MANUAL 
 
 OF THE 
 
 PHYSIOLOGY OF MIND, 
 
 COMPREHENDING THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OP 
 
 PHYSICAL THEOLOGY.
 
 MANUAL 
 
 OF THE 
 
 PHYSIOLOGY OF MIND, 
 
 COMPREHENDING THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF 
 
 PHYSICAL THEOLOGY: 
 
 WITH WHICH ARE LAID OUT THE 
 
 CRUCIAL OBJECTIONS TO THE REIDEIAN 
 
 THEORY. 
 
 TO WHICH IS SUFFIXED A PAPER 
 
 ON THE LOGIC OF RELATION 
 
 CONSIDERED AS A 
 
 MACHINE FOR RATIONATIVE SCIENCE. 
 
 By JOHN FEARN, Esq. 
 
 LONDON 
 
 rniNTED BY A. J. VALl'Y, RED LION COURT, FLEET STREET ; 
 
 SOLI) BY LONGMAN, llEES, ORME, BROWN, AND GREEN, 
 
 PATERNOSTER-ROW ; HATCHARD, PICCADILLY; AND 
 
 HUNTER, ST. PAUL's CHURCH YARD. 
 
 1829.
 
 y '5 / '^wv 
 
 First Preface. 
 
 After the recoonition which has been subscribed 
 to in various quarters, regarding the validity of 
 the principles which form the basis of the following 
 little treatise, nothing appears to be more wanted, 
 in order to adapt to popular apprehension some 
 knowledge of the Science of Mind, than a Manual 
 of its Initial Department, divested of all such 
 disjunct matters as are usually, with a view to 
 readers of a different class, mixed up with a 
 delineation of the Subject, and which have been 
 matter of frequent specific complaint, for having 
 distracted the attention, and confused the under- 
 standing, of readers in ordinary. 
 
 Altogether beside other utility, and the demands 
 of a liberal curiosity in every person of the most 
 ordinary education, to acquire such an initial 
 knowledge of the nature of Mind as is here con- 
 templated ; there is another motive to stimulate 
 them, which cannot be regarded with indifference 
 by any one within the sphere of its operation. 
 The thing, to which I now allude, is the Evi- 
 dence which the Physiology of Mind affords of 
 the truth of Natural Religion, — a matter which, 
 it may here be intimated, will be found in a very 
 conclusive manner to characterise the Principles 
 of the Science to be exhibited ; and which indeed 
 constitutes one of the principal objects of its pub- 
 lication in the present form. 
 
 Man. 705349 A
 
 11 PREFACE. 
 
 In adverting to this object, it may be impressive 
 upon the attention of readers in general to point 
 out a collateral matter, which bears with a very 
 remarkable coincidence upon the result of the 
 principles in question. The thing now suggested 
 is the fact, sufficiently known to all those who are 
 conversant on Asiatic literature, that a Sublime 
 Theological Creed has, during an unknown num- 
 ber of ages, prevailed over the Regions of India ; 
 the tenor of which is, that all mind is homo- 
 geneous, — and ALL body is mind. And what 
 gives great weight to the claims of this Creed, is 
 the certainty that it was that of an enlightened 
 race of men, who had attained at least a very high 
 pitch of Rationative Science. 
 
 While, however, we are upon the one hand 
 possessed of the knowledge that such a Creed 
 existed, and still ovists ; it is to be observed, upon 
 the other, that the Philosophers of Europe have 
 been altogether prevented from rendering the 
 matter in question in the least degree available, 
 owing to a total want of knowledge of the rationale 
 of the process by which its Founders were con- 
 ducted to that Tenet, — the mere fact, of the early 
 existence of which, is the sole light on the subject 
 that has penetrated the gloom of ages, and shed 
 its ray upon the present time. From a want of 
 the connecting links, which were necessary to sub- 
 stantiate the conclusion by an exhibition of premises 
 which alone could support it, the Hindoo Tenet, 
 since it broke in upon the cognisance of the Me- 
 taphysicians of these and Adjacent Countries, has
 
 PREFACE. Ill 
 
 unavoidably been viewed by them as being no 
 other than a mere curiosity, void of all philoso- 
 phical value or interest, because utterly incapable 
 of any appUcabUity for the solution of the great 
 problem involved. The thing has, on every hand, 
 been quoted, and wondered at, and laid aside, 
 like any unmeaning idol, or relique, of Oriental 
 imagination, without engendering any thought of 
 respect, in the minds of those who have afforded 
 it a momentary contemplation, any more than has 
 been accorded to those storied and disbelieved 
 Incarnations of the Deity which are embodied in 
 the same tradition. What, then, will follow, now 
 that it has become matter of proof, that the Foun- 
 ders of the Hindoo Theology certainly may have 
 had, and in great 'probability actually possessed, de- 
 monstrative evidence of the truths upon which 
 their great conclusion rested? Such, at any rate, 
 is a fact comprised in the Principles stated in the 
 following Manual ; and that have at least received 
 an extent of recognition from contemporaries, to 
 warrant the confidence with which they are here 
 exhibited, as a department of science. 
 
 It is known that, collaterally with the Theologi- 
 cal Creed above alluded to, there has also obtained, 
 over a very large proportion of the Regions of 
 Asia, an Atheistical Belief, founded on the sup- 
 posed Nature and Powers of Matter, — a Sort of 
 Philosophy the practical result of which has been 
 that of plunging perhaps nearly a fourth part of 
 the Human Species into the depths of an extreme 
 demoralisation. And it is matter of difhculty, if
 
 IV PREFACE. 
 
 indeed it be at all possible, to determine which of 
 the two Schemes in question had the priority of 
 existence. But the darkness which exists on this 
 question can take nothing from the reality of the 
 main facts — namely — that both have existed, and do 
 still exist. And these facts perhaps only afford us 
 the edifying lesson, that mankind have heretofore 
 fluctuated, and will continue to do so, between 
 Polytheism and Atheism, according to the direction 
 and degree o/'^//e/r Natural knowledge : While 
 it is only in a very rare state of unaided human spe- 
 culation that they would ever cast to the side of a 
 Pure Theism. 
 
 The state of opinion of the Philosophers of 
 Europe during the last hundred years, including 
 the opinion of all such persons as have been de- 
 voted to pursuits connected with Natural Science, 
 affords a confirmation of the effect of that cause 
 to which I have just attributed the past and present 
 state of Religion in Asia. And, I confess, I sup- 
 pose the thing to be little short of certainty in the 
 tendency of the human mind, in the situations de- 
 scribed. The lowest degree of knowledge of the 
 operations of nature leads the Savage to discern a 
 God in every Natural Agent ; and the Barbarian 
 to people the air with Chimerical Intelligent 
 Beings. A high attainment in the knowledge of 
 Nature, or of the Arts, such as that possessed im- 
 memorially by the Natives of India, China, and 
 Japan, leads the practical adept to conclude that a 
 Blind Brute Nature is the Only God. While 
 the habits of a calm and intense abstraction, alto-
 
 PREFACE. V 
 
 gether unbusied in the practical arts, seem to 
 have conducted the Intellect of the Hindoo Theo- 
 logist to the proofs that there is No Nature in 
 THE UxiVERSE, biit the Essence, the Energies, and 
 the YoLiTio^s., of a Great Intelligent Being, 
 acting upon Finite Intelligences which it envelops. 
 
 It would follow, from this view of the subject, 
 that a very deep immersion or absorption in the 
 Natural Sciences, or the Arts, unless counteracted 
 by some favourable circumstance, has a strong ten- 
 dency to draw the Human Understanding to the 
 side of Natural Infidelity. But it by no means 
 follows that the votaries of such pursuits should 
 actually determine that way, providing they prose- 
 cute their labors with circumspect and enlightened 
 views of the Subject, in all its possible phases : — 
 And a contrary result may be fully anticipated, 
 when the evidences which bear most momentously 
 on the question shall attract the general notice of 
 the classes in question. The great desideratum 
 on the Subject, at the present moment, is only to 
 accomplish the point of its acquiring that general 
 notice, which the past neglect of it has rendered 
 unavailing to public opinion, and, perhaps, the 
 most so in the case of those who are habitually 
 immersed in the departments of knowledge above 
 mentioned. 
 
 In such a state of public opinion on the Subject, 
 as that which now exists, it should seem that the 
 manifest rationative connection, between the 
 Principles laid down in the following Manual and 
 the Hindoo Theology, is too striking to require
 
 VI PREFACE. 
 
 any commentary in order to secure to it a due 
 share of attention. And to many persons, indeed, 
 it might seem that the one had been adapted with 
 premeditation to conform to the other, were not 
 the circumstances of their evolution, as well as the 
 nature of the principles themselves, such as alto- 
 gether to preclude such a conjecture. 
 
 To those Readers who are not of any of the 
 classes which lead them to be aware of the ac- 
 cordance which MUST subsist between all True 
 Religion and Sound Philosophy, the following 
 principles can be of no value in a religious point of 
 view : Nor is the statement of them at all in- 
 tended to disturb their ODinion. 
 
 I 
 
 It remains, here, only to say, that the small 
 volume now presented to my contemporaries ; and 
 which, certainly, embraces considerable, and some 
 original, farther matter than a mere statement of 
 the principles above alluded to ; has received more 
 of my attention, in order to render it what it ought 
 to be, than might be expected from the extent of 
 its letter press ; the intention, indeed, having been 
 that it should not, in the main, require my future 
 revision. To most readers, I would commend 
 attention to the Section of our Thinking in Co- 
 lors ; — it being the statement of a general fact of 
 the Mind, never, I think, before suggested ; and 
 which may, more than any other, lead readers to 
 a relish, as well as a knowledge, of the subject.
 
 Second Preface. 
 
 The present state of Pneumatological Science 
 in Britain may be judged from the fact, that, at a 
 very recent meeting of the Proprietors of the newly- 
 instituted University of London, it was officially 
 announced that no Candidate for the Chair of the 
 Philosophy of the Mind had appeared, who was 
 deemed eligible to fill that situation. 
 
 It is not to be dissembled that such a fact ex- 
 hibits a spectacle peculiarly humiliating to the 
 philosophical character of these Countries ; and 
 must fill with concern and anxiety every person 
 who entertains any hope of beholding the Science 
 of Mind raised, from that state of degradation to 
 which it has long since sunk in the public opinion. 
 In such case, certainly, nothing is more to be de- 
 sired, by those who have the interest of the sub- 
 ject at heart, than that the choice of an individual 
 to fill the office in question should be fortunate. 
 As affecting my own particular case, I confess, 
 there is no person concerned in the event who can 
 feel more interest in it than myself: For, although 
 I have more than once, — (and it is, for various 
 reasons, proper for me to intimate the fact,) — ex- 
 pressly declined the suggestion of friends, that I 
 should lay myself out for the thing ; — a step 
 which, even if I had yielded to it from a desire of 
 being useful, might have subjected my eligibility 
 to the contingency either of favor or denial, and,
 
 Vlll PREFACE. 
 
 at best, my ease to much additional sacrifice ; it 
 is manifest that the readiest means of bringing 
 my views into general utility, would be their 
 promulgation from the chair of a Professor in some 
 Collegiate Institution. Urged by these considera- 
 tions ; I deem it incumbent on me to afford the 
 following statement of professorial precedent, in 
 the Science of Mind ; especially, since it can 
 hardly be expected that the future will present 
 a fortunate contrast to the past, unless such 
 amendment shall be induced by a due appreciation 
 of the facts involved. 
 
 In the Notes, at the end of the Third Volume of 
 his Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind, the 
 late Professor Stewart has expressed some pointed 
 strictures on the philosophical calibre and proceed- 
 ing of Professor Brown, who succeeded him in the 
 University of Edinburgh : in which, after ascribing 
 to him, generally, only a superficial genius and 
 hasty views of his subject, Mr. Stewart, as fur- 
 nishing a single example of the truth of his asser- 
 tion, cites the particular instance of Dr. Brown's 
 having employed the words Will and Desire as 
 synonymous terms ; and then adverts to the cir- 
 cumstance of his having afforded to the latter a 
 delicate hint of his mistake ; with regard to which 
 caution Professor Stewart farther says — *' I must 
 " own it was with some regret that, in the third 
 " edition of his Cause and Effect, published as late 
 *' as the year 1818, I found him not only perseve- 
 " ring in the same mistake, but employing many 
 '' pages of discussion in retorting on those philo-
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 '' sophers by whom the distinction had been 
 " made." 
 
 Now it is to be presumed, that no sound philo- 
 sopher will deny that Mr. Stewart was right, on the 
 ground he had thus asserted. But it is principally 
 important here to mark what he has added, in his 
 strictures on the case. He goes on to say that — • 
 " The account given of Dr. Brown's posthumous 
 " works by his ingenious biographer bears ample 
 " testimony to the truth of some of these remarks." 
 And he then quotes the following passages, from 
 the Rev. Mr. Welche's life of Dr. Brown.—' It 
 ' gives an additional value to the priiitcd lectures to 
 ' know that nearly the whole of the lectures that 
 ' are contained in the first three volumes were 
 ' written during the first year of his professorship, 
 ' and the whole of the remaining lectures the year 
 
 ' following.' * As he continued to read the 
 
 ' same lectures till the time of his death, they 
 ' were printed from his manuscripts exactly as he 
 
 * wrote them.' * The subjects of many of his 
 
 * lectures he had never reflected on till he took up 
 ' the pen ; and many of his theories occurred to 
 ' him during the period of composition.' 
 
 Upon marking the tenor of these quotations, 
 given by Mr. Stewart in a spirit which is certainly 
 congenial with my own opinion, it may with con- 
 fidence be affirmed that either Professor Brown 
 was gifted as no other man ever was ; or, there must 
 be a large mass of visionary matter mixed up in 
 his various theories and speculations. And having 
 said this, and considering what is here at stake, I 
 Maji. B
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 should culpably betray a cause in which I have 
 sacrificed more of time, and of life, than any indi- 
 vidual in these Countries now that Professor 
 Stewart is no more, were I not to express my convic- 
 tion that never did Four Volumes on the Subject 
 more extensively bear the stamp of their Origin 
 than the Lectures of Professor Brown : Although I 
 cannot yield to this avowal, without at the same time 
 adding my high opinion of the amiableness of his 
 character. In justification of an opinion for which 
 I should always hold myself bound to answer, I 
 can on the present occasion only allow room for a 
 mention of the fact, that Dr. Brown has argued at 
 '^^arge to derive our 7iotlo?i of ^vactl or Extension 
 f7wn our notioi of Time. And, having adverted to 
 this fact, I trust I need add nothing to strike every 
 philosophic mind with the magnitude of its absur- 
 dity : which, however, is certainly not greater 
 than the ruin it would inflict on the human under- 
 standing. With regard to the Lectures in ques- 
 tion ; whatever could have been their complexion, I 
 cannot do other than join Professor Stewart in 
 expressing my surprise, that the Biographer of 
 Dr. Browqi should have deemed the circumstances 
 of their origin a subject of eulogiw?i, as he manifestly 
 did. 
 
 But, after our being so signally instructed by the 
 case of Professor Brown ; let us now turn to con- 
 template that of Professor Stewart, which is no 
 less instructive, or important to the fate of Phi- 
 losophy in Britain. At the very moment he was 
 expressing those strictures on the procedure of Dr.
 
 PliEFACE. 2SI 
 
 Brown, Mr. Stewart himself was laboring under 
 the pointed condemnation of his friend Dr. Parr, 
 and of Public Criticism, for a conduct of the very 
 same nature, and far more aggravated in degree, — 
 namely — a pertinacious, and I must say a despotic, 
 refusal to listen to the remonstrances either of criti- 
 cism or of friends, that he should revise the tenor 
 of /lis own theories ; or, in any way adverting' to 
 the advances made by me in the subject, especially 
 in the laws of Sensation and Perception : In which 
 proceeding, be it observed, I do not here include 
 the additional step of his endeavor to deny to me 
 the priority in that scientific matter which has 
 been a subject of controversy between us. 
 
 With such precedents as these in our view ; the 
 following considerations can hardly fail to strike 
 every person with sufficient force. In any of 
 those Sciences which, from their bearing obviously 
 upon the arts that conduce to utility, to luxury, 
 or to profit, excite a lively interest in the public 
 mind, no Professor elect in any Public Institution 
 will hazard the promulgation of any obsolete or 
 visionary doctrines : nor will any such ever affect 
 ignorance of any notable advances made by his 
 contemporaries, in his own department of know- 
 ledge. And were any such Professor to trans- 
 gress, in either of these points, there can be no 
 doubt as to his future reputation, and fate. But 
 when we turn from those Sciences, to the case of 
 the Philosophij of the Mi/id ; if a Professor elect, 
 in any British University, were to set out with 
 exliil)iting the most fallacious System on the Sub-
 
 Xll rREFACE. 
 
 ject; and, having so done, were to continue the 
 same course, whilst any advances, even if they 
 were the most important, were made by any 
 other person in the same branch ; Who is there 
 to check him in this procedure ; and to rescue the 
 rising generation from such a delusion ? Or, it is 
 to be feared we might yet, with too much justice, 
 put a farther question — namely — Unless we may 
 except a few who would not interfere. Who is there 
 among us who is competent to disabuse a Nation, 
 by opening its eyes to the fact that it is thus 
 abused ? 
 
 If these questions cannot be answered in a man- 
 ner that is in the least degree either satisfactory 
 or consoling ; it may be hoped that a large part 
 of the community, and especially that illustrious 
 body which has founded a Metropolitan Univer- 
 sity, may be impressed by a consideration so 
 deeply affecting our National Institutions for colle- 
 giate education. 
 
 It is indeed to be hoped, that the caution mani- 
 fested by the Council of the University of London, 
 in their recent proceeding upon the subject, is the 
 augury of a fortunate result in their choice, when- 
 ever it shall take place. And while I freely ac- 
 knowledge an interest, and this a very deep one, in 
 the result ; the fact is unimpeachable that this 
 interest is of no other nature than a desire that 
 whoever may be the individual chosen, for any such 
 office, may be a person open to the admission and 
 promulgation of truth on the subject.
 
 Third Preface. 
 
 The Reideian Philosophy, which, from its sin- 
 gular complexion, from the period of its promul- 
 gation, and from the literary distinction which has 
 attended the writings of its founders, has amounted 
 in point of fact to a notable era in the History of 
 the Human Mind, has been marked, at its origin 
 and its termination, by two of the most extraordi- 
 nary examples of philosophical conversion that 
 were ever exhibited to the notice of mankind : 
 The conversion of Dr. Reid, from the visionary 
 Idealism of Berkeley to the setting up of his own 
 Scheme, had never a parallel of inconstancy in 
 the history of speculative science, except in the 
 conversion of Professor Stewart, near the close of 
 his life, from the Theory of Reid to the Sound 
 Philosophical Idealism of Locke. And though 
 neither of these events bears at all upon Philosophy 
 itself; yet, considered with regard to the effect 
 which they cannot fail to have in influencing 
 opinion, at least in these Countries in which the 
 writings of the Reideian School have long enjoyed 
 much literary respect, it becomes a matter of in- 
 dispensable moment that a statement should, on 
 the present occasion, be given oi the fact, and the 
 ma?iner, of each of the conversions in question. 
 Accordingly, therefore, a brief statement of the 
 documentary history of the change of Mr. Stewart
 
 XIV PREFACE. 
 
 will form an Appendix to the following Manual : 
 And, in the course of the volume itself, an account 
 of that of Dr. Reid will constitute an appropriate 
 article. In noticing these considerations, nothing 
 could be matter of greater satisfaction, for the 
 advancement of the subject at stake, than the fact 
 that the particulars are of such a nature as to pre- 
 clude the possibility of any attempt to elude either 
 the fact or its consequences, were ingenuity set on 
 work to effect such a purpose ; which, of course, 
 it would be natural, and laudable, in any bio- 
 grapher, or friend, of Professor Stewart fairly to 
 attempt, for the philosophical reputation of the 
 deceased. 
 
 As I shall have occasion to advert very repeat- 
 edly, in the course of the following treatise, to the 
 fact of the conversion of Professor Stewart, on 
 account of the re-union which this event must 
 materially tend to produce in the opinions of 
 English readers, and doubtless also in readers on 
 the Continent ; and as there is not room, in the 
 prefatory part of the volume, to enter at all upon 
 the details of the fact ; I would suggest, to such 
 readers as are not already acquainted with the 
 matter, to peruse the appendix previously to their 
 entering upon the body of the work. Having 
 afforded this intimation, I shall, as occasion de- 
 mands, refer to the matter, in the course of reason- 
 ing, the same as if it had been stated here in the 
 preface. And I have made even this brief allusion 
 to the thing the subject of a Third distinct Preface, 
 in order to mark the importance which I conceive
 
 PREFACE. XV 
 
 is to be attached to it, for its bearing upon philoso- 
 phical opinion. 
 
 It cannot be misunderstood, or supposed that I 
 impute blame to Professor Stewart for his con- 
 version. On the contrary, I ascribe this step to 
 him as being the best thing he ever did to give, or 
 rather to restore, Philosophy to his Countrymen. 
 That he did this under pressure of circumstances, 
 and thus acceded to a truth which he never would 
 otherwise have seen in the same light, is a matter 
 which I shall leave to all to decide upon after 
 perusing the documentary evidence. But no one 
 wnll pretend that he did this in a state of imbecility ; 
 or, that his eyes were not completely open to the 
 truth which he was thus drawn to discern. The 
 voice of impartial criticism has spoken sufficiently 
 to the issue, to leave me nothing to wish but that 
 general benefit to the science in question which 
 must follow upon the promulgation of the fact. 
 And if my application to the Subject had been 
 followed by no other fruit, I should look back with 
 much gratification upon the solitary service of 
 having been the means of bringing about the event 
 which is here the object of remark. 
 
 Torrington Square, London, 
 March 20th, 1829.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 
 Sec. I. — Of the Physiology ofthe Human Mind. 
 — Definitions, First Principles, and Rationated Laws. 17 
 
 The Laws of Vision . . . . .25 
 
 Sec. II. — Of the Principles of Physical The- 
 ology. . . . . . .45 
 
 Of the Origin of Physical Theology . . .54 
 
 Of the Hindoo Physical Theology . . -59 
 
 Of the Extent and Limits of Physical Theology . 70 
 
 Sec. III. — 1. Of our Thinking in Colors, — 2. 
 This fact applied to furnish a popular 
 general conception of the Physiological 
 condition of Mind. . . . .76 
 
 Sec, IV. — First Principles of the Science of 
 Mind. — Sub. l. Ofthe Real Extension of Body and 
 of Space, and of the manner in which the Mind appre- 
 hends these Realities considered as the Subjects tvhich 
 form, in a most serious extent, the Foundation of the 
 Philosophy of Mind. — Incidental consideration of 
 Clarke s Argument for the Necessary Existence of God. 1 10 
 
 Siib. 2. — 1 Of the Speculations of Professor Stetcart con- 
 cerning Extension. — 2. Mr. Steivart's notice of Dr. 
 Hutchesons hint concerning our notion of Extensio7i. 
 — Extension apprehended by the Mind by both Sense 
 and Intellect. — 3. Importance of this double evidence 
 of the fact, to the Science of Pneumatology. . .138 
 
 Sub. 3. — Professor Steivart's Criticism on the Philosophy 
 of Kant. — Notice of Kant's Philosophy. Remarkable 
 coincidence, in one point, of the doctrine of Kant tvith 
 the Vieivs maintained in this Matiual. — Dr. Reid's ex- 
 plosion of his own Theory by himself, in his doctrine of 
 Duration. . . . , . . l6l 
 
 Sub. 4. — Of the Method of Philosophising of the School 
 of Reid. . . . . . .176 
 
 Sub. 5. — 1. Of the use and abuse of Analogical Language 
 and Analogical Imaginations in Pneumatology. — Phy- 
 siological nature of the Operations of Mind. — 2. His- 
 torical fact of the change of Dr. Reid, from the Berke- 
 leian Scheme of Ideas to his own Theory. . .186 
 
 Appendix and Notes. 
 A Paper on Relation.
 
 MANUAL, 
 
 &;c. &c. 
 
 SECTION FIRi^T. 
 
 OF THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE HUMAN 
 
 MIND. 
 
 DEFINITIONS, FIRST PRINCIPLES, AND RATIO NATED LAWS. 
 
 Dcjimtions. 
 
 1. — The word Mind can hardly require any 
 definition to an English reader : When referred to 
 ourselves, it means that, within our organic frame, 
 which loves, and hates, and hopes, and fears, — ■ 
 the Thing we call /, or SeJf, recognised alike by 
 the Philosopher and the Vulgar, as our Conscious 
 Subject, or that which thinks. 
 
 2. — The Physiology of the Mind is a Science, 
 which teaches us the nature of our own and of 
 other minds, considered as Substantive Beings 
 carnjing on a Physical correspojidence with other 
 Substantive Beings around us, hyfo^st teaching us 
 the Physical Proper^ties of our own Thoughts, in- 
 cluding their correlativeness to one another during 
 their co-existence in the mind at any time, and in 
 their succession. The Physiology of the Mind 
 may otherwise in this Treatise, for the sake of 
 Man. c
 
 18 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. i. 
 
 convenience, be called Pneumatology ; although 
 Pneumatology properly comprehends, together 
 with the former, all the other departments of human 
 thought, such as those of Memory, Imagination, 
 the Passions, Desires, and Will ; all which are 
 beyond physiological consideration in the present 
 state of our knowledge ; which departments dis- 
 tinguish the last mentioned science from the first, 
 as a whole from its part. 
 
 In other words, and to lay down clearly to the 
 imagination the limit of the present initiatory 
 Treatise ; which, though it points to some farther 
 objects, is in the first instance intended principally 
 as a Primer, for such as are not too old to begin, 
 or too edified to rebuild, their knowledge of the 
 subject ; the Department here to be delineated is, 
 to the Whole Philosophy of the Mind, what a 
 Basement Story, including its foundation, is to a 
 House, — a simile which is so accurately true, that, 
 while the present Department does not run into or 
 blend with those from which it has been distin- 
 guished above, the Sciences, even, of Mathematics 
 and Logic have their foundation in it. 
 
 3. — The Physiology of the Mind is founded in 
 the Laws of our Exterior Sensations ; namely — of 
 those which we undergo in consequence of an 
 operation of any of the five external organs of 
 sense, called Touch, Taste, Smell, Hearing, and 
 Sight. 
 
 4. — Sensations fl-re a Species of Thougkt : And 
 eve7y Thought is a Modification of the Mind. 
 This Proposition forms the very first Principle in
 
 SEC. I.] OF MIND. 19 
 
 Pneumatological Science ; and it rests on the uni- 
 versal consent of Pneumatologists. It is the com- 
 mon foundation and starting-post of all philosophers 
 of mind : and is the Fulcrum, upon which all their 
 Structures must be supported. 
 
 A Modification of any Thing, and therefore of 
 the Miml, is a Change of State in that Thing. 
 Thus, If a bar of Iron be heated, cooled, bent, 
 straitened, twisted, tied in a knot, impressed, 
 rounded, squared, or flattened. Sec, it is thereby 
 MODIFIED : but, if a continuity of parts be essen- 
 tial to this bar, and if the bar be broken asunder, 
 or the continuity of its parts be interrupted, the 
 bar is thereby }iot modified, but it is destructed, that 
 is destroyed. And if the bar in question had a 
 different sensation, i. e. thought, along with every 
 one of the above-mentioned physical modifications ; 
 then, every such Sensation would be a Modifi- 
 cation of the bar, although a modification of a vastly 
 different kind from that of bending, twisting, &c. 
 
 The First Principle, by universal consent, that 
 Every Thought is a Modification of the Mind, and 
 must always be so considered; — which Principle is 
 contradistinguished from every Scheme of De- 
 tached Ideas ; — is upon the whole the most precious 
 in the subject : because, ivithout this unanimity, 
 there would not be wanting extravagant Spirits, 
 occasionally springing up to disturb the Subject, as 
 has happened heretofore. 
 
 5. — Exterior Sensations are those Modifica- 
 tions which the Mind undergoes from the action of 
 External Objects when we first awake from sleep,
 
 20 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. u 
 
 and which are continually varying, and giving place 
 to others of the same species, until sleep again re- 
 turn. These Modifications arise occasionally in 
 sleep also, in the state called dreaming. And, in 
 the important Sense of Sight, we can otherwise 
 excite them, during vigilance, by looking at lucid 
 objects and then closing the eyes ; and, still more 
 remarkably, by any continued pressure upon the 
 closed eye, in the same manner that we can by pres- 
 sure excite Sensations of Hearing, and of Touch. 
 It is known, also, that Sensations of Taste may be 
 produced without the application of any sapid body. 
 
 That action, or cessation of action, of our ner- 
 vous system called Sleep, produces One of the 
 Modifications of our Mind, by producing a Change 
 of State from thinking to a voidance of thought. 
 
 The term Exterior, as put to designate the 
 Sensations in question, has a propriety, (as will be 
 seen hereafter,) altogether independent of any con- 
 sideration of their being occasioned by external 
 objects, — a propriety in the constitution of the Mind 
 itself. 
 
 6. Of the Five different species of Sensation, oc- 
 casioned by the five external organs, those of Touch 
 and of Sight, alone, are adapted to the purpose of 
 demonstrating the Physiological Conditions of the 
 Mind : although an analogy to these may be faintly 
 traced in the Sensations of the three other Senses, 
 and especially in those of Taste. In this dispensa- 
 tion of Providence, we, in all probability, discern 
 the operation of a Final Cause: because there 
 would appear to be no utility, of any moment, in
 
 SEC. 1.] OF MIND. 21 
 
 having our sensations of Smell, or of Hearing, and 
 very little in having those of Taste, so modified as 
 to manifest to us any physiological property, such 
 as their intcrlimitations between each other when 
 several of them are present at once : and, were it 
 otherwise, there seems to be no reason why the 
 Nerves might not have been so ordered as to 
 produce this effect. 
 
 7. — The Two Species of Exterior Sensation which 
 form the adapted subjects for demonstrating the 
 Physiology of the Mind, namely, those of Touch 
 and of Color, are so far analogous in their pheno- 
 mena, that the same General Laws regulate both 
 the one and the other. But, on the other hand, 
 they differ in this respect, that, our Sensations of 
 Colors are far more fitted, than those of Touch, 
 for the purposes of demonstration. As, for exam- 
 ple, di proper line of interlimitation between two 
 Colors is PERCEPTIBLY void of breadth, as its demon- 
 stration also mathematically proves it is : but the 
 external corporeal mechanism of the Sense of 
 Touch is not sufficiently exquisite to make a 
 breadthless line an object of perception by that 
 Sense, as may be proved if we attempt to feel any 
 line which exists externally between two pieces 
 of cabinet-work closely joined together. It follows, 
 therefore, that Sensations of Color, alone, can 
 be employed, as being the adequate subjects of the 
 Physiology of the Mind : Although it is important 
 always to hold in view, that the Laws of Color (to 
 be stated presently) are in fact the Laws of Touch 
 also, if wc choose so to employ them ; and that.
 
 22 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. i. 
 
 the same would hold good in the Sensations of 
 Taste, Smell, and Sound, if the nerves of those 
 Senses distributed their impressions ; as in the 
 Sense of Taste they do, very perceptibly. 
 
 8. — Sensations have occasionally, that is in cer- 
 tain circumstances, another name in being called 
 Ideas: but these two names are not universally 
 convertible. Thus, when we employ the generic 
 term Idealist, Idealism, or, the /<:/er// 77/ eorj/, this term 
 comprehends Sensations under the name of Ideas, 
 and considers the Former as being One Species of 
 the Latter. But when we are speaking of Sensa- 
 tions, and of Ideas of Sensation, the latter term im- 
 ports a remembrance, or else an imagination, of a 
 Sensation, such as that which we have, when we 
 shut our eyes after looking at snow, and call an 
 Idea of white ; or, that which we sustain when we 
 think of a grxen dragon, which includes an Idea 
 of Green. 
 
 It may be held with certainty that our Ideas of 
 Sensation are no other than Very faint Sensations. 
 These, therefore, when they arise in dreams, impose 
 upon us by seeming more vivid than they would 
 in the presence of Vigilant Sensations. At the same 
 time, however, we often have real full Sensations 
 in our dreams : which last combine mysteriously, 
 and with wonderful adaptation, with Ideas that 
 accompany them : and thus, the whole company 
 together make up the dream. 
 
 9. — The word Notion has been employed, by 
 some late Writers, synonymously with the word 
 Idea, — a device set up by the Reideian School, 
 
 •■;'i 
 ■J
 
 SEC. I.] OF MIND. §3 
 
 (which School denies any physiological property 
 to any of our Thoughts) in order to confound a dis- 
 tinction of the older Pneumatologists, who sup- 
 posed our Exterior Thoughts to have physiological 
 properties, and our Interior Thoughts as not hav- 
 ing such properties; the former of which they 
 therefore called Ideas, but the latter they distin- 
 guished by the term Notion. The si/noni/me in 
 question is admitted in this Treatise, and in my 
 previous writings : but this for a reason the veiy 
 opposite to that of the Reideian School, namely, — 
 that, after our Exterior Thoughts are demonstrated 
 to have physiological properties, it becomes a ra- 
 tional conjecture, in the way of analogy and not 
 unnecessarily to multiply causes, that our Interior 
 Thoughts, also, have some modification of the like, 
 although we cannot trace their anatomy. The sy- 
 nonyme, now adverted to, is otherwise useful or con- 
 venient, in order sometimes to vary the name of 
 Idea, in the case of frequent repetition. 
 
 It may be proper to intimate here, although this 
 fact must wait upon its proof hereafter, that the 
 conjecture above-mentioned is turned into an infer- 
 ence in the case of one most important point : for it 
 can be demonstrated, by evidence no less than dis- 
 ciplinal, that the Judging Faculty in the Mind 
 possesses a position of local interneity therein, 
 considered with respect to our Exterior Sensations. 
 This fact is matter of science, strictly speaking ; 
 and it yields not, in evidence, to any principle of 
 Science, cither within or without the Mind. 
 
 The whole of this article, however, with ex-
 
 24 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. i. 
 
 ception of the adoption of the synonyme, is to be 
 regarded as being put after what follows. 
 
 Having defined those terms, to be employed in 
 this Treatise, which appeared to require it ; and 
 laid down the First Principles, by universal con- 
 sent, which form the data of the reasonings to be 
 stated with regard to them ; we may now proceed 
 to exhibit the Rationated Lmvs of the Physiology 
 of our Exterior Sensations, in the Sense of Sight. 
 These Laws, which have been treated on former 
 occasions under the name of the Laws of Primary 
 Vision, are few and self-evident : And they possess 
 the two-fold character of being, at once. Laics of 
 Nature and Mathematical or Necessary Truths, — 
 thus evincing a union of two natures, which have 
 not heretofore been recognised in Philosophy as 
 being compatible. The reader is, for the sake of 
 expedience, required to note the two-fold charac- 
 ter in question, in these Laws, as he proceeds. 
 
 These Laws of Vision are called Primary, and 
 also Rationated, in order to distinguish them from 
 the Principles of Secondary Vision ; for which last 
 we are indebted to the genius of Bishop Berkeley : 
 which are not Laws of our Sensations at all, but are 
 Principles of the Visual Perception of &^e;7z<7/ Ob- 
 jects ; which Principles are not Ratiojiated, but are 
 merely Lnductive and Empirical, and only enable us 
 to guess the Distances, Magnitudes, and Trine Fi- 
 gures, of Bodies that are without us. The two 
 Subjects have no connection with one another; 
 but differ as widely as Mathematics and Scene
 
 SEC. I.] OF MIND. 25 
 
 Painting : which it was proper to explain, in order 
 to prevent any confusion of the subjects in the ima- 
 gination of a reader. 
 
 The Rationated Laws of Vismi. 
 
 First Law : — Unformative. 
 
 No unvaried sensation of color can ever be accom- 
 panied by a perception of any visible figure, any line, 
 or any point. 
 
 An example and proof of this Law is had when 
 we look at the unicolored unclouded sky ; at which 
 time we have no perception of any figure, any line, 
 or any point. 
 
 Second Law : — Formative. 
 
 When any ttuo different and unsoftened, i. e. nn- 
 blended, sensations of colors, such as a Blue and a 
 Yellow, are felt at the same time ; they must meet, 
 and their meeting must be that perceived line 
 
 OF CONTIGUITY AND CONTRAST Xvhich WC CUll a 
 
 Visible Line. 
 
 An example and proof of this Law is had when 
 we look at the sky and the sea together ; or, at 
 the sky and the roof-edge of a house ; where they 
 appear to join : For, in this case, we have two 
 sensations of colors ; and the rjieeting and limitation 
 of ONE color by the other is a perceived line be- 
 tween them. And thus, a Visible Line is nothing 
 in the world but a line of meeting between two of 
 Man. D
 
 26 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. i. 
 
 our own sensations of colors : or, in other words, a 
 Visible Line is the termination of one Sensation of 
 Color by another, in the Mind. 
 
 Third Law : — Formative. 
 
 When any tiuo different and unblended sensations of 
 colors are felt at the same time, and are so disposed, 
 in relation to each other, that one of them surrounds 
 or embraces the other; tlieir common line of con- 
 tiguity MUST RETURN INTO ITSELF and SO CHClose d 
 
 space, and by so doing it must form ivhat is called a 
 Superficial Figure, such as a circle, a square, a 
 triangle, or some other and more irregular shape. 
 
 An example and proof of this Law is had when we 
 look at the White Moon, surrounded by the Blue 
 Sky : For, in this case, the line of meeting, between 
 the White and the Blue, returns into itself, and so 
 forms a circular figure. 
 
 And here it is manifesi, that the Thii^d Law is 
 only a Different Case of the Second. 
 
 Fourth Lav/ : — Unformative. 
 
 When any two different sensations of colors are felt 
 at the same time, but are so softened, at their nearest 
 edges, as that they blend into each other and thus 
 leave no sensible contrast wJiere they meet ; they 
 never can be accompanied by a perception of any 
 figure, any line, or any point, not even if their re- 
 mote PARTS should be of the most opposite colors, or 
 black and white. 
 
 A proof of this Law is had when we look at
 
 SEC. 1.] OF MIND. ag^ 
 
 either the daumbig, or the decline, of day : For, in this 
 case, we have two sensations of colors, which are 
 so different at i\\e parts or portions fartltest from one 
 another as to be, tJie One either ruddy or gray, and 
 the Otlier black, or nearly so ; while, where they ap- 
 proach each other, they blend into one and present 
 to our perception no contrast, or in other words no 
 line, between them. And thus, by this Fourth 
 Law, it is confirmed that a Perceived Line is 
 nothing but a Perceived Contrast between two 
 of our own Sensations. 
 
 In the present statement of these Laws of Vision 
 it may be discerned, by those who have seen the 
 former statements of them, that I have avoided 
 the introduction of the word Relation. This has 
 been done in the present case, inasmuch as the 
 word Relation, as every where employed by me, 
 carries a vastly different import from that here- 
 tofore uniformly assigned to it by Logicians. It 
 is known to those who have read the Analysis of 
 Relation, that, according to it, the terms Relation 
 and Relative are not synonymous, as they are in 
 the Accredited Scheme of the subject : On the 
 contrary, a Relative means a Related Subject 
 LINKED TO Another Related Subject, by the Me- 
 dium OF A Third Thing or Logical Bridge, 
 which Third Thing, as it must have some dis- 
 tinctive name, I have called a Relation. Thus, 
 for example, a Sensation of Blue, and a Sensation of 
 Yellow, coming together in the Mind, are Two 
 Correlated Subjects ; and the perceived line of meeting,
 
 28 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. i. 
 
 which they create by their co-existence, is a Third 
 Thing — that is a Relation — between them ; which 
 Third Thing is a Link or Bridge of Logical Con- 
 nection between the Two Co-existent Colors, at 
 the same time that it is a Logical and a Real Par- 
 tition and Barrier between them. 
 
 From the exposition, now given, it will be seen 
 that an uninitiated reader may best understand the 
 Laws of Vision, in the first instance, from their 
 being laid down without the use of the word Re- 
 lation. But, in order to apprehend the subject 
 duly, it is manifestly of the last importance to un- 
 derstand that the perceiving a line is nothing 
 in the world but an act of our Judging Faculty, 
 performed upon Two of our own Sensations : It is 
 an act of our intuitively judging where 
 Blue meets Yellotv, which is the same as where 
 Yellow meets Blue; which meeting, therefore, 
 can be neither Blue nor Yellow, and hence must 
 be without any color, that is breadthless, by being 
 a privation of all color. In a word ; the perceiving 
 a visible line, and the conceiving a inathematical line, 
 is One Same Specific act of our Judgment, 
 performed upon Tivo Correlated Surfaces : And 
 the Definition of a Visible Line is the Definition of 
 a Mathematical Line. 
 
 It will open a new view of the subject, although 
 it is not necessary here, to point out that a Line 
 is an Action. Thus, a Line is a Meeting between 
 two Colors; and a Meeting is a Touching; and 
 every body knows that touching is an action : Nor 
 is it different if we call it contacting or contrasting ;
 
 SKc. I.] OF MIND. 29 
 
 for the last is as much an action, in a loo-ical sense, 
 as if we had said striking. — Who would have sup- 
 posed that all the Figures of Objects, which he 
 perceives, are actions between Those Objects and 
 Other Objects that appear contiguous to them ? 
 Such, however, are the truths to v/hich a sound 
 rational Logic must conduct us. 
 
 The conceived necessity for recognising the Prin- 
 ciples of Relation, now adverted to, in the case of 
 Philosophical Speculation or Science in general, 
 is the principal object of the ** Paper on Relation" 
 which is suffixed to the present treatise. And it 
 will therein be shown that, in none is it more es- 
 sential, or indispensable, than in the Philosophy 
 of the Mind. 
 
 The First consideration here, after laying down 
 the Four Laws of our Visual Interlimitations as 
 above stated, is to insist upon their nature : Con- 
 cerning which it must be self-evident, to every 
 reader who possesses the smallest tincture of ma- 
 thematical knowledge, that they are Necessary 
 Laws, at the same time that they are also Laws of 
 Nature : The meaning of which is that, though it 
 can be only a contingent fact when any of our 
 Sensations of Colors exist, yet, ivhen they do exist, 
 it becomes a Necessary result that they must create 
 those Interlimitations, between themselves, which 
 we perceive and call Visible Lines. In this character, 
 therefore, the Laws of Vision 2iVQ Mathematical Prin- 
 ciples, absolutely and beyond a cavil : For, in like 
 manner, no equality between two mathematical 
 triangles can be actually true unless the two trian-
 
 30 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. i. 
 
 gles serving as the subjects of the demonstration 
 actualli/ exist ; and, if any such can exist in exter- 
 nal objects, or even in our Sensations, this fact 
 must be a mere contingency. 
 
 The Next consideration is, with regard to the 
 Pneumatological Consequence of these Laws of the 
 Interlimitation of our Sensations. In order to ar- 
 rive at this, it is an initial step in the subject that 
 a reader should make it familiar to his contempla- 
 tion that Colors, that is those beautiful illumined 
 thoughts — those Modifications of his mind — called 
 White, Red, Blue, Yelloiv, S^c. are not skins or 
 coverings adhering to the outsides of External Bodies, 
 as all men, except philosophers in the moment of 
 philosophising, believe them to be. It is this 
 HABIT, rather than a momentary initiation into 
 the fact, that alone constitutes the Key which un- 
 locks the Physiology of the Mind ; and the want 
 of which renders ordinary persons averse from the 
 subject, because they cannot relish what they do 
 not understand. With regard to this, there is a 
 strange degree of reluctance, in most persons, to 
 look at the subject with any desire to apprehend it : 
 although it is certain that even a few minutes of 
 attention is sufficient to introduce them, as it were, 
 to a new world, that is to a knowledge that the 
 world which they believed to be external to them, 
 is in reality in their own Mind, and formed of the Mo- 
 difications of that Mind itself : while there is also a 
 world without, and unperceived by them ; which is 
 the physical cause of exciting what they do per- 
 ceive. (See note a.)
 
 SEC. I.] OF MIND. 31 
 
 The experiments for proving this fact are within 
 the reach of every person ; and this with the greatest 
 ease and convenience. They are endless, in their 
 variety : but the following may be mentioned here. 
 — First. Looking at any lucid object ; and, then, 
 closing the eyes. — Secondlif. Contemplating the 
 objects seen in dreams ; when we are certain that 
 no external objects, like themselves, exist. — Tliird- 
 lij, and above all. Commencing and encreasing a 
 pressure of the hand upon the closed eye : In 
 which case, we begin to perceive a surface covered 
 with minute unduUiiions of color, of a bluish, or 
 grayish cast ; and, as the pressure increases, we 
 perceive bright mottled yellow waves, which not only 
 have sizes, ami siiapes, caused by tlieir own Interli- 
 mitations between themselves, but their sizes and 
 shapes are continually varying, until at length the 
 sense of physical glory is equal to that we have 
 when v/e look at the sun's disk on a clear day. 
 From this last experiment, then, it is in the high- 
 est degree manifest, our Sensations of Colors are, 
 in a certain physical sense, what Hobbes has said 
 of Laughter, in an intellectual, — ^namely — a " Glo- 
 ry' arising in the Mind, upon certain occasions : 
 And every one of them, of every hue and tint, is 
 a Physical Illumination or Picture in the Mind, in 
 the place where it appears ; although, by the word 
 Illumination, I do not here mean Light, in the 
 sense of the Natural Philosopher, because Light is 
 an External thing and is never perceived by us. 
 There is not, indeed, a fact in science which stands 
 upon higher evidence, than that Elementary Sen-
 
 32 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. i. 
 
 sations of Colors are Undulations upon the Sur- 
 face of the Mind, — a fact proved as well in being a 
 deduction from the Rationated Laws of Vision, as 
 in the inductive experiment last described. 
 
 After what has been laid down, it may be of ser- 
 vice here to explain in what manner we are deceived, 
 when we think that our Sensations of Colors are 
 coverings adhering to theoutsides of external bodies. 
 Let us, then, suppose we are looking at what we call 
 a White House: In this case, we are as much de- 
 ceived, and deceived in a similar manner, in believing 
 that the Sensation we have of White is a covering 
 adhering to the House which we call White, as we 
 are when we believe that this House touches or 
 ADHERES TO Another House which is sonie distance 
 beyond it, but which to our apprehension it appears 
 to touch. The real fact is that the Sensation of 
 White, in our Mind, forms a painted or illumined 
 sh^een, which stands between us and the House we 
 call White, and renders it impossible to perceive this 
 House, as completely as it is impossible for us to 
 perceive that part of the House beyond that is shut 
 in behind the one first mentioned. This illus- 
 tration is not only scientific truth in itself; but it 
 is one which brings the subject within the appre- 
 hension of the most ordinary capacity. It will be 
 enlarged upon when we come to treat of our think- 
 ing in colors : when the Physiological Condition 
 of the Mind will be delineated to popular concep- 
 tion. 
 
 To return, now, to the Pneumatological Conse- 
 quence deduced from the Laws of the Interlimita-
 
 SEC. I.] OF MIND. 33 
 
 tions of our Sensations of Colors ; Our Sensations 
 being universally admitted to be Modifications of 
 our Mind, it is no less than an identical proposition 
 to say that our Sensations are extended and figured, 
 and to say that the Mind, of which these are Mo- 
 difications, is extended and figured. These, (I 
 say,) are not two propositions, one deduced from 
 the other ; but they are one same proposition exhi- 
 bited in two equivalent expressions. And since 
 this proposition has been demonstrated by mathe- 
 matical evidence, as being no other than a discipli- 
 nal proposition of that Science, it becomes a truth 
 with which no fact in Natural Philosophy can 
 compete ; but to which, it is sufficient to say, none 
 can be superior ; that the Mind is an Extended 
 Subject, like any external body. 
 
 The important conclusion, now stated, being 
 that which brings us to the first period of the Phy- 
 siology of the Mind, we shall close the present sec- 
 tion with the following historical commentary. 
 
 Brief Historical Minute of the Absurdity of Theorists, 
 involved by their assumption, {avoived, or tacit,) of 
 the Mind's Simplicity. 
 
 The Laws of Vision introduce 720 tiew ground of 
 Pneumatology : They only demonstrate the truth of 
 the Idealism of Locke ; whose proof he had left as a 
 Desideratum, and which was necessary to prevent 
 any sujjposeable opening for such a Scheme as the 
 Reideiun Theory. Without such proof, indeed, 
 Man. E
 
 34 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. i. 
 
 Locke never for a moment doubted that our Ex- 
 terior sensations, (and, of course, the Mind of 
 which he knew they are Modifications,) are ex- 
 tended : But the fact rested upon proofs which, 
 however well grounded, did 7iot Tpreyent the Scheme 
 of Reid from being broached ; nor did it do this, 
 although Mr. Hume, with all his philosophical 
 acumen, at the same time, and upon the ground 
 asserted by Locke, affirmed, without a suspicion 
 that he could be contradicted, that ** if the mind 
 exists at all, it is extended." 
 
 Philosophical Superstition, which can work a 
 real miracle on the human understanding in ma- 
 king it subvert its own first principles, has in all 
 ages led Philosophers to draw a different conclusion 
 from that of the Mind's extension, — a conclusion 
 grounded upon two, and 0)ili/ two, Suppositions ; 
 for they are certainly no better. One of these, is the 
 Supposed Simplicity of the Mind, as being deemed 
 necessary for what is called the Unity of Conscious- 
 ness : The Other, the Sa?7ie Supposed Simplicity, as 
 being thought necessary to prevent the destriictibiUty 
 of the Mind by a discerption of parts, like that 
 which happens to the parts of Bodies : All which 
 while it is undeniable that the line of human 
 reason is too short, to afford us the least ground of 
 knowledge, as to what is necessary to insure these 
 two perfections to the Mind ; and, most certain 
 that men do but deplorably grope in the dark, upon 
 the Subject. This doctrine of the Simplicity of 
 the Mind, therefore, is a mere philosophical 
 SUPERSTITION ; AND NO OTHER. And, accord-
 
 SEC. I.] OF MIND. 36 
 
 ingly, it is most edifying to contemplate the va- 
 riety OF FRUITS which this superstition has pro- 
 duced, when sown in the soil of different minds, 
 variously circumstanced: the bare comparison, or 
 contrast rather, of which, ought to prove a suffi- 
 cient antidote to the poison of the hypothesis. 
 
 For, from this dogma we have,^r*^, the Ancient 
 assumption of Tiuo Souls, a corporeal extended soul, 
 and an incorporeal unei'tended one. And, next, 
 M. Des Cartes, turning his Ideas, (which he knew 
 and recognised to be e.vtended,) out of his assumed un- 
 extended Alind, into his Brain, because he well dis- 
 cerned that extended ideas could not find lodgment 
 at home. And, then. Father Malbranche, who, with 
 the same design of asserting a simple mind, denied 
 to the mind ideas at all ; and, in his assumption, 
 made us perceive the ideas of the Deity. And 
 then. Dr. Reid, who, taking the very opposite 
 course to that of Des Cartes, very rationally brought 
 our ideas back into the Mind ; but, in order to 
 render this possible in an unextended mind, shaved 
 off their extension and thus made them conform to 
 the nature of the mansion they were to inhabit. 
 And lastly, (though not last in order of time,) 
 Bishop Berkeley, who knew that our ideas are 
 as much in the mind as *' the passions of the soul ;" 
 but who at the same time would not forsake the 
 simplicity of the Soul, and therefore betook himself 
 to the most desperate intellectual leap of all, by 
 asserting that Extension is not any thing real, but 
 is a mere illusion of the Mind. Will it be easy 
 for any person, who is unacquainted with the his-
 
 36 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. i. 
 
 tory of the subject, to believe that this is a true 
 account of the conflicting ** Theories," which 
 have been given to the world, of the nature of 
 Mind ? Or, If we did not consider the undoubted 
 calibre of the Authors of these Theories, and to- 
 gether with this the Superstition to which they 
 had previously subjected their understandings, 
 Would not any one suppose the account is more like 
 a history of patients in a lunatic infirmary, every 
 one of whom deemed all the others to be insane 
 upon the subject in question? The glaring ab- 
 surdity in every one of these Schemes, indeed, as 
 well as the conflict which they exhibit with one 
 another, is such as none but its inventor, or some 
 other person under a most deplorable bias, could 
 for a moment endure : And yet, every one of these 
 Schemes has been endured by votaries, more or less. 
 The Schemes adverted to are the more to be 
 deplored, because it must be evident that they are 
 not cited here for any purpose of personal impu- 
 tation. On the contrary, they are held up as being 
 the natural results of the Dogma of the Physical 
 Smplicity of the Mind, when viewed by the most 
 different minds, in diff"erent circumstances. For it 
 may be affirmed, with the utmost confidence, that 
 every one of the different Theorists in question had 
 set out with the assumption, either express or tacit, 
 of the Mind's Simplicity : And, having made this his 
 starting post ; it is wonderful to observe with what 
 ingenuity his imagination, and his reason alike, 
 have been immolated upon the altar of this Idol, 
 through the course perhaps of several volumes, all
 
 <( 
 
 t< 
 
 SEu. I.] - OF MIND. 
 
 of which appear to him as being the very chart 
 and scale of truth ! 
 
 Of the effects of this dogma in other very emi- 
 nent writers, besides the Authors of the above 
 conflicting theories, I may instance the following : 
 Cud worth asserts that " the Soul conceives e.i'- 
 " tended things themselves unextendedly and indivisi- 
 ** bly ; for as the difference of the whole Hemisphere 
 *' is contracted into a narrow compass in the Pupil 
 of the Eye, so are all distances yet more contracted 
 in the Soul itself, and there understood indis- 
 tantly.'" Upon contemplating this effusion, I 
 would ask ; Could any one imagine a more con- 
 clusive evidence, of a Mind's having immolated its 
 reasoning faculty in a superstitious submission 
 to the prejudice in question, than it exhibits ? 
 As another example of this kind, it is to be added 
 that, even Dr. Clarke, who has labored so much 
 and so profoundly in order to assert the Exten- 
 sion' OF THE Divine Mind, has upon one occasion 
 fallen into a slip of conceding, (in his " Ansiver to 
 the Second Letter,'') that " Extension indeed does 
 " not belong to Thought, because Thought is not a 
 ** Being." Is it possible for any impartial person 
 to fail of being struck by the inconsistency of 
 this concession of Clarke : which, the Laws of our 
 Sensations have proved, is as fallacious as it is 
 inconsistent. In all probability, however, Dr. 
 Clarke, as he was certainly a Lockeian, forgot our 
 Sensations, and had only our Interior Thoughts 
 in his recollection, when he fell into this inconsis- 
 tency.
 
 38 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. i. 
 
 It may altogether be trusted that the ravages of 
 Understanding, produced by the prejudice of the 
 Simplicity of the Mind, are too manifest above to 
 require the mention of any other instances of it : 
 And we may, now, turn to the contrary examples of 
 Locke and Hume, who refused to bow their reason 
 to the worship of that Idol. The first of these 
 Philosophers taught, and the second confidently 
 subscribed to the truth, that our Sensations (and 
 with them the Mind of which they are Modifica- 
 tions) are extended. 
 
 To the Names of Locke and Hume, upon this 
 ground, are most undeniably to be added those 
 not only of Newton and of Clarke, but no less of 
 Malebranche and of Des Cartes, that is to say when 
 these Philosophers, respectively, are reduced to a con- 
 sistency luith themselves upon the Subject. Profes- 
 sor Stewart, in the First Volume of his Elements, 
 (pages 81, 82.) having quoted all these, and other 
 eminent names, as asserting in substance, accord- 
 ing with a query put by Newton, that the * Sen- 
 
 * sorium of animals is the place where the sentient 
 
 * substance is present ; and to which the sensible 
 
 * species of things are brought, through the nerves 
 
 * and brain, that there they may be perceived by 
 
 * the mind present in that place ;' adds a/oo^ note, 
 in which he says — " This phrase of * the soul 
 '* being present io the images of external objects,' 
 " has been used by many philosophers since the 
 '* time of Des Cartes ; evidently from a desire to 
 " avoid the absurdity of supposing, that images of 
 ** extension and figure can exist in an unextended
 
 SEC. 1.] OF MIND. 
 
 " mind." Now it is of very material importance 
 to hold up this construction, put upon the matter 
 by Mr. Stewart, as being one of the most demon- 
 strable sophisms ever hazarded on the subject ; 
 because, if not duly exposed, it is ingeniously con- 
 trived so as to produce a mischievous effect in mis- 
 leading the judgment of every unwary reader. 
 
 The ?ral absurdity, then, (for a vast absurditi/ 
 there certainly was) involved, in the phraseology in 
 question, consisted in every one of those philoso- 
 phers calling our Ideas by the name of the Species 
 of External Objects, when most of these already 
 knew, and every philosopher since them has with one 
 voice acknowledged, that these Ideas are Modifica- 
 tions IN, AND OF, the Mind itself; and are no such 
 things as Species ; or, as present to the Mind. 
 The moment, therefore, that Newton and his asso- 
 ciates in that phraseology are put to the test, and 
 made to confess, (what they would never advisedly 
 have denied,) namely — that the So-called Spe- 
 cies of things are the Mind's own Modifications, 
 i. e. its temporary states ; all these Philoso- 
 phers then assert the Extension of the Mind in the 
 most unequivocal and most confident terms, as 
 Mr. Hume did expressly and outright. To insist, 
 then, upon the Sophism contained in Mr. Stewart's 
 ingenious device ; I here point out the manifest 
 truth, that, by the use of the words — species — ■ 
 image, — diX\(}i present to the mind, — the philosophers in 
 question did not ** avoid" an absurdity ; but they 
 embraced an absurdity, and avoided a consisten- 
 cy ; and they did this from a tacit holy reverence for
 
 40 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. i. 
 
 the scholastic dogma of the Simplicity of the 
 Mind : I mean, that the reverence appears to have 
 been tacit or unavoiced in the case of Newton, and 
 of Clarke ; but it was not even concealed in that of 
 Des Cartes and of Malebranche ; so that we have 
 the most express evidence of the reason why Des 
 Cartes and Malebranche turned their ideas out of 
 their minds, in order to immolate their reason upon 
 the altar of a dogma, which had come down to 
 them consecrated by the belief of the Ancient as- 
 sertors of an Intellectual JJnextended Soul, together 
 with a Corporeal and Extended Soul. 
 
 When men argue for victory, it may be thought 
 allowable to take any advantage of any opening 
 left by an opponent. But are we to suppose that 
 Professor Stewart, with all his study of the subject, 
 did not discern that the real absurdity, in the 
 above case, was the glaring fallacy of tacitly ;9z/^^/«^ 
 their own modification out of their minds by the act 
 of callinsr them the Species of Things present 
 TO the Mind ? The explosion of this Sophism, 
 however, renders the assertion of the Mind's Ex- 
 tension, by all the Philosophers in question, one 
 of the most undeniable facts in the history of the 
 subject. 
 
 To leave nothing incomplete, here, I shall cite 
 the following curious test, to show that the Phi- 
 losophers in question well knew the truth which 
 they were virtually denying by the use of the 
 words " image" and ''pi^esent to," &c. Professor 
 Stewart in the place adverted to, has quoted Dr. 
 Clarke (among the rest) as asserting that, '' With-
 
 SEC. I.] OF MIND. 41 
 
 " out being present to the images of the things 
 " perceived, the soul could not possibly perceive 
 " them." Now, in a direct virtual opposition to 
 this admission oi images , and of their being present 
 to the Mind, Dr. Clarke, in his Demonstration, 
 page 53, says, — " The answer is very easy: First, 
 " that Colours, Sounds, Tastes, and the like, are by 
 ** no means Effects arising from mere Figure and 
 " Motion ; there being nothing in the Bodies them- 
 '' selves, the Objects of Sense, that has any man- 
 " ner of similitude to any of these qualities: but 
 " they are plainly Thoughts or Modifications of the 
 " Mind itself, which is an Intelligent Being." The 
 test, then, of the tico contending phraseologies — the 
 true and i]ie false — being used by the same Author, 
 is here complete. 
 
 Upon this last quotation from Dr. Clarke, one 
 observation is requisite : When he therein de- 
 nies that Colours, Sounds, &c. have any manner 
 of similitude to Extension and Figure ; he does 
 not mean to deny that Color is extended and fi- 
 gured: he only means to deny that a Sensation of 
 Color, as a Mere Tint or Hue, is resembled by 
 any thing in Body. I impute this rational dis- 
 tinction to Clarke because he was a Lockeian, and 
 because I have shown elsewhere, in this treatise, 
 that such is Locke's Doctrine of the Subject. And 
 it admits of no demur that both Des Cartes and 
 Malebranche held the same ; or, else, they need 
 not have turned Colors, &c. out of their minds, for 
 want of room therein to contain them. I suppose 
 this explanation may be of service to beginners of 
 Man. ' F
 
 42 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. i. 
 
 the Subject ; who might otherwise be apt to sup- 
 pose, (as I myself once did,) that the doctrine of 
 non-resemblance held by Reid was not carried 
 farther, and was no other than the doctrine of non- 
 resemblance held by Locke; whereas, they must 
 note that the Reideian doctrine is far beyond, and 
 is most seriously different from the Lockeian. 
 
 In fine ; A more indisputable extent of proof 
 was never exhibited, than has been done above, of 
 the fact that the Human Mind has been avoivtcUy 
 held to be extended, and not simple, by all Phi- 
 losophers who have not suffered their reason to be 
 overcome by a reverence for the Scholastic dogma 
 of the contrary ; and that, the very same has been 
 held tacitli) and virtuallij by all Philosophers who 
 have employed the phraseology of species, images, 
 and present to tJie Mind. At the same time, it is 
 manifest that the phraseology just mentioned is 
 most certainly fallacious and exploded : which 
 fact leaves the doctrine of Locke — namely — that 
 Colors, &c. are the Mind's own Modifications, Af- 
 fections, Actions, or States,' — the real Standard 
 Truth upon which the whole Science of Mind must 
 for ever rest. 
 
 One thing, however, still remained a desidera- 
 tum, in order to extricate the Ground of all Exten- 
 sionists, from a mystery which had all along en- 
 veloped it ; and which involved that Ground in a 
 very awkward and uncomfortable uncertainty. The 
 want in question was, to determine the manner or 
 
 RATIONALE of the prodl{Ctio?l ofV ERCEIVED FiGURE 
 
 fro?n our Sensations. Through an oversight al-
 
 SEC. I.] - OF MIND. ^ 
 
 together wonderful, the way of nature in this pro- 
 cess, (eminently simple though it is,) had never 
 been detected, as is now sufficiently known from 
 the endeavour of Professor Stewart, to adduce au- 
 thority for at least a knowledge of the vague generic 
 fact which iiwolves the rationale in question. It was 
 in this state of the Subject, (that is previously to 
 the starting of the involving general fact at all by 
 Mr. Stewart, in his Dissertation in the year 1815,) 
 that the suofsfestion of the Laws of Vision was ef- 
 fected in successive gradations : which have since 
 been embodied, together with a full statement of 
 the Various Modijications of these Laws of our 
 Visual Perception, and of the Various considerations 
 bearing upon the subject, in my First Lines of the 
 Mind : From which last, as a basis, the present 
 Manual has been constructed, by leaving out the col- 
 lateral, and in one sense inessential considerations 
 in that Work, and introducing new matter, which 
 I deem as constituting some real and very material 
 features of the Subject. Among these, for example, 
 the Section on our thixkixg in colors may be 
 mentioned here, in particular ; although it is only 
 one of several additional considerations, which gave 
 rise to the present volume, and which, I trust, will 
 form an accession to the extent of fact previously 
 possessed on the subject.* 
 
 ' In reference to the First Lines, it may be proper to inform 
 such readers as may require it, that the present treatise is in no 
 part a transcript of the former, unless in the case of some very 
 brief quotations.
 
 44 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. i. 
 
 The contempt entertained by Materialists, 
 for the assumption of the Inextension of the Mind, 
 need not be insisted upon here, — it being too well 
 known. And, if Phrenology shall advance in 
 the general estimation, it cannot fail to spread the 
 doctrine of Materialism. But Materialists are de- 
 ceived in concluding that, if their creed with regard 
 to the nature of the Mind be true, it proves Mate- 
 rialism ALSO, together with all its supposed conse- 
 quencesj to be true : For, the legitimate conclu- 
 sion, to which Philosophy must force our assent 
 after the proof that Mind is an extended essence, is, 
 (as will be seen in the next section,) that all 
 
 BODY IS MIND.
 
 SEC. II.] OF MIND. 
 
 SECTION SECOND. 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PHYSICAL 
 THEOLOGY. 
 
 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 The sound Philosophical Idealism of Locke 
 was not only wanting, in itself, of that ultimate and 
 analytical proof of which it admitted : but it was 
 also unapplied by him, to the most important of all 
 its uses — that of determining the Nature of the 
 External AVorld. Mr. Locke took the assumption 
 of a Material World upon the doubtful evidence of 
 former ages, and so he left it ; without attempting, 
 like Des Cartes, to prove the thing upon an as- 
 sumption that the Deity would not deceive us in 
 the prejudice we receive for it; or essaying, like 
 Berkeley, to effect the contrary by an appeal to 
 his supposed nature of Ideas. 
 
 To those who have any competency on the sub- 
 ject it will appear, very decisively, that the want 
 of being able to show the ''manner" or ra- 
 tionale, by which Perceived Figure is produced 
 from our Sensations, must have placed Locke, and 
 all preceding inquirers, in a state of very awkward 
 uncertainty on the subject ; and have prevented 
 the possibility of any comfortable speculation with 
 regard to the Nature of the External World. And 
 Des Cartes' uncalled-for trust in God, for the 
 truth of our prejudice for a Material World ; and
 
 46 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. ii. 
 
 Dr. Reid's assertion that we actually peixeive such a 
 World by a sort of inspiration ; are sufficient evi- 
 dences of the state in which the uncertainty with 
 regard to the rationale of perceived figure had 
 placed them. 
 
 The attempt of Berkeley to disprove a Material, 
 and to prove the existence of a Spiritual World, 
 (it is well known,) was invalidated by the fact that 
 those Detached Substantive Ideas, the existence of 
 which he assumed as his Data, are altogether 
 visionary things ; and those which really exist in 
 our Minds are its own Modifications. And the 
 failure of Bishop Berkeley, through his having 
 built upon chimerical data, has left open the field 
 of the following reasonings. 
 
 Definitions, First Principles, E.vtent and Limits. 
 
 As far as the reader has travelled, in the fore- 
 going Section, he has travelled in his oivn Mind: 
 He has had nothing at all to do with speculating 
 on the Eternal Cause or Occasion of his Sensa- 
 tions ; or, with the nature, or modifications, of any 
 other Being than himself. But, in order to ad- 
 vance farther, he must now quit that Department ; 
 and must enter upon a consideration of the Minds 
 of Other Beings. In order to do this, the following 
 is a rule for his government ; to which he is re- 
 quired to conform. 
 
 In any department of Natural or Inductive Sci- 
 ence, we can possess only a very small comparative 
 extent of actual induction, upon which to rest our
 
 SEC. J I.] OF MIND. 47 
 
 general conclusions. The Natural Historian, the 
 Mechanical Philosopher, or the Experimental 
 Chymist, having satisfied himself by experiments 
 upon the nature of a number of individuals of any 
 kind, without ever finding any instance to the 
 contrary ; thenceforward assumes with confidence 
 the same conclusions, as being applicable to all in- 
 dividuals of the same kind. And, in this proceed- 
 ing, the evidence of the testimonij of other e.rpe- 
 rimentors is received as unquestionable. The case 
 of the Physiologist of Mind is a good deal similar : 
 though it presents, undoubtedly, a strougei' ground 
 of credibility, than that of the Natural Philosopher, 
 in any of the above mentioned departments : be- 
 cause the former, after his having satisfied himself 
 of the Physiological Laws of his own Mind, has, in 
 the speech, and actions, and writings, of other men, 
 internal exi^QwcQ that those men have Minds consti- 
 tuted exactly like his own ; and he has, therefore, 
 the strongest possible ground for extending by 
 ANALOGY all the essential attributes of his own 
 Mind, to the Minds of all other men ; and, be- 
 yond this, to the Minds of All Other Beings 
 WHICH HAVE mind: And he is boand to extend 
 these Laws accordingly. If he should, for a mo- 
 ment, attempt to deny this result ; he would cease 
 to proceed as a Newtonian Philosopher, and would 
 prove himself to be the slave of some prejudice, 
 which he cannot defend, and perhaps dare not 
 avow, even to his own conscience. Is there, for 
 example, any Newtonian who denies gravitation 
 to the Stars, after having ascertained that property
 
 48 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. ii. 
 
 to belong to our Solar System ? This precedent 
 beino- subscribed to ; the reader is introduced to the 
 Second Stage of the Subject. 
 
 The Name Physical Theology is assigned, 
 here, in order to distinguish the present Subject 
 from that Natural Theology which teaches the 
 Existence and Attributes of the Deity from the 
 Moral Appearances in the Economy of Nature. 
 
 Physical Theology is, in point of fact, an Inte- 
 gral Department of the Physiology of Mind. The 
 former grows out of the latter, as certainly as the 
 Physiology of Other Human Minds is demon- 
 strated by that of every man's Own Mind. The 
 knowledge of this Science ought to form a subject 
 of momentous interest to all Religionists ; the far 
 greater number of whom can have neither time, nor 
 interest, for entering farther upon the Superstruc- 
 ture or Various Departments of Pneumatology. 
 
 1. — The First Principle in Physical Theolo- 
 gy is the fact, gathered from a collection of reason 
 and assented to universally by Philosophers, that 
 our Exterior Modifications are excited, or called 
 into existence, by an act of Some Ei'temal Agent. 
 
 2. — It having been previously demonstrated, by 
 the Laws of our Exterior Modifications laid out in 
 the foregoing Section, that these Modifications are 
 extended ; It becomes conclusive that the External 
 Agent of these is an Extended Agent. 
 
 3. — But, not only is it demonstrated, from the 
 Extension of our Visual Modifications, that every 
 man's own Mind is an Extended Substance ; but
 
 SEC. II.] OF MIND. #; 
 
 we know from Consciousness that every man's 
 mind is a Thinking Substance. And, as we have 
 710 knowledge of any extended substance, except the 
 extended substance of our own Mind, (and, by- 
 indisputable analogy, that of Other Human Minds;) 
 we are bound to conclude that the External Sub- 
 stance whose action or energy occasions our Exte- 
 rior Modifications, inasmuch as this substance 
 ALSO IS EXTENDED, IS a Thinking Substaucc. It 
 is certain that no Newtonian could for a moment 
 deny this conclusion, without thereby forfeiting 
 the Name of a Newtonian. 
 
 It is moreover to be asserted, here, as a conside- 
 ration by the way, that the evidence we have for 
 the conclusion, last laid down, is, of the two, of a 
 higher, or at least a more immediate kind, than 
 that we have for the conclusion that the Minds of 
 other men are extended, like our own. Because, 
 neither are our Exterior Sensations occasioned by 
 any action of the Minds of Other Men ; nor do 
 these last mentioned minds ever come into any 
 immediate physical coiTCspondence with our own 
 mind. And it is certain that, how solid soever is 
 our ground for concluding that the Minds of other 
 men are extended like our own, this conclusion 
 rests upon a mere inference of analogy ; whereas, 
 we are acted upon immediately by a portion and 
 action of the Extended Surface of the Great Exter- 
 nal Alind coMMENsuRATELY with the Superjicial 
 Extension of the Sensations which it calls up in us, — a 
 fact which is universally recognised by those, 
 even, who believe the External Agent to be Dead 
 Man. G
 
 50 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. ii. 
 
 Matter : for there has existed no difference 
 among Philosophers (Berkeleians and other Extra- 
 vagants excepted) with regard to the fact that the 
 Great External Agent is eMended; and the only 
 existing difference has been upon the question, 
 Whether Extended Bodj/ is Matter, or Mind? 
 Now, the last mentioned question is laid for ever 
 at rest, unless the Laws of the Interlhiiitations of our 
 Visual Sensations can be impeached: For, nothing- 
 short of this can ever disturb the Physiology of the 
 Human Mind; or shake that basis of Physical 
 Theology which is founded upon it. 
 
 As, however, the analogy of the General Phy- 
 siological Structure of the Minds of Other Human 
 Beings, and of all such of the Inferior Animals as 
 are actuated by sensations o/' Color, or of Touch, 
 to that of each man's own mind, is the considera- 
 tion which, of the two, may appear to be the more 
 immediately forcible upon the conviction of ordi- 
 nary persons ; it appears to be cogent, here, to 
 enter into a consideration of the e.vtent of induction 
 which we have of the Extension of Mind in the 
 case of the endless millions of Human, and of 
 other Animal Beings, which, in their successive 
 generations, cover the face of the earth. It is be- 
 yond a doubt, then, that all the animal Beings 
 on earth, both large and small, are modified by 
 either both, or one, of the Two Species of Sensa- 
 tion just mentioned ; to say which, is to say that 
 all these countless millions of minds which now 
 exist ; and all those millions which went before, 
 and shall follow after them on earth ; are so many
 
 SKC. II.] OF MIND. m 
 
 portions of what may be called a Vast Ocean of 
 Extended Minds, — an Ocean of Minds so Vast, 
 that, at each existing moment of time, it may be 
 said to form a close-set Stratum or Covering over the 
 Whole of our Terraqueous Globe. Nor can we refuse 
 to e.vteml this fact, by analogy, to the Surfaces of 
 All Other Earths and Stars. The reader, therefore, 
 is required to contemplate the fact, (for a demon- 
 strated fact we have seen it is in the case of our 
 aim mind,) that the Whole Envelop of the Uni- 
 verse, wherever there is Earth or Star, is One Vast 
 Congregated mass of Extended Minds ; to which, 
 the innumerable sustaining Orbs of Creation serve 
 as a support. And, then, let him ask himself, as 
 A Newtonian Philosopher, Whether he can le- 
 gitimatelij entertain a doubt that Extension, where- 
 soever, and whensoever, it is manifested by the 
 act of any Being, must be an Attribute of Mind ? 
 In putting which question to himself, he must, as 
 a Newtonian, recollect that he proceeds upon the 
 principle, (which for the sake of the ordinary 
 reader I shall speak more about presently,) that 
 not one instance of a detection of solid Body has ever 
 come in his tvai/ to break the uniformity of the 
 INDUCTION that MiND and Extension have 
 always been found together. And, along 
 with this, he will take in the additional considera- 
 tion, that. Mind being demonstrated to have Ex- 
 tension, there could be no possible Use in a Third 
 Agent, of the Nature of Matter ; since Mind itself 
 possesses that Attribute by which all physical action 
 can be carried 07i.
 
 52 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. ii. 
 
 In order that a reader should be at all adequately 
 impressed with the truth of the aggregate magni- 
 tude (so to speak) of the Ocean of Mental Exten- 
 sion which exists upon the surface of our own 
 Globe, it is requisite he should be aware that, 
 besides all the perceptible animal Beings on Earth, 
 the whole Sea and Lower Atmosphere, not to say- 
 Animal and Vegetable Bodies, are full of Animals 
 that are imperceptible; inasmuch, that E.vtended 
 Mimls make up a real sphere enveloping this, and 
 in all probability every other globe, generally 
 speaking. 
 
 It remains to be called to attention here, in order 
 to assist the conception of the reader, that, had 
 MANKIND BEEN BORN with a knowledge that Red, 
 Blue, Yellow, &c. and their various Inter limitations y 
 are Modifications of their own Minds, and are not 
 coverings adhering to the outsides of distant bodies ; 
 they must, in that case, have recognised Exten- 
 sion ajid Figure as being attributes of Mind only ; 
 and they never could have conceived such a thing 
 as Dead Matter. This result may, at first sight, 
 appear to ordinary persons to be not altogether 
 obvious : But it may be affirmed, with the utmost 
 confidence, that 7io other result could have occurred 
 in the human mind, in the case supposed. There 
 is no person, who is competent to the subject, who 
 will for an instant deny this conclusion, after hav- 
 ing given the premises a due consideration. 
 
 To this consideration may be added ; although 
 it is granted, here, that authority can be no autho- 
 rity in a Treatise of Science ; yet, considering the
 
 SEC. II.] OF MIND. 
 
 nature of the science in question, I think we could 
 not in the present case, with any justice, leave out 
 of our contemplation the Conclusion of the Ancient 
 Asiatic Philosophers, as reported by Sir William 
 Jones, concurred in by the Greeks, and not denied 
 by the most profound of the Modern Europeans, 
 — namely — that "all spirit is homogeneous; 
 " that the Spirit of God is in kind the same ivith that 
 " of man, and that, as material substance is mere illu- 
 *' sion, there exists in this Universe only one Generic 
 " Spiritual Substance, the sole cause, e^cient, sub- 
 ** stantial, and formal, of all appearances whatever, 
 ** but endowed in the highest degree luith sublime pro- 
 ** vidential wisdom.'" But, if this conclusion be 
 admitted ; it, of itself alone, decides the question 
 in the affirmative (jndependentlij of the JVewtonian 
 argument above insisted upon,) that. As our oiv7i 
 Minds are demonstrated to be Extended, the In- 
 finite Mind must be concluded to be the like. 
 
 Along with what has been advanced, it is a great 
 ground of confirmation on the Subject, (as was hint- 
 ed a little back,) that Natural Philosophy has, 
 during the last two Centuries, or throughout its 
 whole progress until the present moment, been ad- 
 vancing uniformly, from the opposite direction, to 
 meet the conclusions of Physical Theology. In a 
 word; Natural Philosophers, one and all, are 
 agreed with the utmost confidence, that 0)ie Par- 
 ticle of Solid Alatter lias never been discovered in Na- 
 ture; although Matter has reigned, from the earliest 
 times, in a Definition. Together with this, is to be 
 taken the fact that, although the Solidity of Body is
 
 54 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. ii. 
 
 universally denied, yet the Ei'tension of it has 
 never been either denied or questioned, except in 
 the extravagance of the Berkeleian Metaphysics. 
 All Philosophers agree to consider Body as made 
 up of Spheres of attraction and repulsion, round a 
 centre of some sort. Hence, although no fact of 
 real contact, between the supposed Solid centres of 
 Bodies, is ever discovered ; yet, w^hen two Bodies 
 (as for example two billiard balls) meet, it is im- 
 possible to doubt that there is a real contact between 
 the Outer Spheres of Repulsion of each Body. The 
 endeavour of the Reideians, therefore, to invalidate 
 the doctrine of Locke and of Newton — namely — 
 that all Bodies, — and all Minds also, — act upon one 
 another by impulse, — is one of the most bottomless 
 attempts that ever sunk under a Philosopher. Is 
 it possible, then, that any competent and unpre- 
 judiced person can hesitate to pronounce the belief 
 in Solid Body to be no other than a prejudice, 
 which must never any longer be entailed upon the 
 understanding of any person above the lowest 
 vulgar ? 
 
 Of the Origin of Physical Theology. 
 
 It is here an object for the consideration of Re- 
 ligionists, and equally of those who would oppose 
 Religion, that they never before had for their 
 contemplation the Kind of Theology which is 
 founded in the Laws of our Visual Interlimitations. 
 For it is certain that no such thing is presented.
 
 SEC. II.] . OF MIND. 55 
 
 either in the Berkeleian Scheme of Detached and 
 Permanent Substantive Ideas ; or in the Scheme 
 of Malebranche, which supposes us to perceive 
 the Ideas of the Divine Mind ; any more than in 
 the Reideian Scheme, which assumes that we 
 perceive Matter, or its Quantities, by inspiration. 
 At the same time, it is proper to observe that, the 
 Speculations of Berkeley and of Malebranche, 
 respectively, however visionary they were as to 
 fact, are sufficient vouchers to Religionists, that 
 any proofs of the Spirituality of Body must be alto- 
 gether congenial v^ith the tenets of the Roman, 
 and equally of the Protestant Religion ; as it cer- 
 tainly is with the Mosaic account of Creation. 
 
 It is, indeed, an essential consideration for every 
 Religionist, who has any tincture of Philosophy, 
 that the Theological Ground in question annihi- 
 lates, in the most complete and beautiful manner, 
 that of the Greek Atheists, in the most stubborn and 
 insuperable of all their maxims — namely — that. Out 
 of N^othing, Nothing can come. Along with which 
 maxim, they coupled a belief in the evidence of 
 Matter. And, from these two tenets, taken to- 
 gether, it obviously followed that Matter must be 
 eternal, necessary, and indcpoident of any Creator. 
 Or, in other words, they made that creed serve 
 for a justification of Atheism. And certain it is 
 that, no assumption was ever more revolting to 
 human reason, according to Philosophers of every 
 age, than that of a Creation of Matter out of 
 NotJiing, that is if wc suppose matter to accord to 
 its Usual De/inilion. But, when we turn from De-
 
 56 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. ii. 
 
 FINED Matter, to contemplate the Philosophical 
 conclusion of the Spirituality of Body ; an act 
 of creation out of nothing ceases to have any mi/steri/ 
 in it: the word — Creation — herein importing 
 
 PURELY AN ENERGISING o/" i/ze INTELLIGENT FiRST 
 
 Cause upon Himself and upon Finite Minds, — a 
 fact which Dr. Clarke (even without knowing the 
 Laws of Vision) had deemed supposable. Such an 
 Acting, or Energising, moreover, it is to be insisted, 
 is a TRUE REAL Creation, i}i the strictest sense of 
 that term : because Every Sensation and Thought, 
 Every Energy, and Every Action, of every Being ; 
 each of all which energies is Only a Modification of 
 some Being ; is an Essence which comes absolutely 
 out of notliing, and returns to nothing again unless 
 it be continued by some adequate Power. Such 
 is the Universe which (according to the Prin- 
 ciples of Physical Theology above laid down) God 
 created around us ; but which we never per- 
 ceive, and which we know only from a collection of 
 our reason : Such, the Sun and the Earth, and all 
 other Stars and Earths, and the Bodies of all Men 
 and Animals; all which have No Substance but 
 Me SUPPORTING Spirit which energised in those 
 modifications which ice call by the name of Stars 
 and Earths, and the Creation of which will last so 
 long as He shall continue those acts of energising. 
 For, to CREATE, and to energise, mean one same 
 thing. 
 
 It is deserving of remark, how closely the Mosaic 
 account conforms to this deduction from the Prin- 
 ciples in question.
 
 SEO. 11.] OF MIND. #^ 
 
 Thus : — *' By the Word of the Lord were the 
 " heavens made ; and all the Host of them by the 
 '* Breath of His Mouth." 
 
 " In the beginning God created the" (substance 
 of) ''heaven and the" (substance of) " earth." 
 
 *' And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of 
 '* the waters." 
 
 When we consider that, this account was deli- 
 vered in a language almost insuperably figurative ; 
 and this to a people so ignorant of physical science 
 that their imagination must have revolted against 
 any assertion that Stocks and Stones are not Solid 
 Material Things ; it manifests, instead of any dis- 
 crepancy, a very wonderful congruity, with the 
 Physiology of Mind laid down in the foregoing 
 pages. 
 
 And if we take in otlier features of the Mosaic 
 History ; the result is equally compatible with it. 
 
 Thus : 
 
 " And the Lord God formed man of the dust of 
 " the ground." 
 
 That is, — Of those Minute Energies of the Deity, 
 which we call, (and which he designed, in a state 
 of knowledge such as that which the Jews were 
 in, that we should call, and believe to be,) dust of the 
 earth, he formed the Bodij of Man : — After which, 
 it figuratively says, — "God breathed into his nos- 
 *' trils the breath of life." 
 
 Again : 
 
 ** Shall the dust praise thee ; Shall it declare 
 '' thy truth." 
 
 That is, — When God pleases to discontinue that 
 ]\Ian. n
 
 58 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. ii. 
 
 Compages of his Minute Energies, which we vul- 
 garly call Dust of the Earth so long as they constitute 
 a Human Body; and, by that discontinuation , leaves 
 a Human Mind in a state of oblivious rest, owing to 
 its being no longer actuated from without ; Shall 
 
 THOSE ANNIHILATED ENERGIES p'«i,se ThcC '. Shall 
 
 they declare Thy truth? — And, What question 
 could have been more cogent, than this ? For En- 
 ergies are 7iot Beings ; and far less are they Minds 
 07^ Intelligent Beings ; and How, then, could these 
 Things praise their Creator, even during their ex- 
 istence ; any more than Dust of the Earth, if such 
 a thing existed, could praise Him. Upon either 
 supposition, it is self-evident that Minds only can 
 praise, or dispraise. 
 
 The instances given above are intended merely 
 as hints, to show how the Mosaic account, in gene- 
 ral, may be explained as well upon the foregoing 
 Principles of Physical Theology, as upon the ex- 
 ploded Hypothesis of Dead Matter. 
 
 It may, indeed, be repeated here, on account of 
 its importance for the satisfaction of Religionists, 
 that, from the Speculations, respectively, of Male- 
 branche, Berkeley, and others, there cannot exist 
 a doubt that the present Physical Theology is per- 
 fectly consonant with the Hebrew Scriptures. 
 
 These observations, on the congruity of the Mo- 
 saic History with Philosophy, may be closed by 
 the remark that, any attempt to interpret that 
 History by the Hypothesis of Dead Matter, — even 
 had that Hypothesis not been exploded by the 
 Physiological Principles laid down, — would for
 
 SEC. II.] OF MIND. 
 
 ever prove the most deeply baneful to the cause of 
 Religion that could be essayed. In proof of this ; 
 I note the fact here, that the Christian Philosopher 
 and Founderof the Inductive Logic, — Lord Bacon 
 — was as much revolted at the Creation of Matter 
 (he taking it to be Dead Matter) out of nothing, as 
 were the Greek Atheists themselves ; insomuch 
 that, he emphatically says, it is to be taken on 
 *' Faith." And it is for all persons well to weigh 
 the fact, that, as long as all the Intellectual Classes 
 of mankind shall agree, with Locke and the Illus- 
 trious Churchmen who took the same ground, to 
 build their Religious belief upon a basis of Philo- 
 sophy ; (which will be as long as Philosophy shall 
 exist ;) their understandings will insuperably war 
 in utter hostilitij against the Vulgar acceptation of 
 the Word Matter, when coupled with an assertion 
 of its Creation; and the least evil result of this 
 must be that. Atheists will derive a real triumph 
 from their dilemma. 
 
 Of the Hindoo Physical Theology. 
 
 The only supposition of a Physical Theology, 
 concerning which it can be a question, Whether it 
 may, or may not, have existed at any period prior 
 to the Origin of that above-stated, is that of the 
 Ancient Hindoos. But, from the single ray of light 
 which has penetrated the gloom of ages, on this 
 point, it is impossible to decide upon it. The Hin- 
 doo Tenet ; which asserts that " The whole of Ore-
 
 GO PHYSIOLOGY [sec. ii. 
 
 " ation is leather an energy^ than a work, hy ivhich 
 ** the infinite mind, ivhich is present at all times, and 
 '* in all places, eidiibits to his creatures a set of per - 
 ** ceptions, like a ivonderf id picture or piece of music, 
 " always varied, yet always uniform;'" — may, with 
 some allowance, be interpreted two ways. It may 
 be supposed to coincide with the result of the 
 Laws of Primary Vision ; which prove that we 
 NEVER PERCEIVE the Woiks of External Creation ; 
 but PERCEIVE ONLY our oivn Modijications, and then 
 INFER the e.vistence of the Qualities of the External 
 Bodies of Creation fwn a collection or process of 
 reasoning. Or, if the Hindoo Tenet be taken to 
 the letter, it must be thought to coincide with the 
 Scheme of Malebranche ; which last, however, was 
 most certainly visionary. The most reasonable 
 conjecture seems to me to be, that the Laws of 
 Primary Vision were knoivn to the founders of the 
 Hindoo Theology ; and that, in their recent origin, 
 these Laws have only suffered a revival, after having 
 been for so many ages lost to mankind. Uncer- 
 tainty must for ever rest over this conjecture. 
 But, if the above supposition be made, (and I am 
 freely ready to grant it, as a thing probable,) then, 
 the Hindoo Tenet amounts, in substance, to this — 
 namely — that the External Extended Intelli- 
 gent Cause of our Sensual Modifications, which 
 Cause ive never perceive, but leam its e.vistence, and 
 qualities, and operations, f^om our reason, " is rather 
 *' an energy, than a work, by which the infinite 
 " mind, which is present at all times, and in all 
 " places, exhibits to his creatures a set of percep-
 
 SEC. II.] OF MIND. Gl 
 
 " tions, like a wonderful picture or piece of music, 
 " always varied, yet always uniform." 
 
 I have dwelt upon this Hindoo Tenet, more par- 
 ticularly here, in order to show in what way it may 
 be applied and reconciled ; because I know not 
 any object, in the Science of Mind, that can com- 
 pare in importance with that of its furnishing a de- 
 monstrable Natural Theology. And here it is 
 plain that, according to the interpretation last sup- 
 posed, the " perceptio/is'' which the Deity by means 
 of his Energies " exhibits to" (perhaps the Tenet 
 might originally have meant called up in) his 
 creatures, are terceptions of their Own Mo- 
 difications. It is at the same time certain, from 
 the Laws of Vision, that the Hindoo Theology 
 cannot be true upon any other interpretation ; but 
 must involve a vast fallacy, coinciding with that 
 of Malebranche. 
 
 There are two other possible suppositions on 
 this question ; each of which, indeed, carries some 
 appearance of probability. First ; Supposing the 
 Laws of Vision were known to the Ancient Hin- 
 doos, they might, still, have fallacionslij believed, 
 from them, that we discern EMernal Objects, in 
 the way supposed by Malebranche. And this is 
 rendered probable by the fact, that the profoundly 
 erudite, acute, and metaphysical Dr. Parr, al- 
 though he knew and assented to the Laws of Vision, 
 mistakingly attributed to me the belief that " the 
 " Deity is visible in his works."" Secondlif : The An- 
 cient Hindoos might have had no knowledge of the 
 Laws of Vision ; but may have proceeded upon
 
 62 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. ii. 
 
 the saine extent of evhkncc, that we perceive only 
 our own extended Modifications, which Locke in- 
 sisted upon. If this last supposition was the fact ; 
 it follows that, the ground of their proceeding was 
 perfectly solid : but, only, they wanted that ex- 
 tent and kind of proof of it which constitutes Sci- 
 ence, and forbids the attempts of schismatics. 
 
 But, whatever was the fact of the precise specific 
 nature of the Hindoo Tenet ; One consideration is 
 to be held up, here, as calling most loudly upon 
 the attention of the learned, and of all persons, in 
 our own age and quarter of the globe ; which is 
 the SUBLIMITY, as well as the truth, of its more 
 GENERAL nature — namely — that, the External 
 Cause of our Exterior Sensations, {being extended 
 like those Sensations,) — is a Sentient and Intel- 
 ligent, as well as an extended Substance. This 
 truth is the common philosophical deduction, arising 
 alike from the Hindoo Tenet ivhatever it was in 
 detail, and from the Laws of Vision. And, there- 
 fore. Let every person, of any pretension to general 
 knowledge, well reflect upon this coincidence, 
 especially when they consider, as they are bound 
 to do, the Source from which the Hindoo Tenet is 
 derived. It is beyond dispute that the Philosophy 
 of Hindostan is older than that of the Greeks. 
 And few will deny that the Greek Philosophers 
 derived their knowledge from that Quarter. There 
 appears no improbability that the former existed, 
 even, antecedently to the Deluge. And, what is 
 of far greater weight in the subject, it is an unde-
 
 SEC. II.] OF MIND. 63 
 
 niable truth that the Tenet in question made part 
 of a Body of General Science, the remains of which 
 prove it to have amounted to a very great height 
 of intellectual attainment. One should think that 
 the slightest degree of reflection, upon such consi- 
 derations, must serve sufficiently to rouse the at- 
 tention of every man of education to a lively sense 
 of the debasement which it presents, when viewed 
 in contrast with the foregoing sublime deduction, 
 to find Modern Metaphysicians immersed in the 
 belief of a Dead Material World in consequence of 
 that creed's having been adopted by the early 
 Greek Atomists, — a Creed which was notoriously 
 rich in the production of Atheism among the 
 Greeks themselves of those ages, — and which has 
 sufficiently germinated, in the same way, in modern 
 times. It is quite certain that Philosophers 
 have not adopted the belief in Matter from the 
 Mosaic History, in any age : but have derived it 
 from the source above-mentioned, always backed, 
 of course, by the natural bias of the species to ac- 
 cept it. And when, to this comparatively small 
 and trifling extent of Atheism, we add the eftect of 
 the introduction of Materialism mio Asia ; which 
 innovation, of its day, has for many ages deluged 
 the Population of all China, and that of a great 
 part of India, under one common ocean of a most 
 demoralising belief i/2 No Power except Matter; 
 What fatuity must it be, if any extent of reflection 
 on such facts can fail to rouse us to a sense of their 
 magnitude, and sure tendency. 
 
 In general, there is a strong tendency in the
 
 64 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. ii. 
 
 human mind, in the case of those who are at all 
 raised above the mass of the species, to think aloof 
 from the Vulgar. This tendency, proceeding from 
 innate human vanity, is too often manifested upon 
 very trifling and ridiculous occasions ; and not 
 seldom upon utterly groundless ones. Wonderful 
 must it then be, if the better informed classes 
 should not be struck by a sense of the vulgarism 
 which is yielded to, — (for a vulgarism it most cer- 
 tainly is, and no better,)— when they tolerate the 
 belief in Matter, in the Atheistical sense of that 
 word. 
 
 It has already been adduced, that Natural Phi- 
 losophy, since the time of Newton, has been ad- 
 vancing with a uniform pace to explode this vulgar 
 notion of Matter. But, while this great end was 
 thus effecting in Natural Science ; the Metaphysical 
 enterprise of Dr. Reid was set on foot, to restore, 
 upon alledged Pneumatological ground, that basis of 
 Atheism which was already, in fact, exploded upon 
 Physical. • , 
 
 The attempt of Dr. Reid, in effect to counteract 
 all the advances of Natural Philosophy in its pro- 
 ving the Immateriality of Body, — an attempt by 
 which the Reideian School has lamentably, as well 
 as most fallaciously, been only laboring to prop up 
 the cause of Atheism ; although it is to be admit- 
 ted that the Writers in question were purely free 
 from any such mischievous intention ; — was one 
 which has been marked by a greater extent and 
 variety of striking inconsistency and absurdity, as
 
 SEC. Ji.] OF MIND. 
 
 well as with greater despotism of unproved assump- 
 tion, than were ever found united in any scheme 
 of speculation, that I am aware of. An account 
 of the manner of the Conversion of Reid, from the 
 Berkeleian Scheme of Ideas, is far too important 
 to the advancement of the subject not to claim a 
 distinct place in the sequel of this treatise. But 
 his procedure with regard to the doctrine of a 
 JSIaterial World cannot be passed over in silence, 
 in this place, since it must operate so strongly upon 
 the judgment of whomsoever shall attend to it 
 along with what has been stated above. 
 
 Dr. Reid, in his ** Inquiry," assures us that, 
 '* The belief in a material world is older, and of 
 " more authority, than any principles of Philoso- 
 ** phy. It declines the tribunal of reason, and 
 '* laughs at all the artillery of the logician. It re- 
 " tains its sovereign authority in spite of all the 
 " edicts of philosophers ; and reason itself must 
 ** stoop to its orders." — The '^edicts ofphilosophei's" 
 here meant, are the edicts oi tivo j)hilosophcrs only 
 — namely — Berkeley and Hume. And, unfor- 
 tunately for the philosophical fame of Dr. Reid, he 
 little knew, when he was uttering the above ex- 
 ulting proclamation, that, soon after, a light was to 
 break in upon Europe from the East, to show that 
 '* Reason" had led millions of mankind, during 
 many ages, to a discernment of the truth that a belief 
 in Matter is no other than a natural bias in unphilo- 
 sophical men ; and that millions of men living in 
 those Countries, in his own time, retained this 
 very same creed of reason. 
 
 Man. I
 
 GG PHYSIOLOGY [sec. ii. 
 
 But the case of Dr. Reid, with regard to the 
 above-mentioned effusion, does not end here : For 
 it is marked by a feature which is still more un- 
 fortunate for his fame as a Philosopher. In his 
 '* Essays," in describing the Berkeleian Theory, 
 he, with very laudable sincerity, says — *' I once 
 " believed this doctrine of ideas so firmlij, as to em- 
 " brace the whole of Berkeley s system in consequence 
 " of it ; till finding other consequences to follow 
 *' from it, which gave me more uneasiness than 
 " the want of a material world," &c.^ — (The conse- 
 quence, which so alarmed him, was Mr. Hume's 
 Pyrrhonic Bugbear about the non-existence of both 
 Body and Mind : but this is of no moment here.) 
 Now it is certain that Dr. Reid could not have been 
 under the age of manhood, when he ** embraced the 
 " ivhole System of Berkeley. "" And, if a belief in a 
 Alaterial World is a Law of our Nature, ''supe- 
 " rior to Logic, and to Reason f' How, then, was 
 Dr. Reid, at the age of manhood, enabled to break 
 through this Law of Nature, and to join the standard 
 of Berkeley against her? And, still farther than 
 this ; after Dr. Reid had so apostatised from the 
 Law of Nature, and had remained some time in a 
 state of rebellion against her; How could he think 
 that Nature would ever pardon such a step, 
 although some other power had made him return 
 to her School ? 
 
 Is the Intellectual Character of this Country 
 to be ridden over ; and to be trodden down be- 
 neath a chaos of inconsistencies made up by such 
 a floundering in speculation as has assumed the
 
 SEC. II.] OF MIND. 
 
 garb of Philosophy in these Counter-apostacies of 
 Dr. Reid? — That he must have believed in Matter 
 when a boi/, is certain ; because all the boys that 
 ever were born have done the same. First, then, he 
 DID believe in Matter. — And, then, he did not 
 believe in it: — And then again, he did believe in 
 it ! ! ! And this is philosophy ! 
 
 After so remarkable an exposure of the philoso- 
 phical inconstancy of Dr. Reid, in which he has 
 certainly rather resembled a Weather-cock than 
 a Philosopher ; it can hardly be doubted that the 
 lofty tone of unproved assumption with which our 
 alleged j)erception of e.vternal matter or its qualities, 
 and the alleged inexplicability or the man- 
 ner of our perceiving these, has been kept up 
 through the long lives of the two Founders of that 
 Scheme; (in the course of which, the doctrine of 
 Locke and Newton concerning impulse and the 
 pi^esence of things in Causality has been treated with 
 such an aifectation of contempt;) must find its 
 proper value in the general estimation, and can no 
 longer mislead any person of the least degree of 
 competency in the subject, especially since it has 
 been in the end consummated by Professor Stew- 
 art's acknowledgment that the manner of our 
 perceiving is not inexplicable. But the method 
 OF philosophising of the School of Reid is too 
 exceptionable, to leave it without more particular 
 animadversion in the sequel of this volume : be- 
 cause, if the present state of Pneumatological Sci- 
 ence should not be rendered herein so manifestly 
 imperative upon our own Countrymen, as to rouse 
 them to a due sense of what is at stake ; it must
 
 68 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. ii. 
 
 be left to the Men of other Nations to rescue Phi- 
 losophy from the disgrace, and Mankind from the 
 miseries, with which the error is pregnant. 
 
 Why such discredit should await the Country 
 which gave birth to Locke, — Why the future Phi- 
 losophers of France, or of any other Country, 
 should snatch from us the lead in shaking off the 
 philosophical ignominy which will at no distant 
 time attach to a belief in Matter, — I think it is 
 impossible to say. The strongest reason against 
 our emancipation from this belief is, the vulgar 
 prejudice arising from our early natural bias. The 
 next strongest reason, is this same prejudice. — ■ 
 And the third reason, again, is this prejudice. — 
 And there is no other than a repetition of this 
 same reason, if we should go on asking, to infinity. 
 In fact, No other reason has been claimed 
 for this belief by either Reid or Des Cartes, — its 
 tioo principal advocates, and the only advocates who 
 have ever attempted to assign a reason for it. It 
 would be just as philosophical, that is it would be 
 the very same sort and depth of fallacy, never to be- 
 lieve the evidence of our Touch, backed by all the 
 evidences of the application of the thing in the Arts, 
 that a strait plank, seen part under water, is in 
 reality strait, because our Eyes seem to us never 
 to proclaim it as being other than crooked; as it is 
 to believe, from the fallacy of our early natural 
 bias, that Body is Material. There is no jot of 
 difference in unreason, between the profound fal- 
 lacy of the case here first supposed, and the popu- 
 lar error of the last. 
 
 In fine : It has followed, from the Physiological
 
 SEC. II.] OF MIND. 69 
 
 Laws of our Sensations, that Pneumatology has 
 joined hands with the Facts of Natural Philoso- 
 phy, to proscribe the belief in Matter as being a 
 Badge of Prejudice and a Reproach to a Philoso- 
 phical Nation. And Natural Philosophers freely 
 admit, from the facts, that Matter is nothing 
 BUT A Phenomenon. Then Where (one is tempt- 
 ed to ask) can be the actuating motive or interest, 
 any more than the reason, for tolerating such a 
 reproach as this : which, so long as it shall be 
 borne, must stamp the Philosophers of Europe, in 
 their character of Pneumatologists, as being dark 
 and barbarous when compared with those Sequest- 
 ered, Contemplative, and Sublime Intellects, 
 which. Four Thousand Years ago, or at a still 
 earlier date, from the depths of a profound ab- 
 straction, led the understandings of the Millions 
 who occupied a large proportion of the Earth, in a 
 united and holy acknowledgement of the Physical 
 Operations of the Deity, upon their Own and 
 other Finite Minds ? 
 
 That the Human Intellect has not degenerated 
 in POWER, since that epoch, is certain. If, there- 
 fore, it be sunk at all ; it is from being seduced 
 by, and absorbed in, the transitory concerns of an 
 advanced community ; most of which are mixed 
 up, and identified, with those Arts in which sup- 
 posed Matter and its operations make the sum of ex- 
 istence. It was this All-sufficiency of supposed 
 Matter that broke in upon the Fabric of the Hin- 
 doo Theology ; and overran a large proportion of 
 the regions which were adorned by its sublime
 
 70 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. ii. 
 
 Tenet. And it is impossible for any deeply-re- 
 flecting mind, after due consideration of the whole 
 subject, to entertain a doubt that the progress of 
 Pliysical Science, unless it be accompanied by a 
 consistent co-operation with the Physiology of 
 Mind, will, sooner or later, produce a similar de- 
 vastation in the intellectual character of European 
 nations. 
 
 In the existing State of the Subject, at this mo- 
 ment. Nothing seems to require being other than it 
 is in result of the agreement between Pneumato- 
 logy and Physical Science, except one, — namely — 
 
 a UNIVERSAL APATHY OU the SubjCCt. 
 
 Of the E.vtent and Limits of Physical Theology. 
 
 To resume our Science, here : Having laid down 
 its Principles ; it is proper to point out the limits 
 of its extent and application . 
 
 Physical Theology, then, as delineated above, 
 constitutes a Third Distinct Demonstration of the 
 Existence and Nature of the Deity; in addition to 
 TWO OTHERS, whicli had before obtained. And 
 Each of the Three is altogether different in 
 KIND FROM, arid entirely independent of, the other 
 two. 
 
 The First, which may be mentioned of these, on 
 account of its more diffuse ground and requisite 
 extent of expatiation, is that which is called Na- 
 tural Theology ; and is comprised in our appre- 
 hension of the Power, the Wisdom, and the Good-
 
 SEC. II.] OF MIND. 71 
 
 ness, of God, as displayed in the Laws of his 
 Providence. The Second, is comprised in the cele- 
 brated " De:monstration— rt priori, — of the Ne- 
 cessary Existence and Attributes of God," as 
 laid out in the Argument of Dr. Clarke. And the 
 Third is founded upon the Laws of the Interlimi- 
 tation of our Exterior Sensations, as laid down in 
 the First Section of this Manual. 
 
 That each of these is altogether different in kind 
 from, and independent of, the other, is a truth 
 which must be perfectly manifest. Each, there- 
 fore, is in fact a Theology of and by itself. The 
 Demonstration by Clarke is a demonstration — a 
 priori — founded upon Two Facts — namely — that 
 Sojnething ( — namely — External Body) noiu exists ; 
 and that Space, also, is an Existing Thing or 
 Reality : Li which argument of Clarke, it is plain, 
 we have nothing at all to do with the Internal 
 Laws of our Sensations themselves. — Physical The- 
 ology, on the other hand, being founded in the 
 Laws of the Interliniitation of our Sensations them- 
 selves, has nothing to do with a demonstration of 
 the Necessary existence of Any External 
 Cause of these Sensations. And, lastly. Moral 
 Theology is founded in arguments which have 
 nothing to do with the evidences of either of the 
 former. All these assertions with respect to the 
 Subjects in question, however, are to be limited by 
 special considerations, and by an admission of a cer- 
 tain connection between the whole three. 
 
 Every one of these Three Arguments, therefore, 
 must undeniably be admitted to be of great impor-
 
 7-2 PHYSIOLOGT [sec. ii. 
 
 tance, inasmuch as three mdependent grounds of 
 a Knowledge of the Existence and Attributes of 
 the Deity must be proportionately more desirable 
 than one. 
 
 The foregoing distinctions, between the three 
 Subjects in question, being pointed out ; it remains 
 to speak of their respective claims and extent, in 
 comparison with each other ; and to point out their 
 different lines of demarcation. This must be a 
 matter of very material importance, to those whom 
 the subjects concern. 
 
 The " Demonstration a prion' by Clarke, then, 
 (as is expressly and duly acknowledged by its 
 Author) does not extend so far as to indicate that 
 the Necessary First Cause of Things is an Intel- 
 ligent Cause : And the proofs of Intelligence, in 
 that Cause, are properly assigned over to the 
 evidence — a posteriori — manifested in the works of 
 Creation. At the same time, the Demonstration 
 a priori has this much against it, at least in the 
 opinion of some, — namely — that it can be deemed 
 cogent by those only who do not deny the reality 
 of Space. Accordingly, it will form a material 
 feature in a subsequent section of this Manual, to 
 insist upon the Reality of Space, and to point out, 
 beyond what I have done on a former occasion, 
 the fallacious reasoning of the opponents of that 
 reality. On account of the objection against the 
 '' DemonstrationJ' now adverted to, (although it is 
 certainly no objection in my opinion,) I conceive, 
 our apprehension of the Laws of the Interlimita- 
 tion of our Sensations, inasmuch as these Laws com-
 
 SKc. II.] OF MIND. 7:4 
 
 prise very peculiar proofs of the Reality of Llvtensioyi, 
 must form a requisite preparation for the study of 
 Dr. Clarke's Demonstration — a priori, — especially 
 for those who would otherwise incline to deny the 
 Reality of Space. At any rate, the object and 
 force of the So-called Argu7ne)it — a priori, — as far 
 as that argument is managed a priori, — is only to 
 prove the Necessary Existence and Indepen- 
 dence of the First Cause, without meddling with 
 its Intelligence, and far less with its Goodness. 
 
 With regard, in the next place, to the Physical 
 Theology founded in the Laws of Vision ; it is un- 
 deniably of this farther extent, when compared 
 with that of the So-called Argument a priori, that 
 its general conclusions certainly comprehend not 
 only the Existence, but also the Intelligence of 
 the External Cause : Although, upon the other 
 hand, it does not go to comprehend a proof of his 
 Eternal or Necessary existence. Beyond this, 
 it is not only manifestly comprehended, in the 
 analogy which we must infer between the nature 
 of our own Mind and that of the External Living- 
 Being which actuates us, that he must be an In-»' 
 telligent — that is an Intellectual — Being; 
 but, also, it is manifest that he is a Moral Being: 
 of which truth, our Pleasures and Pains of Exterior 
 Sensation are a proof. It is, at the same time, to 
 be granted that, the Moral Nature of the Deity is 
 proved only very Umitedly and indefinitely by the 
 Laws of our Sensations. And more extensive and 
 definite proofs of that Nature are certainly desirable. 
 
 Lastly, then, we approach to that Natural The- 
 Man. K
 
 74 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. ii. 
 
 ology which is built upon a moral consideration of 
 the Laws and Dispensations of Providence — that 
 is— the Laws and Economy of Nature,— as mani- 
 fest in the whole discernable Universe. Upon the 
 extent and merits of this Department of the Sub- 
 ject, it is neither relevant to Physical Theology, 
 nor here intended, to enter : While it will not be 
 supposed that its cogency, or importance, is here 
 at all meant to be depreciated, since it is in this 
 Department we are to seek for that plenary evi- 
 dence of the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of 
 God, which neither the Demonstration a priori, nor 
 Physical Theology as above laid down, can afford 
 to us. 
 
 To complete this Demarcation of the Subjects 
 in question, there is one consideration to be stated ; 
 which is of especial moment to Religionists : — 
 namely— that Physical Theology, as founded in 
 the Laws of our Sensations, by its exploding and 
 proscribing for ever the prejudice and belief of 
 Matter; which prejudice and belief are admitted 
 both by the Demonstration of Clarke and by all Na- 
 tural Theologists ; presents an insurmountable 
 barrier against the attempts of Atheism. It is on 
 THIS account that the Physical Argument is espe- 
 cially urged, for the consideration of all who are 
 concerned : For, never can a belief of a Cre- 
 ation q/'*S'w^^^^;?five il/<7?^er (that is a bringing of 
 Substance out of Nothing) ei'ist in the mindoi a Sound 
 Philosopher, as a Philosophical belief: a?id, 
 never can an Atheist exist, icho does not believe 
 in the existence o/' Substantive Matter.
 
 SEC. II.] OF MIND. 76 
 
 The nature and limits of this work obviously 
 forbid any enlargement on the subject, other than 
 to prosecute its farther illustrat on in the next 
 Section, by affording a popular illustration of the 
 nature of the Human mind.
 
 7() PHYSIOLOGY [sec. hi. 
 
 SECTION THIRD. 
 
 1. OF OUR THINKING IN COLORS.— 2. THIS 
 FACT APPLIED TO FUliNISH A POPULAR 
 GENERAL CONCEPTION OF THE PHYSIO- 
 LOGICAL CONDITION OF MIND. 
 
 The Piimeiry Phenomena of Vision,— that is to say 
 our Sensations of Colors together with their In- 
 TERLiMiTATioNs, — possess an office in the Human 
 Mind far more comprehensive, than that of their 
 character in being the General Facts of our Imme- 
 diate Visual Perception : For, in addition to this 
 last mentioned character, they are the General 
 Facts that are formative of the Indices, or En- 
 velops, of all our Thoughts ivhatever, with some 
 special and very limited exceptions : Or, in other 
 words, with the limited exceptions just mentioned, 
 it is a general fact of the Human Mind that we 
 THINK IN COLORS. The thing in question amounts 
 in effect to this, — that, in a certain and a very im- 
 portant sense, the Whole Universe of Human 
 Thoughts is co7np7'ehended under the Laws of our Pri- 
 mary Visual Modifications. 
 
 The fact which I thus introduce to the notice of 
 pneumatological readers, and which I propose to 
 enlarge upon as furnishing the means of a popular 
 general conception of the Physiological Condition 
 of the Mind, is a matter which can hardly have 
 escaped the notice of any person, in the single
 
 SEC. III.] OF MIND. 77 
 
 instances of its operation. But, by one of those 
 oversights which have long obstructed the progress 
 of pneumatological science, this fact has never 
 been generalised, or applied to the advancement of 
 philosophij. At the same time, the thing- in ques- 
 tion certainly does not owe its past neglect to any 
 such subtilty (consisting perhaps in the very sim- 
 plicity of its nature) as that which so long pre- 
 vented the detection of the Laws which govern the 
 Phenomena : For it is impossible that the process 
 of our thinking in colors can have escaped notice : 
 and, in every probability, the reason of its having 
 escaped application has been its apparent want of 
 utility. The fact of our thinking in Colors, indeed, 
 how real and comprehensive soever it is, derives 
 its philosophical importance chiefly from its being 
 previously shown to be founded in the analytical 
 Laws of our Visual Modifications, as laid down in 
 the foregoing section. Accordingly, therefore, I 
 have not entertained the subject (beyond merely 
 hinting its existence) in any of my former publica- 
 tions ; although it is manifestly involved in all that 
 I have advanced upon the general subject. And I 
 should have deemed it as promising only an incom- 
 plete efficacy to intioducc it now, were it not from 
 the fact of its being analytically bottomed upon 
 the Laws in question : Without being founded on 
 which sort of proof, the Author of any such 
 Scheme as the Reideian Theory miglit despotically 
 impute the whole matter to a mere " bias of our 
 " nature, originating in an earli/ habit ;" as the 
 Reideian Philosophers heid long done with regard
 
 78 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. hi. 
 
 to the fact of the out-spread nature ofeolor, concern- 
 ing which, an arbitrary denial was kept up until a 
 fortunate accident led to that virtual recantation on 
 the part of Professor Stewart, the documentary 
 history of which is before the public. 
 
 As being preparatory to entering upon what may 
 be called an Induction of the fact first above 
 suggested ; the observations which are immediately 
 to follow, and which may occupy three or four 
 pages, are introduced for a reason which will be 
 explained. They are, indeed, rather for the con- 
 sideration of those who are somewhat more con- 
 versant on the subject, than for that of the general 
 or uninitiated reader. But they are so brief, that 
 they can hardly in any case demand an apology. 
 And, in point of fact, they contain nothing that an 
 ordinary capacity, and ordinary thinking, may not 
 fully apprehend. 
 
 It is an assumption entertained by the almost 
 universal consent of modern writers on the subject 
 of general reasoning, and it is deemed by them as 
 being a necessary condition of such reasoning, that 
 we think in Words or Language. The knowledge 
 of this fact, moreover, is considered as being a dis- 
 covery of modern times ; and it is esteemed as 
 being one of the advances in logical science for 
 which we are indebted to the Philosophers of the 
 last century. Admitting, as I do, that the fact 
 e.rists as a result of inveterate habit, and, indeed, a 
 habit grounded in what may be called a pi'actical we- 
 cessity ; without, at the same time, allowing that
 
 SEC. 111.] OF MIND. 7^> 
 
 it is founded in a necessity that is absolute ; I dis- 
 sent very widely from the import which these phi- 
 losophers have attached to the phrase in question ; 
 and, on account of what is to follow here, I deem 
 it requisite to describe what I apprehend to be the 
 only import which can in reality be attached to the 
 phrase — '* thinking in Language,'' — or to any other 
 phrase employed on the subject with the same 
 intention. My general views, with regard to this 
 Subject, have been unfolded in the Chapter on the 
 Ultimate Philosophy of Signs, in the concluding 
 part of my Analysis of Language :' But it is suffi- 
 cient, for the present occasion, to describe, in the 
 following brief terms, the fact, as coinciding with 
 those views. 
 
 From the beginning of our existence, our ideas 
 of things are so continually associated with the 
 names by which we have learned to signify them, 
 and to hear them signified by, that at length the 
 name will infallibly excite the idea to which it is 
 annexed in our imagination, and, reciprocally, the 
 idea, when it occurs, will as infallibly call up the 
 the name ; in each of which cases, alike, the Name 
 
 ' With a reference to the just admirers of tlie Diversions 
 OF PuRLEY, I take tliis opportunity to say that, I liave en- 
 titled that Analysis Anti-Tooke, not in any spirit of illiberal 
 opposition ; but in order to indicate not only how widely I di- 
 verge frori the views of Mr. Tooke, (after adniitting liis position 
 that all the pa.ts of Speech are resolvable into the Noun and 
 the Verb,) but also to mark the epoch, in the research after 
 the Philosophy ,( Language, at which my own speculations on 
 the subject had their origin.
 
 80 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. hi. 
 
 and the Idta will co-exist in our conception, neither 
 of them having any power either to discharge or 
 to absorb the other. This process, moreover, 
 holds good as well in the case of Classes or Geiie- 
 rals, as it does in those of Individual Objects. From 
 this summary account of the process, therefore, it 
 follows that we do not, properly speaking, think in 
 words or language. And I have shown at some 
 length, in the work above referred to, that« Name 
 never discharges the mind from thinking of the Thing 
 named. The real fact, then, is that we think only 
 WITH OR accompanied BY words or language, 
 that is to say — words are not analogous to oivelops, 
 nor yet to veils, or visors, over the forms or faces 
 (so to speak) of our collected masses of ideas : On 
 the contrary, words are only labels, or marks, analo- 
 gous to tallies attached to articles of goods or furni- 
 ture ; tvhich tallies we vieio at the same time that we 
 do the goods, or thoughts, to which they are at- 
 tached, without either sinking or confounding the 
 one in the other. In my earlier speculations on 
 general reasoning, I gave into the doctrine of the 
 Nominalists to a considerable extent, it appearing 
 to me to be so rational when contrasted with the 
 scheme either of Realism or of Conceptualism. 
 But, even then, I was struck by what I conceived 
 to be a large defect in the tenets of Nominalism. 
 And, since then, having had time to scrutinise the 
 subject, I have been led to adopt that view of it 
 which has been delineated in iTiy Analysis of Lan- 
 guage, under the distinctive name of Pluralism. I 
 have noticed the fact, here, as a due caution, or
 
 SEC. III.] OF MIND. 81 
 
 qualification; or, indeed, as a luicle dissent rather; 
 whenever it may, for any purpose, be affirmed 
 that we think in Language ; by which phrase the 
 Nominahsts design to iiierge every idea of a Class 
 or Number of Individuals, into the Essence of its 
 Name. 
 
 In case it should be objected, that the phraseo- 
 logy of the Writers alluded to does not justify the 
 imputing to them the doctrine of our thinking in 
 colors, as I have expressed it : As, for example, 
 " In treating of Abstraction," (says Professor Stew- 
 art) " I endeavoured to show that we think, as well 
 ** as speak, by means of words." — And again : — 
 
 * While I was engaged,' (says Lavoisier) ' in the 
 
 * composition of my Elements of Chemistry, I per- 
 ' ceived better than I had ever done before, that 
 
 * we think only through the medium of words.' — If 
 such passages as these, I say, should be interpreted 
 as contradicting the doctrine which I have imputed 
 to these Writers ; I reply, without any fear of 
 being confuted, that the doctrine of the Nomina- 
 lists resolves itself into the phrase which I have em- 
 ployed above to characterise it. 
 
 As a test of this, exhibited in one of the fruits of 
 that doctrine in the de])artment of Language ; we 
 find, Mr. Tooke, in his Diversions of Purley, 
 (page 37) condemns his favorite, Locke, in the fol- 
 lowing terms : — " He would not have talked of the 
 *' composition of ideas ; but would have seen that it 
 " was merely a contrivance of language : and that 
 " the only composition was in terms ; and conse- 
 *' qucntly that it was as improper to speak of a 
 ]\Ian. L
 
 82 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. hi. 
 
 *' complex idea, as it would be to call a constellation 
 " a complex star." — Such is the account given of 
 our Ideas, or of the Operations of the Human Mind, 
 by the most approved Philosophical Grainmarian 
 which the world has seen, — an account resulting 
 entirely from his having subscribed to the doctrine 
 of Nominalism. This criticism on the doctrine of 
 Mr. Tooke, in his profess capacity of a Pneumato- 
 logist, must be admitted to be very far from being 
 unimportant to the general subject of the Philo- 
 sophy of Mind. 
 
 As a farther confirmation of my assertion, that 
 the apparent salvo contained in the words — 
 " through the medium of — means nothing ; I remark 
 that, in Professor Stewart's expression of the doc- 
 trine in question, he announces the fact as being 
 anil/ collateral to another general fact still more ob- 
 vious — namely — that we " speak by means of 
 " tvords." The criticism which I feel under the 
 necessity to offer upon this expression of Mr. 
 Stewart, (at the same time that it must curiously 
 bear out my present view of the doctrine of Nomi- 
 nalism,) cannot be without effect in rousing the 
 attention of such readers, as are but little in the 
 subject, to the absurdities which occasionally lurk 
 in the sustained periods of that distinguished Wri- 
 ter ; in whose language, miy more than in whose 
 opinions, they could not expect to find them. As 
 for the fact of the matter, then, I apprehend that 
 Mr. Stewart's assertion, that we " speak by means 
 " OF tvords," amounts to an absurdity perfectly pa- 
 rallel to an assertion that we think by means of
 
 SEC. III.] OF MIND. # 
 
 thoughts: For, in the name of common sense, 
 Wliat is speaking, but tnording 1 Here, therefore, we 
 have a notable instance of a sacrifice of -philosophical 
 truth, for the sake of substituting sonorous non- 
 sense to please the ear : For, it will not for a mo- 
 ment be believed that Professor Stewart would de- 
 fend his assertion that ivords are a means of speech : 
 whereas, if his language be taken for an expres- 
 sion of the fact, as every reader is forced to take it 
 if he knows no better, it follows that words and 
 speaking are two different things. How little 
 could readers of the Philosophy of the Mind ex- 
 pect that the truth of the subject should ever 
 be sacrificed, by a Writer of such eminence, to a 
 mere parade of verbiage ? It is conclusive, how- 
 ever, that the words — "through the medium or 
 " means of — amount to sound, without sense, in 
 the case in c|uestion. 
 
 It was necessary, on the present occasion, to 
 furnish the foregoing criticism on the doctrine of 
 our thinking in words, for the sake of pointing out, 
 in the beginning here, that it is in a very different 
 sense, from that above described, that I express 
 myself when I suggest the fact of our thinking in 
 colors. For, although the two difi'erent processes 
 in question are so far analogous that in each of 
 them, alike, we have a double object, — that is to say 
 Two Collateral Objects— oi thought in the Mind at 
 once, which different objects we never confound ; 
 yet, it remains to be pointed out, that the two ob- 
 jects, in the case of our thinking in colors, are
 
 84 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. hi. 
 
 connected together in a very different manner y from 
 that in which we connect a Name, or any Exter- 
 nal Sign, with our Ideas of Classes of Objects. But 
 I proceed, now, to a statement or description of 
 the fact of our thinking in colors. 
 
 The General Fact in question is only One Species 
 of a fact still more general,— namely— that we think 
 of each and every one of those Concrete Masses of 
 Attributes that are the assumed Prototypes of our 
 Complex Ideas, under Some Sort of Envelop, 
 OR Visor, of Sensation ; or, else, under Some En- 
 velop, or Visor, of Idea of Sensation. 
 
 The proposition just expressed, it is obvious, can 
 hold true with regard only to the tivo most intelligent 
 species, of those Sensations which we undergo from 
 impressions upon the five external organs of sense. 
 And herein, also, our Sensations of Colors possess 
 so immeasurably the advantage, in the comprehen- 
 siveness, as well as in the accuracy, of the infor- 
 mation they convey, that no individual of our 
 species, except only those who are denied the use 
 of sight, can ever forego the inveterate habit of 
 thinking of the Objects of all the other senses, even 
 of those of Touch itself under an Envelop, or Visor, 
 of Color, unless in some special cases which need 
 not here be adverted to, any farther than to ob- 
 serve that if we, in any case, employ the medium 
 of any other sense, instead of that of sight, the 
 ve?y same general law must hold good — namely — that 
 we always think of Every Object of thought under 
 Some Sort of Veil, or Visor, of Sensation, 
 OR OF Idea of Sensation. For the reason just as-
 
 SEC. HI.] OF MIND. 85 
 
 signed, I shall proceed to illustrate the general 
 fact in question in the department of colors only. 
 And my present design is to show that the species 
 of Sensations, or of Ideas, just mentioned, is not 
 only a Set of Signs of the Objects of Touch, — {Signs, 
 hoicever, in a most different sense from that in which 
 Dr. Re id and his folloicers assert them to be Signs 
 of those Objects,^ but, at the same time, are Signs of 
 All our Comple.v Masses of Thought, both Sensual 
 and Intellectual, — being, in the most obvious or 
 literal sense of the term, no other than Actual 
 Apparent Envelops of those masses. 
 
 Thus, Every thing we see, — every thing we read 
 of, — every thing we remember, — affords us an 
 example of the truth of the fact. Every thing 
 which the Poet can imagine, or the Philosopher 
 conceive, of the past, the present, or the future, 
 furnishes but an additional mstance of it. If we 
 look out on the scenery of the country, — the show 
 of the town, — or the display of the heavens, — in- 
 cluding: all the imagined unseen attributes which lue 
 ascribe to the individual objects they contain ; every 
 object appears to us as being enveloped by, or at 
 least as residing immediately behind, a Visor 
 or Veil, of Some Color, cither uniform or varied ; 
 and we contemplate, or think of, each of those ob- 
 jects as being thus masked, or enclosed. Mankind 
 travel over the diversified face of the earth's four 
 quarters, — traverse its mountains and its valleys, — 
 explore its caverns, — survey its temples, — and mea- 
 sure, or climb, its pyramids; — and, then, return 
 home to relate, or reflect on, what they have seen.
 
 86 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. hi. 
 
 perliaps without their having ever mice eMended a fin- 
 ger with intent to make any one of those things an object 
 of their Touch. In the course of their travel, men 
 may indeed, to a certain extent, have touched any- 
 one, or even all, of the objects in question ; and 
 this not only through necessity, or mere accident, 
 but also through design: But, whensoever they 
 have done this, they have nevertheless afterwards 
 ^/zo^^^gVz^ of these objects under an ideal envelop of 
 colors : And, even, while in the very act of perceiving 
 them by their Touch, they have only very rarely 
 contemplated them as being objects of ^^/j/ other sense 
 than that of Color. For example here, (it may 
 be asked,) What Philosopher ever thought oi fin- 
 gering the wonders of Palmyra, or Persepolis ? Or 
 What Clown ever set himself to thumb St. Peter's, 
 or St. Paul's ? 
 
 The same general fact holds manifestly true 
 when, instead of contemplating the inanimate ob- 
 jects of nature, we either perceive or think of 
 objects in which Mind, or Intellect, with all its 
 imagined variety of attributes, makes a part. We 
 always contemplate, or think of, all the other 
 SUPPOSED ATTRIBUTES of a man, under the colors 
 of a man ; and, oi all the other supposed attributes 
 of a Horse, under the colors of a Horse ; — always 
 including, along with colors, in such case, those Out- 
 lines which the meetings between our Sensa- 
 tions of various colors in the mind create /or the 
 time being ; which Outlines we call by the name 
 of Visible Figure; and which Figures appear to 
 the vulgar, and even to the Philosopher when not
 
 SEC. III.] , OF MIND. 87 
 
 philosophising, to exist witJioiit and at a distance 
 from them. Thus, when reading- their histories, 
 respectively, we view, or think of, the ambition and 
 the clemency of Ceesar, as enveloped by some imagined 
 colors and figure of Ctesar ; — the cruelty of Nero, 
 under some imagined coloi^s and figure of Nero ; — 
 and the turath, the strength, and the swiftness, of 
 Achilles, under some imagined colors and Jigiire of 
 Achilles. 
 
 In a word ; all the remembered objects of time 
 past; — all the Universe of presently-existing things 
 and passing events ; — and all the conceptions of 
 things in futurity ; are equally depicted in our 
 imagination or phantasy u)ider some imagined en- 
 velop, or Visor, of colors, limited by some figure : — 
 Each object, or event, being, by means of a varie- 
 ty in the Colors, parted off (^from all the others 
 that are contemplated at the same time,) by a limit 
 ivhich WE coxsiDER as being appropriately its oivn ; 
 although the Laws of Vision show us that every 
 such line is only a line common— that is it is a 
 MEETING — BETWEEN souic tivo colors. If, for exam- 
 ple, we begin with the earliest of all histories ; we 
 have immediately called up in our mind so}ne 
 imagined colored picture of Adam and of Eve ; and of 
 the beauties of that favored region in which they 
 were originally placed. And, every character, 
 and event, and country, of all the subsequent his- 
 tories which we ever contemplate, including all the 
 imagined invisible attributes of all these characterSy 
 events, and countries, are inevitably depicted in our 
 muid in some imagined colors and figures, upon one 
 same general principle.
 
 88 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. hi. 
 
 In by far the greater number of these cases, in- 
 deed, it is to be admitted that the instantaneous 
 idea or visor of colors called up is, according to 
 circumstances, less or more fabit and vague ; inso- 
 much that any person, if asked, could hardly say 
 %vhich colors he imagines for the dress of Csesar, or 
 of Alexander, when reading his history. But it is 
 beyond dispute that this faintness, or vagueness, 
 forms no impeachment of the fact. 
 
 Nor is the general fact limited, even, to the 
 bounds of visible creation : For the Chemical Phi- 
 losopher, while he is following out the results of 
 his experiments upon the component elements of 
 bodies, finds himself obliged to imagine (so far as 
 imagination can reach,) some pictorial aspect 
 for those elements. He very well knows, indeed, 
 that these atoms, or parts, must defy all his en- 
 deavours to imagine either their size, or their 
 shape. But size, and shape, he is convinced they 
 must have : And he is confident that, if they were 
 large enough to be visible, these elements must 
 occasion in his mind Sensations of colors, together 
 with figures, analogous to those occasioned by large, 
 and ordinary objects ; And, hence, the vain en- 
 deavours of his phantasy are incontinently set in 
 action, to depict them in his sensations. 
 
 If any one were disposed to question this fact, 
 let him only consider the attempts of Philosophers 
 to furnish us with conceptions of the primary ele- 
 ments of body, such as those of supposing them to 
 consist of " indivisible atoms ;'' — of " liooks and eyes ;^ 
 — of "spheres of attractio)i and repulsion;'" — and 
 other such fancies, false, or true. The whole his-
 
 SEC. III.] OF MIND. 89 
 
 tory of these several attempts proves that the 
 
 MiXD IS, IX A PHYSIOLOGICAL SEXSE, AN OrGAN : 
 
 which Organ will, and must, in all cases, attempt to 
 operateunder One Same General Law o/' conceiving 
 
 OF EVERY OBJECT UNDER AN ENVELOP, Or at least 
 BEHIND A VEIL, OF SENSATIONS OF COLORS; Or, 
 
 else, under that of Some Other Species of Se?isation ; 
 even when to effect its purpose is impossible. 
 
 What, then, is the great deduction, to be drawn 
 from the General Law above upon the whole 
 described ? It is this other general fact — namely — 
 that, in the case of all persons endowed with sight, 
 the Judging and Reasoning Power, of the 
 Perceiving or Thinking Mind, perceives, (as often 
 as it does perceive ;) and thinks, (as often as it does 
 think;) in and from some station, or point, 
 OF interneity in the Mind, when the Surface 
 of the Mind is imbued with Illumined Sensa- 
 tions, OR Ideas, called Colors ; luhich illumi- 
 nations are universally acknowledged, by philoso- 
 phers, to be purely mod'fications, or states, of the 
 thinking Mind itself. And, hence, it follows that. 
 Every Mass of Assumed Concrete Attributes, 
 which we ever contemplate under an envelop of 
 colors, or of ideas of color, as making up One 
 Object of thought, such, for example, as a man, 
 a tree, a city, or a planet, is contemplated by the 
 Judging Power of the Mind in a manner very 
 similar to that in which we should contemplate a 
 Painting, or Picture, on the Stained Window of a 
 Church, li WE were placed iia the dark, within 
 Man. M
 
 i)0 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. hi. 
 
 the church ; and light fell upon the Church Win- 
 dows, FROM WITHOUT. 
 
 In a paper which I contemplate furnishing, 
 upon some occasion, on our Notion of Substance ; 
 in which I propose to insist farther upon that 
 view of the subject which I hazarded in my First 
 Lines, and in which I have contended (against a 
 prevailing belief of the contrary,) for our having a 
 POSITIVE knowledge of our own Substantive exist- 
 ence ; I shall have occasion to argue, upon ground 
 entirely collateral to that above-mentioned, and 
 from evidences whose nature is undeniably no less 
 than that of mathematical demonstration, that the 
 Judging or Rationative Principle within us is cer- 
 tainly resident in a central position in the 
 Mind. But the argument contained in the de- 
 scription above given is all-sufficient for the pur- 
 pose at present in view. 
 
 It follows, then, from this account of the Phy- 
 siological Condition of the Mind, that our sensa- 
 tions of colors perform a two-fold office, or two diffe- 
 rent offices. They are, at one and the same time, 
 envelops, 07^ visors, behind which (taken along 
 2vith their interlimitations,) we, in imagination, 
 view every complex object of our Intellect as it 
 were enclosed within a proper skin ; every which 
 object is thus rendered conspicuous, by having a color 
 appropriately its oivn : And, they are also, at the 
 same time, labels or marks of our Ideas, in the 
 same sense that the Names of things are labels or 
 marks of these ideas. And, hereupon, it is very 
 material to point out the following distinction —
 
 SEC. III.] OF MIND. 91 
 
 namely — that, whereas Names are only arti- 
 ficial AXD arbitrary labels or marks of our 
 Ideas of things ; (that is they are marks only in- 
 vented AND CONVENTIONAL, and tvliich the mind 
 MIGHT EXIST WITHOUT HAVING, and the luunt of 
 which is the actual and natural condition of the Mere 
 Animal Tribes of living things;) Sensations or 
 Ideas OF Colors, on the contrary, are natural 
 AND UNCHANGEABLE labels, at the same time that 
 they are much more than this, because they en- 
 close, and THUS define the ideal limits of, 
 the Composite Concrete Objects of our Thoughts, in- 
 cluding all their ideal attributes, of whatever kind. 
 Thus, for example, the Name — Horse — calls up 
 in us ONLY A RECOLLECTION of a liorsc, without 
 this Name's being the most distant likeness, or natural 
 ideal envelop, of the qualities, corporeal and mental, 
 of that animal: But the colors, which arise in 
 the mind when we look at a horse ; or, the ideas 
 of those colors which we contemplate when we 
 only think of a horse ; each of these vehicles forms 
 
 an ACTUAL natural IDEAL ENVELOP, OR VISOR, 
 
 under which ice view, and must view, his strength, 
 his swiftness, his patioice, his courage, and all his 
 other supposed unseen attributes. 
 
 Precision on the subject demands I should ex- 
 plain, here, with the view to a popular apprehen- 
 sion of the fact, upon tuhat jninciple the term en- 
 velop, — visor, — veil, — or mask, — is employed in the 
 foregoing and following statements, and employed, 
 too, with a manifest preference for the first-men- 
 tioned of these names ; while it is evident that.
 
 92 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. hi. 
 
 strictly speaking, color 7niist invariahly, at any one 
 view, or thought of, an object, present itself to our 
 apprehension as a mere veil only, and never as a 
 COMPLETE ENVELOP, of the attributes compre- 
 hended under it. The principle, then, upon which 
 I have shown this preference, is a fact which will 
 be manifest the moment it is suggested — namely — 
 that, although no external object can ever present 
 to our sight more than one side at a time; and 
 though, consequently, we can on that occasion, 
 or upon any occasion whatever, never undergo any 
 sensation of color that is more of the involving na- 
 ture of an envelop or skin (of an object) than that of 
 a mere veil, or mask, which hides it ; yet, we know, 
 from universal experience, that, were we to survey 
 any external object on every side, (as we should do, 
 for example, by the act of walking round a man, or 
 a horse,) we should, as the result of such a series of 
 experiments, uniformly discern that this, and every 
 other such object, is apparently, as to our 
 
 CONCEPTION OF IT, AS COMPLETELY SURROUNDED 
 
 by Color, as if it were any assemblage of things 
 enclosed in a bag : And, hence, it follows, as an 
 invariable general law of our intellectual nature, 
 that, although we can never either perceive or 
 think of a man, or a horse, except as being behind 
 A SCREEN OR VISOR o/* co/or cxcitcd by that ideal 
 side of him ivhich our phantasy presents as being 7iext 
 to us ; yet, to this ideal screen, the understanding, 
 from memory, superadds a coiiception of the color, or 
 
 veil, AS A THING EXTENDING ALL ROUND AND 
 
 TOTALLY ENCLOSING HIM. In this way — that is
 
 SEC. III.] OF MIND. 93 
 
 ujider some complete envelop of Color— vfe, con- 
 ceive of a ichite man, or a gray horse, or any other 
 external object; which external object, all the 
 while, has and can have, in itself, no color at all, — 
 color being nothing but a phantasm in a mind, 
 called up by some unknown action of light reflected 
 from an external object; or, otherwise, by some 
 nervous stimulus of the sight, occasioned by some 
 action of our body. 
 
 In fine : The simile which has now been sug- 
 gested, by which, the condition, the procedure, 
 and the station or position, of the Perceiving and 
 Thinking Power of the Mind, has been compared 
 to those of a person situated in a darkened church ; 
 who perceives colored pictures, demarked upon 
 its windows in consequence of those windows being 
 illumined by light from without ; is meant here to 
 serve, with some approach to truth, in preference 
 to any of those other similes which have, at dif- 
 ferent times, been furnished by Philosophers for 
 the same purpose, such, for example, as the Cave 
 and the Shadows of Plato ; — the Seal and the Wax of 
 Aristotle ; — the Dark Chamber of Locke ; — or 
 the Reflecting Mirror of Leibnitz :— each of which 
 similes, I here of course suppose, must be viewed 
 as being at once both loose and fallacious, in a very 
 great degree ; and each of them aff'ording, in some 
 degree, an index of the quantity of defect of the con- 
 ceptions in which the views of its Author were 
 founded. 
 
 In so far, however, as concerns Perception by
 
 94 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. hi: 
 
 the medium of the Touch, the analogy entertained 
 by Aristotle (and which he, in all probability, 
 derived from a much earlier authority,) may be 
 retained as holding, I think, a parallel pretension, 
 to truth, to that which I have here claimed for the 
 Pictures of Vision : And the Seal and the Wa.r, in 
 the case of the one Sense ; and the Illumined Win- 
 dows of the Darhened church, perceived from within, 
 in the other ; may be insisted upon, as being re- 
 spectively approximations to the real fact in nature, 
 sufficiently close to serve for analogies that are truly 
 scientific ;— always remembering that they are, in 
 part, ONLY ANALOGIES ; although they are also, 
 in part, similitudes,— especially the latter in so far 
 as regards the superficial extension and figures of our 
 sensations. 
 
 As for the Creed of our " Sceino; all things in the 
 " Ideas of the Divine Mind," entertained by Male- 
 branche ; and which the venerable Dr. Parr, in 
 one of his Letters, has supposed to be coincident 
 with my view of the Subject ; I must seize this 
 occasion to repeat, that my foregoing view of the 
 physiological condition of the Mind, which coin- 
 cides altogether with the deduced result of the 
 Laws of Primary Vision, differs as widely, on the 
 one hand, from the assumption of our seeing either 
 the Divine Ideas, or yet of our perceiving Any Thing 
 beyond the Modifications of 0\jR Own Minds ; as it 
 does, upon the other, from Berkeley's assumption 
 of detached, permanent, substantive ideas, that flit, like 
 birds, into, and out of, the mind. To this explana- 
 tion, I have to add that, I am unable to decide in
 
 SEC. iJi.] OF MIND. 95 
 
 my own opinion, whether the Ancient Hindoo 
 Tenet on the subject is to be interpreted as coin- 
 ciding with the view of Malebranche, or with that 
 which I entertain. But I suspect that the Modern 
 Hindoos, or at least the European Commentators 
 on that Tenet, receive it in the meaning of Male- 
 branche : while, however, I have already said, I 
 am inclined to conjecture that the Founders of the 
 Tenet arrived at it by the same road which I have 
 followed in the Subject — namely — by having previ- 
 ously fallen upon the Laws of Vision. — It would be 
 a curious reflection, if the truth of the matter, were 
 it known, would oblige us to compare the Human 
 Intellect, in its progress, to the Ant ; which climbs 
 up a wall with a grain of corn in its grasp, and 
 many times drops its precious burden to the bot- 
 tom ; which it as often resumes, and re-ascends to 
 a lesser, or a greater height. If the fact really was 
 as I have conjectured, (the historical evidence of 
 which, however, is now lost to mankind,) that the 
 Ancient Hindoo Theology was founded upon those 
 same Three, or Four self-evident Propositions in 
 question ; What a lesson does it afford to us, to 
 contemplate the number of ages during which the 
 Philosophers of Asia, and of Europe, have been 
 plunged in the most profound darkness on this 
 subject : through the whole course of which, the 
 Human Intellect, like a grovelling animal, incapa- 
 ble of raising itself above burrowing in earth, has 
 continually embedded itself in a belief of a Universe of 
 Brute Matter; and has wandered into every 
 one of those chimerical regions of the phantasy
 
 96 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. hi. 
 
 which I have enumerated above, as being the Dif- 
 ferent Theories of Perception hitherto exhi- 
 bited to the world ! 
 
 2. 
 
 By the General Fact of our Thinking in Colors ; 
 and by the coincidence, or specijic identity rathe7% of 
 this General Fact with those Laws of Vision which 
 constitute the strict analytical proof of every particu- 
 lar instance of it ; the Science of Pneumatology is 
 BROUGHT BACK, from thoso supposed sublime, but 
 really visionary and bottomless, conceits which, 
 during almost a century, have arbitrarily denied to 
 all our Sensations any resemblance to the Figures, 
 or the Extension, of the External Bodies which our 
 reason informs us are the Physical Causes that 
 excite them : And this Science is thus shown to 
 have its real foundation in truths which may be 
 illustrated and brought home to popular apprehensiony 
 and this with some approach to strict precision, by 
 PHYSICAL analogies displayed to our under- 
 standings in the most ordinary objects. And thus, 
 that method of illustrating the Operations of the 
 Mind with which such Geniuses as those of Plato, 
 of Aristotle, and of Locke, had been fain to toy ; 
 which Leibnitz also chose to fondle, and at which 
 Newton was not offended ; but which have been, 
 with a high hand, held up to ineffable derision by 
 the School of Reid ; are found worthy, and re- 
 quisite, to be employed and cherished, under fit
 
 SEC. iii.J OF MIND. 97 
 
 inodifications, as a method of philosophising which 
 we must believe can never in future be in any 
 danger of being superceded. 
 
 It remains, then, only to introduce here the 
 consideration of a certain axalogy, or Parallel, 
 which exists between the General Laws (/Mind (as 
 now insisted upon) and those General Laws (?/'Body 
 which constitute the Science of Phi/sics. From a sug- 
 gestion of this parallel, or correspondency, a person 
 who has any tincture at all of reading on the sub- 
 ject may derive a very clear and comprehensive 
 conception of the state of the Science of Mind, as 
 induced by the fact of our Thinking in Colors. 
 
 1. — As the First st3ige of this parallel, therefore, 
 I observe that the Visible Universe, including all 
 its unperceived supposed attributes^ considered by us 
 as residing behind a Veil of Color, (or, else, behind 
 a Glove of Touch,) including its Varieties and Inter- 
 limitations, is no other than the One Same Identical 
 Object which employs tlie contemplation of the 
 Natural Philosopher. In other words ; the physi- 
 cal inquirer contemplates all the imagined sub- 
 stances and changes in nature, including all their 
 unperceived supposed attributes, as existing, and 
 going on, behind Veils of Color: and thus, the 
 assumed-eMernal Objects of human thought form One 
 and the Same Identical Universe of things, to the 
 Pneumatologist, and to the Natural Philoso- 
 pher. The only difference, then, between the 
 office of the Pneumatologist, and that of the Natu- 
 ral Philosopher, in any ordinary general view of 
 this Universe, is that the Former regards all the 
 Man. N
 
 98 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. hi. 
 
 things which he actually perceives as being nothing 
 but his own thoughts ; which thoughts he considers 
 as serving in the instrumental capacity of Visors, 
 or Gloves, existing between his Judging Faculty 
 and the External Unperceived Things of a Uni- 
 verse which his reason informs him exists, but 
 which he knows he cannot perceive : Whereas the 
 Latter, illusively, considers these Veils, or Gloves, 
 formed of his own Sensations, as being themselves 
 the E.vternal Things of the Universe ; and, thus, he 
 actually investigates, and experiments upon, his own 
 MODIFICATIONS OR THOUGHTS, Under the mistaken 
 belief that they are the identical modes and 
 
 CHANGES OF EXTERNAL BODIES. ThuS, EACH of 
 
 the parties in question has a double object, or rather 
 two very differeiit objects, of his intellectual con- 
 templation — namely — an Envelop of Colory (or 
 else of Touch,) and a Concrete Mass of Imagined 
 Attributes composing a So-called Body which that 
 Envelop of Color, or of Touch, comprehends : But, 
 the Natural Philosopher, (as well as the Vulgar,) 
 considers the Colors, or Touches, as well as the 
 Attributes contained under them, as being things 
 external; whereas the Pneumatologist, (while rea- 
 soning as such,) remembers that Color, or Touch, 
 IS only in the Mind ; while he admits that the sup- 
 posed Attributes, which these Sensations veil, re- 
 side in Bodies that are unperceived and external. 
 
 It is a striking and a conclusive illustration of 
 this fact to notice that, the Optician, when he is 
 experimenting in what he calls a decomposition of 
 LIGHT with a prism, is in ideality, as far as his per-
 
 SRC. III.] OF MIND. 
 
 ception goes, or the objects of such perception are con- 
 cerned, DOING NO SUCH THING ; but. Oil the Con- 
 trary, he is ONLY DECOMPOSING HIS OWN SENSA- 
 TIONS : Although this Natural Philosopher, just 
 like any ordinary person, herein imposes upon 
 himself by an illusion, which he would instantly 
 acknowledge if questioned in the character of a 
 Pneumatologist. For it is a fact, too notorious to 
 admit of a moment's denial, that the external 
 effect of a prism is only to decompose unper- 
 CEiv^ED LIGHT, WHICH ckcomposition we never 
 PERCEIVE, and could never know except through a 
 collection of reason : While the, perceived effect of the 
 prism is only a decomposition of our oivn Sensations of 
 Colors; that is — the use of a prism occasions in us 
 a composite, but divided, Sensation made up of the 
 several primari/ colors, whereas, if no prism had 
 been employed, we should, from the same external 
 light, have had excited in us a Uniform Sensation 
 of white. After the statement of this well-known 
 fact, Who would believe that a Writer on the 
 subject, with a view to cry down every modifica- 
 tion of Idealism, has, if I mistake not, exultingly 
 put the question, and this question echoed by 
 others; Whether we can decompose our thoughts 
 with a prism ? Such, however, is the force of pre- 
 judice on the subject : And such the extent of 
 profound oversight, which has passed current for 
 truth with regard to it. 
 
 Upon this point it can hardly be necessary to 
 add that the School of Reid, and every other 
 School of Pneumatologists, rests the whole subject
 
 100 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. hi. 
 
 upon the fact that those beautiful phantasms, which 
 seem to us to adhere to a wall in consequence of 
 light having passed through a prism, are no other 
 than Sensations — i. e. Thoughts — in our Mind. 
 And it is a manifest truth that, the whole enter- 
 prise of Dr. Reid intended only to deny that the 
 Interlimitations perceived by us between these 
 Sensations are interlimitations of these Sensations 
 themselves ; and to affirm that the limitations or lines 
 in question are the Identical Outlines of Ex- 
 ternal Bodies, such as those of the Houses, the 
 Men, and the Trees of the external world. How, 
 then, has it happened, even to those who have 
 drunk in the fallacies of the Reideian Scheme, that 
 any one of them could possibly fall into such a 
 shutting of the eyes against fact, as to make an 
 object of his derision of the truth that the Optician 
 decomposes his own Thoughts every time he makes 
 use of a prism ? This, one should think, could have 
 happened only from a sense, that an admission of 
 the fact must be tantamount to an explosion of the 
 Reideian Theory. 
 
 Late, then, as it now is to retrace our way from 
 such illusions ; Let it henceforth be duly, recognised 
 by Pneumatologists, {because denied it is impossible 
 it can be,) that, not only the Optician, but equally 
 the Astronomer, the Chymist, and every other 
 Experimentalist, together wuth every Artisan, and 
 every other Human Being, is continually employed 
 
 upon WITNESSING ; AND WITNESSING NOTHING 
 
 EXTERNAL TO ; the composiug, and the decompo- 
 sing, of his own Sensations : while it is altogether to
 
 SEC. III.] OF MIND. 101 
 
 be admitted, and held in view, that covresjjond'nig 
 processes of composition and decomposition are going on 
 iti bodies, externally and unperceived. (See note b.) 
 And it has ah'eady been shown that, with certain 
 special and very limited cases of exception, the 
 Sensations so excited, and operated upon, are those of 
 COLORS, to the exclusion of all consideration of 
 our accompanying exterior sensations of other 
 senses. 
 
 I take occasion to advert, here, to the fact that 
 Professor Stewart has complained, in his Disser- 
 tation, of having met with some persons, not defi- 
 cient in reason, who could by no means be made 
 to conceive colors to be in their minds, or, to detach 
 these phenomena, in their imagination, from the 
 external objects to which the vulgar conceive them 
 to be coverings. This fact, however, is not sur- 
 prising, in the case of some individuals, when we 
 consider how inapt most persons are to give them- 
 selves the trouble to study the process, even for a few 
 moments : (although such study, if pursued but for 
 a few minutes, could hardly fail to carry convic- 
 tion to any individual of tolerable capacity :) while 
 it is certain that the illusion in question, until it 
 be explained, is most profound ; and doubtless was 
 by the beneficence of the Supreme Being intended 
 to be so. 
 
 On the occasion referred to, Mr. Stewart has 
 morever quoted, with great approbation, M. D'Al- 
 embert's expression of wonder, in the case of 
 colors, — "to see the Mind transport its sensations 
 " out of itself, and to spread them as it were, over
 
 102 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. hi. 
 
 ** a substance to which they cannot possibly be- 
 '* long." I advert to this quotation for an impor- 
 tant purpose. And, Jirst, for my own part, I am 
 entirely of the opposite opinion from M. D'Alem- 
 bert, and think it would be a wonder, — and even 
 a miracle, — if any person, except a Pneumatolo- 
 gist, could possibly do other than, in his belief, 
 attach his Sensations of Colors to External Objects. 
 It would be quite as little wonderful, if a clown, 
 on first witnessing a scenic representation in a 
 theatre, were without any teaching to feel con- 
 vinced that the canvas before him is in reality one 
 fiat surface^ and not an assemblage of objects having 
 depth, as a room, a toivn, or a garden ; the various 
 Figures of which, he must believe, occupy various 
 distances from his eye. But, secondly, it is impor- 
 tant here to note that the 7'eal wonder, which forms 
 the theme of D'Alembert's admiration, is e.v- 
 plained in a preceding part of the passage, which 
 quotes that Writer to say — *'The bias we ac- 
 " quire in consequence of habits acquired in 
 " infancy, to refer to a substance material and 
 " divisible, what really belongs to a substance 
 ** spiritual and simple, is a thing well worthy of 
 ** the attention of metaphysicians." Now, as I 
 presume it is impossible for a moment to doubt 
 that the gratuitous and arbitrary assumption of 
 the SIMPLICITY OF THE MIND, SO long kept up by 
 one Sect of Pneumatologists, is laid for ever at 
 rest by the Laws of the Interhmitations of our Sen- 
 sations of Colors ; the only reply which need be 
 made, to any reiteration of this visionary simplicity
 
 SEC. Ill] OF MIND. 103 
 
 of the mind, is to state the fact that the mind enter- 
 tains, in one same surface of sensations of color, many 
 millions of co-existent elementary sensations — namely 
 
 MILLIONS OF SENSIBLE POINTS OF COLOR; CVCry 
 
 one of which sensible points possesses a locality so 
 distinct from that of its neighbours, that we 7?iight 
 have it alone in the mind : And, then, to desire of 
 any competent person to jfiark the extent of absurdity 
 of attempting to combine the Assumption of the 
 Simplicity of the Alind, with the fact of its being 
 modified by millions of sensations at once ! 
 
 To this consideration, however, we may add the 
 following one. The notion of simplicity is one of 
 the vciost perfect which the human mind can con- 
 ceive. It is mathematically perfect, because it is 
 no other than the notion of a mathematical point, 
 whose mere definition excludes all composition, 
 and compared with which the most simple mode of 
 extension is ideally complex. Now,' Let any of the 
 advocates of a Simple Mind afford us some supposi- 
 tion, (jio matter how visionary or unreal,) of the 
 manner in which such a mind could sustain millions 
 of elementary inodi/ications at once, and endless ?nil- 
 lions of them in succession : and, when he does this, 
 I shall deem his assumption worthy of being rea- 
 soned with. But it is a truth, as self-evident as 
 any axiom in geometry, that a Simple Mind (if it 
 existed) must, like a mathematical point, remain 
 
 FOR ever unmodified BY ANY PRESENT VARIETY 
 
 OF Thoughts ; or, yet, by any change. 
 
 2. The Second stage of that parallel, the First of
 
 104 PHYSIOLOGY [skc. in. 
 
 which has just been concluded, possesses a very 
 different character from that above described. In 
 the Science of Physics, in which all the changes 
 that have been discerned and accounted for have 
 been found to arise from some modification of one, 
 or more, of Three Principles— namely— il^^rr/c^iow. 
 Repulsion, and Inertia (for we need not here intro- 
 duce any consideration of the Atoms which form the 
 Subjects of the above mentioned Three Powers, or 
 Attributes,) if we either observe, or perform any 
 experiment upon, any untried Substance, or upon 
 any change which it may undergo, it will be found 
 to afford only a particular e.va?nple of the General 
 Laws or Principles in question. In a way, then, 
 corresponding with the fact just mentioned, al- 
 though not in a way analogous to it in any other 
 respect, I observe that, if we take any particular 
 case or example of our THINKING in Colors, and 
 submit this example to analysis ; we shall find that 
 it furnishes only aparticular example of the operations 
 of the Laws of Frimary Vision, as laid down in my 
 different statements of that Subject. In point of 
 fact, therefore, it is here manifest, without the aid 
 of any additional illustration, that the Laws of 
 Vision possess an office in one sense corresponding 
 to; and, in the case of the Perceived Universe of our 
 own Thoughts or JMind, commensurate with; that 
 which the Laws of Attraction, Repulsion, and 
 Inertia, possess in the External Universe of Bo- 
 dies. 
 
 To those readers, indeed, who have given atten- 
 tion to the Laws of Vision, and who are at all in
 
 SEC. iii.J OF MIND. 105 
 
 the subject, there cannot exist a moment's doubt 
 with regard to the fact which I have just suggested. 
 Those Four General Facts, which constitute the 
 Laws of Vision, are so manifestly the laws forma- 
 tive of the Indices, or Envelops, undei" some one 
 other of which, all our Perceptions, Remembrances, 
 and Imaginations, of objects and events, in the course 
 of our thinking in colors, must be comprehended ; 
 that it can require nothing more than the bare 
 description of the fact to establish it beyond a 
 cavil. And thus, considered as Pneumatological 
 Laws or those of Mental Phenomena, the Four Ge- 
 neral facts in question possess a correspondent 
 EXTENsivENESs m the Sciencc of MiisiD, to that of 
 the Mechanical Laws of Body in Natural Philoso- 
 phy. 
 
 In order to prevent any misapprehension, of 
 confusion, of the two subjects, however, it is requi- 
 site to point out some distinctions and limitations 
 which affect each of the above mentioned Codes. 
 And, in so doing, it will be shown that, in the 
 present state of our knowledge, each of these 
 Codes derives some dignity over the other one, 
 either with regard to its comprehensiveness, or to 
 its stability ; although a time may perhaps come, 
 when there may be found more equality between 
 the two, in point of stability, than is at present 
 manifest. It is evident, then, in the first place, 
 that the Laws of Vision are not so comprehen- 
 sive in the Phenomena and Changes of Mind, as 
 the Laws of Attraction, Repulsion, and Inertia, 
 are in the Changes of Body ; because the Pheno- 
 Man. o
 
 106 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. hi. 
 
 mena of Vision, including all the returns of these 
 Phenomena in the modes of Memory and of Ima- 
 gination, do not constitute all, or nearly all, the 
 changes of thought which the Mind undergoes ; 
 as, for example, our more internal sensations, in 
 all their various species, are not phenomena or 
 changes of Visio?i, nor are they comprehended 
 under its laws. By the general fact of our think- 
 ing in Color's, however, all the i)iternal., as well as 
 all the external, sensations of our minds are, in a 
 certain sense, comprehended under the Laws of Vision ; 
 although it is obviously granted here, in what 
 went before, that these Laws comprehend our 
 Passions and Liternal Feelings in no other sense 
 than that in which a Bag may be said to compre- 
 hend an assemblage of any distinct articles, which 
 it at any time envelops. 
 
 Another difference, between the two Codes in 
 question, consists in this — namely — that, while we 
 always suppose a connection of causaUty between 
 Objects which we find to be concomitants under 
 Physical Laws; we, on the other hand, canriot dis- 
 cern any connection of causality, but only a mere 
 concomitancy, between any instance of the Laws of 
 Vision and any supposed attributes of things that 
 are called up in our conception at the same time. As, 
 for example, when either the perception or the 
 remembrance of the face, or figure, of a friend calls 
 up the other attributes we ascribe to that friend ; 
 or, by a process reciprocal with this, when, upon 
 reading the history of Ale.vander, our Phantasy sup- 
 plies us with a faint picture of him ; in either of
 
 SEC. III.] OF MIND. 107 
 
 these cases, alike, we cannot suppose the cause of 
 the concomitcnicii to be analogous to that of One 
 Body's moving upon being impelled by another, 
 or, by a body's gravitation to the earth ; and all 
 we know is that the concomitancy is as inevitab/i/ 
 certain in the one case, as it is in the other, when- 
 soever we try any experiment with a due regard 
 to the fact. 
 
 But, to make up for anij lesser comprehensiveness 
 of this Province of the Laws of Vision, when com- 
 pared as above mentioned with the Laws of Body, 
 we have here to claim for the former an undeniable 
 superiority of their kind. The fact is that, whereas 
 the Laws of Body, or as they are called the Laws 
 of Nature, ^lXQ merely contingent general facts for the 
 time being, and whose cessation is certainly conceiva- 
 ble ; the Laws of Vision, on the contrary, are not 
 only facts for the time being, but their mutability, or 
 cessation, is inconceivable ; they are in truth Mathe- 
 matical Laws, although they at the same time 
 present to us a System of Real Efficiency in the 
 Operations of Nature — namely — in those of Visual 
 Perception, and, of course, in those of Tactual 
 Perception also. Now, therefore, as it is manifest 
 that the Laws of Vision, and of Touch, are as truly 
 Laios of our Nature, as any of the other General 
 Facts which possess that title ; it follows that, a 
 large proportion of the Laws of Nature are here 
 proved to be not contingent laws: And this 
 certain truth opens our eyes to a consideration, or 
 rather to a question, concerning a collateral sub- 
 ject — namely — as to how far it is true, as is uni-
 
 108 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. hi. 
 
 formly assumed by Philoso|3hers, that the Me-^^ 
 CHANiCAL Laws of Body are entirely contin- 
 gent facts, which, for aught we know, may be 
 mere arbitrary concomitaucies ? 
 
 In order to afford a momentary light on the 
 question now suggested ; I observe that, it is a 
 contbige)7t event when we liave two contrasted 
 Sensations of colors together in our mind : But, 
 when we actually have two such Sensations in the 
 mind, it is then a necessary result that a Line is 
 formed, or rather is created, a?id perceivedhetween 
 them. Analogously to this, then, I say, it is a 
 contingent event when one Body comes into ap- 
 parent collision with another : And it is also, per- 
 haps, a contingent fact, proceeding only from the 
 Will of God, that each Body is endowed with Inertia 
 and Elasticity : But if all these facts actually happen 
 to exist, then, (looking analogically to the Laws of 
 Vision,) it may be conjectured to be possible, (as 
 indeed I apprehend is the demonstrable fact, al- 
 though I cannot prosecute the subject in this 
 place,) that it is a necessary i^esult for the Bodies to 
 move, as they do move, after collision. 
 
 The object of these last observations, however, 
 is not to go farther into the question concerning 
 the Laws of Body : but is only to show that the 
 Laws of Primary Vision, by proving the ej'istence 
 of Real Efficiency in Nature; which, it is to be 
 observed, is denied by Mr. Hume equally in the 
 Phenomena of Body and of Mind ; open to us a 
 new and very wide field of research. And One great 
 general truth becomes evident, from what has
 
 SEC. in.] OF MIND. 109 
 
 been insisted npon above, — a truth which T think 
 is not at all adverted to by Philosophers — namely 
 — that, — Necessity gTows out of Contingency; 
 although Contingency cannot grow out o/" Neces- 
 sity.
 
 110 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 SECTION FOURTH. 
 
 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF THE SCIENCE OF 
 
 MIND. 
 
 SUBSECTION 1. 
 
 Of the Real Extension of Body and of Space, and of 
 the manner in which the Mind apprehends these 
 Realities, considered as the Subjects which form, in 
 a most serious extent, the Foundation of the Philo- 
 sophy of Mind. — Incidental consideration of Clarke's 
 Argimient for the Necessary Eiistence of God, 
 
 In entering upon the following subject, there is 
 no consideration more important to be held up for 
 the attention of all who would possess any thorough 
 understanding of the Philosophy of Mind, than a 
 legitimate and strict examination of the process 
 and evidence by which the mind attains its con- 
 ception of Extension, in its various principal modes. 
 T\\?it this point has been effected, to all ordinary 
 intents and purposes, by all those who have ap- 
 prehended the Laws of our Mental Nature laid 
 down in the First Section of this Manual, is a fact 
 certain. But the Subject certainly admits ; and, 
 on account of notable occurrences in the Specula- 
 tions of other Inquirers, it demands ; that we 
 should enter into the scrutiny of a Varied Modifi-
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. Ill 
 
 cation of the Principles laid down. In other 
 words ; and to accommodate the Subject to all 
 classes of readers, by speaking in a figure which 
 fortunately happens to bear a close analogy to the 
 Two jModes in question ; tJiat Ground of the Phy- 
 siology of Mind which we may be said to have 
 already ploughed by our act of apprehending the 
 Laws of Vision, admits of a farther process of 
 analysis, by our intellect, in a way which may be 
 called being harrowed. And, accordingly, the 
 following statements, and crucial reasonings on 
 the Subject, make up an essential part of that 
 knowledge of it which I desire to promulgate in the 
 present publication, especially with a view to such 
 readers as do not require to stop their investiga- 
 tions of the Subject at the close of its initiatory 
 stage. The farther analytical process here alluded 
 to, however, will not be entered into, in its details, 
 in the first instance. But a knowledge of its 
 nature and reality will be gathered in the course 
 of reasoning, as we proceed. 
 
 The Philosophers of that School, to which my 
 own speculations on the subject stand principally 
 opposed, are altogether agreed with me as to the 
 primary importance of this part of Pneumatologi- 
 cal Science : Although they have not, (especially 
 until the late remarkable concession on the subject 
 by Professor Stewart,) been agreed with me with 
 regard to the nature of this importance, or with 
 respect to the nature of the evidence by which we 
 acquire the conception of Extension, or of Space ;
 
 112 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 or, yet, with regard to the consequences to he deduced 
 from the manner of that acquisition. To their 
 readers in general it is known, that Dr. Reid and 
 Professor Stewart have employed their conception 
 of the manner in which we gain our Notion of 
 Extension, to serve as an experimentum crucis for the 
 establishment of two most important positions in 
 philosophy, (whether both, or either, of those posi- 
 tions shall be admitted, or denied,)— namely — for 
 the confutation or e.vplosion of the Ideal Theory, in all 
 its Various Modificatio7is ; and for the proof of the 
 reality of our knoioledge. While, upon the other 
 hand, I proceed here on the design of showing, 
 from various strictures upon certain particular parts 
 of their speculations, in illustration of what I pre- 
 sume has been established on former occasions 
 against their doctrine in general, — namely— that 
 the real history of our Notion of E.vtension is alto- 
 gether incompatible with the assumption of the School 
 of Reid with regard to it; and that, the process, and 
 evidence, by which we attain this Notion, are 
 pregnant with consequences equally momentous 
 in themselves and foreign to what was ever con- 
 templated by that School. It follows, however, 
 according to both the schemes in question, that 
 the inquiry concerning our Notion of Extension is 
 of the very first importance to those who would 
 attain a thorough knowledge of the Science of 
 Mind. And it is material to inculcate strongly, 
 here, that no attention must be wanting in the 
 process of discussion, to any of the phases of the 
 subject, by any one who would study this science
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. H3 
 
 with effect ; nor, indeed, by those who would 
 rightly apprehend various other Sciences, which 
 to an ordinary observer may appear to have very 
 little dependence upon, or connexion with, this 
 one. 
 
 As a farther preparatory notice with regard to 
 the subject; it is requisite to observe, in this place, 
 that an assumption has sprung up, of a compara- 
 tively very modern date in the history of Philoso- 
 phy, tJiat there e.vists a profound mystery over the 
 OiiiGiN^ of our notion of Evtensmi. This assump- 
 tion of mystery, which, it is manifest, could never 
 have had an existence until the Philosopher Des 
 Cartes, by a piece of pneumatological conjuration 
 so clumsy and contemptible as would not at this 
 day be tolerated by the auditory of any one above 
 the degree of a charlatan, ejected our ideas (of colors, 
 and of their extension,) /row their i^esidence in the 
 Mind, and assigned to them the BRAiN/or their tene- 
 ment, was embraced by the Reideian School ; and 
 has been sedulously worked up, by it, into a vast 
 imaginary importance, which makes a great figure 
 in its writings : Whereas, I proceed upon ground 
 established with conclusive reference to the con- 
 cession of Mr. Stewart, as well as to the ration- 
 ated proofs of the fact constituted by the Laws of 
 Vision, that never was chimera more unfounded 
 in nature than that which has been thus feigned ; 
 at the same time that no procedure could be more 
 unfortunate for the interests of Philosophy, than 
 tliat of adopting the general principle wliieh 
 gave rise to this pretension of mystery. 
 
 Man. P
 
 114 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 The General Principle, to which I now allude, 
 was the assumption of Des Cartes, which has been 
 extolled and acted upon by the School of Reid — 
 namely — that the Essence of Mind consists in 
 Thought; — an assumption which I would alto- 
 gether assent to, and insist upon, if it were only 
 taken to mean that we are to prosecute the Sci- 
 ence of Pneumatology by attending exclusive- 
 ly to the Phenomena and Properties of Thought ; — 
 but which I am under the necessity to denounce, 
 here, as deserving the utmost philosophical con- 
 tempt when, in order to make way for this as- 
 sumption, — (that is in order to assume that the 
 Essence of Mind consists in Thought Only, as meant 
 to contradistinguish the Nature of 3Iind, from that 
 of Matter which Des Cartes assumed to consist in 
 Extension,) its Author exhibited to the world the 
 spectacle of serving our Ideas, {of Color, ^x.) with 
 an ejectment from the mind. In order to justify 
 this expression of contempt, called forth for the 
 very existence of the Subject, I need only put 
 the question : Would any Immaterialist, in the 
 present day, from the sanction of a Professor's 
 Chair, insult the understandings of his audience 
 by consigning our Ideas to a residence in the 
 Brain ? And yet, this was done, in the case of Des 
 Cartes, by a Philosopher who was eminently an 
 Immaterialist; and whom the Reideian School has 
 estimated as being the Founder of Modern Pneu- 
 matology! 
 
 It was, doubtless, with a view to dissent from 
 the above-mentioned assumption of Des Cartes;
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 115 
 
 whichy we are to observe, tcent to deny to Mind 
 Any Nature at all as a Substance or Sub- 
 stantive Thing ; that the Philosopher Locke has 
 expressed his notion that '' the perception of Ideas is 
 " to the Soul, what motion is to the Body ; — not its 
 
 " ESSENCE, BUT ONLY ONE OF ITS OPERATIONS." 
 
 And it may safely be affirmed that this position 
 of Locke, of itself alone, would have taken from 
 Des Cartes the honor of being the Founder of 
 Modern Pneumatology, had the Author of the Es- 
 say on Human Understanding never done more 
 than assert this fundamental truth, in opposition, 
 alike, to the Visiouari/ Essence of Des Cartes, and 
 to the equalli/ Visionary Detached Substantive Ideas 
 of other Theorists. 
 
 Here, therefore, I have particularly to enforce 
 the consideration, that it is net against the Writers 
 of the School of Reid, considered identically as 
 individuals, that my speculations, at any time, are 
 to be estimated as being levelled ; but it is against 
 the fatuity of every Scheme which could possibly be 
 devised to ideally -sublimise the nature of Mind, by 
 claiming for it the attribute of inextension, — a 
 fatuity which has at all times arisen, in great part, 
 from a fond and illusory belief that the property 
 of inextension would contradistinguish the nature 
 of Mind, from the assumed corruptibility of Matter ; 
 while, in reality, this ideal sublimisation only carries 
 PJiilosophy directly away in a contrary direction from 
 the beautiful truth that All Supposed Matter is Mind. 
 At this stage of my philosophical pursuit, I can- 
 not but look back upon the tenor of my opposition
 
 IIG PHYSIOLOGY [SEC. iv. 
 
 to the fallacious bias in question, and upon the 
 progressive evidences which have in the course of 
 that pursuit been brought to condemn it, with the 
 peculiar satisfaction which attends a conviction 
 that a belief in the existence of Matter is a popular 
 prejudice, so demonstrably fitted to be left only as 
 an heirlooni to the vulgar mass of mankind, that it 
 cannot now prevent the establishment of the sci- 
 ence in question. 
 
 To commence, then, the present investigation 
 of the nature of our Notion of Extension ; I ob- 
 serve, first, that Professor Stewart, together with 
 his predecessor in Pneumatological doctrine, has 
 fortunately sided with names to which I have 
 always referred, as standing highest in my own 
 conception of the subject, such as those of Locke, 
 Clarke, Barrow, and Newton, not to enumerate 
 here a host of other Intellects of the first order, 
 (however they stand in opposition to a considera- 
 ble array of Names of great pretension,) 07i the 
 •primary and fimdamental ground of the Real E.vten- 
 sion both of Body and of Space. The view which 
 has been taken by the School of Reid of the jna?i- 
 ner, or evidence, by which we obtain the Notions of 
 the Extension of Body and that of Space is, indeed, 
 vastly difi'erent from that which results from the 
 Laws of Primary Vision, upon which laws are 
 founded those Consequences, and that Pneumato- 
 logical Superstructure, upon which I all along 
 insist. But, concerning the fact itself of the reality 
 of both these essences, there is the most perfect
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 117 
 
 agreement between the courses of our respective 
 speculations. 
 
 And here it is essential to take our stand upon 
 the fact that, the contrary assumption, and more 
 particularly that extreme degree of it which was 
 entertained by Bishop Berkeley, is one which is 
 the most subversive of all the exercises and attri- 
 butes of reason that is well possible to be imagined. 
 Neither Science, nor Art, of any sort; nor Lan- 
 guage, nor any system of Signs of Ideas ; could 
 exist, — we could not so much as give intelligibility 
 to the Signs of any Science, or Art, or Action, 
 generally speaking; without the pre-supposi- 
 TiON OF ExTEXSiox {together ivith that of Dura- 
 tig's) as forming a Necessary Theatre for the 
 very existence of these things. — Without the pre- 
 supposition of Extension and Duration, Action is 
 impossible ; and Language without import ; and 
 Reason without an object to employ itself upon. 
 A Berkeleian, who, according to his creed, must 
 either declare that he does not in the least degree 
 understand the import of such words as big and 
 little, — up and doiun, — over and under, — before and 
 after,— right side and left side,— contiguous,— far, — 
 near, — at,— in, — &c. ; or, else, upon the other hand, 
 confess that he understands these words in some 
 sense foreign to that in which all mankind in general 
 apprehend them ; must, in the first of these cases, 
 put himself absolutely out of the pale of ordinary 
 understanding; or, in the second, must resort to 
 such shifts, in order to account for his tenet, as 
 are altogether astonishing to reason, and utterly
 
 118 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 incomprehensible to his fellow creatures. How, 
 for example, would it be possible to hold discourse 
 with any man, who should assure us that he can- 
 not conceive a mountain to be larger than the body 
 of any insect which creeps along its base ? 
 
 But, before we proceed farther, it is indispensa- 
 ble to insist upon not only the Real Extension of 
 Body, in opposition to the Berkeleian Theory ; 
 but, also, upon the Rea/itj/ or EMension of Mere 
 Absolute Space, which I consider, in common with 
 the School of Reid, as being the Necessary Ej:- 
 tended Matrlv which has received, or, rather has 
 eternally contained, extended Body ; and which 
 Matrix we cannot conceive possible to be annihi- 
 lated, even though we should suppose Body, or 
 those manifested Energies of the Deity which we 
 call Body, to be removed from it. It is indispen- 
 sable that we should not leave this consideration 
 behind us here, inasmuch as (it is too well-known) 
 there unhappily subsists a great schism upon this 
 fundamental point, between philosophers of the 
 first eminence, and this with some approach to 
 equipolency of opinions with regard to it : — ^Some, 
 with Newton and his illustrious associates, main- 
 taining the reality of the distinction in question ; — 
 while others, with Des Cartes and Leibnitz at their 
 head, hold the opinion that there is no Real 
 External Space or Spread in Nature, ex- 
 cept the Spread or Extension oi So-called Matter or 
 Body, — a Schism with regard to which I have here 
 to suggest a consideration, which I believe has not 
 before been adverted to by Philosophers on either
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 119 
 
 side of the question,— namely — that, the denial of 
 the Reality of Mere Absolute Space involves — a 
 priori — no less a consequence than an inevitable 
 and indisputable Atheism. This momentous con- 
 sequence, I must observe, (at least if I should be 
 found to be borne out by evidence of its truth,) 
 has not been discerned by Professor Stewart, in 
 the course of his philosophical investigations : And 
 this oversight, therefore, happens incidentally to 
 be the first which I have occasion to point out, in 
 my present strictures on his writings. At the 
 same time I remark that, the Atheistical conse- 
 quence in question, if it follow from the premises, 
 demands the more seriously to be adverted to, 
 since some Philosophical Churchmen, of distin- 
 guished eminence, have sided ; and others, without 
 sufficient investigation, might be led to side ; with 
 the deniers of Absolute Space. 
 
 In his Phil. Essays, Ess. 2. cJiap. 2, Mr. Stew-r 
 art says — " It is this circumstance" (he means the 
 confounding of the notion of hardness, Sec. with 
 that of extejision) " that will be found, on examina- 
 ** tion, to be the principal stumbling-block in the 
 ** Berkeleian Theory, and which distinguishes it 
 *' from that of the Hindoos and from all others' 
 " commonly classed along with it by metaphysi- 
 " cians, that it involved the annihilation of Space 
 " as an external existence, thereby unhinging 
 " completely the natural conceptions of the mind 
 " with respect to a truth about which, above all 
 ** within the reach of our faculties, we seem to 
 " be the most completely ascertained ; and which
 
 120 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv, 
 
 " accordingly was selected by Newton and Clarke, 
 *' as the ground-work of their argument for the 
 ** necessary existence of God." 
 
 As preparatory, therefore, to the objection to be 
 laid here against Mr. Stewart's exclusive stric- 
 ture upon the creed of Berkeley ; I must, in the 
 first place, express my own general satisfaction of 
 the solidity of the above-mentioned ground-work 
 of the argument of Clarke and Newton : in the 
 stability of which, also, I think. Professor Stewart 
 himself has again concurred, in his latest publica- 
 tion. And I express my own judgment of the 
 matter here the more especially, on account of the 
 manifestations of dissent from it which have ap- 
 peared ; which, I must affirm, have had no effect 
 in shaking my conviction with regard to the 
 ** ground-work." 
 
 I proceed, then, to state my humble opinion 
 that the creed of Berkeley, although it appears 
 more revolting to our natural reason at first sight, 
 is not in reality more pregnant with evil consequence^ 
 in sweeping away the foundation of Clarke's argu- 
 ment, than is to be charged against the Leibnitzian 
 denial of Mere Absolute Space. It becomes un^ 
 avoidable, therefore, that I should enter in some 
 degree into the merits of this suggestion. In the 
 course of so doing, if any reader should find the 
 few pages, which must be occupied by so serious a 
 matter, too dull for his amusement; or if, from 
 general reading, he shall have taken up a suppo- 
 sition that the subject has been exhausted, or is in 
 itself insuperable ; I may, from previous experience.
 
 SKC IV.] OF MIND. 121 
 
 venture to assure him that he will lose his time in 
 reading any such matters, if his object be to attain 
 any valuable depth, either in Pneumatology or in 
 Metaphysics whatever. At the same time, I would 
 suggest, to every reader who may require it, what 
 1 humbly conceive to be a clue, which cannot lead 
 him wrong in fixing his judgment on this subject; 
 and which I consider as being necessarily prepara- 
 tory to his future course through the various topics of 
 metaphysical speculation ; which is, to observe that 
 the Notions, with regard to Extension of Body and 
 that of Space, upon which I propose to insist, are 
 those which are common to the Philosopher New- 
 ton afid to the gTcat mass of mankind : While the 
 opposed assumptions, which I would here show to 
 be fallacious and chimerical, are those of some 
 Philosophers only, — assumptions built out of 
 scholastic or other extraordinary views of the Subject. 
 From this simple suggestion, therefore, every reader 
 may draw this certain inference — namely — that 
 he shall not need to tax his capacity, in order to find 
 out any thing either occult or difficult, in the course 
 of discussion : And all that he has to do, if he be 
 possessed of any capacity, is to examine fairly 
 ivhcther the arguments set up by the extraordinary 
 deniers of Space have any pretension, to shake the 
 ordinary conception of men in general. I would, 
 of course, commend this clue, to be employed not 
 merely upon the present occasion, wherein the 
 intended discussion will be very brief, but also on 
 the occasion of reading all that has been written, 
 by myself and by other writers, on the subject. 
 Man. Q
 
 122 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 As an additional and especial reason for my 
 prosecuting the subject here, I am obliged to ob- 
 serve, what I have shown on a former occasion, 
 namely, that Dr. Reid, in his treatment of the 
 nature of Space, has not been either so correct, so 
 consistent, or yet in general so profound, as I 
 think might have been expected from his powers, 
 considering that he took his stand on the right side 
 of the question. And, together with this fact, I 
 am not aware that the deniers of Space have been 
 at all met, with any thing like that strength of 
 argument which the subject in reality affords 
 against their fallacy. 
 
 Trusting, therefore, that the question demands 
 no greater incitement, to insure our present consi- 
 deration, than an attention to what has been ad- 
 vanced above ; I proceed to observe. First that. 
 If, according to the assumption of Des Cartes, 
 Matter be supposed to exist and to be infaiitely ex- 
 tefided ; in this case, the Extension of Matter must 
 stand in the mind of a Cartesian, upon the very 
 same footing of necessary existence as that which 
 Absolute Space possesses in the mind of a Newto- 
 nian. The result of this consequence, then, with- 
 out farther argument, is that of a sheer and invin- 
 cible Atheism: because, by it we assume that 
 Matter — Brute Matter — neither was created, nor 
 is annihilable ; since it is certain that, the mo- 
 ment the mind admits the Existence, or Conception, 
 of an Infinite Expanse, whether it be assumed as 
 as being Space, or Matter, it becomes impossible to 
 conceive the Universe ever to have been without it.
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 123 
 
 But, Secondly, — If, according to Leibnitz and 
 the greater number of Philosophers on that side 
 of the question, we suppose Matter to exist, but to 
 exist in only a finite extent ; it follows that the de- 
 nial of Space beyond that extent is not only an. ab- 
 surdity revolting to the natural conceptions of 
 mankind in general ; but, more than this, it leads 
 to as complete an Atheism as that condemned 
 above : because it follows from it that, before finite 
 Matter existed or was created, there was no extended 
 Space or Alatrix, to admit the possibility of its crea- 
 tion. There cannot, I think, be a doubt, therefore, 
 that theLEiBNiTziAN doctrine of the Subject leads 
 to consequences as appalling, as those which I 
 have ascribed to the Cartesian, or which Mr. 
 Stewart has imputed exclusively to the Berke- 
 LEiAN creed. 
 
 As a single proof of this ; I may remark that 
 physical action and force, involving motion, are attri- 
 butes which must be deemed essential to Body, 
 whether Body be supposed to be Matter, or Mind : 
 And, therefore, the principal reason of Clarke — 
 namely — the " sufficient reason" — why Body 
 should begin to move in any one direction, rather 
 than in another, is taken away by the assumption 
 that Absolute Space — the necessary Matrix for 
 the possibility of Motion— has no existence. 
 
 As a supposed remedy, for the evil now objected 
 to. Archbishop King, (who advocates the doc- 
 trine of Leibnitz,) asserts that God " created Space,' 
 when he created Body. And he affirms that, we 
 cannot conceive God not to be ; and yet, we can
 
 124 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 conceive Space not to be. At the same time, we 
 are to observe that. Archbishop King did not be- 
 lieve Ei'tension to be a Mere Idea void of real ex- 
 panse, as was held by Berkeley ; On the contrary 
 he confidently upholds Extension as a real, though 
 a created and therefore an annihilable thing. Now, 
 I must confess, I could quite as soon, and perhaps 
 sooner, go the whole length with Berkeley, and 
 deny the reality or expanse of Extension alto- 
 gether, than believe it capable of either annihila- 
 tion or creation, after my having once acquired the 
 conception of it: For, to conceive the nature of 
 Space, at all, is to me to be convinced of its ne- 
 cessary existence. I am obliged to own, that I 
 cannot in the least, (though with every endeavour 
 to that effect,) agree with the general tenor of rea- 
 soning of Archbishop King on the subject: into 
 whose view of it I have looked again, very recently, 
 for the present purpose ; enriched, as it is, with 
 the notes and reasonings of his learned Commen- 
 tator, and by quotations from Leibnitz and other 
 Oppugners of Space. Although, no one can be 
 more deeply imbued, than I am, with a conviction 
 of the Necessary Existence of God. 
 
 And here, to the conviction which I have already 
 expressed of the solidity of the ground of Clarke's 
 argument, it is important to add that his argument 
 is equally valid, and equally suitable to the pur- 
 pose, whether it be taken along with an assump- 
 tion of the existence of Brute Matter, which how- 
 ever I conceive has been most conclusively ex- 
 ploded ; or, taken along with the proofs, as I
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 125 
 
 altogether esteem them to be, that all Body is 
 Mind. At the same time, it is to be taken along 
 with this last, or rather it is a consequence of it, 
 that I acknowledge myself to be, in one sense of 
 the term, a Cartesian, — that is to say, in affirm- 
 hig the Injimty of Body, and therefore in denybig a 
 Vacuum. In other words ; upon the ground of 
 Clarke and Newton's argument, I feel bound to 
 affirm a Plenum of the Spirit of God in In- 
 finite Space : which consequence, I think, 
 Newton himself would not for a moment have 
 denied, if it had been put to him. When, there- 
 fore, we at any time speak of Void or Mere 
 Space, we can do so only hypothetically for the sake 
 of ajgumeiit, and not as any voidance of Space 
 that can exist : Although it is, at the same time, 
 certain that our original conception of Space, and of 
 its necessary existence, does not involve a conception 
 of the existence of the Deity ; or that of Any Mind 
 or Substance ivhatever : And a conception of the 
 Deity can only be attained by us when we arrive at a 
 mature exercise of reason ; and, then, we can attain 
 it only as a conclusion, deduced from a set Demon- 
 stration laid out and apprehended. Hence, the 
 human conception of the Necessity of Space is cer- 
 tainly 'prior in the time; and, as certainly, is not 
 inferior in evidence ; to the human conception of 
 the Necessity of Any Being that can occupy it. 
 In proof of this, I observe that the whole argument 
 of Clarke is grounded upon an assumed fact— 
 namely— "Something now is :"— And there is 
 no repugnance, to reason, to suppose ourselves
 
 126 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 annihilated; and that nothing now is, in so far as 
 we knoiVy excerpt Space whose annihilation we cannot 
 conceive after having once conceived its existence. But 
 if we suppose Nothing to exist now; we then have 
 nothing to imply, or indicate, a Cause of any 
 existence ; and, hence, nothing except necessary 
 Space is in such case at all supposahle. And, on the 
 other hand, if we affirm that *' Something now is' 
 — that is some extended body — whether Spirit or Mat- 
 ter ; — I then ask ; How could this have been pos- 
 sible without the presupposition of Space, in ivhich to 
 find y^oom for its existencel 
 
 It is here to be distinguished, that the presuppo- 
 sition, now insisted upon, is a presupposition not in 
 time, but only in the order of our ideas. For it 
 follows, from the argument of Clarke, that the 
 First Cause never had a beginning, any more 
 than that Absolute Space which Clarke has de- 
 monstrated that it fills. And it also follows, col- 
 laterally, from those proofs which I have labored 
 to set forth of the truth that all Body is Mind, that 
 Body 7iever had a beginning, or, in other words, 
 that there never was a creation in the Vulgar 
 Sense of that term : Which eternal existence of 
 Body, I fully confess, is my own settled belief on 
 the subject, in result of my whole course of specu- 
 lation ; because, I cannot suppose a time when 
 the Energies of the Deity — (which is all that I mean 
 by ike word Body) were unexerted. The term 
 First Cause in the argument of Clarke, and the 
 word Body in my own speculations as just referred 
 to, mean One and the Same Thing — namely — the
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 127 
 
 Acting Spirit of God. And the Creation, or 
 Universe, I take to be the Actions of his Spirit, 
 in those Modifications which we call Physical 
 Facts. 
 
 It is of moment to distinguish, here, that it does 
 not follow from this last inference that Space and 
 Body are One Same Thing or Esseiice. On the 
 contrary, the very presumption of Space, which, 
 after it enters into our conception, cannot be con- 
 ceived but as existing really and indestructably, 
 and prior in the order of our ideas to all other 
 things, (^Duration excepted,) and existing thus 
 loithout the possibility of being moved ; while Body 
 or the Exertion of Energies may be supposed 
 either to move, or to subside altogether and arise in 
 another part of Space ; makes the Subjects in ques- 
 tion tivo Different Entities : Which plain distinction 
 the Ordinary Man never confounds ; and the Phi- 
 losopher who admits Motion never can confound 
 without great absurdity. But it follows, never- 
 theless, from what I have laid down with regard 
 to it, that Space is, in a certain sense, a Substance ; 
 and that, in this sense, it is the Substance of the 
 Infinite Mind, as Clarke, though under great du- 
 biety or vacillation, and in a sense different from 
 that ivhich I entertain, has called it. As for my 
 own notion of it ; I conceive Absolute Space is 
 the Necessary Stance, i. e. Matrix, for the possi- 
 bility of the Existence of Any Other Substance or 
 Thing that can occupy or fill it : Although, unless 
 we can do away with the assumption of Motion of 
 Body in the process of all physical action, we cannot
 
 128 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 esteem Mere Space to be the Essential Sub- 
 stfDice of Body or Spirit; which last sort of Sub- 
 stance we cannot recognise except as a Being 
 essentially endowed with Activity, and this ac- 
 tivity, in all probability, tievcr altogether unenergised 
 in some way or other. I propose, indeed, to insist 
 farther, in a paper appropriately on Substance, 
 that Mere Space is a Substance in the sense above 
 suggested. And in this view of the subject I 
 differ from Dr. Clarke, who, I think, rather pre- 
 ferably esteems Space to be a Mode of the Sub- 
 stance or Essence of the Deity : While, if the 
 reality of motion of Body be admitted, I must 
 insist that Infinite Space is a Distinct Sheath 
 which is filled with the Divine Essence,— together 
 with the Finite Minds that are comprehended in 
 it. 
 
 From what has been advanced in the foregoing- 
 pages, it becomes manifest. How great is the need 
 that the Schism between Philosophers concerning 
 the real existence of Space should be brought to a 
 satisfactory conclusion. With a view to this desi- 
 deratum, therefore, I devoted a Chapter to Space 
 in my First Lines : the notice of which, in this 
 place, obviates the necessity of my saying any 
 farther with regard to it on the present occasion, 
 except to advert to a consideration which, from 
 sheer oversight, had escaped my attention of meet- 
 ing it in the work just referred to. The matter, 
 to which I now allude, is a denial which has 
 been set up of the existence of Space upon the 
 
 usual LOGICAL RULE FOR THE CONVERSION OF
 
 siic. IV.] OF MIND. 129 
 
 PROPOSITIONS. And it appears to me that I have 
 left little wanting, in point of substantial argument, 
 which I could have desired to urge in the view 
 which I took of the nature of Space in my First 
 Lines, except only that of showing the palpable 
 absurdity, or glaring mistake rather, of that sup- 
 posed objection. I shall therefore consider the 
 matter in this place. And I advert to it the more 
 especially because of the nature of the Work in 
 which it appears; whose selections on the subject 
 are more likely to be consulted by a large class 
 of readers, than the appropriate channels of original 
 writers with regard to it. 
 
 " It has been urged" (says the author of the 
 objection,) " that Space must be something more 
 *' than the absence of matter ; because if nothing 
 " be between bodies, such as the walls of a room, 
 " they must necessarily touch. But surely it is 
 *' not self-evident that bodies must necessarily touch 
 *' if nothing be between them ; nor of the truth 
 *' of this proposition can any thing like a proof be 
 ** brought. It is indeed intuitively certain, that 
 " things, when they are in contact, have nothing 
 " between them ; and hence, it has been rashly 
 ** inferred, that things, when they have nothing 
 " between them, are in contact ;" but this is an 
 illegitimate conversion of the proposition. 
 
 I must interrupt the Writer at this point of his 
 view of the subject, in order to express my simple 
 conception that nothing could be more sound or 
 rational than the conversion of the proposition in 
 this passage so wonderfully condemned, — nothing 
 Man. R
 
 130 PHYSIOLOGY [siic. iv. 
 
 to me more " self -evident" than the fact that " bo- 
 ** dies must necessarily touch if nothing be be- 
 ** tween them :" — And I consider it to be, at one 
 and the same time, a very melancholy and a very 
 satisfactory fact, that the past denial of the exist- 
 ence of Space has been finally grounded, as upon 
 a critical test founded in categorial logic, on reasoning 
 so utterly destructive of itself, as that herein set 
 up. But I now proceed with the passage ; which 
 goes on to say — ** but this is an illegitimate conver- 
 *' sion of the proposition. Every logician knows 
 " that to convert," &c. — ** We are taught by Aris- 
 ** totle, and by common sense, that an universal 
 " affirmative can be converted only into a particular 
 " affirmative. Things when they are in contact 
 ** have nothing between them is a universal affir- 
 ** mative proposition ; and therefore it can be 
 ** converted only into the following particular afiir- 
 ** mative : — Some things, when they have nothing 
 " between them, are in contact, — a proposition 
 ** which by no means includes in it the contact of 
 *' the walls of an empty room." 
 
 Ency. Brit. Third Ed. Metaphysics, 
 
 Article 183. 
 As the baneful denial of the existence of Abso- 
 lute Space has certainly no st?wiger ground to 
 rest upon, than that which is constituted by this 
 above-quoted array of supposed Categorial Logic ; 
 and, as I think no argument can possibly be more 
 void of any claim to respect than this one, after it 
 is once examined ; I conceive nothing could be 
 more desirable than that result, which must at
 
 SEC. iv] OF M[ND. 131 
 
 once appear to us, when we have put it to the 
 test. What, then, is the real state of the question, 
 before we come to this test ? It is this — namely— that, 
 if the accredited rules of the Aristotelian Logic 
 are valid in this instance ; a)id, if the present Op- 
 pugnev of Space has reasoned legitimately /;w« 
 these rules ; they do, by their intuitive force alone, 
 without any evidence at all from our Perception 
 or Judgment; or, rather, in the utter violation of 
 our perception and judgment ; annihilate Space, 
 and strike opposition dumb by the conclusiveness with 
 which they do so. 
 
 Are we, then, to sit down under the despair 
 embodied in this fiat? Reason and Ridicule, alike, 
 forbid it. The real fact of the matter is, that the 
 proposition, as converted above ; and which, in the 
 hands of the Objecter to Space, has wrought such 
 mischief; becomes, when legitimately taken, the 
 solid ground of a totally opposite result. In a word ; 
 the proposition in question is not *' a universal 
 affirmative" proposition; nor is it an affir- 
 mative proposition at all : On the contrary, 
 it is a universal negative proposition; and, as 
 such, it legitimately admits of being converted 
 into another universal negative. The mis- 
 take of the Author of the objection consists in this 
 — namely— He assumes the word which is the Sign 
 of Negation, (i. e. the word Nothing) to serve for 
 the Sign of Something, or of Anything : and then, 
 with this absurd assumption, he forms a mock af- 
 firmative universal proposition : Whereas, instead 
 of emi)loying the word " Nothing,'^ or putting the
 
 132 PHYSIOLOGY [skc. iv 
 
 • 
 
 proposition in the form he has done, — he ought to 
 have said — Things, when they are in contact, have 
 NOT ANY THING between them ; which universal 
 NEGATIVE proposition is legitimately convertible 
 into tliis other universal negative — namely — Things, 
 when they have Aiiy Thing between, are not in 
 contact. 
 
 In confirmation of this exposition, I hardly need 
 observe that the negative, or the affirmative, sign, 
 in any proposition, must affect the copula : And that, 
 it is plain, the Author of the objection has been 
 able to employ the affirmative term — ** have," 
 (in his form of the proposition,) by no other means 
 except by making it couple Negation as a Pre- 
 dicate, with a Positive Thing as its Subject, — an 
 absurdity to the last degree manifest and glaring. 
 Thus, then, the Logic of the Co7iversion of Proposi- 
 tions, in as far as its authority can have any weight 
 or operation in this inquiry, conclusively affi)rds 
 its award to the reality of Space. And it is se- 
 riously to be hoped that the Schism, which has 
 thus long subsisted in the philosophical world with 
 regard to this Reality, must give way in every 
 instance in which any future Philosopher shall set 
 himself to examine the subject duly, and divested 
 of prejudice. 
 
 As a single example of the reasoning of Arch- 
 bishop King on the subject of Space, alluded to 
 above, I shall quote the following passage. In page 
 37, of his Work— (*' On the Origin or Evil,") — 
 he denies the reality of Space, — and equally denies 
 the extension of mind, — upon the assumption that
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 133 
 
 " if we but attend to our thoughts, and sensations, 
 ** which have no relation to external things, or to 
 *' quantity," — ** there will appear to be no more 
 " necessity for the existence of Space than of 
 " Matter." 
 
 Now, I humbly conceive, this assumption is 
 precisely parallel to that of a man's shutting his 
 eyes, in the streets of a large city full of Coaches 
 and Vehicles of all sorts ; and, then, believing that 
 this act may be supposed to annihilate all the 
 vehicles ; and, consequently, that none of them 
 can drive over him. Ludicrous as this supposition 
 must appear ; I seriously can find no difference, in 
 point of reason, between the two assumptions. 
 And, as for the included and intolerable assumption, 
 in the above passage — namely — that '' our thoughts 
 have no relation to quantity ; — it is, now, hardly de- 
 serving of an answer, unless on account of its most 
 certain fallacy, since the Laws of Vision have 
 reduced to rationated proof, (what almost all Phi- 
 losophers in all ages had believed before,) — namely 
 — that the only Quantity, ivhether continuous or 
 discrete, which ive ever perceive are our oivn Sen- 
 sations ; and that, all those quantities which we 
 conceive as being external to us, must have re- 
 mained IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO COXCEIVE if WC 
 
 had not previously perceived their Genera in the 
 Sensations of which 7ve have been co?7 scions. 
 
 In all the cases here last alluded to, of course it 
 is manifest, from the foregoing reasonings, that an 
 act of Judgment or Understanding, upon the Sensa- 
 tions, is essential in the process.
 
 134 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 But, to return to Archbishop King : When he 
 conies to treat of the existence of the Deity, in a 
 subsequent chapter, he turns round upon himself, 
 as will appear from the following expressions. — 
 ** Secondly, we are certain that this principle" 
 (he means the Deity) ** is One, Similar, and 
 *' Uniform. For Matter is, as to its essence, 
 " every where one and alike : the same must be 
 " said of Space if we grant it to be any thing dis- 
 " tinct from Matter : much more must the Cause, 
 " which fills Space with Matter, be One, Simple, 
 " and Uniform." — Now, I observe, that this last 
 reasoning is undeniable. But it follows from it 
 that Any Cause, which can fill Space with any 
 
 thing, MUST ITSELF FILL SPACE ?y zV ^6 ADMITTED 
 that " NOTHING CAN ACT BUT WHERE IT IS." And 
 
 here I must urge, that this objection is ad hominem 
 against King ; because the pretejice, of some mo- 
 dern metaphysicians, since set up ; — (but which I 
 confidently hold to be a figment as contemptible 
 as any fallacy in philosophy,) — namely — that 
 things ?nai/ act ivhere they are not — had 7iot become 
 an Idol of metaphysical vagary in King's time. 
 
 This last-mentioned Chimera, of modern growth, 
 seems indeed to demand an observation, or two, 
 here, in the way of a caution to some readers. 
 The real fact is, that, the supposed nonreality of 
 actual contact, in Physics, can only be proved to 
 amount to this — namely— that the Centres, of the 
 parts of Supposed Matter, are kept asunder by 
 Spheres of Repulsioji forming these parts, respect- 
 ively. Now, then, it remains to be asked ; What
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 135 
 
 are these Spheres of Repulsion, but Bulks? And 
 since undeniably these Bulks are admitted as 
 comino- into a state of proximity which bears 
 
 ALL THE APPEARANCE OF REAL CONTACT ; What 
 
 is this but actual contact of Body icith Body, as 
 Body is now defined by our best Philosophers ? 
 I am prevented, by the nature of the present 
 work, from entering into a subject which would 
 decisively confirm this view of the thing in ques- 
 tion : but I may merely hint, here, my opinion, 
 that, after we assume Elasticity in Body, the fact of 
 motion upon impulse becomes a real secondary effi- 
 ciency, strictly demonstrable in the process of the 
 mutual repulsions of these Bodies. And I am not 
 deterred from avowing that I cannot find reason to 
 think otherwise, notwithstanding all that has been 
 said by Philosophers to the contrary of our know- 
 ledge of real efficiency ; ivhich, we are to observe, 
 includes a denial of Secondary efficiency. 
 
 In fine. I entertain a sufficient trust that the 
 Schism, which has heretofore subsisted concerning 
 Space, must give way to a satisfactory general 
 reunion among those Philosophers who shall come 
 after us, without any dissent of a sufficient amount 
 to disturb the Subject. It is not to be denied, 
 indeed ; and it must for the sake of the subject be 
 held up to particular remark here ; that this 
 Schism, which lies deeper in Philosophy, and which 
 more seriously arraigns the Capacity of the Human 
 Understanding, for the attaining of certainty in its 
 acquisition of First Truths, than any other about 
 which it is inquisitive, has been left as a derelict,
 
 im PHYSIOLOGY [SEC. iv. 
 
 and an opprobrium, by the leading Metaphysicians 
 of tliis Country, for nearly the period of a century. 
 During- the long philosophical reign of the School 
 of Reid, nothing has been eftected towards its 
 amelioration. That Philosopher, himself, has 
 treated the subject only obtusely, — not to say 
 superficially. And Professor Stewart has not ap- 
 peared to deem it available to entertain it at all, 
 except by brief and profitless allusions. Nor must 
 we here fail to notice, as a very important consi- 
 deration, adverted to in the outset of this paper, 
 that, by attributing to the Theory of Berkeley, 
 siiigii/ and exclusively, the consequence of " taking 
 " away the ground-work of Clarke and Newton's 
 " Argument for the necessary existence of God," 
 Mr. Stewart has (if my view of the subject be 
 deemed tenable) unwittingly thrown a veil over 
 a similar and equally-mischievous fallacy, in the 
 Creed of those Philosophers who admit the Ex- 
 tension OF Body, but deny that of Space : 
 And, that an Atheism — a priori — must equally 
 follow the Berkeleian, the Cartesian, and the 
 Leibnitzian creed. 
 
 There is one consideration, which it may be of 
 service to suggest at the close of these statements. 
 It appears to be generally overlooked, by the dis- 
 putants on both sides of the subject, but it yet, 
 perhaps, may operate upon many readers, as 
 strongly as any that can be adduced : which is 
 that, whoever denies Space, must also deny ^lotion. 
 This consequence, I apprehend, follows equally 
 from each of the three Creeds above-mentioned.
 
 «£c. IV.] OF MIND. 137 
 
 And yet, we find such distinguished Opponents 
 of Space as Archbishop King and Bishop Law 
 continually descanting upon Motion, as if it were 
 a thing altogether compatible with their Scheme. 
 Bishop Berkeley, indeed, has preserved a consist- 
 ency at least, in treating Motion, as well as Ex- 
 tension, as being nothing in External Nature, but 
 only a Mere Idea in a Mind. But, in order to 
 manifest the fallacy of the Writers first mentioned, 
 as a self-evident truth, we have only to suppose 
 Body to exist, and to be either Matter or Spirit, 
 and either infinite or finite ; In either of which 
 cases, if its parts occasionally approach to, or re- 
 cede from, one another, these changes of distaiice 
 between the parts must have been impossible if 
 the whole had not existed in a Sheath which af- 
 forded room for the motion of the parts. 
 
 In fine : I repeat here, in order that it may be 
 duly looked to by Religionists, and by all con- 
 cerned, that the denial of Space, in the sense of 
 Leibnitz and of King, is as mischievous a fallacy, 
 in taking away the ground of the proof a priori 
 of the necessary existence of God, as the denial 
 of the Extension of Body in the sense of Berke- 
 ley is ; which last has been exclusively arraigned 
 by Professor Stewart, and held up by him as 
 having peculiar philosophical consequences. 
 
 jMa/i
 
 138 PHYSIOLOGY [skc. iv. 
 
 SUBSECTION 2. 
 
 1. Of the Speculatio7is of Professor Stewart concern- 
 ing Extension . — 2. Mr, Stewart's notice of Dr. 
 Hutchesons hint concerning 'our notion of Exten- 
 sion. Extension apprehended by the Mind by both 
 Sense and Intellect. — 3. Importance of this Double 
 Evidetice of the fact, to the Science of Pneuma- 
 tology. 
 
 1. 
 
 It has appeared, in the foregoing article, that 
 such was the rational ground concerning the reality 
 of Extension and of Space, upon which Professor 
 Stewart had started in his philosophical course, 
 that, it may be believed, had he not previously 
 enthralled his understanding in the fallacious views 
 of Reid ; who had himself previously but half 
 emancipated his understanding from the still more 
 fallacious views of Berkeley ; he would have taken 
 a very different direction in philosophising, from 
 that which he has actually exhibited to the world. 
 The principal objections, therefore, which I at 
 present propose to state against Mr. Stewart's doc- 
 trine of our Notions of Extension and of Space, are 
 those that follow. 
 
 First. In point of enumeration, it is requisite to 
 mention again, what has already been objected — 
 namely — that, although he, in point of fact, gene- 
 rally admits the distinct reality of each of these
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 139 
 
 things, he has yet confounded them together in his 
 allusion to the Berkeleian Theory, and has asserted 
 Berkeley's denial of the real Extension of Body to 
 be the oxly doctrine of the subject that stands 
 opposed to the ground-work of Clarke's argument. 
 
 Secondli/. The assumption upon which I\Ir. 
 Stewart in the main asserts the reality of the at- 
 tribute called Extension — namely — that of " the 
 '' jiatural conception of the mind,'" is not argument, 
 but is only mere assertion, however true it may be 
 in point of fact : because, a Berkeleian might 
 employ the very same CTpression, to serve his own 
 purpose, however untrue it would be in reality. 
 And when, in order to make up for this defect in 
 his view of the subject, we attend to what Mr. 
 Stewart has advanced in the way of argument, in 
 support of his assumption, the result, I think, is 
 deplorable, and is any thing but evidence of the fact. 
 The following several quotations will serve to 
 evince the truth of this last remark. And it is 
 important, here, to the advancement of the subject, 
 to point out what is their tendency and amount. 
 
 In the First Volume of his Elements, Ed. 3. 
 page 97. he says—" The history of our notions of 
 " extension and figure is not altogether so obvious" 
 (he means as those of colors, sounds, &c.) " and 
 ** accordingly it has been the subject of various 
 " controversies." Again, in his Essays, in the 
 conclusion of Ess. 2, he says — " That the idea of 
 " Time might have been formed without any ideas 
 " cither o{ citension or of motion is sufficiently ob- 
 " vious : but it is by no means equally clear
 
 140 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 *' whether the idea of motion presupposes that of 
 " extension, or that of cxtejision the idea of motion'' 
 In a Note (l), upon this last passage, he says — *' I 
 '* intended to have introduced here some doubts 
 ** and queries with respect to the origin, or rather 
 " to the history, of the notion of Extension; not 
 " with any view to an explanation of a fact which 
 *' I consider, with the eminent philosophers referred 
 ** to in the text, as altogether unaccountable," &c. 
 — *' Whatever light can be thrown upon this very 
 " obscure subject may be regarded as a valuable 
 " accession to the natural history of the human 
 " understanding."— He afterwards, in the same 
 note says, — '' I am strongly inclined, at the same 
 ** time, to think, that the idedi oi Extension involves 
 '* the idea oi motion ; or, to express myself more 
 '' explicitly, that our first notions of Extension are 
 *' acquired by the effort of moving the hands over 
 ** the surfaces of bodies, and by the effort of moving 
 " our own bodies from place to place." — He nearly 
 concludes the Note by saying that, he differs 
 from Dr. Smith, and M. Destutt Tracy, and 
 other inquirers, (who insist upon the ^notion of the 
 hand in clearing up this mystery,) only in this— 
 namely—'* that, if true, it exhibits the problem in 
 " a form still more manifestly insoluble than that 
 " in which it is commonly viewed." 
 
 Now, with the opinion of Mr. Stewart here last 
 quoted, I altogether agree — namely— that the sup- 
 posed solution of the question by the use of the 
 hand, or by motion at all, would involve the subject 
 in the darkest cloud possible. But I ask, (and this
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 141 
 
 not without astonishment,) How has it been pos- 
 sible that the Writers in question, one after another, 
 have gone on in stifling the strongest calls of reason 
 by obstinately referring the origin of our notion of 
 Extension to motion, or to the hand ; ichile their 
 Eyes were open to behold all the stationary ex- 
 tended Colors, and Visible Figures, which they daily 
 perceived ? It becomes, I think, perfectly mani- 
 fest, that an inveterate prejudice of these Writers, 
 against the Extension of our Sensations of Colors , and 
 of Touch, founded in their having previously yielded 
 their reason to the Dogma of the SimpUcitif of the 
 Mind, has been the Enchanter who hath wrought 
 this delusion upon them. And the moment we 
 refer to the Laws of Vision, (which demonstrate 
 that field-extension and figure are Properties of 
 our Sensations,) the illusion must be dispelled. It 
 has already appeared, that the rationale which the 
 Laws of Vision exhibit of the process of perception 
 of Extension and Figure ; (which process Professor 
 Stewart, in the quotation here above given, had 
 prematurely declared his confident belief to be 
 " insoluble •") has since then received his own com- 
 plete virtual assent : Which proceeding has left 
 nothing on his part to be desired with regard to 
 it. But here, nevertheless, as a popular consi- 
 deration for every understanding, it may be asked, 
 even supposing that we had not the rationale in 
 question now to proceed upon, What Philosopher 
 would have the hardihood to affirm that, if a man 
 were fixed in a nich, from infancy to age ; and 
 were, for seventy years, to look around him, on
 
 142 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 all the passing and stationary objects of his sight, 
 such as Houses, Men, Trees, Horses, Carts, &c. 
 he could never in all that time, from his sight alone, 
 derive the notions of big, little, broad, long, high, 
 low, lesser, greater, right-side, left-side, round, 
 square, &c. ? As for the conceits of Bishop 
 Berkeley on the subject, so reprehended by Mr. 
 Stewart, it is certain that he jiever attempted any 
 such intolerable assertion as this : He only affirmed, 
 concerning our Sensations of Colors, (" New Theory 
 of Vision," Prop. 156.) that, though "It's true, 
 " there be divers of them perceived at once ; and 
 *' more of some, and less of others ; accurately to 
 ** complete their Magnitudes, and assign precise 
 ** determinate proportions between things so va- 
 *' riable and inconstant, if we suppose it possible 
 ** to be done, must yet be a very trifling, and in- 
 *' significant labor." In another place he asks ; 
 " Is not the Extension we see coloured?" — It is ma- 
 nifest, therefore, from these quotations alone, that 
 Berkeley, whom Dr. Reid has acknowledged to 
 have been his Philosophical Father in this be- 
 lief never dreamed that there was any mystery 
 over the Origin of our notion of Extension. 
 
 It is indeed to be particularly insisted upon, in 
 this place, agreeably with the passage just quoted, 
 (because I conceive it is more than probable that 
 a great mistake has prevailed among readers with 
 regard to the fact,) that Berkeley, notwith- 
 standing his unfounded and mischievous assertion 
 of a specific difference bettveen Visible Figure and 
 Tangible, never denied the E.rtension of our Sensations
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 143 
 
 of Color in so far as any thing in the Universe 
 is extended. All that he denied was the reality 
 of Out-Spread, or Spread ivhatever ; or, in other 
 words, he conceived the notion of Out-Spread 
 OR Spread to be an illusion, and not a realitij, both 
 ill Sight aiid in Touch : And, of course, he equally- 
 supposed the Extended Cause of our Sensations — 
 namely — the Infinite Mind — to be not spread, 
 i. e. as NOT filling Infinite Space, because he ad- 
 mits the existence of No Such Thino- as Real 
 Space to be filled. All which monstrous proceed- 
 ing, we are to observe, followed from his having 
 commenced his philosophical course with a deter- 
 mined prejudice of the SimjjUcity of the Mind. 
 
 Now, in opposition to, and in e.vpress rebellion 
 against, this Paternal creed of Berkeley, we find 
 Dr. Reid, ichen he forsook the Berkeleian Scheme 
 and admitted the reality of Spread or Expansion in 
 Body, intrepidly set up a denial of All Extejision 
 of our Sensations of Color, and Touch, whether real 
 or illusory. And, with regard to Color, he, if pos- 
 sible more intrepidly, made no scruple to deny to 
 it the office of so much as in any way occasioning, or 
 suggesting, our Notion of Figure, or Extension. In 
 proof of this — (his well-known doctrine — ) it can 
 only be necessary for me to quote the following 
 passage from his ** Inquiry." In chap. 5, sect. 5, 
 of that Work, he says, — ** it must on the other 
 " hand be allowed, that if we had never felt" 
 (felt !) " any thing hard or soft, rough or smooth, 
 " figured or moved, we should never have had a 
 " conception of extension." It is indisputable.
 
 144 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 then, that Dr. Reid, in the assumption just quoted, 
 has placed himself in the situation of virtually- 
 affirming that a man, bi/ the use of his sight alone, 
 employed upon all the objects around him, from 
 infancy to old age, could never acquire any notion of 
 either Broad, or Long, or Shape, or Spread, or Local 
 Position whatever ! Can we think it will readily be 
 believed, in after times, that any Philosopher (or 
 we must say any two Philosophers,) in other re- 
 spects much enlightened, and living in a very en- 
 lightened age, could have been brought, by any 
 force of bias, to attempt the promulgation of so 
 intolerable a proposition, as that which I have just 
 shewn is imputable to Dr. Reid ? 
 
 But, concerning the /rw^Y^ o/'^irt^ in the specu- 
 lations of Dr. Reid, and concerning the method of 
 philosophisi?ig pursued by his School, I must have 
 occasion to speak more particularly in the sequel ; 
 especially, in the strictures which it will be re- 
 quisite to offer upon the conversion of Dr. Reid, 
 from the Berkeleian to his own Scheme. Here, 
 however, when so much of the reality of the sub- 
 ject is at stake, it may not be more than duly 
 cautious to insist that, it is impossible to deny the 
 intention of Reid to exclude the Office of sight, 
 in the case adverted to. To justify what I have 
 now said ; it is only requisite to add that, he con- 
 tinues the very passage in question as follows : — 
 " so that as there is good ground to believe, that 
 " the notion of extension could not be prior to 
 " that of other primary qualities; so it is certain 
 "that it. could not be posterior to the notion of
 
 Sfic. I V.J OF MIND. 145 
 
 " any of them, being necessarily implied in them 
 *' all." 
 
 It is matter for remark here, however, that al- 
 though this is Reid's doctrine in his " Inquiry ;" 
 he afterwards, (in his Essays, Ess. 2. chap. 19,) 
 completely vacillates, and assigns to Sight the 
 office which he at first denied to it. Thus he says — 
 ** There are only two of our senses by which the 
 ** notion of space enters into the mind ; to wit, 
 ** touch and sight." This observation, in the place 
 last referred to, is a sound one : although the 
 ground he had chosen involved him. in inconsis- 
 tency in making it. Among other merits, in that 
 place, he expresses his dissent from a very erroneous 
 doctrine of Berkeley, in the following words : — 
 ** When I use the names of tangible and visible 
 ** space, I do not mean to adopt Berkeley's opinion 
 *' so far as to think that they are really different 
 ** things, and altogether unlike. I take them to be 
 ** different conceptions of the same thing : the one 
 " very partial, and the other more complete, but 
 " both distinct and just as far as they reach." In 
 this observation, Reid is certainly right : Of w^hich, 
 any ordinary person may be satisfied, without far- 
 ther argument, by employing his Eye to trace out 
 a square, a circle, or any other figure, upon a wall ; 
 in which process, he will find that the Eye moves 
 its (lirectmi in the very same manner that the Finger , 
 or the Hand, proceeds when a tangible square, or 
 circle, is traced out. 
 
 I shall close these strictures by observing that, 
 the School of Reid most lamentably eonfoamls the 
 Man. T
 
 146 PlIl^SlOLOGY [SEC. iv. 
 
 Science and Phenomena of Primary Vision, with 
 the Science and Phenomena of Secondary Vision ; 
 — than which, no Two Subjects can be more dis- 
 tinct, or different. In other words, that School 
 assumes, and maintains, that all Vision— that is 
 ALL ITS Phenomena — is a language, and noth- 
 ing BUT a Language. Wiiich assumption, I con- 
 fidently affirm, with all its pretended evidences 
 and consequences, is one great mass of the most 
 demonstrable, and demonstrated, fallacy. I admit, 
 with that School, that Secondary Vision is indeed 
 a Language, signifying, to those who can interpret 
 its Phenomena — namely — to all adult persons in 
 general, — the magnitudes, the figures, the positions, 
 and the distances, of such Objects of Touch as are 
 distant from us beyond the immediate reach of 
 Touch itself, but not beyond our Sight: Which 
 magnitudes, figures, positions, and distances, in 
 strict fact, ice do not perceive by Sight at all, but 
 perceive by an instantaneous process of our judg- 
 ment or understanding; which judgment we have 
 learned in time, as an Art ; and could not perform 
 in our early infancy. But Primary Vision, on 
 the contrary, is Itself a Species of Touch : 
 And the objects it apprehends are Peal magnitudes 
 — namely — the Peal Magnitudes and Figures of our 
 Sensations of Colors ; which Magnitudes are nearly 
 about equal to {for they are separate in place, and 
 therefore are not identically the same things as,) the 
 Real Magnitudes of the Impressions of light on the 
 Fund of the Eye during Vision. I repeat, therefore, 
 on account of the vastness and the mischief of the
 
 SEC. iv] OF MIND. 147 
 
 fallacy of the Reideian School, that the Phenomena 
 of Primary Vision are not a Language : Thei^ 
 do NOT signify', or even so much as imply , or indi- 
 cate, or stio-o'esf, the existence of Any Object be- 
 YOND THEM ; Hot cvcn SO miicli as the existence 
 of the impressions, or images, in the Nervous 
 Retina of the Eye : although we afterwards learn to 
 make them serve in the office of suppli/ing us with 
 guesses, (ivhich guesses are often most fallacious in 
 /«c^,)ofthe existence, &c. of objects external to 
 our bodies. 
 
 In contrast with this great mistake of Reid, it 
 is especially due to Berkeley to state here, that 
 He did not confound Primary Vision, with Se- 
 condary : On the contrary, he made the due dis- 
 tinction between the Subjects : And, what is more, 
 to him is due the honor of reducing the Pheno- 
 mena of the latter, in some degree, to matter of 
 science ; although he did not hit upon the rationale, 
 or means, of raising a Science of Primary Vision 
 from its appropriate phenomena, owing (as it should 
 seem) to that deceptive subtilty which has pre- 
 vented men in all ages from discerning those Laws 
 of the Interlimitation of our Sensations of Colors 
 which absolutely create Visible Figure or Out 
 line : which subtilty betrayed Berkeley, no less 
 than the vulgar mass of mankind, into the profound 
 misconception that a visible line must be a thing of 
 SOME COLOR, — ** a blue, or a red line." 
 
 After what has been conceded on the part of 
 Professor Stewart, in his taking up the Lockeian 
 position laid down by Lord Monboddo; I may
 
 148 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 leave it to every ingenuous person, Whether 
 there can exist a doubt that the eyes of Mr. 
 Stewart, towards the close of his life, were com- 
 pletely opened to the fact that all was lost, 
 of this so much-celebrated doctrine of Reid 
 which pretends that Primary Vision, (as well as 
 Secondary,) is a il/ere Language y consisting of Signs 
 altogether unlike to the things signified: Although, 
 from the state of the subject in the public mind, it 
 is manifest that the fact of Professor Stewart's 
 conversion does 7iot do aivay the necessity of the pre- 
 sent and following discussions. The Philosophy of 
 the School of Reid is not only interwoven, in its 
 course, with much collateral true criticism ; but it 
 contains fundamental assumptions so attractive to 
 deluded human vanity, that it might struggle hard for 
 existence, at least in the minds of a considerable 
 number of individuals, if it were, in however large 
 an extent, only scotched not killed to the convic- 
 tion of every person who may ever turn his mind, 
 rationally, to this department of knowledge. 
 
 2. 
 
 In continuation, I observe that not only have 
 the Speculations of the School of Reid left, as a 
 matter proscribed, the whole subject of the Ex- 
 tension of our Sensual Modifications, together with 
 all the consequences which result from the demon- 
 stration of their Extension : But, in the following 
 example we have to mark a notable and a compli-
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 149 
 
 cated instance of vacillation on the part of Mr. 
 Stewart ; by which he retracts the doctrine of our 
 gaining the Idea of Extension from the Sense of 
 Touch only, or from Touch together with ]\ lotion. — 
 The notice of this inconsistency, therefore, I shall 
 introduce here, previously to showing another and 
 more curious inconsistency in the procedure of Dr. 
 Reid ; by which he has exploded his own Theory, 
 in admitting that our Ideas measure Duration; and 
 previously, also, to my showing that the doctrine 
 of Kant (which I conceive has been greatly misap- 
 prehended by Mr. Stewart,) is, when divested of some 
 manifest inconsistency, altogether in unison with 
 the view which is herein maintained. 
 
 In his Philosophical Essays, Essay 1. Chap. 3, 
 Mr. Stewart, after having quoted Dr. Hutcheson 
 to say that — ' Extension, Figure, Motion, and 
 
 * Rest, seem to be more properly ideas accompany- 
 ' ing sensations of sight and touch, than sensations 
 
 * of either of those senses,' — goes on to observe 
 that, — " The peculiarity which Hutcheson had the 
 *' merit of first remarking, with respect to our 
 '' ideas of extension, figure, and motion, might, 
 " one should have thought, have led him to con- 
 " jecture that Locke's principles, when applied to 
 *' some of the other objects of our knowledge, 
 ** would perhaps require an analogous latitude of 
 " construction. But no hint of such a suspicion 
 " occurs, as far as I recollect,— in any part of his 
 " writings ; nor does it appear that he was at all 
 *' aware of the importance of the criticism on which 
 " he had stumbled. The fact, as I shall have
 
 150 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 '' occasion to show in another Essay, is he had 
 ** anticipated the very instances which were after- 
 *' wards appealed to by Reid, as furnishing an 
 '' erperimentum crucis in support of his own reason- 
 " ings against the ideal theory." 
 
 Now upon this passage I must observe, in the 
 first place, that it contains not only a vacillation in 
 doctrine ; but, also, an incorrectness of reference : 
 For, first, since Dr. Reid (as has been shewn,) 
 expressly denied to sight the office of occasioning in 
 us any notion of extension ; he could not consistently 
 have appealed to both Touch and Sight, as an e.v- 
 perimentum crucis, as Mr. Stewart here, by speaking 
 in the plural number, loosely asserts him to have 
 done. And, secondly, Mr. Stewart having here 
 admitted, without exception or comment, the po- 
 sition of Hutcheson — namely — that the notion of 
 extension accompanies sensations of both senses — 
 namely — of Touch and of Color ; — this certainly is 
 a vacillation, and a very momentous one, from the 
 extreme position of Reid : Nor can it be denied 
 that it is a vacillation from the doctrine of Mr. 
 Stewart himself; because he has quoted, with 
 approbation, in his Philosophical Essays, (Essay 
 2. chap. 2. page 92) this extreme position of Reid 
 — namely — that our Notion of Extension is ac- 
 quired from Touch or Feeling only — that is from 
 objects which we have " felt," — to the cvclusion 
 of sight. 
 
 Nor is this all : Because I must here insist upon 
 yet another instance of vacillation in Mr. Stewart 
 on the subject,— namely, — in his having, in the
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. J51 
 
 last quotation, expressly sided with Hutcheson 
 that the Notion of Extension accompanies senm- 
 tions of Sight and of Touch ; whereas, in a passage 
 formerly here quoted, he says — " I am strongly 
 " inclined to think that the idea of Eaiension in- 
 ** volves the idea of Motion, or, to express myself 
 ** more explicitly, that our first notions of exten- 
 *' sion are acquired by moving the hands over the 
 ** surfaces of bodies." 
 
 Now, if the above-quoted tissue of jumbling and 
 inconsistent assertions were uttered by any ordi- 
 nary person, talking on the subject ; or, even, by 
 any Philosopher talking in ordinari/ discourse, apart 
 from Philosophy ; it is certain, the confusion in- 
 volved would not be worth commenting upon. 
 But, that a Philosopher, descanting upon the Subject 
 as matter of Philosophy, should evince such a no- 
 table shifting in the saddle of his argument, is 
 undeniably a matter which becomes a momentous 
 subject of criticism, since it affords indisputable 
 internal evidence that his doctrine of the subject is 
 no more clear, nor true, than it is fixed or invariable. 
 And here it is beyond a cavil, that the assumption 
 of the Idea of Extension's accompanying Sensations 
 of Feeling only ;—ixnd, that again, of its accom- 
 panying Sensations both of Feeling and of Sight ; — 
 and, that other or third assumption, of its i^equiring 
 the additional instrumentality of :\ioriON, of the 
 hands, or of the body, to ascertain it ; are three as 
 DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS, in thc mind of a Philo- 
 sopher, at the moment of philosophising, as any 
 three notions whatever.
 
 152 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 As for the fact that some Writers on the Conti- 
 nent have fallen into the supposition of there being 
 a mystery over the subject ; I can only suppose 
 that a desire to suhlimise the mind and its opera- 
 tions, in the spirit of the Reideian School, has 
 given rise to this chimera. And if the writings of 
 that School should extend their influence abroad, 
 as there is now some appearance of their doing ; 
 we shall, in such an event, have only to mark a 
 repetition of the course before followed by the 
 Writers of France, in the case of the Philosophy 
 of Locke ; — the untenable points of which they 
 embraced, and founded speculations upon, many 
 years after their fallacy was seen through in Bri- 
 tain. But it is far more important to insist here, 
 as an antidote, or a caution on the subject, that no 
 such sentiment of wonder, or mystery, with re- 
 gard to its Origin was ever entertained by such 
 thinkers as Des Cartes, Malebranche, Leibnitz, 
 Newton, Locke, Clarke, Berkeley, or Hume, any 
 more than by any of the Ancient Philosophers. 
 In a word ; The whole pretended mystery of the 
 Origin of our Notion of Extension is a Chimera ; 
 Which illusion has arisen about, or not long before, 
 the time when Dr. Reid, forsaking the creed of 
 Berkeley, conceived the attempt to deprive our 
 sensations of Color and of Touch of those most- 
 surely-ascertained attributes ivhich Berkeley him- 
 self, no less than all other Philosophers, has in- 
 sisted upon their possessing. Nor could such an 
 attempt as that of Reid end, (sooner or later,) in 
 any other fate of demonstrated absurdity than it
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 153 
 
 has done : Althouo-h we must not confound or 
 overlook a real distinction to be made here — 
 namely— that it is a vastly different thing to ob- 
 serve i?i gfvss, with all mankind, the Origin or 
 Sensual Occasion of the idea of Extension, from 
 that of being able to analyse or resolve any 
 VARICOLORED, OR uNicoLORED, Scnsatioii of Co- 
 lor into its COLORED compartments AND LIMITS ; 
 
 or, in other words, to reduce Perception to a Science^ 
 by demonstrating that our Judgment co-operates with 
 Sensation in this process, and by showing the 
 
 MANNER HOW THEY DO thuS CO-OpCrate. 
 
 Secondly. — To proceed, now therefore, to con- 
 sider the Subject of Extension under a more ad- 
 vanced aspect ; as has already just been hinted, I 
 altogether agree that there is a certain and a very 
 frequent Modification of the Idea of Extension, in 
 which the Idea of Extension is indeed "« notion 
 *' accompaiiying Sensations of Sight, and Touch, 
 " ratJier than a mere sensation of either of these senses :" 
 — namely, — It is certain that every perception or 
 idea of extension that exceeds the magnitude of a sen- 
 sible point, either of Color or of Touch, is an idea 
 NOT ENTIRELY of Scnsc or mcrc Consciousness, but 
 is an idea or notion of the Understanding, — it being 
 formed by our discernment or judgment of the co- 
 existence OF many, or SEVERAL, scHsible points 
 of Color, or of Touch, on the mind at any one 
 time. This fact I have duly adverted to in my 
 First Lines, as being preparatory to my treating 
 the process of the perception of Figure or Outline : 
 Man. u
 
 ]54 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 In which place, I suggested that any ord'mary-aized 
 patch of color is not, as is generally supposed, a 
 sensation, — that is 7iot a simple or single sensation 
 or object o{ mere consciousness ; — but it is an assem- 
 blage of many elementary sensations — i. e. of maiiy 
 sensible points of color, — co-existing locally, 
 SIDE BY SIDE ONE ANOTHER in the mind ; and is 
 discerned by our Judgment as such. But, in a stri- 
 king opposition and contrast to this fact, it is in 
 the highest degree evident that the School of Reid 
 has never interpreted the discovery of Hutcheson in 
 THIS manner; nor has it in the least admitted that 
 we perceive any magnitude, or extension, by any 
 evidence that admits of being analysed, or expressed 
 by any species of rationale: And, hence, the at- 
 tempt of that School to avail itself of the concep- 
 tion of Hutcheson was no other than an illusory 
 act ; and was fully as dark, if indeed it was not 
 much more dark, than the conception in question 
 was in the mind of Hutcheson himself. At the 
 same time, it is undeniable, (either by reason or 
 by sense,) that a Sensible Point of Color or " Mini- 
 " mum Visibile/' inasmuch as it is larger than a 
 mathematical point, is an extended thing : And it 
 follows clearly, from this, that our Sensations of 
 Color, even in their elementally points or singly taken, 
 are extended ihm^^, and are, in strict mathematical 
 truth, NOT Points, but Surfaces ; although we 
 cannot by Sense divide them into lesser surfaces. 
 Hence it results, undeniably, that we have a dou- 
 ble evidence of the Exte?ision of the Percipient 
 Mind ; — namely — a Consciousness of the super-
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 155 
 
 fcial nature of each minute elementary Sensation, and 
 an Intuition or Judgment of a co-existence of 
 many, or rather of millions, of these Elementary 
 Surfaces in the Mind every time we are modified 
 by any Ordinary-sized Patch of Sensation of 
 Color ; And the same reference holds good, alike, 
 in our Sensations of Touch. 
 
 It was to this Modification of the act of Per- 
 ception — namely — the Modification in which 
 Sense can no longer act, as it does in the case of 
 the Laws of Vision wherein it suffers a co-existence 
 of Varied Colors ; but in which Intellect alone 
 takes up the process, by discerning that One Un- 
 varied Patch of Sensation of Color is divisible into 
 Minute Elementary Sensations ; that I alluded at 
 an earlier stage of this treatise : wherein I com- 
 pared the intellectual process, now in question, to 
 Harrowing ; whereas the process in the Laws of 
 Vision may be said to be analogous to ploughing 
 the phenomena. 
 
 3. 
 
 As a most important consideration, I have now 
 to point out, that the two-fold evidence of the 
 Extension of the Percipient Subject or 
 Mind renders the truth of the Extension of the 
 Mind the most certain, (if any truth can be more 
 certain than some of those that are proved by single 
 evidence) of any within the scope of our faculties 
 to ascertain. And, when this double evidence of 
 the matter is duly contrasted with the Views and
 
 loG PHYSIOLOGY' [sec. iv. 
 
 Arguments of Dr. Hutcheson and of the School of 
 Reid with regard to the subject, I deem it may be 
 of some moment, as an evidence of consistency in 
 speculation, on a subject pregnant with such con- 
 sequences, to adduce here the fact of my having, 
 in my earhest speculations concerning it, — namely 
 — in the Essay on Consciousness, — advanced ge- 
 nerically the very same account of our acquisition 
 of the idea of Extension by double evidence. In 
 page 61 and following, of the work just mentioned, 
 I have expressed such passages as these : which, 
 as furnishing a contrast to the assumptions of the 
 Writers already had in consideration, I think ought 
 to be placed beside my subsequent and present 
 reasonings on the subject : — " Extension is mani- 
 " fested to us, (at any one visual impulse,) by two 
 " different co-existent feelings. One of these is 
 " already described, as being no other than color 
 ** itself; the other is a consciousness from co-e.vistent 
 ** conjoined impulses, which sort of consciousness 
 " (by inference) renders probable the extension of 
 " the pressing light ; but, by a necessary and 
 ** stronger inference, certifies the Extension of the 
 " Percipient which so feels. — This ast mentioned 
 ** co-feeling from extended impulses is (as well as 
 " color) di primary feeling, that is to say, we are as 
 " truly conscious of the co-existe7ice of several con- 
 " sciousnesses, as we are of one consciousness. 
 " For instance, upon suffering black and white 
 " squares, when we look at a Chess board, we are 
 *' as conscious that we suffer several colors, as that 
 *' we suffer one.'' Here, nevertheless, it is to be
 
 SEC. IV.] • OF MIND. 157 
 
 " observed that, the suffering called color and the 
 *' consciousness of several co-e.vistent similar suffer- 
 ** ings are two different sorts of consciousness." ' 
 
 ** It is thus demonstrated that Extension is be- 
 *' trayed (at one impulse) in ttvo different ways ; 
 '* and this, peculiar comple.vness of the evidence cer- 
 *' tifies the real existence of the quality of Exten- 
 " sion, beyond any of those which have heretofore 
 *' been called Qualities of Body. — It at the same 
 '* time proves that, the Extension of the Percipient 
 ** is a more necessary inference, than that of Body." 
 
 Such as the above are the reasonings in a Work 
 which Professor Stewart has acknowledged he had 
 ** dipped into ;" But which, he signifies, he threw 
 from him with a resolve never to look into another 
 page of my icritings. Let the competent reader 
 therefore compare these passages, or contrast 
 them, with Dr. Hutcheson's vague hint, and with 
 Mr. Stewart's assumption of the mysteriousness and 
 ifisolubility of the subject : and let him, upon this, 
 pronounce ingenuously, whether he believes it was 
 Q.n unmixed love of science that made Mr. Stewart 
 resolve to treat my earliest labors thus ; with what- 
 ever defects, 1 am ready to acknowledge, they 
 were otherwise mixed up. And here, I think, no 
 
 ' Tlie language, or import, of the above passages, I would 
 now correct only by distinguishing tiiat the word " conscious- 
 ness" is therein sometimes improperly employed. Thus, in- 
 stead of saying we are " conscious of tha co-existence ofsfveral 
 consciousnesses ;" I would say, we are cerlijitd, by our Intel- 
 lectual Faculty or Judgment, of the co-existence of several 
 consciousnesses.
 
 158 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 one can imagine that, at this moment, I have any- 
 other feeling than that of peculiar satisfaction in 
 referring to this proceeding of Mr. Stewart ; es- 
 pecially when I reflect on the circumstances in 
 which I first presumed to indulge in, and to pub- 
 lish, any philosophical speculation. 
 
 Upon the present occasion, the Subject appears 
 to demand that I should add the following remarks 
 with regard to it. Mr. Stewart, indeed, on the 
 occasion alluded to, was pleased to compliment 
 me on the score of '* genius," evinced in the work : 
 But he expressed himself as being revolted at my 
 Hypothesis of a Spherule Mind. In my reply to 
 him, upon that point, be it observed, I freely ac- 
 knowledged the mixed nature of the work : but, 
 along with this, I pointed to the peculiar circum- 
 stances which gave rise to my speculating on the 
 subject. After referring to this fact at present, 
 therefore, as a matter which might have excused 
 the Hypothesis in question, even if it had been to 
 the last degree indefensible ; I now refuse to let it 
 pass as condemned by the light in which Mr. Stew- 
 art has viewed it : Although, I believe, no writer 
 can be less charged with feigning hypotheses than 
 myself, on any occasion since that time. Along with 
 this, I must remark, that Professor Stewart him- 
 self has not refrained from acknowledging, in his 
 printed writings, and of course in opposition to the 
 spirit of his Letter to me, that there have been some 
 fortunate hypotheses in Philosophy. And what I 
 would now insist upon, in favor of the Spherule 
 Hypothesis, is. First, the fact (since then reduced
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 159 
 
 to matter of rationated proof,) — namely — that the 
 Mind operates by a Surface. xVnd, Secondly, that 
 Sensations of Colors are most certainly surfaces of 
 Undulations ; because these Sensations change tlieir 
 Shapes, and their Sizes, with correspondent changes 
 of any pressure on the eye. Any person, there- 
 fore, who should deny either of these facts, might 
 with as much ingenuousness deny that the Mind 
 entertains Sensations of Colors at all. Now, I 
 grant, it certainly does not necessarily follow, from 
 these two general facts, that the Percipient or 
 Mind must be a Spherule. But it follows, that 
 the Mind must be Some Sort of Bulk ; because, 
 I suppose, no person will assume that it is a Mere 
 Surface ivithout Third Dimension or Depth at all. 
 And, when I have urged thus much, I shall only 
 add that many analogies of external things lead to 
 the supposition, that the Figure of the Percipient 
 Bulk is Some Modification of a Spherule or Convex 
 Form. 
 
 In fine ; It is of serious moment to insist, that 
 there is not a fact in Natural Philosophy that 
 stands higher, if any so high, in the certainty of 
 its evidence, as that of our Sensations of Colors 
 being made up of Surfaces of ElExMentary Un- 
 dulations. And this fact must, in part at least, 
 pave the way for the future determining aviiat 
 Figure the Percipient actually does bear, if that 
 of a Spherule, in some modification of such Shape, 
 should be found not to be that which really exists: 
 While I have no hesitation in hazarding the sur- 
 mise, that some mode of the Figure already men-
 
 160 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 tioned will in future time be assigned to the Sub- 
 ject. As for the lofty dictum, which would impose 
 upon our understandings, and arrest all progress, 
 by the assumption that we should never get farther 
 than that landing in mysterious darkness, to which 
 the Speculations and Theory of Dr. Reid had 
 brought us; in this direction: I shall only ask. 
 What unbiased Philosopher is there, who observes 
 what is already done in this direction, but must 
 smile at its overweeninsf ? * 
 
 And here I may surely ask, (I trust with un- 
 answerable force,) With what consistency did Mr. 
 Stewart, in one same autograph, (which the reader 
 may inspect, as it is before the public,) pronounce 
 an anathema on my labors on the ground of the 
 Spherule Hypothesis, or on that of any hypothesis 
 of an extended Mind ; and yet, (with intent to 
 deny my claim to the original suggestion of the 
 generic basis of the Laws of Vision,) in the very 
 face of this anathema, take up the express and quoted 
 Lockeian position of Lord Monhoddo — that " Visible 
 " Extension and Figure are nothing but Color of a 
 " certain extent and terminated in a certain man- 
 ** ner?" Will it be credited, by any one who has 
 not perused that document itself, that, in one same 
 
 * On this occasion, I may merely liiiit at the growing disco- 
 veries of connection between galvanism and animal motion : — 
 Nor shonld it be altogether unnoticed here, that the eminent 
 Physiologist Soemering is said to have written a work, ascribing 
 a local presence to the Percipient in a Ventricle of the Brain. 
 Every reader may judge of the tendency of these collateral re- 
 searches.
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 161 
 
 Letter Mr. Stewart has staked his philosophical re- 
 putation to such incompatible avowals, as that of de- 
 nouncing any hypothesis of an extended Mind and 
 yet taking up his refuge under the extended position 
 of Lord Monboddo. In what manner the future 
 Historian (whoever he may be) of the life of Mr. 
 Stewart will be able to dispose of this, and of the 
 whole conversion of the latter from the Philosophical 
 Ground of Reid to that of Locke, it is impossible 
 for me to imagine. But the fate of Philosophy, at 
 least in Britain, and perhaps throughout Europe, 
 is now at a crisis. And although it is manifest I 
 might, at this stage of the matter, with satisfaction 
 spare the proceeding of Mr. Stewart in so far as 
 regards myself; I am placed under an impera- 
 tive obligation, and indeed have no alternative, 
 except either to sacrifice the subject, or else to 
 place that proceeding in so conspicuous a light, 
 that it shall be impossible in future to obstruct 
 the progress of pneumatological science. 
 
 SUBSECTION 3. 
 
 Professor Stewart's Criticism on the Philosophy of 
 Kant. — Notice of Kant's Philosophy. Remark- 
 able coincidence, in one point, of the doctrine of 
 Kant with the Views maintained in this Manual. — 
 Dr. Rcid's explosion of his own Theory, by him- 
 self, in his doctrine of Duration. 
 
 Man. X
 
 162 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 1. 
 
 We may proceed, in the next place, to the 
 Criticism which Professor Stewart has expressed 
 on the doctrine of the German Philosopher Kant, 
 as bearing upon the foregoing subject. 
 
 In his PJiil. Essays^ Ess. 2. chap. 2; where he 
 has quoted Kant as affirming that ' Space and Time 
 
 * are the two forms of our sensibility ; the first is 
 
 * the general form of our external senses ; the se- 
 
 * cond, the general form of all our senses, external, 
 
 * and internal;' Mr. Stewart says — "The only 
 ** important proposition which I am able to ex- 
 ** tract from this jargon, is that, as extension and 
 ** dm^ation cannot be supposed to bear the most 
 ** distant resemblance to any sensations of which 
 ** the mind is conscious, the origin of these notions 
 " forms a manifest exception to the account given 
 ** by Locke of the primary sources of our know- 
 
 " ledge." 
 
 Now I am under the necessity of believing that 
 Kant's meaning, as obviously expressed in the 
 passage quoted by Mr. Stewart ; and, also, Kant's 
 meaning as otherwise expressed ; is directly the 
 contrary of what Mr. Stewart has here ascribed to 
 him. In the account of Kant's doctrine furnished 
 in the Cyclopsedia Londinensis, (it is to be ad- 
 mitted,) he appears to contradict himself in a most 
 extraordinary manner,'— namely,— after asserting, 
 
 ' From the conlradictory nature of his positions ; I have 
 little doubt that Kant, like so many other Piiilosophers, had, in
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 163 
 
 in the strongest terms, that our Sensations are the 
 extended matter of our thoughts, he in one place 
 says — " We cannot say of the human soul, that it is 
 *' an extended body, determinable by degrees ; 
 ** consequently we can have no intuition of the 
 ** human soul." Now if K'ant here meant that we 
 cannot, in the presence of any company of sensa- 
 tions of Colors, affirm that they are measurable by 
 our Judgment into greater and lesser extents : (which, 
 however, I certainly think he did not mean ;) then, 
 I would insist that the Laws of Primary Vision 
 utterly confute him ; and that he, in other ex- 
 pressions, as utterly confutes himself. Thus, he 
 says — *' In every object of nature, that presents 
 ** itself to the senses, we distinguish matter and 
 ** FORiM. Now, as we do not create this matter, 
 ** it must consequently be given; but this neces- 
 " sarily implies that there is in our Mind a faculty 
 ** capable of receiving the given matter ; and this 
 ** faculty is called receptivity. In order, how- 
 ** ever, that we may become conscious of the mat- 
 " ter thus received in the Mind," &c. I stop, 
 here, to call the reader's attention to the last men- 
 tioned expression — namely — " the matter" (i. e. 
 the supposed objects in nature)—** thus received 
 into the Mixd." And, then, I would ask ; What 
 becomes of Mr. Stewart's triumphant assertion 
 that, according to Kant, ** Duration and Extension 
 ** cannot be supposed to bear the most distant 
 
 the outset of liis course, immolated liis reason upon the altar 
 of that Idol the Supposed SimplicHi/ of the Mind.
 
 104 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 " resemblance to any Sensations of which the mind 
 ** is conscious ?" It is, and always has been, to 
 me wonderful that Mr. Stewart could make out 
 such a meaning from the expressions of Kant. 
 And I have stated my surprise, at this, on former 
 occasions. Other expressions of Kant, indeed, 
 leave not a doubt of his having maintained that a 
 portion of Extension and of Duration (both) are 
 occupied by our Exterior Sensations. 
 
 Although I have preferably given the foregoing 
 extracts from the Londinensis, because they ap- 
 ply more particularly to the fact ; I may observe 
 that, the account of Kant's Critical Philosophy, 
 in the Supplement to the Cyclopedia Britannica, 
 Ed. 3. agrees with it : of which fact, the following 
 passage will be a sufficient voucher. And both 
 these works of reference are conveniently open to 
 the general reader. ** Extension is nothing real 
 ** but as the form of our Sensations." — '' If the 
 *' objects which produce the impressions afford 
 ** also the wfl^^er of the ideas, then the ideas are 
 ** empyric." The use of the word — " matter,'' 
 — here, I admit, is preposterous : But, making 
 allowance for this ; the meaning is clear. — " As 
 " the impressions which objects make upon us 
 ** are only certain apparitions or phenomena ; it is 
 " impossible for us to know what an object is in 
 ** itself y Now I ask ; How does this doctrine of 
 Kant give countenance to the Scheme of Dr. Reid ; 
 which makes E.vtension to be an external object 
 only, and makes us perceive the identical Jigures of 
 external bodies themselves ? And I would farther ask :
 
 SEC. IV.] .'OF MIND. 165 
 
 Must not such mistakes, concerning the doctrines 
 of other Writers, as that now exposed, lead us to 
 examine with care the construction which Pro- 
 fessor Stewart puts upon other such matters ; and 
 warn us, duly, of the occasional effects of his 
 biases in philosophy ? 
 
 But here it becomes requisite to direct the read- 
 er's attention to a very exceptionable part of the 
 doctrine of Kant. The fact is, he calls" Sense 
 " the Power of forming Intuitions." — And, here- 
 in, he greatly violates our British doctrine of the 
 subject ; which separates Sense from Intuition, by 
 making \X\q former to be mere Instinctive Conscious- 
 7iess, and the hitter an Act of the Judgment. I con- 
 fess, therefore, that I was, from the beginning, all 
 along revolted at this doctrine of Kant. And, in 
 fact, from what I had seen, especially from Pro- 
 fessor Stewart's estimate of his philosophy, I have 
 until of late scarcely paid any attention to his 
 opinions : For which, perhaps, I have to apologise 
 to his memory, and to the Subject. But, upon 
 very recently perusing the passages in question, I 
 was struck by a very notable coincidence in our 
 respective views of the subject. The fact is, that 
 the doctrine of Kant concerning Sensation ; al- 
 though it is certain/]/ fallacious in ajj'irming that Sense 
 is the power of forming Ii<!t\jitiois:s ', — is otherwise 
 true in that one of his positions which runs thus : — 
 ** it is absolutely necessary" (I would say onli/pJiy- 
 sically necessary) " that we should exert a 7nental 
 ** activity, which is termed spontaniety ; that is, 
 " a connecting activity which gives unity, or power
 
 166 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 " to the received matter or variety. When the recep- 
 •* tivity is affected by any given matter, the spon- 
 " taniety is forced to act, and to connect the re- 
 ** ceived matter into a Unity ; and this Unity is 
 
 ** IXTUITIOX." 
 
 The doctrine of Kant, therefore, in so far as re- 
 gards the SIMPLE, or the complex, nature of the 
 Masses of Sensation, (of Color, &c.) agrees altogether, 
 in effect, with that which I have insisted upon as 
 resulting from my own speculations on the subject 
 in those General Facts of the Phenomena of Per- 
 ception which I have called the Laws of Vision : 
 "Which Laws, lohen followed into the Department of 
 Unicolored Sensdition, and applied herein, resolve 
 the Subject into this General Fact— namely — that 
 Any Patch of Sensation of Unvaried Color that is 
 
 LARGER THAN A SENSIBLE PoiNT OR MiNIMUM 
 ViSIBILE is NOT A SINGLE OR INDIVIDUAL Scn- 
 
 sation, but is an assemblage of single or elemen- 
 tary sensations arranged contiguously side-by-side in 
 the Mind: And the intellectual act of as- 
 sociating of this Plurality of Elementary Soisa- 
 tions, into a Unity or Patch of Color, is the %vork 
 o/*owr Judgment, and is, therefore, as Kant has 
 truly called it, an *' Intuition of Extension." 
 
 It will conclusively illustrate the doctrine of 
 Kant, on this point, when I state here his Defini- 
 tion of >S/Mce.— He says — *' For when we analyse 
 " our notion of Space, we find it to imply merely 
 " a variety in general whose parts lie one without and 
 ** near another, and are iiitimately connected. Hence 
 " it is that, Space is the form of our exter-
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 167 
 
 " NAL SENSE." Herein, I observe, it is plain that 
 Kant had discerned, that our Ordhiajy Patches of 
 Exterior Sensation (as those of color for example,) 
 are ??iade up of Elementary Parts — or Sensible Points, 
 arranged side-by-side. 
 
 The only difference, therefore, between Kant's 
 view of the subject and my own, consists in his 
 vast mistake of calling Sense the formater of 
 Intuitions, that is the mistake o{ giving to Sense 
 the office of apprehending A?ii/ Patch or Assemblage 
 of Elementary Sensations of colors ; which office, 
 indisputably, belongs not to Sense, but to Judgment 
 OR THE Faculty of discerning Intuitions — 
 that is the Faculty which connects, or combines, 
 several things, of any sort, into a Unity of Object ; 
 and which, reciprocally, can intellectually divide 
 that Compound Unity into its Constituent Ele- 
 ments. When the error in question is corrected ; 
 the implied doctrine of Kant, with regard to the 
 complexness of any ordinary extent of any one 
 color, is perfectly true. But it is of vital import- 
 ance, to his doctrine, that it should be thus cor- 
 rected ; because we are revolted, at once, by 
 meeting with such a head as the following— namely 
 — " Sense is tlie power of forming Intuitions ;" — 
 and we are turned aside, (as was my own case,) 
 without looking farther into a doctrine which car- 
 ries such a mark of condemnation on its front. 
 
 A farther and more important correction, indeed, 
 is necessary, of Kant's doctrine on tliis subject. 
 But it is implied in all that I have advanced on 
 this part of our mental constitution, lie talks, not
 
 IGS PHYSIOLOGY [siic. iv. 
 
 only of the "Matter of Sensation;" but, also, 
 of this matter's being received into the Mind : 
 and, of what happens " o)i its entering the recep- 
 *' tivity." If this phraseology be taken literally, 
 or without explanation ; it amounts to no other 
 than the ancient doctrine of Films, entering the 
 mind through the Channels of the Senses : and 
 thus it forms an Idealism, not in the sound philo- 
 sophical sense, but in the 77iost visionary sense of 
 that tej^m. At the same time, it is due to Kant to 
 observe that, the expressions in question, if duly 
 qualified and understood in their explained sense, are 
 certainly tenable : For, although it is certain that 
 Sensations are neither conveyed nor generated ; but 
 that they are absolutely in the strictest philosophical 
 sense created ; (?". e. in other words, upon certain 
 regulated occasions, they start up in the mind out of 
 nothing ; and, when they leave the mind they go 
 no ivhere, but return to nothing ;) yet, it cannot be 
 denied that, as being states of the 7nind, while 
 they endure they are in a certain sense received 
 when they come, and in the same sense are parted 
 WITH OR delivered whcu they go. 
 
 As I have been led to touch at all, here, upon 
 the doctrines of Kant ; I deem it proper to offer a 
 few words upon another part of his Philosophy, 
 on account of what is at stake in the principles 
 which he entertained. The fact, which I shall 
 first mention, of these, consists in his having enter- 
 tained the old and exploded doctrine of Generals 
 or Universals, — involving his method of reasoning
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 1G9 
 
 from assumed generals, to particulars ; instead of 
 reasoning, according to nature, from Individuals to 
 Classes or Plurals. This cardinal fallacy has been 
 very justly objected to, against the philosophy of 
 Kant, by the ^yriter of the Article on the " Critical 
 Pliilosophy in the Supplement to the Cyclopee- 
 dia Britannica, already referred to. And I need 
 not here insist farther upon the extent and con- 
 sequences of the defect which it embodies. 
 
 The second objection, to which I shall advert, 
 is one which is chargeable to Kant ouli/ i)i common 
 with all other Metaphysicians and Logicians. The 
 fact is, that Kant has implicitly taken up with the 
 accredited and unquestioned Scheme of the Ca- 
 tegory of Relation, which resolves every Relation 
 mto a Plexus of Two Things— namely — Two Re- 
 lated Subjects viewed reciprocally, the One with 
 <L respect to the Other : Whereas, in opposition to 
 that Scheme, I have during some years been led 
 to hazard an estimate of the Subject, from which 
 it results that the Category in question consists in 
 a Plexus, not of two, but of Three things — 
 namely — of Two Correlated Subjects, linked 
 together by a Bridge of Logical Connection 
 which forms a Third Object between them. 
 
 When therefore I consider the extent of the 
 abovementioned two grand fallacies in the specu- 
 lations of Kant ; I must suppose, without at present 
 looking farther into his course of philosophising, 
 that they cannot have failed to produce a vast ex- 
 tent of unsoundness in the whole Kantcan Philo- 
 sophy. 
 
 Man. r
 
 170 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv 
 
 With regard to the two considerations just ad- 
 verted to ; each of them is so comprehensive in 
 its province, and so vitally important to the exist- 
 ence of a Sound Rational Philosophy, that I deem 
 the following remarks upon them may be intro- 
 duced with effect. Mr. Stewart, who has written 
 much upon the first in the Two preceding Volumes 
 of his Elements, has again, in his Third Volume, 
 adverted^ to the expectation which may be formed 
 from a right use of Language as an instrument 
 of thought. And he has, elsewhere, expressed his 
 opinion that Logic is yet but in its infancy. To 
 both these positions I have subscribed. But, in 
 so doing with regard to the First of them, it has 
 appeared from the views which I have unfolded 
 with respect to Objects of General Reasoning in 
 my Analysis of Language, that I differ very widely 
 from Mr. Stewart, or rather from the whole Sect 
 of Nominalists of whose doctrine he is a most 
 strenuous assertor, in what I suppose to be a right 
 use of Language considered as an instrument of 
 thought. And I would certainly solicit attention 
 to this difference, on the part of those readers whom 
 the subject may interest. With regard moreover 
 to the Second consideration — namely — the fact that 
 the Science of Logic is still but in its infancy ; I 
 must observe that Mr. Stewart has completed his 
 philosophical course without ever suspecting that 
 a profound and most comprehensive defect exists 
 in the Accredited Logic, in the Scheme of the 
 Category of Relation entertained therein, considered 
 as an Instrument for the effecting of Rationated
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 171 
 
 Science. In having missed the detection of this 
 great fallacy ; I apprehend, Mr. Stewart has left 
 open the most extensive field of reform, in Univer- 
 sal Logic, that has been cultivated since the 
 Aristotelian code was first introduced. But, for 
 the truth, or fallacy, of this opinion, I must refer 
 my readers to the *' Paper on Relation" annexed 
 to this treatise ; and to the Analysis of the Sub- 
 ject, which may be found elsewhere. I have re- 
 marked, in another work, that the language of both 
 Reid and Stewart sometimes implies a view of Rela- 
 tion congenial with my own. But yet, neither of 
 these Writers ever appears to suspect that, in the 
 instances in question, they were placing them- 
 selves upon the ground of a most important, as well 
 as just, hostility to the Aristotelian Scheme of Re- 
 lation ! 
 
 2. 
 
 The Historical Fact which I shall present to 
 the notice of metaphysical readers in this place, is 
 one which ought to be held up to the particular 
 attention of every one who may have given at all 
 into the Philosophy of Dr. Reid; and which, 
 therefore, I have stated in a former publication : 
 but any answer to which has been avoided by Pro- 
 fessor Stewart, during the years which he lived to 
 consider the matter. 
 
 We have seen, in the last article, Mr. Stewart's 
 assertion, (however I think it is a mistaken one,) 
 that Kant had denied all resemblance, of any of our
 
 172 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 Ideas, '* either to Extension or Duration:'" From 
 which assertion, it is manifest, Mr. Stewart admits 
 Duration to be on a footing luith Extension on 
 this question ; insomuch that, if Dr. Reid's Theory- 
 be proved fallacious as to the one of these things, 
 it must be so as to the other also. Besides 
 which, indeed, there cannot be a doubt but this 
 last result must be true whether Mr. Stewart had 
 admitted it or not. Having placed this agreed as- 
 sumption, therefore, in the reader's view ; I proceed 
 to quote the following passage from Reid's Essays 
 on the Intellectual Powers : — •" Mr. Locke" (says 
 he) "draws some conclusions, from his account of 
 " duration, which may serve as a touchstone to 
 ** discover how far it is genuine. One is that" — 
 
 * if it were possible for a man awake, to keep only 
 
 * one idea in his mind, without variation or the 
 
 * succession of others ; he would have no percep- 
 
 * tion of duration at all ; and the moment he be- 
 
 * gan to have this idea would seem to have no 
 ' distance from the moment he ceased to have it.' 
 — *' Now that one idea should have no duration, 
 " and that a multiplication of that no duration 
 " should seem to have duration, appears to me as 
 " impossible as that the multiplication of nothing 
 ** should produce something" — 
 
 Essay 3. chap. 5. 
 
 Now, in the quotation just cited, it is clear, Dr. 
 Reid's argument, against that of Locke, is undeni- 
 able. But, What is the consequence of this ? The 
 consequence plainly is that of the explosion of Dr.
 
 SRC. IV.] OF MIND. 173 
 
 Reid's Theory by himself, as completely as ever 
 happened to any bubble in philosophical specula- 
 tion ; and this, too, by a proceeding scarcely less 
 ludicrous than that of the dreamer, who is said to 
 have destroyed his imagined future fortune by a 
 blow of his foot. What, then, becomes of the 
 exulting tone and assertion of Mr. Stewart, in his 
 strictures on the doctrine of Kant, which doctrine 
 he interprets as coinciding with the views of Reid ; 
 when Reid himself, in his doctrine of Duration, 
 dashes the alleged coincidence from him by 
 asserting the very opposite of what Steivart attributes 
 to him. Assuredly, after such an exposition of a 
 crying mistake as that above-stated ; any Philoso- 
 pher, v/ho was the Author of the mistake, ought not 
 to write on as if notJiing of the kind had happened. 
 And yet, we find Professor Stewart, in his last 
 Work, (published in the year 1828,) still promulga- 
 ting the Theory of Reid; and complimenting the 
 Writers of France upon their beginning to translate 
 Reid's Philosophy ! It is true, this encomium, 
 bestowed on the expected French promulgation of 
 the Reideian Theory, becomes far more intolerable 
 when, to the above-described explosion of Reid's 
 Theory by himself, is to be added the subsequent 
 conversion of Mr. Stewart from the Ground of 
 Reid, to the Lockeian Ground of Lord Monboddo. 
 And, if the Country which gave birth to Locke 
 can continue to look with apathy, upon such a 
 course of proceeding on the Subject as that which 
 is made manifest in the statements which I have 
 made of it in various places ; it is at least to be
 
 174 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 hoped that the Writers of the Continent, the mo- 
 ment they are made aware of the real merits of the 
 case ; (which, indeed, is one of the objects of the 
 present publication;) will set the example of aid- 
 ing in emancipating the Human Understanding 
 from an enthral ment so mischievous and humilia- 
 ting. 
 
 It is due to the memory of the late Dr. Parr, to 
 advert here, that, in one of his Letters, he has 
 touched with assent upon the fact that our Ideas 
 measure Duration. In that letter, however, it ap- 
 pears. Dr. Parr considered that I had not shown 
 the nature of the analogy between Time and Space. 
 Upon this, therefore, I observe that, the analogy 
 in question being admitted by all Philosophers ; (and, 
 even, expressly so by Mr. Stewart himself, which 
 renders it ad hominem with regard to Reid's Princi- 
 ples;) is amply sufficient for the present purpose, 
 without going into the nature of it. But the fact 
 is, that Space and Time, having each of them a 
 Sort of Ediension, and being each of them divisible 
 into parts, constitutes, of itself alone, all the analogy 
 required. And I repeat, here, that not a doubt 
 can possibly exist but that Dr. Reid has, in the 
 most conclusive manner, given the death-blow to 
 his own Theory by his own proceeding, as above- 
 stated. 
 
 Here it is not a little curious ; and it is rather a 
 ludicrous instance of the past procedure of Meta- 
 physicians ; to remark that Dr. Reid, in order to 
 be consistent with himself ought to have taken up 
 that very ground, of the " no duration of any of our
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 175 
 
 " Ideas" which he condemns in the case of Locke. 
 And upon this he ought, as his next step, to have 
 assumed that we are " inspired unaccountably' with 
 the notion of Dxjr.^tio-s from '' a multiplication of 
 ** that 710 duration" Such a procedure as that which 
 I have here pointed out, however groundless it 
 would have been in point of/<2c^, would have pe/fectly 
 suited Dr. Reid's General Views : Such a procedure 
 as this ivas necessari/ to the very existence of his 
 doctrine. But it seems that the real truth of na- 
 ture, in this case, had caught Dr. Reid's fundamental 
 prejudice at unaicares ; and had thus, in an un- 
 guarded moment, overcome its force. 
 
 It is in this place, on the other hand, to be re- 
 marked, Hoio crude and visionary we?^e the specula- 
 tions of Locke upon this part of our constitution. — 
 It is not only a most obvious truth, that every one 
 of our Ideas of Sensation measures a portion of 
 Time ; but it is even certain that the Shortest Sen- 
 sations, of each of the different Senses, respectively, 
 take diffeixnt lengths of time for the possibility of 
 their existence. Dr. Parr was perfectly right, 
 therefore, when he asked, if some of our ideas do 
 not remain longer in the mind than others. In 
 the Essay on Consciousness, in treating of the 
 Senses separately, I have dwelt upon the different 
 relative portions of time which they occupy. 
 Among other examples, therein, I adduced the 
 experiment of Dr, Ilerschel; which proved that 
 the most minute Audual Sensations occupy about 
 double the time that is taken up by the most minute 
 Fj'^wtf/ sensations — namely — the former about IGO,
 
 176 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv» 
 
 and the latter about 320, Sensations in a second of 
 time. The general fact, therefore, of our sensa- 
 tions and ideas being involved in the Nature and 
 Laws of Time, is a matter beyond all controversy. 
 And this, of itself alone, would be a good collateral 
 proof, that our Ideas are involved in the Nature 
 and Laws of Space also. 
 
 The explosion of Dr. Reid's Theory by himself, 
 on the ground of the measurableness of our 
 IDEAS, becomes indeed comparatively a matter of 
 very little importance in itself, after the recogni- 
 tion of the Physiological Laws of our Sensations, 
 and the virtual assent of Professor Stewart to the 
 validity of these Laws. But the case was very 
 different twelve, or fifteen years ago. And the 
 matter is still of very material importance for the 
 secondary purpose of showing, that no mishap of this 
 sort, to the Theory in question, could have the 
 efficacy of preventing Mr. Stewart from continuing 
 to employ the influence of his Name, in order to 
 rivet the shackles of the Reideian Philosophy 
 upon the necks of posterity. 
 
 SUBSECTION 4. 
 
 Of the Method of Philosophising of the School of 
 
 Reid. 
 
 If I may venture to judge from my own feeling 
 of the matter, the repugnance of our reason is so 
 strongly called into action by what may be called
 
 SEC. n.J OF MIND. 177 
 
 tlie method of philosophisbjg adopted by the School 
 of Reid, that this single consideration alone forms 
 of itself a prominent exceptionable feature in its 
 procedure. This objection, indeed, has long since 
 been brought against it by Dr. Priestley, in terms 
 manifesting a very deep sense of the fact. And I 
 must affirm that, in a variety of very important 
 instances, the same feeling has forced itself upon 
 my mind. To one only of these instances, how- 
 ever, I shall at present particularly advert : and I 
 shall do this inasmuch as it bears immediately 
 and essentially upon the subjects under considera- 
 tion in these papers. The thing, to which I now 
 allude, is the fact of Professor Stewart's having, 
 in the very outset of his speculations, condemned, 
 as being u?iphilosophical, all inquiry into the truth 
 whether the Mind is a thing contended or inextended ; 
 AT THE SAME TIME that hc hus, ivith the most won- 
 derful inconsistencij , eulogised Dr. Reid's " In- 
 *' QUiRY," (concerning the extension, or inextension, 
 of our sensations,) as being a ** :model" of philosophical 
 speculation . 
 
 The degree of bias which had strength enough 
 to blind the eyes of such a man as Mr. Stewart, to 
 the incompatibility exhibited in these two contra- 
 dictory positions, must have been such as can 
 leave little surprise at any other effect it may be 
 found to have produced in him. And all that re- 
 mains to be done, here, in order to guard the Sub- 
 ject from being hurt by such an attempt as that 
 above mentioned — namely — to place any research 
 concerning the mind's extension out of the pale 
 Man. z
 
 178 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 of legitimate inquiry, is to shoiu that I have not 
 misrepresented the counter assertion of Mr. Stew- 
 art on this question : Which, in behalf of the Sub- 
 ject, I am manifestly bound to show, in order that 
 all impartial persons may be enabled effectually to 
 throw back, with the philosophical consequence 
 which such a procedure deserves, the derision 
 which his expressed anathema was designed to 
 cast upon that whole bent and direction of research 
 which has ended in the proofs of its validity ; and 
 in which, indeed, I feel an individual interest, 
 since it forms my most gratifying reflection to have 
 prosecuted it through all obstacles : Although, 
 from the antecedence of his writings it is evident, 
 and is duly adverted to here, that Mr. Stewart 
 had not my individual labors in his view when he 
 thus strangely fell into such a violation of philoso- 
 phical consistency ; and, therefore, I cannot herein 
 be supposed to be actuated by any private feeling 
 from his opposition. 
 
 In the early part of the Introduction to his "Ele- 
 " MENTs," Mr. Stewart expresses himself thus: — 
 *' A similar distinction takes place among the 
 *' questions which may be stated relative to the 
 " human mind : — Whether it be extended, or inex- 
 " tended ; Whether or not it has any relation to 
 " place ; and (if it has) whether it resides in the 
 ** brain, or be spread over the body, by diffusion, 
 " are questions analogous to those which Meta- 
 *' physicians have started on the subject of matter. 
 ** It is unnecessary to enquire, at present, whether 
 *' or not they admit of any answer. It is sufficient
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 179 
 
 " for my purpose to remark, that they are as 
 " widely and obviously ditlcrcnt from the view 
 *' which I propose to take of the human mind in 
 *' the following work, as the reveries of Berkeley 
 ** concerninsf the nonexistence of the material 
 " world, are from the conclusions of Newton and 
 " his followers." 
 
 In a passage a little prior to this, Mr. Stewart, 
 confounding in his own imagination every inquiry 
 concernino- the Extension of the Mind with the 
 doctrine of Materialism, as if these two different 
 and opposite researches on the Subject were and 
 must be one and the same, assumes that, — 
 " Instead, therefore, of objecting to the scheme of 
 "Materialism, that its conclusions are false; it 
 " would be more accurate to say, that its aim is 
 " unphilosophical. It proceeds on a misrepresen- 
 " tation of the proper object of science ; the diffi- 
 " culty which it professes to remove being mani- 
 " festly placed beyond the reach of our facul- 
 ties. 
 
 The first criticism, which it is important to offer 
 upon the passages now given, is to urge the mani- 
 fest fact that Mr. Stewart certainly confounds the 
 notion of an Extended Mind, with that of a Ma- 
 terial Mind. Nor is this to be wondered at, 
 since it was the uniform opinion of metaphysicians 
 that an extended mind must be material ; and no 
 writer had ever looked in a direction to discern 
 that, instead of this rash conclusion, Sound Philo- 
 sophy must view the EMcnsiim of the Mind as the 
 kgUlmate ground of a denial of the existence of
 
 180 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 MATTER AT ALL. From tliis last mentioned re- 
 sult, however, it becomes evident how unfortunately 
 the endeavours of philosophers to deny to our 
 Sensations the attribute of Extension, with a view 
 to elude their fears of the consequence of the 
 Mind's being material and corruptible, has been 
 carry'mg Philosophi) directly away from the truth of 
 the Mind's real nature and incorruptibility. 
 
 It is, in the next place, to be objected that, al- 
 though it is to be acknowledged as a legitimate 
 distinction ; and, as such, has been assumed by 
 Mr. Stewart in the place referred to ; to hold out 
 the study of Pneumatology as having for its ap- 
 propriate and exclusive objects "such operations as 
 *' sefisation, thought, and volition;"' it was, at the 
 same time, a most unwarranted accompanying po- 
 sition to expressly exclude from the enumeration, 
 as Mr. Stewart has done, the considerations of 
 " E.vtension and Figure,"" unless it had been previ- 
 ously proved, or admitted by philosophers, that 
 our Sensations are void of these attributes ; where- 
 as, with regard to any such assumption as the 
 latter, we have seen that the contrary has become 
 a matter not only of analytical proof, but also of 
 express concession on the part of Mr. Stewart 
 himself, in his appeal to the position of Lord Mon- 
 boddo. 
 
 In a Foot Note on the subject, Mr. Stewart, in- 
 deed, has adverted to the consideration that — 
 " Some Metaphysicians have urged that the un- 
 " known Substance which has the qualities of exten- 
 " sion, figure, and color, may be the same with the
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 181 
 
 *' unknown substance which has the attributes of 
 ** feeling, thinking, and willing." But he objects, 
 to this, that *' it is only an Jnipothcsis :"" and that, if 
 it were true, it would then turn out, not that the 
 mind is material, but only that hodij is spiritual. 
 Now, this last consequence, I observe, is undenia- 
 ble. And, since the truth of the EMeusion of our 
 Sensations will never henceforward be charged as 
 being an ''hypothesis;'' there is a decided and a 
 fortunate agreement upon this point. I shall pro- 
 ceed, therefore, to show the fact, that Professor 
 Stewart has eulogised that same sort of research in 
 Philosophy in the case of Dii. Reid, which he had 
 condemned in the case of all other Writers : In 
 doing which, he has exerted his powers and influ- 
 ence, however unintentionally, to prevent Philoso- 
 phy from ever making its way back, through the 
 darkness which has been induced by the assump- 
 tion that Extension and Matter are things which 
 must necessarily be united in one essence. 
 
 In the Volume already mentioned, and in the 
 very same Introduction (Part 1.) where he is 
 treating of the proper objects of pneumatological 
 research, Mr. Stewart has entered a very conspi- 
 cuous notice of the labors of his Predecessor; 
 wherein he emphatically calls the attention, and 
 especially directs the study, of his readers, to " the 
 " excellent models of this species of philosophising 
 '* which the writings of Dr. Reid exhibit ;" 
 " which" (he says) " give us ground to expect, 
 " that the time is not far distant, when the study 
 '* of the mind shall assume that rank which it is
 
 182 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 ** entitled to hold among the sciences." Nothing 
 now remains, therefore, but to produce, to the 
 reader, a specimen of these excellent models of 
 philosophising. And the following, I conceive, 
 will fully suffice for the purpose ] only premising 
 that. Professor Stewart, in the place referred to, 
 has expressly specified his desire that his readers 
 should ** study tvith care the fifth and sixth sections 
 " of the fifth Chapter of Reid's Inquiry into the 
 " Mind, also the seventh section of the same 
 ** Chapter." The following, then, is the passage 
 here last recommended. 
 
 " This I humbly propose as an e.vperimentum 
 " crucis by which the ideal system must stand or 
 ** fall : and it brings the matter to a short issue : 
 " Extension, figure, motion, may, any one, or 
 *' either of them, be taken for the subject of the 
 " experiment. Either they are ideas of sensation, 
 " or they are not. If any one of them can be 
 " shown to be an idea of sensation, or to have the 
 ** least resemblance to any sensation, I lay my 
 '* hand on my mouth and give up all pretence to 
 '* reconcile reason to common sense in this mat- 
 " ter." 
 
 The first observation, which the subject una- 
 voidably obliges me to make upon this passage, is 
 that, had Dr. Reid lived to peruse the Laws of 
 Primary Vision, together with the concession of 
 Professor Stewart with regard to the truth of these 
 Laws ; he must then have laid his hand upon his 
 mouth, as he conditioned to do in such event. But, 
 in so doing, he need not have been in the least
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 183 
 
 alarmed for the coyisequence : because the Extension 
 of our Sensations, considered as jModijieations of our 
 jllinds, is a fact as foreign from, and hostile 
 TO, THE Berkeleian Ideal Theory, as can beat 
 all imagined. It ought to be unnecessary to explain 
 here, that, by the Ideal Theory, that is as modi- 
 fied by Berkeley, is meant an assumption of Ideas 
 co7isidered as Detached Substantive beings, floating 
 occasionalli) in the mind, but ichich are not modifi- 
 cations or states of the mind itsef. And, ac- 
 cording to this chimerical assumption, the Scepti- 
 cism of Hume against the Existence of the Mind is 
 valid. But a result totally opposite to this is the 
 consequence when the recognition of the Laws of 
 Vision is taken, together with the now-universally- 
 recognised principle that Sensations and Ideas are 
 Modifications of the Mind itself. And nothing, 
 then, can stand in the way, to obstruct the ad- 
 vance of Pneumatology, when the attention of 
 Philosophers shall be sufficiently drawn to this 
 
 fact. 
 
 But I deem it a due precaution, here, to afford 
 one, or tw^o examples, in order to show farther, 
 whether the Inquiry of Reid was, or was not, an 
 inquiry into the " Edtension or Ine.vtension' of the 
 mind. In Chap. 5. Sec. 5. of his Inquiry, Dr. 
 Reid says — '' suppose him first to be pricked with 
 " a pin ; this will no doubt give a smart sensa- 
 *' tion : he feels pain ; but what can he infer from 
 " it? Nothing surely with regard to the existence 
 '* or figure of a pin." 
 
 Again, Chap. 5. Sec. G.— '' I suppose, thirdly,
 
 184 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 " that the body applied to him touches a larger, 
 " or a lesser, part of his body. Can this give him 
 *' any notion of its extension or dimensions? To 
 " me it seems impossible that it should, unless he 
 ** had some previous notion of the dimensions and 
 " figure of his own body, to serve him as a mea- 
 
 " sure." 
 
 Such, as the above extracts, are specimens of the 
 general terior oiJyw^^i^'s, eulogised experimental 
 inquiry, to determine whether, or not, our Sensa- 
 tions are extended. And yet, Mr. Stewart has 
 condemned, in the way already described, the 
 whole direction of inquiry to determine whether 
 or not the Mind is extended ! Is there any un- 
 prejudiced person, interested in the advancement 
 of Philosophy, who would stand up and defend 
 the consistency, (without at all taking in here 
 the uNPHiLOsoPHiCALNEss) of such a proceed- 
 
 in o" ? 
 
 On this topic, I have only room to remark far- 
 ther, that, while I altogether agree as to the legiti- 
 macy of Dr. Reicfs Inquiry, I view the details of his 
 proceeding as a manifestation of the most deplora- 
 ble prejudice ; and, as involving his conclusions, 
 from his experiments, in the most certain and most 
 mischievous fallacy, in their bearing upon the Phi- 
 losophy of the Mind. 
 
 In case it can unfortunately happen, that my 
 Countrymen should still be slow to take cogni- 
 sance of the matter ; I would earnestly commend 
 to those Writers on the Continent, who may think 
 of turning their attention to the dissemination of
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 185 
 
 the Reideian Philosophy, to examine and weigh 
 well the merits of the objections stated in the fore- 
 going and present Sections; and to proceed ac- 
 cordingly, in order that they may not lend their 
 talents to the plunging of Philosophy back into a 
 state of darkness, certainly more profound than 
 that which existed when Locke began to dispel the 
 mists that huno- over her. 
 
 And here, with regard to the weight, or apparent 
 severity, of the various strictures which I have 
 deemed it imperative upon me to offer, in my 
 several writings, upon the Philosophy of the Reid- 
 eian School ; and which might be thought, by 
 some of their friends, or admirers, may have been 
 called forth, in part at least, from personal feeling ; 
 I am quite content to appeal to the truth, and the 
 moment, of the objections which I have laid against 
 those Writers, to vouch for my having been ac- 
 tuated by a firm belief that Philosophy has been 
 not only ivronged by their vieiv.s, hut also oppressed by 
 their manner of inculcating them. In what way 
 other persons, situated with regard to the late 
 Professor Stewart as I have been, would have 
 acted, or felt; they are the best judges. But this 
 I may say, without any thought of paying court 
 to opinion, that I have always found in myself a 
 strong disposition to venerate what I have con- 
 ceived to bc'noble in Human Nature ; among the 
 Objects of which feeling, I have certainly, from an 
 ea ly period, viewed Professor Stewart as possess- 
 ing a high place. Ani\, in the case of suffering 
 wrong from any such quarter, perhaps any inge- 
 ^fan. 2 A
 
 186 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 niious mind will agree with me, that we do not 
 feel resentment, or hostility ; but right ourselves 
 with a feeling of regret, in as far as personal feeling 
 is at all concerned. 
 
 SUBSECTION 6. 
 
 1. — Of the use and abuse of Analogical Language 
 and Analogical Imaginations in Pneumatology. — 
 Physiological nature of the Operations of Mind. — 
 2. Historical fact of the change of Dr. Reid, from 
 the Berkeleian Schenie of Ideas to his own Theory. 
 
 1. 
 
 Nothing has seemed to give a higher philosophi- 
 cal tone to the speculations of the Reideian School, 
 especially when viewed by readers of a certain 
 bias on the subject, than its condemnation of the 
 analogical phraseology which had generally obtained 
 in the science of Mind. And this proceeding- 
 alone must have had a great tendency to induce, 
 to inlist under the standard of that scheme, such 
 readers as could be worked upon by a desire to 
 deny all affinity of nature between Mind and the 
 thing which they supposed to be corruptible 
 under the name of Matter. At the same time, it 
 cannot be denied, that, in treating of the opera- 
 tions of the mind there is a demand to deal occa- 
 sionally in analogical phraseology, even when this 
 cannot be justified by any evidence of similitude
 
 sec. iv.J OF MIND. 187 
 
 between the things compared : as, for example, 
 when we compare the mind to a balance, and talk 
 oftveio'hino' reasons ; there is in this case a certain 
 analogy, but no similitude. But the object of the 
 school of Reid was far beyond a condemnation of 
 the analogical language employed with regard to 
 our more Interior Thoughts ; for it involved, as an 
 essential and indeed a primary consideration, a 
 denial of any similitude between our more Exterior 
 Sensations and their External Extended Causes, 
 — a similarity which had never been questioned 
 by Philosophers, from Plato down to Reid. In the 
 course of their endeavours to inculcate this denial, 
 and especially in the more advanced speculations 
 of Professor Stewart to effect this object, it is very 
 material to remark, how much he was put to it to 
 adduce any authority in support of such a project. 
 The present article has for its ultimate object 
 to shew, upon what an illusory and palpably- 
 mistaken foundation Dr. Reid has grounded his 
 project. But, as a preparatory consideration to 
 this, it appears of importance to show, also, that 
 almost the only authority which Mr. Stewart, in 
 the course of his reading, could bring to bear at all 
 upon the Subject, in any way favorable to his 
 views — namely — the writer Cuousaz (even if we 
 should admit him as an undeniable authority for 
 such a fact;) has not spoken to the fact in any way 
 that can bear out the conclusion for which Mr. Stew- 
 art in reality, though not ostensibly, has cited him. 
 In his Philosophical Essays, Ess. 1. chap. I. 
 the Professor quotes the Writer in question to the
 
 188 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 following effect. — * When I speak of desire, con- 
 ' tentment, trouble, apprehension, doubt, certainty, 
 
 * of affirming, denying, approving, blaming ; — I 
 
 * pronounce words, the meaning of which I dis- 
 
 * tinctly understand ; and yet I do not represent 
 ' the things spoken of under any image or corpo- 
 
 * real form. While the intellect, however, is thus 
 ■ busy about its own phenomena, the imagination 
 
 * is also at work in presenting its analogical the- 
 
 * ories, but so far from aiding us, it only misleads 
 
 * our steps, and retards our progress. Would you 
 
 * know what thought is ?— It is precisely that 
 
 * which passes within you when you think : Stop, 
 ' but here, and you are sufficiently informed. But 
 ' the imagination, eager to proceed farther, would 
 
 * gratify our curiosity by comparing it to fire, to 
 
 * vapour, or to other active and subtile principles 
 
 * in the material world. And to what can all this 
 
 * tend, but to direct our attention from what 
 ' thought is, and to fix it upon what it is not V 
 
 With regard to the passage, now re-quoted, pro- 
 viding it be taken to apply only to such classes of 
 thought as are therein enumerated, and which are to 
 be ranked along with those above-mentioned by 
 me, there can be no doubt that there is a certain 
 sense in which it is true, and salutary to be incul- 
 cated. And if it was the intention of Mr. Stewart 
 to confine its application to this eiient, and in this 
 sense ; he was, of course, justified in citing it for his 
 purpose. At the same time, and before I pass on 
 to the farther consideration of this proceeding, I 
 deem it due to the subject to assert, as an indispu-
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 181) 
 
 table fact, that there is ground in our consciousness 
 for the use of analogous ]:»hraseology in describing 
 almost all the different classes of our thoughts : 
 And the only fault, or abuse, of this expedient 
 seems to be that we have no conception of the 
 matter in question sujjicicntli/ defuiite, or clear, to 
 justify the imrticular imagery which ice employ as 
 exhibiting a semblance of mental operations. Dr. 
 Reid himself, (who equally with Mr. Stewart was 
 the rigorous opponent of any resemblance in the 
 subjects,) admitted in the fullest manner the exist- 
 ence of such analogies ; and expressly attributed 
 to i\\Q mmdi " operations r and to our thoughts a 
 usual state of "ebullition' and '' fermentation ^ 
 And, therefore, it is essential to insist here upon this 
 agreemetit to the fact, that there is ground for the 
 assertion of these analogies ; which it would be 
 vain to attempt to deny. In other words ; there 
 is within us a continual conscious variety of feelings 
 and appearances co-e.vistent in time : and these feel- 
 ings and appearances are continually changing and 
 giving place to others in succession : insomuch, that 
 the fermentation of liquor in a vessel,— (the figure 
 chosen by Dr. Reid for an illustration of the fact) — 
 is comparative stillness and simplicity, to the mental 
 mi.vture and variety in question. At the same time, 
 all philosophers are now agreed that the thoughts 
 or operations of the mind are 7iothing but states or 
 modifications of the mind itself — Can wc, then, 
 behold it as being any other than the result of a 
 philosojjhical hallucination, when we hear it, in 
 the face of all this admitted vahietv (h- mental
 
 190 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv, 
 
 MODIFICATIONS, gravcly asserted that the mmd 
 must be a Simple Essence ? What renders this the 
 more surprising is, that Professor Stewart himself, 
 though he talks not like Dr. Reid by employing 
 the terms — ebullition and fermentation; — yet, al- 
 together admits the fact in its fullest extent. Thus, 
 in the beginning of his Elements, (page 9.) he says 
 — '* Upon a slight attention to the operations of 
 " our own minds, they appear to be so complicated 
 **and so infinitely diversified, that it seems to be 
 " impossible to reduce them to any general laws." 
 — With regard to this fact, indeed, all Pneumato- 
 logists are agreed. And can we, then, restrain 
 our wonder when, along with this, we hear on any 
 hand an arbitrary assumption that the Mind is a 
 Simple Thing, that is, an assertion of an Infinite 
 Co-existent Variety, and an Infinite Succession of 
 Changes, all taking place in a Substance tvhich is as- 
 sumed as bei?ig Absolutely Simple? (See Note c.) 
 As for the farther question. Whether what are 
 usually understood as being the more interior 
 changes in the mind are in any way similar (which 
 certainly means more than analogous) to the physi- 
 cal operations of Body ? I apprehend that, after it 
 has been proved, (as it has been) that what may 
 be called the more exterior thoughts of the mind — 
 namely — our Sensation of colors, &c. are certainly 
 extended modifications, there cannot be any rea- 
 sonable plea to deny the -probability of the fact : 
 Although, with regard to this question, the veil is 
 not, and perhaps never may be, withdrawn from 
 the means of resolving it. As a sort of parallel
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 191 
 
 procedure with a view to illustrate the question, 
 however, I observe that, although we frequently 
 feel, and cannot doubt, that there are internal 
 changes going on within the organic frame of our 
 bodies, we cannot from this fact in the least degree 
 dejiiie the analogy of those internal parts to the exter- 
 nal members of our frame, 7ior trace the mechanism of 
 their operations: whereas, in contrariety to this, 
 we can accurately define the exterior parts, and 
 describe the exterior motions, of our bodies. In 
 like manner, then, we cannot give any account of 
 the shapes, sizes, or motions, of our more Interior 
 Thoughts : whereas, we can accurately describe 
 our more Exterior Thoughts as having superficial 
 sizes, and shapes, in endless varieties, both iso- 
 chronously and in succession. The reason of the 
 thing appears to be similar in each case : A 
 man cannot peer into either his own mind, or his 
 oicn body : But, as he can ascertain, from an actual 
 survey, that the outside of his Body operates by 
 Extension ; he would, by parity of reasoning, 
 (even without the aid of looking into the Bodies of 
 other men,) be bound to infer that the interior also 
 of his frame operates by Extension : And, I con- 
 ceive that this same reasoning must be legitimate 
 when applied to the mind. 
 
 And here, as bearing upon the subject, I observe 
 that Professor Stewart, notwithstanding all the 
 length he has gone in the matter, was not led into 
 the absurdity of denying that his mind was an inha- 
 bitant of his body : On the contrary, he has left the 
 Ancient Doctrine of the non-kelation of mtm)
 
 192 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 TO PLACE, as a Derelict for the use of those who 
 may choose in modern times to pick it up : He 
 says, in the Pre. Dis. in his Phil. Ess. page 5. 
 " I flatter myself it will not be inferred"—" that 1 
 *' entertain any doubt of the intimate connection 
 " which exists between these phenomena" (he 
 means the inteUectucd) " and the organisation of the 
 " body." Let us now, therefore, suppose a man's 
 body exposed to the action of fire : And, in this 
 case, if his mind be admitted to be in his body, it is 
 impossible to deny that his mind, as well as his 
 body, must become heated. Let us next, then, 
 observe ivhat ive invariably find to be the effect of 
 heat upon the body, and upon the mind, respec- 
 tively. — A gentle heat or warmth sooths the mind 
 gently ; and insetisibly expands the body. A great 
 heat makes the parts of the body sensibly repel each 
 other; and, in its great increase, it destroys the 
 body by distancing its parts : And the identical same 
 heat causes anguish and agony in the mind. Can 
 any man, then, if he reason legitimately on this 
 correspondence, deny that the correspondence af- 
 fords great ground of probability that the anguish 
 or agony of mind occasioned by heat is caused by 
 some modification of structure therein ? I feel assured 
 that Newton would have assented to this probabi- 
 lity, and have given it his deliberate support. As 
 for the reason why we are enabled to discern what 
 may be called the exterior anatomy of our Sensa- 
 tions of Color, and of Touch ; and yet, are denied 
 the like discernment in the case of our more inte- 
 rior thoughts; it may, perhaps, be because the
 
 SEC. iv.J OF MIND. 193 
 
 different result is unavoidable from the very natui^e 
 of the latter. But this much, at least, may be 
 said, upon other ground, — namely — {upon that of 
 final causes) which is, that there is the greatest utility 
 and demand for our discerning the anatomy of our 
 exterior modifications such as colors ; while there 
 appears no pressing demand for our discerning the 
 anatomy of our more inward thoughts. And it 
 may be farther suggested, that, so beautifully is 
 this economy of Providence observable even in the 
 Vajiety of Sorts of our Exterior Sensations, that 
 their Extension is hardly to be demonstrated in the 
 Sense o^ hearing, and not at all in that of smelling ; 
 in each of which Senses it would be a useless 
 thing to note it : While the property of Extension 
 IS plainly demonstrable in the Sense of Taste ; and 
 far more definitely so in Touch ; and exquisitely 
 so in the finer and distant Touch of Sio;ht — -the 
 most comprehensive and intelligent of all the 
 Senses. 
 
 Collaterally with these considerations, I observe 
 that analogical language must have proceeded ori- 
 ginally from analogical imaginations ; and not the 
 reverse. And, therefore, it was not a sound as- 
 sumption, in Crousaz, to affirm that analogical 
 terms are the causes that set the imagination on icork ; 
 although such terms, certainly, might thus operate 
 upon any man who should not think at all for him- 
 self. The undeniable truth of the matter is that, 
 the imagination of every man justifies, because it 
 suggests, analogical language. And, what is a fact 
 of much greater moment on this point is, that the 
 Man. 2 B
 
 194 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 imag'matiom of all men art agreed upoti assert mg spe- 
 c'lfically One Same train of analogies ; which una- 
 nitnitij in the proceeding of all Minds is good ground 
 for believing that the images in question must be 
 real, and true. And since, in correspondence with 
 this fact, the Exterior Sensations of the mind are 
 ascertained by rationated proof to possess a physi- 
 cal anatomy, and to undergo continual and endless 
 changes by the medium of Ei'tmsion ; it must be 
 legitimate to infer that our wwa very passions 
 
 AND MOST INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS are, in like 
 
 manner, effected by, or with, sonie physical chdniges 
 in the interior of the Percipient. 
 
 To step, for a moment here, from the confines 
 of Pneumatological science, and touch upon Cere- 
 bral Anatomy ; which two Subjects are certainly 
 two most distinct Sciences; and which I have 
 not the smallest intention of confounding, although 
 perhaps the one may be made to reflect some light 
 upon the other ; I am led to suggest, that it would 
 seem as if the Percipient cannot be less in Volume 
 than can enable it to sustain Sensations of Colors 
 of nearly the same size as the visual impressions made 
 on the retina of the eye : Because all distant objects, 
 whatever be their real magnitudes, are perceived by 
 the mind as being neither notably larger, nor less, 
 than the impressions on the retinated expansion 
 of the optic nerve. Along v/ith this fact, I farther 
 remark, that the beds in which the optic nerves 
 terminate, (which cerebral beds, in all probability, 
 discharge the last nervous process upon the Mind,) 
 appear to be nearly of the same gross size as the
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 195 
 
 expansion of the retina over the fund of the eye. 
 Having adverted to these corresponding facts; I 
 shall leave it to others to consider, whether this 
 approximation to equality, between these expan- 
 sions OF EACH END of the Opt'ic triink,'\s, diXi <x.cc\- 
 dental coincidence, or is one which seems to bear 
 at all upon the question concerning the Seat of 
 Perception. 
 
 It is said that no less a physiologist than Soe- 
 MERiNG has written a work, purposely to show 
 that the place in question is in a Ventricle of the 
 Brain ; — a fact which I remark here only in order 
 to observe that, the inference he draws may, or 
 may not, bear upon the fact to which I have just 
 adverted. All that I shall hazard upon the matter 
 at present is, that, if anatomy shall ever solve the 
 problem of the seat of Perception ; and, if this 
 Seat prove to be as large as would seem to be indi- 
 cated by the superficial expansion of our sensations 
 of Colors ; this Bulk would leave most ample room 
 for an infinity in the Variety, and the Succession, 
 of Changes which our Thoughts actually exhibit. 
 A Percipient so large, as that now supposed, would 
 be a world in size, compared with any of those 
 microscopic animals which exhibit a vast variety 
 of changes, even in their extremely minute bodies. 
 
 In case any Reideian should incline to censure 
 me, for having in the above remarks transgressed 
 the limits of Pneumatological Science ; I might 
 reply that. Professor Stewart has been guilty of no 
 less a transgression of those limits. In a Note, in 
 the Pre. Dis. to his Philosophical Essays, page iO,
 
 196 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 he has entered into a suggestion of his opinion that 
 — " the hypothesis which assumes the existence 
 " of a subtil fluid in the nerves, propagated by their 
 *' means from the brain to the different parts of 
 ** the body, is of great antiquity and is certainly 
 " less repugnant to the general anatomy of our 
 *' frame, than that" (he means the hypothesis of 
 vibrations) " by which it has been supplanted.'' 
 Now I agree with Mr. Stewart, with regard to this 
 preference. But, at the same time, I must object 
 that, the very fact of his having condescended to ex- 
 press ANY CHOICE, between any •physiological hypo- 
 theses whatever on the subject, as completely brings 
 him under the charge of violating his oivn course of 
 philosophising as an inextentionist, as if he had 
 preferred the worst, instead of the best, hypothesis 
 that could be formed on the subject. And, to this 
 example of his tampering with physiological hypothe- 
 ses, I have to add that, it was nothing short of a 
 manifest absurdity in Mr. Stewart to admit the inti- 
 mate connection of body and mind ; and, in Des 
 Cartes to assign the pineal gland to the soul for its 
 7xsidence ; while both these Wniers gravely asserted 
 the mhuVs inextension : which Des Cartes did for- 
 mally ; and Professor Stewart {though he affects to 
 condemn the inquiry at all) has done virtually in his 
 denial of the Extension of our Sensations. There 
 is no unbiased person, of the least competency in 
 philosophical speculation, but must admit that the 
 pure Scholastic doctrine of the Inextension of the 
 Mind, if attempted to be coupled along tvith that of 
 the Mind's being in Place, is a most manifest ab-
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. * 197 
 
 surdity ; And yet, these two Writers have pro- 
 mulgated this vast absurdity without disguise, or a 
 heeding of the consequence. Philosophy is bound 
 to wipe away such a disgrace. There is an abso- 
 lute necessity, for her very credit or existence, 
 that no Writer should in future be allowed to play 
 as it were fast and loose, upon this point. And, if 
 any one should so transgress ; he must pay the 
 penalty of being silenced, though we should still 
 ascribe to him the merit of having been in earnest, 
 and of not being aware of his transgression. 
 
 As an additional striking example of this kind 
 of proceeding on the part of Mr. Stewart; we have 
 seen, it has been expressly admitted by him that 
 there is an intimate connexion between the Body 
 and the Mind ; and yet, how does this agree with 
 his doctrine of Causality ? Has he not expressed 
 his belief that, the wonder of one body's operating 
 upon another from a distance, is not at all lessened 
 by supposing the two bodies to be in contact? 
 Then, why should he believe in an intimate con- 
 7iexion between our Body and our Mind ? Philoso- 
 phy rejects the concession, with proper feeling, as 
 coming from Him. He was bound to be consistent 
 with himself. In a word ; Mr. Stewart, from his 
 general doctrine of Causality, ought to have out- 
 gone all the Schoolmen in dcni/i/ig to the Mind all 
 relation to place : — and yet, " he flatters himself 
 ** it tvillnot be inferred that he entertains any doubt 
 '* of the intimate connexion which exists between 
 *' these" (i. e. mental) "phenomena and the or- 
 " ganisation of the body." Nor is this piece of
 
 198 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 legerdemain yet completed : for we find, in 
 another place, Mr. Stewart exultingly asserts that, 
 for any thing we can prove to the contrary, the 
 connexion between the Sensations and the Exter- 
 nal Impressions may he merely arbitrary, i. e. 
 MERE CONCOMITANCES, witliout any comiexiou at all! 
 What have the men of England done, that their 
 Understanding should have been deemed a fit 
 Votary, to bow to such tergiversations in so-called 
 philosophy as are here exhibited ? 
 
 But to return, now, to the intention of Professor 
 Stewart in his introducing the quotation from 
 Crousaz. It appears to have been his purpose not 
 only to deny those analogies which his predecessor 
 Dr. Reid had freely admitted ; but, principally to 
 condemn, in common with Reid, every assumption 
 of any resemblance between anjr of our Thoughts or 
 Sensations and the primary qualities of bodies. 
 Upon this Mr. Stewart's design, therefore, I ob- 
 serve that the denial by Crousaz, of any resem- 
 blance, between such Thoughts as he has enume- 
 rated in the passage in question and the Images 
 to which they are usually likened, is perfectly com- 
 patible with a collateral admission that our Exterior 
 Sensations are extended. In order to illustrate this 
 truth, I shall here advert to the doctrine of Locke 
 with regard to primary and secondary qualities ; 
 because, I suspect, many readers have been led 
 into a misconception of this part of his doctrine. 
 Locke justly held that, those sensations of the mind 
 which he unfortunately called the Secondary Quali- 
 ties of bodies — namely — colors, — sounds, — smells,
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 199 
 
 — &c. — are not resemblances of any thing in 
 BODIES. But, any one has greatly mistaken Locke, 
 if he supposes him to have held that our Sensa- 
 tions of color are not extended. In proof of this 
 fact, besides Locke's well-known comparison of 
 our Ideas of Sight to '* Pictures in a dark closet,'' I 
 shall merely refer to the following passage, {Book 
 2. chap. 13.) where he says — " It is true solidity 
 " cannot exist without extension ; neither can 
 *' scarlet color exist without extension." And 
 here I need not teil the least informed reader that, 
 by '* color J' Locke meant a Sensation, and not an 
 external quality. Here, therefore, it is manifest, 
 Locke speaks perfectly in a parallel, or at least 
 compatibly, with Crousaz ; that is to say, he de- 
 nies chat Red, Blue, or Yellow, coyisidered merely 
 as the Tints, red, blue, or yellow, is like to any such 
 quality as Extension, or Figure ; but he neverthe- 
 less asserts, as the most undeniable of truths, that 
 these Tints are extended and figured; and that they 
 ** cannot exist without extension.'' For the sake of 
 such readers as may require to have the distinction 
 in question more perfectly pointed out, I may here 
 urge that, the Tint of yellow, or of any other 
 Color, is as different an object in the contemplation 
 of a Pneumatologict from the Extension of that 
 Tint, as Color is different from sorrow, or grati- 
 tude : although Color is essentially united with Ex- 
 tension in the same Sensation, of which it forms 
 the physical basis. 
 
 But here, on the other hand, it is requisite to 
 remark that nothing could be more confused, or
 
 200 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 illogical, than the phraseology and reasoning of 
 Locke concerning what are called Primary and 
 Secondary qualities of bodies, — a procedure which 
 certainly left open to Dr. Reid a field for showing 
 that our Sensations of Touch, considered merely 
 AS Touches, are no more resemblances of either 
 Solidity, Hardness, Figure, or E.vtension, than our 
 Sensations of Colors, considered merely as Tints, 
 are resemblances of Figure, or Extension. But 
 the fact stands demonstrated, nevertheless, against 
 the whole attempt of Reid, that the Sensations of 
 every one of our senses (although in the sense of 
 smell it is wholly useless, and hardly discernable,) 
 possess the combined attributes of being, each one of 
 them, some Touch, Taste, Sound, Smell, or 
 Tint, united to or bottomed upon a basis of exten- 
 sion. And, agreeably with this distinction, we. 
 find, Locke, while he calls Color, considered as 
 Mere Tint, a Secondary quality of bodies, at 
 the same time also justly assigns to Sight an ap- 
 prehension of the PHYSICAL basis of these Tints — 
 namely — Extension, which last is a Primary 
 quality of bodies. I suppose the exposition, now 
 afforded, may perhaps serve to extricate many 
 readers from a difficulty, which I think they may 
 have labored under, to understand the meaning of 
 much that has been written on this Subject; aince 
 the term Secondary quality of bodies has a strong 
 tendency to involve its merits in confusion. 
 
 A particular contexture of the minute parts of 
 bodies gives them a power to reflect light in such a 
 manner, as to raise in us Sensations of Colors :
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 201 
 
 And tJi is power is very properly called a Secondary 
 Qua lit If in the body: But this phrase has unfortu- 
 nately been misapplied, or misapprehended, to 
 mean Sensations of Colors in the Mind. Hence, 
 there is an ambiguity in the phrase in question ; 
 which readers in general may require to be guarded 
 against. 
 
 2. 
 
 As forming the last of the crucial objections, 
 which was proposed to be laid out in this work 
 against the Reideian Philosophy ; I come now to 
 the statement of that very extraordinary change in 
 the philosophical direction of Dr. Reid — namely — 
 his going over, from the Idealism of Berkeley, to 
 which he had originally subscribed ; and his con- 
 sequent projection of his ov/n Theory. After the 
 series of objections which have been laid in the 
 foregoing pages, against the assumptions and con- 
 clusions of the Reideian philosophy, I conceive it 
 will be crowning the mass of fallacies, which have 
 been shewn to be built up in that philosophy, to 
 afford the history of this singular apostacy ; it 
 being, in my humble opinion, a description of not 
 only^one of the most extraordinary conversions 
 from one philosophical creed to its opposite ; but, 
 at the same time, a conversion founded upon one 
 of the most egregious mistakes that ever befcl a 
 speculative mind, in any enlightened age. And, if 
 I am borne out in this opinion, the interests of 
 Man. 2 c
 
 202 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv, 
 
 Pneumatology are too deeply at stake, not to 
 make it urgent upon all those, who may have in- 
 clined to think either Dr. Reid or his distinguished 
 Successor a sound authority on the Subject, to 
 attend earnestly to the merits of the case. 
 
 In his Essays on the Int. Powers, Essay 2. 
 Chap. 10. Dr. Reid, with a candour that affords a 
 light for which the Subject will ever be deeply 
 indebted to him, informs us to the following ef- 
 fect : — " If I may presume" (says he) " to speak 
 ** my own sentiments, I once believed this doctrine 
 " of Ideas so firmly, as to have embraced the whole 
 '* of Berkeley's System in consequence of it, till 
 " finding other consequences to follow from it 
 " which gave me more uneasiness than the want 
 " of a material world, it came into my head, more 
 " than forty years ago, to put the question, What 
 " evidence have I for the doctrine that all the ob- 
 " jects of my knowledge are ideas in my own 
 ** mind ?" 
 
 Now, before I proceed to state what was the 
 result of this question in the mind of Reid, it is 
 very material to put the question : How could this 
 Philosopher, in the blush of his manhood, *' em- 
 " brace the whole of Berkeley s system," which 
 primarily e.vcludes the possible e.vistence of a mate- 
 rial world; when Dr. Reid, afterwaiYls,:Miownd. 
 out that a belief i?z a material world is a law of our 
 nature, a law of instinct,— t\\^t it ''defies the powers 
 " of reason ; and laughs at all the artillery of the 
 " logician?" Assuredly, if this discovery of his be 
 real, he must have felt it as a law of Ids nature from
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 203 
 
 the beginning of his life ;—^nd., at least, it must 
 have obliged him in his first manhood to laugh as 
 heartily at all the artillery of Berkeley ; as it 
 afterwards was viewed by him as having such eifect 
 upon that of the Logician. And here, as a mat- 
 ter worthy of remark, I observe that Reid might 
 have embraced a certain doctrine of Ideas, and 
 still have believed in a Material World, as we 
 know was the case of Locke and Des Cartes. But, 
 we find, he generously throws the whole matter 
 into the opposite scale, — " he embraced the icholc of 
 " Berkeley s system ;" and, during that time, no 
 doubt, he thought lightly, or rather laughed 
 heartily, " at the want of a Material World:' Yet he 
 afterwards finds that, the belief in a material world 
 is a law of our nature, prior to any other belief. If 
 there be any man, who can contemplate such a 
 procedure in Philosophy as is exhibited in the 
 case now stated, without viewing it as being a 
 most deplorable example of the operation of preju- 
 dice; I leave him totheconsiderationof those who 
 are more competent to pronounce upon his impar- 
 tiality than I am. But I proceed, now, to the 
 History of the evidence, upon which the conver- 
 vsion of Dr. Reid appears to have been brought 
 about. 
 
 The doctrine of Berkeley, on the subject of 
 Visual Perception is, that, if a man were born 
 blind and were subsequently made to see ; — " the 
 " objects intromitted by sight would appear to 
 " him (as in truth they are) no other than a new 
 " set of thou<i:hts, or sensations, each of which is
 
 204 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 ** as near to him as the perceptions of pleasure or 
 " pain." Now this doctrine of Berkeley, in com- 
 mon with the views of Locke and of Des Cartes, 
 (assumed merely upon a consciousness of the fact,) is 
 that very same truth which it has been the office 
 of the Laws of Primary Vision to reduce to ana- 
 lytical proof . And, in opposition to this common 
 assumption of all Idealists, Dr. Reid has proceeded, 
 in his philosophical apostacy from the Creed of 
 Berkeley, upon a mistake of a fact, which I shall 
 now state ; observing that it is the only attempt 
 at evidence, so far as I am aware, that Dr. Reid has 
 ever adduced, in his writings upon this subject. 
 
 It must be evident that, when Reid first took 
 the alarm, and became bent upon forsaking the 
 Scheme of Berkeley provided any possible means 
 should present of quitting its wreck ; he must 
 naturally have looked around him for some argu- 
 ment, which could enable him to deny the ideal 
 extension of our sensations of colors, which, as a 
 Berkeleian, he had heretofore firmly believed iii. 
 Now, it appears that, in this state of his mind. Dr. 
 Reid fell upon the statement which Cheselden 
 published, in his account of the youth whom he 
 had couched for a cataract ; in which account we 
 have the follov/ing passage : — " they can discern 
 " in no other manner than a sound eye can through 
 ** a glass of broken jelly, where a great variety of 
 ** surfaces so differently refract the light, that the 
 '* several distinct pencils of rays cannot be col- 
 " lected by the eye into their proper foci ; where- 
 ** fore the shape of an object in such case cannot
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 205 
 
 ** be distinguished, though the colour may." — Dr. 
 Reid does not, indeed, expressly inform us that he 
 grounded his Scheme upon this account of the fact 
 furnished by Cheselden. But it is so manifestly 
 implied, in what I am now going to quote from 
 Reid, that I shall leave it to every reader, whether 
 there can be any doubt of the matter. 
 
 In his Inquiry, chap. 6. sec. 8. Dr. Reid says — 
 " Let us suppose that the eye were so constituted, 
 ** that the raj^s coming from any one point of the 
 " object were not, as they are in our eyes, collected 
 '* in one part of the retina, but diffused over the 
 " whole. It is evident, to those who understand the 
 " structure of eye, that such an eye as w^e have 
 " supposed would show the colors of a body as our 
 " eyes do, but that it would neither show figure or 
 ** position. The operation of such an eye would be 
 " precisely similar to that of hearing and smell : it 
 " would give no perception of figure or extension, 
 *' but merely of color. Nor is the supposition we 
 " have made altogether imaginary : for it is nearly 
 ** the case of most people who have cataracts, 
 " whose chrystallinc, as Mr. Cheselden observes, 
 ** does not altogether exclude the rays of light, 
 *' but diffuses them over the retina, so that such 
 " persons see things as one does through a glass 
 ** of broken jelly ; they perceive the colour, but 
 ** nothing of the figure or magnitude of objects." 
 
 After perusing this last quotation, it is material 
 to point out that, in point of fact, we have the 
 Whole Theory of Reid pent up in the case fpiotcd 
 by Cheselden, as it were in a fortress garrisoned
 
 206 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 by the single fact of what was perceived by the 
 youth ivhen first made to see. If this fact can de- 
 fend Reid's Theory ; it is well. If not, he has 
 nothing else left for it : For, as to all that Reid 
 has written upon Sensations of Touch; it is alto- 
 gether useless, and worse than useless, for this 
 reason — namely — that, while he had confidently 
 asserted, and asserted in utter violation of the ge- 
 neral feeling of mankind, that our Touches are not 
 extended, there is no crvcial medium of detecting the 
 truth in the Sense of Touch, as there is in that of 
 Sight, since there never was a human being born 
 without the sense of Touch, and therefore it is impos- 
 sible to prove other than by present consciousness that 
 our very first touches must have conveyed a feeling 
 of extension ; although persons born blind, and 
 afterwards made to see, afford us this crucial test 
 of the fact in the case of Sight. It is manifest, 
 therefore, that the Sense of Sight, and the case of 
 persons of mature age made to see who were once 
 blind, affords an experimentum crucis of inestimable 
 value in the Science of Pneiimatology . And herein 
 it must at least be admitted that Dr. Reid was 
 bold, or, instead of bold, Dr. Reid was in a very 
 extraordinary degree under the influence of illu- 
 sion. I do not imagine that any person with an 
 unbiased mind, however much, or little, conver- 
 sant he may be in philosophical matters, can for a 
 moment miss to perceive that, when Cheselden 
 says of persons laboring under a cataract, that — 
 *' the shape of an object, in such case, cannot be 
 '' discerned, though the color may," he means only
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 207 
 
 that the shape of any external object cannot 
 be discerned, any more than a ^ioiind eye can discern 
 the shape of any object seen beyond and through 
 '' a glass of broken jelly."' And I here confidently 
 urge the matter, that, by stating the fact as Che- 
 selden has done, lie never thought of denying that 
 Sejisations of Color, in a patient having a cata- 
 ract, are spread in his mind. As a conclusive 
 and indisputable test of this last mentioned truth, 
 Cheselden himself informs us that, before his 
 patient had learnt to refer his sensations of Colors 
 to THINGS external, he thought ** all objects 
 " whatever touched his eyes, {as he expressed it,) as 
 ** what he felt did his shin." 
 
 It is, therefore, from such cases as that quoted 
 by Cheselden, a settled fact of induction in analomicai 
 Scioice, that patients who have been couched for 
 cataracts, and have first begun to see in mature 
 age, DO feel their Sensations of Colors spread out, that 
 is BEFORE it is possible for them to have formed any 
 
 *' BIAS," or ANY REFERENCE wliateVCr tO EXTER- 
 NAL objects. And yet, we have Professor Stewart 
 asserting, and reiterating throughout his writings 
 the assertion, with a lofty tone of calm contempt 
 for any contrary opinion, that it is a "bias in us to 
 *' connect color with figure or extension.'" Here, then, 
 as upon so many other occasions, it is impossible to 
 refrain from protesting against such a proceeding, 
 as being in the last degree despotic in philosophy. 
 
 But, if any thing had been wanting to render 
 the mistake of Reid an object of the most pointed 
 remark ; let us observe that, he talks of light being
 
 208 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 ** DIFFUSED over the retinaj' just as if Diffusion 
 WERE NOT Extension. It is, surely, an identical 
 proposition, that, if an eye with a cataract discerns 
 light DIFFUSED, it discerns it extended : And, 
 therefore, all that Dr. Reid has said, about such 
 an eye's not discerning the figure or magnitude of 
 any object beyond it, is utterly nugatory : While 
 his denial that Sensation of Color is extended is 
 equally absurd, and inconsistent with his own 
 admission. Yet Dr. Reid was so hoodwinked by 
 prejudice, as to be utterly blind to this egregious 
 fallacy in his proceeding. And Mr. Stewart, 
 equally hoodwinked by the same cause, has never 
 been able to perceive that Reid labored under any 
 such illusion. Is it possible that the Science of 
 Pneumatology could ever be expected to advance 
 under such auspices as these ? Or, can it require 
 any other than such an exposition, as that now 
 afforded, to give an entire new turn to speculation 
 on the subject. (See Note d.) 
 
 In fine : It is on all occasions to be remembered, 
 that this same attempt of Dr. Reid at inductive 
 evidence, to prove the inextension of our sensations 
 of Colors from the case given by Cheselden, is the 
 ONLY evidence offered by the School of Reid in 
 order to carry the weight of so great an enterprise. 
 And here, also, I may appeal to any ingenuous per- 
 son, whether this attempt of Reid, in his Inquiry, 
 (eulogised as we have seen it has been by Mr. 
 Stewart as a model of speculation in Pneumatolo- 
 gical Science) was, or was not, an inquiry to deter- 
 mine ivhether the mind is extended, or inextended ?
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 209 
 
 I have altogether to hope, I may now with satis- 
 faction take leave of that Scheme which has cost 
 so much of my attention, in the present and in for- 
 mer publications. And, if so, it may be safely 
 affirmed that the negative good eifected to the 
 subject would be very great, even if no positive 
 views were to be substituted for those which have 
 been exploded. 
 
 It remains only to impress upon the recollection 
 of readers the consideration, that it is not the 
 Writings of Reid, or the Writings of Stewart; 
 (and far less is it the intentions, or yet the real 
 attainments of these Persons, who were good and 
 enlightened men and distinguished ornaments of 
 their Country;) that are aimed at principally 
 OR ULTIMATELY by the objections which have been 
 laid against the Reideian Scheme in the course of 
 my speculations : It only so happens that the 
 Scheme of Reid was a conspicuous and a singular 
 attempt, made in modern times, to establish, upon 
 the legitimate ground or evidence of the Baconian or 
 Inductive Logic, the Ancient Scholastic doctrine of 
 the Simplicity, (which tneans thel^EXTENsioN,) of 
 Mind. And this attempt has been uniformly op- 
 posed by me from the following considerations — 
 n<ime\y— First, That it is most glaringly fallacious, 
 and has been demonstrated to be so by the Laws 
 of the Configuration of our Sensations : And has 
 been fjirther confirmed to be so, by the foregoing 
 exposure of mistakes, absurdities, and inconsist- 
 encies, in Reid's, and in Stewart's, own writings : 
 Man. 2 d
 
 210 PHYSIOLOGY [sec. iv. 
 
 And, lastly, has been still farther confirmed, by the 
 express concession of Mr. Stewart, in the close of 
 his life, by his subscribing to the Lockeian position 
 of Lord Monboddo. Secoficllj/ .—That if, contrary to 
 the fact in nature, the Fallacious Assumption of the 
 Inextension of Mind be admitted ; it follows that it 
 must be provided with a Handmaid to minister 
 unto it; and this Handmaid is a Material 
 World : because inextended Minds, if all Absolute 
 Space were filled with such, could not produce 
 One physical action. But, the moment we admit 
 the assumption of a Material World, Atheism has 
 a Stance to build its House upon : For no Sound 
 Philosopher ever did, or can, believe in a Creation 
 OF Substantial Matter out of nothing ; and, 
 therefore, no sound Philosopher can avoid being 
 an Atheist, unless he can deny the existence of 
 matter. And, finally, the moment we have shewn 
 philosophical ground to deny the existence of Mat- 
 ter, we have annihilated the ground — the only 
 GROUND — on which the Atheist builds his house. 
 It is true ; if we only deny the existence of Mat- 
 ter because it is desirable to do so, we shall act 
 like children who are slaves to their biases. But 
 if we have legitimate philosophical reasons for denying 
 it ; we shall, then, be less than children if we suffer 
 it, like an incubus, to oppress the human Under- 
 standing, and blind our human prospects. 
 
 As for Dr. Reid's believing that we perceive 
 THE Material World itself; and Mr. Stew- 
 art's lending his Sanction to such a thing ; the attempt 
 stands alone, apart from all conceits on the Subject,
 
 SEC. IV.] OF MIND. 211 
 
 ancient or modern, that were ever conjured up 
 in any speculative mind : It is a touchstone, 
 which must for ever form a test of the philosophical 
 calibre of the Minds which could adopt it, — a ca- 
 libre limited by the hand of nature, and which no 
 labor of reading or reflection, nor yet the great 
 advantage of conversational collision with other 
 minds, nor any adventitious aids, could enlarge. 
 — Such, however, we find, is the Philosophy which 
 Professor Stewart, in his last "Work, congratulates 
 the Metaphysicians of France upon their beginning 
 to translate and disseminate. And from this fact 
 it may be judged, whether any opposition could 
 be too strong, or too resolutely persevered in, 
 to rescue those, who shall come after us, from its 
 promulgation and its consequences.
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 The recorded evidence of the change of Professor Stewart, 
 from the doctrine of Reid that all our Ideas are inextended 
 and that we perceive the External World itself ; to that of 
 Locke, that we perceive no Objects but our own Extended 
 Ideas of Sensation ; is of two different features : the one only 
 involving, but the other evolving the fact. Each of these is 
 equally conclusive in the eye of the Philosopher : but the latter 
 is by far the most obviously so in that of a general reader. 
 They are both contained in one of Mr. Stewart's Letters to me 
 on the subject of our controversy, if such it can be called. And 
 as this document is of very great, and in one sense inestimable 
 value to the subject, especially since, doubtless, it is the only 
 evidence in existence which bears record to the evolving con^ 
 cession ; I deem it upon various accounts indispensable to fu^ 
 nish the following complete transcript of it. In so doing, I 
 notice that the most essential, that is the doctrinal parts of this 
 instrument are quoted in my printed Letter to Professor Stewart, 
 prefixed to my First-Lines, published in the year 1820; and, 
 since then, in a published Letter to him, under date April 6, 
 1827 ; besides a recitation of these same extracts by the Monthly 
 Review, in its Number for February, 1822 : And, lastly, the 
 whole Letter has been republished, with other documents on the 
 subject, in a recent channel to which I shall presently advert. 
 When it is considered that no voucher of the evolving or cir- 
 cumstantial change exists except the Letter now in question, 
 it is manifest, I could not be too cautious in showing that 
 Mr. Stewart had much more than abundant time and opportu- 
 nity to impeach the genuineness of this instrument, if that had 
 been possible : From which fact it is to be presumed that no 
 one will ever attempt to call it in question ; although I should 
 always hold myself willing to submit the original to any pro- 
 per inspection, as I have of course already done in the case of 
 several persons in my confidence.
 
 APPEN"DI\'. "213 
 
 " To John Fearn, Esqve." 
 
 " Kinncil-House, near Bo'-ness, N. B." 
 " August 31. 18-20." 
 
 " Sir, 
 
 "I am just now honored with your Letter of the 2Ath 
 August, and have to apologise for my long silence, after the re- 
 peated communications with which ^'ou have already favored 
 me. To a stranger to my personal habits it would be useless 
 to plead the aversion to letter-writing, which I have felt from 
 my earliest years, and which has now become almost invincible 
 in consequence of the indolence incident to old age. To my 
 intimate friends it is well known, that I have some other oc- 
 cupations to which I am anxious to devote every moment of 
 health and of leisure I can command. The plans which I long 
 ago ventured to announce to the world yet remain unexecuted ; 
 and I have but little time in prospect for the accomplishment of 
 my task. 
 
 " In the present instance, however, since you will force me to 
 acknowledge it, I must own that I have had other reasons for 
 my delay. You seem to complain of some injury which I have 
 done you in the First Part of my Dissertation ; and I can, with 
 the most perfect sincerity declare, that to the best of my recol- 
 lection, neither you, nor any of your writings once occurred to 
 my thoughts, while I was employed in the composition of that 
 work. You refer to something I have said about Varieties of 
 colour; and call on me to ' acknowledge your priority.' The 
 only passage I can discover, in which I have used that expres- 
 sion, is in pp. 100, 101, where I have mentioned as a self-evi- 
 dent proposition that ' if there had been no Variety in our Sen- 
 ' sations of colour, and still more, if we had no Sensation of co- 
 
 * lour whatsoever, the Organ of Sight could give us no informa- 
 
 * tion either with respect to figures or distances; and of conse- 
 ' quence, would be as useless to us, as if we had been alllicted, 
 ' from the moment of our birth, with a guita serena/ if this be 
 the passage which has given you ofl'ence, I must take the 
 liberty of observing, that I have taken no credit to myself for 
 the novc//^ of the remark, which I have stated as a manifest
 
 214 APPENDIX. 
 
 truth, and which is to be found in various books written fifty 
 years before I ever heard of your name. I shall only mention 
 the first volume of Lord Monboddo's Origin and Progress 
 of Language where it is expressly said, that ' Colour is the pri- 
 ' mary perception of the Sense of Seeing, and that the Others are 
 ' only consequential.' * Figure and magnitude' (he adds) * are 
 * nothing else but colour of a certain extent, and terminated in 
 ' a certain manner.' (V. It 2. edn, p. 26. Edinb. 1774.) Should 
 this really be the observation you allude to, (and I cannot 
 possibly think of any other,) you have my free consent to take 
 the credit of the discovery ; nor shall I ever dispute your 
 claims to originality. I have only to request, on the other 
 hand, that you shall not insist on any acknowledgment on my 
 part, that I learned it from your publications. If from this 
 principle, which has so long remained barren in the hands of 
 others, you have been able to deduce any important conse- 
 quences, the greater is the praise due to your inventive powers, 
 and to your philosophical sagacity. 
 
 " Before I conclude, I must beg leave to assure you that T am 
 much less acquainted with your works than you are pleased to 
 imagine.' I have spent much more of my life in thinking than 
 in reading ; and this disposition grows upon me every day as I 
 advance in years. I was led indeed by curiosity to dip into 
 your volume on Consciousness, where 1 saw evident marks of 
 an acute and penetrating, though somewhat too Self-confident 
 genius ; but from the moment I found it stated as your serious 
 opinion that * the Human Mind is a flexible Spherule,' I was 
 satisfied that your views and mine concerning the proper object 
 of this branch of Science were so diametrically opposite, that 
 I resolved to employ my time in what appeared to me (perhaps 
 very erroneously) more profitable studies. — Since that period 
 
 ' This sarcasm was equally arrogant and unprovoked : I 
 never imagined wha,t Mr. Stewart is here pleased to imagine for 
 me. On the contrary, I impeach him, and posterity will judge 
 him, for wilfully not being acquainted with what affected 
 the Subject so seriously as the Laws of Vision, which I both 
 '* addressed" to him and sent to his address.
 
 APPENDIX. 215 
 
 I do not recollect to have ever read a Single page of any one of 
 your books; not even excepting that which you have done rae 
 the honour to address to me thro' the medium of the press. 
 
 " I have only to add, that if I have now said any thing dis- 
 pleasing to you, you have compelled me to do so in my own 
 defence. I have done all I could to avoid a correspondence, 
 which I foresaw from the beginning was more likely to widen 
 than to heal the breach which you conceived to exist between 
 us; and which, I assure you, has given me no Small concern, 
 after the flattering accounts which I have received from 
 Some of our common friends, of your amiable temper and 
 character. 
 
 " Were we living in the neighbourhood of each other, I should 
 have much pleasure in cultivating your acquaintance ; and I 
 have no doubt that we should find many Subjects for our con- 
 versation of a more agreeable nature than those which have 
 given occasion to this letter, and on which I despair of our 
 ever coming to a better Understanding by any argumentative 
 discussions." 
 
 " I am, Sir, with Sincere regard," 
 
 " Your most Obed. and faithful Servant," 
 
 " DuGALD Stewart." 
 
 With respect to the tenor of the Letter, here transcribed ; 
 without for a moment overlooking the parts of it that bespeak 
 courtesy, I am under the necessity, in the first place, to ob- 
 serve, that Mr. Stewart's affecting to talk of his aversion to 
 letter-writing ; — of his being forced in his own defence :—oi' my 
 heino- offended, — and of his not acknoivledging that he took the 
 matter in dispute from my writings; — is one tissue of irre- 
 levance to the subject, and was trifling with the pressure of 
 the case. Various voices have agreed, past dispute, that he 
 had published a matter in which I had been before him. And 
 he was never asked, nor even secretly wished, by me to own that 
 he took the matter from my writings : lie was only called u|>on, 
 in mere justice, to own, m some public channel, that I was 
 BEFORE him in the thing. And he was so requested, never in 
 any tone of offended feeling ; but was solely solicited to removi:
 
 216 APPENDIX. 
 
 from me both a pressure and an odium, which his publication 
 of the thing unacknowledged had brought upon me. And, 
 lastly, as for his time ; Jive minutes of it would have suflSced 
 to restore to me my right, while he was publishing the Second 
 Part of his Dissertation in the Britannica, as I suggested to 
 him : and he well knew that any acknowledgement, which he 
 made to me in a manuscript letter would hardly find circulation 
 in any vehicle at all adequate to the purpose.* To sum up this 
 consideration ; his Letter, now quoted, unequivocally evinces 
 that none of my previous applications to him were of a tenor to 
 stand in the way of his doing what was required. And the 
 
 * The assumed tenor of excuse in Mr. Stewart's Letter has, 
 in one instance, led to a prejudicial consequence. A writer 
 of some remarks on the " Parriana" in the Times Newspaper, 
 — a Channel to which I had on a prior occasion been indebted 
 for some handsome expressions in its observations on the " Bi- 
 " hliotheca Parriana," — has imputed to me " an actual cor- 
 " respondence with Dr. Parr, and an attempted correspondence 
 " with Professor Stewart." Upon looking over Mr. Stewart's 
 Letter, for the present purpose, it has struck me that the writer 
 in question may have been led into the mistake by the passage in 
 that Letter which expresses an endeavour " to avoid a corres- 
 *' pondence" on the subject. I trust it is unnecessary for me, for 
 the sake of those who know me, to say that I nezer attempted 
 a correspondence with Mr. Stewart in the sense imputed to me 
 by the writer in the Times. But, considering the very wide 
 circulation and great respectability of that Journal, it is indis- 
 pensable that I should correct, to the Public, a mistake which 
 reflects, not upon my pretensions as a writer, but on my 
 sense of propriety. And I think it would be only uniform, 
 Avith its usual character, in the Times itself to remove the 
 untoward impression. As for Mr. Stewart's mention of his 
 having done all he could to avoid a correspondence on the sub- 
 ject; I must do myself the justice to say, that he might, with 
 quite as much gravity, have talked of a desire to avoid a cor- 
 respondence with any man who had only sued him justly for a 
 debt of a thousand pounds.
 
 APPENDIX. 217 
 
 handsome sentiments which he has in this Letter expressed 
 toward me as a man, altogether prove that the only thin"- 
 which prevented his doing me justice as a philosopher was 
 the fact, that he had placed himself upon ground which he 
 was staked if possible to defend. In adverting to this; I, on 
 my own part, unfeignedly deplore that his act had bound me to 
 the necessity of declining his courtesy, and even his kindness, 
 in offering me the favor of liis friendly converse, — a proffer 
 which I should have deemed highly honorable to me as a pri- 
 vate individual, but which was out of the question when made 
 under the implied condition that I would forego the public ob- 
 ject of my life. 
 
 But the momentous and primaiy consideration, on the pix- 
 sent occasion, is the fact of Mr. Stewart's having, under the 
 pressure of the issue, identijiid himself with the doctrine of 
 Lord Monboddo, by throwing himself into the redoubt of his 
 Lordshijis Lockeian position. That Professor Stewart did 
 this without at the moment reflecting on the ruin it brought 
 upon the Reideian Theory, and also upon his own consistency, 
 I suppose no one will ever deny. But the general tenor of his 
 Letter proves, at least, that he was fully in the possession of his 
 faculties when he wrote it ; and that his eyes were completely 
 open to the truth of the Lockeian doctrine to which he thus 
 subscribed. Beyond a doubt, therefore, the subject may be 
 congratulated on the event, from the influence it cannot fail to 
 have on the minds of English readers. To prevent the matter 
 from being mistaken, however, or by any means misapplied, 1 
 need only observe the manifest fact, that Mr. Stewart quotes 
 the position of Lord Monboddo as a proof of the truth of his 
 own assertion that he " had taken no credit to himself for 
 "the NOVELTY of the remark :" which, in other words, means 
 Mr. Stewart's sense, at the moment of his quoting, that his own 
 position concerning " A variety of colors," and Lord 
 Monboddo's position of extended and Terminated co- 
 lor, IS IN SUBSTANCE ONE SAME POSITION, that is— 
 THAT THE ONE IS RESOLVABLE INTO THE OTHER. And 
 to confirm this it is most certain, and manifest to any one iu 
 the subject, that the former is resolvable into the lattet\ ^yere 
 
 ' Man, 2 e
 
 218 APPENDIX. 
 
 it possible for dulness itself, or for any other cause, to lead to a 
 misinterpretation of this result ; it would be sufficient to urge 
 thatlVIr. Stewart could never quote what he viewed as being a 
 FALSE position of Lord Monboddo, as his antecedent, or 
 authority, for a true position asserted by himself. I have 
 deemed it necessary to be thus guarded in the matter; not that 
 any attempt has been made to deny the identification ; but only 
 because of the great desire there must naturally be to deny it 
 were there a possible opening for the attempt, — a resort which 
 could not be blamed were it practicable. 
 
 Here I remark that, if not adverted to, it might be 
 thought, by some, that the identification of positions, now 
 proved, at least bears out Mr. Stewart in his attempt to show 
 that Lord Monboddo had the priority to me in the generic po- 
 sition that a VARIETY OF COLORS is neccssari/ for a percep- 
 tion of Yisiblu Outline or Figure. On this account, I 
 refer to my other statements of the Subject, to show that Lord 
 Monboddo's position amounted to no more than Berkeley, and 
 Locke, and even Aristotle, knew before him : and yet, not one 
 of these, nor any other author whom Professor Stewart could 
 cite, in the least degree suspected that a VARIETY of colors 
 is the fact which involves the rationale or manner 
 in which color is terminated. In the present instance, I have 
 only room to cite the recent mention v/hich has been made of 
 the matter in the Monthly Review for September, 1828, in the 
 close of its observations on the Parriana : — " We cannot help 
 " saying, that the treatment he experienced from Mr. Stew- 
 " art, as here detailed, reflects no honor on the memory of that 
 " distinguished writer. His claim to originality, in regard to 
 " the particular position which Mr. Stewart affected to con- 
 " sider as having so little merit, in point either of novelty or im- 
 " portance, was long ago maintained in this Journal, and is put 
 '* beyond the reach of controversy by the statements here pub- 
 " lished." Such are the sentiments in a publication of whose 
 support I confess myself proud, because I feel that no under 
 motive, or partiality, will be imputed to it ; and because if, as 
 I suppose, it is one same authority, it has evinced its competency 
 to the Subject in its former remarks on the First Lines. I deem
 
 APPENDIX. 219 
 
 it of value, and on the present occasion of consequence, 
 to add that, amon^ its last observations, which are indeed 
 highly gratifying to me, it has mentioned the past want of 
 general attention to my writings on the subject as being " any 
 " thing but creditable to the taste and discrimination of my 
 " countrymen." 1 thank this honorable Critic, for such decided 
 aid. And, if my writings be found to bear out his opinion, the 
 liberal part of our countrymen will admit the plea of a gene- 
 rous advocate, iu a cause for the public good ; and all, that was 
 desired, may be eftected. 
 
 But, over and above the foregoing conclusive reasons ; it is 
 impressive to add that Mr. Stewart, when urged on the subject, 
 did not deny the identification of himself with Lord Mon- 
 boddo's position, which manifestly was no other than a virtual 
 identification with the Laws of Vision. In one of those auto- 
 graph " repeated communications, with which" (he says) " I 
 " favored him" (under date November 20th, 1018,) I ex- 
 pressed myself as follows. And, in case any person should 
 suppose that IMr. Stewart was not solicited with a suificicHt 
 observance of all the respect which his eminence could claim, 
 the following specimen will afford satisfaction. — " AVith regard 
 " to the merits of the Laws of Vision themselves ; should Pro- 
 " fessor Stewart do me the honor to point out any specific ob- 
 " jection, it will be received by me with great and un- 
 " feigned respect, and certainly not in a controversial spirit- 
 " But, at present, it is impossible for me to doubt that he has, 
 " in effect, identified himself with the whole four Laics ; inso- 
 " much, that I am strongly encouraged to hope that his very 
 " distinguished sanction will come forth, to accelerate the gene- 
 " ral reception of these laws and the consequences which hang 
 " upon them." — One should have thought that such language, 
 as this, might have sufliccd the most inordinate assumption of 
 intellectual superiority, and have procured a gracious and a 
 candid answer. But What was the result? It was this: — 
 Mr. Stewart, in his last Letter, (already quoted ;) M'hilc it is 
 plain he felt himself unable to deny the identification ; and 
 while his eyes were then, perhaps for the first lime, completely 
 open to the situation in which it placed l)i.)lli Dr. lUid and
 
 220 APPENDIX. 
 
 himself as Philosophers ; yielded himself up to take refuge in the 
 ungracious declaration that, " he did not recollect to have ever 
 " read a single page of any one of my hooks "^ after the Essay 
 on Consciousness. Can it be imagined that my utmost ambi- 
 tion could have desired a more gratifying issue, of this cause, 
 than that Mr. Stewart should have been fain to adopt such a 
 mode of defence ? Can I fail in calculating upon that re-union 
 of opinion, which must follow from having brought Professor 
 Stewart to consign, by his own conspicuous act, the Reideian 
 Theory to the third heaven of speculative illusions? — At any 
 rate ; I appeal the Subject to the intellectual portion of my 
 countrymen now living : and leave with them that responsibility 
 which must attach to any continued want of affording what is 
 due to its advancement. 
 
 It remains to notice, here, as concerning the issue with Mr. 
 Stewart altogether, that the very learned Editor of " Parriana" 
 having written to me, to request that I would furnish him, (with 
 a view to their publication,) any letters I had of the late vene- 
 rable Dr. Parr; and, it being understood, generally, that this 
 gentleman had been intended by Dr. Parr to be his Biographer; 
 I thought I could not do better, as a tribute of respect and gra- 
 titude to the deceased, than supply any such ; while, also, the 
 publication of these letters was very material to the elucidation 
 of the controversy, I therefore transmitted to Mr. Barker 
 those letters of Dr. Parr to me which are published in his 
 book : And he, upon observing the tenor of their contents, very 
 handsomely offered to insert also, in his work, my correspon- 
 dence with Professor Stewart, and other matters relevant. In 
 the result, he has executed this intention in a very full and 
 effective manner ; for which I consider both myself and the 
 
 ' Tliey were not " books " nor bulky ; but were short tracts, 
 of perhaps from thirty to fifty pages, which could take up but a 
 few minutes to apprehend the truths they contain. Could it be 
 any thing less than a resolve concentrated by the utmost pres- 
 sure, that had force to resist the curiosity which must have 
 prompted any philosopher to look into them ?
 
 APPENDIX. 221 
 
 Subject materially indebted to him. The account, which has 
 thus been placed before the Public, is far more particular and 
 documentary than that which is prefixed to my First Lines : 
 And it forms a history of the Subject, which will be matter of 
 interesting and valuable future reference. Its value, indeed, 
 has been acknowledged by more than one Critic of the Par- 
 riana. And, in the insertion of it, Mr. Barker could have had 
 no motive, but a desire for the advancement of truth. As for 
 any private advantage; it was out of the question, as I have 
 not a doubt that he might have had abundant materials, of a 
 very different and more popular complexion, to fill up his 
 volume, had that been his object. I owe this unasked explana- 
 tion, to a gentleman who has spontaneously evinced his feeling 
 that I had justice on my side ; and who has certainly been 
 upright in affording his aid toward my obtaining it, at the 
 same time that he was not uninfluenced by the consideration, 
 that the papers in question have another value, in being more 
 important to science, than they are to individual right. 
 
 In mentioning the name of Dr. Parr, on the present occasion, 
 I cannot withhold my tribute of veneration of what I consider 
 as the first of all his qualities — that of an upright and gene- 
 rous spirit. His admiration of Professor Stewart was great, 
 and avowed. And Mr. Stewart, as may be seen from the 
 correspondence published in the Works of Dr. Parr, liad 
 lavished on him compliment, even to adulation. And yet, 
 not all this could induce Dr. Parr to withhold the generous part 
 he has taken in the matter between Mr. Stewart and myself. 
 It may be judged what must have been the impression made 
 on Dr. Parr's mind by the proceeding of Mr. Stewart, when he 
 has expressed himself as follows in a Letter to me, (published 
 in the Parriana,) of which he knew t must, if requisite, avail 
 myself: — " If Stewart deals out a scanty measure of justice to 
 " you, leave him thus far to the disapprobation of wise and 
 good men." Upon this good advice I have here only to say, 
 that Mr. Stewart lived, and died, without dealing out the 
 most scanty measure of justice, either to mc or to the subject.
 
 222 . NOTES. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Note A, page 30. 
 Professor Stewart has complained, in his Dissertation, 
 that he had " conversed with many, with whom he found it 
 " quite in vain to argue, and this not from any defect in their 
 " reasoning powers," on the fact of Colors being in their Minds. 
 But this, I think, is not surprising when we consider how inve- 
 terate the prejudice is in all mankind, from early life, to believe 
 that color is a skin adhering to the outsides of external bodies. 
 I shall resume this consideration, in the Section of our Thinking 
 in Colors. 
 
 Note on Dr. Pan's Opinion. — See page 94. 
 The words of Dr. Parr, in his Letter on the Subject, are 
 these : — " And though my judgment does not go along with 
 " you, yet my affections sympathise with you, and my imagi- 
 " nation at least is strongly acted upon by your representation 
 " of the Deity, as visible in his works." Upon this opinion I 
 have remarked, in the Parriana, that, after admitting (as he had 
 done) the premises — namely — the Laws of Vision, — it could not 
 have been his unbiased Judgment, but only his judgment under 
 a bias of his imagination, that could have borne him out in a de- 
 nial of the conclusion deduced by me. But, since writing that 
 remark, 1 have been sensible that there has been a mistake on 
 BOTH sides. The correct fact is, that Dr. Parr denied my 
 conclusion only owing to the mistake of supposing it to be that 
 of our perceiving the Ideas, or the Energies, of the Deity : 
 Whereas, the conclusion so denied by him is not mine; but is 
 that of Malebranche, and is infinilehj different from mine. 
 I regret that death has put it out of my power to point out this 
 mistake to the venerable Dr. Parr ; and to secure his senti- 
 ments on the actual fact of the case. But, for the sake of the 
 living, this explanation will, I trust, do equal justice to Dr. 
 Parr and to the Subject. One thing at any rate is certain, 
 namely, that Dr. Parr forms another illustrious authority, of a 
 Churchman, in addition to those of Berkeley and Malebranche, 
 vouching that my conclusion is altogether compatible to work 
 with the truth of the Mosaic Scriptures.
 
 xoTEs. 223 
 
 Note 071 Dr. Rcid's Ohjection, of a Double Object of Percep- 
 tion. — See page 08. 
 
 Dr. Reid, in his Essajs on the Int. Powers, Ess. 2, chap. 9. 
 has put in an objection against Locke's doctrine of Ideas, upon 
 which he lays great stress, — namely — that if wc perceive by 
 means of Ideas, we must have a Double Object of perception 
 every time we either perceive or think of anj- external object. 
 The fact, which he has therein asserted, is true. But it presents 
 no objection to the Subject : And one is only surprised that any 
 Philosopher could raise an objection out of it. I have shewn 
 at large, in the Section of our Thinking in Colors, that Every 
 External Object is at least a double object, or rather is Two 
 Different Objects one enveloped in another. And, besides 
 this class of perceptions, it is a manifest truth that, in various 
 other ways, we continually perceive two, three, or more, objects, 
 one as it were involved in or behind another, when, at the same 
 time, we consider ourselves as perceiving only one single ob- 
 ject : In which processes it is farther remarkable, that the 
 object we consider ourselves as perceiving is the farthest from 
 our perception of the whole group. Thus, at a masquerade, we 
 consider ourselves as perceiving a man, or a woman, and we 
 converse with this person ; icithout all the while perceiving one 
 particle of this person ; but, instead of the person, perceive only 
 an envelop of dress. And, if this person's face were exposed 
 to our view, we should still consider ourselves as perceiving and 
 contemplating the unseen attributes that arc indicated by the 
 face. In like manner, we consider ourselves as perceiving a 
 book, or a table, or any other piece of furniture, when we are 
 in reality perceiving only some covering of it. Now, in any of 
 all these processes there never is any confusion, or mistake, 
 occasioned by either the duplicity or the multiplicity of the 
 objects. The objection of Keid, therefore, is most nugatory 
 and unfounded ; and it cannot require farther explosion. 
 
 jslote C.—On Dr. Browns notion of Mind, page 190. 
 Dr. Brown has followed Locke, in so far as to deny our per-
 
 224 NOTES. 
 
 ception of any thing external to the Mind. But he has not, 
 so far as I at this moment recollect, advanced any evidence 
 in support of Locke's Idealism ; but has only taken his stand 
 upon what existed before: And hence, his adhesion to this side 
 of the subject could have no effect in exploding the Reideian 
 doctrine of perception. Upon the other hand. Dr. Brown is 
 eminently to be classed with the number of Philosophers who 
 have commenced with immolating their reason to that Idol the 
 Simplicity of the Mind : Audit is altogether deplorable to 
 see the ravages of this adoption, throughout his Lectures. It 
 was this alone could have put him upon the astonishing attempt 
 to derive our notion of Extension from our notion of Time. 
 And, what renders that attempt still more wonderful, is the fact 
 that Dr. Brown does not deny the reality of Space or Exten- 
 sion in nature, without or beyond the mind, as Berkeley did, 
 and as I confidently apprehend Dr. Browai's derivation of 
 Extension bound him to do. In fact, it appears to me, past 
 dispute, that Dr. Brown took up One half of the mantle of 
 Berkeley, and left the Other half behind. And how he could 
 combine the four principles — namely — that Extension is a real 
 thin"-, — that we perceive nothing beyond our own Ideas — that 
 yfe perceive Extension, — and yet that our Ideas of Extension 
 are not really extended, — is to me one of the most in- 
 comprehensible proceedings that I have met with in a mind so 
 really acute as was that which he possessed. I have every wish 
 to bear testimony to the merits of Dr. Brown. But I may with 
 confidence affirm that, after he had once imprisoned his genius 
 in the Dogma of the Simplicity of the Mind, no human acumen 
 could save him from a succession of disasters in his course. 
 Contradiction and Mysticism are utterly inadmissible 
 in Philosophy : And no Philosophy can exist, ivhich cannot 
 be embodied in examples. We might, without violence to 
 reason, listen to any Philosopher lecturing upon a Simple 
 Mind AS undergoing an Infinite Variety of Modi- 
 fications, provided his first lecture were that of depicting 
 the Whole of Shakspeare in a mathematical point, as one would 
 depict a Gala, or an Opera, in little, in a scite which could con- 
 tain it !
 
 NOTES. 225 
 
 Having- adverted here to the opinions of Dr. Brown ; T owe it 
 to justice to notice that of a Fair Author, whose notion of the 
 nature of Mind appears to iiio to coincide with his ; and to 
 whom, indeed, I have imputed, in common with liim, a 
 taking up orie half of the mantle of Berkeley, and leaving 
 the other half behind. In the course of a reply which I 
 have oflcrcd in the Parriana, to some remarks on my First 
 Lines by Lady Mary Shepherd, published in the same channel, 
 I have in one place observed, that her Ladyship " has even not 
 " refrained from pronouncing- on the ' piieriliti/' of Xewton, in 
 " his believing that God could have created a world other than 
 " the present one."' To this remark her Ladyship has, in some 
 communications on the subject, objected that I have stated her 
 assertion without a due qualification with which she had ac- 
 companied it. And I have great pleasure in embracing this 
 occasion to acknowledge, with all due apology, the oversight : 
 ■which I now correct by quoting the passage from her Ladyship's 
 Work, (" Essays on the Perception of the External Universe ;") 
 which I did not qiiote on the former occasion ; but only in- 
 curred, upon my very defective memory, a fault which I very 
 rarely risk falling into. — The passage in question is as follows : 
 — " and I cannot avoid considering Sir Isaac Newton's tlieory 
 " as something puerile and unphilosophical, if it is to be under- 
 " stood in the sense Mr. Stewart gives to it." I trust this 
 explanation will altogether satisfy the wish of an Authoress, of 
 whose very rare direction of mind I have already spoken with 
 great and real admiration ; although nothing can be much more 
 opposite than our respective notions of Mind itself. 
 
 Her Ladyship's claims to great respect, on very various 
 grounds, rendered it imperative upon me to entertain her Wri- 
 tings, in the first instance. And, indeed, I considered what I 
 have said, in my reply to her, as being equally applicable to 
 the opinions of Dr. Brown concerning the nature of Mind. I 
 would therefore, if requisite, refer any reader to what I iiavn 
 said on the Subject in the Parriana, as being the i.iiimatc 
 remarks which I prescribed to myself to oiler with regard to it 
 in order that the matter might not possibly degenerate into con- 
 troversy. 
 
 Mail, - I
 
 22G NOTES. 
 
 Note D, page 208. 
 
 In the Third Volume of Mr. Stewart's Elements, he adverts 
 at large to the different results of perception, which followed in 
 the case of the youth who was couched by Cheselden and the 
 cases since described by Mr. Wardro]} and Mr. Ware ; the 
 last of which cases have appeared, or have been supposed? 
 to make against Berkeley's Theory of the perception rj/" Out- 
 ness. The reasoning of Mr. Stewart, on this point, appears 
 to me just, in his attributing the difference to various degrees 
 of blindness in the different patients, — none of whom were to- 
 tally blind. But I am rather surprised it should not have been 
 adverted to, and admitted conclusively, that the matter in ques- 
 tion is not an object of inductive science ; but certainly admits of 
 proof — a priori — as Berkeley had treated it. No PSiilosopher 
 has ever supposed a Sensation of Color to have Trine Dimension 
 or Depth. And it has been abundantly proved, in the fore- 
 going treatise, that a Patch of Sensations of Colors forms a 
 Veil or Blind between the Mind and any External Object 
 which we are said to see. Hence it is plain that the term 
 Outness, when applied to Any Object, is equivalent to, or is 
 only another way of expressing, the ^cj-tm Trine Dimension 
 OR Depth : and, therefore, if Sensation of Color itself have 
 not Trine Dimension, it is impossible that the Mind can discern 
 (httness immediately , as it discerns Color in its tivo Superficial 
 Dimensions. This result is no less than demonstration itself: 
 And it follows, that fln_y result of experiment, vihich appears 
 to differ from it, must be attributed to extrinsic accidental 
 causes, whether apparent or not : Nor, indeed, can experiment 
 ever give a voice in the matter, until some patient be restored to 
 sight who had never in the least degree felt any dawn of Sen- 
 sation of color ; which appears to be yet a desideratum. 
 
 I deem it of importance to notice here, that, in Mr. Ware's 
 statement, as quoted by Mr. Stewart, he says — ' I am aware, 
 ' that these observations not only differ from those related of 
 ' Mr. Cheselden's patient, but appear, on the first statement, 
 ' to oppose a principle in Optics, which I believe is commonly
 
 NOTES. 227 
 
 ■ and justly admit ltd, that the senses of sight and feeling have 
 ' no other connexion but that which is formed by experience.' 
 Upon this passage, 1 observe that the assertion of a specific 
 difference between Ideas of Touch and Ideas of Color is a doc- 
 trine of Berkeley, which has been given into since his time ; 
 but (I deem) most fallaciously so ; and most mischievously to 
 the Nature and Doctrine of the Mind. In this conclusion I 
 am borne out even by Dr. Reid ; whom I have quoted to this 
 eft'ect in the body of the work. And I shall here merely sug- 
 gest the following experiment, in support of it. As preparatory 
 to this, I remark that Mr. Molineaux and Mr. Locke fell into a 
 mistake, in chusing a Cube and a Sphere for the Subjects of 
 their problem ; since no Thing of trine dimension is an imme- 
 diate object oj sight. The Objects chosen ought to have been 
 a Square and a Circle. If, then, we suppose a person, on first 
 being made to see, were to be shown a Square, or a Circle, o^ 
 ani/ small size, such as is perceived without any motion of the 
 eye; I conceive, he would in this case be confused, and at a 
 loss to say of what figure the object is : and this would happen 
 owing to a stupor, which arises in the Mind upon the very first 
 proposal of many self-evident truths. But, in order to solve 
 the problem in question, let the patient to be endowed with sight 
 by means of an operation be couched in the middle of a square 
 room ; and, after receiving his siglit, let it be demanded of him of 
 what shape is the ceiling of the room: In which case, he would 
 be under a necessity to direct his eyes, by a gradual motion^ 
 along the cornice, in the very same manner that he had, (before 
 he received his sight,) been used to move his hand over any 
 large square : And I predict, with confidence, he would infal- 
 libly pronounce that the ceiling is a. four sided figure. It is in- 
 disputable that, in the perception of all very large and near 
 visible figures, such as the side of a room in which we are, the 
 Eye operates precisely as a Hand: And, in fact, the Great 
 Giver of the Eye has therein given to us a Hand, so adapted 
 as to make use of rays of light as a rod, or a bundle of rods ; 
 by means of which we handle distant objects, that Touch 
 could never reach. I shall only add, here, that the attempt of 
 Berkeley to introduce two different /ij/k/s of figures — namely —
 
 228 NOTES. 
 
 a tangible and a Visible — was equally fallacious, and prejudi- 
 cial to the physiology of Mind ; and was so held by Dr. Reid. 
 
 But the most important consideration, intended in the present 
 Note, is to guard even the most careless reader against the mis- 
 take of supposing that the different results of perception, in the 
 cases described by living eminent operators on the eye ; or, yet, 
 the observations of Mr. Stewart upon these cases ; have any 
 thing at all to do with the fact, so conclusively testified by 
 Cheselden, that Sensations of Colors were perceived by his 
 patient extended in Two Dimensions (i. e. in length and 
 breadth) — before the patient had at all learnt to refer these 
 Sensations, fallaciously, to Outness or External Si- 
 tuations, as he afterwards did like all the rest of mankind, 
 — a cheat which he put upon himself by his associating his 
 Sensations of Colors with his Experiments of Touch. The at- 
 tested fact of Cheselden's patients' perceiving Co/ors and their 
 Interlimitations exteyided in his Mind, as being FIGURED 
 Objects " touching his Eye,^^ (that is prior to his at all 
 conceiving Outness,) has nothing whatever to do with the 
 o/'/er question Whether any patient, similarly situated, can con- 
 ceive Outness in the same •primary manner, or on the same 
 primary occasion. Mr. Stewart, indeed, has not asserted that 
 it has : But yet, the precaution, which I now afford, may not 
 be useless, at least to readers in ordinary : And any mistake, 
 on this point, would be of immeasurable consequence.
 
 PAPER 
 ON THE LOGIC OF RELATION 
 
 CONSIDERED AS A 
 
 MACHINE FOR RATIONATIVE SCIENCE. 
 
 The reason for supplying the present paper is 
 merely accidental, and is not that of an intention 
 to state any thing new concerning the nature of 
 Relation itself integrally considered, — a 
 Subject which has appropriately occupied a portion 
 of my former publications. The fact is that, al- 
 though the estimate of the Nature of Relation, 
 which is comprised in the Analysis of the Subject 
 laid out in my First Lines, has been assented to 
 by several writers in very different situations, I 
 have reason to believe that the extent of its applica- 
 bility , or bearing upon the constitutions of science in 
 general, has not awakened the attention of the 
 classes whom it most concerns ; and, even, that 
 its operation in the case oi any one Science has not 
 been duly apprehended, except in the case of a 
 few readers more appropriately conversant on the 
 subject. To provide, therefore, against the con- 
 tingency of this Subject's being possibly left, for an 
 indefinite length of time, in a state equivalent to 
 its non-existence, is the principal, or at least tlie 
 proximate, object of the present paper. In
 
 230 LOGIC OF RELATION. 
 
 order to effect this object, the following considera- 
 tions are in the first place suggested, as being 
 preliminary to what follows. 
 
 To those who are at all conversant on General 
 Logic it will sufficiently appear, from a due consi- 
 deration of the matter, that the Category of 
 Relation possesses an Office for the erecting of 
 Rationative Science, correspondent to that which 
 the Baconian Logic holds in the erection of Induc- 
 tive Science. In addition to this ; it is to be here 
 observed, that all sciences ivhatever — the Inductive 
 as well as the Rationative — are comprehended 
 under the Laws of Relation. In other words ; the 
 Rules of the Novum Organum comprehend, and 
 govern, only all those Sciences which consist in 
 the Classification of Contingent Facts existing : 
 Whereas, the Laws of Relation not only compre- 
 hend and govern all those Sciences which consist 
 in the Necessary Connections between Our 
 Ideas, and also all such comiections betiveen Exter- 
 nal Existences; but, in addition to this, they do 
 the like with regard to All Contingent Facts, so long 
 as such facts actually eiist, just as the Municipal 
 Laws of any Realm comprehend and regulate 
 Every Alien Subject so long as that Subject actually 
 resides therein. From the considerations now stated 
 it is manifest, that Each of these Two Machines 
 for the erection of Science is a Logic, although 
 each is a very different Logic from the other. 
 
 In order farther to afford a general conception 
 of the scope or cojnprehensiveness of the Laws of Re- 
 lation, in our apprehension of the things of the
 
 LOGIC OF RELATION. 201 
 
 Universe ; it may be remarked, in the first place, 
 that the Different Kinds of thinsfs in existence 
 have been, by different Philosophers, divided out 
 into Categories or Primary Classes, as form- 
 ing the Whole Scheme of the Objects of Science, 
 or of the Logician. It is sufficiently known that 
 Aristotle made the numbers of these Categories to 
 be Tex : Of which, the reader may find a cogent 
 account prefixed to Dr. Reid's Essays on the 
 Intellectual Powers ; and in which, he very 
 pertinently comments upon not only these, but 
 likewise upon the Categories of Hume, and those 
 of Locke ; the former of whom makes the proper 
 number to be seven, and the latter three ; while 
 there is also, as Dr. Reid justly observes, as great 
 a discrepancy between the natures, as there is be- 
 tween the numbers, of these assumed Categories ; 
 and, of course, it is plain that much fallacy must 
 be embodied in the whole conflict of these judg- 
 ments of the subject. 
 
 On the other hand ; I would suggest here, that 
 the Scheme proposed by Locke approximates 
 much more to the truth of nature, than either of 
 the others above-mentioned. For he makes his 
 Three Categories to consist in Substance,— Mode, 
 — and Relation. And, from the Principles of 
 Relation which I have deduced in my Analysis, I 
 consider it as a matter which is not likely to be 
 denied, that all the objects of our knowledge, how 
 diversified or infinite soever they are in their jiarti- 
 cular or individual natures, fail under One of Two 
 Generic Classes Only. — Every Object, or Sub-
 
 232 LOGIC OF RELATION. 
 
 ject, in the Universe, must either be considered in 
 itself insularly and ahsoliitelij , and then it is no part 
 of the Universe — that is it is no object of Science — be- 
 cause All Science is of Relativeness, or of Relation ; 
 — or, else, it must be considered in its Capacity 
 OR Office of a Related Subject to Some 
 Correlated Subject, and this Relating to 
 Some Other Subject is, in a Logical Sense, an act- 
 ing WITH that Subject. Hence it must be a self- 
 evident truth, to those who are sufficiently in the 
 Science, that there is not in the Whole Universe 
 any Category of Thing, considered as an Object 
 of either the Philosopher, the Logician, or the 
 Grammarian, besides that of Co-Agents and of 
 Logical Actions existing, or assumed as existing, 
 between these Co-Agents. The Logical Scheme of 
 the Universe proposed by Locke, therefore, needs 
 only to be simplified, by excluding his Category of 
 Modes, inasmuch as Every Mode, as well as every 
 Substance, takes on the Logical Character or Office of 
 a Co-Agent, in any reasoning, or speculation what- 
 ever, which we can enter into concerning it as a 
 part of the Universe : although a distinction be- 
 tween Substance and Alode may still be entertained, 
 as a subordinate consideration, in a logical estimate 
 of things. 
 
 In order completely to illustrate the nature 
 of the foregoing commentary on the Scheme of 
 the Universe proposed by Locke, I observe that 
 what he calls, (and what are indeed in themselves 
 — that is when viewed insularly and absolutely , with- 
 out reference to Other Substantive Things,) — Sub-
 
 LOGIC OF RELATION. 233 
 
 STANCES OR SuRSTANTIVE Things TAKE ON A 
 
 NEW CHARACTER the vcFij juoment ice view them 
 uith RESPECT TO AxY Otiier Thing ; That is, — 
 the moment we view them with reference to Any 
 Other Thing, instead of being any longer viewed 
 as beina: merely substantives, they are this 
 and Something More, for they are Substantives 
 considered as invested ivith an additional that is 
 a Relative Character, and, here, for the sake 
 of brevity, they may be called Relatives or Re- 
 lated Subjects, although they can never lose their 
 Substantive character. Every One of Locke's Sub^ 
 stances, and Every One of his Modes, the moment 
 it is viewed, or reasoned upon, as Associated with 
 Any Other Substance, or Mode, is a Relative 
 according to the description now given. 
 
 As I have shewn, in my Analysis of Language, 
 that the Philosophical Structure of Speech is accu- 
 rately the same as the Logical Structure of the Uni- 
 verse; it will afford a striking illustration of the 
 distinction here made, between Substantive and 
 Relative, when I repeat a suggestion which was 
 advanced in theworkjustmentioned— namely — that 
 — Any Noun Substantive, when it stands alone, as 
 in a Lexicon, is no part of language any more than a 
 hewn Stone, in a quarry, is a part of any building 
 which it afterwards contributes to form. Any Noun, 
 so abstracted and insular, is Only a Mass of Lin- 
 gual Material, cut out in the quarry, to some 
 adapted shape and size, ready to be carried to 
 some Fabric of Language ; and the moment it is 
 phiccd in Association with other Words, and thereby 
 Man. 2 g
 
 234 LOGIC OF RELATION. 
 
 beco7)ies a part of Language, it does this by taking 
 on an additional character to its Substantive Office, 
 that is it becomes a Noun Relative, although 
 Grammarians, not seeing through this matter, have 
 called it still a Noun Substantive. What I now 
 suggest must be a self-evident truth, and an Axiom 
 in Grammar : because Any Word whatever has no 
 import in language, but only in its office of being rela- 
 ted to some Other Word. 
 
 After what has been stated in the foregoing re- 
 marks, I may perhaps, without fear of impeach- 
 ment, be allowed to affirm that the application, and 
 the efficacy, of the Category of Relatives and Rela- 
 tion, must be as extensive, and as powerful, as those 
 of the Baconian Logic, not to say vastly more so. 
 And hence it is certain that, if the Old Estimate 
 of the Category of Relation has been profoundly er- 
 roneous, there cannot exist a doubt but much error 
 has consequently been built up in the world in- 
 stead of Logical Science. 
 
 One farther consideration remains to be noticed 
 here, before I conclude these preliminary obser- 
 vations. It is well known that, according to the 
 general opinion of Philosophers, the two Depart- 
 ments of Knowledge — namely— that of Physical 
 or Inductive and that of Demonstrative Science 
 — -are incompatible in their evidence, and equally so 
 in the nature or identity of their subjects, — because 
 the Truths and Objects of Demonstrative Science 
 are assumed as being purely hypothetical and never 
 as really existing, whereas Inductive Science re- 
 gards only existing facts. Against this accredited
 
 LOGIC OF RELATION. 235 
 
 doctrine, however, it has been proved, in the case 
 of those Laws of Perception which I have treated 
 under the name of the Laws of Vision, that it 
 has been o}ily an erroneous and illusory view of the 
 Laws of Human Thought in regard to Science. It 
 is curious to observe, (what I have remarked in 
 the preceding treatise,) that it is shewn by these 
 Laws of Vision, and indeed is proved by various 
 other subjects, that Necessity springs out of Con- 
 
 TIXGEXCY, ALTHOUGH CoXTIXGEXCY CANNOT re- 
 
 ciprocally spring out of Necessity. Thus, While 
 the Two Machines for the erection of Science, 
 now under consideration, are distinct and collate- 
 ral in themselves, there is a manifest harmonij be- 
 tween their distinct courses of operation, and 
 both may be made to work together for the ad- 
 vancement of general knowledge. 
 
 In fine : If I had not, in the outset of these ob- 
 servations, considered the stupendous magnitude 
 of the Baconian Logic an Edifice to inspire well- 
 grounded awe and diffidence in any one who 
 should presume to place any innovation in the 
 most degree of comparison with it, it had been 
 but a brief and easy thing to show that the re- 
 modelling of the Category of Relation, now in 
 question, (always conditionally provided it shall be 
 held valid) is a Logical Machine of the most com- 
 prehensive nature and operation. For, in a word, 
 I might have observed, as a self-evident truth, 
 that the Aristotelian Scheme of Relation is a 
 Machine of the most comprehensive and paramount 
 kind, since all knowledge tvhatever, both (f Demon-
 
 236 LOGIC OF RELATION. 
 
 strative and of Inductive Science, proceeds upon that 
 Scheme, and it follows, therefore, without farther 
 process of reasoning, that, if the Aristotelian Systein 
 be proved untenable, then, Any Other that validly 
 takes its place must also take its office and dignity, 
 and must produce changes in reputed or so-called 
 Sciences, to an e.vtent commensurate with the logical 
 difference betiveen the two schemes. This, indeed, is 
 not onl}'- a self-evident truth : but I apprehend that 
 such is the existing field for its application, that it 
 may not be too much to affirm that a very large 
 proportion of all the stumbling in Philosophij—ih^t is 
 to say in Metaphysical Science, — including 
 Language and Grammar, has proceeded, as an in- 
 evitable result, from that great and fundamental 
 error in the Scheme of Relation which has been 
 embraced and employed, without opposition or 
 suspicion, from the days of Aristotle to the present 
 time. I hazard this last assertion with an eye to 
 cases which support it, and which will appear 
 here, or have appeared in my former publications ; 
 and, I confess, I have not the least misgiving of 
 the warranty which these cases afford. 
 
 In my Analysis of the Subject, I noticed that 
 there is one great department of Metaphysical 
 Science, in which the fallacy of the Aristotelian 
 Scheme of Relation does 7wt produce error — namely 
 — in that of Mathematics : And I therein pointed 
 out the reason why it does not. The truth is that, 
 although Mathematics is invariably called a Sci- 
 ence of Relation, it is not what it is called ; for 
 it is only a Science of the Relativeness of One
 
 LOGIC OF RELATION. 237 
 
 quantity to Another ; and the Relation or Logi- 
 cal Action between the Two Quantities is a Thing 
 no more integral, or heeded, in the calculus, than the 
 Scaffolding of a Building is made any account of 
 as a part of the Building itself. Thus, in the alge- 
 braical formula— 4=2 + 2— there is a Relative- 
 NESS of Equality between the Quantities on each 
 side the sign — ;— and this Relativexess exists 
 because of a logical action called equalling; 
 which is carried on between the Quantities. This 
 logical action is denoted by the sign := : But, 
 if we want to express it properly in words, we say 
 — 4 EQUALS 2 plus 2. Now, the Mathematician, 
 if asked, must admit that the sign —, or the icord 
 EQUALS, — is the sign of a Link of Logical Con- 
 nection, which (like a fetter) logically ties together 
 the Two Sides of the equation and is the Formal 
 Cause of the One Side being a Relative to the 
 Other Side. But, in uttering his conclusion, he 
 treats this Link as a Builder would a Scaffold after 
 his Housp is completed ; he throws it away, un- 
 heeded, and views the quantity— 4— in its rela- 
 TivEX'Ess to the Quantity 2 + 2. — When, however, 
 I say this ; the strict fact is that the mathematical 
 scaffolding is not absolutely thrown away ; it is only 
 overlooked in a certain sense — namely — in so far, that 
 all mathematicians would agree as to the con- 
 clusion if one half of them took the Aristotelian 
 Scheme of Relation, and the other adopted that 
 which I insist upon. 
 
 ]5ut, when we turn from Mathematics, to other 
 Sciences, the case becomes infinitely difierent. In
 
 238 LOGIC OF RELATION. 
 
 the Science of Language, for example, the proce- 
 dure of the Grammarian, in treating of his own 
 department, produces a very opposite result. 
 When HE utters the expression — Peter strikes 
 Richard; the 7noral and physical action called 
 STRIKING is here as principal an Object of his 
 Science, as the respectative Relative States of Peter 
 and of Richard. Hence, if a Grammarian conform 
 to the Old Scheme of Relation, (which includes 
 NO link of connexion between any two Related 
 Subjects,) he then teaches his hearers the doctrine 
 that the Action of Striking Richard is an Attribute 
 of Peter. In general terms, I may remark that, 
 according to his doctrine. Every Verb in Language 
 is the sign of an Attribute of its Nominative. I 
 need not enlarge, here, upon the devastation of 
 reason, in So-called Grammar, which follows from 
 the same cause — namely— the sinking or not enter- 
 taining the Logical Link between the Striker 
 and the Stricken, and between Every Other Agent 
 and its Co-Agent, which I call a Relati^ti., But 
 I may merely observe, to the informed reader, that 
 it must be quite as illogical, or absurd, in the case 
 of the foregoing algebraical formula, to affirm that 
 the sign zz is an Attribute of the Quantity 4, as it 
 is in Grammar to affirm that Any Action, or Any 
 Verb, is an Attribute of Either of the Subjects 
 concerned ; while this Sign is manifestly a Logical 
 Bridge between the two, and is no more an attri- 
 bute of either than London Bridge is an attri- 
 bute of either London or Southivark. And here it 
 is not meant to deny that there is a loose popular
 
 LOGIC OF RELATION. 239 
 
 sense, in which London Bridge is an attribute of 
 London, as when we say London lias a Bridge. 
 But no Grammarian attributes a Verb to its Nomi- 
 native in any thing like the same sense as a Bridge 
 is attributed to a Town, or to either Bank of the 
 River over which it stands : For it is certain, in 
 strict logical truth, that London has no Bridge ; 
 but London and Southwark have a Bridge between 
 i\\eTi\—t]iat is to say interposed as a Third Ob- 
 ject between them— which ties or connects them, 
 as Tico Distinct Objects, as a thong, or chain, con- 
 nects a couple of dogs, without binding them into 
 One Same logical Object. 
 
 Now the distinction or difference here pointed 
 out, between Any Attribute of Any Thing, and Any 
 Action (i. e. Any Relation) between that Thing 
 and Another Thing, is the Very Foundation of 
 Grammar ; because Action, considered in the 
 sense of a Link between Some Two Co- Agents, is 
 the Very Essence of the Category of Rela- 
 tives AND Relation." And, from this example 
 of the Structure of Language, a reader has some 
 vague conception of the extent, or degree, in which 
 the Estimate of this Category, now insisted upon, 
 must operate in the Structure of Other Sciences. 
 
 ' Resiles otiier assents to this ; in tlie very able and effective 
 article on the First Volume of Anti-Tooke, which appears under 
 the Head Philology in tlie CvcLOPiEDlA Edinensis, (the 
 Second not being then pubhshed) the writer has entered com- 
 pletely into my reasoning on the Subject; and altogcl her agrees 
 that so vast a diflerence between tiie Two Schemes of Relation, 
 as is therein laid down, is fully sutHcient to aftVct the Science 
 of Grammar as extensively as I have asserted.
 
 240 LOGIC OF RELATION. 
 
 2. 
 
 After having well considered the foregoing state- 
 ments, a reader will be enabled to apprehend and 
 appreciate that scale of the Mental Faculties which 
 I was induced to lay down in my First Lines, — 
 a graduation which, indeed, has been assented to 
 by the Critic of that Volume in the Monthly Re- 
 view, upon the ground of Relation in question ; bat 
 the cogency of which, I have reason to think, has 
 not appeared to other readers in general. 
 
 In the Preface to the work just mentioned, I 
 was led to remark upon the very notable discre- 
 pancy observable between the scales, respectively, 
 of Dr. Reid and Professor Stewart on the Subject, 
 — a discrepancy the more striking inasmuch as those 
 two Writers are more extensively identical in their 
 pneumatological opinions, than perhaps any other 
 two upon the same subject: from whence, therefore, 
 of itself alone, we have internal evidence that there 
 must be something ivr on g in the pneumatological views 
 of these Writers, one or both of them. 
 
 In the body of my work, I proceeded upon the 
 conviction, that an understanding of the true 
 Structure of the Category of Relatives and Relation 
 is a necessary preparative to a right understanding 
 not only of such intellectual processes as Reasoning, 
 Abstraction, Generalisation, &c. ; which processes 
 might otherwise appear exclusively to demand it : 
 but necessary, also, to a right apprehension of 
 Imagination or Conception, Memory, Perception, 
 and, lastly, even to Sensation itself, especially in its
 
 LOGIC OF RELATION. 241 
 
 compk.v masses such as that of a Patch of Color. 
 While, upon the other hand, I assumed that all 
 men have a sufficient knowledge, from the teaching 
 of nature alone, of the processes of Sensation, Per- 
 ception, Memory, and Imagination or Conception, 
 to enable them rightly to apprehend an analysis of 
 Relation, when it should be placed before them. 
 
 Agreeably with this view of the Subject, 1 made 
 an Analysis of the Category of Relatives and Re- 
 lation, virtuaili/, the principal feature of the work : 
 And, in point of fact, it forms virtuallij the First 
 Chapter therein ; although in point of Nominal 
 Title the process of Perception gives its Name to 
 the Chapter that precedes it. The truth is that, 
 the process of Perception is nothing other than 
 One Species of the intellectual process of discern- 
 ing the Relativeness of, and the Relations bettcecriy 
 what are called Objects : And my only reason for 
 not comprehending both, under one same nominal 
 head, was a desire to avoid confounding the dif- 
 ferent species, in the mind of a reader. 
 
 If I have been right in the view of the subject 
 now insisted upon, it must follow that, to commence 
 a General Treatise of the Mental Powers in the 
 usual way, by beginning with Sensation, Percep- 
 tion, Memory, Imagination, kc. without previously 
 grounding the learner in a knowledge of the nature 
 of Relation, must prove something like as sterile 
 and unprofitable as it would be to attempt to teach 
 any one the principles of algebraical equations, 
 without first instructing him in the rules of common 
 arithmetic. 
 
 Man. 2 n
 
 242 LOGIC OF RELATION. 
 
 I trust it will be a convincing example of the truth, 
 of the last observation, when I appeal to that 
 ** TRANSFERENCE of the Subjcct of Perception, from 
 '* Inductive Science, of which it had always there- 
 ** tofore been considered as a part ; to form a de- 
 *' partment of Science that is legitimately Mathe- 
 ** matical or Rationative ,"" — a transference which 
 has been seized upon, with most happy discern- 
 ment, by the Critic of my First Lines in the 
 Monthly Review {for February 1822. ;) and recog- 
 nised by him with an adequate force of expression. 
 And thus it appears in the Science of Perception, 
 as conspicuously as it has already been shewn in 
 that of Grammar, that an application of the True 
 Structure of the Category of Relatives and Rela- 
 tion, as a Machine for the erecting of Rationative 
 Science, has produced results which never other- 
 wise could have existed. And, unless those 
 Principles of Grammar, and these of Perception, 
 respectively, can be invalidated ; it becomes unde- 
 niable that the Structure or Machine, which has 
 produced these results, must be allowed to possess 
 the office and dignity of that Aristotelian Scheme 
 of Relation which has governed the procedure of 
 Logicians, in all the departments of Rationative 
 Science, from the days of the Greek Philosophers 
 to the present hour. 
 
 After what has been said above, it hardly needs 
 to be observed, that a commencement of a Treatise 
 on Mind with an Analysis of Relation on the 
 Principles of the Aristotelian Scheme could be 
 of no advantage whatever. If, for example, Mr.
 
 LOGIC OF RELATION. 243 
 
 Locke had placed his copious Analysis of the Sub- 
 ject as his First Chapter; it could never have led 
 him to any other train of speculation, with regard to 
 ^//(? Perception of Extended Figures or Ob- 
 jects, than that which he has followed ; and Per- 
 ception li'ouhl stilly accoi^ding to h'wi, be a mere e.vpe- 
 inmental or inductive science ; without so much as 
 a suspicion that it is a Science of rationale, in 
 being a legitimate discernment, by an act of Judg- 
 ment or Intuition^ of a Relation of Meeting be- 
 tween Some Two Correlated Patches of Sensation of 
 Color, or of Touch, — a fact which, as already ob- 
 served, changes the wliole nature of Perception from 
 that which it was ever considered as possessing ; 
 and, I may here observe, along with this changes 
 also, in an immeasurable extent, the nature of 
 Pneumatological Science at large, as has been de- 
 monstrated in the Principles of the Physiology of 
 Mind, including those of Physical Theology, laid 
 out in i\\Q first and second Sections of the foregoing 
 manual. 
 
 It is impracticable, in the requisite limits of the 
 present paper, to advert at all to other depart- 
 ments, either of Pneumatology, or of Rationative 
 Science in general, to which the newly-modelled 
 Structure of Relation is applicable, and must be ap- 
 plied, in order to convert them into true Science. 
 But it may here in fine be asked: Supposing the 
 Principles or Scheme of the Subject, now in ques- 
 tion, and which, I have here presumed to insist, 
 must take the place of those of the Aristotelian 
 Scheme, cannot be invalidated ; (as the extent of
 
 244 LOGIC OF RELATION. 
 
 recognition already obtained for them, limited as 
 it certainly yet is, seems to promise ;) In this 
 case, Will Professors of Mind in future continue 
 to teach, as heretofore, that Perception is a 
 Mere Fact of Induction, — a Mere Irrationative 
 branch of knowledge ? 
 
 Upon the other hand, I may ask ; and, I trust, 
 with a force which cannot be lost upon those who 
 are interested in the advancement of Philosophy ; 
 Does IT not transport us into a new world of 
 Science, when, instead of the Absolute Mysticism of 
 the School of Reid on the Subject; and the Com- 
 parative mysticism of every other Writer on Pneu- 
 matology, from Locke, nay from Aristotle and his 
 time, down to V i'o^qssoy "^vown, both inclusive ; we 
 recognise that, ivhat is called the perceiving of an 
 Object, is nothing in the world but the perform- 
 ing o/* « Mathematical Process upon two, or more, 
 of our own Mental Modifications ; which process, 
 also, it has been shewn, is the Very Foundation 
 OF the Whole Science of Mind? 
 
 the end. 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 PRINTED EY A, J. VALI'V, HEP LION COURT, FLEET STREET.
 
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