1060 Am Am C/J m — ^ — I r r\ ^^™ _^^^ m u ^ = 33 u = S5S 5 ^ — -^ 1 ^^ -> 6 = n =^ -r. 1 = == ^ 3 = =^^= -n 4 ^ ^i^ , ^ 4 — GP3' Ilempire THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES 'OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE." I'.Y MAJOR EVANS BELL, AUTHOR OF " THE OXUS AND THE INDUS", " RETROSPECTS AND PROSPECTS OF INDIAN policy", ETC. Reddite depositum ; pietas sua foedera servet ; Fr.ius absit ; vaonas cnedis h.abete manus." — (1\ in. LONDON : TRUBNER & CO., 8 k 60, PATERNOSTEK ROAV. 1S70. ■ , " He who woukl rightly appreciate tlie worth of personal indepen- dence as an clement of happiness, should consider the value he himself puts upon it as an ingredient of his own. There is no subject on which there is a greater habitual difference of judgment between a man judging for himself, and the same man judging for other people. "When he hears others complaining that they are not allowed freedom of action, — that tlieir own will has not sufficient influence in the re- gulation of their affairs — his inclination is to ask, what are tlieir grievances ? what positive damage they sustain ? and in what respect they consider their affairs to be mismanaged ? and if they fail to make out, in answer to these questions, what appears to him a suffi- cient case, he turns a deaf eai", and regards their complaint as the fanciful querulousness of people whom nothing reasonable will satisfy. But he has quite a different standard of judgment when he is deciding for himself. Then, the most unexceptionable administration of his in- terests by a tutor set over him, does not satisfy his feelings : his per- sonal exclusion from the deciding authority appears itself the greatest grievance of all, rendering it superfluous even to enter into the ques- tion of mismanagement. It is the same with nations. What citizen of a free country would listen to any offers of good and skilful admi- nistration, in return for the abdication of freedom ? Even if he could believe that good and skilful administration can exist among a people ruled by a will not their own, would not the consciousness of working out their own destiny under tlieir own moral responsibility be a com- pensation to his feelings for great rudeness and imperfection in the details of public affairs?" — J. S. Mill, The Suhjcdioii of Women, pp. 179, 180. IOC PREFACE. In my last revision of those pages I have been troubled by an unpleasant doubt whether, with regard to the Imperial mission of Great Britain in India, they might not, in some degree, and to some readers, convey a less grateful sense of past achieve- ments, less hopeful views of future work, than Avould be truly consonant with ray own feelings. I am desirous, therefore, of repeating here, in words that were published six years ago, that it is not because we have done so little, but because we have done so much, that I wish to see our work in India consolidated and naturalised. I can see no promise or hope of permanence anywhere but in the reformed Native State. TUai, and not the model British Province, is the mature and wholesome fruit of Imperial cultivation. " Tt is a sli-iking fact, tliat the satisfactions and mortifications of personal pride, tliough all in all to raost men when the case is their own, have less allowance made for them in the case of other people, and are less listened to as a ground or justification of conduct, than any other natural human feelings ; perhaps because men compliment them in their own case with the names of so many other qualities, that they are seldom conscious how mighty an influence these feelings exercise in their own lives." — J. S. Mill, The Suljediun of Wome)), p. 181. u OUR GEE AT VASSAL EMPIRE." During the Session of 1869 both Houses of Parhament devoted some hours to India. Our recent poHcy in Afghanistan and Central Asia was brought before the Lords on the 19th of April. The same topic was enter- tained in the House of Commons on the 9th of July. On the 23rd of that month the Duke of Argyll, as Secretary of State for India, addressed the Peers on the subject of Indian finance, confining himself entirely to receipts and dis- bursements, and schemes of railway extension. In the House of Commons Mr. Grant Dufi", the Under- Secretary of State, made the annual statement of the afiairs of "our great Vassal Empu'e" at the afternoon sitting of the 3rd, and the adjourned debate was concluded on the night of the 5th of August. On the former of these two days, Mr. P. W. Crawford, Member for the City of London and Chairman of the East Indian Railway Company, advocated the guaranty system under which the existing lines of railroad had been con- structed' in India ; deprecated export duties on raw pro- duce ; suggested some improvements in the telegraph service, and proposed the consolidation of several small loans into one large stock. Sir Stafford Northcote, Member for North Devon and Secretary of State for India in the late Conservative Ministry, recommended strict economy in the finances ; and doubted whether the Public Works Department was in a proper state to undertake the construction of rail- ways. Sir Charles Wingfield, Member for Gravesend and B 2 OUR GREAT VASSAL EMrillE. late Chief Commissioner of Oude, advised that all ex- penditure, except tliat which was extraordinary or strictly reproductive, should be met by income ; believed that the outlay on barracks in the last ten years had been "a frioflitful dram on tlie resources of India;" insisted stron^lv on the separation of executive and judicial functions, for " such a multiplicity of duties were now thrown upon a Collector that it was impossible he could get through them all except by devolving the larger share of the duties upon his assistants," and " with a view of ascertaining the opinions and feelings of the Natives, and bringing these into harmony with the acts of our officials, weighed down as they were by their various duties," recommended the establishment of " consultative Native Councils," Mr. Fowler of Penryn and Sir Wilfred Lawson of Car- lisle, two Meml)ers honourably noted for their attention to matters of general philanthropy and national morality, denoimced the opium traffic, on which one sixth of the Indian revenue depends. Colonel Sykes, Member for Aberdeen, felt convinced that the income of India was amply sufficient to meet any calls that mio-ht be made on it. After the adjournment, Sir Stafford North cote having moved for some correspondence on the subject of the ex- tension of railways in India, Mr. Graves, the Member for Liverpool, suggested that a map should be added to the return, and "regretted to see that some of those works would not be executed till 1890 or even 1900, and, if that were so, the construction of railways would be entirely inadequate to the wants of India or of this country. " Another important point," continued Mr. Graves, " was the constniction of the Council of India. If more sym- pathy were shown for commerce in that body, there would be a more prompt extension of the railway system. He thought there should be a larger mercantile element in the Council. 1'he railway system of India was not a mere Indian question. For many years we should have to look to India for cotton, and every mile of railway opened there tapped new sources of production." OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 3 The adjourned debate on the evening of the 5th of August enabled Mr. J. B. Smith, Member for Stockport, Mr. Bazley of Manchester, and Mr. Piatt of Oldham, to demand greater facilities for the supj)ly of cotton, and for conveying that staple to the coast. Mr. C B. Denison, Member for the Eastern Division of the West Riding, formerly of the Bengal Civil Service, apologised for the opium revenue ; desired more detailed explanations as to the expenditure on Public Works, the post, the telegraph, and the manufacture of small arms, and supported Mr. Crawford's views as to the guaranty system of constructing railways. Sir David Wedderburn, Member for Ayrshire, proposed certain measures for promoting the health and comfort of the British army on Indian service. All this was very well. If more railroads are wanted they had better be made and worked on the most economi- cal and efficient principles, — on some plan very different from that which has been hitherto pursued. It is highly desirable that there should be a constant and cheap supply of cotton. Of course if sixty-five thousand British troops are to be maintained in India they must be properly housed : the only question is — and here Su" Charles Wing- field again hit a blot — whether fifteen millions sterling have been judiciously expended on solid and permanent barracks during the last ten years ; whether our soldiers are not more healthy and comfortable in less costly lodgings ;* whether on military, political, and financial considerations, they might not be more effectively distributed and occu- pied in a rotation of cantonments and in moveable camps of exercise.'!' Barrack accommodation, the supply of small arms, the Post, the Electric Telegraph, the Public Works, — all these w^ere by no means inappropriate subjects of in- quiiy and remark, though scarcely worthy to have formed the chief topics of discussion. The annual inquisition of the House of Commons might w^ell have been directed less to administrative merits and defects, than to those broader and more general principles of Government, which * Appendix A. t Appendix B. B 2 4 OIH GREAT VASSAL EMPIRK, must not only control the action of every department in India, but affect the course, character, and credit of the British Eni|)ire thronohout the world. On the ^^■hole, the debates in both Houses were distin- guished by an equal dearth of reference to the tribes and nations of India, their political and social condition, and a similar adherence to home interests and departmental criticism. They contained marvellously little mention of the people, or of the only organised communities in which popular feelings and opinions can be fairly ascertained, and in ^\'hich the durable results of British tutelage can be correctly estimated — the Native States. The peculiarly material, mechanical and selfish considera- tions pervading the debate, seem to have struck in their full force one Member of long standing, much respected in the House and the country, not as a leader of party or as an eminent orator, but because — like Sir Wilfred Law- son and Mr. Fowler, whom he supported in their attack upon the opium revenue, — he is one of those men over whom the moral and religious aspects of a question are always seen to exercise an irresistible attraction. The Hon. Arthur Kinnaird, Member for Perth, said : — " The people of India miglit suppose from this discussion that in the House of Commons India was looked upon either as a ^fanchester colony or a military settlement. Was India to be f^ovcrned for her own welfare or for the sake of Manchester? No doubt cotton was a good thing, and honourable gentlemen of one idea thought that India was made for the purpose of receiving ^lanchester goods. But he did not see it. He felt some sym- jjathy for the Natives of India. ^^ The collective temper and demeanour of the House of Commons, towards India, during the past Session, can only be adequately described as apathetic and negli- gent. When the Under Secretary of State commenced speaking on the 3rd of August — the regular annual op- })ortuiiity ibr a discussion on Indian afliiirs — there were about tliii'ty-five Menibers present, which number swelled to a maximum of fifty-five by the time he had got half way through his speecli, but dvvindhjd away towards the clo.se to about forty, among whom was not one occupant OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE, 5 of the Treasury Bencli. No recognised leader, no ex- Cabinet Minister, from either side of the House, except Sir Stafford Northcote, took any part in the debate. Yet the scanty attendance on the 8rd of August is said to have constituted " the best Indian Budget house ever known." India is not governed by the British Parhament. And it would ajDpear as if the apathy of the House of Commons was a very ftiir measure of the apathy in the country. Indian affairs never once occupied the attention of either candidates or constituencies at the General Elec- tion of 1868. No pledges were exacted or offered on any subject connected with India. I can trace no manifesta- tion of political activity relating to India in any part of the United Kingdom, during the year 1869, except the proceedmgs of the Cotton Supply Association. The only events, the only projects, the only measures, affecting, or likely to affect the people of India, that seem capable of exciting any interest or discussion at home, in or out of Parliament, are those concerning the supply of cotton and the extension of railways, for the benefit of British commerce and manufactures. India is not governed by the British nation. It may be said, it has been said, especially by English- men engaged m the public service of India, that this is all just as it should be, — that India ought to be governed in India ; that even the control of the Secretary of State and his Council should be nothing more than formal super- vision ; that Parliamentary dictation is particidarly ob- jectionable ; that although the British public cannot invest too much capital m the Indian funds, in railways, and other works of utility, their mquhies and interference should be strictly limited to the disposal and security of their investments, — a field of inquuy sufficiently wide after all to include all that was to be excluded, — and that no irresponsible persons, miqualified by local observa- tion and experience, ought to meddle with the pohtics of India. It is not by acquiescing in monstrous claims of this de- scription, advanced by professional administrators, that the people of Great Britain can shake off* their national respon- G OrU GREAT \AtSSAL EMPlPvE. sibility for the defects, if there be any, in the Imperial rule of India, or gain absohition from the consequences of such defects. Tlie error that has chiefly led to these claims, and to the too frequent acquiescence in them, is that of supposing f/orcnimcut and administ ration to be identical and convertible terms. Good admmistration and good government are very difierent things, and by no means necessarily co-exist. It' we institute an analogy which may some day be found to be not unscientific, and compare a State with an indi- vidual, government may be said to be its constitution, that more or less perfect co-ordination of all the animal, moral and intellectual energies, under the guidance of a central organ, upon which, in a community as in a person, depends healthy and harmonious life. Administration would then correspond with that daily course of nutrition, clothing, ablution, and exercise, by which the wants of the organism are sujiplied. If the person, or the State, enjoys a good constitution, the means and appliances for admin- istering to its material wants may be very rude, rough, and scanty, and yet life may be vigorous and its work well performed. On the other hand, no amount of careful administration — however lavish the provision, however exquisite the apparatus — can rectify a constitution that is inherently bad, or spoiled by long abuse. If some energies are greatly in excess, and others quite deficient, if some faculties have been over-cultivated, and others utterly suppressed, if a limb or muscle has been too long in un- natural repose, or dependent on foreign support, — harmony will not be restored to the unbalanced functions by merely palliative measures : there must be a constitutional change, a refoiTii in the Government. " They manage these matters better in France", is still true to a very considerable extent. In many departments of the public sei'vice France is more skilfully and more fnigally administered than Great Britain, but she is as- suredly not 80 well governed. She may be tended and supplied more regularly and systematically, but her con- stitution is not so good. Some of her functions may pro- OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 7 ceed with greater energy, but their aggregate is not so harmonious, nor is the central organ so sound as ours. She is hable to dangerous convulsions and hemorrhage on the slightest change of regimen. She cannot assunilate reforms as we do. There might be many gradations of praise and blame before the administration of a country coidd be fairly pro- nounced as good, or its government as bad, as they were in the Lombardo- Venetian Kingdom under Austrian rule. In all probability no provinces of Italy, at any period, were so carefully and conscientiously administered. The Italians were not excluded from office ; there were no religious differences; the system was, above all, untainted by that scornfid prejudice agamst everything Native, en- gendered by the premature authority and anti-social re- lations of Anglo-Indian officialism. From 1815 to 1859 the Austrian administration of Northern Italy steadily improved ; the government steadily deteriorated and be- came more difficult, until latterly it became impossible, except at the point of the bayonet. It may be that great benefits would be conferred on several disorderly and distracted States,- — Mexico, for ex- ample, or Greece, — if they could be subjected for a few years to the coercive management of Great Britain or France. It may be disputed whether, since her indepen- dence of Turkey, the progress of Greece has been delayed by too much foreign interference or by too little. It may be open to question whether Mexico wo aid not be likely to settle down more quickly and decisively, after stagger- ing and strugglmg through a period of confusion under her own leaders, than after undergoing the process of foreign discipline. These are matters of speculation ; but it will hardly be denied or doubted that by extraordinary sacrifices and exertions on the part of the more civilised State, order might be unposed on the less advanced na- tion, — life and property rendered secure, commerce pro- tected and contracts enforced. But with the establishment of a regular administration the difficulties of government are sui-e to be redoubled. However enlightened and dis- interested may have been the original intention, as the 8 OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. term of giiardiansliip is prolonged, its provocations and temptations almost of necessity increase. The thankless and burdensome natirre of the task, on the one side, the loss and humiliation on the other, become every day more and more apparent, and are more and more sensibly felt, as the active work of organisation subsides into tranquil management. The patient, restored to consciousness and strength, expects to be relieved from restraint, requires exercise and amusement, and wishes once more to dii-ect his o^\^l affairs in his own way. Grateful at first, perhaps, to his foreign doctors and nurses, he now resents their control, and begins to doubt their motives. Those motives have actually no tendency to improve, — they tend rather to deteriorate as the curative process is pi'otracted. If the practice has proved lucrative, the physician is averse to lose it ; if it has been unprofitable, he requires some compensatmg advantage. We have had some experience of this treatment, and of the patient's feelings towards us, on a small and unim- portant scale, in the Ionian Islands, now happily off our hands, just as their government, except by military force, was ])ecoming impossible. On the great continent of In- dia, — not aljle, or ready, or fit to Ije off our hands, but not more vitally attached to us than the Ionian Islands, — too long a course of the same treatment, in its most depressing form, over an ever widening area, has gene- rated the same feelings in the heart and braui of its vast and various population, and threatens to render its go- vernment incalculably more difficult. Divided and diffi- dent as it may be, ignorant and indifferent as it may seem, that vast popidation is not an inorganic or insensible mass. The political diagnosis of India has been misunderstood, Vjccause no distinction has been drawn between her con- stitution and her daily functions, — between government and administration. The true government of every realm, great or small, may be said to be carried on in two distinct spheres, that of the Sword, or military force, and that of the Sceptre, or civil authority. There can be no doubt or question of our occupying the former sphere in India more fully and OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 9 firmly than ever. Against external and internal assailants we are armed at all points. But military force can only deal with open assailants, and cannot be everywhere pre- sent and prepared. At a period of great national excite- ment or distress, the efforts of secret conspu^acy and pas- sive resistance, might cause enonnous loss, expense, and terror, while military operations were yet aimless and impracticable. Civil authority and social influence can alone avail for the repression of imseen discontent and growing disaftection. From the Viceroy downwards our officials exercise no du"ect social influence, and no civil authority — unsupported by British bayonets, — over those leading and representative classes whose sentiments and movements determine those of the population at large, and whose disafiection and discontent must ever be ob- structive and dangerous. Indh-ectly and intermediately, no doubt, — especially m the Native States,— our views are, to some extent, interpreted and our objects promoted, by the persuasion and example of those whom the jDeople respect and trust. Although we are not as yet quite face to face with the brutal appetites and wild fanaticism of all India, — al- though many centres of conservatism and mtercommuni- cation have been happily still preserved, — the general tendency of our rule, excessively developed between 1848 and 1856, has been to weaken all civil authority apart from ofiicialism, to destroy our friends and multiply our mercenaries, to reject free co-operation and insist upon monotonous conformity. And thus we have allowed the Imperial Sceptre to be laid aside, and have come to rely more and more exclusively upon the Imperial Sword. We have decluied all assistance ; we have despised all profiered services ; we have destroyed many little Sceptres, and done our best to break every little Sword. The Marquis Wellesley's pohcy of inducing Native Princes to allow our troops, paid by tribute or cession of territory, to be substituted for their own, was ingenious and intelligible, at least as a policy of transition. Many Native States then mamtained formidable forces, chiefly disciphned and officered by Frenchmen, with whose na- 10 OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. tion vre were at ^yar. Under Lord Wellesley's treaties some of these Native armies were considerably reduced in numerical strength, and their foreign officers were dis- eliarged ; wliile our brigades, placed in advantageous positions, overlooked the whole field, and checked the few remaining States not included in the Subsidiary system. The victories and treaties of 1803 and 1805, completed by the campaigns and negotiations of the Marquis of Hastings between 1817 and 1820, made the British Go- vernment, with one apparent exception, the only military Power, and vu'tually if not formally the Imperial Head, among all the States of India. The army of Scindia, the Maharajah of Gwalior, the last shadow of a substantive military Power in Hindostan, was dispersed in the one day's campaign of 1843. But Lord Dalhousie caricatured the policy of Lord Wellesley when he applied the same set of terms to the subordinate and submissive States of Sattara and Nag- pore, spoke of them as " obstacles to safe communication and combined military movement", and declared that their annexation would "consolidate oui- military strength", and " absorb separate military Powers".* They were not " mi- litary Powers", and they were not "separate" from their acknowledged superior. The military force kept up by these and most other Native States, was so small as to be nothing more than a demonstration of moral force in favour of the Biitish Government, and always at its dis- posal. During the momentous crisis of 1857 the Irregu- lar Cavalry which the extinct States of Sattara and Nag- pore were bound by treaty to furnish, t would have done more, with the Princes themselves or some of their nearest relatives at their head, to keep order in the Mahratta country, Bundelcund, and the Central Provinces, and genei'ally to prevent insurrection from spreading, than could have been done by double the number of the finest British troops. • Sattara Ftipers, 1849, p. 83 ; Papers, Bajah of Bcrar, 1854, pp. 35, 36. t Collection of Treaties, Calcutta, 18G4 (Longmans and Co.), vol. iii, p. 124 ; vol. vi, p. 8. OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 11 Even tlie hungry and ragged levies of Oude and Hyder- abad, though large in numbers, — and larger still if their muster-roll was to be believed, — were never dangerous or menacing to our supremacy, and could have been easily reduced, if we had undertaken in good earnest the ad- ministrative reform of those States. Bnt it was the main principle of Lord Dalhousie's policy that the friendly tui- tion and reform of a dependent State was imprudent and luiprofitable. There can be no doubt that he thought the annexation of Oude, as he had said of the annexation of Nagpore and Sattara, would " consolidate our military strength", and " absorb a separate military Power".* What was the result ? What is the actual consequence after the lapse of thirteen years ? There was not a single British soldier iii the Kingdom of Oude from 1846 to 1856, when it was annexed, in- cluding the period of our Sutlej and Punjaub wars, when every man was urgently required. We have now in Oude one Pegiment of Dragoons, live Batteries of Artillery and four Battalions of Foot, at an annual cost of upwards of £600,000, two-thirds of the net revenue of the Province. If we add the annual charges of the Staff, the Native troops (four Pegiments of Infantry and three of Cavaky), and of the Pohce, we shall find nearly the whole revenue swallowed up in paying for an armed force to keep the country quiet. Before the annexation in 18.56 the unre- formed Government of Oude, with an imbecile King at its head, managed to preserve order, and play the part of a good neighbour, with no assistance from us beyond one Company of Native Artillery and three Sepoy Battalions. This is the way we " have consolidated our military strength", and "added to the resources of the public treasury". The Pajah of Nagpore paid us an annual tribute of £80,000, one-fifth of the revenue of his dominions, and mamtained a thousand of " the best description of Irregu- lar Horse," " to serve with the British army in the field."*!* * Sattara Papers, 1849, p, 83 ; Rajah of Berar, Papers, 1854, pp. 35, 36. t Collection of Treaties, vol. iii, p. 124. 12 OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. Xow we have lost tlie tribute, and something more — for the Nagpore Provinces, without anything being charged for the troops quaii:ered mthin them, have never j^aid their own expenses, — and we have lost the services of a thousand Horse. But we have lost much more than the tribute and the Horse, we have lost the moral authority and intiuence of the Rajah and his Government. Wherever a centre of conservative interests and political subordina- tion, such as the Court of Nagpore, Sattara, Jhansi, or Lucknow, is broken up, moral force is destroyed, and oiu* own mihtaiy force must supply its place. Nor can any one avoid joining issue on this point by declaimmg on the alleged misrule of some of these States, or the extravagance and self-indulgence of their Princes, for which, it may be said, annexation was the only feasible remedy. That plea was utterly erroneous then, — it would be flagi'antly false now. It was not a plea upon which Lord Dalhousie relied. He objected to the tuition and reforai of Native States, not so much because it would not be beneficial to them as because it would not, as he supposed, be profitable to ourselves. One of his avowed reasons for deciding to annex the Punjaub, after the re- bellion of 1849, instead of continuing to give the promised " aid and assistance in the administration of the Lahore State, during the minority of the Maharajah Dliuleep Sing,"* was that "we should have all the labour-, all the anxiety, all the responsibility, which woidd attach to the temtories if they were actually made our own ; icliile we should not reap the corresponding benefits of increase of revenue, and acknowledged possession. "t The expected " increase of revenue" from the Punjaub, which was bound Vjy treaty to pay, and was well able to pay, an annual subsidy of £220,000 so long as our troops remained in the country,:}: has been converted into a steady drain of about two millions per annum, iindiminished to this day, from the Lnperial resources of India. In the same manner he recommended the annexation * Collection of Treaties, Calcutta, vol. ii, p. 2G7. t Pzi7ijauh Papers, 1849, p. uanes, b}' the issue of regulations and ordinances entrusted to tliem for execution, would have been regarded by an exasperated and revolted people as a piece of cruel mockery/^* This line phrase of " an exasperated and revolted people," is one example of how, in their anxiety to retain so valu- alile a field of patronage, — for this, however disguised even from themselves, was at the bottom of all their objections, — the resources of rhetoric were stretched in Calcutta de- spatches and London Minutes very near the confines both of the suj^jn'essio veri and the suggestio falsi. In alluding to the Rajah's misrule and to the petty revolt in part of his territories, the original grossly exaggerated accounts are taken as accurate narrations, and no hint is given of new light thrown on the facts by subsequent careful in- quiiy. The Mysore rebellion of 1830 was declared by the Special Commissioners, in their Report of 12th December, 1833, to have been " partly attributable to causes which were beyond the control of the Rajah's administration," especially " to the withdrawal of the advice of the British Resident," who " was prohibited by his instructions not only from the public reception of complamts from the sub- jects of Mysore, but from the avowed support of the cause of those whose grievances might become known to him." The insurrection was by no means general. It broke out in the Province of Nuggiu', the conquest of which by Hyder Ali was a circumstance " unfavourable to the easy maintenance of the Rajah's authority." It was not a popular rising caused by intolerable tyranny, but was chiefly the work of an ambitious pretender to a large feudal estate, aided by insurgents who flocked to the rebel standard from the British Province of Canara, and by the intrigues of an in- fluential Brahmin family at Mysore, whose oppressive and corrupt practices were then under investigation, and who ho])ed to evade inquiry amid the turmoil of an insurrection. The Commissioners say expressly : — " The fact of the assembling of the ryots and their complaining that the taxes were too burdensome to be borne, of itself really * MijKore Papp.rs, 18GG, p. 50. OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 31 proves little or nothing. At the very same time, the Eyots as- sembled in the same manner, and made similar complaints in the Province of Canara, where we understand the public demands have since been found, on full inquiry, to be decidedly moderate. We also understand, and it is a curious coincidence, that those proceedings of the ryots in Canara were instigated hj intrigues on the part of the public servants, as has been already shown to have been the case in Mysore."* Both by the Commissioners of Inquiry and by the Governor-General, Lord William Bentmck, after his own strict local investigation, the Rajah was almost entirely acquitted of personal misconduct. It was indeed admitted by his Lordship, that if he had known the true history of the case, as detailed in the Report of the Special Com- mittee, he would not have suspended the Rajah's authority, but would have resorted to milder measures of reform. In a despatch to the Court of Directors dated the 1 -Ith of April, 1834, recommending that the greater part of the Rajah's dominions should be restored to his dkect rule, three districts being retained by the Honourable Company, under a new Treaty, to secure their subsidy. Lord Wilham Bentinck wrote as follows : — " It is admitted by every one who has had an opportunity of observing the character of the Rajah, that he is in the highest degree intelligent and sensible. His disposition is described to be the reverse of tyrannical or cruel." " The personal character of the Rajah has, I confess, materially weighed with me in re- commending the measure above alluded to. I believe he will make a good ruler in future." The Court of Directors, in their reply dated the 25th of September, 1835, negative the project of partition. They advert to " the deferred and future possession of the whole Kingdom" by the Maharaja, when certam described safe- guards against misgovernment shall be established ; when, they say, "the same reasons which would recommend the restoration to the Rajah of a portion of the country, wiU, in our opinion, recommend the restoration of the whole."t And in making some remarks on the new forms of ad- ministration proposed for Mysore, they observe : — * Mysore Papers, 1866, p. 19. f Ihicl, p. 23. 32 OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. ''We are desirous of adhering, as far as can be done, to the Native usages, and not to introduce a system which cannot be •worked hereafter by Native agency when the country shall be re- stored to the Kajah." But long- before 18G5 the vast increase of patronage in Mysore had driven far away all notions of " Native agency," or of restoring the country to the Rajah. The idea of not merely being unable to provide for the candidates already on the Governor-General's list, but of having to turn adrift, or remand to regimental duty, all the English gentlemen actually in the enjoyment of those luci'ative offices, had become revoltino- at Calcutta. In a Minute dated the IGth of January, 1856, Lord Dalhousie advised the an- nexation of Mysore at the death of the reigning Rajah. Wishing devoutly, and working towards, the same con- summation, the Government of Sh' John Lawrence, in the despatch already quoted, loudly and emphatically pro- nounced as their opinion, " That the reversion of Mysore to the power and adminis- tration of the Maharajah is synonymous with the withdrawal of the European officers, and the abandonment of a system of upwards of thirty years' growth. It is tantamount to the col- lapse of order, and a rapid return to the state of confusion and of insecurity of life, honour, and property, from which, in 1831, the people of Mysore were rescued."* Why should "the system" be "abandoned," when "the European officers" are " withdrawn ?" They cannot, or ^^•ill not, think of any intermediate plan, by which the Prince's power might for the future be limited by law, and by which an efficient Native hierarchy might be gra- dually trained to replace their English instructors. No — a full complement of English gentlemen of the Civil, Military, and Uncovenanted Services having been quar- tered in every department — new departments having been frr)m time to time devised for them, — that full comple- ment must be permanently maintained in Mysore. The same views were lU'ged with even greater vehe- mence at the India Office in London. One of the Coun- cillors, Mr. 11. D. Mangles, formerly of the Bengal Civil * Mijsnrp, Pnpnrft, 1 ROG, p. ^>9. OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 33 Service, and who for many years represented the Borough of Guildford and the East India Company in the House of Commons, declared that if the Maharajah of Mysore were permitted to choose a successor from his family, " only two courses would be open to us," — " Either the adopted son must be permitted to become the actual ruler of his country, to appoint his own officers, and to ad- minister justice and the revenue according- to his own views and principles, or affairs must be carried on, as at present, by a British Commissioner, assisted by a body of British officers."* Notwithstanding the undeviating consistency with which Mr. Mangles for the last quarter of a century, m the Court of Directors, in Parliament, and in the Council of India, has advocated a policy of annexation, it is difficult to imderstand the strange blmdness here shown to the happi- est and most hopeful results of our political operations in India. Why must a Rajah placed at the head of a re- formed Government, " admmister justice and the revenue according to his own view^s and prmciples" ? Why shoidd he not administer justice and the revenue accordmg to our views and principles, as several Native Princes have, to a great extent, learned to do ? This blmdness to recorded facts is even more manifest in a subsequent passage of the same paper, in which Mr. Mangles avows his firm opinion that "Native Government" must be " entirely dependent upon the character of the Prince, or, if he be a nonentity, of his Minister," and that they " have, as a general rule, been going from bad to worse ever since the reign of Akbar."t At a later period in the discussion, the same eminent authority protested once more agamst the j^eople of Mysore being "handed over by Her Majesty's present Government to the capricious domination of such another Prince, with the inevitable concomitants of hungry courtiers, and a rabble of hangers-on, after they and their fathers had tasted for nearly half a century the unspeakable blessings of wise and fixed principles of law, and a just system of revenue, administered by such men as Cubbon, Bo wring, * Mysore Papers, 1866, p. 85. f H'icl., p. 87. D o4 OUR GREAT VASSAL EMl'IRE. and Charles Saunders."* The introduction of these EnofHsh names at tlie end of the sentence is an effective sti'oke of rhetoric. But wliy should " capricious domina- tion" be assumed, or the possibihty of" capricious domina- tion " ? Is the British Government really incompetent to exercise Imperial supremacy ? Durino- the same controversy another much respected Councillor, ^Ir. H. T. Prinsep, also an old Bengal Civilian, Avho had been Secretary to Government under Lord William Bentinck when the administrative sequestration of Mysore took place, maintained in a Minute dated the l.jth of April, 1866, that "it would be impossible ever to make over a large territory hke ]\Iysore, that has once been governed upon system by British officers, who have made revenue settlements and decreed or otherwise estab- lished rights of property, to a Native Prince to he timnaged accord ijif/ to his caprices, assigning districts to favourites with unchecked p>oivers, or' leasing them to the highest bidders, as is the universal jyractice ivhen the dominions are large." And then he assumes, as an incontrovei'tible and acknowledged position, that the only plan for " se- curing the rights and interests created by our institutions," is to maintain " a British administration."! Now the practice of " assigning districts" to " favourites," or to " the highest bidder," is not, and never was, "universal" by any means among the Native States of India, whether " the dominions are large" or small. Mr. Prinsep has here fallen into one of tliose exaggerations which are especially detri- mental wlien put forward in grave considtation by a per- son of gi'eat official and local experience. And why must the "caprices" of a Prince, and the "powers" of his " favourites" be " unchecked" ? The bad custom of grant- ing temtorial assignments to favourites and farmers of the revenue, had grown in Oude before the annexation to the greatest height and enormity it had probably ever attained in India : but if the controlling force of the British Government had been firmly and steadily applied, this abuse mii^ht have been effectually checked and abolished. 'J'his abuse does not prevail in the States of * Mysore Papers, May l«r,7, p. 13. t //><>'-, P- ^. OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 35 either Scindia or Holkar, the two largest and most import- ant in Central India, and is quite incompatible with their administrative system, for which, no doubt, their subjects are greatly indebted to the management of British ofHcers during the minority of the two reigning Princes. In Travancore, in Kolapore, — in any State once fairly brought under supervision, and where regular forms and public channels have been laid down throuo^h which all acts of the Sovereign must pass, — corrupt and capricious grants of land are practically impossible. Even in the Nizam's Dominions, the largest existing Native State, although the prevalence of this abuse in former generations has left its trace in some overgrown hereditary jurisdictions, the executive agency of the Chief Minister, supported by the influence of our Resident, has so over-mastered the nomi- nal despotism, that, during the last three reigns, the Prince has quite lost the Oriental prerogative of alienating the public revenue. These limitations of arbitrary power, though secured by no public ordinance, soon grow into established rules, and an Indian Sovereign would find it quite as difficult and dangerous to break through them as have the Princes of Europe after consenting or submitting to constitutional restrictions. The Nawab Salar Jung, having become head of the Regency of Hyderabad upon the sudden demise of the late Nizam, and retaining all the functions of Prime Min- ister, has been able already to make a great stride towards the liberalisation of the Government by associating several of the principal nobles with himself in a sort of Council of State, and allotting to each of its members a depart- ment of the public administration, — a measure which w^as quite impracticable so long as the Minister was liable to be thwarted at every turn by petty Palace intrigues set on foot by those who could obtain no voice in the State ex- cept by supplanting their rival and stepping into his place. Having overcome and out-lasted the despotism of the Sovereio'u, this enlip'htened statesman is now eno-ao-ed in breaking down in his own person the isolated autocracy of the Minister. Properly advised and supported by our Government on a plan more consistent and more conside- D 2 36 OrR HREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. rate than lias liitlierto been observed, the Nawab Salar Jung ought to be able during the minority of the Nizam to raise the reformed institutions of Hyderabad above all fear Of retrogression, to bring a limited monarchy into working condition on principles that shall be acceptable and suitable to all ranks of the people. It is to be hoped that our Government may do as much during the concurrent minority of the Rajah of IMysore. But there the stumbling-block of place and patronage stops the way at present. The aggregate salaries of the English gentlemen em- ployed in Mysore, about ninety in number, from the Com- missioner with his £6000 down to the Assistant with £600, averaging £1000 a year, amount to £90,000 per annum, one tenth of the annual net revenues of the Pro- vmce. The official mind cannot contemplate without horror the gradual destruction of such a splendid list of appointments, the vested rights of meritorious gentlemen havmg so many strong claims on the consideration of Government. Even the stagnation and stoppage of pro- motion among such a body, the first painful result in the process of reconstructing the fabric of a Native State, cannot be faced by the dispensers of patronage without distress and consternation. What is the degradation of a race, ahen in colour and creed, compared with the dis- heartening of a Service recruited from our own country- men ? Consequently the instructions understood to have been issued by the Secretary of State in 1867 for the gradual substitution of Native for English officials, as opportunities presented themselves, in all district and judicial appoint- ments, has remained a complete dead letter. In three years not a single Native has been placed in any one of the superior offices in Mysore hitherto held by English gentle- men. No such prcjmotion has, indeed, occuiTed for nearly six years. Mr. Krishna Ayengar is still the only Native Deputy Supei'intendent ; and he was appointed to the charge of a district on the 31st of August 1864. And so it will be to the very last possible moment, — the diffi- culties of transition will be enhanced, the immediate sue- "> "7 OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 37 cess of the change will be endangered, the good faith of our Government will be compromised, — unless the pro- fessional interests and national prejudices of Calc\itta are counteracted and swept away by the statesmanlike deter- mination of the Viceroy and the Secretary of State. It is useless to descant, as Mr. Mangles and others do, on " the unspeakable blessings of wise and fixed principles of law, and a just system of revenue,"* because these can be provided for as effectually iii a reformed Native State as in a model British Province, andean be "administered" in a style much more congenial to popular feelings and much more instructive to the popular mind, by Native Princes and functionaries, than by " Cubbon, Bowring, or Charles Saunders." The best institutions that can be devised are not permanently safe unless they are under the personal and responsible custody of men who are bound to the soil by the ties of blood and property. The happiness and progress of nations do not depend on forms. One fruitful cause of error in the study of Indian politics, one ground for hastily takmg for granted, without alloy or deduction, "the unspeakable blessmgs" of British administration, consists in the indiscriminate eulogy that has been too often lavished on the Indian Civil Service. Indiscriminate eulogy applied to a class, a sect, or a party, must always lead to some very false conclusions. It was once the fashion m Parliamentary speeches and periodical essays to extol that Service as "the most accomplished in the world," at a time when a safe passage, " with great credit," through the formal probation of Haileybury, was never refused to a Director's nominee, and as a "nursery of heroes and rulers," when, in proportion to its numerical strength, it had certainly produced very few men of marked originality or conspicuous power. But in those days the rapid growth of British India in territory and revenue cast a glamour over all eyes. The structure was so vast, and had been so hidden, that what was a mere appropria- tion seemed like a creation of our own. Distance lent enchantment to the view, — -young Civilians, and military officers in civil employ, engaged for the most part in the * Ante^ p. 33. 38 OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. formal superintendence of an immemorial routine, were transtio-ured into patriarchs and statesmen. And thoiiofh the cpmpetitive system of first appointments has raised the standard of erudition, it is no test of administrative capacity or of the ruling faculty, and has certainly added nothing to any social authority that may be possessed by the Indian Civil Service. When we consider the early age at which English gentlemen engaged in the public administration of India are placed in positions of great emolument, and of unat- tainable exaltation and command, over a large number of Native officials of tried skill and long experience, whose guidance is indispensable for the successfid despatch of business, it is not surprismg that they learn to magnify their office, that they habitually suppose themselves to be governing the country when they just understand the plan of admmistering a district, when they can make a neat English report on results furnished by their sub- ordinates. As an illustration of the prevailing delusion on this point, we may quote the able editor of the Bombay Gazette, a journal representing veiy fairly the views of the higher class of British officials and merchants in the Western Presidency, who, recently defending the Great Council of the Empke from the charge of negligence, de- clares that " AVhat is called neglect of India is one of the wisest charac- teristics of Parliament. That India is not neglected, the host of able Englishmen sent here to govern her testifies before the ■whole world. ^^ The writer confounds administration with governinent. The Englishmen, able or otherwise, annually sent out from home in the civil and military Services, do not govern India, any more than our Commissioners of Cus- toms and Excise, officers of Police, and County Coui't Judges, govern Great Britain. In both countries the fimctionaries in permanent employ administer laws which they had no share in making, have little or no influence over ]>ublic opinion, and no political influence by virtue of their office. Wliether they have or have not any social influence, depends not upon their office so much as OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 39 upon tlielr personal cpialities. The social influence of Englisli functionaries in India is scarcely appreciable, Tliey have, as a rule, n(j social influence wliatever among- any class of the people, simply because they neither de- sire nor deserve to have any. They have no social in- fluence with the Natives, because they have no social in- tercourse with them. Even with the most accessible of our Collectors and Commissioners in India, the practical notice at their doors is, "No admittance except on busi- ness." The subject races in their milhons, high and low, rich and poor, and the scattered representatives of the dominant nation, live entirely apart, and have nothing in common. The public avocations of the Anglo-Indian "Ser- vices" give them no direct share, and their private course of life jDreclucles them from taking any indirect share, in what is properly called the government of the country. A very few British functionaries, those who rise to the Secretariat and to seats in Council, do, indeed, obtain ac- cess to a certain direct share in the Government ; and these extraordinary prizes to which all may aspire, have, perhaps, contributed more than anything else to the false lustre surrounding the Indian Civil Service, and to the erroneous notions habitually formed by the members of that profession as to the sphere and compass of their daily duties. There are, again, British Commissioners and Collectors, — very few, however, in number, — singularly free from the prevalent failings of our nation and of their profession, largely endowed with that genial tolerance and adapt- abihty, which are supremely requisite for governing an alien race on any principles but those of coercion and contempt. Some of these have undoubtedly, from time to time, gained an influence, considerable though local and temporary, over the public mind, and have made me- ritorious efforts of limited success, to keep up something- like social intercourse with the higher class of Natives around them. A still larger number of British officials among the Eesidents at Native Courts, and the l\)litical Ao-ents set over the groups of petty Chieftainships, really take a cer- 40 OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. tain indirect share in the Imperial Government, just be- cause thev have some social influence and control over the leaders and idols of the people. It is only in these here- ditary jm-isdictions, where the executive power remains in Native hands, that Native volition and intellisfence are sufficiently free to make it worth while to study them, to consult them, and even to humour them. It is only in these last refuges of nationality, where there is a ciireer for talent, and where distinctions of rank and station have a real value, and receive due recognition, that anything like personal intercourse on fair terms can exist between our representatives and those of India. As might be reasonably expected, in the dependent States, where Native mfluence manifestly counts for something, where it is always effective, and frequently decisive, it is more courted than in our own Provinces, where it seems to count for nothing. Our most distinguished countrymen now or recently engaged in the administration of British Provinces, have not failed to remark and to deplore this utter disassocia- tion of the dominant and the pupil race. Sir Ilobert Montgomery, late Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjaulj, in a Memorandum published in The Times in March 1868, caUed forth by the appearance of the Blue Book on the comparative merits and popularity of British and Native rule, writes as follows : — " Our officers are young, and few and scattered, and have much to learn. To administer the mass of law imposed on them they are chained to their courts and their offices from morning till night. They have no leisure for personal intercourse, to mix ■with the people, to gain their trust, to disabuse them of unjust prejudices, to make known our motives of real benevolence, and to ascertain their views. An acute observer of one of our most recently annexed Provinces informs me that the gulf is increasing, the people are disheartened,^' An acute observer in the capital of one of our oldest Provinces, the official metropolis of the Indian Empire, tells the same story. The Editor of the Friend of India, who may certainly be considered as an imwilling witness ratlier than as one prejudiced against British administra- tion, writes as follows : — OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 41 " It is as true of Bcngiil to-day as it lias been any day for tlie last eighty years, that there is a Government and there are forty millions of people, but somehow the one does not come into close contact with the other. Some of the people know our policemen and the scum of our courts, and the better they know them the more they hate them and us. But the villagers do not know the district officer, and the district officer and his superiors cannot know them." Similar testimony is given by a very able ofHcial, the late Mr. A. A. Roberts, tlien Judicial Commissioner in the Punjaub, who declares that " The gulf between us and our Native subjects is becoming wider year by year. It is wider in Bengal than in the North- Western Provinces, and it is wider in the latter than in the Pun- jaub. It is becoming wider every year in the Punjaub. Our executive officers, partly from increase of work, and partly either froDi want of inclination, or from not understanding the necessity and advantage of friendly intercourse with the people, see less and know less of them than formerly, and they know less of us, and misunderstand us and our motives and acts.^"** The longer and more thoroughly our system has been established, the less we are liked. He concludes thus, after a not very hopeful allusion to " the necessity of greater intercourse with, and knowledge of, and sympathy to- wards our Native subjects": — " The following words of Sir John Malcolm express so exactly my views of our duty towards the people of this country that I can- not do better than quote them : — ' The people of India must, by a recurring sense of benefits, have amends made them for the degradation of continuing subject to foreign masters ; and this can only be done by the combined efforts of every individual em- ployed in a station of trust and responsibility, to render popular a Government which, though not national, has its foundations laid deep in the principles of toleration, justice, and wisdom.^ "f We may render our Imperial Government popular : we can never make our direct administration popular. The divergence of feeling and interest between our people and the Natives is not an evil that tends to decrease or to cure itself On the contrary, it has increased, is increasing, and must continue to increase, in proportion as the grow- ing facilities of correspondence and communication with * Papers, British and Native Administration, 1868, p. 112. f Ibid. 42 OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. Europe (limiiiisli the attractions of Indian service and en- liance the charms of home. '' Our own" Calcutta Correspondent, in a letter which appeared in the Times on the 23rd of March, 1868, says : — " No non-missionary remains in India an hour Ljnger than he can help." There is a remarkable unanimity in the tidings from all parts as to the growing aversion to long service or residence in India. From a paper published at the Neilgherry Hills in the Madi'as Presidency the following sentence is ex- tracted : — *' Eveu here in Ootacainuud, where so many advantages as to health, soil, and climate oflFer themselves, we doubt if a score of Europeans could be found who are not looking forward to return, sooner or later, to the old country. A man comes out to India, either as a Government servant, a railway employe, a planter, or what not; but not one of them has the faintest idea of making a home here : — to make a ^ pot of money' and go back again is the aim of every one of them."* The EufjlUhman, the leading daily paper of Calcutta, gives the same account : — " Individually, we are more than ever birds of passage. If Europeans did not build houses forty years ago, when they looked upon India somewhat as a home, there is very little chance of their doing so now that their main object is to get away from India as fast as possible. "f Consequently, as might be expected, the members of the most higlily paid Services, civil and military, in the world, send up their continuous cry for a higher scale of remuneration, in the form of salary or pension or bonus on retirement. The Calcutta Correspondent of the Times tells us that " India has ceased to offer a career to poor men. Saving by men on salaries of from £1500 downwards is almost impossible. Pitiable often is the state of an English gentleman on £500 a year in Indian exile. J * South of Lid la Observer, extracted from the Asiatic of August 1 Itli, 1860. t Englijfhrnav, from the Homeward Mail, August 30th, IBtJD. X " Our own Correspondent", Calcutta, March 0th, The Times, April 8th, \H*u. OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 43 And nearly three years later the Editor of the Friend of India, well informed in snch matters, writes as fol- lows : — "The Anglo-Indian with less than twelve hundred a year finds it impossible to meet the cost of hving here, and pay foi' his chil- dren at home. That sort of pecuniary care so well known in England, but almost unknown in India before the mutiny, is silently working in Anglo-Indian society changes which are to be reo-retted."* It can hardly be expected that this '' pecuniary care", these " changes in Anglo-Indian society", the growing aversion to long residence in India, the yearning to get home as fast as possible, will be in the least mitigated or diminished when educated Natives are admitted, in rapidly increasing numbers, to the superior branches of the public service, hitherto reserved for covenanted Civilians. That inevitable measure will cert.ainly not accelerate the promotion, improve the prospects, or alleviate the discon- tent of any English official. Bat, it may be said, although this measure, just, liberal, and beneficent as all must acknowledge it to be, may un- favourably affect a class of our countrymen, and even bring some administrative difficulties in its tram, it will so conciliate and gratify the people of India as to render the great task of Government more easy. That flattering expectation is open to very considerable doubt. The ad- mission of Natives to the higher official posts, except as part of a large plan of Imperial reconstruction, wiU not, in my opinion, strengthen, but will rather weaken, the hands of Government, and complicate the problem be- fore it. Native officials of high rank could not form an effective bond of connection between the British Govenment and the people of India. They would not be sympathetic with us so much as antipathetic to the masses. In popular estimation, and partly in their own, they have loosened their root in the soil, and have become parasites planted in our hot-houses. Natives educated in our colleges and * Friend of India, extracted from Homeivard Mail, December 6tli, 1869. 44 Om GREAT VASSAL EMPIKE. seekino- for our service are not a turbulent or fanatical o class, and they cannot aid us in keeping such classes in order. They are not very often of the right breed to govern, and as a matter of fact they are, in manners, customs, and morals, governed by the same laws and the same lawgivers as then* more ignorant countiymen. They can never wrest social influence, in our favour or in their own, from the hands of the Princes, the Chieftains, the old families possessing titles, property and traditional fame, or from the Brahmins and other classes learned in popular love and revered on religious grounds, who are themselves by no means debarred for ever from the advantages of European learnmg and science. As a matter of fact old prejudices, both in British Provmces and in Native States, are yielding to the surrounding pressure, and Western education is spreading, though slowly, among the real Koverninix classes. Moreover, it may well be doubted whether our Govern- ment can ever possess, as it is possessed by a good Native liuler, the faculty of selecting and distributing its agents according to their special capabilities where they can com- mand the respect and obedience of those who are under theii' authority. We impose our own wide range on men whose force and value is essentially local. ]ielying too much on forms and regulations, disregarding not merely personal qualities but the strength and weakness, the attractions and repulsions of tribe and race, our latest liberality would send Bengalee and Parsee graduates, in a very undue proportion, to rule over Sikhs, Mahrattas, and llajpoots. There may be Parsees and there may be Bengalees, and there may be Chettys and Moodellys from ^ladj-iis, who are well qualified for such duties, but mere erudition is a very poor test of the requisite qualifica- tions. There is another view to be taken of this question. Educated Natives are certainly not at present a turbulent or aggressive class, Ijut it does not follow that their open competition with English oihcials on something like equal terms, will make tliem more submissive, or will raise the reputation and Ijeighten the dignity of those with whom I OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE, 45 tliey compete. Already tlie transmutation of the old Head Slieristadars, or Office Managers, into the compara- tively new grades of Deputy Collectors and Magistrates, Extra Assistants in the Non-Ilegulation Provinces and Assistant Superintendents in Mysore, — more honourable, perhaps, but not more highly paid than their old appoint- ments,- — ^is understood to have vitiated the source, un- paired the quality, and aggravated the corrupt results of the information and guidance on which all young English officials for a time, and the failures and "hard bargains" during their entire career, must depend for the despatch of current business. Failures and " hard bargains," thougli less common under the competitive system of first appointments than during the continuance of Directors' patronage, can not be totally eliminated from a hierarchy, in which neither dismissal nor stoppage of promotion is practically known. Formerly the untrained young Civilian, or the incompetent old one, was pulled through his daily work by a ministerial expert of long service and high salary. Now he is pulled through by a younger man of lower standing and much smaller pay. The better class of Native subordinates who used to work unseen for the relief and credit of their "covenanted" supe- riors, ai'e now beginning to officiate in open day at the same description of work, endowed with the same powers and in visible emulation. The more Natives are employed in the higher posts, the more visible will this emulation become, the more con- spicuous will be their administrative superiority over the average of their English compeers, — already sufficiently conspicuous in judicial business, — the less will they be content with anything but a perfect equality of standing and preferment. Then, whether their claims are recog- nised or resisted, interminable jealousies and antagonisms will ensue, and the difficulty, insurmountable in my opi- nion, will present itself, that English gentlemen will not serve amicably and harmoniously, except in rare instances, in subordination to Native seniors. The conflict will be- come more bitter on both sides. As education is extended, as the means of commimica- 46 (HTv CiREAT VASSAL EMPlPvE. tioii and locomotion are improved, both in India and be- tween the East and Europe, — in wliicli the Suez Canal may prove an unexpectedly important element, — there must come a closer approximation to our ways of thouolit, to our principles and practice of political movement. The reflective and influential among our Indian fellow-sub- jects will become at once more national and more cosmo- politan. They will better our instructions. The Press is free in India. We shall find ourselves in imminent danefer of finding our own weapons turned against us. As the peo- ple become more enlightened we must expect our Govern- ment, if conducted on the present contemptuous and exclu- sive plan, to be depicted in the most odious colours, and our agents to be attacked at every opportunity with ridicule and invective. We must be prepared, in short, for an era of satire and sedition, which we may be led, against our will and against our convictions, to resist by coercive measures, until we give up our moral and intellectual superiority, and oppose our military force to the physical force of awakened India. We shall never be able to deal satisfactorily with a Hindoo Savonarola, a Hindoo Junius, a Paul Louis Courier, or even a Henri E-ochefoi-t. A Native Prince would have all the aversion we could wish aofainst both the old-fashioned fanatic and the new-fangled agitator, and could, with the countenance and support of the Im- ])erial Power, suppress or moderate either of them more firmly, more gently, and with more discrimination, than the Imperial Power could possibly do by itself. In the following passage of his speech on the Governor- General of India Bill in the House of Lords on the 1 1th of March, 186!), the Marquis of Salisbiuy manifested, if I am not mistaken, some statesmanHke insight into the eml^arrassments we are preparing for ourselves, and into the only possible remedy for them :— - " The other portion of the noble Duko's measure was that which dealt with the difficult prohlein of taking Natives into Go- vernment eniploynient. lie lliought tlie noble Duke's plan in- finitely .superior to the system of competitive examinations. He thought it far better that the appointment of Natives should rest OUR GREAT VASSAL EMi'IRE. 47 exclusively on the responsibility of the Governoi'-Generalj l)ut he ho])od that the Governor-General would not be fettered too uiucli in his discretion. The great difficulty would be to avoid jealousy between the European and Native Civil servants. He believed that the true way of admitting Natives to a participation in the Government would be to maintain the Native Sovereignties which are at present protected in India." Yes, — I should say, — maintain, restore, consolidate and enlarge the Native Sovereignties. The essential problem of Indian statesmanship is how to reconcile self-govern- ment for India with Imperial supremacy for Great Britain. The true solution is that the more we concede the former, the more we confirm the latter. The nearest approach to self-government that the peo- ple of India can make in their present phase of civilisation, must be made by means of reformed Native States, own- ing allegiance and subordination to the Imperial Power. The British Government of India should attempt no longer to be ubiquitously executive ; it should be constructive and critical, not operative ; it should everywhere contrive or revise the political fabric, but wherever Native agency is available, it should not undertake more than superin- tendence or visitation. The rule which, with some real and some apparent qualifications, has long held good, is now becoming abso- lute, that the maximum of direct dominion and direct European agency, involves the minimum of European in- fluence. In order to spread British principles, to extend and intensify the moral authority of our Government, the area of British admmistration should be considerably di- minished. The system under which local affairs are formally managed in every district and in every department by Englishmen, administerino- the same set of stiff re^ula- tions, lowers the moral influence of the Paramount Power, deprives of political privileges those among the Natives who, with a little help and guidance, are fit to use them, and does not educate for political life those who are as yet unfit. The continuance of such a system can only be plausibly justified on those grounds of utter contempt for 48 OUn GREAT VASSAL EMPIKK. the races to be governed which must consign them to per- petual stagnation, or incite them to privy conspii'acy. The ninnerous annexations and confiscations between IS 48 and 1S5G attracted the attention and sympathy of all India towards the Native Princes and Chieftains, whose representative value was recalled to mind when their last hour seemed approaching, and who subsequently acquired strength, credit and authority on all sides by the events and results of the Rebellion of 1857. Since that crisis we may have elaborated some of our administrative machinery, — ^we have certainly effected a vast amount of over-legislation, — but we have not resumed our grasp upon the popular mind or upon the popular imagination. What we have lost the Princes have gained. We have now a smaller actual share in the true government of India, in the tranquillisation and progressive direction of the Indian people, than we had twenty years ago. We may regain the leadership, which will otherwise slip from us altogether, but only by deciding to rule India as a great Vassal Empire and not as a Vassal Kingdom, — by abstaming as far as possible from du^ect administration, and gradually transferring a great part of our immediate possessions to Native States, thoroughly reformed and thoroughly subordinated to the Paramount Imperial Power. Sir Robert Montgomery in the remarkable Memo- randum published in the I'imes in March 1868, which we have already quoted,* says : — " The common error lies in our insular proneness to contract and generalise — to embody in one class all the many separate nationalities and distinct races which have been successively added to the rule of England. In an Empire made up of such differinf( languages and distinct customs, it must be popular, as it is politic, to encourage to a ^reat extent a local administration and a local adaptation of laws.^' That "local administration" and "local adaptation of laws", which Sir Ilobert Montgomery sees is so urgently required, can never be so effectually promoted as by the maintenance, restoration, and enlargement of Native Prin- cipalities. * Anip p. 40. \ OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 49 But we have still more recent, and stronger because unintentional testimony to the excessive centralisation and straining after \niiformity of wliich we complain. The Honourable IT. S. Maine, Legal Member of the Viceroy's Coiuicil, in a Minute dated the 8th of October, 1868, re- plying to the charge of over-legislation that had been brouo-ht aofainst the Government of India, observes that " the great bulk of the legislation of the Supreme Council is attributable to its bemg the local Legislature of many Indian Provinces. These Provinces", he remarks, " ex- hibit very wide diversities, and it is growing more and more difficult to bring the population of two or more Pro- vinces mider any one law which goes closely home to their daily life and habits." Hahemus conjitentein reum. India is not a country but a continent. The varying interests and requirements of its two hundred millions of inhabitants, speaking up- wards of twenty distmct languages, cannot be adequately watched and tended by a centralised Government of salaried officials such as now attempts to rule all India by correspondence from Calcutta. Such a Government can- not continue for an indefinite period to be satisfactory and improving to the people in its action. Peforms of political doctrine and practice in Native States are sohd and secure ; the vast administrative es- tabhshments in our own Provmces, — so far as they are dependent for their success on foreign imported agency, and foreign imported material, — are superficial and pre- carious. Showy specimens may be produced — under glass, as it w^ere, — exotic fruits may be grafted on the native stock ; even artificial flowers may be hung on the branches Avith brilliant effect; but they will not stand the climate : a bad season spoils their appearance ; the first storm sends them flying. Nations cannot live in glass houses, and a horticultural show is not a harvest. Much of our vast administrative structure in India is little more than a show, — a show veiy burdensome to the country. Some departments have outgrown all reason- ble proportions, have quite ceased to imjDose upon the people, and far from being regarded by them as " un- E .30 iA'u (;in-:AT vassai. empire. speakable blessini»s," are felt as extremely oppressive by the poor, and regarded as monstrously inefficient and expensive by those who are more competent to criticise tmd to condemn. I shall not attempt here to present this aspect of the question in detail, or to discnss very fully the financial delinquency which has only just been such as might have been expected from an irresponsible professional Government, instructed by no popular voice, controlled by no public opinion. After nine years of profound peace, the revenue having increased twenty-five per cent, (from thirty-nme to more than forty-eight millions*), " the Indian Exchequer,"- — to use the recent words of Mr. J. W. S. Wyllie, late Foreign Secretary at Calcutta, certainly well informed and as cer- tainly well disposed towards the Government of India, — " shows a chronic deficit of two millions, and wholesale reduction of public expenditure combined with the pros- pect of increased taxation is spreading discontent and distress throughout the Empire, "f All the phenomena in that same matter of " increased taxation," which has caused so much official disagreement and recrimination, so many commercial remonstrances, so many popular complaints and so much dumb misery during the last ten years, demonstrate most clearly that want of harmony between " the opinions and feelings of the Na- tives," and " the acts of our officials," of which Sir Charles Wingfield is conscious,^: which might in some degree be be palliated and relieved by those " consultative Native Coinicils" that he suggests, but which can never be en- tirely cured by any thing but local self-government. And no local self-government but government by Native States will ever work smoothly. The same tax will never suit equally well, either in its incidence or in the mode of col- lection ])rf'scribed, all the Provinces of our centralised Empiie, dilt'ering, as they do, in their prevailing races and languages, in their centres and staples of industry, in their standard of comfort and rate of living. * Sir Richard Tomplo's Budget Speech in the Viccrc<^al Council ;it Calcutta, on flic Oth of Mfirch, 1809. t FoHuliihlhj RevicTV, March 1870, p. -308. + Ante, p. 2. OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. T) I Fliiving l)ii]iglcd for the last eight or nine years witli our Income Tax and our License Tax, we are now, it is said, going to try our hand at a Succession Duty, which if levied m the same way by an Act of the Viceroy's Legislative Council, will assuredly prove a similar failure, inquisitorial and oppressive in its operation, and producing very little for a great amount of heart-burning. We shall never have either the knowledge or the in- fluence to make a new tax adapt itself to the local circum- stiinces and social customs of so many various regions. 'Those who coidd help us have no mducement to do so, and have no confidence in our good intentions. Li the endeavour to assess all the Provinces of a vast contment on a uniform scale and by a uniform process, whether applied to property, income, profession, or inheritance, the same results will follow. The new taxes will disgust and demoralise, but they will not draw. In some localities they will not go deep enough ; in others they will not rise to a sufficient height ; in all they will be evaded. We have observed that the Indian revenues have in- creased nearly twenty-five per cent, in the last nine years, or by about ten millions sterlmg. But only a small part of this mcrease can be attributed to any real financial elasticity, or be considered as a proportionate measure of the general progress and prosj)erity of India. Partly it must be accounted for by the universal rise m prices, which has affected all new assessments as well as all expenditure. But at least nine millions out of the ten are due to heavier taxation and to a precarious augmentation of nearly four millions in a precarious resource — the Opium monopoly. Of the new and enhanced taxation of six millions and a quarter, one million and a quarter arise from increased consumption of ardent spirits, encouraged by our peculiar Excise laws, — two millions and a quarter from the ad- ditional tax on salt, raising an article essential to the health of a very poor and vegetarian population to twenty times the price it bears m England, the richest country in the world, — one million and a half from a higher Stamp duty, or in other words a higher tax on justice. The license tax only produced £G5U,000. The Land revenue E 2 52 OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. did not increase materially in the decade between 1859 and 1801), and the Customs, the duties havmg been largely reduced, did not increase at all. The most ingenious analysis woidd fail to trace any ap- preciable share in the augmentation of the revenues of India, luider any heading, to the influence of railways,* — nothinof that could form the most trifline: set-off ajxamst 11 1 the annual charge of at least £2, 400,000, t which the guai'anteed railways have entailed upon the State. With this annual charge staring them in the face, — with the facts before them, admitted in recently published de- spatches, that the average net income of the existing lines only amounted to three per cent, on the bare cost of their formation,:|: " although the hues already completed, or in course of construction, occupy the most fruitful field for railway enterprise," — the Government of India, with the Siuiction of the Secretary of State, has pledged itself to imdertake the construction of ten thousand miles of new railways at an estimated expense of £100,000,000, "raismg the money upon its own credit, and expending it by the * agency of their o^\^l officers. "§ That is to say, nearly a hundred millions having; been laid out in constructino- five thousand miles of railway which, far from paying, impose an annual burden on the country of two millions and a half sterling, and all the lines of first importance being occupied, we are now to construct ten thousand miles more * Appendix F. t Deficiency of guaranteed interest paid by Government. . .£1,500,000 Interest at 5 per cent, on (at least) £18,000,000 bor- rowed to pay for land and for guaranteed interest . . . 900,000 £2,400,000 X From the Viceroy in Council to the Secretary of State, dated the llih of March, 18G0. Here are the figures from the Report of Mr. Juland Danvcrs for the year ending oOtli June, 18G8 (issued in August 18G0) — Capital expended, exclusive of the cost of land (paid by Gro- vrrnmcnt), £78,080,000,; Net receipts for the year, £2,100,122, being £2:37,178 less than the previous year. This is less than 3 per cent. If the cost of land and accumulated guaranteed interest were added, at least £1*^,000,000, the net returns would belittle more than 2 per cent. § See Speech by the Duke of Argyll in the House of Lords, on the 2;3rd of July, 1800. OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 53 at a cost of a hundred millions more, on lines of compara- tively small traffic, and perhaps they may pay. This is the panacea for a cln^onic deficit ! It would be difficult to point out any symptoms of statesmanlike originality and insight, of far extended re- search and inquiry, of administrative skill, or even of con- scientious frugality, in the financial history of India during the last ten years. But for the candour and energy dis- played by the Viceroy, Lord Mayo, on the magnitude of the crisis becoming known to him, there would be little groimd for hope m the immediate future. Sir Richard Temple, in his speech before the Viceregal Council on the Gth of March 1869, mtroducing the Budget for 1869-70, which even then showed an acknowledged deficit of one million sterling, very soon to be more than doubled by more careful calculation, eulogised the financial policy of Government as "at once safe, just, and sound;" and proudly mentioned "the national balance-sheet exhibiting eighty millions on each side of the account, — truly a high figure demonstrative of the calibre of our power in the East," as " a spirit-stirring fact." As if there were any- thing " demonstrative of power," anything that ought to be " spirit-stuTing," in the mere magnitude of money transactions, irrespective of their solvency and sohdity. To an intelligent Native who has watched and analysed the extravagant expenditure and the delusive economies of the last ten years, the vituperations of the late Vice- roy and of a party in the Secretary of State's Council, when advising the annexation of Mysore, agamst " exces- sive extravagance," " reckless profusion and dissipation of means,"* by a Native Prince, must seem a hollow mockery. As a general rule, the administration of a Native State is carried on with remarkable frugality, and hard cash accu- mulates in the treasury, or in the private hoards of the Prmce, to provide for future exigencies. With augmented taxes and a rapidly increasing revenue, our Government gets deeper into debt, the expenditure of the last three financial years having exceeded the income by nine millions sterhng.'l* The excellence and purity of our motives and * Mysore Papers, 18G6, p. 60. f Appendix G. 54 OUK GREAT VASSAL EMPIKE. intentions cannot aflect tlie financial results, can afford no consolation or compensation for tlie large amount of use- less expenditure. Without being ol)liged to argue, with Mandeville, that }>rivate vices are public benefits, the Natives of India can- not fail to see that what we call the " reckless profusion" of a Native Prince, — in the few cases admittino- of such an im})utation, — is far more advantageous to the country than the temperance and thrift of the English officials who would supplant him. Whatever the Native Prince may sjiend is spent in India, chiefly in his own Principality. His patriarchal bounty supports thousands who would find no place at our boai'd. The manufacture of many fabrics and articles of luxury, the encouragement of native art and learning, depend almost entirely upon the patron- iige of the Sovereign and his Court. The splendour of his genial hospitality, public ceremonies and processions, is a constant soiu'ce of national pride, entertainment and social recreation to all ranks and classes. All this must cease if the Prmcipality becomes a British Provmce ; everything then must settle down to a dull and uniform level. The stately dinner-parties and gay balls, in which the small English community take delight, may be highly civilised and intellectual diversions, worthy of general re- spect and admiration ; but these festivities can hardly be expected to rouse much popular interest, for Natives, even of the highest rank, are very seldom invited to them. The liigh moral character and domestic vu-tues of our officers, who do not mix with the Natives at all and never meet them except officially, afford no equivalent in popular estimation for the money they drain out of the Province to su])ply the wants of their families, ,and to provide for their future years of retirement at home. When a well informed Native hears the Pajah of Mysore, or any other Pruice, denounced for siuTounding liimself with " parasites," " hangers on," " favourites," and " cour- tiers,"* who are declared to " exist on the public revenues," and to " fatten on the corruption of the Court,"t he can ♦ Ml/sore Papers, 18GG, p. HO ; Ditto, 18G7, p. i.'. t I'll purs, Rajah of Berar, ]8-!j4, p. 54. OUR GREAT VASSAL P:MP1RE. 55 hardly avoid inquirmg whether the British Government has no " hangers on" of* its own? What is he to think of " the hundreds of* highly paid military officers leading a lifeof aim- less idleness, under the verbal fiction that they are ' doing duty,'" — of " the hill stations presenting an array of un- employed Colonels and Majors," receiving salaries of £1{)0() and £800 per annum respectively, to the amount of " some- thing like a million sterling a year," These things we find mentioned in a recent number of the Friend of India, by no means a seditious journal ; and most people would be inclined to admit the truth of its very mild comment, that " the payment of handsome salaries for doing nothing is at best unreproductive expenditure."'* No doubt need be throwQi on the good intentions of the Government, on the merits of the unemployed officers, far superior in every pomt of view to the "parasites" of a Rajah, or on the assertion that they are justly entitled to all that they re- ceive. But it may well be disputed whether the system under which these gentlemen have become entitled in a very poor country to such very large pay for httle or no work, can be fairly extolled for its far-sighted economy, or is likely to be regarded by a Native politician as an utterly "unspeakable blessing." The "parasites" of a Kajah, it must also be observed, are not regarded by Na- tives, who know them better than we do, with that im- patient horror and indiscrimmate indignation so natural and so admuable in members of the dominant race. When we complain that as m the Army so also in almost every civil department, a superfluous number of highly paid and (if I may coin the word) highly pensionable English gentlemen, are entertained, no question or doubt is raised of the great benefits conferred by the establisli- ment of regular and orderly government, which, in many instances, could only have been effectually mitiated by British intervention. But this could have been equally well done without destroying the fabric of local institutions, without excluding and proscribing Native talent, and treating an entire population with contempt. The work foi' which, perhaps, forty English officers were employed * Friend of India, extracted from the Asiatic of Juuuary 10th, 1870. 56 OUR GREAT VASSAL EM TIRE. could have been performed as well, witli the assistance of Natives alone, by the two or three able and well qualified men who, in fact, devised and directed the whole process. Instead of tliis wise and just moderation, English gentle- men Avitli no special qualilications have been everywhere, in our own Provinces and in Mysore, forced into office, so that at the present day every district and every depart- ment is over-manned and over-paid to a degree that will not be believed vuitil it is thoroughly and impartially invest ifTH-ted. A very strikino- disclosure and clear admission of this abuse, at least in one department, has been very recently given in the reductions in the Police ordered by Lord Mayo in November 18G9, when the magnitude of the financial emergency seems to have forced itself upon his mmd. Fifteen English gentlemen of the high rank of Deputy Inspector-General, paid at the rate of £1500 a year and uj)wards, and about a hundred and five District Superintendents and Assistants, on an average of £500 a year each, — in all one hundred and twenty supeiior ofiicers drawmg salaries m the aggregate of about £80,000 per annum, — were marked down for summary removal. If these reductions are carried out to the full extent originally ordered, — to which the Home Government is understood to have demurred, — it may well be doubted Avhetlier the efficiency of the Police will sufier in the slightest dega'ee. Into the general merits of the Police under the new organisation, as a protective or as a detec- tive body, we need not enter at present. No one who is at aU acquainted with the opinions and feelings of the Natives, more especially as expounded in their own news- papei'S, both English and vernacular, will deny that it is an eminently unpopular body. It is not regarded as an "un- speakable blessing." The former system of Police having failed, particularly in Bengal, changes far too sweeping were made, and instead of building on the old foundations, which we had damaged but not destroyed, of the village watchmen and the responsibility of the village authorities, to be secured by due remuneration, the usual panacea of rules and forms under highly paid Euro])ean superintend- OUR CREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 57 ence was applied in wliolesale flishion. The following extracts will suggest the possibility of dispensuig witli a large number of English officers without any very great loss or damage to the })ublic service or to general content. Our first extract shall be from the Report on the Famine in Orissa, by Mr. George Campbell, now Chief Commis- sioner of the Central Provmces, dated the 26th of Novem- ber 1867. " The impression is very general that the appointments in the Bengal Pohce were somewhat hastily filled. It is certain that many of the European officers have no sufficient acquaintance with the language of the people among whom they are employed ; some, I believe, have no acquaintance with it whatever. I was a member of the Board of Examiners (although I took no active part in the proceedings) when that body represented to the Lieutenant-Governor the failure of the officers of Police to pass the prescribed tests; and although instructions were then issued requiring the junior officers to qualify in future, I desire to take this opportunity of stating that, in my opinion, the Government of Bengal adopted a course very much to be regretted, when at the same time, on the mere recommendation of Lieutenant- Colonel Pughe, Inspector-General of Police, it exempted from examination a large number of tlie least qualified officers, and permitted them to be placed in the higliest posts without the ne- cessary qualifications. My impression is that the officer in charge of the Cuttack PoHce at the commencement of the famine was one of those exempted officers (although I cannot speak exactly on this last point), and he avowed himself wholly ignorant of the language of the people of his district.* The next piece of testimony shall also come from a witness friendly to our administration in general, and to the Police Department in particular, — the Calcutta Review, most of the contributors to which belong either to the Civil Service or to the Army of Bengal, t The writer of the article to be quoted criticises the working of the new system, which had then been four years m operation, suggests one of the very measures that has just been ordered by Lord Mayo, the abolition of the rank of Deputy * Papers, Administration of Bengal, 18G8, p. 27. t A reviewer in the number of the Calcutta Review, p. 476, we are about to quote, says : — " It is no secret that to the youiio- members of the Civil Service this licvicw is mainly iudcbtcd for its continued existence." 58 UUIi CHEAT VASSAL EMl'TRE. Inspector-General, and says of the gentlemen holding that ofhce, that " they are far less practised and capable, as orticers, than their own subordinates whom they are ex- pected to supervise;" that "there is no highly paid otheer whose existence is so entirely unfelt and unnoticed as is the case with these Deputy Inspectors-General." *■ Their time," he adds, " is chiefly taken up in correspond- ing, reporthig, and making returns." " On the whole," he continues, " we think we never knew either a more useless or more mischievous waste of public money than is incuiTed for these officers."* They remained in office, however, (liu'ing the whole of Sir John (now Lord) Lawrence's Vice- royalty. The reviewer, after noticing some " local and national" peculiarities which, in his opinion, impede the course of justice m India, proceeds thus : — "Tliese difficulties arc further very materially increased^ by the fact that the Police are managed and controlled by a few (a very much too small number), of foreigners, of different colom-, religion, and language to their subordinates and the general community ; who are quite curiously ignorant of the Natives, who have no intimate intercourse with them, know nothing of their inner life, liabits, or feelings, and can't (as a vnrij general rule), understand, or be understood by, any ordinary villager they may come across."t The words in a parenthesis, (" a very much too small a numljer,")are very characteristic of the irresistible tendency of official life in India to foster, in spite of adverse experi- ence, the ever mcreasing employment of English gentle- men in all the best offices. In the very sentence in which be admits their utter want of indispensable qualifications, this clever Bengal Civilian — for such he evidently is — proposes to place more of them in the Police. He pro- poses to abolish the rank (jf Deputy Inspector-General, \)\\t to bring in a larger number of young Englishmen in the lower grade of Assistant Supermtendent, who may be trained in the De[>artment. Fiat exjyerimentum in coiyore rill. In the following passages the reviewer tells us what liave been some of the results of the actual experiment * Calcutta lievlew, No. Lxxxiv, 1866, p. 346, 7, 8. f I/jid., p. .V3l. OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 59 under the new organisation of the Police as it exists at present. " It is undeniable tliat the Pohce and the administration be- tween them have made a criminal prosecution a burden of such a crushino' weiAi^:iionJi from the Records of Government North- West Frovinces, Fiirt XXIV, Agra, 1850, p. 225. OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. Gl jab, where the people have had Httle of our Law," they " are comparatively truthful and honest," but that " the population becomes worse and worse as you descend lower and lower to our old possessions of Calcutta and Madras," It must not be supposed that because a regular code of law and procedure does not exist in unreformed Native States, a creditor or aggrieved person is necessarily left with- out any remedy except violence against the opposite party. Public opinion and social influence are much more potent there than in British territory, where hardly any distinc- tion of rank is recognised, and where the pettiest official may override and supersede every sanction that the people have been accustomed to respect. Supported by theu' tenants, neighbours, and fellow-townsmen, the superior landholders, the head men of villages, the elders of tribes and castes, and, in some cases, religious teachers, with or without a Punchayut or jury of five, exercise an authority for the settlement of clamis and the redi'ess of wrongfs that is not easily resisted or evaded. These customary juris- dictions, dependent on rough and anomalous means for enforcmg theu" decrees, are of course irregular and un- certain in their action, but they can never furnish so cruel a weapon to the rich extortioner as our procedure, which enables him, as plaintiff or defendant, to pursue or retreat through several Courts, with an ultimate apj)eal, if the suit involves more than £1000, to the Judicial Committee of Privy Council m London.* * Why should a wealthy litigant be enabled to drag his opponent across a whole continent, a distance of thousands of miles, to England, and to force him to employ the most expensive process possible, ia order to have another appeal ? Would not litigants in India prefer perhaps an inferior quality of justice in the High Courts of the Presi- dencies, to justice administered by the first judges in the world in Lon- don? There is one class of cases, those in which the local Governments, or high officials, stand in the position of defendant, to which, in my opinion, the riglit of appeal to the Judicial Committee should be con- fined, and into this class should be admitted those matters of disputed succession, alleged lapse and escheat in reigning and mediatised fami- lies of sovereign rank, and cases raised between Native Princes and their feudatory Chieftains, which, often involving the interpretation of treaties, are considered as affairs or acts of " state", are excluded from the cognisance of any tribunal of appeal, and are summarily decided r»2 OUH CliEAT VA8SJAL EMPTIJE. There is another DepaTtment, the constant butt of ridicule in the Native Press of our Provinces for its costly inefficiency and elaborate waste, which would appear from the following passage m a Report by Colonel Daly, Politi- cal Agent at Gwalior, dated the 22nd of April 1868, not to be regarded as an " unspeakable blessing" by either the Prmces or the people of Native States. " It is quite on the cards that, with one of Scindia\s capacity and temperament, Gwalior may one day be as conspicnons in the prosecution of public works as it is now for the absence of them. Unhappily, the daily experience of our own Public Works De- partment does not afford us much room for suggesting them to notice. The oppression wliich overtook the villages along the line of the Agra and Bombay road during its construction, has left a painful impression with Scindia and the people. I make no comment on the barracks and other buildings at Morar and the Fort ; a full report of these works will be made by the Public Works Department.'^* General Sir Mark Cubbon, who, with the assistance of one or two Engineers to guide the operations of his Dis- trict officers and their Native subordinates, had covered Mysore with good roads before any British Province was equally well supplied, strongly objected, but in vain, to the introduction of the Public Works Department into the territories which were under his charge for a quarter of a century. There are now about thirty English gentlemen in Mysore, employed on very simple work in that Depart- ment on very handsome salaries, where two or three at the most would really be required, if any pains were taken to train Native Engineers, or even any encouragement offered for them to come forward. In the Jjombay Gazette of November 20th 1809, there is an article commenting on a striking letter that had then ju.st appeared in the Pioneer, a journal pul)lislied at Alla- habad, not likely, the Gazette says, "to print malevolent insinuations on no sort of authority, or apparent authority." by Political Agents, sure of sujjport in the Foreign Department, or by the Govemmcnt, and too frequently in a very unjudicial manner. These are the very cases that ought to be appealable to the Queen in Council. * Cc/itral India Rt'iiorf, 1807-8, Appendix, p. xiv. OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 03 Tlie letter purports to be written from actual experience obtained within the Department. "Tho writer makes tlio following solemn declaration. He says : — ' I can in all truthfulness assert, after a most close con- nection with the Department for years, and without semblance of fear that my views could be controverted, that no Department under any Government could exhibit such reckless expenditure.'" " He goes on to imply the existence of positive fraud. He asserts, not only that some men have charged one hundred per cent, more than others would have charged — not only that sums are paid far beyond the value of the work done — but that enor- mous sums have been charged for the repairs of a certain road, which road, nevertheless, was always out of repair. He intimates, more than once, that overseers have made fortunes." It is quite unnecessary, in order to prove the notoriety of these scandalous administrative abuses, to cite the ver- naculjir newspapers, or those printed in English under Native management, for we find very similar allegations made, about the same time, by the principal weekly paper of Calcutta. The Friend of India, in December 1869, " commends to the study of Colonel Strachey," Secretary to Government for Public Works, the following two facts : — " The Calcutta Sailors' Home, built three years ago to a con- siderable extent out of charitable subscriptions, has already begun to give way owing to what we may call fraudulent beams. The second fact, which goes far to explain such scandal as this, is that a subordinate of the Public Works Department recently died worth several — we are assured, eight — lakhs of rupees" (£80,000). " He had been a private soldier and had made all his money in the Department."* The Times of India, published at BombPoy at about the same date as our last extract, warns the Government that public woi'ks must be constructed " on commercial prmci- ples," and that " even irrigation works and railways, like gold, may be bought too dearly." A correspondent declares, " after an experience of twenty-five years," that " no State can afford to build refrigerators in the shape of double- storied barracks, — patent producers of asthma, lumbago, and rheumatism, — costing lakhs of rupees, or to pour coin * Homeward Mail, January l<»tli, 1870. G-4 OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. into the hands of Native and European contractors to simply carry out tlie departmental rule — of useless ex- penditure and wanton waste of money," The Editor attributes the shoi-tcomings of the " costly mihtary En- gineers" employed in all the higher offices to " a want of insight, an habitual neglect of close supervision and inde- pendent check, with a deficiency m knowledge of details quite sufficient to account for the abuses and serious mal- versations charged agamst the lower ranks of the Depart- ment."* " Want of insight," and " deficiency in knowledge of details," are terms equally descriptive of the weak points in the qualffications of most English officers in India, and consequently of the Imperial Government, in almost every branch of administration. Having no social intercourse with the Natives, and takinof little interest in their works and ways, the great majority of our officers are more or less at the mercy of theu' Native subordmates — usually of one or two in close attendance — for information on all matters of detail, of local circumstances and current events. The minority, more independent, more confident, more determined to judge for themselves, and to be guided by no one, perhaps, on the whole, mislead themselves more than they could have been misled. Still maintaining my objections to over-centralisation and a straining after Procrustean uniformity, whether mani- fested in violent acts of annexation or m milder acts of leofis- lation, I should say that, speaking generally, our Imperial work has been more efficient, our Imperial influence has been more beneficial, than our local work or our local in- fluence. Local work can be better done by Natives than by Englishmen. Native talent can never be so well se- lected or so well applied to the work of local administra- tion by the British Government as in a Native State. And this will sei've to reconcile an apparent contradiction that may have struck some of my readers as running throughout these pages. I have freely questioned the peH'ection, and cast doubt on the perfectibility of British administration as well as of British Governm.ent in India. * Extracted from the Asiatic, December 22nd, 18G9. oui: (.;iiEA'r VASSAL EMi'iiiii:. 65 And yet I have taken as the chief sign and criterion of a Native State's progress m reform, that it lias adopted to a greater or less extent our principles of government and onr forms of administration. This is because our principles are as good as ever, although our practice may have fallen off, or may have become, by force of altered circumstances, unsuitable for the time and inconsistent with our principles. I do indeed believe that the work of government in our hands is declining, rather than rising, in efficiency and general repute, absolutely in some degree, but still more relatively, or with reference to the keener perceptions and more advanced capabilities of our political pupil. We should be proud, rather than jealous or apprehensive, of these results of oiu" teaching and example. We ought not to be blind to the moral and intellectual growth that calls for a relaxation of discipline. I believe, also, that the enactment of law, the organisa- tion of procedure, and the submission of Government to its own laws and pledges, having been exhibited by us on a large scale, in supersession of the arbitrary and capricious methods which we found in force, the advantages of a rule of law and order are appreciated by a sufficiently large number of the governing classes of India to admit of its beinof introduced and enforced everywhere imder the aus{)ices of the Imperial Power. But w^hile our general idea and plan of reducing Native institutions to a civihsed shape has been almost always excellent, our changes have frequently been premature, too complete and too compre- hensive. What we have gained in precision we have lost in flexibility and self-action. Native States, — if tolerably well administered, some- times when very badly administered, — are for the most part well and easily governed. British Provinces, with an elaborate and expensive administration, could not be governed at all without a formidable military force, always on the alert and frequently displayed. The best proof possible of a Government being so far good as to be suitable and acceptable to the people, is that it can withstand and outlast its own bad administration. F (')<) OIR (JUEAT \AS,SAL EMl'lUE. The luiretbrined Native States of India are reproached, and justly, because the pay of their troops and estal)lish- nients is always, as a matter of course, several months in arrears. That is bad administration. But iJi,ood govern- ment, in some rude fashion or other, surmounts the diffi- culty, even when it has led, as it often does, to mutiny. The Prince himself comes forward ; one or two petty otheials are ostensibly dismissed or disgraced ; a portion of the pay is distributed ; a few presents of clothes are given, and quiet is restored. The constitution being sound, a speedy recovery is made from severe privations and acci- dents. Our troops and civil establishments are paid monthly, with the most admirable regularity. That is good ad- ministration. But if we were to try the experiment, or be reduced to the necessity, of allowing pay to fall six months m arrears, we should find that good administration was all we had to rely on, and that when once that was interrupted there would be no government at all. The constitution is radically weak and unsound ; the biilliant aspect is due to unhealthy repletion and the use of stimu- lants ; a factitious appearance of streng'th is kept up only by the constant purveyance of costly provisions and exotic drugs, and by a complicated apparatus of artificial support. H the supplies should at any time be cut off, if the foreign support should be partially withdrawn, there would be imminent danger of collapse, or of some inflammatory erup- tion that coidd only be treated by blood-letting and other " heroic" remedies. ^lutiny or insubordination in our Native army, disaffec- tion or conspiracy anywhere in the British Provinces of India, cannot be quelled or cured by conciliation and com- promise, Vjy the redress of wrongs or by gracious |)romises. Force and terror — stern repression and penal inflictions — are the oidy means Ijy whicli we can touch that side of the Native character with which alone we come really in contact. The cynical assertion, frequently heard from Anglo-Indians, that Asiatics can only be ruled by fear, has much tnitli in it, with reference to existing relations between the i-aces, but tlie truth is not fV)r us either eulogistic or exculpatory. OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 67 And if any one should demur to these views, and claim for the British Government in India a higher share of moral authority, let him explain where it resides and how it is to be applied. By what operations, except military operations, does he conceive the British Government can oppose the disintegrating forces of ignorance, fanaticism, and wild ambition ? How would he, for instance, meet an impending or incipient rebellion ? Would he rely on Pro- clamations or General Orders ? They did not produce much good in 1857. Not only did their persuasive effect amount to nothnig, but their statements of fact were invariably disbelieved. The gfeneral course and numerous incidents of the Re- bellion served to bring out in strong relief the self-sustain- ing faculties of a Native State, and the vital support it can give to the Imperial Power, strikingly contrasted with the utter inability of our own administration, in District, Province, or Presidency, to stand its ground, unless backed by British troops, against an outburst of popular fury. A very competent authority. Sir Bartle Frere, late Governor of Bombay and now a Member of the Secretary of State's Coiuicil, has officially recorded his opinion that " no ad- ministration could have been more surprised by rebellion, none could have been more powerless to arrest or confront it, than the Government of the North- West Provinces in 1857."* It would be too much to expect this eminent public servant, — conscious of great skill and knowledge acquired, of much good work performed, and of well merited honour gained in his past career, with a grand field of usefidness, and, perhaps, some still more splendid prize open to him in the future, — to interpret these political phenomena in anything like the way that I shoidd, or to draw anything like the same inferences from them. To do so would probably seem to him almost an acknowledgment that his occupation was gone, that he had " scorned delights and lived laborious days" to very little purpose. And yet, what is the remedy he proposes to apply to those defects in the Government of the North- West Provinces that, in * Papers, Administration of Bengal, 1868, p. 49. F 2 OS (»ril GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. his o\vn M-ords, " blinded it to the mine of popular discon- tent which so suddenly exploded" ? How does he propose to endow the Lieutenant-Governor with that " sympa- thetic appreciation of what the people really in the long run desire, or will tolerate," which he believes to have been " the real source of the power" of Runjeet Smgli and Dost ^lohammed. which he justly declares to be " a more essential element in the composition of a successful despot," than even " a strong will,"* and which he evidently thinks we must not expect to find very often in the person of a British Lieutenant-Governor? A Council! Give him a Council such as those of Bombay and Madras. He has not, however, much confidence in the remedy he proposes. He LS in the puzzled state, usual, and indeed inevitable, when an Anglo-Indian functionary considerably above the average calibre gets out of the groove of administration, and becrins to think and talk like a statesman. The in- competence of the Agra Government in 1857, "cannot," he says, " be attributed to any want of ability in the Lieutenant-Governor or his advisers, for they were all among the ablest in India, and I do not say that a Governor and Council w^ould have done better."t Still a Council might be an improvement. At any rate, he urges : — " It cannot be said that the special form of Government in the Xorth-AVest Provinces gave any sort of special facility in dealing with the Rebellion, and it is at least open to argument that the complacent acquiescence in the personal views of the head of the Government, Avhere there is no one in authority to discuss them as a colleague, was a fatal element in blinding the Government." He could, he says, name some men who, " from their accessibility and tact in eliciting opinions, would never be wTong as to the popular view of a question," " But such gifts as they possess are very rare." And he " knows nothing more likely to be fatal to our rule in India than the autocracy of an able, well-intentioned man, who has not this peculiar aptitude i'or divining the wants and wishes of the people,":]: Therefore, try a Council. If one " able, well-intentioned" man witliout this " rare gift,'' * Papers, Administration of Benqol, 3868, p. .'jO. t Ibid., p, 40, ■ ; Ihid., p. 50. OUll CHEAT VASSAL EMPIIIE. 69 " this peculiar aptitude," will not do, associate three or four more of the same class with him as his colleagues. Perhaps one of them may by a happy chance possess that rare and peculiar aptitude. If not, his colleagues would be a check upon the Governor, and there would be less danger of " wanton change under the more elaborate form of government." " There can be no doubt," he contmues, " that the tendency to such change, which is one of the crying evils in our modern Indian system, is seen in its most aggravated form where the Government is autocratic." I should have thouglit that there was very great doubt on this point. I should have supposed, on the contrary, that a tendency to such change, for want of " an appreciation of what the people really desire, or will tolerate," — a ten- dency to over-legislation and over-regidation, — had been a much more " crying evil" under the elaborate forms of the Supreme Government than under the more autocratic institutions of the Punjaub and Central Provinces. But I am more immediately concerned at present with that other capacity which we look for in a Government, and in which Sir Bartle Frere tells us that of Agra failed in 1857, the capacity of maintaining the " public peace," of " arresting and confronting rebellion." This is the funda- mental duty of the Executive ; and it is difficult to con- ceive from what incidents m the great crisis of 18.57 Sir Bartle Frere has been led to suppose that the political vision of the Lieutenant Governor of Agra would have been prolonged or his hands strengthened, if two or three more gentlemen of the Bengal Civil Service had been with. him as his Councillors. No Governor-General was ever surrounded by more able Councillors than was Lord Can- ning at the outbreak of the Mutmies, Yet assuredly that excellent and lamented public servant, Mr. John Colvin, who was then Lieutenant Governor of the North- West Provinces, was not, so far as we can judge from the re- cords of the time, one whit more " surprised" by the Rebellion, one whit more " blinded" to the tremendous proportions it was about to assume, one whit more " power- less to arrest and confront it," without British troops, than were the Viceroy and his Councillors. 7U OUR GREAT \ASSAL E^IPIRE. What they wanted then, what tliey want now, what we shall always want in India, is a vital communication with the conservative interests and free intellio-ence of the coimtrv. And this we can only secure through the Native Princes. We want the Native Princes much more than they .want us. We want them for the discipline and the education of two hundred millions of Asiatics, We can in- struct and manage the two hundred Pruices, their families and followers; we cannot sway the millions without the aid and good will of their natural leaders. No British Collector, no Commissioner, no Lieutenant Governor, no Councillor, however able, however experienced, however highly edu- cated, — though strained and sifted by a dozen successive competitions, — can ever maintain order or propagate re- f >rm as can be done by a Native Prince, however ignorant, whom we have rendered amenable to our purpose. And there is no necessity that Native Princes should be ignorant. If most of them are so, it is only another proof of our negligence. There is no intention here of asserting- that Native Princes or Native States are all that they ought to be, or that they no longer need the restraint of British poli- tical supremacy. My object in the evidence and illustra- tions I have adduced has been rather to prove the inherent capabilities of improvement displayed by many Native States, than to afhrm the great progress made by any one , p. 7. t Mdcnlfe'is Pajiers, p. 22-'. X Ante, p. bl. OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 73 and indeterminate. Even the opponents of annexation, instead of cordially recognising a reformed Principality as at once the most progressive and permanent result pos- sible of British power in India, have seemed rather to look upon each Native State as a sort of privileged Alsa- tia which it was advisable to tolerate, partly out of respect for rights of prescription and compact, partly as a foil to our w^ell-regulated method, and as a field for ill-regulated ambition. There is no element in this contemptuous toler- ance that can form an absolute safeguard against the first plausible temptation. Several refuted heresies showed great vitality a few years ago, when the State of Mysore narrowly escaped extinction, — for instance, the doctrine of " lapse", and the perpetuity of British management, — while, the corporate character of a State being completely overlooked, it was held that a Native Prince, even in his dying agony or his dotage, might lawfully bequeath his Sovereignty to the Paramount Power, and that the ac- ceptance of such a bequest was quite consistent with Im- perial duty and dignity. I do not forget or undervalue the good work that has already been accomplished, and is in course of accomphsh- ment, in the very direction reconmiended in these pages. What I wish to point out is, that this good work has been done, and continues to be done, on no principle and imder no system, — that the reform of a Native State is taken up by mere chance, as it is forced on the considera- tion of our Government by the succession of a minor, by the violence, vice, or incompetence of a reigning Prince,* or by the exceptional combination of a thoroughly com- petent Resident with an enlightened Mmister or Sove- reign. In order that a Pesident should be thoroughly compe- tent, it is not enough that he should be able and active : he must also be genial, patient, and persuasive. He may very easily be too active. If he possesses the requisite tact and talent for the noble task before him, the mere fact of his representing the Imperial Power will clothe him with sufficient influence, without its being necessary * As in the recent cases of Tonk and AH Rajporc. 74 OUll GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. that his interference should be unpleasantly felt at every turn. He sIkhiIcI learn that his office is to teach and in- duce the Native Government to work well, — not to do the work himself, or even to correct it when wrongly done. He should sink his personality and efface himself, rather than allow any rumour of undue pressure or direct action on his ]iart to impair the authority of the Native Sovereign or his Muiister. He should never be tempted impatiently to assume, after the manner of Mr. Mangles and the Civil Service m general, that the work of government and ad- ministration must always be done in a superior style, and be more of an " unspeakable blessing" to the people, at the hands of educated Christian gentlemen like " Cubbon, Bowring, or Charles Saunders", than at the hands of a Hindoo Prince or Mussulman Minister. He should un- derstand that when the new system involves innovations on national habits and customs, the remodelling of old in- stitutions, and the introduction of new forms, the question is not so much what men can do the work best, as who are the best men to do it. The foreign doctor may de- serve all the credit of detecting the disease and prescribing the medicine, and yet the Native practitioner, simply be- cause he is a Native, may alone possess the power of re- moving popular prejudices, of making the new treatment palatable, and giving it vogue, and of securing a per- manent cure by appropriate diet and regimen. Better men cannot be found to carry out a poUcy of Imperial reconstruction than those who are at present actively employed in the civil and political offices of India. I am not a believer in the universally diffused capacity for administration and government of a "Service", whether recruited by patronage or by competition ; but if we would confine ourselves to our appropriate and legitimate sphere, there would be no lack of well-qualified agents. All that they rcfjuire are clear instructions on the subject of Im- perial policy. When the national instinct is roused and the national voice has spoken,— when broader views of our mi,ssion and our duties are expoimded by the highest authorities in Great Britain, — administrative power and administrative loyalty will not he wanting, either in the OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 75 central executive Council or amonof tlie scattered subordi- nate officers, for the fulfilment of the national decree. But no broader views will ever originate in Calcutta. Law reformers do not look for much help or countenance from the great body of judges, advocates, and solicitors, or ecclesiastical and educational reformers from the bishops and beneficed clergy. Old soldiers and sailors are gene- rally opposed to all military and naval novelties. The cause of local self-government never meets with much favour from members of the permanent Civil Service. No one likes to find that his craft and mystery is to lose its value, or to be thrown open to general competition. In India the natural reluctance of a privileged profession to sacrifice its pride and its interests, to relinquish power, place, or patronage, to learn a new procedure and assume new relations towards the outer w^orld, is heightened by strong distinctions of race, creed, and colour. The national conscience and absolute decision of the United Kingdom must overcome these obstacles. The public opinion of Great Britain translated into precepts by the Secretary of State, with or without some Parliamentary action, would soon suffice to modify and transform the temper of the Indian Services and of the Viceregal Government. The more liberal spirit must come from home. It will never spring up unbidden in official circles. A remark officially recorded two years ago by Colonel Hopkinson, Commissioner of Assam, is here very much to the pouit : — , " Lastly, I would observe that if endeavours are ever made to develope the moral nature of the Natives after the fashion of the Anglo-Saxon race, it will be found that for the most part they originate either in England or with Englishmen out of the official pale in India. ^^* The besetting sin of every organised body of professional functionaries, — the desu^e to magnify its own importance and power, — affects most deeply the superintendence of Native States by the Calcutta Foreign Office and its Agents. Instead of strengthening the Prince's hands and * Papers, British and Native Administration^ 1868, p. L(i. 7 b OUH GREAT VASSAL EMl'IllE. g-iiidlno- his steps, tlie official tendency is always to weaken his authority and to fetter his movements. It ought to be clearly understood, for instance, that the fault of the Oude Government for many years before the annexation, Avas not that of tyraimical oppression, but rather a certain weakness and looseness of administration, and a total incapacity to cope with the great landholders, ;;11 lieino- due m a o-reat measure to our own derelictions and neglect. Far from its being true, as has been often alleged, that the Oude Government was enabled to be op- pressive with impunity in consequence of British military support. Sir William Sleeman declares that its inability to control the more powerful feudatories arose from that support not being given to which the Government was justly entitled. From time to time, he tells us, Regiments liad been withdrawn from several points, which " to do our duty lionestlij hy Oude', we ought to restore.* " The British force in Oude is much less than it was when the Treaty of the 11th September, 1837, was made, and assuredly less than it should be with a due regard to our engagements and the Oude requirements.'^ "Our exigencies became great with the Affghan war, and have continued to be so from those wars which grew out of it with Gwalior, Scinde, and the Punjaub ; but they have all now passed away, and those of our humble Ally should be no longer forgotten or disregarded. Though we seldom give him the use of troops in the support of the authority of his local officers, still the prestige of having them at hand, in support of a just cause, is unquestionably of great advantage to him and to his people, and this advantage we cannot withhold from him with a due regard to the obligations of solemn trcaties.'''t Tlie very same weakness in the Head of the State, curable only by Imperial intervention, is the main obsta- cle to improved government in the larger Principalities of Eajpootana, especially in Joudpoor and Oodeypoor. There the great feudatories, regarding the Sovereign as little more than primM.s- inter pares, claim unlimited sway witliin their own estates, resent all judicial or executive interference, and deny all right of appe it ouglit to be enough to point out that the liuler of* a State of moderate size may be able to secure the services of highly educated men for judicial posts and other im- portant offices, w^liile no such help could by any possibility be obtained by a petty Chieftain, whose income w^ould in many cases not exceed £500 a year, and w^ho w^ould fre- quently be himself destitute of even the rudiments of an Indian education. In consequence, as it w^ould seem, of the scandals and loud complaints caused by the misgovernment and mis- conduct of the Maharajah of Joudpoor, — misconduct that would almost have justified his deposition, — the Govern- ment of India turned its attention in the middle of 1869 towards the condition of Rajpootana. Some well intended though imperfect measures for suspending personal rule in Joudpoor were ordained, but nothmg permanent, nothing going to the root of the evil, — central weakness and general irresponsibility. The only additional result of these deliberations was the appointment of six more Assistant Political Agents. Six fortunate English officers, not selected for any special aptitude, merely appointed by virtue of patronage or by dint of their own pertinacious importunity, are sent to reside at the capitals of as many Principalities, whence they will write elaborate reports to their official superior. We hear not a word of any states- maidike instructions or counsels addressed either to the Governor-General's Agent or to the Princes themselves, or of any general measures for initiating progressive reforma- tion. Not a thought seems to have been given to an in- strumentality that has been hitherto entirely neglected, by which we could most effectually penetrate into the inmost recesses of Native Courts, — Native agency, care- fully selected and educated, properly paid, trusted and honoured. Until a policy of reconstructive reform to be applied to the internal wants and resources of each Native State, is authoritatively mculcated from home, the Calcutta Foreign Office will assuredly persist in its policy of msatiable patron- age, barren criticism, and irritating encroachments. The disorder to be cured being beyond all doubt or dispute, 80 OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. the Government of India, instead of trying to improve tlie constitution, can think of no treatment but blisters and restraint, will continue to surround the patient with otHoious niu'ses and ignorant medical students, when one skill'ul practitioner, fully empowered to act, would soon establish the regularity of every function and the free movement of every limb. Provided the Government is so orgranised as to be no longer entirely dependent for its efficiency on the personal qualities of the Prince or his Minister, a Native State cannot be made too free or too strong. If we could only realise this truth with special reference to the military resources and requirements of India, we might find therein a satisfactory solution of that much disputed problem, — how to mauitain a Native armv of sulficient streno'th in safe and responsible hands. Those officers in the British army who have been most successful and distinguished in the command of Native troops, — unequalled as leaders of such troops in war, — must for ever be, as they were seen to be during the mutinies of 1857, completely divided in thought, feeling, and interests from the Sepoys, and practically unacquainted with their hopes and fears, their objects, and their pro- jects. They cannot undertake to be responsible, and they cannot be held responsible, for the conduct of their men at any period of great I'eligious or political excitement. At the moment of critical urgency their detective insight would fail, and their controlling inffiience would be at its lowest point. Pjut the most perfect controlling influence is ready to our call and open to our supervision, if we only choose to use it. The military resources of India and of the Em- pire might be husljanded witli greater care and kept more witliin reach, the force required on a peace footing might be organised and disposed more advantageously and more economically, if in the fulness of time which has now ar- rived, we were to commence V)y judicious degrees the pro- cess of reversing the Subsidiary system of the Marquis Wellesley, — restoring and transferi'ing to Native States, in consideration of military service, territories that would OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. .^1 be no loss to iis. The gain in consolidated strength and reduced charges, would far more than compensate for the nominal sacrifice of revenue. The troops of dependent Sovereigns, so long as their pay, regularly disbursed, does not unduly encroach on the local finances, cannot be made too efficient. Native troops, properly organised, and subject to Imperial inspection, cannot be kept under any control equally effective with that of a Native Prince, whose personal and hereditary ties and engagements constitute a chain of subordination and responsibility to the Paramount Power, more clearly defined and more easily enforced than any that has ever yet existed, or can be devised.* We need have no suspicion of the visible armies of all the Native Sovereions of India. Not one of them has the slightest wish to measure his strength against ours. They are neither willing nor able to combine against us. So long as we can see their little armies, we know where to have them, in case of any unavoidable collision or unex- pected contumacy. It is far better that the warlike ele- ments of the population shall be organised and disciplined under responsible leaders, than that they should be com- pressed or driven out of sight into predatory courses or hidden conspiracy. We cannot rely too much on the as- surance contained in Lord Canning's last letter to Gene- ral Sir Mark Cubbon, dated the 24th of November, I860:— " I have no doubt that the poHcy of disruption and separation was the right one fifty years ago, when the Rohillas and Mahrat- tas possessed armies and artillery which they could increase at pleasure without our consent, and, indeed, without our know- ledge. But now it is quite different. These Chiefs can scarcely cast a gun, — they certainly could not equip it unknown to us. They feel their dependence on us, since 1857, more than ever. We have nothing to fear from them individually, if we treat them rightly ; while they have individually an influence which is in- valuable to us as Supreme Rulers in India, if we will but turn it to account." The following narrative will serve to show how the pro- fessional rulers of India, when relieved for a. time from * Appendix B. G 82 OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. the check and restraint of a British statesman as Viceroy, relapse into their naiTow views, reject and despise the in- fluence deemed invaluable by Lord Canning, refuse to turn it to any account at all, and do their best to destroy or pervert it. In the worst days of the Rebellion of 1857 the chief obstacle to the free exercise of the Maharajah Scindia's authority on our side, the chief support of the turbulent party aroimd him, consisted of the Gwalior Contingent, a force complete in itself, — Horse, Foot, and Artillery, — ^^4th its own arsenal, stores, and cash-chest, raised and disciplined by British oflicers, according to what used to be considered the only safe plan for organising Native troops. The expense of this force w^as imposed upon cer- taui districts assigned to our management by the Gwalior State under the Treaty of 1844, when its unmanageably large Army had been disbanded after Lord EUenborough's campaign. At a very early period of the outbreak the Gwalior Contingent mutinied, some of the English officers being murdered. The mutineers, nearly ten thousand strong, of all arms, left their cantonments, preserving their military order under chosen leaders, and thronged, clamo- rous and wild with excitement, around the Maharajah Scindia's Palace, callinof on him to lead them to Delhi. The brave young Prince confronted this formidable host, humoured them and temporised with them, since he could not fight them, — though he tried that also at last, and failed ; he kept them idle and harmless for months at Gwalior, until Dellii was taken, and after marching on Cawnpore and holding General Windham at bay, the mu- tineers of the Gwalior Contingent, still a compact body, were at last routed by Lord Clyde. It is quite clear that but i\)v the contagion of our re- volted Sepoys, the Maharajah Scindia could have easily kept even the most violent of his own people quiet, and that he could have kept the Contingent quiet also, if it liad ever been lujder his command. At an advanced stage of the Kebellion, his own troops, though quite as ill-dis- posed towards us as our mutineers, were in a great mea- sure obedient to the Maharajah's orders, so fjir at least as OUR GEEAT VASSAL EMPIKE. (S3 to be inactive and innocuous : while tlie men of the Gwahor Contingent, brought up under British discipUne, f rom which they had broken loose, set him at defiance, and took the field against us. As there was no doubt or question of the loyalty and steadfastness of this excellent Prince, w^hich had been tried severely enough, — Scindia liaving perilled his life in our cause with consj)icuous gallantry on several occasions, — the wisest and most natural policy would have been by every possible means to increase his influence, and strengthen his hands within his own domi- nions. Such, in fact, was Lord Canning's pohcy. Such was not the policy of Sir John (now Lord) Lawrence. On the re-establishment of order, the Gwalior Contin- gent havmg been wiped out, its several posts and military duties were taken up by regidar British troops, and by the Maharajah's augmented forces. As the Contingent system had manifestly failed in this instance, a new Treaty was concluded, ratified by Lord Canning on the 12th December, 1860, under which certain pecuniary advan- tages were conferred on the Gwalior State, and its mili- tary force, restricted under the Treaty of 1844, might be raised to the hmit of " 5000 drilled" (Infantry) "soldiers, 6000 Sow^ars" (troopers), and "36 guns wdth 360 gunners."* Scindia, who is described as being a born soldier, with a remarkable talent for military organisation and evolu- tions, w^ell pleased with the concessions of the Treaty of 1860, had taken full advantage of them to indulge his martial tastes. The greater part of his little army, the " drilled soldiers' permitted by the new Treaty, were massed at his capital under his own eye ; and here, in unsuspectmg complacency, he invited the Political Agent to witness a grand review of all his troops. Whether this officer or the Viceroy first took fright, does not appear, but the immediate result w^as an absolute order, in the form of a polite letter from the Governor-General to the Maharajah, desiring that his little Army should at once be broken up, the several corps dispersed about the coun- * Article ix of the Treaty of 1860 ; Collection of Treaties, Calcutta, 1864 (London, Longmans), vol. iv, p. 274. r' *^ 84 OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. try, and that no such large assemblage of troops should again take place. We learn from the Report of the Central India Agency for 18G()-7,* that the measm-es for the reduction and dis- persion of these troops were taken in Februaiy, and " a full and detailed report of the cii'cumstances was fur- nished" in a despatch dated 15th March, 1867. The Agent to the Governor-General says (para. 62, p. 13), "it would be hardly possible to overstate the soreness caused by the check that has thus been given to the indulgence of his" (Scindia's) "passion for military organisation and parades, and of his desire to keep his whole Force with this object at the capital under his personal control and command". \ He continues thus (para. 63) : — '* I will only add that this result, however to be lamented, was altogether inevitable ; and that the necessity for the adoption of the measures under advertence being deemed imperative under the circumstances, no consideration that I am aware of could have broken, or even mitigated, the effects of the blow to His Highness. Certainly no effort was spared by either the Political Agent or myself with this object." It cannot be considered wonderful after this, that the Agent (para. 05 to 68, pp. 13, 14), while "cordially admit- ting" Maharajah Scindia's "friendly personal bearing," declaring his Highness to be " accessible and courteous, and prepared to discuss most subjects in a pleasant way, and to listen with attention to the arguments addressed to him", and giving his testimony to " the Maharajah's re- spect for the authority of the British Government", should still find that the Prince is now and then "suspicious and distrustfud", and sometimes " considers the intervention of the British Government, or its officers, unwarrantable". ILnv coulcl it Vje otherwise while Imperial supremacy was exerted for his personal discomfiture in a manner so offen- sive and vexatious ? It would be difficult to conceive a measure more mise- rable and more unmeaning. It might indeed be urged that such peremptory interference was inconsistent with • Published by authority, Calcutta, 18t]8. OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 85 the eno-ao'ements between the British Govemment and that of Scindia. The Treaty of 18 GO, whicli Umits the number of troops, permits no control over their location or distribution ; while, in Article VIII of the Treaty of 1804, confirmed by every subsequent engagement, it is expressly stipulated that " no officer of the Honourable Company shall ever interfere in the internal affairs of the Maharajah's Government";* and Article IV of the Treaty of 1817, confirmed and declared to be "binding" in the Treaty of 1860, pronounces the Maharajah to be "the undisputed master of his own troops and resources".t No stress need be laid upon tliese conditions ; they are only to be taken as a starting-point ; for undoubtedly, the Paramount Power, responsible for the peace of the Em- pire, cannot be bound by the strict letter of Treaties, when the public safety is endangered, and immediate action may be required to check hostile intrigue or dangerous excitement. Nor is any account or explanation of susj^i- cions and precautions due to the minor State. But such coercive action, equivalent to open war against a Power of equal standing, ought to be very sparingly used, and only in case of urgent necessity. Sir John Lawrence could allege no such necessity for interfering with Scindia's legi- timate authority over his own troops, withm his own territories. He manifested groundless mistrust of a sub- ordinate Ally before all India. Nothing could have been more impolitic or more ungracious. It was just the old leaven of the permanent official, the characteristic disease of the Bengal Civilian, — a sort of fussy jealousy, always sure to be roused by the portentous phenomenon of any Native, whether Prince or peasant, presuming to act or think for himself. Even if there had been any cause or ground for mis- trust, it was most indiscreet and undignified to show it. The action of Sir John Lawrence seems to have involved every fault that should be avoided in dealing with the de- pendent States. It betrayed petty suspicions and in- glorious apprehensions, unworthy of the Imperial Power. It violated a Treaty, — thereby shaking respect for the * Collection of Treaties, vol. iv, p. 286. f Ibid., p. 272. S6 OUll LiKEAT VASSAL EMPIllE. solemn engagements on which the moral authority of our Government depends, not only in the particular State injured, hut in every State throughout India, It tended to alienate an able and estimable Prince, and to make British supremacy hateful and oflensive in his councils, and among all his compeers. By an affront so galling, and so ]nibliely administered, aimed at what w^as known to be the Maharajah's special pride and tenderest point, his in- fluence nuist have been weakened generally in his own dominions, and that of the malcontent party everyAvhere enlianced. The influence of the Maharajah, faithfully and beneflcially exerted on oiu- side in the last great crisis, has been weakened exactly where, judgmg from the ex- perience of those days, it most deserved strengthening, — his personal and undivided command over his own troops. Having thus low^ered at one stroke the moral power of Great Britain, and of a most useful and deserving friend, what positive result did Sir John Lawrence obtain? None except that of having made himself intensely disagreeable. There could be no actual danger or menace to British su- premacy in the encampment of our Ally's small Army, — a mere Division of second-rate Sepoys after all, — at his capital. The idea is ridiculous. He did not in the least diminish the physical force available for bad purposes within or without Scindia's territories. He weakened the Maharajah's controlling influence ; he certainly gained none for any British authority. He probably oft'ended and disgusted an intelligent and high-spirited Prince ; he assuredly pleased nobody whose goodwill or good opinion was worth having. What ought to have been done under the circumstances, is obvious. On receiving the Resident's report of the unlr)oked for efficiency and smartness of Scindia's troops, a Viceroy whose ideas of Imperial statesmanship could rise above those of our own military readiness and admin- istrative tidiness, would have grasped at once at the opportunity of raising the self-respect of a well-disposed Prince, and of promoting substantial and solid progress in one of the largest Native States. He would have con- gratidated and complimented the Mahara;jah on having OUll GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 87 commenced of his own accord the reform of his estabhsh- ments by that of his Army, which he rejoiced to hear was now in a high state of discipline ; and he would then have suggested some other public department, organised on a faulty principle, where improvements, hinted or sketched in outlme, might be introduced with great advantage to the people, and witli great honour to his Highness's name. The administrative and executive reform of a Native State is not a plant that can grow to its full size in a day. Tact and cordiality, genial confidence, and warm appreciation of small beginnings, may make the plant strike deep root. The cold shade and rough usage to which official cultivation has been of late confined, can only stunt the growth, corrupt the soil, and poison the atmosphere. No one can fail to observe how powerful a lever to move the mass of prejudice and ignorance that obstructs the progress of India, is placed in our hands by the possession of so much superfluous and unprofitable territory. Under no pressing necessity to part with it, under no obligation to confer any portion of it on any particular Prmce, the Imperial Power could, in every case of transfer, impose its own conditions. A certain proportion of the Indian debt would have to be paid of£ or assumed by the enlarged feudatory after fair calculation and arrangement ; while the advantages gained by the Imperial Government would be found not only in the riddance of so much dead-weight, but also m the reduction of establishments, and in the prospective diminution in the annual tribute of pensions, furlough allowances, passage money of troops, and other Home charges. By the gradual and more perfect formation of India into a great Vassal Emj^ire, in the true sense of the term, the Imperial Power would gain strength at home and abroad, and relief from the ever present possibility of hideous disaster and disgrace. With the very doubtful exception of the small class that is supposed to profit directly by Indian patronage, no class of our countrymen would lose anything. The interest of the British nation in the annual provision made for some hundreds of young gentlemen, 88 OUK GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. and the fortunes and pensions acquired by some scores of retired t^tiieials, is of very circumscribed importance, of infinitesimal value, when compared with its interest in the development of the energies, in the cultivation of tlie tastes ami desires of an immense and intelligent popula- tion occupying an inexhaustible field of producmg and purchasing- power. The Imperial Government would still exclusively conduct the external relations of the Empii'e ; control and restrict the political intercourse between the States. Our troops would visit and occupy, at pleasure, any and every place and post throughout the land. The military force of every minor State would be strictly subordinate and auxiliary, some Native Princes and Chieftains holding Her Majesty's connnission, and certain Imperial roads and fortresses being specially entrusted to their charge, for w^liich, as well as for the general efficiency, good conduct and discipline of their Contingents, they would be held personally and politically responsible. No customs or transit-duties could be levied without Imperial concurrence. By her treaty- right of authoritative counsel the Imperial Power could modify and direct the institutions of every State. Surely here are some securities both for order and progress. Surely here there will be full scope for British statesmanship, ample space for British energy and enterprise.* Our advocacy of an Imperial system of instructed and superintended self-development for India, in contradis- tinction to a policy of territorial possession and dhect ad- ministration, is sometimes met with objections which desei-ve to be stigmatised as absolutely truculent, and wortliy only of the dark ages. It has been said that the Biitish nation rules India by right of conquest, that we are the concj^uerors of the country, and are, therefore, fVilly warranted and justified in extracting from India such y^rrttits, in exercising such patronage, and in assuming such privileges and pre-eminences, all for the special advantage * It has been most pratifjing to me to observe that, however much the policy I have jidvocated for many years may have been misunder- stood in some quarters, it has met with init'l]i<^(;rjt and iemperate ap- preciation in those Knghsh and veinacular journals which represent the higher class of educated natives of India, — see Appendix H. OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 89 of the dominant race, as may seem for the time being convenient and attainable. It may not be now expedient, perhaps it would not be strictly justifiable, to impose a palpable tribute, but contributions may be, directly and indirectly, levied upon India, over and above what is absolutely required for its administration, in order to re- lieve British taxpayers, to provide lucrative employment for our sons, and to enrich our traders and manufacturers. These contributions are to be measured only by our dis- cretion, and limited only by our magnanimity. Some of as, speaking of the nation as Lord Clive did for himself, seem to be astonished at oui' own moderation. " No !" — say the able editors of the Anglo-Indian press, representing the Services and the British mercantile com- munity, — " do not let the educated Natives deceive them- selves. The futui'e is not for them. We are by no means trustees ; we are conquerors, and entitled by virtue of that position to study oiu" own interests in all our execu- tive and legislative action quite as much as*the interests of the people of India. We are not going to rule the country merely for the benefit of the conquered, to give them gradually a larger share in the government, and to hand it over to them entirely when they think they can "undertake it. Not at all, — we shall keep it for ourselves as long as we choose, and as long as we keep it we shall try to make it as profitable to ourselves as we can." All this appears to me not only very erroneous, but very stupid and very shallow. Those principles of govern- ment must be shallow and stupid that are based on con- tempt for the governed, and find expression in cynical insolence. Whether India can properly be said to have been con- quered by Great Britain is open to very great question. Some of its Provinces, — for example those which formed part of the dominions of Tippoo Sultan and of the Peishwa, — came into our possession by conquest. But in each of the wars which led to these acquisitions Native Princes were our Allies, and shared in the partition of the con- quered territories.* Many minor Chieftains assisted on * Collection of Treaties, Calcutta, 1864, vol. v, pp. 4, 6, 7. 90 OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. our side, and a large number of Natives of India fought in our ranks. Other Provinces were acquired by cession or exchange under Treaties with Native Sovereigns with whom we were at peace, and with some of whom we had never been at war. It were well if certain other Provinces now in our possession had been conquered, for there can- not be a more clear and explicit title to sovereignty than that of conquest confirmed by treaty ; but in the cases to which I refer, — of which only one of great importance, the Carnatic, need be mentioned, — territories are now held and administered by the British Government solely as the silent result of breach of trust and broken treaties, with- out any visible process or public proclamation whereby a title might be acquired or even asserted. But it really matters nothing to our argument whether India is correctly described as a conquered country or not. Neither in International Law as expounded by the old jurists, nor in modern treatises on the same subject, is any eifect of coifquest alleged except that of giving a good title to sovereignty and dominion. The effect of conquest is in its essence transitory and investitive. It simply de- notes the mode of acquisition. Conquest does not impair the obligations of political ethics, destroy rights and duties, or set up a peculiar set of slavish relations between the rulers and the ruled. If it were so, such possessions would be a curse and a disgrace to a civilised and free nation. If it were so in India, contented allegiance would there be cowardly corruption, and the highest form of pohtics would be a permanent conspu'acy. But it is not so. Whatever may be occasionally written or said by rash and irresponsible persons, the heart of this great nation is sound. No Minister in his public despatches, no representative of the people before his constituency or in the House of Commons, wovdd venture to proclaim the doctrine that one penny should be extracted from India beyond the necessary cost of administration, or that any privileges or distinctions, for the benefit of Great Britain or of any class of our population, should be enforced or recognised. But it is highly advisable that the vulgar notions on these heads, so jjrevalent among our professional OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. [)l and commercial countrymen in India and those who are in- structed by them at home, should be dispelled by a voice of national authority. If the British people, in their homes and in their Par- liament, can only be occasionally roused from utter apathy towards India under the feelings of terror and fuiy gene- rated by some terrible calamity, if no statesman is to arise who can more truly represent the national spirit and apply the national maxims of Great Britain to our Imperial tutelage than has hitherto been done in practice by our professional delegates in India, the relations between the races, which are now sufficiently unsocial to cause the most painful forebodings, will by degrees become positively in- human. All the intellectual and emotional force living and moving on that vast continent, — inferior, perhaps, in intrinsic worth and energy, but infinitely superior in volume and in popular affinity to ours, — will gradually be turned from us and against us. At last our military force alone would be left confronted with the physical force of two hundred millions of opponents. No military force in India can ever be superior, or equal, or comparable w^ith ours. Even without Native auxiliaries, a British army of twenty thousand men would meet with no formidable opponent on the soil of India. But without an immense body of auxiliaries, military and civil, such an army would, at no great distance from the coast, find no subsistence in the soil, and would stai've in the midst of plenty. Is it really supposed that the physical force of two hundred millions of people can only be used in fight- ing ? The physical force of India, obstructively exerted, negatively arrayed against us, or merely withheld from our side, would lower us at once from the rank of rulers to that of foreiofn invaders. If we persist in trying to make permanent that which is only defensible as a temporary discipline, the emancipa- tion of India from a pupilage which must become mtole- rable if unduly prolonged, will hardly be delayed, though 92 OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. it may be accelerated, by our determination, and will come to pass in the fulness of time as certainly as the tree will bear its fruit. The only choice open to us is whether the change is to take place peacefully, harmoniously and with good will, or with ruinous confusion and violence, with misery, calamity and hatred on both sides. The choice is open to us now, but no one can foretell how long it will remain open. I do not say that the pupilage, from which India has reaped so many blessings, has been as yet unduly prolonged ; but I do think that everything warns us to prepare for a critical period of transition. And how that period of transition is to be made a period of more diligent instruction, — ^how the process of transition can be kept more closely and more tirmly under Imperial control, and yet left more freely and confidently to Native direction than has ever been hitherto realised, — except by earnestly and systematically promoting the reform of Native States, and, as they are reformed, by their territorial expansion, I am quite at a loss to understand. All attempts to reconcile the in^econcileable, and to sa- tisfy the fair aspirations of the ambitious, by the more liberal admission of Natives to the higher branches of the pubhc service, will certainly fail in the desired effect, and, if exclusively relied on, may even be expected, for reasons on which we have already touched,* to stimulate antagonism, and to weaken British authority. The en- courajjement of education in our o^vn Provinces as well as in the dependent States, and the introduction of well fpialiiied Natives into every department of the adminis- tration, are beneficent and necessary measvu-es, and no considerations of national pride or class interest ought to be allowed to obstruct their progress. These, measures furnish the medicines and the instruments wherewith to treat the political and social diseases of India, and restore her constituent Kingdoms and nations to a healthy and regiilar life. They are the means of cure, but are not the cure itself On the contrary, if not rightly applied they may produce a new and more intractaljle disease. If, * Ante, p. 43 to 4G. OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. O:"? having trained our workmen, we do not set them to work on a sufficiently large and fruitful field, their suppressed energies and talents may find a vent in some very danger- ous channel. Can any unprejudiced and thoughtful observer be so fiir deceived as to accept the present unnatural form of govern- ment for India as if it ought and were to endure for ever? Is that great continent to be ruled and administered for ever by "birds of passage", who have "not the faintest idea of making a home there", whose " main object is to get away from India as fast as possible", and who live in a state of "pecuniary care" that is quite " pitiable" if their income is less than £1.500 a year.* Does that system seem calculated or destined for perpetuity, under which, for example, in one of the poorest countries of the world, the Commissioner of a Division, an officer entrusted with no initiative or independent authority, receives a salary about three times as large as that allotted, in one of the richest countries of the world, — France,— to an officer of much higher functions and heavier responsibility, the Prefect of a Department ?t Does it seem probable, considering the economical vicissitudes and spiritual convulsions to which nations are liable, considermg the growing perceptions, the rising intelligence and the reviving spirit of those who lead and sway that vast population, that the enormous * Ante, p. 42, 43. t The salary of a Commissioner is never less than £3500 a year. I imagine there are few Prefets receiving more than 30,000 francs per annum. And yet in Bengal, where in consequence of our thriftless Permanent Settlement the collection of the land revenue is much more easy and simple than in any other part of India, to strengthen the con- trol over the Collectors of Districts exercised by the Commissioners, it is found necessary to have a Board of Revenue sitting at Calcutta, whose members draw salaries of between £4000 and £5000 a year, and are commonly reported to obstruct business. In the Madras Presidency, where the minute subdivision of land renders the collec- tion of revenue much more laborious, there is a Board of Revenue, but there are no Commissioners. In the Bombay Presidency there arc two Commissioners, but no Board. But it would never do to dimi- nish the number of prizes for the Bengal Civil Service, more especially of that class of prizes that can be safely conferred upon those meri- torious gentlemen of long service whose abilities and activities have always been manifestly mediocre. 94 OUR grii:at vassal empire. remittances now required for disbm-sement in London, amount inix to eleven millions a year, nearly a quarter of the annual revenue of India in these prosperous days, will always be provided without a struggle and without a nuirnuir ? There was great exultation lately, and on very good grounds, when the Rajah of Puttiala was known to have invested forty lakhs of rupees (£400,000) in the Indian funds. The Kajah of Dhar, whose whole revenue scarcely exceeds £50,000 a year, now holds £40,000 of Govern- ment paper. The Friend of India, fairly representing the average oflficial opinion of Calcutta, justly observed of the Puttiala Rajah's purchase that there could be no more satisfactory pledge and bond of loyalty and good behaviour, and that such transactions ought to be en- couraged to the utmost. There can be no doubt of it. We ought not only to encourage Native Princes to make investments of this description, but we ought to induce them to cancel by payment or to take upon their own shoulders, some portions of the Public Debt. The stipu- lated consideration for the territorial cessions recommended as the motive power of our future ImjDerial policy, should be partly exacted in this form. For to any calm and dispassionate uiquirer, not afraid to scan the dark as well as the bright side of affairs, the Debt of India presents a strange and portentous aspect. It now amounts to a hundred millions, and the annual interest is upwards of five millions sterling. It is like no other Puljlic Debt that has ever existed. It has been contracted without the authority or approval of any Native Sovereign or of any Native representative body,— a matter to Ije passed over at present, perhaps, with levity or de- rision, but which may not always deserve such treatment. It is not in Native liands, but in the hands of English capitidists. Only a fraction, a fluctuating and, I believe, a decreasing fraction, is held by Natives, rather for pur- poses of speculation than of investment. It behoves the statesmen and the taxpayers of the United Kingdom to reflect most seriously on their own continirent lisk wifli reference to all Indian securities. OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 9.") Successive Secretaries of State have, it is true, protested that this country will not guarantee, either in a strictly legal or in a loose commercial sense, the payment of prin- cipal or interest of Indian Debt. It is a burden, they say, that India must bear herself, just as Canada and Australia bear theirs, for whose debts Great Britain is no more re- sponsible than for those of the United States or other foreign Governments in which our subjects have largely invested. It is a burden that India must bear. There is this difference between the several cases, that India must be made to bear the burden, — she has no choice in the mat- ter. It is an unmitigated burden to the Indian popula- tion, no class deriving any profit from its existence. A large proportion of the Public Debt of Australia, Canada, and the United States is held by their own citizens, form- ing an influential class upon whom repudiation would in- flict great loss or total ruin. But the Native holders of Indian Debt are so few in number as not to constitute a class at aU. Thus, instead of the Debt of India being really National, and constituting a bond of mutual obliga- tion and confidence between the Government and the most powerful classes of the country in whose name it is borrowed, it is only a bond of mutual obligation between the British Government of India and a certain class of British investors. The s;5stem of open loans which the Emperor Napoleon III introduced into French finance, and by which he suc- ceeded in tapping the hoards of the middle class and even of the landholding peasantry, may well have strengthened his dynasty and Government ; for all the holders of pub- lic securities, a large and influential body of taxpayers, thereby became directly interested in maintaining general tranquillity, in upholding their debtor and legalising his rule. But neither the open loans of Calcutta, nor those negotiated on the London Stock Exchange, can have tended in the least to strengthen our Government. No class of taxpayers has thereby become interested in main- taining tranquillity, or in confirmuig those transactions. On the contrary, the whole body of taxpayers is directly 96 OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. interested in repudiating tliem. Both general taxes and local rates have increased of late, and are increasing. These new imposts, for the most part direct in their inci- dence, are very distinctly felt. As diffused education and more frequent communication with the outer world, create a pohtical consciousness in India, the Natives will ever have before them a very simple motive to dislike us, when they nnderstand not only that we incurred the Debt, not only that we have imposed new taxes to pay the interest, hut that our people hold the Debt, and that the interest (or as they will say, the produce of the new taxes), is an- nually abstracted from India to Great Britain, with other large remittances, for the benefit of the British Govern- ment and people. Still, it may be msisted, even if we suppose that a feel- ing somewhat more bitter than the usual ignorant impa- tience of taxation may at some time or other be roused in India with regard to these payments, if we imagine tlie most alarming possibiHties,- — general distress, widely ex- tended insurrection, foreign sympathy and intervention, battle, mui'der, and sudden death, — if we agree with you that the Indian Debt and Indian Railways may not be always quite as safe as Consols, it will not the less remain perfectly true that the British Government does not guarantee those investments, and that people who lent their money, trusting solely to the credit and resources of the Indian Government, have no more claiiii on tlie British Exchequer than tlie unguaranteed creditors of a British Colony or of a foreign State. But it seems doubt- ful whether such a claim could be so summarily dismissed. The Canadian and Australian loans were raised under laws passed by local representative bodies, in which the Colonial revenues and resources are pledged to the pay- ment, the Home Government n<')t interfering at any stage to sanction or confirm. Tlie Indian loans were raised partly by the absolute fiat of an Executive appointed by the British Government and all of whose acts are subject to the approval of a Cabinet Minister, latterly under the special niles and conditions prescribed by the British LeoHslaturo, the Tnrlinn Govprnment beinjx forbidden to OUK GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 97 l)orrow in the London market witliout an Act of Parlia- ment. It is not very wonderful if nnwary investors have come to look upon the commands of the Crown, under which Indian wars have been carried on, — for example, the Afghan War, — and the Acts of the Legislature, under which Indian loans to pay for those wars have been con- tracted, as coming very near to a British guaranty. If, in deftuilt of payment through the ordinary channel, they should consider themselves at least as much entitled to some compensation from the national treasury as were, for instance, the sufferers from the Cattle Plague, we could not be much surprised, and could not blame them severely. Forty millions, the cost of suppressing the Sepoy Pe- bellion, were borrowed in London in 1857 and 1858 on tolerably easy terms. Admitting that there is no ex- press Parliamentary pledge for either principal or interest of the Indian Debt, it can hardly be doubted that if at any future crisis there should be less alacrity to supply funds for w^arlike operations in India, the Home Govern- ment w^ould have to come to the rescue in some form or other. The Government of India has hitherto found no difficulty in raising money in the European market ; but if the poHtical phenomena of Hindustan were again to assume a threatenmg aspect, an Imperial guaranty might be absolutely required to restore the waning confidence of capitalists, and to save the Indian Exchequer from ruinous exactions. We should then be in for it beyond all retreat, and the next step — as the simplest financial transaction, to save time and mitigate the terms, — might be to raise our own money, and to advance it to the Indian Government, m the hope of being ultimately re- paid. Fortv millions were added to the Indian Debt in two years of msurrection, between June 1857 and June 1859. Who can tell what another insurrection would cost ? It cost us two hundred millions to lose America. What would it cost us to keep or to lose India ? The Imperial Government may not be legally or formally responsible for the liquidation of Indian securities, but TT 98 OUll GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. assuredly it is so far morally answerable, that any inter- mission in the punctual solvency of the Government of India would be most damaguig to Imperial credit. The less, therefore, that there is of capital and interest for which we can be held answerable the better for us. Whether we firmly abide by our previous refusal, or whether we at last consent to give a decided guaranty, we should insist on every measure being adopted for the decrease of Indian Debt. If it is not positively curtailed, its growth will not be checked. Tlie most efficacious measure — the only practicable measure on a large scale, — for the financial relief of the Paramount Power in India, and for the moral release of the Imperial Government, is that of reducing our civil and military establishments, contracting the territories under our direct administration, and promotmg self-government by the enlargement of Native States. The burden can- not be shaken off, — it must be shifted. And this is the only way to do it. We cannot, as in France, tap the hoards of the middle class and of the thriving peasantry, — they can employ their money to greater advantage in their own occupations, and obtain much larger interest in their oAvn neighbourhood. But we can tap the hoards and forestall the savings of Native Princes by the legiti- mate and irresistible temptation of territorial and politi- cal aggrandisement. And thereby, as already shown, we can dispel prejudices and enforce reform, improve our military position while diminishing the number of British troops, and establish a most powerful conservative interest in every State, each balanced against each, incapable of combination, but separately connected with the Paramount Power by pre- cise ties of allegiance and service. The Indian Empire would Vjecome a living organism instead of being a mechanism. The Statesman and the Viceroy would then have some scope for Government, instead of wasting their energies on the incessant fuss and fidget of extravagant and inappropriate administration. To reconcOe the just and growing demands of educated and experienced Natives with the very natural claims and OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE. 99 expectations of our " Services", is an insolvable problem. It is useless to strive after a hybrid and insincere amal- gamation. Any compromise must of necessity be unstable and untenable. We have to choose between the coercive centralisation of a continent, or the local self-government of nations and languages. The choice lies before us, — to move steadily and deliberately towards a future of free- dom and progress, or to drift blindly along towards a future of animosity and confusion. II 2 APPENDIX, (A.) PALATIAL BARRACKS. {Page 3.) " It is impossible sufficiently to condemn the authorities who fixed upon the present site of the main frontier post in the Valley of Peshawur, containing so large a force as ten or twelve thou- sand men of the three arms^ more or less, " The cantonment having been once commenced upon, it was gradually and inconsiderately augmented ; enormous sums were expended; and the quarters for troops became not only extensive but were unnecessarily costly. To abandon, should it be found expedient, a large portion of such a station, where millions of money had been expended, was next door to impracticable. "The author does not hesitate to state here, as he has for many years officially recorded, that the system of building costly and permanent barracks for our f]uropean soldier}^ in India, is the worst that could possibly be adopted. In nine cases out of ten "vve have taken root, as it were, in localities which have proved to be objectionable. Nothing could be more unwise or injudicious than the hasty decision that has been arrived at in such matters ; and the permanent barracks are the source of great evil, and of endless embarrassment. " The author can never admit, and never did admit, that per- manent barracks, even in well-selected localities in these newly- acquired territories, are advantageous to the troops. The tem- porary buildings of mud and thatcli are vastly cooler, and are generally preferred by the soldiers themselves. The temporary buildings will last seven year.s, and it is very desirable for the health of the troops that the ground should be occasionally shifted. All that is really wanted is a standing camp, covered in sufficiently', and no more, to save the troops from the effects of the climate. The Engineer Department, taking a professional view of the question as to which system should be preferred, de- APPENDIX. 101 cicled, as may well be imagined, that permanent buildings would be the cheapest in the long run, and so the Government went headlong into the mischief. " Now at this moment in the Punjaub, and in the Cis-Sutlej Territories, there are several most extensive permanent canton- ments, which are not only of no value in a political point of view, but are positively injurious to the troops themselves. This is an admitted fact ; some of these stations are unhealthv in the ex- treme, but they have cost millions of money, and on that account only cannot be abandoned. " Meeanmeer, near the Punjaub capital, has proved to be the very hot-bed of sickness. "Nowshera, in which is a set of the very best built and finished barracks in the world, is not only unhealthy but positively dan- gerous. " Peshawur cantonment is probably one of the most unhealthy places in the world, and it contains quarters for three or four thousand European troops. " All over India the troops are now suffering from being per- manently fixed in places where they ought not to be, simply be- cause the costly palaces that have been built for troops cannot be thrown away."* " It is being found that the boasted scientific excelltncies of these extravagant barracks are theoretical rather than practical. The Umballa paper thus brings out what seems a fatal defect in their plan : — ' The new bari'acks at that station are no more approved by their inmates than those at Allahabad ; the upper storeys are said to be in- tensely hot. The truth seems to be, that the structures have been designed on such a magnificently extensive scale as regards cubic feet of air per man, that the walls and roofs have insignificant cooling power, or power for the prevention of the generation or access of heat within, and that there is not so much difference as there should be between the temperature of the internal and external atmosphere.' "f From the Times of India, October 30th, 1869 : — " The cost of housing European soldiers is becoming excessive ; for instance, a barrack calculated to accommodate fifty men onl}^, has lately been completed at Poona at a cost of one lakh and a half of rupees, £15,000, or at the rate of £300 per man. There are few bungalows available for officers that have cost more than rupees 3,000, or £300." " The upper-storied barrack is a great mistake, the men prefer the lower to the upper rooms at all times ; and during the hot months the * General Sir Sydney Cotton's Nine Years on the North-West Fron- tier of India (Bentley, 1808), p. 60, 61. t Times of India, extracted from Ilomeivard Mail, December Otli, 1 Stilt. 1 02 APPENDIX. iipiHT rooms arc quite uninhabitable. Buildings that afFonl sufficient protection I'rom the sun, with means and appliances for cooling them, comprise all requisites ; but the palatial barracks that have of late been constructed, are not one whit more healthy than those constructed in a less expensive and less pretending style, nor are they more appreciated by the occupants. " Those who live in palaces can no more stave off epidemics than those who live in less humble abodes, and for ordinarj^ protection, the inexpensive barrack will always prove as salubrious as the palatial one." AVe have had an abundance of melancholy proof during 1869 in the North-^Vest Provinces that our scientifically constructed barracks afford no protection against cholera. The following extracts of a letter to the Calcutta Eiirjllshman are taken from the Times of India, of the 22nd of May, 18G9 : — " Gwalior, as most of your readers, I dare say, are aw^are, has been selected as one of our principal military centres. " An enormous expenditure is being incurred, both at IMorar and in the fortress, on the new double-storeyed barracks for the European soldiers. " !Morar is a notoriously unhealthy station. In ordinary years fevers are rife, and when epidemics, such as small-pox or cholera, appeal*, they seem to get a lending hand from the atmospherical peculiarities of the place ; just as in agriculture certain plants ai-e found to thrive more luxuriantly on some soils than on others. " The fortress at Gwalior stands on a large isolated rock, about three hundred feet above the level of the suiTounding country. The plateau contains an area considerably under one square mile, although it is upwards of a mile in length from end to end. " Both here and at Morar duriucf the hot months of the vear, the register of a thermometer will show an intensity of heat throughout the twenty-four hours. Night brings no relief; for the surrounding low hills and rocks, in which iron ore is the chief clement, give out through the hours of darkness the broiling heat which they have absorbed in the day-time. Some of these low hills are situated close to the sites on which, at Morar, new barracks are being built. A locality more unsuitable for the habitation of Europeans, it would have been difficult to discover all over India. " Tradition has it that the new Artillery lines are built on the site of a village which was deserted many years ago, on account of the constant breaking out of cholera. It might be worth while to make enquiry into the matter, especially as the large majority of cases of cholera, which has lately vi.sited us, and killed upwards of twenty Europeans, was amongst the Koyal Artillery. It is said that the visitation was not of a veiy severe type, and if tliis be the case, it is awful to contemplate what the extent of mortality may be whenever the worst form of the epidemic may appear at Morar. " The mortuary return and statistics of health for the last two or three years may have been favourable. And on the strength of these, large building operations are being carried on. l}ut it is well-known APPENDIX. 103 that a dense population offers the least resistance to the ravages of epi- demics, and it must bo borne in mind that for some years to come the full garrison cannot be stationed at Morar. It has, in fact, to be in- creased by a whole Regiment of European Cavalry and one of Infantry, and there can be no doubt that the cantonment boundaries enclose an area too contracted for the occupation of so large a force in so unhealthy and hot a climate;. " It is melancholy to think, that with all our vaunted improvement in the science of sanitation during the last ten years, such a terrific blunder should have been perpetrated as that of laying out a canton- ment for so large a force within such insufficient space as is available at Morar. " Experience of the past has shown that when a certain rate of mortality is reached stations must be abandoned. Such was the case many years ago with Kuruaul, and such, it is confidently pi'edicted by many, will be the case again with Morar. But before such a desirable consummation is attained, millions of money will have been spent in carrying out the experiment of massing European soldiers in one of the hottest and most unhealthy spots in India, and thousands of our countrymen wiU have fallen victims to the obstinate folly and short- sightedness of onr rulers." (B.) MOBILISATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY. {Page 3.) A military correspondent of the Times of India, under the signature " Chiliarch", writes : — " I believe that the ISTative army is the question of the day, and the o-reat difficulty with which the Government of India has to contend. " I have much faith in the late General Jacob's principle of localising Native corps. Each Regiment should have its home, where its families, its aged soldiers, and its pensioners, might take root, and whence they would not be called upon to move. But do I propose that Regiments are to settle down in their home and never leave it till the alarm of war calls them forth ? Certainly not. My notion is that the best way to keep the army of India, British and Native, in perfect readiness for sei'vice, and at the same time to impress the people with a sense of our military power and alacrity, is not expensively to rear palatial bari-acks in the burning plains, and more expensively to keep British soldiers in them, but to organise field forces and flying brigades, and keep them moving about the country so long as the weather would permit it to be done with safety. Each Native Regiment should form part of such a force once in three or four years. It would march with the least pos- sible encumbrance, and be prepared to go to any part of India.^ Manoeuvring and military operations of every descrijitiou would of 104 APPENDIX. course be practised, aucl every commauder of a column would have some dcHuite scheme prescribed to him by the Commander-in- Chief Avhich he would be required to carry out, its subordinate detail being left to his own judgment. This would constitute an excellent school for generalship, and both for ofiicers and men would be the best kind of military training. Such is the mode in which I would propose to deal with Native troops in quarters and in the field. " There would be no such thing as relief of Native Regiments, and the movements of British corps might be so regulated as to make the change from one station to another — let us suppose from Peshawur to Lncknow — an opportunity for exercising with two or more flying columns ; the families and details, of course, being sent separately to their destination." "As a set-of!' against the expense attending the system of mobilising the Army of India, the great diminution of numbers it would render possible must be considered. Is it too much to say that it would enable reduction to be made to the extent of £4,000,000 to £5,000,000 on our present expenditure ?"* I have no doubt that a redaction iu our monstrous military ex- penditure — now grown to upwards of sixteen millions a year, — to a mucli greater extent than is contemplated above, might be made, if some such plan were adopted, combined with the great tactical change recommended by a very able and accomplished siildier, — too young of course to be listened to ! — Colonel Sir Henry Havelock, now Deputy Quartermaster-General at Dublin, that of converting nearly all the British Infantry in India into Mounted Eifles.f The letter of "Chiliarch^^ is particularly satisfactory to me, and I feel myself justified in thus appropriating it, because two years before its publication I had proposed the same system, with this essential difference that, according to my views. Native troops should be "localised", and a "home" found for each corps in the hot season, by nearly all of them being converted into Auxiliary troops belonging to Native States. " ify opinion is that if we make the Native Princes trust us, we can always trust them. Their troops, properly equipped and disciplined, occuisionally hriffaded in camps of exercise ivith the moveable rohimns which * Homeward Mail, December Gt;h, 1869. t Three Main Military Questions, Longmans, 18G7. The author — personally unknown to me — describes the remarkable effect produced in many cami)aigns, especially in the Amcricaii Civil war, by Mounted Infantry, but with a graceful modesty that we may admire and regret at the same time, abstains from any allusion to his own exploit in 1858 with a ver}' small force organised by himself and mounted on every sort of available animal, against the rebels under Kooer Sing and Oomer Sing in IJchar. I wish I could tell the story myself as I heard it told by a gallant officer of the Bengal Engineers. APPENDIX. 105 should take the place of ozor subsldianj divisions and garrisons, ouglit to be a source of military strength, and, still more, a visible display of moral strength in our favour, to the great relief of our finances and our muster-roll."* Additional testimony to the fact that Native States can furnish efficient x\.uxiliarics is to be seen in the following extract of a letter, dated 3rd of April, 1869, from a correspondent of the Bom- bay Times of India, at the Viceroy's Camp at Umballa during the visit of the Ameer Sher Ali of Afghanistan. It will also be ob- served that, with the usual official tendency, the writer considers that the little army of the Puttiala Rajah is much too efficient. " While on military topics, your correspondent may as well say that the evident efficiency of the portion of the ]\Iaharajah of Puttiala's troops here just now, is such, that were the Force of that Chief as numerous as that of Scindia, it would have to be similarly reduced by order of the Government of India. They are the best uniformed and altogether most serviceable Native State troops that your correspondent has seen. The men are well-statui'ed, and for the most pai^t Sikhs, men who, in open fight on the plain, would ' lick' three times their number of Aflfghans, and whose fathers did so. Returning to their lines from a distant parade, they march 'at case' as all soldiei's are allowed to do when there are miles to be got over ; but they, nevertheless, seemed quite capable of great precision of alignment and movement, were the word 'attention' to be given. The horses of the Cavalry were well- sized and capable of work. The guns were of Government foundry manufacture, and not old, well carriaged and horsed. A European gentleman, who sold out of one of Her Majesty's Regiments, is, I believe, Commandant of the Force." t A higher and more uniform standard of organisation and disci- pline could easily be maintained under Imperial inspection, and by means of camps of exercise. (C.) THE LITTLE STATE OF DHAR. {Page2\.) The following extracts from a leading article in the Bombay Times of India, of the 21st of Decembei-, 18G9, give a pleasing picture of the young Prince of Dhar. " Some weeks back we drew attention to the continued distress in Rajpootana, more especially with reference to the orphan cliildren whose hard fate still claims the active sympathy of the Indian com- * Retrospects and Prospects of Indian Policy, pp. 332-3. t Times of India, 10th of April, 1809. lOG AFPEXDIX. manity eveiywhere. In mentioning vai'ious measures wliicli had been taken towards mitigating the distress, we stated that the Dhar Chief had set aside a considerable sum of money for the cstablishuTcnt of an orphanage which was maintained at Erinpoorah under the oversight of the Governor- General's Agent in Rajpootana. " It Avas in the course of conversation, now some three months back, with Major J. Cadell (at present acting as Bheel Agent) that the sub- ject of tlie Rajpootana distress was brought before His Highness of J)liar. His interlocutor had scarcely finished describing the classes most in need when, with the promptitude and silent dignity befitting a Prince, three bags, each containing 2,000 rupees " (£200) " were placed at the British ofiicer's feet, in aid of the famishing Marwarries and Rajpoots. " The surplus funds of the little State of Dhar cannot be very large ; but such portions of them as are devoted to charitable purposes appear to be laid out with some judgment. In addition to the 6,000 rupees" (£G00) " disposed of as above mentioned. His Highness not long ago appropriated 2,-500 rupees" (£250) "to the building of a refuge for lepers — a purpose which some charitable soul in or near Bombay might do well to imitate. But the Dhar Chief not only built the lazar house, he has set aside 10,000 rupees" (£lO00) " to be invested in Govern- ment paper, for the maintenance of the luckless inmates of the refuge. "We know nothing of the Dhar Ciiief except through his brief, eventful political history ; but we ai'e glad to have an opportunity of placing his benevolent actions in their proper light. It is also not un- instructive to note that to other Chiefs in Central India his example of wise giving, is one clear gain from the act of political justice wdiich, in the restoration of the Dhar Raj, Lord Stanley and the Home Government carried through against the determined opposition of the Calcutta Foreign OflBce." Lord Stanley, there can be no doubt, would frankly admit that without the persistent vigilance aud clear expositions of Mr. John Dickinson,* who has for many years applied himself to Indian re- form as a study and a pursuit, as other men apply themselves to en- tomology or astronomy, he would never have been sufficiently well informed on the facts and merits of the Dhar question to have baffled "the determined opposition of the Calcutta Foreign Office". But for this volunteer interference, the young Rajah of Dhar, who has proved such an excellent ruler, would have been dispossessed and degraded into a pensioner, with no object or career in life open to him except that of a conspirator. As it was, the Calcutta Government, dislodged from their first, succeeded in holding their second position ; and a severe penalty, though short of utter ex- tinction, was inflicted on the Dhar State, because a portion of its troops, following the example of ours, had mutinied. We appro- priated the district of Buirseea, one-sixth of the Dhar territory * Jthar Not Eaxtored, by John Dickinson, F.R. A.S., etc. (P. S. King, Parliament Street), 1804; and A S(^q>Ml l.o Dhar Not lieslored, 1805. APPENDIX. 107 with a I'evouuo of £10,000, and by granting it to the Nawab Begum of Bliopal, cheaply rewarded that faithful and enlightened Princess at the expense of our innocent Ward. The whole revenue of the Dhar State in the year 18G7-8 was only 528,000 rupees (£52,800), out of which 20,000 rupees (£2000) are paid as a military contribution to the Briti:^h Gov^ern- ment, and yet there was a total cash balance of 506,400 rupees (£50,640) in its treasury, of which 350,000 rupees (£35,000) were invested in the 4 per cent. Govern nient Loan. This, at any rate, is not I'eckless extravagance or bad stcwai'dship. (D.) refop.:m by the gaekwar. {Page 25.) ''''{From our oivn Correspondent.^ "Baroda, Nov. 16th, 1869. ''In continuation of my letter of the 27th October last, I have much pleasure to furnish you with a detailed and faithful account of the further progress of the Widow Marriage cause at the Court of His Highness the Gaekwar. In accordance with the invitation sent to the promoters of Widow Marriage at Bombay to come over to Baroda and discuss its legality according to Hindu law with the Shastris at His Highness's capital, a party of fifteen gen- tlemen, including such influential and learned persons as Messrs. Vishnu Parashram Shastri Pandit, Mahadeva Govind Eanade, M.A., LL.B.; Ballajee Pandurang; Wamon Abajee Modak, B.A.; Wittul Xaraycn Pathak, M.A.; Janardhan Sakharara Gadgil, B.A.; Venayek Trimbac Gole ; and Ballajee Narayen Kolatkar, started for Baroda on behalf of the Widow Marriage Association. Rao Bahadoor Gopalrao Hari Deshmookh came from Ahmedabad to join the Bombay party. All were at Baroda by Sunday, the 15th instant, and in the afternoon proceeded to see His Highness and the Dewan" (the Minister) " at Makarpoora, His " Highness's re- sidence. After the formal introduction. His Highness at once expressed to Rao Bahadoor Gopah-ao Hari that he was ready to act as the party desired. It deserves to be mentioned that His Highness is extremely affable, and converses freely with his guests as if he were one of their own rank. He offered to call the Shas- trees of his Court, and bring them to a face to face discussion with the Bombay party at his Palace under his own supervision, with the Dewan and Scuapati Sahib. It was eventually proposed that the lOS APPENDIX. discussion slioukl take place during tlie next Christmas holidays, when all friends of the Widow Marriage cause could afford to stay for some days at Baroda. His Higliness said that the party might consult thoir own convenience. Rao Bahadoor Gopalrao and his fi'iends were left for an hour to themselves to arrive at some reso- lution. AVlien the party met again His Highness himself sug- gested a plan which was most satisfactory to both sides. As the discussion was to be a written one, even if the two parties came face to lace, it was suggested by llis Highness that written ques- tions should be given by the Bombay party which the Baroda Shastris should answer. These answers would be sent to Bom- bay. The Bombay party might then write their answer, and the Shastris of Baroda might give their rejoinder. In this mauner the whole ground being prepared by writing, in the Christmas holidays both parties should meet at Makarpoora. Neutrals should be named on both sides to pronounce an opinion on the discussion, and His Highness himself with the Dcwan Sahib and Senapati Sahib, would be present and pronounce decision on the merits. The plan of His Highness was readily assented to, and it was decided to give the written questions next day. After this. His Highness went into some Shastrical points on which question^ are usually raised. He asked whether there were clear authorities for Avidow marriage after SaptapacU ; what ritual was to be made use of at the second marriage ; who was to give away the girl ; and how the iiatria potestas of the father over the girl revived at the death of her husband when he'' (the father) "had once given her away? He was satisfied on all these points by Mr. Vishnu Shastree Pan- dit and others ; and it must be confessed that the intelligence in questioning and the quickness of comprehension displayed by His Highness would have done credit even to a learned Brahmin. All the Bombay party will bear witness to the truth of this remark. His Highness had the frankness to express again and again that he was already ' twelve annas' — that is seventy-five per cent. — in favour of widow marriage; that he could not see why little girls who never knew what a husband was should be doomed to pei-petual widowhood ; that it was the duty of Kings to look to the happiness of females as well as males ; and that, as God was the Lord of all, not only of males, His laws would not sanction the prohibition of Widow Marriage. " The interview lasted for more than four hours, at the end of which His Highness insisted on entertaining the whole party at supper, for which he issued orders forthwith. After supper the party saw the Dewan Sahib, where an equally agreeable conver- sation took place for about an hour. The whole party then re- turned to Jiaroda from ]\Iakarpoora. Next day (Monday, the IGth) written questions were submitted by the Bombay party. APPENDIX. 109 and His Highness after hearing them read, ordered the same to be forwarded to the ecelesiastical officer of the Court for the rephes of the Shastris, and required the original repHes to be brought to himself. The questions relate to three subjects^ viz. : — widow marriage, early marriage, and foreign travel. •' I hope the above account will interest your readers and the public and will encourage lovers of progi-ess. I have given simple facts, scrupulously abstaining from any reflections except in one or two places where it would have been sheer injustice to His Highness not to do so. The public may draw their own inferences." — Tiwes of India. (E.) A POLITICAL "SUNYASSEe". {Page 28.) To those who imagine that political apathy prevails among the races of India, and that even with the stimulus of English educa- tion they are incapable of political movements in a progressive direction, the following extract from the Bombay newspaper Nat ice Ojjinion, January 9 th, 1870, may prove instructive : — " We ai'B extremely sorry to have to record the death of a character who, in the present state of our society, may well be styled extraor- dinary. We refer to the late Anandasln^am Swamy, who died on the 30th ult. at ]\Iandavee in Kutch, revered and regretted by the whole people cf that State and of its neighbour of Jamnuggur. The people of Mundavee, we are told, voluntarily closed all shops and business for the day as a tribute of respect to the memory of the deceased, and mourned as if each of them had lost his father. " Who was this individual who was thus honoured, and what were the means by which he had enshrined himself in the people's hearts ? He was no royal personage, no grandee, — not even a Native of the Province of Kattyawar or of Kutch, where he was held in such singular estimation. He was, however, peculiarly a public man after the fashion of ancient India — a genuine Rishi in short — a character deservedly ad- mired by the educated and blindly adored by the orthodox Hindu. To illustrate this statement it is only necessary to mention such particulars of his life and conduct as could be made known under the rules of secrecy which appear to have been imposed on the performance of all meritorious deeds in former (unlike the present) days. " The deceased was, we believe, a Native of Bengal, and belonged to a mercantile family of Calcutta. He was possessed of more than average abilities, and had received a good English education. Twelve years ago he gave up the pleasures of the world, and entering one of the monkish orders set out on his travel. What the i)rime cause of his 1 1 APPENDIX. i-enunciatiou was is not known ; but it is certain that a strong bent for ti-avel and a desire to witness the varieties of human luituro was one of the motives to that act. We know nothing of his history until he turned up at Jamnuggur* three or four years ago. From thence he wrote news-letters to this journal, the publication of which led to an inquiry into their authorship. Anandashram Swamy was taken before tlie Jam. He freely admitted the charge, and expressed his determination to persist in the course of exposure so long as His Highness permitted the people entrusted by Providence to his care to be oppressed. For a time he was imprisoned ; but compunction came over the Jam, who ordered the i-elease of the holy and disin- terested man, placed himself under his advice, and asked him virtually to undei'take the management of his atFairs. This he refused ; but agreed to procure for the Jam a man qualified for the task morally and otherwise. An advertisement was then given to the papers inviting applications for the place ; subsequently Mr. Venayek Narayan Bhag- wat, then connected with the management and editing of this journal, accejited the post, and with the advice of his spiritual guide and tem- poral head introduced those rcfox'ms in the government of Jamnuggur some few of which took deep root, but which brought about the fall of the reforming party. This is the truth which Dr. Norman Macleod .seems to have got hold of, and with his usual felicity arranged into the following anecdote. '• I may take this opportunity of giving another instance of the in- direct iniluence of English education. A Rajah of a small Principality iu the West had had transmitted to him some severe articles, written in English, which had appeared in a Bombay Native paper, exposing grievous errors in his government. Irritated at the exposure, he em- ployed spies to detect the writer, A Suiujassee was brought before him as the offender. To a Native Ruler such a charge against such a man seemed absurd. It was very much as if an Irish tinker had been accused of writing articles in the Times against Lord Derby. Yet the ascetic, with little clothing, and no ornament except ashes, claimed the articles as his, and proved his right to do so. On being questioned, he said: — 'I was educated in a mission school. I did not see it to be my duty to become a Christian, but chose to remain a devotee to my own religion. As such I journey through the country examining into and e.'sposing all that is false, cruel, and unjust, and giving my support to whatever is good wherever F find it ; and this I shall continue to do.' " ' I make you my prime minister ! ' exclaimed the wondering Rajah. " ' I refuse the post,' replied the Sunyassee ; * for I have this other work given me to do. But I can get you as good an adviser as my- self, and one who has been educated like; me.' "He accordingly scut to his I'ricnid the editor of the paper for a ])rimc * Or Nowanuggur, one of the petty States of Kattyawar, the re- venue of which is about £00,000 per nurmm. 'J'he Prince of a Raj- poot family, is styled the Jam. APPENDIX. 1 1 1 ministei' to the Rajah, while lie himself went on his lonely way to fnllil his calling in the name of that truth and justice which he had been taug'ht at the mission school." " The old Karbharees were alarmed at the blow aimed at their per- sonal interests by the chano-es, and combining began to work upon the pliant Jam. They soon found a subject suited to the occasion. The Jam was anxious to have a chikl of his by a Mahommedan concubine recognised as his successor. Against this step the reform party de- clared itself with too imprudent an openness. A handle was fairly given to the intriguers to work with. The Swamy was then on a visit to Bomba}-, and it was represented to the Jam that his object there was to work out the defeat of His Highness's project for the succession. Mean- while, a foul trick was played to the prejudice of the new minister, and he was told to leave the State forthwith. This he did, and what Jam- nuggur cast away, the Political Agent at Rajcote willingly utilised into an excellent government official. 13ut to return. The Swamy left Bom- bay by a steamer and landed at JNIandavee in Kutch, where he heard of the contretemjhs endangering his work and undeservedly discrediting his agent. While he was meditating what to do, he was pressed by the Rao of Kutch to repair to his Court. He at last yielded, and it is to his promptings and advice that those nominations of eligible persons and measures of reform in the administration of the State are chiefly due which have been credited to other parties. He was suffering from ill health for some time past and wished veiy much for a change ; but the crisis through which the Kutch Durbar and State is passing pre- vented him from following his wishes, and he thus fell a victim to his goodness. " Such is a brief history of this singular character. His moral and political aspirations were those of the educated Native — his life was devoted entirely to their furtherance. He lived on the voluntary charity of the people : but like the Rishies of old, he more than repaid it by contributing to their general good. Morning and evening he preached to crowds of men and women the duty of doing spiritual service to God and good to man. At the same time he kept himself informed of all the public news of the State, and of the politics of India and the world. His advice to Native Princes was judicious and firm. He would never consent to their yielding a jot of their just right to the demands of the Political officers of the British Government, but he insisted also on the reform of their administrations as the prime duty and function of their existence. The Government Agency at Rajcote styled the man a 'Poli- tical Sunyassee'. May there be many such political characters, and may those who have had hitherto the benefit of their advice, seeing what they have lost, value and cherish it the more. We may remark that in Kutch the Swamy was not less opposed in his endeavours than in Jamnuggur, and he and his agents had often rough paths to travel. But we trust that his shrewd Highness the Rao has now attained to a full appreciation of his position, and that the valuableness and purity of the advice of which he has been deprived will enable him to see the worthlessness of that by wdiich he has been occasionally misled." 1 I 2 APPENDIX. (F.) RAILWAYS AND REVENUE. {Fa.je 52.) The following statement of the comparative progress of Irriga- tion Districts, Kailwaj Districts, and Unimproved Districts in the ^Madras Presidency, is extracted fi-om the Homeward Mall, of the 27th of August, I860:— " In-iijatioii Districts. — Average revenue of Guntoor, ]\rasulipatara, and Rajalimundry, from 18-41 to 1845, £470,000 ; Goclavery and Kistna (same districts as above under new names), for 1865-66, £930,000, — an increase of £460,000, or 100 per cent. ; capital expended in irrigat- ing above districts, under £750,000; upon which the increased revenue is 60 per cent. Raihraij Districts. -^Ayernrre revenue of North Arcot, Salem, Coimba- tore, and Malabar, from 1841 to 1845, £1,034,000 ; same districts for 1865-66, £1,135,000— an increase of £101,000, or 10 per cent ; capital expended on 450 miles of railway in those districts, at £15,000 per mile (including cost of land and interest paid by Government), £6,750,000; increase of revenue on that cajiifal, 1| per cent. Comparatively Unimproved Districts. — Average revenue of Ganjam, Vizagapatam, Nellore, Cuddapah, Bellary, Kurnool, Madura, Tiunevelly, in which districts no Railways have been laid, and only partial Irriga- tion works, from 1841 to 1845, £1,690,000 ; ditto for 1865-66, £2,156,000,— an increase of £466,000, or 27 per cent. " But much of this is owing to improved Irrigation, as it is also in the Railway districts ; besides which, the balance of working expenses and interest against the Railways in Madras is £148,000 by the last Report, or more than the whole increase of revenue in those districts. There is thus no proof of any increase of revenue at all in the districts on which 6| millions have been expended, against nearly half a million increase in those on which under three-quarters of a million has been expended on Irrigation works ; for it so happens that the districts in which no Railwavs have been laid have increased in revenue much more than tho.se in which they have been. " Can we be surprised at the Madras Athenmum, of the 27th July, saying : ' Starvation, disease, and death are reported as prevalent from all quarters, and unless rain speedily falls to an extent that cannot reasonably be expected, we are still only on the threshold of dire calamities that must inevitably follow; save where the great hydraulic works .still furnish some supply to adjacent districts, the ultimate re.«;iiltg will be appalling beyond description. Had such works been construr-ted throughout tlio length and bi'eadtli of tlie country, as Sir Arthur Cotton an