'XV Digitized by tine Internet Archive in 2008 witii funding from IVIicrosoft Corporation littp://www.archive.org/details/foreignpolicyengOOmontricli FOKEIGN POLICY: ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. FOEEIGN POLICY: ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. Right Hon. LORD EGBERT MONTAGU, M.P. " The policy of Europe, since the Treaty of Utrecht, lias been nothing but rival aims at Universal Monarchy." — Cardinal Alberoni. LONDON : CHAPMAN AND HALL, 193, PICCADILLY. 1877. n^ 3^ LONDON: BRADBURY, AGNEVf, il CO., PBINTEBS, WHITEFHIAKS. TABLE OF CONTENTS PRELIMINARY CHAPTER. PAGE Nations are Moral Persons ......... 1 There can be only one Ruler 3 CHAPTER II. The Aims of every State ......... 6 Diplomacy arises as Justice declines ....... 7 General Consideration froni Jmtiee or Fear . . . ... 7 Small States . " 8 Colonial Policy . . . . . . . . • . . . 8 Roman Empire ....... .... 8 Union ............. 9 Example of Union in Switzerland ........ 10 Examples of General Consideration . . . ... • . . 11 Ditto, Poland 12 United Greeks of Chelm 20 Slav idea in the Partition of Poland ....... 26 i CHAPTER III. Power is relative ......... . . 28 Four kinds of Power . . 29 Examples ............ 29 Milltartj Pmver . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Naval Pmver ........... 36 Social Power 38 Evangelical Alliance .......... 39 War of 1870 40 Despatch No. 159, of 1876 .42 Financial Power . . . . • . . . . . . . 43 Federative Power ........... 46 Alliances 48 CHAPTER IV. Law and Treaties. International Law ........... 52 The Treaties ............ 58 Policy of Xoninterreiition ......... 63 302455 Ti TABLE OF CONTENTS. PAGE Mission of Consuls . . . . . . . . . . . 04 Aniirassy Note ........... iM> Fleet sent to Besika Bay 68 Berlin Meinorandura .......... 71 Russian Proposal for Occupation 76 Lord Salisbury ......%.... 78 Despatch of September 21 79 CHAPTER V. Violations of Treaties. Disregard of Treaties 82 Ditto by Lord Salisbury Ho Ditto by Lord Derby 87 Lord Derby's maxim . • • . . . . . . . . . 88 CHAPTER VI. Physical Configuration. Switzerland — Russia 5)0 C!onstantinople ....'....... 91 Balkans 92 Transylvania ............ 95 German frontier. — Persia 96 Islam.— Italy 97 Slav Race 98 Religions 100 The Czar a rival to the Pope 101 Bulgai-ian Church ........... 104 Greek Patriarch. — Staroviitzi 105 Nihilism 109 Secret Despatches . . . . . . . . . .Ill Roman Catholic Church 128 The Secret Societies 126 Russian Cabinet . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Panslavism, Panteutonism, Panlatinism 129 Harmony required . . . . . . . . . . . ISO Europe will be Cossack and Republic . . . . . . .131 CHAPTER Vir. Russian Agitations. Secret Societies.— Holy Alliance 1.34 Secret Despatches 135 Republican Societies 154 Sei-via r. Montenegro 155 Russia and the Secret Societies . .166 TABLE OF CONTENTS. PAGE Austria and the Secret Societies . . . . . . . . 161 Their action against Austria . . . . . . . . .166 Montenegro ............ 168 Lord Derby's Appeal to Germany . . ... . . . .175 Philippopolis 176 Servia and Montenegro , . . . . . . . . .177 Italy and the Secret Societies . . . . . . . ..179 Russia really at war with Turkey . .,. . ,. • .181 Russian " Volunteers ".......... 184 The armistice . . . . . . ■ . . . . . 186 Ignatiew insults the Sultan , . . 191 CHAPTER VIII. The Atrocity Agitation. The atrocity agitation l93 Lord Derby addresses his '* employers " . . . . . . . 195 Mr. Gladstone 196 Cathedral of Kasan ........... 198 The Poles 199 Effects. — Sacerdotalism ; Autonomy 201 CHAPTER IX. Rulers and People. Holy Alliance, and Secret Societies 208 Lord Derby. — Despatch, Noi 159 209 Despatch of September 21 214 Mediation 217 The Porte and People. — Islam. Softas . . . . . .219 Deposition of the Sultan. — D. Urquhart 223 Lords Derby and Salisbury proceed to destroy the Social power of the Porte 227 Czar and People. — Nihilism 235 European dangers. — Anarchy and Despotism . . . . . . 238 CHAPTER X. European Concert .... 240 CHAPTER XI. Mistrust and Animosities 252 Occupation by Belgium 256 Violations of bases of Conference . . 257 Promises of Assistance to the Porte behind Lord Salisbury's back . . 258 TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER XII. Thb Conference ; ok, Extranational Government of Europe. PAGE Lord Salsibury 262 WTiy assent to a Conferenoe ? . 265 Aims of the Conference 270 Mediation 270 Preliminary Conference . . ^ 274 Bases of the Conference . . ^ 277 Ix)rd Derby's Violation of the British Constitution .... 282 Extranational Government of Europe . 283 CHAPTER XIIL Results of the Conference. Guarantees 285 The Constitution 286 Lreland 288 Arbitration. Rewards for Revolutioru Extranational Government . . 294 CHAPTER XIV. Permanent Council ; or, Extranational Government of Europe. Mazzinl— The Holy Alliance 297 Prince Gortchakow's Circular of January 19 300 The Protocol of London 302 Prince Gortchakow's Circular of April 24 314 Extradition • 316 CHAPTER XV. Federal Union of Nations. Equilibrium 317 Condition of Europe . 317 How is Unity to be br©ught about ? 319 Mazzini. — The International 319 How is Unity to be brought about / . . . . . . 323 CONCLUDING CHAPTER. Russia 325 Vigorous Foreign Policy 330 Extranational Government of the World 333 FOREIGN POLICY: ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. PRELIMINARY CHAPTER. European States may be regarded as so many great landowners, whose mental characters are severally those peculiar to the nations of Europe, and who acknowledge no superior to restrain their caprices, nor any tribunal to judge their crimes. They have, indeed, customs ; but they do not consider themselves under external laws. They make rules for their guidance ; but whenever they deem it expedient, they elude those rules and customs by dexterity, or violate them by force. Yet nations have the same duties as the men of which nations are composed. The same moral law, — call it Natural law, or Divine law, but unchangeable, eternal, — is over nations as well as men, declaring their rights and forbidding wrong. All bodies politic may be regarded as individual men ; and, as men are, so are they more often led by passion than guided by reason. From axioms true and maxims wise, they sometimes draw conclusions which are wild, and even grotesque. More often they wilfully invent, or carelessly accept principles which are false, in order to defend acts which are evil. As a great landowner, each state may be considered ; and he who can mentally 2 :\ : :•• • ;•• '..: •• •: , jsasMiGN tolicy : invest himself with the character, and put himself in the place of any State, may with safety predict its move- ments, and understand its aims. This maxim was a household word of foreign policy to the late Czar. In 1853, for example, he said to Sir Hamilton Seymour: " Tenez ; nous avons sur le bras un liomme malade ; ce sera, je vous le dis franchement, un grand malheur si, un de ces jours, il devait nous dchapper." Changes in the circumstances of each nation (as also of every man) ever and anon occur during its life. Yet the social forces of each nation remain, for generations, the same ; and its character is for centuries unchanged, and may safely be studied in history. The antecedents of nations have to be learned, just as the antecedents of men must be studied, in order that we may arrive at a true knowledge of their characters. Nations are as men. They are "moral persons." This truth seems obvious, and even trite, when we remember that each nation is a unity, whose elements are men ; and that the affairs of each nation are con- ducted by men ; — or, let us say that each nation is led, not by a cabinet or selected few, but by the one man who, by his adroit management of men, has risen to the top, and sways the Cabinet that supports Lim, and the Sovereign whom he should serve. The physical forces of men may be combined. Their intellectual faculties cannot be combmedi The mental power of a number 'of mmds is not equal to the sum of all their powers. It is not more than the power of the strongest mind amongst them. In physical and in administrative operations, — in the work of clerks and of carpenters, three times three make nine. In an intellectual opera- tion there can be no multiplication. International games of chess have been played, between committees ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. 3 ill the two capitals. Every one knew that Germany would beat England, because Lowenstein was acknow- ledged as superior to Staunton. All men foretold that, when Ireland should play France, Macdonald, of Belfast, would win the score against La Bourdonnais. That is, every one knew that there was a player in one com- mittee v;^ho could foretell more moves of the adversary, than any one of the adverse committee could predict of his moves. So it is with States. A dozen men sit round a green baize table in each metropolis, and fondly imagine that they rule their nation's destinies. Yet it is the most knowing and most astute in each cabinet who contrives the schemes, and guides all the intrigues, and shapes the nation's acts. The rest of the Cabinet are his tools. Even in those countries where there is a " Government," and an " Opposition," — that is, where the Government is a constitutional monarchy, and not an absolute des- potism, — even there, one man rules the Government, while another of the same kidney guides the ex-cabinet, and the Parliament is led captive between them, while the head of the Government points out the direction. So it is that the nation is as one man. Further than this we may often go, and say that the astutest states- man in Europe, — that is, the man in all Europe who can predict the greatest number of moves, and best handle the passions of men, — can and does shape the actions of all the States of which Europe is composed. Let us, however, at present confine our attention to a single state. It is obvious that the policy of a country is stable and unchanging as to its main princij)les, — which are the great and abiding interests of the nation, — while it varies in complexion and detail, according to the character of the man who leads the nation. More- B 2 4 FOBEIGN POLICY: over, the true interests of the nation dictate the fixed policy to the Ruler; while the changing passions and enduring antipathies of the people are obstacles which hinder that policy from being steadily carried out. The passion roars loud, like the storm ; while interest blows steadily and softly, like a summer wind. The ship of state has her course marked out on a great circle ; but fierce gales arise and drive her from that course, and adverse winds compel her to tack and laveer to wind- ward. The integrity and independence of Turkey has been the great circle for this country. The "atrocity agitation" made Lord Derby write that the universal feeling of indignation thus aroused " made it practically impossible to interfere in the defence of the Ottoman Empire," which would be '* in direct opposition to the Treaty engagements " of the country, and a " most humiliating position " for her to be in.* The antipathies between Turks and Russians ; between Prussians and Austrians ; between Magyars and Slavs ; between Danes and Swedes, are trade winds which blow steadily against the ship's appointed course. Indignation at successful wrong-doing, wounded vanity or offended pride, retching greed, and, above all, fear, are passions which often arise to thwart the statesman's calculations, and the best interests of nations. While fear in the hearts of the people can affect the policy of the Prime Minister ; so the Minister's prevision of the future disposition of the people, and his fear as to its effects, may suffice to thwart the aims of his calmer moments and cause him to swerve beforehand from his appointed course. In some cases (as in the one above cited) the change of policy by the Minister occurs after the outburst of passion on the part of the people. Such * Vol. i. of 1877. No. 159. ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. 5 cases, however, -are rare. They do not occur without the knowledge, or prescience, or complicity of an ex- Premier. For, as long as negotiations are secret, the Ministry cannot be directly affected by public opinion. Moreover, the statesman who rises to the command of Parliament and confidence of his Sovereign, is always one who knows how to address men's passions and to use them for his ends. Such a one has a fearful power, which he is never slow to use. He possesses a talisman to shield him from fear of the mob. AVhenever he cannot make a confusion, and then lead the people's ignorance to his own end ; at least he can light a prairie fire, in his last extremity, and escape amid the smoke and glare. FOREIGN POLICY CHAPTER II It was Count S^gur's axiom, that the two aims of every state must be security and consideration or general credit. (1.) The security of a great state depends upon its internal administration. Its internal tranquillity and stability consist in the maintenance of justice between the citizens, of authority in the Government (that is, re- spect in the governed) ; and of Public Economy and private thrift. A free and contented people, per se, is both firm and secure. (2.) The consideration or credit in which a state is held by other powers — the general opinion concerning it, or, in other words, its influence, rank, or " rate," — can have but one of two bases : either the fearless and inflexible justice of its foreign policy ; or else the fear which, from various causes, it constantly inspires. By the latter basis, I mean the dexterity of the intrigues which it has carried on ; the continued success of its frauds and deceptions ; the advantages it has reaped from the divisions it has engendered ; the number and influence of the allies upon which it can surely count ; the glory of its arms, and the succession of brilliant conquests it has achieved ; — these constitute the basis of policy which looks to fear to pro- mote its ends. This is the policy of rulers who put their trust in force, and not in justice; and who place their fortunes in the hands of chance or craft, and not in those of Providence ; who engrave treaties with the point of ENGLAND AND THE EASTEEN QUESTION. 7 the sword, and then slash them into tatters with the blade. When nations are sincere and just, there is no dexterity of Diplomacy ; there are no false representations to mislead, no mutual distrust to increase deadly armaments and to move menacing armies to the frontiers. Diplomacy is developed as justice declines. For it originates in every state which cherishes aims it does not dare to avow, — aims which, by arms alone, it cannot attain. The general opinion or consideration of states must be built up either on justice or else on fear. Public Opinion is the Queen of modern Europe. It is " stronger than armies" (for it moves armies forward, or calls them back) ; and that hidden Power which engenders and developes public opinion is really the earthly ruler of Europe. The labours of every government are directed towards establishing a public opinion in its own favour. It concedes ; it draws back ; it professes a zealous care for *' humanity," and seeks ''guarantees" on behalf of " Christians ;" it simulates the greatest moderation ; while it secretly sows broadcast the seeds of agitation, or lashes the subjects of an enemy to commit "atrocities;" and then, under the mask of sorrow, and professing a righteous indignation, when the advantageous moment has arrived, it leaps at its enemy's throat, and occupies " in the cause of Order," and annexes " only for a time." Why these troublesome and tortuous courses ? To gain over Public Opinion ; to acquire consideration. For that is one means, and no uncommon one, of rising in consideration. Another mode, which, alas ! is seldom practised, is to earn respect by unswerving justice in abstaining from wrong, and unflinching courage in maintaining the Right. Satisfied with its boundaries, and abjuring ambition ; maintaining content in its population, with prudence and a FOREIGN POLICY: economy in its administration, and discipline in all its services, — such a state becomes the support of the feeble, the defender of the oppressed, a check on the ambitious and grasping, the judge and arbiter of the world. For every weak state, the maintenance of peace is essential to life. Weak states fear every storm, and tremble at every gust of agitation. Their lives consist of feverish efforts for the preservation of a fragile existence. As soon, therefore, as a great nation has established a character for justice, weaker states will appeal to it against any state which intrigues in their affairs, or domi- nates over them. They yield willingly, to a just people, an influence in their councils, and a control over their acts, in return for alliance and protection. They soon become united with such a great state — if not in name, at least in a real federation. Without any geographical changes of frontiers, a true Empire is thus lastingly formed. For all Empire depends on men's minds, and not on the accidents of matter. It is the character for justice which secures the sympathies of the weak ; while rapacity and harshness alienate even the populations in your midst. Colonial policy is foreign policy. In colonial policy the same rule is true. If your Colonies find that their connection with you is a gain to them and an improve- ment in their condition, their strong desire to abide in union with you will add to your strength. But if you sweep away their time-honoured institutions, and offend their prejudices, they will long to separate from you, and ally themselves with some power who is more just. Justice is the strength of states. This w^as the wise policy which made the Roman Empire, as it also formed the Assyrian Empire and the Greek. When the Romans conquered a country, they did not treat it as a vanquished enemy ; but extended ENGLAND AND TUE EASTEEN QUESTION. 9 to it their protection, as to a friendly equal or an ally. Eome was careful not to interfere with local management and ancient liberties. The conquered people were not made to pass under a yoke, and were contented, because they experienced no interference in their own concerns. " The Eoman Empire was strong while it was a federation. " Ainsi Eome n'^tait pas proprement une monarchic ou une republique, mais la tete du corps forme par tons les peuples du monde. Si les Espagnols, apres la conquete du Mexique, et du P^rou, avaient suivi ce plan, ils n'auraient pas ^t^ obliges de tout d^truire pour tout conserver. C'est la folic des conquerants de vouloir donner a tons les peuples leurs lois et leurs coutumes. Cela n'est bon h rien ; car dans toute sorte de gouverne- ment on est capable d'obdir."'"' The true policy of greatness is justice, which never interferes with ancient liberties and local institutions. So also, per contra, the best way to convulse, is to " unite." One race or religion preponderates here, and another there. They each have their own constitutions, customs, and rites ; their own prejudices ; their own jealousies and antipathies. Harmoniously may all live under one sceptre, while these differences are accepted and respected. Bring about a " union," by force or by fraud, and instantly the various parts collide, and clash, and jar. Your union results in discontent and loss of power ; and then in civil war and dismemberment. In Switzerland a strong love of liberty has induced the people of each Canton to govern themselves, and to resist every attempt to persuade them to allow their affairs to be managed for them. Switzerland for many genera- tions has been a Federation of independent States. The unity of self-governing states was the only unity that * Montesquieu, *' Grandeur et Decadence des Eomains," p. 51. 10 FOREIGN POLICY: was possible in Switzerland. A national unity is im- possible ; for Switzerland is German, French, and Italian. Nay, it is quadripartite ; for the German consists of ^ two parts, Austrian or Tyrolese, and North German. An attempt was lately made to " unite " Switzerland, by tiiking from the Cantons their equal voices in federal affairs, and giving to each Canton a number of votes in proportion to its population. The real aim was that the German Protestant, or Prussian Cantons should be able to outvote and control the others. In 1866 this new- fangled Constitution was negatived. The Swiss still understood and loved their liberty. They knew that it was a plan most sure to break up Switzerland into three or four parts. Switzerland valued her Liberty and her Federation, wherein lay her strength. Every man under- stood, and so devoted himself to the affairs of his locality. But this local strength and central weakness, this love of liberty stood in the way of the political intrigues of neighbouring states. The flame of a contradictory feeling had to be lit. A desire to oppress had to be engendered. The love of religious persecution, the desire to make every one as ourselves, had to be kindled. So the Catholic Cantons, tired of resistance to an overbearing majority, and weakened by the persecution they suffered, at last gave way. By agitation, carefully sown, in favour of religious persecution, the scheme which had failed in 1866, has now succeeded, and the liberty of Switzerland has fled. Bishop Mermillod was fighting the battle of Europe ; and Europe allowed him to fail. The gates of the great natural fortress will soon be in the hands of the enemy. The German Cantons are ready to faU under the arms of Prussia. Justice is the strength of states, and the guardian of their liberties. Homage to this truth is ever being ENGLAND AND THE EASTEEN QUESTION. 11 • rendered by Eussia. " Hypocrisy is the homage which vice renders to virtue/' . While Russia plots, and per- petrates injustice, she pretends to be acting on the basis of justice, in order to draw the small states she deceives, towards her as their protector ; she confuses rulers by proclaiming herself as "the great conservative power," even while she is secretly exciting revolutions in their territories. Every great Power, which is at once just and fearless, — good and ready for war, — is a real protector and safe refuge for every little Power. That great Power is then rewarded by an increase of greatness, consisting in the support and affection of its numerous allies. But where- ever a great Power is timid, indolent, selfishly isolated, it alienates all weaker states, and lessens its own federa- tive power, at the very time that the grasping injustice 'of any other great Power inspires a fear on all sides, which adds to its own general consideration or rank. That was the role of Pitt. At the commencemeut of his glorious era we acted the part of the good Samaritan, and helped the weaker states, who had fallen among thieves. Passion soon — a hatred of the names of Napoleon and of France — blinded us, and made us, in 1812, desert the grand role with which we commenced to stem the tide of the Ke volution. Talleyrand tried to shew us the folly of the rivalry, and the paramount necessity of combining to curb Russia. We fought against Napoleon, instead of aiding him in his attempt to reconstitute poor plundered and bleeding Poland, to drive Russia back from the Black Sea, and almost to make her an Asiatic power. Examples in modern history, of states taking their stand upon the basis of justice, are, to our shame be it said, most deplorably scarce; while numerous are the 12 FOREIGN POLICY: examples of states who built up a general opinion in their favour, on the basis of fear. I will mention one, because of its similarity to the scenes which are being enacted before our eyes. The Czars of Russia had already substituted themselves for the Patriarchs of the Eastern schism. They were the absolute, if not infallible heads of the Russo-Greek Church ; and required (as shown by the Catechism) an adoration which is due to God alone. There is then no wonder that the Czar should be the natural enemy of the Pope ; and, as Poland was a Slav and Catholic nation, which also shut out Russia from contact with the states of Europe, it became an object of Russia's fear and hatred. At the close of the seven years' war,* the other great powers of Europe were worn out by war. The Poles and Turks were close allies, being bound together by the same fears and the same interests. The Czarina managed that a suggestion should be whispered to the Porte, that a " roi Piast " ought to be elected to sit on the Polish throne. The Turks regarded such a suggestion as an eminently Polish idea, and one that would contribute to the liberty of Poland. They knew not that it came from the Czarina, and that she was plotting against the liberties of Poland, by getting her paramour placed upon the throne. Too late, they discovered their mistake, and declared against Stanislaus ; for he was at once elected at the points of Russian bayonets. Then all the measures, which had been already established for the amelioration of the Polish State, were swept away under the various pretexts, fallacious and false ; and the Republic of Poland was plunged into chaos, anarchy, and " confusion worse con- founded." That was Russia's first step, during which her cloven foot was not seen. Then stepping into the * A.D. 1763, wheu Augustus III., King of Poland, died. ENGLAND AND THE EASTEEN QUESTION. 13 dirt, she lifts her skirt, and lo ! a glimpse of her cloven foot is seen. She occupied Poland, " in the cause of order," and " for the rectification of frontiers." A few members of the Greek Church, who were called "dissi- dents " from the catholic faith of Poland, were induced to raise an outcry about some imaginary rights. The sanctimonious, or sham religious zeal of Russia was at once kindled. The Czarina posed as their " protector," promising redress of all their grievances, and uniting in a Confederation, centered in Lithuania, all who professed the Greek religion. A Protestant Confederation, under the lead of Prussia, was formed at Thorn ; and then the Catholics united themselves in the famous Confederation of Barr. Thus there was a pro-Russian party, and a German party made in Poland. In 1767 the Turks demanded a withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Polish soil (not, as now, a " demol^ilisation " on Russian soil). This was promised by Russia with alacrity. But Russia never for a moment contemplated a fulfilment of her promise ; and the Russian successes in fraud gave her such consideration that the Turks feared to enforce a fulfilment of the promise. In 1771 all was ready. The Czarina, through the Prussian Prince Henri, proposed to Frederick a partition of Poland. Prussia was as anxious for Pomerania, as Russia was for her share ; and they both worked together to achieve the robbery. Kaunitz, on the part of the young Emperor of Austria, — himself an admirer of his brother sovereign Frederick, whom he had fought and learned to fear, — made counter- proposals, and did all he could to save the Polish State. Austria wished France to join her in opposing the scheme ; but Louis XV. cared for his pleasures. Yet it was clearly the interest of both to maintain both Poland and Turkey, as a rampart to keep Russia from supporting 14 FOREIGN POLICY: Prussia. France refused. This was a blunder ; for she was henceforth regarded, not as the supporter of justice and the refuge of the weak; but as an instrument of Eussia and Prussia ; and every instrument counts for nothing, except in the hands of him who uses it. The weak states then ranged themselves under the banner of Eussia, or under that of Prussia. Frederick the Great, and Catharine, at once put their troops in motion, as the best answer they could give to Austria. Austria feared to carry on a war alone against Eussia and Prussia, and consented to take the shilling. If Austria, instead of haggling in St. Petersburg and Berlin, had offered her mediation, and armed to give weight to her offer and to support her award, she would have been sustained by Turkey and the Polish forces, — perhaps even by France, — and could have kept in check Eussia and Prussia, who were in this position : by Poland, a hostile country, they were divided from each other. But the two Emperors and the King (like the three Emperors now), met and devised a perfidious robbery and outrage. De Broglie, in his Memoir of 1775, wrote: "The fruits of this annexation will be that Eussia will obtain the whole commerce of the Black Sea ; also the Crimea, Wallachia, and Moldavia. The leaven of rebellion will also be spread among the Greek populations of Austria and Turkey. Moreover, Eussia will acquire all the Cossack tribes for her cavalry ; and so she will menace Turkey, Austria, and even Prussia. Of course, Eussia will soon possess herself of Prussian Poland, the mouths of the Vistula, and the commerce of Poland.'' Austria has since discovered her error. Austrian policy has constantly been in favour of a reconstitution of Poland, even at the Congress of Vienna, when ENGLAND AND THE EASTEEN QUESTION. 15 Eussia was her ally. During the Polish insurrection in 1863, she and France and England were about to compel Eussia to carry out the engagements made at the Congress of Vienna, and recognize the autonomy of Poland. Prussia at once stepped forward, and thwarted their efforts : — fear, again, being the basis of their policy. To return to 1771. Frederick received a tract (of 9,645 square miles) which was vital to the very exist- ence and union of Prussia. Eussia took 87,500 square miles ; while to Austria were chucked 62,500 square miles, which the Empress mother, Maria Theresa, refused to accept, until she found herself compelled to do so. She then wrote a solemn Protest (Feb., 1772) : "What an example we are giving to the world. . . . We throw our honour and reputation to the winds ! I see well that I am alone, and no more in vigour ; therefore, I musty though to my great sorrow, let things take their course. . . . Placet, since so many great and learned men will have it so ; but long after I am dead, it will be known what this violation of all that was hitherto held sacred and just will give rise to." Eussia' s success was due to the general opinion of Europe in her favour, which was built on fear. Next came the assertion of a general proposition, which every one feared to controvert. The Czar, Nicholas, said to the Poles at Warsaw — " I have prohibited your sons, as those of the Eussians, from studying at German Universities, and even from travelling abroad, that they may not be affected by foreign principles. Ye are Poles no longer, but Slavonians, fellow-brethren of the Eussians. This I speak to you as Emperor of all the Eussias, and I shall soon speak to you, and to the rest of your Slavonian brethren, as Sovereign of the whole of Slavonia. Know the ambition of Eussia, which 16 FOREIGN POLICY: is also mine ! She hears in herself the germ of her greatness. From the Duchy of Muscovy she became a Czardom — she conquered the adjacent free towns and dukedoms; her Czars have re-incorporated all the Russias, and have assumed the name of Emperor of all the Russias, a title corresponding with the extent of their dominions, and that of Autocrat corresponding with the nature of their unlimited power. My brother has reconquered Poland, and it is an inheritance of the great family, of which I am the head, not to lose it, not to lose an inch of what had once belonged to Russia. Believe me, it is a real happiness to belong to Russia and to enjoy its protection." Side by side with the Warsaw address, let us put the Moscow speech of the Czar Alexander.''' The Russian policy is the same. " I thank you for the sentiments you have been good enough to express towards me in reference to the present political state of affairs, which has now become more clearly defined than before. I am pleased and ready to receive your address. It is already known to you that Turkey has yielded to my demands for the immediate conclusion of an armistice in order to put an end to useless slaughter in Servia and Monte- negro. In this unequal struggle, the Montenegrins have, as on all previous occasions, shown themselves to be real heroes. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the Servians, notwithstanding the presence of our volunteers in the Servian ranks, many of whom have shed their blood for the Slavonian cause. I know that all Russia most warmly sympathizes with me in the sufferings of our brethren and co-religionists. The true interests of Russia, however, are dearer to me than aU, and I should wish to the uttermost to spare Russian * November 11, 18T6. ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. 17 blood from being shed. This is the reason why I have striven, and shall still strive, to obtain a real improve- ment of the positio7i of the Christians in the East by peaceful means. In a few days negotiations will com- mence in Constantinople between the representatives of the Great Powers to settle the conditions of peace. My most ardent wish is that we may arrive at a general agreement. Should this, however, not be achieved, and should I see that we cannot obtain such guarantees as are necessary for carrying out what we have a right to demand of the Porte, I am firmly determined to act independently, and I am convinced that in this case the w^hole of Russia will respond to my summons, should I consider it necessary and should the honour of Russia require it. I am also convinced that Moscow, as heretofore, will lead the van by its example. May God help us to carry out our sacred mission ! " Yes ; Russia, who committed the enormous crime of murder- ing Poland, now puts herself forward (indeed, she has always done so), as the earnest sympathizer with the Christians, as the friend of order, and as the enemy of the Revolution. A compound she is of the astutest hypocrisy and the most barbarous ferocity. Pope Gregory XVI. characterized Russian diplomacy as "Avita Fraus," or hereditary duplicity. Let us first consider her Christian sympathy, and then look at her Slavonic idea. The first treaty of Partition of Poland* contained an article, assuring to the Poles complete civil and religious liberty, and the free exercise of their religious worship and discipline. As soon as it had been signed, a horde of Cossacks was launched against "the enemies of our (Russo-Greek) religion," and, according even to Russian accounts, 50,000 Poles * September 18, 1773. 18 FOREIGN POLICY: were slaughtered. Twenty years elapsed, and the Treaty of Grodno stipulated for the Catholics of both rites (Latin, and United-Greek) a full and free exercise of their religion, and perfect toleration. The Czarina Catherine, moreover, promised to maintain them in undisturbed possession of their prerogatives, and to abstain for ever from doing the least thing prejudicial to their religion. Yet she was, at this very time, taking secret counsel as to how she might put an end altogether to the United-Greek Church. In 1831, out of 300 convents in Poland, 202 were destroyed ; while numbers of Churches were seized and handed over to the Russo-Greek schism. On April 10, 1832, a Rescript was issued, ordering all Catholic children to be snatched from their mothers, and sent away to be brought up in the Russian Church. In 1839, the Czar Nicholas gave 33,000 roubles to the Protestant Governor of Witepsk, as a reward for having perverted 33,000 Catholics. The Czar, at the same time, w^rote to the Pope the fullest assurances that he (the Czar) would never cease to protect his Catholic subjects, and respect their religious convictions, and secure their perfect tranquillity. This was the Avita Fraus. In 1845, the Czar Nicholas, with his own hands, gave Gregory XVI. a note, in which he had written that "no one was more anxious than he to maintain, in a worthy manner, the Catholic Church in Poland," and that he " vowed to God that, without distinction as to religion, he w^ould watch over the spiritual interests of all his subjects." By the Penal Code, which came into operation on the 1st of May, 1846, it is enacted that " whosoever shall turn away any one from the Orthodox confession to another Christian confession shall be condemned to the loss of all rights and privileges to him belonging, and to exile in the ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. 19 government of Tobolsk, or of Tomsk (Siberia). If he is not exempt by law from liability to corporal punish- ment, he will receive from fifty to sixty lashes before being sent into penal servitude for one or two years" (Art. 195). By Article 196 it is provided that "whoso- ever shall abandon the Orthodox confession for another Christian confession is handed over to the ecclesiastical authority to be exhorted and enlightened, and that he may be dealt with after the rules of the Church." Alexander If. forbad his ambassador, Count Orloff, to permit any mention to be made at the Congress of Paris concerning the sorrows of the Poles. Count Orloff, how- ever, promised, in the name of "his august master," that tlie Czar would go far beyond the desires of Europe, in according to the Poles (l) a general amnesty; (2) full liberty of conscience ; (3 and 4) re-establishment of the Polish language in the Administration and in the schools ; and (5) restoration of the Polish Universities. That was in 1856. In 1862, Eussian agents were sent, in disguise, to stir the Poles up to rebellion, in order to furnish a pretext for further barbarities. Those barbarities were described in the journals of the day. Here is one from a journal always most favourable to Russia: — "They put unarmed men, women, and children (of the Poles) to the sword. . . . They put the peaceful inhabitants of the town to the sword, after they had routed the * insurgents.' . . . The Eussians do not allow the Poles to bury their slain, as the Grand Duke Constantine has declared that they shall be food for ravens." * On April 23rd there were accounts of the slaughter of entire unoffending families. With regard to the men, the Times says : — " The above were first castrated, and then twice stabbed with bayonets." In January, 1874, * Times, Feb. 21, 1863 (quoted by Baron de Worms). c 2 20 FOREIGN POLICY: troops were sent into all the villages of the diocese of Chelm, and the inhabitants were assembled and bidden to abjure their religion. Those that refused — men, women, and children, — were first beaten, and then shot. Thus we see what is a government which is based, not on justice, but on fear. Thus we see how" the Russians can promise and pledge the royal word, and not fulfil. We see, also, how not one of those governments who now pro- pose to enforce fulfilment of Turkish promises, ever even whispered such a desire to the Russians. We see, too, what faith must be put in Russian pretences of sympathy with Christians, and regard for humanity. Before the Annexation, there were 12,000,000 Catholics in Poland, now there are 3,140,000 ; while the United-Greeks have been well-nigh extirpated. This day there has been issued, " by command," a correspondence carried on between 1871 and 1875, concerning the treatment of the members of the United-Greek Church in Russia. The United- Greek Church consists of Catholics who adhere to the Greek rite, but who own the supreme jurisdiction of the Pope, and the doctrines of the Catholic Church. The United-Greeks separated from the Greek schism, and were united with Rome at the end of the 1 6th cen- tury.* In 1812, vast numbers of them were exiled, and others were sent to the Khersonese. Since 1833, the Rus- sian Government has employed violence and persecution in order to compel the Uniats to enter the Russo-Greek Church. Many fell away ; but some thousands remained steadfast, and have been persecuted up to the present time. From a despatch of Nov. 23, 1872,1 we learn * Bull Magnus Dominus of Clement YIII., Jan. 10, 1595. t No. 2. ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. 21 that " a Committee of Inquisition has been installed . . . before which the United-Greek clergy are sum- moned from time to time, and interrogated respecting their opinions/' If the Commissioners do not approve of their answers, or suspect their opinions, the clergy- are suspended, and sometimes exiled. The above mea- sures," it continues, " are having a somewhat dis- astrous effect ; in cases of suspension the parishes are left indefinitely without religious services, sacraments, and pastoral supervision ; while if United-Greeks fre- quent the Catholic churches, punishments and fines are the consequence." As the Pope, by Bull, confirmed to the priests of this Church their ancient practice of being married, "the distress and sufiering is far from inconsiderable." In a further despatch * we read : — " In the district of Mincie- wicz the peasants surrounded the church, and defied the military to introduce the Russo-Greek priest. The peasants, with their wives and children, were finally mastered and surrounded, and were given the option of signing a declaration accepting the priest ; on their refusal, fifty blows with the * nagaika ' (Cossack whip) were given to every adult man, twenty-five to every woman, and ten to every child, irrespective of age or sex ; one woman, who was more vehement than the rest, receiving as much as one hundred." Again, March 7, 1874, "Any show of resistance on the part of the peasants is now met by a comparatively overwhelming body of military, the recalcitrant peasants are imprisoned, and fined sums of from ten to fifteen roubles ; while in the villages, where the culprits cannot be got hold of, the whole community is fined from 200 to 400 roubles." * No. 3 of Jan. 29, 1874. 22 FOREIGN POLICY: On June 1 2, the despatch from Warsaw is in the fol- lowing terms : — " The general features of the condition of the United- Greeks have undergone little alteration ; the govern- mental priests are now fairly installed, with the result of a total abstention on the part of the population from all relations with the clergy and participation in the services in the churches. "The peasants bury their dead in the churchyards without funeral services, and by night, and assert that they have ceased to baptize or marry; but I am in- formed that they get the assistance, in secret, of the Catholic clergy in the latter cases, often going immense distances, such as sixty and seventy miles, to avoid detection, either for themselves or for the priests who assist them in their difficulty. "Since 1839, when the United-Greeks in Lithuania were finally drafted into Russian orthodoxy, very con- siderable districts in that province have followed a similar system, and I need hardly point out to your lordship the evil consequences of a whole peasant population being deprived of spiritual supervision, and that generations shoidd grow up to whom meeting for public worship is but a tradition'' Again, on New Years Day, 1875, another despatch is sent from Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby : — " Since I last had the honour to address your lordship on the subject, the details of the antagonism between the authorities and the peasants have been most harrowing. " In one village a peasant suffocated himself and family with charcoal rather than have his child baptized by the governmental parish pope. " The mortality among the peasants bivouacking in the forests in this severe weather has been frightful. ENGLAND AND THE EASTEEN QUESTION. 23 " Orders have been lately given to the Cossacks to hunt them down back to villages, so that the peasants bivouacking have been constantly on the move, reta- liating by hanging the Cossacks here and there, when in isolated parties. " Finding their crops and stores are ravaged by the Cossacks, the peasants, in many instances, have deter- mined to leave their fields uncultivated." On January 27, Lord A. Loftus speaks of "the con- flict (with the Eussian troops) which has desolated so many hearths in the districts of Chelm and Siedlce." In forty-nine parishes a population of 50,000 inhabitants abjured their faith, and were imitated by twenty-six priests, who were constrained by the stress of Eussian ferocity to enter the State or "Orthodox" Church. The fol- lowing despatch of January 29 to Lord Derby explains the circumstance: — " The passing over of these 50,000 United-Greeks has been effected by various means, in which physical mal- treatment has formed a not inconsiderable element. " In some parishes the most obstinate having been sent to the interior of the Empire or Siberia, the remainder finding their substance eaten up by the Cossacks, gave in to the pressure of the subordinate officials, and signed the petitions desiring to be received into the Eussian Church. " In other districts money has been distributed, when it was seen that the resistance was less obdurate. " In others, corporal maltreatment was resorted to until the peasants gave in, but stating as they did so that they yielded only on compulsion. . . " The peasants were assembled and beaten by the Cossacks until the military surgeon stated that more would endanger life ; they were then driven, through a 24 FOREIGN POLICY: half-frozen river up to their waists, into the parish church through files of soldiers, where their names were entered in the petitions as above, and passed out at an oppo- site door, the peasants all the time crying out, * You may call us Orthodox, but we remain in the faith of our fathers/ . . . " It is now officially stated that, among the remainder of the United-Greeks in the Government of Lublin, numbering something over 300,000, a like movement is to be expected, which probably means that measures are being taken to secure a similar result. " Looking on the whole in a broad point of view, the measure is very similar to what took place in Lithuania between 1835 and 1838, when upwards of 1,000,000 United-Greeks, by fair means and foul, were passed over to Russian orthodoxy. . . . " Roman Catholic priests in this country are under so much surveillance, and know so well that a whisper may send them to Siberia for life, that it is unlikely that they have put forward any pressure, and indeed the obstinate fanaticism of the peasants did not require an additional stimulus." Lord A. Loftus adds, in a despatch to the Earl of Derby on Feb. 16 : — " Circumstances under which cruelties of the most revolting nature were committed by the military authori- ties— cruelties which can only be compared with those resorted to in the darkest ages of the Inquisition." Another despatch to Lord Derby of April 24, 1875, contains the following : — " The United-Greek conversions to Russian orthodoxy have made considerable progress since I last had the honour to address your Lordship on the subject, and in the Government of Lublin nearly the whole of the ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. 25 United-Greeks, numbering something over 250,000, have passed over to the National Church. ... I regret to have to report that the system of barbarity and oppression is still in requisition to compel the peasants to frequent the churches, and avail themselves of the services of the Russian popes as regards baptisms, marriages, and burials, while terrorism on one side, and reprisal on the other, has by no means abated. . *^ The Catholic priests of these latter have in various instances, been exiled to Russia on the charge of abetting the recalcitrants, such as having admitted them to the confessional, and various other matters of a religious character." On New Year's Day of 1876, the following is sent to the Earl of Derby : — *' The United-Greek converts of last year are far from acquiescing in their conversion ; they frequent neither churches nor sacraments, do not have their children baptised or their dead buried by the Russian popes, and contract no marriages!^ Lastly, on June 29 : — " There now remain about 60,000 Uniats, all of them small landowners ; and, as they will not change their religion, the Government persecutes them by put- ting them in prison, by flogging them and by billet- ing Cossack troops, who commit every license, in their villages. " Numbers of them were confined in fortresses, and last winter, 300 of the most earnest, who had previously been in prison, were exiled to the Government of Kherson and 300 to the Government of Ekaterinoslav. " All these 600 possessed small parcels of land, which they were forced to abandon. They were torn ruthlessly from their wives and children, who remained behind to 96 FOEEIGN POLICY: share their houses with the Cossacks who were quartered upon them. . . . ** What afflicts them the most is the conviction that now they are away, their wives and children, who are being persecuted by the priests and ruined by the soldiery, will no doubt be driven into becoming members of the Russian Greek Church." Who gains the members which the Catholic Church loses ? The Russo-Greek Church ? No, the Revolution, — the band of atheists. Russia, in murdering Poland with protracted tortures, and in extirpating the Catholic religion of both rites, is preparing her own death at the hand of the Secret Societies or the Revolution. Russia will die like Antiochus, who was inwardly gnawed by the rottenness and ulcerations which his wickedness had engendered. Now let us turn to the Slav idea in the Partition of Poland. As Prussia and Austria had received part of that Slav population, the Czars, who constituted them- selves as the champions of the Panslavic idea, had fixed their fish-hook in the jaws of their two neighbouring Leviathans. Moreover East and West Prussia, con- taining Konigsberg and Dantzic, are surrounded on two sides by Russia, and on one side by the sea ; while the mouth of the Vistula, which bears the grain of Polish Russia and the trade of Warsaw, to the sea, is in the hands of Prussia. That mouth is guarded by Dantzic? which Russia has more than once planned to seize. Panslavism will break up Germany and Austria ; and Panslavism is Russia. A Panslavonian Empire cannot be formed without taking from Germany (Prussia) those pro^dnces of hers which once belonged to the kingdom of Poland, and which comprise one- third of Germany's sea- . board; while Austria would lose Bohemia and Moravia, ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. 27 (which are half German and half Slav), and Hungary, (of which the nobles are Magyar, and the people are Slav). The mouths of the Danube, — that is the control of South German commerce, would also be in the hands of that Panslavonian Empire. This is the wraith which hangs over the heads of the two thieves, or rather accomplices ; while that which hangs over the head of the instigator of the plot will be seen further on. There is a Eussian proverb, " Woe to Europe when the Czar shall wear a beard ; " that is ; when the Czar shall put himself heart and soul at the head of the Panslavonian movement. There is a maxim far older and of far greater authority : " What seest thou ? A seething pot, and the face thereof is toward the North. Then the Lord said unto me : Out of the North an evil shall break forth upon all the inhabitants of the land."* * Jer. i. 13, 14. 28 FOREIGN POLICY; CHAPTER III. I HAVE said that the aim of every state is twofold : security, and general consideration ; and that the general consideration in which a state is held — that is, its influ- ence, rank, or rate — depends either on its acknowledged justice, which is respected ; or else on its force, which is feared. We will now confine ourselves to the latter basis — the reign of force by fear. The power of every state is relative. A state is rela- tively stronger, as the power of other states is wasted, or, at least, discredited. All things remaining the same, a state is stronger if it is generally believed to be stronger. For it can play a great r61e when other states fear to meddle. To believe any state to be more powerful, is to yield to it the pre-eminence ; and every state which accepts such a belief — every state which fears — must play a subordinate part. Only that state which is believed to be strong can, indeed, be said to play any part at all. For the other states are made subservient to its ends. They must dig pits for their neighbours, or be swallowed up themselves. They must ever consent to the actions of their master, or be crushed themselves. In either case that master is still further aggrandized; and all that every other state can hope is that, like Ulysses, it may be eaten* up the last. Dependence is inferiority ; and inde- pendence means either an acknowledged pre-eminence, or else a noli-me-tangere isolation. ENGLAND AND THE EASTEEN QUESTION. 29 Force, or the power which is feared, is of four kinds — (1.) Military and Naval power ; or the ability to de- stroy men and property. (2.) Social power ; or the number, the character (moral, intellectual, and physical), and the disposition or passing feeling, of the population. (3.) Financial power ; or the amount of productions, and profits in trade, beyond the amount of unproductive expenditure. (4.) Federative power ; or the number and character of its allies. (It must be noted that another species of Federative power is that which is based on a character for justice.) Power being of four distinct kinds, it follows that the sum of power of any state is a matter of difficult calcula- tion. Per contra ; war is a difficult calculation for a statesman ; for war consists in the destruction of one or more kinds of power in the hands of the enemy, without thereby losing a greater balance of power oneself. This destruction of power may be efiected with or without the help of gunpowder ; that is, a power of the enemy may be decreased or destroyed, by means of any one of the powers which a state possesses. I will give some examples. A state, with a view to vanquish an enemy, may enter into a number of ofiensive and defensive alliances, which will hereafter entail continual and harassing wars. The desired victory over one enemy, will thus result in its own lasting destruction, by the loss of Financial and Social powers. A state with vast military resources, may proudly and ambitiously dash into an unjust war, and thereby perma- nently alienate all other nations. The balance of Federa- tive power will then be thrown into the enemy's scale. An unjust war, or a shameful peace, may be so un- 30 FOREIGN TOLICY: popular with the nation, that the Government becomes weak and insecure. This is a loss of Social power. A war may result in loss of trade, and financial depres- sion, without a balance of augmentation in any of the other kinds of power. An example of this was the Federal war in the United States in 1862. The Govern- ment was short-sighted in its desire for a stricter unity. The self-government claimed by the Southern States would have resulted in a greater strength of the Eepublic. The refusal of one state to assist another state in war, may prevent an alliance which would add more to the sum of its powers, than would be lost in Financial and Social powers, by many campaigns. If we had stood by Denmark in 1864, by Austria in 1866, and by France in 1870, we should have gained in Federative power. If France had helped Austria in 1866, she would have gained the Ehine provinces, and the catastrophe of 1871 would not have occurred. A state may be cajoled into declaring itself for one combatant, when she should remain neutral, and become the arbiter of their differences. For this is an increase of Federative power. A little more than forty years ago, w^e declared in favour of the Sikhs and against the Affghans, and so threw the Affghans into the arms of Persia and Eussia, and lost immensely in Federative power. When England rebelled against her Sovereign, James II., Ireland remaining loyal and faithful, Louis XIV. might have aggrandized himself by supporting King James and Ireland, against William the old enemy of France. Whenever an enemy's country is divided into two camps, and you can support the weaker, you destroy your enemy's Social and Financial and Military powers ; while you gain Federative power for yourself. If you ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. 31 support the stronger, the weaker will be dispirited, and your enemy will become united. You would thus be giving an increase of Social power to your enemy. A state may have its hands full, in a quarrel with an enemy, which a third state has stirred up. That third state will then be unmolested in some process of aggran- dizement which it may have in view. So Russia., having seen us plunged into a war with Persia, seized Persia's north frontier — Mazanderan ; and we actually took off our hats and bowed and thanked Eussia for aggrandizing herself at our expense, and threatening our possessions of India. Or the state which would be likely to interfere with that aggrandizement, may have its Social power destroyed by civil disturbances, or even agitations, which that third state, by its secret agents, has fomented. So Germany may, any day, be paralyzed by a Slav agitation {i.e., by an irruption of Eussian Poles) ; or by exciting the rage of the disinherited German Princes (now called " Parti- cularism" — i.e., particular states, as against a German Empire), and the jealousy of other Sovereigns, and the resentment of Catholic populations. Or that third state may threaten war against the first state, if it should prepare an interference to prevent two other states from weakening themselves in war. Thus Eussia threatened us with war in 1870, if we should dare to " come between the points of two fell insensate oppo- sites," Prussia and France. Eussia then, seeing our fear, and consequently their own great consideration, declared herself free from the Treaty of 1856. In the same way Eussia led us into the " Opium War," and at once took the Amoor from China. After our war was over, Eussia had to give back to China all her booty, except the Eussian settlements at the mouth of the Amoor ; and J 32 FOREIGN POLICY: the Chinese were about to drive them from these also, when we bombarded Canton and saved Russia. A state may lose Social power by an immoral or atheistical propaganda. It loses Financial power by luxury and selfish expenditure. Thus Russia has always promoted luxury at Constantinople, and a waste of resources in building palaces for the Sultan ; while she has also abetted maladministration in the Turkish Government, and discontent in the people ; and has sown, by means of secret societies, books and pamphlets of a socialistic and revolutionary tendency. She has always, moreover, driven from power any minister who has tried to stop this course of vice and folly. Examples of this we shall see hereafter. A state may be induced to conclude a secret treaty with another state, which treaty involves detriment to an ancient ally. Then, at the proper time, that other state discloses the Treaty to the ancient ally. Thus Russia cajoled us into a secret treaty against Turkey, which she then showed to the Porte. Another example was given in the Times of March 24, 1877. "The second thing which happened at Berlin was this : — ' Scarcely had General IgnatiefF communicated his first instructions and the draught Protocol proposed by Russia to Prince Bismarck than the latter forwarded them by telegraph to London, where they were placed under the eyes of Lord Derby. Thus, while Count SchouvalofF and General Ignatieff were discussing be- tween themselves and with others the terms of the Protocol, and what it was proper to retain or expunge, the English Cabinet had in its hands the original text, which indicated to it the extreme starting-point of the Russian proposals — a thing which put one party on their guard and betrayed the exigencies of the other." ENGLAND AND THE EASTEEN QUESTION. 33 So also Benedetti, Napoleon's envoy, was persuaded to act as scribe, wliile Bismark dictated the heads of a Treaty between France and Prussia, giving Belgium to France and Holland to Prussia. As it was in Bene- detti's handwriting, Bismark showed it to our Govern- ment as a French scheme, which the Prussians had scouted. Thus England was deterred from helping France in 1870, and France lost an amount of Federa- tive power which would have turned the scale in her favour. A state may be induced to refuse the payment of interest on its debts. Thus did Turkey, at General Ignatiew's suggestion, and very nearly lost the general consideration in her favour, and an immense amount of Federative power. It was Mahmoud Pasha, the Grand Vizier, Russia's tool, who, at Ignatiew's sugges- tion, and with the aid of some Greek bankers, pre- pared the Firman of October, 1875, which amounted to a declaration of either bankruptcy or dishonesty. The following words occur in a pamphlet of great authority and power, — a pamphlet which reveals some Cabinet secrets, and in which are found an apology for Lord Beaconsfield, and complaints of his too timorous colleagues. The apology was easy to write, as Lord Beaconsfield is the only one of the Cabinet who has shown knowledge, courage, or consistency : — '' We know that Mahmoud Pasha was the tool of General Ignatiew ; our knowledge of him erases the word ' simpleton,' and writes the word ' traitor.' Through him and the gang of parasites, and worse, who thronged his doorstep, the Russian ambassador ruled Turkey."* A state, by proclaiming its cordial alliance with an enemy of other nations, may alienate those nations, and * T "he Noithem Question," p. 29. King & Co. 1870. 34 FOREIGN POLICY: SO lose Federative power. Thus the repeated assertions of various members of the present Government, that the most cordial ties exist between us and Russia, have alienated the Turks from us, and must also alienate the Persians and Affghans, and all who look for pro- tection against Russian aggressions. Those few minis- terial phrases have taken from us an immense amount of Federative power. A Government may alienate ah important ally, by resisting some measure of defence which it desires. Austria w^ould not join with us in the Crimean war, unless we would consent to join with her and Prussia in proclaiming the re-constitution of Poland, as a barrier between them and Russia. We thus lost both Federa- tive and Military power. Federative power may be gained by taking up the absurd theories which nations run after. Thus the Porte, in announcing the Constitution, said it was in adherence to the theories of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity of France. So likewise Cavour wrote to Admiral Persano : *"' " II problem a die abiamo da sciog- liere, e questo : aiutare la Rivoluzione ; ma operare in guisa che apparisca agli occhj dell' Europa come un moto spontaneo. Se questo avviene, la Francia e ringhil terra sono con noi." If a state assails the basis of Justice, by doing a mean and shameful act, it loses Social, and even Federative power, as well as General Consideration on the basis of Justice. Thus France weakened herself in the war of 1859, and was stopped at the Adige by a threat from Prussia. Still more did she weaken herself in 1860. So also the Governments of United Italy and United Germany, having allied themselves with the * August 9, I860. ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. 35 Freemasons, were forced to declare a spiritual war on the Churcli. The effect has been an enormous loss of Social Power. First : the Kevolutionary party (Socialists and Communists) has increased greatly, and aims at the establishment of a Universal Eepublic (Associazione Eepublicana Universale) ; Secondly : the Catholic subjects have been alienated from their rulers ; and Thirdly : the Catholics of the whole world are enemies of those two states. This is, for them, a loss of Federative power. To seize the fruits of unjust conquest is a loss of Federative power. Germany, by taking Alsace and Lorraine, has permanently alienated the French ; by her Austrian conquests, she has made an enemy of Austria ; by seizing Holstein and part of Schleswig, she has established resentment in the breast of Den- mark ; and by her burglary and falsehoods in the matter of Hanover, she has engendered a bitterness against her in England. Italy, by receiving Lombardy from Napoleon's hands, has made an enemy of Austria. In each of the cases I have mentioned, the ceded terri- tory is full of unwilling subjects of the Conqueror ; so that there has been a loss of Social power as well as a diminution of Federative power. We must now pass in review each of the four kinds of power. (I.) Military Power all men understand. An army is a fighting machine. The discipline and esprit de corps render it a unity. The physique and. exercise of the men give it rapidity of motion, so that it may, with quickness and precision, assemble . and strike at some unexpected point, before its adversary can bring together his troops and make the proper dispositions for a defence ; and " more battles are won by legs than D 2 36 FOREIGN POLICY: by arms." The discretion of its Generals, and their knowledge of the country and of the enemy's position, show them where the attack should be concentrated, and where feints or diversions should be made. The detailed acquaintance of the officers with the character of the ground, enables them to seize natural advatitages in carrying out their orders. Naval power does not consist in Ironclads. For ironclads are ever being built of thicker and thicker ironsides, so that they may not be pierced. The enemy's ironclads are then as invulnerable as your own, and may steam into your harbours (if invulnerable), destroy the shipping, and steam out again. To prevent this, Whitehead torpedoes have been invented; and White- head-torpedo-ships. These have lessened the value of ironclads. Moreover, ironclads cannot sail ; they steam slowly and laboriously ; and they cannot keep the sea for a long time without coaling ; and our coaling-stations abroad are always liable to be taken or burned. Or the ships which carry the coals to those stations, may be destroyed. What swift frigates can do to destroy the Financial power of the enemy, was shown by the- achievements of the Alabama. She burned 10,000,000Z. worth of her enemy's goods on the sea ; she caused damage (by loss of trade, rising of freights, &c.) to the amount of 200,000,000/. ; and last of all she drove away the American trade, and to this day it has not come back. Great also is the effect of the maxim, "Free ships make free goods,'^ in destroying the Financial power of a maritime enemy. For it means that an enemy's exports may be taken only out of his own ships, but not from under a neutral flag. It was proved before a Committee of the House of Commons, that, at the ENGLAND AND THE EASTEEN QUESTION. 37 mere rumour of war in 1859, American ships of the second class commanded a freight fifty per cent, higher than our first class ships could obtain. This was because our merchants would not send their goods in English ships, lest England should be involved in war, while America remained neutral. Thus our trade was greatly injured, and only came back to us during the Federal war of the United States. Then the Americans lost their trade ; their ships passed into our hands, and their sailors were discharged and became articled to English ships. Countries are, however, variously affected in this respect, in proportion to their exports by sea in their own ships. The per-centage of maritime exports, in respect of the total exports (viz. by sea, and over the land frontier), is as follows : — Austria 15*9 Holland 24-4 Belgium 35*3 Italy 47-8 France ee-O"'*- Spain 90-6t United States 99*3 Eussia 67*5 Spain and the United States still hold to the maxim that enemy's goods may lawfully be captured wherever found, and under whatever flag. France would not be benefited by the maxim "Free ships, free goods," if she were at war with us, and the United States do not acknowledge that maxim. Russia is the power who would be most injured by the ancient maxim, and who, therefore, benefits by the new maxim of " Free ships, free goods." Moreover, the exports of Russia ^ Half of which is to Great Britain. t Two- thirds of which is to Great Britain. 8« FOREIGN POLICY: cannot well be taken by land, as they are bulky raw- produce, viz. : — Com 45 per cent. Flax 11 Wood 9 Linseed 7 Living animals ... 3 Hemp 3 Besides wool, tallow, and leather. The per-centage of exports in national ships to the total exports by sea, is as follows :— Belgium 9*0 Eussia . 11*9* Holland 26*0 France . . . . . . . 330 United States 34*0 Italy . . . . ... 37-0 Spain 39-0 Denmark 44*0 Germany 51*0 Great Britain 66-0 Norway and Sweden .... 80*0 Austria 85-0 Belgium and Eussia are, therefore, in this respect, also, the most interested in asserting the maxim " Free ships, free goods," or " Neutral flag covers the goods." These remarks, suffice to show the true source of "maritime Power." (II.) Social Power consists in the numerical quantity, the health, the stamina, the strength, the intelligence, the character, the content, and the passing disposition of the population. If the people are healthy and contented, for example, they love their country, and are eager to support the policy of their rulers. During the Franco- Prussian War it was frequently said that the over- whelming superiority of the Germans, even when * This is a per-centage rapidly diminishing. ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. 39 opposed to greater numbers, arose from the greater streno-th and higher intelligence of their soldiers. O c5 O Towards the close of the war, France learned to rue the prevalence of those secret crimes which had, through the lapse of many years, contracted families to only one or two children, and so reduced the numbers of the French people. The French, at the last, were in absolute want of men. The close of the same war serves also as an example of the importance of good character and content. The Emperor was informed, while at Sedan, of a discon- tent so widespread, that only a brilliant victory could save his throne. That is the reason why he fought the battle, when all military critics said that he should have retired on Paris. His soldiers went to battle singino: the Marseillaise, and other revolutionary songs; and soon, not caring to spill their blood for an Emperor, they ran away in thousands. I will give another example. On Sept. 11, 1857, the King of Prussia assembled at Berlin, an " Evan- gelical Alliance," with the intention of making himself the Head or CalifF of a union of all the ''Reformed" Churches in Europe, — the Anglican, Scandinavian, Lutheran, Calvinist, et hoc genus omne. This plan was not original. It was the plan of Frederick the Great, exactly a century before. What were the effects of this assemblage called " The Evangelical Alliance " ? The Polish and the Rhenish provinces of Prussia were thereby alienated, and began to look to the Emperor of Austria as their natural Head. This was a great loss of Social power. Next month the King of Prussia was declared mad, and the present Emperor, who was and is the Head of the Freemasons, was made Regent. Xever- theless, he had at once to remove, as far as possible, the effects of the Evangelical Alliance, and regain some of 40 FOREIGN POLICY: the lost Social power, by issuing a Royal Proclamation in favour of liberty of worship and freedom of teaching in "confessional" {i.e. denominational) schools for the poor. The Prussian statesmen were henceforth more alive to the necessity of preserving Social power. Prussia, in order to unite all Germany, saw that it was necessary both to excite the passions of Germany and of France ; and also to make it appear that the war was forced on Germany, against her will, by a declaration of war on the part of France. Prussia having already seized the Federal fortresses of Raastadt and Mayence, contrary to the express words of the Treaty, Bismark heaped con- tinued insults on Napoleon, which he took care to publish in all the newspapers. Napoleon became uneasy ; for he felt that he was losing Consideration and Federative power as well as Social power. That game was at its height in 1867. When the propitious moment arrived, Bismark, — having ascertained that the candidature of a Hohenzollern, to the throne of Spain, would be unac- ceptable to France ; and having committed the French Government to an assertion that they would use every means in their power to resist it, — at once advanced this candidature in a manner which was sure to provoke opposi- tion. Benedetti had interviews with the King of Prussia. At the last of these interviews, at Ems, he appeared to have settled matters amicably ; whereupon he took cordial leave of the King. That instant it was tele- graphed, throughout Germany, that Benedetti had insulted Germany, in the person of the. Prussian King; whilst it was telegraphed, throughout France, that the Prussian King had wantonly insulted France, in the person of her Ambassador. The popular passions in both countries were aroused to a pitch of fury ; and ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. 41 Napoleon had either to declare war, or see all Social power slip away from him. The Germans, having been aroused to a coQimon fury by a supposed wrong to their race, combined to seek revenge. Hence the Union of Germany. Another element which forced Napoleon to this course, so fatal to his dynasty, was that the French Socialists were looking for an accession of strength to their cause (which any paroxysm of weakness in the French Govern- ment would be), in order to break forth in a long prepared Communist Revolution. The loss of Social power, which would have been occasioned if Napoleon had brooked the insult, would have at once furnished them with the desired opportunity. Napoleon had the choice of either vacating the throne, or risking all in war, in order to retrieve his Social power. Eussia, desiring the prostration of France, as she had before desired the .prostration of Austria (in order that her own powers might be relatively greater), had announced that any interference, by other states, in the quarrel of Prussia and France, would cause her to support Prussia by arms. Austria had agreed to brave the uttered menaces of Russia, and aid France, by causing a diversion. This she was to do on the first success of the French arms, as Austria was not sufficiently prepared to declare war at once. The defeats of France, however, followed each other in such quick succession, raising so much the Teutonic enthusiasm of Austria's German provinces, that Austria would have lost Social power by declaring her- self in favour of France. Moreover the Hungarian conspirators, who were in possession of the Transleithan Government, tied Austria's hands and prevented her from giving aid to France. The English people had been turned against France by Bismark's opportune 42 FOREIGN POLICY: publication of the draft secret Treaty (which was in Benedetti's hand -writing), whereby France proposed to seize Belgium. Italy had promised to send an army of 100,000 men to the Ehone, in return for Napoleon's promise to evacuate Rome and Civita Vecchia. But the agents of Bismark, and the Carbonari, at the orders of Mazzini and Garibaldi, threatened to overturn the Pied- montese dynasty. This had been ne^jotiated by Usedom (who had, in 1866, arranged the filibustering expedition of Garibaldi to Dalmatia, in order to raise the Slavs and Hungarians). ■^^' Moreover, Bismark offered, as a bribe, the throne of Spain to Amadeo, the son of the King of Italy. The King of Italy then promised not to send the 100,000 ; although he procured the evacuation of Rome and Civita Vecchia by his promise to send them. Put not any trust in Princes ! Before quitting the subject of Social power, it is well to remark how acutely the present Government felt the danger of losing Social power, through the " atrocity agitation.'^ Lord Derby's despatch f will be afterwards considered. The Chancellor of the Exchequer on Sept. 17, at Edinburgh, was inclined to kick against fate. He complained bitterly of the members of Corporations making speeches on Foreign politics, which, he said, they did not understand. While Lord Derby said he was anxious to receive directions from the people, whom he called his employers and masters, and only complained that he generally received those directions too late, and after he had been compelled to act. In that spirit he wrote the despatch No. 159, in August. In regard to Sir Stafford Northcote's manly avowal, it may indeed be * See, in the posthumous works of Mazzini, the letter from Usedom's * wife, in 1870. t No. 159. I. of 1877. ENGLAND AND THE EASTEEN QUESTION. 43 said that if no one is to utter that which he does not know to be true, nor discuss that which he does not understand, England will become a land of silence, like the place of shadows across the Styx. He evidently holds that even the English people consists of deceivers and deceived : — the majority going about ever ready to swallow anything that " designing politicians tell them, and to do what those persons, for their own ends may bid them." In short, he maintains that they " drink in errors like water." (III.) Financial^ or Monetary Power comes from the resources of soil and climate ; the productions of manu- factures ; and the profits of trade. Th-ese may be rela- tively and fictitiously increased in value, by acting on other countries, and interfering with their resources, pro- ductions, or trade. An export duty, and still more a prohibition, placed by the Government, on the export of an article, will increase the value of the like product in other countries. There is a rivalry in production. If Russia produces corn, tallow, hemp, hides, she must desire, with a view to increasiug her wealth, that the corn and oil of Turkey, the palm oil of Africa, the corn of the Danubian principalities and of North America, and the hides and tallow of South America, may meet with hindrances against exportation. The Vistula was the means of egress of Polish corn. The Vistula was seized, and that trade strangled, and Poland weakened, before she was divided. The mouths of the Danube are allowed to silt up, so that the corn, which should be borne on that great river to the sea, may be deterred. The struggle to decrease the Financial power of other nations — the w^ars of commerce, are carried on, from year to year, under the guise of peace and friendship. Whenever a war of commerce reaches the crisis of open 44 FOKEION POLICY: battle, it is always more fierce than a religious war, because money is more esteemed than religion, and Financial power is more sought after than righteousness and justice. Internal discords may be fomented in countries which are our rivals in some produce, so as to interfere with their agriculture, factories, or mercan- tile marine. The Republics of South America are always in a state of revolution, or else in external war. Influence has, before now, been obtained on Railway and Canal Company's Boards, and the rates of corn freights have been raised. The corn of the Western States of North America, is not allowed to come by the lakes to the St. Lawrence, for exportation. Its compulsory destination is New York ; and so the freightage is greatly increased, and the corn is rendered dearer. This is an advantage for the corn-producing countries. In the Federal war, the Southern States looked forward to a split between the Northern and Western States on this very point, and calculated that the trade down the Mississippi would be increased. The debts of countries {e.g., those of Turkey) have, by external pressure and cajolery, been first initiated, and then increased, so that the internal burdens of taxation may press down the production and trade of the country, and that the cost of production may be in- creased, and the profits on exports may be diminished or destroyed. This is the same as a relative increase of Financial power in other countries. The carrying trade of a country may be filched away ; or it may be harassed by mercantile marine laws " in the interest of humanity ; " and then its freights will gradually disappear. Russia places restrictions on our commerce with her vast empire. We therefore export to her less than we import from her, the balance being ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. 45 paid in gold. Her aim is, doubtless, to increase her capital, and fictitiously to nurse her industries. Turkey, on the other hand, encourages trade with foreign nations. It is, therefore, a financial injury when Russia annexes a Turkish country; for Russia at once restricts the foreign trade, and especially excludes British trade. In 1874,-"' the Imports from Eussia wore . . £20,800,000 Exports to ,, ., . . £11,800,000 Exports to Turkey . . . £16,900,000 Imports from „ . . . . £12,500,000 We may say, then, that for every 205. which Russia receives from us, she takes 105. of it in goods and IO5. in cash, while Turkey takes more, in goods, from us than we get from her. If we were to buy the oil of Turkey (which is now hampered by a heavy duty of I5. per quintal,t) instead of the tallow of Russia, then Turkey would demand still more goods in exchange, and our exports and carrying trade would be greatly increased. This would be an increase of our Financial power. It is as well to note that the source of revenue which pays for war, is the export trade. Adam Smith says : J " Fleets and armies are maintained, not with gold and silver, but with consumable goods." He then enumerates three means by which a nation may support war : "by sending abroad (1) some part of its accumu- lated gold and silver ; (2) some part of the annual pro- duce of its manufactures ; (3) some part; of its annual raw produce. ... It can seldom happen that much can be spared from the circulating money of the country ; because in that there can seldom be much redundancy." ^ Abstract Tables of Trade and Navigation, t Hlibner's " Customs Tariff." Murray, 1855. X "Wealth of Nations," book iv. chap. i. 46 FOREIGN POLICY: War must, therefore, be supported by the export of manufactures, or by the export of raw produce. (IV.) Federative Power (not that Federative power whose foundation lies in a character for just dealing, but that which is based on force), — Federative power rests upon reciprocal wants. Portugal, for example, being shut in between its rival and the sea, must cling, for the sake of its maritime trade, to some great naval power ; while we, on the other hand, receive, by a close alliance with Portugal, an influence over the affairs of Spain. This advantage was patent during the Penin- sular War. In every alliance (based on the lower ground of which I am speaking) there must be a common ground of interest. The objects or aims of the allies may be dis- tinct, but not separate ; they may be subalternate but not repugnant. Friendship, or alliance, is " idem velle et idem nolle de rebus publicis.*' The old empire of Germany was a federation of free and sovereign king- doms, yielding to all of them the maximum of Federa- tive power. The modern German Empire could not be made a true alliance or federation ; for many of the German kingdoms are Catholic ; and Protestant Ger- many would not hear of their freedom or sovereignty. Hence the " Union " of Germany was brought about by feigned insults and the blind passions of war. The " Union " of Italy, also, was engendered by force and fraud. In neither case was there any increase of Federa- tive power, while there has been a loss of Social power, seeing that all the people are not at one, and content with the Government. The defeat of Jena appeared to be the extinction of the Prussian kingdom and nation. Stein and Hardenberg, however, rebuilt Prussia by means of the same policy ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. 47 which Burke advocated for England : viz., opposition to those abstract and " philosophic " doctrines of the Revolu- tion, which only tended to the subversion of local customs and national traditions ; to the equality which is repugnant to liberty ; to the democratic Csesarism which effaces the individual ; to the disregard of rights, and the worship of force ; to the extinction of provincial autonomy and local life. The policy which built up Prussia, in the day of her disaster, and which Burke recommended for England in the days of her blindness, was the policy which the Christian Church laboured to establish in a Europe just ruined by the fall of the Eoman Empire and the sway of barbarians. Stein made Prussia strong, not by a revolutionary sameness and centralization, but by a federal unity, — Christian, historical, traditional, and free. Without diminishing her independence, he united Prussia in closer bonds, and thus increased her Social . power. Bismark, on the other hand, has made an onslaught on local independence, without even creating a unity of feeling, — nay, even while alienating the Southern States, and Saxony, and the Rhine Pro- vinces, Bavaria, Westphalia, Wirtemburg, Poland, Alsace, and Lorraine. Let Austria pursue a wise and conciliating policy, shunning concentration, respecting local liberties and ancient rights, and she will reap the fruits of Prus- sia's ploughing and sowing. In the Home policy of Austria is to be found the revenge for Sadowa. To Prussian unitarianism, Austria must oppose the provin- cial and historical varieties of a conciliating federalism. Bismark should have endeavoured to consolidate the German Empire' on German sympathies and feelings — an Empire based on the cordial assent of all, for this is Social power ; or if the component states are sovereign, then it is the maximum of Federative power. It is now 48 FOREIGN POLICY: a Protestant state, with millions of Germans in hostility to it, — a Protestant state, with a Protestantism which is the subject of numberless and incurable divisions and varieties, and with the absorbed states crying out for " particularism " or disunion. By attacking the Church, by his alliance with Italy, Bismark has lost the Social power of a single state, and the Federative power of allied states, — virtually dividing Germany into hostile atoms, and causing the particular states to sigh for auto- nomy, while the Socialistic Revolution seeks to annihilate the Empire and erect a Kepublic on its ashes. He has lost political unity in a butterfly chase after an impossible religious unity. He has destroyed an Empire in snatch- ing at the phantom of a national Church, which the antichristian party will never allow either Germany or Italy to frame. Yet a false and unreal federation, having gone thus far on a wrong road, seeks now to go still further. Not Germany, but a Panteutonic Empire ; not Russia, but a Panslavonic Empire ; and a Pan-Italian kingdom, with the Trentina, Corsica, and Malta. These would indeed be great seething masses; they would be sandhills of atoms, without Federative power. No alliance can in reality exist, nor is it of any use that an alliance should exist in name, where a common ground of mutual wants and reciprocal assistance has either not been found, or has once been found and passed away. Not sheepskin parchment, writing ink, and appeals to the sacred name of the " most holy, one, and undivided Trinity," can make that essential character which is called friendship or alliance. Where there is no common interest, no reciprocal service, it is no more than an empty name, impotent to move an army, unable even to awake an echo. It is worse than that : a nominal ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. 49 alliance, where the aims of the allies are separate, is in- sidious, fraudulent, and misleading. It causes you to "trust in Egypt'' when "Egypt is hut a broken reed, which will pierce your hand ; " it causes you to trust in Eussia, when she is but " a wall against which, if a man lean, a serpent comes out and bites him." All the advan- tages are on the side of the more cunning ally ; while the expenses and danger will be borne by the other. The more astute will dominate ; the more stupid ally will be his Caliban to hew wood and draw water for him. As all power is relative, so Federative power must be relative. For more than a century, it has been the diplo- macy of Eussia, relatively to increase her own Federative power, by setting one state against another in Europe and Asia. Now Prussia and Austria have a difficulty. Now the French colonels threaten England. Now there is a Danish " question ;" then Germany attacks France. Now the relations between the United States of America and England are " strained." Eussia, the world's great diplo- matist, remains quiet, and then poses as arbiter in the dispute, as mediator in the quarrel, as conciliator in the differences which she has been busy, on both sides, in stirring up. Just so is a state relatively strengthened in Social power, and is sought as a home of residence, on the ground of "security in life and property," — whenever other states are socially weakened, by setting the people against their rulers, through Fenian, Chartist, or Com- munist theories ; or by inducing the rulers to oppress the people, so that they may be goaded into rebellion ; or by disseminating irreligious and immoral doctrines, such as those which flood the east of Germany ; or by confusing men's minds through moving the landmarks of ancient principles. 50 FOKEIGN POLICY: Unless by a stupid Government, treaties are entered into solely from clear motives of self-interest. Hatred, resentment, admiration, and other passions, should never affect the policy of cabinets : — no, not even Royal connec- tions. Passion only blinds the cabinet, and prevents them from seeing the real interests of the nation ; while sentiment is no proper motive for a ruler, who has to look to the good of the nation alone. The aim of every treaty must, therefore, be the increase of the four kinds of power. The clause in the Treaty of March 1856, for the neutralization of the Black Sea, was a relative increase of the naval powers of France and England. The Treaty with the United States, concerning the Alabama damages, caused a slight increase of Financial power to the United States, and a great augmentation of Consideration and the character for justice in our favour ; while the ravages of the Alabama, by transferring the carrying trade of the United States to England, was an immense loss of Finan- cial power to the United States. Eussia had, at that time, just increased her Financial power and her Federative powers by the sale and cession of Alaska to the United States ; and the naval power of America against us in any war would have been troublesome. The Treaty and award removed every ground of quarrel, and by increas- ing our alliance with America, was a relative loss of Federative power for Russia. The Protocol of London of 1871, was a great loss of Consideration for Russia, as it declared that she had been guilty of gross injustice and a breach of international law ; and so her Federative power was lessened at the very time that she was pre- paring to spring upon Turkey. Any treaty which is very unpopular with the nation, is a loss of Social power ; for it shakes the bond which should bind the people to their rulers. At this moment ENGLAND AND THE EASTEEN QUESTION. 61 Eussia is in such a position that she must sustain a serious loss of Social power if she withdraws her armies, or if she fights and is beaten ; while she must lose in Federative power if she does not withdraw her armies and fights. As the material power of a nation is the resultant of these four kinds of power, in its own hands and in its allies, on the one side ; as against the adverse powers of inimical nations, on the other side ; so the Federative power of a nation is the resultant of those interests which are common to it, and to other nations. Let us take an example. Our own interest in the preservation of Turkey- is patent. France and Austria have the same interest. Yet, on the other hand, a war with Russia would be a greater detriment to France and to Austria, than to us ; for they have not yet recovered from their recent prostra- tions, by which Germany was so enormously aggrandized. They may, therefore, be tempted to stand by and see Turkey dismembered. Germany, knowing this, may wish to see England and Russia with their hands full, in order that she may unhindered seize Holland and the Schelde, and so increase her naval and commercial (Financial) powers, by obtaining a naval station outside the narrow Sound. This, however, would be against the interests of France, England, and Denmark ; while the possession of the mouths of the Danube by Russia would be such an injury to Austria, that she would have a common interest with us in preventing the advance of Russia. £ 2 62 POREIGN POLICY: CHAPTER IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND TREATIES. Let us now pass to the Eastern Question. A few chapters must first be devoted to a study of the elements of this question. The principles above advanced shall then be applied to the proceedings of this country in regard to the Eastern Question. The foremost place must be occupied by international law. In the consideration of a policy, or course of con- duct, the first question which should be asked is this : Is it riglit ? Is it lawful 1 A policy is a method, or way of arriving at a definite end. Not only must the end be right, but the means also must be lawful. The conduct of individuals is always modelled and shaped after the acts of its Government. For that which the Government does, in the name of the nation, the nation itself commits ; and if a nation commits a crime, it will at once seek for some maxim, or frame some general principle, by which to defend its sin. In this ex post facto labour the Government and the party-press are foremost to assist. Those maxims and principles, having been invented for the sake of defence or excuse, and accepted by the people, — either through carelessness and indolence, or else to save their vanity, —will then at once be applied to their private lives. For every one is conscious in himself that there cannot be two moralities, one for the individual man, and the other for an aggre- gate of men, — a nation or moral person. Everyone ENGLAND AND THE EASTEEN QUESTION. 53 knows that there is one moral law which is eternal and universal. The Law of Nature was established by God at the Creation, and promulgated again, amid the thunders of Mount Sinai. It governs all men ; and no other law was ever proclaimed to rule the conduct of nations. If the leaders or rulers of a state regard these moral prin- ciples as eifoete, and throw them aside whenever ex- pedient, then every man, in his private dealings, will also consider them as effoete and dead ; and the moral law will cease to be regarded as a law, in that authority is no longer attributed to it. The fishermen of the sea of Azov have a true saying : " It is always at the head that the fish begins to stink." Private demoralisation always follows political turpitude. Before deciding to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey, or of any state, the Government and nation have to ask themselves what right they have to interfere. What gejieral right is there under the natural law ? or, what right has been especially conceded by Treaty ? First : what general right is determined by the law of nature (which is the law of nations). Yattel ''^ says that : Every nation is mistress of her actions, so lonsf as those acts do not affect the ris^hts of others. Even if a nation is badly governed, yet other states are bound to acquiesce, since they have no right to dictate any course of conduct. He further adds these words if " It is an evident consequence of the liberty and independence of nations, that all have a right to be governed as they think proper, and that no state has the smallest right to interfere in the government of another Of all the rights that can belong to a nation, sovereignty is, doubtless, the most precious, and that which other * Prelim., p. Ixiii. § 10. f Bk. II. ch. iv. § 54. M FOREIGN POLICY: nations ought the most scrupulously to respect, if they would not do her an injury." Again/' he says that no Sovereign may judge the conduct of another, nor oblige him to alter it. " If he loads his subjects with taxes, and if he treats them with severity, the nation alone is concerned in the business ; and no other Sovereign is called upon to compel him to amend his conduct and follow more wise and equitable maxims." The Sultan, then, is, according to the Law of Nations, an independent or Sovereign Ruler. We have under the law of nations, no more right to intervene in Turkish affairs (that is, to violate his independence or sovereignty), (except at the call of Justice), than a man has a right to enter his neighbour's house, and dispose of his goods according to his own pleasure. It will be perceived that I have made an exception or limitation to the duty of non-intervention. The Syllabus condemned the prin- ciple : " Proclamandum est et observandum principium quod vocant de non-interventu." The contradictory of that principle is true ; that is : Sometimes it is right to intervene. When ? At the call of Justice. If the Sultan, by oppressing his subjects and invading their rights, causes them to rise in insurrection, we may then intervene to defend the right ; but no more. This is the answer to an objection which may be urged, viz. : " Then every Government may do just what it likes ? " Certainly not. (1.) If the Government is limited by a Constitution and persistently violates the fundamental laws, then it ceases to be a legal Government. (2.) If the Government is absolute in form, and breaks the natural law, by persisting in injustice, then it ceases to be a legal Government. ■* § 55. ENGLAND AND THE EASTEEN QUESTION. 55 In both cases the subjects may revolt against the illegality and injustice, and defend their rights ; and other nations may help the insurgents to regain their rights (but no more than their rights), and may declare war on any state which helps the illegal Government to maintain its oppression. For a Government that does not fulfil the raison d'etre of every Government, is no Government. Cessante ratione, cessat lex. Cessante fine, cessant media. That this statement is correct, is proved by Vattel.'"' " Some celebrated writers maintain that if the prince is invested with the supreme command in a full and absolute manner, nobody has a right to resist him, much less to curb him ; and that nought remains for the nation, but to suffer and obey with patience." Against such an inhuman dictum, Vattel argues, and then adds : " If the prince becomes the scourge of the state, he degrades himself ; he is no better than a public enemy, against whom the nation may and ought to defend itself. . . . If he be absolute, when his government, without being carried to extreme violence, manifestly tends to the ruin of the nation, it may resist him, pass sentence on him, and withdraw from his obedi- ence." Again : t With regard to other states : " If the Prince, by violating the fundamental laws, gives his subjects a legal right to resist him,- — if tyranny, becoming insupportable, obliges the nation to rise in their own defence, — every foreign Power has .a right to succour the oppressed people ivho implore their assistance. . . . Whenever, therefore, matters are carried so far as to produce a civil war, foreign Powers may assist that ijarty which appears to them to have justice on its side.^^ * '^ Vattel," Bk. I. ch. iv. § 51. f Bk. 11. ch. iv. § 56. 5r, FOREIGN rOLICY: Vattel also lays down the principle which should guide all states in the case of religious disturbances : " When a religion is persecuted," he says that a foreign nation of that religion may not do more than " intercede for their brethren." ^ If that is the law for each nation separately, it is the law for all in concert ; for half a dozen nations together have no more right of interference than each of them singly. The result is that, except in support of un- doubted Justice, no nation may coerce another, except it has received or is menaced with an injury from that other nation, t It may be objected that Turkey, not being a Christain nation, is outside the comity of nations or European concert, and " that the natural law may and does bind tIJhristian nations in their mutual dealings, but does not restrain their action towards unchristian nations. To this it is enough to reply that the natural law is universal and eternal. It extends over the whole world, and is not subject to change. If there is any difference between Christian nations and others, in regard to the law, it is that Christian nations are those who are more rigid in observing the Divine law, or law of nature. Isodorus says : J " Jus naturale est commune omni nationi." And St. Thomas of Aquin § : " Dicendum est quod lex naturae, quantiim ad prima principia communia, est eadem apud omnes ; " and " Lex naturalis dirigit hominem secundum qusedam prsecepta communia, in- quibus conveniunt tam perfecti quam imperfecti ; et ideo est una omnium." || By the natural law, then, there is no right of inter- ference unless it can be shown either that some Treaty * Sect. 61. t See Vattel, III. cap. iv. § 51. $ V. Etymol. cap. 4. § Sum. Th. la, 280, Q. 94, § 4. || Ibid. Q. 91, Sect. 5, ad. 3. ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. 57 has been made with the Porte, by which a right of inter- ference has been conceded ; or that persistent injustice and oppression on the part of the Porte, has been the cause of the present troubles. These two exceptions shall presently come under our attention. It is proper, here, to advert to the liberal doctrine of " absolute non-intervention ; " that is, the assertion that there can be no occasion on which it is right to interfere in the affairs of another nation. Dolus latet in gene- ralihus. This is one of those general propositions which Burke used to call " great swaggering majors." So far from this being true, it is right, on the contrary, to do all that is possible in order to prevent justice from succumb- ing to force. Half a century ago a man was stopped by two highwaymen not far from Portsmouth. He fought for his life, and nearly succeeded in overcoming the high- waymen. A sailor boasted that he had seen the struggle from behind a bush, where he had hid himself. That sailor was hung on the ground that his intervention would have been enough to prevent the murder. Man- davit unicuique de proximo suo : Every one is bound to come to the aid of his neighbour. So, then, intervention in the cause of justice is right ; intervention where no right is threatened, is always wrong. This major premiss — " The domination by men of one religion over those of another is an injustice " — would go further than most men would desire. It would bind us to take Poland from Pussia ; Alsace, Lorraine, and the Rhine provinces from Prussia ; and Ireland from England. It would compel us to assert that all legislation and ad- ministration must be strictly founded on the Gospel of Christ as the people of each locality expound it. Such a notion is at the opposite pole to the liberal principle that the State, and indeed every civil administration, 58 PO REIGN rOLICY: has nothing to do with religion, and must regard all religions with indiflference. Secondly : we have to see whether there is any right of interference by Treaty. It must be borne in mind that it would not be sufficient to show that the Treaties with the Porte do not debar us from interference. For even if they do not debar us, yet interference is forbidden by the natural law. The question before us is : Whetlier a right of interference has been expressly conceded by an existing Treaty 1 So far from this, it is a fact that the existing Treaties, also, debar us from interference in the internal affairs of Turkey. On this point I may be allowed to quote a portion of my speech in the debate of February 16, 1877:— " The right honourable member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) said that ' it is necessary in the first place to consider what the Treaties are.' He was right. But in considering them he led up to an erroneous conclusion, namely : * The Treaties, even if binding, would not debar any one of the signatory powers from interfering between the Sultan and his subjects.' 1 affirm, on the contrary, that they do debar each of the powers from interference ; and further, that they were framed and intended directly against the interference of Russia. The House will doubtless remember the * proposals' which were made by Count Nesselrode, before the Crimean war, on June 24, 1854. The third proposal was, * the consolidation of the rights of the Christian subjects of the Porte.' That was identical in scope and aim with the phrase which has since been invented, and is now in vogue : * Guarantees for the good government of the Christian subjects of the Sultan.' At the eighth sitting of the Conference of Vienna, although the order ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. 59 of the day was the * neutrahzation of the Black Sea/ the Kussian Plenipotentiaries (knowing that the other was the vital point, without which all would be worth- less to them, as they would, without it, no longer be able to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey) — the Eussian Plenipotentiaries knowing • this, pressed Prince Nesselrode's third proposal on the attention of the Con- ference. Lord John Pussell, our Plenipotentiary, how- ever, met it with a decided negative, on the ground that it * nearly affected the rights of the sovereignty of the Sultan.' On this point, as the most vital of all, the Conference broke up. The allies preferred war to the plea for increased interference which such a proposal would give to Kussia ; and the Russians risked a war against four European powers for the sake of it. Russia was beaten ; and the Congress of Paris met in February, 1856. At the second sitting, on the 28th of February, the Russian Plenipotentiary, Count Orloff, along with Baron Hiibner, endeavoured to insert in the Treaty a recital of the measures already decreed or promised by the Sultan in favour of his Christian subjects, making the execution of those measures ' an obligation on the co-signatory powers,' with the addition of a sop or blind, in the words : ' without touching the independence of the Porte.' Austria, France, England, Sardinia, and Turkey objected, and the proposal was negatived. On the 25th of March, during the fourteenth sitting of the Congress, the proposal was insidiously renewed by Baron Brunnow, in a long speech, and again, with the crafty suggestion of this stipulation : that ' it should not give to any power the right of interference.' Again this was opposed by LorS Clarendon ; and at length the French compromise — that of Count Walewski — was accepted. This compromise was formally based on the proposition that ' Kussia had GO FOREIGN POLICY: no greater interest in the condition of the Christians in Turkey than any other power of Europe ; ' and it became Article IX. of the treaty. That Article recited that the Sultan had issued a * Firman emanating spontaneously from his sovereign will/ and added that such a commu- nication * it is clearly understood cannot, in any case, give to the said powers the right to interfere, either collec- tively or separately, in the relation of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, nor in the internal adminis- tration of his empire.' That is to say, although the gracious act or promise of the Sultan is mentioned in the deed, yet it is carefully excluded from the contract which then was made. Now I ask any lawyer in this House whether a verbal promise made before the time of signing a deed, but excluded from the contract by a proviso in the deed, can in any way affect the contract itself? I believe that the contract would be equally binding whether the promise were fulfilled or not. What, then, was that contract which still remains ? The only part to which I shall allude is contained in the 7th Article : * Their Majesties engage, each on his part, to respect the independence aod. territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire ; guarantee in common the strict ob- servance of that engagement ; and will, in conseqaence, consider any act tending to its violation as a question of general interest.' That contract was rendered still more stringent by the Tripartite Treaty between England, France, and Austria, on the 15th of April : *The high contracting parties guarantee, jointly and severally, the independence and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, recorded in the Treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of March, 1856 ; any infraction of the stipulations of the said Treaty will be considered by the powers signing the present treaty as casus helW That is to say, those three ENGLAND AND THE EASTEEN QUESTION. 61 powers bound themselves to make war upon Eussia if slie should violate the independence or the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; and the refusal of any one of those powers to fulfil its obligations was not to act as a release to the others. This Treaty was not signed by Turkey, and cannot be affected by the acts of the Porte. It was made in the interest of Austria, France, and England. " The proposition which the right hon. member for Greenwich has just affirmed was that ' the Treaties do not debar any power from interfering between the Sultan and his subjects.' Yet this very proposition was answered by the right hon. gentleman himself, in his speeches at Frome and at Taunton. Speaking, at the latter place, of the Treaty of March 30th, 1856, and of ' the second Treaty, more stringent still, passed a few months after the Treaty of Paris, between Austria, France, and England,' he continued in these words : — " ' If these Treaties are in force, then w^e are bound towards Turkey, not only to the general recognition of its general independence and integrity, but likewise to that which is much more important, viz., to a several as well as a joint guarantee. In truth, it is impossible for national engagements to be stronger. ... If the Treaties are in force, you are bound hand and foot by them. . . . This is, to a great extent, the hinge of the whole subject' "The Secretary at War certainly asserted just now that those Treaties ' do not bind us to go to war.' But what did a superior authority affirm ? On the 1 4th of July, Lord Derby said, in reply to two deputations : — " ' We undertook, undoubtedly, twenty years ago (1856) to guarantee the sick man (Turkey) against murder, but we never undertook to guarantee him 62 FOUEIGN POLICY: against suicide, or sudden death. Now that, gentlemen, is, in a few words, our policy as regards this war now going on. We shall not intervene ; we shall do our utmost, if necessary, to discourage others from inter- vening ; but I don't believe that, under present circum- stances, it will be necessary.' " Now, first, the * discouragement against intervening,' which was not then * necessary,' could not refer to diplomatic action, which was then going on briskly. It must have meant a threat of war, at the least. Secondly, according to Lord Derby, those Treaties bind us to defend the Porte from murder, but not from suicide. Suicide is death by one's own act ; murder is death by the hand of another. By that ' other,' he certainly meant Eussia ; so we are bound to defend Turkey against Russia. Let us see what another authority says of the character of those Treaties. Prince Gortchakow himself, the Russian Chancellor, wrote, in despatch No. 1,053 (Nov. 7, 1876), after stating that the aim of Russia is the same as the end of England, but that they differ as to the means : " * The London Cabinet would reconcile it, with the letter of stipulations concluded in former times (1856), . . . without taking into account the twenty years which have elapsed, and the painful experience they have brought. This experience has shown on the clearest evidence that European action in Turkey has been reduced to impotency by the stipulations of 1856. . . . . The independence and integrity of Turkey must be subordinated to the guarantees demanded by humanity. . . . It is the right and duty of Europe to dictate to Turkey the conditions on which alone it can on its part consent to the maintenance of the, poli- tical status quo created by that Treaty.' ENGLAND AND THE EASTEEN QUESTION. 63 *' It appears, therefore, that even in the eyes of Kussia, the Treaties of 1856 have a binding effect, to reduce to impotency all efforts to interfere with the independence and integrity of Turkey. "The Russian Government, then, hold that, up to the end of 1876, those Treaties were in vigour and force, and therefore desire that the independence of Turkey should be subordinated to a vague chimera of the brain, called *the interests of humanity.' I think this is sufficient to disprove the proposition of the right hon. member for Greenwich, that ' the Treaties do not debar any power from interfering between the Sultan and his subjects.' " The 7th Article of the first Treaty of 1856, then, guarantees the independence and integrity of the Otto- man Empire. Can it be construed as no more than a permission to defend that independence and integrity ? No ; without any treaty, every state has a right to defend the independence and integrity of any other state which is unjustly attacked. There is no need of a solemn Treaty to give such a right. Such a Treaty would be a superfluous affirmation of a right which already exists under the natural law. It would, as has been well said,'"' be impossible to get nearer to " the depths of diplomatic vacuity.'' But if the 7th Article affirms more than a right, it must bind by a duty. It is the duty of the signatories to defend the indepen- dence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. If this be the scope of the Treaty of March, how much more can it be said of the Tripartite Treaty of April ? This binds the three nations severally and in common, to take part in such a war of defence. That this was the intention at the time, that this * Times, March 8, 1877. i 64 FOREIGN POLICY: was the duty to which the European states bound themselves, is proved by the words of Lord Palm erst on, in giving his reasons for the Crimean war."^^ " The ^ye great Powers have, in a formal document, recorded their opinion that it is for the general interest of Europe that the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire should be maintained ; and it would be easy to show that strong reasons, political and commercial, make it especially the interest of England that this integrity and independence should be maintained. . . We support Turkey for our own sake and for our own interests." In 1875, this was the policy of England. On July 31, Mr. Disraeli said :f " But why was England in a state of isolation ? She was isolated because she determined in favour of the principle of non-inter- ference." He then asserted that the other Powers had come round to that principle ; and he affirmed, more- over, that the status quo and integrity of the Turkish Empire should be maintained ; and that the territorial integrity could not be preserved, except upon the prin- ciple of the status quo. Immediately on the first sign of the rising in Herze- govina, Russia, — in order to get in the thin edge of the wedge of diplomatic intervention, and in order to give an air of importance to the rebellion, and to raise it into a European question, and to get the maxim of the necessity of interference accepted, — proposed that the Consuls of all the powers should be convened to deliberate on the affairs of Turkey. On what ground did Lord Derby first object, and then, with great reluc- tance, and, only at the direct request of the Porte, assent • Life by the Hon. E. Ashley, M.P. f Hansard, ccxxxii. p. 207. ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. fi5 to the mission of the Consuls ? Because such a mission was " scarcely compatible with the independent autho- rity of the Porte over its own territory. . . . and may not improbably open the way to further diplomatic interference in the internal affairs of the Empire."^ This was repeated, in nearly the .same words, in Lord Derby's despatch of Jan. 25, 1876, when, also at the direct request of the Porte, he accepted the Andrassy Note,t or gave, rather, only "a general support to it . . . without pledging Her Majesty's Government to the details." The Porte left it entirely to the British Government, before the Porte had even seen the An- drassy Note, to decide whether the Andrassy Note was *' altogether objectionable," J and " strongly " requested Lord Derby to agree to it if not "altogether objection- able." Yet, for twelve days after this request, and for a month after the presentation of the note. Lord Derby hesitated to give the note a "general support." He hesitated, although he stated that it merely proposed those reforms which had already been promulgated by the Sultan. So far, then, the Government adhered to the principle of integrity and independence. The Andrassy Note had "reference to the whole Empire," and proposed (1) religious liberty, which, Lord Derby said, § had already " been acknowledged to the fullest extent," by the Porte ; (2) the abolition of tax farming ; (3) the application of the revenues, derived from direct taxation, to the interests of the Provinces in which they wxre raised ; (4) a mixed commission to superintend reforms or an Extra-national Government of those Provinces ; (5) improvement in the state of the * II. of 1876. Despatch of Aug. 24, 1875. f H. of 1876. No. 73. X II. of 1876. No. 60. Sir H. Elliot. Jan. 13, 1876. § II. of 1876. No. 72. r 66 FOREIGN POLICY: rural population.* On January 22nd, 1876, Count Beust, the Austrian Ambassador, informed Lord Derby that this note "was not regarded by the Austrian Government in the light of mere good advice " ; to which Lord Derby replied that the British Government would not " do more than offer friendly advice." He still respected the independent Sovereignty of the Porte, and feared the menace against the integrity of Ottoman territory, of which menace Count Beust had been made the medium of communication. The history of this note was as follows : Austria, having (as we shall see in a subsequent chapter) at the first aided in the intrigues for stirring up the rebellion, was now afraid lest the sedition should extend to the Slav populations in her own territory. Eussia feared that Austria was veering round against her, and therefore cunningly persuaded Count Andrassy to draw up a note which should be more favourable to Turkey, than were ■the demands of the insurgents. Russia, it appears, then said that she could not propose the measures contained in the note, as she was too deeply interested ; and that Prussia could not do so, as she was too little interested ; and that it would be convenient for Austria to do so, in accordance with the maxim : in medio tutissimus ibis. This was the mise-en-scene of the Eastern melodrama : Russia whose persecutions of Poland had lasted for a century ; and Prussia with her Falk laws ; and Austria who had repudiated the Concordat, agreed to put on masks and suitable attire and act the part of Protectors of the Christians. Austria indites and presents the note. Turkey promises to carry out the note before she sees the note ; and then Russia persuades the insurgents to reject it absolutely, and swear that they will never * II. of 1876. No. 55. Dec. 30, 1875. ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. 67 lay down their arms. The result of this machination ^^•as that Austria was made unpopular with her own Slav populations, and thus suffered a considerable loss of Social power ; and she offended the Slav populations in Turkey and Russia, and lost Federative power. Wisselitzki, — a Russian, domiciled at Cetigne, who was one of the Russian agents in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and engaged in stirring up the revolt, — was the bearer, to St. Petersburg, of this refusal by the insurgents, and of the demands of the insurgents. Russia then put her- self forward as the friend of the Slavs, by embodying those demands, word for word, in the Berlin Memoran- dum (of which anon). This was an increase of Federa- tive powxr for Russia, Avhile it weakened the Social power of Austria, Prussia, and the Porte, whose Slav populations naturally turned to Russia. Lord Derby, having been so informed by Count Beust, ^YYote a despatch on Jan. 18, 1876,* saying : " that if tlie Porte accepted the Andrassy Note, it would be advantageous to the Porte, as the Powers engaged them- selves (l) not to make fresh demands, and (2) to give support to the Turkish Government, in the event of its acceptance. '^ A promise, that the Powers would "restrain Montenegro,'' was also conveyed. These promises were speedily broken. The Berlin Memoran- dum was one of the violations of it. Yet no one learns by experience. Exactly the same thing occurred a year after. For in the index of Vol. I. of 1877, we find a reference to a despatch of Lord Derby's, which runs thus: "No. 63, p. 56. Her Majesty's Government do not contemplate probability of Powers urging Porte to make fresh concessions to Prince Milan (of Servia)." The despatch itself has been cut out of the Blue-book ; ^ II. of 1876. No. 63. F 2 68 FOEEION POLI Y: doubtless because the promise was violated directly afterwards. The clerk forgot to remove the reference from the index. The mission of the Fleet to Besika Bay — the most powerful fleet that ever divided the blue waves of the Mediterranean — is the next incident, indicating the policy of the Government, which we have to contem- plate. The Blue-book* contains four telegrams of the 10th of May. Sir H. Elliot informs Lord Derby that he has telegraphed for the fleet to protect the Christians against the Turks, t A second telegram of the same day I says that this move is to " give confidence to the Christians.'' On the same day Lord Derby telegraphs § to Sir H. Elliot : " to explain more fully his reasons." On the same day || Sir Henry Elliot replies merely : " that the presence of the squadron at Besika Bay would greatly conduce to the security of the Christians." That, surely, is not " explaining more fully his reasons " ! On the same day% doubtless after the four former telegrams had gone back and forwards, and the more full explana- tion to show the necessity had been given, the permanent Secretary at the Foreign Ofiice writes a despatch to the Secretary of the Admiralty, — by far the longest communi- cation of the five, saying that " there are grounds for appre- hending serious occuri^ences at Constantinople, and that great uneasiness prevails there among all classes." The reader may think that the telegraphic operations were ex- traordinarily rapid; or he may have his suspicions aroused, and may recall to mind how that, in the House of Lords, and also on various platforms. Lord Derby was congra- tulated, by his Conservative supporters, on his " spirited foreign policy," in sending the Fleet to Besika Bay to * Vol. III. of 1876, t No. 22 1. J No. 271. § No. 228. II No. 229. 1 No. 230. ENGLAND AND THE EASTEEN QUESTION. 69 support the Turks ; and that Lord Derby owned the soft impeachment. There was commercial disturbance, there was financial uncertainty, there were war risks on insur- ance, — until the Deputations interviewed Lord Derby on July 14, and were told that the Fleet was to menace the Turks, who had dethroned a Sultan and murdered a Consul ; and to prevent a massacre of Christians, that is, to repress the Turks and aid those insurgents whom the Turks were twice bidden by Lord Derby to put down with vigour. Could it be so ? Was the principle of integ- rity and independence already forgotten ? At the end of the conference* we seem to learn a different story. Lord Salisbury presented the twice diminished undiminishable ultimatum, and demanded, in peremptory terms, the Sultan's instant adherence. The Sultan said it would be as much as his crown was worth. Lord Salisbury said he should no longer have the countenance and support of England, and that the Fleet should therefore be recalled from Besika Bay. If it was recalled in order to take away support from the Turks, it was there in order to give support to the Turks. If this be true, it is another example of the policy of maintaining the integrity and independence of the Porte. I have learned from a source of undoubted knowledge,^ • — but the name I may not reveal ; — I have learned in a manner which has produced certainty in my mind, — but to that mode I may not allude, — the true history of the wdiole matter. I prefer to give the story in the words of another authority, of very great weight and knowledge.t " The nation is demented. Some months ago the Eussian Cabinet planned the immediate surprise of Constantinople. Lord Beaconsjield foiled the attempt, and the English * Telegram of December 27. f " The Northern Question," pp. 10 and 34. 70 FOREIGN POLICY: people, misled by a parcel of dishonest agitators and fren- zied enthusiasts, rewarded him with abuse. ... By sending the fleet to Besika Bay, Russia received a severe check, and was about to resume her former quiet course of action, when the * Daily News ' started on its unpa- triotic crusade ; and England, carried away for a moment by a mistaken sympatliy, caught up the popular outcry and preached a religious war, whilst Russia, misled by the apparent discord between the opinion of the Govern- ment and that of the nation, resumed the oiFensive. . . . To the end Russia strove against fate. With her ambassador at his elbow, the unhappy monarch (the Sultan) planned the occupation of his capital by 60,000 Russian troops. The Russians were ready, and waited only the signal to sweep down on the Bosphorus. That signal was never given. The English fleet dropped anchor in Besika Bay, and in a single night the sword of Othman was wrenched from the hand of Abdul Aziz. . . . The popular party, headed by Hussein Avni, Mithad and Namyk Pashas, rose in their might and swept away at one stroke, treason and its prompter. Mahmoud fell, and with him the power and influence of General Ignatiew.'' This fact was probably alluded to by Lord Derby in a despatch of October 30.'"' He is relating the past trans- actions to Lord A. Loftus : " I thought it right to warn his Excellency (Schouvaloff) that, however strong migJit be the feeling of national indignation against Turkish cruelties, it would be superseded by a very diflerent sentiment if it were once believed by the English nation that Constantinople were threatened." The Government, then, still continued to adhere to their policy of non- .* I. of 1877, p. 560. ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. 71 intei'vention, of maintaining the independence and in- tegrity of Turkey. The Berlin memorandum was an attempt, on the part of the three Emperors, to govern Turkey without the co- operation of the Porte, or even the cognizance of the other powers of Europe. Eussia,' Germany, and Austria settled the terms between them, and despatched the note on May 13, 1876, to England, France, and Italy.* It proposed (l) an International Commission to supervise the necessary reforms in Turkey. This was a blow at the sovereignty or independence of the Porte ; and was a proposal for an extra-national government of the Ottoman Empire, — the germ of an extra-national government of Europe by a committee of foreigners. It proposed (2) the interning of Turkish soldiers within certain for- tresses, — which was in fact taking the command of the Turkish army from the Sultan, and, by denuding the country of all armed force, would have certainly led to conflicts (between the armed Mussulmans and the refugees who returned with arms in their hands), to further sedi- tions, and to intervention by the other Powers. It pro- posed (3) what were called by the vague term " guaran- tees ; " by which was evidently meant either war or annexation, or at least an occupation, for an indefinite time, by foreign troops. This was a blow at the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The Memorandum concluded in these words : — " If, with the friendly and cordial support of the great powers, and by the help of an armistice, an arrangement could be concluded on these bases, and be set in train immediately by the return of the refugees and the elec- tion of the Mixed Commission, a considerable step would be made towards pacification. If, however, the armistice * III. of 1876. No. 248. 72 FOREIGN POLICY: were to expire without the efforts of the Powers being successful in attaining the end they have in view, the three Imperial Courts are of opinion that it would become necessary to supplement their di2)lomatic action by the sanction of an agreement with a view to such efficacious measures as might be demanded in the interest of general peace, to check the evil and prevent its de- velopment." On the 15th of May, Lord Odo Eussell telegraphed from Berlin that the Italian and French Governments had agreed to support the Berlin Memorandum.* There were now five great powers on the one side, and England alone was standing out. On that day Lord Derby wrote a despatch containing an account of the conversation with the German Ambassador.t It contains the following passage : — " With regard to the 3rd Article, I said that I did not see how peace was to be preserved between the Christian and Mahometan populations if the Turkish troops were to be concentrated as proposed, or how the Turkish Go- vernment could be held responsible for the maintenance of order, if the only disciplined force in the country were thus withdrawn. TJie Ath Article showed this conclusively y since if the insurgents were to return armed to meet the Mussulmans, also retaining their arms, a collision would be inevitable. " I did not lay any stress on the 5th Article, as it might meun much or little, according to the interpretation which might be given to the duties of surveillance by the Consuls or Delegates entrusted with them. (In short, it opened a door to any amount of interference.) *' I could not, however, but remark that the intimation ♦ ni. of 1876. No. 261. t III. of 1876. No. 259. May 15. ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. "3 contained in the last 'paragraph of the Memoi^andum seemed to leave the disposal of events wholly ivith the insurgents. It almost amounted to an invitation to them to refuse to entertain any terms that were likely or pos- sible to be offered, since it gave them to understand that hy continuing the insurrection they would secure further intervejition on their behalf." Yet the Berlin Memorandum was officially termed " A Memorandum for the Pacification of the Provinces of Turkey." After four days of consideration Lord Derby explained to Sir Henry Elliot his ground of refusing to accede to the Berlin Memorandum. It was : that ever since the commencement of the troubles the British Government had deprecated any intervention in the affairs of Turkey, and that they would not consent to a policy which struck at the integrity and independence of the empire. The words are :^ — " Her Majesty's Government have, since the outbreak of the insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina, deprecated the diplomatic intervention of other Powers in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. '' They agreed, at the instance of the Porte, to take part in the Consular Commission established in August last, although they felt little confidence in any good results arising from it. They also, at the request of the Porte, took part in the concert of the Powers in regard to Count Andrassy's Note, although with certain reservations. They scarcely suppose that the Porte will again appeal to them to join the other Powers on the present occasion ; and, even if the Porte were to do so, they would not be able to comply, since they feel that they cannot con- scientiously advise the Porte to accept conditions which they cannot recommend as politic or feasible." '"* * III. of 1876. No. 278. May 19, 1876. 74 FOREIGN POLICY: On the same day he wrote a despatch to our ambas- sador at Berlin.* It contains the following passage : — " In the first place, it appears to Her Majesty's Go- vernment that they would not be justified in insisting upon the Porte consenting to an armistice without know- ing whether the military situation admitted of its being established without prejudice to the Turkish Government y and without rendering necessary the exercise of greater efforts on the renewal of the campaign, and a consequent prolongation of the struggle. Moreover, the faithful observance of the armistice by both sides would have to be secured, since the Porte could not well be called upon to suspend operations against the insurgents while the insurrection was receiving support from Servia and Montenegro, and the insurgents strengthening their posi- tion, and recruiting their forces and obtaining arms and supplies. . . . Her Majesty's Government do not feel justified in recommending it to the Porte, still less in insisting upon its acceptance. ... " The concentration of the Turkish troops in certain places would be delivering up the whole country to an- archy, particularly when the insurgents are to retain their arms. " The ' Consular supervision ' would reduce the au- thority of the Sultan to nullity ; and, without force to support it, supervision would be impossible. *' Even if there were any prospect of the Porte being willing and able to come to an arrangement with the insurgents on the basis proposed, which Her Majesty's Government scarcely believe possible, the intimation with which the Memorandum closes would render any such negotiation almost certainly abortive, for it could not he sujyposed that the insurgents would accept any terms * m. of 1876. No. 275. To Lord 0. Eussell. May 19. ENGLAND AND THE EASTEEN QUESTION. 75 of pacification from the Porte in face of the cleckration that if the insurrection continued after the armistice the Powers would intervene further." It was not until the 29th of May that Lord Derby, as we find from a despatch of that date, discovered that the proposals of " the chiefs of the insurgents," with which " M. Wisselitzki " was entrusted, " closely resem- bled those which the three Powers adopted at the Berhn Conference." ^^ So far, then, it is evident that the policy of Her Majesty's Government was to prevent interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, or (in other words) to maintain the independence and integrity of Turkey.' The next assertion of this policy, by the British Go- vernment, reveals to us, however, a deplorable infirmity of purpose. The occasion arose on an endeavour, first to terrify, and then to cajole the Porte into accepting the "mediation " of the six Powers. The mediation meant, of course, that the six Powers should constitute them- selves into an Areopagus, or rather a cabinet or com- mittee to manage the afi'airs of Turkey : — another attempt to establish extra-national government. Into such a fatal course the six Powers endeavoured first to terrify, and then to cajole the Porte. The argumentum in ter7wem consisted in a threat that we would disregard all Treaties and not defend the Porte, should Eussia make an attem})t to murder her, unless the Porte would consent to the extra-national government. The argume^itum in spem was a promise that if Turkey would accept the proposed extra-national government (which would put an end to the independence of the Porte), the Treaties (which guaranteed the independence of the Porte) should not be disregarded, and the integrity (termed the " interests ") * III. of 1876. No. 313. 76 FOEEIGN POLICY: and the independence (called the " dignity ") of the empire should be maintained. In short, the promise was that if 'the Porte would relinquish its integrity and independence it should not relinquish them. This is found in a despatch from Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby, dated Sep. 10, 1876."^^ The words are these : — *'The Porte was again, on this occasion, distinctly given to understand that if it rejects the offered media- tion, and an attack on the part of any power were to ensue, no support from Her Majesty's Government is to he expected by it. " It was informed that if, on the contrary, the media- tion is accepted, the Sultan's Government may be assured that no efforts will be wanting on the part of that of Her Majesty to procure the conclusion of a peace by which the empire should not suffer either in^ its interests or its dignity!' This vacillation was accentuated by Lord Derby, on the 20th of April, 1877, in the House of Lords. He is reported to have said : ** I stated as long ago as May last, when negotiations in connexion with the Berlin Memorandum were pending, that the Porte must not count upon receiving material support from England. I have repeated that warning on several occasions, par- ticularly at the time of the Conference, and if I have not uttered it again within the last few days, it is because a repetition of it would be superfluous, and would only weaken the effect of the previous warnings we have given." Another occasion speedily arose for enforcing the policy of non-interference. On September 26, Count Schouvaloff, the Russian Ambassador, communicated proposals to Lord Derby, that " in the event of peace ♦ I. of 1877. No. 332, ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. 77 being refused by the Porte, Bosnia should be occupied by an Austrian, and Bulgaria by a Russian force," while the combined fleets should force the passage of the Dar- danelles. This is the account which Lord Derby gave of the proposal in his summary despatch of October 30.* " I had no difficulty in submitting this proposal to my colleagues, and informed Count Schouvaloff that Her Majesty's Government had .... heen unable to concur in the measures of occupation and the entry of the united fleets into the Bosphorus which had been previously sug- gested by Prince Gortchakow. " Sir Henry Elliot was accordingly instructed, on the 5th of October, in the event of the terms of peace which had heen proposed hy the Powers being refused, to press upon the Porte as an alternative to grant an armistice of not less than a month, and to state that, on the conclusion of an armistice, it was proposed that a Con- ference should immediately follow. He was further to intimate that, in case of the refusal of an armistice, he was instructed to leave Constantinople, as it would then be evident that all further exertions on the part of Her Majesty's Government to save the Porte from ruin would have become useless.'' The following is the account of the transaction, which is given by the renowned author of "The Northern Question " : — ■ " Witness the SumorakofF mission. Austria was on the very point of falling, from sheer fright of Eussia, into the gaping trap, when our Government's counsel saved her, and if Lord Beaconsfield again become inde- pendent of hostile Radicals and too cautious colleagues, will save England also."t * I. of 1877. No. 800. Earl of Derby. Oct. 30. t " The Northern Question," p. 10. 78 FOREIGN POLICY. This, tlion, w