' '' ' sity of California ihern Regional irary Facility JUb^+J-'*' "J /*-* , "> . 1/7 DIALOGUES ON THE HINDU PHILOSOPHY, COMPRISING THE NYAYA, THE SANKHYA, THE VEDANT; TO WHICH IS ADDED A DISCUSSION OP THE AUTHORITY OF THE YEDAS. BY REV. K. M. BANERJEA, SECOND PROFESSOR OF BISHOP'S COLLROF, CALCUTTA. SFXOND EDITION, ONE THOUSAND COPIHS. T HE CHRISTIAN LITERATURE SOCIETY FOR INDIA LONDON AND MADRAS. 1903. To JOHK Mum, ESQ., D. c. L. LATE OF THE BENGAL CIVIL SERVICE, WHO FOR A LONG SERIES OF YEARS MAS CONTRIBUTED BOTH BY HIS PUKSE AND HIS PEN TO THE VERY OBJECTS HEREIN AIMED AT, THIS WORK IS INSCRIBED AS A SMALL TRIBUTtt OF THE AUTHOR'S RESPECT AND ESTEEM. NOTE. This Second Edition has been printed with the kind permission of Dr. Banerjea's family and of Messrs Williams and Norgate, whose name appears on the title page of the First Edition. 2004651 THE objects aimed at in the following dialogues are, first, to give a correct and authentic statement of the doctrines of Hindu philosophy, and, secondly, to suggest such modes of deal- ing with them as may prove most effective to the Hindu mind. Our first object we have attempted to ensure by citing the original authorities, and letting the old Eishis speak for them- selves. The second we have endeavoured to attain by availing ourselves in some measure of the arguments which the advo- cates of contending schools have used against each other. We have thus impressed Kanada, Kapila, Kamanuja, to do battle for us against the Vedant, and taken advantage of S'ankara- charya's powerful battery against the Nyaya and the Sankhya. There was a time, not full fifty years ago, when politicians and statesmen expressed the most extravagant admiration of the Hindu philosophy, both in official documents and in speeches delivered in the parliament of Great Britain. In defence of the policy of excluding Christian missions from the country, reference was made to " her philosophers, lawyers, and moralists who have left the oracles of political and ethical wis- dom, to restrain the passions and awe the vices which disturb the commonwealth 1 ." The panegyrics passed on the Hindu systems by politicians are no doubt to be referred in part to the temporary excitement and consequent bias under which they were written or spoken. But writers are still not wanting who affect to be amazed at the transcendental excellency of the Hindu philosophy, and who do not hesitate to declare that however much the undoubted excellency of the system may be mixed up with possible errors, it would be impossible without profane violence to the one to refute the other. 1 Speech of Mr. Charles Marsh iu the House of Commons in Capt. Kayo's Christianity in India, p. 280. VI PREFACE. The difficulty of the task we freely admit. But our endeavour has been candidly to recognize what we have found to be true, and courageously to condemn what we have discov- ered to be false. What, it may be asked, is to be the test of truth and error in these discussions? We say, in the language of the Koyal proclamation, the only document through which the Queen has ever spoken to her Indian subjects and in Indian languages, that " firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of Religion, we disclaim alike the Right and the Desire to impose our con- victions," on any of our controversial opponents. The Chris- tian religion itself, which recognizes " the work of the law written in the hearts" of men, forbids unfairness of argument- ation in discussions, voluntarily undertaken, with the full understanding that the parties argued with are not Christians. We have no right therefore in this argument to appeal to that which we believe to be the primary standard of truth, and the highest authority in all controversies to which it is applicable. That authority, however, as we have just hinted, recog- nizes another authority the authority of conscience limited indeed in its range, but still a sufficient authority within its own province. Now the questions discussed in these pages certainly fall within that province. We have to deal with those who profess to discriminate between dharma and adha/rma, between right and wrong. Our test of truth and error in these discussions is accordingly the same which writers on moral philosophy and natural theology are in the habit of observing. It is substantially the very test to which the founders of the Hindu philosophy themselves appeal. But do not the founders of the Hindu philosophy appeal also to the positive authority of the Vedas which they look upon as a revelation from God ? This is only partially true, for most of the schools maintain that their doctrines are supe- rior to the Vedas, and as to the few which profess to deduce their tenets from the authority of texts, they certainly do not say that the texts contain a revelation of God's will. Some of them say nothing at all about the existence of God, and all deny that the Vedas had any author, human or divine. (See below pp. 870-379.) We have discussed their tenets on these points, and the final appeal remains therefore to the work of the Law written in the hearts of men. One of the staunchest of the defenders of the Vedas allows that even their authority could not sanction what involves an absurdity or a contradiction. PREFACE. Vii It is generally believed by the modern followers of Brah- rainism that the Vedas contain a revelation from God, and under this impression they implicitly submit to their spiritual guides ; whose authority they think may be traced to the teach- ing of the Vedas, and through them to the declaration of God's will. It is only justice to all parties to say that those founders of Brahminical systems who were considered most orthodox did not propound the Kich, Yajush, Saman, and Atharvan, as given by God in any sense of the term. It is also a popular belief among the Hindus that the great Bishis, who founded their schools, and whose teaching they consider to be infallible, were themselves men of superior sanctity that had laboured to counteract the atheistic teaching of the Buddhists by zealously and skilfully arguing for the exist- ence of a Supreme Intelligence, the Author and Governor of the universe. This is what living Pandits say, and their unlearned followers believe. That nothing can be a greater delusion will appear from the following pages. It is much to be . regretted that the delusion has in some respects been sanction- ed even by Christian authors writing on the Hindu philosophy. The accounts given by living Pandits and the representations contained in popular elementary treatises have been too unsuspectingly received. Perhaps we may say that no writer since the days of Colebrooke has endeavoured to test the cor- rectness of the popular representations by a careful examination of the original Sutras themselves. The popular delusion has consequently been widely spreading without anything to rectify it. The following broad facts may be advanced without much fear of condradiction. Neither of the two Bishis of the Nyaya school, Gotama and Kanada, has argued at all for the existence of a Supreme Intelligence as the Author and Governor of the universe. Kanada, again, positively accounts for the construc- tion of the world without the intervention of any Supreme Intelligence 1 , while the principles of Gotama with reference to 1 To prevent misconceptions we feel it right to explain that the aphorism in which Kanada asserts the authority of the Veda as His word, is considered by some succeeding writers as a proof of his theism. An author who could account for the origin of the universe without God, can hardly be called tlteistic for any thing he may say on other points. But the natural rendering of the aphorism would be, " The Veda is of authority, because it is ITS declaration," (tadvachandt), the antecedent of "its" being Dharma mentioned in the previous aphorism. // is of authority because it is fJi-e declaration of Dharma. It is after the same fashion that most Brahminical writers have argued. We did not question the other rendering in Dialogue x, because the point at issue being the authority of the Veda, we were unwilling to clog the discussion with other matters. viii PREFACE. life and emancipation are almost identically the same as those of the Buddhists. The principles on which Kapila (if indeed he was the author of the Sankhya Sutras) denied the existence of God, he held in common with all the other Rishis, and so far the elements of atheism exist in all the schools. Patanjali, the author of the Ses'wara or theistic Sankhya, though he acknowledged a Supreme Being, did not declare Him to be the creator of the universe. Jaimini, the author of the Prior Mimansa, has never argued for the existence of God, and if he ever said any thing of a Supreme Being, it was only to deny His providence and His moral government of the world. His description of the Veda, as a s'abda or infallible teaching without a teacher, involved atheism in the conception of some of his eminent followers; who have not hesitated to argue on his principles against the possibility of a God to create the world or teach the Veda. Vyasa, the author of the Vedant Sutras, did certainly argue for the existence of a God, but he taught that the universe is identical with Him, and conse- quently that there is no God above the world. It is also believed among those who admire the tran- scendental doctrines of the popular Vedanta that the universe is but an illusion, a Maya, a phantom. The discussion of this question will be found in the following pages. Here we would only ask the advocates of Mayavada to remember that their favourite theory was first propounded by the founder of Buddhism, and that the Brahmins had probably learnt it from those very schools on which they continue to this day to affix the stigma of heresy. We say that the Brahmins had probably borrowed their transcendental doctrine of Maya from Buddhist schools, because, when they first settled on the fertile plains of Hindustan, they were far from pronouncing the world to be a phantom, or sensuous life to be an essential evil. In their earliest literature, the Mantras of the Vedas, we do not see any traces of such doctrine. Every thing is there natural- nothing transcendental. We see hymns and prayers addressed to divinities. The things prayed for are all such as belong to our common everyday life. Offspring, cattle, lands, houses, such are the boons which the gods are requested to bestow on their votaries. No impatience of life, no description of the world as an assemblage of evils, much less as a mere phantom or maya, no aspirations after release from corporeal existence, are found there. PREFACE. ix Xor do we descry any decided advance toward the tran- scendentalism of the Shad-Dars'anas in the Brdhmanas of the Vedas. Hindoo society was then regularly formed, the institution of caste was matured, the Brahmins were recognized as the repositories of learning, and ministers for the performance of rites and ceremonies. Rules had been formed for their initiation in theology. The learned among them were teachers of their order. Young Brahmins would be brought up in the houses, and under the watchful eyes, of their preceptors. They would take lessons on the Vedas. Clever pupils would be allowed to ask questions on speculative science, and the tutors would resolve their doubts. In these conferences between teachers and pupils, metaphysical questions would naturally be debated. The prospects of the soul after death would often become the subject of catechetical instruction. But these instructions and speculations, so far as appears from .the Brahmanas, had nothing decidedly transcendental in them. They were for the most part ethical and ritualistic. We do indeed see occasionally certain aspirations after union with the divinity, but these are rare and exceptional. We also notice a tendency toward identifying the universe and deified impersonations with the Supreme Brahma. But we do not see any marked condemnation of the world because of the evils of disease and death. We do not see it denounced as an assemblage of essential evils incapable of remedy. We do not find any impatience of life and embodied existence. We do not hear of the necessity of getting rid of transmigrations. We are not told that supreme felicity consists in the separation of the soul from body and mind, or that the functions of body and mind inevitably lead to misery. We do not learn that prarritti or activity is an evil in itself or that our chief good can only be found in a state in which the soul will be deprived of its capacities of thought, feeling, and action. The transcendental notions, now the fundamental prin- ciples of Hindu philosophy, had no existence in the Mantras and Brahmanas. When, then, were they first broached, by whom, and how ? The Upanishads, as will be seen from the following pages, do not give a satisfactory account of the origin of the doctrine of Maya. The Buddhists, on the other hand, do supply us with what must be admitted to be at any rate a plausible explanation of its origin. The incidents of their founder's life are all we require for this purpose. They say the father of S'akya Muni had been apprized from the beginning that his X PREFACE. son would soon take to the lite of an ascetic. When the boy was twelve years old, the king assembled his Brahmins and asked them to state the cause for which the prince would renounce his home and his kindred. They told him that the boy would see four things decrepitude, disease, a dead body, and a recluse, which would induce him to leave the palace and retire to the forest. The king commanded that those four sights should always be kept at a distance from him, and that care should be taken to prevent his ever coming across them. But these precautions were all in vain. The gods themselves were impatiently waiting for the happy moment when Siddhartha would enter on his high calling. One day therefore when he was resolved to go out on a drive and when by the king's orders all unseemly sights had been removed from the town, the gods exhibited in his way the appearance of a decrepid old man, humpbacked, with broken teeth, grey locks, wrinkled, leaning on a staff, and walking slowly with tremulous steps. Wondering, aghast, at the wretched spectacle, the prince inquired of the coachman, who the person was ? " An old man, my Lord, answered the coachman, bent down by age, his strength and energy gone, his senses worn out, and he himself destitute and disabled." Struck by the coachman's answer, the prince asked again, " Is such a wretched existence peculiar to the race or tribe of which this unhappy person is a member, or is that the common lot of the whole world ? Do tell me the truth quickly." The coachman replied : " It is not a peculiar misfortune, my Lord, of this poor man or of his family, or country. Youth and old age are incident to all, nor can your highness expect to be free from it. No one can escape decrepitude." The prince was so overwhelmed with the conception of the world's misery, that he immediately ordered the coachman to turn the carriage homeward, and he came back in a most melancholy mood of mind. When the prince on another occasion was driving out with a large retinue, a leper, full of sores, unable to move, and breathing with difficulty, fell in his sight and from the enquiries he made of the coachman, he concluded thai ^/.sw/.sv> was another evil to which all were subject. A third drive brought him the sight of death in a similar manner, and another addition again was made to his knowledge of the evils of life. A fourth drive revealed the sight of a mendicant Brahmachari, absorbed in meditation with subdued mind and senses. Buddha was at once convinced that this was PREFACE. XI the only mode of living by which earthly perils could be avoided. The dreaded sights produced the effects which the Brahmins had foretold. The prince began to cry shame on life and exist- ence. " Fie on youth," said he, " almost in the very grasp of decrepitude ! Fie on health, soon to be overpowered by disease ! Fie on life, running headlong into the jaws of death 1 ." This legend is found in the traditions of all Buddhists, whether of China, Nepaul, or Ceylon. Divested of the romantic ornaments, the story means that Certain sights of woe had produced in young Buddha a feeling of disgust with life and earthly existence, which he characterized as an assemblage of decrepitude, disease, and death, a maya,a mirage. The Brahminical philosophers use the very same expressions with reference to the evils of life, but they cannot produce a hero, as the original teacher of the doctrine. When they say this doctrine was taught by the Creator to the Sun, by the Sun to Manu, c., it is simply a confession that they know not bow to account for it, for their own Vedas show that the doctrine was unknown in the period of the Mantras, and they themselves declare that the doctrine was lost by the lapse of time, until it was restored in the Bhagavad-yitd*. But the Bhagavad-gita is clearly a post-Buddhistic work, and we can- not admit Krishna's claim to the doctrine taught by S'akya. It is singular that, on Krishna's own confession, the tran- scendental doctrine should have remained with the kings, instead of Brahmins. We have in the following pages suggested a historical con- sideration of the relation between the Brahminical philosophy and Buddhism. What appears to us most strange is the occurrence of two names, Gotama and Kapila, in the Buddhist tradition of the origin of the race from which their leader sprang. The following is the Tibetan version of a tradition held in common by all Buddhists : Sakya, is the name of that tribe or family of Sakya Muni, belong- ing to the Kshatria caste. According to Buddhist traditions, this 1 Lalita Vistara. fa 1 58 160 1G3 1G4 IGf. Existence without its signs The moral philosophy of Ny&ya ........ The Nyaya harps in Buddhistic tunes ........ Dialogue VI. How Sankaracharya attacks the Sankhya ...... 168 His argument quoted at length. . 171 Kapila's view of nature's agency 172 TABLE OF CONTEXTS. XV11 Sankara's inconsistency Kapila's contradictions His view of habit proved to be erroneous Mutual adaptations a proof of design Meaning of prakriti discussed . . Animal organisms proofs of design Development theory That theory not necessarily athe- istic like Kapila's Mind cannot be a product of matter Kapila's atheism exposed by passages from his Sutras Sinkhya pleadings Inconsistencies of the Vedant . . Sinkhya theory of the soul's freedom from attachments examined No moral greatness without God What true freedom is Kapila teaches Buddhism Sinkhya meditation is no-medit- ation Dialogue VII. A marriage assembly described. . Debate among Brahmins A Buddhist retorts on Hindu- ism charges preferred against his system and quotes Hindu authorities Discussion of the Vedanta's one principle Vedant charged with atheism by a Hindu writer . . . . . . The doctrine of the world being a mere shadow discussed Discussion of the alleged par- allelism between Vedantisni and Berkeley Disproof of the assertion that the ontology of the Vedant is that of Berkeley . . 3 Page Page 175 Sankaracharyu quoted to the 176 above effect 226 Idealism proved to be a Bud- 177 dhistic dogma .. .. .. 228 184 187 188 190 190 192 193 196 197 200 205 206 208 212 218 224 Dialogue VIII. The disputants meet again at the Rajah's house . . . . . . 233 The Buddhist encounters them. . 235 The Buddhist contends that the doctrines of miy& and'rnukti were borrowed from Buddhism 235 The original Vedas say nothing of M4y4 236 Nor do most of the Upanishads 240 The Swetaswatara alone main- tains the doctrine of M6y4 . . 246 It is proved to be Post-bud- dhistic 217 Review of Vedant sutras . . . . 250 Sankara's authority as a com- mentator . . . . . . 251 Pantheism inculcated in Vedant Sutras 253 How Sankara met objections . . 253 Sankara's self-contradiction . . 257 Difficulties of pantheism . . 288 Sankara's idea of the soul's iden- tity with God 291 Strictures on pantheism by Gauda-purnananda. a Raimi- nuja . . . . . . . . 293 Kau&da against pantheism . . 294 Moral consequences of panthe- ism . . . . . . . . 295 Immorality excused by panthe- ism . . . . . . . . 296 ! The old Vedantisni of Vyisa dis- tinguished from that of later writers . . . . . . . . 299 Saiikara's self-contradictions on the reality of the external world 300 Whether Vyisa taught the theory of M6y4 . . 302 Spiritual pantheism as bad as material . . 3O4 XV111 TABLE OF CONTENTS. Page Vedantisni admits no idea of law or duty 306 Spiritual pantheism, a libel ou God 307 Dialogue IX. Discussion with a Dandi . . . . 30 ( J The Dandi's explanations . . 309 Satyak&ma's reply .. .. 310 Dependent existence not neces- sarily illusory . . .. . . 311 The absurdity of calling the world false and yet God . . 312 Pantheism precludes the idea of duty 312 \VhatisM4y4 313 Bim&nuja's strictures on Pan- theism . . . . .. 311 The Dandi asserts that the world is called an illusion because of its vanity 320 Satyakima points out the limita- tion of the doctrine . . . . 320 To deny the world is to deny the power and wisdom of God . . 321 True idea of Heaven . . . . 322 Vedantism militates against all proof . . . . . . . . 324 Vedantism falsified by its own rules 325 R4m4nuja's strictures (again) on Pantheism 326 His idea of the essential form of God 328 How Ramanandis differ from R4manujas 330 Discussion of the modern Vedant- ism of Bengal . . . . . . 331 The pantheism of the Upanishads exposed by citations of texts . . 383 The text " ckamevadwitiyam" proved to be pantheistic . . 336 Citations of passages proving the pantheism of the Upanishads :! 1 1 How the school of Rammohun Roy gradually gave up al 1 tras :il!i Page Dialogue X- Discussion of the authority of the Veda 351 Passages adduced in support of its inspiration proved to be inconclusive . . . . . . 352 Veda cannot prove itself . . 755 Review of arguments adduced by philosophers in support of the Vcdas 357 Jaimini's violent artifice in explainingaway the anachron- isms in the Vedas . . . . 359 Proofs adduced from Vedas against their eternity . . . . 300 Sankara's theory of eternal species . . . . . . . . 361 His argument refuted . . . . 364 Arguments of Gotama, KanAda, and Kapila refuted . . . . 366 Atheism of the Probh4kara mimansa . . . . . . 369 What can the Vedas be . . . . 376 Conflicting accounts of their production . . . . . . 377 Their own admission of a human origin . . . . . . . . 380 Necessity of a Revelation .. 381 The fact of a primitive Revela- tion apparent from Brahminical traditions . . . . . . 382 But they prove nothing in behalf of the four Vedas . . . . 385 The Bible declared to be the true record of God's will . . 386 Evidence of prophecy . . . . 886 Contrasted with alleged prophe- cies in Brahminical sastras . . 393 Evidence of miracles . . . . 394 Contrasted with the alleged miracles of Brahmiuism .. 396 The Bible throws light on the Brahminical institution of sacri- fices . 398 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XIX Page Againika speaks of the Vaishnava doctrine of Krishna the " Lord of all sacrifices " . . . . 398 Satyakirua suggests that the Vaishnava doctrine may have been borrowed from the Chris- tians of Southern India .. 401 The character of Krishna a mo- dern invention after the over- throw of Buddhism . . . 403 Page The Brahniiuical triad of divin- ities probably a distorted tradi- tion of primitive Revelation . . 104 So too the doctrine of Vishnu's incarnations . . . . . . 405 The Great Duty and the Chief End according to Christianity 106 DIALOGUE I. FROM A BRAHMIN TO A BRAHMIN. You wonder at the doings of the Kali Yuga. The late mutiny in the Bengal army gives a plausible appearance to your wonder. You quote the S'astra that the Kali Yuga will be followed by the return of the Satj^a Yuga ; you say the terrible scenes you have witnessed are only a prelude to the Mahapralaya, for which you are now looking. But the mutiny is over, and there are no signs of a Pralaya. How do you know that the renovation is not to be brought about by the gradual progress of opinion without any violent catastrophe ? The manifestation of Vishnu, which the Brah- mins expect at the end of the Yuga, may prove to be nothing more than the general dissemination of truth and knowledge. That circumstances are tending toward a new order of things cannot be doubted by the most superficial observer. You say that your fellow S'astris in the holy city show now- a-days a freedom of speculation which would have surprized Gotama and Kapila. You may consider that as one of the signs of the times. But such plain speaking is not confined to the city of S'iva. I have witnessed occasional instances of it in lower Bengal. After my departure from the North- West, on the breaking out of the rebellion, I had many a narrow escape from the violence of the soldiery, and at last arrived safe in Bengal. Some time after finding lodgings in this town, I paid a visit, in the cool of a lovely morning, to my old friend Satyakama. I found him standing at the gate on the side of the road. You have no doubt heard of the movement in his mind. He no longer bows to the high-sounding names of your liishis. Notwithstanding the tender cry of the Veda against being subjected to the arguments of heretics, he feels no hesitation in controverting some of its fondest doctrines. " Quarter," says he, " must indeed be given to parties when they ask for mercy, provided they submit at discretion ; but while a party 2 DIALOGUE I. continues rampant, and issues orders that you must not attack him, the mandate is a threat, not capitulation." While the Tilangas have been so fiercely plying their S'listra (weapons) in the North-West, the pundits in Bengal have been equally zealous in the exercise of their S'astra some of the latter manifesting no greater fidelity to the systems of their order, than did the Sepoys to the Government which so long protected and patronized them. Of the Sepoys' doings you have had enough in your own province. I will tell you something of the Pundits' doings here. I have already said I paid a visit to Satyakama. We were talking on the events of the day, when two middle- aged persons, from whose neat appearance I concluded they were Brahmins, even before I saw their thread, approached the house. They were both nearly as devoid of artificial decorations as the poet represents the peasants of Oude 1 , perhaps with this difference, that they took pains religiously to wash and clean themselves every morning, which was more than your rustics care to do. If there be any truth in the common saying, that externals form an index of the internal 2 , one of the new comers was certainly a guileless candid Brahmin, though the physiognomy of the other was somewhat ominous. While they were yet at a distance, Satyakama appeared to eye them very intently, paying little or no attention for the moment to what I said. As soon as they were near enough to be spoken to, " Obeisance, A'gamika," said he, " Obeisance, Tarkakama ! What an unexpected pleasure to see you both together after so long a separation. It is like the nectar- < ous moonbeams on the thirsty Chakar !" \Vhile uttering these words, he beckoned to them with his hands to enter the house. In his eagerness to show attention to his new (as I then thought, but, as I afterwards learnt, his old) friends, he almost forgot that I was in the company. I followed them however into the house, curious to know who the new comers were. As we were walking in, one of them, A'gamika, pleasantly remarked, " I am glad to find, Satyakama, ffg tfa: afaapj e *rrgr^ Ol/ OLD 11UEMDS. 3 you can refer in such good humour to our sacred adages. I, too, am delighted to see you, as indeed I am, to see all who were the companions of my youth under the happy roof of our common preceptor." I soon learnt who the new arrivals were. They were old friends of our host no way pleased with his recent change of opinion, but very kind and respectful. In the course of conversation, A'gamika, though naturally cheerful, said with an air of melancholy : " The only painful reflection which crosses my mind whenever I think of you, Satyakama, (and believe me it does so, with the sharpness, no less than the swiftness, of an arrow,) is, that after all the instruction you had received from our venerable A'charya, and the various tokens of affection he had heaped on his pupils, you should, by embracing foreign opinions, have frustrated the hopes once entertained of you. Never did a father contemplate, more joyously, the birth of his first-born, procuring him absolution from the debt 1 lie owed to his ancestors, than did our holy tutor, the gradual development of our minds under the discipline of the Vedas and other S'astras. His benevolence and love of literature had persuaded him, that besides the obligations which the S'astras entailed on the whole of the twice-born order, there was a fourth debt 2 which he owed to posterity. The success with which he had mastered the oracles of inspiration, and had traversed all the arcana of a philosophy, which had exercised the minds of countless sages, anxious for liberation from the bonds of transmi- gration, called upon him to communicate what he had learned lo intelligent pupils, that, through their instrumentality, myriads, yet unborn, might be supplied with the treasures of ^ 3T 3Fv m T Sfft: He who has begotten a son is absolved from Jtis debt. Veda in Mallindtha. The Hindus arc of opinion that the happiness of those who have departed to another world depends in a great measure on the performance of certain ceremonies by their descendants. A man is accordingly considered to be in debt to his forefathers as long as he has no son the hope of the family, as of the living so also of the dead. 2 The Veda speak of three debts in which the Brahmin is involved from his birth. " A Brahmin is born to three debts he owes student-ship to the Rishis, sacri- fices to the gods, and offspring to his forefathers." Veda quoted in the NyAya Sutra Vritti. 4 DIALOGUE I. knowledge, and thus a recurrence of that fearful catas- trophe, the loss of the Veda, which had once rendered necessary an incarnation of the divine Vishnu, might be averted. He was accordingly overjoyed at the prospect of discharging what he owed to succeeding generations, by be- queathing, through his pupils, those invaluable remedies for the perils of our nature, which had come down from the age, when the four heads of Brahma produced the Rich, Yajus, Saman, and Atharvan. Oh what a disappointment have you inflicted on him ! Have all his labours come to this, that you should become a scoffer at the Vedas, renounce the Sandhya 1 , forsake that which the illustrious son of Vasudeva said, was the most excellent for you, and adopt a foreign system, which the same sacred authority emphatically pronounced to be fraught with TEKROK 2 . Who could have imagined that you would bring on your preceptor the disgrace of betraying divine learning to a future enemy, notwithstanding its tender appeals for protec- tion 3 . Why even the Mahometan impostor Feizi, a very type of the demon who had made off with the churned-nectar in disguise, turned to a better use the Vedic learning he had un- 1 The prayers which the Brahmins have to repeat three times a day are called tlie Sandhya. They are generally free from references to the more recent legends of a directly idolatrous nature. They are held in the highest estimation. A Brahmin forfeits his position, not only by practically neglecting, but even by theoretically disregarding them. " Whosoever," says tiatatapa, does not honor it, is not esteemed a Brahmin " q^f ^K^IT^cl^ ^T ^ ?f I^FT The Puranas are full of eulogies of the Sandhya. I shall give only one passage from the Brahma- Vaivarla q^^^y^^ jf^^p{j cffltfrT =3 | % ^ 1g3T: .' II ^hugavat Gita III. 35. 3lt is said in the Vcdas that Divine Learning went to a Brahmin tagging protection against unworthy candidates for instruction. f^^Jf ?cf ccf Jit q!55q 3\^3 t\fa3 ^ flT^T BRAHMINICAL APOSTACY. 5 blushingly stolen 1 . But perhaps you could not help it ; there was no contending against Adrishta (fate) !" The Brahmin paused evidently overcome by conflicting feelings. But scarcely had he stopped, when his companion broke forth in a tone which presented a remarkable contrast to the melancholy gravity of A'gamika. " Yes," said he, " it idiosyncrasy be Fate ! " " Our friend," continued Tarkakama, " has so strong a predilection for what is singular, that he must needs forsake every thing that accords with the common sense of his countrymen." Satyakama had listened very attentively to A'gamika, but he was vexed at the sneers of his other friend. " My beloved friend A'gamika," said he, " has greatly mis- apprehended my doctrines and practice. I hope to explain both before we part. I cannot help meanwhile expressing my surprise at Tarkakama's taxing me with singularity, and re- buking me for my deviation from the track marked out by the common sense of our countrymen. Such a censure might have been expected from the poetical Kalidasa, who never allowed his mind to be distracted with the intrica- cies of science and philosophy, and who lauded the king and people of Ayodhia, for not deviating from the path chalked out ever since the days of Manu 2 . But I must confess I was not prepared for such a lecture from my philosophical l"Not all the authority of Akbar could prevail with the Brahmins to reveal ' the principles of their faith. He was therefore obliged to have recourse to ' artifice to obtain the information which he so much desired. The -Emperor, ' for this purpose, concerted a plan with his chief Secretary, Abul Fazil, to ' impose Feizi, then a boy, upon the Brahmins, in the character of a poor orphan ' of their tribe. Feizi, being instructed in his part, was privately sent to Bena- ' res. the principal seat of learning among the Hindoos. In that city the fraud 1 wa> practised on a learned Brahmin, who received the boy into his house and ' educated him as his own son."-Dow's History of Hindustan. While Feizi was carrying on his studies in disguise, a secret attachment grew up between the preceptor's daughter and himself. The Brahmin was easily persuaded to make him his son-in-law. But Feizi's conscience smote him. He could not any longer practise the deception without incurring to guilt of swindling. He discovered himself to his benefactor, and craved pardon for what he had done. The Brah- min was thunderstruck. From the mortification he felt in communicating the Vedas to an unclean barbarian, he could think of no other relief than instant death. He drew his knife to stab himself. Feizi fell down at his feet, beseech- ing him not to lay violent hands on himself. The Brahmin consented to live only on the Mahometan's solemnly promising not to translate the Vedas, nor to reveal the Brahminical creed to his fraternity. tfTFcrmjfr c5*R: q* | ^ s3 H Baghuvansa. (3 DIALOGUE I. friend Tarkakama. One who never for himself pretends to how to common sense, but is always in chase of bright ideas, da/./.ling to ordinary intellects, should not condemn another on the score of singularity. Nothing satisfies this A'charya that is not transcendental. Nothing is of any value that is not above popular sense. The teaching of the Veda fails to come up to his mark. The whole town talks of the eloquence with which he repeats and expounds Kapila's and Is'warakrish- na's open declarations of the shortcomings 1 of the Veda. Human society is to be improved, and its highest interests secured, not by the application of means which are open to ordinary men, but by something that even the majority of the learned fail to apprehend ; not by adherence to the precepts and injunctions of the Vedas, but by something which will be above the Vedas something of which Madhuchhand, Vis'wa- mitra, and other old sages were all equally ignorant, which it was reserved for a Gotama or Kapila to expound for the edification of the wise. To be taxed with singularity by one who is so regardless of established systems, is itself most singular." Tarkakama seemed somewhat uncomfortable under the rebuke which his own sneers had provoked. He was anxious to drop a subject he had indiscreetly introduced, and yet lie was unwilling to appear vanquished by allowing his opponent to have the last word. " My friend Satyakama," said he, " is eager to take every thing wrong. May it not be allowable in a person to speculate on grand truths, so long as he does not practically deviate from the duties of his class? 1 do not blame you lor thinking above the level of ordinary intellects. A philosophic mind cannot help doing so. Nor do I cavil at your diverging in thought from Vedic teaching, which certainly has not ex- hausted the topics of rational inquiry. I am not charging you with mental heresy. What I rind fault with you for is your practice. You do not tell the Sandhya. You mix and frater- nize with barbarians. You are for placing the unholy on the same level with the holy, the race that proceeded from the 1 Siukhya Sutra I. 83. Karika.II. THEORY AGAINST PRACTICE. 7 feet, with that which issued from the mouth of the Creator 1 . Already has our discipline been sadly relaxed by the ascendancy of barbarian rulers. Already are the worst anticipations of ancient sages realized in the insolence of the lower classes, and the depression of the sacerdotal office. But if your principles prevail, there will be an end to whatever still remains of peace and order. Social anarchy, added to political humiliation, will fill the cup of our misery up to the brim. The family will share the fate of the state. Vile S'udras and apostate barbari- ans, still under the ban of maledictions that cannot fail, will arrogate equality with gods-of-the-earth 2 . Nay matrimonial alliances will be uublushingly proposed without distinction of high and low. Our females, now scarcely accessible to the solar rays, will be exposed to the gaze of barbarian eyes ; and consequences, still worse than those which were so graphically depicted by the son of Kunti 3 , will be the result of disregarding the honor and dignity of our race." The debate now grew warm. Principles and practices were called in question, and though the parties w T ere never forgetful of the respect they owed to one another, each was eager to defend his own point. "I hope to satisfy you by and bye," replied Satyakama, "that neither my practice nor my principles are justly chargeable with any evil tendency. But allow me to express my wonder at the distinction you have drawn between your innocent speculations and my noxious example. If I under- stand you rightly, your philosophy treats with perfect contempt the very institutions which you blame my practice for ignoring. You laugh at the rites and ceremonies to which our countrymen are so much attached. The pride of caste stands neither the test of your dialectics, nor of your most favourite texts of the Vedas. You claim for your system the moral dignity of 1 The S'astras speak of the Brahmins having been produced from the mouth, and the Sudras from the feet of Brahman. 2 "fl^n *T who made the waters, the sun, and the elements, to confess before Him, morning and evening, both what I have done and what I have left undone, and to ask His pardon for sins, of tlwught, icord, and deed, whether committed at night or in the day. " You have also charged me with abandonment of my Swadharina. Now do not consider it a mere cavil, if I ask you, what do you mean by Sivadhanna /" " Why, your own religion," said Tarkakama, rather impa- tiently. " Pardon me," said Satyakama, " if I repeat the question What is my own religion /" " The Hindu religion to which you were born the religion of the people of India. That is plain enough as a definition." " The Hindu religion ! does such a term or idea occur in any S'astra. Will you cite a passage of S'ruti or Smriti, giving such a definition of Swadharma ?" Tarkakama paused for a moment when A'gamika remarked, " Yes ! it is singular the term Hindu is not found in our sacred language, and yet we speak of the Hindu religion. I wonder how we got such a term. I fancy we got it from the Moham- medans." Satyakama. " The oldest writing in which the word, or something very like it, occurs, is a portion of the Hebrew scriptures 1 . The Greeks appear to have got it from some eastern country, and rendered it ' India,' and the Arabians and Persians 'Hind.' We received it no doubt from the Mohammedans." " Whatever the origin of the word may be," said Tarkakama, " here we have it and by the Hindu religion we mean the religion of the inhabitants of this country. 1 mean the right- ful inhabitants of our Punyabhumi, excepting of course such men as the Mohammedans, Parsees, and other foreigners who have recently settled here." Satyakama. " But where do you find the religion of the rightful inhabitants of the country ?" Tarkakama. " You are putting questions after the manner of Vakeels in the courts ; of course, in the Veda and other- s' as tras." " Pardon me again," said Satyakama, " I mean no offence ; but I ani not aware of any system inculcated in the S'ruti and .irn, Esther. WHAT IS SWADHARMA? 21 the Smriti which may be called the religion of the rightful inhabitants of this country. Nor is it easy to determine who are the rightful inhabitants of our Punyabhumi. The Vedas speak of the A.'ryas, and it is supposed by many learned persons that the A'ryas were emigrants from the other side of the Indus. But whether they were emigrants or aborigines, they certainly did not form one community with the Dasyus, spoken of also as inhabitants of the country and there could be no system which might be called their common religion. And there were Kakshases, also inhabiting the country, whose Swadharma, or religion, as you have expounded the term, consisted in acts which it would not be safe in us to en- courage, though Kama Chandra himself did not deny it was their Dharma 1 ." " But the Kakshases never pretended to be any other than enemies of Brahmins." " Very true but they were nevertheless rightful inhabitants of the country. All I contend for, is that there is no system in the S'astras, which may be called the common religion of all Hindus." " But the Kakshases were not Hindus." " I do not know that you can deny them the right of occupa- tion in the country. But I will not dispute that point with you. You acknowledge the S'udras as Hindus do you not ?" " Certainly. If we were to discard the S'udras, twelve annas or more of our community would be lopped off The Kajah, our own Zemindar, would himself be excluded. And we should lose almost all patrons of our religion." " Well : do the S'astras inculcate any common Dlianna for Brahmins and S'udras ? I suppose you cannot answer the question in Lhe affirmative. The Brahmins have to study and meditate on the Vedas S'udras only to do service to the twice- born. ' Only one duty,' says Menu, ' has the Creator ordained to the S'udra to serve the three superior orders.' And this is his swadJiarnia. " Granted what then ?" sqfa^T c? qmf? W I *o Bhatti. 22 DIALOGUE I. " Swadharma, then, means the duties proper for one's class. I only wish to understand the precise nature of the charge against me. I suppose I may expect that you will not encour- age the vulgar clamour in this respect. People ignorant of the S'astra think that all Hindus have a community of Dharma a word by which they understand religion, when, as we have just seen, it more properly means class-duty. The word Hindu is unknown in the S'ruti and Smriti, and there is no other term by which the whole body of rightful occupiers of our piuuja- b'hittni may be designated. If there were a community of religion, there would surely be a name whereby to designate it." Tarkakama. " A'ryavarta is synonymous with Punyabhumi. I should say the word A'nja would be a common designation." " But," said Satyakama, " A'rya cannot possibly include Dasyu, with which it is plainly contrasted in the Vedas, and I believe it excludes S'udra. ' The Brahmin is a caste divine ; the S'udra from Asu-ras or demons 1 .' You would hardly be disposed to call the S'udra an A'rya." " But why all this discussion ? Granted, Swadharma means the peculiar duties of one's own class. Can its observance be the less binding for that '?" " Let it be understood then, that I am to be put on my trial on a charge of deviating from the duties of my class. Will you tell me what those duties are ? " " Manu's summary," said Tarkakama, " is no doubt the best. ' To Brahmins lie assigned the duties of reading the ' Veda, teaching it, of sacrificing, of alluring others to sacrifice, ' of giving alms (if they be rich), and, if indigent, of receiving 'gifts 2 ." " You cannot easily convict me," said Satyakama, " of habitual neglect of all these duties, unless I voluntarily plead guilty of doubting the inspiration of the Veda." " Well," said Tarkakama, " there can be no difficulty in showing that you have not been particularly careful in abstain- ing from acts forbidden in numerous texts of the S'astras, such as the following : ' The Brahmin is not to dine with the S'udra 3 ."' if ^'jff ^fSTCrj: ST^q": J; | TRittiriya. Brahmana. DUTIES OF BRAHMINS. 23 " You have not given the full meaning of that text, as expounded by Rishis. The Brahmin is not to take any food supplied by a S'udra. Even raw materials J such as ghee, and unprepared rice, given personally by a S'udra, are forbidden to him. Is that not the teaching of the S'astras ? "It is," said A'gamika. " There can be no doubt about it." " Well then," said Satyakama, " although on my trial, allow me to suggest another rule, which may further strengthen the cause of the prosecution, whenever a Brahmin is arraigned before you for breach of duty. The Brahmin is prohibited to cook for the S'udra,, to perform religious offices for him to follow the profession of anna or to live by liis pen or by selling his learning. Is that not the dictum of the S'astras 2 ? " " There can be no doubt about," it said A'gamika. " Hear now my defence " said Satyakama. " You have lamented over me as an apostate from my Swadharma. We have seen that the observance of our Swadharma means the observance of all the rules we have just cited, and many others which we have not cited. Do you not see that if I am to be lamented over as an apostate, there are myriads of others who are as fitting objects of your compassion. If my friend Tarkakama condemns me, I find myself condemned in very good company. Whosoever, being a Brahmin, follows the occupation of a paid professor of our sacred language, in a College or School, whosoever officiates as a village priest, or at poojahs in the houses of S'udras, whosoever accepts from S'udras offerings of any thing eatable, whosoever enlists in an army, or works for his livelihood as secretary or clerk, is as much an object of your compassion, as one that may have given up the Sandhya, or renounced his Dharma, as the vulgar would say. How many Brahmins do you think there are who can stand a searching investigation on these points '? You have no doubt heard of a society called the Dharma Sabha ; you will recollect who its president was a Eaja of the S'udra caste, while the Secretary was a Brahmin." " What could we do under the circumstances ? " said Tarka- kama. " No Brahmin could be found possessing sufficient TO i u.> li\ pMthesi.-, of an i rtte ooatragBDc? : q1wrt ^ *?< flS^ f-' ' GOTAMA'S LOGIC. 45 schools commence with the word atha, supposed to be an auspicious particle. The sixteen topics proposed by him certainly embrace a wide range of human research and specula- tion ; but as the Brahmins in general cared little for intellectual and physical inquiries, not founded on the Veda, he endeavoured to gain them over by proclaiming that the final liberation of the soul depended on the study of his topics. " I have supposed Gotama to be the earliest of Brahminical philosophers. My reason for doing so is that his system, while it combats many opinions advanced by teachers of heresy, con- tains nothing that may be considered as levelled against doc- tors of other orthodox schools. He notices and answers numerous objections, (some of a most fanciful description,) which cannot be traced to any work or system now known ; but there is no evidence of his contending against Vedantism, or even the Sankhya. The commentator recognizes a few skirmishes against Kapila in some of the Sutras, but in no Sutra does any characteristic doctrine of the Sankhya school appear to be the point of attack. " Gotama appears, as I have said, to have laboured to introduce among the Brahmins the study of logic and phys- ics, and although in consequence of the great variety of topics which he undertook to discuss simultaneously, he did not arrive at any great results, the rules he laid down for correct reasoning, and especially for the detection of fallacies, have done great service to posterity. He taught in its elemen- tary form the very method of syllogism with which the name of Aristotle is associated in Europe a name which many of us have heard from the Omla of our courts, and from others who have carefully studied the literature of the Mohammedans. If Gotama's system of logic were amended by succeeding scholars, not bound by the authority of their immediate teachers, we might expect the same success in India which has crowned the efforts of philosophers in Europe. " But in order to ensure that success it would be necessary to allow fair discussionunrestrained by the dictum of authority, and unhampered by the dread of incurring popular obloquy, when errors and defects required to be corrected by careful experiment and investigation. To perpetuate those errors and defects, instead of rectifying them by the light of new discoveries, is in reality not reverence to the memory of that eminent philosopher, but injustice to the truths with which the errors are mixed up. It was a great thing that he taught the rules of correct reasoning, and a system capable of 40 DIALOGUE II. improvement and if he did not succeed in rightly applying those rules in many points, it is incumbent on his successors to follow them up, and supply the deficiency. But to perpet- uate the errors alongside the truths, is like an obstinate refusal to wipe off the mildew on a beautiful picture, and like wilfully thrusting a great piece of art on the notice of posterity in an unclean and disfigured state." Satyakama paused for a moment here to decipher some scrawls in his paper. I took the opportunity of asking what he meant by errors in the system of Gotama. " Kishis," said I, " cannot err. We must have very cogent reasons, indeed, if we be called upon to abandon that long-cherished maxim." "I will not enter now," said Satyakama, "into the question of the specific errors of Gotama. We must have a conference on the subject sooner or later. But the fact of the various Kishis, who founded schools of philosophy, having disagreed among themselves, is sufficient evidence against your long cherished maxim. Where two persons hold conflicting opinions, one must be in the wrong because truths cannot be conflicting." " But perhaps," said I, " they only misunderstood each other perhaps their opinions were only seemingly conflicting." " S'ankaracharya," replied Satyakama, " understood them to be really conflicting. A'gamika cited a passage to that effect the other day. But even if they misunderstood each other, the misunderstanding itself was an error." Satyakama resumed his discourse: " I should be inclined on general grounds to place Kapila as the immediate successor of Gotama, but the express mention of the .$/,/ catff/orics, and ' the Vais'eshikas ' in the k 25th Sankhya Sutra presents a diffi- culty. A comparison of the Sankhya and Vais'eshika does not countenance the supposition of that Sutra being an inter- polation I must therefore name Kanada as our second philosopher in order of succession. " Kanada's system is considered a branch of the Nyaya. His theory is what we call the Atomic a theory which was simply hinted at by Gotama. The founder of the Vais'eshika school took up "the less than the least," as the author of the Nyaya Sutras had denned an atom, and produced theory, which has earned for him and his followers the nickname of feeders on small particles. The name Kanada itself has that meaning, and was evidently given him by his enemies His real name appears to be unknown. '' His first three Sutras form an extraordinary introduction to his work. As if by way of making a mere confession of KANADA'S THEORY OF CREATION. 47 faith, he begins by defining Pharma 1 , and declaring the author- ity of the Vadas, though we hear nothing on religion or ethics in the first chapter, and but very little in any other part. His categories and his classification of causes bear a singular resemblance to those of the Greek philosopher Aristotle, while his mode of accounting for the origin of the world, by the combination of atoms, is almost identical with that of a sect of ancient European philosophers, the Epicureans, as represent- ed by Lucretius. He does not indeed betray the diffidence with which the Latin poet asserts the necessity of a small, the smallest possible, inclination in the motion of falling atoms, nor is he afraid of introducing the theory of oblique motions 2 , but he boldly attributes to adrishta, four things, which he conceived to be necessary for the first start of his world, viz. the upward course which heat takes when emitted by fire, the oblique motion of the air, and the primal action of atoms and of the mind 3 . He does not seem to have entertained the idea of a Self-existent Supreme Intelligence creating the world." I could not help interrupting my friend again. " Do you mean," said I, " to maintain that Kanada did not allow the existence of God, or that his system is niriswara?" " I have no knowledge of him," answered Satyakama " ex- cept from his Sutras, and I can safely say he makes no men- tion of God in any of them and that he ascribes the primal action of his eternal atoms to adrishta. Atoms combine by actions and impulses. These are imparted by combinations already formed, and thereby fresh combinations are produced. In tracing these actions and impulses to their origin, he could not find any cause for the first impulse, except in adrishta' If this implies that he did not admit the existence of a God, I am sorry for it, but I cannot help it." " Does not S'ankaracharya say, and is it not universally believed, even among the opponents of Brahminism, that the 2 Quare etiam atque etiam paullum clinare necosse est Corpora, nee plus quam minimum, ne fingere motus Ol>liquos videamnr, et id res vera refntt-t. 1- DIALOGUE II. Nyaya, including khe .Vais'eshika, considers atoms as the mate- rial, but God us the efficient cause of the world 1 ? " " S'ankaracharya certainly attributes that doctrine to the follutrrr* of Kanada, and many of them indeed maintain it, but there is no trace of it in the Sutras of their original teacher; and S'ankara thus represents A/x doctrine : ' At the creation also, an operation is pro- ' duced in aerial atoms, which is dependant on udrislttd. ' That operation joins its own atom with another. Then ' from binaries, by gradual steps, is produced the air. ' The same is the case with fire. The same with water. ' The same with earth. The same with organized bodies. ' Thus is the whole universe produced from Atoms. The form and other qualities of binaries and other compounds ' are derived from those of the atoms themselves 2 .' As to the opponents of Brahminism if thereby you mean Kuropean^, they have for the most part drawn their information from Colebrooke, the most learned of foreign scholars and very few that may have consulted native authorities, probably attended solely to modern manuals, or confided in their pundits, and did not care to verify what they read or heard by a reference to the Sutras. " Colebrooke makes no mention of the above Sutra, but he evidently refers to it when he speaks of the Nyaya theory of the original combination of atoms 3 . As he did not 3 Two earthly atoms, concurring by an unseen peculiar virtue, tin- cn-ntive will of GOD, or time, or other competent < -an^c. i-onstitntf a
  • ul>lc atom .if earth; and, by concourse of three binary atoms, a tt-rtiury atom is produced; and, by concourse of four triple atoms, a quaternary atom ; and so <>n, to a tfross, grosser, or K''" s s;st mas?, of cartb : thus -rcat cartli is produced; and in like manner, great water, from aqueous atoms; grrat li;,'ht, from luminous; and ,'ivat air, from aerial. The qualities that belong to the effect are those whiol) appertained to the integrant part, or primary particle, as its material cause : and conversely, the qualities which In-long to the cause are found in the effect." Colebrooke's Essays. KAHADA'S THEORY OF CREATION. 4v the meaning of adrishta, those that followed him. without a knowledge of the Sutra itself, did not perhaps pay especial attention to all the expressions which he used, and so missed his real meaning. Whether adrishta means destiny, or some unseen virtue in the material atoms themselves, is a question which we shall discuss afterwards. I shall for the present content myself with having given you Kanada's own words, which scarcely justify our explicitly assigning to them a theistical character 1 , nor is there any thing in Gotama calling for the same." I was much surprized by what Satyakama represented to be the teaching of Kaiiada, but, reserving further discussion for a future occasion, I begged him to resume his paper. He con- tinued ; " Kapila came forward next with his remedy for the three-fold evils of life, which neither the Vedas nor the com- mon sense of mankind had been able to remove. Who this Kapila was, or when he lived, is equally uncertain with the age and personality of Gotama. There is a Kapila mentioned in the Swetaswatara, a son of Brahma, but some commentators explain it away by taking the word as an adjective, not a 1 " The Nyaya is essentially theistical. According to them, God is personal. He is not, as it expressly asserts, mere existence, mere knowledge, mere bliss, but he is a substance, of which existence, &c. are attributes ; for it is immpossiblc to think of existence, knowledge, which may be rendered, the word. Gotama also had acknowledged those sources of knowledge, and had added a fourth, upamana, or analogy, while Kanada had reduced the number to two, by contending that the ivord was implied in Inference, " It does not clearly appear what Gotama, Kanada, and Kapila meant by S'abda, or the word. They defined it to be the VJ DIALOGUE II. language of unerring authority ; but was it unerring de jure, or simply de facto ! If, as is more probable, they meant the former, then by S'abda they understood simply the authority of the S'dstra ignoring that important branch of evidence for truth, which is founded on human testimony. According to the rules of those philosophers, it would in that case be impossible to prove to a Bengali, that the sepoys of the Bengal army mutinied at Meerut and Delhi. " The objects of knowledge are, according to Kapila's ar- rangement, twenty-five. Prakriti, or nature, defined to be the equipoise of the three qualities of excellence, foulness, and darkness, is the first, as Purush-a, or soul, is the last. The intervening twenty-three are ma hat, or intelligence, ahankdra, or self-consciousness, the five tanmatra, or subtle elements, eleven organs, inclusive of the mind, and the five gross ele- ments. Of these Prakriti, the rootless root, is the first cause of all things while Purusha, or soul, is a simple witness. Both are eternal : but the former, inanimate and non-sentient, is prolific and active ; the latter, intelligent and sentient, is non-productive, because free and indifferent. Prakriti how- ever creates for the soul, and in its vicinity. " The atheistic part of Kapila's system was rectified by a mystic Kishi of the name of Patanjali, who unmistakeably inculcated the existence of Is'wara or God, and whose system has consequently been called Ses'wara, or theistical. It must however be confessed, in justice to Kapila, that Patanjali does not attribute the creation to his Is'wara. His definition of Is'wara corresponds exactly to Kapila's idea of the soul viz., " untouched by troubles, works, fruits, or deserts 1 ." The only difference is that Patanjali considers him to be the guru, or master, of "even the elder beings' 2 ," thereby acknowledging one spirit as supreme over the rest. The non-acknowledgment of some such Supreme Being was a glaring inconsistency in Kapila, when nevertheless he contended for the authority of the Vedas. Who could have inspired the Vedas if there were no Supreme Being ? "Patanjali's is thoroughly a mystical system. It consists mainly of some vague rules of yoga, or a sort of mental and corporeal discipline, which cannot be considered as other than chimerical. His references to Is'wara i-itni aicr0ij(riv \a/3(i)v /J-r} fiovov efceivo yva> a\\a tcai erepov evvorjaij ov firj 1} avrij eTria-TTjfAr} aXX' a\\.rj' a/o' ov%i TOVTO SiKaico? \fyop.ev ori avep.vria-6^ ov rrjv evvoiav \af3ev ; K 74 DIALOGUE III. Satyakdma. "Is it so? Will you state the argument in detail." Tarkakdnia. " Gotama, you must remember, was demons- trating the eternity of the soul, and so he proves that it never began, nor shall ever cease, to be. The former point, from which the latter followed as a matter of course, he thus attempts to make good. He says (III. 19.) ' Because of the ' manifestation of joy, fear, and grief, in him that is born, from * the memory of previous habits.' The commentator expounds ' the meaning of the Sutra in the following words : ' The rise of ' joy and other feelings in the infant that is born, while the ' occasions of those feelings are yet not apprehended in this ' birth, can only be accounted for by his recollection of previous ' apprehensions. Thus the successive prior stages of the ' present soul being show T n, it is proved to be without beginning. ' And what is without beginning can have no destruction. ' Thus is its eternity demonstrated 1 .' Can any one conceive a possible objection to this argument '?" Satyakdma. " It seems Gotama himself could conceive an objection to his argument ; at least he notices one in the next Sutra. ' The changes (on the child's face) may be like the ' opening and closing of the lotus.' (III. 20.) The commentator thus expounds the objection. ' Joy and other feelings in the ' infant are inferred from changes on his face. They may be ' produced by some especial unseen virtue, as in the opening ' and closing of the lotus' 2 ." Tarkakdma. " But Gotama furnished a ready reply to INTERNAL EMOTIONS EXCITED BY EXTERNAL CAUSES. 75 the objection. ' No ! for causes of changes ill things ' composed ' of the five elements, are heat, cold, rain, season 1 .' ' Satyakdma. " The reply is not satisfactory. The objection is neither worded nor expounded as clearly as it might have been. It may fairly be thus paraphrased. Gotama says that certain internal emotions are indicated by changes on the child's face, and that those emotions are proofs of a prior existence. The objector does not disallow the premises, but he disputes the conclusion. He admits the existence of the internal emotions, but he contends they are occasioned by external impressions after birth. He contends that the first instances of joy and fear are owing to outward causes sur- rounding the child. Of the changes on its face, those emo- tions may be the proximate causes ; but the external impres- sions, by which the emotions themselves were excited, must be recognized as their remote causes. The changes on the child's face may accordingly be compared with the expansion and contraction of the lotus. You say the expansion and contraction of the lotus are caused by heat and moisture. Granted. But it would be more accurate to say that the heat and moisture are neither their immediate, nor only causes ; that the expansion and contraction have the flower's OICH organism as their proximate cause, and that the external heat and moisture are remoter causes acting on that organism : for without the intervention of that organism the flower would no more be affected by the atmosphere, than the wax or light- wood lotus which your children value so much as a toy. The analogy between the child and the lotus, therefore, stands good. External circumstances act on something internal in each case, and thereby occasion certain visible changes. That the organism is in the one case only physical, in the other both physical and intellectual, does not affect the analogy. " It cannot therefore be said, in reply, that the changes on the child's face are independent of eternal causes. That would be a begging of the question. The child is ex- posed to certain outside impressions from its very birth, and these impressions excite certain mental emotions which are indicated by change of countenance. The case of the lotus is an example in point. The child has a mental constitution by virtue of which external circumstances are able to call into action certain internal feelings. The lotus, too, has an 76 DIALOGUE III. organism of its own, by virtue of which the action of the atmosphere occasions the expansion and contraction of the flower. In both cases certain effects are produced by virtue of internal organisms, through the action of external impressions. The child may be afterwards capable of pure internal impulses, not depending immediately on the external. But you cannot prove that, previously to the reception of its first impressions from without, any of its internal capacities are in active exercise ; much less that such exercise is conscious and delib- erate. The indications of joy and sorrow on the infant's face do not, therefore, demonstrate the fact of previous habits acquired in a prior state of life, but are simply proofs of the capacities, in the mental constitution of human nature, for certain emotions which ^YQ put in exercise by impressions from without ; and the analogy of the lotus stands good, inasmuch as the lotus has also an organism in its tender stalk, by virtue of which its flowers open and shut when acted upon by heat and moisture." Tarkakama. " I am not convinced that Gotama's argument is invalid. But that is not his only argument. He has another : ' From the desire for milk, after dying, caused by the habit of taking food.' (III. 22). The commentator gives the following scholium on it ' After dying, or rather having died, ' means being just born, after the dissolution of the previous 'body 1 .'" Satijnkama. " Neither is this argument above the pos- sibility of assault in the author's estimation, for he anticipates an objection. ' The child's spontaneous approach to the mother's ' breast may be like that of the iron to the magnet.' " (1IJ. 2:'>). Tarkakama, " That only shows the author's candour. I'-ut see how he repels the objection. ' No ! because there is no motive, elsewhere.' (III. 24). That is to say, as the scholiast renders it, ' the child is moved only to suck the milk. The 'rule does not hold good in the other case. Why? lU-cause 1 uhere is in reality no motive in the other case i.e., in that of 'the iron. Motive is deduced from H'l'ort, not from a mere ' act*. Hence the argument is not vitiated.' ' INl'AXT EFFORTS INVOLUNTARY. 77 Satyakdma. " I do not deny that the child, being endowed with intellectual and active powers, is capable of an effort of which inanimate iron is incapable. But this fact does not proves the soul's pre-existence. But as Gotama has another argument yet, let us hear it before we discuss the reasons he has adduced for and against his doctrine." Tarkakdma. " ' From not seeing any one, born without desire 1 .' The innate affections of human nature are proofs of a previous state of existence, in which their germs were planted." Satyakdma. " The author is again candid enough to anti- cipate an objection. ' Its birth is like the production of a substance with inherent qualities 2 .' ' Tarkakama-. "He refutes it too. 'No! for desire and other affections are occasioned by intelligence,' i. e., deliber- ation 3 ." Satyakdma, "I say again the answer is not to the point. With reference to the second argument, facts do not warrant the conclusion that the infant, previous to after-birth experi- ence, is moved, or makes a deliberate effort, to approach the breast. All that you can say is, that when the breast is applied, it sucks. But it will suck any thing that is presented to it. It sucks its own fingers. The fact only proves that it has a capacity and an inclination for sucking, just as the magnet has the capacity of attracting iron. If the infant afterwards indi- cates a discriminative knowledge on the subject, that is owing to its experience after birth. The three arguments of Gotama may be compressed into one. He contends that men exhibit from their infancy certain habits and inclinations, passions and affections, which cannot be accounted for without assuming a previous state of existence ; and, as that state, again, must, for the same reasons, have another antecedent to it, you must carry the argument successively backwards, and pronounce the soul to be eternal. Is not this his argument ?" 78 DIALOGUE 111. Tarkakdma. " I do not object to your construction of his argument ; but what can you say in reply?" Satyakoma. " I can say something by quoting one of his own texts, by opposing Gotama to Gotama. He had asserted in his definition of the soul, that ' Desire, Aversion, Volition, Pleasure, Pain, and Knowledge, are its characteristics, (i. 10) l ' If then the infant exhibits external indications of those mental operations, the phenomenon simply proves the existence of a soul in him. Those characteristics have nothing to do with the soul's pre-existence. The examples cited in the objections, are not fairly met by his answers. It is a characteristic of the soul to think, feel, desire, shun ; to desire that which imparts pleasure, to avoid that which communicates pain. If the infant spontaneously takes to sucking, it is because that is an effort natural and agreeable to him ; and indeed every effort is then agreeable, which affords exercise to his physical or mental capacities, without actually imparting pain. There is not the slightest necessity for assuming that his involuntary motions are the results of habits acquired in a previous state of existence, or that they are reminiscences of past associations." Tarkakama. "The argument is not merely that the in- fant evinces desire and inclination, but that he evinces inclina- tion for particular objects, as if known by previous experience to be agreeable to the taste ; and hence Gotama contends that it is proof of a previous life." Sdti/akdma. "Here the premise is incorrect. It is not true in fact that the infant evinces a taste for particular objects, prior to experience in his existing state. It makes an effort to suck whatever is presented to its mouth. Among some nations it is usual to give the oil of Rendi (castor-oil) as the first food for an infant when it is born and it takes the oil as promptly as it does milk. And it would suck either liquid with the same readiness, even if it contained arsenic. You cannot say it had found oil and arsenic to be so agreeable in a previous life. " These involuntary efforts in the infant are exactly what you would expect from human nature. You need not form a theory of pre-existence in order to account for them. Since light and heat are characteristics of fire, if you make a piece; of iron red-hot, it will naturally both shine and burn. Would you say it is owing to habits of a previous state ? Of course you would not. You would simply recognize the natural property NATURAL LAW. 79 of fire already ascertained. So, when the child only manifests the characteristics of the soul that animates his body, you have simply to accept the fact as a verification of your own aphorism on the nature of that soul. You have no room for bringing in a new theory. You cannot do so without stultify- ing your own Sutra. The child does what you would expect from his soul. If the case were otherwise, if the child gave no more indication of internal sensibility than a wooden doll, you should have to revise your aphorism. You have no phenomenon before you, but what is fully explained by your previous premises. Your argument is redundant, and your theory of a pre-existence unnecessary." Tarkakdma. "Even if Gotama's argument were incon- sistent with his definition of the soul, still how would you account for such natural dispositions in the infant ? Who taught him the way to take food at an age when he is incapable of learning from those around him?" Satyakdma. " The natural dispositions of the infant are to be accounted for in the same way in which you might account for the natural properties of other substances. Who gave the cliampd its fragrance, the lion its courage, and the sun its refulgence ? Answer my query, and, I warrant you, the same answer will explain who taught the way of taking food at an age when the infant is incapable of communicating with his neighbours. The same great Being, Tarkakama, is the giver and the teacher in both instances. His Maker instructed the infant to desire food, to take it in the way best suited to his state, to give forth signs of pain when he misses his sustenance. Do not stare at what I say, as if it were something uncommon. The natural law which instructs and guides the infant governs the whole of the animal and vegetable creation. The same fiat which bestowed on the peacock its beauty, the swan its gloss, the kokila its voice, the chakwa its sentiment, the elephant its strength, conferred on man the nature he exhibits even in infancy. The babe is taught how to suck, by Him who instructs the bird how to build her nest when the comforts of her offspring require it ; who commands the mdlati to entwine itself round the tree that supports it, the lotus to open by day, and the kumuda by night ; who admonishes trees, herbs, and creepers to germinate in the way best suited to their organism, and animals to seek the nourishment best adapted for their constitution." Tarkakdma. "What you say maybe a fine theory in itself. But it does not disprove Gotama's doctrine. The phenomena 80 DIALOGUE III, you have mentioned may be accounted for equally well on the suppc ition of a previous existence." Sati/fikdma. "Neither do the reasons adduced by Gotama prove his theory ; which indeed reaches much further back than simple pre-existence. He contends that the various stages of previous lives may in like manner be proved from those immediately succeeding them, and thus the soul demon- strated to be uncreated and eternal, and that not merely in a spiritual state, unconnected with body and mind, but in an embodied and .intellectual state. See then the length to which the argument carries you. If man has existed without beginning, sucked milk, taken food, there must have been vegetable life, co-existent with him. How could he otherwise be sustained ? Even if he lived on nothing but animal matter, still the animals which supplied that matter must have requir- ed vegetable sustenance. And if animal and vegetable life be uncreated and eternal, so must inorganic matter be too ; for it is from inorganic matter that vegetables draw the sap which sustains them, the gas which supports them, and the heat which vivifies them. If you allow the validity of Gotama's argument for the pre-existence of the soul, and extend it, as he has done, to times without beginning, you must then maintain the eternity of every thing around you ; and that, not in an atomic state, but collected in masses. And if the universe be uncreated and eternal in a perfect state of development, how can you, on your own theory, contend for Lhe existence of God ? Since the theory of a previous life, and the principles of Gotama drive us to this extremity, how can you say that the supposition of a pre-existence explains the facts before us, equally iccll with that for which I am contending?" Tarkakdma. " But granting that the argument, based on the infant's spontaneous efforts, is inconclusive, because there is nothing to preclude the supposition of their being natural to him ; how can you, still, get over the moral argument,, or withhold your assent from the doctrine, when you con- sider the marked inequalities in the circumstances and posi- tions of men? How can you reconcile with the justice and equity of God the fact of some men being in the enjoy- ment of honor and wealth, others pining in penury and misery, except by considering their various conditions as the consequences of their own works in a past world ? Human happiness or misery, you said, may be traced to virtuous or vicious conduct in this very world. I do not HARMONY AND VARIETY. 81 deny it may be so in some cases but surely you do not mean to stigmatize every poor man as a monster of wickedness. To vindicatethe justice of God, and to save the credit of men, it is necessary to look to the events of a prior existence for an ex- planation of the difficulty, especially when you consider that many are born with disease and infirmity which they could not have brought on themselves by their own acts, but which nevertheless render. them miserable for life." Satyakdma. " That a portion of our happiness or misery is owing to our actions in this life, you seem to admit. " So far then we are agreed. As regards differences in race and birth they are not, (I have already said,) necessarily con- nected with corresponding diversities in enjoyment or suffering. The elephant is of a different species from the lion, the peacock from the deer, the bull from the horse. Does it necessarily follow that the deer is less happy than the lion, or the horse than the elephant ? By no means. Is it then impossible to vindicate the justice of God without supposing a prior existence regulating the differences in their species ? Each may be amply endowed in its own way, and each bears testimony to the wisdom and beneficence of the Creator. The same may be predicated of races of mankind. There is a variety in the crea- tion which, while it indicates the inexhaustible riches of the Divine intelligence and goodness, does not for a moment suggest a want of equity in the Author of our being. No one had an antecedent right to be created in a particular manner, or of a particular race. He that was free to create in His own way, has so performed his work that there should be symmetry, variety, and happiness, in the universe. And that there is. The smallest insect that crawls on the ground contributes to the beauty and harmony of the world in its own way, as the lofty elephant does in his way. How could there be order if there were no variety ? Is that symmetry, or that harmony worthy of the name, where there is no plurality of different, but proportional, substances ? Inequalities are in themselves no proofs of injustice, or culpable partiality. " I will not deny, what I have already admitted, that there is a large residuum of worldly inequalities which may still remain to be accounted for. That account, however, is found more satisfactorily in my theory than in yours I mean, in the supposition that this is a state of probation and trial prepara- tory to another and a better world. Probation itself demands difficulties. The gold cannot be tried without being placed in the heated crucible. The child is not trained for the purposes L 32 DIALOGUE III. of life without passing through the ordeal of a school. This world may be to us a preparation for a better. There is nothing in this idea which is derogatory to the justice and goodness of God." Tarkakdma. "You called the doctrine of a prior state an arbitrary assumption. Is your doctrine of probation and trial, preparatory to a better world yet to come, any thing better ? You cannot prove it either." Satyakdma. " Strong presumptive evidence you know is proof in cases which do not admit of mathematical demonstra- tion. The theory I propose accounts for our difficulties, without giving the lie to our moral convictions. Your theory, on the contrary, is nullified by its own vagueness, and, instead of justifying the ways of God, has a tendency to cast doubts on His very existence. Witness the argument of Sankaracharya ; ' What is the want of equity (on the part of God) ? He makes ' a distinction between souls, high, low, middling. Hence ex- ' hibiting partiality and prejudice, and other infirmities, he ' might be proved to be like ourselves, and therefore no God 1 ." The question is accordingly one of vital importance in theology. S'ankara, I may say, has given two solutions of the problem which are apparently inconsistent with each other. In one place, at least, he strongly inveighs against the way in which you propose to account for it. ' If it be said,' he continues, '* that the above distinctions are owing to the past works of the souls themselves, and that consequently there can be nothing wrong in the existing inequalities ; the solution will not stand : for works being motions, and God the mover, there will still be the fault of [cause and effect resting on] reciprocal support [as in a vicious circle]. If you say there has been a series of works without a beginning, then, as in the present world, so also in past states, the same fault must be found of reciprocal support, [each cause producing, and also being produced by, its own effect] and it will be after the manner of a troop of blind leading the blind 8 .' Commentary on Yeclanta Sutra II. ii. 37. SANKARA'S IDEA OF ENDLESS SUCCESSION. 83 " I do not cite S'ankara approvingly, but I wish simply to remind you that he does not here countenance your theory of past works justifying present distinctions. It will drive us from one world to a second, from that again to its predecessor, until, as in Gotama's theory, you are compelled to hold the eternity of the world before us." Agamika. " But if so many philosophers of the west and east held the doctrine of the soul's pre-existence, is it, I ask again, modest to treat it as a mischievous theory'?" Satyakdma. " I have myself only said that our philosophers have drawn from it the most startling conclusions. It would hardly be worth one's while to combat the doctrine, if it were held as a mere opinion, and if no inferences, subversive of the interests of religion and morality, were deduced from it. " In Plato's system the theory of the soul's pre-existence holds a very subordinate place. It is not pushed to any ex- treme conclusion, destructive of religion or morals. The doc- trine appears to have had a feeble hold on his mind. In the arguments brought forward there is nothing which corresponds to the force usually attached to Socratic sayings. The immor- tality of the soul is his great theme. Its past existence is insist- ed on for the purpose of demonstrating that theme. As your Arabic and Persian scholars constantly parade the name of Plato in connection with the doctrine under consideration, let us, once more, consider that philosopher's reasoning. " Plato's opinion of the soul's pre-existence appears some- what abruptly in the conversation which Socrates last held with his friends before his death. The philosopher was there joyously contemplating the happiness that awaited his submis- sion to the cruel sentence of his countrymen. He did not grieve at a prospect which to his friends appeared so melancholy, but looked without the least concern for the fatal cup preparing for him. As a reason for this indifference, he stated his belief that he was going to a happier world, where he should find a better community. The scepticism of his friends leads him to a philosophical discussion of his hope of immortality. He assumes as an axiom, what his friends admit without difficulty, that in all things which are produced, the process is no Commentary on Vedinta Sutra II. ii 37. 84 DIALOGUE III. otherwise than opposites issuing out of opposites 1 . So that when a thing becomes greater, it is from having been less. Life proceeds out of death, and death out of life. Thus he concludes that souls exist in Hades after death. The pre-existence of the soul is involved in this reasoning, which is founded on the gratuitous assumption, so frequently observed in our Indian S'astras that whatsoever is born must necessarily die. and whatsoever dies must as necessarily be generated again 2 . Birth succeeds death, no less than death birth. The soul when it is born is only re-manifested after a previous death and consequently after an anterior existence. In the course of the above reasoning, he refers to an old tradition, that souls, dying, go to Hades, and, being born, return from the dead. That this old saying had influenced Plato more than any reasons by which the doctrine itself was supported, would appear from the assertion of Aristotle that the ancient philosophers were afraid of nothing more than this one thing, that any thing should be made out of nothing pre-existent. To say that the soul was created would of course involve the dreaded predicament. "Then again Plato's opinion of knowledge being mere reminiscence, necessitated the doctrine of the soul's pre- existence. Socrates calls up an untaught slave boy, and, by a string of leading questions, makes him enunciate the rule for the duplication of a square. I am not sure that any catechizer, short of a Socrates, would succeed in drawing, from the lips of an uninstructed clown, a statement of the truth, that in a square, the square of "what professors of science call the diagonal " is equal to twice that of one of the sides. But even if every teacher of youth had the tact and ability with which that great philosopher catechized the boy, just referred to, what would the fact pro\e? Nothing more than this, that the human mind was so constituted that some ideas should be suggestive of others. The truths of geometry have been successively deduced by that very mind. \Vhat wonder then that a clown, under the tuition of such an inter- rogator, should gather some of those truths, though never he- fore instructed. The notions which, from the constitution oi our minds, are generated within us by external sensation and internal reflection need not be considered as stamps of 1 OVK a\\oOev i] ex TWV evavnwv ra evavrta. l'li. d<>. 9 *??? ifo 5T'fl qrftq ^ j Bhuguvat wtt. c M v e PLATO'S OPINION ON PRE -EXISTENCE. 85 previously existing ideas. Whatever those ideas be in Plato's system, there is no reason why we may not at once assume the present as a world of reality in which our ideas are for the first time learnt. " Plato likewise concluded that the soul was uncreated and immortal from its being an independent ever-moving principle. ' Every soul is immortal, for that which is in ceaseless ' motion is immortal. But that which moves another, and ' is moved by another, as it stops in motion, stops in life.* * * ' If then there be nothing which moves itself but the soul, it ' necessarily follows that the soul is a thing uncreated and ' immortal 1 .' " Plato you will observe did not deduce or persist in any conclusions from that doctrine opposed to the glory of God or the interests of man. In truth Socrates himself propounds it with diffidence in the Meno. He positively refuses to make any other use of it than that of encouraging men to persevere in intellectual pursuits. He thought people would be more manly and less idle, if they were persuaded they were once endowed with knowledge, and could conse- quently regain it with facility, than if they believed they were never blessed with knowledge, and that what the} r had never known, it was neither possible nor necessary to inquire after. If you were once possessed of ideas, now forgotten, it is evident you may recall them without difficulty. You should not then indulge in idleness as if it were impossible for you to improve your mind. This is the sort of exhortation in which that philosopher delighted. But it is evident there was no necessity for postulating the pre-existence of the soul with a view to this. It were quite sufficient to say the soul is naturally capable of intellectual acquisitions, and that therefore earnest endeavours after knowledge must be successful. " If he made any other practical use of his doctrine, it was to enforce the observance of morals, by holding out the terrors of a future world to the wicked and ungodly. ' Whosoever ' passes his life justly, afterwards obtains a better lot, but who ' unjustly a worse one. Those who are timid and unjust are ' changed into women in their second generation.' ' Tarkak&ma, " What other conclusions could our philoso- phers, either, have drawn from the doctrine of the soul's pre- 1 et Se earn TOVTO OVTOX; e%ov, fj.rj a\\o rt eivac TO avro eavro KIVOVV T) ^rv^rjv, e avayfcrjs ayevijrov re Kai aOavarov ^rv^rj av eirj. Phaedrus, C. 24. 86 DIALOGUE III. existence ? They too insisted on good behaviour as a neces- sary qualification for future happiness." Satyakdma. " I see I have not yet succeeded in explaining my views to you, notwithstanding several attempts. I think it is not too severe a remark to say that they have all drawn from it conclusions which militate against our conceptions of the divine attributes, and which tend to the subversion of good manners. Such conclusions may be called mischievous, may they not, Tarkakama?" " Of course, if they really involved notions such as you describe." " Well, then, one great conclusion that our philosophers have drawn from the doctrine of the soul's pre-existence is that this world is a scene of reward or punishment according to works performed in a previous state. Whatever happens now is owing to adrishta, or the ' unseen' merit or demerit of past works, otherwise called daiva 1 . Our thoughts, feelings, and actions are all fettered by the events of a life already passed. It is impossible even for God to help us except as far as adrishta will allow. He cannot get over this difficulty any more than he can produce rice out of wheat seed, as Sankaracharya says. On the immoral consequences of such a doctrine of necessity, I need not expatiate. Tarkakdma. " But adrishta simply regulates our condition in life as the reward of punishment of past works. I repeat, it does not diminish our control over ourselves." Satyakdma. " The condition itself is in your system almost every thing. If a person is degraded by adrishta to a Sudra's condition, he is precluded from every aspiration which may be called noble for according to the Sastra he should be engaged solely in doing service to the twice-born. He may, by a lucky stroke of daiva, get up to the surface again, but he cannot cal- culate on such a chance, nor guide himself by such a hope. " Then, again, although some parts of the Sastra, with a view no doubt to stimulate human efforts, limit the operation of adrishta 2 , and magnify man's freedom of will and action, thereby enhancing his responsibility, there are other parts equally, I may say, more, decisive in establishing the para- mount influence of daiva, and extending it without bounds to FATALISM. 87 all actions and events 1 . The very exceptions that are solemnly mentioned prove its absolute sovereignty as a rule. Philoso- phers maintain that by true knowledge one can cast off the bonds of works, and sectarians contend that by devotion to their ishta devata?, or favourite god, one can get over the effects of daiva, or Fate ; both thereby admitting its uncontrolled potency in ordinary cases. And it is not denied by those who would limit the influence of daiva that it extends over every event only that it requires the concurrence of human efforts." " But I do not see," said Tarkakama, " what great evil would arise from the doctrine of adrislita or daiva, supposing that it does imply a restriction on men's actions." Satyakiima. " If you admit the extreme view of its power, by which for instance the Brahmin, already adverted to 3 , excused an unnatural act of severity against his own sons, it ' amounts to a doctrine of fatalism. Now suppose a fatalist to ' educate any one from his youth up, in his own principles ; ' that the child should reason upon them ; and conclude, that ' since he cannot possibly behave otherwise than he does, he is ' not a subject of blame or commendation, nor can deserve to ' be rewarded for, or punished : imagine him to eradicate the ' very perceptions of blame and commendation out of his mind, ' by means of the system ; to form his temper and character ' and behaviour to it ; and from it to judge of the treatment he ' was to expect, sa} r , from reasonable men, upon his coming ' abroad into the world, as the fatalist judges from this system, ' what he is to expect from the Author of nature, and with ' regard to a future state. I cannot forbear stopping here to ' ask, whether any one of common sense would think fit that a 1 child should be put upon these speculations, and be left to ' apply them to practice. And a man has little pretence to Brahma Vaivarta. a fagfa 3*%i srcfgcf J^ci fo^tH i ll Hitopwles'a. r II Matsya Purina. vJ 3 See Foot note 2, page 71. 88 DIALOGUE III. ' reason, who is not sensible, that we are all children in specula- ' tions of this kind. However the child would doubtless be ' highly delighted to find himself freed from the restraints of ' fear and shame, with which his play-fellows were fettered ' and embarrassed ; and highly conceited in his superior knowl- ' edge so far beyond his years. But conceit and vanity would ' be the least bad part of the influence which these principles ' must have, when thus reasoned and acted upon, during the ' course of his education. He must either be allowed to go on ' and be the plague of all about him, and himself too, ' even to his own destruction : or else correction must ' be continually made use of, to supply the want of those ' natural perceptions of blame and commendation which we ' have supposed to be removed ; and to give him a practical ' impression of what he had reasoned himself out of the belief of, 1 that he was in fact an accountable child, and to be punished ' for doing what he was forbid 1 .' " Our best security against this mischievous theory of adrishta is in those principles of conscious responsibility which the Supreme Being has implanted in our minds, and which we cannot wholly unlearn, notwithstanding all that philosophers may say to the contrary. Hence it is that poets have often censured an idle dependence on daiva, and inculcated a firm resistance of its power. But the poivcr itself is not denied. 9 ' 1 Tnrkakiima. "What is daiva but the inscrutable will of God ? Is it not right that man should not presume too much on his power or freedom, but be constantly reminded of his dependence on the will of God ?" Satyaktima. " Certainly. If daiva or adrishta signified the inscrutable will of God, there could be no objection to extend- ing the range of its operation, The impression that we are under the power of God's will, can never discourage efforts in the right direction, nor diminish our s DIALOGUE III. (turning to Satyakama) you have overlooked one main point. In your essay you condemned the theories of all the schools about creation. Is it possible that the universe could proceed out of nothing .' Kvery effect must have a cause." Satyakama. " I do not deny that every effect must have a cause. But we probably assent to the maxim in very different senses. Let us see how the theory of causation is treated in the schools. It is commonly understood that the Nyaya phil- osophy acknowledges three sorts of causes, substantial or inherent, non-substantial or exterior, and a third which might, perhaps, be conveniently styled the operative cause. The modern followers of the school do indeed entertain such a view, as is evident from the BJirahmins can now-a-days scarcely ' read one-twentieth of what they ought to study, and that is ' the reason why so few are familiar with the texts and ' aphorisms on which our philosophy and theology are based. * We begin our course of study early enough, and we certainly ' keep it up as long as we can, but it is a drop only from the ' inexhaustible oconn that we are able to sip. As soon as a boy ' attains the age of five, we put the chalk into his hand, and ' guide it to form letters. The smartest lad must be allowed ' two or three years for learning to read and write in the 4 vernacular. When he is seven or eight, he commences his ' education in the Sastras. He takes a year or two to commit 4 the Sutras, or rules, of Grammar to memory. Then the rules ' are explained to him. The study of the Grammar with the 4 Gana, or list of verbs, and the lexicon, or list of nouns, must 4 occupy him, perhaps, till he is sixteen. He must then learn ' some of the poems in order to perfect his knowledge of the ' language. He can hardly be expected to take up theology or ' philosophy before he is eighteen or twenty. If he commences 4 the Nyaya, he goes cursorily over a manual such as the ' Bhasha parichheda, with or without its commentary the 4 Muktdvali, and then he takes up works treating on Anumana, 4 or deduction. A careful study of these occupies him for many ' years, and then he can no longer continue in the state >t a 4 student. He has by that time perhaps become a father, and 4 the duties of a householder, the second stage in his life, 4 press upon him. He has studied the Anumana Khanda, or the ' Chapter on deduction, and made himself familiar with the 4 rules of syllogism, but he has learnt nothing else. Pramdna, 4 or proof, is but one of Gotama's sixteen topics, and Anumana, 4 or deduction, is but one of the four subdivisions of proof. So A LARGE GATHERING. 105 ' that he has mastered but ^ of Gotama's teaching when he ' quits College for the cares and anxieties of a householder. ' And as to the Sutras, or aphorisms, of either of our leading ' teachers, he has not in all likelihood even seen them. A ' controversy on the Sutras must therefore be something ' foreign to his habits and study. This appears to be the secret ' of your friend Satyakama's success in some of his attacks ' against Tarkakama. ' Satyakama ', you continue to remark, ' represents a new ' school of Brahmins altogether. These are raised in the ' Colleges established by the English and their course of stud}' ' is regulated by the maxim, .something of ere)-)/ thing, without ' caring for every thing of anything. They learn the Sutras; ' they read foreign literature too ; and they obtain in a short ' time a general survey of all the systems. They are up to all 4 kinds of discussion, and it requires more than ordinary tact to ' deal with them.' Your remarks, my learned friend ! perfectly coincide with my experience. To what a low ebb is divine learning now reduced ! If Narada had to confess he had no knowledge of the soul, notwithstanding his vast learning, how pitifully small must our knowledge be in these days ! With reference to your remarks on Kanada's theory about creation, you will see what use I made of them when you hear of a conference which took place yesterday on the Xyaya. It was the Vdruni (a holy day) and the conjuncture for bathing early in the morning, so the bank of the river was more than usually crowded. Many had come from distant villages to obtain the merit of a bath in the Ganga on such a holy occasion. Tarkakama met several of his learned friends, and related to them the discussions he had with Satyakama. After our ablutions were over, we all came into Satyakama's house. We formed a pretty large circle, all deeply interested in scholastic disputations. There were some versed more particularly in the Nyaya, and among them was one who had, by his extensive reading, earned the appellation of Nydya- ratna. There were others, though but few in number, whose studies had been directed to the Sankhya. They too had one, more eminent than the rest, who rejoiced in the surname of Kapila. Others again there were of various acquirements who held opinions more or less different from one another, but all entertained the highest reverence for the founders of the several schools. One of them, named Yaiyasika, knew the IOC) DIALOGUE IV. Vedanta Sutras and S'ankara's commentary almost word for word by heart. The conversation at my suggestion turned on Kanada's theory of the Creation to which reference was made in Satyakama's discourse. I began with reading your remarks on that point. ' Satyakama certainly read the Sutra right. ' Kanada does attribute the primal action of Atoms to ' adrishta, and the primal action certainly means the impulse ' by which the first combination took place, and that was of ' course the operative cause of the creation. The scholium ' of S'ankara Mis'ra is to the same effect. ' The primal means " before the creation. At that time there could be no such " thing as an impulse or a stroke 1 .' But the question is what ' is adrishta? Literally, it means unseen, and is an adjective. ' Technically, in the usage of philosophers, it is a substantive, ' and means a power or influence inhering in things both ' animate and inanimate. As inherent in the former it implies ' an unseen power, both intellectual and active ; as inherent ' in the latter it signifies a material power, perhaps partly ' the effect of previous combinations and motions. In souls ' embodied, it influences both thoughts and actions. Thus ' the poet S'riharsha 8 says a person often dreams by the power ' of adrishta of things he had never seen in life. And Kulidasa 3 ' says that when Parvati commenced her studies, all her Icarn- ' ing of a former life flocked into her mind, just as a swarm ' of cranes flocks into the Ganga in autumn, or the spontaneous ' brilliancy of certain drugs comes into them at night. ' And with reference to its impulses as an active power, 'the commentator on the Kusumanjali 4 says that in the ' performance of ceremonies on which the enjoyment of ' heaven depends, the body and the organs are moved by ' adrishta. This unseen moving power in men is again the ' consequence of works done in a previous life, and hence 'it stands sometimes for Dharma and Arthanna (virtue and n 2 Naisli;ulli;i. I. II Kum4ra Sumbhava. a * See page 71 Foot note. THEOLOGY OF THE NYAYA= KAN ADA'S. 107 ' vice) and Ka rma (works) . Thus the origin of the world is ' attributed by the scholiast on Kanada's Sutra's to Dharma 1 and Adharma 1 , after he had himself declared adrishta to be ' the cause of the Creation. And Kanada attributes the soul's ' departure from one body and reception into another, to the ' agency of Adrishta 2 , while Gotama ascribes it to Karma 3 , both ' evidently meaning the same thing. In inanimate objects it ' simply signifies a material property or virtue, perhaps a sort ' of velocity or attraction as in the (magnetic ?) motion of ' stones and needles which Kanada expressly attributes to ' adrishta 4 . ' Now the point to be decided is whether Kanada, who 'simply undertook to explain ,the phenomena of the world, ' as far as possible, by natural causes, that is to say, who would ' not unnecessarily obtrude a supernatural cause, excluded the ' divine operation, when he declared that the primal action of ' Atoms was owing to a power or virtue inhering in them. ' What can debar the supposition that he held the power itself ' to be a gift of God, who was consequently the original opera- ' tive cause of the Universe, the adrishta itself being dependent ' on His Will ? Adrishta was a mere yantra. or instrument, ' while the Supreme Being was the yantri, or the user of the ' instrument.' Tarkakd?na. " This is an excellent solution of the difficulty raised by Satyakama, and I trust we shall hear no more of great men's names being subjected to charges of atheism for it is a sin to be even a hearer of such charges 5 ." SatyaJcama. "I wish I could report myself satisfied with this explanation, but it is not in my power to do so. We seem to be pretty well agreed as to one meaning of adrishta. It is a power, influence, or habit based on the acts or relations of a previous existence. It is inherent in men, animals, and : i in. 132. SE^K 55 qt fi^ft'W^ *mftfa Kumara Sambhava, 108 DIALOG I'E IV. inorganic matter. But it has another meaning. It is not only an inherent power or habit. It is also a destiny that acts externally. The adrshta, inherent in one man, \vill often influence others with a view to bring about consequences which that man's merit or demerit calls i'or. It is with reference to this sense of Adrishta that men often excuse their neighbour's delinquencies, as well as their own, by attributing them to its influence 1 . " We have not discussed in which sense Kanada used the word when he attributed the creation to adrishta. Was it an inherent power in Atoms, or an external influence?" Ni/dijaratnd. "In whichever sense the word may have been used, I suppose you may admit the explanation suggested by our Benares friend in defence of Kanada's theism." tiatyakdma. "I do not see how the explanation can be applicable, if adrishta be taken in the sense of destiny, or a moving power, exterior to the Atoms. You must therefore make up your mind as to the meaning of the term in Kanada's Sutra." Tarkakdma. " Well, suppose we take it in the sense of an inherent power in Atoms, with which they were endowed by the will of God." Satyakdma. " You wish me to try, by the process of exhaustion, if, on either supposition, I can bring myself to accept the explanation above referred to. 1 must frankly say, I am not satisfied on either view of the meaning of Adrishta. Taking it in the sense of an inherent power, I am constrained to say, that the explanation not only fails at the very outset in its object of defending the theism of Kanada's system : but is in itself vague and almost unintelligible. It fails as a defence of Kanada, because Kanada lias never in any of his Sutras spoken of God as the ultimate cause of all things. In truth, the word God never occurs in his work. The only aphorisms in which he may be supposed to make a remote reference to Him are those (and they are only two) in which he asserts the authority of the Veda. But we know, as in the case of Kapila, that our philosophers had a way of their own of asserting the authority iqar ^ifi q*r i M4mm.ru. V3 f.t<>-uxli<'irtha. The general answer to this he states in his first aphorism, where he lays down further the ' position that deliverance from evil can be reached only 1 through knowledge of the truth 1 .' ' Satijakdma. " Here are Gotama's own words as translated by that eminent Scholar himself. ' Proof (i.e., the instrument ' of right notion), that which (as having a proof) is the subject ' of right notion ; doubt ; motive ; familiar fact ; scholastic ' tenet ; confutation ; ascertainment ; disquisition ; controversy ; 1 Aphorism* of the Nyaya Part 1, printed for the Benares College. IS BIRTH A CALAMITY? 137 ' cavil ; semblance of a reason ; perversion ; futility ; and ' un fitness to be argued with: from knowing the truth in ' regard to these (sixteen things) there is the attainment of the 4 siunmum bonum (mVreyasa) 1 .' "I do not see, continued Satyakama, what connection most of these topics can have with any such improvement of our spiritual nature, as is involved in the idea of emancipation. You will say, the second topic, ' subject of right notion,' includes every thing. So, according to the Puranas, did the mighty ocean, both poison and nectar. Would you then tell a person, who was longing for immortality, to go down to the sea-shore, and drink a quantity of sea water?" " Do you then deny, asked Tarkakama, that the pursuit of philosophy is the highest employment in which man can engage?" "Philosophy is a loose expression; so I cannot directly answer your question. But to say to a mumuksha, or an in- quirer after Salvation, that a knowledge of certain topics and categories is necessary for the soul's welfare, is like telling an invalid, who requires a remedy for the cure of fever, that anatomy and materia medica are necessary to be studied for the removal of diseases." " But is not the mind improved by the knowledge of logical rules ? and as the soul derives, through the mind, the informa- tion necessary for its welfare, it follows that the art of dispu- tation is useful for the soul's welfare." "You mistake me, said Satyakama, if you think I under- value the study of logic. That study may be as important a help in leading to right conclusions and guarding against falla- cies, as the sextant is to the mariner in making his observa- tions at sea. But the logician should not therefore set forth Nits' reijasa, or emancipation, as the reward for studying that science." Tarkakdma. " But why do you exhaust your energy on mere verbal criticisms ? What wrong doctrine do you find in Gotama's philosophy?" " Let us then consider, said Satyakama, the nature and end of human existence, as inculcated by Gotama. Your Acharya 138 DIALOGUE V. places janma 1 , birth, and pravritti, activity, among evils, the annihilation of which is necessary for Emancipation. He also says distinctly that birth is a calamity. (Nyaya Sutras i. 2 and iv. 55). I appeal to you, is birth then essentially an evil 9 , and activity a sin?" Tarkakdma. " Is it not a fact, notwithstanding what A'garnika said a little while ago, that our birth is attended with numerous sufferings, and that when the soul is born, it is born to misery and unhappiness ?" " Is it not," said Satyakarna " sapping the very foundation of filial duty to parents, and of piety to God, to say that birth is an essential evil?" Here I interposed a remark ; "I confess it is possible to push the doctrine to an unwarrantable extreme." " But," said Satyakarna, " has not Gotama already so push- ed it? We must get rid of our births if we are desirous of 2 The learned principal of the Benares College has thus expounded Gotama's view on this point. " The remembering of the order of the steps in 2, may be facilitated, to some " readers, by availing one's-self of the distributively cumulative form of exposition " employed in the nursery tale of the house that Jack built." Thus : "1. Dukha. This is the pain that the man had. " 2. Janma. This is the birth (again renewed) that gave room for the pain " that the man had. "3. Pravritti. This is 'activity' (requiring reward) that led to the birth " (again renewed) that gave room for the pain that the man had. " 4. Dosha. This is the fault" (of ' desire or dislike' alike to be shunned, or ' stupidity) which (in the man who, if wise, had done nothing at all,) begot the ' activity' (requiring reward) that led to the ' birth' (again renewed) that gave ' room for the pain that the man had. " 5. Mithyd Jnana. This means the wrong notions (of that man unversed in ' the truth teaching Nyaya Philosophy) which (since the man knew no better, ' gave rise to the ' fault' (of ' desire' or ' dislike' or stupidity,) which in the man ' who, if wise, had done nothing at all, begot the activity (requiring reward) that ' led to the ' birth' (again renewed) that gave room for the ' pain' that the man 'had. " 6. Apavarga. This last is ' beatitude' promised as fruit of the truth teaching Nyiya Philosophy, which gave us right ones instead of the wrong notions, which gave rise to what Gotama styles a fault, in as much as it mischievously begot the ' activity' carefully shunned by the wise, for ' activity' shaping itself in acts that are good or bad, and requiring reward of a like description, occasions a man to be born again, and 't was this same ' birth' that gave room for the ' pain' that the man had. GOTAMA'S REPRESENTATION OF LIFE. 139 Liberation. This view I know he deduced from the endless transmigrations involved in his doctrine of a pre-existence. Those transmigrations are in spite of ourselves. We are tied hand and foot by karma or adrishta 1 . If we do good, we shall have to return to the world to enjoy our reward. If we commit evil we must still return to undergo our punishment. Tired of such transmigrations, he considered birth itself an evil. The pity is he rested so much on deductions from a theory hastily adopted, in opposition to his own principles of investigation. He did not reason inductively by regular argument from facts. " Then, again, continued Satyakama, pravritti, or activity, is noted down as an evil, and pravritti is denned to be the orgin- ator of the functions of the voice, the understanding, and the body." (Nyayal. 17).2 " I am sure, said A'gamika, you will not tax Gotama with what he has not himself said. He placed pravritti among the things to be removed, but did not call it an evil." " Whatever is necessary to be removed, rejoined Satyakama, in order to attain a good object, must be its pratiyogi, or something incompatible with it, and therefore an impediment in its way, and whatever is incompatible with a good object, must be an evil. But it is not by mere implication that he condemns pravritti. He has defined it to be the cause of dosha, or fault." 3 (I. 18.) " I cannot deny that he does say so," replied A'gamika. " Let us then see what this amounts to. Agreeably to Gotama's doctrine, it is a fault to speak, think, or do any thing. Can this be a true view of the nature of human existence ?" A'gamika. " It is a fault because it is not the chief good." Satyakama. " And yet, on your theory, thought, speech, and powers of action are divine gifts ; indeed the only gifts God bestows on man ; for as regards existence, that you do not hold to be a gift of God, since the soul is uncreated, and has independent existence. The body and mind are only given by God, and yet, you say, it is a fault, or rather it is not for our chief good, to give exercise to our physical and mental powers." 140 DIALOGUE V. A'gamika. " But man has abused the gifts of God. When the nectar is converted to poison, what can you do? You must throw it away." Tarkakdma. " Victory to Kama ! You have made a very pood remark, A'gamika. I contend that Gotama has not pushed any doctrines to unwarrantable extremes, nor is it mere deductions from a ' hastily adopted theory,' that he sets forth in his work. In his representation of the evils of life, he only reasoned from facts, and there is no gap in the chain of his reasonings. Every conclusion has a lietu, or reason, to support it. You seem, Satyakama, to stumble at the 2nd Sutra in which he shows how certain hindrances to the soul's release require to be removed. I had a sort of presenti- ment that it might be a stumbling-block in your way, and I have brought with me a leaf from Vatsayana (the very author to whom you have just made reference) in the hope of smoothing your passage. Now listen attentively how that excellent commentator expounds these grand ideas of Gotama, ideas which he was the first among our Rishis to embody in a short pithy sentence for the instruction of mankind. That sentence is as follows : ' pain, birth, activity, fault, false ' notions, since on the successive annihilation of these in ' turn, there is the annihilation of the one next before it, there ' is (on the annihilation of the last of them) Beatitude.' That is to say, Beautitude proceeds from the annihilation of false notions as its primary cause. Vatsayana thus expounds this ' sentence : ' False notions are manifold ; (1) with reference ' to Spirit, that there is no spirit at all ; (2) with reference to 1 Matter, that it is spirit ; (3) with reference to Pain, that it is ' pleasure ; (4) with reference to the Transient, that it is ' eternal ; (5) with reference to No-salvation, that it is salva- ' tion ; (6) with reference to Risk, that it is security ; (7) with * reference to the Culpable, that it is desirable ; (8) with reference ' to the thing to be eschewed, that it is not to be eschewed ; (9) ' with reference to Activity, that it does not involve karma, (deed), ' nor the fruits of deeds ; (10) with reference to Faults, that ' this world is not caused by faults ; (11) with reference to ' Renewed birth, that there is no being, soul, entity, or spirit, ' that dies, and, having died, is born. Birth is without ' cause, the cessation of birth is without cause. Renewed birth ' has a beginning and is without end. Being occasional, renewed existence is not the effect of karma (works). Renewed birth ' is without soul, because of the growth and existence of the ' body, the senses, the understanding, and the feeling. That GOTAMA'S VIEW OF LIFE. 141 ' Emancipation is terrific. That it is in fact the cessation ' of all work, the disruption of every thing. That many good ' things are thereby destroj^ed. What intelligent person, then, ' will desire such emancipation a state of insensibility, in ' which all works and all enjoyments are extinct ? ' From this false notion, or ignorance, continues the com- ' mentator, proceed partiality to favourites and prejudice against ' adversaries. In partiality and prejudice, again, consists the ' faults of detraction, envy, delusion, intoxication, pride, avarice, ' &c. Connected with faults, and acting with a body, a person ' commits injury, theft, and unlawful sensualities ; becomes ' false, harsh, and slanderous in speech ; with hatred, avarice, ' and atheism, in the mind. This vicious activity produces 1 adharma, (demerit). But to do acts of charity, benevolence, ' and service, with the body, to be truthful, useful, agreeable in ' speech, or given to reading the Veda, to be kind, disinterested, ' and reverential in the mind, these produce dJmriiia, (merit). 4 Now dharnia and adharma, (merit and demerit), being fostered ' pravritti (activity), are denoted by the word pravritti, just as ' life is denoted by food which fosters it, for it is said, Food is ' the life of living creatures. This activity is the cause of a vile, ' as well as of an honourable, birth. Birth, again, is connected ' with the manifestation and assemblage of body, senses, and ' understanding. Attendant on birth is pain. That, again, ' comprises the feeling of distress, trouble, disease, sorrow. ' The congregated attributes, beginning with Ignorance and ' ending with Pain, compose sansdra (the world).' " Having thus described the concatenation of evils, produced by ignorance, the learned and ingenious Vatsayana proceeds next to represent the effects of true knowledge. ' But when,' says he, ' ignorance is extinguished, then, by the extinction of ' ignorance, Faults are extinguished. By the extinction of ' faults, Activity is extinguished. By the extinction of activity, ' Birth is extinguished. By the extinction of birth, Pain is ' extinguished. By the extinction of pain, is the beatitude of ' final Emancipation. As for true knowledge, it is best explain- ' ed as the contrary of ignorance. With reference to spirit, ' that such a thing exists. With reference to matter, that it is ' not spirit. And it is to be similarly understood with reference ' to pain, to the transient, to the no-salvation, to the perilous, ' to the culpable, and to the things to be eschewed. With re- ' ference to activity, that it involves karma (works), and the ' fruit of works. With reference to faults, that the world is ' caused by faults. With reference to renewed birth, that it is 142 DIALOGUE V. ' a living soul, entity, or spirit, which, having died, is born. ' Birth has a cause, the cessation of birth has a cause, renewed ' birth is without beginning, and continues until emancipation. 1 Renewed birth has a cause, and its cause is activity. Being ' endowed with a soul, renewed birth remains in force until ' emancipation, with the restitution of the body, senses, under- ' standing, and feeling. Emancipation, however, is the disrup- 4 tion of all these, the cessation of all these. A multitude of ' troubles, fears, and vices is thereby extinguished. What ' intelligent person will not desire an emancipation which is ' the extinction of all pain, which is separation from all pain ? 1 For, it is said, food mixed with honey and poison is to be ' avoided ; pleasure, joined with pain, is to be avoided.' ' " Such is the exposition of Vatsayana 1 . You see how correct was A'gamika's remark, that if the nectar be converted to poison, you must throw it away. Sansara is but an assem- blage of ignorance and other evils. This is a matter of fact, ffcT ?ftqr GOTAMA'S VIEW OF LIFE. 143 and not a mere deduction. If you are disposed to deny the fact, then you must have a theory of optimism, in which it will be impossible for me to follow you. For I cannot overlook the miseries and sufferings with which the world abounds. Let us only make up our minds to call things by their right names, and then what can we say of life in this stage of existence ? Is not this the one great characteristic of our bodies, that they fall into decay and are dissolved? How can we, then, ffef ftre SFTT mine which of its infirmities are the more pitiable the physic- al or the moral. 1 Who, then, can desire to continue in this embodied state this house of a body, in which the organs of sense, and desire, and the mind, are, as fellow-occupants, continually deluding and distressing us ? 8 Of all the causes of our miseries the greatest is desire, which, like a traitor in your own house, betrays its inmates to danger and difficulty. 3 Hence we say that the renouncement of this whole assemblage of evils is our only remedy, and that they alone live happily, whose birth shall not be renewed in the world ! 4 " We do not say that there is no such thing as happiness in the world. We do not deny the possibility of dharrna, or merit, but we cannot ignore the painful fact that dharma is mixed up with adharma, that pleasure is linked with pain, and that birth, when renewed, is but a renewal of misery. We do not deny the existence of pleasure, nor do we say that there is no good pravritti, or laudable activity 5 ; but, since evil unques- tionably predominates, we cannot help considering life, in our present stage, to be a great misfortune. Hence we denote both dharma and adharma by pravritti, because it produces karma, which is our great bondage. When honey is mixed with poison, the whole cup is called poison, and thrown away. Even so we call pravritti an evil, and look for emancipation, as our only effectual escape from the miseries of transmigra- tion and the sufferings of life." Yoga-vas'ishtha. Ibid. *rr zcTOrq s ? i ibid. : I ibid. Gotama iv. 56, 64. 146 DIALOGtE V. Satijakdma. "If you had not said that the yellow paper 1 in your hand is a leaf from Vatsayana's commentary, and that you are giving an exposition of the doctrine of Gotama, the author of the Nyaya, I might have mistaken it for the teaching of Gotama, the founder of Buddhism." A'gamika. " Mahabharat ! Mahabharat 2 ! Oh Satyakama ! what do you say ? Can there be any similitude between a learned Eishi, who contended for orthodoxy, and the unhappy heretic, who reviled gods and Brahmins?" Satyakdma. " Pardon me, A'gamika, if I have caused you pain. But the ' heretic who reviled gods and Brahmins ' taught doctrines so very much akin to those of the ' learned Rishi who contended for orthodoxy,' that it is no hyperbole to say you are liable to mistake the one for the other. Indeed, the tenets of the two Gotamas, the orthodox and the heretic, bear such a strong resemblance in their features, that you may safely declare they were uterine brothers, if not twins; and, unless you studied to note their distinctive signs, you might always incur the danger of a mistake. Now mark their resemblance. The orthodox Gotama begins with the assertion that supreme felicity is derivable from true knowledge. The heretical Gotama exhorts his followers to seek it from the same source 3 . The orthodox Gotama says that Ignorance, by producing faults and activity, becomes the cause of Birth. The heretical Gotama taught the same only enlarging the list of intermediate agencies between Ignorance and Birth. 1 Native manuscripts are generally preserved in paper saturated with yellow arsenic to guard against insects. * When Brahmins hear any thing which shocks their feelings, they repeat some auspicious word, just as the Mahometans rehearse ^e^\ tiJJb ^\ ^i S. 3 f rfa fi L ' llit - 1 VUara - BUDDHIST CHAIN OF EVILS. 147 The orthodox Gotama acknowledged that the world is a compound of good and evil, dharma and adharma, pleasure and pain, and yet maintained that the whole is to be renounced, and that the only remedy for the perils of life is apavarga, or the complete cessation of effort and activity, and separa- tion of the soul from body and mind. The heretical Gotama also allowed that the world contains dharma and adJiarma, Jcus'ala and akus'ala, the one being a cause of virtue, and the other of vice, and yet that there is no other salvation from the miseries of life, than the ' acquirement of the unchangeable state of nirvana}." Both pronounced the world to be a state of suffering, and transmigrations to be calamities and misfortunes 8 . Both considered human life to be unimprov- able, except as it tends to apavarga or nirvana. ' You have heard how Gotama, the orthodox, connected birth with ignorance, and emancipation with true knowledge. Hear now how Gotama, the heretic, did the same in the following catechism ; ' On what existing, do decrepitude and death come into exist- ' ence, and on what do they depend ? ' On Birth taking place, decrepitude and death come into ' existence, and they depend on birth. . ' On what existing, does birth come to pass, and on what ' again does it depend ? ' On the World existing birth comes into existence, and ' it depends on the world. Wayland's Memoir of Judson. Also in the Lalita Vistara ; 2 " Painful are repeated births" (^T^f SfffflT'Tr TTl) Hardy's Manual Zi O O of Buddhism. Again in Lalita vistara, 3 -O s3 Compare these lines with Gotama I. 2. iv. 55, 148 DIALOGUE V. 1 On what existing, does the world come into existence and ' on what does it depend ? ' On Affection existing, the world comes into existence and ' it depends on affection. ' On what existing, does affection comes into existence and on ' what does it depend ? ' On Desire existing, affection come into existence, and it ' depends on desire. ' On what existing, does desire come into existence, and on ' what does it depend ? ' On Sensibility existing, desire comes to exist, and it depends ' on sensibility. ' On what existing, does sensibility come to exist, and on ' what does it depend ? ' On Contact existing, sensibility comes to exist, and it ' depends on contact. ' On what existing, does contact come to pass, and on what ' does it depend ? ' On the Bix organs existing, contact conies to pass, and it ' depends on the six organs. ' On what existing, do the six organs come to existence, and ' on what do they depend ? ' On Name and form existing, the six organs come to exist, ' and they depend on name and form. ' On what existing, do name and form come into existence, ' and on what do they depend ? ' On Apprehension existing, name and form come into exist- ' ence, and they depend on apprehension. ' On what existing, does apprehension (vijnana) come to exist, ' and on what does it depend ? ' On Ideas (sanskara) existing, does apprehension come into ' existence, and it depends on ideas. 1 On what existing, do ideas come into existence, and on ' what do they depend ? ' On Ignorance existing, ideas come to exist, and they depend ' on ignorance ?'* efa srrfci^ffi fareproT ^ T?T5T?fa: BUDDHIST CHAIN OF REMEDIES. 149 " Having thus given the succession of causes by which the sufferings of decrepitude and death, the two great evils which had struck Sakya most, are produced, he proceeds next to show how their cessation may be brought about. ' On what ' subsiding, do decrepitude and death subside, and on whose 1 cessation is the cessation of decrepitude and death ? ' On birth subsiding, decrepitude and death subside, and on ' its cessation is their cessation. ' On what subsiding, does birth subside, and on whose ' cessation, is its cessation '? f| ^: f vrsrfcT f^ ^fcl f R fff H 150 DIALOGUE V. ' On the world subsiding, birth subsides, and on the world's ' cessation, is the cessation of birth. ' On what subsiding, in fine, do ideas subside, and on whose ' cessation is the cessation of ideas ? 1 On ignorance subsiding, ideas subside, and on its cessation ' is their cessation. On the cessation of ideas, is the cessation ' of apprehension 1 .' ' Tarkakdma. " The sufferings and miseries of existence are the common lot of all men. That the Buddhists had their share is no marvel ; and it is only natural that, in their deplor- able ignorance of the true remedy for the perils of life, they should be somewhat uncomfortable. To place them on the same level with as, simply because they did not know how to escape from their miseries, and therefore complained of their sufferings, is certainly not fair. Our Gotama did not rest satis- fied with giving us a knowledge of evil and a sight of darkness. He also taught us the way of emancipation. He showed us light. Like a benevolent and experienced physician, he told us at once what our disease was, what its cause, and what the treatment should be, that we might be restored to health. The Buddhists, on the contrary, only set up loud yells under their sufferings, but were lamentably ignorant of the means of escape. Their master physician, as they delighted to call their leader, could only tell them what the very clowns in the streets knew for themselves that they were miserable and wretched, and that their only escape was in the extinction of their miserable existence ! The great empiric could only cure souls by condem- ning them to perdition. He could talk of nothing but *Trfa 3TPir WTf Lali * Vistara, EMANCIPATION AND NIRVANA BOTH ALIKE. 151 Nirvana (annihilation), as if an eternal principle, such as the soul, could ever cease to exist. The founder of the Nyaya led us to look for apavarga or emancipation." Satyakdma. "But what is apavarga ?" Tarkakdma. " Apavarga, or emancipation, is final deliver- ance from these, that is to say, from pain, birth, activity, fault, false notions, and it is a state of unmingled felicity." Satyakdma. "If, as you say, the soul, when emancipated gets rid of birth it must, on your theory, be separated both from body and mind. It cannot then have any powers of thought and action. Emancipation must accordingly be a state of torpor and of perfect insensibility. I cannot under- stand what felicity there can be in such a state, nor, in v. hat respect, it can differ from the Nirvana of the Buddhists." Tarkakdma. " There are certain truths, Satyakama, which cannot be described by metaphysical definitions. They can only be realized by the feeling. I mean they are comprehens- ible to those alone, who can understand and enjoy them. I must therefore decline a discussion of the metaphysical definition of our Emancipation. I can- only say that it is a state of supreme felicity, by which all evil, all suffering, all sorrow, all pain, are at once and for ever extinguished. The utmost efforts of human rhetoric cannot adequately represent the highest flights of human imagination cannot properly comprehend such a state of .ineffable joy and of undisturbed tranquillity. But do not, I pray you, commit such a grievous outrage on common sense, as to confound our Emancipation with the Buddhistic Nirvana or annihilation." Satyakdma. " But Buddhists talk of their Nirvana pre- cisely in the same way as you do of your emancipation. ' The ' Pali doctrinal books speak of Nirvana as an exemption from ' old age, from decay, and from death ; and as being also the ' acquirement of all bliss. The most celebrated of the Burman ' priests at Ava, in reply to inquiries made by one of the ' Catholic Missionaries, replied as follows : " When a person is " no longer subject to any of the following miseries, namely, " to weight, old age, disease and death, then he is said to have "obtained nigban. No thing, no place, can give us any " adequate idea of nigban ; we can only say that to be free ' from the four above-mentioned miseries, and to obtain salva- " tion, is nigban 1 ." Here, said Buddha, lust and anger arising ' from delusion, and infesting the world, are, like convicted Wayland's Memoir of Dr. Judson. 152 DIALOGUE V. ' thieves, utterly destroyed. Here that ignorance and worldly ' lust, which are ever productive of mischief, are burnt up from ' their corrupt roots, by the great fire of knowledge. Here ' the intractable cords of time, with lands and houses as hard ' knots, and. consisting of the selfish discriminations, myself 1 and mine, are cut down by the weapons of my knowledge. ' There is dried up, by the sun of my knowledge, the ' violent stream of desire, which takes its rise in evil, and is ' fed with the waters of sight, together with avidity and all evil ' thoughts. The forest of troubles, slander, and detraction, to- ' gether with delusion, jealousy, and envy, is here burnt up by ' the fire of moderation. The three-fold bonds of the world ' are all loosened by me on attaining emancipation by the ' weapon of knowledge. Here I have, by the boat of resolution ' (viryci), got over the ocean of sansara, (the world), infested ' with the aquatic monster of lust, and agitated by the waves of ' the waters of desire, excited by an evil eye. Here I have an ' experience of immortality for the benefit of the world, wherein ' is cessation of old age, death, sorrow, and trouble, and which ' is unattainable by the followers of other doctrines. Here I ' have experience of that which was known to innumerable ' saints of yore, whose agreeable and pleasing report is ' celebrated in the world 1 .' er Tfjrffr HAD BUDDHA ONLY GLIMPSES OF GOTAMA' S IDEAS. 153 Tarkakdma " I cannot understand the utility of this labo- rious attempt to confound the teaching of the Nyaya with that of Buddhism. You are acting with a vengeance on the prin- ciples of upamana, or analogy, inculcated by Gotama himself. You are exerting yourself to no purpose with a view to turn his own weapon against himself. You forget that there are certain truths, which, like the solar rays, are self-apparent to the whole world, and that although, if a desperately blind man fails to recognize them, it is no proof against their existence, (any more than the incapacity of certain animals for seeing by day-light is an argument against the existence of the meridian sun,) yet when men of gross sensibilities do succeed in getting glimpses of the truth, the fact is a verification not refutation of it. What if the Buddhists had understood a few fragments of the grand truth which our Gotama was the first to embody in his memorable work?" Satyak'ima. " I do not see how you can justly say that the Buddhists had only got glimpses of the ' grand truth ' which Gotama taught in the Nyaya. The followers of Sakya appear to me to have had greater reasons for saying that the grand truth was first inculcated by their leader. 1 The fact is that the thoughtful natives of India had begun at an early period to recognize the evils which existed in the world, and were not satisfied that the mere performance of the ceremonies inculcated in the Veda could give them deliverance. Such ideas had long been floating in the popular mind, and certain aspirations after higher objects than were propounded in the Mantras and Brahmanas had also occasionally found entrance into Lalita VUara. c^ x: s: s: u 154 DIALOGUE V. it. But to say that Gotama, the founder of the Nyaya, was the first to embody them in his sutras, appears to me to betoken no small mhasa or boldness. For the age of Buddha was confessedly anterior to that of the Nyaya. Indeed you glory in saying that one great object of the Nyaya was the refuta- tion of Buddhism. And surely the inculcation of the evils of existence and of the alleged felicity of emancipation or Nirvana was more characteristic of Buddhism than of the Nyaya. What is the idea prominently suggested by the word Buddhism ? Is it not (however divided public opinion may be as to its theism) associated with the idea of an aspiration after something called Nirvana as an escape from the sufferings of life? ' Anitya, Dukha, Anatta, (andtmd), ' Transience, Pain and Unrealty, (so the devout Buddhist ' mutters as he tells his beads) these are the characters of all ' existence, and the only true good is exemption from these ' in the attainment of Nirvana 1 .' What again is the prominent idea associated with the Nyaya ? Is it not metaphysical and logical speculation ? If then the Nyaya gives a representation of the evils of life and of emancipation, which has a strong resemblance with Buddhistic teaching, the probability is that the author of the Nyaya made a concession to Buddha on these points under the pressure of existing popular opinion, or was perhaps himself infected by the doctrine of the great heretic. " You say that the author of the Nyaya was the first to em- body those ideas in his sutras. But the founder of Buddhism had embodied them in his personal history. For what is his biography, but a consecutive account of acts, deeds, and speeches, all indicative of his impatience of life, because of the evils of decay, old age, and death, and of the sufferings entailed by desire and attachment, and bearing record to his idea of nirvana, or final escape from these ? Sakya was in this respect a character, such as the Brahminical literature fails to produce in the pre-Buddhistic age." A'gamika. "But the divine Kama, we find, was also dis- gusted with the evils of life, and panted after mukti or eman- cipation." Satydkdma. " Valmiki, if he was really the author of the Yoga vds'istha, has certainly attempted the personation of a character in that work, somewhat approaching to Sakya's. Nay he makes use of the identical terms (jard, marancun, trixhnd,) by which Buddha described old age, death, desire. 1 Capt. Yule's Narrative of the Mission to the court of Ava. NIRVANA PECULIAR TO BUDDHISM. 155 But Valmiki's sketch is a poor imitation of the Buddhists, and in ill keeping with the story of his own Epic. Kama was only for a time afflicted, when a boy, with the ideas in question. The Brahmins in the palace of Das'aratha were evidently greater adepts in the art of persuasion than those in the court of his successor Sudhodhana, for we find that Rama had quickly unlearnt his disgust with the world. He chased the Rakshases, when his infantine locks were yet uncropped on his head, in the hermitage of Vis'wamitra, and then accompanied the sage to the court of Janaka, where he competed successfully for the prize of fair Sita's hand. Returning home with his bride, he accepted his father's proposal for his installation as associate king, and was only prevented from assuming the reins of Government by the jealousy of his stepmother. He became a voluntary exile from his country under the necessity of vindicating his father's truthfulness, and retired to the forests in the cheering company of his wife and brother. Even there, though unjustly excluded from his home and his throne, and afterwards deprived of his wife's society by the dastardly out- rage of the wicked Havana, he does not appear to have had any relapse into his early disgust with life. On the contrary, nothing can exceed the thoroughly business-like energy, with which he proceeds to the rescue of his captive wife. We then see Barna happily returning home with his queen, and resuming the pleasures and responsibilities of his throne. And if we afterwards find him abandoning the world in a melancholy mood of mind, we are at the same time assured that it was to return to a life of sensuous enjoyment in heaven. " Buddha, on the contrary, declined to accept a throne and a sceptre, the possession of which was undisputed, and betook himself to the life of an ascetic, notwithstand- ing the importunities of affectionate relatives, teach- ing everywhere that life was a series of troubles and sorrows, and holding out the hope of nirvana as the only effectual escape. The means adopted for reconciling his mind to the pleasure of a palace served only to increase his disgust. To the characteristic peculiarities of his life and doctrine, and to the success which attended his efforts, ample testimony is borne to this day by the history and traditions of Nepaul, Thibet, Burmah, Ceylon, Siam, China and Tartary." A'gamika. " You seern to have a greater faculty for recog- nizing resemblances than differences. You are ignoring the fact that the Buddhists denied the existence of God and spirits, and reviled the Vedas and Brahmins," 156 DIALOGUE V. Satyakama. " Atheism is certainly not the common teach- ing of all Buddhists, for the Ais'warikas among them acknowl- edge a self-existent Deity whom they call AMi Buddha*. Nor do they positively deny the existence of the soul. Tn fact the existence of the soul cannot be practically denied by men who hold out promises and threats of future reward and punishment. The Buddhists certainly do hold out such hopes and fears. ' The sceptic,' they say, will be punished in one 'or other of these ' two ways. He will be born in hell or as ' a beast. The wise man will be rewarded in one or other ' of these two ways ; he will be born in a dewa-loka, or as a ' man 8 .' They. again,who get a sight of Buddha are exempted from troubles for thousands of Kalpas 3 . " I do not pretend to have a clear understanding of Buddhis- tic psychology. Many of their writers speak of the soul in terms that might justify your suspicion of their denying its existence. But it is impossible to charge them with such positive denial of the soul in the face of their declarations of future retribution. " As to their ' reviling' of the Veda, it would be more cor- rect to say that they do not enforce the necessity of the. pre- scribed rites and ceremonies, and thus ignore, rather than revile, its contents. They may, under cross examination by Brah- minical controversialists, or when irritated by invective and abuse, have used strong expressions against its authority, or even denounced it as the production of impostors. But that was the language of provocation, and what a man says under provocation requires to be charitably construed, for Narada himself poured, under irritation, blasphemous invectives on Vishnu 4 , and yet no one would call him a reviler of gods. 1 Hodgson. 2 Hardy's Manual of Buddhism, p. 17 - J. Wfa I * 3 Z&Wttlfa 3TTrT 3 v: II Lalita Vistara. aft $w TR -i ^f; ^if2w f q'Rfa^Fifl'fn'cJ^^Fif^r qtniWT^f^nr^.' 11 Ny4ya Sutra iv. 111. NYAYA ETHICS. 159 For how does he dispose of the objection, cited by himself, to the possibility of Emancipation ? ' There is no emancipation ' because of the association of one's debts and troubles and ' exertions 1 ,' or, as the scholiast expounds it, ' there can be no ' emancipation, because, by reason of the clinging to us of our ' debts,' &c., there is no opportunity for working out of our ' salvation : and so it is stated in scripture ' when born, verily, ' a Brahman is born triply indebted ; from the liishis, by his ' course of student-life ; from the gods, by sacrifice ; from the ' progenitors, by progeny ; ' that is to say, one is freed ' from ' the Rishis,' i. e., from his debts to the Rishis, by his course ' of student-life ; he is freed from the gods,' i. e., from his ' debts to the gods, by sacrifice ; he is freed ' from the ' progenitors,' i. e., from his debts to the progenitors, 'by progeny,' i. e., by [his begetting] offspring : and ' life passes away in the mere clearing off of these debts 2 .' ' The debts or duties, thus entailed by the Sastra, are opposed to the idea of Emancipation, for their non-performance would be a demerit, and hence require punishment by renewed birth, while their performance, on the other hand, would entail merit, and require reward, also precisely in the same way. Well how does he dispose of the objection ? Not by contending that the discharge of duty is not incompatible with salvation, but by endeavouring to weaken the force of the injunctions, and showing that, since the words could not be literally inter- preted, for how can a child, just born, perform any duty or discharge a debt ? they must be taken figuratively 3 . And then he falls back on another rule of the Sastra which requires a Brahmin to retire from the world when he is old. Noticing the objection that ' even if burnt sacrifices were no obstacle, the very ' fruit of it, Heaven, must be an obstacle to emanci- pation,' Gotama re/utes it by saying that the Brahmin, when old, must retire from the world, and so be unable to procure the utensils necessary for a sacrifice, which cannot therefore be completed, and the enjoyment of heaven will as a matter of course be avoided 1 . Dr. Ballantyne, expounding Vis'wanatha's 2 Ballantyne' s translation. 3 qsmM: NyAya iv. 59. : II iv. 60. ?fi T^smrsr: 11 H-. 6-2. 160 DIALOGUE V. scholium on iv. 61, says, ' when a Brahmin, having reached ' the age at which he ought to retire from the world, is no ' longer competent to perform the regular daily duties, he must ' imagine himself performing them ; and this will free him ' from the bad consequences of neylectiitr/ them : while, on the ' other hand, the defect of actual fulfilment will free him from ' the necessity of having to undergo reward for the same.' ' In the case of him that possesses knowledge, the ' fruit,' ' i. e , Paradise, does not take place : for burnt sacrifice ' implies a collection of vessels,' vessels, i. e., vessels for ' burnt sacrifice, a collection of such, an arrangement of ' them with respect to the members of the victim, the ' thing sacrificed, according to the direction. " In the mouth ' a ladle filled with butter," and so in order. These cannot ' be provided by a bcyyar, and therefore, the fruit of the ' burnt sacrifice, from the want of these things, does not take ' place.' Dr. Ballantyne makes the scholiast's meaning clearer, by adding, ' for it is he " that possesses knowledge" who can both perform the " constant duties," so as to avoid the guilt ' of their neglect, and at the same time escape the opposite ' Charybdisof having to suffer the reward of them in Paradise.' " The scheme of emancipation in the Nyaya comes then to this that none but Brahmins of advanced age can possibly attain it, for all others are bound by duties, the performance of which, quite as much as their neglect, must subject them to transmigration. To the Kshetriyas, Vais'yas and S'udras, and to n<>irrtotttvvvcri<; to represent this very prakritis of Kapila, especially as he added that it was from the same element that heaven and the stars were produced. Now what is the cosmogony of Kapila ? There is the self-existent Pnru*ha, and there is this prakriti, or nature. The first product of the latter is mind, the immediate cause of ahankara or self-consciousness, from which all the rest were produced. Might not Kapila have only meant to say that the self-existent Spirit was naturally endowed, first with mind, then with self-consciousness, and so created the world." " Satyakdma. " There would be some meaning in the theory according to the interpretation you suggest. Indeed the Matsya Purana appears to identify the equipoise of the three qualities with the one-formed triad 1 ekdmtirti strayodevah, one form and three gods) Brahma, Vishnu, and Mahes'wara. Even the admirers of Kapila have not received his doctrine without an amendment. But he himself glories in denying creative agency to the Purusha or soul. Prakrit i worked itself up like milk in the cow's body." " I am astonished," continued Satyakama, turning, after a brief pause, to Kapila, " at your A'charya referring to the cow and her milk in support of his doctrine. A better example II Matsya Purfoia. ANIMAL ORGANISMS. 185 cannot easily be adduced for its refutation. Your A'charya maintains that nature, inanimate and unintelligent, works without direction and guidance for the benefit of the soul. The instance of the cow and her milk is appealed to in illustra- tion of this theory. That milk, it is said, comes up spontane- ously for the benefit of the calf. S'ankaracharya replies to you that the milk does not come up spontaneously, and that its determination is owing to the tender affection of the cow and to the calf's power of suction. I admit this reply does not fairly meet your doctrine. But how does the milk come up in the cow V The animal eats the grass which goes into its stomach, where by the process of digestion food turns into chyle, which is carried by a curious mechanism into the reservoir of blood with which it then assimilates. The mechanism is as fine as it is curious, and by a wonderful contrivance it pro- tects the blood vessels against any matter in the chyle which might cause inconvenience to the animal. The blood, thus replenished by food, performs a secreting function, the very conception of which strikes the mind with awe. The secre- tions are partly constant and partly occasional. Those that are constant are necessary for the conservation of the organs and the healthy state of the body. Those that are occasional answer certain purposes called for by the condition of the animal at the definite time. And provision is made in its physical organism for meeting such contingencies. When the animal is in a condition to bring forth young, the blood makes a new secretion, with a quality not found in any other secre- tion, namely, that of nutrition. This secretion we call milk. There is an organ already provided by a prospective contriv- ance for the reception and retention of that secretion, and there is an excretory duct annexed whereby the fluid deter- mines to the udder at the particular juncture when it is about to be wanted. We have in all this a machinery and a contriv- ance, suited to an especial end and purpose, and obviously indicative of design. Now to say that an inanimate and irra- tional principle is capable of design is simply a contradiction in terms." Kdpila. " You were candid enough to admit that S'anka- racharya's remark on the instance of the cow and her milk is not to the point. This admission encourages me to hope that you will not lend any countenance to the popular calumny against our system. Men, incapable of nice discriminations, think they will pass muster for piety by only calling the Sankhya niris'wara (godless). Wiser heads have however AA DIALOGUE VI. confessed that there is no knowledge equal to that which is embodied in our system. Even the popular poet Tulasidasa 1 is compelled to speak of Kapila with religious reverence, and to acknowledge that the distinguishing characteristic of the Sankhya is tattwa vichdra, or discussion of truth. It is per- fectly gratuitous to charge us with ungodliness. Any discus- sion may be cut short by putting on a cloak of piety after this fashion. But how stands the argument ? S'ankaracharya has told us of houses with rooms for sleeping, sitting, and amuse- ments, and you have just made reference to a wonderful organ- ism in the cow's body. We never denied that. The organism in the cow's body cannot surely be more wonderful than the organism of the world itself, which we not only admit but perhaps admire even more than our adversaries. But what is the question between us? Without contravening what people call the religious intuitions of human nature, we simply declare that the physical arrangement of the universe may be sufficiently accounted for by physical causes, that nature and natural law, that is to say prater it i and her prolific operations, were themselves competent to settle the positions, and give the propelling impulses which regulate the motions, and secure the stability of all things in heaven and earth. Whether you refer to the phenomena which are owing to the motions of luminaries far above, or to formations, mechanisms, and organisms near at hand on our globe, they may be all traced to the agency of the same prakriti or natural law as their ultimate cause. The formations and organisms have been gradual, have taken time, and been developed by a slow process like milk turning into curds. And this is a con- ception of Kapila's mind in which, I am credibly informed, he is followed by eminent philosophers in Europe, and which is confirmed by recent discoveries in all parts of the world. I have heard from a relative, who has received a paper of commendation (Diploma) from the Doctors' College in Calcutta, that many learned Europeans have come to the conclusion that the earth has, from time immemorial, been a scene of changes, by natural development, of dead matter into organic and vege- table substances, and of vegetables into animal life. One eminent writer says, that ' in pursuing the progress of develop- DEVELOPMENT THEORY. 187 ment of both plants and animals upon the globe, an advance is visible in both cases, from simple to higher forms of organiza- tion.' ' In the botanical department we have first sea, after- wards land, plants.' In the department of zoology, too, we see, first traces of the very lowest, removed by a few steps only from vegetable life, and leading by slow gradation to higher forms. Then we have fishes, then land animals, com- mencing with reptiles, then birds, and at last thejardyuja, or mammalia. " Thus after a long series of years you see a wonderful con- firmation of Kapila's grand conception. For what else is his great doctrine ? He recognized onward progress in the world, and therefore protested against the fanatical doctrine of the Vedanta that the world was a product of the Supreme Spirit, as if dead matter could be a manifestation of a pure and spiritual essence. The process of creation would then be a process of deterioration a process inconsistent with the very idea of creation. In opposition to such a fantastic notion he taught that nature was the original of all things, and that the act of creation was one of development and progress. But as the spiritual could not proceed from the material, he added that the soul was eternal and independent. The ignorant may brand him as niris'wara, or godless, and cover their imbecility as logicians by an affectation of piety, but his doctrine is found to commend itself now to all thoughtful minds even in Europe." Saiyakama. " You have given a colouring to Kapila's doc- trine which I do not remember to have seen elsewhere, and you seem to think you have strengthened his cause by forming an alliance with certain philosophers of Europe. But it does not add strength to your doctrine in reality. For the eminent writer to whom you have made reference does not ignore an intelligent Creator, the author of nature and the giver of nature's law. His theory has reference only to proximate or secondary causes which fall within the province of science. The doctrine, however, has not, certainly, commended itself ' to all thoughtful minds' in Europe, for the leading men of science consider it to be based on inaccurate statements of fact and on untenable premises. But I am not going to discuss the theory of transmutation of species. That has been already done satisfactorily by profound investigators. All that I am concerned with at present is to say that the author to whom you have made reference does not deny a supreme Intelligence as the ultimate cause of all things, as the initiator and ordainer 188 DIALOGUE VI. of the natural law which science attempts to expound. Your medical friend who spoke to you of the development theory ought to have drawn your attention to passages like the follow- ing : ' All these considerations, when the mind is thoroughly pre- ' pared for them, tend to raise our ideas with respect to the ' character of physical laws, even though we do not go a simple ' step further in the investigation. ' But it is impossible for an intelligent mind to stop there. ' We advance from law to the cause of law, and ask what is ' that ? Whence have come all these beautiful regulations ? ' Here science leaves us, but only to conclude, from other ' grounds, that there is a First cause to which all others are ' secondary and ministrative, a primitive, Almighty will, of ' which these laws are merely the mandates. That great Being, ' who shall say where is his dwelling place, or what is his ' history ! man pauses breathless at the contemplation of a ' subject so much above his finite faculties, and only can wonder 1 and adore ! When all is seen to be the result of law, the ' idea of an Almighty author becomes irresistible, for the crea- ' tion of a law for an endless series of phenomena, an act of ' intelligence above all else that we can conceive, could have no ' other imaginable source, and tells, moreover, as strongly for a ' sustaining as for an originating power 1 .' " The eminent writer to whom you have made reference does not accordingly inculcate a niris'ivara, (excuse me, for repeat- ing the word,) or atheistic doctrine. How could there be a law without a lawgiver? or a final cause without design and purpose ? or a design or purpose without a designer? It is impossible therefore for an inanimate principle, such as nature, to have worked, as you represent, without intelligent direction. " But are you not shifting from your original ground ? You contended in opposition to the Vedanta that your Prakriti is the material or substantial cause, and now you talk of its operation and its aim. You treat it, then, as an efficient cause. S'anku- rachurya's argument, of which you complained, recoils there- fore with double force against you. How could a principle, itself inanimate and therefore incapable of thought and intelli- gence, produce by its operation such a vast and wonderful world with its infinite adaptations, and with such harmony in all its parts?" of the Natural History of Creation. MATTER CANNOT BE PROGENITOR OF MIND. 189 Kdpila. " Of God we can know nothing. Of physical causes we are constantly witnesses. The founder of the Sankhya was only treating his subject scientifically, and all that he meant to inculcate, was, that as far as pure science was con- cerned, the development of the world can be explained by natural law. The European author to w r hom I made reference, and from whose work you have just read a passage, confessed that the Almighty Being he spoke of was found, not in science, but out of science. Kapiia did not choose to go out of science." Salyakdma. " But you cannot stop at what you call natural law without offering violence to a science which is higher than mere physics." Kdpila. " I do not quite understand your meaning. Explain yourself." Satyakdma. " How do you arrive at what you call the known in science. How do you come to know what you call objects of pratyaksha, or perception? A wave of light strikes your optic nerve, and hence you perceive some form before you. A vibration of the atmosphere strikes your acoustic nerve, and you perceive a sound. The particles of some substance resist your touch, and you feel its presence. Knowledge, which is itself power, is also produced by power the force of sensation. But as you have the organsof external sensation, so you have also an organ of internal perception, the mind, which your system dignifies by the appellative mahat or great. Now this great organ has a force, no less powerful than those of external sensation, and it convinces you of the existence of certain objects quite as forcibly and constantly, as the organs of seeing and hearing do. If your organs of external sensation force on your observation the form and mechanism of the world if your science tells you of the wonderful adaptations of means to ends on our globe if indeed you are thereby com- pelled to theorize that your prakriti, or nature, worked for the happiness and comforts of Purusha (Soul) in the formation of the world, (just as the king's cook aims at the king's satisfaction in his culinary office, and as an experienced servant aims at his master's convenience,) the great organ of internal per- ception at once compels you to look up higher. It protests against the possibility of adaptations of means to ends without intelligent agency, and rejects the notion of such numerous harmonious mechanisms and wonderful combinations being brought into existence by mere chance. It also repudiates your account of its own creation from an unintelligent principle. Mind will not admit matter to be its progenitor or superior. 190 DIALOGUE VI. The fact of intelligent agency in creation becomes therefore as much a suggestion of science as any physical deduction with reference to cosmical phenomena. "What constitutes the distinction between our ideas of matter and mind ? Is it not simply this that the one has no pravritti, no motion or action, of itself, and that the other has both ; that the vis inertia? of matter requires to be overcome by an external impulse before matter can act, and that all impelling forces, which have an object in view, pre-suppose the existence of mind. To speak of the self-moving power of matter is to introduce a confusion of language calculated only to create misunderstanding and misapprehension. Design, purpose, aim are all mental operations. To speak of them as predicates of an inanimate principle is to talk like children and madmen, 1 to adopt Kapila's own expression when administer- ing a wholesome rebuke to the Vedantists." A'gamika. "But does not Kapila virtually acknowledge a Supreme intelligence as the creator of the world ? He speaks of ' an omniscient author of ail things' 2 ?" Satyakdnia. "The scholiast says he thereby means the Jirst male 3 , or the first agent at the commencement of a world. I would have most willingly received this Sutra as a consoling proof of Kapila's theism, had not Kapila himself exhibited a sort of unaccountable obtinacy in arguing, not only against the existence, de facto, of a Supreme Being, but also against the possibility of Supreme Intelligence, the author and governor of all things. The all-knowing creator is only a sort of f/od ; sack a god, says he, ix proved ; that god being, as the scholiast adds, himself a creature or a created agent 4 . In the first book it is broadly stated that the existence of God is not proved that if there were a God he must be either bound or free, if bound, he would be incompetent for the act of creation ; it free, that is to say, if unmoved by passion and desire, he could be subject to no motives, and hence would not concern himself Hi. 66. I Vijimna Bhikshu. I v. B. THE ATHEISTIC ARGUMENT OF KAPILA. 191 in the act of creation ; whether therefore .bond or free, he could not be the creator of the universe. As to theistic pas- sages in the S'astra, they are, says the author of the Sankhya, ' either mere eulogies of emancipated souls, or expressions of ' devotion to perfected spirits, such as (according to the 1 scholiast) the transient or created gods Brahma, Vishnu, and ' Hara, figuratively styled eternal 1 .' He defends the infallible authority of the Vedas, while thus denying the existence of an omniscient inspirer, simply by asserting that their texts are experimentally verified 8 by events, just as the teaching of medical science is established by facts. " In the fifth book, again, Kapila resumes his atheistic argument, and commences with denying God's providence and his government of the world. ' The distribution of fruits, ' or rewards, is not by divine appointment, for it is regulated ' by works,' which, the scholiast designates necessary 3 . ' If, ' continues the author, there were any divine interference, then ' it must be for God's own purpose, and if God had a purpose ' in view, he would himself be a worldly God. If a wordly ' God were acknowledged, it would be using a mere technical 'term 4 ,' for, adds the scholiast, ' the theist would then be ' speaking like us of a created being by the technical term ' God 5 .'' ' Such an act, with a purpose in view, is not possible ' without rdga, or passionate desire, for effort invariably implies ' such desire. And if he were subject to a vehement passion I V. B. 192 DIALOGUE VI. ' he could not be essentially free. Passions and affections ' cannot be attributed to God, for then he would be proved to ' be a soul with attachments. If it be said that God is creator by ' the very virtue of existence, than all existing souls must be ' gods 1 , and, so adds the commentator, the doctrine of one God ' must be surrendered.' " Kapila then goes on saying that the existence of God ' cannot be established 8 because there is no proof. There ' can be no evidence of sensation 3 on such a subject, nor can it ' be proved by Inference, 4 because you cannot exhibit an ' analogous instance. And as to the testimony of the S'astra, ' it is decidedly toxpradhdna, or nature 5 , as the ultimate cause ' of all things.' " I need not follow our author further in what he says to point out certain inconsistencies in the Vedanta doctrine. But I suppose there can be no doubt of his absolute denial of a Supreme Deity." Kapila- " I think my good friends you are not doing justice to Kapila. As I said the other day, his only fault is his un- flinching honesty. He will not equivocate on a serious subject such as the one under discussion. The difficulty with all philosophers has been how to reconcile the idea of perfect freedom, suggested by the conception of a Supreme Divinity, with the bondage betokened by subjection to motives. No animated and thinking agent does any thing without a purpose, and a purpose must always betoken mental imbecillity. The followers of the Nyaya and the Vedanta feel this difficulty as keenly as ourselves, only they do not boldly avow it. The Vedantists evade the real question by saying that God : I v. 6, 7. Vijnana Bhikshu. i STTwraripr ^^ \ v. 8, 9. i v. 10. SANKHYA PLEADINGS. 193 creates the world in connection with avidya, (ignorance or delusion). The)' thus support their system by actually attri- buting ignorance and delusion to the creator of the universe. They virtually deny supreme intelligence to the creator. Such is the theism of our opponents before whom Kapila's teaching must dwindle into a niris'wara system ! I doubt whether any one can have the boldness to say that avidyd, or a principle of ignorance, is a more intelligent cause than prakriti or inanimate nature. S'ankaracharya's wonder at the idea of inanimate nature producing such a harmonious world ill consorts with his own doctrine that the same world was created by ignorance or want of deliberation. He that can believe that a principle of ignorance could project a plan of the universe before us, need not look aghast at the idea of an unintelligent principle performing the same exploit. " S'ankara is as confident that Brahma or the spirit is nirquna, or destitute of affections, as Kapila that the Purusha is ninitanqa or free from attachments. Kapila carries out his principle and maintains that the soul without attachments cannot be a creator, having no motive for any action. The Vedantist endeavours to reconcile opposite principles by main- taining that the nirguna Spirit, also independent of motives, creates the universe in association with avidya or ignorance. "But the most unaccountable flight of Vedantic imagination is in the saying that Brahma or the spirit is not really associat- ed with delusion that it is through avidya or delusion that delusion is attributed to him. Kapila will have nothing to do with this tissue of inconsistencies 1 . If it is a delusion to attribute delusion to the spirit, then he is not really associated with delusion, and if without such unworthy association he could not create the universe, then it is a fallacy to call him the creator. Avidya or ignorance must be the real creator. If the Vedantist will only give up his addiction to party and boldly search out the truth, he must be driven to the conclusion that the world was created by a principle of ignorance, a conclusion not essentially different from ours while ours has the further advantage of being a more intelligible and consist- ent theory. "It is useless to remind is of the complex and harmoni- ous arrangement of the world. The real question remains v. 18, 14. BB 194 DIALOGUE VI. unchanged how to associate a perfectly free intelligence (such as you must suppose the Creator to be) with ignorance and delusion, or with a subjection to motives and purposes." A'gamika. "But you do not deny, friend Kapila, do you? th&t purutka, OT foe Spirit, does perform various acts in the world. Why then must you deny his creative agency?" Kapila. " We do deny that purutha does any thing in reality. He is essentially free from those impulses which lead to action, and from the encumbrances of body and mind wherein consist capacities for operativeness. The soul appears operative simply because of its active accidents just as a crystal vase appears coloured because of the red flowers placed in it, but is itself devoid of any taint or tinge. It is not affected or fettered by the operativeness of its accidents. If it appears affected, disturbed, or fettered, it is because of the mind with which it is for a time associated. The actions and passions are all of the mind, not the soul 1 . Nor does this accidental and temporary association produce any permanent, or even mo- mentary, impression on the soul, for it passes off like water on a lotus leaf without real contact, and without leaving any traces behind itself 9 . ' The soul is witness, solitary, by-stander, speculator, and passive.' 'The qualities, as agents, act; a witness neither acts nor desists from action.' ' Though the qualities be active, the stranger (soul) appears as the agent.' ' There being activity of the qualities, soul which is indifferent, or inactive, appears as if it was the agent, which it is not 3 .' " So you see we do deny the operativeness, and maintain the perfect freedom of puruxha. And even if the contrary \\civ the fact even if we allowed that the soul was competent for certain acts, still it would not follow that he was competent for the act of creation. Supposing the soul were subject to motives and impulses, and therefore capable of ordinary agencies in the world, he would for that very reason be dis- : sfH 3 Wilson's S&nkhya K&rika. SANKHYA THEORY OF SOUL AND MIND. 195 qualified for the great work of creation, for which no agent, fettered by attachments, could be competent." A'gamika. "You have just cited a passage from the Karika and Gaurapada's commentary thereon. Those autho- rities seem to acknowledge the superintendence of the soul over nature. The Karika says ' there must be superintendence,' on which Gaurapada comments thus ; ' As a charioteer guides ' a chariot drawn by horses able to curvet, to prance, to gallop, so ' the soul guides the body : as it is said in the Shashti Tantra, 'Nature, directed by soul, proceeds.' Vachaspati also says, ' whether this (evolution) of nature be for its own purpose or ' that of another, it is a rational principle that acts. Nature ' cannot act without rationality, and therefore there must be a ' reason which directs nature. Embodied souls, though rational, ' cannot direct nature, as they are ignorant of its character ; ' therefore there is an omniscient Being, the director of nature, ' which is I'swara, or God 1 .' " Thus you see, Kapila, that even among the upholders of your characteristic doctrine of creation by the agency of nature, men are compelled to acknowledge a Supreme Intelli- gence, the author and director of nature." Kdpila. " The Sankhya is pre-eminently a system of dis- criminative knowledge. We are, by name and profession, guardians of the interests of truth and reason, and it would be a betrayal of those interests, if on a subject of such awe- striking solemnity as the creation, we failed to follow out our principles to their legitimate consequences. I have told you that we are not wanting in admiration of the wonderful mechanism of the universe, but we cannot persuade ourselves so far to lower our conceptions of moral and spiritual greatness as to allow the competence of a creator that is itself under the thraldom of motives and purposes. The very title of Sankhya would be a misnomer if we admitted such a low standard of moral greatness in the Creator of the world." Satyakdma. "I feel more perplexed than ever how to understand the drift of your sayings. You have challenged our veneration by speaking of the awe-striking solemnity of the subject of Creation, and you have been raising our concep- tion of the moral greatness of the Creator of the world. You have been raising our conceptions however only to hurl them down by a dash. You teil us of the moral greatness of the Wilson's Sankhya Kdrika. 196 DIALOGUE VI. Creator, only as a prelude to your doctrine that there is no Creator of any intellectual and moral qualifications what- ever; and you raise our conceptions of that greatness, only to assure us that there is no moral greatness of any standard in the world for thought and action are affections of the mind, not the soul. They can no more touch the soul than the red roses in a vase taint the crystal of which it is composed. What is the meaning of ' awe-striking solemnity' if there be no God in the universe? Who is to strike the awe? What can be the value of knowledge at the utmost, if there be no God to be known ? What can you mean by a betrayal of the interests of truth and reason, if the soul is not responsible for any acts ? '* You say your difficulty in the way of acknowledging a Creator of supreme intelligence is how to reconcile subjection to motives and purposes with omnipotence. Yo do not deny the evidences of design which the universe displays, but you cannot allow the existence of a Designer because of the moral difficulty you have mentioned. Before this difficulty the argument from design loses its force with you. " In the case of the Supreme Being, however, we are not called upon to say that he requires an external motive for any thing He does, much less are we at liberty to speculate on his motives. He has His all-wise, all-gracious plans, and he acts according to the good pleasure of His will. " The argument from design, again, is a sheer logical argu- ment based on the very nature of all reasoning. It cannot lose its force from any consideration whatsoever, while the moral difficulty you have raised is a creature of your own im- agination. It does not consort well with the position you claim for your system, as ' pre-eminently one of discriminative knowledge,' to set aside a logical argument on a mere fanciful theory about motives and purposes. That the universe was created by a Supreme Intelligence is attested by the indica- tions of design around us, prior to all other considerations. As to His motives and purposes, that is a point which concerns the question of His attributes, not of His existence. " And here must we not pause to consider the nature of our inquiry before we venture a single step further? Before Him who projected the vast universe, in which our own dwelling place is but an atom, and of which our powers of sensation and reflection can reach but the smallest conceivable portion, before Him, I ask what are we, and what are the highest flights of our imagination ! Are we to venture on probing His WHAT TRUE FREEDOM IS. 197 motives and purposes ? Can the human mind by any of its devices fathom the depth of His purposes the finite grasp at the Infinite ? And are we to say that His motives and pur- poses are abridgments of His essential freedom? " Well does the author of the Sarva-dars'ana-sangraha say that benevolence is His purpose 1 ! And that such a purpose can be no detraction from His freedom, just as a person's own body cannot be an interposing barrier to himself. His mo- tives and purposes who shall presume to fathom ? Enough for us that in all He has made we see striking adaptations to the comforts and conveniences of animal life, and thus descry signs of benevolence written in indelible characters. " To say that an essentially free spirit is incapable of motives is to beg a moral question and to build a moral system on a mere fanciful theory. Granted, Brahminical philosophers have held the same theory granted, the Vedan- tists are guilty of inconsistencies ; (though I very much doubt they will protest against your version of their doctrine) is that a reason why the divine glory should be obscured, and knowledge deprived of its highest object the only object that can lend it dignity or importance? Do you think you have made out a great case for your system by contending that all its speculations end in this, that there is no God in the world and that all its knowledge consists in the dogma that there is not and cannot be any .intelligent and deliberate act or moral agency in the universe ? " Is not the saying that a free spirit can have no motive itself a gross abridgment of its freedom ? The only idea we can have of a spiritual essence is that it is an existent sub- stance endowed with mind, with will, with powers of intelli- gence and action, but destitute of physical organs. To deprive it of motives and emotions is to deprive it of will and of active powers. You do not deny that mind implies all this, but you will not allow that spirit is essentially and constantly con- nected with mind. What can its existence mean then? How can it differ from a nullity ? " What is the value of a freedom, either, in which there is no freedom of action ? What is independence, if one is denied the choice of doing what he pleases ? True freedom implies ^cftfrf - 198 DIALOGUE VI. not a mental void, not a destitution of attachment and acti- vity, not a state which can only be characterized by a nega- tion, but a power, a power to think and to act. It' it involves a negation at all, it is simply a negation of attachment to that which is evil a negation of activity in the wrong direction." Kdpila. " But how can you trust to one's discriminating between that which is good and that which is evil between a right and a wrong direction ? Satyakiima. " Is not that the very discrimination which your philosophy undertakes to discuss? But whether your philosophy teaches that discrimination or not, you will perhaps allow that it is no bondage to the creature to do that which his Creator intended he should do. And the intention of the Creator may be inferred from the constitution of the mind itself. If desire and aversion be, as they undoubtedly are, natural to the mind, they cannot of themselves be evils. It is not a bondage to the father to love his son. It is no bondage to any it is on the contrary true freedom to love virtue and hate vice. It is no bondage to desire or do what is good. No one has ever regretted such an impulse or act. No one has ever derived any thing but pleasure therefrom. " There is no doubt much evil in the world, One cannot be too jealous of his affections lest they lead him astray. Care should be taken to regulate them. Human nature requires to be reformed and regenerated. But to destroy is not to reform. To renounce is not to regulate. Nay you cannot destroy, you cannot renounce the passions and emotions of the mind. They are natural, and, as your A'charya admits, what is natural cannot be destroyed 1 . You will only force them to take the wrong way by refusing them a field of action in the right way." '\dpila. " We do not deny that passions and affections arc, natural to the mind. We say it is endowed both with intellec- tual and active powers 9 . But the mind is distinct from the soul, nor are they so associated as that the passions of the one should really affect the other. The association is temporary. The two are not essentially connected with each other." Satyakdma. "You mean the soul is not essentially possess- ed of intellectual and active powers. The freedom then which you are postulating in behalf of the soul is not the freedom which implies moral greatness. It is the freedom of which WHAT TRUE FREEDOM IS NOT. 199 stocks and stones may boast ; it is the freedom which the paralytic attains in proportion to the extent of his disease. There can be no moral greatness without moral agency, nor any moral agency without choice of action. He that is open to impulses and has the power of action, he that resists temptations to evil and deliberately chooses that which is good may assert a claim to moral greatness not he, who is destitute of feeling and emotion, or has no power of action. " Nor do you propound a very dignified idea of spiritual freedom when you say that the soul's tranquillity and con- tentedness are or ought to be like those of the harlot Pingala who simply submitted to what she considered a hard necessity when it was out of her power to attain her wished-for object 1 . There is no moral virtue in such forced resignation. " And yet on a mere moral quibble, itself militating against every moral principle, you must set at nought all the indica- tions of benevolent design which you see in the world, and pronounce it to be a world without God. And rather than allow freedom of action to a free spirit you are content to admit the undirected agency of an inanimate and unintelligent prin- ciple. You will allow that dead matter is competent to pro- duce the wonderfully complex mechanism of the world, but you cannot admit that an intelligent spirit, having a purpose in view, could have such competence. This is, to use a well known proverb, to strain at a gnat while swallowing a camel. And the gnat, too, is simply a creature of your own fancy ; for there is no moral difficulty in the supposition of a free spirit acting freely according to the good purpose of his own will. " I am perfectly amazed at youi undertaking to rid the country of heresy and yet admitting and enforcing some of its worst tenets. The sic abh civic as are no doubt the most dangerous of Buddhists. And yet your theory seems to me precisely the same as theirs." " A'gamika. " Is it possible that the doctrine of the vener- able Kapila can be so bad as that !" | IV. 11. faffrir v. B. 200 DIALOGUE VI. Satyakdma. " The Buddhists I have named deny God's agency and attribute the creation to swabhdva. They speak also of the efficacy of Karma, or the merit of works, and reject the idea of a divine providence by asserting the necessary con- nection between works and their deserts. They say ; if God is the agent, then what are works for ? and what is the use of yatna (effort) either 1 ? Kapila's teaching on creation and provi- dence appears to me to be precisely the same. He deliberately gives up the idea of an intelligent Creator by maintaining the theory of an inanimate but yet operative prakriti, and he says, almost in the very words of the swablidvika Buddhists, that the distribution of rewards is not under divine direction because it is regulated by karma, (works). I must do him the justice to add that the majority of Brahminical philosophers have broached the same doctrines in other words. Vedantism, as our friend Kapila justly remarked, did not dare to assert God's creative power without associating him with avidya, nor could it acknowledge his providence without at the same time teaching that God and the world were identical, and that there could be no giver or receiver of benefits or favors. Vedantism al^so falls back on the old idea of adrishta or karma and its deserts, in order to account for the unequal distribution of pleasure in the world. " Our philosophers, indeed, while professing to guard against Buddhistic teaching, have only contributed to its wider diffusion by setting forth, perhaps unconsciously, some of its character- istic tenets of a very pernicious tendency. Discontent with life and existence are taught as clearly in the Brahminical schools as in the Buddhist sects. The merit and demerit of karma or works are spoken of, in some of our schools at least, not only without reference to, but also to the absolute denial of, a judicial governor of the universe. The influence of karma is supposed to be itself sufficiently powerful for the government of the world, and the idea of God as Creator and Supreme ruler is deliberately renounced. Dhyana or meditation is inculcated as an effectual means of escape from the miseries of life and existence, but no object is presented to the mind on which dhydna is to be exercised. I do not know whether Buddha himself taught all these doctrines, but there is no denying that many of his followers hold them with great tenacity and our Kapila has evidently adopted them from the same source. He 8ambhu Pwrdna in Hodgson. KAPILA TEACHES BUDDHISM. 201 denies a Supreme Being as creator and governor of the universe, and attributes the distribution of fruits or rewards to the influence of karma. And yet, like the Buddhists, he talks of dhyana and of true knowledge as the only means of emancipa- tion. What importance can possibly be attached to dhyana or knowledge if the world be without a God ?" Kapila. " I will not be so disingenuous as to deny the force of some of your observations. I must however explain our definition of dhyana. Our A'charya had said that knowledge is the only means of emancipation. But lust after the things of the world presents formidable obstructions in the way of knowledge. He accordingly tells us that dhydna is the best means of suppressing lust and promoting knowledge 1 . He tells us also that dhyana consists in the stoppage of intellectual exercises on other points than those which are the select objects of contemplation 2 . And this is done by controlling the breath in a proper posture and by assiduous discharge of the duties of one's 3 own stage of life, as well as by renouncement of all passions and desires." Satyakama. " But what can be the ' select object' otdhi/dna or knowledge in your system ? You acknowledge no Supreme Divinity, and your great conclusion is I am not. nor aught is mine." Kapila. " By dhyana we mean the abstraction of the mind from all objects." Satyakama. " Am I to understand that dhyana or medita- tion means that the mind does not actually meditate on any thing, and that it is in a state of entire inactivity, not dwelling on any reality whatever." m - 30- Vijnana Bhikshu. 202 DIALOGUE VI. Kapila. " Yes certainly you are to understand so." For though the scholiast adds, ' other than the select objects of contemplation,' yet that is not found in the Sutra itself. And Kapila says elsewhere that dhydna implies the mind without an object* ." S&tyakama." What can be the efficacy of such meditation, or rather such no-meditation ?" Kapila. " Our A'charya, in anticipation of this very ques- tion, says that one great use of dhydno is the suppression of lust 2 . When you can abstract your mind from every thing in the world, it is certain you exclude all passion and lust." Satynkama. " Your dhydna or meditation is then a nega- tive idea. It does not imply the pondering of any reality in the mind, but rather dwelling on no-thing. It is natural that your knowledge should be equally negative, for, says the Karika, ' through study of principles, the conclusive, incon- ' trovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither I am, ' nor is aught mine, nor do I exist.' ' Kapila. '' Is it not one of the most admirable features in the Sankhya system that it teaches you the truth of truths that all things are vain and transient. You may call it a negative conclusion, but are not some negative conclusions of the greatest value, and above all is it not of prime importance that men should be convinced of the vanity and nullity of vain and unreal things?" Satyakama. " It is no doubt of the greatest importance to be convinced of the vanity of vain things, but why is it so'? Is it not because the exposure of the vanity of vain things facilitates the knowledge of things that are real ? P>ui if, as you say, there be no God in the world, nothing pre-eminently real if all that your discriminative knowledge has to untold is that we are not, nor is aught ours, I really cannot sec what great value there can be in such knowledge. That knowledge is simply the information that nothing is ours. It might l>e a most valuable information, if along with the denial of things unreal, it contained an assurance of that which is real and abiding. The dispelling of error is no doubt an inestimable blessing when there is a corresponding great truth to be com- municated. But in a system without God, without an active SANKHYA IN LEAGUE WITH BUDDHISM AGAINST GOD. 208 soul, with simply a passive by-stander purusha, essentially devoid of mind, and with the mere projections of an inanimate principle, themselves to be denounced as vain and transient in an empty system such as this, what claims can be possibly set up on the score of valuable information of any kind? " And as to the ultimate object which the system professes to have in view, the emancipation of the soul, the idea becomes preposterous w r hen you confidently assert that the soul neither has nor is capable of any real bondage or freedom 1 . There is nothing to emancipate the soul from for you say the soul can have no bondage. If it has any pain by reason of its connec- tion with mind, it is merely a reflection or shadow of pain 2 . Nor could there be a possible way of emancipating it, for you say it is not so associated with mind and the senses (the only media through which it could be reached) as that sensa- tion and reflection could affect it any more than water can affect the lotus leaf on which it drops 3 . And even if the soul could be reached, it could not be emancipated from a real bondage, because that which is essentially bound cannot on your theory be liberated. " Such is your system, and it is you say a preservative from Buddhism. But, what Buddhistic doctrine can possibly be put down thereby, appears to me an enigma incapable of solution. It cannot be its atheism, for Kapila's system is itself without God. It is then simply its rejection of caste that you wish to remedy with the help of the Sankhya"? Allow me once for all to put you on } 7 our guard against the spirit that pervades your system. You care not for the honor due to God, or rather you argue against His existence ; but you are particularly jealous for the honor of your own fraternity. You are not offended at Buddhists' denying the God of Heaven on the contrary you support their doctrine in this respect, you are ready with your prakriti to re-inforce their swabhava in the unholy contest against God. But you cannot tolerate their denial of Brahminical supremacy you cannot allow their I Vijnina Bhikshu. Vijnana Bhikshu. 204 DIALOGUE VI. onset against gods-of-the-earth as you delight to call your- selves." Kapila remained silent for some minutes. He then remarked that he had never thought of the Sankhya except in connection with the Vedanta, and there could be no doubt it contrasted favourably with S'ankara's pantheism. He never reviewed it in its relation to Buddhism. He must confess that such a review was desirable for the purpose of investigating truth, but all he could now promise was that he would cogitate calmly on the subject. DIALOGUE VII. FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME. We have just got through the festivities of a grand marriage in our neighbourhood. The Rajah's daughter was united to a fine young man, as handsome in his person, as he is noble in his origin and graceful in his manners. You have never yet told me how you manage these social affairs in your part of the world. With us matrimonial ceremonies are generally performed at night. The bridegroom comes with a large retinue of friends, marching in procession. He is received at the door by the bride's party, and thence conducted to a spacious hall where he takes his seat as the lion of the evening. Before him are assembled, on the one hand, the party he has himself brought, and on the other the company invited by the bride's friends. Learned Brahmans often take these opportu- nities of making themselves known by means of literary and philosophical controversies ; which commence in good humour indeed, but sometimes become sufficiently animated to require the interference of third parties for the peace of the house. On the occasion of the wedding I have just mentioned, all pundits of any pretensions in the neighbourhood were invited to grace the assembly. Tarkakama, A'gamika among my new friends, as well as many old faces long familiar to me, were there. Satyakama was not asked, for his highness, though himself of an enlarged mind, was afraid of offending the prejudices of others. The bridegroom, however, was not so timid. Young Bengal, you may have heard, does not give way to such scruples ; and we had an instance the other night in the bridegroom's bringing Satyakama in his company. As soon as the bridegroom was conducted to his splendid velvet throne, and the numerous guests who formed the two parties for the evening had assembled, Tarkakama came up to me and said, " Do you see, Satyakama is here? He has, as you know, lately been carrying on hot debates on the several schools of our philosophy. I think we should have told him at the very beginning that although we assent to the teaching of 206 DIALOGUE VII. the Nyaya and the Sankhya in deference to the venerable Rishis who propounded them, yet it is not on the Nyaya or the Sankhya that our hopes of Salvation are practically placed. We dare not say that Gotama or Kapila was or could be wrong, but we certainly do not look to the system founded by either for spiritual consolation. Men may in their speculations give a preference to their analysis of the intellectual powers or their peculiar rules of reasoning ; vidydrthis (students) may go to the school of Gotama or Kanada for mental discipline, but the mmnukshu will not turn that way for the salvation of his soul. It is to the Vedanta that we look for such salvation. It is on the sacred teaching of this school that we rely in your efforts to escape the miseries of life. Satyakama could not have enjoyed even a seeming triumph against us if we had taken our vant- age-ground on the Vedanta, and cut short the unprofitable discussion of categories and topics. Our case has at present an unfavourable appearance because of our not having con- sidered what would be the best tactics for us to adopt. But it is not too late to set him and ourselves right on this point. We have a good and fitting opportunity now and here." Scarcely had Tarkakama finished these words when our attention was arrested by a noisy debate which several pundits had commenced with a view to introduce themselves to the notice of the assembled audience. It did not appear to be a regular controversy on any particular point. It was a series of desultory discussions, kept up at random, by several persons, impelled by jigishd (a desire of victory) rather than jijndsa (a desire of knowledge), in which there was a greater display of learning than search after truth. It is impossible to report to you all I heard. As there was no connected argument the reasoning employed cannot be called to recollection on any principle of suggestion. I can only put down desultory passages as memory may serve them out. One said the world was produced by the union of prakriti and purusha, and that S'iva was the great God. ' I cannot, said another, allow your last saying. The Mahes'waras are all wrong. Vishnu is the great God. Did not S'iva confess his inferiority when he failed to protect his devotee, king VYuia, against the divine Krishna 1 ?' ' You are all wrong, cried a Yogi Sri Bhigavata, x. 63. DIVERSE DISPUTES. 207 of the Bankhya school, all wrong, both Mahes'waras and Bhaga- vatas. The active intervention of God is not at all necessary, prakriti is alone sufficient.' ' Prakrit! alone sufficient ! (said another) I say purusha is alone sufficient. No necessity for a prakriti. All this is out of nothing ' ' All this is out of nothing ! Then the husbandman may reap without sowing, the potter may get his vessel without working, and the lazy weaver find his cloth as successfully as his hardworking associate 1 !' One of the loudest talkers was a Vaishnava of the new school of Chaitanya, and a follower of the Bhagavata philo- sophy, for which he had acquired the surname of Bhagavata. He was contending, against a follower of S'ankaracharya, that the Supreme Being was not and could not be niraltdra (form- less), that he had an eternal vigralia or form of which no created being can have the least conception, and that those who denied this truth denied in effect the existence of God, and are to be stigmatized as those rankest of rank Buddhists who maintained that the creation and conservation of the world do not require the exercise of divine agency, the merit of karma, being itself sufficient. ' Well has it been said that the doctrine of mdijd, which falsifies the eternal form of God, is only disguised Buddhism 2 a blasphemy against gods and Vedas.' While the learned expounder of the pancha rdtra theory was thus declaiming against the ideal Vedantists, there came forward, from one of the hinder rows, a pundit, whose features and habiliments were somewhat different from the rest of the company, and who, T afterwards learnt, was a Buddhist s'astri attending on a Nepaulese officer (colonel, they called him) now on a visit to Bengal. The officer and the s'astri were both invited by the bride's father. " 80, venerable Bhagavata, said the Buddhist, you take us to be not only impious ourselves, but also patterns of impiety. You cannot find a more rhetorical term' for rebuking your opponents than by comparing them with Buddhists. You call us revilers of gods fl*RIF 3*j^>W: I S'ankara Com. Vedant, II. 2. 27. Padma 208 DIALOGUE VII. and Vedas. Well, we shall patiently submit to your inflic- tions. This is not the first time when we have been called to bear them. But will you allow us to say one word in our defence ?" Bkdgavata. " I meant no offence to you, Sir. But we shall gladly receive any explanations from you." Buddhist. "Well, then, I say, If we have reviled gods and Vedas, we have done nothing more than your own Bhagavan Vasudeva has done." No sooner had the Buddhist S'astri uttered these words than a whole troop of Bhagavatas and Vaishnavas vociferated aloud " Dont hear him ! dont hear him ! Oh blasphemy against thr Lord! could the Lord revile gods and Vedas ? Impossible." The assembly was now in an uproar. It was with some difficulty that a domestic Brahmin of the Rajah restored silence and order, and told the disputants that it was unbecom- ing the dignity of learned and aged religionists to create such confusion and disorder. " Young men of hot blood," said he, " have been known on occasions of marriage festivities to carry literary contests to the length of smashing lights and chandeliers, but the Rajah has a right to expect better examples from venerable s'astris." The Buddhist was now allowed to speak for himself. " If," said he, " the force of numbers and the power of eloquence are to decide between us. then I must at once retire from the contest. I am a foreigner, single-handed, and far from my country, and . I do not pretend to the dialectics of your schools. But if you will listen to facts, I will point to certain sayings of your Vasudeva in proof of my assertion that we do not revile gods and Yedas more than he has done. For how did he remonstrate with his foster father Nanda against the popular custom of tender- ing divine worship to Indra ? ' By Karma or the merit of 'works,' said he, 'are living creatures born, by kannu again they ' enter into dissolution. Pleasure, pain, fear, bliss, all proceed ' from karma. If there be a god, the distributer of the fruits ' of others' actions, he too bestows them only on workers. ' There is no such thing as a Lord of one that works not. ' What can Indra do to men following their respective actions? ' He cannot counteract what they do by virtue of swabhava. or ' nature. We are subject to nature and we follow nature. ' Every one, whether a man, an asura, or a god is under the 'control of nature. A person receives and gives up various ' sorts of bodies by the instrumentality of Karma, which is DISITTV IIKTWKKN' MTUMIIST AND J'.HAHA VATA. 1 } 09 'itself our friend, our foe, our stranger, our pn vrptor, our ' god. Let. one therefore following his nature and doing his ' own work worship karma. That which a person is fitted to ' observe is in reality his god. He who, living on one principle 'observes another, receives no good therefrom, just as a lady ' of honour receives no benefit from a paramour 1 .' " I appeal to your fairness, learned Sirs," continued the Buddhist, " if any precepl of S akya Sinha can be a stronger denunciation of the divine power than the passage 1 have just read from the great text book of all Bhagavatas. And as to the Vedas, allow me to remind you how the U pan i shad itself talks of them when it stigmatizes all four as apard, or inferior, and classifies them with books which may be considered manuals for children 2 . We never intended to say anything more severe than this. S'andilya also speaks of the four Vedas as failing to teach the way of salvation, and S'ankaracharya calls that saying a reviling of the Veda 3 . And your divine Vasudeva himself condemns the florid speech of those unwise sf Bhagavata. x. -24. J3 2o. Mundaka. ^^ T^ ^^?-^T qtf^rJ] ?T Veclant Com. II. 2. 45. niAT.nr, |'|.; VII. men who, ' addicted to the texts of the Veda, and bent on the enjoyment of heaven, say that there is no other way than this, The sentiments of such men are not fitted for samadhi, or the mental abstraction necessary for nirvana in Brahma 1 .' terms and ideas which I very much suspect you have borrowed from our philosophy and its nomenclature." Bnag&vata. "Ah, but the divine Vasudeva has elsewhere set forth the authority of the Vedas and the dignity of the gods. It is only when he was expounding the Jndna-Kdnda, or chapter on knowledge, that he was speaking in depreciation not of the whole Veda, but of the Karma-Kdnda or chapter on works." Buddhist. " And yet, relying on the same ' chapter on works,' he inveighed against the worship of any divinity, after the fashion of Jaimini. Well, Sirs, the only difference between us is that we hold to a consistent doctrine, whereas you make a convenience of your gods and Vedas, sometimes defending, sometimes condemning them, just as your fancy prompts you for the moment. This only confirms me in my opinion that when our S'akya of blessed memory protested against your original system of mere rites and ceremonies, and taught the way of escaping the miseries of life and of transmi- gration, you would neither follow him, nor could you resist the force of his doctrines. So you borrowed some of his ideas about the bondage of works and the means of saikddhi and nirrnna. But truth does not find its natural place in a system of error, and so you have a series of inconsistencies in your philosophy on which your best doctors are perpetually wrangling with one another. Your original Vedas say nothing of the miseries of life, decay, and transmigration, nor impress on your minds the necessity of seeking for nirvana or mukti. Several of your Upanishads to present to your aspirations nothing higbcr than the sensuous enjoyment of heaven 2 ; and, if some of those Vedic appendages chime in other tunes, they were evidently written Bhagavad-Oita. II. ^r sqr^qrai ^T i II Tnittiriyn. ' H S'ankara on dittn. VEDAMA'S U.NE riuxcirLE EXCEEDS MILLIONS. '211 after the age of S'akya, and liave learnt those tunes from the lyre of our philosophy." The debate was going on after this fashion when Tarkakama told me there was no use sitting and listening to such incoher- ent discussions. He proposed that we should leave the dis- putants to themselves, and seek a less noisy place for ourselves. We accordingly moved to a quiet corner in one of the side wings of the hall. A'gamika, Satyakama, Vaiyasika, and a few other friends followed us. We formed a little group of our own. Tarkakama, referring to our past conferences, said to Satya- kama, that the ^yayaand the Sankhya were intended as intel- lectual exercises rather than as means of escape from the troubles of a sinful world. " It was the Vedanta to which we really looked for salvation. Vyasa and S'ankara are our real guides in a spiritual point of view. Gotama and Kapila may have taught us metaphysics and logic, hut the author of the Brahma sutras and his commentator have shown us the way to life and happiness." Vaiyasika, not anticipating a controversy on the subject, spoke thus in support of Tarkakama's remarks ; " Do you not see. Satyakama, the great service which our venerable A'charya and his commentator have rendered to the cause of Theology? How nobly have they fought with men who would set up other eternal principles in rivalry with the one Supreme Spirit. Vyasa told them, as he told the whole world, that it was per- fectly needless to look for other causes than one only Brahma in order to account for the origin of the universe." Snti/nkama. " I should be unwilling this night to enter into a discussion with you Yaiyasika. You and 1 have come in the same procession ; it is not usual for friends of the bridegroom to choose such an occasion lor a debate among themselves. I will simply remark that your one Brah- ma is otherwise described to have as many forms or modifica- tions as there are things in the universe, and therefore your one eternal principle exceeds millions." ti; vil. Tnrl;(il,-iintdver the illusion by the help of the ear and the touch. If the ear is deluded by the practice of ventriloquists, the eye helps it to detect the error. You cannot I believe adduce a single instance in which all the senses were simultaneously deceived. " Hut by arguing against the validity of the senses arid the doctrine of the world's reality, you are by no means doing good service to the cause of Vedantism ; for you are thereby "cutting away the ground on which the system rests. How does the great doctor of Vedautism introduce his doctrine? He declines the reasonableness of desiring the knowledge of Brahma. But who is Brahma? He from whom in the production, < *"". n. . I Vcdant Sutra, I. i. '2. VEDANTISM UPSETS ITS OWN FOUNDATION. 217 ' cause, from which proceed the production, conservation, and ' destruction of this world, which is distinguished by names ' and forms, containing many agents and patients, and times, 1 spaces, causes, effects, and fruits, adapted to one another, and ' the beautiful arrangement of which cannot be even imagined ' by the mind, is Brahma 1 .' The aphorism and the commen- tary are but expositions of the text in the Upanishad in which the inquirer is informed that ' He is Brahma from whom these ' elements are produced, by whom those which are produced ' are sustained, in whom departing they are resolved*.' Now if these elements are mere phantoms, no argument based simply on them, can be other than phantastic. Whether the maxim (ex nihilo nihil tit,) which affirmatively is an exact rendering of our interrogatory adage 3 of the Yedas, be universally true or not, so far as the necessity of a material cause is concerned, there can be no doubt as to the logical fallacy involved in reasoning & posteriori from nothing at all to something. What sort of a 8'eshavat anumana would Gotama call it, if after asserting it has rained, because the river lias risen; you were presently to declare that the river has not really risen. The author of the Vidwan-moda-tar-angini does no injustice to the Vedantist when he calls him a master atheist, and represents him as foiled by the unhappy man who had worked up his mind into a denial of God. Nor does Chiranjiva wrong the Vedantist much by adding, ' If that be the case, then who are ' you ? what do you say ? and what is your Brahma ? Of you, ' the utterer of unreality, nothing can be real 4 .' Chhfadogya. BE 218 DIALOGUE VII. Tarkakdma. " But does not even a shadow betoken some reality which has cast it ? Does not a reflection point to its substance ? Does not even the mirage prove the existence of something of which it is a distorted likeness ? The world is indeed a mere shadow, but it points to Brahma as its sub- stance." Satyakdma. " We must remember that a shadow is only cast by an opaque body when it intercepts the rays shot by a luminous body, and it must be cast on something from which those rays are intercepted. A shadow, if it betokens a reality at all, must prove the existence at least of three entities, the luminous body whose light is intercepted, the opaque body which intercepts it, and the body on which the shadow is cast. But where is the luminary before which Brahma stands as an opaque substance? Is not Brahma ' light of lights by whose refulgence all other things shine 1 ?' How then can it cast a shadow like an opaque substance ? Or if you prefer to use the words reflection and mirage, you must remember that a reflec- tion, in like manner, must prove the existence at least of tiro or rather three substances ; the luminous body, the light, and the reflecting mirror or refracting medium. The mirage too, besides pointing to the substance of which it is a distorted image, implies the existence of an atmosphere in which the refraction takes place. What room then can there be for your much talked of unity of essence .' It is impossible for you ito answer Kanada's or Kapila's objections to your unity. You must either renounce your theory of one essence, or you must avow that you have no reasons for holding that opinion. You can have no reason if you deny every thing that is not Brahma, for then there can be no independent reason. What then will become of your Vedas either? If there be nothing but the Supreme Spirit, then the Vedas must be a nullity." While Satyakama and Tarkakama were thus discussing the idealism of the Vedanta, I was reminded of what you so often wrote to me, learned s'astri, of the lectures which the accom- plished president of your Pathas'ala delivered on the subject, and specially of the analogy he pointed out. boiwrm tin- doc- trines of the Vedanta and the Philosophy of a celebrated Eng- lish Bishop. And this brings to my recollection my ingrati- Mundaka. REFLECTION AND MIRAGE IMPLY TWO OR THREE THINGS. '21'J tude in never yet thanking you for the Reprints for the Pundits which contain the opinions of Berkeley, and propound the problem ot pressing into the ranks of progress the generally revered system of the Vedanta. I thought it only just to Tarkakama that he should have the benefit of the sentiments broached at Benares. We might then be able to discuss the question of assimilating the philosophy of the East with that of the West. Nothing could be more desirable than this con- summation, if only it were practicable. You might then hope to see the Reverend gentlemen of Sigra and the learned alumni of your pdthasdld allied in one great cause. Did you, I asked Satyakama, approvingly cite the rebuke administered to the Vedantist in the Vidwanmoda-tarangini / Do you really think that to deny the reality of the external world savours of atheism V What then would you say to Bishop Berkeley ? Tarkakama who, it appears had read the Reprints, instantly took the hint, and triumphantly exclaimed ; " Well said ! well said ! the ontology of the Vedanta is the philosophy of Ber- keley ! How can you pronounce the one to be atheism without including the other in the same condemnation ? You seem to hesitate, friend Satyakama. Out with your usual boldness.'' Satyakdina. " I was not hesitating from fear. Indeed what can I have to fear ? My object is to vindicate the truth. I care not where and in what shape that truth is found. But I was hesitating because I think you are not dealing fairly with learned Europeans by pressing them into this controversy. It is impossible for you to have read the fourth number of the Reprint* without being convinced that Berkeley's opinions are not those of your Yedantists. It was Colonel Kennedy that first suggested the idea that the opinions of Berkeley were similar to those of the Vedanta, but in the plenitude of his sur- prize at the Ne plus ultra of transcendentalism which he found in the Vedanta, he could only say that the good Bishop approached in some degree to that system. Another gentle- man has since remarked that the ontology of the Vedanta is the doctrine of that prelate. But you must for your part re- member that the object of those authors is to narrow as much as possible the points of difference between philosophers of Europe and India. If they have made any over-statement, it must be attributed to their charity. At any rate it is not for us to build philosophical arguments on mere compliments generously paid to the systems of our fathers. If you take unfair advantage of compliments, foreigners will be at a loss 220 DIALOGUE VII. how to deal with you. Courtesy will then prove a dangerous virtue." Vaiyasika. " I do not understand what you mean. But is it true that there is any resemblance between the Vedanta and Berkeley's' doctrine ?" Satyakama. " I should like to hear what Tarkakama says to this. A question from the bridegroom's party had better be answered by the bride's guests." Tarkakama. "Not a resemblance merely, but, as it has been well said, the doctrine of Berkeley is the ontology of the Vedant." Satyakama. " Is it in their affirmations or negations that Berkeley and the Vedanta are consentient?" Tarkakama. " Both. Berkeley acknowledges the existence of spirit, and denies that of matter. The Vedanta does the same." Satyakama. " First then with reference to their affirma- tions : can you tell me whether Berkeley allowed the existence of one Eternal Spirit only, or did he also assert the reality of many created spirits?" " On this point, said Tarkakama, the Christian is of course inferior to the Brahman. Berkeley was unfortunately desti- tute of the light of the Vedas, and ignorant of our grand doctrine of unity. Consequently he allowed a multiplicity of real spirits." " Such as God, angels, men, &c." " I must say so." " Well, said Satyakama, how many spirits does the Vedanta allow ? "Tarkakama replied instantly, " Ekumcrddicitiyam, one only without a second." " And that is a cardinal doctrine of the Vedanta. Is it not ?" " Of course, or it would degenerate into a dicaitavdda, a system of duality." " Is Berkeley's teaching adwaitavmda, a system of unity ?" " I wish, said Tarkakama, it were, but here is his failure." " Then in one of your cardinal points, the very point which distinguishes the Vedanta from other schools of Brahminical philosophy, the ontology of the Vedanta is not the doctrine of Berkeley. The Vedanta' s idea of spiritual existence is eternal and underived existence. It does not allow the possibility of a created soul really existing. It likens such souls to the reflec- tion of the sun or the moon in the waters. It pronounces all derived existence to be a nullity. Nothing can be which has not always been. Nothing can really exist which has not VEDANTlSM AND BERKELEY. 221 always existed. But Berkeley held the real existence not only of God, but also of all created spirits. Berkeley found no difficulty in admitting that a soul could come into existence without having existed from eternity that a spiritual sub- stance, which once was not, could afterwards begin to be an idea perfectly inconsistent with the ontology of the Vedant. I am only astonished that you did not see the difference directly. Now as to the negations : Berkeley, you say, denies identically what the Vedanta also rejects. "No doubt about it?" " Please to tell me, said Satyakama, what it is that he denies." " Matter." " And what does the Vedanta deny." " The same, answered Tarkakama, even matter? " What is the word uaed in the Vedanta for matter ?" "It is difficult to light on a Sanscrit word that is exactly equivalent to matter. Haughton proposed n good many, but an ingenious writer of our own day has shown that none of them will do. 1 " " Then the objects denied in the two systems cannot be prima facie identical ; the one sums up the things denied by a term for which the other has no equivalent. You still think their negations are the same, and that the objects denied in the one correspond to those denied in the other?" " Yes." " What, asked Satyakama, are the objects denied in the Vedanta?" " Every thing which is not Brahma. The whole universe." "As we have seen before, much that the Vedanta denies is acknowledged by Berkeley ; viz. men, angels, demons. These are spiritual essences. But you think Berkeley denies all other things ; whatever is not spirit, whatever has parts or dimen- sions." " Does he not?" said Tarkakama, somewhat faltering. A'gamika, who fancied that the Vedanta doctrine involved a sublimity which none but a Brahmin, learned in the Veda and taught by an Acharya in the prescribed way, could compre- hend, 2 was not pleased with the idea that an English Bishop, untaught of a Brahmin, had discovered the great mysteries of ' There is no Sanscrit word for " Matter." Ballantyne's Prize Essay, p. 123. srafa i 2'22 DIALOGUE VII. philosophy. " 11' you find any reason for faltering, said he, the question should have been asked and considered ere you under- took to pronounce, in such a circle and on such an occasion, that the doctrine of a Mletcha dualist was identical with our divine Vedanta." Satyakama remarked that his friend A'gamika needs not be alarmed. If the learned disputant of the bride's party had attentively read the Reprints for the Pundits, he might have solved that question in a way that would be quite satisfactory to the admirers of Berkeley on the one hand and the followers of the Vedanta on the other. A member of the liajah's family, who was listening to the discussion with great interest, produced the book in a minute from his highness's library, when Hatyakama read the follow- ing extracts from it : ' When Berkeley denied the existence of matter he simply ' denied the existence of that unknown substratum, the ' existence of which Locke had declared to be a necessary ' inference from our knowledge of qualities, but the nature of ' which must ever be altogether hidden from us. Philosophers ' had assumed the existence of substance, i.e., of a noumenon ' lying underneath all phenomena, a substratum supporting all ' qualities, a something in which all accidents inhere. This ' unknown substance Berkeley denies. It is a mere abstrac- ' tion, he says. If it is unknown, unknowable, it is a Figment: ' and I will none of it : for it is a Figment worse than useless : ' it is pernicious as the basis of all Atheism. If by matter you ' understand that which is seen, felt, tasted, and touched, then ' I say matter exists. I am as firm a believer in its existence ' as any one can be. Herein I agree with the vulgar. If on ' the contrary, you understand by matter that occult substratum, ' which is not seen, not felt, not tasted, and not touched, that 'of which the senses do not, cannot inform you, then I say I ' believe not in the existence of matter, and herein I differ with ' the philosophers and agree with the vulgar. ' I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that ' we can apprehend either by sensation or reflection. That ' the things I see with my eyes and touch irith inij hand:- ' exist, really exist, 1 make not the least question. The only ' tiling ivhose existence I deny is what ph&otopkert call matter, 1 or corporeal substance. And in doing this there is no daimige ' done to the rest of mankind, who 1 dare say will never miss it 1 .' 'Reprints for the Pundits, No. 4. VEUANTISM AND BERKELEY. 223 " It appears, said Satyakama, from the above extracts that Berkeley only denied something which philosophers called matter, but could not explain, which no body perceived by his senses. He acknowledged ihepratyaksha-siddha-jagat (the world proved by the senses), the denial of which savoured of atheism in the estimation of the Vidivan-moda-tarangini. " Berkeley, in short, did not deny the whole external world, nor any thing we see or touch. The only thing he denied is ' that which philosophers called matter.' The Vedanta has no term for matter, and as matter, in Berkeley's use of the term, is something different from what is seen, it cannot be made out that he understood by it the identical things denied in the Vedanta. In fact it is difficult to say what Berkeley denied. It is easier to say what he did not deny. He did not deny the truthfulness of the senses, nor the facts of sensation, nor the existence of objects of sensation all which however are denied in that school of the Vedanta which talks of ' all this as no thing.' Every thing is false which is not Brahma 1 . " You see then what a large residuum Berkeley's negations leave untouched, not of spiritual essences alone, but of non- spiritual things perceptible by the corporeal senses, which the Vedanta, I mean the doctrine of the elementary treatises, nevertheless absolutely denies, by falsifying every thing which is not Brahma." Tarkakdnia. " But the Vedanta's denial is not absolute. It allows a vyavahdrika existence to them." Satyakdma. " That it could not help doing. Vyavahdrika means what is customary, conventional, popular. If people cannot divest their minds of the reality of the world, the Vedantist cannot help saying, it is Vyavahdrika, just as even Bhaskaracharya will allow it is Vyavahdrika to say the moon is taken (by the giant) when she is in an eclipse, although he knows that the true cause of that phenomenon is the intercep- tion of the solar light by the intervention of the earth. This is not the sense in which Berkeley admits the existence of external things. What he saw, heard, and felt, he believed to ej'ixt as really as his own being ; not in the sense in which Bhaskaracharya believed in the periodical capture of the moon. " Whatever vyttvahdrika existence and the Berkeleyian mat- ter may be, it is evident that no negation in the one system is fa*?}! I Vedanta Paribhdsha. 224 DIALOGUE VII. obviously identical with the other. If there be any occult matter equally denied by both, it is a hypothesis on which no thoery can be built." But how was it, I asked, that Berkeley has been so univer- sally accused of denying the reality of the external world? "The reason, said Satyakama, is explained in the Reprints. True it is that owing to the ambiguities of language, Berke- ley's Theory does seem to run counter to the ordinary belief of mankind, because by matter men commonly understand the seen, the tasted, the touched &c. : therefore when the existence of matter is denied, people naturally suppose that the existence of the seen, the tasted, and the touched is denied, never suspecting that matter in its philosophical sense is the not seen, not tasted, not touched.'' A'gamika. "Then there does not seem to be a shadow of reason for confounding the ontology of the Vedanta with the doctrine of Berkeley, if the extracts you have read are genuine. The one denied the very thing the other allowed, viz. the seen, the tasted, the touched. How was it then that eminent men have hazarded such assertions?" Satyakama. " The extracts are from the Reprints, and I have also verified them. There cannot be a doubt on that score. But, as it is added in the Reprints,' Berkeley has not, it must be confessed, sufficiently guarded against all ambiguity. He says ' It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word, all sensible objects have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding.' " I do not pretend to stand up as Berkeley's advocate, nor do I feel myself called upon to reconcile what may appear inconsistencies in him. All I contend for is that no case has been made out for asserting that the ontology of the Vedanta is the doctrine of Berkeley, and that neither in their affirma- tions nor in their negations are the systems characteristically consentient. The stigma of idealism which has been affixed to Berkeley's theory is no doubt owing to assertions like the following : ' For what are the forementioned objects but the things we 4 perceive by sense ? and what do we perceive, besides our 4 own ideas or sensations, and is it not plainly repugnant that 4 any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist 4 unperceived ? ' In short, if there were external bodies it is impossible we ' should ever come to know it, and if there were not, we might DISPROOF OF ANALOGY BETWEEN VEDANTISM AND BERKELEY. 225 ' have the very same reasons to think there were that we have ' now ; suppose, what no one can deny possible, an intelligence, ' without the help of external bodies to be affected with the ' same train of sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in ' the same order, and with like vividness in his mind, I ask ' whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to believe ' the existence of corporal substances, represented by his ideas ' and exciting them in his mind, that you can possibly have for ' believing the same thing '? Of this there can be no question ; ' \vhich one consideration is enough to make any reasonable ' person suspect the strength of whatever arguments he may ' think himself to have, for the existence of bodies without ' the mind. ' I say it is granted on all hands, and what happens in dreams, ' frenzies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute, that it is possi- ' ble we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, ' though no bodies existed without, resembling them. Hence ' it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not neces- ' sary for the producing our ideas : since it is granted they are ' produced sometimes, and might possibly be produced always, ' in the same order we see them in at present, without their ' concurrence.' " Vaiyasika, on hearing the above extracts from Berkeley, said he was perfectly astonished at the remark that the doctrine of Berkele}" was the ontology of the Vedanta. Nothing could be a greater mistake than to charge such an opinion on the founder of the Vedanta or his great commentator. " Did you not know, he asked, that the extracts last read contain the very heresy of the Buddhists which Vyasa and S'ankaracharya have taken infinite pains to refute '? The learned president of the Benares p'athas'ala should rather have taught that the ontology of Buddhism was the doctrine of Berkeley that its Vijnana-vada, demolished by our commentator, was identical with his idealism." " Impossible ! " said I, " do you mean to say that the founder of the Vedanta and his celebrated commentator have de- nounced idealism ? Va4yasika, " I appeal to my learned friends here." "What, said I, the very system which the atheistic inter- locutor in the Vedwan-modrt-taranyini hailed as his auxiliary, and which the author stigmatized as the teaching of a master- infidel, because it denied the visible world, that very system contains a refutation of idealism ? Tarkakama and A'gamika remained silent. FF 226 DIALOGUE VII. Satyakama said that the Veclant, as taught by Vyasa, was not idealistic, and that his fellow-companion of the bridegroom's procession was right. " Let us have the Sutras and commentary," he added, " you, Vaiyasika, must have them at your finger's end : come, give us chapter and verse." A copy of the Vedant Sutras with commentary was instantly brought from the Koyal library and handed to Vaiyasika, who, on opening the book, said, " The 28th Sutra of the 2nd Section of the second Chapter reads : ' Not unreality, because of per- ception 1 ,' or perhaps apprehension would be a better rendering of upalabdhi. This Sutra was intended for the refutation of Buddhistic idealism which denied the reality of the world, and which S'ankara thus epitomized 8 : ' In that theory of Vijndna (cognitions or ideas,) all dealing ' with proof and the provable is an internal process by 3RT:**T i c fcUDDHlSTIC VIJNANA-VADA. 22*7 means of images existing in the understanding. Even if there were external objects, their proof could not be had except by its existing in the understanding. If it be asked, how is it known that all operations are internal, and that external objects have no existence apart from cognitions V The reply is from sheer impossibility. External objects must be comprehended either as atoms, or as their aggregates, pillars, &c. But there cannot be atoms distinct from pillars, itc., for it is impossible there should be cognition of atomic appearances. Nor can they be the pillars, their aggregates, for it is impossible to regard them as at the same time both different from and identical with atoms. * * * Again ; of the general apprehensions produced by perception, that which becomes especial with reference to individual objects, such as the notion of pillar, the notion of wall, the notion of pot, the notion of cloth, is not produced but by peculiarities in the notion itself. Hence it must be acknowledged that objects are similar to cognitions. And this being acknowledged, the theory of real objects is rendered nugatory, because it is con- tradicted by the cognition of their forms. * * * This is also to be regarded in the light of dreams, &c. As dreams, jugglery, mirage, fairy towns, become, without the presence of exter- nal objects, forms of apprehensions and apprehenders ; in the same manner may the notions of pillars, &c., come in when one is awake, for in either case the notion is the same. If it be asked, how a variety of notions is occasioned if there be no external objects ; the answer is, from a variety of fancies. There can be no difficulty in supposing that in this world without a beginning fancies and cognitions may have RRT 228 DIALOGUE VII. ' mutually caused each other's varieties like seed and sprout. ' That the variety in notions is owing to a variety of fancy is ' evident from positive as well as negative proof. We are both ' agreed that in dreams and other visions there is a variety of ' notions occasioned by fancy even in the absence of external ' objects. Only [we Buddhists maintain the same is also the ' case in the presence of objects] we do not allow a variety ' of notions occasioned by objects in the absence of fancy. ' Hence there is no real external object.' " This, learned Sirs, continued Vaiyasika, was a theory of the Buddhists who pronounced the world to be a mere phan- tom. S'ankara has by no means made an over-statement of their doctrine. Their popular books liken the universe to a mdijd, a mirage, a flash of lightning, a froth 1 . They no doubt carried the ideal theory further than Berkeley, but substitute the word idea for oijmi-na, and you put the very words of the Christian Bishop into the mouths of those Buddhists. And now listen to the masterly way in which our accomplished leader demolished the whole of that phantastic argument 2 . 3rfa?rr s I Lalita-vistara. ANALOGY BETWEEN 13EKKELEY AND VEDANTA DISPROVED. 229 ' Not unreality ; because of perception. It is impossible to ' maintain that there is no external object. Why ? Because ' of perception. External objects are severally perceived such ' as a pillar, a wall, a pot, a cloth. It is impossible there can ' be unreality in that which is perceived. As if a man, while ' enjoying a good dinner, were to say, I am not eating, nor am ' 1 enjoying it, the saying would not be handsome ; so if, while ' himself apprehending an object by sensation, a person were ' to say, I arn not apprehending it, nor is there any external ' substance, how could his disclaimer be acceptable ? If it ' be objected, I do not say I do not perceive any object, but ' that I do not perceive any thing besides the perception. Well, ' you say this because your mouth is ungoaded, but you do not ' speak reasonably ; for from the very act of perception, sonie- ' thing distinct from perceptions must also be apprehended by ' the force of objects. No one indeed perceives that a pillar or ' a wall is a mere perception, but every one perceives it as an 'object of perception. Thus do (idealistic) men, too, perceive ' things ; for, even while denying external objects, they virtu- ' ally acknowledge them by avowing that the forms, internally ' apprehended, are like the externals. Partaking of the know- ' ledge of externals, universally prevalent among men, and yet f| sn 230 DIALOGUE VII. ' desirous of denying external objects, they turn them into a ' simile by using the phrase like the externals. Otherwise [i.e., ' it' they did not perceive external objects] why should they ' use the phrase like the external* ! ' No one can say Vishnu ' Mitra appears like a barren woman's son. Those therefore ' who perceive things as they are, should say that the externals ' themselves appear, not that appearances like externals are ' seen. Perhaps it will be urged that because of the [antece- ' dent] impossibility of external objects you talk of appearances ' like externals. This is not a right saying at all, for possi- ' bility or impossibility is determined by the impulse or non- ' impulse of proof, not the impulse or non-impulse of proof by ' possibility or impossibility. That which is established by ' perception or any other proof is possible : that which cannot ' be established by any proof is impossible. Now external ' objects being established, like the spirit itself, by all descrip- ' tions of proof, why should exceptions be taken to the one, ' when they are not taken to the other, and the former be pro- ' nounced impossible ? Nor, again, because cognitions may ' resemble objects, therefore objects must be negatived ; for ' there could not be such resemblance with objects if there 1 were no objects, and because those objects are externally ' apprehended.' " S'ankaracharya, you will observe, contends that there is the same proof for the reality of the external world as there is for that of the internal spirit. It is impossible to con- ceive how learned men could persuade themselves, merely on the authority of a few pages of elementary manuals, that the ontology of the Vedant was the doctrine of European idealism. Our commentator goes on smashing to fragments all the idealistic arguments of the Buddhists. He denounces the theory that there could be cognition, or any intellectual process, without objects to act upon. 'If you say, he continues, ' that cognitions, being of the nature of light, are self -prod need, ' like a self-shining lamp, without the force of external objects, ' you utter a most unreasonable doctrine that the spirit acts on ' itself, as if one could say fire burns its own self. But that ' which every body calls reasonable, the perception of external ' objects by cognitions distinct from themselves, you do not ' allow. Oh, what great wisdom you show 1 ! ' ANALOGY BETWEEN BERKELEY AND VEDANTA DISPROVED. 231 " The 29th Sutra denies that external objects are like dreams and visions because the characteristics of the two are different. 1 And S'ankara thus expounds it : ' As to what has been said b} T ' the denier of external objects that waking sensations of ' pillars, &c., may be caused like the visions of dreams without ' the presence of external objects, the sensations being alike in ' both cases, we thus reply to it. Waking sensations cannot be % like visions of dreams, because the two are different. There ' is a difference between dreaming and waking. What now is 4 the difference ? We reply, Contradiction and Non-contradic- ' tion. What is perceived in a dream is contradicted by the ' waking conviction, my interview with a great man is untrue, ' there has been no interview with a great man, my mind was ' deceived in sleep, hence it is a misapprehension. Jugglery ' and similar appearances are also contradicted in that manner. ' But waking sensations are never contradicted in any state. 2 The Nepaulese Buddhist, worried by the Bhagavatas, had sought refuge in our little circle while the extracts from S'ankara were yet being read ; and he was now going to speak in defence of his doctrine, when the military musicians com- menced beating their drams and blowing their trumpets, and the European guests, ladies as well as gentlemen, began to f^, qq} 232 DIALOGUE VII. dance in front of the bridegroom. The attention of all present was thereby concentrated in the middle hall, and our philosophical discussion was at once interrupted. A'gamika's simplicity amused us not a little, when, mistaking the company for professional dancers, he expressed his indignation at the station-doctor, the only European face he could recognize, engaging in such a questionable occupation from mere pecu- niary motives. I told him that the company was not one of professional dancers, but of respectable ladies and gentlemen, who were expressing their joy on the happy event they had come to celebrate, by joining in a dance for the amusement of all present. "Then, said A'gamika, even Indra's court could not exhibit a scene, so beautiful, and this was not an occasion when any argument for Buddhistic idealism can prevail against the reasoning of S'ankaracharya. It would certainly be most unhandsome at this moment to say we are not perceiving any objects by our eyes and ears." DIALOGUE VIII. FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME. The conference we held at the marriage assembly in a corner of the Hall was reported to the Rajah by his nephew, who was listening with great attention to the arguments adduced on both sides. The following day His Highness gave a private audience to Vaiyasika, A'gamika, Satyakama, and myself. He thanked us all for the interest we took in the happy event of his daughter's marriage. He felt proud, he said, that his assembly was graced by such learned men, and that his house was the scene of a discussion, in which certain ideas were elicited, which he for his part had not met with elsewhere, and which might possibly throw new light on the history of Indian philosophy. " It is a great pity that the Brahma Sutras and S'ankara's commentary are so little known. I have not met with a single pundit, with the exception of the venerated Vaiyasika, who was familiar with the whole of the S'aririka mimansa bhaxhya. Vedantic scholars in my circle profess to have read only such manuals as the Vedtinta Kara and the ParibJidia. Their acquaintance with the Sutras and commen- tary never extended beyond the opening section of the opening chapter. When therefore I first read in a native newspaper at Bombay, now more than a quarter of a century ago, that Colonel Kennedy had discovered some resemblance between the theory of Bishop Berkeley and the Vedantic doctrine, I sought for further information from my father's pundits, but in vain. Colonel Kennedy's idea was lately adopted and enforced by the authorities of the Government College at Benares. I then thought it must be substantially correct. You have how- ever now successfully disproved it, as far as Vyasa's Vedant is concerned. But, Satyakama, what have you gained by it? The disproof of that idea does not necessarily throw discredit on the Vedant, for my friend Vaiyasika was no less impatient than yourself of the statement, which has of late been so widely circulated, that the ontology of the Vedant is the doctrine of Berkeley.'" DIALOGUE VIII. i. "Please Your Highness, 1 cannot say what I have gained, or whether I have gained any thing, nor do I know that I came with the expectation of gaining any thing besides the pleasure of congratulating you on the happy occasion which brought us together. With reference to our conference, the right way to look at it is to consider not if a particular system is necessarily overthrown thereby, but if in the course of fair discussion, truth of any kind is elicited. If a wrong idea, which had been much in vogue of late, has been disproved, it must so far be a service to truth. Your Highness will now know how to deal with persons that may say in your presence that the ontology of the Vedant is the doctrine of Berkeley." Rdjah. " But will you accept my friend Vaiyasika's sugges- tion that the ontology of Buddhism is the doctrine of Berke- ley ? Are you gratified at the idea that Berkeley is proved a Buddhist ?" Satyakdma. "Certainly not, please Your Highness. I always protested against making free with Berkeley's name in an Indian discussion. What he wrote had reference to philosophers that lived far away from us. Even Europeans find it difficult to say what Berkeley's opinions were. We cannot expect so to under- stand them in a hurry as to find analogies between them and Indian theories. I did not think it necessary last night to undertake the defence of Berkeley, because I thought his, reputation for piety and theological orthodoxy was far too well established to require any advocacy from myself." Rajah. " Do you think, Vaiyasika, you have gained any thing for the Yedant by last night's conference?" Vaiydsika. "Blessings on Your Highness! I agree with Satyakama that if a popular error has been disproved the result itself must be a gain to truth, and I must rejoice over it. I think also that the Vedant, as inculcated in the Stitras, does not involve the doctrine of Maya, w ? hich some of our S'astras condemn as Buddhism in disguise. The erroneous notion, dis- proved last night, virtually connected the Vedant with the doctrine of Maya. It is only just to our system that people should know it was not originally allied to that theory, and that it contended strenuously, against the Buddhists, for the reality of external objects. Whether later writers have mixed it up with the doctrine of Maya, or not, is quite a different ques- tion." The Chobdar now came in, and, with hands joined, an- nounced that the Nepaulese Colonel and the Buddhist S'astri had come to bid farewell before leaving the station for Calcutta. BUDDHIST CHARGES AGAlNSl BRAHM1MSM. 235 ' Show them," said His Highness, " into this private-audience chamber. You will not mind their presence, my learned friends. I am sure the Colonel will be pleased to see you. He takes great interest in philosophical discussions. He has adopted the Buddhist faith, though by birth a Kshetriya, and a Hindu. The S'astri, you saw last night, is his domestic priest." The Colonel entered the room with his S'astri, and was courteously received. The Hajari apologized to the S'astri for the annoyance he had received the night before from the turbu- lent Vaishnavas, and told him what the nature of our confer- ence was that some of us were anxious to disclaim the doc- trine of Maya, and that therefore Vaiyasika was reading S'an- karacharya's argument against the idealism of Buddhists. " You have every right, said the Buddhist, to disclaim what you do not hold. 1 will not deny that S'ankara in his commen- tary on the Vedant contends against, what you call, our idealism, but his argument is virtually shown to be untenable not only by his own admissions in his commentaries on the Upanishads, but also by the general reception of our doctrine by all recent writers on the Vedant." liajali. " I do not quite understand you. Do you mean that Vedantic writers have generally adopted any of your doctrines." Buddhist. " I have no doubt they have. In fact all your schools of philosophy have taken lessons from us." Rajah. " What lessons? Speak mere definitely." Buddhist. " Blessings without number on Your Highness ! The doctrine of Maya and all your ideas of Mukti and Nirvana are borrowed from us. We first taught you to reflect on the miseries of life and transmigration, and to seek for perfect release from the bondage of works. Your Highness will allow that our system is older than that of Yyasa or Gotama." Kajah. " Of course I must allow that, for the llishis who founded our schools aimed at the refutation of Buddhism as one of their principal objects." Buddhist. " I do not know whether they aimed at the refu- tation of Buddhism. They have certainly done much for the reproduction of Buddhism;, for which we must ever be thankful to them." liajali." How so V You astonish me. Speak more plainly. Name the doctrines one by one which you think we have learnt from you." Buddhist. " The very doctrine of Maud, of which you were speaking before we came." DIALOGUE VIII. Rajah. " How do you know we learnt it from you ?" Buddhist. "Because before the rise of our S akya Muni (blessings on him !) you knew nothing but rites and ceremonies, and your sole business was how to fulfil them agreeably to the formula of your Vedas. The great objects of your ambition were the good things of earth and heaven. For them you worked, for them you sacrificed, for them you prayed. S'akya was the first to teach you that the good things of earth and heaven were transient and illusory that the external world by which you were so fascinated was a phantom, a maya, a mirage, a mere flash of lightning. You cannot point to a single sage of your school who taught that idea before the age of Buddha." Rajah. " What ! not Vas'ishtha, V'almiki, or Vis'wamitra V" Buddhist. " It is not for me to say when those Kishis lived, or what they taught ; but I think I may affirm that none of your Kishis can, like our S'akya, be singled out, even in your own traditions, as the original teacher of a novel doctrine in depreciation of the sensuous and carnal enjoyments promised in your older Vedas, and certainly no work, written decidedly before the age of Buddha, contains any description of the world as a mere phantom or mirage." Rajah. " What do you mean by writings before the age of Buddha?" Buddhist. " The Vedas certainly, by which I mean, what your own writers themselves generally understand by the term, the Mantras and Brahmanas. These do not represent the world as an illusion, nor direct the mind to any higher aspirations than sensuous enjoyments, whether of heaven or of earth." Rajah. " What say you of the Upanishads?" Buddhist. " The term Upanishad, please Your Highness, itself a vague designation, cannot mark out a separate division of the Vedas. It is applied to certain parts from doctrinal considerations. Any thing is called an Upanishad which sets forth a certain favourite doctrine the doctrine of Brahma. Hence even the Bhagavad-gita is called an Upanishad. I think therefore the authority of the Upanishads, as historical guides, cannot be very weighty. A small section might at any time have been added to a Veda with a view to set up ;i claim for antiquity in behalf of a favourite doctrine. Such claims ought to be received with great suspicion especially when you consider that, in order to recommend their own novel doctrines, some of those spurious additions have gone the length of slighting the original Vedas themselves, and treating them with quite as much contempt as S'akya could HISTORICAL AUTHORITY OF t f pANlsHADS. '237 ever have poured on them, calling them the repositaries of inferior doctrines, and classing them with mere children's books. And if any of the Upani shads bear marks of decided antiquity, they do not inculcate the doctrine of mdija. " That the doctrine of the Brahmins was not originally a may a vdda is evident from the Vedas themselves i. e., the Mantras and Brahmanas. When, then, was it first taught ? Who introduced it, where, and how ? W r hat is the history of this great innovation, this transition from doctrines purely carnal to a denial of the material world ? How came you into possession of that which you must acknowledge you did not possess originally, and which is decidedly not a natural develop- ment of your primitive doctrine of sacrifices and heavenly enjoyments ? You cannot answer these questions. You cannot account for your possession of the doctrince of Maya. We can. We tell you that S'akya taught it first that, reflect- ing on the vanity of the world, he condemned the whole as a shadow without substance, a mdijd, a mirage. His life is the best history of the doctrine. While you were scrambling and fighting for the pleasures of life, he renounced them all as vain and illusory. Myriads were convinced by his precepts and his example. But his party could not ultimately hold their place in Hindoostan. They were turned out, but their teaching was left as a legacy to their country. You banished them under the influence of party-spirit, but nevertheless the watchword of your philosophy has since continued to be mdyd." Rajah. " Well, my Buddhist friend what other stolen goods do you find amongst us ?" Buddhist. " Our doctrine of Nirvana and muliti. It is well known that your original Vedas propound to your aspirations nothing but the sensuous enjoyments of life, whether in heaven or earth, houses, lands, cattle, and similar things. It is equally well known that S'akya Muni taught his disciples to regard those very enjoyments as vain, illusory, and fleeting, and to look forward to nirvana, or complete release from life and transmi- gration. Teaching this transcendental doctrine, he exemplified it in his life renouncing his home which was a palace, his dignity which was that of a throne, his enjoyments which were those of empire and sovereignty. These are facts patent to all the world, and you dare not dispute them. They are inter- woven with the rise and progress of our society a society which now overspreads the greater part of the vast continent of Asia. Even children are catechized on the vanity of this passing world from the great wall of China to the utmost blALUGt'E Vlii. boundary of Ceylon. It now you say you knew the same doctrine before the birth of S'akya, the burden of proof is decidedly on you. You are bound to account for the way you got possession of what we assert, and you cannot deny, to be a characteristic tenet of our great corporation. And you failing to prove your acquisition of it from a Brahminical source, we hold ourselves justified in charging you with borrowing it from us. " I repeat, your original Vedas say nothing of the miseries of life and transmigration, or of the necessity of complete escape from the bondage of works. Apavarga, nirvana, and mukti are words unknown to your Vedas. You will refer me to your Upanishads. As the burden of proof is on you, because the doctrine of mukti involves an impatience of life, not only unknown to your earlier system, but at variance with its essential doctrines, you must adduce some stronger evi- dence than the Upanishads, and give a better account of its introduction than is furnished in those writings, before you can justly claim the merit of originating a doctrine so foreign to your ancient philosophy. I repeat, the testimony of the Upanishads cannot be held satisfactory in a historical research. The name Upanishad is arbitrarily applied to works, or rather tracts, setting forth a favourite doctrine that of Brahma. Such of the Upanishads, again, as chime in our tunes and in our very words, on the miseries of life, both earthly and heavenly, and on the necessity of emancipation, contain refer- ences to doctrines and ideas so manifestly modern, that they cannot, consistently with historical criticism, be classed with the original Veda in point of antiquity. " Some of them stand, also, in open rivalry with the four Vedas which they stigmatize as inferior. This shows that they are compositions of a much later date, when the Vedas had partially lost credit with the learned, probably owing to our own forcible denunciations of mere rites and ceremonies. " Please your highness, I must crave your indulgent consid- eration of the points I have had the good fortune to advance in your presence. I think we may fairly claim the honor of having, at the cost of expatriation, somewhat diverted the Brahminicil mind from an empty ritual, stained with the blood of helpless animals, and of having taught it the elements of a philosophy to which it betakes itself to this day for rest and consolation. S'ankara may have argued strongly against our denial of the reality of external objects, but it is that very denial it is the idea of a titaya and the prospect ot mukti and THEORY oF MAYA BORROWED FROU IH'DDHISM. '2M >iiiTuun, \\hich at the present moment constitute the hopes, and regulate the aspirations of all minds, capable of rising above the world and its fascinations." The Nepaulese colonel apprehending that the hortatory strain, which the Buddhist had adopted, might be disrespectful to the Rajah, here stopped his spiritual guide. " Enough, said he, enough ! a word to the wise. -You have stated our argument, and the Rajah will no doubt give it a fair consider- ation." The Colonel, then, after a few minutes of social conversation with the Rajah, took leave agreeably to the mode prevalent among men of distinction and dignity. When the Xepaulese officer had left the room the Rajah asked Vaiyasika what he thought of the Buddhist's charges against our philosophy. " As far, said Vaiyasika, as the doctrine of Maya is concerned, I cannot say that the Buddhist's charge is entirely without foundation. Vyasa does not inculcate that doctrine, nor do the Upanishads Taittiriya, Aitareya and Ken a. Vijnana Bhikshu, in his commentary on the Sankhya sutra (1. 2'2), only does us justice when he draws a marked distinction between the Brahma Sutras and the theory of may a. ' There is not a ' single Brahma Sutra, says he, in which our bondage is declar- ' ed to be a mere deception. As to the novel theory of maya, 'propounded by persons calling -themselves Vedantists, it is 'only a species of the Vijnana-vada (of Buddhists).' The commentator then quotes the well known passage in the Padma-purana in which that theory is called cli^guifed Bud- dhism. He proceeds to say, 'that theory is not a tenet of the ' Yedanta, and it must be understood that the doctrine of the ' newfangled disguised Buddhists, who assert the theory of ' maya and reduce our bondage to a mere delusion, is in this ' way refuted 1 .' ' 24U DIALOGUE VIII. Rajah. " But is it not singular that learned Europeans, who have written on our philosophy in a friendly spirit, should not have discovered that the theory of Maya, is not inculcated in the Brahma sutras, and that they should in reality be com- plimenting Buddhism by seeking analogies between their Bishop Berkeley and our Vedanta." Satyakama. " Please Your Highness, there were at least two Europeans who knew how to distinguish between the original Vedant and the theory of Maya. Your Highness has no doiibt heard that an eminent scholar, Colebrooke by name, wrote digests of the sutras of our several schools for the information of his countrymen. In his digest of the Vedarita, he trans- lated many of Vyasa's aphorisms, inculcating that God is the material cause of the univer.so, and rein-irked in conclusion that ' the notion that the versatile world is an illusion (Maya) ; that ' all which passes to the apprehension of the waking individual ' is but a phantasy, presented to his imagination, and that ' every sensible thing is unreal and all is visionary, does not ' appear to be the doctrine of the text oH the Vedant. I have; 'remarked nothing,' he aJde-1, ' tliat countenances it in the ' Sutras of Vi/asa, nor in the gloss of Sanknra, but much con- ' cerning it in the minor commentaries and elementary ' treatises.' " This conclusion of Colebrooke proved unsatisfactory to Colonel Kennedy, the Bombay Officer you have already men- tioned, who, in a letter to the iioyal Asiatic Society, remarked : ' I am therefore at a loss to understand the grounds on which ' Mr. Colebrooke, in his essay on this system, has thus stated : " The succeeding section affirms the important tenet of the " Vedanta, that the Supreme Being is the material as well as " the efficient cause of the universe ; it is a proposition directly " resulting from the tenor of the passages of the Vedas, and " illustrations and examples adduced." ' For the copy of the ' Sutras now before me is divided in a different manner from ' the one referred to by Mr. Colebrooke, and I have not been 4 able to find in them a single Sutra which, in my opinion. ' would bear such a meaning. In fact, the Sanscrit language 'does not contain any term equivalent to the Word matter; ' and even the four principal schools of Hindu philosophy ' concur in rejecting the notion of matter which has invariably ' prevailed in Europe 1 .' 1 Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society. Vol. III. COLEBROOKE, HAUGHTON, KENNEDY. 241 Hfijali. "But who was the other European, who, you say, did not fall into the popular error about the Vedanta?" Satyakama. " Sir G. G. Haughton ; who defended Cole- brooke and to whom Colonel Kennedy replied saying : ' If there- fore, Maya, or illusion, is not the doctrine of the Vedantikas, as Sir G. C. Haughton maintains, and their belief is that the Creator and nature are one, and that he is the efficient and material cause of the universe, it must necessarily follow that their tenets are precisely the same as those which have been held to constitute material pantheism by every writer on phil- osophy. But, so far are the Vedantikas from identifying God with matter, that they have always denied the existence of matter, and maintained that one sole undivided spiritual essence alone exists. * * * For otherwise, he (Sir G. Hangb- ton) must have perceived that, if the creation is held to be material, the identifying the Creator with the creation neces- sarily turns the Vedanta system into one of pure materialism 1 .'" Rajah. " Well, Vaiyasika, if you maintain that the doctrine of maya is not an original tenet of the Vedant, then you do pronounce us guilty of possessing stolen goods." Satyakdma. " Not exactly so, please your highness, if I may interpose a remark by way of qualifying the verdict. You ma}' have, in your possession, goods claimable by Buddhists, but you may also on your part ask, whence did they themselves get them ? We have heard of S'akya's teaching certain doctrines, but whence did S'akya himself learn them. He was brought up under the influence of Brahminism, and if Brahminism has taken lessons from his school, it is simply the tutor learning in his turn from a smart pupil." Rajah. " Speak more plainly, Satyakama. Have we learnt from Buddhism any thing which our Vedas and Upanishads do not inculcate?" Satyakama . "You have just heard Vaiyasika repudiate the doctrine of Maya, and refer to certain authorities which condemned it as Buddhism in disguise. That is certainty a lesson which Brahminical philosophers have taken from S'akya Muni. The Upanishads, with perhaps one or two exceptions (of which I shall speak presently) , taught no such lesson. They do not maintain that the world is a mere phantom or shadow, a no thing. Most of them on the contrary promise sensuous enjoyments both here and hereafter as the rewards of knowledge. The Taittiriya says repeatedly, ' He who know r s these great l Col. Kennedy in Asiatic Journal. HH 242 DIALOGUE VIII. ' summaries of doctrine, thus explained, will obtain offspring, ' cattle, holiness, food, and heaven 1 .' These words form a sort of chorus, which is repeated five or six times in the short com- pass of the tract. The Aitireya too contains a similar chorus which it repeats at the end of two out of its three sections called the Upanishad part. ' He, knowing this, went upward ' on the dissolution of body, and, attaining all desires in that ' heavenly world, became immortal 8 .' The Kena promises the same ' heavenly world ' to those who attain knowledge. 3 The Katlia, also, to which a discerning translator has assigned a date posterior to the Sankhya 4 , is quite ignorant, notwithstand- ing its transcendentalism in other respects, of the idea that the world is a phantom and a shadow. The Pras'na says, ' he who, ' thus knowing, knows the vital air, will not be wanting in ' offspring, and will be immortal 5 .' It certainly does not incul- cate the doctrine of Maya. The word maya does indeed occur in this Upanishad, but it is in the sense of a moral turpitude, akin to deceit and falsehood 6 , disqualifying men from entering the world of Brahma, not in the philosophical sense of an illusion. The same Upanishad says, also, ' all this and whatever is of ' repute in heaven is subject to life. Do thou protect us, as a ' mother protects her sons ; give us also prosperity and know- ' ledge 7 .' The h'a says, ' performing duty in this world, one ' is to desire a life of a hundred years 8 ,' and adds nothing as to 1 See note in page 210. 2 See the same/ 3 See the same. * " In the order of manifestations or emanations from the absolute spirit, it deviates, however, from that adopted by other Upanishads and by the later Vi'-danta, and is evidently more closely allied to the Sankhya. The order is here The unmanifested (avyakta), the great soul (mahatma or mahat), intellect (buddhi), mind, the objects of the senses and the senses. The same order is followed by the Sinkhya, with the exception, that they have not between the unmanifested and intellect the intervening "mahat," which with them is equivalent to intellect. The " manas " (mind) has here also the same function as in the Sinkhya the nhamkara (self-consciousness). Hence it is probable, that this Upanishad was written at a time, when the Sankhya had already been founded." /). Ri>cr, in Bibliotheca Indici. fldf UPANiSliADb PROMISE SENSUOUS ENJOYMENTS. the unreality of the world. Nor has the Mandukya, notwith- standing the grand Kdrika which Gaudapada has made on it, any thing to say against the reality of the external. It pro- mises the attainment of all desires, and of pre-eminence, with a learned progeny, as the rewards of knowledge 1 . The Brihadd- ranijaka and Chhdndoyya, both a good deal larger than the tracts already named, are also silent on the subject of Maya, or illusion. They say nothing about the unreality of the world. " The Brihaddranyaka says, he who knows thus, becomes a (jod, and attains heaven. The ignorant, departing from this world, becomes slaves, the knowers, Brahmins 8 . The Chhdn- dogija assures to those who understand its mysteries, a heroic progeny, and heavenly enjoyments, as well as a life of sixteen hundred years, together with the free choice of any pleasures for which they may have a taste, whether it be for those of food and drink, or of perfumery, or of music, or whether it be for objects of filial, fraternal, or conjugal affection 3 . The Mun- * * This is repeated several ff ^3 times in the form of a chorus. ltd 2ii blALOGtJE VIII. jlaka is more sparing in its promises of sensuous enjoyments, but it does not decidedly countenance the theory oi Maya, and as this is the Upauishad which passes a sweeping censure on the Vedas, calling all four (to use the Buddhist S'astri's words) the repositaries of inferior doctrines, and placing them in the same category with grammars and children's manuals, it would hardly be correct chronologically to class it among books whose short-comings it professes to supply. It would almost be a contradiction in terms to say that the Muinlaka is a section of the Atharva-veda, which it condemns, along with the others, as inferior science. And if it must be referred to a post Vedic age, it would be difficult to affirm that it was composed before the age of Buddha. But even the Mundaka says nothing directly of Maya, though it marks a period, still riper than that of any other Upanishad above named, and still further removed from the date of the original Vedas. It boldly condemns sacri- .ficial rites with their eighteen members as vain and futile, and affixes the stigma of folly to those who perform or rely on them 1 . But it does not plainly say that the world is a phantom, or a shadow without substance." cv c o -o CiiUDE IDEA. Of Mt'KTl IN Ll'ANlbHADS. 'J4-J Rajah. " But the Buddhist S'astri seemed to admit that borne oi' the Upanishads did affirm the doctrine of may a only he would not allow their existence in the Vedic period. He likewise claimed the doctrine of Nirvana or mukti as Buddhistic property." Satyakwna. " I cannot say that he has a right to claim the doctrine of mukti as the peculiar property of his sect, though the formation of a distinct school, fearlessly inculcating the necessity of Nirvana and mukti, in open opposition to sacrificial rites and ceremonies, was perhaps an unprompted act of S'akya. The Brahmins had long been panting for some reward more permanent than than the terminable enjoyment of heaven. In some of the Upanishads, the Brihadaranyaka and the Chhan- dogya for instance, we see the commencement of a notion, that those who attain to the knowledge of their mysterious teaching do not revolve again 1 , which S'ankara understands to .imply a release from the necessity of transmigration. I do not see any trace of this notion in the Taittiriya, Aitireya, Man- duki/a, Pras'na or Kena. These were probably the productions of an anterior age, when the Brahmins had only begun to identify the Creator with the creation, and when their pan- theism had not yet got to its maturity. The notion of a release from life and birth had not attained any thing like the vigor of age in the Brihadaranyaka and Chhdndogya either, for while the conception of sensuous enjoyments, as the rewards of knowledge, is constantly met with, that of a freedom from transmigration is but rarely found. Nor can the former be said to occupy its natural place in the midst of boons, not only de- scribed in the language of voluptuaries, but also sometimes opposed to all ideas of decency 2 . One of the Upanishads, again, in which this crude notion of release from the necessity of trans- migration is found, speaks of ' Krishna, son of Devaki,' receiv- ing a certain lesson from Grhora, son of Angiras. The name, Krishna, was not itself unknown in the Vedic period, but the ' son of Devaki ' was a character of a later date. If then the passage be accepted as genuine, it must militate very much against the antiquity of the Chhandogya. If, on the other hand, the idea of an interpolation be admitted, I do not see any 2 Dr. Kocr was obliged to translate nearly the whole of the concluding chapter of the Brihadiranyaka into Latin because of its gross indecencies. " It would uot bear an Englibh rendering." Bee note, page '2T3. itibliotheca Indica, No. 1:35. 246 DIALOGUE vni, reason tor not extending it to a few more isolated passages, prom- ising freedom from sensuous existence, a notion not less at variance with other Vedic promises than is the appellative Dcca- kipntra with the ordinary rule of Vedic patronymics. " The transcendental idea of emancipation has a more definite form in the Mtiudaka and the Katha, but these are Upanishads which, for reasons already mentioned, we may fairly assign to a much later, probably a post-Buddhistic, age. And it is only in the ti'tvetd-Jwafara that we see the notion in its full grown shape, and it was perhaps this very Upanishad which the Bud- dhist had in his mind, when he made the admission to which your highness refers. There we have the theory of m/<> bianer titan a thumb, the p uru *h a of the measure of a xpan, the ether in ///<" heart, all these personifications, set forth in the Upanishads, are no other than the supreme Brahma who is without a second. So likewise the passages which speak of certain inanimate things as the primary element, e.n., food, air, breath of life, light, ether, are referred to Brahma. If it be asked what right the author had to identify those descriptions with I'.rahma. the commentator reminds you of the great charter of Pantheism, the text, AH tlii* is P>rahma. Vyasa does not however say, except by implication, that the world is identical with Brahma, or that Brahma is Prakriti, nature, or substance of the universe, before the 23rd sutra of the 4th Pada of the 1st chapter." Rajah. " But does he, in the earlier portion of his work, say by implication that the world is identical with Brahma ?" "The idea is undoubtedly found, said Satyakama, in the following sutras: 'Because of resolution or absorption into bANKAKA'b AUTHUUm: AS A LLLMMEVlATuK. 25i ' the spirit.' (1. i. ').) ' it (the Veda) declares its (the world's) ' assimilation into Him." (I. i. 1 ( J.) ' He is the Eater, because ' he takes into Himself moveables and iimnoveables.' (I. ii. 1J.) ' Because it is distinguished as the place to be approached by ' the emancipated.' (L iii. 2.) ' It (the Sankhya) is not true, ' it is disproved, hecause of observation.' I. i. 5. ' From desire, ' too, there is no room for the Sankhya inference 1 .' I. i. 18. The two Sutras, last mentioned, evidently refer to texts in which the Supreme Being is represented as desirous of multi- himself by the process of creation, I, of course, continued Satyakania, make use of Sankara's authorized gloss in interpreting the above sutras, but I am not confounding the commentator's deductions with the author's language. The light which the commentator throws on the Sutras must be accepted, but it would be quite unphilosophical to attribute to the author of the Sutras all that the fertile mind of his commentator has imagined. Were I to consider every sentence of S'ankara to be an exact index of Vyasa's mind, 1 could recognize many more decided instances of his pantheism before coming to the 23rd sutra I. iv. But it is at that sutra that the author commences a series of aphorisms, unhesitat- ingly pronouncing God to be the material cause of the world." Rajah. " Do you mean to say that S'ankara' s commentary contains any misconception of Vyasa's teachin 1 do not exactly mean that, but I do not wish to lose sight of the distinction between the author and his commentator. ' ' Rajah.---" What do you say, \ aiyasika, to this?" Vaiydjuika. "As Satyakama has not charged the coin- mentator with misrepresenting the author's views, I do not wish to say anything." Rajah. " What authority then do you attach to S'ankara's commentary V ' Vaiyasika. " S'ankara deserves all credit for learning, hoiiesty, and clearness of mind. He at once gets at the mind of his author, and expounds the meaning plainly and fully. I cannot conceive the possibility of his misapprehending a single expression of Vyasa, nor can 1 imagine it to be within the range of a mortal's capacity to add to or subtract from 252 DIALOGUE Vlll. what S'ankara hab said. Tu say less would involve a sacri- fice of fuluesb. To say more would be incurring prolixity. There is nothing redundant in his commentary, nor any thing defective. You cannot improve it by adding or curtailing. Still S'ankara was not a Itishi. The author of the S'ankaru- diyvijaya has indeed represented him as an incarnation of S'iva 1 , but we have not received that story in any other light than that of a complimentary tribute for his successful refutation of Bud- dhism. We cannot say he was essentially infallible. Vya^a was a liishi. He was essentially infallible, for liishis cannot err." Satyakdnia. " Have not different iiishis, Gotania, Kapila, Vyasa, taught mutually conflicting doctrines ? Are we then still to suppose them all to be infallible ?" Haja. " But a learned writer has suggested that their dif- ferences are capable of being reconciled"." Vaiyasika. " Without waiting for Satyakama's reply, 1 shall at once admit that the differences are not capable of being reconciled. At least S'ankaracharya did not think they were. He not only condemns the opinions of the Nyaya and the Sankhya on the origin of the universe, but he brands their authors as discordant heretics 3 . There is certainly no reason for saying that Gotaina lays greater stress on sensation than 2 " Assuming, each of them implicitly, the truth of the Yedas, and proceeding to give, oil that foundation, a comprehensive view of the totality of things, the three systems differ in their point of view. To illustrate this, suppose that three men in succession take up a cylindrical ruler; the one, viewing it with its end to- wards his eye, sees a circle ; the second, viewing it upright before his eye, sees a parallelogram ; the third, viewing it in a direction slanting away in front of his eye, sees a frustum of a cone. These three views are different, but no wise irre- concilable. So far are they from being irreconcilable, that it might be argued that till of them must be accepted in succession, before any adequate conception of the form of the ruler can be arrived at. Now, in somewhat such a way, the three Hindu systems differ mainly in their severally regarding the universe from different points of view, viz., as it stands in relation severally to sensation, emo- tion, and intellection. The Naiydyika, founding on the fact that we h;m \ariou^ sensations, enquires what and how many are the channels through which such varied knowledge flows in. The Sdnkhya, struck with the fact that we have emo- tions, with an eye to the question ivhence our impressions come, enquires their quality. The Veaantin, rising above the question as to what is pleasing, displeas- ing, or indifferent, asks simply, what is, and what is not." Ballantyne' s Prize Essay, pp. xvi, xvii. 3 Com. Vcdaut, 11. i, 1. HEVtfcW Otf VfcDAfcl bUTKAb. 'J53 Kapila, or that Kapila speaks more of emotion* than Gotaina. Nor cati it be urged that the authors of the Nyaya and the Sankhya undertook to teach their systems on the foundation of the Vcdas. The fact of their differences is certainly a difficulty with us, but still we hold that Kishis are infallible. We are not bound to receive their teaching if it be opposed to the Veda, but we must not be wanting in reverence to their memory. But why do you press on our attention a point which we confess is attended with some difficulty, and which is irrelevant to our present discussion? Go on with your review of the Vedaut teaching." Satyakdma. " Well then, with reference to Sutra '2'6. iv. I., it runs thus 1 , ' He is also prakriti (the substance of the world) *TORfa?Tcft ' m: ?|at DIALOGUE V1U. ' because tlie QuetitioQ and Example require it.' S'ankara ex- pi muds the aphorism thus: 'It lias already been said that as ' inquiry into duty is necessary for prosperity, so enquiry ? a? REVIEW OF VEDANT SUTRAS. 255 ' into Brahma is also necessary for emancipation. Brahma ' again has been defined as He ' from whom are the production, ' &c., of this.' But that definition is equally applicable [both ' to material and efficient causes] to the substance, such as the ' clay and gold are in the case of the jar and necklace, and to ' the agent such as the potter and the goldsmith. Hence the ' doubt, of u-liat kind is the causality of Bralima ' Here it ' might appear that He is only the efficient cause. Why ? ' Because we hear of observation preceding the agencj'. The ' agency of Brahma is indeed found preceded by observation, in ' the following texts. 'He observed. He created the vital air.' ' Now agency with observation is seen only in efficient causes ' such as potters and others. Therefore it is proper to under- ' stand the causality of God as simply that of an agent. The ' universe, again, as a work, is composed of parts, inanimate, 4 impure. Its cause must likewise be of the same kind, for ' cause and effect are homogeneous. But Brahma does not 4 answer to this description ; witness the texts, ' without parts, ' without work, quiet, unblemished, unstained.' In fine, a 4 material cause, different from Brahma, and possessed of ' impurity and similar qualities, such a cause as is set forth in ' the smriti, should be looked for ; and as to the text declaring 4 the causality of Brahma, it would be quite sufficient to con- 4 sider Him as the efficient agent (alone). To this argument, (continues S'ankara) we reply : Brahma is to be understood as 4 the Prakriti, the substance or material, and also the efficient ' cause. Not simply the efficient cause. Why ? Because the ' congruity of the question and example requires it. This is ' the question, ' Did you ask him for the doctrine by which that " which is unheard becomes heard, that which is unthought of " becomes thought of, that which is unknown becomes known '*' ' Herein it was understood that by the knowledge of one, all ' others, though unknown, become known. Now it is by the 4 knowledge of the material cause, that every thing else is ' known, because the material cause is inseparable from the ' effect. But the efficient cause is not inseparable from the ' effect, because a difference between the architect and the ' edifice is seen in the world. This, again, is the example, " As O beloved ! by means of one clod of earth every earthy form " is known, it being in truth only earth, though called, in words, ' a modification.' Thus is the material cause set forth in the ' Vedas. Also, 4 as by means of one magnet, every [magnet- " ized] iron becomes known, and as by means of one nail- " clipper, every black iron is known.' So also elsewhere, 4 What 256 DIALOGUE VIII. ' is that, Sir, which being known, all this becomes known ?' ' on this question the example is ; 'as in the earth herbs are ' produced.' ' The Spirit being seen, heard, thought of, known, ' all this is known/ on this question the example is, ' as one ' cannot take hold of the external sound of a drum that is beaten, ' but by taking up the beaten drum itself, the sound of the ' stroke is also taken up.' Thus in every Vedant text bearing ' on the point, the question and example are to be known as ' proving material causality. Again, in the sentence, ' From 1 whom all these creatures proceed,' -from whom is in the abla- ' tive case ; hence since it refers especially to the maker's ' material, it must be expressive of the material cause. His ' efficient causality is to be deduced from the want of any other ' agent. As in the world, the material causes, such as earth ' and gold, need the working of potters, goldsmiths, and other ' agents, not so does the material cause Brahma need another ' agent, for before the creation we learn there was one only ' without a second. The want of another agent is also deducible ' from the congruity of the question and example, for if there ' were another agent, separable from the material, then by means 1 of one thing every thing else could not be known, and the ' question and example would become incongruous. Hence ' from the want of another agent, is deduced the spirit's agency, 1 and from the want of another substance his material causality.' " The next Sutra (24th) confirms the above view. ' From ' the doctrine of his desire too.' S'ankara thus expounds it. ' The doctrine of desire, too, demonstrates the spirit's efficiency ' and material causality. ' He desired, let me become many, " let me be born.' Also ' He saw &c.' ' Here from the inde- ' pendent action preceded by desire he is inferred as the actor : ' from the words ' let me become many,' because of individual ' souls being the objects of the thought or intention of multi- ' plication, he is inferred to be the substance or material cause ' also 1 .' The founder of the Vedanta School goes on urging the same doctrine. ' Because the two processes [of springing from REVIEW OF VEDAXT SUTRAS. 257 and being resolved into] are both manifestly spoken of in the Vedas 1 .' S'ankara explains it thus : ' This is the exposition of the state otprakriti. Hence too is Brahma the material cause, for the Vedas, manifestly taking Brahma to be the only cause, speak of production and absorption. ' All these elements pro- ceed from ether and are resolved into ether.' That from which any thing proceeds and into which it is resolved is called the material cause as the earth is of rice and wheat. By the use of the word ' manifest,' too, he shows that the words ' from ether' exclude the supposition of any other material. Nor is the resolution of an effect ever seen to be into any other than the material cause.' Again, says Vyasa, ' Because of his creating himself by mutation.' S'ankara thus expounds it : Hence too is Brahma the material cause for with reference to his operation, it is said ' He himself created himself '- thereby indicating that he was both the agent and the object of the creation ' himself ' signifying the object ' he himself created ' signifying the agent. But now how can one, already held to be the Maker, be again represented as an object, being tnade ! We reply, by Mutation. The spirit, before proved to be existent, altered himself, by a particular modification. It is by particular modifications that the muta- tion of materials like earth and other things is found. The specification, too, of ' He himself ' excludes the supposition of another agent 2 .' Vyasa continues : ' He is also sung as the w ^tfkwrtat KIv 258 DIALOGUE VIII. womb 1 .' S'ankara explains it thus ' Hence also is Brahma the material cause, for the expression ' Brahma is the womb ' is read in the Vedant, thus 'the Lord, the creative soul, Brahma, ' is the womb/ also, ' the self-restrained see the womb of the creation/ The womb is popularly understood to be the mate- rial cause thus the earth is the womb of herbs and trees/' The fourth section, and consequently the first chapter, con- cludes with the aphorism, ' Hereby all (hostile tenets) are re- ' futed 8 / " The above extracts, continued Satyakama, prove that ac- cording to the teaching of Vyasa and S'ankara the substance or material of the universe is God, and that the world is only ;i development of Him. Such a view of Brahma's relation to the world could' not but be startling. Many were the objections preferred by the followers of the Sankhya and Nyaya, which S'ankaracharya cited and answered. 1 cannot say he has fairly met them, but let us now review that discussion. Objection 3 . ' Brahma is not the material cause for ' this has ' a characteristic difference, and so also the ' Veda says/ This fk ft HOW SANKAHA MET OBJECTIONS. 2o f J is Vyasa's epitome of his adversaries' sayings. S'ankara thus expounds it. ' The objection, raised on the authority of ' the Sniriti against Brahma's substantial and efficient causality ' has been refuted ; that founded on argumentation is now being 5fiTq qtfq 260 DIALOGUE VIII. ' disposed of. It may be asked how could there be room for ' argumentation on a point settled by the S'astra ? May not the ' S'astra be an independent authority in the ease of Brahma, as ' it is in the case of Dharma V But then it would be a question ar srrq i0\V bAMKAHA MET OBJECTIONS. 1 of practice, whereas Brahma is a demonstrable substance. ' Hence further evidence is admissible. And so he anticipates ' the logical objection, ' This has a characteristic difference, &c.' You say that the sentient Brahma, the cause of the world, is also its prakriti. This is not congruous. Why? because of the ' characteristic difference between this, the fabric, and its sub- ' stance. This world, which you would describe as a production ' of Brahma, is of a different character from Him, being per- ' ceived to be non-sentient, impure. And Brahma is declared ' to be of a different character from the world, i.e., sentient ' and pure. The relation of material and fabric is never seen ' where there is characteristic difference ; for neckchains and ' other golden fabrics cannot have earth for their material, nor ' earthen pots, gold. Earthen fabrics are made only of earth, ' and golden of gold. So this world, too, being connected with sqqf?T?q^ srfa: J(v2 DIALOGUE VIII. ' pleasure, pain, and delusion, must be the production of a noii- ' sentient cause, also connected with pleasure, pain, and delu- ' sion, and not of Brahma, which is of a different character. ' That Brahma has a characteristic difference is evident from ' our observation of the world's being non-sentient and impure. ' This world is indeed impure, because, being a compound of ' pleasure, pain, and delusion, it is a cause of delight, sorrow, ' and grief, and because it consists of the opposite varieties of ' heaven and hell. And it is non-sentient, for we see that it ' serves the sentient as an object or an instrument. But there 1 cannot be the relation of server and served where there is ' equality. Nor can two lamps serve each other. But cannot ' the sentient too serve as the object and instrument of ' the enjoyer, after the manner of master and servant ? No ! for ' even as regards master and servant, it is the non-sentient part ' that serves the sentient. That which is the attribute of one ' that is sentient, such as the understanding, itself non-sentient, ' does service to another that is sentient, but the sentient ' himself does neither service nor damage to another sentient. 1 Sentient actors have no superior. Thus do the followers of ' the Sankhya believe. Therefore object and instrument are ' non-sentient. Nor is there any sign of sentiency in wood and ' earth, and this distinction between the sentient and non- ' sentient is notorious in the world. Therefore because of its ' characteristic difference from Brahma, this world cannot have ' him for its material. Perhaps some one will say, ' since " the Vedas declare that the world has a sentient being " for its material, I shall for that very reason hold the world to " be sentient, because the quality of the material follows in the " fabric. Its sentiency may be latent owing to some especial " modification. As in souls, obviously sentient, sentiency dors " not properly appear in the state of sleep or trance, so the " sentiency of wood and earth may also be only latent. Because " also of this difference of manifestation and non-manifesta- " tion, and of colour and no colour, notwithstanding that " sentiency is common to objects and instruments and to " spirits, the predominant quality is not affected. As also flesh, " sauce, and rice, though all of one common element, earth, " are still subservient to each other, because of their several " distinctions, so also here. Therefore the known distinction " is not affected.' It is with difficulty that this person explains " away the characteristic difference between sentiency and " non-sentiency, but he cannot explain away the characteristic " difference between purity and impurity. Nor can he really HOW SANKARA MF.T OBJECTIONS. 263 1 explain away the other either, and therefore it is added ' [by Vyasa in his summary of the Sankhya objection,] ' And ' so also the Veda.' This sentiency of all things, which is ' not held among men, is a mere hypothetical deduction ' from the Vedic teaching of a sentient material cause, ' depending solely on that teaching. But it is negatived ' by Vedic teaching itself, for the Veda also inculcates ' that (characteristic difference). 'And so ' the Veda itself ' expresses the characteristic difference thus, ' Knowledge ' and ignorance ' teaching thereby that some part being ' non-sentient, the non-sentient world is characteristically ' different from the sentient Brahma. But do not some texts ' inculcate the sentiency of the elements and organs, (other- ' wise) considered mm sentient ? thus, ' the earth spake, the 'waters spake,' and, 'that light saw, those waters saw.' ' These texts teach that the elements are sentient. So ' do others about the organs, thus, ' these my vital airs ' contending for superioritys went to Brahma' also, ' they ' said, do thou sing us.' To this the objector replies, (as Vyasa ' represents him in the next Sutra IT. i. 5.) ' But that is ' proved to be a mere personification, both by the distinction and ' the usage.' S'ankara again thus expounds Vyasa's curt repre- ' sentation of his adversary's rejoinder : ' The w r ord but con- ' tradicts the previous supposition. From texts such as ' the ' earth spake,' one cannot suppose that the elements and ' organs are sentient, because it is a mere personification. ' Sentient gods, imagined as personifications of earth and other ' elements, and of speech and other organs, are described as ' speaking and discoursing, which are acts of sentient beings ; ' not that elements and organs speak. Why ? because there is ' the distinction and the usage. A distinction has been before ' established between enjoyers and elements and organs, ' marking the division between sentient and non-sentient. ' That would not consort with the notion of every thing being ' sentient. Moreover in the Kaushitaki, the vital airs are ' distinguished by the word gods in order to show that the ' sentient divinities which direct them, are meant, and not ' the mere organs themselves, thus these my gods contending ' for superiority,' and, ' these gods know the supreme felicity ' to be in the vital air.' And in the figurative language of the ' Mantras, as well as in the Itihasas and Puranas, there are ' every where personifications of sentient gods introduced. ' Again, texts, such as ' Agni becoming speech, entered the ' mouth,' exhibit gods personifying the organs. In the con- 2(',[ DIALOGUE VIII. ' text of the passage about vital airs, also, we have, they, ' the vital airs, went and spoke to Prajapati the father.' 4 The going to Prajapati was for the ascertainment of ' superiority, and the speech, directly and indirectly, sets forth 4 the excellence of the vital airs. So also the taking of offerings 4 to him. Such following of acts like ours confirms the per- 1 sonification. In the passage, ' that light saw,' we are also 4 to observe that the seeing is predicated of the presiding ' Supreme Divinity, personifying his own modification. The ' world is therefore, characteristically different from Brahma, ' and because of the difference he cannot be its material.' ' 4 I have no great respect, continued Satyakama, for the. Sankhya philosophy, but the above argument, enforced by its adherents, appears irresistibly powerful. I do not acquiesce in every thing continued in the objection, so candidly and elaborately represented by S'ankara, but there is no denying that the external universe is characteristically different from Brahma, and that it cannot have the spirit for its fmbjcrt matter, which indeed is a contradiction in terms." Rajah. " But has not S'ankaracharya given a sufficient reply to that argument'?" Satyakdma. " His reply is singularly unsatisfactory. Let us consider it in detail. The next Sutra (II. i. 6,) reads, ' Hut it is seen 1 ,' which S'ankara thus expounds. That which qf ft^rr HOW SANKARA MET OBJECTIONS. 265 ' you ' urge, that the universe cannot, because of its charac- ' teristic difference, have Brahma for its substance, is not ' conclusive ; for from men and other animals, well known ' to be sentient, the production of hair, nails, and other ' things, different in character, is witnessed in the world ; ' and that of scorpions and other insects from cowdung and ' other things, well known to be non-sentient. If you ob- ' ject that the causes of hair and nails, which are non- ' sentient, are only the bodies of men and other animals which ' are no other than non-sentient, and the productions of cow- ' dung and other matter, which are non-sentient, are the bodies ' of scorpions and other insects which are no other than non- ' sentient ; my reply is, Here too there is a difference in the ' characters ; something non-sentient becomes the receptacle of ' the sentient and something does not. Hence there is a dif- 4 ference. Great, again, is this natural mutation, because of ' the difference in colour between the human and other bodies ' (on the one hand,) and hair, nails, &c. (on the other) ; so also ' between cowdung and other matter and scorpions and other ' insects. Nor could there be the relation of material and fab- ' ric if there were too much similarity [and no difference at all ' in the characters]. Again if you say that there is a certain ' earthiness, or other natural character, in the human and other ' bodies, which is also found in hair, nails, and other things, ' and a similar one in cowdung and other matter, which is also rff? Ibid., II. i. 7. LL 2(5() DIALOGUE VIII. ' found in scorpions, c., I reply, so is there a natural character ' in Brahma, even his entity, which is also found in ether and ' other things. By finding fault with the notion of the universe ' having Brahma for its material, because of a difference of ' characters, tell me, do you refer to the absence of the whole ' of Brahma's nature in the effect, or of any part of it, or merely ' of His Intelligence? In the first case your argument would ' destroy the very possibilit}^ of the relation of material and fab- 4 ric, for there cannot be such things, if the one is to have no ' excess above the other. In the second case the argument is ' not founded in fact, for, as I have already said, one natural ' character of Brahma, i.e., his entity, exists in ether and other things. As to the third case, it has no example. Against ' them who assert that Brahma is the cause, what example can ' be adduced of a thing which is not endowed with sentiency ' /taring other material than Brahma, when we declare that ' all this, which has sprung from a substance, has Hralmia for ' its material ?' " I submit, continued Satyakama, the reply is not satisfac- tory. The example of hair and nails, as products of the animal body, gives no countenance to the relation which S'ankara would establish between the world and Brahma. Hair and nails, themselves material, (or earthy as he himself calls them), are produced from the animal body, also material, or earthy. The example would be analogous if hair and nails were pro- ducts of the immaterial said unearth y soul. The Sankhya would not however admit such a premiss, nor does S'ankara, though commencing the argument with such a suggestion, insist on it in the end. But then he tells us that as the relation of cause and effect between the animal body and hair and nails is verified by the property of earthiness, common to both, so may the relation of cause and effect, or rather material and fabric, between Brahma and the universe, be verified by the common property of entity. We shall see afterwards, when we review his theory of avidyd, or ignorance, whether this common pro- perty is compatible with that theory. Meanwhile I must re- mark that this part of his argument involves an ati-vydpti. It proves too much. To say that mere entity is a character on which the relation of cause and effect, or rather of material and fabric, may be founded, is simply to assert that merely because two things exist, the one may be a material of the other. Then any thing may be proved to be a material of every fabric. When you are called upon to show in what respect can this fabric, the universe, exhibit a sameness of quality with its SAXKAHA'S UNI-'AIU EKCUUMEK WITH SANKHYA. '207 material Brahma, you say it is in respect of entity. But entity is a universal attribute of every thing that exists. It cannot be a characteristic attribute of a particular cause or effect. The argument involves the fallacy which Kanada has expressed by the formula, because it has horn,*, therefore it is a coic. The general attribute of all horned animals cannot be an especial attribute of the individual cow. " Then, again, the Sankhya comes forward with a counter assertion, directly negativing the Vedantist's proposition. He say;-, the non-sentient cannot be a product of the sentient. An assertion, such as this, might be at once disproved by a single example, if one could be adduced, and it is therefore for the opponent of the Sankhya to dispose of it in that way if he can. S'ankara however challenges an example in support of the Sankhya's negative proposition, and asks for a parallel instance of an inanimate fabric being produced from a material other than Brahma. It would be easier for him to disprove the Sankhya's negative, than for the Sankhya to adduce an instance in its support. Still it might not be unjust in itself to demand such an example. But S'ankara, when he demands the example, demands it in such a way as would make it abso- lutely impossible for the Sankhya to satisfy him. He assumes that whatever exists has Brahma for its material ! This is to ask for a thing you have antecedently resolved not to accept. It is in fact a mockery, and is in other words an evasion of the argument. ISIo man can undertake to argue a case where his adversary plainly tells him he will admit no counter evidence. When you allowed room for the Sankhya's argument when you boasted that if Veda alone, were proof \m(\ arguments dis- allowed, then the question of Brahma would be degraded into one of mere practice nay, when you confidently added, that, as, when there are conflicting texts one may be overruled by another, so, in the conflict of arguments, Veda itself may be overruled by the force of proof 1 you virtually staked the correctness of your inference on the result of a logical discussion. But directly you enter into the argument, yon endeavour to stop wfa Coin. Vcdant, 11. i. i. 2(38 DIALOGUE VIII. your adversary's mouth by a sddhya-aama, or an assumption, which not only amounts to, but is rather identical with the very proposition under examination. If such was your intention, why did you not say so to the Sankhya at the first onset ? Why did you meet him in the field of argumentation '? Why did you not say plainly that since you cannot agree with the Sankhya on first principles, you are mutually nigraliasthana to each other, or not in a position to carry on a discussion." Rajah. "Well, go on with your review of the Vedunla Sutras, we shall have plenty of time for discussion after- wards." Sati/akdnia. " I cheerfully acquiesce. Here then is another objection preferred by the followers of the Sankhya. 1 ' Be- cause of contact with it in dissolution, there is incongruity.' They say if a gross, material, inanimate, divisible, and impure effect have Brahma for its cause, then at the disso- lution, when the effect resolves into, and becomes inseparable from, the cause, it will defile the cause by association with its own qualities. Therefore since at the dissolution the cause Brahma must become impure like its effect, the doctrine of the Upanishad, that the cause of the universe is omniscient Brahma, becomes incongruous. Moreover, be- cause of all distinctions being then dissolved (by absorption I 3Tfq=g s Ihiil., II. i. 8. HOW SANKARA MET OBJECTIONS. 269 in Brahma) there cannot, at the reproduction, be a production of the distinction of enjoyer and enjoyment owing to want of direction. This is another incongruity. Again, enjoyers being at that time inseparable from the supreme Brahma, and a reproduction being inevitable even at the dissolution occasioned by works, the emancipated also are liable to that reproduction. This is another incongruity still. If you say the universe may, even in dissolution, remain distinct from the Supreme Brahma, then there cannot be a dissolution at all, nor can the effect be inseparable from the cause. This is likewise an incongruity.' The Yedantist replies 1 : ' Not so, there being example.' S'ankaracharya expounds the aphorism in the following manner. ' There is no incongruity in our doctrine. That WI rfqfa?5I f^ WWm qf3T cfiRij 270 DIALOGUE VIII. ' which is said as to the effect defiling the cause by contact ' with its own qualities on being resolved thereinto ; it is not a ' valid objection. Why? Because \ve have instances on our ' side. There are instances of effects not defiling the cause by irqqr q**OTfq a^n: q^^ q?r: n^r f?wrirt " IL ;.,,. HOW SANKARA MET OBJECTIONS. 271 ' contact with their own qualities on being resolved thereinto ; ' c.f/., earthen saucers and other manufactures, having mud for ' their material, and being in their separate states distinguished ' as large, small, middling, do not, when resolved into their ' material, affect it with their own qualities. Neck-chains, ' having gold for their material, do not, when dissolved, affect ' their material with their own qualities. The fourfold organic ' modifications, too, of earth (viviparous, oviparous, c.) do not ' in dissolution affect it with their own qualities. But on your ' side there is no example. Nor would it be a dissolution at ' all, if the effect, when resolved into the cause, could continue ' with its own qualities. And though we say that the cause ' and effect are inseparable, we mean by such words as mere ' naniffi, that effect is of the same nature as the cause, not the ' cause as the effect. The objector, again, far understates his ' own argument, when he says that the effect may, in dissolu- ' tion, affect the cause with its own qualities. For the same ' contact remains in the state of existence too, because cause ' and effect are held inseparable. ' All this is the same as this ' spirit.' 'All this is Spirit.' This is immortal in its front, 'even Brahma.' 'All this is indeed Brahma.' These texts ' teach that the cause and effect are inseparable in all the three ' states. Now the argument by which this difficulty is removed ' holds equally good in regard to dissolution also, viz., that the ' effect and its qualities, being fictions of Ignorance, cannot ' affect the cause. There is also this other example. As a ' juggler is not himself touched in any of the three states by ' the projected illusion, because of its not being a substance, ' so the Supreme Spirit is untouched by the illusion of the ' world. As also a seer of dreams is not touched by the ' illusion, seen in dreams, because the pleasing vision does not ' follow the waking state, so the one invariable observer of the ' three-fold states [of production, continuance, and dissolution] ' is not touched by the variable three-fold state. For the % appearance of the Supreme Spirit, as in the form of the three- fold states, is but an illusion, like that of a rope in the form ' of a snake. Thus has it been said by scholars versed in the ' Yedant doctrine : 4 when the animal soul, sleeping under an ' eternal delusion, awakes, then it understands itself to be ' uncreated, unsleeping, undreaming, without .a second.' Thus ' that which has been said that in dissolution the cause may be ' defiled by the grossness of the effect, is absurd. This, again, ' which has been said that all distinctions being then merged in ' n state of no distinction, there cannot be a directing cause for 272 DIALOGUE VIII. ' the reproduction of the distinctions, is also no objection, for ' there are examples on our side. As in sleep and samddhi (or ' fixed meditation), notwithstanding the natural attainment ' of a state of no distinction, the distinctions come to pass ' again in the waking state, as before, because of ignorance not ' being destroyed, so may it be here too. There is the Veda ' here also ; 'All these creatures, having attained to the ' [eternally] existent, did not know that they had attained to 1 the [eternally] existent.' 'Whatever they be in this state, ' whether it be a tiger, or a lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or an ' insect, or a fly, or a gnat, or a musquito, they become the ' same [in the reproduction].' As in the state of existence ' [in life], notwithstanding that there is no distinction from ' the Supreme Being, still the practice of distinction after the ' manner of a dream is, owing to ignorance, not precluded, so ' may the capacity of distinction be inferred also in dissolution owing to ignorance. By this the idea of the reproduction of ' the emancipated is also refuted, because their ignorance is ' dispelled by full knowledge. With reference to the other ' supposed alternative, that the world may, then, in dissolution ' remain distinct from the Supreme Brahma, that is also ' refuted, simply by its not following necessarily from the ' premises. Hence this doctrine of the Upanishad is con- ' sistent.' ' Rajah. " I do not wish to interrupt you, Satyakama, but is not this a Sutra in which Vyasa and S'ankaracharya inculcate the theory of Maya? What do you say Vaiyasika to this?" Vaiydsika. " Please your highness, there is nothing in the language of Vyasa that countenances such a theory. He only relies on ' examples' seen in the world, which Sankara correctly expounds notwithstanding that he adds something about Ignorance." Satyaktma. " And I may add with reference to S'ankara himself that he seems to make use of a convenient theory, inculcated by ' certain scholars versed in the Vedant doctrine,' rather than inculcate it himself. He certainly takes advantage of it in self-defence, and so far acquiesces in that doctrine, but he does not enforce or argue for it. His primary argument, suggested by the words in the Sutra, has reference to 'examples.' Earthen saucers do not, when in dissolution, affect their material with their specific qualities, nor neck- chains their gold." Rajah. " Well go on, Satyakama, but we must consider afterwards to what extent S'ankara has adopted the theory of HOW SAKKARA MET OBJECTIONS. 273 Maya after having so forcibly written against the idealism of Buddhists." Satyakaana. "A third Sankhya objection is thus repre- sented 1 . ' It may be said this distinction between enjoyer and enjoyment is well known in the world. The sentient soul is the enjoyer. Objects, such as sound, are enjoyments. For instance Devadatta is enjoyer. Food is enjoyment. The distinction would be destroyed if the enjoyer were to become the enjoyment, or the enjoyment the enjoyer. Such inter- change of conditions between the two would be inevitable, if they are identical with their supreme cause Brahma. This confounding of the distinction is not reasonable. As the distinction between enjoyer and enjoyment is visible at the present moment, so must it be supposed as to the past and future. Therefore because of the confounding of the well- known distinction between enjoyer and enjoyment, this theory of Brahma as the cause is absurd. If any one bring W fljT RF3ttT a^a cT^T =3 Ibid II. i. 13. MM 274 DIALOGUE Vlll. ' forward this objection, the author (Vyasa) would reply, ' it ' is as in the world.' ' Such a difference is proved even on our theory, because it is ' seen in the world. For it is usual to consider, at the same ' time, as different from one another, and also characteristically * alike, waves, froths, and bubbles which are various moditica- ' tions of the sea, though essentially water, and therefore ' identical with it. Nor can froths and waves which, though ' of the same substance as water, are various modifications of ' the sea, lose their separate individualities ; neither are they ' different in substance from the sea because they are indivi- ' dually separate. So here too there is no confusion of enjoyer ' and enjoyment, nor is any thing different from the supreme ' Brahma." A fourth objection is thus noticed 1 . ' Because of one being ' styled the other, there is the objection of doing injury.' fa: $cW5qqn?l fawj srrfasj *m<3 sqqferfa fa HOW SANKARA MET OBJECTIONS. 275 ' S'ankara thus expounds it. ' The theory of a sentient cause ' is again objected to. If the production of the universe be ' from a sentient cause, then objections present themselves on ' the score of doing injury. Why ? Because of one being styled ' the other. The Veda styles another, that is the embodied ' soul, Brahma ; thus in the assurance [given to S'wetaketu as follows.] ' He is the Spirit, thou art He. O S'weta- ' ketu.' Or [as it may be otherwise construed] another, that ' is Brahma, is styled the embodied soul : thus, ' Having created .' it, he entered into itself,' representing God, the unchanged ' creator, to be the embodied soul by his entrance into his own ' production. The same also appears from the text, ' by enter- ' ing as this animal spirit I will make names and forms.' The ' supreme divinity, describing the animal soul by the word ' spirit, shows that the embodied soul is not different from ' Brahma. Therefore that which is the agency of Brahma is ' in truth the agency of the embodied soul. Hence, being an ' independent actor, he would do that which was for his own ' benefit, and pleasing to himself, not that which was injurious ' to himself, namely, the assemblage of vanities, such as birth, ' death, decay, and disease. No one indeed makes of his own ' accord a prison for himself, and enters it ; nor, being himself ' perfectly unstained, would he betake himself to a body that is ' extremely foul. And even if he had created a world some- ' how or other, he would willingly renounce that which was a ' causs of pain, and take to that which was a cause of pleasure. ' And he would remember that this variegated and diversified ' world was created by himself. For every person, when he ' has distinctly performed an act, remembers, ' this was done ' by myself.' Again, as a conjurer can, at pleasure, easily ' dissolve an illusion, [or charm] , projected [or set up] by ' himself, so would the embodied soul ' dissolve this his own ' creation. But the embodied soul cannot, at pleasure, easily ' dissolve the body, though his own. Thus from non-observ- ' ation of beneficial acts, it may be inferred that the world is ' produced from an irrational and inanimate cause." It is thus answered ' But it is the superior, because a differ- 1 ence is inculcated.' S'ankara thus expounds it. The word 276 DIALOGUE VIII. ' but contradicts the foregoing objection. We call that the ' world's creator which is omniscient, all powerful, Brahma, ' eternal, pure, intelligent, free, true in his nature, superior to ' and different from the embodied soul. There cannot against ' him be objections on the score of doing injury. He has no bene- ' fit to bring about, nor injury to avert, being eternally free. Nor ' can there ever be in him any lack of knowledge, or of power, ' being omniscient and all powerful. The embodied soul how- ' ever is not so. Against him such objections may be taken ' on the score of doing injury. But we do not call him the ' creator of the world. Why so ? because a difference is in- ' culcated. ' The spirit is to be seen, heard, thought of, medi- ' ' tated on, sought, enquired after. The embodied soul is then ' ' endued with the existent. The spirit followed by the know- ' ' ing spirit.' Such inculcation of distinction between agent ' and object shows that Brahma is superior to the embodied ' soul. But is not identity also inculcated ? thus, thou art He ! ' How then can the two contradictory ideas, identity and dis- ' tinction, stand ? This is no fault. Both are possible in their ' respective places after the manner of the ether and the ether- ' in-a-pot. Moreover, when identity is inculcated after the ' fashion of the identification, ' thou art He,' then the worldli- ' ness of the animal soul and the creativeness of Brahma are ' both passed away. Since the practice of all distinctions, set ' up by Ignorance, is contradicted by full knowledge, where ' then is the creation, and where the objection on the score ' of doing injury ? The total exhibition of name, form, act, ' object, instrument, being set up by ignorance is an error, a ' creature of thoughtlessness. I have repeatedly told you that ' the world, characterized by good or evil acts, does not in ' reality exist, it being like the fancies of birth, death, separation, ' and division. But if the practice of distinctions be not dis- ' allowed, then such texts, as ' He is to be sought after,' in- ' culcating a distinction, establish the superiority of Brahma, ' and preclude the ascription of fault because of doing injury 1 .' HOW SANKAEA MET OBJECTIONS. 277 The same objection is again answered. ' It [the objection] is refuted, after the manner of stones, &c.' S'ankara says, Moreover, as in the world, of stones, though endowed with the common property of earthiness, a great variety is seen, some being gems of great value, e. g., diamonds and vaidurya, others of middling worth, e. g., suryakdnta, others, again, of low estimate, fit for casting at dogs and birds ; as also of seeds, though all partaking of the same earthiness, a great variety [of developments] is found, of leaves, flowers, fruits, perfumes, and flavors, e. g., in the sandal and champa plants ; as also, in fine, of the same substance of food, various effects are produced, e. g. blood, wool, so may there be a variety of productions from the same Brahma, in the distinction between the animal and the knowing souls. Hence ''it is refuted' meaning, the objection adduced by the adverse party is refuted. 278 DIALOGUE VIII. ' It may also be said that the product, being agreeably to the ' Veda, a mere nominal one, appears various like visions seen ' in dreams 1 .' Another objection is thus met. ' If you say, No ! because 4 an elaborate process is seen, I reply, No ! it is like milk.' S'ankara says : ' The saying that one sentient Brahma 4 is the only cause of the world is not demonstrable, be- ' cause an elaborate process is seen. In this world, pot- ' ters and other workmen, as manufacturers of jars, clothes, 4 and other things, are found to accomplish their works, by ' successfully using the instrumentality of many agencies, 4 earth, staff, wheel, string. You say Brahma had no helper. 4 If he had no other instruments to assist him, how could 4 he be the Creator ? Hence Brahma is not the cause of 1 the world. If this be said, it is no fault. For it is accom- 4 plished like milk, through the peculiar property of the sub- 4 stance itself. As in the world milk or water turns of itself 4 into curds or ice, without requiring an external instrument, 4 so also here. But does not milk itself when turning into 4 curds require an external instrument, such as heat ? Then ; how can it be said that the creation is like the operation of 4 milk ? This is no fault. Milk is only more quickly turned 4 by heat into the state of curds, but not in a greater measure 4 than it would itself attain. If it had not the capacity of 4 turning into curds, it could not be forced into that state by 4 the power of heat ; for air and ether cannot be forced into 4 that state by the power of heat. By the fulness of the inst i n- 4 ment, also, is its fulness accomplished. But Brahma has HOW SANKABA MET OBJECTIONS. 279 fulness of power. His fulness cannot be accomplished by any thing else. There is the Veda, too, saying, He has no work or instrument. He has no equal or superior. His power is heard to be supreme and diversified, and the exercise of his knowledge and strength, natural. Therefore, because of his diversified power, though but one Brahma, his diversi- fied change, like milk, is proved l ? The objection is further answered 2 , ' Like gods and other beings, in the world.' S'ankara's gloss is as follows : Be ^rn qf^TR flr : q?r: 280 DIALOGUE VIII. it so. Milk and other non-sentient things are proved by observation to change into curds, &c. without requiring external instruments. But sentient agents, such as potters, are found to engage in their occupations only by applying their tools and instruments to their respective works. Why then should sentient Brahma engage without help ? We reply, Like gods and other beings. As in the world, Kishis, and other beings of superior power, though sentient, are, without requiring any external instruments, found, on the authority of the illustrative language of Mantras, and of Itihasas and Puranas, to create bodies, houses, chariots and many other things of various descriptions by the simple exercise of volition, by virtue of their especial dignities, and as spiders weave their nets of themselves as also cranes conceive without the assistance of their males as again assemblages of the lotus move, without requiring any exter- nal help, from pool to pool, so may Brahma, though sentient, himself create the universe without any external instrument.' Another objection is thus anticipated 1 : ' The whole would be affected, or violence done to the Veda that he is without fqa* 3?fa spcrr^mq fafesrif Wa HOW SA.NKAKA MET OBJECTIONS. parts.' S'ankara says, ' It is proved that the one sentient Brahma, changing himself without a second, and without requiring external helps, becomes the cause of the world. But with a view to clear the sense of the S'astra, he again anticipates an objection : ' The whole would be affected,' Brahma, as a whole, would be changed into the form of his product, because he has no parts. If Brahma were, like earth and other materials, composed of parts, then one portion might be lost, and one portion might stand. But texts, like the following, preclude the possibility of any qualifications, and describe him as without parts. ' Without parts, without ' work, quiet, unstained, without blemish.' The heavenly soul ' is without form, uncreated within and without.' ' This great ' substance is without bounds, without end/ ' He is a mass ' of knowledge. ' This is a spirit, not ' such, not such.' ' Not stout, not thin.' * The alteration of a part being thus impossible, if the whole be supposed to be altered, then there will be a destruction of the root itself, and the exhortation to observe him prove futile. Besides, from the want of a Brahma, separate from his production, there would be violence done to the texts which describe him as uncreated. If to obviate this difficulty he were held to be composed of parts, then the texts, already cited, which inculcate he is without parts, would he outraged. If, again, he were supposed to have parts, he would be proved uneternal. On all accounts therefore this theory appears impracticable.' NN 282 DIALOGUE VIII. Answer to the objection. ' But because of the Veda, because ' of its being founded on texts,' S'ankara thus expounds it. ' The ' \vordbut refutes the objection. There is indeed no fault on our ' side. There is no affection of the whole. Why ? because of ' the Veda. For as the production of the world from Brahma ' is heard, so is also his continuance, separate from the pro- ' duction, heard from the description of the substance and ' modification as distinct. ' That divinity observed, I am these ' three gods. By entering as animal soul I will make names and ' forms.' ' So much is his dignity. The soul is greater than ' he. The world is a quarter of Him. Immortality is three ' quarters of Him in heaven.' His existence, as separate from ' his production, is also evident from the declaration of his ' dwelling in the heart, and from that of being endowed with ' [eternal] entity. If Brahma were, in his totality, to be held ' as a production, then the following text, ' one is endowed with ' [eternal] entity,' describing the state of sleep, would be ' futile, because the altered Brahma must be held to be ' transient, and because of the non-existence of unaltered ' Brahma. Also because of Brahma not being subject to ' sensuous perception, and the mutation, or product, being ' subject to it. Therefore Brahma is unaltered. Nor can there 4 be any violence done to texts which inculcate that He is ' without parts, for that very description is inculcated in the ' Veda, and received. ' Tt is founded on texts.' Brahma is 1 dependent on Vedic testimony, not on that of the senses. \-c. ' He is to be received as inculcated in the Veda. The Veda dr- ' scribes Brahma both as unaffected in his totality, and also as ' being without part. Jn worldly things, too, such as stones. ' Mantras, medicines, owing to varieties of place, time, and ' occasion, powers are seen, productive of contradictory effects. ' They can, neither, be understood by mere argumentation ' without the indoctrination, that of such a substance, such are ' the powers, with such helps, such objects, and for such uses. ' What wonder then that the form of Brahma, who is of ' inconceivable power, cannot be established but by Vedic ' teaching ? And the Pauranikas say, ' one is not to apply ' argumentation to topics that are inconceivable : that which is ' above nature is a sign of the inconceivable.' There the truth ' of matters that transcend the senses is based on the Veda ' alone. But may it not be said that contradictions cannot be ' established even by the Veda, such as the tenet that Brahma. ' though without parts, alters, but not in his totality '.' Tf ' Brahma be without parts, then, either he would not alter at HOW SANKARA MET OBJECTIONS. 28M * all, or would alter in his totality. To say that he alters in ' one form, and remains in another, is, by introducing a ' distinction of forms, to say he has parts. With reference to ' practice, contradictory injunctions may be both alternately ' performed, and so there be no contradiction, the performance ' being dependent on the soul itself. But contradictions [in ' ontology] cannot be reconciled by means of alternation, for a ' substance is not dependent on the soul ; therefore this ' doctrine is impracticable. This is no objection because the ' distinction of forms is held to be a creation of ignorance. A ' substance is proved to be composed of parts by distinction of ' forms created by ignorance. For the moon, observed as ' many by the diseased eye, does not therefore really become ' numerous. By a distinction of forms, created by ignorance, ' signifying names and figures, modified and unmodified, and ' not describable either as that or another, Brahma is held to ' be subject to alteration, and other conventional ideas, but he ' remains unaltered, in his essential form, superior to all ' conventional notions. The expression, that distinctions of ' names and forms, created by ignorance, are merely in words, ' protects the text about Brahma's being without parts, from ' being outraged. Nor is this text about alteration intended to ' set forth alteration, for there could be no [practical] fruit ' resulting from such doctrine, but the following aims at set- ' ting forth Brahma's spiritual essence, freed from all conven- ' tional notions, for there is a [practical] fruit resulting from ' that teaching, viz. (commencing with the words ' he is a ' spirit, not such, not such.') ' O Janaka thou hast attained ' fearlessness.' Therefore there is no fault on our side 1 .' ararasi 284 DIALOGUE VITT. Another objection is again brought forward : ' Not so, for ' there must be an object.' S'ankara says, ' He again antici- ' pates an objection to the universe being a production of a ' sentient being. The sentient supreme could not have fabri- ' cated this spectre of a world, for efforts must have objects. em et*q flTr frofrreat fa HOW SANKARA MET OBJECTIONS. 285 In the world a sentient person, acting on previous delibera- tion, is seen to engage, even in small efforts, to say nothing of great efforts, moved by some objects of his own. There is also the text concurring with this popular idea, ' Every thing is not agreeable to every one's desire, but every thing is agreeable to the Spirit's desire.' The effort is indeed a great undertaking, that the world, with its varieties of high and low, should be fabricated. But if this effort on the part of the sentient Supreme Spirit be supposed to have an object of his own, then the all-contentedness of the Supreme Spirit, taught in the Veda, would be contradicted. And if such an object be not supposed, there could not be the effort. Perhaps it may be said that a maniac, though sentient, is sometimes seen to engage in efforts, by a default of his understanding, without an object of his own. The Supreme Spirit may have engaged in a similar manner. But in that case violence would be done to the Vedic doctrine of his omniscience. Therefore creation from a sentient cause is impossible 1 .' mi 3Tnfirt ^f^i^t fa: 286 DIALOGUE VIII. The objection is thus answered. ' But it is only a sport, as ' in the world.' S'ankara expounds it thus : ' By the word but ' he repels the objection. As in the world a king or courtier, ' having attained all his wishes, may be seen, in games and ' amusements, to engage in efforts, merely as sports, without 4 aiming at any objects, and as acts of respiration also take ' place naturally without aiming at any other external ob- ' jects, so does God's effort naturally take place, after the ' manner of a sport, without looking for any other objects. ' The assignment of an ulterior object to God is not consistent ' with reason or Veda. Nor can nature oppose an argument. ' Although the fabrication of this spectre of a world appears to ' us like a great undertaking, yet to God it is a mere sport, ' because his power is unbounded. Although again with refer- ' ence to worldly sports, some subtle object may be imagined, ' still no object can be imagined here, for the Veda says, He is one that has attained his wishes. Nor can the want of an ' effort, or a mad effort, be supposed, because of the texts in- ' culcating creation and all power 1 .' " Please your Highness, continued Satyakama, I must submit that S'ankara's replies to the Sankhya are not at all con- ^rarar ^ firo**3rdtfa SANKARA'S SELF-CONTKADICTION. 287 elusive. He commences with logic, but falls back on the Veda, and then, at last, when neither logic nor Veda is of any avail, he has recourse to the traditional doctrine of his school that the world is a fiction of ignorance, that there is no real universe, that it is Brahma himself that appears to you in the form of the world, just as a rope may do in that of a snake, and that there is no creation in reality ! Without going into the question of Maya, at present, I shall only say that S'ankara has himself argued for the reality of the external world, which in most of his answers here he also takes for granted, and his arguments lead to the theory that so far as the world is a reality, it is itself God. He quotes texts which declare that the world is the same as this spirit or God. That the world is a reality is a doctrine, he himself inculcates elsewhere, and it is only by self-contradiction that he can maintain his position against the Sankhya." Rajah. " What self -contradiction ?" $atyakdmu. "He says in his reply to the Sankhya, The ' appearance of the Supreme Spirit, as in the form of the three- ' fold states, is but an illusion, like that of a rope in the form ' of a snake.' He says, elsewhere, in his reply to the Bud- ' dhists, ' Desirous of denying external objects, they turn ' them into a simile by using the phrase like the externals.' He rebukes the Buddhists for denying the reality of the external world, and yet saying that the forms internally per- ceived, are lihe the externals. The rebuke is certainly well deserved, for, as he justly adds, no one can say Vishnu Mitrais ' like a barren woman's son ' But the same rebuke may with equal propriety be administered to himself for denying the reality of the ' three-fold states.' and yet maintaining that the Supreme Spirit appears in those forms. To use his own words, again, ' no one can say that Vishnu Mitra is like a fora 288 DIALOGUE VIII. barren woman's son.' If the ' spectre of a world' be an unreality, ' like a barren woman's son,' then it is absurd to say God appears in that form. If the ' spectre' be not alto- gether ' like a barren woman's son,' whatever minimum of reality may be ascribed to it, as an object of sensuous percep- tion, must so far be material, and if that minimum of material reality be solemnly styled God, it must be material pantheism to the same extent.' " But, answered Yaiyasika, neither Yyasa nor S'ankara- charya has said that God is a gross material substance." " It is true he has never said that. It is also true that he desired that the world should be looked upon as God. not God as the world 1 ; but the conversion cannot be altogether pre- cluded if Bnihma be an undivided and indivisible essence. Indeed when the Vedantic doctor brings in his caveat against the assimilation of God with the world, he does so as a matter of ethical policy. It will only be enhancing the coachman's dignity to give him a royal title. No one in our country takes offence on being addressed a king. In truth the word Maha- raja has become a mere term of compliment like the English Sir. But you will not do well to address the King as a subject. That will be a degradation of the royal dignity. This is a way of reasoning which ill suits the solemnity of the subject. It is only by way of compliment that a subject can ever be addressed with royal appellatives, and the appellatives themselves have in such a case a yauna, or figurative, sig- nification. But if you were seriously and solemnly to call an ordinary person your King, as verily and indisputably the Vedant does every creature, it would involve the guilt of high treason against your rightful sovereign. Even though you did not dishonor your King by calling him a subject, still if you render royal honors to all his subjects, you virtually degrade him by elevating every body else to the level of his dignity. Levelling may be brought about in two ways. You may either bring down your high places to the level of the low, or II Vcn that aphorism : ' Souls are manifold. Why '.' Because of ' varieties. One is respectable, another poor. One is happy. ' another miserable. One is high, another is low. One is a =fiNt qforcfqr ifa: 51% ^rrfta * * ST^lfa: MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF PANTHEISM. 295 ' scholar, another a clown. These varieties, which cannot be ' reconciled with the unity of the Spirit, prove the distinction ' of souls 1 .' " Consider the moral consequences of the pantheistic doctrine. The founder of the system himself is anxious that his followers should still continue in the performance of the duties they owe to God and man. But if God and man be indentical, then there can be no relation in life to give rise to the notion of duty. If there be only one essence in the world, then, 'who will regard, or honour, and whom?' says the L'panishad. Where there is a difference of personality, one can perform certain offices to another. Such an interchange of offices is impossible where all are one 2 . It would be absurd to say that one can adore or worship himself. In truth Yedantic authors have boldly asserted that they are subject to no law, no rule, and that there is no such thing as virtue or vice, in- junction or prohibition. " Ponder now the drift of your theory. To give up all distinc- tions between right and wrong all morals, all religion, all science, all philosophy would be to reduce human nature to a chaotic state to destroy the bands of society, and outrage the sanctity and decency of domestic life. Once more I remind you of what the pious authors already cited, says : ' If I and the whole ' universe be God, then you and I are one. Then my wealth, ' my children, my wife, must be our common property, without fcf: ft tern vraft afore Brihad. 29G DIALOGUE VIII. ' any distinction. If, again, there be such unity, how can there 'be injunction or prohibition? If you are decided that there is ' no difference, then what faults have the Buddhists commit- ted 1 '? ' What barrier can you oppose to the encroachments of bad passions, if men are to be persuaded that there can be in reality no law binding on any individual ; that virtue and vice, right and wrong, are mere vydvahdrika, or conventional ideas, founded on misapprehension ; that no one can do good or evil to his neighbour, there being no such thing as a neighbour, for all are one. " Rajah. " Is it fair, Satyakama, to deduce far-fetched infer- ences of an immoral tendency from a system which repudiates such tendency? Can you show on any respectable authority that principles of an immoral tendency have been practically deduced from the doctrine of the soul's unity with (iod?" Satyakama. Without making any remarks on your high- ness's first question, I shall only say, in reply to the second, that I think I can show that inferences of an immoral tendency have been deduced from the Vedant doctrine of the identity of the creature with the Creator. The Upanishads do not allow the possibility of any offices being done by one person to another. This is in itself a denial of all kinds of duty or obli- gation. And it is S'ankaracharya's own argument when he justifies the inequalities found in the world by the plea that God and the world being essentially one, there can be no such thing as injustice ! S'ankara's argument has again been enforced in another way in the S'ri-Bhdgavata, second only, perhaps, to the Pancha-ratra, in point of authority as a text-book of BJiaaa- vatas. These theosophists receive the pantheistic element of the Vedant, notwithstanding their peculiarities in other respects. The character which they set up as the incarnation of the Supreme Being was a foul pattern of sensuality and lust. No community can encourage such sensuality without bringing instant ruin on itself. Now the Bhagavatas do not ^5f*Tr a 5Ftf IMMORALITY JUSTIFIED BY PANTHEISM. Miy that sensuality and lust are themselves innocent. How then do they justify the irregularities of the youthful Krishna? Chiefly by relying on the theory of pantheism. King Parik- shit asks S'uka, ' The Lord of the world became incarnate with a view to establish virtue and put down vice. How could he, then, the preacher, the author, and the keeper of the bridges of virtue, behave so inconsistently, and dally with other men's wives?' S'ukadeva says in reply, ' He who lives within the cowherdesses, their husbands, and indeed all embodied souls, is the rightful owner and possessor of the sporting body 1 .' This is a practical application of the pantheistic dogma of the Upanishads and the Brahiua-sutras, at which one cannot help looking aghast, and your highness will allow it is a serious warning against the reception of that dogma." Tarkakdma . " But S'uka does not say that the example of Vasudeva can be safely followed by a mortal. ' He who is ' not himself divine should not commit such acts even in his ' mind. If a mortal were foolish enough to do so, he would ' perish as inevitably as if one, not being Rudra, took the ' sea-produced poison. The words of the gods are true, their ' acts only occasionally right. What is agreeable to their ' words, the wise are to observe in their conduct 8 ." Satyakdma. "It will be practically hard to persuade men to observe the precepts of those whose examples they are instructed to avoid. But the gods (Is'icaranam) , spoken of in the plural, necessarily include other persons than Vasudeva, and they represent a dignity, certainly within the reach of mortal ambition, according to the transcendental system of Bhagavata pantheism. ' Every thing is Krishna from Brahma . CREATION OF AVlDYA. 301 ' contemplaters of the creation ' in opposition to ' contemplaters of the chiei good, who take no interest in the creation ' ! l ' Rajdh. " But yau say Vyasa does not inculcate the doctrine of Maya in his siitras. I have read of an English scholar's citing one in proof of that doctrine." Satyakama. "The 3rd of III. ii. was cited by Colonel Kennedy, but under a great mistake. It reads thus : ' But k it is a mere illusion, because its reality does not appear by the ' whole of the properties of real substances 2 .' The latter part is of course elliptical. As the Colonel was not satisfied with S'ankara's explanation, let us consider the Sutra in detail. The 2nd Pada of the 3rd chapter commences with discussing the question whether the ideas which arise in the mind in dreams are real, as are those which arise in the waking state. ' In the intermediate state [between sound sleep and waking, i.e., in dreams] is there a real creation ? for it is so said 3 .' S'ankara proves by citing a Vedic text that the ' inter- mediate state' means a dream. He thus expounds the question contained in the Sutra : ' There is the doubt, Is the creation (or ' imagination in breams) real, as is the case in the waking ' state ? * * * for the Veda says so 4 .' The question is repeat- ed in the 2nd Sutra where reference is made to other Vedic passages, seemingly inculcating that dreams are real. In the 3rd Sutra (that which the Colonel quoted) the author decides the question by declaring that a dream is a mere ' Maya,' or delusion, for its reality is not established by the collection of proofs by which real substances are distinguished. " The late Uajah Earn Mohun lioy interpreted the last men- tioned Sutra after the manner of S'ankara, in his Bengalee edition. He thus translates the question contained in the 1st Aphorism : ' Since the creations in a state of dreaming are ' like God's works, let them also be true, like His other crea- ' tions. This question he determines in the following Sutra. 3 in. ii. i 4 aeRsrg: %* Com. on Do. 302 DIALOGUE VIIl. ' Those things which are presented in a dream, are mere ' illusions : for, of those which are seen in dreams, the reality ' is not sufficiently manifest.' Thus the very Sutra, which the learned Colonel had cited to prove his theory, proves precisely the contrary by implication. The author of the Vedanta calls dreams niaija, or illusions, because they are unlike the realities perceived in the waking state. " To me, however, spiritualistic pantheism, as it is called, I mean that which Col. Kennedy attributes to the Vedanta, appears scarcely better than material, or that which the ' so- called Vedantists' are anxious to disown. For it is as great a departure from truth, and as dangerous an error, to spiritu- alize matter, as it can be to materialize the spirit. You shrink from the idea of identifying the visible world with God, because the material world is not, and cannot be, a spiritual substance, much less, God, and because such an idea is subversive of the very first principles of religion. But is it not equally erroneous to say that the world is false, that all our senses are under a deception, and that God has deliberately projected certain appearances for the very purpose of practising that deception ? I am quite sure it is equally subversive of the interests of religion and morals. And I may add it is more dangerous, because more insidious in its plausibility. For there can be no religion, there can be no devotion, without a subject and an object. There must be the devotee, and there must be the object of devotion. If however the world is a nullity, if the human soul itself is a mere reflection, then I ask in the words of the Upanishad, who will worship, whom, and how.' " " The successors of Vyasa, who were unwilling to iden- tify matter with God, and therefore pronounced the world to be an illusion, were aware of the difficulties connected with their new position. The denial of a world, which was evident to all our senses, was itself so much opposed to nature and common sense, that they taxed their ingenuity, as far as they could, to qualify that denial. They introduced the ten us vyavaharika and pai'amdrtkika, or conventional and real ex- istences, in order to save their doctrine. The former they attributed, the latter they denied, to the world. If asked, how all this can be God, they would tell you the material w r orld was a Maya, an illusion, and that by not recognizing any visible entity, they virtually inculcated nothing but monotheism. But the true inference from their position was not unity of Deity, but unity of being. " If however charged, on the other hand, with the absurdities TECHNICAL SHIFTS IN DEFENCE OF MAYA. MUM so well set forth in the Vedican moda taranyini, they instantly shift from their position, and tell you they did not entirely deny the visible world. It had an existence in tn/avahdra, though it was, paramarthatah, no reality. " But the soul of man itself has no other than vyavaharika existence. Do you think you are an entity ? You may be one in popular parlance you are not BO paramarthafah, in reality. ' This one, says the Vedanta Sara, which, fancies itself to be ' agent and patient, and passes to and fro between this and the 'other world, is called the vyavafiarikajiva, or conventional soul 1 .' " The inference from the principles of this spiritualistic pantheism is inevitable, that in the sense in which the material world is existent, it is identical with God ; and since it is existent in the same sense, and quite to the same extent, as the human soul is existent : it must be God in the same sense in which a human being is not a non-entity. The Vedantist may solemnly swear &// his life that the universe is God ! The profound thinker, I have already cited several times, suggests, that the asserter of maya, if called on to declare, after the manner of jury-men, whether such and such persons, being guilty of theft, are to be punished by the King, will affirm on his oath that the whole is a tissue of falsehood 2 . " Vyasa's Vedanta was an unsuccessful attempt to reason from nature up to nature's God. The aphorist was certainly a contemplater of the creation and its wonders. He eyed the world was struck by its reality and beauty, and fancied that it proceeded from God, as a spark proceeds from fire, or froth from the sea." Tarkakama. " But how can you avoid the train of thought which passed in Vyasa's mind '? How can you deny that the universe is to God what the spark is to fire, and froth to the sea ? It must have a substantial cause, and if you deny that God is its cause, will you prefer to be an atheist ?" II Tattka-muktavali by Gaudapuniannnda. .-ill] DIALOGUE VIII. Satynkfuna. " i do not think one nerds bo in such ;i dilemma. It is not necessary to be an atheist in order to meet the Vedantic conclusion with a negative. It is quite sufficient for all purposes of theism to consider God as the efficient cause and author of the world, without going the length of pro- nouncing it to be consubstantial with Him." Tarkakdma. " How could God make a substantial world of no substance /" Satyakama. " I will simply refer to Vyasa's own aphorism, ' Like the gods and others.' He maintains that it is possible for gods, Rishis, and others of great power to produce effects by their own volition. AVhy could not the Supreme Being likewise create, by the exercise of His own will, the Universe before us, as a real substance dependent indeed on Himself, and differing from Him infinitely, (for who, save God Himself, can fathom the gulf that separates the SELF-EXISTENT from the created?) and yet real, not deceptive, or fallacious '.' No other conception of creative power is worthy of the Almighty. All other theories of creation are, not only unnecessary, but liable to insuperable objections and difficulties. It was only to escape from those difficulties that the successors, of Vyasa had recourse to the maya-vvda of Buddhism. But if they escaped one error, they ran headlong into an opposite one. In order to preserve the spiritual purity of the God whom their founder had identified with the visible world, they denied the reality of His productions ; not remembering that unless the world were originally received as a real effect, its cause could never have been deduced b}' human reasoning. Nor could there be any pious intuitions in a soul, that, in the plenitude of Vedantic knowledge, would deny its own existence. Howsoever deduced, whether aetiologically or morally, the truth of God's existence would, as an article of human belief, be affected in the same proportion in which the reality of the visible world and of the human soul was denied. The Vedantist forgot that the moment the effect was denied, the ground on which the deduction of the cause rested was cut away ; the instant the deducer's existence was doubted, his moral persuasions lost all their value. " If the Vedantism of Vyasa, who was a ' contemplater of the creation,' materialized, and thereby degraded, the Divinity, the pantheism of Gaudapada, who ' took no interest in the creation,' deified humanity. I for one will not undertake to say which of the two is, physically, the grosser error. morally, the more pernicious delusion, or, theologically, the more dangerous doctrine." WHAT IS VYAVAHARIKA EXISTENCE. 305 Tarkakdma. " Excuse my repeating a question which I put last night, but to which you gave no distinct reply. Does not even a shadow betoken some reality which has cast it, or a reflection point to its substance ? The world, though itself a mere shadow, may prove the existence of God as its sub- stance.'' Satyakdma. "If you mean by the word reflection, or shadow a reflection, or shadow, of Clod, as S'ankara suggests 1 , I shall only remind you of the learned commentator's own admission in his scholia on the Taittiriya*. He allows that God, being Himself infinite and without form, cannot have a reflection, or cast a shadow especially as there cannot be a medium or receptacle for such a reflection or shadow. If, again, there could be such a receptacle, would it not be mate- rial, and if it were identified with God, would that not be a material pantheism ? ' Now there can be no such thing as a substance existing conventionally, but not really. Things there may be, existing in the opinions of men, or implied in their conduct, but if we deny their reality, we can only mean that they are mere fancies, and therefore not actually existing substances. S'ankaracharya has said, what it is impossible to gainsay, ' that the question of the reality of a substance is not dependent on human notions. It depends on the substance itself. To say of a post that it is either a post, or a man, or something else, is not to enunciate the truth. That it is a man, or something else, is a false notion. That it is a post is alone the truth, since it is dependent on the substance itself. Thus the deter- mination of an existing substance depends on the substance itself 3 . ]t must either exist, or not exist, whatever men may say or think. In fact conventional, as opposed to real, can 1 See p. 371. fa? Fff?T QQ :'.OG DIALOGUE viii. only mean imaginary, in other words, false. It is conventional, even with the followers of Bhashkaracharya, to say that the sun mounts the udaydchala (or the eastern mountains) in the morning, it is a, vyavahdra, or custom, to say so, though they know very well that it is a mythological fable. There are no such eastern mountains, notwithstanding their vydrahdrika existence. So also with reference to eclipses, it is a vgavah&ra, or popular custom, to believe that the solar or lunar orb is in the giant's grasp, and, on that belief, to perform certain cere- monies. But here what is a vyavaharika truth is, in essence, a gross error." Tarkdknma. " But the cases are not parallel. When the Vedanta tells a person that while he is in society he ought not to slight what is vyavaharika, it merely means that conven- tional rules ought not to be set aside. Will you not acknowledge that a man's duty may vary with his position? A man in a state of ignorance must perform the duties attached to that state, and he must not aspire after the rights of the truly wise." Satyakdma. "You mean you will not allow the astronomer to evade the performance of pwat'eharana ! But the question at present is not respecting a man's duty, but the truth of substances. Whether duties may vary, as S'ankara admits, we shall consider bye and bye but, as that eminent commen- tator says, it is impossible for physical realities to change with the notions of society. Objective truth is independent of the subjective man. " The moment you deviate from this unalterable rule of truth, you can have no confidence in any reality. What evi- dence can you have even of spiritual reality, but from traces of spiritual agency visible in the world, or from moral convic- tions in the mind itself ? If you falter in your admission of those traces, and of the real existence of that mind, how can you be sure of any truth ?" Tarkakdma. " When the Vedantist says that every thing is false which is not Brahma, or when he says the visible world, and even the human soul, h&vevi/drahdrikct, not paramdrtkika, existence, he merely means that nothing can have the kind of reality which God has." Satyakdma. " When you say that the human soul and the visible world have a different kind of reality from the reality of God, and then add that both are God, you talk simply in unintelligible language. If the two classes of reality are differ- ent, then what do you mean by identifying thorn ? VEDAK1ISM ADMITS NO LAW. 307 " No fallacy is inure insidious than that of ambiguity, in ascribing two different meanings to the same word, and in the same argument. If you say the universe is of the same substance with God, and that the soul is iden- tical with the Supreme Being in the strict sense of the term, (excluding the figurative senses of satnpat &c.,) then you must either unduly exalt the world, or grossly degrade the divinity. In either case you strike at the root of Dlmr- nia. or duty- You cannot, with any fairness or consistency, impose upon persons duties which on your own theory are im- possibilities. Whether you acknowledge the universe to be God, or deny the existence of every thing that is not Brahma, you can have no law, no ethics, no discipline." Tarkakdma. " We allow that a man in a state of ignorance is bound by laws, rules, and duties." 8. " You allow that which your better sense contradicts. You hold that in truth there can be neither law nor lawgiver. The bolder spirits among you glory in denying injunctions or prohibitions." T. " When a man arrives at such a state of knowledge he needs no law." S. " How can you prevent a sensualist from being en- couraged in his evil course by your doctrine ?" T. " He has no right to deviate from the path of his duties." >'. "If you tell him so, he will only wonder you can keep your countenance, while you lecture him to do that which your better sense pronounces to be an illusion, a fabrication of ignorance, May he not say that since whatever he does must be an illusion, he had better remain satisfied with that which suits his pleasures best ? AVhat can you with any consistency say in order to exhort him to holiness of life V " T, " 1 will tell him that it' IK-' goes on at that rate, he will never enjoy Brahma." 6'. " Do not say, ' Never', for you hold that at general dissolutions, every thing is swallowed up by Brahma. Whether a man be good or bad, he cannot help enjoying Him on those occasions. The stream, whether turbid or limpid, must flow into the ocean." T. "I will remind him of what Yyasa says that if he attend to his duties, he might be much more quickly emancipated from the bondage of the world." -S. " Which in itself is nothing. The soul is no more in bondage than the crystal in the vicinity of blue cloth is 308 .DIALOGUE Vlll. tinged 1 , it there be no world, there can be no bondage. Your spiritual pantheism again is a libel on God. 1'ou say the world is a maya, aii illusion, and that God is the inayi, the conjurer who thus deceives you. is it not grossly revolting to our moral feelings to say that God has deliberately projected a false appearance with a view to beguile rational minds of Hib own creation ? And if the world be a mere spectacle a mere charm why again dignify it by the appellation of God ?" The sun had, by this time, got very near to the western hills, and was about to give rest to Aruna and his horses by betaking himself to the mountain summit. The Rajah desired us to lodge for the night in his gardens, where the requisite utensils would be provided for our evening prayers, and where a Koolin Brahmin had charge of the culinary department " so competent for the office,'' said his highness, " and without the least injury to animal life, that if the Mlechas could have but made sure of such dishes every day, the world would at once have got rid of the butcher's profession." Leaving the Rajah in his palace, we came to the gardens, and attended first to our evening duties, and then proceeded to consider our physical wants for the night, But here a diffi- culty presented itself. The ingenious member of our sacred fraternity, at the head of the culinary office, was of the Vaidic S'reni. Vaiyasika, who was a Rddi, and A'gamika, who was a V'arendra, were, as matters of course, obliged to deny them- selves the dainties of the royal kitchen. Tarkakama said that although he was of the same s'reni as the provisioner royal, yet he could not persuade himself to taste food prepared by one who was a S'udra's hireling cook. As for myself, i had been so long in the habit of observing your close practice of abso- lutely refusing to partake of food, dressed by strangers, that i excused myself by telling the Kooliu president of cookery, I had been accustomed to Hiiidoostaui dishes, and had lost all relish for those of Bengal. Satyakama accordingly engrossed to himself all the good things which, the Rajah said, required only to be tasted, in order to put a stop to the slaughter of dumb creatures for the table. We had to cook each for him- self. All being ol' different Brents, no one could perform that accommodating office for another. Utensils and raw materials were liberally and richly supplied, and we soon prepared every thing \vecould possibly require, and passed the night merrily and joyously. A'tuml.odba. DIALOGUE IX. FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME. My last letter informed you of our doings on the day we spent at the liajah's house. I shall now report to you what passed on the morrow. We had scarcely done our prescribed duties of the first prahara, (or, quarter of day,) when the adhikdri, in charge of the garden, came, and said, that the Rajah had sent a Jemadar to communicate his remembrance of us in the private-audience chamber. We responded to the summons, and repaired to that chamber. His highness was engaged in conversation with a Dandi, who had taken to his staff the year before, and, giving up his home, had ever since been performing the exercises of a Yogi in the hope of attain- ing to Samddhi and Nirvana. On our reaching the audience- chamber, and taking our seats, the Dandi turned to Satyakama, and spoke as follows : " The Rajah has told me of the discussion you had yesterday. I will not deny that your arguments have some force, but I still feel, that on several important points, you have totally misapprehended our views. You say there is no medium between reality and unreality, and that, if we call the world an illusion, we cannot argue from it as a reality. You say we cannot be sure of any truth if we consider the world an illusion, and the human soul a mere Vydvahdrika jiva. You also argue that on our theory no one can have a motive for virtue, nor can there be such a thing as law or duty. You accuse us too, of gross inconsistency in talking of emancipation from a bondage which in reality has no existence, because the world is itself an illusion. " Now, whatever Vyasa or S'ankaracharya may have said on the nature of substantial existence, I can point out a palpable middle term between reality and unreality. There is such a thing as a self-subsisting independent existence, and there is such a thing as dependent existence. The former we 310 DIALOGUE IX. attribute to the Deity, the latter to the world. \Ve accordingly say, emphatically, that He alone is sat, or really existent. He lives paramdrtkatah. We add that the world is asat, thai is, not real in this absolute sense, because it is not self-subsist- ing, and therefore transient. And yet we do not pronounce it to be such an unreality as that we could not argue for any truths founded on its existence. It is certainly real, in some sort ; for it is producing actual impressions on the senses, and surely we may with logical propriety deduce the existence of a first cause from an illusion ; for how could the illusion be produced without the agency of a cause? It requires to be accounted for as much as any phenomena on your hypothesis. Then again as to the human soul, the recipient of the impres- sions occasioned by the illusion, whatever the Vedanta Sara may say, we do not attribute to it a mere vyiuakdrika existence ; nor do we consider it as part of the Universe, for the human soul is consubstantial with God. With reference to practical duties, our theory cannot disturb them, for how- soever the ignorant voluptuary may argue to the contrary, we say, what every thinking man will readily understand, that in the state of avidyd, the observance of duty is the safest, and, when avidyd is removed, and the soul gets the fulness of divine illumination, the violation of duty will be as impossible as its observance unnecessary. Nor can you justly say that we toil to no purpose in seeking for emancipation from a bondage, which, notwithstanding its illusory character, produces real apprehensions and fears in the mind. We are actually in terror under its influence, and therefore it is said, ' O Janaka, thou hast attained fearlessness !' ' Satyakdma. -"I think, revered and learned Sir, the new explanations you have introduced into the Vedant philosophy fail to impart to it any additional strength. Your view of the Vedanta appears to be derived from foreign sources, and is therefore somewhat different, not only from Vyasa's ami S'aukara's, but also from the minor treatises, such as the Paribhasha and the Yedanta Sara. It is impossible in a general refutation of a system to anticipate every thing that an individual follower of the doctrine, especially one who is acquainted with other systems of philosophy, may conceive in his mind, apart from the positions laid down by leading expositors. Your philosophical principle seems to be that which Kapila recommends in Sankhya Sutra iv. 13. ' Not- ' withstanding much reading of S'astra, and much instruction from tutors, one is to take the substantial part only, like the DEPENDENT EXISTENCE NOT NECESSARILY ILLUSORY. 311 ' bee 1 .' The bee flies from flower to flower and takes only the melliferous matter. You seem to be collecting ideas in the same eclectic way. Now it would be a great historical inaccuracy to give to such a collection the name of Vedantism. But as you have unbosomed yourself so frankly, I am bound to tell you what I think on the subject. " That God's existence is independent and self-subsisting, is a doctrine which you cannot hold more firmly than myself. If by adding that the world has a dependent existence, you only mean that the world is a created, and, therefore, not a self-existent, substance, it is impossible for us to differ on that point either. You cannot then call it an illusion, for surely God is able to create a real substance by the power of his will. Why must you compare Him with a conjurer, that calls up an appearance, having no existence except in a deceived imagin- ation ? Why should you limit His power by such an unworthy comparison ? If your meaning be that the world has no existence but in human ideas, cognitions, or impressions, then that is the very theory of the Buddhists which has been so successfully refuted by S'anka.racharya. I can only repeat that eminent philosopher's language, that the world has an existence, independent of human notions. " Assuming, however, that the only difference in point of real existence that you desire to establish between God and the Universe is the necessary one of Creator and creature, my objection to the Yedantic tenet, that the Universe is identi- cal with God, does not lose its force at all. That identification would, on the theory now before us, clearly amount to material pantheism. It must either be a degradation of the Creator, or a deification of the creature. " Since, again, you call the world an illusion, I do not understand how you can reconcile such language with the notion of its existence (however dependent) as a creature. For I still contend that an existent creature cannot be an illusion. An illusion may, as an effect, prove the agency of a cause. That I do not deny. But the phantom, as S'ankaracharya 312 DIALOGUE IX. himself admits, must have a medium, a really existing medium, separate from its projector. The medium then must be a second substance, and so contradict your theory of one essence without a second. The medium, again, must be something material, for the illusion is an object of sensuous perception, and, if ' all this ' be God, the material medium must be deified too. Supposing, however, the world to be an illusion and no-thing, what do you mean by saying, All this is God ? What can be the drift, what the motive of such an assertion ? What truth can you explain, what knowledge can you impart, what object can you attain by calling that to be God which you are convinced is a no-thing'? What can you be possibly aiming at by saying, almost in the same breath, ' every thing from Brahma to a bundle of grass is false,' AND AGAIN, ' every thing, animate or inanimate, from Brahma to a bundle of grass is Krishna, i.e., God?' 1 " When, moreover, calling the world an illusion, you still contend that it has perils which require to be remedied by a laborious process of philosophy, your argument is simply unintelligible." Yogi. " Even an illusory peril may produce real fears in the mind. So long as a man is subject to such fears, the peril must be considered real, and remedied accordingly." Saty&kmmm. " Well how do you propose remedying the illusory peril ?" Yogi. " By teaching that nothing is existent but the Supreme Being. All else being a vanity,,^** as the Javans say. Allah bas, balii haus (God is sufficient, the rest is vanity)." Satyakdma. " But the Javans do not say that the world is an illusion. They call it a vanity, because it has nothing solid, nothing abiding, nothing worthy of love or attachment. You again contend that the vanity is God. The Javan theory may have a tendency to lead men to look up to God as their only refuge from evil, but your theory teaches there is no real evil, or the evil is God himself, and, there being one essence alone, no possibility of law or duty." Yogi. " But we do admit both law and duty. We tell men that, so long as they are in a state of Avidi/d, or ignorance, it Nariula-panrha-ritrn, DUTY PRESUPPOSES TW<> PARTIES. B19 is safe for them to conform to the duties of their respective classes." Satyakama. " People look for what is practically safe when they are in a dilemma. The deluded subject of Maya, whom you wish to reclaim, will naturally ask, why you speculate on what is merely safe, or expedient, if you are sure the world is an illusion, and there is no real evil? To tell a man that he must do his duty, merely, because it is safe to do so, is in fact to tell him that he is not bound by duty. It is to lose sight altogether of the definition of duty. Duty is what ought to be done. Such a duty, that is to say strict duty, cannot however exist where all is illusion, but Brahma. Duty presupposes the existence of two parties, the person bound by the duty, and the party to whom he is bound. The question of the Upani- shad, however bold in setting duty at defiance, is, on its own principles, unanswerable, Wlw will regard, irliom, and lioir .' Do you think you will produce any impression on your neigh- bour by playing fast and loose with him on points of duty ?" Yoffi. '' If my neighbour is determined to act like a deprav- ed person I cannot help it. If he be a mass of corruption, nothing will save him." Satyakama. "But how can you expect better things from Maya ? How can there be a real mass of corruption, either, if all is illusion but Brahma? I of course believe that not your neighbour only, but all men are naturally depraved, though capable of the highest improvement. And it may be expected of a scheme propounded for the amelioration of the human race, that it will meet the disease with which our race is. afflicted, and work on the affections of our nature, so as to promote vir- tuous and restrain vicious inclinations. But this service can never be performed by a system which confounds all distinc- tions of right and wrong, by pronouncing every thing to be an illusion but Brahma. " What again is the precise meaning of your theory of may a ? What is maya ? Is it a deceptive power, or is it the deception itself? Is it the illusion by w r hich you are deceived, or is it the delusive influence through which God presents the illusion to your senses ? S'ankaracharya appears to take it in t]ae sense of a delusive influence, the instrumental cause of the illusion for he talks of the world as a creation of ignorance. This is something like the old story of Indra's propping up the heavens in a state of intoxication, but, in this sense, the creation itself may be a substance. A real and abiding effect may be pro- duced under intoxication." RR 314 DIALOGUE IX. Yogi. "We say it is either no-thing, or a distorted reflec- tion of the only one thing existent, that is God." Satydkdma. "Is it not an extremely low view of the Divinity to say that He appears to us in the form of the world, that He has projected a distorted reflection of Himself with a view to delude His rational creatures ? We are all agreed that religious errors are the most serious of all errors, and of all religious errors, the greatest must be that which consists in a false notion of the Divine attributes. Is it possible to believe that God would deliberately produce such an error in his crea- tures by projecting a distorted likeness of Himself ? " And here allow me to direct your attention to the opinions which Ramanuja expressed on this point. He, like yourself. had abandoned the pleasures of the world, and looked for a higher spiritual position than most men think of. It is not for me to say anything as to his success, but his remarks on the subject of our present discussion, as recorded by one of his followers, will perhaps have some weight in your estimation J . ' In the recesses of all s'astras we are told of both knowledge and ' ignorance, of virtue and vice, of right and wrong sciences. ' Thus we see [opposites in] pairs every where, and God and fafef c?r llAMANUJA AGAINST ! 3 ANTHEiSM. 315 ' the soul are also notoriously so. How then can they have ' unity ? Let holy men answer this with a candid mind. The ' word tat (it) stands for the ocean of immortality, full of ' supreme felicity. The word twain (thou) stands for a miser- ' able person, distracted in mind, through fear of the world. ' The two cannot therefore be one. They are substantially aw agfaar faf J?fta: w: 11 V3 ^ar DIALOGUE IX. ' different. He is to be worshipped by the whole world. Thou ' art but His slave. There can be no designation, nor sub- ' stantial existence, nor definition, where there is no foundation ' or reason. How can Brahma be understood or inferred on ' the theory of Maya ? His existence we deduce as the author ' of the universe, for all this appears, on the evidence of infer- ' ence, to have a cause. This earth must surely have an author, ' for, like pots and other things, it is but a production. Mark ' the great difference between the Lord, and men, working ' with axes, choppers, and ploughshares. These are sore ' troubled by the six waves of their passions. They toil, and ' labour, and are exhausted. He effects every thing by a mere ' turn of his brow. How could there be an image or reflection ' of the Infinite and spotless One ? How could the Veda, ' either, declare the merit and demerit of a non-sentient (reflec- ' tion), or the reflection itself be a subject of pain or pleasure ? ' There may be a reflection of a finite substance ; how could there be such a thing of the Infinite? Kamanuja, the first ' among great men, condemned this theory of an image and ' reflection. That his opinions were not received by great men ' makes them only still dearer. I am sometimes happy, some- ' times miserable. He, the [Supreme] Spirit, is always happy. Such is the discrimination. How then can two distinct substances be identical ? He is an eternal Light, without anything to obscure it pure, the one superintendent of the world. But the animal soul is not so. Thus a thunderbolt falls on the tree of no-distinction. How canst thou, oh slow of thought ! say, 1 am He, who has set up this immense sphere of the universe in its fulness? Consider thine own capacities with a pure mind. Can a collection of infurialrd elephants enter into the stomach of a niusquito ? Whose art thou? Whence art thou come? "What is the roii'urtion ol enrfq iiAilANUJA AuAINbT 1'AM'HEISH. 317 ' thi* bondage of the world ? Ponder these questions in thy ' mind, give up the way of the erring. By the mercy of the ' Most High a little understanding has been committed to thee, ' it is not for thee, oh perverse one, to say, therefore I am God. ' That would be, as if some wicked person, having received ' [from a king], elephants, horses, and infantry, were to form ' the intention of usurping the royal dignity. Some sophists, ' sunk in a sea of false logic, addicted to evil ways, labouring ' to bring about the destruction of the world by false state- ' ments, themselves deceived and deceiving the world, say I ' am God, and all this universe is God. Their wicked device ' is now abundantly exposed. To speak of a void of qualities ' in the ocean of qualities ! Oh theirs is like the stream of a 1 flock of sheep. Having made a separate paraphrase of the ' sutras, they are deceiving the followers of their o\vn doctrine. ' All the qualities of sovereignty and activity are eternally ' God's. He is therefore one endowed with qualities (guni), 1 how can He be nirguna, or devoid of qualities? The asser- ' tion of the void of qualities is mere disputation. A substance ' without attributes, like the sky-flower, is never admitted ' either in the Veda, or in the world. If the Vedas were to ' set forth such an object, they would no longer be any authority. ' As the stone, or utensils, and the sacrificer are instruments ' of a sacrifice, so is this theory of no-attribute or no-duty an ' instrument for the obstruction of Dharma or virtue.' ' To these extracts I shall only add a few passages from Kamanuja'b own philosophical work. With reference to the pantheistic dogma, that individual animal souls are but reflections of the Supreme Spirit, he says ; ' Some persons 1 , ' betaking themselves to the doctrine of God's being the only * * * 318 DIALOGUE IX. ' entity, have come to the conclusion that animal souls arc ' but reflections of the one Supreme Being. Their happiness, ' misery, and other conditions are owing to their different ' receptacles, just as the same face may appear, variously, ' small, large, obscure, and clear, when reflected from various ' gems, swords, and looking-glasses. This difference ' in condition is [they say] owing to a fabricated distinc- ' tion. Now, it may be asked, whose fabrication is it? qfw ?rrfq * * * UAMAXU7A AGAINST PANTHEISM. 1 Not surely God's, for He is inc t apable of such fabrication, ' being Himself pure knowledge. Nor can it be the animal 'soul's, for then there would be reciprocal support [i. e., a ' vicious circle] ; thus, the soul itself is dependent [for its ' existence] on the fabrication, and the fabrication is owing to ' the soul.' "Ramanuja asks again, 'Of the soul, fabricated by ignor- ' auce, who is the fabricator ? This ought to be determined. ' Not biirely the ignorance itself, for it is inanimate. Nor the ' soul, for then it would be a case of self- fabrication, because ' [you say] the soul is the object of the fabrication by Ignor- ' ance, after the manner shell and silver. If you say God is ' himself the fabricator of the notion of soul, then you intro- ' duce ignorance into the Deit} r . And, if you do not introduce ' ignorance into the Divinity, [may I ask] whether God looks ' on souls or not ? If he does not look, then [the Yedic ' description of] the creation of varieties of names and forms 'after observation, is falsified. If you say he looks [on the 4 fabricated souls] then, since the one integral Brahma cannot ' look on souls without the intervention of ignorance, you ' necessarily talk of his ignorance. Therefore the theory of ' distinction founded on may a and ignorance is refuted. For ' even the conjurer (mayi), Brahma, cannot look on souls ' without the intervention of Ignorance. Nor can the conjurer ' delude others without seeing them. Nor can a maya itself be ' the means of observation on the part of the mayi, or conjurer. ' The instrument of its delusiveness is observation of others. ' But you will say that the maya of Brahma, bringing about ' his observation of souls, is the cause of the soul's delusion. ' Then the maya, bringing about the observation of others on ' the part of the one integral self-apparent Brahma, is, in other ' words, his ignorance. You may say that ignorance is the ' cause of a wrong observation, but maya, which only brings ' about an observation, on the part of Brahma, of all besides 1 him being false, is not the cause of a wrong observation, and ' therefore there is no ignorance in him. But you cannot say ' that when the moon is seen as one, it is seen as two, even if ' there be ignorance in the cause. If Brahma saw every thing ' to be false besides himself, he would not think of deluding it ' again. For none but a mad man would study to delude that ' which he knew to be false.' ' Why again, asks Eamanuja, ' should this useless idle delusion ' be exercised [by God] ? If you say, as a sport, [I ask again] ' why should a being of unbounded joy engage in sport ? If ;V2U DIALOGUE TX. you retort that sports are found in the world to be engaged in, only by men whose enjoyments are full, [I reply] this does not hold good here, for none but mad men would enter- tain the sportful sentiment in a case where the objects of sport are admitted to be unreal and illusory, and the sporter to be real, and himself the projector of the illusions.' " Beware then, my dear Sir, of the consequences of playing fast and loose on such questions as these. To say that (rod has projected an illusion for deluding his creatures, or that, being essentially nirgiina, or devoid of qualities, He becomes active under the influence of may a, is equally opposed to godliness. You cannot, if you believe Him to be all Truth, allow the possibility of His projecting a deceptive spectacle ; nor can you, if you believe Him to be all knowledge and all power, assent to the theory of His making anything under the influence of avidyd, or ignorance, which cannot but be akin to the mad effort which S'ankara repudiates 1 , and which can- not differ essentially from the intoxication attributed to Indra." Yor/i. " The right way to look on our doctrine is to contem- plate its drift We say that God alone exists, because He is the only independent reality. We say again that the world is an illusion, because it is transient, impure, and corrupt. We say also, each, He is myself and I am He 9 , because, by becoming one with God, we desire to escape the perils of the world, and the lusts of the flesh." Satyakdma. " I can have no objection to your use of the most exclusive terms that human language can supply, to express the self-dependent existence of God, as the only eteni;il essence. You may also adopt the strongest words you can find, to express the vanity of the world, because of its transiency, impurity, and corruptibility. All I contend for is, that you must hold both those ideas with their proper limitations. God is self -existent and eternal. You may emphatically call Him the sat, you may say He is sat in a sense in which nothing else is sat. He is an entity in a sense in which nothing else is an entity for he is eternal and self-existent. But you must remember the proper limitation of the doctrine. God is the eternal sat, but if sat be taken in its grammatical sense, as the See page 370. ^forffh S f fa f^^cf^TT I Y g , 9 PANTHEISM OF UPANISHADS. 335 and to ananda (joy), and repeats, in turns, that the production and final resolution of the universe may be traced to all those five principles 1 . The same Upanishad speaks, elsewhere, of the production of ether ' from that or this Spirit', and from ether air, from air fire, from fire water, from water earth, from earth herbs, from herbs food, from food rctas, from retas the puruaha (personal soul), which is pronounced to be annarasa- maya (all food.) It is then added ' those who worship food as God, obtain all food,' and that ' all creatures are produced from food. The Upanishad proceeds to say that from the soul which is all food, another, the inner spirit, is produced, which is praiKimayn (all vital air), thence again, manomaya (all mind), thence vijnana-maya (all knowledge), thence ananda- maya (all joy) 2 . Vyasa and S'ankara thought that passages such as these could not be explained except on the pantheistic theory." * * SHOT Jpp^rfwf i * * fr^e t? i w^r ^icTTf^r ^t^f ? ci i R?T: * * 5TTarf;T : I ^l^T qq TOs^R^JW: I * * i * * : awisr 336 DIALOGUE IX. ' All seemingly pantheistic passages, said A'dhunika, must be so interpreted as to be consistent with other texts expressly declaring the unity of God, and His distinction from the world." S. " It was in trying to reconcile the texts in question with the unity of God, that Vyasa was led to Pantheism. The other idea of His distinction from the world forced Vyasa's successors to the necessity of denying the reality of that world. If you can interpret the texts to which I have referred, with- out either identifying the world with God, or denying its reality, you will achieve an exploit which no Vedantist, from V\ ;i>a to Sadananda downwards, had been able to accomplish. But what are the texts, pray, which expressly declare the unity of God, and His distinction from the world?" A. " As to the unity of God, you have our celebrated for- mula, which we inscribe on our solemn documents, and with which we conclude our devotions: Ekamcvodwitiyam ' God is one only without a second.' ' .S'. " The word ' God' does not occur in the passage." A . " No, but it is understood ; you must supply the ellipsis." " We shall see, said Satyakama, how the ellipsis is to be supplied ; but you, who are so jealous of corrupt criticisms of the Upanishads, ought to be careful how you construe your sacred books. Give us the whole passage, where the formula occurs, and we shall then be able intelligently to consider what the ellipsis is." A. " This, gentle (pupil), was even an entity at the begin- ning, one without a second. 1 " " How then, asked Satyakama, can you, as a matter of course, interpolate the word 'God' here. The subject is 'this' (idam) ; is it not?" A. " Of course." S. " Well ; to what does the word this, in the neuter gender, generally refer in the language of the Upanishads '.' Is it not to the visible universe ?" " I cannot say readily, answered A'dhunika, to what it gener- ally refers, but I should say there can be no doubt it refers to God here." " Is not the passage you quoted the solution of a question which had been disputed V Give us the whole paragraph." PANTHEISM OF UPANISHADS. 337 A. '* ' This, Ogentle (pupil), was even existent at the begin- ning, one only without a second. Some say, indeed, this ' was even non-existent at the beginning, one only without a ' second : hence out of a non-existent an existent may be 4 begotten. But how, O gentle (pupil), can this be ? He said, ' how out of a non-existent can an existent be begotten ? This, ' O gentle (pupil), was even an entity at the beginning, one ' without a second.' "' " You will find it difficult, said Satyakama. to maintain that the word this refers to God, throughout the passage without involving pantheism. No one that acknowledged a God would doubt His existence at the beginning. S'ankara's commentary is perfectly intelligible. He understands ' this ' to refer to the visible world, and the question to be whether the world was existent or non-existent at the beginning, i.e., before the creation. The Upanishad decides that the Universe was exist- ent in its material cause (God), and was thus one without a second at the beginning, it being, as the commentator adds, a protest against the Sankhya, which inculcated two eternal principles. Nature and Soul, and against the Vais'eshika, which assumed the eternity of innumerable Atoms. And thus the very text in which your community reposes so much confidence, which is exalted into a formula to express its characteristic doctrine, is inexplicable except in a pantheistic sense. I do not think you will contend for the possibility of considering God as the material cause of the world without countenancing pantheism." A'dhnnika. " But there is a passage, the very first verse in the Aitareya Upanishad, in which the Spirit Himself is called one." Satyakama. " I fear that passage will give you no better help. It reads thus ; ' This was a spirit, even one, at the beginning 2 .' You must remember that idam (this) is in the neuter gender, and therefore cannot as an adjective pro- noun. belong to fitma (spirit) in the masculine. Idam must 3iwr?r Chher hastily to conclude that the works are self -contradictory or recklessly to interpret texts without taking into account how far they may be consistent with one another. But you can not call upon me to submit to unnatural rules of interpreta- tion with the sole object of proving the doctrine of one Cpiuiishad to be consistent with that of any other, so that there may be no theory in the Mundaka contradictory to the lessons of the S'wetas'watara : for you have not yet shown 1'AMHEISM AN 1NTEKKAL LVIDJiNCE AGAlNbT VKDAS. 341 that the Upanishads have all the same paternity. Nor can you require me to surrender my private judgment before you have proved that the Veda* are of divine authority. 1 conceive I may undertake to say that you have no external proof to bring forward in behalf of such authority." A'dhunika. " We do not pretend to bring forward such proofs 1 . There are no historical records in our country. You cannot expect such proofs. But the internal evidence which the real doctrines of the Yedas afford ought to satisfy a reason- able inquirer of their divine authority." 8&tya1cama. " That evidence cannot be admitted at least before the Vedas are acquitted of the charge of pantheism, now under consideration. Passages really pantheistic cannot, I say, be overruled by texts, merely setting forth a distinction between God and the world. The pantheism 1 am charging on the Upauishads does not imply that God and the universe are one in such a sense as that it would be a truism to say, * All this is God.' That pantheism is inculcated in three different ways : first, by teaching that God is the material cause of the world : Secondly, by maintaining that the soul and the universe are cousubstautial with God ; thirdly, by asserting that he who knows God is absorbed in, and identified with Him. " The Upanishads clearly inculcate that God is the material cause (call it substantial, if you prefer it) of the world. That from which a thing is produced and into which it is resolved is called its material cause. The following texts will prove the teaching of your Vedas on this point : ' Brahma is he from whom all these elements are produced, and into which they are resolved 8 / ' As the spider projects its web, as small sparks proceed from ' tire, so from this Spirit are produced all animals, all worlds, ' all gods, all creatures 3 .' 1 " The Vaids having existed from a time when Indian literature and indeed all literature, was only (as it were) in a state of germination, it is impossible to prove the divine origin of these sacred books by any historical testimonies, tht value of which was not understood at the time." yaidantic Doctrines Vindicated. Taittiriya. 342 DIALOGUE IX. ' As a water bubble, when cast into the water, ib resolved ' into water, so that no one can restore it : wheneesoever it be ' taken, it will be saline ; so this great being (in yourself), ' which has neither end nor limit, will bo resolved into the solid ' aggregate of knowledge (God) 1 /' ' This God of all, this omniscient, this in-goer. this origin ' or womb of all, is the source and resolution of creatures'.' ' This was in the beginning one, even Brahma -V ' This was in the beginning a spirit, even one 4 .' ' Thu> was in the beginning a spirit like a male person- 1 .' ' This is the truth, As from a blazing tire consubstantial ' sparks proceed thousand-fold, so from the imperishable. O ' gentle pupil, diverse entities are produced, and they return ' into him too'/ ' He desired, Let me become many let me be produced. ' He conceiving knowledge created all this. Having created it, He got into it 7 .' ' He observed, Let me become many, let me be produced' .' Hriluul. Alaudukya. 4 : mj w^rr: Mundiika. 51f[ I Tail. r1 I ChhAndogya. PANTHEISTIC TEXTS CITED. 348 A'dhun-ika. " The text, ' Let me become many, let me he produced,' is only in accommodation to our ancient conven- tional idea that the father is begotten in the son 1 ." Satyakdma. ** I thought your opinion was that the Upa- nishads were given by God at the creation, before conventional idioms could be formed. It seems your mind is far from being saturated with that belief. 1 see you involuntarily treat it as an ordinary work, and reason from its style as a ' creation of man.'" A'dhvnika. "May not an inspired work be characterized by particular idioms V" Sati/akfima. " If composed by a mortal under divine direction, it may still bear traces of the writer's idiom and style : but if it were revealed at the creation, before idiom and style could be formed, it must be independent of such human peculiarities." " \Ve do not receive, said A'dhunika, nor do we literally interpret the fable respecting the revelation of the Vedas at the time of the creation." Satyakama. " But the fable is contained in the Vedas themselves. The S'wetas'watara says, that God revealed the Vedas at the creation. How can you receive the Vedas as the word of God if j'ou reject that fable ? But as regards the passage under consideration, you cannot prove that the con- ventional idea you speak of really existed at any time. The father is indeed said to be born in the son ; that is because the latter is of the substance of the former. But no writer ever said that the potter was begotten in the jar. On your own confession, then, the text teaches that the world is consnbstan- tial with God, which is the second characteristic of pantheism taught in the Upanishads. That this characteristic is promi- nently inculcated will be apparent from the following passages : 'This was nonentity in the beginning; then was entity ' produced. It made itself 2 .' * Tin's i^ the way in which the Neo-Vedantist* endeavour to explain away the passage given in Note I , " The text 5ffPjt JTSTF^T^J does not mean, as the Revd. " gentleman asserts, that God has been many, and that the objects of the universe " are of the same substance with God. It is a conventional thought peculiar to ancient Sanscrit writings to consider the Creator himself as born in his creation, ^ 'as for example B^frflf ^[ ^F^cT T?fr ?Wb. As a man's self is born in his *' son, yet remains distinct from him, so God, having created man and the world, " remains distinct from them." Remarks, dc, 9 Tait, M44 DIALOGUE IX. "If the Upanishad is not inculcating the atheistic dogma of Kapila, that nature made itself into the form of the universe, the obvious meaning is that the world is a formation of Brahma, and is consubstantial with Him. ' As the one fire having entered into the world became ' diversified in form, so the one spirit pervading all creatures, ' inside and outside, becomes many forms. As the one air ' having entered into the world became diversified in form, so ' the one spirit pervading all creatures, inside and outside, ' becomes various forms 1 .' 4< The Chhandogya teaches the relation, in which the world stands to God, thus : ' As, gentle pupil, by means of one clod of earth, every earthy form is known, being in truth ' only earth, though called in words a modification, and as, ' O gentle pupil, by means of one magnet every magneti/ed ' iron becomes known, being in truth only iron, though called ' in words a modification, and as by one nail-parer every black ' iron, is known, being in truth only black iron, though called ' in words a modification ; so is the doctrine I delivered 9 .' Then follows the assertion of one original principle which was multiplied into many. Connect the above passages with the text, ' All this is God,' and the meaning of the Tpanishad can no longer admit of doubt. Again. ' Here all these become one 3 .' ' This universe is even Purusha (or a male person) 4 .' f ft$rfftri&f 3 Brihnd. Mnndnka. PANTHEISTIC TEXTS CITED. .345 ' All this is Brahma. This spirit is Brahma. This spirit is four-footed, [has four quarters 1 .] ' " Equally decisive of Pantheism are those passages which declare that the student is unified with God on attaining to the knowledge of Brahma. Nay sometimes he is identified with God even before fulness of knowledge. ' He that knows God becomes God.' ' He is a spirit. Thou art he, S'weta- ketu 2 .' This is given as a sort of refrain, and is repeated nine times in the Chhandogya. ' I am Brahma 3 .' ' Whoever knows this, I am Brahma, he ' knows this all. TCv^n the gods are unable to prevent his ' becoming Brahma. ' ' ' As flowing rivers are resolved into the sea, losing their ' names and forms, so the learned, freed from name and form, ' get into the heavenly and super-excellent Spirit. He who ' knows that supreme Brahma becomes Brahma 5 .' ' The knowers of Brahma, understanding the difference here, ' are resolved into Brahma, being bent on Him and freed from ' birth. He who sees this by true devotion is received into the ' Spirit, even as oil is in sesamum seed, butter in curds, water ' in streams, and fire in the flint 6 .' ' Where there is something like duality, there one may see ' the other, one may smell the other, one may hear the other, Mundaka. Chhandogya Brihad. I U rih ad. Mund. arq?r S'wetas'watara. XX Ub DIALOG I' K IX. ' one may honour tin- other, one may regard the otliev, one may ' know the other ; but where the whole of this is one spirit, ' there whom and by what can one smell ? whom and by what ' can one see ? whom and by what can one hear ? whom and 4 by what can one honour ? whom and by what can one regard V ' whom and by what can one know 1 V ' That is his excellent ' state in which he thinks, I am allV "The Brihadaranyaka again contains the following cate- chetical lecture : ' Ushasta asked Yajnawalkva, Declare to me the all-pervading ' spirit, \vlio is manifestly and perceptibly, Brahma. ' Yajnawalkya answered, This thy spirit is all-pervading. ' U. Which is that all-pervader, Yajnawalkya? ' 1'. The same who performs the physical functions of the live ' vital airs. This thy spirit is the all-pervader. ' U. This is like an evasive description of the cow or the horse. Tell rne which is the all-pervading spirit, manifestly and percepti- bly, Brahma. ' Y. Your spirit is the all-pervader. ' U. Which is that all-pervader, Yajnawalkya ? ' Y. Look not at him who sees through sight, hear not him who 4 hears through the hearing, think not of him who thinks through ' thinking, know not him who knoweth through knowing. This thy ' spirit is all-pervader. The rest is subject to decay 3 .' 1 See note 2, page 295. 3 a 3?r?flr 31f?fl[ TAMHElbTIC TEXTS CITED. 347 "I need not stop to remark on the meaning of some of these antitheses, on which even eminent commentators are not agreed : but no one dissents from the obvious construction of the identity of the querist with the Supreme Being. Another inquirer is introduced, Kahola, by name, asking precisely the same questions, and he is answered in a similar manner, that his spirit was the all-pervader, ' that is above hunger and thirst, grief, anxiety and death 1 .' Eventually Yajnawalkya says to the querist Uddalaka : ' This thy spirit which, remaining in earth, is different from the earth, which the earth itself does not know, whose body is the ' earth, which, being within, directs the earth, is the immortal In- ' goer. This thy spirit which, remaining in water, is different from ' water, which the water itself does not know, whose body is the water, which, being within, directs the water, is the immortal ' In-goer. This thy spirit which, remaining in fire, is different from ' tire, which the fire itself does not know, whose body is the fire, which, ' buing within, directs the fire, is the immortal In-goer. This thy ' spirit which, remaining in ether, is different from ether, which the ' ether itself does not know, whose body is the ether, which, being ' within, directs the ether, is the immortal In-goer. This thy spirit ' which, remaining in air, is different from the air, which the air 'itself docs not know, whose body is the air, which, being within ' directs the air, is the immortal In-goer. This thy spirit which, ' remaining in heaven, is different from heaven, which the heaven ' itself docs not know, whose body is heaven, which, being within, ' directs the heaven, is the immortal In-goer*.' 3r e o q " q: II V II q>S?fl fag 348 DIALOGUE IX. "It is not necessary to quote the whole oi' this long passage in which the querist's spirit (in common, adds the comment- ator, with that of every other man) is declared to be the immortal In-goer, pervading all things, the sun, the cardinal points, the moon and the stars, the firmament, darkness, light. the vital air, speech, the eye, the ear, the mind, the skin, knowledge, the relax itself being expressly included in the list. -The same spirit of the querist is, in conclusion, pronounced to be ' the seer, though unseen, the hearer, though unheard, 'the thinker, though unthought of, the knower, though un- ' known, there being no other seer, no other hearer, no other ' thinker, no other kuower. 1 ' "The preceding passages are so significant that 1 cannot conceive how any one can doubt their meaning. They indis- putably inculcate- a compound of material and mystical pantheism. Had there been the least ambiguity in them, I might have understood your anxiety to give them the benefit of the doubt. The texts I have cited are however so pointed, that 1 am unable to enter into your feelings." A'dhunika. " Will you not accord to us the same liberty oi interpretation that you claim for yourself. We choose to con- strue them consistently with pure monotheism. What is the use of telling us we are bad interpreters ? What is your object? Is it to convert us to pantheism, or to read us lectures on philology." ? Satyakama. " Neither. My object is to enter a protest against assumptions calculated, on the one hand, to pervert ^f^f srct* : ii ^ n q> fgrfsr I 1'ANISHADS SET ASIDE BT THE KEW SCHOOL. 349 historical truths, and, on the other hand, to circulate wrong ideas on the teaching of the Vedas. If you abjure pantheism, while accepting the Upanishads, your renouncement of a gross error must be a subject of congratulation, but your adherence to books, which teach that error and do not contain the true word of God, cannot but be a cause of anxiety." Here A'dhunika paused for a moment, when the Kumara, finding he could speak without interrupting any party, said to his father, that he had come to ask permission for amusing himself with the k/uts billiard table for half an hour. " You need not," said his highness, " have waited for permission, my only liquidator of debts to ancestors ! You may go into that amusement-room, whenever and with whomsoever you please. 1 am only too glad to find you have a taste for such manly exercises. But stop for one moment. I wish you to write down what presents are to be made to my learned friends, who attended your sister's wedding-party, and have since been with me from yesterday." The Kumara pulled out a golden pencil from his pocket and wrote out an order on the Dewan of the Household. The Ixajah, without stopping to read the list, ordered it to be taken to the Dewan. While the Kumara' s autograph was on its way to the royal Wardrobe (Toshakhana) and the Treasury, we were in pleas- ant expectation of what was coming (I may at least confess for myself). A'gamika, however, could not, when the Kumara had left the room with his young friends, suppress his astonish- ment at the view which A'dhunika had taken of the Vedant. Vaiyasika said, " The Baboo belongs to the new school initiated by lianiinohun Roy. But A dhunika has evidently been absent from the Head-quarters of his own school longer than myself, for, when I was there last, I noticed that the divine authority of the Vedas and Upanishads had been given up as a false idea ! The Brahma-dharma was now inculcated as sahaja-jndna, or simple natural theology." ltdjah. "Is it possible they have changed again? The school commenced with the acknowledgment of all the s'astras, Puranas, Smritis, as well as Yedas. At least Kam- mohun Koy did not avowedly reject any of them, though he did not follow the orthodox interpretation. In his preface to the Is'opanishad he admitted the authority of the whole body of our s'astras. His successors set aside the Smriti and the Puranas, and adhered to the Vedas alone. And now they have given up the Upanishads too ! Why a learned writer I.')!) DIALOGUE IX. claimed consideration lor those writings on the very ground of their finding acceptance in J>engal'." Scarcely had his highness finished these words when a number of servants, dressed in diverse colours, entered the room with silver trays, shawls, silks, and gold coins. Each of us received a tray with a pair of costly Cashmere shawls, silk dhooties, and twenty pieces of gold coin. Laden with these gifts we took leave of the Ixajah, wishing him a long life of health and prosperity. 1 But thi challenger cannot claim th- i nmlrr.l.iinl v, li.il ii i in llir-> treatises, thai Si ri'i-lcrn Iliinkii n.' Hii/^nih/iK''-- ('In i:.tintrtu;ti'il iri/li lll/iilll Pllllnsn/il/. /'. ,1. DIALOGUE X. FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME. I lold vu in ii iy last how we returned home from the liajah's, laden with presents:. \\"e were all happy and cheer- ful with the single exception of A'gamika, who appeared to be labouring under some inward perturbation. None asked him any questions at the time, but I called the day after, to inquire after his health. " I am quite well," said he, " physically, but feel rather unhappy at the progress of sceptical senti- ments. Even the new class of Vedantists have given up the divine authority of the Upanishads. What is all this leading to ? Is it possible for human society to keep together for a single century without the discipline and direction of God's word ?" The good Brahmin was talking after this fashion when Satyakama came in, also to make friendly enquiries. A'gamika turned to him, and, after some desultory observations on the Vedant controversy, said : " I cannot help complaining, Sat- yakama, that yon have not been dealing fairly with Vyasa and S'ankaracharya. You have been forcing them to submit to an ordeal against which they have often protested. They do not pretend to base their doctrine on the suggestions of reason. If they had done so, perhaps I might have joined you to a certain extent in finding fault with their deductions. But their appeal is to the Vedas, the eternal and infallible Vedas, which were coeval with the creation. As the productions of Brah- ma's wisdom, they contain truths which it would be an act of profaneness to gainsay. For every doctrine contained in the Uttara Mimdtisd, S'ankaracharya has adduced ample proof from the Vedas. There is, I think, not a single Sutra which is not supported by the unerring texts of the Upanishads. Nay, he has in more than one place plainly expressed his jealousy of argumentations not founded on those records of eternal truth. He has never hesitated to avow that his teach- ing is regulated by passages breathed out by the Creator. It. is onlv when reason is subservient to the Vedas, and, as a DIALOGUE X. faithful handmaid, assists in enforcing their doctrine, that he allows her room. ' The knowledge of Brahma, says he, pro- ' ceeds from a critical consideration of the sense of Vedic texts, ' not from inference and other proofs ; and the Vedanta texts ' being recognized as setters forth of the cause of the world's ' production, inference, when it is a proof not opposed to those ' texts, is not excluded from confirming their meaning 1 .' " You do not, continued A'gamika, really meet S'ankara- charya, when you use against his system arguments quite irrelevant to his position. How can I, or any body else, sub- mit to your wisdom, when we believe it to be opposed to that of the Omniscient ? " Satyakdma. " But does the Veda contain the wisdom of the Omniscient? This question has never yet been discussed. You assume it as already decided in your favour. I do not deny that S'ankaraeharya is generally borne out by texts of the Vedas. I say generally, because 1 do not wish absolutely to pronounce judgment, as between him and the leaders of other schools. But you must prove that the Vedas are records of eternal truth, before their texts can be allowed to drown the voice of reason, and stitle the dictates of conscience." A'gamika. " Has not S'ankaracharya himself proved that point? 'Nor could such S'astras, says he, as the Uich and ' other Vedas, endowed with the characteristics of omniscience. ' proceed from any other than the Onmiscent '-." Satyakdma. "Do you call that proof? In Gptama's voca- bulary, the reason adduced would be called Sddhyasama, a mere petitio principii. S'ankara assumes that the Vedas contain characteristic marks of omniscience, and thence argues that they proceeded from the Omniscient. The hypothesis is almost identical with the inference. The argument is not a process of logic. It is a mere assertion. Nor must it lie forgotten that S'ankara is not, in the above passage, proving SWFT ( 'mil. Yrdimt I. i. _'. I T bid. l. i. a. HAS TTIF VK1U MAUKS f>F OMNISCIENCE. .TiM the authority of the Veclas. His object is to demonstrate the omniscience of God by asserting that of the Vedas which proceeded from Him. He assumes but does not prove that point." A'gamika. ''But does not the Veda itself decide the question. ' Being desirous of liberation, I seek Him, the ' manifestation of spiritual understanding, who in the begin- ning created Brahma and revealed to him the Vedas 1 .' ' That ' which all the Vedas set forth 1 declare 2 .' ' This Kig-veda was breathed out by that great Being. 3 ' " Satyalcdma. " Why do you commence and stop just where S'ankara commenced and stopped when citing those passages ? Why do you give the text second-hand ? Read out the passages whole and entire from the Upanishads themselves." A'gamika. " As from the fire contained in damp-fuel, ' smoke comes out separate, so, (O Maitreyi) was breathed out ' of the great Being this, namely, the Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, ' the Sama-veda, the Atharva, Angirasa, the Itihasa, Purana, ' Sciences, Upanishads, S'lokes, Sutras, After-expositions. All these were breathed out of Him. 4 ' ' Satyakdma. " Does not this prove too much for you '? " A'gamika. " S'ankara has shown that all these stand simply for the Vedas. for in his commentary on the passage he remarks ' The Veda is not like any other work ; having 1 issued like a man's breath, without any personal exertion. 5 ' ' S'weUs'-watara. I Brihadaranyaka. Brihaddranyaka 5 fffl I S'ankara. Y Y 354 DIALOGUE X. " I thought, rejoined Satyakama, you said a little while ago that the Vedas were productions of the wisdom of Brahma. But it appears now that they issued from the Omniscient like human breath without any other effort on his part. \Ye cannot then say that they contain his deliberate teaching. He did not intelligently utter them ; they escaped Him like smoke from fire. You have no right to say that an involuntary emanation of that kind is the production of his intellect." A'gamika. " He is called prajndna-ghana, a mass of intel- ligence. Whatever issues from Him must also partake of the Omniscient." Satyakama. "But the Vedas say that every thing issues from Him. He is not a mass of intelligence only, but ' this ' spirit, Brahma, is all mind, all vital air, all eye, all ear, all ' earth, all water, all air, all ether, all light, all no-light [or ' darkness,] all desire, all no-desire, all anger, all no-anger, all ' virtue, all vice, all everything.' 1 Is not this the language of the Upanishad ? How can you then trust the Veda to be all knowledge, merely because it escaped him? " "You are so fond of vilifying the Vedas," said A'gamik;i, somewhat irritated. " That is your besetting sin. You are such a contemner of the Veda." " I thought, said Satyakama, I was speaking guardedly enough by making no observation of my own, and confining myself to the very language of the Veda." A'gamika. "You will draw us again into the whole ques- tion of the Vedanta. We have had that to our heart's content." Satyakama. " My impression is, you conceded that on the grounds of human reasoning the Vedanta could not stand, but that it is supported by the Vedas. We are now survey- ing that fundamental support. I am anxious to get at your theory of the Veda before proceeding to examine it." A'gamika. "Well, hear patiently the proofs we adduce. I have already shown that the S'wetas'watara, Katha, and the Brihadaranyaka support the authority of the Vedas. The ST q;fm?j: qFiwrefo sffaw VEDAS CANN'UX 1'KOVE VEDAb. 355 Mundaka does the same. " From him the Rich, Sanian, Yaius 1 ." Satyakdnta. "Go on, why do you stop short? Does not the Upanishad specify the whole creation as a procession from him like the Vedas ? " A'gamika. "It does." " And who is the ' Him ' here ? " asked Satyakama. " What is the antecedent of the tasmdt ? " " The soul, or Male person, spoken of immediately before." " That is a Male described as one of like passions with our- selves, becoming a father after the ordinary animal fashion, the description itself not being at all choice in point of decency of language. It is hardly consistent with the reverence due to God to identify Him with such a 'male,' and call him the author of the Vedas on the strength of this passage. 2 " " What is the use of such criticisms ? " said A'gamika querul- ously. " Do you seriously mean that the Upanishads do not uphold the authority of the Vedas." Satyakdma. " I think you cannot deny that some of the texts you have quoted actually disprove your theory of Vedic inspiration. But suppose I waived that question for the pre- sent, and allowed that the Vedas support the authority of the Vedas. What then ? Not even a dexterous person can ride on hi>< own shoulder 3 ." A'gamika. " What do you mean ?" Satyakdma. " As you are impatient of cross-questioning on the Vedas, you had better ask what Sayana means by intro- ducing that remark, for it is not mine. The remark means that the Vedas cannot prove their own authority, any more than a man support himself on his own shoulders." A'gamika. "I am astonished at your still calling the authority of the Vedas in question. At the marriage assembly you quoted Gotama against Tarkakama in order to prove that if all evidence were denied there would be an end of discussion. You are now acting against the spirit, if not the letter, of that I Mundaka. I Mundaka. S&yana in Max Muller's Rig- Veda. 356 DIALOGUE X. Sutra of the N^aya. You are calling in question the authority of that which everybody allows is the word of God. Keally I feel now the wisdom of Mann's ordinance that those who vilify the Vedas ought to be banished from Society." Satyakdnia. " You may banish me, if you like ; but you must remember, I have not wantonly said any thing against the Vedas. On certain questions of vital importance you contend that the authority of the Veda should be binding on all. You say that it is the repository of infinite wisdom. I ask- only for proof. If your point can be established by satisfactory evidence, I cannot fail to be highly edified. Your summary appeal to Manu does not augur well tor the strength of your position. Nor is it just to the great interests at stake. The Vedas are now appealed to as the only support of the Vedan- tic doctrine, which appears to be much at variance with reason and conscience. Before I can consent to this appeal, I am anxious to examine the authority of our judge. Is the Veda the inspired word of God ? Let the question be dis- passionately discussed. You can gain nothing by hastily asserting its authority, if it really have none. Nor can I gain any thing by disproving its authority. Before we can once for all surrender our Reason, it is necessary to sift the pretensions of that which challenges implicit obedience. " Besides, continued Satyakama, it is somewhat out of place now to decline discussion on the authority of the Vedas, when some of our eminent scholars long ago condescended to cite objections against their genuineness and inspiration, and under- took to answer them. Indeed it is impossible to conceive stronger objections against the authority of a S'astra than those which Jaimini, Sayaiiu. Gotama. Kanada, and Kapila have themselves cited. If they could but have refuted them with any success, the cause of the Vedas would have been entirely triumphant. Y'ou need not be afraid of condescend- ing too much to sceptical cavillers, when such authorities attempted to answer the objections to which I refer. Allow me to bring some of them to your notice. Sayana notices the following objections as to the authenticity of the Vedas. 1. The four Vedas are named in several texts. Is not that. proof 1 ? ' No, says he, for those texts being contained in the bAYANA's REPLY INCONCLUSIVE. 35? ' Yedas, their admission would amount to a satisfaction with ' mere self-dependence. Not even a dexterous man can sup- ' port himself on his own shoulders.' '2. But the Smriti bears testimony to the Yedas. ' This is ' nothing, because the Smriti itself depends on the Yedas.' 3. ' As to the popular opinion in favor of the Yedas, though ' it prevail universally, it may be as erroneous as the notion ' that the sky is blue.' If such objections, added Satya- kama, have been noticed by so many condescending sages, perhaps it may not be beneath your dignity to resolve my doubts.'" A'gamika. " But Sayana has satisfactorily replied to those objections and disposed of them. You have yourself said you can conceive no stronger objections. You should accordingly declare yourself satisfied.'' Satijakaina. " If Sayana's reply to those objections were at all satisfactory, I should never have troubled you with my doubts. But he has left the objections quite intact. He says', ' with reference to the authenticity of the Y T edas, proofs as mentioned, founded on the Yedas, on Smriti, on popular- opinion, may be seen. As it is not absurd that the sun, moon, and other luminaries should have the quality of self- manifestation, though pots, clothes, and other substances cannot manifest themselves ; so there may be, in the extra- ordinarily powerful Yedas, the quality of proving themselves, as they have that of proving other substances, though it may be impossible for men to ride on their own shoulders.' " This, I submit, added Satyakama, is no demonstration. The argument comes too late after the entertainment of the objections already mentioned. The entertainment of the objections shows that the proposition was not, in the concep- tion of Sayana, self-evident ; for no sane man would seriously Ibid - DIALOGUE X. entertain an objection against a self-evident proposition, such as the existence of the sun and moon though a blind man might question it. The blind man would in such a case be simply nigraha-sthana, i.e., not fit to be argued with on that question. But it would be a mockery to think of satisfying a man by an assertion of which he was not capable of judging for himself." A'gauiika. " But if you were called upon to prove the existence of the sun, what would you say ? You would only wonder, would you not ? at the question. My feeling is, and 1 have no doubt Sayana's also was, the same, at this question on the authority of the Vedas." Satyakdnia. "It is not for me to contradict you in what you describe as a matter of feeling. But Sayana could not have been possessed with such a feeling : for then he would not have so elaborately cited objections, or tendered replies. Nor does any other sage appear to have partaken of your won- der at the question, for we find Jaimini, Vyasa, Gotama, Kanada, Kapila, S'ankaracharya all undertaking to establish the authority of the Veda, by the refutation of arguments adduced by infidels. They could not therefore have considered it as clear as the sun or moon. If the omniscient wisdom con- tained in the Vedas were of this self -evidencing description, you could not have staggered at the conclusions of the Vedanta. It is because they were prima facie opposed to the dictates of reason and conscience, because they were NOT as clear as the sun or moon, that you appeal to the positive authority of the Vedas. However brilliant the Vedas may be in other respects, here is the Verlantic doctrine hanging over it as a cloud. Here we have Indra's achievements, as a chief god, enthusiastically celebrated as acts performed under the influence of liquor. Here we have Brahma, declared to be all-vice, no less than all-virtue. Here we have the Creator pronounced to be a sort of conjurer, deliberately deluding rational souls, by the pro- jecting of illusory appearances 1 . Here we have the very author of the Vedas described as an ordinary male, with animal propensities, producing a large offspring. Here we have elaborate lectures on the most obscene subjects, which even profligate men would think it beneath the dignity of i? rat OBSCENE DESCRIPTIONS IN VEDAS. human nature to realize in practice 1 . Are we to be silenced by the assertion that the divine authority of such books is as apparent as the sun or moon ? If you have any explanations to offer on these revolting descriptions, we may give you the patient hearing due to your learning and character. But if you wish to persuade us that the Vedas are of divine authority, you must prove your position by evidence. You must show by external proofs that they are possessed of such authority, or we must draw the natural inference, to which the offensive descriptions 1 have just mentioned, would lead us. There is no use therefore in screening them from a critical examin- ation. Jaimini himself never did so. He noticed numerous objections against those works." A'gamika. "And has answered them too. Are you not satisfied with his replies ? " Satyakdma. " Satisfied ! No, on the contrary, I am con- firmed in my doubts." A. "How?" S. " Jaimini notices an objection to the eternity of the Vedas, founded on their containing names of persons and places. ' From connection with non-eternal objects the ' Mantras are vain.' On this Sutra the commentator remarks, ' In the Mantra, what do they in Kikata, there is mention ' made of the country Kikata. So are other uneternal objects ' mentioned, such as the town Naichas'akha, the king Praman- ' gada. This being the case, it follows that the Mantra could ' not have existed before PramangadaV The answer to the objection is obviously inconclusive. It can refer only to those names after which any portions of the Vedas are called. ' The names, says the philosopher, ' from reading 3 '. Different sections were styled after different men who first read them. This does not at all meet the question regarding the names which historically occur in the narratives. Another answer is 1 See the last section but one of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad pp. 1U77 1089. Bibliotheca Indica Vol. ii. No. 18. We cannot make up our minds to reprint such a long obscene passage. sft '' ! Jaimini quoted in Max Mailer's Rig- Veda. :Y.(J therefore attempted, but that is a mere reference to n previous Sutra in which a similar objection was noticed. That objection concerned a text wherein mention was made of ' Babara, son of Pravahani.' The question was how could the Veda be eternal when non-eternal objects are named in it. Jaimini replies that the words may be otherwise interpreted, and the commentator makes out, ingeniously enough, that Pravahani may be tortured to do duty for the ' wind ' and Habara may serve as the imitation of its sound 1 . This explanation is not only unsatisfactory ; it is something more. It recoils against the" Vedas. A sad plight such as this shows how much the philosopher must have been straitened. Is it possible to explain away by this violent artitice all the passages that one can adduce containing narratives concerning men ? Is it to be pretended that no persons, places, or human actions are historically named in the Vedas V The very supposition is preposterous. What for instance is the Kathopanishad but a series of lectures given by Yama to Nuchiketas ? Are not Sanatkumara, S'wetaketu, Yajnawalkya, Uddalaka, Gotama, my own namesake, persons of Vedic notoriety ? How could the Vedas be composed before the persons mentioned in them were born V* The objection recoils with redoubled force after such an ineffectual attempt to refute it. Had Jaimini never undertaken the refutation of objections against the Yedas, my doubts on their divine authority could hardly have been so strong as now they are. When a philosopher of his intelli- gence is driven to the necessity of spellitifi out n fanciful meaning from a well-known word (Pravahani), the rnnse niiisi be bad indeed. This subtile interpretation is however impos- sible with scores of proper names that occur in the Yedas. You cannot volatilize the whole army of Kishis celebrated in those writings. Are Indra's exploits against Vitra also to be dissolved into the ' wind ' ? Even Jaimini's shift therefore must fail. You cannot reconcile with your theory of Yedic eternity the existence of historical narratives in the Vedas. " Again the Vedas themselves refer to times anterior to their own age. How could there be a period before eternity V In Jaimini quoted in Max Muller's Rig- Veda. SAN KARA 'S THEORY OF ETERNAL SPECIES. 361 the very first Sukta of the Kig-Veda there is mention made of old and new Kishis. The S'wetas'-watara speaks also of former periods of gods and Kishis 1 . The Kena, or as it is otherwise called the Talavakara, similarly speaks of old teachers, from whom was derived its mysterious doctrine 2 . The Is a, or Vdjasaneija, repeats the same idea in two different places, only substituting the word wise for old 5 . The Kat ha describes the doctrine delivered to Nuchiketas as so sub tile that even the gods had doubts about it in olden times 4 . T Qe Mundaka says that Atharva in the, days of yore revealed the science of Brahma to Angir. 5 Again, that Angiras declared it of old to Saunaka.* 5 The Taittiriya Brahmana says ' the Vajas'ravases knew this Brahmana of old 7 . Thus the Vedas themselves testify against your theory of their eternity." A'gamika. " Well, but have not Gotama, Kanada, Vyasa, S'ankaraeharya, and Kapila defended the authority of the Yedas. To begin with Vyasa and S'ankara : they explain the anachronisms you complain of by declaring that there are dental species of gods, men, and other beings, and that it is ' with the species that words are connected, and not with ' individuals, for as the latter are infinite, such a connection ' would in their case be impossible. But as species are eternal ' (though individuals begin to exist) no contradiction is discover- ' able in the case of such words as cow, etc. In the same way ' it is to be remarked that though we allow that the individual ' gods, etc., have commenced to exist, there is no contradiction ' [to the eternity of the Vedic word] in the [existence of the] ' words ('&, etc., [which denote those individual gods], since ' species are eternal. And the fact that the gods, etc., at 7 cra| z z ' to particular species may be learned from this, that we dis- 4 cover their corporeality and ptber attributes in the hymns and 4 arthavadaa (explanatory remarks in the Vedas), etc 1 .' In truth it was by means of the eternal words of the Vedas. as prototypes of things, that the Creator formed the universe. ' Thus the Veda says, at (or with) the word ete (tJicfc) Praja- ' pati created the gods; at asrif/ram (they were poured out} he 4 created men ; at indavah (drops o/ aoma) he created the pitri* : 4 at tirah paritrain (through tJie filter) he created the planets ; ' at as' avail (swift) he created hymns ; at vis'vdni (all) he ' created praise ; and at the words abhi saubhaf/a (for the sake 4 o/ blessing) he created the other creatures. And in another ' place it is said ' with his mind he produced speech, as a mate.' ' (Brih. Ar. Up. p. 50.) By these and other such texts the ' Veda declares that creation was preceded by the word. And 4 when the Srnriti says, ' At first a divine voice, eternal, with- 4 out beginning or end, formed of the Vedas, was uttered by ' Svayambhu, from which all activities [proceeded] the ex- ' pression, utterance of the voice, is to be regarded as employed 4 out of deference to the customary phraseology, since it is 'inconceivable that a voice which w r as ' without beginning or 'end,' could be uttered in the same sense as other sounds. ' Again, we have this other text. ' In the beginning Mahes'- ' vara created from the words of the Veda the names and forms ' of creatures, and their several modes of action ;' and ag;n'n, ' He created in the beginning the several names, functions. ' and conditions of all creatures from the words of the Veda.' And ' it is a matter of common observation to us all, that when any ' one is occupied with any end which he wishes to accomplish, ' he first calls to mind the word which expresses it, and then ' proceeds to effect his purpose. So, too, in the case of 4 Prajapati the creator, we conclude that before the creation 4 the words of the Veda were manifested in his mind, and ' afterwards he created the objects which resulted from them. 'Thus the Vedic text which says, ' uttering linn-, he created 4 the earth (bhilmi), etc.,' intimates that the different worlds, 4 earth and the rest, were manifested, /. r., created from the 4 words b/nlr, etc., manifested in his mind 2 .' "Those eminent expounders of the Veda have also sho\\n that the world being in reality without beginning, there is no absurdity in the supposition of all worldly events being only repetitions of the same things in other ages. There can be no 1 Dr. Muir'b Sanskrit Text >, 1'art iii, p. 70. * Ibid pp. 71, 72. ARGUMENTS OF OTHER RISITTS. 863 such thing, therefore, as past or future. What is past is also future in reference to the next age in which it will re-appear. What is future is also past in reference to the last age in which it had already occurred once. There is no room for an argu- ment founded on a charge of anachronism. " Gotama has also noticed certain objections preferred by unthinking heretics, complaining of the failure of Vedic prom- ises, of mutually conflicting texts, and of tautologies. He answers them quite effectually by contending that the failure of the promised fruit may be owing to defects in the per- formance of ceremonies ; that the conflicting texts may be reconciled by the supposition that they refer to different times and places, and that tautologies are. useful in the inculcation of doctrine. " This defence is unanswerable. Men ought not to charge on the Vedas the consequences of their own neglect in the performance of ceremonies, nor ought they to be so narrow- minded as not to perceive that differences of time and season may occasion differences of description and injunction : and, instead of murmuring, they ought to be thankful for tautolo- gies, for they may thereby have better chances of understand- ing the mysteries of truth. " Kanada too contends for the authority of the Vedas. The ' composition of sentences, says he, in the Vedas is according ' to reason.' ' In the Brahmanas the occurrence of names is ' the characteristic (of omniscience.)' How could the Vedas contain the names of all things if they were not inspired ? Again ' the rules of alms-giving are also after reason.' Accordingly Kanada begins and ends his work with the declara- tion of the authority of the Vedas as HIS word 1 . " Kapila, too, notwithstanding his many eccentricities and his denial of the eternity of the Vedas, avows that no person could have fabricated them ; for, of free or bond, none was competent to produce them 2 ." Satyakdma. "You have produced a formidable array of witnesses in support of the Vedas. Do not think I am want- ing in respect for any of them ; but you must remember 364 DIALOGUE X. that it is no disrespect to a witness to subject him to a cross- examination. I will do nothing more than test their assertions by that logical touchstone which they have themselves sup- plied. " Let us first classify the questions under discussion. They may be considered as fourfold : 1. How can the Vedas be eternal when they not only contain narrations of events that occurred in time, but also speak of periods previous to themselves t; 2. What proofs are there of their eternity, or of their inspiration by God ? H. What are the Vedas ' 1. W T hat are their own claims ? " In answer to the first question you refer to Yya>a and S'ankaracharya who maintain that there are eternal .s/nwVx of men and gods, and that when the Yedas speak of names which appeared in time, they refer really to those eternal species, tilt- individual members of which were manifested in the transactions of the world. They also maintain that the universe was created after the words contained in the Vedas. As those words arose in the Creator's mind, he formed the things indicated by them. They likewise contend that the world, being in reality without beginning, is revolving in continued cycles, so that the Vedas are only speaking of past events, namely those which happened in a previous age, when t hex- refer to what appears to be posterior to their production. " On this explanation of the difficulty contained in the first question, I have only to make three remarks. Firxt, the explanation is founded on a gratuitous hypothesis of the exist- ence of eternal species, for which no proof is offered other than a few sentences of the Vedas. This reason is vitiated by the fault of self-dependence^ Secondly, assuming the existence of eternal species, and the unceasing revolution of worlds with the same personal manifestations and events, you may still be called upon to account for the singular fact that the Vedas make allusion only to such incident^ &8 happened Uel'ore a certain definable era, but are totally silent on all affairs that belong to a later date. Thirdly, S ankara quotes the text thai the Supreme Being settled 'the names, functions, and condi- tions of all creatures from the words of the Vedas!' It the fact were so, the Vedas would be a real s'abda-kalpa-druma, or a cyclopaedia of every thing conceivable by any body. But the fact is not so, and we may meet the extravagant affirmation with a direct negative. Kor the \Ydas have no terms, no ALL INCONCLUSIVE. : ) ( ().') names, for multitudes of things which are either of modern discover}', or were unknown in India in times of yore. If the creation of the universe was after the words of the Vedas suggesting ideas to the Creator's mind, how is it that there is an endless variety of things for which there are no terms in the Vedas. but of the creation of which we have nevertheless ocular evidence ?" A yamiku. " I do not quite comprehend what you mean." Satyakdma. " In the first place the supposition of eternal species is altogether gratuitous. What is the meaning of species before the existence of individuals ? Or supposing that akriti means form, and ri/akfi its manifestation, what is the meaning of & form before its manifestation V* Assuming how- ever that such eternal forms are possible, how is it that the Vedas only allude to forms of such things as may have appeared in India down to a certain ascertainable period '? Again, the Vedas speak not of names only, as the vyakti of the akriti, but also of acts performed in time. How can the theory of eternal species account for the narration of events, in books supposed to have been completed before the creation of the universe ? Is there for instance an eternal form of a drunken Indra when he kills Vitra 1 , of a sober Indra when awe-stricken, with folded hands, before a more powerful god, and of a profligate Indra in the company of the Apsarascs* .' If you refer, in reply, to the theory of an eternal succession of worlds, I must then -ask again , how is it there is no mention of any incident of an age posterior say to that of Yudhisthira. You hear of certain anecdotes of S wetaketu, of Sanatkumara, of I'ddalaka, of Vas'ishtha ; but you never meet with any accounts of Vikramaditya, Kalidasa, Ghatakarpara, Bhaskaracharya, S ankaracharya, A disura. Bullalsen ; not to mention charac- ters still nearer to our times. How is it that some old mani- festations of forms only are given, but there is profound silence concerning events later than the time of Yudhisthira, or tran- spiring elsewhere than in India? " If again the whole creation was regulated by the words of the Yedas, how is it that there are multitudes of created Max Mailer's Big-Yoda, vol. ii. p. 487. qji I (I MArkandeya PurAna, :',('.(; DI.U.IH.I i: x. things of which there is no intimation to be found in them? How man}' plants and animals are there, how many organic and inorganic substances, how many things noticed in the different physical sciences and in natural history, are there, for which we have no term, no name, in the Vedas ? Their s'abdas are only indicative of some Indian produce of a date anterior to the age of Yudhisthira. Why are you obliged to use foreign words when you apply to the sub- assistant surgeon for a little quinine, or ask Tarkakama to decide a question of conscience, as to whether you can take a little tea, or coffee, as a remedy against cold ? And if with our limited knowledge we are acquainted with so many things of which there are no traces in the Vedas, if we who have never travelled beyond the boundaries of our native land know more s'abdas than are found in those writings, how much greater still must be the range of things, which men of larger experience must miss in their pages ? " As to the second question of proofs of Vedic inspiration, nothing that Gotama, Canada, or Kapila has advanced on the subject is worth a moment's consideration, (iotama. says that its authority is deduced from the infallible person who (as the commentator adds) made the Vedas. 1 The Sadhya, or point to be proved, is, in other words, cited as its own Jietii or reason ! Who would doubt for a moment that the Vedas were of authority, if once convinced of their infallible original ? That the very philosopher who discriminated so clearly be- tween true and false reasons, in the explanation of his topics. should himself offer a proof, exactly corresponding to his own definition of the false reason, styled Sddhyasama, leaves little room for doubting that the cause, which drove him to such a departure from his own logical principles, must be piteously weak." A'aamika. "Not exactly so, for Gotama says that the infallibility of the Veda is proved like that of Mantras (spells) and the A'yurveda (the medical treatise)." Sati/akdma. "That only removes the difficulty one step. For what are spells? Nothing ! At any rate we cannot connect the Most Holy, that governs according to rule and moral law. with spells that profess to be independent ol' rule, and make 5imi" 3 iH KANADA'S ARGUMENT FUR THE VEDA INCONCLUSIVE. 367 no discrimination of right and wrong. None but the vulgar practise them, none but the vulgar repose confidence in them, and certainly none can prove any thing about them. If spells be true, then it must be idle to talk of morals or of religion, then must we surrender reason and conscience to the freaks of the profligate men that deal in those unmeaning things. And as to the medical treatise, I need hardly remind you that the Medical College of Calcutta has served to throw it very much into discredit. I believe few in our days would trust a cholera patient to an adept in the A'yurveda. " Kanada's pleas for the authority of the Vedas are little better than Gotama's. His assertion in the third and last Sutras is a mere confession of faith. ' The Veda is of authority, because it is His (God's) word' ! This reason, almost identical with that which Gotama urged, is likewise Sadhya-satna, being scarcely different from the inference. Two other reasons, given by him, resemble the vicious arguments by which he himself exemplifies false reasoning. ' The composition of ' sentences and the rules of alms-giving contained in the Vedas ' are according to reason.' If the premises be admitted, the argument is an antitype of the one, It has horns, therefore it is a cow. 1 Many human compositions are reason- able, though not divine ; just as many animals are horned, though not cows. But the premises are by no means certain, if not positively untrue. This very appeal to the authority of the Vedas is caused by the fact of their teaching not being according to reason, and as to the rules of alms-giving which they inculcate, they are based on class prejudices rather than on reason. Witness the passage cited by Kanada's own com- mentator, though it is on alms-&ffcw*# rather than sAms-gicinf/, but the two are treated as one subject by the author. ' On the ' seventh (day of going without food) he may steal S'udra's 'food: on the tenth, the Vais'ya's : on the seventeenth, the ' Kshetriya's : in peril of life, or for the preservation of him- ' self or a relative, the Brahmin's 2 .' Excellent instance of reasonable jurisprudence ! The above argument for the 3(38 DIALOGUE X. Vedas rather resembles the other exemplar of false reasoning ; it has hontfi therefore it /.s an horse* ! " There is a fourth reason adduced by Kanada, but that is identical with one of S'ankaracharya's, already noticed, vi/,., that the Vedas contain names of all things. " You have cited Kapila, too, as a witness for the divine authority of the Veda. How a person that disbelieves the existence of the Deity, can bear testimony to His word is a problem which it is impossible to solve. But Kapila's attempt to prove the authority of the Veda gives us an insight into a theory which most of the schools held on this point, but which is now little thought of by their followers. They looked upon it as a talisman, a charm. Kapila grounds the authority of the V r eda oil the perfect knowledge of its utterers, and on its practical success, as in the ayur-veda, or the medical trea- tise. But he denies the possibility of its having an author of any kind. His reasoning on this point is analogous to that which he used in denying the existence of a Supreme Being. He says it could not be the production of any personal being, because there could be no personal being competent for the task of composing it. A person must either be free or in bondage. A free person would not, and one in bondage could not, compose it. A free person would not, because, (as Vij- iiana Bhikshu 2 expounds the last sutra cited by yourself) not being subject to a motive, he would not impose on himself the task of composing such a work with its ' thousand ramifica- tions,' and one in bondage could not, because he had not the omniscience necessary for the office. The fact of the first per- sonal being having uttered it, does not constitute it his work : for it is only essays ;i intelligently and elaborately composed, that II San. sut. A KKLIG10N WITHOUT GUI) ! 36'J may be called an author's work. But the Vedas issued from the self-existent by the power of adrishta, like breath, without any deliberation on his part. And the self-existent himself is no God on Kapila's theory. The Vedas therefore are destitute of any external authority, and it is only their internal self- evidencing virtue 1 , by force of which they challenge our obedience. " Kapila is not singular in his view of the authority of the Veda. Vyasa, S'ankaracharya, Jaimini, S'ayana, and others hold substantially the same opinion. But Kapila disavows the doctrine of its eternity 2 . He calls it a product. And here we have an extraordinary theory of a work, which is neither eternal, nor the composition of any person, divine or human, bond or free. " But Kapila's theory cannot astound us more than that of a large and influential class of the followers of Jaimini, the author of the Purva Mimansa. Jaimini contends for the paramount authority of the Vedas, and the universal obliga- tion of Dharma, or the sacrificial works enjoined in their texts. Now religious injunctions can only have their authority from the sanction of God's will. To say that there can be a religion without God, is to say there can be a law without a law-giver, or a verdict without a judge. Jaimini however says nothing about a God. We are to be bound by words of which there was no intelligent utterer. Some of his followers have gone the length of denying the possibility of an original utterer, a First cause of the Vedas, ridiculing the idea, as if it were hunting after a rabbit's horn a sheer impossibility. " It is the school of Prabhakara that talk in this bold and audacious way. ' An injunction, they say, implies a saying 4 that moves to action. Hence is the authority of the Veda ' only in regard to acts. How then do we learn about objects, ' or existent substances ? By the explanatory remarks and 'the mantras, (hymns or incantations). The Veda does not ' teach any thing liable to contradiction : hence there can be sr?T*?7 o effcf || Vij-Bliik. : sra: qmp^ 11 A A A :!7<) DIALOGUE X. ' no fear of there being any incongruity in it'.' This implies that the Vedas have nothing to do with existent substances which cannot be established for certain. There are no object- ive truths taught in them. You have only to follow out their injunctions and perform the established ceremonies. ' What ' is good ? That which leads to supreme felicity, such as the 'performance of thejyutishtoma and other sacrifices. What ' is evil ? That which leads to ruin, such as theft 2 .' As to the origin of the Vedas, one is to restrain his curiosity. The doctrine amounts to this that we can know of no being that could have composed them. If you talk of deducing the authority of the Veda from an author, the question will recur, and whence the authority of that author? Such authority, again, can only be settled by a text, and hence there will be a vicious circle. The Veda you see ; its author you do not sec. You have ocular proof of the existence of the Veda. You have no proof of the existence of its author. Nor is there any necessity for speculating about an author, for the un-beginning or eternal tradition of society is quite enough. The following extracts will show how some of the staunchest advocates for the Vedas argued on these points. ' Persons use language in order to communicate to others ' something which they know. But that which is not appre- ' hended (on proof) cannot be known, hence a person's words ' ought to be supported by some other proof. Therefore it is ' said that a person cannot know any thing without a text (of ' the Veda). But why should we say ' without a text,' when ' we ought to say ' without some other proof ? And even ' though the aim [of the assertion] be some act, still ought not ' texts to have a personal utterer ? [No !] Without a text ' (the utterance could not be proved). * * Thus Dharma is ' established as derived from age to age without any other f rfq ATHEISTS ARGUING FOR THE AUTHORITY OF VKDA. 871 ' proof. How is this established? In consequence of the futility ' of other proof than traditional instruction, it is impossible to ' introduce any prompter [of Dharma.] 'Observation is everywhere a proof with us. A work that ' is seen is independent of any person's exertion, because no ' person could be proved (as its author) . It is dependent when it is not known at the first application, and is known at another 4 application. If the injunction does not teach (or persuade) ' at the first hearing, what is the meaning of its being an ' author's work ? If again an author's work may be not of ' time, that is only establishing an established point, for the ' meaning of those who speak of the sabda [Veda] as proof ' is precisely that it is independent of any person's exertion ' or of any other aid. ' Now relation is that by which the sense is known when a ' word is known. * * But is there not another relation than ' this of a name and its object ? That is an unreasonable ' saying, for even then the relation between the thing to be ' apprehended and the causer of the apprehension is of the ' same character as that of the name and its object. But why ' [the Mirnansaka asks] is this objection ? ' Because, [the ' opponent of Jaimini's theory replies] , as before explained, it ' (the Veda) as an author. Hence we believe that the Vedas ' were composed by some person who had settled the relation of ' the words with their meaning. And thus are they dependent.' ' To this now it is replied. It has been proved, that because ' of the relation not being caused by any person, the old usage ' of society is without a beginning. How is this ? On this ' question the reply is, because of the want of a person to ' create the relation. The reply is not to the purpose. It is. ' The object is to exclude that which is opposed to the no- 4 beginning theory. But why do you fear that it is opposed ' to your theory ? Yes, we fear, because though it has been ' proved that the sense of words is determined by then-begin- ' ning usage of old, yet if an author were allowed, then a 'beginning must come perforce, like the viiddhi of certain ' vowels after a (in grammar). Therefore the idea of truth ' must be excluded. ' The Veda cannot be proved [to be an author's work] by 4 the first kind of inference, because the old usage of society 4 is without beginning. It cannot be established either by per- ' ception, or inference a priori. ' Even if it could be shown that the Veda had fallen into ' oblivion, still we could not, without further proof, establish' :H7'2 DIAI.OC.CK \. ' :uiy other relation. In the case of an existing substance 1 missing, we could not. without proof. fancy it to be u rabbit's ' horn. Suppose oblivion were established, what is the object ' forgotten ? The very thing that we desire to demonstrate ? ' Well then, it itself is a proof, the oblivion. ' If, [says the opponent of Jaimini] non-perception were ' only possible of existent things, then who can say there ' is no rabbit's horn ? But [replies the Mimansaka] we ' do not adduce oblivion of non-perception as proof, we ' only bring it forward to refute the absurdity of assigning ' a cause to an object established by perception. Because there ' may be a non-perception (or missing) of perceived objects. ' like pots, you cannot for that reason imagine the existence of ' the rabbit's horn. The non-perception of a perceived object ' is dependent on another cause, but the non-perception itself ' is simply the non-perception of a non-perception. 4 But how is it, [asks the opponent of Jaimini] that the ' author of the relation is not inferable from the non-under- ' standing of the sense after the first hearing '.' ' If on the first hearing, [replies the MimansakaJ the sense ' is not comprehended, what do you get from it of an author of ' the relation ? If Devadatta is not found at home, what does it prove of his being without ? ' But does not conversancy itself presuppose that it is ;i ' work ? How ? Thus, that such a one is its utterer. But there ' can be no inconclusiveness in that which is seen. We see ' in the case of boys that the sense of words is arrived at by ' mere practice. Therefore of an object which is seen by per- ' ception. it is not consistent to speculate about an author. ' This is another reason for excluding an instrument [or origin - ' ator] of the practice. Even if the relation [of words with ' their meaning] were itself [an author's] work, its production ' by gods, who are themselves unseen, would be excluded by ' the impossibility of the case. The relation being therefore ' eternal, it is proved to be independent. ' This notion of an effect is owing to the expansion of similar- ' ity (with the cause). Bui here dissimilarity being perceived. ' there can be no proof (of a cause). If you say there can be ' no production without dissimilarity, it only establishes your ' inconsistency. By this very reasoning, an author, his desiiv ' and recollection, are all refuted. ' Pleasure and other feelings being mere material affections 'can only be described as properties of matter. Now one that * has no quality or property cannot affect that which has. ATHEISTS ARGUING FOR VEDA. 878 ' Other adepts in Brahma (Vedantists) say rhnt from the ' word author, from remembrance, from desire, they lind the ' existence of a spirit different from the material body and its ' organs. Hence they conclude there is an existent spirit as ' author. But [the Mimansaka asks] is he not also described ' as without work or agency ? Thus the illustrious comment- ' a tor [Prabhakara] refutes those reasons for taking that to ' be a spirit [or reality] which is no-spirit (or unreal). ' Without a sensuous perception of the spirit itself, there 1 cannot be this inference [of a spirit] . ' Perception can only be allowed as a proof in the establish- ' ment of the Supreme [Spirit] . It is useless to talk of infer- ' ence. 'If the adepts in supreme Brahma (Vedantists) come to the ' conclusion that what is perceived is untrue, the real is not ' perceived, then we would simply bid them adieu with a bow. ' 1 1 there be nothing hut knowledge, then knowledge itself would be disproved. ' If the spirit is to be known, then the instrument of the ' knowledge and the knower cannot be said to be excluded 1 .' s^9f ?ft T^R DIALOGUE X. " I need not multiply these extracts, but the passages already given show that Kapila was not the only niris'wara, or atheistic, teacher among the Brahmins. A large body of the followers of Jaimini openly inculcated the same idea. Indeed they went a good many paces beyond the author srrsaf swwfofa a^rfq riatfa ?^r sfa WHAT CAN THE VEDAS BE ? 875 of the 8'ankhya. For they contended that since the existence of a soul, as distinct from physical organization, is not an object of sensuous perception, it could not be one of Inference, ??ffRiR|rTSrR[ Tlfq?f 870 DIALOGUE X. cither. Thought and feeling they considered to be affections of our corporeal members. And it was with a view to defend the paramount authority of the Vedas that they were led to this atheism and materialism. " I cannot say that the principles on which they based their reasoning are peculiar to themselves. All schools of Urah- minical philosophers considered the mind, the instrument of thought and feeling, as a sort of material organ, which can only co- exist with the body. But they recognized an titnid, or spirit, as the owner or director of the mind and other organs. The school of the Prabhakara Mimansa appear to deny such a director, and to assign all mental phenomena to the physical organization. And yet they are staunch defenders of the Yedas. " Thirdly, therefore, I ask, what can the Vedas possibly be in the conception of Brahminicai philosophers? Not the word of (lod, not a revelation of His will, such as you justly say is needed for our guidance under bewildering circumstances, but something which, certain of them affirm, mechanically issued from Brahma, like smoke from burning fuel, something which, others declare, was educed from the elements, something which, others again tell us, is eternal and independent of a cause. Hut what that thing is, it is impossible to gather from them, unless it be a charm or a talisman. They talk of it ;is a i lieu- late sound, but what is articulate sound without a sounder, an uttererV And they all identify it with the Rich, Yajush. lllll|-ic]||-;i\ il WHAT CAN THE VEDAS BE ? : J >77 S'aman, and Atharvan. Singularly enough, they know nothing about the date or circumstances of these compositions. It is clear, however, that whatever the eternal sound of the Veda may have been, it could not have been committed to writing without a fresh revelation from God' without the direct inspiration of His Spirit. Such revelation must be impossible on the theory of the atheistical writers I have noticed. And as to those that were theists, they do not pretend to give us any account of such a repeated revelation. They all talk indeed of tradition, but you will admit that tradition cannot be trusted as an infalliable guide. "Again I ask, what are the Vedas ? In the S'atapatha Brahmana, it is said, ' He (Prajapati) brooded, &c. over ' [i.e., infused warmth into] these three worlds. From them, ' thus brooded over, three lights were produced, fire, this ' which purifies (L e., pavana, or the air), and the sun. He ' brooded over these three lights. From them so brooded over, ' the three Vedas were produced, the Rig-veda from fire, the ' Yajur-veda from air, and the Sama-veda from the sun. He ' brooded over these three Vedas. From them so brooded over, ' three seeds [or essences] were produced, bhnr from the ' Rig-veda, bhitvah from the Yajur-veda, and svar from the ' Sama-veda 1 .' "What were these productions? Mere sounds, or writ- ings on paper, or palm leaf ? In either case how could they be generated by brooding over fire and the sun ? What again is the meaning of the production of bhur, bhuva, svar by brooding over the Vedas? The Chhandogya and Manu speak in a similar way of the origin of the Vedas. (See the passages in Dr. Muir's Sanscrit texts) Kulluka Bhatta, in explanation of the difficulty we have stated, says, ' The same Vedas which [existed] in the previous mundane era (Kalpa) were preserved in the memory of the omniscient Brahma, who was one with the supreme spirit. It was those same Vedas that, in the beginning of the [present] Kalpa, he drew forth from fire, air, and the sun : and this dogma which is founded upon the Veda is not to be questioned, for the Veda says, The Rig-veda comes from fire, the Yajur-veda from the sun.' ' Another commentator on Manu, Medhatithi, explains ' this passage in a more relationalistic fashion, ' by remarking i Dr. Muir's Sanscrit Texts, BBB 378 DIALOGUE X. ' that the Rig-veda opens with a hymn to fire, and the Yajur- ' veda with one in which air is mentioned 1 .' " Manu adds, ' Prajapati also milked out of the three Vedas 4 the letters a, u, and m, together with the words bhur, bhuvah, ' and svar. The same supreme Prajapati also milked from ' each of the three Vedas one of the [three] lines of the text ' called sdvitrl [or gayatri] , beginning with the word tat. The 'three great imperishable particles (bhur, bhuvah, svar) pre- ' ceded by oni, and the gayatri of three lines, are to be regarded ' as the mouth of Veda [or Brahma] 2 .' " What in the name of common sense is the meaning of all this ? What is milking of letters or words from Vedas ? The explanation of Medhatithi only shows that the difficulty had occurred to him, but it does not at all remove it for not only is nothing said as to the signification of the extraction of the S'aman from the sun, but the explanation about the Rich and the Yajush too is very unsatisfactory. " The S'wetas'watara Upanishad, however, gives a different story of the origin of the Vedas. The Supreme Being is there set forth as its imparter to Brahma 3 , and the Harivans'a says, ' For the emancipation of the world, Brahma, sunk in con- ' templation, issuing in a luminous form from the region of the ' moon, penetrated into the heart of Gayatri, entering between ' her eyes. From her there was then produced a quadruple ' being, lustrous as Brahma, indistinct, and eternal, undecay- ' ing, devoid of bodily senses or qualities, distinguished by the ' attribute of brilliancy, pure as the rays of the moon, radiant, ' and embodied in letters. The god fashioned the Rig-veda, ' with the Yajush, from his eyes, the Sama-veda from the ' tip of his tongue, and the Atharvan from his head. The ' Vedas, as soon as they are born, find a body (xtra). Hence ' they obtain their character of Vedas, because they find (vin- ' danti) that abode. These Vedas then create the pre-existent ' eternal Brahma (sacrifice or ceremonial,) a being of celestial * form, with their own mind-born qualities 4 .' " In the Rig-veda, again, we have another story, ' In the 9th ' verse of the Purusha Sukta, the three Vedas are said to have ' been derived from the mystical victim, Purusha. ' From that ' universal sacrifice were produced the hymns called Rik and ' Saman, the metres, and the Yajush 5 .' " The Atharva Veda says, ' From time the Rik verses > Ibid * Ibid. 3 See above page 329 note 1. * Dr. Muir's Sans. Texts. 5 ibid. SELF-CONTRADICTORY ACCOUNTS OF THE ORIGIN OF VEDA. 379 ' sprang, the Yajush sprang from time.' The Bhagavata ' Purana says, ' From these three letters the divine and un- ' born being created the various letters of the alphabet, ' distinguished as inner (y, r, I, v), ushmas (', sh, s, h), vowels, ' long and short, and consonants. With this [alphabet] the ' omnipresent Being, desiring to reveal the functions of the ' four classes of priests, [created] from his four mouths the * four Vedas with the three sacred syllables and the omkara' 1 . 1 Again, ' There was formerly only one Veda, the sacred mono- ' syllable om, the essence of all speech ; only one god, Narayana ; ' only one Agni, and [one] caste. From Pururavas came the ' triple Veda in the beginning of the Treta age V " The learned Kishis who propounded these theories of the production of the Vedas must have calculated on the per- manence of a state of popular ignorance in the country. They could hardly have expected criticism or cross questioning from their readers. For even this meteoric origin of their s'astra is related in a slovenly manner without any regard to consist- ency. At times we hear of the Gayatri being the mother of the Veda which was produced from it ; at times, again, the Gayatri appears to be the child of the Vedas, having itself been milked from them ! " Now before we can absolutely submit to the guidance of the Vedas, is it not a solemn duty to ponder these unmeaning, incoherent, and inconsistent descriptions of their nature and origin ? I cannot at all gather from any of these descriptions what the substance, called Veda, was at its production, and certainly it could not be eternal, without falsifying some of these accounts." A'gamika. "The substance, called Veda, must at first have been sound, or words uttered, but not written down." S'atyakdma. "What can be the meaning of producing words from fire, air, and the sun, or of extracting bhur, bhuvah, svar from words or sounds'? Elsewhere, the Vedas are said to have been breathed out. What is meant by this ? Brahma, or whoever was the producer, emitted the sounds or words at the beginning, for that is what most S'astras say. Were there any person present to hear those sounds?" A'gamika. " There was no person present when the sounds uttered, but the same words were afterwards written down by the persons to whom they were revealed." Ibid. a Ibid. 380 DIALOGUE X. Satyakama. " What evidence have you of that? How do you know they were revealed to the writers in question, and not produced from their own imaginations ? The story of their original extraction from the elements, even if it could be made intelligible, can have no practical use in determining their authority, because we have no means of knowing any thing beyond what is written, and what we require is evidence of the writers' inspiration. " But the writers in many instances claim their writings as their own productions, and not as communications of pre- existing sounds. And this leads me to the fourth question, what are the claims set up by the Vedas themselves ? The following are but a few among many passages which have been cited by Dr. Muir to show that the rishis claimed their compositions as the products of their own minds : "This hymn, conferring wealth, has been made to the divine race, by the sages, with their mouth [or in presence of the gods] ." " Grow, Agni, by this prayer which we have made to thee through [or according to] our power, or our knowledge." " Thus, O Indra, yoker of steeds, have the Gotamas made for thee pure [or beautiful] hymns." " These, your ancient exploits, Asvins, our fathers have declared. Let us, who are strong in bold men, making a hymn for you, bountiful gods, utter our offering of praise." " Nodhas, descendant of Gotama, fashioned this new hymn for [thee] , Indra, who art of old, and who yokest thy steeds," etc. " Desiring wealth, men have fashioned for thee this hymn, as a skilful workman [fabricates] a car, and thus they have disposed (lit. fashioned) thee to (confer) happiness." " This reverential hymn, divine Maruts, fashioned by the heart, has been presented by the mind [or, according to Sayana ' let it be received by you with a favourable mind'] ." " Thus, hero, have the Gritsamadas, desiring succour, fashioned for thee a hymn, as men make roads." (Sayana explains vayima by " road ;" but it generally means knowledge). " We generate a hymn, like pure butter, for Agni, Vaisvanara, who promotes our sacred rites." " I have generated a new hymn to Agni, the falcon of the sky ; who bestows on us wealth in abundance." " Indra, the wise rishis, both ancient and modern, have generated prayers." " The soraa cheers not Indra unless it bo poured out ; nor do liba- tions [gratify] Maghavan when offered without a priest. To him I generate a hymn such as may please him, that, after the manner of men, he may hear our new [song] ." VEDAS THEMSELVES CLAIM HUMAN AUTHORSHIP. 381 " In like manner as I spread the sacrificial grass to the Nasatyas (Asvins), so do I send forth to them hymns, as the wind [drives] the clouds ; to them (I say), who bore off to the youthful Vimada his bride in a chariot which outstripped the enemy's host." " The devout sage, deeply versed in sacred lore, sends forth his hymns to you, O Mitra and Varuna. You mighty gods, receive his prayers with favour, since ye till [prolong '?] , as it seems, his autumns by your power." A'gamika. " I cannot deny the force of your arguments, Satyakama, and yet I am far from being convinced. The result of our conferences hitherto has been to weaken the foundations of human belief, and foster a spirit of universal scepticism. There must be a grave error somewhere in all this. To disprove a certain position is not to find out the truth. And if there be no truth in the texts of the Vedas, or the aphorisms of philosophers, where are we to go in search of it ? The characteristic of righteous men is to set forth Faith, as the poet says 1 , not scepticism. Our studies, speculations, and discussions cannot be considered successful, if they end in the conclusion that there is no truth in the world. Our faculty of reason could never have been granted by the Almighty for that; it is doubtless intended to put us in possession of some definite and positive truth, to discover His will in nature and in His word, for it is preposterous to think of discovering His will for all practical purposes without His word. Surely He could not have left us in the dark destitute of a revelation of His will. Like yourself I find it difficult to believe that He would be deliberately deluding us by the projection of an illusion. But I cannot on the other hand understand that he would leave us, without an dgama, or revelation, to follow our own bewildering reason in things beyond its range, and thus, in another way, consign us to inevitable delusions. Hence my still cleaving to the hope that the Vedas may contain His word notwithstanding all you have said. We must have some- thing on which to repose our faith, or our minds must be tossed to and fro by the waves of doubt and disputation, like a boat without a rudder on stormy waters. I cannot say that our conferences have at all tended to the discovery of that something." Satyakdma. " I perfectly agree with you here, A'gamika. You are quite right in saying that belief, not scepticism, is the 382 DIALOGUE X. end of human study, but not belief of every kind. Bad as it is to be in a state of doubt, to believe in falsehood is still worse. To get rid of error is a most important step toward the dis- covery of truth. You will allow that he who removes rubbish in order to secure a good foundation, assists in raising the superstructure, as much as he that puts in layers of bricks. If the foundation of your house be radically bad, so that no supply of props or buttresses will save the building, you will doubtless be thankful to the man who points out the fact to you, and you will admit that your wisest course then is to dig it up. You dig up, however, only to build anew, and, in doing so, you do not recklessly throw away all the bricks and mate- rials of the old edifice. Whatever is good you retain with pleasure, not only because that is the dictate of economy, but also because a stone that has stood the encroachments of time, uninjured, in a certain locality, has proved its adaptation to that locality, and must be preferable to one untried. Good stones of the old building may be depended upon more con- fidently than new ones." A'gamika. " I do not understand what you mean. You have certainly dug up the foundation by condemning the only revelation of God's will to which we looked for guidance. And as to bricks, I really do not know whether you have left any unbroken." Satyakdma. " I have only been condemning the Eich, Yajush, Saman, and Atharvan. Their condemnation is not synonymous with the rejection of all revelation. A person does not disallow the true coin, merely because he refuses to accept a counterfeit one." A'gamika. "But where is your true coin? you are only finding fault with the Veda. We say that God communicated his will in the beginning. You say, No." Satyakdma. " I certainly do not say, No, to the idea of a primitive Revelation of God's will. If by talking of the eter- nal s'astra, you only mean that God gave an utterance to His will in the beginning, and if you do not insist on that utter- ance being recorded in the Eich, Yajush, Sainan, and Atharvan, I am sure we are both of the same opinion." A'gamika. "But if the revelation be not on record, of what use would it be V Satyakdma. "You acknowledge that the primitive Eeve- lation was not at the time committed to writing. It could only be transmitted by traditional instruction. It could not under such circumstances be recorded without direct inspiration from JAIMINI UNCONSCIOUSLY TESTIFIES TO A GREAT TRUTH. 383 God, in other words without a fresh revelation. You have no evidence to offer in favor of the Kich and others being such an after-revelation, and the books themselves purport in some places to be ordinary human compositions. " I cannot join you in saying that an unwritten revelation is of no use. It serves the immediate object of its utterance, and, notwithstanding the mistakes and errors incident to human tradition, there is some utility in its oral transmission. Gold with alloy may still have some value. But I agree with you so far as to believe that revelation, thus transmitted, becomes mixed up with human errors, and gradually loses its influence. Unless it were recorded under divine inspiration, it could not be a trustworthy guide for all ages. " But that the oral transmission of unwritten revelation is not altogether useless is apparent from the fact that the Brah- minical systems, notwithstanding all their errors, have at least one great truth lurking in them all." A'gamika. "What truth do you allude to?" Satyakdnia. " The fact of a primitive Revelation. No case has been made out for the Rich, Yajush, Saman, and Atharvan, but the fact of a primitive Revelation from the Almighty can admit of little doubt, and the idea, almost universal in India, of an eternal Veda, may be accepted as an evidence of that great fact. The zealous apologist for the Vedas, the author of the Prior Mimansa, himself suggests some such consideration. His argument is that the Vedas are eternal, for sound is eternal. People may naturally wonder at the confidence with which this argument is broached. What especial connection, it ruaj' be asked, is there between the Sadhya and hetu, between the thing to be proved and the reason adduced. If the eternity of sound were admitted as a reason for the eternity of words, phrases, and sentences, all words, phrases, and sentences, and consequently all compositions must be eternal. How could a philosopher offer such a poor argument to his readers ? How could he rely on its satisfying those who had reasoned so strongly against the Mantras and Brahmanas. " The mystery can only be explained on the supposition of some distorted tradition existing among the Brahmins of a primitive revelation from God. By s'abda, or sound, as an instrument of true knowledge, they meant the teaching of an infallible author. Those, who, like Jaimini, would not allow that the Vedas had an author, still understood s'abda in the sense of an infallible teaching. When, again, they speak of s'abda as eternal, they suggest the idea that there was an 384 DIALOGUE X. infallible teaching co-eval with the creation of man. This is the only sense in which their language becomes intelligible, and, whether they understood their own minds or not, whether they were conscious of what they were propounding or not, we can find no difficulty in admitting that a great truth is couched in their words. The reason they give for their position is thus expressed : ' It is eternal, for its manifestation was for the benefit of others 1 .' " Jaimini's theory, then, amounts to this, that there was an infallible teaching from the beginning for the benefit of others. This theory we may cordially accept as a testimony to the fact of a Primitive Revelation. We may well take for granted that an infallible teaching was available ' for the benefit of others,' when sentient creatures were called into being. We can have no difficulty in believing that the Almighty made a communication of His will to our first parents when He created them. How dependent human beings are upon external aid for years after their birth, is known to all men. They are quite powerless as infants and children. They necessarily look to their parents and guard- ians for maintenance and education. But the first man could have had no earthly father to foster him. The inference is accordingly almost inevitable that He, who gave him being, furnished him at the same time with such directions as were necessary for his guidance. That which the first man thus heard from His Maker, was a s'abda, an infallible teaching, intended for the benefit of others, i.e., mankind, and co-eval with the commencement of human society. " So far I see no reason for differing from Jaimini's apho- rism, which certainly a theistic commentator may construe in our sense, whatever the author's own meaning may have been. But then he proceeds to identify that s'abda, or infallible teaching, with the Veda. And, here, the double meaning attached to this word helped to introduce a great error. Veda is by some defined to be S'abda rds'i?, or a collection of words, sounds, or infallible teachings. When Jaimini argued that the Veda is eternal, for sound is eternal, he was probably thinking of this definition. But if the word Veda be synony- mous with sound, or infallible teaching, then the argument is II *{ II e II CS || S'ankara on the Mindukya. NO EVIDENCE FOR RICH YAJUSH, ETC. 385 a truism. If it signifies a specific collection of words, then the argument involves the false reasoning, it has horns, therefore it is a cow. Because there was some infallible teaching in the beginning, therefore the Rich, Yajush, etc. are eternal ! Assuming, however, that the word Veda stands simply for a collection of words, or infallible teachings, the aphorism, as we have interpreted it, only amounts to the asser- tion of a primitive Revelation, which, as I have already said, is more than probable in itself. " But, as we know that Jaimini contends for the authority of the Rich, Yajush, Saman, and Atharvan, the signification of the word Veda must shift from the general to the particular at some point in the argument. The moment however the word stands for the Rich and the other three, Jaimini's argument must be repudiated. Because some infallible teaching existed in the beginning, some collection of sounds was given, it does not follow that the Rich, Yajush, and others are eternal. To say that man was created in the beginning may be a truth, but to conclude from thence that Vikramaditya was co-eval with the creation is a gross error. Similarly, to say that some in- fallible teaching was received in the beginning may be a truth ; to conclude from thence that the Rich and others were breathed out at that time is an error. " The assertion of Jaimini, that the Rich, Yajush, S'aman, and Atharvan contain the primitive Revelation is not proved. No one knows when, where, or by whom, those four works were written, and consequently no one can pretend that they are a record of the primeval Sound. On the contrary a critical examination of their contents disproves their authority. As to the argument that the Vedas must have proceeded from the divinity because no human author can be shown to have pro- duced it, it is not of much validity. If a stranger, or a man brought up as a foundling, came to you, and no one was able to give you an account of his paternity, you would not surely conclude that he was co-eval with the creation. " And there is nothing in the general scope of the Vedas to justify the conclusion that they were revealed in the beginning. It is impossible to fancy what edification our first parents could derive from mere praises of the Sun, Moon, and Fire. If his- torical narratives were entirely excluded, the residuum would be mere invocations of the elements, and a few ceremonial injunctions." A'aamika. " But you have not answered my question, where is your true coin ?" ccc 386 DIALOGUE X. Satyakdma. " The true coin I believe to be the Bible. It has strong external evidences for its being composed under divine inspiration, and its contents are just what might be expected from a work intended for the spiritual instruction of mankind." A'cjamika. " I have often heard of the Bible, but what I cannot fancy is the confidence with which you speak of the external evidences of the Bible, while you summarily reject those of the Vedas." Satyakdma. " You have no external evidences for the Vedas. You have not the slightest idea of the time when, and the persons by whom, the Kich, Yajush, Banian, and Atharvan were composed. There is a complete want of evidence here. As regards the Bible, it is, you must know, divided into two parts, the Old and New Testaments. The former was written by the prophets of the .Jews, the latter by the apostles and followers of Jesus Christ, the Saviour of mankind. In both cases we have the evidence of miracles and prophecy ; the evidence becoming, in the case of the New Testament, espe- cially strong, because of its being confirmed by collateral and circumstantial proofs. Now to set your face against these evidences, simply because you have no external evidences i< ti- the Veda, would not be acting with the manliness of an inquirer after truth." A'gamika. "Well, what do you mean by the evidence of prophecy '?" Satyakdma. " By the evidence of prophecy I mean the exact coincidence of events, as foretold long before their occurrence. There are in the Old and New Testaments, more especially the former, many predictions of events, far beyond the range of human sagacity, which were fulfilled, in some cases many centuries afterwards, exactly as they were uttered. The future condition of many nations of Asia and of Africa were thus accurately predicted long before the events. The circumstances attending the birth, death, and resurrection ol' Christ were in like manner foretold. Now since no man can obtain an insight into the future, beyond the ordinary range of annniana, or guess, by natural sensation or reflection, the inference is inevitable that the writers of the Old and New Testaments obtained such knowledge by divine inspiration. "To specify one instance of such predictions, Moses, who lived fifteen hundred years before Christ, foretold the future sufferings of his own nation, which are still being realized in our days. At the time of the prediction, there was no lakuliana 1'KOPHECY IN EVIDENCE Jb'Oll THE BIBLE. 387 or sign, from which the prophet might have formed an idea of the calamities he was describing, especially since those calamities were, in some respects, without a parallel in the history of mankind. Consider now a few of those predictions, and the manner in which each was fulfilled. '< The following prophecies are taken from the 28th Chapter of the Book of Deuteronomy, and the statements representing their exact fulfilment, from a valuable work of a learned divine of the last century, Bishop Newton by name : PROPHECY. " The Lord shall bring a nation against thee from far, from the ' end of the earth, as swift as the eagle flieth ; a nation whose tongue ' thou shalt not understand." FULFILMENT. " This description cannot be applied to any nation with such propriety as to the Eomans. They were truly brought from, far, from the end of the earth. Vespasian and Adrian, the two great conquerors and destroyers of the Jews, both came from command- ing here in Britain. The Komans too for the rapidity of their conquests might very well be compared to eagles, and perhaps not without an allusion to the standard of the Eoman armies, which was an eagle : and their language was more unknown to the Jews than the Chaldee." PllOPHECY. A nation of tierce countenance, which shall not regard the person ' of the old, nor shew favour to the young : ' And lie shall eat the fruit of thy cattle, and the fruit of thy land, ' until thou be destroyed : which also shall not leave thee either corn, ' wine, or oil, or the increase of thy kine, or flocks of thy sheep, 'until, he have destroyed thee.' FULFILMENT. ' Such also were the Komans : for when Vespasian entered Gadara Josephus saith, that ' he slew all, man by man, the Romans showing ' mercy to no age, out of hatred to the nation, and remembrance of ' their former injuries.' The like slaughter was made at Gamala, ' for no body escaped besides two women, and they escaped by ' concealing themselves from the rage of the Eomans. For they ' did not so much as spare young children, but every one at that ' time snatching up many cast them down from the citadel.' FBOPHECY. ' And he shall besiege thee in all thy gates, until thy high and ' fenced walls come down, wherein thou trustedst, throughout all ' thy land : and he shall besiege thee in all thy gates throughout all ' thy land, which the LOKD thy God hath given thee.' 388 DIALOGUE X. FULFILMENT. So likewise the Romans, as we may read in Joseph us's history ol the Jewish war, demolished several fortified places, before they besieged and destroyed Jerusalem. And the Jews may very well be said to have trusted in their hinh and fenced trail*, for they seldom ventured a battle in the open field. They confided in the strength and situation of Jerusalem, as the Jebusites, the former inhabitants of the place, had done before them : insomuch that they are represented saying (Jer. XXI. 13.) Who shall conic dotni ixt us ? or who shall enter into our hulntation .' Jerusalem was indeed a very strong place, and wonderfully fortified both by nature and art according to the description of Tacitus as well as of Josepblis: and yet how many times was it taken ? It was taken by Shishak king of Egypt, by Nebuchadnezzar, by Antiochus Epiphanes, by Pompey, by Sosius and Herod, before its final destruction by Titus." PROPHECY. ' And thou shalt eat the fruit of thine own body, the flesh of thy ' sons and of thy daughters, which the LOUD thy God hath given 1 thee, in the siege and in the straitness, wherewith thine enemies 1 shall distress thee : ' So that the man that is tender among you, and very delicate, his ' eye shall be evil toward his brother, and toward the wife of his 1 bosom, and toward the remnant of his children which he shall ' leave : ' So that he will not give to any of them of the flesh of his children ' whom he shall eat : because he hath nothing left him in the siege ' and in the straitness, wherewith thine enemies shall distress thee in ' all thy gates. ' The tender and delicate woman among you, which would not ' adventure to set the sole of her foot upon the ground for delicate- ' ness and tenderness, her eye shall he evil toward the husband of ' lier bosom, and toward her son, and toward her daughter. ' And toward her young one that cometh out from between her ' feet, and toward her children which she shall hear : for she shall ' eat them for want of all thinyx secretly in the siege and straitness, ' wherewith thine enemy shall distress thee in thy gates.' FULFILMENT. " And in the last siege of Jerusalem by the Romans there was a most terrible famine in the city, and Josephus hath given so melan- choly an account of it, that we cannot read it without shuddering. He saith, particularly, that 'women snatched the food out of the ' very mouths of their husbands and sons of their fathers, and (what ' is most miserable) mothers ol their infants :' and in another place he saith, that ' in every house, if there appeared any semblance ol' PROPHECIES AND THEIR FULFILMENTS. 389 ' food, a battle ensued, and the dearest friends and relations fought ' with one another, snatching away the miserable provisions of life.' * * And again it was fulfilled above 1500 years after the time of Moses in the last siege of Jerusalem by Titus, and we read in Jose- phus particularly of a noble woman's killing and eating her own sucking child. Moses saith, The tender and delicate woman among I/OH-, icould not ad cent lire to net the -sole of her foot upon the ground, for delicateness and tenderness : and there cannot be a more natural and lively description of a woman, who was according to Josephus illustrious for her family and riches. Moses saith, she shall eat tJiem for want of all things : and according to Josephus she had been plundered of all her substance and provision by the tyrants and soldiers. Moses saith, that she should do it secretly : and according to Josephus, when she had boiled and eaten half, she covered up the rest, and kept it for another time." PHOl'HECY. ' And ye shall be plucked from off the land whither thou goest to ' possess it. ' And the LOKD shall scatter thee among all people, from the one ' end of the earth even unto the other ; ' And among these nations shalt thou find no ease, neither shall ' the sole of thy foot have rest : but the LOKD shall give thee there ' a trembling heart, and failing of eyes, and sorrow of mind : ' And thy life shall hang in doubt before thee ; and thou shalt fear ' day and night, and shalt have none assurance of thy life : FULFILMENT. " Now not to mention any other of the calamities and slaughters which they have undergone, there was in the last siege of Jerusalem by Titus an infinite multitude, saith Josephus, who perished by famine, and he computes, that during the whole siege, the number of those who were destroyed by that and by the war amounted to eleven hundred thousand, the people being assembled from all parts to celebrate the passover : and the same author hath given us an account of 1,240,490 destroyed in Jerusalem and other parts of Judea, besides 99,200 made prisoners ; as Basnage has reckoned them up from that historian's account. Indeed there is not a nation upon earth, that hath been exposed to so many massacres and perse- cutions. Their history abounds with them. If God had not given them a promise of a numerous posterity, the whole race would many a time have been extirpated. They had come out of Egypt triumphant, but now they should return thither as slaves. They had walked through the sea as dry land at their coming out ; but now they should be carried thither in ships. They might be carried thither in the ships of the Tyrian or Sidonian merchants, or by the Romans who had a fleet in the 300 DIALOGUE X. Mediterranean : and this was a much safer way of conveying so many prisoners, than sending them by land. It appears from Josephus that in the reigns of the two first Ptolemies many of the Jews were slaves in Egypt. And when Jerusalem was taken by Titus, of the captives who were above 17 years he sent many bound to the works in Egypt ; those under 17 were sold : but so little care was taken of these captives, that eleven thousand of them perished for want. And we learn from St. Jerome, that ' after their last over- ' throw by Adrian many thousands of them were sold, and those who ' could not be sold were transported into Egypt, and perished by ' shipwreck or famine, or were massacred by the inhabitants. They were indeed plucked front, off their own laud, when the ten tribes were carried into captivity by the king of Assyria, and other nations were planted in their stead ; and when the two other tribes were carried away captive to Babylon ; and when the Romans took away their place and nation ; besides other captivities and transport- ations of the people. Afterwards, when the Emperor Adrian had subdued the rebellious Jews, he published an edict forbidding them upon pain of death to set foot in Jerusalem, or even to approach the country round about it. Tertullian and Jerome say, that they were prohibited from entering into Judea. From that time to this their country hath been in the possession of foreign lords and masters, few of the Jews dwelling in it, and those only of a low servile con- dition. Benjamin of Tudela in Spain, a celebrated Jew of the twelfth century, travelled into all parts to visit those of his own nation, and to learn an exact state of their affairs . and he hath reported, that Jerusalem was almost entirely abandoned by the Jews. What people indeed have been scattered so far and wide as they '/ and where is the nation, w T hich is a stranger to them, or to which they are strangers? They swarm in many parts of the East, are spread through most of the countries of Europe and Africa, and there are several families of them in the West Indies. They circulate through all parts, where trade and money circulate ; and are, as 1 may say, the brokers of the whole world. They have been so far from finding rest, that they have been banished from city to city, from country to country. In many places they have been banished, and recalled, and banished again. We will only just mention their great banishments in modern times, and from countries very well known. In the latter end of the thirteenth century they were banished from England by Edward L, and were not permitted to return and settle again till Cromwell's time. In the latter end of the fourteenth century they were banished from France (for the seventh time, says Me/erayJ by Charles VI ; and ever since they have been only tolerated, they have not enjoyed entire liberty, except at Met/ where they have a synagogue. In the latter end of the fifteenth century they were banished from Spain by Ferdinand and Isabella ; and according to Mariana, they were a PROPHECIES AND THEIR FULFILMENTS. 391 nundred and seventy thousand families, or as some say eight hund- red thousand persons who left the kingdom. Most of them paid dearly to John II. for a refuge in Portugal, but within a few years were expelled from thence also by his successor Emanuel. And in our o\vn time, within these few years, they were banished from Prague by the queen of Bohemia." " That part of the prophecy which related to the dispersion of the Jews all over the world, is being still fulfilled before us. The fact is itself almost miraculous, and it is a standing evi- dence of Christian truth. There have been other people, dis- possessed of their homes and banished from their country, but they have either been exterminated, or their nationality has been destroyed by amalgamation with strangers. The Jews, however, though long banished from their own country, still live as a separate people, with all their distinctive traditions and peculiar manners of old. They still live, not as emigrants in a new colony of their own, not removed in one body to any particular spot inhabiting it as another Judea, but they live, scattered over the whole world, ' present in all countries, and ' with a home in none, intermixed and yet separated, and ' neither amalgamated nor lost : but like those mountain- ' streams which are said to pass through lakes of another kind 'of water and keep a native quality to repel commixture 1 .' There is no land in the world which may now be called Jews' Land, and yet Jews are to be found, aliens, in all lands. They live under all governments, and yet have no govern- ment of their own. Such a fact has no parallel in history. It can only be looked upon as a wonder. He that could predict such a wonder, more than fifteen hundred years before the event, could only have done so under the inspiration of the Omniscient." A'yamika. " Are you not reasoning after a fashion for which even Gotama's category fails to find the proper terms ? The eternity of the Veda, you say, is disproved by its recording events that transpired in time, and yet not only is the antiquity of Moses NOT disproved by his description of events that fol- lowed the capture of Jerusalem, but his prophetical authority is thereby actually established !" Sdtyakama. " The Vedas, you must remember, my friend, describe the events alluded to as by-gone facts, as past occur- rences. The dialogues between Yama and Nuchiketas, between Yajnawalkya and Maitreyi, between Uddalaka and S'wetaketu Davison on Prophecy. 892 DIALOGUE X. are recorded, not as prophecies of the future, but as narrations of the past. Hence we say that the narratives must have been written after the events. Moses, on the other hand, recorded the future sufferings of his countrymen as predictions. His writings existed before the Roman nation, ' of a fierce counten- ance,' which was. in the divine counsels, finally to inflict those chastisements on the Jews, was yet formed, or had obtained its name. These writings again were already translated into Greek above three hundred years before the destruction of Jerusalem ; and the destruction of Jerusalem, as a fact, is re- corded by two of the most accurate of ancient historians. The alternative of assigning to Moses a date posterior to the events is not open in this case. It is precluded by the facts of the Septuagint translation and of the corruption of the Jewish language during the captivity. The Jews, you must know, were taken captives to Babylon about six hundred years before the Christian era, and, for seventy years, they remained exiles from their own country. There, by mixing with a strange nation, their language was very much corrupted. The five books of Moses must therefore have been written, at latest, before the captivity, while the destruction of Jerusalem and the dispersion of the Jews could not have taken place before the reign of the Emperor Vespasian. " Judea, you must remember, had been brought under the subjection of the Komans some time before the catastrophe predicted by Moses. Roman historians, who, as Gentiles, could have had no motive in recording any thing from which a favourable inference might be drawn for the divine inspira- tion of prophets whom they despised, themselves inform us that one of their generals, Pompey, had forced himself into the temple of Jerusalem more than five hundred years after the captivity, which, as we saw, is the latest possible date that could be assigned to the Pentateuch, and about two hundred years after Moses had been translated into Greek. The temple, then, on the testimony of historians whose honesty was above suspicion, was in existence many hundred years after Moses, and it was destroyed in the reign of Vespasian, when the events gave accurate fulfilment to the predictions of Moses. " In the above presentation of the facts, I have confined my- self to the testimony of enemies, and to the very extremes of historical possibilities. I have taken no account of the evidence which the Jewish writers themselves afford. As those writers again give a consistent account of the age of Moses and the times of his successors, we must consider the actual date NO EVIDENCE FOR PROPHECIES IN PURANAS. 393 of the Pentateuch as established, beyond doubt, by the cumula- tive evidence of Jews and Gentiles." A'gamika." Is it certain that Moses lived long before the events described ? Satyakdma. I have just told you that Moses lived fifteen hundred years before Christ, and Jerusalem was destroyed seventy years after Christ. The works of Moses, originally written in Hebrew, were translated into Greek two hundred and seventy years before Christ, so that many persons un- acquainted with Hebrew had also known, more than three hundred years before the event, what was coming on the Jews." A'gamika. " But is there no doubt of the events them- selves ?" Satyakdma. " The events are minutely described by Josephus and Tacitus, one writing in Greek, the other in Latin the former a Jew, the latter a Eoman, and both cautious, accurate, and faithful as historians. And we see with our own eyes the Jewish people dispersed all over the world, and without a country of their own." A'gamika. " But there are numerous prophecies in our own Puranas. May we not cite them as proofs of their author- ity ? The Bainayana was written before Kama was born." Satyakdma. " You cannot settle the age or paternity of any of the Puranas. How can you urge any thing as to the date of the predictions '? The Upanishads say that the Pura- nas were breathed out from Brahma along with the "Vedas at the time of the creation. The Puranas themselves claim Vyasa for their author, and one of them goes the length of saying that it was composed for correcting the errors of the Vedas, while another pretends to be prior in point of time to the Vedas. Thus ; ' That about which, venerable sage, you have ' enquired, is all known by me, the essence of the Puranas, the ' pre-eminent Brahma-vaivartta, which refutes the errors of ' the Puranas and Upapuranas and of the Vedas.' ' First of ' all the s'astras, the Purana was uttered by Brahma. Subse- ' quently the Vedas issued from his mouths.' 1 " Learned critics, again, are forced to assign a much more recent date to all the Itihases and Puranas that are extant in our days. What trust-worthy evidence can you possibly have of any prophecy having been delivered ? or even of the facts (supposed to have been predicted) , having really occurred ? We do not know of any contemporaneous historian that 1 Dr. Muir's Sanscrit Texts, Part iii DDD 394 DIALOGUE X. recorded them. Nay the writing of history does not appear to have been undertaken by any Brahminical authors, either in prose or poetry. Prose writers have chiefly treated of specu- lative subjects, and as to poetry, it is a recognized rule in rhe- toric that poetry must be rasdtmaka, or full of striking ideas and sentiments, and that iti vritta, or a mere narrative, is a defect in poetry. " As to the Barnayana, the popular saying about its compo- sition before the events, may be a bold effort of fancy, but it cannot stand the test of historical criticism. Valmiki is said to have been a contemporary of iiarna. Whether that be an authenticated fact or not, is not now the question, but what evidence can be possibly adduced under such a circumstance of his writing the whole epic before the recovery of Sita, and the conqueror's return to Ayodhia V" A'gamika. " You said that the Bible was attested by mira- cles as well as prophecies. What have you to say on the question of miracles V" Satyakdma. "As prophecy is a sign of divine knowledge, so are miracles proofs of divine power. Numerous miracles of that description were publicly performed by Christ, and they were recorded by men who had ample opportunities for obtain- ing correct information, and whose honesty as historians has been established by irrefragable proofs. " Miracles of course require to be authenticated by stronger evidence than ordinary facts. We must have the testimony of contemporaries, and the witnesses must prove their competency and their integrity. Proof of compe- tency is required as a safeguard against mistakes founded on their ignorance, and proof of integrity is necessary to prevent impositions. A learned divine says, ' The ' strength and validity of every testimony must bear pro- ' portion with the authority of the testijier ; and the authority ' of the testijier is founded upon his ability and integrity: ' his ability in the knowledge of that which he delivereth and ' asserteth ; his integrity in delivering and asserting accord- ' ing to the knowledge. For two several ways he which re- ' lateth or testifieth any thing may deceive us ; one, by being ' ignorant of the truth, and so upon that ignorance mistaking, ' he may think that to be true which is not so, and consequently ' deliver that for truth which in itself is false, and so deceive ' himself and us ; or if he be not ignorant, yet if he be dishonest 'or unfaithful, that which he knows to be false he may pro- ' pound and assert to be a truth, and so, though himself be not CHARACTERS OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE. 395 ' deceived, he may deceive us. And by each of these ways, for ' want either of ability or integrity in the testifter, whoso ' grounds his assent unto any thing as a truth, upon the testi- ' mony of another, may equally be deceived. But whosoever ' is so able as certainly to know the truth of that which he ' delivereth, and so faithful as to deliver nothing but what and ' as he knoweth, he, as he is not deceived, so deceiveth no 1 man 1 ." " Both these characters of credible evidence are prominent in the testimony on which we receive the miracles of Christ. Those who have testified to them were his own disciples, who constantly kept company with him and had every opportunity of knowing the truth of what they declared to others. And their honesty was unimpeachable. In the first place, they had nothing to gain by false testimony. Men are known in the world to pervert facts only from interested motives. No one tells a lie where he has nothing to gain. When we are satis- fied that a person is disinterested, we never doubt his testi- mony. And so from the obvious disinterestedness of the disci- ples of Christ, their testimony is beyond suspicion. In the second place, their honesty was proved by the severest ordeal to which a human witness could possibly be subjected. Judea was at that time under the government of the Romans who, being idolaters, were bitterly opposed to the teaching of Christ. That teaching was also hateful to the Jews who had contracted the strongest prejudices against the Saviour. His disciples had therefore to encounter the severest persecutions both from Jews and Gentiles for their proclaiming the doctrines and miracles of Christ. They were reviled and reproached, im- prisoned and beaten, and most of them were finally put to cruel deaths because of their unflinching honesty in declaring what they had seen and heard. " The miracles, thus attested, were also numerous and stu- pendous. They could not otherwise have been such satisfac- tory credentials of divine commission. A single isolated act, however wonderful, might fail as an evidence of religious truth. It might be a deception, or a delusion. But Christ's miracles were both numerous and stupendous. The eye or the ear might have been deceived in a single instance. It could not be so in a multiplicity of instances, or in cases in which persons, born blind, were cured in an instant, or dead men were raised to life. 1 Pearson on the Creed. 396 DIALOGUE X. " The miracles of Christ, again, had nothing in them, mili- tating with our conceptions of God's goodness and majesty. They were exhibitions of the divine benevolence no less than the divine power." A'gamika. " But there are numerous miracles recorded in our Itihases and Puranas. Why may we not cite them also as instances of divine power?" Saiycik&ma. " Because of a failure of evidence and because of their militating with our conceptions of the divine perfec- tion. Where nothing is known as to the age, circumstances, and character of the writers, how can the least confidence be placed in their sayings ? The descriptions again are unworthy of the Godhead. The alleged miracles were in many instances performed by the most immoral personations and for improper purposes. " The Christian miracles are in these respects totally dif- ferent. The performer, Christ, was in his life a perfect pattern of holiness and moral virtue. It would be literally impossible for the disciples of Christ to have composed such an exemplar of perfection from their own heads. " And the Bible, thus attested by external evidences, teaches in point of doctrine and precept precisely such things as might be expected from the teaching of God, and throws light on many points on which we were per- plexed by doubts and difficulties. The internal evidence thus confirms the external, and leaves no possible room for doubt." A'gamikn. " What are the points on which the Bible throws light?" Satyakdma. "Some of the very points on which we have been conversing for some days of late. As regards the external universe, it tells us, ' In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth,' thus showing that theNyaya, Sankhya, and Vedant were all right and all wrong. They rightly appre- hended the truth, as regarded their opposition to each other's systems. The Vedant was right in its protest against the eternal atoms of the one, and the unintelligent creative Prakriti of the other; and the Nyaya and Sankhya were equally right on their part in inveighing against the doctrine of the world's identity with God. But they were all wrong in regard to their positive doctrines the Nyaya in its theory of eternal atoms, the Sankhya in that of creative Prakriti, and the Vedant in its denial of a duality of substance. The universe is neither an illusion nor self-formed, but was called into being, out of nothing, THE BIBLE THROWS LIGHT ON BRAHMINICAL INSTITUTIONS. 397 by the one only Eternal and Supreme Intelligence, the author of all things in heaven and in earth. All perplexing difficulties are thus cleared. " As regards the chief end of human existence, again, we learn, that the soul is a created substance but immortal, neither eternal or self-existent, nor again a mere compound of physical organs ; born in time but to endure for ever, neither swayambhu, nor anitya in the sense of perishable. It has neither inde- pendent nor terminable existence. Being a creature, it can never be promoted to the dignity of the Creator, but it has an eternity before it, to look forward to. It may strive to approach Him it may aspire after communion with Him, but it can never be unified with its Creator. There may be spiritual communion, but not physical identity. Since, however, the human soul is become tainted with sin, it must be cleansed and purified before it can look for that communion. It is impossible there can be any fellowship between the most holy God and impure sinners, before the latter have been redeemed and freed from sin. But the sinner, could not compass his own redemption, and therefore Christ came into the world for the salvation of helpless man. " Thus, A'gamika, we have a clearing up of those points on which philosophers had so long debated un profitably. And in the doctrince of Christ's atoning sacrifice for the sins of men, we have an explanation of a point which had certainly often puzzled me, and, I dare say, you too. The followers of Jaimini you know are all most forward in ex- horting men to perform the sacrificial rites enjoined in the Veda. The only way to the realms above, they say, is by means of sacrifices. Now it is singular that Jaimini never talks of God ; and, as we have just seen, a large and influ- ential class of Mimansakas set aside altogether the idea of a Supreme Creator and moral Governor of the universe. Works and worlds, they say, mechanically follow one another in eter- nal succession. There was no more necessity, in the opinion of the atheistic Mimansakas, for a Supreme Being to create the universe, than there was, in the opinion of the whole school, for a puntsha, or personal author, to compose the Vedas, or for an intelligent Governor to direct the distribution of fruits. And yet they all say, he that desires heaven must perform sacrifice. I do not know whether the question ever struck you, but I have often asked myself, what could they possibly mean by performing sacrifices, when they did not acknowledge a Supreme Divinity ? 398 DIALOGUE X. " The difficulty is cleared up in the Bible. We there learn that in the inscrutable wisdom of God, there could be no remission of sin apart from sacrifice, that Christ was revealed in the primitive age of the world as the great sacrifice for the sins of men, and that immolation of animals was ordained at an early period as typical of that great sacrifice. On the dis- persion of the families of men, the institution must have extended widely over the surface of the globe. But while the ceremonial performance of the rite was kept up, probably every where, its object and intention were gradually for- gotten or lost sight of in many countries. The practice, no doubt, came down to our ancestors from their immediate pro- genitors, but its signification appears to have fallen into oblivion before the formation of our literature. The zeal and assiduity with which it was maintained in our country is accounted for by its transmission from age to age as an imme- morial primitive practice, but the inability of our ancestors to give the least intelligent explanation of the rite, and the want of any information in the oldest of the Vedas on its connexion with the celestial fruits of which it was believed to be inva- riably productive, are enigmas which can only be understood by the light of Biblical history. Viewed as an institution originally appointed of God to represent the future sacrifice of Christ, and transmitted from father to son in every age as a most important ceremony connected with the eternal happiness of mankind, the external observance of the rite would, we can easily comprehend, be religiously maintained, even though the doctrine typified by it might be forgotten. Without the light which the Biblical account affords, one can find no adequate explanation of the difficulty. Why should the writers of the Vedas tell us abruptly that the only way to the felicity of heaven is the regular observance of certain sacrifices^ What again could those advocates for rites and ceremonies possibly mean, who either doubted or actually denied the existence of God, and yet contended for the necessity of offering sacrifices?" " Oh !" said I, " this is what you meant by the Great Sacri- fice for sin of which you spoke the other day. Now I under- stand your meaning." A'gamika. "I have sometimes been perplexed, I must confess, by the zeal with which persons have contended for the importance of sacrificial ceremonies who were perfectly indifferent, if not absolutely opposed, to the very foundation of all religion, the doctrine of a Supreme Being, the creator and moral governor of the world. DOCTRINE OF KRISHNA THE SUPREME QUITE MODERN. 399 " But I have always consoled myself with the idea that even atheists might by a happy inconsistency be animated by the sentiment contained in the following formula of adoration to Vishnu ; ' Obeisance to the sovereign God, the benefactor of ' Brahmins and kine. Obeisance, O obeisance ! to Krishna, ' even Govinda, the benefactor of the world. I am sin, my ' works are sin, my spirit is sin, my origin is sin. Save me, O ' thou lotus-eyed Han, who art the Lord of all sacrifices. None ' such a sinner as myself, none such a destroyer of sin as ' thyself, taking this, God, into consideration, do what is ' proper.' Sentiments such as these give some insight into the meaning of our ancient practice of animal sacrifices 1 ." Satyakdma. " That is however a formula of very recent origin. It was unknown to those who composed the Vedas and enjoined the sacrifices. There are reasons for suspecting that the idea contained in the formula you have quoted is derived from an exterior source." A'gamiha. " What are those reasons?" Satyakdma. " In the first place, the doctrine of Krishna, as a distinct object of worship, identical with the Supreme Being, appears to be quite modern. Professor Wilson, whom all Brahmins respected for his profound Sanscrit learning and who was never suspected of having ever done the least injustice to our national Sastras, says : ' The whole of this book is dedicated to the biography of Krishna. Many of the Puranas omit this subject altogether, or only allude to it occasionally. In others, it is equally prominent. The Brahma P. gives the story exactly in the same words as our text : which has the best right to them may be questioned ; but as it is usually met with, the Brahma P. is a very heterogeneous compilation. The Hari Vansa has a narrative more detailed than that of the text, with additions and embellishments of its own. The Brahma Vaivartta throughout celebrates the acts of Krishna ; and one portion of it, the Krishna Janma Khanda, especially describes his boyhood and youth. The incidents are the same in general as those in the text, but they are lost amidst interminable descriptions of Krishna's TOR: f ^ 400 DIALOGUE X. sports with the Gopis and with his mistress Radha, a person not noticed elsewhere ; the whole is in a style indicative of a modern origin. The Agni P. and Padma P. (Uttara Khaada) have accounts of Krishna, but they are mere summaries, compiled evidently from other works. The principal authority for the adventures of Krishna is the Bhagavajja, the tenth book of which is exclusively devoted to him. It Is this work which has, no doubt, mainly extended the worship of Krishna, as its popularity is evinced by its having been translated into all the spoken languages of India professing to have a literature. The Prem-sagar, its Hindi version, is well known ; but there are also translations in Mahratta, Telugu, Tamil, &c. It does not seem likely, however, that the Vishnu P. has copied the Bhagavata ; for although its greater conciseness may sometimes look like abridgment, yet the descriptions are generally of a more simple and antiquated character. Here, as usual, the Mahabharata is no doubt the earliest extant authority ; but it is not the earliest, for whilst it omits to narrate most of his personal adventures unconnected with his alliance with the Pandavas, it often alludes to them, and names repeatedly, his capital, his wives, and his prog- eny. It also devotes a section, the Mausala P., to the destruction of the Yadavas. The story of Krishna, the prince and hero, must have been complete when the Mahabharata was compiled. It is doubtful, however, if Krishna the boy, and his adventures at Vrindavan, were not subsequent inventions. There are no allusions to them in the poem, of an unsuspicious nature. The only ones that I have met with are contained in a speech by Sisupala, Sabha P., in which he reviles Krishna ; but they may easily have been interpolated. There may be others scattered through the poem, but I have not observed them. " As a warrior and prince he is always on the scene ; but he is repeatedly called an Ansa, or portion of Vishnu : whilst in a great number of places he is identified with Vishnu Naniyana, and is con- sequently ' all things.' This latter is his character, of course, ' amongst the Vaishnavas, agreeably to the Bhagavata ; f>OTJ^rT S3 " *T13T^ ^"4 I ' Krishna is the lord (Vishnu) himself. 1 ' " Professor Wilson is of opinion that the Sri Bhagavata was composed in the twelfth century of the Christian era, or about seven hundred years ago. The worship of Krishna as identical with the Supreme Being cannot then be much older than that." A'gamlka. " Surely the Ndrada-panchft-rdtra speaks of Krishna's sports with the Gopis and with Kadha, magnifying his glory as the Supreme Brahma. And that work is older than the S'ri-Bhagavata." 1 Note. Translation of the Vishnu I'urana, pp. 491, 492. NARADA-PANCHA-RATRA. 401 Satyakdma. " I have no objection to allow that the Pancha-ratra was prior to the Bhagavata in point of time, notwithstanding its express mention of the Bhagavata in one of its chapters. That mention I think is an interpolation. The Pancha-ratra must have been written before Sankara- charya, for he not only refers to it by name, but controverts some of its doctrines. I believe it was the Narada-Pancha- ratra that first invested Krishna with the dignity of the Supreme Godhead, and celebrated his youthful freaks as some- thing mystically divine. I have my theory of the reasons which led the author of that work to exhibit as adorable what I believe had before been held to be at best only tolerable in a prince and a warrior. But we cannot possibly have any reasons for assigning to the doctrine of ' Krishna the lord of sacrifices ' any date anterior to the Pancha-ratra which was written probably in the eighth or ninth century. The formula which affords you an insight into the doctrine of sacrifices cannot accordingly be of an older date than the eighth or ninth century. Now we have strong evidences for believing that the doctrine of the Great Sacrifice for sin, of which I have been speaking, had been introduced before that period into some parts of India, not far from the scene of the literary labours and theological discussions of the age. It was in the South of India that the Brahminical genius was in those days most active, as is apparent from the history of Sankaracharya, Ramanuja, and their respective followers, and it w 7 as also in the South of India that large congregations of Christians, calling themselves after the name of St. Thomas, had, for some centuries before the formation of Vaishnava sects, been maintaining the doctrine of the Great Sacrifice for sin. It is not at all improbable that some enterprising Brahmins had fallen in with them, and, struck by the doctrine in question, made use of it in giving a more imposing character to their popular god Krishna." A'gamika. " But what is your theory of the reasons which led to the deification of Krishna in the Pancha-ratra and the Sri-Bhagavata ? " Satyakdma. " I do not know whether I can explain myself in a few words, but I will make the attempt. Krishna, you must remember, is a great character in the Mahabharata, as the friend of the Pandavas. He must have been admired from the beginning for the abilities he displayed both on the field of battle and in the hall of consultation. He was feared and honoured as an extraordinary person, perhaps a god. But EE E 40'2 DIALOGUE X. though celebrated as a hero, there is no record of his youthful irregularities being held as adorable. Public morals had not as yet become so low. We need not consider the reproaches which Sis'upala cast on him as an interpolation. There may have been reports of his having, as a boy, led a very dissolute life. Most princes in our country still do the same. But we have no reason for taxing the age of which we are speaking with recounting those irregularities as divine acts. If the hero was deified, it was only by throwing the mantle of pious charity over the infirmities of the boy. " Indeed the Brahmins were so much opposed in those days to the recounting of the foibles of deified persons, that one entire canto of a popular poem was suppressed or expunged because of its containing an indelicate description of a god's dalliance with his own wife. Kalidasa who seems to have taken peculiar delight in such descriptions had given a very indecent representation of Siva's uxoriousness in the last canto of the Kumara-sambhava, and the horror of the Brah- mins at such an impious exposure of a god's infirmities has thrown that canto into utter oblivion. " The moral constitution of the Brahminical mind must therefore have undergone a radical change when poems like the Narada-pancha-ratra and S'ri-Bhagavata were composed. These works not only recounted as divine, acts on the part of Krishna, far worse than those which Kalidasa had described of S'iva, but they attached a peculiar religious merit to the con- stant hearing, uttering, and contemplating of those acts. And these impure descriptions have not only been received with favor, but that which is the more circumstantial of the two, I mean the Sri-Bhagavata, has been classed among the sacred writings, and translated, more or less freely, into most of the vernacular dialects of the country. What can be the cause of this moral revolution in the Brahminical mind ? What inducement could there be for selecting, as objects of religious worship, the most ugly traits in a character who had before been conspicuous in the traditions of the country only as a skilful prince and warrior. Above all, what could be the motive for exhibiting such a character as higher than all other gods, and identical with the Supreme Being'?" A'gamika. " I never thought of this point ; but I see that the deification of Bal Krishna is an event that may require to be accounted for. What do you think was the motive of our ancestors in setting up such an object of worship ?" Sati/fiJfdma. " I have only a theory on the subject. I think WORSHIP OF KRISHNA UNDER REACTION AGAINST BUDDHA. 403 it will afford an explanation of the moral phenomenon of the change in the Brahminical mind, but since there is a total absence of historical evidence, I cannot propound it as abso- lutely true. The Panch-ratra was written after the overthrow of Buddhism. What was the meaning of that overthrow? Only that its leaders were silenced or expelled. The great body of the people still entertained their veneration for the charac- ter of Buddha. They more especially the Sudras had found in that personation an object of reverence and adoration, such as had never been supplied to them by the Brahmins. Indeed the Brahmins had denied them the privilege of engaging in relig- ious exercises of any kind, and even punished such acts on their part as were indicative of the least aspiration after celestial blessings 1 . Buddha however had allowed them to participate freely in religious acts and meditations. He had so far emancipated the Sudras. The Brahmins saw, on regaining their supremacy after the fall of the rival school, that it would be impossible to enlist the popular sympathy in their favour without some concessions to the Sudras. They accord- ingly pitched on the well-known, and perhaps already deified, character of Krishna, and set it up as an object of universal worship. And in order to make it the more fascinating to the popular mind, and to give that mind a strong impulse in a direction the very opposite of Buddhism, they invested their new god with those infirmities of the flesh from which Sakya Muni is said to have been somewhat unnaturally free. The rude mind of the populace, devoid of education, is easily led in the direction of sensuality, and whereas Buddha had observed rigid chastity in the midst of several thousand damsels resi- dent in his own palace, Krishna was represented as the very antithesis of Buddha, deliberately going about to seek, seduce, carry off, or procure by other means many thousands of females from different parts of the country. The moral perversion of the Brahminical mind was accordingly brought about by the reac- tion against Buddhism. The Brahmins had found no difficulty in adopting the speculative principles of that system, but, as regarded practical devotion, they were desirous of setting up a character the very opposite of S'akya, with a view to wean the popular mind from Buddhism. " Under the impulse of the reaction in their own minds the Brahmins set up their popular gods as the Supreme Brahma, allowing all castes freely to worship him, taking care only to See above page 35. 404 DIALOGUE X. maintain their ministerial importance as gurus, or spiritual guides of other classes. Whatever ideas, expressive of the divine majesty, they could themselves imagine, and whatever sentiments, borrowed from other quarters, struck their fancies as suitable for a popular system, they freely received in the construction of their new idol. And thus the very character which had injured so many husbands and stained the purity of so many households, was otherwise described as the Lord of sacrifices, the greatest destroyer of sin, and the deliverer of the world. If a man had only faith in that pre-eminent divinity, he would obtain excellence whatever his caste or race 1 . The S'udras carried the dogma to greater lengths than was intended by the Brahmins. Sects arose afterwards which conferred the dignity of gurus on eminent members of their bodies without distinction of caste or colour. " I need hardly add, A'gamika, that Krishna, invested \vith the attributes of a Saviour from sin, presents only the picture (to use the fabulist's illustration) of a jackdaw in peacock's plumes. The picture looks unnatural, and you have no hesita- tion in saying that the plumage is borrowed. And yet the fact has some value in it. The jackdaw that borrows the peacock's plumes testifies thereby that the plumes are beautiful. And so the character of Krishna proves that, in the conception of its framers, human salvation could only proceed from the free grace of Him who was the Lord of sacrifices, ' in whom,' to quote a text from the Bible, ' we have redemption through His blood, the forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of His grace.' ' A'gamika. " But I am told that the Christian religion which you are now advocating speaks of a plurality of gods, three gods." Satyakdma. " Not three gods, nor a plurality of gods, but a plurality of persons in the unity of the Godhead. This doc- trine you can find no great difficulty in acknowledging, (1) because it is inculcated in the Bible which, as we have seen before, is attested by miracles and prophecies, and (2) because the Brahminical s'astras themselves bear some confirmatory testimony to its truth." S?q: S$ en qfo 3!' God. Not that an essentially formless Being can have a corporeal image, but man was CHRISTIAN IDEA OF FINAL BLISS. 407 made in the likeness of His Spirit. The Vedantic conception of the human soul being a reflection of the Supreme, like that of the sun or moon in the waters, is not correct, but the human soul is certainly an image, a likeness, and, in that sense of the term, a reflection of the Supreme Spirit. The likeness has been disfigured by the introduction of sin. The reflection partakes of the mirror's impurity, but the chief end of human existence is so to cleanse and polish the mirror of the soul by personal holiness that it may present an unspotted likeness of its God and Saviour, and be fully restored to the image in which it was originally made. The restoration of that image implies perfect release from all those corruptions which the Brahminical philosopher dreaded most, but it does not involve destitution of sentient existence or loss of indiv- idual consciousness. Christianity animates us with the hope of positive happiness and glory. Far from involving a destitu- tion of sentient existence or loss of individual consciousness, the ineffable bliss we look for, signifies the full sanctification of our senses, and the unceasing contemplation of the divine perfections without the least abatement of individual con- sciousness. We do not seek to fall into a state of irreparable insensibility, but we seek for an eternal life of perfect sen- tiency, that we may live for ever, intelligently and consciously to land and magnify the goodness and mercy of God. We wish our passions and affections, not to be destroyed, but to be brought in subjection to God, and to continue as immortal trophies of His omnipotent grace." A'gamika. " Many ideas are suggested by what you say. I shall not ask any more questions now. It is so late in the day, and I must first of all think more maturely of what you have already advanced. I shall probably call upon you soon for further information. I certainly feel that if there be truth in the world, it must be found in the Christian Scriptures." Satyakdma. " Since there is a God, the author and director of all things, there must also be a corresponding TRUTH. And if we seek it in dependence on Him, we shall no doubt find it, and the truth shall make us free, shall give us real Mukti." NATIVE AUTHORITIES CITED IN THIS WOBK. BHATTI-KAVYA, Calcutta Edition, Devanagri character. HITOPADESA, the same. NYAYA SUTRA VRITTI, the same. BHAGAVAD-GITA, the same, but in Bengali character. BRAHMA-VAIVARTA, in Eaja Radhakant's Sabda-kalpa-druma. RAGHU-VAXSA, Cal. Ed. Dev. Nag. Sutras of GOTAMA, the same. Ditto of KAPILA, the same, also the Serampore edition. Ditto of KAN ADA, Manuscript borrowed from the Benares College. This work has since been printed by the Asiatic Society of Cal- cutta. Ditto of PANTANJALI, Manuscript borrowed from a pandit of the Maharajah of Burdwan. Ditto of JAIMINI, Manuscript borrowed from the Library of the Asiatic Society. Ditto of VYASA, Cal. Ed. Beng. Commentary of SANKARACHARYA, Cal. Ed. Beng. Ditto of VATSAYANA Manuscript (imperfect) borrowed from the Library of the Calcutta Sanscrit College. Ditto of VIJNANA BHIKSHU, Calcutta and Serampore editions. Ditto of UDYOTAKARA MISRA, Manuscript borrowed from the Library of the Asiatic Society. Ditto of SANKARA MISRA, Manuscript from Benares College. This work has since been printed by the Asiatic Society. Ditto of INDRACHARYA SARASWATI, Ms. from Asiatic Society. Ditto of RAMANUJA, Ditto Ditto. SANKHYA KARIKA, Professor Wilson's Edition, London. SRI BHAGAVATA, Cal. Ed. Beng. SWETAS\YATARA Upanishad, Bibliotheca Indica. KATHA ditto ditto. PRASNA ditto ditto. MUNDAKA ditto ditto. MANDUKYA ditto ditto. CHHANDOGYA ditto ditto. FFF 410 NATIVE AUTHORITIES CITED IN THIS WOBK. BRIHADARANYAKA Upanishad, Bibliotheca Indica. ISA ditto ditto. AITAREYA ditto ditto. TAITTIRIYA ditto ditto. KENA ditto ditto. MEGHA-DUTA, Gal. Ed. Dev. Nag. TULASIDASA, his Kamayana, Ditto Ditto. TAITTIRIYA Brahmana, Bibliotheca Indica. MAHABHARATA, some passages from Dr. Muir's Sanscrit Texts Part I. YOGA-VASISHTHA, Cal. Ed. Beng. SARVA-DARSANA-SANGRAHA, Bibliotheca Indica. SABDA-MUKTA-MAHARNAVA, Ms. in the author's possession. RAMAYANA, Cal. Ed. Dev. Nag. SlDDHANTA-SIROMANI, Ditto Ditto. VIDWAN-MODA-TARANGINI, Ms. in the author's possession. There is a printed edition, but it is very imperfect and inaccurate. VASAVADATTA, Bibliotheca Indica. HARIDASA BHATTA on the Kusumanjali, Cal. Ed. Dev. Nag. MARCANDEYA Purana, Bibliotheca Indica. MATSYA Purana, Ms. PREMACHANDHA on Naishadha Charita, Cal. Ed. Dev. Nag. BHASHA-PARICCHEDA, ditto ditto. NAISHADHA-CHARITA, ditto ditto. GAUDAPADA, Karika on the Mandukya, Bibliotheca Indica. LALITA VISTARA, Bibliotheca Indica. KUMARA SAMBHAVA, Cal. Ed. Dev. Nag. PANCHADASI, Ditto Beng. SlDDHANTA-MUKTAVALI, Ditto DeV. Nag. TATTWA-CHINTAMANI, Ditto Ditto. SIDDHANTA-MANJARI, Ms. in the author's possession. VEDANTA-SARA, Cal. Ed. Beng. PARIBHASHA, Ditto Dev. Nag. GAUDA-PURNANANDA, his Tatiwa-muktavali, Ms. from the Asiatic Society. ATMOPADESA, by Sankaracharya, ditto ditto. SAYANA, in Max Muller's Rig-veda. NARADA-PANCHA-RATRA, Ms. from Asiatic Society. RAMMOHUN ROY, brief commentary on the Vedant sutras, Cal. Ed. Beng. INDEX AND GLOSSARY. A. Acharya, an authorized religious teacher. No teaching is allowed to be successful without him, 222, 327. Adharma, demerit, sin, 107, 141, 145, 147, 158. Adhikari, superintendent, 309 ; a qua- lified student, 325. Adhunika, recent, novel : one of the interlocutors in this book, 330. Adi-buddha, the first Buddha; identi- fied with the Supreme Being, 156. Adisura, a king supposed to be the founder of the last native dynasty of Bengal, 365. Aditya, a god, the son, 291. Adrishta, literally unseen. It stands for fate, luck, merit or demerit found- ed on works of a previous state of existence ; destiny, necessity, 5, 47, 48, 49, 56, 59, 69, 70, 86, 87, 88, 90, 106, 107, 113, 115, 368. Adwaitavada, the theory of unity of being; pantheism, 220. Agama, sastra, or a book of revelation ; applied generally to the Vedas, 15, 381. Agamika, literally that which rests on the Sastra or revelation. One of the interlocutors in this book. Agni, the god of fire, 380. Aguua, devoid of quality, 330. AhalyA, wife of a sage named Gotama, 12, dishonoured by Indra, 48. Ahaiikira, egotism, or self-conscious- ness, the third principle in the Sn- khya philosophy, 52, 184.' Aiswarika, one of the theistic sects among Buddhists, 156. Akisa, ether ; one of the five elements mentioned by Brahminical philos- ophers, 135. Akriti, form, species, 365. Akshapada, eye-footed, a name of Got- ama. Some say it means intellect- ualism and indicates the system of Gotama, 44. Akusala, evil; applied in Buddhistic terminology to adharma, 147, 158. Alaka, the city of the Yakshas, 16. Amavasya, the last of the moon when it is dark all night, 181. Ananda, joy, 335. Anatta, for anatma, unreality ; told by Buddhists on their beads, 154. Angir, name of a sage, 361. Angiras, the same, 361. Aniruddha, a grandson of Krishna ; one of the four forms of the Supreme Being agreeably to the Bhagavatas, 212. Anitya, transient; one of the words which Buddhists tell on their beads, 154. Annarasamaya, all food, made up of the essence of food, 335. Anumana, Inference ; one of the instru- ments of knowledge, somewhat differ- ent from the Aristotelian syllogism. 130. Anumiti, the knowledge derived from the process of Inference, 130. Anuvritti,- that which is understood, ellipsis, 41. 412 INDEX AND GLOSSARY. Apara, inferior, low ; so the older Vedas are called in some of the Upanishads, 209. Apavarga, emancipation, freedom from transmigration, renouncement of body and mind, 147. Apsaras, the dancing girls of Indra's palace, 365. Apta, unerring, infallible, spoken of valid testimony, or the teaching of sastras, 134. Arjuna, one of the five brothers PAn- davas, to whom Krishna is said to have addressed the Bhagavad-giti 157. Arthavada, explanatory remarks in the Vedas, 862. Aruna, the charioteer of the sun, 808. Arya, excellent, noble ; the name by which the ancient Hindus were dis- tinguished, 21, 22, 134. Aryavarta, the land of the Aryas, Hindustan proper, 12. As, the verb substantive, to be, 321. Asat, not being, non-entity, 310. Asura, a demon, an enemy of the gods, 22. Asvins, celestial twins celebrated in the Vedas, 380. Aswamedha, a horse offering, in which the animal is burnt after being put to death. Atha, an auspicious particle used on the introduction of a new subject, 45. Atharvan, the last of the four Vedas, 4, 382, 385. Ati-vyapti, when the reason adduced proves too much, 266. Atma, spirit, soul, 116, 128. Atyantabhava, absolute want, or im- possibility, 163. Atyukti, an exaggeration, a hyperbole, 291. Ava the capital of Burmah. How the Buddhist priests thereof explained their idea of Nirvana, 151. Avayava, the five members of a regular argument according to Gotama, 130. Avidya, ignorance, delusion, 266, 292, 300, 310. Ayodhya, a town in Oude, the capital of Rama, 5. Ayurvcda, the treatise on medicine, 367. B. Babara, a person named in the Vedas, 360. Bal-Krishna, the boy Krishna ; how and when he was set up as an object of universal worship, 402. Ballalsen, one of the kings of the last Hindu dynasty in Bengal, 365. Bhagavat-gfta, a discourse purporting to be addressed by Krishna to Arjuna ; its depreciation of the Vedas, 157. Bhagavan, Lord; applied especially to Krishna. Bhagavata, one belonging to the sect of Vishnu or Krishna. Bhagya, luck, destiny, fate, 88. Bharata, a brother of Rama, 16. Bhasha, dialect ; spoken especially of vernacular dialects, 15. Bhaskaracharya, an eminent Hindu astronomer, the author of the Sid- dhanta siromani, 53, 306. Bho Bhagavan, Lord, O Sir, 328. Brahma, the first sentient being, or god, 248. Brahmana, one of the two parts into which each Veda is divided. c. Caranam, cause, 99. Carya, an effect, a product, 100. Chakar, a bird represented as peculiarly fond of moonlight, 2. Chaitanya, a native of Bengal who pretended to be an incarnation of Vishnu and founded a new school of Vaishnavas, 207. Chamara, a chowri or sort of flap for beating off gnats, flies, &c., 830. INDEX AND GLOSSARY. 413 Charvaka, a follower of a Buddhist teacher of the same name supposed to have held atheistic doctrines, 19. Chakwa, a bird supposed to be ex- tremely impatient of separation from its mate, 79. Chhala, fraud, artifice in argument- ation, 42. Chiranjiva, the author of certain Dialogues on the Hindu philosophy written in Sanscrit verse, 214. Chitrakuta, a mountain in Bundel- khund, where Rama is said to have halted in his progress to the south, 16. D. Daiva, luck, destiny, 87. Dandi, one that has taken to his staff and retired from the world, 309. Darsana, observation ; applied to sys- tems of philosophy. Dasaratha, king of Ayodhya, father of Rama, 31, 155. Dasyu, a people spoken of in the Vedas as the antagonists of the Brahmins, 21. Devakiputra, sou of Devaki, Krishna. Dhan, wealth, 298. Dharma, duty, merit, works, property, destiny, 21, 107, 141, 145, 158. Dharma-sabha, a Hindu society estab- lished in Calcutta for the protection of Hindooism, 28. Dhyana, meditation ; in the Sankhya philosophy meditation without an object, a mental void, 202. Dilipa, a king of the solar race, an ancestor of Rama, 31. Dishta, luck, destiny, 89. Dosha, fault, applied to the passions and emotions of human nature, 183, 164, 166. Dukha, pain, trouble. DwaitavAda, duality of entities, belief in the existence of more than one substance. It is the opposite of pantheism, 220. Dwyanuka, a compound of two atoms, a binary, 118. G. Gana, a list of verbal roots composed in metre, the final letters being arranged alphabetically, 104. Gandharva, a species of supernatural beings. A town of Gindharva means an imaginary thing, a fairy town, 164. Ganga, the Ganges. Ganga Sagur, Sagur, at the mouth of the Hooghly. Garuda, a fabulous bird, the bird of Vishnu. Gaudapada, a commentator on the Sankhya, Karika, and the author of a Karika on the Mandukya Upan. Gauna, not the literal sense, figurative, 291. Gaurava, multiplicity ; the assigning of more causes than would be neces- sary for the accounting of a pheno- menon, 126. GAyatri, a sacred verse, 378. Ghatakarpara, a poet who flourished in the age of Vikramaditya, 365. Girisanta, one that secures the welfare of the mountain, 247. Giritra, protector of the mountain, 339. Gotama, the author of Nyaya. It is a name of Buddha too ; also, of one or more of his ancestors. Gritsamada, a Vedic character, 880. Guni, one endowed with qualities, 317. Guru, Teacher. H. Haituka, rational, 37. Harischandra, a king of the Solar race forced to sell his wife and child, and himself to submit to servitude, for fear of a malediction from Viswa- mitra. Harivansa, a poem appended to the Mahabharata, 878. Hetu, reason; the second member of a regular argument according to 414 INDEX AND GLOSSARY. Gotama ; the major premiss, 130, 144. Hindu, a word not of Indian origin, not found in the Sastras, 20. Ikshwaku, the first King of the Solar race, 36. Ikshwaku Virodhakha, the progeni- tor of the Sakya race. Isana, Lord, lording, a name of Siva, 246, 389. Ista-devata, the divinity whom any in- dividual worships as his own chosen God, 27. Iswara, God, Lord. Iswarakrishna, author of the SAnkhya Karika; spoke slightingly of the Veda, 6. Iti, plague, drought, inundation, &c. [The word appears in a mis- taken form of niriti,] 171. Itihasa, an epic poem held as author- itative among the Brahmins. Iti-vritta, a mere narrative, 386. J. Jabala, mother of Satyakama ; a char- acter in the Vedas, 48. Jaimini, author of the Prior mimansa : his denial of God's providence, 60. Janaka, king of Mithila, reputed to be a great saint and sage, though a King and a Kshetriya, 44, 34, 310. Janma, birth ; pronounced to be a calamity, 138. Jara, decrepitude ; one of the evils of life according to Buddha, 164. Jarayuja, viviparous, 187. Jayadeva, author of the Gita Govinda, a poem full of obscene descrip- tions, 333. Jigisha, desire of victory, 200. Jijnasa, desire of knowledge, 202. Jivatma, the spirit of life, individual souls, 116. Jn&na-kanda, those sections of the Veda which treat of knowledge, 210. Jyotishtoma, a particular sacrifice, 370. K. Kahola. a character in the Vcdas, 347. Kalidisa, a celebrated poet who lived in the age of Vikramaditya, 365. Kali-yuga, the last or iron age of the world, 1. Kalpa, the period of the duration of the world, 156. Kama, desire, 164. Kanfida, author of the Vaiseshika (su- tras,) a branch of the Nyiya. Kansa, king of Mathura, represented as an enemy of God and the Brah- mins, 19. Kapila, appertaining to Kapila, a fol- lower of Kapila ; one of the interlo- cutors in this book. Kapila, author of the Sinkhya sutras spoke slightingly of the Veda, 6, denied the existence of God, 51, 191. Karma, works, the merit of works ; hence destiny, 107, 140, 158, 208, 248. Karma-kinda, those sections of the Vedas which treat on works. Karmika, those who rely on works 406. Kasi, a native name of Benares. Kasyapa, a sage, the father of the im- mortals. The son of Kasyapa p. 86, means the sun. Kausitaki, one of the sections of the Vedas, 268. Khanda, in Buddhistic vocabulary, the elements. Kikata, a country mentioned in the Vedas, 359. Kshetra, in Buddhistic vocabulary, a Kshetriya, a person of the second or warrior caste, 157. Kokila, the cuckoo. Kshetriya, the second or warrior among the Hindus. INDEX AND GLOSSARY. 415 Kshetra, a field, a site, a body, 378. Kulluka Bhatta, a celebrated comment- ator on the institutes of Manu, 837. Kumkum, saffron, 176. Kumuda, a flower that opens at night, 79. Kusala, good, meritorious ; applied by Buddhists to Dharma, 147, 158. L. Lakshana, sign, 380. Lakshmi, the wife of Vishnu, 58. Lanka, the kingdom of Ravana ; Cey- lon, 84. M. Madhuchhanda, one of the old Vedic Rishis, 6. Maghavau, Indra, 380. Mahapralaya, the great dissolution, or end of the world, 1. Mahat, great ; so Intelligence or the first created principle in the Sankhya philosophy is called, 52. Mahavakya, a great saying ; the pan- theistic dogma ' thou art He ' is so called, 291. Maheswara, a follower of Maheswara or Siva, 207, 339. Maheswara, great god, a name of Siva, 247. Malati, a creeper that bears a sweet flower, 79. Man, mind, 298. Mangalacharana, auspicious particles or words or sentences at the com- mencement of a work. Manomaya, all-mind, purely mental, 335. Mantra, a hymn, an incantation. Manu, the celebrated Rishi who wrote the Institutes called after his name, 14, 356. Manzal, a day's journey, 16. Maranam, death, one of the evils of life, 154. Marut, a species of gods, attendants on Indra, 380. Matsya, one of the Puranas or mytho- logical poems ; speaks of a triad of gods under the title of one form and three gods, 184. Maya, illusion, delusion, imposition, 64, 65, 207, 235, 236, 239, 240, Ml, 244, 246, 248, 316. Mayi, a conjurer, one that practises Mdyd, 290. Medhatithi, a commentator on Manu, 377. Meru, a mountain at the North pole where the gods are supposed to re- side, 118. Mimansi, decider, one of the schools of Brahminical philosophy. Mitra, one of the gods invocated in the Vedas, the sun, 381. Mletcha, a barbarian, one not a Hin- doo, 135. Mukti, freedom from transmigration, emancipation, 235. Mumukshu, one that is desirous of liberation, 137, 206. N. Nachiketas, son of Vajasravasa who was delivered to Yama or death by his father, 164. Naga, a species of serpents celebrated as demi-gods, 158. Naichasakha, a town spoken of in the Vedas, 359. Narada, a divine Rishi, 166. N&rAyana, a name of Vishnu, the Supreme Being, 379. Nasatyas, the twins Aswins, 381. Nigamana, the fifth member of a re- gular argument according to Gotama, the conclusion, 130. Nigban, Burmese and Singalese cor- ruption of the word Nirvana, 147. ! Nigraha-sthana, not to be admitted on the field of argument, unfit to be argued with, 268, 858. 416 INDEX AND GLOSSARY. Nirikira, without form or shape, 207. Nirguna, devoid of qualities, 317. Niriswara, godless, 116. Nirvina, extinction, freedom from transmigration 151, 154, 158, 166. Nisreyasa, the chief good emancipa- tion, 137. Nissanga, without attachment, 193. Nodhas, one of the authors of Vedic hymns, 380. Nyaya, one of the six schools of Brah- minical philosophy ; its close resem- blance to Buddhism, 146. Nyayaratna, jewel or ornament of the Nyaya, one of the interlocutors in this book. 0. Om, a mystical syllable, 378. P. Pada, a quarter, a fourth part, 250. Pali, the sacred language of Singalese Buddhists. Panchikarana, the formation of a speci- fic atom in the composition of the animal body, 122. Panda, a priest of a public temple, 16. Pandava, a son of Pandu. Pandu, a celebrated king, brother of Dhritarastra and father of Yudhis- thira. Para, excellent. Paramapurushartha, the chief end of man, 136. Paramarthika, real, 300, 302, 306. Paramatma, the supreme Spirit, 116. Parartha, for the sake of another, with a view to another, 133. Parikshit, grandson of Arjuna, heir of the Pandavas, 297. Parinama-v&da, the theory of the creator being changed into the creation, 63. Parusarama, a Brahminical hero who is said to have extirpated the Ksbe- triyas, 36. PArvatf, fabled as the daughter of Mount Himalaya, wife of Siva, 57, 247. Patanjali, author of the Yogasutras, 52. Pinaka, bow of Siva, 247. Pingala, 199. Prabhakara, a follower of the school of Jaimini, 369. Prabhu, Lord, master, 298. Pradhina, chief, spoken of nature as the first cause of all things accord- ing to the Sankhya, 247. Pradyumna, a son of Krishna ; one of the forms of the supreme Being according to the Bhagavatas, 212. Prahara, one quarter of the day or night, 309. Prajapati, the Lord of the creation Brahma, 362. Prakriti, nature, 247. Pralaya, a dissolution of the world, 161. Prama, true knowledge, 130, 136. Pramana, proof, an instrument of true knowledge, 136, 136. Pramangada, a proper name in tln> Vedas, 359. Pranamaya, all vital air, 335. Pranidhana, contemplation, 52. Pratijna, the first member of a regular argument according to Gotama, the question, 180. Pratiyogi, something which is incom- patible with its correlative, 139. Pratyaksha, perception, 189. Pravahani, a proper name in the Vedas, 360. Pravritti, activity, motive, 138, 1 :',!), 138, 141. Prayojana, end, object, aim, final cause, 42. Punyabhumi, holy land, so the Hindus called their country, Hindustan pro- per, 12. Purina, a mythological poem. INDEX AND GLOSSARY. 417 Pururava, a king in whose age there became for the first time three Yedas, 879. Puruscharana, name of a ceremony performed on the occurrence of an eclipse, 306. Purusha, a male, a person, soul, 176, 198, 194, 339, 344, 347. Purushottama, the excellent personal being, so Jagannatha was called ; hence the land of Jagannatha, Poo- ree, 16. Purvapaksha, the opposite party in an argument, 89, 379. Pnrvavat, 6 priori, 129. R. Radhi, mistress of Krishna, 400. Radhi, a classification of Bengal Brah- mins, 303. Raga, affection, attachment. Rajas, the principle of activity, foul- ness, one of the three qualities in the Hindu philosophy. Rakshasa, a demon, an enemy of gods and Brahmins, 155. Rama, prince of Ayodhya, son of Dasaratha ; kills a Sudra for engag- ing in religious exercises, 35. Ramagiri, a mountain where Rama had once halted, 16. RAm&nandi, a follower of R6mi- nand, 330. Rasatmaka, full of striking senti- ments, 394. Ravana, king of Lanka, vanquished and slain by Rama, 155. Retas, the seminal fluid, 335. Rich, the first of the four Vedas. Riransa, a desire of sensual enjoy- ment, 164. Rishi, a Brahminical sage considered to be infallible. Rudra, fierce, a name of Siva, 247, 339. s. Sabda-kalpa-druma, an encyclopedia, 364. GGG Sabdarasi, a collection of words, 384. Sacti, power, energy ; the deified female principle in Hindu mythology. Sadananda, a modern Vedantist, author of the Vedanta-sara, 836. Sadhya-sama, equal to the thing to be proved, a petitio principii, 366. Sagara, one of the kings of the Solar race. Saguna, endowed with qualities, 330. Sahaja-jndna, natural knowledge, 349. Sahasa, boldness, 109, 154. ' Saiva, a follower of Siva, 247. Saivya, wife of Raja Harischandra, 164. Sakshi, witness, 247. Sakya, the race from which Buddha sprang, who was thence called Sakya Muni, Sakya Sinha. Sakya-sinha, the Lion of the Sakya race, a name of Buddha. Samfidhi, deep meditation, in Bud- dhistic philosophy, as also in the Brahminical, the state immediately preceding Nirvana, 210. SAman, the third of the four Vedas. Samashti, collectiveness, 124. Samavaya, substratum. Sambuka, a Sudra put to death for engaging in religious exercises, 35. Sampat, attainment, when a thing falls into a state in which it was not from the beginning, 307. Samvarga-vidya, the science of Reso- lution ; resolution of things into the atmosphere, 291. Sanatana, everlasting, 25. Sandhya, prayers which the Brahmins utter three times a day, 4. Sandilya, a Rishi whom Sankaracharya rebukes for teaching other ways of salvation than those propounded in the Vedas, 209. Sankaracharya, an eminent comment- ator on the Vedant sutras and the Upanishads. 418 INDEX AND GLOSSARY. Sankarshana, a brother of Krishna, one of the four forms of the Supreme Being according to the Bhagavatas, 212. Sankhya, one of the six systems of Brahminical philosophy ; the school of Kapila, its absolute denial of God, 51, 65, 169. Sansara, the world, an assemblage of evils, 141. Sanskara, habit, ideas. Saririka-mfmansa-bhAshya, the com- mentary or paraphrase of the Ve- dant by Sankaracharya. Sastra, that by which faith and practice are governed ; used of the Vedas and other authorized scriptures of the Brahmins. Sastra, weapons, 2. Sat, being, present participle of as, to be. Satapatha, one of Brahmanas of the Vedas, 377. Satyakama, a lover of truth, the princi- pal speaker in this book. Satya-yuga, the first or golden age of the Brahmins, 1. Saumya, gentle, 323. Savitri, Gayatrf, 878. Sayana, a commentator on the Vedas, 365. Seshavat, a posteriori, 129. Seswara, possessing fJod, theistical, 52. Seva-dasi, a ministering slave, 298. Shad-darsana, the six schools of Hindu philosophy. SftA, wife of Rama, 155. Siva, one of the three principal gods of the Brahmins, 339. Siva, wife of Siva, 67, 339. Smriti, recollections of Rishis versed in the Vedas. Sreni, class, 308. Sruti, that \vhich has been heard ; the Veda. Strabo, his remark on the five ele- ments of the Brahminical philoso- phy, 184. Sudder Court, the highest appellate Court in any presidency. Sudhodhana, father of Buddha, 165. Sudra, the lowest caste among the Hindus. Suka, a Rishi, the narrator of the Sri Bhagavata, 297. Sukta, a hymn of the Vedas, 361. Suparna, a fabulous bird. Suryakanta, bright as the sun, name of a precious stone mentioned in Brahminical literature, 277. Sushka-tarka, a dry argument, 124. Sutra, aphorism. Suvarga, an old Vedic word for hea- ven, 167. Suvarna, gold, 322. Swabhava, nature, 268. Swabhivica, natural ; a sect of Bud- dhist philosophers who accounted for all things by the laws of nature, 256. Swadharma, one's own Dharma, duty, or religion, 20. Swarga, heaven, 322. Swarna, gold, 322. Swartha, for one's own self, 133. Swayambhu, self-existent, 126. T. Tan, body, 298. Tanmatra, subtle, only itself, 5-2. Tantra, a portion of the Hindu atra, addressed by Siva to his wife Par- vat, i. Tapasya, religious exercises, medita- tion, austerity, 34. Tasmat, thence, from it or him. Tat, it, 815. Tathastu, so lie it ! 167. Tattwa-vichara, discussion of truth, 186. Tilanga, a native of Tilanga in the South of India, the first levies in INDEX AND GLOSSARY. 419 the East India Company's army were in that country, hence all se- poys are called by that name, 2. Trasarenu, a tertiary, or compound of six atoms, 118. Trishna, thirst, desire, 154. Twam, thou, 315. u. Udaharana, example, the third mem- ber of a regular argument according to Gotama, the minor premiss, 130. Udasin, a stranger, one that takes no interest in any thing, 51. Udayachala, the mountain of rising, the eastern mountains, 306. Upalabdhi, apprehension, perception, 226. Upamina, analogy, one of the four instruments of knowledge accord- ing to Gotama, 43. Upanaya, the application, the fourth member of a regular argument ac- cording to Gotama, the repetition of the reason or major premiss, 130. Upanishad, sections of the Veda which set forth the doctrine of Brahma. Ushma, a sibilant letter, 379. Ushusta, a character in the Vedas. Uttara mimansa, the latter miminsa, the Vedanta. V. Vac-chhala, artifice in words, 168. Vachaspati, a theistic commentator on the Sankhya, 195. Vaidurya, a precious stone spoken of in Brahminical writings. Vaiseshika, one of the six systems of Brahminical philosophy ; the atomic system of Kanada. Vaishnava, a follower of Vishnu. Vaisya, the third or mercantile caste among the Hindus. Vaiyasika, appertaining to Vyasa, a follower of Vyasa : one of the inter- locutors in this book. Vajasravasa, son or descendant of Vajasrava, 361. Vilinfki, the author of the Ramayana. Varendra, a classification of Bengal Brahmins, 308. Varuna, one of the gods in the Vedas, the god of water, 381. Varuni, a bathing festival, 105. Vasishtha, a Rishi spoken of in the Vedas, the domestic priest of Dasa- ratha and other solar kings, 31. Vasu, one of the gods, wealth, 361. VAsudeva, the son of Vasudeva ; Krishna, 203. Veda, the original sacred literature of the Brahmins ; conflicting ac- counts of its production, 377 879, its own admissions of human authorship, 380, 381. Vedant. one of the six systems of Brahminical philosophy; the pan- theistic school. Vedanta-vruva, one who calls himself a Vedantist but is not so in truth, a pseudo-Vedantist, 299. Vidyarthi, a student, 206. Vigraha, body, form, 207. Vijnana, knowledge, cognition, ideas, 228. Vijnana-vada, the theory of cogni- tions, the ideal theory, 239. Vijnanamaya, essentially possessed of knowledge, all-knowledge, all-cog- nition, 335. Vikramaditya, a king of Ougein who lived 50 years before Christ, 365. Vishnu, one of the three principal gods of the Brahmins. Viswamitra, a Rishi, born of a Kshe- triya race but promoted to the Brahminical for his sanctity, 6, 34. Visweswara, the lord of the world, proper name of one of the forms Siva at Benares, 16. Vitra, a giant destroyed by Indra 360. 4-20 INDEX AND GLOSSARY. 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