfect 
 obedience, much more strongly than a 
 person enjoying the knowledge of the 
 gospel would a similar exhibition of the 
 divine Being, if aH he saw of Him was 
 only sufficient to lead him to perform that 
 act. Were the whole heathen world, in 
 the circumstances in which they exist, to 
 yield a perfect obedience to the Most 
 High, observing the law of beaevolence 
 
349 
 
 in all their conduct; that ohedience 
 would involve and express a much high- 
 er degree of love to God, and much high- 
 er moral excellence, than a similar obe- 
 dience would from those who live under 
 the reign of the gospel, if all the know- 
 ledge they possess, and all the influence 
 exerted on them to induce them to obey, 
 were only sufficient to induce them to 
 yield that obedic: < < k . For it' all the 
 knowledge of God, His will, and His pur- 
 poses, which they possess, and all the in- 
 fluence exerted on them to induce them 
 to obey, were only sufficient to induce 
 them to yield that obedience; then place 
 them in circumstances, in which they 
 should be subjected to a less iniluence, 
 prompting them to obedience, as in cir- 
 cinn-tances like those of the headien, 
 and they would not \ield obr'dioncc. On 
 the other hand, place the heal- en, sup- 
 posed in their present circumstances to 
 yield such an obedience, under all the 
 light and influence exerted on the others, 
 and which are barely sufficient to pro- 
 duce obedience in them; and tin.* hea- 
 then would rise to a more exalted obe- 
 dience, and display a higher degree of 
 moral excellence. They would love all 
 the divine character, then revealed to 
 30 
 
350 
 
 their view, as intensely as they did that 
 part of it they saw before. 
 
 As then the value of an act of obedi- 
 ence, as a means of displaying the divine 
 glory, depends on the degree of love in- 
 volved and exercised in it, and the de- 
 gree of love depends on the quantity of 
 influence which is employed to excite to 
 its performance ; it is apparent, that the 
 value of an act of obedience depends on 
 the quantity of means employed to excite 
 to that act. An act which only the influ- 
 ence of a given quantity of means was re- 
 quired to excite, is of greater worth than 
 a similar act which the influence of a 
 greater quantity of means was required 
 to excite. 
 
 Were mankind then to yield a perfect 
 obedience under that share of influence 
 now exerted on them to excite them to 
 obedience, their obedience would be of 
 greater worth, as a means of displaying 
 the divine glory, than an obedience which 
 a more powerful influence was required to 
 excite them to perform. An obedience in 
 their present circumstances would involve 
 and express a higher degree of love to the 
 Most High, it being more spontaneous, 
 than an obedience which a larger quan- 
 tity of influence was required to excite ; 
 
351 
 
 it would be a much more strong and ex- 
 pressive testimony to His worthiness of a 
 perfect obedience from mankind, and 
 constitute a larger tribute of praise to 
 lli^ character and His government, and 
 therefore be more glorious to Him. 
 
 The reason, then, that though an obe- 
 dience from mankind in the circumstan- 
 ces in which they now e\i-t. would h 
 good materials ns tin ir di-<hedi i nce is 
 for a perfect display of the divine glory; 
 still an obedience rendered under that 
 increased degree oT influence, which God 
 im:-t use to lead them to that obedi< 
 would not be, is, that from the 
 quantity of influence that would be re- 
 quired to excite that obedience.it \\ 
 
 [Ve :uid express a i ^ree of love 
 
 to God, and therefore be less gloriou 
 Him. 
 
 These several arguments then, demon- 
 strate the truth of the position, that did 
 mankind yield, in the circumstances in 
 which they exist, a perfect obedience to 
 the divine government, their obedience? 
 would be as good material- as their dis- 
 obedience is, for a perfect display of the 
 divine glory; and the same sum of glory 
 would result to the Most High from the 
 system of events which would then exist 
 
352 
 
 as redounds to Him from the system of 
 events that now exists. And if this be 
 true of mankind, it is likewise true, un- 
 doubtedly, of all sinful beings. 
 
 We are now prepared to show, by 
 deductions from the truth thus esta- 
 blished, the erroneousness of the peculiar 
 views entertained by those whom we op- 
 pose, on the subject of moral evil. We 
 shall also take the liberty of directing 
 the eye of our readers from the point, to 
 which we have conducted them, over 
 some other fields of theological truth, in- 
 volved, according to the ordinary exhibi- 
 tions of them, in some obscurity ; in the 
 persuasion that, contemplated in their 
 relation to this subject, they will be seen 
 somewhat more clearly. We shall pre- 
 sent for consideration, likewise, some 
 thoughts as conclusions from the whole 
 subject. 
 
 First. If the position we have endea- 
 voured to demonstrate be true, then it is 
 apparent, that the sins of mankind are 
 not necossary to the glory of God by a 
 natural necessity. The reason of their 
 existing is not that they are from their 
 nature necessary to the glory of God, 
 and that His glory could not possibly by 
 any means be perfectly displayed, if those 
 
353 
 
 sins were not to exist: for we have 
 shown, that a perfect obedience from 
 mankind, in the circumstances in which 
 they exist, would be as good materials as 
 their disobedience is, for a perfect dis- 
 play of the divine glory. Their disobe- 
 dience, therefore, is no more necessary 
 on account of its nature to the divine 
 glory, than their obedience is. And were 
 mankind to yield a perfect obedience, 
 their disobedience would not be neces- 
 sary to the divine glory, by any nece-M- 
 ty whatever. The only ground of neces- 
 sity, that either their obedience or diso- 
 bedience should exist, in order to adisplay 
 of the divine glory, is, that materials are 
 necessary to a display of that glory. And 
 since their obedience would be as ood 
 materials as their disobedience is, for a 
 perfect display of that glory, no necessi- 
 ty arises out of the nature of either of 
 them, that that should exi<t instead of: he 
 other, in order that that display might be 
 made. And si. (- o ' oi them is, m far 
 as it respects its natin '''ri- 
 
 als ns the other, for (hat displ . \. :!r-n if 
 either of them eiitted there u. :?.!(! then 
 exiM all the materials uhich are IK- 
 sary to a* perfect dispL y of the divine 
 glorv ; and there would be no necessity 
 30* 
 
354 
 
 that the other should exist in order to that 
 display. If, therefore, mankind were to 
 yield a perfect obedience to God, their 
 disobedience would riot then, by any ne- 
 cessity whatever, be necessary to a per- 
 fect display of His glory. 
 
 The sins of mankind, therefore, exist, 
 not because from their nature they are 
 indispensable to a perfect display of 
 the divine glory ; but simply, because 
 mankind, in the circumstances in which 
 they exist, choose to commit them, in- 
 stead of yielding a perfect obedience to 
 the divine government. That is, they 
 exist only by a mora/, not a natural ne- 
 cessity. And the only reason that God 
 permits them to come into existence as 
 they do is, that He cannot lead mankind 
 to yield a perfect obedience, without em- 
 ploying such a quantity of means as is 
 inconsistent with a perfect display of His 
 glory. 
 
 Sin is of no more value to the extent to 
 which it exists, nor to any extent, than 
 holiness as a means of displaying the di- 
 vine glory. It is no more necessary, that 
 mankind should commit the sins they do, 
 nor that they should commit any sins, 
 that the glory of God may be perfectly 
 displayed, than it is, that they should sin 
 
355 
 
 in all the instances in which they yield 
 obedience, that His glory may be dis- 
 played. All that can be said in favour 
 of it is, that existing to the extent, and in 
 the circumstances in which it does in our 
 world, the evils naturally resulting from 
 it, are not irremediable; God is able to 
 and does overrule it, in such a manner, 
 that on the whole the same sum of glory 
 re-nits to Him from the system of events 
 that now eiiaUh as would result to Him 
 WITO mankind to yield Him a perfect 
 obedience. 
 
 If then, the sins of mankind are not ne- 
 cessary to the glory of God, mankind are 
 not under any obligation to rejoiee in 
 their e\i As neither the glory of 
 
 God is displayed, nor the L:ood of His 
 kingdom promoted to an\ greatrr extent, 
 than they would be. were none of those 
 sins committed ; no ground of rejoicing 
 that they are committed exists. 
 
 And godly sorrow for sin, therefore, 
 does not exclude sorrow for the existence 
 of sin, but actually includes it. For god- 
 ly sorrow for sin must bo, either sorrow 
 for the existence of sin in general, or sor- 
 row for the existence of our own sins, or 
 sorrow for sin, in itself considered, or sor- 
 row for the motives from which sinful acts 
 
356 
 
 are committed, or part or all of them uni- 
 ted. But sorrow for sin in any of those 
 respects would, as we have shown, in- 
 clude sorrow for the existence of sin. 
 And since godly sorrow for sin necessa- 
 rily includes sorrow for its existence, 
 mankind are under all the obligation to 
 exercise sorrow for the existence of sin, 
 that they are to exercise godly sorrow 
 for sin. The obligation of mankind to sor- 
 row that they have committed the sins 
 which they have committed, is as great 
 as their obligation was not to have com- 
 mitted those sins. For whatever consti- 
 tutes a ground of obligation not to have 
 committed those sins, constitutes a rea- 
 son for sorrow that they have committed 
 them. 
 
 The fact that God institutes such a 
 system of measures in regard to their 
 sins, that He secures as large a display 
 of His glory as would exist, were man- 
 kind perfectly obedient, no more annihi- 
 lates, nor diminishes their obligation most 
 deeply to lament that they have commit- 
 ted those sins, than it does their obliga- 
 tion not to have committed them. 
 
 They cannot, indeed, if they have a 
 proper sense of their obligations, avoid 
 feeling a lively sorrow, that they have 
 
357 
 
 violated them. As a proper sense of 
 their obligations will awaken an ardent 
 desire to comply with them, so it will ex- 
 cite an ardent wish that they always had 
 complied with them, and therefore a live- 
 ly sorrow for the violation of them. And 
 as mankind are bound to feel a proper 
 sense of their obligation to yield a period 
 obedience to the Most Hi^h. they are 
 therefore ccjnnlh hound to lament deeply 
 that they have not yielded ih; I obedi- 
 c nee. Thus the |M'-i f inn of those whom 
 we oppose, respecting the ncccs-ii- 
 sin, is shown to bo en'moous; HIM! 
 the several they deduce from 
 
 it, respecting the feelings \\ith which mo- 
 ral evil should be contemplated by iii''n. 
 Secondly. If a perfect obedience from 
 kind, in the circum-i 
 
 * ould be as good material- for 
 n perfect dUplay of the glory of Go. 1 
 their disob* is; and if, therefore, 
 
 sin is not n< v to His glory by a na- 
 
 tural itv. then mankind are not. 
 
 those teaeh \\houi we oppose, under obli- 
 gation to be willing to be everlastin^lv 
 the enemies of (i<>-l. in order that Hi- 
 glory may be pnn-oiod. A> all the sins 
 they \\ould couj:>,it. were they to be for 
 ever the enemies of God, are not at all 
 
358 
 
 necessary to His glory, and would not 
 promote it to any greater degree than a 
 pr.-foct obedience from them would, no 
 ground exists for desiring that those sins 
 should be committed, in order that the 
 glory of God may be promote I, and 
 therefore no motive for being willing to 
 be enemies to God for ever for that pur- 
 pose. And as there is no reason or mo- 
 tive whatever for being willing to be ene- 
 mies to God for ever to promote His glo- 
 ry, mankind are not under obligation to 
 be willing to be His enemies for ever to 
 promote His glory. They are no more 
 under obligation to be willing to be His 
 enemies to promote His glory, than they 
 are to be willing to be any thing else 
 which is not at all necessary to promote 
 His glory. But, on the contrary, they are 
 under the highest obligation not to be wil- 
 ling to be His enemies for ever. They 
 are under all the obligation not to be wil- 
 ling to be His enemies, that they are to be 
 willing to be His friends. They are un- 
 der all the obligation not to be willing to 
 commit all the sins they would commit 
 should they be His enemies for ever, that 
 they are to be willing to exercise all the 
 holiness they would exercise should they 
 yield Him a perfect obedience for ever. 
 
339 
 
 As they are under the highest obligation 
 never to sin against Him, so they are un- 
 der the highest obligation never to be 
 willing to sin against, but ever to choose 
 to yield Him a complete obedience. For 
 not being willing to be His enemies, and 
 to sin against Him, and being willing to 
 be His friends, and ever to yield Him a 
 perfect obedience, are precisely the same 
 tiling. 
 
 Those, therefore, whom we oppose, err 
 in teaching, that unconditional submis- 
 sion to God includes a willingness to be 
 1 1 is enemies, and the objects of His wrath 
 for ever, to promote His glory. For since 
 mankind are under the highest obligation 
 not to exercise a willingness to be the 
 enemies of God for ever, to ex< rabc such 
 \viHiniM;r i- rebellion against Him. in- 
 stead of submission to Ili> \\ill. And they 
 err also in making a willingness to be His 
 rnrmies for ever, lor the promotion of His 
 glory, a test of piety ; since the exercise 
 of such a willingness is the most unmixed 
 rebellion against Him, instead of obedi- 
 ence. And therefore all the conclusions 
 respecting Christian character, which 
 have been formed by making that willing- 
 ness a test of piety, have been false con- 
 clusions; and all the hopes of heaven, 
 
360 
 
 which have been built on the exercise of 
 that willingness as an evidence of piety, 
 have been false hopes. 
 
 Thirdly. The atonement was made for 
 all mankind. It constituted a provision 
 for the pardon of ail of them, if they would 
 accept it. It was made for them as mo- 
 ral agents; and removed every obstacle 
 out of the way except the enmity of their 
 hearts, and left nothing to do to gain sal- 
 vation, but to change their conduct from 
 rebellion to obedience, by complying with 
 the Gospel. In proof of this it rn^iy be 
 observed, that salvation through the 
 atonement is offered to all mankind, and 
 all arc required to accept it; and, as we 
 have shown, were all to comply with that 
 requisition, it would be perfectly consist- 
 ent with the highest glory of God. But 
 the compliance of all with the Gospel, 
 would not be consistent with His glory, 
 unless the atonement was made for all. 
 For God has promised to save all who 
 yield obedience to the Gospel ; and were 
 all mankind to yield UK obedience re- 
 quired, He would be u : uJer obligation, 
 from His promise, to confer the blessings 
 of salvation on them all. Were the atone- 
 ment then made for only a part of man- 
 kind, He would be necessitated to save 
 
361 
 
 the rest, did they obey the Gospel as they 
 are required and bound to do, without an 
 atonement. But that would not be con- 
 sistent with His glory, but would spread 
 clouds of impenetrable darkness over the 
 whole glory of the work of redemption, 
 and destroy, in the view of His creatures, 
 the proofs of the perfection of His moral 
 character. For. I st. in -a\ iiiir a part of man- 
 kind without an atonement lor their sins, 
 He would virtually declare that no atone- 
 ment was nece.^ary for the salvation of 
 the others, and exhibit Him-clf as having 
 acted unwisely iri providing an atonement 
 for them. If the sins of a part of mankind 
 could be forgiven without expiation, 
 where could he the necessity of an expi- 
 ation for those of the other pr.rt? If He 
 could open the <;atcs of heaven to a part 
 of our race without a Mediator, why not 
 to the re 
 
 2dly. Were He to grant salvation 
 lo any without an atonement for their sins, 
 He would violate the pledge given to this 
 and other worlds, in the penalty of the 
 law. that sin should not escape the ex- 
 pression of His displeasure. In annexing 
 the penalty to the law, He expressed the 
 purpose, were it violated, of vindicating 
 His rights, and maintaining the honour oi* 
 His government. But where would be 
 31 
 
362 
 
 the execution of that threatening, if part 
 of mankind were saved without an atone- 
 ment ? Would such an omission of it, and 
 such a disregard to the claims of justice, 
 be consistent with His glory ? Would it 
 not occasion the rest of the universe to 
 ask, Where, in respect to those of man- 
 kind whose sins are thus left unexpiated 
 and unpunished, are the proofs that the 
 moral Governor regards rebellion as such 
 an infringement of His rights as His law 
 exhibits it ; or that it is necessarily incom- 
 patible with the happiness of creatures; 
 or that the penalty shall be executed on 
 those who may in future choose to trans- 
 gress ? 
 
 3dly. In saving any with their guilt 
 unexpiated, He would pronounce a sen- 
 tence of justification on their guilt. No 
 atonement having been made for them, 
 He could not save them from respect to 
 any thing out of themselves ; and, regard- 
 ing their character solely, to accept them 
 as meet for the heavenly inheritance, 
 would be to pronounce on them a sen- 
 tence of entire approbation. But would 
 it be consistent with His glory so to jus- 
 tify rebellion, and declare it to be worthy 
 of such a reward ? or thus to abandon 
 His law, and pronounce the institution of 
 it unwise? or, by exhibiting such a pros- 
 
363 
 
 perl not only of impunity but of approba- 
 tion ai ! r 'svarJ, to present to the rest of* 
 the uiii\ ment to rebellion ? 
 
 I'ii'v. In Caving them for accepting 
 Christ Ji -i:s as their atoning sacrifice, in 
 obedience to the requisition of the Gos- 
 pel, He would act precisely as though He 
 saved them out of respect to the atone- 
 ment of Christ : ;,:< ! thereby virtually de- 
 clare, f was 
 made for them as well as tl 
 kind. But if the atoir 
 no relation whatever to them, wuuld it be 
 consistent \\ith His glory to save ti 
 from respect t<, t. or to de- 
 clare that He did ? \Vouid ii. ' 
 for accepting a ; -ovided for 
 prafi not provided for them? 
 
 "Is to accept ofChr 
 atonement , lor th< 
 
 ,'iy on the ^rrinid of ttieir 
 acceptance, grant them u an i-.ihcritanco 
 among them that are sanctified ?"' 
 
 It would not then be consistent with 
 
 the glory of God to save all mankind, 
 
 they to yield a perfect obedience to 
 
 the Gospel, unless the atonement of Christ 
 
 was made for all. Hut we have* proved 
 
 it to be consistent with His glory (< 
 
 all, should they actually comply with the 
 
 pel. Our proof of that truth, tiirre- 
 
364 
 
 lore, involves proof that the atonement 
 was made for all. 
 
 Fourthly. Since it is an obedience from 
 mankind, in the identical circumstances 
 in which they exist, that would be per- 
 fectly glorious to God, and not an obe- 
 dience in other circumstances, it is appa- 
 rent that no objection can be made to his 
 bettevoleuce, because he does not cause 
 them to yield him a perfect obedience. 
 As mankind are not disposed to yield him 
 a perfect obedience, in the circumstances 
 in which they now exist, He cannot cause 
 them to yield Him a perfect obedience 
 without employing a more powerful iri- 
 iluence, exciting them to obedience, and 
 thereby placing them in different circum- 
 stance?. But an obedience, which such 
 an increased ii}fhoncc was required to 
 excite, would not, as has been shown, be 
 as good materials for a display of His 
 glory, as an obedience rendered under 
 only that degree of influence which is now 
 exerted on them. It would not express 
 so much love to him, nor be so high a tes- 
 timony to the rectitude of his authority, 
 and the reasonableness of his laws, and to 
 His worthiness of such a service from man- 
 kind. Nor, since it would not be as good 
 materials for the display of His glory, as 
 an obedience in their present circum- 
 
365 
 
 stances, would it be as good materials as 
 their present disobedience is for that end. 
 It would not be consistent with His glory, 
 therefore, to exert on them an influence 
 causing them to yield Him a perfect obe- 
 dience, nor any greater influence of that 
 kind than that to which they are now 
 subjected ; for it would prevent a per- 
 fect display of His glory. The system of 
 events which would then exi-t would not 
 be as good materials foradUplav of His 
 glory aa cither the system \\hich now 
 is, or that Astern which would exist, 
 were mankind, in their present circum- 
 btances to yield a perfect obedience to 
 His will. 
 
 And as it would be inconsistent with 
 'l' s glory* so >t would be with His h< 
 volence, to exert on mankind such an iri- 
 tlueiu r. t anting them t<> \ ieK! i lim B per- 
 fect obedience. Perfect benevolence 
 will k'ad Him to (hat course >f adminis- 
 tration which shall secun .ret dis- 
 play of His ijory. For He displays His 
 glory by doing good, or promoting happi- 
 ness; and promoting happiness is exer- 
 cising benevolence. The display of His 
 glory and the exercise of His benevolence 
 are precisely commensurate; and that 
 course of administration therefore, which 
 secures a perfect display of His glory, 
 
366 
 
 will involve the exercise of perfect bene- 
 volence. As then, to exert on mankind 
 an influence causing them to yield a per- 
 fect obedience, would be inconsistent with 
 a perfect display of His glory, so it would 
 be equally inconsistent with the exercise 
 of perfect benevolence. Benevolence 
 forbids, instead of requiring that He 
 should exert such an influence on them. 
 
 God has thus made all the provision for 
 the perfect obedience of cpankind, which 
 perfect benevolence required Him to 
 make. He exerts on them all the in- 
 fluence exciting* them to holiness, which 
 it is consistent with benevolence to exert. 
 No objection, therefore, against His per- 
 fect benevolence can be made from His 
 not causing men to yield Him a perfect 
 obedience, by exerting on them a more 
 powerful influence. He has raised all 
 the barriers against the introduction of 
 e*in into the world which benevolence 
 could rear. 
 
 It may perhaps be still objected that, 
 granting that as mankind are, existing in 
 the circumstances in which they do exist, 
 it is inconsistent with perfect benevolence 
 for God to exert on them any greater in- 
 fluence than He now exerts on them, ex- 
 citing them to obedience; yet may it not 
 have been inconsistent with perfect bene- 
 
367 
 
 volence to have placed them in circum- 
 stances in which it would be incompati- 
 ble with benevolence to exert on them 
 an influence that should cause them to 
 yield a perfect obedience? 
 
 To this we reply If (led conducts to- 
 wards mankind with perfect benevolence, 
 in the circumstances in which they now 
 exist, we are bounl to draw the conclu- 
 sion, that K 1 with perfect benevo- 
 lenee al-o in placing them in tlm^e cir- 
 cum-ta, !f we see nothing in his 
 conduct which is not perfectly hen- 
 lent, we have no ground to infer that any 
 of His conduct i^ not peiv-ctlv do. If all 
 
 that we understand of His administration 
 
 rfectly benevolent, we arc hound to 
 conclude, that all that \\ith which we are 
 not entirely acquainted i- also prrfrctly 
 l)ene\olent. \'. inkiml indeed the 
 
 Only ord'T of h IQ the uni\<-iM . \\e 
 
 are unahle to decide that benevolence 
 would not demand their bein^ placed in 
 precisely the circum-tanee> in \\ Inch they 
 are placed. The rijrht belongs to the 
 Most Hi^h. as their Creator ;,nd Moral 
 (iosernor. of placing them in circumstan- 
 ces of trial, that it may be seen by expe- 
 riment whether they love Him as they 
 ou^lit, and will choose Him above every 
 thing else. And there is a necessity of 
 
368 
 
 His exercising that right, since there 
 would be an impropriety in His bestow- 
 ing on them the gift of His everlasting 
 favour before they had given any proof 
 that they would yield Him their everlast- 
 ing love. And who can say that a fair 
 and decisive trial of their character could 
 be made without placing them in circum- 
 stances like those in which they are plac- 
 ed. In order that they should be deci- 
 sively tested, would it not be necessary 
 that God should withdraw from them all 
 the assisting influences of His Spirit, and 
 leave them under all the influence which 
 the devil and the world could exert in 
 them, to make their choice between Him 
 and His works, of their portion? Could 
 it be shown, that they would love Him 
 with all their hearts in all circumstances, 
 and were therefore worthy to be crowned 
 with the high rewards of His kingdom, 
 unless they had shown that they would, 
 by actually loving Him with all their 
 hearts, when subjected to the most pow- 
 erful temptation that could be presented 
 to them. 
 
 But if, were mankind the only order of 
 beings in the universe, benevolence would 
 not require that they should be placed in 
 circumstances of trial like those in which 
 they are now placed ; yet, as there are 
 undoubtedly innumerable other orders, 
 
309 
 
 each of which is probably placed in cir- 
 cumstances peculiar to itself, who can 
 find it difficult to believe that benevo- 
 lence should require mankind to be 
 placed in those peculiar circuipstan< * s 
 in v. Inrh t! -t. 
 
 Fifthlj. If our proposition be true, th'-n 
 it mil be secii at the day of judgment, 
 
 :1 ll'i* ?:' or.ll 
 
 and 
 
 . and the bi 
 
 1 of all iM-ii.kiui!. ha\r always ! 
 ; t with c, l-'or 
 
 the course whi i in ,/,! the < IK 
 
 in \N iiicii lhc\ h -i\c bee. i pl.-.rrJ, He 
 iiicd them to pur-'u . \'onld. hud they 
 
 io [Mir- ; ueto'l them 
 
 all io perfect and eternal ' 
 and at tl ae been perfect U 
 
 riou- to Him. The f. im of j; lory 
 
 Mou!d 1, ' t ) 1 !i: Milts 
 
 from the prrsmt .-v.-l.-m of events; and 
 they. in?teivl of liein^. without exception, 
 the victims of misery in this world, and 
 perishing for ever in iimnin<T;tI>ie multi- 
 tudes, would all have been crowned with 
 perfect and e\ ( i I,;-lini( safety and happi- 
 
 As He required them to be actuated 
 by perfect benevolence to Him and all 
 other beings, so lie will be seen to have 
 
370 
 
 been actuated by it towards them in all 
 the measures of His moral and providen- 
 tial government. 
 
 He will be seen to have made as ample 
 provision in all those measures, for their 
 happiness, in proportion to its value, as 
 He did foi'His own and the happiness of 
 His kingdom. Such provision indeed He 
 must have made, if actuated towards them 
 by benevolence. 
 
 Benevolence must have led H : n to 
 place precisely that value on their per- 
 fect happiness which really belongs to 
 it; and that is precisely the value which 
 belongs to the same sum of happiness, 
 enjoyed by any being or beings. It must 
 have led Him, therefore, to consult their 
 happiness as much, according to its value, 
 as His ovn and the happiness of other 
 beings, and to make as good provision 
 for it. Their perfect happiness is as de- 
 sirable, according to the quantity of it, as 
 is the perfect happiness of any being or 
 beings. It would have been inconsistent 
 with benevolence to have made no pro- 
 vision for their perfect happiness, but to 
 have placed them in circumstances in 
 which they were subjected by a natural 
 necessity to perfect and eternal misery; 
 for that would have been placing a less 
 value on their happinees than belongs to 
 
371 
 
 it, and than was placed on an equal por- 
 tion of the happiness of other beings. 
 
 Benevolence also must have led Him 
 to place precisely that value on His own 
 perfect happiness, and on that of all other 
 beings, which belongs to it; and to have 
 consulted His own happiness and that of 
 His kingdom, in proportion to their value, 
 as much as lie did the perfect happiness 
 of mankind. 
 
 And lie did thus consult His own and 
 the happiness of His kingdom, and the 
 happiness of mankind. each according to 
 their value, by requiring mankind to pur- 
 sue a course of conduct, which if pur- 
 sued would have secured the perfect 
 happiness both of God and His kingdom, 
 and of themselves. And in doin^ that. 
 lie made all the proviso?! it belonged to 
 Hiia to make for the perfect happiness of 
 mankind. 
 
 \Ve sec then, that all the object! 
 made by men against the divine benevo- 
 lence, on the ground that they are not 
 perfectly happy, are entirely ground!' 
 For if He has given to their interest* all 
 the attention to which, compared with His 
 own and the interests of all other beings, 
 they are entitled, if He has made all the 
 provision for their perfect happiness 
 which it belonged to perfect benevo- 
 
372 
 
 lence to make, then their not being per- 
 fectly happy is no ground for the conclu- 
 sion, that He is not perfectly benevolent. 
 If He has consulted their highest good, 
 as much in proportion to its value as He 
 has His own, they have no ground, if they 
 are not perfectly happy, to complain that 
 He has wantonly and unjustly sacrificed 
 their happiness to promote His own glo- 
 ry. If He has placed their perfect hap- 
 piness within their attainment, and placed 
 them under the obligation and under the 
 influence of powerful motives to accept 
 it; and if the only reason that they do 
 not possess it is, that they voluntarily re- 
 ject it, they surely have no reason to as- 
 cribe their unhappiness to a want of be- 
 nevolence in Him. Benevolence cer- 
 tainly is not obliged to force beings to be 
 happy. It is enough for it to make suit- 
 able provision for their happiness, and 
 cause their attainment of it to depend on 
 their complying with their obligations. 
 
 Sixthly: We see from the truth which 
 we have established, that all mankind, if 
 they will yield obedience to the gospel, 
 may be saved, notwithstanding God has 
 elected only a part of them to be the heirs 
 of salvation. 
 
 For since, were they to yield a perfect 
 obedience, that obedience would be as 
 good materials as their disobedience is, 
 
373 
 
 for a perfect display of God's glory, it is 
 perfectly consistent with His glory that 
 they should all accept salvation, and be- 
 come partakers of its blessings. He will 
 not be glorified any more in consequence 
 of the sins which they shall commit, and 
 by which they shall perish, than He would 
 be by their yielding a perfect obedience 
 to the gospel, and partaking of its salva- 
 tion. 
 
 And his having elected only a part of 
 mankind to salvation, does not throw any 
 obstacle in the way of the other's being 
 saved. His purpose of election is sim- 
 ply the purpose of bestowing on a cer- 
 tain portion of mankind, besides the other 
 mrans of grace, the renewing influences 
 of His spirit, by which they shall be led 
 to comply with the offers of the gospel. 
 It is not a purpose, that the others shall 
 not without those influences accept sal- 
 vation; nor that if they do, they shall not 
 be saved. Nor did God form the pur- 
 pose of applying the atonement of Christ 
 to only a part of mankind by the renew- 
 ing influences of the Spirit, because it 
 was inconsistent with His glory, that the 
 rest should be saved, if they would ac- 
 cept salvation without the Spirit's influ- 
 ences ; but simply because it was incon- 
 sistent with His glory to bestow those in- 
 32 
 
374 
 
 fluences on any more of mankind. Were 
 all the impenitent, therefore, immediately 
 to reform and comply with the gospel, 
 God would be perfectly glorified, and 
 they would all be saved, His purpose of 
 election notwithstanding; for it is per- 
 fectly consistent with His purpose of elec- 
 tion, that all mankind should comply with 
 the gospel and be saved, if they will, 
 \vithout the influence of the Spirit. The 
 door of the divine kingdom is entirely 
 open to the access of all who are not the 
 objects of His electing grace, if they are 
 disposed to enter it. JNo obstacle exists 
 on the part of the divine glory, nor of the 
 divine will, but only in their choice. All 
 objections, therefore, to the doctrine of 
 election, as though it were an obstacle to 
 the salvation of those who are not the ob- 
 jects of election; or as though it pre- 
 sented discouragements to all efforts on 
 their part to obtain salvation, are entire- 
 ly groundless. Since it is not at all God's 
 purpose of election that forms the ground 
 of certainty, that they shall not obtain 
 salvation, but wholly their choice to re- 
 ject salvation, that constitutes that ground 
 of certainty. God's purpose respecting 
 the elect has no influence whatever on 
 the non-elect. They stand on precisely 
 the same ground respecting the possibl- 
 
lily of their gaining salvation, and the 
 ground of certainty, that they will not 
 gain it, on which they would stand, if no 
 such purpose existed. 
 
 Seventhly. We see from the truth of 
 our proposition, that God does not create 
 the sinful volitions of mankind. If God 
 
 ted the sinful volitions of mankind, 
 then the reason of their < instead 
 
 of holy volitions, would not lie at all in 
 mankind themselves, a- mankind them- 
 selves would not be in any the 
 cause of the exi-ience of their volitions; 
 of course they would not be the e 
 their nature. As their volition- would 
 owe their existence solely to God, so they 
 would of course he indebted to Him 
 solely for their Ho would he the 
 soli- author of them : and ue ^Imuld look 
 to Him alone for tin- i, that they 
 were sinful. in-tead of holy volition- 
 
 But if God created all the volitions oi 
 mankind, since, as we have -liown. the 
 
 fence otVm is not at all necessary to 
 the perfect display of His glory, He would 
 never create any hut holy volitions : for 
 no possible reason could c\i-t lor Hi- 
 ever creating sinful volitions. If He 
 
 ted all the volitions of mankind, then 
 the reason of His creating one kind, in- 
 stead of the other, must lie wholly in the 
 
376 
 
 nature of those volitions. No reason for 
 creating one kind instead of the other, 
 could be found in the means necessary to 
 give them existence ; since precisely the 
 same means, His own omnipotent voli- 
 tion, and that alone, would be necessary 
 in each case ; and therefore the reason 
 for creating one kind, instead of the other, 
 must arise wholly from the nature of the 
 volitions themselves. And if any thing 
 in the nature of one class constituted a 
 reason for creating that class instead of 
 the other, it must be either a superior 
 adaptation to promote His glory; or if 
 they were equal in that respect, an in- 
 trinsic excellence of that class above the 
 other. But God could never create the 
 sinful volitions of mankind, because they 
 are better adapted than holy volitions, as 
 materials for displaying His glory ; for 
 as we have shown they are not. No 
 higher sum of glory can result to Him 
 from the existence of the sinful volitions, 
 than would result to Him from the exis- 
 tence of holy volitions in their place. If 
 then He were to create one kind of voli- 
 tions in preference to the other, it must 
 be on the ground of its possessing a su- 
 perior intrinsic excellence. But God 
 could never create sinful volitions in pre- 
 inrence to holy ones, on the ground of 
 
377 
 
 their possessing the greatest intrinsic ex 
 cellence, since they do not possess any 
 intrinsic excellence at all, but are intrin- 
 sically vile and odious, and the object of 
 His supreme hatred. But holy volitions 
 are intrinsically excellent, and the objects 
 of His entire love. Since then, if God 
 created the volitions of mankind, He 
 could never create one kind iu prefer- 
 ence to another, except il ue;e on the 
 ground of their superior inti, \cel- 
 lence; and since He could never on that 
 ground create any except holy voliti- 
 we have an infallible certainty that lie 
 does not create the sinful volition 
 mankind. 
 
 The theory, therefore, of Doctor Km- 
 m<m- re-pccfm^ Cud'- agency on man- 
 kind, by uhich he represents the Most 
 Uiii'li as creating all their actions, holy 
 and >inful, is, at least as 1-ir afritl 
 their sinful actions, entin-lv 
 
 AVu///i/y. And since God doe- not cre- 
 ate any of the sinful actions of rnunki id, 
 the proper method of exhibiting IT 
 cy respecting the existence of their sins, 
 is, after the manner of President Rd wards 
 and most Calvinistic divines, that of re- 
 pre-enting Him as permitting mankind to 
 exert their sinful actions. As C-Jod does 
 not create any of their sinful actions. He 
 32* 
 
378 
 
 is not the efficient cause of those actions ; 
 that is, they are not exerted by His power. 
 Of course they are exerted by the power 
 of mankind themselves, and mankind are 
 therefore the efficient causes of them; for 
 that being is the efficient cause of an ef- 
 fect, who possesses and exerts the power 
 by which that effect is produced. As then 
 mankind are the efficient causes of all 
 their sinful actions, it is literally true that 
 God permits them to exert those actions, 
 and philosophically correct to exhibit His 
 agency as concerned in that mariner in 
 the existence of their sins. For, in the 
 first place, God upholds mankind in exist- 
 ence, and in the possession of all the pow- 
 ers which are exerted in the exercise of 
 those actions, and thereby gives them op- 
 portunity to act. Next, He places them 
 in the circumstances in which they exist 
 at the time of exerting their sinful actions, 
 and subjects them to all the influences of 
 every kind to which they are subjected ; 
 and thereby gives them opportunity to 
 exert those particular actions which they 
 do exert. And thence, thirdly, the rea- 
 son that they exercise those sinful actions 
 instead of others, is, that He leaves them 
 to act under precisely those influences to 
 which they are subjected, instead of ex- 
 erting on them a different influence that 
 
379 
 
 would prevent their sinning, and lead 
 them to yield Him a perfect obedience. 
 He, therefore, permits them to exercise 
 their sinfui actions. 
 
 He determines the existence before 
 their minds of all the motives that exist 
 there at the time, and in the circumstan- 
 ces in which they exist, and determines 
 also the precise kind and degree of influ- 
 ence exerted by those motives; and 
 thereby constitutes a ground of certainty 
 that, unless some preventing influence is 
 interposed, they will exert nil their sinful 
 actions. And. as it is His prerogative to 
 exert that influence which would prevent 
 their sinning, and lead them to yield a 
 perfect obedience; in withholding that 
 influence. He permits them to sin in the 
 mariner in which they do. 
 
 No valid objection, therefore, can be 
 made to His conduct, in regard to the sins 
 of mankind, on the ground that it repre- 
 sents mankind thomsi Ives as the efficient 
 causes of their sinful actions, instead of 
 ascribing the efficient causation of them 
 to God ; since mankind are the efficient 
 causes of their sinful actions, and truth 
 and the divine glory demand that they 
 be represented as such. For to deny 
 that they are the efficient causes of their 
 actions, is not only to deny the fact in re- 
 
380 
 
 spect to the efficient causation of them, 
 but is also to deny that mankind are mo- 
 ral agents, and worthy of blame on ac- 
 count of their sins. And to exhibit God 
 as the efficient cause of their sinful ac- 
 tions, is not only to contradict the fact 
 respecting their efficient causation, but is 
 also to ascribe all the guilt of those sins 
 to Him. 
 
 Nor can this mode of exhibiting His 
 conduct, respecting the sins of mankind, 
 be justly or plausibly charged with re- 
 presenting mankind as exempted from the 
 Divine control in all their sinful actions, 
 and thereby contradicting the doctrine of 
 God's universal government. For man- 
 kind are no more exempted from the Di- 
 vine control by being the efficient causes 
 of their sinful actions, than they would be 
 were God the efficient cause of those ac- 
 tions. 
 
 Though they are the efficient causes of 
 their sinful actions, yet they are univer- 
 sally and absolutely dependent on God, 
 and entirely under His control. They 
 are entirely dependent on Him for exis- 
 tence, and for all the powers and proper- 
 ties which belong to their constitution. 
 It is He who upholds them and every 
 thing pertaining to their constitution by 
 the word of His power. They are, there- 
 
fore, wholly under His control, as u 
 spects their existence and all the powers 
 and properties of their constitution. They 
 are also entirely dependent on Him for 
 the mode in which they exercise their 
 powers. He lays the foundation of the 
 certainty, that all those motives shall exist 
 before their minds that do exist there, and 
 at the time and in the circumstances in 
 which they exist, and that they shall pos- 
 precisely that kind and degree of 
 influence which they do possess; and 
 thereby lays the foundation of the cer- 
 tainty that mankind shall act in precisely 
 that mode in which they do act. Man- 
 kind are therefore wholly under His con- 
 trol in respect to the mode of their act- 
 ing. And being thus entirely under His 
 control in regard to their existence and 
 all that pertains to their constitution, and 
 in regard to the mode in which they act; 
 they are as universally and absolutely 
 under His control as they can be. For. 
 their existence and the powers and pro- 
 perties of their constitution, and the ex- 
 ercise of their powers in their actions, 
 are all that can be predicated of them. 
 And if they are entirely under His con- 
 trol in regard to every tiling that can be 
 predicated of them, they are as universally 
 
382 
 
 and absolutely under His control as they 
 can he, and, therefore, as much so as 
 they would be were He the efficient 
 caus of their sinful actions. 
 
 God's government of mankind consists 
 in His placing them, (as moral agents,) by 
 an agency direct or indirect, under pre- 
 cisely all those influences in kind and 
 degree to which they are subjected, and 
 under no others whatever ; and thereby 
 laying the foundation of a certainty that 
 they sh?ill act in precisely the mode in 
 which they do act. Or it consists in His 
 subjecting them to precisely those influ- 
 ences, and no others whatever, under 
 which they voluntarily exercise their own 
 powers in exerting precisely that series of 
 actions which they do exert ; and does 
 not consist in His creating their actions. 
 And such, from the nature of moral agents, 
 must be the nature of a moral govern- 
 ment over them ; and such is the uniform 
 decision of common sense on the subject. 
 We presume no one whose common sense 
 had not been strangled by the hand oi 
 false philosophy, ever conceived of God ? s 
 government of moral agent*, as consist- 
 ing in any thing else than His determin- 
 ing the mode in which they act, or His 
 exerting such an agency respecting them, 
 fhat they in consequence of it voluntari- 
 
383 
 
 ly exercise their own power in exerting: 
 precisely that series of actions which 
 they do exert. 
 
 No foundation whatever, therefore, 
 exists for the objections?, made by those 
 \\liom we oppose, to this mode of exhi- 
 biting the conduct of God respecting the 
 sins of mankind. 
 
 Finn/ly. This subject has been the 
 theme or much erroneous reasoning and 
 incorrect belief. The number of the 
 not small, \\ ho have held the position, nor 
 
 "iilv ;i sin, ill number of conversations 
 and serm >n> been employed to prove it, 
 that all the sin which exists, and shall 
 
 t in the universe, is necessary to the 
 calory of God 1>> a natural necessity; and 
 thai had mankind orde\i.'s yielded a per- 
 fect obedience, in place of committing the 
 sins vvhiclrthey havu committed, or were 
 they hereafter to yield obedience, instead 
 
 inning, as they will sin, iln-\ would 
 ea-1 a veil over the glories of Jehovah, 
 and dry up the streams of bles-et!. 
 which How to His creatures from His 
 throne : and who, therefore, as a conse- 
 quence of that position, have held, that 
 God absolutely desires mankind and de- 
 vils to sin in all the instances in which 
 they do and shall sin ; and have laboured 
 to vindicate His benevolence, or illustrate 
 
384 
 
 His wisdom in desiring and permitting 
 sin to exist, in order that a perfect display 
 of His glory might be made ; and who 
 thence have also held, that it is the duty 
 of men and devils to rejoice in the exist- 
 ence of their sins, as the necessary means 
 of displaying the divine glory. And in 
 holding and advocating these positions, 
 they have virtually embraced and advo- 
 cated a mass of other appalling errors. 
 In holding that the sins of mankind are 
 necessary to the glory of God by a natural 
 necessity, they have virtually, as we have 
 shown, denied the perfections of God, by 
 affirming, that He has required mankind 
 to pursue a course of conduct which 
 would be unspeakably dishonourable to 
 Him, and destructive to His own and the 
 happiness of His kingdom. In holding, 
 that God does not really desire mankind 
 to yield Him obedience in any of the in- 
 stances in which they do not, and that He 
 absolutely desires them to commit all the 
 sins they do commit, they deny his vera- 
 city by charging Him with uttering a de- 
 claration that is not true, in affirming that 
 He has given to mankind in the sacred 
 volume a revelation of His will respecting 
 their conduct; and in affirming explicitly 
 in various declarations in that volume, and 
 Impliedly in all its requisitions of obe- 
 
385 
 
 dience, that lie does not de.-ire mankind 
 to sin against Him in any instance what- 
 ever, but absolutely desires them to yield 
 him a perfect obedience. In holding, that 
 mankind are under obligation to rejoice 
 in the existence of all the sins which they 
 commit, they hold, as we have sho ui, 
 that they are under obligation not to ex- 
 ercise any godly sorrow for sin; and 
 therefore charge God with inconsistency 
 in requiring them to exercise that sorrow. 
 In holding, that it would be inconsistent 
 with the glory of God for mankind to yield 
 a perfect obedience to Hi- hw, they hold, 
 as we have shown, that mankind might, in 
 the exercise of perfect benevolence, do 
 infinite injury to Him and His kingdom, 
 and thereby imolve themselves in the 
 contradiction of affirming, that perfect 
 science to\\ard> God and His king- 
 dom is not perfect benevolence towards 
 them, but malevolence. In holding, that 
 it is utterly inconsistent with the divine 
 y for mankind to yield a perfect obe- 
 dience to the divine government, they 
 hold, as has been demonstrated, that 
 mankind are totally destitute of any rule 
 of determining, prerioteljto their acting, 
 what they must do in order to promote 
 the glory of God. and thereby declare it 
 to be utterly impossible, by a natural im- 
 33 
 
386 
 
 possibility, for mankind to do any 
 from benevolence towards God or any 
 other being; and thence, that they -ire 
 under the most absolute natural necessity 
 of acting in all their conduct from perfect 
 selfishness, and so involve themselves in 
 the contradiction of affirming, that man- 
 kind are perfectly justifiable in all their 
 sinful conduct. And in attempting to de- 
 monstrate and justify these several views, 
 they have involved themselves in various 
 other absurdities; as that, there is a dif- 
 nce between a thing, in itself consi- 
 dered, and all things considered; that a 
 thing mny be absolutely good, and abso- 
 lutely evil, at the same time; that, a thing 
 may be absolutely desirable, and abso- 
 lutely undesirable at the same time; that 
 God may desire a thing, and not desire it, 
 at the same time; and that men may, at 
 the same time, be under two opposite 
 and equal obligations. 
 
 And they have not merely held these 
 contradictions to be the truth of God, but 
 have contended for them as the most im- 
 portant part of divine truth, as the very 
 bnsis on which many of the other truths 
 of the Gospel rrst, and from which they 
 derive their harmony and efficiency: have 
 made them the most essential articles in 
 a creed of orthodoxy, and poured a storm 
 of invective on all who ventured to reject 
 
387 
 
 them, as babes in knowledge, weak in the 
 faith, heretics. They have thus dese- 
 crated religion, by attempting to rend 
 away from her the robes of her simplicity 
 and purity, and compelling her to the pa- 
 rentage of these abortions of science, 
 falsely so called. 
 
 We are aware thnt we impose an un- 
 grateful task in calling them to fix the 
 itimacy on the ir.o-t I'M oinvd 
 
 ollsprmir of their tbeologtcafepecul 
 
 to renounce, as unsound, thM 
 on which they have reared no mean rcpu- 
 tatini for logical depth and adroitness ,- 
 to doom to the tlan: u<-o;l. hay. ;u,d 
 
 stubble," the multitude of sermon^ 
 logues, essays, dieaoiBitiOMt pam|!d(Ms, 
 and volumes, they have <!e\ oted to this 
 Mihjeel, and ptM'haps fondly regarded ;LS 
 (be Choicest *-^old. silver, and precious 
 Stoned among their work-. 
 
 I5ut we are ;i\vare like\\ isc\ that it is the 
 part of their Christian meeknc k ss and hu- 
 mility to weigh with attention every dis- 
 pa^ionate <-\amination of their \ie\\s; 
 and the part of their enlightened zeal to 
 seek and embrace the truth, however 
 much at variance it may be with the opi- 
 nions they have heretofore field ; and the 
 part of their love to the Redeemer, to 
 shrink from no sacrifices involved in 
 abandoning errors injurious to Him and 
 
388 
 
 His cause, and in gaining just views of His 
 character and will. And we repose on 
 their intelligence and piety the hope, that 
 the views we have exhibited, however 
 subversive of those they have been accus- 
 tomed to entertain, will commend them- 
 selves to their consciences in the sight of 
 God, as the truth, and command from 
 them an unreluctant acceptance. 
 
 We conjure them not to scorn our rea- 
 sonings, nor disregard them, till they shall 
 be able with the weapons of indubitable 
 truth to refute them; and we conjure 
 them by all the regard that should be 
 cheiished for the truth as it is in Jesus; 
 and by all the injuries which it may in- 
 flict on the cause of God, virtually to de- 
 ny His attributes and misrepresent His 
 government; and by the fears of being 
 found to have turned from the simplicity 
 of the Gospel, and taught for doctrines the 
 commandment* of men; henceforth to 
 chain the hand of sacrilege, with which 
 this subject has been assailed, and re- 
 strict their speculations and belief within 
 the limits of truth and soberness. We 
 recommend them, as brethren, to God 
 and to the word of His grace, which is 
 able to build them up, and to give them 
 an inheritance among all them which are 
 
 sanctified. 
 
 THE END. 
 
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