.
 
 RECOGNITION 
 
 WITH AN OUTLINE OF A 
 
 Theory of Knowledge.
 
 BD 
 III 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 
 EXPONENTS of this subject have, in some cases, gone deeply 
 into its psychological aspects ; in other cases its logical aspects, 
 and in a few cases its epistemological aspects, have been care- 
 fully expounded. But, with the exception of the treatise recently 
 delivered by Dr. Wildon Carr before the Aristotelian Society, no 
 other exponent has treated the entire subject in a general way. 
 
 My object now is to present the varied aspects of recognition 
 briefly but inclusively ; to submit them to a preliminary 
 analysis, carrying this analysis out just far enough to place its 
 resultants within the spheres of Logic, Epistemology, or Psycho- 
 Physiology, and there to abandon them to the treatment of 
 specialists. Beyond this I have attempted to place the subject 
 of recognition in its true relative position in the constellation 
 of Philosophy, and to show how the universal force of meta- 
 physic holds it just there. 
 
 Portions of this treatise were delivered, in the form of a 
 lecture, at the Conference Hall, Streatham, on November 19th, 
 
 1916. 
 
 A. WORSLEY. 
 
 Isleworth, 1916.
 
 " Philosophers devoid of reason find 
 This \\orld a mere idea of the mind ; 
 
 'Tis an idea but they fail to see 
 The Great Idealist who looms behind." 
 
 J AMI (Laiva'ih).
 
 RECOGNITION. 
 
 AT first sight it may seem that such a simple subject as 
 Recognition does not require an elaborate exposition. Yet it 
 is these very actions of every-day life, so often repeated, so 
 common in the experience of each one of us, that we are apt 
 to pass by without noting their significance ; nor does it occur 
 to many persons to ask themselves how, as a matter of fact, 
 this simple act of recognition is effected. 
 
 But first let us inquire whether all cognition does not consist 
 in recognition. Our reply must be that with the exception of our 
 earliest cognition, which has long since slipped from the memory, 
 we must admit that we cannot now cognize without the act of 
 recognition. In other words, Memory has its say.
 
 Recognition clearly consists in comparing some object with 
 similar objects held in the memory, and in judging whether 
 or no this is that, or is like that. Therefore the conscious or 
 unconscious classifications of the mind determine the act of 
 recognition, and the subject of recognition is a proper subject 
 for logical treatment in so far as it depends on classification : 
 for epistemological treatment in so far as we must bear down 
 on our system of classification and consider if it is valid, 
 confused, or worthless : and, lastly, for psychological treatment 
 in so far as recognition is a mental, as opposed to a physiolo- 
 gical action. All at once the prinia facie simplicity of this 
 subject has vanished, and we have before us the ample fields 
 of Logic, Epistemology, and Psychology in which to ramble. 
 As to modern definition of the content of recognition, Prof. 
 Bosanquet, in his Logic, says of Recognition that it " is another 
 of these curiously limited processes," and he describes it as 
 " reflective reproduction under the influence of an idea of 
 identity." I am personally unable to follow the line of thought 
 in which Prof. Bosanquet is here indulging, but my view is 
 that Logic by itself will not carry us as far as Recognition 
 and what recognition implies. I return to this subject later on. 
 
 As to axioms, I must claim one (depending upon the 
 Theory of Knowledge) which forces its way into every theory
 
 of Recognition, and cannot be dissevered therefrom. I wish 
 therefore to say that I assume throughout that the mind is 
 endued ab initio with the power of discrimination, at least in 
 the logical sense of like and unlike, and greater and less* 
 
 To my question as to whether we can make a clear distinction 
 between Recognition and Cognition, an objector might urge 
 that, before recognition became possible, there must have been 
 a first cognition. If so, this must have occurred very early in 
 life, and we shall find no inconsiderable difficulty in even con- 
 ceiving how it may have occurred. Certain writers from the 
 University of Leipzig consider that a baby's first cognition of 
 any object or group of objects is of " shapeless, tremulous spots 
 of colour situated close to the eye." But this classification 
 does not, on the face of it, bear the impress of baby's first 
 thought.! It is surely our cognition of its cognition, and this 
 double process of second-hand cognition has brought about 
 
 * Compare Pratyabhijna-Darsana : " The cognition is self - 
 luminousness." 
 
 t The young of many Mammalia remain blind for some days 
 after birth. In such cases touch-cognition must precede sight - 
 cognition. We may assume that, at least among Mammalia, 
 touch-cognition of the mother's breasts precedes all other forms 
 of cognition.
 
 metamorphosis ! These ' tremulous spots of colour,' to what 
 possible classification of the mind, conscious or unconscious, 
 did the baby refer for comparison. How did it discriminate 
 between what had shape and what had no shape (impossible 
 thought); between what was tremulous and what was steady; 
 what was coloured and what was not coloured ; a baby, who, 
 e\ hypothesi, had had no previous cognitions of objects, and 
 to whom no comparison was therefore possible ? 
 
 Here wo are driven back upon the Theory of Knowledge and 
 its axiom. Provided that there was a plurality of objects present 
 in that little monismusupon which the baby concentrated its at- 
 tention, then the movements of these objects, and their relative 
 sizes and distances apart, would fall within the scope of the most 
 elementary cognition which assumes discrimination between 
 like and unlike, greater and less. It is indisputable that babies 
 cannot extend this power of discrimination outside the limits 
 of the little monism us (ostensibly pluralistic) upon which the 
 attention is momentarily concentrated. No idea of spatial 
 connection between that little world and the greater world of 
 their immediate surroundings is then present in cognition. 
 Nor, in the case of sight-cognition, is any idea of distance 
 present to the baby mind whose then determination is to hold 
 out its hand and obtain something far beyond its grasp,
 
 9 
 
 Moreover I do not think that, at any period in psychical 
 development, we ever reach or attain to any process of 
 thinking that differs in its nature from our first sight or sound- 
 cognition of a real monismus inclosing an ostensible pluralism. 
 No systems of philosophy have ever placed us above this world 
 of relativity, in which parts are measured by other parts, and 
 things expressed in terms of other things. No one has ever driven 
 out of this little world on which we concentrate our atten- 
 tion, its ostensible pluralism ; no one has ever placed that 
 conceived monismus containing this plurality of objects quite 
 within our reach, and we still hold out baby-hands to grasp 
 what is quite beyond our reach. 
 
 Such are the chains which bind our actions, and limit, in 
 effect, our thought. None but slaves will passively submit to 
 conscious servitude in shackles. Hence the Spirit strives cease- 
 lessly ; and this very striving is Life. 
 
 My theory is that any conceived first cognition must be so 
 conceived that the object is presented in plural form,* and that 
 no singular objective first cognition is possible. For if we 
 could ever have cognized a single object, without having, 
 
 * As in the case of the baby's first touch-cognition, and of 
 all forms of first cognition, however brought about.
 
 in 
 
 either in memory or actually present at the moment, some 
 other object comparable with it, we should have solved the 
 dual relationship of Subject-Object, and should have laid bare 
 the inscrutible it ness of the Object. What would thus become 
 known to us would not be the Quality and Quantity of the 
 It, for these are comparatives, but the it ness of the It, that is 
 the self-identity thereof. But no system of philosophy has ever 
 done this, and the itncss of the object has always remained 
 inscrutible.* Hence it is quite certain that no primary cog- 
 nition can have achieved, at the first step, what no one has 
 ever been able to do at any period of life. A singular 
 objective first cognition is therefore impossible, and this cog- 
 nition must be conceived in the plural. This plurality may 
 take two forms. Either the comparable objects must be pre- 
 sented in succession, so that from those objects held in memory 
 
 Nor could one object in space be cognized as one, unless 
 by comparison with some previous experience of plurality. 
 Nor could the single object be even cognized as object, unless 
 by the setting over against it, by way of comparison, of the 
 objectless ambient of space. Nor would a baby's first touch- 
 cognition have been possible had there not been present to his 
 touch both particular objects (or object) and also other data 
 of touch-sensation, as between which discrimination was 
 possible. All which cognitions are plural.
 
 11 
 
 a subsequent single-object presentation may be recognized ; 
 or, more than one comparable object must be synchronously 
 presented. The latter class of presentation is the only one 
 which fulfils the desiderata of a first cognition. 
 
 This plurality of our cognitions in their simplest forms 
 brings them all down to the cognition of an objective sequence or 
 procession (implying intervals between the objects cognized). As 
 I will presently show, what is true of our cognition of any 
 sequence of objects, is also true of any sequence of events, and of 
 the sequences of Cause-Effect. 
 
 Our conception of Space is thus built up out of our obser- 
 vations on the relative positions of, and intervals between, 
 objects present at the same moment ; our conception of Time 
 out of the relative intervals between each event in a sequence 
 or series of events ;* and our conception of Causality out of 
 the observed sequence of Cause-effect. 
 
 * We are here reminded of the words of one of our con- 
 temporary poets Flecker who said, 
 
 " When from the clock's last chime to the next chime 
 Silence beats his drum, 
 
 And Space with gaunt grey eyes and her brother Time 
 Wheeling and whispering come, 
 She with the mould of form and he with the loom of rhyme."
 
 I would therefore completely reverse Kant's hypothesis, 
 and declare that Time, Space, and Causality are by no means 
 given, but are, on the other hand, constructions from our 
 experience of Sequence, and are, as such, liable to all kinds 
 of misconstruction. Quite recently mathematicians have shown, 
 in the Theory of Relativity, how imperfectly we have construed 
 the signs given to us in experience, and to what extent \ve 
 should rectify our conceptions of Time and Space. 
 
 It is indeed clear that I make no preposterous demand 
 when I assert that the cognition of simple sequence is a sine 
 qua non of all mental action.* It is also a vital part of the 
 mental equipment of animals and insects, and we may trace 
 it down the scale of intellectual life until we begin to doubt 
 if it may not be a physiological as well as a physio-psychical 
 process, and have its roots far down in the undulatory and 
 vibratory nature of movement in the Elements. 
 
 " Intuition involves at least one sequence of sense data, 
 however remotely inter-comparable such data may be.
 
 13 
 
 All animals, in common with human beings, locate the 
 point from which sound issues by the minute interval of time 
 which intervenes between the sound waves striking one ear and 
 then the other. Should the sound waves, by any chance, strike 
 both ears simultaneously, the hearer at once turns the head to 
 one side, so that the sound, if repeated, should not a second 
 time baffle his power of locating it. This is noticeable even in 
 very young puppies. The location of a flash of lightning is 
 also gauged, with tolerable accuracy, by the immeasurably short 
 interval of time between the impact of the light on one eye 
 and then on the other. If one judges, "the flash came from 
 this direction," the ear will generally confirm the instantaneous 
 eye-judgment. The location of sounds and of light belongs 
 to the sequential order of cognition, but also comes in some 
 secondary sense under the heading of means of recognition. 
 
 Having established the plurality of first cognitions, and 
 the necessary existence of sequence as included in their appre- 
 hension, I will now briefly show how, in such sequences, 
 mathematical ratio is implicit, and can be made explicit. For 
 when we consider the groups of things necessarily presented 
 to the mind in all cognitions unsupported by past experience 
 (such as some objects in Space, some events in Time, and so
 
 14 
 
 forth), we realize that between the things in these groups exist 
 mutually sustaining ratios (however we may fail at the moment 
 to apprehend them), such as that the third object in Space is 
 twice as far away from the second as the second is from the first 
 (or, logically, the third is farther away from the second than the 
 second is from the first) ; or, the second object has an apparent 
 size equal to the other two together (or is greater than either) ; 
 or, there is the same interval of time between a series of gun- 
 reports, etc. In short, all these elementary cognitions, whether 
 we do, or do not, comprehend their true nature at the moment 
 of cognition, disclose a world of relativity which extends to 
 and implies mathematical ratio. 
 
 We can now proceed to discuss our accumulated experiences 
 and consider how these are classified in mind. The art of 
 classification depends upon comparison, and to a lesser extent 
 upon language. If some edifice is seen in the distance, the 
 observer, as he approaches it, forms a judgment as to whether it 
 is a church, a house, railway station, factory, or what not, by 
 comparing it with his experience of the various structures 
 associated in his mind witli these names. Now, clearly, if he 
 judges that it is a house, he does not mean to imply that it is 
 absolutely identical in every respect with any particular house 
 lie may have in memory, nor even that it represents the exact
 
 15 
 
 mean of all the houses he remembers.* He simply means that 
 it comes under the classification of " house " because he judges 
 that it is more like what he means by house than what he means 
 by church, station, factory, etc. But if he were asked, " Are you 
 sure that this is properly described as a house, rather than as 
 flats, maisonettes, etc. ? " he would, perhaps, have to think again 
 about whether the word "house" did in his experience include 
 more than one class of building used for residential purposes, 
 and whether he invariably used this word in one sense only. 
 
 If we pay strict attention to differences then classifications 
 can be indefinitely articulated, as they are in chemistry, until 
 each class contains but few individuals. But even then we have 
 not exhausted the possibilities of subdivision, for inasmuch as 
 each individual thing possesses a name of its own it cannot be 
 identical with any other individual thing, even though they 
 may both be included in the same class. Even if we produced 
 a dozen oranges, or a dozen new shillings from the Mint, a really 
 critical inspection would disclose differences between each one. 
 
 * Compare the Nyaya Sutras of Gotama ; the Kusumanjali 
 
 III. 11, of Udayana (Note by Prof. Cowell) ; and Siddhanta 
 
 Muktavali, pp. 82, 83.
 
 16 
 
 But if the closest examination failed to discern any difference, 
 yet no one of them could really be identical with any other one 
 of them, because the position in space occupied by one of them 
 is already filled, and cannot be occupied by the other. Hence 
 they cannot be identical in respect of locality, and no two things 
 can ever be identical with or wholly like each other.* On the 
 other hand, a comparison between two things must always 
 disclose both likeness and unlikeness. We say that this is like 
 that when the mutual likenesses are striking and the dis- 
 similarities inconspicuous, and we put things together in the 
 same class (that is, under the same descriptive name) by this, 
 somewhat arbitrary, process, Nearly every mistake which 
 it is possible for one to make proves, on analysis, to be a 
 mistake in classification, and consists in placing oneself, or other 
 people, or some things, into their wrong class. Hence we should 
 greatly admire the science of chemistry, with its scientifically 
 devised and admirable system of nomenclature and symbolism. 
 And we should all study classification. If any one dissuade you 
 by saying that it is a dull study, then he himself is incurably 
 smitten by the disease of dulness ; for I assure you that it is one 
 
 * Compare the doctrine of theSautrantikas (Re-presentationists") 
 "All is lik* Itself alone," <S:r
 
 17 
 
 of the most entertaining of studies, and that nearly every bit of 
 humour and jocoseness in life is based upon the gaucheries of 
 mixed classification. The comedies of the stage supply ample 
 examples of this fact from the days of Aristophanes down to 
 modern Pantomime, in which men appear as various animals 
 and girls in male attire. 
 
 Conscious mental classifications based upon likeness and 
 unlikeness, which we may call reasoned classifications, are 
 supplemented by unconscious classifications for which we have 
 no name, and which are only known to us as pleasurable or 
 painful emotions. In so far as Psychology is applicable to this 
 class of experience, it appears that because pleasurable sensa- 
 tion has been associated with a particular thing, all things 
 bearing a similar appearance will also excite these same 
 pleasurable emotions. This is a blind lumping together of 
 apparently similar things into unnamed classes.* Strictly 
 speaking, these unconscious, or unreasoned, classifications form 
 a category of two great classes (1) the pleasure- giving objects, 
 and (2) the pain-giving objects divided into as many sub- 
 divisions as there are objective signals and subjective responses. 
 
 * It cannot be called " reasoning," yet it is a common 
 psychical process.
 
 18 
 
 Our likes ami dislikes are governed by our emotional experience 
 of these tuo classes, and very seldom ,'if at all) by any process 
 of reason. Here \\-c are treacling on the border line of instinct, 
 for our habits-of-thought are matched by the habits of our senses 
 and emotions. Both classes of habit enable us to do easily what 
 was at first difficult, and the mind readily responds to the 
 habitual stimulus of some particular pleasurable sensation 
 already known by past experience as pleasurable, just as the 
 Alcoholic or the Opium Taker readily falls under the snsuous 
 charm. Such habits, capable of giving sensuous pleasure, are 
 often far stronger than the Reason, which vainlv tries to combat 
 them. 
 
 Now our memory of events and objects, and our classification 
 of them, constitute the reasoned part of our experience, just a-, 
 our emotional habits of lumping together into the tuo categories 
 <>f pleasurable or painful the effects upon ourselves of those ex- 
 ternal stimuli which we have not taken the trouble to name, 
 constitute the instinctive or unreasoned part of our experience. 
 The two in combination form the " 1 " (ego) of experience. It 
 is to this " I " that rvery subject instantaneously refers every 
 fresh experience for purposes of classification and recognition. 
 Bear heavily upon this word, and put out of mind any popular
 
 19 
 
 and faulty usages thereof. Recognition is the knowing over 
 again by reference to past experience.* Hence I call the 
 totality of the recorded experience of the individual his Sy**w 
 of Reference. 
 
 Philosophers who treat of the " ego " generally mean this 
 " I of experience ; " but, alas, not always. This " I " suffers 
 continual slight change* from the acquisition of ntw experiences, 
 other changes from forgetfulness of past experience, but remains 
 generally, after manhood is reached, without much change. 
 
 Yet we must not orerlook the greater changes that do take 
 place in the System of Reference of two classes of men. The 
 first class contains those rare individuals who have a life- long 
 and insatiable desire for knowledge. Let us clearly discriminate 
 these men from the ordinary ruck of mankind. Out of every 
 thousand young men who leave school or college there may be 
 one such, the rest regard their education as then complete, and 
 fling away their books with some such demoniacal remark as 
 "Thank God that is done with." But the one, whom a fairy 
 has touched at birth, knows that his education is then beginning. 
 He chants a Te Deum laudamus that he is at last free to begin his 
 
 * See the Pratyabhijna-Darsana ; "Recognition is a cog- 
 nition relative to an object represented in memory."
 
 -JO 
 
 real studies, and lie continues to thankfully class himself as a 
 ^tudent to the end of ins days. It is on account of the perpetual 
 studentship of our most learned and mobile-minded men that 
 the "I of experience " grows and develops in them to an ex- 
 ceptional degree. The other class of individuals suffering 
 unusual changes in this respect, contains those whose minds 
 break down under, or rebel against, rational methods of apprehen- 
 sion. I'p to some point in their education the struggle is con- 
 tinued, and some sort of cosmos is constructed out of the chaos 
 of sensation, but then it is all given up in despair, and more 
 or less complete mental confusion causes the troublesome science 
 of thinking to be altogether abandoned. Such individuals soon 
 fall under the impulses of emotion no longer restrained by 
 Reason, and supply with lull membership the clashes suffering 
 from religious and other forms of dogmatic mama. 
 
 In times like those in which \ve are now living, many 
 persons cannot retain their mental equilibrium. Events give us 
 pause, and we wonder whether our world is really an ordered 
 world dependent upon Law and led by Reason. Under existing 
 conditions the one old sheet-anchor of reason is apt to be slipped 
 off as out of date, and a preference given to the wildest forms 
 of credulity. The world will presently be astonished at finding
 
 21 
 
 that, in the space of a few years, it has, in some respects at 
 least, slid back into the Dark Ages.* 
 
 It is certainly true of the animal world that the association 
 of certain objects with pleasurable and painful sensations 
 appears to dominate their actions and thoughts. This is 
 demonstrably the case with babies in the suckling stage. The 
 Dog is pleased not only with his food, but with the person who 
 brings it to him ; and the same is true of tame fish, and of various 
 other domestic or partly tamed animals. This method of classifi- 
 cation, by the mere association of things, sounds, and persons with 
 events, is just the same form of emotional association that we 
 note in the classification of the human emotions into Pleasurable 
 and Painful ; and in the blind lumping together into the 
 pleasure-giving class of other objects that only bear a prima facie 
 resemblance to the object from which pleasure was actually 
 experienced. For instance, the crying baby is easily satisfied 
 with such a barefaced fraud as an indiarubber teat, made in 
 ruthful imitation of its mother's teats. The time may come 
 
 * " For Reason is the fountain from of old 
 
 From which the prophets drew. And none beside. 
 
 Who boasts of other inspiration lies, 
 
 There are no prophets other than the wise." --Jatni.
 
 22 
 
 when discrimination enables us to reject counterfeits of what 
 gave us pleasure. The earlier stages of this discrimination 
 seem easy enough, hut its ultimate stages demand 1he most 
 <Titiral arts of recognition. 
 
 Let us take just a few instances of how we use our indi- 
 vidual systfm of reference in Recognition and in Classification, 
 and let us consider first those acts of recognition which result 
 in the object recogni/ed being placed in one of these two 
 classes,* without confusing ourselves by troubling much about 
 very exact classification. Like and Dislike of other people 
 is a very complicated and difficult topic, for it depends not 
 only on our experience of them, but also on our experience of 
 other people whom we judge to be like them, and whom 
 we have lumped into the same class with them in our system 
 of classification. All kinds of ethical contentions are also 
 introduced as to their beliefs, manners and customs, and (as 
 these are often unknown to us) as to the beliefs, manners and 
 customs of those other persons whom we have rightly or 
 wrongly clasied with them. For instance, if an unknown 
 and unseen man is mentioned to us as a Muhammedan, we 
 at once begin to classify him a being like some other alleged 
 
 * Pleasure-giving and Pain-giving.
 
 23 
 
 Mohammedan whom we may have met, or read about. And 
 this notwithstanding the probability that the alleged Muham- 
 medans of whom we had read were purely fictitious persons, 
 whose beliefs, rnannen and customs, were attributed to them 
 because some other alleged Nfuhammedans about whom the 
 author had read were alleged to fall into such classes. This 
 is but one initance of the mental confusion caused by reading 
 Fiction. 
 
 Let us eicape from all this complexity in our judgments' 
 of actual persons by merely looking at a row of portraits in 
 a picture gallery. Let us put away from the mind all question 
 of artistic merit, and simply ask one's self, "Why do I like the 
 style of individual whom I take to be represented in this 
 picture, and dislike the one in that ; why does this face please 
 me, and that displease me ? " Even now, when the matter has 
 been reduced to its smallest compass, we shall find that it is 
 still complex, and that Emotion plays a stronger game than 
 Reason in determining the answer. If the portrait is of a 
 person of different sex from the observer, then sexual admiration 
 will be the strongest influence. Some one like this rather like 
 this had already filled the observer with the tenderest emotions. 
 
 Some writers have gone much farther, and have claimed 
 that eroticism is the sole determining influence in all such
 
 24 
 
 cases, hut \\ith this dictum I am not in agreement. I think 
 that inasmuch as the classification and subsequent judgment is 
 subjective, and that the object has merely the power, by signal 
 ax H were, to awaken Memory, that therefore the varying 
 strengths of the emotions in different individuals are one factor 
 in judgment. In some individuals, certainly, eroticism would 
 he the deciding factor, and all other memories would be 
 brushed aside ; but in other individuals there are other 
 emotions quite strong enough to hold their own A parent, 
 a sister or brother, some, treasured friend, was perhaps like this 
 picture : in some sense like this picture. 
 
 Or, again, religious emotion might determine the judg- 
 ment of a Catholic devotee, who had for years silently adored 
 a holy painting in some cathedral. This face has a something 
 in it of the ineffable charm and love of the Holy Madonna; 
 is in some sense like that. Or an Oriental might decide thus 
 there is something in this picture of the perfect serenity and 
 bliss of a Buddha, of a mind so far removed from this world 
 of actions and recompense ; in some sense it is like That 
 One. But here we seem to be already trespassing into that 
 sphere where one is beginning to think things out, instead 
 of allowing the emotions to decide our likes and dislikes.
 
 25 
 
 In the series of hypothetical cases just given conscious mental 
 classification was purposely excluded, and we treated judg- 
 ments as though they were founded upon the unthought-out 
 classification of pleasure-given emotions. In them, this was 
 preferred to that, because this resembled some pleasure-giving 
 prototype held in experience. It was memory of emotional 
 pleasure, not of the reasons why this constituted pleasure, that 
 held the mind in thrall. It is the very pleasure itself that is 
 called back in memory by the bare significance of form and 
 feature.* 
 
 The action is, in such instances, very simple. The signal 
 is recognized as a pleasure signal, and a rasa, or pleasure-state, 
 ensues. Led by these considerations I class such judgments as 
 based upon emotional recognition. No doubt the category of 
 pleasure-giving and painful sensation can be divided into 
 classes, for there must clearly be a limit-class in both, beyond 
 
 * Particular sounds may call back particular scenery, in 
 cases where the two were once fortuitously associated in expe- 
 rience. Herbert Spencer gives an instance, from his own 
 experience, in his Autobiography, Vol. II., pp. 68, 69.
 
 26 
 
 which no experience of sensation has ever gone within the 
 memory of each individual experience!'.* 
 
 S<> far I have dealt with those specific and individual 
 personal traits capable of recognition in portraiture. But across 
 the conclusions thereby reached there sweeps a strong cross 
 current of generic, or pseudo-universal, traits of character. 
 Most human beings when under the influence of passion give 
 themselves away by unconsciously exhibiting, in countenance 
 and posture, the violence of their emotions. Love or Hate, 
 Defiance or Submission, arc clearly portrayed in stance and 
 feature. In the case of animals other than human beings there 
 is no attempt to hide these expressions of the emotions, and 
 in many cases these expressions are common to humanity also 
 For instance, all animals using their teeth as weapons of offence 
 exhibit them in a snarling expression when angry, or con- 
 temptuous of their antagonist. This language of the emotions, 
 whether expressed in the individual or delineated in Art, is 
 not always understood without study. For instance, Oriental 
 
 * Herbert Snencer says (Autobiography, Vol. II., p. 69) of a 
 special combination of music and scenery " The exaltation of 
 feeling produced was unparalleled in my experience ; and never 
 has pleasurable emotion risen in me to the same intensity."
 
 27 
 
 Art has a language of its own, the conventional nature of 
 which demands much study for its elucidation. On the other 
 hand, it is admitted that the parrot's expression is inscrutible 
 to most men. 
 
 Beyond, therefore, the excitation of the pleasure-state by 
 the recognition that some portrait resembles a pleasure-giving 
 prototype held in memory, there is also the possibility that 
 various rasas may be produced by the pseudo-universal signals 
 in the object, such as those of Love (sexual or universal), Hate, 
 Defiance or Submission, etc. ; or of the comparatively perfect 
 attainment of Manhood, Godhood, Reason, etc. And the 
 Chooser would like that particular portrait which reflected his 
 existing state of mind ; or that, by a combination of individual 
 and general modes of expression, excited in him the passions 
 that it portrayed. The highest form of portraiture has this 
 latter power. 
 
 In general, objects of desire (not being in the class of 
 necessities) are not sought by all persons with the same avidity. 
 It is said that the preference of this over that is a question of 
 taste. For instance, the preference of one man for antique 
 coins rather than for books, and of another for books rather 
 than for coins, may depend on education and various other
 
 personal factors: but liis final act of choosing from one class 
 of objects in preference to another class is an act of recog- 
 nition that he had experienced more intense pleasure from 
 previous enjo\ment of this class of objects than he had felt 
 from objects belonging to the other class. In such cases we 
 are evidently dealing with a development of the category of 
 Pleasure-giving and Painful Sensations into various grades of 
 such feelings. 
 
 It is a canon that we should not dispute about matters 
 of taste, and for the unanswerable reason that, as no two men 
 have had exactly the same experiences of pleasure and pain, 
 no two men can be affected in exactly the same way by the 
 same object of experience. If we go back again to the example 
 of a portrait gallery we shall find that this same unanswerable 
 reason governs this case also, and it would be the merest chance 
 (mathematically) if any two successive spectators selected the 
 same portrait as the most pleasing. 
 
 An instance of the instantaneous recognition of error is 
 evident to nil players of out-door games. The moment a bad 
 stroke is made, the striker is seized by an instantaneous recog- 
 nition that that particular stroke must be classed among the 
 many errors he has perpetrated during his career. I think that
 
 29 
 
 this act of recognition is mainly emotional. There is a definite 
 feeling of mistake, which has been often felt before, and which 
 causes the mind to instantly classify the stroke as an error, 
 and this long before the event has disclosed any actual error to 
 any other person than the striker. 
 
 In leaving the subject of emotional recognition I would 
 mention that few authors of philosophical works have dealt 
 with this branch of Recognition. 
 
 One of the earliest, and possibly the earliest, philosophical 
 description of Recognition is found in the Abhidhammattha 
 Sangaha attributed to the venerable Anuruddha.* In so far 
 as I can comprehend the translator's meaning, Anuruddha 
 considered that Recognition proceeded backwards from an 
 immediately present object to past experiences of a like nature. 
 It would indeed appear that in his view our mental classifi- 
 cations are subject to continual revision with each fresh recog- 
 nition, in the sense that we re-classify our experiences backwards 
 from every fresh experience. 
 
 Let us at once admit that each fresh experience confirms, 
 adds to, and often farther articulates our previous classifi- 
 
 * The Bergsonian philosophy is founded on this school. The 
 Pali Text Society has published a translation.
 
 30 
 
 cations. Beyond this there are, n<> doubt, cases of incomplete 
 or uncertain classifications of experience which some fresh 
 experience enables us to complete and classify properly. As 
 when a mineralogist, unable to classify some specimens, puts 
 them into some provisional classification with a query attached 
 to it, but subsequently his doubts are solved by a fresh speci- 
 men, and he then goes back and re-classifies his previous 
 specimens. 
 
 But, in general, I am firmly convinced that the process of 
 recognition by no means consists in casting doubt upon the 
 established classifications of the mind, but rather in recalling 
 these cases clearly, and seeing into \\iiich class the new object 
 will slide with the least possible disturbance to our ideas. 
 
 In the cases in which class recognition takes place there 
 is no disturbance; but in those cases which are unique in 
 experience a ne\- class must be formed, and this implies a 
 certain mental disturbance and possible confusion of mind. 
 Tins i> noticeable in school boys: for at the school period 
 th" number of unique experiences crowded into a few vears 
 dem.uuis a continual expansion and articulation of the cate- 
 goiii., of the mind. While these conditions obtain, clear 
 thinking should not be expected from a student.
 
 31 
 
 Prof. Bosanquet's view that Recognition consists in a. 
 "reflective reproduction under the influence of an idea of 
 identity," presents great difficulty. If the subject was really 
 " under the influence of an idea of identity " in any complete 
 sense, he would insist on individual recognition of the first 
 human being he set eyes on, and he would, during every day 
 of his life, add an immense number of faulty "judgments " to 
 his already onerous category of errors. Moreover, as I have 
 already shown, an " idea of identity " must be an illusion, for 
 true identity cannot be even predicated as between any two 
 objects whatever. An idea of similarity, such as is implied 
 by the inclusion of more than one object in a class, does 
 undoubtedly arise in mind during the process of recognition ;* 
 it is implied in every reasoned act of comparison, and may be 
 present at the onset of emotional recognition. However, Prof. 
 Bosanquet was treating of the logical aspect of Recognition, 
 and would, presumably, specially restrict ''"identity" to some 
 modern meaning which I am unable to grasp. 
 
 There are then two processes of recognition ; (1) a reasoned 
 process, and (2) an emotional, or unreasoned, process. But 
 
 * Compare Udayana in Kusumanjali (Cluster III.) on the 
 likeness of the Gavaya to the Cow.
 
 32 
 
 there arc also two distinct kinds ol classification brought about 
 by our reasoned process of recognition, i.e. (J) Logical assembly 
 into classes, or Class Recognition, and (2) Individual Recognition. 
 For instance, the recognition that a thing, or things, may be 
 included in a certain class is the easiest form of recognition. 
 The first man who leaves a meeting, or railway carriage, should 
 have no difficulty in recognizing that a number of somewhat 
 similar articles may be classed together as umbrellas, but 
 mistakes are not uncommon when it comes to recognizing 
 one particular umbrella as his own. However, mistakes in 
 Class Recognition are not uncommon. An Irishman, attending 
 a ball at a courury house close to his home, guided his steps 
 there by a lantern. The entertainment passed of! well, but 
 early on the morrow his groom carried a large wire cage to 
 the host's house. ' Here is your parrot," said he, "kindly give 
 me back my master's lantern.' * 
 
 Moreover, the proper classifications of thinkers and doers 
 is not so very easy, and it has become a bye word that the art 
 of classification in this sense is not known in political govern- 
 ments, where the attempt is constantly renewed to push the 
 'square' man into the 'round' hole. 
 
 An instance of the comedy of mixed classification.
 
 The following instances of acts of recognition, or of 
 failure in recognition, are mostly trivial as actions, although 
 full of import as recognitions. If acts of importance to the 
 individual were analysed, it would be found that the entire 
 functions of the mind and probably also those of the body 
 were engaged in the action. Hence no analysis of any special 
 function would be possible on account of the immense com- 
 plexity of the forces in play. But the more trivial the act the 
 less general the disturbance, or stimulated activity, of the 
 functions of the individual, and the greater the probability of 
 some correct diagnosis of effect. Yet, even in trivial actions, 
 great mental disturbance often ensues. He who is known as 
 'shy ' or 'ill at ease in company ' is he who is unable to limit 
 the excitation caused by trivial events to their local centres 
 of reaction. 
 
 I will now narrate, from my own experience, an instance 
 of individual recognition. This instance is very interesting 
 as showing how recognition proceeds by various avenues of 
 comparison, one of which may lead to recognition while others 
 may fail. Now if these different avenues of comparison arose 
 from different objects, one object would be recognized and the 
 other objects unrecognized ; but if these avenues sprang from
 
 34 
 
 the same object, we reach the startling conclusion that this 
 object \voulcl be both recognized and unrecognized ! Yet this 
 paradox is not only conceivable, but is actual in my experience. 
 I entered a cricket ground where a match was in progress, 
 and instantly, from a distance of about 150 yards, recognized 
 (without the slightest doubt) a certain bowler, whom I know 
 full well, in the act of bowling. About half-an-hour afterwards 
 1 was ceremoniously introduced to one of the players, and 
 asked (sotto roce) if I knew him. I paused for some time and 
 listened to his voice, which called back the memory that I 
 had heard it before, but 1 was quite unable to recognize him. 
 This was the same man who was the object of my instant 
 recognition on entering the ground, and my failure in recog- 
 nition was due to the absence of his flowing beard. The 
 interest of this incident lies in the fact that it is a concrete 
 example of how we analyse objects. A single entilv thus 
 becomes known to us as consisting of an aggregation of 
 characters. Now every artist knows that the stance of a man, 
 and the way in which he carries his weight when in motion, 
 is more typical of that particular man than any other single 
 character. In picture or statue every other character may be 
 true to the original, but the representation utterly fails unless 
 the stance is that particular stance idiosyncratic of the man.
 
 35 
 
 But if you value the friendship of painters do not suggest to 
 them that this is the reason why they so often advise half- 
 length portraits. 
 
 In the above instance a specially trained eye enabled me 
 to recognize a man by one characteristic only, but directly 
 I was no longer able to bring that special eye training into 
 use, neither eye nor ear enabled me to recognize the same man 
 over again. 
 
 Some might say that my failure in recognition was the 
 result of a trick, or change in the appearance, of my acquaint- 
 ance. But this objection has no weight, for we can never have 
 the opportunity of recognizing any object without some change 
 having affected it since we observed it last. If there is such 
 a condition as that of objective reality, that condition only 
 exists momentarily at the instant of observation, and then 
 passes away into a changed something differing from what it 
 was when observed. In many cases such changes are slow 
 and slight, and we do not fail to recognize our friends simply 
 because of the tarnish of time, or change of habitat. Yet \ve 
 know that no event can ever happen again ; that the friend 
 whom we met yesterday can never again be met either at the 
 same time (which is gone for ever), or in the same place (left
 
 36 
 
 thousands of miles behind in space), or under the same Subject- 
 Object relations ; for between that meeting and this both 
 I arsons have changed. Even that suppositions momentary 
 reality of the Object as Object is surely born of the Subject, 
 in the Berkeleyan sense, and hence does not inhere in the 
 Object as Object. The alleged New Realists have, in this 
 context, sunk back into the dreamland of poesy, and of Hebraic 
 mythology. In the time of the poet Spenser it was not so 
 difficult to be a \'ew Realist, in fact he had claims to this 
 1 1 tie which seem indisputable. 
 
 " Then give 1 think on that which Nature said 
 ot that same time when Change shall no more be, 
 but steadfast rest of all things, firmly stayed 
 upon the pillars of Eternity. 
 Which iscontrair to Mutability, 
 for all that moveth doth in Change delight. 
 But henceforth all shall rest eternally 
 with him who is the God of Sabaoth light. 
 O ! that same Sabaoth God, grant me that Sabaoth 
 sight." * 
 
 All forms of recognition are therefore operative on changing 
 objects, and we rely upon our experience helping us to follow 
 
 * Faery Queen.
 
 37 
 
 changing things through their changes without losing sight 
 of them, or of the remembrance of what they once were. The 
 one thing that does not change, and which thus gives us the 
 necessary criterion of fixity by which to appraise Change, is 
 the Eternal Subject, the Contemplator of existence, the Atman 
 of Vedantic thought.* 
 
 This example is on all fours with the one given by Prof. 
 Bosanquet, who cites the case of a man (presumably not a 
 musician) who asked for a special air written by a given com 
 poser to be played, but failed to recognize it when it was 
 played. Putting to one side all chance of error on the hearer's 
 part in having associated in his mind certain names with a 
 special melody, and also dismissing any peculiar method of 
 rendering the melody which may have baffled him, the reason 
 of the recognition of the name and the failure in the recog- 
 nition of the tune probably lies in the fact that his memory 
 was specially trained to remember names, but not melodies. 
 
 As an instance of the extent to which special training 
 assists in class recognition let me add that the late Dr. W. G. 
 
 * Some urge that Memory enables us to appraise Change, 
 and will not enter into Metaphysic,
 
 Grace once told me that, directly the opposing side took their 
 place, in the cricket field, he rould tell how many left-handed 
 howlers the side contained hy the way they walked, lie was 
 certainly right on the few occasions on which I heard him 
 prophesv. Attain, a gardener can toll, even in mid-winter, to 
 what class any fuming currant hush belongs: some Fruit 
 (irowers ran, in mid-winter, name all the well-known varieties 
 of Pears from a single glance at the habit of the trees; and 
 an old sailor can generally recognize in the far distance the 
 nationality of any sailing ship. 
 
 One more very interesting instance hangs upon what is 
 recogni/.ed in the ordinary act of reading. Most literary men 
 can read ahout three times as fast as they can read aloud. 
 Persons of this class, and of very varied interests, will read the 
 contents of the day's Times (not including the advertisements! 
 in ahout 2<> minutes. P>ut this may he called "skimming 
 through" the paper, and not reading it. However, I know 
 that, in my own case, I miss out nothing of interest to myself, 
 so that this skimming process does not preclude Recognition. 
 P)iit the interest lies in the answer to the question What is 
 rrcogni/ed ? Clearly not the letters ; presumably not the 
 individual words; doubtfully even the sentences in any perfect
 
 39 
 
 sense. Yet the meaning is apprehended. There are, however, 
 exceptions. Sometimes one meets with a most confusing 
 author, who expresses himself in such round-about, topsy- 
 turvy ways, that one must continually stop and read some- 
 thing over again. This is generally a waste of time, for, in 
 nine cases out of ten, confused, doubtful methods of expression 
 are a true reflection of the confusion and doubt reigning in the 
 author's mind. 
 
 I am in doubt as to the exact process of apprehension in 
 this act of skimming through printed matter. Possibly the 
 attention is only given to the verbs, nouns, and pronouns, and 
 not to qualifications. It is my experience that it can only be 
 done in one's native language, and it is perhaps one of those 
 new developments of eye-sense that comes to some persons as a 
 result of much practice. We might call it a means of appre- 
 hending the content of writing by synoptic recognition.* 
 
 The analysis of Emotional Recognition is difficult. Like 
 all other analyses, the first steps are comparatively easy, and 
 their results are enlightening ; but each step presents us with 
 an ever-increasing number of problems awaiting solution. The 
 
 * Compare Panini-Darsana, on Sphota.
 
 tin.il result >f analysis is invariable. It leaves us Fared with 
 tar more unknown things' and unsolved difficulties than we \\'ere 
 faced with when our analysis began. The problem n|' kecup- 
 nition, as disclosed in this short address, has developed into a 
 series of problems, and time only allows me to point on! a 
 murh more intractible sei ies which the next step in analysis 
 brings forward. 
 
 Our senses and our feelings develop habits of their own, 
 and the brain becomes habituated to the receipt from them of 
 certain linked impressions, or synchronous sets of impressions, 
 which it learns to associate with certain times, places, and 
 conditions. It is in this way that we obtain from the mind 
 certain intuitive or instinctive responses. To the habitual series 
 of synchronous impressions the brain responds with satisfied 
 complacency, an "all is well " response. Rut to an unusual set- 
 it responds with surprise and alarm. Mental distress is evideni, 
 and danger is apprehended. Xor can we, in such cases, argue. 
 ourselves back into a state of complacency. II we can succeed 
 in allaying the feeling of danger, we are still left in an uneasv, 
 mystery-stricken, state of mind. 
 
 I will give a very trivial, but quite typical, instance. 
 Persons whose life is spent partlv in a big city and partly in
 
 41 
 
 the country, wear various raiments suitable to their occu- 
 pations. The tall hat of their city life is supplanted by a cap 
 when rusticating', and so forth. I have it from a friend, that 
 one day, directly he had left his country home for an afternoon 
 in London, he was seized with the feeling that something was 
 wrong. At first he thought he had forgotten something that he 
 should have taken with him, but soon assured himself that this 
 was not so. A few yards further on he stopped again, perfectly 
 convinced that he had forgotten the existence of some appoint- 
 ment that he had made for that day. Mental confusion was 
 increasing every moment, when the source of his trouble was 
 suddenly realized. He had started out without changing his 
 hat, and this interruption to the accustomed series of linked 
 impression had disturbed his mind. 
 
 Another instance opens fresh channels for investigation. 
 It appears that a series of mental impressions (such as are 
 involved in a calculation) should all be capable of being re- 
 called together in judgment. But one or more may hang back, 
 as it were, and the judgment, when formed, ma) r be based upon 
 an unconsciously imperfect set of representations. Presently 
 the loiterers turn up and contradict the judgment. If the mind 
 is not then occupied by an inflow of fresh impressions, but is
 
 feeding upon past impressions by a process of regurgitation, 
 a recognition of error arises. 
 
 A mathematician, possessed of remarkable accuracy in his 
 work, told me that one evening, when he was rather tired, he 
 was showing a youth how to do certain sums in which he had 
 failed. These he demonstrated quite satisfactorily to the 
 youth, and retired to rest. But not to sleep, for his brain 
 became agitated. A cognisance of some error which he Iincl 
 committed was forced upon him. He lay there thinking of 
 what error he could have been guilty, but he failed to satisfy 
 himself. Presently confused sets of figures were presented in 
 his mind, but without any particular bearing, or signification. 
 He woke next morning in the same state of mental unrest, 
 and, on looking at the boy's sums, found that he himself had 
 made an error in calculation by having omitted a certain 
 factor. 
 
 I think that the faulty decisions of many men, and of 
 most public bodies, arn due to the fact that feA have the power 
 of recalling all the facts necessary for judgment and of repre- 
 senting the whole series synchronously in mind. Faulty deci- 
 sions are due to the fact that first one and lii^n another fact 
 becomes dommant in mind and obscures ail the rest. Some
 
 43 
 
 men are so hopelessly incompetent in this respect that they will 
 come to one decision one day, and, on the same set of facts, go 
 back upon it the next day. All these errors depend upon the 
 inability of most minds to really weigh or value facts. They 
 only see one thing among the many, and ivhich one they happen 
 to see at the moment of judgment decides the issue. The low 
 craft of the lawyer consists in making the fact telling in 
 favour of his client the dominant fact in the minds of the Jury 
 at the moment of their verdict. It is the duty of the Judge to 
 recall to their minds all the facts, or to at least attempt this 
 task. 
 
 There is also a set of loitering impressions that often 
 cause mental confusion. What we were just considering were 
 not loitering impressions, but loitering representations, mental 
 processes in which there was a failure in synchronous repre- 
 sentation. But, just as we have two forms of recognition, 
 i.e., the consciously mental process and the emotional or un- 
 conscious process, so we have two ways in which failure in 
 mental synchrony may occur. In the second mode it is the 
 impressions themselves that loiter,* and so are presented to 
 
 * In a physiological sense.
 
 14 
 
 the uniul in succession notwithstanding that the objective 
 occurrence was singular. The duplication of our senses of 
 sight, hearing, and touch, presents an obvious possibility that 
 the duplicate set of impressions, which are normally presented 
 synchronously in mind, may on occasions be presented suc- 
 cessively, with an interval, however short, between the presenta- 
 tions. In such cases we receive what is, for all practical 
 purposes, a icpeated signal in place of one signal. A subject, 
 seeing for the first time a certain event or object, but whose 
 mind receives a repeated, or duplicated, signal of the fact, 
 necessarily compares the second impression with the first, and 
 concludes that he has seen all this before. This would be 
 undoubtedly true of his brain (or of part of it), which \vould in 
 fact have received the impression before, although perhaps only 
 one hundredth of a second before. But it is also true that the 
 brain itself presents a duplication of some of its organs, an 
 obscure parallelism between certain parts, and might thus 
 originate a psychic duplication on its own account. It is thus 
 conceivable that, in cognition, the time-order of objective events 
 might be invalidated, or even reversed, in abnormal cases of 
 physio-psychic retardation of sensuous impressions. The 
 evidence of persons suffering from hysteria, or from great mental 
 excitement, often furnishrs instances of time-confusion, effects
 
 45 
 
 preceding causes, and so forth. Although such evidence may be 
 quite valueless as to chronology, it may be honestly given, and 
 may be quite correct as to the persons and things that made up 
 the scenes referred to. 
 
 By these psycho-physical facts we can dissolve all that fog 
 of mystery with which modern psychologists have surrounded 
 this matter. But we have not as yet found a name that 
 is properly applicable to this peculiar form of dual pre- 
 sentation. The second or repeat-presentation results in true, 
 and not in false, recognition. It is "had before," and "known," 
 by comparison with the other moiety of the impression which 
 first gained the ear of the mind. Hence the name " Plural 
 Recognition " would seem the most applicable. The pluralizing 
 of objects, which occurs during some states of intoxication in 
 the subject, may be considered in this connection. 
 
 Let those who feel inclined to decry the importance, or the 
 frequency, of non- synchronous response due to retarded nerve - 
 transmission ask a teacher of piano-playing how many of his 
 most expert pupils keep true time with the left hand. 
 
 But it must not be assumed, on account of my manner of 
 presenting this subject of recognition, that I necessarily believe
 
 46 
 
 in the existence of true records in the brain. The clear thinker 
 ib \\f whose mind, influenced by his experiences, and carrying in 
 memory a clear, complete, and logically valid classification of 
 them, instantly apprehends each fresh experience as being like 
 and unlike his previous experiences. Of him it may truly be 
 said that lie modifies (in a logical sense) each fresh experience 
 by putting it through the mill of his classified experiences. For, 
 as no event can be identical with any other event, so no new 
 experience can be identical with any past experience ; the sense 
 data are not identical, nor is the experiencer exactly the same 
 experiencer that he was on the former occasion. Hence the 
 modes of his comprehension to some extent determine \\hat 
 can be apprehended by him, and, in this sense, some modification 
 of a new experience must be declared. 
 
 But so also are his past experiences, and their classifi- 
 cations, modified, retrospectively, by each fresh experience, 
 within the meaning of the venerable Anurudclha. For instance, 
 no concept of " house " can fail to be modified, affected, 
 expanded, or articulated, by each fresh experience of some 
 object coming under the class " house," but yet not exactly 
 like, or altogether unlike, any particular house " had before." 
 
 I said that Cognition is Recognition. But the reverse of 
 this is also true in thr sense that Recognition proceeds by
 
 47 
 
 precisely the same method, i.e., by the mutual modification of 
 one criterion by each other criterion, and is therefore as purely 
 relative as is the conceived foundation of our knowledge in our 
 first act of cognition. I ruled out all possibility of an original 
 cognition of a single object, and said that every original cog- 
 nition must be of some plurality of objects in Space, events in 
 Time, etc. 
 
 If we then became aware that one of these objects in 
 Space was larger than another, or that the distance or interval 
 between A and B was greater than the interval between B and 
 C, we must at the same moment have also become aware of 
 the following modification in our method of standardization, 
 i.e., that one object was smaller than another, and that the 
 interval between B and C was less than the interval between 
 A and B. Just so do we modify our methods of appraisement 
 when we gauge each new experience by past experiences, and 
 past experiences by each new experience. In this sense the very 
 process of simple cognition is ' had again ' in every subsequent 
 recognition. Moreover, the moment of experience in an original 
 cognition is an extended present, or continuum ; as when the 
 ticks of a clock are cognized as having an equal interval 
 between them, hence they cannot be even conceived as
 
 4S 
 
 'Happening all together in one true instant. So also is the 
 moment of recognition an extended present in which the new 
 experience is crushed against the thought-modes of the mind, 
 which latter generally extends the moment long enough to 
 conjure up against it a whole army of past experiences by way 
 of comparison. Then follows the mutual modification. The 
 new comer takes his place in the ranks, and these ranks are 
 reformed for his admission. 
 
 This continuum of tiie moment of experience is just 
 long enough for the experience!' to take the first time-portion 
 of the experience and set it up against the middle portion 
 (the immediate present) by way of criterion, and even to 
 stage it up in anticipation of the not-yet-arrived, or third 
 period, of that "moment of experience." In the case of the 
 whistle of an express train passing close to the observer, he 
 experiences an increasing noise followed by a decrease and 
 change of note, and, however short he may arbitrarily make his 
 " moment of experience," he will experience just this. In other 
 words, the moment is long enough for him to put up the first 
 part against the actual instant of experience, and to recognize 
 the increase of the volume of sound, and also to anticipate (if 
 he does not actual!} experience) the third or concluding period 
 of derrf-ase.
 
 49 
 
 Anticipation, Realization, and Reflection are the three 
 necessary phases of thought, and even if, in the case of an 
 entirely unexpected event, no previous anticipation may be 
 possible, yet Anticipation will have its say at some point in 
 every " moment of experience." 
 
 In leaving the subject of the How and the Why of Recog- 
 nition, I will only remark that the content of recognition and 
 its implications have only been " skimmed through," leaving 
 much interesting matter undiscussed. I often feel much sym- 
 pathy with a certain countryman, who, having listened to a 
 critical discussion of this subject, remarked : " When I get out- 
 side I shall stare about me, for this is a very different world 
 from what I took it to be." He had reason on his side, for 
 none of us know exactly what sort of world this is. 
 
 Grammar, that faultless index of human thought, against 
 which the pseudo- logicians are engaged in ceaseless struggle, 
 provides for this necessity in Past, Present, and Future tenses. 
 Although the Eternal Subject always experiences the Now of 
 existence, and not the Has been or Will be, yet every single 
 experience of this continually-existing present contains in itself 
 its own immediate criteria of comparison : and the opinion 
 then formed is verifiable by comparison with past experience.
 
 The twin infinities of Past and Future, the unbroken stream 
 of existence, presents in itself no objects and parts, no possi- 
 bility of measurement, until it is bisected (in the present 
 moment) by the Subject of experience, and measured back- 
 wards and forwards bv the standard or criterion of that 
 experience. This gives us our Loci of the events in our expe- 
 rience, and our point d'appui in the universe. It introduces into 
 the monismus of existence the essential minimum of duality 
 necessary for perception.* 
 
 Let us for a moment consider the Yoga of Recognition : 
 how the capacity of recognition may be gained. 
 
 The first step is to pay attention, to bend the mind down 
 to the particular object (or group of objects), and not to treat 
 it as the Priest and th^ Levite treated the wounded man. 
 These are the moments of experience, when concentrated 
 thought will produce life-long memory, and earn for the 
 experiencer the title of an observant man. 
 
 The next step is to make certain that no confusion exists 
 as to your conscious classification of this object, event, or 
 whatever it may be. For if the categories of the mind are 
 
 * C.f. My Concepts of Monism, p. 260 et seq.
 
 51 
 
 in a state of confusion, memory will represent to you an 
 inextricable chaos of records, and your thought (or what passe* 
 in your case for thought) will be made still more confused, will 
 be made more turbid instead of being clarified, by your memory- 
 records. To attain the condition of well-ordered memory, 
 some practice in the analysis and synthesis of the characters 
 of objects is essential * Following this, practice in the art of 
 classifying such objects after such analysis and synthesis. In 
 this respect study of Natural History is of the greatest use. 
 
 The third step is to obtain the power of recall over this 
 well-ordered memory. This is generally effected by a system 
 of keys, which are learned by heart, parrot fashion. The crux 
 of this system of keys is to connect together the various links 
 into a chain of memory, so that the remembrance of one link 
 calls back all the others. The Hindus have perfected this 
 system of memory to an extent not approached by the western 
 
 * Compare Marcus Aurelius. " Make for thyself a definition, 
 or description, of the thing which is presented to thee, so as to 
 see distinctly what kind of thing it is .... and tell thyself 
 its proper name .... For nothing is so productive of elevation 
 of mind as to be able to examine methodically and truly every 
 object which is presented to thee in life ; " et seq.
 
 races, for they have kept alive the traditions of mnemonic 
 literature long since lost in the West. \\ hen n man has really 
 achieved this task, and learned the Yoga of recognition, he lias 
 at once placed himself in a little intellectual aristocracy, which 
 is always, and at every period in the world's history, a very 
 small class. They, alone among men, can form judgments- 
 the rest are mere gamblers, playing dice with Providence, and 
 guessing all the time. 
 
 I have shown how Logic, Epistemology, Psychology, and 
 in some sense Mathematics, are all necessary to the knowledge 
 of how we recognize ; but, to justly apprehend the place which 
 Recognition takes in Philosophy, it is necessary to still farther 
 expand its basis. 
 
 In this mutually dependent Subject-Object Universe, all 
 we know is that the Subject makes various responses to Object - 
 signals. From varied responses we infer various signals, and 
 from this we conclude that the Itness of the Objective World 
 is articulated or particularized. But the content of Recognition 
 is the subjective interpretation of the repeated object-signals, 
 not the self- identity of the Object, for of the Object we can 
 posit only un Itness. For instance, on a railway, when the 
 stop (or danger) signal is ^een, the train stops. But from this
 
 53 
 
 relationship we should not argue that the stopping of the train 
 is in fact the signal ! By no means. The signal is one thing, 
 its interpretation is another ; and no subjective interpretation 
 should be read into the nature of the Object de se. 
 
 The itness of the Object is therefore unknown to us. But 
 this admission of an objective It is not an admission of Dualism, 
 since, for all we know to the contrary, this unknown It may be 
 the Eternal Subject, or Self, over again in an unrecognized 
 form.* 
 
 This is the bridge that makes the position of the monist 
 defensible. We hear him insistently calling to us not to fail 
 in this final act of recognition, after which " there is nothing 
 more to be known."! 
 
 * " And all the phantom, Nature, stands, 
 With all the music in her tone, 
 A hollow echo of mine own, 
 A hollow form with empty hands ! " 
 
 TENNYSON. (In Memoviam.} 
 
 f Compare Somananda-natha in Sivadvishti : " When once 
 the nature of Siva that resides in all things has been known 
 with tenacious recognition, . . . there is no farther need of 
 doing aught, or of any farther reflection."
 
 54 
 
 But the position of the monist, although defensible, is open 
 to the pluralistic objection that Recognition implies cognizable 
 objects. 
 
 If the inscrutability of the It is in any way bound up with 
 tiie fact that this It is in reality the Eternal Subject over again 
 " in an unrecognized form," then this apprehension of an external 
 something is not Recognition but failure in recognition. To 
 tln^ it is replied that the apprehension of this fact is both 
 success in recognition and failure in recognition ; as when twin 
 brothers are always recognized by some friend, who is yet 
 continually mistaking the one for the other ; who might even 
 distinguish them when they were both present, and afterwards 
 "recognize" the wrong one when the other \\as absent. To 
 this it may be objected that Self-recognition is only one form 
 of recognition, and that all other forms of recognition imply 
 objects discrete from the Perceiver, a something capable of being 
 known by comparison with other objects. But to this objection 
 tin- monist may reply that cognizable objects are admittedly in 
 relation to the Subject, otherwise their cognizability would be 
 fictitious ; and that this relationship demands their joint inclu- 
 sion in some monismus. 
 
 Monism is a. conceptual explanation of the facts of existence, 
 rather than an immediate method of solving one bv one the
 
 55 
 
 problems of experience. It is faced with three* difficulties, for 
 it has to explain away (1) the seeming plurality of subjects, 
 (2) of objects, and (3) the seeming duality of Subject and Object. 
 The first difficulty is got over by the altruistic doctrine that 
 individual selves are collectively and individually the Eternal 
 Subject, and that there is no real division, or allocation of 
 " parts pertaining to selves." The second difficulty is said to 
 be due to the illusion of names and forms, a kind of realistic 
 Tower of Babel, where, even if everyone expressed the same 
 
 * Ananda-Tirtha, in his Bhashya, declares five monistic 
 cruxes in place of three. "A difference between soul and the 
 Lord, a difference between the unsentient and the Lord, a 
 difference among souls, and a difference of the unsentient and 
 the soul each from the other. Also the difference of unsentient 
 things from one another, the world with its five divisions." 
 Vedantins declare that soul (Atman) and the Lord (Brah- 
 man) are not different. But some were prepared to make a 
 compromise in the manner of classification. The category of 
 Ananda-Tirtha is open to a grave mathematical objection, for 
 if the number of differences between each different thing (in a 
 great or infinite class of differing things) and each different soul 
 (in a great or infinite class of differing souls) were to be 
 enumerated, such enumeration would result in very great num- 
 ber of differing differences, and each one would be worthy of a 
 separate class of its own.
 
 56 
 
 thought, yet, to the illiterate ear, all say different things. The 
 last difficulty is met by the assertion that the Object is merely 
 the Subject over again, although not recognizable as such by a 
 mere formal in>pection. \Ye shall see that both methods of 
 approaching the subject of cognition are essential. Pluralistic 
 concepts enable u-. to explain one by one, by analytical means. 
 the facts of experience, and monistic concepts enable us, by 
 synthesis, to realize (in some sense) what is implicit in these 
 relations and commensurability between the ostensible parts of 
 t his real whole. 
 
 All schools of philosophy are agreed that the fact of self- 
 oonsciousness is indisputable. Now I maintain that in this'one 
 fact is implicit both ostensible pluralism and real monism. 
 Without the former there would be no outer \\orld of corn- 
 parables from which to discriminate Self, and without the 
 latter no possible relation bct\\e<>n Self and its " comparables.'' 
 Hence both ostensible pluralism and real monism are essential 
 lor ari\ cognition whatever. It may be objected, why not 
 deduce ostensible monism and real pluralism? The reply is 
 obvious, tor real pluralism dobars relationship, and hence cog- 
 nition ; *nd an ostensible monism would also be fatal to 
 cognition.
 
 57 
 
 Recognition and Cognition demand that this complex 
 of plurality within unity should remain insoluble, for, if 
 resolved, there would no longer be the knower or the known. 
 In what, then, does Knowledge consist ? It consists in the 
 transformation of the objective world into sets of intelligible 
 objects. These intelligible objects are themselves transformed 
 into brain " sensations," and here defy farther analysis. During 
 these processes of the transformation of various objects into 
 subjective experiences we note certain similarities and dis- 
 similarities in these subjective experiences. Recognition of 
 these likenesses and unlikenesses are given in Language and in 
 Logic. 
 
 By way of amplification, let me bring forward again the 
 connection between the stopped train and the physical signal. 
 Some may object that the stopping of the train is never 
 mistaken for the signal, or likened to it as a comparative, in 
 the sense that some thinkers liken the itness of the object with 
 the intelligible object presented to the mind, and who would 
 thus carry over to the object, and clothe it with, the attributes 
 with which the intelligible object is clothed. The stopping of 
 the train, they might say, is an effect of the signal, and this 
 latter is cognized as it really is that is to say, it is such-and-
 
 5S 
 
 such a size, shape, and colour, in such-and-such a position, and 
 so forth. 
 
 But does tins really help us to build up an actual physical 
 object out of a constituted intelligible object ? The objection 
 amounts to this, that we must interpose between a (physical) 
 objective signal and its ultimate subjective interpretation, an 
 intermediate interpretation, called the intelligible signal. But 
 the difficulty remains; for, just as the stopping ol the train was 
 held to be the subjective interpretation of a physical object, so 
 this same object is now said to have an intermediate interpre- 
 tation that is, it is subjectively clothed with size, shape, colour, 
 and position. Have we any reason for saying that the qualities 
 with which the intelligible signal is clothed are not as purely 
 subjective as is the ultimate subjective interpretation, i.e., that 
 the train should stop ? 
 
 Let u.> consider how this question is practically dealt with 
 in the act of recognition. II a man chooses an orange in prefer- 
 ence to an apple, ib this because he knows that the objective 
 itness of the orange differs from the objective itness of the apple 
 in certain respects which are objectively more admirable ? The 
 question is absurd, and analytically unthinkable. But what he 
 dofs recognize- is trial the colours smells, etc., of the intelligible
 
 59 
 
 orange and apple now present are comparable with those of 
 the intelligible oranges and apples apprehended by him in past 
 experience. This experience of the comparability of this orange 
 with those previous oranges (or with any of them) may be called 
 the intermediate interpretation of these objective signals. Now 
 follows the ultimate interpretation, i.e., the knowledge or belief 
 founded on experience that this intelligible orange (or orange 
 as intermediately apprehended) will be more productive of 
 pleasure-giving sensation than would the synchronously appre- 
 hended apple. But none of the intelligible oranges of his 
 experience were ever known to him except by the pleasure- 
 giving effect produced in the brain by their flavour, etc. The 
 physical orange is recognized by the intelligible orange, and 
 the intelligible oranges of his experience are known only by 
 their pleasure (and pain) giving effects as felt by the brain. 
 
 Now just as the railway "stop" signal, whatever its real 
 objective nature may be, is ultimately interpreted by the 
 stopping of a train, and that we cannot even conceive any 
 attributes in this final interpretation which can be carried over 
 and made to clothe the objective itness of the signal de se ; so 
 also in the case of the orange and the apple, the final interpre- 
 tation of these object-signals is the memory of some satisfaction
 
 (50 
 
 felt in the brain, between which and ihr itnts^ of ihe object m 
 comparable qualities can be conceived. 
 
 Hence the interpolation of an intelligible object between a 
 physical object and its ultimate subjective interpretation, gives 
 us no sanction for clothing the physical object with any attri- 
 butes whatever. But just for this very reason, i.e., that there 
 are no comparable qualities as between the ultimate subjective 
 interpretation and the physical signal (objs.'i t; which is thu> 
 dealt with, it follows that no recognition of the physical .signal 
 would be thus possible. All the experience r could hope for 
 would be for repeated cognitions of oranges and so forth, but 
 without any possibility of recognition. It is then quite obvious 
 that the function of the intelligible object is to secure thepo\\er 
 of recognition. 
 
 Recognition is the power that enables us to follow the 
 changing thing through its changes without losing sight of it. 
 But if the physical orange was allowed to undergo complete 
 metamorphosis until it reappeared as a pleasant "taste," etc., in 
 the brain, Recognition would be utterly baflled. The difficulty 
 is met by catching the orange half-way through its process of 
 transformation, and in recognizing it as the intelligible orange. 
 At this stage it has changed from the piiysical object into a 
 psycho-physical 'uibjrct- object ^onditioa, not vot unrec o^-n./.abl r;.
 
 61 
 
 This is the doctrine of transformation, so called because it 
 treats of a transformed object of knowledge as distinct from 
 
 one which is conceived as either ideal or "real." 
 
 However we may declaim against any attribution of sub- 
 jective qualities to the true objectivity or itness of the object, we 
 must not extend this particular objection to quality or quantity 
 
 resulting from an objective comparison of physical objects, if 
 such comparison is possible, which is doubtful. For instance, 
 
 quantitative and qualitative comparisons as made in Chemistry 
 or Physics are said to be free from objection on this ground. Nor, 
 it is said, does this objection apply to comparisons between 
 objects made in a similar way by unaided human means. We 
 may discern that certain ratios as to weight, size, distance, 
 hardness, etc., obtain as between comparable objects, while 
 admitting that the objects (as apart from their mutual relations) 
 are unknown to us except by transformation into the Psycho - 
 Physical sphere of intelligibility. 
 
 At first sight it may seem that these exceptions, if admitted, 
 would cover more ground than my rule. Now, relations lie on 
 the borderland of Recognition, and will not here be discussed at 
 length. I would only remark that intelligible relations are 
 themselves subjective interpretations of objective conditions
 
 quite ;is inscrutable as are the physical objects themselves. 
 Many of these relations, as appiehended by us, are "intelligible 1 
 enough, but purely arbitrary. Some are mere definitions of 
 intelligibility and none of them have been proved to be objec- 
 tively true 
 
 Some say that no coherent philosophy of the Subject-Object 
 relationship has yet been formulated. My object here is not to 
 write everything that could be said on this matter, for that 
 would lead me far beyond my present intention, but to restrict 
 myself to the bare outline of a psycho-physiological and psycho- 
 physical system which should render Recognition intelligible. 
 
 As we know nothing of Object de se, we cannot carry out 
 objective comparison?. All we can say is that, inasmuch as 
 various objects are apprehended differently, a horned cow being 
 apprehended as such, and a hare as such, and as confusion does 
 not arise as to which is which, hence we are fully justified in 
 maintaining that as between the horned cow and the hare 
 objective difference exists. But we cannot expand this elemen- 
 tary logical cognition into anv more detailed system of objective,' 
 classification. For directly we note the horns on the one and 
 their absence on the other, we are comparing the intelligible
 
 63 
 
 cow with the intelligible hare, and our comparison becomes one 
 between psycho- physical, or cognized, objects. The existential 
 It, or Its, have become clothed with qualities, and perhaps with 
 quantity and other relations. All these apprehended differences 
 may be compared, but such comparison is no longer an objective 
 comparison. Nor have we any justification for transferring such 
 differences to the existential items of the object world. As 
 between such we can only posit Difference, not particular 
 differences.* 
 
 * Madhava quotes Gautama, the Buddha, as saying (in 
 Lankavatara ?), " Of things discriminated by the intellect, no 
 nature is ascertained." Madhava quotes the proverb [Sarva- 
 Darsana-Samgraha], "A religious mendicant, an amorous man, 
 and a (wild) dog have three views of a woman's person, respec- 
 tively that it is a carcase, that it is a mistress, and that it is a 
 prey." Can it be maintained that such intelligible views dis- 
 close the real " nature " of the object in its bald objectivity ? 
 Among the schools of Buddhistic philosophy we find only the 
 Vaibhashikas (Presentationists) willing to make even a show of 
 concession to objective reality, and they admitted the apparent 
 existence of " an object concomitant to the cognition." On the 
 other hand, both Samkhyas and Jainas admit an external objec- 
 tive world (Prakriti), and the Jainas of the Arhata school admit 
 an eight-fold division of Prakriti : but Prakriti consists in 
 quality only.
 
 64 
 
 Philosophy contains no single topic of wider import than 
 Recognition. \Vhetlier its meanings are realized or not, in any 
 case acts of recognition begin when we wake and do not cease 
 until each one of us says farewell to the world of that day as 
 apprehended by him. Each day the dog gambols at his master's 
 feet, and each day every human being gains, through Recog 
 nition, the pleasure of meeting, and the pain of parting from, 
 the objects of his desires. 
 
 Recognition implies more than this, for without it existence 
 would be meaningless and unthinkable. 
 
 A Co . Print*, 38, Htath Road Twiekmhw*
 
 This l)cn>k is 1)1' E on the last date stamped below. 
 
 Form L9-Series 4939